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TO THE
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SHERIFS,
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T is not better known to you, moſt worthy Magiſtrats
,
that Government is the preſerving Cauſe of all Societys;
than that every Society, is in a languiſhing or flouriſhing
condition, anſwerable to the particular Conſtitution
of its Government : And if the Goodneſs of the Laws in
any place be thus diſtinguiſhable by the. Happineſs of the
People, ſo the Wiſdom of the People is beſt diſcern'd by
the Laws they have made, or by which they have choſen to
be govern'd." The cruth of theſe Obſervations is no where
more conſpicuous than in the preſent State of that moſt
Antient and Famous Society you have the honor to rule, and
which reciprocally injoys che chearful influence of your Ad-
miniſtration. 'Tis ſolely to its Government that London
ows being univerſally acknowlegd the largeſt, fair-
eft, richeſt, and moſt populous City in the World; all
which glorious Actributes could have no Foundation in Hi-
ſtory or Nature, if it were not likewiſe che moſt free. 'Tis
confeſt indeed that it derives infinit Advantages above other
A
places
un
The Dedication.
places from its incomparable Situation, as being an inland
City, ſeated in the middle of a Vale no leſs delicious than
healthy, and on the Banks of a Noble River, in reſpect of
which (if we regard how many ſcore miles it is navigable,
the clearneſs and depth of its Channel, or its ſmooth and
even Courſe ) the Seine is but a Brook, and the celebrated
Tyber it ſelf a Rivụler : Yet all this could never raiſe iç to any
conſiderable pitch without the ineſtimable Bleſſings of Li-
BERTY, which has choſeni her peculiar Reſidence, and more
eminently fixe her Throne in this place. LIBERTY is the true
Spring of its prodigious Trade and Commerce with all the
known parts of the Univerſe, and is the original Planter of its
many fruitful Colonys in America, with its numberleſs Factorys
in Europe, Aſia, and Africa : hence it is that every Sea is co-
ver'd with our Ships, that the very Air is ſcarce exemted from
our Inventions, and that all the Productions of Art or Na-
ture are imported to this common Storehouſe of Mankind;
or rather as if the whole Variety of things wherwith the
Earth is ſtockt had bin principally deſign d for our profit or
delight, and no more of 'em allow'd to the reſt of Men,
than what they muſt neceſſarily uſe as our Purveyors or La
borers. As Liberty has elevated the native Citizens of Lon.
den to ſo high a degree of Riches and Politeneſs, that for
their ſtately Houſes, fine Equipages, and ſumcuous
Tables, they excede the Port of ſom Foren Princes ; rois
it náturally becom every Man's Country, and the happy
Refuge of thoſe in all Nations, who prefer the fecure injoy-
ment of Life and Property to the glittering pomp and
Navery, as well as tº the arbitrary luft and rapine of their
ſeveral Tyrants. To the ſame Cauſe is owing the Splen-
dor and Magnificence of the public Structures, as Palaces,
Temples, Halls, Colleges, Hoſpitals, Schools, Courts of
Judicáture, and a great many others of all kinds, which,
tho ſingly excel'd where the Wealth or State of any Town
cannot reach further than one Building, yet, taking them
all together, they are to be equal'd no where beſides. The
delicat Country Seats, and the large Villages crouded on
all hands around it, are manifeſt Indications how happily
the Citizen's live, and makes a Stranger apt to believe him
ſelf in the City before he approaches it by ſom miles. Nor
is it to the felicity of the preſent times that London is only in-
debted : for in áll Ages, and under all Changes, it ever
fhew'd a moſt paſſionat love of LIBERTY, which it has not
!
more
The Dedication,
111
more bravely preferv'd than wiſely manag'd, infuſing the
fame Genius into all quarters of the Land, which are in-
fluèncd from hence as the ſeveral parts of the Animal Body
are düly ſupply'd with Blood and Nouriſhment from the
Heart. Whenever therfore the execrable deſign was hacche
to inflave the Inhabitants of this Country, che firſt At-
temes were ſtill made on the Government of the City,
as there alſo the ſtrongeſt and moſt ſuccesful Efforts were
firſt us'd to reſtore Freedom: for we may remember (to
name one inſtance for all) when the late King was fled,
and every thing in confuſion, that then the chief Nobility
and Gentry reſorted to Guildhall for protection, and to con-
cért proper methods for ſertling the Nation hereafter on a
Baſis of Liberty never to be ſhaken. But whac greater
Demonſtration can the World require concerning the Ex-
cellency of our National Government, or the particular
Power and Freedom of this City, than the B A' N K of Eng-
land, which, like the Temple of Saturn among the Romais,
is eſteem'd ſo ſacred a Repoſitory, that even Foreners think
their Treaſure more ſafely lodgʻd there than with chem-
felves at home; and this not only don by the Subjects of
Abſolute. Princes, where there can be no room for any
Public Credit, but likewiſe by the Inhabitants of thoſe Com-
monwealths where alone ſuch Banks were hitherto reputed
ſecure. I am the more willing to make this Remark, be-
cauſe the Conſtitution of our Bank is both preferable to that
of all others, and coms the neareſt of
any
Government to
HARRINGTON'S Model. In this reſpect a particular Com-
mendation is due to the City which producd ſuch Perſons
to whoſe Wiſdom we ow ſo beneficial an. Eſtabliſhinent:
and therfore from my own ſmall obſervation on Men or
Things I fear not to propheſy, that, before the term of
years
be expir’dto which the Bank is now limited, the deſires of
all people will gladly concur to have it render'd perpetual.
Neither is it one of the laſt things on which you ought to va-
lue your ſelves,moſt worthy Citizens, that there is ſcarce a way
of honoring the Deity known any where, but is either already
allow'd, or may be ſafely exercis'd among you ; Toleration
being only denyd to immoral Practices, and the Opini.
ons of Men being left as free to them as their Poſſeſſions,
excepting only Popery; and ſuch other Rites and Notions as
directly tend to diſturb or diffolve Society. Beſides the poli-
tical Advantages of Union, Wealth, and numbers of Peo.
ple
A 2
iv
The Dedication.
ple, which are the certain Conſequents of this impartial Liber.
ty, 'tis alſo highly congruous to the nature of crue Religion ;
and if any thing on Earth can be imagin'd to ingage the In-
tereſt of Heaven, it muſt be ſpecially chat which procures
ir the ſincere and voluntary reſpect of Mankind. I might
here diſplay the Renown of the City for Military Glory,
and recite thoſe former valiant Archieyments which our Hir-
torians carefully record; but I ſhould never finiſh if I in-
larg’d on thoſe things which I only hint, or if I would men-
tion the extraordinary Privileges which London now injoys,
and may likely poſleſs hereafter, for which ſhe well deſerves
the name of a New Rome in the Weſt, and, like the old one,
to becom the Soverain Miſtreſs of the Univerſe.
THE Government of the City is ſo wiſely and com-
pletely contriv'd, that HARRINGTON made very few Al-
terations in it, tho in all the other parts of our National
Conſtitution he ſcarce left any thing as he found it. And
without queſtion it is a moſt excellent Model. The Lord
Mayor, as to the Solemnity of his Election, the Magnificence
of his State, or the Extent of his Authority, tho inferior to a
Roman Conſul (to whom in many reſpects he may be fitly
compar’d) yer he far outſhines the figure made by an Athé-
nian Archon, or the grandeur of any Magiſtrat preſiding
over the beſt Citys now in the World. During a vacan-
cy of the Throne he is the chief Perſon in the Nation, and
is at all times veſted with a very extraordinary Truſt, which
is the reaſon that this Dignity is not often confer'd on un-
deſerving Perſons; of which we need not go further for an
Inſtance than the Right Honorable Sir RICHARD LE-
VET, who now ſo worthily fills that eminent Poſt; into
which he was not more freely choſen by the Suffrages of
his Fellowcitizens, than he continues to diſcharge the Func-
tions of it with approv'd Moderation and Juſtice. But of
the great Caution generally us'd in the choice of Magiſtrats,
we may give a true judgment by the preſent Worſhipful She-
rifs, Sir CHARLES Duncomb and Sir JEFFERY JEFFERIES,
who are not the Creatures of perty Factions and Cabals,
nor (as in the late Reigns) illegally obtruded on the City to
ſerve a Turn for the Court, but unanimouſly elected for
choſe good Qualitys which alone ſhould be the proper Re-
commendations to Magiſtracy; chat as having the greateſt
Stakes to loſe they will be the more concern'd for ſecuring
the Property of others; ſo their willingneſs to ſerve their
Country
*
The Dedication.
Country is known not to be inferior to their Zeal for King
WILLIAM; and while they are, for the Credit of the
City, generouſly equalling the Expences of the Roman
Pretors, ſuch at the ſame time is their tender care of the Di-
ſtreſt, as if to be Overſeers of the Poor were their ſolé
and immediar Charge. As the Common Council is the
Popular Repreſentative, ſo the Court of Aldermen is the
Ariſtòcratical Senat of the City. To enter on the parti-
cular Merits of chole Names who compoſe this Illüſtri-
ous Aſſembly, as it muſt be own'd by all to be a labor
no leſs arduous than extremely nice and invidious, yet to
paſs it quite over in ſuch a manner as not to give at leaſt a
Specimen of ſo much Worth; would argue a pufillanimity
inconſiſtent with LIBERTY, and a diſreſpect to thoſe I wou'd
be always underſtood to honor. In regard therfore that
the eldeſt Alderman is the ſame at London with what the
Prince of the Senat was at Rome, I ſhall only preſume to
mention the Honorable Sir ROBERT CLAYTON as well
in that capacity, as by reaſon he univerſally paſſes for the per-
feet Pattern of a good Citizen. That this Character is noe
exaggerated will be evident to all thoſe who conſider him,
either as raiſing a plentiful Fortune by his Induſtry and Me
rit, or as diſpoſing his Eſtate with no leſs liberality and judg-
ment than he got it with honeſty and care : For as to his pub-
lic and privat Donations, and the proviſion he has made
for his Relacions or Friends, I will not ſay that he is un-
equal'd by any, but that he deſerves to be imitated by all.
Yer theſe are ſmall Commendacions if compar'd to his
ſteddy Conduct when he ſupply'd the higheſt Stations of
this Great City. The danger of defending the Liberty of the
Subject in thoſe calamitous times is not better remember:d.
than the courage with which he acted, particularly in bringing
in the Bill for excluding a Popiſh Succeſſor from the Crown,
his brave appearance on the behalf of your Charter, and
the general applauſe with which he diſcharg’d his Truſt
in all other reſpects; nor ought the Gratitude of the Peo-
ple be forgot, who on this occaſion firſt ſtild him the Father
of the City, as Cicero for the like reaſon was the firſt of all
Romans call’d the Father of his Country. That he ſtill aliſts in
the Government of London as eldeſt Alderinan, and in that
of the whole Nation as a Member of the High Court of
Parlament, is not ſo great an honor as that he deſerves it;
while the Poſterity of thoſe Familys he ſupports, and the
memory
vi
The Dedication.
memory of his other laudable Actions, will be the living
and eternal Monuments of his Virtue, when time has con-
ſum'd the moſt durable Braſs or Marble.
TO whom therfore ſhou'd I inſcribe a Book containing
the Rules of good Polity, but to a Sociéçy, ſo admirably
conſtituted, and producing ſuch Great and Excellené. Men?
That elſwhere there may be found who underſtand Go-
vernment better, diſtribute Juſtice wiſer, or love Liberty
more, I could never perſuade my ſelf to imagin: nor..can
the Perſon wiſh for a nobler Addreſs, or the Subject be
made happy in a more futable Patronage - than THE
SENAT AND PEOPLE OF LONDON.; tQ
whoſe uninterrupted increaſe of Wealth and Dignity, none
can be a heartier Welwiſher, than the greateſt admirer of their
Conſtitution, and their moſt humble Servant,
+
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JOHN TOLAND.
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Τ Η Ε
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(vii)
T HE
PREFACE.
H
od
11
T ow allowable it is for any man to write the Hiſtory of another;
without intitling himſelf to his Opinions, or becoming anſwers-
ble for his Actions, "I have expreſly treated in the Life of
JOHN Milton, ånd in the juſt defence of the ſame un-
der the Title of A MYNTOR. The Reaſons there alleg?d are Excuſe
and Authority enough for the Task I have ſince impos’d on my ſelf, which
is, to tranſmit to Poſterity the worthy Memory of JAMES HARRING-
TON, a bright Ornament to uſeful Learning, a hearty Lover of his Na-
tive Country, and a generous Benefactor to the whole World; a Perſon who
obſcurid the falſe Lufre of our Modern Politicians, and that eqaald (if
not exceded) all the Antient Legiſlators.
BUT there are ſom People more formidable for their Noiſe than Num.
ber, and for their Number more conſiderable than their power, who will
not fail with open mouths to proclaim that this is a ſeditious Attemt to
gainſt the very being of Monarchy, and that there's a pernicious deſign on
foot of Speedily introducing a Republican Form of Government into the
Britannic Iſlands; in order to which the Perfon (continue they) whom
we have for fom time diſtinguiſht as a zealous promoter of this Cauſe, has
noin publiſbť the Life and Works of HARRINGTON, who was the
greateſt Commonwealthſman in the World. This is the ſubſtance of what
theſe roaring and hoarſe Trumpeters of Detraction will ſound; for what's
likely to be ſaid by men who talk all by rote, is as eaſy to gueſs as to anſwer,
tho'tis commonly ſo ſilly as to deſerve no Animadverſion. Thoſe who in
the late Reigns were invidiouſly nicknam'd Commonwealthſmen, are by
this time ſufficiently cleard of that Imputation by their Aitions, a much
better Apology than any Words:
for they valiantly
reſcu'd our antient Go-
vernment from the devouring Jaws of Arbitrary
Power, and did not only
unanimouſly concur to fix the Imperial Crown of England on the moſt des
ſerving Head in the Univerſe, but alſo ſettld the Monarchy for the fu-
turenot as if they intended to bring it ſoon to a period, but under ſuch
wiję Regulations as are moſt likely to continue it for ever, conſisting of
feich excellent Laws as indeed ſet bounds to the Will of the King, but that
render him therby the more fafe, equally binding up his and the Subjects
hands from anjuftly ſeizing one anothers preſcribd Rights or Privi-
leges.
’T 1S confeſt, that in every Society there will be always found fom Per-
fons prepard to enterprize any thing tho never ſo flagitious) grown de-
Sper dit by their Villanies, their Profuſeneſs, their Ambition, or the more
maging madneſs of Superſtition; and this Evil is not within the compaſs of
Art or Nature to remedy
. But that a whole People, or any conſiderable
number of them, ſhou'd rebel againſt a King that well and wiſely 'admini-
ſters his Government, as it cannot be inſtand out of any Hiſtory, ſo it is
* thing in it ſelf impolſible. An infallible Expedient therfore to exclude
# Commonwealth, is for the King to be the Man of his people, and, 46-
cording
7
.
.
11
"
i't
viii
The PREFACE.
cording to his preſent Majeſty's glorious Example, to find out the Secret of
so happily uniting too ſeemingly
, incompatible things, Principality and: L
berty.
T IS ſtrange that men ſhou'd be cheated by mere Names ! yet hom frem
quently are they ſeen to admire under one denomination, what going
under another they wou'd undoubtedly. deteft ; which Obſervation made.
Tscitus lay down for a Maxim, That the ſecret of ſetting up a new
State conſiſts in retaining the Image of the old. Now if a Common-
wealth be a Government of Laws enačted for the common Good of all the
People, not without their own Conſent or Approbation ; and that they are not
aholly excluded,, as in abſolute Monarchy, which is a Government of. Men
who forcibly rule over others for their own privat Intereft : Then it is una
déniably.manifeſt that the Engliſh Government is already
, a Commonwealth,
the most free and beſt conſtituted in all the world. This was frankly:-66-
knowlegd by King James the Firſt
, who ſtil'd himſelf the Great Ser-
vant of the Commonwealth, It is the Language of our beſt Lawyers,
and allow'd by our Author, who only makes it a leſs perfect and more inequal
Form than that of his Oceana, wherin, he thinks, better proviſion is
made againſt external Violence or internal Diſeaſes. Nor dos it at all import
by what names either Perſons, or Places, or Things are calld, ſince the
Commonwealthſman finds he injoys Liberty under the ſecurity of equal
Laws, and that thereſt of the Subjects are fully ſatisfy'd they live under
à Government which is a Monarchy in effect as well as in name. There's
not a man alive that excedes my affection to a mixt Form of Government, by
the Antients counted the moſt perfect ; yet I am not. So blinded with admir-
ing the good Conſtitution of our own, but that every day I can diſcern in
it many things deficient, Som things redundant, and others that require.es
mendation or change. And of this the Supreme Legiſlative Powers are so
ſenſible, that we ſee nothing more frequent with them than the enatting,
abrogating, explaining, and altering of Laws, with regard to the very Form
of the Adminiſtration. Nevertheleſs
, I hope the King and both Houſes of
Parlament will not be counted Repúblicans ; or, if they be, I am the rear
dieſt in the world to run the ſame good or bad Fortune with them in this as
well as in all other reſpects.
BUT, what HARRINGTON was oblig'd to ſay.on the like occaſion,
muſt now produce for my ſelf. It was in the time of. ALEXANDER, the
greateſt Prince and Commander of his Age, that ARISTOTLE (with
Jcarce inferior Applauſe, and equal Fame) wrote that excellent piece of Pru-
dence in his Cloſet which is called his Politics,going upon far, other Principles
than ALEXANDER's Government which it has long putliv’d. The like
did Livy without diſturbance in the time of Augustus, Sir TAO-
À AS More in that of HENRÝ the Eighth, and MACCHIAVEL
when Italy was under Princes that afforded him not the ear. If theſe and
many
other celebrated Men wrote not only with honor and ſafety, but even
Commonwealths under Deſpotic or Tyrannical Princes, who can be ſo
notoriouſly ſtupid as to wonder that in a free Government, and under a
King that is both the reſtorer and ſupporter of the Liberty of Europe, I
ſhou'd do juſtice to an Author who far ontdos "all that went before him in
his exquiſit"knowlege of the Politics ?
THIS Liberty of writing freely, fully, and impartially, is a part of thoſe
Rights which in the last Reigns were ſo barbarouſly invaded by ſuch as
had no inclination to hear of their own enormous violations of the Laws
of God and Män; nor is it undeſerving Obſervation, that ſuch as raiſe
the
117
.
1
1
The PREFACE
1X
the loudeſt Clamor's againſt it now, are the knovi Enemys of King
WILLIAM's Title and Perſon, being ſure that the Abdicated King
JAMES can never be reinthron'd ſo long as the Preſs is open for brave
and free Spirits to diſplay the Miſchiefs of Tyranny in their true Colors,
and to ſlew the infinit Advantages of Liberty. But not to diſmiſs even
fach unreaſonable People without perfect ſatisfaction, let ’em know that I
don't recommend a Commonwealth, but write the Hiſtory of a Common-
wealth man, fairly divulging the Principles and Pretences of that Party,
and leaving every body to approve or diſlike what he pleaſes, without impo
ſing on his Judgment by the deluding Arts of Sophiftry, Eloquence, or anj
.
other ſpecious but unfair methods of perſuaſion. Men, to the beſt of their
ability, ought to be ignorant of nothing; and while they talk ſo much for
and againſt a Commonwealth, 'tis fit they ſhou'd at leaſt underſtand the
Subječt of their Diſcourſe, which is not every body's caſe. Now as HAR-
RINGTON'S Oceana is, in my Opinion, the moſt perfect Form of Popular
Government that ever was : ſo this, with his other Writings, contain the
Hiſtory, Reaſons, Nature, and Effects of all ſorts of Government, with
ſo much Learning and Perſpicuity, that nothing can be more preferably read
on ſuch occaſions.
LET not thoſe therfore, who make no oppoſition to the reprinting or
reading of Plato's Heathen Commonwealth, ridiculouſly declaim againſt
thë better and Chriſtian Model of HARRINGTON; but peruſe both of
'em with as little prejudice, paſſion, or concern, as they would a Book of Tra.
vels into the Indys for their improvement and diverſion. Yet fo contra
ry are the Tempers of many to this equitable diſpoſition, that DIONYSI-
us the Sicilian Tyrant, and ſuch Beaſts of Prey, are the worthy Examples
they wou'd recommend to the imitation of our Governors, tho, if they cou'd
be able to perſuade 'em, they wou'd ſtill miſs of their fooliſh aim: for it is
ever with all Books, as formerly with thoſe of CREMUTius CORDUS,
who was condemn'd by that Monſter TIBERIUS for Speaking honorably of
the immortal Tyrannicides Brutus and CASSIUs. Tacitus
records the laſt words of this Hiſtorian, and ſubjoins this judicious Re-
mark: The Senat, ſays he, order'd his Books to be burnt by the E-
diles; but fom Copys were conceald, and afterwards publiſhd;
whence we may take occaſion to laugh at the ſottiſhneſs of thoſe who
imagin that their preſent Power can alſo aboliſh the memory of ſuc-
ceding time: for on the contrary, Authors acquire additional Repu-
tation by their Puniſhment; nor have Foren Kings, and ſuch others
as have usd the like ſeverity, got any thing by it, except to them-
ſelves Diſgrace, and Glory to the Writers. But the Works of H AR-
RINGTON were neither Juppreſt it their firſt publication under the vi
furper, nor ever ſince call'd in by lawful Authority, but
as ineſtimable
Trea-
füves preſerv'd by all that had the happineſs to poſſeſs’em intire; ſo that
what was a precious rarity before, is now becom à Public Good, with ex-
traordinary advantages of Correctneſs, Paper, and Print. What I have
perform'd in the Hiſtory of his Life, I leave the Readers to judg for thema
ſelves; but in that and all my other ſtudys, I conſtantly aim'd as much
at leaſt at the benefit of Mankind, and eſpecially of my fellow Citizens,
as at my own particalar Entertainment or Reputation.
THE Politics, no leſs than Arms, are the proper ſtudy of a Gentle
man, the he ſhou'd confine himſelf to nothing, but carefully adorn, his
Mind and Body with all uſeful and becoming Accompliſhments; and not
imitat the ſervil drudgery of thoſe mean Spirits, who, for the ſake of
som
IH
1
1
X
The PREF A C E.
ſom oxe Science, neglect the knowlege of all other matters, and in the end
are many times neither maſters of what they profeſs, nor vers’d enough in any
thing elſe to ſpeak of it agreably or pertinently: which renders 'em un
tractable in Converſation, as in Diſpute they are opinionative and paſſio-
nat, envious of their Fame who eclipfe their littleneſs, and the livorn Ene.
mys of what they do not underſtand.
BUT Heaven be duly prais’d, Learning begins to flouriſh again
in its proper Soil among our Gentlemen, in imitation of the Roman
Patricians, who did not love to palk in Leading ſtrings, and to be guided
blindfold, 'nor lazily to abandon the care of their proper Buſineſs to the
management of Men having a diſtinct Profeſſion and Intereſt: for the
greateſt part of their beſt Authors were Perſons of Conſular Dignity, the a-
bleſt Stateſmen, and the moſt gallant Commanders. Wherfore the ampleſt
Satisfaction I can injoy of this ſort will be, to find thoſe delighted with read-
ing this Work, for whoſe ſervice it was intended by the Author; and which
with the ſtudy of other good Books, but eſpecially' a careful peruſal of the
Greec and Roman Hiſtorians, will make 'em in reality deſerve the Title
and Reſpect of Gentlemen, help 'em to make an advantageous Figure in
their own time, and perpetuat their illuſtrious Names and
ſolid Worth to
be admir'd by future Generations.
AS for my ſelf, tho no imployment or condition of Life ſhall make me
diſreliſh the laſting entertainment which Books afford; yet I have refolv'd
not to write the Life of any modern Perfon again, except that only of one
Man ſtill alive, and whom in the ordinary courſe of nature I am like to
ſurvive a long while, he being already far advanc'd in his declining time, and
I but this preſent day beginning the thirtieth year of my Age.
Canon near Banſted, Novemb. 30. 1699.
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IAMES HARRINGTON.
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( xiii )
-
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THE
LIFE
0 F
James Harrington
"J
AMES HARRINGTON (who was born in Janua.
ry 1611) was deſcended of an Antient and Noble Family
in Rutlandſhire, being Great Grandſon to Sir JAMES HAR-
RINGTON; of whom it is obferv'd by the * Hiſtorian * Wright's
of that County, that there were ſprung in his time eight Dukes, the country of
three. Marquiſſes, ſeventy Earls, twenty ſeven Viſcounts, and Rucland, p.sa.
thirty ſix Barons; of which number ſixteen were Knights of
the Garter : to confirm which Account, we ſhall annex a Copy
of the Inſcription on his Monument and that of his three Sons at
Exton, with Notes on the ſame by an uncertain hand. As for our
Author, he was the eldeſt Son of Sir SAPCOTES HARRINGTON,
and JA NE the Daughter of Sir WILLIAM SAMUEL of Upton
in Northamtonſhire. His Father had Children beſides him, WILLIAM
a Merchant in London ; ELIZABETH marry'd to Sir RALPH
ASHTO N in Lancaſhire, Baronet; ANN marry'd to ARTHUR
EVELYN Eſq. And by a ſecond Wife he had John killd at Sea
EDWARD a Captain in the Army, yet living ; FRANCES marry's
to JOHN BAGSHA W of Culworth in Northamtonſhire Eſq; and Do-
ROTHY marry'd to ÁLLAN BELLINGHAM of Levens in West-
morland Eſq. This Lady is ſtill alive, and, when ſhe underſtood my
Deſign, was pleas’d to put me in poſſeſſion of all the remaining Let-
ters, and other Manuſcript Papers of her Brother, with the Collecti-
ons and Obſervations relating to him, made by his other Siſter thë
Lady ASHTON, a Woman of very extraordinary Parts and Accom-
pliſhments. Theſe, with the Account given of him by ANTHONY
Wood in the ſecond Volum of his Athene Oxonienfes, and what I
cou'd learn from the Mouths of his ſurviving Acquaintance, are the
Materials wherof I compos'd this inſuing Hiſtory of his Life.
2. IN his very Childhood he gave ſure hopes of his future Abi-
litys
as well by his Inclination and Capacity to learn whatever
was
1
xiv
The LIFE of
was propos'd to him, as by a kind of natural gravity; whence his Pa-
rents and Maſters were wont to ſay, That he rather kept them in aw,
than needed their correction : yet when grown a Man, none could ea-
fily ſurpaſs him for quickneſs of Wit, and a moſt facetious Temper.
He was enter'd a Gentleman Commoner of Trinity College in Oxford
in the year 1629, and became a Pupil to that great Maſter of Reaſon
Dr. CHILLINGWORTH, who diſcovering the Errors, Impoftures,
and
Tyranny of the Popiſh Church (wherof he was for ſom time a Mem-
ber) attackt it with more proper and ſucceſsful Arms than all before,
or perhaps any ſince have don. After conſiderably improving his
Knowlege in the Univerſity, he was more particularly fitting himſelf
for his intended Travels, by learning ſeveral Foren Languages, when
his Father dyd, leaving him under Age. Tho the Court of Wards
was ſtill in being, yet by the Soccage Tenure of his Eſtate he was at
liberty to chuſe his own Guardian ; and accordingly pitcht upon his
Grandmother the Lady SAMUEL, a Woman eminent for her Wif-
dom and Virtue. Of her and the reſt of his Governors, he ſoon ob-
tain'd a permiſſion to ſatisfy his eager deſire of ſeeing ſom other parts
of the World, where he cou'd make ſuch Obſervations on Men and
Manners, as might beſt fit him in due time to ſerve and adorn his Na-
tive Country.
3. HIS firſt ſtep was into Holland, then the principal School of Mara
tial Diſciplin, and (what toucht him more ſenſibly) a place wonderfully
flouriſhing under the influence of their Liberty which they liad ſo Jate-
ly aſſerted, by breaking the Yoke of a ſevere Maſter, the Spaniſh Ty.
rant. And here, no doubt, it was that he begun to make Govern.
ment the Subject of his Meditations : for he was often heard to ſay,
that, before he left England, he knew no more of Monarchy, Anarchy,
Ariſtocracy, Democracy, Oligarchy, or the like, than as hard words
wherof he learnt the ſignification in his Dictionary. For ſom months he
liſted himſelf in my Lord Crave n’s Regiment and Sir ROBERT
STONE's ; during which time being much at the Hague, he had the
opportunity of further accompliſhing himſelf in two Courts, namely
thoſe of the Prince of Orange, and the Queen of Bohemia, the Daugh-
ter of our K. JAMES I. then a Fugitive in Holland, her Husband hav.
ing bin abandon'd by his father in Law, betray'd by the King of
Spain, and ſtript of all his Territorys by the Emperor. This excel-
Lent Princeſs entertain'd him with extraordinary favor and civility on
the account of his Uncle the Lord HARRINGTON, who had bin
her Governor; but particularly for the ſake of his own Merit. The
Prince Elector alſo courted him into his Service, ingag'd him to attend
him in a Journy he made to the Court of Denmark, and, after his re-
turn from travelling, committed the chief management of all his Af-
fairs in England to his care. Nor were the young Princeſſes leſs de-
lighted with his Company, his Converſation being always extremely
pleafánt, as well as learn'd and polite; to which good qualitys thold
unfortunat Ladys were far from being ſtrangers, as appears by the
Letters of the great Philoſopher CARTESIus, and by the orfier
Writers of thoſe times,
4. THO he found many Charms inviting his longer ſtay in this
place, yet none were ſtrong enough to keep him from purſuing his näin
deſign of travelling; and therfore he went next cliro Flanders into
France, where having perfected himſelf in the Language, ſeen what
deſerv'd
+
1
A M'ES HARRINGTON.
krܐ
deſerv'd his curioſity, and made ſuch Remarks on their Government
as will beſt appear in his Works, he remov'd thence into Italy. It
happen'd to be then (as it is now) the Year of Jubilee. . He always
usd to admire the great dexterity wherwith the Popiſh Clergy could
inaintain their fevere Government over fo great a part of the World,
and that Men otherwiſe reaſonable enough ſhould be inchanted out of
their Senſes, as well as clieated out of their Mony, by theſe ridiculous
Tricks of Religious Pageantry. Except the ſmall reſpect he ſhew'd
to the Miracles they daily told him were perform'd in their Churches,
le did in all other things behave himſelf very prudently and inoffen-
fively. But going on a Candlemaſs day with ſeveral other Proteſtants,
to ſee the Pope perform the Ceremony of conſecrating Wax Lights;
and perceiving that none could obtain any of thoſe Torches, except
ſuch as kiſt the Pope's To (which he expos’d to 'em for that purpoſe)
tho he had a great mind to one of the Lights, yet he would not accept
it on fo liard a condition. The reſt of his Companions were not fo
ſcrupulous,and after their return-complain'd of his ſqueamiſhneſs to the
King; who telling him he might have don it only as a reſpect to a tem-
poral Prince, he preſently reply'd, that ſince lie had the lionor to kiſs
his Majeſty's hand, he thought it beneath him to kiſs any other Prince's
foot. The King was pleasd with his anſwer, and did afterwards ad-
mit him to be one of his Privy Chamber extraordinary, in which qua-
lity he attended him in his firſt Expedition againſt the Scots.
5. HE prefer'd Venice to all other places in Italy, as lie did its Go-
vernment to all thoſe of the whole World, it being in his Opinion inn-
mutable by any external or internal Cauſes, and to finiſh only with
Mankind; of which Aſſertion you may find various proofs alleg'd in
his Works. Here he furniſh'd himſelf with a Collection of all the
valuable Books in the Italian Language, eſpecially treating of Politics,
and contracted acquaintance with every one of whom he might receive
any benefit by inſtruction or otherwiſe.
6. AFTER having thus ſeen Italy, France, the Low Countrys, Deä.
mark, and ſom parts of Germany, he return'd home into England, to
the
great joy of all his Friends and Acquaintance. But he was in a
ſpecial manner the Darling of his Relations, of whom he acknowlegd
to receive reciprocal ſatisfaction. His Brothers and Siſters were noi
pretty well grown, which made it his next care ſo to provide for each
of 'em as might render 'em independent of others, and eaſy to tliem,
ſelves. His Brother WILLIAM he bred to be a Merchant, in which
calling he became a conſiderable Man; he was a good Architect, and
was ſo much notic'd for his ingenious Contrivances, that he was re-
ceiv'd a Fellow of the Royal Society. How his other Brotllers were
diſpos'd, we mention'd in the beginning of this Diſcourſe. He took
all the care of a Parent in the education of his Siſters, and wou'd lim-
ſelf make large Diſcourſes to 'em concerning the Reverence that was
due to Almighty God; the benevolence they were oblig'd to ſhew all
mankind; how they ought to furniſh their minds with knowlege
-by reading of uſeful Books, and to ſhew the goodneſs of their diſpoli-
tion by a conſtant practice of Virtue : In a word, he taught 'em
the
true Rules of humanity and decency, always inculcating to 'em that
good Manners did not ſo much conlift in a faſhionable carriage (which
ought not to be neglected) as in becoming words and actions, an ob-
liging addreſs, and a modeft
behavior. He treated his Morher in Law
as
-
xvi
Tbe LIFE of
1
as if ſhe were his own, and made no diſtinction between her Children
and the reſt of his Brothers and Siſters; which good Example had
ſuch effects on 'em all, that no Family has bin more remarkable for
their mutual friendſhip.
7. HE was of a very liberal and compaſſionat nature, nor could he
indure to ſee a Friend want any thing he might ſpare; and when the
Relief that was neceſſary excéded the bounds of his Eſtate, he per-
fuaded his Siſters not only to contribute themſelves, but likewiſe to go
about to the reſt of their Relations to complete what was wanting.
And if at any time they alleg’d that this Bounty had bin thrown away
on ungrateful Perſons, he would anſwer with a ſmile that he ſaw they
were mercenary, and that they plainly ſold their Gifts ſince they ex-
pected ſo great a return as Gratitude.
8. HIS natural inclinations to ſtudy kept him from ſeeking after
aby publick Imployments. But in the year 1646, attending out of
curioſity the Commiſſioners appointed by Parlament to bring King
CHARLES the Firſt from Newcaſtle nearer to London, he was by
ſom of 'em nam'd to wait on his Majeſty, as a Perſon known to him
before, and ingag'd to no Party or Faction. The King approv'd the
Propoſal, yet our Author would never preſume to com into his pre-
ſence except in public, till he was particularly commanded by the
King; and that he, with THOMAS HERBERT (created a Baronet
after the Reſtoration of the Monarchy) were made Grooms of the
Bedchamber at Holmby, together with JAMES MAXWELL and
PATRICK MAULE (afterwards Earl of Penmoore in Scotland)
which two only remain’d of his old Servants in that Station.
9. HE had the good luck to grow very acceptable to the King,
who much convers’d with him about Books and Foren Countrys. In
his Siſters Papers I find it expreſt, that at the King's command lie
tranſlated into Engliſh Dr.SANDERSONS Book concerning the Obliga-
tion of Oaths: but ANTHONY Wood ſays it was the King's own
doing, and that he ſhew'd it at different times to HARRINGTON,
HEREERT, Dr. Juxo N, Dr. HAMMOND, and Dr. SHELDON
for their approbation. However that be, 'tis certain he ſervd his
Maſter with untainted fidelity, without doing any thing inconſiſtent
with the Liberty of his Country; and that he made uſe of his Intereſt
with his Friends in Parlament to have Matters accommodated for the
ſatisfaction of all Partys. During the Treaty in the Ile of Wight, lie
frequently warn’d the Divines of his acquaintance to take heed how
far they preft the King to inlift upon any thing which, however it con-
cern’d their Dignity, was no eſſential point of Religion; and that ſuch
matters driven too far wou'd infallibly ruin all the indeavors us’d for a
Peace, which Prophecy was prov'd too true by the Event. His Mas
jeſty lov’d his company, ſays ANTHONY Wood, and, finding his
to be an ingenious Man, choſe rather to converſe with him than with others
of his Chamber : They had often diſcourſes concerning Government ; but
when they happen'd to talk of a Commonwealth, the King ſeem'd not to
indure it. Here I know not which moſt to commend, the King for truft-
ing a Man of Republican Principles, or HARRINGTON for owning
his Principles while he ſerv'd a King.
10. AFTER the King was removid out of the Ile of Wight to
Hurſtcaſtle in Hampſhire, HARRINGTON was forcibly turn'd out
of ſervice, becauſe he vindicated fom of his Majeſty's Arguments
againſt
2
.
t
1
:
1
JAMES HARRINGTON.
xvii
fat
241
againſt the Parlament Commiſſioners at Newport, and thought his Con-
ceſſions not ſo unſatisfactory as did ſom others. As they were taking
thie King “to Windſor, he beg‘d admittance to the Boot of the Coach
that he might bid his Maſter farewel; which being granted, and he
preparing to kncel, the King took him by the hand, and pulld him in
to him. He was for three or four days permitted to ſtay ; but becauſe
he would not take an Oath againſt afíifting or concealing the King's
Eſcape, he was not only diſcharg'd from his Office, but alſo for ſom
time détain'd in cuſtody, till Major General IRETON obtain'd his
Liberty: He afterwards found means to ſee the King at St. James's,
and accompäny'd him on the Scaffold, where, or a little before, he
receiv’d'a
Token of his Majeſty's Affection.
*11. AFTER the King's Death lie was obſerv’d to keep much in
his Library, and more retir'd than uſually, which was by his Friends a
long time attributed to Melancholy or Diſcontent. At length when they
weary'd him with their importunitys to change this ſort of Life, lie
thought fić to ſhew ''em at the ſame time their miſtake, and a
Copy of his “ Oceana, which he was privatly writing all that
while: telling 'em withal, that ever ſince he began to examin
things feriouſly, he had principally addicted himſelf to the ſtudy
of Civil Government, as being of the higheſt importance to the
Peace and Felicity of mankind; and that he ſucceded at leaſt to his
own fatisfaction, being now 'convinc'd that no Government is of ſo
accidental. or arbitrary an Inſtitution as people are wont to imagin,
there being in Societys natural cauſes producing their neceſſary effects;
as well as in the Earth or the Air. Hence he frequently argu'd that the
Troubles of his time were not to be wholly attributed to wilfulneſs or
faction, 'neither to the miſgovernment of the Prince, nor the ſtubborneſs
of the People ; but to a change in the Balance of Property, which
ever ſince HENRY the Seventh's time was daily falling into the Scale
of the Commons from that of the King and the Lords; as in his Book
he evidently demonſtrats and explains. Not that hereby lie 'approv'd
either the Breaches which the King had made on the Laws, or excus'd
the Severity which ſom of the Subjects exercis'd on the King ; but to
fhew that as long as the Cauſes of theſe Diſorders remain’d, fo long
would the like Effects unavoidably follow: while on the one handa King
would be always indeavoring to govern according to the example of
his Predeceſſors when the beſt part of the National Property was in their
own hands, and conſequently the greateſt command of Móny and Men,
as one of a thouſand pounds a Year can entertain more Servants,or inflú-
ence more Tenants, than another that has but one hundred; out of
which he cannot allow one Valet; and on the other hand he faid, the
People would be ſure to ſtruggle for preſerving the Property wherof
they were in poſſeſſion, never failing to obtain more Privileges, and
to inlarge the Baſis of their Liberty, as often as they met with any fuc-
ceſs (which they generally did ) in quarrels of this kind. His chief
aim therfore was to find out a method of preventing ſuch Diſtempers,
or to apply the beſt Remedys when tliey happen'd to break out. But
as long as the Balance remaind in this unequal ſtate, he affirm'd that
no King whatſoever could keep himſelf eaſy, let him never ſo much in-
deavor to pleaſe his people ; and that tho a good King might manage
Affairs tolerably well during his life, yet this did not prove the Go-
vernment to be good, ſince under a leſs prudent Prince it would fall to
b
pieces
1
xviii
The LIFE of
pieces agairt, while the Orders of a well conſtituted State make wick-
ed men virtuous, and fools to act wiſely.
12. THAT Empire follows the Balance of Property, whether
lodg'd in one, in a few, or in many hands, he was the firſt that ever
made out ; and is a noble Diſcovery, wherof the Honor folely be
longs to him, as much as thoſe of the Circulation of the Blood, of
Printing, of Guns, of the Compaſs, or of Optic Glaſſes, to their ſeveral
Authors. 'Tis incredible to think what groſs and numberleſs Errors
were committed by all the Writers before him, even by the beſt of
them, for want of underſtanding this plain Truth, which is the foun-
dation of all Politics. He no ſooner diſcours'd publicly of this new
Doctrin, being a man of univerſal acquaintance, but it ingag'd all ſorts
of people to buſy themſelves about it as they were varioully affect-
ed. Som, becauſe they underſtood him, deſpis'd it, alleging it was plain
to every man's capacity, as if his higheſt merit did not conliſt in making
it ſo. Others, and thoſe in number the feweſt, diſputed with him &-
bout it, merely to be better inform’d; with which he was well pleas’d,
as reckoning a pertinent Objection of greater advantage to the diſcovery
of Truth which was his aim) than a complaiſant applauſe or ap-
probation. But a third fort, of which there never wants in all places
a numerous company, did out of pure envy ſtrive all they could to
lelſen or defame him; and one of 'em (ſince they could not find
any
precedent Writer out of whoſe Works they might make him a Plagia-
ry) did indeavor, after a very ſingular manner, to rob him of the
Glory of this Invention : for our Author having friendly lent him a
part of his Papers, he publiſh'd a ſmall piece to the ſame purpoſe, ia-
titld, A Letter from an Officer of the Army in Ireland, &c. Major
WCDMAN was then reputed the Author by ſom, and HENRY
NEVIL by others; which latter, by reaſon of this thing, and his
great intimacy with HARRINGTON, was by his detractors re-
ported to be the Author of his Works, or that at leaſt he had a
principal hand in the compoſing of them. Notwithſtanding which
provocations, ſo true was he to the Friendſhip he profef to NE-
VIL and WILDMAM, that he avoided all harſh Expreſſions or
public Cenſures on this occaſion, contering himſelf with the Juſtice
which the World was foon obligd to yield to him by reaſon of his
other Writings, where no ſuch clubbing of Brains could be reaſonably
fufpected.
13. BUT the publication of his Book met with greater difficultys
from the oppoſition of the ſeveral Partys then ſet againlt one another and
all agaibft him; but none more than ſom of thoſe who pretended to
be fora Commonwealth, which was the ſpecious name under which
they cover’d the rankeſt'Tyranny of OLIVER CROMWEL, while
HARRINGTON, like PA uŹ at Athens, indeavor'd to make
known to the People what they ignorantly ador’d. By Thewing that
Commonwealth was a Government of Laws, and not of the Sword,
he could not bur detect the violent adminiſtration of the Protector by
his Bafhaws, Intendants, or Majors General, which created him.no ſmaú
danger : while the Cavaliers on the other ſide tax?d him with Ingrati-
tude to the memory of the late King, and prefer'd the Monarchy e-
ven of a Uſurper'to the beſt order?U\Commonwealth. To theſe he an-
fwer'd, that it was enough for him to farbear publiſhing his Sentiments
during
1
JAMES
AMES HÁR ŘINGTON.
xix
the rage
during that King's life ; but the Monarchy being now quite diſſolvid,
and the Nation in a ſtate of Anarchy, or (what was worſe) groan-
ing under a horrid Uſurpation, he was not only at liberty, but even
oblig'das a good Citizen to offer a helping hand to his Countrymen,
and to thew 'em ſuch a Model of Government as he thought moſt con-
ducing to their Tranquillity, Wealth, and Power : That the Cavaliers
ought of all People to be beſt pleas'd with him, ſince if his Model
fucceded, they were ſure to injoy equal Privileges with others, and
ſo be deliver'd from their preſent Oppreſſion; for in a well conſtituted
Commonwealth there can be no diſtinction of Partys, the paſſage to
Preferment is open to Merit in all perſons, and no honeſt man can be
uneafy: but that if the Prince ſhould happen to be reſtor’d, his Doc-
trin of the Balance would be a light to fhew him what and with
whom he had to do, and fo either to mend or avoid the Miſcarriages of
his Father; ſince all that is ſaid of this doctrin may as well be accommo-
dated to a Monarchy regulated by Laws, as to a Democracy or more
popular form of a Commonwealth. He us'd to add on ſuch occaſions
another reaſon of writing this Model, which was, That if it ſhould
ever be the fate of this Nation to be, like Italy of old, overrun by any
barbarous People, or to have its Government and Records deſtroydby
of ſom mercileſs Conqueror, they might not be then left to
their own Invention in framing a new Government; for few People can
be expected to ſuccede ſo happily as the Venetians have don in ſuch a cafe.
14. IN the mean time it was known to ſom of the Courtiers, that
the Book was a printing; wherupon, after hunting it from one Preſs
to another, they ſeiz’d their Prey at laſt, and convey'd it to Whitehall
.
All the ſollicitations he could make were not able to retrieve his Papers,
till he remember'd that Oliver's favorit Daughter, the Lady
ÇLAYPOLE, acted the part of a Princeſs very naturally, obliging
all perſons with her civility, and frequently interceding for the un-
happy. To this Lady, tho an abſolute ſtranger to him, he thought
fit to make his application ; and being led into her Antichamber, he fent
in his Name, with his humble requeſt that ſhe would admit him to
her preſence. While he attended, ſom of her Women coming into
the room were follow'd by her little Daughter about three years old,
who ſtaid behind them. He entertain’d the Child ſo divertingly, that
ſhe ſuffer'd him to take her up in his arms till her Mother came;
Wherupon he ſtepping towards her, and ſetting the Child down at her
feet, fáid, Madam, 'tis well you are com at this nick of time, or I
" had certainly ſtollen this pretty little Lady : Stollen her, reply'd the
: Mother ! pray, what to do with her ? for ſhe is yet too young to be-
com your
Miſtreſs. Madam, faid he, tho her Charms aſſure her of a
more conſiderable Conqueſt, yet I muſt confeſs it is not love but re-
venge that promted me to commit this theft
. Lord, anſwer?d the Lady
again, what injury have I don you that you ſhould ſteal my Child?
None at all
, reply'd he, but that you might be induc'd to prevail with
your Father to do me juſtice, by reſtoring my Child that he has ſtele
len. But ſhe urging it was impoſſible, becauſe her Father had. Children
enough of his own; he told her at laſt it was the iſſue of his brain
which was miſrepreſented to the Protector, and taken out of the Preſs
by his order. She immediatly promisd to procure it for him, if it
contain’d nothing prejudicial to her Father's Government; and he af-
fur'd her it was only a kind of a Political Romance, fo far from any
Treaſon
ba
1
XX
A
1
The LIFE of
Treaſon againſt her Father, that he hop'd ſhe would acquaint limi
that he delign’d to dedicat ít to him, and promis’d that ſhe her: ſelf
ſhould be preſented with one of the firſt Copys. The Lady was ſo
well pleas’d with his manner of Addreſs, that he had his Book ſpeedi-
ly reſtor'd to him; and he did accordingly inſcribe it to OLIVER:
CROMWEL,
who, after the peruſal of it, ſaid, the Gentleman lad,
like to trapan him out of his Power, but that what he got by the
Sword he would not quit for a little paper Shor: adding in his uſual
cant, that he approv'd the Government of a ſingle Perſon as little as any
of 'em, but that he was forc'd to take upon him the Office of a High
Conſtable, to preſerve the Peace among the ſeveral Partys in the Na-
tion, ſince he ſaw that being left to themſelves, they would never agree
to any certain form of Government, and would only ſpend their
whole Power in defeating the Deſigns, or deſtroying the Perſons of
one another.
15. BUT nothing in the world could better diſcover CROM-
WEL's Diſſimulation than this Speech, ſince HARRINGTON
had demonſtrated in his Book, that no Commonwealth could be ſo
eaſily or perfectly eſtabliſh'd as one by a ſole Legiſlator, it being in
his power (if he were a man of good Invention himſelf, or had a
good Model propos’d to him by others) to ſet up a Government in the
whole piece at once, and in perfection; but an Aſſembly, being of
better Judgment than Invention, generally make patching work in
forming a Goveroment, and are whole Ages about that which is fel-
dom or never brought by 'em to any perfection : but is commonly ru-
in’d by the way, leaving the nobleſt Attemts under reproach, and the
Authors of 'em expos’d to the greateſt dangers while they live,
and to a certain infamy when dead. Wherfore the wiſeſt Ali
ſemblys, in mending or making a Government, have pitch'd upon a
ſole Legiſlator, whoſe Model they could rightly approve, tho not ſo
well digeft; as Muſicians can play in confort, and judg of an Air that
is laid before them, tho to invent a part of Muſic they could never a-
gree, nor ſuccede ſo happily as one Perſon. If CROMWEL therfore
had meant as he ſpoke, no man had ever ſuch an opportunity of refor-
ming what was amiſs in the old Government, or ſetting up one wholly
new, either according to the Plan of Oceana, or any other. This
would have made him indeed a Hero ſuperior in lafting fame
to SOLON, LycuRGUS, ZALEUcus, and CHARONDAS;
and render his Glory far more reſplendent, his Security greater, and his
Renoun more durable than all the Pomp of his ill acquir'd Greatneſs
could afford: wheras on the contrary he liv’d in continual fears of
thoſe he had inſlav'd, dy'd abhor'd as a monſtrous betrayer of thoſe
Libertys with which he was intruſted by his Country, and his Poſterity
not poſſeſſing a foot of what for their only fakes he was generally
thought to uſurp. But this laſt is a miſtaken Notion, for ſom of the moſt
notorious Tyrants liv'd and dy'd without any hopes of Children; which
is a good reaſon why no mortal ought to be truſted with too much
Power on that ſcore.' Lycurgus and ANDREW DORIA, who,
when it was in their power to continue Princes, choſe rather to be the
founders of their Countrys Liberty, will be celebrated for their Vir-
tue thro the courſe of all Ages, and their very Names convey the
higheſt Ideas of Godlike Generoſity; while Julius CÆSAR,
OLIVER CROMWEL; and ſuch others as at any time inflav’d
their
James HARRINGTON:
xxi
their fellow Citizens, will be for ever remember'd' with deteſtation,
and cited as the moſt execrable Examples of the vileſt Treacliery and
Ingratitude. It is only a refin’d and excellent Genius, a noble Soul
ambitious of ſolid Praiſe, a ſincere lover of Virtue and the good of
all Minkind, that is capable of executing ſo glorious an Undertaking as
making a People free. 'Tis my fix'd opinion, that if the Protetor's mind
had the leaſt tin&ture of true greatneſs, he could not be proof againſt the
incomparable Rewards propos'd by HARRINGTON in the Corollary
of his Oceana; as no Prince" truly generous, whether with or without
Heirs, is able to reſiſt their Charms, provided he has an opportunity to
advance the happineſs of his People. 'Twas this Diſpoſition that
brought the Prince of ORANGE to head us when we lately contend-
ed for our Liberty ; to this we ow thoſe ineſtimable Laws we have
obtain'd, ſince out of a grateful confidence we made him our King; and
how great things, or after what manner, - we may expect from him in
time to com, is as hard to be truly conceiv'd as worchily expreſs’d.
16. I SHALL now give' ſom account of the Book it ſelf, inti-
tid by tlie Author, The Commonwealth of Oceana, a name, by which
he deſign’d England; as being the nobleſt Iland of the Northern Ocean
But before I procede further, I muſt explain ſom other words occur-
ring in this Book, which is written after the manner of a Romance,
in imitation of Plato's Atlantic Story, and is a méthod ordinarily
follow'd by Lawgivers.
Adoxus
Convallium
Coraunus
Dicotome
Emporium
Halcionia
Halo
Hiera
Leviathan-
Marpefia
Morpheus
Mount Celia
Neuſtrians-
Olphaus Megaletor-
Panopæa-
Pantheon
Panurgus
Parthenia
Scandians
Teutons
Turbo
Verulamius
King JOHN
Hamton Court.
HENRY VIII.
RICHARD II.
London.
The Thames.
Whitehall.
Weſtminſter.
HOBB ES.
Scotland.
JAMES I.
Windſor.
Normans.
OLIVER CROMWELI
Ireland,
Weſtminſter Hall.
HENRY VII.
Queen ELIZABETH.
Danes.
Saxons,
WILLIAM the Conqueror.
Lord Chancellor BACON:
!
171 THE Book conſiſts of Preliminarys divided into two parts, and
a third Section call'd the Council of Legiſlators; then follows the Model
of the Commonwealth, or the body of the Book ; and laſtly coms the
Corollary or Concluſion. The Preliminary Diſcourſes contain: the
Principles
, Generation, and Effects of all Governments, whether Mo-
narchical, Ariſtocratical, or Popular, and their feveral Corruptions; as
Tyranný
xxii
The LIFE of
}
Tyranny, Oligarchy, and Anarchy, with all the good or bad mixtures
that naturally reſult from them. But the firſt part dos in a more par-
ticular manner treat of agtient Prudence, or that genius of Government
which moſt prevail'd in the world till the time of Julius CESAR
None can conſult a more certain Oracle that would conceive the nature
of Foren or Domeſtic Empire ; the Balance of Land or Mony ; Arms
or Contracts; Magiſtracy and Judicatures; Agrarian Laws; Elections
by the Ballot; Rotation of Officers, with a great many ſuch heads, e-
ſpecially the inconveniences and preeminences of each kind of Govern-
ment, or the true compariſon of 'em all together. Theſe Subjects
have bin generally treated diſtinąly, and every one of them ſeems to
require a Volum; yet I am of opinion that in this ſhort Diſcourſe there
is a more full and clearer account of them, than can be eaſily found
elſwhere: at leaſt I muſt own to have receiv'd greater ſatisfaction here
than in all my reading before, and the ſame thing has bin frankly
own'd to me by others.
18. THE ſecond part of the Preliminarys treats of modern Prue
dence, or that genius of Government which has moſt obtain'd in the
world ſince the expiration of the Roman Liberty, particularly the Go-
thic Conftitution, beginning with the inundation of the barbarous Nor-
thern Națions over the Roman Empire. In this Diſcourſe there is a ve-
ry clear account of the Engliſh Government under the Romans, Saxons,
Danes, and Normans,till the foundations of it were cunningly undermind
by HENRY VII. terribly ſhaken by HENRY VIII. and utterly ruin'd
under CHARLESI. Here he muſt read who in a little compaſs would
completely underſtand the antient Feuds and Tenures, the original and
degrees of our Nobility, with the inferior Orders of the reſt of the Peo-
ple: under the Saxons, what was meant by Ealdorman, or Earls; King's
Thane; middle Thane or Vavaſors; their Shiremoots, Sherifs, and
Viſcounts; their Halymoots, Weidenagemoots, and' ſuch others.
Here likewiſe one may learn to underſtand the Baronage of the Nor.
mans, as the Barons by their Poſſeſſions, by Writ, or by Letters Pa-
tent; with many other particulars which give an inſight into the ſprings
and management of the Barons Wars, ſo frequent and famous in our
Annals. The reſt of this Diſcourſe is spent in ſhewing the natural
Cauſes of the diffolution of the Norman Monarchy under CHARLES
the Firſt, and the generation of the Commonwealth, or rather the
Anarchy that ſucceded.
19.
NEXT follows the Council of Legiſlators : for HARRING-
TON being about to give the moſt perfect Model of Government,
he made himſelf maſter of all the Antient and Modern Politicians, that
he might as well imițat whatever was excellent or practicable in
them, as his care was to avoid all things which were impracticable or
inconvenient. Theſe were the juſteſt meaſures that could poſlibly be
taken by any body, whether he deſign’d to be rightly informd, and
fufficiently furniſh'd with the beſt materials; or whether he would
have his Model meet with an eaſy reception: for ſince his own Senti-
ments (tho never ſo true) were ſure to be rejected as privat Specu-
lations or impra&icable Chimeras, this was the readieſt way to make
Pem paſs currently, as both authoriz’d by the wiſeſt
men in all Nati-
ons, and as what in all times and places had bin practis’d with ſucceſs.
To this end therfore he introduces, under feign'd names, nine Legif-
lators, who perfectly understood the ſeveral Governments they were
appointed
*
JAMES HARRINGTON. xx
of the Roman State: nor in this reſpect dos the Commonwealth of
appointed to repreſent. - The Province of the firſt was the Commons .
wealth of Iſrael; that af the ſecond, Athens of the third, Sparta;
of the fourth, Carthage; of the fifth, the Acheans, Ætolians, and Ly-
cians; of the ſixth, Rome; of the ſeventh, Venice; of the eighth ;
Switzerland; and of the ninth, Holland, Out of the Excellencys of all
theſe, fupply'd with the Fruits of his own invention, le fram'd the
Model of his Oceant; and indeed he hews himſelf in that work fo
throly vers’d in their ſeveral Hiſtorys and Canſtitutions, that to any
man who would rightly underſtand them, I could not eaſily recom-
mend a more proper Teacher : for here they are diſſected and ſaid openi
to all Capacitys, their Perfections applauded, their Inconveniencys ex-
pos’d, and parallels frequently made between 'em no leſs entertaining
chan uſeful. Nor are the Antient and Modern Eaſtern or European
Monarchys forgot, but exhibited with all their Advantages and Cor-
ruptions, without the leaſt diſſimulation or partiality.
20. A $ for the Madel, I ſhall ſay nothing of it in particular, as
well becauſe I would
not foreſtal the pleaſure of the Reader, as by rea-
ſon an Abridgment of it is once or twice made by himſelf, and inſerted
among his Works. The method he obſerves is to lay down his Orders
or Laws in ſo many poſitive Propoſitions, to each of which he fubjoins
an explanatory Diſcourſe; and if there be occaſion, adds a Speech ſup.
pos’d to be deliver'd by the Lord ARCHON, or ſom of the Legiſla-
tors. Theſe Speeches are extraordinary fine, contain a world of good
Learning and Obſervation, and are perpetual Commentarys on his
Laws. In the Corollary, which is the concluſion of the whole work,
he ſhews how the laſt hand was put to his Commonwealth ; which we
muſt not imagin to treat only of the Form of the Senat and Aſſemblys
of the People, or the manner of waging War and governing in Peace.
It contains beſides, the Diſciplin of a National Religion, and the
ſecurity of a Liberty of Conſcience; a Form of Government for
Scotland, for Ireland, and the other Provinces of the Commonwealth ;
Governments for London and Weſtminſter, proportionably to which the
other Corporations of the Nation are to be modeld; Directions for
the incouraging of Trade; Laws for regulating Academys; and moſt
excellent Rules for the Education of our Youth, as well to the Wars
or tle Sea, to Manufactures or Husbandry, as to Law, Phyſic, or Di-
vinity, and chiefly to the breeding and true figure of accompliſh'd
Gentlemen : There are admirable Orders for reforming the Stage; the
fiumber, choice, and buſineſs of the Officers of State and the Reve-
oue, with all ſorts of Officers, and an.exact account both of their Sa-
larys, and the ordinary yearly charge of tlie whole:Commonwealth,
which for two rarely conſiſtent things, the grandeur of its State, and
the frugal management of its Revenues, excedes all the Governments
that
ever were. I ought not to omit telling here, that this Model gives
a fül:anſwer to thoſe who imagin that there can be no Diſtinctions or
Degrees, neither Nobility nor Gentry in a Democracy, being led into
This miſtake, becauſe they ignorantly think all Commonwealths to be
conſtituted alike; when, if they were but never fo ditcle vers'd in Hila
tory, they might know that no Order of men now in she world can
com near the Figure that was made by the Nobleineo and Gentlemen
Oceana com any thing behind them; for, as HARRINGTON fays
verg truly, an Army may as well conſiſt of Soldiers withion Officers, or of
Officer's
E'
****
+
xxiv
Tbe LIFE of
+
Officers without Soldiers, as a Commonwealth (eſpecially ſuch a one as is can
pable of Greatneſs) conſiſt of a People without a Gentry, or of a Gentry
without a People. So much may fuffice for underſtanding the ſcope
of this Book : I ſhall only add, that none ought to be offended with
a few od terms in it, ſuch as the Prime Magnitude, the Pillar of Ni-
lus, the Galaxy, and the Tropic of Magiſtrats, ſince the Author ex-
plains wbất he means by 'em, and that any other may call 'em by
what more ſignificative names he pleaſes; for the things themſelves
are abſolutely neceſſary.
21. NO ſooner did this Treatiſe appear in public, but it was gree-
dily bought up, and becom the ſubject of all mens diſcourſe. The
firit that made exceptions to it was Dr. HENRY FERNE, afterwards
Biſhop of Cheſter. The Lady ASHTON preſented him with one of
the Books, and deſir'd his opinion of it, which he quickly ſent in ſuch
a manner as ſhew'd he did not approve of the Doctrin, tho he treated
the Perſon and his Learning with due reſpect. To this Letter a
reply was made, and ſom Querys fent along with it by HAR-
RINGTON, to every one of which a diſtinct Anſwer was return'd
by the Doctor ; which being again confuted by HARRINGTON, he
publiſh'd the whole in the year 1656, under the title of Pian Piano, or
an Intercourſe between H. FERNE Doctor in Divinity, and JAMES
HARRINGTON Eſq; upon occaſion of the Do&tor's Cenſure of the
Commonwealth of Oceana. 'Tis a Treatiſe of little importance, and
contains nothing but what he has much better diſcours’d in his an-
ſwers to other Antagoniſts, which is the reaſon that I give the Reader
no more trouble about it.
22. THE next that wrote againſt Oceana was MATTHEW
WRE N, eldeſt Son to the Biſhop of Ely. His Book was intitld
Conſiderations, and reſtrain'd only to the firſt part of the Preliminarys.
To this our Author publiſh'd an anſwer in the firſt Book of his Preroga-
tive of Popular Government, where he inlarges, explains, and vindi-
cats his Aſſertions. How inequal this Combat was, and after what
manner be treated his Adverſary, I leave the Reader to judg; only
minding him that as WREN was one of the Virtuoſi who mer at
Dr. WILKINS's (the Seminary of the now Royal Society)
HARRINGTON jokingly faid, That they had an excellent faculty of
magnifying a Louſe, and diminiſhing a Commonwealth. But the Subjects
he handles on this occaſion are very curious, and reduc'd co the twelve
following Queſtions.
(1.) WHETHER Prudence (or the Politics) be well diſtin-
guiſh'd into Antient and Modern?
(2.) WHETHER a Commonwealth be rightly defin’d to be a
Government of Laws and not of men; and Monarchy to be a Govern-
ment of fom men or a few men, and not of Laws?
(3.) WHETHER the Balance of Dominion in Land be the na-
tural cauſe of Empire?
(4.) WHETHER the Balance of Empire be well divided into
National and Provincial ? and whether theſe two, or any Nations that
arc of a diſtinct Balance, coming to depend on one and the fame head,
ſuch a mixture creates a new Balance?
(5.) WHETHER there be any common Right or Intereſt of
Mankind diſtinct from the Intereſt of the parts taken ſeverally ? and
how by the orders of a Commonwealth this may beſt be diſtinguiſh'd
from privat Intereſt?
(6.) WHE-
JAMES HARRINGTON.
XXV
(6.) WHETHER the Senatuſconſulta, or Decrees of the Roman
Senat, had the power of Laws?
(7.) WHETHER the Ten Commandments, propos'd by God
or Moses, were vored and paſt into Laws by the People of Iſrael?
(8.) WHETHER a Commonwealth,coming up to the perfection
of the Kind, coms not up to the perfection of Government, and has no
faw in it? that is, whether the beſt Commonwealth be not the beſt
Government ?
(9.) WHETHER Monarchy, coming up to the perfection of
the Kind, coms not ſhort of the perfection of Government, and has
not ſom flaw in it? that is, whether the beſt Monarchy be not the
worſt Government? Under this head are alſo explain’d the Balance of
France, the Original of a Landed Clergy, Arms, and their ſeveral
kinds.
(10.) WHETHER any Commonwealth, that was not firſt bro-
ken or divided by it felf, was ever conquer'd by any Monarch? where
he ſhews that none ever were, and that the greateſt Monarchys have
bin broken by very ſmall Commonwealths.
(11.) WHETHER there be not an Agrarian, or fom Law or
Laws to ſupply the defects of it, in every Commonwealth? Whether
the Agrarian, as it is ſtated in Oceana, be not equal and ſatisfactory to
all Intereſts or Partys?
(12.) WHETHER a Rotation, or Courſes and Turns, be neceſſa-
ry to a welorder'd Commonwealth ? In which is contain'd the Parema
bole or Courſes of Iſrael before the Captivity, together with an Epitome
of the Commonwealth of Athens, as alſo another of the Common-
wealth of Venice.
23. THE ſecond Book of the Prerogative of Popular Government
chiefly concerns Ordination in the Chriſtian Church, and the Orders of
the Commonwealth of Iſrael, againſt the opinions of Dr. HAMMOND,
Dr. SEAMA N, and the Authors they follow. His Diſpute with theſe
learned Perſons (the one of the Epiſcopal, and the other of the Presby-
terian Communion) is comprehended in five Chapters.
(1.) THE firſt, explaining the words Chirotonia and Chirotheſia,
paraphraſtically relates the Story of the Perambulation made by the
Apoſtles Paul and BARNABAS thro the Citys of Lycaonia, Pilie
dia, &c.
(2.) THE ſecond ſhews that thoſe Citys, or moſt of 'em were at
the time of this Perambulation under Popular Government; in which
is alſo contain'd the whole Adminiſtration of a Roman Province.
(3.) THE third ſhews the deduction of the Chirotonia, or holding
up of hands, from Popular Government, and that the original of Or-
dination is from this cuſtom : in which is alſo contain'd the Inſtitution
of the Sanhedrim or Senat of Iſrael by Moses, and of that of Rome
by ROMULUS.
(43) THE fourth ſhews the deduction of the Chirotheſia, or the
laying on of hands, from Monarchical or Ariſtocratical Government,
and to the ſecond way of Ordination procedes from this cuſtom: here
is alſo declar'd how the Commonwealth of the Jews ſtood after the
Captivity:
(5.) THE fifth debates whether the Chirotonia usd in the Citys
mention was (as is pretended by Dr. HAMMOND, Dr. SEAMAN,
ånd the Authors they follow.) the ſame with the Chirotheſia, or a far
different
C
xxvi
The LIFE of
Ву
1
different thing. In which are contain’d the divers kinds of Churchi
Government introduc'd and exercis’d in the age of the Apoſtles.
theſe beads we may perceive that a great deal of uſeful Learning is con-
tain'd in this Book; and queſtionleſs he makes thoſe Subjects more plain
and intelligible than any Writer I ever yet conſulted.
24. AĞAINST Oceann chiefly did RICHARD BAXTER
write his Holy Commonwealth, of which our Author made ſo flight
that he vouchſaf'd no other anſwer to it but half a ſheet of Cant and
Ridicule. It dos not appear that he rail'd at all the Miniſter's as a parcel
of Fools and Knaves. But the reſt of B AXTER's complaint ſeems bet-
ter grounded, as that HARRINGTON maintain'd neither he
nor any Miniſters underſtood at all what Polity was, but prated againſt they
knew not what, &c. This made him publiſh his Holy Commonwealth in
anſwer to HARRINGTON'S Heatheniſh Commonwealth; in which, adds
he, I plead the Cauſe of Monarchy as better than Democracy or Ariſtocra-
cy; an odd way of modelling a Commonwealth. And yet the Roya-
liſts were ſo far from thinking his Book for their ſervice, that in the
year 1683 it was by a Decree of the Univerſity of Oxford condemn’d
to be publicly burnt, which Sentence was accordingly executed upon
it, in company with ſom of the Books of HOBBES, MILTON, and
others; wheras no cenſure paſt on HARRINGTON's Oceana, or the
reſt of his Works. As for Divines meddling with Politics, he has in the
former part of the Preliminarys to Oceana deliver'd his Opinion, That
there is ſomthing firſt in the making of a Commonwealth, then in the go-
verning of it, and laſt of all in the leading of its Armys, which (tho there
be great Divines, great Lawyers, great Men in all Profeſſions) ſeems to be
peculiar only to the genius of a Gentleman : for it is plain in the univerſal
ſeries of ſtory, that if any man founded a Commonwealth, he was firſt a
Gentleman; the truth of which Aſſertion he proves from Moses
downwards.
25. BEING much importund from all hands to publiſh an
Abridgment of his Oceana, he conſented at length; and ſo, in the year
1659, was printed his Art of Lawgiving (or of Legiſlation) in three
Books. The firſt, which treats of the Foundations and Superſtructures
all kinds of Government, is an abſtract of his Preliminarys to the Oceana:
and the third Book, ſhewing a Model of Popular Government fitted to the
preſent State or Balance of this Nation, is an exact Epitome of his Oceana,
with ſhort Diſcourſes explaining the Propoſitions. By the way, the
Pamphlet called the Rota is nothing elſe but theſe Propoſitions without
the Diſcourſes, and therfore to avoid a needleſs repetition not printed
among his Works. The ſecond Book between theſe two, is a full Ac-
count of the Commonwealth of Iſrael, with all the variations it underwent.
Without this Book it is plainly impoſſible to underſtand that admirable
Government concerning which no Author wrote common ſenſe before
HARRINGTON, who was perſuaded to complete this Treatiſe by
ſuch as obſervd his judicious Remarks on the ſame Subject in his other
Writings. To the Art of Lawgiving is annex'd a ſmall Differtation, or a
Word concerning a Houſe of Peers, which to abridg were to tranſcribe.
26. IN the fame year, 1659, WREN coms out with another
Book calld Monarchy afferted, in vindication of his Conſiderations. If
he could not preſs hard on our Author's Reaſonings, he was reſolv’d
to overbear him with impertinence and calumny, treating him neither
with the reſpect due to a Gentleman, nor the fair dealing becoming an
inge-
, **
James HARRINGTON.
Xxvi
ingenạous Adverfary, but on the contrary with the utmoſt thicanery
and Inſolence. The leaſt thing to be admir'd is, that he would needs
make the Univerſity a Party againſt him, and bring the heavy weight
of the Church's diſpleaſure on his ſholders: for as corrupt Miniſters
ſtile themſelves the Government, by which Artifice they oblige better
men to ſuppreſs their Complaints, for fear of having their Loyalty
fufpected ; fo every ignorant Pedant that affronts a Gentleman, is pré-
fently a Learned Univerſity; or if he is but in Deacons Orders, he's
forthwith transform'd into the Catholic Church, and it becoms Sacri-
lege to touch him. But as great Bodys no leſs than privat Perſons,
grow wiſer by Experience, and coin to a clearer diſcernment of their
true Intereſt: ſo I believe that neither the Church nor Univerſitys will
be now ſo ready to eſpouſe the Quarrels of thoſe, who, under pre-
tence of ſerving them, ingage in Diſputes they no ways underſtand,
wherby all the diſcredit redounds to their Patrons, themſelves being
too mean to ſuffer any diminution of Honor. HARRINGTON was
not likewiſe leſs blamable in being provok'd to ſuch a degree by this
pitiful Libel
, as made him forget his natural character of gravity
and greatneſs of mind. Were not the beſt of men ſubject to their pe-
Culiår weakneſſes, he had never written ſuch a Farce as his Politicafier,
For Comical Diſcourſe in anſwer ta Mr. WREN. It relates little or no-
thing to the Argument, which was not ſo much amiſs, conſidering the
ignorance of his Antagoniſt: but it is of ſo very ſmall merit, that I
would not inſert it among his other Works, as a piece noc capable to
inſtruct or pleaſe any man now alive. I have not omitted his Anſwer
to Dr. STUBB e concerning a ſelect Senat, as being ſo little worth ; but
as being only a repetition of what he has much better and more am-
ply treated in fom of his other pieces. Now we muſt note that upon
the firſt appearance of his Oceana this STUBBE was ſo great an admi-
rer of him, that, in his Preface to the Good Old Cauſe, he ſays he would
inlarge in his praiſe, did he not think himſelf too inconſiderable to add any
thing to thoſe Applauſes which the underſtanding part of the World muſt be-
ſtow upon hini, and which, the Eloquence ſhould turn-Panegyriſt; he ngt
only merits but tranſcends..
27. OTHER Treatiſes of his, which are omitted for the ſame
reaſon, are, i. A Diſcourſe upon this Saying: The Spirit of the Nation
is not yet to be truſted with Liberty, left it introduce Monarchy, or invade
the Liberty of Conſcience ; which Propoſition le diſapprov'd. 2. A Dif-
courſe ſheiving that the Spirit of Parlaments, with a Council in the inter.
vals, is not to be truſted for a Settlement, left it introduce Monarchy, and
Perſécution for Conſcience. 3. A Parallel of the ſpirit of the People with
the ſpirit of Mr. ROGERS, with an Appeal to the Reader whether the
Spirit of the People, or the ſpirit of, men like Mr. Rogers be the fitter
to be truſted with the Government. This ROGERS was an Anabap-
tiſt, a ſeditjouş Enthuſiaſt, or fifthmonarchy man. 4. Pour enclouer le
canon, or thë riailing of the Enemys
, Artillery. 5. The ſtambling block of
Diſobedience añd Rebellion, cunningly imputed by Peter HEYLIN BO
CALVIN, remov’d in á Letter to the ſaid P. H. who wrote a long
Anſwer to it in the third part of his Letter combat. 'Tis obvious by
the bare peruſal of the Titles, that theſe are but Pamphlets ſolely cal-
culated for that time; and it certainly argues a mighty want of judg.
ment in thoſe Editor's who make no diſtinction between the elaborat
Works which an Author intended for univerſal benefits and his more
Night
C 2
!
i
xxviii
The LIFE of
flight or temporary Compoſitions, which were written to ſerve a pre-
ſent turn, and becom afterwards not only uſeleſs, but many times not
intelligible. Of this nature are the Pieces I now mention'd: all their
good things are much better treated in his other Books, and the perſo.
nal Reflections are (as I ſaid before) neither inſtructive nor divert-
ing. On this occaſion I muſt ſignify, that tho the Hiſtory I wrote of
MILTON's Life be prefix'd to his Works, yet I had no hand in the
Edition of thoſe Volumes; or otherwiſe his Logic, his Grammar, and
the like, had not increas'd the bulk or price of his other uſeful Pieces.
Our Author tranſlated into Engliſh Verſe fom of Virgil's Eclogs, and
about fix Books of his Æneids; which, with his Epigrams, and other
Poetical Conceits, are neither worthy of him nor the light.
28. SOM other ſmall Books he wrote which are more deſerv-
ing, and therfore tranſmitted to Poſterity with his greater Works ;
namely, 1. Valerius and Publicola, or, the true form of a Popular
Commonwealth, a Dialog. 2. Political Aphoriſms, in number 1 20.
3. Seven Models of a Commonwealth, Antient and Modern; or brief Di-
rections ſhewing how a fit and perfect Model of Popular Government may
be made, found, or underſtood. Theſe are all the Commonwealths in
the World for their kinds, tho not for their number. , 4. The Ways
and means wherby an equal and lafling, Commonwealth may be ſuddenly in-
troduc’d, and perfectly founded, with the free conſent and aétual confir-
mation of the whole People of England. 5. There is added, The Detj.
tion of divers well affected Perſons, drawn up by HARRINGTON,
and containing the Abſtract of his Oceana ; but preſented to the
Houſe of Commons by HENRY Nevil the 6th of July 1659,
to which a ſatisfactory anſwer was return’d, but nothing don. 6. Be.
ſides all theſe, finding his Doctrin of Elections by Balloting not ſo
well underſtood as could be deſir'd, he publish'd on one ſide of a large
Sheet of Paper, his uſe and manner of the Ballot, with a copper Cut in
the middle repreſenting ſuch an Election in the great Aſſembly of the
Commonwealth: but 'tis now inſerted in its proper place in the body
of Oceana. Moſt of theſe conca in Abridgments of his Model, adap-
ted to the various Circumſtances and Occurrences of thoſe times; but
containing likewiſe ſom Materials peculiar to themſelves, and for that
reaſon thought fit to be printed a ſecond time. He did not write the
Grounds and Reaſons of Monarchy exemplify'd in the Scotiſh Line
(which Book is prefix'd to his Works) but one JOHN HALL, born
in the City of Durham, educated at Cambridg, and a Student of Grays
Inn. Being commanded by the Council of State (of whom he had a
yearly Penſion) to attend 'OLIVER into Scotland, it occafion'd him
to publiſh that Piece. He wrote ſeveral other things in Proſe and
Verſe, and dy'd before he was full thirty, lamented as a Prodigy of
29. HARRINGTON having thus exhauſted all that could be
written on this Subject, he likewiſe indeavor’d to promote his Cauſe by
public diſcourſes at a nightly meeting of ſeveral curious Gentlemen in
the New Palace Yard at Weſtminſter. This Club was call'd the Rota, of
which I ſhall give a ſhort account from ANTHONY Wood, who
mortally hated all Republicans, and was as much prejudic'd in favor of
the Royaliſts, tho, to his honor be it ſpoken, he never deny'd juſtice to
either ſide. « Their Diſcourſes about Government, ſays he, and of or-
dering a Commonwealth, were the moſt ingenious and ſmart that
his Age.
*
ever
JAMES HARRINGTON.
XXix
CC
ever were heard ; for the Arguments in the Parlament houſe were
“ but flat to thoſe. This Gang had a balloting Box, and balloted how
things ſhould be carry'd by way of Eſſay; which not being us’d or
“ known in England before on this account, the room was every even-
ing very full. Beſides our Author and H. Nevil, who were the
prime men of this Club, were CYRIAC SKINNER, Major
“ WILDMAN, Major VENNER, CHARLES WOLSLÉ Y after-
“ wards knighted, Roger COKE the Author of the Detection of
“ the four laſt Roigns, WILLIAM Poultney afterwards made
a Knight, John AUBRY, MAXIMILIAN Petty, and Dr.
“ PETTY who was afterwards Sir WILLIAM, Sir John Hos-
KYNS, and a great many others, fom wherofare ſtill living.
“ The Doctrin was very taking, and the more becauſe, as to human
« foreſight, there was no poſſibility of the King's return. The great-
« eſt of the Parlamentmen hated this Rotation and Balloting, as being
“ againſt their Power. Eight or ten were for it, of which number
“ H. NEVIL was one, who propos'd it to the Houſe, and made it
out to the Members, that, except they imbrac'd that ſort of Govern-
ment, they muſt be ruin'd. The Model of it was, that the third
part of the Senat or Houſe ſhould rote out by Ballot every year
(not capable of being ele{ted again for three years to com) ſo that
every ninth year the Senat would be wholly alter'd. No Magi-
“ ſtrat was to continue above three years, and all to be choſen by the
“ Ballot, than which nothing could be invented more fair and impar-
“ tial, as'twas then thought, tho oppos'd by many for ſeveral rea-
« fons. This Club of Commonwealthſmen laſted till about the 21ſt
" of Feb. 1659, at which time the ſecluded Members being reſtor'd
by General GEORGE MONK, all their Models vaniſh'd
30. WHEN the whole matter is duly conſider'd, it's impoſſible a
Commonwealth ſhould have ſucceded in England at that time, ſince
CROMWEL, who alone had the Power, yet wanted the Will to
ſet it up. They were comparatively but very few that entertain'd
ſuch a Deſign from the beginning of the Troubles; and, as it uſually
happens, a great part of theſe did afterwards deſert their Principles,
being feduc'd by the Honors and Preferments wherby they were re-
taind in the Service of the reigning Powers. The body of the Peo-
ple were either exaſperated on a religious account, only to obtain that
Liberty which they afterwards mutually deny'd each other, or by the
change of the Balance they grew weary of Monarchy, and did not
know it. The Republicans indeed
made an advantage of their Dif-
contents to deſtroy the eſtabliſh'd Government, without acquainting
'em with their real Deſigns; and when this was effectually don, the
People (who had no ſetrld Form in their view, and thought all things
ſafe by the Victory they had gain'd over the King and the Church)
fell in with what was firſt offer'd by thoſe in whom they confided, and
would as well have accepted a better Government if they had bin ma-
nag'd by men of honeſt and public Deſigns. But the Multitude can
feel
, tho they cannot fee. Inſtead of injoying their deſir'd Liberty,
they foon found themſelves under a moſt heavy Yoke, which they na-
turally labor'd to ſhake off; and yet in all the changes then made, two
things were remarkable, that every one of 'em would be ftild a
Commonwealth, and yet none of 'em would mend or take warning
by the Errors of thoſe that preceded, but ſtill continu'd to abuſe the
Nation,
1
XXX
The LIF E of
web
Națion, and unnaturally to ingroſs the Government into a few lands.
The People being all this while told they were under a Common
wealth, and not being able to ſee thro the deceit, begun to think them
ſelves miſtaken in the choice they had made, ſince their ſufferings under
theſe pretended Commonwealths were infinitly greater than Whát in
ducd'em to diſſolve the former Monarchy. In this condition the leve-
ral Partys might (as HARRINGTON us’d to ſay) be fitly compard
to a company of Puppydogs in a bag, where finding themſelves úneafy
for want of room, every one of 'em bites the tail or foot of the next,
fuppoſing that to be the cauſe of his miſery. By this means whatevet
was ſaid againſt a Commonwealth obtain'd-ready belief, as, that it is
the moſt feditious fort of Government, and that inftead of one Ty,
rant there are a great many who inrich themſelves by laying intolera-
ble Taxes on others. All this and much more the People in England
then experienc’d, and therfore deteſting their new Commonwealth,
they reſtor'd the old Monarchy. But to do all Governments the Ju-
ſtice due from an impartial Hiſtorian, they never had a Common-
wealth, but were interchangeably under Anarchy, Tyranny, and 'Oli-
garchy, to which Commonwealths have ever bin the greateſt ene.
mys, and have frequently lent their voluntary affiſtance to deliver
other Nations from the like oppreſſions. Thus the People of Eng-
land came to hate the name of a Commonwealth, without loving
their Liberty the leſs.
3r. BUT to return whence we digreſs’d: Our Author,not concern'd
in the exceflive feags and hopes of thoſe that favor'd or oppos-d the
Reſtoration of CHARLES the Second, continud to live in a peace-
able manner at his one houſe, demeaning himſelf as became a perfon
blindly ingag’d to no Party or Factions. But tho his Life was retird,
it was not
ſolitary, being frequented with people of all forts, fom with
a malicious deſign to fiſh fomthing to his prejudice, and others-to gain
advantage to themſelves by his learned Converſation, or to put him
upon ſomthing towards the better ſettlement of the Kingdom. Among
theſe there was an eminent Royaliſt who prevaild with him to draw
up
ſom Inſtructions for the King's ſervice, wherby he might be inabid
to govern with fatisfaction to the People and ſafety to himſelf: which
being perform’d and ſign’d with his one hand, his friend after ſhewing
it to ſeveral of the Courtiers, found they did not approve a Scheme thac
was not likely to further their ſelfiſh Deſigns. At laſt he put his Paper
into the hands of a great Miniſter about the King; and how well our
Author was rewarded for his good Intentions, we are now going to re-
late. About this time he was buſy in reducing his Politics into ſhort
and eaſy Aphoriſms, yet methodically digeſted in their natural order,
and ſuted to the moſt vulgar capacitys. Of this he made no fecret,
and freely communicated his Papers to all that viſited him. While he was
putting the laſt hand to this syſtem, and as an innocent mån appréhen-
five of no danger, he was by an Order from the King, on the 28th of
December 1661, feiz’d by Sir WILLIAM POULTNEY and others,
and committed to the Tower of London for treaſonable Deſigns and
Practices. He had the written ſheets of his Aphoriſms then lying looſe
on the table before him, and underſtanding they intended to carrý,’em
to the Council, he beg'd the favor that he might ſtitch 'em togerher ;
which was granted, and ſo remov'd with ſom other Papers to White-
ball. I have that Manuſcript now in my hands, and another Copy
of
1
James H A R RINGTON. xxxi
cuous manner.
of the ſame which was given me by one of his acquaiątance, from both
which I have printed it among the reſt of his works. It is a complete
Syſtem of Politics, and diſcovers the true Springs of the riſe, temper;
and diſſolution of all ſorts of Governments, in a very brief and perſpi-
32. HE had no time given him to take leave of any body, but was
ſtraight convey'd to the Tower, where norie were allow'd to com to
his light or ſpeech. His Siſters were inconſolable, and the more ſo, the
leſs they knew what was laid to their Brother's charge. One of them,
who on another occaſion had experienc'd the King's favor, threw her ſelf
now at his feet, and petition'd him to have compaſſion on her Brother,
who thro a great miſtake was fallen under his Majeſty's diſpleaſure:
for as ſhe was ſure that none of his Subjects exceded his Loyalty, ſo his
Majeſty might ſee he was not the man they deſign’d, ſince the Warrant
was for Sir JAMES HARRINGTON, wheras her Brother was never
honor?d with ſuch a Title by his Majeſty's Anceſtors, and he would not
have accepted it from OLIVER. Tothisthe King made ankwer, that
tho they might be miſtaken in his Title, he doubted he might be found
more guilty of the Crimes alleg’d againſt him, than he wiſh?d any
Brother of hers to be. Then ſhe preſs'd he might be examin'd before
his Majeſty, or be brought to a ſpeedy trial. Shortly after my Lord
LAUDERDALE, Sir GEORGE CARTEBET, and Sir EDWARD
WALKER were ſent to the Tower to queſtion him about a Plot which,
they ſaid, he had contriv'd againſt his Majeſty's Perſon and Govera-
ment. At this he was extraordinarily reviv'd, not being able to divine
before the cauſe of his Confinement, and knowing himſelf wholly in-
nocent of this Charge. He found means to tranſmit a Copy of his Ex-
amination to his Siſters, giving 'em leave to publiſh it, which was never
hitherto don, and is as follows.
33. THE Ex.imination of James HARRINGTON, ta-
ken in tbe. Tower of London by the Earl of LAUD E R-
DALE, Sir GEORGE CARTERET, and Sir ED-
WARD WALKER.
J
:
L
ORD LAUDERDALE. Sir, I have heretofore accounted it
an honor to be your Kinſman, but am now ſorry to ſee you upon
this occafion; very ſorry I aſſure you.
HARRINGTON, My Lord, ſeeing this is an occaſion, I am
glad to ſee you upon this occaſion. Which ſaid, the Commiſſioners
lar down; and Mr. HARRINGTON ſtanding before my Lord, he
began in this manner :
Lord. SI R, the King thinks it ſtrange that you, who have foemi-
nently appear'd in Principles contrary to his Majeſty's Government,
and the Laws of this Nation, ſhould ever ſince he came over live ſo
quiet and unmoleſted, and yet ſhould be so ungrateful. Were you
diſturb’d? were you ſo much as affronted, that you ſhould enter into
ſuch. deſperat practices ?
Har. MY Lard, when I know why this is faid, I ſhall ktow
:
what to ſay.
Lords
Xxxii
The LIFE of
:
Lord. WELL then, without any longer preamble, will you an-
ſwer me ingenuouſly, and as you are a Gentleman, to what I have to
propoſe?
Har. MY Lord, I value the aſſeveration ( as I am a Gentleman
as high as any man, but think it an aſſeveration too low upon this oc-
caſion; wherfore, with your leave, I ſhall make uſe of ſom greater
aſſeveration.
Lord. FOR that do as you ſee good: do you know Mr. WILD-
MAN?
Har. MY Lord, I have ſom acquaintance with him.
Lord, WHEN did you ſee him?
Har. MY Lord, he and I have not bin in one houſe together theſe
two years.
Lord. WILL you ſay ſo?
Har. YES, my Lord.
Lord. WHERE did you ſee him laft?
Har. ABOUT a year ago I met him in a ſtreet that gos to Drury-
Lane.
Lord. DID you go into no houſe?
Har, NO, my Lord.
Sir G. Carteret. THAT's ſtrange!
Lord, COM, this will do you no good: Had not you, in March
laſt, meetings with him in Bomſtreet in Coventgarden, where there
were about twenty more of you ; where you made à Speech about
half an hour long, that they ſhould lay by diſtinguiſhing Names, and
betake themſelves together into one Work, which was to diſſolve this
Parlament, and bring in a new one, or the old one again. Was not
this meeting adjourn'd from thence to the Mill Bank were not you
there alſo ?
Har. MY Lord, you may think, if theſe things be true, I have no
refuge but to the mercy of God and of the King.
Lord. TRUE
Har WELL then, my Lord, ſolemnly and deliberatly, with
*my eys to Heaven, I renounce the mercy of God and the King, if any
of this be true, or if ever I thought or heard of this till now that you
tell it me.
Sir G.C. THIS is ſtrange!
Lord. DO you know BAREBONES?
Har. YES, my Lord.
Lord. WHEN did you ſee him?
Har. I THINK that I have calld at his houſe or ſhop thrice in
Lord. HAD you never any meetings with bim ſince the King
came over?
Har. NO, my Lord.
Sir G.C. THIS is ſtrange !
Lord. DO you know Mr. Nevil?
Har. VERY well, my
Lord.
Lord. WHEN did you fee him ?
Har. MY Lord, I ſeldom us’d to viſit him ;- but when he was in
Town, he us'd to ſee me at my houſe every evening, as duly, almoftas
the day went over his head.
+
A.
i
my life.
Lord.
JAMES HARRINGTON.
Xxxiii
Lord. WERE you not with him at ſom public meeting ?
Har. MY Lord, the publickeſt meeting I have bin with him at,
was at dinner at his own lodging, where I met Sir BERNARD GAS-
COIN, and I think Col. LEG.
Sir Edw. Walker. THEY were good ſafe company.
Lord. WHAT time was it?
Hır. IN Veniſon time I am ſure, for we had a good Veniſon paſty.
Lord. Do you know one PortMAN?
Har. NO, my Lord, I never heard of his name before.
Sir G.C. THIS is ſtrange!
Lord. COM, deal ingenuouſly, you had better confeſs the things.
Hur. MY Lord, you do not look upon me (for I ſaw he did not
firmly) I pray look upon me. Do you not know an innocent face
from a guilty one ? com, you do, my Lord, every one dos: Mv Lord,
you are great Men, you com from the King, you are the Meſſengers
of Death.
Lord. IS that a ſmall matter ? (at which my Lord gave a ſhrug.)
Har. IF I be a Malefactor, I am no old Malefactor: why am not I
pale ? why do not I tremble ?' why dos not my tongue falter? why
have
you not taken me tripping? My Lord, theſe are unavoidable
fymtoms of guilt. Do you find any ſuch thing in me?
Lord. NO (which he ſpoke with a kind of amazement) and then
added, I have ſaid all that I think I have to ſay.
Har. MY Lord, but I have not.
Lord. COM thcn.
Har. THIS plainly is a pra&tice, a wicked practice, a practice
for innocent Blood; and as weak a one as it is wicked. Ah, my Lord,
if you had taken half the pains to examin the Guilty that you have
don to examin the Innocent, you had found it; it could not have
eſcap'd you. Now, my Lord, conſider if this be a practice, what
kind of perſons you are that are thus far made inſtrumental in the hands
of wicked men. Nay, whither will wickedneſs go ? Is not the King's
Authority (which should be ſacred) made inſtrumental? My Lord,
for your own ſake, the King's ſake, for the Lord's fake, let ſuch Vil
lanys be found out and punilh'd. At this my Lord LAUDERDALE,
as was thought ſomwhat out of countenance, roſe up; and fumbling
with his hand upon the Table, faid:
Lord. WHY if it be as you ſay, they deſerve puniſhment enough,
but otherwiſe look it will com ſeverely upon you.
Har. MY Lord, I accepted of that condition before.
Lord. CUM, Mr. Vice-Chamberlain, it is late.
Har. MY Lord, now if I might I could anſwer the Preamble.
Lord. COM, ſay; and ſo he ſat down again.
Har. MY Lord, in the Preamble you charge me with being emi-
nent in Principles contrary to the King's Government, and the Laws of
this Nation. Som, my Lord, have aggravated this, ſaying, that I being
4 privat man have bin ſo mad as to meddle with Politics : what had 4
privat man to do with Government? My Lord, there is not any public
Perſon, not any Magiſtrat, that has written in the Politics worth a
button. All they that have bin excellent in this way, have bin privat
men, as privat men, my Lord, as my felf. There is Plato, there
is ARISTOTLE, there is Livy; there is MACCHIAVEL. My
Lord, I can ſum up ARISTOTLE's Politics in a very few words;
d
he
xxxiv
The LIFE of
he ſays there is the barbarous Monarcliy (ſuch a one where the Pec-
ple have no Votes in making the Laws) he ſays there is the Heroic
Monarchy (ſuch a one where the People have their Voies in making
the Laws) and then he ſays there is Democracy; and affirms that a
man cannot be ſaid to have Liberty, but in a Democracy only.
MY Lord LAUDERDALE, who thus far had bin very attentive,
at this ſhew'd ſom impatience.
Har. I SAY, ARISTOTLE ſays fo; I have not ſaid ſo much.
And under what Prince was it? Was it not under ALEXANDER,
the greateſt Prince then in the World? I beſeech you, my Lord, did
ALEXANDER hang up ARISTOTLE, did he moleft him? Lívy
for a Commonwealth is one of the fulleſt Authors; did not he write
under Augustus CÆSAR? did CÆSAR liang-up Livy; did
he moleft him? MACCHIAVEL what a Commonwealthſman was
he? but he wrote under the Medici when they were Princes in
Florence; did they hang up MACCHIAVEL, or did they moleſt him?
I have don no otherwiſe than as the greateſt Politicians, the King will
do no otherwiſe than as the greateſt Princes. But, my Lord, there
Authors had not that to ſay for themſelves that I have; I did not write
under a Prince, I wrote under a Uſurper, OLIVER.
He having
ſtarred up into the Throne, his Officers (as pretending to be for a
Commonwealth) kept a murmuring, at which he told them that he
knew not what they meant, nor themſelves; but let any of them ſhew
him what they meant by a Commonwealth (or that there was any
ſuch thing) they ſhould ſee that he ſought not himſelf: the Lord
knew he ſought not himſelf, but to make good the Cauſe. Upon this
ſom ſober men came to me and told me, if any man in England could
ſhew what a Commonwealth was, it was my ſelf. Upon this per-
ſuaſion I wrote; and after I had written, OLIVER never an-
fwer'd his Officers as he had don before, therfore I wrote not againſt
the King's Government. And for the Law, if the Law could have
puniſh'd me, OLIVER had don it; therfore my Writing was not
obnoxious to the Law. After OLIVER the Parlament ſaid they
were a Commonwealth; I ſaid they were not, and prov'd it: infomuch
that the Parament accounted me a Cavalier, and one that had no
other deſign in my writing, than to bring in the King ; and now the
King firſt of any man makes me a Roundhead.
Lord. THÉSE things are out of doors; if you be no Plotter,
the King dos not reflect upon your Writings.
AND ſo riſing up, they went out : my Lord being at the head of
the ſtairs, I ſaid to him, My Lord, there is one thing more; you tax
me with Ingratitude to the King, who had ſuffer'd me to live undi-
ſturb’d: truly, my Lord, had I bin taken right by the King, it had
(by this Example already given) bin no more than my due. But I
know well enough I have bin miſtaken by the King; the King ther-
fore taking me for no Friend, and yet uſing me not as an Enemy, is
ſuch a thing as I have mention'd to all I have convers’d with, as a high
Character of Ingenuity and Honor in the King's Nature.
Lord. I AM glad you have had a ſenſe of it; and ſo went down.
Har. MY Lord, it is my duty to wait on you no farther.
34. NOTWITHSTANDING the apparent Innocence of
our Author, he was ſtill detain'd a cloſe Priſoner; and Chancellor
HIDE,
James HARRINGTON
XXXV
Hide, at a Conference of the Lords and Commons, charg'd him
with being concern'd in a Plot, wherof one and thirty perſons were
the chief managers after this manner : That they met in Bowſtreet
Coventgarden, in St. Martins le grand, at the Mill Bank, and in other
places; and thaſ they were of ſeven different Partys or Intereſts,
as
three for the Commonwealth, three for the Long Parlainent, three
for the Cicy, three for the Purchaſers, three for the Disbanded Army,
three for the Independents, and three for the Fifthmonarchy men.
That their firſt Conſideration was how to agree on the choice of Par-
lamentnen againſt the inſuing Seſſion; and that a ſpecial care ought
to be had about Members for the City of London, as a precedent for
the reſt of the Kingdom to follow, wherupon they nominated the
four Members after choſen, and now ſitting in Parlament: but three of
theſe, being then preſent, ſtood up, and cleard themſelves of this Aſper-
ſion. Their next care was to frame a Petition to the Parlament for a
preaching Miniſtry, and Liberty of Conſcience. Then they were to di-
vide and ſubdivide themſelves into feveral Councils and Committees, for
the better carrying on their buſineſs by themſelves or their Agents and
Accomplices all over the Kingdom. In theſe Meetings HARRING-
TON was ſaid to be often in the Chair; that they had taken an Oathi
of Secrecy, and concerted meaſures for levying Men and Mony.
35. THE Chancellor added, that tho he had certain Information of
the times and places of their meetings, and particularly thoſe of HAR-
RINGTON and WILDMAN, they were nevertheleſs fo fixt in their
nefarious deſign, that none of thoſe they had taken would confeſs
any
thing, not ſo much as that they had ſeen or ſpoken to one another at thoſe
times or places ; which obſtinacy, he thought, muſt needs procede
from a faithfulneſs to their Oath. But a Committee of Lords and
Commons, after ſeveral fittings, could make nothing of this imagi-
nary Plot, and did not ever name our Author in all their Reports.
36. HIS Siſters in the mean time being impatient to ſee him, and
to know his Condition, after ſeveral fruitleſs Petitions, obtain'd an order
of Council at lalt to be admitted into the Tower, where they found him
barbarouſly treated by the Lieutenant, whom they foften'd into more
humanity with a preſent of fifty pounds under the notion of Fees. By
them he deliver'd a Petition to the King,importing that in the late times
he was no public Perſon, nor acted to any man's detriment in his Life,
Body, or Eſtate, but on the contrary had don his indeavors to help all
perſons in diſtreſs; that he had oppos’d the Uſurper in ſuch a manner
as was judg’d even by the Royaliſts themſelves to be very much to his
diſadvantage; and that it was not probable that he, who had liv'd lo
peaceably before, would attemt any Novelty after his Majeſty's Re-
ſtoration : wherfore he beg'd the favor of a public Trial, or a more
caſy confinement. But tho he had bin now a priſoner during the ſpace
of five months, neither he nor any on bis behalf could receive an An-
ſwer to their Petitions ; which made him ſomwhac impatient, not ſo
much to injoy his Liberty, as to vindicat himſelf from the baſe Aſperſi-
ons of his Enemys. He thierforecontinually urg'd his ſiſter ASHTON
to procure him a Trial, which ſhe not being able to effect, le petition'd
the Parlament, ſhewing that he had lain a cloſe Priſoner in the Tower
for five months upon a bare ſuſpicion of ſom diſaffection to the Govern-
ment, which in all his Examinations did not in the leaſt
that he hop'd e'er that time ſo to have clear'd his innocence by a public
Trial,
appear; and
d 2
1
Xxxvi
The LIFE of
60
Trial, as to deſerve his Liberty. But becauſe he underſtood theſe
matters were in ſom meaſure repreſented to their Houſe, he would not
preſume, without firſt making his application to them, to ſue for his
freedom by other legal means. “ May it therfore pleaſe this honorable
“ Houſe, ſays he, to take tender conſideration of the ſufferings of an
“ Engliſman hitherto innocent; and that the long continuance of him
“ in priſon without trial may be hereafter the caſe of others, and a pre-
« cedent for the like caſe: and that this honorable Houſe would pleaſe
to move his Majeſty that your Petitioner may be proceded againſt
" by a legal way of Trial, or that he may have his freedom ; thar ſo
“ he may no longer languiſh in Priſon to the ruin of his Health and
“ Eſtate. Theſe are not the words of a man conſcious of Guilt, or
afraid of Power.
37. HIS Siſter could get no Member to deliver this Petition, or to
give her any incouragement; ſom alleging that ſhe was more likely
to deſtroy than-ſerve her Brother, and others that by unſeaſonable pref-
ſing ſhe might precipitat his danger ; wheras if he would be patient
under his ſufferings, he might be ſafe in his reſtraint. Then he advis’d
her to move for his habeas Corpus; which at firſt was flatly deny'd, but
afterwards when it was granted and duly ſerv’d, his Warder came one
day to his Siſters at Weſtminſter, and acquainted them that between one
and two a clock that morning their Brother was put on board a Ship
to be tranſported he knew not whither, without any cime given him
either to fee his Friends, or to make proviſion of Mony, Linen, or
other neceſſarys. Nor could his Relations for a whole fortnight, ei-
ther at the Tower or in the Secretarys' Office, learn what was becom of
him, till they receiv'd a note from himſelf on board one of the King's
Ships then lying under Hurſt Caſtle, informing them that he believ'd
he was bound for Plymouth. About a month after he fent 'em word
by another letter that he was landed on a kind of Rock oppoſit to
Plymouth, callid St. Nicholas's Iſland, whence he afterwards had fre-
quent opportunitys of writing to 'em many pious and moral Admoniti-
ons, as well as Letters of buſineſs and entertainment.
38. BUT his cloſe reſtraint to this ſmall ſpot of Earth, where
there was no freſh Water, and ſcarce any room to move his Body,
quickly chang’d the ſtate of his Health ; this occafion'd him to pe-
tition he might be remov'd to Plymouth, which was granted, his Bro-
ther WILLIAM, and his Uncle ANTHONY SAMUEL, obliging
themſelves in a Bond of 5000 l, for his faſe Impriſonment. Here he
had not only the liberty of walking on the Hoe, but was alſo us'd with
extraordinary Reſpect by the Deputy Governor of the Fort Sir JOHN
SKELTON, who frequently invited him to his Table, and much
lov'd his Converſation. ‘Among the other Acquaintance he made at
Plymouth, one was Dr. DUNSTAN, who advis'd him to take a pre-
paration of Guaiacum in Coffee, as a certain cure for the Scurvy, with
which he was then troubld. He drank of this Liquor in great quan-
titys, every morning and evening. But after uſing it for fon time,
his Siſters, to their no ſmall amazement, receiv'd no more Anſwers to
their Letters. At length Advice was brought 'em from his Landlady,
that his Fancy was much diſorder'd, and deſiring ſom body might
com to look after him. Immediatly one of them addreſs’d her
ſelf to the Earl of Bath, then chief Governor of Plymouth, and in-
form'd him of liis Priſoner's fad condition. This noble Lord, who
laid
James
AMES HARRINGTON.
xxxvii
laid many Obligations on him before, and gave frequent orders for
his good Uſage, went hereupon to intercede for him with the King,
repreſenting the danger of his Life if he were not remov'd from that
unwholſom place to London, where he might have the Advice of able
Phyſicians: and the King was accordingly pleas’d to grant a Warrant
for his Releaſe, fince nothing appear'd againſt him ſupported by good
Proof or probable Preſumtions.
39. THE next day the Lady ASHTON, with another of his Sif-
ters, took their Journy towards Plymouth, where they found their
poor Brother ſo transform'd in Body and Mind, that they ſcarce could
perſuade chemſelves it was the ſame perſon. He was reduc'd to a Ske-
leton, not able to walk alone, ſlept very little, his imagination dif-
turb’d, often fainted when he took his drink, and yet ſo fond of it
that he would by no means be advis’d to forbear it. Dr. PRUJE A N,
and other eminent Phyſicians, greatly blam'd Dr. DUNSTAN's pre-
ſcriptions, giving their Opinion under their hands that Guaiacum and
the other drying things, which he adminiſter'd to his Patient in Coffee,
were cnough of themſelves to beget Melancholy or Phrenzy, where
there was no previous diſpoſition to it. A rumor at Plymouth, that
HARRINGTON had taken ſom drink which would make any man
mad in a month; the ſurlineſs of his Doctor, and ſomthing blab’d
by a Maid that was put againſt his will to attend him, made his Siſter
fuſpect he had foul play leſt he ſhould write any more Oceanas.
'Tis certain, that (tho his Recovery was never perfect) he mended
finely as ſoon as he was perſuaded toʻabſtain from this Liquor. In leſs
than a month he was able to bear the Journy to London in a Coach,
where he was no ſooner arrivd but Sir JOHN SKELTON,
who
was then in Town, paid him a viſit. My Lady Ashton com-
plaining to him that The had not timely notice of her Brother's
Diftemper, he proteſted he would have ſent her word of it, had
not his Doctor aſſur'd him that he only counterfeited ; and yet at the
fame time he made him take ſtrong Doſes of Hellebor, and God knows
what beſides.
40. HE paft ſom time at Aſhted in Surrey to drink the Epſom-
waters, by which he found no benefit. At London he was pur wholly
under the care of Doctor PRUJEAN, who with all his Art could
afford little help to the weakneſs of his Body, and none at all to the
diſorder of his Mind, to his dying day. He was allow'd to diſcourſe
of moſt other things as rationally as any man, except his own Diſtemper;
fancying ſtrange things in the operation of his animal Spirits, which he
thought to tranſpire from him in the ſhape of Birds, of Flys, of Bees,
or the like. And thoſe about him reported that he talk'd much of good
and evil Spirits, which made them have frightful apprehenſions. But
he us'd, they ſaid, ſomtimes to argue lo ſtrenuouſly that this was
no deprav'd imagination, that his Doctor was often put to his ſhifts for
an Anſwer. He would on ſuch occaſions compare himſelf to Demo-
CRIT us, who for his admirable diſcoverys in Anatomy was reck-
on'd diſtracted by his fellow Citizens, till HIPPOCRÁTes curd
'em of their miſtake. I confeſs I did not know at firſt what to make
of theſe things from the informations of his Acquaintance, till I met
with a Letter of Dr. Bur THOGGE to his Siſter, wherin are con
tain'd certain Querys propos’d to him by HARRINGTON,
with
a ſtate of his Cale written by the Doctor, who was his intimat Friend,
and
Xxxviii
The LIFE of
and a very good judg, whether conſider'd as a Phyſician or a Philoſo
pher, as appears by his late Treatiſe of the Soul of the World, &c.
and as I have particular reaſon to affirm from his Letters to my La-
dy ASHTON, which are all now before me. Among other things
the Doctor fays, that he ever expreft the higheſt ſatisfaction in think-
ing of what he had at any time written, as the beſt Service he was
capable to do his Country, and ſincerely intended by him to the glory
of God, which he thought in ſom meaſure to be the good of man-
kind : ſo far was hie from being under any remorſe of Conſcience on
that ſcore, as his ill wiſhers maliciouſly reported. Now, tho I was
fomwhat ſtagger'd concerning the nature of his Diſtemper by Dr.
BURTHOGGE's Letter, I grew perfectly amaz’d when I found
among his Papers the beginning of a little Treatiſe written by him.
ſelf, wherin (without raillery) he proves 'em to be all mad that
thought him ſo with reſpect to what he diſcours'd of Nature, which
he maintain’d to work mechanically or mathematically, as BELLINI,
BORELLI, Dr.PITCAIRNS, and other eminent men have ſince evi-
dently ſhewn. It appears there that his pretended Viſions of Angels and
Devils were nothing elſe but good or bad animal Spirits, and that his
Flys and Bees were only Similitudes wherby he us’d to expreſs the va-
rious figures and forms of thoſe Particles. I own that he might pro-
bably enough be much decay'd in his underſtanding, by reaſon of his
great and long weakneſs of body; but I ſhall never be convinc'd that
he was delirious in that only inſtance which they allege: and to ſatisfy
the Learned in this point (which, in my opinion, is a memorable Story
that concerns 'em all) I ſhall ſubjoin his own diſcourſe to this Hil-
tory.
41. WERE he really out of order, it liad bin his misfortune, not his
fault, and was the caſe of fom of the beſt men that ever liv'd. An action
thar will better perſuade the world he was not truly himſelf, was his
marrying in this condition. The Lady was a very agreable woman,
whoſe Perſon and Converſation he always admir'd; ſhe was the
Daughter of Sir MARMADUK E Dorrel of Buckinghamſhire,
fam'd for wit more than became her pretenſions to good ſenſe, had long
liv'd among his Relations with the reſpect of a Friend and a Siſter; but
now would needs change the office of a voluntary Attendant for the
name of a Wife. It foon appear'd that this match was not ſo much diſin.
tercſted as ſhe would pretend, which occaſion'd ſom difference between
'cm; but they were quickly reconcild, and Me was always treated by
him afterwards with the higheſt Generoſity, tho ſhe did not uſe him ſo
handſomly when they were both young and healthy, and might have
made a more feaſonable match than at this time. Towards his latter
end he was ſubject to the Gout, and injoy'd little eaſe, but languiſhing
and drooping a good while, he fell at laſt into a Palfy, and departed this
Life at Weſtminſter, the 11th of September, in the Year 1677 (leaving his
Eſtate to his Brother's Children) and lys bury'd there in S. Margaret's
Church, on the South ſide of the Altar, next to the Grave of Sir W AL-
TER RALEIGH, with this Inſcription over him: Hic jacet JACOBUS
HARRINGTON Armiger (filius maximus natu SAPCOTIS HAR-
RING ron de Rand, in Com. Linc. Equitis aurati, to JAN Æ uxoris
ejus, filie GULIELMI SA MUEL de Upton in Com, Northamton. Mi-
litis) qui obiit ſeptimo die Septembris,etatis fuæ ſexageſimo fexto, anno Dom.
1677. Nec virtus, nec animi dores (arrha licet æterni in animam amoris
Dei) corruptione eximere queant corpus.
42. THUS
James HARRINGTON.
xxxx
42. THUS dyd JAMES HARRINGTON, whoſe Name is fure
to live ſo long as Learning and Liberty bear any Reputation in Eng-
land. But cho he did not think ſo highly of himſelf, yet he was
ſtrongly perſuaded that his Oceana was the Model of an equal Com-
monwealih, or a Government wherin no Party can be at variance
with or gaining ground upon another, and never to be conquer'd by
any foren Power; whence he concluded it muſt needs be likewiſe im-
mortal: for as the People, who are the materials, never dy; ſo the
Form, which is the Motion, muſt (without ſom oppoſition) be end-
leſs. The Immortality of a Commonwealth is ſuch a new and curious
Problem, that I could not aſſure my ſelf of the Reader's pardon, with-
out giving hiin ſom brief account of the Arguments for it, and they
run much after this manner. The perfection of Government is ſuch a
Libration in the frame of it, that no Man or Men under it can have
the intereſt, or (having the intereſt) can have the power to diſturb it
with Sedition. This will be granted at fæſt fight, and HARRING:
TON appeals to all Mankind, whether his Oceaná (examin’d by this
principle) be not ſuch an equal Government, completely and intirely
fram'd in all its neceſſary Orders or fundamental Laws, without any
contradiction to it felf, to Reafon, or Truth. If this be ſo (as the
congrary dos not yet appear) then it has no internal cauſe of Diffolu-
tion, and conſequently ſuch a Government can never be ruin’d any
way; for he further ſhews (what all Hiſtory cannot contradict) that
a Commonwealth, if not firſt broken or divided by Factions at home,
was never conquer'd by the Arms of any Monarch from the beginning
of the World to this day: but the Commonwealth of Oceani having
no Factions within, and ſo not to be conquer'd from without, is ther-
fore an equal, perfect, and immortal Government. For want of this
equality in the frame he clearly demonſtrats how the Common
wealthis of Rome, Athens, and others, came to be deſtroy'd by their
contending and overtopping partys; wheras that of Venice can never
change or finiſh. He proves that this Equality is yet more wanting in
Monarchys; far in abſolute Monarchy (as that of the Turk, for ex-
ample) the Janizarys have frequent intereſt, and perpetual power to
raiſe Sudition to the ruin of the Emperor, and, when they pleaſe; of
the Empire: This cannot be ſaid of the Armys of Oceana, and ther-
fore an abſolute Monarchy is no perſect Government. In what they
improperly call a mix’d Monarchy the Nobility are ſomtimes putting
Chains on the King, at other times domineering over the People ; the
King is either oppreſſing the People without control, or contending
with the Nobility as their Protectors; and the People are frequently
in arms againſt both King and Nobility, till at laſt one of the thrce
Eſtates becoms maſter of the other two, or till they ſo mutually weak-
en one another that either they fall a prey to fom more poterit Go-
vernment, or naturally grow into a Commonwealth: therfore mixt
Monarchy is not a perfect Government; and if no ſuch Partys or Con-
tentions can poſſibly exiſt in Oceana, then on the contrary is it a molte-
qual, perfect, and immortal Commonwealth, Quod erat demonſtrandum.
43: IT will not be objected to the diſparagement of this Model, that
it was no better receiv'd by OLIVER CROMWEL; nor is it fair to
judg of things at any time by their Succeſs. If it ſhould be ſaid, that,
after the expiration of his Tyranny, the People did not think' fit to
eſtabliſh it ; I ſhall only anſwer, that all the Attemts which have bin
us’d for introducing Arbitrary Power have prov'd as unfortunat, wher-
bý
xl
The LIFE of
by it appears at leaſt that the character which Tacitus gave the Ram
mans of his time, may as well agree to the People of England: and it is,
that They are able to bear neither abſolute Liberty, nor abſolute Slavery.
CONCLUSION.
I AM diſpos'd to belieye that my Lady ASHTON's memory
fail'd her, when ſhe ſaid that her Brother was at Rome during the
Jubilee ; for as Chronology ſeems to contradict it, ſo ſhe might caſily
miſtake the Jubilee for the Ceremony of conſecrating Candles, or any
other ſolemnity; his remarks being equally applicable to all thoſe of
the Popiſh Church. But as to the whole of this Hiſtory, tho it be ma-
nag'd with due moderation, and contains nothing but bare matters of
fact, or ſuch obſervations as they naturally ſuggeſt; yet I was ſenſible
before I wrote it, that I could not eſcape the diſpleaſure of three forts
of perſons : ſuch as have reſolv'd to be angry at whatever I do; ſuch as
neither rightly underſtand what is written by me nor any body elſe ; and
thoſe who, without any particular ſpite againſt an Author, yet to get a
penny will pretend to anſwer any book that makes a conſiderable figure.
Therfore I find my ſelf oblig'd beforehand to diſclaim all explanations
made of my meaning, beyond what is warranted by the expreſs words
of my Book; having conſtantly indeavor'd not only to write intelli-
gibly, but ſo as that none can poſſibly miſunderſtand' me. I renounce
all the deſigns that may be imputed to me by ſuch as are ſo far from
being admitted into my ſecret, that they were never in my company ;
but I ſpecially diſown whatever is ſaid by thoſe who firſt preſume to
divine my thoughts, and then to vent their own raſh conjectures as my
undoubted opinions. I ſight their artifice who, when unable to object
againſt the point in queſtion, labor to ingage their Adverſary in matters
wholly beſides the purpoſe; and when their Evaſions have no better for-
tune than their Attacks, fall to railing againſt his Perſon, becauſe they
cannot confute his Arguments. I am as much above the malice of fom,
as they are below my reſentments; and I wou'd at any time chuſe to
be rather the object of their Envy than of their Favor : but as I am far
from thinking my ſelf exemt from all the indiſcretions of Youth, or the
fraileys of human Nature; ſo I am not conſcious of entertaining higher
thoughts of my own performances than are becoming,or meaner of other
mens than they deſerve. I know that to enterprize any thing out of the
cominon road is to undergo undoubred envy or peril; and that he, who is
not beforehand reſolvd to bear oppoſition, will never doany great or be-
neficial exploit : yet 'tis no ſmall incouragement to me, that from the be-
ginning of the world to this time not a ſingle inſtance can be produc'd of
one who either was or would be eminent, but he met with Enemys to
his perſon and fame. Notwithſtanding this conſideration be juſt, yet if I
write any thing hereafter (either as oblig'd by Duty, or to'amuze idle
time ) I have determin'd it ſhall not concern perſonal diſputes, or the
narrow intereſts of jarring Factions, but fomthing of univerſal benefit,
and which all ſides may indifferently read. Without ſuch provocations
as no man ought to indure, this is my fix'd reſolution ; and I particular-
ly deſire that none may blame me for acting otherwiſe, who force me
to do ſo themſelves. "I ſhall never be wanting to my own defence,
when either the Cauſe or the Aggreſſor deſerves it: for as to thoſé
Authors who conceal their names, if they wrițe matters of fact 'tis a
ſign they cannot make them good; and all men are agreed to reject
their Teſtimony, except ſuch as reſolve to deny others common juſtice :
but the ill opinion of theſe prejudic'd perſons can no more injure any
man,
JAMES HARRINGTON.
man, than their good opinion will do him honor, Beſides other reaſons
of mentioning my ſuppos’d deſigns, one is to diſabuſe ſeveral people
who (as I am told) are made to believe that in the Hiſtory of SOCRA-
TES I draw a Parallel between that Philoſopher and Jesus CHRIST.
This is a moſt ſcandalous and unchriſtian calumny, as will more fully
appear to the world whenever the Book it ſelf is publiſh'd : for tliat I
have bin fom time about it, I freely avow; yet not in the manner thoſe
officious Informers report, but as becoms a diſintereſted Hiſtorian, and
a friend to all mankind.
1
who was
The Inſcription on the Monument of Sir JAMES HARRING-
TON and his three Sons, at Excon in Rutlandſhire.
ERE lieth Sir James Harrington of
HE
Sidney Kit
.
Eston, Kt. with. (a) Lucy his wife, & who was afterwards created at Harpa
Daughter to Sir William Sidney Kt. by Queen of. Bohemia. His Family is extind as
whom he had 18 Children, wherof three to Heirs Male : One of his Daughters was
Sons and 8 Daughters marry'd as follows. marry'd to the Earl of Bedford, and was
Groom of the Stole to Q. Ann. The other
was marry'd to a 'Scotch Lord whoſe name
THE eldeſt Son, Sir (6) Johx, marry'd was Lord Bruce Earl of Elgin ; his Grand-
the Heireſs of Robert Keylwoy Surveyor of ſon now. Lord Alisbury,
the Court of Wards and Liverys. The 2d. Who happend to be Preſident of Ire-
Son, Sir (c) Henry, took to Wife one of the Fretchavil's Father, my Lady Morijon, and
land; and from him deſcended my Lady
Coheirs of Francis Agar, one of his Majeſty's my Lord Falkland's Lady. -
Privy Council in Ireland. The 3d Son, (d) Afterwards Baronet: To him were
James (d) Harrington Efq; had to Wife Form Sir Edward Harrington, Sir Sapcotes
one of the Coheirs of Robert Sapcotes Eſq. had Iſſue both Sons and Daughters.
Harrington, and Mr. Folia Harrington ; who
The eldeſt Daughter, Elizabeth, was mar- (e) Who was Father to the Lord Monta-
ried to Sir Edward (e) Montague Kt. The gue, the Earl of Nlancheſter, and Lord Privy
2d, Frances
, to Sir William (f) Lee ķt. The afterwards created Earl of Sandwich; and to
3d, Margaret, to Don (8) Bonitto de Sifnores the Earl of Rutland's Ladý, and Judg Mon-
of Spain, of the Family of the Dukes of tagne.
Frantaſquo. The 4th, Katherine, to Sir Who was afterwards created Lord
Chicheſt'cr and Earl of Dunmore; and mar-
Edward (b) Dimmock Kt. The 5th, Mary, ryd one of his Daughters to the Earl of
to Sir Edward (i) Wingfield Kt. The 6th, Southamton, by whom he had the preſent
Maball, to Sir Andrew (k) A cell Kt. The Lady, Northumberland. And his other
7th, Sarah, was marry'd to the Lord Haft. Daughter marry'd her felf to Col. Villers
,
ings, Heir to the Earl of Huntingdon. The the Duke of York's eldeſt Daughter.
8th, Theodoſia, (I) to the Lord Dudley of (8) Which Dukedom afterwards fell to
Dudley Caſtle.
him; and by this Lady he had one fole
Daughter and Heir, who is faid to have
Marry'd the Duke of Frio, and by him to
THE fame Sir James and Lucy. were lrave had one Daughter, who is marry'd to
marry'd fifty years : She died firit, in the a King of Portugal.
720 year of her Age; he ſhortly after yielded (0) Of Lincolnſhire, the King's Standard-
to Nature, being 80 years old, in the year (0) An antient noble Family in Kent.
of our Lord' 1591, and of Queen Eliza- (K) Now Lord Cambden, Owner of the
beth's Reign 34. their Son James being place where this Monument is
made ſole Exécutor to them both; who, Earl of Hume in Scotland, and had by him
(1) One of whoſe Laughters marry'd the .
that he might as well perform to his Parents two Daughters ; one married my Lord Noia
their Rites, as leave a Teſtimony of his rice, and the other my Lord Niaitland now
own Piety to Poſterity, hath erected and Duke of Lauderdale. The other Daughter
dedicated this Monument to their eternal of my Lady Dudley was Heir to the Honour
Memory
Mother's Tide is the preſent Lord Dudie;'
.
e
Ile
xlii
Tbe LIFE of
+
The Mechanics of Nature :
OR
An Imperfect Treatiſe written by JAMES HARRINGTON
during his ſickneſs, to prove againſt his Doctors that the
Notions he had of his own Diſtemper were not, as they
alleg’d, Hypocondriac Whimſys or Delirious Fancys.
The PREFACE.
HA
I
VING bin about nine months, fom ſay in a Diſeaſe, I in a
Cure, I have bin the wonder of Phyſicians, and they mine; not but
that we might
have bin reconcil'dh, for Books (I grant ) if they keep cloſe
to Nature muſt be good ones, but I'deny that Nature is bound to Books.
am no ftudy'd Naturaliſt, having long ſince given over that Philoſophy as
inſcrutable and incertain : for thus I thought with my ſelf; “ Nature, to
“ whom it is given to work as it were under her Veil or behind the Curtain,
« is the Art of God: now if there be Arts of Men who have wrought open-
“ ly enough to the anderftanding (for example that of TITIAN) ne-
“ vertheleſs whoſe excellency I ſhall never reach ; How ſhall I thus, ſticking
" in the Bark at the Arts of Men, be able to look thence to the Roots, or
“ dive into the Abyſs of things in the Art of God? And nevertheleſs, Si
placidum caput undis extulerit, fould Nature afford me a light of her,
I do not think ſo meanly of my ſelf but that I would know her as ſoon as ano-
ther, tho more learn'd man. Laying therfore Arts wholly, and Books almost
all aſide, I ſhall truly deliver to the world how I felt and ſaw Nature; that
is, how ſhe
came firſt into my ſenſes, and by the ſenſes into my underſtand.
ing. Tet for the ſake of my Readers, and
alſo for my own, I muſt invert the
order of my Diſcourſe ; For theirs, becauſe, till I can ſpeak to men that have
had the ſame Senſations with my ſelf, I muſt speak to fach as have a like
underſtanding with others: For my own, becauſe, being like in this Dif
courſe to be the Monky that play’d at Cheſs with his Maſter, I have need of ſom
Cushion on my head, that being in all I have ſpoken hitherto more laid at
than my Reaſon. My Diſcourſe then is to conſiſt of two parts: the firft, in
which I appeal to his underſtanding who will uſe his Reaſon, is a Platform of
Nature drawn out in certain Aphoriſms ; and the ſecond, in which I ſhall
appeal to his ſenſes who in a Diſeaſe very common will make further trial, is
a Narrative of my Cafe.
A Platform or Scheme of Nature.
I.
NA
'ATURE is the Fiat, the Breath, and in the whole Sphere of
her activity the very Word of God.
2. SHE is a Spirit, that ſame Spirit of God which in the begin-
ning mov'd upon the Waters, his plaſtic Virtue, the auvages in die
sinn, 'Evepycia wrin.
3. SHE is the Providence of God in his Government of the things
of this world, even that Providence of which it is ſaid, that without
it a Sparrow cannot fall to the ground, Mat. 10. 29.
4. SHE
*
JAMES HARRINGTON.
xliji
!
4. SHE is the Anima Mundi, or Soul of the World;
Principio Cælum, ac Terras, campoſque liquentes,
Lucentenique globum Lune, Titaniaque aftra
Spiritus intus alit, totamque ef'uſa per artus
Mens agitat molem, & magno ſe corpore miſcet.
Inde hominum pecudumque genus, vitæque volantum,
Et
qua
marmoreo fert monſtra ſub æquore pontus.
Igneus eft ollis vigor, & cæleftis Origo
Seminibus, quantum non noxia corpora tardant,
Terrenique hebetant artus, moribundaque membra.
Hinc metuunt, cupiuntque, dolent, gaudentque, neque auras
Difpiciunt claufe tenebris & carcere caco. Virgil. Æn.l.6.
5.
SHE is infallible: for the Law of an infallible Lawgiver muſt
needs be infallible, and Nature is the Law as well as the Art of God.
6. THO Nature be not fallible, yet ſhe is limited, and can do no-
thing above her matter ; therfore no Miracles are to be expected from
her.
7. AS Defects, Redundancys, or ſuch other rude qualitys of
matter, ought not to be attributed to the Artificer or his Art; fó nei-
ther is Nature,or the Art of God, to be charg’d with Monſters or imper-
fections, the things ſo reputed being the regular Effects both of the
Matter and the Art that forms it.
8. NATURE is not only a Spirit, but is furniſh’d, or rather fur-
niſhes her ſelf with innumerable miniſterial Spirits, by which ſhe ope-
rats on her whole matter, as the Univerſe; or on the ſeparat parts, as
man's Body.
9. THESE miniſterial Spirits are certain Æthereal Particles in-
viſibly mix'd with elementary Matter; they work ordinarily unſeen
or unfelt, and may be calld Animal Spirits.
10. AS in ſound Bodys there muſt needs be GOOD SPIRITS
managing the Oeconomy of Health ; ſo in unfound Bodies, as in chro-
nical Diſeaſes, there muſt needs be EVIL SPIRITS managing the
Oeconomy of Diſtempers.
11, ANIMAL Spirits, whether in the Univerſe, or in man's Bo-
dy, are good or evil Spirits, according to the Matter wherin and
wherof they are generated.
12. WHAT is a good Spirit to one Creature, is evil to another,
as the food of fom Bealts is poiſon to man; whence the gentleneſs of
the Dove, and the fierceneſs of the Hauk.
13. BETWEEN the Animal Spirits of the whole or Univerſe,
and of the parts
, as of man's Body, there is an intercourſe or coopera-
tion which preſerves the common order of Nature unſeen ; and in fom
things often foretels or diſcovers it, which is what we call Preſages,
Signs, and Prodigys.
14
THE work of good Spirits, as Health for example, is felici ,
tous, and as it were Angelical, and that of evil Spirits, as in Diſeaſes,
is noxious, and as it were diabolical, a ſort of faſcination or witchcraft.
15. ALL Fermentation is caus’d by unlocking, unbinding, or let.
ting looſe of Spirits; as all Attenuation is occafiona by ſtirring, work-
ing, or provoking of Spirits; and all Tranſpiration by the em f100 or
ſending abroad of Spirits.
16. NOTHING in Nature is annihilated or loſt, and therfore
whatever is tranſpir’d, is receiv’d and put to ſom uſe by the Spirits of
the Univerſe.
17. SCARCE
xliv
I
The LIFE, &c.
1
the Humor upon his Organs, which ſomtimes may be ſtrong enough
17. SCAR CE any man but at ſom time or other has felt ſuch a .
motion as Country people call the Lifeblood; if in his Ey, perhaps
there has flown out ſomthing like a dusky cloud, which is a tranſpira-
tion or emiſſion of Spirits ; perhaps as it were a flaſh of Fire, which
alſo was an emiſſion of Spirits, but differenc'd according to the matter
wherin and wherof they were wrought, as Choler, &c.
18. ANIMAL Spirits are ordinarily emitted ſtreaking them-
ſelves into various figures, anſwerable to little arms or hands, by which
they work out the matter by Tranſpiration, no otherwiſe than they
unlock'd it, and wrought it up in the body by attenuation, that is, by
manufacture: for theſe operations are perfectly mechanical, and down-
right handywork as any in our ſhops or workhouſes.
19.
If we find Nature in her operations not only uſing hands, but
likewiſe tomthing analogous to any Art, Tool, Engin, or Inſtrument
which we have or uſe, it cannot be ſaid that Nature had theſe things of
men, becauſe we know that men muſt liave theſe things of Nature.
20. IN Attenuation and Tranſpiration, where the matter of the
Diſeaſe is not only copious but inveterat, the Work will not as I may
ſay be inarticulat, as in the trembling call'd the Lifeblood; but articu-
lat, and obviouſly ſo to the ſenſe of the Patient by immediat ſtrokes of
(tho not ordinarily) to reach anothers.
21. NATURE can work no otherwiſe than as God taught her,
nor any man than as ſhe taught him.
22. WHEN I fec a curious piece from the hands of an Appren-
tice, I cannot imagin that his Maſter was a bungler, or that he wrought
not after the ſame manner as his Servant learn’d of him; which I apply
to God and Nature.
23. PHYSICIANS ſomtimes take the PRUDENCE of Nature
for the PHRENSY of the patient.
24. IF any man can ſhew why theſe things are not thus, or that
they may be otherwiſe, then I have don, and there is ſaid in this part
already more than enough ; but if they can neither ſhew that theſe
things are not thus, nor know how they ſhould be otherwiſe, then ſo
far I ſtand my ground, and am now arm’d for my Narrative Cap a pe.
'T IS a thouſand pitys that we have not this Narrative, to which no doubt
he apply'd theſe Principles, and thence form’d the ſtate of his Dic
ſtemper. But the Manuſcript containing no more, we may however
evidently conclude that the Writer of it was not ſo greatly diſorderd
in his thoughts
, which are for the moſt part very juft, and all as
cloſe and coherent as any man's.
ERRAT A.
1
Preface. Page 8. line 2. for too, read two.
Life. P. 21. To the other words there explain'd add Hemifua the River Trent, and
Alma the Palace of St. James.
Works. P. 5. 1. 32. r. opac. P. 35. 1. 11. f. Affertors, r. Aſſertreſs. P. 48. 1. 5.
r. than to. p. 54. I. 11. r. Lycians. P. 106. 1. 17. 1. Tarentum.
My Lords, other, r. My Lord's other. P.110. 1. 19. r. Brokage. P. 267. 1. 37. f. pai-
Soning, r. poiſing.
*
A
A
Τ Η Ε
Grounds and Rcaſons
OF
MONARCHY
Conſider'd:
And Exemplify'd in the Scotiſh Line,
out of their own beft Authors and Records.
1
B
T H E
PREFACE.
T
HERE is nothing that has more confounded Knowlege among
men, than the reciprocal violences of the Underſtarding and
the Will; or, to ſpeak plainly, the Paſſion of the one and
Blindneſs of the other : Since ſom by chance or intereſt take up
Principles which they force the underſtanding by ſtrain’d Arguments to
maintain ; others by the habit of Jom Opinion ſo bewitch the Will into con-
federacy, that they can never quit it, even after confutation. To remedy
this Diſorder, ſince I had reſolv’d with my ſelf to Say Somthing to this
Point (which tho it be but as a ſmall Wyre, yet the great weight of civil Fe-
licity lys upon it) I knew no better Method than to take the Scales from the
Eys of the Underſtanding, and to Shew the Will how better to bring about
her great Deſign of Good. And in the proſecution of this, I would not
skirmiſh with every Argument, which had bin a thing of immenſe ſlavery,
and not for every Ey; but I choſe rather to ſtrike at the Foundations, that
the underſtanding, might loſe its Paſſion, and more freely conſider upon
what Quickſands they lay. And in this I needed not to be poſitive, becauſe
I undertake a Task in which moſt Men are commonly ſuccesful, that is, to
Support Error rather than to aſſert Truth, Hence I conſider King ſhip
fimply, not troubling my ſelf to maintain any other Form, or to conſider
Oaths, Ends, Changes of Government, or the particular Neceſſity or Rea-
Jons of Safety: they being diſtinct Confiderations and Subjects by them-
ſelves. Now if this
negative Method Satisfys not, I ſee no ſuch great cauſe to
be diſcourag’d; for, I confeſs, I do not perceive it ſo eaſy a thing to diſcover
ax Érror; and I had rather tell a Man he was out of the way, than by en-
deavoring to bring him to the end of his Journy, lead him further about.
And it is my opinion, that as Scepticiſm is not only uſeleſs, but dangerous ; if
in ſetting our Thoughts in a poſture of Defence, it makes us abſolutely
wavering and incredulous : yet had I rather be ſceptical in my opinion, than
maintain it upon grounds taken upon truſt, and not demonſtrated.
THE Second Part is merely an inſtance accommodated to the Arguments
of the Firſt, wherin I would not be underſtood to be a Writer of an Epi.
tome (for I have other Imployments for my Time and Thoughts, and thoſe
nobler too) but to ſet down a true Series by way of Example; and therfore
I was only to note Acceſſes to Government, and Receſſes from it, with the
Effečts proceding from the Perſons of Governors. And here as I needed
not much trouble Chronology: So left it might be a bare Sceleton, I ſprink-
led fom Obſervations that came to hand, and ſeem to afford either Plea-
Sure or Vle. Thus much, left I might be miſunderſtood, thought neceſſary
to premiſe.
THE
3
THE
Grounds and Reaſons
OF
MON ARCHY.
The Firſt Part.
HAVE often thought it ftrange, that among all the Govern-
ments, either paſt or preſent, the Monarchical ſhould ſo far in
Extent and Number excede the Popular, as that they could never
yet com into compariſon. I could never be perſuaded but it was
more happy for a People to be diſpos’d of by a number of Perſons joint-
ly intereſted and concern’d with them, than to be number'd as the
Herd and Inheritance of One, to whoſe Luſt and Madneſs they were
abſolutely ſubject ; and that any Man of the weakeſt Reaſon and
Generoſity would not rather chuſe for his Habitation that ſpot of Earth
where there was acceſs to Honor by Virtue, and no Worth could be
excluded, rather than that where all Advancement ſhould procede
from the Will of one ſcarcely hearing and ſecing with his own Organs,
and gain’d for the moſt part by means leud and indirect: and all this in
the end to amount to nothing elſe but a more ſplendid and dan.
gerous Slavery. To clear this Point, I conſider'd how infcrutably Pro-
vidence carrys on the turns and ſtops of all Governments, ſo that moſt
People rather found than made them. The Conſtitutions of Men,
ſom not fit to be Maſters of their Liberty, ſom not capable, ſom not
willing; the Ambition of ſettled Tyrants, who breaking their own
Bonds have brought in violent Alterations; and laſtly, civil Diſcord,
have either corrupted or alter'd better Settlements.
BUT theſe are Obſervations rather than Arguments, and relate to
Fact rather than Reaſon. That which aſtoniſh'd me moſt was to ſee
thoſe of this Heroic and Learn’d Age, not only not riſing to Thoughts
of Liberty, but inſtead therof fooliſhly turning their Wits and Swords
againſt themſelves in the maintenance of them whoſe Slaves they are :
and indeed they can be no weak Cauſes that produce ſo long and ſettled
a Diſtemper; tho ſom of thoſe I mention’d, if not moſt of them, are
the true ones.
HE knows nothing that knows not how ſuperſtitiouſly the genera-
lity of Mankind is given to retain Traditions, and how pertinacious
they are in the maintenance of their firſt Prejudices, inſomuch that a
Diſcovery or more refin’d Reaſon is as inſupportable to them, as the
Sun is to an Ey newly brought out of Darkneſs
. Hence Opiniative
neſs (which is commonly proportion’d to their Ignorance) and a ge-
nerous Obſtinacy ſomtimes to Death and Ruin. So that it is no won-
der if we ſee many Gentlemen, whoſe Education inabled them only
B 2
to
4
The Grounds and
to uſe their Senſes and firſt Thoughts, ſo dazled with the Splendor
of a Court, prepoſſeſt with the Affection of a Prince, or bewitch'd
with ſom ſubdolous Favor, that they chuſe rather any hazard than
the Inchantment ſhould be diffolv'd. Others, perhaps a degree a.
bove theſe, yet in reſpect of fom Title ſtuck upon the Family (which
has bin as fortunat a Myſtery of Kingcraft as any other) or in reve-
rence to fom glorious former Archievements (minding not that in all
theſe caſes the People are the only effective means, and the King only
imaginary) think they ſhould degenerat from Bravery in bring-
ing on a Change. Others are witheld by Sloth and Timorouſneſs,
either not daring, or unwilling to be happy; ſom looking no further
than their privat Welfare, indifferent at the multiplication of public
Evils ; others (and theſe the worſt of all) out of a pravity of Na-
ture ſacrificing to their Ambition and Avarice, and in order to that,
following any Power, concurring with any Machinations, and ſup-
porting their Authors: while Princes themſelves (train’d up in theſe
Arts, or receiving them by Tradition) know how to wind all their
humors to their own advantage, now foiſting the Divinity of their
Titles into Pulpits, now amuzing the People with Pomp and Shews,
now diverting their hot Spirits to ſom unprofitable foren War (mak-
ing way to their accurs d ends of Revenge or Glory, with the effuſion
of that Blood which ſhould be as dear to them as their own) now
ſtroking the People with ſom feeble but inforc'd Law, for which not-
withſtanding they will be paid (and 'tis obſerv'd, the moſt notorious
Tyrants have taken this Courſe) now giving up the eminenteſt of
their Miniſters (which they part with as indifferently as their Robes)
to the Rage and Fury of the People ; ſo that they are commanded and
condemnd by the ſame Mouth, and the credulous and ignorant, be-
lieving their King divinely ſet over them, fit ſtill, and by degrees grow
into Quiet and Admiration, eſpecially if luld aſleep with ſom ſmall
continuance of Peace (be it never ſo injuſt, unſound, or dangerous)
as if the Body Politic could not languiſh of an internal Diſeaſe, tho its
Complexion be freſh and chearful.
THOSE are the Reaſons which (if I conceive aright) have ſtu-
pify'd the leſs knowing part of Mankind. Now, how the more
ſearching part have foodly miſcarry'd, will fall under conſideration.
FIRST then, we need not take the pains to demonſtrat how eaſy
a thing it is for men of Acuteneſs, not converſant in Civil Affairs, not
only to miſcarry in the Apprehenſion, but even in their Judgment of
them: for they, inſtead of bringing the Series and Reaſon of things
into Rule and Method, uſe on the contrary to meaſure them by their
own preſuppos'd Speculation; and by that means becom incapable of
weighing rightly the various Incidences and Circumſtances of Buſineſs.
For it is to be obferv'd, that the Theorems of no Art or Profeſſion are
either more eaſily found, or of more difficult practice than thoſe of
Policy; ſo that it is no wonder if Men merely contemplative, fail fo
oft in the very laying of Grounds, as we ſhall anon inſtance. Now
how fruitful Daintys Error and Abfurdity are, we all know. But
more eſpecially the Contentions of contemplative Men are moſt nu-
merous, various, and endleſs; for wrangling is with them an Art,
and they are indu'd with that ungenerous Shame, never to acknowlege
their Miſtakes. Moreover, their Principles are moſt times ill-grounded,
and it is to be fear’d that in their Superſtructures they as often call in
their
Reaſons of Monarchy.
5
their Imaginations as their Judgment to frame Arguments. Befides,
theſe men fighting only with Pen, Ink and Paper, feldom arrive at a
means to decide the Quarrel
, by which he that gains the laſt word is
ſuppos’d Conqueror ; or the other leaves almoſt as inglorious a Con-
queſt to the Victor, as if he had bin overthrown.
THAT which I would infer from all this, is, that the Generality
of ſpeculative Men, for the moſt part guiding their Underſtandings by
thoſe notions which they find in Books, fall not ſeldom by this means
into conſiderable Errors. For all Books, thoſe I mean that are human,
and fall directly under our Conſideration, either lay down practical
Things and Obſervations of Kingſhip, or ſom general and univerſal
Notions, or elſe controverſially affert Monarchy againſt ſom Oppoſers.
Now in the two latter there are generally found two grand and inſup.
portable Fallacys, the firſt wherof is, that they fraudulently converſe
in Generals, and (to borrow the School-terms) ſpeak of that in the
Abſtract which they ſhould do in the Concrete : As for example, where
they ſhould aſſert the particular Right of this or that Prince, they cun-
ningly or ignorantly lay out moſt of their Diſcourſe about Monarchy in
general
, and often weary and amaze the Diſpute before they com to
the true ground and ſtating of the Quarrel, wherby the Readers (di-
verted by ſuch Prepoſſeſſion, and intangled by general Notions of Au-
thority, Power and Government) ſeldom deſcend into the conſiderati-
on of Particulars, where the great Scruple and Difficulty for the moſt
part lys. So that any King (be his Acceſs to the Government never ſo
fraudulent and unjuſtifiable) coms to be look’d on as ſacred, authori-
tative, and by degrees begins not to bluſh at the Attributes of Sacred
Majeſty, Grace, and Highneſs, or any other Terms that the ſervil
Flattery and witty Barbarity of Courtiers can give to them: nay, ſom
even of the wickedeſt of the Roman Emperors could be content to be
faluted with Perennitys and Divinitys; wheras if Men would call
their Reaſon into counſel, they might find that theſe blazing Stars
were opace Bodys,and did ſhine only by Reflection: Theſe Men having
no more Lufter than either the Cabal of their own ſtate and diſtance,
or the wretched Impoſition upon the People, caſts on them. For did
Men deveft the Authority from the Perſon, they would then common-
ly find it inconſiderable, if not poſitively evil. And again, conſider
Áuthority in it ſelf as a thing fixt, real, immutable, and (when juſtly
adminiſtér’d) ſacred, they might find, that granting a Prince to be the
moſt regular, juſt Perſon in all the world, yet many Men as good join'd
with him, intruſted, and concurring to the fame end, might do much
more good; and that to deny this, were to be as irrational as to deny
that one perſon could do any good at all. But however, this I take to
be certain and demonſtrable out of their own Principles, that Kings be-
ing only to be conſider’d in reſpect of the Truſt and Power lodg’d in
them, a number of Men by as juſt means (not to ſay better) inveſt-
ed with the ſame Truſt and Power, are every jot as ſacred, and of as
much Divine Right as any Monarch is, the Power being eſſentially
the ſame, united or divided, as if a Commiſſion be to one or three. It
will follow then, that Republics may be as juſt and authoritative as
Kingſhips; and then their radical Argument of the Jure Divino of
Kingſhip is wholly enervated, and the other render'd equally as Sove-
rain. And I am to note (but this is only tranſiently) the Poorneſs, or,
to ſay better, the Blaſphemy of that Argument which flouriſhes out
Kings
6
The Grounds and
Kings as the Types of Divinity, and vainly laviſhes ſom Metaphyſics,
to prove that all things have a natural tendency to Oneneſs; nay, the
itch of fom merry Wits has carry'd them to run over moſt of the Di-
vine Attributes (as ſom Engliſh Lawyers have talk'd of the legal, I
muſt ſay phantaſtical Ubiquity and Omniſcience of our Kings, tho we
ſee the contrary; and ſom Civilians have ſaid as much about the Empe-
ror before them) wheras they ſhould conſider, that the immenſe Sim-
plicity of God flows out in its ſeveral Operations with ineffable variety,
God being every where and the ſame, or, as the Platoniſts ſay, a Cen-
ter in every part of its Circle, a Spirit without Quantity, Diſtance, and
Comprehenſion; wheras Man is a determinat narrow Being, who do-
ing one thing, ceaſes to do another, and thinking of one thing is forc'd
to quit his former thought. Now how fit he is to be a Shadow of this
Archetype, let any judg, unleſs lie could be refin’d from his Corporei-
ty, and inlarg’d into a proportionable Immenſity. Beſides, I know
not whether it be ſafe to think or no, That as God, who, for the moſt
part,indues Men with Gifts ſutable to the places to which he calls them,
would in fom meaſure pour out his Spirit proportionat to theſe Men,
wheras moſt commonly we find them, notwithſtanding their extra-
ordinary advantages of Society, Education, and Buſineſs, as weak Men
as any other : and good Princes being ſway'd by the Advice of Men,
good and wiſe, and the bad ſeduc'd by Men of their own Inclinations,
what are all Monarchys but in reality Optimacys? for a few only eſ-
ſentially govern under the name of one, who is utterly as unable as the
meaneſt of thoſe over whom he claims Superiority:
THE fecond Fallacy is this, That Men, while they labor thus to
ſupport Monarchy, tell us not what kind of Monarchy it is, and con-
ſequently gain nothing, tho we ſhould grant them the former Propoſi-
tion to be true. For what dos it avail to tell me of the Title of ſuch
a Prince, if I know not by what Title he holds? Grant it were viſible
to me that ſuch a Man was mark'd out by Providence to be my Gover-
nor, yet if I cannot tell what kind of one, whether abſolute, mixt, li-
mited, merely executive, or only firſt in order, how ſhall I know to
direct my Obedience? If he be abſolute, my very natural Liberty is
taken away from me; nor do I know any Power that can make any
Man ſuch, the Scripture ſetting juſt limitations and reſtrictions to all
Governors. If mixt and limited, I muſt know the due Temper and
Bounds wherby he is to rule, or elſe he may uſurp or be miſtaken, and
I oppreſt or injur’d. If executive, the Power fundamentally reſides
not in him, but in the Great Council, or them intruſted by the People;
then I adore only a Shadow. Now if any Prince of Europe can really
clear up theſe Miſts, and ſhew the Lines of his Government drawn fair-
ly, and his Charter whole and authentic, like that of Venice and anti-
ent Rome, for my part, I'll be the firſt man ſhall ſwear him Allegiance,
and the laſt that will preſerve him. But you will find that they will
tell you in general about their Office, and in particular of their Claims
of Succeſſion, Inheritance, and Anceſtors; when look but three or four
Storys back, and you will meet either ſom favage unnatural Intruſion,
diſguiz’d under ſom forc'd Title or chimerical Cognation, or elſe fom
violent Alteration, or poſſibly ſom ſlender Oath or Articles, hardly ex-
torted and imperfectly kept. Now if any man that will but run over
theſe Rules, and apply them to any Hiſtory whatever (as we ſhall ex-
emplify in that of Scotland, upon which for the preſent we have pitcht)
and
*
Reaſons of Monarchy.
and not find moſt Titles ambiguous, the Effects of former Monarchy:
(for where, in a Catalogue of forty Kings, can you almoſt ſhew me
three good ones, but things merely ſtrugling to maintain their Titles
and domeſtic Intereſt?) ruinous to the People, who for the moſt part
conſider them no otherwiſe than as to be reſcu'd from violent Confuſi-
on, not as they conduce to the poſitive Happineſs of a civil Life; I ſay,
all this will be found to be true, or my ſmall Converſation in Books is
extremely falſe. And truly I conceive reading of Hiſtory to be the
moſt rational Courſe to ſet any Judgment right, becauſe it inſtructs by
Experience and Effects, and grounds the Judgment upon material 06-
fervations, and not blindly gropes after Notions and Cauſes, which to
him are tantum non inſcrutabile ; but of that anon. A main Miſtake
under this Topic has bio an erroneous compariſon and application of
matters Civil and Military; for Men obſerving that mixt Councils a-
bout Generals, Plurality, Equality of Commands, frequent and ſud-
den Military Alterations, have brought no ſinalDiſtempers and Dangers
to ſeveral Governments and Attemts; therefore they preſently con-
clude, that in Civils alſo it is the ſafeſt to continue a Command in one
hand for preventing the like Diſturbances. But here they are deceiv’d;
Civil matters conliſt in long debate, great conſideration, patient ex-
pectation, and wary foreſight, which is better to be found in a number
of choice experienc'd Heads, than in one ſingle Perſon, whoſe Youth
and Vigor of Spirit inables him rather to Action, and fills him with
that noble Temerity which is commonly ſo happy in Martial Affairs;
that muſt be guided always to improve Occaſions, which are ſeldom to
be found again, and, which miſtaken, are to be ſcarcely amended.
Beſides, the Ferocity of daring Spirits can liardly be bounded while
they ſtand level; ſo that it is no wonder if they extinguiſh all Emula-
tions by putting the Power into the hands of one, wheras in a Com-
monwealth it is quite otherwiſe: and Factions (unleſs they be cruelly
exorbitant) do but poiſe and balance one another; and many times,
like the diſcord of Humors upon the natural Body, produce real good,
to the Government. That ſlender conceit, that Nature ſeems to dreſs
out a Principality in moſt of her works, as among Birds, Bees, &c. is
ſo ſlender indeed (in regard they are no more Chiefs than what they
fancy them, but all their Prepotency is merely predatory or
oppreſſive;
and even Lions, Elephants, Crocodils and Eagles, have ſmall incon-
ſiderable Enemys, of which they ſtand in fear, and by which they are
often ruin'd) that the Recital confutes it; and if it were fo, yet unleſs
they could prove their One Man to be as much more excellent than the
reſt as thoſe are, and that ſolely too, I ſee not what it would advantage
them, ſince to comply with the deſign of Nature in one, they would
contradict it in others, where ſhe is equally concern'd. But theſe Phi-
lological and Rhetorical Arguments have not a little hinder'd the ſe-
verer Diſquiſition of Reaſon, and prepoſſeſs’d the more eaſy Minds
with Notions ſo much harder to be laid aſide, as they are more erro-
neous and pleaſing.
THESE are the fundamental Errors that have miſled the Judg.
ment; now thoſe which have miſguided the Conſcience, lave princi-
pally proceded from the Miſinterpretation of Scripture; and therfore
ſeeming Sacred, have bin leſs examin’d and doubted, as carrying the
moſt Authority. Thus in the Old Teſtament, there being ſuch fre-
quent mention of Kings, which notwithſtanding were given in Wrath,
f
they
8
The Grounds and
they ſuperſtitiouſly maintain not only the neceſſity, but even the im-
punity of Kings; wheras we know not their Powers and Limitati-
ons, and it is inconſequent to argue, That becauſe Judea was ſo go-
vern'd, we ſhould follow the fame Pattern, when we find neither
Precept, Conſequence, nor Neceſſity convincing us. And it is mad-
neſs to think that while the Divine Spirit fo freely and velemently
exclaims againſt the Iniquity of men, God would authorize it ſo far as
to leave it in them only unpuniſhable who ſhould exterminat and re-
form it. As for the Antiquity from A D AM, it is true, before his Fall
his Dominion was large and wide, but it was over the Beaſts that after
his Fall learn’d to rebel againſt him; and economically, not deſpo-
tically, over his Wife and Children. But what is this to Civil Ġo-
vernment? In the New Teſtament (for I the brieflier paſs over this
head, in regard it has bin ſo copiouſly treated upon by thoſe under
whoſe Profeſſion it falls, and that it dos nor immediatly conduce to
my Deſign) the principal Argument has bin the meekneſs of CHRIST
and his compliance with Civil Powers, which certainly, if he had bin
diſpos’d to have reſiíted, ſay they, he could as eaſily have overthrown,
as with a few Cords whip the Buyers and Sellers out of the Temple.
But he, that was the Wiſdom of his Father, rather thought fit to build
up his Kingdom (which is not earthly, nor known of earthly men)
in Meekneſs and Obedience to Civil Powers, which are perpetually
chang’d and hurry'd at the Will of the firſt Mover, otherwiſe he
would never have concern'd himfelf ſo much in.giving Dues to C#-
SAR, and to God what is Gods; intimating the diſtinct Obedience
owing by all men, as Chriſtians, and CitizensWhen, granting Mo-
narchy the moſt and only lawful Government, yet every one knows,
that knows any thing of the Roman Story, that Augustus had no
more Title to that Government, than to any of thoſe over whom he
uſurp'd, and that his Acceſs to the Government was as fraudulent and
violent as could be. Another Error is the miſtaking of the word
* Auvel ress: * Powers, when it's clear the Scripture ſpeaks of it in a Latitude, as
Rom. 13. 'extending it to all ſorts of eſtabliſh'd Governments. Now men have
fallly pretended, that thoſe Powers were only meant of Kings; and
what by an indiſcrete collation of the places of the Old, and violent
wreſtings of others of the New Teſtament, they perfected the other
grand Miſtake ; which ſince it has bin already clear'd up, and as we ſaid
is but collateral with us for the preſent, we ſhall no further mention it.
AS for the alleg'd Examples and Speeches of the Primitive Times,
I ſee not much in them conſiderable: for tho Inſurrections againſt
Princes cannot be produc'd, or rather much is ſaid againſt them,
yet
we are to conſider, that the Goſpel of CHRIST (which was at that
time not much défild by the World) engages not to any Domina-
tion, but (wholly taken up with its own Extafys, ſpiritual Delights
and Expectations) neglects all other Affairs as ſtrange and dangerous.
And moreover (tho I know what has bin ſaid to the contrary) I
cannot find, after well conſidering thoſe Ages, any probable ground
how, if they would have rebeld, they could have made any Head.
They were indeed numerous, but then they had Legionarys among
them; and who knows not what an ineffectual thing a People is (be
it never fo deſirous ) when overaw'd by the Soldiery? And they were
a People (as Greatneſs to God and Man is different) not conſiderable
for their worldly Power (for how few eminent Commanders were
converted
Reaſons of Monarchy.
9
converted in the firſt Ages?) but out of his own mere choice, ſo that
it was not ſtrange if they could not do much. For God, as lie choſe
the weakeſt means in planting the Goſpel, even Fiſhermen; ſo, in the
primitive Propagation he cal?d the weaker Men, tho Chriſtianity af-
terwards grew ample and auguſt, and Kings were proud to give their
Names to it.
A S for the Fathers (ſuppoſing them free of their many Adultera-
tions, Interpolations, and all thoſe Errors and Incertaintys which the
proceſs of time and fraud of men has foiſted into them) they are to be
accepted only as Witneſſes, not as Judges : that is to ſay, they may
prove matter of fact, but none of their words matter of Right; eſpe-
cially if we conſider their Writings, either Homilys, Commentarys,
or Controverſys, which are ever directed to another end than this is,
and they themſelves (men ſecluded from Buſineſs) are ſo much more
unable to judg and reſolve civil Controverſys, in regard the unhappi-
neſs of the latter times las produc'd many Controverſys not known or
thought of in their days, which not falling directly under their Profef-
fion, cannot receive any Light or Authority from them.
HAVING thus conſider'd Kingſhip, and how well it has appear'd
thro the falſe Lights of the Underſtanding, we ſhall now conſider,
whether, taking it by it ſelf, its Foundations be laid upon a Cylinder
or upon a Cube: and this, I think, we are the likelieſt to do, if we
conſider them in their Rights and Uſes, or, to ſpeak plainer, in their
Legality and Policy; ſo that if we find that none of the ways of re-
taining their Crowns can be authentic except one, and that one makes
againſt them, we ſhall ſee we have no juſt cauſes of blind Adoration
or implicit Obligation to truckle under any of their Commands. And
if again we diſcover that ſort of Government it felf is not ſo profitable
to the end of civil Happineſs, but rather diametrically oppoſit to it;
we may ſuppoſe that men are either ſtrangly obſtinat, or elſe they
might eradicat an Error which not only offers ſo many Prejudices to
their Underſtanding, but that has ſuch an evil Influence upon their
external Welbeing.
WE have then to conſider, that for One man to rule over Many,
there muſt neceſſarily be pretended ſome Right, tho it be but colora-
ble ; for either he muſt be choſen by the People as their Arbitrator
and ſupreme Judg, or elſe he muſt by force of Arms invade them, and
bring them to Obedience, which he by force preſerving for his Sons
or Succeſſors, makes way for a third Claim, which is Inheritance. A
fourth ſome have invented, tho were it real, it is but a difference of
the laſt, and I therfore ſhall mention it under that Head. But to the
Conſideration.
FIRST therfore Election, ſuppoſing the People, either finding
themſelves unable to weild their own Happineſs, or for preventing of
Diſorder, make choice of one Man to be ſet over them, it here in-
ſtantly follows, that the Authority is in the People, and flowing from
them; for Choice argues a Power, and being clected a Subordination
to it; in the end, I mean, tho not in every act. Now there is none
choſen but for ſom End, or for ſom Intentions reciprocal betwixt both
Partys; for otherwiſe ſuch a choice were but Dotage, and conſequent-
ly invalid: Wherefore thus it will follow, that thoſe who pretend to
King it upon this Topic, muſt either ſhew a formal Election (which
I think many Kings are not able to do) or if he can ſlew one, pro-
C
duce
+
1
1
10
The Grounds and
duce alſo the Conditions and Ends for which lie was thoſen. Now all
parts being either implicit or explain’d, let him exhibit the Covenant,
that it may be known whether he governs according to it or not; for
if he tranſgreſſes, he forfeits, and the others are abfolv'd from their
promis'd Obedience. If the Agreement be unwritten or intentional;
either Party is relatively ty’d; and then if he dos any thing againſt the
welfare of the People (that Soverain Law and end of all Governments)
the People may not only juſtly ſuppoſe the former Capitulation broken,
but even endeavor, by what poſſible means they can, to reſtore them-
ſelves to their former Rights: for why ſhould the making of a Compact
prejudice any
when it is once broken? And here comes in another Fal-
Iacy, with which the Aſſertors of Royalty have ſo flouriſh’d, that an
Agreement between a People and one Man ſhould defcend to his Porte-
rity; wheras it is to be conſider'd, that the People chuſing one man is
commonly in conſideration of his Perſon and perſonal Merit; which not
being the ſame in his Son (as commonly Familys in the Horizon are in
the Meridian, the Founders being braver than any that follow after
them) that very intent is fruſtrated and ceaſes; and the People provid-
ing for the Happineſs of a few years, which are determinable with in-
certainty of the latter part of the Life of one man, run themſelves and
their Poſterity into an eternal Inconvenience (for any thing they know)
of bad Governors. And if the People would never ſo formally agree
with him, that in regard of his Merits or felicity of Actions, his Son
ſhould be receiv'd in that place, yet would they not ſtand to it, that ve-
ry Pact expiring with the lite of either. For my Farlier may leave me
notionally a Slave in a Tenure, (a thing frequent with our Anceſtors)
or as Civilians term it, a Feodary, with which I am content, in reſpect
of the Advantage it brings me, or becauſe my own Eſtate is too little
to be independent, and therfore I think it good prudence to be ſhelter'd
under the protection of the greater ; but my natural Liberty, that is to
ſay, to make my Life as juſtly happy and advantageous to me as I may,
he can no more give away from me than my Underſtanding or Eyſight:
for theſe are Privileges with which God and Nature have indud
me,
and theſe I cannot be deny'd but by him that will alſo deny mea Being.
But to go on, Suppoſe a ſecond Generation ſhould accept the Son, and a
third a Grandſon, yet this confirms not a fourth; and the People very
impoliticly ſtrengthen and confirm the Power by continuance, and in a
manner with their own hands lay the Foundation of Abſoluteneſs;
their Governors themſelves growing in Intereſts, increaſing in Allian-
ces and Forces : ſo it is very improbable but that within a little they
grow too big and formidable
, and leave nothing of Liberty except the
Name, and (if they be leſs cunning) not that. A pertinent Example
of this, and ſo near us that I cannot paſs it, we ſee in young Orange
and the Low Countrys at this day, who continuing his Progenitors for
their ſignal Services, and him for theirs, are now puniſh'd for their
gen
nerous and indiſcrete rewarding of Virtue, that their Liberty was lately
almoſt blown up before they well perceiv'd it to be undermin’d, and they
are now at charge to maintain their own Oppreſſion. As for that formal
Election and Stipulation, who ſees not whata vain and ridiculous cheat
it is, they coming with Swords in their hands to demand the Scepter of
a weak and ſtupid multitude that appears only to gaze upon the Cere-
monys,
and whoſe refuſal were ineffectual? but it is a gracious piece of
the Cabal of Tyranny to deceive the People with Shadows, Fantaſms,
and names of Liberty.
ተ
-
AS
Reaſons of Monarchy.
II
A S for thoſe that intrude by Force, they cannot certain'y have the
Forhead to infer any Right, they being but, as the Pirat ſaid to A L E X-
ANDER, public and more magnificent Robbers. Certainly theſe are
the NIMRODS, the great Hunters, Gods Scourges, and the Burdens
of the Earth; and whether they be Founders of Empires, or great
Captains (as BocCALIN diſtinguiſhes them) they ought rather to
be remember'd with horror and deteſtation, than have that undue Re-
verence with which they commonly meet.
: YET theſe are they that lay the Foundations of Succeſſion, and
from theſe do the Succeſſors claim, and enjoy with the leſs reluctance,
becauſe the regret of the Violences, and hate of the firſt daily wears
out; whether it be by the continuance of Peace that charms men into
a 'love of eaſe, or that the continuance of Slavery enfeebles their Minds,
that they rather chufe to look at their preſent Enjoyment than real
Happineſs; ſo that it is not ſtrange if the Perſon of their Oppreſſor be-
comes in time adorable, and lie himſelf thinks that confirm'd and ju-
ſtify'd to him in proceſs of time, to which in the beginning he had no
right. But if we conſider the buſineſs a little higher, we might find
that ſince neither the People (as we have prov'd before) have power
to make themſelves Vatlals, and the Intruders themſelves cannot pre-
tend any juſt Title; their Domination is merely illegal, and apt to be
ſhaken off with the firſt conveniency, it being every whit as equitable,
that theſe men ſhould be judg’d Enemys of Mankind, and condemn’d
to die the death of Parricids for uſurping a Power, as NERO for a-
buſing it. But I would fain ask the Regious Defenders, by what Law
they can maintain Governments to be inherent in one, and to be tranſ-
mitted to his Ofspring ? If they ſay by the Law of God, I would de-
mand again how they can make this Law appear to me? If they ſay
that the Scripture contains the Right and ſacredneſs of Kings, I ask
them again, How they know that God extends that Privilege and Au-
thority to this King? "If they fay, that he is involv'd in the general
Right, they do but run into a Circle; unleſs they can ſhow me, that
all his Approches to the Government were regular, and ſuch as God
was pleas'd with, or elſe God had by ſom Sign and Wonder declar'd
his approbation of him; for without theſe two, they muſt make God
the Author of Evil, which is impious, and pretend his Commiſſion
for an unlawful Act; and by the ſame right, any other (as a Tyrant,
for example) may pretend it to an Action never ſo unjuſt, it being no
inuſual thing to borrow the face of Divinity, even upon ſom foul Iin-
poſtures, as (to forbear further Inſtances) Numa's Conference withi
ÆGERIA, SCIPIO's Retirement into the Capitol, and SERTO-
RIUS's white Hart.
Now if they pretend the Law of Nature, they muſt demonſtrat to
us, both that ſhe endow'd men with inequal Freedom, and that ſhe
ſhap'd out ſuch a Man to rule; whereas it appears on the contrary, that
all Men naturally are equal : for tho Nature with a noble Variety has
made different the Features and Lineaments of Men, yet as to Free-
dom, till it be loſt by ſom external means, ſhe has made every one a
like, and given them the fame Deſires. But ſuppoſe ſhe had intended
ſuch a Family for Government, and had given them ſom illuſtrious
Marks, as we read of fom that had, whether by the imagination of
their Mothers, or by Deceit; yet then would Nature fall into a double
Irregularity, firſt in deſerting her Method of making all free, and ſe-
C 2
condly
--
12
The Grounds and
condly in making her general Work merely ſubſervient, and ſeconda-
ry to her particular; which how contrary it is to that beautiful Har.
mony of hers, I need not much infift. Now if they ſay, they are Fa-
thers of the People, and for that reaſon they call themſelves the Heads,
inferring the People to be no more than a Trunk, it's only metaphori-
cal, and proves nothing: for they muſt remember, that' ſince Father
has a relation upon which it depends, and upon whoſe removal it va-
niſhes, they themſelves cannot bring any ſuch ; for by phyſical pro-
creation they will not offer it; and for metaphorical Dependence, it
will com to nothing, we ſeeing People languiil when their Princes are
fulleſt, and, like Leeches, rather willing to burſt than to fall of; and
on the contrary, the People upon the removal of a Prince cheerful and
reliev'd. Now if there were ſottrict a Union between theſe two, ſuch
a Contrariety and Antipathy could never appear; for certainly when
any two Perſons endeavour to gain ground one upon another, there is
an Enmity, whatever is pretended. Beſides, if theſe men would be
Fathers, it were then their duty to do like Fathers, which is to pro-
vide for, defend and cheriſh; wheras on the contrary, it is they them-
ſelves that eat the bread out of the mouths of their Children, and
thro the groans of the Poor.
of the Poor. And wheras Flattery has ſaid, that what
they draw up in Vapors they ſend down in Showers, yet are we ſure
that ſuch rains are for the moſt part unfruitful, if not ominous and in-
fectious. If they pretend the Law of Nations, it were well they would
declare to us firſt what this Law is, and whether generally agreed on or
no by Nations. If they fay, yes, they muſt reſolve whether explicit-
ly or implicitly : if they ſay the former, let them produce them; if the
latter, they muſt demonftrat, that all Nations are agreed in ſuch and
ſuch Notions, and all men of theſe Nations, ſince every one muſt be
of equal capacity: When on the contrary, tho the Underſtandings
of moſt men, whom we know or have convers'd with, ſeem to agree
in ſom general maxims, but unpoliſh'd, unnumbred, and unmethodiz’d,
yet we ſee many Nations differing from us in many things, which
we think clearly, fundamentally, and naturally true ; neither do Cli-
mats and Education only fo diverſify the Minds of men, but even their
Underſtandings, and the different ways of thinking ſo diſtinguiſh
even thoſe of one Country, that tho we may pleaſe our ſelves in think-
ing that all mens thoughts follow the fantaſtical method of ours, yet we
might find, if we were perfe&tly converſant with all men of the
World, and well read in their Authors (as we are not with half of
them, no, nor any one man with the twentieth part) that there are
ſcarce four or five Axioms, excepting, as they make a part of the Law
of nature, would be univerſally receiv’d. Now (for I have bin the
longer by reaſon that this imaginary Law has bin ſo held up by the Ci-
vilians, and made the ſubterfuge of ſo many conſiderable Diſputes) if
it be ſo weak as that we can ſcarce tell whether it has a being or no, for
even that which we account the moſt facred piece of it, the violation
of public Meſſengers, the Tartar and Muſcovite
, unleſs reſtrain’d by
fear, break it every day. What then are the Arguments deduc'd from
it? or if there were ſuch a Law, what would it avail ſuch a particular
man? for why ſhould other Nations impoſe a Governor where they
are not concernd? And if they pretend this Law as to the preſerva-
tion and impunity of their perſons, the fame Anſwer will ſerve again,
with this addition, That they make an Offender incapable of puniſh-
ment,
.
.
Reaſons of Monarchy
1
.
13
ment, which is but to give them a Commiſſion to offend. Now if
they run upon that diſtinction of ſuſpending only, and not puniſhing
(as if forſooth this kind of People muſt be preſervd, tho by the ruin
of Mankind, to immediat Vengeance) then I ſay, Thát Suſpenſion
is really a Puniſhment; and if his Demerits can deſerve that, I ſee not
but that upon a proportionable Increaſe, they may deſerve Dethroni-
zation or Death, as clearly as two and two make four, and four more
make eight. If they allege poſitive or municipal Laws, and number
Homages, they are not much the nearer, ſince that all ſuch Laws are
but Rivulets and Branches of them we before examin'd; and ſince we
found that thoſe ſpeak ſo little in their favor, that which theſe do can-
not ſignify much, eſpecially ſince Princes, who are ever watchful to
improve all occaſions of this nature, can either by terror or artifice
draw Aſſemblys, or the major part of them, to their own Lure ; nay,
even the worſt of them have not forgot to be ſolicitous in this caſe.
But it muſt be remark’d, That whatever poſitive Laws are repugnant
to thoſe general ones, they are injurious, and ought to be repeald.
And truly it is a ſad Obſervation, that as Monarchs grow, either out of
the weakneſs of Government, and (as I may ſay, its Pupilage, as
ROMULUS and THESEUS did at Rome and Athens, or elſe our of
the diſeaſe or depravation of it, as CÆSAR again invaded Rome : ſo
have the People bin never more fond of them, than when Manners
were at the higheſt corruption, which ever gave acceſs of ſtrength to
them ; nor have they more diſtaſted them, than when their Spirits and
Diſciplin were the moſt brave and healthful: fo fatally diſagreeing are
true Liberty, which is the very ſource of Virtue and Generoſity, and
the impotent Domination of a ſingle Tyrant, who commonly reigns
by no other means than the Diſcords of braver Citizens, who can nei-
ther indure Equality or Superiority among themſelves, and ratlier ad-
mit a general Vallalage, than juſt Equality; or by the Vices of the
baſer fort, which naturally reconcile them and Kings, and concern
them both in a bad Example. But ſuppoſe Succeſſion a thing facred
and inviolable, yet once break and interrupt it, it is little worth, either
the Uſurper being to be acknowlegʻd regular, or the whole Series
daſh'd out of order. Nay, we ſee Aſpirers themſelves either fo blinded
with their Pretences, or with Animoſity, and ſo crying up their own
Titles
, that it is almoſt impoſſible for any privat Judgment to do right
in this caſe, themſelves thwarting one another, and it cannot be in the
power of Nature that both ſhould be right. But who can inſtance one
Monarch whoſe Crown is come to him by untainted Succeſſion and
what Hiſtory will not confirm the Example I ſhall anon bring? Cer-
tainly tho Succeſſion were a thing that had not ſo little reaſon
or reali-
ty, yet I ſee not why men ſhould with ſuch a ſtrange pertinacy defend
it. Matters of Government ought to be managʻd by Prudence; buc
Succeſſion puts them into the lands of Fortune, when a Child incapa-
ble or infirm, under the regiment of a Nurſe, muſt (poſſibly) be
Supreme Governor, and thoſe whom either their Abilitys or Virtues
fit for it, ſubordinat or laid aſide. But what if the Perſon whomi ne-
ceſſity has fet at the ſtern be incapable, lunatic, weak, or vitíous, is
not this a good way to prevent Controverſys? yet this plainly ener-
vats all good Counſil, when a King ſhould have need of Tutors, and
that a multitude of People ſhould be commanded by one who com-
mands not
himſelf; and, when we ſcarce obey even excellent Princes, to
adore Shadows and weak ones.
AS
The Grounds and
14
ܪ
AS for BOXHORNIUS's diſtinction of Succeſſion, wherin the
next Heir muſt neceſſarily ſuccede by the original Right of the former,
I would ask him, whether the Predeceſſor were a Poſſeſſor or Uſu-
fructuary? If the firſt, all our former Arguments fall on him; if the
latter, it makes not for his Succeſſor, the People being: Owners: and
beſides, the diſtinction is one of his own coining, never pretended be-
fore; upon the firſt controverſy it is invalid, altho the firſt Founder
had a Right, as we have prov'd the contrary.
HAVING, with what brevity I could, brought to an end my firſt
Intention, I ſhall now fall upon the ſecond, which is the intrinſic value
and expediency of this Government, and ſom little compariſon with
other's, but herein we ſhall be ſhort, and only ſo far as concerns this.
And indeed it is a buſineſs ſo tickliſh, that even Mr. Hobs in his piece
de Cive, tho he aſſur'd himſelf that the reſt of his Book (which is
principally calculated for the aſſertion of Monarchy) is demonſtrated,
yet he douts whether the Arguments which he brings to this buſineſs
be ſo firm or not; and MALVEZZI contrarily remonftrats (in his
Diſcourſes upon Tacitus) that Optimacys are clearly better than
Monarchys, as to all advantages. And indeed if we look on the Argu-
ments for Monarchy, they are either Flouriſhes, or merely Notions ;
ſuch are the reference and perfection of Unity, which, fay they, muſt
needs work better and more naturally, as one ſimple cauſe (beſides
that it ſtills and reſtrains all other claims) than many coordinat: wher-
as they never conſider that tho among many joint Cauſes there may be
ſome jarring, yet like croſs Wheels in an Engin, they tend to the regu-
lation of thic wlivle. What violent Miſchiefs are brought in by the
Contentions of retenders in Monarchys, the Ambiguitys of Titles,
and lawleſs Ambition of Aſpirers? wheras in a fettled Republic all this
is clear and unperplex’d; and in cale any particular man aſpires, they
know againſt whom to join, and puniſh as a common Enemy. As for
that reaſon which alleges the advantage of Secreſy in buſineſs, it carries
not much with it, in regard that under that even moſt pernicious de-
figns may be carried on; and for wholſom Councils (baring fom more
nice Tranſactions) it inatters not how much they be toſt among thoſe
who are ſo much intruſted and concern'd in them, all bad deſigns be-
ing never in probability fo fecble and ineffectual, as wlien there are ma-
ny eyes to overlook them, and voices to decry them. As for that ex-
pedition in which they ſay Monarchs are ſo happy, it may as well fur-
ther a bad intention, as give effect to a juſt Council
, it depending on
the Judgment of a ſingle man, to whoſe will and ends all muſt refer;
wheras a ſelect number of intruſted Perſons may haften every oppor-
tunity with a juſt flowneſs as well as they, tho indeed (unleſs it be in
ſom Military critical Minutes) I ſee not ſuch an Excellency in the ſwift-
neſs of heady Diſpatch, precipitation in Counſils being fo dangerous
and ominous. As for what concerns privat Suitors, they may as ſpee-
dily and effectually (if not more) be anſwer'd in ſtaid Republics, as
in the Court of a King, where Bribery and un worthy Favorits do not
what is juſt, but what is deſir'd.
WITH theſe and many others as conſiderable (which partiy wil.
lingly, and partly in this penury of Books, forgettingly I país) do
they intend to ſtrengthen this fantáſtical and airy Building; but as fly
Controvertcrs many times leave out the principal Text or Argument,
bccauſe ſhould it be produc'd, it could nor be io eaſily aniwerd: fo
f
theſe
Reaſons of Monarchy.
is
1
theſe men tell us all the Advantages of Monarchy, ſuppoſing them ftill
well ſettled, and under virtuous men ; but you ſhall never hear them
talk of it in its corrupt ſtate under leud Kings and unſettled Laws; they
never let fall a word of the dangers of Interreigns, the Minoritys and
Vices of Princes, Miſgovernments, evil Councils
, Ambitions, Ambi-
guitys of Titles, and the Animoſitys and Calamities that follow them,
the neceſſary Injuſtices and Oppreſſions by which Monarchs (uſing
the Peoples Wealth and Blood againſt themſelves) hold them falt
in their Seats, and, by ſom ſuſpenſion of Divine Juſtice, dy not vio
lently.
WHEREAS other Governments, eſtabliſh'd againſt all theſe E-
vils, being ever of Vigor and juſt Age, ſettled in their own Right,
freed from pretences, ſerv'd by experienc'd and engagʻd Councils, and
(as nothing under the Moon is perfect) ſomtimes gaining and advan-
tag’d in their Controverſys, which have not ſeldom (as we may ſee
in Old Rome) brought forth good Laws and Augmentations of Free-
dom; whereas once declining from their Purity and Vigor, and (which
is the effect of that) raviſh'd by an Invader, they languish in a brutiſh
Servitude, (Monarchy being truly a Diſeaſe of Government) and like
Slaves, ſtupid with harſhneſs and continuance of the laſh, wax old
under it, till they either arrive at that period which God preſcribes to
all People and Governments, or elſe better Stars and Poſterity awaken
them out of that Lethargy, and reſtore them to their priſtin Liberty,
and its daughter Happineſs.
BUT this is but to converſe in Notions, wandring, and ill abſtract-
ed from things; let us now defiend to practical Obſervation, and
clearly manifeſt out the whole Series of Time and Actions, what
Circumſtances and Events have either uſher'd or follow'd one Race of
Kings, That if there were all the Juſtice in the World that the Go-
vernment of a Nation ſhould be intaild upon one Family, yet cer-
tainly we could not grant it to ſuch a one whoſe criminal Lives and
formidable Deaths have bin Evidences of God's Wrath upon it for ſo
many Generations.
AND ſince no Country that I know yields ſuch an illuſtrious Ex-
ample of this as Scotland dos, and it may be charity to bring into the
way ſuch as are miſſed, I have pitch'd upon the Scotifli Hiſtory, wher-
in as I have only conſulted their own Authors, as my fitteſt Witneſſes
in this caſe; fo have I (not as a juſt Hiſtory, but as far as concerns
this purpoſe) faithfully, and as much as the thing would permit, with-
out gloffes repreſented it: ſo that any, calm Underſtanding may con-
clude that the Vengeance which now is leveld againſt that Nation, is
but an attendent of this new introduc'd Perſon; and that he himſelf,
tho for the preſent he ſeems a Log among his Frogs, and ſuffers them
to play about him, yet God will ſuffer him (if the Engliſh Army pre-
vents not) to turn Stork and devour them, while their Crys ſhall not
be heard, as thoſe that (in ſpite of the warning of Providence, and the
light of their own Reaſons, for their own corrupt Intereſt and greedy,
Ambition) brought theſe Miſerys upon themſelves
.
1
1.
<
Ar
,
+
.
16
J
An Inſtance of the preceding REASONS out of
the SCOTISH HISTORY.
The Second Part.
A
1
45.
.
:
-7
ND now we com to our main buſineſs, which is the review of
Story, wherin we may find ſuch a direct and uninterrupted
Series, ſuch mutual Endearments between Prince and People,
and ſo many of them crown’d with happy Reigns and quiet Deaths
(two ſucceſſively ſcarce dying naturally) that we may conclude, they
have not only the moſt reaſon, but a great deal of excellent Intereſt
who eſpouſe the Perſon and Quarrel of tře hopeful Deſcendent of ſuch
a Family: nor ſhall we be ſo injurious to the Glory of a Nation,
proud with a Catalogue of Names and Kings, as to expunge a great
part of their number; tho fom, who have don it, affirm there can be
no probability that they had any other being than what HECTOR
BOYes, and the black book of Palley (out of which BUCHANAN
had moſt of his Materials) are pleas'd to beſtow on them, there being
no mention of the name of Scot in any Authentic Writer, till four
hundred years after CHRIST. No, we ſhall no more envy theſe
old Heroes to them, than their placing the Red Lion in the dexter Point
of their Eſcucheon. But tho we might in juſtice reject them as fa-
bulous and monkiſh, yet ſince they themſelves acknowlege them, and
they equally make againſt them, we ſhall run them over like genuin
1. Hiſtory. The firſt of this bleſſed Race was FERGUS; firſt General,
and afterward got himſelf made King: but no ſooner caſt away on the
Coaſt of Ireland, but a Contention ariſes about the validity of their
Oath to him, and Uncles are appointed to ſuccede, which argues it
Elective: fo FERITHAR IS Brother to FERG us is King, but his
Nephew forms a Conſpiracy againſt him, forces him to reſign and fly
to the Iles, where he dy'd. FERITHARIS dying ſoon after, was
.
ſuſpected to be poiſon'd. After him coms in MAIN (FERGUS'S
fecond Son) who with his Son DOR NADILLA, reign'd quietly fifty
ſeven years. But REUTHER his Son not being of age, the People
5.
make his Uncle NOTHAT take the Government; but he miſruling,
6. REUTHER, by the help of one Doual, rais'd a Party againſt him,
and beheads him, makes himſelf King with the indignation of the Peoa
ple that he was not elected : ſo that by the Kindred of NoTH A T he
is fought, taken, and diſplac’d; but afterwards makes a Party, and
regains. His Son THEREUS was too young,fothat his Brother R HEN-
TH A ſucceeded, but after ſeventeen years was glad to reſign. Well,
8.
Thereus reigns, but after fix years declines to ſuch Leudneſs that
they force him to fly, and govern by a Prorex. After his Death
9. 10. Josina his Brother, and his Son FINANare Kings, and quietly dy
fo.
BUT then coms Durst, one who ſlays all the Nobility at a
Banquet, and is by the People ſlain. After his Death the validity of
the Oath to FERGUS is call'd in queſtion, and the elective Power vin-
dicated; but at length EVEN his Brother is admitted, who tho he
ruld
2.
3.
.
4
7.
F.
1
II.
12.
*
Reaſons of Monarchy
17
1 2
1
:
7
ruld valiantly and well, yet he had GIllus a Baſtard Son, Vafer de
Regni cupidus. The next of the Line are Twins, DOCHAM and
DORGAL, Sons of DURST: they while they diſputed about pri-
ority of Age, are, by the artifice of GIllus, ſlain in a Tumult;
who makes a ſtrong Party, and ſeizing of a Hold, ſays lie was made
Superviſor by his Father, and ſo becoms King, cuts off all, the Race
13.
of Durst: but is after forc'd out of the Kingdom, and taken by
Even the Second his Succeſſor (who was choſen by the People) and
14.
by him put to death in Ireland. After EVEN coms EDER: after
15.
EDER his Son Even the Third, who for making a Law, that the 16.
Nobility ſhould have the enjoyment of all new marry’d Women before
they were touch'd by their Husbands, was doom'd to Priſon during
his Life, and there ſtrangld. His Succeſſor was his Kinſman ME-
17.
TELLAN: after whom was elected CARATAC, whom his Brother 18.
CORBRET fucceded. But then came DARDAN (whom the 19. 20.
Lords made to take on him the Government, by reaſon of the Noriage
of CORBRET's Son) who for his Leudneſs was taken by the People,
and beheaded.
AFTER him CORBRET the Second, whoſe Son LucTAC for 21. 22
his Leudneſs was by the People put to death; then was elected
MOGALD, who following his vitious Predeceſſors ſteps, found his
23
Death like theirs violent.
HIS Son CONAR, one of the Conſpirators againſt him, ſucce-
24.
ded, but miſgoverning was clapt in Priſon, and there.dy'd.
ETHODIUS his Siſter's Son ſucceded, who was ſain in the
25.
night in his Chamber by his Piper.
HIS Son being a Minor, SATRAEL his Brother was accepted,
who ſeeking to place the Succeſſion in his own Line, grew ſo hateful to
the People, that, not daring to com abroad, he was ſtrangld in the
night by his own Servants, which made way for the youngeſt Bro-
ther
DONALD, who ourdid the others Vices by contrary Virtues, 27
and had a happy Reign of one and twenty years.
ETHODIUS the Second, Son of the firſt of that name, was
28.
next, a dull inactive Prince, Familiariun tumultu occiſus.
HIS Son ATHIRCO promis'd fair, but deceiv'd their expecta 29.
tions with moſt horrid Leudneſs, and at length vitiated the Daughters
of NATHALOCK a Nobleman, and caus’d them to be whipt be-
fore his eys ; but ſeeing himſelf ſurrounded by Conſpirators, cluded
their Fury with his own Sword; his Brother and Children being forc'd
to fly to the Piets. NATHALOCK, turning his Injury into Am-
30.
bition, made himſelf King, and governd anſwerably; for he madə
moſt of the Nobility to be ſtrangļd; under pretence of calling them
to Council, and was after ſlain by his own Servants.
AFTÉR his Death ATHIRCO's Children were call'd back, and
3rd
FINDOC his Son, being of excellent hopes, accepted; who made
good what his Youth promis’d: lie bcat in ſundry Battels DONALD
the Ilander ; who ſeeing he could not prevail by force, fent two as
Renegados to the King, who (being not accepted) conſpire with his
Brother, by whoſe means one of tliem flew him with a Spear when he
HIS Brother DONALD fuccedes (the youngeſt of the three) who, 34
about to révénge his Brother's Death, hears the llander is enter'd Murá
D
May;
26.
.
was hunting
:
18
T be Grounds and
36.
38.
Tay; whom le incountring with inequal Forces, is taken Priſoner
with thirty of the Nobility, and whether of Grief, or his Wounds,
dy's in Priſon.
33. THE Ilander that had before uſurp'd the Name, now aſſum'd the
Power (the Nobles, by reaſon of their kindred Priſoners, being over-
aw'd) This man wanting nothing of an exquiſit Tyrant, was, after
twelve years Butcherys, flain by ČRATHLINTH Son of FIN DOC,
who under a diſguiſe found Addreſs and Opportunity. The brave
34. Tyrannicid was univerſally accepted, and gave no cauſe of Repen-
tance; his Reign is famous for a War begun between the Scots and
Picts about a Dog (as that between the Trojans and Italians for a white
Hart) and the defection of CAR AUSIUs from DIOCLESIA N,
which happen'd in his time,
35.
HIS Kinſman FINCORMAC ſucceded, worthy of memory for
little but the Piety of the Culdys (an Order of religious Men of that
time overborn by others ſucceding) He being dead, three Sons of
his three Brothers contended for the Crown: ROMACH as the eldeſt,
ſtrengthen’d by his Alliance with the Picts, with their aſſiſtance ſeiz'd
on it, forcing others to fly; but proving cruel, the Nobility conſpir'd
and flew him.
37
ANGUSIAN, another Pretender, ſuccedes, who being aſſaild
by NECTHAM King of the Picts, who came to revenge ROMACH,
routed his Army in a pitcht Battel; but NECTHAM coming again,
he was routed, and both he and NECTHAM ſlain.
FETHELMAC, the third Pretender, came next, who beating
the Piets, and waſting their Fields, HERG'UST, when he ſaw there
could be no advantage by the Sword, ſuborn'd two Pifts to murder
him, who drawing to conſpiracy the Piper that lay in his Chamber
(as the manner was then) he at the appointed time admitted them,
and there flew him.
39.
THE next was EVGE N Son of FINCORMAC, who was ſlain
in a Battel with the Piets, to the almoſt extirpation and baniſhment of
the Scots ; but at laſt the Picts, taking diſtaſt at the Romai?s, en-
40.
ter nto a ſecret League with the Scots, and agreed that FERGUS
(whoſe Uncle the laſt King was) being then in baniſhment, and of a
military breeding and inclination, ſhould be choſen King. With him
the Danes maintain’d a long War againſt the Romans, and puld down
the Picts wall: at laſt he and the King of Picts were in one day ſain
in a Battel againſt them. This Man's acceſs to Government was
ſtrange, ignotus Rex ab ignoto populo accerfitues, and may be thought
temerarious; he having no Land for his People
, and the Roman Name
inimical; yet founded he a Monarchy, there having been Kings ever
ſince; and we are to note, this is the firſt man that the founder Wri-
ters will allow to be real and not fabulous. Him ſucceded his Son
41.
EUGENIUS (whoſe Grandfather GRAHAM had all the power) a
warlike Prince, whom ſome ſay ſlain, ſome dead of a diſeaſe. After
42.
him his Brother DONGARD, who after the ſpending of five ſuper-
ftitious years, left the Crown (as they call it) to his youngeſt Bro-
43. ther Constantin; who from a good privat Man turn’d a leud
Prince, and was ſlain by a Nobleman, wlioſe Daughter he had raviſh’d.
44.
He was ſucceded by CÔNGAL, CONSTANTIN's Son, who came
a tolerable good Prince to a looſe People ; and having ſpent ſom two
and twenty years in ſlight excurſions againſt the Saxons, loſt the rute
f
helen
to
,
+
46.
48.
1
Reaſons of Monarchy.
12
to his Brother GORAN, who notwithſtanding he made a good League
45
againſt the Britans, which much conducd to his and the Peoples
ſettlement, yet in requital, after thirty four years, they made away
with him, which brought in EUGENIUS, the Third of that name,
the Son of CON GAL, who was ſtrongly ſuſpected to have a hand
in his Death, inſomuch that GORAN's
Widow was forc'd to fly into
Ireland with her Children. This man in thirty three years time did
nothing but reign, and make ſhort Incurſions upon the Borders; he
left the Rule to his Brother CONGAL, a monaſtical, fuperfticious, and 47.
inactive Prince, who reign’d ten years. KINNATEL his Brother
was deſigns for Succeſſor; yet AIDA N the Son of GORAN laid
his claim, but was content to ſuſpend, in reſpect of the Age and Dif-
eaſes of KINNATEL, which after fourteen Months took him out of
the World, and clear'd the controverſy, and AIDAN by the conſent 496
of COLUMBA (a Prieſt that govern'd all in thoſe days) came to be
King; a Man that, after thirty four years turbulently ſpent, being
beaten by the Saxons, and ſtruck with the Death of COLUMB A,
dy'd of Grief.
AFTER him was choſen KENNETH, who lias left nothing 50.
behind him but his Name. Then came EUGENIUS the Fourth, SI.
the Son of AIDAN (ſo irregular is the Scots Succeſſion, that we ſee
it inverted by Uſurpation or croſs Elections in every two or three Ge-
nerations) This man left an ambiguous Fame; for HECTOR BO E-
Ti us ſays he was peaceable; the Mamufcript, implacably fevere: He
reign'd lixteen years, and left his Son FERCHARD Succeſſor, who,
52
endeavoring to heighten the Prerogative by the Diſſenſions of the
Nobility, was on the contrary impeach'd by them, and call'd to an ac-
count, which he denying, was clapt in. Priſon, where he himſelf fav'd the
Executioner a labor. So that his Brother DONALD ſucceded, who
53.
being taken up with the Piety of thoſe days, left nothing memorable,
except that he in perfon interpreted Scots Sermons.to the Saxons. He
was follow'd by his Nephew FERCHARD, Son to the firſt of that 545
Name, a Thing like a King in nothing but his Exorbitancys, who in
hunting was wounded by a Wolf, which caſt him into a Fever, wher-
in he not obſerving the imposd Temperance, brought on himſelf the
loufy Diſeaſe; upon which diſcomforted, he was by the perſuaſion of
COLMAN (a religious man) brought out in his Bed cover'd with
Hair-cloth, where he made a public Acknowlegement to the People,
and ſoon after dy’d. MALDWIN, DONALD'S Son, follow'd,
55.
who after twenty years ignoble Reign was ſtrangled by his Wife.
EUGENIUs the Fifth ſucceded; Son (they ſay) of King Don 56.
GARD, tho Clironology ſeems to refute it. This man ſpent five
years in flight Incurſions, and was ſucceded by EUGENIUS the
57.
Sixth, Son of FER CHÁR D. This man is famous for a little Learn-
ing, as the times went, and the Prodigy of raining Blood ſeven days,
all Milkmeats turning into blood. AMBER KELLETH, Nephew
to EUGENIUS the Fifth, who ſucceded this rude Prince, while he
was diſcharging the burden of Nature, was ſlain by an Arrow from
an unknown hand. EUGENIUs the Seventh follow'd, who being
596
attemted by Conſpirators, had his new marry'd Wife ſlain in bed be-
fide
him ; for which he being accus’d, produc'd the Murderers before
his Trial, and was acquitted, and ſo ended the reſt of his 17 years in
Peace, recommending to the People MORDA Cs Son of AMBER-
D 2
KELLETH
58.
6o.
The Grounds and
64.
KELLE T1, who continuing a blank Reign, or it may be a happy
61. one, in regard it was peaceable, left it to ETFY N Son of EU Ghim
NIU s tlie Seventh : the firſt part of his Reign was peaceable; buit
Age obliging him to put the Government into the hands of four of lais
Servants, it happen'd to him, as it dos to other Princes, whoſe For-
tunes decay commonly with their Strength, that it was very unhappy
62. and turbulent: Which Miſerys EUGENIus the Eighth, Son of
MORDA G, reſtrain'd. But lie, it ſeems, having a Nature fitter ro
appeaſe Tumules than to enjoy Reſt, at the firſt enjoyment of Peace
broke into ſuch Leudneſs, that the Nobility at a meeting ſtabd him,
63. and made way for Fergus the Son of ETFYN, one like his Pre“
deceſſor in manner, death, and continuance of Reign, which was three
years ; the only diſſimilitude was, that the latters Wife brought his
Death; for which others being impeach'd, ſhe ſtept in and confeſt it;
and to avoid puniſhment, puniſh'd her felf with a knife. SOLU ATH,
Son of EUGENIus the Eighth, follow'd him, who tho his Gout
made him of leſs Action, yet it made his Prudence more viſible, and
65.
himſelf not illaudable: His Death brought in ACHAIus the Son of
ETFYN, whoſe Reign was innobled with an Iriſh War, and many
learned Men; beſides the Alliſtance lent Hungus to fight againſt
the Northumbrians, whom he beat in a famous Bartel, which if I
may mention the matter) was preſignify'd to Hungus in a Dream,
St. Andrew appearing to him, and alluring him of it; and in the time
of Battel a white Croſs (that which the Heralds call a Saltier, and we
fee commonly in the Scots Banners) appeard in the Sky, and this I
think co havé bin the occalion of that bearing, and an Order of Knights
of St. Andrexv, fomtimes in reputation in Scotland, but extinguiſhid,
for ought I can perceive, before the time of JAMES the Sixth, tho
the Collar and Pendant of it are at this day worn about the Scots
66. Arms. To this, man СONGAL his Couſin ſucceded, who left non
thing behind him but five years to ſtretch out the account of time.
DONGAL the Son of SOLUTh came next, who being of a Na-
ture fierce and inſupportable, there was an endeavor to ſet up ALPIN
Son of ACHAIus, which Deſign by ALPIN himſelf was fruſtat-
ed, which made the King willinger to aſſiſt ALPIN in his pretenſion
to the Kingdom of Pitts; in which. Attemt he was drown'd, and
68. left to ALPIN that which he before had ſo nobly refus’d, who maka
ing uſe of the former, rais’d an Army, beat the Picts in many ſignal
Victorys; but at laſt was flain by them, leaving his name to the place
69. of lais Death, and the Kingdom to his Son KENNETH.
ſeeing the People broken with the late War, and unwilling to fight,
drew them on by this Subtilty; he invites the Nobility to dinner, and
after plying them with Drink till midnight, leaves them fleeping on
the floor (as the manner was) and then hanging Fiſhskins about the
Walls of the Chamber, and making one ſpeak thro a Tube, and call
them to war; they waking, and half aſleep, ſuppos’d fomthing of
Divinity to be in it, aud the next morning not only conſented to War,
but (ſo ſtrange is deluded imaginacion) with unſpeakable Courage
fell upon the Enemy and put them to the rout; which being confirm'd
by other great Victorys, utterly ruind the Pietiſh Name. This man
may be added to the two FERGUSES, and truly may be ſaid to be
the Founder of the Scots Empire, not only in making that the middle
of liis Dominion, which was once the bounds, bur in confirming his
Acqui.
67.
This man
.
Reaſons of Monarchy
21
1
Acquiſitions with good Laws, having the opportunity of a long Peace,
which was ſixteen years, his whole time of Government being twen-
ty. This was he that plac'd that Stone, famous for that illufory Pro-
phecy, Ni fallat fatum, &c. (which firſt was brought oụt of Spain
into Ireland, and from thence into Argyle) at Scoon; where he put it
in a Chair, in which all his Succeſſors (till EDWARD the Firſt brought
it away) were crown'd, and ſince that all the Kings of England, till
the happineſs of our Commonwealth made it uſeleſs. His Brother
DONALD was his Succeſſor, a man made up of extremitys of Vir-
70.
tues and Vices; no man had more bravery in the Field, nor more
Vice at home, which increaſing with his yeras, the Nobility put him .
in priſon, where either for fear or ſcorn he put an end to his days,
leaving behind him his Brother CONSTANTIN, a Man wanting 715
nothing of him but his Vices, who ſtrugling with a potent Enemy (for
the Picts had call'd in the Danes) and driving them much into deſpair
(a Bravery that has not ſeldom rain'd many excellent Captains) was
taken by them, put into a little Cave, and there ſlain. He was ſuc-
ceded by Ethus his Brother, who had all his eldeſt Brother's Vices, 724
and none of his ſeconds Virtues; Nature, it ſeems, making two ex-
tremes and a middle in the three Brethren. This mán voluptuous and
cowardly, was forc'd to reſign; or, as others ſay, dy'd of Wounds
receiv'd in a Duel from his Succeſſor, who was GREGOR Y Son of 73.
DONGAL, who was not only an excellent Man, but an excellent
Prince, that both recover'd what the others had lost, and victoriouſly
travers’d the Northern Countys of England, and a great part of Ire-
Land; of whole King a Minor, and in his power, he generouſly made
no advantage, but ſettled his Country, and provided faithful and
able Guardians for him. Theſe things juſtly yield him the name of
Great. DONALD Son of CONSTANTIN the Second, by his
74.
recommendation, ſucceded in his power and Virtues, notwithſtanding
ſome ſay he was remov'd by Poiſon. Next was CONSTANTIN the
756
the Third, Son of ETHús, an unſtable perſon, who aſſiſted the
Danes, which none of his predeceſſors would do ; and after they had
deſerted him baſely, yet yielded them Succors, conſiſting of the chief
of the Scuts Nobility, which with the whole Daniſh Army were rout-
ed by the Saxons. This ſtruck him ſo, that he retir'd among the Culo
dys (which were as the Greec Caloyers, or Romiſh Monks at this day)
and there bury'd himſelf alive. After him was MILCOM, Son of 76.
DONALD the Third, who tho a good Prince, and well skild in the
Arts of Peace, was fain by a Conſpiracy of thoſe to whom his Virtue
was burdenſom. His Succeſſor was INDULF (by what Title I find
77.
nor) who fighting with the Danes that with a Navy unexpectedly came
into the Frith, was flain. Duf his Son ſuccedes, famous foran Accident, 78
which if it be true, ſeems nearly diſtant from a Fable. He was ſuda
denly, afflicted by a ſweating Diſeaſe, by which he painfully lan-
guiſ’d, yet no body could find the cauſe, till at laſt a Girl, that had
Scatter'd fom words, after torments, confeſt that her Mother and ſom
other women liad made an Image of Wax, which; as it waſted, the
King ſhould waft, by ſweating much : the place being diligently
Search?d, it was found accordingly; fo the Image being broke, he in-
Atantly recover?d. That which dißurb'd his five years Reign was
the
turbulency of
the Northern People, whom, when he had reduc'd and
taken, with intent to make exemplary Puniſhment, DONALD the
Commander
11
22
The Grounds and
79.
80.
Commander of the Caſtle of Forres, where he then lay, interceded
for ſom of them; but being repuls’d, and exaſperated by his Wife,
after he had made all his Servants drunk, flew him in his Bed, and
bury'd him under a little Bridg (left the cutting of Turfs might dif-
cover a Grave) near Kilros Abby; tho others ſay, he turn'd aſide a
River, and after he had bury'd him, ſuffer'd it to take its former
Chanel. CULEN the Son of INDUL F, by the Election of Par-
lament, or Convention of the People, ſucceded, good only in this one
Action, of inquiring and puniſhing his Predeceſſor's Death; but after,
by the neglect of Diſcipline, and the exquiſiteneſs of his Vices, became
a Monſter, and ſo continued three years, till being weakned and ex-
hauſted in his Body, and vext with perpetual Diſeaſes, he was ſum-
mond by the Parlament, and in the way was flain by a Thane (fo
they then call'd Lieutenants of Counties) whoſe Daughter he had
l'avill'd.
THEN came KENETH, Brother to Dus (tho the forepart of
his Reign was totally unlike his) who being invaded by the Danes,
beat them in that famous Battle, which was won by the three HAYS,
Husbandmen (from whom all tl.e HAYS now give three Shields
Gules) who with their Sythes reinforc'd the loft Battle; but in his lat-
ter time he loſt this reputation, by poiſoning MILCOLM Son of
Duf, to preſerve the Crown for a Son of his Name, tho of leſs
merit (for ſays BuCHANA N, They uſe to chuſe the fitteſt, not the
neareſt) which being don, he got ordain'd in a Parlament, that the
Succeſſion ſhould be lineal, the Son ſhould inherit, and-be-call'd Prince
of Scots; and if he were a Minor; be govern’d by ſom wiſe Man (here
coms the pretence of Succeſſion, wheras before it was clearly Elective)
and at fiftcen he ſhould chuſe his Guardian himſelf. But the Divine
Vengeance, which ſeldom, even in this life, paſſes by Murder, over-
took him ; for he was enſnar'd by a Lady, whoſe Son he had caus'd
to be executed, and flain by an Arrow out of an Ambuſh ſhe had laid.
CONSTANTIN the Son of CULEN, notwithſtanding all the Ar-
tifice of KENNETH, by his reaſoning againſt the Act, perſwaded
moſt of the Nobility to make liim King, To that MILCOLM the
Son of KENNETH and he made up two Factions, which tore the
Kingdom; till at length MILCOLMs Baſtard Brother (himſelf be-
ing in England aſſiſting the Danes) fought him; routed his Army,and
with the loſs of his own Life took away his, they dying of mutual
Wounds. GRIME, of whoſe Birth they do not certainly agree, was
choſen by the Conſtantinians, who made a good Party; but at the In-
terceſſion of FORARD (an accounted Rabbi of the times) they ar
laſt agreed, GRIME being to enjoy the Kingdom for his Life, after
which MIL COLUMB ſhould fuccede, his Father's Law ſtanding in
force. But lie, after declining into Leudneſs, Cruelty and Spoil (as
Princes drunk with Greatneſs and Proſperity uſe to do) the People
calld back MILCOLUMB, whoʻrather receiving Battle than giving
it (for it was upon Aſcenſion-day, his principal Holy-day) routed
his Forces, wounded himſelf, took him, pulpd out his Eyes, which
altogether made an end of his Life, all Factions and Humors being
reconcild.
MILCOLUMB, who with various Fortune fought many ſignal
Battles with the Danes, that under their King Sueno had invaded Scota
land, in his latter time grew to ſuch Covetouſneſs and Oppreſſion, that
al
81.
82.
83.
Reaſons of Monarchy.
23
94
855
86,
all Authors agree he was murder'd, tho they diſagree about the man-
ner; ſom ſay by Confederacy with his Servants; tom by his Kinſmen
and Competitors; ſom by the Friends of a Maid whom he had ra-
viſh'd. DONALD his Grandchild ſucceded, a good-natur’d and
inactive Prince, who with a Stratagem of ſleepy Drink deſtroy'd a
Daniſh Army that had invaded and diſtreſt him; but at laſt being in-
ſnard by his Kinſman MACKBETH (who was prick'd forward by
Ambition, and a former Viſion of three Women of a four human
ſhape, whereof one faluted him Thane of Angus, another Earl of
Murray, the third King) he was beheaded.
THE Severity and Cruelty of MACKBETH was ſo known,
that both the Sons of the murder'd King were forc'd to retire, and
yeild to the times, while he courted the Nobility with Largeſſes. The
firſt ten years he ſpent virtuoully, but the remainder was ſo ſavage
and tyrannical, that MACDUF Thane of Fife fled into England to
MILCOLM Son of DONALD, who by his perſuaſions, and the
aſſiſtance of the King of Engl.ind, cnter'd Scotland, where he found
ſuch great acceſſions to his Party, that MACKBETH was forc'd to
fly; his Death is hid in ſuch a miſt of Fables, that it is not certainly
known.
MILCOLUMB, the third of that name, now being quietly
ſeated, was the firſt that brought in thoſe gay inventions and diſtincti-
ons of Honors, as Dukes, Marqueſſes (that now are become ſo airy,
that ſom carry them from places to which they have as little relation as
to any
Iland in America, and others from Cottages and Dovecotes ) His
firſt trouble was FORFAR, MACKBETH's Son, who claim'd
the Crown, but was ſoon after cut of. Som War he had with that
WILLIAM whom we call falſly the Conqueror, ſom with his own
People, which by the interceſſion of the Biſhops were ended. At
length quarrelling with our WILLIAM the Second, he laid ſiege
to Alnwick Caſtle, which being forc'd to extremity, a Knight came
out with the Keys on a Spear, as if it were to preſent them to him, and
and to yield the Caſtle; but he, not with due heed receiving them,
was run through the Ey and Nain. Som from hence derive the name
of PIERCY (how truly I know not) His Son and Succeſſor Ed.
WARD following his Revenge too hotly, receiv'd fom Wounds, of
which within a few days he dy'd.
DONALD BANE (that is in Iriſh, White) who had fled in-
to the Iles for fear of MACKBETH, promis’d them to the King of
Norway, if he would procure him to be King, which was don with
caſe, as the times then ſtood; but this Uſurper being hated by the
People, who generally lov’d the memory of MILCOLM, they ſet
DUNCAN, MILCOLM's Baſtard, againſt him, who forc'd him to
retire to his Iles. DUNCAN a military Man ſhew'd himſelf unfit
for Civil Government; ſo that DONALD, waiting all advantages,
caus’d him to be belicaded, and reſtor'd himſelf: But his Reign was
ſo turbulent, the Ilanders and Engliſh invading on both ſides, that
they call'd in EDGAR Son of MILCOLM, then in England, who
with ſmall Aſſiſtances poſſeft himſelf, all Men deſerting DONALD,
who being taken and brought to the King, dy'd in Priſon. EDGAR
ſecure by his good Qualitys, and ſtrengthen'd by the Engliſh Alliance,
fpent nine years virtuouſly and peaceably; and gave the people leave to
breathe and reſt, after ſo much trouble and bloodſhed. His Brother
87.
88,
89.
ALEX
24
The Grounds and
go.
91.
92.
93.
A Ľ E XA NDERý ſirnam’d A CER, or the Fierce, ſucceded; the
beginning of whoſe Reign being diſturb'd by a Rebellion, he ſpeedi-
ly met them at the Spey, whiclı being a ſwift River, and the Enemy
on the other ſide, he offer'd himſelf to ford it on Horſeback : but
ALEXANDER CAR taking the Imployment from him, forded the
River with ſuch Courage, that the Enemy fled, and were quiet the reſt
of his Reign. Som ſay he had the name of ACER, becauſe ſom
Conſpirators being by the fraud of the Chamberlain admitted into his
Chamber, he caſually waking, firſt flew the Chamberlain, and after
liim ſix of the Conipirators, not ceaſing to purſue the reſt, till he had
ſlain moſt of them with his own hands: this with the building of ſom
Abbys, and ſeventeen years Reign, is all we know of him.
HIS Brother DAVID ſucceded, one whoſe profuſe Prodigality upon
the Abbys brought the Revenue of the Crown (ſo prevalent was the Su-
perſtition of thoſe days) almoſt to nothing. He had many Bartels with
our STEPHEN about the Title of Maud the Empreſs; and having
lost his excellent Wife and hopeful Son in the flower of their days, le
left the Kingdom to his Grandchildren, the eldeſt wherof was Mil-
COLUMB a ſimple King, bafił’d and led up and down into France by
our HENRY the Second ; which brought him to ſuch contemt, that
he was vex'd by frequent Inſurrections, eſpecially them of Murray,
whom he almoſt extirpated. The latter part of his Reign was ſpent
in building Monaſtery's; he himſelf ty’d by a Vow of Chaſtity, would
never marry, but lett for his Succeſſor his Brother WILLIAM, wlio
expoſtulating for the Earldom of Northumberland, gave occaſion for a
War, in which he was ſurpriz'd and taken, but afterwards releas'd up
on his doing Homage for the Kingdom of Scotland to King Henry,
of whom he acknowledg’d to hold it, and putting in caution the
Caſtles of Roxboro (once ſtrong, now nothing but Ruins) Barwic,
Edinburg, Sterling, all which notwithſtanding was after releas’d by
RICHARD Cæur de Lyon, who was then upon an Expedition to the
Holy War; from whence returning, both he and DAVID Earl of
Huntingdon, Brother to the King of Scots, were taken Priſoners. The
reſt of his Reign (except the rebuilding of St. Johnſton, which had bin
deſtroy’d by Waters, wherby he loſt his eldeſt Son, and ſom Treatys
with our King John) was little worth memory; only, you will
wonder that a Scotill King could reign forty nine years, and yet
peace.
ALEXANDER his Son ſucceded, famous for little, except ſom
Expeditions againſt our King Ton N, ſom Inſurrections, and a Reign
two years longer than his Father's. His Son was the third of that
name, a Boy of eight years old, whoſe Minority was infeſted with the
turbulent Cum MINs; who when he was of age, being calPd to ac-
court, not only refus’d to appear, but furpriz?d him at Sterling, go-
verning him at their pleaſure. But ſoon after he was awak'd by a fu-
rious Invaſion of A CHO King of Norway (under the pretence of
ſom Iſlands given him by MACBETH) whom he forc'd to accept
a Peace, and
ſpent the latter part amidſt the Turbulencys of the Prieſts
drunk at that time with their Wealth and Eaſe) and at laſt having
ſeen the continu'd Funerals of his Sons DAVID, ALEXANDER,
his Wife, and his Daughter, he himſelf with a fall from Horſe broke
his neck, leaving of all his Race only a Grandchild by his Daughter,
which dy'd ſoon after.
1
die in
94.
95.
THIS
Reaſons of Monarchy.
25
THIS Man's Family being extinguiſh’d, they were forc'd to run to
another Line, which, that we may fee how liappy an expedient inime-
diat Succeſſion is for the Peace of the Kingdom, and what Miſeries it
prevents, I ſhall, as briefly and as pertinently as I can, ſet down.
DAVID, Brother to K. WILLIAM, had threc Daughters, MAR-
GARET married to AML A N Lord of Galloway, ISABEL married to
ROBERT Bruce Lord of Annandale and Cleveland, ADA married
to HENRY HASTINGS Earl of Huntingdon. Now ALLAN be-
got on his Wife DORNADILLA, married to JOHN BALIOL af-
terwards King of Scotland, and two other Daughters. Bruce on
his Wife got ROBERT BRUCE Earl of Carick, having married the
Heretrix therof.
As for HUNTINGDON he defiited his claim.
The queſtion is, whether BALIOL in right of the eldeſt Daughter,
or Bruce being com of the ſecond (but a Man) Nould have the
Crown, he being in the ſame degree, and of the more worthy Sex,
The Controverſy being toft up and down, at laſt was refer'd to Ed-
WARD, the Firſt of that name, King of England. He thinking to fill in
theſe troubled waters, ſtirs up eight other Competitors, the more to en-
tangle the buſineſs, and with twenty four Counſellors, half Engliſh,
halt Scots, and abundance of Lawyers fit enough to perplex the matter,
ſo handled the buſineſs, after cunning delays, that at length he ſecretly
tampers with BRUCE (who was then conceiv'd to have the better
right of the buſineſs) that if he would acknowlege the Crown of him,
he would adjudg it for him; but he generouſly anſwering, that he va-
lu'd a Crown at a leſs rate, than for it to put his Country under a foren
Yoke: He made the ſame motion to BALIOL, who accepted it; and
ſo we have a king again, by what Right we all ſee; but it is good rea-
ſon to think that Kings, com they by their Power never ſo unjuſtly,
may juſtly keep it.
BALIOL having thus got a Crown, as unliappily kept it; for no
ſooner was he crown'd, and had don homage to EDWARD, but the
ABERNETHYs having ſlain Macduf Earl of Fife, he not only
pardon’d them, but gave them a piece of Land in controverſy: wher-
upon MACDU F's Brother complains againſt him to EDWARD, who
makes him riſe from his Seat in Parlament, and go to the Bar: He
hereupon enrag’d, denies EDWARD aſliſtance againſt the French, and
renounces his Homage. EDVARD immediatly coms to Berwic,
takes and kills feven thouſand, moſt of the Nobility of Fife and Low-
thian, and afterwards gave them a great Defeat at Dunbar, whoſe
Caſtle inſtantly furrenderd. After this he march'd to Montroſe, where
BALIOL relign'd himſelf and Crown, all the Nobility giving ho-
mage to EDWARD. BALIOL is ſent Priſoner to London, and from
thence, after a years detention, into France, While EDWARD was poſ-
ſeſt of all Scotland, one WILLIAM WALLACE aroſe, who being
a privat man, beſtir’d himſelf in the Calamity of his Country, and
gave the Engliſh ſeveral notable foils. Edward coming again with
an Army, beat him that was already overcom with Envy and Emula-
tion as well as Power ; upon which he laid by his Command, and never
acted more, but only in flight Incurſions. But the Engliſh being beat-
en at Roflin, EDWARD coms in again, takes Sterling, and makes them
all render Homage; but at length Bruce ſeeing all his Promiſes no-
thing but ſmoke, enters into League with Cum MIN to get the King-
dom; but being betray'd by him to EDWAB D, he ſtabd Cummin
E
at
95.
.
26
The Grounds and
97: at Drumfreis
, and made himſelf King. This man, tho he came with dif-
advantage, yet wanted neither Patience, Courage, nor Conduct; ſo that
after he had miſerably lurk'd in the Mountains, he came down, and ga-
thering together ſom Force,gave our EDWARD the Second ſuch a defeat
near Sterling, as Scotland never gave the like to our Nation: and continu'd
the War with various fortune with the Third; till at laſt Ageand Lepros
98. fy brought him to his Grave. His Son David, a Boy of eight years,
inherited that which he with ſo much danger obtain'd, and wif-
dom kept. In his Minority he was governd by THOMAS RAN-
DOLF Earl of Murray, whoſe ſeverity in puniſhing was no leſs dread-
ed than his Valor had bin honor’d. But he ſoon after dying of poiſon;
and EDWARD BALIOL, Son of JOHN, coming with a Fleet, and
ſtrengthn'd with the aſſiſtance of the Engliſh, and ſom Robbers, the
99.
Governor the Earl of Mar was routed, ſo that BALIOL makes him-
ſelf King, and DAVID was glad to retire into France. Amidſt theſe
Parties (EDWARD the Third backing BALIOL) was Scotland mi-
ſerably torn, and the Bruces in a manner extinguiſh'd, till Ro-
EERT (after King) with them of Argile and his own Family and
Friends, began to renew the claim, and bring it into a War again;
which was carried on by Andrew MURRAY the Governor, and
afterwards by himſelf: So that DAVID, after nine years baniſhment,
durft return, where making frequent Incurſions, he at length in the
fourth year of his return march'd into England, and in the Biſhoprick
of Durham was routed, and fled to an obſcure Bridg, ſhew'd to this
day by the Inhabitants. There he was by JOHN COPLAND taken
priſoner, where he continu'd nine years, and in the thirty ninth
year
of his Reign he dy'd.
ROBERT his Siſters Son, wliom he had intended to put by, ſuc-
cedes, and firſt brought the STUARTS (which at this day are a plague
to the Nation) into play. This man after he was King, whether it
were Age or Sloth, did little; but his Lieutenants and the Engliſh were
perpetually in action. He left his Kingdom to JOHN his Baſtard Son
by the Lady More his Concubin, whom he marry'd, either to legi-
timat the three Children (as the manner was then) he had by her, or
elſe for old Acquaintance, his Wife and her Husband dying much about
a time. This JOHN would be crown'd by the name of ROBERT
(his own, they ſay, being unhappy for Kings) a wretched inactive
Prince, lame, and only govern’d by his brother WALTER, who
having David the Prince upon complaint of fom Exorbitancys deli-
ver'd to his care, caus’d him to be ſtarv’d; upon which the King in-
tending to ſend' his Son JAMES into France, the Boy was taken at
Flamburg, and kept by our HENR Y the Fourth: upon the hearing of
which his Father ſwounded, and ſoon after dy'd. His Reign was me-
morable for nothing but his breaking with GEORGE Earl of Marchi
(to whoſe Daughter, upon the payment of a great part of her Portion
which he never would repay," he had promis'd his Son DAVID
for a Husband) to take the Daughter of Douglas who had a
greater ; which occaſion'd the Earl of March to make many inrodes
with our HENRY HOTSPUR; and a famous Duel of three hun-
dred men a piece, wherof on the one ſide ten remain'd, and on the O-
ther one, which was the only way to appeaſe the deadly Feuds of
theſe two Familys. The Interreign was govern’d by ROBERT,
who enjoying the Power he had too much coveted, little minded the
Liberty
100.
IOI.
Reaſons of Monarchy.
27
102:
there were many, the day of Battle, habited like him. His Succeſſor
Liberty of his Nephew, only he ſent ſom Auxiliary's into France,
who, they ſay, behav'd themſelves worthily; and his ſlothful Son
MORDAC, who making his Sons fo bold with Indulgence, that one
of them kild a Falcon on his fiſt, which hedeny'd to give him: he in
revenge procur'd the Parlament to ranſom the King, who had bin
eighteen years a Priſoner. This JAMES was the Firſt of that name,
and tho he was an excellent Prince, yet had a troubleſom Reign; firſt,
in regard of a great Penſion rais’d for his Ranſoni; next, for domeſtic
Commotions; and laſtly, for raiſing of Mony; which, tho the Rea
venue was exhauſted, was called Covetouſneſs. This having offended
ROBERT GRAHAM, he conſpir'd with the Earl of Athol, flew
him in his Chamber, his Wife receiving two wounds, endeavoring
to defend him.
THIS JAME s left the Second, a Boy of ſix years, whoſe Infan- 103.
cy, by the miſguidance of the Governor, made a miſerable People,
and betray'd the Earl DOUGLAs to death, and almoſt all that
great
Family to ruin; but being ſupplanted by another Earl DoUGLAS,
the King in his juſt age ſu Ferd Minority under him, who úpon dil-
pleaſure rebeld, and was kild by the King's own hand. Afterwards
having his iniddle years perpetually moleſted with civil Broils, yet go-
ing to aſſiſt the Duke of Tork againſt HENRY thë Sixth, he was
diverted by an Engliſh Gentleman that counterfeited himſelf a Nuncio
which I mention out of a Manuſcript, becaule I do not remember
it in our Storys) and broke up his Army. Soon after beſſeging Rox-
burg, he was ſlain by the burſting of a Cannon in the twenty ninth year
of his Age.
JAM
ES the Second left a Boy of ſeven Years, govern'd by his Mở 104
ther, and afterwards by the BoyDS; thro the perſuaſions of Aſtrolo-
gers and Witches, to whom he was ſtrongly addicted, he declin'd to
Cruelty ; which ſo inragʻd the Nobility, that, headed by his Son, they
conſpir'd againſt him, routing his Forces near Sterling, where he flying
to a Mill, and asking for a Confeffor, a Prieſt came, who told him,
that tho he was no good Prieſt, yet he was a good Leech, and with that
ſtabd him to the heart. A Parlament approv'd his death, and order'd
Indemnitys to all that had fought againſt him.
JAMES the Fourth, a Boy of fifteen Years, is made King, go: 10$
vern’d by the Murderers of his father ; a prodigal, vainglorious Prince,
Nain at Floddon Field, or, as ſom ſuppoſe, at Kelly by the Humes,
which (as the Manuſcript alleges) ſeems more probable
, in regard
that the Iron Belt (to which he added a Ring every Year) which he
wore in repentance for the death of his Father, was never found, and
ivas his Son James, the Fifth of that name, a Boy of not above two 105;
age;
under whoſe Minority, what by the miſgovernment of
Tutors, and what by the Factions of the Nobility, Scotland was waft-
ed almoſt into Famiñ and Solitude: however in his juſt Age he prova
an induſtrious Prince, yet could not ſo ſatisfy the Nobility, but that he
and they continued in a mutual hate, till tliat barbarous execution of
young HAMILTON fo fild him with Remorſe, that he dream'd he
came and cut of his two Arms, and threaten'd' after to ćut of his
Head. And he diſpleas'd the People ſo much, that he could not make
his Army fight with the Engliſh then in Scotland; wherupon he dy'd
of grief, having firſt heard the death of his two Sons, who dy'd at the
E 2
inſtang
years of
.
:
ir
11
28
107.
The Grounds and
inſtant of his Dream, and leaving a Daughter of five days old, whom
he never ſaw.
THIS was that MARY under whoſe Minority (by the weak-
neſs of the Governor, and ambition of the Cardinal) the Kingdom
felt all thoſe Woes that are threaten’d to them whoſe King is a
Child ; till at length the prevalency of the Engliſh Arms (awak'd for
her cauſe) brought the great deſign of ſending her into France to per-
fection: So at five Years old ſhe was tranſported, and at fifteen mar-
ry'd to the Dolphin FRANCIS, after King; while her Mother, a
Daughter of the Guise, in her Regency, exercis'd all Rage againſt
the Profeſſors of the pure Religion then in the dawn. FRANCIS af-
ter two Years leſt her a childleſs Widow, ſo tłuat at eighteen ſhe re-
turn’d into Scotland to ſuccede her Mother (the newly dead) in her
Exorbitancys.
I HAV almoſt forgot to tell, that this young Couple in the
tranſport of their nuptial Solemnitys took the Arms and Title of Eng-
land; which indiſcrete Ambition we may ſuppoſe firſt quicken’d the
jealouſy of ELIZABETH againſt her, which after kindid fo great
a flame.
IN Scotland ſhe ſhew'd what a ſtrange influence looſe Education
has upon Youth, and the weaker Sex. All the French Effeminacys
came over with
her, and the Court loſt that little Severity which was
left. DAVID Rizio, an Italian Fidler, was the only Favorit, and
it is too much fear'd, had thoſe enjoyments which no Woman can give
but ſhe that gives away her Honor and Chaſtity.
BUT a little after, HENRY Lord Darnly coming with MAT-
THEW Earl of Lenox, his Father, into Scotland, ſhe caſt an ey upori
him, and marry'd him. Whether it were to ſtrengthen her preten-
ſion to England, he being com of HENRY the Seventh's Daughter,
as we ſhall tell anon, or to color her Adulterys, and hide the ſhame of
an Impregnation (tlio fom have whiſper'd, that ſhe never conceiv’d,
and that the Son was ſuppoſititious) or ſom Phrenzy of Affection
drew lier that way; certain it is ſhe ſoon declin'd her Affection to her
Husband, and increas'd it to DAVID. (he being her perpetual Com-
panion at board, and managing all Affairs, while the King with a con-
temtible Train was ſent away) inſomuch that ſom of the Nobility
that could not digeſt this, enters a Conſpiracy, which the King head-
ed, and flew him in her Chamber.
THIS turn'd all her neglect of the King into rage, ſo that her
chiefeſt buſineſs was to appeaſe her Favorits Ghoſt with the ſlaughter
of her Husband; poiſon was firſt attemted, but it being (it ſeems)
too weak, or his Youth overcoming it, that cxpectation faild. But
the Devil and BOTHWEL furniſh'd her with another that ſucceded;
ſhe ſo intices him, being ſo ſick that they were forc'd to bring him in a
Horſlitter to Edinburg, where ſhe cheriſh'd him extremely, till the
credulous young man began to lay aſide ſuſpicion, and to hope better :
So The
puts him into a ruinous houſe near the Palace, from whence no
news can be had, brings in her own bed, and lys in the houſe with
him; and at length when the deſign was ripe, cauſes him one Sunday
night, with his Servant, to be ſtrangļd, thrown out of the Window,
and the houſe to be blown up with Gunpowder, her own rich Bed
having bin before ſecretly convey'd away.. This and other perfor-
mances made her favor upon BOTHWEL fo liot, that ſhe muſt marry
f
+
him ;
f
Reaſons of Monarchy.
OV
29
E-
108.
him; the only obſtacle was, he had a Wife already; but ſhe was
compeld to ſue for a Divorce, which (ſo great Perſons being con-
cern'd) it was a wonder it ſhould be granting ſo long as ten days.
Well, ſhe marrys; but the more honeſt Nobility amaz’d at thoſe Ex-
orbitancys, aſſemble together, and with Arms in their hands begin to
expoſtulat. The newmarry'd Couple are forc'd to make back south-
wards; where finding but ſlender aſſiſtance, and the Queen fooliMly
coming from Dunbar to Leith, was glad at laſt to delay a parly till her
Dear was eſcap’d; and then (clad in an old tatter'd coat) to yield her
felf a Priſoner.
BEING brought to Edinburg, and us'd rather with hate of her
former Enormitys, than pity of her preſent Fortune, ſhe receiv'd a
Meſſage, that ſhe muſt either reſign the Crown to her Son J A MES
(that was born in the time of her marriage with DABNLY) or elſe
they would procede to another Election, and was forc'd to obey. So
the Child then in his Cradle was acknowlegd J AMEs the Sixth, bet-
ter known afterwards by the Title of Great Britain.
THE wretched Mother flying after into England, was entertain'd
(tho with a Guard) by Queen ELIZABETH; but after that being
ſuborn’d by the Papifts, and exaſperated by the GUIZES, ſhe enter'd
into Plots and Machinations, fo inconſiſtent with the Safety of England,
that by an Act of Parlament ſhe was condemn’d to death, which ſhe
receiv'd by a Hatchet at Fotheringay Caſtle.
THE Infancy of her Son was attended with thoſe domeſtic Evils
that accompany the Minority of Kings. In his Youth he took to Wife
the Daughter of Denmark (a Woman I hear little of, faving the Cha-
racter Salust gives SEMPRONIA, that the could dance better
than became a virtuous Woman) with whom he ſuppoſing the Earl
GOWRY too much in League, caus’d him and his Brother to be ſlain
at their own houſe whither he was invited; he giving out, that they
liad an intent to murder him; and that by miracle and tlie aſſiſtance
of fom men (whom lielad inſtructed for that purpoſe, and taught
their tale) he eſcap’d. For this Deliverance (or tj ſay better, Al-
fallination) he blaſphem'd God with a ſolemn Thankſgiving once a
Year all the remainder of his Life.
WELL had it bin for us, if our Forefathers had laid hold of that
happy opportunity of ELIZABETH's Death (in which the Teu-
THORS took a period) to have perform'd that which, perhaps in due
puniſhment, has coſt us ſo much blood and ſwear; and not have bow'd
under the ſway of a Stranger, diſdain’d by the muſt generous and wiſe
at that time, and only ſupported by the Faction of fom, and the Sloth
of others; who brought but a ſlender Title, and (however the fat-
tery of the times cry'd him up for a SOLOMON) weak Commenda-
tions for ſuch an advancement.
HIS Title ſtood thus, MARGAR E T, eldeſt Daughter to HEN-
Ry the Seventh, was marry'd to James the Fourth, whoſe Son
JAMES the Fifth had MARY the Mother of JAMES the Sixth.
MARGARET after her firſt Husband's death, marrys ARCHIBALD
Douglas Earl of Angus, who upon her begot MARGARET
Wife of MATTHEW Earl of Lenox, and Mother of that HENRY
DARN LY, whoſe tragical End we juſt now mention'd. Now upon
this ſlender Title, and our internal Diſſenſions (for the Cecilians
and Eſſexians, for ſeveral ends, made perpetual Applications) goe
JAMMY
н
1:
kui
IM!
1:
1
1
30
The Grounds and
J AMMY from a Revenue of 30000 l. to one of almoſt two Millions,
tho there were others that liad as fair pretences (and what elſe can
any
of them make?) the Statute of 25 Edı. 3. exprelly excluding Foren-
ers from the Crown: and ſo the Children of CHARLES BRAN-
DON by Ma ky the ſecond Daughter, Dowager of France, being
next to com in. And the Lady AR ABELL A being ſprung from a
third Husband (the Lord STUART) of the ſaid MARGARE T,
and by a Male Line, carry'd ſurely fo formidable a pretenſion (it
ſhould ſeem) that even that Iniquity which was perſonally inherent
to her, made her days very unhappy, and for moſt part captive, and
her death ('tis thought) fomwhat too early; fo cruel are the Perſe-
cutions of cowardly minds, even againſt the weakeſt and moſt
unpro-
tected Innocence.
AND indeed his Right to the Crown was ſo unſatisfactory even
to the moſt judicious of thoſe days, that TOBY MATTHEWS
having ſuit about ſom Privileges which he claim'd to his Biſhoprick
(which was then Durham) wherin the King oppos’d him; and having
one day ſtated the Caſe before ſom of his Friends, who ſeem'd to ap-
prove of it; yes, ſays he, I could wiſh he had but half fo good a Ti-
tle to the Crown. And 'tis known that ſome Speeches of Sir Wal-
TER RAWLEY, too generous and Engliſh for the times, was that
which brought him to Trial and Condemnation for a feign’d Crime
j
and afterwards ſo facilitated that barbarous Deſign of GUNDAM A R,
to cut of his Head for a Crime, for which he was condemn'd fourteen
years before, and which by the Commiſſions he after receiv'd (ac-
cording to the opinion of the then Lord Chancellor, and the greateſt
Lawyers) was in Law pardon'd.
THIS may appear beſides our purpoſe; but we could not fever
this conſideration, unleſs we would draw him with a half face, and
leave as much in umbrage as we expreſt. That which moſt folem-
niz'd his Perſon was, firſt the conſideration of his adhering to the Pro-
teſtant Religion; wheras we are to conſider that thoſe light Velitati.
ons he had with BELLARMIN' and the Romaniſts, tended rather to
make his own Authority more intrinſically intenſe and venerable, than
to confute any thing they ſaid : for he had before ſhak'd them of as
to foren Juriſdiction; and for matter of Popery, it appear’d in his lat-
ter time that he was no ſuch enemy to it, both by his own compliances
with the Spaniſh Embaſſadors, the deſign of the Spaniſh Match (in
which his Son was perſonally imbarkt) and the flow aſſiſtances ſent to
his Daughter, in whoſe ſafety and protection Proteſtantiſm was at that
time ſo much concern'd.
FOR his Knowlege, he had ſome glancings and niblings, which
the Severity of the excellent BUCHANAN forc'd into him in his
younger time, and after converſation ſomwhat polifh'd. But tho I
bear not ſo great a contemt to his other Works, as BEN JOHNSON
did to his Poetry, yer if they among many others were going to the
fire, they would not be one of the firſt I ſhould reſcue, as poſibly ex-
pecting a more ſevere and refind Judgment in many others; and know-
ing that he that had ſo many able Wits at command, might eaſily give
their Oracles thro his Mouth. But ſuppoſe the things generous and fit
to live (as I am not yet convinced) yet what commendation is this to
a King, who ſhould have other buſineſs than ſpinning and weaving fine
Theorys, and engaging in School Chiquaneries? which was well un-
derſtood
Rhy
Reaſons of Monarchy.
31
1
1
derſtood by HENRY the Fourth, who hearing fom men celebrat him
with theſé Attributes; yes (anſwer'd he, very tartly ) He is a fine
King, and writes little Books,
'Ť IS true, he was a good Drol, and poſſibly after Greec Wine
ſomwhat factious: But of his ſubſtancial and heroic Wiſdom I have
not heard any great Inſtances. He himſelf usd to brag of his King-
craft, which was not to render his People happy, and to proſecute the
ends of a good King, but to ſcrue up the Prerogative, divert Parla-
ments from the due diſquiſition and proſecution of their Freedoms, and
to break them up at pleaſure ; and indeed his parting with the Cautio-
nary Towns of the Low Countrys, and that for ſo ſmall a Sum, ſhew'd
him a Perſon not ſo quickſighted, or unfit to be overreach'd.
FOR his peaceable Reign, honorable and juſt Quarrels he wanted
not; but ſloth and cowardice withield him: and indeed the eaſe
and luxury of thoſe times fomented and nouriſh'd thoſe lurking and
peftilent humors, which afterwards ſo dangerouſly broke out in his
Son's Reign.
We ihall not trouble his Aſhes with the mention of his perſonal
Faults; only, if we may compare God's Judgments with apparent
Sins, we may find the latter end of his Life neither fortunat nor com-
fortable to him. His Wife diſtaſted by him, and ſom ſay, languiſhing,
of a foul Diſeaſe; his eldeſt son dying with too violent ſymtoms of
Roiſon, and that, as is fear'd; by a hand too much ally'd ; his ſecond
(againſt whom he ever had a ſecret antipathy) ſcarce return’d from á
mad and dangerous Voyage; his Daughter (all that was left of that
Sex ) baniſh'd, with hier numerous tiſue, out of her Husband's Do-
minion, and living in miſerable Exile; and laſtly, himſelf dying of a
violene death by poiſon, in which his Son was more than ſuſpected to
have a hand, as may be infer'd from BUCKINGHAM's Plea, that
he did it by the Command of the Prince, and CHARLES's diſſolu-
tion of the Parlament that took in hand to examin it; and laſtly, his
indifferency at Buckingham's death (tho he pretended all love to him
alive) as glad to be rid of ſo dangerous and ſo conſiderable a Partner
of his Guilt. Yet the miter'd Paraſits of thoſe times could ſay, that
one went to Heaven in Noah's Ark, the other in Eliſha's Chariot, he
dying of a pretended Fever, ſhę (as they ſaid) of a Dropſy.
CHARLES having now obtain’d his Brother's Inlıeritance, car-
ry'd himſelf in managing of it like one that gaind it as he did. The
firſt of his Acts was that glorious attemt upon the Ile of Rhee. The
next, that Noble and Chriſtian betraying of Rochel, and conſequently
in a manner the whole Proteſtant Intereſt in France. The middle of
the Reign was heightening of Prerogative and Prelacy, and conform-
ing our Churches to the pattern of Rome ; till at laſt juſt Indignation
brought his Subjects of Scotland into England, and ſo forc'd him to
call a Parlament': which tho he ſhamelelly ſays in the firſt line of the
Book, calld his, was out of his own inclination to Parlaments, yér how
well he lik’d them, may appear by his firſt tampering with his own
Army in the North, to ſurprize and diſſolve them; then with the
Scors, who at that time were Court proof; thén raſſing up the Iriſbe
Rebellion, which has waſted millions of Lives ; and laſtly, his open
ſeceſſion from Weſtminſter, and hoſtility againſt the two Houſes, which
maintain'd a firſt and ſecond ſharp War, that liad almoſt ruin'd the
Nation, had not Providence in a manner immediatly interpos’d and
reſcu'd
109
32
I he Grounds, &c.
I10.
reſcu'd us to Liberty, and made us ſuch ſignal Inſtruments of his Ven-
geance, that all wicked Kings may tremble at the example.
IN a word, never was Man foreſolute and obftinat in a Tyranny;
never People more ſtrangely beſotted with it. To paint the Image of
DAVID with his face, and blaſphemouſly to parallel him with
CHRIST, would make one at firſt thought think him a Saint : But
to compare his Proteſtations and Actions ; his Actions of the Day, his
Actions of t'e Night; his Proteſtant Religion, and his courting of
the Pope ; and obedience to his Wife; we may juſtly fay, he was one
of the moſt conſummat in the Arts of Tyranny that ever was. And
it could be no other than God's hand that arreſted him in the height of
his Deſigns and Greatneſs, and cut off him and his Family, making
good his own Imprecations on his own ead.
OUR Scene is again in Scotland, which has accepted his Son, whom
for diſtinction ſake we will be content to call CHARLES the Second.
Certainly theſe People were ſtrangely blind as to God's Judgment per-
petually pour'd out upon a Family; or elſe wonderfully addicted to
their own Intereſt, to admit the ſpray of ſuch a ſtock ; one that has
ſo little to commend him, and ſo great improbability to further their
Deſigns and Happineſs; a Popiſh Education, if not Religion too,
however for the preſent he may ſeem to diſſemble it; France, the Je-
ſuits, and his Mother, good means of ſuch an improvement; the dan-
gerous Maxims of his Father, beſides the Revenge he ows his Death,
of which he will never totally acquit the Scots; his Hate to the whole
Nation; his Senſe of Montrose's Death ; his backwardneſs to
com to them till all other means faild (both his foren beg'd Aſſiſtan-
ces, his Propoſitions to the Pope, and Commiſſions to MONTROSE)
and laſtly, his late running away to his old Friends in the North : ſó
that any man may ſee his preſent compliance to be but hiſtrionical and
forc'd, and that as ſoon as he has led them into the Snare, and got
power into his own hands, ſo as that he may appear once more bare-
fac’d, lie will be a ſcourge upon-them for their groſs-Hypocriſy, and
leave them a ſad Inſtance to all Nations, how dangerous it is to eſpouſo
ſuch an Intereſt, againſt which God with ſo viſible and ſevere a hand
dos fight, carry'd on by and for the fupport of a tyrannizing Nobility
and Clergy, and wherin the poor People are blindly led on by thoſe
afrighting (but falſe and ungrounded) pretenſions of Perfidy and
Perjury, and made inſtrumental with their own Eſtates and Blood to-
wards inſlaving and ruining themſelves.
I
THE
+
+
THE
1
ܕ
Commonwealth
0 F
$
OCEAN A.
To his HIGHNESS
The Lord Protector of the Common:
wealth of England, Scotland, and Ireland.
-
1
-Quid rides? mutato nomine, de te
Fabula narratur.
Horat.
1
i
É
:
34
The Introduktion, or Order of the Work.
O
Pliny'sDeſcrip
CEAN A is faluted by the Panegyriſt after this manner ; 0
tion of Oceana.
the moſt bleſt and fortunat of all Countrys, OCEANA!
How deſervedly has Nature with the bountys of Heaven and
Earth indu'd thee? Thy ever-fruitful Womb not clos’d with
Ice, nor diſſolu'd by the raging Star ; where ĆER ES and BACCHUS
are perpetual Twins. Thy Woods are not the harbor of devouring Beaſts
,
nor thy continual Verdure the ambuſh of Sérpents, but the food of innu-
merable Herds and Flocks preſenting thểe their Shepherdeſs
: with diſtended
Dugs, or golden Fleeces. The wings of thy Night involve thee not in
the horror of darkneſs, but have ſtill som white feather; and thy Day is
(that for which we eſteem Life) the longeſt. But this Extaſy of PLINY
(as is obſerv'd by Berrius) ſeems to allude as well to Marpeſia and
Panopea, now Provinces of this Commonwealth, as to Oceana it felf.
The Nature of To ſpeak of the People in each of theſe Countrys, this of Oceana, for
the People, ſo ſoft a one, is the moſt martial in the whole World. Let States that
aim at Greatneſs (ſays VERULA MIUS) take heed how their Nobility
and Gentlemen inultiply too faſt, for that makes the common Subject grov to
be a Peaſant and baſe Swain driven out of heart, and in effect but a Gentle
man's Laborer ; juſt as you may ſee in Coppice Woods, if you leave the
Staddels too thick, you ſball never have clean Underwood, but Shrubs and
Buſhes : So in Countrys, if the Gentlemen be too many, the Commons will
be baſe; and you will bring it to that at laſt, that not the hundredth Pol
will be fit for a Helmet, Specially as to the Infantry, which is the nerve of
an Army, and ſo there will be great Population and little Strength. This
of which I speak has bin no where better ſeen than
by comparing of Oceana
and France, wherof Oceaná, tho far leſs in Territory and Population,
has bin nevertheleſs an overmatch, in regard the middle People of Oceaná
make good Soldiers, which the Peaſants in France do not
In which words
VERULAMIUS (as MACHIAVEL has don before him) harps
much upon a ſtring which he has not perfectly tun'd, and that is the
balance of Dominion or Property: as it follows more plainly in his praiſe
of the profound and admirable device of PANURGUs King of Oceana,
in making Farms and Houſes of Husbandry of a Standard; that is, maina
taind with ſuch a proportion of Land to them, as may breed a Subject to
live in convenient plenty, and no ſervil condition, and to keep the Plow in
the hand of the owners, and not mere hirelings. And thus indeed (ſays
he) you ſhall attain to VIRGIL’s Character *which he gives of antient
Italy.
BUT the Tillage bringing up a good Soldiery, brings up a good
Commonwealth; which the Author in the praiſe of Panur Gus did
not mind, nor Pa Nurgus in deſerving that praiſe: for where the
owner of the Plow coms to have the Sword too, he will uſe it in de
fence of his own; whence it has happen'd that the People of Oceana in
proportion to their property have bin always free. And the Genius of
4
* Terra potens armis atque ubere gleba,
i.
this
The Introduction.
35
this Nation has ever had fom reſemblance with that of antient Italy,
which was wholly addicted to Commonwealths, and where Rome
came to make the greateſt account of her ruſtic Tribes, and to call
her Conſuls from the Plow; for in the way of Parlaments, which
was the Government of this Realm, men of Country-lives have bin ſtill
intruſted with the greateſt Affairs, and the People have conftantly had
an averſion to the ways of the Court. Ambition loving to be gay,
and to fawn, has bin a Gallantry look'd upon as having fomthing in it
of the Livery; and Husbandry, or the country way of Life, tho of a
groſſer ſpinning, as the beſt ſtuf of a Commonwealth, according to
ARISTOTLE, ſuch a one being the moſt obſtinat Aſſertors o: hier
Liberty, and the leaſt ſubject to Innovation or Turbulency. Wher-
fore till the Foundations (as will be hereafter ſhew'd) were re-
mov'd, this people was obſerv'd to be the leaſt ſubject to Shakings and
Turbulency of any: Wheras Commonwealths, upon which the City
Life has had the ſtronger influence, as Athens, have feldom or never
bin quiet; but at the beſt are found to have injur'd their own buſineſs
by over-doing it. Whence the Urban Tribes of Rome, conſiſting of
the Turba forenſis, and Libertins that had receiv'd their Freedom by
manumiſſion, were of no reputation in compariſon of the Ruſtics. It
is true, that with Venice it may ſeem to be otherwiſe, in regard the
Gentlemen (for ſo are all ſuch call?d as have a right to that Govern-
ment) are wholly addicted to the City Life: but then the Turba foren-
fis, the Secretarys, Cittadini, with the reſt of the Populace, are whol-
ly excluded. Otherwiſe a Commonwealth, conſiſting but of one
City, would doubtleſs be ſtormy, in regard that Ambition would be
every man's trade: but where it conſiſts of a Country, the Plow in
the ſiands of the owner finds him a better calling, and produces the
moſt innocent and ſteddy Genius of a Commonwealth, ſuch as is that
of Oceana.
MARPESIA, being the Northern part of the fame Iland, is The Nature of
the dry Nurſe of a populous and hardy Nation, bu' where the Stad- theMarpeſians.
dels have bin formerly too thick : whence their Courage anſwer'd not
their hardineſs, except in the Nobility, who govern'd that Country
much after the manner of Poland; but that the King was not elective
till the People receiv'd their Liberty, the yoke of the Nobility being
broke by the Commonwealth of Oceana, which in grateful return is
therby provided with an inexhauſtible Magazin of Auxiliaryś.
PANOPE A, the ſoft Mother of a flothful and pufillanimous Peo- The Nature of
ple, is a neighbor Iland, antiently ſubjected by the Arms of Oceana ; the Panopcans:
ſince almolt depopulated for ſhaking the Yoke, and at length replant-
ed with a new Race. But (thro what virtues of the Soil
, or vice
of the Air foever it be) they com ſtill to degenerat. Wherfore ſeeing
it is neither likely to yield 'men fit for Arms, nor neceſſary it ſhould;
it had bin the Intereit of Oceanå ſo to have diſpos’d of this Province,
being both rich in the nature of the Soil, and full of commodious
Ports for Trade, that it might have bin order'd for the beſt in rela-
tion to her Purſe: which in my opinion (if it had bin thought upon
in time) might have bin beſt don by planting it with Jews, allowing
them their own Rites and Laws; for that would have brought them
ſuddenly from all parts of the World, and in ſufficient numbers.
And tho the Jews be now altogether for Merchandize, yet in the Land
of Canaan (except ſince their exile from whence they have not bin
F 2
Landa
36
The Introduction.
Landlords) they were altogether for Agriculture; and there is no
cauſe why a man ſhould doubt, but having a fruitſul Country, and
excellent Ports too, they would be good at both. Panopea well peo-
pled, would be worth a matter of four millions dry rents; that is, be
ſides the advantage of the Agriculture and Trade, which, with a Na-
tion of that Induſtry, coms at leaſt to as much more. Wherfore
Panopea being farm'd out to the Jews and their Heirs for ever, for the
pay of a provincial Army to protect them during the term of ſeven
years, and for two Millions annual Revenue from that time forward,
beſides the Cuſtoms which would pay the provincial Army, would
have bin a bargain of ſuch advantage both to them and this Com-
monwealth, as is not to be found otherwiſe by either. To receive
the Jews after any other manner into a Commonwealth, were to maim
it: for they of all Nations never incorporat, but taking up the room
of a Limb, are of no uſe or office to the body, while they ſuck the
nouriſhment which would ſuſtain a natural and uſeful Member.
IF Panopea had bin ſo diſpos’d of, that Knapſack, with the Marpe-
fian Auxiliary, had bin an ineſtimable Treaſure; the Situation of theſe
Countrys being Ilands (as appears by Venice how advantageous ſuch a
one is to the like Government) ſeems to have bin deſign’d by God for a
Commonwealth. And yet that, thro the ſtreitneſs of the place and
The Situation defect of proper Arms, can be no more than a Commonwealth for
of the Common- Preſervation : wheras this, reduc'd to the like Government, is a
wealth of Oce-
Commonwealth for increaſe, and upon the mightieſt foundation that
ány has bin laid from the beginning of the World to this day.
Illam ar&tâ capiens Neptunus compede ſtringit :
Hanc autem glaucis captus complectitur ulnis.
ana.
THE Sea gives law to the growth of Venice, but the growth of
Oceana gives law to the Sea,
THESE Countrys having bin antiently diſtinct and hoſtil King-
doms, came by MORPHEUS the Marpeſian (who ſucceded by heredi-
tary right to the Crown of Oceana) not only to be join'd under one
head; but to be caſt, as it were by a charm, into that profound ſleep,
which, broken at length by the Trumpet of Civil War, has produc'd
thoſe effects, that have given occaſion to the inſuing Diſcourſe, divi-
ded into four parts.
1. The
37
1. The Preliminarys, ſhewing the Principles of
Government.
2. The Council of Legiſlators, ſhewing the Art
of making a Commonwealth.
3. The Model of the Commonwealth of Oceana,
Shewing the effe&t of ſuch an Art.
4. The Corollary, Shewing ſom Conſequences of
ſuch a Government.
.
The Preliminarys, Sewing the Principles of
Government.
1
J
ANOTTI, the moſt excellent Deſcriber of the Commonwealth of
Venice, divides the whole Series of Government into two Times
or Periods. The one ending with the Liberty of Rome, which
was'the Courſe or Empire, as I may call it, of Antient Prudence,
firſt diſcover'd to mankind by God himſelf in the Fabric of the
Commonwealth of Iſrael, and afterwards pick'dout of his Footſteps in
Nature, and unanimouſly follow'd by the Greecs and Romans. The
other beginning with the Arms of CÆSAR, which, extinguiſhing
Liberty, were the Tranſition of Antient into Modern Prudence, intro-
duc'd by thoſe Inundations of Huns, Goths, Vandals, Lombards, Sax-
ons, which, breaking the Roman Empire, deform’d the whole face of
the World with thoſe ill features of Government, which at this time
are becom far worſe in theſe weſtern parts, except Venice, which e-
ſcaping the hands of the Barbarians, by virtue of its impregnable
Situation, has had its ey fix'd upon antient Prudence, and is attain’d to
a perfection even beyond the Copy.
RELATION being had to theſe two times, Government (to Definitions of
define it de jure, or according to antient Prudence) is an Art wherby Government.
a Civil Society of Men is inſtituted and preſerv'd upon the Foundation
of common Right or Intereſt; or (to follow ARISTOTLĖ and
LIVY) It is the Empire of Laws, and not of Men.
AND Government (to define it de facto, or according to modern
Prudence) is an Art wherby ſom man, or foin few men, , ſubject a
City or a Nation, and rule it according to his or their privat Intereſt :
which, becauſe the Laws in ſuch caſes are made according to the in-
tereſt of a man, or of ſom few Familys, may be ſaid to be the Em-
pire of Men, and not of Laws.
.
THE
38
OCEAN A.
any In-
THE former kind is that which MACHIAVEL (whoſe Books
are neglected) is the only Politician that has gon about to retrieve; and
Pag. 180. that LEVIATHAN (who would have his Book impos'd upon the
Pag. 377. Univerſitys) gos about to deſtroy. For, It is (ſays he) another Er-
ror of ARISTOTLE's Politics, that in a well-orderd Commonwealth not
Men ſhould govern, but the Laws. What man that has his natural ſenſes,
tho he can neither write nor read, dos not find himſelf goverr’d by them he
fears, and believes can kill or hurt him when he obeys not? Or, who bilieves
that the Law can hurt him, which is but Words and Paper, without the
Hards and Swords of men? I confeſs, that* the ivlagiftrat upon his Bench
is that to the Law, which a Gunner upon liis Platform is to his Can-
non. Nevertheleſs, I ſhould not dare to argue with a man of
genuity after this manner. A whoie Army, tho they can neither
write nor read, are not afraid of a Platform, which they know is but
Earth or Stone; nor of a Cannon, which without a hand to give fire
to it, is but cold Iron; therlore a whole Army is afraid of one man.
But of this kind is the Ratiocination of LEVIATHAN (as I ſhall
ſhew in divers places that com in my way) throout his whole Politics,
Pag. 111. or worſe; as where he ſays of ARISTOTL E and of CICERO, of the
Greecs, and of the Romans, who liv’d under popular States, that they dem
riv'd thoſe Rights not from the Principles of Nature, but tranſcrib'dihem
into their Books, out of the practice of their own Commonwealths, as Gram-
marians deſcribe the Rules of Language out of Poets. Which is as if a
man ſhould tell tamous HERVY, that he tranſcrib'd his Circulation of
the Blood not out of the Principles of Nature, but out of the Anatomy
of this or that Body.
TO go on therfore with this preliminary Diſcourſe, I ſhall divide it
(according to the two definitions of Government relating to Janot-
T I's two times) into two parts. The firſt treating of the Principles
of Government in general, and according ro the Antients : The Second
treating of the late Governments of Oceana in particular, and in that
of modern Prudence.
Diviſion of Go-
GOVERNMENT, according to the Antients, and their
learn'd Diſciple MACHIAV E L, the only Politician of later Ages,
is of three kinds; The Government of One Man, or of the Better
Tort, or of the whole People : which by their more learn’d names are
call’d Monarchy, Ariſtocracy, and Democracy. Theſe they hold, thro
their proneneſs to degenerat, to be all evil. For wheras they that go-
vern ſhould govern according to Reaſon, if they govern according to
Paſſion, they do that which they ſhould not do. Wherfore as Reafon
and Paſſion are two things, ſo Government by Reaſon is one thing,
and the corruption of Government by Paſſion is another thing, but
not always another Government: as a Body that is alive is one
thing, and a Body that is dead is another thing, but not always ano-
ther Creature, tho the Corruption of one coms at length to be the
Generation of another. The Corruption then of Monarchy is call’d
Tyranny; that of Ariſtocracy, Oligarchy; and that of Democracy, A-
narchy. But Legiſlators having found theſe three Governments at
the beſt to be naught, have invented another conſiſting of a
mixture of them all, which only is good. This is the Doctrin of
the Antients.
vernment,
܀܀
* Magiſtratus eſt lex armata.
BUT
s
OCEAN A.
39
Fortune,
BUT LEVIATHAN is poſitive, that they are all deceiv'd, and
that there is no other Government in Nature than one of the three; as
alſo that the Fleſh of them cannot ſtink, the names of their Corrup-
tions being but the names of mens Phanſies, which will be underſtood
when we are ſhown which of them was Senatus Populufque Romanus.
TO
go my own way, and yet to follow the Antients, the Principles
of Government are twofold ; Internal, or the goods of the Mind;
and External, or the goods of Fortune. The goods of the Mind are Goods of the
natural or acquir’d Virtues, as Wiſdom, Prudence, and Courage, &c. Mind and of
The goods of Fortune are Riches. There be goods alſo of the Body,
as Health, Beauty, Strength; but theſe are not to be brought into ac-
count, upon this ſcore, becauſe if a Man or an Army acquires Victory
or Empire, it is more from their Diſciplin, Arms, and Courage, than
from their natural Health, Beauty, or Strength, in regard that a Peo-
ple conquer'd may have more of natural Strength, Beauty and Health,
and yet find little remedy. The Principles of Government then are in
the goods of the Mind, or in the goods of Fortune. To the goods of
the Mind anſwers Authority ; to the goods of Fortune, Power or Em-Empire and
pire: Wherfore LEVIATHAN, tho he be right where he ſays that Authority.
Riches are Power, is miſtaken where he ſays that
Prudence, or the repu-
tation of Prudence, is Power: for the Learning or Prudence of a Man
is no more Power than the Learning or Prudence of a Book or Author,
which is properly Authority. A learned Wțiter may have Authority
tho he has no Power; and a fooliſh Magiſtrat may have Power, tho
he has otherwiſe no Eſteem or Authority. The difference of theſe
two is obſerv'd by Livy in EVANDER, of whom he ſays,
* that he govern'd rather by the Authority of others, than by his own
Power.
To begin with Riches, in regard that Men are hung upon thieſe, Empire
not of choice as upon the other, but of neceſſity and by the teeth:
for as much as he who wants Bread is his Servancícliat will feed him;
if a Man thús feeds a whole People, they are under his Empire.
EMPIRE is of two kinds, Domeſtic and National, or Foren Diviſion of
and Provincial.
Empire.
DOMESTIC Empire is founded upon Dominion.
Domeſtic Em..
DOMINION is Property real or perſonal, that is to ſay, in Dominion.
Lands, or in Mony and Goods.
LANDS, or the parts and parcels of a Territory, are held by Balance in
the Proprietor or Proprietors, Lord or Lords of it, in fom proportion;
and ſuch (except it be in a City that has little or no Land, and whofé
Revenue is in Trade) as is the proportion or balance of Dominion or
Property in Land, ſuch is the nature of the Empire.
I'P one Man be fole Landlord of a Territory, or overbalance Abſolute Mos
the People, for example three parts in four, he is Grand Signior: for narchy.
16 the Turk is callid from his Property; and his Empire is abſolute
Monarchy.
If the Few or a Nobility, or a Nobility with the Clergy be Land- Mixd Med
lords, or overbalance the People to the like proportion, it makes the narchy.
Gothic balance (to be ſhewn at large in the ſecond part of this Dil-
courſe) and the Empire is mix'd Monarchy, as that of Spain,
Poland, and late of Oceana.
pire,
Lands.
1
1.
Regebat magis Autoritate quam Imperio.
I
AND
+
40
OCEAN A.
Popular G-
vernment.
Tyranny.
Oligarchy.
Anarchy.
1
AND if the whole People be Landlords, or liold the Lands fo
divided among them, that no one Man, or number of Men, within
the compaſs of the Few or Ariſtocracy, overbalance them, the Empire
vithout the interpoſition of Force) is a Commonwealth.
IF Force be interpos’d in any of theſe three caſes, it muft either
frame the Government to the Foundation, or the Foundation to the
Government ; or holding the Government not according to the balance,
it is not natural, but violent: and therfore if it be at the devotion of
a Prince, it is Tyranny; if at the devotion of the Few, Oligarchy; or
if in the power of the People, Anarchy. Each of which Confuſions,
the balance ſtanding otherwiſe, is but of ſhort continuance, becauſe
againſt the nature of the balance, which, not deſtroy'd, deſtroys that
which oppoſes it.
BUT there be certain other Confuſions, which, being rooted in
the balance, are of longer continuance, and of worſe conſequence; as
firſt, where a Nobility holds half the Property, or about that
pro-
portion, and the People the other half; in which caſe, without altering
the balance, there is no remedy but the one muſt eat out the other : as
the People did the Nobility in Athens, and the Nobility the People in
Rome. Secondly, when a Prince holds about half the Dominion, and
the People the other half (which was the caſe of the Roman Empe-
rors, planted partly upon their military Colonies, and partly upon the
Senat and the People ) the Government becoms a very ſhambles both
of the Princes and the People. Somwhat of this nature are certain
Governments at this day, which are ſaid to ſubſiſt by confuſion. In
this caſe, to fix the balance, is to entail miſery : 'but in the three for-
mer, not to fix it, is to loſe the Government. Wherfore it being un-
lawful in Turky, tliat any ſhould poſſeſs Land but the Grand Signior,
the balance is fix?d by the Law, and that Empire firm. Nor, tho the
Kings often fell
, was the Throne of Oceana known to ſhake, until
the Statute of Alienations broke the Pillars, by giving way to the No
bility to ſell their Eſtates, * While Lacedemon held to the diviſion of
Land made by Lycurgus, it was immovable, but, breaking that,
could ſtand no longer. This kind of Law fixing the balance in Lands
is call?d Agrarian, and was firſt introduc'd by God himſelf, who di-
vided the Land of Canaan to his People by Lots, and is of ſuch virtue,
that wherever it has held, that Government has not alter'd, except by
conſent; as in that unparalleld example of the People of Iſrael, when
being in liberty they would needs chuſe a King. But without an
Agrarian, Government, whether Monarchical, Ariſtocratical, or Popu-
lar, has no long Leaſe.
AS for Dominion perſonal or in Mony, it may now and then ſtir
up a MELIus or a MANLIUS, which, if the Commonwealth be
not provided with ſom kind of Dictatorian Power, may be dangerous,
tho it, has bin feldom or never ſucceſsful : becauſe to Property prödu-
cing Empire, it is requir'd that it ſhould have 'Tom certain root or
foothold, which, except in Land, it cannot have, being otherwiſe as
it were upon the Wing.
NEVERTHELESS, in ſuch Cities as ſubſiſt moſtly by Trade,
and have little or no Land, as Holland and Genoa, the balance of Trea-
fure may be equal to that of Land in the caſes mention'd.
-...
A
..
Balance in
Stony.
* Si terra recedar, Ionium Ægæo fraggat marc.
BUT
OCEAN A.
BUT LEVIATHAN, tho he ſeems to ſcew at Antiquity, follow-
îng his furious Maſter CARNE ADES, has caught hold of the public
Sword, to which he reduces all manner and matter of Government;
as, where he affirms this opinion [that any Monarch receives his Powej Paz. Ega
by Covenant, that is to ſay, upon conditions ) to procede from the not un.
derſtanding this eaſy truth, That Covenants being but i'ords and Breath,
have no power to oblige, contain, conſtrain, or protect any Man, but what
they have from the public Sword. But as he ſaid of the Law, that with-
out this Sword it is but Paper; fo he might have thought of this
Sword, that without a Hand it is but cold Iron. The Hand whichi
holds this Sword is the Militia of a Nation; and the Militia of a Na-
tion is either an Army in the field, or ready for the field upon occaſion. .
But an Army is a Beaſt that has a great belly, and muſt be fed ;
wherfore this will com to wliat Paſtures you have, and what Paſtures
you have will com to the balance of Property, without which tlie pub:
lic Sword is but a name or mere ſpitfrog. Wherfore to ſet that which
LEVIATHAN ſays of Arms and of Contracts a little ſtreighter; Arms and Cons
he chat can graze this Beaſt with the great belly, as the Turk dos his tra&ts.
Timariots, may well deride him that imagins he receiv'd his Power by
Covenant, or is obligd to any ſuch toy: it being in this caſe only that
Covenants are but Words and Breath. But if the Property of the
Nobility, ſtock'd with their Tenants and Retainers, be the paſture of
that Beaſt, the Ox knows his Maſter's Crib; and it is impoſſible foi a
King in ſuch a Conſtitution to reign otherwiſe than by Covenant; or
if lie breaks it, it is words that com to blows.
BUT ſays he, when an Aſſembly of Men is made Soverain, then no
Man imagins any ſuch Covenant to have paſt in the Inſtitution. But what
was that by PuBLICOLA of appeal to the People, or that wher-
by the People had their Tribuns? Fy, ſays he, no body is ſo dull as to
ſay, that the People of Rome made a Covenant with the Romans, to hold
the Soverainty on fach or ſuch conditions ; which not perform’d, the Ro-
mans might depoſé the Roman People
. In which there be ſeveral re-
markable things; for he holds the Commonwealth of Rome to have
conſiſted of one Aſſembly, wlieras it conſiſted of the Senat and the
People; That they were not uponi Covenant, wheras every Law en-
acted by them was a Covenant between them; That the one Aſſembly
was made Soverain, wlieras the People who only were Soverain, weré
ſuch from the beginning, as appears by the antient ſtile of their co-
venants or Laws, * The Senat has reſolv’d, the People have decreed;
That a Council being made Soverain, cannot be made ſuch upon con-
ditions, wheras the Decemvirs being a Council that was made Sove-
rain, was made ſuch upon conditions ;; That all Conditions or Cove-
nants making a Soverain, the Soverain being made, are void ; whence Pigas:
it muſt follow that, the Decemviri being made, were ever after the
lawful Government of Rome, and that it was unlawful for the Com
monwealth of Rome to depoſe the Decemvirs; as alſo that CICERO,
if he wrote otherwiſe out of his Commonwealth, did not write out
of Nature. But to com to others that ſee more of this balance:
YOU have ARISTOTLE full of it in divers places, eſpecially E. 5, 3.3, 9i
where he ſays, that immoderat Wealth, a where One Man or the Few have
greater Poffeſions than the Equality or the frame of the Commonwealth
* Cenſuere patres, juffit populus.
G
will
42
OCEAN A.
will bear, is an occaſion of Sedition, which ends for the greater part in Mo-
narchy; and that for this cauſe the Oſtraciſm has bin receiv'd in diver's
places, as in Argos and Athens. But that it were better :0 prevent the
growth in the beginning, than, when it has got head, to ſeek the remedy of
ſuch an evil.
D.B. 1. C.55.
MACCHIAVEL has miſs'd it very narrowly and more danger-
ouſly; for not fully perceiving that if a Commonwealth be galld by the
Gentry, it is by their overbalance, he ſpeaks of the Gentry as hoſtil
to popular Governments, and of popular Governments as hoſtil to the
Gentry; and makes us believe that the People in ſuch are ſo inrag'd a-
gainſt them, that where they meet a Gentlema isey kill him : which
can never be prov'd by any one example, unleſs in civil War; ſeeing
that even in Switzerland the Gentry are not only fife, but in honor.
But the Balance, as I have laid it down, tho unſeen by MACCHI-
Avel, is that which interprets him, and that which he confirms by his
Judgment in many others as well as in this place, where he concludes,
That he who will go about to make a Commonwealth where there be
many
Gentlemen, unleſs he firſt deſtroys them, undertakes an Impoſſibility. And
that he who goes about to introduce Monarchy where the condition of the
People is equal, ſhall never bring it to paſs, unleſs he cull out ſuch of them
as are the moſt turbulent and ambitious, and make them Gentlemen or No.
blemen, not in name but in effect ; that is, by inriching them with Lands,
Caſtles, and Treaſures that may gain them Power among the reſt, and
bring in the reſt to dependence upon themſelves, to the end that they main-
taining their Ambition by the Prince, the Prince may maintain his Power
WHERFORE as in this place I agree with MACCHIAVE Lij
that a Nobility or Gentry, overbalancing a popular Government, is
the utter bane and deſtruction of it; fo I ſhall ſhew in another, that a
Nobility or Gentry, in a popular Government not overbalancing it, is
the very life and ſoul of it.
The right of the
BY what has bin ſaid, it ſhould ſeem that we may lay aſide further
Militia Stated. diſputes of the public Sword, or of the right of the Militia; which,
be the Government what it will, or let it change how it can, is infepa-
rable from the overbalance in Dominion: nor, if otherwiſe ſtated by
the Law or Cuſtom (as in the Commonwealth of Rome, * where the
People having the Sword, the Nobility came to have the overbalance)
avails it to any other end than deſtruction. For as a Building ſwaying
from the Foundation muſt fall
, ſo it fares with the Law fwaying from
Reaſon, and the Militia from the balance of Dominion. And thus
much for the balance of National or Domeſtic Empire, which is in
Dominion,
The Balance of The balance of Foren or Provincial Empire is of a contrary na-
faren šmpire. ture. A man may as well ſay, that it is unlawful for him who has
made a fair and honeſt purchaſe to have Tenants, as for a Government
that has made a juſt progreſs, and inlargement of it felf, to have Pro-
vinces. But how
a Province may be juſtly acquir'd, appertains to ano-
ther place. In this I am to ſew no more than how or upon what
kind of balance it is to be held ; in order wherto I ſhall firſt thew upon
wliat kind of balance it is not to be held. It has bin ſaid, that nati-
onal or independent Empire, of what kind ſoever, is to be exercisa
by them.
* Confules fine lege Curiaca rem militarem attingere non potuerunt.
f
by
OCEAN A.
43
one.
by them that have the proper balance of Dominion in the Nation;
wherfore provincial or dependent Empire is not to be exercis’d by them
that have the balance of Dominicn in the Province, becauſe that would
bring the Government from Provincial and Dependent, to National
and Independent. Abſolute Monarchy, as that of the ſurks, neither
plants its People at home nor abroad, otherwiſe than as Tenants for
life or at will, wherfore its National and Provincial Government is all
But in Governments that admit the Citizen or Subject to Domi-
nion in Lands, the richeſt are they that ſhare moſt of the Power at
home; wheras the richeſt among the Provincials
, tho native Subjects,
or Citizens that have bin tranſplanted, are leaſt admitted to the Go-
vernment abroad: for men, like flowers or roots being tranſplanted,
take after the ſoil wherin they grow. Wherfore the Commonwealth
of Rome, by planting Colonys of its Citizens within the bounds of
Italy
, took the beſt way of propagating it ſelf
, and naturalizing the
Country; wheras if it had planted ſuch Colonys without the bounds
of Italy, it would have alienated the Citizens, and given a root to Li-
berty abroad that might have ſprung up foren, or ſavage, and hoſtil
to her: wherfore it never made any ſuch diſperſion of it ſelf and its
ſtrength, till it was under the yoke of the Emperors, who disburden-
ing themſelves of the People, as having leſs apprehenſion of what they
could do abroad than at home, took a contrary
courſe.
THE Mamalucs (which till any man ſhew me the contrary, I ſhall
preſume to have bin a Commonwealth conſiſting of an Army, wherof
the common Soldier was the People, the Commiſſion Officer the Senat;
and the General the Prince) were Foreners, and by Nation Circaſſians,
that govern'd Ægypt; wherfore theſe never durft plant themſelves up-
on Dominion, which growing naturally up into the National Intereſt,
muſt have diſſolv'd the foren yoke in that Province.
THE like in ſom fort may be ſaid of Venice, the Government wherof
is uſually miſtaken: for Venice, tho it dos not take in the People, ne-
ver excluded them. This Commonwealth, the Orders wherof are the
moſt Democratical or Popular of all others, in regard of the exquiſit
Rotation of the Senat, at the firſt inſtitution took in the whole People;
they that now live under the Government without participation of it,
are ſuch as have ſince either voluntarily choſen fo to do, or were ſub-
du'd by Arms. Wherfore the Subject of Venice is govern’d by Pro-
vinces, and the balance of Dominion not ſtanding, as has bin faid,
with Provincial Government : As the Mamalucs durft not caſt their
Government upon this balance in their Provinces, left the National In-
tereſt ſhould have rooted out the Foren; ſo neither dare the Venetians
take in their Subjects upon this balance, leſt the foren Intereſt ſhould
root our the National (which is that of the 3000 now governing) and
by diffuſing the Commonwealth throout her Territorys, loſe the
advantage of her Situation, by which in great part it ſubliſts. And
ſuch alſo
is the Government of the Spaniard in the Indies, to which he
deputes Natives of his own Country, not admitting the Creolios to the
Government of thoſe Provinces, tho deſcended from Spaniards.
BUT if a Prince or a Commonwealth may hold a Territory that is
foren in this, it may be ask'd, why he may not hold one that is native
in the like manner? To which I anſwer, becauſe he can hold a foren
by a native Territory, but not a native by a foren: and as hitherto I
have ſhewn what is not the provincial Balance, ſo by this anſwer it
G2
may
44
OCE A N A.
Authority.
may appear what it is, namely the Overbalance of a native Territory
to á foren; for as one Country balances it ſelf by the diſtribution of
Property according to the proportion of the ſame, ſo one Country over-
balances another by advantage of divers kinds. For example, the
Commonwealth of 'Rome overbalanc'd her Provinces by the vigor of a
more excellent Government oppos’d to a crazier, or by a more exqui-
ſit Militia oppos'd to one inferior in Courage or Diſciplin. The like
was that of the Mamalucs, being a hardy People, to the Ægyptians that
were a ſoft one. And the balance of Situation is in this kind of won-
derful effect ; ſeeing the King of Denmark, being none of the moſt
potent Princes, is able at the Sound to take Toll of the greateſt: and as
this King by the advantage of the Land can make the Sea tributary ;
ſo Venice, by the advantage of the Sea, in whoſe arms ſhe is impreg-
nable, can make the Land to feed her Gulf
. For the Colonys in the
Indies, they are yet Babes that cannot live without ſucking the breaſts
of their Mother Citys, but ſuch as I miſtake if when they com of
age they do not wean themſelves : which cauſes me to wonder at
Princes that delight to be exhauſted in that way. And ſo much for the
principles of Power, whether National or Provincial, Domeſtic or Fo.
ren; being ſuch as are external, and founded in the goods of Fortune.
I.COM to the principles of Authority, which are internal, and
founded upon the goods of the Mind. Theſe the Legiſlator that cari
unite in his Government with thoſe of Fortune, coms neareſt to the
work of God, whoſe Government conſiſts of Heaven and Earth:
which was ſaid by PLATO, tho in different words, as, when Princes
ſhould be Philoſophers, or Philoſophers Princes; the World would be
Eccleſ. 10.15. happy. And ſays SOLOMON, There is an evil which I have ſeen'un.
der the Sun, which procedes from the Ruler (enimvero neque nobilem, ne-
que ingenuum, nec libertinum quidem armis pr.eponere, regia utilitas est)
Folly is ſet in great dignity, and the Rich (either in Virtue and Wiſdom,
in the goods of the Mind, or thoſe of Fortune upon that balance which
gives them a ſenſe of the National Intereſt) fit in low places. I have
ſeen Servants upon horſes, and Princes walking as Servants upon the earth.
Sad complaints, that the principles of Power and of Authority, the
goods of the Mind and of Fortune, do not meet and twine in the Wreath
or Crown of Empire! Wherfore, if we have any thing of Piety or of
Prudence, let us raiſe our ſelves out of the mire of privat Intereſt to
the contemplation of Virtue, and put a hand to the removal of this
evil from under the Sun; this evil againſt which no Government that is
not fecur’d, can be good; this evil from which the Government that is
ſecure muſt be perfect. SOLOMON tels us, that the cauſe of it is
from the Ruler, from thoſe principles of power, which, balanc'd up-
on earthly traſli, exclude the heavenly treaſures of Virtue, and that
influence of it upon Government, which is Authority. We liave
wander'd the Earth to find out the balance of power : but to find out
that of Authority, we muſt aſcend, as I ſaid, nearer Heaven, or to
the Image of God, which is the Soul of Man.
TH Soul of Man (whoſe life or motion is perpetual Contempla-
tion or Thought). is the Miſtreſs of two potent Rivals, the one Reaſon,
the other Paſſion, that are in continual ſuit; and, according as the
gives up her will to theſe or either of them, is the felicity or miſery
which Man partakes in this mortal life.
Tacit.
Gror.
FOR
OCEAN A
45
FOR as whatever was Paſſion in the contemplation of a man, beá
ing brought forth by his will into action, is Vice and the bondage of
Sin; fo whatever was Reaſon in the contemplation of a man, being
brought forth by his will into action, is virtue and the freedom of
Soul.
AGAIN, as thoſe actions of a man that were Sin acquire to him-
felf Repentance or Shame, and affect others with Scorn or Pity; ſo
thoſe aètions of a man that are Virtue acquire to himſelf Honor, and
upon others Authority.
NOW Government is no other than the Soul of a Nation or City:
wherfore that which was Reaſon in the debate of a Commonwealth
being brought forth by the reſult, muſt be Virtue ; and foraſmuch as
the Soul of a Ciry or Nation is the Soverain Power, her Virtue muſt
be Law. But the Government whoſe Law is Virtue, and whoſe
Virtue is Law, is the ſame whoſe Empire is Authority, and whoſe
Authority is Empire.
AGAIN, If the Liberty of a man conſiſts in the Empire of his
Reaſon, the abſence wherof would betray, him to the bondage of his
Paſſions; then the Liberty of a Commonwealth conſiſts in the Em-
pire of her Laws, the abſence wherof would retray her to the Luſt of
Tyrants. And there I conceive to be the Principles upon which ARI-
STOTLE and Live (injuriouſly accus'd 'bý LEVIATHAN for
not writing out of nature) have grounded their Aſſertion, That a Com-
monwealth is an Empire of Laivs, and not of Men. But they muſt not
carry it fo. For, ſays he, the Liberty, wherof there is ſo frequent and Pag. 110.
honorable mention in the Hiſtorys and Philoſophy of the antient Greecs and
Romans, and the Writings and Diſcourſes of thoſe that from them have
receiv’d'all their Learning in the Politics, is not the Liberty of particular
Men, but the Liberty of the Commonwealth. He might as well have
faid, that the Eſtates of particular Men in a Commonwealth are not
the Riches of particular Men, but the Riches of the Commonwealth;
for equality of Eſtates cauſes equality of Power, and equality of Power
is the Liberty not only of the Commonwealth, but of every Man.
But ſure a Man would never be thus irreverent with the greateſt Au-
thors, and poſitive againſt all Antiquity, without ſom certain demon-
ſtration of Truth: and, what is it? Why, there is written on the Tur-
rets of the City of Lucca in great Characters at this day the word LI-
BERTAS; yet no Man can thence infer, that a particular Man has
more Liberty or Immunity from the Service of the Commonwealth there,
than in Conſtantinople. Whether a Commonwealth be Monarchical or
Popular, the Freedom is the ſame. The Mountain has brought forth,
and we have a little Equivocation ! For to ſay, that a Lucheſe has no
more Liberty or Immunity from the Laws of Luca, than a Turk has
from thoſe of Conſtantinople ; and to ſay that a Luccheſe has no inore
Liberty or Immunity by the Laws of Lucca, than a Turk has by thoſe
of Conſtantinople, are pretty different Speeches. The firſt may be ſaid
of all Governinents alike; the ſccond ſcarce of any two; much eſs of
theſe, ſeeing it is known, that wheras the greateſt Baſha is a Tenant,
as well of his Head as of his Eſtate, at the Will of his Lord, the
meaneſt Luccheſe that has Land, is a Freeholder of both, and not to
be control'd but by the Law, and that fram’d by every privat Man to
no other end (or they may thank themſelves) than to protect the Li-
berty of every privat Man, which by that means coms to be the Lin
berty of the Commonwealth.
BUT
+
46
OCE A N A.
Hots,
BUT ſeeing they that make the Laws in Commonwealths are but
Men, the main Queſtion ſeems to be, how a Commonwealth coms to
be an Empire of Laws, and not of Men? or how the Debate or Re-
ſult of a Commonwealth is ſo ſure to be according to Reaſon; ſeeing
they who debate, and they who reſolve, be but Men? And as often
as Reaſon is againſt a Man, ſo often will a Man be againſt Reaſon.
THIS is thought to be a ſhrewd ſaying, but will do no harm ; for
be it fo that Reaſon is nothing but Intereſt, there be divers Intereſts,
and fo divers Reaſons.
A S firſt, there is privat Reaſon, which is the Intereſt of a privat
Man.
SECONDLY, There is Reaſon of State, which is the Intereſt
(or Error, as was ſaid by SOLOMON) of the Ruler or Rulers, that
is to ſay, of the Prince, of the Nobility, or of the People.
THIRDLY, There is that Reaſon, which is the Intereſt of Man-
Hooker. B.1. kind, or of the whole. Now if we ſee even in thoſe natural Agents
that want ſenſe, that as in themſelves they have a Law which directs them in
the means wherby they tend to their own perfe£tion, ſo likewiſe that another
Law there is, which touches them as they are fociable parts united into one
Body, a Law which binds them each to ſerve to others good, and all to pre-
fer the good of the whole, before whatſoever their own particular; as wher
ſtones, or heavy things forſake their ordinary wont or center, and fly up-
wards, as if they heard themſelves commanded to let go the good they prin
vatly wiſh, and to relieve the preſent diſtreſs of Nature in common.
There is a common Right, Law of Nature, or Intereſt of the whole;
which is more excellent, and ſo acknowleg'd to be by the Agents
themſelves, than the Right or Intereſt of the Parts only. Wherfore
tho it may be truly ſaid that the Creatures are naturally carry'd forth to
their proper utility or profit, that ought not to be taken in too general &
ſenſe ; ſeeing divers of them abſtain from their own profit, either in regard
of thoſe of the ſame kind, or at leaſt of their young
MANKIND then muſt either be leſs juſt than the Creature, or ac-
knowlege alſo his common Intereſt to be common Right. And if Rea-
ſon be nothing elſe but Intereſt, and the Intereſt of Mankind be the
right Intereſt, then the Reaſon of Mankind muſt be right Reaſon. Now
compute well; for if the Intereſt of popular Government com the
neareſt to the Intereſt of Mankind, then the Reaſon of popular Go-
vernment muſt com the neareſt to right Reaſon.
BUT it may be faid, that the difficulty remains yet; for be the Intereſt
of popular Government right Reaſon, a Man dos not look upon Reaſon
as it is right or wrong in it ſelf, but as it makes for him or againſt him.
Wherfore unleſs you can ſhew ſuch Orders of a Government, as, like
thoſe of God in Nature, ſhall be able to conſtrain this or that Creature
to ſhake off that Inclination which is more peculiar to it, and take
up
that which regards the common Good or Intereſt; all this is to no more
end, than to perſuade every man in a popular Government not to carve
himſelf of that which he deſires moft, but to be mannerly at the public
Table, and give the beſt from himſelf to Decency and the common
Intereſt. But that ſuch Orders may be eſtabliſh'd, as may, nay muſt
give the upper hand in all caſes to common Right or Intereſt, notwith-
ſtanding the nearneſs of that which ſticks to every man in privat, and
this in a way of equal certainty and facility, is known even to Girls,
being no other than thoſe that are of common practice with them in
f
divers
Crot
T
OCEAN A.
47
1
divers caſes. For example, two of them have a Cake yet undivided,
which was given between them: that cach of them therfore may
have
that which is due, Divide, ſays one to the other, and I will chuſe;
or let me divide, and you ſhall chuſe. If this be but once agreed up-
on, it is enough for the divident, dividing unequally, loſes, in regard
that the other takes the better half; wherfore ſhe divides equally, and
ſo both have right. O the depth of the W’ifaom of God! and yet by the
mouths of Babes and Sucklings has he ſet forth his ſtrength; that which
great Philoſophers are diſputing upon in vain, is brought to light by
two harmleſs Girls, even the whole Myſtery of a Commonwealth,
which lys only in dividing and chuſing. Nor has God (if his Works
in Nature be under{tood) left ſo much to Mankind to diſpute upon,
as who ſhall divide, and who chuſe, but diſtributed them for ever in-
to two Orders, wherof the one has the natural right of dividing, and
the other of chuſing. For Example:
A COMMONWEALTH is but a civil Society of Men : let The Orders of
us take any number of Men (as twenty.) and immediatly make a popular Governa
Commonwealth. Twenty Men (if they be not all Idiots, perhaps
if they be ) can never com fo together, but there will be ſuch a dif-
fererice in them, that about a third will be wiſer, or at leaſt leſs fooliſh
than all the reſt; theſe upon acquaintance, tho it be but ſmall, will be
diſcover'd, and (as Stags that have the largeſt heads) Icad the herd:
for while the ſix diſcourfing and arguing one with another, ſhew the
eminence of their parts, the fourteen diſcover things that they never
thought on; or are clear’d in divers Truthis which had formerly
perplex'd them. Wherfore in matter of common concernment, diffi-
culty, or danger, they hang upon their lips as Children upon their
Fathers; and the influence thus acquir'd by the lix, the eminence of
whoſe parts is found to be a ſtay and comfort to the fourreen, is * the
Authority of the Fathers. Wherfore this can be mó ötlier than a na-
tural Ariſtocracy diffus’d by God tliroduir the whole Body of Man-
kind to this end and purpoſe ; and therfore ſuch as the People have
not only a natural, but å poſitive Obligation to make uſe of as their
Guides ; as where tlie People of Iſrael are commanded to take wiſe men, Deut. I. 13.
and underſtanding, and known among their Tribes, 'to be made Rulers over
them. The fix then approv'd of, as in the preſent caſe, are the Senat,
not by hereditary Right, or in regard of the greatneſs of their Eſtates
only (which would tend to ſuch Power as might force or draw the
People) but by election for their excellent Parts, which tends tö.the
advancement of the influence of their Virtue or Authority that leads
the People. Wherfore the Office of the Senat is not to be Com-
manders, but Counſellors of the People ; and that which is proper to
Counſellors is firſt to debate, and afterward to give advice in the bu-
ſineſs wherupon they have debated; whence the Decrces of the Senat
are never Laws, nor ſo of call’d: and theſe being maturely fram’d, it
is their duty i to propoſe in the caſe to the People
. Wherfore the
Senat is no more than the debate of the Commonwealch. But to dé-
bate, is to diſcern or put a difference between things that, being alikë,
are not the ſame; or it is ſeparating and weighing this reaſon againſt
that, and that reaſon againſt this
, which is dividing.
.
1
* Authoritas Patrum.
+ Senatuſconfulci. Ferre ad Populim.
THE
.
1
i
48
OCE A N A,
The People. THE Senat then having divided, who ſhall chuſe? Ask the Girls:
for if ſhe that divided muſt have choſen alſo, it had bin little worſe for
the other in caſe ſhe had not divided at all, but kept the whole Cake to
her ſelf, in regard that being to chuſe too, ſhe divided accordingly.
Wherfore if the Senat have any farther power tha nto divide, the
Commonwealth can never be equal. But in a Commonwealth conſiſt-
ing of a ſingle Council, there is no other to chuſe than that which di-
vided; whence it is, that ſuch a Council fails not to ſcramble, that is,
to be factious, there being no other dividing of the Cake in that caſe
but among themſelves.
NOR is there any remedy but to have another Council to chuſe.
The Wiſdom of the Few may be the Light of Mankind; but the In-
tereſt of the Few is not the Profit of Mankind, nor of a Common-
wealth. Wherfore ſeeing we have granted Intereſt to be Reaſon, they
muſt not chuſe, leſt it put out their Light. But as the Council divi-
ding conſiſts of the Wiſdom of the Commonwealth, ſo the Aſſembly
or Council chuſing ſhould conſiſt of the Intereſt of the Common-
wealth : as the Wiſdom of the Commonwealth is in the Ariſtocracy,
ſo the Intereſt of the Commonwealth is in the whole body of the Peo-
ple. And wheras this, in caſe the Commonwealth conſiſt of a whole
Nation, is too unweildy a body to be aſſembled, this Council is to conſiſt
of ſuch a Repreſentative as may be equal, and ſo conſtituted, as can ne-
ver contract any other Intereſt than that of the whole People ; the
manner wherof, being ſuch as is beſt ſhewn by Exemplification, I re-
mit to the Model. But in the preſent caſe, the fix dividing, and the
fourteen chuſing, muſt of neceſſity take in the whole intereſt of the
twenty.
DIVIDING and chuſing in the language of a Commonwealth
is debating and reſolving; and whatſoever upon debate of the Senat is
propos’d to the People, and reſolv'd by them, is enacted * by the au-
thority of the Fathers, and by the power of the People, which con-
curring, make a Law.
BUT the Law being made, ſays LEVIATHAN, is but Words
The
Magiſtracy.
and Paper without the Hands and Swords of Men; wherfore as thoſe
two Orders of a Commonwealth, namely the Senat and the People,
are Legiſlative, ſo of neceſſity there muſt be a third to be executive of
the Laws made, and this is the Magiſtracy; in which order, with the
reſt being wrought up by art, the Commonwealth conſiſts of the Senat
propoſing, the People reſolving, and the Magiſtracy executing : wherby
partaking of the Ariſtocracy as in the Senat, of the Democracy as in the
People, and of Monarchy as in the Magiſtracy, it is complete. Now
there being no other Commonwealth but this in Art or Nature, it is
no wonder if MACCHIAVEL has ſhew'd us that the Antients held
this only to be good ; but it ſeems ſtrange to me, that they ſhould hold
that there could be any other : for if there be ſuch a thing as pure Mo-
narchy, yet that there ſhould be ſuch a one as pure Ariſtocracy, or pure
Democracy, is not in my underſtanding. But the Magiſtracy both
in number and function is different in different Commonwealths. Ne-
vertheleſs there is one condition of it that muſt be the ſame in
every
one, or it diſſolves the Commonwealth where it is wanting. And
this is no leſs than that as the hand of the Magiſtrat is the executive
* Althoritate Patrum & juſſu Populi.
of
Power
OCE A N A.
49
in experience,
Power of the Law, ſo the head of the Magiſtrat is anſwerable to the
People that his execution be according to the Law; by which LEVI A-
THAN may ſee that the hand or ſword that executes the Law is in it,
and not above it.
NOW whether I have rightly tranſcrib'd theſe Principles of a The Orders of a
Commonwealth out of Nature, I ſhall appeal to God and to the Commonwealth
World. To God in the Fabric of the Commonwealth of Iſrael: and as that
to the World in the univerſal Series of antient Prudence. But in
regard the fame Commonwealths will be open'd at large in the Coun-
cil of Legiſlators, I ſhall touch them for the preſent but ſlightly, be-
ginning with that of Iſrael.
THE Commonwealth of Iſrael conſiſted of the Senat, the People, of Iſraeli
and the Magiſtracy.
THE People by their firſt diviſion, which was genealogical, were
contain'd under their thirteen Tribes, Houſes, or Familys; wherof the
firſtbo:n in each was Prince of his Tribe, and had the leading of it: Numb. I.
the Tribe of LEVI only being ſer apart to ſerve at the Altar, had no
other Prince but the High Prieſt. In their ſecond diviſion they were
divided locally by their Agrarian, or the diſtribution of the Land of ſofh.ch. 13, to
Canaan to them by lot, the Tithe of all remaining to LEVI; whence th. 42.
according to their local diviſion, the Tribes are reckon'd but twelve.
THE Aſſemblys of the People thus divided were methodically ga- The Peoph.
ther'd by Trumpets to the Congregation ; which was, it ſhould ſeem, Numbo 10.7.
of two ſorts. For if it were call'd by one Trumpet only, the Princes
of the Tribes and the Elders only aſſembld; but if it were calld Numb. 10. 4.
with two, the whole People gather'd themſelves to the Congregation, Numb. 10.3.
for ſo it is render'd by the Engliſh : but in the Greec it is call’d Eccleſia, Judg. 20.2.
or the Church of God, and by the Talmudiſt, the great Synagog.
The word Eccleſia was alſo antiently and properly us'd for the Civil
Congregations or Aſſemblys of the People in Athens, Lacedemon, and
Epheſus, where it is ſo call'd in Scripture, tho it be otherwiſe render'd Acts 196 23.
by the Tranſlators, not much as I conceive to their commendation,
ſeeing by that means they have loſt us a good leſſon, the Apoſtles bora
rowing that name for their ſpiritual Congregations, to the end that we
might ſee they intended the Government of the Church to be Demo-
cratical or Popular, as is alſo plain in the reſt of their Conſtitutions.
THE Church or Congregation of the People of Iſrael aſſembl'd
in a military manner, and had the reſult of the Commonwealth, or Judg. 20. 2.
the power of confirming all their Laws, tho propos'd even by God
himſelf; as where they make him King; and where they re. Exod. 19.
ject or depoſe him as Civil Magiſtrat, and elect Saul. It is ma- 1 Sam. 8.7.
nifeſt that he gives no ſuch example to a Legiſlator in a popu-
lar Government as to deny or evade the power of the People,
which were a contradiction : but tho he deſervedly blames the ingra-
titude of the People in that action, he commands SA MUE L, being next
under himſelf Supreme Magiſtrat, to hearken to their Voice (for where
the ſuffrage of the People gos for nothing, it is no Commonwealth)
and comforts him, ſaying, They have not rejected thee, but they have
rejected me that I ſhould not reign over them. But to reject him that he
ſhould not reign over them, was as Civil Magiſtrat to depoſe him.
The Power therfore which the People had to depofe even God himſelf
as lie was Civil Magiſtrat, leaves little doubt but that they had power
to have rejected any of thoſe Laws confirm'd by them throout the
H
Scrip
50
OCEAN A.
Deut. 29.
1 Mac. 14.
Exod.9. 3,4,5.
Joſh. 7.
1 Sam. 10.
The Senat.
Numb. II.
Deut. 1.
Numb. II.
Scripture, which (to omit the ſeveral parcels) are generally contain'á
undertwo heads, thoſe that were made by Covenant with the People
in the Land of Moab, and thoſe which were made by Covenant with
the People in Horeb : which two, I think, amount to the whole body
of the Iſraelitiſh Laws. But if all and every one of the Laws of Iſrael
being propos’d by God, were no otherwiſé enacted than by Cove-
nant with the People, then that only which was reſolv'd by the People
of Iſrael was their Law; and ſo the reſult of that Commonwealtlı was
in the People. Nor had the People the reſult only in matter of Law,
Joſh. 7. 16. but the Power in fom caſes of Judicature; as alſo the right of levying
Judg. 20. 8, 9 War; cognizance in matter of Religion; and the election of their
1 Sam.7.6,7,8. Magiſtrats, as the Judg or Dictator, the King, the Prince; which
1 Chron. 13.2. fun&tions were exercis’d by the Synagoga magna or Congregation of If
Judg. 11. 11. rael, not always in one manner; for ſomtimes they were perform’d
i Sam. 10. 17. by the ſuffrage of the People, vivâ voce; fomtimes by the Lot only;
and at others by the Ballot, or by a mixture of the Lot with the Suf-
frage, as in the caſe of ELDAD and MED AD, which I ſhall
openi
with the Senat.
The Senat of Iſrael, calld in the Old Teſtament the ſeventy Elders,
and in the New the Sanhedrim (which word is uſually tranſlated the
Council) was appointed by God, and conſiſted of Seventy Elders be-
ſides MOSES, which were at firſt elected by the People ; but in what
manner is rather intimated than ſhewn. Nevertheleſs, becauſe I can-
not otherwiſe underſtand the paſſage concerning E 1. D A D and ME-
DA D, of whom it is faid, that they were of them that were written,
but went not up to the Tabernacle, then with the Talmudiſts, I conceive
that ELDAD and MEDAD had the ſuffrage of the Tribes, and ſo were
written as Competitors for Magiſtracy; but coming afterwards to the
lot, faild of it, and therfore went not up to the Tabernacle, or place
of Confirmation by God, or to the Seſſionhouſe of the Senat with the
Seventy upon whom the lot fell to be Senators : for the Seſſionhouſe of
the Sanhedrim was firſt in the Court of the Tabernacle, and afterwards
in that of the Temple, where it came to be call'd the ſtone Chamber
John.
or Pavement. If this were the Ballot of Iſrael, that of Venice is the
fame tranſpos’d: for in Venice the Competitor is choſen as it were by
the lor, in regard that the Electors are ſo made, and the Magiſtrat is
choſen by the Suffrage of the great Council or Aſſembly of the People. But
the Sanhedrim of Iſrael being thus conſtituted, Moses for his time, and
after him his Succeſſor, ſat in the midſt of it as Prince or Archon, and
at his left hand the Orator or Father of the Senat; the reſt of the
bench coming round with either horn like a Creſcent, had a Scribe at-
tending upon the tip of it.
THIS Senat, in regard the Legiſlator of Iſrael vvas infallible, and
the Laws given by God ſuch as were not fit to be alter’d by men, is
much different in the exerciſe of their Power from all other Senats, ex-
cept that of the Areopagits in Athens, which alſo was little more than a
Supreme Judicatory; for it will hardly, as I conceive, be found that
the Sanhedrim propos'd to the People till the return of the Children of
Iſrael out of Captivity under Eſdras
, at which time there was a new
Law made, namely, 'for a kind of Excommunication, or rather Ba-
niſhment, which had never bin before in Iſraei. Nevertheleſs it is
not to be thought that the Sanhedrim had not always that right, which
from the time of Eſdras it more frequently exercis’d, of propoſing to
f
the
L'
OCEAN A.
51
+
large hereafter
;
the People, but that they forbore it in regard of the fulneſs and infalli-
bility of the Law already made, wherby it was needleſs. Wherfore
the function of this Council, which is very rare in a Senat, was exe- The Magiſtracy,
cutive, and conſiſted in the adminiſtration of the Law made; and
wheras the Council itſelf is often underſtood in Scripture by the Prieſt Deut. 17.9,
and the Levit, there is no more in that ſave only that the Prieſts and 10, 11.
the Levits, who otherwiſe had no Power at all, being in the
younger
years of this Commonwealth, thoſe that were beſt ſtudy'd' in the
Laws were the moſt frequently elected into the Sanhedrim. For the
Courts conſiſting of three and twenty Elders ſitting in the Gates of
every City, and the Triumvirats of Judges conſtituted almoſt in every
Village, which were parts of the executive Magiſtracy ſubordinat to
the Sanhedrim, I ſhall take them at better leiſure, and in the larger
Diſcourſe; but theſe being that part of this Commonwealth which
was inſtituted by Moses upon the advice of JETHRO the Prieſt Exod. 13.
of Midian (as I conceive a Heathen) are to me a ſufficient warrant
even from God himſelf who confirm'd them, to make farther uſe of
human Prudence, wherever I find it bearing a Teſtimony to it ſelf,
whether in Heathen Commonwealths or others: And the rather, be-
cauſe ſo it is, that we who have the holy Scriptures, and in them the
Original of a Commonwealth, made by the ſame hand that made the
World,are either altogether blind or negligent of it; while the Heathens
have all written theirs, as if they had had no other Copy: As, to be
more brief in the preſent account of that which you ſhall have more at
ÅTHENS conſiſted of the Senat of the Bean propoſing, of the of Athens.
Church or Aſſembly of the People reſolving, and too often debating,
which was the ruin of it; as alſo of the Senat of the Aropagits, the
nine Archons, with divers other Magiſtrats executing.
LACEDEMON conſiſted of the Senat propoſing; of the Of Lacedemon
Church or Congregation of the People reſolving only and never de-
bating, which was the long life of it; and of the two Kings, the
Court of the Ephors, with divers other Magiſtrats executing.
CARTHÂGE conſiſted of the Senat propoſing and Tomtimes of Carthage.
reſolving too; of the People reſolving and ſomtimes debating too, for
which fault ſhe was reprehended by ARISTOTLE; and ſhe had
her Suffetes, and her hundred Men, with other Magiſtrats executing:
ROMÉ conſiſted of the Senat propoſing, the Concio or People of Romc.
reſolving, and too often debating, which caus’d her ſtornis; as alto of
the Conſuls, Cenſors, Ædils, Tribuns, Pretors, Queſtors, and other
Magiſtrats executing.
VENICE conliſts of the Senat or Pregati propoſing, and fom- of Venice.
times reſolving too; of the great Council or Aſſembly of the People, in
whom the reſult is conſtitutively; as alſo of the Doge, the Signory, the
Cenfors, the Dieci, the Quazancies
, and other Magiltrats executing.
THE proceding of the Commonwealths of Switzerland and of Switzerland
Holland is of a like nature, tho after a more obſcure manner : for the and Holland.
Soveraintys, whether Cantons, Provinces, or Citys, which are the
People, ſend their Deputys commiſſion'd and inſtructed by themſelves
(wherin they reſerve the Reſult in their own power) to the Provincial
or general Convention, or Senat, where the Deputies debate, but have
no other power of Reſult than what was confer'd upon them by the
People, or is farther confer'd by the ſame upon farther occaſion. And
H 2
for
11
.
1
1
1
1
52
OCE A N A.
-
Pag. 170.
for the executive part they have Magiſtrats or Judges in every Canton,
Province or City, beſides thcfe which are more public, and relate to
the League, as for adjuſting Controverſies between one Canton, Pro-
vince or City, and another; or the like between ſuch perſons as are not
of the fame Cant n, Province or City.
BUT that we may obſerve a little farther how the Heathen Po-
liticians have written, not only out of Nature, but as it were out of
Scripture: As in the Commonwealth of Iſrael God is ſaid to have bin
King; ſo the Commonwealth where the Law is King, is ſaid by
ARISTOTLE to be the Kingdom of God. And where by the Luſts
or Paſſions of Men a Power is ſet above that of the Law deriving
from Reafon, which is the dictat of God, God in that ſenſe is rejected
or depos’d that he ſhould not reign over them, as he was in Iſrael.
And
yet
LEVIATHAN will have it, that by reading of theſe Greec
and Latin (he might as well in this ſenſe have ſaid Hebrew) Authors,
young Men, and all others that are unprovided of the antidot of ſolid Rea-
Yon, receiving a ſtrong and delightful impreſſion of the great Exploits of
War, atchiev’d by the Conductors of their Armys, receive withal'
pleaſing Idea of all they have don beſides; and imagin their great proſperity
not to have proceded from the emulation of particular Men, but from the
virtue of their popular form of Government, not conſidering the frequent
Seditions and Civil Wars produc'd by the imperfection of their Polity.
Where, firſt, the blame he lays to the Heathen Authors is in his ſenſe
laid to the Scripture; and wheras he holds them to be young Men, or
Men of no antidot that are of like opinions, it ſhould ſeem that
MACCHIA VEL, the ſole retriever of this antient Prudence, is to
his folid Reaſon a beardleſs Boy that has newly read Livy. And
how folid his Reaſon is, may appear, where he grants great proſpe-
rity of antient Commonwealths, which is to give up the Controverſy.
For ſuch an effect muſt have ſom adequat cauſe; which to evade he
inſinuats that it was nothing elſe but the emulation of particular Men:
as if ſo great an Emulation could have bin generated without as great
Virtue; ſo great Virtue without the beſt Education; the beſt Educa-
tion without the beſt Laws; or the beſt Laws any otherwiſe than by
the excellency of their Polity.
BUT if ſom of theſe Commonwealths, as being leſs perfect in
non
their Polity than others, have bin more feditious, it is not more an ar-
gument of the infirmity of this or that Commonwealth in particular,
than of the excellency of that kind of Polity in general; which if
they, that have not altogether reach'd, have nevertheleſs had
greater
proſperity, what would befal them that ſhould reach?
IN anſwer to which Queſtion let me invite LEVIATHAN, who
of all other Governments gives the advantage to Monarchy for per-
fection, to a better diſquiſition of it by theſe three aſſertions.
THE firſt, That the perfection of Government lys upon ſuch a
libration in the frame of it, that no Man or Men in or under it can
have the intereſt; or having the intereft, can have the power to diſturb
it with Sedition.
THE ſecond, That Monarchy, reaching the perfection of the kind,
reaches not to the perfection of Government; but muſt have ſom dana
gerous flaw in it.
THE third, That popular Government, reaching the perfection of
the kind, reaches the perfe&tion of Government, and has no Haw in it.
THE firſt aſſertion requires no proof.
FOR
the
1
.:
OCEAN A.
53
FOR the proof of the ſecond; Monarchy, as has bin ſhewn, is
of two kinds, the one by Arms, the other by a Nobility, and there is
no other kind in Art or Nature : for if there have bin antiently ſom
Governments call’d Kingdoms, as one of the Goths in Spain, and ano-
ther of the Vandals in Africa, where the King ruld without a Nobi-
lity, and by a Council of the People only; it is expreſly ſaid by the
Authors that mention them, that the Kings were but the Captains,
and that the People not only gave them Laws, but depos’d them as
often as they pleas'd. Nor is it poſſible in reaſon that it ſhould be other-
wiſe in like caſes; wherfore theſe were either no Monarchys, or had
greater flaws in them tan any other.
BUT for a Monarchy by Arms, as that of the Turc (which of
all models that ever were coms up to the perfection of the kind) it is
not in the wit or power of Man to cure it of this dangerous flaw,
That the Janizarys have frequent intereſt and perpetual power to raiſe
Sedition, and to tear the Magiſtrat, even the Prince himſelf, in pieces.
Therfore the Monarchy of Turky is no perfect Government.
AND for a Monarchy by a Nobility, as of late in Oceana (which
of all other models before the declination of it came up to the per-
fection in that kind) it was not in the power or wit of Man to cure it
of that dangerous flaw, That the Nobility had frequent intereſt and
perpetual power by their Rerainers and Tenants to raiſe Sedition; and
(wheras the Janizarys occaſion this kind of Calamity no ſooner than
they make an end of it) to levy a laſting War, to the vaſt effuſion of
Blood, and that even upon occaſions wherin the People, but for their
dependence upon their Lords, had no concernment, as in the feud of
the Red and White. The like has bin frequent in Spain, France, Ger-
many, and other Monarchys of this kind; wherfore Monarchy by a
Nobility is no perfect Government.
FOR the proof of the third aſſertion ; LEVIATHAN yields it to
me,
that there is no other Commonwealth but Monarchical or Popular :
wherfore if no Monarchy be a perfect Government, then either there
is no perfect Government, or it muſt be popular; for which kind of
Conſtitution I have ſomthing more to ſay, than LEVIATHAN has
faid or ever will be able to lay for Monarchy. As,
FIRST, That it is the Government that was never conquer'd by
any
Monarch, from the beginning of the World to this day: for if the
Commonwealths of Greece came under the yoke of the Kings of Ma-
cedon, they were firſt broken by themſelves.
SECONDLY, That it is the Government that has frequently
led mighty Monarchs in Triumph.
THIRDLY, That it is the Government, which, if it has bin
ſeditious, it has not bin ſo from any imperfection in the kind, but in
the particular Conſtitution ; which, wherever the like has happen'd,
muſt have bin inequal.
FOURTHLY, That it is the Government, which, if it hias bin
any thing near equal, was never ſeditious; or let him ſhew me what
Sedition has happend in Lacedemon or Venice.
FIFTHLY, Tliat it is the Government, which, attaining to
perfect equality, has ſuch a libration in the frame of it, that no Man
living can ſhew which way any Man or Men, in or under it, can con-
any
ſuch Intereſt or Pover as ſhould be able to diſturb the Com-
monwealth with Sedition; wherfore an equal Commonwealth is that
only
tract
54
OCE A N A.
Common-
mealths.
*
only. which is without flaw, and contains in it the full perfection of
Government. But to return,
.
BY what has bin ſhewn in Reaſon and Experience it may appear,
that tho Commonwealths in general be Governments of the Senat pro-
poſing, the People reſolving, and the Magiſtracy executing; yet ſom
are not ſo good at theſe Orders as others, thro ſom impediment or de-
fect in the frame, balance, or capacity of them, according to which
they are of divers kinds.
Diviſion of
THE firſt diviſion of them is into ſuch as are ſingle, as Iſrael,
Athens, Lacedemon, &c. and ſuch as are by Leagues, as thoſe of the
Acheans, Etolians, Lyceans, Switz, and Hollanders.
THE ſecond (being MACCHIAVE L’s) is into ſuch as are for
preſervation, as Lacedemon and Venice, and ſuch as are for increaſe, as
Athens and Rome; in which I can ſee no more than that the former
takes in no more Citizens than are neceſſary for defence, and the latter
ſo many as are capable of increaſe.
THE third diviſion (unſeen hitherto ) is into equal and inequal,
and this is the main point, eſpecially as to domeſtic Peace and Tranquil-
lity; for to make a Commonwealth inequal, is to divide it into partys,
which ſets them at perpetual variance, the one party endeavoring to
preſerve their Eminence and Inequality, and the other to attain to
Equality : whence the People of Rome deriv'd their perpetual ſtrife
with the Nobility or Senat. But in an equal Commonwealth there
can be no more ſtrife than there can be overbalance in equal weights;
wherfore the Commonwealth of Venice, being that which of all others
is the moſt equal in the Conſtitution, is that wherin there never liap-
pen'd any ſtrife between the Senat and the People.
AN equal Commonwealth is ſuch a one as is equal both in the
balance or foundation, and in the ſuperſtructure; that is to ſay, in her
Agrarian Law, and in her Rotation.
Equal Agreto AN equal Agrarian is a perpetual Law eſtabliſhing and preſerving
tlie balance of Dominion by ſuch a diſtribution, that no one Man or
number of Men, within the compafs of the Few or Ariſtocracy, can
com to overpower the whole People by their poſſeſſions in Lands.
AS the Agrarian anſwers to the Foundation, ſo dos Rotation to
the Superſtructures
.
EQUAL Rotation is equal viciſſitude in Government, or ſucceſ-
fion to Magiſtracy confer'd for ſuch convenient terms, enjoying equal
vacations, as také in the whole body by parts, ſucceding others, thro
the free election or ſuffrage of the People.
Prolongation of THE contrary wherunto is prolongation of Magiſtracy, which,
Magijiracy. 'traſhing the wheel of Rotation, deſtroys the life or natural motion of
a Commonwealth.
THE election or ſuffrage of the People is moſt free, where it is
made or given in ſuch a manner, that it can neither oblige * nor diſob-
lige another; nor thro fear of an Enemy, or baſhfulneſs towards a
Friend, impair a Man's liberty.
WHERFORE, ſays ĆICERO, † the Tablet or Ballot of the
People of Rome (who gave their Votes by throwing Tablets or little
pieces of Wood ſecretly into Urns mark'd for the negative or affirma-
rian.
Rotation.
Ballot.
:
* Qui beneficiuin accepit libertatem vendidit. + Grata populo eft tabella quæ frontes aperit
hominum, mentes tegic, datquc cam libertatem ut quod velint faciant.
tive)
45
11
the moſt perfect.
/
OCEAN A.
55
tive) was a welcom Conſtitution to the People, as that wlrich, not im-
pairing the aſſurance of their brows, increas'd the freedom of their
Judgment. I have not ſtood upon a more particular deſcription of this
Ballot, becauſe that of Venice exemplify'd in the Model is of all others
AN equal Commonwealth (by that which has bin ſaid ) is a Govern. Definition of an
ment eſtabliſh”d upon an equal Agrarian, ariſing into the Superſtructures equal. commen:
or three Orders, 'the Senat debating and propoſing, the People reſolving,
and the Magiſtracy executing by an equal" Rotation thro the ſuffrage of
the People given by the Ballot. For tho Rotation may be without the
Ballot, and the Ballot without Rotation, yet the Ballot not only as to
the inſuing Model includes both, but is by far the moſt equal way;
for which cauſe under the name of the Ballot I ſhall hereafter undera
ſtand both that and Rotation too.
NOW having reafon’d the Principles of an equal Commonwealth,
I Mould com to give an inſtance of ſuch a one in experience, if I could
find it; but if this work be of any value, it lys in that it is the firſt
example of a Commonwealth that is perfectly equal.' For Venice, tho
it coms the neareſt, yet is a Commonwealth for preſervation; and
ſuchi
a one, conſidering the paucity of Citizens taken in, and the num-
ber not taken in, is externally unequal: and tho every Commonwealth
that holds Provinces muſt in that regard be ſuch, yet not to that degree.
Nevertheleſs Venice internally, and for her capacity, is by far the moſt
equal, tho it has not in my judgment arriv'd at the full perfection of
equality ; both becauſe her Laws ſupplying the defect of an Agrarian,
are not ſo clear nor effectual at the Foundation, nor her Superitructures
by the virtue of her Ballot or Rotation exa&tly librated : in regard that
thro the paucity of her Citizens, her greater Magiſfracys are conti-
nually wheeld thro a few hands, as is con eſt hy JANOT ti where
he ſays, that if a Gentleman coms once to be Savio di terra ferma, it
ſeldom happens that he fails from thenceforward to be adornd with
ſom one of the greater Magiſtracys, as Savi di mare; Savi di terra fer-
ma, Savi Grandi, Counſellors, thoſe of the Decemvirat or Dictatorian
Council
, the Aurogatori or Cenſors
, which require no vacation or in-
terval. Wherfore if this in Venice, or that in Lacedemon, where the
Kings were hereditary, and the Senators (tho elected by the People)
for life, cauſe no inequality (which is hard to be conceiv'd) in a
Commonwealth for preſervation, or ſuch a one as conſiſts of a few Ci-
tizens; yet is it manifeſt, that it would cauſe a very great one in a
Commonwealth for increaſe
, or conſiſting of the Many, which by in-
groſſing the Magiſtracys in a few hands, would be obſtructed in their
Rotation.
BUT there be who ſay (and think it a ſtrong Objection) that let a
Commonwealth be as equal as you can imagin, two or three Men when
all is don will govern it; and there is that in it, which, notwithſtand-
ing the pretended ſufficiency of a popular State, amounts to a plain
confeſſion of the imbecillity of that Policy, and of the Prerogative of
Monarchy: for as much as popular Governments in difficult caſes
have had recourſe to Dictatorian Power, as in Rome.
TO which I anſwer, That as Truth is a ſpark to which Objecti-
ons are like bellows, ſo in this reſpect our Commonwealth ſhines'; for
the Eminence acquir'd by ſuffrage of the People in a Commonwealthi,
eſpecially if it be popular and equal
, can be aſcended by no other ſteps
tban
56
OCEAN A.
than the univerſal acknowlegement of Virtue : and where men excel
in Virtue, the Commonwealth is ſtupid and injuſt, if accordingly they
do not excel in Authority. Wherfore this is both the advantage of
Virtue, which has her due incouragement, and of the Commonwealth
which has her due ſervices. Theſe are the Philoſophers which PLATO
would have to be Princes, the Princes which SOLOMON would have
to be mounted, and their Steeds are thoſe of Authority, not Empire;
or, if they be buckld to the Chariot of Empire, as that of the Dicta-
torian Power, like the Chariot of the Sun, it is glorious for terms and
vacations, or intervals. And as a Commonwealth is a Government of
Laws and not of Men, ſo is this the Principality of Virtue, and not of
Man; if that fail or ſet in one, it riſes in another * who is created his
immediat Succeſſor. And this takes away that vanity from under the
Sun, which is an Error proceding more or leſs from all other Rulers
under Heaven but an equal Commonwealth.
THESE things conſider'd, it will be convenient in this place to
ſpeak a word to ſuch as go about to inſinuat to the Nobility or Gentry
a fear of the People, or to the People a fear of the Nobility or Gentry,
as if their intereſts were deſtructive to each other, when indeed an
Army may as well conſiſt of Soldiers without Officers, or of Officers
without Soldiers, as a Commonwealth (eſpecially ſuch a onc as is ca-
pable of Greatneſs) of a People without a Gentry, or of a Gentry
without a People. Wherfore this (tho not always ſo intended, as may
appear by MACCHIAVEL, who elſe would be guilty) is a pernici-
ous error. There is ſomthing firſt in the making of a Commonwealth,
then in the governing of it, and laſt of all in the leading of its Armys;
whích (tho there be great Divines, great Lawyers, great men in alí
profeſſions) ſeems to be peculiar only to the Genius of a Gentleman.
For ſo it is in the univerſal ſeries of Story, that if any man has found-
ed a Commonwealth, he was firft a Gentleman. Moses had his
Education by the Daughter of PHARAOH; Theseus and So-
LON, of noble Birth, were held by the Athenians worthy to be Kings;
LYCURGUs was of the Royal Blood ; ROMUL us and NUMA
Princes; Brutus and PUBLICOLA Patricians; the GRACCHI,
that loſt their lives for the People of Rome and the reſtitution of that
Commonwealth, were the Sons of a Father adorn'd with two Triumphs,
and of CORNELIA the Daughter of Scipio, who being demand-
ed in marriage by King PTOLOMY, diſdain'd to becom the Queen of
Egypt. And the moſt renown' OLPHAUS MEGALETOR, ſole
Legiſlator (as you will ſee anon) of the Commonwealth of Oceana,
was derivd from a noble Family: nor will it be any occaſion of ſcru-
ple in this caſe, that LEVIATHAN affirms the Politics to be no anti-
enter than his Book de Cive. Such alſo as have got any fame in the Ci-
vil Government of a Commonwealth, or by the leading of its Armys;
have bin Gentlemen; for ſo in all other reſpects were thoſe plebeian
Magiſtrats elected by the People of Rome, being of known Deſcents,
and of equal Virtues,except only that they were excluded from the name
by the Uſurpation of the Patricians. Holland, thro this defect at home,
has borrow'd Princes for Generals, and Gentlemen of divers Nations
for Commanders: And the Switzers, if they have any defect in this
* Uno avulſo, non deficit alter
Aureus, & fimili frondefcit virga metallo.
of
kind,
OCEAN A.
57
their
kind, rather lend their People to the Colors of other Princes, than
inake that noble uſe of them at home, which ſhould aſſert the Liberty
of Mankind. For where there is not a Nobility to hearten the People,
they are flothful, regardleſs of the World, and of the public intereft
of Liberty, as even thoſe of Rome had bin without their Gentry :
wherfore let the People embrace the Gentry in peace, as the light of
eys; and in war, as the trophy of their arms. And if COR-
NELIA diſdain'd to be Queen of Egypt, if a Roman Conſul look'd
down from his Tribunal upon the greateſt King; let the Nobility love
and cheriſh the People that afford them a Throne ſo much higher in á
Commonwealth, in the acknowlegement of their Virtue, than the
Crowns of Monarchs.
BUT if the equality of a Commonwealth conſiſt in the equality firſt An inequal
Commonwealth
of the Agrarian, and next of the Rotation, then the inequality of a
Commonwealth muſt conſiſt in the abſence or inequality of the Agra-
rian, or of the Rotation, or of both.
ISRAEL and Lacedemon, which Commonwealths (as the People
of this, in Josephus, claims kindred of that) have great reſemblance,
were each of them equal in their Agrarian, and inequal in their Rota
țion; eſpecially Ifrael, where the Sanhedrim or Senat, firſt elected
by the People, as appears by the words of Moses, took upon them Deut. I.
ever
after, without any precept of God, to ſubſtitute their Succeſſors
by Ordination; which having bin there of civil uſe, as Excommunica-
tion, Community of Goods, and other Cuſtoms of the Eſſeans, who
were many of them converted, came afterward to be introduc'd into
the Chriſtian Church. And the election of the Judg, Suffes or Dicta-
tor, was irregular, both for the occaſion, the term, and the vacation
of that Magiſtracy; as you find in the Book of Judges, where it is of-
ten repeated, That in thoſe days there was no King in Iſrael, that is, no
Judg: and in the firſt of SAMUEL, where El y judgd Iſrael forty
years, and SAMUEL all his life. In Lacedemon the election of the
Senat being by ſuffrage of the People, tho for life, was not altogether
ſo inequal; yer the hereditary Right of Kings, were it not for the
Agrarian, had ruin'd her.
ATHENS and Rome were inequal as to their Agrarian, that of
Athens being infirm, and this of Rome none at all; for if it were more
antiently carry'd, it was never obſerv’d. Whence by the time of T 1-
BERIUS GRACCHUS the Nobility had almoſt eaten the People quite
out of their Lands, which they held in the occupation of Tenants and
Servants : Wherupon, the remedy being too late, and too vehemently
apply'd, that Commonwealth was ruin'd.
THESE alſo were inequal in their Rotation, but in a contrary
manner. Athens, in regard that the Senat (choſen at once by lot, not
by fuffrage, and chang'd every year, not in part, but in the whole) con-
fiſted not of the natural Ariſtocracy; nor ſitting long enough to under-
ſtand, or to be perfect in their office, had no lufficient Authority to
reſtrain the People from that perpetual Turbulence in the end, which
Was their ruin, notwithſtanding the efforts of Nicias, who did all
a man could do to help it. But as Athens by the headineſs of the Peo-
ple, fo Rome fell by the Ambition of the Nobility, thro the want of
an equal Roration, which, if the People liad got into the Senat, and
timely into the Magiſtracys (wherof the former was always uſurp'd
I
by
58
OC E A N A.
by the Patricians, and the latter for the moſt part) they liad both care
ry'd and held their Agrarian, and that had render'd that Common-
wealth immovable.
BUT let a Commonwealth be equal or inequal, it muſt conſiſt, as
has bin ſhewn by Reaſon and all Experience, of the three general Or-
ders; that is to ſay, of the Senat debating and propoſing, of the Peo-
ple reſolving, and of the Magiſtracy executing. Wherfore I can never
wonder enough at LEVIATHAN, who, without any reaſon or ex-
ample, will have it, that a Commonwealth conſiſts of a ſingle Perſon,
or of a ſingle Aſſembly; nor can I fufficiently pity thoſe thouſand Gen-
tlemen, whoſe Minds, which otherwiſe would have waver’d, he has fram'd
as is affirm'd by himſelf) into a conſcientious obedience (for ſó he is
pleas'd to call it) of ſuch a Government.
BUT to finiſh this part of the Diſcourſe, which I intend for ascom-
plete an Epitome of antient Prudence, and in that of the whole Art of
Politics, as I am able to frame in ſo ſhort a time;
THE two firſt Orders, that is to ſay, the Senat and the People, are
Legiſlative, wherunto anſwers that part of this Science which by Poli-
ticians is intitld * of Laws; and the third Order is execurive, to
which anſwers that part of the fame Science which is ſtild of the
Frame and Courſe of Courts or Judicatorys. A word to each of theſe
will be neceſſary.
Of Laws
AND firſt for Laws, they are either Eccleſiaſtical or Civil, ſuch as
concern Religion or Government.
LAWS Eccleſiaſtical, or ſuch as concern Religion, according to the
univerſal courſe of ancient Prudence, are in the power of the Magi-
ſtrat; but according to the common practice of modern Prudence,
ſince the Papacy, torn out of his liands.
BUT, as a Government pretending to Liberty, and yet ſuppreſſing
Liberty of Conſcience (which, becauſe Religion not according to a
man's Conſcience can to him be none at all, is the main) mult be a
contradiction; ſo, a man that, pleading for the Liberty of privat Con-
ſcience, refuſes Liberty to the National Conſcience, muſt be abſurd.
A COMMONWEALTH is nothing elſe but the National
Conſcience. And if the conviction of a mans privat Conſcience
pro-
duces his privat Religion, the conviction of the national Conſcience
muſt produce a national Religion. Whether this be well reaſon'd, as
alſo whether theſe two may ſtand together, will beſt be ſhewn by the
examples of the antient Commonwealths taken in their order.
IŃ that of Iſrael the Government of the National Religion apper-
tain'd not to the Prieſts and Levits, otherwiſe than as they happend to
be of the Sanhedrim or Senat, to which they had no right at all but by
election. It is in this capacity therfore that the People are commanded
under pain of death to hearken to them, and to do according to the ſen-
tence of the Law which they ſhould teach ; but in Iſrael the Law Eccleſia.
ftical and Civil was the fame, therfore the Sanhedrim liaving the pow-
er of one, had the power of both. But as the National Religion ap-
pertain’d to the Juriſdiction of the Sanhedrim, ſo the Liberty of Con-
ſcience appertain'd, from the fame date, and by the ſame right, to the
Deut. 18. 10. Prophets and their Diſciples; as wlicre it is ſaid, I will raiſe up a Pro-
Deut. 17.
* Dc Legibus.
† De Judiciis.
phet
i
OCE A N A.
59
phet-- and whoever will not hearken to my words which he ſhall ſpeak in
my name, I will require it of him. The words relate to prophetic
Right, which was above all the Orders of this Commonwealth ;
whence ELIJAH not only refus’d to obey the King, but deſtroy’d his 2 Kings to
Meſſengers with fire. And wheras it was not lawful by the Natio-
nal Religion to facrifice in any other place than the Temple, a Prophet
was his own Temple, and might ſacrifice where he would, as ELI-
JA H did in Mount Carmel. By this right John the Baptiſt and our 1 Kings 18.196
Savior, to whom it more particularly related, had their Diſciples, and
taught the People; whence is deriv'd our preſent right of GATHER'D
CONGREGATIONS: Wherfore the Chriſtian Religion grew
up according to the Orders of the Commonwealth of Israel, and not
againſt them. Nor was Liberty of Conſcience infring’d by this Go-
vernment, till the civil Liberty of the fame was loſt, as under H E-
ROD, PILAT, and TIBERIUS, a threepild Tyranny.
TO procede, Athens preſerv'd her Religion, by the teſtimony of
Paul, with great Superſtition: If ALCIBIA D'es, that Atheiſtical
fellow, had not ſhew'd them a pair of heels, they had ſhaven off his head
for ſhaving their MERCURY's, and making their Gods look ridicu-
louſy upon them without beards. Nevertheleſs, if Paul reaſon'd
with them, they lov'd news, for which he was the more welcom; and
if he converted DIONYSIUS the Areopagit, that is, one of the Sena-
tors, there follow'd neither any hurt to him, nor loſs of honor to
DIONYSIU S. And for Rome, if CICERO, in his moſt excellent
Book de natura Deorum, overthrew the National Religion of that
Commonwealth, he was never the farther from being Conſul. But
there is a meanneſs and pcorneſs in modern Prudence, not only to the
damage of Civil Government, but of Religion it ſelf: for to make a
man in matter of Religion, which admits not of ſenſible demonſtrati-
on (jurare in verba Magiſtri) engage to believe no otherwiſe than is
believ'd-by my Lord Biſhop, or Goodman Presbyter, is a Pedantiſm,
that has made the Sword to be a Rod in the hands of Schoolmaſters;
by which means, wheras the Chriſtian Religion is the fartheſt of any
from countenancing War, there never was a War of Religion but
ſince Chriſtianity : For which we are beholden to the Pope ; for the
Pope not giving liberty of Conſcience to Princes and Commonwealths,
they cannot give that to their Subjects which they have not themſelves:
whence botli Princes and Subjects either thiro his inſtigation, or their
own diſputes, have introduc'd that execrable cuſtom, never known in
the world before, of fighting for Religion, and denying the Magiſtrat
to have any juriſdiction concerning it; wheras the Magiſtrats loſing the
power of Religion loſes the Liberty of Conſcience, which in that cafe
Înas nothing to protect it. But if the People be otherwiſe taught, it
concerns them to look about then, and to diſtinguiſh between the
Shrieking of the Lapwing, and the voice of the Turtle.
To com to Civil Laws, if they ſtand one way and the balance a-
nother, it is the caſe of a Government which of neceſſity muſt be new
modeld; wherfore your Lawyers adviſing you upon the like occaſions
to fit
your Government to their Laws, are 110 more to be regarded,
than
your Taylor if he ſhould deſire you to fit your body to his dou-
blet. There is alſo danger in the plauſible pretence of reforming the
Law, except the Government be firſt good, in which caſe it is a good
I 2
Tree,
60
O C E A N A.
Tree, and (trouble not your felves overmuch) brings not forth evil
fruit; otherwiſe, if the Tree be evil, you can never reform the fruit :
or if a Root that is naught bring forth fruit of this kind that ſeems to
be good, take the more heed, for it is the ranker poiſon. It was no-
wiſe probable, if Augustus had not made excellent Laws, that the
bowels of Rome could have com to be ſo miſerably eaten out by the
Tyranny of T IBER I us and his Succeſſors. The beſt Rule as to
your Laws in general is, that they be few. Rome by the teſtimony of
CICERO was beſt govern'd under thoſe of the twelve Tables ; and
by that of Tacitus, Plurima leges, corruptiſſima reſpublica. You
will be told, That where the Laws be few, they leave much to Arbi-
trary Power; but where they be many, they leave more: The Laws
in this caſe, according to JusTINIAN and the beſt Lawyers, being
as litigious as the Suitors. Solon made few; Lycurgus fewer
Laws: and Commonwealths have the feweſt at this day of all other
Governments.
NOW to conclude this part with a word de Judiciis, or of
the Conſtitution or Courſe of Courts; it is a Diſcourſe not otherwiſe
capable of being well manag’d but by particular examples, both the
Conſtitution and Courſe of Courts being divers in different Govern-
ments, but beſt beyond compare in Venice, where they regard not ſo
much the Arbitrary Power of their Courts, as the Conſtitution of them;
wherby that Arbitrary Power being altogether unable to retard or do
hurt to buſineſs, produces and muſt produce the quickeſt diſpatch, and
the moſt righteous dictats of Juſtice that are perhaps in human nature.
The manner I ſhall not ſtand in this place to deſcribe, becauſe it is ex-
emplify'd at large in the Judicature of the People of Oceana. And
thus much of antient Prudence, and the firſt branch of this prelimina-
ry Diſcourſe.
of Courts.
Tbe
OCEAN A.
G
+
The Second Part of the Preliminarys.
I
Romans.
N the ſecond Part I ſhall endeavor to ſhew the Riſe, Progreſs, and
Declination of modern Prudence.
THE date of this kind of Policy is to be computed, as was
ſhewn, from thoſe Inundations of Goths, Vandals, Huns, and Lom-
bards, that overwhelm'd the Roman Empire. But as there is no ap-
pearance in the Bulk or Conſtitution of modern Prudence, that it
ſhould ever have bin able to com up and grapple with the Antient,
ſo fomthing of neceſſity muſt have interpos’d, wherby this came to
be enervated, and that to receive ſtrength and incouragement. And
this was the execrable Reign of the Roman Emperors taking riſe from
that fælix ſceltes) the Arms of CÆSAR, in which ſtorm the Ship of
the Roman Commonwealth was forc'd to disburden it ſelf of that pre-
cious Fraight, which never ſince could emerge or raiſe its head but in
the Gulf of Venice.
IT is faid in Scripture, Thy evil is of thy ſelf, O Iſrael! To which The Tranſition
anſwers that of the Moraliſts, * None is burt but by himſelf, as alſo the ºf Antient into
whole matter of the Politics ; at preſent this Example of the Romans, dence.
who, thro a negligence committed in their Agrarian Laws, let in the
ſink of Luxury, and forfeited the ineſtimable Treaſure of Liberty for
themſelves and thieir Poſterity.
THEIR Agrarian Laws were ſuch, wherby their Landsought to The Agrarian
have bin divided among the People, either without mention of a Co-Laws of the
lony, in which caſe they were not oblig'd to change their abode ; or
with mention and upon condition of a Colony, in which caſe they Sigonius de
were to change their abode; and leaving the City, to plant themſelves Ans. Ro.
upon the Lands ſo afſign'd. The Lands aſſign'd, or that ought to
have bin aſſign'd in either of theſe ways, were of three kinds : Such
as were taken from the Enemy and diſtributed to the People, or ſuch
as were taken from the Enemy, and under color of being reſerv'd to
the Public uſe, were thro ſtealth poſſeft by the Nobility; or ſuch as
were bought with the Public Mony to be diſtributed. Of the Laws
offer'd in theſe caſes, thoſe which divided tlie Lands taken from the
Enemy, or purchas?d with the Public Mony, never occaſion d any
diſpute ; but ſuch as drove at diſpoſſefling the Nobility of their Ufur-
pations, and dividing
the common purchaſe of the Sword among the Peo-
ple, were never touch'd but they caus’d Earthquakes, nor could they
ever be obtain’d by the People; or being obtaind, be obſerv'd by
the Nobility, who not only preſerv'd their prey, but growing vaſtly
rich
upon it, bought the People by degrees quite out of thoſe Shares
that had been confer'd upon them. This the GRACCHI coming too
Jate to perceive, found the Balance of the Commonwealth to be loft
i
but putting the People (wlien they had leaſt force) by forcible means
upon the recovery of it, did ill, ſeeing it neither could nor did tend to
any more than to ſhew them by worſe effects, that what the Wiſdom
of their Leaders had diſcover'd was true. For (quite contrary to
what has happen'd in Oceana, where, the Balance falling to the Peo-
* Nemo nocetur niſi ex fer
ple,
62
OCEAN A.
113s.
the Roman Em-
pire.
ple, they have overthrown the Nobility) that
Nobility of Rome, under
tlié conduct of SYLLA, overthrew the People and the Common-
wealth : ſeeing SyLL A firſt introduc'd that new Balance, which was
Military Colo- the Foundation of the ſucceding Monarchy, in the plantation of Mi-
litary Colonys, inſtituted by his diſtribution of the conquer'd Lands,
not now of Enemys, but of Citizens, to forty ſeven Legions of his
Soldiers; ſo that how he came to be PERPETUAL DIC-
TATOR, or other Magiſtrats to ſuccede him in like Power, is no
Miracle.
The Balance of THESE Military Colonys (in which manner ſucceding Empe-
rors continu'd, as' Augustus by the diſtribution of the Veterans,
wherby he had overcom Brutus and Cassius, to plant their
Soldiery) conſiſted of ſuch as I conceive were they that are call?d Mi-
lites beneficiarii; in regard that the Tenure of their Lands was by way
of Benefices, that is for Life, and upon condition of Duty or Service
in the War upon their own Charge. Theſe Benefices A L'EXANDER
SEVER us granted to the Heirs of the Incumbents, but
upon
the
ſame conditions. And ſuch was the Dominion by which the Roman
Emperors gave their Balance.
But to the Beneficiarys, as was no leſs
than neceſary for the ſafety of the Prince, a matter of eight thouſand
by the Example of Augustus were added, which departed not
from his ſides, but were his perpetual Guard, calld Pretorian Bands;
tho theſe, according to the incurable flaw already obſerv'd in this
kind of Government, became the moſt frequent Butchers of their
Lords that are to be found in Story. Thus far the Roman Monarchy
is much the ſame with that at this day in Turky, conſiſting of a Camp,
and a Horſequarter ; a Camp in regard of the Spabys and Janizarys,
the perpetual Guard of the Prince, except they alſo chance to be li
quoriſh after his Blood; and a Horſequarter in regard of the diſtributi-
of his whole Land to Tenants for Life, upon condition of continual
Service, or as often as they ſhall be commanded at their own charge by
Timars, being a word which they ſay ſignifys Benefices, that it shall
fave me a labor of opening the Government.
BUT the Fame of MAHOMET and his Prudence, is eſpecially
founded in this, That wheras the Roman Monarchy, except that of
Iſrael, was the moſt imperfect, the Turkiſh is the moſt perfect that
Which happen'd in that the Roman (as the Ifraelitiſh of
the Sanhedrim and the Congregation) had a mixture of the Senat and
the People; and the Turkiſh is pure. And that this was pure, and
the other mix d, happen'd not thro the Wiſdom of the Legiſlators,
but the different. Genius of the Nations; the People of the Eaſtern
Parts, except the Iſraelits, which is to be attributed to their Agrarian,
having bin ſuch as ſcarce ever knew any other Condition than that of
Slavery; and theſe of the Weſtern having ever had ſuch a reliſh of
Liberty, as thro what deſpair ſoever could never be brought to ſtand
ſtill while the Yoke was putting on their Necks, but by being fed with
ſom hopes of reſerving to themſelves ſom part of their Freedom.
WHERFORE Julius CÆSAR (faith * SUETONIUS)
contented himſelf in naining half the Magiſtrats
, to leave the reſt to
the ſuffrage of the People. And MÆCEN A s, tho he would not have
Augustus to give the People their Liberty, would not have him
on
ever was.
Dion,
1.
* Comitia cum populo fortitus eft.
take.
Ö C E Ε Α Ν Α.
63
take it quite away f. Whence this Empire being neither Hawk nor
Buzzard, made a flight accordingly; and the Prince being perpetually
toft ( having the Avarice of the Soldiery on this hand to ſatisfy upon
the People, and the Senat and the People on the other to be defended
from the Soldiery ) ſeldom dy'd any other death than by one Horn of
this Dilemma, as is noted more at large by MACCHIAVEL. But P. cap. 19.
the Pretorian Bands, thoſe beſtial executioners of their Captain's Ty:
ranny upon others, and of their own upon him, having continued
from the time of Augustus, were by CONSTANTIN the Great
incens'd againſt them for taking part with his Adverſary MAXE N'
Tius) remov'd from their ſtrong Gariſon which they held in Rome,
and diſtributed into divers Provinces. The Benefices of the Soldiers
that were hitherto held for Life and upon Duty, were by this Prince
made Hereditary : ſo that the whole Foundation wlierupon this Em-
pire was firſt built being now remov’d, ſhew's plainly, that the Em-
perors muſt long before this have found out ſom other way of ſupport;
and this was by ftipendiating the Goths, a People that, deriving their
Roors from the Northern parts of Germany, or out of Sweden, had
thro their Victorys obtain'd againſt DOMITIAN) long ſince ſpred
their Branches to ſo near a Neighborhood with the Roman Territorys;
that they began to overſhadow them. For te Emperors making uſe
of them in their Armys (as the French do at this day of the Switz)
gave them that under the notion of a Stipend, which they receiv'd as
Tribute,
coming (if there were any default in the payment) fo often
to diſtrein for it, that in the time of HONORIU's they fack'd Rome,
and poſſeſt themſelves of Italy. And ſuch was the tranſition of an
tient into modern Prudence; or that breach which being follow'd in
every part of the Roman Empire with Inundations of Vandals, Huns,
Lombards, Franks, Saxons, overwhelm'd antient Languages, Leara-
ing, Prudence, Manners, Citys, changiog the names of Rivers, Macchiuvela
Countrys, Seas, Mountains, and Men ; CAMILʻL'US, CÆSAR
and POMPEY, being com to EDMUND, RICHARD, and GE OF
TO open the Groundwork or Balance of theſe new Politicians: The Gothic B.t-
Feudum, ſays CALVIN the Lawyer, is a Gothic word of divers ſig- lance.
nifications ; for it is taken either for War, or for a poſſeſſion of conquerd
Lands, diſtributed by the Victor to ſuch of his Captains and Soldiers as
bad merited in his Wars, upon condition to acknowlege him to be their per-
petual Lord, and themſelves to be his Subjects.
Of theſe there were three Kinds or Orders: The firſt of Nobi-Inſtitution of
lity, diſtinguiſh'd by the Titles of Dukes, Marquiſſes, Earls; and Feudatory Prin
cipalityst
theſe being gratified with the Citys, Caſtles, and Villages of the con-
querd Italians, their Feuds participated of Royal Dignity, and were
call'd Regalia, by which they had right to coin Mony, create Magi-
ftrats, take Toll, Cuſtoms, Confiſcations, and the like.
FEUDS of the ſecond Order were ſuch as, with the conſent of
the King, were beſtow'd by theſe Feudatory Princes upon men of infe-
rior, Quality, called their Barons, on condition that next to the King
they ſhould defend the Dignitys and Fortunes of their Lords in
Arms:
FREY
+ Neque id exiſtimare debes autorem me cibi eſſe, ut cyrannidem in S. P.Q: R. in ſervitu-
tem redactum teneas : quod neque dicere meum, neque facere cuum eſt.
THE
64
O C E AN A.
THE loweſt Order of Feuds were ſuch as being confer'd by thoſe
of the ſecond Order upon privat men, whether Noble or not Noble,
oblig'd them in the like Duty to their Superiörs; theſe were call'd Va
vafors. And this is the Gothic Balance, by which all the Kingdoms
this day in Chriſtendom were at firſt erected; for which cauſe, if I had
time, I ſhould open in this place the Empire of Germany, and the
Kingdoms of France, Spain, and Poland : But ſo much as has bin faid
being ſufficient for the diſcovery of the Principles of modern Prudence
in general, I ſhall divide the remainder of my Diſcourſe, which is
more particular, into three parts.
THE firſt ſhewing the Conſtitution of the late Monarchy of
Oceana.
THE ſecond, the Diſſolution of the ſame. And
THE third, the Generation of the preſent Commonwealth.
I
1
THE Conſtitution of the late Monarchy of Oceana is to be confi-
der'd in relation to the different Nations by whom it has bin fuccel-
ſively ſubdu'd and governd. The firſt of theſe were the Romans,
the ſecond the Teutons, the third the Scandians, and the fourth thc Neu-
ftrians.
THE Government of the Romans, who held it as a Province, I
ſhall omit, becauſe I am to ſpeak of their Provincial Government in
another place; only it is to be remember'd here, that if we have given
over running up and down naked, and with dappld hides, learn'd to
write and read, and to be inſtructed with good Arts, for all theſe we
are beholden to the Romans, either immediatly, or mediatly by the
Teutons : for that the Teutons had the Arts from no other hand, is
plain enough by their Language, which has yet no word to ſignify ei-
ther writing or reading, but what is deriv'd from the Latin. Fur-
thermore, by the help of theſe Arts ſo learn'd, we have bin capable of
that Religion which we have long ſince receiv’d; wherfore it ſeems
to me, that we ought not to detract from the memory of the Romans,
by whoſe means we are, as it were, of Beaſts becom Men, and by
whoſe means we might yet of obſcure and ignorant Men (if we
thought not too well of our ſelves) becom a wife and a great Peo-
ple.
For the proof of THE Romans liaving govern'd Oceana provincially, the Teutons
the inſuing Dife were the firſt that introduc'd the form of the late Monarchy. To
cords and An- theſe ſucceded the Scandians, of whom (becauſe their Reign was
tiquitys, fee ſhort, as alſo becauſe they made little alteration in the Government as
of Honor, from to the Form). I ſhall take no notice. But the Teutons, going to work
pag. 593, to upon the Gothic Balance, divided the whole Nation into three forts of
Fends, that of Ealdorman, that of Kings Thane, and that of Middle
WHEN the Kingdom was firſt divided into Precincts will be
narchy.
as hard to ſhew, as when it began firſt to be govern'd ; it being
impoſſible that there ſhould be any Government without fom Divi-
fion. The Diviſion that was in uſe with the Teutons, was by Coun-
tys, and every County had either its Ealdorman, or High Reeve. The
title of Ealdorman came in time to Eorl, or Erl, and that of High
Reeve to High Sheriff
pag. 837
Thane.
The Teuton Mo-
f
EARL
OCEAN A.
65
Earls,
ËARL of the Shire or County denoted the Kings Thane, or Te:
hant by Grand Serjeantry or Knights Service, in chief or in capite ; his
Poſſeſſions were ſomtimes the whole Territory from whence he had his
denomination, that is, the whole County, fomtimes more than one
County, and ſomtimes leſs, the remaining part being in the Crown.
He had alſo ſomtimes a third, or ſom other cuſtomary part of the
profits of certain Citys, Boroughs, or other places within his Earl-
dom. For an example of the poſſeſſions of Earls in antient times,
ETHELRED had to him and his Heirs the whole Kingdom of Mercia,
containing three or four Countys; and there were others that had
little leſs
KINGS Thane was alſo an honorary Title, to which he was Kings Thane;
qualify'd that had five Hides of Land held immediatly of the King
by ſervice of perſonal attendance ; inſomuch that if a Churl or Coun-
tryman had thriven to this proportion, having a Church, a Kitchin, a
Belhouſe (that is, a Hall with a Bell in it to call his family to dinner)
a Boroughgate with a feat (that is, a Porch) of his own, and any
diſtinct Office in the Kings Court, then was he the Kings Thane. But
the proportion of a Hide Land, otherwiſe call'd Caruca, or a Plow
Land, is difficult to be underſtood, becauſe it was not certain ; never-
theleſs it is generally conceiv'd to be ſo much as may be manag’d with
one Plow, and would yield the maintenance of the ſame, witli the
appurtenances in all kinds.
THE Middle Thane was feudal, but not honorary; he was alſo Middle Thane;
calld a Vavalor, and his Lands a V avafory, which held of fom Meln
Lord, and not immediatly of the King.
POSSESSIONS and their Tenures, being of this nature, flew
the Balance of the Teuton Monarchy; wherin the Riches of Earls were
ſo vaſt, that to ariſe from the Balance of their Dominion to their Pow.
er, they were not only call'd Reguli or little Kings, but were ſuch in-
deed ; their Juriſdiction being of two forts, either that which was
exercis'd by them in the Court of their Countys, or in the High Court
of the Kingdom.
IN the Territory denominating an Earl, if it were all his own, Shiremosti
the Courts held, and the Profits of that Juriſdiction were to his own
uſe and benefit. But if he had but ſom part of his County, the his
Juriſdiction and Courts (ſaving perhaps in thoſe poſſeſſions that were
his own) were held by him to the King's uſe and benefit; that is, he
commonly ſupply'd the Office which the Sheriffs regularly executed in
Countys that had no Earls, and whence they came to be calld Viſ- Viscountsi
counts. The Court of the County that had an Earl was held by the
Earl and the Biſhop of the Dioceſs, after the manner of the Sheriffs
Turns to this day ; by which means both the Eccleſiaſtical and Tem-
poral Laws were given in charge together to the Country. The Cau-
Tes of Vavaſors or Vavaſorys appertain’d to the cognizance of this Court,
where Wills were prov'd, Judgment and Execution given, Caſes cri-
minal and civil determin'd.
THE Kings Thanes had the like Juriſdiction in their Thane Lands, Halymout.
as Lords in their Manors, where they alſo kept Courts.
BESIDES theſe in particular, both the Earls and Kings Thanes,
together with the Biſhops, Abbots, and Vavafors, or Middle Thines,
had in the High Court or Parlament of the Kingdom, a more public Weitenager
Juriſdiction, conſiſting Firſt of deliberative Power for adviſing upon,
K
and
mots
1
.
:
66
O C E A N A.
and aſſenting to new Laws: Secondly, of giving counſil in matters of
State: and Thirdly, of Judicature upon Suits and Complaints. I ſhall
not omit to inlighten the obſcurity of theſe times in which there is
little to be found of a methodical Conſtitution of this High Court) by
the addition of an Argument, which I conceive to bear a ſtrong teſti-
mony to it ſelf, tho taken out of a late Writing that conceals the Au-
thor. “It is well known, ſays he, that in every quarter of the Realm
“ a great many Boroughs do yet ſend Burgeſſes to the Parlament,
« which nevertheleſs be ſo antiently and ſo long ſince decay'd and gon
to nought, that they cannot be ſhew'd to have bin of any Reputa-
« tion ſince the Conqueſt, much leſs to have obtain'd any ſuch Privi-
" lege by the grant of any ſucceding King: wherfore theſe muſt have
“ had this right by more antient uſage, and before the Conqueſt, they
6 being inable now to ſhew whence they deriv’d it.
THIS Argument (tho there be more) I ſhall pitch upon as ſuf-
ficient to prove; Firſt, that the lower ſort of the People had right to
Seſſion in Parlament during the time of the Teutons. Secondly, that
they were qualify'd to the fame by election in their Boroughs, and, if
Knights of the Shire (as no doubt they are) be as antient in the Coun-
trys. Thirdly, If it be a good Argument to ſay, that the Commons
during the reign of the Teutons were elected into Parlament, becauſe
they are ſo
now, and no man can ſhew when this cuſtom began ; I ſee
not which way it ſhould be an ill one to ſay, that the Commons du-
ring the reign of the Teutons conſtituted alſo a diſtinct Houſe, becauſe
they do ſo now; unleſs any man can ſhew that they did ever ſit in the
ſame Houſe with the Lords. Wherfore to conclude this part, I con-
ceive for theſe, and other reaſons to be mention’d hereafter, that the
Parlament of the Teutons conſiſted of the King, the Lords Spiritual
and Temporal, and the Commons of the Nation, notwithſtanding
25 Edw.3.c.1. the ſtile of divers Acts of Parliament, which runs as that of Magna
Charta in the Kings name only, ſeeing the ſame was nevertheleſs enact-
ed by the King, Peers, and Commons of the Land, as is teſtify'd in
thoſe words by a ſubſequent Act.
Monarchy of the THE Monarchy of the Teutons had ftood in this poſture about
two hundred and twenty years ; when TURBO Duke of Neuffria
making his claim to the Crown of one of their Kings that dy'd child-
leſs, follow'd it with ſucceſsful Arms; and being poſſeft of the King-
dom, us’d it as conquer'd, diſtributing the Earldoms, Thane Lands,
Biſhoprics and Prelacys of the whole Realm among his Neuſtrians.
From this time the Earl came to be call'd Comes, Conful, and Dux (tho
Conſul and Dux grew afterward out of uſe) the Kings Thanes came to
be calld Barons, and their Lands Baronys; the Middle Thane holding
ſtill of a mean Lord, retain'd the name of Vavafor.
THE Earl or Comes continu'd to have the third part of the Pleas of
the County paid to him by the Sheriff or Vice-comes, now a diſtinct Of
ficer in every County depending upon the King ; ſaving that ſuch Earls
as had their Countys to their own uſe, were now Counts Palatin, and
had under the King Regal Juriſdiction : inſomuch that they conſtitu-
ted their own Sheriffs, granted Pardons, and iſſu'd Writs in their
own names ; nor did the Kings Writ of ordinary Juſtice run in their
27 H. 8. Dominions till a late Statute, wherby much of this privilege was taken
away.
+
:
Neulirians.
Their Earls.
;
FOR
OC E A N A.
67
1
FOR Barons, they came from henceforth to be in different times of Their Barons.
three kinds; Barons by their Eſtates and Tenures, Barons by Writ,
and Barons created by Letters Patents. From TURBO the firſt to
ADOxu s the ſeventh King from the Conqueſt, Barons had their de-
nomination from their Pollellions and Tenures. And there were ei-
ther Spiritual or Temporal; for not only the Thane Lands, but the Barons by their
poffeffions of Biſhops, as alſo of fom twenty fix Abbats, and two Poffefſions.
Priors, were now erected into Baronys, whence the Lords Spiritual
that had ſuffrage in the Teuton Parlament as Spiritual Lords, came to
have it in the Neuſtrian Parlament as Barons, and were made ſubject
(which they had not formerly bin) to Knights ſervice in chief. Baro-
ny coming henceforth to ſignify all honorary poſſeſſions as well of Earls
as Barons, and Baronage to denote all kinds of Lords as well Spiritual
as Temporal having right to ſit in Parlament, the Baronys in this ſenſe
were fomtimes more, and ſomtimes fewer, but commonly about 200
Or 250, containing in them a matter of ſixty thouſand feuda militum,
or Knights Fees, wherof ſom twenty eight thouſand were in the Cler-
gy. It is ill luck that no man can tell what the Land of a Knights Fee
(reckon’d in ſom Writs at 40 l. a year, and in others at 10) was cer-
tainly worth; for by ſuch a help we might have exactly demonſtrated
the Balance of this Government. But ſays Cook, it contain’d Cook 11. Inſt.
twelve Plow Lands, and that was thought to be the moſt certain ac- pag. 596.
count. But this again is extremely uncertain ; for one Plow out of ſom
Land that was fruitful, might work more than ten out of ſom other
that was barren. Nevertheleſs, ſeeing it appears by BRACTON, Balance of the
that of Earldoms and Baronys it was wont to be faid, that the
whole Neuſtrian Mo-
Kingdom was compos’d; as alſo, that theſe conſiſting of 6000o Knights narchy.
Fees, furniſh'd 60000 men for the King's ſervice, being the whole Mi-
litia of this Monarchy, it cannot be imagin'd, that the l' dvaſorys or
Freeholds in the People amounted to any conſiderable proportion.
Wherfore the Balance and Foundation of this Government was in the
60000 Knights Fees, and theſe being poſſeft by the 250 Lords, it was
a Government of the Few, or of the Nobility; wherin the People
might alſo aſſemble, but could have no more than a mere name. And
the Clergy holding a third to the whole Nation, as is plain by the
Parlament Roll; it is an abſurdity (ſeeing the Clergy of France came
firſt thro their Riches to be a State of that Kingdom) to acknowlege
the People to have bin a State of this Realm, and not to allow it to the
Clergy, who were ſo much more weighty in the Balance, which is 4 Rich. a.
that of all other whence a State or Order in a Government is denomi. Num. 13.
nated. Wherfore this Monarchy conſiſted of the king, and of the
three (ordines Regni, or) Eſtates, the Lords Spiritual and Temporal
,
and the Commons: 'It conſiſted of theſe I ſay as to the balance, tho
during the Reign of ſurn of theſe' Kings, not as to the adminiſtra-
tion.
FOR the ambition of Turbo, and fom of thoſe that more im- Adminiſtration
mediatly fucceded him, to be abſolute Princes, ſtrove againſt the na: of the Neuftri-
ture of their Foundation, and, inaſmuch as he had divided almoſt the during the reign
whole Realm among his Neuſtrians, with ſom incouragement for a of the first
while. But the Neuſtrians while they were but foren Plants, having Kings.
no ſecurity againſt the Natives, but in growing up by their Princes
ſides, were no ſooner well rooted in their vaſt Dominions, than they
came up according to the infallible conſequence of the Balance domeſtic,
K 2
and,
68
OCE A N A.
L.
'
and, contracting the National intereſt of the Baronage, grew as fierce
in the vindication of the antient Rights and Liberties of the ſame, as
if they liad bin always Natives: Whence, the Kings being as obftinat
on the one ſide for their abſolute Power, as there on the other for their
Immunitys, grew certain Wars which took their denomination from
the Barons.
THIS fire about the middle of the Reign of Adoxus began to
break out.
And wheras the Predeceſſors of this King had divers times
bin forc'd to ſummon Councils reſembling thoſe of the Tentons, to
Barons by Writ. which the Lords only that were Barons by Dominion and Tenure had
hitherto repair’d, ADOxus ſeeing the effects of ſuch Dominion, be-
gan firſt not to call ſuch as were Barons by Writ (for that was accord-
ing to the practice of antient times) but to call ſuch by Writs as were
otherwiſe no Barons; by which means ſtriving to avoid the conſequence
of the Balance, in coming unwillingly to ſet the Government ſtreight,
he was the firſt that ſet it awry. For the Barons in his Reign, and
his Succeſſors, having vindicated their antient Authority, reſtord the
Parlament with all the Rights and Privileges of the ſame, ſaving that
from thenceforth the Kings had found out a way wherby to help them-
ſelves againſt the nrighty, by Creatures of their own, and ſuch as had
no other ſupport but by their favor. By which means this Govern-
- ment, being indeed the Maſterpiece of modern Prudence, has bin cry'd
up to the Skys, as the only invention wherby at once to maintain the
Soverainty of a Prince, and the Liberty of the People. Wheras in-
deed it has bin no other than a wreſtling match, wherin the Nobility,
as they have bin ſtronger, have thrown the King; or the King, if he
has bin ſtronger, has thrown the Nobility; or the King, where he has
had a Nobility, and could bring them to his party, has thrown the
People, as in France and Spain ; or the People where they have had no
Nobility, or could get them to be of their party, have thrown the
King, as in Holland, and of later times in Oceana. But they came not
49 H. 3. to this ſtrength but by ſuch approaches and degrees, as remain to be
further open'd. For wheras the Barons by Writ (as the ſixty four
Abbats, and thirty ſix Priors that were ſo call’d) were but pro tempore,
Dico TOME being the twelfth King from the Conqueſt, began to
Barons by Let-make Barons by Letters Patents, with the addition of honorary Pen-
ters latents. fions for the maintenance of their Dignitys to them and their Heirs;
ſo that they were hands in the King's Purſe, and had no ſhoulders for
his Throne. Of theſe when the Houſe of Peers came once to be full,
as will be ſeen hereafter, there was nothing more emty. But for the
preſent, the Throne having other ſupports, they did not hurt that ſo
much as they did the King: For the old Barons taking DicotoME's
Prodigality to ſuch Creatures ſo ill, that they depos’d him, got the
trick of it, and never gave over ſetting up and pulling down their
Kings according to their various intereſts, and that faction of the White
Disſolution of and Red, into which they had bin thenceforth divided, till PA NURGUS
the late Manar the cighteenth King from the Conqueſt, was more by their Favor than
chy Oceana.
his Right advanc'd to the Crown." This King thro his natural ſubtilty
reflecting at once upon the greatneſs of their Power, and the inconftan-
cy of their favor, began to find another Flaw in this kind of Govern-
ment, which is alſo noted by MACCHIAVEL, namely that a Throne
ſupported by a Nobility, is not ſo hard to be aſcended, as kept warm.
Wlierfore his ſecret Jealouſy, left the diſſenſion of the Nobility, as it
brought
*
.
!
OCEAN A.
69
brought him in, might throw him out, made him travel in ways un-
diſcover'd by them, to ends as little foreſeen by hiinſelf: while to eſta.
bliſh his own ſafety, lie by mixing Water with their Wine, firſt began
to open thoſe Sluces that have ſince overwhelm'd not the King only, but
the Throne. For wheras a Nobility ſtrikes not at the Throne with-
out which they cannot ſubſiſt, but at ſom King that they do not like;
popular Power ſtrikes thro the King at the Throne, as that which is
incompatible with it. Now that PANUR Gus in abating the Power
of the Nobility, was the cauſe whence it came to fall into the hands of
the People, appears by thoſe ſeveral Statutes that were made in his
Reign, as that for Population, thoſe againſt Retainers, and that for
Alienations,
BY the Statute of Population, all houſes of Husbandry that were
us’d with twenty Acres of Ground and upwards, were to be main-
tain'd, and kept up for ever with a competent proportion of Land
laid to them, and in no wiſe, as appears by a ſubſequent Statute, to
be ſever'd. By which means the houſes being kept up, did of neceſſi-
ty
inforce Dwellers; and the proportion of Land to be tilld being kept
up, did of neceſſity inforce the Dweller not to be a Begger or Cot-
tager, but a Man of ſom ſubſtance, that might keep Hinds and Ser-
vants, and ſet the Plow a going. This did mightily concern (ſays the
Hiſtorian of that Prince) the might and manhood of the Kingdom,
and in effect amortize a great part of the Lands to the hold and pof-
feſſion of the Yeomanry
or middle People, who living not in a ſervil
or indigent faſhion, were much unlink'd from dependence upon their
Lords, and living in a free and plentiful manner, became a more excel-
lent Infantry; but ſuch a one upon which the Lords had ſo little Power,
that from henceforth they may be computed to have bin diſarmd.
AND as they loſt their Infantry after this manner, fo their Cam
valry and Commanders were cut off by the Statute of Retainers: for
wheras it was the cuſtom of the Nobility to have younger Brothers of
good houſes, metald fellows, and ſuch as were knowing in the feats
of Arms about them; they who were longer follow'd with fo dange-
rous a train, eſcap'd not ſuch Puniſhments, as made them cake up..
HENCEFORTH the Country-lives, and great Tables of the
Nobility, which no longer nouriſh'd veins that would bleed for them,
were fruitleſs and loathſom till they chang’d the Air, and of Princes
became Courtiers; where their Revenues, never to have bin exhauſted
by Beef and Mutton, were found narrow, whence follow'd racking
of Rents, and at length ſale of Lands: the riddance thro the. Sta-
tute of Alienations being render'd far more quick and facil than for-
merly it had bin thro the new invention of Intails.
TO this it happen'd, that CORA UNUs the Succeſſor of that
King diſſolving the Abbys, brought with the declining ſtate of the
Nobility fo valt a prey to the Induſtry of the People, that the Balance
of the Commonwealth was too apparently in the popular Party, to
be unſeen by the wiſe Council of Queen PARTHENIA, who con-
verting her reign thro the perpetual Lovetricks that paſt between her
and her People into a kind of Romance, wholly neglected the Nobi-
lity. And by theſe degrees came the Houſe of Commons to raiſe
that head, which ſince las bin ſo high and formidable to their Princes,
that they have look’d pale upon thoſe Aſſemblys. Nor was there
any thing now wanting to the deſtruction of the Throne, but that the
People,
OCE A N A.
70
01
People, not apt to ſee their own ſtrength, ſhould be put to feel it;
when a Prince, as ſtiff in diſputes as the nerve of Monarchy was
grown ſlack, receiv’d that unhappy incouragement from his Clergy
which became his utter ruin, while truſting more to their Logic than
the rough Philoſophy of his Parlament, it came to an irreparable
breach ; for the Houſe of Peers, which alone had ſtood in this gap,
now ſinking down between the King and the Commons, ſhew'd that
Crassus was dead, and the Iſthmus broken. But a Monarchy de-
veſted of its Nobility, has no refuge under Heaven but an Army.
Wherfore the diſſolution of this Government caus'd the War, not the
War the diſſolution of this Government.
OF the King's ſucceſs with his Arms it is not neceſſary to give any
further account, than that they prov'd as ineffectual as his Nobility ;
but without a Nobility or an Army (as has bin ſhew'd) there can be
no Monarchy. Wherfore wliat is there in nature that can arife out of
theſe Aſhes, but a popular Government, or a new Mcnarchy to be
erected by the victorious Army?
TO erect a Monarchy, be it never ſo new, unleſs like LEVIA-
THAN you can hang it, as the Country-fellow ſpeaks, by Geometry
(for what elſe is it to ſay, that every other Man muſt give up his will
to the will of this one Man without any other foundation?) it muſt
ſtand
upon
old Principles, that is, upon a Nobility or an Army planted
on a due balance of Dominion. Aut viam inveniam aut faciam, was an
Adage of CÆSAR; and there is no ſtanding for a Monarchy unleſs
it finds this Balance, or makes it. If it finds it, the work's don to its
hand : for, where there is inequality of Eſtates, there muſt be inequa-
lity of Power ; and where there is inequality of Power, there can be
no Commonwealth. To make it, the Sword muſt extirpat out of
Dominion all other roots of Power, and plant an Army upon that
ground. An Army may be planted Nationally or Provincially. To
plant it Nationally, it muſt be in one of the four ways mention'd, that
is, either Monarchically in part, as the Roman Beneficiarii ; or Mo-
narchically in the whole, as the Turkiſh Timariots ; Ariſtocratically,
that is, by Earls and Barons, as the Neuſtrians were planted by
TURBO; or Democratically, that is, by equal lots, as the Ifraelitiſh
Army in the Land of Canaan by Joshua. In every one of theſe
ways there muſt not only be Confiſcations, but Confiſcations to ſuch a
proportion as may anſwer to the work intended.
CONFISCATION of a People that never fought againſt you,
but whoſe Arms you have born, and in which you have bin viéto-
rious, and this upon premeditation, and in cold blood, I ſhould have
thought to be againſt any example in human Nature, but for thoſe
alleg'd by MACCHIAVEL of AGATHOCL Es, and OLIVE-
RETTO di Fermo : the former wherof being Captain General of the
Syracufans, upon a day aſſembld the Senat and the People, as if he had
ſomthing to communicat with them, when at a ſign given he cut the
Senators in pieces to a man, and all the richeſt of the People, by which
means he came to be King. The procedings of OLIVERETTO in
making himſelf Prince of Fermo, were ſomwliar different in circum-
ſtances, but ot'the ſame nature. Nevertheleſs CATILIN, who liad
a ſpirit cqual to any of theſe in his intended miſchief, could never
bring the like to paſs in Rome. The head of a ſmall Commonwealth,
fuch a one as was that of Syracuſa or Fermo, is eaſily brought to the
block;
1
1
*
OCE A N A:
71
block; but that a populous Nation, ſuch as Rome, had not ſuch a one,
was the grief of NERO. If SYLLA or CÆSAR attain'd to be
Princes, it was by Civil War, and ſuch Civil War as yielded rich
fpoils, there being a vaſt Nobility to be confiſcated; which alſo was
tlie caſe in Oceana, when it yielded earth by Earldoms and Baronys to
the Neuſtrian. for the plantation of his new Potentars. Where a
Conqueror finds the Riches of a Land in the hands of the Few, the Por-
feitures are eaſy, and amount to vaſt advantage; but where the l'eople
have equal ſhares, the Confiſcation of many coms to little, and is not
only dangerous, but fruitleſs.
THE Romans in one of their defeats of the Volſci found among
the Captives certain Tuſculans, who, upon examination, confeſt that
the Arms they bore were by command of their State; wherupon in-
formation being given to the Senat by the General CAMILL US, lic
was forthwith commanded to march againſt Tuſculum ; which doing
accordingly, he found the Tuſculan Fields full of Husbandmen, that
ftir'd not otherwiſe from the Plow, than to furniſh his Army with all
kind of Accommodations and Victuals: drawing near to the City, he
faw the Gates wide open, the Magiſtrats coming out in their Gowns
to ſalute and bid him welconi: entring, the Shops were all at work, and
open; the Streets founded with the noiſe of Schoolboys at their Books;
there was no face of War. Wherupon CAMILLUS cauſing the Se-
nat to aſſemble, told them, That tho the Art was underſtood, yet
had they at length found out the true Arms wherby the Romans were
moſt undoubtedly to be conquer'd, for which cauſe he would not an-
ticipat the Senat, to which lie deſir’d them forthwith to fend, which
they did accordingly; and their Dictator with the reſt of their Em-
baffadors being found by the Roman Senators as they went into the
houſe ſtanding ſadly at the door, were ſent for in as Friends, and not
as Enemys: Where the Dictator having ſaid, If we have offended, the
fault was not ſo great as is our Penitence and your Virtue; the Senat
gave them peace forthwith, and ſoon after made the Tuſculans Citizens
of Rome.
BUT putting the caſe, of which the World is not able to ſhew
an example, That the forfeiture of a populous Nation, not conquer'd,
but Friends, and in cool blood, might be takenį your Army muſt be
planted in one of the ways mention'd... To plant it in the way of ab-
folute Monarchy, that is, upon feuds for liſe, ſuch as the Timars, a Coun-
try as large and fruitful as that of Greece, would afford you bur ſix-
teen thouſand Timariots
, for that is the moſt the Turc (being the beſt
husband that ever was of this kind) makes of it at this day : and if
Oceana, which is leſs in fruitfulneſs by one half, and in extent by three
parts, ſhould have no greater a force, whoever breaks her in one bat-
tel, may be ſure ſhe fhall never riſe; for ſuch (as was noted by
MACCHIAVEL) is the nature of the Turkiſh Monarchy, if you
break it in two battels, you have deſtroy'd its whole Militia ; and the
reſt being all ſlaves, you hold it without any further reſiſtance. Wher-
fore the erection of an abſolute Monarchy in Oceana, or in any other
Country that is no larger, without making it a certain prey to the firſt
Invader, is altogether impoſſible.
TO plant by halves, as the Roman Emperors did their Beneficiarys,
or military Colonys, it muſt be either for life; and this an Army of
Oceaners in their own Country (eſpecially having Eſtates of Inheri-
tance)
:
72
O C E A N A.
tance ) will never bear ; becauſe ſuch an Army ſo planted is as well
confiſcated as the People; nor had the Mamalucs bin contented with
ſuch uſage in Egypt, but that they were Foreners, and daring not to
mix with the Natives, it was of abſolute neceſſity to their being.
OR planting them upon Inheritance, whether Ariſtocratically as
the Neuſtrians, or Democratically as the Iſraelits, they grow up by
certain conſequence into the national Intereſt: and this, if they be
planted popularly, coms to a Commonwealth; if by way of Nobi-
lity, to a mix'd Monarchy, which of all other will be found to be the
only kind of Monarchy, wherof this Nation, or any other that is of
no greater extent, has bin or can be capable: for if the Iſraelits (tho
their Democratical Balance, being fix'd by their Agrarian, ſtood firm)
be yet found to have elected Kings, it was becauſe, their Territory lying
open, they were perpetually invaded, and being perpetually invaded,
turn’d themfelves to any thing which thro the want of experience
they thought might be a remedy; whence their miſtake in election of
their Kings (under whom they gain’d nothing, but on the contrary loft
all they had acquir’d by their Commonwealth, both Eſtates and Li-
bertys) is not only apparent, but without parallel. And if there have
bin (as was ſhewn) a Kingdom of the Goths in Spain, and of the
Vandals in Aſia, conſiſting of a ſingle Perſon and a Parlament (taking a
Parlament to be a Council of the People only, without a Nobility)
it is expreſly ſaid of thoſe Councils, that they depos'd their Kings as
often as they pleas'd : nor can there be any other conſequence of ſuch
a Government, ſeeing where there is a Council of the People, they do
never receive Laws, but give them; and a Council giving Laws to a
ſingle Perſon, he has no means in the World wherby to be
any
than a fubordinat Magiſtrat, but force: in which caſe he is not a ſingle
Perſon and a Parlament, but a ſingle Perſon and an Army, which Ar-
my again muſt be planted as has bin ſhewn, or can be of no long con-
tinuance.
IT is true, that the Provincial Balance being in nature quite contra-
ry to the National, you are no way to plant a Provincial Army upon
Dominion. But then you muſt have a native Territory in Strength,
Situation, or Government, able to overbalance the foren, or you can
never hold it. That an Army ſhould in any other caſe be long ſup-
ported by a mere Tax, is a mere phanſy as void of all reaſon and ex-
perience, as if a Man ſhould think to maintain ſuch a one by robbing
of Orchards: for a mere Tax is but pulling of Plumtrees, the root's
wherof are in other Mens grounds, who ſuffering perpetual Violence,
com to hate the Author of it : And it is a Maxim, that no Prince that
is hated by his People can be ſafe. Arms planted upon Dominion extirpat
Enemys, and make Friends; but maintain’d by a mere Tax, have Ene-
mys that have roots, and Friends that have none.
TO conclude, Oceana, or any other Nation of no greater extent,
muſt have a competent Nobility, or is altogether incapable of Mo-
narchy : for where there is equality of Eſtates, there muſt be equality
of Power; and where there is equality of Power, there can be no
Monarchy.
The generation
TO com then to the generation of the Commonwealth; it has bin
of the Common- ſhewn how thro the ways and means us’d by PANURGUS to abaſe
the Nobility, and ſo to mend that flaw which we have aſſerted to be
incurable in this kind of Conſtitution, he ſuffer'd the Balance to fall
more
wealth.
.
into
OCEAN A.
73
.
.
IN
L
Pd
into the power of the People, and ſo broke the Government: but the
Balance being in the People, the Commonwealth (tho they do noi
ſee it) is already in the nature of * them. There wants nothing elſe
but Time (which is ſlow and dangerous) or Art (which would be
more quick and ſecure) for the bringing thoſe native Arms (wher-
withal they are found already) to reſist they know not how every
thing that oppoſes them, to ſuch maturity as may fix tliem upon their
own ſtrength and bottom.
BUT wheras this Art is Prudence; and that part of Prudence What Prudence
which regards the preſent Work, is nothing elſe but the skill of rai. it.
ſing ſuch Superſtructures of Government, as are natural to the known
Foundations : they never mind the Foundation, but thro certain ani-
moſities (wherwith by ſtriving one againſt another they are infected)
or thro freaks, by which, not regarding the courſe of things, nor how
they conduce to their purpoſe, they are given to building in the Air, com
to be divided and ſubdivided into endleſs Partys and Factions, both
Civil and Eccleſiaſtical: which briefly to open, I ſhall firſt ſpeak of
the People in general, and then of their Diviſions.
A PEOPLE (ſays MACCHIAVEL) that is corrupt, is not
capable of a Commonwealth. But in ſhewing what a corrupt Peo-
ple is, he has either involv'd himſelf or me; nor can I otherwiſe com
out of the Labyrinth, than by ſaying, that the Balance altering a Peo-
ple, as to the foregoing Government, muſt of neceſſity be corrupt :
but Corruption in this ſenſe ſignifys no more than that the Corruption
of one Government (as in natural Bodys) is the Generation of
another. Wherfore if the Balance alters from Monarchy, the Corrup-
tion of the People in this caſe is that which makes them capable of a
Commonwealth. But wheras I am not ignorant, that the Corruption
which he means is in Manners, this alſo is from the Balance. For the
Balance leading from Monarchical into Popular, abates the Luxury of
the Nobility, and, inriching the People, brings the Government from
a more privat to a more public Intereſt'; which coming nearer, as has
bin ſhewn, to Juſtice and right Reaſon, the People upon
a like alteration
is ſo far from ſuch a Corruption of Manners, as ſhould render them
incapable of a Commonwealth, that of neceſſity they muſt therby
contract ſuch a Reformation of Manners as will bear no other kind of
Government. On the other ſide, where the Balance changes from
Popular to Oligarchical or Monarchical, the public Intereſt, with the
Reaſon and Juſtice included in the ſame, becoms more privat; Luxury
is introduc'd in the room of Temperance, and Servitude in that of
Freedom; which cauſes ſuch a corruption of Manners both in the No.
bility and people, as, by the Example of Rome in the time of the
Triumvirs, is more at large diſcover'd by the Author to have bin alto-
gether incapable of a Commonwealth.
BUT the Balance of Oceana changing quite contrary to that of
Rome, the Manners of the People were not therby corrupted, but on
the contrary adapted to a Commonwealth. For differences of Opinia
on in a People not rightly inform’d of their Balance, or a diviſion in-
to Partys (while there is not any common Ligament of Power ſuffi-
5
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OCEAN A.
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74
cient to reconcile or hold them) is no ſufficient proof of Corruption.
Nevertheleſs, ſeeing this muſt needs be matter of ſcandal and dan-
ger, it will not be amiſs, in ſhewing what were the Partys, to ſhew
what were their Errors.
THE Partys into which this Nation was divided, were Tempo-
ral, or Spiritual: and the Temporal Partys were eſpecially two, the
one Royaliſts, the other Republicans: each of which aſſerted their dif-
ferent Cauſes, either out of Prudence or Ignorance, out of Intereſt or
Conſcience.
FOR Prudence, either that of the Antients is inferior to the Mo-
dern ( which we liave hitherto bin ſetting face to face, that any one
The Royaliſt. may judg) or that of the Royaliſt muſt be inferior to that of the
Commonwealthſman. And for Intereſt, taking the Commonwealthf-
man to have really intended the Public (for otherwiſe he is a Hypo-
crit and the worſt of Men) that of the Royaliſt muſt of neceſſity
have bin more privat. Wherfore the whole diſpute will com upon
matter of Conſcience; and this, whether it be urgʻd by the Right of
Kings, the Obligation of former Laws, or of the Oath of Allegiance,
is abfolv'd by the Balance.
FOR if the Right of Kings were as immediatly deriv'd from the
Breath of God as the Life of Man, yet this excludes not Death and
Diſſolution. But, that the diſſolution of the late Monarchy was as
natural as the Death of a Man, has bin already ſhewn. Wherfore it
remains with the Royaliſts to diſeover by what Reaſon or Experi-
ence it is poſſible for a Monarchy to ſtand upon a popular Ba-
lance; or, the Balance being popular, as well the Oath of Allegiance,
as all other Monarchical Laws imply an impoſſibility, and are therfore
void.
TO the Commonwealthſman I have no more to ſay, but that if
wealthſman. he excludes any Party, he is not truly ſuch; nor ſhall ever found a
Commonwealth upon the natural Principle of the ſame, which is Ju-
ſtice. And the Royaliſt for having oppos’d a Commonwealth in
Oceana (where the Laws were ſo ambiguous that they might be eter-
nally diſputed, and never reconcild) can neither be juſtly for that
cauſe excluded from his full and equal ſhare in the Government; nor
prudently, for this reaſon, that a Commonwealth conſiſting of a Party
will be in perpetual labor of her own deſtruction: Whence it was that
the Romans having conquer'd the Albans, incorporated them with
equal Right into the Commonwealth. And if the Royaliſts be fleſh of
your fleſh, and nearer of Blood than were the Albans to the Romans,
you being alſo both Chriſtians, the Argument's the ſtronger. Never-
theleſs there is no reaſon that á Commonwealth ſhould any more favor
a Party remaining in fix'd oppoſition againſt it, than Brutus did his
own Sons. But if it fixes them upon that oppoſition, it is its own
fault, not theirs; and this is don by excluding them.
Men that
have equal Poſſeſſions, and the ſame ſecurity for their Eſtates and their
Libertys that you liave, have the ſame cauſe with you to defend both :
But if you will be trampling, they fight for Liberty, tho for Monar-
chy; and you for Tyranny, tho under the name of a Common-
wealth: The nature of Orders in a Government rightly inſtituted be-
ing void of all jealouſy, becauſe, let the Partys which it imbraces be
what they will, its Orders are ſuch as they neither would relift if they
could,
The Cominon-
1
:
O G E A NA
ot
75
tysa
could, nor could if they would, as has bin partly already ſhewn; and
will appear more at large by the following Model
.
THE Partys that are Spiritual are of more kinds than I need men- Religious Par
tion; ſom for a National Religion, and others for Liberty of Con-
ſcience, with ſuch animoſity on both ſides, as if theſe two could not
conſiſt together, and of which I have already ſufficiently fpoken, to
Thew, that indeed the one cannot well ſubſiſt without the other. But
they of all the reſt are the moſt dangerous, who, holding that the
Saints muſt govern, go about to reduce the Commonwealth to a
Party, as well for the Reaſons already ſhewn, as that their Pretences
are againſt Scripture, where the Saints are commanded to ſubmit to
the Higher Powers, and to be ſubject to the Ordinance of Man. And
that men, pretending under the notion of Saints or Religion to Civil
Power, have hitherto never faild to diſhonor that Profeſſion, the
World' is full of Examples, wherof I ſhall confine my ſelf at preſent
only to a couple, the one of Old, the other of New Rome.
IN Old Rome the Patricians
or Nobility pretending to be the godly Saints.
Party, were queſtion'd by the People for ingroſſing all the Magiſtracys
of that Commonwcalth, and had nothing to ſay why they did ſo,
but * that Magiſtracy requir'd a kind of Holineſs which was not in-
the People: p at which the People were filld with ſuch Indignation
as had com to cutting of Throats, if the Nobility had not immediat-
ly laid by the Inſolency of that Plea; which nevertheleſs when they
had don, the People for a long time after continu'd to elect no other
but Patrician Magiſtrats.
THE Example of New Rome in the riſe and practice of the Hie:
rarchy (too well known to require any further illuſtration) is far
more immodeft.
THIS has bin the courſe of Nature: and when it has pleas’d, or
Niall pleaſe God to introduce any thing that is above the courſe of Na-
ture, he will, as he has always don, confirm it by Miracle ; for ſo
in his Prophecy of the Reign of CHRIST upon Earth, he expreſly
promiſes : ſeeing that the Souls of them that were beheaded for Jesus,
Thall be ſeen to live and reign with him; which will be an object of
Senſe, the rather, becauſe the reſt of the Dead are not to live againt
till the Thouſand Years be finiſh'd. And it is not lawful for men to
perſuade us that a thing already is
, tho there be no ſuch object of our
Senſe, which God has told us ſhall not be till it be an object of our
Senſe.
THE Saintſhip of a People as to Government, conſiſts in the elec-
tion of Magiſtrats fearing God, and hating Coverouſneſs, and not
in their confining themſelves, or being confin’d to men of this or that
Party or Profeſſion. It conſiſts in making the moſt prudent and reli-
gious choice they can; yet not in truſting to Men, but, next God, to
their own Orders. Give us good Men, and they will make us good Laws,
is the Maxim of a Demagog, and is (thro the alteration which is
commonly perceivable in men, when they have power to work their
own Wills) exceding fallible. But give us good Orders, and they
* Quòd nemo plebeius auſpicia haberet. † Plebs ad id maximâ indignacione exarfit, quod
auſpiciri, tanquam inviſi Diis immortalibus, negarentur poſſe, T. Liv. 4.8
L2
will
76
OCEAN A.
ternors.
vernment.
will make us good Men, is the Maxim of a Legiſlator, and the moſt in-
fallible in the Politics.
BUT theſe Diviſions (however there be ſom good Men that look
ſadly on them) are trivial things; firſt as to the Civil concern, becauſe
the Government, wherof this Nation is capable, being once ſeen,
takes in all Intereſts. And, ſecondly, as to the Spiritual; becauſe as
the pretence of Religion has always bin turbulent in broken Govern-
ments, ſo where the Government has bin ſound and ſteddy, Religion
has never ſhew'd it ſelf with any other face than that of the natural
Sweetneſs, and Tranquillity: nor is there any reaſon why it ſhould;
The Errors of wherfore the Errors of the People are occaſion’d by their Governors.
the people are If they be doubtful of the way, or wander from it
, it is becauſe their
from their Goo
Guides miſled them; and the Guides of the People are never ſo well
qualify’d for leading by any Virtue of their own, as by that of the Go-
THE Government of Oceana (as it ſtood at the time wherof we
diſcourſe, conſiſting of one ſingle Council of the People, excluſively
of the King and the Lords) was call’d a Parlament: Nevertheleſs the
Parlaments of the Teutons and of the Neuſtrians conſiſted, as has bin
ſhewn, of the King, Lords and Commons; wlierfore this under an
old Name was a new thing: A Parlament conſiſting of a ſingie Ar-
fembly elected by the People, and invelted with the whole Power of
the Government, without any Covenants, Conditions, or Orders what-
ſoever. So new a thing, that neither antient nor modern Prudence
can Thew any avow'd Example of the like. And there is ſcarce any
thing that ſeems to me ſo ſtrange as that (wheras there was nothing
more familiar with theſe Counſillors, than to bring the Scripture to
the Houſe) there ſhould not be a Man of them that ſo much as of
fer’d to bring the Houſe to the Scripture, wherin, as has bin ſhewn,
is contain’d that Original, wherof all the reſt of the Commonwealth's
ſeem to be Copys. Certainly if LEVIATHAN (who is ſurer of
nothing than that a popular Commonwealth conſiſts but of one Coun-
cil) tranſcrib’d his Doctrin out of this Aſſembly, for him to except a-
gainſt ARISTOTLE and Cicer o for writing out of their own
Commonwealths, was not ſo fair play ; or if the Parlament tranſcrib'd
out of him, it had bin an honor better due to MOS E S. But where
one of them ſhould have an Example but from the other, I cannot
imagin, there being nothing of this kind that I can find in ſtory, but
the Oligarchy of Athens, the thirty Tyrants of the ſame, and the Re-
man Decemvirs.
FOR the Oligarchy, THUCYDIDES tells us, that it was a Senat
or Council of Four hundred, pretending to a Balancing Council of the
People conſiſting of Five thouſand, but not producing them ; wherin
you have the definition of an Oligarchy, which is a ſingle Council botlı
debating and reſolving, dividing and chuſing; and what that muſt
com to, was ſhewn by the Example of the Girls, and is apparent by
the experience of all times: wherfore the Thirty ſet up by the Lacede-
monians (when they had conquer'd Athens) are call?d Tyrants by all
Authors, LEVIATHAN only excepted, who will have them a.
gainſt all the World to have bin an Ariſtocracy; but for what reaſon I
cannot imagin, theſe alſo, as void of any Balance, having bin void of that
which is ellential to every Commonwealth, whether Ariſtocratical or
Popular ;
Lib. 8.
1
1
2
F
.
OCE A N A.
77
Popular ; except he be pleas’d with them, becauſe that, according to
the Teſtimony of XENOPHON, they killd more men in eight
months, than the Lacedemonians had don in ten years; oppreſſing the
People (to uſe Sir WALTER RALEIGH's words) with all baſe
and intolerable Slavery.
THE uſurp'd Government of the Decemvirs in Rome was of the
fame kind. Wherfore in the fear of God let Chriſtian Legiſlators
ſetting the Pattern given in the Mount on the one ſide, and theſe
execrable Examples on the other) know the right hand from the left;
and ſo much the rather, becauſe thoſe things which do not conduce to
the good of the Govern'd, are fallacious, if they appear to be good for
the Governors. God in chaſtiſing a People, is accuſtom’d to burn his
Rod. The Empire of theſe Oligarchys was not ſo violent as ſhort,
nor did they fall upon the People, but in their own immediat ruin. Á
Council without a Balance is not a Commonwealth, but an Oligarchy;
and every Oligarchy, except it be put to the defence of its Wicked
neſs or Power againſt ſom outward danger, is fačtious. Wherfore the
Errors of the People being from their Governors (which Maxim in
the Politics bearing a ſufficient teſtimony to it ſelf, is alſo prov'd by
MACCHIAVEL) if the People of Oceana have bin fačtious, the
Cauſe is apparent : But what Remedy ?
IN anſwer to this Queſtion, I com now to the Army; of which The Generals
the moſt victorious Captain, and incomparable Patriot OL PHAUS
MEGALETOR was now General : who being a much greater maſter
of that Art, wherof I have made a roughi draught in theſe Prelimina-
rys,
had ſuch ſad reflections upon the ways and procedings of the Par-
lament, as caſt him upon Books, and all other means of diverſion, a-
mong which he happend on this place of MACCHIAVEL:
" Thrice happy is that people which chances to have a Man able to
“ give them ſuch a Government at once, as without alteration may ſe-
cure them of their Libertys; feeing it is certain that Lacedemon, in
« obſerving the Laws of Lycurgus, continu'd about eight hun-
« dred years without any dangerous Tumult or Corruption. My Lord
General (as it is ſaid of THEMISTOCLES, that he could not ſleep
for the Glory obtain’d by MILTIADES at the Battel of Maratho)
took ſo new and deepan Impreſſion at theſe words of the much
greater
Glory of Lycurgus, that, being on this ſide aſſaulted with the
emulation of his illuſtrious Object, and on the other with the Miſery
of the Nation, which ſeem'd (as it were ruin’d by his Victory) to
caſt it ſelf at his feet, he was almoſt wholly deprív'd of his natural
reſt, till the debate he had within himſelf came to a firm reſolution,
that the greateſt Advantages of a Commonwealth are, firſt, that the
Legiſlator ſhould be one Man: And, ſecondly, that the Government
ſhould be made altogether, or at once. For the firſt, It is certain, ſays Deſ. B.I. c.9.
MACCHIA V E L that a Commonwealth is ſeldom or never well turn'd
or conſtituted, except it has bin the Work of one Man; for which That a Legift-
cauſe a wiſe Legiſlator, and one whoſe mind is firmly fet, not upon
privat but the public Intereſt, not upon his Poſterity but upon his
Country, may juſtly endeavor to get the foverain Power into his own
hands : nor ſhall any man that is Maſter of Reaſon blame ſuch extra-
ordinary means as in that caſe will be neceſſary, the end proving no
other than che Conſtitution of a well-order'd Commonwealth. The
reaſon
.
1
!
tor is to be one.
3
!
.
3
78
OC E A N A,
That a Com- made at once;
may be
monwealth is
once.
reaſon of this is demonſtrable: for the ordinary means not failing, the
Commonwealth has no need of a Legiſlator ; but the ordinary means
failing, there is no recourſe to be had but to ſuch as are extraordinary.
And, wheras a Book or a Building has not bin known to attain to its
perfection, if it has not had a ſole Author or Architect; a Common-
wealth, as to the Fabric of it, is of the like nature. And thus it
at once; in which there be great advantages: for a Commonwealth
to be made at made at once, takes Security at the ſame time it lends its Mony;
and truſts not it ſelf to the Faith of Men, but lanches immediatly
forth into the Empire of Laws: and being ſet ſtreight, brings the
Manners of its Citizens to its rule ; whence follow'd that uprightneſs
which was in Lacedemon. But Manners that are rooted in men, bow
the tenderneſs of a Commonwealth coming up by twigs to their bent ;
whence follow'd the obliquity that was in Rome, and
thoſe perpetual
Repairs by the Conſuls Axes, and Tribuns Hammers, which could ne-
ver finiſh that Commonwealth but in deſtruction.
MY Lord General being clear in theſe Points, and of the neceſſity
of fom other courſe than would be thought upon by the Parlament,
appointed a meeting of the Army, where he ſpoke his ſenſe agreable
to theſe Preliminarys with ſuch ſucceſs to the Soldiery, that the Parla-
ment was ſoon after depos’d ; and he himſelf (in the great Hall of
the Pantheon or Palace of Juſtice, ſituated in Emporium the capital Ci-
ty) was created by the univerſal Suffrage of the Army, Lord AR-
CHON, or ſole Legiſlator of Oceana: upon which Theatre you have,
to conclude this piece, a Perſon introduc'd, whoſe fame ſhall never
draw its Curtain.
THE Lord Archon being created, fifty ſelect Perſons to alliſt
bim (by laboring in thc Mineş of antient Prudence, and bringing its
hidden Treaſures to new light) were added, with the ſtile alſo of Lea
giſlators, and fat as a Council
, whicrof he was the ſole Director and Pre-
fident,
:
Tbe
:
A
OCEAN A.
79
The Council of Legiſlators.
O
::
.
1
The Commonwealth of
fell to
H
F this piece, being the greater half of the whole work, I ſhall be
able at this time to give no farther account, than very briefly to
ſhew at what it aims.
MY Lord ARCHON in opening the Council of Legiſlators,made it
appear how unſafe a thing it is to follow Plianſy in the Fabric of a Com-
monwealth; and how neceſſary that the Archives of antient Prudence
ſhould be ranſack'd before any Counſillor ſhould preſume to offer any
other matter in order to the work in hand, or towards the conſideration
to be had by the Council upon a Model of Government. Wherfore
he caus'd an Urn to be brought, and every one of the Counſillors to
draw a Lot. By the Lots as they were drawn,
SISRAEL
PHOSPHORUS DE AUGE.
ATHENS
NAVARCHUS DE PARALO.
LACEDEMON
LACO DE SCYTALE.
CARTHAGE
MAGO DE SYR TIBUS.
the ACHEANS,
ÆTOLIANS, and 9 ARATUS DE ISTHMO.
LICIANS
the SWITZ
ALPESTER DE FULMINE.
HOLLAND, and the
UNITED PRO Glaucus de ULNA.
. VINCES
ROME
DOLABELLA DE ENYO.
VENICE
LYNCEUS DE STELLA.
THESE contain’d in them all thoſe Excellencys wherof a Common-
wealth is capable; ſo that to liave added mort, had bin to no purpoſe.
Upon time given to the Counſillors, by their own Studys and thoſe of
their Friends, to prepare themſelves, they were open'd in the Order, and
by the Perſons mention’d at the Council of Legiſlators; and afterwards
by order of the ſame were repeated at the Council of the Prytans to
the People : for in drawing of the Lots, there were about a dozen of
them inſcrib'd with the letter P. wherby the Counſillors that drew them
became Prytans.
THE Prytans were a Committee or Council ſitting in the great Hall
of Pantheon, to whom it was lawful for any man to offer any thing in
order to the Fabric of the Commonwealth: for which cauſe, that they
might not be oppreſt by the throng, there was a Rail about the Table
where they fat, and on each ſide of the fame a Pulpit ; that on the
right hand for any man that would propoſe any thing, and that on the
left for any other that would oppoſe him. And all Partys (being indem-
nify'd by Proclamation of the ARCHON) were invited to diſpute their
own Intereſts, or propoſe whatever they thought fit in order to the
future Government) to the Council of the Prytans, who (having a
Guard of about two or three hundred men, left the heat of diſpute
might break the peace) had the Right of Moderators, and were to
report
.
9
+
$
::
-
1
80
OCE A N A.
report from time to time ſuch Propoſitions or Occurrences as they
thought fit, to the Council of Legiſlators ſitting more privatly in the
Palace callid Alma.
THIS was that which made the People (who were neither ſafely
to be admitted, nor conveniently to be excluded in the framing of the
Commonwealth) verily believe when it came forth, that it was no o-
ther than that wherof they themſelves had bin the makers.
MOREOVER, this Council ſat divers months after the publiſh-
ing, and during the promulgation of the Model to the People; by which
means there is ſcarce any thing was ſaid or written for or againſt the ſaid
Model, but you ſhall have it with the next impreſſion of this work by
way of Oration addreſt to, and moderated by the Prytans.
BY this means the Council of Legiſlators had their neceſſary Solitude
and due aim in their greater work, as being acquainted from time to
time with the pulſe of the People, and yet without any manner of in-
terruption or diſturbance.
WHERFORE every Commonwealth in its place having bin
open’d by due Method; that is, Firſt, by the People; Secondly, by the
Senat; And, Thirdly, by the Magiſtracy: The Council upon mature
debate took ſuch reſults or orders out of each, and out of every part of
each of them, as upon opening the ſame they thought fit; which be-
ing put from time to time in writing by the Clerc or Secretary, there
remain’d no more in the concluſion, than putting the Orders ſo taken
together, to view and examin them with a diligent ey, that it might
be clearly diſcover'd whether they did interfere, or could any
wifecom
to interfere or joſtle one with the other. For as ſuch Orders joftling,
or coming to joſtle one another, are the certain diſſolution of the Com-
monwealth ; To taken upon the proof of like experience, and neither
joftling, nor ſhewing which way they can poſſibly com to joftle one
another, they make a perfect, and (for ought that in human Prudence
can be foreſeen) an immortal Commonwealth.
AND ſuch was the Art wherby my Lord ARCHON (taking
Counſil of the Commonwealth of Iſrael, as of Moses; and of the
reſt of the Commonwealths, as of JETHRO) fram'd the Model of
the Commonwealth of Oceana.
+
1
THE
OCE A N A.
81
THE
0
M O DEL
1
OF THE
Commonwealth of OCEANA.
11
HERAS my Lord ARCHON being from Moses and
Lycurgus the firſt Legiſlator that hitherto is found in
Hiſtory to have introduc'd or erected an intire Common-
wealth at once, happen'd, like them alſo, to be more intent upon put-
ting the ſame into execution or action, than into writing; by which
means the Model came to be promulgated or publiſh'd with more bre-
vity and leſs illuſtration than is neceſſary for their underſtanding who
have not bin acquainted with the whole Procedings of the Council of
Legiſlators, and
of the Prytans, where it was aſſerted and clear'd from
all objections and doubts : To the end that I may ſupply what was
wanting in the promulgated Epitome to a more full and perfect Nar-
rative of the whole, I thall rather take the Commonwealth practically,
and as it has now given an account of it ſelf in fom years Revolutions
(as DICEARCHus is ſaid to have don that of Lacedemon, firſt tran- Suidas.
ſcrib'd by his hand ſom three or four hundred years after the Inſtituti-
on) yet not omitting to add for proof to every Order ſuch Debates and
Speeches of the Legiſlators in their Council, or at leaſt ſuch parts of
them as may beſt diſcover the reaſon of the Government; nor ſuch
ways and means as were usd in the inſtitution or riſe of the Building,
not to be ſo well conceiv'd, without ſom knowlege given of the En-
gins wherwithal the mighty Weight was mov’d. But thro the intire
omiſſion of the Council of Legiſlators or Workmen that ſquar'd every
ſtone to this Structure in the Quarrys of antient Prudence, the proof of
the firſt part of this Diſcourſe will be lame, except I inſert, as well for
illuſtration, as to avoid frequent repetition, three remarkable Teſtimo-
nys in this place.
THE firſt is taken out of the Commonwealth of Iſrael: So Mo- Exod. 18.24.
ses hearken’d to the voice of (JETHRO) his Father in law, and did all
that he had ſaid. And MOSES choſe able men out of all Ifrael
, and Numb. 1. 16.
made them heads over the People ; Tribuns, as it is in the vulgar Latin ;
or Phylarchs, that is, Princes of the Tribes, fitting upon twelve * Thrones, Matth.
and judging the twelve Tribes of Iſrael: and next to theſe he choſe Ru-
lers of Thouſands, Rulers of Hundreås, Rulers of Fiftys, and Rulers
of Tens, which were the ſteps or riſe of this Commonwealth from its
foundation or root to its proper elevation or accompliſhment in the San-
hedrim, and the Congregation, already open'd in the Preliminarys.
* Sellis Curulibus. Grot.
M
THE
82
OCE A N A.
C
6
.:
:
Halicar.
THE Second is taken out of Lacedemon, as Lycurgus (for the
greater impreſſion of his Inſtitutions upon the minds of his Citizens)
pretended to have receiv'd the Model of that Commonwealth from the
Oracle of APOLLO at Delphos, the words wherof are thus recorded
by PLUTARCH in the Life of that famous Legiſlator: 'When thou
Crag. de Rep.' Ihalt have divided the People into Tribes (which were (ix) and Obas
Lac. lib.1.c.6." (which were five in every Tribe) thou ſhalt conſtitute the Senat, con-
fiſting, with the two Kings, of thirty Counſillors, who, according as
occaſion requires, ſhall cauſe the Congregation to be aſſembled be-
tween the Bridg and the River Gnacion, where the Senat ſhall propoſe
to the People, and diſmiſs them without ſuffering them to debate. The
Obe were Linages into which every Tribe was divided, and in each
Tribe there was another Diviſion containing all thoſe of the fame that
were of military Age; which being calld the Mora, was ſubdivided
into Troops and Companys that were held in perpetual Diſciplin under
the Command of a Magiſtrat calld the Polemarch.
THE Third is taken out of the Commonwealth of Rome, or thoſe
parts of it which are compriz’d in the firſt and ſecond Books of Livy,
where the People, according to the inſtitution by Romulus, are firſt
divided into thirty Curias or Pariſhes, wlierof he elected (by three out
of each Guria) the Senat, which from his Reign to that of SERVIUS
Tullus propos’d to the Pariſhes or Parochial Congregations; and
theſe being call the Comitia Curiata, had the election of the * Kings,
the Confirmation of their of Laws, and the laſt appeal in matters of
Judicature, as appears in the caſe of HORATIus that kild his Siſter;
till in the Reign of SERVIUS (for the other Kings kept not to the
inſtitution of ROMULUS) the People being grown fomwhat, the
Power of the Curiata was for the greater part tranſlated to the Centu-
riata Comitia inſtituted by this King, which diſtributed the People ac-
cording to the cenſe or valuation of their Eſtates into fix Claſſes, every
one containing about forty Centurys, divided into Youth and Elders;
the Youth for field-ſervice, the Elders for the defence of their Territo
ry, all arm’d and under continual Diſciplin, in which they aſſembld
both upon military and civil occaſions. But when the Senat propos'd
to the People, the Horſe only, wherof there were twelve Centurys
conſiſting of the richeſt ſort over and above thoſe of the Foot enume-
rated, were call'd with the firſt Claſſis of the Foot to the fuffrage; or
if theſe accorded not, then the ſecond Claſſis was calld to them, but
ſeldom or never any of the reſt. Wherfore the People after the ex-
pulſion of the Kings, growing impatient of this inequality, reſted not
till they had reduc'd the fuffrage as it had bin in the Comitia Curiata to
the whole People again : But in another way, that is to ſay, by the
Comitia Tributa, which therapon were inſtituted, being a Council
where the People in exigencys made Laws without the Senat; which
Laws were calld Plebiſcita.' This Council is that in regard wherof
CICERO and other great Wits fo frequently inveigh againſt the Peo-
ple, and ſomtimes even Livy, as at the firſt || inſtitution of it. To
ſay the truth, it was a kind of Anarchy, wherof the People could not
:
1
ܪ
* Quirites, Regem create ; ita patribus viſum eſt: Tullum Hoftilium Regem Populus juſſit, Pa-
tres authores facti. t ut ab Romulo traditum, fuffragium
viritim cudem vi, codemque jure omni-
bus datum eft. | Hunc annum ini znení maximè Comitia Tributa efficiunt; res major victoriâ fuf-
cepti certaminis quam ufu, plus enim dignitatis Comiciis ipfis detractum est, patribus ex Concilio
fubmovendis, quam virium aur plebi additum aut demeum patribus.
**
be
OCE A N A.
83
be excuſable, if there had not, thro the Courſes taken by the Senat,
bin otherwiſe a neceſſity that they muſt have ſeen the Common-
wealth run into Oligarchy.
THE manner how the Comitix Curiata, Centuriata or Tributa Sigonius.
were call’d, during the time of the Commonwealth, to the ſuffrage, was
by lot : the Curia, Century, or Tribe, wheron the firſt lot fell,
being ſtild Principium, or the Prerogative; and the other Curid,
Centurys, or Tribes, wheron the ſecond, third, and fourth Lors, &c.
fell
, the Jure vocate: From henceforth not the firſt Claſſis, as in the
times of SERVIUs, but the Prerogative, whether Curia, Century,
or Tribe, came firſt to the Suffrage, whoſe Vote was call?d Omen Pre-
rogativum, and ſeldom faild to be leading to the reſt of the Tribes.
The Jure vocate in the order of their Lots came next : the manner of
giving fuffrage was, by caſting wooden Tablets, mark’d for the Af
firmative or the Negative, into certain Urns ſtanding upon a Scaffold,
as they march'd over it in files ; which for the reſemblance it bore,
was call’d the Bridg. The Candidat or Competitor, who had moſt
Suffrages in a Curia, Century, or Tribe, was ſaid to have that Curia,
Century, or Tribe, and he who had moſt of the Curia, Centurys, or
Tribes, carry'd the Magiſtracy.
THESE three places being premis’d, as ſuch upon which there will
be frequent reflection, I com to the Narrative, divided into two parts,
the firſt containing the Inſtitution, the ſecond the Conſtitution of the
Commonwealth; in each wherof I ſhall diſtinguiſh the Orders, as
thoſe which contain the whole Model, from the reſt of the Diſcourſe,
which tends only to the explanation or proof of them.
IN the inſtitution or building of a Commonwealth, the firſt work Inſtitution of
(as that of Builders) can be no other than fitting and diſtributing the the Commons
Materials.
THE Materials of a Commonwealth are the People; and the Peo- Diviſions of the
ple of Oceana were diſtributed by caſting them into certain Diviſions, People.
regarding their Quality, their Age, their wealth, and the places of
their reſidence or habitation, which was don by the inſuing Orders.
2
:
wealth.
HELL
THE firſt ORDER diſtributes the People into Freemen or Citi- f. Order.
zens, and Servants, while ſuch; for if they attain to Liberty, that is, and Screamins
.
to live of themſelves, they are Freemen or Citizens.
THIS Order needs no proof, in regard of the nature of Servitude,
which is inconſiſtent with Freedom or participation of Government in a
Commonwealth.
!
{
THE ſecond ORDER diſtributes Citizens into Touth and Elders 2. Order.
(ſuch as are from 18 years of age to 30, being accounted Youth; and ſuch Endemos
as are of 30 and upwards, Elders) and eſtabliſhes that the youth all be
the marching Armys, and the Elders the ſtanding Gariſons of this Na-
PTERI
tion.
.
2
I
i
1
។
A COMMONWEALTH whoſe Arms are in the hands of her
Servants, had need be ſituated (as is elegantly ſaid of Venice by
*CONTARINI) out of the reach of their clutches; witneſs the
* Lontana della fede degli huomini.
M 2
danger
84
OCEAN A.
3. Order.
Into Horſe and
Foot,
danger run by that of Carthage in the Rebellion of SPENDIUs and
MATHO. But tho a City (if one Swallow makes a Summer) may
thus chance to be ſafe, yet ſhall it never be great; for if Carthage or
Venice acquir’d any Fame in their Arms, it is known to have happen'd
thro the mere virtue of their Captains, and not of their Orders :
wherfore Ifrael, Lacedemon, and Rome intaild their Arms upon the
prime of their Citizens, divided (at leaſt in Lacedemon and Rome)
into Youth and Elders ; the Youth for the Field, and the Elders for
defence of the Territory.
THE third ORDER diſtributes the Citizens into Horſe and Foot
by the cenfeor valuation of their Eſtates; they who have above one hundred
Pounds a year in Lands, Goods, or Monys, being oblig’d to be of the Horſe;
and they who have under that Sum, to be of the Foot. But if a man has
prodigally waſted and ſpent his Patrimony, he is neither capable of Magiftra-
cy, Office, or Suffrage in the Commonwealth.
CITIZENS are not only to defend the Commonwealth, bue
according to their abilitys, as the Romans under SERVIus Tullus
(regard had to their Eſtates) were ſom inrol'd in the Horſe Centurys,
and others of the Foot, with Arms injoin'd accordingly; nor could it
be otherwiſe in the reſt of the Commonwealthis
, tho out of Hiſtorical
Remains that are ſo much darker, it be not foclearly provable. And the
neceſſary Prerogative to be given by a Commonwealth to Eſtates, is in
ſom meaſure in the nature of Induſtry, and the uſe of it to the Pub-
lic. *The Roman People, ſays Julius Ex UPERANTIUS, were
divided into Claſſes, and táx'd according to the value of their Eftates. · All
that were worth the Sums appointed were imployd in the Wars; for they
moſt eagerly contend for the Victory, who fight for Liberty in defence of
their Country and Poſſeſſions. But the poorer ſort were pol'd only for their
Heads (which was all they had) and kept in Gariſon at home in time of War:
For theſe might betray the Armys for Bread, by reaſon of their Poverty;
which is the reaſon that MARIUS, to whom the care of the Government
ought not to have bin committed, was the firſt that led "em into the field ;
and his Succeſs was accordingly. There is a mean in things; as exor-
bitant Riches overthrow the Balance of a Commonwealth, ſo extreme
Poverty cannot hold it, nor is by any means to be truſted with it. The
Clauſe in the Order concerning the Prodigalis Athenian, and a very lau-
dable one; for he that could not live upon his Patrimony, if he coms
to touch the public Mony, makes a Commonwealth Bankrupt.
THE fourth ORDER diſtributes the People according to the places
Hundreds, and of their Habitation, into Pariſhes, Hundreds, and Tribes.
FOR except the People be methodically diſtributed, they cannot
be methodically collected; boe the being of a Commonwealth con-
ſiſts in the methodical Collection of the People : wherfore you have the
i
4. Order.
Into Parides,
Tribes.
* Populus Romanus per Claſſes divifus erat, & pro Patrimonii faculcate cenfebantur ; ex iis,
omnes quibus res erat, ad miliciam ducebantur; diligenter enim pro victoria laborabant, qui ex
libertate bona patriam defendebant : Illi autem quibus nullæ opes erant, caput fuum, quod fo-
lum poffidcbant, cenſebantur, & belli tempore in moenibus refidebant ; facile enim poterane
exiſtere proditores, quia egeſtas haud facile habetur fine damno. Hos igitur Marius, quibus non
fycrat Refp. committenda, duxit ad bellum.
Ifram
OCEAN A.
85
veyors
Ifraelitiſi Diviſions into Rulers of Thouſands, of Hundreds of Fiftys;
and of Tens; and of the whole Commonwealth into Tribes : The
Laconic into Obas, Moras, and Tribes; the Roman into Tribes, Cen-
turys, and Claſſes: and fomthing there muſt of neceſſity be in every
Government of the like nature; as that in the late Monarchy, by
Countys. But this being the only Inſtitution in Oceana (except that
of thc Agrarian) which requir’d any charge, or included any difficul-
ty, ingages me to a more particular Deſcription of the manner how it
was perform’d, as follows:
A THOUSAND Surveyors commiſſionated and inſtructed by The use and me
the Lord ARCHon and the Council
, being divided into two equal thod of the Sur-
numbers, each under the inſpection of two Surveyors General, were di-
ftributed into the Northern and Southern parts of the Territory, di-
vided by the River Hemifua, the whole wherof contains about ten
thouſand Pariſhes, ſom ten of thoſe being aſſign'd to cach Surveyor :
For as to this matter there needed no great exactneſs, it tending only
(by ſhewing whither every one was to repair, and wherabout to begin
to the more orderly carrying on of the work; the nature of their In-
ſtructions otherwiſe regarding rather the number of the Inhabitants,
than of the Pariſhes. The Surveyors therfore being every one
furniſh'd
with a convenient proportion of Urns, Balls and balloting Boxes (in
the uſe wherof they had bin formerly exercis’d) and now arriving
each at his reſpective Pariſhes, began with the People, by teaching
them their firſt leſſon, which was the Ballot; and tho they found
them in the beginning ſomthing froward as at toys, with which
(while they were in expectation of greater matters from a Council of
Legiſlators) they conceiv'd themſelves to be abus'd, they came within
a little while to think them pretty ſport, and at length ſuch as might
very ſoberly be us'd in good earneſt : wherupon the Surveyors began
the Inſtitution included in
.
putys.
I
THE fifth ORDER, requiring, That upon the firſt Monday next, $. Order.
inſuing the laſt of December, the bigger Bell in every Pariſh throout the Inſtitution of
Nation be rung at eight of the clock in the morning, and continue ringing of the Balót,
for the ſpace of one hour; and that all the Elders of the Pariſh reſpectively and of the De-
repair to the Church, before the Bell has don ringing ; where dividing them-
ſelves into two equal Numbers, or as near equal as may be, they ſhall take
their places according to their Dignitys (if they be of divers qualitys) and
according to their Seniority (if they be of the fame) the one half on
the one ſide, and the other half on the other, in the body of the Church:
which don, they shall make Oath to the Overſeers of the Pariſh for the
time being (inſtead of theſe the Surveyors were to officiat at the Inſtitu-
tion or firſt Aſſembly) by holding up their hands, to make a fair Election
according to the Laws of the Ballot, as they are hereafter explain’d, of ſuch
Perſons, amounting to a fifth part of their whole number, to be their Depu-
tys, and to exerciſe their Power in manner hereafter explaind, as they ſhall
think in their Conſciences to be fitteſt for that truſt
, and will acquit them-
felves of it to the beſt advantage of the Commonwealth. And Oath be-
ing thus made, they shall procede to Election, if the Elders of the Pariſha
amount to one thouſand by the Ballot of the Tribe (as it is in due place ex-
plain’d) and if the Elders of the Pariſh amount to fifty or upwards, but
within the number of one thouſand, by the Ballot of the hundred (as it is
in due place explain’d). But if the Elders amount 'not to fifty, 'then they
Sall
86
OCE AN A.
1
ſhall procede to the Ballot of the Pariſh, as it is in this place and after
this manner explain’d. The two Overſeers for the time being ſhall feat
themſelves at the upper end of the middle Ally, with a Table before them,
their faces being towards the Congregation : And the Conſtable for the
time being ſhall ſet an Vrn before the Table, into which he ſball put fa
many Balls as there be Elders preſent, wherof there ſhall be one that is
gilded, the reſt being white, and when the Conſtable has ſhaken the Orn
Jufficiently to mix the Balls, the Overſeers ſhall call the Elders to the Vrn,
who from each ſide of the Church ſhall com up the middle Ally in two
files, every man paffing by the Vrn, and drawing out one Ball; which if it
be Silver, he ſhall caſt into a Bonil ſtanding at the foot of the Orn, and
return by the outward Ally on his ſide to his place. But he who draws the
golden Ball is the Propoſer, and ſhall be ſeated between the Overſeers, where
he ſhall begin in what order he pleaſes, and name ſuch as (upon his Oath
already taken) he conceives fitteſt to be choſen, one by one, to the Elders;
and the Party nam'd ſball withdraw while the Congregation is balloting his
name by the double Box or Boxes appointed and mark'd on the outward
part, to fhem which ſide is Affirmative and which Negative, being carry'd
by a Boy or Boys appointed by the Overſeers, to every one of the Elders, who
jhall hold up a pellet made of linen Kags, between his Finger and his Thumb
and put it after ſuch a manner into the Box, as tho no man can ſee intó
which fide he puts it, yet any man may ſee that he puts in but one pellet or
fuffrage. And the fuffrage of the Congregation being thus given, ſhall be
return'd with the Box or Boxes to the
Overſeers, who opening the ſame,
ſball pour the affirmative Balls into a white Bowl ſtanding upon the Table on
the right hand, to be number'd by the firſt Overſeer; and the Negative in-
to a green Bomlftanding on the left hand, to be number?d by the ſecond
Overſeer : and the ſuffrages being number’d; be who has the major part
in the Affirmative is one of the Deputys of the Pariſh : and when fo
ny Deputys are choſen as amount to a full fifth part of the whole num.
ber of the Elders
, the Ballot for
that time, ſhoall ceaſe
. The Deputys being
choſen are to be liſted by the Overſeers in order as they were choſen, except only
that ſuch as are Horſe muſt be liſted in the firſt place with the reſt, pro.
portionable to the number of the Congregation, after this manner :
70
ma-
Anno Dom.
E. E.
The Liſt of the firſt Mover.
A. A. Ord.Eq. 1 Dep. 7of the Pariſh, of in the Hundred
B.B. 2 Dep. of
-and the Tribe of which
C.C. 3 Dep. > Pariſh at the preſent Ele&tion contains
D.D. 4 Dep. 20 Elders, wherof one is of the Horſe
5 Dep. or Equeſtrian Order.
The firſt and ſecond in the Lift are Overſeers by conſequence : the third
is the Constable, and the fourth and fifth are Churchwardens ; the Per-
fons fo choſen are Deputys of the Pariſh for the ſpace of one year from
their Election, and no longer ; nor may they be elected two years together.
This Lift being the Primum Mobile, or firſt Mover of the Commonwealth,
is to be regiſtered in a Book diligently kept and preſerv'd by the Overſeers,
who are reſponſible in their places for theſe and other Dutys to be hereafter
inentiond, to the Cenſors of the Tribe : and the Congregation is to obſerve
of
the
OCE A N A.
87
the preſent Order, as they will anſwer the contrary to the Phylarch, or Pre-
rogative Troop of the Tribe; which, in caſe of failure in the whole or any
part of it, have power to fine them or any of them at diſcretion, but un-
der an Appeal to the Parlament.
FOR proof of this Order ; Firſt, in Reaſon: It is with all Politi-
cians paſt diſpute, that paternal Power is in the right of Nature; and
this is no other than the derivation of Power from Fathers of Familys, as
the natural root of a Commonwealth. And for Experience, if it be o-
therwiſe in that of Holland, I know no other example of the like kind.
In Ifrael, the ſoverain Power came clearly from the natural Root, the Jof. 24. I.
Elders of the whole People ; and Rome was born (Comitiis Curiatis)
in her Parochial Congregations, out of which Romulus firſt rais'd
her Senat, then all the reſt of the Orders of that Commonwealth,
which roſe ſo high: For the depth of a Commonwealth is the juſt
height of it.
* She raiſes up her Head unto the Skys,
Near as her Root unto the Center lys.
AND if the Commonwealth of Rome was born of thirty Pariſhes,
this of Oceana was born of ten thouſand: But wheras mention in the
birth of this is made of an Equeſtrian Order, it may ſtartleſuch as know
that the diviſion of the People of Rome, at the Inſtitution of that Com-
monwealth into Orders, was the occaſion of its ruin. The diſtinction
of the Patrician as a hereditary Order from the very Inſtitution, ingroſ-
ſing all the Magiſtracys, was indeed the deſtruction of Rome ; but to a
Knight or one of the Equeſtrian Order, ſays HORACE,
Si quadringentis ſexs ſeptem millia defunt,
Plebs eris.
By which it ſhould ſeem that this Order was not otherwiſe hereditary
than a mans Eſtate, nor did it give any claim to Magiſtracy; wher-
fore you ſhall never find that it diſquieted the Commonwealth; nor
dos the name denote any more in Oceana, than the Duty of ſuch a man's
Eſtate to the Public.
BUT the Surveyors both in this place and in others, foraſmuch as
they could not obſerve all the Circumſtances of this Order, eſpecially that
of the time of Election, did for the firſt as well as they could; and, the
Elections being made and regiſter’d, took each of them Copys of thoſe
Lifts which were within their Allotments; which don, they produc'd
THE ſixtlı ORDER, directing, in caſe a Parſon or Vicar of a Pa- 4. Order.
riſh coms to be remov’d by Death or by the Cenſors
, that the Congregation of of ordination,
the Pariſh afſemble and depute one or two Elders by the Ballot, who upon the ligion, and Li-
charge of the Pariſb ſhall repair to one of the Univerſitys of this Nation with berty of Consci-
Certificat fignd by the Overſeers, and addreſt to the Vice-Chancellor :
which Certificat giving notice of the Death or Removal of the Parſon or
Vicar, of the value of the Parſonage or Vicarage, and of the deſire of the
ence.
* Ipfa hærer Scopulis, & tantum vertice ad Auras
Æthereas, quantum radice ad Tartara, tendit.
Congre-
88
OCE A N A.
Congregation to receive a Probationer from that Univerſity; the Vice-Chan-
cellor upon the receit therof ſhall call a Convocation, and having made choice
of a fit Perſon, ſhall return him in due time to the Pariſh, where the Perſon
ſo return'd ſhall receive the full fruits of the Benefice or Vicarage, and do the
duty of the Parſon or Vicar, for the ſpace of one year, as Probationer : and
that being expir’d, the Congregation of the Elders fall put their Probation-
er to the Ballot : 'and if he attains not to two parts in three of the Suffrage
affirmative, he ſhall take his leave of the Pariſh, and they ſhall ſend in like
manner as before for another Probationer ; but if their Probationer obtains
two parts in three of the Suffrage affirmative, he is then Paſtor of that Pa
rill. And the Paſtor of the Pariſh ſhall pray with the Congregation, preach
the Word, and adminiſter the Sacraments to the ſame, according to the Di-
rectory to be hereafter appointed by the Parlament. Nevertheleſs ſuch as
are of gather’d Congregations, or from time to time ſhall join with any of
them, are in no wiſé oblig'd to this way of eletting their Teachers, or to give
their Votes in this caſe, but wholly left to the liberty of their own Conſciences,
and to that way of Worſhip which they ſhall chuſe, being not Popiſh, Jen-
iſh, or Idolatrous. And to the end they may be the better protected by
the State in the free exerciſe of the ſame, they are deſir’d to make choice,
in ſuch manner as they beft like, of certain Magiſtrats in every one of their
Congregations, which we could wiſh might be four in each of them, to be
Auditors in caſes of differences or diftaft, if any thro variety of opinions,
that may be grievous or injurious to them, ſhould fall out. And ſuch Au.
ditors or Magiſtrats ſhall have power to examin the matter, and inform
themſelves, to the end that if they think it of ſufficient weight, they may ac-
quaint the Phylarch with it,or introduce it into the Council of Religion ; where
all ſuch Cauſes as thoſe Magiſtrats introduce, ſhall from time to time be heard
and determin’d according to ſuch Laws as are or ſhall bereafter be provided
by the Parlament for the juſt defence of the Liberty of Conſcience.
THIS Order conſiſts of three parts, the firſt reſtoring the power of
Ordination to the People, which, that it originally belongs to them, is
clear, tho nor in Engliſh yet in Scripture, where the Apoſtles ordain'd
Acts 14. 23. Elders by the holding up of hands in every Congregation, that is
, by the
fuffrage of the People, which was alſo given in fom of thoſe Citys
by the Ballot. And tho it may be ſhewn that the Apoſtles ordain'd
ſom by the laying on of hands, it will not be ſhewn that they did ſo
in every Congregation.
EXCOMMUNICATION, as not clearly provable out of
the Scripture, being omitted, the ſecond part of the Order implys
and eſtabliſhes a National Religion : for there be degrees of Knowlege
in divine things ; true Religion is not to be learnt without ſearching
the Scriptures; the Scriptures cannot be ſearclid by us unleſs we liave
them to ſearch ; and if we have nothing elſe, or (which is all one) un-
derſtand nothing elſe but a Tranſlation, we may be (as in the place
allegd we have bin) beguild or miſled by the Tranſlation, while we
ſhould be ſcarching the true ſenſe of the Scripture, which cannot be
attain’d in a natural way (and a Commonwealth is not to preſume up.
on that which is ſupernatural) but by the knowlege of the Original
and of Antiquity, acquir’d by our own ftudys, or thoſe of ſom o-
thers, for even Faith coms by hearing. Wherfore a Commonwealth not
making proviſion of men from time to time, knowing in the original
Languages wherin the Scriptures were written, and vers’d in thoſe An-
tiquitys
1
OCEAN N
A.
89
.?
tiquitys to which they ſo frequently relate, that the true ſenſe of them
depends in great part upon that Knowlege, can never be ſecure that
ſhe ſhall not loſe the Scripture, and by conſequence her Religion;
which to preſerve ſhe muſt inſtitute fom method of this Knowlege,
and ſom uſe of ſuch as have acquir'd it, which amounts to a National
Religion.
THE Commonwealth having thus perform’d her duty towards
God, as a rational Creature, by the beſt application of her Reaſon to
Scripture, and for the preſervation of Religion in the purity of the
ſame, yet pretends not to Infallibility, but coms in the third part of
the Order, eſtabliſhing Liberty of Conſcience according to the In-
ſtructions given to her Council of Religion, to raiſe up her hands to
Heaven for further light ; in which proceding ſhe follows that (as was
ſhewn in the Preliminarys) of Iſrael, who tho her National Religion
was always a part of her Civil Law, gave to her Prophets the upper
hand of all her Orders.
BUT the Surveyors having now don with the Pariſhes, took their Definition of é
leaves ; ſo a Pariſh is the firſt diviſion of Land occaſion'd by the firſt Pariſh,
Collection of the People of Oceana, whoſe Function proper to that
place is compriz'd in the ſix preceding Orders.
THE next ſtep in the progreſs of the Surveyors was to a meeting of Inſtitution of
the neareſt of them, as their work lay; by twentys; where conferring the Hundred.
their Lifts, and computing the Deputys contain’d therin, as the number
of them in Pariſhes, being neareſt Neighbors, amounted to one hun-
dred, or as even as might conveniently be brought with that account,
they caſt them and thoſe Pariſhes into the Precinct which (be the De-
putys ever ſince more or fewer) is ſtill calld the Hundred: and to every
one of theſe Precincts they appointed a certain place, being the moſt
convenient Town within the ſame, for the annual Rendevouz; which
don, each Surveyor returning to his Hundred, and ſummoning the
Deputys contain'd in his Liſts to the Rendevouz, they appeard and
receiv'd
THE ſeventh ORDÈ R, requiring, That upon the firſt Monday
next isſuing the laſt of January, the Deputys of every Pariſh annually aſ
ſemble in Arms at the Rendevouz of the Hundred, and there elect out of
their number one Juſtice of the Peace, one Juryman, one Captain, one
Enſign of their Troop ör Century, each of theſe out of the Horſe; and
one Juryman, one Crowner, one High Conſtable, out of the Foot; the
Election to be made by the Ballot in this manner. The Jurymen for the
time being are to be Overſeers of the Ballot (inſtead of theſe, the Survey-
ors are to officiat at the firſt aſſembly) and to look to the performance of
the ſame according to what was directed in the Ballot of the Pariſbes
, ſav-
ing that the High
Conſtable ſetting forth the Wrn, ſhall have five ſeveral
ſutes of Gold Balls
, and one dozen of every ſute ; wherof the firſt ſhall be
mark'd with the Letter A, the ſecond with the letter B, the third with C,
the fourth with D, and the fifth with E: and of each of theſe futes he fall
caſt one Ball into his Hat, or into a little Vrn, and making the Balls toge-
ther preſent them to the firſt Overſeer, who fall draw onė, and the fute
which is ſo drawn by the Overſeer ſhall be of uſe for that day, and no
other : for example, if the Overſeer drew an A, the High Conſtable ſhall
put ſeven Gold Balls mark'd with the letter A into the Vrn, with ſo many
Silver ones as Mall bring them even with the number of the Deputys, who
N
7. Order.
2
1
being
H!
7!
୨୦
OCE A NA:
being ſworn, as before, at the Ballot of the Pariſh to make a fair Election,
fall be callid to the Vrn; and every man coming in manner as was there
Joem'd, ſhall draw one Ball, which if it be Silver, he ſhall caſt it into a Boil
ſtanding at the foot of the Vrn, and return to his place; but the firſt that
draws a Gold Ball (jbewing it to the Overſeers, who if it has not the leta
ter of the preſent Ballot, have power to apprehend and puniſh bim) is the
firſt Elector, the ſecond the ſecond Elector, and ſo to the ſeventh ; which
Order they are to obſerve in their function. The Electors as they are drawn
ſhall be plac'd upon the Bench by the Overſeers, till the whole number be
complete, and then be conducted, with the Liſt of the Officers to be choſen,
into a Place apart, where being privat, the firſt Elector ſhall name &
Perſon to the firſt Office in the Liſt; and if the Perſon ſo nam’d, being bal.
loted by the reſt of the Electors, attains not to the better half of the Suffra-
ges in the Affirmative, the firſt Elector ſhall continue nominating others,
till one of them ſo nominated by him attains to the plurality of the Suffra-
ges in the Affirmative, and be written firſt Competitor to the firſt Office.
This don, the ſecond Elector ſhall obſerve in his turn the like order; and ſo the
reſt of the Elettors,naming Competitorseach to his reſpective Office in the Lift,till
one Competitor be choſen to every Office: and when one Competitor is choſen toe.
very Office, the
firſt Elector
ſhall begin again to name a ſecond Competitor to the
firſt Office, and the reſt ſucceſſively ſoall name to the reſt of the Offices till two
Competitors be choſen to every Office; the like ſhall be repeated till three Com-
petitors be choſen to every Office. And when three Competitors are choſen to
every Office, the Lift ſhall be return’d to the Over ſeers, or ſuch as the Over-
ſeers, in caſe they or either of them happend to be Electors, have ſubſtituted
in his or their place or places : and the Overſeers or Subſtitutes having caus’d.
the Liſt to be read to the Congregation, fall put the Competitors, in order as
they are written, to the Ballot of the Congregation : and the rest of the
Procedings being carry'd on in the manner directed in the Fifth Order, that
Competitor, of the three written to each Office, i who has moſt of the Suf-
frages above half in the Affirmative, is the Officer. The Liſt being after
this manner completed, ſall be entred into a Regiſter, to be kept at the
Rendevouz of the Hundred, under inſpection of the Magiſtrats of the ſame,
after the manner following:
Anno Domini
The Liſt of the Nebuloſa.
A. A. Ord. Eq. Juſtice of the Peace
B. B. Ord. Eq. Firſt Juryman
C.C. Ord. Eq. Captain of the Hundred of the Hundred of—in the
D.D. Ord. Eq. Enſign
Tribe of which Hundred
E. E. Second Juryman
confifts at this Election of
F. F.
High Conſtable
105 Deputys.
G. G.
Crowner
THE Liſt being enter?d, the High Conſtable ſball take three Copys of the
ſame, wherof he ſhall preſently return one to the Lord High Sheriff of the
Tribe, a ſecond to the Lord Cuſtos Rotulorum, and a third to the Con.
fors; or theſe, thro the want of ſuch Magiſtrats at the firſt muſter, may
be return’d to the Orator, to be appointed for that Tribe. To the obſerva-
tion of all and every part of this Order, the Officers and Deputys of the
Hundred are all and every of them oblig?d, as they will anſwer it to the Phy:
.
larch,
O CE A N A.
91
*-
1
the Tribe:
larch, who has porver in caſe of failure in the whole or any part, to fine all
,
or any of them ſo failing at diſcretion, or according to ſuch Laws as ſhall
hereafter be provided in that taſe; but under an Appeal to the Parlament.
THERE is little in this Order worthy of any further account,
but that it anſwers to the Rulers of Hundreds in Ifrael, to the Mora or
Military part of the Tribe in Lacedemon, and to the Century in Ronie.
The Jurymen, being two in a Hundred, and ſo forty in a Tribe, give
the Latitude allow'd by the Law for exceptions. And wheras the
Golden Balls at this Ballor begin to be mark'd with Letters, wherof
one is to be drawn immediatly before it begins ; this is to the end that
the Letter being unknown, Men may be fruſtrated of tricks or foul
play, wheras otherwiſe a Man might bring a Golden Ball with him,
and make as if he had drawn it our of the Urn. The Surveyors, when
they had taken Copys of theſe Liſts, had accompliſh'd their work in
the Hundreds.
SO a Hundred is the ſecond Diviſion of Land occafion’d by the Definition of
ſecond Collection of the People, whoſe Civil and Military Functions the Hundred.
proper to this place are compriz’d in tlie foregoing Order.
HAVINĠ ſtated the Hundreds, they met once again by Twen-
tys, where there was nothing more eaſy than to caſt every twenty
Hundreds, as they lay moſt conveniently together, into one Tribe;
ſo the whole Territory of Oceana, confitting of about ten thouſand Inſtitution of
Pariſhes, came to be caſt into one thouſand Hundreds, and into fifty
Tribes. In every Tribe at the place appointed for the annual Rende-
vouz of the ſame, were then, or foon after, begun thoſe Buildings
which are now cald Pavilions ; each of them ftanding with one of the Paris
open ſide upon fair Columns, like the porch of ſom antient Temple,
and looking into a Field, capable of the muſter of ſom four thouſand
Men : Before each Pavilion ſtand three Pillars ſuſtaining Urns for the
Ballot, that on the right-hand equal in height to the brow of a Horf-
man, being call’d the Horſe Vrn; that on the left-hand, with Bridges
on either ſide to bring it equal in height with the brow of a Footman,
being calld the Foot Vrn; and the middle Vrn with a Bridg on thé
ſide towards the Foot Urn, the other ſide, as left for the Horſe, being
without one: and here ended the whole work of the Surveyors, who
return'd to the Lord ARCHON with this
Account of the Chargé.
IMPRIMIS, Urnis, Balls, and Balloting Boxes for
The whole
ten thouſand Pariſhes, the fame being wooden Ware,
00 Charge of the
Inſtitution
IT E M, Proviſions of the like kind for a thouſand Hundreds, 3000
ITEM, Urns and Balls of Metal, with Balloting?
2000
Boxes for fifty Tribes,
IT E M, For erecting of fifty Pavilions,
60000 00
ITEM, Wages for four Surveyors General at 1000 l. a man, 4000
ITEM, Wages for the reſt of the Surveyors, being?
1000, at 250 h. a man,
25000000
lion.
1
밥
​i.
S.
?
20000
oo
oo
00
Sum Tötál, 339000 00
oo
N 2
THIS
92
OC E A N A:
THIS is no great matter of charge for the building of a Comniori-
wealth, in regard that it has coſt (which was pleaded by the Survcy-
ors) as much to rig a few Ships. Nevertheleſs that proves not thein
to be honeſt, nor their account to be juſt; but they had their Mony
for once, tho their reckoning be plainly guilty of a Crime, to coſt him
his Neck that commits it -another time, it being impoſſible for a Com-
monwealth (without an exact proviſion that it be not abus'd in this
kind) to ſublift: for if no regard ſhould be had of the Charge (tho
that may go deep) yet the Debauchery and Corruption, wherto, by
negligence in Accounts, it infallibly expoſes its Citizens, and therby
leſſens the public Faith, which is the Nerve and Ligament of Govern-
ment, ought to be prevented. But the Surveyors being diſpatch'd, the
Lord' ARCHON was very curious in giving names to his Tribes,
which having caus’d to be written in Scrols calt into an Urn, and pre-
ſented to the Counſillors, each of them drew one, and was accordinga
ly ſent to the Tribe in his lot, as Orators of the ſame, a Magiſtracy
no otherwiſe inſtituted, than for once and pro tempore, to the end that
the Council upon ſo great an occaſion might both congratulat with the
Tribes, and allift at the firſt muſter in ſom things of neceſſity to be
differently carry'd from the eſtabliſh'd Adminiſtration, and future
Courſe of the Commonwealth.
THE Orators being arriv’d, every one as ſoon as might be, at the
Rendevouz of his Tribe, gave notice to the Hundreds, and fummond
the Muſter, which appear'd for the moſt part upon good Horſes, and
already indifferently well arm’d; as to inſtance in one for all, the Tribe
of Nubia, where HERMES DE CADUCEO, Lord Orator of the
ſame, after a ſhort falutation and a hearty welcom, apply'd himſelf to
his buſineſs, which began with
8. Order.
THE eighth ORDER, requiring, That the Lord High Sheriff as
Commander in Chief, and the Lord Cuſtos Rotulorum as Muſtermaſter
of the Tribe (or the Orator for the first Muffer) upon reception of the
Liſts of their Hundreds, return'd to them by the High Contables of the
Same, preſently cauſe them to be caſt up, dividing the Horſe from the Foot,
and liſting the Horſe by their names in Troops, each Troop containing about
a hundred in number, to be inſcrib’d, firſt, ſecond, or third Troop, &c.
according to the Order agreed upon by the ſaid Magiſtrats : Which don,
they ſhall lift the Foot in like manner, and inſcribe the Companys in like ora
der. Theſe Liſts upon the Eve of the Muſter ſhall be deliver'd to certain
Trumpeters and Drummers
, wherof
, there ſhall be fifteen of each fort ( as
well for the preſent as other uſes to be hereafter mention'd) ſtipendiated by
the Tribe. “And the Trumpeters and Drummers ſhall be in the Field before
the Pavilion, uppn the day of the Muſter, ſo ſoon as it is light, where they
Mall ſtand everyone with his Liſt in his hand, at a due diſtance, plac'd ac-
cording to the Order of the Liſt; the Trumpeters with the Liſts of the
Horſe on the right-hand, and the Drummers
with the
Liſts of the foot on
the left-hand : where having founded a while
, each of them ſhall begin to
call, and continue calling the names of the Deputys, as they com into the
field, till both the Horſe and Foot be gather'd by that means into their due
Order. The Horſe and Foot being in order, the Lord Lieutenant of the
Tribe ſhall caſt ſo many Gold Balls mark'd with the figures 1, 2, 3, 4, &c.
as there be Troops of Horſe in the Field, together with
jo many Silver Balls
as there be Companys, mark'd in the ſame manner, into a little Vrn, to
..
which
OCEAN A.
9]
.
9.
Order:
which he ſhall call the Captains ; and the Captains drawing the Gold Balls
ſhall command the Horſe, and thoſe that draw the Silver the Foot, each in
the order of his Lot.' The like ſhall be don by the Conductor at the ſame
time for the Enſigns at another Urn; and they that draw the Gold Balls
Shall be Cornets, the reſt Enſigns.
THIS Order may puzzle the Reader, but tends to a wonderful
ſpeed of the Muſter, to which it would be a great matter to loſe a day
in ranging and martialling, wlieras by virtue of this the Tribe is no
ſooner in the field than in Battalia, nor ſooner in Battalia than call'd to
the Urns or the Ballot by virtue of
THE ninth ORDER, wherby the Cenſors (or the Orator for the
firſt Muſter) upon reception of the Liſts of the Hundreds from the High
Conſtables, according as is directed by the ſeventh Order, are to make their
Notes for the Urns beforehand, with regard had to the Liſts of the Man
giſtrats, to be elected by the inſuing Orders; that is to ſay, by the firſt Liſt
call’d the prime Magnitude, fix; and by the ſecond called the Galaxy,
nine. Wherfore the Cenſors are to put into the middle Vrn for the Election
of the firſt Lift twenty four Gold Balls, with twenty fix Blanks or Silver
Balls, in all fixty; and into the ſide Vrns fixty Gold Balls divided into each
according to the different number of the Horſe and the Foot : that is to ſay,
if the Horſe and the Foot be equal, equally,
and if the Horſe and the Foot
be inequal, inequally, by an Arithmetical Proportion. The like ſhall be
don the ſecond day of the Muſter, for the ſecond Lift, except that the Cen-
fors ſhall put into the middle Vrn 36 Gold Balls with 24 Blanks, in all ſixty;
and fixty Gold Balls into the ſide Vrns, divided reſpectively into the number
of the Horſe and the Foot: and the Gold Balls in the ſide Vrns at either Ballot
are by the addition of Blanks to be brought even with the number of the
Ballotants at either Vrn reſpectively. The Cenſors having prepared their
Notes, as has bin Shewn, and being com at the day appointed into the Field,
Shall preſent a little Urn to the Lord High Sheriff, who is to draw twice for
the Letters to be us’d that day, the one at the fide Vrns, and the other at
the middle. And the Cenfors having fitted the Vrns accordingly, Soal
place themſelves in certain movable Seats or Pulpits ( to be kept for that
tuſe in the Pavilion) the firſt Cenſor before the Horſe vrn, the ſecond before
the Foot Vrn, the Lord Lieutenant doing the Office of Cenfor pro tem-
pore at the middle Vrn; where all and every one of them ſhall cauſe the
Laws of the Ballot to be diligently obſerv’d, taking a ſpecial care that no
Man be ſuffer'd to com above once to the Urn (wherof it more particular-
ly concerns the Subcenſors, that is to say, the Overſeers of every Pariſh,
to be careful; they being each in this regard reſponſible for their reſpective Pás
riſhes) or to draw above one Ball
, which if it be Gold, he is to preſent to the
Cenfor, who ſhall look upon the Letter; and if it be not that of the day,
and of the reſpective Orn, apprehend the Party, who for this or any other
like diſorder, is obnoxious to the Phylarch.
THIS Order being obſerv'd by the Cenſors, it is not poſſible for
the People, if they can but draw the Balls, tho tley underſtand no-
thing at all of the Ballot, to be out. To philofophize further upon
this Art, tho there be nothing more rational, were not worth the
while; becauſe in writing it will be perplex’d, and the firſt practice of
it gives the demonſtration : whence it came to paſs, that the Orator;
after
d.,
E!
94
Ε Α Ν Α,
OCEA
10. Order.
after ſom needleſs pains in the explanation of the two foregoing Or.
ders, hetaking himſelf to exemplify the ſame, found the work don to
his hand; for the Tribe, as eager upon a buſineſs of this nature, had
retain’d one of the Surveyors, out of whom (before the Orator ar-
riv’d) they had got the whole Myſtery by a ſtoln Muſter, at whichi
in order to the Ballot they had made certain Magiſtrats pro tempore.
Wherfure he found not only the Pavilion (for this time a Tent ) erect-
ed with three Poſts ſupplying the place of Pillars to the Urns; but the
Urns being prepar'd with a juſt number of Balls for the firſt Ballot, to
becom the Field, and the occaſion very gallantly, with their Covers
inade in the manner of Helmets, open at either ear to give paſſage to
the hands of the Ballotants, and flanting with noble Plumes to direct
the March of the People. Wherfore he proceded to
THE tenth ORDER, requiring of the Deputys of the Pariſhes,
That upon every Monday next enſuing the laſt of February, they make
their perſonal appearance, Horſe and Foot in Árms accordingly, at the Rene
cievouz of the Tribe ; where being in Diſciplin, the Horſe upon the right,
and the Foot upon the left, before the Pavilion, and having made Oath by
holding up their hands upon the tender of it by the Lord High Sheriff
, to
make Election without favour, and of ſuch only as they ſhall judg fitteſt for
the Commonwealth: The Conductor ſhall take three Balls, the one inſcribd
with theſe words Coutward Files] another with theſe words [inward Files]
and the third with theſe [middle Files] which Balls he ſhall caſt into a little
Prn, and preſent it to the Lord High Sheriff
, who, drawing one, ſhall give
the words of Command, as they are therapon inſcrib’d, and the Ballot ſhall
begin accordingly., For example
, if the Ball be inſcrib'd middle Files, the
Ballot ſhall begin by the middle; that is, the two Files that are middle to
the Horſe, Mall draw out firſt to the Horſe Orn, and the two Files that are
middle to the Foot, ſhall draw out firſt to the Foot Vrn, and be follow'd by
all the reſt of the Files as they are next to them in order. The like ſhall be
don by the inward, or by the outward Files, in caſe they be firſt callid. And
the Files, as every Man has drawn his Ball
, if it be Silver, ſhall begin at
the Vrn to countermarch to their places; but he that has drawn a Gold Ball
at a ſide Urn, ſhall procede to the middle Vrn, where if the Ball he draws
be Silver, he alſo ſhall countermarch : But if it be Gold, he mall take his
place upon a form ſet croſs the Pavilion, with his face toward the Lord
High Sheriff, who ſhall be ſeated in the middle of the Pavilion, with cer-
tain Clercs” by him, one of which ſhall write down the names of every E-
lector, that is, of every one that drew a Gold Ball at the middle Urn, and
in the Order his Ball was drawn, till the Electors amount to fix in number.
And the firſt fix Ele&tors, Horſe and Foot promiſcuouſly, are the firſt Order
of Electors; 'the ſecond ſix (ſtill accounting them as they are drawn) the
ſecond Order ; the third fix, the third Order; and the fourth fix, the fourth
Order of Electors: every Elector having place in his order, according to
the order wherin he was drawn. But ſo ſoon as the firſt Order of Eleitors
is complete, the Lord High Sheriff ſhall ſend them with a Copy of the
following Lift
, and a Clerc that underſtands the Ballot, immediatly to 4
little Tent ſtanding before the Pavilion in his ey, to which no other perſon
but themſelves, during the Election, ſhall approach. The Lift jhall be
witten in this manner:
Anno
OCEAN A.
Anno Domini
The Liſt of the Prime Magnitude or firſt days Election of Magiſtrats.
1. The Lord High Sheriff
, Commander in Chief of the Tribe of Nu Prime Magnia
Inſtitution of the
2. Lord Lieutenant
3. Lord Cuſtos Rotulorum, Muſtermafter Generall bia, containing at this tude
4. The Conductor, being Quartermaſter General preſent Muſter 700
Horſe,and 1500 Foot,
5. The firſt Cenfor
6. The ſecond Cenſor
in all 2200 Deputys
AND the Electors of the firſt hand or order, being fix, Mall each of
them name to his reſpective Magiſtracy in the left ſuch as are not already
ele&ted in the Hundreds, till one Competitor be choſen to every Magiſtracy
in the Liſt by the Ballot of the Elečtors of the firſt Order; which dom, the
Liſt with the Competitors therunto annex'd ſhall be return'd to the Lord
High Sheriff by the Clerc attending that Order, but the Electors ſhall keep
their places : for they have already given their Suffrage, and may not enter
into the Ballot of the Tribe. If there ariſes any Diſpute in an Order of
Electors, one of the Cenſors or Subcenſors appointed by them in caſe they be
Electors, ſhall enter into the Tent of that Order; and that Order ſhall ſtand
to his Judgment in the deciſion of the Controverſy. The like ball be don
exactly by each other Order of Electors, being ſent as they are drawn, each
with another Copy of the ſame Lift, into a diftin&t Tent, till there be rea
turn'd to the Lord High Sheriff four Competitors to every Magiftracy in
the Liſt; that is to ſay, one Competitor elected to every Office in every one
of the four Orders: which Competitors the Lord High Sheriff ſhall cauſe
to be pronounc'd or read by a Cryer to the Congregation ; and the Congre-
gation having heard the whole Liſts repeated, the Names ſhall be put by the
Lord High Sheriff to the Tribe, one by one, beginning with the
firſt Com-
petitor in the firſt Order, thence proceding to the firſt Competitor in the
ſecond Order, and ſo to the firſt in the third and fourth Orders. And the
Suffrages being taken in boxes by boys (as has bin already ſhewn
Shall be pour'd into the Bowls ſtanding before the Cenfors, who ſhall be ſeated
at each end of the Table in the Pavilion, the one numbring the Affirma-
tives, and the other the Negatives ; and he, of the four Competitors to the
firft Magiſtracy, that has moſt above half the Suffrages of the Tribe in the
Affirmative, is the firſt Magiſtrat. The like is to be don ſucceſively by
the reſt of the Competitors in their order. But becauſe ſoon after the
Boxes are ſent out for the firſt name, there be others ſent out
for the ſecond,
and ſo for the third, &c. by which means divers
, names are ſucceſſively at
one and the ſame time in ballotting; the Boy that carrys a Box ſhall fing
or repeat continually the name of the Competitor for whom that Box is
carrying, with that alſo of the Magiffracy to which he is propos’d. A A
Magiſtrat of the Tribe happening to be an Elector, may ſubſtitute any
one of his own order to execute his other Function. The Magiſtrats of
the Prime Magnitude being thus elefted, ſhall receive the preſent Charge
of the Tribe.
IF it be objected againſt this Order, that the Magiſtrats to be
elected by it, will be Men of more inferior rank than thoſe of the
Hundreds, in regard that thoſe are choſen firſt; it may be remem,
berd,
r
.
.
KI:
.
-
1
96
OC E A N A.
ber'd, that ſo were the Burgeſſes in the former Government, never-
theleſs the Knights of the Shire were Men of greater quality : And
the Election at the Hundred is made by a Council of Electors, of
whom leſs cannot be expected than the diſcretion of naming Perſons
fitteſt for thoſe Capacitys, with an ey upon theſe to be elected at
the Tribe. As for what may be objected in point of Difficulty, it is
demonſtrable by the foregoing Orders, that a Man might bring ten
thouſand Men (if there were occaſion) with as much eaſe, and as
ſuddenly to perform the Ballot, as he can make five thouſand Men
(drawing them out by double Files) to march a quarter of a mile.
But becauſe at this Ballot, to go up and down the Field, diſtributing
the linen Pellets to every Man, with which he is to ballot or give
ſuffrage, would loſe a great deal of time, therfore a Mans Wife,
his Daughters, or others, make him his proviſion of Pellets before the
Ballot; and he coms into the field with a matter of a ſcore of them
in his pocket. And now I have as good as don with the ſport. The
next is
ii. Order.
2
THE eleventh ORDER, explaining the Dutys and Functions of
Functions of the Magiſtrats contain’d in the Liſt of the Prime Magnitude : And thoſe
of the Prime of the Hundreds, beginning with the Lord High Sheriff
, who, over and
Magnitude. above his more antient Offices, and thoſe added by the former Order, is
the firſt Magiſtrat of the Phylarch, or Prerogative Troop. The Lord
Lieutenant, over and above his Duty mention'd, is Commander in Chief
of the Muſters of the Touth, and ſecond Magiſtrat of the Phylarch.
The Cuſtos Rotulorum is to return the yearly Muſter-rolls of the Tribe,
as well that of the Youth as of the Elders, to the Rolls in Emporium,
and is the third Magiſtrat of the Phylarch. The Cenſors by themſelves,
and their Subcenſors, that is
, the Overſeers of the Pariſbes, are to ſee
that the reſpective Laws of the Ballot be obſerv'd in all the popular Affem-
blys of the Tribe. They have power alſo to put ſuch National Miniſters,
as in Preaching fall intermeddle with matters
of Government, out of their
Livings; except the Party appeals to the Phylarch, or to the Council
of Religion, where in that caſe the Cenſors ſhall proſecute. All and every
one of theſe Magiſtrats, together with the Juſtices of Peace, and the
Jurymen of the Hundreds, amounting in the whole number to threeſcore
and fix, are the Prerogative Troop or Phylarch of the Tribe.
THE Function of the Phylarch or Prerogative Troop is fivefold.
FIRST, They are the Council of the Tribe, and as ſuch to govern
the Phylarch. the Muſters of the same according to the foregoing Orders, having cogni-
zance of what has paſt in the Congregation or Elections made in the
Pariſhes or the Hundreds, with power to puniſh any undue practices; or
variation from their reſpective Rules and Orders, under an Appeal to the
Parlament. A Marriage legitimatly is to be pronounc'd by the Paro-
chial Congregation, the Muſter of the Hundred, or the Phyfarch. And
if a Tribe have a deſire (which they are to expreſs at the Muſter by their
Captains, every Troop by his own ) to petition the Parlament, the Phy-
larch, as the Counſil
, ball frame the petition in the Pavilion, and propoſe
it by Clauſes to the Ballot of the whole Tribe; and the Clauſes that shall
be affirm'd by the Ballot of the Tribe, and ſign’d by the hands of the six
Magiſtrats of the Prime Magnitude, ſhall be receivd and eſteem’d by the
Parlament as the Petition of the Tribe, and no other.
:
Funktions of
.
*
SECOND
OCEAN A.
97
1
SECONDLY, The Phy!arch has power to call to their aſſiſtance what
other Troops of the Tribe they pleajë (be they Elders or Youth, whoſe Diſci-
plin will be hereafter directed) and with theſe to receive the Judges Itinerant
in their Circuits, whom the Magiſtrats of the Phylarch ſball aflift upon the
Bench, and the Furys elſwhere in their proper functions according to the
more antient Laws and Cuſtoms of this Nation.
THIRDLY, The Phylarch ſball hold the Court callid the Quarter
Seſſions according to the antient Cuſtom, and therin ſhall alſo hear Cauſes
in order to the protection of Liberty of Conſcience, by ſuch Rules as are or
Shall hereafter be appointed by the Parlament.
POURTHLY, All Commiſſions, iſſud into the Tribes by the Parla-
ment, or by the Chancery, are to be directed to the Phylarch, or ſom of that
Troop, and executed by the ſame reſpectively.
FIFTHLY, In the caſe of Levys of Mony the Parlament ſhall tax
the Phylarchs, the Phylarchs ſhall tax the Hundreds, the Hundreds the
Pariſhes, and the Pariſhes shall levy it upon themſelves. The Pariſhes
having levy'd the Tax Mony, accordingly ſhall return it to the Officers of
the Hundreds, the Hundreds to the Phylarchs, and the Phylarchs to the
Exchequer. But if a man has ten Children living, he ſhall pay 10 Taxes;
if he has five living, he ſhall pay but half Taxes; if he has bin murry'd
three
years, or be above twenty five years of Age, and has no Child or
Children lawfully begotten, he ball pay double Taxes. And if there happen
to grow any diſpute
upon theſe or ſuch other Orders as fall' or may hereto
be added hereafter, the Phylarchs ſhall judg the Tribes, and the Parla-
ment ſball judg the Phylarchs. For the reſt, if any man shall go about
to introduce the right or power of Debate into any popular Council or
Congregation of this Nation, the Phylarch or any Magiſtrat of the Hun-
dred, or of the Tribe, ſhall cauſe him preſently to be ſent in cuſtody to the
Council of War.
4
of
1
THE part of the Order relating to the Rolls in Emporium being of Inftirution of
ſingular uſe, is not unworthy to be ſomwhat better open'd. In what the Roll Card
manner the Liſts of the Pariſhes, Hundreds, and Tribes are made, las Nilius.
bin ſhewn in their reſpective Orders, where after the Partys are elected,
they give an account of the whole number of the Elders or Deputys in
their reſpective Aſſemblys or Muſters; the like for this part exactly is
don by the Youth in their Diſciplin (to be hereafter ſhewn) wherfore
the Liſts of the Pariſhes, Youth and Elders, being ſum'd up, give the
whole number of the People able to bear Arms; and the Liſts of the
Tribes, Youth and Elders, being ſum'd up, give the whole number of
the People bearing Arms. This account, being annually recorded by
the Maſter of the Rolls, is call’d the Pillar of Nilus, becauſe the Peo
ple being the Riches of the Commonwealth, as they are found to riſe
or fall by the degrees of this Pillar, like that River, give an account of
the public Harveſt.
THUS much for the Deſcription of the firſt days work at the
Muſter, which happen'd, as has bin ſhewn, to be don as ſoon as ſaid:
for as in practice it is of ſmall difficulty, ſo requires it not much time,
ſeeing the great Council of Venice, conſiſting of a like number, begins at
twelve of the Clock, and elects nine Magiſtrats in one Afternoon. But
the Tribe being diſmiſt for this night, repair’d to their Quarters, under
the conduct of their new Magiſtrats. The next morning returning in-
to the field very carly, the Orator proceded to
O
THE
H
-
11
1
7
HI
1
1
98
1
OCEAN A.
12. Order.
THE twelfth ORDER, directing the Maſter of the Tribe in the
the Galaxy ſecond days Election, being that of the Lit call’d the Galaxy ; in which
the Cenſors ſhall prepare the Urns according to the Directions given in
the ninth Order for the ſecond Ballot ; that is to ſay, with 36 Gold Balls
in the middle Vin, making four Orders, and nine Electors in every Or-
der, according to the number of the Magiſtrats in the Liſt of the Galaxy,
which is as follows :
1. Knight} to be choſen out of the Horſe. .
2. Knight
3. Deputy?
4. Deputy to be choſen out of the Horſe.
5. Deputy
6. Deputy
7. Deputy to be choſen out of the Foot.
8. Deputy
9. Deputy
1
THE reft of the Ballot ſhall procede exactly according to that of the firſt
day. But foraſmuch as the Commonwealth demands as well the fruits of
mans body as of his mind, he that has not bin marry'd ſhall not be capable of
theſe Magiſtracys till he be marry'd. If a Deputy, already choſen to be an
Officer in the Pariſ, in the Hundred, or in the Tribe, be afterwards choſen
of the Galaxy, it ſhall be lawful for him to delegat his Office in the Pariſh,
in the Hundred, or in the Tribe,to
any one of his own Order,being not already
choſen into Office
. The Knights and Deputys being chofen, ſhall be brought
to the head of the Tribe by the Lord High Sherif,who ſhall adminiſter to them
this Oath ; Ye ſhall well and truly obſerve and keep the Orders and
Cuſtoms of this Commonwealth which the People have choſen. And
if any of them ſhall refuſe the Oath, he ſhall be rejected, and that Competi-
tor which had the moſt' voices next ſhall be call d'in his place; who if he
takes the Oath ſhall be entred in the Liſt; but if he alſo refuſes the Oath,
he who had moſt voices next ſhall be calld, and ſo till the number of nine
out of thoſe Competitors which had moſt voices be ſworn Knights and Depu-
tys of the Galaxy. [This Clauſe, in regard of the late Diviſions, and
to the end that no violence be offer'd to any mans Conſcience, to be of
force but for the firſt three years only.] The Knights of the Galaxy being
cbęEted and ſworn, are to repair, by the Monday next inſuing the laſt of
March, to the Pantheon or Palace of Juſtice, ſituated in the Metropolis of
this Commonwealth (except the Parlament, by reaſon of a contagious Sick-
neſs, or fom other occaſion, has adjourn’d to another part of the Nation)
where they are to take their places in the Senat, and continue in full Power
and Commiſſion as Senators for the full term of three years next inſuing
the date of their Election. The Deputys of the Galaxy are to repair by
the ſame day (except as before excepted) to the Halo ſituated in Empori-
um, where they are to be liſted of the Prerogative Tribe, or equal Reprem
ſentatics of the People, and to continue in full Power and Commiſſion as
their Deputys for the full term of three years next inſuing their Elefti:
on. But forafmuch as the term of 'every Magiſtracy or Office in this
Commonwealth requires an equal vacation, a Knight or Deputy of the
Galaxy,
.
F
OC E A N A.
99
Galaxy, having fulfild his term of three years, ſhall not be reelected
into the ſame Galaxy, or any other, till he has alſo fulfild his three years
Vacation.
WHOEVER ſhall rightly conſider the foregoing Orders, will be
as little able to find how it is poſſible, that a worſhipful Knight ſhould
declare himſelf in Ale and Beef worthy to ſerve his Country, as how
my Lord High Sherifs Honor, in cafe he were protected from the Law,
could play the knave. But tho the foregoing Orders, ſo far as they re-
gard the Conſtitution of the Senat and the People, requiring no more
as to an ordinary Election than is therin explain'd, that is but one third
part of their Knights and Deputys, are perfeet; yet muſt we in this
place, and as to the Inſtitution, of neceſſity erect a Scaffold. For the
Commonwealth to the firft creation of her Councils in full number,
requir'd thrice as many as are eligible by the foregoing Orders. Wher-
fore the Orator, whoſe aid in this place was moſt neceſſary, rightly in-
forming the People of the reaſon; ſtaid tliem two days longer at the
Muſter, and took this courſe. One Liſt containing two Knights and
ſeven Depurys, he caus’d to be choſen upon the ſecond day; which
Lift being call’d the firſt Galaxy, qualify'd the Partys elected of it
with power for the term of one year and no longer : another Lift con-
taining two Knights and ſeven Depurys more, he caus’d to be choſen
the third day, which Liſt being call di the ſecond Galaxy, qualify'd
the Partys elected of it with Power for the term of two years andino
longer. And upon the fourth day he choſe the third Galaxy, accord-
ing as it is directed by the Order, impower'd for three years; which
Liſts ſucceſſively falling (like the Signs or Conſtellations of one Hemi-
ſphere, which ſetting, cauſe thoſe of the other to riſe): caſt the great
Orbs of this Commonwealth into an annual, triennial, and perpetual
Revolution.
THE buſineſs of the Muſter being thus happily finiſh’d, Hermes
DE CADUCEO, Lord Orator of the Tribe of Nubia, being now put
into her firſt Rapture, caus’d one of the Cenſors Pulpits to be planted
in front of the Squadron, and aſcending into the fame, ſpake after this
*
manner.
My Lords, the Magiſtrats and the People of the Tribe of Nubia.
upon their
W
E have this day ſolemniz?d the happy, Nuptials of the two
greateſt Princes that are upon the Earth-orin Nature, ARMS
“ and Councils: in the mutual Embraces whierof conlifts
your
" whole COMMONWEALTH; whoſe Councils
perpe-
“ tual Wheelings, Marches, and Countermarches, create hier Armys;
“ and whoſe Armys with the golden Vollys of the BALLOT at once
create and falute her Councils. There be thoſe' (ſuch is the World
« at preſent) that think it ridiculous to ſee a Nation exerciſing its Ci-
« vil Functions in Military Diſciplin; while they, committing their
< Buff to their Servants, com themſelves to hold Trenchards. For
6 what avails it ſuch as are unarm’d, or (which is all one) whoſe
“ Education acquaints them not with the proper uſe of their Swords,
be call'd Citizens? What were two or three thouſand of you, tho
“ never ſo well affected to your Country, but naked, to one Troop of
c6 to
0 %
« Merce-
TA
1
OCEAN A.
100
“ Mercenary Soldiers? If they ſhould com upon the Field and fay,
“ Gentlemen, It is thought fit that ſuch and ſuch Men ſhould be choſen
o by you; where were your Liberty ? Or, Gentlemen, Parlaments
“ are exceding good, but you are to have a little patience, theſe times
are not fo fit for them; where were your Commonwealth? What
“ cauſes the Monarchy of the Turcs but Servants in Arms? What was
“ it that begot the glorious Commonwealth of Rome, but the Sword
6 in the hands of her Citizens? Wherfore my glad eys falute the Se.
renity and Brightneſs of this day with a ſhowr that ſhall not cloud
" it. Behold the Army of Iſrael becom a Commonwealth, and the
“ Commonwealth of Iſrael remaining an Army, with her Rulers of Tens
« and of Fiftys,her Rulers of Hundredsand Thouſands,drawing near (as
" this day throout our happy Fields) to the Lot by her Tribes, increas'd
« above threefold, and led up by her Phylarchs or Princes, to ſit
upon
"* fifty Thrones, judging the fifty Tribes of Oceana! Or, Is it A-
" thens, breaking from her Iron Sepulcher, where ſhe has bin ſo long
« trampled by Hoſts of Janizarys ? For certainly that is the voice of
“ Theseus, having gather'd his ſcatter'd Athenians into one City.
" This freeborn Nation lives not upon the Dole or Bounty of one
“ man, but diſtributing her annual Magiſtracys and Honors with her
own hand, is her felt King PEOPLE-(at which the Orator was a
« while interrupted with ſhouts, but at length proceded)— Is it grave
« Lacedemon in her arm's Tribe divided by her Obe and her Mora,
“ which appears to chide me that I teach the People to talk, or conceive
“ ſuch Language as is dreſt like a Woman, to be a fit Uſher of the
“ Joys of Liberty into the liearts of men
? Is it Rome in her victorious
« Arms (for ſo lhe held her Concio or Congregation) that congratu-
« lats with us, for finding out that which ſhe could not hit
on, and
“ binding up her Comitia Curiata, Centuriata, and Tributa, in one in-
“ violable League of Union? Or is it the Great Council of incompa-
« rable Venice, bowling forth by the ſelf fame Ballot her immortal
« Commonwealth? For, neither by Reaſon nor by Experience is it
“ impoſſible that a Commonwealth ſhould be immortal; ſeeing the
« People being the Materials, never dy; and the Form, which is
“ Motion, muſt, without oppoſition, be endleſs. The Bowl which
« is thrown from your hand, if there be no rub, no impediment, ſhall
never ceaſe: for which cauſe the glorious Luminarys that are the
« Bowls of God, were once thrown for ever; and next theſe, thoſe
u of Venice. But certainly, my Lords, whatever theſe great Ex-
« amples may have ſhewn us, we are the firſt that have ſhewn to the
« World a Commonwealth eſtabliſh'd in her riſe upon fifty ſuch
“ Towers, and ſo garnizon'd as are the Tribes of Oceana, containing
a hundred thouſand Elders upon the annual Liſt, and yet but an Out
guard; beſides her marching Armys to be equal in the Diſciplin, and
in the number of her Youth.
“ AND foraſmuch as Soverain Power is a neceſſary but a for-
“ midable Creature, not unlike the Pouder which (as you are Soldiers)
" is at once your Safety and your Danger, being ſubject to take fire
RA
CC
't
i
* Sellis Curulibus.
+
Hæc juris ſui
Parere Domino Civicas uni negat :
Rex ipſe Populus annuas mandar vices
Honoris huic illiye
.
«
againſt
OCEAN A.
101
1
againſt you as well as for you ; how well and ſecurely is ſhie by your
“ Galaxys ſo collected as to be in full force and vigor, and yet ſo diſtri-
buted that it is impoſſible you ſhould be blown up by your own Mau
gazine ? Let them who will have it, that Power if it be confin'd
cannot be Soverain, tell us, whether our Rivers do not enjoy a more
“ ſecure and fruitful Reign within their proper banks, than if it were
“ lawful for them, in ravaging our Harveſts, to ſpill themſelves?
" Whether Souls, not confind to their peculiar Bodys, do govern them
any more than thoſe of Witches in their Trances? Whether Power,
“ not confind to the bounds of Reaſon and Virtue, has any other
« bounds than thoſe of Vice and Paſſion ? Or if Vice and paſſion be
“ boundleſs, and Reaſon and Virtue have certain Limits, on which of
" theſe Thrones holy men ſhould anoint their Soverain? But to blow
“ away this duſt, The Soverain Power of a Commonwealth is no more
bounded, that is to ſay ſtraitned, than that of a Monarch; but is
" balanc'd. The Eagle' mounts not to her proper pitch, if ſhe be
" bounded; nor is free, if ſhe be not balanc’d. And left a Monarch
" ſhould think he can reach further with his Scepter, the Roman Eagle
upon ſuch a Balance ſpread her Wings from the Ocean to Euphrates.
Receive the Soverain Power; you have receiv'd it, hold it faſt, im-
" brace it for ever in your ſhining Arms. The virtue of the Loadſtone
" is not impair’d or limited, but receives ſtrength and nouriſhment by
“ being bound in Iron. And ſo giving your Lordſhips much Joy, I
“ take my leave of this Tribe.
CC
the Iribe.
THE Orator deſcending, had the period of his Speech made with a
vaſt applauſe and exultation of the whole Tribe, attending him for that
night to his quarter, as tlie Phylarch with ſom commanded Troops did
the next day to the Frontiers of the Tribe, where leave was taken on
both ſides with more Tears than Grief.
So, a Tribe is the third Diviſion of Land occaſion'd by the third Definition of
Collection of the People, whoſe Functions proper to that place are
contain'd in the five foregoing Orders.
THE Inſtitution of the Commonwealth was ſuch as needed thoſe
Props and Scaffolds which may have troubled the Reader ; but I ſhall
here take them away, and com to the Conſtitution which ſtands by
it ſelf, and yields a clearer proſpect.
THE motions, by what has bin already ſhewn, are Spherical; and Conſtitution of
Spherical Motions have their proper Center : for which cauſe (e're I the Commons
procede further) it will be neceſſary, for the better underſtanding of wealth.
the whole, that I diſcover the Center wherupon the Motions of this
Commonwealth are form'd.
THE Center, or Baſis of every Government, is no other than the
Fundamental Laws of the fame.
FUNDAMENTAL Laws are ſuch as ſtate what it is that a
Man may call his own, that is to ſay, Property; and what the Means
be wherby a Man may enjoy his own, that is to ſay, Protection. The
firſt is alſo call’d Dominion, and the ſecond Empire or Soverain Power,
wherof this (as has bin ſhewn) is the natural product of the former ;
for ſuch as is the Balance of Dominion in a Nation, ſuch is the nature
WHERFORE the Fundamental Laws of Oceana, or the Center
of this Commonwealth, are the Agrarian and the Ballot : The Agras
rian
of its Empire.
OCEAN A.
102
rian by the Balance of Dominion preſerving Equality in the Root;
and the Ballot by an equal Rotation conveying it into the Branch,
or Exerciſe of Soverain Power : As, to begin with the former, ap-
pears by
*
13.
Order.
1
THE thirteenth ORDER, conſtituting the Agrarian Laws of
Occana, Marpeſia and Panopea, wherby it is ordain'd, Firſt, for all ſuch
Lands as are lying and being within the proper Territorys of Oceana, that
every
Man who is at preſent poſest, or ſhall hereafter be pofleft of an E-
ftate in Land exceding the Revenue of two thouſand Pounds a year, and
having more than one Son, fball leave his Lands either equally divided a-
mong them, in caſe the Lands amount to above 2000 l. a year to each'; or
ſo near equally in caſe they com under, that the greater part or partion
of the ſame remaining to the eldeſt, excede not the value of two thouſand
Pounds Revenue. And no man, not in preſent poſſeſſion of Lands above
the value of two thouſand Pounds by the year, ſhall receive, enjoy: (except
by lawful Inheritance) acquire, or purchaſe to himſelf Lands within the
ſaid Territorys, amaunting, with tboſe already in his poſſeſſion, above the
Taid Revenue. And if a man has a Daughter, or Daughters, except she
be an Heireſs, or they be Heireſſes; he ſhall not leave or give to any one of
them in Marriage or otherwiſe, for her Portion, above the value of one
thouſand five hundred Pounds in Lands, Goods, and Monys. Nor ſhall
any Friend, Kinſman, or Kinſwoman, add to her or their Portion or Por-
tions that are ſo provided for, to make any one of them greater. Nor .
Mall any man demand, or have more in marriage with any Woman. Never-
theleſs an Heireſs ball enjoy her lawful Inheritance; and a Widar,, what-
ſoever the Bounty-or: Affection of her Husband ſhall bequeath to her, to be
divided in the firft Generation, wherin it is diviſible according ás has
bin fewn.
SECONDLY, For Lands lying and being within the Territorys of
Marpeſia; the Agrarian Mall hold in all parts as it is eſtabliſh'd in Ocea-
na, except only in the Standard, or Proportion of Eſtates in Land, which
Shall be ſet for Marpeſia at five hundred Pounds. And,
THIRDLY, For Panopea, the Agrarian ſhall hold in all parts, as
in Oceana. And whoſoever poſſeſſing above the proportion allow'd by theſe
Laws, ſhall be lawfully convicted of the ſame, ſhall forfeit the Overplus to
the uſe of the State.
AGRARIAN Laws of all others have ever bin the greateſt Bug-
bears, and ſo in the Inſtitution were theſe, at which time it was ridi-
culous to ſee how ſtrange a fear appear’d'in every body of thatwhich,
being good for all, could hurt no body. But inſtead of the proof
of this Order, I'ſhall out of thoſe many Debates that happend e're it
could be paſt, inſert two Speeches that were made at the Council of
Legiſlators, the firſt by the Right Honorable PHILAUT US DE
GARBO, a young Man, being Heir apparent to a very Noble Fami-
ly, and one of the Counſillors, who expreſt himſelf as follows.
Nay
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May it pleaſe your Highneſs, my Lord ARCHON of Oceana.
IF
F I did not, to my capacity, know from how profound a
Counſillor I diſſent, it would certainly be no liard task to make
it as light as the day : Firſt, That an Agrarian is altogether un-
neceſſary. Secondly, That it is dangerous to a Commonwealth.
" Thirdly, That it is inſufficient to keep out Monarchy. Fourthly;
“That it ruins Familys. Fifthly, That it deſtroys Induſtry. And
" laſt of all, that tho it were indeed of any good uſe, it will be a
matter of ſuch difficulty to introduce in this Nation, and foto ſettle
" that it may be lafting, as is altogether invincible.
“ FIRST, That an Agrarian is unneceſſary to a Commonwealth,
« what clearer Teſtimony can there be, than that the Commonwealths
« which are our Cotemporarys (Venice, to which your Highneſs
“
gives the upper hand of all Antiquity, being one) have no ſuch
thing? And there can be no reaſon why they have it nor, ſeeing it
" is in the Soverain Power at any time to eſtabliſh ſuch an Order, but
" that they need it not; wherfore no wonder if ARISTOTLE,
who
“ pretends to be a good Commonwealthſman, has long ſince derided
« PHALE AS, to whom it was attributed by the Greecs, for his in-
16 vention.
“ SECONDLY, That an Agrarian is dangerous to a Common-
« wealth is affirm'd upon no ſlight Authority, ſeeing MACCHIAVEL
“ is poſitive, that it was the Diffenſion which happen'd about the Agra-
“ rian that caus'd the Deſtruction of Rome ; nor do I think that it
< did much better in Lacedemon, as I ſhall ſhew anon.
" THIRDLY; That it is inſufficient to keep out Monarchy can-
not without impiety be deny'd, the holy Scriptures bearing witneſs,
« that the Commonwealth of Iſrael, notwithitanding hier Agrarian,
« ſubmitted her neck to the arbitrary Yoke of her Princes.
« FOURTHLY, Therfore to com to my next Aſſertion, That
6 it is deſtructive to Familys; this alſo is ſo apparent, that it needs
6 pity rather than proof. Why, alas, do you bind a Nobility (which
no Generation ſhall deny to liave bin the firſt that freely facrific'd
o their Blood to the antient Libertys of this People) on an unholy
“ Altar? Why are the People taught, That their Liberty, which,
except our noble Anceſtors had bin born, muſt have long ſince bin
bury'd, cannot now be born except we be bury’d? A Common-
" wealth ſhould have the innocence of the Dove. Let us leave this
« purchaſe of her Birth to the Serpent, which eats it ſelf out of the
« womb of its Mother.
“ FIFTHLY, But it may be faid, perhaps, that we are fallen
« from our firſt Love, becom proud and idle. It is certain, my
" Lords, that the hand of God is not upon us for nothing. But take
“ heed how you admit of ſuch aſſaults and fallys upon Mens Eftates,
as may ſlacken the Nerve of Labor, and give others alſo reaſon to
« believe that their Sweat is vain; or elſe, whatſoever be pretended,
your Agrarian (which is my Fifth Aſſertion) muſt indeed deſtroy
“ Induſtry, For, that fo it did in Lacedemon is moſt apparent, aş allo
" that it could do no otherwiſe, where every Man having his 40
" Quarters of Barly, with Wine proportionable, fupply'd him out of
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« his own Lot by lis Laborer or Helot; and being confind in that
be to the ſcantling above which he might not live, there was not any
« ſuch thing as a Trade, or other Art, except that of War, in ex-
“ erciſe. Wherfore a Spartan, if he were not in Arms, muſt fit and
" play with his fingers, whence inſu'd perpetual War, and, the Eſtate
“ of the City being as little capable of increaſe as that of the Citizens,
“ her inevitable Ruin. Now what better ends you can propoſe to
your ſelves in the like ways, I do not ſo well fee as I perceive that
" there may be worſe: For Lacedemon yet was free from Civil War:
" But if you imploy your Citizens no better than ſhe did, I cannot
“ promiſe you that you ſhall fare ſo well, becauſe they are ſtill defi-
rous of War that liope it may be profitable to them; and the ſtrong-
" eſt Security you can give of Peace, is to make it gainful. Otherwiſe
· Men will rather chuſe that whierby they may break your Laws,
* than that wherby your Laws may break them. Which I ſpeak not
“ ſo much in relation to the Nobility or ſuch as would be holding, as
to the People or them that would be getting; the paſſion in theſe
s being ſo much the ſtronger, as a Man's felicity is weaker in the
s fruition of things, than in their proſecution and increaſe.
6 TRULY, my Lords, it is my fear, that by taking of more
« hands, and the beſt from Induſtry, you will further indamage it,
• than can be repair'd by laying on a few, and the worſt; while the
“ Nobility muſt be forc'd to ſend their Sons to the Plow, and, as if
" this were not enough, to marry their Daughters alſo to Farmers.
“ SIXTHLY, But I do not ſee (to com to the laſt point) how it
« is poſſible that this thing ſhould be brought about, to your good I
mean, tho it may to the deſtruction of many. For that the Agra-
« rian of Iſrael, or that of Lacedemon might ſtand, is no ſuch mi-
racle; the Lands, without any conſideration of the former Pro-
prietor, being ſurvey'd and caſt into equal Lots, which could nei-
« ther be bought, nor ſold, nor multiply'd: ſo that they knew wher-
« about to have a Man. But in this Nation no ſuch Diviſion can be
« introduc'd, the Lands being already in the hands of Proprietors,
« and ſuch whoſe Eſtates ly very rarely together, but mix'd one with
* another; being alſo of Tenures in nature fo different, that as there
" is no experience that an Agrarian was ever introduc'd in ſuch a cafe,
« ſo there is no appearance how, or reaſon why it ſhould: buc that
" which is againſt Reaſon and Experience is impoſſible.
THE caſe of my Lord Philautus was the moſt concern'd
in the whole Nation; for he had four younger Brothers, his Father
being yet living to whom he was Heir of ten thouſand Pounds a
year. Wherfore being a Man both of good Parts and Eſteem, his
Words wrought both upon Mens Reaſon and Paſſions, and had born
a ſtroke at the liead of the buſineſs, if my Lord ARCHON had not
interpos'd the Buckler in this Oration.
My Lords, tie Legiſlators of Oceana.
05
Y Lord Philautus has inade a thing which is eaſy to
ſeem hard; if the Thanks were due to his Eloquence, it
« would be worthy of leſs praiſe, than that he ows it to his Merit,
" and
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" and the Love he lias moſt deſervedly purchas'd of all Men: nor is
66 it rationally to be fear'd, that he who is ſo much beforehand in his
« privat, ſhould be in arrear in his public Capacity. Wherfore my
« Lord's tenderneſs throout his Speech ariſing from no other Prin-
ciple than his Solicitude left the Agrarian ſhould be hurtful to his
“ Country; it is no leſs than my duty to give the beſt ſatisfaction I am
« able to ſo good a Patriot, taking every one of his Doubts in the Or-
“ der propos’d. And,
FIRST, Wheras my Lord, upon obſervation of the modern
« Commonwealths
, is of opinion, that an Agrarian is not neceſſary:
“ It muſt be confeſt, that at the firſt ſight of them there is ſom
appearance favoring his Aſſertion, but upon Accidents of no prece-
“ dent to us. For the Commonwealths of Switzerland and Holland, I
mean of thoſe Leagues, being ſituated in Countrys not alluring the Ín-
“ habitants to Wantonneſs, but obliging them to univerſal Induſtry,
“ have an implicit Agrarian in the nature of them: and being not ob-
“ noxious to a growing Nobility (which, as long as their former
« Monarchys had ſpread the wing over them, could either not at all
« be hatch'd, or was ſoon broken) are of no example to us, whoſe
& Experience in this point has bin to the contrary. But what if even
« in theſe Governments there be indeed an explicit Agrarian? For
6 when the Law commands an equal or near equal diſtribution of a
“ Man's Eftate in Land among his Children, as it is don in thoſe
« Countrys, a Nobility, cannot grow; and ſo there needs no Agra-
« rian, or rather there is one. And for the growth of the Nobility
☆ in Venice (if ſo it be, for MACCHIAVEL obſerves in that Re-
“ public, as a cauſe of it, a great mediocrity of Eſtates ) it is not a
« point that ſhe is to fear, but might ſtudy, ſeeing ſhe conſiſts of no-
6 thing elſe but Nobility ; by which, whatever their Eſtates ſuck from
< the People, eſpecially if it coms equally, is digeſted into the better
« Blood of that Commonwealth, which is all, or the greateſt benefit
« they can have by accumulation. For how inequal foever you will
“ have them to be in their Incoms, they have Officers of the Pomp,
" to bring them equal in expences, or at leaſt in the oftentation or ſhew
o of them. And ſo unleſs the advantage of an Eſtate conſiſts more
« in the meaſure than in the uſe of it, the Authority of Venice dos
« but inforce our Agrarian; nor ſhall a Man evade or elude the Pru-
“ dence of it, by the Authority of any other Commonwealth. For
e if a Commonwealth has bin introduc'd at once, as thoſe of Iſrael
« and Lacedemon, you are certain to find her underlaid with this as the
« main Foundation; nor, if ſhe is oblig'd more to Fortune than Pru-
« dence, has ſhe rais’d her head without muſing upon this matter, as
appears by that of Athens, which thro her defect in this point, ſays
“ ARISTOTLE, introduc'd her Oſtraciſm, as moſt of the Demo- Polic. 1. 3.c.9.
cracys of Grece.
of Grece. But, not to reſtrain a Fundamental of ſuch la-
« titude to any one kind of Government, do we not yet ſee, that if
there be a ſole Landlord of a vaſt Territory, he is the Turc? That
“ if a few Landlords overbalance a populous Country, they have ſtore
" of Servants? That if a People be in an equal balance, they can have
Il no Lords? That no Government can otherwiſe be erected, than
upon ſom one of theſe Foundations ? That no one of theſe Foun-
" dations (each being elſe apt to change into ſom other) can give
any
ſecurity to the Government, unleſs it be fix'd ? That thro the
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want of this fixation, potent Monarchys and Commonwealths have
“faln upon the heads of the People, and accompany'd their own ſad
6 Ruins with vaſt effuſions of innocent Blood ? Let the Fame, as was
6. the merit of the antient Nobility of this Nation, be equal to, or
« above what has bin already ſaid, or can be ſpoken ; yet have we
“ ſeen not only their Glory, but that of a Throne, the moſt indulgent
to, and leaſt invaſive for ſo many Ages upon the Liberty of a People
" that the World has known, thro the mere want of fixing her foot
" by a proportionable Agrarian upon her proper Foundation, to have
“ faln with ſuch horror, as has bin a Spectacle of Aſtoniſhment to the
66 whole Earth. And were it well argu'd from one Calamity, that
we ought not to prevent another ? Nor is ARISTOTLE ſo good
a Commonwealthſman for deriding the invention of PHALE A S, as
Polit. 1.5.C. 3. “ in recollecting himſelf, where he fays, That Democracys, when a
« leſs part of their Citizens overtop the reſt in Wealth, degenerat
« into Oligarchys and Principalitys: and, which coms nearer to the
“ preſent purpoſe, that the greater part of the Nobility of Tarantum
6 coming accidentally to be ruin'd, the Government of the Few came
“ by conſequence to be chang'd into that of the Many.
" THESE things conſider’d, I cannot ſee how an Agrarian, as
to the fixation or ſecurity of a Government, can be leſs than necella-
ry.
And if a Cure be neceſſary, it excuſes not the Patient, his
« Diſeaſe being otherwiſe deſperat, that it is dangerous ; which was
“ the caſe of Rome, not ſo ſtated by MACCHIAVEL, where he
“ ſays, That the ſtrife about the Agrarian caus’d the Deſtruction of that
" Commonwealth. As if when a Senator was not rich (as CRÁssus
« held) except he could pay an Army, that Commonwealth could
« expect nothing but Ruin, whether in ftrife about the Agrarian, or
6 without it. * Of late, fays Livy, Riches have introduc'd Ava-
“ rice ; and voluptuous Pleaſures abounding, have thro Luft and Luxury
“ begot a deſire of blaſting and deſtroying all good Orders. If the greateſt
“ Security of a Commonwealth conſiſts in being provided with the
« proper Antidote againſt this poiſon, her greateſt danger muſt be
from the abſence of an Agrarian, which is the whole truth of the
“ Roman example. For the Laconic, I ſhall reſerve the farther expli-
“cation of it, as my Lord alſo did, to another place: and firſt ſee
66 whether an Agrarian proportion'd to a popular Government be
“ ſufficient to keep out Monarchy. My Lord is for the Negative,
« and fortify'd by the People of Íſrael electing a King. To which Í
« ſay, That the action of the People therin expreſt is a full Anſwer to
“ the Objection of that Example : For the Monarchy neither grew
upon them, nor could, by reaſon of the Agrarian, poſſibly have
“ invaded them, if they had not pulld it upon themſelves by the
" election of a King. Which being an Accident, the like wherof is
not to be found in any other People fo planted, nor in this, till, as it
“ is manifeſt, they were given up by God to infatuation (for ſays he
Samuel, They have not reje&ted thee, but they have rejected Me,
“ that I should not reign over them) has ſomthing in it which is appa-
rent, by what went before, to have bin beſides the courſe of Na-
ture,
and by what follow'd. For the King having no other Foun-
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16
46
* Nuper divitiæ avaritiam, & abundantes voluptates defiderium, per luxum atque libidinem,
pereundi perdendique omnia invexere. Liv. in Præf.
*
" dation
OCEAN A.
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dation than thie Calamitys of the People, ſo often beaten by their E-
nemys, that deſpairing of themſelves, they were contented with a-
ny change; if he had Peace as in the days of SOLOMON, left but
a flippery Throne to liis Succeſſor, as appear’d by REHOBOA M.
And the Agrarian, notwithſtanding the Monarchy thus introduc’d,
“ fo faithfully preſerv'd the Root of that Commonwealth, that ić
" ſhot forth oftner, and by intervals continu'd longer than any other
& Government, as may be computed from the Inſtitution of the ſame
" by Josu A, 1465 years before Christ, to the total diſſolucidri
" of it, which happend in the Reign of the Emperor ADRIA N,
135 years after the Incarnation. A People planted upon an equal
Agrarian, and holding to it, if they part with their Liberty, muſt
do it upon good will, and make but a bad title of their Bounty. As
to inſtance yer further in that which is propos’d by the preſentOr-
" der to this Ñation, the Standard wherof is at 2000 l. a year: The
“whole Territory of Oceana being divided by this proportion, a-
mounts to 5000 Lots. So the Lands of Oceana being thús diſtribut-
2 ed, and bound to this Diſtribution, can never fall to fewer than five
" thouſand Proprietors. But five thouſand Proprietors ſo ſeiz'd will
agree to break the Agrarian, for that were to agree to rob one
" another; nor to bring in a King, becauſe tliey muſt maintain him,
“ and can have 10 benefit by him ; nor to exclude the People, becauſe
e they can have as little by that, and muſt ſpoil their Militia. So thé
« Commonwealth continuing upon the balance propos'd, tho it ſhould
“ com into five thouſand hands, can never alter; and that it ſhould
ever com into five thouſand hands, is as improbable as any thing in
is the World that is not altogether impoſſible.
“MY Lords, other Conſiderations are more privat : As that this
" Order deſtroys Familys; which is as if one ſhould lay the ruins of
“ ſom antient Caſtle to the Herbs which uſually grow out of them;
" the deſtruction of thoſe Familys being that indeed which naturally
produc'd this Order. For we do not now argue for that which
" we would have, but for that which we are already poffeſt of;
as would appear, if a note were but taken of all ſuch as have at
6 this day above two thouſand Pounds à year in Oceani. If
« ſhould grant (and I will put it with the moſt) that they who are
« Proprietors in Land, exceding this proportion, excede nor three
" hundred; with what brow can the Intereſt of fo few be balanc'd
" with that of the whole Nation? or rather, what Intereſt have
" they to put in ſuch a Balance? They would live as they have bin ac-
“ cuſtom’d to do; Who hinders them? They would enjoy their E-
« ftates; who touches them? They would diſpoſe of what they have
« according to the Intereſt of their Familys: It is that which we dc-
“ fire. A Man has one Son ; let him be call’d: Would he enjoy his
“ Father's Eſtate ? It is his, his Son's, and his Son's Son's after him.
A Man has five Sons; let them be call'd : Would they enjoy their
" Father's Eſtate? It is divided among them : for we have four Vores
" for one in the fame Family, and therfore tliis muſt be the Intereſt of
“the Family, or the Family knows not its own Intereſt. If a Man
“ ſhall diſpute otherwiſe, he muſt draw his Arguments from Cuſtom,
" and from Greatneſs, which was the Intereſt of the Monarchy, not
" of the Family: and we are now a Commonwealth. If the Mo-
narchy could not bear with ſuch Diviſions becauſe they tended to a
6 Com-
66
my Lord
46
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And truly,
108
OCEAN A.
" Commonwealth ; neither can a Commonwealth connive at ſuch Ac-
6 cumulations, becauſe they tend to a Monarchy. If the Monarchy
might make bold with ſo many for the good of one, we may make
« bold with one for the good of ſo many; nay, for the good of all.
“ My Lords, it coms into my mind, that which upon occaſion of the
variety of Partys enumerated in our late Civil Wars, was ſaid by a
“ Friend of mine coming home from his Travels, about the latter
" end of theſe Troubles; That he admir'd how it came to paſs, that
younger Brothers, eſpecially being ſo many more in number than
« their Elder, did not unite as one man againſt a Tyranny, the like
" wherof has not bin exercis'd in any other Nation.
" when I conſider that our Countrymen are none of the worſt natur'd,
“ I muſt confeſs I marvel much how it coms to paſs, that we ſhould
« uſe our Children as we do our Puppys; take one, lay it in the lap,
" feed it with every good bit, and drown five : nay yet worſe;
6 foraſmuch as the Puppys are once drown'd, wheras the Children are
« left perpetually drowning. Really, my Lords, it is a flinty Cu-
6 ſtom! And all this for his cruel Ambition, that would raiſe himſelf a
“ Pillar, a golden Pillar for his Monument, tho he has Children, his
own reviving Fleſh, and a kind of Immortality. And this is that
“ Intereſt of a Family, for which we are to think ill of a Govern-
6 ment that will not indure it. But quiet your ſelves: The Land thro
66 which the River Nilus wanders in one ſtream, is barren; but where
" it parts into ſeven, it multiplys its fertil Shores by diſtributing, yet
6 keeping and improving ſuch a Propriety and Nutrition, as is a pru-
“ dent Agrarian to a wellorder'd Commonwealth.
“ NOR (to com to the fifth Aſſertion) is a political Body render'd
any
fitter for Induſtry, by having one gouty and another wither'd
“ Leg, than a natural. It tends not to the improvement of Mer-
6 chandize that there be ſom who have no need of their Trading, and
“ others that are not able to follow it. If Confinement diſcourages
“ Induſtry, an Eſtate in Mony is not confin’d; and left Induſtry
“ ſhould want wherupon to work, Land is not ingroft or intail'd
upon any man, but remains at its devotion. I wonder whence the
“ computation can ariſe, that this ſhould diſcourage Induſtry. Two
" thouſand Pounds a year a man may enjoy in Oceana, as much in
" Panopea, five hundred in Marpeſia : There be other Plantations, and
" the Commonwealth will have more. Who knows how far the
“ Arms of our Agrarian may extend themſelves ? and whether he
“ that might have left a Pillar, may not leave a Temple of many
“ Pillars to his more pious Memory? Where there is ſom meaſure in
“ Riches, a man may be rich ; but if you will have them to be in-
“ finit, there will be no end of ſtarving himſelf, and wanting what he
56 has: and what pains dos ſuch a one take to be poor! Furthermore,
“ if a man ſhall think that there may be an Induſtry leſs greafy, or
" more noble, and ſo caſt his thoughts upon the Commonwealth,
“ he will have leiſure for her, and the Riches and Honors for him;
« his Sweat ſhall ſmell like ALEXANDER's. My Lord PHI-
L A Utus is a young Man, who enjoying his ten thouſand Pounds
“ a year, may keep a noble Houſe in the old way, and have homely
“ Gueſts; and having but two, by the means propos’d, may take the
upper hand of his great Anceſtors ; with reverence to whom, I
may ſay, there has not bin one of them would have diſputed his
f
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•
OCEAN A.
109
"
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A
place with a Roman Conſul. My Lord, do not break my heart;
"
the Nobility Mall go to no other Plows than thoſe from which we
call our Conſuls. But, ſays he, it having bin ſo with Lacedemon,
that neither the City nor the Citizens were capable of increaſe, a
blow was given by that Agrarian, which ruind both. And what
are we concern’d with that Agrarian, or that blow, while our Citi-
zens and our City (and that by our Agrarian) are both capable of
“ increaſe? The Spartan, if he made a Conqueſt, lad not Citizens to
" hold it; the Oceaner will have enow: thic Spartan could have no
“ Trade, the Oceaner may have all. The Agrarian in Laconia, that
" it might bind on knapſacs, forbidding all other Arts but that of
War, could not make an Army of above 30000 Citizens. The Agra-
“ rian in Oceana without interruption of Traffic, provides us in the
“ fifth part of the Youth an annual ſource or freſh ſpring of 100000,
" beſides our Provincial Auxiliarys, out of which to draw marching
“ Armys; and as many Elders, not feeble, but men moſt of them in
“ the flower of their Age, and in Arms for the defence of our Ter-
“ ritorys. The Agrarian in Laconia banilh'd Mony, this multiplys it:
" That allow'd a matter of twenty or thirty Acres to a man; this
two or three thouſand: There is no compariſon between them.
“And yet I differ ſo much from my Lord, or liis Opimon that the
“ Agrarian was the ruin of Lacedemon, that I hold it no leſs than de-
« monſtrable to have bin her main ſupport. For if, baniſhing all other
“ diverſions, it could not make an Army of above 30000; then
“ letting in all other diverſions, it muſt have broken that Army.
" Wherfore LYSANDER bringing in the golden ſpoils of Athens,
irrecoverably ruin'd that Commonwealth; and is a warning to us,
" that in giving incouragement to Induſtry, we alſo remember, that
“ Coverouſneſs is the root of all Evil. And our Agrarian can never be
“ the cauſe of thoſe Seditions threaten'd by my Lord, but is the pro-
per cure of them, as *Lucan notes well in the State of Rome be-
fore the Civil Wars, which happen'd thro the want of ſuch an An-
66 sidote
Why then are we miſtaken, as if we intended not equal advan-
tages
in our Commonwealth to either Sex, becauſe we would not
" have Womens Fortunes conſiſt in that metal, which expoſes them
to Cutpurſes? If a man cuts my Purſe, I may have him by the heels,
or by the neck for it; wheras a man may cut a woman's purſe,
“ and have her for his pains in fetters. How brutiſh, and much more
" than brutiſh, is that Commonwealth, which prefers the Earth be-
“ fore the Fruits of her Womb ? If the People be her Treaſure, the
“ ſtaff by which ſhe is fuftain'd and comforted, with what Juſtice can
“ The ſuffer them, by whom ſhe is moſt inrich'd, to be for that cauſe
“the moſt impoveriſh'd ? And yet we ſee the Gifts of God, and the
Bountys of Heaven in fruitful Familys, thro this wretched cuſtom
of marrying for Mony, becom their inſupportable grief and pover-
ty. Nor falls this ſo heavy upon the lower fort, being better able
" to ſhift for themſelves, as upon the Nobility or Gentry. For what
“ avails it in this caſe, from whence their veins have deriv'd their
CG
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* Hinc ufura vorax, rapidumque in tempore Fenus;
Hinc concuffa fides, & multis utile bellum,
« Blood;
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« Blood; while they fliall ſee the Tallow of a Chandler ſooner convert-
" ed into that Beauty which is requir’d in a Bride ? I appeal, whether
my Lord PHILAUT us or my ſelf be the Advocat of Nobility ;
“ againſt which in the caſe propos'd by me, there would be nothing
6 to hold the balance. And why is a Woman, if ſhe may have but
“ fifteen hundred pounds, undon? If ſhe be unmarry’d, what Noble-
man allows his Daughter in that caſe a greater Revenu, than ſo
“ much Mony may command? And if ſhie marry, no Nobleman can
“ give his Daughter a greater portion than ſhe has. Who is hurt in
“ this caſe ? nay, who is not benefited ? If the Agrarian gives us the
- ſweat of our brows without diminution; if it prepares our Ta-
65 ble, if it makes our Cup to overflow; and above all this, in pro-
os viding for our Children, anoints our Heads with that Oil which
“ takes away the greateſt of worldly cares; what man, that is not be-
“ fotted with a Covetouſneſs as vain as endleſs, can imagin ſuch a
" Conſtitution to be lis Poverty ? ſeeing where no woman can be con-
“ ſiderable for her portion, no portion will be conſiderable with a wo-
man; and ſo his Children will not only find better preferments with-
« our liis Brocage, but more freedom of their own Affections. We
are wonderful ſevere in Laws, that they ſhall not marry without our
re conſent; as if it were care and tenderneſs over them : But is it not,
" left we ſhould not liave the other thouſand Pounds with this Son, or
" the other hundred Pounds a year more in Jointure for that Daugh-
os ter? Theſe, when we are croſt in them, are the Sins for which we
water our couch with tears, but not of Penitence; ſeeing wheras it
“ iš a miſchief beyond any that we can do to our Enemys, we perſiſt
as to make nothing of breaking the affection of our Children. But
« there is in this Agrarian a Homage to pure and ſpotleſs Love,the con-
< ſequence wherof I will not give for all your Romances. An Alder-
“ man makes nor his Daughter a Counteſs till he has given her 20000 1.
nor a Romance a conſiderable Miſtriſs till ſhe be a Princeſs; theſe are
" Characters of baſtard Love. But if our Agrarian excludes Ambi-
« tion and Covetouſneſs, we ſhall at length have the care of our own
“ breed, in which we have bin curious as to our Dogs and Hor-
ſes
. The Marriage-Bed will be truly legitimat, and the Race of
is the Commonwealth not ſpurious.
" BUT (impar magnanimis aufis,imparque dolori) I am hurld from all
my hopes by my Lords laſt aſſertion of Impoſſibility, that the Root
" from whence we imagin theſe Fruits, ſhould be planted or thrive in
“ this Soil. And why? becauſe of the mixture of Eſtates, and vari-
ety of Tenures. Nevertheleſs, there is yet extant in the Exchequer
an old Survey of the whole Nation; wherfore ſuch a thing is not
impoſſible. Now if a new Survey were taken at the preſent rates,
" and the Law made, that no man ſhould hold hereafter above ſo much
“ Land as is valu'd therin at 2000 l. a year, it would amount to a good
" and fufficient Agrarian. It is true, that there would remain fom
“ difficulty in the different kind of Rents, and that it is a matter re-
“ quiring not only more leiſure than we have, but an Authority which
may be better able to bow men to a more general Conſent, than is
" to be wrought out of them by ſuch as are in our capacity. Wherfore,
“ as to the manner, it is neceſſary that we refer it to the Parlament;
“ but as to the matter, they cannot otherwiſe fix their Government up-
on the right Balance.
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“ I SHALL conclude with a few words to ſom parts of the
Order, which my Lord has omitted. As firſt to the Conſequences
“ of the Agrarian to be ſettled in Marpeſia, which irreparably breaks
" the Ariſtocracy of that Nation; being of ſuch a nature, as ſtanding,
“ it is not poſſible that you ſhould govern. For while the People of that
Country are little better than the Cattel of the Nobility, you muſt not
wonder if according as theſe can make their Markets with foren Prin-
ces, you find thoſe to be driven upon your Grounds. And if you be ſo
“ tender, now you have it in your power, as not to hold a hand upon
" them that
inay prevent the ſlaughter which muſt otherwiſe inſue in
" like caſes, the Blood will ly at your door. But in holding ſuch a
“ band upon them, you may ſettle the Agrarian; and in ſettling the
“
Agrarian, you give that people not only
Liberty, but Lands; which
makes your Protection neceſſary to their Security; and their Contri-
" bution due to your Protection, as to their own Safety.
“ FOR the Agrarian of Panopea, it allowing ſuch proportions of ſo
“ good Land, men that conceive themſelves ſtraitned by this in Oceana,
“ will begin there to let themſelves forth, where every Citizen will in
6 time have his Villa. And there is no queſtion, but the improvement
“ of that Country by this means muſt be far greater than it has bin in
(6 the beſt of former times.
“ I HAVE no more to ſay, but that in thoſe antient and heroic
« Ages (when men thought that to be neceſſary which was virtuous)
“ the Nobility of Athens having the People fo much ingag'd in their
« debt, that there remain'd no other queſtion among theſe, than
6 which of thoſe ſhould be King, no ſooner heard SOLON ſpeak
" than they quitted their Debts, and reſtor'd the Commonwealth ;
“ which ever after held a ſolemn and annual Feaſt calld the Sifafthia,
“ or Reciſion, in memory of that Action. Nor is this example the
« Phænix; for at the inſtitution by LYCURGUS, the Nobility having
“ Eſtates (as ours here) in the Lands of Laconis, upon no other va-
« luable conſideration than the Commonwealth propos’d by him,
66 threw them up to be parceld by his Agrarian. But now when no
6 man is deſir’d to throw up a farthing of his Mony, or a ſhovel full
" of his Earth, and that all we can do is but to make a virtue of ne-
« celſity ; we are diſputing whether we ſhould have Peace or War:
« For Peace you cannot have without ſom Government, nor any Go-
“ vernment without the proper Balance. Wherfore if you will not
“ fix this which you have, the reſt is Blood, for without Blood
you
can bring in no other.
BY theſe Speeches made at the Inſtitution of the Agrarian, you may
perceive what were the Grounds of it. The next is
THE fourteenth ORDER, conſtituting the Ballot of Venice, as it 14: Order.
is fitted by ſeveral Alterations, and appointed to every Aſſembly
, to be the
conſtant and only way of giving ſuffrage in this Commonwealth, according
to the following Scheme.
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OCEAN A A.
113
►
I SHALL indeavor by the preceding Figure to demonſtrač
the Manner of the VENETIAN BĂL LOT (a thing as
difficult in diſcourſe or writing, as facil in practice) according
to the uſe of it in Oceana. The whole Figure
The whole Figure repreſents the Se-
nat, containing, as to the Houſe or form of fitting, a ſquare and a
half; thé Tribunal at the upper end being aſcended by four ſteps.
On the uppermoſt of theſe fit the Magiſtrats that conſtitute the
Signory of the Commonwealth, that is to ſay, A the Strategus; B the
Orator ; C the three Commiſſioners of the Great Seal; D the three
Commiſſioners of the Treaſury, wherof one, E, exerciſes for the
preſent the Office of a Cenfor at the middle Urn F.
TO the two upper ſteps of the Tribunal anſwer G G. G G. the two
long Benches next the Wall on each ſide of the Houſe; the outward-
moſt of which are equal in height to the uppermoſt ſtep, and the in-
nermoſt equal in height to the next. Of theſe four Benches conſiſts the
firſt Seat; as the ſecond Seat conſiſts in like manner of thoſe four Ben-
ches HH. H H. which being next the Floor, are equal in height
to the two nethermoſt ſteps of the Throne. So the whole
Houſe is diſtributed into two Seats, each conſiſting of four Ben-
ches.
THIS diſtribution cauſes not only the greater conveniency, as will
be ſhewn, to the Senators in the exerciſe of their Function at the Bal-
lot, but a greater grace to the aſpect of the Senat. In the middle
of the outward benches ſtand 1. 1. the chairs of the Cenſors, thoſe
being their ordinary places, tho upon occaſion of the Ballot they de-
ſcend, and fit where they are ſhewn by K. K. at each of the outward
Urns L. L. Thoſe M. M. that fit with their Tables, and the Bowls
N. N. before them, upon the half ſpace or ſecond ſtep of the Tribunal
from the floor, are the Clercs or Secretarys of the Houſe. Upon the
Short Seats 0. O. on the floor (which ſhould have bin repreſented by
Woolfacks) ſit P the two Tribuns of the Horſe; Q the two Tribuns
of the Foot; and RR. RR, the Judges: all which Magiſtrats are Al-
fiftants, but have no ſuffrage. This poſture of the Senat conſider'd,
the Ballot is perform'd as follows.
FIRST, wheras the gold Balls are of ſeveral futes, and according-
ly mark'd with ſeveral Letters of the Alphabet, a Secretary preſents
a little Urn (wherin there is one Ball of every ſute or mark) to the
Strategus and the Orator ; and look what Letter the Strategus draws,
the fame and no other is to be us’d for that time in the middle Urn F;
the like for the Letter drawn by the Orator is to be obſerv'd for the
fide Urns L. L. that is to ſay, if the Strategus drew a Ball with an A,
all the gold Balls in the middle Urn for that day are mark'd with the
Letter Å; and if the Orator drew a B, all the gold Balls in the ſide
Urn for that day are mark'd with the Letter B: which don immediat-
ly before the Ballot, and ſo the Letter unknown to the Ballotants,
they can uſe no fraud or jugling; otherwiſe a man might carry á
gold Ball in his hand, and ſeem to have drawn it out of an Urn.
He that draws a gold Ball at any Urn, delivers it to the Cenſor or Al-
feſſor of that Urn, who views the Character, and allows accordingly
of his Lot.
THE Strategus and the Orator having drawn for the Letters, the
Urns are prepard accordingly by one of the Commiſſioners and the
two
MI
114
OCEAN A.
two Cenſors. The preparation of the Urns is after this manner. If
the Senat be to elect, for example, the Liſt call’d the Tropic of Magi-
ſtrats, which is this
1. The Lord STRATEGVS;
2. The Lord O RATO R;
3. The third COMMISSIONER of the Great Seal;
4. The third COMMISSIONER of the Treaſury;
5. The firſt CENSOR;
6. The ſecond CENSOR ;
This Liſt or Schedule conſiſts of ſix Magiſtracys, and to every
Magiſtracy there are to be four Competitors, that is
, in all four and
twenty Competitors propos’d to the Houſe. They that are to propoſe
the Competitors are calld Electors, and no Elector can propoſe above
one Competitor : wherfore for the propoſing
of four and twenty Com-
petitors you muſt have four and twenty Electors; and whieras the
Ballot conſiſts of a Lot and of a Suffrage, the Lot is for no o-
ther uſe than for the deſignation of Electors ; and he that draws a
gold Ball at the middle Urn is an Elector. Now, as to have
four and twenty Competitors propos'd, you muſt have four and
twenty Electors made; ſo to have four and twenty Electors made
by lot, you muſt have four and twenty gold Balls in the middle
Urn; and theſe (becauſe otherwiſe it would be no Lot) mix'd with a
competent number of Blanks, or ſilver Balls. Wherfore to the four and
twenty gold Balls caſt fix and twenty ſilver ones, and thoſe (reckoning
the Blanks with the Prizes) make fifty Balls in the middle Urn. This
don (becauſe no man can com to the middle Urn that has not firſt
drawn a gold Ball at one of the ſide Urns) and to be ſure that the Pri-
zes or gold Balls in this Urn þe all drawn, there muſt com to it fifty
perſons: therfore there muſt be in each of the ſide Urns five and twen-
ty gold Balls, which in both com to fifty; and to the end that
every
Senator may have his Lot, the gold Balls in the ſide Urns are to be
made up with Blanks equal to the number of the Ballotants at either
Urn: for example, the Houſe conſiſting of 300 Senators, there muſt
be in each of the ſide Urns 125 Blanks and 25 Prizes, which com in
both the ſide Urns to 300 Balls
. This is the whole Myſtery of pre-
paring the Urns, which the Cenfors having skill to do accordingly,
the reſt of the Ballot, whether the partys balloting underſtand it or no,
'muſt of neceſſary conſequence com right; and they can neither be out,
nor fall into any confuſion in the exerciſe of this Art.
BUT the Ballot, as I ſaid, is of two parts, Lot and Suffrage,
or the Propoſition and Reſult. The Lot determins who ſhall propoſé
the Competitors; and the Reſult of the Senat, which of the Com-
petitors ſhall be the Magiſtrats. The whole, to begin with the Loc,
procedes in this manner.
THE firſt Secretary with an audible Voice reads firſt the Liſt of
the Magiſtrats to be choſen for the day; then the Oath for fair Electi-
on, at which the Senators hold up their hands; which don, another
Secretary preſents a little Urn to the Strategus, in which are four Balls,
each of them having one of theſe four Inſcriptions : FIRST SEAT
AT THE UPPER END. FIRST SEAT AT THE
LOWER END. SECOND SEAT AT THE UPPER
END.
**
OCEAN A.
IIS
:
F
3
END. SECOND SEAT AT THE LOWER END,
and look which of them the Strategus draws, the Secretary pronoun-
cing the Inſcription with a loud Voice, the Seat ſo call'd coms ac-
cordingly to the Urns: this in the Figure is the SECOND SEAT
AT THE UPPER END. The manner of their coming to the
ſide Urns is in double Files, there being two holes in the cover of each
fide Urn, by which means two may draw at once. The Senators
therfore SS. SS. are coming from the upper end of their Seats HH. HH.
to the ſide Urns L. L. The Senators TT. T. are drawing. The
Senator V has drawn a gold Ball at his ſide Urn, and is going to the
middle Urn F, where the Senator W having don the like at the other
fide Urn, is already drawing. But the Senators X X. X X. having
drawn Blanks at their ſide Urns, and thrown them into the Bowls
Y. Y. ftanding at the feet of the Urns, are marching by the lower end
into their Seats again; the Senator a having don the like at the iniddle
Urn, is alſo throwing his blank into the Bowl b, and marching to his
Seat again: for a man by a prize at a ſide Urn gains no more than
right to com to the middle Urn, where if he draws a Blank, his For-
tune at the ſide Urn coms to nothing at all; wherfore he alſo returns to
his place. But the Senator c has had a Prize at the middle Urn,
where the Commiſſioner having viewed his Ball, and found the mark
to be right, he marches up the Iteps to the Seat of the Electors, which
is the form d fet croſs the Tribunal, where he places himſelf according
as he was drawn with the other Electors e ee drawn before him.
Theſe are not to look back, but fit with their Faces towards the Signo
ry or State, till their number amount to that of the Magiſtrats to be
that day chofen, which for the preſent, as was ſhewn, are ſix; wher-
fore ſix Electors being made, they are reckon d according as they were
drawn: Firſt, fecond, third, fourth, fifth, ſixth, in their Order;
and the firſt ſix that are choſen are the FIRST ORDER OF
ELECTORS.
THE firſt Order of Electors being made, are conducted by a
Secretary, with a copy of the Liſt to be chofen, out of the Se-
nat, and into a Committee or Council - Chamber, being neither
fuffer'd by the way, nor in their room (till the Ballot be ended)
to have conference with any but themſelves; wherfore the Secretary,
liaving given thiem their Oath that they shall make Election according
to the Law and their Conſcience, delivers them the Liſt, and ſeats
himſelf at the lower end of the Table with his Pen and Paper, while
another Secretary keeps the Door.
BY ſuch time as the firſt Order of Electors are thus ſeated, the
ſecond Order of Electors is drawn, who with a fecond Copy of the
fame Liſt are conducted into another Committee-chamber, by other
Secretarys performing the ſame Office with the former.
THÉ like exactly is don by the third and by the fourth Orders
(or Hands, as the Venetians call them) of Electors ; by which
means you have the four and twenty Electors divided according to
the four Copys of the fame Liſt, by fix, into four Hands or Or-
ders; and every one of theſe Orders names one Competitor to
every. Magiſtracy in the Liſt; that is to ſay, the firit Elector
names to the firſt Magiſtracy, the ſecond Elector to the ſecond Magi-
ſtracy, and ſo forth. But tho the Electors, as has bin ſhewn, are
choſen by mere lot, yet the Competitors by them nam'd are not cho
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116
OCEAN A.
ſen by any Lot, but by the Suffrage of the whole Order : For exam-
ple'; 'The firſt Elector in the firſt Order propoſes a Name to be Strate-
gus,
which Name is balloted by himſelf and the other five Electors ;
and if the Name ſo balloted attain not to above half the Suffrages, it is
laid aſide, and the firſt Elector names another to the ſame Magiſtracy;
and ſo in caſe this alſo fails, another, till one he has nam’d, whe-
ther it be himſelf, or ſom other, has attain’d to above hálf the
Suffrages in the affirmative ; and the name ſo attaining to a-
bove half the Suffrages in the Affirmative is written to the firſt
Magiſtracy in the Lift by the Secretary; which being don, the ſe-
cond Elector of the firſt Order names to the ſecond Magiltracy till one
of his nomination be choſen to the ſame. The like is don by the reſt
of the Electors of the firſt Order, till one Competitor be choſen, and
written to every Magiſtracy in their Liſt. Now the ſecond, third,
and fourth Orders of Electors doing exactly after the fame manner, it
coms to paſs that ohe Competitor to every Magiſtracy being choſen in
each Order,there be in all four Competitors choſen to every Magiſtracy.
IF any Controverſy ariſes in an Order of Electors, one of the Cen-
fors (theſe being at this game the Groomporters) is advertis'd by the
Secretary, who brings him in, and the Electors diſputing are bound to
acquieſce in his Sentence. For which cauſe it is that the Cenſors do not
ballot at the Urns; the Signory alſo abſtains, leſt it ſhould deform the
Houſe: wherfore the Blanks in the fide Urns are by ſo many the fewer.
And ſo much for the Lot, which is of the greater Art but leſs Conſe-
quence, becauſe it concerns Propoſition only : But all (except the
Tribuns and the Judges, which being but Aſſiſtants have no Suffrage)
are to ballot at the Reſult, to which I now com.
THE four Orders of Electors having perfected their Liſts, the face
of the Houſe is chang’d: for the Urns are taken away, and every Se-
nator and Magiſtrat is feated in his proper place, ſaving the Electors,
who, having given their Suffrages already, may not ſtir out of their
chambers, till the Houſe have given theirs, and the reſt of the Ballot
be perform'd; which follows in this manner.
THE four Liſts being preſented by the Secretarys of each Coun-
cil of Electors to the Signory, are firſt read, according to their
Order, to the Houſe with an audible Voice ; and then the Com-
petitors are put to the Ballot or Suffrage of the whole Senat in
this manner : A. A. nam'd to be Strategus in the firſt Order
wherupon eight Ballotins or Pages, ſuch as are expreſs’d by the
Figures f. f. take eight of the Boxes repreſented, tho rudely, by
the Figures g.g. and go four on the one, and four on the other ſide
of
the Houſe, that is, one to every Bench, ſinging A. A. nam'd to be the
Strategus in the firſt Order : and every Magiftrat and Senator (begin-
ning by the Strategus and the Orator firſt) holds up a little Pellet of
Linen, as the Box paſſes, between his Fingerand his Thumb, that men
may ſee he has but one, and then puts it into the ſame. The Box con-
fiſting in the inner part of two Boxes, being painted on the outſide
white and green, to diſtinguiſh the Affirmative from the Negative
fide, is ſo made, that when your Hand is in it, no mancan ſee to which
of the ſides you put the Suffrage, nor hear to which it falls, becauſe
the Pellet being Linen, makes no noiſe. The Strategus and the Orator
having begun, all the reſt do the like.
THE Ballotins having thus gather'd the Suffrages, bring them
before
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OCE A N A.
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THE Ballot not finiſh'd before Sunſet, tho the Election of the Ma-
before the Signory, in whoſe preſence the outward Boxes being opend,
they take out the inner Boxes, wherof the Affirmative is white, and the
Negative green, and pour
the whice into the Bowl N on the right
hand, which is white alſo, and the green into the Bowl N on the left,
which is alſo green._Theſe Bowls or Baſons (better repreſented at
the lower end of the Figure by h. i.) being upon this occaſion ſet before
the Tables of the Secretarys at the upper end N. N. the white on the
right hand, and the green on the left, the Secretarys on each ſide num-
ber the Balls: by which if they find that the Affirmatives amount not
to above one half
, they write not the Name that was balloted; but if
they amount to above one half, they write it, adding the number of a-
bove half the Suffrages to which it attain’d. The firſt name being
written, or laid aſide, the next that is put is B. B. nam’d to be Strategus
in the ſecond Order; the third C. C. nam d to be Strategus in the third
Order; the fourth D.D. nam'd to be Strategus in the fourth Order : and
he of theſe four Competitors that has moſt above lialt in the Affirma-
tive, is the Magiltrat; or if none of them attain to above half, the no-
mination for that Magiſtracy is to be repeated by ſuch new Electors as
ſhall be choſen at the next Ballot. And ſo, as is exemplify'd in the firſt
Magiſtracy, procedes the Ballot of the reſt; firſt in the firſt, then in
the ſecond, and ſo in the third and fourth Orders.
NOW wheras it may happen that A.A. (for example) being nam'd
Strategus in the firſt Order, may alſo be nam'd to the ſame or fom one
or more other Magiſtracys in one or more of the other Orders; his name
is firſt balloted where it is firſt written, that is, to the more worthy Ma-
giſtracy, wherof if he miſſes, he is balloted as it coms in courſe for the
next,
and ſo for the reſt, if he miſſes of that, as often as he is nam'd.
AND becauſe to be nam'd twice, or oftner, whether to the ſame
or ſom other Magiſtracy, is the ſtronger recommendation; the note
muſt not fail to be given upon the name, at the propoſition, in this man-
ner ; A. A. nam'd tobe Strategus in the firſt, and in the ſecond Order: or
A. A. nam’d to be Strategus in the firſt and the third; in the firſt and the
fourth, &c. But if he be nam’d to the fame Magiſtracy in the firſt, fe-
cond, third, and fourth Orders, he can have no Competitor; wherfore
attaining to above half the Suffrages, he is the Magiſtrat
. Or thus :
A. A. nam'd to be Strategus in the firſt, to be Cenſor in the ſecond, to be
Orator in the third, and to be Commiſſioner of the Seal in the fourth Order,
or the like in more or fewer Orders: In which caſes if he miſſes of the
firſt Magiſtracy, he is balloted to the ſecond ; if he miſſes of the ſecond,
to the third; and if he miſſes of the third, to the fourth.
giſtrats already choſen be good, voids the Election of ſuch Competi-
tors as being choſen are not yet furniſh'd with Magiſtracys, as if they
had never bin nam'd (for this is no Jugling Box, but an Art that
muſt ſee the Sun) and the Ballot for the remaining Magiſtracys is
to be repeated the next day by new Orders of Electors, and ſuch Com-
petitors as by them ſhall be elected. And ſo in the like manner, if of
all the names propos’d to the fame Magiſtracy, no one of them attains
to above half the Suffrages in the Affirmative.
THE Senatorian Ballot of Oceana being thus deſcrib'd, thoſe of the
Pariſh, of the Hundred, and of the Tribe, being ſo little different,
that in this they are all contain'à, and by this may be eaſily underſtood,
are
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OCE A N A.
are yet fully deſcrib'd, and made plain enough before in the 5th, 6th,
7th, 8th, 9th, and ioth Orders.
THIS therfore is the general Order, whence thoſe branches of the
Ballor, ſom wherof you have already ſeen,are deriv'd; which, with thoſe
that follow, were all read and debated in this place at the Inſtitution,
When my Lord EPIMO NUS DE GARRUL A, being one of the
Counſillors, and having no farther patience (tho the Rules were com-
pos'd by the Agent of this Commonwealth, reſiding for that purpoſe
at Venice) than to hear the direction for the Pariſhes, ſtood up and made
way for himſelf in this manner.
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, you
May it pleaſe your Highneſs, my Lord ARCHON.
NDER correction of Mr. PEREGRIN Spy, our very
U
learn'd Agent and Intelligencer, I have ſeen the World a lit-
tle, Venice, and (as Gentlemen are permitted to do) the Great Coun-
“ cil balloting. And truly I muſt needs ſay, that it is for a dumb ſhew
" the goodlieſt that I ever beheld with my eys. You ſhould have ſom
o would take it ill, as if the noble Venetians thought themſelves too
“ good to ſpeak to ſtrangers, but they obſerv'd them not ſo narrowly.
" The truth is, they have nothing to ſay to their Acquaintance; or
66 Men that are in Council fure would have Tongues: For a Council,
6 and not a word ſpoken in it, is a contradiction. But there is ſuch a
“ pudder with their marching and countermarching, as, tho never a
« one of them draw a Sword, you would think they were training;
- which till I found that they did it only to entertain ſtrangers, I came
“ from among them as wiſe as I went thither. But in the Parlament
“ of Oceana you had no Balls, nor Dancing, but ſober Converſation ;
6 a man might know and be known, Thew his parts, and improve
“ 'em. And now if you take the advice of this fame féllow, will
« ſpoil all with his whimſys. Mr. Speaker --Cry you mercy, my
« Lord' ARCHON, I mean; Set the wiſeſt man of your Houſe in
“ the Great Council of Venice, and you will not know him from a
“ fool. Wheras nothing is more certain, than that flat and dull fel-
“ lows in the judgment of all ſuch as us’d to keep company with them
“ before, upon election into our Houſe, have immediatly chitted like
“ Barly in the fat, where it acquires a new Spirit, and flow'd forth in-
a to Language, that I am as confident as I am here, if there were not
« ſuch as delight to abuſe us, is far better than Tullys; Or, let any
body but tranſlate one of his Orations, and ſpeak it in the Houſe,
« and ſee if every body do not laugh at him. This is a great matter,
“ Mr. Speaker; they do not cant it with your Booklearning, your Orbs,
your Centers, your prime Magnitudes, and your Nebulones, things
"I profeſs that would make a ſober man run ſtark mad to hear 'em ;
“ while we, who ſhould be conſidering the Honor of our Country,
“ and that it gos now or never upon our hand, whether it ſhall be ri-
“ diculous to all the World, are going to Nineholes, or trow Madam
“ for our buſineſs, like your dumb Venetian, whom this fame Sir
6 Politic your Reſident, that never ſaw him do any thing but
s make faces, would inſinuat into you, at this diſtance, to have the
“ only knack of State. Wheras if you ſhould take the pains, as I have
don, to look a little nearer, you would find theſe fame wonderful
of
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OCE A N A.
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" things to be nothing elſe but mere natural Fopperys, or Capricios, as
“ they call them in Italian, even of the meaneſt of that Nation. For,
put the caſe you be travelling in Italy, ask your Contadino, that is,
“the next Country fellow you meet, fom queſtion, and preſently he
" ballots you an anſwer with a nod, which is affirmative; or a ſhake
with his head, which is the negative box; or a ſhrug with his
“ ſhoulder, which is the Boſſolo di non ſinceri.Good? You will
" admire S ANDs for telling you, that Grotta di Cane is a Miracle :
" and I ſhall be laugh'd at for aſſuring you, that it is nothing elſe but
“ ſuch a damp (continu'd by the neighborhood of certain Sulphur
“ Mines) as thro accidental heat dos ſomtimes happen in our Coalpits.
“But Ingratitude muſt not diſcorage an honeſt man from doing good.
" There is not, I ſay, ſuch a tonguery'd Generation under Heaven
as your Italian ; that you ſhould not wonder if he makes ſigns. But
our People muſt have ſomthing in their Diurnals, we muſt ever
" and anon be telling 'em our minds ; or if we be at it when we raiſe
“ Taxes, like thoſe Gentlemen with the finger and the thumb, they
" will ſwear that we are Cutpurſes.--Com, I know what I have heard
“ 'em fay, when ſom men had mony that wrought hard enough for
" it; and do you conceive they will be better pleas'd when they ſhall
" be told, that upon like occaſions you are at mumchance or ſtoolball?
“ I do not ſpeak for my ſelf; for tho I ſhall always acknowlege, that
“ I got more by one years ſitting in the Houſe, than by my three years
« Travels, it was not of that kind. But I hate that this fame SPS
Y,
“ for pretending to have play'd at Billiards with the moſt Serene Com-
monwealth of Venice, ſhould make ſuch fools of us here, when I
“ know that he muſt have had his intelligence from ſom Corncutter
upon the Rialta; for a noble Venetian would be hang’d if he ſhould
“keep ſuch a fellow company. And yet if I do not think he has made
you all dote, never truſt me, my Lord ARCHON is ſomtimes in
“ ſuch ſtrange Raptures. Why, good my Lord, let me be heard as
“ well as your Apple Squire; Venice has freſh blood in her Cheeks, I
« muſt confeſs, yet ſhe is but an old Lady. Nor has he pick'd her Ca-
6 binet ; there he ſends you are none of her Receits I can aſſure
you,
“ he bought them for a Julio at St. Marcs of a Mountebank. She has
“ no other waſh, upon my knowlege, for that ſame envy'd Complexion
“ of hers but her Marſhes, being a little better ſcented, faving your
« preſence, than a Chamberpot. My Lords, I know what I ſay, but
you will never have don with it, That neither the Great Turc, nor
any of thoſe little Turcs her Neighbors, have bin able to ſpoil her!
“ Why you may as well wonder that Weefels do not ſuck egs in
“ Swans neſts. Do you think that it has lain in the devotion of her
“ Beads; which you that have puk'd ſo much at Popery, are now
“ at length reſolv'd ſhall conſecrat M. Parſon, and be drop'd by every
one of his Congregation, while thoſe fame whimſical Intelligen-
ces your Surveyors (you will break my heart) give the turn to
your primum mobile ? and ſo I think they will; for you will find,
" that Mony is the primum mobile, and they will turn you thus out of
“ fom three or four hundred thouſand Pounds: a pretty Sum for
"Urns and Balls, for Boxes and Pills, which theſe fame Quackſalvers
~ are to adminiſter to the Pariſhes; and for what Diſeaſe I marvel!
« Cr how dos it work? Out com a Conſtable, an Overſeer, and a
Churchwarden! Mr. Speaker, I am amaz’d!
OC
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120
OCEAN A.
NEVER was there Gooſe ſo ſtuck with Lard as my Lord. Epii
MONUS's Speech with Laughter ; the ARCHON laving much
ado to recover himſelf, in ſuch manner as might inable him to return
theſe thanks.
OC
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your whole lives, my Lords, were you never entertain'd
with ſo much Ingenuity; my_Lord EPIMO nus having at
once mended all the faults of Travellers. For, firſt; whieras
they are abominable liars, he has not told you (excepe ſom mali-
« tious body has miſinform'd him concerning poor Spy) one ſyllable
« of falſhood. And, ſecondly, wheras they never fail to give the
upper hand in all their Diſcourſes to foren Nations, ſtill juſtling their
own into the kennel ; he bears an Honor to his Country that
“ will not diſſolve in Cephalonia, nor be corrupted with Figs
" and Melons, which I can aſſure you is no ordinary obligation:
" And therfore hold it a matter of public concern, that we be no
“ occaſion of quenching my Lord's Affections ; nor is there any
“ ſuch great matter between us, but in my opinion might be eaſily
reconcild: for tho that which my Lord gain’d by ſitting in the
“ Houſe, I ſtedfaſtly believe, as he can affirm, was got fairly ;
yet dare I not, nor do I think, that upon conſideration he will
promiſe ſo much for other Gameſters, eſpecially when they were
at it ſo high, as he intimats not only to have bin in uſe, but to
“ be like enough to com about again. Wherſore, ſay I, let them
“ throw with boxes; for unleſs we will be below the Politics of
an ordinary, there is no ſuch bar to cogging. It is known to
" his Lordſhip, that our Game is moſt at a throw, and that every
« caſt of our Dice is in our Suffrages; nor will he deny, that partiality
« in a Suffrage is downright cogging. Now if the Venetian Boxes be
« the moſt foverain of all Remedys againſt this ſame cogging, is it not
a ſtrange thing that they ſhould be thrown firſt into the fire by
“ a fair Gameſter? Men are naturally ſubject to all kinds of Par-
“ fions: Som you have that are not able to withſtand the brow
“ of an Enemy; and others that make nothing of this, are leſs
“ proof againſt that of a Friend. So that if your Suffrage be bare-
fac'd, I dare ſay you ſhall not have one fair cait in twenty. But
whatever a man's fortune be at the box, he neither knows whom
to thank, nor whom to challenge. Wherfore (that my Lord may
“ have a charitable opinion of the choice Affection which I conteſs
to have, above all other Beautys, for that of incomparable Venice)
" there is in this way of Suffrage no leſs than a demonſtration that
“ it is the moſt pure: and the purity of the Suffrage in a popular Go-
“ vernment is the Health, if not the Life of it ; ſeeing the Soul is no
“ otherwiſe breath'd into the Soverain Power, than by the Suffrage
“ of the People. Wherfore no
Wherfore no wonder if PosTELLUS be of
opinion, that this uſe of the Ball is the very fame with that
“ of the Bean in Athens ; or, that others, by the Text concerning
“ ELD.ad and MEDAD, derive it from the Commonwealth of 1
"srael. There is another thing, tho not ſo material to us, that my
Lord will excuſe me if I be not willing to yield, which is, that Vé-
“ nice ſubſiſts only by her Situation. It is true, that a man 'in time of
« War may be more ſecure from his Enemys by being in a Citadel,
“ but not from his Diſeaſes: wherfore the firſt cauſe, if he lives long,
<
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IS
OCEAN A.
I 21
" is his good Conſtitution, without which his Citadel were to little
purpoſe; and it is not otherwiſe with Venice.
WITH this Speech of the ARCHON I conclude the proof of the
Agrarian, and the Ballot, being the Fundamental Laws of this
Commonwealth ; and com now from the Center to the Circumfe-
rences or Orbs, wherof ſom have bin already ſhewn: As how the
Pariſhes annually pour themſelves into the Hundreds, the Hundreds
into the Tribes, and the Tribes into the Galaxys; the Annual Galaxy
of every Tribe conſiſting of two Knights and ſeven Deputys, wherof the
Knights conſtitute the Senat; the Deputys, the Prerogative Tribe,
commonly call’d the People ; and the Senat and People conſtitute the So-
verain Power, or Parlament of Oceana. Wherfore to ſhew what the
Parlament is, I muſt firſt open the Senat, and then the Prerogative Tribe.
To begin with the Senat, of which (as a Man is differently re- The Face of the
preſented by a Picturedrawer, and by an Ànatomiſt) I ſhall firſt dif- Senat.
cover the Face or Aſpect, and then the Parts, with the uſe of them.
Every Monday morning in the Summer at ſeven, and in the Winter
at eight, the great Bell in the Clockhouſe at the Pantheon begins, and
continues ringing for the ſpace of one hour: in which time the Ma-
giſtrats of the Senat, being attended according to their Quality, with
à reſpective number of the Ballotins, Doorkeepers, and Meſſengers;
and having the Enſigns of their Magiſtracys born before them, as the
Sword before the Strategus, the Mace before the Orator, a Mace with
the Seal before the Commiſſioners of the Chancery, the like with the
Purſe before the Commiſſioners of the Treaſury; and a Silver Wand,
like thoſe in uſe with the Univerſitys, before each of the Cenſors, be-
ing Chancellors of the ſame. Theſe with the Knights, in all three
hundred, aſſemble in the Houſe or Hall of the Senat.
THE Houſe or Hall of the Senat, being ſituated in the Pantheon
or Palace of Juſtice, is a Room conſiſting of a Square and a half. In
the middle of the lower end is the Door; at the upper end hangs a
rich State overſhadowing the greater part of a large Throne, or half
pace of two Stages; the firſt aſcended by two ſteps from the floor,
and the ſecond about the middle riſing two ſteps higher.
Upon this
ſtand two Chairs, in that on the right hand ſits the
Strategus, in the
other the Orator, adorn’d with Scarlet Robes, after the faſhion that
was us’d by the Dukes in the Ariſtocracy. At the right end of the
upper Stage ſtand three Chairs, in which the three Commiſſioners of
the Seal are placd; and at the other end ſit the three Comidiſſioners of
the Treaſury, every one in a Robe or Habit like that of the Earls. Of
theſe Magiſtrats of this upper Stage conſiſts the Signory. At either
end of the lower Stage ſtands a little Table, to which the Secretarys of
the Senat are ſet with their tufted Sleeves in the habit of civil Lawyers.
To the four ſteps, wherby the two Stages of the Throne are aſcend-
ed, anſwer four long Benches
, which ſucceſſively deriving from
every
one of the ſteps, continue their reſpective height, and extend them-
ſelves by the lide Walls towards the lower end of the Houſe, every
Bench being divided by numeral Characters into the thirty ſeven parts
or places. Upon the upper benches ſit the Cenſors in the Robes of Ba-
rons; the firſt in the middle of the right hand bench, and the ſecond
directly oppoſit to him on the other ſide. Upon the reſt of the Ben-
ches fit the Knights, who if they be call'd to the Urns, diſtribucing
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122
themſelves by the Figures, com in equal files, either by the firſt Seat,
which conſiſts of the two upper Benches on either ſide ; or by the ſe-
cond Seat, conſiſting of the two lower Benches on either ſide: begin-
ning alſo at the upper, or at the lower ends of the ſame, according to
the Lot wherby they are calld; for which end the Benches are open,
and aſcended at either end with eaſy ſtairs and large paſſages. The
reſt of the Ballot is conformable to that of the Tribe; the Cenſors of
the Houſe ſitting at the ſide Urns, and the youngeſt Magiſtrat of the
Signory at the middle: the Urns being plac'd before the Throne, and
prepar'd according to the number of the Magiſtrats to be at that time
choſen by the Rules already given to the Cenſors of the Tribes. But
before the Benches of the Knights on either ſide ſtands one being
Shorter ; and at the upper end of this ſit the two Tribuns of the Horſe.
At the upper end of the other, the two Tribuns of the Foot in their
Arms; the reſt of the Benches being cover'd by the Judges of the
Land in their Robes. But theſe Magiſtrats have no Suffrage, nor the
Tribuns, tho they derive their preſence in the Senat from the Romans ;
nor the Judges, tho they derive theirs from the antient Senat of Oceaná.
Every Monday this Aſſembly fits of courſe; at other times, if there
be occaſion, any Magiſtrat of the Houſe by giving order for the Bell,
or by his Lictor or Enſignbearer, calls a Senat. And every Magiſtrat
or Knight during his Seſſion has the Title, Place, and 'Honor of a
Duke, Earl, Baron, or Knight, reſpectively. And every one that
has born the fame Magiſtracy by his third Seſſion, has his reſpective
Place and Title during the term of his Life, which is all the Honor
confer'd by this Commonwealth, except upon the Maſter of the Ce-
remonys, the Maſter of the Horſe, and the King of the Heralds,
who are Knights by their places. And thus you have the face of the
Senat, in which there is ſcarce any Feature that is not Roman or Vene-
tian; nor do the Horns of the Creſcent extend themſelves much un-
like thoſe of the Sanhedrim, on either hand of the Prince, and of the
Father of that Senat. But upon Beauty, in which
But upon Beauty, in which every Man has his
phanſy, we will not otherwiſe philoſophize than to remember that
there is ſomthing more than decency in the Robe of a Judg, that would
not be well ſpar'd from the Bench; and that the graveſt Magiſtrat, to
whom you can commit the Sword of Juſtice, will find a quickneſs in
the Spurs of Honor, which if they be not laid to Virtue, will lay
themſelves to that which may rout a Commonwealth.
Conflitution of TO com from the Face of the Senat, to the Conſtitution and Uſe of
the Parts: It is contain'd in the peculiar Orders. And the Orders
which are peculiar to the Senat, are either of Election or Inſtruction.
ELECTIONS in the Senat are of three forts, Annual, Biennial,
and Extraordinary.
ANNUAL 'Elections are perform'd by the Schedule call’d the
Tropic: And the Tropic conſiſts of two parts; the one containing the
Magiſtrats, and the other the Councils to be yearly elected. The
Schedule or Tropic of the Magiſtrats is as follows in
THE fifteenth ORDER, requiring, That upon every Monday next
Tropic of the inſuing the laſt of March, the Knights of the Annual Galaxys taking
Magistrats.
their places in the Senat, be call?d the third Region of the ſame; and that
the Houſe having diſmiſt the firſt Region, and receiv'd the third, procede
to election of the Magiſtrats containd in the firſt part of the Tropic, by
the inſuing Schedule :
The
the Senat.
15. O-der.
*
1
OCEAN A.
123
The Lord Strategus,
The Lord Orator,
The firſt Cenſor,
The ſecond Cenſor,
Annual Magiſtratě.
The third Commiſſioner of
the Seal,
The third Commiſſioner of
the Treaſury,
Triennial Magiſtrats.
THE Annual Magiſtrats (provided that no one Man bears above one
of thoſe Honors during the term of one Seſſion) may be elected out of any
Region. But the Triennial Magiſtrats may not be elected out of any other
than the third Region only, left the term of their Seſſion expire before that
of their Honor ; and (it being unlawful for a Man to bear Magiſtracy
any longer than he is therto qualify'd by the Election of the People) cauſe a
Fraction in the Rotation of this Commonwealth.
THE Strategus is firſt Preſident of the Senat, and General of the of the Scrate-
Army, if it be commanded to march; in which caſe there ſhall be a few gus.
cond Strategus elected to be firſt Preſident of the Senat, and General of
the ſecond Army: and if this alſo be commanded to march, a third Stra-
tegus shall be choſen; and ſoon, as long as the Commonwealth fends forth
Armys.
THE Lord Orator is the ſecond and more peculiar Preſident of the of the Orator.
Senat, to whom it appertains to keep the Houſe to Orders.
THE Cenſors, wherof the firſt by conſequence of his Election is Chan-Of the Cenſors:
cellor of the Vniverſity of Clio, and the ſecond of that of Calliope, are
Preſidents of the Council for Religion and Magiſtrats, to whom it belongs
to keep the Houſe to the order of the Ballot. They are alſo Inquiſitors into
the
ways and means of acquiring Magiſtracy; and have power to puniſh
indirečt procedings in the ſame, by removing & Knight or Magiſtrat out
of the Houſe, under appeal to the Senat.
THE Cömmiſſioners of the Seal being three, wherof the third is annu- of the Com-
ally choſen out of the third Region, are Judges in Chancery.
THE Commiſſioners of the Treaſury being three, wherof the third is of the Com-
annually choſen out of the third Region, are Judges in the Exchequer; and miſſioners of
every Magiſtrat of this Schedule has right to propoſe to the Senat.
B VT the Strategus with the fix Commiſſioners, are the Signory of of the Signo
this Commonwealth, having right of Seſſion and Suffrage in every Councilry.
of the Senat, and Power either jointly or ſeverally to propoſe“ in all or
miſſioners of
the Seal.
the Treaſury.
any of them.
I HAVE little in this Order to obſerve or prove, but that the
Strategus is the fame Honor both in name and thing that was born,
among others, by PHILOPEMEN and Aratus in the Common
wealth of the Acheans ; the like having bin in uſe alſo with the Ætolia
ans. The Orator, call'd otherwiſe the Speaker, is with ſmall altera-
tion the ſame that had bin of former uſe in this Nation. Theſe two,
if you will
, may be compar’d to the Conſuls in Rome, or the Suffetes
in Carthage ; for their Magiſtracy is ſcarce different.
THE Cenſors derive their power of removing a Senator from thoſe
of Rome; the Government of the Ballot, from thoſe of Venice; and
R2
that
1
124
OCE A N A:
that of Animadverſion upon the Ambitus, or canvaſs for Magiſtracy,
from both.
THE Signory, with the whole Right and Uſe of that Magiſtracy,
to be hereafter more fully explain’d, is almoſt purely Venetian.
THE ſecond part of the Tropic is directed by
16. Order.
Contitution of
the Councils.
cil of State.
of War.
THE ſixteenth ORDER, wherby the Conſtitution of the Councils,
being four, that is to ſay, the Council of State, the Council of War, the
Council of Religion, and the Council of Trade, is renderd conformable in
of the Coun- their Revolutions to that of the Senat. As, firſt, by the annual Elec-
tion of five Knights out of the third Region of the Senat, into the Coun-
cil of State, conſisting of fifteen Knights, five in every Region. Second-
of the Council ly, By the annual Election of three Knights out of the third Region of the
Council of State, to be propos’d by the Provoſts, and elected by that Coun-
cil, into the Council of War, conſisting of nine Knights
, three in every
Region, not excluded by this Election from remaining Members alſo of the
Council of State. The four Tribuns of the People have right of Seſſion
of the Council and Sufrage in the Council of War. Thirdly, By the annual Election of
of Religion. four Knights out of the third Region of the Senat into the Council of Re-
ligion, conſisting of twelve Knights, four in every Region: Of this Coun-
Of the Council cil the Cenſors are Preſidents
. Fourthly, By the annual Elećtion of four
Knights out of the third Region of the Senat into the Council of Trade,
Of tlie Pro. conſisting of twelve Knights, four in every Region. And each Region, in
every one of theſe Councils thus conſtituted, Jhall weekly and interchangeably
elečt one Provoſt, whoſe Magiſtracy fall continue for one Week ; nor Mall
he be reelected into the ſame, till every Knight of that Region in the ſame
of the Council Council has once born the ſame Magiſtracy. And the Provoſt s being one in
every Region, three in every Council, and twelve in all, beſides their other
Capacitys, ſhall aſſemble and be a Council, or rather an Academy apart, to
certain ends and purpoſes to be hereafter further explain’d, with thoſe of
the reſt of the Councils.
of Trade.
vofts.
of the Pru-
voſts.
+
very ſick.
THIS Order is of no other uſe than for the frame and turn of the
Councils, and yet of no ſmall one: for in Motion conſiſts Life; and
the Motion of a Commonwealth will never be current, unleſs it be
circular. Men that, like my Lord EPIMONUs, not induring the
reſemblance of this kind of Government to Orbs and Spheres, fall on
phyſicing and purging it, do no more than is neceſſary; for if it
be not in Rotation both as to Perſons and Things, it will be
The People of Rome, as to Perſons, if they had not bin taken up by
the Wheel of Magiſtracy, had overturn'd the Chariot of the Senat.
And thoſe of Lacedemon, as to Things, had not bin ſo quiet when the
Senat traſl’d their Buſineſs
, by incroaching upon the Reſult, if by the
Inſtitution of the Ephors they had not brought it about again. So
that if you allow not a Commonwealth her Rotation, in which con-
fifts her Equality, you reduce her to a Party, and then it is neceſſary
that
you be Phyſicians indeed, or rather Farriers; for you will have
ſtrong Patients, and ſuch as muſt be halter'd and caſt, or your ſelves
may need Boneſetters. Wherfore the Councils of this Common-
wealth,
both in regard of their Elections, and, as will be ſhewn, of
their Affairs, are uniform with the Senat in their Revolutions ; not as
Whirlpits to ſwallow, but to bite, and with the Scrues of their Ro-
tation to hold and turn a Buſineſs (like the Vice of a Smith) to the
Hand
:
OCEAN A.
125
Hand of the Workman. Without Engins of which nature it is
not poſſible for the Senat, much leſs for the People, to be perfect
Artificers in a political Capacity. But I ſhall not hold you longer
from
1
ordinary
THE ſeventeenth ORDER, directing biennial Elections, or the 17, Order.
Conſtitution of the Orb of Ambaſſadors in ordinary, conſisting of four Re- the biennial e-
fidences, the Revolution wherof is perform'd in eight years, and preſerv’d le&tion or Orbof
thro the Election of one Ambaſſador in two years by the Ballot of the Senat Ambasſadors in
to repair to the Court of France, and reſide there for the term of two
years, and the term of tivo years being expir’d, to remove from thence to
the Court of Spain, there to continue for the ſpace of two years, and
thence to remove to the State of Venice; and after two years reſidence in
that City, to conclude with his reſidence at Conſtantinople for a like term
of time, and ſo to return. 4 Knight of the Senat, or a Deputy of the
Prerogative, may not be elected Ambaſſador in Ordinary, becauſe a Knight
or Deputy ſo choſen, muſt either loſe his Seffion, which would cauſe an un-
evenneſs in the motion of this Commonwealth, or accumulat Magiſtracy,
which agrees not with the equality of the ſame. Nor may any Man
be clected into this Capacity, that is above five and thirty years of Age,
left the Commonwealth loſe the charge of his Education, by being depriv’d
at his return of the Fruit of it, or elſe injoy it not long thro the defects of
Nature.
1
THIS Order is the Perſpective of the Commonwealth, wherby
ſhe foreſees Danger, or the Trafic; wherby ſhe receives every two
years the return of a Stateſman inrich'd with eight years experience,
from the prime Marts of Negotiation in Europe. And ſo much for
the Elections in the Senat that are ordinary ; ſuch as are extraordinary
follow in
and
puit
THE eighteenth ORDER, appointing all Elections upon emergent 18.0:der.
occaſions, except that of the Dictator, to be made by the Scrutiny, or that constitution of
kind of Election, wherby a Council coms to be a fifth Order of Electors. ordinary, or by
For Example, if there be occaſion of an Ambaſſador Extraordinary, the tic Scrutiny.
Provofts of the Council of State, or any two of them ſhall propoſe to the
Same, till óne Competitor be choſen by that Council : and the Council having
choſen a Competitor, fall bring his name into the Senat, which in the uſual
way ſhall chuſe four more Competitors to the laine Magiſtracy;
them, with the Competitor of the Council
, to the Ballot of the Houle, by
which he of the five that is choſen is ſaid to be elected by the Scrutiny of
the Council of State. A Vice-Admiral, a Polemarch, or Field Officer
, ,
ſhall be elected after the ſame manner, by the Scrutiny of the Council of
War. A Judg or Serjeant at Law, by the Scrutiny of the Commiſioners
of the Seal. Å Baron, or conſiderable Officer of the Exchequer, by the
Scrutiny of the Commiſſioners of the Treaſury
. Men in Magiſtracy, or
out of it, are equally capable of Election by the Scrutiny; but a Magiſtrat
or Officer elected by the Scrutiny to a military Imployment, if he be neither
Knight of the Senat
, nor a Deputy of the Prerogative, ought to have
his office confirm’d by the Prerogative, becauſe the Militia in a Common-
wealth, where the people are Soverain, is not lawful to be touch'd injuſtu
Populi.
a
THE
126
OCEAN A.
no ſuch
7
19. Order.
For the Coun-
THE Romans were ſo curious, that tho their Conſuls were elected
in the * Centuriat Aſſemblys, they might not touch the Militia, except
they were confirm'd in the f Parochial Aſſemblys : for a Magiſtrat not
receiving his Power from the People, takes it from them; and to take
away their Power, is to take away their Liberty. As to the Election
by the Scrutiny, it is eaſily perceiv'd to be Venetian, there being
way to take in the Knowlege, which in all reaſon muſt be beſt
in every Councilof ſuch men as are moſt fit for their turns, and yet to
keep them from the biaſs of particular Affection or Intereſt under that
pretence: For the cauſe why the Great Council in Venice ſcarce ever
elects any other than the Name that is brought in by the Scrutiny, is
very probable to be, that they may.... This Election is the laſt of thoſe
appertaining to the Senat. The Councils being choſen by the Orders
already ſhewn, it remains that we com to thoſe wherby they are
inftruéted: and the Orders of Inſtruction to the Councils are two, the
firſt for the Matter wherupon they are to procede; and the ſecond for
the Manner of their proceding. The Matter of the Councils is di-
ſtributed to them by
THE nineteenth ORDER, diſtributing to every Council ſuch Bu-
The councils fons fineſſes as are properly to belong to their Cognizance
, wherof
Som they ſhall
to their Matter receive and determin; and others they ſhall receive, prepare, and introduce
into the Houle : As, firſt,
THE Council of State is to receive all Addreſſes, Intelligences, and
cil of State. Letters of Negotiation; to give audience to Ambaſſadors ſent to, and to
draw up Inſtructions for ſuch as ſhall be ſent by, this Commonwealth ; to
receive Propoſitions from, and hold Intelligence with the Provincial Couna
cils; to conſider upon all Laws to be enacted, amended, or repeald; and
up-
on all Levi's of Men or Mony, War or Peace, Leagues or Aſſociations to
be made by this Commonwealth, ſo far forth as is conducible to the orderly
preparation of the Same to be introduc'd by them into the Senat. Provid-
For the Coun. ed that all ſuch Affairs, as otherwiſe appertaining to the Council of State
are, for the good of the Commonwealth, to be carry?d with greater ſecrecy,
be manag’d by the Council of War, with Power to receive and ſend forth
Agents, Spys, Emiſſarys, Intelligencers, Frigots; and to manage Affairs
of that nature, if it be neceſſary, without communication to the Senat,
till ſuch time as it may be had without detriment to the Buſineſs. But
they fall have no Power to ingage the Commonwealth in a War, without the
conſent of the Senat and the people. It appertains alſo to this Council to take
charge of the Fleet as Admirab; and of all Storehouſes, Armorys, Arſenals,
and Magazins appertaining to this Commonwealth. They shall keep a di-
ligent Record of the military Expeditions from time to time reported by
him that was Strategies or General
, or one of the Polemarchs in that Acti-
on; or at leaſt ſo far as the Experience of ſuch Commanders may tend to
the improvement of the military Diſciplin, which they ſhall digeſt and in-
troduce into the Senat: and if the Senat ſhall therupon frame any Arti-
cle, they ſhall ſee that it be obſervd in the Muſters or Education of the
Touth. And wheras the Council of War is the Sentinel or Scoult of this Com-
monwealth, if any perſon or perſons ſhall go about to introduce Debate into
any popular Aſſembly of the ſame, or otherwiſe to alter the preſent Govern-
cil of war.
* Centuriacis.
+ Curiatis Comitiis.
ment,
OCE A N A.
127
ܪ
ment, or ſtrike at the root of it, they ſhall apprehend, or cauſe to be ap-
prehended, ſeiz’d, impriſon'd; and examin, arraign, acquit
, or condemn,
and cauſe to be executed any ſuch Perſon or Perſons, by their proper Power
and Authority, and without appeai.
THE Council of Religion, as the Arbiter of this Commonwealth in For the Coun-
caſes of Conſcience more peculiarly appertaining to Religion, Chriſian cil of Religion.
Charity, and a pious Life, ſhall have the care of the National Religion,
and the protection of the Liberty of Conſcience, with the cognizance of all
Cauſes relating to either of them. And firſt as to the National Religion
They ſhall cauſe all Places or Preferments of the beſt Revenue in either of
the Univerſitys to be confer'd upon no other than ſuch of the most learn'd
and pious Men, as have dedicated themſelves to the ſtudy of Theology.
They ſhall alſo take a ſpecial care that by ſuch Augmentations as be or shall
hereafter be appointed by the Senat, every Benefice in this Nation be im-
prov'd at leaft to the value of one hundred pounds a year. And to the
end that there be no intereſt at all, wherby the Divines or Teachers of the
National Religion may be corrupted, or corrupt Religion, they ſhall be ca-
pable of no other kind of Imployment or Preferment in this commonvealth.
And wheras a Directory for the Adminiſtration of the National Religion
is to be prepard by this Council
, they ſhall in this and other Debates of this
nature procede in manner following : A Queſtion ariſing in matter of Reli-
gion ſhall be put and ſtated by the Council in writing ; which Writing the
Cenfors ſhall ſend by their Beadles (being Proctors choſen to attend them)
each to the Univerſity wherof he is Chancellor ; and the Vice-Chancellor of
the ſame receiving the Writing, fall call a Convocation of all the Divines
of that Vniverſity, being above forty years of Age. And the Univerſitys
upon a point so propos’d, ſhall have 110 manner of Intelligence or Correſpon-
dence one with another, till their Debates be ended, and they have made
return of their Anſwers to the Council of Religion by two or three of their
onn Members, that may clear their ſenſe, if any doubt ſhould ariſe, to the
Council; which don, they ſhall return, and the Council having receiv’d
ſuch information, Shall procede according to their own Judgments, in the
preparation of the whole matter for the Senat: That ſo the Intereſt of the
Learned being remov’d, there may be a right application of Reaſon to
Scripture, which is the Foundation of the National Religion.
SECONDLY, This Council, as to the protection of the Liberty of
Conſcience, Mall ſuffer no coercive Power in the matter of Religion to be
exercis'd in this Nation : The Teachers of the National Religion being
no other than ſuch as voluntarily undertake that calling; and their Auditors
or Hearers, no other than are alſo voluntary. Nor ſhall any gather'd Con-
gregation be moleſted or interrupted in their way of Worſhip (being nei-
ther Jewiſh nor Idolatrous ) but' vigilantly and vigornuſly protected and de-
fended in the Injoyment, Practice, and Profeſſion of the ſame. And if there
be Officers or Auditors appointed by any ſuch Congregation for the introduction
Cauſes into the Council of Religion, all ſuch Cauſes ſó introduc'd ſhall be
receiv’d, heard, and determin’d by the ſame, with recourſe had, if need be,
THIRDLY, Every Petition addreſt to the Senat, except that of a
Tribe, ſhall be receiv’d, examin’d, and debated by this Council; and ſuch
only as they
, upon ſuch examination and debate had, ſhall think fit
, may be
introduc'd into the Senat.
THE Council of Trade being the Vena Porta of this Nation, fall For the Coun-
bereafter receive Instructions more at large. For the preſent, their Ex-
perience
to the Senat.
cil of Trade.
128
OCEAN A.
For the Aca-
Provoſts.
perience attaining to a right underſtanding of thoſe Trades and M. Sterys
that feed the Veins of this Commonwealth, and a true diſtinction of them
from thoſe that ſuck or exhauſt the ſame, they ſhall acquaint the Senat with
the Conveniences and Inconveniences, to the end that Incouragement may
be apply'd to the one, and Remedy to the other.
THE Academy of the Provoſts, being the Affability of the Common-
demy of the wealth, ſhall aſſemble every day towards the Evening in a fair Room, having
certain withdrawing Rooms therto belonging. And all ſorts of Company
that will repair thither for Converſation or Diſcourſe
, ſo it be upon matters
of Government, News, or Intelligence, or to propoſe any thing to the Coun-
cils, shall be freely and affably receiv’d in the outer Chamber, and heard in
the way of civil Converſation, which is to be manag’d without
any
other
Aw or Ceremony than is therto uſually appertaining ; to the end that every
Man may be free, and that what is propos’d by one, may be argu'd or diſ-
cours'd by the reſt, except the matter be of ſecrecy; in which caſe the Pro-
vofts, or ſom of them, Shall take ſuch as deſire Audience into one of the
withdrawing Rooms. And the Provofts are to give their minds, that this
Academy be o govern’d, adorn’d, and preſerv’d, as may be moſt attrattive
to Men of Parts and good Affections to the Commonwealth, for the ex-
cellency of the Converſation.
FURTHERMORE, If any Man, not being able or willing to com
in perſon, has any advice to give which he judges may be for the good of the
Commonwealth, he may write his mind to the Academy of the Provoſts, in a
Letter ſign’d or not ſign’d; which Letter ſhall be left with the Doorkeeper of
the Academy. Nor ſhall any Perſon delivering ſuch a Letter be ſeiz'd,
moleſted, or detain’d, tho it ſhould prove to be a Libel. But the Letters
ſo deliver'd ſhall be preſented to the Provofts; and in caſe they be ſo many
that they cannot well be perus’d by the Provoſts themſelves, they ſhall diſtri-
bute them as they pleaſe to be read by the Gentlemen of the Academy, who
finding any thing in them material, will find matter of Diſcourſe : Or if
they happen upon a buſineſs that requires privacy, return it with a Note upon
it to a Provoſt. And the Provoſts by the Secretarys attending ſhall cauſe
Such Notes out of Diſcourſes or Letters to be taken as they pleaſe, to the
end that they may propoſe, as occaſion ſerves, what any two of them ſhall think
fit out of their Notes fo taken to their reſpective Councils : to the end that
not only the Ear of the Commonwealth be open to all, but that Men of ſuch
Education being in her ey, she may upon emergent Elections or Occaſions be
always provided of her choice of fit Perſons.
ÉVERT Council being adorn’d with a State for the Signory, ſhall be
dance of the attended by two Secretarys, two Doorkeepers, and two Meſſengers in ordinary,
and have power to command more upon Emergencys, äs occaſion requires
.
And the Academy ſhall be attended with two Secretarys
, two Meſſengers, and
two Doorkeepers; this with the other Councils being provided with their
farther Conveniences at the charge of the State.
BUT wheras it is incident to Commonwealths, upon Emergencys re-
quiring extraordinary ſpeed or ſecrecy, either thro their natural delays
or unnatural haſt, to incur equal danger, while holding to the flow pace of
their Orders, they com not in time to defend themſelves from ſom fadden
blon; or breaking them for the greater ſpeed, they but hajt to their own de-
ſtruction: If the Senat ſhall at any time make Election of nine Knights
extraordinary, to be added to the Council of War, as a Juncta for the term
of three Months, the Council of War, with the Junčta ſo added, is for
the term of the ſame Dictator of Oceana, having power to levy Men and
Mony,
1
For the Atten-
Councils.
For the Dicta.
tor,
0 C E A N A.
129
1
Mony, to make Wai and Peace, as alſo to enact Laws, which ſhall be good
for the ſpace of one year (if they be not ſooner repeald by the Senat and the
People, and for no longer time, except they be confirmd by the Senat and
the People. And the whole Adminiſtration of the Commonwealth for the
term of the ſaid three Months ſhall be in the Dictator ; provided, that the
Dictator Mall have no Power to do any thing that tends not to his proper end
and inſtitution, but all to the preſervation of the Commonwealth 'as it is
eſtabliſb’d, and for the ſudden reſtitution of the ſame to the natural
Channel and common courſe of Government. And all Acts, Orders, De-
ees, or Laws of the Council of War with the Juncta, being thus created,
Jhall be ſign'd,
DICTATOR OCEANÆ.
THIS Order of Inſtructions to the Councils being (as in a mat-
ter of that nature is requiſit) very large, I have us'd my beſt skill to
abbreviat it in ſųch manner as might ſhew no more of it than is necef-
fary to the underſtanding of the whole; tho as to the parts, or further
dutys of the Councils, I have omitted many things of ſingular uſe in
a Commonwealth. But it was diſcours'd at the Council by the
ARCHON in this manner.
.
:
Y.
(
My Lords, the Legiſlators ;
OUR Councils, except the Dictator only, are proper and
native Springs and Sources, you ſee, which (hanging a few
“ ſticks and ſtraws, that, as leſs conſiderable, would otherwiſe be
more troubleſom, upon the banks of their peculiar Channels) de-
“rive the full ſtream of buſineſs into the Senat, fo pure, and ſo far
" from the poſſibility of being troubld or ſtain'd (as will undenia-
bly appear by the Courſe contain'd in the inſuing Order) with
any kind of privat Intereſt or Partiality, that it ſhall never be poſſi-
$c
ble for any Aſſembly hearkning to'the advice or information of this
or that worthy Member (either inſtructed upon his Pillow, or
" while lie was making himſelf ready, or by the Petition or Ticket
as which he receiv'd at the door ) to have half the Security in his
« Faith, or advantage by his Wiſdom; ſuch a Senat or Council being,
" thro the incertainty of the Winds, like a wave of the Sea. Nor
« ſhall it otherwiſe mend the matter by flowing
up into dry ditches,
or referring buſineſſes to be better examin’d by Committees, than to
go further about with it to leſs purpoſe; if it dos not eb back again
« with the more mud in it. For in a caſe refer'd to an occaſional
“ Committee, of which any Member that is deſirous may get himſelf
nam'd, and to which no body will com, but either for the ſake of
" his Friend, or his own Intereſt; it fares little better as to the Infor-
“ mation of the Senat, than if it had bin refer'd to the Partys. Wher-
fore the Athenians being diſtributed into four Tribes, out of which
by equal numbers they annually choſe four hundred Men, call'd
" the Senat of the Bean (becauſe the Ballot at their Election was per-
forin’d by the uſe of Beans) divided them by Fiftys into eight
parts. And every Fifty in their turn, for one eighth part of the
year, was a Council apart called the Prytans. The Prytans in
" their diſtinct Council receiving all Comers, and giving ear to every
“ Man that had any thing to propoſe concerning the Commonwealth,
S
66
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(C
16 had
130
OCEAN A.
.
66
“ had power to debate and prepare all the buſineſſes that were to be
“ introduc'd into the Senat. The Acheans had ten ſelected Magiſtrats
" call'd the Demiurgs, conſtituting a Council apart call'd the Synarchy,
“ which with the Strategus prepar'd all the buſineſs that was intro-
56 duc'd into their Senat. But both the Senat of the Athenians, and
" that of the Acheans, would have wonder'd if a Man had told them,
" that they were to receive all Comers and Diſcourſes, to the end that
they might refer them afterwards to the Prytans or the Synarchy;
“ much leſs to an occaſional Committee, expos'd to the catch that
" catch may of the Partys intereſted. And yet Venice in this, as in
“ moſt of her Orders, excels them all by the Conſtitution of her
" Councils
, that of the College, and the other of the Dieci, or Coun-
“ cil of Ten. The courſe of the College is exactly deſcrib'd in the
inſuing Order: And for that of the Dieci, it ſo little differs from
“ what it has beſtow'd upon our Dictator, that I need not make any
" particular deſcription of it. But to Dictatorian Power in general,
« and the uſe of it, becauſe it muſt needs be of difficult digeſtion to
“ ſuch as, puking ſtill at antient Prudence, ſhew themſelves to be in
" the Nurſery of Motherwit; it is no leſs than neceſſary to ſay ſom-
thing. And, Firſt, in a Commonwealth that is not wrought up,
or perfected, this Power will be of very frequent, if not continual
uſe; wherfore it is ſaid more than once, upon defects of the Govern-
“ ment, in the Book of Judges, That in thoſe days there was no King in
“ Iſrael. Nor has the Tranſlator, tho for no King he ſhould have
" ſaid no Judg, abus'd you ſo much; ſeeing that the Dictator (and
“ ſuch was the Judg. of Iſrael) or the Dictatorian Power being in a
“ ſingle Perſon, ſo little differs from Monarchy, which follow'd in
« that, that from the fame cauſe there has bin no other effect in any
« Commonwealth; as in Rome was manifeſt by Sylla and CESAR,
66 who to make themſelves Abſolute or Soverain, had no more to do
“ than to prolong their Magiſtracy; for * the Dictatorian Power was
“ reputed Divine, and therfore irreſiſtible. Nevertheleſs, ſo it is,
" that without this Power, which is ſo dangerous, and ſubject to in-
« troduce Monarchy, a Commonwealth cannot be ſafe from falling
“ into the like diſſolution; unleſs you have an Expedient in this caſe
“ of your own, and bound up by your Providence from recoiling.
“ Expedients in ſom caſes you muſt not only have, bụt be beholden
“ for them to ſuch whom you muſt truſt at a pinch, when you have
not leiſure to ſtand with them for Security ; which will be a thou-
“ fand times more dangerous. And there can never be a Common-
« wealth otherwiſe than by the Order in debate wrought up to that
“ perfection; but this neceſſity muſt fomtimes happen in regard of
“ her natural flowneſs and openneſs, and the ſuddenneſs of Aſſaults
" that may be made upon her, as alſo the Secrecy which in fom caſes
may be of abſolute neceſſity to her Affairs. Whence MACCHIA-
“ vel concludes it poſitively, That a Commonwealth unprovided of
“ ſuch a Refuge, muſt fall to ruin: for her courſe is either broken
" by the blow in one of thoſe caſes, or by her felf, while it ſtartles
66 her out of her Orders. And indeed a Commonwealth is like a
“ Greyhound, which having once coaſted, will never after run fair,
« but grow flothful; and when it coms to make a common practice
66
+
* Dictatoris imperium quafi Numen. Liv.
.
66 of
OCEAN A.
13
P
CC
+
? of taking nearer ways than its Orders, it is diſſolv'd: for the being
si of a Commonwealth conſiſts in its Orders. Wherfore at this litt
you will be expos’d to danger, if you have not provided before-
“ land for the ſafety of your Reſort in the like caſes: nor is it ſuifi-
16
cient that your Reſort be ſafe, unleſs it be as ſecret and quick; for if
« it be now or open, your former Inconveniences are not re-
“ medy'd. Now for our imitation in this part, there is nothing in
experience like that of the Council of Ten in Vesnice; the benefit
“ wherof would be too long to be fricwn in the whole piece, and
" therfore I ſhall take but a pattern out of JANOTTI. In the War,
“ ſays he, wliich the Venetians had with Florence in Caſentin, the
“ Florentins finding a neceſſity in their affairs far from any other incli-
“ nation in themſelves to ask their Peace, ſenc Ambaſſadors about it
to Venice, where they were no ſooner heard, than the bargain was
“ ſtruck up by the Council of Ten: and every body admiring (ſee-
ing this Commonwealth ſtood upon the higher ground) what
“ ſhould be the reaſon of ſuch haft; the Council upon the return of
“ the Ambaſſadors imparted Letters to the Senat, wherby it appear'd,
" that the Turc had newly lanch'd a formidable Fleet againſt their
« State ; which had it bin underſtood by the Florentins, it was well
enough known they would have made no Peace. Wherfore the
6 ſervice of the Ten was highly applauded by the Senat, and cele-
" brated by the Venetians. Wherby may appear, not only in part
what uſe there is of Dictatorian Power in that Government, but
" that it is aſſum'd at the diſcretion of that Council; wheras in this
6 of Oceana it is not otherwiſe intruſted than when the Senat, in the
“ Election of nine Knights extraordinary, gives at once the Com-
miſſion, and takes ſecurity in a balance, added to the Council of
" War, tho ſecurer before by the Tribuns of the People than that
of Venice, which yet never incur’d Jealouſy: For if the younger
5 Nobility have bin often girding at it, that happen’d not ſo muchi
çe thro the apprehenſion of danger in it to the Commonwealth, as
" thro the aw of it upon themſelves. Wherfore the Graver lave
« doubtleſly ſhewn their Prudence in the Law; wherby, the Ma-
“ giſtracy of theſe Counfillors being to laſt till their succeſſors be
"created, the Council is eſtabliſh'd.
THE Inſtructions of the Councils for their matter being ſhewn,
it remains that I ſhew the Inſtructions for the manner of their
pro-
ceding, as they follow in
THE twentieth ORDER, containing the Method of Debates to 20. Order.
be obſerv’d by the Magiſtrats and the Councils ſucceſively, in order to a the coloniches
Decree of the Senat.
THE Magiſtrats of the Signory, as Counſillors of this Commonwealth, of Proceding.
Shall take into their conſideration all matters of State, or of Government ;
and, having right to propoſe in any Council, may any one or more of them
propoſe what buſineſs he or they pleaſe in that Council to which it moſt pro-
perly belongs. And, that the Councils may be held to their duty, the Said
Magiſtrats are ſuperintendents and inſpečtors of the ſame, with right to
propoſe to the Senat.
THE Cenfors have equal Power with theſe Magiſtrats, but in relation
to the Council of Religion only.
S 2
1
to their manner
2
ANT
1
132
OCE A N A.
ANY two of the three Provoſts in every Council may propoſe to, ani
are the more peculiar Propoſers of, the ſame Council; to the end that there
be not only an inſpection and ſuperintendency of buſineſs in general, but
that every work be alſo committed to a peculiar hand.
ANY one or more of the Magiſtrats, or any two of the Provoſts
reſpectively having propos’d, the Council Shall debate the buſineſs ſo propos’d,
to which they of the third Region that are willing Shall ypeak firſt in their
order ; they of the ſecond, next; and they of the firft, laft: and the opi-
nions of thoſe that propos’d or Spoke, as they ſhall be thought the moſt con-
ſiderable by the Council, ſhall be taken by the Secretary of the ſame in
writing, and each of them ſign’d with the name of the Author.
TH'E Opinions being thus prepard, any Magiſtrat of the Signory, the
Cenfor, or any two of the Provoſts of that Council, upon this occaſion may
afſemble the Senat.
THE Senat being aſſembled, the Opinions (for example, if they be
four) Mall be read in their Order, that is
, according to the Order or Dig-
nity of the Magiſtrats or Counſillors by which they were ſign
d. And being
read, if any of the Council introducing them will ſpeak, they, as beſt ac-
quainted with the buſineſs, ſhall have precedence ; and after them the Se-
nators ſhall ſpeak according to their Regions, beginning by the third firſt,
and ſo continuing till every man that will has ſpoken : and when the Opini-
ons have bin Sufficiently debated, they ſhall be put all together to the Ballot
after this manner.
FOUR Secretarys carrying each of them one of the Opinions in one
hand, with a white Box in the other, and each following the other, accord-
ing to the order of the Opinions, ſball preſent his Box, naming the Author
of his
Opinion to every Senator ; and one Secretary or Ballotin with a green
Box Mall follow the four white ones; and one Secretary or Ballotin with a
red Box Mall follow the green one : and every Senator Jhall put one Ball into
ſom one of theſe fix boxes
. The Suffrage being gather'd and open'd before the
Signory, if the red Box or Nonſincere had above half the Suffrages
, the
Opinions ſhall be all caſt out, for the major part of the Houſe is not clear
in the buſineſs. If no one of the four Opinions had above half the Suf-
frages in the Affirmative, that which had feweſt ſhall be caſt out, and the
other three ſhall be balloted again. If no one of the three had above half, that
which had feweſt ſhall be caſt out, and the other two ſhall ballot again. If nei-
ther of the two had above half, that which had feweſt ſhall be caſt out, and the
remaining Opinion ſhall be balloted again. And if the remaining Opinion has
not above half, it ſhall alſo be caſt out. But the
firſt of the Opinions that ar-
rives at moſt above half
in the Affirmative, is the Decree of the Senat. The
Opinions being all of them caſt out by the Nonſincere, may be review'd, if oc-
caſion permits
, by the Council
, and brought in again. 'If they be caſt out by the
Negative, the caſe being of advice only, the Houſe approves not, and there is
an end of it: the caſe being neceſſary, and admitting delay, the Council
is to think again upon the buſineſs, and to bring in new Opinions ; but the
Cafe being neceſſary, and not admitting delay, the Senat immediatly ele£ting
the Juncta, (ball create the Dictator. * And let the Dictator, as the
Roman ſaying is, take care that the Commonwealth receives no harm.
THIS in caſe the Debate concludes not in a Decree. But if a Decree
be paſt
, it is either in matter of State or Government according to Law
enacted already, and then it is good without going any further : or. it is in
* Et videat Dictator ne quid Rcfpub. detrimcnti capiat.
mintter
:
133
OCE A N A.
matter of Law to be enacted, repeald, ar amended; and then the Decrée
of the Senat, eſpecially if it be for a War, or for a Levy of Men or Mony,
is invalid, without the reſult of the Commonwealth, which is in the Prea
rogative Tribe, or Repreſentative of the People.
THE Senat having prepar'd a Decree to be propos’d to the People,
ſhall appoint their Propoſers; and no other may propoſe for the Senat to the
People but the Magiftrats of the Houſe: that is to ſay, the three Com-
millioners of the Seal, or any two of them; the three of the Treaſury, or
any two of them; or the two Cenſors.
THẾ Senat having appointed their Propoſers, ſhall require of the
Tribuns a muſter of the People at a ſet time and place : and the Tribuns
any two of them having muſter'd the People accordingly
, the Propoſers
Shall propoſe the Senſe or Decree of the Senat by clauſes to the People. Anth
that which is propos’d by the Authority of the Senat, and reſolv’d by the
Command of the People, is the Law of Oceana.
TO this Order, implicitly containing the ſum very near of the
whole Civil part of the Commonwealth, my Lord ARCHON ſpoke
thus in Council.
or
66
TI
1
My Dear Lords;
HERE is a Saying, That a man muſt cut his Coat accord-
ing to his Cloth. When I conſider what God has allow'd or
“ furniſh'd to our preſent work, I am amaz’d. You would have a
“ popular Government, he has weigh'd it to you in the preſent ba-
“ lance, as I may fay, to a dram; you have no more to do, but to fix
“ it. For the Superſtructures of ſuch a Government, they require a
“ good Ariſtocracy: and you have, or have had a Nobility or Gentry
" the beſt ſtudy'd, and the beſt Writers, at leaſt next that of Italy,
“ in the whole World; nor have they bin inferior, when ſo exercis'd,
in the leading of Armys. But the People are the main body of a
« Commonwealth ; Thew me from the Treaſurys of the Snow (as it
« is in Jo B) to the burning Zone, a People whoſe ſhoulders ſo uni-
“ verſally and ſo exactly fit the Corſlet. Nevertheleſs it were conve-
“ nient to be well provided with Auxiliarys. There is Marpefia thro
« her fruitfulneſs inexhauſtible of men, and men thro her barrenneſs
not only inur’d to hardſhip, but in your Arms. It may be ſaid,
" that Venice, excepting only that ſhe takes not in the People, is the
“ moſt incomparable Situation of a Commonwealth. You are Venice
“ taking in your People and your Auxiliarys too. My Lords, the
“ Children of Iſrael were makers of Brick, before they were builders
“ of a Commonwealth: But our brick is made, our Morter temperd,
“ the Cedars of Lebanon are hew'd and ſquar'd to our hands. * Has
w this bin the work of man? or is it in man to withſtand this work?
“ Shall be that contends with the Almighty, inſtruct him? He that re-
proves God, let him anſwer it. For our parts, every thing is ſo laid,
" that when we com to have uſe of it, it is the next at hand; and un-
“ leſs we can conceive that God and Nature do any thing in vain,
" there is no more for us to do but to diſpatch. The Piece, which we
“ have reach'd to us in the foregoing Orders
, is the Ariſtocracy. 4
" thens, as has bin ſhewn, was plainly loſt'thro the want of a good
Ariſtocracy, But the fufficiency of an Ariſtocracy gos demonſtra-
bly upon the hand of the Nobility or Gentry: for that the Politics
e can
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OCEAN A.
134
66
can be maſter'd without ſtudy, or that the People can have leiſure to
“ ſtudy, is a vain imagination, and what kind of Ariſtocracy Divine's
6 and Lawyers would make, let their incurable running upon their
own narrow biaſs, and their perpetual invectives againſt MACCHI-
" AVEL (tho in fom places juſtly reprovable, yet the only Politician,
and incomparable Patron of the People) ſerve for inſtruction.
“ will ſtand no more to the Judgment of Lawyers and Divines in this
" work, than to that of ſo many other Tradeſmen; but if this Mo-
« del chances to wander abroad, I recommend it to the Roman Specu-
« lativi (the moſt complete Gentlemen of this age) for their cenſure :
or, with my Lord EPIMONUS his leave, ſend three or four hun-
“dred Copys to your Agent at Venice, to be preſented to the Magi-
« ftrats there ; and when they have conſider'd them, to be propos’d to
“ the debate of the Senat, the moſt competent Judges under Heaven,
« who, tho they have great Affairs, will not refuſe to return you the O-
« racle of their Ballot. The Counſillors of Princes I will not truſt; they
« are but Journymen. The Wiſdom of theſe later times in Princes Affairs
“ (ſays VERULA MIUS) is rather fine deliverys and ſhiftings of dangers
“ when they be near, than ſolid and grounded courſes to keep them off. Their
« Counſillors do not derive their procedings from any ſound root of
« Government that may contain the demonſtration, and aſſure the
« ſucceſs of them, but are expedient-mongers, givers of themſelves
“ to help a lame dog over a ſtile ; elſe how coms it to paſs, that the
« fame of Cardinal RICHLIEU has bin like Thunder, wherof we
“ hear the noiſe, but can make no demonſtration of the reaſon? But
u to return, if neither the People, nor Divines, and Lawyers, can be
“ the Ariſtocracy of a Nation, there remains only the Nobility ; in
« which ſtile, to avoid farther repetition, I Niall underſtand the
“ Gentry alſo, as the French do by the word Nobleſſe.
“ NÓW to treat of the Nobility in ſuch ſort as may be leſs obnoxi-
ous to miſtake, it will be convenient, and anſwerable to the preſent
“ occaſion, that í divide my Diſcourſe into four parts.
“ THE Firſt treating of Nobility, and the kinds of it.
« THE Second, of their capacity of the Senat.
" THE Third, of the divers kinds of Senats.
“ THE Fourth, of the Senat, according to the foregoing Orders.
# NOBILITY may be defin'd divers ways; for it is either an-
« tient Riches, or antient Virtue, or a Title confer'd by a Prince or a
" Commonwealth.
" NOBILITY of the firſt kind may be ſubdivided into two O-
thers, ſuch as hold an overbalance in Dominion or Property to the
whole People, or ſuch as hold not an overbalance. In the former
6 caſe, a Nobility (ſuch was the Gothic, of which ſufficient has bin
“ ſpoken) is incompatible with popular Government; for to popular
“ Government it is eſſential that Power ſhould be in the People, but
" the overbalance of a Nobility in Dominion draws the Power to
of themſelves. Wherfore in this ſenſe it is that MACCHIAVEL is
" to be underſtood, where he ſays, * That theſe are pernicious in a
" Commonwealth and of France, Spain, and Italy, that they are
A
(6
<
* Queſti cali ſono pernicioſi in ogni Republica, & in ogni Provincia.
.
" Nations
OCE A N A.
135
.
60
66
66
OC
" Nations + which for this cauſe are the corruption of the World : for
otherwiſe Nobility may according to his definition (which is, That
they are fuch as live upon their own Revenue's in plenty, without in-
gagement either to the tilling of their Lands, or other work for their
livelinood) hold an underbalance to the People; in which caſe they
are not only fafe, but neceſſary to the natural mixture of a well-or-
“ der'd Commonwealth. For how elſe can you have a Common-
“ wealth that is not altogether mechanic? or what compariſon is there of
“ ſuch Commonwealths as are, or com neareſt to mechanic, for example,
" Athens, Switzerland, Holland, to Lacedemon, Rome, and Venice, plum'd
" with their Ariſtocracys? Your Mechanics, till they have firſt fea-
" ther’d their neſts, like the Fowls of the Air, whoſe whole imployment
“ is to feek their food, are ſo buſy'd in their privat concernments, that
“ they have neither leiſure to ſtudy the public, nor are ſafely to be
“ truſted with it, | becauſe a Man is not faithfully imbark'd in this
“ kind of ſhip, if he has no ſhare in the freight. But if his ſhare be
« ſuch as gives him leiſure by his privat advantage to reflect upon that
“ of the public, what other name is there for this ſort of Men, being
& leur aiſe, but (as MACCHIAVEL you ſee calls them) Now
BILITY? eſpecially when their Familys com to be ſuch as are
“ noted for their Services don to the Commonwealth, and ſo take into
“ their ancient Riches antient Virtue, which is the ſecond definition
• of Nobility, but ſuch a one as is ſcarce poſſible in nature without
« the former. For as the Baggage, ſays VERULAMIUS, is to an
« Army, ſo are Riches to Virtue; they cannot be ſpar’d nor left behind,
« tho they be impediments, ſuch as not only hinder the march, but ſomtimes
" thro the care of them loſe or diſturb the Victory. Of this latter fort is
" the Nobility of Oceana; the beſt of all others, becauſe they, having
no ftamp whence to derive their price, can have it no other-
« wiſe than by their intrinſic value. The third definition of Nobility,
" is a Title, Honor, or diſtinction from the People, confer'd or al-
“ low'd by the Prince or the Commonwealth. And this may be two
ways, either without any ſtamp or privilege, as in Oceana; or with
“ ſuch privileges as are inconſiderable, as in Athens after the battel of
« Platex, whence the Nobility had no right, as ſuch, but to religious
“ Offices, or inſpection of the public Games, to which they were alſo
to be elected by the People: or with Privileges, and thoſe conſide-
“ rable ones, as the Nobility in Athens before the battel of Plates,
" and the Patricians in Rome, each of which had right, or claim'd it,
“ to the Senat and all the Magiſtracys; wherin for ſom time they
“ only by their ſtamp were current.
“ BUT to begin higher, and to ſpeak_more at large of Nobility
“ in their ſeveral capacitys of the Senat
. The Phylarchs or Princes of
“ the Tribes of Iſrael were the moſt renown'd, or, as the Latin, the Numb. I. 16.
“ moſt noble of the Congregation, wherof by hereditary right they
“had the leading and judging. The Patriarchs, or Princes of Familys, Ver. 18.
according as they declar'd their Pedigrees,had the like right as to their
“ Familys; but neither in theſe nor the former,was there any hereditary
“ right to the Sanhedrim: tho there be little queſtion but the wiſe men,
“ and underſtanding, and known among their Tribes, which the Peo-
66
+
+ Lcquali tutte inſieme fono la corruttela del mondo. Egeſtas haud facile habetur fine
damno.
ple,
65
1
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Deut. 1. I3
COM
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CC
136
O C E A N A.
“ ple took or elected into thoſe or other Magiſtracys, and whom
" Moses made Rulers over them, muſt have bin of theſe ; ſeeing
" they could not chuſe but be the moſt known among the Tribes, and
were likelieſt by the advantages of Education to be the moſt wiſe
" and underſtanding.
“ SOLON having found the Athenians neither locally nor genealo-
"gically, but by their different ways of Life, divided into four Tribes,
" that is, into the Soldiery, the Tradeſmen, the Husbandmen, and
" the Goatherds, inſtituted a new diſtribution of them, according to
" the cenſe or valuation of their Eſtates, into four Claſſes : the firſt,
“ ſecond, and third, conſiſting of ſuch as were Proprietors in Land,
diſtinguiſh'd by the rate of their Freeholds, with that ſtamp upon
" them, which making them capable of adding Honor to their
“ Riches, that is to ſay, of the Senat and all the Magiſtracys, exclud-
« ed the fourth, being the Body of the People, and far greater in num-
“ ber than the former three, from all other right, as to thoſe Capaci-
tys, except the election of theſe, who by this means became a here-
itary Ariſtocracy or Senatorian Order of Nobility. This was that
“ courſe which came afterwards to be the deſtruction of Rome, and
“ had now ruin’d Athens. The Nobility, according to the inevitable
“ Nature of ſuch a one, having laid the Plot how to deveſt the Peo-
plc of the Reſult, and ſo to draw the whole Power of the Com-
“ monwealth to themſelves; which in all likelihood they had don, if
“ the People, coming by mere chance to be victorious in the Battel of
“ Plated, and famous for defending Greece againſt the Perſians, had
not return'd with ſuch Courage as irreſiſtibly broke the Claſſes, to
66 which of old they had born a white Tooth, brought the Nobility
to equal Terms, and the Senat with the Magiſtracys to be common
“ to both; the Magiſtracys by Suffrage, and the Senat (which was the
" miſchief of it, as I ſhall ſhew anon in that Conſtitution) by Lot only.
« THE Lacedemonians were in the manner, and for the ſame cauſe
“ with the Venetians at this day, no other than a Nobility, even ac-
“ cording to the definition given of Nobility by MACCHIAVEL;
“ for they neither exercis'd any Trade, nor labor'd their Lands or
Lots, which was don by their Helots : wherfore ſom Nobility may
“ be far from pernicious in a Commonwealth by MACCHIAVEL'S
own Teſtimony, who is an admirer of this, tho the Servants ther-
" of were more in number than the Citizens. To theſe Servants I
“ liold the anſwer of LYCURGUS, when he bad him who ask'd
« why he did not admit the People to the Government of his Com-
monwealth, to go home and admit his Servants to the Govern-
ment of his Family, to relate : for neither were the Lacedemonians
Scrvants, nor farther capable of the Government, unleſs, wheras the
Congregation had the Reſult, he ſhould have given them the Debate
" alſo ; every one of theſe that attain'd to fixty years of Age, and the
“ major Vote of the Congregation, being equally capable of the Senat.
“THE Nobility of Rome, and their capacity of the Senat, I have
“ already deſcrib’d by that of Athens before the battel of Platee ; fa-
«6. ving only that the Athenian was never eligible into the Senat with-
" out the ſuffrage of the People, till the introduction of the Lot, but
“ the Roman Nobility ever: for the Patricians were elected into the
“ Senat by the Kings, by the Conſuls, or the Cenſors; or if a Ple-
os beian happen'd to be conſcrib’d, he and his Poſterity became Patri-
66
CS
16
06
*
» cians.
OCE A N A.
137
u ciaus. Nor, tho the People had many diſputes with the Nobili-,
ty, did this ever com in controverſy, whicli
, if there had bin no-
thing elſe, might in my judgment have bin enough to overturn that
Commonwealth.
« THE Venetian Nobility, but that they are richer, and not mi-
" litary, reſemble at all other points the Lacedemonian, as I have al-
ready ſhewn. Theſe MACCHIAVEL excepts from his rule, by
ſaying, that their Eſtates are rather perſonal than real, or of
any
great revenue in Land; which coms to our account, and ſhews, that
a Nobility or party of the Nobility, not overbalancing in Domini-
on, is not dangerous, but of neceſſary uſe in every Commonwealth,
" provided it be rightly order'd: for if it be ſo order'd as was that
" of Rome, tho they do not overbalance in the beginning, as they
" did not there, it will not be long ere they do, as is clear both in
" reaſon and experience towards the latter end. That the Nobility
“ only be capable of the Senat, is there only not dangerous, where
" there be no other Citizens, as in this Government and that of La-
c6 cedemon.
“ THE Nobility of Holland and Switzerland, tho but few, have
“ Privileges not only diſtinct from the People, but ſo great, that in ſom
Soveraintys they have a negative voice; an example which I am far
" from commending, being ſuch as (if thoſe Governments were not
6c cantoniz'd, divided, and ſubdivided into many petty Soveraintys
« that balance one another, and in which the Nobility, except they
“ had a Prince at the head of them, can never join to make work)
" would be the moſt dangerous that ever was but the Gothic, of which
" it ſavors. For in antient Commonwealths you ſhall never find a
“ Nobility to have had a negative but by the Poll, which, the People
being far more in number, came to nothing; wheras theſe have it,
“ be they never ſo few, by their ſtamp or order.
« OURS of Oceana have nothing elſe but their education and their
“ leiſure for the public, furniſh'd by their Eafe and competent Riches ;
“ and their intrinſic value, which, according as it coms to hold weight
“ in the judgment or ſuffrage of the People, is their only way to honor
« and preferment. Wherfore I would have your Lordſhips to look
upon your Children as ſuch, who if they com to ſhake off ſom part
“ of their baggage, ſhall make the more quick and glorious march:
“ for it was nothing elſe but the baggage ſordidly plunderd by the
« Nobility of Rome, that loſt the victory of the whole world in th
midſt of her Triumph.
“ HAVING follow'd the Nobility thus cloſe, they bring us, ac-
“ cording to their natural courſe and divers kinds, to the divers Con-
« ſtitutions of the Senat.
“ THAT of Iſrael (as was ſhew'd by my Right Noble Lord
" PHOSPHORUS DE À UG e, in the opening of the Commonwealth)
conſiſted of ſeventy Elders, elected at firit by the People. But
" wheras they were for life, they ever after (tho without any divine
precept for it) ſubſtituted their Succeſſors by Ordination, which Ce-
remony was moſt uſually perform’d by impofition of hands; and
“ by this means a Commonwealth of as popular inſtitution as can be
« found, became, as it is accounted by JOSEPHUS, Ariſtocraticale
“ From this Ordination derives that which was introduc'd by the A-
« poſtles into the Chriſtian Church; for which cauſe I think it is, that
T
the
46
138
OCEAN A.
the Presbyterians would have the Government of the Church to be
“ Ariſtocratical: Tho the Apoſtles, to the end, as I conceive, that
“ they might give no occaſion to ſuch a miſtake, but ſhew that they
“ intended the Government of the Church to be popular, ordaind El-
“ ders, as has bin ſhewn, by the holding ap of hands (or free Suffrage of
“the People) in every Congregation, or Eccleſia: for that is the word in
“ the Original, being borrow'd from the civil Congregations of the
« People in Athens and Lacedemon, which were ſo calld; and the
“ word for holding up of hands in the Text, is alſo the very ſame, which
" fignify'd the Suffrage of the People in Athens, XergoTOVYOONTES; for
“ the Suffrage of the Athenians was given per Chirotonian, ſays
" EMMIUS.
“ THE Council of the Bean (as was ſhewn by my Lord NA-
VARCHUS DE PARALO in his full Diſcourſe) being the propo-
“ fing Senat of Athens (for that of the Areopagits was a Judicatory)
" conſiſted of four, fom fay five hundred Senators, elected annually,
“ all at once, and by a mere lot without fuffrage. Wherfore tho the
“ Senat, to correct the temerity of the Lot, had power to caſt out
« ſuch as they ſhould judg unworthy of that honor ; this related to
manners only, and was not ſufficient to repair the Commonwealth,
" which by ſuch means became impotent: and foraſmuch as her Senat
“ conſiſted not of the natural Ariſtocracy, which in a Commonwealth
" is the only ſpur and rein of the People, it was caſt headlong by the
“ raſhneſs of her Demagogs or Grandees into ruin; while her Senat,
“ like the Roman Tribuns (* who almoſt always, inſtead of governing,
father govern'd by the multitude) propos’d not to the Reſult only,
66 but to the Debate alſo of the People, who were therfore call'd to the
" Pulpits, where ſom vomited, and others drank poiſon.
« THE Senat of Lacedemon, moſt truly diſcover'd by my
Lord
“ LACO DE SCYTAL E, conſiſted but of 30 for life, wherof the
s two Kings liaving but ſingle Votes, were hereditary, the reſt elect-
« ed by the free Suffrage of the People, but out of ſuch as were ſixty
age.
Theſe had the whole debate of the Commonwealth
“ in themſelves, and propos’d to the Reſult only of the People. And
now the riddle which I have heretofore found troubleſom to unfold,
" is out; that is to ſay, why Athens and Lacedemon, conſiſting each of
" the Senat and the People, the one ſhould be held a Democracy, and
“ the other an Ariſtocracy, or laudable Oligarchy, as it is term'd by
“ ISOCRATES; for that word is not, wherever you meet it, to be
6 branded, ſeeing it is us’d alſo by ARISTOTLE, PLUTARCH,
“ and others, ſomtimes in a good ſenſe. The main difference was ,
" that the People in this had the Reſult only, and in that the Debate
« and Reſult too. But for
But for my part, where the People have the electi-
“on of the Senat, not bound to a diſtinct order, and the Reſult, which
" is the Soverain Power, I hold them to have that ſhare in the Govern-
* ment (the Senat being not for life) wherof, with the ſafety of the
Commonwealth, they are capable in nature; and ſuch a Govern-
ment, for that cauſe, to be Democracy : tho I do not deny, but in
“ Lacedemon, the paucity of the Senators conſiderºd, it might be call'd
« Oligarchy, in compariſon of Athens; or, if we look on their continu-
“ ance for life, tho they had bin more, Ariſtocracy.
.
were
years of
'
* Qui ferè femper regebantur à multitudinc magis quam rçgebanr.
« THE
OCEAN A.
139
C
CG
6C
CC
us not.
(
* THE Sénat of Rome (whoſe Fame has bin heard to thunder in
" the Eloquence of my Lord DOLABELLA D'Enyo) conſiſting of
300, was, in regard of the number, leſs Oligarchical than that of
“ Lacedemon; but more in regard of the Patrician, who, having a
hereditary Capacity of the fame, were not elected to that Honor
by the People; but, being conſcrib’d by the Cenſors, injoy'd it for
life. Wherfore theſe, if they had their wills, would have refolv'd
as well as debated; which ſet the People at ſuch variance with them,
as diſſolv’d the Commonwealth: wheras if the People had injoy'd
" the Reſult, that about the Agrarian, as well as all other ſtrife, muſt
“ of neceſſity have ceas’d.
" THE Senats of Switzerland and Holland (as I have learnt of
my Lords ALPESTER and GLAUCus) being bound up (like
“ the ſheaf of Arrows which the latter gives) by Leagues, ly like
" thoſe in their Quivers : But Arrows, when they com to be drawn, fly
“ fom this way, and ſom that; and I am contented that theſe concern
“ THAT of Venice (by the faithful Teſtimony of my moſt ex-
cellent Lord LINCEUS DE STELLA) has oblig'd a World, fuf-
ficiently puniſh'd by its own blindneſs and ingratitude, to repent
“ and be wiſer for wheras a Commonwealth in which there is no
Senat, or where the Senat is corrupt, cannot ſtand ; the Great
“ Council of Venice, like the Statue of Nilus, leans upon an Urn or
“ Waterpot, which pours forth the Senat in ſo pure and perpetual a
6 ſtream, as being inable to ſtagnat, is for ever incapable of Cor-
“ ruption. The fuller Deſcription of this Senat is contain’d in that
“ of Oceana; and that of Oceana in the foregoing Orders. To every one
" of which, becauſe ſomthing has bin already ſaid, I ſhall not ſpeak
" in particular. But in general, your Senat, and the other Aſſembly,
or the Prerogative, as I ſhall ſhew in due place, are perpetual, not
as Lakes or-Puddles, but as the Rivers of Eden; and are beds made,
as you have ſeen, to receive the whole People, by a due and faithful
« vicillitude, into their current. They are not, as in the late way, al-
“ ternat. Alternat Life in Government is the alternat* Death of it.
“ THIS was the Gothic work, wherby the former Government
“ (which was not only a ſhip, but a guſt too) could never open her
fails
, but in danger to overſet her ſelf; neither could make any voy-
age, nor ly ſafe in her own harbor. The Wars of later ages, ſays
“ VERUL Á MIUs, ſeem to be made in the dark, in reſpect of the
“ glory and honor which reflected on men from the Wars in antient
“ times
. Their ſhipping of this ſort was for Voyages, ours dare not
“ lanch; nor lys it ſafe at home. Your Gothic Politicians ſeem to me
“ rather to have invented ſom new Ammunition or Gunpowder, in
" their King and Parlament, than Government. For what is becom
“ of the Princes (a kind of People) in Germany ? blown up.
'Where
“ are the Eſtates, or the Power of the People in France ? blown up.
“ Where is that of the People in Arragon, and the reſt of the Spaniſh
Kingdoms? blown up. On the other ſide, where is the King of
Spain's Power in Holland? blown up. Where is that of the Ati-
ftrian Princes in Switzerland? blown up. This perpetual peeviſhneſs
“ and jealoufy, under the alternat Empire of the Prince, and of the
66
CC
(G
(C
* Ut fratrem pollux alternâ morre redemic.
T2
“ People,
::
:
:
140
OCE A N A.
66
LUS,
6 VESTA.
Senators is not per-
« People, is obnoxious to every Spark. Nor ſhall any man ſhew a
“ reaſon that will be holding in prudence, why the People of
" Oceana have blown up their King, but that their Kings did not
“ firſt blow up them. The reſt is diſcourte for Ladys. Wherfore
your Parlaments are nor henceforth to com out of the Bag of Æo-
but by your Galaxys, to be the perpetual ſcord of the Fire of
YOUR Galaxys, which divide the Houſe into ſo many kegi-
ons, are three; one of which conſtituting the third Region is an-
nually choſen, but for the term of three years; which cauſes the
“ Houle (having at once Bloſſoms, Fruit halt ripe, and others drop-
ping off in full maturity) to reſemble an Orange-tree, ſuch as is at
es the ſame time an Education or Spring, and a Harveſt too: for the
People have made a very ili choice in the Man, who is not eaſily ca-
“ pable of the perfect knowlege in one year of the Senatorian Orders;
" which Knowlege, allowing him for the firſt to have bin a Novice,
brings him the ſecond year to practice, and time enough. For at
" this rate you muſt always have two hundred knowing Men in the
" Government. And thus the Viciſſitude of
your
« ceivable in the ſteadineſs and perpetuity of your Senat; which, like
“ that of Venice, being always changing, is for ever the fame. And
" tho other Politicians have not ſo well imitated their Pattern, there is
nothing more obvious in Nature, ſeeing a Man who wears the fame
" Fleſh but a ſhort time, is nevertheleſs the ſame Man, and of the
* ſame genius; and whence is this but from the conſtancy of Nature,
" in holding a Man to her Orders? Wherfore keep alſo to your Or-
“ ders. But this is a mean Requeſt, your Orders will be worth little, if
* they do not hold you to them; wherfore imbark. They are like a
Ship, if you be once aboard, you do not carry them, but they you;
" and ſee how Venice ſtands to lier tackling: you will no more forſake
" them, than you will leap into the Sea.
“ BÚT they are very many, and difficult. O, my Lords, what
66 Seaman caſts away his Card, becauſe it has four and twenty Points
“ of the Compaſs? and yet thoſe are very near as many, and as dif-
“ ficult as the Orders in the whole circumference of your Common-
wealth. Conſider, how have we bin toſt with every wind of Doc-
trin, loft by the glib Tongues of your Demagogs and Grandees in
our own Havens? A company of Fidlers that have diſturbid your
“ reſt for your Groat; two to one, three thouſand pounds a year to
" another, has bin nothing. And for what? Is there one of them
es that yet knows what a Commonwealth is ? And are you yet afraid
“ of ſuch a Government in which theſe ſhall not dare to ſcrape, for
“ fear of the Statute? THEMISTOCLES could not fiddle, but could
“ make of a ſmall City a great Commonwealth : theſe have fiddeld,
" and for your Mony, till they have brought a great Commonwealth
to a ſmall City
“ IT grieves me, while I conſider how, and from what cauſes i-
maginary Difficultys will be aggravated, that the foregoing Orders
are not capable of any greater clearneſs in diſcourſe or writing :
" But if a Man ſhould make a Book, deſcribing every trick or par-
“ ſage, it would fare no otherwiſe with a game at Cards; and this is
no more, if a Man plays upon the ſquare. There is a great diffe-
rence, ſays VERULAmius, between a cunning Man and a wiſe
Man
$
30
6
1
1
OCE A N A.
141
CC
OS
CG
1
" Man (between a Demagog and a Legiſlator) not only in point of
honeſty, but in point of ability : As there be that can pack the Cards
,
and
yet cannot play well; ſo there be fom that are good in Canvaſſes
and Factions, that are otherwiſe weak men. Allow me but theſe Ör-
ders, and let them com with their Cards in their ſleeves, or pack
“ if they can. Again, ſays lie, it is one thing to underſtand Perſons,
and another to underſtand Matters ; for many are perfect in mens hu-
mors,
that are not greatly capable of the real part of Buſineſs : which
is the conſtitution of one that has ſtudy?d Men more than Books. But
" there is nothing more hurtful in a State, than that cunning men ſhould
paſs for iviſe. His words are an Oracle. As Dionysiu s,. when
“ he could no longer exerciſe his Tyranny among men, turn’d School-
“ maſter, that he might exerciſe it among Boys. Allow me but theſe
Orders, and your Grandees ſo well skild in the Baits and Palats of
“ Men, ſhall turn Ratcatchers.
"AND wheras Councils (as is diſcretely obſerv’d by the ſame
Author in his time) are at this day, in moſt places, but familiar meet-
ings (ſomwhat like the Academy of our Provoſts) where matters
rather talk'd on than debated, and run too ſwift to order an Act of
“ Council; give me my Orders, and ſee if I have not puzzeld your
“ IT is not ſo much my deſire to return upon hants, as theirs that
" will not be ſatisfy'd ; wherfore if, notwithſtanding what was ſaid
" of dividing and chuſing in our preliminary Diſcourſes, men will yet
“ be returning to the Queſtion, Why the Senat muſt be a Councila-
part (tho even in Athens, where it was of no other Conſtitution
" than the popular Aſſembly, the diſtinction of it from the other was
never held leſs than neceſſary) this may be added to the former
" Reaſons, that if the Ariſtocracy be not for the Debate, it is for no-
thing; but if it be for debate, it muſt have convenience for it: And
" what convenience is there for debate in a croud, where there is no-
thing but joſtling, treading upon one another, and ſtirring of
“ Blood, than which in this caſe there is nothing more dangerous ?
Truly, it was not ill faid of my Lord EPIMO NUs, That Ve-
“ nice plays her game, as it were, at Billiards or Nineholes; and ſo
may your Lordſhips, unleſs your Ribs be ſo ſtrong, that
" better of Footbal: for ſuch ſport is Debate in a popular Aſſembly,
as, notwithſtanding the diſtinction of the Senat, was the deſtructi
on of Athens.
are
" Demagogs..
Cc
1
you think
.
Pierog.itive
Iribe.
THIS Speech concluded the Debate which happen'd at the Inſti,
tution of the Senat. The next Aſſembly is that of the People or Pre-
rogative Tribe.
THE face, or mien of the Prerogative Tribe for the Arms, the The Face of Wig
Horſes, and the Diſciplin, but more eſpecially for the felect men, is
that of a very noble Regiment, or rather of two; the one of Horſe,
divided into three Troops (beſides that of the Provinces, wirich will
be ſhewn hereafter) with their Captains, Cornets, and two Tribuns
of the Horſe at the head of them; the other of Foot in three Con-
panys (beſides that of the Provinces) with their Captains, Enſigas,
and two Tribuns of the Foot at the head of them. The firſt Troop
is call?d the Phænix; the ſecond the Pelican; and the third the Swallow.
The firſt Company the Cypreſs ; the ſecond the Myrtle ; and the third
the
142
OCE A N A.
the Spray. Of theſe again (not without a near reſemblance of the
Roman diviſion of a Tribe ) the Phænix and the Cypreſs conſtitute the
firſt Claſs; the Pelican and the Myrtle the ſecond; and the Swallow
with the Spray the third, renew'd every Spring by
THE one and twentieth ORDER, directing, that upon every
The Change noi Monday next inſuing the laſt of March, the Deputys of the annual Ga-
Triennial of laxy arriving at the Pavilion in the Halo, and elečting one Captain and
one Cornet of the Swallow (triennial Officers) by and out of the Cavalry
Prerogative.
at the Horſe Urn, according to the Rules contain’d in the Ballot of the
Hundred; and one Captain with one Enſign of the Spray (triennial Offi-
cers) by, and out of the Infantry at the Foot Vrn, after the ſame
way of ballotting ; conſtitute and becom the third Claſſes of the Preroga-
tive Tribe.
21. Order.
cers of the
+
?
22. Order.
SEVEN Deputys are annually return'd by every Tribe, wherof
three are Horſe, and four are Foot; and there be fifty Tribes: fo the
Swallow muſt conſiſt of 150 Horſe, the Spray of 200 Foot. And the reſt
of the Claſſes being two, each of them in number equal; the whole
Prerogative (beſides the Provinces, that is, the Knights and Deputys
of Marpeſia and Panopea) muſt conſiſt of 1050 Deputys. And theſe
Troops and Companys may as well be callid Centurys as thoſe of the
Romans; for the Romans related not, in ſo naming theirs, to the num-
ber. And wheras they were diſtributed according to the valuation of
their Eſtates, ſo are theſe; which by virtue of the laſt Order, are now
accommodated with their triennial Officers. But there be others ap-
pertaining to this Tribe, whoſe Election, being of far greater impor-
tance, is annual, as follows in
THE twenty ſecond ORDER; whereby the firſt Claſs having
The Change of elected their triennial Officers, and made Oath to the Old Tribuns, that
they
Annual Magie will neither introduce, cauſe
, nor to their power ſuffer Debate to be intro-
ftrats of the duc'd into any populár Aſſembly of this Government, but to their utmoſt
Pierogative. be aiding and affiſting to ſeize and deliver any perſon or Perſons in that way
offending, and ſtriking at the Root of this Commonwealth, to the Coun-
cil of War ; are to procede with the other two Claſſes of the Prerogative
Tribe to election of the new Tribuns, being four annual Magiſtrats, wherof
two are to be elected out of the Cavalry at the Horſe Vrn, and two out of
the Infantry at the Foot Urn, according to the common Ballot of the Tribes.
And they may be promiſcuouſly choſen out of any Claſſis, provided that the
ſame Perſon shall not be capable of bearing the Tribunitian Honor twice in
the term of one Galaxy. "The Tribuns thus choſen ſhall receive the Tribe
(in reference to the Power of muſtering and diſciplining the ſame) as Com-
manders in chief; and for the rest as Magiſtrats, whoſe proper Function
is preſcribd by the next Order. The Tribuns may give leave to any num-
ber of the Prerogative, not exceding one bundred at a time, to be abſent,
ſo they be not Magiſtrats, nor Officers, and return within three months.
If a Magiſtrat or® Officer has a neceſſary occaſion, he may alſo be abſent for
the ſpace of one month; provided, that there be not above three Corners or
Enligns, two Captains," or one Tribun fo abſent at one time.
TO this the ARCHON ſpoke at the Inſtitution after this manner.
**
My
OCEAN A.
143
til
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IT
6
My Lords;
T is affirm'd by Cicero in his Oration for FLACCUS
that the Commonwealths of Greece were all ſhaken or ruin’d by
the intemperance of their Comitia, or Aſſemblys of the People,
" The truth is, if good heed in this point be not taken, a Common-
“ wealth will have bad legs. But all the world knows he ſhould have
Si excepted Lacedemon, where the People, as has bin ſhewn by the
“ Oracle, had no power at all of Debate, nor (till after Lysan-
Der, whoſe Avarice open'd a gulf, that was not long ere it ſwal-
“ low'd up his Country) came it ever to be exercis'd by them.
" Whence that Commonwealth ſtood longeſt and firmeſt of any
other, but this, in our days, of Venice : which having underlaid
“ her félf with the like Inſtitution, ows a great, if not the greateſt
part of her ſteddineſs to the ſame principle; the great Council,
" which is with her the People, by the Authority of my Lord
" EPIMO nus, never ſpeaking a word. Nor ſhall any Common-
“ wealth, where the People in their political capacity is talkative, ever
“ ſee half the days of one of theſe: But being carry'd away by vain-
“ glorious Men (that, as OVERBURY fays, piſs more than they
« drink) ſwim down the ſtream ; as did Athens, the moſt prating of
" theſe Dames, when that ſame ranting fellow ALCIBIADES fell
a demagoging for the Sicilian War. But wheras Debate by the
“ authority and
experience of Lacedemon and Venice, is not to be com-
mitted to the People in a well-order'd Government, it may be ſaid,
" That the Order ſpecify'd is but a ſlight bar in a matter of like dan-
ger; for ſo much as an Oath, if there be no recourſe upon the
“ breach of it, is a weak ty for ſuch hands as have the Sword in
" them: wherfore what ſhould hinder the People of Oceana, if they
"happen not to regard an Oath, from aſſuming Debate, and making
« themſelves as much an Anarchy as tlroſe of Athens ? To which I
« anſwer, Take the common fort in a privat capacity, and, except
" they be injur'd, you ſhall find them to have a baſhfulneſs in the
“ preſence of the better fort, or wiſer Men; acknowleging their
Abilitys by attention, and accounting it no mean honor to receive
“ reſpect from them: But if they be injur'd by them, they hate them,
" and the more for being wiſe or great, becauſe that makes it the
greater injury. Nor refrain they in this caſe from any kind of in-
temperance of Speech, if of Aětion. It is no otherwiſe with a
People in their political capacity; you ſhall never find that they have
“ aſſum'd Debate for it felf, but for ſomthing elſe. Wherfore' in La-
“ cedemon where there was, and in Venice where there is nothing
" elſe for which they ſhould aſſume it, they have never ſhewn fo
" much as an inclination to it. Nor was there any appearance of ſuch
" a deſire in the People of Rome (wlio from the time of Romulus
“ had bin very well contented with the power of Reſult either in the
« * Parochial Aſſemblys, as it was ſettled upon them by him; or in
" the meetings of the Hundreds, as it was alter'd in their regard for
“ the worſe by SERVIus Tullius) till news was brought ſom
“ fifteen years after the exile of TAR QUIN their late King during
66
* Comitiis Curiaris.
t Centuriatis.
Ik which
,
OCE A N A,
144
66
66
66
“ which time the Senat had govern'd pretty well) that he was dead
« at the Court of ARISTODEM us the Tyrant of Cume. * Wher-
upon the Patricians, or Nobility, began to let out the hitherto
o diſſembld Venom, which is inherent in the root of Oligarchy,
" and fell immediatly upon injuring the People beyond all modera-
« tion. For wheras the People had ſerv'd both gallantly and con-
“ tentedly in Arms upon their own charges, and, tho joint Purchaſers
« by their Swords of the conquer'd Lands, had not participated in
" the ſame to above two Acres a man (the reſt being ſecretly
uſurp'd by the Patricians) they thro the meanneſs of their ſupport,
6 and the greatneſs of their expence, being generally indebted, no
“ ſooner return'd home with Victory to lay down their Arms, than
«s they were ſnatch'd up by their Creditors, the Nobility, to cram
16 Goals. Wherupon, but with the greateſt modeſty that was ever
“ known in the like caſe, they firſt fell upon debate, affirming, if that
“ they were oppreſt and captivated, at home, while abroad they fought for
Liberty and Empire; and that the Freedom of the common People was
Safer in time of War than Peace, among their Enemys than their Fellow-
“ citizens. It is true, that when they could not get the Senat, thro
" fear, as was pretended by the Patricians, to aſſemble and take their
grievances into conſideration, they grew ſo much the warmer, that
** it was glad to meet ; where Appius CLAUDIUS, a fierce Spirit,
was of opinion, that recourſe ſhould be had to Conſular power,
wherby fom of the brands of Sedition being taken off, the flame
“ might be extinguiſh'd. SERVILIUS being of another temper,thought
" it better and ſafer to try if the People might be bow'd than broken.
“ But this debate was interrupted by tumultuous news of the near
« approach of the Volſci, a caſe in which the Senat had no recourſe
" but to the People, who contrary to their former cuſtom
upon
the
« like occaſions would not ftir a foot, but fell a laughing, and ſaying,
66 || Let them fight that have ſomthing to fight for. The Senat that
« had purſes, and could not ſing ſo well before the Thief, being
« in a great perplexity, found no poſſible way out of it, but to be-
“ feech SERVILIUS, one of a Genius well known to be popular,
« That he would accept of the Conſulſhip, and make ſom ſuch uſe of
« it as might be helpful to the Patrician Intereſt. SERVILIUS ac-
" cepting of the Offer, and making uſe of his Intereſt with the Peo-
" ple, perſuaded them to hope well of the good intention of the Fa-
" thers
, whom it would little beſeem to be forc'd to thoſe things which
« would loſe their Grace, and that in view of the Enemy, if they
“ came not freely; and withal publiſh'd an Edict, that no Man
« ſhould withhold a Citizen of Rome by impriſonment from giving
“ his name (for that was the way, as I Mall have opportunity here-
after to ſhew more at large, wherby they drew out their Armys)
nor to ſeize or ſell any man's Goods or Children that was in the
“ Camp. Wherupon the People with a mighty concourſe immediat-
" ly took Arms, march'd forth, and (which to them was as eaſy as
“ to be put into the humor, and that, as appears in this place, was not
66
* Eo nuncio erecti patres, creita plebs. Sed patribus nimis luxurioſa ca fuit lætitia; plebi,
cui ad eam diem fummâ ope infervitum erat, injuriæ à primoribus fieri cæpêre. Liv. 1. 2.
+ Se foris pro libertate & imperio dimicantes, domi à civibus captos & oppreffos effe: tutiorem-
que in bello quam in pace, inter hoftes quam inter cives, libertatem plebis effe. | Patres milica-
rent, patres arma caperent, ut penes cofdem pericula belli, penes quos præmia, "effent.
6 hard)
OCE A N A.
145
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66
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“ liard) totally defeated the Volſci firſt, then the Sabins (for the
neighbor Nations, hoping to have had a good bargain of the Dif-
“ cord in Rome, were up in arms on all ſides) and after the Sabins,
“ the Aurunci.' Whence returning victorious in three Battels, they
expected no leſs than that the Senat would have made good their
“ words: when APPIUS. CLAUDIUS, the other Conful, of his
“ innate Pride, and that he might fruſtrat the Faith of his Collegue,
caus'd the Soldiers (who being ſet at liberty, had behav'd them.
“ ſelves with ſuch valor) to be reſtor'd at their return to their Credi-
“tors and their Goals. Great reſort upon this was made by the Peo-
ple to Servilius, Thewing him their Wounds, calling him
to witneſs how they had behav'd themſelves, and minding him of
“his promiſe. Poor SER VILIUS was forry, but ſo overaw'd
“ with the headineſs of his Collegue, and the obſtinacy of the whole
“ faction of the Nobility, that not daring to do any thing either way,
" he loſt both Partys: the Fathers conceiving that he was ambitious,
" and the People that he was falſe; while the Conſul CLAUDIUS
6: continuing to countenance ſuch as daily ſeiz’d and impriſon'd fom of
º the indebted People, had ſtill new and dangerous Controverſys with
" them, inſomuch that the Commonwealth was torn with horrid
" Diviſion, and the People (becauſe they found it not ſo ſafe, or ſo
“ effectual in public) minded nothing but laying their heads together
“ in privat Conventicles. For this Aulus VIRGINIUS, and
" Titus Vetusius, the new Conſuls, were reprov'd by the
“ Senat as flothful, and upbraided with the Virtue of APPIUS
“ CLAUDIUs. Wherupon the Conſuls having deſir'd the Senat,
" that they might know their pleaſure, ſhewd afterwards their
“ readineſs to obey it, by ſummoning the People according to com-
" mand, and requiring names wherby to draw forth an Army for di-
“ verſion, but no man would anſwer. Report hereof being made to
" the Senar, the younger ſort of the Fathers grew ſo hot with the
Conſuls, that they deſir'd them to abdicat the Magiſtracy, which
had not the courage to defend.
“ THE Conſuls, tho they conceiv'd themſelves to be roughly
“ bandled, made this ſoft Anſwer: Fathers Conſcript, that you may
pleaſe to take notice it was foretold ſom horrid Sedition is at land,
“ we ſhall only deſire, that they whoſe valor in this place is ſo great,
may ſtand by us to ſee how we behave our ſelves, and then be as
“ reſolute in your Commands as you will: your Fatherhoods may
“ know if we be wanting in the performance.
“ AT this ſom of the hot young Noblemen return’d with the
“ Confuls to the Tribunal, before which the People were yet ſtand-
“ ing; and the Conſuls having generally requir’d names in vain, to
put it to ſomthing, requir’d the name of one that was in their
ey
particularly; on whom, when he mov'd not, they commanded a
“ Lictor to lay hands : but the People thronging about the Party
“ fummond, forbad the Lictor, who durſt not touch him; at which
“the Hotſpurs that came with the Conſuls, inrag’d by the affront,
“ deſcended from the Throne to the aid of the Lictor; from whom
“ in ſo doing they turn’d the indignation of the People upon them-
" felves with ſuch heat, that the Conſuls interpoſing, thought fit, by
remitting the Aſſembly, to appeaſe the Tumult; in which never-
“ theleſs there had bin nothing but noiſe. Nor was there leſs in the
V
Senat,
CC
C
146
OCE A N A.
CC
own, fell
(6
N
+
Senat, being ſuddenly rally’d upon this occafion, where they that
6 receiv'd the repulſe, with others whoſe heads were as addle as their
upon the buſineſs as if it had bin to be determin'd by cla-
mor, till the Conſuls, upbraiding the Senat that it differ'd not from
“ the Marketplace, reduc'd the Houſe to Orders. And the Fathers
“ having bin conſulted accordingly, there were three Opinions; Pub-
LIUS VIRGINIus conceiv'd, that the conſideration to be had
upon the matter in queſtion, or aid of the indebted and impriſon'd
People, was not to be further extended than to fuch as had in-
“ gag'd upon the promiſe made by SERVILIUs: Titus LAR-
Gius, that it was no time to think it enough, if mens Merits were
“ acknowleg’d, while the whole People, funk under the weight of
“ their debts, could not cmerge without fom common aid ; which to
reſtrain, by putting ſom into a better condition than others, would
« rather more inflame the Diſcord than extinguiſh it. APPIUS
“ CLAUDIUS (ſtill upon the old hant) would have it, that the
" People were rather wanton than fierce: It was not oppreſſion that
“ neceſſitated, but their power that invited them to theſe freaks; the
« Empire of the Conſuls ſince the appeal to the People (wherby a
« Plebeian might ask his fellows if he were a Thief) being but a
“ mere ſcarecrow. Go to, ſays he, let us create the Dictator, from
" whom there is no appeal, and then let me ſee more of this work,
« or him that ſhall forbid my Lictor. The advice of Appius was
« abhor'd by many; and to introduce a general reciſion of Debts with
“ LARGIUS, was to violat all Faith: That of VIRGINIUS, as
" the moſt moderat, would have paſt beſt, but that there were privat
" Intereſts, that conſtant bane of the Public, which withſtood it.
“ So they concluded with Appius, who alſo had bin Dictator, if
“ the Conſuls and ſom of the graver ſort had not thought it altoge-
“ther unſeaſonable, at a time when the Volſci and the Sabins were up
“ again, to venture ſo far upon alienation of the People: for which
" cauſe VALERIUS, being deſcended from the PUBLICOLAS, the
« moſt popular Family, as alſo in his own perſon of a mild nature,
« was rather truſted with ſo rigid a Magiſtracy. Whence it hap-
“ pen’d, that the People, tho they knew well enough againſt whom
“ the Dictator was created, fear'd nothing from VALERIUS; but
upon a new promiſe made to the ſame effect with that of SERVI-
LIUS, hop'd better another time, and throwing away all diſputes,
gave their names roundly, went out, and, to be brief, came home
“ again as victorious as in the former Action, the Dictator entring the
“ City in Triumph. Nevertheleſs when he came to preſs the Senat
“ to make good his promiſe, and do fomthing for the caſe of the Peo-
ple, they regarded him no more as to that point than they had don
“ SERVIL I us. Wherupon the Dictator, in diſdain to be made a
ftale, abdicated his Magiſtracy, and went home. Here then was
"a victorious Army without a Captain, and a Senat pulling it by the
“ beard in their Gowns. What is it (if you have read the Story, for
“ there is not ſuch another) that muſt follow? Can any man imagin,
“ that ſuch only ſhould be the opportunity upon which this People
“ could run away? Alas, poor men, the qui and the Volſci, and the
« Sabins were nothing, but the Fathers invincible! There they fat
6 fom three hundred of them arm'd all in Robes, and thundering with
© their Tongues, without any hopes in the earth to reduce them to
LE
(6
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15 any
OCE A N A.
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any tolerable conditions. Wherfore, not thinking it convenient to
" abide long ſo near them, away marches the Army, and incamps in
“ the fields. This Retreat of the People is call’d the Seceſſion of Mount
“Aventin, where they lodg’d very ſad at their condition; but not let-
ting fall ſo much as a word of murmur againſt the Fathers. The
“ Senat by this time were great Lords, had the whole City to them-
“ ſelves; but certain Neighbors were upon the way that might com
to ſpeak with them, not asking leave of the Porter. Wherfore
their minds became troubld, and an Orator was poſted to the Peo-
ple to make as good conditions with them as he could ; but, what-
ever the terms were, to bring them home, and with all ſpeed.
" And here it was covenanted between the Senat and the People, that
" theſe ſhould have Magiſtrats of their own Election, call’d the Tri-
buns ; upon which they return’d.
To hold you no longer, the Senat having don this upon ne-
“ceſſity, made frequent attemts to retract it again'; while the Tri-
“ buns on the other ſide, to defend what they had got, inſtituted their
“ Tributa Comitia, or Council of the People; where they came in time,
and, as Diſputes increas'd, to make Laws without the Authority of
the Senat, call'd Plebiſcita. Now to conclude in the point at which
“ I drive; ſuch were the ſteps wherby the People of Rome came to
“ aſſume Debate: nor is it in Art or Nature to debar a People of the
« like effect, where there is the like, cauſe. For Romulus having
e in the Election of his Senat ſquar'd out a Nobility for the ſupport
“ of a Throne, by making that of the Patricians a diſtinct and here-
ditary Order, planted the Commonwealth upon two contrary In-
“tereſts or Roots, which ſhooting forth in time produc'd two Com-
“monwealths, the one Oligarchical in the Nobility, the other a mere
Anarchy of the People, and ever after caus’d a perpetual feud and
“ enmity between the Senat and the People, even to death.
“ THERE is not a more noble or uſeful queſtion in the Politics
than that which is ſtarted by MACCHIAVEL, Whether means
were to be found wherby the Enmity that was between the Senat
" and the People of Rome could have bin remov'd. Nor is there
any other in which we, or the preſent occafion, are ſo much con-
cern'd, particularly in relation to this Author; foraſmuch as his
Judginent in the determination of the queſtion ſtanding, our Com-
“ monwealth falls. And he that will crect a Commonwealth againſt
" the Judgment of MACCHIAVEL, is oblig’d to give ſuch reaſons
" for his enterprize as muſt not go a begging. Wherfore to repeat
“the Politician very honeſtly, but ſomwhat more briefly, he diſputes
“ THERE be two ſorts of Commonwealths, the one for preſerva- Macch. Diſc.
tion, as Lacedemon and Venice ; the other for increaſe, ás Rome.
“ LACEDEMON being govern’d
, by a King and a ſmall Senat,
could maintain it ſelf a long time in that condition, becauſe the Inha-
bitants, being few, having put a bar, upon the reception of Strangers,
and living in a strict obſervation of the Laws of Lý cursus, which
non had got reputation, and taken away all occaſion of Tumults, might
as well continue long in Tranquillity. For the Laws of Lycurgus in-
troduc'd a greater equality in Eft ates, and a leſs equality in Honors
,
plence there was equal Poverty; and the Plebeians were leſs ambitiosus
,
becauſe the Honors or Magiſtracys of the City could extend but to a few,
«
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148
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OCEAN A.
« and were not communicable to the People : nor did the Nobility by uſing
" them ill
, ever give them a deſire to participat of the ſame. This pro-
“ ceded from the Kings, whoſe Principality being plac'd in the midſt of the
" Nobility, had no greater means wherby to ſupport it ſelf, than to ſhield
" the People from all injury; whence the People not fearing Empire, deſir’d
“ it not : And ſo all occaſion of enmity between the Senat and the People
was taken away. But this Vnion happen'd eſpecially from two cauſes; the
one,
that the inhabitants of Lacedemon bèing few, could be govern’d by
the Few: the other, that, not receiving Strangers into their Common-
wealth, they did not corrupt it, nor increaſe it to ſuch a proportion as was
not governable by the Few.
“ VENICE has not divided with her Plebeians, but all are callid Gen-
" tlemen that be in adminiſtration of the Government; for which Govern-
ment ſhe is more beholden to Chance than the Wiſdom of her Lawmakers :
" For many retiring to thoſe Ilands, where that City is now built, from the
« inundations of Barbarians that overwhelm'd the Roman Empire, inhen
they were increas’d to ſuch a number, that to live together it was neceſſary
" to have Laws; they ordain’d a form of Government, wherby aſſembling
often in Council upon Affairs, and finding their number ſufficient for Go-
vernment, they put a bar upon all ſuch as repairing afterwards to their City
ſhould becom Inhabitants, excluding them from participation of Power.
" Whence they that were included in the Adminiſtration had right; and they
" that were excluded, coming afterwards, and being receiv’d upon no other
“ conditions to be Inhabitants, had no wrong; and therfore had no occaſion, nor
(being never truſted with Árms) any means to be tumultuous. Wher-
fore this Commonwealth might very well maintain it ſelf in Tranquillity.
* THESE things conſider'd, it is plain that the Roman Legiſlators,
to have introduc’da quiet State, muſt have don one of theſe two things;
“ either ſhut out Strangers, as the Lacedemonians; or, as the Venetians,
not allow'd the People to bear Arms. But they did neither. By which
the People having power and increaſe, were in perpetual tumult
.
« Nor is this to be help'd in a Commonwealth for increaſe, ſeeing if Rome
“ had cut off the occaſion of her Tumults, ſhe muſt have cut of the means
“ of her Increaſe
, and by conſequence of her Greatneſs
.
Wherfore let a Legiſlator conſider with himſelf, whether he would make
“ his Commonwealth for preſervation, in which caſe ſhe may be free from
“ Tumults; or for increaſe
, in which caſe ſhe muſt be infeſted with them.
I F he makes her for preſervation, ſhe may be quiet at home ; but will
“ be in danger abroad. Firſt, Becauſe her Foundation muſt be narrow,
i and therfore weak, as that of Lacedemon, which lay but upon 30000
“ Citizens'; or that of Venice, which lys but spon 3000. Secondly,
“ Such a Commonwealth muſt either be in Peace, or in War: If she be in
“ Peace, the Few are ſooneft effeminated and corrupted, and ſo obnoxious
“ alſo tó Faktion. If in War, ſucceding ill, she is an eaſy prey; or fuc-
ceding well, ruin'd by increaſe: a weight which her Foundation is not able
" to bear. For Lacedemon, when ſhe had made her ſelf, Miftriſs
, upon the
matter, of all Greece, thro a ſlight accident, the Rebellion of Thebes,
occaſion’d' by the Conſpiracy of PELOPIDAS diſcovering this infirmity
6 of her nature, the reſt of her conquer'd Citys immediatly fell off, and in
" the turn as it were of a hand reduc'd her from the fulleſt tide to the loweſt
“ eb of her fortune. And Venice having, poflest her ſelf of a great part
« of Ítaly by her purſe, was no ſooner in defence of it put to the trial of
Arms, than ſhe lost all in one Battel.
« И НЕ N СЕ
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OCE A N A.
149
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“WHENCE I conclude, That in the Ordination of a Cornmori
" wealth a Legiſlator is to think upon that which is moſt honorable; and
laying aſide Models for Preſervation, to follow the example of Rome
conniving at, and
temporizing with the enmity between the Senat and the
People
, as a neceſſary ſtep to the Roman Greatneſs
. For that
For that any Man
Should find out a balance that may take in the Conveniences, and fout out
" the Inconveniences of both, I do not think it poſſible. Theſe are the
" words of the Author, tho the method be ſomwhat alter'd, to the
" end that I may the better turn them to my purpoſe.
“ MY LORDS, I do not know how you hearken to this ſound;
“ but to hear the greateſt Artiſt in the modern World, giving ſentence
againſt our Commonwealth, is that with which I am nearly con-
cern'd. Wherfore, with all honor due to the Prince of Politicians,
" let us examin his reaſoning with the ſame liberty which he has aſſert-
" ed to be the right of a free People. But we ſhall never com up to
him, except by taking the buſineſs a little lower, we deſcend from
effects to their cauſes. The cauſes of Commotion in a Common-
" wealth are either external or internal. External are from Enemys,
" from Subjects, or from Servants. To diſpute then what was the cauſe
“ why Rome was infeſted by the Italian, or by the Servil Wars; why
" the Slaves took the Capitol ; why the Lacedemonians were near as
"s frequently troubl’d with their Helots, as Rome with all thoſe; or
why Venice, whoſe Situation is not truſted to the faith of Men, has
" as good or better quarter with them whom ſhe governs, than Rome
6 had with the Latins; were to diſpute upon external cauſes. The
queſtion put by MACCHIAVEL is of internal cauſes; Whether
" the enmity that was beeween the Senat and the People of Rome
might have bin remov'd. And to determin otherwiſe of this queſti-
on than he dos, I muſt lay down other Principles than he has don.
6 To which end I affirm, that a Commonwealth internally con-
fider’d, is either equal or inequal. A Commonwealth that is inter-
- nally equal, has no internal cauſe of Commotion, and therfore can
6 have no ſuch effect but from without. A Commonwealth inter-
nally inequal has no internal cauſe of quiet, and therfore can have
« no ſuch effe& but by diverſion.
6 TO prove my Aſſertions, I ſhall at this time make uſe of no
“ other than his examples. Lacedemon was cxternally unquiet, be-
“ cauſe ſhe was externally inequal, that is as to her Helots, and ſhe
was internally at reſt, becauſe ſhe was equal in her ſelf, both in
“ root and branch: In the root by her Agrarian, and in branch by
" the Senat, inaſmuch as no Man was therto qualify’d, but by election
“ of the People. Which Inſtitution of Lycurgus is mention d Ariſt. Polit:
by ARISTOTLE, where he ſays, that rendering his Citizens B. 2.
« emulous (not careleſs) of that honor, he aſſign’d to the People
« the election of the Senat. Wherfore MACCHIAVEL in this, as
“ in other places, having his ey upon the diviſion of Patrician and
“ Plebeian Familys as they were in Rome, has quite miſtaken the Or-
“ ders of this Commonwealth, where there was no ſuch thing. Nor
« did the quiet of it derive from the Power of the Kings, who were
“ ſo far from ſhielding the People from the injury of the Nobility, of
66 which there was none in his ſenſe but the Senat, that one declar'd
as end of the Senat at the inſtitution was to ſhield the People from the
Kings, who from that time had but ſingle Votes. Neither did it
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procede from the ſtraitneſs of the Senat, or their keeping the People
excluded from the Government, that they were quiet, but from
“ the equality of their adminiſtration, ſeeing the Senat (as is plain
by the Oracle, their fundamental Law) had no more than the De-
bate, and the Reſult of the Commonwealth belong'd to the People.
" Wherfore when THEOFOMPUs and POLYDORUS Kings of
Lacedemon, would have kept the People excluded from the Govern-
ment, by adding to the antient Law this Clauſe, if the determina-
tion of the People be faulty, it ſhall be lawful for the Senat to reſume
" the Debate; the People immediatly became unquiet, and reſum'd
" that Debate, which ended not till they had ſet up their Ephors, and
caus'd that Magiſtracy to be confirm'd by their Kings. * For when
THEOPOMPus firſt ordaind that the Ephori or Overſeers ſhould be
“ created at Lacedemon, to be ſuch a reſtraint upon the Kings there as the
* Tribuns were upon the Conſuls at Rome, the Queen complain'd to him that
by this means he tranſmitted the Royal Authority greatly diminiſh'd to
“: his Children: I leave indeed leſs, anſwer'd he, but more laſting. And
“ this was excellently ſaid; for that Power only is ſafe which is limited from
doing hurt.
THEOPOMPUs therfore, by confining the Kingly
“ Power within the bounds of the Laws, did recommend it by ſo much to
" the Peoples Affection, as he remov’d it from being Arbitrary. By
6 which it may appear, that a Commonwealth for preſervation, if
" ſhe coms to be inequal, is as obnoxious to enmity between the
- Senat and the People, as a Commonwealth for increaſe; and that
" the Tranquillity of Lacedemon was deriv'd from no other cauſe than
" FOR Venice, to ſay that ſhe is quiet becauſe ſhe diſarms hier
Subjects, is to forget that Lacedemon diſarm’d her Helots, and
yet
“ could not in their regard be quiet; wherfore if Venice be defended
“ from external cauſes of Commotion, it is firſt thro her Situation, in
“ which reſpect her Subjects have no hope (and this indeed may be
“ attributed to her fortune) and, ſecondly, thro her exquiſit Juſtice,
56 wlience they have no will to invade her. But this can be attributed
to no other cauſe than her Prudence; which will appear to be great-
er, as we look nearer; for the effects that procede from Fortune, if
" there be any ſuch thing, are like their cauſe, inconſtant. But
" there never happen'd to any other Commonwcalth fo undiſturb’d
" and conſtant a Tranquillity and Peace in her ſelf, as is that of
" Venice; wherfore this mult procede from ſom other cauſe than
" Chance. And we ſee that as ſhe is of all others the most
quiet, ſo the moſt equal Commonwealth. Her Body conſiſts of
one Order, and her Senat is like a rolling ſtone, as was ſaid, which
“ never did, nor, while it continues upon that rotation, never ſhall
gather the moſs of a divided or ambitious intereſt; much leſs ſuch a
one as that which graſp'd the People of Rome in the talons of their
I own Eagles. And if MACCHIAVEL, averſe from doing this
“ Commonwealth right, had conſider’d her Orders, as his Reader
« her Equality.
+
66
* Nam cum primus inſtituiffet Theopompus ut Ephori Lacedæmone crcarentur, ita futuri regiæ
pcreſtati ppofiti queniadmodum Roma Tribuni plebis confulari impcrio funt objecti; atquc illi
uxor disitiet
, id cţific illum ut filiis minorem poteſtatem relinqueret : Relinquam, inquit, fed
diuturnicrem. Optimè quidem : Ea enim demum cuta eft potentia, quæ viribus fuis modum
iniponit. Thcopompus igitur legitimis regnum vinculis conftringendo, quo longius à licentia
jetraxit, hoc proprius ad benevolentiam civium admovit. Val. Máx.l. 4.c. 1. de externis, $. 8.
66 ſhall
*
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“ ſhall eaſily perceive he never did, he muſt have bin ſo far from at,
tributing the Prudence of them to Chance, that he would have
touch'd up his admirable work to that perfection, which, as to the
“ civil part, has no pattern in the univerſal World but this of Venice.
ROME, ſecure by her potent and victorious Arms from all ex-
" ternal cauſes of Commotion, was either beholden for her Peace at
“ home to her Enemys abroad, or could never reſt her head. My
LORDS, you that are Parents of a Commonwealth, and ſo freer
Agents than ſuch as are merely natural, have a care. For, as no man
Thall ſhew me a Commonwealth born ſtreight, that ever became
crooked; fo, no man ſhall ſhew me a Commonwealth born crooked,
" that ever became ſtreight. Rome was crooked in her birth, or ra-
“ ther prodigious. Her twins the Patricians and Plebeian Orders
çame, as was ſhewn by the foregoing ſtory, into the World, one
body but two lieads, or rather two bellys : for, notwithſtanding
" the Fable out of Æsop, wherby MENENIUS AGRIPPA the
“ Orator that was ſent from the Senat to the People at Mount Aven-
tin, ſhew'd the Fathers to be the Belly, and the People to be the
Arms and the Legs (which except that, low flothful ſoever it
might ſeem, they were nouriſh'd, not theſe only, but the whole
Body muſt languiſh and be diſſolv'd) it is plain, that the Fathers
were a diſtinct Belly ; ſuch a one as took the meat indeed out of
" the Peoples mouths, but abhorring the Agrarian, return'd it not
“ in the due and neceſſary nutrition of a Commonwealth. Never-
" theleſs, as the People that live about the Cataracts of Nilus are
“ ſaid not to hear the noiſe, ſo neither the Roman Writers, nor
" MACCHIAVEL the moſt converſant with them, ſeem among ſo
many of the Tribunitian ſtorms, to hear their natural voice : for
tho they could not miſs of it ſo far as to attribute them to the ſtrife
" of the People for participation in Magiſtracy, or, in which MA C-
CHIAVEL more particularly joins, to that about the Agrarian;
“ this was to take the buſineſs ſhort, and the remedy for the diſeaſe.
“ A PEOPLE, when they are reduc'd to miſery and deſpair, be-
com their own Politicians, as certain Beaſts when they are ſick be-
“ com their own Phyſicians, and are carry'd by a natural inſtinct to
" the deſire of ſuch Herbs as are their proper cure; but the People,
for the greater part, are beneath the Beaſts in the uſe of them.
" Thus the People of Rome, tho in their miſery they had recourſe
by inſtinct, as it were, to the two main Fundamentals of a Com-
monwealth, participation of Magiſtracy, and the Agrarian, did
“ but taſt and ſpit at them, not (which is neceſſary in Phyſic)
drink down the potion, and in that their healths. For when they
“had obtain’d participation of Magiſtracy, it was but lamely, not to
a full and equal Rotation in all Elections ; nor did they greatly re-
gard it in what they had got. And when they had attain'd to the
Agrarian, they neglected it ſo far as to ſuffer the Law to grow ob-
folete: but if you do not take the due doſe of your Medicins (as
as there be ſlight taſts which a man may have of Philoſophy that in-
cline to Atheiſm) it may chance to be poiſon, there being a like
“ taſt of the Politics that inclines to Confuſion, as appears in the
" Inſtitution of the Roman Tribuns, by which' Magiſtracy and no
more, the People were ſo far from attaining to Peace, that they in
getting but ſo much, got but heads for an eternal feud; wheras if
they
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up
their Ephors,
" they had attain'd in perfection either to the Agrarian, they had in-
« troduc'd the equality and calm of Lacedemon, or to Rotation, and
" they had introduc'd that of Venice : And ſo there could have bin no
“ more enmity between the Senat and the People of Rome, than there
“ was between thoſe Orders in Lacedemon, or is now in Venice. Wher-
“ fore MACCHIAVEL ſeems to me, in attributing the Peace of Ve-
“ nice more to her lack than her prudence, of the whole ſtable to liave
" ſaddled the wrong Horſe; for tho Rome * in her military part could
“ beat it better, beyond all compariſon, upon the founding hoof, Venice
“ for the civil part has plainly had the wings of Pegaſus.
“ THE whole Queſtion then will com upon this point, Whether
" the People of Rome could have obtain'd theſe Orders? And firſt, to
“ ſay, that they could not have obtain’d them without altering the
Commonwealth, is no Argument; ſeeing neither could they, with-
out altering the Commonwealth, have obtain’d their Tribuns, which
" nevertlielefs were obtain'd. And if a man confiders the poſture
“ citat the People were in when they obtain'd their Tribuns, they
might as well, and with as great eaſe (foraſmuch as the reaſon why
" the
Nobility yielded to the Tribuns was no other, than that there
was no remedy) have obtain’d any thing elſe. And for
And for experience,
66 it was in the like caſe that the Lacedemonians did ſet
6 and the Athenians after the battel of platea bow'd the Senat (ſó hard
a thing it is for a Commonwealth that was born crooked to becom
“ ſtreight) as much the other way. Nor, if it be objected, that this
" muſt have ruin'd the Nobility (and in that depriv'd the Common-
“ wealth of the Greatneſs which ſhe acquir'd by them) is this opinion
“ holding; but confuted by the ſequel of the ſtory, ſhewing plainly,
" that the Nobility thro the defect of ſuch Orders, that is to ſay, of
• Rotation and the Agrarian, came to eat up the People; and batten-
“ ing themſelves in Luxury, to be, as SALUST ſpeaks of them, f.
“ most ſuggiſh and lazy Nobility, in whom, beſides the name, there was no
« more than in a ſtatue; and to bring ſo mighty a Commonwealth,
« and of ſo huge a Glory, to ſo deplorable an end. Wherfore means
might have bin found to remove the enmity that was between the
“ Senat and the People of Rome.
“ MY LORDS, If I have argu'd well, I have given you the com-
“ fort and aſſurance, that notwithſtanding the judgment of MAC-
CHIAVEL, your Commonwealth is both ſafe and ſound: but if I
“ have not argu'd well, then take the comfort and aſſurance which he
“ gives you while he is firm, That a Legiſlator is to lay aſide all other
« examples, and follow that of Rome only, conniving and temporizing
“ with the enmity between the Senat and the People, as a neceſſary
“ ſtep to the Roman Greatneſs. Whence it follows, that your Com-
“ monwealth, at the worſt, is that which he has given you his word
« is the beſt.
“ I HAVE held your Lordſhips long, but upon an account of no
“ ſmall importance, which I can now ſum up in theſe few words:
“ Where there is a liquoriſhneſs in a popular Aſſembly to debate, it
“ procedes not from the Conſtitution of the People, but of the Com-
a
Qui nimbos & non imitabile fulmen
Æ e, & cornipedum curſu ſimularat equorum.
+ Inerciſſimi nobiles, in quibus, ficut in ftatua, præter nomen nihil erat additamenti.
monwealth.
-
OCEAN A.
· 153
e monwealth. Now that your Commonwealth is of ſuch a Conſti-
" tution as is naturally free from this kind of intemperance, is that
“ which to make good, I muſt divide the remainder of my Diſcourſe
" into two parts.
" THE Firſt, ſhewing the ſeveral Conſtitutions of the Allem-
“ blys of the People in other Commonwealths.
" THE Second, comparing our Aſſembly of the People with
" theirs; and Thewing how it excludes the Inconveniences,
" and imbraces the Conveniences of them all.
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“ IN the beginning of the firſt Part I muſt take notice, that among
" the popular Errors of our days it is no ſmall one, that men imagin the
“ antient Governments of this kind to have conſiſted for the moſt
part
" of one City, that is, of one Town; wheras by what we have learnt
" of my Lords that opend them, it appears that there was not any
conſiderable one of ſuch a Conſtitution but Carthage, till this in our
days of Venice.
“ FOR to begin with Iſrael, it conſiſted of the twelve Tribes, lo-
"cally ſpread or quarter'd throout the whole Territory; and theſe be-
ing call’d together by Trumpets, conſtituted the Church or Aſſembly
“ of the People. The vaftneſs of this weight, as alſo the flowneſs
" thence inavoidable, became a great cauſe (as has bin ſhewn at large
" by my Lord PHOSPHORUS) of the breaking that Commonwealth;
“ notwithſtanding that the Temple, and thoſe religious Ceremonys
“ for which the People were at leaſt annually oblig’d to repair thither,
were no ſmall Ligament of the Tribes, otherwiſe but ſlightly tack'd
together.
“ ATHENS conſiſted of four Tribes, taking in the whole People
" both of the City and of the Territory ; not ſo gather'd by The-
seus into one Town, as to exclude the Country, but to the end
" that there might be ſom Capital of the Commonwealth : tho true it
“ be, that the Congregation conſiſting of the Inhabitants within the
" Walls, was ſufficient to all intents and purpoſes, without thoſe of
“ the Country. Theſe alſo being exceding numerous, became bur-
“ denſom to themſelves, and dangerous to the Commonwealth ; the
more for their ill education, as is obſerv'd by XENOPHON and
POLYBIUS, who compare them to Mariners that in a calm are
perpetually diſputing and ſwaggering one with another, and never
“ lay their hands to the common tackling or ſafety, till they be all in-
danger'd by ſom ſtorm. Which caus’d THUCYDIDES, when he
"ſaw this People thro the purchaſe of their miſery becom fo much
“ wiſer, as to reduce their Comitia or Aſſemblys to five thouſand, io
ſay in his eighth Book; And now, at leaſt in my time, the Athenians
" ſeem to have order'd their State aright, conſiſting of a moderat temper
both of the Few (by which he means the Senat of the Bean) and of the
Many, or the five thouſand. And he dos not only give you his judg-
ment, but the beſt proof of it; for this
, ſays he, was the firſt thing
as that, after ſo many misfortunes paſt, made the City again to raiſe her
"head. The place I would deſire your Lordſhips to note, as the firſt
"example that I find, or think is to be found, of a popular Aſſembly
by way of Repreſentative.
X
« LACE
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เ
Theſe gave
OC
“ LACEDEMON conſiſted of thirty thouſand Citizens diſpers’d
“throout Laconia, one of the greateſt Provinces in all Greece, and di-
“ vided, as by ſom Authors is probable, into fix Tribes. Of the
" whole body of theſe, being gather’d, conſiſted the great Church or
“Afſembly, which had the Legiſlative Power; the little Church, ga-
“ ther'd ſomtimes for matters of concern within the City, conſiſted of
" the Spartans only. Theſe happen'd, like that of Venice, to be good
“ Conftitutions of a Congregation, but from an ill cauſe the infirmity
of a Commonwealth, which thro her paucity was Oligarchical.
“ WHERFORE, go which way you will, it ſhould ſeem,
" that without a Repreſentative of the People, your Commonwealth
conſiſting of a whole Nation, can never avoid falling either into
" Oligarchy or Confuſion.
“ THIS was ſeen by the Romans, whoſe ruſtic Tribes extending
" themſelves from the River Arno to the Vulturnus, that is, from Fe-
Jule or Florence to Capua, invented a way of Repreſentative by Lots :
" the Tribe upon which the firſt fell, being the Prerogative; and ſom
“ two or three more that had the reſt, the Jure vocatæ,
“ the Suffrage of the Commonwealth in * two meetings; the Prero-
“ gative at the firſt Aſſembly, and the Jure vocatæ at a ſecond.
« NOW to make the parallel
, all the inconveniences that
you
have
“ obſerv'd in theſe Aſſemblys are ſhut out, and all the Conveniences
taken into your Prerogative. For firſt it is that for which Athens,
« ſhaking off the blame of XENOPHON and POLYBIUS, came
to deſerve the praiſe of THUCYDIDES, a Repreſentative. And,
“ ſecondly, not as I ſuſpect in that of Athens, and is paſt ſuſpicion in
o this of Rome, by lot, but by ſuffrage, as was alſo the late Houſe of
« Commons, by which means in your Prerogatives all the Tribes of
« Oceana are Jure vocatæ ; and if a man ſhall except againſt the pau-
city of the ſtanding number, it is a wheel, which in the revolution
« of a few years turns every land that is fit, or fits every hand that it
“ turns to the public work. Moreover, I am deceiv'd if upon due
« conſideration it dos not fetch your Tribes, with greater equality and
66 eaſe to themſelves and to the Government, from the Frontiers of
Marpeſia, than Rome ever brought any one of hers out of her Pomeria,
« or the neareſt parts of her adjoining Territorys. To this you may
" add, That wheças a Commonwealth, which in regard of the Peo-
“ple is not of facility in execution, were ſure enough in this Nation to
“ be caſt off thro impatience; your Muſters and Galaxys are given to
“ the People, as milk to Babes, wherby when they are brought up
« thro four days election in a whole year, (one at the Pariſh, one at the
“ Hundred, and two at the Tribe) to their ſtrongeſt meat, it is of no
“ harder digeſtion, than to give their Negative or Affirmative as they
“ fee cauſe. There be gallant men among us that laugh at ſuch an
" Appeal or Umpire; but I refer it whether you be more inclining to
“ pardon them or me, who I confeſs have bin this day laughing at a
“ ſober man, but without meaning him any harm, and that is PE-
TRUS Cunaus, where ſpeaking of the nature of the People, he
“ fays, that taking them apart, they are very ſimple, but yet in their Al-
“ Jemblys they ſee and know ſomthing: and ſo runs away without trou-
« bling himſelf with what that ſomthing is. Wheras the People,
* Binis Comitiis.
6 taken
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taken apart,
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The Conftituti-
won, Fun&tion,
• taken apart, are but ſo many privat Intereſts; but if you take them
“ together, they are the public Intereſt. The public Intereſt of a
« Commonwealth, as has bin ſhewn, is neareſt that of mankind, and
« that of mankind is right reaſon; but with Ariſtocracy (whoſe Rea-
“ ſon or Intereſt, when they are all together, as appear'd by the Patri-
“ cians, is but that of a Party) it is quite contrary : for as,
" they are far wiſer than the People conſider'd in that manner; ſo be-
" ing put together, they are ſuch fools, who by depoſing the People,
as did thoſe of Rome, will ſaw off the branch wherupon they fit,
or rather deſtroy the root of their own Greatneſs. Wherfore
“ MACCHIAVEL following ARISTOTLE, and yet going before
" him, may well aſſert, * That the People are wiſer and more conſtant in
“ their Reſolutions than a Prince; which is the Prerogative of popular
« Government for Wiſdom. And hence it is that the Prerogative of
your Commonwealth, as for Wiſdom ſo for Power, is in the People:
« which (tho I am not ignorant that the Roman Prerogative was ſo
"call'd à Prerogando, becauſe their Suffrage was firſt ask'd) gives the
denomination to your Prerogative Tribe.
THE Elections, whether Annual or Triennial, being ſhewn by the
twenty ſecond, that which coms in the next place to be conſider’d'is
THE twenty third ORDER, Sherring the Power, Function, and_23. Order.
manner of Proceding of the Prerogative Tribe.
THE Power or Function of the Prerogative is of two parts, the one of and manner of
Reſult, in which it is the Legiſlative Power; the other of Judicature, in which Proceding of
regard it is the higheſt Court, and the laſt appeal in this Commonwealth. the Prerogative
FOR the former part (the People by this Conſtitution being not oblig?d.
by any Law that is not of their own making or confirmation, by the reſult of
the Prerogative, their equal Repreſentative) it ſhall not be lawful for the
Senat to require obedience from the People, nor for the People to give obe-
dience to the Senat in or by any Law that has not bin promulgated, or print-
ed and publiſh'd for the space of ſix weeks; and afterwards propos d'by the
Authority of the Senat to the Prerogative Tribe, and reſolv'd by the major
Vote of the ſame in the Affirmative. Nor all the Senat have any power
to levy War, Men, or Mony, otherwiſe than by the conſent of the People
so given, or by a Law ſo enacted, except in caſes of Exigence, in which'it
is agreed, that the Power both of the Senat and the People ſhall be in the
Dictator, fo qualify’d, and for ſuch a term of time, as is according to that
Conſtitution already preſcribd. While a Law is in promulgation, the Cen-
fors Jhall animadvert upon the Senat, and the Tribuns upon the People, that
there be no laying of heads together, 'no Conventicles or canvalling to carry
on or oppoſe any thing; but that all may be don in a free and open way
.
FOR the latter part of the Power of the Prerogative, or that wherby
they are the Supreme Judicatory of this Nation, and of the Provinces of
the
same, the cognizance of Crimes againſt the Majeſty of the People, ſuch
as High Treaſon, as alſo of Peculat, that is, robbery of the Treaſury, or
defraudation of the Commonwealth, appertains to this Tribe. And if any
Perſon or Perſons, Provincials or Citizens, ſhall appeal to the People, it
belongs to the Prerogative to judg and determin the caſe ; provided that if
the Appeal be from any Court of Juſtice in this Nation or the Provinces,
* Che la multicudine è piu favia di piu conſtante che un Frencipe.
X 2
the
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O C E A N A.
begin and
the Appellant ſhall firſt depoſit a hundred Pounds in the Court from which
he appeals, to be forfeited to the ſame, if he be caſt in his Suit by the peo-
ple. But the Poiver of the Council of War being the expedition of this
Commonwealth, and the martial Law of the Strategus in the field, are
thoſe only from which there ſhall ly no Appeal to the People.
THẾ Proceding of the Prerogative in caſe of a Propoſition, is to be
thus orderd. The Magiſtrats, propoſing by Authority of the Senat, ſhall
rebearſe the whole matter, and expound it to the People': which don, they
Shall put the whole together to the Suffrage, with three Boxes, the
Negative, the Affirmative, and the Nonſincere : and the Suffrage ben
ing return'd. to the Tribuns, and number'd in the preſence of the Pro-
polers, if the major Vote be in the Nonſincere, the Propoſers shall de-
Sijt, and the Senat ſhall reſume the Debate. If the major Vote be in the
Negative, the Propoſers ſhall defift, and the Senat too.
But if the major
Vote be in the Affirmative, then the Tribe is clear, and the Propoſers ſhall
put
the whole matter, with the Negative and the Affirmative
(leaving out the Nonſincere), by Clauſes; and the Suffrages being taken and
number'd hy the Tribuns in the
preſence of the Propoſérs, ſhall be written and
reported by the Tribuns to the Senat. And that which is propos’d by the
Authority of the Senat, and confirm’d by the Command of the People, is
the Law of Oceana.
THE Proceding of the Prerogative in a caſe of Judicature is to be thus
order’d. The Tribuns being Auditors of all Cauſés appertaining to the
cog-
nizance of the People, ſhall have notice of the Suit or Trial, whether of
Appeal or otherwiſe, that is to be commenc’d; and if any one of them hall
accept of the ſame, it appertains to him to introduce it. A Cauſe being in-
troduc'd, and the People muſter d or aſſemblºd for the deciſion of the ſame,
the Tribuns are Preſidents of the Court, having power to keep it to Orders,
and ſhall be ſeated upon a Scaffold erected in the middle of the Tribe. Up-
on the right hand ſhall ſtand a Seat, or large Pulpit affign’d to the Plaintif,
or the Accuſer; and, upon the left, another for ihe Defendent, each if they
pleaſe with his Council. And the Tribuns (being attended upon fuch occa-
fions with ſo many Ballotins, Secretarys, Doorkeepers, and Meſſengers of
the Senat as ſhall be requiſit) one of them ſhall turn up a Glaſs of the na-
ture of an Hourglaſs
, but ſuch a one as is to be of an hour and a halfs run-
ning, which being turn'd up, the Party or Council on the right hand
begin to ſpeak to the People. If there be Papers to be read, or Witneſſes
to be examin'd, the Officer Ball lay the Glaſs ſideways till the Papers be read,
and the Witneſſes examin'd, and then turn it up, again; and ſo long as the
Glaſs is running, the Party on the right hand has liberty to ſpeak, and no
longer. The Party on the right hand having had his time, the like ſhall be
don in every reſpect for the Party on the left
. And the Cauſe being thus
heard, the Tribuns ſhall put the queſtion to the Tribe with a white, å black,
and á red Box (or Nonſincere) whether Guilty, or not Guilty. And if
the Suffrage being taken, the major Vote be in the Nonfincere, the Cauſe
Shall be rebeard upon the next juridical day following, and put to the queſtion
in the ſame manner. If the major Vote coms the ſecond time in the Non-
ſincere, the Cauje ſhall be heard again upon the third day: but at the third
bearing the queſtion ſhall be put irithout the Nonſincere. Upon the firſt
of the three days in which the major Vote cums in the white Box, the Par-
ty accus’d is abſolv’d; and upon the firſt of them in which it coms in the
black Box, the Party accus’d'is condemnd. The Party accus’d being con-
demnid, the Tribuns (if the caſe be criminal) Mall put with the white and
the
MAY
*
OCEAN A.
157
the bback Box theſe Queſtions, or ſuch of them, as, regard had to the caſe,
they ſhall conceive moſt proper.
N
+
1. WHETHER he ſhall have a Writ of eaſe.
2. WHETHER he ſhall be find ſo much, or ſo much.
3. WHETHER he ſhall be confiſcated.
4. WHETHER he ſhall be render'd incapable of Magiſtracy.
5. WHETHER he ſhall be baniſh’d.
6. WHETHER he ſhall be put to death.
THESE, or any three of theſe Queſtions, whether ſimple or ſuch as
Shall be thought fitly mix’d, being put by the Tribuns, that which has moſt
above half the votes in the black Box is the Sentence of the People, which
the Troop of the third Claſis is to ſee executed accordingly.
BUT wheras by the Conſtitution of this Commonwealth it may appear
that neither the Propoſitions of the Senat, nor the Judicature of the Peo-
ple, will be ſo frequent as to hold the Prerogative in continual imploy-
ment; the Senat, a main part of whoſe Office it is to teach and inſtruct the
People
, ſball duly (if they have no greater Affairs to divert them) cauſe
an Oration to be made to the Prerogative by ſom Knight or Magiſtrat of
the Senat, to be choſen out of the ableft men, and from time to time ap-
pointed by the Orator of the Houſe, in the great Hall of the Pantheon,
while the Parlament reſides in the Town; or in fom Grove or ſweet place in
the field, while the Parlament for the heat of the year ſhall reſide in the
Country; upon every Tueſday, morning or afternoon.
AND the Orator appointed for the time to this Office, ſhall firſt repeat
the Orders of the Commonwealth with all poſſible brevity; and then making
choice of one or ſom part of it, diſcourſe therof to the People. An Ora-
tion or Diſcourſe of this nature, being afterward perus’d by the Council of
State, may as they ſee cauſe be printed and publiſh’d.
THE ARCHON's Comment upon the Order I find to have bin
of this fenſe.
i
CC
66
My Lords,
TO
O crave pardon for a word or two in farther explanation of
what was read, I ſhall briefly ſhew how the Conſtitution of
“ this Tribe or Aſſembly anſwers to their Function; and how their
" Function, which is of two parts, the former in the Reſult or Legi-
" llative Power, the latter, in the ſupreme Judicature of tlie Common-
wealth, anſwers to their Conftitution. MACCHIAVEL has a
** Diſcourſe, where he puts the queſtion, Whether the guard of Liber-
ty may with more ſecurity be committed to the Nobility, or to the People.
" Which doubt of his ariſes thro the want of explaining his terms;
e for the guard
of Liberty can ſignify nothing elſe but the Reſult of the
“ Cominonwealth: fo that to lay, that the guard of Liberty may be
“ committed to the Nobility, is to ſay, that the Reſult may be com-
“ mitted to the Senat, in which caſe the People ſignify nothing. Now
to thew it was a miſtake to affirm it to have bin thus in Lacedemon,
“ ſufficient has bin ſpoken ; and wheras he will have have it to be ſo
66
.
..
158
(
-
6
i
OCEAN A.
“ in Venice alſo, *They, ſays CONTARINI, in whom reſides the Sis
preme Power of the whole Commonwealth, and of the Laws, and upon
whoſe Orders depends the Authority as well of the Senat as of all the o-
« ther Magiſtrats, is the GREAT COUNCIL. It is inſtitutively
" in the Great Council
, by the judgment of all that know that Com-
“monwealth ; tho for the Reaſons ſhewn, it be ſomtimes exercis'd
“ by the Senat. Nor need I run over the Commonwealths in this
place for the proof of a thing fo doubtleſs, and ſuch as has
“ bin already made ſo apparent, as that the Reſult of each was in
" the popular part of it. The popular part of yours, or the Prero-
gative Tribe, conſiſts of ſeven Deputys (wherof three are of the
“ Horſe) annually elected out of every Tribe of Oceana; which be-
ing fifty, amounts to one hundred and fifty Horſe, and two hundred
“ Foor. And the Prerogative conſiſting of three of theſe Liſts, con-
“ fifts of four hundred and fifty Horſe, and ſix hundred Foot, beſides
" thoſe of the Provinces to be hereafter mention'd; by which means
“ the overbalance in the Suffrage remaining to the Foot by one hun-
« dred and fifty Votes, you have to the ſupport of a true and natural
“ Ariſtocracy, the deepeſt root of a Democracy that has bin ever
“ planted. Wherfore there is nothing in Art or Nature better
qua-
“ lify'd for the Reſult than this Aſſembly. It is noted out of CICERO
by MACCHIAVEL, That the People, tho they are not ſo prone
“ to find out Truth of themſelves, as to follow Cuſtom, or run into
“ Error; yet if they be ſewn Truth, they not only acknowlege and
“ imbrace it very ſuddenly, but are the moſt conſtant and faithful
“ Guardians and Conſervators of it. It is your Duty and Office,
“ wherto you are alſo qualify'd by the Orders of this Commonwealth,
to have the People as you have your Hauks and Greyhounds, in
“ Leaſes and Slips, to range the Fields, and beat the Buſhes for them;
« for they are of a nature that is never good at this ſport, but when
you ſpring or ſtart their proper quarry. Think not that they will
“ ſtand to ask you what it is, or leſs know it than your Hauks and
á Greyhounds do theirs ; but preſently make ſuch a fight or courſe,
“ that a Huntſman may as well undertake to run with his Dogs, or a
“ Falconer to fly with his Hauk, as an Ariſtocracy at this game to
compare with the People. The People of Rome were poſſeft of no
« leſs a prey than the Empire of the World, when the Nobility turn'd
“ tails, and perch'd among Daws upon the Tower of Monarchy.
“ For tho they did not all of them intend the thing, they would none
« of them indure the Remedy, which was the Agrarian.
“ BUT the Prerogative Tribe has not only the Reſult, but is the
“ Supreme Judicature, and the ultimat Appeal in this Commonwealth.
" For the popular Government that makes account to be of any
“ ſtanding, muſt make ſure in the firſt place of the of Appeal to the
People. As an Eſtate in truſt becoms a man's own, if he be not
“ anſwerable for it; ſo the Power of a Magiſtracy not accountable to
“ the People, from whom it was receiv’d, becoming of privat uſe,
“ the Commonwealth loſes her Liberty. Wherfore the Right of Su-
ti
.
1
* Quello appreſſo il quale e la fumma autorita di tutta la città, e delle leggi & decreti, de i
quali jende l'autorità coſi del Senato come anccra di tutti i Magiſtrati, e il Contiglio Grunde.
† Ante omnes de provocatione adverſus Magiſtracus ad Populum, facrandcque cum bonis capite
ejus, qui regni cccupandi confilia inüiffet.
preme
OCE À N A.
159
CC
06
CC
06 QUINTIus CINCINNATUS was created Dictator; who hav.
preme Judicature in the People (without which there can be rio
“ ſuch thing as popular Government) is confirm’d by the conſtant
« practice of all Commonwealths; as that of Iſrael'in the caſes of
"ACHAN, and of the Tribe of BENJAMIN, adjudg’d by the
“ Congregation. The Dicaſterion or Court call the Heliaia in Athens,
" which (the Comitia of that Commonwealth conſiſting of the whole
People, and ſo being too numerous to be a Judicatory) was conſti-
“ tured comtimes of five hundred, at others of one thouſand, or, ac-
cording to the greatneſs of the cauſe, of fifteen hundred, elected by
" the Lot out of the whole Body of the People
, had with the nine
“ Archons that were Preſidents, the cognizance of ſuch Cauſes
as were of higheſt importance in that State. The five Ephors in
" Lacedemon, which were popular Magiſtrats, might queſtion their
Kings, as appears by the caſes of PAUSANIAS, and of Agis,
who being upon his Trial in this Court, was cry'd to by his Mother
to appeal to the People, as PLUTARCH has it in his Life. The
“ Tribuns of the People of Rome (like, in the nature of their Magi-
ſtracy, and for ſom time in number, to the Ephors, as being, ac;
“cording to HALICARNASSE us and PLUTARCH, inſtituted
“ in imitation of them) had power of to ſummon any man, his Magi-
“ ſtracy at leaſt being expir'd (for from the Dictator there lay no Ap-
peal) to anſwer for himſelf to the People. As in the caſe of CORI-
OLA NUs, who was going about to force the People, by withhold-
ing Corn from them in a Famin, to relinquiſh the Magiſtracy of the
« Tribuns; in that of Spurius Cassius for affecting Tyranny;
“ of Marcus Sergius for running away at Veii; of Caius
“ Lucretius for ſpoiling his Province ; of Junius SIL ANUS
" for making War, without a command from the People, againſt the
6 Cimbri; with divers others. And the Crimes of this nature were
callid Laſa Majeſtatis, or High Treaſon. Examples of ſuch as were
" arrain’d or try'd for Peculat, or Defraudation of the Common-
" wealth, were Marcus Currus, for intercepting the Mony of
" the Samnits ; SALINATOR, for the inequal diviſion of Spoils to
“ his Soldiers; MARCUS POSTHUMIUS, for cheating the Com-
« monwealth by a feign'd Shipwreck. Cauſes of theſe two kinds
" were of a more public nature; but the like Power upon Appeals
was alſo exercis'd by the People in privat matters, even during the
“
time of the Kings; as in the caſe of HORATIU S.
"Sotherwiſe with Venice, where the Doge LOREDANO was ſentencd
" by the Great Council ; and ANTONIO GRIMANI, afterwards
"Doge, queſtion?d, for that he being Admiral had ſuffer'd the Turi
" to take Lepanto in view of his Fleet,
"NEVERTHELESS, there lay no Appeal from the Rom.ir
Dictator to the People; which if there had, might have coſt the
Commonwealth dear, when Spurius Melius affecting Empire,
circumvented and debauch'd the Tribuns : wherupon Titus
ing choſen SERVILIus AHALA to be his Lieutenant, or Ma-
gifter Equitum, ſent him to apprehend Melius, whom, while
he diſputed the Commands of the Di&ator, and implor'd the aid of
" the People, AHA LA cut off upon the place. By which example
CG
-
Nor is it
CC
CC
66
+ Diem dicere.
“ you
160
OCEAN A.
SC
to
you may ſee in what caſes the Dictator may prevent the Blow whichi
is ready fomtims to fall e’re the People be aware of the Danger.
“ Wherfore there lys no Appeal from the Dieci, or the Council of Ten,
“ in Venice, to the Great Council
, nor from our Council of War to
" the People. For the way of proceding of this Tribe, or thë Bal-
“ lot, it is, as was once ſaid for all, Venetian.
« THÍS Diſcourſe of Judicatorys wherupon we are faln, brings
us rather naturally than of deſign from the two general Orders of
every Commonwealth, that is to ſay, from the debating part or the
“ Senat, and the reſolving part or the People, to the third, which is
“ the executive part or the Magiſtracy, wherupon I ſhall have no need
dwell: For the executive Magiſtrats of this Commonwealth are
* the Strategus in Arms; the Signory in their ſeveral Courts, as the
“ Chancery, the Exchequer; as alſo the Councils in divers caſes witli-
« in their Inſtructions; the Cenſors as well in their proper Magiftra-
cy, as in the Council of Religion; the Tribuns in the Government
“ of the Prerogative, and that Judicatory, and the Judges with their
“ Courts : Of all which ſo much is already ſaid or known as may
66 fuffice.
“ THE Tueſday Lectures or Orations to the People will be of
great benefit to the Scnat, the Prerogative, and the whole Nation.
" To the Senat, becauſe they will not only teach your Senators Elocu-
“ tion, but keep the Syſtem of the Government in their memorys.
“ Elocution is of great uſe to your Senators; for if they do not un-
“ derſtand Rhetoric (giving it at this time for granted, that the Art
“ were not otherwiſe good) and com to treat with, or vindicat the
“ cauſe of the Commonwealth againſt ſom other Nation that is good
" at it, the advantage will be ſubject to remain upon the merit of the
“ Art, and not upon the merit of the Cauſe. Furthermore, the Ge-
" nius or Soul of this Government being in the whole and in
every
part, they will never be of ability in determination upon any par-
ticular, unleſs at the ſame time they have an Idea of the whole.
“ That this therfore muſt be, in that regard, of equal benefit to the
« Prerogative, is plain; tho theſe have a greater concernment in it.
6. For this Commonwealth is the Eſtate of the People: and a man,
you know, tho he be virtuous, yet if he dos not underſtand his
“ Eſtate, may run out or be cheated of it. Laſt of all, the Trea-
“ ſures of the Politics will by this means be ſo open'd, rifcd, and di-
ſpers’d, that this Nation will as ſoon dote, like the Indians, upon
“ glaſs Beads, as diſturb your Government with Whimſys and Freaks
“ of Motherwit ; or ſuffer themſelves to be ſtutter'd out of their Li-
« bertys. There is not any reaſon why your Grandees, your wiſe
men of this Age, that laughout and openly at a Commonwealth as
" the moſt ridiculous thing, do not appear to be, as in this regard they
are, mere Idiots, but that the People have not eys.
THERE remains no more relating to the Senat and the People
than
66
<<
24. Order.
Conſtitution of
THE twenty fourth ORDER, wherby it is lawful for the Pro-
el seu provincial vince of Marpeſia to have 30 Knights of their own election continually
,
part of the Se-preſent in the Senat of Oceana, together with 60 Deputys of Horſe
, and
nat and the 120 of Foot in the Prerogative Tribe, indu'd with equal Power (reſpect
People.
had
OCEAN A.
161
40,0f
had to their quality and number) in the Debate and Reſult of this Com.
monwealth : provided that they obſerve the Courſe or Rotation of the ſame
by the annual Return of 10 Knights, 20 Deputys of the Horſe, and
the Foot. The like in all reſpects is lawful for Panopua ; and the Horſe of
both the Provinces amounting to one Troop, and the Foot to one Company,
one Captain and one Cornet of the Horſe ſhall be annually choſen by Marpeſia,
and one Captain and one Enſign of the Foot [bill be annually choſen, by Pa-
nopea.
THE Orb of the Prerogative being tlus complete, is not unna-
turally compar'd to that of the Moon, either in conſideration of the
Light borrow'd from the Senat, as from the Sun; or of the ebs and
floods of the People, which are mark’d by the Negative or Affirmative
of this Tribe. And the Conſtitution of the Senat and the People be- Conſtitution of
ing ſhewn, you have that of the Parlament of Oceana, conſiſting of the Parlament.
the Senat propoſing, and of the People reſolving; which amounts to
an Act of Parlament. So the Parlament is the Heart, which, conſiſt-
ing of two Ventricles, the one greater and repleniſh'd with a groſſer
matter, the other leſs and full of a purer, ſucks in, and ſpouts forth
the vital Blood of Oceana by a perpetual Circulation. Wherfore the
life of this Government is no more unnatural or obnoxious upon this
ſcore to diſſolution, than that of a Man ; nor to giddineſs than the
World: ſeeing the Earth, whether it be it ſelf or the Heavens that are
in rotation, is ſo far from being giddy, that it could not ſubſiſt without
motion. But why ſhould not this Government be much rather capable
of duration and ſteddineſs by motion ? than which God has ordain'd no
other to the univerſal Commonwealth of Mankind : ſeeing one Genera-
tion coms; and another gos, but the Earth remains firm for ever; that is,
in her proper Situation or Place, whether ſhe be mov'd or not mov'd up-
on her proper Center. The Senat, the People, and the Magiſtracy, or
the Parlament ſo conſtituted, as you have ſeen, is the Guardian of this
Commoriwealth, and the Husband of ſuch a Wife as is elegantly de-
fcrib'd by SOLOMON. She is like the Merchant's Ship; ſhe brings her Prov. 31,
Food from far. She conſiders a Field, and buys it: With the fruit of her
hands fhe plants a Vineyard. She perceives that her Merchandize is good.
She ſtretches forth her hands to the Poor. She is not afraid of the Snow
for her Houſhold; for all her Houſhold are cloth'd with Scarlet. She
makes her Self Coverings of Tapeſtry; her Clothing is Silk and Purple.
Her Husband is known (by his Robes) in the Gates, when he fits among the
Senators of the Land. The Gates, or inferior Courts, were branches
it were of the Sanhedrim or Senat of Iſrael. Nor is our Common-
wealth a worſe Houſwife, or ſhe has leſs regard to her Magiſtrats ; as
may appear by
THE twenty fifth OR DER: That
, wheras the public Revenue 25. Order.
is thro the late Civil Wars dilapidated, the Exciſe, being improv’d or im-
provable to the Revenite of one Million, be apply'd for the ſpace of eleven
years to com, to the reparation of the ſame, and
for the preſent maintenance
of the Magiſtrats, Knights, Deputys, and other Officers, who according to
their Jeveral Dignitys and Functions, ſhall annually receive towards the
Support of the ſame, as follows.
y
THE
ܪ
as
T
162
OCEAN A.
lib. per ann.
THE Lord Strategus Marching, is, upon another account, to have
Field Pay as General.
THE Lord Strategus ſitting-
2000
THE Lord Orator.
2000
THE three Commiſſioners of the Seal.
4500
THE three Commiſioners of the Treaſury.
4500
THE two-Cenſors
3000
THE 290 Knights, at 500l. a man-
145000
THE 4 Embaſſadors in Ordinary
I 2000
THE Council of War for Intelligence-
3000
THE Maſter of the Ceremonys
500
THE Maſter of the Horſe-
goo
HIS Subſtitute
150
THE 12 Ballotins for their Winter Liverys
240
FOR their Summer Liverys-
120
FOR their Boardwages
480
FOR the keeping of three Coaches of State, 24 Coachhorſes,
with Coachmen and Poftilions
1500
FOR the Grooms, and keeping of 16 great Horſes for the
Maſter of the Horſe, and for the Ballotins whom he is to 480
govern and inſtruct in the Art of Riding
THE 20 Secretarys of the Parlament-
THE 20 Doorkeepers, who are to attend with Poleaxes ; for
200
their Coats
FOR their Boardwages
THE 20 Meſſengers, which are Trumpeters, for their Coats-
FOR their Boardwages
FOR Ornament of the Muſters of the Touth
5000
Sum 189370
!
to?
2000
IOCO
200
I000
1
OVT of the perſonal Eſtates of every man, who at his Death bequeaths
not above forty Shillings to the Muſter of that Hundred wherin it lys, ſhall
be levy'd one per cent. till the ſolid Revenue of the Müſter of the Hun-
dred amonnts to 50 l. per annum for the Prizes of the Touth,
THE twelve Ballotins are to be divided into three Regions, according
to the courſe of the Senat; the four of the first Region to be elected at the
Tropic out of ſuch Children as the Knights of the same ſpall offer, not being
under eleven years of Age, nor above thirteen. And their Elečtion ſhall be
made by the Lot at an Vrn ſet by the Serjeant of the Houſe for that
pura
Poſe in the Hall of the Pantheon. The Livery of the Commonwealth for
the faſhion or the color may be chang’d at the Election of the Strategus
according to his phanſy
. But every Knight during his Seffion ſhall be bound
to give to his Footman, or fom one of his Footmen, the Livery of the
Commonivealth.
>
THE Prerogative Tribe ſhall receive as follows.
lib.by the week.
THE 2 Tribuns of the Horſe
14
THE 2 Tribuns of the Foot
THE 3 Captains of Horſe-
IS
THE
I2
+
OCEAN A.
163
I2
884
THE
3
Cornets
9
THE 3 Captains of Foot
THE 3 Enſigns
7
THE
442 Horſe, at 21. a man
THE 592 Foot, at il. 10 . a man-
888
THE 6Trumpeters
7 IOS.
THE 3 Drummers
55.
SU M by the Week-1850 155.
2
leven
SUM by the Year 96239
THÈ Total of the Senat, the People,andthe Magiſtracy, 287459 155.
THE Dignity of the Commonwealth, and Aids of the ſeveral Magiſtra-
cys and Offices therto belonging, being provided for
as aforeſaid, the Overplus
of the Exciſe, with the Product of the Sum riſing, ſhall be carefully ma-
nag’d by the Senat and the People thro the diligence of the Officers of the Ex-
chequer, till it amounts to eight Millions, or to the purchaſe of about four
hundred thouſand Pounds fólid Revenue. At which time, the term of e-
years being expir’d, the Exciſe, except it be otherwiſe order'd by the
Senat and the People, Shall be totally remitted and aboliſh'd for ever.
AT this Inſtitution the Taxes, as will better appear in the Corolla-
ry, were abated about one half, which made the Order when it came
to be taſted, to be of good reliſh with the People in the very begin-
ning; tho the Advantages then were no ways comparable to the Con-
ſequences to be hereafter ſhewn. Nevertheleſs
, my Lord EPIMO-
Nus, who with much ado had bin held till now, found it midſummer
Moon, and broke out of Bedlam in this manner.
CC
My Lord ARCHON,
I
HAVE a ſinging in my head like that of a Cartwheel, my
Brains are upon a Rotation; and ſom are ſo merry, that a man
cannot ſpeak his griefs, but if your highſhod Prerogative, and thoſe
" fame ſlouching Fellows your Tribuns, do not take my Lord Strate-
gus's, and my Lord Orator's heads, and jole them together under
" the Canopy, then let me be ridiculous to all Pofterity. For here is
" a Commonwealth, to which if a man ſhould take that of the Pren-
“ tices in their antient Adminiſtration of Juſtice at Shrovetide, it were
an Ariſtocracy. You have ſet the very Rabble with Troncheons
in their hands, and the Gentry of this Nation like Cocks with Scar-
" let Gills, and the Golden Combs of their Salarys to boot, left they
« ſhould not be thrown at.
“ NOT a Night can I ſleep for ſom horrid Apparition or other;
one while theſe
Myrmidons are meaſuring Silks by their Quarter-
( ftaves; another, ſtuffing their greafy Pouches with my Lord High
• Treaſurers Jacobuſſes. For they are above a thouſand in Arms to
three hundred, which, their Gowns being puld over their ears,
are but in their Doublets and Hoſe. But what do I ſpeak of a thou-
" land ? there be two thouſand in every Tribe, that is, a hundred
thouſand in the whole Nation, not only in the poſture of an Army,
Y 2
but
::
164
1
OCEAN A.
I but in a civil Capacity fufficient to give us what Laws they pleaſe:
“ Now every body knows, that the lower fort of People regard no-
" thing but Many; and you ſay it is the Duty of a Legiſlator to pre-
“ ſume all men to be wicked: wherfore they muſt fall upon the
“ richer, as they are an Army, or, left their minds ſhould miſgive them
" in ſuch a villany, you have given them incouragement that they
“ have a nearer way, ſeeing it may be don every whit as well as by
" the overbalancing Power which they have in Élections. There is
a Fair which is annually kept in the Center of theſe Territorys at
Kiberton, a Town famous for Ale, and frequented by good Fel-
“ lows, where there is a Solemnity of the Pipers and Fidlers of this
“ Națion (I know not whether Lacedemon, where the Senat kept ac-
ççunt of the ſtops of the Flutes and of the Fiddleſtrings of that
Commonwealth, had any ſuch Cuſtom) call?d the Bulrunning ;
" and he that catches and holds the Bull, is the annual and ſupreme
Magiſtrat of that Comitia or Congregation, call'd King Piper ;
" without whoſe Licence it is not lawful for any of thoſe Citizens to
injoy the liberty of his Calling; nor is he otherwiſe legitimatly
qualify'd (or civitate donatus) to lead Apes or Bears in any Per-
ambulation of the fame. Mine Hoſt of the Bear, in Kibertón, the
Father of Ale, and Patron of good Footbal and Cudgelplayers, has
any time ſince I can remember, bin Grand Chancellor of this Order.
“ Now, ſay I, ſeeing great things ariſe from ſmall beginnings, what
“ fhould hinder the People, prone to their own: Advantage, and lov-
ing Mony, from having Intelligence convey'd to them by this fame
King. Piger and his Chancellor, with their Loyal Subjects the Min-
" ftrils and Bearwards, Mafters of Çeremonys, to which there is
great recourſe in their reſpective Perambulations, and which they
" will commiſſion and inſtruct, with Directions to all the Tribes,
“ willing and commanding them, that as they wiſh their own good,
" they chufe no other into the next primum Mobile, but of the ablert
“ Cudgel and Footbalplayers ? Which don as ſoon as ſaid, your
primum Mobile conſiſting of no other ſtuff, muſt of neceſſity be
“ drawn.forth into your Nebulones, and your Galimofrys; and ſo the
“ filken Purſes of your Senat and Prerogative being made of Sows
ears, moſt of them Blackſmiths, they will ſtrike while the Iron is
“ hot, and beat your Eſtates into Hobnails; mine Hoſt of the Bear
“ being Strategus, and King Piper Lord Orator. Well
, my Lords, it
" might have bin otherwiſe expreft, but this is. well: enough a cona
" ſcience. In.youn way, the W.it of man ſhall not prevent this or the
“ like Inconvenience ;, but if, this (for I have confer'd with Artiſts)
" he a. mathematical: Demonſtration, I could kneel to you, that, e're
“ it
, he toq,late we might return to ſom kind of Sobriety:
"IF we emty, our Purſes with theſe Pomps, Salarys, Coaches,
Lacquys, and Pages, what can the People ſay leſs than that we
have dreſt.a. Sepaf and 4,Prerogative for nothing, but to go to the
“ Park, with the Ladys?
MY LardịA,,CH,9:N,, whoſe meekneſs.reſembl'd that:of MO SE S;
vauchſaf?d,this. Anſwer.
1
ch.
C
Mỹ
OCEAN A
165
* To love and i1ot injoy, is the way to break ones heart.
F
*
CC
My Lords
OR all this, I can ſee my Lord EPIMONUS every night in
the Park, and with Ladys; nor do I blame this in a young
Man, or the Reſpect which is and ought to be given to a Sex that is
one half of the Commonwealth of Mankind, and without which
“ the other would be none : But our Magiſtrats, I doubt, may be ſom-
“ what of the oldeſt to perform this part with much acceptation;
and, as the Italian Proverb ſays, * Servire & non gradire è coſa dá
far morire. Wherfore we will lay no certain Obligation upon them
in this point, but leave them, if it pleaſe you, to their own fate or
« diſcretion. But this (for I know my Lord EPIMonus loves me,
" tho I can never get his eſteem) I'will ſay, if he had a Miſtreſs
" ſhould uſe him ſo, he would find it a fad Life ; or I appeal to your
Lordſhips, how I can reſent it from ſuch a Friend, that he puts
King Piper's Politics in the Balance with mine. King Piper, I dený
not, may teach his Bears to dance, but they have the worſt ear of
all Creatures. Now how he ſhould make them keep time in fifty
ſeveral Tribes, and that two years together, for elſe it will be to
no purpoſe, may be a ſmall matter with my Lord to promiſe; but
“ it ſeems to me of impoſſible performance. "Firſt, Thro the nature
" of the Bean; and, Secondly, thro that of the Ballot; or how what
" he has hitherto thought ſo hard, is now com to be eaſy : but he
may think, that for expedition they will eat up theſe Balls like Apa
ples. However, there is ſo much more in their way by the Conſti-
" tution of this, than is to be found in that of any other Common-
" wealth, that I am reconcild; it now appearing plainly, that the
" Points of my Lord's Arrows are directed at no other White, than
to ſhew the excellency of our Government above others; which, as
she procedes further, is yet plainer ; while he makes it appear, that
" there can be no other elected by the People but Smiths,
Bronteſque Steropeſque & nudus membra Pyracmon :
"OTHONIEL, A OD, GIDEON, JEPHTHA, SAMSON, as in
" Ifrael: MID TIADES, ARISTIDES, THEMISTOCLES, CI-
MON, PERICL es, as in Athens : PAPYRIU'S, CINCINNA-
TUS, CAMILLUs, FABIUS, SCIPIO, as in Rome : Smiths of
" the fortune of the Commonwealth ; not ſuch as forgd Hobrails,
a but Thunderbolts: Popular Elections are of that kind, that all the
“ reſt of the World is not able, either in number or glory, to equal
" thoſe of theſe three Commonwealthis. Theſe indeed were the
ableſt cudgel and Footbal-players ; bright Arms were their
Cudgels, and the World was the Ball that lay at their feet. Wher-
fore
we are not ſo to underſtand the Maxim of Legiſlators, which
es holds all men to be wicked; as if it related to Mankind or a Com-
monwealth, the Intereſts' wherof are the only ſtrait lines they
have wherby, to reform the crooked; but as it relates
to every Man
" or Party, under what color ſoever he or they pretend to be truſted
(6
(C
<t
«
" apart,
?
166
46
(
OCE A N A.
apart, with or by the whole. Hence then it is deriv'd, which is
“ made good in all experience, that the Ariſtocracy is -ravenous, and
not the People. Your Highwaymen are not ſuch as have Trades,
or have bin brought up to Induſtry; but ſuch commonly whoſe
“ Education has pretended to that of Gentlemen. My Lord is ſo ho-
“ neſt, he dos not know the Maxims that are of abſolute neceſſity to
“ the Arts of Wickedneſs; for it is moſt certain, if there be not more
“ Purſes than Thieves, that the Thieves themſelves muſt be forc'd to
" turn honeſt, becauſe they cannot thrive by their Trade: But now
“ if the People ſhould turn Thieves, who ſees not that there would
“ be more Thieves than Purſes? Wherfore that a whole People
• ſhould turn Robbers or Levellers, is as impoſſible in the end as in
the means. But that I do not think your Artiſt which you men-
« tion'd, whetler Aſtronomer or Arithmetician, can tell me how
many Barlycorns would reach to the Sun; I could be content he
were call'd to the account, with which I ſhall conclude this point :
“ when by the way I have chid my Lords the Legiſlators, who, as
“ if they doubted my Tackling could not hold, would leave me to flag
" in a perpetual Calm, but for my Lord Epimo nus, who breaths
nowand then into my Sails, and ſtirs the Waters. A Ship makes not
“ her way fo briskly, as when ſhe is handſomly bruſh'd by the Waves,
66.and tumbles over thoſe that ſeem to tumble againſt her ; in which
- caſe I have perceiv'd in the dark, that Light has bin ſtruck even out
6 of the Sea, as in this place, where my Lord EPIMON U s feigning
to give us a demonſtration of one thing, has given it of another,
« and of a better. For the People of this Nation, if they amount
“ in each Tribe to two thouſand Elders, and two thouſand Youths,
upon the annual Roll, holding a fifth to the whole Tribe; then the
“ whole of a Tribe, not accounting Women and Children, muſt a-
“ mount to twenty thouſand; and lo the whole of all the Tribes, be-
ing fifty, to one Million. Now you have ten thouſand Pariſhes,
“ and reckoning theſe one with another, each at one thouſand pounds
a Year dry Rent, the Rent or Revenue of the Nation, as it is or
“ might be let to Farm, amounts to ten Millions; and ten Millions
« in Revenue divided equally to one Million of men, coms but-to
ten pounds a year to cach wherwith to maintain himſelf, his Wife
" and Children. But he that has a Cow upon tlie Common, and
earns his Shilling by the day at his labor, has twice as much already
as this would com to for his ſhare; becauſe if the Land were thus
divided, there would be no body to ſet him on work. So
my
Lord
“EPIMónus's Footman, who cofts him thrice as much as one of
" theſe could thus ger, would certainly loſe by this bargain. What
“ ſhould we ſpeak of thoſe innumerable Trades wherupon men live,
not only better than others upon good ſhares of Lands, but becom
alſo purchaſers of greater Eſtates? Is not this the demonſtration
Lord meant, that the Revenue of Induſtry in a Nation,
at leaſt in this, is three or fourfold greater than that of the mere
“ Rent? If the People then obſtruct Induſtry, they obſtruct their
livelihood; but if they make a War, they obſtruct Induſtry.
« Take the Bread out of the Peoples mouths, as did the Roman Patri-
cians, and you are ſure enough of a War, in which caſe they may
“ be Levellers ; but our Agrarian cauſes their Induſtry to flow with
“ Milk and Hony. It will be own'd, that this is true, if the People
CC
66
46
Who.
for
which my
C
own
66
were
.
....
167
66 the truer.
«C
OC E A N A.
were given * to underſtand their own happineſs; But where is it
" they do that? Let me reply with the like queſtion, Where do they
« not? They do not know their happineſs it should ſeem in France,
« Spain, and Italy : bur teach them what it is, and try whoſe Senſe is
As to the late Wars in Germany, it has bin affirm'd to
« me there, that the Princes could never make the People to take
" Arms while they had Bread, and have therfore ſuffer'd Countrys
now and then to be waſted, that they might get Soldiers. This
you will find to be the certain pulſe and temper of the People; and
" if they have bin already prov'd to be the moſt wiſe and conſtant
" Order of a Government, why ſhould we think (when no man can
" produce one Example of the common Soldiery in an Army muti-
nying becauſe they had not Captains pay) that the Prerogative
ſhould jole the heads of the Senat together, becauſe theſe liave the
" better Salarys; when it muſt be as evident to the People in a Nation,
as to the Soldiery in an Army, that it is no more poſſible their Emo-
« luments of this kind ſhould be afforded by any Commonwealth in
" the World to be made equal with thoſe of the Senat, than that the
common Soldiers ſhould be equal with the Caprains? It is enough
for the common Soldier, that his Virtue may bring him to be a
Captain, and more to the Prerogative, that each of them is neater
to be a Senator.
“If my Lord thinks our Salarys too great, and that the Com-
monwealth is not Houſwife enough; whether is it better Houſ-
wifery that ſhe ſhould keep her Family from the Snow, or ſuffer
them to burn her Houſe that they may warm themſelves ? for one
of theſe muſt be. Do you think that ſhe came off at a cheaper
rate, when men had their Rewards by a thouſand, two thouſand
pounds a Year in Land of Inheritance? If you fay, that they will
be more godly than they have bin, it may be ill taken ; and if you
cannot promiſe that, it is time we find out fom way of ſtiating at
leaſt, if not caring them of that ſame facra Fames. On the other
fide, if a poor man (as ſuch a one may ſave a City) gives his
ſweat to the Public, with what conſcience can you ſuffer his Family
in the mean time to ſtarve? But he that lays his hand to this Plow,
" ſhall not loſe by taking it off from his own: and a Commonwealth
" that will mend this, ſhall be penny wiſe. The Sanhedrim of Iſrael
being the Supreme, and a conſtant Court of Judicature, could not
“chule but be exceding gainful
. The Senat of the Bean in Athens,
becauſe it was but annual, was moderatly ſalariated; but that of
the Areopagits being for Life, bountifully : and what advantages
" the Senators of Lacedemon had, where there was little Mony or
a uſe of it, were in Honors for life. The Patricians having no profit,
took all
. Venice being a Situation, wliere a man gos bur to the
door for his Imployment, the Honor is great, and the Reward
very
" little: but in Holland a Counſillor of State has fifteen hundred Fles
s millb Pounds a Year, beſides other Accommodations. The States
" General have more.' And that Commonwealth looks nearer her
Penny than ours needs to do.
CC
1
to fortunati nimium, bona'fi fua nôrint,
Agricola !
SFOR
168
OCEAN A.
(C
CC
G
CC
06
“ FOR the Revenue of this .Nation, beſides that of her Incuſtry;
“ ir amounts, as lias bin Mcwn, to ten Millions; and the Salarys in
" the whole com not to three hundred thouſand Pounds a Ycar. "The
Beauty they will add to the Commonwealth will be exceding great,
and the People will delight in this Beauty of their Commonwcalth;
the Incouragement they will give to the ſtudy of the Public being
very profitable, the Accommodation they will afford to your Magi-
“ ſtrats very honorable and eaſy. And the Sum, when it or twice as
much was ſpent in Hunting and Houſekeeping, was never any grie-
vance to the People. I am aſham'd to ſtand huckling upon this
Point; it is ſordid. Your Magiſtrats are rather to be provided with
“ further Accommodations. For what if there ſhould be Sickneſs?
" whither will you have them to remove ? And this City in the
ſoundeſt Times, for the heat of the Year, is no wliolſom abode :
have a care of their Healths to whom you commit your own. I
would have the Senat and the People, except they ſee cauſe to the
contrary, every firſt of June to remove into the Country Air for
“ the ſpace of three months. You are better fitted with Summer-
“ houſes for them, than if you had built them to that purpoſe. There
is ſom twelve miles diſtant the Convallium upon the River Halcio-
nia, for the Tribuns and the Prerogative, a Palace capable of a
thouſand Men : and twenty miles diſtant you have Mount Celia,
reverend as well for the Antiquity as State of a Caſtle completely
capable of the Senat: the Propoſers having Lodgings in the Conval-
lium, and the Tribuns in Celia, it holds the Correſpondency be-
tween the Senat and the People exactly. And it is a ſmall matter
for the Propoſers, being attended with the Coaches and Officers of
State, beſides other Conveniences of their own, to go a matter of
five or ten miles (thoſe Seats are not much further diſtant) to
meet the People upon any Heath or Field that ſhall be appointed :
where, having diſpatch'd their buſineſs, they may hunt their own
Venizon (for I would have the great wall’d Park upon the Hal-
cionia to belong to the Signory, and thoſe about the Convalliuni to
" the Tribuns) and ſo go to ſupper. Pray, my Lords, ſee that they
“ do not pull down theſe Houſes to ſell the Lead of them; for when
you have conſider'd on't, they cannot be ſpar’d. The Founders of
" the School in Hiera provided that the Boys ſhould have a Summer
“ Seat. You ſhould have as much care of theſe Magiſtrats. But
there is ſuch a ſelling, ſuch a Jewiſh humor in our Republicans, that
" I cannot tell what to ſay to it; only this, any man that knows what
« belongs to a Commonwealth, or how diligent every Nation in that
caſe has bin to preſerve her Ornaments, and ſhall ſee the waſt late-
ly made (the Woods adjoining to this City, which fervºd for the
s delight and health of it, being cut down to be ſold for three pence)
" will tell you, that they who did ſuch things would never have made
" a Commonwealth. The like may be ſaid of the Ruin or Damage
S don upon our Cathedrals, Ornaments in which this Nation excels
" all others. Nor ſhall this ever be excus'd upon the ſcore of Reli-
gion; for tho it be true, that God dwells not in Houſes made with
“ lands, yet you cannot hold your Aſſemblys but in ſuch Houſes, and
«. theſe are of the beſt that have bin made with hands. Nor is it well
« argu'd that they are pompous, and therfore profane, or leſs proper
« for Divine Service ; ſeeing the Chriſtians in the Primitive Church
obo
" choſe
CC
ift
C6
OCEAN A.
169
66
porium,
“ choſe to meet with one accord in the Temple ; ſo far were they from
any inclination to pull it down.
THE Orders of this Commonwealth, ſo far, or near ſo far as they
concern the Elders, together with the ſeveral Speeches at the Inſtitu-
tion, which
may
ſerve for the better underſtanding of them as ſo ma-
ny Commentaries, being ſhewn; I ſhould now com from the El.
ders to the Youth, or from the Civil Conſtitution of this Government
to the Military, but that I judg this the fitteſt place wherinto, by the
way, to inſert the Government of the City, tho for the preſent but
perfunctorily,
THE Metropolis or Capital City of Oceana is commonly calld Empo- The Governa
rium, tho it conſists of two Citys diſtinct, as well in Name as in Goveriz
. ment of Em-
ment, wherof the other is call' d Hiera: For which cauſe I ſhall treat of
each
apart, beginning with Emporium.
EMPORIUM; with the Libertys is under a twofold Diviſion, the The City,
one regarding the National, and the other the Vrban or City Government. Wards.
It is divided, in regard of the National Government, into three Tribes,
and in reſpect of the Vrban into twenty fix, which for diftin&tion fake
are calld Wards, being contain'd under the three Tribes but inequally :
Wherfore the firſt Tribe containing ten Wards is callid Scazon, the ſecond
containing eight Metoche, and the third containing as many, Telicouta ;
the bearing of which names in mind concerns the better underſtanding of the
Government.
EVERY Ward has her Wardmote, Court, or Inqueſt, conſisting Wardmore,
of all that are of the Clothing or Liverys of Companys reſiding within
SUCH are of the Livery or Clothing as have attain'd to the dignity The Liverys,
to wear Gowns and particolor'd Hoods or Tippets, according to the Rules
and antient Cuſtoms of their reſpective Companys,
A COMPANY is a Brotherhood of Tradeſmen profeſſing the Same The Compa-
Art, govern'd according to their Charter by a Maſter and Wardens.
theſe there be about ſixty, wherof twelve are of greater dignity than the
reſt, that is to ſay, the Mercers, Grocers, Drapers, Fifbmongers, Gold-
ſmiths, Skinners, Merchant-Taylors, Haberdaſhers, Salters, Ironmon-
gers, Vintners, Clothworkers; which, with moſt of the reſt, have common CommonHalls,
Halls
, divers of them being of antient and magnificent Structure
, wherin
they have frequent meetings at the Summons of their Maſters or Wardens,
for the
managing and regulation of their reſpective Trades and Myſterys
.
Theſe Companys, as I shåll ſhev, are the Roots of the whole Government
of the City
. For the Liverys that reſide in the ſame Ward, meeting at
the Wardmote Inqueſt (to which it belongs to take cognizance of all ſorts
of Nuſances, and violations of the Cuſtoms and Orders of the City, and
to preſent them to the Court of Aldermen) have alſo power to make elécti-
one of two forts of Magiſtrats or Officers; the firſt of Elders or Aldermen
of the Ward, the ſecond of Deputys of the same, otherwiſe call’d Com-
THE Wards in theſe Elections, becauſe they do not ele&t all at once,
but ſom one year, and ſom another, obſerve the diſtinction of the three che common
Tribes ;, for example, the Scazon conſiſting of ten Wards, makes e-Council men,
lection the firſt rear of ten Aldermen, one in each Ward, 'and of one
bundred and fifty Deputys, fifteen in each Ward: all which are Triennial
.
Z
Magiſtrats
the ſame.
Ofhys
.
mon Council men.
Election of Al-
.
OCEAN A.
Aldermen.
The Common
Council.
The Common
Hall.
170
Magiſtrats or Officers, that is to ſay, are to bear their dignity for 19:
Space of three Years.
THE ſecond Tear, the Metoche, conſiſting of eight P’ards, eleits
eight Aldermen, one in each Ward, and a hundred and twenty Deputys, fif-
teen in each Ward, being alſo Triennial Magiſtrats.
THE third Tear Telicouta, conſiſting of a like number of Wards,
eleits an equal number of like Magiſtrats for a like term. So that the
whole number of the Aldermen, according to that of the Wards, amounts
to twenty fix; and the whole number of the Deputys, to three hundred and
ninety.
The Court of THE Aldermen thuis elected have divers Capacitys : for, firſt, they
are Juſtices of the Peace for the term, and in conſequence of their E-
lection. Secondly, They are Preſidents of the Wardmote, and Governors
each of that Ward wherby he was elected. And laſt of all
, theſe Magiſtrats
being aſſembled together, conſtitute the Senat of the City, otherwiſe call?d
the Court of Aldermen: but no man is capable of this Élection that is not
worth ten thouſand Pounds. This Court upon every new Election, makes
choice of nine Cenſors out of their own number.
THE Deputys in like manner being aſſembled together, conſtitute the
Prerogative Tribe of the City, otherwiſe call’d the Common Council: by
which means the Senat and the People of the City were comprehended, as it
were, by the motion of the National Government, into the ſame Wheel of
annual, triennial, and perpetual Revolution.
BUT the Liverys, over and above the right of theſe Elections by their
Diviſions mention'd, being aſſembled all together at the Guild of the City,
conſtitute another Aſſembly called the Common Hall.
THE Common Hall has the right of two other Elečtions; the one
of the Lord the Lord Mayor, and the other of the two Sherifs, being annual Magi-
Mayor and
ſtrats. The Lord Mayor can be elected out of no other than one of the
twelve Companys of the firſt Ranks; and the Common Hall agrees by the
plurality of Suffrages upon two Names: which being preſented to the
Lord Mayor for the time being, and the Court
of Aldermen, they elect one
by their Scruting; for ſo they call it, tho it differs from that of the Com.
monwealth. The Orator or Aſiſtant to the Lord Mayor in holding of his
Courts, is ſom able Lawyer elected by the Court of Aldermen, and called
the Recorder of Emporium.
THE Lord Major being thus ele&ted, has two Capacitys; one regard-
ing the Nation, and the other the City. In that which regards the City,
he is Preſident of the Court of Aldermen, having power to aſſemble the
Same, or any other Council of the City, as the Common Councilor Common
Hall
, at his will and pleaſure : and in that which regards the Nation, kie
is Commander in Chief of the three Tribes wberinto the City is divided;
one of which he is to bring up in Perſon at the National Muſter to the Bal-
lot, as his Vicecomites, or High Sherifs, are to do by the other
ti'o,
each
at their diſtinct Pavilion, where the nine Aldermen, elected Cenſors,
are to officiat by three in each Tribe, according to the Rules and Order's
already given to the Cenſors of the ruſtic Tribes. And the Tribes of the
City have no other than one common Phylarch, which is the Court of Al-
dermen and the Common Council; for which cauſe they elect not at their
Mufter the firſt-Lift call'd the Prime Magnitude.
THE Conveniences of this Alteration of the City Government, beſides
ences in this the bent of it to a conformity with that of the Nation, were many, wherof
I ſball mention but a few : As firſt, wherar men under the former admi-
..
niſtration,
The Election
of
Sherifs.
Som Conveni-
Alteration.
O C E A N A.
171
ment of Hiera,
The High
Sreward,
niſtration, when the burden of fom of theſe Magiſtracys lay for life, were
oftentimes choſen not for their fitneſs, but rather unfitneſs, or at leaſt un-
willingneſs to undergo ſuch a weight, wherby they were put at great Rates
to fine for their eale; a man might now take his ſhare in Magiſtracy with
that equity which is dae to the Public
, and without any inconvenience to his
privat Affairs. Secondly, Wher as the City (inaſmuch as the Acts of the
Ariſtocracy, or Court of Aldermen, in their former way of proceding, were
rather Impoſitions than Propoſitions) was frequently diſquieted with tha
inevitable conſequence of diſorder in the power of Debate exercis’d by the
popular Part, or Common Council; the right of Debate being henceforth
eſtabliſh'd in the Court of Aldermen, and that of Reſult in the Common
Council
, killed the branches of Diviſion in the root. Which for the pre-
fent may ſuffice to have bin Jaid of the City of Emporium.
THAT of HIER A conſists as to the National Government of two The Govern-
Tribes
, the firſt callid Agoræa, the ſecond Propola : But as to the pecula
liar Policy, of twelve Manipuls, ar Wards divided into three Cohorts, each
Cohort containing four Wards ; wherof the Wards of the firf Cohort elect
for the firſt Year four Burgeſſes, one in each Ward; the Wards of the ſecond
Cohort for the ſecond year four Burgeſſes, one in each Ward; and the Ward's
of the third Cohort for the third Tear four Burgeſſes, one in each Ward;
all
triennial Magiſtrats : by which the twelve Burgeſſes, making one Court for The Courr.
the Government of this City, according to their Inſtructions by Act of Par-
liament, fall likewiſe into an Annual, Triennial, and perpetual Revolution.
THIS Court being thus conſtituted, makes election of divers Magi-
ſtrats; As firſt of a High Steward, who is commonly ſom Perſon of Quality,
and this Magiſtracy is elected in the Senat by the Scrutiny of this Court ;
with him they chuſe ſom able Lawyer to be his Deputy, and to hold the
Court; and laſt of all they elect out of their own Number fix Cenfors.
THE High Steward is Commander in Chief of the two Tribes, wher-
of be in Perſon brings up the one at the National Maſter to the Ballot,
and his Deputy the other at a diſtinct Pavilion ; the fix Cenſors choſen by
the Court, officiating by three in each Tribe at the Vras : and theſe Tribes
have no other Phylarch but this Court.
A S for the manner of Elections and Suffrage, both in Emporium and
Hiera, it may be ſaid once for all
, that they are perform’d by the Ballot,
and according to the reſpective Rules already given.
THERE be other Citys and Corporations throout the Territory,
hofe Policy being much of this kind, would be tedious and not worth the
labor to inſert, nor dare I ſtay. Juvenum manus emicat ardens.
I RETURN, according to the method of the Commonwealth,
to the remaining part of her Orbs, which are Military and Provincial
i
the Military, except the Strategus, and the Polemarchs or Field Of-
cers, conſiſting of the Youth only, and the Provincial conſilting of a
mixture both of the Elders and of the Youth.
To begin with the Youth, or the military Orbs, they are Circles
to which the Commonwealth muſt have a care to keep cloſe. A Man
is a Spirit rais’d by the Magic of Nature; if ſhe dos not ſtand ſafe, and
ſo that ſhe may ſet him to toni good and uſeful work, he ſpits fire, and
blows up Caſtles: for where there is life, there muſt be motion or
work; and the work of idleneſs is miſchief, bur the work of induſtry
is health. To ſet Men to this, the Commonwealth muſt begin betimes
with them, or it will be too late: and the means wherby ſie ſets them
Z 2
to
172
OCEAN A.
ri
to it, is EDUCATION, the plaſtic art of Government. Durit is
as frequent as fad in experience (whether thro negligence, or, which
in the conſequence is all one or vvorſe, overfondnels in the domeſtic
performance of this Duty) that innumerable Children com to ow
their utter Perdition to their own Parents ; in each of which the Com-
monwealth loſes a Citizen. Wherfore the Laws of a Government,
how vvholſom foever in themſelves, are ſuch as, if Men by a con-
gruity in their Education be not bred to find a reliſh in them, they will
be ſure to loath and deteſt. The Education therfore of a Man's own
Children is not vvholly to be commited or truſted to hiinfelf. You
find in * Livy the Children of Brutus having bin bred under
Monarchy, and us’d to a Court life, making faces at the Cormon-
vvealth of Rome : A King (ſay they) is a Man with whom you may pre-
vail when you have need there should be Law, or when you have need there
ſhould be no Law; he has Favors in the right, and he frowns not in the
wrong place; he knows his Friends from his Enemys. But Laws are deaf
inexorable things, ſuch as make no difference between a Gentleman and an
ordinary fellow; a Man can never be merry for them, for to truſt altogether
to his own innocence is a fad life. Unhappy vvantons ! SCIPIO en the
other ſide, vvhen he vvas but a Boy (about two or three and twenty)
being inform'd that certain Patricians or Roman Gentlemen, throa
qualm upon the defeat which HANNIBAL had given them at
Canne, vvere laying their heads together and contriving their Flight
vvith the tranſportation of their Goods out of Rome, drevv his Sword,
and ſetting himſelf at the door of the Chamber vvhere they vveré
at Council, proteſted, That who did not immediatly livear not to deſert
the Commonwealth, he would make his Soul to deſert bis Body. Let Men
argue as they pleaſe for Monarchy, or againſt a Commonwealth, the
vvorld ſhall never ſee any Man ſo fotciſh or vvicked as in cool blood
to prefer the Education of the Sons of Brutus before that of
SCIPIO;
and of this mould, except a Melius or a MANLIUS,
was the whole youth of thar Commonwealth, tho not ordinarily ſó
well caft. Now the health of a Government, and the education of the
Youth being of the ſame pulſe, no wonder if it has bin the conſtant
practice of well order'd Commonwealths to commit the care and feeling
of it to public Magiſtrats. A duty that was perform'd in ſuch a man-
ner by the Areopagits, as is clegantly prais’d by ISOCRATES.
The Athenians, ſays he, write not their Laws upon dead l’alls, nor con-
tent themſelves with having ordaind Puniſhments for Crimes, but pro-
vide in ſuch a way by the Education of their Touth, that there be no Crimes
for Puniſhment. He ſpeaks of thoſe Laws which regarded Manners,
not of thoſe Orders which concern’d the Adminiſtration of the Com-
monwealth, leſt you ſhould think he contradicts XENOPHON and
POLYBIU's. The Children of Lacedemon, at the ſeventh
year
their
age,
were deliver'd to the Pædonomi, or Schoolmaſters, not mer-
cenary, but Magiſtrats of the Commonwealth, to which they were
accountable for their charge: and by theſe at the age of fourteen they
were preſented to other Magiſtrats calld the Beidiai, having the in-
of
* Affueti more regio vivere inter ſe conquerebantur
. Regem hominem eſſe à quo
impetres ubi jus, ubi injuria opus fit ; eſſe gratix locum, eſſe beneficio; & irafci & ignoſcere
poſſe; inter amicum & inimicum difcrimen noffe. Leges rem ſurdam, inexorabilem elle; lalu-
briorem, meliorenique inopi quam porenti ; nihil laxamenti nec venix habere, fi modum ex-
cefferis periculofum efle in cor humanis erroribus fola innocencia vivere. Liv. 1. 2.
|
fpection
OCEAN A.
173
ípcation of the Games and Exerciſes, among which that of the Plas
taniſta was famous, a kind of Fighe in Squadrons, bur fomwhat too
fierce. When they came to be of military age, they were liſted of the
Mora, and ſo continu'd in readineſs for public Service under the Diſci-
plin of the Polemarchs. But the Roman Education and Diſciplin by
the Centurys and Claſſes is that to which the Commonwealth of
Oceana has had a more particular regard in her three Eſſays, being cer-
tain degrees by which the Youth commence as it were in Arms for
Magiſtracy, as appears by
THE twenty fixth ORDER, inſtituting, That if a Parent has 26. Order.
but one Son, the Éducation of that one Son Mall be wholly at the diſpoſition
of that Parent. But wher as there be Free Schools erected and indow'd, or
to be erected and indow'd in every Tribe of this Nation, to a ſufficient pro-
portion for the Education of the Children of the ſame (which Schools, to
the end there be no detriment or hindrance to the Scholars upon caſe of
removing from one to another, are every of them to be govern’d by the ſtričt
inſpection of the Cenfors of the Tribes, both upon the Schoolmaſters man-
mer of Life and Teaching, and the proficiency of the Children, after the
rules and method of that in Hiera) if à Parent has more Sons than onle,
the Cenſors of the Tribes ſhall animadvert upon and puniſh him that ſends
not his Sons within the ninth year of their age to ſom one of the Schools of
A Tribe, there to be kept and taught if he be able at his own charges ; and if
he be not able, gratis, till they arrive at the age of fifteen years. And a
Parent may diſpoſe of his Sons at the fifteenth year of their age according
to his choice or ability, whether it be to Service in the way of Apprentices
to ſom Trade or otherwiſe, or to further ſtudy, as by ſending them to the
Ins of Court, of Chancery, or to one of the Univerſitys of this Nation.
But he that takes not upon him one of the Profeſſions proper to ſom of thoſe
places, ſhall not continue longer in any of them than till he has attain'd to
the
age of eighteen years; and every Man having not at the age of eigh-
teen years taken upon him, or addicted himſelf to the profeſſion of the
Law, Theology, or Phyſic, and being no Servant, ſhall be capable of the
Eſays of the Youth, and no other perſon whatſoever : except a Man, having
taken upon him ſuch a profeſſion, happens to lay it by, ere he arrives at three
or four and twenty years of age, and be admitted to this Capacity by the
reſpective Phylarch, being ſatisfyd that he kept not out ſo long with any
deſign to evade the Service of the Commonwealth ; but, that being no ſooner
at his own diſpoſal, it was no ſooner in his choice to com in. And if any
Youth or other Perſon of this Nation have a deſire to travel into foren
Countrys upon occaſion of buſineſs, delight, or further improvement of his
Education; the ſame ſhall be lawful for him upon a Paſs obtain'd from the
Cenſors in Parlament, putting a convenient limit to the time, and recom-
mending him to the Embaſſadors by whom he fball be aſſiſted, 'and to whom
he ſball yield Honor and Obedience in their reſpective Reſidences
. Every
Youth at his return from his Travel is to preſent the Cenſors with a Paper of
his own writing, containing the Intereſt of State or Form of Government
of the Countrys, or ſom one of the Countrys where he has bin ; and if it
be good, the Cenſors Shall cauſe it to be printed and publiſh’d, prefixing a
Line in commendation of the Author.
EVERY Wedneſday next inſuing the laſt of December, the whole
Touth of every Pariſh, that is to ſay every Man ( not excepted by the fore-
going part of the Order ) being from eighteen jears of age to thirty, Shall
1
repair
174
OCE A N A
the ſame, diſtributing the Horſe and Foot with their Officers, according
repair at the ſound of the Bell to their reſpective Church, and being there
aſſembld in preſence of the Overſeers, who are to govern the Ballot, and
the Conſtable who is to officiat at the Vrn, ſhall
, after the manner of the
Elders, elect every fifth Man of their whole number (provided that they
chufe not above one of two Brothers at one Election, nor above half if they
be four or upward) to be a Stratiot or Deputy of the Touth; and the Liſt
of the Stratiots ſo elected being taken by the Overſeers, Mall be enter'd in
the Pariſh Book, and diligently preſerv’d as a Record, callid the firſt Eſſay.
They whoſe Eſtates by the Law are able, or whoſe Friends are willing to
znount them, ſhall be of the Horſe, the reſt are of the Foot. And he who
bas bin one year of this Liſt, is not capable of being reelected till after ano-
ther year's interval.
EVERY Wedneſday next inſuing the laſt of January, the Stratiots
being muſter?d at the Rendevouz of their reſpective Hundred, ſhall in the
preſence of the Jurymen, who are Overſeers of that Ballot, and of the High
Contable who is to officiat at the Urn, elećt out of the Horſe of their Troop
or Company one Captain, and one Enlign or Cornet, to the command of the
fame. And the futrymen having enter'd the Liſt of the Hundred into a
Record to be diligently kept at the Rendevouz of the Same; the firſt public
Game of this Commonwealth ſhall begin and be perform'd in this manner.
Wbcras there is to be at every Rendevouz of a Hundred one Cannon,
Culverin, or Saker; the prize Arms being forg’d by ſworn Armorers of
this Commonwealth, and for their proof, beſides their Beauty, viem’d and
try'd at the Tower of Emporium, ſhall be expos’d by the Juſtice of Peace
appertaining to that Hundred (the ſaid Juſtice with the Jurymen being
Judges of the Game) and the Judges shall deliver to the Horſman that
gains the Prize at the Career, one ſute of Arms being of the value of twen-
ty Pounds; to the Pikeman that gains the Prize at throwing the Bullet, one
Jute of Arnis of the value of ten Pounds; to the Musketeer that
the Prize at the Mark with his Musket
, one ſute of Arms of the value of
ten Pounds; and to the Cannoneer that gains the Prize at the mark with
the Cannon, Culverin, of Saker, a Chain of Silver being of the value of
ten Pounds; provided, that no one man at the ſame Muſter plays above
one of the Prizes. Whoſoever gains a Prize is bound to wear it (if it be
his lot ) upon Service; and no man Jhall ſell or give away any Armor
thus won, except he has lawfully attain'd to two or more of them at the
Games.
THE Games being ended, and the Muſter diſmiſt, the Captain of the
Troop or Company Shall repair with a copy of the Liſt to the Lord Liet-
tenant of the Tribe, and the High Conſtable with a Duplicat of the ſame
to the Cuſtos Rotulorum, or Muſtermaſter General, to be alſo commu-
nicated to the Cenſors; in each of which the Jurymen giving a note
a note upon
every name of an only Son, Shall certify that the
Lift is without ſubterfuge
or evaſion : or, if it be not, an account of thoſe upon whom the Evaſion
or Subterfuge lys, to the end that the Phylarch or the Cenſors may animad-
AND every Wedneſday next inſuing the laſt of February, the Lord
Lieutenant, Cuſtos Rotulorum, the Cenſors, and the Conductor, ſhall
receive the whole Muſter of the Touth of that Tribe at the Rendevouz of
to the Directions given in the like caſe for the diſtribution of the Elders ;
and the whole Squadron being put by that means in Battalia, the ſecond
Game of this Commonwealth Jhall begin by the exerciſe of the Touth in all
the
gains
1
vert accordingly.
i
O C E A N A.
175
**
3
part of the firſt ; and the Senat another Strategus.
the parts of their military Diſciplin according to the Orders of Parlament,
or direction of the Council of War in that cale. And the hundred Pound's
a!low'd hy the Parlament for the Ornament of the Muſter in every Tribe,
fivall be expended by the Phylarch upon ſuch artificial Caſtles, Citadels, or
the like Devices, as may make the beſt and moſt profitable Sport for the
Youth and their Spectators. Which being ended, the Cenſors having pre-
par’d the Vrns by putting into the Horſe Urn 220 Gold Balls, wherof'ten
are to be mark'd with the letter M, ind other ten with the letter P; into
the Foot Urn 700 Gold Balls, wherof so are to be mark’d with the letter
M, and 50 with the letter P: and after they have made the Gold Balls in
each Vrn, by the addition of Silver Balls to the ſame, in number equal with
the Horſe and Foot of the Stratiots
, the Lord Lieutenant ſhall call the
Stratiots to the Vrns, where they that draw the Silver Balls ſhall return to
their places, and they that draw the Gold Balls ſhall fall off to the Pavia
lion, where, for the ſpace of one hour, they may chop and change their Balls
according as one can agree with another, whoſe Lot he likes better. But the
hour being out, the Conductor ſeparating them whoſe Gold Balls have no
letter, from thoſe whoſe Balls are mark'd ſhall cauſe the Cryer to call the
Alphabet, as firjl A ; wherupon all they whoſe Gold Balls are not mark’d,
and whoſe firnames begin with the letter A, ſhall repair to a Clerc appertain-
ing to the Cuſtos Rotulorum, who shall firſt take the names of that letter
then thoſe of B, and ſo on, till all the names be alphabetically inrold. And
the Youth of this Liſt being fix hundred Foot in a Tribe, that is, 30000
Foot in all the Tribes; and two hundred Horſe in a Tribe, that is, 10000
Horſe in all the Tribes, are the ſecond Eſſay of the Stratiots, and the ſtand-
ing Army of this Commonwealth to be always ready upon command to march.
They whoſe Balls are mark?d with M, amounting, by 20 Horſe and 50 Foot
in a Tribe, to 2500 Foot, and 500 Horſe in all the Tribes; and they whoſe
Balls are 'mark”d with P, in every point correſpondent, are parts of the
third Eſay: they of M being ſtraight to march for Marpeſia, and they of 1
? for Panopea, to the ends, and according to the further directions follow-
ing in the Order for the provincial Orbs.
I F the Polemarchs or Field Officers be elected by the ſcrutiny of the Coun-
cil of War, and the Strategus commanded by the Parlament or ihe Dictator
to march, the Lords Lieutenants (who have power to muſter and diſciplin
the Youth ſo often as they receive Orders for the ſame from the Council of
War) are to deliver the ſecond Eſſay, or ſo many of them as ſhall be com-
manded, to the Conductors, who ſhall preſent them to the Lord Strategus
at the time and place appointed by his Excellency to be the general Rendevori
$ of Occana, where the Council of War ſhall have the accommodation of
Horſes and Arms for his men in readineſs ; and the Lord Strategus having
arm’d, mounted, and diſtributed them, whether according to the recommen-
dation of their Prize Arms, or otherwiſe
, ſball lead them away to his Ship-
ping, being alſo ready and provided with Victuals, Ammunition, Artille-
my, and all other neceſſarys ; commanding them, and diſpoſing of the whole
Conduct of the War by his fole Porrer and Authority. And this is the third
Elay of the Stratiots, which being ship’d, or march?d out of their Tribes,
the Lord Lieutenant's ſhall reelect the ſecond Eſſay out of the remaining
Veteran or Veterans of this Nation, the term of whoſe Touth or
Militia is expir’d, having a deſire to be entertaind in the further ſervice of
the Commonwealth, ſhall preſent him or themſelves at the Rendevou of
Oceana to the Strafegus, it is in his power to take on fach and ſo many of
IF
any
176
OCEAN A.
ceding his
them as ſhall be agreed by the Polemarchs, and to ſend back an equal number
of the Stratiots.
AND for the better managing of the proper Forces of this Nation, the
Lord Strategus, by appointment of the Council of War, and out of ſuch
Levys as they ſhall have made in either or both of the Provinces to that
end, ſhall receive Auxiliarys by Sea or elſwhere at jom certain place, not ex-
proper Arms in number.
ÅN D whoſoever ſhall refuſe any one of his three Eſſays, except upon
cauſe ſhewn he be diſpens'd withal by the Phylarch; or, if the Phylarch be
not aſſembled, by the Cenſors of his Tribe, ſhall be deemd a Helot or pub-
lic Servant, Mall pay a fifth part of his yearly Revenue, beſides all other
Taxes, to the Commonwealth for his Protection, and be incapable of bear-
ing any Magiſtracy except ſuch as is proper to the Law. Neverthele's if a
man has but two Sons, the Lord Lieutenant ſhall not ſuffer above one of
them to com to the Vrn at one Election of the ſecond Elay : and the he has
above two Sons, there ſhall not com above half the Brothers at one Election :
and if a man has but one Son, he ſhall not com to the Urn at all without the
conſent of his parents, or his Guardians ; nor ſhall it be any reproach to
him, or impediment to his bearing of Magiſtracy.
THIS Order, with relation to foren Expeditions, will be prov'd
and explain'd together with
27. Order.
THE twenty ſeventh ORDER, providing, in caſe of Invaſion ap-
prehended, that the Lords High Sherifs of the Tribes upon Commands re-
ceiv’d from the Parlament, or the Dictator, diſtribute the Bands of the
Elders into diviſions after the nature of the Eſ ays of the Youth; and that
the ſecond Diviſion or Eſay of the Elders, being made and conſiſting of
30000 Foot, and 10000 Horſe, be ready to march with the ſecond Ejay of
the Youth, and be brought alſo by the Conductors to the Strategus.
THE ſecond Eſſay of the Elders and Touth being march'd out of their
Tribes
, the Lords High Sherifs and Lieutenants ſhall have the remaining
part of the annual Bands both of Elders and Youth in readineſs, which, if
the Beacons be fir’d, Mall march to the Rendevon to be in that caſe appoint-
ed by the Parlament, or the Di&tator. And the Beacons being fird, the
Curiata Comitia, or Parochial Congregations, ſhall elect a fourth both of
Elders and Youth to be immediatly upon the Guard of the Tribes, and di-
viding themſelves as aforeſaid, to march alſo in their Diviſions according.
to Orders: which method in caſe of extremity Mall procede to the election of
a third, or the levy of a ſecond, or of the laſt man in the Nation, by the
Porver of the Lords High Sherifs ; to the end that the Commonwealth in
her utmoſt preſſure may ſew her truſt that God in his Juſtice will remember
Mercy, by humbling her Self
, and yet preſerving her Courage, Diſciplin and
Conſtancy
, even to the laſt drop of her blood, and the utmoſt farthing.
Ť HĚ Services performed by the Youth, or by the Elders, in caſe of In-
vaſion, and according to this Order, ſhall be at their proper coſt and charges
that
any ways able to indure it; but if there be ſuch as are known in
their Pariſhes to be ſo indigent that they cannot march out of their Tribes,
nor undergo the burden in this caſe incumbent, then the Congregations of
their Pariſhes shall furniſh them with ſufficient ſums of Mony to be repaid
upon
the Certificat of the ſame by the Parlament when the Action fall be
And of that which is reſpectively injoin’d by this Order, any Tribe,
Parijſ, Magiſtrat, or Perſon that ſhall fail, is to anſwer for it at the
Council of War, as a Deſerter of his country.
THE
are
over.
OC E A N A.
177
THE ARCHON, being the greateſt Captain of his own, if not
of any age, added much to the Glory of this Commonwealth, by in-
terweaving the Militia with more Art and Luſter than any Legillator
from or before the time of SERVIus Tullius, who conſtituted the
Roman Militia. But as the Bones or Skeleton of a man, tho the great-
eft
part of his Beauty be contain’d in their Proportion or Symmetry,
yet ſhewn without Fleſh, are a ſpectacle that is rather horrid than en-
tertaining; ſo without Diſcourſes are the Orders of a Commonwealth:
which, if ſhe gos forth in that manner, may complain of her Friends
that they ſtand mute, and ſtaring upon her. "Wherfore this Order was
thus fleſh'd by the Lord ARCHON.
(G
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(6
6
<
My Lords;
IOGENES ſeeing a young Fellow drunk, told him that his
Father was drunk when he begot him. For this in natural
Generation I muſt confeſs I fee no reaſon; but in the Political it is
right. The Vices of the People are from their Governors ; thoſe of
" their Governors from their Laws or Orders; and thoſe of their Laws
or Orders from their Legiſlators. *. Whatever was in the Womb
imperfect, as to her proper work, coms very rarely, or never at all
be to perfection afterwards: and the formation of a Citizen in the
( Womb of the Commonwealth is his Education.
“ EDUCATION by the firſt of the foregoing Orders is of ſix
“ kinds : At the School, in the Mechanics, at the Univerſitys, at the
“ Ins of Court or Chancery, in Travels, and in military Diſci-
“ plin : fom of which I ſhall but touch, and ſom I Mall handle more
at large.
“THAT which is propos’d for the erecting and indowing of Schools,
" Schools throout the Tribes, capable of all the Children of the ſame,
" and able to give to the Poor the Education of theirs gratis, is only
“ matter of direction in caſe of very great Charity, as ealing the needy
“ of the charge of their Children from the ninth to the fifteenth year
16
of their age, during which time their work cannot be profitable;
" and reſtoring them when they may be of uſe, furniſh'd with tools
" wherof there are advantages to be made in every work, ſeeing he
" that can read and uſe his Pen has ſom convenience by it in the mean-
“ eſt Vocation. And it cannot be conceiv'd, but that which
coms,
" tho in ſmall parcels
, to the advantage of every man in his Vocati-
on, muſt amount to the advantage of every Vocation, and ſo to that
6c of the whole Commonwealth. Wherfore this is commended to the
Charity of every wiſehearted and welminded man, to be don in
time, and as God ſhall ftir him up or inable him; there beiog ſuch
proviſion already in the caſe, as may give us leave to procede with-
out obſtruction.
“ PARENTS, under animadverſion of the Cenſors, are to dif- Mechanics in
“poſe of their Children at the fifteenth year of their age to fomthing;
es but what, is left, according to their abilitys or inclination, at their
own choice. This, with the multitude, muſt be to the Mechanics,
"
that is to ſay, to Agriculture or Husbandry; to Manufactures, or
4
66
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general,
to Merchandize.
1
* Ut male poſuimus inicia, fic catera fequuntur. Cic,
Аа
66 AGRI
I
1
178
OCEAN A,
C6
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«
Husbandry.
" AGRICULTURE is the Bread of the Nation; we are hung
« upon it by the teeth; it is a mighty Nurſery of Strength, the beſt
Army, and the moſt aſſurd Knapſac; it is manag’d with the leaſt
" turbulent or ambitious, and the moſt innocent hands of all other
« Arts. Wherfore I am of ARISTOTLE's opinion, that a Com-
monwealth of Husbandmen, and ſuch is ours, muſt be the beſt of
“ all others. Certainly, my Lords, you have no meaſure of what
ought to be, but what can be don for the incouragement of this
« Profeſſion. I could wiſh I were Husband good enough to direct
« fomthing to this end; but racking of Rents is a vile thing in the
" richer fort, an uncharitable one to the poorer, a perfect mark of
Slavery, and nips your Commonwealth in the faireſt Bloſſom. On
" the other ſide, if there ſhould be too much eaſe given in this kind,
~ it would occaſion Sloth, and ſo deſtroy Induſtry, the principal
66 nerve of a Commonwealth. But if ought might be don to hold
“ the Balance even between theſe two, it would be a work in this Na-
“ tion equal to that for which FABIUS was ſirnam’d MAXIMUS by
" the Romans.
Manufactures “ IN Manufactures and Merchandize the Hollander has gotten the
and Merchan- « ſtart of us; but at the long run it will be found, that a People work-
dize.
« ing upon a foren Commodity dos but farm the Manufacture, and
" that it is really intaild upon them only, where the growth of it is
6 native: as alſo that it is one thing to have the carriage of other mens
“ Goods, and another for a man to bring his own to the beſt market.
" Wherfore (Nature having provided incouragement for theſe Arts in
" this Nation above all others, where, the People growing they of
“ neceſſity muſt alſo increaſe) ir cannot but eſtabliſh them upon a far
more ſure and effeétual Foundation than that of the Hollanders. But
“ theſe Educations are in order to the firſt things, or neceſſitys of Na-
ture, as Husbandry to the Food, Manufacture to the Clothing, and
“ Merchandize to the Purſe of the Commonwealth.
« THERE be other things in Nature, which being ſecond as to
“ their Order, for their Dignity and Value are firſt, and ſuch to which
“ the other are but Accommodations; of this ſort are ſpecially theſe,
“ Religion, Juſtice, Courage, and Wiſdom.
Univerſitys. “ THE Éducation that anſwers to Religion in our Government is
" that of the Univerſitys. Moses the Divine Legiſlator was not
“ only skilful in all the Learning of the Egyptians, but took alſo into
“ the Fabric of his Commonwealth the Learning of the Midianites in
" the advice of JETHRO: and his Foundation of a Univerſity laid
“ in the Tabernacle, and finiſh'd in the Temple, became that Pinacle
“ from whence (according to many, Jewiſh and Chriſtian Authors)
“ all the Learning in the world has taken wing; as the Philoſophy of
“the Stoics from the Phariſees; that of the Epicureans from the Sad-
“ duces; and from the Learning of the Jews, ſo often quoted by our
Acts 17. 18. “ SAVIOR, and fulfild in Him, the Chriſtian Religion. Athens
“ was the moſt famous Univerſity in her days; and her Senators, that
" is to ſay, the Areopagits, were all Philoſophers. Lacedemon, to
“ ſpeak truth, tho ſhe could write and read, was not very bookiſh.
“ But he that diſputes hence againſt Univerſitys, diſputes by the ſame
6 Argument againſt Agriculture, Manufacture, and Merchandize;
every one of theſe having bin equally forbid by Lycurgus, not
« for it ſelf (for if he had not bin learn’d in all the Learning of Crete,
+
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16 and
OCE A N A.
179
dc
16
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and well traveld in the knowlege of other Governments, he had
never made his Commonwealth) but for the diverſion which they
“ muſt have given his Citizens from their Arms, who, being but few,
" if they had minded any thing elſe, muſt have deſerted the Com-
monwealth. For Rome, ſhe had ingenium par imperio, was as learned
as great, and held her College of Augurs in much reverence. Ve-
" nice has taken her Religion upon truſt. Holland cannot attend it to
" be very ftudious. Nor dos Switzerland mind it much; yet are they
all addicted to their Univerſitys. We cut down Trees to build
“ Houſes ; but I would liave ſom body ſhew me, by what reaſon or
experience the cutting down of a Univerſity ſhould tend to the fet-
ting up of a Commonwealth. Of this I am ſure, that the perfecti-
on of a Commonwealth is not to be attain’d without the knowlege
“ of antient Prudence; nor the knowlege of antient Prudence with-
out Learning; nor Learning without Schools of good Literature:
« and theſe are ſuch as we call Univerſitys. Now tho mere Univerſity
learning of it ſelf be that which (to ſpeak the words of Veru-
LAMIUS) crafty men contemn, and ſimple men only admire, yet is it
ſuch as wilé men have uſe of; for Studys do not teach their own uſe,but that
is a Wiſdom without and above them, won by obſervation. Expert men
may execute, and perhaps judg of Particulars one by one; but the
gene-
« ral Counſils and the Plots, and the marſhalling of Affairs, com beft
from thoſe that are learned. Wlierfore if you would have your Chil-
“dren to be Stateſmen, let them drink by all means of theſe Foun-
“ tains, where perhaps there were never any. But what tho the Wa-
ter a man drinks be not nouriſhment; it is the Vehicle without which
" he cannot be nouriſh'd. Nor is Religion leſs concern'd in this point
" than Government; for take away your Univerſitys, and in a few
years you loſe it.
" THE Holy Scriptures are written in Hebrew and Greec : they
" that have neither of theſe Languages may think light of both; but
“ find me a man that has one in perfection, the ſtudy of whoſe whole
Life it has not bin. Again, this is apparent to us in daily Conver-
ſation, that if four or five Perſons that have liv'd together be talk-
« ing, another ſpeaking the ſame Language may com in, and yet un-
"derſtand very little of their
Diſcourſe, in that it relates to Circum-
ſtances, Perſons, Things, Times and Places, which he knows not.
" It is no otherwiſe with a man, having no inſight of the times in
which they were written, and the Circumſtances to which they re-
late, in the reading of antient Books, whether
they be divine or hu-
man. For example
, when we fall upon the Diſcourſe about Bap-
tiſmand Regeneration that was between our SAVIOR and Nico-
Demus, where CHRIST reproaches him with his ignorance in
this matter : Art thou a Doctor in Iſrael
, and underſtandeſt not theſe
" things? What ſhall we think of it? or wherfore ſhould a Doctor in
Ifrael have underſtood theſe things more than another, but that both
Baptiſm and Regeneration,
as was ſhew'd at largé by my Lord
PHOSPHOR us, were Doétrins held in Iſrael? I inſtance in one place
of a hundred, which he, that has not maſter'd
the Circumſtances to
which they relate, cannot underſtand. Wherfore to tlie underſtand-
ing of the Scripture, it is neceſſary to have antient Languages, and
the knowlege of antient
times, or the aid of them who have ſuch
knowlege: and to have ſuch as may be always able and ready to
A a 2
CC
CC
“ give
!
180
OCEAN A.
(C
66 than
CC
66
give ſuch aid (unleſs you would borrow it of another Nation,
“ which would not only be baſe, but deceitful) it is neceſſary to a
« Commonwealth that ſhe have Schools of good Literature, or Uni-
“ verſitys of her own. We are commanded, as has bin ſaid more
once, to ſearch the Scriptures, and which of 'em ſearch the
Scriptures, they that take this pains in ancient Languages and Learn-
“ ing, or they that will not, but truſt to Tranſlations only, and to
" words as they found to preſent Circumſtances ? than which no-
" thing is more fallible, or certain to loſe the true ſenſe of Scriptures,
pretended to be above human Underſtanding, for no other cauſe
" than that they are below it. But in ſearching the Scriptures by the
proper uſe of our Univerſitys, we have bin heretofore bleft with
greater Victorys and Trophys againſt the purple Hofts and golden
“ Standards of the Romiſh Hierarchy, than any Nation; and ther-
“ fore, why we ſhould relinquiſh this upon the preſumtion of ſom,
" that becauſe there is a greater Light which they have, I do not know.
“ There is a greater Light than the Sun, but it dos not extinguiſh the
“ Sun, nor dos any Light of Gods giving extinguiſh that of Nature,
“ but increaſe and fanctify it. Wherfore, neither the Honor born by
“ the Iſraelitiſh, Roman, or any other Commonwealth that I have
« ſhewn, to their Eccleſiaſtics, conſiſted in being govern'd by them,
« but in conſulting them in matters of Religion; upon whoſe Reſpon-
“ fes or Oracles they did afterwards as they thought fit. Nor would
“I be here miſtaken, as if, by affirming the Univerſitys to be, in or-
« der both to Religion and Government, of abſolute neceſſity, I de-
< clar'd them or the Miniſtry in any wiſe fit to be truſted, ſo far as to
“ exerciſe any power not deriv'd from the Civil Magiſtrat in the ad-
miniftration of either. If the Jewiſh Religion were directed
" and eſtabliſh'd by Moses, it was directed and eſtabliſh'd by
" the Civil Magiſtrat; or if Moses exercis’d this Adminiſtrati-
on as a Prophet, the fame Prophet did inveſt with the ſame Ad-
c miniſtration the Sanhedrim, and not the Prieſts; and ſo dos our
“ Commonwealth the Senat, and not the Clergy. They who had
“ the ſupreme Adminiſtration or Government of the National Religi-
on in Athens, were the firſt ARCHON, the Rex Sacrificus, or High
“ Prieſt, and á Polemarch ; which Magiſtrats were ordain’d or elected
« * by the holding up of lands in the Church, Congregation, or Co-
“ mitin of the People. The Religion of Lacedemon was govern'd by
" the Kings, who were alſo High Prieſts, and officiated at the Sacri-
“ fice; theſe had power to ſubſtitute their Pythii, Embaſſadors, or
“ Nuncios, by which, not without concurrence of the Senat, they
“ held intelligence with the Oracle of APOLLO at Delphos. And the
" Eccleſiaſtical part of the Commonwealth of Rome was govern'd by
" the Pontifex Maximus, the Rex Sacrificulus, and the Flamins, allor-
“ dain’d or elected by the People, the Pontifex by the of: Tribes, the
King by the | Centurys, and the Flamins by the || Pariſhes. I do
“ not mind you of theſe things, as if, for the matter, there were any
“ parallel to be drawn out of their Súperſtitions to our Religion ; but
to ſhew that for the manner, antient Prudence is as well a rule in di-
· vine as human things; nay, and ſuch a one as the Apoſtles them-
“ ſelves, ordaining Elders by the holding up of hands in every Con-
co
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is
* Per gelegtevídy. † Tributis. || Centuriacis. Curiacis Comitiis.
*
“ gregation,
OCEAN A.
181
.
66
KG
C
gregation, have exactly follow'd : for ſom of the Congregations
" where they thus ordaind Elders were thoſe of Antioch, Iconium,
" Lyſtra, Derbe, the Countrys of Lycaonia, Piſidia, Pamphylia, Perga,
“ with Attalia. Now that theſe Citys and Countrys, when the Ro-
mans propagated their Empire into Aſia, were found moſt of them
" Commonwealths, and that many of the reſt were indu'd with like
power, ſo that the People living under the protection of the Roman
" Emperors, continu'd to elect their own Magiſtrats, is ſo known a
" thing, that I wonder whence it is that men, quite contrary to the
6 univerſal proof of theſe examples, will liave Eccleſiaſtical Govern-
ment to be neceſſarily diſtinct from Civil Power, when the Right
“ of the Elders ordain’d by the holding up of hands in every Congre-
“ gation to teach the People, was plainly deriv'd from the ſame Civil
“ Power by which they ordain’d the reſt of their Magiſtrats. And it
“ is not otherwiſe in our Commonwealth, where the Parochial Con-
gregation elects or ordains its Paſtor.' To object the Common-
" wealth of Venice in this place, were to ſhew us that it has bin no
“ otherwiſe but where the Civil Power has loſt the liberty of her
" Conſcience by imbracing Popery; as alſo that to take away the
Liberty of Conſcience in this Adminiſtration from the Civil Power,
were a proceding which has no other precedent than ſuch as is Poa
« piſh. Wherfore your Religion is ſettled after the following man-
ner : the Univerſitys are the Seminarys of that part which is natio-
“ nal, by which means others with all ſafety may be permitted to follow
“ the Liberty of their own Conſciences, in regard that, however
" they behave themſelves, the ignorance of the unlearned in this caſe
cannot loſe
your Religion nor diſturb your Government, which o-
“therwiſe it would moſt certainly do ; and the Univerſitys with their
“ Emoluments, as alſo the Benefices of the whole Nation, are to be
“ improv'd by ſuch Augmentations as may make a very decent and
comfortable ſubſiſtence for the Miniſtry, which is neither to be al-
" low'd Synods nor Aſſemblys, except upon the occaſion ſhewn in
" the Univerſitys, when they are conſulted by the Council of State,
« and ſuffer'd to meddle with Affairs of Religion, nor to be capable
“ of any other public Preferment whatſoever ; by which means the
" Intereſt of the Learned can never com to corrupt your Religion, nor
your Government, which otherwiſe it would moſt certainly
“ do. Venice, tho ſhe dos. not ſee, or cannot help the corruption of
" her Religion, is yet ſo circumſpect to avoid diſturbance of her Go-
vernment in this kind, that her Council procedes not to election of
“ Magiſtrats, till it be proclaim’d, Fora Papalini, by which words
" ſuch as have conſanguinity with red Hats, or relation to the Court
" of Rome, are warn’d to withdraw. If a Miniſter in Holland meddles
with matter of State, the Magiſtrat ſends him a pair of Shoes
;
wherupon, if he dos not go, he is driven away from his charge.
I wonder why Miniſters, of all men, ſhould be perpetually tamper-
“ing with Government; firſt becauſe they, as well as others, have it
& in expreſs charge to ſubmit themſelves to the Ordinances of men;
" and ſecondly, becauſe theſe Ordinances of men muſt go upon ſuch
political Principles, as they of all others
, by any thing that can be
6 found in their Writings or Actions, leaft underſtand : whence you
have the ſuffrage of all Nations to this ſenſe, that an ounce of Wif-
“dom is worth a pound of Clergy. Your greateſt Clercs are not
your
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66 diſturb
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182
OC É AN A.
The Ins of
Court and
Chancery.
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*66
your wifeſt men: and when ſom foul Abſurdity in State is com
"mitted, it is common with the French, and even the Italians, to call
" it Pas de Clerc, or, Governo da Prete. They may bear with men
“ that will be preaching without ſtudy, while they will be govern-
ing without Prudence. My Lords, if you know not how to rule
your Clergy, you will moſt certainly, like a man that cannot rule
“ his Wife, have neither quiet at home, nor honor abroad. Their
“ honeſt Vocation is to teach your Children at the Schools and the
“ Univerſitys, and the People in the Pariſhes; and yours is concern'd
" to ſee that they do not play the ſhrews : of which parts dos con-
“ ſiſt the Education of your Commonwealth, ſo far as it regards Re-
ligion.
“TO JUSTICE, or that part of it which is commonly exccutive,
" anſwers the Education of the Ins of Court and Chancery. Upon
which to philoſophize requires a peculiar kind of Learning that I have
not. But they who take upon them any Profeſſion proper to the E-
« ducations mention'd, that is, Theology, Phyſic, or Law, are not
at leiſure for the Eſſays. Wherfore the Eſſays being Degrees wher-
by the Youth commence for all Magiſtracys, Offices, and Honors in
" the Pariſh, Hundred, Tribe, Senat or Prerogative; Divines, Phy-
“ ſicians, and Lawyers, not taking theſe Degrees, exclude themſelves
“ from all ſuch Magiſtracys, Offices, and Honors. And wheras
Lawyers are likeſt to exact further reaſon for this, they (growing
up from the moſt gainful Art at the Bar to thoſe Magiſtracys upon
" the Bench, which are continually appropriated to themſelves, and
not only indow'd with the greateſt Revenues, but alſo held for
« life) have the leaſt reaſon of all the reſt to pretend to any
other
;
“ eſpecially in an equal Commonwealth, where Accumulation of Ma
“giſtracy, or to take a Perſon ingagʻd by his Profit to the Laws, as
" they ſtand, into the Power which is Legiſlative and which ſhould keep
« them to what they were, or ought to be, were a Soleciſm in Pru-
« dence. It is true, that the Legillative Power may have need of Ad-
6 vice and Alliſtance from the executive Magiſtracy, or ſuch as are
“ learn’d inthe Law; for which cauſe the Judges are, as they have here-
“ tofore bin, Aſſiſtants in the Senat. Nor, however it came about,
“ can I ſee any reaſon why a Judg, being but an Alliftant or Lawyer,
“ ſhould be Member of a Legiſlative Council.
“ I DENY not, that the Roman Patricians were all Patrons, and
“ that the whole People were Clients, ſom to one Family, and fom to
“ another, by which means they had their Cauſes pleaded and defend-
“ ed in ſom appearance gratis ; for the Patron took no Mony, tho if
“ he had a Daughter to marry, his Clients were to pay her Portion:
nor was this ſo great a grievance. But if the Client accus'd his
“ Patron, gave teſtimony or ſuffrage againſt him, it was a crime of
“ ſuch a nature, that any man might lawfully kill him as a Traitor ;
“ and this
, as being the nerve of the Optimacy, was a great cauſe of
“ ruin to that Commonwealth: for when the People would carry
any thing that pleas'd not the Senat, the Senators were ill provided
“ if they could not intercede, that is, oppoſe it by their Clients;
“ with whom, to vote otherwiſe than they pleas’d, was the higheſt
“ Crime. The obſervation of this Bond till the time of the GRAC-
CHI, that is to ſay, till it was too late, or to no purpoſe to break it,
“ was the cauſe, why in all the former heats and diſputes that had
“ lappen'd
7
*
OCE A N A.
183
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be,
5
66
happen'd between the Senat and the People, it never came to blows,
" which indeed was good: but withal, the People could have no re-
medy, which was certainly evil. Wherfore I am of opinion, that
a Senator ought not to be a Patron or Advocat, nor a Patron or Ad-
vocat to be a Senator: for if his Practice be gratis, it debauches the
People; and if it be mercenary, it debauches himſelf: take it which
way you will, when he ſhould be making of Laws, he will be
“ knitting of Nets.
“LYCURGUS, as I ſaid, by being a Traveller became a Legi-
ſlator, but in times when Prudence was another thing. Neverthe-
" leſs we may not ſhut out this part of Education in a Commonwealth,
" which will be her ſelf a Traveller; for thoſe of this make have
e ſeen the World, eſpecially becauſe this is certain (tho it be not re-
" garded in our times, when things being left to take their chance, it
" fares with us accordingly) that no man can be a Politician, except he
“ be firſt a Hiſtorian or a Traveller ; for except he can ſee what muſt
or what may be, he is no Politician. Now if he has no know-
lege in Story, he cannot tell what has bin; and if he has not bin a
"Traveller, he cannot tell what is : but he that neither knows what
" has bin, nor what is, can never tell what muſt be, or what may be.
" Furthermore, the Embaſſys in ordinary by our Conſtitution are the
Prizes of young men, more eſpecially ſuch as have bin Travellers.
" Wherfore they of theſe inclinations having leave of the Cenſors,
ow them an account of their time, and cannot chuſe but lay it out
“ with ſom ambition of Praiſe or Reward, where both are open ;
whence you will have eys abroad, and better choice of public Mini-
fters; your Gallants ſhewing themſelves not more to the Ladys at
their Balls, than to your Commonwealth at her Academy, when
they return from their Travels.
BUT this Commonwealth being conſtituted more eſpecially of
two Elements, Arms and Councils, drives by a natural inſtinct at
Courage and Wiſdom; which he who has attain’d, is arriv'd at the
perfection of human nature. It is true, that theſe Virtues muſt have
" ſom natural root in him that is capable of them; but this amounts
not to ſo great a matter as ſom will have it. For if Poverty makes
an induſtrious, a moderat Eſtate a temperat, and a laviſh Fortune a
wanton man, and this be the common courſe of things; Wildom
" then is rather of neceſſity than inclination.
And that an Army
which was meditating upon flight, lias bin brought by deſpair to
win the Field, is ſo far from being ſtrange, that like cauſes will e-
yermore produce like effects. Wherfore this Commonwealth drives
her Citizens like Wedges ; there is no way with them but thorow,
nor end but that Glory wherof Man is capable by Art or Nature.
"That the Genius of the Roman Familys commonly preſerv'd it ſelf
throout the line (as to inſtance in fom, the Manli were ſtill
fevere, the PueLICOL Æ lovers, and the Appui haters of the
People) is attributed by MACCHIAVEL to their Education: nor,
if Intereſt might add to the reaſon why the Genius of a Patrician
was one thing, and that of a Plebeian another, is the like ſo appa-
rent between different Nations, who, according to their different
yet as different manners. It was anciently noted,
and long confirm’d by the actions of the French, that in their firſt af
ſaults their Courage was more than that of Men; and for the reſt leſs
than
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OCEAN A.
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« than that of Women: which nevertheleſs, thro theaiendinent of
“ their Diſciplin, we ſee now to be otherwiſe. I will not ſay,
« but that ſom Man or Nation upon an equal improvement of this
“ kind may be lighter than ſom other ; but certainly, Education is the
“ ſcale without which no Man or Nation can truly know his or
“ her own weight or value. By our Hiſtorys we can tell when one
Marpeſian would have beaten ten Oceaners, and when one Oceaner
« would have beaten ten Marpeſians. MARC ANTHONY was a
Roman, but how did that appear in the imbraces of CLEOPATRA?
" You muſt have fom other Education for your Youth; or they, like
< that paſſage, will ſhew better in Romance than true Story.
“ THE Cuſtom of the Commonwealth of Rome in diſtributing
“ her Magiſtracys without reſpect of age, happend to do well in
CORVINUs and SCIPIO; for which cauſe MACCHIAVEL
" (with whom that which was don by Rome, and that which is well
“ don, is for the moſt part all one) commends this courſe. Yer how
« much it did worſe at other times, is obvious in POMPEY and CÆ-
SAR; Examples by which BOCCALIN I illuſtrats the Prudence of
" Venice in her contrary practice, affirming it to have bin no ſmall ſtep
“ to the ruin of the Roman Liberty, that theſe ſhaving taſted in
o their Youth of the ſupreme Honors had no greater in their age
“ hope for, but by perpetuating of the fame in themſelves; which
came to Blood, and ended in Tyranny. The opinion of Ver U-
LAMIUs is ſafe : The Errors, ſays he, of young men are the ruin of
buſineſs; wheras the Errors of old men amount but to this, that more
might have bin don, or ſooner. But tho their Wiſdom be little, their
“ Courage is great: Wherfore (to com to the main Education of
" this Commonwealth) the Militia of Oceana is the Province of
16 Youth.
« THE diſtribution of this Province" by the Eſſays is ſo fully de-
ſcribd in the Order, that I need repeat nothing : the Order it ſelf
“ being but a Repetition or Copy of that Original, which in antient
66 Prudence is of all others the faireſt; as that from whence the Com-
6 monwealth of Rome more particularly deriv'd the Empire of the
6 World. And there is much more reaſon in this age, when Govern-
ments are univerſally broken, or ſwerv'd from their Foundations,
" and the People groan under Tyranny, that the ſame cauſes (which
« could not be withſtood when the World was full of popular Go-
« vernments) ſhould have the like effects.
« THE Cauſes in the Commonwealth of Rome, wherof the Em-
« pire of the World was not any miraculous, but a natural (nay I may
fafely ſay a neceſſary) conſequence, are contain'd in that part of her
" Diſciplin which was domeſtic, and in that which ſhe exercis'd in her
“ Provinces or Conqueſt. Of the latter I ſhall have better occa-
on to ſpeak when we com to our provincial Orbs; the former
divided the whole People by Tribes, amounting, as Livy and
“ CICERO ſhew, at their full growth to thirty five, and every
“ Tribe by the Cenſe or Valuation of Eſtates into five Claſſes : for the
“ fixth being Proletary, that is the Nurſery, or ſuch as thro their
po-
“ verty contributed nothing to the Commonwealth but Children, was
not reckond, nor us’d in Arms. And this is the firſt point of the
Militia, in which modern Prudence is quite contrary to the antient;
" for wlieras we, excuſing the rich, and arming the poor, becom the
.
of Vaflals
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OCEAN A.
* Vaſſals of our Servants, they, by excuſing the poor, and arming
* fuch as were rich enough to be Freemen, became Lords of the Eartli.
" The Nobility and Gentry of this Nation, who underſtand ſo little
“ what it is to be Lords of the Earth, that they have not bin able to
Po keep their own Lands, will think it a ſtrange Education for their
“ Children to be common Soldiers, and oblig'd to all the Dutys of
* Arms : nevertheleſs it is not for 45. a week, but to be capable of
“ being tlie belt man in the Field or in the City; the latter part of
“ which conſideration makes the common Soldier Irerein a better man
than the General of any monarchical Army. And wheras it may
“ be thought, that this would drink deep of noble Blood, I dare
" boldly fay, take the Roman Nobility in the heat of their fierceſt
« Wars, and you ſhall not find ſuch a ſhambles of them as has bin
"made of ours by mere Luxury and Slothfulneſs; which, killing the
“ Body, kill the Soul alſo ; Animafque in vulnere ponunt. Wheras
common Right is that which who ſtands in the vindication of, has
"us'd that Sword of Juſtice for which he receives the Purple of
Magiſtracy. The Glory of a man on Earth can go no higher, and
“ if he falls he riſes again, and coms ſooner to that reward which is
s ſo much higher as Heaven is above the Earth. To return to the
« Roman Example : Every Claſſis was divided, as has bin more than
6 once ſhewn, into Centurys, and every Century was equally divi-
< ded into Youth and Elders ; che Youth for foren Service, and the
« Elders for the guard of the Territory. In the firſt Claſſis were a-
« bout eighteen Centurys of Horſe, being thoſe which by the Inſti-
tution of SERVIUs were firſt call’d to the Suffrage in the * Cen-
« turial Aſſemblys. But the Delectus, or Levy of an Army, which
is the preſent buſineſs; proceded, according to POLY BIUS, in this
manner.
Upon a War decreed, the Conſuls elected four and twenty mi
" litary Tribuns or Colonels; wherof ten, being ſuch as had merited
«. their tenth Stipend, were younger Officers. The Tribuns being
“ choſen, the Conſuls appointed a day to the Tribes, when thoſe in
“ them of military age were to appear at the Capitol; the day being
com, and the Youth aſſembld accordingly, the Conſuls aſcended
“
their Tribunal, and the younger Tribuns were ſtraight divided into
four
parts
after this manner : four were aſſign'd to the firſt Legion
(a Legion at the moſt conſiſted of 6000 Foot, and 300 Horſe)
" three to the ſecond, four to the third, and three to the fourth. The
younger Tribuns being thus diſtributed, two of the elder were
aſſign'd to the firſt Legion, three to the ſecond, two to the third,
" and three to the fourth. And the Officers of cach Legion thus al-
ſign’d, having drawn the Tribes by Lots, and being feated accord-
ing to their diviſions at a convenient diſtance from each other.
" the Tribe of the firſt Lot was call’d : wherupon they that were of
it knowing tlie buſineſs, and being prepar’d, preſently bolted out four
of their number, in the choice wherof ſuch care was taken, that
" they offer'd none that was not a Citizen; no Citizen that was not
of the Youth ; no Youth that was not of Tom one of the five
C Claſſes; nor any one of the five Claſſes that was not expert at his
“ Exerciſes. Moreover, they us?d ſuch diligence in matching them
<<
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OCEAN A.
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to
" for Age and Stature, that the Officers of the Legions, except they
“ lappen'd to be acquainted with the Youth fo bolted, were forc'd to
put themſelves upon fortune, while they of the firſt Legion choſe
one; they of the ſecond, the next ; they of the third another;
" and the fourth Youth fell to the laſt Legion: and thus was the
“ Election (the Legions and the Tribes varying according to their
Lots) carry'd on till the Foot were complete. The like courſe with
" little alteration was taken by the Horſe Officers till the Horſe alſo
were complete. This was call'd giving of Names, which the
Judg. 20.9. Children of Iſrael did alſo by Lot; and if any man refus'd to give
« his Name, he was ſold for a Slave, or his Eſtate confiſcated to the
" Commonwealth. When * Marcus CURIUs the Conſul was
forc'd to make a ſudden Levy, and none of the Touth would give in their
Names, all the Tribes being put to the Lot, he commanded the firſt
“ Name drawn out of the Urn of the Pollian Tribe (which happend to
com firſt) to be calld; but the Youth not anſwering, he orderd his Goods
be ſold: which was conformable to the Law in Iſrael
, according
“ to which Saul took a yoke of Oxen, and hew'd them in pieces,
3 San. 11. 7. “ and ſent them throout the Tribes, ſaying, Whoſoever coms not forth
battel after Saul and SAMUEL, So Shall it be don to his Oxen.
“ By which you may obſerve alſo, that they who had no Cattel
« were not of the Militia in Iſrael. But thic age of the Roman Youth
“ by the Tullian Law determin'd at 30; and by the Law (tho it
• ſould ſeem by MACCHIAVEL and others, that this was not
« well obſerv'd) a Man could not ſtand for Magiſtracy till he was
“ Miles emeritus, or had fulfild the full term of his Militia, which
was complete in his tenth Stipend or Service: nor was he after-
“ wards oblig'd under any penalty to give his name, except the
" Commonwealth were invaded, in which caſe the Elders were as
“ well oblig'd as the Youth. t. The Conſul might alſo levy Milites
evocatos, or Soldiers, commanded Men out of ſuch as hail fery'd
" their turn, and this at his diſcretion. The Legions being thus com-
plete, were divided by two to each Conſul; and in theſe no Man
“ had right to ſerve but a Roman Citizen: now becauſe two Le-
“ gions made but a ſmall Army, the Romans added to every one of
" their Armys an equal number of Foot, and a double number of
« Horſe levy'd among their Latin or Italian Aſſociats; ſo a Conſular
“ Army, with the Legions and Auxiliarys, announted to about thirty
6 thouſand: and wheras they commonly levy'd two ſuch Armys to-
" gether, theſe being join'd made about ſixty thouſand.
" THE Steps wherby our Militia follows the greateſt Captain,
the three Eſſays; the firſt, ele&ted by a fifth man in the | Pa-
" riſhes, and amounting in the whole to one hundred thouſand, chuſe
" their officers at the ** Hundreds, where they fall alſo to their
Games or Exerciſes, invited by handſom Prizes, ſuch as for them-
" ſelyes and the honor of them will be coveted ; ſuch as will render
" the Hundred a place of Sports, and exerciſe of Arms all the year
“ long; ſuch as in the ſpace of ten years will equip 30000 Men
are
C6
* Marcus Curius Conſul cum ſubitum delectum edicere coactus eſſet, & juniorum nemo re-
ſpondiſſer, conjectis in fortem omnibus, Polliæ quæ proxima exierat, primum nomen urna cx.
tractum citari juffit, neque co reſpondente, bona adoleſcentis .hafta fubjecit. Val. t Quod
per magnos cumultus fieri folicum erat, juftitio indicto, delectus fine vacationibus liabitus cſt. Liv.
| Curiatis. ** Cencuriatis,
t
" Horſe
I
OCEAN A.
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6 of Men, and to her own advantage, who will make a far better
66 account by the Arms, than by the Pins of Poland. Wherfore as a
« Conſular Army conſiſted of about an equal number of Auxiliarys
" Horſe and Foot, with fuch Arms for their Forge, Proof, and Beau-
ty, as (notwithſtanding the Argyraſpides, or ſilver Shields of
ALEXANDER'S Guards) were never worn by ſo many ; ſuch
as will preſent marks of Virtue and Direction to your General or
Strategus in the diſtribution of his Army, which doubles the va-
lue of them to the Proprietors, who are bound to wear them, and
" eaſes the Commonwealth of ſo much Charge, ſo many being arm’d
“ BUT here will be the objection now. How ſhall ſuch a Revenue
o be compas’d? Fifty pounds'a year in every Hundred is a great deal,
not ſo eaſily rais’d. Men will not part with their Mony; nor would
“the ſum as it is propos’d by the Order of Pompe, riſe in many years.
“ Theſe are difficulties that fit our Genius exactly: And yet a thou-
“ fand pounds in each Hundred once levy'd, eſtabliſhes the Revenue for
Now the Hundreds one with another are worth ten thouſand
pounds
a year dry Rent, over and above perſonal Eſtates, which
bring it to twice the value: So that a twentieth part of one year's
“ Revenue of the Hundred dos it. If you cannot afford this while
you pay Taxes, tho from henceforth they will be but ſmall ones, do
it when you pay none. If it be then too much for one year, do it
in two: If it be two much for two years, do it in four. What
“ Husbands have we hitherto bin? What is becom of greater Sums?
“ My Lords, if you ſhould thus caſt your Bread upon the Waters,
" after many days you would find it : ſtand not huckling when you
are offer'd Corn and your Mony again in the mouth of the Sack.
“ BUT to procede : The firſt Eſſay being officer'd at the Hundreds,
and muſter'd at the * Tribes where they are entertain'd with other
Sports, which will be very fine ones) procedes to the Election of the
ſecond Eſſay, or ſtanding Army of this Nation, conſiſting of thirty
thouſand Foot, and ten thouſand Horſe; and theſe, upon a War
decreed, being deliver'd at the Rendevous of Oceana to the Stra-
tegus, are the third Eſſay, which anſwers to the Roman Legions.
But you may obſerve, that wheras the Conſuls elected the military
“ Tribuns, and rais'd commanded Men out of the Veterans at their
own diſcretion; our Polemarchs or Field Officers are elected by the
Scrutiny of the Council of War: and our Veterans not otherwiſe
s taken on than as Volunteers, and with the conſent of the Pole-
marchs; which may ſerve for the removal of certain fcruples which
might otherwiſe be incident in this place, tho without incourage-
ment by the Roman way of proceding, much leſs by that which
But wheras the Roman Legions in all amounted not
" in one Army to above 30000 Men, or little more, you have here
forty thouſand, and wheras they added Auxiliarys, it is in this
regard that Marpeſia will be a greater Revenue to you, than if
you
s had the Indys; for wheras heretofore ſhe has yielded you nothing
e but her native Thiſtles, in plowing out the rankneſs
of her Ariſto-
cracy by your Agrarian, you will find her an inexhauſtible Magazin
4
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« is propos’d.
“ added to their Legions by their Latin or Italian Aſſociats, you may
* Tribucis.
6 add
:
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OC E A N A.
60
:
“ add to a Parlamentary Army an equal number of Marpeſians or Pa-
nopeans, as that Colony ſhall hereafter be able to ſupply you: By
« which means the Commonwealth will be able to go forth to Battel
" with fourſcore thouſand Men. To make Wars with ſmall Forces
" is no Husbandry, but a waſt, a diſeaſe, a lingring and painful con-
“ fumtion of Men and Mony ; the Romans making theirs thick, made
“ them ſhort, and had little regard to Mony, as that which they who
“ lave Men enow, can command where it is fittelt that it ſhould be
« levy'd. All the antient Monarchys by this means got on wing, and
“ attain’d to vaſt Riches. Wheras your modern Princes being dear
“ purchaſers of ſmall parcels, have but emty pockers. But it may
« be ſom will accuſe the Order of raſhneſs, in that it commits the ſole
“ Conduct of the War to the General; and the Cuſtom of Venice by
“ her Proveditori, or checks upon her Commanders in chief, may
« ſeem to be of greater Prudence: but in this part of our Government
neitlier Venice nor any Nation tliat makes uſe of mercenary Forces
66 is for our inſtruction. A mercenary Army, with a ſtanding Gene-
6 ral, is like the fatal Siſter that ſpins; but proper Forces, with an
“ annual Magiſtrat, are like her that cuts the thred. Their Intereſts
« are quite contrary, and yet you liave a better Proveditor than the
« Venetian, anotlier Strategus ſitting with an Army ſtanding by him ;
66 wherupon that which is marching, if there were any probability it
« ſhould, would find as little poſſibility that it could recoil, as a
“ foren Enemy to invade you. Theſe things conſider'd, a War will
appear to be of a contrary nature to that of all other reckonings,
“ inaſmuch as of this you muſt never look to have a good account if
you be ſtrict in impoſing checks. Let a Council of Huntſmen
« aſſembld beforehand, tell you which way the Stag Shall run, where
“ you ſhall caſt about at the fault, and how you ſhall ride to be in at
“ the chaſe all the day: but theſe may as well do that, as a Council
« of War direct a General
. The hours that have painted wings, and
“ of different colors, are his Council: he muſt be like the Ey that
« makes not the Scene, but has it ſo ſoon as it changes. That in many
«c Counſillors there is ſtrength, is ſpoken of Civil Adminiſtrations :
« as to thoſe that are military, there is nothing more certain, than
" that in many Counſllors there is weakneſs. Joint Commiſſions in
“ military affairs, are like hunting your Hounds in their Couples
. In
“ the Attic War CLEOMENES and DeMARAT us, Kings of
“ Lacedemon, being thus coupld, tug'd one againſt another; and
~ while they ſhould have join'd againſt the Perſian, were the cauſe
er of the common calamity: wherupon that Commonwealth took
“ better Counſil, and made a Law, wherby from thenceforth there
" went at once but one of her Kings to Batte).
“ THE Fidenati being in rebellion, and having ſain the Colony of
es the Romans, four Tribuns with Conſular Power were created by the Peo-
ple of Rome, wherof one being left for the guard of the City, the other
" three were ſent againſt the Fidenati, who, thro the diviſion that happen'd
among them, brought nothing home but' Difbonor : whernpon the Ro-
“ mans created the Dictator, and Livy gives his Judgment in theſe
" words : * The three Tribuns with Conſular Power were a leſſon how uſeleſs
* Tres Tribuni, poteſtate Confulari, documento fuêre, quàm plurium imperium bello inutile
ellet; tendendo ad fua quiſque coniilia, cum alii aliud videretur, aperuerunt ad occafionem,
66
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locuin hofti.
*
66 in
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OCEAN A.
189
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juniores Sacramento adacti ſunt, fed feniorum etiam cohortes factx.
“ in War is the joint Command of ſeveral Generals; for each following
“ his own Counſils
, while they all differ’d in their opinions, gave by this
opportunity an advantage to the Enemy., When the Conſuls Quintius
“ and AGRIPPA were ſent againſt the ÆQui, AGRIPPA for this
“ reaſon refus’d to go with his Collegue, ſaying, * That in the admini-
fration of great Actions it was moſt ſafe that the chief Command
ſhould be lodg’d in one Perfon. And if the Ruin of modern Armys
" were well conſiderd, moſt of it would be found to have faln upon this
point : it being in this caſe 'far Safer to truſt to any one Man of common
Prudence, than to any two or more together of the greateſt Parts. The
“ Conſuls indeed being equal in Power, while one was preſent with
" the Senat, and the other in the Field with the Army, made a good
“ Balance; and this with us is exactly follow'd by the Election of a
new Strategus upon the march of the old one.
“ THE feven and twentieth Order, wherby the Elders in caſe
“ of Invaſion are oblig'd to equal duty with the Youth, and cach
upon their own charge, is ſutable to Reaſon (for every Man de-
fends his own Eſtate and to our Copy, as in the War with the
“ Samnits and Tuſcans. ' The Senat order'd a Vacation to be proclaim’d,
" and a Levy to be made of all ſorts of Perſons : And not only the Free-
* men and Youths were liſted, but Cóhorts of the old Men were likewiſe
form’d. This Nation of all others is the leaſt obnoxious to Invaſion.
“Oceana, fays a French Politician, is a Beaſt that cannot be devour'd
“ but by her ſelf; nevertheleſs, that Government is not perfect which
" is not provided at all points; and in this (ad Triarios res rediit)
“the Elders being ſuch as in a martial State muſt be Veterans, the
Commonwealth invaded gathers ſtrength like Antwus by her
fall, while the whole number of the Elders conſiſting of five hun-
“dred thouſand, and the Youth of as many, being brought up ac-
“cording to the Order, give twelve ſucceſſíve Battels, each Battel
conſiſting of eighty thouſand Men, half Elders and half Youth.
And the Commonwealth whoſe Conſtitution can be no ftranger to
any of thoſe Virtues which are to be acquir'd in human life, grows
“ familiar with Death ere ſhe dys. If the hand of God be upon
her
“ for her Tranſgreſſions, ſhe ſhall mourn for her Sins, and ly in the
« duſt for her Iniquitys, without loſing her Manhood.
Si fractus illabatur orbis,
Impavidam ferient ruine.
The remaining part, being the Conſtitution of the Provincial
Orb, is partly Civil, or conſiſting of the Elders; and partly Military,
or conſiſting of the youth. The Civil part of the provincial Orb is
THE twenty eighth ORDER, wherby the Council of a Province 28. Order.
being conſtituted of twelve Knights
, divided by four into three Regions
, the Civil pare
(for their term and revolution
conformable to the Parlament ) is perpetuated of the Provin
by the annual election at the Tropic of four Knights (being triennial cial Orb.
* Saluberrimum in adminiſtratione magnarum rerum, fummam imperii apud unum eſſe,
| Senacus
juftitium indici, delectum Omnis generis hominum haberi juffic: nec ingenui modo, &
Magi-
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Magiſtrats) out of the Region of the Senat whoſe term expires; and of
one Knight out of the ſame Region to be Strategies or General of the Pro-
vince, which Magiſtracy is annual. The Strategus or Magiſtrat thus
choſen, Shall be as well Preſident of the Provincial Council with power to
propoſe to the ſame, as General of the Army. The Council for the reſt
Shall elect weekly Provoſts, having any two of them alſo right to propoſe
after the manner of the Senatorian Councils of Oceana. And 'wheras
all Provincial Councils are Members of the Council of State, they may and
ought to keep diligent correſpondence with the ſame, which is to be don
after this manner : Any Opinion or Opinions legitimatly propos'd and
debated at a Provincial Council, being therupon ſign’d by the Strategus,
or any two of the Provots, may be tranſmitted to the Council of State
in Oceana; and the Council of State proceding upon the ſame in their
natural courſe (whether by their own Power, if it be a matter within their
Inſtructions, or by Authority of the Senat therupon conſulted, if it be a
matter of State which is not in their Inſtructions ; or by Authority of the
Senat and Command of the People, if it be a matter of Law, as for the
Levys of Men or Mony upon common uſe and ſafety) Mall return ſuch
Anſwers, Advice, or Orders, as in any of the ways mention'd ſhall be de-
termin’d upon the caſe. The Provincial Councils of Marpeſia and Pa-
nopea reſpectively ſhall take special care that the Agrarian Laws, as alſo
all other Laws that be or ball from time to time be enacted by the Parlament
of Oceana, for either of them, be duly put in execution : they ſhall ma-
nage
and receive the Cuſtoms of either Nation for the Shipping of Oceana,
being the common Guard : they ſhall have a care that moderat and ſufficient
pay upon the reſpective Province be duly rais'd for the ſupport and mainte-
nance of the Officers and Soldiers, or Army of the fame, in the moſt effectu-
al, conſtant and convenient way: they shall receive the Regalia, or public
Revenues of thoſe Nations, out of which every Counſillor ſhall have for
his term, and to his proper uſe, the Sum of 503 l. per annum, and the
Strategus 500 l. as Preſident, beſides his Pay as General, which ſhall be
1000 Pounds; the remainder to go to the uſe of the Knights and De-
putys of the
reſpective Provinces, to be paid, if it will reach, according to
the rates of Oceana ; if not, by an equal diſtribution, reſpectively; or
the overplus, if there be any, to be return’d to the Treaſury of Oceana.
They shall manage the Lands (if there be any ſuch held'in either of the
Provinces by the Commonwealth of Oceana, in Dominion) and return
the Rents into the Exchequer. If the Commonwealth coms to be poflest
of richer Provinces, the Day of the General or Strategus, and of the
Councils
, may be reſpectively increas’d., The People for the rest hall elect
their own Magiſtrats, and be govern’d by their own Laws, having Power
alſo to appeal from their native or provincial Magiſtrats, if they pleaſe,
to the People of Oceana. And wheras there may be ſuch as receiving In-
jury, are not able to proſecute their Appeals at ſo great a diſtance, 'eight
Şerjeants at Law being ſworn by the Commiſſioners of the Seal, ſhall be ſent
by four into each Province once in two years; who, dividing the ſame by
Circuits, ball hear ſuch Caulės; and having gather’d and introduc'd them,
ſhall return to the ſeveral Appellants, gratis, the Determinations and De-
crees of the People in their ſeveral caſes.
THE term of a Knight in a Provincial Orb, as to domeſtic Magi-
ſtracys, ſhall be effeemed a Vacation, and no bar to preſent Election to any
other Honor, his provincial Magiſtracy being expir’d.
1
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191
¢
THE Quorum of a Provincial Council, ris alſo of every other Couna
cil or Aſſembly in Oceana, Mall in time of health conſist of two parts in
three of the whole number proper to that Council or Aſſembly, and in á
time of ſickneſs, of one part in three : But of the Senat there can be no Quo-
rum without three of the Signory; nor of a Council without two of the
Provoſt s.
THE Civil part of the Provincial Orb being declar'd by the Fores
going Order; the Military part of the fame is conſtituted by
THE twenty ninth ORDER; wherby the Stratiots of the third 2s. Order:
Eſſay having drawn the Gold Balls mark'd with the Letter M, and being Confitution of
ten Horſe and fifty Foot in a Iribe, that is to ſay, five hundred Horſe, part of the Pro-
and two thouſand five hundred Foot in all, the Tribes ſhall be deliverdby vincial Orb.
the reſpective Conductors to the provincial Strategus or General, at ſuch
a time and place, or Rendevous, ' as he ſhall appoint by Order and Certificat
of his Election : and the Strategus having receiv’d the Horſe and Foot men-
tion'd, which are the third Claſſis of his provincial Guard or Army, ſhall
forthwith lead them away to Marpeſia, where the Army conſists of three
Claſſes, each Claffis containing three thouſand men, wherof five hundred
are Horſe ; and receiving the new Strategis with the third Claſſis, the old
Strategus with the firft Claffis ſhall be diſmiſt by the Provincial Council.
The lame method with the Stratiots of the letter 'P, is to be obſerv'd for
the provincial Orb of Panopea: and the Commonwealth coming to acquire
new Provinces, the Senat and the Peopie may erect new Orbs in like manner,
--conſiſting of greater or leſs numbers, according as is requir’d by the re-
spective occaſion. If a Stratiot has once ſerv'd his term in a Provincial
Orb, and liappens afterwards to draw the Letter of a Province at the Elec-
tion of the ſecond Ejay, he may refuſe bis Lot ; and if be refuſes it, the
Cenfor of that Vrn ſhall cauſe the Files bállóring at the ſame to make a
halt ; and if the Stratiot produces the Certificat of his Strategus or Gene-
ral, that he has ſerv'd his time accordingly, the Cenſor throwing the Ball
that he drew into the Vrn again, and taking out a Blank, ſhall diſmiſs the
Youth, and cauſe the Ballot to procede.
TO perfect the whole Structure of this Commonwealth, fom Di-
rections are given to the third Eſſay, or Army marching, in
THE thirtieth ORDER. Wheri thou goeſt to battel againſt tlıy 30. Order:
Enemys, and ſeeſt Horſes and Chariots, and a People more than thou;
be not afraid of them, for the Lord thy God is lie that gos withi thee Deut. 20. I.
to fight for thee againſt thy Enemys. And when thou divideſt the
Spoil, it ſhall be as a Statute and an Ordinance to thee; that as his í Sam.30.24.
part
is that gos down to the battel
, ſo ſhall his part be that tarrys by
the Stuff: that is, (as to the Commonwealth of Oceana) The Spoil' taken
of the Enemy (except Clothes, Arms, Horſes, Ammunition and Victuals,
to be divided to the Soldiery by the Strategus and the Polemarchs upon the
place according to their diſcretion) ſhall be deliver'd to four Commiſſarys
of the Spoils elečted and livorn by the Council of War ; which Commiffa-
rys sball be allowed Shipping by the State, and Convoys according as occa-
fion fball require by the Strategus ; to the end that having a Bell of Lading
fugn’d by three or more of the Polomarchs, they may ſlip and bring, or cauſe
Such Spoils to be brought to the Prize:Office in Oceana, where they fall
1
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:
O Ć E A N A
*
never be any ſuch Effect.
be fold; and the Profit ariſing, by ſuch Spoils ſhall be divided into thrce
parts, wherof one ſhall go to the Treaſury, another ſhall be paid to the
Soldiery of this Nation, and a third to the Auxiliarys at their return
from their Service, provided that the ſaid Auxiliarys be equal in number
to the proper Forces of this Nation, otherwiſe their Share ball be ſo much
leſs as they themſelves are fewer in number: the reſt of the two thirds to go
to the officers and Soldiers of the proper Forces. And the Spoils ſo di-
vided to the proper Forces, ſhall be ſubdivided into three equal parts,
wherof one fall go to the Officers, and two to the common Soldiers : The
like for the Auxiliarys
. And the Share allotted to the Officers shall be di-
vided into four equal parts, wherof one ſhall go to the Strategus, another
to the Polemarchś, a third to the Colonels, and a fourth to the Captains,
Cornets, Enſigns, and under Officers, receiving their ſhare of the Spoil as
common Soldiers : The like for the Auxiliarys
. And this upon pain, in
the caſe of failure, of what the People of Oceana (to whom the Cogni-
zance of Pecalat or Crimes of this nature is properly appertaining) Ihath
adjudgʻor decree.
UPON theſe three laſt Orders the ARCHON ſeem'd to be ha-
ranguing at the head of his Army in this manner.
My Dear Lords and Excellent Patriots ;
GOVERNMENT of this make is a Commonwealth for
Increaſe. Of thoſe for Preſervation, the Inconveniences and
Frailtys have bin ſhewn: Their Roots are narrow, ſuch as do not
run, have no Fibers, their tops weak and dangerouſly expos’d to
" the weather ; except you chance to find one, as Venice, planted in
a Flowerpot; and if the grows, ſhe grows top-heavy, and falls too.
& But you cannot plant an Oak in a Flowerpot; ſhe muſt have Earth
for her Root, and Heaven for her Branches.
Imperium Oceano, famam que terminet aftris.
“ ROME was ſaid to be broken by her own weight, but poeti-
cally: For that weight by which ſhe was pretended to be ruin’d,
was ſupported in her Emperors by a far ſlighter Foundation. And
s in the common experience of good Architecture, there is nothing
more known, than that Buildings ſtand the firmer and the longer
“ for their own weight ; nor ever ſwerve thro any other internal
cauſe, than that their Materials are corruptible: But the People ne-
cs
ver dy; nor, as a political Body, are ſubject to any other Corrup-
" tion than that which derives from their Government. Unleſs a
“ Man will deny the Chain of Caufes, in which he denys God, he
muſt alſo acknowlege the Chain of Effects; wherfore there can be
no effect in Nature, that is not from the firſt Cauſe, and thoſe ſuic-
« ceſſive Links of the Chain, without which it could not have binl.
« Now except a Man can ſhew the contrary in a Commonwealth; if
" there be no cauſe of Corruption in the firſt 'make of it, there can
o faneneſs upon this Aſſertion ; for as Man is finful
, but yet the U-
“ niverſe is perfect, fo may the Citizen be finful, and yet the Com-
« monwealth be perfect. And as Man, ſeeing the World is perfeet,
$ can never commit any ſuch Sin as ſhall render it imperiect, or bring
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it to a natural diſſolution ; ſo the Citizen, where the Common-
wealth is perfect, can never commit any ſuch Crime as will render
it imperfećt, or bring it to a natural diſſolution. To com to ex-
perience; Venice, notwithſtanding we have found ſom flaws in
it, is the only Commonwealth in the Make wherof no man can
find a cauſe of diſſolution; for which reaſon we behold her (tho
" ſhe conſiſts of men that are not without fin) at this day with one
thouſand Years upon her back, yet for any internal cauſe, as young,
as freſh, and free from decay, or any appearance of it, as ſhe was
born: but whatever in nature is not ſenſible of decay by the courſe
* of a thouſand Years, is capable of the whole Age of Nature; by
“ which Calculation, for any check that I am able to give my ſelf, a
Commonwealth, rightly orderd, may, for any internal cauſes, be
as immortal or longliv’d as the World. But if this be true, thoſe
Commonwealthis that are naturally fall’n, muſt have deriv'd their
Ruin from the riſe of them. Iſrael and Athens dy'd not natural but
“ violent deaths; in which manner the World it ſelf is to dy. We
are ſpeaking of thoſe cauſes of Diſſolution which are natural to
Government; and they are but two, either Contradiction or In-
equality: If a Commonwealth be a Contradiction, ſhe muſt needs
deſtroy her ſelf; and if ſhe be inequal, it tends to ſtrife, and ſtrife
to ruin. By the former of theſe fell Lacedemon, by the latter Rome.
" Lacedemon being made altogether for War, and yet not for Increaſe,
6: her natural Progreſs became her natural Diſſolution, and the build-
ing of her own victorious Hand too heavy for her Foundation ; ſo
" that ſhe fell indeed by her own weight. But Rome periſh'd thro
“ her native Inequality, which how it inveterated the Boſoms of the
" Senat and the People each againſt other, and even to death, has bin
" LOOK well to it, my Lords, for if there be a contradiction or
inequality in your Commonwealth, it muſt fall; but if it lias neither
as of theſe, it has no principle of Mortality. Do not think me impu-
dent; if this be truth, I lhould commit a groſs indiſcretion in con-
cealing it. Sure I am that MACCHIAVEL is for the immorta-
“ lity of a Commonwealth upon far weaker Principles. If a Com- Diſc.B.3.c.22.
monwealth, ſays he, were ſo happy as to be provided often with men,
b.3.c.29.
that, when ſhe is ſwerving from her Principles, Mould reduce her to
her Inſtitution, She would be immortal. But a Commonwealth, as
we have demonſtrated, ſwerves not from her Principles, but by
" and thiro her Inſtitution; if ſhe brought no Biafs into the world
with her, her courſe for any internal Cauſe muſt be ſtreight for-
ward, as we fee is that of Venice
. She cannot turn to the right
nor to the left, but by ſom rub, which is not an internal but
external cauſe; againſt ſuch ſhe can be no way fortify'd, but
thro her Situation, as is Venice ; or thro her Militia, as was Rome :
by which Examples a Commonwealth may be ſecure of thoſe alſo.
Think me not vain, for I cannot conceal my opinion here; a Com-
monwealth that is rightly inſtituted can never ſwerve, nor one that
i is not rightly inſtituted be ſecur’d from ſwerving by reduction to her
e firſt Principles : Wherfore it is no leſs apparent in this place, that
“ MACCHIAVEL underſtood not a Commonwealth as to the whole
piece, than where having told you, That a Tribun, or any other Ci- Diſc. B.1.c.18.
" tizen of Rome, might propoſe a Law to the People, and debate it with
Cc
6 them;
“ ſhewn at large.
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them; lie adds, this Order was good, while the People were good; but
" when the People became evil, it became moſt pernicious. As if this Or-
" der (thro which, with the like, the People moſt apparently became
evil) could ever have bin good; or that the People, or the Common-
" wealth could ever liave becom good, by being reduc'd to ſuch Princi-
ples as were the Original of their Evil. The Diſeaſe of Rome was,
as has bin ſhewn, from the native inequality of her Balance, and no
“ otherwiſe from the Empire of the World, than as, this falling into
one Scale, that of the Nobility (an evil in ſuch a Fabric inevitable)
“ kick'd out the People. Wherfore a Man that could have made her
to throw away the Empire of the World, might in that have re-
“ duc'd her to her Principles; and yet have bin ſo far from rendring
“ her immortal, that going no further, he ſhould never have curd
“ her. But your Commonwealth is founded upon an equal Agrari-
an; and it the Earth be given to the Sons of men, this Balance is the
“ Balance of Juſtice, ſuch a one as in having due regard to the diffe-
rent Induſtry of different men, yet faithfully judges the Poor. And
Prov. 29. 14. “ the King that faithfully judges the Poor, his Throne ſhall be eſtabliſh'd
for ever;
much more the Commonwealth, ſeeing that equality
" 'which is the neceſſary diſſolution of Monarchy, is the Generation,
“ the very Life and Soul of a Commonwealth. And now, if ever,
“ I may be excuſable, feeing my aſſertion, that the Throne of a Com-
“ monwealth may be eſtabliſli'd for ever, is conſonant to the holy
“ Scriptures.
THE Balance of a Commonwealth that is equal, is of ſuch a
nature, that whatever falls into her Empire, muſt fall equally; and
as if the whole Earth falls into your Scales, it muſt fall equally; and
“ ſo you may be a greater People, and yet not ſwerve from your Prin-
ciples one hair. Nay, you will be ſo far from that, that you muſt
“ bring the world in ſuch a caſe to your Balance, even to the Balance
“ of Juſtice. But hiearken, my Lords; are we on Earth? do we fee.
“ the Sun? or are we viſiting thoſe ſhady places which are feign’d by
" the Poets?
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Continuò audit & voces, vagitus & ingens.
6
“ Theſe Gothic Empires that are yet in the world, were at the firſt,
" tho they had legs of their own, but a heavy and unweildy burden ;
" but their Foundations being now broken, the Iron of them enters
" even into the Souls of the Oppreſt; and hear the voice of their Com-
« forters : Mly Father hath chaſtis’d you with Whips, but I will chaſtiſe
you with Scorpions. Hearken, I ſay; if thy Brother crys to thee in
“affliction, wilt thou not hear him? This is a Commonwealth of the
“ Fabric, that has an open car and a public concern ; ſhe is not made
“ for her ſelf only, but given as a Magiſtrat of God to Mankind, for
" the vindication of common Right, and the Law of Nature. Wher-
“ fore fays CICERO of the like, that of the Romans, * We havera.
" ther undertaken the Patronage, than the Empire of the World. If you,
“ not regarding this Example, like fom other Nations that are upon
point to ſmart for it, ihall, having attain'd to your own Liberty:
“ bear the Sword of your common Magiſtracy in vain, ſit ſtill, and
16 the
* Nos magis Patronacum orbis terrarum fufcepimus, quam Imperium.
6 fold
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, :
fold your Arms, or, which is worſe, let out the Blood of your Peo-
ple to Tyrants, to be ſhed in the defence of their Yokes like Water,
« and fo not only turn the Grace of God into wantonneſs, but his Juſtice
“ into Wormwood : I ſay if you do thus, you are not now making a Com-
monwealth, but heaping coals of fire upon your own heads. A Com-
monwealth of this make is a Miniſter of God upon Earth, to the end
" that the World may be govern'd with Righteouſneſs. For which cauſe
(that I may com at length to our preſent buſineſs) the Orders latt
rehears'd are buds of Empire, ſuch as with the bleſſing of God may
“ ſpread the Arms of your Commonwealth, like a holy
Aſylum, to the
" diſtreſsd World, and give the Earth her Sabbath of years, or reſt
" from her Labors, under the ſhadow of your Wings. It is upon this
point where the Writings of MACCHIAVEL, having for the
“ reſt excel'd all other Authors, com as far to excel themſelves.
“ COMMONWEALTHS, ſays he, have had three ways of pro- Diſc. B. 2.C.4.
pagating themſelves, one after the manner of Monarchys, by impo-
ſing the Yoke, which was the way of Athens, and towards the latter
times of Lacedemon ; another by equal Leagues, which is the way of
Switzerland; (I ſhall add of Holland, tho ſince his time) a third by
inequal Leagues, which, to the ſbame of the World, was never praca
tisd, nay nor ſo much as ſeen or minded, by any other Common-
“ wealth bút that only of Rome. They will each of them, either for
« caution or imitation, be worthy to be well weigh’d, which is the
proper work of this place. Athens and Lacedemon have bin the
"Occaſion of great ſcandal to the world, in two, or at leaſt one
of two regards: the firſt their Emulation, which involvd Greece
" in perpetual Wars; the ſecond their way of Propagation, which by
impoſing Yokes upon others, was plainly contradi&tory to their own
Principles.
"FOR the firſt : Governments, be they of what kind ſoever, if
they be planted too cloſe, are liké Trees, that impatient in their
growth to have it hinder'd, eat out one another. It was not un-
known to theſe in ſpeculation, or, if you read the ſtory of AGE-
SILA us, in action, that either of them with thirty thouſand mien
might have maſter'd the Eaſt; and certainly, if the one had not
“ ſtood in the others light, ALEXANDER had com too late to that
end, which was the means (and would be if they were to live a-
gain) of ruin, at leaſt to one of them: wherfore with any man
that underſtands the nature of Government this is excufable. So it
was between Oceana and Marpeſia; ſo it is between France and
Spain, tho leſs excuſable; and ſo it ever will be in the like caſes. But
to com to the ſecond occaſion of Scandal by them given, which was
es in the way of their propagation, it is not excuſable : for they
brought their Confederats under bondage ; by which means Athens
gave occaſion of the Peloponneſian War, the wound of which ſhe
dy'd ſtinking, when Lacedemon, taking the ſame Infection from
her Carcaſe, foon follow'd.
"WHER FORE, my Lords, let theſe be warnings to you, not
to make that Liberty which God has given you a ſnare to others, in
practiſing this kind of inlargement of your felves
.
"THE ſecond way of Propagation or Inlargement us’d by Com-
monwealths, is that of Switzerland and Holland, equal Leagues
“ This, tho it be not otherwiſe miſchievous, is uſeleſs
to the World,
ir
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“ and dangerous to themſelves: uſeleſs to the World; for as the for-
“ mer Governments were Storks, theſe are Blocks, have no ſenſe of
“ Honor, or concern in the Sufferings of others. But as the Ætolians,
a State of the like Fabric, were reproach'd by PHILIP of Mace-
“ don, to proſtitute themſelves, by letting out their Arms to the Luſts
« of others, while they leave their own Liberty barren, and without
legitimat iſſue; ſo I do not defame theſe people : the Switzer for
6. Valor has no Superior, the Hollander for Induſtry no equal; but
“ themſelves in the mean time ſhall ſo much the leſs excuſe their Go-
vernments, ſeeing that to the Switz it is well enough known that the
“ Enſigns of his Commonwealth have no other Motto than in te con-
« verte manus : and that of the Hollander, tho he ſweats more Gold
" than the Spaniard digs, lets him languiſh in debt ; for ſhe her felf
" lives upon charity. Theſe are dangerous to themſelves, precarious
“ Governments, ſuch as do not command, but beg their Bread from
" Province to Province, in Coats that being patch'd up of all colors
are in effect of none. That their Cantons and Provinces are ſo
many Arrows, is good; but they are ſo many Bows too, which is
naught.
“ LIKE to theſe was the Commonwealth of the antient Tuſcans,
“ hung together like Bobbins, without a hand to weave with them;
66 therfore eaſily overcom by the Romans, tho at that time, for number,
a far leſs conſiderable People. If your Liberty be not a Root that
grows, it will be a Branch that withers; which conſideration brings
me to the Paragon, the Commonwealth of Rome.
" THE ways and means wherby the Romans acquir'd the Patro-
nage, and in that the Empire of the World, were different, ac-
« cording to the different condition of their Commonwealth in her riſe,
« and in her growth: in her riſe ſhe proceded rather by Colonys; in
“ her growth by inequal Leagues. Colonys without the bounds of
« Italy The planted none (ſuch diſperſion of the Roman Citizen
as to
« plant him in foren parts, till the contrary Intereſt of the Emperors
« brought in that Practice, was unlawful) nor did ſhe ever demoliſh
any Čity within that compaſs, or deveſt it of Liberty; but wheras
the moſt of them were Commonwealths, ſtir’d up by emulation of
“ her great felicity to war againſt her, if ſhe overcame any, ſhe con-
« fiſcated ſom part of their Lands that were the greateſt Incendiarys,
or cauſes of the Trouble, upon which ſhe planted Colonys of her
“ own People, preſerving the reſt of their Lands and Libertys for
6 the Natives or Inhabitants. By this way of proceding, that I
may be as brief as poſſible, ſhe did many and great things. For
« in confirming of Liberty, the propagated her Empire; in holding
“ the Inhabitants from Rebellion, ſhe put a curb upon the incurſion of
“ Enemys; in exonerating her ſelf of the poorer fort, ſhe multiply'd
her Citizens; in rewarding her Veterans, ſhe render'd the reſt leſs
“ feditious; and in acquiring to her ſelf the reverence of a common
" Parent, ſhe from time to time became the Mother of newborn
“ IN her farther growth the way of her Propagation went
“ more upon Leagues, which for the firſt diviſion were of two kinds,
6 Social and Provincial.
“ AGAIN, Social Leagues, or Leagues of Society, were of two
66 kinds.
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* THE firſt call?d Latinity or Latin, the ſecond Italian Right.
“ THE League between the Romans and the Latins, or Latin
" Right, approach'd neareſt to Jus Quiritium, or the Right of a na-
" tive Roman. The Man or the City that was honor'd with this
Right, was Civitate donatus cum fuffragio, adopted a Citizen of Rome,
with the right of giving Suffrage with the People in fom caſes, as
thoſe of Confirmation of Law, or Determination in Judicature, if
« both the Conſuls were agreed, not otherwiſe; wherfore that com-
ing to little, the greateſt and moſt peculiar part of this Privilege
was, that who had born Magiſtracy (at leaſt that of Ædil or Que-
ſtor) in
any Latin City, was by conſequence of the ſame, a Citizen
" of Rome at all points.
“ ITALIAN Right was alſo a donation of the City, but with
out Suffrage: they who were in either of theſe Leagues, were go-
“ vern’d by their own Laws and Magiſtrats, having all the Rights, as
to Liberty, of Citizens of Rome, yielding and paying to the Com-
" monwealth as head of the League, and having in the conduct of all
“ Affairs appertaining to the common Cauſe, ſuch aid of Men and
Mony as was particularly agreed to upon the merit of the Cauſe, and
ſpecify'd in their reſpective Leagues, whence ſuch Leagues came to
« be cald equal or inequal accordingly.
“ PROVINCIAL Leagues were of different extenſion, accord-
« ing to the Merit and Capacity of a conquer'd People; but they were
6. all of one kind : for every Province was govern'd by Roman Ma-
“ giſtrats, as a Prætor or a Proconſul, according to the dignity of the
* Province, for the Civil Adminiſtration and Conduct of the Provin-
“ cial Army; and a Quæſtor for the gathering of the public Revenue,
" from which Magiſtrats a Province might appeal to Rome.
“ FOR the better underſtanding of theſe Farticulars, I ſhall exem-
plify in as many of them as is needful: and firſt in Macedon.
* THE Macedonians were thrice conquer'd by the Romans, firſt un-
« der the Conduct of Titus Quintus FLAMINIUS; fecond-
ly, under that of Lucius ÀMILIUS PAULUS; and, thirdly,
« under that of QUINTUS CÆCILIUS METELLUS, thence calld
“ MACEDONICUS.
“ FOR the firſt time PHILIP of Macedon, who (poſſeſt of Acro
« corinthus) boaſted no leſs than was true, that he had Greece in fetters,
being overcom by FLAMINIUS, had his Kingdom reſtor’d to him
upon condition that he ſhould immediatly ſet all the Citys which he
" held in Greece and in Aſia at liberty; and that he ſhould not make
“ war out of Macedon, but by leave of the Senat of Rome; which
« Philip (having no other way to ſave any thing) agreed ſhould be
“THE Grecians being at this time aſſembld at the Iſthmian Games,
" where the Concourſe was mighty great, a Crier, appointed to the
or office by FLAMINIus, was heard among them proclaiming all
Greece to be free; to which the People being amaz’d at ſo hopeleſs a
thing, gave little credit, till they receivd ſuch teſtimony of the
truth as put it paft all doubt: wherupon they fell immediatly on run-
ning to the Proconful with Flowers and Garlands, and ſuch violent
expreſſions of their Admiration and Joy, as, if' FLAMINIUS, a
young man, about thirty three, had not alſo bin very ſtrong, he
muſt have dy'd of no other death than their kindneſs, while every
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OCE A N A.
66
“ one ſtriving to touch his hand, they bore him up and down the field
“ with an unruly throng, full of ſuch Ejaculations as theſe: How !
• Is there a People in the world, that at their own charge, at their own
« peril, will fight for the Liberty of another? Did they live at the
“ next door to this fire? Or what kind of men are theſe, whoſe buſi-
“ neſs it is to paſs the Seas, that the World may be govern'd with
Righteouſneſs? The Citys of Greece and of Aſia ſhake off their Iron
“ Ferters at the voice of a Cryer ! Was it madneſs to imagin ſuch a
“ thing, and is it don? O Virtue! O Felicity ! O Fame !
« IN this Example your Lordſhips have a donation of Liberty, or
“ of Italian Right to a People, by reſtitution to what they had for-
merly injoy'd ; and ſom particular Men, Familys, or Citys, accor-
ding to their merit of the Romans, if not upon this, yet upon the like
“ occaſions, were gratify'd with Latinity.
“ BUT PHIĽi p's ſhare by this means did not pleaſe him, wher-
“ fore the League was broken by his Son Perseus; and the Mace-
« donians therupon for the ſecond time conquer'd by Æmilius
« Paulus, their King taken, and they ſom time after the Victory
“ ſummond to the Tribunal of the General; where remembring how
« little hope they ought to liave of Parden, they expected ſom dread-
“ ful Sentence: When ÆMILIUs in the firſt place declar'd the Ma-
o cedonians to be free, in the full poſſeſſion of their Lands, Goods, and
« Laws, with Right to elect annual Magiſtrats, yielding and paying
“ to the People of Rome one half of the Tribute which they were
« accuſtom’d to pay to their own Kings. This don he went on,
“ making ſo skilful a diviſion of the Country in order to the 'metho-
“ dizing of the People, and caſting them into a form of popular GO-
« vernment, that the Macedonians, being firſt ſurpriz'd with the Vir-
6 tue of the Romans, began now to alter the ſcene of their Admirati-
on, that a Stranger ſhould do ſuch things for them in their own
“ Country, and with ſuch facility, as they liad never ſo much as once
« imagind to be poſſible. Nor was this all, for Æmilius, as if not ,
dictating to conquerid Enemys, but to ſom well deſerving Friends,
gave them in the laſt place Laws ſo futable, and contriv'd with ſuch
“ care and prudence, that long uſe and experience (the only Correctreſs
6 of Works of this nature) could never find a fault in them.
“ IN this Example you have a Donation of Liberty, or of Italian
" Right, to a People that had not taſted of it before, but were now
“ taught how to uſe it.
“ MY LORDS, The Royaliſts ſhould compare what we are do-
“ ing, and we what hitherto we have don for them, with this example.
" It is a ſhame that while we are boaſting up our ſelves above all o-
" thers, we ſhould yer be ſo far from imitating ſuch examples as theſe,
“ that we do not ſo much as underſtand that if Government be the Pa-
“ rent of Manners, where there are no Heroic Virtues, there is no He-
“ roic Government,
" BUT the Macedonians rebelling, at the name of a falſe PHILIP,
“ the third time againſt the Romans, were by them judgʻd incapable of
« Liberty, and reduc'd by METELLUS to a Province.
“ NOW wheras it remains, that I explain the nature of a Province,
“ I ſhall rather chuſe that of Sicily
, becauſe having bin the firſt which
" the Romans made, the deſcriptions of the reſt relate to it.
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Provinces to burſt her ſelf, this is no otherwiſe to be underſtood, than
“WE have ſo receiv'd the Sicilian Citys into Amity, ſays CICERO,
" that they injoy their antient Laws; and upon no other condition than of
" the ſame obedience to the People of Rome, which they formerly yielded
" to their own Princes or Superiors. So the Sicilians, wheras they had
“ bin parceld out to divers Princes, and into divers States (the cauſe
of perpetual Wars, wherby, hewing one another down, they be-
came Sacrifices to the Ambition of their Neighbors, or of ſom In-
vader) were now receiv'd at the old rate into a new Protection
which could hold them, and in which no Enemy durſt touch them;
nor was it poſſible, as the caſe then ſtood, for the Sicilians to receive,
for the Romans to give more.
“ A ROMAN Province is defin’d by SIGONIUS, a Region haa
" ving Provincial Right. Provincial Right in general was to be go-
"vern'd by a Roman Pretor, or Conſul, in matters at leaſt of State,
and of the Militia: And by a Quæſtor, whoſe Office it was to re-
ceive the Public Revenue. "Provincial Right in particular was dif-
ferent, according to the different Leagues or Agreements between
the Commonwealth, and the People reduc'd into a Province. Si-
"culi hoc jure fünt, ut quod civis cum cive agat, domi certet ſuis legi-
"bus; quod Siculus cum Siculo non ejuſdem Civitatis
, ut de eo Prator
"Judices, ex P. Rupilii Decreto, fortiatur. Quod privatus a Populo
petit, aut populus a privato, Senatus ex aliqua Civitate, qui judicet,
"datur, cui alternx Civitates rejecte ſunt. Quod civis Romanus a Si-
“ culo petit, Siculus Judex datur ; quod Siculus a cive Romano, civis
« Romanus datur. Cæterarum rerum ſelecti Judices ex civium Roma-
norum conventu proponi ſolent. Inter aratores e decumanos lege fru-
mentaria, quam Hieronicam appellant, judicia fiunt. Becauſe the reſt
“ would oblige me to a diſcourſe too large for this place, it ſhall ſuf-
“ fice that I have ſhew'd you how it was in Sicily.
“ MY LORDS, Upon the Fabric of your Provincial Orb I ſhall
not hold
you; becauſe it is ſufficiently deſcrib'd in the Order, and I
cannot believe that you think it inferior to the way of a Prætor and
a Quxſtor. But wheras the Provincial way of the Roman Common-
“ wealth was that wherby it held the Empire of the World, and your
" Orbs are intended to be capable at leaſt of the like uſe; there may
" ariſe many Controverſys : As whether ſuch a courſe be lawful; whe-
“ther it be feizible; and, ſeeing that the Romans were ruin'd upon
that point, whether it would not be to the deſtruction of the Com-
FOR the firſt, If the Empire of a Commonwealth be an occa-
“ fion to ask whether it be lawful for a Commonwealth to aſpire to
the Empire of the World, it is to ask whether it be lawful for it to
do its duty, or to put the World into a better condition than it was
“ AND to ask whether this be feizible, is to ask why the Oceaner,
being under the like adminiſtration of Government, may not do as
"much with two hundred men as the Roman did with one hundred ;
for comparing their Commonwealths in their riſe
, the difference is
yet greater. Now that Rome (feris Avaritia Luxuriaque) thro the na-
tural thirſt of her conftitution, came at length with the fulneſs of her
as when a man that from his own evil Conſtitution had contracted
" the Dropſy, dys with drinking: It being apparent that in caſe her
“ Agrarian
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« Agrarian had held, ſhe could never have bin thus ruin'd; and I have
already demonſtrated that your Agrarian being once pois’d, can ne-
ver break or ſwerve.
“ WHERFORE to draw towards ſom concluſion of this Dil-
“ courſe, let me inculcat the uſe, by ſelecting a few Conſiderations
“ out of many. The regard had in this place to the Empire of the
6. World appertains to a well-order'd Commonwealth, more eſpe-
cially for two reaſons.
1. THE facility of this great Enterprize, by a Government of the
Model propos’d.
2. THE danger that you would run in the omiſtion of ſuch a
« Government.
“ THE facility of this Enterprize, upon the grounds already laid,
“ muſt needs be great, foraſmuch as the Empire of the World bas bin,
“ both in Reaſon and Experience, the neceſſary conſequence of a Com-
“ monwealth of this nature only : for tho it has bin given to all kinds
to drive at it, ſince that of Athens or Lacedemon, if the one had not
“ hung in the others light, might have gain’d it; yet could neither of
“ them have held it : not Athens, thro the manner of her propagati-
on, which, being by downright Tyranny, could not preſerve what
“ The had ; nor Lacedemon, becauſe ſhe was overthrown by the weight
“ of a leſs Conqueſt. The facility then of this great Enterprize be-
ing peculiar to popular Government, I ſhall conſider it, firſt, In
gaining; and ſecondly, In holding.
“ FOR the former, Volenti non fit injuria; it is ſaid of the Peo-
ple under EUMENES, that they would not have chang’d their
“ ſubjection for Liberty ; wherfore the Romans gave them no diſtur-
“ bance. If a People be contented with their overnment, it is a
a certain ſign that it is good, and much good do them with it. The
“ Sword of your Magiſtracy is for a terror to them that do evil.
« EUMEN ES had the fear of God, or of the Romans before his
eys;
“ concerning ſuch hc has given you no Commiſſion.
“ BUT till we can ſay here are the Romans, where is EUMENES?
“ Do not think that the late appearances of God to you have bin alto-
gether for your ſelves; he has ſurely ſeen the Affliction of your Bre-
thren, and heard their cry by reaſon of their Taskmaſters. For to be-
“ lieve otherwiſe, is not only to be mindleſs of his ways, but altoge-
" ther deaf. If you have ears to hear, this is the way in which you
“ will certainly be call'd upon: For if, while there is no ſtock of Li-
« berty, no ſanctuary of the afflicted, it be a common object to be-
“ hold a People caſting themſelves out of the Pan of one Prince into
“ the Fire of another ; what can you think, but if the World ſhould
“ ſee the Roman Eagle again, ſhe would renew her age, and her flight?
“ Nor did ever ſhe ſpread her Wings with better Omen, than will be
“ read in your Enſigns; which if, call'd in by an oppreſs’d People,
“ they interpoſe between them and their Yoke, the People them-
“ ſelves muit either do nothing in the mean time, or have no more
“ pains to take for their wiſh'd Fruit than to gather it, if that be not
“ likewiſe don for them. Wherfore this muſt needs be eaſy, and yet
“ you have a greater facility than is in the arm of fleſh; for if the
« Cauſe of Mankind be the cauſe of God, the Lord of Hoſts will be
your Captain, and
you
fjall be a Praiſe to the whole Earth.
*
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« THE facility of Holding is in the way of your Propagation; if
you take that of Athens and Lacedemon, you ſhall rain Snares; but
“ either catch, or hold nothing. Lying lips are an abomination to the
Lord : If ſetting up for Liberty, you impoſe Yokes, he will infallibly
deſtroy you. On the other ſide, 'to go about
a work of this nature
a League without a Head, is to abdicar that Magiſtracy, wher-
with he has not only indu'd you, but wherof he will require an
account of you ; for, curs’d is he that dos the Work of the Lord neg-
ligently. Wherfore you are to take the courſe of Rome : if you have
" ſubdu'd a Nation that is capable of Liberty, you ſhall make them a
preſent of it, as did FLAMINIUS to Greece, and ÆMILIUS
to, Macedon, reſerving to your ſelves ſom part of that Revenue
which was legally paid to the former Government, together with
the right of being Head of the League, which includes ſuch Levys of
Men and Mony as ſhall be neceſſary for the carrying on of the Pub-
“ lic Work. For if a People have by your means attain?d to freedom,
they ow both to the Cauſe and you, ſuch Aid as may propagat the
" like Fruit to the reſt of the World. But wheras every Nation is
not capable of her Liberty to this degree, leſt you be put to doing
and undoing of things, as the Romans were in Macedon, you ſhall
diligently obſerve what Nation is fit for her Liberty to this degree,
and what not : Which is to be don by two Marks, the firſt if ſhe be
willing to help the Lord againſt the Mighty; for if ſhe has no care of
" the Liberty of Mankind, ſhe deſerves not her own. But becauſe
« in this you may be deceiv'd by Pretences, which, continuing for a
" while ſpecious, may afterwards vaniſh; the other is more certain,
and that is if ſhe be capable of an equal Agrarian; which that it
was not obſerv'd by excellent Æmilius in his donation of Li-
berty, and introduction of a Popular State among the Macedonians,
I am more than mov'd to believe for two reaſons: the firſt, becauſe
at the ſame time the Agrarian was odious to the Roman Patricians ;
the ſecond, that the PSEUDO-Philip could afterwards ſo eaſily
recover Macedon, which could not have happen'd but by the Nobi-
lity, and their impacience, having great Eſtates, to be equald with
" the People ; for that the People ſhould otherwiſe, at the mere found
« of a Name, have thrown away their Liberty, is incredible. Wher-
“ fore be aſſur’d, that the Nation where you cannot eltabliſh an equal
Agrarian, is incapable of its Liberty as to this kind of Donation.
" For example, except the Ariſtocracy in Marpēſia be diſſolv’d, nei-
" ther can that people have their Liberty there, nor you govern at
" home; for they continuing ſtill liable to be ſold by their Lords to fo-
ren Princes, there will never (eſpecially in a Country of which there
" is no other profit to be made ) be want of ſuch Merchants and Dro-
“ vers, while you muſt be the Market where they are to receive their
NOR can the Ariſtocracy there be diffolv'd but by your means,
" in relation wherto you are provided with your Provincial Orb;
which being proportion’d to the meaſure of the Nation that you
se have vindicated or conquer’d, will eaſily hold it: for there is not a
“ People in the World more difficult to be held than the Marpeſians,
“ which tho by themſelves it be aſcrib’d to their own nature, is truly
“ to be attributed to that of their Country. Nevertheleſs you hav-
ing nine thouſand men upon the continual guard of it, that, threa-
Dd
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OCEAN A.
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« ten’d by any ſudden infurre&tion, have places of retreat; and an
Army of forty thouſand men upon a days warning ready to march
their reſcue; it is not to be rationally ſhewn which way they can
poſſibly ſlip out of your hands. And if a man ſhall think that up-
on a Province more remote, and divided by the Sea, you have not
" the like hold, he has not ſo well conſider'd your Wings as your
Talons, your ſhipping being of ſuch a nature, 'as makes the deſcent
your Armys almoſt of equal facility in any Country : fo that
“ wliat you take you hold, both becauſe your Militia, being already
s populous, will be of great growth in it felf; and alſo thro your
6 Confederats, by whom in taking and holding you are ſtill more in-
€ abled to do both.
“NOR ſhall you eaſilier hold, than the People under
"pire or Patronage may be held. My Lords, I would not go to the
door to ſee whether it be cloſe fhut; this is no underhand dealing,
« nor a game at which he ſhall have any advantage againſt you who
“ fees your Cards, but on the contrary the Advantage ſhall be your
own: for with eighteen thoufand men (which number I put, be-
“ cauſe it circulats your Orb by the annual change of fix thouſand)
“ having eſtabliſh'd your matters in the order ſhewn, you will be able
« to hold the greateſt Province; and eighteen thouſand men, allow-
“ ing them greater pay than any Prince ever gave, will not ſtand
4. This by the “ the Province in one million Revenue; * in confideration wherof,
pay of a Par- “ they ſhall have their own Eſtates free to themſelves, and be govern'd
tamentary Ar-
by their own Laws and Magiſtrats; which, if the Revenue of the
Strated in the “ Province be in dry Rent (as there may be ſom that are four times.
Gorollary.
" as big as Oceana) forty millions, will bring it with that of Indu-
« ftry, to ſpeak with the leaſt, to twice the value : So that the Peo-
“ ple there, who at this day are fo oppreſt that they have nothing at
66 all wheron to live, ſhall for one Million paid to you, receive at
“ leaſt ſeventy nine to their proper uſe: in which place I appeal to any
man, whether the Empire deſcrib’d can be other than the Patronage
" of the World.
" NO w if you add to the propagation of Civil Liberty (ſo na-
“ tural to this Commonwealth that it cannot be omitted) the propa-
gation of the Liberty of Conſcience, this Empire, this Patronage of
“ the World is the Kingdom of Chriſt: For as the Kingdom of God
" the Father was a Commonwealth, ſo ſhall be the Kingdom of God
" the Son; The People ſhall be willing in the day of his Power.
“ HAVING ſhew'd you in this and other places, ſom of thoſe
" ineſtimable Benefits of this kind of Government, together with the
natural and facil Emanation of them from their Fountain, I com
(left God, who has appear'd to you, for he is the God of Nature,
" in the glorious Conſtellation of theſe ſubordinat Cauſes, wherof we
" have hitherto bin taking the true Elevation, ſhould ſhake off the
“ duſt of his Feet againſt you) to warn you of the Dangers whichi
you, not taking the opportunity, will incur by omiſſion.
MACCHIAVEL ſpeaking of the defect of Venice, thro her
want of proper Arms, crys out, * This cut her Wings, and ſpoild her
“ mount to Heaven. If you lay youç. Commonwealth upon any
my, is deinon.
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gagements: If we be charitable, here is that which imbraces all
“ Foundation than the People, you fruſtrat your ſelf of proper Arns,
" and fo loſe the Empire of the World ; nor is this all, but ſom other
66 Nation will have it.
“COLUMBUS offer'd Gold to one of your Kings, thro whoſe
happy incredulity another Prince las drunk the Poiſon, even to the
" conſumtion of his People ; but I do not offer you a Nerve of War
" that is made of Purſeſtrings, ſuch a one as has drawn the face of the
" Earth into Convulſions, but ſuch as is natural to lier Health and
“ Beauty. Look you to it, where there is tumbling and toſſing upon
" the bed of ſickneſs, it muſt end in death or recovery. Tho the
“ People of the World, in the dregs of the Gothic Empire, be
tumbling and toſſing upon the bed of ſickneſs, they cannot dy;
nor is there any means of recovery for them but by antient pru-
"dence, whence of neceſſity it muſt com to paſs, that this Drug be
" better known. If France, Italy, and Spain, were not all fick, all
corrupted together, there would be none of them fo; for the ſick
"would not be able to withſtand the ſound, nor the ſound to preſerve
" their health without curing of the ſick. The firſt of theſe Nations
(which, if you ſtay her leiſure, will in my mind be France) that
recovers the health of antient Prudence, ſhall certainly govern the
World; for what did Italy when ſhe had it? And as you were in
" that, ſo ſhall you in the like caſe be reduc'd to a Province; I do not
" ſpeak at random. Italy, in the Conſulſhip of Lucius ÆMILI-
us Papus, and Caius ATILIUS REGUL us, arm’d upon
" the Gallic Tumult that then lappen'd of her ſelf, and without the
" Aid of foren Auxiliarys, feventy thouſand Horſe, and ſeven hundred
thouſand Foot : But as Italy is the leaſt of thoſe three Countrys in
extent, ſo is France now the moſt populous.
I, decus, I, noftrum, melioribus utere fatis.
« My dear Lords, Oceana is as the Roſe of Sharon, and the Lilly of
" the Vally
. As the Lilly
, among Thorns, ſuch is my
Love among
the
Daughters. She is comly as the Tents of Kedar, and terrible as an
Army with Banners. Her Neck is as the Tower of David, builded for
an Armory, wheron there hang a thouſand Bucklers and Shields of migha
ty Men. Let me hear thy Voice in the morning, whom my Soul loves.
The South has dropd, and the Weſt is breathing upon thy Garden of
Spices. Ariſë, Queen of the Earth, Ariſe, holy Spouſe of Jeſus; for
lo the Winter is paſt, the Rain is over and gon; the Flowers appear
on the Earth, the time for the ſinging of Birds is com, and the Voice of
the Turtle is heard in our Land. Ariſe, I ſay, com forth, and do not
Ah! wherfore ſhould my eys behold thee by the Rivers of Ba-
bylon, hanging thy' Harps upon the Willows, thou faireſt among Wo-
( EXCELLENT PATRIOTS; If the People be Soverain,
here is that which eſtabliſhes their Prerogative: If we be ſincere,
here is that which disburdens our Souls, and makes good all our In-
Partys: If we would be ſettļd, here is that which will ſtand, and
"I F our Religion be any thing elſe but a vain boaſt, ſcratchingand
"defacing human Nature or Reaſon, which, being the Image of
Dd 2
66
(C
(G
(
(6
CC
tarry :
CG
men ?
(G
CC
(G
u laſt for ever.
“ God,
204
OCEANA
Amos 5. 24•
« God, makes it a kind of Murder; here is that Empire whence Juſtice
“ Shall run down like a River, and Judgment like a mighty Stream. Who
6 is it then that calls us? or what is in our way? a Lion! is it not the
“ Dragon that old Serpent ? for what wretched ſhifts are theſe? Here
“ is a great deal, might we not have ſom of this at one time, and ſom
at another?
6
“ MY LORDS, permit me to give you the Sum, or brief
Epitome of the whole Commonwealth.
Th
HE Center or Fundament al Laws are, firſt, the Agrarian, pro-
portion'd at two thouſand Pounds a Year in Land, lying and being
within the proper Territory of Oceana, and ſtating Property in Land at
ſuch a balance, that the Power can never ſwerve out of the hands of the
Many.
SECONDLY, The Ballot conveying this equal Sap from the Root,
by an equal Election or Rotation, into the Branches of Magiſtracy or So-
verain Power.
THE Orbs of this Commonwealth being Civil, Military or Provincial,
are, as it were, caft upon this Mold or Center by the Diviſions of the Peo-
ple; Firſt into Citizens and Servants : Secondly, into Youth and Elders :
Thirdly, into ſuch as have one hundred Pounds a year in Lands, Goods or
Monys, who are of the Horſe ; and ſuch as have under, who are of the
Foot: Fourthly, they are divided by their uſual reſidence, into Pariſhes,
Hundreds, and Tribes.
THE Civil Orbs conſiſt of the Elders, and are thus created; every
Monday next inſuing the laſt of December, the Elders in every Pariſh elečt
the fifth man to be a Deputy; which is but half a days work : every Mon-
day next inſuing the laſt of January, the Deputys meet at their reſpe-
Etive Hundred, and elect out of their number one Juſtice of the Peace,
one Juryman, one Coroner, and one High Conſtable of the Foot; one days
work
EVERY Monday next inſuing the laſt of February, the Hundreds
meet at their reſpective Tribe, and there elečt the Lords High Sherif, Lieu-
tenant, Cuſtos Rotulorum, the Conductor, the two Cenſors out of the
Horſe, the Magiſtrats of the Tribe and of the Hundreds, with the Jury-
men conftituting the Phylarch, and who aliſt in their reſpective Offices at the
Afizes, hold the Quarter Seſſions, &c. The day following the Tribe elects
the annual Galaxy, conſiſting of two Knights, and three Deputys out of
the Horſe, with four Deputys out of the Foot, therby indu’d with Power,
as Magiſtrats of the whole Nation, for the term of three years. An Officer
choſen at the Hundred may not be elected a Magiſtrat of the Tribe; but
Magiſtrat or Officer either of the Hundred or of the Tribe, being elected
into the Galaxy, may ſubſtitute any one of his own Order to his Magi-
ſtracy or Office in the Hundred, or in the Tribe. This of the Muſter is
two days work. So the body of the People is annually, at the charge of
three days work and a half
, 'in their own Tribes
, for the perpetuation of
their Power, receiving over and above the Magiſtracys ſo divided among
them.
EVERY Monday next inſuing the laſt of March, the Knights, being
a Hundred in all the Tribes, take their places in the Senat; the Knights,
F
having
OCE A N A.
205
Embaſſador in ordinary, by the Ballot of the Houſe, to the Reſidence of.
having taken their places in the Senat, make the third Region of the ſame ;
and the Houſe procedes to the Senatorian Elections. Senatorian Elections
are annual, biennial, or emergent,
THE annual are perform'd by the Tropic.
THE Tropic is a Scedule conſiſting of two parts; the firſt by which the
Senatorian Magiſtrats are elected'; and the ſecond, by which the Senatorian
Councils are perpetuated.
THE firſt part is of this Tenor.
THE Lord Strategus, Annual Magiſtrats, and therfore ſuch as may
THE Lord Orator, be elected out of any Region ; the term of
THE firſt Cenſor,
every Region having at the Tropic one
THE Second Čenſor, year at the leaſt unexpir’d.
THE third Commiſſi- Triennial Magiſtrats, and therfore ſuch as
oner of the Seal, can be choſen out of the third Region
THE 'third Commiſi only, as that alone which has the term of
oner of the Treaſury, three years unexpir’d.
THE Strategus and the Orator ſitting, are Conſuls, or Preſidents of
the Senat.
THE Strategus marching is General of the Army, in which caſe a
new Strateg us is elected to fit in his room.
THE Strategus ſitting with the fix Commiſſioners, being Counfillors of
the Nation, are the Signory of the Commonwealth.
THE Cenſors are Magiſtrats of the Ballot, Preſidents of the Council
for Religion, and Chancellors of the Univerſitys.
THE ſecond part of the Tropic perpetuats the Council of State, by the
election of five Knight's out of the firſt Region of the Senat, to be the firſt
Region of that Council conſiſting of fifteen Knights, five in every Region.
THE like is don by the election of four into the Council of Religion,
and four into the Council of Trade, out of the ſame Region in the Senat;
each of theſe Councils conſiſting of twelve Knights, four in every Region.
B'VT the Council of War conſiſting of nine Knights, three in every
Region, is elected by and out of the Council of State, as the other Councils
are elected by and out of the Senat. And if the Senat add a Funeta of nine
Knights more, elected out of their own number, for the term of three
months, the Council of Wař, by virtue of that addition, is Dictator of
Oceana for the ſaid term.
THÉ Signory jointly or ſeverally has right of Seſſion and Suffrage in
every Senatorian Council, and to propoſe either to the Senat
, or any of them.
every Region in a Council electing one weekly Provoſt, any two of
thoſe Provofts have Pover alſo to propoſe to their reſpective Council
, as the
proper and peculiar Propoſers of the ſame : for which cauſe they hold an Aca-
demy, where any man either by word of mouth, or writing, may propoſe to the
NEXT to the Elections of the Tropic is the biennial Election of one
; at which time the Reſident of France removes to Spain, be of
Spain to Venice, he of Venice to Conſtantinople, and he of Conſtanti-
nople returns. 'So the Orb of the Reſidents is wheeld about in eight years,
by the biennial Election of one Embajador in Ordinary:
THE
Propoſers.
France
206
OCE A N A.
THE laſt kind of Election is emergent. Emergent Elections are made
by the Scrutiny. Election by Scrutiny is when a Competitor being made by
á Council, and brought into the Senat, the Senat chuſes four more Conia
petitors to him; and putting all five to the Ballot, he who has moſt above
half the Suffrages, is the Magiſtrat. The Polemarchs or Field Officers
are choſen by the Scrutiny of the Council of War; an Embaſſador" Ex-
traordinary by the Scrutiny of the Council of State; the Judges and Ser-
jeants at Law by the Scrutiny of the Seal; and the Barons and prime Offi-
cers of the Exchequer, by the Scrutiny of the Treaſury.
THE Opinion or Opinions that are legitimatly propos’d to
any
Council
anuſt be debated by the ſame, and ſo many as are reſolv'd upon the Debate
are introduc'd into the Senat, where they are debated and reſolv'd, or re-
jected by the whole Houſe: that which is reſolu’d by the Senat is a Decree,
which is good in matters of State, but no Law, except it be propos’d to, and
reſolv'd by the Prerogative.
THỂ Deputys of the Galaxy being three Horſe and four Foot in it
Tribe, amount in all the Tribes to one hundred and fifty Horſe, and two
hundred Foot; which, having enter'd the Prerogative, and choſen their
Captains, Cornet and Enſign ( triennial Officers) make the third Claſlis,
conſiſting of one Troop, and one Company; and ſo joining with the whole
Prerogative, elect four annual Magiſtrats, called Tribuns, wherof two are
of the Horſe
, and two of the Foot. Theſe have the Command of the Pré-
rogative Seſſions, and Suffrage in the Council of War, and Seſſions without
Suffrage in the Senat.
THE Senat having paſt a Decree which they would propoſe to the Peo-
ple, cauſe it to be printed and publiſhºd, or promulgated for the ſpace of fixe
weeks; which being order’d, they chuſe their Propoſers. The Propoſers
muſt be Magiſtrats, that is, the Commiſſioners of the Seal, thoſe of the
Treaſury
, or the Cenſors. Theſe being choſen, deſire the Muſter of the
Tribuns, and appoint the day. The People being aſſemblºd at the day apa
pointed, and the Decree propos’d, that which is propos’d by authority of the
Senat, and commanded by the People
, is the Law of Oceana, or an Act of
Parlament.
SO the Parlament of Oceana conſiſts of the Senat propoſing, and the
People reſolving.
THÉ People or Prerogative are alſo the Supreme Judicatory of this Na-
tion, having Power of hearing and determining all Cauſes of Appeal from
all Magiſtrats, or Courts Provincial, or Domeſtic; as alſo to queſtion any
Magiſtrat
, the term of his Magiſtracy, being expir’d, if the caſe be in-
troduc°d by the Tribuns, or any one of them.
THẾ Military Orbs conſiſt of the Touth, that is, ſuch as are from
eighteen to thirty years of Age ; and are created in the following manner.
EVERY Wedneſday next inſuing the laſt of December, the Touth of
every Pariſh aſſembling, elect the fifth of their number to be their Deputys';
the Deputys of the Touth are call'd Stratiots, and this is tbe firſt Eſay
.
EVERY Wedneſday next inſuing the laſt of January, the Stratiots
aſſembling at the Hundred, elect their
Captain and their Enſign, and fall to
their Games and Sports.
EVERY Wedneſday next inſuing the laſt of February, the Stratiots
are receiv’d by the Lord Lieutenant their Commander in Chief, with the
Conductors and the Cenſors; and, having bin diſciplin’d and entertain’d with
other Games, are callid to the Vrns, where they elect the ſecond Eſſay, con-
ſiſting of two hundred Horſe and fixí hundred Foot in a Tribe; that is, of
f
ten
A
A.
207
WA
at ,
like duty with the Youth, and a
« which are not of uſe but in building. And how much is here?
OCEAN ten thouſand Horſe, and thirty thouſand Foot in all the Tribes, which is
the Standing Army of this Nation, to mirch at any warning. They alſo
eleft at the ſame time a part of the third Eſay, by the mixture of Balls
marked with the letter M, and the letter P, for Marpeſia and Panopea ;
They of either mark being ten Horſe and fifty Foot in a Tribe, that is, five
hundred Horſe and two thouſand five hundred Foot in all the Tribes, which
are forthwith to march to their reſpective Provinces.
BUT the third Eſſay of this Nation more properly ſo call'd, is wher.
the Strategis with the Polemarchs (the Senat and the People, or the Dieta-
tor having decreed a War ) receive in return of his Warrants the ſecond
Efjay from the hands of the Conductors at the Rendevous of Oceana
which Army marching with all Accommodations provided by the Council of
the Senat elett's a new Strategus, and the Lords Lieutenants a nem
ſecond Eſſay.
A TOUTH, except he be an only Son, refuſing any one of his three
Elſays, without ſufficient cauſe ſhewn to the Phylarch or the Cenſors, is in,
capable of Magiſtracy, and is fin’d a fifth part of his yearly Rent, or of
his Eftate, for Protection. In caſe of Invaſion the Elders are obligʻd to
THE Provincial Órb conſiſting in part of the Elders, and in part of
the Youth, is thus created.
FOUR Knights out of the firſt Region falling, are elected in the Se-
nat to be the firſt Region of the Provincial Orb of Marpeſia; theſe being
triennial Magiſtrats, take their places in the Provincial Council
, conſiſting
of twelve Knights, four in every Region, each Region chuſing their weekly
Provoſts of the Council thus conftituted. One Knight
more choſen out of
the same Region in the Senat, being an annual Magiftrat, is Preſident,
with Power to propoſe ; and the opinions propos’d by the Preſident, or any
two of the Provoſts, are debated by the Council, and, if there be occaſion of
farther Porper or Inſtruction than they get have, tranſmitted to the Council
of State, with which the Provincial is to hold Intelligence.
THE Preſident of this Council is alſo Strategiw, or General of the
Provincial Army; wherfore the Conductor's upon notice of his Election, and
appointment of his Rendevous, deliver to him the Stratiots of his Letter,
which he takes with him into his Province: and the Provincial Army
having receiv’d the new Strategies with the third Claſſis, the Council diſ
miſſes the old Strategus with the
firft Claflis. The like is don for Panopea,
other Province.
BOT wher as the term of every other Magiſtracy. or Election in this
Commonwealth, whether annual or triennial, requires an equal Vacation;
the term of a Provincial Counſillor or Magiſtrát requires no Vacation at
all
. The Quorum of a Provincial, as alſo that of every other
Council and Aſſembly
, requires two thirds in a time of health, and one
“ I THINK I have omitted nothing but the Props and Scaffolds,
Shew me another Commonwealth in this compafs? How many
things? Shew me another intire Government confiſting but of thirty
you now go to Law with any body, there ly to fom
of our Courts two hundred Original Writs: If you ftir your hand,
there go more Nerves and Bones to that motion
: If you play, you
" have more Cards in the pack ; nay you could not fit with your
66 eaſe
2
or
any
third in a time of ſickneſs.
(6
« Orders. If
66
H
208
you not
t6
O C E A N A.
66 eaſe in that Chair, if it conſiſted not of more parts. Will
es then allow to your Legiſlator, what you can afford your Upholdſter;
or to the Throne, what is neceſſary to a Chair ?
! « MY LORDS, If you will have fewer Orders in a Common-
" wealth, you will have more; for where ſhe is not perfect at firſt,
every day, every hour will produce a new Order, the end wherof is
to have no Order at all, but to grind with the
clack of fom Dema-
gog. Is he providing already for his golden Thum? Lift up your
“ heads; Away with Ambition, that fulſom complexion of a Statel-
man, temper’d, like SYLL A's, with blood and muck. And the
« Lord give to his Senators Wiſdom; and make our faces to ſhine, that
be a Light to them that fit in darkneſs and the ſhadow of death,
« to guide their feet in the way of Peace. - In the name of God,
16 what's the matter !
CC
CC
we may
PHILADELPHUS the Secretary of the Council having per-
form’d his task in reading the ſeveral Orders as you have ſeen, upon the
receit of a Packet from his Correſpondent BOCCALINI, Secretary
of Parnaſſus, in reading one of the Letters, burſt forth into ſuch a
violent paſſion of weeping and downright howling, that the Legiſla-
tors being ſtartled with the apprehenſion of ſom horrid news; one of
them had no ſooner ſnatch'd the Letter out of his hand, than the reſt
crying, Read, Read, he obey'd in this manner.
21.
שעוס
THE 3d inſtant his Phobean Majeſty having taken the nature of Free
States into his Royal conſideration, and being, ſteddily perſwaded that the
Laws in ſuch Governments are incomparably
better and more
ſurely directed
to the good of Mankind than in any other; that the Courage of ſuch a
Trajano Boc. People is the apteſt tinder to noble fire; that the Genius of ſuch a Soil is
alini, Centu. that wherin the roots of good Literature are leaſt worm-eaten with Pedan-
ria 1. Raggual.
tiſm, and where their Fruits have ever com to the greateſt maturity and
higheſt reliſh ; conceiv’d ſuch a loathing of their Ambition and Tyranny,
who, ufurping the liberty of their native Countrys, becom Naves to them-
ſelves, inaſmuch as (be it never ſo contrary to their own Nature or Com-
Sciences) they have taken the earneſt of Sin, and are ingag’d to perfecute
all Men that are good with the ſame or greater rigor than is ordain'd by
Laws for the wicked: For * none ever adminiſter'd that Power by
good, which he purchas'd by ill Arts: PHOE B us, I ſay, having con-
ſider'd this, aſſemblid all the Senators reſiding in the learned Court at the
Theater of MEL POMENE, where he cans'd CÆSAR the Dictator to
com upon the ſtage, and his Siſter Actia, his Nephew Augustus,
Julia his Daughter, with the Children which ſhe had by MARCUS
AGRIPPA, Lucius and CAIUS CÆSARS, AGRIPPA Post-
Humus, JuLIa, and AGRIPPINA, with the numerous Progeny
which ſe bore to her renown'd Husband GERMANICUs, to enter.
miſerable Scene in any, but moſt deplorable in the eys of CÆSAR, thus
beholding what havock his prodigious Ambition, not ſatisfy'd with his own
bloody Ghoſt, had made upon his more innocent Remains, even to the total
extinction of his family. For it is (ſeeing where there is any humanity
,
there muſt be fom compaſion) not to be ſpoken without tears, that of the
11
A
* Nemo unquam imperium flagitio quæſitum bonis artibus cxercuit,
*
full
-
.
*
OCEAN A.
209
full branches deriving from OCTAVIA the elder Siſter, and Julia
the Daughter of Augustus, there ſhould not be one fruit or bloſſom
that was not cut off or blaſted by the Sword, Famin, or Poiſon. Now
might the great Soul of CÆSAR have bin full; and yet that which pour’d
in as much or more, was to behold that execrable race of the CLAUDII,
having hunted and fuck’d his Blood with the thirſt of Tigers, to be re-
warded with the Roman Empire, and remain in full poſſeſion of that fa-
mous Patrimony : a Spectacle to pollute the Light of Heaven! Neverthe-
leſs as if Cæsar had not yet enough, his Phæbean Majeſty caus’d to be
introdúcd on the other ſide of the Theater, the moſt illuſtrious and happy
Prince ANDREA Doria, with his dear Poſterity, imbrac'd by the
Soft and conſtant arms of the City of Genoa, into whoſe boſom, ever fruitfal
in her gratitude, he had dropt her fair LIBERTY like the dew of Hea-
ven; which when the Roman Tyrant beheld, and how much more freſh
that Laurel was worn with a firm root in the Hearts
of the People, than
that which he had torn off, he fell into ſuch a horrid diſtortion of limbs and
countenance, that the Senators who had thought themſelves ſteel and flint at
fach an object
, having hitherto ſtood in their reverend ſnowlike thawing
Alps, now coverd their faces with their large ſleeves.
1
“ MY Lords, ſaid the ARCHON riſing, witty PHILADELPHUS
“ has given us a grave admonition in a dreadful Tragedy. Diſcite
" juſtitiam moniti, di non temnere Divos. Great and glorious Cæfar,
« the higheſt character of fleſh, yet could not rule but by that part
< of Man which is the beaſt : but a Commonwealth is a Monarchy;
to her God is King, in as much as Reaſon, his dictat, is her Sove-
« rain Power.
WHICH faid, he adjourn'd the Council. And the Model was
ſoon after promulgated. Quod bonum, fælix, fauſtumque fit huic Rei-
publice. Agite Quirites
, cenſuere Patres, jubeat Populus : The Sea roard,
and the Floods clapt their hands.
LIBERTAS.
The Proclamation of his Highneſs the Lord ARCHON of
OCEAN A upon Promulgation of the Model.
W12
of the Decem.
ſheras his Highneſs and the Council, in the framing of the see the courſe
Model promulgated, have not had any puivat intereſt, oz am offskin
bition, but the fear of God, and the good of this people promulgation
before their eys; and it remains their delire that this great Wok of the firſt
may be carryd on accordingly: This preſent greeting is to inform the twelve Tables
good People of this Land, that as the Council of Prytans ſat during in Livr.
the framing of the model, ta receive from time to time ſuch propas
ditions as thould be offer'd by any wiſehearted oz public ſpirited man,
towards the inftitution of a weli older'd Commonwealth, ſo the ſaid
Council is to ſit as formerly in the great
Hall of the Pantheon during
Promulgation (which is to continue foz the ſpace of three months)
Ee
ta
IO
OCEAN A.
to receive, weigh, and, as there fhall be occalion, tranſmit ta the
Council of Legiſlators, all ſuch Dbjections as ſhall be made againſt the
Caid apodel, whether in the whole, Oliit any part. Walherfore, that
nothing be don rafhly, od without conſent of the People, fuch, of
what party ſoever, with whom there may remain any doubts op diffi-
cultys, are delir'd with all convenient (peed to addreſs themſelves to
the latd Prytans; where, if ſuch objections, doubts, or difficultys re-
ceive ſolution to the ſatisfaction of the Auditory, they fall have public
thanks : but if the ſaid objections, doubts 02 difficultys, receive no ſa-
lution to the ſatisfaction of the Auditoy, then the Goodel promulgated
thall be reviewed, and the party that was the occalion of thje review,
thall receive public thanks, together with the beſt horſe in his high-
neſs's Stable, and be one of the Council of Legillatous. An ſo God
Have you in his keeping.
I SHOULD now write the ſame Council of the Prytans, but for
two reaſons; the one that having had but a ſmall time for that which is
already don, I am overlabor'd; the other, that there may be new
Objections. Wherfore if my Reader has any ſuch as to the Model,
I intreat him to addreſs himſelf by way of Oration, as it were, to the
Prytans, that when this rough draught coms to be a work, his Speech
being faithfully inſerted in this place, may give, or receive correction
to amendment: For what is written will be weigh’d. But Converſa-
tion, in theſe days, is a game, at which they are beſt provided that have
light Gold: It is like the ſport of Women that make Flowers of ſtraws,
which muſt be ſtuck up, but may not be touch'd. Nor, which is
worſe, is this the fault of Converſation only: But to the Examiner,
Arift. Rhet. I ſay, If to invent method, and to teach an art, be all one, let him ſhew
that this Method is not truly invented, or this Art is faithfully taught.
I CANNOT conclude a Circle (and ſuch is this Common-
wealth) without turning the end into the beginning. The time of
Promulgation being expir'd, the Surveyors were ſent down, who
having in due ſeaſon made report that their work was perfećt, the
Orators follow'd; under the adminiſtration of which officers and
Magiſtrats the Commonwealth was ratify'd and eſtabliſh'd by the
whole body of the People, in their * Parochial, Hundred, and
County Aſſemblys. And the Orators being, by virtue of their Scrols
or Lots, Members of their reſpective Tribes, were elected each the
firſt Knight of the third Liſt, or Galaxy: wherfore having at their
return aſſiſted the ARCHON in putting the Senat, and the People
or Prerogative into motion, they abdicated the Magiſtracy both of
Orators and Legiſlators.
* Curiatis, Centuriatis, & Tributis Comitiis.
The
OCEAN A.
211
F
Book De Divinatione has made it, that there was never any
exquiſit, and that his City, holding to the ſtrict obſervation of his form
olably bound by their Oath, that they would alter nothing till his re-
cordingly. Nor was he deceiv'd in the conſequence; for his City be-
The COROLLARY.
TOR the reſt (ſays PLUTARCH, cloſing up the ſtory of Lv-
CURGUS) when he ſaw that his Government had taken
root,
and was in the very Plantation ſtrong enough to ſtand by it ſelf,
he conceiv'd ſuch a delight within him, as GOD is deſcrib'd by
PLATO to have don when he had fíniſh'd the Creation of the
World, and ſaw his own Orbs move below him : For in the Art of
Man (being the imitation of Nature, which is the || Art of GOD) || Hobbs.
there is nothing ſo like the firſt call of beautiful Order out of Chaos
and Confuſion, as the Architecture of a welorder'd Commonwealth.
Wherfore Lycurgus ſeeing in effect, that his Orders were good,
fell into deep Contemplation how he might render them, fo far as
could be effected by human Providence, inalterable and immortal.
To which end he aſſembld the People, and remonſtrated to them,
That for ought he could perceive, their Policy was already ſuch, and
ſo well eſtabliſh'd, as was ſufficient to intail upon them and theirs
all that Virtue and Felicity wherof human Life is capable: Never-
theleſs that there being another thing of greater concern than all
the reſt, wherof he was not yet provided to give them a perfect
account, nor could, till he had conſulted the Oracle of APOLLO,
he deſir’d that they would obſerve his Laws without any change
or alteration whatſoever, till his return from Delphos ; to which
all the People chearfully and unanimouſly ingagʻd themſelves by pro-
miſe, deſiring him that he would make as much haft as he could.
But Lycurgus before he went, began with the Kings and the Se-
and thence taking the whole People in order, made them all
ſwear to that which they had promisd, and then took his Journy.
Being arriv'd at Delphos, he facrific'd to APOLLO, and afterwards
inquir’d if the Policy which he had eſtabliſh'd, was good and fuffi-
cient for a virtuous and a happy Life? By the way, it has bin a Maxim
with Legiſlators not to give checks to the preſent Superſtition, but to
make the beſt uſe of it, as that which is always the moſt powerful
with the People ; otherwiſe tho PLUTARCH being a Prieſt, was
intereſted in the cauſe, there is nothing plainer than Cicero in his
as an Oracle, except in the cunning of the Prieſts. But to be civil to
the Author, The God anſwer'd to Lycurgus, that his Policy was
of Government, ſhould attain to the height of fame and glory. Which
Oracle Lycurgus cauſing to be written, faild not of tranſmitting
to his Lacedemon. This don, that his Citizens might be for ever invi-
turn, he took fő firm a reſolution to dy in the place, that from
thence-
forward receiving no manner of Food, he foon after perform’d it ac-
came the firſt in glory and excellency of Government in the whole
World. And ſo much for Lycurgus according to PLUTARCH.
nators,
ſuch thing
Ee 2
MY
212
OCEAN A
MY Lord ARCHON when he beheld not only the rapture of
motion, but of joy and harmony, into which his Spheres (without
any manner of obſtruction or interfering, but as if it had bin naturally)
were caſt, conceiv'd not leſs of exultation in his Spirić ; but ſaw no
more neceſſity or reaſon why he ſhould adminiſter an Oath to the Senat
and the People that they would obſerve his Inſtitutions, than to a
Man in perfect health and felicity of Conſtitution, that lie would not
kill himſelf. Nevertheleſs wheras Chriſtianity, tho it forbids violent
hands, conſiſts no leſs in felfdenial than any other Religion, he re-
folv'd that all unreaſonable Deſires ſhould dy upon the ſpot ; to which
end that no manner of food might be left to Ambition, he enter'd into
the Senat with a unanimous Applauſe, and having ipoken of his Go-
vernment as Lycurgus did when he aſſembld the People, he abdi-
cated the Magiſtracy of ARCHON. The Senat, as ſtruck with aſto-
niſhment, continu'd ſilent; Men upon ſo ſudden an Accident being al-
together unprovided of what to ſay; till the ARCHON withdraw-
ing, and being almoſt at the door, divers of the Knights flew from
their Places, offering as it were to lay violent lands on him, while he
eſcaping left the Senat with the tears in their Eys of Children that
had loſt their Father ; and to rid himſelf of all farther importunity,
retir'd to a Country Houſe of his, being remote, and very privat, in
ſo much that no man could tell for fom time what was becom of him.
Thus the Lawmaker happen'd to be the firſt object and reflection of the
Law made : For as Liberty of all things is the moſt welcom to a Peo-
Never Ingrati-ple, ſo is there nothing more abhorrent from their nature than Ingra-
much Love, the titude. We, accuſing the Roman People of this Crime againſt ſom
conſtant fault of their greateſt Benefactors, as CAMIL LUş, heap miſtake upon
of the People. miſtake; for being not ſo competent Judges of what belongs to Li-
berty as they were, we take upon us to be more competent Judges of
Virtue. And wheras Virtue, for being a vulgar thing among them,
was of no leſs rate than Jewels are with ſuch as wear the moſt; we
are ſelling this precious Stone, which we have ignorantly rak’d out
of the Roman ruins, at ſuch a rate as the Switzers did that which
they took in the Baggage of CHARLES of Burgundy. For that
CAMILLUS had ſtood more firm againſt the ruin of Rome than her
Capitol, was acknowleg’d; but on the other ſide that he ſtood as
firm for the Patricians againſt the Liberty of the People, was as plain:
wherfore he never wanted thoſe of the People that would dy at his
foot in the Field, nor that would withſtand him to his beard in the
City. An example in which they that think CAMILLUS had
wrong, neither do themſelves right, nor the People of Rome; who in
this ſignify no leſs than that they had a ſcorn of Slavery beyond the
fear of Ruin, which is the height of Magnanimity. The like might
be ſewn by other examples objected againſt this, and other Popular
Governments, as in the Baniſhment of ARISTIDES the Juſt from
Athens, by tlie Oſtraciſm, which, firſt, was no puniſhment, nor ever
underſtood for ſo much as a diſparagement; but tended only to the
Security of the Commonwealth, thro the removal of a Citizen
(whoſe Riches or Power with a Party was ſuſpected ) out of harms
way for the ſpace of ten years, neither to the diminution of his Eſtate
or Honor. And next, tho the virtue of ARISTIDES might in it
ſelf be unqueſtion’d, yet for him under the name of the Juſt to becom
Univerſal Umpire of the People in all caſes, even to the neglect of the
legal
1
OCE A N A.
213
AVEL,
ſtood waiting at the Gate.
legal ways and orders of the Commonwealth, approach'd ſo much
to the Prince, that the Athenians, doing ARISTIDES no wrong,
did their Government no more than right in removing him; which
therfore is not ſo probable to have com to paſs, as PLUTARCH
preſumes, thro the envy of THEMISTOCLES, ſeeing ARISTI-
DES was far more popular than THEMISTOCL Es, who foon after
took the ſame walk upon a worſe occaſion. Wherforé as MACCHI-
for
any thing ſince alleg'd, has irrefragably prov'd that Po-
pular Governments are of all others the leaſt ingrateful; fo the ob-
fcurity, I ſay, into which my Lord ARCHON had now withdrawn
himſelf
, caus'á a univerſal ſadneſs and cloud in the minds of Men upon
the glory of his riſing Commonwealth.
MUCH had bin ventilated in privat diſcourſe, and the People
(for the Nation was yet divided into Partys that had not loſt their
animoſitys) being troubl’d, bent their eys upon the Senat, when, after
fom time ſpent in devotion, and the folemn action of Thankſgiving,
his Excellency NAVARCHUS DE PARALO in the Tribe of Do-
rean, Lord Strategris of Oceana (tho in a new Commonwealth a very
prudent Magiſtrat) propos'd his part or opinion in ſuch a manner to
the Council of State, that paſſing the Ballor of the ſame with great
unanimity and applauſe, it was introduc'd into the Senat, where it
paſt with greater. Wherfore the Decree being forthwith printed and
publiſh’d, Copys were return’d by the Secretarys to the Phylarchs (which
is the manner of Promulgation) and the Commiſſioners of the Seal,
that is to fay, the Right Honorable P110SPHORUS DE Auge in
the Tribe of Eudia, DOLABELLA D'Enyo in the Tribe of Tur-
me, and LINCEUS DE STELLA in the Tribe of Nubia, being
elected Propoſers pro tempore, beſpoke of the Tribuns a Muſter of the
to be held that day ſix weeks, which was the time allow'd for
Promulgation at the Halo.
THỂ Satisfaction which the People throout the Tribes receiv'd
upon promulgation of the Decree, loaded the Carriers with weekly
Letters between Friend and Friend, whether Magiſtrats or privat
Perſons. But the day for Propoſition being com, and the Prerogative
upon the Place appointed in Diſciplin, SANGUINE DE RING-
Wood in the Tribe of Saltum, Captain of the Phenix, march'd by
Order of the Tribuns with his Troop to the Piazza of the Pantheon,
where his Trumpets entering into the great Hall by their Blazon gave
notice of his Arrival; at which the Serjeant of the Houſe came down,
and returning inform’d the Propoſers, who deſcending were receiv'd
at the foot of the Stairs by the Captain, and attended to the Coaches
of State, with which CALCAR DE Ġilvo in the Tribe of Pha-
lera Maſter of the Horſe, and the Ballotins upon their great Horſes,
The Propoſers being in their Coaches, the Train for the Pomp,
the ſame that is us’d at the reception of Embaſſadors
, proceded in this
order: In the Front march’d the Troop with the Cornet in the
Van, and the Captain in the Rear: next the Troop came the twenty
Meſſengers or Trumpets ; the Ballotins upon the Curvet with their
Ulher in the Van, and the Maſter of the Horſe in the Rear : Next
the Ballotins, Broncus De Rauco in the Tribe of Beſtia King
of the Heralds, with his Fraternity in their Coats of Arms; and
next to Sir BRONCHUS, BORISTHENES DE HOLIWATER in
People
ta
thie
214
OCE A N A.
the Tribe of Ave, Maſter of the Ceremonys: The Mace and the
Seal of the Chancery went immediatly before the Coaches; and on
either ſide, the Doorkeepers or Guard of the Senat, with their Pole-
axes, accompany'd with fom three or four hundred Footmen belonging
to the Knights or Senators; the Trumpeters, Ballotins, Guards, Po-
ſtilions, Coachmen and Footmen, being very gallant in the Liverys
of the Commonwealth; but all, except the Ballotins, without Hats,
in lieu wherof they wore black velvet Calots, being pointed with a lit-
tle peak at the forehead. After the Propoſers came a long file of
Coaches full of ſuch Gentlemen as uſe to grace the Commonwealth
upon the like occaſions. In this poſture they mov'd ſlowly thro the
ſtreets (affording in the gravity of the Pomp, and the welcomneſs of
the end, a moſt reverend and acceptable Proſpect to the People all the
way from the Pantheon, being about half a mile) and arriv'd at the
Halo, where they found the Prerogative in a cloſe body inviron'd with
Scaffolds that were cover'd with Spectators. The Tribuns receiv'd the
Propoſers, and conducted them into a Seat plac'd in the front of the
Tribe, like a Pulpit, but that it was of fom length, and well adorn'd
by the Heralds with all manner of Birds and Beaſts, except that they
were ill painted, and never a one of his natural color. The Tribuns
were plac'd at a Table that ſtood below the long Seat, thoſe of the
Horſe in the middle, and thoſe of the Foot at either end, with each
of 'them a Boul or Baſon before him, that on the right hand being
white, and the other green : In the middle of the Table ſtood a third
which was red. And the Houſekeeper of the Pavilion, who had al-
ready deliver'd a proportion of linen Balls or Pellets to every one of the
Tribe, now preſented Boxes to the Ballotins. But the Propoſers as
they enter'd the Gallery, or long Seat, having put off their Hats by
way of Salutation, were anſwer'd by the People with a ſhout; wher-
upon the younger Commiſſioners ſeated themſelves at either end; and
the firſt ſtanding in the middle, ſpoke after this manner.
}
:
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My Lords, the People of Oceana.
HILE I find in my ſelf what a Felicity it is to falute you
by this Name, and in every Face, anointed as it were with
« the Oil of Gladneſs, a full and ſufficient teſtimony of the like ſenſe,
to go about to feaſt you with words, who are already fill'd with
" that Food of the mind, which being of pleaſing and wholſom di-
geſtion, takes in the definition of true Joy, were a needleſs Enter-
“ terprize. I ſhall rather put you in mind of that thankfulneſs which
" is due, than puff you up with any thing that might ſeem vain. Is
“ it from the arms of fleſh that we derive theſe Bleſſings? Behold the
Commonwealth of Rome falling upon her own victorious Sword.
“ Or is it from our own Wiſdom, whoſe Counſils had brought it even
to that paſs, that we began to repent our ſelves of Victory? Far be
" it from us, my Lords, to ſacrifice to our own Nets, which we our
“ felves have fó narrowly eſcap'd! Let us rather lay our mouths in
“ the duſt, and look up (as was taught the other day when we were
“ better inſtructed in this Leſſon) to the Hills with our Gratitude.
« Nevertheleſs ſeeing we read how God upon the neglect of his Pro-
6 phets hias bin provok'd to wrath, it muſt needs follow that he ex-
pects Honor ſhould be given to them by whom he has choſen to
6 work
46
:
CC
(G
*
OCEAN A.
215
EG
work as his Inſtruments. For which cauſe, nothing doubting of
my Warrant, I ſhall procede to that which more particularly con-
cerns the preſent accalion, the diſcovery of my Lord ARCHON's
“ Virtues and Merit
, to be ever plac'd by this Nation in their true Me-
66
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46
«. ridian.
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66
06
My Lords;
“I AM not upon a Subject which perſuades me to balk, buč ne-
"ceſſitats me to ſeek out the greateſt Examples
. To begin with
ALEXANDER erecting Trophys common to his Sword and the
Peſtilence; To what good of Mankind did he infect the Air with his
heaps of Carcaſes? The Sword of War, if it be any
otherwiſe
us’d than as the Sword of Magiſtracy, for the fear and puniſhment
of thoſe that do evil, is as guilty in the fight of God, as the Sword
of a Murderer ; nay more, for if the Blood of Aeel, of one in-
nocent Man, cry'd 'in the ears of the Lord for Vengeance, what
“ſhall the Blood of an innocent Nation? Of this kind of Empire, the
Throne of Ambition, and the Quarry of a mighty Hunter, it has
bin truly faid, that it is but a great Robbery. But if ALEXA N-
DER had reſtor’d the Liberty of Greece, and propagated it to
mankind, he had don like my Lord ARCHON, and might have
bin truly calld the Great. ALEXANDER car'd not to ſteal a
Victory that would be given: But my Lord ARCHON has torn
away à Victory which had bin ſtoln, while we were tamely yield-
ing up Obedience to a * Nation reaping in our Fields, whoſe Fields * The Scotiſla
he has ſubjected to our Empire, and naild them with his victorious Royal Line.
Sword to their native Caucaſus.
“ MACCHIAVEL gives a handſom caution, Let no man, ſays
lie, be circumvented with the Glory of CÆSAR, from the falſe re-
flection of their Pens, who thro the longer continuance of his Em-
pire in the Name than in the Family, chang'd their Freedom for
Flattery. But if a man would know truly what the Romans
thought of CÆSAR, let him obſerve what they ſaid of CATI-
AND yet by how much he who has perpetrated ſom heinous
Crime, is more execrable than he who did but attemt it; by fo
“much is CÆSAR more execrable than CATILIN. On the con-
trary, let him that would know what antient and heroic Times,
what the Greecs and Romans would both have thought and ſaid of
my Lord ARCHON, obſerve what they thought and ſaid of so-
LON, Lycurgus, Brut us, and PuBLICOLA. And yet
by how much his Virtue, that'is crown’d with the perfection of
his Work, is beyond theirs, who were either inferior in their aim,
or in their performance ; by ſo much is my Lord ARCHON to be
prefer'd before SOLON, LYCURGUs, Brutus, and PUBLI•
“NOR will we ſhun the moſt illuftrious Example of SCIPIO:
* This Hero, tho
never ſo little leſs
, yet was he not the founder of a
Commonwealth; and for the reſt, allowing his Virtue to have bin
of the moſt untainted Ray, in what did it outſhine this of my
Lord ARCHON? But if dazling the Eys of the Magiſtrats it over-
aw'd Liberty, Rome might be allow'd ſom excuſe that the did not
44
6
66
"
LIN.
16
66
<<
du
CC
COLA.
66 like
216
OCE A N A.
...
66 VII. THAT in caſe there remains any diſtinction of Partys not
“ like it, and I, if I admit not of this compariſon: For where is my
“ Lord ARCHON? Is there a Genius, how free ſoever, which in his
“ preſence would not find it ſelf to be under power? He is ſhrunk in-
" to Clouds, he ſeeks Obſcurity in a Nation that fees by his Light.
“ He is impatient of his own Glory, leſt it ſhould ſtand between you
and
your Liberty.
“ LIBERTY! What is even that, if we may not be grateful?
"And if we may, we have none : For who has any thing that he dos
“ not ow? My Lords, there be ſom hard conditions of Virtue: If
« this Debt were exacted, it were not due; wheras being canceld,
we are all enter'd into Bonds. On the other ſide, if we make ſuch
a payment as will not ſtand with a free People, we do not inrich
my Lord ARCHON, but rob him of his whole Eſtate, and his
« immenſe Glory.
" THESE Particulars had in due deliberation and mature debate,
“ according to the Orders of this Commonwealth, It is propos'd by All-
thority of the Senat, to you my Lords the People of Oceana.
“ I. THAT the Dignity and Office of ARCHON, or Protector
« of the Commonwealth of Oceana, be, and is hereby confer'd by
“ the Senat and the People of Oceana, upon the moſt Illuſtrious Prince,
“ and ſole Legiſlator of this Commonwealth, OL PHAUS MEGA-
LETOR,
Pater Patrix, whom God preſerve, for the term of his
"s natural Life.
“ II. THAT three hundred and fifty thouſand pounds per annum
yer remaining of the antient Revenue, be eſtated upon the ſaid Il-
“luſtrious Prince, or Lord ARCHON, for the ſaid term, and to the
proper and peculiar uſe of his Highneſs.
* III. THAT the Lord Archon have the reception of all foren
“ Embaſſadors, by and with the Council of State, according to the
« Orders of this Commonwealth.
“ IV. THAT the Lord Archon have a ſtanding Army
of
“ twelve thouſand men, defray'd upon a monthly Tax, during the
term of three years, for the protection of this Commonwealth a.
gainſt diſſenting Partys; to be govern'd, directed, and commanded
by and with the advice of the Council of War, according to the Or-
“ ders of this Commonwealth.
“ V. THAT this Commonwealth make no diſtinction of Perſons
or Partys, but every man being elected and ſworn, according to the
« Orders of the ſame, be equally capable of Magiſtracy; or not elected,
“ be equally capable of Liberty, and the injoyment of his Eftate free
6 from all other than common Taxes.
“ VI. THAT a man putting a diſtinction upon himſelf, re-
“ fuſing the Oath upon Election, or declaring himſelf of a Party
not conformable to the Civil Government, may within
of the three years ſtanding of the Army, tranſport himſelf and
“ his Eſtate, without moleſtation or impediment, into any other Na-
16
66
16
any
time
16 tion,
CC
years
« conforming to the Civil Government of this Commonwealth, af-
ter the three
of the ſtanding Army be expir’d, and the Com-
“ monwealth be therby forc'd to prolong the term of the ſaid Ar-
my, the pay from thenceforth of the ſaid Army be levy'd upon the
CC
Eſtates
*
1
12
OCEAN A.
217
-
* Eſtates of ſuch Partys ſo remaining unconformable to the Civil Go-
“ vernment.
1
THE propoſer having ended his Oration, the Trumpets founded ;
and the Tribuns of the Horfe being mounted to view the Ballot, caus'd
the Tribe (which thronging up to the Speech, came almoſt round
the Gallery) to retreat about twenty paces, when LINCEUS DE
STELLA receiving the Propoſitions, repair'd with BRONCHUS
DE RAUCO the Herald, to a little Scaffold erected in the middle of
the Tribe, where he feated himſelf, the Herald ſtanding bare upon
his right hand. The Ballotins having their Boxes ready, ſtood before
the Gallery, and at the command of the Tribuns march’d, one to eve-
ry Troop on Horſeback, and one to every Company on Foot; each of
them being follow'd by other Children that bore red Boxes: now this
is putting the Queſtion, whether the Queſtion Chould be put. And
the Suffrage being very ſuddenly return'd to the Tribuns at the Table,
and number'd in the view of the Propoſers, the Votes were all in the
Affirmative: wherupon the red or doubtful Boxes were laid aſide, it
appearing that the Tribe, whether for the Negative or Affirmative,
was clear in the matter. Wherfore the Herald began froin the Scaf-
fold in the middle of the Tribe, to pronounce the firſt Propoſition,
and the Ballotins marching with the Negative and Affirmative only,
BRONCHUS with his voice like Thunder, continu'd to repeat the
Propoſition over and over again, fo long as it was in Ballotting. The
like was don for every Clauſe, till the Ballot was finiſh’d, and the
Tribuns afſembling, had ſign’d the Points, that is to ſay, the number
every Suffrage, as it was taken by the Secretary upon the tale of
the Tribuns, and in the light of the Propolers; for this may not be
omitted, it is the pulſe of the People. Now wheras it appertains to
the Tribuns to report the Suffrage of the People to the Senat, they caſt .
the Lot for this office with three ſilver Balls, and one gold one; and
it fell upon the Right Worſhipful ARGUS DE CROOKHORN 11
the Tribe of Paſcua, firſt Tribun of the Foot. Argus being a good
ſufficient man in his own Country, was yer of the mind that he ſhould
make but a bad Spokeſman; and therfore became ſomching blank at
his luck, till his Collegues perſwaded him that it was no ſuch great
if he could but read, having his Paper before him. The Pro-
poſers taking Coach, receiv'd a Volly upon the Field, and return'd
in the ſame order, ſave that being accompany'd with the Tribuns,
they were alſo attended by the whole Prerogative to the Piazza of the
Pantheon, where with another Volly they took their leaves. Argus,
who had not thought upon his wife and Children all the way, wend
Very gravely up: and every one being ſeated, the Senat by their fin
lence feem’d to call for the Report; which Argus ſtanding up, deli-
of
matter,
ver'd in this wiſe,
CC
66
1
Right Honorable Lords and Fathers aſſemblºd in Parlament ;
Select is, that it has faľn to my lot to report to your Excellencys
the Votes of the People, taken upon the third inſtant, in the firſt
year of this Commonwealth, at the Halo ; the Right'Honorable
PHOSPHOR US De Auge in the Tribe of Eudia, DOLABEL-
LA DE Enzo in the Tribe of Turma, and LINCEUS DE
Ff
STELLA
/
218
+
O C E A N A.
“ STELLA in the Tribe of Nubia, Lords Commiſſioners of tlie
" Great Seal of Oceana, and Propoſers pro temporibus together
“ with my Brethren the Tribuns, and my ſelf being preſent. Wher-
« fore theſe are to certify to your Fatherhoods, that the ſaid Votes
“ of the People were as follows; that is to ſay:
“ TO the firſt Propoſition, Nemine contradicante
« TO the ſecond, Nemine contradictante
“ TO the third, the like.
6 TO the fourth 211, above half.
« TO the fifth 201, above lialf.
" TO the ſixth 150, above half, in the Affirmative.
« TO the ſeventh, Nomine again, and ſo forth-
« MY LORDS, It is a Language that is out of my Prayers, and
66 if I be out at it, no harm-
“ BUT as concerning my Lord ARCHON (as I was ſaying)
" theſe are to ſignify to you the true-heartedneſs and good-will which
" is in the People, ſeeing by joining with you, as one man, they confeſs
« that all they have to give, is too little for his Highneſs. For truly,
“ Fathers, if he who is able to do harm, and dos none, may well be
«s call'd honeſt; What ſhall we ſay to my Lord ARCHON's Higli-
“ neſs, who having had it in his power to have don us the greateſt
« miſchief that ever befel a poor Nation, ſo willing to truſt ſuch as
“ they thought well of, has don us ſo much good, as we ſhould never
“ have known how to do our ſelves? which was ſo ſweetly deliver'd
« by my Lord Chancellor PHOSPORUS to the People, that I dare
ſay there was never a one of them could forbear to do as I do
« An't pleaſe your Fatherhoods, they be tears of Joy: Ay, my Lord
« ARCHON ſhall walk the ſtreets (if it be for his eaſe I mean )
« with a Switch, while the People run after him, and pray for him:
" he ſhall not wet his foot ; they will ſtrew flowers in his way: he
" ſhall fit higher in their hearts, and in the Judgment of all good men,
« than the Kings that go up ſtairs to their Seats; and one of theſe had
“ as good pull two or three of his fellows out of their great Chairs,
as wrong him, or meddle with him; he has two or three hundred
“ thouſand men, that when you ſay the word, ſhall ſell themſelves
" to their ſhirts for him, and dy at his foot. His Pillow is of Down,
66 and his Grave ſhall be as foft, over which they that are alive ſhal}
« wring their hands. And to com to your Fatherhoods, moſt truly
“ ſo call'd, as being the loving Parents of the People, truly you
not know what a feeling they have of your Kindneſs
, ſeeing you
« are ſo bound up, that if there coms any harm, tliey may thank
themſelves. And, alas! poor Souls, they ſee that they are given
to be of ſo many minds, that tho they always mean well, yet if
“ there coms any good, they may thank them that teach them better.
" Wherfore there was never ſuch a thing as this invented, they do ve-
“ rily believe that it is no other than the ſame which they alway's
« had in their very heads, if they could have but told how to bring
" it out. As now for a ſample; My Lords the Propoſers had no
“ ſooner ſaid your minds, than they found it to be that which heart
“ could wiſh. And your Fatherhoods may comfort your ſelves, that
" there is not a People in the world more willing to learn what is for
do
(6
CC
;
their
OCE A N A.
219
might go
" their own good, nor more apt to ſee it, when you have ſhew'd it
" them. Whierfore they do love you as they do their own ſelves;
" honor you as Fathers; reſolve to give you as it were Obedierice
“ for ever : and ſo thanking you for your moſt good and excellent
“ Laws, they do pray for you as the very Worthys of the Land,
Right Honorable Lords and Fathers aſſembld in Parlament.
ÅRGVS came off beyond his own expectation; for thinking right,
and ſpeaking as he thought, it was apparent by the Houſe, and the
thanks they gave him, that they eſteem'd him to be abſolutely of the
beſt ſort of Orators ; upon which having a mind that till then mif-
gave him, he became very crounſe, and much delighted with that whichi
down the next week in print to his wife and Neighbors.
Livy makes the Roman Tribuns to ſpeak in the ſame ſtile with the
Conſuls, which could not be, and therfore for ought in him to the
contrary, VOLERO and CANULEIUS might have ſpoken in no
better ſtile than ARGUS. However, they were not created the firſt
year of the Commonwealth; and the Tribuns of Oceana are ſince
becom better Orators than were needful. But the Laws being enacted,
had the Preamble annex’d, and were deliver'd to BRONChus, who
lov'd nothing in thc Earth ſo much as to go ſtaring and bellowing up
and down the Town, like a Stag in a Foreſt, as he now did, with
his fraternity in their Coats of Arms, and I know not how many
Trumpets, proclaiming the Act of Parlament; when meeting my
Lord ARCHON, who from a retreat that was without Affectation,
as being for Devotion only, and to implore a Bleſſing by Prayer and
Fafting upon his Labors, now newly arriv'd in Town, the Herald of
the Tribe of Beſtia ſet up his throat, and having chanted out his
Leffon, paſt as haughtily by him, as if his own had bin the better
Office; which in this place was very well taken, tho BRONCHUS
for his high mind happen'd afterwards upon ſom diſaſters, too long to
tell, thạt ſpoil'd much of his Imbroidery.
MY Lord ARCHON's Arrival being known, the Signory, ac-
company'd by the Tribuns, repair’d to him, with the news he had
already heard by the Herald ; to which my Lord Strategus added,
That his Highneſs could not doubt upon the Demonſtrations given,
but the minds of Men were firm in the opinion, that he could be no
ſeeker of himſelf in the way of earthly Pomp and Glory: and that
the Gratitude of the Senat, and the People, could not therfore be un-
derſtood to have any ſuch reflection upon him. But ſo it was, that in
regard of Dangers abroad, and Partys at home, they durſt 'not truſt
themſelves without a ſtanding Army, nor a ſtanding Army in any
man's hands but thoſe of his Highneſs
.
THE ARCHON made anſwer, that he ever expected this would
be the ſenſe of the Senat and the People ; and this being their ſenſe,
he ſhould have bin forry they had made choice of any other than him-
ſelf for a ſtanding General: Firſt, Becauſe it could not have bin more
to their own ſafety: And, Secondly, Becauſe ſo long as they ſhould
have need of a ftanding Army, his work was not done: That he would
not diſpute againſt the Judgment of the Senat and the People,nor ought
that to be. Nevertheleſs, he made little doubt but experience would
Party their own Intereſt in this Government, and that bet-
ter improvd than they could expect from any other; that Mens ani-
Ff 2
moſitys
#
ſhew
every
.
220
OCEAN A.
moſitys ſhould overbalance their Intereſt for any time, was impoſſi:
ble; that humor could never be laſting, nor, thro the Conſtitution of
the Government, of any effect at the firſt charge. For ſuppoſing
the worſt, and that the People had choſen no other into the Senat
and the Prerogative than Royaliſts, a matter of fourteen hundred
men muſt have taken their Oaths at their Election, with an intention
to go quite contrary, not only to their Oaths ſo taken, but to their
own Intereſt; for being eſtated in the Soverain Power, they muſt
have decreed it from themſelves (ſuch an example for which there
was never any experience, nor can there be any reaſon) or holding it,
it muſt have don in their hands as well every whit as in any other.
Furthermore, they muſt have remov'd the Government from a Foup-
dation that apparently would hold, to ſet it upon another which ap-
parently would not hold; vvhich things if they could not com to paſs,
the Senat and the People conſiſting, vvholly of Royaliſts, much leſs
by a parcel of them elected. But if the fear of the Senat and of the Peo-
ple deriv'd from a Party without, ſuch a one as would not be elected,
nor ingage themſelves to the Commonwealth by an Oath; this again
muſt be fo large, as would go quite contrary to their own Intereſt,
they being as free and as fully eſtated in their Liberty as any other,
or ſo narrow that they could do no hurt, vvhile the People being in
Arms, and at the beck of the Strategus, every Tribe vvould at any
time make a better Army than ſuch a Party; and there being no
Partys at home, fears from abroad vvould vaniſh. But ſeeing it vvas
otherwiſe determin'd by the Senat and the People, the beſt courſe
vvas to take that which they held the ſafeſt, in vvhich vvith his humble
thanks for their great bounty, he was reſolv’d to ſerve them vvith all
Duty and Obedience.
A VERY ſhort time after the Royaliſts, now equal Citizens,
made good the ARCHON's Judgment, there being no other that
found any thing near ſo great a ſweet in the Government. For he
who has not bin acquainted with Affiction, ſays SENECA, knows
but half the things of this world.
MOREOVĒR they ſaw plainly, that to reſtore the antient Go-
vernment, they muſt caſt up their Eſtates into the hands of three
hundred men; wherfore in caſe the Senat and the Prerogative, conſiſting
of thirteen hundred men, had bin all Royaliſts, there muſt of ne-
ceſſity have bin, and be for ever, one thouſand againſt this or any
ſuch Vote. But the Senat being inform’d by the Signory, that the
ARCHON had accepted of his Dignity and Office, caus'd a third
Chair to be ſet for his Highneſs, between thoſe of the Strategus and
the Orator in the Houſe, the like at every Council; to which he re-
pair’d, not of neceſſity, but at his pleaſure, being the beſt
, and, as
Argus not vainly ſaid, the greateſt Prince in the World: for in the
Pomp of his Court he was not inferior to any, and in the Field he was
follow'd with a Force that was formidable to all. Nor was there a
cauſe in the nature of this Conſtitution to put him to the charge of
Guards, to ſpoil his ſtomach or his ſleep: Inſomuch, as being hand-
ſomly diſputed by the Wits of the Academy, whether my Lord
ARCHON, if he had bin ambitious, could have made himſelf ſo
great, it was carry'd clear in the Negative; not only for the Reaſons
drawn from the preſent balance, which was Popular ; but putting the
caſe the balance had bin Monarchical. For there be fom Nations,
+
wherof
}
OCE A NÅ.
221
wherof this is one, that will bear a Prince in a Commonwealth far
higher than it is poſſible for them to bear a Monarch. Spain look'd
upon the Prince of Orange as her inoſt formidable Enemy; but if ever
there be a Monarch in Holland, he will be the Spaniards beſt friend.
For wheras a Prince in a Commonwealth derives his Greatneſs from
the root of the People, a Monarch derives his from one of thoſe ba-
lances which nip them in the root; by which means the Loir Countrys
under a Monarch were poor and inconſiderable, but in bearing a
Prince could grow to a miraculous height, and give the Glory of his
Actions by far the upper land of the greateſt King in Chriſtendom,
There are Kings in Europe, to whom a King of Oceana would be but
a petit Companion. But the Prince of this Commonwealth is the Ter-
ror and the Judg of them all.
THAT which my Lord ARCHON now minded moſt, was
the Agrarian, upon which Debate he inceſſantly thruſt the Senat and
the Council of State; to the end it might be planted upon ſom firm
root, as the main point and baſis of perpetuity to the Commonwealth.
AND theſe are ſom of the moſt remarkable Paſſages that happen'd
in the firſt year of this Government. About the latter end of the ſe-
cond, the Army was disbanded, but the Taxes continu'd at thirty
thouſand Pounds a month, for three years and a half. By which
means a piece of Artillery was planted, and a portion of Land to the
value of gol. a year purchas'd for the maintenance of the Games, and
of the Prize arms for ever, in each Hundred.
WITH the eleventh year of the Commonwealth, the terſ of
the Exciſe, allotted for the maintenance of the Senat and the People,
and for the railing of a public Revenue, expir’d. By which time
the Exchequer, over and above the annual Salarys, amounting to
three hundred thouſand Pounds, accumulating every year out of one
Million incom ſeven hundred thouſand Pounds in Banco, brought it
with a product of the Sum, riſing to about eight Millions in the whole:
wherby at ſeveral times they had purchas’d to the Senat and the Peo-
ple four hundred thouſand Pounds per annum ſolid Revenue; which,
beſides the Lands held in Panopea, together with the Perquiſits of ei-
ther Province, was held fufficient for a public Revenue. Nevertheleſs,
Taxes being now wholly taken off, the Exciſe of no great burden
(and many ſpecious advantages not vainly propos’d in the heightning
of the public Revenue) was very chearfully eſtabliſh'd by the Senat
and the People, for the term of ten years longer; and the ſame courſe
being taken, the public Revenue was found in the one and twentieth
of the Commonwealth, to be worth one Million in good Land. Wher-
upon the Exciſe was fo aboliſh'd for the preſent, as withal reſolvd
to be the beſt, the moſt fruitful and eaſy way of raiſing Taxes, ac-
cording to future Exigencys. But the Revenue being now ſuch as was
able to be a yearly Purchaſer, gave a jealouſy that by this means the
balance of the Commonwealth, conſiſting in privat Fortunes, might
be eaten out ; whence this year is famous for that Law wherby the
Senat and the People forbidding any further purchaſe of Lands to the
Public within the Dominions of Oceana and the adjacent Provinces,
put the Agrarian upon the Commonwealth her ſelf. Theſe Increaſes
are things which Men, addicted to Monarchy, deride as impoſſible,
wherby they unwarily urge a ſtrong Argument againſt that which
they would defend. For having their eys fix'd upon the Pomp and
Expence,
222
OCEANA
Expence, by which not only every Child of a King being a Prinice,
exhauſts his Father's Coffers; but Favorits and ſervil Spirits, devoted
to the flattery of thoſe Princes, grow inſolent and profuſe, returning
a fit Gratitude to their Maſters, whom while they hold it honorable
to deceive, they ſuck and keep eternally poor: It follows that they
do not fee how it ſhould be poſſible for a Commonwealth to clothe
her ſelf in Purple, and thrive ſo ſtrangely upon that which would
make a Prince's hair grow thro his hood, and not afford him bread.
As if it were a Miracle that a careleſs and prodigal Man ſhould bring
ten thouſand Pounds a year to nothing, or that an induſtrious and frugal
Man brings a little to ten thouſand Pounds a year. But the fruit of
one man's induſtry and frugality can never be like that of a Common-
wealth; Firſt, becauſe the greatneſs of the Increaſe follows the great-
neſs of the Stock or Principal: And, Secondly, becauſe a frugal Father
is for the moſt part ſucceded by a laviſh Son; wheras a Commonwealth
is her own Heir.
THIS year a part was propos’d by the Right Honorable A u-
REUS DE WOOLSACK in the Tribe of Pecus, firſt Commiſſioner
of the Treaſury, to the Council of State, which foon after paſt the
Ballot of the Senat and the People: by which the Lands of the Public
Revenue, amounting to one Million, were equally divided into five
thouſand Lots, enter'd by their names and parcels into a Lotbook pre-
ſerv'd in the Exchequer. And if any Orphan, being a Maid, ſhould
caſt her Eſtate into the Exchequer for fourteen hundred Pounds, the
Treaſury was bound by the Law to pay her quarterly two hundred
Pounds a year, free from Taxes, for her Life, and to aſſign her a Lot
for her Security: if ſhe marry'd, her Husband was neither to take
out the Principal without her conſent (acknowlegd by her ſelf to
one of the Commiſſioners of the Treaſury, who according as he found
it to be free, or forc’d, was to allow or diſallow of it) nor any other
way ingage it, than to her proper uſe. But if the Principal were
taken out, the Treaſury was not bound to repay any more of it than
one thouſand Pounds; nor might that be repaid at any time, fave
within the firſt year of her Marriage: the like was to be don by a half
or quarter Lot reſpectively.
THIS was found to be a great Charity to the weaker Sex, and as
ſom ſay, who are more skilful in the like Affairs than my ſelf, 'of good
Profit to the Commonwealth.
NOW began the native Spleen of Oceana to be much purg'd, and
Men not to affect Sullenneſs and Pedantiſm. The Elders could re-
member that they had bin Youth. Wit and Gallantry were ſo far
from being thought Crimes in themſelves, that care was taken to pre-
ſerve their innocence. For which cauſe it was propos’d to the Coun-
cil for Religion by the Right Honorable CADISCUS DE CLERO,
in the Tribe of Stamnum, firſt Cenſor, That ſuch Women as living
in Gallantry and View about the Town, were of evil fame, and could
not ſhew that they were maintain'd by their own Eſtates or Induſtry;
or ſuch as having Eſtates of their own, were yet waſtful in their way
of life, and of°ill example to others, ſhould be obnoxious to the
animadverſion of the Council of Religion, or of the Cenſors: In
which the proceding ſhould be after this manner. Notice ſhould be
firſt given of the ſcandal to the party offending, in privat: if there
were no amendment within the ſpace of ſix months, ſhe ſhould be
3
ſummon'd
OCE A N A:
223
far from the detriment of Virtue, that it is to the improvement of it,
ſeeing Women that heretofore made havock of their Honors that they
Cenſors, according to their annual Cuſtom, reported the Pillar of Ni-
ſummond and rebuk'd before the ſaid Council or Cenſors; and, if af
ter other ſix months it were found that neither this availd, ſhe ſhould
be cenſured not to appear at any public Meetings, Games, or Recrea-
tions, upon penalty of being taken up by the Doorkeeper's, or Guards
of the Senat, and by them to be detain'd, till for every ſuch Offence,
five Pounds were duly paid for hier inlargement.
FURTHERMORE, if any common Strumpet ſhould be found,
or any fcurrility or profaneneſs repreſented at either of the Theaters,
the Prelats for every ſuch Offence ſhould be fin’d twenty Pounds by the
faid Council
, and the Poet, for every ſuch offence on his part, ſhould be
whipt. This Law relates to another, which alſo was enacted the fame
year upon this occaſion.
THE Youth and Wits of the Academy liaving put the Buſineſs
ſo home in the defence of Comedys, that the Provoſts had nothing but
the Conſequences provided againſt by the foregoing Law to object,
prevail'd ſo far, that two of the Provoſts of the Council of State
join’d in a Propoſition, which after much ado came to a Law, wher-
by one hundred thouſand pounds was allotted for the building of two
Theaters on each fide of the Piazza of the Halo: and two annual Ma-
giſtrats cald Prelats
, choſen out of the Knights, were added to the
Tropic, the one call'd the Prelat of the Buskin, for inſpection of the
Tragic Scene calld Melpomene; and the other the Prelat of the Sock,
for the Comic call's Thalia, which Magiſtrats had each five hundred
pounds a year allow'd out of the Profits of the Theaters; the reſt,
except eight hundred a year to four Poets, payable into the Exchequer.
A Poet Laureat created in one of theſe Theaters, by the Strategus re-
ceives a Wreath of five hundred pounds in Gold, paid out of the ſaid
Profits. But no man is capable of this Creation, that had not two
parts in three of the Suffrages at the Academy, aſſembld after ſix
weeks warning, and upon that occaſion.
THESE things among us are ſure enough to be cenſurd, but by
ſuch only as do not know the nature of a Commonwealth : for to tell
men that they are free, and yet to curb the genius of a People in a
lawful Recreation, to which they are naturally
inclin’d, is to tell a tale
of a Tub. I have lieard the Proteſtant Miniſters in France, by men
that were wiſe, and of their own profeſſion, much blam'd in that
they forbad Dancing, a Recreation to which the genius of that Air is
ſo inclining, that they loſt many who would not loſe that: Nor do
they leſs than blame the former determination of raſhneſs, who now
gently connive at that which they had fo roughly forbidden. Theſe
Sports in Oceana are ſo governºd, that they are pleaſing for privat di-
verſion, and profitable to the Public: For the Theaters foon defray'd
their own charge, and now bring in a good Revenue. All this is ſo
might have their Pleaſures, are now incapable of their Pleaſures, if
they loſe their Honors.
ABOUT the one and fortieth year of the Commonwealth, the
lus, by which it was found that the People were increas’d very near
one third. Wherupon the Council of War was appointed by the Se-
nat to bring in a State of War, and the Treaſurers the State of the Trea-
fury. The State of War, or the Pay and Charge of an Army, was foon
alter exhibited by the Council in this Account.
The
.
OCEAN A.
224
The Field Pay of a Parlamentary Army.
Pole marchs.
THE Lord Strategus, Marching-
Gencral of the Horſe
Lieutenant General
General of the Artillery
Commiſſary General
Major General-
Quartermaſter General
Two Adjutants to the Major General
Forty Colonels
100 Captains of Horſe, at 500 1. a Man-
300 Captains of Foot, at 300 l. a Man
100 Cornets, at 100 l. a Man
300 Enſigns at sol. a Man
Quartermaſters
Serjeants
800
Trumpeters
Drummers
10000 Horſe, at 25. 6 d. per day each
30000 Foot, at I s. per day each
Chirurgeons
l. per ann.
10000.
2000.
.
2000.
1000.
1000.
I000.
1000.
1000.
40000.
500oo.
90000
I0000.
1
15000
20000.
470000.
500000.
400.
Sum-II14400.
40000 Auxiliarys, amounting to within a little as much I lOOOCO.
THE Charge of mounting 20000 Horſe
3000no.
THE Train of Artillery, holding a 3d to the whole 900000.
Summa totalis-1414400.
t
ARMS and Ammunition are not reckon'd, as thoſe which are
furniſht out of the Store or Arſenal of Emporium : Nor waftage, as
that which gos upon the account of the Fleet, maintain'd by the Cu-
ftoms; which Cuſtoms, thro the care of the Council for Trade, and
growth of Traffic, were long ſince improv'd to about a Million Reve-
The Houſe being thus inform’d of a State of War, the Com-
miſſioners brought in
nue.
THE ſtate of the Treaſury this preſent year, being the one and
fortieth of the Commonwealth.
ECEIVED from the one and twentieth of this
Commonwealth, by 700000 l. a year in bank, with 1600000®.
the Product of the Sum riſing
l.
-
.:
EX
i
OCEAN A.
225
EXPENDED from the one and twentieth of this
Cominonwealth.
l.
200000
MPRIMIS, For the Addition of Arms for 100000?
Men, to the Arſenal, or Tower of Emporium 1000000
FOR the ſtoring of the ſame with Artillery,
200000.
FOR the ſtoring of the ſame with Ammunition
FOR beautifying the Citys, Parks, Gardens, Public
Walks, and Places for Recreation of Emporium
and Hiera, with Public Buildings; Aquæducts,
15000oo.
Statues, and Fountains, &c.
EXTRAORDINARY Emballys
150000.
Sum- 3150000.
I 2000000.
1
REMAINING in the Treaſury, the Salarys of the
Exchequer being defalk'd
.
BY compariſon of which Accounts, if a War with an Ariny of 80000
Men were to be made by the Penny, yet was the Commonwealth able
to maintain ſuch a one above three years, without levying a Tax. But
it is against all Experience; Senſe and Reaſon, that ſuch an Army ſhould
not be foon broken, or make a great progreſs; in either of which
caſes the Charge ceaſes; or rather, if a right courſe be taken in the lat-
ter, Profit coms in: for the Romans had no other conſiderable wa
but Victory wherby to fill their Treaſury, which nevertheleſs was
ſeldom emty. ALEXANDER did not conſult his Purſe upon his De-
ſign for Perſia: It is obferv’d by MACCHIAVEL, that Live ar-
guing what the event in reaſon muſt have bin had that King invaded
Rome, and diligently meaſuring what on each ſide was neceſſary to
ſuch a War, never ſpeaks a word of Mony. No man imagins that
the Gauls, Goths, Vandals, Huns, Lombards, Saxons, Normans, made
their Inroads or Conqueſts by the ſtrength of the Purſe; and if it be
thought enough, according to the dialect of our Age, to ſay in anſwer
to theſe things, that thoſe times are paſt and gon; what Mony did the
late GUSTA V US, the moſt victorious of modern Princes, bring out
of Sweden with him into Germany? An Army that gos upon a golden
Leg, will be as lame as if it were a wooden one; bur proper Forces
have Nerves and Muſcles in them, ſuch for which, having four or five
Millions, a Sum eaſy enough, with a Revenue like this of Oceana, to
be had at any time in readineſs, you need never, or very rarely charge
the People with Taxes. What influence the Commonwealth by ſuch
Arms has had upon the World, I leave to Hiſtorians, whole cuſtom it
has bin of old, to be as diligent Obſervers of foren Actions, as careleſs
of thoſe domeſtic Revolutions which (leſs pleaſant it may be, as not
partaking ſo much of the Romance) are to Stateſmen of far greater
profit; and this Fault, if it be not mine, is ſo much more fre-
quent with modern Writers, as has causd me to undertake this
Work; on which to give my own Judgment, it is perform'd as much
above the time I have bin about it, as below the dignity of the
Gg
BUT
1
matter.
226
OCE A N A.
Plucarch in the
Icon.
BUT I cannot depart out of this Country, till I have taken leave
of
my Lord ARCHON, a Prince of immenſe Felicity, who laving
built as high with his Counſils, as he dig'd deep with his Sword, had
now ſeen fifty years meaſur'd with his own inerring Orbs.
TIMOLEON (ſuch a hater of Tyrants, that not able to perſuade
Life of Timo- his Brother T I MOPHAN ES to relinquiſh the Tyranny of Corinth, lie
flew him) was afterwards elected by the People (the Sicilians groaning
to them from under the like burden) to be ſent to their relief: Wherupon
TELECLIDES the Manat that time of moſt Authority in the Common-
wealth of Corinth, ſtood up,and giving an Exhortation to T I MOLEON,
how he ſhould behave himſelf in his Expedition, told him, that if he re-
ſtor’d the Sicilians to Liberty, it would be acknowleg’d that he had
deſtroy'd a Tyrant; if otherwiſe, he muſt expect to hear that he had
murder'd a King. TIMOLEON taking his leave, with a very
ſmall Proviſion for ſo great a Deſign, purſu'd it with a Courage not in-
ferior to, and a Felicity beyond any that had bin known to that day
in mortal Fleſh, having in the ſpace of eight years utterly rooted
out of all Sicily thoſe Weeds of Tyranny, thro the deteftation
wherof men fled in ſuch abundance from their Native Country, that
whole Citys were left deſolat; and brought it to ſuch a paſs, that o-
thers thro the fame of his Virtues, and the excellency of the Soil,
flockt as faſt from all Quarters to it, as to the Garden of the World:
While he, being preſented by the People of Syracuja with his Town-
houſe, and his Country Retreat, the ſweeteit Places in either, liv'd
with his wife and Children a moſt quiet, happy, and holy Life
;
for he attributed no part of his Succeſs to himſelf, but all to the Bleſ-
ſing and Providence of the Gods. As he paſt his time in this man-
ner, admir'd and honor'd by Mankind, LAPHISTIus an envious
Demagog, going to ſummon him upon ſom pretence or other to an-
ſwer for himſelf before the Aſſembly, the People fell into ſuch a Mu-
tiny, as could not be appeas'd but by TIMOLEON, who under-
ſtanding the matter, reprov'd them, by repeating the pains and travel
which he had gon thro, to no other end than that every Man might
have the free uſe of the Laws. Wherfore when DÆMEN E Tus ano-
ther Demagog, had brought the ſame Deſign about again, and blam'd
him impertinently to the People for things which he did when he was
General, TIMOLEON anſwer'd nothing, but raiſing up his hands,
gave
the Gods thanks for their return to his frequent Prayers, that he
might but live to ſee the Syracuſians ſofree, that they could queſtion
whom they pleas’d.
NOT long after being old, thro ſom natural imperfection, he fell
blind; but the Syracufians by their perpetual viſits held him, tho he
could not ſee, their greateſt Object: if there arrivd Strangers,
they brought them to ſee this fight. Whatever came in debate at the
Aſembly, if it were of ſmall conſequence, they determin'd it them-
ſelves; but if of importance, they always fent for TIMOLEON;
who being brought by his Servants in a Chair, and ſet in the middle
of the Theater, there ever follow'd a great ſhout, after which ſom
time was allow'd for the Benedictions of the People; and then the
matter propos’d, when TIMOLEON had ſpoken to it, was put to
the Suffrage; which given, his Servants bore him back in bis Chair,
accompany'd by the People clapping their hands, and making all ex-
preſſions of Joy and Applauſe, till leaving him at his Houſe, tliey re-
1
ܪ
turn'd
OC E A N A.
227
turn'd to the diſpatch of their Buſineſs. And this was the Life of
TIMOLEON, till he dy'd of Age, and drop'd like a mature Fruit,
while the Eys of the People were as the Showers of Autumn.
THE Life and Death of my Lord ARCHON (but that he had
his Senſes to the laſt, and that his Character, as not the Reſtorer, but
the Founder of a Commonwealth, was greater) is ſo exactly the
fame, that (ſeeing by Men wholly ignorant of Antiquity, I am ac-
cus’d of writing Romance) I ſhall repeat nothing: but tell
year
the whole Nation of Oceana, even to the Women and Chil-
dren, were in mourning, where ſo great or fad a Funeral Pomp had
never bin ſeen or known. Somtime after the performance of the
Excquys, a Colosſus, mounted on a brazen Horſe of excellent Fabric,
was erected in the Piazza of the Pantheon, ingrav'd with this Inſcrip:
tion on the Eaſtern ſide of the Pedeſtal :
you that
this
H IS
N A ME
IS AS
Precious Ointment .
And on the Weſtern with the following:
Gg 2
GRATA
I
1
228
GRAT A P ATRIA
Piæ & Perpetuæ Memoriæ
D. D.
I
Olphaus Megaletor
Lord Archon, and ſole LEGISLATOR
OF
OCEAN A.
Pater Patriæ.
Invincible in the Field.
Inviolable in bis Faith.
Unfained in bis Zeal.
Immortal in bis Fame.
The Greateſt of Captains.
The Beſt of Princes.
The Happieſt of Legiſlators.
The Moſt Sincere of Chriſtians.
Who ſetting the Kingdoms of Earth at Liberty,
Took
the Kingdom of the Heavens by Violence;
.
Anno SÆtat. fuæ 116
Hujus Reipub. 50.
THE
PREROGATIVE
0 F
PopularGovernment .
B EING A
POLITICAL DISCOURSE
In Two Books.
The former
Containing the firſt Preliminary of Oceana, in-
larg’d, interpreted, and vindicated from all ſuch
Miſtakes or Slanders as have bin alleg’d againſt
it under the Notion of Objections.
The Second
Concerning Ordination, againſt Dr. H. H A MMOND,
Dr. L. SE AMAN, and the Authors chey follow.
In which Two Books is contain'd the whole Commonwealth of the
Hebrews, or of Iſrael, Senat, People, and Magiſtracy, both as it
ſtood in the Inſtitution by Moses, and as it came to be form'd af-
ter the Captiviry.
As alſo the different Policys introduc'd into the Church of CHRIST,
during the time of the Apoſtles.
Without Council Purpoſes are diſappointed; but in the multitude of Counfillors tbey
are eſtabliſh’d. SOLOMON.
La multitudine è piu Savia è piu coſtante ch’un Principe. MACCHIAVII.
1
239
!
E PISTLE to the READER:
HOSOEVER ſheds mans blood; by man ſhall his
blood be ſhed; for in the Image of God made he
Man. If this Rule holds as well in ſhedding the blood
of a Turk as of a Chriſtian, then that wherin Man
is the Image of God is REASON. Of all Controverſys, thoſe of the
Pen are the moſt honorable : for in thoſe of Force, there is more of the
Image of the Beaſt, but in thoſe of the Pen there is more of the
Image of God. in the Controverſys of the Sword, there is but too often
no other Reaſon than Force ; but the Controverſy of the Pen has never
any force but Reaſon. Of all Controverſys of the pen next thoſe of Re
ligion, thoſe of Government are the moſt honorable, and the moſt uſeful;
the true end of each, tho in a different way, being that the Will of God
may be don in Earth as it is in Heaven. Of all Controverſys of Govern-
ment, thoſe in the vindication of Popular Government are the moſt noble,
as being that Conſtitution alone, from whence all we have that is good is de-
ſcended to us; and which, if it had not exiſted, Mankind at this day had
bin but a Herd of Beaſts. The Prerogative of Popular Government must
either be in an ill hand, or elſe it is a game againſt which there is not a
Card in the wole pack; for we have the Books of Moses, thoſe of the
Greecs and of the Romans, not to omit MACCHIAVÉL, "all for it.
What have the Aſſerters of Monarchy; what can they have againſt us?
A Sword; but that rufts, or muſt have a Scabbard; and the Scabbard of
this kind of Sword is a good frame of Government.
A MAN may be polleſt of a piece of Ground by force, bit to make uſe
or profit of it, he muſt build upon it, and till it by Reaſon; for whatever
is not founded upon Reaſon, cannot be permanent. In Reaſon there
are two parts, Invention and Judgment: As to the latter, In a multitude
of Counſillors (Say both SOLOMON and MACCHIAVEL) there is
ſtrength, Nay as for Judgment, there is not that Order in Art or Na-
ture that can compare with a Popular Aſſembly. THE VOICE OF
THE PEOPLE IS THE VOICE OF GOD. Hence it is
that in all well-orderd Policys the People have the ultimat reſult : but unleſs
there be fom other to invent, a Popular Aſſembly can be of no effect at all
but Confuſion. Invention is a ſolitary thing. All the Phyſicians in the
world put together, invented not the Circulation of the Blood, nor can in-
vent any ſuch thing, tho in their own Art; yet this was invented by one
alone, and being invented, is unanimouſly voted and imbracd by the
rality of Phyſicians. The Plow and Wheels were at firſt, you muſt think,
the invention of ſom rare Artiſts; but who or what ſhall ever be able to tear
the uſe of them from the People? Hence, where Government is at a lofs,
a ſole Legiſlator is of abſolute neceſſity; nay where it is not at a loſs
, if
well modeld, as in Venice, the Propoſers, tho frequently change.
able, as in that caſe is neceſſary, are very few, as the Counſillors, the
Savi, the Provoſts. Wherever a Commonwealth is thus propos’d to,
the
Balance or Popular Aſſembly will do her duty to admiration, but till then
never. Yet ſo it has bin with us of late years, that altho in Royal Au-
thority
gene-
To the Reader.
231
Reſervation and implicit Faith in their nods or nightcaps.
the Scripture, but the Cabala.
thority there was no more than the right of Propoſing, and the King him.
Self was to ſtand (legibus & conſuetudinibus quas vulgus elegerit) to
the reſult of the People
, yet the popular Council h.ts bin pilt upon In-
vention, and they that have bin the prevailing Party have us’d means to
keep the Reſult to themſelves, quite contrary to the nature of Popular Ad-
miniſtration. Let one ſpcak, and the reft judg. Of whatever any one
man can ſay or do, Mankind is the natural and competent Judg, in which
is contain’d the very reaſon of Parlaments; thro the want of underſtand-
ing this came in confuſion. Man that is in Honor, and lias no under-
ſtanding, is like the Beaſts that periſh. Nor can be poſſibly return to
Order, but by mending the Hedg where it was broken. A prudent, intire
and fit Propoſition made to a free Parlament, recovers all. To them who
are of the greateſt Eminency or Authority in a Commonwealth, belongs na-
turally that part of Reaſon which is Invention; and uſing this, they are
to propoſe : but what did our Grandees ever invent or propoſe, that might
Shew ſo much as that themſelves knew what they would be at and yet hov
confidently do they lay the fault upon the People, and their unfitneſs, for-
footh, for Government : in which they are wondrous wiſe! For, this I will
boldly ſay, Where there was an Ariſtocracy that perform’d their duty, there
never was, nor ever can be a People unfit for Government; but on the con-
trary, where the Ariſtocracy have fail'd, the People being once under Or-
ders, have held very often. But while they are not under Orders, if they
fail it is not their fault, but the fault of the Ariſtocracy; for who elſe
Should model a Government but men of Experience? There is not in Eng-
land, I ſpeak it to their fame, one GRANDE E that has any perfect
knowlege of the Orders of any one Commonwealth that ever was in the
World. Away with this ſame grave complexion, this huff of Wiſdom
maint ain'd by making faces. The People cannot do their duty conſiſting in
Judgment, but by virtue of ſuch Orders as may bring them together, and
direct them; but the duty of the Ariſtocracy conſiſting in Invention, may
be don by any one man, and in his ſtudy; and where is that one man among
all the Grandees that studys? They are ſo far from knowing their own
duty
, that a man for propoſing that in which none can find a flaw, has don
enough to be ridiculous to them, who are themſelves ridiculous to the whole
World, in that they could never yet propoſe any thing that would hold.
BUT if this amounts to a Demonftration, it amounts to a clear de-
tection of your profound Grandees
, and a full proof that they are Phana-
tical Perſons, State Jeſuits, ſuch as have reduc'd the Politics to mental
GOD, toxpropoſe his Commandments to the People of Iſrael, wrote
them on two Tables; the Decemviri
, to propoſe their Commandments
to the People of Rome, wrote them on twelve Tables; the Athenians
propos d in writing, ſign’d with the name of the particular Inventor ; after
Pittern do the Venetians, as was ſaid, the ſame at this day. But
no Scribling : Your Grandees are above this.
MOSES, who was the firft Writer in this kind, ſhall be pardon’d; but
MACCHIA VEL, the firſt'in later times that has reviv'd his Principles,
or trod in his ſteps, 'is deſervedly pelted for it by Sermons. They are not for
IWIL'L tell you a ſtory out of BOCCALINI: APOLLO
having Spyd the Philoſopher and great Maſter of Silence HARPOCR A-
Tes in the Court of Parnaſſus, usid ſuch importunity with him, that for
once he was perſuaded to ſpeak; upon which ſuch apparent diſcovery was
no Gooſquill,
232
To the Reader.
made of the Hypocrite, and the groſs ignorance he had ſo long harbor’d un-
der a deceitful ſilence, that he was immediatly baniſk'd the Court. Were
there canſe, I could be modeſt ; but this Virtue, to the diminution of ſound
and wholſom Principles, would be none : wherfore let a Grandee write, and
I will ſew you HARPOCRAT E S.
THUS having ſufficiently defj?d Sir Guy, I may with the leſs im-
peachment of reputation deſcend to Tom Thum. Not that I hold my
ſelf a fit perſon to be exercis’d with Boys play, but that ſon, who ſhould
bave more wit, have ſo little as to think this fomthing. A good Rat.
catcher is not ſo great a bleſſing to any City, as a good Jugglercatcher would
be to this Nation. Now becauſe I want an Office, I ſhall Mew my Parts
to my Country, and how fit I am for the white Staff, or long Pole of ſo mor-
Shipful a Preferment.
+
Ridiculus ne ſis, efto.
room
:
THE
J'.
1
THE
..
A
FIRST BOOK,
CONTAINING
The firſt Preliminary of OCEANA, inlarg’d, in-
terpreted, and vindicated from all ſuch Miſtakes
or Slanders as have bin alleg'd againſt it under
the notion of Objections
.
i
' Ει μη κρατήσεις Πρησας γελοίG- αν
Orgav o'tua's fè OUK ÖN TOT' &uiavoy gelegs.
!
is
:
A full Anſwer to all ſuch OBJECTIONS as
bave hitherto bin made againſt OCEAN A.
NH
EITHER the Author or Authors of the Conſiderations upon
OCEANA, nor any other, have yet ſo much as once pretended
one Contradiction or one Inequality to be in the whole Common-
wealth. Now this is certain, That Frame of Government which is void
of any contradiction, or any inequality, is void of all internal cauſes of Diſ
ſolution, and muſt, for ſo much as it imbraces, have attain’d to full per-
fection. This by wholeſale is a full Anſwer to the Confiderations,
with all other objections hitherto; and will be (with any man that
comprehends the nature of Government) to thouſands of ſuch Books,
or Myriads of ſuch tittel tattel. Nevertheleſs, becauſe every man is
not provided with a Sum, in the following Diſcourſe I ſhall comply
with them that muſt have things by Retail
, or ſomwhat for their Far-
thing.
The
1
235
.
I
in
that a man may not make a Sea-chart, unleſs he be a Pilot. It is known that
The P R E F A CE.
T is commonly ſaid, and not without incouragement by ſom who think
they have Parnaſſus by the horns, that the Univerſity has laſh'd
me: ſo it ſeems I have to do with the Univerſity, and laſhing is
lawful; with;both which I am contented. In Moorfields, while the
People are buſy at their ſports, they often and
ridiculouſly loſe their Buttons,
their Ribbands, and their Purſes; where if they light, as ſomtimes they
do, upon the Maſters of that Árt, they fall a kicking them a while (which
one may call a rude charge) and then to their work again. I know not
whether I invite you to Moorfields, but (difficile eſt Šatyram non fcri-
bere) all the favor I deſire at your hands is but this
, that you would not
So condemn one man for kicking, as in the Same Aét to pardon another
for cutting of Purſes. A Gentleman that commits a fallacious Argument
to writing, or gos about to ſatisfy others with ſuch Reaſons as he is not
Satisfy'd with himſelf, is no more'a Gentleman but a Pickpocket; with this
my mind, I betake my ſelf to my work, or rather to draw open the Cur-
tain, and begin the Play.
ONE that has written conſiderations upon OCEAN A, Speaks the
Prolog in this manner : I beſeech you Gentlemen, are not we the Wri- Epiſte
ters of Politics fomwhat a ridiculous fort of People? Is it not a fine
piece of Folly for privat men ſitting in their Cabinets to rack their
brains about Models of Government? Certainly our Labors make a
very pleaſant recreation for thoſe great Perſonages, who, ſitting at the
Helm of Affairs, have by their large Experience not only acquir’d the
perfect Art of Ruling, but have attain'd alſo to the comprehenlion of the
Nature and Foundation of Government. In which egregious Comple-
ment
the Conſiderer has loſt his conſidering Cap.
IT was in the time of ALEXANDER, the greateſt Prince and Com-
mander of his age, that ARISTOTLE, with ſcarce inferior Applauſe
and equal Fame, being a privat man, wrote that excellent piece of Prudence
in his Cabinet, which is call'd his Politics, going upon far other Principles
than thoſe of 'ALEXANDER's Government, which it has long outlid.
The like did Titus Livius in the time of Augustus, Sir Tho-
M'AS Moor in the time of HENRY the Eighth, and MACCHIA-
VEL, when Italy was under Princes that afforded him not the ear.
Theſe
Works nevertheleſs are all of the moſt eſteem'd and applauded in this kind;
nor have I found any man, whoſe like Indeavors have bin perfecuted ſince
PLATO by Dionysius. I ftudy not without great Examples, nor
Ollt of my Calling ; either Arms or this Art being the proper Trade of 4
Genileman. A man may be intruſted with a ship, and a good Pilot tuo,
get not underſtand how to make Sea-charts. To ſay that a man may not
write of Government except he be a Magiſtrat, is as abſurd as to say,
a ,
CHRISTOPHER Columbu's made a Chart in his Cabinet, that
found out the Indys. The Magiftrat that was good at his Steerage never
took it ill of him that brought him a Chart, ſeeing whether he would uſe it or
nowas at his own choice; and if Flatterers, being the worſt ſort of Crows,
did not pick out the eys of the living, the ship of Government at this day
H h 2
throout
I
1
236
The Preface.
Arte della
Gucr. Proem.
V
1
throout Chriſtendom had not ſtruck ſo often as ſhe has don. To treat of Af-
fairs, ſays MACCHIA VEĽ, which as to the conduct of 'em appertain
to others, may be thought a great boldneſs; but if I commit Errors in
writing, theſe may be known without danger, wheras if they com-
mit Errors in acting, ſuch com not otherwiſe to be known, than in the
ruin of the Commonwealth. For which cauſe I preſume to open the
Scene of my Diſcourſe, which is to change according to the variety of theſe
following Queſtions.
1. WHETHER Prudence be well diſtinguiſh'a into Antient and
Modern ?
2. WHETHER a Commonwealth be rightly defin’d to be a Go-
vernment of Laws, and not of Men; and Monarchy to be a Govern-
ment of ſom Man, or a few Men, and not of Laws?
3. WHETHER the Balance of Dominion in Land be the natu-
ral'cauſe of Empire?
4. WHETHER the Balance of Empire be well divided into Na-
tional and Provincial? and whether theſe two, or any Nations that are
of diſtinct Balance, coming to depend upon one and the fame head, ſuch
a mixture creates a new Balance ?
5. WHETHER there be any common Right or Intereſt of Man-
kind diſtinct from the parts taken ſeverally ? and
how by the Orders of
a Commonwealth this may beſt be diſtinguiſh'd from privat Intereſt?
6. WHETHER the Senatuſconſulta, or Decrees of the Roman
Senat, had the power of Laws ?
7.
WHETHER the ten Commandments propos'd by GOD or
Moses were voted by the People of Iſrael?
8. WHETHER'a Commonwealth coming up to the perfection
of the kind, coms not up to the perfection of Government, and has no
flaw in it?
9. WHETHER Monarchy, coming up to the perfection of the
kind, coms not ſhort of the perfection of Government, and has not
fom flaw in it? in which is alſo treated of the Balance of France, of the
Original of a landed Clergy, of Arms, and their kinds.
10. WHETHER a Commonwealth that was not firſt broken
by it ſelf, was ever conquer'd by any Monarch?
II. WHETHER there be not an Agrarian, or fom Law or Laws
of that nature to ſupply the defect of it, in every Commonwealth?
and whether the Agrarian, as it is ſtated in Oceana, be not equal and
ſatisfactory to all Intereſts or Partys?
12. WHETHER Courſes or a Rotation be neceſſary to a well-
order'd Commonwealth? In which is contain'd the Parembole or
Courſes of Ifrael before the Captivity ; together with an Epitome of
the whole Commonwealth of Athens, as alſo another of the Common-
wealth of Venice.
Antient
237
Chap. I:
Antient and Modern Prudence.
CHAP. I.
i.
Whether Prudence be well diſtinguiſh'd into Antient and Modern.
T
P.4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9
HE Conſiderer (where by Antient Prudence I underſtand
the Policy of a Commonwealth, and by Modern Prudence
that of King, Lords, and Commons, which introduc'd by
the Goths and Vandals upon the ruin of the Roman Empire,
has fince reignd in theſe Weſtern Countrys, till by the predominating
of fom one of the three parts, it be now almoſt univerſally extin-
guiſh’d) thinks it enough for the confutation of this diſtinction, to
ſhew out of THUCYDIDES that of Monarchy to be a more an-
tient Policy than that of a Commonwealth. Upon which occaſion,
I muſt begin here to diſcover that which, the further I go, will be the
more manifeſt; namely, that there is a difference between quoting
Authors, and ſaying ſom part of them without book: this may be
don by their words, but the former no otherwiſe than by keeping to
their ſenſe. Now the ſenſe of THUCYDIDES, as he is tranſlated
by Mr. Hobbs in the place allegd, is thus : The manner, ſays he, Thu B. r.
of living in the moſt antient times of Greece was Thieving; the ſtronger
going abroad under the conduct of their moſt puiſſant Men, both to inrich
themſelves, and fetch home maintenance for ihe weak : for there was nei-
ther Traffic, property of Lands, nor conſtant Abode, till Minos built
a Navy, and expelling the Malefactors out of the Iſands, planted Colonys
of his own, by which means they who inhabited the Seacoaſts
, becoming
more addicted to Riches, grew more conſtant to their devellings : of whom
som, grown now rich, compaſs?d their Towns about with Walls
. For out of
a deſire of Gain, the meaner fort underwent Servitude with the Mighty;
and the Mighty (thus overbalancing at home) with their Wealth,
brought the leſſer Citys (abroad) into ſubjection. Thus PELOPS, tho
he was a ſtranger, obtain’d ſuch Power in Peloponneſus, that the Coun-
try was callºd after his name. Thus, ATReus obtain’d the Kingdom of
Mycenæ; and thus Kingdoms with Honors limited came to be hereditary';
and riſing to Power, proceded afterwards to the War againſt Troy.
After the War with Troy, the with much ado, and in a long time
Greece had conſtant reft (and Land without doubt came to Property) for
Shifting their ſeats no longer, at length they ſent Colonys abroad; the Athe-
nians into Ionia with the Iſlands, the Peloponneſians into Italy, Sicily,
and other parts. The Pover of Greece thus improv’d, and the deſire of
Mony withal, their Revenues (in what? not in Mony, if yet there
was no Ufury; therfore except a man can Shew that there was Uſury
in Land) being inlarg’d, in moſt of the Citys there were erected Tyrannys
.
Let us lay this place to the former, when out of a deſire of Gain the
meaner fort underwent Servitude with the Mighty, it caus'd hereditary
Kingdoms with Honors limited, as happen'd alſo with us ſince the time
of the Goths and Vandals. But when the People came to Property in
Land, and their Revenues were inlarg’d, ſuch as aſſum'd Power over
+
them,
1
1
-
(1
i
238
The Prerogative
Book I. them, not according to the nature of their Property or Balance, were
Tyrants: well
, and what reinedy? why, then it was, ſays the Con-
fiderer, that the Grecians out of an extreme averfion to that which was
Conſid. p. 4. the cauſe of their preſent Sufferings, ſlipt into Popular Government, not that
upon calm and mature Debates they found it beſt, but that they might put
themſelves at the greateſt diſtance (which Spirit uſually accompanys all Re-
formations ) from that with which they were grown into diſlike. Wherby
he agrees exactly with his Author in making out the true Force and
Nature of the Balance, working even without deliberation, and whe-
ther men will or no. For the Government that is natural and eaſy,
being in no other direction than that of the reſpective Balance, is not
of choice but of neceſſity. The Policy of King, Lords and Com-
mons, was not ſo much from the Prudence of our Anceſtors, as from
their neceſſity. If three hundred men held at this day the like over-
balance to the whole People, it was not in the power of Prudence to
inſtitute any other than the ſame kind of Government, thro the ſame
neceſſity. Thus the meaner ſort with THUCYDIDES ſubmitting
to the Mighty, it came to Kingdoms with hereditary Honors: but the
People coming to be wealthy, call’d their Kings, tho they knew noc
why, Tyrants; nay, and uſing them accordingly, found out means,
with as little deliberation it may be as a Bull takes to toſs a Dog, or a
Hern to ſplit a Hauk (that is, rather, as at the long-run they will
ever do in the like caſes, by Inſtinct, than Prudence or Debate) to
thro down that, which by the mere information of ſenſe they could
no longer bear; and which being thrown down, they found them-
ſelves cas’d. But the queſtion yet remains, and that is, forſooth,
whether of theſe is to be call?d Antient Prudence. To this end, ne-
ver man made a more unlucky choice than the Conſiderer has don for
himſelf of this Author, who in the very beginning of his Book,
ſpeaking of the Peloponneſian War, or that between
the Common-
wealths of Athens and Lacedemon, ſays, that the Aftions which
pre-
ceded this, and thoſe again that were more antient, tho the truth of them
thro length of time cannot by any means be clearly diſcover’d; yet for any
Argument that (looking into times far paſt ) he bad yet lighted on to per-
Suade him, he dos not think they have bin very great either for matter
of War, or otherwiſe ; that is, for matter of Peace or Government.
And left this ſhould not be plain enough, he calls the Prudence of the
Mr. Hobbs in three Periods, obſerv'd by Mr. HOBBS, viz. that from the beginning
the Magire. of the Grecian Memory to the Trojan War, that of the Trojan War it
ſelf, and that from thence to the preſent Commonwealth and Wars,
Thu. 6. 1. p.3. wherof he treats, The Imbecillity of antient Times. Wherfore certainly
this Prevaricator, to give him his own fees, has leſs diſcretion than a
Conſid. p. 34. common Attorny, who will be ſure to examin only thoſe witneſſes that ſeem
to make for the Cauſe in which he is entertain'd. Seeing that which he
affirms to be Antient Prudence is depos'd by his own witneſs to have
bin the Imbecillity of antient Times, for which I could have ſo many
more than I have leiſure to examin, that (to take only of the moſt
Authentic) as you have heard one Greec, I ſhall add no more than
one Roman, and that is FLoRus in his Prolog, where (computing
the Ages of the Romans, in the ſame manner THUCYDIDES did
thoſe of the Greecs) 'he affirms the time while they livid under their
Kings, to have bin their Infancy; that from the Conſuls till they conquerid
Italy, their Touth; that from hence to their Emperors, their manly age;
and
1
239
of Popular Government.
and the reſt (with a Complement or Salvo to TRAJAN his preſent Chap. i.
Lord) their Dotage.
THESE things, tho originally all Government among the Greecs
and the Romans was Regal, are no more than they who have not yet paſt
their Novitiat in ſtory, might have known. Yet ſays the Conſiderer, Confid. P.2, 3.
It ſeems to be a defect of experience to think that the Greec and the Roman
Actions are only conſiderable in Antiquity. But is it ſuch a defect of Ex-
perience to think them only conſiderable, as not to think them chiefly
conſiderable in Antiquity, or that the name of Antient Prudence dos
not belong to that Prudence which was chiefeſt in Antiquity ? True,
ſays he, it is very frequent with ſuch as have bin converſant with Greec
and Roman Authors, to be led by them into a belief that the reſt of the
World was a rude inconſiderable People, and, which is a term they very
much delight in, altogether Barbarous. This ſhould be ſom fine Gentle-
man that would have Univerſitys pull'd down; for the Office of a
Univerſity is no more than to preſerve ſo much of Antiquity as may
keep a Nation from ſtinking, or being barbarous ; which Salt grew
not in Monarchys, but in Commonwealths :
or whence has the
Chriſtian World that Religion and thoſe Laws which are now com-
mon, but from the Hebrews and Romans? or from whence have we
Arts but from theſe or the Greecs ? That we have a Doctor of Divi-
nity, or a Maſter of Arts, we may thank Popular Government; or
with what Languages, with what things are Scholars converſant that
are otherwiſe deſcended? will they fo plead their own Cauſe as to tell
us it is poſſible there ſhould be a Nation at this day in the world with-
out Univerſitys, or Univerſitys without Hebrew, Greec and Latin,
and not be Barbarous, that is to ſay, rude, unlearn'd, and inconſide-
fable? Yes, this humor even among the Greecs and Romans themſelves
was a ſervil addiction to narrow Principles, and a piece of very pedantical
Pride. What, man! the Greecs and the Romans that of all other
would not ferve, fervil! their Principles, their Learning, with whoſe
we ſet up for Batchelors, Maſters, and Doctors of fine things,
narrow! their inimitable Eloquence a piece of very pedantical Pride!
The World can never make ſenſe of this any otherwiſe than that ſince
Heads and Fellows of Colleges became the only Greecs and Romans,
the Greecs and Romans are becom ſervily addicted, of narrow Princi
ples, very Pedants, and prouder of thoſe things they do not under
ſtand, than the other were of thoſe they did : For, ſay they, in this
Queſtion, the Examples of the Babylonians, Perſians and Égyptians
(not to omit the antient and like modern Diſcoverys of the Queen of
the Amazons
, and of the King of China) cannot without groſs partiality be
neglected. This is pretty; they who ſay nothing at all to the Policy
theſe Governments, accuſe me, who have fully open'd it, of
nego
ligence. The Babylonian, Perſian, and, for ought appears to the con-
trary, the Chineſe Policy, is ſum'd up, and far excell'd by that at this
this day of Turky; and in opening this latter, I have opend them all,
ſo far from neglect, that I every where give the Turc his due, whoſe
Policy I aſſert to be the beſt of this kind, tho not of the beſt kind.
But they will bear me down, and but with one Argument, which I
you mark, that it is abſolutely of the beſt kind; for ſay they,
it is of a more abſolute form (has more of the Man and leſs of the Law
in it) than is to be met with in any Kingdom of Europe. :
ſcraps
of
beſeech
f
240
The Prerogative
Book I.
ما
I AM amaz'd! This is that kind of Goverment which to hold
Barbarous, was in the Greecs and Romans Pedantical Pride, but would
be in us who have not the ſame Temtarion of Interest, downright Folly.
The Intereſt of a People is not their Guide but their Temtation! We
that hold our Land divided among us, have not the ſame Temtation
of Intereſt tliat had the ſervil Hebreivs, Greecs, and Romans; but the
ſame that had tlie free People of Babylon, Perſia, and Egypt, where not
the People but the Prince was fole Landlord ! O the Arts in which
theſe men are Maſters! To follow the pedantical Pride of Moses,
Lycurgus, SOLON, Romulus, were with us downright
Folly; but to follow humble and learned MAHOMET or OTTO-
MAN, in whoſe only Model the Perfection of the Babylonian, Perſian,
Egyptian Policy is conſummated, is Antient Prudence ! Exquiſit Poli-
ticians ! egregious Divines, for the leading of a People into Egypt or
Babylon! Theſe things conſider'd, whether Antient Prudence, as I
have ſtated it, be downright Folly, or as they have ſtated it, be not
downright Knavery, I appeal to any Court of Claims in the world,
where the Judges, I mean, have not more in their Caps than in their
Heads, and in their Sleeves than the Scarlet. And wheras Men love
compendious works, if I gain my Cauſe, the Reader, for an anſwer
to the Oxford Book, needs look no further than this Chapter. For if
Riches and Freedom be the end of Government; and theſe Men
propoſe nothing but Slavery, Beggery, and Turciſm, what need more
words?
CH A P. II.
Whether a Commonwealth be rightly defin’d to be a Government of
Lavs and not of Men, and a Monarchy to be the Government of
ſom Man, or a feip Men, and not of Laws?
T
HAT part of the Preliminarys which the Prevaricator, as is
uſual with him, recites in this place falſly and fraudulently, is
thus: Relation had to theſe two times (that of Antient and that of
Modern Prudence) the one, as is computed by JA NOTTI, ending
with the Liberty of Rome, the other beginning with the Arms of
CESAR ( which extinguiſhing Liberty, became the Tranſlation of
Antient into Modern Prudence, introduc'd in the Ruin of the Roman
Empire by the Goths and Vandals ) GOVERNMENT (to define
it de jure, or according to Antient Prudence) is an Art wherby a civil
Society of Men is inſtituted and preſerv’d, upon the Foundation of C013-
mon Right or Intereſt; or ( to follow ARISTOTLE and Livv) it is
an Empire of Laws, and not of Men.
AND Government, to define it de facto, or according to Modern
Prudence, is an Art wherby forn Man, or ſom few Men, ſubject a City or
a Nation, and rule it according to his or their privat Intereſt; which,
becauſe Laws in ſuch caſes are made according to the Intereſt of a Man, or
ſom few Familys, may be ſaid to be an Empire of Men, and not of Laws.
HEREBY it is plain, whether in an Empire of Laws, and not of
Men, as a Commonwealth ; or in an Empire of Men, and not of
Laws, as Monarchy: Firſt, That Law muſt cqually procede from
Will,
.
of Popular Government.
24E
Will, that is either from the Will of the whole People, as in a Com-Chap. 2.
monwealth ; from the Will of one Man, as in an Abſolute, or from
the Will of a few Men, as in a Regulated Monarchy.
SECONDLY, That Will, whether of one or more; or al), is
not preſum'd to be, much lefs ro act without a Mover.
THIRDLY, That the Mover of the Will is Intereſt.
FOURTHLY, That Intereſts alfo being of one, of more, or of
all; thoſe of one Man, or of a few Men, where Laws are made ac-
cordingly, being more privat than coms duly up to the Law, the na-
ture wherof lys not in Partiality but in Juſtice, may be call’d the Em-
pire of Men, and not of Laws: And that of the whole People com-
ing up to the public Intereſt (which is no other than common Right
and Juſtice, excluding all Partiality or privat Intereſt ) may be callid
the Empire of Laws, and not of Men. By all which put together,
wheras it is demonſtrable that in this diviſion of Government I do not
ſtay at the Will, which muſt have ſom Motive or Mover, but go to
the firſt and remoteſt Notion of Government, in the Foundation and Orio
gination of it, in which lys the Credit of this Diviſion, and the Definition
of the ſeveral Members, that is to ſay, of Intereſt, wliether privat or
public, the Prevaricator tells me, That this diviſion of Government Conſid. p.
having ( he knows not how) loſt its Credit, the definitions of the ſeve-
ral Members of it need not be conſider'd further, than that they com not at
all up to the firſt and remoteft Norion af Government in the Foundation
and Origination of it, in which lys all the difficulty; and being here neg-
lected, there is little hope the ſubſequent Diſcourſe can have in it the light
of probable Satisfaition, wuch leſs the Force of infallible Demonfira
tron.
VERY good! Intereſt it ſhould fecm then is not the firſt and re-
moteft Notion of Government, but that which he will outthrow; and
at this caſt, by ſaying, that the Declaration of the Will of the Soverain Confid. P: 8:
Power is callid Law: which if it outlives the perſon whoſe Will it was, it is
only becauſe the Perſons who ſuccede in Power are prefum'd to have the
Same Will, unleſs they manifeſt the contrary, and that is the Abrogation of
the Lam; so that fill the Government is not in the Lan, but in the Per-
ſon whoſé Will gave a being to that Law, I might as well ſay, The De-
claration to all
men by theſe preſents that a man ows Mony is call'd a
Bond; which if it outlives the Perſon that enter'd into that Bond, it
is only becauſe the Perſons that ſuccede him in his Eſtate, are prefum?d
to have the ſame Will, unleſs they manifeſt the contrary, and that is
the abrogation or cancelling of the Bond ; fo that ſtill the Debt is not
in the Bond, but in his Will who gave a being to that Bond. If it be
alleg'd againſt this example, that it is a privat one, the cafe
may
put between ſeveral Princes, States, or Governments, or between fe
veral States of the ſame Principality or Government, whether it be
a
Regulated Monarchy or a Commonwealth; for in the like Obligation
of the States (as of the King, the Lords, and Commons) or Party:
agreeing, Authoritate Patrum & juffu Populi, till the Partys that fe
agreed to the Obligation, ſhall agree to repeal or cancel it, lys all Law
that is not merely in the Will of one Man, ok of one State, or Party,
as the Oligarchy. But not to diſpute tlieſe things further in this place
let the Government be what it will, for the Prevaricator to fetch the
Origination of Law no furthce than the Will (while he knows very
well that I fetch'd it from Intereſt, the Antecedent of Will) and yće
Į i
1
ho
to
i
242
The Prerogative
Book I. to boaſt that he has outthrown me, I ſay he is neither an honeſt Man,
u h
W nor a good Bowler. No matter, he will be a better Gunner ; for
where I ſaid that the Magiſtrat upon the Bench is that to the Law,
which a Gunner upon his Platform is to his Cannon, he gos about to
take better aim, and ſays, If the proportion of things be accuratly con-
fider’d, it will appear that the
laden Cannon anſwers not to the Laws, but to
the Power of the Perſon whoſe Will created thoſe Laws : Which if ſom of
them that the Power of the Perſon whoſe Will created them, in-
tended ſhould be of as good Stuff or Carriage as the reſt, do neverthe-
leſs according to the nature of their Matter or of their Charge, com
ſhort or over, and others break or recoil ; ſure this Report of the Pre-
varicator is not according to the bore of my Gun, but according to the
bore of ſuch a Gunner. Yet again, if he be not ſo good a Gunner,
he will be a better Anatomiſt: for wheras I affirm, that to ſay, ARI-
STOTLE and CICERO wrote not the Rights or Rules of their Po-
litics from the Principles of Nature, but tranſcrib'd them into their
Books out of the practice of their own Commonwealths, is as if a
man ſhould ſay of famous HARVEY, that he tranſcrib'd his Circula-
tion of the Blood, not out of the Principles of Nature, but out of the
Anatomy of this or that Body: He anſwers, that the whole force of this
Obječtion amounts but to this, that becauſe HARVE Y in his Circulation
has follow'd the Principles of Nature, therfore ARISTOTLE and Ci-
CERO have don ſo in their Diſcourſes of Government.
PRETTY! It is ſaid in Scripture, Thy Word is ſweet as Hony :
Amounts that but to this, Becauſe Hony is ſweet, therfore the Word
of God is ſweet? To ſay that my Lord Protector has not conquer'd
many Nations, were as if one ſhould ſay, that CESAR had not con-
quer'd many Nations : Amounts that but to this, that becauſe C#
SAR conquer'd many Nations, therfore my Lord Protector las con-
quer'd many Nations? What I produce as a Similitude, he calls an
Objection; where I ſay, as, he ſays, becauſe : what ingenuous man
dos not deteft ſuch a cheat! (A Similitude is brought to ſhow how a
thing is or may be, not to prove that it is ſo; it is us?d for Illuſtration,
not as an Argument: The Candle I held did not ſet up the Poſt, but
New where the Poit was ſet, and yet this blind Buzzard has run his
head againſt it. Nor has he get enough; if he be not the better Na-
turaliſt, he will be the better Divine, tho he ſhould make the worſe
Sermon. My Doctrin and Uſe upon that of SOLOMON, I have ſeen
Servants upon Horſes, and Princes walking as Servants upon the Ground,
diſcovers the true means wherby the Principles of Power and Autho-
rity, the Goods of the Mind and of Fortune, may ſo meet and twine
in the Wreath or Crown of Empire, that the Government ſtanding
upon Earth like a holy Altar, and breathing perpetual Incenſe to
Heaven in Juſtice and Piety, may be ſomthing, as it were, between
Heaven and Earth; while that only which is propos’d by the beſt,
and reſolv’d by the moſt, becoms Law; and ſo the whole Govern-
ment an Empire of Laws, and not of Men. This he ſays, is a good-
ly Sermon; it is honeſt, and ſenſe. But let any man make ſenſe or ho-
Confid. p.7. neſty of this Do&trin, which is his own; To ſay that Laps do or
. 7.
can govern, is to amuſe our ſelves with a Form of Speech, as when
we lay Time, or Age, or Death, dos ſuch a thing; to which indeed
the Phanſy of Poets, and Superſtition of Women, may adapt a Per-
ſon, and give a Power of Action : but wiſe Men know they are only Ex-
preſſions
A
of Popular Government.
243
preſſions of ſuch Actions or Qualifications as belong to Things or Chap. 3.
Perſons.
SPEAK out ; Is it the Word of God, or the Knavery and Non-
ſenſe of ſuch Preachers that ought to govern ? Are we to hearken to
that of the Talmud, There is more in the word of a Scribe, than in the
words of the Law, or that which Chriſt therupon ſays to the Phari-
ſees, You have made the Word of God of no effe&t by your Traditi- Mat. 15. 6.
ons ? Say, is the Commonwealth to be govern’d in the Word of a
Prieſt or a Phariſee, or by the Vote of the People, and the Intereſt of
Mankind ?
CH A P. III.
Whether the Balance of Dominion in Land be the natural Cauſe of
Empire ?
T
HE Doctrin of the Balance is that, tho he ſtrains at it, which
choaks the Prevaricator : for this of all others is that Principle
which makes the Politics, not ſo before the invention of the ſame, to
be undeniable throout, and (not to meddle with the Mathematics, an
Art I underſtand as little as Mathematicians do this the moſt' de-
monſtrable of any whatſoever.
FOR this cauſe I ſhall rather take pleaſure than pains to look back,
or tread the fame path with other, and perhaps plainer ſteps: as thus ;
If a man having one hundred pounds a year may keep one Servant,
or have one man at his command, then having one hundred times ſó
much, he may keep one hundred Servants; and this multiply'd by a
thouſand, he may have one hundred thouſand men at his command.
Now that the ſingle Perſon, or Nobility of any Country in Europe,
that had but half ſo many men at command, would be King or
Prince, is that which I think no man will doubt. But * no Mony, no
Switzers, as the French ſpeak: If the Mony be flown, ſo are the Men
alſo. Tho Riches in general have Wings, and be apt to bate; yet
thoſe in Land are the moſt hooded, and ty'd to the Perch, wheras
thoſe in Mony have the leaſt hold, and are the ſwifteſt of fight.
A Bank where the Mony takes not wing, but to com home ſeiza,
or like a Coyduck, may well be great; bụt the Treaſure of the
going cut, and not upon returns, makes no Bank, Whence
a Bank never paid an Army; or paying an Army, ſoon became
no Bank. But where a Prince or a Nobility has an Eſtate in Land,
the Revenue wherof will defray this Charge, there their Men are
planted, have Toes that are Roots, and Arms that bring forth what
THUS a ſingle Perſon is made, or a Nobility makes a King, not
with difficulty, or any great prudence, but with eaſe, the reſt coming
home, as the Ox that not only knows his Maſter's Crib, but muſt ſtarve
or repair to it, Nor for the ſame reaſon is Government acquir'd with
more eaſe than it is preſervd; that is, if the Foundation of Property
Indys
Fruit
you pleaſe.
i
* Poinç de Argent, poiar de Suiſſe.
Ii 2
be
The Prerogative
244
Book I. be in Land: but if in Mony, lightly com, lightly go. The reaſon
why a ſingle Perſon, or the Nobility that has one hundred thouſand
men, or half ſo many at command, will have the Government, is
that the Eſtate in Land, wherby they are able to maintain ſo many, in
any European Territory, muſt overbalance the reſt that remains to the
People, at leaſt three parts in four, by which means they are no more
able to diſpute the Government with him or them, than your Servant
is with you. Now for the ſame reaſon, if the People hold three
parts in four of the Territory, it is plain there can neither be any
ſingle Perſon nor Nobility able to diſpute the Government with
them ; in this caſe therfore, except Force be interpos’d, they govern
themſelves. So by this computation of the Balance of Property or
Dominion in Land, you have according to the threefold Foundation of
Property, the Root or Generation of the threefold kind of Govern-
ment or Empire.
I F one man be fole Landlord of a Territory, or overbalance the
Oceana, p. 39.
whole People, three parts in four, or therabouts, he is Grand Signior;
for fo the Turc, not from bis Empire, but his Property is calld; and
the Empire in this caſe is abſolute Monarchy.
If the Few, or a Nobility, or a Nobility with a Clergy, be Land-
lords to ſuch a proportion as overbalances the People in the like man-
ner, they may make whom they pleaſe King; or if they be not pleas'd
with their King, down with him, and ſet up whom they like better ;
a HENRY the Fourth, or the Seventh, a Guise, a MONT FOR T, 2
NEVIL, or a PORTER, ſhould they find that beſt for their own
ends and purpoſes : For as not the Balance of the King, but that of
the Nobility in this caſe is the cauſe of the Government, ſo not the
Eſtate or Riches of the Prince or Captain, but his Virtue or Ability, or
fitneſs for the ends of the Nobility, acquires that Command or Office.
This for Ariſtocracy, or mix'd Monarchy. But if the whole People
be Landlords, or hold the Land fo divided among them, that no one
man or number of men within the compaſs of the Few, or Ariſtocra-
cy
overbalance them, it is a Coinmonwealth. Such is the Branch in
the Root, or the Balance of Property naturally producing Empire ;
which not confuted, no man ſhall be able to batter my Superſtructures,
and which confuted, I lay down my Arms. Till then, if the cauſe
neceſſarily precede the effect, Property muſt have a being before Em-
pire, or beginning with it, muſt be ſtill firſt in order.
PROPERTY coms to have a being before Empire or Govern-
ment two ways, either by a natural or violent Revolution. Natural
Revolution happens from within, or by Commerce, as when a Go-
vernment erected upon one Balance, that for example of a Nobility
or a Clergy, thro the decay of their Eſtates coms to alter to another
Balance; which alteration in the Root of Property, leaves all to con-
fuſion, or produces a new Branch or Government, according to the
kind or nature of the Roct. Violent Revolution happens from with-
out, or by Arms, as when upon Conqueſt there follows Confiſcation.
Confiſcation again is of three kinds, when the Captain taking all to
himſelf
, plants his Army by way of military Colonys, Benefices, or
Timars, which was the Policy of MAHOMET; or when the Cap-
tain has fom Sharers, or a Nobility that divides with him, which was
the Policy introduc'd by the Goths and Vandals; or when the Captain
divides the Inheritance by Lots, or otherwiſe, to the whole People;
which
4
of Popular Government.
245
1
have regarded ſuch a Lor in compariſon of his Mony; and he that
which Policy was inſtituted by God or Moses in the Common: Chap
wealth of Iſrael. This triple diſtribution, whether from natural or
violent Revolution, returns as to the generation of Empire to the
ſame thing that is' to the nature of the Balance already ſtated and
demonſtrated. Now let us fee what the Prevaricator will ſay, which
firſt is this.
THE Aſſertion, that Property producing Empire conſiſts only in Land, Confid. p.14.
appears too poſitive. A Pig of my own Sow; this is no more than Í
told him, only there is more imply'd in what I told him, than he will
ſee; which therfore I ſhall now further explain. The balance in Mony
may be as good or better than that of Land in three caſes. Firſt,
where there is no Property of Land yet introduc'd, as in Greece during
the time of her antient Imbecillity; whence, as is noted by Thu-
CYDIDES, the meaner fort thro a deſire of Gain underwent the Servi.
tude of the Mighty
. Secondly, in Citys of ſmall Territory and great
Trade, as Holland and Geron, the Land not being able to feed the Peo-
ple, who muſt live upon Traffic, is overbalanc'd by the means of that
Traffic, which is Móny. Thirdly, in a narrow Country, where the
Lots are at a low ſcantling, as among the Iſraelits, if care be not had
of Mony in the regulation of the fame, it will cat out the balance of
Land. For which cauſe tho an Iſraelit might both have Mony, and
put it to Uſury (Thou ſhalt lend [upon uſury] to many Nations) yet Deut. is: 6.
might he not lend it upon uſury to a Citizen or Brother: whence two & 23. 19.
things are manifeft: Firſt, that Uſury in it ſelf is not unlawful: And
next, that Uſury in Iſrael was no otherwiſe forbidden, than as it might
com to overthrow the Balance or Foundation of the Government : for
where a Lot as to the general amounted not perhaps to four Acres, a
man that ſhould have had a thouſand Pounds in his Purſe, would not
ſhould have bin half ſo much in debt, would have bin quite eaten out.
Uſury is of ſuch a nature, as, not forbidden in the like caſes, muſt de
vour the Government. The Roman People, while their Territory
was no bigger, and their Lots, which exceded not two Acres a man,
were yet fcantier, were flead alive with it; and if they had not help’d
themſelves by their Tumults, and the Inſtitution of their Tribuns, it
had totally ruin'd both them and their Government. In a Common-
wealth, whoſe Territory is very ſmall, the Balance of the Government
being laid upon the Land, as in Lacedemon it will not be ſufficient to forbid
Uſury, but Mony it ſelf muſt be forbidden. Whence Lycurgus al-
lowd of none, or of ſuch only as being of old, or otherwiſe uſeleſs Iron,
was little better, or, if you will, little worſe than none. The Pru
dence of which Law appeard in the neglect of it, as when LYSAN-
DER, General for the Lacedemonians in the Peloponneſian War, hava
ing, taken Athens, and brought home the ſpoil of it, occaſion’d the
Ruin of that Commonwealth in her Victory. The Land of Canaan
compard with Spain or England, was at the moſt but a Torkſhire, and
Laconia was leſs than Canaan. Now if we imagin Yorkſhire divided,
as was Canaan, into fix hundred thouſand Lots, or as was Laconia,
into thirty thouſand ; a Yorkſhire man having one thouſand Pounds in
his Purſe, would, i believe, have a better Eftate in Mony than in
Land; wherfore in this caſe, to make the Land hold the Balance,
there is no way but either that of Iſrael by forbidding Uſury, or that
of Lacedemon by forbidding Mony: Where a ſmall Šum may com to
over
:
246
The Prerogative
Book I. overbalance a man's Eſtate in Land, there I ſay Uſury or Mony for
the preſervation of the Balance in Land, muſt of neceſſity be forbid.
den, or the Government will rather reſt upon the Balance of Mony, than
upon that of Land, as in Holland and Genoa. But in a Territory of ſuch
extent as Spain, or England, the Land being not to be overbalanc'd by
Mony, there needs no forbidding of Mony or Uſury. In Lacedemon
Merchandize was forbidden, in Iſrael and Rome it was not exercis'd ;
wherfore to theſe Uſury muſt have bin the more deſtructive: but in
a Country where Merchandize is exercis’d, it is ſo far from being de-
ſtructive, that it is neceſſary; elſe that which might be of profit to
the Commonwealth would ruſt unprofitably in privat purſes, there
being no man that will venture his Mony but thro hope of fom Gain ;
which if it be fo regulated that the Borrower may gain more hy it
than the Lender, as at four in the hundred, or therabouts, Uſury becoms
a mighty Profit to the Public, and a Charity to privat Men; in which
ſenſe we may not be perſuaded by them that do not obſerve theſe
different cauſes, that it is againſt Scripture. Had uſury to a Brother
bin permitted in Iſrael, that Government had bin overthrown: but
that ſuch a Territory as England or Spain cannot be overbalancd by
Mony, whether it be a ſcarce or a plentiful Commodity, whether it
be accumulated by Parſimony, as in the purſe of HENRY the 7th,
or preſented by Fortune, as in the Revenue of the Indys, is ſufficiently
demonftrated, or ſhall be.
FIRST, by an Argument ad hominem, one good enough for the
Confid. D. 12. Prevaricator, who argues thus; The Wiſdom or the Riches of another man
can never give him a Title to my Obedience, nor oblige Mr. HARRING-
TON to give his Clothes or Mony to the next man he meets, wiſer or richer
than himſelf.
If he had ſaid ſtronger, he had ſpoil'd all; for the parting with a
mans Clothes or Mony in that caſe, cannot be help'd : now the richer,
as to the caſe in debate, is the stronger, that is, the advantage of
Strength remains to the Balance. But well ; he preſumes me to have
Clothes and Mony of my own, let him put the ſame caſe in the Peo-
ple, or the fimilitude dos not hold. But if the People have Clothes
and Mony of their own, theſe muſt either riſe (for the bulk) out of
Property in Land, or at leaſt out of the cultivation of the Land, or
the Revenue of Induſtry; which if it be dependent, they muſt give
ſuch a part of their Clothes and Mony to preſerve that dependence
out of which the reſt ariſes to him or them on whom they depend, as
he or they ſhall think fit, or parting with nothing to this end, muſt
loſe all; that is, if they be Tenants, they muſt pay their Rent, or turn
So if they liave Clothes and Mony, dependently, the Balance of
Land is in the Landlord or Landlords of the People: but if they have
Clothes and Mony independently, then the Balance of Land muſt of
neceſſity be in the People themſelves, in which caſe they neither would,
if there were any ſuch, nor can, becauſe there be no ſuch, give their
Mony or Clothes to ſuch as are wiſer, or richer, or ſtronger than them-
felves. So it is not a mans Clothes and Mony or Riches
, that oblige
him to acknowlege the Title of bis Obedience to him that is wiſer
or richer, but a man's no Clothes or Mony, or his Poverty, with which,
if the Prevaricator ſhould com to want, he could not ſo finely pre-
varicat but le muſt ſerve ſom body, ſo he were rich, no matter if
leſs wiſe than himſelf. Wherfore ſeeing the People cannot be ſaid to
out.
1
Com
have
of Popular Government.
247
have Clothes and Mony of their own without the balance in Land, Chap. 3.
and having the balance in Land, will never give their Clothes, or
Mony, or Obedience to a ſingle Perſon, or a Nobility, tho theſe
ſhould be the richer in Mony; the Prevaricator by his own Argument
has evinc'd that in ſuch a Territory as England or Spain, Mony can
never com to overbalance Land.
FOR a ſecond Demonſtration of this Truth, HENRY the Se-
venth, tho he miſs'd of the Indys, in which for my part I think him
happy, was the richeſt in Mony of Engliſh
) Princes. Nevertheleſs this
acceſſion of Revenue did not at all preponderat on the King's part,
nor change the balance. But while making Farms of a Standard he
increas’d the Yeomanry, and cutting off Retainers he abasd the No-
bility, began that Breach in the balance of Land, which proceding
has ruin’d the Nobility, and in them that Government.
FOR a third, the Monarchy of Spain, ſince the Silver of Potoſi
faild up the Guadalquivir, which in Engliſh is, ſince that King had the
Indys, ſtands upon the ſame balance in the Lands of the Nobility on
which it always ſtood.
AND ſo the learned Concluſion of the Prevaricator (That it is conſid. p. 16;
not to be doubted but a Revenue ſufficient to maintain a Force able [to cry
ware horns) or beat down all oppoſition, dos equally conduce to Empire,
whether it ariſes from Rents, Lands, Profits of ready Mony, Dutys,
Cuſtoms, &c.) asks you no more than where you ſaw her Premiſes.
For unleſs they aſcended his Monti, and his Banks, it is not to be
imagin’d which way they went; and with theſe, becauſe he is a pro-
feſt Zealot for Monarchy, I would wiſh him by no means to be mon-
tebanking or meddling : for the purſe of a Prince never yet made
a Bank, nor, till ſpending and trading Mony be all one, ever ſhall.
The Genoeſe, which the King of Spain could never do with the Indys,
can make you a Bank out of Letters of Exchange, and the Hollander
with Herrings. Let him com no more here; where there is a Bank,
ten to one there is a Commonwealth. A King is a Soldier, or a Lover,
neither of which makes a good Mercliant ; and without Merchandize
you will have a lean Bank. It is true, the Family of the MEDICI
were both Merchants, and made a Bank into a Throne : but it was in
Commonwealth of Merchants, in a ſmall Territory, by great purchaſes
in Land, and rather in a mere confuſion than under any ſettld Go-
vernment; which Cauſes, if he can give them all ſuch another meet-
ing, may do as much for another man. Otherwiſe let it be
agreed
and reſolv’d, that in a Territory of any extent, the balance of Empire
conſiſts in Land, and not in Mony; always provided that in caſe a
Prince has occaſion to run away, as HENRY the Third of France
did out of Poland, bis Balance in ready Mony is abſolutely the moſt proper
for
the carrying on of ſo great and ſudden an Enterprize.
IT is an excellent way of diſputing, when a man has aileg'd no
experience, no example, no reaſon, to conclude with no doubt. Cera
tainly upon ſuch occaſions it is not unlawful nor unreaſonable to be mer-
ry. Reaſons, ſays one Comedian, are not ſo common as Blackberrys.
For all tſat, ſays another Comedian, no doubt but a Revenue in Taxes
is as good as a Revenue in Feeſimple ; for this, in brief, is the ſenſe of
his former particular, or that part of it, which, the Monti and the
Banks being already diſcharg'd, remains to be anſwerd. Yet that
the Rents and Profits of a man's Land in Feeſimple or Property, com
an
7
in
248
The Prerogative
Book I. in naturally and caſily, by common conſent or concernment, that is
I by virtue of the Law founded upon the public Intereſt, and therfore
voluntarily cftabliſh'd by the whole People, is an apparent thing. So
a man that will receive the Rents and Profits of other mens Land,
muſt either take them by mere force, or bring the People to make a
Law deveſtiog themſelves of ſo much of their Property, which upon
the matter is all one, becauſe a People poſſeft of the Balance, cannot
be brought to make ſuch a Law, further than they fee neceſſary for
their common defence, but by force, nor to keep it any longer than
tliat Force continues. It is true, there is not only ſuch a thing in nan
ture as health, but ſickneſs too: nor do I deny that there is ſuch a
thing as a Government againſt the Balance. Buc look about, ſeeks, find
where it ſtood, how it was nam’d, how lik’d, or how long it laſted,
Otherwiſe the comical Propolition coms to this, It is not to be doubted
but that Violence may be permanent or durable, and the Blackberry, for it
is becauſe Nature is perinanent or durable! What other conſtruction
can be made of theſe words? It is not to be doubted but a Revenue (uffi-
cient to maintain a Force able to beat down all oppoſition (that is, a Force
able to raiſe ſuch a Revenue) das equally (on which word
grows the
Blackberry) conduce to Empire; that is, as much as could any natural
Balance of the ſame! He may ſtain mouths, as he has don ſom, but
Tie ſhall never make a Politician. The Earth yields her natural increaſe
without loſing her lieart; but if you com once to force her, look
your Force contine, or ſhe yields you nothing: and the balance of
Empire conſiſting of Earth, is of the nature of lier Element.
DIVINES are given to ſpeak much of things which the Confi-
derer balks in this place that would check them, to the end he inay
fly out with them in others, wherto they do not belong, as where lie
Conſid. p. 23. fáys, that Government is founded either upon Paternity, and the natural
Advantage the firſt Father bad over all the reſt of Mankind, who
Sons; or elſe from the increaſe of Strength and Power in ſom Man or Men,
to whoſe Will the reſt (ubmit, that by their ſubmiſſion they may avoid fuchs
miſchief, as otherwiſe would be brought upon them. Which two Vagary's
are to be fetch'd home to this place.
FOR the former; If ADAM had liv'd till now, lie could have ſeen
no other than his own Children; and ſo that he muſt have bin King by
the right of Nature, was his peculiar Prerogative. But whether the
eldeſt Son of his Houſe, if the Prevaricator can find him at this time
of day, has the ſame right, is ſomwhat diſputable; becauſe it was
early when ABRAHAM and Lot dividing Territorys, became ſe-
veral Kings: and not long after when the Sons of JACOB being all
Patriarchis, by the appointment of God, whoſe Right ſure was not
inferior to that of ADAM, tho he had liv’d, came under Popular Go-
vernment. Wherfore the advantage of the firſt Father is for
grave
men a pleaſant fancy; nevertheleſs if he had liv'd till now, I hope
they underſtand that the whole Earth would have bin his Demeans,
and ſo the Balance of his Property muſt have anſwer'd to his Empire, as
did that alſo of ABRAHAM and Lot to theirs. Wherfore this way
of Deduction coms directly home again to the Balance. Paterfamilias
De jure belli, Latifundia poſſidens, & neminem alià lege in fuas terras recipiens quam
ut ditioni fue, qui recipiuntur, ſe ſubjiciant, eſt Rex, ſays GROTIUS,
Fathers of Familys are of three forts, either a ſole Landlord, as
ADAM, and then he is an abſolute Monarch; or a few Landlords,
Il'ere
his
1. i. 6.3
as
.
249
of Popular Government:
Mr. HOBBS, or any other Politician. Which is as if he had told
as Lot and ABRAHAM, with the Patriarchs of thoſe days; who if Chap. 3:
they join'd not together, were ſo many. Princes; or if they join'd,
made a mix'd Monarchy; or, as GROTíus believes, a kind of Com-
monwealth adminiſter'd in the Land of Canaan by MELCHISE DE C;
to whom as King and Prieſt ABRAHAM paid Tithes of all that he
had. Such a Magiſtracy was that alſo of JETHRO, King and Prieſt
in the Commonwealth of Midian. Fathers of Familys for the third
ſort, as when the Multitude are Landlords (which happen'd in the di-
viſion of the Land of Canaan) make a Commonwealth. And thus
much, however it was out of the Prevaricator's head in the place now
deduc'd, he, excepting no further againſt the Balance than that it might
conſiſt as well in Mony. as in Land, had confelt before.
HIS ſecond Vagary is in his deduction of Empire from increaſe of
Strength, for which we muſt once more round about our Coalfire. The
ſtrength wherby this effect can be expected, conſiſts not in a pair of
Fiſts, but in an Army; and an Army is a Beaſt with a great Belly,
which ſubſiſts not without very large paſtures: ſo if one man has
fufficient paſture, he may feed ſuch a Beaſt; if a few have the paſture,
they muſt feed the Beaſt, and the Beaſt is theirs that feed it. But if
the People be the Sheep of their own paſtures, they are not only a
flock of Sheep, but an Army of Lions, tho by ſom accidents, as I
confeſt before, they be for a ſeaſon confinable to their dens. So the
advantage or increaſe of Strength depends alſo upon the Balance:
There is nothing in the world to ſwear this Principle out of counte-
tenance,
but the fame of PHALARIS, GELON, DIONYSIUS,
AGATHOCLES, NABIS, &c. with which much good do them
that like it. It is proper to a Government upon the Balance to take
root at home, and ſpread outwards; and to a Government againſt the
Balance to ſeek a root abroad, and to ſpread inwards. The former is
ſure, but the latter never ſucceſsful." AGATHOCLES for having
conquer'd Africa, took not the better root in Syracuſa. Parvi ſunt
arma foras, niſi ſit conſilium domi.
To conclude this Chapter ; the Prevaricator gives me this thanks for
finding out the Balance of Dominion (being as antient in Nature as her
ſelf, and yet as new in Art as my Writing) that I have given the world
cauſe to complain of a great diſappointment, who, while at my hand that
Satisfaction in the Principles of Government was expected, which ſeveral
great Wits had in vain ſtudy’d, have in diverſifying "Riches in words only
,
as Property, Dominion, Agrarian, Balance, made up no more than a nem
Lexicon, expreſſing the ſame thing that was known before; ſeeing the opi-
nion that Riches are power is (as antient as the firſt Book of Thu-
CYDIDES, or the Politics of ARISTOTLE, and) not omitted by
Dr. HARVEY, that wheras the Blood is the Life was an Opinion as
antient as Moses, and no Girl ever prick'd her finger, but knew it
muſt have a courſe; he had given the world cauſe to complain of great
diſappointment in not ſhewing a Man to be made of Gingerbread, and
his Veins to run Malmfy.
!
1
:
1
*
Kk
CHAPA
1
4
14.
250
The Prerogative
Book I.
CHA P. IV.
*
37.
Whether the Balance of Empire be well divided into National and
Provincial; And whether theſe tiro, or any Nations that are of
diftin&t Balance, coming to depend upon one and the ſame Head,
Such a mixture creates a new Balance.
He Balance of Empire that is National, as it is ſtated in the
TI
former Chapter, ſtandsin a regulated or mix'd Monarchy upon
the Property or native Intereſt of the Nobility ; in a Commonwealth,
upon
the Property or native Intereſt of the People; ſo theſe are very
natural. But the Balance of abſolute Monarchy, partaking of Force
as well as Nature, is a mix'd thing, and not much different from the
Balance of Provincial Empire, or the manner of holding a Province
or conquer'd Country. In a Province, if the Native that is rich be
admitted to Power, the Power grows up native, and overtops the
foren: therfore you muſt either not plant your Citizens in your Pro-
vinces, where in time they will becom native ; or, ſo planting them,
neither truſt them with Power nor with Arms. Thus the provincial
Balance coms to be contrary to the National. And as where Empire
is native or national, the adminiſtration of it can be no otherwiſe than
according to the national Balance; ſo where Empire is foren or
provincial, the adminiſtration of it can be no otherwiſe than con-
trary to the national Balance. That this may be admitted without
oppoſition the Conſiderer is inclining to allow, always provided he be
Confid. p. 16, fatisfy'd in this demand, Whether diſtinct Balances under the Same Head or
Governor, as thoſe of Caſtile and Arragon, the Power of the King (I
preſume he means by the Balance of a Nobility) being greater in the
one, and that of the People in the other, may not jo poiſe one the other, as
to produce a new Balance. To which I anſwer, That no one Govern-
ment whatſoever has any more than one of two Balances; that, ex-
cept in the caſes excepted, of Land which is national, or that of arms
which is provincial. Wherfore if the King of Spain by his War a-
gainſt the Commons alter'd the Balance of Arragon, it muſt have bin
one of two ways, either by ſtrengthining the Balance of the Nobility,
and governing the Arragonian People by them, in which caſe their
Balance, tho alter'd, remain'd yet National ; or by holding both No-
bility and People by a provincial Governor and an Army, in which
caſe his Empire in that Kingdom is provincial. There is no third way;
nor, putting the caſe that the Balance of Caſtile be national, and that
of Arragon provincial, dos this any more create in the Monarchy of
Spain a third Balance of Empire, than did the multiplication of Aſſoci-
ations and Provinces, divers for their Balances, in the Commonwealth
of Rome. England and Scotland being united in one Prince, made,
if it had bin rightly us’d, an increaſe of Strength, but not a third
Balance ; nor do the Kingdoms in Spain. Whether a Soverainty has
many Territorys and Provinces in ſubjection, or in League, it is all one
as to this point ; the ſtronger Union or League will give the ſtronger
Balance : and the caſe of the preſent Soveraintys in Europe being no
other, the more nice than wife Speculation of the Conſiderer, who has
nor bin able to diſcern the Balance of a League from that of Empire, is
a Mares neſt.
C H A P:
-4
:
of Popular Government.
251
1214
Chap:
5
CHA P. V.
20.
Whether there be any common Right or Intereſt of Mankind diſtinct
from the parts taken ſeverally; and how by the Orders of a Com-
monwealth it may beſt be diſtinguiſh'd from privat Intereſt.
IN
N the next place the Prevaricator dos not go about to play the man,
but the unlucky boy. Where I ſay that the Soul of Man is Miſtreſs
of two potent Rivals
, Reaſon and Paffion; he dos not ſtand to weigh
the truth of the thing, or the fitneſs of the compariſon, either of
which had bin fair ; but tumbles Dick upon Sis, the Logic upon the
Rhetoric, the Senſe upon the Figure, and ſcuds away in this manner :
If I could be perſwaded Mr. HARRINGTON was ſo far in earneſt, as Confid.p. 191
to expect any man ſhould be convinc'd by the metaphorical uſe of two or
three
words, ſom farther conſideration might be propos’d. This is to uſe his
Readers as the Fox dos the Dogs, when having piſt upon his Tail, and
fapt it in their Eys, he gets away. Dos not his Book deſerve to be
gilded and carry'd in Stateſmens Pockets ? Alas! mine are nothing ?
Quis leget hæc? vel duo vel nemo : they break the Stationer. And yet
let me comfort my ſelf, Whoſe are better? the Prevaricator ſeems to
ſet every whit as light by thoſe of HOOKER and GROTIUS, at
leaſt where they favor me. The Opinions of GROTIUS, ſays he, cand
not oblige us beyond the Reaſons wheron they are founded ; and what are
thoſe ? he will diſpute againſt that which he dares not repeat : that his
Comment may take you by the Noſe, he has left out the Text. The
words of Grotius are of this ſenſe: Tho it be truly ſaid that the In Proleg.de
Creatures are naturally carry'd to their proper Utility, this ought not to be jure B. uc Po
taken in too general á fenfe, ſeeing divers of them abſtain from their own
Profit
, either in regard of thoſe of the same kind,' or at leaſt of their
Young. Which words, ſays the Prevaricator, carry a great reſtriction
in them, and the way of producing A&tions in Beaſts is ſo different from
the emanation of human Reaſon (mark the Impoſtor! the Author is
ſpeaking of natural Affection, and he wipes out that, and puts in
human Reaſon) that the Inferences from (the natural Affe&tion of the
one, to the (degree of Reaſon which is in the other, muſt needs bé
very
weak. Excellent! dos it therfore follow that the eminent degree of
Reaſon, wherewithal God has indu'd Man, muſt in him deface that
natural' Affection, and deſertion in fom caſes of privat for common
good, which is apparent even in Beaſts? What do reverend Divines
mean to cry up this Infidel? Nay, is not be worſe than an Infidel that
provides not for his own Family? A Commonwealth is but a great Fa-
mily; and á Family is a little Commonwealth. Even Beaſts, in
ſparing out of their own mouths, and expoſing themſelves to danger
for their young, provide for their Familys; and in providing for their
Familys, provide for their whole Commonwealth ; that is, forfake in
fom things their privat good and ſafety, for the good of the public, or
of the kind. In this caſe it is that even Stones or heavy things, ſays Book in
HOOKER, forſake their ordinary wont or center, and fly upwards to
relieve the diſtreſs of Nature in common. Wretch that he is, ſhall a
Stone upon this occaſion fly upwards, and will he have a Man to go
Kk 2
down
252
The Prerogative
1
Book I. downwards! Yes, Mr. HOOKER's Expreſſion, ſays he, is altogether
figurative; and it is eaſier to prove from thence that things wanting Senſe
make Diſcourſes
, and act by Election, than that there is ſuch a thing as a
common Interest of Mankind. This is like the reſt, HOOKER ipeaks
of the neceſſity that is in Nature, and this Gentleman tranſlates that
Senſe into the word Election. So becauſe a Stone is neceſſitated to
comply with the common intereſt of Nature, without Diſcourſe or
Election; therfore it rather follows from hence, that things wanting
Senſe make Diſcourſes, and act by Election, than that there is ſuch a thing
as a common Intereſt of Mankind. His old Trick. I do not ſay, that
becauſe it is ſo with the other Creatures, therfore it muſt be ſo with
Man: but as we ſee it is with the Creatures in this
part,
ſo we find
it to be with Man. And that ſo, and more than ſo, we find it to be
with Man (who tho he be evil, gives good things to his Children, will
tvork hard, lay up, deny himſelf, venture his Life for his little Com-
monwealth) is thus further demonſtrated. All civil Laws acknow-
lege that there is a common Intereſt of Mankind, and all civil Laws
procede from the Nature of Man; therfore it is in the Nature of Man
to acknowlege that there is a common Intereſt of Mankind. Upon this
acknowlegement of Mankind, a Man that ſteals is put to death, which
certainly is none of his privat Intereſt; nor is a man put to death for
any other Man's privat Intereſt: therfore there is a common Intereſt
of Mankind diſtinct from the parts taken ſeverally. But this, tho
acknowlegd in part by all Governments, yet thro their natural frailty
is nothing
ſo well provided for in fom as in others : for if the Power
be in one or a few Men, one or a few Men, we know, may be
Thieves, and the rather, becauſe applying Mony that is public, with-
out a conſideration that is public, to uſes that are privat, is thieving.
But ſuch Thieves will not be hang’d; in this caſe therfore the Govern-
ment gos not upon public but privat Intereſt. In the frame of ſuch a
Government as can go upon no other than the public Intereſt, confifts
that whole Philoſophy of the Soul which concerns Policy: and this whole
Philoſophy of the Soul being throout the Commonwealth of Oceana
demonſtrated; for the Prevaricator to inſinuat that I have omitted it,
is to ſhew what it is that he loves more than Truth. The main of
this Philoſophy conſiſts in depoſing Paſſion, and advancing Reaſon to
the Throne of Empire. I expected news in this place, that this were
to promiſe more for the Magiſtrat or the People than has bin per-
form’d by the Stoics; but two Girls, meaning no body any harm, have
provok’d his Wrath, forſooth, to ſuch extravagancy by the way, that
cho in all. modeſty it were forbid, as he confeſſes, by their cheeks,
which diſcovering the Green-ſickneſs, ſhew'd that they were paſt the
rod, he has taken them up! Tantæne animis cæleftibus iræ! What he
may have in School-Divinity for ſo rude a charge, I do not know;
but' he ſhall never be able to ſhew any Maxim for this kind of Diſci-
plin or Philoſophy of the Soul, either in Chevalry or the Politics. The
offence of the Girls was no more, than that having a Cake (by the
gift of an Uncle or Aunt, or by purchaſe, or ſuch a one perhaps as
was of their own making) in common, or between them, the one
had moſt accuratly divided, and the other was about to chuſe; when
Confid. p. 22, in coms this rude fellow: How now Gentlewomen, ſays he, What, dividing,
23. and chufing! Will no leſs ferve your turn than the whole Myſtery of a well-orderd
Commonwealth? Who has taught you to caſt away Paſſion, an't pleaſe you,
+
*
like
of Popular Government.
253
like the Bran, and work up Reaſon as pure as the Flower of your Cake? Chap. 5.
Are you acquainted with the Author of Oceana, that has ſeen foren
Countrys, convers’d with the Speculativi, learn’d of the moſt ſerene Lady
VENETIA to work with Bobbins, makes you a Magiſtracy like a Pippin
Py, and ſells Butterprints with S.P. Q. R.? Have don, as you dread
Ballads, fuſty Pamphlets, or the Oſtraciſm of Billingſgate. Have don, I
Say; will you vy that green in your Cheeks with the purple of the State ?
muſt your Mother, who was never there her ſelf, ſeek you in the Oven?
Com, when I live to ſee MACCHIAVEL in pufpaſte, a Commonwealth
com
out of a Bakehouſe, where Smocks were the Boulters, let me be a Mil-
horſe. But now you muſt know coms the beſt ſeſt of all, and I
need not ſay that it coms from Oxford; he tells them that their Cake is
Dow (let it not be loſt I beſeech you) and ſo ſnatching it away, eats
it, for all the world as Jackpudding eats the Cuſtard. Did you ever
ſee ſuch a Beſtia ?
BUT wheras either office, that of dividing or chuſing, was com-
municable to either of the Girls, it is not indifferent in the diſtribution
of a Commonwealth, becauſe dividing is ſeparating one thing, one
reaſon, one intereſt, or conſideration from another, which they that
can ſo diſcern in privat affairs are call'd diſcrete, but they that can do it
in public are prudent; and the way of this kind of dividing in the
language of a Commonweath is Debating. But they that are capa-
ble of this kind of dividing or debating are few among many, that
when things are thus divided and debated, are able enough to chuſe,
which in the language of a Commonwealth is to reſolve. Hence it
is that the Debate of the Few, becauſe there be but few that can de-
bate, is the wiſeft Debate; and the Reſult of the Many (becauſe
every man has an Intereſt what to chuſe, and that choice which ſutes
with every man's Intereſt, excludes the diſtinct or privat Intereſt or
Paſſion of any man, and ſo coms up to the common and public Inte-
reſt or Reaſon) is the wiſeſt Reſult. To this end, God, who dos no-
thing in vain, has fo divided Mankind into the Few or the natural
Ariſtocracy, and the Many or the natural Democracy, that there can
hardly be upon any occaſion a meeting of twenty men, wherin it
will not be apparent, or in which you may not ſee all thoſe Lines
which are requiſit to the face of a beautiful Commonwealth. For
example, among any twenty men, occaſionally met, there will be
ſom few, perhaps fíx, excelling the fourteen in greatneſs of Parts.
Theſe fix falling into diſcourſe of buſineſs, or giving their judgment
upon Perſons or Things, tho but by way of mere Converſation, will
diſcover their Abilitys; wherupon they ſhall be liſten’d to and re-
garded by the Fourteen ; that is, the Six will acquire an Authority
with, and imprint a Reverence upon the Fourteen : which Action and
Paſſion in the Roman Commonwealth were calld Authorit as Patrum,
& Verecundia Plebis. Nevertheleſs if the Six indeavor to extend the
Authority, which they find thus acquir’d, to Power, that is, to bring
the Fourteen to terms or conditions of Obedience, or ſuch as would be
advantageous to the Few, but prejudicial to the Many; the Fourteen
will ſoon find, that conſenting, they hurt not only themſelves by in-
damaging their own Intereſts, but hurt the Six alſo who by this means
com to loſe their Virtue, and ſo ſpoil their Debate, which, while ſuch
advantages are procurable to themſelves, will go no further upon the
common Good, but their privat Benefit. Wherfore in this caſe they
will
254
The Prerogative
ما
Book I. will not confent, and not conſenting, they preferve not only their own
Liberty, but the integrity of the Six alſo, who perceiving that they
cannot impair the common Intereſt, have no other intereſt left but to
improve it. And neither any Converſation, nor any People, how dull
ſoever and ſubject by fits to be deluded, but will ſoon ſee thus much,
which is enough, becauſe what is thus propos’d by the Authority of
the Six or of the Senat, and reſolv'd by the Fourteen, or by the Peo-
ple, is enacted by the whole, and becoms that Law, than which,
tho Mankind be not infallible, there can be nothing leſs fallible in Man-
kind. Art is the imitation of Nature; by obſervation of ſuch Lines
as theſe in the face of Nature, a Politician limns his Commonwealth.
Conſid. p. 26. But ſays the Prevaricator, the Paralogiſm lys in this, that the twenty
men are firſt ſuppos’d to be a Commonwealth, and then it is conſider'd home
they would diſpoſe of the Government. What is this? Art is the imitati-
on of Nature; therfore Art preſumes Nature to be Art. A Pi&ture is
the repreſentation of a Face; therfore the Picturedrawer preſum'd
the Face to be a Piature; and in this ſame, there is lying, heing, or
ſquatting, a thing calld a Paralogiſm. Did you ever hear ſuch a Pa-
raketiſm? for to ſpeak a word without underſtanding the ſenſe of it,
is like a Parrat. And yet I wrong the Parrat in this compariſon; for
ſhe, tho ſhe do not underſtand her felf, is underſtood by others,
wheras neither can this Prevaricator tell what lie means, nor any man
Conſid. p. 27. elſe. Or riddle me, riddle me what is this? The ſenſe of want among
men that are in equality of Power may beget a deſire of exchange ; as let
me have your Horſe, and you ſhall have my Con, which is the fountain of
privat Contracts : but it is not to be with reaſon imagin’d, that this ſhould
be enough to make a man part with a natural Freedom, and put himſelf into
the hands of a Power from which he can afterwards have no ſhield, tho it
fhonld be us’d to his own deſtruction,
MOST victorious Nonſenſe! for he that ſays nothing, cannot be
anſwer'd. It ſhould ſeem, if the twenty men were in:!eed a Common-
monwealth, or in equality of Power, for ſo he puts the caſe, they
might truck Horſes and Cows, but not by any means confider, or once
let it enter into their heads, how by Art to make good their natural
Freedom: That (unleſs they ſet up a Prince, as you ſhall ſee anon)
were to part with their natural Freedom, and put themſelves into the
hands of a Power from which (there being no other Power but them-
felves) they can afterwards have no ſhield. To read it throughly for the
underſtanding, as is intimated in his Epiſtle, will be more, I doubt, than
his Book will obtain of any Reader. Yet is he, in his own conceit, as .
ſurefooted as any Mule, and knows the Road. But Mr. HARRING-
Ton has not loſt his way without company; his Brother GROTIUs com-
plains, that they who treat of Jus Gentium, do commonly miſtake ſom part
of the Roman Jus Civile for it: and even ſo he laments (an't pleaſe
you) that while men profefs to conſider the Principles of Government,
they fall upon Notions which are the mere effects of Government.
But as an Ape is the more ugly for being like a Man; ſo this
Prevaricator, for making Faces like Grotius. I, who am com-
plain’d of, deriving Government from the true Principle of the ſame,
in the Balance or Foundation, ſet the Superſtructures accordingly; and
he who complains forſooth, never ſo much as propoſes any thing like a
Principle or Superſtructure, but runs altogether upon mere Notions :
Confid. D. 28. As where he asks me, What Security will you give, that the Six in their
fo
Conful-
I
1
1
of Popular Government.
255
+
unum liberæ civitatis Concilium cft, Senatus habendus eft. Liv.
Conſultations ſhall not rather aim at their own advantage, than that of Chap. 5.
the Fourteen, and ſo make uſe of the emigence of their Parts to circum-
5.
vent the reſt? In another place he can anſwer himſelf and fay, that
the Fourteen, or the People in this Conſtitution, have the Vote and the
Sword too. How then thould the Six circumvent them? What Secu-
rity has a Prince, that his People will not pull him out of his Throne?
why, a Nobility or an Army : And are not the People in a Common-
wealth their own Army? Is this to mind Principles? On the other ſide,
How, ſays lie, ſhall we be ſatisfy'd that the Fourteen will not ſoon begin
to ihink themſelves wiſe enough to conſult too, and making uſe of their ex-
ceſs in Porrer, pull the Six off their Cuſhions ? As if there were any ex-
perience public or privat, any ſenſe or reaſon, that men having the
whole Power in their own hands, would deprive themſelves of Coun-
fillors; or tliat ever a Commonwealth depos'd the Senat, or cande-
poſe the Senat, and remain a Commonwealth. The People of Capuit
being inrag’d to the full height, reſolv'd and aſſembld together (the
Senat, it the People will, being always in their power) on purpoſe to
cut the throats of the Senators, when Pacuvius CALAVIUS
exhorted them that ere they went upon the deſign, they would first
make clećtion among themſelves of a new Senat, which, the throats
of the old being cut, might for the ſafety of the Commonwealth in-
mediatly take their places; for, ſaid he, * You muſt either have a King,
which is to be abhor'd; or whatever becoms of this, you muſt have ſom
other Senat: for the Senat is a Council of ſuch a nature as' without it no.
free City can ſubfift. By which Speech of PACUVI us; the People,
who thought themſelves, as the Conſiderer has it, wiſé enough to con-
fult, being convinc'), fell to work for the Election of a ſucceding Se-
pat out of themſelves (the Prevaricator ſhould not tell me of Nocions,
but learn that in a Commonwealth there muft be a Senat, is a Principle)
while the People of Capua were intent upon chuſing this new Senat,
the Partys propos’d ſeem'd to them to be ſo ridiculouſly unfit for ſuch
an Office, that by this means coming to a nearer fight of themſelves,
were ſecretly ſo filld with the ſhame of their Enterprize, that
ſlinking away, they would never after be known ſo much as to have
thought upon ſuch a thing. Nor ever went any other People fo far,
not the Florentins themſelves, tho addicted to Innovation or changing
of the Senat beyond all other examples. Sons of the Univerſity, Bro-
thers of the College, Heads and Points ; you love fine words. "Whe-
ther tends to bring all things into fervitude, my Hypotheſis, or his
*Hypothytes? For ſays he, I am willing to gratify Mr. HARRÜN G- + Arochet
TON with his partition of 'the twenty men into fix and fourteen; but
if I had bin in a humor of contradiction, it had bin as free for one to
have ſaid that ſom one of the twenty would have excel'd all the reſt in Judg-
ment, Experience
, Courage, and height of Genius, and then told him,
that this had bin a natural Monarchy, eſtabliſh?d by God himſelf over
Mankind : As if the twenty would give their Clothes or Mony to the
nest man they meet wiſer or richer than themſelves, which before he de-
nyd; Oportet mendacem eſſe memorem. God eſtabliſh'd Kings no other-
Wife than by election of the People; and the twenty will neither give
their Clothes nor Mony: How then? why in coms a Gallant with a file
Senatum omnino non habere non vultis: Quippe aut Rex, quod abominand :im ; aut, quod
of
A
•
#
they
I
256
The' Prerogative
Book I. of Musketeers; What, ſays he, are you dividing and chuſing here?
Go to, I will have no dividing, give me all. Down go the pots, and
up go their heels: What is this? why a King! What more? by Di-
vine Right! As he took the Cake from the Girls !
1
C H A P. VI.
Whether the Senatuſconſulta, or Decrees of the Roman Senat, had
the Power of Laws.
A
MONG divers and weighty Reaſons why I would have that
Prince look well to his file of Musketeers, this is no ſmall one,
that he being upon no balance, will never be able to give Law without
them. For to think that he ſuccedes to the Senat, or that the power
of the Senat may ſerve his turn, is a preſumtion that will fail him.
The Senat, as ſuch, has no power at all, but mere Authority of pro-
põſing to the People, who are the makers of their own Laws; whence
the Decrees of the Senat of Rome are never Laws, nor ſo call’d, but
Senatuſconſulta. It is true that a King coming in the Senat, as there it
did, may remain
to his aid and advantage; and then they propoſe not as
formerly to the People, but to him, who coms not in upon the right of
the Senat, but upon that of the People: whence fays JUSTINIAN;
* The Princes Pleaſure has the force of Law, ſince the People have by the
Lex Regia concerning his Power, made over to him all their own Empire
Conſid. p. 30, and Authority. Thus the Senatuſconſultum Macedonicum, with the reſt
31. that had place allow'd by JuSTINIAN in compilement of the Roman
Laws, were not Laws in that they were Senatuſconſulta, or propos'd
by the Senat, but in that they were allow°d by JUSTINIAN or the
Prince, in whom was now the right of the People. Wherfore the
Zealot for Monarchy has made a pas de clerc, or foul ſtep in his
pro-
ceſſion, where he argues thus out of Cujacius: It was ſoon agreed
that the diſtinct Decrees of the Senat and People ſhould be extended to
the nature of Laws; therfore the diſtinct Decrees of the Senat are
Laws, whether it be ſo agreed by the People, or by the Prince, or no.
For thus he has no ſooner made lis Prince, than he kicks him heels over
head; ſeeing where the Decrees of the Senat are Laws without the
King, that ſame is as much a King as the Prevaricator a Politician.
A Law is that which was paſt by the Power of the People, or of the
King. But out of the Light; in this place he takes a Welſh Bait, and
Conſid. P. 32. looking back, makes a muſter of his Victorys, like the bulling Gaſcon,
who, to ſhew what he had thrown out of the windows in his De-
bauchery, made a formal repetition of the whole Inventory of the
Houſe.
1
* Quod Principi placuit legis habet vigorem, quum lege Regia quæ de ejus imperio fara eft,
Populus ci, & in cum omnc imperium fuum & poteftatem concedat.
:
.
CH A P.
1
7
257
.
**)
Chap 1:
O
35.
NE would think the Gaſcon had don well; Is he ſatisfy'd ? No,
of Popular GovernmentL
CH A P. VII.
Whether the Ten Commandments were propos’d by God or Mo:
ses, and voted by the People of Iſrael.
he will now throw the Houſe out of the windows. The principal Confid. P. 33;
Stones being already taken from the Foundation, he has a bag of certain
Winds wherwithial to reverſe the Superſtructures. The firſt Wind he
lets go is but a Puff, where he tells me, that I bring Switzerland and
Holland into the enumeration of the Heathen Commonwealths: which if
I had don, their Libertys in many parts and places being more antient
than the Chriſtian Religion in thoſe Countrys (as is plain by TA-
CITUS, where he ſpeaks of CIVILIS, and of the Cuſtoms of the
Germans) I had neither wrong'd them nor my ſelf; but I do no ſuch
matter, for having enumerated the Heathen Commonwealths, I add
that the Procedings of Holland and Switzerland, the after a more ob- Oceana, P. 51;
ſcure manner, are of the like nature. The next is a Storm, while ren
proaching me with Rudeneſs, he brings in Dr. FERN and the Cler-
gy by head and ſhoulders, who till they undertake the quarrel of Mo-
narchy, to the confuſion of the Commonwealth of Iſrael, at leaſt fo
far that there be no weight or obligation in ſuch an Example, are
poſted. As if for a Chriſtian Commonwealth to make ſo much uſe of
Ifrael as the Roman did of Athens, whofe Laws ſhe tranſcrib’d, were
againſt the Intereſt of the Clergy, which, it ſeems, is ſo hoſtil to po-
pular Power, that to ſay the Laws of Nature, tho they be the Foun-
tains of all Civil Law, are not the Civil Law, till they be the Civil
Law; or thus, that thou ſhalt not kill, thou ſhalt not ſteal, tho they be
in natural Equity, yet were not the Laws of Iſrael or of England, till
voted by the People of Iſrael, or the Pariament of England, is to aſſert Conſid. p. 35,
the People into the mighty Liberty of being free from the whole moral
Law; and, inaſmuch as to be the Adviſer or Perſuader of a thing, is leſs
than to be the Author or Commander of it, to put an Indignity upon
God himſelf. In which Fopperys the Prevaricator, boaſting of
Principles, bue minding none, firſt confounds Authority and Com-
mand or Power; and next forgets that the dignity of the Legiſlator,
or, which is all one, of the Senat fucceding to his Office, as the San.
hedrim to Moses, is the greateſt dignity in a Commonwealth: and
yer that the Laws or Orders of a Commonwealth derive no other-
wiſe, whether from the Legiſlator, as Moses, LYCURGUS, So-
LON, &c. or the Senat, as thoſe of Iſrael, Lacedemon, or Athens, than
from their Authority receiv'd and confirm’d by the Vote or Command
of the People. It is true, that with Almighty God it is otherwiſe than
with à mortal Legiſlator, but thro another Nature which to him is
peculiar, from whom as he is the cauſe of being, or the Creator of
Mankind, Omnipotent Power is inſeparable ; yet ſo equal is the good-
neſs of this Nature to the greatneſs therof, that as he is the cauſe of
welbeing by way of Election, for example in his choſen People Iſrael,
or of Redemption, as in the Chriſtian Church, himſelf has preferid.
his Authority or Propoſition before his Empire. What elſe is the
LI
meaning
401
+
i
1
TE
258
The Prerogative
Book I. meaning of theſe words, or of this proceding of his? Non therfore
if ye will obey my Voice indeed, and keep my Covenant, ye ſhall be to me a
Exod. 19.5.
Kingdom, or I will be your King; which Propoſition being voted by
the People in the Affirmative, God procedes to propoſe to them the ten
Commandments in ſo dreadful a manner, that the People being ex-
Exod. 20. 19. vedingly afrighted, ſay to Moses, Speak thor with us, and we will
hear thee : that is, be thou henceforth our Legiſlator or Propoſer, and
we will reſolve accordingly; but let not God ſpeak with us, left we dy.
From whenceforth God propoſes to the People no otherwiſe than by
Moses, whom he inſtructs in this manner; Theſe are the Judgments
which thou ſhalt propoſe or ſet before them. Wherfore it is ſaid of the
Deut. 29. 1. Book of Deuteronomy, containing the Covenant which the Lord com-
manded Moses to make with the Children of Iſrael in the Land of
Moab, beſides the Covenant which he made with them in Horeb; This is
Deut. 4. 44• the Law which MOSES ſet before the Children of Iſrael. Neither did
God in this caſe make uſe of his Omnipotent Power, nor CHRIST
in the like, who alſo is King after the ſame manner in his Church, and
would have bin in Iſrael, where when to this end he might have
muſter'd up Legions of Angels
, and bin victorious with ſuch Armys,
or Argyrafpides, as never Prince could ſhew the like, he ſays no more
Matth. 23. 37. than, o Jeruſalem, Jeruſalem, how often would I have gatherd thee and
thy Children, as a Hen gathers her Chickens under her wings, and ye would
not? where it is plain that the Jews rejecting CHRIST, that he
Jould not reign over them, the Law of the Goſpel came not to be the
Law of the Jews; and ſo if the ten Commandments came to be the
Law of Iſrael, it was not only becauſe God propos’d them, ſeeing
Chriſt alſo propos'd his Law,which nevertheleſs came not to be the Law
of the Jews, but becauſe the People receiv'd the one, and rejected the
other. "It is not in the nature of Religion that it ſhould be thought a
profane faying, that if the Bible be in England, or in any other Go-
vernment, the Law or Religion of the Land, it is not only becauſe
God has propos'd it, but alſo becauſe the People or Magiſtrat has re-
ceiv'd it, or reſolv'd upon it; otherwiſe we muſt ſet lighter by a
Nation or Government than by a privat Perſon who can have no part
nor portion in this Law, unleſs he vote it to himſelf in his own Con-
ſcience, without which he remains in the condition he was before, and
as the Heathen, who are a Law to themſelves. Thus wheras in a Co-
venant there muſt be two Partys, the Old and New Teſtament being
in fum the Old and New Covenant; theſe are that Authority and
Propoſition of God and CHRIST, to which they that refuſe
their Vote or Reſult may be under the Empire of a Clergy, but are
none of his Commonwealth. Nor, ſeeing I am gon ſo far, dos this
at all imply Freewil, but, as is admirably obſerv'd by Mr. HOBBS,
the freedom of that which naturally precedes Will, namely, Delibe-
ration or Debate, in which, as the Scale by the weight of Reaſon or
Paſſion coms to be turn'd one way or other, the Will is caus’d, and
being caus'd, is neceſſitated. When God coms in thus upon the Soul
of Man, he gives both the Will and the Deed; from which like Office
of the Senat in a Commonwealth, that is, from the excellency of their
Deliberation and Debate, which prudently and faithfully unfolded to
the People, dos alſo frequently cauſe and neceſſitat both the Will and
the Deed. God himſelf has ſaid of the Senat, that they are Gods :
an expreſſion, tho divine, yet nor unknown to the Heathens ; Homo
*
homini
1
4.
.
1111
of Popular Government.
259
homini Deus, one man, for the excellency of his Aid, may be a God to Chap. 8.
another. But let the Prevaricator look to it; for he that leads the
blind out of his way, is his Devil
.
FOR the things I have of this kind, as alſo for what I have ſaid
upon the words Chirotonia and Ecclefia, the Prevaricator is delighted to
make me beholden underhand to Mr. HOBBS, notwithſtanding the open
enmity which he ſays I profeſs to his Politics. , As, if Josephus upon
that of SAMUEL, They have not rejected thee, but they have rejected me 1 Sam. 8. 7.
that I ſhould not reign over them, had not ſaid of the People (ody & TE-
XetRotóvxv ş Bandeias) that they unchirotoniz’d or unvoted God of the
Kingdon. Now if they unchirotoniz’d or unvoted God of the King-
dom, then they had chirotoniz'd or voted him to the Kingdom; and to
not only the Doctrin that God was King in Iſrael by Compact or
Covenant, but the uſe of the word Chirotonia alſo in the ſenſe I un-
derſtand it, is more antient than Mr. HOBBS. I might add that of
CAPELL’us, * God was a Political King and Civil Legiſlator of the
Jews. And for the uſe I have made of the word Eccleſia, as no man
can read ſuch as have written of the Grecian Commonwealths, and
miſs it, ſo I do not remember that Mr.HOBBS has ſpoken of it.
To theſe things fuller ſatisfaction will be given in the ſecond Book
which nevertheleſs I do not ſpeak to the end I might wave Obliga-
tion to ſo excellent an Author in his way. It is true, I have op-
pos’d the Politics of Mr. HOBBS, to ſhew him what he taught me,
with as much diſdain as he oppos'd thoſe of the greateſt Authors, in
whoſe wholſom Fame and Doctrin the good of Mankind being con-
cern'd, my Conſcience bears me witneſs that I have don my duty.
Nevertheleſs in moſt other things I firmly believe that Mr. HOBB'S
is, and will in future Ages be accounted the beſt Writer, at this day, in
the world. And for his Treatiſes of human Nature, and of Liberty
and Neceſſity, they are the greateſt of new Lights, and thoſe which
I have follow'd, and ſhall follow.
1:
;
1
1
.
1
CHA P. VIII.
i
'
1
111
I!
Whether a Commonwealth coming up to the perfection of the kind,
coms not rp to the perfection of Government, and has no flaus
in it.
WH
1
HAT a Commonwealth coming up to the perfection of the
kind is, I have ſhewn both by the definition of an equal
Commonwealth, and the Exemplification of it in all the parts.
THE Definition is contain’d in the firſt of my Preliminarys; which,
becauſe it is ſhort, I ſhall repeat.
An equal Commonwealth is a Government eſtabliſb’d upon an equal A-
grarian, ariſing into the Superſtructures or three Orders, the Senat debat-
ing and propoſing, the People refolving, and the Magiſtracy executing, by
an equal Rotation, or interchangeable Election, thro the ſuffrage of the
People given by the Ballot. The Exemplification is the whole Common-
T
di
i
* Deus Populi Judaici Rex erat veluti politicus, & civilis Legiſlator. In Diatriba de Voto
Jephtha.
Ll2
wealth
.
1
1
MII
I'
260
The Prerogative
Book I. wealth of Oceani. Each of which by him, who, if his Doctrin of
pure and
abſolute Monarchy be obſerv'd, can be no Engliſhman, is calld
an Iriſh Bog; as in ſom ſenſe it is, ſeeing the Prevaricator has ſet never
Conſid. Po 43. a foot in it that will ſtand, nor has more to ſay, than that Where there is
one ambitious poor man, or one vicious rich man, it is impoſſible there
should be any ſuch Government as can be ſecure from Sedition.
WHICH, Firſt, is rather to make all Governments ineffectual,
or to make all Governments alike, than to object againſt any, ſeeing
That there ſhould not be one ambitious poor man, or one vicious rich man,
is equally, if not more, improbable in a Monarchy than in a Common-
wealth.
SECONDLY, That one man alone, whether he be rich or poor,
ſhould without a Party be able to diſturb a Commonwealth with Se-
dition, is an abſurdity; nor is ſuch a party, as may be able in ſom fort
to diſturb the Peace by robbing upon the Highway, or ſom ſuch diſ-
order, always able to diſturb a Government with Sedition. Wherfore
this feat gos not ſo much upon the ability of any one man, rich
or poor, as the Power of the Party he is able to make; and this
ſtrength of the Party gos upon the nature of the Government, and
the content or diſcontents thence deriving to the Few, or the Many.
The Diſcontents, whether of the Few or the Many, derive from that
which is, or by them is thought to be ſom bar to their Intereſt; and
thoſe Intereſts which are the cauſes of Sedition are three, the deſire of
Liberty, the deſire of Power, and the deſire of Riches; nor be there
any more: for where the People thro want of Bread, thro Vio-
lence offer'd to their Women, or Oppreſſion, riſe up againſt their
Governors, it relates to the deſire of Liberty; thoſe alſo under the
name of Religion make not a fourth, but com to one of the three.
NOW to ſpeak in the firſt place of the Many, and anon of the
Pew; the People in an equal Commonwealth have none of theſe three
Intereſts: Not the deſire of Liberty, becauſe the whole Frame of an
equal Commonwealth is nothing elſe but ſuch a method wherby the
Liberty of the People is ſecur’d to them: Not of Power, becauſe the
Power which otherwiſe they could not exerciſe, is thus eſtated in
them : Nor of Riches, becauſe where the Rich are ſo bounded by an
Agrarian that they cannot overbalance (and therfore neither oppreſs
the People, nor exclude their Induſtry or Merit from attaining to the
like Eſtate, Power, or Honor) the whole People have the whole
Riches of the Nation already equally divided among them; for that
the Riches of a Commonwealth ſhould not go according to the diffe-
rence of mens Induſtry, but be diſtributed by the Poll, were inequal.
Wherfore the People in an equal Commonwealth having none of
thoſe Intereſts which are the cauſes of Sedition, can be ſubject to no
ſuch effect.
TO affirm then with the Conſiderer, that the whole of this Libra-
tion is reduc'd to the want of Power to diſturb the Commonwealth, muſt
needs be a miſtake, feeing in the Commonwealth propos'd the People
have the Power, but can have no ſuch Intereſt; and the People having
no ſuch Intereſt
, no Party can have any ſuch Power, it being impolli-
ble that a Party ſhould com to overbalance the People, having their
Arms in their own hands. The whole matter being thus reduïd to the
want of Power to diſturb the Government ; this, according to his own
Argument, will appear to be the Libration in which the Power, wherof
1
11
the
15
1
th
that
mi
1
4.
of Popular Government.
26
the Governor is poſſest, ſo vaſtly excedes the Power remaining with thoſe Chạp. &.
who are to obey which in caſe of conteſt muſt be ſo ſmall a Party)
that it would be defperatly unreaſonable for them to hope to maintain their
Cauſe. If the true method then of attaining to perfection in Govern-
ment be to make the Governor abſolute, and the People in an equal Com-
monwealth be abſolute, then there can be none in this Government,
upon probable terms can diſpute the Poiver with the Governor, and
ſo this State by his own Argument muſt be free from Sedition. Thus
far upon occaſion of the ambitious poor Man objected. I have
ſpoken of the Many; and in ſpeaking of the Many, implicitly of the
Few: for as in an equal Commonwealth, for example in England
during the Peerage or Ariſtocracy, the Many depended upon or were
included in the Few; fo in an equal Commonwealth the Few depend
upon or are included in the Many, as the Senat of Venice depends upon,
Or is included in the Great Council, by which it is annually elected in
the whole or in ſom part. So what was ſaid in an equal Common-
wealth of the Many or the poorer fort, is alſo ſaid of the Few or of
the Richer ; who, thro the virtue of the Agrarian, as in Oceana, or
of other Orders ſupplying the defect of an Agrarian, as in Venice,
not able to overbalance the People, can never have any Power to diſturb
the Commonwealth in caſe they had ſuch an Intereſt, nor can have
any ſuch Intereſt in caſe they had ſuch Power. For example iſ
Oceana, putting the caſe that the Few were as powerful as it is poſſible
they ſhould be; that is, that the whole Land was
fallen into five thou-
ſand hands: The five thouſand, excluding the People, could get no
more Riches by it, becauſe they have the whole Land already; no
more Liberty by it, becauſe they were in perfect Liberty before; nor
any more Power by it, becauſe thro the equality of the Balance, or of
their Eſtates, they can be no more by themſelves than an equal Com-
monwealth, and that they were already with the People: but would
be much leſs, the Power or Commonwealth, in which there be five
thouſand Equals, being not greater, but much leſs than the Power or
Commonwealth wherin the whole People are equal; becauſe the
Power or Effect of a greater People is proportionably greater than the
Power or Effect of a leſſer People, and the Few by this means would
get no more than to be the leſſer People. So the People being no bar
to the Riches, Liberty, nor Power of the five thouſand, and the de-
fire of Liberty, Riches, and Power, being the only cauſes of Sedi-
tion; there could ariſe no Sedition in this Commonwealth by realon
of the Nobility, who have no ſuch Intereſt if they had the Power,
nor have any ſuch Power if they had the Intereſt, the People be-
ing equally poſſeſt of the Government, of the Arms, and far ſuperior
in number. In ſum, an equal Commonwealth conſiſts but of one
hereditary Order, the People, which is by election divided into two
Orders, as the Senat and the Congregation in Lacedemon, or the Senat
and the Great Council in Venice ; for the Gentlemen of Venice, as has
bin often faid, are the People of Venice, the reſt are Subjects. And
an inequal Commonwealth conſiſts of two Hereditary Orders, as the
Patricians and Plebeians in Rome, wherof the former only had a he-
reditary Capacity of the Senat: whence it coms to paſs that the Senat
and the People in an equal Commonwealth having but one and the
ſame Intereſt, never were nor can be at variance; and that the Senat
and the People in an inequal Commonwealth having two diſtinct In-
tereſts,
1
:
1
.
H.
:
!
1
1
.
5
EN
..
F
2. "
.
1
1.
::
:
262
The Prerogative
Book I. tereſts, never did nor can agree. So an equal Commonwealth cannot
u be ſeditious, and an inequal Commonwealth can be no other than ſe-
ditious.
If a man be reſolv'd, as the Conſiderer is, to huddle theſe things
together, there is no making any thing of this kind of Policy ; of
which therfore it will be a folly to talk. For example, Lacedemon is
either to be conſider'd as not taking in the Helots; and then in her
felf ſhe was an equal Commonwealth void of any Sedition, or cauſe
of it, how much foever ſhe were troubl'd with the Helots : So the
Objection made by him, of her Troubles by the Helots, is imperti-
nently urg'd, to ſhew that ſhe was a ſeditious Commonwealth : Or
if he will needs have it, that ſhe took in the Helots, it is undeniable
that ſhe took them in inequally, and ſo was inequal; whence the
Troubles by the Helots muſt needs be impertinently urg'd againſt an
equal Commonwealth.
AGAIN, when I allege Venice from PIERO GRADENIGO;
that is, for the ſpace of about four hundred years from the preſent
date, at which time the Reformation, yet in force, began, as an Ex-
ample of an equal Commonwealth ; for him to inſtance in the times
before, when tho the Commonwealth, according to the intention, was
as equal as now, yet being not bound by fufficient Orders to give her
ſelf Security of her native Liberty, her Dukes on the one ſide did
what they pleas'd, and the inrag'd People on the other ſide baniſh'd,
condemn'd to death, or murder'd them; who ſees not the Impoſture ?
Indeed he bluſhes at it himſelf. Wherfore my Aſſertion being not yet
knock'd on the head, he promiſes to kill it better, firſt by the ex-
ample of Lacedemon leaving out the Helots, and next by that of Venice
ſince the time of PIËR O GRADENIGO.
Conſid. p. 60. FOR the firſt you muſt know that once upon a time there was a
Paufan. Lacon, quarrel between CLEOMENES and DEMARAT uş Kings of La-
cedemon about Succeſſion, which was determin’d by the Ephori, that
is, by a Court of Juſtice, and not by the Sword ; the like happen'd
Plut. Alcib. in L'EOTYCHIDES the known Baſtard of ALCIBIADES, or ſo
confeſt to be by his Mother to divers of her Maids. Now this is a
Maxim in the Politics, Where the differences of Kings can go no fur-
ther than & Court of Juſtice, there the Government is ſeditious
.
Moſt ridiculous ! Is there a ſtronger Argument that ſuch a Govern-
ment is not ſeditious ? No matter, give him room; Much more fatal
was the conteſt between CLEON Y Mus and his Brother Areus the
Son of ACROTATUS, by whole War Z ARAX was ruin'd, and
PYRRHUS came into the game, who befieg?d the Capital City: the Reign
of Agis and CLEOMENEs was ſo full of turbulency, as would put
a man out of breath to relate. Fair and ſoftly: was not all this after
LYSANDER, and the Spoils of Athens had broken the Agrarian,
and ſo ruin'd Lacedemon? I affirm there can be no Sedition in an equal
Commonwealth ; and he to oppoſe me, ſhews that there was Sedition
in an inequal one; whether dos this affirm his Aſſertion or mine?
BUT for better luck in Venice. This City by Mr. HÄRRING-
TO N's own confeſſion is poſſeſt of ſeveral Advantages. Yes, I ſay that
the Commonwealth of Venice, thus ſeated, is like a man in a Citadel,
who therby may be the ſafer from his Enemys, bur ne're a whit the
fafer from diſeaſes. What conclufion would you expect he ſhould in-
fer from hence? Why among theſe therfore there is good cauſe to reckon ber
..
ܪ
-1
IM
Immu.
of Popular Government.
263
+
Immunity from Seditions: Dos not our Logician repeat faithfully, and Chap. 8.
diſpute honeſtly? Again, Sir, ſhe is like a ship ready to be boarded by
Pirats, has the Turc on this Frontier, the Pope on that, the King of
Spain on another. As if this were an Argument every Government
muſt not be void of Sedition, ſeeing there is none except they be Ilands,
whoſe Frontiers are not bounded by the Territorys of other Princes.
Well, but ſince the laſt Reglement in Engliſh, Reformation) in the
time of GŘADENIGO, you have had three Seditions in Venice, that
of MARINO Bocconi, that of BALAMONTE TIEPOLO,
and that of MARINO FALERI O.
BODIN has bin long ſince beaten for this like Stockåſh, and yet 'our
Author will be ſerving it up for a Courtly diſh. BOCCONI would
have kill'd the Duke, but was hang'd before he could do it. Pel-
TOn kill'd a Duke that had greater power here than the other in
Venice, and was
hang’d afterwards, therfore England was a feditious
Government; for this muſt either be undeniable for Felton's fake,
or why muſt the other be ſo for Bocconi's? Again, FALERIO
and his Complices would have deſtroy'd the Great Council
, but were
hang'd before they could do it. Vaux and his Accomplices would
have blown up the Parlament, but were hang'd before they could do
it; therfore England was in this relation a ſeditious Government, elſe
why was Venice? There paſſes not a month but there dy Rogues at
Tyburn, is the Government therfore ſeditious ? or is this one regard
in which it is not? Where all that ſo invade the Government are by
virtue of the ſame brought to that end, there the Commonwealth,
or the Orders of it, are not the cauſe but the cure of Sedition; and
ſo theſe are undeniable Arguments that Venice is not ſeditious, where,
ſince the Reformation, there has not bin a cut finger upon this ſcore,
ſave only thro the conſpiracy of BAIAMONTE, which indeed came
to blows. Nor for this yet can Venice be called a feditious Common
wealth. You find no man accuſing Rome of Sedition, in that ſhe had
a Manlius or a Melius that dangerouſly affected Monarchy,
becauſe to theſe her Orders, by which they ſufferd Death, as ſoon ap-
ply'd the Remedy. But Rome was a ſeditious Commonwealth, be-
cauſe the perpetual feud that was between the Senat and the People
out of her Orders, and was that to which there was no Re-
to apply. England was not a feditious Government becauſe it
had a V aux or a FELTON, but becauſe the Power antiently of
the Nobility, and lace of the People, was ſuch by the Orders of the
ſame as might at any time occaſion Civil War. "Put the caſe a Slave
or ſom deſperat fellow has kill'd the Great Turc, the Govern-
ment for that cannot be ſaid to be ſeditious, but in this, that thro the
very nature of the Policy, the Janizarys at any time may do as much,
it is undeniably feditious.' BAIA MONTE's Conſpiracy he will not
ſay was of this nature. It was not a Diſeaſe in the Bones of the Com-
monwealth, but a thing that no ſooner appear'd, or broke out (the
true, there lappend a little ſcratching firſt) than it fell off like a
Scab; ſuch an accident may befal the beſt Conftitution, and Venice
never had the like but once: if he could ſay as much of a Monarchy,
he gains no advantage ; yet let him fay it, and prove it, I give him
all. I omit many Falíhoods and Abſurditys in the proceding of the
Prevaricator, as where he intimats the Power of the Dukes to have
bin that wherby Venice gain’d I know not what, and yet to have
bin
ſprung
medy
it be
264
The Prerogative
Book I. bin that alſo by which FALER 10 had like to have ſpoil'd all : each
of which, the Duke of Venice having no power at all
, is known to
be falſe. Why ſhould I ſtay to put you in mind that having affirm'd
Venice to derive her Immunity from inteſtin Diſcord no otherwiſe
than a Ship that is ready to be boarded by Pirats, he inſtances in ſuch
examples to the contrary, as took occaſion by the hair of a foren
ſcalp, while in thoſe of Bocconi and Tiepolo the Common-
wealth by her Wars with the Genoeſes and Ferrara, was put to her
plunges, and in that of FALERIO reduc'd to the laſt extremity? I Mall
only note, that if ſuch ſudden filallies as theſe may com under the name
of Sedition, he has don a fine Office for Monarchy, feeing no Senat is ſo
much expos'd to like blows as any Prince.
WELL; but for all this it is confeſt that there may be ſuch a thing
as a feditious Commonwealth, in that the feud between the Senat and
Confid. . 48. the People of Rome could not be cur’d; What Security, ſays he, will
you give us,
that the like may not happen in Oceana, or that the whole
body of the People being intruſted with giving a Vote," and keeping a Sword,
may not by way of Counfil or Arms, fall to ſuch work as levelling the fivé
thouſand, or bringing the Agrarian
from two to one thouſand pounds a year,
or leſs, as they fancy?
To which I anſwer by a like queſtion, What ſecurity will he give
me that the People of any Commonwealth thall not caſt themſelves
into the Sea ? A Prince may be mad, and do ſo, but the People are na-
turally incapable of ſuch madneſs. If men will boaſt of their know-
lege in Principles, and yet talk of nothing but effects, why may not a
Man fly as well as a Bird ? but if Cauſes may be regarded, 'let him
once ſhew how the Will, ſeeing it is not free, nor mov'd without ſom
Object, ſhould move the people in fuch a manner ; or for what, they
having all the Liberty and all the Power that can be had, ſhould it
ſtrive? Well, that is ſoon don, for the Land may com into the hands of
five thouſand, and ſo the Booty may be great, and the reſiſtance ſmall.
Good: The Romans being the wiſeſt of all People, went no further
towards the Remedy of their Grievances, than to ſtrive for the intro-
duction of an Agrarian, in which they fainted too, even to the de-
ſtruction of that Government. Except cheſe, none have bin ſo wife;
and if there be any ſuch thing familiar with the nature of the People,
why appear'd it but once, and then vanilli'd without effect? why did
nor the People for example under the late Monarchy (when the Domi-
nion or Freehold of the Nation, by greater ſhares, was in a ſmaller
Party, and they had not only Riches, but Liberty and Power too, to
whet them on ever ſo much as think of levelling three hundred Men?
for the Nobility and Clergy, in whom was the Balance, were no more.
If it be reply'd that the People were not arm’d; by whom did the
Barons make War with the Kings? If they were not truſted with
a Vote; what was that of the Houſe of Commons ? Let Domi-
nion or Freehold ſtand upon what balance you will, inequal or equal,
from the beginning of the world you ſhall never find a People turning
Levellers. And as Reaſon is Experience in the root, ſo Experience is
Reaſon in the branch, which might therfore be ſufficient in the caſe.
Nevertheleſs for clearer ſatisfaction in a point of fuch concernment,
I ſhall indeavor to dig up and diſcover the root of this branch, or
the reaſon of this Experience. That which in Beaſts is Inſtinct, ,
wherof they can give no account, is in it ſelf that Wiſdom of God
.
wherby
of Popular Government.
265
wherby he provides for them; ſo it is with the People, they are not Chap. 8.
Levellers, nor know they why, and yet it is, becauſe to be Levellers
were to deſtroy themſelves. For, ſeeing I muſt repeat, to repeat
briefly; There is no Territory of any Extent and Populouſneſs where
the Revenue of Induſtry is not twice as much as the dry Rent. This
has bin demonſtrated in Oceana. The Revenue of Induſtry is in
thoſe that work, that is, the People : Wherfore the Revenue of the
People, where their Induſtry is not obſtructed, is twofold to that of
the Nobility, holding the whole Territory in Freehold. But where
their Induſtry is obſtructed, their Revenue is nothing. Civil War
being of all other the greateſt Obſtruction of Induſtry, the People in
taking Arms muſt venture all they have, for that, which if they ob-
tain they loſe two for one; and if they obtain not, all for nothing.
Wherfore a People never will, nor ever can; never did, nor ever ſhall
take Arms for Levelling. But they are intruſted with a Vote; and ther-
fore taking away the Lands of the five thouſand, or diminiſhing the
Agrarian by way of Counſil, they need not obſtruct their Induſtry:
but, preſerving the Revenue of that, may bring themſelves into the
poſſeſſion of the Land too. This will they, this can they leſs do, be-
cauſe being in Counſil they muſt propoſe fomthing for the advantage
of the Commonwealth, or of themſelves, as their end in ſuch an
Action. But the Land coming to be in the poſſeſſion of five thouſand,
falls not into a number that is within the compaſs of the Few, or ſuch
a one as can be Princes, either in regard of their Number, or of their
Eſtates; but to fuch a one as cannot conſent to aboliſh the Agrarian,
becauſe that were to conſent to rob one another : nor can they have
any Party among them, or againſt their common Intereſt, ſtrong
enough to force them, or to break it; which remaining, the five
thouſand neither are nor can be any more than a Popular State, and
the Balance remains every whit as equal, as if the Land were in never
ſo many more hands. Wherfore the Commonwealth being not to be
better'd by this means, the People by Counſil can never go about
to level, nor diminiſh the Agrarian for the good of the Common-
wealth. Nor can they undertake it for the inrichment of them-
ſelves, becauſe the Land of Oceana, as has bin demonſtrated, being
leveld or divided equally among the Fathers of Familys only, coms
not to above ten pounds a year to cach of them, wheras every Foot-
man coſts his Maſter twenty pounds a year; and there is not a Cot-
tager having a Cow upon the Common, but with his own Labor, at
pne ſhilling a day, gets twenty pounds a year; which, the Land being
leveld, were impollible, becauſe there would be no body able to fet
a Laborer on work, or to keep a Servant: wherfore neither would,
nor could the People by Counlil go about any ſuch buſineſs. So
there being no poflìble cauſe of Diſagreement between the Few and
the Many, the Senat and the People, there can be no ſuch effect;
whence this is the Government, which being perfectly equal, has ſuch á
Libration in the frame of it, that no man in or under it can contract
ſuch an Intereſt or Pover, as ſhould be able to diſturb the Common-
svealth with Sedition. Yet after all this, the Prevaricator will only tell Conſid. p. 67%
Mr. HARRINGTON (for to deny the Concluſion is a fair way of
diſputing) that this Libration is of the ſame nature with a Perpetual Mo-
tion in the Mechanics. But let me tell him, that in the Politics there is
nothing mechanic, or like it. This is but an Idiotiſm of ſom Mathe-
Mm
matician
1,
266
The Prerogative
Book I. matician reſembling his, who imagin’d the Stream of a River to be
like that of his Spiggot.
Rafticus expectat dum defluat amnis, at ille
Labitur c labetur in omne volubilis evuni.
1
The filly Swain upon a River ſtood,
In hope the rolling bottom of the Flood
Would once unwind it ſelf, whoſe liquid Clew
The ſilver Thred for ever ſhall renewv.
T Mathematician muſt not take God to be ſuch a one as he is.
Is that of the Sun, of the Stars, of a River, a perpetual Motion?
Galen. de uſu Even ſo one Generation gos and another coms. Nature, ſays GALEN,
partium, l. 4. has a tendency to make her Creature immortal, if it were in the capacity
of the matter on which ſhe has to work; but the People never dys. "This
motion of theirs is from the hand of a perpetual Mover, even God
himſelf, in whom we live, and move, and have our being; and to this
Current the Politician adds nothing but the Banks, to which end, or
none, the fame God has alſo created human Prudence. Wherfore
there is not any thing that raiſes it felf againſt God or right Reaſon,
if I ſay that it is in human Prudence ſo to apply theſe Banks, that
they may ſtand as long as the River runs ; or let this Conſiderer
conſider again, and tell me out of Scripture or Reaſon, why not.
Mathematicians, it is true, pretended to be the Monopoliſts of Demon-
ſtration; but ſpeak ingenuouſly, have they, as to the Politics, hi-
therto given any other Demonſtration, than that there is a difference be-
tween Seeing, and making of Spectacles ? Much more is that compariſon
of the Politics, going upon certain and demonſtrable Principles, to
Aſtrologers and Fortunetellers, who have none at all, vain and inju-
rious. For as in relation to what DAVID has ſaid, and Experience
confirm’d, of the Age of Man, that it is threeſcore years and ten; I
may ſay, that if a Man lys bedrid, or dys before threeſcore years and
ten, of any natural Infirmity or Diſeaſe, it was not thro any imper-
fection of Mankind, but of his particular Conſtitution: So in rela-
tion to the Principles and Definition of an equal Commonwealth
yet unſhaken, nay untouch'd by this Prevaricator, I may, ſafely affirm,
that a Commonwealth is a Government, which if it has bin feditious,
it has not bin from any imperfection in the kind, but in the particular
Conſtitution, which where the like has happen'd, muſt have bin in-
equal. My Retreat to theſe Principles is call?d running into a Bog; as
if ſuch as have no Principles were not Bogs, Informis limus, Stygieque
paludes.
و
C H A P.
of Popular Government.
.
267
.
Chap. 9.
CHA P. IX.
!
Whether Monarchy coming up to the perfečtion of the kind, coms not
ſhort of the perfection of Government, and has not ſom flaw in
it. In which is alſo treated of the Balance of France ; of the
Original of a landed Clergy; of Arms, and their kinds.
o
11
N Monarchy I have ſaid, that wheras it is of two kinds, the one
by Arms, the other by a Nobility; for that by Arms, as (to
take the moſt perfect model) in Turky, it is not in Art or Nature to
cure it of this dangerous flaw, that the Janizarys have frequent Inte-
reſt, and perpetual Power to raiſe Sedition, or tear the Magiſtrat in
pieces. For that by a Nobility, as (to take the moſt perfect Model of
late in Oceana, it was not in Art or Nature to cure it of that dangerous
flaw, that the Nobility had frequent Intereſt and perpetual Power by
their Retainers and Tenants to raiſe Sedition, and levy War: whence
I conclude that Monarchy reaching the perfection of the kind, reaches
not the perfection of Government, but muſt ſtill have ſom dangerous
flaw in it.
THIS place (tho I did not intend by it to make work for a Tinker)
could not be of leſs concernment, than it proves to the Prevaricator,
who, as; if he were oblig'd to mend all, falls firſt to patching with a
Monarchy by Arms, then with a Monarchy by a Nobility; at length
deſpairing, throws away each, and betakes himſelf with egregious
confidence, to make out of both a new Monarchy, which is neither.
By obſervation of theſe three flouriſhes, the preſent Chapter may be
brought into ſome method. The firſt blow of his Hammer, or that
wherby he intends the flaw or hole in Monarchy by Arms ſhall
henceforth be mended and tite, is this: That the Guards of the King's Confid. p. 46:
Perſon be not increas'd beyond the neceſſity of ſecurity; that they be not
Suffer’d to ſtagnat at Court, but be by a perpetual circulation drawn out
upon ſervice ; and chiefly that they conſiſt not of one intire Body united
under the same Head, but be divided into diſtinɛt Partys and Commands ;
as we may ſee in France, where tho ( in proportion to the extent of their
Dominions) the King's Guards be more numerous than thoſe of the Ro-
man or Turkiſh Emperors, yet being divided into diſtinct Bodys of French,
Scots and Switzers, under their ſeveral Colonels and Captains, they have
never bin the Authors of any the leaſt Sedition. And in Turky of late
years they begin to learn the Art of poiſoning the Janizarys by the Spalys,
and ſo have frequently evaded the danger of their Mutinys. Which fine
work at firſt view gos upon this falle ground, that the Foundation of
Monarchy by Arms is laid upon the Princes Guards, or the Court Militia,
wheras Monarchy by Arms conſiſts in no other Balance than the Princes
being fole Landlord, which, where imperfect, as it was in that of the
Roman Emperors, the Empire is the moſt troubld, and where perfect,
as in Turky, the Empire is leſs ſeditious. For that which he ſays of
France, it relates to Monarchy by a Nobility; and therfore is not to
be confounded, according to his method, with this
, but refer'd to the
next branch.
Mm 2
AS
.
:
268
Tlie Prerogative
Book I.
fi
AS to Monarchy by Arms, tho it be true that the balance of Du:
minion in any of the three kinds may be ſaid to be natural, in regard
of the effect; yet ſeeing God has given the Earth to the Sons of Men,
that of a ſole Landlord, as Turky, is not fo natural in the cauſe or
foundation, as the Timars, and therfore requires the application of
ſom kind of force, as the Janizarys, who are not the root of the Go-
vernment, that being planted in the Earth of the Timars, or military
Farms and Colonys (for that the Janizarys are not the Foundation of
this Empire, which was founded long before, is plain, in that this
Order was not introduc'd till AMURATH the Second) but the
Dragon that lys at that root and without which the Fruit would fall
into the mouths of the Timariots by way of Property (as when the
Knights Fees granted firſt for life, became afterwards hereditary in
Oceana) which would cauſe ſuch a fall from Monarchy, that it would
becom, as we have ſeen, the riſe of popular Power (the Lots, in
caſe this ſhould happen, of the Timariots, little differing from thoſe
divided by Joshu A to the Children of Iſrael), wherfore when this
happens in the Turkiſh Monarchy, it is at an end. And that this dos
not happen, tho there be divers other concurrent Policys, I would have
any man ſhew me, how it could be but for the Janizarys. Otherwiſe
it is plain that the Janizarys being a flying Army, on wing at all games,
and upon all occaſions, are not ſo much the Guard of the Prince, as of
the Empire; which ruin'd, the Prey falls to the Timariots, as thoſe
that are in poſſeſſion, except theſe be ruin’d too, who being all Horſe,
and far greater in number than the Janizarys that are Foor, would
(in caſe the aw of the Prince, and the Policy of the Government
which holds them divided, were broken) be invincible by the fa-
nizarys, who nevertheleſs by theſe aids can caſily contain them.
Whence the Sedition of the Janizarys, like that of a Nobility, may
be
dangerous to the Prince, but never threatens the Throne ; wher as the Sea
dition of the Timariots, like that of a People, would be more againſt the
Throne than the Prince. Theſe things conſider'd, and in them the
Nature, Conſtitution, or Diſeaſe of Monarchy by Arms, we may
conſult the more rationally with the Conſiderer upon the Applications
or Remedys by him offer'd, which are three.
FIRST, That the Guards of the King's Perſon be not increas'd be-
yond the neceſſity of Security. But of what Security, that of his Per-
fon, or of his Empire, or of both? for ſpeaking of a Monarchy by
Arms, in this latter fenſe only it is true; and if ſo, then this ſingular
Maxim of State (Fruſtra fit per' plura, quod fieri poteft per pauciora)
might have bin ſpard (Cela s'en va ſans le dire, comme les heures de
noſtre cure.)
SECONDLY, That they be not ſuffer'd to ſtagnat at Court, but be
by a perpetual circulation drawn out upon ſervice ; for if there be not per-
petual ſervice, it ſhould ſeem, men might be apt to think that Govern-
ment was inſtituted for Peace as well as War. I add no more than is
imply'd in his words, which as to this of Turky have chanc'd well ;
where not the Stagnation of the Janizarys only, but of the Court it
ſelf (which by the inſtitution ſhould always be in exerciſe of Arms)
is the cauſe of that preſent decay, ſo perceivable in this Empire. But
the Prince ſitting ſtill or ſtagnating, to what the Circulation of the
Fanizarys (whoſe Alienation from the Government, or Intelligence
with the Timariots, muſt needs be of dangerous conſequence) could
tend,
of Popular Government.
269
.
tend, Mould have bin thought on: otherwiſe to expoſe tlie Empire to Chap.9.
danger for the ſafety of the Prince, is no cure of the Government.
BUT his chief 'Remedy remains : This Court Militia muſt not con*
Siſt of one intire body united under the ſame head, but be divided under ſeve-
ral Colonels, Captains, Partys, Brigades, and diſtributed to ſeveral
Quarters. As it this were a cure, there were any Army that could
bc mutinous : but where he ſays, not united under the ſame Head, he
intiinats perhaps divers Generals, and divers Armys; now ſuch are
the Turkiſh Beglerbegs, and the Provinces under their Governments.
That theſe therfore be kept divided, ſo that not any two of them can
lay their heads together without having them cut off, nor any Son
fuccede the Father in Government, requires that there be always a
ſufficient force (diſtinct from the Intereit of the Timariots and Begler-
begs) united, and ſtill ready upon occaſion of this ſervice; and the
Janizarys with the Spahys or Court-Horſe being united, are no more
than ſufficient for this ſervice. Wherfore if there alſo were ſo di-
vided as therby to be weaken'd, they could not be ſufficient for this
ſervice; and their diviſion, except ſuch as might weaken them, would
be of no ſecurity to the Prince. That the Provinces
, under this aw,
are leſs apt to rebel, than the Court-Guards to mutiny, is no wonder;
but the Court-Guards being curd by the preſcription of this Phyſician,
of the poſlibility of Mutiny, which without weakening them is im-
poſſible, the Provinces, if Liberty, or Riches, or Power be deſirable,
would never indure the yoke of this Government. Wherfore it being
inavoidable in the Turkiſh Empire, that either the Janizarys, or the
Timariots may do what they liſt (in regard that whether of them be
able to give Law to the other, muſt at the ſame time be able to give
Law to the Prince; and to bring them to an equal Balance, were to
make a Civil War, or at leaſt to ſow the Seed of it) the native
Wound of Monarchy by Arms remains incurd and incurable. What
more may be don for Monarchy, founded upon a Nobility, coms next
to be try'd. In this the Conſiderer gives his word, that there never
riſes any danger to the Crown, but when either a great part of the Sove-
rain Power is put into the hands of the Nobility, as in Germany and Po-Confid. P. 47
land (where it ſhould ſeem by him, that the Electors and the Gentry
do not put Power into the hands of the Emperor, or King, but the
Emperor or King puts Power into the hands of the Electors or Gen-
try) or when ſom Perſon or Family is ſuffer'd to overtop the reſt in Riches
,
Commands, and Dependence, as the Princes of the Blood and Lorrain, not
long ſince, in France; and of old the MONTFORTS and Nevils
in England. The firit of theſe he declares to be a vicious Government,
and a Monarchy only in name: The ſecond he undertakes ſhall eaſily ad
mit of this Remedy; That the great ones be reduc'd (decimo fexto) to a
Leffer Volim, and level'd into an Equality with the reſt of their Order.
HIS Putpin is pretty : The Emperor puts Power into the hands of the
Electors; and the King of Poland puts Poper into the hands of the Gen.
tlemen : Which Governments therfore (and all ſuch like, as when the
King of England did put Power into the hands of the Barons, at ſuch a
time as he was no longer able to keep it out of their fingers, by which
means the antient and late Government of King, Lords and Commons,
was reſtor’d) are vicious. Conſtitutions, and Monarchys only in name ;
ſuch as he will not meddle with, and therfore let them go. Well;
but where is the Patient then? if theſe be not Monarchys by Nobility,
what
1!
1
:
you pleaſe.
270
The Prerogative
Book I. what do we mean by that thing? or what Government is it that we
are to cure? Why ſúch a one, where ſom Perſon or Family is ſuffer’d to
overtop the reſt in Riches, Commands, and Dependence, as the Princes
of the Blood and Lorrain, not long ſince, in France; and of old the
MONTFORTS and the Nevils in England. So then the ſame
again (for theſe are no other) upon recolle&tion, are thoſe that ada
mit of this eaſy cure. Let the great Ones be reducd to a leſſer Volum, and
leveld with the reſt of their Order. But how? if they be the weaker
Party, they are not the Great Ones; and if they be the ſtronger Par-
ty, how will he reduce them? Put the caſe a man has the Gout, his
Phyſician dos not bid him reduce his overtopping Toes to the Volum
of the other Foot, nor to level them to equality with the reſt of their
Order, but preſcribes his Remedys, and inſtitutes the Method that
ſhould do this feat. What is the Method of our ÆSCULAPIUS?
Point de Novelle ; or where are we to find it? e’en where
The Princes of the Blood, and of Lorrain in France; the MONT-
FORTS and the Nevils in England, overtop'd not their Order by
their own Riches or Power, but by that of the Party, which for
their Fidelity, Courage, or Conduct, intruſted them with the ma-
naging of their Arms or Affairs. So the Prince that would have leveld
them, muſt have leveld their Party ; which in caſe the Controverſy
be upon the Right, or pretended Right of the Nobility in the Govern-
ment, which commonly makes them hang together, may com to the
Confid. Do 49. whole Order : what then? Why then, fays lie, the Prince muſt pre-
ſerve his Nobility weighty enough to keep the People under, and yet not tall
enough in any particular Perſon to meaſure with himſelf : which, abating
the figure, is the ſame again; and ſo I have nothing to anſwer but the
figure. Now for this, the Prince himſelf is no otherwiſe tall, than
by being ſet upon the ſhoulders of the Nobility, and ſo if they fet
another
upon
the ſame ſhoulders (as in HENRY the 4th or the
who had no Titles to the Crown, nor could otherwiſe have meaſur'a
with the Prince) be he never fo low, he coms to be tall enough in his
particular perſon to meaſure with the Prince, and to be taller too, not
only by thoſe old examples, but others that are younger than our
felves, tho ſuch (the Nobility having not of late bin weighty enough
to keep the People under) as derive from another Principle, that of
popular Balance." A Prince therfore preſerving his Nobility weighty
enough to keep the People under, muſt preſerve in them the balance
of that kind of Empire: and the balance containing the Riches,
which are the Power, and ſo the Arms of the Nation; this being
in the Nobility, the Nobility, when willing, muſt be able to diſpoſe
of the King, or of the Government. Nor under a leſs weight is a
Nobility qualify’d to keep down the People, as by an Argument from
the contrary. HENRY the 7th having found the ſtrength of his
Nobility, that ſet him in a Throne to which he had no right, and
fearing that the Tide of their Favor turning, they might do as much
for another, abated the dependence of their Tenants, and cut off their
Train of Retainers; which diminution of their weight, releaſing the
People by degrees, has caus'd that Plain or Level into which we live
to ſee the Mountain of that Monarchy now ſunk and ſwallow'd:
wherfore the Balance of the Nobility being ſuch as failing, that kind
of Monarchy coms to ruin; and not failing, the Nobility, if they
join, may give Law to the King, the inherent diſeaſe of a Monar-
chy
1
7th,
+
1
*
1
of Popular Government
271
Chap 9
chy by a Nobility remains alſo uncur'd, and incurable.
THESE are points to which I had ſpoken before; but ſomthing the Balance of
concerning France and foren Guards was mumbld by the Prevaricator France
in a wrong place; while he was ſpeaking of Turky, where there is no
ſuch thing. This, leſt I be thought to have courted oppoſition for
nothing, Ihall open a new Scene; while I take the occaſion in this place
to ſpeak firſt of the Balance of the French Monarchy, and next of the
Nature and Uſe of Foren Guards.
THE whole Territory of France, except the Crown Lands;
which on this account are not conſiderable, conſiſts of three ſhares or
parts, wherof the Church holds one, the Nobility another; and the
Preſidents, Advocats, other Officers of the Parlaments, Courts of
Juſtice, the Citizens, Merchants; Tradeſmen, the Treaſurers, Re-
ceivers of the Cuſtoms, Aids, Taxes, Impoſitions, Gabels, all which
together make a vaſt body, hold a third: by how equal Portions I am
forry that I do nor know, nor where to learn; but this is the Ba.
lance of the French Monarchy, to which the Peaſant holding nothing,
but living (tho in one of the beſt Countrys of the World) in the
meaneſt and moſt miſerable condition of a Laborer, or Hynd, is of
no account at all.
THE Partys that hold the Balance in a Territory are thoſe of
whom the Government dos naturally conſiſt, wherfore theſe are calld
Eſtates ; ſo the Clergy, the Nobility, and the Commons, are the
three Eſtates of France. Tho the third, becauſe the Peaſant partaking
not of the Balance can (in relation to Government) be of no account,
is not call'd the Commons, but only the third Eſtate : wheras thé
Yeomanry and Gentry in England having weigh’d as well in the Ba-
lance as the Church and the Nobility, the three Eſtates of England
(while the Monarchy was in vigor) were the Clergy, the Nobility,
and the Commons. The Conſent of Nations evinces that the Function Grotius de
of the Clergy, or Prieſt
, except where otherwiſe determind by Law, apper. Imp. Sum. Pst.
tains to the Magiſtrat. By this right NOAH, ABRAHAM, JO B, C. 2. 3. 4.
with the reſt of the Patriarchs, inſtructed their Familys, or ſacrific’d.
There ſeems to have bin a kind of Commonwealth in Canaan, while
MELCHISED.E C was both King and Prieſt. Such alſo was Moses
till he conſecrated A ARON, and confer'd the Prieſthood upon the Levits,
who are exprefly ſaid to ſuccede to the firſtborn, that is to the Patriarchs,
who till then exercis'd that Function. Nor was it otherwiſe with the
Gentils
, where they, who had the Soverain Power, or were in eminent Ma-
giftracy, did alſo the Prieſtly Office (omnino apud veteres qui rerum
potiebantur, iidem Auguriá tenebant: ut enim fapere, ſic divinare,
regale ducebant, ſays Cicero; and VIRGIL, REx Anius, Rex
idem hominum, PhoeBIQUE Sacerdos.) Tou find the Heros, that
is Printės, in Poets, facrificing. The Ethiopian, Egyptian, Lacedemo-
nian Kings did the like. In Athens conſtantly and in Rome, when they
had no Kings, occaſionally they ele&ted a Rex facrorum, or King. Prieji
.
So that a free People had thus far Power of electing their Prieſts, is
not deny'd by any man. This came, it ſhould ſeem to be otherwiſe Original of
eſtabliſhd by the Law in Egypt, where the Prieſts (whoſe Lands Landed Clergy.
Joseph when he bought thoſe of the People did not buy) being Gen. 47.22.
great Landlords, it may be to the Third of the whole Territory,
were one of the three Éftates of the Realm. And it is clear in Scripá
ture that the People, till they fold their Lands, became not Servants to
PHA-
1
in
11
The Prerogative
272
L. .
Book I. PHARAOH. While A GESILAUS was in Egypt they depos’d their
King, which implys the recovery of their Balance; but fo, feeing they
Xenoph. in
Orac. de Ageſ.
ſet
up another, as withal ſhews the Balance of the Nobility to have
bin predominant. Theſe Particulars ſeem to com near to the account
of DIODORUS Siculus, by whom the Balance of Egypt ſhould
have ſtood thus : The whole Revenue was divided into three Parts,
wherof the Prieſt had the firſt, the King had the ſecond, and the Nobility
had the third. It ſeems to me that the Prieſts had theirs by their an-
tient Right and Title, untouch'd by JOSEPH; that the Kings had
all the reſt by the purchaſe of JOSEPH; and that in time, as is uſual in
like caſes, a Nobility came thro the bounty of ſucceding Kings to
ſbare with them in one half. But however it came about, Egypt by
this means is the firſt example of a Monarchy upon a Nobility, at
leaſt diſtributed into three Eſtates by means of a Landed Clergy,
which by conſequence came to be the greateſt Counſillors of State,
and, fitting Religion to their uſes, to bring the People to be the moſt
ſuperſtitious in the whole World.
WERE it not for this Example, I ſhould have ſaid, that the
Indowment of a Clergy or religious Order with Lands, and the erect-
ing of them into an Eſtate of the Realm or Government, were no an-
tienter than the Goths and Vandals, who introducing a like Policy,
which to this day takes place throout the Chriſtian World, have bin
the cauſe;
FIRST, Why the Clergy have bin generally great Counſillors to
Kings, while the People are led into Superſtition.
SECONDLY, By planting a religious Order in the Earth, why
Religion
has bin brought to ſerve worldly ends.
AND, Thirdly, by rendring the Miter able to make War; why
of latter Ages we have had ſuch a thing as War for Religion, which
till the Clergy came to be a third State or Landlords, was never known
in the World: For that ſom Citys of Greece, taking Arms upon the
Thucyd. l. I. Uſurpation or Violation of ſom Temple, have call'd it the Holy War;
ſuch Diſputes having bin put upon matter of fact, and not of Faith,
in which every man was free, came not to this account. MOSES WAS
learn’d in all the Learning of the Egyptians; but a Landed Clergy in-
troduc'd he not in Iſrael: nor went the Apoſtles about to lay any ſuch
Foundation of a Church. Abating this one example of Egypt, till
the Goths and Vandals, who brought in the third Eſtate, a Govern-
ment, if it were inequal, conſiſted but of two Eſtates; as that of
Rome, whether under the Kings or the Commonwealth, conſiſted of
the Patricians and Plebeians, or of the Nobility and the People. And
an equal Commonwealth conſiſts but of one, which is the People:
for example of this you have Lacedemon and Venice, where the Peo-
ple being few, and having many Subjects or Servants
, might alſo
be call'da Nobility, as in regard of their Subjects they are in Venice,
and in regard of their Helors or Servants, they might have bin in
Lacedemon. That, I ſay, which, introducing two Eſtates, cauſes
Diviſion, or makes a Commonwealth inequal, is not that ſhe has a
Nobility, without which ſhe is depriv’d of her moſt ſpecial Orna-
ment, and weaken'd in lier Conduct, but when the Nobility only is
capable of Magiſtracy, or of the Senat; and where this is ſo orderd,
ſhe is inequal, as Rome. But where the Nobility is no otherwiſe ca-
pable of Magiſtracy, nor of the Senat, than by Election of the
People,
ti
*
of Popular Government.
273
69.
70.
People, the Commonwealth conſiſts but of one Order, and is equal; as Chap: 9.
Lacedemon or Venice.
BUT for a Politician commend me to the Conſiderer, he will have
Rome to have bin an equal Commonwealth, and Venice to be an ine-
qual one, which muſt be evinc'd by wiredrawing. For having elf-
where, as has bin ſhewn, admitted without oppoſition that the Balance
of Empire is well divided into national and provincial, the humor now.confid
. p. 16.
takes him to ſpin that wedg into ſuch a thred, as by intangling of
theſe two, may make them both eaſy to be broken. Hereto he be-
takes himſelf in this manner. As Mr.HARRINGTON has well ob-
ſerv’d (p. 40.) where there are two Partys in a Republic with equal
Power (as in that of Rome, the People had one half, and the Nobility had
the other half ) Confuſion and Miſerý are there intail’d. For remedy wher-
of, or to avoid this, there can be no way but to make the Commonwealth ve-
ry inequal.
IN anſwer to this, there will need no more than to repeat the ſame
things honeſtly. Mr. HARRINGTON ſpeaks of the national Ba-
lance of Empire (p. 40.) to this ſenſe: Where the Nobility holds half
the Property, or about that proportion, and the People the other half (the
ſhares of the Land may be equal; but in regard the Nobility have
much
among Few, and the People little among Many, the Few will
not be contented to have Authority, which is all their proper ſhare
in a Commonwealth, but will be bringing the People under Power,
which is not their proper ſhare in a Commonwealth ; wherfore this
Commonwealth muſt needs be inequal. And except by altering the
Balance, as the Athenians did by the Sifasthia, or reciſion of Debts;
or as the Romans went about to do by an Agrarian, it be brought
to ſuch an equality, that the whole Power be in the People, and there
remain no more than Authority to the Nobility) there is no remedy
but the one (with perpetual feud) will eat out the other, as the People did
the Nobility in Athens, and the Nobility the People in Rome. Where
the Carcaſe is, there will be the Eagles alſo; where the Riches are,
there will be the Power. So if a few be as rich as all the reſt, a few
will have as much Power as all the reſt; in which caſe the Common-
wealth is incqual, and there can be no end of ſtaving and tailing, till
it be brought to equality. Thus much for the national Balance;
For the provincial, there Power dos not follow Property, but the
contrary: This the Prevaricator having acknowlegd, lets flip, to
the end he may take a gripe of Venice, which, (becauſe the three
or four thouſand of which originally conſiſted, and now conſiſts
that whole Government, having acquird Provinces, and increaſe of
their City by later comers, do not admit theſe to participation of
Power) he ſays is an inequal Commonwealth. He will be a Mill-
horſe, whether the Cake be dow or not; for this is to draw in a circle :
and Rome, which by his former Arguments ſhould have bin equal,
by this again muſt be inequal, ſeeing Rome as little admitted her
Provinces into the body of the Commonwealth, as dos Venice. This
claſh is but by way of Parentheſis ; to return therfore to the buſineſs
in preſent agitation.
THE Eſtates, be they one, or two, or thrce, are ſuch (as was
faid) by virtue of the Balance, upon which the Government muſt
naturally depend. Wherfore conſtitutively the Government of France
(and all other Monarchys of like Balance) was adminiſter'd by an
Nn
Aſſembly
.
The Prerogative
274
Book I. Aſſembly of the three Eſtates; and thus continu'd till that Nation
n being vanquiſh'd by the Engliſh, CHARLES the 7th was put to
ſuch ſhifts as, for the recovery of himſelf in the greateſt diſtreſs, he
could make. To which recovery, while the Eſtates could not be le-
gally callºd, he happening to attain without them, ſo orderd his
affairs, that his Succeſſors, by adding to his Inventions, came to rule
without this Aſſembly; a way not futing with the nature of their
Balance, which therfore requir’d ſom Aſliſtance by force, and other
concurring Policys of like nature, wherof the foren Guards of that
Monarchy are one; the great baits alluring the Nobility another; and
the emergent Intereſt of the Church a third.
To begin with the laſt of theſe; the Church (except it be in a
War for Religion, as when they join'd with the Princes of Lorrain,
and what Party of the French 'Nobility were made, or they could
make againſt the King of Navar) are not of themſelves ſo hot at
hand, or promt to Arms: but the King being (to uſe their word)
no Heretic, thro their great apprehenſion of the third Eſtate, as that
which is moſt addicted to the Proteſtant Religion, may be confident
they will never ſide with the People. So by this emergent Intereſt or
Accident he has the Church ſure enough.
FOR the Nobility, which is exceding gallant, this Change has
the greateſt baits ; for wheras the Church being not ſpar'd, the third
Eſtate is laden, and the Peaſant overladen with Taxes, the Nobility
is not only at better eaſe in this regard, but for the greater or more
conſiderable part, receives advantage by it: the King having always,
whether in Peace or War, a great Cavalry, than which there is no
better in the world for the Exerciſe, Entertainment, and Profit of the
Nobility; Governments of Citys, Caſtles, Provinces in abundance,
which he rarely diſtributes to any other. The greater Nobility are
Marechals, Generals; the leſs Officers in the Armys, ſpecially of the
Horſe, the Emoluments wherof they receive alſo in time of Peace;
and many of this Order being Penſioners, taſte of the King's Libera-
lity, without taking pains, or having any Imployment at all. By
which both that France is a Monarchy by a Nobility, and how ſhe
holds her Nobility, is apparent.
NOW the Church and the Nobility ſtanding thus ingag'd to the
King, by which means he has two parts of the
Balance to one, it is
demonſtrable that the Government muſt be quiet. Nor, ſeeing the
Church for the reaſon ſhewn is ſure enough, coms the Government
(ſince the Proteſtant Citysand Holds were demoliſh'd) to be otherwiſe
diſquieted than by the flying out of the Nobility, which, whenever it
happens in any party conſiderable, either for the Number, or the In-
tereſt, cauſes the Crown to ſhake ; for it ſeldom coms to paſs upon
this occaſion, but the third Eſtate, or ſom part of it, takes Arms im-
mediatly. In which place it is worthy to obſerv'd, that Wealth, ac-
cording to the diſtribution of the Balance, has contrary motions.
The third Eſtate in France having Riches, and thoſe laden with
Taxes, com to have ſomthing to loſe, and ſomthing to ſave: which
keeps them in continual fear or hope. The Nobility holding to the
King, the third Eſtate has ſomthing to loſe, which withholds them
from Arms thro fear; but the Nobility flying out, the third Eſtate
has ſomthing to ſave, which precipitats them into Arms thro hope :
wheras the Peaſant having nothing to ſave or to loſe, to hope or to fear,
*
never
of Popular Government.
275
1
never ſtirs. The caſe ſtanding thus, the ſufficiency of the French Chap. 9:
Politician (ſince the Maſterpiece of Cardinal RICHLIEU, in delo
moliſhing thoſe Walls of the Proteſtants, which had otherwiſe by
this time bin a Refuge for the third Eſtate, and perhaps overturn'd the
Monarchy) lys altogether in finding for the Nobility work abroad,
or balancing them in ſuch fort at home, that if a Party flys out, tliere
may be a ſtronger within to reduce its or at
leaſt to be oppos'd to it.
In this caſe, let the native Intereſt of the Nobility, ſince the Aſſem-
blys of the three Eſtates were aboliſh?d, might cool the remaining
Party, or make them ſlower in the redreſs of ſuch Diſorders or Dif.
contents than were requiſit, the King is wiſely provided of Foren
Guards; which being always in readineſs
, and not obnoxious to the
native Intereſt, may upon like occaſions be of more Expedition and
Truſt. Being com thus to foren Arms, which is the point I more
eſpecially propos’d to my ſelf in the preſent Diſcourſe, one Objection
in relation to what has bin already faid, ſeems to interpoſe it ſelf:
Seeing France, while it is not governd by the Aſſembly of States, iş
yet
of the ſame Balance it was when govern'd by the Aſſembly of
States; it may be ſaid that a Government of the fame Balance may.
admit of divers Adminiſtrations.
TO which I need make no other anſwer, than to put you in mind
that while this Government was natural, or adminiſter'd by the Aſſem-
bly of States, it is celebrated by MACCHIAVEL to have bin the
beſt order'd of any Monarchy in the world; and that what it is, or has
bin of later times, you may believe your own eys or ears.
THERE be yet, before I can com to foren Guards, ſom previous Of Arms, and
their kind.
Conſiderations. All Government, as is imply'd by what has bin already
ſhewn, is of theſe three kinds: A Government of Servants : A Goo
vernment of Subjects; or, a Government of Citizens. The firſt is ab-
ſolute Monarchy, as that of Turky: The ſecond Ariſtocratical Mo-
narchy, as that of France : The third a Commonwealth, as thoſe of
Iſrael, of Rome, of Holland. Now (to follow MACCHIAVEL
in part) of theſe, the Government of Servants is the harder to be
conquer'd, and the eaſier to be held: The Government of Subjects is
the eaſier to be conquer'd, and the harder to be held. To which I
ſhall preſume to add, that the Government of Citizens is both the
hardeſt to be conquerd, and the hardeſt to be lield.
MY Authors Reaſons, why a Government of Servants is the hardeſt
to be conquer’d, com to this, that they are under perpetual Diſciplin
and Command, void of ſuch Intereſts and Factions, as have Hands or
Power to lay hold upon Advantages or Innovation; whence he that
invades the Turk muſt truſt to his own ſtrength, and not rely upon
Diſorders in the Government, or Forces which he ſhall be ſure enough
to find united.
HIS Reaſons why this Government, being once broken, is eaſily
held, are, that the Armys once paſt hope of rallying, there being no
ſuch thing as Familys hanging together
, or Nobility to ſtir up their
Dependents to further Reluctancy for the preſent, or to preſerve
themſelves by complacence with the Conquerors for future Diſcontents
or Advantages, he that has won the Garland has no more to do but to
extinguiſh the Royal Line, and wear it ever after in ſecurity. For
the People having bin always Slaves, are ſuch whoſe condition he may
better, in which caſe they are Gainers by their Conqueror, but can
ti
+
MIN
1
!
1
Nn 2
never
276
The Prerogative
Book I. never make worſe, and therfore they loſe nothing by him. Hence
V ALEXANDER liaving conquer'd the Perſian Empire, he and his Cap-
tains after him could hold it without the leaſt diſpute, except it aroſe
among themſelves. Hence MAHOME T the Second having taken
Conſtantinople, and put PALÆOLOG us the Greec Emperor (whoſe
Government was of like nature with the Perſian) together with his
whole Family, to the Sword, the Turk has held that Empire without
reluctancy.
ON the other ſide, the Reaſons why a Government of Subjects is
eaſilier conquerd, are theſe: That it is ſupported by a Nobility ſo an-
tient, ſo powerful, and of ſuch hold and influence upon the People,
that the King without danger, if not ruin to himſelf or the Throne
(an example wherof was given in HE N. 7th of England) can nei-
ther invade their Privileges, nor level their Éſtates; which remaining,
they have power upon every diſcontent to call in an Enemy, as
RÓBERT Count of Artois did the Engliſh, and the Duke of Guiſe
the Spaniard into France.
THE Reaſons why a Government of Subjects being ſo eaſily con-
querd, is nevertheleſs the harder to be held, are theſe: That the No-
bility being ſoon out of countenance in ſuch a caſe, and repenting
themſelves of ſuch a bargain, have the ſame means in their hands
wherby they brought in the Enemy, to drive him out, as thoſe of
France did both the
Engliſh and the Spaniard.
FOR the Government of Citizens, as it is of two kinds, an equal
or an inequal Commonwealth, the Reaſons why it is the hardeſt to be
conquer'd, are alſo of two kinds; as firſt, the Reaſons why a Go-
vernment of Citizens, where the Commonwealth is equal, is hardelt to
be conquer'd, are, that the Invader of ſuch a Society muſt not only truſt
to his own ſtrength, inaſmuch as the Commonwealth being equal,
he muſt needs find them united, but in regard that ſuch Citizens, be-
ing all Soldiers or train'd up to their .Arms, which they uſe not for
the defence of Slavery, but of Liberty (a condition not in this world
to be better'd) they have more ſpecially upon this occaſion the higheſt
Soul of Courage, and (if their Territory be of any extent) the vaſteſt
Body of a well diſciplin’d Militia that is poſſible in nature: wher-
fore an example of ſuch a one overcom by the Arms of a Monarch, is not
to be found in the World. And if ſom ſmall City of this Frame has
happend to be vanquiſh'd by a potent Commonwealth, this is her
Prerogative, her Towers are her Funeral Pile, and ſhe expires in her own
flame, leaving nothing to the Conqueror but her Aſhes, as Saguntum over-
whelm’d by Carthage, and Numantia by Rome.
THE Reaſons why a Government of Citizens, where the Com-
monwealth is inequal, is
, next the former, the hardeſt to be conquerid,
are the ſame, with this difference, that tho her Peace be not perfect
within, her condition is not to be better'd by any thing without.
Wherfore Rome in all her ſtrife never calld in an Enemy; and if an
Enemy upon occaſion of her ſtrife, and hopes of advantage by it,
came withouť calling, he preſented her with her moſt Soverain Cure,
who had no leiſure to deſtroy her ſelf, till having no Enemy to find
her work, ſhe became her own.
Nondum tibi defuit hoftis,
In te verte manus-
.
Nor
+
1
of Popular Governmeni.
277
Guic. I: tri
proper Arms:
Nor is there any example that a Government of this kind was ever Chap. 9.
ſubdu'd by the Arms of a Monarch ; tho ſom indeed
that have call'd or ſuffer'd foren Princes or Force to com in, as Holland
by Marriages of their Princes, and Genoa thro her Factions, as thoſe
of the FIESCI and ADORNI.
TO conclude this part as to the Reaſons why a Government of Ci-
tizens fo acquir’d or poſſeſt, as thro Marriage, or Faction, is the
hardeſt to be held, there needs no more than that men accuſtom'd to
their Arms and their Libertys will never indure the Yoke. Wherfore
the Spaniard, tho a mighty King, no ſooner began in Holland, a ſmall
Commonwealth, to innovat or break her Orders, than ſhe threw him
off with ſuch Courage and Diſdain, as is admirable to the World.
And ſomwhat of the like kind did Genoa by the help of her DORIA
in the vindication of fer Liberty from France.
TO com by this fartheſt way about as I think the neareſt way
liome: Arms are of two ſorts, Proper or Improper ; that is, Native Proper and Ima
or Foren.
PROPER and Native Arms are, according to the triple nature
of Government, of three kinds; Servants in Arms, as the Helots in
Lacedemon, the Timariots and Fanizarys in Turky; Subjects in Arms,
as the Horſe in France, and the Seaguards or Forces in Venice; or Ci-
tizens in Arms, as thoſe upon the Lexiarcha in Athens, of the More in
Lacedemon, and the Legions in Rome.
IMPROPER or Foren Arms are of two ſorts; Auxiliarys, and
Mercenarys
AUXILIARYS are ſuch as are ſupply'd by virtue of ſom
League, as were thoſe of the Latins and Italians to the Romans; and
thoſe of the Cantons of Swiſs (except Zuric) to the King of France :
or they may be ſuch as are occaſionally lent freely, or let forth for
Mony by one State to another, the latter wherof differ not much from
Mercenarys.
MERCENARYS are Soldiers of Fortune that have no
other Trade than their Arms, and let out themſelves for Mony; of
ſuch conſiſted the greateſt part of the Carthaginian Strength, ſuch is
the Land Force of Venice, and, notwithſtanding the antient League of
France with thoſe Nations, ſuch at this day are the Swiſs and Scotill
Guards (and ſomtimes a good part of the Foot) in France.
MACCHIAVEL diſcourſes upon theſe Particulars in his Art of
War, to admiration : by whom I ſhall therfore ſteer.
WHERE the Arms in bulk are proper, and conſiſting of Citizens,
they have other Trades, and therfore are no Soldiers of Fortune; and
yet becauſe the Commonwealth has Arms for her Trade (in regard
he is a Magiſtrat given for the good of Mankind, and bears not her Sword
in vain) they are all educated as well in Military as Civil Diſciplin,
taking their turns 'in ſervice of either nature according to the occaſion,
and the Orders of the Commonwealth, as in Iſrael
, Athens, Lacedemon,
and Rome, which had (if their Territorys permitted, and ſomtimes,
as I may ſay, whether their Territorys permitted or no, as in Iſrael)
the vaſteſt, the higheſt temper’d, and the beſt diſciplin’d Militia,
that is to be found in the whole compaſs of Story. Som Armys of
Ifrael have conffted of three or four hundred thouſand men: Rome
upon the rumor of a Gallic Tumult, arm'd in Italy only, without Plin
. L. Ærci-
foren Aid, ſeventy thouſand Horſe and ſeven hundred thouſand Foot ; tilio
Regulo
things Coss:
278
The Prerogative
.
Book I. things in our days (when the Turk can hardly arm half ſo many) not
to be credited.
HENCE that a Commonwealth, which had not firſt broken her ſelf,
or bin broken by ſom other Commonwealth, ſhould not be found to have bir
conquer'd by the Arms of any Monarch, is not miraculous, but a natural
effect of an apparent Cauſe. In this place, or upon this Text, Divines
whom I would deſire not to be Enemys of popular Power, but to give
MACCHIAVEL his due, ſhall, if they pleaſe, hear him make a
Arte della goodly Sermon, in theſe words: ſf antient Commonwealths and Govern-
Guer. Proem. ments us’d Diligence in any other Order to make their People lovers of
Peace, faithful to their Country, and to have the fear of God before their
eys, they doubl'd it in this of their Militia : for of whom ſhould your
Country expect greater Faith, than of ſuch as have offer?d themſelves to
dy for her whom ſhould be indeavor to make greater Lovers of Peace,
than them who only can inſave her by force? in whom ſhould there bé
greater Fear of God, than in ſuch as carry their Lives in their hands ?
This, when Langivers and Captains rightly cinſider'd, was the cauſe why
Soldiers were eſteem’d, honor’d, follow'd, and imitated above all men in the
World; wheras fince ſuch Orders are broken, and Cuſtom is altogether de-
viated from the courſe of antient Prudence, men are com to deteſt the Ini-
quity of the Camp, and fly the Converſation of ſuch as are in Arms, as the
Pejčilence. Where the Arms in bulk are proper, but conſiſt of Sub-
jeěts, they are the beſt next; and but the beſt next, as appears by all
Examples antient and modern. The Arms with which PYRRHUS
Prince of Epyrus invaded the Romans, were of Subjects; yet that
Prince, tho he was not vanquiſh'd by the Romans, confeſt their ad-
vantage, ard
gave them over. The Spaniard being a far more po-
tent King than was PYRRHUS, has acknowleg'd as much to the
Hollanders, tlo a far leſs Commonwealth than Rome : So have the
Princes of Auſtria, and of Burgundy, to the Switzers. That the Arms
of Subjects are nevertheleſs as much ſuperior to the Arms of Servants,
as inferior to the Arms of Citizens, is as plain ; ſeeing as ALEXAN-
Der, with thirty thouſand Subjects, vanquiſh'd DARIUS, having
innumerable Slaves; ſo thirty thouſand Chriſtians are at this day a
match for any Army of Turks : and we ſee Venice, whoſe Force by
Sea conſiſts of Subjects, to have made him quit that Element near as
fully to her Dominion or Empire, as did the Perſian to Athens.
TO Arms that are proper, but conſiſt of Servants, all the pre-
eminence that can be given is, that they are better than foren Arms;
a proof wherof we have in thoſe of SELIMUS, wherby he con:
quer'd the Mamalucs ; who being but a foren Force that held Egypt in
ſubjection, the Country was irrecoverably loſt, and, for the reaſons
already ſhewn, as eaſily kept.
IMPROPER Arms, whether Auxiliary or Mercenary, where the
Force of a Prince or of a Commonwealth conſiſts, for the bulk or
greater part, of no other, are the leaſt effectual, and the moſt dange-
rous of all. For Auxiliarys, or what effe&t has bin found of them by
Princes or Commonwealths, it was ſeen in France during the League
by the Spaniard; and in Holland during the Reign of Queen ELIZA-
BETH by the Engliſh; but eſpecially in the Goths and Vandals, who
having bin Auxiliarys or Mercenarys, rely'd upon by the later Em-
perors, came therby to ruin the Roman Empire.
--
*
.
MERCE-
of Popular Government.
279
MERCENARYS who make their Arms their Trade, muſt of Chap. 9.
all others be the moſt pernicious; for what can we expect leſs of ſuch
whoſe Art is not otherwiſe ſo profitable, than that they ſhould (as
MACCHIAVEL ſhews) be breakers of their Faith, given up to Rapin,
Enemys of Peace and Government?
To inſtance in fom Commonwealths, that of Carthage after her firſt
War with the Romans, fell thro the Rebellion of SPENDIus and
MATHO, Ringleaders of her Mercenarys, into another that was far
more dangerous. Of ſuch a Dilemma were the Arms of this State,
that if HANNIBAL had conquer'd Rome, le muſt have bin King of
Carthage ; and not conquering Rome, Carthage was ruin'd. The Com-
monwealth of Milan, truſting her ſelf to F. SFORZA and his Mer-
cenarys, became the Subject of lier Servant, and he her Duke. Nor
is Venice, whoſe Land-Forces are of the ſame kind, otherwiſe in ſafe-
ty as to theſe, than by her Situation. To give ſom inſtances of the
ſame nature in Princes: The Father of F. SFORZA being Captain of
a like mercenary Army, forc'd JOAN Queen of Naples, whom he
left diſarm'd in the midſt of her Enemys, to lay. her ſelf at the feet of
the King of Arragon; and BRACCIO by ſuch another Treachery had
plainly poſſeft himſelf of the Kingdom of Naples, had he not bin bro-
ken at Aquila, where Death intercepted his deſign. From what has
bin ſaid (firſt of Government, and then of Arms) if a Government
of Servants be harder to be conquer'd, and eaſier to be held, then in
this foren Arms muſt needs be leaſt neceſſary, and moſt dangerous.
IF a Government of Subjects be eaſier to be conquer'd, and harder
to be held, then in this foren Arms may be more neceſſary, but muſt
be leſs dangerous.
BUT tho a Government of Citizens be both liardeſt to be con-
querd, and hardeſt to be held, yet as it is again in this regard of
two kinds, this cannot be ſaid of each kind alike; wherfore I muſt
diſtinguiſh.
IN a Government of Citizens, if the Commonwealth be not for
increaſe, but preſervation only, as Lacedemon, Carthage, Venice, foreni
Arms are both neceſſary and dangerous; but in a Government of Ci-
tizens, where the Commonwealth is both for increaſe and preſervation,
as Rome, foren Arms are neither neceſſary nor dangerous.
TO repeat the parts of this Concluſion, which being brief is obſcure,
more fully and particularly.
THE Empire of Turky is of the harder kind to be conquer'd, wher-
fore the Turk needs not foren Guards to defend him, but it is of the ea-
fier to be held; wherfore let him take heed of intruſting his Perſon
with foren Guards, who having a foren Intereſt, may have a foren
Nation to aſſiſt them : and ſo the Perſon of the Prince being in their
hands, they have no more to do than to extinguiſh the Royal Line;
and the Empire being eaſily held, is their own thenceforth with
ſecu-
rity. Thus the Mamalucs which were at firſt foren Guards, extinguiſh-
ing the Royal Line of the Kings of Egypt, came to poſſeſs and hold
that Realm without oppoſition. Who well conſiders this point, will
never enough admire the Policy of the Turk in the creation (as it
were) of his Janizarys, free from any national Intereſt that might
make them dream of, or deſire Liberty ; and yet ſo void of all foren
Intereſt or Knowlege, that they know not what, or who were their
Country or Parents. Hence tho they have Intereſt to murder the
Turk
280
The Prerogative
Book I. Turk, and ſomtimes do accordingly, they have no further Intereſt in
the world but what depends upon the Government; and ſo the Em-
pire is ſafe, tho the Prince be in danger : wheras if they were foren
Guards, or had any native Intereſt, not only the Prince, but the Em-
pire too would be in danger, the reſt being Servants, and ſuch whoſe
condition might be better'd by a change, but could be no worſe.
Wherfore a Government of Servants muſt by no means admit of foren
Guards or Mamalucs.
BUT the Empire of France, where the Nobility are not only ſubject
to fly out, but to call in Strangers, may have uſe of foren Guards, which
not obnoxious to native Intereſt and Factions, as thoſe of the Nobili-
ty, are the readieſt and beſt help at this lift; yet not dangerous, tho
having the Prince in their power, becauſe by him they are ſafe from
the Nobility, who, were it not for the Prince, would be ſo far from
bearing or brooking foren Guards, that in caſe a Forener came in up-
on their call, having the ſame means to help themſelves wherby they
brought him in, they would ſhake the Yoke, and the ends why they
call d him in, being ſatisfy'd or repented of, drive him out again, as
they did the Spaniard and the Engliſh. But if this Government being
invaded or conquerid, be ſo hard to be kept, how much harder being
ſurpriz’d? Wherfore' in a Government by Subjects, foren Arms may be
more neceſſary, but muſt be leſs dangerous.
IN a Commonwealth for preſervation, as Lacedemon, Carthage, Ve-
nice, foren Arms are neceſſary : So Lacedemon, tho able to defend her
ſelf by her proper Forces againſt any one City, yet the Wars in Greece
going much upon Leagues and Confederats, was forc'd alſo to make uſe
of her Confederats, and ſomtimes of her Helots.
BUT as antiently to Carthage, ſo now to Venice, foren or merce-
nary Forces are eſſential, becauſe for Land-ſervice ſuch a Conſtitution
can have no other : Yet is this courſe extremely dangerous, as appear'd
by Lacedemon, who (being ever in fear of her Helots) when ſhe had
acquir’d upon the matter the whole Empire of Greece, came, by the
Rebellion of her Confederats, not only to loſe all, but likewiſe to ru-
in. For Carthage, upon the Mutiny of SPENDIUs and MA THO,
ſhe eſcap'd, as at other times upon like occaſions, very narrowly. That
ſuch an Accident neither has befaln Venice, nor can befal her, is to be
attributed to her Situation, by which, in this regard, ſhe is ſecure:
Nevertheleſs, her Progreſs or Increaſe, which by this means either
cannot be great, or being great, muſt render her but the more infirm,
is fully bard.
TO a Commonwealth for increaſe, which always takes in the
whole body of the People, foren Arms (ſeeing ſhe abounds above all
other kinds of Policy, with ſuch as are proper) muſt needs be the
leaſt neceſſary; and they are the moſt ſafe, becauſe never admitting
them, but for her mere convenience and frugality in expence of native
Blood, ſhe receives no ſuch charge of them as can recoil, but muſt car-
ry point blank, and as vigorouſly at her proper Intereſt, very near as
hier
proper Arms. Thas did the Latin and Italian Auxiliarys, of which,
join'd with the Roman Legions, conſiſted a Conſular Army.
BY thus much it ſeems that an inference from the ſucceſs of Arms to
the perfection of Government, and from the perfection of Government to
the ſucceſs of Arms, ſhould be no fallacious way of diſputing.
1
*
BUT
of Popular Government.
281
149
HH
BUT this being ſweaty work with the Conſiderer, who loves his Chap. 9.
eaſe, it is enough to argue thus: The Switz, Scotiſh, and French
Guards, have never bin the Authors of any Sedition, therfore the Sedi-
tiouſneſs of a Nobility may be mended by foren Guards : which is, as if
one ſhould ſay, ſuch a Phyſician has never bin the cauſe of the Gout ;
therfore the Gout may be cur'd by ſuch a Phyſician. That foren
Arms may be well enough apply'd in the caſe of a feditious Nobi-
lity, and have ſom good effects, is not deny'd : but is France ther:
fore cur'd of her Sedition, or remains ſhe, notwithſtanding her foren
Guards, the moſt ſeditious Example in the world? If thus ſhe has
not bin, nor be, what has he read of the Princes of the Blood in fora
mer times, or heard of late from them? But if thus ſhe has bin, and
be, is it not a fine way of Cure to give us an example of the Diſeaſe
for the Remedy? Nor are her Guards ſo void of Sedition neither ;
but the Switzer, if he wants his pay, dares threaten Paris : the Scot,
at leaſt of late years, has not bin ſo bold; but if a Prince flys out, thé
Enſigns of the French Guards will one way or other be Captains,
while Soldier and Officer too follows his Affections or Intereſts, which
way ſoever they frame. I ſhould be glad to know when a Dragon
fell from that Court, that did not bear down Stars with his Train.
But the Prevaricator is ſet upon it: wheras of late years the Fanizarys
are known to have bin far more imbru'd in the Blood of their Princes
than ever; he gives us his honeſt word, that of late years in Turky
they begin to learn the art of poiſing the Janizarys (who are the Foot
of the Princes Guard) by the Spahys (who are the Horſe of the
fame) and ſo have frequently evaded the danger of their Mutinys. At
which rate, ſeeing every Army conſiſts of Horſe and Foot, no Army
could be mutinous. If theſe had not bin meer ſlights, and ſo intended,
he might have don well to have ſhewn us one Mutiny of the Janizarys
appeas'd by the Spáhys. But all the parts of his Politics, as was ſaid
of thoſe in Rhetoric, conſiſt of Pronunciation.
THUS the Wounds of Monarchy, notwithſtanding the former,
or this laſt Remedy of foren Guards, are ſtill bleeding or feſtering.
BUT his Courage is undaunted (aut viam inveniet aut faciet) he
will either mend a Government, or make one, by aſſerting without
any example, but with egregious confidence, That the perfection of conſid. p. 48,
Monarchy is free from thoſe, flaws which are chargʻd upon it
, and that it
conſiſts in governing by a Nobility, weighty enough to keep the People un-
der
, yet not tall enough in any particular Perſon to meaſure with the Prince;
and by a moderat Army kept under the notion of Guards and Gariſons,
be ſufficient to ſtrangle all Sedition in the Cradle : from which
mixture, or counterpoiſe of a Nobility and an Army, ariſes the moſt excel-
lent form of Monarchical Government.
THER E's for your learning now, A Model which is a ſhort
Horſe, and a Legiſlator that has foon curry'd him. To the parts of it,
conſiſting of a Nobility, and in force, I have already ſpoken ſeverally. Í
ſhall now ſpeak to the whole together ; that is, to the imagin’d mixture
or counterpoiſe of a Nobility and an Army; and becauſe there is no-
thing in Nature that has not had a natural effect by ſom example.
THE ſcale of Arms, or of Iron, continu'd in the Line of W1L-
LIAM the Conqueror; and the ſcale of Property, or Gold, con-
tinu'd in the Barons of England, and their Succeſſors. But in this be-
fore the Barons Wars conſiſted not the perfection of the Monarchy,
becauſe
MI
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282
The Prerogative
!
Book I. becauſe it preponderated too much on the ſide of Arms; nor after
the Barons Wars, becauſe the King, putting Power (which he
could not keep out of their fingers) into the hands of the Nobility,
it became a vicious Conſtitution, and a Monarchy only in name (ſo
ſays the Conſiderer) therfore the Balance being then only even,
when neither the King could overbalance or get the better of the
Barons, nor the Barons
overbalance or get the better of the King; the
perfection of Monarchy conſiſted in the Barons Wars! Lycurgus
the Second !
MARK; the King by all means muſt have a Nobility weighty
enough to keep down the People; and then he muſt have an Army to
hold Gold weight with his Nobility : as if the Nobility in that cafe
would keep down the People, and not fetch them up (as did the Ba-
rons) into their Scale, that fo together they might weigh down the
Army; which fooner or later is the infallible conſequence of this
Phanſy, or let it be ſhewn where it was ever otherwife. To inſtance
in France is quite contrary, where all the conſiderable Offices and
Commands being in the Nobility, or the richer ſort of that Nation,
the Balance of Arms and of Property are not two, but one and the
ſame. There is no way for Monarchy, but to have no Army, or no
other than the Nobility, which makes the regulated Monarchy, as in
France, Spain, &c. or to have an Army that may weigh down Nobi-
lity and People too ; that is, deſtroy them both, which makes the ab-
ſolute way of Monarchy, as in Turky: the wit of man never found,
nor ſhall find a third, there being no ſuch thing in Nature.
THIS Chapter is already with the longeſt, and yet I muſt give you
a Corollary, pouce de roy, or a piece above meaſure; relating to a Queſti-
on on which the greeneſt Politician that ever brought his Verjuce to
the Preſs, has ſpur'd me.
WHÉR E he deſires to know my opinion of the way of governing by
Councils, which he confeſſes he has always thought admirable ; he dos not
Conſid. P. 49, mean ſuch as are coordinat with the Prince (which have bin ſeen in the
50.World) but ſuch as thoſe of Spain, purely of Advice and Diſpatch, with
power only to inform and perſuade, but not limit the Princes Will
. For al-
moſt all the Weakneſſes which have bin thought incident to Monarchy, are by
this courſe prevented; and if there be any ſteadineſs and maturity in the
Senat of a Commonwealth, this takes it all in.
To give my Counſil without a Fee, and deal ſincerely with a Pre-
varicator: Let the Prince (that is, ſuch a one as his ) hold himſelf
contented with his Divan, or Cabinet. If this be that he means, we
are agreed; but if he would have more, I can make no leſs of his
words, than a hankering after ſuch Councils as I have propos’d, and
that theſe are ſuch as he always thought admirable, ſuch as prevent almoſt
all the Weakneſſes incident to Monarchy, and take in the ſteadineſs and ma-
turity of a Commonwealth.
HOW may we make this agree with that other place, where he
ſays, that there is no frame of Laws, or Conſtitution of Government,
which will not decay and com to rain, unleſs repair’d by the Prudence and
Conſid. p. 68. Dexterity of them that govern? Now that this may not be expected from
a Monarch, as well as from a Senat or Aſſembly of Men, he has not yet
met with any conviction, but rather finds it reaſonable to think that where
Debates are cleareſt, the reſult of them moſt ſecret, and the execution ſud-
den (which are the advantages of Monarchy) there the diſorders of a
State
+
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I.
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of Popular Government
!
283
.
1.
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State will ſooneſt be diſcover'd, and the neceſſary Remedys beſt apply'd. Chap. 9.
In that former place he bethought himſelf, that the Debates of Rome
were as clear as thoſe of ANTIOCHUS, that her Reſults were as
ſecret as thoſe of PHILIP or PERSEUS, and of more ſudden exe-
cution than either of theirs. He doubted it might be true, which is
affirm'd by good Authors, and commonly cnough known, that for
the clearneſs of Debate, and ſecreſy of Reſult, the world never ſaw
any thing like the Senat of Venice ; and that in all appearance they are
for execution as quick with the Divan, as the Divan
can be with them.
Now when all this is don, to baniſh fo generous Thoughts without
Thewing us for what cauſe, and knock under the table, is fad news.
But he ſhall find me, in any thing that is reaſonable, moſt ready to
ſerve him. To the Queſtion then, low ſuch Councils as I have
pro-
pos’d would do with a Prince ; I anſwer, truly the beſt of them, I
doubt, but untowardly. One, that is the popular Aſſembly, has no
mean,
but is either the wiſeſt in Nature, or has no brains at all.
When affairs go upon no other than
the public Intereſt, this having no
other Intereſt to follow, nor eys to ſee withal, is the wiſeſt Council:
but ſuch ways are deſtructive to a Prince, and they will have no Nay.
The Congregation of Iſrael, when REHOBOAM would not hearken
to their advice, depos’d him: and we know what popular Councils,
ſo ſoon as they came to ſufficient Power, did in England. If a Prince
put a popular Council from this Ward, he dos a great matter, and
to little purpoſe; for they underſtand nothing elſe but themſelves.
Wherfore the Kings of France and of Spain have diſſolv'd all ſuch
Aſſemblys. It is true, where a Prince is not ſtrong enough to get
Mony out of them but by their confent, they are neceſſary; yet then
they are not purely of Advice and Diſpatch, but ſhare in the Governi-
ment, and he cannot be medling with their Purſes, but they will be
medling with his Laws. The Senat is of fitter uſe for a Prince, and
yet, except he has the way of T'IBERIUS, but a tickliſh piece, as
appears by MAXIMINUs, who was deſtroy'd by PupIenus and
BALBINUs, Captains ſet up againſt him by this Order. To go to
the root : Theſe things are not otherwiſe in Prudence or Choice than
by direction of the Balance ;, where this is popular, no Remedy but the
Prince muſt be advis'd by the People, which if the late King would
have indur'd, the Monarchy might have ſubſiſted ſomwhat longer :
but while the Balance was Ariſtocratical, as during the great Eſtates
of the Nobility and the Clergy, we find not the People to have bin
great or wiſe Counſillors. In ſum, if a King governs by a popular
Council
, or a Houſe of Commons, the Throne will not ſtand long:
If he governs by a Senat, or a Houſe of Lords, let him never fear the
Throne, but have a care of himſelf: there is no third, as I have ſaid
often enough, but the Divana
AIME
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CH AP.
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44
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284
The Prerogative
Book I.
CHAP. X.
Whether a Commonwealth that was not firſt broken by her ſelf, was
ever conquer'd by the Arms of any Monarch?
Hu
:
-
1
I
COM in this Chapter to reſume the Diſcourſe, where I broke off
in the former, making good my aſſertion, That a Commonwealth
is the Government, which from the beginning of the world to this
day was never conquer'd by any Monarch; for if the Commonwealths
of Greece came under the yoke of the Kings of Macedon, they were
firſt broken by themſelves.
WHEN Í ſpeak of a Commonwealth, in relation to this point,
I am no more to be argu'd againſt out of the little Citys in Aſia, or
thoſe of Raguſa, and Șan Marino, which cannot be ſhewn to have had
the command of any conſiderable Army, than I argue againſt the Pre-
varicator, where he aſſerts Monarchy to conſiſt of a mixture of Arms
and of a Nobility, from the King of Tuetot, who had neither.
THIS Aſſertion in the judgment of any rational man ought not
to be incounter'd, but where there was a natural poſſibility of de-
fence, in regard that a City which has no Army at all, as Geneva
(which yet being invaded by the Duke of Savoy, found means to
defend her felf) or ſuch a one as is not conſiderable, ſhould be ſub-
du'd by ſom potent Monarch (if we could find the example) con-
cerns the Government no more, than if it had bin overwhelm'd by
ſom Inundation, or ſwallow'd up by ſom Earthquake. And yet all
that is oppos’d by the Conſiderer, amounts not to thus much. The
Teſtimony he brings out of PauSA NIAS coms far ſhort; for it is
Confid. p. 53. recorded (ſays the Author ſpeaking of the Lacedemonians) that being
Paul. Meſſen. corrupted by the Bounty of CRÆsus, they were the firſt that contracted
Amity with the Barbarians at the time when that King added the Terria
torys
inhabited by the Dorians upon the border of Caria, with other Com-
monwealths in Aſia, to his Empire. So that CR Æsus corrupted the
Lacedemonians with Gifts, PAUSANIAS is expreſs; but whether he
obtain'd the Aſiatic Citys (likely in this caſe to have bin eaſilier cor-
rupted than the Lacedemonians) by Arms or by Purchaſe, he is not
expreſs: and the preſumtion of the latter, as in other regards, ſo in
this
, is the ſtronger, that CR Æsus by the teſtimony of SÓLON,
was more potent in Gold than in Iron. Now if it were ſo (and if
otherwiſe, let the Conſiderer ſhew) that theſe Commonwealths, in-
veigľd by the Treaſure of CRÆSus, came firſt under the Lydian,
and fell with that under the Perſian Empire, when CR Æsus was
ſubdu'd by Cyrus; all I can learn by this example is no more than
that CR # sus,. for ought that is perceivable, might have bought
thoſe Commonwealths as COSIMO of Medicis did Florence; from
whom it is affirm'd by MACCHIAVEL, that there was not a confi-
derable Man in the wholé City that had not receiv'd fom conſiderable Sum.
So this example preſumes ;y but in the next, which is of Sicily, there
is not ſo much as a Preſumtion in favor of the Aſſertor : the State of
Sicily, before that which the Romans call the firſt Carthaginian War,
being clear in Story againſt his deſign. For that Africa for the gene-
ration
.
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(as it did) brought in the King of France, there is nothing plainer than
of Popular Government.
285
tation of Monſters is not more famous than Sicily for that of Tyrants, Chap. 10.
they who have paſs’d their Novitiat in Story are not ignorant ; nor how
when TIMOL'Eon had freed her of this Vermin, and with Liberty de Sicil.
ſhe had recover'd ſom ſtrength and virtue, ſhe relaps’d under A G A. Polyb. I. s.
THOCLES and his horrid violation of Faith, while he was truſted
with the Arms of her Citizens : how after him PYRRHUS was
call'd in from Epirus; after PYRRHUS, Hiero uſurp’d; all by the
fame Arts, getting firſt into truſt or charge, and then recoiling upon
them that would take no warning: by which it is apparent that the
Commonwealths of Sicily, like thoſe of Greece, were ruin’d by them-
felves, and their own Diſorders; and no more fubdu'd upon theſe
changes by foren Arms, than was Iſrael by the Canaanites, or Rome by
the Gauls' or Decemvirs.
ISRAEL, having broken her Orders, was indeed ſomtimes op-
preſt by the Canaanites; Rome was fack'd by the Gauls, and uſurp'd
by the Decemvirs. But as the man that having got a fall in a Duel,
throws off his Adverſary, recovers himſelf and his Sword, is not con-
querd, ſo neither the Commonwealth: wherfore neither Holland nor Decree of the
States of Hol-
Genoa, tho they have bin under, being yet ſtanding, can be ſaid to be land apud
conquer'd by the Arms of Spain or France, but rather the contrary ; Grot. Hift. 4.
feeing the Liberty of Holland (in many Citys more antient than any
Records or other Monuments there can witneſs, and in it ſelf than
that of Tacitus, wherby CIVILIS, born of Princely Blood, is
affirm'd to have vindicated the Batavian Freedom) is ſtill the fame;
and Genoa, tho happy in her DORIA, remains as ſhe was before he was
born. Nor did the Family of the MEDICIS baniſli'd out of Flow
rence (where, by virtue of their prodigious Wealth, and the inevita-
ble conſequence of the Balance, their Anceſtors had bin Princes many
years before CHARLES the Fifth was a Soldier) any more by the
help of his Arms, thoſe of the Pope (at that time of the fame Fa-
mily) and their Party at home, than get into their known faddle
.
To infiſt a little more at large upon the Storys of Genoa and Florence
(becauſe upon theſe the Prevaricator ſets up his reſt that Mr. HAR-
RINGTON muſt needs be afflicted) Genoa was and is an Oligarchy
conſiſting of twenty eight Familys, making the Great Council, or Ag-
gregation, as they call it, none but theſe being capable of the Senat
or of Magiſtracy; and if ever it could be faid of a Commonwealth,
that ſhe had broken her ſelf
, it might be ſaid, at the time related to,
of Genoa, where not only the Faction of the Guelphs and Gibelins,
which had deſtroy'd many Citys in Italy, then reignd; but the feud
between the People included, and the Subject excluded, was as great
as ever had bin between the Nobility and the People in Rome. Be-
fides the quarrel of the FIESCHI and the ADORNI, two Familys,
like CÆSAR and POMPEY, which having many years together as
it were ingroſt the Magiſtracy of Duke, were nevertheleſs perpetual-
ly ſtriving each with other, which ſhould have it; and if one of theſe
that this Commonwealth was ſubdu'd by her own Sedition, nor is
there a man knowing any thing of lier affairs, that makes any doubt
of it. That of Florence indeed, if the Prevaricator could 'Thew it
had bin ever up, I ſhould grant were down; but to relate the Story of
this City, I muſt relate that of the Houſe of MEDICIS. From
COSIMO, à Citizen famous throout Europe both for his Wiſdom and
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286
The Prerogative
Book I. his Riches, this Family for the ſpace of ſixty years exercis’d, under
the pretext of ſom Magiſtracy, very great Power in Florence. To
COSIMO ſucceded PETER, to PETER LAURENCE, a man in
P. Jovius.
Prudence and Liberality reſembling his' Grandfather, fave that he
us’d more abſolute Power in managing the Commonwealth ; yet withi
gentleneſs, and not altogether to the ſuppreſſion of Liberty. Never-
teleſs he obtain’d of the Signory (which did for the moſt part as
he would have them) ſom ſmall Guard for his Perſon; he was a man
renown'd thro Italy, and look'd upon by foren Princes with much
reſpect. To him ſucceded his Son, another PETER, who thro Youth
and Raſhneſs conceiving the Power exercis’d by his Predeceſſors to be
no more than his due, took upon him the Government as abſolute
Lord of all; and ſtanding moſt formidably upon his Guard, grew
ſottiſhly profuſe of the public Mony, and committed many Abſurditys
and Violences : By which means having incurr'd the hatred of the
Citizens, he was baniſh'd by the Signory, with Cardinal John and
JULIAN his Brothers. This John coming after to be Pope LEO
the Tenth, requir'd the revocation of his Brother's Baniſhment, and
the reſtitution of the Houſe of Medicis; to which finding the
prevailing Party of the Florentins to be refractory, he ſtir’d
up
the
Arms of the Emperor CHARLES the Fifth againſt them, by whoſe
joint aid the City, aſter a long ſiege, was reduc’d to her old Ward,
and ALEXANDER of MEDICIS, Nephew to the Pope and Son
in law to the Emperor, ſet. in the known Saddle of his Anceſtors.
This is the Action for which the Prevaricator will have a Common-
wealth to have bin conquer'd by the Arms of a Monarch, tho whoever
d'eads the Story may very ſafely affirm, Firſt, That Florence never at-
tain'd to any ſuch Orders as could deſerve the name of a Common-
wealth ; and next, That the Purſe of Cosimo had don that long be-
fore, which is here attributed to the Arms of the Pope and the Empe-
ror. Reaſon and Experience, as I ſaid, are like the Roots and the
Branches of Plants and Trees: As of Branches, Fruits, and Flowers,
being open and obvious to the ey, the ſmell, the touch, and taſte,
every
Girl can judg; ſo examples to vulgar capacitys are the beſt Ar-
guments. Let him that ſays a Commonwealth has bin at
any
time
conquer'd by a Monarch, to it again, and ſhew us the example. But
tho Fruits and Flowers be eaſily known each from other, their Roots
are latent, and not only ſo, but of ſuch reſemblance, that to diſtin-
guiſh of theſe a man muſt be a Gardiner or a Herbalift. In this man-
ner, the reaſon why a Commonwealth has not bin overcom by a
Monarch, has bin ſhewn in the diſtribution of Arms, thoſe of a
Prince conſiſting of Subjects or Servants, and thoſe of a Common-
wealth rightly order'd of Citizens, which difference relates plainly to
the perfection or imperfection of the Government.
Conſid. p. 51. BVT, ſays the Prevaricator, this ſeems intended for a trial of our
Noſes, whether they will ſerve us to diſcover the fallacy of an inference from
the proſperous ſucceſs of Arms to the perfection of Government. If the
Univerſity, who ſhould have ſom care of the Vinyard of Truth, ſhall
ly pigging of wild Boars, to grunt in this manner and fear with their
tusks, and I happen to ring fom of them (as I have don this Marcaſſin
for rooting) there is nothing in my faith why ſuch trial of their Noſes
ſhould be Sin; but for fallacious Inferences, ſuch I leave to them wlioſe
Caps are ſquarer than their Play.
FOR
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of Popular Government.
287
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FOR all that, Great and well policy?d Empires, ſays he, have bin Chap. 10.
ſubverted by people ſo eloign'd from the perfection of Government, that
ne ſcarce know of any thing to ry them together, but the deſire of Booty.
Where, or how came he to know this? What Reaſon or Experience
dos he allege for the proof of it? May we not ſay of this, it is for the
trial of our Noſes, whether they will ſerve us to diſcover that a Concluſion
ſhould have ſom Premiſes ? He gives us leave to go look, and all the
Premiſes that I can find are quite contrary.
THE Arms of Iſrael were always victorious, till the death of Judg. ch. s,
JOSHUA, wherupon the Orders of that Commonwealth being neg-
lected, they came afterwards to be feldom proſperous. ISOCRA-
tes in his Oration to the Areopagits, ſpeaks thus of Athens : The La-
cederonians, who when we were under Oligarchy, every day commanded.
us ſomthing ; now while we are under-popular Adminiſtration, are our
Petitioners that we would not ſee them utterly ruin'd by the Thebans.
Nor did Lacedemon fall to ruin till her Agrarian, the Foundation of her
Government, was firſt broken. The Arms of Rome (ever noted by
Hiſtorians, and clearly evinc'd by MACCHIAVEL to have bin the Arte della
reſult of her Policy ) during the popular Government were at ſuch
a pitch, as if Victory had known no other wings than thoſe of her
Eagles: nor ſeeing the Goths and Vandals are the Legiſlators, from
whom we derive the Government of King, Lords, and Commons,
were theſe when they overcame the Roman Empire, a People fo
eloign’d from the perfection of Government, but their Policy was then
far better than that of the Emperors, which having bin at firſt founded
upon a broken Senat, and a few military Colonys, was now com to
a Cabinet, and a mercenary Army. The Judgment of all Ages and
Writers upon the Policy of the Roman Emperors, is in this place
worthy, and thro the pains already taken by Erasmus and SLEI-
DAN, eaſy to be inſerted. O miſerable and deplorable State, ſays
ERASMUS, the Authority of the Senat, the Power of the Law, the In kis Preface
Liberty of the People being trod underfoot ! to a Prince, that got up in to Sluetonius.
this manner, the whole World was a Servant, while he himſelf was a Ser-
vant to fuch, as no honeſt man would have indur'd the like Servants in
his Houſe : the Senat dreaded the Emperor, the Emperor dreaded his ex-
ecrable Militia: the Emperor gave Laws to Kings, and receiv'd them
from his Mercenarys. To this is added by SLEIDAN, That the con- De quat. Imp.
dition of theſe Princes was ſo deſperat, it was a wonderful thing Ambition
it ſelf could have the Courage to run ſuch a hazard; ſeeing from Carus
CÆSAR Nain in the Senat to CHARLES the Great, there had bin
above thirty of them murder’d; and four that had laid violent hands upon
themſelves: For there was always ſomthing in them that offended the Sol-
diery, which whether they were good or bad, was equally ſubject to pick
Quarrels, upon the leaſt occaſion rais dTumults, and diſpatch'd even fuch
of them as they had forc’d to accept of that Dignity, for example, Ælius
PERTINAX. But if this be true, that of the Goths and Vandals
,
when they ſubdu'd this Empire, muſt have bin the better Govern-
ment; for ſo ill as this never was there any, except that only of the
Kings of Iſrael, which certainly was much worſe. Thoſe of the Bri-
tans and the Gauls were but the dregs of this of Rome, when they
were overcom by the Saxons and Franks, who brought in the Policy
of the Goths and Vandals.
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288
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The Prerogative
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1
Book I. WHEN TAMERLAN overcame BAJAZET, the Turkiſh
Policy had not attain'd to that extent of Territory which is plainly
neceſſary to the nature of it, nor was the Order of the Janizarys yet
inſtituted. The Hollander, who under a potent Prince was but a Fiſher-
man, with the reftitution of the popular Government, is becom the
better Soldier ; nor has he bin match'd but by a riſing Commonwealth,
whoſe Policy you will ſay, was yet worſe, but then her Balance
(being that eſpecially which produces men) was far better. For
Vaftneſs
, for Fruitfulneſs of Territory, for Bodys of Men, for Num-
ber, for Courage, Nature never made a Country more potent than
Germany: yet this Nation, antiently the Seminary of Nations, has of
late years, merely thro the defect of her Policy (which intending
one Commonwealth, has made a hundred Monarchys in her Bowels,
whoſe croſs Intereſts twiſt her guts) bin the Theater of the ſaddeſt
Tragedys under the Sun; nor is the curable, unleſs ſom Prince falling
to work with the Hammer of War, be able totally to deſtroy the old,
and forge her a Government intirely new. But if this coms to paſs,
neither Thall it be faid, that a well-policy'd Empire was ſubverted, nor
by a People ſo eloign'd from perfection of Government, but theirs muſt be
much better than the other. Let me be as ridiculous as you will, the
World is (in fece Romuli) ripe for great Changes which muſt com.
And look to it, whether it be Germany, Spain, France, Italy, or Eng-
land, that coms firſt to fix her ſelf upon a firm Foundation of Policy,
ſhe ſhall give Law to, and be obey'd by the reſt. There was never
ſo much fighting as of late days to ſo little purpoſe; Arms, except
they have a root in Policy, are altogether fruitleſs
. In the War
between the King and the Parlament, not the Nation only, but the
Policy of it was divided ; and which part of it was upon the better
Foundation?
BVT, ſays he, Raguſa and San Marino are commended for their
right and equal
frame of Government, and yet have hardly extended their
Dominion beyond the ſize of a handſom Mannor.
HAVE Raguſa or San Marino bin conquer'd by the Arms of
any
Monarch? For this (I take it) is the queſtion; tho, if they had, theſe
being Commonwealths unarm’d, it were nothing to the purpoſe. The
queſtion of Increaſe is another point. Lacedemon' could not increaſe
(becauſe her frame was of another nature) without ruin; yet was ſhe
not conquer'd by any Monarch.
Confid. D. $2. COM, com, ſays he, for all this; It is not the perfection of Govern-
ment, but the populouſneſs of a Nation, the natural valor of the Inha-
bitants, the abundance of Horſes, Arms, and other things neceſſary for
equipping of an Army, aſſiſted with a good military Diſciplin, that qualify
People for Conqueſt ; and where theſe concur, Victory is intail'd upon
them. Very fine!
AS if theſe could concur any otherwiſe than by virtue of the Po-
licy. For example, there is no Nation under Heaven more populous
Eſſay 29. than France : Yet, ſays Sir FRANCIS BACON, If the Gentlemen be
too many, the Commons will be baſe, and not the hundredth Poll fit for
a Helmet, as may be ſeen by compariſon of England with France, wherof
the former, tho far leſs in Territory and Populouſneſs, has bin neverthe-
leſs the overmatch ; in regard the middle People in England make good
Soldiers, which the Peaſants in France do not. This therfore was from
the Policy, by which the one has bin the freeſt, and the other the
moſt
1
Conſid. p. 51.
up-
1
11
폰
​14
w
14
of Populär Government.
289
mort inllav'd Subject in the World; and not from Populouſreſs, iñi Chap. 10.
which caſe France muſt have bin the Overmatch.
THE like is obfervable in the natural valor of the People, there
being no greater courage of an Infantry, than that of the middle
People in England, wheras the Peaſant having none at all, is never
us'd in Arms. Again, France has one of the beſt Cavalrys in the
World, which the Engliſh never had, yet it avail'd her not. Victory
is more eſpecially intaiťd upon Courage, and Courage upon Liberty,
which grows not without a Root planted in the Policy or Foundation
of the Government.
ALEXANDER with a handful of Frecmen overcame the
greateſt abundance of Horſes, Arms, and other things neceſſary for the
equipping of an Army, the hugeſt Armys, the moſt vaſt and populous
Empire in the World; and when he had don, could not by all theſe
ſubdue that handful of freer men (tho he killd Clytus with his
own hand in the quarrel) to the ſervil Cuſtoms of that Empire.
And that the beſt military Diſciplin deriv'd from the Policy of the
Romans, I intimated before, and have ſhewn at large in other places.
BUT the Prevaricator neither minds what is ſaid, nor cares what
he ſays; to affirm tliat a Commonwealth was never conquer'd by
any Monarch, and that a Commonwealth has conquer'd many Mo-
narchs, or frequently led mighty Kings in triumph, is to run upon
the foil, the ſecond Propoſition being
with him no more than only
the converſion of the firſt. As if that Rome was not conquer'd by Conſid. p. 55.
the World, and that the World was conquer'd by Rome, were but a
ſimple converſion. So the World having not conquer'd Venice, it
muſt follow, that Venice has conquer'd the World. Do we take, or
are we taken? Nor is he thus fatisfy'd to burn his fingers, but he will
bliſter his tongue.
WHERĚ I ſaid that the Commonwealth of Venice, conſiſting of
all them that firſt fled from the main Land to thoſe Ilands where the
City is now planted, at the Inſtitution took in the whole People, he
would make you believe I had ſaid that the Senat of Venice, at the firſt
Inſtitution, took in the whole People : It is matter of fact, and that in Conſid. p. 70.
which his Integrity will be apparent to every man's judginent. [ Oceana, P. 43.
pray
ſee the places. And yet when he has put this trick upon me, he
tells me, perhaps it is not true; and this only I grant him paſt perad-
venture is falle, whether that I ſaid it, or that the thing is pollible.
For how is it poſſible, that the Senat, which is no otherwiſe ſuch
than as it conſiſts of the Ariſtocracy, or ſelect part of the People,
ſhould take in the whole People? It is true, that good Authors, both
antient and modern, when they ſpeak of the Senat of Rome, or of
Venice hiſtorically, imply the People. MACCHIAVEL ſpeaks of
the Magiſtracy of Publilius Philo, as prolong’d by the Se-
nat of Rome, without making any mention of the People, by whom
nevertheleſs it was granted: the like is uſual with other Authors.
Thuanus ſeldom mentions the Commonwealth of Venice, but by
the name of the Senat; which not underſtood by the learned Conti-
derer, where CONTARINI ſpeaks in the ſame manner of the
Courſes taken by the Commonwealth of Venice, for withholding the
Subject in the City from Sedition, he takes him to be ſpeaking of
the means wherby the Senat (an't pleaſe you) keeps the People
under: and fo. having put one trick upon me, and another upon
Рp
CON-
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290
The Prerogative
Book I. CONTARINI, theſe two are his Premiſes, wlience he draws this Cori-
cluſion, That Venice is as much as any in the World an inequal Commons
wealth. Now the Concluſion you know no body can deny.
1
CH AP. XI.
1
Whether there be not an Agrarian, or ſom Law or Lains of that. nature,
to ſupply the defect of it in every Commonwealth : and whether thé
Agrarian, as it is ſtated in Oceana, be not equal and fatiſ-
factory to all Intereſts.
IN
.
But Pro-
N this Chapter the Prevaricator's Devices are the moſt welfavor’d:
for wheras the Agrarian of Oceana dos no more than pin the basket,
which is already fill'd, he gets up into the Tree where the Birds have
long ſince eaten all the Cherrys, and with what Clouts he can rake up,
makes a moſt ridiculous Scarcrow. This pains he needed not to have
taken, if he had not ſlighted overmuch the Lexicon, of which he allows
me to be the Author; yer will have it, that he underſtood the words
before, ſom of which nevertheleſs his ill underſtanding requires ſhould
be further interpreted in this place, as Property, Balance, Agrarian,
and Levelling.
PROPERTY is that which is every mans own by the Law of the
Land ; and of this there is nothing ſtir'd, but all intirely left as it was
found by the Agrarian of Oceana.
PROPERTY in Mony (except, as has bin ſhewn, in Citys that
have little or no Territory) coms not to the preſent account.
perty in Land, according to the diſtribution that happens to be of the
fame, cauſes the political Balance producing Empire of the like nature :
that is, if the Property in Lands be ſo diffus'd thro the whole People,
thai neither one Landlord, nor a few. Landlords overbalance them, the
Empire is popular. If the Property in Lands be ſo ingroſt by the Few,
that they overbalance the whole People, the Empire is Ariſtocratical,
or mix'd Monarchy; but if Property in Lands be in one Landlord,
to ſuch a proportion as overbalances the whole People, the Empire is
abſolute Monarchy. So the political Balance is threefold, Democrati-
cal, Ariſtocratical, and Monarchical.
EACH of theſe Balances may be introduc'd either by the Legiſla-
tor at the inſtitution of the Government, or by civil Viciſſitude, Alie-
nation, or Alteration of Property under Government.
EXAMPLE S of the Balance introduc'd at the Inſtitution, and
by the Legiſlator,. are firſt thoſe in Iſrael and Lacedemon, introduc'd
by God or Moses, and Lycurgus, which were Democratical
of Popular. Secondly, Thoſe in England, France and Spain, intro-
duc'd by the Goths, Vandals, Saxons, and Franks, which were Ariſto-
cratical, or ſuch as produc'd the Government of King, Lords, and
Commons. Thirdly, Thoſe in the Eaſt and Turky, introduc'd by
NIMROD, and MAHOMET or OTTOMAN, which were pure-
ly Monarchical.
EXAMPLES of the Balance introduc'd by civil Vicillitude, Alie-
nation, or Alteration of Property under Government, are in Florence,
where
.
.
".
of Popular Government.
291
Pauſan.
:
where the Medici attaining to exceſſive wealth, the Balance alter'd Chap. 11.
from Popular to Monarchical: In Greece, where the Argives being lov-
ers of Equality and Liberty, reduc'd the Power of their Kings to ſo ſmall Corinth.
a matter, that there remain'd to the Children and Succeſſors of Cosas
Little more than the Title, where the Balance alter'd from Monarchical
to Popular. In Rome, „about the time of CRASSUS, the Nobility
having eaten the People out of their Lands, the Balance alter'd from
Popular, firſt to Ariſtocratical, as in the Triumvirs, CE S A R,
POMPE Y and CRASSUS; and then to Monarchical, as when
Crassus being dead, and POMPE Y conquer'd, the whole came
to CESAR. In Tarentum, not long after the War with the Medes, Ariſt. Pole
the Nobility being waſted, and overcom by Tapyges, the Balance, and with L. s. C. 3.
that the Commonwealth, chang?d from Ariſtocratical to Popular : The like
of late has diſcover'd it ſelf in Oceana. When a Balance coms ſo thro
civil Viciſſitude to be chang'd, that the change cannot be attributed to
liuman Providence, it is more peculiarly to be aſcrib’d to the hand of
God; and ſo when there happens to be an irreſiſtible change of the
Balance, not the old Government which God has repeald, but the
new Government which he dictats as preſent Legiſlator, is of Divine
Right.
THIS Volubility of the Balance being apparent, it belongs to Le-
gillators to have eys, and to occur with ſom prudential or legal Keme:
dy or Prevention; and the Laws that are made in this caſe are callid
Agrarian. So An Agrarian is a Law fixing the Balance of a Government
in ſuch a manner that it cannot alter.
THIS may be don diver's ways, as by intailing the Lands upon cera
tain Familys, without power of Alienation in any caſe, as in Iſrael and
Lacedemon; or, except with leave of the Magiſtrat, as in Spain : But
this, by making ſom Familys too ſecure, as thoſe in poſſeſſion, and o-
thers too deſpairing, as thoſe not in poſſeſſion, may make the whole
People leſs induſtrious.
WHERFORE the other way, which by the regulation of Pure
chaſes ordains only that a mans Land ſhall not excede ſom certain pro-
portion; for example, two thouſand Pounds a year ; or, exceding
ſuch a proportion, ſhall divide in deſcending to the Children, fo foon
as being more than one, they ſhall be capable of ſuch a diviſion, or
ſubdiviſion, till the greater ſhare excedes not two thouſand pounds a
year in Land, lying and being within the native Territory, is that
which is receiv'd and eſtabliſh'd by the Commonwealth of Oceana.
BY Levelling, they who uſe the word ſeem to underſtand, when
a People riſing invades the Lands and Eſtates of the richer fort, and di-
vides them equally among themſelves; as for example, No where
in.the World; this being that, both in the way and in the end, which
I have already demonſtrated to be impoſſible. Now the words of this
Lexicon being thus interpreted, let us hearken what the Prevaricator
will ſay, and out it coms in this manner.
TOʻhim that makes Property, and that in Lands, the Foundation of conſid. P. 73.
Empire, the eſtabliſhing of an Agrarian is of abſolute neceſſity, that by it the
Power may be fixed in thoſe hands to whom it was at firſt committed.
WHÁT need we then procede any further, while he, having no
where diſprov'd the Balance in theſe words, gives up the whole Cauſe?
For as to that which he ſays of Mony, ſeeing neither the vaſt Treaſure
of Henry the 7th alter'd the Balance of England, nor the Revenue of
the
1
PP2
The Prerogative
292
Book I, the Indys alters that of Spain, this Retrait (except in the Cafes except-
Wed) is long ſince barricado'd. But he is on and off, and, any thing to
the contrary,notwithſtanding, gives you this for certain.
THE Examples of an Agrarian are ſo infrequent, that Mr. HAR-
RINGTON is conſtrain'd to wave all but two Commonwealths; and can
find in the whole extent of Hiſtory only Ifrael and Lacedemon to faſten
upon.
A MAN that has read my Writings, or is skill'd in Hiſtory, can-
not chuſe but ſee how he ſlurs his Dice; nevertheleſs to make this a
Pol. L:2. C.s. little more apparent, It has ſeem'd to ſom (ſays ARISTOTLE) the
main point of Inſtitution in Government, to order Riches right; whence
otherwiſe derives all civil Diſcord. Upon this ground PHALE As the Chal-
cedonian Legiſlator made it his firſt work to introdnce equality of Goods;
and PLATO in his Laws allows not increaſe to a poſſeſſion beyond cer.
tain bounds. The Argives and the Meſſenians had each their Agrari-
an after the manner of Lacedemon. If a man ſhall tranſlate the words
Plut. Lycurg. (aritti
, duvaquis mollitini, virtus facultas civilis) Political Virtue or
Faculty, where he finds them in A ISTOTLE's Politics (as I make
bold, and appeal to the Reader whether too bold to do) by the
words Political Balance, underſtood as I have ſtated the thing, it will
give ſuch a light to the Author, as will go nearer than any thing
allegd (as before by this Prevaricator) to deprive me of the honor
fol. L. 3. C.s. of that invention. For example, where ARISTOTLE ſays, If one
man, or ſuch a number of men, as to the capacity of Government com with-
in the compaſs of the Few, excel all the reft" (&@ 7" đęEtwv) in balance, or in
ſuch a manner, that the (duvalues Totium) Political Facultys or Eſtates
of all the reſt be not able to hold weight with him or them, they will never
condeſcend
to ſhare equally with the
reſt in power, whom they excel in Balance;
nor is it to any purpoſe to give them Lans, who will be as the Gods, their
own Laws, and will anſver the People as the Lions are ſaid by ANTIS-
THENES to have anſwer'd the Hares, when they had concluded, that
every one ought to have an equal Portion. For this cauſe (he adds) Citys
that live under Popular Power, have inſtituted the Oſtraciſm for the prefer-
vation of Equality; by which, if a man increaſe in Riches, Retinue, or
Popularity, above what is ſafe, they can remove him (without loſs of
Honor or Eſtate) for a time.
If the Conſiderer thinks that I have ſtrain'd courteſy with ARIS-
TOTLE (who indeed is not always of one mind) further than is war-
rantable, in relation to the Balance, be it as he pleaſes; I who muſt either
have the more of Authority, or the leſs of Competition in the point Mall
lofe neither way. However, it is in this place enough that the Oſtraciſm
being of like nature; was that which ſupply'd the defect, in the Grecian
Citys, of an Agrarian. To procede then to Rome, that the People there,
by ſtriving for an Agrarian, ſtrove to ſave their Liberty, is apparent,
in that thro the want of ſuch a Law, or the nonobſervance of it, the
Commonwealth came plainly to ruin. If a Venetian ſhould keep a
Table, or have his Houſe furniſh'd with Retainers, he would be obnoxi-
ous to the Council of Ten; and if the beſt of them appear with other
State or Equipage than is allow'd to the meaneſt, he is obnoxious to the
Officers of the Pomp: which two Orders in a Commonwealth, where
the Gentry have but ſmall Eſtates in Land, are as much as needs be in
lieu of an Agrarian. But the German Republics have no more to ſup-
ply the place of this Law, than that Eſtates deſcending are divided
among
1
of Popular Government.
293
among the Children ; which ſure no man but will ſay muſt needs be Chap. 11.
both juſt and pious; and we ask you no more in Oceana, where grant
this, and you grant the whole Agrarian. Thus had I ſet him all the
Commonwealths in the World before, and ſo it is no fault of mine,
that he will throw but at three of them: Theſe are Iſrael, Lacedemon,
and Oceana.
FIRST at Ifrael: Mr. HARRINGTON (ſays he) thinks not upon Confid. D. 77.
the Promiſe of ĠOD to ABRAHAM (whence the Iſraelites deriv'd their
Right to the Land of Canaan) but conſiders the diviſion of the Lands as
a Politic Conſtitution upon which the Government was founded, tho in the
whole Hiſtory of the Bible there be not the leaſt foot ſtep of ſuch a deſign.
WHAT 'means the man! the Right of an Iſraelite to his Land de-
riv’d from the Promiſe of GoD to ABRAHAM, therfore the Right
of an Oceaner to his Land muſt derive from the Promiſe of GOD to
ABRAHAM? Or, why elſe ſhould I in ſpeaking of Oceana (where
Property is taken as it was found, and not ftirr'd a hair) think on the
Promiſe to ABRAHAM? Nor matters it for the manner of diviſion,
ſeeing that was made, and this was found made, each according to the
Law of the Government. But in the whole Bible (ſays he) there is not
the leaſt footſtep that the end of the Iſraelitiſh Agrarian was Political, or
that it was intended to be the Foundation of the Government.
THE Footſteps of God, by the Teſtimony of DAVID, may be ſeen
in the deep Waters, much more, by the conſent of the whole Bible, in
Land, or in the foundation of Empire; unleſs we make the Footſteps
of God to be one thing, and his ways another, which as to Govern-
ment are theſe.
GOD by the Ballot of Iſrael (more fully deſcrib'd in the next Book) Grot, ad
divided the Land (ſom reſpect had to the Princes and Patriarchs for Numb. 26.53.
the reſt ) to every one his inheritance, according to the number of names,
which were drawn out of one Urn firſt, and the Lots of Lånd (the
meaſure with the goodneſs of the ſame conſider'd) drawn afterwards
out of the other Urn to thoſe names. Whierfore God ordaining the
Cauſe, and the Cauſe of neceſſity producing the Effect, God in or-
daining this Balance intended Popular Government. But when the
People admitting of no Nay, would have a King, God therupon com-
manding SAMUEL to ſhew them the manner of the King, SAMUEL
declar'd to the People concerning the manner or policy of the King, fay-
ing, He will take your Fields and your Vinyards, and your Oliveyards, even i Sam. 8.
the beſt of them, and give to his Servants (which kind of proceding
muſt needs create the Balance of a Nobility;) over and aboye this, he
will take the tenth of your Seed, and of your Vinyards, and of your Sheep
(by way of Tax, for the maintenance of his Armys) and thus your
Daughters ſhall com to be his Cooks and Confectioners, and your Sons to
before his Chariot. There is not from the Balance to the Super-
ſtructures a more perfect deſcription of a Monarchy by a Nobility.
For the third Branch, the People of Egypt in time of the Famin,
which was very fore, com to JOSEPH, ſaying, Buy us and our Land Gen.47.19,202
for Bread, and we and our Land will be Servants to PHARAOH. And
Joseph bought all the Land of Egypt (except that of the Prieſts) for
So the Land became PHARAOH's; who, left the re-
membrance of their former Property by lively marks and continual re-
membrancers ſhould ſtir them up (as the Vandals in Africa, ſtrip'd in Grot. ad
like manner of their Property, and yet remaining in their antierit Gen. 47.
Dwellings,
1072
PHARAOH.
1
-
$
- :
+
294
The Prerogative
Book I, Dwellings, were ſtir’d up by their Women) to Sedition, remov'd the
row People thus fold, or drave them like Cattel even from one end of the bor-
ders of Egypt to the other end therof. In which you have the Balance
of a Tole Landlord or abſolute Prince, with the miſerable, and yet ne-
ceſſary conſequence of an inſlav'd People. Now the Balance of Go-
vernnients throout the Scriptures being of theſe kinds, and no other,
the Balance of Oceana is exactly calculated to the moſt approv'd way,
and the cleareſt Footſteps of God in the whole Hiſtory of the Bible : and
wheras the Fubile was a Law inſtituted for preſervation of the popular
Balance from alteration, ſo is the Agrarian in Oceana.
BUT ſays the Prevaricator, Hocus Pocus, or in the name of Wonder,
how can this Agrarian be the Foundation of that Government which had
fubfifted more than forty five years without it? For they were ſo long after
the giving of this Law for the diviſion of the Land, before they had the
Land to divide.
WHICH is as if one ſhould ſay upon that other Law of the like
date, fudges and Officers ſhalt thou make thee in all thy gates; Hocus Po-
cus, or in the name of Wonder, how ſhould the Children of Iſrael
make them Judges and Officers in their gates, before they had any
gates to make them in? fine ſport to be play'd by an Attorny for the
Clergy with Scripture, where it is plain enough that the Laws of a
Commonwealth were given by Moses to an Army, to be put in ex-
ecution when that Army ſhould becom a Commonwealth, as hap-
pend under JOSHUA.
BUT no ſaying will ſerve his turn. If this Agrarian were meant as
fundamental to the Government, the Proviſion ( he will have it) was
weak, and not proper for attaining the end propos’d, there being nothing in
the nature of the Agrarian to hinder, but that the whole Country might
for
the ſpace of near fifty years, that is, the time between the two Jubiles,
have com into the hands of one man, and ſo have deſtroy’d Balance, Agra-
rian, Government and all
.
THIS they that boaſt of their Mathematics might have taken the
pains (before they had bin fo confident) to have demonſtrated poſſible;
as how or by what means one Lot could com in fifty years to be multi-
ply'd fix hundred thouſand times, and that without Uſury, which
bar (the Iſraelits being no Merchants) was thought fufficient to be
given: or thus to call the Prudence of God by their impracticable Phan-
fys in queſtion, is abominable.
I WOULD have Divines (as this Prevaricator perſuades, and it
Should ſeem has perſuaded fom of them) to overthrow the Com-
monwealth of Iſrael; for otherwiſe I will give them my word they
ſhall never be able to touch that of Oceana, which, except in the here-
ditary Succeſſion and Dignity of the Princes of the Tribes, and the
Patriarchs, and that the Senat was for life, differs not from the former :
for as to the divers working up of the Superſtructures in divers Com-
monwealths, according to the diverſity of occaſions, it coms to no ac-
countable difference; and much, I conceive, of this carving or finiſli-
ing in Iſrael (which had it bin extant, would perhaps have ſhewn a
greater reſemblance) is loft. For the Senats, as to their numbers, that
of the 30o‘in Oceana, conſidering the bulk of the People,excedes not that
of the Seventy in Ifrael; the Succeſſion and Dignity of the Princes of
the Tribes and of the Patriarchs was ordain’d for the preſervation of the
Pedigrees, which (CHRIST being born) are not any more to be of
1
3
d
like
>
of Popular Government.
295
+
4
like conſequence; and that the Senators were for life, deriv'd from a Chap. 1t.
former Cuſtom of ſuch a number of Elders exerciſing ſom Authority
in Egypt (tho not that of the Senat till it was inſtituted by God)
from the deſcent of the Patriarchs into that Land, who being at their
deſcent ſeventy Perſons, and governing their Familys by the right of
Paternity, as the People increas'd, and they came to dy, had their
Succeſſors appointed in ſuch a manner that the number of Seventy,
in remembrance of thoſe Patriarchs, was diligently preſerv'd. And
foraſmuch as the Patriarchs governing their own Familys (which at
firſt were all) in their own right, were conſequently for life, this alſo
pleas'd in the ſubſtitution of others. Theſe things rightly conſider'd;
I have not vary'd from the Authority of Iſrael in a titele, there being
neither any ſuch neceſſary uſe of Pedigrees, nor uninterrupted Suc-
cefſion of Élders for life in Oceana; and unleſs a man will ſay, That
we ought to haye the like Effect where there is not the like Cauſe
(which were abſurd) the Authority of a Commonwealth holds no
orlierwiſe than from the Cauſe to the Effect.
OCEAN A, I ſay, cannot be wounded but by piercing the Au-
thority of Iſrael, with which ſhe is arm’d Cap a Pe. It is true, as
the Prevaricator ſays in another place, that Law can oblige only thoſe Conſid. P. 36.
to whom it was given; and that the Laws of Iſrael were given, as to the
Power or Obligation of them, only to the Children of Iſracl. - But the
Power, as has bin ſhown, of a Commonwealth, and her Authori-
ty, are different things; her Power extends no further than her own
People, but her Authority may govern others, as that of Athens did
Rome, when the latter wrote her twelve Tables by the Copy of the
former. In this manner, tho a Man, or a Commonwealth, writing
out of antient Governments, have liberty to chuſe that which ſures
beſt with the occaſion, out of any; yet (whether we conſider the
Wiſdom and Juſtice of the Legiſlator ſupremely good, or the excel-
lency of the Laws) the Prerogative of Authority, where the nature
of the thing admits it, muſt needs belong to Iſrael. That this opi-
nion ſhould go fore with Divines, is ſtrange; and yet, if there be any
feeling of their pulſe by this their Advocat or Attorny, it is as true.
FÖR while he finds me writing out of Venice, he tells me, I have In his Epift.
miſely put my ſelf under her Proteftion or Authority, againſt whom he dares
not make War, left he ſhould take part ivith the Turk.
BUT when he finds me writing out of Iſrael, he tells me, that he conſid. p. 39.
is not aware of any Prerogative of Authority belonging to the Iſraelitiſh
more than any other Republic: which is to take part with the Devil
. .
So much for Iſrael. Now for Lacedemon; but you will permit me
to ſhake a Friend or two by the hand, as I go.
THE firſt is ARISTOTLE, in theſe words:
INEQUALITY is the ſource of all Sedition, as when the Riches Pol. L. s. C.3.
of one or the few com to cauſe fuch an Overbalance as draws the Common-
wealth into Monarchy or Oligarchy; for prevention wherof the Oftraciſm
has bin of uſe in divers places, as at Argos, and Athens. But it were
better to provide in the beginning, that there be no fuch Diſeaſe in the Coma
monwealth, than to com afterwards to her Cure.
!
1
IHH
THE
L
7
296
The Prérogativé
Book I.
1
Plut. Lycur.
'THE ſecond is PLUTARCH, in theſe words:
LYCURGUS judging that there ought to be no other inequality
among Citizens of the Same Commonwealth than what derives from their
Virtues, divided the Land ſo equally among the Lacedemonians, that on a
day beholding the Harveſt of their Lots lying by Cocks or Ricks in the
field, he laughing ſaid, that it ſeem'd to him they were all Brothers.
THE third ſhould have bin the Conſiderer, but he is at feud
with us all.
Confid. p. 78. THE Deſign of LYCURGUs, he profeſſes, was not ſo much to
attain an Equality in the frame of his Government, as to drive into exile
Riches, and the effeEts of them, Luxury and Debauchery,
GENTLEMEN, What do you ſay? you have the Judgment
of three great Philoſophers, and may make your own choice; only
except
he that has but one hundred pounds a year, can have Wine and
Women at as full command, and Retainers in as great plenty, as he that
has ten thouſand, I ſhould think theſe advantages accru'd from Ine-
quality, and that Lycurgus had skill enough in a Commonwealth
to fee as much. No, ſays the Prevaricator, it appears far otherwiſe,
in that he admitted of no Mony but old Iron, a Cartload of which was
worth little. · Well, but in Iſrael, where Silver and Gold was worth
enough, my Gentleman would have it, that one man in the compaſs of
fifty years might purchaſe the whole Land, tho that Country was much
larger than this: and yet where, if the People had us’d Mony, they
would have us’d Trade, and uſing both, ſuch a thing, thro the ſtrait-
neſs of the Territory, might have happen'd, he will not conceive the
like to have bin poſſible. No, tho he has an example of it in Ly-
SANDER, who by the ſpoil of Athens ruïnd the Agrarian, firſt by
the overbálance that a mans Mony came to hold to his Lot;' then by
eating out the Lots themſelves, and in thoſe the Equality of the
Commonwealth. But theſe things he interprets pleaſantly, as if the
Vow of voluntary Poverty (ſo he calls it ) being broken, the Common-
wealth, like a forſworn Wretch, had gon and hang d her ſelf : a.
Phanſy too rank, 'I doubt, of the Cloyſter, to be good at this
work.
BUT wheras PLUTARCH, upon the narrowneſs of theſe Lots
(which had they bin larger, muſt have made the Citizens fewer than
thirty thouſand, and ſo unable to defend the Commonwealth) and
uſe of this fame old and ruſty Iron inſtead of Mony, obſerves
Flut. Lycur. it came by this means to paſs that there was neither a fine Orator,
Fortuneteller, Baud, nor Goldſmith to be found in Lacedemon; our
Conſiderer profeſſes,
THAT it is to him as ſtrange as any thing in Hiſtory, that Lycur-
Gus ſhould find credit enough to ſettle a Government, which carry'd along
with it ſo much want and hardſhip to particular men, that the total ab-
ſence of Government could ſcarce have put them into a worſe condition ;
the Laws that he made prohibiting the uſe of thoſe things, which to injoy
with ſecurity, is that only to other men that makes the Toke of Larys
Supportable.
+
*
HERE
.
?
of Popular Government.
297
Pa
1
1
HERE he is no Monk again; I would ask him no more, thani that Chap: 11.
he would hold to ſomthing, be it to any thing. It is true; we, who us
have bin us’d to our Plumportage, are like enough to make faces (as
did the King of Pontus ) at the Lacedemonian black broth: But who
has open’d his mouth againſt Plumpottage, gilded Coaches, Pages;
Lacquys, fair Mannorhouſes, good Tables, rich Furniture, full Purſes,
Univerſitys, good Benefices, Scarlet Robes, ſquare Caps, rich Jewels,
or faid any thing that would not multiply all this? Why, ſays he, you
are ſo far right, that the Voice of Lycurgus's Agrarian was, Eve-
ry man Mall be thus poor; and that of yours is, That no mån ball be more
than thus rich. This is an Argument (an't pleaſe you) by which he
thinks he has prov'd, that there is no difference between the Agra-
rian that was in Lacedemon, and that which is in Oceana: For, Sir,
whatſoever is thus and thus, is like : But the Agrarian of Lacedemon
was thus, A man could have no Mony, or none that deſerv'd that
name; and the Agrarian of Oceana is thus, A mans Mony is not con-
fin'd: Therfore the Agrarian of the one, and of the other, are like.
Was it not a great grievance in Lacedemon, think you, that they had
no ſuch Logic nor Logician? Be this as it will, It had bin impoſſible,
ſays he, for Lycurgus to have ſettl’d his Government, had he not
wiſely obtain'd a Reſponſe from the Oracle at Delphos, magnifying and re-
commending it : After which all reſiſtance would have bin downright Impie-
ty and Diſobedience, which concerns Mr. HARRINGTON very little.
The Bible then is not ſo good an Oracle as was that at Delphos. But
this Reflection has a tang with it, that makes me think it relates to
that where he ſays, I know not how, but Mr. HARRINGTON has Confid. p. 18.
taken up a very great unkindneſs for the Clergy. He will know no-
thing ; neither that the Oracle of the Scripture is of all other the clear-
eſt for a Commonwealth, nor that the Clergy being generally a.
gainſt a Commonwealth, are in this below the Prieſts of Delphos, who
were more for LYCURGUs than theſe are for Moses. But hav'at
the Agrarian of Oceana with the whole bail of Dice, and at five
THE firſt throw is, That it is unjuſt : For,
IF it be truly aſſerted ( in Oceana, Page the 39th) that Government Conſid. p. 81.
is founded on Property, then Property conſiſts in Nature before Govern-
and Government is to be fitted to Property, not Property to Govern-
How great a Sin then would it be againſt the firſt and pureſt notion
of Juſtice, to bring in a Government not only different from, but directly de-
ſtructive to the ſettld Property of Oceana, where (in the 107th Page )
are confeſt to be three hundred Perſons, whoſe Eſtates in Land excede
the Standard of two thouſand pounds a year. Let me not be chok’d with
the Example of Lacedemon, till Mr. HARRINGTON has ſhewn us
the Power of his Perſuaſion with the Nobility of Oceana, as Lycur-
Gus with them of Lacedemon, to throw up their Lands to be parcel'd by
his Agrarian ( as Page 111.) and when that is don, I ſhall ceale to com
plain of the Injuſtice of it. Nor need any one of theſe three hundred be
put to own a ſhame, fór preferring his own Intereſt before that of a whole
Nation; for tho when Government is once fix’d, it may be fit to ſubmit
privat to public Vtility, yet when the queſtion is of chuſing a Government,
every particular man is left to his own native Right, which cannot be pre-
Scribd againſt by the Intereſt of all the reſt of Mankind.
throws.
ment,
ment.
there
29
HOW
298
The Prerogative
0
Book I.
HOW many falſe Dice there are in this throw (becauſe you ſee
I have little to do) will be worth counting.
WHERAS I no where deny Property to derive her being from
Law; lie infinuats that I preſume Property to be in Nature. There's
One.
WHERAS in natural and domeſtic Viciſſitude, I aſſert, That
Empire is to follow the Legal State of Property; he impoſes, as if
I had aſſerted, that Empire muſt follow the natural ſtate of Property.
Two.
WHERAS in violent or foren Viciſſitude (as when the Iſraelits
poſſeſt themſelves of the Land of Canaan, the Goths and Vandals of
Italy, the Franks of France, the Saxons of England) Property, in or-
der to the Government to be introduc'd, is alterable; he inſinuats as
if I had ſaid, that Empire muſt always follow the ſtate of Property,
not as it may be alter'd in that relation, but as it is found. Three.
WHERAS the Government of Oceana is exactly fitted to Pro-
perty, as it was ſettl'd before; he inſinuats it to be deſtructive to the
ſettld Property. Four.
WHERA'S I ſay, that to put it with the moſt, they that are
Proprietors of Land in Oceana, exceding two thouſand pounds a year,
do not excede three hundred Perſons; he ſays, that I have confeſt they
be three hundred. Five.
WHERAS I ſhew that tlie Nobility of Lacedemon, upon the
perſuaſion of LYCURGUS, threw up their Eſtates to be parceľd by
his Agrarian; but that in Oceana, it is not needful or requir'd that
any man ſhould part with a Farthing, or throw up one ſhovelful of
his Earth: he impoſes, as if I went about to perſuade the Nobility to
throw up their Lands. Six.
WHERAS I have ſhewn that no one of thoſe within the three
hundred can have any Intereſt againſt the Agrarian; he, without
ſhewing what ſuch an Intereſt can be, infinuats that they have an In-
tereſt againſt it. Seven.
WHERAS the Government of Oceana gos altogether upon con-
ſent, and happens not only to fit privat to public, but even public to
privat Utility, by which means it is void of all Objection; he inſinuats,
that it is againſt privat Utility. Eight.
WHERE he ſays, that' in chuſing a Government every man is
left to his own native Right; he inlinuats thiat the Agrarian (which
dos no more than fix Property, as ſhe found it) is againſt native Right.
Nine.
WHERAS God has given the Earth to the Sons of men, which
native Right (as in caſe a man for hunger takes ſo much as will feed him,
and no niore, of any other mans meat or herd) preſcribes againſt legal
Property, and is the cauſe why the Law eſteems not ſuch an Action
to be Theft ; he inſinuats that there is a native Right in legal Proper-
ty, which cannot be prefcribd againſt by the Intereſt of all the reſt of
Mankind. Ten.
WHILE he pleaded the caſe of Monarchy, Levelling was con-
cluded lawful; in the caſe of a Commonwealth, which asks no ſuch
favor, Levelling is concluded unlawful. Eleven.
IN the Reformation or Level as to Monarchy, tho Property ſub-
ſiſted before that Level, yet Property was to be fitted to the Govern-
ment, and not the Government to Property; but in the caſe of a Com-
monwealth
}
of Popular Government.
299
monwealth the Government is to be fitted to Property, and not Pro-Chap. II.
perty to the Government. Twelve.
IN that, any man was bound to relinquiſh his native Right, elſe
how could a Prince level his Nobility? In this, no man is bound to
relinquiſh his native Right. Thirteen.
IN that, this fame native Right might be preſcrib'd againſt by the
Prince; in this, it cannot be preſcrib'd againſt by the Intereſt of Man-
kind. Fourteen.
IN that, no Nobleman but ought to own a ſhame if he prefer'd
his Intereſt before that of the Prince; in this, no Nobleman ought to
own a ſhame for preferring his own Intereſt before that of a whole Nation.
Fifteen.
WOULD you liave any more? theſe fifteen majors and minors, ,
or falſe Dice, are ſoop'd up again, and put all into this concluſion or
Box, like themſelves.
THVS the Intereſt of the three hundred is not balanc'd with that of
a whole Nation, but that of fom fem extravagant Spirits; who, by making
Dams in the Current of other mens Estates, hope to derive fom Water to
their own parch'd Fortunes.
CALUMNIAR E fortiter, nihil adhærebit. If a River has but
one natural Bed or Channel, what Dam is made in it by this Agrarian?
but if a River has liad many natural Beds or Channels, to which ſhe
has forgot to rcach her Breaſt, and whoſe Mouths are dry'd up or ob-
ſtructed; theſe are Dams which the Agrarian dos not make, but re.
move: and what parchi'd Fortunes can hereby hope to be water'd, but
theirs only, whoſe Veins having drunk of the ſame Blood, have a
right in Nature to drink of the ſame Milk? The Law of Moses
allow'd the firſtborn but a double portion: was his an extravagant
Spirit?
HIS ſecond throw is, That the nature of the Agrarian is ſuch as
cannot be fix’dy in regard that the People being intruſted with a Vote and
a Sword, may alter it for the leſs, or com to downright Levelling. But as
to this, in the 8th Chapter I liave bar'd his Dice, that being the
place in which I thought moſt proper to give a full Anſwer to this
Objection.
AT the third throw, he is extreme aukward. For wheras the
I[raelits (notwithſtanding the Voyages of SOLOMON, and what is
faid of the Ships of Tharſis) during their Agrarian, or while they had
Land, were a Commonwealth of Husbandmen, and not of Merchants,
nor came to the exerciſe of this Trade, till they had no Land, or after
their diſperſion by the Emperor ADRIA'N; lie fcrues it in, after this
As the Jews who have no Lands, are every where great 'Tra- Confid. p. 85,
ders; ſo the poſſeſſion of Lands being limited by this Agrarian, men who
are either covetous or ambitious (as it Eſtates were not got by Induſtry,
but by. Coverouſoefs and Ambition) will imploy themſelves and their
Estates in foren Traffic, which being in a manner wholly ingroft by the Ca-
pital City of Oceana, that City, already too great, will immediatly grom
into en exceſs of Power and Riches, very dangeroits to the Commonwealth ;
Amſterdam being com by ſuch means to exerciſe of late a Tyranny in the
diſpoſal of ſom public Affairs, much to the prejudice both of the Liberty
and Intereſt of the reſt of the Union, An equal, if not greater Incom-
modity to Oceana, would be created by the Agrarian, which making Em-
porium a City of Princes, would render the Countrý a Commonwealth of
Cotta.
manner
Qq
1
The Prerogative
300
9
T:
1691
!"
Book I. Cottagers, able to diſpute Precedence with the Beggers Bufh.
NEW S, not from Tripoli, nor any other corner of the whole
World but one. Bate me this, and ſhew me in what other City
increaſe of Houſes or new Foundations was ever held a Nufance.
This ſure is a Phanfy that regards not the old Folks, or antient Pru-
depce.
ONE of the Bleſſings that God promis'd to ABRAHA M, was,
that his Seed ſhould be multiply'd as the Stars of Heaven : And the Com-
monwealth of Rome, by multiplying her Seed, came to bound her
Territory with tlie Ocean, and her fame with the Stars of Heaven.
That ſuch a Populouſneſs is that without which there can be no
great Commonwealth, both Reaſon and good Authors are clear; but
whether it ought to begin in the Country, or in the City, is a ſcruple
I have not known themi make. That of Iſrael began in the Country,
that of Rome in the City. Except there be obſtruction or impedi-
ment by the Law, as in Turky where the Country, and in England
where the City is forbid to increaſe ; wherever there is a populous
Country, for example France, it makes a populous City, as Paris;
and wherever there is a populous City, as Rome after the ruin of
Alba, and Amſterdam after the ruin (as to Trade) of Antwerp, it
makes a populous Territory, as was that of the Ruſtic Tribes, and is
that of Holland.
BUT the ways how a populous City coms to make a populous
Country, and how a populous Country coms to make a populous
City, are contrary; the one happening thro fucking, as that of the
City, and the other thro weaning, as that of the Country.
FOR proof of the former : the more mouths there be in a City,
the more meat of neceſſity muſt be vented by the Country, and ſo
there will be more Corn, more Cattel, and better Markets; which
breeding more Laborers, more Husbandmen, and richer Farmers,
bring the Country fo far from a Commonwealth of Cottagers, that
where the Bleſſings of God, thro the fruitfulneſs of late years with
us, render'd the Husbandman unable to diſpute Precedence with the
Beggers Buſh, his Trade thus uninterrupted, in that his Markets are
certain, gos on with increaſe of Children, of Servants, of Corn, and
of Cattel: for there is no reaſon why the Fields adjoining to Emporiun,
being but of a hard ſoil, ſhould annually produce two Crops, buc the
Populouſneſs of the City.
THE Country then growing more populous, and better ſtock'd
with Cattel, which alſo increaſes Manure for the Land, muſt propor-
tionably increaſe in fruitfulneſs. Hence it is that (as the Romans alſo
were good at ſuch works) in Holland there is ſcarce a puddle un-
drain'd, nor a bank of Sand caſt up by the Sea, that is not cover'd
with Earth, and made fruitful by the People; theſe being ſo ſtrangely,
with the growth of Amſterdam, increas’d, as coms perhaps to two
parts in three: nor, the Agrarian taking place in Oceana, would it be
longer diſputed, whether Me might not deltroy Fiſhes to plant Men.
Thus a populous City makes a Country milch, or populous by ſuck-
ing; and wheras ſom may ſay, that ſuch a City may ſuck from foren
parts, it is true enough, and no where more apparent than in Amſter-
dam. But a City that has recourſe 'to a foren Dug, ere ſhe had firſt
ſuck'd that of her proper Nurſe or Territory dry, you ſhall hardly
find; or finding (as in ſom Plantation not yet wean'd) will hardly
be
ai:
}
ment
IH
1
.
of Popular Government.
301
1
.
be able to make that Objection hold, ſeeing it will not ly ſo much againſt Chap. II.
the Populouſneſs of the place, as the contrary.
BUT a populous Country makes a populous City by weaning;
for when the People increaſe ſo much, that the dug of Earth can do
no more, the overplus muſt ſeek fom other way of Livelihood: which
is either Arms, Yuch were thoſe of the Goths and Vandals; or Mer-
*chandize and Manufacture, for which ends it being neceſſary that
they lay their Heads and their Stock together, this makes populous
Citys. Thus Holland being a ſmall Territory, and ſuck'd dry, has
upon the matter wean’d the whole People, and is therby becom as it
were one City that ſucks all the World.
BUT by this means, ſays the Conſiderer, Emporium being already
too great (while indeed Amſterdam, conſidering the narrowneſs of the
Territory, or the ſmalneſs of Holland, is much more populous) would
immediatly grow into an exceſs of Power and Riches, very dangerous to
Liberty,
an example wherof was ſeen in the late Tyranny of that City:
As if it. were not ſufficiently known that Amſterdam contributes, and
has contributed more to the defence of the Commonwealth, or United
Provinces, than all the reſt of the League, and had in thoſe late Acti-
ons which have bin ſcandaliz'd, refifted not the Intereſt of Liberty,
but of a Lord. That the increate of Rome, which was always ſtudy'd by
her beſt Citizens, ſhould make her Head too great for her Body, or her
Power dangerous to the Tribes, was never ſo much as imagin'd; and
tho ſhe were a City of Princes, her ruſtic Tribes were ever had in
greateſt Eſteem and Honor ; inſomuch, that a Patrician would be of
BUT the Authority of ancient Commonwealths is needleſs; the
Prevaricator by his own Argumentation or Might, lays himſelf neck
and heels.
FOR, ſays he, Were this Agrarian once ſettl’d, Emporium would Corfid. P. 93.
be a City of Princes, and the Nobility fo throly plum'd, that they would be
juſt as ſtrong of wing, as wild Fowl in moulting time. There would
be a City of Princes, and yet no Nobility. He is ſo faſt that I have
pity on him, if I knew but which way to let him looſe. He means
perhaps, that the Merchants growing rich, would be the Nobility;
and the Nobility growing poor, would be Graſiers.
BUT fo for ought I know it was always, or worſe, that is, men
attain’d to Riches and Honors by ſuch or worſe Arts, and in Poverty
made not always ſo honeft Retreats. To all which Infirmitys of the
State, I am deceiv'd if this Agrarian dos not apply the proper Reme-
dys. For ſuch an Agrarian makes a Commonwealth for increaſe :
the Trade of a Commonwealth for increaſe, is Arms; Arms are not
born by Merchants, but by Noblemen and Gentlemen. The No-
bility therfore having theſe Arms in their hands, by which Provinces
· are to be acquir’d, new Provinces yield new Eſtates; ſo wheras the
Merchant has his returns in Silk or Canvas, the Soldier will have his
return in Land. He that repreſents me as an Enemy to the Nobility,
is the man he ſpeaks of; for if ever the Commonwealth attains to
five new Provinces (and ſuch a Commonwealth will have Provinces
enow) it is cercain, that (beſides Honors, Magiſtracys, and the Reve-
nues annex'd ) there will be more Eſtates in the Nobility of Oceana,
of fourteen thouſand pounds Land a year, than ever were, or can
otherwiſe be of four ; and that without any the leaſt danger to the
Common
no other.
1
11.
h!
302
The Prerogative
1
Book I Commonwcalth : for if Rome had but look'd ſo far to it, as to have
vind made good her Agrarian in Italy, tho ſhe had neglected the reſt, the
Wealth of lier Nobility might have ſuck'd her Provinces, but muſt
have inrich'd the People; and ſo rather have water'd her Roots, than
ſtarv'd and deſtroy'd them, as it did. In this caſe therfore the Nobi-
lity of Oceana would not moulter like wild Fowl, but be ſtrong of wing,
as tlie Eagle.
ONE Argument more I have heard urg'd againſt the Populouſneſs
of the Capital City, which is, That the Rich in time of ſickneſs for-
ſaking the place, by which means the Markets com to fail, the Poor,
left they ſhould ſtarve, will run abroad, and infect the whole Coun-
try. But ſhould a man tell them at Paris, or Grand Cairo (in the
latter wherof the Plague is more frequent and furious than happens
with us) that tliey are not to build 'Houſes, nor increaſe ſo much,
left they ſhould have the Plague; or that Children are not to be born
ſo faſt, left they dy, they would think it ſtrange news. A Com-
monwealth is furniſh'd withi Laws, and Power to add ſuch as ſhe
fall find needſul. In caſe a City be in that manner viſited, it is the
duty of the Country, and of the Government, to provide for them
by contribution.
Conſ.d. 1.87. THE difficulty in making the Agrarian egual and ſteddy thro the riſe
or fall that may happen in Mony, which is the fourth throw of the Pré-
varicator, is that which it might have bin for his eaſe to have taken
norice was long ſince fufficiently bar'd, where it is faid, That if a
new Survey at the prefent Rent was taken, an Agrarian ordaining
that no man Should thenceforth hold above ſo much Land as is there
valu'd at the rate, however Mony might alter, would be equal and
ſteddy enough.
Confid. t. 89.
HÍS laſt caſt is, That the Agrarian would make War againſt uni-
verſal and immemorial Cuſtom; which being without doubt more preva-
lent than that of Reaſon, there is nothing of ſuch difficulty as to perſuade
men at once, and crudely, that they and their Forefathers have bin in an
Error.
WISE men, I ſee, may differ in Judgment or Counfil: for, ſays
E:Tay 24.
Sir FRANCIS BACON, Strely every Medicin is an Innovation, and
he that will not apply new Remedys mujt expect new Evils : for Time is
the greateſt Innovator ; and if Time of courſe alters things to the worſe,
and Wiſdom and Counſil may not alter them to the better, what muſt be the
end?
BUT the caſe of the Agrarian receives equal ſtrength from each
of theſe Counſillors or Opinions: from the latter, in that it gos upon
grounds which Time has not innovated for the worſe
, but for the betier ;
and ſo according to the former coms not to have bin at once, and crude
ly perſuaded, but introduc'd by Čuſtom, now grown univerſal and
immemorial.' For who remembers the Gentry of this Nation to have
worn the blew Coats of the Nobility, or the lower ſort of people to
have liv'd upon the ſmoak of their Kitchins? On the contrary, Is it
not now a univerſal Cuſtom for men to rely upon their own For .
tunes or Induſtry, and not to put their Truſt in Princes, ſeeking in
their Liberality or Dependence the means of living ? The Prevarica-
tor might as well jump into his great Grandfather's old Breeches, and
perſuade us that he is a la mode, or in the new cut, as that the ways of
Forefathers would agree with our Cuſtoms. Dos not every man
now
our
it
of Popular Government.
303
1
now ſee, that if the Kings in thoſe days had ſettld the Eſtates of the Chap: 12.
Nobility by a Law, reftraining them from felling their Land, ſuch a
a Law had bin an Agrarian, and yet not warring againſt their an-
tient Cuſtoms, but preſerving tliem? Wherfore neither dos tlie Agra-
rian propos’d, taking the Balance of Eſtates as ſhe now finds them,
make War againſt, but confirm the preſent Cuſtoms. The only Ob-
jection that can ſeem in this place to ly, is, that wheras it lias bin the
Cuſtom of Oceana that the bulk of the Eſtate ſhould defcend to the
eldeſt Son, by the Agrarian he cannot, in caſe he has more Brothers,
inherit above two thouſand pounds a year in Land, or an equal ſhare.
But neither dos this, whether you regard the Parents or the Children,
make War with Cuſtom. For putting the caſe the Father has twenty
thouſand pounds a year in Land, he gos not the leſs in his cuſtom or
way of Life for the Agrarian, becauſe for this he has no leſs: and if he
has more or fewer Sons to whom this Eftate deſcends by equal or in-
equal portions, neicher do they go leſs in their ways or cuſtoms of Life
for the Agrarian, becauſe they never had more. But, fays AR I S- Pol. L. 3. c.94
TOTLE (ſpeaking of the Oſtraciſm as it ſupplys the defect of an
Agrarian) this courſe is as neceſſary to Kings as to Commonwealths. By
this means the Monarchys of Turky and of Spain preſerve their Ba.
lance; thro the neglect of this has that of the Nobility of Oceana bin
broken : and this is it which the Prevaricator, in adviſing that the No-
bility be no further leveľd than will ſerve to keep the People under,
requires of his Prince. So, That ani Agrarian is neceſſary to Govern-
ment, be it what it will, is on all hands concluded.
CHAP. XII.
Whether Courſes or a Rotation be neceſſary to a well-order’d Com-
monwealth. In which is contain’d the Courſes or Parembole of
Iſrael before the Captivity, together with the Epitome of Athens
and Venice.
C
NE bout more and we have don: This (as reaſon good) will Oceana, P. 54.
be upon Wheels or Rotation : For,
AS the Agrarian anſwers to the equality of the Foundation or
Root, ſo dos Rotation to the equality of the Superſtructures or Brati
ches of a Commonwealth.
EQUAL Rotation is equal Viciſſitude in, or Succeſſion to Ma-
giſtracy confer'd for equal terms, injoining ſuch equal Vacations, as
cauſe the Government to take in the Body of the People, by parts ſuc-
ceding others, thro the free Election or Suffrage of the whole.
THE contrary wherto is prolongation of Magiſtracy, which,
traſhing the wheel of Rotation, deſtroys the Life or natural Motion
of a Commonwealth.
THE Prevaricator, whatever he has don for himſelf, has don this
for me, that it will be out of doubt whether my Principles be capable
of greater Obligation or Confirmation, than by having Objections made
againſt them. Nor liave I bin altogether ingrateful, or nice of my
Labor, but gon far (much farther than I needed) about, that I might
return with the more valuable Preſent to him that ferit më of the
errand:
304
The Prerogative
Grot.
Book I. errand : I ſhall not be ſhort of like proceding upon the preſent Subjects
LG
but rather over.
ROTATION in a Commonwealth is of the Magiſtracy, of the
Senat, of the People ; of the Magiſtracy and the People ; of the Ma-
giſtracy and the Senat; or of the Magiſtracy, of the Senat, and of the
People: which in all com to ſix kinds.
FOR example of Rotation in the Magiſtracy, you have the Judg
of Iſrael, call'd in Hebrew Shophet
. The like Magiſtracy after the Kings
IT HOB A L and BA A L came in uſe with the Tyrians; from theſe, with
their Poſterity the Carthaginians, who alſo call’d their ſupreme Ma-
giftrats, being in number two, and for their Term Annual, Shophetim,
which the Latins by a ſofter Pronunciation render Suffetes.
THE Shophet or Judg of Iſrael was a Magiſtrat, not, that I can
find, oblig'd to any certain term, throout the Book of Judges ; never-
theleſs, it is plain, that his Election was occaſional, and but for a time,
after the manner of a Dictator.
TRUE it is, that Eliand SAMUEL ruld all their lives; but
this ſuch impatience in the People follow'd, thro the corruption of their
Sons, as was the main cauſe of the ſucceding Monarchy.
THE Magiſtrats in Athens (except the Areopagits, being a Judica-
tory) were all upon Rotation. The like for Lacedemon and Rome,
except the Kings in the former, who were indeed hereditary, but had
no more Power than the Duke in Venice, where all the reſt of the Ma-
giſtrats (except the Procuratori, whoſe Magiſtracy is but mere Orna-
ment) are alſo upon Rotation.
FOR the Rotation of the Senat you have Athens, the Achaans,
Ætolians, Lycians, the Amphictionium; and the Senat of Lacedemon re-
Pol. I. 2. c.7. prov'd, in that it was for life, by ARISTOTLE: Modern Examples
of like kind are the Diet of Switzerland, but eſpecially the Senat of
Venice.
but upon
FOR the Rotation of the People, you have firſt Iſrael, where the
Congregation (which the Greecs call Eccleſia; the Latins, Comitia, or
Concio) having a twofold capacity; firſt, that of an Army, in which
they were the conſtant Guard of the Country; and, ſecondly, that
of a Repreſentative, in which they gave the Vote of the People, at the
creation of their Laws, or election of their Magiltrats, was Monthly.
1 Chron.27.1. Now the Children of Iſrael after their Number, to wit, the chief Fathers
and Captains of thouſands and hundreds, and their Officers that ſerv’d the
King in any matter of the Courſes, which came in and went out month by
month, throout all the months of the year, of every Courſe were twenty and
four thouſand.
SUCH a multitude there was of military Age, that without incon-
venience, four and twenty thouſand were every month in Arms, whoſe
term expiring, others ſucceded, and ſo others; by which means the Ro-
tation of the whole People came about in the ſpace of one year. The
Tribuns, or Commanders of the Tribes in Arms, or of
the Prerogative
for the month, are nam'd in the following part of the Chapter, to the
fixteenth Verſe; where begins the enumeration of the Princes (tho
GAD and Ashur, for what reaſon I know not, be omitted) of the
Tribes, remaining in their Provinces, where they judg’d the People,
and as they receiv’d Orders, were to bring or ſend ſuch farther Inforce-
meņt or Recruits as occaſion requir’d to the Army : after theſe, fome
cther
Grot, ad loc.
*
LUT
1
1
of Popular Government.
305
other Officers are mention'd. There is no queſtion to be made but this Chap. 12.
Rotation of the People, together with their Prerogative or Congregati-
on, was preſerv'd by the monthly Election of two thouſand Deputys
in each of the twelve Tribes, which in all came to four and twenty
thouſand ; or. let any man ſhew how otherwiſe it was likely to be don,
the nature of their office being to give the Vote of the People, who
therfore ſure muſt have choſen them. By theſe the Vote of the Peo-
ple was given to their Laws, and at Elections of their Magiſtrats.
TO their Laws, as where DAVID propoſes the reduction of the
Ark: And DAVID conſulted with the Captains of thouſands and hun- 1 Chron. 13.
dreds, and with every Leader. And David ſaid to all the Congregation
of Iſrael, If it ſeems good to you, and it be of the Lord God, let us ſend
abroad to our Brethren every where (the Princes of Tribes in their Pro-
vinces) that are left in the Land of Iſrael, and with them alſo to the Prieſts
and Levites, which are in the Citys and Suburbs, that they may gather them-
ſelves to us, and let us bring again the Ark of our God to us, for we in-
quir'd not at it in the days of Saul. And all the Congregation (gave their
Suffrage in the Affirmative) ſaid that they would do to; for the thing
was right in the eys of the People
. Nulla lex fibi foli conſcientiam Juſtitiæ Grot. è Tertul.
ſua debet, ſed eis a quibus obfequium expectat. Now that the fame Con-
gregation or Repreſentative gave the Vote of the People alſo in the
Elečtion of Prieſts, Officers and Magiſtrates ; Moreover DAVID and 1 Chron. 25,
the Captains of the Hoſt ſeparated to the Service of the Sons of A'S
A PH,
and of HEMAN, and of JEDUTHUN, who ſhould prophefy with Harps,
with Pfalterys, and with Cymbals. But upon the occaſion to which we
are more eſpecially beholden for the preſervation and diſcovery of this
admirable Order (DAVID having propos’d the buſineſs in a long and 1 Chron.28. 2.
pious ſpeech) the Congregation made SOLOMON the Son of DAVID
King the ſecond time, and anointed him to the Lord to be chief Governor, 1Chron.29.22.
and ZADO K to be Prieſt. For as to the firſt time that SOLOMON
was made King, it happen'd, thro the Sedition of ADONIJA H,
1 Kings 1.
have bin don in haſt and tumultuouſly by thoſe only of Jeruſalem;
and the reaſon why ZADOK is here made Prieſt, is, that ABIATHAR
was put out for being of the Conſpiracy with ADONIJA H.
I MAY expect (by ſuch Obje&ions as they afford me) it ſhould
be alleg’d, that to prove an Order in a Commonwealth; I inſtance in
a Monarchy ; as if there were any thing in this Order monarchical, or
that could, if it had not bin ſo receiv'd from the Commonwealth,
have bin introduc'd by the Kings, to whom in the judgment of any fo-
ber man (the Prevaricator only excepted, who has bin huckling about
ſom ſuch Council for his Prince) no leſs could have follow'd upon the
firft frown of the People, than did in REHOBOA M, who having 1 Kings 12.
us’d them roughly, was depos’d by the Congregation, or the major part
.
It is true, that while Iſrael was an Army, the Congregation, as it
nceded not to aſſemble by way of Election or Repreſentative, ſo I be-
lieve it did not ; but that by all Iſrael aſſembļd to this end, ſhould be
meant the whole People after they were planted upon their Lots, and
not their Repreſentative, which in a political ſenſe is as properly focall'd,
were abſurd and impoſſible. Nor need I go upon preſumtion only,
be the ſame never for ſtrong, ſeeing it is ſaid in Scripture of the Kora-
thites, that they were keepers of the Gates of the Tabernacle, and their Fa- 1 Chron.9.29;
tbers being over the Hoſt of the Lord, were keepers of the Entry: That is,
(according to the Interpretation of Grotius) the Korathites were
to
14:
U
1
й
f
RI
now
.:
1
306
The Prerogative
Q
Numb. 4.
+
- Book I. now keepers of the Gates, as it appears in the Book of Numbers, clieir
Anceſtors the Kohathites had bin in the Camp, or while Iſrael was yet
an Army. But our Tranſlation is lame in the right foot, as to the true
diſcovery of the antient manner of this ſervice, which according to the
Septuagint and the vulgar Latin was thus, they were keepers of the Gates
of the Tabernacle (iy Trutiges &UTæv 67' Tüs Tapéu Borñs, do familie eo-
rum per vices) and their Fathers by turns, or Rotation. So that Offices
and Services by Courſes, Turns, or Rotation, are plainly more anti-
ent than Kings in the Commonwealth of Iſrael ; tho it be true that
when the Courſes or Rotation of the Congregation or Repreſentative
of the People were firſt introduc'd, is as hard to ſhew, as it would be
how, after the People were once planted upon their Lots; they could
be otherwiſe aſſembl’d. If Writers argue well and lawfully from
what the Sanhedrim was in the inſtitution by JEHOSAPHAT, to
what it had more antiently bin; to argue from what the Congregation
was in the inſtitution by DAVID, to what it had more antiently bin,
is ſufficiently warranted.
THESE things rightly conſider'd, there remains little doubt but
we have the courſes of Iſrael for the firſt example of Rotation in a
popular Aſſembly. Now to com from the Hebrew to the Grecian Pru-
dence, the ſame is approv'd by ARISTOTLE, which he exemplifys
in the Commonwealth of THALES MILESIUS, where the People,
Pol. I. 4. C. 14. he ſays, aſſembļd (to zeza pé G-, ó Mà pesi troévtos átęóous ) by turns or
Rotation. Nor is the Roman Prudence without ſom ſhadow ofthe like
Proceding, where the Prerogative (pro tempore) with the jure vocatæ,
being made by Lot, gave frequently the Suffrage of the whole People.
But the Gothic Prudence in the Policy of the third State, runs alto-
gether upon the Collection of a Repreſentative by the Suffrage of the
People (tho not ſo diligently regulated, by Terms and Vacations, as
to a ſtanding Aſſembly were neceſſary, by. Turns, Rotation, Parem-
bole or Courſes) as in the election of the late Houſe of Commons, and
the conſtitutive Viciſſitude of the Knights and Burgeſſes, is known by
ſufficient experience.
WHEN the Rotation of a Commonwealth is both in the Magiſtra-
су
and the People, I reckon it to be of a fourth kind, as in Iſrael, where
both the Judg and the Congregation were ſo elected.
THE fifth kind is when the Rotation of a Commonwealth is in the
Magiſtracy and the Senat, as in thoſe of Athens, of the Acheans, of the
Ætolians, of the Lycians, and of Venice ; upon which Examples, ra-
ther for the influence each of them, at leaſt Athens, may have upon
the following Book, than any great neceſſity from the preſent occalion,
I ſhall inlarge in this place.
THE Commonwealth of Athens was thus adminiſter'd.
THE Senat of the Bean being the propoſing Aſſembly (for that of
Achenian com- the Areopagits, call'd alſo a Senat, was a Judicatory) conſiſted of four
hundred Citizens choſen by Lot, which was perform’d with Beans.
Theſe were annually remov'd all at once:By which means Athens became
fruſtrated of the natural and neceſſary uſe of an Ariſtocracy, while nci-
ther her Senators were choſen for their parts, nor remain'd long e-
nough in this. Function to acquire the right underſtanding of their pro-
per Office. Theſe thus elected, were ſubdivided by Lot into four e-
qual parts, call?d Prytan;s, each of which for one quarter of the year
..
#11
Epitome of the
monwealth.
::
*
was
of Popular Government.
307
Acc.
Phil. I.
was in office. The Prytany, or Prytans in office, elected ten Preſi- Chap. 12.
dents, call'd Proedri, out of which Proedri or Preſidents they weekly
choſe one Provoſt of the Council, who was call'd the Epiſtata. The
Epiſtata and the Proedri were the more peculiar Propoſers to the Pry-
tans, and to the Prytans it belong'd eſpecially to prepare buſineſs Petit
. de Leg.
(τρό της βελής και προ της εκκλησίας) for the Senat. They gave
dience to any that would propoſe any thing concerning the Common-
wealth, which if, when reported by the Prytans, it were approv'd by
the Senat, the party that propos’d might promulgat the buſineſs; and
Promulgation being made, the Congregation aſſembld, and deter-
mind of it. Sic data concio Lelio eſt, proceſſit ille, & Græcus apud Græcos Cic. pro Flac.
non de culpa ſua dixit, ſed de pæna queſtus eft ; porrexerunt manas, Pfe-
phiſma natum eft.
THE Prytans and their Magiſtrats had right to aſſemble the Senat,
and propoſe to them; and what the Senat determin'd upon ſuch a Pro-
poſition, if forthwith to be offer'd to the People, as in privat caſes,
was calĽd Proboulema ; but if not to be propos'd till the People had a
years trial of it, as was the ordinary way in order to Laws to be enact-
ed, it was call'd Plephiſma; each of which words, with that difference,
fignifys a Decree. Å Decree of the Senat in the latter ſenſe had for
one year the power of a Law, after which trial it belongʻd to the Theſ-
mothetæ (usporedioev) to hang it in writing upon the Statues of the He-
ros, and aſſemble the Congregation. Theſe Magiſtrats were of the Ulpian. ad
number of the Archons, which in all were nine; the chief, more pecu-
liarly ſo call?d, was ARCHON EPONYMUS, he by whoſe name the
year was reckonid or denominated (his Magiſtracy being of a Civil Poll. I. 8. c.8.
concernment) the next was the King (a Magiſtrat of a Spiritual con-
cernment) the third the Polemarch (whoſe Magiſtracy was of a Mili-
tary concernment) the other ſix were the Theſmotheté, who had ſe-
veral Functions common with the nine ; others peculiar or proper to
themſelves, as (wgoyegpsv) to give the People (by Placares) notice
when the Judicatorys were to aſſemble, that is, when the People were
to aſſemble in that capacity, and to judg according to the Law made;
or, when the Senat or the People were to aſſemble upon an élocygenia,
a Crime that was not provided againſt by the Law, as that of Alci-
BIADES (the Wits about that time in Athens being moſt of them
Atheiſts) for laughing at CEREs, diſcovering her Secrets, and ſhav-
ing of the MERCURY S. If an Archon or Demagog was guilty of ſuch
a Crime, it belong’d to the cognizance of the Senat, otherwiſe to that
of the People, whom the Theſmothet & were alſo in like manner to warn, L. 8. c.16,
when they were to com to the Suffrage.
THESE fix, like the Electors in Venice, preſided at all Elections
of Magiſtrats, whether made by the Lot as the Judges, or by Suffrage
as the new Archons, the Strategus or General, and moſt of the reit.
They alſo had the hearing and introducing of all Cauſes into the Judi-
BUT the right of aſſembling the Ecclefia or Congregation belong’d
to the Prytans, by whom the Senat propos’d to the People.
THẾ Congregation conſiſted of all them that were upon the Roll of
the Lexiarcha, that is to ſay, of the whole People having right to the
City. The Prytans ſeated upon a Tribunal, were Preſidents of this
Aſſembly; the Aſſembly liaving facrific'd and made Oath of Fideli-
ty to the Commonwealth, the Proedri or Preſidents of the Prytans
Rr 2
propos'd
catorys.
0
1
308
The Prerogative
Book I. propos'd by Authority of the Senat to the People in this manner : July
wom the 16th POLICLES being Archon, and the Tribe of Pandion in the
Prytaneat, DEMOSTHENES PEAN EUS thought thus, or was of
this opinion. The ſame Cuſtom wherby the firſt Propoſer ſubſcribes
his Opinion or Part with his Name, is at this day in Venice. Propoſi-
tion being made, ſuch of the People as would ſpeak were call’d to the
Pulpit; they that were fifty years of Age, or upwards, were to com
firſt, and the younger afterwards; which cuſtom of prating in this
manner made excellent Orators or Demagogs, but a bad Common-
wealth.
FROM this, that the People had not only the Reſult of the Com-
monwealth, but the Debate alſo, Athens is calld a Democracy; and
this kind of Government is oppos'd to that of Lacedemon, which, be-
cauſe the People there had not the power of Debate, but of Reſult
only, was call'd an Ariſtocracy, ſomtimes an Oligarchy: thus the Greecs
commonly are to be underſtood, to diſtinguiſh theſe two; while ac-
cording to my Principles, if you like them, Debate in the People
makes Anarchy; and where they have the Reſult and no more, the
reſt being manag’d by a good Ariſtocracy, it makes that which is pro-
perly and truly to be call d Democracy, or Popular Government. Nei-
ther is this Opinion of mine new, but according to the Judgment of
fom of the Athenians themſelves; for ſays ISOCRATES in his Ora-
tion to the Areopagits for Reformation of the Athenian Government,
I know the main reaſon why the Lacedemonians flouriſh to be, that their
Commonwealth is popular. But to return. As many of the People as
would, having ſhew'd their Eloquence, and with theſe the Demagogs,
who were frequently brib’d, conceal'd their Knavery ; the Epiſtata,
or Provoſt of the Proedri, put the Decree or Queſtion to the Vote, and
the People gave the Reſult of the Commonwealth by their Chirotonia,
that is, by holding up their hands: the Reſult thus given, was the
Law or Pfephiſma of the People.
NOW 'for the Functions of the Congregation, they were divers ;
as firſt, Election of Magiſtrats (óun éxeIÇOTUVŠTE vuôn đUT! Since
Ταξιάρχους και Στρατηγούς και Φυλάρχεις, ε, Ιππάρχους δύο;) namely, the Ar-
chons, the Strategus or General, the Field Officers, the Admirals,
with divers others, all, or the chief of them annual, and com-
monly upon Terms and Vacations; tho it be true, as PLUTARCH
has it, that PHOCION was Strategus four years together, having
that Honor ſtill put upon him by the Congregation, without his feek-
ing. The next Office of this Aſſembly was to elect Judges into five
Courts or Judicatorys; for the People being in the Bulk too unweildy
a Body for the performance of this duty, they exercis'd the ſupreme
Judicature by way of Repreſentative, into which Election was made
by Lottery, in ſuch a manner that five hundred, one thouſand, or
1500 of them (according to the importance of the occaſion) being
above thirty years of Age, and within the reſt of the Qualifications in
that caſe provided by the Law, became the Soverain Judicatory,
calld the Helida. In all Elections, whether by Lot or Suffrage, the
Theſmothetz were Preſidents, and order'd the Congregation. Fur-
thermore, if they would amend,'alter, repeal, or make a Law, this
alſo was don by a Repreſentative, of which no man was capable
that had not bin of the Helian, for the reſt elected out of the whole
People: this amounting to one thouſand, was call’d the Nomothet e or
Legiſla-
Dem. Phil. 1.
of Popular Government
309
Legiſlators. No Law receiv'd by the People could be abrogated but Chap. Iž.
by the Nomóthete ; by theſe any Athenian, having obtain'd leave of
the Senat, might abrogat a Law, provided withal lie put another
in the place of it. Theſe Laws the Proedri of the Prytans were
to put to the Suffrage.
FIRST, the old, whether it agreed with the Athenian People, or
not? then the new; and whether of theſe happen'd to be chirotoniz'd
or voted by the Nomrothetæ, was ratify'd, according to that piece of
the Athenian Law cited by DEMOSTHENES againſt TimoCRA-
TES, οπότερον δ' αν τον νόμον χειροτονήσωσιν οι νομοθέται, τέτον κύριον είναι.
What has bin ſaid of the Commonwealth of Athens, in relation to
the preſent purpoſe, amounts to thus much, That not only the Serrat
and the Magiſtracy in this Policy was upon Rotation, but even the
People alſo, at leaſt as to the Nomotheta, or their Legiſlative Power,
and the Supreme Judicatory of the Helied, each of theſe being á
Repreſentative, conſtituted of one thouſand, or fifteen hundred Ci-
tizens.
BUT for what follows in the ſecond Book, it is neceſſary that I
obſerve in this place the proceding of certain Divines, who indeavor
to make uſe of this Commonwealth for ends of their own, as parti-
cularly Dr. SEAMAN; who in his Book calld Four Propoſitions,
argues after this manner.
CHIROTONIA ( as SuidAS has it) ſignifys both Plebiſcitum,
a Law made by the People, and Pſephiſma. Now, ſays he, Plephiſmá
is the ordinary word usd in the Attic Laws, and in DEMOSTHENES
for Senatuſconſultum, a Law made by the Senat: whence he draws this
Concluſion; As, when the People make a Law, they are ſaid to Chiroto-
nize; ſo may the Rulers, in like manner, in thoſe Laws that are made by
themſelves alone.
THESE ways with Divines are too bad. The words of Sur-
DAS are theſe (xergotovio, tudogi, TÁNTWV négaos) Chirotonia is Election
or Ratification by the Many: which expreſly excludes the Few or the
Senat from being otherwiſe contain’d by the word Chirotonia, than a
part is by the whole. Nor has the Author the word Pfephiſma or
Plebiſcitum in the place. I would fain know what other word there
is in Greec for Plebiſcitum but Pſephiſma; and yet the Doctor puts it
upon Surdas, that he diſtinguiſhes between theſe two, and taking
that for granted where he finds Pſephiſma in DEMOSTHENES and
the Attic Laws, will have it to ſignify no more than a Decree of the Se-
It is true that ſom Decrees of the Senat were ſo call’d, but
thoſe of the People had no other name; and whenever you find Pre-
phiſma in DEMOSTHENES or the Attic Laws, for à Law, there
is nothing more certain than that it is to be underſtood of the People:
for to ſay that a Law in a Popular Commonwealth can be made with
out the People, is a Contradiction.
THE fecond Paſſage is a What think you of theſe words of PolLlib: 8.c.96
POLLux, ίδια δε οι μεν θεσμοθέται προγράφιση, πότε δεί δικάζειν τα δικασ-
τήρια, και τας εισαγγελίας εισαγγέλλεσιν ες ή δήμον και τας χειροτονίας. which
the Doctor having engliſh'd in this manner, The Theſmotheræ do pria
vatly preſcribe when Judgment is to be given, and promulge public Accuſa-
tions and Suffrages to the People, asks you whoſe Suffrages® were theſe, if
not the Rulers? By which ſtrange Conſtruction, where Pollux
having
nat.
1
310
The Prerogative
i
Book I. having firſt related in what part the function of the Themothetæ was
common with that of the nine Archons, coms (idio d) to ſhew you
what was peculiar to themſelves, namely, to give notice when the
Helica or other Judicatorys were to aſſemble; the Doctor renders it,
they do privatly preſcribe : as if the Seſſion of a Court of Juſtice, and ſuch
a one as contain'd a thouſand Judges, being the Repreſentative of the
whole People, were to be privatly preſcrib'd. Then to this privat
preſcribing of Juſtice, he adds, that they do publicly promulge (razening)
Citations upon Crimes not within the written Law; as if privat Pre-
ſcription and public Promulgation could ſtand together. Next,
wheras Promulgation in the very nature of the word ſignifys an Act
before a Law made, he preſumes the Law to be firſt made by the
Rulers, and then promulgated by the Theſmotheta to the People, kim
kam to the experience of all Commonwealths, the nature of Promul-
gation, and the ſenſe of his Author, whoſe words, as I ſhew'd before,
declare it to have bin the proper or peculiar office of the Theſmothetä
to give the People notice when they were to aſſemble for Judicature, or wher
for giving their Chiroronia or Suffrage, by Promulgation of the Cauſe
(cis dwipov) upon which they were to determin.
FOR the fourth paſſage, the Doctor quoting a wrong place for
theſe words, Xago TOVÁCUO VOMODétal, that the Nomot het e (being a
Repreſentative, as I ſhew'd, of the whole People, choſen by Lot,
and in number one thouſand) chirotoniz’d, or gave the Legiſlative
Suffrage; thence infers, that the Rulers chirotoniz’d, voted or made
Laws by themſelves without the People : which is as if one ſhould ſay,
that the Prerogative Tribe in Rome, or the Houſe of Commons in
England, gave their Vote to ſuch or ſuch a Law, therfore it was
made by the Rulers alone, and not by the People of Rome or of
England.
FOR the fourth Paſſage, STEPHANUS quotes DEMOSTHE-
NES at large in thefe words, όυτε βελής, όυτε σήμό χειροτονήσαντος αυτόν.
This the Doctor interprets of an Officer; to which I ſhall ſay more,
when he ſhews me where the Sentence is, or what went before: for
as yet I do not know of an Officer in any Commonwealth, whoſe
Election was indifferently made, either by the Senat or by the Peo-
ple; nor do I think the Doctor has look'd further for this than STE-
PHENS, who has not interpreted it.
THE fifth paſſage is, That a Decree of the Senat in Athens had the
force of a Law for one year, without the People
. So had the Edicts of
the Prætors in Rome : but I would fain know, whence the Senat in
Athens, or the Prætors in Rome, originally deriv'd this Right (which
was no more than that ſuch Laws might be Probationers, and ſo bet-
ter underſtood when they came to the vote) but from the Chirotonia,
or Suffrage of the People.
THE ſixth paſſage ſtops the mouths of ſuch as having nothing to
ſay to the matter of my writing, pick quarrels with the manner or
freedom of it, the Liberty I take in the defence of Truth ; ſeeing the
Doktor takes a greater liberty upon other terms, while he bids his
Antagoniſt (one that defended the Cauſe now in my hand)
conſult his Authors, namely, STEPHENS and Budæus again: for,
ſays he, you wrong thoſe learned
Men, while you would have us believe that
they were as ignorant of the Greec Śtory as your ſelf, or that things are
to be found in them which are not. To which Confidence I have better
1.
leave
of Popular Government.
I
311
than he gives.
Chili:
نما
leave to ſay, that the Doctor ſhould do well to take no worſe Counſil Chap. 12.
BUT what is becom of my Prevaricator? I have quite loſt him,
elſe I ſhould have intreated him to compare his Notes out of my
Sermon, with theſe out of the Doctor's; or retract that ſame affecta-
tion, in ſaying, I know not how, but Mr. HARRINGTON has con-
ceiv'd a great unkindneſs for the Clergy. As if theſe their Stratagems;
with which they make perpetual War againſt the unwary People, did not
concerna man that has undertaken the cauſe of Popular Government.
IN
RI
H
L
THE Policy of the Achæans conſiſted of divers Commonwealths
under one, which was thus adminiſter'd. The Citys ſent their De-
putys twice every year of courſe, and oftner if they were ſummon’d
by their Strategus, or their Demiurges, to the place appointed. The
Strategus was the Supreme Magiltrat both Military and Civil, and
the Demiurges being ten, were his Council, all Annual Magiſtrats e-
lected by the People. This Council thus conſtituted, was call’d'the
Synarchy, and perform'd like Dutys, in relation to the Senat, con-
fiſting of the Deputys ſent by their peculiar Soveraintys or Citys, as
the Prytans to that in Athens. The Policys of the Atolians and Ly-
cians are ſo near the ſame again, that in one you have all. So both the
Senats and the Magiſtracy of theſe Commonwealths were upon Rota-
tion. To conclude with Venice.
THE Commonwealth of Venice conſiſts of four parts; the Great Epitome of the
Commonwealth
Council, the Senat, the College, and the Signory.
of Venice.
THÉ Great Council is the aggregat Body of the whole People, The Great
or Citizens of Venice, which, for the paucity of their number, and Council.
the Antiquity of their Extraction, are calld Gentlemen, or Noble Ve-
netians. Every one of them at five and twenty years of age has right
of Seſſion and Suffrage in this Council; which right of Suffrage, be-
cauſe throout this Commonwealth, in all Debates and Elections, it is
given by the Ballot, is calld the right of Balloting, wherby this Coun-
cil being the Soverain Power, creates all the reſt of the Orders, Coun-
cils, or Magiſtracys; and has conſtitutively the ultimat Reſult, both
in caſes of Judicature, and the Conſtitution of Laws.
THE Senat, call'd alſo the Pregati, conſiſts of fixty Senators pro- The Senat:
perly ſo ſtild, wherof the Great Council elects ſix on a day, begin-
ning ſo long before the month of October, that theſe being all chofen
by that time, then receive their Magiſtracy: it conſiſts alſo of ſixty
more, calld the Junta, which are elected by the Scrutiny of the old
Senat, that is, by the Senat propoſing, and the Great Council re-
ſolving; the reſt of their Creation is after the ſame manner with the
former. In the Sixty of the Senat, there cannot be above three of
any one Kindred or Family, nor in the Junta ſo many, unleſs there
be fewer in the former. "Theſe Magiſtracys are all'annual
, but
without interval, fo that it is at the pleaſure of the Great Council
,
whether a Senator having finiſh'd his year, they will eleet him again.
THE College is a Council conſiſting more eſpecially of three Or- The College.
ders of Magiſtrats, call'd in their Language Savi; as the Savi grandi,
to wlioſe cognizance or care belong the whole affairs of Sea and Land;
the Savi di Terra ferma, to whoſe care and cognizance belong the
affairs of the Land, and the Savi di Mare, to whoſe cognizance ap-
pertain
ܪ
!"
**
.
I'll
- "W
-
:
*
312
The Prerogative
Book I. pertain the affairs of the Sea, and of the Ilands. Theſe are elected
Tw by the Senat, not all at once; but for the Savi grandi, who are ſix,
by three at a time, with the interpoſition of three months; and for
the Savi di Terra ferma, and the Savi di Mare, who are each five,
after the fame manner, ſave only that the firſt' Election conſiſts of
three, and the ſecond of two. Each Order of the Savi elects week-
ly one Provoſt, each of which Provoſts has Right in any affair belong-
ing to the cognizance of his Order, to propoſe to the College. Au-
dience of Embaſſadors, and matters of foren Negotiation, belong
properly to this Council.
The Signory,
THE Signory conſiſts of the Duke and of his Counſillors. The
Duke is a Magiſtrat created by the Great Council for life, to whom
the Commonwealth acknowleges the Reverence due to a Prince, and
all her Acts run in his name; tho without the Counſillors he has no
Power at all, while they can perform any Function of the Signory
without him. The Counſillors, whoſe Magiſtracy is annual, are e-
lected by the Scrutiny of the Senat, naming one out of each Tribe
(for the City is locally divided into fix Tribes) and the Great Council
approving ; ſo the Counſillors are ſix, whoſe Function in part is of
the nature of Maſters of Requeſts, having withal power to grant cer-
tain Privileges: but their greateſt preeminence is, that all or any one
of them may propoſe to any Council in the Commonwealth.
Certain Rights THE Signory has Seſſion and Suffrage in the College, the College
of the Councils. has Seſſion and Suffrage in the Senat, and the Senat has Seſſion and
Suffrage in the Great Council. The Signory, or the Provoſts of the
Savi, have power to aſſemble the College, the College has power to
aſſemble the Senat; and the Senat has power to aſſemble the Great
Council; the Signiori, but more peculiarly the Provoſts of the Savi,
in their own Offices and Functions, have power to propoſe to the
College, the College has power to propoſe to the Senat, and the Senat
has power to propoſe to the Great Council. Whatever is thus pro-
pos’d and reſolv’d, either by the Senat (for ſomtimes, thro che fecu-
rity of this Order, a Propoſition gos no further) or by the Great
Council, is ratify’d, or becoms the Law of the Commonwealth. Over
and above theſe Orders, they have three Judicatorys, two Civil and
one Criminal, in each of which forty Gentlemen elected by the Great
Council are Judges for the term of eight months; to theſe Judicatorys
belong the Avogadori and the Auditori, who are Magiſtrats, having
power to hear Cauſes apart, and, as they judg fitting, to introduce
them into the Courts.
IF a man tells me, that I omit many things, he may perceive I
write an Epitome, in which no more ſhould be comprehended, than
that which underſtood may make a man underſtand the reſt. But of
theſe principal parts conſiſts the whole body of admirable Venice.
THE Conſiglio de' Dieci, or Council of Ten, being that which
partakes of Di&tatorian Power, is not a limb of her but as it were a
Sword in her hand. This Council (in which the Signory has alſo
Seſſion and Suffrage) conſiſts more peculiarly of ten annual Magiſtrats,
created by the Great Council, who afterwards elect three of their
own number by Lot, which ſo elected are calld Capi de' Dieci, their
Magiſtracy being monthly: Again, out of the three Capi, one is taken
by Lot, whoſe Magiſtracy is weekly : this is lie, who over againſt the
Tribunal in the Great Council firs like another Duke, and is called the
Provoſt
.
ii
-1
"
1
191
*
1
of Popular Government.
313
1
Provoſt of the Dieci. It belongs to theſe three Magiſtrats to aſſemble Chap: 12.
the Council of Ten, which they are oblig’d to do weekly of courſe,
and oftner as they ſeě occaſion. The Council being aſſembld, any
one of the Signory, or two of the Capi may propoſe to it: the power
which they now exerciſe. (and wherin for their aſſiſtance they create
three Magiſtrats calld the Grand Inquiſitors), conſiſts in the puniſh-
ment of certain heinous Crimes, eſpecially that of Treaſon; in rela-
tion wherto they are as it were Sentinels, ſtanding upon the guard of
the Commonwealth: But conſtitutively (with the addition of a
Junta, conſiſting of other fifteen, together with fom of the chief Maa
giftrats having Right in caſes of important ſpeed or ſecrecy to this
Council) they have the full and abfolute Power of the whole Com-
monwealth as Dictator.
THAT Venice either tranſcrib'd the whole and every part of her
Conſtitution out of Athens and Lacedemon, or happens to be fram'd as
if ſhe had ſo don, -is moſt apparent. The Reſult of this Common-
wealth is in the Great Council, and the Debate in the Senat: ſo was
it in Lacedemon. A Decree made by the Senat of Athens had the
power of a Law for one year without the People, at the end wherof
the People might revoke it': A Decree of the Senat of Venice ſtands
good without the Great Council, unleſs theſe ſee reaſon to revoke it.
The Prytans were a Council preparing buſineſs for the Senat; ſo is the
Collegio in Venice : the Preſidents of the Prytans were the ten Proedri;
thoſe of the Collegio are the three Provoſts of the Savi. The Archons
or Princes of Athens being nine, had a kind of Soverain Inſpection
upon all the Orders of the Commonwealth ; ſo has the Signory of
Venice, conſiſting of nine beſides the Duke. The Quarancys in Venice
are Judicatorys of the nature of the Helica in Athens; and as the
Thelinothetæ heard and introduc'd the cauſes into that Judicatory, ſo do
the Avogadori and the Auditori into theſe. The Conſiglio de' Dieci in
Venice is not of the Body, but an Appendix of the Commonwealth;
ſo was the Court of the Ephori in Lacedemon: and as theſe had power
to put a King, a Magiſtrat, or any Delinquent of what degree Toever
to death, ſo has the Conſiglio de? Dieci. This again is wrought up
with the Capi de' Dieci, and the weekly Provoſt, as were the Prytans
with the Proedri, and the weekly Epiſtata ; and the Ballor is lineally
deſcended from the Bean: yet is Venice in the whole, and in every part,
a far more exquiſit Policy than either Athens or Lacedemon.
A POLITICAL is like a natural Body. Commonwealths re-
ſemble and differ, as Men reſemble and differ; among whom you ſhall
not ſee two Faces, or two Diſpoſitions, that are alike. Peter and
Thomas in all their parts are equally Men, and yet PETER
and THOMAS of all Men may be the moſt unlike; one may have
his greater ſtrength in his Arms, the other in his Legs; one his greater
Beauty in his Soul, the other in his Body ; one may be a fool, the
other wife; one valiant, the other cowardly. Theſe two, which
at a diſtance you will not know one from the other, when you look
nearer, or com to be better acquainted with, you will never miſtake.
Our Conſiderer (who in his Epiſtle would make you believe that
Oceana is but a mere Tranſcription out of Venice) has Companions
like himſelf; and how near they look into matters of this nature
is plain, while one knows mot JETHRO from Moses, and the
ST
other
th
Tbe Prerogative
314
Book 1. other takes a ſtate of Civil War to be the beſt model of a Civil Govern-
ment.
LET a Man look near, and he ſhall not find any one Order in
Oceana (the Ballot only excepted) that has not as much difference
from, or reſemblance to any one Order in Rome or Venice, as any one
Order in Rome or Venice has from, or to any one Order in Athens or
Lacedemon : Which different temper of the parts muſt of neceſſity in
the whole yield a Reſult, a Soul or Genius, altogether new in the
World, as imbracing both the Arms of Rome, and the Counfils of
Venice; and yet neither obnoxious to the Turbulency of the one, nor
the narrowneſs of the other.
BUT the ſum of what has bin ſaid of Venice, as to the buſineſs in
hand, coms to no more than that the Senat and the Magiſtracy of this
Commonwealth are upon Rotation. No more: nay I am well if it
coms to ſo much. For the Prevaricator catching me up, where I ſay,
that for all this the greater Magiſtracys in Venice are continually
Conſid. f. 93. wheeld thro a few hands, tells me, that I have confeſt it to be otherwiſe.
I have indeed confeft, that tho the Magiſtracys are all confer'd for
certain terms, yet thoſe terms do not neceſſitat Vacations; that is, the
term of a Magiſtracy being expir’d, the Party that bore it is capable
upon a new Election of bearing it again without interval or vacation :
which dos not altogether fruſtrat the Rotation of the Commonwealth,
tho it renders the ſame very imperfect. This infirmity of Venice
derives from a complication of Cauſes, none of which is incident to
a Commonwealth confiſting of the Many: wherfore there lys no
obligation upon me to diſcover the reaſon in this place. But on the
contrary, ſeeing, let me ſhew things never fo new, they are ſlighted
as old, I have an obligation in this place, to try whether I may ger
eſteem by concealing fomthing. What is ſaid, every body knew be-
fore; this is not ſaid, who knows it?
RIDDLE me, Riddle me, what is this? The Magiſtracys in Venice
( except ſuch as are rather of Ornament than of Power) are all annual, or
at moſt biennial. No man whoſe term is expir’d, can hold his Magiſtracy
longer, but by a new Election. The Elections are moſt of them made in
the Great Council, and all by the Ballot, which is the moſt equal and im-
partial way of Suffrage. And yet the greater Magiſtracys are perpetually
wheeld thró a few hands.
A Riddle.
IF I be worthy to give advice to a man that would ſtudy the Po-
litics, let him underſtand Venice; he that underſtands Venice right,
Shall go neareſt to judg (notwithſtanding the difference that is in eve-
ry Policy) right of any Government in the World. Now the aſſault
of the Conſiderer deriving but from ſom Pique or Emulation which of
us ſhould be the abler Politician, if the Council of State had the cu-
rioſity to know either that, or who underſtands Venice, this Riddle
would make the diſcovery; for he that cannot eaſily unfold this Rid-
dle, dos not underſtand her.
THE ſixth kind of Rotation is when a Commonwealth gos upon
it in all her Orders, Senat, People, and Magiſtracy. Such a one
taking in the Many, and being fix'd upon the foot of a ſteady Agra-
rian, has attain’d to perfect Equality. But of this an example there is
none, or you muſt accept of Oceani.
THE
of Popular Government.
315
Rotation of
The Rotation of Oceana is of two parts, the one of the Electors Chap. 1 2.
which is annual, and the other of the Elected which is triennial.
SPEAKING of Electors in this ſenſe, I mean as the great Oceana.
Council in Venice are Electors of all other Orders, Councils or Magi-
ſtrats. But the Commonwealth of Oceana taking in the whole People,
cannot, as dos the Great Council of Venice (wherin they that have
right are but a few) attain to this capacity at one ſtep : for which
cauſe ſhe takes three ſteps; one at the Pariſhes, where every fifth
Elder is annually elected by the whole People. There is no doubt but
there was ſom ſuch Order in Iſrael wherby the monthly Rotation of
her Congregation or Prerogative, by election of two thouſand in each
Tribe, was preſerv'd. The next ſtep ſhe takes is at the Hundred,
wherby election of Officers and Magiſtrats, the Troops choſen at
the Pariſhes, are very near form’d. Her third ſtep is at the Tribe,
where the whole body of her Deputys are in exact Form, Diſciplin
and Function, headed by proper Officers and Magiſtrats, theſe alto-
gether conſiſting of one fifth part of the whole People. This Rotation
being in it ſelf annual, coms in regard of the body of the People to be
quinquennial, or ſuch as in the ſpace of five years gives every man
his turn in the power of Election.
BUT tho every man be ſo capable of being an Elector, that he
muſt have his turn; yet every man is not ſo capable of being elected
into thoſe Magiſtracys that are Soverain, or have the leading of the
whole Commonwealth, that it can be ſafe to lay a neceſſity that eve-
ry man muſt take his turn in theſe alſo: but it is enough that every
man, who in the Judgment and Conſcience of his Country is fit, may
take his turn. Wherfore upon the Conſcience of the Electors, ſo
conſtituted as has bin ſhewn, it gos to determin who ſhall partake of
Soverain Magiſtracy, or be at the Aſſembly of a Tribe elected into the
Senat or Prerogative; which Aſſemblys are ſo triennial, that one third
part of each falling every year, and another being elected, the Parla-
ment is therby perpetuated.
SUCH was the Conſtitution of thoſe Councils which the Prevarica-
tor has confeſt he always thought admirable, but now the toy takes him
to be quite of another mind; for, ſays he, That antient Republics have conſid. p. go.
thro a malicious Jealoaſy (let them take it among themn) made it un.
lawful even for Perſons of the cleareſt merit to continue long in command,
but have by perpetual viciſſitude ſubſtituted new men in the Government, is
manifeſt enough; but with what ſucceſs they did this, will beſt appear by
VETURIUS, VARRO, and Mancinus.
and Mancinus. He is ſtill admirable:
One would wonder what he means; if it be that there were bur
three weak or unfortunat Generals in the whole courſe of Rome, how
ſtrange is it to urge this as an Argument againſt Rotation, which is as
ſtrong a one as can be urg?d for Rotation? If the Romans by this way
of Election having experience of an able General, knew ever after
where to have him; or lighting upon one they found not ſo fit for
their purpoſe, could in the compaſs of one year be rid of him of
courſe, without diſhonor or reproach to him, taking therby a warn-
ing to com no more there; was this a proceding to favor malice? or
ſuch as one as, removing the cauſe of malice, left no root for ſuch a
branch or pollibility of like effect? Certainly by this aſſertion the
Prevaricator has jolted his preſumtuous Head not only againſt the
prudence of antient Commonwealths, but of God himſelf in that of
.SE 2
Ifrael.
:
1
1
316
The Prerogative
Liv. 1.9.
Book I. Ifraèl. VETURIUS, VARRO, and MANCINUS (tho ſom of
them cannot be at all points excus’d) by this mark upon them, may
be thought hardlier of than is needful, for which cauſe there being
that alſo in their Storys which is neither unpleaſant nor unprofitable,
I ſhall indeavor to make the Reader ſomwhat better acquainted with
them. One of the greateſt blows Rome ever receiv'd was by
PONTIUS, Captain General of the Samnits, who having drawn
her Conſuls, POSTHUMIus and VETURIUS, by Stratagem into
the Straits of Caudium, a Vally of narrow entrance, and ſhut up
the mouth of it by poſſeſſing himſelf of the only Paſſage, the reſt
being inviron’d with inſuperable Kocks, the Samnit came to have both
the Armys, and ſo upon the matter the whole ſtrength (in thoſe days)
of Rome inevitably at his diſcretion. Hereupon, having leiſure, and
being deſirous (in a matter of ſuch moment) of good advice, he dif-
patch'd a Meſſenger to his Father HEREN NIUs, the ablert Coun-
fillor in Samnium, to know what might be his beſt courſe with the
Romans now inavoidably at his mercy, who anſwer'd, that he ſhould
open the Paſs
, and let them return untouch’d. The young General amaz’d
at this Counſil
, deſir’d farther direction; wherupon HEREN NIUS
for the ſecond time made anſwer, that he ſhould cut them off to a man.
But the General, upon the ſtrange diſagreement of ſuch opinions,
having his Fathers Age (for he was very old) in ſuſpicion, took a
third courſe, which neither (according to the firſt advice of wiſe
HERENNIUS) making Friends, nor, according to the ſecond, de-
ſtroying Enemys, became as he propheſy'd the utter Ruin of the Com-
monwealth of Samnium. For the Romans being diſmiſt ſafe, but ig-
nominiouſly, the Senat upon their return fell into the greateſt ſtrait
and conſternation that had bin known among them. On the one ſide,
to live and not revenge ſuch an affront was intolerable; on the other,
to revenge it was againſt the Faith of the Conſuls, whoſe neceſſity
(the loſs of two Armys lying upon it) had in truth forc'd them to
accept of a diſhonorable League with the Samnits. Now not the
Armys, but the Senat it ſelf was in Caudium, not a man of them
could find the way out of this Vale invirond with Rocks, but he
only that could not find it out of the otlier ; POSTHUMIUS, who
having firſt ſhew'd, that neither War nor Peace could be ſo made, as
to ingage the Commonwealth (injuſſu Populi) without the Com-
mand of the People, declar'd that the Senat returning the Conſuls,
with fuch others as had conſented to ſo wicked and diſhonorable a
Peace, naked, and bound to the Samnits, were free: nor ceas'd he till
the Senat (therto preſt by the neceſſity of the Commonwealth ) re-
folving accordingly, He, VETURIUS, and ſom of the Tribuns
were deliver'd to the Samnits; who, nevertheleſs, to hold the Romans
to their League, diſmiſt them with ſafety. The Diſputes on either
ſide that aroſe hereupon, and, coming to Arms, ended with the de-
ſtruction of Samnium, I omit
. That which as to the preſent occaſion
is material, is the Reputation of the Conſuls; and VETURIUS,
tho he were not the leading man, being for the reſt as deep in the
Action as PosthuMI US, the People were ſo far from thinking
themſelves deceiv'd in this choice, that the Conſuls were more honor'd
in Rome for having loft, than Pontius in Samnium for having won
the day at Caudium.
I
of Popular Government.
317
I DO not rob Graves, nor ſteal Windingſheets; my Controver- Chap. 1 2
ſys are not but with the Living, with none of theſe that have not
ſhew'd themſelves beſt able for their own defence; nor yet with ſuch,
but in the proſecution of Truths oppos’d by them to the damage of
Mankind : yer the Prevaricator accuſes me of rude charges. What
are his then in defence of Fallhood, and againſt ſuch as cannot bite?
or whether of theſe is the more noble ?
FOR VARRO, who being Conſul of Rome, loſt the Battel of
Canne to HANNIBAL, Captain General for the Carthaginians, tho
without Cowardice, yet by Raſhneſs, he is not ſo excuſable.
BUT for MANCINUS, brought (as was PostHUMIUS by Florus, l. 2.
the Samnits) to diſhonorable conditions by MeGERA, Captain C 18.
General of the Numantins, there be excuſes: As firſt, the Numantins,
for their number not exceding four thouſand fighting men, were the
gallanteſt of ſo many, on which the Sun ever ſhone.
FOURTEEN years had their Commonwealth held tack with
the Romans, in Courage, Conduct, and Virtue, having worſted Pom-
PEx the Great, and made a League with him, when ſhe might have
made an end of him, e're ever MANCINUS (of whom CICERO
gives a fair Character) came in play: So his Misfortunes, having
great examples, cannot want ſom excufe. But ſuppoſe none of them
deſerv'd any excuſe, what is it at which theſe examples drive? againſt a
Commonwealth? Sure the Samnits, the Carthaginians, the Numantins
were as well Commonwealths as the Romans; and ſo wherever the
advantage gos, it muſt ſtay upon a Commonwealth : or if it be Ro-
tation that he would be at (for we muſt gueſs) granting Pontius
the Samnit, and MEGER A the Numantin, to have bin no more up-
on Rotation, than HANNIBAL the Carthaginian; yet is it plain
that Rome upon her Rotation overcame not only Pontius, HA N-
NIBAL and MEGERA, but Samnium, Carthage, and Numantia.
So much for Rome ; but, ſays he, No leſs appears by the Rabble of Ge-Confid. p. 91.
nerals often made uſe of by the Athenians, while men of Valor and Con-
duct have lain by the walls.
A RABBLE of Generals did I never hear of before ; but not to
meddle with his Rlietoric, wheras each of his Objections has at leaſt
fo:n one Contradiction in it, this has two (one à priori, another à
pofieriori) one in the ſnout, another in the tail of it. For had there
bin formerly no Rotation in Athens, how ſhould there have have bin
men of Valor and Conduct to ly by the Wals? And if Rotation thence-
forth ſhould have ceas’d, how could thoſe men of Valor and Conduct have
don otherwiſe than ly by the Walls? So this inavoidably confeſſes, that
Rotation was the means wherby Athens came to be ſtor'd with Perſons
of Valor and Conduct, they to be capable of Imployment, and the
Commonwealth to imploy the whole Virtue of her Citizens: And it
being, in his own words, an Argument of much imperfection in Go-
vernment not to dare to imploy the whole Virtue of the Citizens, this
wholly routs a ſtanding General; for the Government that dares im-
ploy but the Virtue of one, dares not imploy the Virtue of all. Yet
THOSE Orders muſt needs be againſt Nature, which, excluding Per-Confid. Do 91.
Sons of the beſt Qualifications, give admiſſion to others, who have nothing
to commend them but their Art in canvalſing for the ſuffrage of the People.
He never takes notice that the Ballot bars Canvaſſing beyond all poſſi-
he jogs on
bility
318
The Prerogative
Conſid. p. 91.
Book I. bility of any ſuch thing; but we will let that go. Canvalling, it is
w
confeſt, was more frequent in Rome and Achens than is laudable,
where nevertheleſs it is the ſtronger Argument for the integrity of po-
pular Suffrage, which, being free from any aid of Art, produc'd in
thoſe Commonwealths more illuſtrious examples (if a man gos no
further than PLUTARCH's Lives) than are to be found in all the
reſt of Story.
YET, ſays he, this Law has bin as often broken as a Commonwealth
has bin brought into any exigence; for the hazard of truſting Affairs in
weak hands then appearing, no ſcruple has bin made to trample upon
this
Order, for giving the Power to ſom able man at that time render'd incapa-
ble by the Vacation this Law requires. The continuation of the Conſul-
Ship of MARIUS is ſufficient to be allegʻd for the proof of this, tho, if
occaſion were, it might be back'd by plenty of examples. His choice con-
futes his pretended variety, who jefts with edgʻd tools : this example
above all will cut his fingers; for by this prolongation of Magiſtracy,
or, to ſpeak more properly, of Empire (for the Magiſtracy of the
Conſul was Civil, and confer'd by the People Centuriatis Comitiis, but
his Empire was Military, and confer'd Curiatis) Rome began to drive
thoſe wheels of her Rotation heavily in MARIUS, which were quite
taken off in CÆSAR.
I HAVE heretofore in vain perſuaded them upon this occaſion,
to take notice of a Chapter in MACCHIAVEL, ſo worthy of re-
gard, that I have now inſerted it at length, as follows:
THE Procedings of the Roman Commonwealth being well conſider’d,
two things will be found to have bin the cauſes of her diſſolution. The
Contention that happen'd thro the indeavor of the People ( always oppos’d
or eluded by the Nobility) to introduce an Agrarian, and the damage that
accru'd from the prolongation of Empire; which Miſchiefs, had they bin
foreſeen in due time, the Government by, application of fit Remedys might
have bin of longer life and better health. The Diſeaſes which this Com-
monwealth,
from contention about the Agrarian, contracted, were acute and
tumultuous ; but
thoſe being flower, and without tumult, which ſhe got by
promulgation of Empire, were Chronical
, and went home with her, giving
A warning by her example, how dangerous it is to States that would injoy
their Liberty
, to ſuffer Magiſtracy (how deſervedly ſoever conferd) to
remain long in the posſeſſion of the ſame man. Certainly if the reſt of
the Romans, whoſe Empire happend to be prolong’d, had bin as virtuous
and provident as Lucius QUINTIUS, they had never run into this
inconvenience. Of ſuch wholfom example was the goodneſs of this man,
that the Senat and the People, after one of their ordinary Diſputes, being
com to ſom accord, wher as the People had prolong’d the Magiſtracy of their
preſent Tribuns, in regard they were Perſons more fitly oppos’d to the Am-
bition of the Nobility, than by a new Election they could readily have
found ; when hereupon the Senat (to ſhew they needed not be worſe" at this
game) would have prolong'd the Conſulat to Quintius, he refus’d
his conſent, ſaying, that ill examples were to be corrected by good ones, and
not incouragºd by others like themſelves ; nor could they ſtir bis Reſolution,
by which means they were neceſſitated to make new Conſuls. Had this Wil
dom and Virtue, I ſay, bin duly regarded, or rightly underſtood, it might
have fav’d Rome, which thro this negle&t came to ruin. The firſt whoſe
Empire happen'd to be prolong?d was Publilius Philo, his Conſúl-
at expiring at the Camp before Palæpolis, while it ſeem'd to the Senat ihat
be
Macch. Diſcor.
B. 3. C. 24.
*
of Popular Government.
319
Liv. l. 8.
he had the Vistory in his hand (actum cum Tribunis Plebis eſt, ad Popu- Chap. 12,
lum ferrent ut cum Philo Conſulatu abiiſſet, Proconſul rem gereret)
they ſent him no Succeſſor, but prolong’d his Empire, by which means he
came to be the firſt Proconſul. An Expedient (tho introduc'd for the pub-
lic good) that came in time to be the public bane : For by how much the
Roman Armys march'd further off, by ſo much the like courſe ſeeming to
be the more neceſſary, became the more cuſtomary ; whence inſu'd two per-
nicious conſequences : The one, that there being fewer Generals, and Men
of known Ability for Conduct, the Art with the reputation of the Same
came to be more ingroft, and obnoxious to Ambition : the other, that a Ge-
neral ſtanding long, got ſuch hold upon his Army,as could take them off from
the Senat, and hang them on himſelf. Thus Marius and SYLLA
could be follow'd by the Soldiery to the detriment of the Commonwealth, and
CESAŘ to her perdition. Wheras had Rome never prolong’d Empire,
fbe might perhaps not ſo foon have arriv’d at Greatneſs or Acquiſition, but
would have made leſs haſte to deſtruction.
ALL the Dilemma that MACCHIA VEL obſerves in theſe words
is, that if a Commonwealth will not be ſo ſlow in her acquiſition as
is requir'd by Rotation, ſhe will be leſs ſure than is requiſit to her pre-
ſervation. But the Prevaricator (not vouchſafing to ſhew us upon
what reaſons or experience he grounds his Maxim) is poſitive, That Conſid. P. Sa,
the Dilemama into which a Commonwealth is in this caſe brought, is very
dangerous ; for either fe muſt give her ſelf a mortal blow by gaining the
habit of infringing ſuch Orders as are neceſſary for her preſervation, or re-
ceive one from without.
THIS fame is another Parakeetiſm: theſe words are ſpoken by
me, after MACCHIAVEL, in relation to Dictatorian Power, in
which they are ſo far from concluding againſt Rotation, that this in
caſe of a Dictator is more eſpecially necellary (maxima libertatis cuſto- Mamercus a.
dia eſt, ut magna imperia diuturna non fint, & temporis modus imponatur, pud Liv, I.
quibus juris imponi non poteft) which could not be more confirm'd
than by him, who in the example of Marius ſhews that the con-
trary courſe ſpoild all.
THE Romans, if they had fent a Succeſſor to PUBLILIUS
Philo at Palapolis, it may be might have let the Victory flip out
of his hands, it may be not; liowever this had bin no greater wound
to the Commonwealth, than that her Acquiſition would have bin
flower, which ought not to com in competition with the ſafety of a
Government, and therfore amounts not to a Dilemma, this being a
kind of Argument that ſhould not be ſtub’d of one horn, but have
cach of equal length and danger. Nor is it ſo certain that increaſe
is flower for Rotation, ſeeing neither was this interrupted by that,
nor that by this, as the greateſt Actions of Rome, the Conqueſt of
Carthage by Scipio AFRICANUS, of MACEDON by FLA-
MINius, and of Antiochus by ASIATICus, are irrefraga-
ble Teſtimonys.
I WOULD be loth to ſpoil the Conſiderer's preferment; but he
is not a ſafe Counſillor for a Prince, whoſe Providence not ſupplying
the defect of Rotation, whether in civil or military affairs
, with fom-
thing of like nature, expoſes himſelf if not his Émpire 'as much to
danger as a Commonwealth. Thus the Sons of ZERVIAH, JO A B 2 Sam. 3. 39:
Captain of the Hoft, and ABISHAI his Brother, were too ſtrong
for DAVID; thus the Kings of Iſrael and of Judá fell moſt of them
by
4:
1
The Prerogative
320
Book I. by their Captains or Favorits, as I have elſwhere obſerv'd more parti-
w cularly. Thus Brutus being ſtanding Captain of the Guards,
could caſt out TARQUIN; thus SEJA
NUS had means to attemt
againſt TIBERIUS; Otho to be the Rival of GALBA, CASPE-
RIUS ALIANUS of NERVA, Cassius of ANTONINUS,
PERENNIS of COMMODUS, MAXIMINUS of ALEXAN-
DER, PHILIPPUs of GORDIAN, ÆMILIANUS of Gallas;
INGEBUS LOLLIANUS, AUREOLUS, of GALLIENUS;
MAGNESIUS of CONSTANTIUS, MAXIMUS of GRATIAN,
ARBOGASTES of VALENTINIAN, RUFFINus of ARCA-
DIUS,
STILICO of HONORIUs. Go from the Weſt into the Eaſt:
upon the death of MARCIANUS, ASPARIS alone, having the
command of the Arms, could prefer Leo to the Empire; PHOCAS
deprive MAURITius of the fame; HERACLIUS depoſe PHO-
CAS; LEO ISAURIUS do as much to THEODOSIUS ADRA-
MYTTENUS; NICEPHORUS to IRENE, LEO ARMENIUS
to MICHAEL CUROPALATES, ROMANUS LAGAPENUS
to CONSTANTIN, NICEPHORUS PHOCAS TO ROMANUS
PUER, JOHANNES ZISMISCES TO NICEPHORUS PHOCAS,
ISAAC COMNENUS to MICHAEL STRATIOTICUS, Bo-
TONIATES to MICHAEL the Son of Ducas, A LÉXIUS
COM NENUS to BOTONIATES: which work continu'd in ſuch
manner till the deſtruction of that Empire. Go from the Eaſt to the
North: Gustavus attain'd to the Kingdom of Sweden, by his
Power and Command of an Army; and thus SECECHus came near
to ſupplant BOLESLAUS the Third of Poland. If WALLES-
TEIN had liv'd, what had becom of his Maſter? In France the
Race of PHARÁMOND was extinguiſh'd by Pipin; and that of
PIPIN in like manner, each by the Major of the Palace, a ſtanding
Magiſtracy of exorbitant Truſt. Go to the Indys : You ſhall find a
King of Pegu to have bin thruſt out of the Realm of Tangu by his
Captain General. Nay go where you will, tho this be pretty well
, you
ſhall add more than one example. But as to the Prevaricator, if he
was not given to make ſuch mouths, as eat up nothing elſe but his own
words, needed not have brought any other Teſtimony to abſolve a
Commonwealth of Malice in this order than his own, where he
Conſid. p. 47, ſays, that when ſom Perſon overtops the reſt in Commands, it is a Diſeaſe
48. of Monarchy which eaſily admits of this cure, that he be reduc'd to a leſs
Volum, and leveld to an equality with the reſt of his Order. Now a
Prince can no otherwiſe level a Nobleman, that excels the reſt thro
Command, to equality with his Order, than by cauſing thoſe of the
fame Order to take their turns in like command. Good Wits bave ill
Confid. P. 93. Memorys. But, ſays he, I know not what advantage Mr. HARRING-
TON may foreſee from the Orders of this Rotation, for my part I can
diſcover no other effect of it than this, that in a Commonwealth like that
of Oceana, taking in the Many (for in Venice he confeſſes it to be other-
mife) where every man will preſs forward towards Magiſtracy, this Law
by taking off at the end of one year ſom Officers, and all at the end of
three, will keep the Republic in a perpetual Minority: No man having
time allow'd him to gain. That Experience
, which may ſerve to lead the
Commonwealth to the underſtanding of her true Intereſt either at home or
abroad.
W!
WHAT
of Popular Government.
321
WHAT I have confeſt to be otherwiſe in Venice, I have Thewri Chap. 12.
already at leaſt ſo far as concerns the preſent occaſion, the cauſes of
that defect being incompatible with a Commonwealth conſiſting of
the Many; otherwiſe why was not the like found in Athens or Rome?
where tho every man preſt forward towards Magiſtracy, yet the Ma-
giſtrats were, for illuſtrious examples, more in weight and number
than are to be found in all the reſt of the world.
IF where Elections were the moſt expos'd to the Ambition of the
Competitor, and the humors of the People, they yet fail'd not to ex-
cel all others that were not popular, what greater Vindication can
there be of the natural integrity of popular Suttrage even at the worſt?
But this, where it is given by the Ballot, is at the beſt, and free from
all that preſſing for Magiſtracy in the Competitor, or Faction of the
People tħat can any ways be laid to the former: or let the Conſiderer
conſider again, and tell me by what means either of theſe in ſuch a
State can be dangerous or troubleſom; or if at worſt the Orders for
Election in Oceana muſt not perform that part, better than a Croud
and a Sherif. Well; but putting the caſe the Elections which were
not quarreld much withal be rightly ſtated, yet this Law for Terms
and Vacations, by taking off at the end of one year fom Officers, and all
at the end of three, will keep the Republic in perpetual Minority, no
man having time allow'd him to gain that Experience, which may ſerve ·
to lead the Commonwealth to the underſtanding of her true Intereſt at home
or abroad. Becauſe every man will preſs forward for Magiſtracy,
therfore there ought not to be Terms and Vacations, left theſe ſhould
keep the Conmonwealth in perpetual Minority.. I would once ſee an
Argument that might be reduc'd to Mode and Figure. The next Ob-
jection is, that theſe Orders take off at the end of one year ſom Officers,
which is true, and that at the end of three years they take off all
,
which is falſe; for wheras the Leaders of the Commonwealth are
all triennial, the Orders every year take off no more than ſuch only
as have finiſh'd their three years'term, which is not all, but a third
part. Wherfore let him ſpeak out ; three years is too ſhort a term
for acquiring that knowlege which is neceſſary to the leading of a
Commonwealth. To let the courſes of Iſrael which were monthly,
and the annual Magiſtracys of Athens and Rome go; if three years he
too ſhort a term for this purpoſe, what'was three months? A Parla-
ment in the late Government was rarely longer liv'd than three
months, nor more frequent than once in a year ; ſo that a man having
bin twelve years a Parlament-man in England, could not have born
his Magiſtracy above three years, tho he were not neceſſarily ſub-
ject to any Vacation. Wheras a Parlament in Oceana may in twelve
years have born his
. Magiſtracy fix,notwithſtanding the neceſſity of his
Vacations. Now which of theſe two are moſt ſtraiten'd in the time
neceſſary to the gaining of due experience or knowlege for the leading
of a Commonwealth? Nevertheleſs the Parlament of England was
ſeldom or never without men of ſufficient Skill and Ability ; tho the
Orders there were more in number, leſs in method, not written, and
of greater difficulty than they be in Oceana. There, if not the Parla-
ment man, the Parlament it ſelf was upon Terms and Vacations, which
to a Council of ſuch a nature is che moſt dangerous thing in the
world, ſeeing Diſſolution, whether to a Body natural or political
, is
Death. For if Parlaments happen'd to riſe again and again, this was
Tt
.
not
322
The Prerogative
Book I. not ſo much coming to themſelves (feeing a Council of ſo different
Genius has not bin known) as a new Birth; and a Council that is
every year new born indeed muſt keep a Commonwealth in perpetual
Minority, or rather Infancy, always in danger of being overlaid by
her Nurſe, or ſtrangld by her Guardian: wheras an Aſſembly con-
tinu'd by Succeſſion, or due Rotation regulated by Terms, giving
ſufficient time for digeſtion, grows up, and is like a man, who tho
he changes his Fleſh, neither changes his Body nor his Soul. Thus
the Senat of Venice changing Fleſh, tho not ſo often as in a Common-
wealth conſiſting of the Many were requiſit, yet ofteneſt of any other
in the world, is, both in Body and Soul, or Genius, the moſt unchange-
able Council under Heaven. Fleſh muſt be chang'd, or it will ſtink
of it ſelf; there is a Term neceſſary to make a man able to lead the
Commonwealth to her Intereſt, and there is a Term that may inable
a man to lead the Commonwealth to his Intereſt. In this regard it is,
that, according to MAMER CUs, the Vacations are (maxima li-
bertatis cuſtodia) the Kecpers of the Libertys of Oceana.
THE 'three Regions into which each of the leading Councils is
divided, are three Forms, as I may fay, in the School of State: for
them of the third, tho there be care in the choice, it is no ſuch
great
matter what be their skill; the Ballot which they practis'd in the
Tribe being that in the performance wherof no man can be out: and
this is all that is neceſſary to their Novitiat or firſt year, during which
time they may be Auditors. By the ſecond, they will have ſeen all
the Scenes, or the whole Rotation of the Orders, ſo facil
, and ſo in-
telligible, that at one reading a man underſtands them as a Book, but
at once acting as a Play; and ſo methodical, that he will remember
them better. Tell me then what it is that can hinder him for the fe-
cond year from being a Speaker ; or wly for the third, ſhould he not
be a very able Leader.
THÉ Senat and the Prerogative, or Repreſentative of the People,
being each of like conſtitution, drop annually four hundred, which in
a matter of ten years amount to four thouſand experienc'd Leaders,
ready upon new Elections to reſume their leading.
ANOTHER thing which I would have conſider'd is, whether
our moſt eminent men found their Parts in Parlament, or brought
them thither. For if they brought them, think you not the military
Orders of the Youth, the Diſciplin of the Tribes, the eight years
Orb of the Embaſſadors, the provincial Armys of Oceana, likely to
breed men of as good Parts, as to ſuch matters? Nor have Aſtrono-
mers that familiarity with the Stars, which men without theſe Orbs
will have with ſuch as are in them. He is very dull, who cannot per-
ceive that in a Government of this frame the Education muſt be uni-,
verſal, or diffus'd throout the whole Body. Another thing which is
as certain as comfortable, is that the pretended depth and difficulty in
matters of State is a mere cheat. From the beginning of the World
to this day, you never found a Commonwealth where the Leaders
having honeſty enough, wanted skill enough to lead her to her true
Intereſt at home or abroad : that which is neceſſary to this end, is not
ſo much Skill as Honeſty; and let the Leaders of Oceana be diſhoneſt
if they can. In the leading of a Commonwealth aright, this is cer-
tain, Wiſdom and Honeſty are all one: and tho you all find defects
in their Virtue, thoſe that have had the fewcft, have ever bin, and for
ever ſhall be, the wiſelt.
ROME
of Popular Government.
323
ROME was never ruin'd, till her Balance being broken; the Nobility Chap: 12
forſaking their antient Viftue, abandon’d themſelves to their Luſts;
and the Senators, who, as in the caſe of JuGURTHA, were all
bribd, türn'd Knaves; at which Turn all their skill in Government
(and in this never men had bin better skilld) could not keep the
Commonwealth from overturning. CICERO, an honeſt man, la-
bord might and main ; POMPONIUS ATTICUS, another, de-
ſpair'd; CATO tore out his own Bowels; the Poigniards of Bru-
Tus and Cassius neither conſider'd Prince nor Father : But the
Commonwealth had ſprung ler Planks, and ſpilt lier Ballaſt; the
world could not ſave her.
FOR the cloſe, the Prevaricator, who had judg’d before, that
there was much reaſon to expect ſom of the Clergy ( againſt all of whom Confid. Þ: 35
Mr. HARRINGTON has declar'd War) would undertake the Quarrel,
tells me in the laſt line, that there be to whom he has recommended the
Diſquiſition of the Jewiſh Commonwealth.
IT is a miſerable thing to be condemn’d to the perpetual Budget;
once turn an honeſt man to me. In the mean time, that it may be fura
ther ſeen, how much I am delighted in fair play, ſince fom Divines,
it may be, are already at work with me, and I have not ſo fully
explain'd my ſelf upon that Point, which with them is of the greateſt
concernment, that they can yet ſay, they have peep'd into my hand,
or ſeen my game; as I'have won this trick, Gentlemen, or ſpeak, ſó
I play them out the laſt Card in the next Book for Up.
p. 94-
An Advertiſment to the Reader, or a Direction
contain'd in certain Querys, how the Common-
wealth of Oceana may be examin’d or anſwer'd
by divers forts of men, without ſpoiling their
high Dance, or cutting off any part of their
Elegance, or freeneſs of Expreſſion.
To the Scholar chät has paſs’d his Novitiat in Story.
I. HETHER the Balance of Property in Land coming thro
Civil Viciſſitude by ſlow and undiſcern'd degrees, to alter as it did,
and to ſtand as it dos in Oceana, any other Government could have bin
introduc’d, otherwiſe than by the interpoſition of foren Arms, that
could have ſubſiſted naturally without Violence or Reluctancy, or ſteddily
withart frequent Changes, Alterations, and Plunges, except that only
of the Commonwealth propos?d?
IÌ. WHETHER the Balance in Land ſo ſtanding, as has bin ſhewn,
the Commonwealth propos’d, being once eſtabliſb’d, were without the
immediat hand of God, as by Peſtilence, Famin, or Inundation, to
be alter'd or broken ; and which way?
TE 2
To
324
WHEZ
To the Godly Mani.
1. HET HER Human Prudence be not a Creature of God, and
to what end God made this Creature?
II. WHETHER the Commonwealth of Iſrael in her main Orders, that
is to ſay, the Senat, the People, and the Magiſtracy, was not erected by
the ſame Rules of human Prudence with other Commonwealths ?
III. WHETHER JETHRO were not a Heathen ?
IV. WHETHER God did not approve of the Advice of JETHRO;
in the Fabric of the Commonwealth of Iſrael ?
V. WHETHER the natural Body of a Godly Man can any otherwiſe
be ſaid to ſupport and nouriſh it ſelf in the Air, or between Heaven and
Earth, than by a figurative Speech? or whether it be any more poſſible for
the Political Body of a People fo to do, than for the natural Body of 6
Godly Man?
To the Grandee, or Learned Commonwealthſman.
1. HETHER a noble Houſekeeper has a Horſekeeper, that is as
well to live as himſelf; and whether the Houſekeeper, ſhould be
loſe his Eſtate, would not be a Horſekeeper rather than want Bread ?
II. WHETHER Riches and Poverty, more or leſs, do not introduce
Command or Obedience, more or leſs, as well in a public as in a privat
Eſtate?
III. WHETHER the Introduction of Command or Obedience, more
or leſs, either in a public or private Eſtate, dos not form or change the
Genius of a Man, or of a People accordingly? Or what is the reaſon why
the Peaſant in France is baſe, and the lower People in England of a high
?
IV. WHETHER the Genius of the People of Oceana has bin of late
years, or be devoted or addicted to the Nobility and the Clergy as in for-
mer times ?
V. WHETHER the Genius of the People of Oceana, not being ad-
dited to the Nobility and Clergy as formerly, can be ſaid to be for Mo.
narchy, or againſt it?
VI. WHETHER the People be not frequently miſtaken in Names,
while as to Things they mean otherwiſe ; or whether the People of Oceana
defiring Monarchy in Name, do not in Truth deſire a Government of
Laws, and not of Men?
VII. WHETHER for theſe Reaſons, not to know how to hold the Ba-
lance or Foundation of a Government ſteddy, nor yet to reform, or vary
the Orders of the famie (as the Foundation coms to vary) be not to de-
liver a Nation to certain Ruin and Deſtruction ?
To the Rational Man.
I.
HETHER there be any thing in this Fabric or Model that is
contradictory to it felf, to Reaſon, or to Truth?
II. WHETHER á Commonwealth that is fram'd intire or complete in
all her neceſſary Orders, without any manner of contradiction to her ſelf,
to Reaſon, or to Truth, can yet be falſe or inſufficient ?
*
Τ Η Ε
THE
1
.
SECOND BO O K;
OR, A
Political Diſcourſe
CONCERNING
ORDINATION:
Againſt
Dr. H. HAMMOND,
Dr. L. SE A MAN
And the Authors they follow.
Optat Aprum aut fulvum defcendere monte Leonen.
E: W.
+
!
Advertiſment to the READER.
00RS, eſpecially whoſe Authors have got themſelves Names,
are Leaders; wherfore in caſe any of theſe err in Leading, it
is not only lawful, but matter of Conſcience to a man that perceives it,
as far as he is able, to warn others. This were Apology enough for
my writing againſt Dr. HAMMOND and Dr. SE À MAN; and
yet I have happen'd to be brought under a farther Obligation to this
enterpriſe, their Books having bin ſent me by way of Objection againſt
what I have formerly ſaid of Ordination, and am daily more and more
confirm'd I ſhall make good. However, there can be ito great hurt
in this Ejay, Truth being, like Veniſon, not only the beſt Quarry,
but the beſt Game.
Order of the Diſcourſe.
T!
O manage the preſent Controverſy with the more Clearneſs, I
have divided my Diſcourſe into five Parts or Chapters.
THE Firſt, explaining the words Chirotonia and Chirotheſia, paras
phraſticaly relates the Story of the Perambulation made by the Apoſtles
Paul and BARNAB AS thro the Citys of Lycaonia, Piſydia, &c. by
way of Introduction.
THE Secondhews thoſe Citys, or moſt of them, at the time of this per-
ambulation, to have bin under popular Government. In which is contain'd
the whole Adminiſtration of a Roman Province.
THE Third Shews the Deduction of the Chirotonia from Popular Go-
vernment, and of the Original Right of, Ordination from the Chirotonia.
In which is contain’d the Inſtitution of the Sanhedrim or Senat of Iſrael by
Moses, and of that at Rome by ROMULUS.
THE Fourth ſhews the Deduction of the Chirotheſia from Monarchi-
calor Ariſtocratical Government, and the ſecond way of Ordination from
the Chirotheſia. In which is contain'd the Commonwealth of the Jews as
it ſtood after the Captivity.
THE Fifth debates whether the Chirotonia, us’d in the Citys mention’d,
was (as is pretended by Dr. HAMMOND, Dr.SEAMAN, and the Aü-
thors they follow) the ſame with the Chirotheſia, or a far different thing,
In which are contain'd the divers kinds of Church-Government introduc'd
and exercisd in the age of the Apoſtles.
I AM entring into a Diſcourſe to run much, for the Words, upon a
Language not vulgar, which therfore I ſhall uſe no otherwiſe than by
way of Parentheſis
, not obſtructing the Senſe; and for the Things, upon
Cuſtoms that are foren, which therfore I ſhall interpret as well as I can.
Now ſo to make my way into the parts of this diſcourſe, that (wheras
they who have heretofore manag'd it in Engliſh, might in regard of
their Readers have near as well written it in Greec) I may not be above
the vulgar capacity, I ſhall open both
the Names wherof, and the Things
wherupon we are about to diſpute, by way of Introduction.
A
327
Chap. I.
À
Political Diſcourſe
CONCERNING
ORDINATION.
+
The INTRODUCTION,
OR
Firſt Chapter.
T
HE Names or Words wherof we are about to diſpute are
Greec, the one Chirotonia, the other Chirotheſia. The firſt
ſignification of the word Chirotonia, in Suid As, imports
a certain leud action of the hand, which ſeems alſo by the Greec that
renders it by the ſame word, to have bin intimated in Ifa. 5.9.
In
the ſecond ſignification with SUID AS, it is énhozni, TOTWV kúgwors
.
Election (that is no ſay of Magiſtrats) or Ratification (that is to ſay of
Laws) by the Many: which amounts both by his Teſtimony, and
that generally of antient Authors, to this, that the moſt uſual and na-
tural ſignification of the word Chirotonia is Popular Suffrage, whether
given, as when they ſpeak of Athens, by the holding up of hands; or
as when they ſpeak® (as dos Sudas in the place mention'd) of
Rome, and other Commonwealths (whoſe Suffrage was not given with
this Ceremony) without holding up of hands.
CHIROT HESIA (Étri Jeois geeigar) is a word that in the ſtrict ſig.
nification imports laying on of hands, and no more: but the Jews uſing to
confer their Ordination moſt commonly by laying on of hands, and yet
ſomtimes by word of mouth, or by letter, the word both as it relates to
the cuſtom of the Jewiſh Commonwealth, and Ordination thence tranf-
planted into the Church of CHRIST, ſignifys Ordination confer'd by
one man, or a few men, that is to ſay, by ſom diſtinct Order, from
the People, whether with impoſition of hands, or without it.
THESE words thus interpreted, I ſhall throout my diſcourſe
(which elfe muſt have run altogether upon the Greec ) preſume, as al-
ready I have don, to take for good Engliſh, and ſó procede to the
things wherof we are to diſpute ; firſt, by opening the Scene of this
Perambulation, which will be don beſt by the help of E R Asmus, a
man as for his Learning not inferior to any, ſo for his freedom not ad.
dicted to Intereſts or Partys. For the remainder then of this Intro-
duction, I ſhall begin with the nineteenth Verſe of the eleventh, and
continue my
diſcourſe to the end of the fourteenth Chapter of the Acts;
interweaving the Text where it is darker with the Paraphraſe of that
excellent Author, for liglit, and his Paraphraſe with the Text, where it
is clearer, for brevity, in manner following.
THET
1
328
The Prerogatite
Book II. THEY whom the heat of Perſecution from the Death of STEPHEN
whad diſpers’d, travel'd thro the Citys and Villages as far as Phenice, and
Ads 11. 19. the adjacent Iland of Cyprus; as alſo thro Antiochia, which lies between
Phenice and Cilicia, preaching the Gospel receiv'd from the Apoſtles, which
nevertheleſs they dard not to communicat but to ſuch only as were of the
Jewiſh Nation, not out of Envy, but a kind of Superſtition, they believing
that to do otherwiſe were to give the Childrens Bread to Dogs, which
Chriſt had forbid.
BUT ſom of them that believ?d, being of. Cyprus and Cyrene, when
they came to Antioch, had the boldneſs to speak of CHRIST to the Greecs,
preaching the Lord Jesus, in which they made ſuch progreſs thro the
Bleſſing of God upon them and their Labors, that a great number of theſe
alſo believing the Goſpel
, were turn!d to the Lord. The tidings of theſe
things coming to the ears of the Church which was at Jeruſalem, a man of
Apoſtolical Sincerity, BARNABAS, the Levite, a Cyprian born, was ſent
by the Apoſtles to take a view of what was don upon the places; and if he
found it to be according to the will of God, to approve of it
, by authority of
the Apoſtles. So great cantion in receiving the Gentils to the Goſpel was
not, that the thing was not greatly deſir’d by the Apoſtles; but left it ſhould
afterwards be repeald or made void by the Jews, as don rafhly, or that the
Gentils ſhould rely leſs upon what was don, as conceiving it needed ratifi-
cation by the Law. Wherfore BARNABA S ſo ſoon as he came to Antioch,
and found the Greecs by Faith, and without profeſſion of the Law, to have
receiv’d the fame Grace of God with the Jews, was very much joyed that
the number of Believers increas?d, and exhorted them to remain conſtant in
their Enterprize of adhering to the Lord. For he was a good man, and
full of the Holy Spirit, and of Faith. Wherfore thro his miniſtry it came
to paſs, that a multitude of other Believers were added to the former. Now
Antioch being not far from Cilicia, the Neighborhood of the place invited
him to ſeek Paul, the fitteſt helper in this work, as choſen by CHRIST
to preach his Name to the Gentils and Kings of the Earth. For when
Paul fled from Jeruſalem, the Diſciples had conducted him to Ceſarea
of Phenice, whence he went to Tarſus; whom therfore when BAR NABAS
had found there, he brought to Antioch, hoping in a City both famous and
populous (but with a confus'd mixture of Jews and Greecs) to receive the
better fruit thro the aid of an Apoſtle more peculiarly deſignd to this work.
Theſe two being converſant a whole year in the Church of Antioch, which by
the confluence both of Jews and Greecs became very numerous, ſo many
were added by their preaching, that wheras hitherto, not expoſing the name
of CHRIST to envy, they had bin callid Diſciples, they now began firſt at
Antioch from the name of their Founder to be call'd Chriſtians. In theſe
times certain Prophets came from the City of Jeruſalem to Antioch, wher-
of one named A GAB Us ſtanding up in the Congregation, ſignify'd by in-
Spiration, that there ſhould be a great Dearth thro the whole world; which
came to paſs under ČLaudius CESAR, the Succeſſor of CALIGU-
LA. At this time they at Jeruſalem, partly becauſe they were poor at their
converſion to the Goſpel, partly becauſe they had depoſited their Goods in
common, and partly becauſe they had bin ſpoil?d.by the Prieſts for their pro-
feſſion of Christ, ordaind that by the contribution of ſuch as had wher-
withal
, eſpecially among the believing Gentils, Mony ſhould be ſent to the
relief of the Chriſtians dwelling in Judea ; but ſo that this Contribution
was not to be forc'd bust free, and according to every mans ability. This
Mony thus gather'd was ſent by PAUL and BARNABA S to the Elders
at f
of Popular Government.
329
!
at Jeruſalem, to be diſtributed at their diſcretion to ſuch as were in need. Chap. 1.
While Paul and BARN ABAS were thus imploy’d, King Heron, the
Same that beheaded John, and returned CHRIST cloth’d, thro deriſion,
in white, to PILAT, being griev’d to ſee this kind of People increaſe, and
the Name of Jesus King of the Jews to grow famous in divers Nations,
became concern’d to root out ſuch a Faction, and ſo ſpreading; wherfore he
ſtretch'd forth his hand to vix certain of the Church, kilºd JAM
Es the
Brother of John with the Sword; and becauſe he ſaw it pleasd the Jews,
proceded further to take Peter alſo, who being impriſon’d, was after-
ward miraculouſly deliver’d. But Paul and BAR NAE AS having per-
form’d the Truſt committed to them by the Brethren, and deliver'd the Con-
tribution for relief of the Poor to the Apoſtles, return'd from Jeruſalem to
Antioch, taking with them John, whoſe Sirname was MARC.
NOW the Church of Antioch flouriſh'd in ſuch manner, that she
had fom fill'd with the gift of Prophecy, and others with that of Teaching;
among whom was BAR NABAS and SIMEON, alias NIGER, together
with LUCIAS a Cirenian, and MANAE N who had bin brought up with
Herod the Tetrarch, whom he left to com to CHRIST: but the chief
of them was Saul, indow'd with all the Gifts and Graces Apoſtolical.
While all theſe were intent upon the Miniſtry of the Church, imploying their
ſeveral Gifts to the Glory of God, and in his moſt acceptable Service, the
Salvation of Souls, with faſting and prayer, the Holy Ghoſt being ſtird
up by their Zeal, ſignify'd his Will by the Prophets, Jaying, Separat me
BARNAB AS and Paul for the Work wherto I have callid them, namely,
to be Doctors of the Gentils, that by them I may propagat the Goſpel
.
The command of the Spirit was obey'd, and BAR NABA S with Paul,
to the end that every one might ſee who were choſen, were ſeparated from the
rest; and when the Congrigation had unanimouſly implord the favor of
God by prayer and faſting, the
moſt eminent in Authority among them laid
their hands upon the Perſons ſo ſeparated, and ſent them wherever the Spi-
rit of God (bould direct them. By this impulſe therfore BARNABAS
and Paul went to Seleucia, being a Promontory of Antiochia, and
thence fail'd into the Iland of Cyprus,where they landed at Salamis a famous
City upon the Eaſtern part of the Iland; they preach'd not haman Inventi-
ons, but the Word of God, nor that by ſtealih, but in the Synagogs of the
Jews, wherof thro the Neighborhood of Syria there was ſtore. "This Ho-
nor by the Commandment of Christ was always deferid to the Jews,
that the Goſpel ſhould be firſt offer'd to them, left they being a querulous.
and repining Nation, ſhould complain that they were deſpis’d. Thus travel'd
theſe Apoſtles thro the whole Iland, till they came to Paphos, a City conſe-
crated to Venus upon the Weſtern Coaſt of Cyprus. Here they found a
certain Magician call'dBAR Jesus, that is, the Son of Jesus a few, both
by Nation and Religion, under which color he fallly pretended to the gift
of Propheſy. This man follow'd the Court of SERGIUS Paulus,
Proconſul’or Governor of ihe Iland for the Romans, otherwiſe a prudent
man ; but this ſort of Vermin inſinúats it ſelf into the beſt to chule, that
ſo their Corruption may do the greater and more compendious miſchief to man-
kind. The Proconſul nevertheleſs having underſtood the Goſpel to be plant-
ing throout Cyprus, not only forbore to ſtop the ears of others, but by
Sending for BARNABAS and Paul ſeemºd deſirous to open his own.
Wherfore B A R Jesus indeavoring to refift the growth of the Word, as
an Enemy to CHRIST, and reſifting the Truth with Falſbood, a ſtrife
aroſe between the true Prophets and a falſe one (for ſuch is the Interpretati-
बा|
Uu
012
1
330
The Prerogative
Book II. on of the Syriac word E L YMAS) whom Paul at tength confuted of ſpi-
wor *writual blindness, by taking away the eys of his body, miraculouſly, {truck in
the preſence of the Proconlul, who at the ſame time receiving the light of
the Goſpel, imbrac'd the Chriſtian Faith. This being don at Paphos,
Paul imbark'd there with his Aſſociats for the leſſer Aſia, and came to
Perga, being a City of Pamp!!ylia ; bere John, whoſe Sirname was
MARC, left them, and return' to Jeruſalem, while. they, when they had.
viſited Pamphylia, traveld to Antiochia, a City of Piſidia, where having,
enter'd a Synagog, they ſat after the uſual manner with the reſt, attentive
to the Law and the Prophets; wherof when the Parts appointed were read,
and no man ſtood up, the Rulers of the Synagog perceiving that the Strange
ers by their habit were Jews, and ſuch as by their aſpect promis’d more than
ordinary, ſent to them, defiring that if they had any word of exhortation
for the People, they would ſpeak. Wher upon Paui Standing up, preach'd
to them CHRIST; whence came the Word of the Lord to be divulgºd
throout that Region, tho the Jews out of envy to the Gentils, ſtirring up
the devouteſt Matrons (an Art not unknown in theſe times) and by them
the chief of the City, rais’d ſuch Sedition in it, and Tumult againſt the
Apoſtles, that Paul and BARNAB A s being caſt out, ſhook off the duſt
from their feet againſt them, and went thence to Iconium a City of Lyca-
Clap. 14:
onia. When they were com to Iconium, entring with the Jews after the
cuſtom
into the Synagog, they preach’d, as they had at Antioch, the Goſpel of
Fefus Chriſt, and with ſuch efficacy, that multitt:des both of the Jews and
Greecs believ’d. Here again the Envy of the Jews became the Author of
Sedition, by which means the City was divided into two parts or Factions,
wherof one food for the unbelieving Jews, and the other for the Apoſtles.
At length when ſuch of the Gcnsils as were join'd with the Jews, and
Rulers of the City, made an aſſault upon ihe Apoſtles, to offer violence
anit ſtone them; they being aware of it, fled to Lyitra (a City of Lycaonia,
which is a part of Pamphylia) and Derbe. At Lyftra there was a man
lame of his feet from the Womb, who having liſten’d to Paul with
great
Attention and Zeal
, was miraculouſly curºd by the Apoſtle; when the People
ſeeing what Paul had don, cry'd out, The Gods were defcended in the like-
neſs of men : a perſuaſion that might gain the more eaſily upon the minds of
the Lycaonians for the Fable of Jupiter and MERCURY, ſaid to
have deſcended in human ſhape, and bin entertain’d by LYCAQN, from
whom the Lycaonians receivód their name. Wherfore they callid BARNA-
BAS, for the gravity of his aſpect, JUPITER; PAUL for his Eloquence,
MERCURY: and the Prieſt of JuPITER, who dwelt in the Suburbs,
brought Bulls and Garlands to the Gates of the Houſe where the Apoſtles were,
to have offer'd Sacrifice with the People, which the Apoſtles abhorring, vi-
gorouſly diſuaded. In the mean time certain Jews by Nation that were
Unbelievers, coming from Antioch of Piſidia, and Iconium, drew the
People to the other extreme, who from facrificing to the Apoſtles fell on
ftoning them; a'work which was brought ſo near to an end, that PAUL
being drawn by them out of the City, was left for dead, tho be ſoon after
recover?d, and went thénice with BARNAB AS ta Derbe : when they bad
propagated the Goſpel there alſo, they return'd to Lyſtra, Iconium, and
Antiochia
, confirming the Diſciples whom they had converted. Now becauſe
the propagation of the Gospel requir’d that the Apoſtles should be moving
thro divers Nations, they chirotonizing them Elders in every Congrega-
tion or Church, that is, ordaining them Elders by the Votes of the
People in every City, left them to perform the Dutys of the abſent Apoſtles,
and
.
of Popular Government.
I
33
and when they had fafted and pray’d, commended them to the Lord. Theſe Chap. 2.
things being brought to a concluſion, or finiſlad at Antioch in Piſidia, when
they had perambulated this Country, they alſo viſited Pamphylia, ſowing the
Goſpel where it was not yet fown, and confirming thoſe who already believ’d,
till they came to Perga : where having order'd their affairs, they proceded to
Atralia, being a maritim City of Pamphylia ; and from thence they faild
back to 'Antioch of Syria, whence firſt they ſet out, with Commiſſion from
the Elders, to preach the Goſpel to the Gentils, and where by the Chirotheſia,
or Impoſition of hands, Prayer and Faſting, they had bin recommended to
the Grace of God, and deſign’d to the Work
now finiſh d.
IN this Narrative you have mention both of the Chirotonia and of
the Chirotheſia, or Impoſicion of hands, but of the former as of Ordi-
nation; for by that ſuch were made Presbyters or Church-Officers
,
as were not ſo before : of the latter not, I think, as of Ordination, at
leaſt in the ſenſe we now take it; but as of deſignation of Perſons to
an occaſional and temporary imployment, that had bin ordain'd before,
for ſo ſure liad Paul at leaſt. However, that which is offer'd by this
Narrative to preſent conſideration, is no more than the bare Story.
C H A P. II.
That the Citys, or moſt of them namºd in the Perambulation of the
Apoſtles PA u L and B A R N A B A s, iperc at that time under po-
pular Government.
In uphich is contained the cdminiſtration of 4
Roman Province.
TH
HE Romans of all Nations under Heaven were indow'd, as
with the higheſt Virtues, ſo with the greateſt human Glory;
which proceded from this eſpecially, that they were in love with ſuch
as were in love with their Liberty. To begin with their dawn, the
Privernates (a free People inhabiting the Cicy and Parts adjoining,
which at this day is calld Piperno, ſom fifty miles from Rome, and five
from Seſle) being the ſecond time conquer'd by the Romans, it was
conſulted in the Senat what courſe ſhould be taken with them ; where
while ſom, according to the different temper of men, ſhew'd them
felves hotter, and others cooler, one of the Privernates more mind. Liv.l.8. c.21.
ful of the condition wherin he was born, than of that wherin he
was faln, happen'd to render all more doubtful: for being ask'd by
a Senator of the ſeverer judgment, wliat Puniſhment he thought
the Privernates might deſerve, Such (ſays he) as they deſerve who
believe themſelves worthy of Liberty., At the courage of which an-
fwer, the Conſul (perceiving in them that had bin vehement e-
nough before againīt the Privernates but the greater animoſity, to
the end that by a gentler Interrogatory he might draw ſom ſofter
anſwer from him) reply'd, And what if we inflict no puniſhment at all
,
but pardon you ; what peace may we expect of you? Why if you give us
a good one (ſaid the other) a ſteady and perpetual Peace, but if an ill one,
not long. At which a certain Senator falling openly upon ruffling and
threatning the Privernat, as if thoſe words of his tended to ſom prac-
tice or intention to ſtir up the Citys in Peace to Sedition, the better
· part of the Fathers being quite of another mind, declar'd, That they
had heard the voice of a Man, and of a Freeman. For why, ſaid they,
Uu 2
spoutá
332
The Prerogative
Book II. fhould it be thought that any Manor People will remain longer under ſuch
& Burden as they are not able to bear, than till they can throw it down?
There a Peace is faithful, where it is voluntary; if you will have Slaves,
30!! are not to truſt them, but their Fetters. To this opinion the Conſul
elpecially inclining, inclin’d others, while he openly profeſt, That they
who had no thought het upon their Liberty, could not but be thought worthy
to be Romans : wherupon the Decree paſt by Authority of the Fathers,
which was afrerwards propos'd to the Congregation, and ratify'd by
the Coinmand of the People, wherby the Privernates were made Citi-
zens of Rome. Such was the Genius of the Roman Commonwealtlı;
where by the way you may alſo cbſerve the manner of her Debate and
Reſult (Authoritate Patrum e Juffu Populi) by the Advice of the Se-
Hit, and the Chirotonia of the People.
BUT that which in this place is more particularly offer'd to conſi-
deration, is hier ufual way of proceding in caſe of Conqueſt with other
Nations: for tho bearing a haughty brow towards ſuch as, not content-
ed ro injoy their Liberty at home, would be her Rivals abroad, ſhe
dealt far otherwiſe, as with Carthage ; this caſe excepted, and the
pilling and polling of her Provinces, which happen'd thro tlic Avarice
and Luxury of her Nobility, when the Balance of popular Power
being broken, her Empire began towards the latter endto languiſh and.
cecline; the way which ſhe took with the Privernates was that which
fhe uſually obſerv'd with others throout the courſe of her Victorys, and
was after the Change of Government made good at leaſt in ſom part
by the Roman Emperors, under whom were now thoſe Citys menti-
ond in the preſent Perambulation of the Apoſtles Paul and BAR-
NA BAS. STRABO for his credit among human Authors is equal to
any; he liv'd about the time of his Perambulation, and being a Greec,
is leſs likely to be partial: Of that therfore, which I have affirm'd to
hare bin the courfeof the Romans in their Victorys, I ſhall make choice
of this Author for a witneſs ; firfk wliere le epitomizes the Story of
Athens after this manner : When the Carians by Sea, and the Bæotians by
Land wafted Attica, Cecrops the Prince, to bring the People under
fbelter, planted them in twelve Citys, Cecropia, Tetrapolis, Epacrea,
Decelea, Eleuſis, Aphydna, Thoricus, Brauron, Cytherus, Sphettus,
Cephiſfia, Phalerus; which THÉ SEUs is ſaid to have contracted into one
call?d Athens. The Government of this City had many changes ; at firſt it
was Mondrchical, then Popular : This again was uſurped by the Tyrants
PISISTRAT US and his Sons, whence recover’d, it fell afterwards into
the hands of the Few, as when the four hundred once, and again the thirty
Tyrants were impos’d by the Lacedemonians, in the War of Peloponneſus:
which Yoke the Athenians (by means of their faithful Army) ſhaking off,
reſtor'd their popular Government, and held it till the Romans attaind ta
the Dominion of Greece. Now tho it be true that they were not a little diſ-
turb’d by the Kings of Macedon, to whom they were forc'd to yield forts
kind of obedience; they nevertheleſs preſerv’d the form of their Common-
wealth ſo intire, that there be who affirin it never to have bin better admi-
niftred, than at ſuch time as Macedon was governed by CASSANDER:
for this Prince, the in other things more inclining towards the Tyrant,
having taken Athens by ſurrender, us’d not the People ill, but made De-
METRIUS PHALEREUS thé Diſciple of THEOPHRASTUS the
Philoſopher, chief Magiſtrat among them; a man ſo far from ruining
their popular State (as in the Commentarys he wrote upon this kind of Go-
Stra5. 1.9.
F
1
vernment
។
of Popular Government
333
1
vernment is attzted) that he repair’d it. Nevertheleſs, whether ſuſpected Chap. 2.
or envy'd for his Greatneſs without ſupport by the Macedonians, after the
death of CASSAN DER he fled into Egypt, while his Enemys breaking
dovn his Statues (as ſom ſay) made homoly Veſſels of them But the
Ronins having receiv'd the Athenians under their popular form, left them
their Livs ant Libertys untouch'd, till in the war with MITHRIDA-
TEs they were forc'd to receive ſuch Tyrants as that King wis pleas'd to
give them ; wherof ARISTION the greateſt, when the Romais bad re-
taken the City from him, being found trampling upon the People, was put
to death by SYLLA, and the City pardon'd, which to this day (le wrote
about the Reign of TIBERIUS) not only injoys her Libertys, but is high
in honor with the Romans. This is the Teſtimony of STR'ABO agre-
ing with that of Cicero, where diſpuring of Divine Providence, he
ſays, that to affirm the World to be govern’d by Chance, or withont God,
is as if one ſhould ſay that Athens were not govern’d by the Areopagits.
Nor did the Romans by the depoſition of the ſame Author (or indeed
of any other) behave themſelves worſe in Afia (the ſcene of our pre-
fent Diſcourſe, where the ſame Pau L, of whom we are ſpeaking, being
born at T'arſus, a City of Cilicia, that had acquir'd like or greater Pri-
vilege by the fame bounty, was alſo a Citizen of Rome) than in Greece.
Aſia is underſtood in three ſignifications : Firſt, for the third part of
the World anſwering to Europe and Africa. Secondly, for that part of
Aſia which is now callid Natolia. Thirdly, for that part of it which
A'ITALUS King of Pergamum, dying without Heirs, bequeath'd and
left to the People of Rome : this contain’d Myſia, Phrygia, Æolis, lo-
nia
, Caria, Doris, Lydia, Lycaonia, Piſtdia, and by conſequence the
wherof we are ſpeaking. To all theſe Countrys the Romans gave
their Liberty, till in favor of ARISTONICUS, the Baſtard of Eu-
MENES, many of them taking Arms, they were recover'd, brought
into ſubjection, and fram'd into a Province.
WHEN a Conſul had conquer'd a Country, and the Romans in-
tended to forin it into a Province, it was the cuſtom of the Senat to
fend (decem Legatos) ten of their Members, who with the Conful had
power to introduce and eſtabliſh their provincial way of Government.
In this manner Aſia was form’d by MARCUS A QUILLIUS Con-
ful ;-afterwards ſo excellently reform’d by SCAVOL A, that the Senat
in their Edicts us’d to propoſe his example to ſuccesling Magiſtrats, and
the Inhabitants to celebrat a Feaſt to his Name. Nevertheleſs MITH-
RIDATES King of Pontus (all the Romans in this Province being
maſſacred in one day) came to poſſeſs himſelf of it, till it was recover
at ſeveral times by SYLLA, MURENA, Lucullus and Pom-
PEY. The Romans in framing a Country into a Province, were not
accuſtom'd to deal with all the Inhabitants of the ſame in a like man-
ner, but differently according to their different merit. Thus divers
Citys in this were left free by SYLLA, as thoſe of the Ilienſes, the
Chians, Rhodians, Lycians, and Magnefars, with the Cyzicens, tho the
laſt of theſe afterwards for their practices againſt the Romans forteited
their Liberty to TIBERIUS, in whoſe Reign they were for this rea-
Ton depriv'd of the ſame.
TAKING Aſia in the firſt ſenſe, that is, for one third part of the
World, the next Province of the Romans in this Country was Cilicia,
containing Pamphylia, Iſauria
, and Cilicia more peculiarly ſo calld.
Here Cicero was fomtimes Proconſul, in honor to whom
of
Phrygia,
Citys
+
$
part
334
The Prerogative
-
Book II. Phrygid, witli Piſidia and Lycaonin, were taken from the former, and
Wadded to this Juriſdiction, by which means the Citys wherof we are
ſpeaking came to be of this Province. Adjoining hereto was the Com-
monwealth of the Lycians, which the Romans left free : into this alſo
the City of Attalia by ſom is computed, but Iconium both by STRA-
Frift. BO and CICERO; the latter wherof being Proconſul, in his Journy
from Laodicea, was receiv'd by the Magiſtrats and Deputys of this
City. Lyſtra and Derbe, being Citys of Lycaonia, muſt alſo have bin of
the ſame Province. Next to the Province of Cilicia was that of Syria,
containing Comagene, Seleucis, Phænicia, Cæloſyria, and Judea or Pa-
leſlin. In Selencis were the four famous Citys, Seleucia, Antiochia,
Apamea (the laſt intire in her Liberty) and Laodicea. Comagene and Ju-
dea were under Kings, and not fram'd into Provinces, till in the time of
the Emperors.
THE fourth Province of the Romans in Afia was that of Bithynia
with Pontus : theſe were all acquir’d or confirm'd by the Victorys of
Pompey the Great. STRABO, who was a Cappadocian born at
Amalia, relates a ſtory worthy to be remember'd in this place. From
the time, ſays he, that the Romans, having conquerid ANTIOCHUS,
became Moderators of Aſia, they contracted Leagues of Amity with diver's
Nations ; where there were Kings, the honor of addreſs was defer'd to them,
with whom the Treatys that concern'd their Countrys were concluded. But
as concerning the Cappadocians, they treated with the whole Nation, for
which cauſe the Royal Line of this Realm coming afterwards to fail, the
Romans gave the People their freedom or leave to live under their own
Laws : and when the People hereupon ſending Embaſſadors to Rome, re-
nounc'd their Liberty, being that to them which they ſaid was intolerable,
and demanded a King; the Romans amaz’d there ſhould be men that could
lo far deſpair, permitted them to chufe, of their Nation, whom they pleased;
To ARIOBARZANE S kas choſen, whoſe Line again in the third Genera-
tion coming to fail, ARCHELA us was made King by ANTONY
(where you may obſerve, in paſſing, that the Romans impos'd not
Monarchical Government, but
for that matter us'd to leave a People as
they found them) Thus at the ſame time they left Pontus under King
MITHRIDATES, who not containing himſelf within his bounds, but ex-
tending them afterwards as far as Colchis and Armenia the Leſs, was re-
duc'd to his terms by POMPEY; who deveſting him of thoſe Countrys
which he had uſurp'd, diſtributed ſom part of them to ſuch Princes as had
afifted the Romans in that War, and divided the reſt into twelve Common-
wealths, of which, added to Bithynia, he made one Province. When the
Roman Emperors became Monarchs, they alſo upon like occaſions made other
diſtributions, conſtituting Kings, Princes, and Citys, ſom more, ſom leſs,
Som wholly free, and others in ſubjection to themſelves. Thus came a
good, if not the greater part of the Citys in the Leſſer Aſia, and the
other adjoining Provinces, to be ſom more, ſom leſs free; but the moſt
of them to remain Commonwealths, or to be erected into popular Go-
vernments, as appears yet clearer by the intercourſe of PLINY, while
he was Pretor or Governor of Bithynia, with his Maſter the Emperor
TRAJAN; a piece of which I have inſerted in the Letters following.
13
.
it
1
PLINY
+
of Popular Government335
1
.
Chap 2
PINY to TRAJA N.
SIR;
)
6
IT
T is provided by POMPEY's Laws for the Bithynians, that no Plin. Epiſt:
man under thirty years of Age be capable of Mágiſtracy, or ofl. 10.
the Senat: by the ſame it is alſo eſtabliſh'd, that they who have
“born Magiſtracy may be Senators. Now becauſe by a latter Edie
of Augustus, the leſſer Magiſtracys may be born by ſuch as are
above one and twenty; there remains with me theſe doubts, whe-
" ther he that being under thirty, has born Magiſtracy, may be elect-
"ed by the Cenſors into the Senat; and if he may, whether of thoſe
" alſo that have not born Magiſtracy, a man being above one and
twenty, ſeeing at that age he may bear Magiſtracy, may not by the
“ fame interpretation be elected into the Senat, tho he has not born it :
“ which is here practis'd and pretended to be neceſſary, becauſe it is
“ fomwhat better, they ſay, that the Senat be fill'd with the Children
< of good Familys, than with the lower fort. My opinion being
ask'd upon
theſe points by the new Cenſors, I thought ſuch as being
“ under thirty have born Magiſtracy, both by POMPE Y's Laws, and
« the Edict of Augustus, to be capable of the Senat; ſeeing the
“ Edict allows a man under thirty to bear Magiſtracy, and the Law,
a man that has born Magiſtracy, to be a Senator. But as to thoſe
" that have not born Magiſtracy, tho at the age in which they may
« bear it, I demur till I may underſtand your Majeſtys pleaſure, to
is whom I have ſent the Heads both of the Law and of the Edict.
16
CC
TRAJAN to PLINY.
YOL
1
CC
OU and I, deareſt PLINY, are of one mind. Pompey's
Lawsare ſo far qualify'd by the Edict of Augustus, thaç
they who are not under one and twenty may bear Magiſtracy, and
they who have born Magiſtracy may be Senators in their reſpective
" Citys: but for ſuch as have not born Magiſtracy, thọ they might have
" born it, I conceive them not eligible into the Senat till they be thirty
years of age.
PLINY to TRA JA N.
SIR;
POWER
66
OWER is granted to the Bithynian Citys by Pompey's
Law, to adopt to themſelves what Citizens they pleaſe, ſo they
be not Foreners, but of the ſame Province; by the ſame Law it is
" Thewn in what caſes the Cenſors may remove a man from the Senat:
Among which nevertheleſs it is not provided what is to be don in
« caſe a foren Citizen be a Senator. Wherfore certain of the Cenſors
“ have thought fit to conſult me, whether they ought to remove a man
" that is of a foren City for that cauſe out of the Senat. Now be-
6 cauſe the Law, tho it forbids the adoption of a Forener, commands
not that a Forener for that cauſe ſhould be remov'd out of the Senat,
« and I am inform’d there be foren Citizens almoſt in every Senat; ſó
that many, not only Men, but Citys might ſuffer Concuſſion by the
66 reftis
.
336
The Prerogative
Book II.“ reſtitution of the Law in that part, which thro a kind of conſent
" ſeems to be now grown obſolete ; I conceive it neceſſary to have
your Majeſtys Reſolution in the caſe, to which end I have ſent a
66 Breviat of the Law annex’d.
66
TRAJ A N O PLINY.
W.
CG
IT H good cauſe, deareſt PLINY, have you doubted what
anſwer to return to the Cenſors, inquiring whether they
ought to elet a man into the Senat that is of another City, tho of
“ the ſame Province ; ſeeing on the one ſide the Authority of the Law,
" and of Cuſtom on the other to the contrary, might well diſorder
you. To innovat nothing for the time paſt, I think well of this ex-
“ pedient: they who are alrcady elected Senators, tho not according
" to the Law, of what City foever they be, may remain for the pre-
« ſent; but for the future Pompe y's Laws ſhould return to their full
o virtue, which if we ſhould cauſe to look back, might create troll-
« ble.
*
THIS might ferve, but there will be no hurt in being a little fuller
in the diſcovery of Provincial Government.
THE Provinces ſo fram’d, as has bin ſhewn, were ſubdivided in-
to certain Circuits call?d Dioceſes; that of Aſia had fix, Alabande, Sar-
des (antiently the Senat of CRÆsus) Smyrna, Ephefis, Adramytis,
Pergamum. That of Cilicia had alſo fix, the Pamphylian, Iſaurian,
and Cilician, the Metropolis wherof was l'arſus, a free City ; to theſe
were taken out of the Province of Aſia, Cibra, Sinnade, Apamea :
what were the Dioceſes of the other two, SIGONIUs, whom I fol-
low, dos not ſhew. At theſe in the Winters for the Summer was
fpent commonly with the Army) the People of the Province aſſembld
at ſet times, as at our Allīzes, wliere the Roman Governors did them
Juſtice.
THE Governors or Magiſtrats, to whoſe care a Province was com-
mitted, were of two kinds: the firſt and chief was Conſul or Pretor,
which appellations differ'd not in Power, but in Dignity, that of Con-
ſul being more honorable, who had twelve Lictors, wheras the Pretor
liad but lix; if the annual Magiſtracy of either of theſe came to be
prorogu'd, he was call's Proconful or Propretor.
THE ſecond kind of Magiſtrat in a Province was the Queſtor,
Receiver or Treaſurer, who being alſo annual, was attended by Lictors
of his own; if he dy'd within his year, the Conſul, Proconſul, or
Pretor might appoint one for that time in his place, who was call'd
Proqueſtor. The Power of the Conſul, Proconful, or Pretor, was of
two kinds, the one Civil, the other Military ; the former calld Ma-
giſtracy, the latter Empire.
THE Pomp of theſe aſſuming and exerciſing their Magiſtracy was
reverend; the Conful or Proconſul
: had Legats, ſomtimes more, but
never under three, appointed him by the Senat: theſe were in the na-
ture of Counſillors to aſlift him in all A fairs of his Province ; he had
Tribuns, Colonels, or Field Officers, for the military part of his Ad-
miniſtration; he had alſo Secretarys, S::rjeants, Heralds or Criers,
Lictors or Inſignbearers, Interpreters, Meſſengers, Divines, Chamber-
lains, Phyſicians ; and beſides theſe his Companions, which for the
moſt
of Popular Government.
337
what the Law of this or that Province
moſt part were of the younger fort of Gentlemen or Gallants that ac-Chap. 2.
company'd him for his Ornament, and their own Education. Into,
this the fomwhat like Train of the Queſtor (who by the Law was in
place of a Son to the Proconſul, and to whom the Proconſul was to
give the regard of a Father) being caſt, it made the Pretorian Co-
hort or Guard always about the Perſon of the Proconſul, who in this
Equipage having don his Devotions at the Capitol, departed the City,
Paludatus, that is in his Royal Mantle of Gold and Purple, follow'd
for ſom part of the way with the whole Train of his Friends, wiſh-
ing him much joy and good ſpeed.
IN his Province he executed his twofold Office, the one of Captain
General, the other of the ſupreme Magiſtrat. In the former relation
he had an Army either receiv'd from his Predeceſſor, or new levy'd in
the City; this conſiſted in the one half of the Legions (as I have elſe-
where ſhewn) and in the other of Aſſociats: for the greatneſs of the
ſame, it was proportion'd to the Province, or the occaſion; to an or
dinary Province in times of Peace, I believe an Army amounted not to,
above one Legion with as many Auxiliarys, that is, to a matter of
twelve thouſand Foot, and twelve hundred Horſe. The Magiſtracy
or Juriſdiction of the Proconſul, or Pretor, was executed at the Me
tropolitan City of each Diæcis, which upon this occaſion was to fur-
niſh the Pretorian Cohort with Lodging, Salt, Wood, Hay, and Stable-
room at the charge of the Country. Theſe, tho CICERO would
hardly receive any of them, were, towards the latter time of the Com-
monwealth, extended by the Provincial Magiſtrats to ſo great a bur-
den to the People, that it caus’d divers Laws to be paſs'd in Rome
(de repetundis) for reftitution to be made to the Provinces, by ſuch
had injur'd them. Upon ſuch Laws was the proſecution of VER-
Res by CICERO. When and where this kind of Court was to be
held, the Conſul, Proconſul,: or Pretor, by Proclamation gave timely
notice. Being aſſembld at the time, and the City appointed, in the
Townhal ſtood a Tribunal; upon this the Sella Curulis, or Chair of
State, in which fat the Conſul, Proconſul, or Precor, with his Preto-
rian Cohort or Band about him; furniſh'd with all manner of Pomp,
and Officers requiſit to the Ornament or Adminiſtration of fo high a
Magiſtracy. The Juriſdiction of this Court was according to the
Laws made for the adminiſtation of the Province ;. but becauſe they
could not foreſee all things (as appear’d by the Queſtions which Pli-
Ny put upon the Laws of POMPEY, to TRAJAN) it came to paſs,
that much was permitted to the Ediéts of the Provincial Pretors, as
was alſo in uſe at Rome with the Pretors of the City : and if any man
had judgd otherwiſe in his Province, than he ought to have don in
the City, made an Edict contrary to the Law of his Province, or
judgd any thing otherwiſe than according to his own Edict, he
was held guilty of, and queſtionable for a hainous Crime. But
was, would be hard particularly to fay; only in general it was for the
main very much reſembling that of Sicily
, call’d Rupilia.
LEG’e Rupilia, or by the Law of Rupilius, a Cauſe between one
Citizen and another being of the ſame City, was to be try'd at home by their
own Laws. A Cauſe between one Provincial and another being of divers
Citys, was to be tryd by Judges whom the Pretor ſhould appoint by lor.
What a privat man claim'd of a People, or a People of a privat man,
Xx
as
TVAI
338
The Prerogative
w
Book II. was to be refer’d to the Senat of fom third City. Upon what a Roman
W claim'd of a Provincial, a Provincial was to be appointed Judg. Upon
what a Provincial claim'd of a Roman, a Roman was to be appointed
Judg. For deciſion of other Controverſys, ſelect Judges from among the
Romans ( not out of the Pretorian Cobort, but out of ſuch Romans, or
other Citizens free of Rome, as were preſent in the ſame Court) were to be
given. In criminal Cauſes, as Violence, Peculat, or Treaſon, the Law, and
the manner of proceding was the ſame in the Provinces, as in Rome.
FOR the Tributs, Cuſtoms, Taxes, levys of Men, Mony, Ship-
ping, ordinary or extraordinary, for the common defence of the Ra
man Republic, and her Provinces, the Conſuls, Proconfuls, or Pretors,
proceding according to ſuch Decrees of the Senat as were in that caſe
ftanding or renew'd upon emergent occaſions; in gathering theſe lay
the Magiftracy or office of the Queftor: if the Proconſul were indir-
pos’d, or had more buſineſs than he could well turn his hand to,
Courts of this nature might be held by one or more of his Legats.
With matters of Religion they meddid not; every Nation being fo far
left to the liberty of Conſcience, that no violence for this cauſe was
offer'd to any man: by which means both Jews and Chriſtians, at
Jeaſt till the time of the perſecuting Emperors, had the free exerciſe of
their Religion throout the Roman Provinces. This the Jerps lik'd well
for themſelves, nor were they troubld at the Heathens ; but to the
Chriſtians they always grudg’d the like privilege. Thus when they
could no otherwiſe induce PILAT to put Chriſt to death, they
accus’d Chriſt of affecting Monarchy, and ſo afrighted PILAT, be-
ing a mean condition'd fellow, while they threatend to let T11 E-
Rius know he was not Ceſar's Friend, that he comply'd with their
ends. But when at Corinth where GALLIÓ (a man of another
temper) was Proconful of Achaia, they would have bin at this ſport
again, and with a great deal of Tumult had brought Paul before
the Tribunal, GALLIO took it not well, that they ſhould think
he had nothing elſe to do than to judg of Words, and Names, and
Queſtions of their Law; for hc car’d no more for the Diſputes be-
tween the Chriſtians and the Jews, than for thoſe between the Epi-
cureans and the Stoics. Whertore his Lictors drave them from the
Tribunal, and the officious Corinthians, to ſhew their love to the Prc-
conſul, fell on knocking them out of the way of other buſineſs. .
NOW tho the Commonwealth of the Achaans, being at this time
a Roman Province under the Proconſul GALL10, injoy'd no longer
her common Senat, Strategus, and Demiurges, according to the model
fhown in the former Book; yet remain’d cach particular City under
her antient form of Popular Government, ſo that in theſe, eſpecially
at Corinth, many of the Greecs being of the ſame judgment, the Jen's
could not diſpute with the Chriſtians without Tumult
. Of this kind
was that which happen'd at Epheſus, where Chriſtianity growing fo
faft, that the Silverſmiths of DIANA's Temple began to fear they
ſhould loſe their Trade; the Jews liking better of Heatheniſm than
Chriſtianity, ſet ALEXANDER, one of their pack, againſt Paul.
THIS place (in times when men will underſtand no otherwiſe
of human ſtory than makes for their ends) is fallen happily into my
hand; ſeeing that which I have ſaid of a. Roman Province, will be
thus no leſs than prov'd out of Scripture. For the Chancellor of
Epheſus perceiving the Eccleſia (ſo it is in the Original) or Aſſembly
(as
1
Alt 19
of Popular Government.
339
110
(as in our Tranſlation) uncall’d by the Senat, or the Magiſtracy to Chap. 2.
be tumultuouſly gather'd in the Theater (their uſual place, as in
Syracuſa and other Citys, of meeting) betakes himſelf to appeaſe the
People with divers arguments: among which he has theſe. Firſt, as
to matter of Religion, Tou have brought hither, ſays he, theſe meri
which are neither robbers of Temples (Churches our Bible has it, before
there was any Church to be robb’d) nor yet blafphemers of the Goddeſs :
In which words (ſeeing that they offering no ſcandal, but only pro-
pagating that which was according to their own judgment, were not
obnoxious to Puniſhment) he ſhews that every man had liberty of
Conſcience. Secondly, as to Law: If DEMETRIUS and the Crafts-
men which are with him have a matter againſt any man, the Law, ſays he,
is open. Thirdly, as to the matter of Government, which appears to
be of two parts, the one Provincial, the other Domeſtic: For the form
mer, ſays he, there are (đv JÚLUTCI) Proconſuls (he fpeaks in the plu-
ral number with relation to the Legats, by whom the Proconſul
ſomtimes held his Courts; otherwiſe this Magiſtrat was but one in a
Province, as at this time for Aſia Publius Sullius) and to the
latter, ſays he, if you deſire any thing concerning other matters, that is,
ſuch as appertain to the Government of the City (in which the care
of the Temple was included) it ſhall be determind in a lanful Eccleſia,
or Aſſembly of the People. By which you may ſee that notwithſtand-
ing the Provincial Government, Epheſus, tho ſhe was no free City,
for with a free City the Proconſul had nothing of this kind to do)
had (autovouhxv) the Government of her ſelf (as thoſe other Citys
mention’d in PLINY's Epiſtles) by the Senat, and the People ; for
wherever one of theſe is nam'd, as the Senat by Pliny, or the
People by Luke, the other is underſtood. When the Chancellor
had thus ſpoken, he diſmiſs’d the Eccleſia. It is Luke's own word,
and ſo often as I have now repeated it, ſo often has he usd it
upon
the
ſame occaſion. Wherfore I might henceforth expect two things of Di-
vines; firſt, that it might be acknowlegd that I have good Au-
thors, Luke and the Chancellor of Epheſus, for the word Eccleſia
in this ſenſe; and ſecondly, that they would not perſuade us, the
word Eccleſia has loſt this ſignification, left they condemn this place of
Scripture to be no more underſtood. The manner of Provincial Go-
vernment being thus prov’d, not only out of profane Authors, but
out of Scripture it ſelf; and the Citys that were leaſt free having had
ſuch power over themſelves, and their Territorys; why, if the Re-
mans took no more of them for this protection, than was paid to their
former Lords, did they not rather undertake the patronage of the World
than the Empire ; ſeeing Venice, and Dantzic, while the one was tri-
butary to the Turk, the other to the King
of Poland, were neverthe-
leſs ſó free Eſtates, that of a King, or a Commonwealth that ſhould
have put the reſt of the world into the like condition, no leſs in our day
could have bin faid? And yet that the Romans, when the nature of the
Eaſtern Monarchys ſhall be rightly conſider'd, took far leſs of theſe
Citys than their old Maſters, will admit of little doubt. CICERO
ſurely would not ly; he, when Proconſul of Cilicia, wrote in this
manner concerning his Circuit, to his friend Servicius: Tivo days
I ſtaid at Laodicea, at Apamea five, at Sinnadæ three, at Pilomelis five,
at Iconium ten; than which Juriſdiction or Government there is nothing
more juſt or equal. Why then had not thoſe Citys their Senats and their
X X 2
Ecclefio,
340
The Prerogative
Book II. Eccleſië, or Congregations of the People, as well as that of Epheſus
,
and thoſe wherof Pliny gives an account to TRAJAN?
CORINTH was in Achaia; Perga of Pamphylia, Antioch of Pi-
ſidia, Iconium, Lystra, Derbe of Lycaonia, were in Cilicia; and with
theſe, as ſom reckon, Attalia. Epheſus and the other Antioch were in
Syria. Achaia, Cilicia, and Syria, were Roman Provinces at the time
of this Perambulation of the Apoſtles: The Citys under Provincial
Adminiſtration, whether free or not free, were under Popular Govern-
ment; whence it follows, that Corinth, Epheſus, Antioch of Syria,
Antioch of Piſidia, Perga, Iconium, Lyftra, Derbe, Attalia, being at this
time under Provincial Adminiſtration, were at the ſame time under Po-
pular Government. There has bin no hurt in going about, for the proof
of this; tho indeed to ſhew that theſe Citys (had quandam autovolúxv)
were under Popular Government, we needed to have gon no further
than the Text, as where the Chancellor of Epheſus, to get rid of a
tumultuous Eccleſia or Aſſembly of the People, promiſes them a law-
ful one. In Iconium, Lyſtra, Derbe, and the reſt, you hear not of
any
King (as where HEROD ſtretch'd out his hand to pleaſe the Jews,
and vex the Church) but of the People, of their Rulers, of their ar
ſemblys, and of their Tumults. The People at Lyſtra are now a-
greed to give the Apoſtles divine Honors: and anon, both at Iconium
and Lyſtra, to ſtone them. Now to determin of divine Honor, or of
Life and Death, are acts of Soverain Power. It is true, theſe never-
theleſs may happen to be uſurp'd by a mere Tumult; but that cannot
be ſaid of theſe Congregations, which conſiſted as well of the Magi-
ftrats and Rulers, as of the People, and where the Magiſtrats ſhew
that they had no diſtinct Power wherby to reſtrain the People, nor 0-
ther means to prevail againſt them, than by making of Partys: Which
Paſſages, as they prove
theſe Commonwealths on the one ſide to have
bin ill conſtituted, evince on the other, that theſe Citys were under
Popular Government.
CH A P. III.
C
The Deduction of the Chirotonia from Popular Government, and
of the Original Right of Ordination from the Chirotonia. In
which is contain’d the Inſtitution of the Sanhedrim or Senat of
Iſrael by Mo s E s, and of that of Rome by Ro MUL U S.
D
IVINES generally in their way of diſputing have a bias
that runs more upon Words than upon Things ; ſo that in this
place it will be neceſſary to give the Interpretation of fom other Words,
wherof they pretend to take a ſtrong hold in their Controverſys.
The chief of theſe has bin ſpoken to already: Chirotonia being a word
that properly ſignifys the Suffrage of the People
, wherever it is pro-
perly us?d, implys Power; wherfore tho the Senat decrees by Suffrage
as well as the People, yet there being no more in a Decree of the Senat
than Authority, the Senat is never ſaid to Chirotonize, or very ſel-
dom and improperly, this word being peculiar to the People. And
thus much is imply'd in what went before.
2
*
THE
1
M
for a
HI
of Popular Government.
341
THE next Word in Controverſy is Pſephiſma, which ſignifys.a De- Chap. 3.
cree or Law; and this always implying Power, always implys the lo
Suffrage of the People, that is, where it is ſpoken of popular Govern-
ment: for tho a Pſéphiſma or Decree of the Athenian Senat was a Law
year before it came to the Suffrage or Chirotonia of the People, yet
the Law or Conſtitution of SOLON, wherby the Senat had this Pow-
er, originally deriv'd from the Chirotonia of the People.
THE third Word (49.35 éves) ſignifys to conſtitute or ordain;
this in the political ſenſe of the ſame implys not Power, but Authority :
for a man that writes or propoſes a Decree or Form of Government,
may be ſaid (&Frosávos) to propoſe or conſtitute it, whether it be con-
firm’d by the Chirotonia of the People or not; nay with HALICAR-
NASSÆus the Word ſignifys no more than barely to call or aſſemble
the Senat, Boua, nu har Tivos xx Frisável.
NOW if theſe Words be ſomtimes otherwiſe taken, what Words
be there in any Language that are not often us'd improperly? But that
underſtood politically, they muſt of neceſſity be underſtood as I have
ſhewn, or will ſo intangle and diſorder Government, that no man
ſhall either make head or foot of it, is that which I make little quel-
tion to evince in the ſureſt way, that is, by opening the nature of the
Things whence they derive, and wherof they are ſpoken by the beſt
Authors.
AND becauſe the Words (tho the Things they ſignify were much
more antient) derive all from Athens, I ſhall begin by this Conſtituti.
on to ſhew the proper uſe of them. Chirotonia in Athens, as has bin
ſhewn out of SUIDAS (who ſpeaking of Rome refers to this) was
Election of Magiſtrats, or enacting Laws by the Suffrage of the Peo-
ple; which, becauſe they gave by holding up their hands, came
thence to be calld Chirotonia, which ſignifys holding up of hands.
The Legiſlative Aſſembly, or Repreſentative of the People, call'd the
Nomothetæ, upon occaſion of repealing an old Law, and enacting a
new one, gave the Chirotonia of the People : And yet ſays the Athe- Demoſt. con-
nian Law (διαχειροτονίαν δεί ποιείν της προέδρας περί τέτων η νόμων ) tra Timocr.
Let the Proedri give or make the Chirotonia to either Law. The Proe-
dri, as was ſhewn in the former Book, were the ten Preſidents of the
Prytans; which Prytans upon this occaſion were Preſidents of the No-
motheta. Again, wheras it was the undoubted Right and Practice of
the People to elcét their Magiſtrats by their Chirotonia (xêv ouers Ev«,
κάν πλείος, κάν ή δείνα, κάν οντινών χειροτονήσητε σρατηγόν) it is neverthe- Pil. r.
leſs ſhewn by Pollux to have bin the peculiar Office of the Ther-
mothetæ (sedmnyos Xespotoveiv) to chirotonize the Magiſtrats. For as
the Proedri were Preſidents of the People in their Legiſlative Capacity,
ſo were the Theſmotheta, upon occaſion of Elections: thus the Chiroto-L. 8. c.8.
nia of the Proedri or of the Theſmothetæ, ſignifys nothing elſe but the
Chirotonia of the People, by which they enacted all their Laws, and
elected all their Civil or Eccleſiaſtical Magiſtrats or Prieſts, as the Rex
Sacrificus, and the Orgeones, except ſom by the Lot; which Ordinati-
on, as is obſerv'd by ARISTOTLE, is equally popular. This
,
whether ignorantly or wilfully unregarded, has bin, as will be feeń
hereafter, the cauſe of great abſurdity; for who ſees not that to put
the Chirotonia, or Soverain Power of Athens upon the Proedri or the
Theſmot hete, is to make ſuch a thing of that Government as can no
wiſe be underſtood ?
WHAT
*3
1
342
The Prerogative
ما
91
'L
Lib, 2.
Book II. WHAT the People had paſt by their Chirotonia, was call'd Ple-
wphiſma, an Act or Law. And becauſe in the Nomothetæ there were al-
ways two Laws put together to the Vote, that is to ſay, the old one,
and that which was offer'd in the room of it, they that were for the
old Law were faid (amorçilev) to pronounce in the Negative; and
they that were for the new (x@Tamoiſev) to pronounce for the Affir-
mative.
THESE Laws, theſe Propoſitions, or this frame of Government,
having bin propos'd firſt by Solon, and then ratify'd or eſtabliſh'd
by the Chirotonia of the Athenian People; ARISTOTL E ſays of him
Tle S druoneg TiXv X&TQ5Town) that he inſtituted or conſtituted the popu-
lar Government; which Conſtitution implys not any Power in So-
LON, who abſolutely refus’d to be a King, and therfore the word
ja ne snoei as to him implys no more than Authority. I have ſhew'd
you the Words in controverſy, and the Things together in the Mint ;
now whether they that as to Athens introduc'd them both, underſtood
either, I leave my Reader by comparing them to judg.
IT is true that the Things expreſt by theſe Words have bin in fom
Commonwealths more, in others leſs antient than the Greec Lan-
guage; but this hinders not the Greecs to apply the Words to the like
Conſtitutions or Things, wlierever they find them, as, by following
HALICARNASS Æ us, I ſhall exemplify in Rome.
“Ο ΔΕ Ρώμυλα, επειδή ταύτα διακόσμηση, βολευτας ευθις έγνω καταςή-
od txt Romulus, when he had diſtributed the People into Tribes and
Pariſhes, proceded to ordain the Senat : in this manner the Tribes were
three, and the Pariſhes thirty ; out of every Tribe he elected three
Senators, and out of every Pariſh three more, all by the Suffrage of
the People. Theſe therfore came to ninety nine choſen by the Chiroto-
nia; to which he added one more, not choſen by the Chirotonia, but
by himſelf only: Which Election we may therfore ſay was made by
the Chirotheſia; for as in this Chapter I am ſhewing that the Chirotonia
is Election by the Many, ſo in the next I ſhall ſhew that the Chirotheſia
is Election by One, or by the Few. But to keep to the matter in hand;
the Magiſtrat thus choſen by Romulus was (prefectus urbi) the
Protector of the Commonwealth, or he who, when the King was out
of the Nation or the City, as upon
as upon occaſion of war, had the exerciſe
of Royal Power at home. In like manner with the Civil Magiſtracy
were the Prieſts created (tho ſom of them not ſo antiently) for the
Pontifex Maximus, the Rex Sacrificus, and the Flamens, were all or-
dain'd by the Suffrage of the People (Pontifex Tributis, Rex Centuri-
atis, Flamines Curiatis) the latter of which, being no more than Pa-
riſh Prieſts, had no other Ordination than by their Pariſhes. All the
Laws, and all the Magiſtrats in Rome, even the Kings themſelves,
were according to the Orders of this Commonwealth to be crcated by
the Chirotonia of the People; which nevertheleſs is by APPIAN
ſomtimes call'd druáezar Xeipotovice, the Chirotonia of the Tribuns, whe-
ther theſe Magiſtrats were Preſidents of the Aſſemblys of the Peo-
ple, or elected by them. Sic Romani Hiſtorici non raro loquuntur, Confu-
lem qui comitia habuerit creaſſe novos Magiſtratus, non aliam ob cauſam
niſi quia (uffragia receperit, Populum moderatus eft in eligendo.
WHAT paſt the Chirotonia of the People, by the Greecs is call?d
Dion. Hal. 1.3. Pephifma : μελλούσης και διαλύεται τις εκκλησίας, ανατές ο ΜάρμG- έφη &
μίνιψήφισαι το κοινόν υμών έχει καλάς: When the Congregation of the Peo-
ple
Calv. Inft.
L.4. cap. 3.
S. 15.
11
of Popular Government.
343
H
3
the People.
ple was to be diſmiſt, Marcụs ſtanding up, ſaid, Your Pfephiſma, Chap. 3.
that is your Act, is exceding good, &c.
THIS Policy, for the greater part, is that which ROMULUS (as
was ſhewn) is ſaid ( X&T&shou bai) to have inſtituted or ordain'd, tho
it be plain that he ordain'd it no otherwiſe than by the Chirotonia of
THUS you have another example of the three words in contro-
verſy (Chirotonia, xx.S15 áv«!, Pſephiſma) ſtill apply'd in the ſame
ſenſe, and to the ſame things. Have I not alſo diſcover'd already the
original Right of Ordination, whether in civil or religious Orders ?
This will be ſcandalous. How! derive Ordination asit is in the Churchi
of CHRIST, or as it was in the Church of the Jervs, from the Re-
ligion, or rather Superſtition of the Heathens ! I meddle not with their
Religion, nor yet with their Superſtition, but with their Ordination
which was neither, but a part of their Policy. And why is not Or-
dinacion in the Church or Commonwealth of CHRIST, as well a
political thing as it was in the Churches or Commonwealths of the
Jews, or of the Heathens? Why is not Election of Officers in the
Church as well a political thing, as Election of Officers in the State?
and why may not this be as lawfully perform’d by the Chirotonia in
the one, as in the other?
THAT Moses introduc'd the Chirotonia, is expreſly faid by Philo de Inſt.
PHILO; tho he oppoſes it to the Ballot, in which I believe he is miſ Princ.
taken, as not ſeeing that the Ballot including the Suffrage of the Peo-
ple, by that means came as properly under the denomination of the
Chirotonit, as the Suffrage of the Roman People, which tho it were
given by the Tablet, is ſo call'd by Greec Authors. All Ordination of
Magiſtrats, as of the Senators or Elders of the Sanhedrim, of the
Judges or Elders of inferior Courts, of the Judg or Suffes of Iſrael,
of the King, of the Prieſts, of the Levits, whether with the Ballot or
viva voce, was perform’d by the Chirotonia or Suffrage of the People.
In this (eſpecially if you admit the Authority of the Jewiſh Lawyers,
and Divines call’d the Talmudiſts) the Scripture will be clear, but
their Names are hard; wherfore not to make
my Diſcourſe more rough
than I need, I ſhall here ſet them together. The Authors or Writings
I uſe, by way of Paraphraſe upon the Scripture, are the Gemara Babylo
nia, Midbar Rabba, Sepher Siphri, Sepher Tanchuma, Solomon Farchius,
Chiskuny, Abarbanel, Ajin Iſrael, Peſiktha Zotertha. Theſe and many
more being for the Élection of the Sanhedrim by the Ballot, I might have
ſpoken them more briefly; for the truth is, in all that is Talmudical I
am aſſiſted by SeLDEN, GROTI us, and their Quotations out of the
Rabbys, having in this Learning ſo little Skill, that if I miſcall'd none
of them, I ſhew'd you a good part of my acquaintance with them.
NOR am I wedded to GROTIus or SELDEN, whom ſomtimes
I follow, and ſomtimes I leave, making uſe of their Learning, but of
my own Reaſon. As to the things in this preſent Controverſy, they
were no other in Athens and Rome than they had bin in the Common.
wealth of Iſrael.
WHEŃ Moses came to inſtitute the Senat, he ask'd counſil of Numb. 1r?
God. And the Lord ſaid, Gather to me ſeventy men of the Elders of v. 16, 24.
Ifrael; and Moses went out and told the People the words of the Lord:
that is, propos’d the Dictat of the ſupreme Legiſlator to the Chirotonix
of the Congregation. What elſe can we make of theſe words of Mo-
:
SES
344
The Prerogative
1
Deut. I. v. 13,
14, 15.
Book II. se s to the People? Take ye wiſe men, and underſtanding, and known as
πong your Tribes (ή κατασήσω αυτος εφ' υμών ηγουμένους υμών) and I wil
conſtitute them Rulers over you. Now how the People could otherwiſe
take or chuſe theſe Rulers or Magiſtrats thus propos'd, than by their
Chirotonia, let Divines—ſhew ; or notwithſtanding the conſtitution
of Moses, both the Senat of Ifrael, and the inferior Courts, were
decreed by the Chirotonia of the People. For the People upon this
Propoſition reſolv'd in the Affirmative, or anſwer'd and ſaid, The thing
which thou haſt Spoken is good for us to do. This then was the Plephif-
ma or Decree of the People of Iſrael, wherupon ſays Moses (até-
5100 áut s iyaaa) I conſtituted or ordaind them Governors. In which
example you have the three words, or the three things again ; nor as
to the things, is it, or ever was it, otherwiſe in any Commonwealth.
Whence it is admirable in our Divines, who will have xoetésnoa, conſti-
tuted, to be the word of Power ; that they do not ſee by this means
they inuſt make two Powers in the fame Government; the ratesmod
or Conſtitution of the Legiſlator, and the Chirotonia or Suffrage of the
People: or elſe ſay that the Commonwealth of Iſrael was inſtituted by
the Power of the Legiſlator, and the Authority of the People, than
which there is nothing more abſurd. But the People ſtaid not upon
their firſt Pſephiſma, or Reſult, that the thing was good for them toºde,
bur did accordingly. The manner of their proceding at different times
was ſomwhat different ; for it was ſomtimes viva voce, fomtimes by
the Lot, without the Suffrage, and ſomtimes by the Ballot, which con-
fifted not of the Lot only, but of the Suffrage. Each of theſe are
equally popular (for neither of them gives an advantage to any
Perſon or Party ) but not equally prudent ways of proceding; the
Lot committing too much to Fortune, except in ſom kinds of buſinef-
fes, as firſt in the diviſion of Lands, whence the Suffrage was pro-
perly excluded : for the Diviſions being made by three Deputys out of
each Tribe, if there happen'd to fall ſom advantage or diſadvantage
to any inan by the Lot, it was equal or impartial; wheras if it had
fallen by the Suffrage, it muſt have bin inequal, or partial. Such was
the cauſe why the Lot in the Diviſion of the Land of Canaan was us'd
without the Suffrage. In caſe of a Crime committed by an unknown
Author, but among many of whom ſom one or more muſt have bin
guilty as in the caſes of A CHAN and JONATHAN,the Lot was alſo
us'd without the Suffrage, fomwhat after the inanner of Decimation in
an Army, when many that are guilty throw the Dice, and he on whom
the Lot falls is puniſhd; yet with confiderable difference, for wheras
Decimation is not us'd but for puniſhment, where the perſons are as
well known as the Guilt; this uſe of the Lot in Iſrael was for the diſ-
of the unknown Author of fom known Crime, that ſom one of
many being put to the queſtion (who if either by his own confeffion,
or other proof he were found guilty, was puniſh'd accordingly, other-
wiſe not) Men might have leſs incouragement that their Crimes
would be the more hidden, or leſs puniſhable for company, or the ſha-
dow of it..
WHEN the People were ſet upon the introduction of a new
Magiſtracy, and card not at all who ſhould be the man, as in the
Elečtion of Saur, at which time the Philiſtins lay hard upon them,
and they look'd upon the Eaſe they hop'd from a King, withoạt co-
veting the trouble which he was like to have; it ſeems to me there was
a third uſe of the Lot without the Suffrage.
BUT
covery
1
Mentor
of Popular Government.
345
BUT that the common uſe of the Lot in Iſrael imply'd alſo the Chap. 3.
Suffrage, and was of the nature of the Ballot at this day in Venice, is
little to be doubted; or you may ſatisfy your ſelf, when you have con-
fider'd the manner how the Senat or Sanhedrim was firſt elected
(**SI5UL160) or conſtituted by Mos'E s.
UPON the Pſephiſma, or decree of the Legiſlator and the People,
The thing which thou haft Spoken is good for us to do, they proceded to
election of Competitors in this manner. Each of the twelve Tribes
(to be hereafter as well locally, as they were yet but genealogically di-
vided ) were to make the Election, not excluding the Thirteenth, nor
yer nominally taking it in ; for Levi, tho genealogically as diſtinct a
Tribe as any of them, yet was not deſign'd locally ſo to be, but to
have the right of promiſcuous Inhabiting, Cohabiting, or Marriage
with all or any of the reſt, and with right of Suffrage accordingly;
for this cauſe the Tribes being Thirteen, are reckon'd but Twelve. So
each of the twelve Tribes elected among themſelves by their Suffrages;
fix wiſe men, and underſtanding, and known among them; whó
being elected, were written; and being written, were deliver'd each
in a ſeveral Scrol to Moses. Moses having receiv'd all the
Scrols, had ſeventy two Competitors, which caus’d a Fraction; for
the Senat, as is plain by the Text (gather me ſeventy men, that they may
stand with thee) was to conſiſt but of Seventy with Moses, that is, in
all, of ſeventy one. So Moses having two Competitors more than
he needed, caus’d two Urns to be brought, into one of which he caſt
the ſeventy two Competitors, or Names written in the Scrols; and in-
to the other feventy two Scrols, of which two were blanks, and fe-
venty vzorc infcrib'd with the word Presbyter. This being don, the
while rongregation pray'd, and when they had pray’d, gave forth
their Lots
THE Lots were given forth after this manner. Firſt a Lot was
draut our of the Urn of the Magiſtracys, then another out of the
Urn of the Competitors. The Competitor to whoſe name a Blank was
drawr, departed : but he to whoſe name a Prize was drawn, or gi-
ven fore', became a Magiſtrat.
THEY who had thus gain’d Magiſtracy were oursætan\v.pl?ouéloig
by this Pfephiſma decreed to be together of the number of the feventy
Elders. But wheras in the Urn of Magiſtracys there were two Blanks,
two that had bin written Competitors muſt of neceſſity have failá
of Magiſtracy. So ELDAD and MedAd being of them that were Numb. II. 26;
written Competitors by the Tribes, yet went not up to the Tabernacle ;
that is, attain'd not to be (ouixote 4x.pl?omévol) numbred among the
ſeventy, who were to fit in the Court of the Tabernacle; as afterwards
they did in the Pavement, or ſtone-Chamber, in the Court of the
Temple.
IŃ this place I ſhall mind you but once more of the three Words
in controverſy. Moses the Legiſlator (GETÉSNOE) conſtituted,
the People chirotoniz'd; and that which they had chirotoniz’d, was
Pſephiſma, their Decree.
THERE be in theſe times that are coif'd with ſuch Opinions,
that to ſhew Scripture to be Reaſon, is to make it loſe weight with
them; and to talk of the Talmudiſts, is to profane it: Of theſe I ſhall
only deſire to know how they underſtand that place of ELDAD
and MEDAD; for if they can no otherwiſe make ſenſe of it than as
Y Y
346
The Prerogative
of
Book IL I have don, it is a ſufficient proof (letting the Talmudiſts go) of all
nu that I have ſaid. What thierfore has the Hierarchy, and the Presby-
tery for their opinion that the Sanhedrim was inſtituted by the Chiro-
theſia, or Impoſition of Hands?
THERE is in the Old Teſtament no mention of laying on
Hands by way of Ordination, or Election, but only by Moses in
the deſignation of Joshua for his Succeſſor : and in this Moses
did firſt as Romulus afterwards in the Election of the Prefect or
Protector of Rome, but upon a far greater exigence; for the Common-
wealth of Rome, when ROMULUs did the like, was ſeated or plan-
ted, but the Commonwealth of Iſrael, when Moses did this, was
neither ſeated nor planted, nor indeed a Commonwealth, but an Army
deſign'd to be a Commonwealth. Now between the Government
that is neceſſary to an Army, and that which is neceſſary to a Common-
wealth, there is a vaſt difference. The Government even of the Ar-
mys of Rome, when ſhe was a Commonwealth, was nevertheleſs
Monarchical : in this regard Moses himſelf exercis'd a kind of
Dictatorian Power for his life; and the Commonwealth being not yet
planted, nor having any Balance wherupon to weigh her ſelf
, muſt
either have bin left at his death to the care of fom Man wlion lie
knew beſt able to lay her Foundation, or to extreme hazard. Wher-
fore this Ordination, which was but accidental, regarding the preſent
military condition of the People, Moses moſt prudently diſtinguiſhes
from the other; in that he ſhew'd them how they ſhould manage
their Commonwealth, in this he bequeaths them the Man whom he
thinks the moſt likely to bring them to be a Commonwealth : of
which judgment and undertaking of Moses, Joshua the next
illuſtrious Example, moſt worthily acquitted himſelf,
THERE is in theſe Elections another remarkable paſſage, but
ſuch a one as, being ſo far from political that it is ſupernatural, dos
not properly appertain to this diſcourſe, and ſo I ſhall but point at
it.
When the Elders, thus choſen, were ſet round about the Taberna-
Numb. II. 24; cle, the Lord came down in a cloud, and took of the ſpirit of Moses,
and gave it unto the ſeventy Elders; and it came to paſs, that when the
Spirit reſted upon them, they prophefyd and did not ceafé
. So JOSHUA
Deut. 34. 9 was full of the Spirit of Wiſdom, for Moses had laid his hands upon
1 Tim. 1.6. him. And Paul minds TIMOTHY, Stir up the gift of God which
is in thee by the laying on of my hands. But the Talmudiſts themſelves
do not pretend that their Ordination was further accompany'd with
ſupernatural indowments than the firſt Inſtitution, and if Divines
were as ingenuous, no leſs might be acknowlegd of theirs. Moses
was a Prophet, the like to whom has not bin in Iſrael; and has there
bin an Apoſtle like Paul in the Chriſtian Church? Every body can-
not do Miracles
, we ſee they can't. Take heed how you deny Senſe,
for then bread may be fleſh. If we be not to make choice of a poli-
tical Inſtitution without a miraculous teſt or recommendation; either
Ordination was at firſt accompany'd with ſupernatural Gifts, and from
thenceforth, as I conceive, neither. Divines methinks as ſuch ſhould
not be ſo much concern'd in the Ordination of the Sanhedrim, or of
OSHUA, who were Magiſtrats, as the People or the Magiſtrat: yer
if theſe ſhould hence infer that their Election, Ordination, or Deſigna-
tion of perſons confer'd ſupernatural Gifts, Divines would hardly
allow of it; and why are the People, or the Magiſtrat obligʻd to
allow
1
25.
1
of Popular Government.
347
wao
Chap. 3.
Ver. 1o.
allow more to that of a Clergy? To return.
SUCH as I have ſhewn was the Ordination of the Senat, or great
Sanhedrim, that of the leſſer Sanhedrim, or inferior Courts, was of
like nature, for it follows; I took the chief of your Tribes, wviſe men and Deut. 1.15.
known (KATESH.00) and made them Heads over you, Captains of thou-
Sands, and Captains of hundreds, &c. which were other Magiſtrats
than, according to our cuſtom, we ſhould readily expect to be intima-
ted by ſuch words, for they were the Judges of the inferior Courts,
thoſe that ſat in the gates of each City, and others that appertain'd tó
the Villages, as in the next Verſe: And I charg'd your Judges at that
time, ſaying, Hear the Cauſes, and judg righteouſly.
THE next Magiſtrat whoſe Election coms to be conſider'd is the
Dictator, or Judg of Iſrael. Where it is ſaid of this people, that
the Lord rais’d them up Judges, which deliver'd them out of the hands of Judg. 2. 15.
thoſe that ſpoild them, it is to be underſtood, ſays Sigonius, that God De Rep. Heb.
put it into the mind of the People to elect ſuch Magiſtrats, or Captains
over them. For example, when the Children of Ammon made war
againſt Iſrael, God rais'd up JEPHTHA, whoſe Election was after
this manner : The Elders went to fetch JEPHTHA out of the Land of Judges 11,
Tob, and when they had brought him to Mizpeh (which in thoſe days
was the place, where euunuoice oes, the Congregation of Iſrael uſually
People, as that of the Judg, is paft all controverſy, ſeeing the Law
ſpeaking of the People ſays thus : One from among thy Brethren (halt Deut. 17.15
thou ſet King over thee; and accordingly when the Government was
chang'd te Monarchy, it was not SAMUEL, but the People that
would have it ſo; thus SAUL was choſen King by the Lot. Where the
contradiction of Grotius is remarkable, who in this place to ſhew
that the Lot is of Popular Inſtitution, quotes ARISTOTLE; and yet Ariſt. Pol.
when he coms to ſpeak of the Lots that were caſt at the Election of
MATTHIAS, ſays it was that it might appear not whom the Multitude, De Imp. S. P:
but whom God' had ordaind; as if the Magiſtrat lawfully elected by C. 10.
the People, were not elected by God, or that the Lot which thus falls
into the lap were not at the diſpoſing of the Lord. But if the League by
which the People receiv'd David into the Throne, or the Votes
by which firſt the People of Jeruſalem, and afterwards the Congre-
gation of Iſrael (as was Thewn in the former Book) made SOLOMON
King, were of the Lord; then Election by the People was of the
Lord, and the Magiſtrat that was elected by the Chirotonia of the
People, was elected by the Chirotonia of God: for as the Congrega-
tion of Iſrael is call'd in Scripture (eux Anoix oc8) the Eccleſia or Con- Judges 20;
gregation of God; ſo the Chirotonia of this Congregation is calld by
JOSEPHUS (es xergotovía) the Chirotonia of God, who as I nored Jof. 1. 4.
before out of CAPELLUś, was in this Commonwealth Political
King, or Civil Legiſlator (Sans comparaiſon) as Solon in Athens,
and Romulus in Rome; that is to propoſe to the People (Hec et
lex quam Moses propoſuit) and whatever was propos’d by God, or
the lawful Magiftrat under him, and chirotoniz?d or voted by the
People, was Law in Iſrael, and no other. Nay, and the People had not
only power to reject any Law tlmt was thus propos’d, but to repcal
any Law that was thus enacted: for if God intending Popular Go-
vernment ſhould have ordain’d it otherwiſe, he muſt have contradicted
Yy 2
himſelf;
B. 5. c. 2.
:.
348
The Prerogative
a. s.
Book II. himſelf; wherfore he plainly acknowleges to them this
power, where
Vy (orov é qoxagotovão Tus Euolus) they rejected him (whom they had for-
Jofephus, 1. 6.
jos
merly chirotoniz'd or choſen King) that he ſhould not reign over them;
and elected Saul. This if God had withſtood by his Power, he
muſt have introduc'd that kind of Monarchy which he had declar'd
againſt; wherfore he choſe rather to abandon this fottiſh and ingrate-
ful People to the moſt inextricable yoke of deſerv'd ſlavery, telling
them, when he had warn’d them and they would not hear him, that
they ſhould cry to him and he would not hear them, one tittle of whoſe
words paſs'd not unfulfild.
BY 'this time I have ſhewn that all the Civil Magiſtrats in Iſrael
were choſen by the Chirotonia of the People, or, to follow Josephus,
by the Chirotonia of God, which is all one; for the Chirotonia of the
Preſident of the Congregation, as I have inſtanc'd in that of the
Proedri, of the Theſmothete, of the Conſuls
, of the Tribuns, and the
Chirotonit of the Congregation is the ſame thing; and of the Con-
gregation of Iſrael God, except only at the voting of a King, was
Prelident.
TO com then from the Civil Magiſtrats to the Prieſts and Levits,
theſe were choſen in two ways, either by the Lot, or by the Chiro-
tonia.
THE office and dignity of the High Prieſt being the greateſt in
Iſrael, and by the inſtitution to be hereditary, caus’d great diſputes in
the Election: to this Moses by the command of God had deſign'd
AARON his Brother; which Deſignation, the Command of God be-
ing at firſt either not ſo obvious as that relation, or the ambition of
others ſo blind that they could not or would not ſee it, caus'd great
combuſtion. Firſt, thro the conſpiracy of KORAH, DATHAN,
and ABIRAM; and next by the murmuring of the Princes of the
Tribes, all emulous of this Honor. KORAH being not only a great
man, but of the Tribe of Levi, could not fee why he was not as
Jolephus 1. 4. worthy of the Prieſthood, conſideration had of his Tribe, as AARON;
and if any other Tribe might pretend to it, DATHAN and ABI-
RAM being deſcended from REUBEN were not only of the elder
Houſe, but troubl'd to ſee a younger prefer'd before them. Wher-
fore theſe having gain’d to their party three hundred of the moſt
powerful men of the Congregation, accus'd MOSES of affecting Ty
ranny, and doing thoſe things which threaten'd the Liberty of the
Commonwealth ; as under pretence of Divination to blind the eys of
the People, preferring his Brother to the Prieſthood without the Suf-
frage of the Congregation: of which charge Moses acquitting him-
ſelf in the Congregation, tells the People that A ARON was choſen
both by God, and (x@Ta Thv ÚMETERæv yvápens autê TUyXávar) by their
Suffrages, which (KORAH being upon this occaſion miraculouſly
deſtroy'd) were therupon once more given by the People. Never-
theleſs the Princes of the Tribes continuing ſtill diſcontented, and full
of murmur, God decided the Controverſy by a ſecond miracle, the
budding of AARON’s Rod: (and for ó piev Teis &utov TË OES gaigotovi-
OCTOS GEEæÍCS ÉIXE TẢv ti priv) being thrice confirm'd by the Chirotonia of
God, he was confirm'd in that honor. Now that the Chirotonia of
God in this place of Josephus ſignifys the Chirotonia of the
Chron.: Sözzi People, is plain by that in Scripture, where they made Solo-
MON King, and ZADOCK to be Prieſt. After the Captivity, as
Numb. 16.
*
in
of Popular Government.
349
26. 13.
is her things, ſo in this power the Sanhedrim came, as I conceive, Chap. 3.
210cmci the People : Joshua the Son of Josedech being a
11:17 ciccted High Prieſt by the Sanhedrim, and this Honor thenceforth Grot, ad
(as appears by MAIMONIDES) being at the diſpoſing of this Court. Hag. 1. 1.
Nor could any inferior Prieſt ferve at the Altar, except he had ac-
Jofeph.de Bel
Jud. l. 4.
quir’d that right by the Lot, as is not only deliver'd by the ſame Au. Maimon
thor, and by JOSEPHUS, but in Scripture. Now the Lot, as was Hal. Cele
ſhewn, giving no Prerogative either to any perſon or party, is as popular cap. 4,& 5.
an Inſtitution as the Chirotonia. So in election of Prieſts, the Orders 2 Chron. 24.
of Iſrael differ'd not from human Prudence, nor thoſe of other Com- 5. & 25. 8. &
monwealths, the Prieſt of Jupiter having bin elected after the
fame manner in the Commonwealth of Syracufa; the Auguſt ales, and
the Veſtals in that of Rome : and if the right of bearing holy Ma-
giſtracy, being in Iſrael confin’d to one Tribe or Order, may ſeem to
make
any
difference, it was for fom time no otherwiſe in Athens, nor in
Rome, where the Patricians or Nobility aſſum'd theſe Offices, or the
greateſt of them to themſelves, till the People in thoſe Citys diſputed
that Cuſtom, as introduc'd without their conſent, which the People
of Iſrael could not fairly do, becauſe it was introduc'd by their con-
ſent.
TO com to the Levits in their original Ordination, God com-
manded Moses ſaying, Thou ſhalt bring the Levits before the Taber- Numb. 8.9,10,
nacle of the Congregation, and thou ſhalt gather the whole aſſembly of the
Children of Iſrael, and they ſhall put their hands upon the Levits. This
in the ſound of the words may ſeem to imply the Chirotheſia, or Im-
poſition of Hands, but take heed of that; Divines will not allow the
Chirotheſia to be an Act of the People: but in this proceding the whole
people acted in the Ordination of the Levits, wherfore the Levits
alſo were ordain'd by the Chirotonia, Conſent, Vote, or Suffrage of
the whole People imply'd in this action. But for the Ordination of
Prieſts and Levits, whatever it was, it is not to the preſent purpoſe;
Divines deriving not theirs from Prieſts and Levits, but from Dukes,
Generals and Magiſtrats, from that of JOSHUA and of the Sanhe-
drim, always provided, that this were of the fame nature with the
former, that is, by the Chirothefia, or Impoſition of Hands, and not
by the Chirotonia of the People. However the Ordination of the
Magiſtracy was certainly Political ; and ſo in this deduction they them- Exod. 29.
ſelves confeſs that their Ordination alſo is a Political Conſtitution : yet
wheras Moses is commanded by God to bring AARON and his Numb. 8.
Sons to the door of the Tabernacle of the Congregation, and having
waſh'd them there, to adorn them with the Prieſtly Robes, with the
Miter, and to anoint them; wheras he is commanded (the Children
of Iſrael having firſt laid their Hands upon the Levits) to cleanſe them,
and offer them for an Offering ; Divines of the Hierarchy and the
Presbytery (tho it be otherwiſe with WALLÆ us and ſuch as ac-
knowlege Popular Government) give the Congregation, or Conſent
of the People for nothing, and put
the whole Ordination of the Prieſts
and Levits upon the waſhing and cleanſing, or other Ceremonys of
Conſecration : as if to put the Ordination of Saul upon the Ćere-
mony of anointing by SAMUEL, tho perform’d by the immediat
Command of God, were not abſolutely contradi&ory to Scripture,
and to the known Law of Iſrael, which ſpeaking of the People, ex-
preſly ſays, One from among thy Brethren ſhalt thou ſet King over thee
upon
THE
+
.
350
The Prerogative
Philo de inſt.
Book II. upon which place ſays PhilO, Moſt wiſe Moses never intended that
the Royal Dignity ſhould be acquir’d by lot, but choſe rather that the Kings
principiis. should be ele&ted by the Chirotonia, or Suffrage of the whole People. The
Congregations of the People aſſembld upon this as upon other public affairs,
and requir'd a ſign or confirmation from God: foraſmuch as by his will Man
is to the reſt of Nature, what the Face is to the Body. Whierto agrees
that of the Heathens, Os homini ſublime dedit, Cælumque tneri juffit, and
their Divinations upon the like occaſions by Intrals, none of which
were ever underſtood as deſtructive of the liberty of the People, or of
the freedom of their Chirotonia.
WHERE SOLOMON is made King, and ZADOCK Prieſt by
the People, tho the Ceremony of anointing was doubtleſs perform'd,
and perhaps by the Prophet NATHAN, it is wholly omitted in the
place as not worth the ſpeaking of. The opinion that the Ordination
of the Prieſts and Levits lay in the Ceremonys of their Conſecration,
is every whit as ſober and agreable to reaſon, as if a man ſhould
hold the Kings of England to have bin made by the Unction of the
Biſhops. Iſrael from the inſtitution of Moses to the Monarchy,
was a Democracy, or Popular Government; in Popular Government
the Conſent of the People is the Power of the People, and both the
Prieſts and Levits were ordain’d by the Conſent of the People of
Ifrael.
TO bring theſe things to the Citys in the perambulation of the
Apoſtles, which by the former Chapter I have prov'd to have bin
Ditm. c. 10. Popular Governments; it is acknowleg’d by Grotius to the Citys
of Aſia, not only that they us’d the Chirotonia, but in the ſtricteſt
ſenſe of the word, that is, to give their Suffrage by the holding up
of Hands. And that they had the liberty of their Religion, the choice
of their Magiſtrats, both Civil and Eccleſiaſtical in their Ecclefi.e, or
Congregations, has bin alſo undeniably evidenc’d; whence it muſt
needs follow that there were Citys in Affa (χειροτονήσαντος αυτούς πρεσβυ-
régrs xQT'EuuNyoiwv) chirotonizing or ordaining them Elders
, that is, Ma-
giſtrats and Prieſts in every Congregation (with Reverence be it
ſpoken) long before CHRIST was in the fleſh, or the Apoſtles any
of them were born. Wherfore to ſum up what in this Chapter I
conceive to be ſufficiently prov'd, I may boldly conclude, That the
Chirotonia derives from popular Conſtitution, and that there was a way of
Ordination by the Chirotonia.
1
t
1
CHAP. IV.
The deduction of the Chirotheſia from Monarchical or Ariſtocratical
Government, and of the ſecond way of Ordination from the Chi-
rotheſia. In which is contain’d the Commonwealth of the Jews
as it ſtood after the Captivity.
W
HAT pleaſes the Prince, ſays JUSTINIAN, has the force of
a Law, ſeeing the People in his Creation have devolv’d their whole
Power upon his Perſon; which is with the moſt. But when Popular
Government is chang'd into Monarchical, either the whole Power of
the People, or a great part of it muſt of neceſſity accrue to the King.
Hence
*
of Popular Government.
351
4
S. voi
Hence ſays Samuel, he will appoint him Captains over Thouſands, Chap. 4:
and Captains over Fiftys : in which words perhaps is intimated the
Judges of the inferior Courts, or Jethronian Prefectures; ſo that hereby 1 Sam. 8: 121
SAMUEL tells the People they ſhall no more have the Election of
their Rulers, but the King will have it ; who, it may be, chang'd
the nature of ſom of theſe Magiſtracys, or added others: for when
DAVID. came to reign over all Ifrael, JOAB was over the Hoſt (his 2 Sam. 8. Isi
Strategus or General) JEHOSHA PHAT was Recorder, ZADOc and
ABIMELEC were the Prieſts, SERAIAH was the Scribe, and BE-
NAIAH was over the Pelethits, and the Cherethits; that is, was Cap-
tain of his Regiments of Guard, call'd perhaps by theſe names, as
thoſe of ROMULUS were call'd Celeres. But it ſhould ſeem that
few or none of theſe Officers were elected by the Chirotonia, that is
by the People, but by the Prince, which kind of Election, as will be
ſhewn anon, may be calld Chirotheſis. For the deduction of this
kind of Ordination, or Election, we ſliall do well to hearken firſt to
Dr. HAMMOND; who in his Query, or Diſcourſe concerning Ordi
nation by the Impoſition of Hands, puts it thus. To lift up the Hands
was a Ceremony in Prayer, and accordingly to lay hands on any (differing Exod. 17. it
no otherwiſe from lifting up, than by the determining that Action to a pecu-
liar Object, the Perſon that was pray'd for) was generally among the Jews
a Ceremony of benediction us’d firſt by the Father to the Children, in be-
ſtoring the Bleſſing upon them and with that the ſucceſſion to fom part of
his Eſate or Inheritance) as appears in La cob's bleſſing the Children of
Joseph: he ſtretch'd out his right hand, and laid it upon Ephr A-Gen. 48. 14.
im's head, and his left hand on MANASSES, and ſo lie bleſs’d, &c.
From thence it was accommodated among them to the communicating of any
part of Power to others as aſſiſtants, or to the deriving of any Jucceſſive
Office from one to another. Thus when Moses had from Heaven re-
ceiv’d, and long as’d his Commiſſion to be under God the Ruler of the
People
, the ſeventy Elders were by God's appointment affum'd to alift him : Numb. It: 191
it being certain from the Jewiſh
Writings, tho the ſacred Scripture has no
occaſion to mention it, that the ſucceſſion of the ſeventy Elders under the
name of Sanhedrim or Council was continu'd thro all Ages by their
creating others in the place of thoſe that dy?d, by this Ceremony of Impoſition
of Hands. To this purpoſe are the clear words of MAIMONIDES: Tit. Sanhed,
Moses our Maſter created the ſeventy Elders by Impoſition of hands, c. 4.
and the Divine Majeſty reſted on them; and thoſe Elders impos’d
Hands on others, and others on others, &c. So a little before the depar-
ture of Moses out of this life, when a Succeſſor was to be provided for
bim, God commands him to take JosHUA, and lay his hands upon Numb. 27. 18,
him. And Moses laid his hands upon him, and gave him a Charge
as the Lord commanded by the hand of Moses: that is, deriv’d to
him by this Ceremony the Authority which himſelf had, and conſtituted
him his Succeſſor in that Government. And ſo it is repeated, JOSHU A Deut. 34. 9.
was full of the ſpirit of Wiſdom, for Moses had laid his Hands
THIS is the Doctor's deduction of the Chirotheſia, or Ordination
by the laying on of Hands, from the Commonwealth of Iſrael: and,
ſays he, from the three Uſes of this Ceremony there, that is, firſt in praying
for another ; ſecondly, in paternal benediction; thirdly
, in creating Suc-
ceſſors in power, either in whole, or in part, derive i hree forts of things
in the New Teſtament, to which this Ceremony of laying on of Hands is
+
23
upon him.
.
Accon.
HILL
352
The Prerogative
Acts 6. 6.
!
Deut. I.
Book II. accommodated. That of Prayer ſimply taken was of two forts, either for
the cure of Diſeaſes, or pardoning of Sins. For Diſeaſes : They ſhall
Mar. 16.18. lay hands on the ſick, and they Thall recover. For Sins they were doin
away alſo by this Ceremony in the abſolution of Penitents, to which belongs
1 Tim. 5. 22. that Exhortation of Paul to TIMOTHY, Lay hands ſuddenly on no
man, that is, not without due examination and proof of his Penitence,
left thou be partaker of other mens Sins. From the ſecond, that of Pa-
Nar. 16. 16. ternal Benediftion, was borrow'd, firſt that of bleſſing Infants with the Ce-
remony of Impoſition of Hands, as it differ’d from Baptiſm. And ſe-
condly, that of confirming thoſe of fuller age, that had bin formerly bap-
tiz'd. Laſtly, to the creating Succeſſors in any Power, or communicating any
part of Power to others, as to Aſſiſtants, is anſwerable that Impoſition of
Hands in Ordination fo often mention'd in the New Teſtament, ſomtimes in
the lower degree, as in the ordaining of Deacons, elſwhere in the higheſt
degree, ſetting Governors over particular Churches, as generally when by
that laying on of Hands it is ſaid, they receiv'd the Holy Ghoſt';
wher as the Holy Ghoſt contains all the regionato requir’d to the
paſtoral
Luke 24. 49. Function, and ſo fignifys Power from on high: the Authority and Function
it ſelf, ſo it be given by Impoſition of Hands, makes the parallel exact be-
tween this of Chriſtian Ordination, and that obſerv’d in the creating Suc-
ceſſors in the Jewiſh Sanhedrim. So far the Doctor.
NOW ſay I, if the Scripture be ſilent as to the Ordination of the
Elders in Iſrael, what means that place; Take ye wiſe men, and under-
ſtanding, and known among your Tribes, and I will make them Rulers over
you? Once in their lives let them give us the ſenſe of it, or of that
Numb. 11. other, where ELDAD and MEDAD are of thoſe that were written, and
yet went not up to the Tabernacle : Otherwiſe that we hear no more of
theſe, is from the ſilence of Divines, and not of the Scripture. But
if the Scripture be not ſilent in this point, is there not a great deal of
fancy in going on to cure the Sick, tó pardon Sins, to bleſs Infants,
confirm the Baptiz’d, ordain Miniſters, nay, give the Holy Ghoſt, and all
the Graces belonging to the paſtoral Function, from a place that lias no ſuch
thing in it? for if the Sanhedrim according to Scripture were not or-
daind by the Chirotheſia, there is no ſuch thing to be deriv'd by the Chic
rotheſia from the Sanhedrim. The firſt Chirotonia indeed of the Sanlie-
drim was accompany'd with miraculous indowments; wherfore if they
will derive thefe Gifts and Graces from the Sanhedrim, why are
they ſworn Enemies to the Chirotonia ? Again, the Sanhedrim was a
Civil Court or Senat; wherfore then by this Title ſhould not theſe
Gifts and Graces be rather pretended to by the Civil Magiſtrat, than
by Divines? what becoms of the Prieſt A ARON and his Lots? is he
left to the Civil Magiſtrat, while Divines derive themſelves from Ge-
neral Joshua and his Chirotheſia? But if the Sanhedrim and infe-
rior Judicatorys were otherwiſe ordain’d originally; then no Magi-
ftrat in Iſrael was originally ordain’d by the Chirotheſia, but only
JOSHUA. It is admirable that Divines ſhould look upon God, as if
in the inſtitution of a Commonwealth he had no regard at all to human
Prudence, but was altogether fix'd upon their vain advantages. Who
made human Prudence? or to what end was it made ? Any man that
underſtands the Politics, and conſiders that God was now proceding
according to this Art (as in his conſtitution of the Senat, and of the
People or Congregation, is moſt obvious) muſt needs ' ſee that this
Power he indulg'd to Moses of making his own choice of one
2
*
man,
H
+
of Popular Government.
353
man, could not poſſibly be intended as a permanent Conſtitution ; Chap.
for wheras he intended Popular Government, nothing is plainer than
that a People not electing their own Magiſtrats can have no Popular
Government. How abſurd is it to conceive that God having already
mad), an expreſs Law, that the People if at any time they came under
Monarchy, ſhould yet have the election of their King, would now
make a Law that the People being under a Commonwealth, ſhould no
longer have the election of their Magiſtrats ? For who fees not that to
introduce the Chirotheſia as a ſtanding Ordinance, had bin to bar the
People of this power? Iſrael at this time, tho deſign’d for a Common-
wealth, had no Land, no foundation to balance her ſelf upon, bur
was an Army in a Wilderneſs, incompaſs’d about with Enemys.
To permit to the People in this caſe, the choice of all their Civil Mía-
giſtrats was nevertheleſs ſafe enough, nay beſt of all: for at the
election of wiſe men, and underſtanding, and known among their Tribes,
ſo far as was needful to civil adminiſtration, their skill muſt needs
have bin at any time ſufficient; but the Commonwealth was yet in
abſolute neceſſity of a Prorector, and of Dictatorian Power. Now
to know who was fitteſt in this caſe to fuccede Moses, requir'd the
Wiſdom of God, or of Moses; and therfore was not yet ſafe to be
ventur'd upon a People ſo new in their Government. For theſe rea-
ſons, I ſay, Moses us’d the Chirotheſia for once, and no more; or let
them ſhew me among all the Dictators, Judges, or Kings, that ſuc-
ceded JOSHUA, any one that was choſen by the Chirotheſia, and be
all Dictator's. It is now above three thouſand years ſince the inſtitu-
tion of the Sanhedrim, from which time the ambitious Elders firſt,
then the Talmudiſts, and of latter ages Divines have bin perpetually
ſtriving for, or poſſeſſing themſelves of this fame Oligarchical Invention
of the Chirotheſia pretended to be deriv'd from MOSES; tho there be
neither any ſuch Precept of God or Chriſt in the Old or New Teſta-
ment, nor any unanimous reſult upon the point, either by the Talmu-
diſts or Divines themſelves. And for the clear words quoted by the
Doctor out of MAIMONID ES, they are ſuch to which I ſhall in due
time ſhew MAIMONIDES to be elſwhere of a clear contrary opi-
nion. But in this Controverſy, without ſom clearer deduction of the
Chirotheſia, we ſhall make no happy progreſs; in this therfore I ſhall
follow ŚELDEN the ableſt Talmudiſt of our age, or of any.
THE Commonwealth of Lacedemon (if I could ſtand to ſhew it)
has ſtrange reſemblances to that of Iſrael, not only in the Agrarian,
which is nothing to the preſent purpoſe, but in the Senat, which to pre
vent catching another time, I do not ſay was a Judicatory only, but
not only a Senat, but a Judicatory alſo. For Lycurgus of all
other Legiſlators was in this the likeſt to God, or to Moses, that
his work was ſo exquiſitly perfected at once, and his Laws fo com-
prehenſive, that if the Senat had had no other function than to make
or propoſe new Laws, there being little or nothing of that wanting,
they would have had little or nothing to do. Now it being thus, and
much more than thus in Iſrael, the Sanhedrim was not only the Senat,
but the ſupreme Judicatory. And becauſe one Court in a Territory of
any Extent is no where ſufficient to this end; therfore the Sanhedrim
had divers branches diſtended not only to the Citys of Judea, but even
to the Villages; theſe were call?d the Leſſer Sanhedrim, or the Jethro-
nian Prefectures.
THE
110
F HI,.
E
Em
Z zi
IN
賽
​.
354
The Prerogative
Book II. THE Great Sanhedrim conſiſting, as has bin ſhewn, of 70 El.
ders, fat firſt in the Tabernacle, and afterwards in the Court of the
Sclden de Syn.
Temple.
THE Jethronian Prefectures conſiſted ſom of three and twenty
Elders, and others but of three. Of the former kind there were two
in the gates of the Temple, and one fitting in the gates of every
City; of the latter there was one almoſt in every Village.
THE power of the Fethronian Court, conſiſting of twenty three
Elders, was in matter of Judicature equal with that of the great San-
Vid. Grot. ad hedrim, only in caſes of difficulty they obſerv'd this Precept. If
Deut. 17. 8. there ariſe a matter too hard for thee in judgment between Blood and Blood,
between Plea and Plea, between Stroke and Stroke, being matter of Come
troverſy within thy gates ; then ſhalt thou ariſe, and
8 get thee up into the
place which the Lord thy God ſhall chuſe (in the future, for the Common-
wealth was yet but deſign'd, not planted) and thou ſhalt com to the
Prieſts and the Levits, and to the Judg that ſhall be in thoſe days, and in-
quire, and they ſhall ſbew thee the ſentence of Judgment : That is, thou
Thalt conſult the Sanhedrim, or if there be no Sanhedrim, the Suffes
or Judg of Iſrael. The reaſon why the Sanhedrim in this Texť is
mention'd under the name of the Prieſts and Levits is, that theſe about
the beginning of this Commonwealth having (as were alſo the Egyp-
tian Prieſts at the ſame time) bin the learnedſt Men, whether for
Lawyers, or Phyſicians, there were ſcarce any other choſen into the
Sanhedrim, tho towards the latter end it happend to be far otherwiſe.
For wheras ſacrificing was feaſting, the Prieſts injoying a fat Idleneſs,
became in latter times ſo heavy, that as to the Election of the Sanlie-
drim not only the Levits of inferior rank were upon the matter wholly
laid by, but the High-Prieſt himſelf ſomtimes omitted, the reſt of the
Tribes far excelling this in Learning.
THE power of the Triumvirats, or three Judges in the Villages,
extended no farther than to inflict ſtripes to a certain number, and
cuniary mulets to a certain ſum. Theſe poſſibly had the ſame recourſe
upon occaſion of difficulty to the Judges in the Gates, as the Judges in
the Gates had to the Sanhedrim : but their power is not ſo much to
the preſent purpoſe, which regards only their manner of Election.
This having bin inſtitutively exercis’d, as has bin ſhewn by the Chiroto-
nia, or Ballot of the People, came ſooner or later (I find no man that
can reſolve
upon the certain time) to the Chirotheſia. For tho when
a Judg in the Gates was dead, that Court elected his Succeſſor out of
their Diſciples (each Court in the Gates had 99 Diſciples that were
their conſtant Auditors) or out of the Triumvirats; and when an
Elder of the Sanhedrim dy'd, the Sanhedrim elected his Succeſſor out
of the Courts in the Gates, more particularly thoſe in the Gates of the
Temple by Suffrages; yet no man was capable of being elected into
any of theſe Courts that was not a Presbyter, nor was any man a
Mikorzi Miſna Presbyter that had not receiv'd the Chirotheſia: nor could any man con-
fer the Chirotheſia that had not firſt receiv?d'it, or bin ſo ordaind a Pref-
byter himſelf: 'nor tho he were ſo ordain'd, could he confer the like Or-
dination, but in the preſence of two others, whether ordain'd or not
ordain'd: and no Ordination could be confer'd but either this
Abr. Zacuth. by ſom one of the Ludicatorys. The manner how this Ordination was
Maimonides. confer'd, if the party were preſent, was either by laying on of Hands,
or by ſaying a Verſe or Charm; or if he were abſent, by a Letter, or
Paterit.
AN
pea
4
w
Gemara,
way, or
1
..
of Popular Government.
355
AN Elder thus ordain'd was call?d Rabbi, might have Diſciples, Chap. 4.
teach, practiſe, or expound the Law, declare what was therby free
or forbidden ( which with them was call'd binding and looſing) ordain Rab: Nathan.
Rab. Jonah.
others with the aſſiſtance mention’d, or be capable of Election into
ſom one, or any Court of Juſtice, according to the nature of his Or-
dination, the Conditions mention'd at the conferring of the ſame, or the
gift that was in him by the laying on of the hands of the Presbytery; which
in ſom extended no farther than to ſhew how Meat ſhould be kill'd and
dreſs’d, how Uncleanneſs ſhould be purify'd, what were Vices of the
body, what might be eaten or drunk, and what not ; in others it ex-
tended to fom one or more, or all the Facultys exprefs'd: but I am
inclining to believe that a plenary Ordination us’d not to be conferd but
by the Great Sanhedrim, or at leaſt ſom one of the Fethronian Courts.
THEY us'd alſo to confer this Ordination ſom time occaſionally,
and for a ſeaſon in this manner. Receive the gift of judiciary Ordina. Maimon. Tit. .
tion, or the right of binding and looſing, till ſuch time as you return to izs Sin. cap. 4.
in the City. Where the Chriſtian Jews ſtill following their former
Cuſtoms in higher matters, as the obſervation of the Sabbath, and of
Circumciſion, even to ſuch a degree, that Paul not to diſpleaſe them
took TIMOTHY and circumcis'd him, ſeem to me to have follow'd
this cuſtom, who when the Prophets at Antioch had inform’d them
that Paul and BARNABAS were to be ſeparated to an extraordi-
nary work, laid their hands upon them, and ſent them away; for otherwiſe Acts 13. 3:
as to Ordination Paul and BARNABAS had that before; at leaſt
Paul by ANANIAS, and for any ſuch Precept in the Chriſtian Re-Acts 9. 17.
ligion there was none.
JOSEPHVS, PHILO, and other Authors that tell us the Com-
monwealth of Iſrael was an Ariſtocracy, look no farther than the in-
troduction of the Chirotheſia by the Presbyterian Party, which muſt
have taken date ſom time after the Captivity, or the reſtitution of the
Commonwealth by Ezra, there being not one ſyllable for it in
Scripture, but enougl to the contrary, ſeeing God introduc'd the Chi-
rotonia. By which it is demonſtrable that a Presbyterian Party may
bring a Popular Government to Oligarchy, and deface even the work
of God himſelf, ſo that it ſhall not be known to after ages; as alſo
that Eccleſiaſtical Writers (for ſuch are the Talmudiſts) may pretend
that for many hundred years together, as Divines alſo have don, to be
in Scripture, which neither is, nor ever was there. But have I yet
ſaid enough to ſhew that Ordination, eſpecially as in this Example,
not of a Clergy, but of a Magiſtracy, whether by the Chirotonia, or
Chirothefia, is a Political Inſtitution? or muſt I rack my brains for Ar-
guments to prove that an Order or a Law having ſuch influence
upon
the Commonwealth, that being introduc'd or repeald, it quite alters
the whole frame of the Government, muſt needs be of a political nature,
and therfore not appertain to Divines, or to a Clergy, but to the Ma-
giſtrat, unleſs their Traditions may be of force to alter the Govern-
ment as they pleaſe? All is one, they can abate nothing of it, let what
will com of the Government, the Chirotheſia they muſt and will have.
Then let them have Monarchy too, or Tyranny; for one of theſe,
according as the balance happens to ſtand with or againſt their Chiro-
theſia, is the certain conſequence ; either Tyranny as in Iſrael, or Mo.
narchy as in the Papacy, and, from that or the like Principle, in all
Gothic
Z z 2
356
The Prerogative
San, cap. 4.
Book II. Gothic Empires : which Examples, to begin with Iſrael, well deſerve
w the pains to be ſomwhat more diligently unfolded.
ALL Elections in Iſrael, fave thoſe of the Prieſts who were eligible
by the Lot, being thus uſurp'd by the Presbyterian Party, and the Peo-
ple by that means deveſted of their Chirotonia; ſom three hundred
years before CHRIST, HILLEL Senior High Prieſt, and Archon,
or Prince of the Sanhedrim, found means to draw this Power of Ordi-
nation, in ſhew fomwhat otherwiſe, but in effect to himſelf, and his
Maimon. Tit. Chirotheſia: for by his influence upon the Sanhedrim it was brought
to paſs, that wheras formerly any man ordain'd might, in the manner
Shewn, have ordaind his Diſciples; it was now agreed that no man
ſhould be ordain’d without the Licenſe of the Prince, and that this
Power ſhould not be in the Prince, but in the preſence of the Father
of the Sanhedrim, or Speaker of the Houſe. Thus the Ariſtocracy
of Iſrael becoming firſt Oligarchical, took (according to the nature of
all ſuch Governments) long ſteps towards Monarchy, which ſucced-
ing in the Afmonean Family, commonly calld the Maccabees, was for
their great merit, in vindicating the Jews from the Tyranny of An-
TIOCHUS, confirm’d to them by the univerſal conſent and Chirotonia
of the People. Nevertheleſs to him that underſtands the Orders of a
Commonwealth, or has read the Athenian, Lacedemonian, or Roman
Story, it will be plain enough that but for their Ariſtocracy they
needed not to have bin ſo much beholden to, or to have ſtood ſo much
in need of one Family. It is true, both the merit of theſe Princes,
and the manner of their free Election by the People, ſeem to forbid
the name of Tyranny to this Inſtitution : but ſo it is, that let there
be never ſo much Merit in the Man, or Inclination of the People to
the Prince, or the Government that is not founded upon the due ba-
lance, the Prince in that caſe mult either govern in the nature of a
Commonwealth, as did thoſe of this Family, reforming the policy
after the Lacedemonian Model; or turn Tysant, as from their time, ,
who liv'd in the Age of the Grecian Monarchy, did all their Succeſſors,
till under the Romans this Nation became a Province: From which
time ſuch Indeavors and Inſurrections they us’d for the recovery
of
their antient Policy, that under the Emperor ADRIAN (who per-
ceiv'd at what their Ordination, being not of Prieſts, but of Magi-
ſtrats, and of a Senat pretending to Soverain Judicature and Authority,
ſeem'd to aim) there came, ſays the Talmud, againſt the Iſraelites an
Edict out of the Kingdom of the Wicked (meaning the Roman Empire)
wherby whoſoever ſhould ordain, or be ordain'd, was to be put to death, and
the School or City in which ſuch an AEt ſhould be don, to be deſtroy’d: wher-
upon Rabbi JEHUDA BEN BABA (left Ordination ſhould fail in IL-
rael) went forth, and ſtanding between two great Mountains, and two
great Citys, and between two Sabbathdays journys from Oſa and Sephara,
ordain'd five Presbyters. For this Feat the Rabbi is remember'd by the
Talmudiſts under the name of Ordinator ; but the ſame, as it follows,
being diſcover'd by the Roman Guards, they ſhot his Body thro with
ſo many Darts, as made it like a Sive: Yet ſtaid not the buſineſs here,
but ſo obſtinat continu'd the Jews in the Superſtition to which this
kind of Ordination was now grown, that whieras by the ſame it was
unlawful for them to ordain in a foren Land, and at home they could
not be brought to abſtain, the Emperor banilh'd them all out of their
own
*
of Popular Government.
357
own Country ; whence happen’d their total Diſperſion. That of a Chap. 4.
thing whichi at the firſt was a mere deluſion, ſuch Religion ſhould
com in time, and with education to be made that not only they who
liad receiv’d'advantage could ſuffer Martyrdom, but they that had loſt
by it, would be utterly loſt for it, were admirable in the caſe of this
People, if it were not common in the caſe of moſt in the World at this
day : Cuſtom may bring that to be receiv'd as an Ordinance of God, for
which there is no color in Scripture. For to conſult MAIMONIDES
a little better upon this point: Wheras, ſays he, they grant, in caſe it Halac. San.
Should happen that in all the Holy Land there remaind but one Presbyter, C. 4. S. 117
that Presbyter, aſſiſted by two other Ifraelites, might ordain the ſeventy, or
great Sanhedrim, and the Sanhedrim ſo conſtituted might conſtitute and
ordain the leſſer Courts, I am of opinion that were there no Presbyter in the
Land, yet if all the Wiſe Men of Iſrael ſhould agree to conſtitute or ordain
Judges, they might do it lawfully enoug. But if ſo, then how coms it to
paſs that our Anceſtors have bin ſo ſolicitores
, leſt Judicature ſhould fail
in Iſrael ? Surely for no other cauſe than that from the time of the Cap-
tivity the Iſraelites were ſo diſpers’d that they could not upon like occaſions
be brought together. Now I appeal whether the clear Words of MAI-
MONIDES, where he ſays, that our Maſter Moses ordaind the
Sanhedrim by the Chirotheſia, be not more clearly and ſtrongly contra-
dicted in this place, than affirm'd in the other, ſince acknowleging that
if the People could aſſemble, they might ordain the Sanhedrim, he
gives it for granted, that when they did aſſemble, they had power to
ordain it ; and that Moses did aſſemble them upon this occaſion, is
plain in Scripture. Again, if the power of Ordination falls ultimatly
to the People, there is not a ſtronger argument in Nature that it is
thence primarily deriv’d. To conclude, the Chirothefia of the Preſ-
byterian Party in Iſrael is thus confeſs'd by the Author no otherwiſe
neceſſary, than thro the defect of the Chirotonia of the People: which
Ingenuity of the Talmudiſt, for any thing that has yet paſt, might be
worthy the imitation of Divines.
IN tracking the Jews from the reſtitution of their Commonwealtlı
after the Captivity to their diſperſion, it ſeems that the later Monarchy
in Iſrael was occaſion'd by the Oligarchy, the Oligarchy by the Ari-
ſtocracy, and the Ariſtocracy by the Chirotheſia ; but that this Monar-
chy, tho erected by magnanimous and popular Princes, could be no leſs
than Tyranny deriv’d from another Principle, that is, the inſufficiency of
the balance : For tho from the time of the Captivity, the Jubile was
no more in uſe, yet the Virgin MAR Y as an Heireſs
, is affirm'd by ſom
to have bin marri’d to JOSEPH by virtue of this Law : Every
Daughter that poſſeſſes an Inheritance in any Tribe of the Children of Iſrael
, Numb. 27. 8.
ſhall be Wife to one of the Family of the Tribe of her Fathers, &c. By
which the Popular Agrarian may be more than ſuſpected to have
bin of greater vigor than would admit of a well-balanc'd Monarchy.
THE ſecond Presbytery, which is now attain’d to a well balanced
Empire in the Papacy, has infinitly exceļd the pattern, the Lands of
Italy being moſt of them in the Church. This, if I had leiſure,
might be track'd by the very fame ſteps: At firſt it conſiſted of the
ſeventy Pariſh Prieſts, or Presbyters of Rome ; now ſeventy Cardi-
nals creating to themſelves a High Prieſt, or Prince of their Sanhe-
drim, the Pope, but for the Superſtition wherto he has brought Re-
ligion,
1
it!
358
V
I
1
The Prerogative
Book II. ligion, and continues by his Chirotheſia to hold it, a great and a Re-
verend Monarch, eſtabliſhi'd upon a ſolid Foundation, and governing
by an exquiſit Policy, not only well balanc'd at home, but deeply root-
ed in the greateſt Monarchys of Chriſtendom, where the Clergy by
virtue of their Lands are one of the three States.
THE Maxims of Rome are profound ; for there is no making uſe
of Princes without being neceſſary to them, nor have they any regard
to that Religion which dos not regard Empire. All Monarchys of the
Gothic Model, that is to ſay, where the Clergy by virtue of their
Lands are a third eſtate, ſubſiſt by the Pope, whoſe Religion creating
a reverence in the People, and bearing an aw upon the Prince, preſerves
the Clergy, that elſe being unarm’d, becom a certain Prey to the
King or the People ; and where this happens (as in HENRY the
Eightli) down gos the Throne ; for ſo much as the Clergy loſes,
falls out of the Monarchical into the Popular Scale. Where a Clergy
is a third Eſtate, Popular Government wants Earth, and can never
grow : but where they dy at the root, a Prince may fit a while, but is
not ſafe; nor is it in nature (except he has a Nobility or Gentry able
without a Clergy to give balance to the People) that he ſhould ſubliſt
long or peaceably : For wherever a Government is founded on an
Army, as in the Kings of Iſrael or Emperors of Rome, there the fad-
deſt Tragedys under Heaven are either on the Stage, or in the Tiring-
houſe. Theſe things conſider'd, the Chirotheſia being originally no-
thing elſe but a way of Policy excluding the People, where it attains
not to a balance that is ſufficient for this purpoſe, brings forth Oli-
garchy or Tyranny, as among the Jews : And where it attains to a
balance ſufficient to this end, produces Monarchy, as in the Papacy,
and in all Gothic Kingdoms.
THE Prieſts of Ægypt, where (as it is deſcrib'd by Siculus
their Revenue came to the third part of the Realm, would no queſtion
have bin exactly well fitted with the Chirotheſia pretended to by mo-
dern Divines. Suppoſe the Apoſtles had planted the Chriſtian Re-
ligion in thoſe Parts, and the Prieſts had bin all converted, I do not
think that Divines will ſay, that having alter'd their Religion they
needed to have deſerted their being a third Eſtate, their overbalance
to the People, their Lands, their Preeminence in the Government, or
any part of their Policy for that: and I am as far from ſaying ſo as
themſelves.
ON the other ſide, as Paul was a Citizen of Rome, let us ſuppoſe
him to have bin a Citizen of Athens, and about (naf 1506voe) to conſti-
tute the Chriſtian Religion in this Commonwealth, where any Citi-
zen might ſpeak to the People: Imagin then he ſhould have ſaid thus :
Men of Athens, that which you ignorantly ſeek I bring to you, the true
Religion; but to receive this, you muſt not alter your former Belief only,
your antient Cuſtoms. Your Political Aſſemblys have bin hitherto callà
Eccleſiæ; this word muft loſe the antient ſenſe, and be no more underſtood
but of Spiritual Confiftorys; and ſo wher as it has bin of a Popular, it muſt
henceforth be of an Ariſtocratical, or Presbyterian ſignification. For
your Chirotonia, that alſo muſt follow the ſame rule; infomuch as on
whomloever one or more of the Ariſtocracy or Presbytery ſhall lay their hands,
the ſame is underſtood by virtue of that Action to be chirotoniz'd. How
well would this have founded in Ægypt, and how ill in Athens ? Cer-
tainly
but
1
*
of Popular Government.
359
+
tainly the Policy of the Church of Christ admits of more Pru: Chap. 5.
dence and Temperament in theſe things : Tho the Apoſtles being Jews
themſelves, fatisfy'd tlie converted Jews that were us’d to Ariſtocracy,
by retaining ſomwhat of their Conſtitutions, as the Chirotheſia; yet
when Paul and BARNAB A S com to conſtitute in Popular Com-
monwealtlis, they are (χειροτονήσαντες αυτοις πρεσβυτέρας κατ' εκκλησίαν)
Chirotonizing them Elders in every. Congregation.
CHA P. V.
Whether the Chirotonia mention'd in the fourteenth of the Acts bě
indeed, as is pretended by Dr. HAMMOND, Dr. SEAMAN,
and the Authors they follow, the ſame with the Chirotheſia, or
far different thing. In which are contain’d the divers kinds of
Church Government introduc'd and exercis’d in ihe age of tlie
spoſtles.
E.
1
ITHER I have impertinently intruded upon the Politics, or
cannot be ſaid ſo much to meddle in Church matters, as
Churchmen may be ſaid to have meddled in State matters: For if the
Chirotonia be Election by the many, and the Chirotheſia be Election
by one, or by the Few, the whole difference between Popular and
Monarchical Government falls upon theſe two words; and ſo the
queſtion will be, Whether the Scriptures were intended more
for the advantage of a Prince, of a Hierarchy or Presbytery, than
of the People. But that God in the Old Teſtament inſtituted the
Chirotonia, not only in the Commonwealth, as by the Election of
the Sanhedrim, but in the Monarchy, as in the Election of the Kings,
is plain : So if there remains any advantage in Scripture to Kings,
to the Hierarchy or Presbytery, it muſt be in the New Teſtament.
Ifrael was God's choſen People, and God was Ifrael's choſen King:
That God was pleas'd to bow the Heavens, and com down to them,
was his choice, not theirs; but in thac upon his Propoſition, and thoſe
of his Servant Moses, they reſolv’d to obey his Voice, and keep his
Covenant, they choſe him their King. In like manner, the Church is
CHRIST's choſen People, and CHRIST is the Church's choſen
King. That CHRIS T taking fleſh was pleas’d to bow the Heavens,
and com down in a more familiar capacity of propoſing himſelf to
Mankind, was his own choice, not theirs: but in that the Church
up-
on his Propoſition, or thoſe of his Apoſtles ſent by him, as he was
fent by the Father, reſolv'd to obey his Voice, and keep his Cove
nant, ſhe has choſen him her King.
Whatever in Nature or in
Grace, in Church or in State, is choſen by Man according to the
Will of God, is choſen by God, of whom is both the Will and the
Deed. Which things conſiderd, Į wonder at Dr. HAMMOND,
who ſays, Sure the Jewiſh and Heathen Citys, to whom the Goſpel by
Christ's Command was to be preach’d, were not to chuſe their Guides
or Teachers. CHRIST was not choſen by them to whom he preachd; for
Says he, ye have not choſen me. He came from Heaven, ſent by his Father
on that Errand; and happy they whom he was thus pleas’d to chufe, to call,
and
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360
Book II. and preach to. And when his Apoſtles, after his example, go and preach
to all Nations, and actually gather Diſciples, they choſe their Auditors,
and not their Auditors them. To make Îhort work, I ſhall anſwer by
explaining his Words as they fall.
A ROMAN chuſing whether he would ſpeak to the Senat or the
People, choſe his Auditors, and not they him : Nevertheleſs if it were
the Conſul, they choſe him, and not he them. It is one thing to be a
Speaker to a People, that have the liberty, when that's don, to do as
they think fit; and another thing to be a Guide, whom the People
have conſented, or oblig'd themſelves to follow : which diſtinction
not regarded, makes the reſt of his Argumentation recoil upon himſelf;
while lie procedes thus: And they that give up their Names to the Obe-
dience of the Goſpel (choſe the Preachers, as I ſhould think, of that
Goſpel their Guides) one branch of this Obedience obliges them (by their
own conſent it ſeems, becauſe before they gave up their Names) to
obſerve thoſe that (being thus plac'd over them by their conſent) are
plac'd over them by God : ſuch not only are their Civil Magiſtrats (who
ſuccede to their places by, and govern according to the Laws which
the People have choſen) but alſo their Paſtors, whom the Hoiy Ghoſt
either mediatly (according to the Rules of Church Diſciplin in Scrip-
ture) or immediatly (upon ſom ſuch miraculous Call, as the People
ſhall judg to be no impofture) has ſet over them. From which
words the Doctor, not conſidering thoſe Qualifications I have ſhewn all
along to be naturally inherent in them, concludes that a Biſhop is made
by the Holy Ghost, and not by the People.
IF he would ſtand to this yet it were ſomthing; for if the Holy
Ghoſt makes a Biſhop, then I ſhould think that the Holy Ghoſt or-
dainºd a Biſhop, and ſo that the Election and Ordination of a Biſhop
were all one." But this hereafter will appear to be a more dangerous
Conceſſion than perhaps you may yet apprehend. Whierfore when all
is don, you will not find Divines, at leaſt Dr. HAMMOND, to
grant
that the Holy Ghoſt can ordain: he may elect indeed, and that is all
;
but there is no Ordination, without the Chirotheſia of the Biſhops, or
of the Presbytery. Take the Doctor's word for it.
WHEN St. Paul Says of the Biſhops of Alia, that the Holy Ghoſt
Acts 2c. 28. had ſet them Overſeers, I ſuppoſe that it is to be underſtood of their É-
lection or Nomination to thoſe Dignitys : for fo CLEMENT ſpeaks of
St. John, who conſtituted Biſhops of thoſe that were ſignify'd by the
Spirit ; where the Spirit's Signification notes the Election or Nomination of
the Perſons, but the conſtituting them was the Ordination of St. Joh N.
GOD may propole, as the Electors do to the great Council of
Venice; but the Power of the Council, that is, to reſolve or ordain,
is in the Biſhop, ſays Dr. HAMMOND, and in the Presbytery, ſays
Dr. SEAMAN. Indeed that Election and Ordination be diſtinct
things, is to Divines of fo great importance, that loſing this hold, they
loſe all : For, as I ſaid before, whatever is choſen by Man according
to the Will of God, that is, according to Divine Law, whether na-
tural or poſitive, the ſame, whether in State or Church, is choſen by
God, or by the Holy Ghoſt, of whom is both the Will and the Deed.
To evade this, and keep all in their own hands, or Chirotheſia, Di-
vines have invented this diſtinction, that Election is one thing, and
Ordination another : God may elect, but they muſt conſtitute; that
is, God may propoſe, but they muſt reſolve. And yet GROTIUS,
who
$. 107.
of Popular Government.
361
g.
34
Acts 61
ction of Matrimonial Conſent, as when a Wife conſents to another
who in theſe things is a great Champion for the Clergy, has little Chap. 5.,
more to ſay upon this point than this. Whether we conſider antient or,
modern Times, we ſhall find the manner of Election very different, not only Pot. c. 10.
De Imp. ſum.
in different Ages and Countrys, but in different years of the ſame age, and
places of the Same Country ; ſo uncertain it is to determin of that which
the Scripture has left uncertain. And while men diſpute not of Right,
but of Convenience, it is wonderful to ſee what probable Arguments are
brought on all ſides. Give me CYPRIAN and his times, there is no
danger in popular Election. Give me the Nicene Fathers, and let the
Bilbops take it willingly. Give me THEODOSIUS, VALENTINIAN,
and CHARLES the Great, than Royal Election there is nothing Safer.
Upon the heels of theſe Words treads Dr. HAMMOND in this man S. 1041
ner : That Election and Ordination are ſeveral things, is ſufficiently
known to every man that meaſures the nature of Words either by uſage or
Dictionarys; only for the convincing of ſuch as think not themſelves ob-
ligʻd to the obſervation of ſo vulgar Laws, I ſhall propoſe theſe evidences.
In the Story of the Creation of the Deacons of Jeruſalem, there are two
things diſtinctly ſet down, one propos’d to the multitude of Diſciples to be
don by them, another reſerv’d to the Apoſtles ; that which was propos'd to
the Multitude was to elect, &c. Election of the Perſons was by the A-
poſtles permitted to them, but ſtill the (rata siod jev) conſtituting is re-
Served to the Apoſtles. Then coms Dr. SEAMAN: Be it granted, as it of Ordinas
is by Proteſtants generally, that Paul and BARNABAS made Elders po 13.
with the conſent of the People, their Conſent is one thing, and their Power
another.
WHERE in the firſt place I for my particular, who have had
the Books of Dr. HAMMOND and Dr. SEAMAN fent to me by
way of Objection, need not go a ſtep further. All that I have inſert-
ed in my Oceana concerning Ordination, is in theſe three Votes ac-
knowlegd and confirm’d: For the Probationer to be there ſent by
a Univerſity to a Cure that is vacant, may by a Doctor, or the Doctors
of the fame Univerſity already ordain'd, receive Impoſition of Hands,
if that be thought fit to be added, and then the Election of the ſame
Probationer by the People dos nó hurt, nay, ſays GROTI us, is of De Imp. c. 107
the right of Nature ; for it is náturally permitted to every Congregation to
procure thoſe things which are neceſſary to their conſervation, of which num-
ber is the Application of Function. So Merchants have the right of elect-
ing of a Maſter of their Ship; Travellers of a Guide in their way, and a
free People of their King. The Merchant, it ſeems, dos not make the
Maſter of his Ship, the Traveller his Guide, nor the free People their
King, but ele&t them. As if VAN Trump had bin Admiral, a
Robber upon the Highway had bin a Scout, or the Guide of an Army,
or Saul a King before they were elected. The point is very nice,
which inſtead of proving, he illuſtrats in the beginning of the ſame
Chapter by theſe three fimilitudes.
THÉ firſt is this, The Power of the Husband is from God, the Applia
tation of this Pomer to a certain Perſon is from conſent, by which nevera
theleſs the right is not given ; for if this ivere by conſent, the Matrimony
might be diffolv’d by conſent, which cannot be. As it an apparent rétra-*
than her own Husband, or commits Adultery, did not deliver a man
from the bond of Marriage by the Judgments of CHRIST. There
is an imperfe&tion or cruelty in thoſe Laws, which make Marriage to
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The Prerogative
Per. 2. 13.
;
Book II. laſt longer than a man in humanity may be judgʻd to be a Husband,
or a Woman a Wife: To think that Religion deſtroys Humanity, or
to think that there is any defending of that by Religion which will
riot hold in Juſtice, or natural Equity, is a vaſt error.
THE ſecond Similitude is this: Imperial Power is not in the Prin-
ces that are Electors of the Empire ; wherfore it is not given by them, but
applied by them to a certain Perfor.
THIS is anſwer'd by PETER, where he commands Obedience
to every Ordinance of Man (or, as ſom nearer the Original, every
Power created by men) whether it be to the Roman Emperor as Su-
preme, or to the Proconſuls of Aſia and Phrygia, as ſent by him ; for
this is the ſenſe of the Greec, and thus it is interpreted by GROTIU S.
Now if the then Roman Emperor were a Creature of Man, why not
the now Roman Emperor?
THE laſt Similitude runs thus: The Power of Life and Death is
not in the Multitude before they be a Commonwealth ; for no privat Man
has the right of Revenge ; yet it is applid by them to fom Man, 'or Political
Body of Men. But if a man invades the Life of another, that other,
whether under Laws or not under Laws, has the right to defend his
own Life, even by taking away that if there be no other probable
Remedy) of the Invader. So that men are ſo far from having bin
void of the power of Life and Death before they came under Laws,
that Laws can never be fo made as wholly to deprive them of it after
they com under them: wherfore the power of Life and Death is
deriv'd by the Magiſtrat from, and confer'd upon him by the conſent
or Chirotonia of the People, wherof he is but a mere Creature; that is
to ſay, an Ordinance of Man.
THUS theſe Candles being ſo far from lighting the Houfe, that
they dy in the Socket, GROTIUs has bin no leſs bountiful than to
grant us that the People have as much right (where there is no hu-
man Creature or Law to the contrary) to elect their Churchmen, as
Merchants have to elect their Seamen, Travellers their Guides, or a
free People their King; which is enough a conſcience. Nor is
Dr. HAMMOND ſtraiter handed : Election, ſays he, was permit-
ted by the Apoſtles to the Multitude, and therfore the ſame may
be allow'd, always provided the (na tu soojev) conſtituting be
reſerv’d to the Paſtors, or ordain'd Doctors and Preachers. And
Dr. SE AMAN, upon condition the People will not ſay that it was
don by their power, but think it fair that it was don by their conſent,
is alſo very well contented.
So all ſtands ftreight with what I have
heretofore propos’d. Let no man then ſay, whatever follows, that I
drive at any Ends or Intereſts, theſe being already fully obtain’d and
granted ; nevertheleſs for truth fake I cannot leave this Diſcourſe im-
perfect
. If a Politician ſhould ſay that the Election and the Ordina-
tion of a Roman Conſul or Pontifex were not of like nature; that the
XATZSVocher, Contract of the Senat of Rome with the People in the
Livy. Election of N UNA (it cum populus regem jußiffet, id fic ratum eſſet,
ſi patres autorés fierent) included or impli’d the Soverain power to be
in the Fathers; that 'the Conſent of this people was one thing, and
their Power another: if, I ſay, he ſhould affirm theſe or the like in
Athens, Lacedemon, or any other Commonwealth that is or has bin
under the Sun, there would be nothing under the Sun more ridiculous
than that Politician. But ſhould men pretending to Government of
any
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of Popular Government.
36
ht
äny kind be not oblig'd to ſom conſideration of theſe Rules in Nature Chap. 5.
and univerſal Experience; yet I wonder how the word (rec Disočici) to
conſtitute, with which they make ſuch a flouriſh, did not lead them,
otherwiſe than they follow; this, as it was ſaid of SOLON by ARIS-
TOTLE, being that which I have already ſhewn to be us both in
the Greec of the Scripture, for the conſtitution of the Sanhedrim bý
Moses, and in other Authors for that of the Senat by ROMULUS,
each of which was then elected by the People: whence it may appear
plainly that this is no word, as they pretend, to exclude popular Suffrage,
but rather to imply it. And indeed that it is of no ſuch nature as ne-
ceſſarily to include Power, could not have bin overſeen in the New
Teſtament, but voluntarily where (oi de nec@isautes * Tlæūlov) they are Acts 17. 15.
ſignify’d by it that conducted Paul. But they have Miracles : ſuch
indeed as have neither words nor reaſon for them, had need of Miracles.
And where are theſe ſame Miracles? why the Apoſtles by the Chiro-
theſia or laying on of hands confer'd the Holy Ghoſt. So they did not
only when they us'd that Ceremony in reference to Ordination, but
when they us'd it not in that relation, as to thoſe that were newly
baptiz'd in Samaria, Men and Women: now it is not probable, that Acts 8.
theſe, who ſhould ſeem to have bin numerous, were all ordain’d,
at leaſt the Women; and ſo the Miracle is to be attributed to the Hands
of the Apoſtles, and not to Ordination in general. Joshua was full
of the Spirit (not becauſe he had bin ordain’d by the Chirotheſia, for
to had many of them that crucify'd CHRIST and perſecuted the
Apoſtles, but) becauſe Moses had laid his hands upon him.
WOULD Divines be contented that we ſhould argue thus ; The
Chirotonia or Suffrage of the People of Iſrael at the firſt inſtitution was
follow'd with miraculous Indowments, therfore whoever is elected by
the People ſhall have the like ? Or what have they to ſhew why the
Argument is more holding as to their Chirotheſia, ſeeing for above one
thouſand years all the Hierarchy and Presbytery laid together have don
no more Miracles than a Pariſh Clerc?
A CONTINU'D Miracle, as that the Sea ebs and flows, the
Sun always runs his admirable courſe, is Nature. Intermitted Nature,
as that the waters of the Red Sea were mountains, that the Sun ſtood
ſtill in the Dial of AHAZ, is a Miracle. To continue the latter kind
of Miracle were to deſtroy the former, that is, to diffolve Nature.
Wherſore this is a certain rule, that no continu'd external Act can be in
the latter ſenſe miraculous. Now Government, whether in Church or
State, is equally a continu'd external Act. An internal continu’d Act
may indeed be natural, or ſupernatural, as Faith.
A NATURAL Man, being even in his own natural apprehen-
ſion fearfully and wonderfully made, is by the continu’d Miracle of Nam
ture convinc'd that the World had a Creator, and ſo coms to believe
in that which is ſupernatural ; whence it is that all Nations have had
fom Religion: and a Spiritual Man being convinc'd by the purity of
CHRIST's Doctrin, and the Miracles wherby it was firſt planted, is
brought to the Chriſtian Faith. However CHRIST may require
ſuch continu'd Faith or Spiritual exerciſe of his Church as is ſuper-
natural, le requires not any ſuch continu'd Act or bodily exerciſe of
his Church as is ſupernatural. But the Government of the Church is
á continu'd Act, or bodily exerciſe. It ſhould be heeded that to delude
the ſenſe is not to do Miracles, but to uſe Impoſture. Now to per-
Ааа 2
fuade
ܪ ܠܐ
v
364
Chrilt.
Acts 1.
The Prerogative
Book II. ſuade us, That Monarchical, Ariſtocratical, Popular, or mixt Govern-
ment have not always bin in Nature, or that there has ever bin any
other in the Church, were to delude ſenſe. Wherfore give me leave
(in which I am confident I ſhall uſe no manner of Irreverence to the
Scripture, but on the contrary make the right uſe of it) to diſcourſe
upon Church-Government according to the rules of Prudence.
THE Goſpel was intended by Chriſt to be preach'd to all Na-
tions, which (Princes and States being above all things exceding te-
nacious of their Power) is to me a certain Argument that the Policy
of the Church muſt be ſo provided for, as not to give any of them jult
cauſe of Jealouſy, there being nothing more likely to obſtruct the
growth of Religion: and truly the nearer I look to the Scripture, the
more I am confirm'd in this opinion.
Firſt way of CHRIST being taken up into Heaven, the firſt Ordination that
Ordination in we find was that of the Apoſtle MATTHIAS after this manner.
the Church of
THE Ariſtocracy of the Church, that is the Apoſtles, aſſembld
the whole Congregation of Diſciples or Believers at Jeruſalem, being
in number one hundred and twenty, where PETER (it having as it
ſhould ſeem bin ſo agreed by the Apoſtles) was Propoſer ; who ſtand-
ing up in the midſt of the Diſciples, acquainted them, that wheras
Judas was gon to his place, the occaſion of their preſent meeting
was to elect another Apoſtle in his room: wherupon proceding to
the Suffrage, they appointed two Competitors, Joseph and MAT-
THIAS, whoſe names being written each in a ſeveral Scrol, were put
into one Urn, and at the ſame time two other Lots, wherof one was a
blank, and the other inſcrib'd with the word Apoſtle, were put into ano.
ther Urn; which don, they pray'd and ſaid, Thou Lord which knoweſt
the hearts of all men, Thew whether of theſe two thou haft choſen. The
Prayer being ended, they gave forth their Lots, and the Lot fell upon
MATTHIAS (και συνκατεψηφίσθη μετά την ένδεκα αποσύλων) and by this
Pſephiſma (the very popular word, and not only fo, but being apply'd
to the Ballot, is the very literal and original ſignification) he was ad-
ded to the eleven Apoſtles. So you have the firſt way of Ordination
in the Church, after Chriſt was taken up into Heaven, perform’d by the
Election or Chirotonia of tlie whole Church.
NOW except any man can ſhew that MATTHIAS ever receiv'd
the impoſition of hands, thoſe ſeveral things are already demonſtrated.
Firt, that the Chirotonia is not only the more antient way of Ordina-
tion in the Commonwealth of Iſrael, but in the Church of CHRIST.
Secondly, that the Chirotheſia or impoſition of Hands is no way ne-
ceſſary to Ordination in the Chriſtian Church. Thirdly, that the
Diſciplin of the Chriſtian Church was primitively Popular; for to
ſay that in regard of the Apoſtles it was Ariſtocratical, is to forget that
there is no ſuch thing, without a mixture of Ariſtocracy, that is
without the Senat, as a Popular Government in Nature. Fourthly,
that Ordination in the Commonwealth of Oceana being exactly after
this pattern, is exactly according to the Diſciplin of the Church of
CHRIST.' And fifthly, that Ordination and Election in this example
are not two, but one and the ſame thing.
THE laſt of theſe Propoſitions having bin affirm'd by Mr. H OBS,
Dr. HAMMOND tells him plainly, that his aſſertion is far from all
truth: Let us therfore conſider the Doctor's Reaſons, which are theſe;
Seeing the Congregation, ſays he, is affirm’d by the Gentleman to have or-
dain'd,
S. IIS.
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1
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365
of Popular Government.
Dr. H. of Im
dain’d, and it is plain by the words of St. Luke that God elected, Electi- Chap. 5.
on and Ordination by this Example muſt be diſtinct things : which in be
another place going about to fortify with this Argument, That it was
don by Lottery, and SOLOMON ſays, The Lot is at the diſpoſing of the
Lord, he utterly overthrows without, and beyond help; for in this
SOLOMON not denying, but rather affirming that he was choſen
King by the People, plainly. Thews that Election by the People is
Election by God. Where it is affirm'd, that God rais'd up Judges in
Iſrael, it is not deny’d that the People elected them. The Doctor is
at it in MAIMONIDes more than once, that the Divine Majeſty
reſted upon ſuch as were ordain’d by Impoſition of Hands. But wheras
it is affirm’d by MAIMONIDES more often, that when the People
Eccleſia Dei) or Congregation of Iſrael aſſembld, then the Divine Ma-
jeſty, or the Holy Ghoſt reſted upon them; of this he never takes
any
notice. The People, whether in Iſrael, Athens, Lacedemon, or Rome,
never aſſembl'd for enacting of Laws, or Election of Magiſtrats, with
out Sacrifice and imploring the aſſiſtance of God, to whom when
their work was perform’d, they always attributed the whole Reſult or
Election: and would the Doctor have Chriſtians to allow him but a
Piece? For wheras God electing there had in the ſenſe both of Jews
and Heathens, his choice of all, God electing here had in the ſenſe
of Divines, but his choice of two, which were next this or none, but
that indeed where he has not the whole he has none at all. Is that
then far from all truth, which the Gentleman, or that which the Di-
vine has ſaid, either in this part, or where he adds, that the hundred
and twenty in the Text are never mention'd but once, and then it is in pofition
.
a Parentheſis? I will but tranſcribe the place.
AND in thoſe days Peter ſtood up in the midſt of the Diſciples, Acts I, IS.
and ſaid (the number of the Names together were about an hundred and
twenty) &c. Are the Diſciples in the Parentheſis, or out of it? Are
they but once mention'd, and that is in a Parentheſis? Or are they but
once number'd, and that is in a Parentheſis? If a Gentleman ſhould do
thus, what would they ſay ? Or, what were ill enough to be ſaid ?
But to mend the Text, and bring the Diſciples into the Parentheſis,
they have more ways than one; wheras the Heatlien People, while
the Prieſts were willing, mix'd theſe Dutys with Devotions, Divines
will not ſuffer a Chriſtian People upon like occaſions to pray: for where
it is ſaid, They pray’d, it went before, they appointed two, and it follows,
They gave out their Lots; which antecedent and conſequent, if the
People pray'd, muſt be equally underſtood of them, and to they could
be no Parentheſis. Therföre pray they muſt not, or Divines are loft.
But how will they filence them? To ſhew you this art I muſt tran-
ſcribe the Heads of the Chapter.
THE Apoſtles being return’d from Mount Olivet to Jeruſalem,
went up into an upper room, where abode both
, Peter and James Verſe 131
and John, and ANDREW, JAMÈS the Son of Alpheus, and
SIMON ZELOTES, and Jud as the Brother of J A MES.
AN D in thoſe days Peter ſtood up in the midſt of the Diſciples,
and said (the number of Names together were about one hundred and
twenty)
MEN and Brethren,
O F theſe men which accompany'd with us all the time that the Lord
Jeſus ment in and out among us,
MOST
S. 11S.
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15.
16.
21.
366
The Prerogative
22.
23.
24.
26.
Grotius.
Book II. MUST one be ordain'd to be a Witneſs with us of his Reſurrection.
AND they appointed two, JOSEPH and MATTHIAS.
AND they pray’d, and ſaid, Thou Lord which knoweſt the hearts of
all men, Shew whether of theſe two thou haſt choſen.
AND they gave forth their Lots, and the Lot fell upon MATTHIAS,
ες, συνκατεψυφίσθη μετά την ένδεκα άσοςίλων.
THEY whom PETER acquainted that one muſt be ordain’d,
one would verily believe were the hundred and twenty Diſciples, in
the midſt of whom he ſtood up, and made the Propoſition; and ſo
much the rather, becauſe this was no more than the Apoſtles knew be-
fore, and (in all right underſtanding of Government and Senſe) were
already agreed upon, it being the Office of the Ariſtocracy or Senat in
a Commonwealth (and ſuch exactly were the Apoſtles in the Church)
upon all new Orders or Elections to be made; firſt, to debate and de-
termin by-themſelves, and then to propoſe to the Chirotonia or ultimat
reſult of the People. But Divines ſay abſolutely no, which word to
make good, They appointed two, and they pray’d, and they gave forth their
Lots, being ſentences that ſtand plainly together, or hunt in couples,
muſt leap ſheer over nine Verſes, PETER's whole Oration (which
by this means is no more than a Parentheſis neither) and over the
hundred and twenty Diſciples, without touching a hair of their heads,
to light plum upon the thirteenth Verſe, and the eleven Apoſtles !
Never man us'd his Grammar ſo ſince he threw it at a Pear tree! Yet
that CHRYSOSTOM (who underſtood Greec) allows of no ſuch
conſtruction, is confefs'd by the learnedft of this opinion; and wheras
they fly to the Latin Fathers, that retreat is wholly cut off by DAVID
BL'UN DEL in his very learned Treatiſe of the right of the People in
Church-Government,
BUT what do we ſtand upon words ? Are theſe ſuch wherof the
things to which they relate may be Interpreters? Or to what things can
they relate but the Inſtitution of the Sanhedrim by MOSES? That at
the Inſtitution of the Sanhedrim the Competitors were elected by the
Suffrage of the People, and from thence that the Ballot of Iſrael con-
fiſted not only of a Lot but of a Suffrage too, has bin already demon-
ſtrated out of Scripture; and that the Election of MATTHIAS was
by the Ballot of Iſrael is no leſs apparent in it felf, than fully confeſs'd
upon the place by GROTIUS.
Demonftrittion “ THEY that under color of Religion in matter of Government,
that God never « ſlight Prudence, are miſtaken, or do not mean honeſtly. Neither
Policy Ecclefi “God nor CHRIST ever inſtituted any Policy whatſoever upon
aftical or Civil, « any other Principles than thoſe of Human Prudence. The Em-
Principles of
so baſſadors ſent from the Gibeonits to JOSHUA deliver their Meſſage
Hum.in Pru- “ in this manner; The El ders and all the Inhabitants of our Country
“ Spake to us, ſaying, Go meet them, and ſay to them, We are your Ser-
Jolh. g. 11
vants; therfore now make ye a League with us. They that had power
“ to ſend Embaſſadors, and to make a League with a foren Nation,
“ had ſoverain Power; this ſoverain Power was in the Elders, or Se-
“ nat, and in the People of Gibeon : wherfore God conſtituting his
“ Commonwealth for the main Orders (that is to ſay, the Senat and
“ the People ) upon the ſame Principles on which the Gibeonits had
« long before built theirs, laid his Foundations upon no other than
« human Prudence. So for the inferior Courts they were tranſcribd
" by Moses out of the Commonwealth of Midian, upon advice
„
but 1991 the
dence.
*
6 of
of Popular Government.
367
* of JETHRO his Father in Law. According to ſuch patterns was Chap. 5.
" Iſrael fram’d, and by that of Iſrael this firſt Policy of the Church of
“ CHRIST ſo exactly, as (ſans comparaiſon) any man ſhall ſhew
« the Commonwealth of Oceana to have bin tranſcrib'd out of Rome
or Venice. Let them that would have the Government be ſomwhat
“ between Earth and Heaven, conſider this place.
NOR is Eccleſiaſtical Policy only ſubject to Human Prudence,
but to the ſame viciſſitudes alſo wherto Human Prudence is ſubject,
both in her own nature, and as ſhe is obnoxious to the State wherin
ſhe is planted, and that inavoidably; as I com now to demonftrat
by the Alterations which happen'd even in the Age of the Apoſtles
themſelves: for this at the Election of MATTHIAS being alter'd,
the next form of Eccleſiaſtical Policy introduc'd in their times, is re-
ſembld by GROTIUS to that of Athens, of which, for the better
clearing of what
follows, it is neceſſary that I firſt ſay ſomthing by
way of Introduction.
THE Theſmotheta, being in number fix, were Magiſtrats of the
higheſt dignity, power, and rank in Athens. Theſe, ſays ARISTO- Arift. 2. lib. 2.
.
TLE, were elected by the Chirotonia or Suffrage of the People; and C. 10.
ſays, Pollu x being elected underwent the Inquiſition of the Senat,
where they were to anſwer to theſe Interrogatorys, Whether they wor-
ſhip'd the God of their Countrys? Whether they had bin dutiful to their
Parents? born Arms for the Commonwealth? paid Dutys or Taxes?
In which Particulars the Senat being ſatisfy'd, They were ſworn and Pol. lib. 8. c.g.
crown'd with Mirtle : which comś to this, that the (Matoshoouev) or
Conſtitution being reſerv'd to the Senat, the Theſmotheta were eleéted
by the Chirotonia of the People. Now tho the Government of Athens
throout the Citys of Aſia ( being moſt of them of the like Model) was
moſt known, I will not ſay that the Apoſtles wrote their Orders out
of Athens, but ſeeing all Political Inſtitutions muſt needs be according
to Human Prudence, and there is nothing to be written out of this but
what will fall even with ſom other Government that is or has bin,
I may ſay, as GROTIUS has faid before me, that the frame of "
Church Government in the infuing Example was after the manner of
Athens.
WHEN the number of the Diſciples, or Believers, was multiply?d, Second way of
there aroſe a murmuring among ſuch of the Jews as having bin bred in
the Church of
Alexandria or other parts, were for their Language (which was Greec) Chriſt
.
partly ſtrangers, againſt the Hebrews or converted Jews, that ſpoke
their own Language, as if theſe indeed us’d them like ſtrangers, their
Widows being neglected, or not dealt ſo liberally withal, as thoſe of
the Hebrews in the Contributions due for their conſtant maintenance.
HEREUPON the twelve Apoſtles, after the manner of the Se-
nat, having without all queſtion debated the buſineſs among them-
ſelves, as appears by the ſpeech upon which they were agreed, af-
ſembľd the People, which is ſtill Senatorian, or call’d the multitude
of the Diſciples to them, and ſaid, It is not reaſon that we ſhould leave
preaching, or the Word of God, to be taken up with this, tho chari-
table, nay, ſeeing we have introduc'd Community of goods, moſt juſt
and neceſſary imployment of providing Food and Clothing for cvery
one of our Fellowſhip or Community (the Chriſtians in theſe times,
much after the manner of the Lacedemonian Convives, us’d to eat in
public and together ) to do this as it ought to be don, were to becom
Caterers,
Ordination in
368
The Prerogative
the con-
1
Book II. Caterers, and be taken up in ſerving Tables
. Wherforé, Brethren,
how (take the wiſe men and underſtanding, and known among you) look
out ſeven men of honeſt report, full of the Holy Ghoſt, and of Wiſdom
(ες καταςήσομεν και της χρέας πύτης) νhom we may appoint over this
buſineſs.
THIS Saying, that is, this Propoſition of the Senat or Apoſtles,
pleas’d the whole Multitude" (like that of Moses, the thing which thou
haſt ſaid is good for ris to do) So they choſe STEPHEN, PHILIP,
PROCHORUS, NICANOR, TIMON, PARMENAS, and Ni-
CHOLAS, whom being elected, they ſet before the Apoſtles, who when
they had pray’d, laid their hands upon them.
WHAT fuller demonſtration can be given of any thing, than
that in this example Ordination and Eletion are one and the
ſame, and that this was confer'd by the Chirotonia of the People ?
If there be any poſſible way of making this clearer, it muſt be by
oppoſition : wherfore let us ſee what Divines have to ſay to the
trary.
GROTIVS gives all we ask from this place, which he gives for
nothing, becauſe it concerns not the Election of Paſtors, but of Dea-
cons. As if STEPHEN and PHILIP had not only bin Preachers of
the Goſpel, but don Miracles. What Dr. SEAMAN denys or
grants in relation to the fame, I have indeavord to underſtand, but it
will not do. Dr. HAMMOND is ſo plain, that his Objections may be of
uſe. He, to prove that the Ordination of theſe Deacons was not in
the Chirotonia of their Diſciples, but in the Chirotheſia of the Apoſtles,
has theſe Arguments.
THERE be two things diſtinctly ſet down, Election permitted to
the People, and the (x«Ta shodusv) conſtituting reſerv'd to the Apoſtles.
TO which I anſwer, That there were two things ſet down by the
Athenian Law, Election of the Thelmothété by the People, and the
(Ta soo jeev) conſtituting of them by the Senat ; yet that the Ordi-
nation was in the Power, and that the Power was in the People of
Athiens : hë that makes a doubt, is not reſolv'd whether the moſt po-
pular Commonwealth that ever was were a Democracy.
BUT, ſays he, this looking out of men, or chuſing, was permitted to
the Multitude by the Apoſtles with theſe three bounds : Firſt, to take ſeven,
rieither more nor fewer : Secondly, thoſe men generally known and well re-
puted of : And thirdly, full of the Spirit, and of Diſcretion or parts fit for
Government. To which I anſwer, That the Election of the Theſmothet a
was permitted by the Law to the People of Athens with theſe three
bounds; Firſt to take fix, neither more nor fewer : Secondly, thoſe
generally known and reputed of: Thirdly, in ſuch eſtimation for their
honeſty and ability for Government, as in their conſciences (to which
alſo they made Oathi) they ſhould judg fitteſt for tlic Commonwealth.
Yet is all this ſo far from any proof that Athens was no Democracy, or
that the Soverain Power, whether in enacting of Laws, or election of
Magiſtrats by the Lot or the Suffrage (Inſtitutions equally popular)
was
not in the People, that it amounts to the ſtrongeſt argument that
the People were Soverain, and the Commonwealth was Democratical.
Could Truth deſire greater advantage than redounds from ſuch oppo-
ſition? We have another example of the fame Model, in which, bc-
cauſe it has bin paraphras'd uponi already in the Introduction, I ſhall be
briefer here. In the Church of Antioch, where the Diſciples were
Acts 13
NOW
of Popular Government.
369
now becom fo numerous, that they began to be call’d Cliriſtians, Chap. $:
there were among them Prophets : fo being aſſembld on occaſion, as
I conceive, of giving an extraordinary Commiſſion after the manner
of the people of Athens when they elected Ambaſſadors, or (that I
may avoid ftriſe upon a point ſo indifferent) to chuſetwo new Apoſtles,
The Holy Ghoſt ſaid, Separat me BARNABAS and Saul, for the Work
wherto I have appointed them: that is (for ſo it is render'd by all Inter-
preters) the Holy Ghoſt ſpake thoſe words by the mouths of the Pro-
phecs. Now the Prophets being well known for ſuch, this Suffrage of
theirs was no ſooner given; than (as one that can allow Prophers to
be leading men may eaſily think) follow'd by all the reſt of the Con-
gregation : So the whole multitude having faſted and pray'd, the moſt
eminent among them, or the Senatorian Order in that Church, laid
their liands upon Paul and BARNABAS, who being thus ſent
forth by the Holy Ghoſt, departed to Seleacia.
TO evade this apparent Election, or Chirotonia of the whole Con.
gregation, wherby theſe Apoſtles or Ambaſſadors to the Churches of
the Gentils were ordaind, Divines have nothing to fay, but that they
were elected by the Holy Ghoſt : As if the Chirotonia of the People were
more excluſive to election by the Holy Ghoſt, than the Chirotheſia of
the Ariſtocracy, for which in the mean time they contend. But if nui-
ther of theſe were indeed excluſive of the Holy Gholt, how is it
poſſible in this frame (where tho of natural neceſſity an Ariſtocracy
muſt have bin included, yet the Ariſtocracy is not in the Tcxr lo much
as diſtinguiſh'd from the People, or once nam’d) that the Power, and to
the Ordination ſhould not have bin in the People? The Council of the
Apoſtles, of the Elders, and of the whole Church at Jerufalem, and
other Councils, not of Apoſtles, nor of the whole Church, in other
times or places
, us'd this form in their Acts ; It ſeems good to the Holy Acts 15i 22.?
Ghoft, and to us: But dos this, whether a true or a pretended ſtile,
exclude that Act from being an Act of that whole Council? Or
how coms it to paſs that becauſe Paul and BARNAB AS were fe-
parated by the Holy Ghoſt, they were not ordain'd by the Chirotonia
of the whole Chriſtian People at Antioch?
THE Chirotheſia can be no otherwiſe underſtood in nature, not
ever was in the Commonwealth of the Jews, than Election by the
few : And ſo even under the mere Chirotheſia, Ordination and Election
were not two, but one and the ſame thing. If Moses ordain'd
JOSHU A his' Succeſſor by the Chirotheſia, he elected JOSHUA his
Succeſſor by the Chirotheſia'; and for what reaſon muſt it be otherwiſe
with the Chirotonia? That'a Phariſee could do more with one hand,
or a pair of hands, than a Chriſtian Church or Congregation can do
with all their hands, is a Doctrin very much for the honor of the true
Religion, and a ſoverain Maxim of Eccleſiaſtical Policy.
THE third Conſtitution of Church-Government in Scripture Third way of
(whether conſiſting of Biſhops or Presbyters, between which at this Ordination in
the Church of
time a man ſhall hardly find a difference) runs wholly upon the Ariſto- Chriji
.
cracy, without mention of the People, and is therfore compard by
GROTIUS to the Sanhedrim of Iſrael, as that came to be in theſe Grot. ad
days; from whence Divines alſo generally and truly confeſs that it was a Tim. 4. 14.
taken up: to which I ſhall need to add no more, than that it is an Order
for which there is no Precept, either in the Old Teſtament of God, or
in the New Teſtament of Chriſt. This therfore thus taken up by the
Bbb
Apoſtles
G
ما
1;
19. 13.
.
S. 106.
370
The Prerogative
Book II. Apoſtles from the Jews, is a clear demonſtration that the Government
w of the Church, in what purity ſoever of the Times, nay tho under
the inſpection of the Apoſtles themſelves, has bin obnoxious to that
of the State wherin it was planted. The Sanhedrim, from the inſti-
tution of the Chirotheſia, for a conſtant Order, conſiſted of no other
Senators than ſuch only as had bin ordain’d by the Impoſition of
Hands; which came now to be confer'd by the Prince, in the pre-
fence, or with the aſſiſtance of the Sanhedrim. The ſame Order was
Gror. ad Mat obſerv’d by the Jewiſh Synagogues, of which each had her Archon
nor would the Jews converted to the Chriſtian Faith,relinquiſh the Law
of Moses, wherto this way of Ordination, among other things,
tho erroneouſly, was vulgarly attributed : whence in the Church,
where it conſiſted of converted fews, Ordination was confer'd by the
Archon, or firſt in order of the Presbytery, with the aſſiſtance of the
reſt. Hence PAUL, in one place, exhorts TIMOTHY thus:
1 Tim. 4. 14. Neglect not the Gift that is in thee, which was given thee by Prophecy,
with the laying on of the hands of the Presbytery. And in another thus:
2 Tim. 1.6. Wherfore I put thee in remembrance, that thou ſtir up the Gift of God
which is in thee by the putting on of my hands.
I GRANT Divines, that'Ordination by this time was wholly in
the Presbytery; what ſay they then to the diſtinction of Ordina-
tion and Election? Are theſe ſtill two diſtinct things, or may we
lence, at leaſt, compute them to be one and the ſame? If they ſay
Yes, why then might they not have bin ſo before ? If they ſay No,
who in this place, but the Presbytery, elected ? Why, ſays Dr. H A M-
MOND, it is plain that the Spirit of Prophecy elected. But to give ac-
count of no more than is already perform’d, were the ſpirit of Hiſtory
rather than of Prophecy, to which it appertains to tell things before
they be don; as did the Prophets now living in this Church, that T 1-
MOT HY ſhould com to be ordain's : So the place is interpreted by
GROTIUS; and how it ſhould be otherwiſe underſtood I cannot ſee.
Put putting the caſe fom Ac preceded, as Saul and DAVID were
elected Kings by Prophecy ; yet did ever man ſay that for this Saul
or DAVID were any wbit the leſs elected Kings by the People? To
the contrary in every well-orderd Commonwealth (a Jove principium)
the diſpoſing of the Lot, and of the Suffrage too, has univerſally bin
attributed to God.
THE Piery of Divines in perſuading the People that God elects
for them, and therfore they need not trouble themſelves to vote, is as if
they ſhould perſuade them that God provides their daily Bread, and
therfore they need not trouble themſelves to work. To conclude this
point with Dr. HAMMOND's own words upon the ſame occaſion;
this diſtinction of Ordination and Election is in Divines the procreative
S. 111. Miſtake, or Ignorance producing all the reſt.
THE reaſon why Pau ordain'd' now after this manner among
the Jews, is to me an irrefragable argument that he ordain'd not after
this manner among the Gentils : for wheras the firſt Ordination in the
Chriſtian Church, namely that of MATTHIAS, was perform’d
by the Chirotonia, which by degrees came now in complacence with
the 'fers to the Chirothefia; it ſeems he was contented not to alter the
worit of political Inſtitutions or Cuſtoms, where he found them con-
firm'd by long and univerſal Practice: and if ſo, why ſhould any man
think that he would go about to alter, or weed out the beſt, where
they
S. 134
HT
of Popular Government
371
1
li
1
L
AT
they had taken like root? That this Adminiſtration of the Jews was Cliap. 5.
of the very worſt, is clear in the nature of the Politics, there being no
example of a pure Ariſtocracy or of a Senat, ſuch as was now the
Sanhedrim, without a popular balance, that ever governd with Juſ-
tice, or was of any continuance. Nor was the Chirotheſia, by which
means this work came to effect in Iſrael, introduc'd by the prudence
of God, but by the corrupt arts of Men. Now that the Governments
at the ſame time of the Gentils, all balanc'd by the Chirotonia of the
People, were in their nature more excellent, and indeed more accommo-
dated to antient Prudence, as it was introduc'd by God himſelf in the
Commonwealth of Iſrael, has bin already ſufficiently prov'd: never-
theleſs, to refreſh your memory with one example more.
CRET E having bin (as is affirm’d by the Conſent of Authors)
the moſt antient, and the moſt excellent Commonwealth in human
Story, was founded by RHADAMANTHus and Minos, an Age
before the Trojan War: Theſe were held to have learnt their Arts by
familiar Diſcourſe with Jupiter, and from point to point to have
fram’d their Model according to his direction. Nor, tho allacknowlege
Minos to have bin a King, did he found his Government upon any
other than a popular Balance, or a fundamental regard to the Liberty
of the People : For the whole Commonwealth was made up of theſe three Epitome of
parts
, the College, the Senat, and the People. The College conſiſted of the contouren
the annual Magiſtrats call'd the Coſmi: theſe had the whole extentive Crete.
Power, ſom in leading forth the Armys, and others in judging the People;
which Functions were accordingly aſſign’dby the Orders to each in particular.
That which was common to them all, was to propoſe ſuch things as they had
debated or prepard in their College or Council, to the Senat. The Senat
being elective for life, was the Council
, to which appertain’d the Debate of
whatever was to be propos’d to the Congregation. The Congregation, or
Aſſembly of the People of Crete, had not the right of Debate; but in
enacting of Laws, and election of Magiſtrats, had the ultimat Reſult of the
Commonwealth. Such was the Copy after which LYCURGUs wrote
himſelf ſo famous a Legiſlator. And thus ſtood this Frame to the
ſix hundred and eighth year of Rome ; when this people, having bin too
favorable to Pirats tlien infeſting thoſe Seas, turn'd the Arms of the
Romans upon themſelves; and by theſe, under the conduct of QUIN-
ctus METELLUS, thence callid CRETicus, Crete was made
a Province: tho the chief Citys being firſt freed, it ſhould ſeem (by
CICERO's ſecond Oration againſt Antony) that the whole Iland
was at length reſtor’d to her antient Liberty. However by the man
ner obſerv'd by the Romans, as was ſhewn, in Provincial Govern-
ment, the Citys under their Magiſtrats (who while the Common-
wealth was a Province perhaps might have exercis’d the Office of the
Coſmi) were not yet depriv'd of their Popular Aſſemblys, at leaſt in
their diſtinct Citys, ele&ting all Magiſtrats for their Ćutovouío) pecu-
liar or domeſtic Government. Such was the State of Crete, when
Paul having appeald from the Jews to CÆSAR; and being ther-
upon conducted by Sea towards Rome, touch'd in his way upon this
Iland, where he left Titus to conſtitute Elders in every City. The
word (r&ta svons) conſtitute, our Divines will have to ſignify ordain by
Impoſition of Hands
, and Impoſition of Hands to ſignify an act of Power,
excluding the People. But why Paul, whoamong the Jews had com-
pli’d with their Cuſtoms, ſhould injoin; or how Titus, had it bin fo
Bbb 2
injoin'd,
372
The Prerogative
+
Book II. injoin'd, ſhould accompliſh this where the Power was Popular, they liave
not ſhewn nor conſider'd. To introduce Religion or Government
there be but two ways, either by perſuaſion, or by force. To per-
fuade the people
of Crete, in whom
was the Power, to this new way
of Ordination, Titus muſt have ſpoken to this effect : Men of Crete,
Minos being a King, could not chuſe but have a natural incli-
nation to popular Power ; wherfore his pretence that JUPITER told him,
Power was to be in the People, may be ſuſpected to have bin imagin’d merely
for his own ends : or this is a certain ſign that JUPITER is no true, but
a feign'd God; ſeeing the true God will have it that the People ſhould have
no Power at all, but that ſuch, upon whom his Ambaſſadors ſhall confer
power, be without all diſpute obey’d. How ! are you ſtarting at this ! 'are
you ſolicitous for your Commonwealth ! It is true, that upon carnal principles
or human prudence, without Power in the People there can be no Commons
wealth : but Ifrael was a Commonwealth without power in the People ;
where Moses made all the Laws by the power inveſted in him by God, and
created all the Magiſtrats, not by popular ſuffrage, but by his Chirotheſia.
Wherfare, Men of Crete, know ye, that on whomſoever I lay my hands,
the ſame is in all ſpiritual Affairs, or matters of Church-Government, tá
be obey'd ly you, after the Jame manner that you have hitherto obey'd ſuch
ats or Prieſts as have bin ordain’d by your own Election, or Chiro-
tonia. Of what other nature the Arguments of Titus to the
pretended purpoſe could have bin, I am not able to imagin; nor
how this ſhould have don leſs than provoke the People to a dange-
rous jealouſy of ſuch a Doctrin. But Divines, to ſet all ſtreight,
think it enough to repeat the words of Paul to Titus in Greec:
For this cauſe left I thee in Crete (ivo xata Shons Tió AIV ZOPEO GUTÉIES ) that
De Corond. thou ſhouldji ordain Elders in every City. It is true that DEMOSTH E-
NEs ſpeaks ſom what like words concerning the Expedition of PHI-
LIP of Macedon in Peloponnefits (επειδή τυράννας εχεΐνος εν ταύταις ταις σό-
nes væTESOE) when he had ordain'd Tyrants in every City: but then Phi-
LIP had an Army; what Army did Pau ! leave with Titus? Or if
he ordain’d bis Élders neither of theſe two ways, I ſee no other than
that only by the known and legalChirotonia or Suffrage of the People.
But if this be clear, the Clergy com from Crete, not upon the Wings of
Titus, but of ICAR us, whoſe ambitious Wax is diffolv'd by the Sun.
So much, I conceive, is now diſcover'd concerning Church-Go-
vernment, as may ſhew that it was not of one, but of three kinds,
each obnoxious to the nature of the Civil Government under which it
was planted; in as much as the Chirotonia, or Ballot of Iſrael, being
firſt introduc'd pure, and without any mixture, as at the Ordination of
MATTHIAS, came afterwards to receive ſom mixture of the Chiro-
theſia, as in the Ordination of STEPHEN; and laſt of all by exclud-
ing the People, to degenerat wholly into the Chirotheſia of the Pref-
bytery, as in the Ordination of TIMOTHY: all this by the teſtimony
of Scripture, and in the pureſt times, even the age of the Apoſtles.
Whence Undertaking, to ſhew that as CHRIST intended his
Doctrin ſhould be preach'd to all Nations, fo he intended his Diſciplin
fhould be ſuch as might fute with any Government (as indeed, if the
choice of any of theſe three be lawful, it dos exactly) is, I hope, per-
form’d. For where the Government is Popular, it is the ſame with
the firſt; where it is Ariſtocratical or Monarchical, it agrees with the
Jaſt; and where it is mixd, it is between both, and reſponſible to the
ſecond.
Tit. 1. 5:
my
i
of Popular Government.
373
ſecond. Of theſe three in the farther exerciſe of their natural and Char. 5.
intended compliance with Human Prudence, it may be convenient to
give ſom fuller Exemplification.
THAT any other Ordination than that of the firſt kind for the
original Authority or Practice of it, whether in the Commonwealth
of Iſrael or in the Church of Chriſt, and indeed for the Prerogative
of the fame in nature, ſhould have bin introduc'd by the Apoſtles,
where it might, much leſs where the nature of the civil Policy would
admit of no other, is neither probable by Scripture nor Reaſon; whence
it is that in the Citys of Lycaonia and Piſidia, the Government of
theſe being then Popular, we do not find any mention at all of the
Chirotheſia, the Apoſtles in theſe places (XAQOTOVÚ OZLVTES TIGEO LUTÉZES K&T
EurAudixv) chirotonizing Elders in every Congregation.
TO evade this place, our Adverſarys turn tail to the things, and
make their whole flight at the words. In taking one of them into the
Diſputation, I ſhall take in all, for they run all upon the fame Quota-
tions, or with little addition.
THAT the word Chirotonizing, ſays Dr. HAMMOND, in this S. 31
place ſignifys no more than ordaining by the Impoſition of Hands, is
not lo generally acknowlegd. by late Writers, but that it may be
uſeful to give ſom fem Teſtimonys out of thoſe Writers which were
neareſt the times of the Scripture. Thus Philo JUD Eus of
JosEPH (βασιλέως ύπαρχος εχειροτονείτο) he was ordair'd Governor
of all Egypt under the King. So, again of Moses (uycuáv exergoto-
VēITO) he was conſtituted their Ruler. So of AARON's Sons (iegers
Exagótóve) God conſtituted them Prieſts. ALEXANDER Son of
ANTIOCHUS EPIPHANES writes to JONATHAN (Xergotova. Jofeph. An. L.
MEV DE Qgzegése) We (in the regal ſtile ) conſtitute thee High Prieſt. 13. c. s.
LUCIAN fays of HEPH ESTION (Θεόν χειροτονήσαι ή τετελευτηκότα)
that ALEXANDER made him a God when he was dead. APPIAN
(which is added out of Grotius, whence moſt of the reſt is taken)
to ſignify Election of Magiſtrats made by the Roman Emperors,
uſes no other word; and later Writers ſpeak of rom that were
chirotoniz'd Emperors by their Fathers. For the uſe of the word
among Chriſtian Writers, take one place in the Author of the Conſtitutions L. 7. c. 45.
for many; CLEMENT after the death of Linus (nex GIQOTÍVUTQI
was ordaind Biſhop of Rome by Peter. But what need any more?
CHRIST's Diſciples are ſaid (w porExerçotornjeévor irò 068) deſign’d Acti 10. 41.
or foreconſtituted by God the witneſſes of his Reſurrection: by all which
that of PAUL and BARNABAS (χειροτονήσαντες πρεσβυτέρες κατ' εκ-
unvoicev) is but conſtituting or creating Elders in every Church.
Wherfore they that have look ſo far back to the Original, as to think ii
neceſſary to render the word to create by Suffrages, are Jure guilty of a very
impertinent nicety. I promiſe you had this bin againſt one of our
Doctors
, it might have bin a rude Charge; but it is only againſt
Erasmus, BEZA, DIODATI, and ſuch as took upon them to
tranſlate the Switz, French, Italian, Belgic
, and (till the Epiſcopal
correction) the Engliſh Bibles. And what apparent cauſe is there of
ſuch confidence? What neceſſity is there even in the places alleg'd
why the word Chirotonia ſhould be underſtood in the ſenſe impos'd ?
The People of Egypt, till having fold their Lands they came to loſe
their Popular balance, were not Servants to PHARÁQH; wherfore
when JOSEPH was made Governor over all Egypt they were free:
1
now
374
The Prerogative
De Cor.
Book II. now that a King ſhould make a Governor of a free People without
their conſent, or
ſom advice as we ſay of his Parlament, is altogether
improbable, the rather becauſe a Protector, in the abſence or minority
of the King, has bin no otherwiſe made in England, nor pretends the
preſent Protector to any other title than the like Chirotonit. But
that Moses is ſaid by the ſame Author (who affirm'd that he intro-
duc'd the Chirotonia in Iſrael) to have bin chirotoniz'd Ruler of the
People, can in my judgment be no otherwiſe than originally and lite
rally taken, ſeeing God himſelf was no otherwiſe made King in Iſrael
than by the Suffrage of the People. That the like muſt be underſtood
of the Sons of AAR O N has bin already ſhewn. The Doctor is the
firſt has told me, that the plural number for the Royal Stile is ſo an-
tient as EPIPHANES: Sure I am it was not deriv'd from his Mace-
donian Predeceſſors, for in the Letters to the Athenians and the Thebans
recited by DEMOSTHENES, PHILIP of Macedon writes in the
ſingular number. But the Letter of EPIPHANES to JONA-
THAN muſt it ſeems import that he at ſingle hand (tho the
words carry double) had chirotoniz'd a High Prieſt of the Jews:
Who can help it? Som Princes have not only given out that their
Prieſts have bin chirotoniz'd when they were not, but that themſelves
have bin chirotoniz'd when there was no ſuch matter. When a
Prince ſays that he was chirotoniz'd or elected by the People, to talk
of Rhetoric is to have none. Divines in this caſe commonly under-
ſtand it to be proper, or literally meant; for to impoſe a new ſenſe is to
ſpoil the word ; and ſpoil the word, ſpoil the Prince. LUCIAN is a
Drol, and intends a Jeft, but not ſo good a one, as that he of all others
ſhould com neareſt to help up with a Hierarchy. For the Chirotonia,
or Election of the Roman Magiſtrats by the Suffrage of the People or
of the Army, every man knows that it is literal : SUIDAs himſelf
interpreting the word by this very example; where he affirms it to
ſignify Election or Ratification by the Many. The Quotation out of
the Conſtitutions, with thoſe of Biſhop Bilson, and others out of
the Greec Fathers, and out of Councils, do not only imply the word
Chirotonia, but the thing, while they all relate to that kind of Ordina-
tion, which being in thoſe Churches yet adminiſter'd as at the Ordi-
nation of STEFHEN, was not confer'd without the conſent of the
People. But it is above all, that laboring to prove the Chirotonia and
the Chirotheſia to be the ſame thing, they ſhould rely moſt upon the
place where the Apoftles are faid (σροκεχειροτονημένοι από το Θε8) to
have bin forechirotoniz'd by God; as if it were clear in this, that God
ordain'd the Apoſtles by the laying on of Hands, for ſo it muſt be un-
derſtood, or it makes no more for them than for us. Or if they mean it
only to fhew that the word Chirotonia or Suffrage is us’d for ſom Ordi-
nation that cannot be taken in our ſenſe ; ſo the word Chirotheſia
(67 BEGIS XEipäv) or laying on of Hands, where ANANIAS being
neither Biſhop nor Presbyter, but only a Diſciple, that is, a Chriſtian,
lays his hands upon Paul, is us’d for ſom Ordination that cannot be
taken in their ſenſe; or a man not ordain'd may ordain as well as they :
for to ſay that the Call was extraordinary, where the like is, or is
pre-
tended, will avail little. But there is no need that we ſhould
go
fo
near the wind; wherfore to give them all theſe places in their own
ſenſe, even till we com to the Citys in queſtion. What word in any
Language is not ſomtimes, nay frequently, us’d in fom other than the
proper
7
of Popular Government
375
1
proper ſenſe? With what elegance, if this be forbidden, can any Chap. 5.
man write or ſpeak? Is a word like a Woman that being taken with
a Metaphor, it can never be reſtor'd to the Original Virtue? If Chiro-
tonia has, as Divines pretend, loſt all other but their ſignification,
how ſhall we underſtand it in Iſaiah, or where Paul ſpeaks it of
the Brother (RAIZOTOPKOVÉTU iwò enningar) chirotoniz’d, or choſen by 2 Cor. 8. 19.
the Churches ? Certainly in this one place at leaſt it is of our ſenſe,
and in the word as gonexespotovnuévoi it is but once yer in all the New
Teſtament of any other; ſo that if we gain the place in controverſy,
we have it twice of our ſenſe in Scripture for once not in theirs,
but in any other : and in human Authors, they will not ſo much as
pretend to have it once for them of a hundred times for us; which
is pretty
well for the vindication of the property of one word, and
ſomwhat more perhaps than can be don for another. But in the
ſenſe of words that are ſomtimes properly and fomtimes improperly
taken, may we admit of the things wherof they are ſpoken for In-
terpreters? Or if Lillys and Roſes have bin almoſt as often ſaid of
Ladys Cheeks, muſt we underſtand them no otherwiſe when we are
ſpeaking of Gardens?
YES, ſays Dr. HAMMOND, and therfore to ſay of the Apoſtles
PAUL and BARNAB AS, that they created Elders by their own Suf-
frages, is no more than to ſay that they jointly did create, and indeed
being but two, there could be no place for Suffrages; and to affirm they did
it by the Suffrages of others, is not agreable to the pretended uſe of the
word; for where it is us’d of chuſing by Suffrages, as when the People are
ſaid to chirotonize, it is certain that their own, and not others Suffrages
are meant by it.
IT were hardly poſſible to have contriv’d a greater number of Affirma- His own words
tions in ſo ſmall a compaſs, nor to have gon farther in them from all truth. to Mr. Hobbs.
Phraſes, as words, are to be underſtood according to the Rule and
Law of Speech, which is Uſe: and thus that the Apoſtles created El-
ders by their own Suffrage, is not ſaid ; that they did it by the Suf-
frage of others, is neceſſarily imply'd; as alſo that the People are un-
derſtood to chirotonize as well when it is ſaid of the Preſidents of their
Aſſemblys, as of themſelves.
Diruit, ædificat, mutat quadrata rotundis:
WHEN a man is ſaid to build a Houſe, or marry a Daughter,
he is not underſtood to be the Maſon, or the Bridegroom: but the
Apoſtles built Churches in theſe Citys; therfore the People were not
the Maſons. The Apoſtles marry'd CHRIST to theſe Nations ;
therfore the People gave not their Conſent or Suffrage: wliat a Con-
ſtruction were this in ordinary diſcourſe or writing, and yet in the
Language, as I may fay, of a Commonwealth the Phrafe is more uſuala
How often dos DEMOSTHENES ſpeak of his . Laws (ſee ney Pfe- De Cərch:
phiſma, peruſe my Law) and thoſe of other privat men? after which
Copy the Parté, or Laws in the Commonwealth of Venice, are calld
by the names of the Propoſers, as were thoſe of Rome, Rupilia, Cor-
nelia, Trebonia ; in which manner we have POYNING's Law, and
ſom Statutes bearing no other Stile than Enacted by the King's moſt
Excellent Majeſty, which nevertheleſs are known to have bin all enacted
by the Parlament. Thus the Laws of Moses, RHADAMANTHUS,
S. 118.
a
MINOS
1
376
The Prerogative
Tiinocrat.
Book II. Minos, LYCURGUS, Solon, Romulus, King EDWARD,
and were (leges & conſuetudines quas vulgus elegerit) ſuch as the People
had confirm'd or choſen by their Chirotonia. But they may fay, gian-
țing you this uſe of ſpeech in relation to Laws, what have you of this
kind for Elections? The Exception is nice, but to leave none.
THE High Sherifs in England propoſing to their Countys the
Names of ſuch as ſtand, are ſaid to elect Parlament men. They that
thus propoſe Competitors to the Great Council in Venice are call's
Electors, and ſaid to elect the Magiſtrats. The Proedri, certain Ma-
giſtrats to whom it belong'd to put the Queſtion in the Repreſentative
of the People of Athens, conſiſting of one thouſand, were ſaid
Demoſt. conc. (P& XergoTOVÍCV zgoreñve) to give or make the Suffrage. The Theſmotheta,
wlio were Preſidents at the creation of Magiſtrats, were ſaid ( sfæreyes
Pol. l. 8. c. 8. XEIFOTOVEiv) to chirotonize the Generals. JOSEPHUS renders thoſe
words of God to SAMUEL, Hearken to the Voice of the People (veleúw
Ant. 1. 6. c. 4. δ: σε χειροτονείν αυτοίς βασιλέα ) I command thee to chirotonize them 4
King; which Authors vindicating Luke for liis underſtanding both
of the Grecian Cuſtoms, and property of Speech, at each of whichi
lie was expert, com up to the full and genuin interpretation of
the place in controverſy, where Paul and BARNABAS (X&'POTO-
νήσαντες αυτούς πρεσβυτέρας κατ' εκκλησίαν) chirotonizing them Elders in
every Congregation, can be no otherwiſe underſtood than that they here,
as Moses at the inſtitution of the Sanhedrim, SAMUEL at the
Election of the King, the Proedri at the paſſing of Laws, the 'I heſmo-
thete at the creation of Magiſtrats, the Electors in the great Council
of Venice, and the High Sherifs in the Countys of England, were no
more than Preſidents of that Chirotonia, which was giver. or made
by the Suffrage of the People.
WHERFOR E the Greec is thus render'd by thefe ſeveral Tranſla-
tions of the Bible.
That of. Zurich,
WHEN they had created them Elders by Suffrages in every con-
gregation.
That of Beza,
WHEN they had created them Elders by Suffrages in every Con-
gregation.
The French,
WHEN by the advice of the Aſſemblys they had eſtabliſh'd Elders,
The Italian,
WHEN by the advice of the Congregation they had conſtituted them
Elders.
That of Diodati,
WHEN they had ordain’d them in every Church by the common votes
of the Elders.
That appointed by the Synod of Dort,
WHEN in each Church, by the holding up of Hands, they had elected
Presbyters.
That us’d in England from the time of the Reformation
till the Epiſcopal correction of the ſame,
WHEN. they had ordain'd them Elders by Election in every Cone
gregation.
1
INDEED
of Popular Government
377
ny
45
INDEED the circumſtance of the Place forbids any other con- Chap: 5.
ſtruction of the words; for if the Suffrage or Chirotonia (which were
ſcarce ſenſe) related to the Apoſtles only, what needed they have don
that in every Congregation or Church, which they might have don
in any Chamber or Cloſer ? The circumſtance of the Action forbids
any other conſtruction; for the People were aſſembld upon occaſion
of Election or Creation of Officers, which cking dos not uſe to be
don in Aſſemblys gather'd for Divine Service: belides, theſe Congre-
gations were not always of one mind, but ſomtimes for ſacrificing to
the Apoſtles, ſomtimes for ſtoning them, which are acts of Power ;
wherfore they were Political Aſſemblys. Now theſe conſiſting alſo of
a People, that had in their Citys (quandam &utovojo) the govern
ment of themſelves, hence ariſes the ſtrongeſt circumſtance of all, for-
bidding any interpretation of the Text that might exclude them from
election of their own Magiſtrats, Prieſts, or Eccleſiaſtical Elders, ſuch
as had bin the Afiarchs, tho Heathen Prelats, yet remember'd by the
Scripture as affectionat Friends to Paul; or ſuch as were thoſe, tho Acts 19. 37.
to a better end, now ordain’d by the Apoſtles. Wherfore GROTIUS,
notwithſtanding all the art he uſes in other places to avoid this ſenſe,
giving his note upon the Text, yields, Tho chirotonizing may be ſaid of a-
Election made by one, or by the few; yet to the Election in this place
it is probable that the conſent of the People was given, no leſs being implid
in the beginning of the Chapter, where the Multitude believºd, where they
were ſtir'd up, where they were evil affected, and where
part
held with the
Jews, and part with the Apoſtles: Which ſhews that the People were
active in the buſineſs. But, ſays Dr. SE A M A M, There is difference
between the Conſent of the People, and the Power of the People : which is
not to underſtand the caſe in controverſy, nor to take notice that the
People wherof we are ſpeaking were under Popular Government;
for wherever the People are under Popular Government, between that
which is don by their conſent, and that which is don (juffu populi) by
their power, there is no difference. How ſhould the People give their
conſent, but by their Suffrage ? or what difference, where they have
Power, can there be between the Suffrage, and the Power of the Peo-
ple?
Dr. HAMMOND upon this point is far more quaint : where
the Scripture ſays, that the Multitude were evil effected, and where
part held with the Jews, and part with the Apoſtles, he thinks it e'en like
enough: But where it is ſaid that a great Multitude of the Jews, and
alſo of the Greecs believ’d, he ſeems to have no opinion of it: for, ſays
he, It is evident that Believers were at firſt but fem in every Town or City; $. 13%.
they were not whole Corporations at once converted, nor conſequently could
they act in a common capacity: but as CLEMENS Romanus Says, they
that were by the Apoſtles conſtituted Biſhops and Deacons in ſeveral Citys
and Regions, were conſtituted over thoſe that ſhould after believe, there
were oft fo fer at the preſent. And then, as faſt as any did com into
the Faith, they readily ſubmitted themſelves to thoſe by and under whom
they did com in, and were not at all troubled (honeſt men) with the con-
ſultation or deliberation about the way of electing their Teachers and
Guides.
COM away,to leave the Scripture a while, and follow CLEMENS;
be it ſo for diſcourſe fake, that in thoſe days there was no where any
ſuch thing as a great Multitude believing, much leſs whole States or
Сҫс
Common-
1
378
The Prerogative
S. 125.
Book II. Conmonwealths at once converted, wherby they might ſtill act in a conta
umon capacity, but only ſom privat or gather'd Congregations or Church-
es; and that in ſuch it was the Apoſtles Paul and BARNABAS
chirotoniz'd: yet theſe, as they were found, or as afterwards they
came to be made, muſt of neceſſity have bin Corporations ; for what
can a number of Men coming into á Society regulated by certain Laws,
Conſtitutions, or Form, be but a Corporation? Som Eccleſiaſtical
Policy or Diſciplin they muſt have liad; and that probably, ſeeing the
greateſt Legiſlators, even Moses himſelf, lave written after Copys,
according to ſom Pattern : what was this Pattern,and whence came it?
WHY, ſays he, not from their Heathen Cuſtoms, but from the Me-
tropolis ; for it muſt be remember'd, that wherſoever the Goſpel was preachd,
it came originally from Jeruſalem ; and then, as AGRIPPA in PHILÓ
$. 135. Says of that City, it was the Metropolis, not only of Judea, but
many
other Regions, becauſe of the Colonys thence ſent into Ægypt, Phenice,
and both the Syria's ; nay, to Pamphylia, Cilicia, and a great part of
Aſia, as far as Bithynia and Pontus. So in reaſon the Churches in Ly-
ſtra, Iconium, and Antioch, where Paul and BARNABA S ordain'd
Elders, were to follow the pattern at Jeruſalem ; and there, we know, it
was not by the Suffrage of the People, that an Elder was aſſum'd into the
Sanhedrim, but the Prince or Head of the Sanhedrim receiv’d him in by
Impoſition of Hands. It will be much more reaſonable to deduce the cira
cumſtances of ordaining Elders from the Cuſtoms familiar to them that
preach'd the Faith to them, than from the former uſages of them to whom
it was preach'd, who were not to diſpute, but to believe, and receive the
Inſtitutions as well as Doctrins which were brought them.
THESE, methinks, are ſtrange Arguments: The Goſpel came to
us from Rome, is Rome therfore the Metropolis of England? It is
true AGRIPPA being a Jew, and writing to CALIGULA in the be-
Piilo de lega- half of the Jews, not of the Chriſtians, tells him, That Jeruſalem is
rione ad Cai- the Metropolis of the Jews, and of all their Colonys ; ſo is London of the
Engliſh, and of all their Colonys: but dos it follow from hence that
citlier Jeruſalem or London is the Metropolis of Chriſtendorn ? But the
Jews had many Colonys in Aſia ; and therfore the Churches of Lyſtra,
Iconium, and Antioch were to follow the pattern at Jeruſalem. The
Jews indeed had Synagogs in Iconium and Lyſtra, as the French have
Churches in England; but is this a good argument, The French have
Churches in England, therfore the Engliſh are to follow the Orders of
the French Church?' The Jews withſtood the Goſpel at Iconium; for,
Afts 14.4. ſays the Text, the Multitude of the City was divided, and part held with
the Jews, and part with the Apoſtles: therfore the believing Iconians
muſt have acknowleg'd Jeruſalem to be their Metropolis, and were
to follow the pattern of that City : And what was that? Why there
we know it was not by the Suffrages of the People that an Elder was aſſum'd
into the Sanhedrim, but the Prince or Head of the Sanhedrim receiv’d
him in by Impoſition of Hands. The Government of the Iconians was
Popular, that of the Jews was Ariſtocratical; therfore the Iconians
receiving the Chriſtian Faith, were bound to change their Democracy
into Ariſtocracy. The Apoſtles, to comply with an Oligarchy, had
alter'd that Ordination, which originally (as at the Election of MA T-
THIAS) was popular, to Ariſtocracy ; therfore being now to plant
the Goſpel in a free State, they might not alter it from Ariſtocracy to
Democracy: To pleaſe the Jews they might change for the worſe;
therfore
1
um.
*
of Popular Governinent.
379
therfore to pleaſe the Iconians they might not charge for the better, Chap. s.
but muſt tell the People plainly, That they were not to diſpute, but to bea
lieve, and receive the Inſtitutions as well as Doétrins that were brought
them from the Metropolis
. How would this found to a People that
underſtood themſelves ?
Sic volo, ſic jubeo, ftat pro ratione voluntas.
THE right temper of a Metropolitan, to whom Popular Power
is a Heathen Cuſtom, and with whom nothing will agree but Prince-
ing of it in the Senat : But with the Apoſtles it was otherwiſe, wlio
making no words of the Chirotheſia where it was needleſs, were glad
of this occaſion to chirotonize, or elect thein Elders in every Congres
gation by Popular Suffrage. But this, they will ſay, is not to com off
from the haunt, but to run ſtill upon the People in a common or public
capacity. Tho the Scripture ſpeaks of great Multitudes believing,
believe it there is no ſuch thing: CLEMENS ſays they were very few,
their Aſſemblys privat, and very ſcanty things. As privat as they were,
by the judgment of Divines they were, it ſeems, to receive from their
Pattern (if that were the Sanhedrim) a Form that was public e-
nough; and why might not they have receiv'd this from that public
Form wherto they were accuſtom’d, rather than from a foren Policy,
and one contrary to their Cuſtoms? why ſhould they ſuffer ſuch Power
in new and privat, as they would not indure in their old and public
Magiſtrats ? Or, if they receiv'd the Scriptures, why ſhould they
chule that Ordination which would fit them worſt, rather than that
which would fit them beſt? that of TIMOTHY rather than that of
MATTHIAS? Or, let their Aſſemblys have bin never ſo privat or
ſcanty, yet if the Apoſtles chirotoniz'd them Elders in every Congregation,
is it not demonſtrable that they did receive that of MATTHIAS, and
not that of TIMOTHY?
THUS much for the Propagation of the pure, or firſt kind of Ec-
cleſiaſtical Policy to the Citys of Lycaonia. I he mix'd or ſecond kind
into which (the Chriſtian Presbytery delighting to follow the ſteps of
the Jewiſh) the former might foon degenerat, continu'd in the primi-
tive Church, to ſpeak with the leaſt for WALLE us brings it down
to CHARLES the Great) three hundred years after CHRIST:
which Aſſertion in Mr. HOBS, prov'd out of AMMIANUS MAR-
CELLINUS, Dr. HAMMOND has either willingly overſeen, or in-
cludes in this Anſwer, it is moſt viſibly void of all appearance of Truth. $. 138;
Wherfore to the Quotation mention'd I ſhall add the words of PLA.
TINA: DAM A sus the ſecond, by Nation a Bavarian, firnam'dBAG
NIARIUS, or as ſom will Popo, polleſs?d himſelf of the Papacy by force,
nd without conſent of the Clergy and of the People. Now what can be
clearer than that by this place the Clergy and the People had hitherto a
right to elect the Pope? 'The Doctor coms near the word of defiance
to Mr. Hobs, in a matter of fact ſo apparent to any judgment, that
I need not add what gos before in the Life of CLEMEN T the ſecond
where the Emperor ingages the People of Rome not to meddle with the
Election of the Pope without his eşpreſs Command: nor what follows
after in Leo the Ninth, where the whole power of Election was now
confer'd by the Emperor upon the Clergy. Again, Víctor the Second,
ſays the ſame Author, 'obtain’d the Papacy rather by favor of the En-
peror, than by free Suffrages of the Clergy and the People of Řome, who
apprehended the power of the Emperor, whoſe diſpleaſure they had ſomtime
incurr'd by creating Popes. So then the People, it is clear, had hitherto
Ссс 2
created
.
1
380
The Prerogative
Book II. created the Popes. The power of Election thus in the whole Clergy
came afterwards, as at this day, to be reſtrain'd to the Cardinals only;
and ſo to devolve into the third kind of Ordination exactly correſpon-
dent to the Sanhedrim, and their Chirotheſia, as it was exercis'd among
the converted Fers, when TIMOTHY was ordain’d by the laying on
of the Hands of the Presbytery.
NOW this is that with which, of all others, Divines are ſo in-
amor'd, that they will not indure it ſhould be ſaid there is any other :
It is alſo propitious above all the reſt to Monarchy, as that which ac-
cording to the inherent nature or impotence of Oligarchy, muſt have a
Prince at home or abroad to reſt upon, or becom the inevitable Prey
of the People. Herein lys the Arcanum or Secret of that Antipathy
which is between a Clergy and a Popular Government, and of that
Sympathy which is between the Miter and the Crown. A Prince re-
ceiving a Clergy with the Monopoly of their Chirotheſia, has no more
to do than to make a Metropolitan, by whom he governs them, and
by them the People, eſpecially if he indows them with good Reve-
nues; for ſo they becom an Eſtate of his Realm, and a more ſteddy
Pillar of his Throne than his Nobility themſelves, who as their depen-
dence is not ſo ſtrong, are of a more ſtirring nature. This is the
Gothic Model, from whence we had our Pattern, and in which No
Biſhop, no King.
THUS for the dignity of Eccleſiaſtical Policys, whether in Scrip-
ture or Human Prudence, Popular Government you ſee is naturally in-
clin’d to the very beſt, and the ſpiritual Ariſtocracy to the very worſt.
It is alſo remarkable that the Political Balance extends it ſelf to the
deciſion of the queſtion about Ordination: For as a People never of
fer’d to diſpute with a well-balanc'd Clergy, ſo a Clergy diſmounted
never gain'd any thing by diſputing with the People. As to the que-
ftion of Empire or Government (I propheti diſarmati Rovivano) the
Apoſtles became all things to all.
THUS beyond all medfure improſperous are this Divine's Vndertakings
to Mr. Hobs. againſt Mr.HO Bš, and the Vndertakings of Divines upon this Subject.
His own words
S. 122
Advertiſment to the Reader, or Direction to the Anſwerer.
T
HE Anſwer of this Book muſt ly in proving that the Apoſtles at the ſe-
veral times and places mention'd, introduc'd but one way of Ordination,
and that the ſame to which Divines now pretend : or if the Apoſtles divided,
that is to ſay, introduc'd divers ways of Ordination, then the People or Ma-
giſtrat may chuſe.
I HAVE taken the more leiſure and pains to ſtate, I think, all the caſes of
Controverſy that can ariſe out of the Commonwealth of Oceana, as you have ſeen
in theſe two Books, to the end I may be no more oblig'd to write, and yet not
omit writing on any occaſion that ſhall be offer'd; for if my Principles be over-
thrown (which when I ſee, I ſhall moſt ingenuouſly confeſs with thanks to the Au-
thor) ſuch an acknowlegement will ly id a little room; and this failing, I am de-
ceiv'd if I ſhall not now be able to thew any Writer againſt me that his Anſwer
is none, within the compaſs of three or four ſheets.
THIS alſo will be the fittelt way for Boys-play, with which I am ſure enough
to be entertain'd by the quibling Univerſity men; I mean a certain buſy Gang of
'em, who having publicly vañted that they would bring 40 examples againſt the
Balance
and ſince laid their Caps together
about it, have not produc'd one. Theſe
vants of theirs offering prejudice to truth and good Principles, were the cauſe why
they were indeed preſs'd to ſhew fom of their skill ; not that they were thought
fit judges of theſe things, but firſt that they had declar'd themſelves fo, and
next that they may know they are not.
*
Anh
of Popular Government.
381
TO argue from the Roman Dictator (an Imperfection which ruin'd
An Anſwer to three Objections againſt Popular Go-
vernment, that were given me after theſe two
Books were printed.
ON ARCHICAL Government is more natural, becauſe we ſee Object. të
M even in Commonwealths that they have recourſe to this, as La-,
cedemon in her Kings; Rome both in her Confuls and Dictas
tors; and Venice in her Dukes.
GOVERNMENT, whether Popular or Monarchical, is e. Anſwer:
qually artificial; wherfore to know which is more natural, we muſt
conſider what piece of Art coms neareſt to Nature: as for example,
whether a Ship or a Houſe be the more natural; and then it will be
eaſy to reſolve that a Ship is the more natural at Sea, and a Houſe at
Land. In like manner where one man or a few men are the Landlords,
a Monarchy muſt doubtleſs be the more natural; and where the whole
People are the Landlords, a Commonwealth: for how can we under-
ſtand that it ſhould be natural to a People, that can live of themſelves,
to give away the means of their livelihood to one or a few men that
they may ferve or obey ? Each Government is equally artificial in
effect, or in it felf; and equally natural in the cauſe, or the matter
upon
which it is founded.
A COMMONWEALTH conſiſts of the Senat propoſing,
the People reſolving, and the Magiſtracy executing ; ſo the Power of
the Magiſtrats (whether Kings as in Lacedemon, Conſuls as in Rome,
or Dukes as in Venice) is but barely executive: but to a Monarch be-
longs both the Reſult, and Execution too; wherfore that there have
bin Dukes, Conſuls, or Kings in Commonwealths (which were
quite of another nature) is no Argument that Monarchical Govern-
ment is for this cauſe the more natural.
AND if a man ſhall inſtance in a mix'd Government, as King
and Parlament ; to ſay, that the King in this was more natural than
the Parlament, muſt be a ſtrange Affirmation.
that Commonwealth, and was not to be found in any other ) that all
Commonwealths have had the like recourſe in exigences to the like
remedy, is quite contrary to the univerſal Teſtimony of Prudence or
Story.
A MAN who conſiders that the Commonwealth of Venice las
ſtood one thouſand years (which never any Monarchy did ) and
yet
ſhall affirm that Monarchical Government is more natural than Popu-
lar, muft affirm that a thing which is leſs natural may be more dura-
ble and permanent than a thing that is more natural.
WHETHER is a Government of Laws leſs natural than a Go.
vernment of Men? or is it more natural to a Prince to govern by
Laws or by Will? Compare the Violences and bloody Rapes perpe-
tually made upon the Crown, or Royal Dignity in the Monarchys of
the Hebrews and the Romans, with the State of the Government
under
382
The Prerogative, &c.
under either Commonwealth, and tell me which was lefs violent, or
wliether that which is more violent muſt therfore be more natural.
Object. 2.
THE Government of Heaven is a Monarchy, ſo is the Government
of Hell.
Anſwer.
IN this, ſays MACCHIAVEL, Princes loſe themſelves and their
Empire, that they neither know how to be perfectly good, nor intirely wicked.
He might as well have ſaid, that a Prince is always ſubject to Error
and Miſgovernment, becauſe
he is a Man, and not a God, nor a Devil.
A Shepherd to his Flock, a Plowman to his Team, is a better Na-
ture; and ſo not only an abſolute Prince, but as it were a God. The
Government of a better or of a ſuperior Nature, is to a worſe or in-
ferior as the Government of God. The Creator is another and a better
Nature than the Creature; the Government in Heaven is of the Crea-
tor over his Creatures, that have their whole dependence upon him,
and fubfiftence in him. Where the Prince or the Few have the whole
Lands, there is ſomwhat of dependence reſembling this; ſo the Go-
vernment there muſt of neceſſity be Monarchical or Ariſtocratical:
But where the People have no ſuch dependence, the cauſes of that
Government which is in Heaven are not in Earth; for neither is the
Prince a diſtinct or better Nature than the People, nor have they
their ſubliſtence by him, and therfore there can be no ſuch effect.
If a Man were good as God, there is no queſtion but he would be not
only a Prince but a God; would govern by Love, and be not only obey'd
but worſhip’d: or if he were ill as the Devil, and had as much power
to do miſchief, he would be dreaded as much, and ſo govern by Fear.
To which latter, the Nature of man has ſo much nearer approaches,
that tho we never ſaw upon Earth a Monarchy like that of Heaven,
yet it is certain the perfe&tion of the Turkiſh Policy lys in this, that
it coms neareſt to that of Hell.
Object. 3.
GOD inſtituted a Monarchy, namely in MELCHIZEDEC, before
he inſtituted a Commonwealth.
Anſwer.
IF MELCHIZEDEC was a King, ſo was ABRAHAM too;
tho one that paid him Tithes, or was his Subject: for ABRAHAM
made War, or had the power of the Sword, as the reſt of the Fa-
thers of Familys he fought againſt. So if CANAAN was a Mo-
narchy in thoſe days, it was ſuch a one as Germany is in theſe; where
the Princes alſo have as much the right of the Sword as the Emperor,
which coms rather (as has bin ſhewn already) to a Commonwealth.
But whether it were a Monarchy or a Commonwealth, we may fee
by the preſent ſtate of Germany that it was of no very good Example;
nor was MELCHIZEDEC otherwiſe made a King by God than
the Emperor, that is, as an Ordinance of Man.
* 1
THE
1
*
THE
A R T
0 F
L A W GIVING:
In Three BOOKS.
The Firſt, ſhewing the Foundations and Super-
ſtructures of all kinds of Government,
✓
The Second, ſhewing the Frames of the Com-
monwealths of Iſrael, and of the Jews.
The Third, ſhewing a Model fitted to the preſent
State, or Balance of this Nation.
The Order of the Work,
The Firſt Book.
TH
HE Preface, conſidering the Principles, or Nature of Family Go-
vernments.
CHAP. I. Conſidering the Principles, or Balance of National Govern-
ments; with the different kinds of the ſame.
CHAP. II. Shewing the variation of the Engliſh Balance.
CHAP. III. Of the fixation of the Balance, or of Agrarian Laws.
CHAP. IV. Shewing the Superſtructures of Governments.
THE Concluſion, obſerving that the Principles of Human Prudence
being good without proof out of Scripture, are nevertbeleſs ſuch as are
provable out of Scripture.
The Second Book.
T of Ifrael
HE Preface, Shewing that there were Commonwealths before that
of Iſrael.
CHAP. I. Shewing that Ifrael was a Commonwealth.
CHAP. II. Shewing what Commonwealth Iſrael was.
CHAP. III. Shewing the Anarchy, or ſtate of the Iſraelits ander their
Judges.
CHAP IV, Shewing the ſtate of the Iſraelits under their Kings to the
Captivity.
CHAP. V. Shewing the ſtate of the Jews in Captivity, and after their
return from Captivity; or the frame of the Jewiih Commonwealth : and
in that the Original of Ordination.
CHAP. VI. Shewing how Ordination was brought into the Chriſtian
Church, and the divers ways of the ſame at divers times in uſe with
the Apoſtles.
THE Concluſion, Shewing that neither God, nor Chrift, or the Apoſtles
ever inſtituted any Government Eccleſiaſtical or Civil, upon any other
Principles than thoſe only of Human Prudence.
The Third Book.
T
HE Preface, Containing a Model of Popular Government, pro-
pos’d notionally.
CHAP. I. Containing the Civil part of the Model, propos’d practicably.
CHAP. II. Containing the Religious part of the Model, propos’d pračti-
cably.
CHÁP. III. Containing the Military part of the Model, propos’d practi-
cably.
CHAP. IV. Containing the Provincial part of the Model, propos’d
practicably.
THE Concluſion, Shewing how the Model may be prov’d or examin'd;
and giving a brief Anſwer to Mr. Wren's last Book, intituld,
Monarchy aſſerted, &c.
385
K
THE
JI
FIRST BOOK,
SHEWING THE
FOUNDATIONS
A N D
1
11
SUPERSTRUCTURES
Of all kinds of
7
GOVERNMENT
If this Age fails me, the next will do me Juſtice.
The P R E F A CE,
Conſidering the Principles or Nature of
Family Government
D
IVINES, and the like ſtudious Aſſertors of Monarchy, havė
not laid their Principles ſo fairly, while they have conceald one
part from the right of Paternity, or from the Government of
Familys, which may be of two kinds; wheras they have takesz
notice but of one: For Family Government may be as neceſſarily Popular in
for caſes, as Monarchical in others.
To bem now the nature of the Monarchical Family. Prit the caſe a Monarchical
man has one thouſand Pounds a year, or therabouts; he marrys à Wife
, Family
has Children and Servants depending upon him (at his good will) in the di-
ſtribution of his Eftate for their livelihood. Suppoſe then that this Eſtate
coms to be ſpent or lost, where is the Monarchy of this Family? But if the
Maſter was no otherwiſe Monarchical than by virtue of his Eſtate
, then the
foundation
or balance of his Empire conſiſted in the thouſand pounds a year.
THAT from theſe principles there may alſo be a Popular Family, is ap- PopulaFa;
parent : For Suppoſe Siss or ten, having each three hundred pounds'a year,
mily.
or fo, sball agree to dwell together as one Family; can any one of theſe pretend
to be Lord and Maſter of the ſame, or to diſpoſe of the Eſtates of all the
reft? Or do they not agree together upon ſuch Orders, to which they conſent
equally to ſubmit? But if ſo, then certainly muſt the Government of this
Ddd
Family
V
*
1
Government
Government
of Men.
386
The Preface.
Book I. Family be a Government of Laws or Orders, and not the Government of
one, or of Som three or four of theſe men.
YET the one Man in the Monarchical Family giving Laws, and the
of Laws, and Many in the Popular Family doing no more, it may in this ſenſe be indiffe-
rently ſaid, That all Laws are made by Men. But it is plain that where
the Law is made by one Man, there it may be unmade by one man; ſo that
the Man is not govern’d by the Law, but the Law by the Man ; which a-
mounts to the Government of the Man, and not of the Law : Wheras the
Law being not to be made but by the Many, zo man is govern’d by another
man, but by that only which is the common interest; by which means this a-
mounts to a Government of Laws, and not of Men.
The facility THAT the Politics may not be thought an unneceſſary or difficult Art,
that is in true if theſe Principles be leſs than obvious and undeniable, even to any Woman
that knows what belongs to houſekeeping, I confeſs I have no more to ſay.
But in caſe what has bin Saidbe to all ſorts and capacitys evident, it is moſt
humbly ſubmitted to Princes and Parlaments, whether, without violence
or removing of Property, they can make a Popular Family of the Monar-
chical, or a Monarchical Family of the Popular? Or, whether that be
practicable or poſſible in a Nation, upon the like balance or foundation in Pro-
perty, which is not in a Family? A Family being but a ſmaller Society or
Nation, and a Nation but a greater Society or Family.
THAT which is uſually anſwer'd to this point, is, That the fix or ten,
betveen a So-thus agreing to make one Family, muſt have ſom Steward; and to make
and a Magi- ſuch a Steward in a Nation, is to make a King. But this is to imagin
ſtrat, cho fu- that the Steward of a Family is not anſwer able to the Maſters of it, or to
them upon whoſe Eſtates (and not upon his own) be defrays the whole
Charge : For otherwiſe this Stewardſhip cannot amount to Dominion, but
muſt com only to the true nature of Magiſtracy, and indeed of annual Ma-
giſtracy in a Commonwealth; ſeeing that ſuch Accounts in the years end,
at fartheſt
, uſe to be calculated, and that the Steward, Body and Eſtate,
is anſwerable for the ſame to the Proprietors or Maſters; who alſo have
the undoubted right of conſtituting ſuch another Steward or Stewards as
to them ſhall ſeem good, or of prolonging the Office of the ſame.
NOW, where a Nation is caſt, by
, the unſeen ways of Providence, into
of Lawgiving a diſorder of Government, the duty of ſuch particularly as are elected by the
is neceſſary.
People, is not ſo much to regard what has bin, as to provide for the ſu-
preme Law, or for the ſafety of the People, which conſiſts in the true Art
of Lawgiving
THE Art of Lawgiving is of two kinds; the one (as I may fay)
Lawgiving is falſe, the other true. The firſt conſiſts in the reduction of the Balance to
of two kinds, Arbitrary Superſtructures; which requires violence, as being contrary, to
Nature: The other in erecting neceſſary Superſtructures, that is, ſuch as
are conformable to the Balance or Foundation ; which, being purely natural,
requires that all interpoſition of Force be remov’d.
The difference
preme.
Where the art
The art of
СНА Р.
The Art of Lawgiving.
387
Chap. I.
CHAP. I.
Conſidering the Principles or Balance of National Governments;
with the different kinds of the ſame.
T
Gen. 3.190
in Property
HE Heaven, ſays DAVI D, even the Heavens are the Lords ; Pfal. 115. 16.
but the Earth has he given to the Children of Men : Yet, fays The Original of
God to the Father of theſe Children, In the ſweat of thy Face Property,
ſhalt thou eat thy Bread. Dii laborantibus fua munera vendunt. This
Donation of the Earth to Man coms to a kind of ſelling it for IN-
DUSTRY, a Treaſure which ſeems to purchaſe of God himſelf.
From the different kinds and ſucceſſes of this Induſtry, whether in
Arms, or in other Exerciſes of the Mind or Body, derives the natural
equity of Dominion or Property; and from the legal cſtabliſhment or
diſtribution of this Property (be it more or leſs approaching towards
the natural equity of the ſame) procedes all Government.
THE diſtribution of Property, ſo far as it regards the nature or The balance of
procreation of Government, lys in the overbalance of the fame : Empire consists
Juſt as a man, who has two thouſand pounds a year, may have a Re-
tinue, and conſequently a Strength, that is three times greater than
his who injoys but five hundred pounds a year. Not to ſpeak at this
time of Mony, which in ſmall Territorys may be of a like effect ; but
to inſiſt upon the main, which is Property in Land, the over balance
of this, as it was at firſt conſtituted, or coms inſenſibly to be chang'd
in a Nation, may be eſpecially of three kinds; that is, in One, in the
Pew, or in the Many.
THE overbalance of Land, three to one or therabouts, in one The generatiori
Man againſt the whole People, creates Abſolute Monarchy; as when Abfolute
Joseph had purchas?d all the Lands of the Egyptians for PHA-
The Conſtitution of a People in this and ſuch caſes, is ca-
pable of intire ſervitude. Buy us and our Land for Bread, and we and Gen. 47.19.
Our Land will be Servants to PHARAOH.
THE overbalance of Land to the ſame proportion, in the Few a-The generation
gainſt the whole People, creates Ariſtocracy, or Regulated Monarchy, Regulated
as of late in England : And hereupon ſays Samuel to the People 1 Sam. 2:
of Iſrael, when they would have a King, He will take your Fields, even
the beſt of them, and give them to his Servants. The conſtitution of a
People in this and the like caſes, is * neither capable of intire Liberty,
nor of intire Servitude.
THE overbalance of Land to the ſame proportion in the People, The generation
or where neither one nor the few overbalance the whole People, creates of Popular Go.
Popular Government; as in the diviſion of the Land of Canaan to the
whole People of Iſrael by lot.
The conftitution of a People in this
and the like caſes, is capable of intire Freedom, nay, not capable of a-
ny other ſettlement ; it being certain, that if a Monarch, or ſingle
Perſon in ſuch a State, thro the corruption or improvidence of their
Counſils
, might carry it; yet by the irreſiſtible force of Nature, or
the reaſon alleg’d by MOSES (I am not able to bear all this people a- Numb. 1 1.14.
Monarchy.
R A 0 H.
vernment.
* Nec totam libertatem nec coram ſervitutem pati poſſunt. Tacit.
D dd 2
alone,
388
The Art of Lawgiving.
Book I. lone, becauſe it is too heavy for me) he could not keep it; but out of the
deep Waters would cry to them, whoſe feet he had ſtuck in the mire.
of the Militia, WHEREVER the balance of a Government lys, there natu-
eative Voice rally is the Militia of the fame; and againſt him or them whierin the
Militia is naturally lodg'd, there can be no negative Vote.
If a Prince holds the overbalance, as in Turky, in him is the Mi-
litia, as the Janizarys and Timariots. If a Nobility has the over-
balance, the Militia is in them, as among us was ſeen in the Barons
Wars, and thoſe of Tork and Lancaſter ; and in France is ſeen, when
any conſiderable part of that Nobility rebelling, they are not to be
reduc'd, but by the major part of their Order adhering to the King.
If the People has the overbalance, which they had in Iſrael, the
Judg. 20.
Militia is in them; as in the four hundred thouſand firſt decreing
and then waging War againſt Benjamin: Where it may be inquir'd,
what Power there was on earth having a Negative Voice to this Al-
ſembly ? This always holds where there is Settlement, or where a
Government is natural. Where there is no Settlement, or where the
Government is unnatural, it procedes from one of theſe two cauſes;
either an imperfection in the Balance, or elſe ſuch a corruption in the
Lawgivers, wherby a Government is inſtituted contrary to the Balance.
Imperfe&i GO IMPERFECTIONS of the Balance, that is, where it is
not good or down weight, cauſe imperfect Governments; as thoſe of
the Roman and of the Florentin People, and thoſe of the Hebrew Kings
and Roman Emperors, being each exceding bloody, or at leaſt turbulent.
Tyranny,
GOVERNMENT againſt the balance in One, is Tyranny, as
Oligarchy, that of the Athenian PISISTRATUS: in the Few it is Oligarchy,
Anarchy.
as that of the Roman DECEMVIRS; in the Many Anarchy, as that
under the Neapolitan MAZI NELLO.
WHEREVER, thro Cauſes unforeſeen by Human Providence,
right of Govern- the Balance coms to be intirely chang'd, it is the more immediatly to be
attributed to Divine Providence: And ſince God cannot will the necef-
ſary cauſe, but he muſt alſo will the neceſſary effect or conſequence,
wliat Government ſoever is in the neceſſary direction of the Balance,
the ſame is of Divine Right. Wherfore, tho of the Iſraelits God ſays,
They have ſet up Kings, but not by me; they have made Princes, and í
knery it not; yet, to the ſmall Countries adjoining to the Aſyrian Em-
Jer. 27. 6,17. pire, he ſays, Now have I given all theſe Lands into the hand of the King
of Babylon my Servant-Šerve the King of Babylon, and live.
vernment.
The Divine
inent,
1
For. 8. 4.
CH A P. II.
3
Shewing the variation of the Engliſh Balance.
TH
HE Land in poſſeſſion of the Nobility and Clergy of England,
till HENRY 7th, cannot be eſteem'd to have overbalanc'd
thoſe held by the People leſs than four to one. Wheras in our days,
the Clergy being deſtroy'd, the Lands in poſſeſſion of the People
overbalance thoſe
held by the Nobility, at leaſt, nine in ten. In ſhew-
ing how this change came about, ſom would have it that I aſſume to
my ſelf more than my ſhare; tho they do not find me delivering that
which muſt rely upon Authority, and not vouching my Authors. But
HENRY the Seventh being conſcious of infirmity in his Title, yet
finding
*
1
The Art of Lawgiving.
389
1
finding with what ſtrength and vigor he was brought in by the Nobi- Chap. 2.
lity, conceiv'd jealouſys of the like Power in caſe of a decay or change
of Affections. Nondum orbis adoraverat Romam. The Lords yet led
Country lives, their Houſes were open to Retainers, Men experienc'd
in Military Affairs, and capable of commanding; their Hoſpitality was
the delight of their Tenants, who by their Tenures or Dependence
were oblig'd to follow their Lords in Arms. So that, this being the
Militia of the Nation, a few Noblemen diſcontented could at any time
levy a great Army; the effect wherof, both in the Barons Wars, and
thoſe of Tork and Lancaſter, had bin well known to divers Kings.
This ſtate of Affairs was that which inabid HENRY the Seventh to.
make his advantage of troubleſom times, and the frequent unrulineſs
of Retainers; while, under the pretence of curbing Riots, he obtain'd
the paſſing of ſuch Laws as did cut off theſe Retainers, wherby the
Nobility wholly loſt their Officers. Then, wheras the dependence of
the People upon their Lords was of a ſtrict ty or nature, he found
means to looſen this alſo by Laws, which he obtain’d upon as fair a .
pretence, even that of Population. Thus Farms were ſo brought to a Verulam. H. 7;
ſtandard, that the Houſes being kept up, each of them did of neceſſity in-
force a Dweller', and the proportion of Land laid to each Houſe, did of
neceſſity inforce that Dweller not to be a Begger or Cottager, but a man
able to keep Servants, and ſet the Plow on going. By which means a great
part of the Lands of this Nation came in effeci to be amortiz'd to the
hold
of the Teomanry, or middle People, wherof conſiſted the main body of
the Militia, hereby incredibly advancºd; and which henceforth, like
cleaner underwood leſs choak’d by their ſtaddles, began to grow exceding-
ly. But the Nobility, who by the former Laws had loſt their Offices,
by this loſt their Soldiery: Yet remain’d to them their Eſtates, tilí
the ſame Prince introducing the Statutes for Alienations, theſe alſo be-
came looſe; and the Lords leſs taken (for the reaſons Thewn) with
their Country lives, where their Trains were clip'd, by degrees be-
came more reſident at Court, where greater pomp and expence by the
Statutes of Alienations began to plume them of their Eſtates. The
Court was yet at Bridewel, nor reach'd London any farther than Temple-
Bar. The latter growth of this City, and in that, the declining of
the Balance to Popularity, derives from the decay of the Nobility and
of the Clergy. In the Reign of the ſucceding King were Abbys
(than which nothing more dwarfs a People) demoliſh’d. I did
not,
ì do not attribute the effects of theſe things thus far to my own partim
cular obſervation; but always did, and do attribute a ſenſe therof to
the Reign of Queen ELIZABETH, and the Wiſdom of her Council.
There is yet living Teſtimony, that the ruin of the Engliſh Monar-
chy, thro the cauſes mention’d, was frequently attributed to HENRY
the Seventh by Sir HENRY WOTTON; which Tradition is not
unlike to have deſcended to him from the Queen's Council. But there
is a difference between having the ſenſe of a thing, and making a right
uſe of that ſenſe. Let a man read PLUTARCH in the Lives of
AGIs, and of the GRACCHI, there can be no plainer demonſtra-
tion of the Lacedemonian or Roman Balance; yet read his Diſcourſe of
Government in his Morals, and he has forgot it: he makes no uſe,
no mention at all of any ſuch thing. Who could liave bin plainer upon
this point than Sir WALTER RALEIGH, where, to prove that the
Kings of Egypt were not elective but hereditary, he alleges that if the
Kings
#
Hiſt, of the
P. 200.
:
390
The Art of Lawgiving
Book I. Kings of Egypt had bin elective, the Children of PHARAOH muſt have
1 bin more mighty than the King, as Landlords of all Egypt, and the
World, part I.
King himſelf their Tenant? Yet when he coms to ſpeak of Govern-
ment, he has no regard to, no remembrance of any ſuch Principle.
In Mr. SELDEN'S Titles of Honor, he has demonſtrated the Eng-
liſ Balance of the Peerage, without making any application of it,
or indeed perceiving it there, or in times when the defect of the ſame
came to give ſo full a ſenſe of it. The like might be made apparent in
ARISTOTLE, in MACCHIAVEL, in my Lord VERULAM,
in all, in any Politician: there is not one of them in whom may not be
found as right a ſenſe of this Principle as in this preſent Narrative; or
in whom may be found a righter uſe of it than was made by any of
the Partys thus far concern'd in this ſtory, or by Queen ELIZA-
M. D.l.1.b.1c. BETH and her Council. If a Prince, ſays a great Author, to reform
a Government were oblig'd to depoſe himſelf, he might, in neglecting of it,
be capable of ſom excuſe ; but reformation of Government being that with
which a Principality may ſtand, he deſerves no excuſe at all. It is not in-
deed obſerv'd by this Author that where by reaſon of the declination
of the Balance to Popularity, the State requires Reformation in the
Superſtructures, there the Prince cannot rightly reform, unleſs from So-
verain Power he deſcends to a Principality in a Commonwealth : ne-
vertheleſs upon the like occaſions this fails not to be found ſo in Nature
and Experience. The growth of the People of England, ſince the
ruins mention’d of the Nobility and the Clergy, came in the Reign
of Queen ELIZABETH to more than ſtood with the intereſt, or
indeed the nature or poſſibility of a well founded or durable Monar-
chy; as was prudently perceiv’d, but withal temporiz'd by her
Council, who ( if the truth of her Government be rightly weigh’d)
ſeem rather to have put her upon the exerciſe of Principality in a
Commonwealth, than of Soverain Power in a Monarchy. Certain it
is, that ſhe courted not her Nobility, nor gave her mind (as do Mo-
narchs ſeated upon the like foundation) to balance her great Men,
or reflect upon their Power now inconſiderable ; but ruid wholly,
with an art he had to high perfe&ion, by humoring and bleſſing her
People. For this mere fhadow of a Commonwealth is ſhe yet famous,
and ſhall ever be ſo; tho had ſhe introduc'd the full perfection of the
Orders requiſit to Popular Government, her fame had bin greater.
Firſt, She had eſtabliſh'd ſuch a Principality to her Succeſſors, as they
might have retain'd. Secondly, This Principality (the Common-
Tire great Crun. wealth, as Rome of Romulus, being born of ſuch a Parent) might
cil of Venice have refain'd the Royal Dignity and Revenue to the full, both im-
but the Souve; prov'd and diſcharg’d of all Envy. Thirdly, It had ſav'd all
the
love Duke the Blood and Confuſion, which thro this neglect in her and her Succeſſors,
Siverain Dig- has ſince inſu’d. Fourthly, It had bequeath’d to the People a Light not
ſo naturally by them to be diſcoverd, which is a great pity. For
:1. D. 1.1.c.5.qven as the Many, thro the difference of opinions that muſt needs aa
bound among them, are not apt to introduce a Government, as not under-
Standing the good of it: ſo the Many, having by trial or experience once at-
tain'd to this underſtanding, agree not to quit ſuch a Government. And
laſtly, It had plac'd this Nation in that perfect felicity, which, ſo far
as concerns mere Prudence, is in the power of human nature to injoy.
To this Queen ſucceded King JAMES, who likewiſe regardleſs of
this point (into which nevertheleſs he ſaw ſo far as not ſeldom to
propheſy
nity.
*
The Art of Lawgiving.
391
1
,,
5
prophefy ſad things to his Succeſſors) neither his new Peerage, which Chap. 3.
in abundance he created, nor the old availd him any thing againſt
that dread wherin, more freely than prudently, he diſcover'd him-
ſelf to ſtand of Parlaments, as now mere Popular Councils, and run-
ning to popularity of Government like a Bowl down a hill; not ſo
much, I may fay, of Malice prepens’d, as by natural inſtinct, wher-
of the Petition of Right, well conſider’d, is a ſufficient Teſtimony. All
perſuaſion of Court Eloquence, all patience for ſuch, as but look'd
that way, was now loft. There remain'd nothing to the deſtruction
of a Monarchy, retaining but the name, more than a Prince who by
contending ſhould make the People to feel thoſe advantages which
they could not ſee. And this happend in the next King, who, too fe-
cure in that undoubted right wherby he was advanc'd to a 'Throne
which had no foundation, dard to put this to an unſeaſonable trial;
on whom therfore fell the Tower in Silo. Nor may we think that
they upon whom this Tower fell
, were Sinners above all men ; but
that we, unleſs we repent, and look better to the true foundations,
muſt likewiſe perilh. We have had latter Princes, latter Parlaments.
In what have they exceld, or where are they?' The Balance not
conſider'd, no effeétual work can be made as to ſettlement; and
conſider'd, as it now ſtands in England, requires to ſettlement no leſs
than the Superſtructures natural to Popular Government; and the Su-
perſtructures natural to Popular Government require no leſs than the
higheſt skill or art that is in Political Architecture. The ſum of whiclı
Particulars amounts to this, That
the ſafety of the People of England
is now plainly caſt upon skill or ſufficiency in Political Architecture :
it is not enough therfore, that there are honeſt men addicted to all the
good ends of a Commonwealth, unleſs there be skill alſo in the forma-
tion of thoſe proper means wherby ſuch Ends may be attain’d.
Which is a fad, but a true account; this being in all experience, and in
the judgment of all Politicians, that wherof the Many are incapable.
And tho the meaneſt Citizen, not informing the Commonwealth of
what he knows, or conceives to concern its ſafety, commits a hainous
Crime againſt God and his Country; yet ſuch is the temper of later
times, that a man, having offer'd any light in this particular, has ſcapa
well enough, if he be deſpis’d and not ruin’d.
BUT to procede: if the Balance, or ſtate of Property in a
Nation, be the efficient cauſe of Government, and, the Balance
being not fix'd, the Government (as by the preſent Narrative is
evincd) muſt remain inconſtant or floting; then the proceſs in the
formation of a Government muſt be firſt by a fixation of the Balance,
and next by erecting ſuch Superſtructures as to the nature therof are
neceſſary
1
CHA P. III.
Of Fixation of the Balance, or of Agrarian Laws.
F
PIXATION of the Balance of Property is not to be provided
for but by Laws; and the Laws, wherby ſuch a Proviſion is
made, are commonly call'd Agrarian Laws. Now as Governments,
thro the divers Balance of Property, are of divers or contrary na-
tures,
*
"
* *
392
The Art of Lawgiving.
Book I. tures, that is Monarchical or Popular; ſo are ſuch Laws. Monarchy
requires of the ſtandard of Property, that it be vaſt or great; and of
Agrarian Laws, that they hinder receſs or diminution, at leaſt in fo
much as is therby intaild upon Honor: But Popular Government re-
quires, that the ſtandard be moderat, and that its Agrarian prevent
accumulation. In a Territory not exceding England in Revenue, if the
It is at pre- Balance be in more hands than three hundred, it is declining from
ſent in more
Monarchy; and if it be in fewer than five thouſand hands, it is
without fixati-ſwerving from a Commonwealth : which as to this point may ſuffice
at preſent.
femer.
hands;
but
on may com into
CHAP. IV.
Shewing the Superſtructures of Governments.
TH
141
The Super-
HAT the Policy or Superſtructures of all abſolute Monarchis;
Structures of
more particularly of the Eaſtern Empires, are not only
Abſolute 110-
narchy contain'd, but meliorated in the Turkiſlo Government, requires no far-
ther proof than to compare them: but becauſe ſuch a work would
not ly in a ſmall compaſs, it ſhall ſuffice for this time to ſay, that
ſuch Superſtructures of Government as are natural to an abſolute
Prince, or the ſole Landlord of a large Territory, require for the firſt
ſtory of the Building, that, what Demeans he ſhall think fit to re-
ſerve being ſet apart, the reſt be divided into Horſe quarters or Mili-
tary Farms, for life or at will, and not otherwiſe : And that
every
Tiinariocs. Tenant for every hundred pounds a year ſo held, be, by condition
of his Tenure, oblig'd to attend his Soverain Lord in Perſon, in Arms,
and at his proper coſt and charges, with one Horſe, ſo often, and
ſo long as he ſhall be commanded upon ſervice. Theſe among the
Turks are callid Timariots.
Beglerbeks. THE fecond Story requires, that theſe Horſe quarters, or Mili-
tary Farms, be divided by convenient Precincts or Proportions into
diſtinct Provinces; and that each Province have one Governor or
Commander in chief of the ſame, at the will and pleaſure of his
Grand Signior, or for three years and no longer. Such among the
Turks (unleſs by additional lionors they be call'd Baſhaws or Viziers )
are the Beglerbegs.
Janizarys and
FOR the third Story, there muſt of neceſſity be a Mercenary
Spahys.
Army conſiſting both of Horſe and Foot, for the Guard of the Prince's
Perſon, and for the Guard of his Empire; by keeping the Governors
of Provinces fo divided, that they be not ſuffer'd to lay their arms
or heads together, or to hold correſpondence or intelligence with
one another. Which Mercenary Army ought not to be conſtituted
of ſuch as have already contracted ſom other intereſt; but to conliſt
of Men ſo educated from their very childhood, as not to know that
they have any other Parent, or native Country, than the Prince and
hiş Empire. Such among the Turks are the Foot call'd Janizarys,
and the Horſe calld Spahys.
THE Prince accommodated with a Privy Council, conſiſting of
1 9Grand Sig- ſuch as have bin Governors of Provinces, is the Topſtone: This Coun-
cil
among the Turks is call'd the Divan, and this Prince the Grand
Signior.
THE
The Divan and
nior.
*
The Art of Lawgiving.
393
4
cy, or pure Deo
THE Superſtructures proper to a regulated Monarchy; or to the Chap. 4.
Government
of a Prince (three or four hundred of whoſe Nobility, the swer
or of whoſe Nobility and Clergy hold three parts in four of the Terri-structures of
tory) muſt either be by his perſonal influence upon the Balance, or by Regulated
virtue of Orders.
IF a Prince, by eaſing his Nobility of Taxes, and feeding them
with ſuch as are extorted from the People, can ſo accommodat their
Ambition and Avarice with great Offices and Commands, that a Party
rebelling, he can overbalance and reduce them by a greater part of their
own Order, he may have greater Power and leſs Security, as at pre-
ſent in France.
THE ſafer way of this Government is by Orders; and the Orders
proper to it ſpecially conſiſt of a Hereditary Senat of the Nobility,
admitting alſo of the Clergy, and of a Repreſentative of the People
made up of the Lords menial Servants, or ſuch as by Tenure and for
Livelihood have immediat dependence upon them, as formerly in Eng-
land.
AN Ariſtocracy, or State of Nobility, to exclude the People muſt No ſuch thing'as
govern by a King; or to exclude a King, muſt govern by the People : pure Ariſtocra-
Nor is there, without a Senat or mixture of Ariſtocracy, any Popular
mocracy.
Government. Whence, tho for diſcourſe fake Politicians ſpeak of
pure Ariſtocracy, and pure Democracy, there is no ſuch thing as either
of theſe in Nature, Art, or Example.
WHERE the People are not overbalanc'd by one Man, or by the The Superfiruc-
Few, they are not capable of any other Superſtructures of Govern- tur government
ment, or of any other juſt and quiet ſettlement whatſoever, than of
ſuch only as conſiſts of a Senat as their Counſillors, of themſelves or their
Repreſentatives as Soverain Lords, and of a Magiſtracy anſwerable to
the People, as diſtributers and executioners of the Laws made by the
People. And thus much is of abfolute neceſſity to any or every Govern-
meni, that is or can be properly callid a Commonwealth, whether
it be well or ill order'd.
BUT the neceſſary definition of a Commonwealth, any thing well Definition of a
orderd, is, That it is a Government conſiſting of the Senat propoſing, Commons
the People reſolving, and the Magiſtracy executing.
MAGISTRACY is a ſtile proper to the executive part: yet be. Diſtinction of
cauſe in a Diſcourſe of this kind it is hardly avoidable, but that ſuch Magiſtracy:
are of the propoſing or reſolving Aſſemblys, will be ſomtimes compriz’d
under this name or ſtile, it ſhall be enough for excuſe to ſay, that Ma-
giſtracy may be eſteem'd of two kinds; the one proper or Executive,
the other improper or Legiſlative.
· A SENAT may conliſt of a Hereditary Order, elective for life Senats, and
by it ſelf, or by ſom Magiſtrat or Magiſtrats of the ſame; as the Se their kinds.
nat of Rome conſiſted of the Patrician Order therinto eligible
, firſt by
the Conſuls, and then by the Cenſors. A Senat may conliſt of Sena-
tors elected by the People for life, as that of Lacedemon: It may con-
liſt of Senators eligible by the People for terms, without any vacation
or interval, as the Senat of Venice; or with intervals, as the Senat of
Athens, which alſo for another difference was elected by lot.
A POPULAR Aſſembly may conſiſt of the whole People, as the Popular A,ſem.
great Council of Venice (for the Venetians, tho call?d, in reſpect of their blys and their
.
Subjects, Nobility, are all that free People which is compriz’d in that
Commonwealth) or of a Repreſentative, as in Ifrael. Again, a Re-
Eee
preſentative
wealth.
as
394
The Art of Lawgiving.
may be
Book I. preſentative of the People may be for life, as in the particular Citys or
Soveraintys of Holland, improperly callid Senats; or it upon
Rotation, that is to ſay, by changes or courſes, as that of Iſrael, and
the preſent Repreſentative in England; it may alſo be by lot, as the
Roman Tribes call’d the Prerogative, and the Jurevocatæ.
Supreme Mag! TO ſpeak of Magiſtrats in a Commonwealth, and all their kinds,
Strats, and their
kinds.
were to begin an endleſs diſcourſe; the preſent I ſhall therfore confine
to ſuch only as may be calld Supreme Magiſtrats. The Supreme
Magiſtracy of a Commonwealth may be in one or more; and it may
be for life, or for terms and vacations. In one elective by the People
for life; as in the Duke of Venice, whoſe Function is Civil and not
Military. In two Hereditarily; as in the two Kings of Lacedemon,
whoſe Function was rather Military than Civil. In nine annually e-
lective by the People; as in the nine Princes or Archons of Athens.
In two annually elected by the People; as the Roman Conſuls, whoſe
Power was both Military and Civil. In a word, it may be in one or
more, for life, or for terms and vacations, as ſhall beſt ſute with the
occaſion.
Other diffe-
SOM Commonwealths conſiſt of diſtinct Soveraintys, as Switzer-
rences in Com- Land and Holland; others are collected into one and the fame Sove-
rainty, as moſt of the reſt. Again, ſom Commonwealths have bin
upon Rotation or Courſes in the Repreſentative only, as Ifrael: Others
in the Magiſtracy only, as Rome. Som in the Senat and in the Ma-
giſtracy, as Athens and Venice : Others in ſom part of the Magiſtracy,
and in others not; as Lacedemon in the Ephori, and not in the Kings;
and Venice not in the Duke, nor in the Procuratori, but in all the reſt.
Holland, except in the Election of States Provincial (which is emer-
gent) admits not of
any
rotation or courſes. There may be a Com-
monwealth admitting of Rotation throout, as in the Senat, in the
Repreſentative, and in the Magiſtracy; as that propos’d in Oceana.
Rotation, or ROTATION, if it be perfect, is equal election by, and fuc-
Courſes.
ceſſion of the whole People to the Magiſtracy by terms and vaca-
tions.
EQUAL Election may be by Lot, as that of the Senat of Athens;
by Suffrage, as that of Lacedemon; or by Ballot, as that of Venice,which
of all others is the moſt equal.
THE Ballot, as it is us’d in Venice, conſiſts of a Lot; whence pro-
cedes the right of propoſing, and of an unſeen way of ſuffrage, or of
reſolving.
The different FROM the wonderful variety of parts, and the difference of mix-
Genius of Com- ture (hitherto ſcarce touch'd by any) reſult thoſe admirable diffe-
rences that are in the Conſtitution and Genius of Popular Govern-
ments; ſom being for defence, ſom for increaſe; fom more equal,
others inequal; ſom turbulent and ſeditious, others, like ſoft ſtreams,
in a perpetual tranquillity.
The cauſe of se- THAT which cauſes innat Sedition in a Commonwealth, is Ine-
monwealth." quality ; as in Rome, where the Senat oppreſt the People. But if a
Commonwealth be perfectly equal, it is void of Sedition, and has
attain’d to perfection, as being void of all internal cauſes of diſſo-
lution.
Definition of an A N equal Commonwealth is a Government founded upon a ba-
equil Conimon-
lance which is perfectly Popular, being well fix?d by a ſutable Agra-
rian; and which from the balance, thro the free fuffrage of the People
given
Popular E.
leliion.
The Ballot.
monwealths.
wealth.
*
The Art of Lawgiving.
395
and Orders.
given by the Ballot, amounts in the Superſtructures to a Senat debating Chap. 4:
and propoſing, a Repreſentative of the People reſolving, and a Ma-
giſtracy executing : each of clieſe three Orders being upon Courſes or
Rotation ; that is, elected for certain terms, injoining like. Intervals.
SUCH Conſtitutions in a Government aś regard the Frame of The difference
Model of it, are calld Orders; and ſuch things as are enacted by the betreen Laws
Legiſlative Orders, are call'd Laws.
TO undertake the binding of a Prince from invading Liberty,
and yet not to introduce the whole Orders neceſſary to Popular
Government, is to undertake a flat contradiction, or a plain iinpoſli-
bility.
Á PEOPLE or Aſſembly not underſtanding true Principles, give 11azard thro
leaſt credit to the beſt Orders, and ſo com to caſt themſelves upon par-the want of
ticular perſons : for where Orders are not credited, there Men mult be Principles.
truſted; and where Men are truſted, they find themſelves ſo well in
their power, that they are either for bringing in a Commonwealth by
degrees, or more probably not at all
. The deſire of bringing in a
Commonwealth by degrees, ariſes from want of conſidering that the
whole of a Commonwealth, as to charge or trouble, is leſs than the
half. He who has a Journy to go, dos not chufe to have but half a
Bridle; or but one Bootor Stirrup, tho theſe be fewer things, and com
but to half the charge; becauſe this would but neceſſitat him to pro-
cure more things, and perhaps more chargeable or dangerous.
Optimus ille animi vindex, liedentia pectus
Vincula qui rupit, dedoluitque ſemel.
The Concluſion:
mes
Obſerving that the Principles of Human Prudence being good with.
out proof of Scriptore, are nevertheleſs ſuch as are provable orit
of Scripture.
WHILE
HO imagins that the Romans governd by proof out of Scrip-
ture? Yet ſays PETER, Submit your ſelves to (Human Pru- 1 Pet. 2o 13;
dence, or) every Ordinance of Man ;, which relates more particularly
to the Government of the Romans.' The moſt frequent compariſon of
a Commonwealth is to a Ship; but who imagins that a Ship ought not
to be built according to the Art of the Shipwright; or govern'd accord-
ing to the Compaſs, unleſs thieſe be prov'd out of Scripture? Never-
theleſs, as hitherto I have prov'd the principles of Human Prudence in
the ſeveral parts out of Holy Scripture; fo I undertake to vindicat
them in the whole, as to the intire frame of Popular Government, in
the inſuing Book, by the ſame Authority and undeniable Evidence.
Eée, 2
THE
L
396
Book II.
Τ Η Ε
SECOND BOOK
Containing the
COMMON W E ALT HS
OF THE
HEBREWS:
1
Namely,
ELOHIM, or the Commonwealth of Iſrael;
AND
CABAL A, or the Commonwealth of the fews.
The PREFACE,
Shewing that there were Commonwealths before
that of Iſrael.
II
HI
VMAN Prudence is originally a Creature of God, and, with
reſpect to its exiſtence, as antient as human Nature; nor is it ſo
much younger in any of thoſe Effects or Ends for which it was
ordain'd by God, that we should think Ifrael to have bin the firſt
Commonwealth, or the firſt Popular Government that ever was, or that
was planted at leaſt in Canaan : for the like Governments, in the Coun.
trys therabout, there were both before and at the ſame time. It was
in Canaan, that MELCHISEDEC, King and Prieſt of Salem, had
reign°d during the time of A BRAHAM, who paid him Tithes of all that
Tiches origi- he had. Now Tithes before Iſrael and the inſtitution of the Levits, be-
pally belong long'd not to any ſort of Clergy, but to the Prince or State. Whence
sam. 2. is, Samuel in the deſcription of a King, tells the People that he will take
17. the tenth of their Goods. Thus ABRAHAM in paying Tithes to Mel-
CHISE DE C,, acknowleg’d him for his Prince. Tet had ABRAHAM
The Common- the right of the Sword, and made War with Kings, as thoſe of Sodom,
at his own diſcretion ; nihence Canaan may ſeem to have bin á Commons
wealth
i calch of Sa-
icon
*
The Art of Lawgiving.
397
The
dian.
gave to
Hi
wealth in thoſe days, much after the manner of Germany in ours. The Chap. i.
five Lords (perhaps five Tribuns) of the Philiſtins muſt
' needs have bin
Som Ariſtocracy at leaſt of Princes joining in one Bódy or Commonwealth. wealth of the
So Venice in her firſt Age was under Lords or Tribuns. It is little to be Philiſtins.
doubted, but the Government of JETHRO, King and Prieſt of Midian, The Comman-
was of a like nature with that of MELCHISEDEC, or of the Lace- wealth of Mi-
demonian Kings, who were alſo Prieſts; or that the Counſil he
Moses (being for the inſtitution of ſuch Fudicatorys às are not proper in
a Monarchy) was any other than according to the Orders of his own Coma
monwealth. And left theſe Governments ſhould ſeem leſs popular, the Em-
baſſador's of the Gibeonits coming to Joshua, ſay thus ; Our Elders The Commons-
or our Senat) and all the Inhabitants of our Country (or the popular walich of the
Aſſembly of the ſame) ſpoke to us ſaying; Go meet them, and ſay to Jothuż g. 18.
them, We are your Servants: therfore now make a League with us.
To make a League with a foren Nation evinces Soverain Power; and that
this League was made by the Senat and the People, evinces Gibeon tó
have bin a Popular Government. Such a thing then as Popular Governo
ment moſt undeniably there was before Ifrael. Now whether Ifrael were
« Popular Government or no, I ſhall refer to trial by the inſuing Chapter.
t.
C H A P. I.
Shewing that Iſrael w.1s a Commonwealth.
IT
as any
11
12
K1
T is ſaid of the Iſraelits that went firſt intó Egypt, All the Souls that Sect. i.
came out of the loins of Jacob were ſeventy Souls
. Theſe becoming Exod. 1. 5.
ſo many Fathers of Familys, and governing their own Familyş. by Ifraclicin Go-
the
Paternal Right, it follows that at firſt they ſo governd the whole vernment.
People ; yet not with any foverain Power (as may be caſily thought of the Princes
in a Country that had a Prince of its own) but by way only cf di- and Princes of
rection and advice. The People being thus accuſtom'd to this way,
Fımilys.
of theſe ſeventy came to dy, ſupply'd his place with another of
their Election; at leaſt for the probability of this opinion, we find
mention of MOSES, NADA B, A BIH U, and ſeventy of the Elders, Exod. 24. 9.
before the inſtitution of the Iſraelitiſ Senat or Sanhedrim. To theſe
and to the People MOSES propos'd his Laws. So I am ſure in the
* Latin it is expreſly ſaid, where by our Engliſh Tranſlation it is thus
render'd, This is the Law (and by the Law here is meant no leſs
than the whole Book of Deuteronomy) which Moses ſet before the
Children of Iſrael, whoſe Aſſemblys were not always without faction.
For KORAH, DATHAN, and ABIRA M, with two hundred Princes
of the Aſſembly
, famous in the Congregation, Men of Renown, bandy'd
themſelves againſt Moses, and his intended Eleétion of his Brother
AARON to the hereditary Prieſthood, reproaching him (ſays Jo-Antiq. 1.4.c.2.
SEPHUS) that he went about to diſpoſe of this Honor without the
Suffrage of the Congregation, therby affecting Tyranny, and a lly
1
* Hæc eft lex quam Moſes propoſuit, Deut. 4.44, and woheras bet nixt a Precept and a Commard'
there is a large difference; in places more than I can ſtand to number, where the Latin has it, præ-
cepit Mofes, the Englift: hos it, Mofes commanded.
uſurpa.
398
The Art of Lawgiving.
Whe
1.
Deut. 34. 4.
Book II. uſurpation of the Liberty of the People: which ſenſe alſo is imply'd
new by their upbraiding him in Scripture; Is it a ſmall thing that thou haft
Numb. 16. 13. brought us up out of the Land that flows with Milk and Hony, to kill us in
the Wilderneſs? except thou makeſt thy ſelf altogether a Prince over us.
But wheras the Scripture in all this preſumes theſe Incendiarys to have
Thit Moſes bely'd Moses, ſom will have all they thus laid to his charge, to
was no King. be no more, but leſs than truth; in as much as they will needs have
Moses not only to have bin a King, but to have bin a King exerciſing
Arbitrary Power, and ſuch Arbitrary Power as, being without any
bounds, "fully amounts to Tyranny.
Seat. 2.
THE word King is not a ſufficient definition of the Magiſtrat ſo
That Mofes ſtild: Between a Lacedemonian King and a Perſian King, or between
Laws to the either of theſe and a King of England, there was a vaſt difference.
People and
Both the Kings in Lacedemon were but as one Duke in Venice. The
their Suffrage. Venetians therfore, if it had ſo pleas’d them, might as well have calld
their Duke a King. Certainly it is, that he is not ſo much in the
Commonwealth, as are a few of his Counſillors ; and yet all Acts
of the Government run in his name, as if there were no Common-
wealth.
IT is ſaid (according to our Tranſlation) Moses commanded us
In what ſenſe a Law, &c. according to the Original, Moses (propos'd, or) gave
cal'd a "King" us a Lar, which is an Inheritance to the Congregation of JACOB. The
Duke of Venice has a right to propoſe or give Law in the Congrega-
tion or great Council of Venice ; where he, who ſees him litring,
would believe he were a King. And if Moses were King in Jeſita
run (or Iſrael) it was when the Heads of the People and the Tribes of
Iſrael were gather'd together. Paul, epitomizing the ſtory of the
Acts 13. People of Iſrael in his Šermon to the Antiochian Jews, ſhews how God
choſe their Fathers, exalted the People, deſtroy’d (for their ſakes) ſeven
Nations in the Land of Canaan, and divided their Land to them by Lots:
but ſpeaks not a word of any King given to them, till exprelly after
their Judges. But if Moses were a King, yet that he did not pro-
poſe, but command by his power the Laws which he gave to Iſrael,
dos not follow. For DAVID was a King, who nevertheleſs did no
otherwiſe make any Law than by Propoſition to the People, and their
1 Chron. 13. free Suffrage upon it. DAVID conſulted with the Captains of thou-
Sands, and hundreds, and with every Leader (of which Military Diſci-
plin of the Congregation of Iſrael more in due place will be ſhown)
and DAVID ſaid to all the Congregation, if it ſeems good to you, and
that it be of the Lord our God (tho he was a King, and a man after
God's own heart, he makes the People Judges what was of God)
let us ſend abroad to our Brethren every where that are left in all the Land
of Iſrael, and with them alſo to the Prieſts and Levits that are in their
Citys and Suburbs, that they (to the end this thingʻmay be perform’d
with the greateſt folemnity) may gather themſelves to us, and let us bring
the Ark of God to us : for we inquir'd not at it in the days of SAUL.
1 Sam. 4.. In the days of Eli the Ark was taken by the Philiſtins, who being
ſmitten till there was a deadly deſtruction throout all the City, and
their Divines attributing the cauſe therof to the detention of the Ark,
after ſeven months ſent it to Bethſhemeſh; wlicnce it was brought to
Kirjath-jearim, and there lodg’d in the houſe of AMINA D A B, be-
foré Saul was King, where it remain'd till ſuch time as DAVID
propos'd (in the manner ſhewn) to the People the reduction of the
ſame.
Ver. s.
ity
TH
The Art of Lawgiving.
399
1 Chron. 13.4.
*
Sect. 3.
fame. Upon this Propoſition, the People giving Suffrage are unani-Chap. I.
mous in their reſult; All the Congregation ſaid, that they would do ſo (not
that they could do no otherwiſe by a King, for they did not the like
by REHOBOAM, but that) the thing was right in the eys of all the
People. Moreover, David and the Captains of the Hoſt ſeparated to Chap. 25.
the Service fom of the Sons of ASAP H, and of HEMAN, and of JE-
DUTHUN, who ſhould propheſy with Harps, with Pſalterys and with
Cymbals ; that is, propos'd theſe Laws for Church Diſciplin, or Offices
of the Prieſts and 'Levits, to the fame Repreſentative of the People:
of which more in other places. Thus much in this, to ſhew, that if
Moses were a King, it dos not follow that he propos'd not his
Laws to a Congregation of the People having the power of Reſult.
To ſay that the Laws propos’d by Moses were the Dictat of GOD,
is not to evade, but to confirm the neceſſity of propoſing them to the
People, ſeeing the Laws or Dictats of God or of CHRIST, can no
otherwiſe be effectually receiv'd or imbrac'd by a People, or by a
privat man, than by the free ſuffrage of the Soul or Conſcience; and
not by Force or Rewards, which may as well eſtabliſh the Laws of
the Devil.
BUT for another way, ſuch a one as it is, of crowning Moses,
fom are poſitive that there lay an appeal from the ſeventy Elders to
That there lay
Him. Now the Command of God to Moses for the inſtitution of the 70 Elders
110 appeal from
the Seventy, is this: Gather to me ſeventy men of the Elders of Iſrael to Moſes.
that they may ſtand with thee. Upon which words let me ask, whether Numb. 11.16.
had MOSES thenceforth a diſtinct or a joint political Capacity? If
the Seventy ſtood with Moses, or it were a joint Capacity, then
Moses was no King in their ſenſe; and if it were diſtinct, then lay
there to Moses no appeal, even by his own Law: for thus in the
caſe of Appeals it is by him directed. If there ariſes a Controverſy too Deut. 6.
hard for thee in Judgment thou ſhalt com to the Prieſts and Levits
that is, to the ſeventy Elders) -- According to the ſentence of the
Law which they -Shall tell thee, thou ſhalt do And the man that will
do preſumtuouſly
, and will not hearken—even that man ſhall dy. In which
words all color of appeal from the ſeventy Elders is excluded.
BUT whether Moses were a King or no King, either his Sect. 4.
Power was more than that of King DAVID; or without propoſition
to, and reſult of the People it is plain that he could pafs no Law.
Now the Senat, Sanhedrim, or ſeventy Elders, came in the place of
Moses, or ſtood with him ; therfore their Power could be no more
than was that of Moses. So that if the Power of Moses were
never more in the point of Lawgiving, than to propoſe to the People;
then the power of the Sanliedrim could be no more in the point of
Lawgiving, than to propoſe to the People. Nor will it be found in Scrip-
ture that the Sanhedrim ever made any Law without the People, yet
it is found in Scripture that the People made a Law without the San-
hedrim, or levy'd War without them, which is all one: for where
there is a power to levy War, there will be the power of making
Law. And the occaſion upon which this is found, is the War levyä
againſt BENJAMIN by the Congregation conífting of four hun- Judg. 20.
dred thouſand. Again, 'If the Sanhedrim inherited the whole power
of Moses, and yet had no larger power in Lawmaking than to pro-
poſe to the People, then had Moses never any larger power in Law-
making than to propoſe to the People. Now where there is no King,
1
OF
1
i
4
The Art of Lawgiving,
400
Book II. oi no King in a diſtinct capacity from the Senat; and where the Senat
has no farther power in Lawmaking than to propoſe to the free ſuffrage
of the People; the Government there is a Commonwealth. Thus
having ſhewn that Ifrael was a Commonwealth, I com next to ſhew
what Commonwealth Iſrael was.
CH A P. II.
Shewing what Commonwealth Iſrael was.
Sect. 1.
A
51, 52
LL Political Methods that are collective of the People, muſt
Diviſion of the
neceſſarily begin with a diſtribution or diviſion of the People.
Children of Ir-
FOR the diviſion of the People of Iſrael, it was firſt Genealogical,
rael ; first Gea
nealogical. and then local. Now theſe are the Names (of the Anceſtors of the
Exod. I. Tribes, or) of the Children of Iſrael which came into Egypt, every
man and his Houfhold came with JACOB: REUBEN, SIMEON,
Levi, and JUDAH, ISSACHAR, ZEBUL UN, and BENJAMIN,
DAN, and NAPHTALI, GAD, and Asher.
Theſe being e-
leven in number, were the Sons of JACOB, who had alſo one more,
Gen. 41.50, namely JO SEPH. And to Joseph were born two Sons before the years
of Famin came, which ASENAh the Daaghter of POTIPHERAH
Prieſt of On, bore to him. · And Joseph called the name of the firſt-
born MANASSEH—and the name of the ſecond callid he EPHRAIM.
Which two (tho but Grandchildren) were adopted by JACOB for
Gen.48.16.
his Sons, in theſe words: Let my name be nam'd on them, and the name
of my Fathers ABRAHAM and I SA AC; and let them grow into a mul-
titude in the midſt of the Earth. From which addition to the former
came the Tribes of Iſrael, genealogically reckon'd, to be in number
thirteen. In the genealogical diſtribution ofthe Tribes there were alſo
obſerv'd certain Ranks, Qualitys, or Degrees, as appears by the Poll
made of Iſrael in the Wilderneſs of Sinai, and in the Tabernacle the
Congregation by Moses. Theſe Degrees were of two forts: firſt,
Phylarchs, or Princes of Tribes; and ſecondly, Patriarchs, or Prin:
ces of Familys : all hereditary Honors, and pertaining to the Firſtborn
of the Tribe or of the Family reſpectively. That this Poll be more
perfectly underſtood, will be uſeful ; for which cauſe I ſhall be ſom-
what more particular. Firſt, for the Phylarchs, or Princes of the
Tribcs; and then for the Patriarchs, or Princes of Familys. To begin
with the Princes of the Tribes.
Sect. 2.
MOSES and AARON ---aſſembld the Congregation (or political
Num. 1,17,18. Convention of the People) together on the firſt day of the ſecond month,
of thiberones after their Familys, by the houle of their Fathers, according to the num-
the Maſter ber of the names, from twenty years old and upward, by the poll. Where
every Phylarch or Prince of a Tribe, with the number of men at the
age mention’d and upward, throout his Tribe, are liſted much after
Num. I.
,
11
Ron in Sinai.
this inanner.
6
1. O F the Tribe of REUBEN, ELIZUR, Prince. The men of
military age in liis Tribe, forty fix thouſand five hundred.
2. O F the Tribe of SIMÉON, SHELA MIEL, Prince. The men
of military age in his Tribe, fifty nine thouſand three hundred.
*
3. OR
The Art of Lawgiving.
401
eht
ht
3. Of the Tribe of JuD A H, NASHON, Prince. The men of mili- Chap. 2.
tary age in his Tribe, threeſcore and fourteen thouſand ſix hundred.
4. Of the Tribe of ISSACHAR, NETHANIEL, Prince. Tlie
men of military age in his Tribe, fifty four thouſand four hundred.
5. OF the Tribe of ZE BULUN, ELI A B, Prince. The men of
military age in his Tribe, fifty ſeven thouſand four hundred.
6. Of the Tribe of EPHRAIM, ELISHA MA, Prince. The men
of military age in his Tribe, forty thouſand five hundred.
7. OF the Tribe of MANASSEH, GEMALIEL, Prince. The
men of military age in his Tribe, thirty two thouſand two hundred.
8. Of the Tribe of BENJAMIN, ABIDAN, Prince. The men of
military age in his Tribe, thirty five thouſand four hundred.
9.
Of the Tribe of DAN, AHI EZER, Prince. The men of mic
litary age in his Tribe, threeſcore and two thouſand ſeven hundred.
10. Of the Tribe of ASHER, PAGIEL, Prince. The men of
military age in his Tribe, forty one thouſand five hundred.
11. OF the Tribe of GAD, ELIASA PH, Prince. The men of mili-
tary age in his Tribe, forty five thouſand ſix hundred and fifty.
12. Of the Tribe of NAPHTALI, AHIRA, Prince. The men
of military age in his Tribe, fifty three thouſand four hundred.
THE total ſum of which Muſterroll in the twelve Tribes, amounts
to Princes twelve ; and men of military age ſix hundred three thou.
fand five hundred and fifty, beſides the Levits.
*
Call, Order, or
V. 39.
preſs'd.
ALL the firſtborn, ſays God, are mine. In which words is im- Séct. g.
ply'd that the Prieſthood, or right of preaching, inſtructing, or ad-The Levits
miniſtring divine things, belong’d, as it were, of natural right, to Tribe.
Fathers of Familys, or the Firſtborn; till the Lord took the Levits Num.3
. 12,13.
from among the Children of Iſrael, inſtead of the Firſtborn. Theſe being
thus taken, were ſer apart, and ſo liſted by themſelves (to omit their
ſeveral Familys, Functions, and Orders in the ſervice of the Taber-
nacle, and afterwards of the Temple, which would require a Volum)
much after this manner.
OF the Tribe of LEVI, AARON High Prieſt. The number
of all the Males of this Tribe, from a month old and upwards, twenty
and two thouſand. The manner how God took the Levits, is thus ex-
Thou ſhalt bring the Levits before the Tabernacle of the Congre- Num. 8. 9, 10,
gation, and thou ſhalt gather the whole Aſſembly together and the Chil. 11, 12.
dren of Iſrael (after the manner that the Levits lay their lands
upon
the Bullocks, or Sacrifice) Mall put their hands upon the Levits, in token
that they are ſacrific'dor ſeparated by the
free fuffrage of the People to
the Lord. For left the ſuffrage of the People be thought hereby to
have bịn excluded, ſo David and the Captains of the Hoft or Army a Chr. 29.
(which Army was the Repreſentative of the People) ſeparated to the
fèrvice fom of the Sons of ASAP H, of HEMAN, and of JE DUTHUN
who ſhould propheſy with Harps. But of the Congregations of the
People more in due place.
THE hereditary Right more ſpecially belonging to the Phylarchs, Sect. 4.
or Princes of the Tribes, conſiſted (as that of the Kings of Lacedemon, Theresa
of Athens, and of Rome) in the leading of the Armys of the Com-Grot. ad Num.
monwealth; which was diſtributed to them in this manner. The 10.
twelve Tribes were divided into four Brigades, every Brigade conſiſt-
ing of three Tribes. The leading of the firſt Brigade pertain'd to
Fff
JUDAH,
t
402
The Art of Lawgiving.
ما
Num. 3.
Book II. JUDAH, who in his Standard bore a Lion. The leading of the ſe-
wcond Brigade belong'd to REUBEN, who in his Standard bore a Man.
The leading of the third Brigade belong'd to EPHRAIM, who in his
Standard bore an Ox. The leading of the fourth Brigade belong'd to
DAN, who in his Standard bore an Eagle. Theſe four by the text
Num. 10. 14, are term'd Standards of the Camp, which were as the Roman Eagles.
18, 22, 25. Furthermore, as the ſubdiviſions of the Roman Legions had their pro-
per Inſigns, ſo had the Tribes here, which had not the leading of a
Brigade of the Camp. The Inſigns of theſe Tribes were calld Staves;
as the Staff of the Children of ISSA CHA R, the Staff of the Tribe of
ZE BULUN, which follow'd the Standard of JUDAH: The Staff of
the Tribe of SIMEON, the Staff of the Tribe of G AD, which fol-
low'd the Standard of REUBEN: The Staff of the Tribe of MA-
NAS SE H, the Staff of the Tribe of BENJAMIN, which follow'd
the Standard of EPHRAIM: The Staff of the Tribe of A SHER,
the Staff of the Tribe of NAPHTALI, which follow'd the Standard
of DAN. All which Inſigns or Staves in our Engliſh Tranſlation are
render'd Hoſts, or Armys.
IN the midſt of theſe four Squadrons or Brigades ſtood the Ta-
bernacle, with the Levits divided, and diſtributed by their diſtinct
Familys to the ſeveral uſes and carriages of the ſame, and lodg’d upon
the four quarters.
WHÈN the Ark fet forward, or the Camp remov’d, theſe words
were with folemnity pronounc'd by the General, or by the High Prieſt;
Num. 10. 35. Riſe up Lord, and let thy Enemys be ſcatter'd, and let them that hate thee
fly before thee
OF the Martial Diſciplin in which the Youth in Iſrael were edu-
cated to theſe ends, there was certainly more than is remaining in ſtory,
But that their Popular Aſſemblys were all held in Military Order and
Diſciplin, and that the deſerters of the Militia were anathematiz’d,
confiſcated, or put to the ſword, will in due time be made ſufficiently
apparent. For the preſent, you have the Iſraelitiſh Muſterroll, being
of a like nature with that in Athens call?d Lexiarcha, and that in Rome
call’d Cenſus. Nor has any Commonwealth bin well order'd in its
Militia, which has not bin diligent in the inſtitution and preſervation
of the like Military Rolls or Regiſters. Hitherto of the Phylarchs,
or Princes of the Tribes; the next rank or quality in this Government
was that of the Patriarchs or Princes of Familys.
THE word Family in many places of Scripture, is not to be taken
The Patriarchs, for a ſingle Houſhold; but as we take the word in Heraldry, that is,
chief of the Fa- for a Lineage or Kindred. The Patriarchs in Iſrael, taken in this
ces of Familys, ſenſe, were ſuch as, till of late years in Scotland, were they that could
with a cata- lead the whole Name or Kindred, and be follow'd by them. The Fa-
milys in Iſrael of this kind, that were greateſt about the plantation
fume.
of the Commonwcalth, were of REUBE N, the Henochits, the Phal-
luits, the Heſronits, and the Charmits.
OF Simeon, the Namuelits, the Jamnits, the Jachenits, the
Zarits, and the Shaulits.
OF GAD, the Zepbronits, the Haggits, the Shunits, the Oznits,
the Erits, the Arodits, and the Arelits.
OF JUDAH, the Shelanits, the Pharzits, the Zarhits, the Hef
yonits, and the Hamulits.
OF ISSA CHA R, the Tholaits, the Punits, the Shubits, and the
Shimranits.
OF
Sect. s.
log of the
Num. 26.
*
The Art of Lawgiving.
403
OF ZABUL U N; the Sardits, the Elonits, and the Fahleelits. Chap. I.
OF MANASSEH, the Machirits, the Galeadits, the Feezrits, the
Helekits, the Afrielits, the Sechemits, the Shemidaits
, and the Hepherits
.
OF EPHRAIM, the Shuthalaits, the Bachtits, the Tahanits, and
the Eranits.
OF BENJAMI N, the Belaits, the Aſhbelits,the Ahiramits,the Shu-
phamits, the Huphamits, the Ardits, the Heredits, and the Naamits.
OF DAN, the Suhamits.
OF Asher, the Jimnits, the Jesſuits, the Briits, the Heberits,
and the Melchielits.
OF NAPHTALI, the Jazrielits, the Gunits, the Jeferits, and the
Shillemits.
OF LEVI, the Gerfonits, the Caharits, and the Merarits. The
lieads of theſe were ſuch as are calld Patriarchs, Princes, heads of
Familys, or chief of the Fathers.
FAMILYS, tho far leſs ſubject than in other Governments to
decay or increaſe, might at divers times be different in Iſrael; as after
BENJAMIN was deſtroy'd, or after David had rais’d his own
and many other : But thus were the Familys at this time ſixty; the
Tribes being, as was ſhewn before, thirteen.
IN the firſt inftitution of the Tribes of Rome, that is, Ramnenſes,
Titienſes, and the Luceri, they were alſo genealogical, but long it
held not fo; genealogical diviſions in a Commonwealth being for the
moſt part of greater danger than uſe: but whether Genealogys be ob-
ſerv’d or not, the local way of diviſion is of abſolute neceſſity.
TO inſert the Geography of the Iſraelitiſh Tribes, would be as Sect. 6.
burdenſom both to the Reader and my felf, as needleſs to either. Of the Lot or
Ballet of ir
But the manner how the Tribes became local, was thro the diftribu-
tion of the Land of Canaan by Lot, and intailing the Lands ſo diſtribut-
ed upon the Proprietors and their Heirs for ever, without power of
alienation, in any ſuch manner as to deprive their Poſterity. The
Lot or Ballot in Iſrael was ſpecially of three uſes ; one for election of
Magiſtrats, another for the diſcovery of ſom ſecret Malefactor, and
a third for the diviſion of Lands. To which three heads I hope to re-
duce the whole Hiſtory of their Government: and this work once
perform’d, it will be caſy to repreſent the Commonwealth in its Po-
litical method.
To begin with the election of Magiſtrats, it was perform'd ſom-
times by the Lot, without Suffrage; and ſomtimes by the Ballot, that
is, by a mixture of Lot and Suffrage. For the clearer diſcovery of the
Order in Elections, I mult invert the Order of the Magiſtrats elected,
and begin with the King; then procede to the Judg, and com laſt of
all to the Sanhedrim, and the inferior Courts.
THE Inſtruments usd upon theſe occaſions, were firſt Lots, ſom
Blanks and fom Prizes; then Urns (that is, Pots) into which theſe
Lots were caſt
, and out of which they were afterwardsdrawn, or given
forth ; by what Officers, or with what farther Solemnity, dos not ap-
pear.
WHEN the People would needs have a King, Samuel being Sect. 7.
their Judg, did that, tho againſt his will, which nevertheleſs was no Planner of elect,
more than his duty: that is, firſt, hearken’d to the voice of the People ; 1 Sam.2.7,22.
or obey'd their vote. Secondly, Callid the People together to the Lord 1 Sam. 1o.17.
to Mizpeh. The political Aſſembly, or Congregation of the People
Fff 2
of
rael.
+
1.
سا
Deut. 23.
gregution at
II. 11.
& 20. J.
& 21. I.
tical Congres
3.
404
The Art of Lawgiving.
Book II. of Iſrael was call’d Ecclefia Dei, the Congregation of the Lord, as it
ought to have bin expreſt in the Trial of BENJAMIN, and is
Judg. 20.
in ſom places by our Tranſlation; as where an Eunuch (or one
unfit for marriage with a Daughter of Iſrael, which capacity was
neceſſary to the being inroſd of a Tribe) a Baſtard (as diſhonorable)
an Ammonite or Moabite (as deſcended of perfidious Nations) ſhall
not enter into the Congregation of the Lord: that is, ſhall not liave
right of ſuffrage with the People of Iſrael. So Samuel, by calling
For t.se Aſem-the Congregation of the Lord, or the People together to the Lord in Mizpeh
bly of the Con- (the place, before the taking of Jeruſalem, where they always held
their Parlaments or political Aſſemblys) did the office of the like Ma-
Mizrch, lee
Judz. 16. 17. giſtrats in Commonwealths. The People being thus aſſembļd (for
to be brief, I muſt procede with conjectures, which at firſt ſight will
ſeem bolder than really they are) SAMUEL cauſing the Urns to be
1 Sun1.7.6,15. ſet forth, pronounc'd the folemn form of words in uſe upon the like
1 Sam. 10. 19. Occaſion, which were theſe : Preſent your ſelves before the Lord by your
Tribes, and by your thouſands. The political Aſſemblys of the Children
The Military of Iſrael were held, or gather'd (as we ſay) with Drums beating,
and Colors flying; and if it were an extraordinary Congregation, that
gations in Il. is, a Congregation conſiſting of the whole People, as this, and
rael, lee Chap.
that for the trial of BENJAMIN, the Princes of the Tribes with
their Staves, and the Standards of the Camp (in the order
ſhewn) led up thc People to the Urns, or Ballot. Wherfore up-
on theſe words of SAMUEL, the Princes march'd in their known
diſciplin to the Urns. The Urns were two: in the one were twelve
Lots inſcrib'd with the names of the twelve Tribes; in the other were
alſo twelve other Lots, wherof eleven were Blanks, and the twelfth
infcrib'd with ſom word. What the Iſraelitiſh word was, dos not
appear; the Roman word upon the like occaſion was Prerogative :
wherfore ſeeing that which is loft muſt have bin of a like nature,
we may, for diſcourſe ſake, preſume it to have bin the ſame in Iſrael
as in Rome. And when Samuel had caus’d all the Tribes of Iſrael to
Tive!'rirogative com near, the Tribe of BENJAMIN was taken: That is, the name
of this Tribe being drawn out of the one Urn, to it was drawn the
Word Prerogative out of the other Urn; which being don, the Urns
were chang’d, or at leaſt the Lots. And wheras in the enumeration of
the Patriarchis, I ſhew'd by a catalog of their Names, that the whole
Tribe of BENJAMIN conſiſted of feven Familys; ſeven names by that
account ſhould have bin caſt into theone Urn, and as many Lots into the
other ; one of them being inſcrib'd with the word Prerogative,and the o-
ther ſix being Blanks. But both the names, and the number of Familys.
at this Ballot, are moſt likely to liave bin quite otherwiſe than in the
Judy. 20. 2. Catalog; becauſe ſince that time the Tribe of BENJAMIN had in
the far greater part bin deſtroy'd, and piec'd up again out of a Rem-
nant: fo for the number of the Familys, or the names of them, I can ſay
nothing. But the Urns being thus prepard, came BENJAMIN, as
now the Prerogative Tribe, to the Urns by Familys. And when S A-
MUEL had caus’d the Tribe of BENJAMIN to com near by their Fa-
milys, the Family of MATRI (which is a new one) was taken : that
is, lighting, in the manner ſhewn, upon the Prize, became the Pre-
rogative Family. This don, the Lots were again chang’d, and ſo
many
others as there were Houſholds in the Family of MATRI (for
Jf'.7.14,16, ſo you will find it in the trial of Achan) were caſt into the Urns.
Thus
1.20.
Tivic .
18.
*
The Art of Lawgiving.
405
2
That miracit.
1
21, 22.
Thus the Houſhold of Kish coming to be the Prerogative Houſhold, Chap. I.
and ſo many Lots as there were men of that Houſhold, being caſt into
the Urns, wherof the Prize was inſcrib'd King, came the Houſhold
of Kish, man by man, and SAUL the Son of KISH was taken.
We find it recorded by Livy, of TARQUINIUS PriscUs Sect. 8.
and of Servius Tullius, that before either of them was King,
lous deſignation
the one had his hat taken off, and carry'd up by an Eagle; the other of Magiſtats in
had a flame reſting upon his forehead, by which it was firmly be a common-
liev'd, that each of them was deſign’d of the Gods to be King : yet never underſtood
was this never ſo underſtood by themſelves, or any other, as to ex-to exclude the
clude the right of popular Suffrage in their Election, by which free Suffrage of
Priscus reign'd; or to create an opinion that any man ought to be their Ele&tionis
.
King of Rome, whom the People had not firſt commanded to reign
over them, to whoſe Election therfore SERVIUS, tho in poſſeſſion
of the Throne, thought it his beſt way to refer himſelf. Far be it
from me to compare Prodigys among Heathens, to Miracles in the
Church : But each People had of each a like opinion. Both Iſrael
and the Heathens began their popular Aſſemblys with Sacrifice. In
order to the election of SOLOMON, the Repreſentative of Iſrael 1 Chron. 29.
ſacrific’d Sacrifices to the Lord—even a thouſand Bullocks, a thouſand
Rames, and a thouſand Lambs, with their Drink-offerings, and Sacrifices
in abundance, for all Iſrael. And when they had thus
don, what Ma-
giſtrats ſoever the Iſraelits, or the Heathens elected, they always un-
derſtood to be elected by God. The Lot is caſt into the lap, but the Prov. 10. 33.
whole diſpoſing therof is of the Lord. And indeed, wheras in this man-
ner they made SOLOMON King, and ZADOC to be Prieſt, if we
will hold otherwiſe, we muſt think that neither the King nor the
Prieſt was elected by God. A man that is elected to ſom great Office,
by a King rightly qualify’d, muſt have little Religion, or hold himſelf
to be rais'd up by God.' Why then ſhould it be otherwiſe, when a
Magiſtrat is elected by a People rightly qualify’d? Or what conſe-
quence is there in ſaying, that Saul was anointed by SAMUEL
before he was elected by the People, or that God rais'd them up
Judges; therfore neither Saul nor the Judges were elected by the
People? That God elected the Kings in Iſrael, is certain; and that
the People no leſs for that did alſo elect the Kings, is as certain. One
from among thy Brethren ſhalt thou (that is, thou the People of Iſrael ) Deut. 17. 15.
Set King over thee. That God rais'd up. Judges in Iſrael, is certain ;
and that the People no leſs for that, did alſo elect the Judges, is as
certain. When the Children of Ammon made War againſt Iſrael,
Ifrael aſſembld themſelves together, and incamp'd in Mizpeh, whence the Judg. 10. 17.
Elders of Gilead went to fetch JEPHTA out of the Land of Tob.-- Judg.11.5,11.
Then JEPHTA went with the Elders of Gilead, and the People made
him Head and Captain over them ; and JEPHT A utter'd all his words
before the Lord in Mizpeh. But that SOLOMON was elected by the
Lot
, I do not affirm; it being moſt probable, that it was by Suffrage
only, DAVID propoſing, and the People reſolving. Nor whether
JEPHT A was elected by Suffrage, or by the Ballot, is it material
;
however that the ordinary Magiſtrats were elected by the Ballot, Í
little doubt.
THE ordinary Magiſtrats of this Commonwealth (as ſhall here. Sect.
after be more fully opend) were the Sanhedrim, or the ſeventy El- Election of se-
ders; and the inferior Courts or Judges, in the Gates of the Citys. Judge's of infe-
Forrior Courts
A
..
9.
:
,4
Take you
Deut. 1. 13.
406
The Art of Lawgiving.
Book II. For the Inſtitution and Election of theſe, Moses propos’d to the
People, or the Congregation of the Lord, in this manner.
wiſe men, and underſtanding, and known among your Tribes (iy xQme show )
and I will make (or conſtitute) them Rulers over you. Where, by the
way, left Moses in theſe words be thought to aſſume power, So-
LON, ſays ARISTOTLE (JherokegTixv x«Tu fioul ) made, or con-
ſtituted the Popular Government of Athens. In which he implys, not
that SOLON was a King, or had Soverain Power, but that he was
a Lawgiver, and had authority to propoſe to the People. Nor
is there more in the words of Moses; upon whoſe Propofition,
ſay Jewiſh Writers, each of the twelve Tribes, by free Suffrages,
elected (ix Competitors, and wrote their Names in fcrols, which they
deliver’d to Moses. Moses having thus preſented to him by the
twelve Tribes ſeventy and two Competitors for ſeventy Magiſtracys,
had by conſequence two more Competitors than were capable of
the Preferment to which they werc eleated by the People: Wherfore
Moses took two Urns, into the one he caſt the ſeventy two Names
preſented by the People; into the other, ſeventy two Lots, wherof
two were blanks, the reſt inſcrib'd with the word Elder. This don,
le call'd the Competitors to the Urn, where the ſeventy, to whoſe
Names came forth the Prizes, went up to the Tabernacle, the Seſſion-
S22 Numb. 11. houſe being there provided : and the two that drew the Blanks, name-
26. ly ELDAD and MEDAD, tho of them that were elected and
written by the Tribes, went not up to the Tabernacle, but remaind in
the Camp, as not having attaind to Magiſtracy. Thus, if this
place in Scripture can admit of no other Interpretation, ſo much as I
have cited out of the Talmud (tho otherwiſe, for the moſt part, but
a fabulous and indigeſted heap) muſt needs be good and valid. In
this manner, one or more Senators happening to dy, it was caſy for
each Tribe, chuſing one or more competitors accordingly out of
themſelves, to decide at the Urn which Competitor ſo choſen, ſhould
be the Magiſtrat, without partiality, or cauſe of feud ; which, if a
man conſiders this Conſtitution, was not perhaps ſo readily to be don
otherwiſe. The like, no doubt, was don for the inferior Courts,
except that ſuch Elections (the Commonwealth being once ſertld)
were more particular, and perform’d by that Tribe only in whoſe Gates
that Court was ſitting.
Sect. 1o.
THE firſt inſtitution of theſe Courts came to paſs in the manner
The ſtory of the following. Before the People were under orders, the whole Judica-
Sanbedrim, and
ture lay upon the ſhoulders of MOSES, who being overburden'd,
of the inferior
Courts, as to was adviſed by JETHRO. And Moses hearken’d to the voice of his
their firſt inſti. Father-in-law---and choſe (after the manner ſhewn) able men out of
all Ifrael, and made them. Heads over the People, Rulers of thouſands,
25. Rulers of hundreds, Rulers of fiftys, and Rulers of tens. The number
of which Rulers, compar’d with the number of the People, as in the
muſter roll at Sinai, mult in all have amounted to about ſix thou-
ſand. Theſe thus inſtituted, while Iſrael was an Army, came to be
the ſame when the Army was a Commonwealth : wherof it is ſaid,
Delit. 15.18. Judges and Officers ſhalt thou make thee in all thy Gates which the Lord
ihy God gives thee, throout thy Tribes; and they ſhall judg the People
with juft Judgment. Each of theſe Courts, by the practice of the
Jewiſh Commonwealchi, conſiſted of twenty three Elders. But ] E-
THRO, in his advice to Moses, adds concerning theſe Judicatcrys,
trion.
Fixod. 18. 24,
*
this
The Art of Lawgiving.
407
--
Exod. 18. 22,
16.
this Caution; Let them judg the People at all ſeaſons : and it ſhall be, that Chap. 2.
every great matter they
ſhall bring to thee, but every ſmall matter they shall Exod. ca.
judg: Sɔ ſhall it be eaſier for thy ſelf, and they ſhall bear the burden with thee.
Which nevertheleſs follow'd not according to JETHRO's promiſe,
the Appeals being ſuch to Moses that he gos with this complaint to
God: I am not able to bear all this people alone, becauſe it is too heavy for me. Numb. 11. 14,
Wherupon the Lord ſaid to Moses, Gather to me ſeventy men, of the
Elders of Iſrael, whom thou knoweſt to be Elders of the People, and Officers
over them; and bring them to the Tabernacle of the Congregation, that they
may ſtand with thee (but Crowns will have no rivals) and they all
bear the burden of the People with thee, that thou bear it not alone. But a
Monarch is one that muſt be alone. And MOS Es went out, and told Ver. 24.
the People the words of the Lord ( which a Monarch needed not to have
don) and gather'd the ſeventy men of the Elders of the People; the man-
ner wherof' is already ſhewn. JETHRO, being a Heathen, informs
Moses of the Orders of his own Commonwealth, which alſo was
Heatheniſh. Yet in Scripture is both Jethro join'd with MOSES,
and the Commonwealth of Midian with the Commonwealth of
Iſrael: How then coms it to be irreverend, or atheiſtical, as ſom ſay,
in Politicians (and while political Diſcourſes cannot otherwiſe be
manag’d) to compare, tho but by way of illuſtration, other Legiſla-
tors, or Politicians, as LY CURGUS, SOLON, with Moses; or
other Commonwealths, as Rome, and Venice, with that of Iſrael?
But the Authors of ſuch Objections had better have minded, tliat the
burden wherof Moses here complain’d, could in no manner be that
of ordinary Judicature, of which he was eas'd before by the advice
of JETHRO; and therfore muſt have bin that of Appeals only: fo
either the Sanhedrim bore no burden at all with Moses, or they
bore that of Appeals with him. And if ſo, how fay they that there
lay an Appeal from the ſeventy Elders to Moses?
BUT I ſaid the Lot was of uſe alſo toward the diſcovery of con- Sect. 11.
ceald Malefactors. Of this we have an Example in the detection of Lot, Ordel, or
Inquiſition by
ACHAN. The words of the Law, wherby the Fact of ACHA N Lot.
was criminal, are theſe: If thou ſhalt hear ſay in one of thy Citys, which Deur. 13.
the Lord thy God has given thee to dwell therin, ſaying, Certain men,
the Children of Belial, are gon out from among you, and have withdrawn
the Inhabitants of their City, ſaying, Let us go and ſerve other Gods,
which have not known: then ſhalt thou inquire, and make ſearch,
yoni
and ask diligently; and behold, if it be truth, and the thing certain, that
ſuch Abomination is wrought among you, thou ſhalt ſurely ſmite the In-
habitants of that City with the edg of the Sword, deſtroying it utterly,
and all that is therin, and the Cattel therof with the edg of the Sword.
And thou ſhalt gather all the ſpoil of it into the midſt of the ſtreet therof
,
and ſhalt burn with fire the City, and all the ſpoil therof
, every whit, for
the Lord thy God: and it ſhall be a heap for ever, it ſhall not be built again,
and there Wall
cleave nongkt of the accurs’d thing to thy hand. Among
the Citys that were given by God to Iſrael, was Jericho. Now
tho againſt this City, before it was taken, Joshua had folemnly Joſh. 6. 17.
and publicly denounc'd the Anathema, or Curſes contain’d in the
foregoing Law; and after the taking of it, liad, in all appearance, ex-
ecuted upon it the whole of the Anathema ſo pronounc'd: yet thro
ſubſequent loſſes before the City of Ai, being ſore afflicted, he en-
ter'd into ſuſpicion, that there might have bin ſom failure in the per-
formance
1
.
12, doc.
408
The Art of Lawgiving.
w
Earth upon
Book II. formance of the Law. Wherupon he rent his Clothes, and fell to the
his face before the Ark of the Lord, till the eventide, he and
Joſh. 7.6.
the Elders (or Sanhedrim of Iſrael) and put duft on their heads. The
Sanhedrim, in difficult caſes of the Law, inquir'd of God by Urim;
and the Sanhedrim, or the People, in caſes of high concernment to the
State, as in the War againſt BENJAMIN, inquir'd of the Ark.
When God was inquir'd of by Vrim, he gave his Oracle by the ſhining
of certain Stones or Jewels in the Breaſtplate of the High Prieſt.
When he was inquir’d of by the Ark, he gave his Oracle vocally from
the Mercy feat, which was plac'd upon the Ark of the Covenant.
Whence he who ſat between the Cherubims thus anſwer'd JOSHUA:
Joſh. 7. 10. Get thee up; wherfore lieſt thou thees upon thy face? Iſrael has ſinn'd
they have even taken of the accurs'd thing. Joshu A thus inform’d of
the Crime, but not ſo particularly of the Malefactor as to know
Joſh. 7.17. where to charge it, calls the whole People to the Urns; in one of which
it may be thought that there were eleven white Stones, or Lots, with
one black one, and in the other the twelve Names of the Tribes.
So Iſrael coming firſt by Tribes to the Urns, the Tribe of Juda H was
taken ; that is, this Tribe lighting upon the black Lot, was denoted
for the Guilty Tribe: Which conſiſting (as appear’d by the Catalog)
of five Familys, wherof the Zarhits were one, came next by Familys
to the Urn; wherin there might be four white Lots, and one black
one, by which the Zarhits were taken. In like manner came the
Family of the Zarhits by Houſholds, and the Houſhold of Z ABDI
was taken: Laſt of all came the Houſhold of Z ABDI man by man,
and ACHAN was taken. This kind of Inquiſition was perform'd
with ſuch Religion and Solemnity, that a man thus taken, if he had
any guilt, could have no face to conceal it ; or, if there were any
Witneſſes of his Crime, they could not any longer diſſemble it: and
whether le were convicted by teſtimony, or by his own confeſſion
(as now A CHAN) he was put to death. The like proceding, in part,
is imply'd to have bin in the caſe of JONATHAN; tho in this, by a-
greement therupon between SAUL and the People, it ſhould ſeem as
it but two Lots were put into the Urn, wherof Saul and JONA-
THAN, on the one part, drew the black : Or the Prince of the
Tribe of Judah drawing for the whold People, on the other part,
drew the white one ; and that the ſame ting put into the Urn again,
to decide it between SA UL and JONATHAN, JONATHAN drew
the black : wherupon, he being queſtion'd, confeſs'd the fact; and,
but that the People reſcu'd him from Saul, had bin put to death.
Seet. 12.
TO conclude with the uſe of the Lot, in the diviſion of the Land
Diſtribution of of Canaan. This (as implying the Foundation or Balance of the Go-
eravian Laws' vernment) ought to have bin the firſt in order, but happens here to
com laſt; becauſe theſe Orders were inſtituted in the Wilderneſs, and
ſo before the People had any Lands to divide. Nevertheleſs, this alſo
was propos’d by Moses, and reſolv'd by the People: By lot was their
Joſh. 14. 2. Inheritance, as the Lord commanded Moses; and now coms (as it
was, or ſhould have bin put in execution by Joshua) to be con-
ſider'd.
IT may be true, that the Roman People were the wiſelt that have
bin; and it is true, that they only of a People, did labor to introduce
Agrarian Laws, tho without effect: Otherwiſe, Levelling was never
introduc'd, but by the wiſdom and providence of ſom great Man, as
1 Sam. 14.
in Ifrael.
*
a
The Art of Lawgiving.
409
To many
a Moses, a JOSHUA, or a Lycurgus; or hy ſom accident, or Chap. 2.
accidents, bringing a Nobility to ruin, as the Laws of HENRY VII.
and the ways of HENRY VIII. in England.
BETWEEN the Muſter Roll in Sinai, wherby the men of Num. 1. 46.
military age, as was ſhewn, amounted to fix hundred and three thou- Num. 26. sr.
fand five hundred and fifty, in the twelve Tribes, and the Law for the
diviſion of the Land of Canaan, there happen'd a Plague, by which the
number of the People, upon a new Poll, came but to fix hundred and
one thouſand ſeven hundred and thirty. Upon this Poll was the Law
made, which runs thus : To theſe the Land ſhall be divided for an In-V, 53, 54, 55;
heritance, according to the number of names.
thou ſhalt give 56.
the more Inheritance, and to fewer thou ſhalt give the leſs inheritance :
Τοε every one ſhall his Inheritance be given, according to thoſe that were
number'd of him. Notwithſtanding, the Land ſhall be divided by lot :
According to the names of the Tribes of their Fathers, they ſhall inherit;
according to the lot fall the poſſeſſion therof be divided to many and few.
This Law, in another place, is repeated thus: You ſhall divide the Num. 33. 54.
Land by lot, for an inheritance among your Familys; and to many ye
Shall give the more Inheritance, and to the fewer ye ſhall give the leſs In-
heritance: Every man's inheritance ſhall be in the place where his Lot falls,
according to the Tribes of your
Fathers ye fall inherit.
IN the making of theſe Lots conſideration was as well had of the
goodneſs of the Land, as of the meaſure. Now ſuppoſing this Law
to have bin in the whole and methodically executed, the Canaanits
muſt firſt have bin totally rooted out of the Land of Canaan; which
Land, in that caſe (as ſom affirm) would have afforded to this Com-
monwealth a Root or Balance, conſiſting of three millions of Acres. Hecateus apud
Theſe, reckoning the whole People in the twelve Tribes, at ſix hun- Joſeph. cont.
dred and two thouſand (which is more than upon the later Poll they
came to) would have afforded to every man four Acres; to every
onc of the Patriarchs (upon the poll of the foregoing Catalog, where
they are ſixty) four thouſand Acres; to every one of the Princes of
the Tribes, fourteen thouſand Acres; to the Levitical Citys (being
forty eight, each with its Suburbs, of four thouſand Cubits diameter)
one hundred thouſand Acres; and yet for extraordinary Donations,
as to JOSHUA and CALEB (of which kind there were but few) ſom
eighty thouſand Acres might remain. Now it is true, four Acres to
a man may ſeem but a ſmall Lot; yet the Roman People, under Ro.
mulus, and long after, had but two. And it may very well be, that
one Acre in Canaan was worth two in Italy, eſpecially about Rome ;
and four in England, tho of the beſt fort : and if ſo it were that four
Acres in Paleſtin were worth ſixteen of our beſt, ſuch a Lot, at our
account, might be worth about thirty or forty, pounds a year, which,
for a popular ſhare, holding that rate thro the whole body of a Peo-
ple, was a large proportion. By this eſtimat, or what poſſibly could
be allow'd to the Princes of the Tribes and of the Familys, their ſhare
came not to a fixth of the whole : ſo the reſt remaining to the People,
the Balance of this Government muſt have bin purely popular. It is
true, that in the whole this Law of Moses for the diviſion of the
Land was never executed: but that in the parts fom ſuch courſe was
taken, is plain; for example, in the diviſion to ſeven Tribes, where
Joshua propoſes to the People in this manner : Give out from among
Joſhi. 18.4
you three men for each Tribe and they shall go throthe Land and de-
fcribe
Ap.
G88
410
The Art of Lawgiving.
Book II. ſcribe it. The People having reſolv'd accordingly, theſe went, and
paſs?d thro the Land, and deſcribd it by Citys into ſeven parts in a Book,
and came again to JOSHUA to the Hoſt at Shiloh. And Joshua caſt
Lots for them in Shiloh, before the Lord: and there Joshu A divided
the Land to the Children of Iſrael according to their diviſions. It were
abſurd to think that this Lot determind of proportions; for ſo a mean
man might have com to be richer than the Prince of his Tribe: but
the proportions allotted to Tribes being ſtated, tho at firſt but by gueſs,
and entred into the Lot Book of the Surveyors (who, ſays JOSEPHUS,
were moſt expert in Geometry) the Princes came firſt to the Urns,
wherof the one contain’d the names of the Tribes that were to draw,
the other the names of thoſe parcels of Land that were to be drawn
firſt to a whole Tribe. Thus the name of a Tribe, for example BEN-
JAMIN, being drawn out of one Urn, to that name a parcel was
drawn out of the other Urn; for example, the Country lying between
Jericho and Bethaven. This being don, and the Prince of the Tribe
having choſen in what one place he would take his ſtated and agreed
proportion, whether of fourteen thouſand Acres, or the like, the reſt
of the Country was ſubdivided in the Lot Book, according to the num-
ber of Familys in the Tribe of this Prince ; and the Parcels ſubdivided
being caſt
into the one Urn, the names of the Patriarchs into the other,
the fame Tribe came again by Familys. Thus every Patriarch making
choice in what one part of this Lot he would take his agreed propor-
tion, whether of four thouſand Acres, or the like ; the remainder
was again ſubdivided in the Lot Book, according to the number of
names in his Family: if they were more than the parcel would fur-
niſh at 'four Acres a man, then was that defect amended by addition
our of the next parcel; and if they were fewer, then tlie overplus
was caſt into the next parcel. By ſuch means the People came, or
miglit have com in the whole, and in every part, to the Lot of their
Inheritance; while every Tribe that was thus planted, became local,
Num. 36. 3.
without removal. Neither ſhall the Inheritance remove from one Tribe
to another Tribe; but every one of the Tribes of the Children of Iſrael
Shall keep himſelf to his own Inheritance.
THE Tribes thus planted, or to have bin planted, were twelve.
The Portion of The thirteenth, or that of LEVI, came in the like manner to the
Lot, for their forty eight Citys with their Suburbs, and receiv'd them
Joſh.21.4,5,6.
Num. 18. 20. accordingly; as the Lot came forth for the Familys of the Kola-
Deut. 16. s. thits, and the reſt. Theſe Iſrael gave to the Levits out of their In-
Deut. 18. 1. heritance: That is, theſe were ſuch as the twelve Tribes, before the
diviſion, ſet apart for the Levits, with the Tithes, and the Offerings;
which, tho this Tribe had no other Lands, made their portion by far
the beſt. The Tribes being henceforth reckond by their locality, and
theſe forty eight Citys being ſcatter'd throout the twelve Tribes, that
of Levi was no more computed as a diſtinct Tribe, but loſt as it
were the name, yet with advantage: for to their promiſcuous abode
they had the right of promiſcuous marriage ; no more in this point
Ezek. 44. 22. being injoin’d any of them, than to take Maidens of the Seed of Iſrael,
or at leaſt the Widows of Prieſts. And as in the Tribes where they
dwelt they had promiſcuous Marriage, ſo had they right of promiſ-
cuous Election; that is, of electing, and being elected, into all the
Magiſtracys and Offices of the Commonwealth : which they fo fre-
quently injoy’d, that the Sanhedrim is ſomtimes underſtood by their
sect. 13.
Levi.
names,
The Art of Lawgiving
411
1
names. If there ariſes a matter too hard for thee in judgment, thou ſhalt Chap. 2.
com to the Prieſts the Levits. Between the Law, and the Religion of
this Government, there was no difference; whence all Ecclefiaftical
Deut. 17. 8.
perſons were alſo Political perſons, of which the Levits were an intire
Tribe, fet more peculiarly apart to God (the King of this Common-
wealth) from all other cares, except that only of his Government.
Thus Moses did that with the ſafety of Liberty in Iſrael, which
Lycurgus could not do in Lacedemon, but by condemning the
Helots to perpetual Slavery : For wheras without theſe to be Tillers
of the Ground, the Citizens of Lacedemon could not be at leiſure for
the Commonwealth; the Children of Iſrael might imploy themſelves
in their domeſtic Affairs, as they requir’d, with ſafety : while the
Levits bore the burden of the Government; or, in caſe either their
privat Affairs permitted, or their Ambition promted, were equally
capable of Magiſtracy,
Of the Levitical Citys, three beyond, and three on this ſide Jordan, Sect. 14.
were Citys of Refuge. If a man was Nain, the next of kindred, by citys of Re-
the Laws of Iſrael, was the Avenger of Blood; and to the Avenger of Num. 35.
Blood it was lawful to ſlay him that ſlew his Kinſman, wherever he
could find him, except only in a City of Refuge. For this cauſe, if a
man had ſlain another, he Aed immediatly to one of theſe Sanctuarys;
whence nevertheleſs, the Judges in the Gates, within whoſe proper
verge the Crime was committed, caus'd the Malefactor to be brought
before them by a Guard, and judg'd between the Slayer and the A-
venger of Blood. If that which we call
Murder, or Manſlaughter,
was prov'd againſt him by two Witneſſes, he was put to death
but if it was found, as we ſay, Chancemedly, he was remanded
with a Guard to the City of Refuge; whence if, before the Death of
the High Prieſt, he was found wandring, it was lawful, not only for
the Avenger of Blood, but for any man elſe to ſlay him. The High
Prieſt being dead, he return'd, not home only, but to his Inheritance
alſo, with liberty and ſafety. "If a Prieſt had ſlain a man, his Refuge
was the Sanctuary : whence nevertheleſs lie was taken by the San-
hedrim; and, if upon trial he was found guilty of wilful Murder,
put to death. If a man coms preſumtuouſly upon his Neighbor to ſlay Exod. 21. 14.
him with guile, thou ſhalt take him from my Altar, that he may dy.
IN HERITANCES, being thus introduc'd by the Lot were im- Seat. .15.
movably intaild on the Proprietors and their Heirs for ever, by the inſti- The Jubile.
tution of the Jubile, or the return of Lands, however ſold or ingag’d,once
in fifty years to the antient Proprietor, or his lawful Heir. Yet remain'd
there two ways wherby Lots might be accumulated; the one by ca-
ſual Inheritance, the other by marriage with an Heireſs: as in the caſe Num. 35.
of ZELOPHEDAD, or of his Daughters.
NOW to bring the whole reſult of theſe hiſtorical parts, thus provºd, Sect. 16.
to the crue Political Method or Form, the Commonwealth inſtituted
by Moses was according to this Model.
THE whole People of Iſrael (thro a popular diſtribution of the Land of The Model of
Canaan among themſelves by lot, and the fixation of ſuch a popular Ba-
lance by their Agrarian Law, or Jubile
, intailing the inheritance of each rael
.
Proprietor upon his Heirs for ever) was locally divided into twelve
Tribes.
the Common-
wealth of T-
Ggga
EVERY
412
The Art of Lawgiving.
Book II.
EVERY Tribe had a double capacity, the one Military, the other
Civil.
ATRIBE, in its Military capacity, conſiſted of one Staff or Stan-
dard of the Camp, under the leading of its diſtinct and hereditary Prince,
as Coinmander in chief ; and of its Princes of Familys or chief Fathers,
as Captains of thouſands and Captains of hundreds.
ATRIB E, in its Political capacity, was next and immediatly under
the government of certain Judicatórys, ſitting in the Gates of it's Citys;
each of which conſiſted of twenty three Elders, elected for life, by free
Suffrage.
THE Soverain Power, and common Ligament of the twelve Tribes,
was the Sanhedrim of Iſrael
, and the Eccleſia Dei, or Congregation of the
Lord.
THE Sanhedrim was a Senat, conſiſting of ſeventy Elders for life, so
inſtituted by the free Election of six Competitors, in and by each Tribe
every Elder, or Senator of the Sanhedrim being taken out of this number of
Competitors by the Lot.
THE Congregation of the Lord was e Repreſentative of the People
of Iſrael, conſiſting of twenty four thouſand, for the term of one month ;
and perpetuated by the monthly Election of two thouſand Deputys of the
People in each Tribe.
THE Sanhedrim, upon a Law made, was a ſtanding Judicatory of Appeal
from the Courts in the Gates, throout the Tribes ; and upon a Law to be
made, whatever was propos’d by the Sanhedrim, and reſolv’d in the affir-
mative by the Congregation of the Lord, was an A&t of the Parlament of
Iſrael.
1
j
Deut. 4. 5,6. OF this Frame ſays Moses to the People (as well he might)
Behold, I have taught you Statutes and Judgments, even as the Lord my
God commanded me, that ye ſhould do jo in the Land whither you go to
posſeſs it. Keep therfore, and do them; for this is your Wiſdom, and
your Underſtanding in the fight of the Nations, which ſhall hear all theſe
Statutes, and ſay, Surely this great Nation is a wiſe and underſtanding
People. ' In another place, upon the Peoples obſerving this form, he
pronounces all the choiceſt Bleſſings; and in caſe of violation of the
ſame, a long enumeration of moſt dreadful Curſes, among which he
Deur. 28. 36. has this: The Lord ſhall bring thee, and thy King which thou Jhalt ſet over
thee, to a Nation which neither thou nor thy Fathers have known; and
there ſhalt thou ſerve other Gods, Wood and Stone. In which words,
firſt he charges the King upon the People as a Creature of their own,
and next oppoſes his Form pointblank to Monarchy; as is farther ap-
parent in the whole Antitheſis running throout that Chapter. To the
neglect of theſe Orders may be apply'd thoſe words of DAVID: I have
ſaid that ye are Gods—but ye ſhall dy like Men, and fall like one of the
Princes. But this Government can with no countenance of Reaſon,
or teſtimony of Story, give any man ground to argue from the Framé
thus inſtituted by Moses, that a Commonwealth rightly order'd and
eſtabliſh’d, may by any internal cauſe ariſing from ſuch Orders, be
f:roken or diſſolv’d; it being moſt apparent, that this was never eſta-
bliſh'd in any ſuch part as could poſſibly be holding, . Moses dy'd in
the Wilderneſs: and tho Joshua, bringing the People into the pro-
mis'd Land, did what he could, during his Life, towards the eſta.
bliſhment of the Form deſign'd' by MOSES; yet the hands of the
People
+
The Art of Lawgiving.
413
Peopl,e ſpecially after the death of JOSHUA, grew ſlack, and they Chap. 3.
rooted not out the Canaanits, which they were ſo often commanded
to do; and without which it was impoſſible their Commonwealth
ſhould take any root. Nevertheleſs, ſettled as it could be, it was in
ſom parts longer liv'd than any other Government has yet bin; as
having continu'd in ſom fort from Moses, to the diſperſion of the
Fews in the Reign of the Emperor ADRIAN ; being about one thou-
fand ſeven hundred years. But that it was never eſtabliſh'd accord-
ing to the neceſſity of the Form, or the true intent of Moses, is that
which muſt be made farther apparent throout the ſequel of the preſent
Book ; and firſt, in the ſtate of the Iſraelits under their Judges,
CHA P. III.
Shewing the Anarchy, or State of the Iſraelits under their fudges.
1 Chr. 27.
TH
HE Frame of that which I take to have bin the ordinary Con- Sect.T.
gregation or Repreſentative of the People of Iſrael, is not per- tion of the me
fectly ſhewn in Scripture, till the time of DAVID; when, tho it has preſentative of
nothing in it of a Monarchical Inſtitution, it is found intirely remain-the People of
ing, and perfectly deſcrib'd in theſe words: Now the Children of Iſrael Iſrael
after their number, to wit, the chief Fathers; and Captains of thouſands
and hundreds, and their Officers that ſerv’d the King in any matter of
the Courſes, which came in, and went out month by month, throout all the
months in the year ; of every Courſe were twenty and four thouſand men.
The Polls of the People, as they have bin hitherto Thewn, were taken
before their plantation in Canaan, where before they had Kings, they
had grown (according to the account of Paul) four hundred and Acts 13. 20.
fifty years; during which time, that they were excedingly increasid,
appears by the Poll of Military age taken by DAVID, and amount- 2 Sam. 24. 9.
ing to one Million three hundred thouſand : yet could chis Aſſembly
of the Children of Iſrael after their number, in one year, by monthly
rotation, take in the whole body of them. How theſe, being a Repre-
ſentative of the People, and thus changeable, could be otherwiſe col-
lected than by the monthly election of two thouſand in each Tribe, is
nor imaginable. And that both a Repreſentative of the People they
were, and thus changeable, is by the clear words of Scripture, and
the nature of the buſineſs upon which occaſion they are deſcrib'd, un-
deniably evincd: for DAVID propoſing, and the People reſolving,
they make SOLOMON King, and ZADOC Prieft. . This Aſſembly 1 Chr. 29. 22.
(beſides the Military Diſciplin therof, in which it differ'd little from
the Cuſtoms of ſuch other Commonwealths as have bin great and
martial) had not only a Civil, but a Military Office or Function, as
the ſtanding Guard or Army of this Country; which, tho ſmall
, and
lying in the very Teeth of its Enemys, could thus, by taking in every
man but for one month in a whole year, fo equally diſtribute a Burden,
to have bin otherwiſe intolerable to all, that it might be born by a few,
and ſcarce felt by any. This Epitome of that Body (already defcribd
under the leading of the ſeveral Princes of the Tribes, with their
Staves, and Standards of the Camp) ſeems to have bin commanded
by Lieutenants of the Princes, or Tribuns of the reſpective Tribes :
For,
1
414
The Art of Lawgiving.
That this Rec
Seet. 3.
Book II. For, over the firſt courſe, for the firſt month, was J A S O BEAM the
Son of Z ABDIEL (of the Children of PEREZ, or of the Family
Ver. 2. 3. of the Pharzits, in the Catalog of Judah) and of his courſe were
four and twenty thouſand.
IN this caſe the Princes did not. lead in perſon, but reſided in their
Tribes for the Government of the fame; whence, upon extraordinary
occaſions, they fent extraordinary Recruits : or in caſe of ſolemn War,
or ſom weighty affair, as the trial of a Tribe or the like, led up in
perſon, with their Staves and Standards; an Ordinance, whether we
regard the military or civil uſe of it, never enough to be admir’d.
Sect. 2.
IT is true, while, the whole People being an Army, Moses could
propoſe to them in body, or under their Staves and Standards of the
prezentative
was us'd in the Camp; as he needed not, ſo he us'd not any Repreſentative. But when
time of the Joshua had let the People go, and the Children of Iſrael went every
Judges.
Judg. 2.6.
man to his Inheritance, to poſſeſs the Land; how was it poſſible they
Judy. 3. 3.
ſhould poſſeſs any thing (while the five Lords of the Philiſtins, and all
the Canaanits, and the Sidonians, and the Hivits, remain'd yet among
them unconquer'd) without the wing of ſom ſuch Guard or Army as
this, under which to ſhelter themſelves? How was it equal, or polli-
ble, that a few of the People upon the guard of the whole, ſhould be
without relief, or ſuſtain all the burden? Or how could every man
be ſaid to go to his Inheritance to poſſeſs it, unleſs they perform’d
this or the like duty, by turns or courſes? Theſe things conſider'd,
there is little doubt but this Congregation was, according to the Inſti-
tution of Moses, put in practice by JOSHU A.
THUS ſtood both the Sanhedrim, and the Congregation, with
The diſsolution the inferior Courts, and all the Superſtructures of the Mofaical Com-
cal Common- monwealth, during the life of JOSHUA, and the Elders of the San-
liedrim that outliv'd him; but without any fufficient root for the
poſſible ſupport of it (the Canaanits not being deſtroy’d) or with
Judg. 2. 7, 11•luch roots only as were full of worms.
Wherfore, tho the People
Servd the Lord all the days of Joshua, and all the days of the Elders
that outliv?d Joshua; yet after the death of theſe, they did evil in
the fight of the Lord. And an Angel (a Meſſenger or Prophet) of the
Judg. 2. I, 2. Lord came up from Gilgal to Bochim, and ſaid, I made you go up out of
the Land of Egypt, and have brought you into the Land which I ſwore to
Deit. 7. 2. your Fathers; and I ſaid, I will never break my Covenant with you. And
je ſhall make no League with the Inhabitants of this Land, ye ſhall throw
down their Altars: but ye have not obey'd my Voice: Why have
you
don
Joſh 23. 3. this? Wherfore I alſo ſaid, I will not drive them out from before you : but
Exod. 23,33. they ſhall be as Thorns in your ſides, and their Gods ſhall be a ſnare to you.
Anciu.l.S.C.2. Upon the ſeveral Contents of which places, ſays Josephus, The
Ifraelits (after the death of JOSHUA, and the Elders that outliv'd
him) neglecting their Arms, betook themſelves to Tillage; and effeminated
with peace, gave their minds rather to what was eaſy and pleaſing, than
what was ſecure or honorable : forgetful of the Laws of God, and of their
Diſciplin. Wherupon God being moud to anger, admoniſh'd then by a
Prophet, that in ſparing the Canaanits, they had diſobey'd him; and that
in caſe they perſiſted, for his Mercys neglected they ſhould taſt of his Juſtice.
But they, tho terrify'd with the Oracle, were altogether averſe to the War;
both becauſe they were brib?d by the Canaanits, and thro luxury were be-
com unapt for labor : the form of their Commonwealth being now deprav’d,
and the Ariſtocratical part therof invalid ; while neither the Senat was
elected,
wealth.
ܪ
cli. 12. 2.
The Art of Lawgiving.
415
elected, nor the ſolemn Magiſtrats created as formerly
. In which words, Chap. 3.
:
the not electing of the Senat as formerly, being laid as a Crime by
JOSEPHUS to the People; he is firſt clear enough, for his part, that
the Senat was formerly elected by the People, and ought to have bin ſo
ſtill: And ſecondly, that henceforth the eleétion of the Senat, or San-
hedrim, was neglected by the People. So this Commonwealth, which,
thro the not rooting out of the Canaanits, had never any Foundation,
came now to fail alſo in lier Superſtructures : for proof wherof, the
Teſtimony of Scripture is no leſs pregnant in divers places. As where
JUDAH ſaid to SIMEON his Brother, Com up with me into my Lot, Judg, 1. 3,27,
that we may fight againſt the Canaanits, and I likewiſe will go with thee 29, br.
into thy Lot : So SIMEON went with him. In which words you have
a League made by two Tribes, and a War manag'd by them, while.
other Tribes, that is, EPHRAIM, MANASSE H, with the reſt, fat
ſtill : wheras, if there had bin now any common ligament, as while the
Sanhedrim was in being, ſuch leaguing, and ſuch warring by particu-
lar Tribes at their own diſcretion, could not have bin. Again, wheras
to judg a Tribe pertain'd to the Sanhedrim ; in the Judgment given
againſt BENJAMIN, by the Congregation of four hundred thou- Judg. 20
ſand, there is no mention of the Sanhedrim at all.
NOW Government is of ſuch a nature, that where there is no Sect. 4.
Senat, there muſt be ſom King, or ſom what like a King, and ſuch was No King, lim
the Judg of Iſrael; yet is not their reckoning valid, who from hence nat, som King.
compute the Monarchy of the Hebrews. Firſt, becauſe Paul di-Calav. ap. Liv.
ftinguiſhes between the Kings and the Judges. Secondly, becauſe Acts 13.
GIDEON, when he was a Judg, in refuſing to be King, dos the like.
Judg. 7. 23.
Thirdly, becauſe the Judges in Iſrael (as Dictators in other Common-
wealths) were not of conſtant Election, but upon Emergencys only.
Fourthly, becauſe complaint being made to the men of Judah of Judg. 15. 13.
their Judg SAMSON, they deliver'd him to the Philiſtins bound;
no leſs than did the Romans their Conſuls to the Samnits. And laſtly,
becauſe S A MUEL, diſtinguiſhing to perfection between Dictatorian
and Royal Power, or between the Magiſtracy of the Judg and of
the King, ſhews plainly (in that he hearken'd to the Voice of the Peo-
ple) that the one being without any balance at all, was at the diſcre-
tion of the People ; and that the other not to be founded but
Property in himſelf
, to which end he muſt take the beſt of their Fields,
and give them to his Servants) could no otherwiſe ſublilt than by hava
ing the People at the diſcretion of the King. This difference (being
no ſmall one) excepted, the office of the King and of the Judg was
much the ſame ; each conſiſting in judging the People, and going forth
with their Armys.
BUT whatever be the difference between theſe Magiſtracys, the Secř. s.
State of the Iſraelitiſh Commonwealth under the Judges was both void Befognia vcz-
of natural Superſtructures, and of the neceſſary Foundation; ſo the Zır o ſpegnere.
Ifraelits, when they were weak, ſerv’d the Philiſtins, as is imply'd in the
ſpeech of the men of Judah to their Judg: Knoweſt thou not that the Judg. 15. 11.
Philiſtins are Rulers over us?— And it came to paſs when Iſrael was ſtrong,
that they put the Canaanits to tribute, and did not utterly drive them out.
Which, as it was contrary to the Command of God, ſo was it pointblank
againſtall Prudence; for thus neither made they to themſelves Friends,
nor did they ruin their Enemys: which proceding, as it far’d witli
this Commonwealth, and was obſerv'd by HERENNIus in that Livy.
of
416
The Art of Lawgiving.
Seet. 6.
Ifrael.
18. I.
19. I.
Book II. of the Samnits, is the certain perdition of a People.
Of the diſorder of this people upon the diſſolution of the Mofaical
The Anarchy of Commonwealth, it is often ſaid that there was no King in Iſrael :
every man did that which was right in his own eys. That is, at the times
Judg. 17:6. related to by theſe expreſſions, there was neither Sanhedrim, nor Judg
in Iſrael: ſo every man, or at leaſt every Tribe govern'd it ſelf as it
21. 25. pleas’d. Which, nevertheleſs, is not ſo generally to be underſtood,
Judg. 20.
but that the Tribes (without either Judg or Sanhedrim) marching
up with their Standards and Staves of the Camp, not only aſſembla
the Congregation in the uſual place at Mizpeh, but there condemn'd
BENJAMIN for the rape of the Levits Concubine; and, marching
thence to put their Decree in execution, reduc'd that obftinat Tribe,
or rather deſtroy'd it by a Civil War.
WHEN in this, and divers other ways, they had pamper'd their
Enemys, and exhauſted themſelves, they grew (as well they might)
out of love with their Policy; eſpecially when after impious expoftu-
1 Sam. 4• 30 lation (Wherfore has the Lord (mitten us this day before the Philiſtins?)
they had, as it were, ſtak'd their God (let us fetch the Ark--that it,
# Sam. 7. Zo may ſave us ) and the Ark being taken by the Enemy, they fell to
Idolatry. To this it happen'd, that tho upon Repentance ſucceſs was
better, God having miraculouſly diſcomfited the Philiſtins before them;
yet SAMUEL their Judg was old, and had made his two Sons
(being takers of Bribes, and perverters of Juſtice) Judges over Iſrael.
Wherupon, there was no gainſaying, but a King they muſt and would
have.
Sect. 7.
The riſe of the
Hebrew Mo-
narchy.
CH A P. IV.
Shewing the State of the Iſraelics under their Kings, to the
Caprivity.
F
Set. . OR Method in this part, I ſhall firſt obſerve the Balance or
The Mcthod of
Foundation, then the Superſtructures of the Hebrew Monarchys;
this part.
and laſt of all, the Story of the Hebrew Kings.
Sect. 2. THE Balance neceſſary to Kingly Government, even where it is
The Balance of regulated or not abſolute, is thus deſcrib’d by SA MUEL. This will be the
1 Sam. 8. 11, manner of the King that ſhall reign over you: He will take your Fields, your
14. Vinyards, and your Oliveyards, even the beſt of them, and give them to
bis Servants, That is, there being no proviſion of this kind for a
King, and it being of natural neceſſity that a King muſt have ſuch an
Ariſtocracy or Nobility as may be able to ſupport the Monarchy
(which otherwiſe, to a People having equal ſhares in property, is
altogether incompatible ) it follows, that lie muſt take your Fields,
and give them to his Servants, or Creatures.
THIS notwithſtanding could not Saul do, in whoſe time the
Monarchy attain'd not to any balance, but was ſoon torn from him
2 Sam. 8. 1. - like the lap of a Garment. The Prince who gave that balance to this
1 Chron. 15. Monarchy, which it had, was DAVID: for beſides his other Con-
queſts, by which he brought the Moabits, the Syrians of Damaſcus,
the Ammonits, the Amalekits, the Edomits, to his Obedience, and ex-
tended his Border to the river Euphrates ; 'he-fmote the Philištins, and
ſubdu'd them, and took Gath and her Towns, out of the hand of the Phi-
liſtins.
The Art of Lawgiving.
417
menes.
liſtins. Now this Country which DAVID thus took, was part of Chap. 4.
the Land given to the People by God, and which was by the Law of
Moses to have bin divided by Lot to them. Wherfore if this di-
viſion follow'd not, but David having taken this Country, did
hold it in his particular Dominion or Property; then tho he took not
from the People any thing wherof they were in actual poſſeſſion,
yet, as to their legal Right, took hie from them (as Samuel had
forewarn'd) their Fields, their Vinyards, and their Oliveyards, even the
beſt of them, and gave them to bis Servants, or to a Nobility, which
by this means he introduc'd.
THE firſt Order of the Nobility thus inſtituted, were, as they are 2 Sam. 23.
term’d by our Tranſlators, David's Worthys: to theſe may be Chron. 11.
added, the great Officers of his Realm and Court, with ſuch as ſprang
out of both. But however, theſe things by advantage of foren Con-
queſt might be order'd by DAVID, or continu'd for the time of his
next Succeſſor ; certain it is, that the balance of Monarchy in ſo ſmall
a Country muſt be altogether inſufficient to it felf, or deſtructive to
the People.
THE Commonwealth of Lacedemon, being founded by LYCUR. Sect. 3.
gus upon the like Lots with theſe deſign’d by Moses, came, after A Parallel of
the ſpoil of Athens, to be deſtroy'd by Purchaſers, and brought into chal Balances
one hundred hands; wherupon, the People being rooted out, there re- in Iſrael and in
main'd no more to the two Kings, who were wont to go out with Plutarch in A-
great Armys, than one hundred Lords: nor any way, if they were in- gis and Cleo-
vaded, to defend themſelves, but by Mercenarys, or making War up-
on the Penny; which, at the fartheſt it would go (not computing the
difference in Diſciplin) reach'd not, in one third, thoſe Forces which
the popular Balance could at any time have afforded without Mony.
This fom of thoſe Kings perceiving, were of all cthers the moſt earncit
to return to the popular Balance. What Diſorders in a Country no
bigger than was theirs, or this of the Iſraelits, muſt, in caſe the like
courſe be not taken, of neceſſity follow, may be at large perus’d in the
ſtory of Lacedemon; and ſhall be fully ſhewn, when I com to the ſtory
of the preſent Kings.
FOR the Superſtructures of DAVID's Government, it has bin_Sect. 4.
ſhewn at large what the Congregation of Iſrael was; and that withi-Tlc Superftruc-
out the Congregation of Iſrael
, and their Reſult, there was not any brew Atorar-
Law made by DAVID. The like in the whole, or for the moſt part, chy.
was obſerv'd till REHOBO AM, who, refuſing to redreſs the Grie-
vances of the People, was depos’d by one part of this Congregation or
Parlament, and ſet up by another ; to the confuſion both of Parlament
and People. And DAVID (as after him JehOS HAPHAT) did
reſtore the Sanhedrim; I will not affirm, by popular Election, after
the ancient manner. He miglit do it perhaps, as he made JOAB over
the Hoſt, JEHOSHAPHAT Recorder, and SERAIAH Scribe. 1 Sam. 8. 15.
Certain it is
, the Jewiſh Writers hold unanimouſly, that the ſeventy
Elders were in DAVID's time, and by a good token; for they ſay,
to him only of all the Kings it was lawful, or permitted, to enter into
the Sanhedrim: which I the rather credit, for the words of DAVID,
where lie fays, I will praiſe the Lord with my whole Heart in the Council, Pfal. 111. I.
and in the Congregation of the Upright; which words relate to the Se-
nat, and the Congregation of Iſrael. The final cauſe of the popular
Congregation, in a Commonwealth, is to give ſuch a balance by their
Hhh
Reſult,
more
418
The Art of Lawgiving.
Sect. 5.
Book II. Reſult, as máy, and muſt keep the Senar from that Faction and Cor-
ruption, wherof it is not otherwiſe curable, or to ſet it upright. Yet
our Tranſlation gives the words cited, in this manner: I will praiſe the
Lord with my whole Heart in the Aſſembly of the Upright, and in the
Congregation. There are other Alluſions in the Engliſh Pſalms, of the
Pfal. 81. 1.
like nature, fhaded in like manner : As, God is preſent in the Congre-
gation of God (that is, in the Repreſentative of the People of Iſrael)
he judges among the Gods, that is, among the ſeventy Elders, or in the
Sanhedrim. What the Orders of the Iſraelitiſh Monarchy in the time
of DAVID were, tho our Tranſlators throout the Bible have don
what they could againſt Popular Government, is clear enough in many
ſuch places.
TO conclude thris Chapter with the ſtory of the Hebrew Kings:
The Story of the
Hebrew Kings.
Till REHOBOAM, and the diviſion (thro the cauſe mention d ) of
the Congregation in his time, the Monarchy of the Hebrews was one,
but came thenceforth to be torn into two: that of Judah, conſiſting
of two Tribes, Judah and Benjamin ; and that of Iſrael, con-
fiſting of the other ten. From which time this people, thus di-
vided, had little or no reſt from the flame of that Civil War, which,
once kindl'd between the two Realms or Factions, could never be ex-
tinguiſh'd but in the deſtruction of both. Nor was Civil War of
ſo new a date among them; SAUL, whoſe whole Reign was impo-
tent and perverſe, being conquer'd by DAVID; and DAVID in-
vaded by his Son ABSALOM ſo ſtrongly, that he fled before him.
SOLOMON, the next Succeſſor, happend to have a quiet Reign, by
ſettling himſelf upon his Throne in the death of ADONIJA H his elder
Brother, and in the depoſing of the High Prieſt ABIATHAR; yec
made he the yoke of the People grievous. After him, we have the Wár
between JER OBO A M and REHOBOAM. Then, the Conſpiracy
of BAASHA againſt NADAB King of Iſrael, which ends in the
deſtruction of JER OBO A M's Houſe, and the Uſurpation of his
Throne by BAASHA, which BA ASHA happens to leave to his Son
ASA. Againſt ASA riſes ZIMRI, Captain of the Chariots; kills
him with all his kindred, reigns ſeven days; at the end wherof he
burns himſelf for fear of OMR), who upon this occaſion is made Cap-
tain by one part of the People, as is alſo TIBNI by another. The
next Prize is plaid between OMRI and TIBNI, and their Facti-
ons; in which TINI is ſain. Upon this ſucceſs, OMRI out-
doing all liis Predeceſſors in Tyranny, leaves his Throne and Virtues
to his Son A HAB. Againſt AHAB drives Jehu furiouſly, de-
ſtroys him and his Family, gives the fleſh of his Queen JEZEBEL to
the Dogs, and receives a Preſent from thoſe of Samaria, even ſeventy
Heads of his Maſters Sons in Baskets. "To As A and JE HOSHA-
PHAT, Kings of Judah, belongs much Reverence. But upon this
Throne fat ĂTHALIAH; who, to reign, murder'd all her Grand-
children except one, which was JOASH. JOASH being hid by
the High Prieſt, at whoſe command ATHALIAH was ſom time
after ſlain, ends his Reign in being murder'd by his Servants. To
him fuccedes his Son AMAZI A, Alain alſo by his Servants. About
the ſame time ZACHARIAH King of Iſrael was ſmitten by SH AL-
L u M, who reignd in his ſtead : SHALLum by MANA HIM,
who reign’d in his ſtead: PeKA HA the Son of MA NAHIM
by PEKAH one of his Captains, who reign’d in his ſtead : PEKAH
by
)
The Art of Lawgiving.
4.19
1
by HOSHEA. HOSH E A having reign’d nine years, is carry'd by Clap. 4.
SALMA NAZZIR King of Aſſyria with the ten Tribes into Cap. i
tivity. Now might it be expcated that the Kingdom of Judah ſhould
injoy Peace: a good King they had, which was HEZE KLAH; but
to him ſucceded his Son MANASSE H, a fhedder of innocent
Blood. TOM ANISSE H ſucceded his Son AMMON, Nain by his
Servants. Josun the next, being a good Prince, is fucceded by
JE HO A HAZ, who being carry'd into Egypt, there dys a Priſoner,
while J E HOLA KIM his Brother becoms PHARAOH's Tributa-
ry.
The laſt of theſe Princes was ZE DEKIAH, in whoſe Reign
was Judah led away captive by NELU CHADNE Z ZAR. Thus
came the whole Enumeration of thoſe dreadful Curſes denounc'd by Deut. 28.
Moses in this caſe, to be fulfil'd in this people; of whom it is alſo
ſaid, I gave them a King in my anger, and took him away in my wrath. Hoſ. 13. 11.
TO conclude this Story with the Reſemblances or Differences that
are between Monarchical and Popular Government: What Parallel can
there be beyond the Storys wherby each of them are ſo largely de-
ſcrib'd in Scripture? True it is, that A HIMELEC uſurp'd the
Magiſtracy of Judg in Iſrael, or made himſelf King by the men of
Sichem; that the men of Ephraim fought againſt JEPTH A, and that
there was a Civil War caus'd by Benjamin : yet, in a Popular
Government, the very womb (as they will have it) of tumult, tho
never ſo well founded that it could be ſteddy, or take any ſufficient
root, can I find no more of this kind.
BUT the Tribuns of the People in Rome, or the Romans under Sect. 6.
the Magiſtracy
of their Tribuns, throout the whole Adminiſtration 4 Parallel of
of that Government, were never quier ; but at perpetual ſtrife and Storms with
enmity with the Senat. It is very true; but firſt
, this happen'd not thoſe in the
from a Cauſe natural to a Popular Government, but from a Cauſe un-
narchys.
natural to Popular Government; yea, fo unnatural to Popular Govern-
ment, that the like has not bin found in any other Commonwealth.
Secondly, the Cauſe is undeniably diſcover'd to have conſiſted in a
Faction introduc'd by the Kings, and foſter'd by the Nobility, ex-
cluding the Suffrage of the main body of the People thro an Optimacy,
or certain rank or number admitted not by the People or their Election,
but by the value of their Eftates, to the Legiſlative Power, as the Com-
mons of that Nation. So the State of this people was as if they had
two Houſes of Lords, and no Houſe of Commons. Thirdly, this
danger muſt have bin in any other Nation, at leaſt in ours, much
harder to be incur'd, than Authors hitherto have made it to be ſeen in
this. And laſt of all, this Enmity, or theſe Factions, were without
Blood, which in Monarchys they are not, as you ſaw well in thoſe
mention'd; and this Nation in the Barons Wars, and in thoſe of York
and Lancaſter, beſides others, has felt. Or, if at length they came in-
deed to Blood, this was not till the Foundations were deſtroy'd, that
is, till the Balance of Popular Government in Rome was totally ruin'd;
which is equally in caſes of the like nature inavoidable, be the Govern-
inent of what kind ſoever, as of late years we have bin ſufficiently in-
form'd by our own fad Experience.
Hebrew Mou
Hhh 2
CHAT.
420
The Art of Lawgiving.
Book II.
C H A P.
V.
Shewing the State of the Jews in the Captivity, and after their
return out of it ; with the Frame of the Jewiſh Commonwealth.
Ezra 1.
Ezra 2.
Ezra 8.
Ezra 2. $9.
Sect. '1. E left the Children of Iſrael upon a fad march, even into Cap-
The State of
tivity. What Orders had bin antiently obſerv’d by them
the Iſraelics in
Captivity.
during the time they were in Egypt (one of which, as has bin already
ſhewn, was their ſeventy Elders) the ſame, ſo far as would be
per-
mitted by the Princes whoſe Servants they were, continu'd in prac-
tice with them during the time of their Captivity, out of which the
Jer. 25. 12. ten Tribes never more return'd. The two Tribes, when ſeventy years
2 Chr. 36. 22. were accompliſh'd from the time that they were carry'd away by NE-
BUCHAD N EZZA R, and in the firſt year of Cyrus King of Per-
ſia, return'd the beſt part of them, not only with the King's leave and
liking, but with reſtitution of the Plate and Veſſels belonging to the
Temple.
Sect. 2.
THE firſt Colony (as I may fay) of the two Tribes, or thoſe that
The Balance of return'd under the Conduct of ZOROBABEL Prince of Judah, a-
weakenrejtorid mounted to forty two thouſand three hundred and threeſcore, among
by Zorobabel. which there were about one hundred Patriarchs or Princes of Familys.
To theſe, in the reign of AR TAXERXES, came fixteen or twenty
Princes more with their Familys ; among whom the Prophets H A G-
GAI, ZACHARIAS, and MALACHI were eminent. Som of
them could not ſhew their Fathers Houſe and their Seed, whether they were
of Iſrael. But theſe were few ; for it is ſaid of them in general, That
they went every one to his own City, or to the Inheritance of his Fathers :
In which you may note the reſtitution of the Balance of the Mofaical
Commonwealth; tho to what this might com without fixation, the
Jubile being not after the Captivity in uſe, I cannot fay. However,
for the preſent, plain it is that the antient Superſtructures did alſo in-
ſue: as in order to the putting away of the ſtrange Wives, which the
People in Captivity had taken, is apparent.
Set. 3.
THEIR whole progreſs hitherto is according to the Law of Mo-
The Superſtruc-SES; they return every man to his Inheritance by direction of his Pe-
tures of this degree, or according to the Houſe of his Fathers ; they are led by
in the time of Princes of their Familys, and are about to put away ſtrange Wives :
Ezra and Ne- for what reaſon then ſhould a man believe that what follows ſhould
not be according to the Orders of the fame Lawgiver? Now that
which follows, in order to the putting away of theſe foren Wives, is,
Ezra 10.8, 9. Proclamation was made throout Judah and Jeruſalem to all the Children of
the Captivity, that they ſhould gather themſelves to Jeruſalem; and that
whoſoever would not com within three days, according to the counfil of the
Princes and Elders, all bis Subſtance ſhould be forfeited, and himſelf je-
parated from the Congrégation of thoſe that had bin carry'd away. This
plainly, by the penalty annex’d, is a Law for Baniſhment; of which
kind there was none made by Moses; and a Law made by the
Princes and the Elders. What doubt then can remain, but theſe El.
ders were the Sanhedrim, or ſeventy Elders? But wheras neither the
Sanhedrim, nor any other Senat of it felf has bin found to make Laws,
what others can thieſe Princes be that are join'd with the Elders, than
thoſe
hemia.
*
im
**
The Art of Lawgiving
42 |
thoſe ſpoken of before ; that is, the Princes of Familys, or the chief Cliap: 5:
Fathers in the Congregation of them that had bin carry'd away? So
the Princes and the Elders in this place may be underſtood of the San-
hedrim and the People: for thus DAVID propoſes to the Congrega-
tion of the People of Iſrael, or the chief Fathers, and muſt be under- 1 Chr. 27. 1.
ſtood of them, becauſe there is no ſuch thing thrdout the Scripture to
be found, as a Law made by the Sanliedrim without the People: and
if ſo, then that the Sanhedrim with the People had power to make a
Law, is by this place of Scripture undeniably evincd. But beſides
the chief Fathers, which here are call?d Rulers of the Congregntion, Ezra 10. 14
and in the time of DAVID were call’d Captains of thouſands and Cap-
tains of hundreds, mention is alſo made of the Elders of every City,
And the Judges therof; in which words you have the Judges in the Gates
throout the Tribes of Iſrael, as they were inſtituted by Moses: All
which particulars being rightly ſum'd up, com to this total; That the
Commonwealth reſtor'd by EZ RA, was the very fame that original.
ly was inſtituted by Moses.
SUCH was the Government reſtord by ZOR OBABEL, EZRA, Sect. 4.
and NEHEMIA. Now whether the Jewiſh or Cabaliſtical Common- A Tranſition to
wealth, father’d by the Presbyterian Jews of latter ages upon Moses or Jewiſh Com-
or Ezra, be the ſame, ſhall be Thewn by reducing the invention of monwealth.
theſe Men to three heads : as firſt, their Cabala ; fecondly, their Ordi-
mation ; and laſt of all, their great Synagog.
THE Cabala, call'd alſo by the Jews the Oral Law, conſiſts of Sect. s.
certain Traditions by them pretended at the inſtitution of the Sanhedrim The Cabala!
to have bin verbally deliver'd to the ſeventy Elders by Moses for the
Government of the Commonwealth. Theſe were never written till
after the diſperſion of the Jews by the Emperor ADRIAN; when, to
fave them from being loft, they were digeſted into thoſe Volums call'd
the Talmud : which they hold to be, and indeed are as to matter of
Fact, the authentic Records of their Government. Of the Traditions
thus recorded ſays one of the Rabbins or Jewiſh Doctors: Think not Rabbi Corbu-
that the written Lam (or the Law of MOSES) is fundamental, but that lenſes.
the Oral or Traditional Law is fundamental, it being upon this that God en.
ter'd into a League with the Iſraelits, as it is written : After the tenor of Exod. 34.27
theſe words, I have made a Covenant with thee, and with Ifrael. A man In codice jul-
(lays another) who returns from the ſtredy of the Talmud to the ſtudy of the ris Chagiga.
Bible, can have no quiet conſcience, neither was there any peace to him that Zach. 2. 10.
went out or came in. The like wherof is the Talmudical
way
of
plying Scripture throout. And it was the common Bleſſing the Pha-
rifes gave their Children : My Son, hearken to the words of a Scribe
or Doctor, rather than to the Law of MOSES.
To whom ſays
CHRIST hereuporı, You have made the Commandment of God of no Mat. 15. 6.
effect by your tradition.
NO W as true as the Talmad, or as this word of a Scribe, or that sect. 6.
Moses deliver’d the Oral Law to the ſeventy Elders and to JOSHU A, Ordination by
fo true it is that Moses ordain'd both the ſeventy Elders and Impoſition of
Joshua by the impoſition of Hands; and that this Ordination by
the impoſition of Hands, together with the Oral Law, came fuc-
ceſſively, and hand in hand from the ſeventy Elders, and from Jo-
ShuA downright to theſe Doctors. This indeed is ſo generally af-
firm'd by their Talmudiſts, that there is no denying of it ; but, that as
to
the ſeventy Elders it is quite contrary to Scripture, has already bin
made
ap-
Hands.
422
The Art of Lawgiving.
Sect. 7.
Book II. made ſufficiently apparent ; for Joshu A is acknowleg’d to have
rond bin ordain’d by MOSES with impoſition of hands. But this Argu-
ment (beſides that the Act of Moses was accompany'd with a mi.
racle, and that it is abſurd to think that a thing plainly miraculous
ſhould or can be receiv'd as an Order in a Commonwealth) will
go no
farther than that Joshua, upon this authority, might liave elected
his Succeſſor by impoſition of hands. Let them ſhew us then that he
did ſo, or indeed that he left any Succeſſor at all: for certainly if
Joshu A left no Succeſſor ſo ordain'd, or no Succeſſor at all (which is
the truth of the caſe) then deſcended there upon them no ſuch Ordina-
tion from Joshua; and ſo by conſequence none from Moses.
Whence it follows, that the Authority and Vogue of Ordination by
the impoſition of hands among the Jews procedes not from the Law of
Moses, but from the Oral Law; which how bad an Authority ſo-
ever it be to us of right, is of fact, or of what the exerciſe of Ordi-
nation was among the Jews, a good and ſufficient teſtimony. Now
therby the condition of this Ordination (tho in fom times of the
Commonwealth it was leſs reſtrain'd) was ſuch, that no man not
having receiv'd the fame from the great Sanhedrim, or ſom one of
the inferior Courts by laying on of hands, by word of mouth, or
by writing, could be a Presbyter, or capable of any Judicature or
Magiſtracy in the Commonwealth, or to give Counſil in the Law,
or any part of the Law, or to be of the Aſſembly of the great Sy-
nagog.
WHAT the Aſſembly of the Princes and Fathers was in the time
The great Sy- of EZRA, has bin ſhewn, and is left to the judgment of others.
But this is that which the Talmudiſts and their Anceſtors the Caba-
liſtical Jews (among which the Phariſes were of the higheſt rank)
unanimouſly affirm to have conſiſted of the ſeventy Elders, and of a
Juncta of fifty Presbyters not elected by the People; but by the laying
on of hands by the Sanhedrim, or by ſom other Judicatory. This,
they ſay, was the inftitution of their great Synagog, where I leave
them: but that, according to the ſenſe wherin they cite their Autho-
ritys, the like with them was a conſtant practice, appears not only by
their own Teſtimony and Records, but is plain in Scripture; as where
CHRIST ſpeaks of the Jews to his Apoſtles in this manner, They
Grat. ad Mat, will fcourge you in their Synagogs: that is
, the Jers, having as yet no
Law made wherby they can invade the liberty of Conſcience, or
bring you for the practice therof to puniſhment, will call their great
Synagog, wherin the Prieſts and the Phariſes, or the Sanhedrim, have
at leaſt ſeven to five the overbalancing Vote over the reſt. Which al-
ſo are their Creatures, and by theſe will eaſily carry, or make ſuch
Laws wherby they may inflict upon you corporal Puniſhment: which
Interpretation of Chriſt's words, was fulfild even to a tittle, or rather
with over meaſure. For upon this occaſion the High Prieſt, and as
Acts 4.6. many as were of the kindred of the High Prieſt, were gather'd together at
Jeruſalem. That this ſame Juncta, to be in this caſe added to the San-
hedrim, was to conſiſt but of fifty, thoſe fifty not elected by the Peo-
ple, but choſen by the Elders of the Sanhedrim ; and not out of the
body of the People, but out of ſuch only as had receiv'd Ordination by
the Sanhedrim, or by ſom other Court, or indeed were actually Judges
in ſom other Court, was not enough, unleſs they might conſiſt alſo of
as many as were of the kindred of the High Prieſt. · Which Rights and
10. 17.
Alts sa 211
Privi
The Art of Lawgiving.
423
Privileges being all obſerv’d, The High Prieſt came, and they that were Chap. 5.
with him, and callid the Sanhedrim, and all the Presbytery of the Children
of Iſrael: that is, ſo many of them, as being aſſembld in the great Sy-
nagog, repreſented all the Presbytery of the Children of Iſrael, or all the
Children of Iſrael themſelves. In this Aſſembly you have the full de-
ſcription of the great Synagog: and when (in this Synagog) they had
beaten the Apoſtles Peter and John, they commanded them that A&. 5. 40.
they ſhould not ſpeak in the Name of Jesus, and let them go. Upon theſe
procedings there are Conſiderations of good importance; as firſt
, That
the Cabaliſtical Doctors themſelves did never ſo much as imagin that
Moses had indu'd the Sanhedrim alone, or ſeparatly conſider'd from
the People, with any Legiſlative Power; nevertheleſs, that the San-
hedrim came into the place, and ſucceded to the whole Power of
Moses, they unanimouſly held: whence, even upon their Principles,
it muſt follow that in Moses, diſtinctly and ſeparatly taken from the
People, there could be no Power of making any Law. The ſecond
thing remarkable in this proceding, is, That the moſt corrupt Com-
monwealth, and in her moſt corrupt Age, had not yet the face, with-
out ſom blind, of pretending to Legiſlative Power in a ſingle Council
.
The laſt I ſhall obſerve, is, That no poſſible ſecurity is to be given to
liberty of Conſcience, but in the ſecurity of Civil Liberty, and in that
only not by Laws which are otherwiſe as periſhing as flowers or fruits,
but in the roots or fundamental orders of the Government. What
even in theſe times muſt have follow'd, as to the liberty of Conſcience,
had there bin an equal Repreſentative
of the People, is apparent, in that
the Captain and the Officers, imployd by this Synagog to apprehend Acts 5. 26.
the Apoſtles, brought them without violence; for they feard the People
,
left they ſhould have bin ſtond. It is true, there is nothing with us more
cuſtomary, even in the folemneſt places, and upon the folemneſt occa-
fions, than to upbraid the People with giddineſs from the Hoſanna and
the Crucifige of the Jews. What may be charg'd upon a multitude not
under orders, the fouler Crime it be, is the fairer Argument for ſuch
Orders, as where they have bin once eſtabliſh'd, the People have
not bin guilty of ſuch Crimes ; at leaſt, it ſhould ſeem, that in this
caſe there is great fcarcity of Witneſſes againſt them, ſeeing the Death
of SOCRATES is more laid to one People, than that of all the
Martyrs to Kings: yet were the falfe Witneſſes by whom SOCRA-
Tes ſuffer'd (and by the like whierto a man in the beſt Government
may
chance to ſuffer) no ſooner diſcover'd, than they were deſtroy'd
by the People, who alſo erected a Statue to SOCRATES. And the
People who, at the Arraignment of CHRIST, cry’d, Crucify him, Mark 15. tr.
crucify him, were ſuch as the chief Prieſts mov'd or promted, and ſuch
alſo as fear’d the multitude. Now that the People which could be Mat. 21.
promted by the chief Prieſts, or the People which could fear the Peo-
ple, could be no other than this pretended Repreſentative of the Peo-
ple, but indeed a Juncta of Couſins and Retainers, is that which, for
ought I know, may be poſſible; and the rather, for what happen'd be-
fore upon the Law calld among the Jews, The Law of the Zealot,
which was inſtituted by Moses in theſe words: If thy Brother, the Deut. 13.6.
Son of thy Mother ---intice thee, ſaying, Let us go and ſerve other Gods
thy hand ſhall be firſt upon him to put him to death and afterwards the
hand of all the people. By this Law it is plain that, as to the true in-
tent therof, it relates to no other caſe than that only of Idolatry. The
execution
1
1
424
The Art of Lawgiving.
!
w
Book II. exccution of the ſame, according to the Talmud, might be perform’d
o by any number of the People, being not under ten, either apprchend-
ing the Party in tlie Fact, or upon the Teſtimony of ſuch Witnelles
as liad ſo apprehended him : yet will it not be found to have bin exe-
cited by the People, but upon inſtigation of the Prieſt, as where
(they interpreting the Law as they liſt) STEPHEN is ſton'd. Now
if the Prieſts could have made the People do as much againſt CHRIST,
what needed they have gon to PILAT for help? and if they could
not, why ſhould we think that the Multitude which cry'd out, Cru-
cify him, crucify him, ſhould be any other than the great Synagog?
HOWEVER, that it was an Oligarchy, conſiſting of a Senat
and a Presbytery, which not only ſcourg'd the Apoſtles, but caus'd
CHRIST to be crucify’d, is certain. And ſo much for the great
Synagog
Sect. 8.
THES E parts being hiſtorically laid down and prov'd, it fol-
The model of lows that the Cabaliſtical or Jewiſh Commonwealth was much after
the Je: ilh
Cominmwelts. this Model.
BE the capacity of bearing Magiſtracy, or giving Counfil upon the
Law, or any part of the Law of this Commonwealth, in no other than ſuch
only as are Presbyters.
BE Presbyters of two ſorts: the one general
, the other particular.
BE Presbyters general ordain'd by the laying on of hands of the Prince of
the Sanhedrim with the reſt of the Elders, or Presbytery of the ſame, and
by no other Court without a Licence from the Prince of the Sanhedrim;
and be thoſe ordain'd in this manner eligible by the major vote of the ſeventy
Elders into the Sanhedrim, or into any other Court by the major vote of the
Elders or Presbytery of that Court.
BE Presbyters particular ordain'd by any Court of Juſtice; and be theſe
capable of giving Counſil in the Law, or in ſom particular part of the Law,
according to the gift that is in them by the laying on of the hands of the
Presbytery.
B E all Presbyters capable of nomination to the great Synagog.
Be the Sanhedrim in Law made the ſupreme Magiſtracy or Judicatory;
and with a Juncta of fifty Presbyters of their Nomination, the great Sy-
nagog.
BE the great Synagog the Legiſlative Power in this Commonwealth.
SUCH was the Government, where the word of a Scribe or
Doctor was avowedly held to be of more validity than the Scripture ;
and where the uſual appellation of the People, by the Doctors and
Phariſes, was (populus terre) the Raſcally Rabble.
Regis ad exemplum totus componitur orbis.
Sect. 9.'
THERE were other Synagogs for other uſes, as thoſe wherin the
Ordination in
the leffer sy. Law was read every Sabbathday; each of which alſo had her Ruler
and her Presbytery, with power to ordain others to this Capacity.
1
nagog.
1
CH A P.
1
The Art of Lawgiving:
425
Chap. 6.
CH A P. VI.
I
Shewing how Ordination was brought into the Chriſtian Church,
and the divers ways of the ſame that were at divers times in ufé
with the Apoſtles.
WE
1.
E do not find that CHRIST (who gave little countenance to Sect. 1.
the Jewiſh Traditions) ordain'à his Apoſtles or Diſciples by the The form introm
impoſition of lands: his Apoſtles were twelve, whom he compares to into his church.
the twelve Princes of the Tribes of Iſrael; and his Diſciples were ſeven-Matth. 19:28.
ty, in which number it is receiv'd by Divines, that he alluded to the ſe-
venty Elders or Sanhedrim of Iſrael. So thus far the Government of
the Church, inſtituted by CHRIST, was according to the form
inſtituted by MOSES., But CHRIST in this form was King and
Prieſt, not after the inſtitution of Moses, who ſeparated the Levits
to the Prieſthood; but as before Moses, when the Royal and Prieſt- Vid. Grotium,
ly Function were not ſeparated, and after the order or manner of & videat Gru-
MELCHISED E C, who came not to the Prieſthood by proving ad Hebræos.
his Pedegree, as the High Prieſt in Iſrael by Father, or as the King
Prieſt in Athens by Mother, but without Father and Mother. Or be
what, has bin ſaid of MELCHISEDEC approv'd or rejected, ſuch
for the reſt, as has bin ſhewn, was the form introduc'd by CHRIST
into his Church.
CHRIST being taken up into Heaven, his Diſciples or Fole Sect. 2.1
lowers in Jeruſalem increas'd to about one hundred and twenty names ; of ordination
and the Apoſtles decreas'd by one, or by JUDAS, who was gon to his Acts 1.
place. Peter, whether upon the Counlil or Determination of the
eleven Apoſtles (as is moſt probable) beforehand or otherwiſe, itood
up and ſpoke both to the Apoſtles and Diſciples aſſembld upon this
occaſion, That one out of the preſent Aſſembly might be ordain'd an
Apoſtle: and they (that is, the Congregation, or why was this pros
pos’d to them?) appointed two by Suffrage; for how otherwiſe can an
Aſſembly appoint?" Theſe were BARSABAS and MATTHIAS,
which Names, being written in ſcrols, were caſt into one Urn; two
Lots, wherof one was a blank, and the other infcrib’d with the word
Apofkle, being at the ſame
time caft into another Urn. Which don, they
pray'd that God would ſhew which of the Competitors by them to
made, he had choſen: when they had thus pray'd, they gave forth
their Lots, that is, a ſcrol out of the one Urn, and then a name to
that ſcrol out of the other Urn; and the Lot fell upon MATTHIAS,
or MATTHIAS was taken; wherupon MATTHIAS was num
berd, or rather decreed with the eleven Apoſtles. For * Pſephiſma, be- * Elyxiate;
ing a word which properly derives from ſuch Stones or Pebbles as po papiešana
pular Aſſemblys of old were wont to ballot with or give ſuffrage by,
not only ſignifys a Decrce, but eſpecially ſuch a Decree as is made by
a popular Aſſembly. Now if this was Ordination in the Chriſtian
Church, and of Apoſtolical Right, then may there be a way of Ordi-
nation in the Chriſtian Church, and of Apoftolical Right, exactly
conformable to the Ballot, or way us'd by Moses in the inſtitution
of the ſeventy Elders or Sanhedrim of Iſrael
.
Iii
AFTER
426
The Art of Lawgiving.
منا
Set. 3.
The ſecond way
Acts 4. 4.
Alts 6.
Book II. AFTER the converſion of fom thouſands more, moſt, if not all,
w of which were Jews, a People tho converted, yet ſo tenacious of their
Laws and Cuſtoms, that even Circumciſion (hitherto not forbidden
of ordinarim. by the Apoſtles) was. continu'd among them; the twelve Apoſtles callid .
the multitude of Diſciples to them. So MOSES, when he had any thing
to propoſe, aſſembld the People of Iſrael. And when the twelve had
thus called the Diſciples, they ſaid, Look ye out among 301 feven men of
honeſt report, full of the Holy Ghoſt and Wiſdom, whom we may appoint
over this buſineſs. So Moses ſaid to the Congregation of Iſrael, Take
jie wiſe men, and underſtanding, and known among your Tribes, and I will
make themi Rulers over you. And the ſaying of the Apoſtles pleas’d the
whole multitude. So the People of Iſrael were wont to anſwer to
MÓSES, The thing which thou færſt is good for us to do. This ſaying of
the Apoftles being thought good by the whole multitude, the whole
multitude elected ſeven men whom they ſet before the Apoſtles: and when
they had pray'd, they laid their hands on them. To fay in this place (as
they do ) that the Act of the People was but a Preſentation, and that
the Apoſtles had power to admit or refuſe the Perſons fo preſented, is
as if one ſhould ſay, That the act of electing Parlament men by the
People of England, was but a Preſentation, and that the King had
power to admit or refuſe the Perſons ſo preſented. And ſeeing the
Deacons henceforth had clárge of the Word, to ſay, that by this choice
the Deacons receivid not the charge of the Word, but the care to
ſerve Tables, is as if one ſhould fay, Thiat Parlament men by their E-
letion receiv'd only the care to levy Mony or Proviſion for the King's
Table; but if upon ſuch Election they debated alſo concerniog Laws,
that Power they receiv'd from tlie King only.
BUT if this was a way of Ordination in the Chriſtian Church,
and of Apoſtolical Riglit, then there may be a way of Ordination in
tlie Chriſtian Church, and of Apoſtolical Riglıt, conſiſting in part of
the Orders of the Iſraelitiſh Commonwealth, and in part of the Orders
of the Jewiſh Commonwealth,
LASILY, PAUL writing to TIMOTHY concerning his Ordina-
The third way tion, lias in one place this expreſſion, Neglect not the Gift that is in thee,
of Ordination.
which was given thee by propheſy, with the laying on of the hands of the
Presbytery. So the Presbytery of a Jewiſh Synagog laid their hands on
2 Tim. 1.6. the Party ordain'd. And in another place he has this expreſſion: Stir up
the Gift of God which is in thee by the laying on of my hands. So the Rulcr
of a Jewiſh Synagog did lay his hands alſo on the Party ordain’d.
Moreover, the Apoſtle in theſe words, The Gift that is in thee by lay-
ing on of hands, tho in relation to Gifts beyond compariſon more cx-
cellent, uſes the Phraſe known upon the like occaſion to have bin com-
mon with the Jews. Wherfore if this were a way of Ordination in the
Chriſtian Church, and of Apoftolical Riglit, then may there be a way
of Ordination in the Chriſtian Church exactly conformable to the Jewiſh
Commonwealth, and yet be of Apoſtolical Right. Nor is it ſo ſtrange
that the Apoſtles in matters of this nature ſhould comply with the
Jews, of which ſo many were converted, ſeeing it is certain that not
only the Apoſtles, but all ſuch as in theſe times were converted, did
obſerve the Jewiſh Sabbath ; nay, and that Paul himſelf took T 1-
MOTHY and circumcis'd him, becauſe of the Jews; that is, to com-
ply with them, or to give them no offence. Nor do our Divines any
where pretend impoſition of lands to be deriv’d from CHRIST, but
Sect. 4.
i Tim. 4. 14.
unani,
The Art of Lawgiving.
MU
427
dination,
1
unanimouſly confeſs, that it was taken up by the Apoſtles from the
Jewijl Sanhedrim.
NOW in theſe ſeveral ways of Ordination, there is a moſt re. Sect. s.
markable Providence of God. "For wheras States and Princes in re of God in the
ceiving of Religion are not at any point ſo jealous as of an incroach- different way of
ment upon their Power; the firſt way of Apoftolical Ordination de Apoftolical or .
ſtroys Monarchical Power : the laſt wholly excludes the Power of the
People: and the ſecond has a mixture which may be receiv’d by a Com-
monwealth, or by a Monarchy. But where it is receiv'd by a Com-
monwealth, the impoſition of hands coms to little; and where it is
receiv'd by a Monarchy, the Election of the People coms to nothing,
as may be farther conſider'd in the original and progreſs of the
Conge d'Elire.
THE ways of Ordination or of Church Government lying thus in
Scripture, the not receiving of the Cliriſtian Religion is not that wherof
any State or Prince thro the whole world can be any ways excuſable.
The Concluſion:
Shewing, that neither God, nor CHRIST, or the Apo-
SILES, ever inſtituted any Government Eccleſiaſtical or Civil
upon any other Principles than thoſe only of Human Prudence.
TE
O fum up this ſecond Book in the Uſes that may be made of it: Sect. 1 .
Certain it is of the Greec and Roman Storys, that he who has not uſes of this
Brok,
ſom good Idea or Notion of the Government to which they relate,
cannot rightly underſtand them. If the like holds as to the Scripture
Story, ſom light may be contributed to it by this Book. Again, if
ſom gifted Men happening to read it, ſhould chance to be of the ſame
judgment, it is an Argument for acquir’d Learning, in that for the
means of acquir'd Learning, and in the means of acquir'd Learning
for Univerſitys. For how little ſoever this performance be, had it not
bin the faſhion with the Engliſh Gentry, in the breeding of their Sons,
to give them a ſmack of the Univerſity, I ſhould not have don ſó
much.
BUT letting theſe paſs. If there were Commonwealths, or Go. Sect. 2.
vernments exerciſing Soverain Power by the Senat and the People, be- The preſent use
fore that of Iſrael, as namely, Gibeon: If the inferior Orders and ºf this Book.
Courts in Iſrael, as thoſe inſtituted by Moses after the advice of
Jethro a Heathen, were tranſcrib'd out of another Government
tho Heathen, as namely, that of Midian : If the order of the Church
introduc'd by CHRIST in his twelve Apoſtles and his feventy Diſci-
ples, were after the pattern of Iſrael, namely, in the twelve Princes
of the Tribes, and the ſeventy Elders: If there were three diftinct
ways of Ordination introduc'd by the Apoſtles; one exactly accord-
ing to the Ballot of Iſrael, as namely, in the Ordination of MATA
THIAS; another exactly according to the way of the Jewiſh Sanhedrim
or Synagog, as namely, that of TIMOTHY; and a third, compos’d
of theſe two, as namely, that of the Deacons : Then is it a clear
and undeniable reſult of the whole, That neither GOD, nor CHRIST,
Iii 2
or
428
The Art of Lawgiving.
+
Sect. 3.
Book II. or the APOSTLES, ever inſtituted any Government Ecclefiaftical oś
L
Civil
upon any other Principles than thoſe only of Human Prudence.
AN Obſervation of ſuch conſequence, as, where it has bin rightly
The Consequence conſider'd, there the truth of Religion and of Government once
of this Uſe.
planted, have taken root and flouriſh'd; and where it has not bin
rightly heeded, there has Religion or the pretence of if bin the hook
and the line, and the State the prey of Impoſtors and falfe Prophets,
as was ſhewn in the hypocritical Phariſes, for ever ftigmatiz’d by the
word of Truth.
AND for Might, let her be never fo much exalted in her felf,
let her Sword be never ſo dreadfully brandiſh’d; the Government
not founded upon Reaſon, a Creature of God, and the Creature of
God whoſe undoubted right in this part is by himſelf undeniably
avow'd and aſſerted, is a Weapon fram'd againſt God; and no Wea.
pon fram'd againſt God ſhall proſper.
THE Principles of Human Prudence, and in them the Art of
A tranſition *° Lawgiving, being ſhewn in the firſt Book, and vindicated throour
the whole courſe of Scripture by this ſecond, I com in the third
to ſhew a Model of Government, fram'd according to the Art thus
ſhewn, and the Principles thus vindicated.
Sect. 4.
THE
1
429
THE
THIRD BOOK
CONTAINING
A
MODEL
OF
Popular Government ,
Practically propos'd according to Reaſon, con-
firm’d by the Scripture, and agreable to the
preſent Balance or State of Property in England.
The PREFACE,
Containing a Model of Popular Government,
propos'd Notionally.
T
1
HERE is between the Diſcourſes of ſuch as are commonly calld
Natural Philoſophers, and thoſe of Anatomiſts, a large diffe-
rence; the former are facil
, the latter difficult. Philoſophers,
diſcourſing of Elements for example, that the Body of Man
conſiſts of Fire, Air, Earth and Water, are eaſily both underſtood and cre-
dited, ſeeing by common Experience we find the Body of Man returns
to the Earth from whence it was taken. A like Entertainment may befal
Elements of Government, as in the firſt of theſe Books they are ſtated. But
the fearful and wonderful making, the admirable ſtructure and great va-
riety of the parts of man's Body, in which the Diſcourſes of Anatomiſts
are altogether converſant, are underſtood by ſo few, that I may ſay they are
not underſtood by any. Certain it is
, that the delivery of a Model of Go-
vernment (which either muſt be of, no effect, or imbrace all thoſe Muſcles,
Nerves
, Arterys and Bones, which are neceſſary to any Function of a well
order'd' Commonwealth) is no leſs than political Anatomy. If you com
Short of this, your Diſcourſe is altogether ineffectual; if you com home,
you are not underſtood: you may, perhaps
, be callºd a learned Author ; but
you are obſcure
, and your Doitrin is impracticable
. Had I only ſuffer?d
in this, and not the People
, I ſhould long ſince have left them to their hus
mor ; but ſeeing it is they that ſuffer by it, and not my felf
, I will be yet
more
430
The Preface.
pre-
may be
be inſiſted upon
Book III. more a fool, or they ſhall be yet wiſer. Now coms into my head what I ſam
n long ſince upon an Italian Stage, while the Spectators wanted Hoops for
their ſides. · A Country fellow came with an Apple in his hand; to which,
in a ſtrange variety of faces, his Teeth were undoubtedly threaten’d, when
Enter'd a young Anatomiſt brimful of his laſt Leſſon, who, ſtopping in good
time the hand of this ſame Country fellow, would by no means
ſuffer him to go
on with ſo great an Enterprize, till he had firſt nam’d and deſcrib'd to him
all the Bones, Nerves, and Muſcles which are naturally necesſary to that
motion : at which, the good man being with admiration plainly chopfallen,
coms me in a third, who, ſnatching away the Apple, devour'd it in the
ſence of them both. If the People, in this caſe wherof I am ſpeaking, were
naturally ſo well furniſh’d, I had here learn’d enough to have kept ſilence :
but their eating, in the political way, of abſolute neceſſity requires the
aid of ſom political Anatomiſt; without which, they may have Appetits,
but will be chopfallen. Examples wherof they have had but too many; one
I think
without
envy.
THIS is that which was call’d The Agreement of the People, con-
Sifting in ſum of theſe Propoſitions :
Tie Anarchy of" THAT there be a Repreſentative of the Nation conſiſting of four
:lc Lezellers hundred Perſons, or not above.
WHICH Propoſition puts the Bar on the quite contrary ſide; this be-
ing the firſt example of a Commonwealth, wberin it was conceiv’d, that
five hundred thouſand men, or more, might be repreſented by four hundred.
The Repreſentation of the People in one man, cinſes Monarchy; and in a
fer, caules Oligarchy: the Many cannot be otherwiſe repreſented in a State
of Liberty, than by ſo many, and ſo qualify’d, as may within the compaſs
of that number and nature imbrace the intereſt of the whole People. Go-
vernment ſhould be eſtabliſh'd upon a Rock, not ſet upon a Precipice: 4
Repreſentative conſiſting but of four hundred, tho in the nature therof it
be popular, is not in it ſelf a l’eapon that is fix’d, but has ſomshing of
the broken Bow, as fill apt to ſtart aſide to Monarchy. But the paucity
of the number is temper'd with the ſhortneſs of the term, it being farther
provided,
THAT this Repreſentative be biennial, and ſit not above eight
Months. But ſeeing a Supreme Council in a Commonwealth is neither
aſſembl’d nor diſſolv’d, but by ſtated Orders directing upwards an irreſiſtible
strengtis from the root, and as one tooth or one nail is driven out by another;
how is it provided that this Biennial Council ſhall not be a perpetual Coun-
cil? Wheras nothing is more dangerous in a Commonwealth than intire
Removes of Councils, how is it provided that theſe ſhall be men ſufficiently
experienc°d for the management of Affairs ? And laſt of all, wheras diſſo-
lution to Soverain Power is death, to whom are theſe after their eight months
10 bequeath the Commonwealth? In this caſe it is provided,
THAT there be a Council of State elected by each new Repre-
ſentative, within twenty days after their firſt meeting, to continue till
ten days after the meeting of the next Repreſentative. In which the
faults obferv’d in the former Order, are ſo much worſe, as this Council
conſiſts of fewer. Thus far this Commonwealth is Oligarchy : but it is pro-
vided,
THAT theſe Repreſentatives have Soverain Power, fave that in
ſom things the People may reſiſt them by Arms. Which firſt is a flat
contradiction, and next is downright Anarchy. Where the Soverain Power
is not as intire and abſolute as in Monarchy is ſelf, there can be no Govern-
ment
\r
The Preface.
431
!
ment at all. It is not the limitation of Soverain Power that is the cauſe
of a Commonwealth, but ſuch a libration or poize of Orders, that there
can be in the ſame no number of men having the intereſt, that can have the
porter i nor any number of men having the power, that can have the intereſt,
to invađe or diſturb the Goverment. As the Orders of Commonwealths are
more approaching to, or remote from this Maxim ( of which this of the
Levellers kas nothing ) ſo are they more quiet or turbulent. In the Reli
gious part only, propoſing a National Religion and Liberty of Conſcience,
tho without troubling themſelves much with the means, they are right in
the end.
AND for the Military part, they provide,
THAT no man (even in caſe of Invaſion) be compellable to go
out of the Country where he lives, if he procures another to ſerve in
his room. Which plainly intails upon this Commonwealth a fit Guard for
fosch a Liberty, even a Mercenary Army; for what one dos of this kind, may
and will (where there is no bar ) be don by all: ſo every Citizen by mony
procuring his man, procures his Maſter
. Now if this be work of that kind
which the People in like caſes ( as thoſe alſo of Rome, when they inſtituted.
their Tribuns) do uſually make, then have I good reaſon not only to think,
but to ſpeak it audibly, That to footh up the People with an opinion of their
own fufficiency in theſe things, is not to befriend them, but to feed up all
bopes of Liberty to the faughter, Yet the Leveller, a late * Pamphlet,
having gather'd out of Oceana the Principles by him otherwiſe well, inſinuda
ted, attributes it to the Agitators, or that Aſſembly which fram'd this
wooden Agreement of the People: That then ſom of that Council af-
ſerted theſe Principles, and the reaſon of them.
BUT Railery apart, we are not to think it has bin for nothing that
the
wifeſt Nations have in the formation of Government as much rely?d
upon the invention of ſom one man, as upon themſelves : for wheras it can-
not be too often inculcated, that Reaſon conſiſts of two parts, the one In-
cjention, the other Judgment; a People or an Aſſembly are not more emi-
nent in point of Judgment, than they are void of Invention, "Nor is there
in this any thing at all againſt the fufficiency of i People in the
ment of a proper Formi,
being once introducd, tho they ſhould never com
te
a perfett underſtanding of it. For were the natural Bodys of the People
ſuch as they might commonly underſtand, they would be ( as I may say)
wooden Bodys, or ſuch as they could not 'uſe ; wheras their Bodys being nom
ſuch as they underſtand 'not,are yet ſuch as in the uſe and preſervation wheröf
they are perfect.
THE RE are in Models of Government things of ſo eaſy practice,
and yet of ſuch difficult underſtanding, that we muſt not think then even in
Venice, who uſe their Commonwealth with the greateſt prudence and fás
cility
, to be all, or any conſiderable number of them, ſuch as perfectly un-
derſtand the true Reaſon or Anatomy of that Government: nor is this a
preſumtuous Aſſertion, ſince none of thoſe Venetians, who have hitherte
written of their own form, have brought the truth of it to any perfect light
The like perhaps (and yet with due acknowlegement to LIVÝ) mighi be
ſaid of the Romans. The Lacedemonians had not the right underſtanding
of their Model, till about the time of ARISTOTLE it was firſt written
* A later Pamphlet calla XXV Querys, uſing the Balance of Property, which is fair enouglı
,
refers ir to Sir Thomas Smith's isth chap. (de Repub. populi ingenio accommodanda) where the
Author ſpeaks nor one word of Property, which is very foul.
by
432
The Preface.
ar,
Book III. by DICEARCHUS one of his Scholars. How egregiouſly our Anceſtors
till thoſe foundations were broken which at length have brought us round)
did adminiſter the Engliſh Government, is ſufficiently known. Tet by one
of the wiſeſt of our Writers (even my Lord VERULAM) is HENRY
the Seventh paralleld with the Legiſlators of antient and heroic times, for
the inſtitution of thoſe very Laws which have now brought the Monarchy
to utter ruin. The Commonwealths upon which MACCHIAVEL in
his Diſcourſes is incomparable,' are not by him, any one of them, ſufficiently
explain’d or underſtood. Much leſs is it to be expected from a People, that
they ſhould overcom the like difficultys, by reaſon wherof the wiſeſt Nations
( finding themſelves under the neceſſity of a change, or of a new Government)
induc°d by ſuch offers as promisºd fair, or againſt which they could find no ex-
ceptions, have uſually acted as men do by new Clothes; that is, put them on,
that, if they be not exactly fit at firſt, they may either fit themſelves to the
body in wearing, or therhy more plainly ſhew wherin they can be mended even
by ſuch, as would otherwiſe prové but bad workmen. Nor has any ſuch offer
bin thought to have more preſumtion, much leſs Treaſon in it, than if one
conſcious of his skill in Architecture, ſhould offer himſelf to the Prince or
State to build a more convenient Parlament houſe. England is now in ſuch
a condition, that he who may be truly ſaid to give her Law, ſhall never go-
vern her; and he who will govern her, hall never give her Law. Tet ſom
will have it, that to aſſert Popular Power, is to ſow the ſeed of Civil TV
and object againſt a Commonwealth, as not to be introduc'd but by Arms;
which by the undeniable teſtimony of later Experience, is of all other ob-
jections the moſt extravagant : for if the good old Cauſe
, againſt the deſire
even of the Army, and of all men well affected to their Country, could be trodo
under foot without blood; what more certain demonſtration can there be,
that let the deliberations upon, or changes of Government, be of what
kind ſoever which all pleaſe a Parlament ) there is no appearance that they
can occaſion any Civil War? Streams that are ſtop?d may urge their Banks ;
but the courſe of England, into a Commonwealth, is both certain and
natural. The ways of Nature require Peace : The ways of Peace require
Obedience to the Laws: Laws in England cannot be made but by Parla-
ments : Parlaments in England are com to be mere popular Aſſemblys :
The 'Laws made by popular Aſſemblys (tho for a time they may be aw'd, or
deceiv’d, in the end) muſt be popular Laws: and the ſum of popular Laws
maſt amount to a Commonwealth. The whole doubt or hazard of this con-
Jequence remains upon one queſtion, Whether a ſingle Council conſiſting but
of four hundred, indu'd both with Debate and Reſult; the Keys of whoſe
Doors are in the hands of ambitious men; in the croud and confuſion of
whoſe Election the People are as careleſs as tumultuous, and eaſy, thro the
want of good Orders, to be deluded; while the Clergy ( declard and inve-
terat Enemys of popular Power ) are laying about, and ſweating in the
throng, as if it were in the Vinyard; upon whoſe Benches Lawyers ( being
feather’d and arm’d, like ſharp and ſudden Arrows, with a privat intereſt
pointblank againſt the Public ) may and frequently do ſwarm, can indeed be
callid a popular Council
. This, I confeſs, may ſet the whole ſtate of Liberty
upon the caſt of a Dy; yet queſtionleſs it is more than odds on the behalf of
a Commonwealth, when a Government labors in frequent or long ſtruggles,
not thro any certain biaſs of Genius or Nature that can be in ſuch a Council
,
but thro the impotence of ſuch Concluſions as may go awry, and the external
force or ſtate of Property now fully introduc'd: whence ſucis a Council may
wander, but never find any reſi or ſettlement, except only in that natural and
proper
1
*
The Preface.
1
433
1
1
or
proper Form of Government which is to be erected upon a mere Popular
Foundation. All other ways of proceding muſt be void, as inevitably
guilty of contradiction in the Superſtructures to the Foundation ; which
have amounted, and may amount to the diſcouragement of honeſt men, but
with no other ſucceſs than to imbroil or retard Buſineſs : England be-
ing not capable of any other permanent Form than tha: only of a Commons
wealth; tho her ſupreme Council be ſo conſtituted, that it may be Monarchi-
cally inclin’d. This contradi&tion in the Frame is the frequent occaſion of
contradictory Expoftulations and Queſtions. How, ſay they, ſhould we
have a Commonwealth? Which way is it posſible that it mould com in?
And how, ſay I, can we fail of a Commonwealth? What poſſibility is there
we should miſs of it?
1 F a man replys, he anſwers thus : No Army ever ſet up a Common-
wealth. To the contrary, I inſtance the Army of Iſrael under Moses;
that of Athens about the time of ALCIBIA DES; that of Rome upon
the expulſion of the TAR QUINS; thoſe of Switzerland and Holland.
But, ſay they, other Armys have not ſet up Commonwealths. True in.
deed, divers other Army's have not ſet up Commonwealths; yet is not
that any Argument why our Armys should not. For in all Armys that
have not ſet up Commonwealths, either the Officers have had no Fortunes
or Estates at all, but immediatly dependent upon the mere Will of the
Prince, as the Turkiſhi Armys, and all thoſe of the Eaſtern Countrys ;
the Officers have bin a Nobility commanding their own Tenants. Certain
it is, That either of theſe Armys can ſet up nothing but Monarchy. But
our Officers hold not Eſtates of Noblemen able upon their own Lands to
lerry Regiments, in which caſe they would take home their People to plon,
or make Hay; nor are they yet ſo put to it for their Livelihood, as to de-
pend wholly upon a Prince, in which caſe they would fall on robbing the
People: but have good honeſt Popular Eſtates to them and their Heirs for
never. Now an Army, where the Eſtates of the Officers were of this kind, in
no reaſon can, in no experience ever did ſet up Monarchy. Ay but, ſay they,
for all that, their Pay to them is more conſiderable than their Eſtates. But
ſo much more muſt they be for a Commonwealth, becauſe the Parlament
muſt pay : and they have found by experience, that the Pay of a Parba-
ment is far better than that of a Prince. But the four hundred being
Monarchically inclin’d, or running upon the Intereſt of thoſe irreconcila-
ble Enemys of Popular Power, Divines and Lawyers, will rather pay an
Army for commanding, or for Jupporting of a Prince, than for obeying.
Which may be true, as was acknowlez'd before, in the
way;
or at the long run, for the reaſons mention'd, muſt be of no effect.
THESE Arguments are from the Cauſe; now for an Argument to
Senſe, and from the Effect : If our Armys would raiſe Mony of themſelves,
or, which is all one, would make a King, why have they not made a King
in ſo many Tears? Why did they not make one yeſterday? Why do they
not to day? Nay, why' have they ever bin, wly do they ſtill continue to be
of all others in this point the moſt averſe and refractory?
BUT if the caſe be ſo with us, that Nature runs wholly to a Common-
wealth, and we have no ſuch Force as can withſtand Nature, why may we
not as well have golden Dreams of what this Commonwealth may be, as of
the Indys, of Flanders, or of the Sound? The Frame of a Commonwealth
may be dreamt on, or propos’d two ways; the one in Theory, or notionally,
in which it is of eaſy underſtanding, but of difficult practice : The other
practicably, in which it is of difficult underſtanding, but of facil ufe.
Kkk
but in the end
One
434
The Preface.
The model pro-
1
Book III. One of tbeſe ways is a Shooinghorn, and the other the Shoo; for which cauſe
I Mall propoſe both, as firſt notionally, thus :
1. THAT the native Territory of the Commonwealth be divid-
posid notionellyed, ſo equally as with any convenience it may, into fifty Tribes or
Precinets.
2. THAT the People in each Tribe be diſtinguiſh'd, firſt by their
Age, and next by the valuation of their Eſtates : All ſuch as are a-
bove cighteen, and under thirty, being accounted Youth ; and all ſuch
as are thirty or upwards, being accounted Elders. All ſuch as have
under one hundred pounds a year in Lands, Goods, or Mony, being
accounted of the Foot; and all ſuch as have ſo much or upwards, be-
ing accounted of the Horſe.
3. THAT cach Tribe elect annually out of the Horſe of their
number two Elders to be Knights; three Elders out of the ſame,
and four Elders more out of the Foot of their number, to be Deputys
or Burgeſſes. That the term of each Knight and Burgeſs, or Deputy
fo elected, be triennial ; and that whoever has ſerv'd his triennial
Term in any one of theſe Capacitys, may not be reelected into any
one of the ſame, till a triennial Vacation be expir’d.
4. THAT in the firſt year of the Commonwealth there be a Se-
nat fo conſtituted, of three hundred Knights, that the term of one
hundred may expire annually; and that the hundred Knights, annual-
ly elected by two in cach Tribe, take in the Senat the places of them
whoſe Term coms to be thus annually expir’d.
5. THAT in the firſt year of the Commonwealth there be a
Repreſentative of the People, conſiſting of one thouſand and fifty De-
putys; four hundred and fifty cf them being Horſe, and the reſt Foor.
That this Repreſentative be lo conſtituted, that the term of two hun-
dred of the Foot, and of one hundred and fifty of the Horſe, expire
annually; and that the two hundred Foot, and one hundred and fifty
Horſe elccted annually, by four of the Foot, and three of the Horſe
in each Tribe, take the places in this Repreſentative of them whoſe
terms coins thus annually to be expir’d.
6. THAT the Senat have the whole Authority of Debate; that
thie Repreſentative have the whole power of Reſult, in ſuch a manner,
that whatever (having bin debated by the Senat) ſhall by their Au-
thority be promulgated, that is, printed and publiſh'd, for the ſpace
of fix weeks; and afterwards (being propos’d by them to the Repre-
ſentative) Niall be reſolv’d by the People of the ſame in the Affirma-
tive, bc the Law of the Land. I
THOS much may ſuffice to give implicitly a notional account of the
whole frame. But a Model of Government is nothing as to aſe, unleſs it
be alſo deliver'd practicably; and the giving of a Model practicably, is lo
much the more difficult, that men, noi vers’d in thiseway, Say of it ( as they
would of the Anatomy of their own Bodys ) that it is impracticable. Here
lys the whole difficulty: ſuch things as, trying them never ſo often, they
Cannot make hang together, they will yet have to be practicable; and if you
would bring them from this kind of ſhifts, or of tying and untying all ſorts
of knots, to the natural nerves and ligaments of Government, then with
ihem it is impracticable. But to render that which is practicable, facil ;
or to do my laſt indeavor of this kind, of which if I miſs this once more, I
muſt hereafter deſpair : Iſhall do two things ; firſt, omit the Ballot, and then
make ſom alteration in my former method.
THEY
The Art of Lawgiving
435
THEY who have interwoven the Ballot with the deſcription of a Chap. t.
Commonwealth, have therby render’d the ſame by far the more complete
in it felf; but in the underſtanding of their Readers, as much defective:
ipherfore preſuming the uſe of the Ballot throont the Orders of this Model,
I ſhall refer it to practice, in which it will be a matter of, as much facility,
as it would have bin of difficulty in writing, And for the methodº I have
choſen, it is the moſt natural and intelligible, being no more than to propoſe
the whole practicably: firſt, in the Civil; ſecondly, in the Religions; there
in the Military; and laſt of all in the Provincial part of the Model
CH À P. I.
Containing the Civil part of ile Model; propos'd practicablý.
SELE
1:
Laws,
EEING it has bin ſufficiently prov'd, that Empire follows the na
ture of Property; that the particular kind of Empire, or Govern-
ment depends upon the ſpecial diſtributiori (except in ſmall Countrys)
of Land; and that where the Balance in Property has not bin fix’d,
the nature of the Government (be it what you will) has, bin
foting : it is very reaſonable that, in the propoſition of a Common-
wealth, we begin with a fixation of the Balance in Property;, and this
being not otherwiſe to be don than by ſom ſuch Laws as have bin
commonly calld Agrarian, it is propos’d,
THAT every one holding above two thouſand pounds a year in Land,
lying within the proper Territory of the Commonwealth, leave the ſaid Agrarias
Land equally divided among his Sons; or elſe ſo near equally
, that there
remain to the eldeſt of them not above two thouſand pounds a year in Land
jo lying. That this Propoſition be ſo underſtood, as not to coạcern any Pa .
rent having no more than one Son, but the next Heir only that ſhall have
more Sons ; in ſuch ſort, as nothing be hereby taken from any man, or from
his Poſterity, but that fatherly Affection be at all points extended as former-
ly, except only that it be with more Piety, and lefs Partiality. And that
the ſame Propoſition, in ſuch Familys where there are no Sons, concern the
Daughter or Daughters in the like manner.
TºHAT no Daughter, being neither Heir nor Coheir, have ribove fif-
teen hundred pounds in Portion, or for her preferment in Marriage. That
any Daughter, being an Orphan, and having ſeven hundred pornds or up-
wards in Portion, may charge the State with it. , That the State being ſo
charg’d, be bound to manage the Portion of ſuch an Orphan for the belt;
either by due payment of the Intereſt of the ſame; or, if it be deſir’d, by
way of Annuity for Life, at the rate of one hundred pounds a genr, for every
jëven hundred pounds ſo receiv’d. The manner wherof being elfwliere
Thewn, is not needful to be repeated.
THAT theſe Propoſitions prevent the growing of a Monarchi-
cal Nobility, is their peculiar end : Wherfore that this ſhould hold the
weight of an Objection in a popular Balance, already introduc'd thro
the failure of a Monarchical Nobility, or thró a level made not thic
People but by the Kings or themſelves, were prepoſterous. Yet upori
this ſcore (for I ſee no other) is there ſuch Animoſity againſt the like
Laws, that wiſe men have judgʻd it an Indiſcretion, in ſuch as are
affected to Popular Government, not to temporize in this point; at
Kkk 2
Jealia
436
The Art of Lawgiving.
Additional
Claute to the
Book IIŤ. İcaſt, till a Commonwealth were firſt introduc'd. To which Judge
ment I am by no means inclining : Firſt, Becauſe the whole ſtream of
this kind of Government is ſo clear and pellucid, as to abhor having
any thing in the bottom which may not appear at the very top. Se-
condly, Becauſe an Agrarian, not brought in with the introduction of a
Commonwealth, was never yet known to be brought in after the intro-
duction of a Commonwealth. And thirdly, Becauſe the change of Ba-
lances in States, thro the want of fixation, has bin ſo ſudden, that between
thie Reign of HENRY the Seventh, and that of Queen ELIZABETH,
being under fifty years, the Engliſh Balance of Monarchical became
Popular; and that of Rome, between the Lives of SCIPIO and of
TIBERIUS GRACCHUS, being alſo under fifty years, of Popular
became Monarchical. Nevertheleſs, if there remains any cure of
Animoſity that may be ſafe, it muſt be prudent: And ſuch a cure (if
we be not fo abandon'd to mere fancy, as to ſacrifice all Prudence to
it ) there may be in the addition of this Clauſe
THAT no Agrarian Law hereby given to this Commonwealth, or to
Agrarian.
be hereafter given to the ſame, or to any Province of the fame, be under-
ſtood to be otherwiſe binding, than to the Generation to com, or to the
Children to be born ſeven years after the enacting of the Law.
UPON the addition of this Clauſe, it may be ſafely ſaid of theſe
Agrarian Laws, that they concern not any man living: and for Poſte-
rity, it is well known, that to enact a Law, is no more in their regard,
than to commend a thing to their choice; ſeeing they, if ſo pleas'd,
can no more be deveſted of the Power to repeal any Law enacted by
their Anceſtors, than we are of repealing ſuch Laws as have bin enact-
ed by ours.
TO this it may be objected, That Agrarian Laws, being once e-
nacted, muſt have brought Eſtates to the ſtandard of the fame, before
Pofterity cani com into a capacity to judg of them. But this is the
only means wherby Pofterity can com to a true capacity to judg of
them: Firſt, becauſe they will have had experience of the Laws
wherof they are to judg: And ſecondly, becauſe they will be void
of all ſuch imaginary Intereſts as might corrupt their Judgment, and
do now certainly corrupt ours.
The firſt Pa
THE Balance of the Commonwealth of Iſrael, thro the diſtribu:
tion of Lands at the introduction of the ſame, became Popular ; and
becoming Popular, was fix?d by the Law for the Jubile. "That which
Deut.25. 28. was fold, Mall remain in the hands of them that bought it till the year of
Jubile; and in the Jubile it ſhall go out, and he ſhall return to his possesſi-
on. The ways in Iſrael, and in the Commonwealth propos’d, where
the Popular Balance is not made but found, are divers; but the Agra-
rian Laws in each, as to the end, which is the preſervation of the
Balance, are of a like effect.
TO 'riſe thus from true Foundations to proper Superſtructures, the
firſt ſtep from the Balance thus fix'd into the Orders of a Common-
wealth, is not otherwiſe to be taken than by certain Diſtributions or
Diviſions of the People, wherof ſom are to be perſonal, and ſom local.
THE firſt perſonal diviſion of a People, is into Freemen and Ser-
vants. Freemen are ſuch as have wherwithal to live of themſelves;
and Servants, ſuch as have not. This diviſion therfore is not conſtitu-
tive, but naturally inherent in the Balance; nor, ſeeing all Govern-
ment is in the direction of the Balance, is it poſſible for the Super-
ſtructures
rallel.
f
Freemen and
Servants.
*
The Art of Lawgiving.
437
pos’d,
4.
Elders and
yenne
ſtructures of any to make more Freemen than are ſuch by the nature Chap. 1.
of the Balance, or by their being able to live of themſelves.
ALL that could in this matter be don, even by Moses himſelf, is The ſecond pa:
contain’d in this Proviſo: If thy Brother that dwells by thee be grown poor, Levit
. 25. 29;
and be ſold to thee, thou Malt not compel him to ſerve as a bondſervant: but
as a bird ſervant, and a ſojourner he ſhall be with thee, and ſhall ſerve
thee to the year of Jubile. And then ſhall be depart from thee, both he
and his Children with him, and ſhall return to his own Fainily, and to the
Poſſeſſion of his Fathers ſhall he return.
THE nature of Riches conſider’d, this diviſion into Freemen and
Servants is not properly conſtitutive, but as it were natural. To com
to ſuch Diviſions as are both perſonal and conſtitutive, it is pro-
THAT all Citizens, that is, Freemen, oy ſuch as are not Servants, Horse Zana
be diſtributed into Horſe and Foot. That ſuch of them as have one hun- Forte
dred pounds a year in Lands, Goods or Mony, or above that proportion, be
of the Horſe ; and all ſuch as have under that proportion, be of the Foot.
THAT all Elders or Freemen, being thirty years of Age or upivards, be
capable of Civil Adminiſtration : and that the Youth, or ſuch Fréemen ds Youth.
are between eighteen years of Age and thirty, be not capable of Civil Ad-
miniſtration, but of Military only; in ſuch a manner as ſhall follow in the
Military part of this Model.
NOW, beſides perſonal diviſions, it is neceſſary in order to the
framing of a Commonwealth, that there be ſom ſuch as are local
. For
theſe therfore it is propos'd,
THAT the whole native
, or proper Territory of the Commonwealth, precine of the
be caſt
, with as much exactneſs as can be convenient, into known and fix'd Parilt.
Precincts or Pariſhes.
THAT the Elders, reſident in each Pariflı, annually aſſemble in the
ſame; as for example, upon Monday next inſuing the laſt of December
gregations and
of that Parijh; and that the firſt and ſecond ſo elefted be Overſeers, or Pre-
ſidents, for regulating of all Parochial Congregations, whether of the Elders
or of the Touth, during the term for phich they were elected.
THAT ſo many Pariſhes lying neareſt together, whoſe Deputys, fluall crecinct of
amount to one hundred or ther about, be caſt into one Precinct call the che Hundred
Hundred. And that in each Precinct callid the Hundred, there be a Town,
Village, or place appointed to be the Capital of the fame.
TⓇH AT the Parochial Deputys elected throout the Hundred, aſſemble
annually ; for example, upon Monday next inſuing the laſt of January, at Alimely man
the Capital of their Hundred. That they then and there elect out of the Hundred
Horse of their number one Juſtice of the Peace, one Juryman, one Captain,
one Inſígn: and out of the foot of their number, one other Juryman, one
High Conſtable, &c.
THỞ our Juſtices of the Peace liave not bin annual, yet that they
may fo be is apparent; becauſe the high Sherifs, whoſe Office is of
greater difficulty, have always bin annual : ſeeing therfore they may
be annual, that ſo they ought in this Adminiſtration to be, will ap-
pear, where they com to be conſtitutive of ſuch Courts as, ſhould
they conſiſt of a ſtanding Magiſtracy, would be againſt the nature
of a Commonwealth. But the Precincts hitherto being thus ſtated, it
is propos’a;
THAT
6,
a
8.
1
438
Tribe.
Tribe.
The Art of Lawgiving.
Book III. TH AT every twenty Hundreds, lying neareſt and moſt conveniendly
Lo
together, be caſt into one Tribe. That the whole Territory being after this
Precinét of the manner caſt into Tribes, ſom Town, Village, or place be appointed to every
Tribe for the Capital of the ſame. And that theſe three Precincts, that is,
the Pariſly, the Hundred, and the Tribe ( whether the Deputys, thenceforth
annually choſen in the Pariſhes or Hundreds, com to increaſe or diminiſh)
remain firm and inalterable for ever, ſave only by A&t of Parlament.
THESE Diviſions, or the like, both perſonal and local, are that
in a well order'd Commonwealth, which Stairs are in a good houſe ;
rot that Stairs in themſelves are deſirable, but that without them there
is no getting into the Chambers. The whole matter of Coſt and Pains,
neceſſary to the introduction of a like Model, lys only in the firſt
Architecture, or building of theſe Stairs; that is, in ſtating of theſe
three Precincts: which don, they lead you naturally and neceſſarily
into all the Rooms of this Fabric. For the juſt number of Tribes into
which a Territory thus caſt may fall, it is not very eaſy to be gueſt:
yet,
becauſe for the carrying on of diſcourſe it is requiſit to pitch upon
ſom certainty, I ſhall preſume that the number of the Tribes, thus
ſtated, amounts to fifty; and that the number of the Parochial De-
putys annually elected in each Tribe, amounts to two thouſand. Be
the Deputys more or fewer by the alterations which may happen in
progreſs of time, it diſorders nothing. Now to aſcend by theſe Stairs
into the upper Rooms of this Building, it is propos’d,
ic.
THAT the Deputys elected in the ſeveral Pariſhes, together with their
or
Alufter
' The Magiſtrats and other Officers both Civil and Military, elected in their feve-
ral Hundreds, aſſemble or muſter annually; for example, upon Monday next
infuing the laſt of February at the Capital of their Tribe.
HOW the Troops and Companys of the Deputys, with their
Military Officers or Commanders thus aſſembld, may, without ex-
pence of time, be ſtraight diſtributed into one uniform and orderly
* in Oceana. Body, has bin elſwhere * ſhewn, and is not needful to be repeated.
For their work, which at this meeting will require two days, it is
propos’d,
THAT the whole Body thus aſſembl’d, upon the firſt day of the Aſſema
bly, elect out of the Horſe of their number one High Sherif, one Lieute-
nant of the Tribe, one Cuſtos Rotulorum, one Conductor, and two Cenia
fors. That the High Sherif be Commander in chief, the Lieutenant
Commander in the ſecond place, and the Conductor in the third, of this
Band or Squadron. That the Cuſtos Rotulorum be Muſtermaſter, and
keep the Rolls. That the Cenſors be Governors of the Ballot. And that
the term of theſe Magiſtracys be annual.
THESE being thus elected, it is propos'd,
THAT the Magiſtrats of the Tribe, that is to ſay, the High Sherif,
tive Troop." Lieutenant, Cuſtos Rotulorum, the Cenſors, and the Condučtor, toge-
ther with the Magiſtrats and Officers of the Hundreds, that is to ſay, the
trenty Juſtices of the Peace, the forty Jurymen, the twenty High
Conſtables,
be one Troop, or one Troop and one Company apart, called the Prerogative
Troop or Company. That this Troop bring in and aſſiſt the Juſtices of
Allize, hold the Quarter Seſſions in their ſeveral Capacitys, and perform
their brber Functions as formerly.
BY this means the Commonwealth at its introduction may imbrace
the Law as it ſtands, that is, unreform’d; which is the greateſt advan-
tage of ſuch Reformations: for to reform Laws before the introduction
OF.
.
ii.
Magiftrars of
the Tribe.
12.
The
*
The Art of Lawgiving.
439
4
/
12.
Book 2.
of the Government, which to low to wizat the Laws in Refor- Chap. 1.
mation are to be brou cor ti red, is impo.Tible. But theſe Magi-
ftrats of the Hun: reds and Tribes being ſuch wherby the Parlament is
to govern the Nation, this is a regard in which they ought to be fur-
ther capable of ſuch Orders and Inſtructions as ſhall therto be requi-
fit: For which cauſe it is propos'd,
THAT the Magiſtrats of the Tribe, that is to ſay, the High Sherif,
Lieutenant, Cuſtos Rotulorum, the Cenſors, and the Condučtor, toge-
The Phyfarch
ther with the twenty Juſtices elected at the Hundreds, be a Court for the
Government of the Tribe call’d the Phylarch; and that this Court procede
in all matters of Government, as ſhall from time to time be directed by AEt
of Parlament.
BY theſe Courts the Commonwealth will be furniſh'd with true
Cliannels, wherby at leiſure to turn the Law into that which is ſuf-
ficiently known to have bin its primitive Courſe, and to a perfect Ren
formation by degrees, without violence. For as the corruption of our
Law procedes from an Art inabled to improve its privat Intereſt; or
from the Law upon the Bench, and the Jury at the Bar: So the Refor-
mation of our Law muſt com from diſabling it as an Art to improve
its privat Intereſt; or to a Jury upon the Bench, and the Law at the
Bar, as in Venice.
JUDGES and Officers ſhalt thou make thee in all thy Gates which the The third Pa-
Lord thy God gives thee throout thy Tribes, and they ſhall judg the People rallel
.
with juſt Judgment. Theſe Courts, whoſe Seſſionhouſe was in the Deut. 16. 18.
Gates of every City, were ſhewn each of them to have conſiſted of
twenty three Elders, which were as a Jury upon the Bench, giving
fentence by plurality of Votes, and under a kind of appeal to the fe-
venty Elders or Senat of Iſrael, as was alſo ſhewn in the ſecond
Book.
THIS, or the like, by all example and beyond any controverſy,
has bin, and is the natural way of Judicature in Commonwealths.
The Phylarchs, with a Court or two of Appeals eligible out of the
Senat and the People, are at any time with eaſe and very ſmall altera-
tion to be caſt upon a triennial Rotation : which, in all things beſides
proceding after the manner of the Venetian Quarancys, will be in this
caſe perfect Orders.
TO return : The firſt Day's Election at the Tribe being as bas bin
ſhewn, it is propos’d,
THAT the Squadron of the Tribe, on the ſecond day of their Aſſem-
bly, elect two Knights and three Burgeſſes out of the Horſe of their num- Knightf'aną
ber, and four other Burgeſſes out of the foot of their number.
That Burgeiles.
each Knight upon Election forthwith make Oath of Allegiance to the Com.
monwealth ; or refuſing this Oath, that the next Competitor in Election to
the ſame Magiſtracy,
making the ſaid Oath, be the Magiſtrat : the like
for the Burgeſſes. That the Knights, thus ſworn, have Seſſion in the
Senat for the term of three years; and that the Burgeſſes thus ſworn be of
the Prerogative Tribe, or Repreſentative of the People for the like term.
NOW wheras this Propoſition is fufficient for the perpetuation of
the Senat and the Aſſembly of the People, being once inſtituted, bui
not ſufficient for the full and perfect Inſtitution of them, it neceſſitats
,
the addition in this place, not of a permanent Order, but of an Expe.
dient for the firſt years Élection only; which may be this:
“THAT
440
The Art of Lawgiving.
66
Elcction.
13.
Proviro.
Book III.
"I HAT for the full and perfect Inſtitution of the Aſſemblys mention’d,
" the Squadron of the Tribe in the firſt year of the Commonwealth elect
Expedicut for
the firſt years
two Knights for the term of one year, two other Knights for the term
" oftiro years, and laſtly, tivo Knights more for the term of three years :
" i he like for the Burgeſſes of the Horſe firſt, and then for thoſe of the
Foot.
BY this Expedient the Senat in fifty Tribes is conſtituted of three
hundred Knights or Senators, wherof one hundred, by the expira-
tion of their terms, com annually to fall ;. and another hundred at the
ſame time to enter. The like for the Prerogative Tribe or Aſſembly of
the People, which, conffting ir the whole of one thouſand and fifiy,
ſuffers the like alteration in one third part, or in the yearly exchange of
one Inundred and fifty Burgeſſes: By which means the Motion or Ro-
tation of theſe Aſſemblys is Annual, Triennial, and Perpetual. For
the full diſpatch of the foregoing Elections there remains but one Pro-
poſition more, which is this:
THAT a Magiſtrat or Officer elečied at the Hundred be therby exclud-
ed from being elected a Magiſtrat of the Tribe, or of the firſt days Election :
that no former Election whatſoever exclude a man from the ſecond days
Election at the Tribe, or to be choſen a Knight or Burgeſs. That a man
being choſen a Knight or Burgeſs, who before was choſen a Magiſtrat or
Officer of the Hundred or Tribe, delegat his former Office, or Magiſtracy
in the Hundred or the Tribe, to any other Deputy being no Magiſtrat nor
Officer, and being of the ſame Hundred and of the ſame Order, that is, of
the Horſe or Foot reſpectively. That the whole and every part of the fore-
going Orders for Election in the Pariſhes, the Hundreds, and the Tribes,
be holding and inviolable upon ſuch Penaltys in caſe of failure, as Mall
hereafter be provided by Act of Parlament againſt any Pariſh, Hundred,
Tribe, Deputy or Perſon fo offending.
WITHOUT ſom ſuch Provilion as is contain'd in the former
part of this Propoſition, men would be inconveniently excluded from
preferment, or the Tribe oblig'd to return to the Ballot; and ſo to
ſpend more time for trifles than is requir'd by their real buſi-
nefs.
The fourth Pa. THE Repreſentative of Iſrael collected monthly by the two thou-
ſand out of cach Tribe (if we conſider what Merlod muſt have bin
us’d in ſuch Elections) intimars, firſt, that there were Subdiviſions to
that end in each Tribe, perhaps of the nature of our Hundreds and
Pariſhes: Secondly, that there were qualifications in thoſe Elections
as to the Patriarchs or chief Fathers, and as to the People with their
Captains of thouſands, and Captains of hundreds; which is enough
thus far to approve and recommend the foregoing Propoſitions.
THE Senat, and the Congregation or Repreſentative of the Peo-
ple, are in every Commonwealth the main Orders. The Stairs or De-
grees of aſcent to theſe being now mounted, it remains that I lead you
into the Rooms of State, or the Aſſemblys themſelves : which ſhall
be perform’d, firſt, by ſhewing their Frame, and next by ſhewing their
Uſes or Functions. To bring you firſt into the Senat, it is propos’d,!
THAT the Knights of the Annual Election in the Tribes take their
Frame of the places on Monday next inſuing the laſt of March in the Senat. That the
like number of Knights, whoſe Seſſion determins at the ſame time, recede.
That every Knight or Senator be paid out of the public Revenue quarterly,
one hundred twenty five Pounds during his term of Seſſion, and be oblig’d
to fit in purple Robes.
THAT
rallcl.
2 Chron. 27.
16.
Senat.
1
1
The Art of Lawgiving.
44.1
17.
19.
20.
THAT annually, upon the reception of the new Knights, the Senat Chap. I.
procede to the Election of new Magiſtrats and Counſillors. That for Ma-
giftrats they clect one General, one Speaker, and two Cenſors, each for the Senatoriani
term of one year ; theſe promiſcuouſly : 'and that they elect one Commiſſioner Magiſtrats.
of the Great Seal, and one Commiſſioner of the Treaſury
, each for the
term of three years, and out of the new Knights only.
THIS Propoſition ſuppoſes the Commiſſioners of the Seal and
thoſe of the Treaſury to conliſt each of three, wheeld by the annual
Election of one into each Order, upon a triennial Rotation. For far-
ther explanation of the Senatorian Magiſtračys, it is propos’d,
THAT the General and Speaker, as CONSULS of the Common- The General
wealth, and Preſidents of the Senat, be, during the term of their Magi- fitting, and
ſtracy, paid quarterly five hundred Pounds : That the Inſigns of theſe the Speaker.
Magiſtracys be a Sword born before the General, and a Mace before the
Speaker : That they be oblig'd to wear Ducal Robes; and that what is ſaid
of the General in this Propoſition, be underſtood only of the General ſitting,
and not of the General marching.
THÁT the General ſitting, in caſe he be commanded to march, receive The General
Field Pay; and that a new General be forthwith elected by the Senat to ſucc- marching.
cede him in the Houſe, with all the Rights, Inſigns, and Emoluments of
the General ſitting: And this ſo often as one or more Generals are marching.
THAT the three Commiſſioners of the Great Seal, and the three Com-Commiſſio-
millioners of the Treaſury, uſing their Inſigns and Habit, and performing ners of the
their other Functions as formerly
, be paid quarterly, to each of them three Seal and of the
Treaſury.
hundred ſeventy five Poiinds.
THÁT the Cenſors be each of them Chancellor of one Univerſity by The Cenforsi
virtue of their Election: that they govern the Ballot; that they be Pre-
ſidents of the Council for Religion; that each have a ſilver Wand for the
Inſign of his Magiſtracy; that each be paid quarterly three hundred ſeventy
five Pounds, and be oblig’d to wear ſcarlet Robes.
THAT the General fitting, the Speaker, and the fix Commiſſioners The Signory
.
aboveſaid, be the Signory of this Commonwealth.
THIS for the Senatorian Magiſtrats. For Senatorian Councils it
is propos’d,
THAT there be a Council of State conſiſting of fifteen Knights, five Council of
out of each Order or Election, and that the same be perpetuated by the State.
annual Election of five out of the new Knights, or laſt elected into the
THAT there be a Council for Religion conſiſting of twelve Knights, Councis of
four out
of each Order, and perpetuated by the annual Election of four out Religion, of
of the Knights last elected into the Senat. Ibat there be a Council for Trade.
Trade, conſiſting of a like number, elected and perpetudted in the ſaine
THAT there be a Council of War, not elected by the Senat, but elect-Council of
ed by the Council of State out of themſelves. That this Council of War War.
confijt of nine Knights, three out of each Order, and be perpetuated by the
annual Election of three out of the laſt Knights elected into the Council of
State.
THAT in caſe the Sendt adds nine Knights more out of their own num- The Dictator
:
ter to the Council of War, the ſaid Council be underſtocd by this addition
be DICTATOR of the Commonwealth for the term of three months,
and no longer, except by farther Order of the Senat the ſaid Dictatorian
Power be prolong'd for a like term.
LII
THAT
t
23.
Senat
manner.
ܟ݂
،
26.
to
442
The Art of Lawgiving.
27
The Propoſers
general.
29.
particular Pro-
poters.
29.
Academy
30.
Emballadors
THAT the Signory have Seſſion and Suffrage, with right alſo jointly
or ſeverally to propoſé, both in the Senat and
in all Senatorian Councils
.
THÄT each of the three Orders, or Diviſions of Knights in each
Provofts, or Senatorian Council, elect one Provost for the term of one week ; and that
any two Provoſts of the ſame Council ſo elected may propoſe to their reſpective
Council, and not otherwiſe.
THAT ſom fair Room or Rooms well furniſh’d and attended, be allow'd
at the States charge for a free and open Academy to all comers at ſom conven
nient hour or hours towards the Evening. That this Academy be govern'd
according to the Rules of good Breeding, or civil Converſation, by ſom or
all of the Propoſers; and that in the ſame it be lawful for any man by
word of mouth or by writing, in jeſt or in earneſt, to propoſe to the Pro-
poſers.
FROM the frame or ſtructure of theſe Councils, I ſhould paſs
to their Functions; but that beſides annual Elections, there will be ſom
biennial, and others emergent : in which regard it is propos'd, firſt,
for biennial Elections,
THAT for Embaſſadors in ordinary, there be four Reſidences ; as
in ordinary. France, Spain, Venice, “and Conſtantinople: that every Reſident, upon the
Election of a new Embaſſador in ordinary, remove to the next Reſidence
in the Order nominated, till having ſerv’d in them all
, he returns home.
That upon Monday next inſuing the laſt of November, there be every ſecond
year elected by the Senat ſom fit Perſon, being under thirty five years of
Age, and not of the Senat or popular Aſſembly: that the Party fo elected,
repair upon Monday next inſuing the last of March following, as Em-
baſſador in ordinary to the Court of France, and there reſide for the term
of two years, to be computed from the firſt of April next inſuing his Electi-
on. That every Embaſſador in ordinary be allow'd shree thouſand pounds
a year during the term of his Reſidences; and that if Reſident coms to
dy, there be an extraordinary Election into his Reſidence for his term, and
for the remainder of his Removes and Progreſs.
THAT all emergent Eleftions be made by Scrutiny, that is, by a
Council, or by Commisſioners propoſing, and by the Senat reſolving in the
manner following : That all Field-Officers be proposd by the Council of
War; that all Embaſſadors extraordinary be propos’d by the Council of
State; that all Judges and Serjeants at Law be propos d by the Commiſio-
ners of the great Seal; that all Barons and Officers of Truſt in the Ex-
chequer, be propos’d by the Commiſſioners of the Treaſury and that ſuch
as are thus propos’d, and approv’d by the Senat, be held lawfully elected.
THESE Elections being thus diſpatch’d, I com to the Functions
of the Senat, and firſt, to thoſe of the Senatorian Councils : for which
it is propos'd,
THAT the cognizance of all matters of State to be conſider’d, or
she Senatorian Law to be enacted, whether it be Provincial or National, Domeſtic or Fo-
ren, pertain to the Council of State. That ſuch Affairs of either kind, as
they ſhall judg to require more Secrecy, be rcmitted by this Council, and
belong to the Council of War, being for that end a ſelect part of the same.
That the cognizance and protection both of the National Religion, and of
the Liberty of Conſcience equally eſtablifbd in this Nation, after the man
ner to be ſhewn in the Religious part of this Model, pertain to the Council
for Religion. That all matters of Traffic, and the regulation of the ſame
belong to the Council of Trade. That in the exerciſe of theſe ſeveral Functi-
ons, which naturally" are Senatorian or Authoritative on's, no Council
affume
31.
Emergent
Elections.
32.
Function of
*
The Art of Lawgiving.
443
ܬ
Function of
V
aſſume any other Power than ſuch only as ſhall be ſettl’d upon the same by Chap. 1.
Het of Parlament.
THAT what ſhall be propos’d to the Senat by any one or more of the
Signory or Propoſers general ; or whatever was propos?d by any two of the the Senat.
Provoſts or particular Propoſers to their reſpective Council
, and upon
de-
bate at that Council ſhall com to be propos’d by the ſame to the Senat, be ne-
ceſſarily debatable and debated by the Senat. That in all caſes wherin Power
is committed to the Senat by a Lam made, or by AEt of Parlament, the
Reſult of the Senat be ultimat: that
in all caſes of Law to be made, or not
already provided for by an Act of Parlament, as War and Peace, levy of
Men or Mony, or the like, the Reſult of the Senat be not ultimat. That
whatſoever is reſolv'd by the Senat, upon a caſe wherin their Reſult is not
ultimat, be propos’d by the Senat to the Prerogative Tribe or Repreſen-
tative of the People; except only in caſes of ſuch ſpeed or ſecrecy, wherin
the Senat ſball judg the neceſſary ſlowneſs or openneſs in this way of pro-
ceding to be of detriment or danger to the Commonwealth.
THAT if upon the motion or propoſition of a Council or Propoſer Function of
General, the Senat adds nine Knights promiſcuouſly choſen out of their own che Dictator.
number, to the Council of War; the ſame Council, as therby made Distan
tor, have power of Life and Death, as alſo to enact Laws in all ſuch caſes
of speed of ſecrecy, for and during the term of three months and no
longer, except upon a new Order from the Senat. And that all Laws enacted
by the Dictator be good and valid for the term of one year, and no longer ;
except the ſame be propos’d by the Senat, and reſolv’d by the People.
THIŚ Dictatorian Council (as may already appear) conſiſts
fundamentally of the Signory, with nine Knights elected by the
Council of State, additionally of nine Knights more emergently cho-
fen by the Senat, and of the four Tribuns
of courſe; as will appear
when I com to ſpeak of that Magiſtracy. Now if Dictatorian Power
be indeed formidable, yet this in the firſt place is remarkable, that the
Council here offer'd for a Dictator is of a much ſafer Conſtitution;
than what among us hitherto has bin offer'd for a Commonwealth;
namely, a Parlament and a Council in the interim. For here is no in-
terim, but all the Councils of the Commonwealth not only remaining,
but remaining in the exerciſe of all their Functions, without the abate-
ment of any ſpeed and ſecrecy belonging not to any of them, but to
that only of the Dictator. And if this Dictatorian Council has more in
it of a Commonwealth than has hitherto among us bin either practis dor
offer'd, by wliat Argument can it be pretended that a Commonwealth
is ſo imperfect thro the neceſſity of ſuch an Order, that it muſt needs
borrow of Monarchy; feeing every Monarchy that has any Senat,
Aſſembly, or Council in it, therby moſt apparently borrows more of
a Commonwealth, than there is to be found of Monarchy in this
Council ?
TO dimiſs this whole Senat with one Parallel : The inſtitution of the fifth pa-
the ſeventy Elders in Iſrael (as was Thewn in the ſecond Book) for
their number related to an Accident, and a Cuſtom therupon antiently
introduc'd. The Accident was that the Sons of JACOB who went
into Egypt were ſo many ; theſe, firſt governing their Familys by na-
tural right, came, as thoſe Familys increas’d, to be for their number re-
tain’d and continu'd in the nature of a Senatorian Council, while the
People were yer in Egyptian Bondage. So 'we, having had no like
Cuſtom, have as to the number no like Inducement. Again, the
LII2
Terris
rallel.
444
The Art of Lawgiving.
22. I.
Luke throout is
Common-
wealths
35.
Fabric of the
Book III. Territory of Canaan amounted not to a fourth of our Country; and
in Government we are to fit our ſelves to our own proportions. Nor
can a Senat, conſiſting of few Senators, be capable of ſo many diſtri-
butions as a Senat conſiſting of more. Yet we find in the reſtitution
2 Chr. 19. 11. of the Sanhedrim by JEHOSHAPII A T, that there was AMA-
RIAH chief in all matters of the Lord, that is, in judgment upon the
Laws, which, having bin propos'd by God, were more peculiarly his
matters; and ZEBADIA H chief in all the King's matters, that is, in
political debates concerning Government, or War and Peace. Laſtly,
Judg.11.5,11. When the Children of Ammon made War against Iſrael, the People of
Ifrael made JEPHTHA not only Captain, but Head over them. So
the Judg of Iſrael, being no ſtanding Magiſtrat, but elected upon
emergencys, ſupplys the Parallel as to Dictatorian Power in a Com-
monwealth.
DEBATE is the natural Parent of Reſult; whence the Senat
throout the Latin Authors is call's Fathers, and in Greec Authors the
compellation of a popular Aſſembly is Men; as Men of Athens, Men
AC. 7. 2. & of Corinth, Men of Lacedemon: nor is this Cuſtom Heathen only,
ſeeing theſe Compellations are us’d to the Senat and the People of the
Ferfe&tly well Fews, not only by STEPHEN, but alſo by Paul, where they be-
skilld in thegin their ſpeeches in this manner: Men, Brethren, and Fathers.' To
Cuſtoms of
com then from the Fathers to the People, the Popular Aſſembly, or
Prerogative Tribe; it is propos’d,
THAT the Burgeſſes of the annual Ele&tion return’d by the Tribes,
Prerogative enter into the Prerogative Tribe upon Monday next inſuing the laſt of
March ; and that the like number of Burgeſſes
, whoſe term is expir’d, rea
cede at the ſame time. That the Burgeſſes
thus enter'd elect to themſelves
out of their own number, two of the Horſe ; one to be Captain, and the
other to be Cornet of the ſame : and two of the Foot; one to be Captain,
the other to be Inſign of the ſame, each for the term of three years. That
theſe Officers being thus elected, the whole Tribe or Aſſembly procede to the
Election of four annual Magiſtrats; two out of the Foot, to be Tribuns
of the Foot: and two out of the Horſe, to be Tribuns of the Horſe. That
the Tribuns be Commanders of this Tribe in chief, fofar as it is a Military
Body; and Preſidents of the ſame, as it is a civil Aſſembly. And laſtly,
that this whole Tribe be paid weekly as follows. To each of the Tribuns
of Horſe, ſeven pounds." To each of the Tribuns of Foot, fix pounds.
To each of the Captains of Horſe, five pounds. To each of the Captains
of Foot, four pounds. To each
of the Cornets
, three pounds. To each of
the Inſigns, two pounds ſeven ſhillings. To every Horſeman two pounds, and
to every one of the Foot one pound ten ſhillings.
FOR the Salarys of the Senat and the People together, they a-
mount not to three hundred thouſand pounds a year; which is cheaper
by near two parts in three, than the chief Magiſtracy ever did or can
otherwiſe coſt: for if you give nothing (omnia dat qui jufta negat)
men will be their own Carvers. But to procede, it is propos'd,
THAT inferior Officers, as Captains, Cornets, Inſigns, be only for
Offices of the the Military Diſciplin of the Tribe. That the Tribuns have Seſſion in
the Senat without fuffrage; that they have Seffion of courſe in the
Dictatorian Council
, ſo often as it is created by the Senat, and with ſuf-
frage. That they be Preſidents of the Court in all caſes to be judg' by
the People.
Tribe.
36.
Officers,
*
THAT
The Art of Lawgiving.
445
37.
rallcl.
t
38.
the Senat.
Fuiction of
the Preroga-
40.
THAT Peculat or Defraudation of the Pablic, and all caſes tending Chap, I.
to the ſubverſion of the Government, be triable by this Repreſentative;
and that there be an Appeal to the fame in all Cauſes, and from all Magi- Appeal to the
forats, Courts, and Councils, whether National or Provincial.
People.
THIS Judicatory may ſeem large: but thus the Congregation of The ſixth Pa-
Ifrael, conſiſting of four hundred thouſand, judg'd the Tribe of Ben-
Judg. 20.
jamin. Thus all the Roman Tribes judg’d CORIOLANDS. And thus Halicar.
Duke LOREDANO was try'd by the great Council of Venice, con- Janotti.
fiſting yet of about two thouſand.
THIS is as much as I have to ſay ſeverally of the Senat and the
People; but their main Functions being joint, as they make one Parla-
ment, it is farther propos’d,
THAT the right of Debate, as alſo of propoſing to the People, be the main
wholly and only in the Senat ; without any power at all of Reſult, not de- Function of
riv'd from the People.
THAT the power of Reſult be wholly and only in the People, with- The main
out any right at all of Debate.
TÚÅT the Senat having debated and agreed upon a Law to be pro-cive Tribe
pos’d, cauſe promulgation of the fame to be made for the ſpace of fix weeks
before propoſition ; that is, cauſe the Law to be printed and publiſk'd ſo long Promulgation.
before
it is to be propos d.
THAT promulgation being made, the Signory demand of the Tribuns, Manner: of
being preſent in the Senat, an Aſſembly of the People
. That the Tribuns, Propofition.
upon ſuch a demand of the Signory or of the Senat, be obligd to aſſemble
the Prerogative Tribe in Arms by ſound of Trumpet, with Drums beating,
and Colors flying, in any, Town, Field, or Market place being not above fix
miles diftant, upon the day and at the hour appointed ; except the meeting,
thro
anzy
inconvenience of the weather or the like, be prorogu'd by the joint
conſent of the Signory and the Tribuns. That the Prerogative Tribe being
aſſembld accordingly, the Senat propoſe to them by two or more of the Sena
torian Magiſtrats, therto appointed at the firſt promulgation of the Law.
That the Propoſers for the Senat open to the People the Occaſion, Motives,
and Reaſons of the Law to be propos’d; and the ſame being don, put
it by
diſtinct Clauſes to the Ballot of the People. That if any material Clauſe
or Clauſes be rejected by the People, they be review'd by the Senat, alter'd,
and propos'd ( if they think fit) to the third time, but no oftner.
THAT what is thus propos’d by the Senat, and reſolv’d by the People, Act of Parla-
be the Law of the Land, and no other, except as in the caſe reſerv’d to the mento
Dictatorian Council.
THE Congregation of Iſrael being monthly, and the Repreſenta-The fevents
tive propos'd being annual and triennial, they are each upon Courſes Paralel.
or Rotation: the Congregation of Iſrael conſiſting of twenty four
thouſand, in which the whole number of the Princes of the Tribes and
of the Princes of the Familys amounted not, I might ſay, to one hun-
dred, but will ſay to one thouſand; it follows, that the lower fort in
the Congregation of Iſrael held proportion to the better fort, above
Wheras in the Repreſentative propos’d, the lower fort
twenty to one.
hold proportion to the better fort but ſix to four'; and that popular
Congregation where the lower ſort hold but fix to four, is by far the
inolt Ariſtocratical that is or ever was in any well order'd Common-
wealth, except Venice : but if you will have that Gentry to be all of
one fort, or if you allow them to be of a better and of a meaner
fort, Venice is not excepted. The Sanhedrim made no Law without
1
the
446
The Art of Lawgiving.
i
Ezra 10.8.
Book III, the People; nor may the Senac in this Model : but the Sanliedrim with
the Congregation, might make Laws; ſo may the Senat, in our Mo-
del, with the Repreſentative of the People. Laſtly, as the Congre-
gation in Iſrael was held either by the Princes in perſon, with their
Staves and Standards of the Camp, or by the four and twenty thou-
ſand in Military Diſciplin; ſo the Repreſentative propos’d is in the na-
ture of a Regiment.
EXCEPTING Venice, where there is a ſhadow, and but a
ſhadow of Law made by the Senat (for the Soverain Power is un-
deniably in the great Council) and Athens, where a Law made by
the Senat was current as a Probationer for one year before it was pro-
pos’d to the People; there neither is nor has bin any ſuch thing in a
Commonwealth as a Law made by the Senat. That the Senat ſhould
have power to make Laws, reduces the Government to a ſingle Coun-
cil; and Government by a ſingle Council, if the Council be of the
Many, is Anarchy, as in the Aſſembly of the Roman People by
Tribes, which always ſhook,and at length ruin'd that Commonwealth:
Or, if the Council be of the Few, it is Oligarchy, as that of Athens con..
fiſting of the four hundred, who nevertheleſs pretended to propoſe to
Thucyd. lib.8. five thouſand, tho they did not. Of which ſays THUCYDIDES,
This was indeed the form pretended in words by the four hundred; but the
moſt of them, thro privat ambition, fell upon that by which an Oligarchy
made out of a Democracy is chiefly overthrown: for at once they claim'd
every one not to be equal
, but to be far the chief. Anarchy, or a ſingle
Council conſiſting of the Many, is ever tumultuous, and dos ill even
while it means well. But Oligarchy, ſeldom meaning well, is a Facti-
on wherin every one ſtriving to make himſelf, or ſom other from whom
he hopes for advantage, ſpoils all. There is in a Commonwealth no
other cure of theſe, than that the Anarchy may have a Council of
ſom few, well choſen, and elected by themſelves, to adviſe them ;
which Council ſo inſtituted, is the Senat: Or that the Oligarchy
have a popular Repreſentative to balance ir; which both curing Tumult
in the raſh and heady People, and all thoſe Corruptions which cauſe
Factiouſneſs in the fly and ſubtil Few, amount to the proper Super-
Itructures of a well order'd Commonwealth. As, to return to the ex-
ample of the Oligarchy in Athens, where the four liundred (whoſe
Reign, being very ſhort, had bin as feditious) were depos'd; and
the Soverainty was decreed to a popular Council of five thouſand,
with a Senat of four hundred annually elective upon Courſes, or by
Rotation. Of this ſays THUCYDIDES, Now firſt ( at leaſt in my
time) the Athenians ſeem to have order'd their State aright, it conſiſting
of a moderat temper both of the Few and the Many. And this was the firſt
thing that, after ſo many misfortunes, made the City again to raiſe her
Head. But we in England are not apt to believe, that to decree the
Soverainty to thouſands, were the way to make a City or a Nation
recover of its Wounds, or to raiſe its Head. We have an averſion
to ſuch thoughts, and are ſick of them. An Aſſembly of the People
Soverain! Nay, and an Aſſembly of the People conſiſting in the major
vore of the lower fort! Why, ſure it muſt be a dull, an unskilful
thing. But ſo is the Touchſtone in a Goldſmiths Shop, a dull thing,
and altogether unskild in the Trade; yet without this, would even the
Maſter be deceivid. And certain it is, that a well order'd Aſſembly of
he People is as true an Index of what in Government is good or great, as
tany Touchſtone is of Gold.
A
lib, 8.
*
: The Art of Lawgiving.
447
2
43.
tions.
A COUNCIL (eſpecially if of a looſe Election) having not Chap. 1.
only the Debate, but the Reſult alſo, is capable of being influenc'du
from without, and of being ſway'd by Intereſt within. There may
be a forin'd, a prejudic'd Party, that will haſten or outbaul you from
the Debate to the Queſtion, and then precipitat you upon the Reſult :
Wheras if it had no power of Reſult, there could remain to the ſame
no more than Debate only, without any Biaſs, or cauſe of diverting
ſuch Debate from Maturity ; in which Maturity of unbiaſs’d Debate
lys the final cauſe of the Senat, and the whole Light that can be given
to a People. But when this is don, if your reſolving Aſſembly be not
ſuch as can imbibe or contract no other Intereſt than that only of the
whole People, all again is loft : for the Reſult of all Aſſemblys gos
principally upon that which they conceive to be their own Intereſt.
But how an Aſſembly upon Rotation, conſiſting of one thouſand,
where the Vote is ſix to four in the lower ſort, ſhould be capable of
any other Intereſt than that only of the whole People by which they
are orderly elected, has never yet bin, nor, I believe, ever will be
ſhewn. In a like diſtribution therfore of Debate and Reſult, conſiſts
the higheſt Myſtery of Popular Government ; and indeed the ſupreme
Law, wherin is contain'd not only the Liberty, but the Safety of the
People.
FOR the remainder of the Civil part of this Model, which is now
but ſmall, it is farther propos’d,
THÁT every Magiſtracy, Office, or Election throout this whole Com- Rulc for* Vaca-
monwealth, whether annual or triennial
, be underſtood of conſequeuce to
injoin an interval or vacation equal to the term of the ſame. That the
Magiſtracy of a Knight and of a Burgeſs, be, in this relation, underſtood
as one and the ſame; and that this Order regard only ſuch Elections as are
National or Domeſtic, and not ſuch as are Provincial or Foren.
THAT, for an exception from this Rule, where there is but one Elder Exception
of the Horſe in one and the ſamne Pariſh, that Elder be eligible in the Same from the Rule.
without interval; and where there be above four Elders of the Horſe in
one and the ſame Pariſly, there be not above half, nor under two of them ea
ligible at the ſame Election.
OTHER WISE the People, beyond all manner of doubt,
would elect ſo many of the better fort at the very firſt, that there
would not be of the Foot or of the meaner ſort enough to ſupply the
duc number of the Popular Aſſembly or Prerogative Tribe : and the
better fort being excluded ſubſequent Elections by their intervals
,
there would not be wherwithal to furniſh the Senat, the Horſe of
the Prerogative Tribe, and the reſt of the Magiſtracys; each of which
Obſtructions is prevented by this Exception. Where, by the way, if
in all experience ſuch has bin the conſtant temper of the People, and
can indeed be reaſonably no other, it is apparent what cauſe there can
be of doubt who in a Commonwealth of this nature muſt have the
leading. Yet is no man excluded from any Preferment; only Indu-
ftry, which ought naturally to be the firſt ſtep, is firſt injoin’d by this
Policy, but rewarded amply: ſeeing he who has made himſelf worth
one hundred Pounds a year, has made himſelf capable of all Prefer-
ments and Honors in this Government. Where a man from the low-
eft ftate may not riſe to the due pitch of his unqueſtionable Merit, the
Commonwealth is not cqual: yet neither can the People, under the
Limitations propos’d, make choice (as ſom object) of any other than
the
44.
448
The Art of Lawgiving.
سا
45.
The Quorum.
Book III. the better fort; nor have they at any time bin ſo inclining to do, where
w they have not bin under ſuch Limitations. Be it ſpoken, not to the
diſparagement of any man, but on the contrary to their praiſe whold
Merit has made them great, the People of England have not gon ſo
low in the election of a Houſe of Commons, as ſom Prince has don
in the ele&tion of a Houſe of Lords. To weigh Election by a Prince
with Election by a People, ſet the Nobility of Athens and Rome by the
Nobility of the old Monarchy, and a Houſe of Commons freely cho-
ſen by the Nobility of the new. There remains but the Quoruin, for
which it is propos’d,
THAT, throout all the Aſſemblys and Councils of this Commonwealth,
the Quorum conſiſt of one half in the time of Health, and of one third
part in a time of Sickneſs, being ſo declar'd by the Senat.
HOW the City Government, without any diminution of their
Privileges, and with an improvement of their Policy, may be made to
* In Oceana. fall in with theſe Orders, has * elſwhere bin ſhewn in part, and may be
confider'd farther at leiſure. Otherwiſe the whole Commonwealth,
fo far as it is merely Civil, is in this part accomplifh’d. Now as of
neceſſity, there muſt be a natural Man, or a Man indu'd with a natural
Body, before there can be a ſpiritual Man, or a Man capable of Divine
Contemplation ; ſo a Government muſt have a Civil, before it can
have a Religious part: And if a man furniſht only with natural parts
can never be ſo ſtupid as not to make fom Reflections upon Religion,
much leſs a Commonwealth; which neceſſitats the Religious part of
this Model.
4
CHAP. II.
Containing the Religious Part of this Model, propos'd
practicably.
1
T Senfe
, Ehan that the far greater part of Mankind, it matters of
1
to
Senſe, than that the far
in
Religion, give themfelves up to the public Leading. Now a National
Religion rightly eſtabliſh'd, or not coercive, is not any public driving,
but only the public leading. If the Public in this caſe may not lead
ſuch as deſire to be led by the Public, and yet a Party may lead ſuch as
deſire to be led by a Party ; where would be the Liberty of Conſcience
as to the State ? Which certainly in a well order'd Commonwealth,
being the public Reaſon, muſt be the public Conſcience. Nay, where
would be the Liberty of Conſcience in reſpect of any Party which
ſhould ſo procede as 'to ſhew, that without taking their Liberty of
Conſcience from others, they cannot have it themſelves? If the Public,
refuſing Liberty of Conſcience to a Party, would be the cauſe of Tu-
mult, how much more a Party refuſing it to the Public? And how,
in caſe of ſuch a Tumult, ſhould a Party defend their Liberty of Con-
ſcience, or indeed their Íhroats from the whole or a far greater Party,
without keeping down or cyrannizing over the whole or a far greater
Party by force of Arms? Theſe things being rightly conſider'd, it is
no wonder that Men, living like men, have not bin yet found without
a Government, or that any Government has not bin yet Icund with-
out
!
The Art of Lawgiving.
449
46.
out a National Religion; that is, fom orderly and known way of pub-Chap. 2.
lic leading in divine things, or in the Worſhip of God.
to
A NATIONAL Religion being thus prov'd neceſſary, it re-
mains that I prove what is neceſſary to the ſame; that is, as it con-
cerns the State, or in relation to the Duty of the Magiſtrát.
CERTAÍN it is, that Religion has not ſeen corruption but by
one of theſe three cauſes; ſom Intereſt therwith incorporated, ſom ig-
norance of the truth of it, or by ſom complication of both. Nor was
ever Religion left wholly
to the management of a Clergy that eſcap'd
theſe Cauſes, or their moſt pernicious Effects; as may be perceiv'd in
Rome, which has brought Ignorance, to be the Mother of Devotion,
and indeed Intereſt to be the Father of Religion. Now the Clergy
nor failing in this caſe to be dangerous, what recourſe but to the Magi-
ſtrat for ſafety ? ſpecially ſeeing theſe Cauſes, that is, Intereſt and
Ignorance (the one proceding from evil Laws, the other from the
want of good Education) are not in the right or power of a Clergy,
but only of the Civil Magiſtracy. Or if ſo it be that Magiſtrats are ob-
lig'd in duty. to be nurſing Fathers and nurſing Mothers to the Church; Iſa. 49. 23:
how ſhall a State in the light of God be excuſable, that takes no heed
or care left Religion ſuffer by Cauſes, the prevention or remedy
wherof is in them only? To theſe therfore it is propos’d,
THAT the Univerſitys being prudently reform'd, be preſerv’d in their Universitys
,
Rights and Indowments, for and towards the education and proviſion of an
able Miniſtry.
We are commanded by CHRIST to ſearch the Scriptures : The Joh. 5: 39:
Scriptures are not now to be ſearch'd but by skill in Tongues: The
immediat gift of Tongues is ceasd: How then ſhould skill in Tongues
be acquir'd but mediatly, or by the means of Education? How ſhould
a State expect ſuch an Education (particularly for a matter of ten
thouſand men) that provides not for it? And what proviſion can a
State make for this Education, but by ſuch Schools ſo indow'd and re-
gulaced, as with us are the Univerſitys? Theſe therfore are a neceſſary
itep towards the prevention of ſuch Ignorance or Intereſt, as thro the
infirmitys or biaſs of Tranſlators, Interpreters, and Preachers, both
have and may frequently com to be incorporated with Religion; as
alſo to the improvement or acquiſition of ſuch Light as is by the com-
mand of CHRIST to be attain’d or exercis'd in ſearching the Scrip-
tures.
THE excellent Learning of the Levits in all kinds, not ordinarily The eighth Pas
infus’d, but acquir'd (there having bin among them as well the Teacher rallel.
as the Scholar) leaves little doubt but their forty eiglit Citys were as Mal...1.2.
1 Chron.25.8.
Univerſitys. Theſe with their Suburbs or Indowments con-
tain'd in the whole (each of their Circuits in Land reckon'd at four
thouſand Cubits deep) about a liundred thouſand Acres; that is, if
their meaſure was according to the common Cubit: if according to
the holy Cubit (as with Levits was moſt likely) twice ſo much ;
which, at the loweſt account, I conceive to be far above the Revenues
of both our Univerſitys:
THESE being order'd as has bin ſaid, it is propos’d,
THAT the legal and antient proviſion for the National Miniſtry he Augmentation
So augmented, that the meaneſt fort of Livings or Benefices, without de- of Livings.
falcation from the greater, be each improv'd to the Revenue of one hundred
M mm
THIS
ſo many
47
pounds at leaſt
450
The Art of Lawgiving.
The ninth Pio
rullel.
Ordination.
Book III. THIS, in regard the way is by Tithes, coms up ſo cloſe to the
Orders of Iſrael
, as, in our day, may ſhew that a Commonwealth
may com too near that pattern to be lik’d. We find not indeed that
the Apoſtles either took or demanded Tithes; in which caſe the
Prieſts, who were legally poſſeſt of them, might have had ſuſpicion
that they, under color of Religion, had aim'd at the violation of Pro-
perty. But putting the caſe cliat generally the Prieſts had bin con-
verted to the Chriſtian Faith, whether the Apoſtles would for that
reaſon have injoin'd them to relinquiſh their Tithes? Or what is
there in the Chriſtian Religion to favor any ſuch ſurmiſe? To me there
ſeems abundantly enough to the contrary. For if the Apoſtles
ſtuck not to comply with the Jews in a Ceremony which was of mere
human invention, and to introduce this, as they did Ordination by im-
poſition of hands, into the Chriſtian Church; that they would, upon
a like inducement, have refus'd a ſtanding Law undoubtedly Mofaical,
is in my opinion moſt improbable. So that, I conceive, the Law for
Tithes now in being, may or may not be continu’d, at the pleaſure of
the Lawgivers, for any thing in this caſe to the contrary. Confident
I am, that the introducing of this Model in the whole, which is
thought impracticable, were not to willing minds ſo difficult a work
as the abolition of Tithes.
BUT Benefices, whether by way of Tithes or otherwiſe, being
thus order'd; it is propos’d,
48.
THAT a Benefice becoming void in any Pariſh, tbe Elders of the
fame may aſſemble and give notice to the Vice-Chancellor of either Univer-
fity by a Certificat, Specifying the true value of that Benefice : that the Vice-
Chancellor, upon the receit of this Certificat, be oblig’d to call a Congrega-
tion of his Univerſity: that the Congregation of the Univerſity to this end
aſſemblºd, having regard to the value of the Benefice, make choice of a
Perſon fit for the Miniſterial Function, and return him to the Parijh ſo
requiring : that the Probationer thus return’d to a Pariſh by either of the
Univerſitys, exerciſe the Office, and receive the Benefits as Miniſter of the
Pariſb får the term of one year : that the term of one year being expir’d,
the Elders of the Pariſh aſſemble and put the Election of the Probationer
to the Ballot : that if the Probationer has three parts in four of the Balls or
Votes in the Affirmative, he be therby ordain’d and elected Miniſter of that
Parijb; not afterwards to be degraded or remov’d, but by the Cenſors of the
Tribe, the Phylarch of the ſame, or the Council of Religion in ſuch caſes
as ſhall be to them reſerv'd by Act of Parlament : That in caſe the Proba-
tioner coms to fail of three parts in four at the Ballot, he depart from that
Pariſh; and if he returns to the Univerſity, it be without diminution of
the former Offices or Preferments which he there injoy’d, or any prejudice to
his future Preferment i and that it be lawful in this caſe for any Pariſh to
Send
ſo often to either Univerſity, and it be the duty of either Vice-Chancellor
upon ſuch Certificats to make return of different Probationers, till ſuch time
as the Elders of that Parijſ have fitted themſelves with a Miniſter of their
own choice and liking.
IN cafe it was thought fit that a Probationer thus elected
ſhould, before he departs, receive impoſition of hands from the
Doctors of the Univerſity, I cannot ſee what the moſt ſcrupulous in
the matter of Ordination could find wanting. But let this be ſo, or
otherwiſe, it is indifferent. The Univerſitys by propoſing to the Con-
gregation in every Pariſh, do the Senatorian Office; and the People,
thus
The Art of Lawgiving.
451
rallel.
Numb. II.
49.
chus fitting themſelves by their Suffrage or Ballot, reſerve that Office Chap. 2.
which is truly popular, that is the Reſult, to themſelves.
MOSES (for ſo far back the Divines reach at Ordination) in the The tenth Pa-
inſtitution of the Senat of Iſrael, wherin he can never be prov'd to
have us'd impoſition of hands, performing the Senatorian Office, caus'd
the People to take wiſe men, and underſtanding, and known among Deut. 1.
their Tribes, wherof the Lor fell upon all but ELDAD and MEDAD.
And the Apoſtles doing the Senatorian Office, in like manner without
impoſition of hands, caus’d the whole Congregation to take two, Acts I. 25.
wherof the lot of Apoſtleſhip fell upon MATTHIAS. So that this
way of Ordination being that which was inſtituted by Moses, and
the chief or firſt of thoſe which were us'd by the Apoſtles, is both
Mofaical and Apoſtolical. Nor has a well order'd Commonwealth See Book z.
any choice left of thoſe other ways of Ordination, us’d by the Apo-chap. 8.
ſtles in complaiſance to worſe ſort of Government; but is naturally
neceſſitated to this, that is, to the very beſt.
ORDINATION being thus provided for, it is propos’d,
THAT the National Religion be exercis'd according to a Directory in National Rell-
that caſe to be made, and publiſh'd by Act of Parlament. That the Natio-gion; and
nal Miniſtry be permitted to have no other public Preferment or Office in gainſt ſcanda-
this Commonwealth. That a National Miniſter being convict of Ignorance Tous Miniſters.
or Scandal, be movable out of his Benefice by the Cenſors of the Tribe, under
an appeal to the Phylarch, or to the Council for Religion.
THAT no Religion, being contrary to or deſtructive of Chriſtianity, Liberty of
nor the public exerciſe of any Religion, being grounded upon or incorporated Conſcience
.
into a foren Intereſt, be protected by or tolerated in this state. That all
other Religions, with the public exerciſe of the ſame, be both tolerated and
protected by the Council of Religion : and that all Profesſors of any ſuch Re-
ligion, be equally capable of all Elections, Magiſtracys, Preferments, and
Offices in this Commonwealth, according to the Orders of the same.
UPON the whole of theſe Propoſitions, touching Church Diſci-
plin, we may make theſe Obſervations. Thus neither would the
Party that is for gifted Men, and Enemys to Learning, thro ignorance
(which elſe in all probability they muſt) loſe Religion ; nor the Cler-
gy
be able to corrupt it by Intereſt. But Decency and Order, with
liberty of Conſcience, would ſtill flouriſh together; while the Mini-
fter has a Preferment he fought, the Pariſh a Miniſter they choſe, the
Nation a Religion according to the public Conſcience, and every man
his Chriſtian Liberty. He therfore that indeavors to confute this
Chapter, muſt either ſhew how theſe things may be omitted, or more
effectually provided for ; or tithe Mint and Cumin, and neglect the
weightier things of Lawgiving.
Å COMMONWEALTH having, in the eſtabliſhment
of Religion, made reſignation of her ſelf to God, ought in the next
place to have regard to the natural means of her defence; which in-
troduces the Military part of this Model.
50.
I
Mmm 2
CHA PS
452
The Art of Lawgiving
Book III.
L
C HA P. III.
Containing the Military part of this Model, propos'd practicably
.
TI
Si.
52.
crciſes.
and by
HE Military Part, on which at preſent I ſhall diſcourſe little;
conſiſts in the Diſciplin of the Youth, that is, of ſuch as are be-
tween eighteen and thirty years of Age: and for the Diſciplin of the
Youth it is proposid,
Diſciplin of THAT annually upon Wedneſday next inſuing the laſt of Decem-
the Youth. ber, the Youth of each Pariſh ( under the inſpection of the two Overſeers
of the ſame ) aſſemble and elect the fifth man of their number, or one in
· five of them, to be for the term of that year Deputys of the Touth of that
Pariſe.
Their Troops, THAT annually on Wedneſday next-inſuing the last of January, the
and Sports. ſaid Deputys of the reſpective Pariſhes meet at the Capital of the Hundred
* In Occana. (where there are Games and Prizes allotted for them, as has bin ſber'd * elf-
where ) and there elect to themſelves out of their own number, one Captain,
and one Infign. And that of theſe Games
, and of this Election, the Magi-
ſtrats and Officers of the Hundred be Preſidents, and Judges for the impar-
tial diſtribution of the Prizes.
$3.
Their Squa-
THAT annually upon Wedneſday next inſuing the laſt of February,
drons, and Ex- the Youth thro the whole Tribe thus elected, be receiv'd at the Capital of the
ſame, by the Lieutenant as Commander in chief, by the Conductor, and
the Cenſors; that under the inſpection of theſe Magiſtrats, the ſaid Touth
be entertain’d with more ſplendid Games, diſciplin'd in a more military man-
ner, and be divided by lot into ſundry parts, or Eſays, according to the
* In Occana. Rules * elfwhere given.
THÁT the whole Touth of the Tribe, thus aſſembld, be the firſt
Ellay, or the Eſay. That out of the firſt Eſſay, there be caſt by lot two hundred Horſe
,
ftanding Ar- and ſix hundred Foot: that they whom their friends will, or themſelves can
mount, be accounted Horſe, the reſt Foot. That theſe Forces (amounting
in the fifty Tribes to ten thouſand Horſe, and thirty thouſand Foot) be always
ready to march at a weeks warning: and that this be the ſecond Elay, or the
ſtanding Army of the Commonwealth.
THAT for the holding of each Province, the Commonwealth in the
firſt year aflign an Army of the Touth, conſiſting of ſeven thouſand five
hundred Foot, and one thouſand five hundred Horſe
. That for the per-
petuation of theſe Provincial Armys or Guards, there be annually, at the
time and places mention'd, caſt out of the firſt Eſſay of the Youth in each
Tribe. ten Horſe, and fifty Foot : that is, in all the Tribes five hundred
Horſe, and two thouſand five hundred Foot for Scotland; the like for Ire-
land, and the like of both orders for the Sea Guards : being each oblig'd to
ſerve for the term of three years upon the States pay.
THE ſtanding Army of the Commonwealth confifting thus of
forty thouſand, not Soldiers of fortune neither in body nor in pay,
but Citizens at their Vocations or Trades, and yet upon command in
continual readineſs; and the Provincial Armys each conſiſting of nine
thouſand in pay in body, and poſſeſs’d of the Avenues and places of
ſtrength in the Province, it is not imaginable how a Province ſhould
be ſo ſoon able to ſtir, as the Commonwealth muſt be to pour forty
thouſand men upon it, beſides the Sea Guards. Nor coms this Militia
thus
54.
The ſecond
my.
55.
Provincial
Guards.
o
453
The Art of Lawgiving.
Parallel
56.
57.
thus conſtituted, except upon Marches, to any charge at all; the Chap. 3:
ſtanding Army having no pay, and the Provinces, wherof the Sea
thus guarded will be none of the pooreſt, maintaining their own
Guards. Such is the military way of a Commonwealth, and the The eleventh
Conſtitution of its Armys, whether levy'd by Suffrage, as in Rome ;
or by Lot, as in Iſrael
.
WE will go up by Lot againſt Gibeah.
Judg. 20. Gi
STANDING Forces being thus eſtabliſh'd; for ſuch as are
upon emergent occaſions to go forth, or march, it is propos’d, ,
THAT the Senat and the People, or the Dictator having decreed or The third El-
declard War, and the Field Officers being appointed by the Council of War ; fay, or Army
marching.
the General by Warrant iſſu’d to the Lieutenants of the Tribes, demand
the ſecond Ejay, or ſuch part of it as is decreed; whether by way of levy
or recruit. That by the ſame TV arrant he appoint his time and Rendevouz:
that the ſeveral Conductors of the Tribes deliver him the Forces demanded,
at the time and place appointed. That a General thus marching out with
the ſtanding Army, a new Army be elected out of the firſt El ay as for-
merly, and a new General be elected by the Senat ; that ſo always there be a
General ſitting, and a ſtanding Army, what Generals or Armys foever be
marching. And that in caſe of Invaſion the Bands of the Élders be ob-
lig'd to like
duty with thoſe of the Touth.
THAT an only Son be diſcharg’d of theſe Dutys without prejudice. Pæna aseg-
That of two Brothers there be but one admitted to foren Service at one Teids, or the
time. That of more Brothers, not above half. That whoever otherwiſe Education and
refuſes his Lot, except upor cauſe ſhewn he be diſpens’d with by the Phy- Libercy.
larch, or upon penitence be by them pardon’d and reſtor’d, by ſuch refujál
be uncapable of electing, or being elected in this Commonwealth; as alſo
that he
pay
to the State a fifth of his Revenue for protection, beſides
Taxes. That Divines, Phyſicians, and Lawyers, as alſo Trades not at lez-
ſure for the Eſays, be so far exemted from this Rule
, that they be ſtill
capable of all Preferments in their reſpective Profeſſions, with Indemnity,
and without Military Education or Service.
A COMMONWEALTH whoſe Militia conſiſts of Mera
cenarys, to be ſafe, muſt be ſituated as Venice, but can in no wiſe be
great.
The Induſtry of Holland is the main Revenue of that State ;
whence not being able to ſpare hands to her Arms, ſhe is caft upon
Strangers and mercenary Forces, thro which we in our time have ſeen
Amſterdam neceſſitated to let in the Sea upon her, and to becom (as it
were) Venice. To a Popular Government that could not do the
like, Mercenary Arms have never faild to be fatal; whence the
laſt Propoſition is that which in every well order'd Commonwealth
lias bin look'd to as the main guard of Liberty.
IN this Ifrael was formidable beyond all other Commonwealtlis Tie twelfth
with a kind of Fulmination. Saul when he heard the Cruelty of Paralle!.
NAHASH the Ammonit, at the Leaguer of Jabeſis-Gilead, took & 1 Sam. 11. 7
joke of Oxen and hew'd them in pieces, and ſent them thrcout the Coaſts
of Iſrael, by the hands of Meſſengers, ſaying, Whoſoever coms not out
after Sául, and after SAMUEL, ſo Shall it be don to his Oxen.
Which amounted not only to a confiſcation of Goods (the Richies
of the Iſraelits lying moſt in their Cattel) but to a kind of Ana-
thema; as more plainly appears, wliere it is ſaid, Curſe ye Meroz, Judg. 5. 27.
curſe ye bitterly the Inhabitants therof, becauſe they came not forth to help
the Lord againſt the Mighty. Nay this rásegteix) deſertion of tlie
Military
I
454
The Art of Lawgiving.
Book III. Military Orders and Services in Iſrael, was ſomtimes puniſh'd with
total extermination, as after the Victory againſt Benjamin, where
the Congregation or Political Aſſembly of that people, making inquiſi-
Judg. 21.
tion what one of the Tribes of Iſrael came not up to the Lord in Mizpeh
(the place where before the taking of Jeruſalem they held, as I may
ſay, their Parlaments) and finding that there came none to the Camp
from Jabeſh-Gilead, ſent thither twelve thouſand men of the valianteſt,
Saying, Go and ſmite the Inhabitants of Jabeſh-Gilead with the edg of
the Sword, with the Women and the Children: which was don accord-
ingly.
BUT by this time men will ſhrink at this as a dreadful Order,
and begin to compute that a Commonwealth, let her Prerogatives for
the reſt be what they will, muſt at this rate be but a dear purchaſe:
wheras indeed, if this way coſts ſomthing, there is no other that dos
not hazard all; foraſmuch as diſcarding this Order, play your game as
you can, you are ſomtime or other a Prey to your Enemys, or to your
Mercenarys. This certainly is chat root in (the Penetralia) the
bowels of a Commonwealth, whence never any Court Arts, or Police-
neſs, could attain to the gallantry or ſplendor of the Education in Popu-
lar Governments. For let any man (remembring what it was to be
a GIDEON, a MILTIADES, a TIMO LEON, a SCIPIO, or
a Magiſtrat in a Commonwealth) conſider if there ſhould be no way
with us to Magiſtracy, but by having ſerv'd three years at Sea, and
three years at. Land, how the whole face and genius of Education,
both in the better and in the lower ſort, would of neceſſity be chang'd
in this Nation, and what kind of Magiſtrats ſuch experience in thoſe
Services muſt create to the Commonwealth. Conſider, whether
the threaten’d Puniſhments of this Order, tho thro unacquaintance
they may at firſt ſight have ſom brow, would not, as they have
don in other Commonwealths of like ſtructure, even with low ſpirits,
expire in ſcorn and contemt, or thro the mere contemplation of the
reward of Honor, nay of the Honor it ſelf, in which point where
right has not bin don, men, under:Governments of this nature, have
bin much more apt to heats; as where the men of Ephraim fought
againſt JEPTHA, for an affront in this kind which they conceiv'd him
Judg. 12.
to have put upon them. Wherfore paſſedſt thou over to fight againſt the
Children of Ammon, and didſt not call us to go with thee? We will burn
thy houſe upon thee with fire. Nor is this way fo expenſive of the
Purſe, or of Blood. Not of the public Purſe, becauſe it deteſts Mer-
cenarys; nor of the privat Purſe, becauſe the ways of Education thus
directed, are all aſſiſted with the States pay: ſo that a man in this road
might educat three Children cheaper, and to the moſt folid ends, than
he could any cne to trifles in thoſe which among us hitherto have
bin uſual. And as to Blood, there is nothing more certain, than that
Idleneſs, and its inſeparable companion Luxury, are excedingly more
waftful as of the Purſe, ſo of Health, nay and of Life it felf, than
is War; which nevertheleſs this Order is ſuch as dos pather
prevent
than neceſſitat, in regard that to be potent in Arms is the way of
Peace. But wheras in a Martial Commonwealth there may be men
having exceded the thirtieth year of their Age, who like thoſe of
Ephraim would yet take it ill to be excluded the Liſts of Honor, and
it muſt alſo be to the detriment of the Commonwealth that they
fhould; for theſe, whom we may call Volunteers, it is propos’d,
THAT
4
If
The Art of Lawgiving.
455
58.
THAT upon Warrants iſſu’d forth by the General for Recruits. or Chap. 4.
Levys, there be an Aſſembly of the Phylarch in each Tribe; that ſuch Vo-
lunteers, or men being above thirty years of Age, as are deſirous of farther volunteers
imployment in Arns, appear before the Phylarch fo aſſemblºd. That any
number of theſe, not exceding one moity of the Recruits or Levys of that
Tribe, may be taken on by the Phylarch, ſo many of the Youtü being at
the diſcretion of this Council disbanded, as are taken on of the Volunteers.
That the Levys thus made, be conducted by the Conductor of the reſpective
Tribe to the Rendevouz appointed. And that the Service of theſe be.
without other term or vacation, than at the diſcretion of the Senat and the
People, or ſuch Inſtructions to the General, as ſhall by them in that caſe.
be provided.
THU S much for the Military or Defenſive part of this Model.
For Offences in general it is written, Wo unto the world becauſe of Of- Mat. 18. 7.
fences;
for it muſt needs be that Offences com, but wo to that man by whom
the Offence coms. Among Offences are offenſive Wars: now it be-
ing out of queſtion, that for the righteous execution of this Wo upan
him or them by whom the Offence coms, a War may be juſt and
neceſſary, as alſo that Victory in a juft and neceſſary War may intitle
one Prince or one People to the Dominion or Empire of another
Princc or People; it is alſo out of queſtion, that a Commonwealth,
unleſs in this caſe ſhe be provided both to acquire, and to hold what
the acquires, is not perfect: which Conſideration brings me to the
Provincial part of this Model.
CHAP. IV.
Containing the Provincial Part of this Model, propos’d practicably.
TH
HE word Province is with Roman Authors of divers ſignifi-
cations. By theſe it is taken ſomtimes for Magiſtracy; as that
of the Conſul, which is calld His Province : ſointime for
any
Reli-
gion or Country, in which a Roman Captain or General was com-
manded to make War; but fpecially for ſuch a Country as was ac-
quir'd and held by Arms, or by Provincial Right. The word is of
the like different uſe in Scripture; as where it is ſaid, That A H A- Eſth, I. 1.
suerus reign’d over a hundred and ſeven Provinces ; by which are
underſtood as well the diviſions of the native, as thoſe of the ac-
quird Territorys. But where TANAIS the Governor writes to Ezra s. 8.
the King of Aſſyria concerning the Province of Judea, it is under-
ſtood a Country acquir'd and held by Arms; which coms to the
uſual ſignification of the word with the Romans, it being in this ſenſe
that the Governor Felix ask'd Paul of what Province he was, Acts 23. 34.
and came to underſtand that he was of Cilicia, then a Province of the
Roman Empire: and this fignification is that in which I take the word
throout this Chapter.
THE mighty load of Empire which happend to the Common-
wealth of Rome thro the Acquiſition of many and vaſt Provinces,
is that wherto the Songs of Poets, and the opinions of more ſerious
Writers attribute the weight which they ſay overſway'd her. But
this Judgment, tho in it ſelf right, is not in the manner they take it to
be ſwallowd without chewing. For how probable it is that the
fucs
456
The Art of Lawgiving
Plurarch in
Gracch.
Book III. fucceding Monarchy was able to ſupport a weight in this kind, which
the Commonwealth could not bear, may at this diſtance be diſcern'd,
in that the Provinces were infinitly more turbulent in the Reign of the
Emperors, than in that of the Commonwealth, as having a far ſtronger
Intereſt, thro ambition of attaining to the whole, to tear the Em-
pire in pieces: which they did, while divers Provinces made divers
Emperors, which before could not hope to make divers Common-
wealths, nor to acquire ſafety by retreat to a petty Government.
But in this, the acquiſition of Provinces devour'd the Commonwealth
of Rome, that, ſhe not being ſufficiently fortify’d by Agrarian Laws,
the Nobility, thro the ſpoil of Provinces, came to eat the People out
of their popular Balance or Lands in Italy by Purchaſes; and the Lands
that had bin in the hands of the Many, coming thus into the hands
of the Few, of natural and neceſſary conſequence there follows Mo-
narchy.
NOW that England, a Monarchy, has bin ſeiz'd of Provinces
(one of them, while France was ſuch, being as great as any one of the
Roman) is a known thing; and that the Militia propos'd' by the pre-
ſent Model, contains all the cauſes of Greatneſs that were in that of
Rome, is to ſuch as are not altogether ſtrangers to the former, no leſs
than obvious. Now of like Cauſes not to preſume like Effects, were
unreaſonable. The ſafety therfore of the foregoing Agrarian, as hi-
therto propos’d, or that Lands be divided in their deſcent, muſt in this
caſe be none at all, unleſs there be ſom ſtop alſo given in their Accu-
mulation by way of purchaſe; leſt otherwiſe the ſpoil of ſom mighty
Province be ſtill ſufficient to eat out the People by purchaſe.
TO ſubmit therfore in this place (for ought I perceive) to in-
evitable neceſſity, it is propos’d,
Propoſitions
THAT ( great Commonwealths having bin overthrown by the ſpoil of
to the Agra- Provinces ) an Eſtate of two thouſand pounds a year in Land, be inca-
pable of any Accumulation by way of purchaſe.
DONATIONS and Inheritances will be fewer than to be
dangerous; and as ſom fall, others will be dividing in their deſcent.
But to reſume the Diſcourſe upon the Agrarian Laws, which, becauſe
they were not till in this Propoſition complete, remains imperfect.
That to Agrarian Laws fom Standard" is neceſſary, appears
plainly enough. This Standard in a well founded Monarchy, muſt
bar receſs; and in a well founded Commonwealth muſt bar increaſe.
For certain it is, that otherwiſe each of the Policys dos naturally
breed that Viper which eats out the Bowels of the Mother : as Mo-
narchy, by Pomp and Luxury, reduces her Nobility thro debt to
poverty, and at length to a level with the People, upon which no
Throne ever ſtood or can ſtand : ſuch was the caſe of this Nation un-
der her latter Princes. And a Commonwealth by her natural ways
of frugality, of fattening and cockering up of the People, is apt to
bring Eſtates to ſuch exceſs in ſom hands, as eating out the reſt,
bows the Neck of a free State or City to the yoke, and expoſes
hier to the goad of a Lord and Maſter ; which was the caſe of Rome
under her perpetual Dictators. But why yet muſt this Standard of
Land in the preſent cafe, be neither more nor leſs than juſt two thou-
ſand pounds a year? Truly, where ſom Standard was neceſſary to
be nam’d, I might as well ask why not this as well as any other? yec
am ! not without ſuch Reaſons why I have pitch'd upon this rather
than
59.
Additional
rian,
The Art of Lawgiving.
457
than any other, as I may ſubmit to the judgment of the Reader in Chap. 4.
the following computation or compariſon of the divers Effects or
Conſequences of ſo many different Standards, as by the rules of
proportion may give ſufficient account of the reſt.
LET the dry Rent of England (that is, at the rate a man may
have for his Land without ſweating) be computed at ten Millions :
This preſum’d, if you ſet the Standard at ten thouſand pounds a
year, the whole Territory can com into no fewer than one thouſand
hands. If you ſet it at five thouſand pounds a year, it can com into
no fewer than two thouſand hands; and if you ſet it at two thou-
ſand pounds a year, it can com into no fewer than five thouſand
hands. It will be ſaid, In which way you pleaſe, it will never com
into fo few hands as are capable of having it; which is certain: yet
becauſe the Effects in their approaches would be ſuch as may be mea-
ſur’d by their Extremes, I ſhall pitch upon theſe as the readieſt way to
guide my Computation. The Balance in a thouſand hands might
affect the Government with a hankering after Monarchy; in two
thouſand lands it might uſurp it, as did the Roman Nobility, and
therby occaſion a feud between the Senat and the People. Theſe
not only in the extremes, but with much of a like nature in the
ap-
proaches.
BUT letting theſe paſs, as alſo the numbers or compaſs neceſſary
to the Rotation of ſuch a Commonwealth (none of which inconve-
niences are incident to the Standard of two thouſand pounds a year, as
that wherby Lands can com into no fewer than five thouſand Pro-
prietors) we will ſuppoſe theſe Standards to be each of them, as to the
ſafety of the Government, indifferently practicable.
YET it is recorded by Experience, and wiſe Authors, that the
true cauſe whence England has bin an overmatch in Arins for France,
lay in the communication or diſtribution of Property to the lower
fort; and for the ſame cauſe let it be conſider’d, if the Commonwealth
upon the Standard of two thouſand pounds a year (ceteris paribus)
muſt not neceſſarily be an overmatch in the potency of its Militia for
the other two. Such are the advantages, ſuch is the glory of the like
moderation to the public. Mony (lays the Lord VERUL AM) is
like muck, not good except it be ſpread. Much rather in Popular Go-
vernment is this holding as to Land, the latter having upon the State a
far ſtronger influence, at leaſt in larger Territorys, than Mony: for
in ſuch, Mony, while ſcarce, cannot overbalance Land; and were
Silver and Gold as plentiful as Braſs or Iron, they would be no more,
nor would Land be leſs worth. And for privat men, were it not that
it is eaſier to fill the belly of a Glutton than his eys, not only Virtue,
but the Beatitude of Riches, would be apparently conſiſtent in a mean.
But what need I play the Divine or the Philoſopher upon a Doctrin,
which is not to diminiſh any mans Eſtate, not to bring any man from
the Cuſtoms to which he has bin inur’d, nor from any emergent ex-
pectation he may have; but regards only the Generation to com, or
the Children to be born ſeven years after the paſſing ſuch a Law?
Whence it muſt needs follow, that putting the caſe this Agrarian be
introduc'd, it is to our Age as if there were none; and if there be
10 Agrarian, it is to our Age as if there was one. The difference is no
more, than that in the one way the Commonwealth is at all points
fecur’d, and in the other it is left to its fortune even in the main. Of
Nnn
fuch
Į
458
The Art of Lawgiving.
liclinid.
Book III. ſuch ſoverain effect are the like Laws, that I would go yet farther,
and propoſe,
60.
THAT in Scotland the Standard bé' ſet at five hundred pounds a
' a
Agrarian for
Scotland and gear ; in Ireland at two thouſand pounds a year in Land; the reſt for eacli
as for England.
NARROWNESS of an Agrarian for Scotland, being a Mar-
tial Country, would make the larger proviſion of a good Auxiliary
Militia ; and largeneſs of an Agrarian for Ireland, being leſs Martial,
would caſt a Sop into the Jaws of the Avarice of thoſe who ſhould
think it too much confin'd in England. And left the Provincials in
this caſe ſhould think themſelves worſe dealt with than the Citizens
themſelves, the ſum of the Agrarian Laws being caſt up together, any
man in the three Nations may hold four thouſand five hundred pounds
a year in Land; and any ſmall Parcel of Land, or mere Reſidence in
England, makes a Provincial a Citizen. Should the Commonwealth
increaſe in Provinces, the Eſtates at this rate both of the Citizens and
Provincials, would be more and greater than ever were thoſe of the
antient Nobility of theſe Nations; and without any the leaſt hazard
to Liberty. For he, who conſidering the whole Roman Story, or that
only of the GRACCHI in PLUTARCH, ſhall rightly judg, muſt
confeſs, that had Rome preſerv'd a good Agrarian but in Italy, the Rich-
es of its Provinces could not have torn up the Roots of its Liberty, but
on the contrary muſt have water'd them. It may be ſaid, What need
then of putting an Agrarian upon the Provinces ? I anſwer : For two
Reaſons: firſt is Indulgence to the Provincials ; and the ſecond, Ad-
vantage to the Commonwealth. For the firſt, it is with ſmall fore-
fight apparent enough, that the Avarice of the Citizen being bounded
at home, and having no limits in the Provinces, would in a few years
eat up the Provincials, and bring their whole Countrys (as the Romani
Patricians did Italy) to found in their Fetters, or to be tilld by their
Slaves or Underlings.' And ſo, for the ſecond, the Commonwealth
would by ſuch means loſe an Auxiliary Militia, to be otherwiſe in
Scotland only more worth than the Indys. Theſe things therfore thus
order'd, it is propos'd,
THAT the expiration of Magiſtracy in the Senat, or at the ax.
nual Receſs of one third part of the ſame, there be elected by the Senat out
of the part receding, into each Provincial Council four Knights for the
term of three years ; therby to render each Provincial Council (preſuming
it in the beginning to have bin conſtituted of twelve Knights, divided
after the manner of the Senat by three ſeveral Liſts or Elečtions) of an-
nual, triennial, and perpetual Revolution or Rotation.
THAT out of the Same third part of the Senat annually receding,
vernors or Ge- there be to each Province one Knight elected for the term of one year.
That the Knight ſo elected be the Provincial General or Governor. That
a Provincial Governor or General receive annually in April at his Rende-
voy appointed, the Touth or Recruits elected in the precedent Month to that
end by the Tribes, and by their Conductors deliverd accordingly. That he
repair with the said Touth or Recruits to his Province, and there diſmiſs
that part of the Provincial Guard or Army whoſe triennial term is expir’d.
That each Provincial Governor have the conduct of Affairs of War and of
State in his reſpective Province, with advice of the Provincial Council;
and that bebe Preſident of the same.
€ 1.
Frovincial
Councils.
upon the
62.
Provincial Go-
nerals.
1
THAT
+
The Art of Lawgiving.
459
63.
I'rovoſts.
64.
Subordin:tion
or Mony be the
THAT each provincial Council ele&t three weekly Propoſers, or Pro-Chap. 4.
vofts, after the manner, and to the ends already ſhewn in the conſtitution
of Senatorian Councils; and that the Provoſt of the ſenior Liſt, during his Provincial
term, be Preſident of the Council in abſence of the General.
THAT'each Provincial Council procede according to Inſtructions re-
ceivd from the Council of State, and keep intelligence with the ſame by and Function
any tro of their Prozoſts, for the Government of the Province, as to of Provincial
matters of War of State. That is pon Levys of native or proper Arms by Councils.
the Senat, and the People, a Provincial Council (having to that endre-
ceiv'd Orders) make Levys of Provincial Auxiliarys accordingly. That
Auxiliary Arms upon no occaſion whatſoever excede the proper or native
Arms in number. That for the reſt, the Provincial Council maintain the
Provincials, defraying their peculiar Guards and Council, by ſuch a knonin
proportion of Tributs, as on them Mall be ſet by the Senat and the People,
in their proper Rights, Laws, Liberties and Immunitys, ſo far as upon the
Merits of the cauſe wherupon they were ſubdu’d, it ſeemd good to the
Senat and the People to confirm them, And that it be lawful for the Pro-
vincials to appeal from their Provincial Magiſtrats, Councils, or Gene-
rals, to the People of England.
IN modelling a Commonwealth, the concernment of Provincial
Government coms in the latt place; for which cauſe I conceive any
long Diſcourſe upon theſe Orders to be at preſent unneceſſary: But
certain things there are in the way which I am unwilling to let ſlip
without pointing at them.
SOM will have Men, rom will have Mony to be the Nerve of War: Whether Men
each of which Poſitions, in proper caſes, may be a Maxim: For if
Nerve of War.
Francë, where the main Body of the People is imbas'd; or Venice,
which ſtands upon a Mercenary Militia, want Mony, they can make
no War. But it has heretofore bin otherwiſe with Commonwealths.
Roman Hiſtorians (as is obſerv'd by MACCHIAVE L) in their Mi-
litary Preparations or Expeditions, make no mention of Mony, unleſs
what was gair’d by the War, and brought home into the Treaſury; as
the Spoil of Macedon by Æ MILIUs Paulus, being ſuch as the Pco-
ple for ſom years after were diſcharg'd of their Tribute. Not that their
Wars were made altogether without Mony; for if ſo, why ſhould
the People at any time before have paid Tribute ? Or why, upon this
occaſion were they excus'd ? but that the Mony in which their Wai's
ſtood them, was not conſiderable in compariſon of that which is re-
quiſit wliere Mony may be counted the Nerve of War; that is;
where Men are not to be had without it. But Rome, by virtue of
its Orders, could have rais'd vafter numbers of Citizens and Alo-
ciats than perhaps it ever did, tho during the Conſulat of PAPPUS
and Regulus, ſhe levy'd in Italy only ſeventy thouſand Horſe,
and ſeven hundred thouſand Foot. Should we conceive the Nerve of
this Motion to have bin Mony, we muſt reckon the Indys to have bin
exhauſted before they were found; or ſo much Braſs to have bin in Ita-
lj, às would have made Stones to be as good Mony. A well orderd
Commonwealth dos theſe things not by Mony, bút by ſuch Orders as
make of its Citizens the Nerve of its Wars. The Youth of the Com-
monwealth propos’d are eſteem'd in all at five hundred thouſand. Of
theſe there is an annual Band, conſiſting of one hundred thouſanid. of
this one hundred thouſand there is a ſtanding Army conſiſting of thirty
thouſand Foot and ten thouſand Horſe, beſides ſuch as being above
Nnn 2
thirty
460
The Art of Lawgiving.
1
1
or Town.
Book III. thirty years of age, ſhall offer themſelves as Voluntiers; of which
the number is in no wiſe likely to be few. To the ſtanding Army
the Provinces, or that only of Scotland, being both Populous and Mara
tial, can afford at any time an equal number of Auxiliarys.
THESE Orders, thus ſum'd up together, render this Common-
wcalth ordinarily able to wage War with fourſcore thouſand men ;
a Force which, it is known, not any Prince in Chriſtendom is able
to match in Virtue, Number, or Diſciplin. For theſe the Common-
wealth in her Sea Guard has always at hand ſufficient Waftage, or at
leaſt ſuch a ſufficient Convoy as may make any Veſſels at hand a ſuf-
ficient Tranſportation : all this, I ſay, by virtue of Orders. Not
but that the March, the Equipage, the Waftage of fo great an Army
muſt coſt Mony; but that it will com to no account in compariſon of a
lingring War made by a matter of thirty thouſand Mercenarys, the
very conſumtion of a State: wheras fourſcore thouſand men ſo diſci-
plin'd and ſo furniſh'd, as has bin ſhewn, being once tranſported, muſt
ſuddenly com to be no Charge, or make the War defray it ſelf.
BUT ’tis objected that to reckon upon ſuch a Militia were to ſuppoſe
a large Country capable of being a Commonwealth ; wheras we hold
them learn'd, who ſay that no Commonwealth has conſiſted of more
Whether acon- than ſom one City or Town. But in what Language or in what
monwealth boas Geography, are the twelve Tribes of Iſrael; the (dául) Peopledoms
than one City or Prytanys of Athens, which THESEUS gather'd into one body;
the Tribes and Linages in Lacedemon inſtituted by LY CURGUS;
the five and thirty Roman Tribes planted between the Rivers Vultur-
ius and Arno, or between the Citysnow call'd Capua and Florence; the
13 Cantons of the Switzers; the ſeven United Provinces of the Low
Countrys, underſtood to have binor to be but one City or Town? Whe-
ther were not the People of Iſrael under their Commonwealth ſix hundred
thouſand ? What reaſon can be given why the Government that could
take in ſix hundred thouſand, might not as well take in twice that
number? How much ſhort came the Country, planted by the Ro-
mani Tribes, of 150 Miles ſquare? Or how much over is England?
And what reaſon can be given why a Government, taking in
150 Miles ſquare, might not as well take in twice that Compaſs ?
Whether was our Houſe of Commons under Monarchy not collected
from the utmoſt Bounds of the Engliſh Territory ? And whether lad
the Laws by them enacted not their free courſe to the utmoſt limits of
the ſame? And why ſhould that be impoſſible or impracticable to a
Repreſentative of the People in a Commonwealth, which was ſo facil
and practicable to a Repreſentative of the People under Monarchy ?
IT is a wonder how the Commonwealth of Rome, which hield
as it were the whole World by Provinces, ſhould be imagin’d by any
man to have conſiſted but of one Town or City.
BUT to return : It is alleg'd by others, and as to Provincial Go.
vernment very truly, that a Commonwealth may be a Tyranny :
Nor do I think that Athens, in this point, came ſhort of any Prince :
Rome, on the other ſide, was (according to the merits of the cauſe)
as frequent in giving Liberty as in taking it away. The Provinces of
Venice and of Switzerland, would not change their condition with the
Subjects of the beſt Prince. However the poſſibility in a Common-
wealth of tyrannizing over Provinces, is not to be cur’d; for be the
Commonwealth or the Prince a State or a Man after God's own heart,
there is no way of holding a Province but by Arms. WHEN
1
Lii
The Art of Lawgiving.
461
The thir-
teenth Paral-
WHEN the Syrians of Damaſcus came to ſuccor HÄDADEŻER
'King of Zobahı
, DAVID few of the Syrians two and twenty thouſand fet.
Men: then David put Gariſons in Syria of Damaſcus, and the Sy- 2 Sam. 8. 5; 6.
rians became Servants to DAVID, and brought Gifts; and the Lord
preſerv’d DAVID whitherſoever he went.
WITH this Parallel I draw the Curtain, and cloſe (be it Come-
dy to ſuch as are for Tragedy) this Model ; appealing to the preſent,
or the next Age, whether throout I have not liad God himſelf for my
Vouchee. In the mean time, there is nothing hereby propos'd which Sce the Corolla-
may not ſtand with a ſupreme Magiſtrat.
ry of Oceana.
The Concluſion :
Shewing how the Model propos'd may be provid or examin’d; and gi-
ving a brief Anſwer to Mr. Wren's laſt Book, intitl’d, Mo-
narchy aſſerted againſt Mr. HARRINGTON's Oceana.
F
not
OR a Nation to be ſtill upon the caſt of a Dy, to be ever in Sect. 1.
trepidation as to the main chance of Government, is a dreadful That a Com.
Itate of things. Such indeed with us has bin the Conſtitution of our rightly order’d,
late Governments, of which therfore nor any can be call’d a Common- is less feditious
wealth. Yet has the like ſtate of things (in favor of Monarchis, and than the beſt of
Monarchys.
thro the induſtry of the Clergy) bin for many Ages, that wherof
Commonwealthis unheard are ſtill accus’d and condemn'd. For proof
in this caſe, the Tribunitian Storms of the Roman People are thought
abundantly fufficient. But theſe having bin without Blood, if with
our Affairs they hold any parallel, are not co be compar'd with the
Barons Wars, thoſe of Tork and Lancaſter, or the like; but with the
Conteſts or Sugivings of our Parlaments with their Kings, while ſuch
Diſputes came not to Arms. Or if the Roman Fields from the time of the
GRACCHI grew bloody, we have known a matter of a dozen years
in which ours might have compar'd with them. The Seditions un-
der the Commonwealth of Rome to thoſe under the Empire, hold ſuch
a proportion, as the Seditions under the Commonwealth of Iſrael to See Book 2.
thoſe under their Kings. I am contented at this time, for diſcourſe chap. 4.
fake, that the Seditions of Venice ſhould paſs as they are computed by
Mr.'WREN: Let thoſe alſo which have happend in the Common-
wealths of the Switzers, and of the United Provinces, by the skill of
ſom Man wlio may be thought more impartial than my ſelf, be right:
ly enumerated and added. This being don, let the Seditions that
have happend in the Monarchys of England, France, and Spain, be
as impartially ſum'd up; and I may, venture to promiſe you, That
you
ſhall not find the fum of the Seditions which have happend ini
thoſe three Commonwealths, to balance the foot of the account with
thoſe Seditions, which have happend in any one of thoſe Monar-
chys: nor are we without ſufficient inducement to believe, that
the whole account in this particular of thoſe Commonwealthis
which have bin in the World, can com any whit nearer to that
of the Monarchys. But this being ſo, be it alſo ſuppos’d, tho not
granted, that a Commonwealth is a ſeditious Government, yet multic
be
"..
462
The Art of Lawgiving.
έλλίωικών.
Lib. 4.
Sect. 2.
be the leaſt feditious Government. The Republic of Corinth never
ſuffer'd but that one Sedition which is deſcrib'd by Xenophon ; and this
too from an external cauſe.
BUT I am the more confirm'd by the Aſſaults of Mr. WREN,
That Mr. to have no leſs than demonſtrated in the propos’d Model, that a Com-
Wren's Oppo monwealth rightly orderd is altogether incapable of Sedition, and ſo
lar Prudence a-conſequently of Diſſolution, that is, from any internal cauſe. To
mounts t3 a., render his Confutation intire, and the truth of this Aſſertion the more
Cantormation of conſpicuous, I fhall firſt inſert thoſe Rules or Maxims wherby a Model
of a Commonwealth may be exactly prov'd or examin'd, and then
ſhew how they totally enervat and overturn thoſe Arguments elabo-
rated by Mr. WREN towards the examination and confutation of the
Model propos’d.
THE Maxims or Rules wherby a well order'd Model of Popular
of Popular G9-Government may be moſt exactly prov'd or examin’d, are ſpecially two:
be try'd or ex:
1. J T must be wholly void of any Contradiction or Inequality.
2. IT muſt be ſuch in which no number of Men, having the Intereſt, čan
have the Power or Strength; and no number of Men, having the
Power or Strength, can have the Intereſt to invade or diſturb the
Government.
HOW A Mindel
qoymiinent inity
win'd.
W. p. 78.
IT is not in the power of Nature that there ſhould be an effect,
where there is not the cauſe of that effect; and in a Frame of Go-
vernment that is exactly according to the foregoing Maxims, there can
be no cauſe of Sedition or Diſſolution. A Model of Government
therfore that will hold examination by theſe Maxims, muft (without
oftentation, or with Mr. WREN's patience) be perfect.
NOW let us obſerve how lie beftirs himſelf to examin and con-
fute this Model. As to contradiction, he dos not ſo much as pretend
that there is any Guile in it; yet will not allow it to have any truth :
For, ſays he, as in a Fiktion the ſeveral Members may be lo contriv’d,
as
not to give one another the ly, but be all contain d within the limits of
Veriſimilitude, and yet the whole remain without the leaſt ſyllable of Truth';
ſo in a Model of Government. To which I anſwer, that there being a
truth of Nature, and a truth of Fact, this way of Mt. WREN'S
diſputing is mere equivocation. For the Model is not "propos'd to
ſhew the truth of Fact, or that there has bin any ſuch exactly in
practice; but to Mew the truth of Nature, or that ſuch a Model is
practicable: wherfore he needed not to have alleg'd that it has not the
truth of Fact, which we all know; but was to ſhew where it fails of
ſuch a truth in Nature as can any way render it impracticable. But in-
ſtead of this, he is gon to the Moon; and will read us a Lecture in
Politics by the Planets, or the various Hypotheſes of Celeſtial Mo-
tions, which may be excogitated including no abſurdity in themſelves, and
yet perbaps not any one of them prove to be the true method of Nature.
But may a man therfore argue in this manner? It is very hard to know
certainly which are the Highways of the Planets, therfore there can
be no certain knowlege which are the Highways to London. Let us
e'en ſay, Becauſe the Rotation of the World may as well go upon the
Heavens as upon the Earth, therfore a man may as well go upon his
Head as upon his Heels; and a Commonwealth as well ſtand upon a
Milkwoman's Pattins, as upon the ſtrongeſt Intereſt, or tlie Intereſt of
the ſtrongeſt.
SO
Ibid.
'
The Art of Lawgiving.
463
1
1
SO much for Contradiction. Now for Inequality, ſays Mr. WREN, W. p. 1794
Tho it ſhould be allow'd Mr. HARRINGTON, that his Commonwealth
has none in it, get would it fail of attaining the perfection of Government,
ſeeing there is an inequality in the Nature of man, which is nut rectify'd by
the Model of his Commonwealth. As if the equality of a Government
was pretended to be ſuch, as ſhould make a crooked man ſtraight, a
wicked man good, or a paſſionat man a Philoſopher; and it were
not perfect, in being ſufficient to prevent any influence that Wicked-
neſs or Pallion in a man or men, may have upon the Government. But
for farther diſcovery of theſe Inequality in the Nature of man, that
are not rectify'd by the Model, Mr. Wren ſends us to his eight
and ninth Chapters, where he produces them in ſuch order, as I ſhall
obſerve in repeating him. Whenſoever, fays he, under Popular Go- Pag. 84.
vernment the number of thoſe whoſe Offences have render'd them liable to
the ſeverity of Laws, is conſiderable enough to qualify them for attemt,
Popular Government has no more ſecurity than any other, of being free
from Sedition. It is very true: but Mr. WREN was oblig'd to Thew
how in an equal Commonwealth, or under the Model propos’d, it
was poſſible that the number of ſuch men ſhould com to be conſide-
rable enough to qualify them for ſuch an attemt. But in this kind he
is no otherwiſe provided than to tell us, That of this Original and Ex-
traction, as to the main, was CATILIN's attemt upon the Roman
Commonwealth. So undertaking againſt Oceana, or the moſt equal
Commonwealth, he is com to arguing againſt Rome, or the moſt ine-
qual Commonwealth; and at ſuch a time too, when being no longer
capable of Liberty, but ready for bonds, there were other partys be-
ſides CATILIN's, and others beſides ſuch as were obnoxious to the
Laws, that lay in wait for her : as POMPEY and his Party, or at
leaſt CESAR and his, who at length carry'd it; ſo that this feat was
not ſo much perform’d by men otherwiſe liable to ſeverity of Laws, as
by men puff'd up by ambition. But let thieſe have bin of which fort
he will, it remains with him to ſhew, how there ſhould be of either
kind enough in Oceana for a like attemt. It is known that long before
this happen'd in Rome, the whole of that Commonwealth was in the
hands of three men, CESAR, POMPEY, and CRASSUS: wherfore
he ſhould have firſt ſhewn, which way the whole of the Common-
wealth of Oceana miglit com into the hands of three, or of a few men.
Bur leaving this untouch’d, lie runs making a duſt, and a doubt where
the foverain Power of Oceana can be; which even in Rome, as ine-
qual as it was, is acknowlegd to have bin in the Aſſemblys of the Peo
ple; and in Athens, Thucydides exprefly ſays, That the Sove- Lib. s.
rainty was in the five thouſand. Who ever doubted but where the ulti-
mat "Reſult is, there alſo muſt be the Soverainty ? and the ultimat
Reſult of Oceana is in the Prerogative Tribe, or Repreſentative of the
People. Then ſays he, This Repreſentative thinking it their intereſt, may pag. 84
diſſolve the Government, and perpetuat themſelves, and may com to think
it their intereft. For the deſire of Power being natural to man, a far greater
Share of Power remains with every, particular man, when the Soverain
Power is divided among ſo many, than when the fame Power is divided
among two hundred thouſand, But I ſhew'd that this Repreſentative
has the whole Soverain Power in themſelves, not divided with any
other, or with the five hundred thouſand; which I ſuppoſe he means
by the two hundred thouſand lie mentions. Now this Repreſenta-
tive
464
The Art of Lawgiving.
W, p. 85.
tive cannot be underſtood to have the Soverain Power by overbalance
of ſtrength, becauſe they are but one thouſand to five hundred thou-
ſand; ſo it is plain that they have it by conſent, or by orders only:
wherfore theſe Orders they have not the power, or ſtrength, nor the
intereſt.to break; becauſe breaking their Orders (by which only, and
not by ſtrength, the Power is in themſelves, they com to divide the
Power that was in themſelves, with the five hundred thouſand, as
they, who, in defect of the Orders, have the far greater ſtrength, and
no legal bar. Yet ſays he, That a Repreſentative is not incapable of
making ſuch an attemt as this, will (it is not improbable ) eaſily find be-
lief with thoſe who are acquainted with the Actions of theſe laft eighteen
years. Which is as much as to ſay, That becauſe a Repreſentative,
by and with the People, may have both the intereſt, and the power
or ſtrength to free themſelves of a broken Monarchy; therfore a Rc-
preſentative may, without and againſt the People, liave both the inte-
reſt, and the power or ſtrength
to break the Orders of the moſt equal
Commonwealth. But if the Repreſentative of Oceana has not the
power or ſtrength to break their Orders, and perpetuat themſelves;
much leſs the Senat. True it is, if we look upon ſom other Common-
wealths, a Senat might have the intereſt to do it; but not where the
Senat has bin upon Rotation. To add then to Mr. WREN’s faculty
of oppoſition greater ſtrength than is in it; if the Senat of Oceana
would do any thing of this kind, their readieſt way were by creating of
the Dictator. The Dictator being created, has ſoverain Power in car-
rying on the Orders of the Commonwealth: but thoſe do not perpe-
tuat their Power; this therfore cannot be don but by Force or Arms.
The Arms of the Commonwealth are both numerous, and in a poſture
or readineſs; but they conſiſt of its Citizens: and for the Dictator
to bring the Citizen to break the Commonwealth, were for a Ge-
neral to command his Army to cut their own throats. It is true,
the Roman Decemvirs put in for prolongation; but, tho in the
moſt inequal Commonwealth, they could not make it ſtand one
year, becauſe of the Citizens in Arms: And for Mercenarys there are
none in Oceana; is this news? there were none in Iſrael, there were
none in Athens, there were none in Lacedemon, there were none in
Rome, while thoſe Commonwealths flouriſhid. But were there Mer-
cenarys, as he might perhaps reckon Servants, they are unarm’d, un-.
diſciplind; they cannot riſe thro the vaſt bodys of Citizens in Arms
both Elders and Youth ; or if they would riſe, they could be nothing
in their hands. The Roman Slaves, and the Lacedemonian Helots,
being far of another and more dangerous nature, never roſe againſt
their Lords but to their own deſtruction. All this while I ſay nothing
of the ſecurity which is in tlie frame of this Dictator, beyond any ex-
ample or intereſt of prolongation to be found either in the Roman
Dictator or the Venetian Council of ten, each wherof having bad the
like power, did never diſcover any ſuch inclination. It is true, that
in the time of Sylla, the Roman Dictator began to be perpetual;
but this is not to be attributed ſo much to the imperfection of the
Order, as to the change of the Balance. But if the Dictator of Oceana
cannot have the intereſt, or, having the intereſt, cannot have the
power or ſtrength to perpetuat that Magiſtracy; much leſs can the Senat.
THE ſum of what has bin ſaid, may be thus caſt up, as to the
whole Conſtitution. If Things or Perſons that have neither the
1
right
The Art of Lawgiving.
465
go
1
right nor the might, may prevail againſt Things and Perſons who have
both the right and the miglit; then may one Order of this Common-
wealth break the whole Syſtem: but the Might, thro the foundation
or popular balance of Property, being in the whole People, and the
whole Superſtructures of this Commonwealth being nothing elſe but an
equal diſtribution of common Right to the whole People, who are
poileft of the Might; they who have the Might, lave not the intereſt to
break, but to preſerve the Orders; which therfore no other can have
the power or ſtrength to break, or ſom other breaking, inuft but loſe
that which they pretend to gain, to wit, the Right, which in this caſe
muſt ſtill fall to the Might, devolving upon the People. That
Mr. WREN will needs fancy the Tribes or Citys in Oceana, as thoſe in W. p. 87,
the united Provinces, or the Cantons of Switzerland, to be diſtinct Sove-
raintys, concerns not me, feeing the form of Oceana is far otherwiſe; nor
indeed him, ſeeing neither do the Citýs in Holland, nor the Cantons in
Switzerland about to diſſolve their Commonwealths or Leagues.
The Champion having thus fáild at the head, is contented to play low.
The there be care taken, ſays he, that at the Aſſembly of the Hundred W. p. 181,
and the Tribe, ſuch and ſuch Magiſtrats ſhould be elected out of the Horſe,
there is no neceſſary proviſion there ſhould be any Horſe there, out of which
to elect. And where can they be then, if not in ſom Pariſh? He
might better have ſaid, that at the Pariſh there was no care taken,
that the People ſhould not elect too many of the Horſe, which being
indeed the defect of the former, is in this Edition rectify’d. His laft See Prop:-
exception is againſt the place where I ſay, that They who take upon wimpel toaz.
them the profeſſion of Theology, Phyſic or Law, are not at leiſure for the
Elays, wherby the Youth commence for all Magiſtracys and Honors, in the
Commonwealih. To which reaſon he offers not ſo much as any An-
fwer: nor pretends any other Argument againſt it, than that this ex-
cludes Divines, Lawyers, and Phyſicians, from thoſe Honors to which
their Pariſh Clerks, their Scriveners, and their Apothecarys, nay Far-
riers and Coblers may attain. And what can I help that, if it ought ne-
vertheleſs ſo to be, for a reaſon which lie cannot anſwer? Nay, if ſo
it be in common practice where the reaſon is nothing near ſo ſtrong,
ſeeing a Pariſh Clerk, a Scrivener, an Apothecary, nay a Cobler or a
Farrier, is not uncapable of being of the Common Council, nor yet
of being an Alderman or Lord Mayor of London; which nevertheleſs
that a Divine, a Lawyer, or a Phyſician ſhould be, were abſurd to
think. Divines have a Plow from which they ought not to look back:
they have above a tenth of the Territory, with which they ought
to be contented; and more than all, Civil Intereſt contracted by a
Clergy, corrupts Religion. For Lawyers, their Practice and Magi-
ſtracys are not only the moſt gainful, but for life ; and in a Common-
wealth, neither is accumulation of Magiſtracy juſt or equal, nor the
confounding of Executive and Legiſlative Magiſtracy ſafe. Will
Mr. WREN believe one of our own Lawyers, and one of the learnedſt
of them upon this point? It is the Lord VERULAM: They, ſays he, Verulam de
who bave written (de legibus) of Larymaking, bave handl'd' this Argu-Aug. Scien,
ment as Philoſophers, or as Lawyers. Philoſophers ſpeak higher than will
fall into the capacity of practice (to which may be referd PLATO's
Commonwealth, Sir THOMAS MORE's Wropia, with his own At-
lantis) and Lawyers being obnoxious, and addicted each to the Laws of their
particular Country, have no freedom nor ſincerity of Judgment, but plead
lib. 8. cur. 3.
Ooo
4S
466
The Art of Lawgiving.
Sect. 3.
That
Mr. Wren's
it.
W. p. 97.
as it were in bonds. Certainly the cognizance of theſe things is mo!! pro-
perly pertaining to political Perſons, who beſt know what ſtands w:!*na-
man Society, what with the ſafety of the People, what with natural Equit,
with antient Prudence, and with the different Conftitution of Comnc
wealths. Theſe therfore, by the Principles and Precepts of natural Equity
and good Policy, may and ought to determin of Laws. For Plasſician.sg
who (as ſuch) have in the management of State Affairs no prejudice,
if you open then the door, they will not at all, or very rarely,
com in: wherby it appears, Firſt, that ſuch a bar may in Tom cafés
be no violation of Liberty; and, ſecondly, that the Divines, who
for better cauſes might be as well ſatisfy’d, and for more unanſwera-
ble Reaſons ought to forbear, yet are impatient, and give a full teſti-
mony that their meaning is not good.
THUS is the Commonwealth by Mr. WREN oppos’d, by him
aſſerted.. There remains no more to the full confutation of his Book,
than to ſlew how the Monarchy by him aſſerted is by him deſtroy'd.
This is to be don by the examination of his ninth Chapter, which is
the next of thoſe to whiclı he refer'd us.
THE oppoſition made by Mr. WREN to a Commonwealth,
and his pretended aſſerting of Monarchy, run altogether upon
Afertion of
Mr. HOBS's Principles, and in his very words; but for want of un-
Alonarchy do derſtanding, much enervated : ſo that Mr. WREN's whole feat of
mounts to the Arms coms but to have given me a weaker Adverſary for a ſtronger.
Subversion of
In Soverainty, ſays he, the diffus’d ſtrength of the Multitude is united
in one perſon; which in a Monarchy is natural perſon ; in a State, in
artificial one procreated by the majority of Votes. This then is the nrard
W. P. 99. ſecurity of all Soverains, whether Single Perſons or Aſſemblys, that the ani.
ted Forces of their Subjects, with which they are inveſted, is ſufficient to
fuppreſs the beginnings of Séditions. Who reads Mr. Hoes, it this te
news? But what proviſion is made by either of thele Authors, that
the Forces of the Subject muſt needs be united ? Is Union in Forces, or
in Government, an Iffect wherof there is no Cauſe? Or to what caufc
are we to attribute this certain Union and grand Security ? Why let
W. p. 103. there be ſuch a Novilkty as may be a Monarch's Guard againſt the people
,
And left a Monarch ſtand in need of another Guard againſt this Nobility,
let none of theſe excel the reſt of his Order in power or dignity. Which
Effecis or Ends, thus commanded, vouchſafe not to acquaint us with
ibid. their ways: Yes, let the Nobility have no right to aſſemble themſelves for
electing a Succeſſor to the Monarchy, or for making of W'ar or Peace, for
nominating the great Miniſters of State, or for performing any other 1€
which by the nature of it is inſeparable from the Soverain Power. But why
then muſt ſuch a Nobility be a guard againſt the People, and not rather
a guard for the People, ſeeing both their Intereſts and Sufferings at this
rate are the ſame, and include thoſe very cauſes for which, in the Ba-
rons War, the Nobility became Incendiarys and Leaders of the People
of England againſt their Kings, and ſo thoſe wherby their Captain
came to excel the reſt of his order in power or dignity? But for this
**". p. 105. the Prince is to be provided, by having always in pay a ſufficient Militia;
and ſome places of ſtrength where a few may be fécure againſt a number.
For places of Strength, Citadels, or Caſtles, there were in the time of
the Barons Wars, more than ſom ; yet were they, as to this purpoſe,
But a Militia is one thing, and a ſufficient Militia is another;
where the Government conſiſts of a Nobility and of a People, what
fufficient
11one.
The Art of Lawgiving.
467
!
ſufficient part of the Property or Revenue of the Territory can there
remain to the Prince, wherby to have always in pay ſuch a Militia, as
may be ſufficient to keep the Nobility and the People from joining, or
to ſuppreſs them being join'd? If theſe be ſmall Armys, the like
may
befal them, which befel thoſe of the Kings in the Wars of the Barons.
And if they be great Armys, the Prince has not wlierwithal to fup-
port or content them; nay if he liad, Mr. Wren tells us plainly, w. p. 106
That Princes who keep great Armmys, as Guards to their perſons or Empires,
teach us that this is to walk upon Precipices ; there being no poſſibility of
preventing ſuch an Army (ſpecially if they ly ſtill without imployment")
from acquiring an intereſt diſtinct from that of the Prince. Wherfore (to
follow Mr. WREN, and no other Leader, in his own words againſt
himſelf) this Militia being great, cannot be ſo inſtituted, as to have no
intereſt beſides the pay it receives from the Monarch; nor ſo as to liave
no hopes of being ſafe in their own ſtrength, if they ſhould withdraw
themſelves from the Service and Obedience due to him: and being not
great, againſt the whole Order or Orders of the Nobility and the Peo.
ple they cannot be ſufficient. What then remains buč to ſay, that
Mr. Wren having declar'd the perfection of Monarchical Gover12- W. p. 107.
ment to conſiſt in a mixture of Monarchy by a Nobility, and a Monarchy by
Arms, has as to his Model íntirely ſubverted Monarchy ? In this way
of diſputing, I have rather follow'd my Leader than Reaſon; the true
Anſwer being that which was given in the Preface, namely, that an
Army to be effectual in England, muſt be ſuch where the officers have
popular Eſtates, or where they have ſuch Eſtates as had the antient
Nobility: in the latter caſe, they make a King; in the former, a
Commonwealth. But Mr. WREN will have his own way; and
therfore, to conclude, let me but deſire him to lay his hand upon
his heart, and then tell me, whether the condition of the Nobility
(to whoſe favor in my excluſion he pretends a meritorious Title)
#haring eminently and according to their rank with the People
in the Commonwealth by me propos’d; or the condition of the
Nobility under the infolence and burden of a mercenary Army,
ſharing equally with the People in Oppreſſion and Slavery, or re-
viving the old Barons Wars for new Liberty, in the Monarchy by
him propos’d; be the more deſirable. And to ſpeak a word for
my
Adverfary, we will ſubmit it wholly to the preſent Nobility, whetlier
Mr. Wr En or I be ſo extravagant in theſe things, that they have,
or can have any other than the like choice. Yet enter's not Mr. WREN
into deſpair of living to injoy his ſhare
, (which ought to be a good one)
of the Felicitys which will belong to the Subjects of ſuch a Government.
He looks upon Perſons, but Things are invincible.
THE reſt of his Book (to which The Prerogative of Popular
Government is ſtill a complete Anſwer) conſiſts altogether of groſs
evaſion or invective, or of drawing out of ſtory againſt Popular Pru:
dence ſuch imaginary Swords as do but ſtand bent. To rectify or
ſtreighten theſe, I may hereafter preſent him (if any man ſhall think
it worth the while) with a fuller Anſwer.
Ibid.
0002
À
468
A Word concerning
AVVOR D
Concerning a Houſe of PEERS.
N
O man knowing what is neceſſary to the Foundation or Being
of a Popular Government, can hope or expect the intro-
duction of any ſuch Form, where Monarchy is not im-
practicable. They (where Monarchy is impracticable) who com
firſt to diſcover it, and be convinc'd of it, if Reaſon be not altogether
depos'd, are inevitable Leaders. Hence it is that our Common-
wealthſmen are already renown'd throout this Nation for their invin-
cible Reaſons, even by the confeflion of their opponents, or ſuch as
procede nevertheleſs in other ways. But where Seed is ſo well fown
and rooted, intervening Poſſeſſion and Intereſts are like ſuch Weather
as holding back the Spring, yet improves the Harveſt : Common-
wealthſmen indeed may have a cold time on't, but upon the Common-
wealth it muſt beſtow Fermentation. Had our incomparable Aſſert-
ors of public Liberty appear'd before a univerſal eviction of the nea
ceſſity which inforces their Cauſe, it muſt have bin thro ſuch a re-
luctancy, as would have made them glad to do things by halves, which
is the only Rock to a riſing Commonwealth of Scandal, or of Danger;
the whole being ſuch againſt which there is nothing to be alleg'd, and
the half what may be eaſily confuted. Theſe things conſider'd, what
appearance is there but that it muſt redound to the greater advantage
of our Commonwealthſmen, that we are under the force of a preſent
Humor which abhors the very name of a Commonwealth ? Seeing by
this means one of two things muſt of neceſſity happen, and com
ſhortly to public view or diſcovery : either that Monarchy is practi-
cable, or that it is not practicable; I mean, in our ſtate of Affairs, or
in this preſent diſtribution of the Balance. If Monarchy be found
practicable, Commonwealthſmen are ſatisfy'd in their Conſciences,
and ſo ready in fair ways to return, and ſubmit not only for Wrath,
bur for Conſcience fake. But (let Divines cry Atheiſm, and Lawy-
ers Treaſon) if it be once diſcover'd to common Underſtanding that
Monarchy is impracticable, then in coms the Commonwealth, not
by halves, but with all its Tackling, full fail, diſplaying its Streamers,
and flouriſhing with Top and Topgallant.
THE ways wherby it is at hand to be diſcover'd whether Mo-
narchy be practicable or impracticable, are particularly two; the one
quicker, the other flower : The quicker way will be by the Work-
men, the flower by the Work.
IF the Workmen, being willing, be yet overcom by the mere
obſtinacy of their Matter, it amounts to a plain confeſſion, that Mo-
narchy is impracticable. And if they give away the Libertys of the
People, they are overcom by the obſtinacy of the Matter ; for that is
not their Work : nor any other Work than ſuch as muſt be uſeleſs,
not ſo much in regard of it ſelf (tho that may be true enough) as hý
the want of any other Security than what the Prince had before, that
is,
a Houſe of Peers.
469
ܪ
1
is, an Army. And ſuch an Army, which for ſecurity is as good as
none at all, nay the very contrary, as has bin ſhewn already: nor to Art of Law.
be alter'd with better ſucceſs than theirs, who became Princes in Gre giving, p. 433.
cian and Sicilian States.
BUT if the Workmen give not away the Libertys of the People,
then muſt they ſo limit their Prince, that he can in no manner invade
thoſe Libertys; and this by any other means than the full and perfect
introduction of a well order'd'Commonwealth, they will find to be
utterly impoſſible : So either way they are overcom by the mere ob-
ſtinacy of their Matter.
IF thro ſom ſecret Dietat (as when the Senat of Rome was Con-
viva Cefaris) or a haſt to make riddance, this be not perceiv’d by the
Workmen, it will be but the more perceivable by the Work when it
coms to wearing or in practice; and the Flaws or Grievances being
found inſupportable, the next Parlament, thro the mere want of
any
other remedy, muſt introduce a Commonwealth.
GOOD, and egregiouſly Prophetical! But what ſay you for all this,
if we have a Houſe of Peers, and that even for the Lord's ſake, there being
no other way to ſecure Liberty of Conſcience? Why I ſay, if we have a
Houſe of Peers, it muſt be a Houſe of old Peers, or a Houſe of new
Peers, or a Houſe of the one and the other. Moreover I ſay, Let it
be which way you will, ſuch a Houſe may at ſom time, or for ſom
reaſon, be perſonally affected to Liberty of Conſcience; but is a
Conſtitution in it ſelf naturally averſe, and contrary to Liberty of Con-
ſcience, and therfore can be no ſecurity to the fame, whether the Lords
be Spiritual, or Temporal, or partiperpale.
LORDS Spiritual are inſpir’d with a third Eſtate, or ſhare of a
Realm, which gives no toleration to any Religion, but that only af-
ſerting this point, which is Monarchy. Setting this Oracle, and ſom
like Reaſons of State aſide, we may think that every Soverainty (as
ſuch) has Liberty of Conſcience : This a King having, cannot give;
and a People having, will not loſe. For Liberty of Conſcience is in
truth a kind of State, wherin a man is his own Prince : but a Houſe.
of Peers ſets up another Prince; it cannot ſtand without a King. If
the Balance be in the Lords, as before Henry the Seventh, yet muſt
they have a King, to unite them, and by whom to adminiſter their
Government ; and if the Balance be not in the Lords, they ſtand or
fall with the King, as the Houſe of Peers in the Long Parlament :
and the King falling, their Government devolves to the People.
Again,
a Houſe of Peers having the overbalance, ſignifys ſomthing; in which
caſe it has not bin known to be for Liberty of Conſcience : and not
having the overbalance, ſignifys nothing; in which caſe it cannot ſecure
the Liberty of Conſcience. Thus a Houſe of Peers, wliether ſom-
thing or nothing, is no way
for the Liberty of Conſcience, but every
way for a King: and a King is a defender of the Faith. The Faith
wherof a King is defender, muſt be that which is, or he ſhall call his
own Faith ; and this Faith it concerns his Crownand Dignity, that he
defend againſt all other Faiths. True it is, that a King for a ſtep to a
Throne, may uſe what is readieſt at hand : Otherwiſe where there is
Liberty of Conſcience, to affert Civil Liberty by Scripture can be no
Atheiſm ; which laines a Prince of one Arm. But where Liberty of
Conſcience is not at all, or not perfect, Divines, who (for the greater
part) are no fair Huntſmen, but love dearly to be poaching or club-
bing
470
A Word concerning
bing with tlic ſecular Arm (tho if we, who deſire no ſuch Advan-
tages, might proſecute them for abuſing Scripture, as they have don
this thouſand years, to all the ends, intents, and purpoſes of Monar-
chy, they would think it a hard caſe) Divines, I ſay, not only brand
the Affertors of Civil Liberty with Atheiſm, but are ſom of them ftu-
dious in Contrivances, and quaint in Plots to give a check or remove
to this or that eminent Patriot, by the like pretences or charges;
which ſucceding accordingly by the power of a Parlament, they may
at length com to have a Parlament in their power. Where there is no
Liberty of Conſcience, there can be no Civil Liberty; and where
there is no Civil Liberty, there can be no ſecurity to Liberty of Con-
ſcience : but a Houſe of Peers is not only a neceſſary, but a declar'd
check
upon Civil Liberty; therfore it can be no ſecurity to Liberty of
Conſcience. And ſo much for this particular.
NOW to make upon the other parts propos’d, and in a mere
civil ſenſe, ſom farther conjecture.
WHEN a Houſe of Peers ſets up a Houſe of Commons, as in
the Barons Wars, they will govern the Commons well enough for
their own purpoſe, and not ſeldom the King too.
BUT we are to ſpeak of a thing without any example, a Houſe of
Peers ſet up by a Houſe of Commons; nor, in the want of cxample,
are we thought worthy by our Adverſarys to be furniſh'd with Rea-
ſon: ſo the guidance of our Diſcourſe upon this point is committed to
Mother Wit, a notable Goſſip, but not ſo good a Politician.
NEVERTHELESS, if this Houſe conſiſts of old Peerage on-
ly, we have direction enough to know how that will be; for either
the ſingle Perſon, or the Commons will be predominant in the Go-
vernment : if the Commons be ſo, then it will be with the Peers, as
it was before their laſt Secluſion; that is, while they do as the Com-
mons would have them, they may fit; otherwiſe they are ſent home.
And if the ſingle Perſon be predominant, it can be no otherwiſe than
by an Army; in which caſe the old Peers being not in Arms, nor
having any help that way, are as much under the Yoke as the Com-
mons. By which it may be apparent, that it is the great intereſt of
the preſent Peerage, that there be a well order'd Commonwealth ; 0-
therwiſe the Commons being in bondage, the Lords, whom that leaſt
.
becoms, are but equal with them: and being frce, the Lords are not
the head, but at the foot of them; wheras in an equal Common-
wealth, that the Nobility be not at the head, or have not the leading,
is quite contrary to all Reaſon and Experience.
IF the Houſe conſiſts of new Peers only, it muſt conſiſt of the chief
Officers in the Army; which immediatly divides the Government into
two diſtinct Governments: the one in the Houſe of Commons, whoſe
Foundation is the Body of the People ; the other in the Houſe of
Peers, whoſe Foundation is the Army. This Army if it remains firm
to the Peers, they not only command the Commons, but make and un-
make Kings as they pleaſe; or as ambitious Partys and Perſons among
themſelves are diligent or fortunat : But if the Army (as is moſt and
more than moſt likely) coms off to the Commons, the Peers are no-
thing, and the Commons introduce a Commonwealth,
IF the Houſe conſiſts of new Peers and old, the old Peers while they
like it, are Cyphers to new Figures; and when they like it not, may
go hoine again : Nor whether they ſtay or go, is this caſe ſo different
frorn
*
, Houſe of Peers.
LLL
471
from the former, as to be any greater obſtruction to a Common
wealth.
TO liate the very name of a Commonwealth, or not to ſee that
England can be no other, is as if men were not in earneſt. It is ask'd
of the Commons what the Protector ſhall be, and he can be nothing
but what they will. It is ask'd of the Commons what the other,
Houſe ſhall be, and it can be nothing but what the Commons will.
The Commons are ask'd whoſe the Army, whoſe the Militia, whoſe
the Negative Vote is; nor can theſe be otherwiſe determin’d'than as
they pleaſe. The Commons are ask'd whether they will make ſuch a
War, whether they will pay ſuch a Debt, whether they will advance
ſuch a Sum; all which are intirely at their diſcretion: therfore actual-
ly and poſitively England is a Commonwealth. Nay, and that there
remain not the leaſt doubt, whether it be ſafe for any man to ſay thus
much, the preſent Government has either no legal denomination at all,
or is legally denominated the Commonwealth : the queſtion of the
future ſtate of it coms not one whit upon the matter, which is already
granted, but upon the form only. A Commonwealth for the matter
makes it ſelf; and where they will not beſtow upon it the Form ne-
ceſſary, fails not of coming to ruin, or, at leaſt, to diſgrace the Work-
men : Or, to ſpeak more properly and piouſly, a Commonwealth is
nor inade by Men, but by God; and they who reſiſt his holy Will,
are Weapons that cannot proſper.
Feb. 20.
1659.
1
.
1
SIX
+
11
1
Six Political
TRACTS
Written on
Several Occaſions.
V IZ
!
I. Valerius and Publicola. A Dialog.
II. A Syſtem of Politics, delineated in ſhort
and eaſy Aphoriſms, now firſt publiſh'd from
the Author's own Manuſcript.
III. Political Aphoriſms.
IV. Seven Models of a Commonwealth, Antient
and Modern, cc.
V. The Ways and Means of introducing a
Commonwealth by the Conſent of the People
.
1
VI. The humble Petition of divers well affected
Perſons with the Parlament's Anſwer therto.
PPP
+
*
于
​上
​*
|
475
+
Valerius and Publicola:
{
Or, the True
1
FOR M
OF A
POPULAR COMMONWEALTH
Extracted
Ex puris Naturalibus. .
Quos perdere vult JUPITER, lios dementat prius.
1
To the READER
..
T
He way of Dialog being not faithfully manag’d, is of all other's
the moſt fraudulent; but being faithfully managd, is the cleareſt
and moſt effe&tual for conveying a mans ſenſe into the undera
ſtanding of his Reader. There is nothing in this World, next
the favor of God, I ſo much deſire as to be familiarly underſtood; which
becauſe great men have thought below them, has prov’d hitherto but the ruin
of themſelves, and the detriment of the Public : for which reaſon, having
try'd all other means, I now add this. My work, if I be not given over to
utter blindneſs, is the ſame with, or neareſt, that of the Nation; and the
Work of the Nation being not underſtood, is in extreme danger of utter
ruin.
D
Valerius.
EAREST PUBLICOLA, how have I long’d to meet you,
and in the favorable ſilence of this long Walk!
Publicola.
What has my noble Friend VALERIUS to command his faithful
Servant ?
Val
. Why really, notwithſtanding the tumult of theſe extravagant
Changes, your laſt Diſcourſe had ſo much of my attention then, and
has had ſuch a digeſtion with me ſince, that I feel it running in my
Veins.
Pub. Do you find in that any temtation to the buckling on of High-
(hoou?
Val. My thoughts, PUBLICOLA, are quite of another ſtrain ;
Tomtimes I fancy I ſee England graſping at Empire, liké Rome it ſelf.
Ppp 2
Pub.
476
Valerius and Publicola.
Pub. Why then VALERIUS, my Diſcourſes are not ſuch as they
ſay; there runs nothing of them in your Veins, that has imbas'd your
noble Blood.
Val. The Heraldry of them is of as high a pitch as the Policy; but
I would have them be a little lower in ſom things.
Pub. What are thoſe ?
Val. The Vulgar complain of you, that you are too learn'd.
Pub. I thought it was not you, VALERIUS.
Val. For all that, I could be contented to ſee you raiſe your Structure
by your own ſtrength, and without the help of other Authors.
Þub. That I dare ſay you may, when you pleaſe.
Val. I muſt ſee it then, before I loſe the covert of theſe reverend
Elms.
Pub. You take care that the Building ſhould be well ſituated ; and
for the Foundation, I may preſume by what has already paſt between
you and me, that we are long ſince agreed.
Val. That the threefold Balance, or Diſtribution of Property is the
cauſe of the triple way of Government, I fully conſent with you; as
alſo, that the Balance now in England is in the People plainly, and ex-
cluſively both of a King and Lords.
Pub. You are not of them that grant this, and then ask which
way
a Commonwealth ſhould be introduc'd in England.
Val. Why truly yes; ſeeing not only the People are ſo wholly un-
acquainted with the means, but their Leaders ſo averſe to it.
Pub. Think you that a Plant grows the worſe for not underſtanding
the manner of its Vegetation?
Val. A Plant is not a free Agent; but among Men who are free
Agents, the Introduction of Government ſeems to be Arbitrary.
Pub. What, where there is no more than Hobſon's choice, this or
Val
. It is true, that if they can have nothing elſe, they muſt at
length have a Commonwealth'; but tho they can have nothing elſe to
be holding, yet they will be trying other things.
Pub. There is all the miſchief.
Val. And enough to ruin the Nation,
Pub. To hurt it very fore, but not to ruin it; nor yet to evade a
Commonwealth, except they expoſe us to foren Invaſion
Val
. I am glad of your Confidence.
Pub. You may let it paſs for Confidence, if you pleaſe; but if there
be no other way except that only of Invaſion, wherby the preſent Ba-
lance can receive a change ſudden enough to admit of any other Form,
the reaſon why we muſt have a Commonwealth is coercive.
Val. And putting the caſe it be the Will of God to defend us from
foren Invaſion, how long will it be ere they ſee at home the coercive-
neſs of this Reaſon, or, which is all one, that all Power is in and from
Pub. Good VALERIU S, how long is it ſince this was both ſeen
and declar'd in Parlament?
Val. Perhaps as they meant, it might be admitted as a Principle even
in Monarchy.
Pub. This with your pardon you will revoke, ſeeing you well re-
member that this their Déclaration of Power in the People, has bin ex-
cluſive of King and Lords, and that in expreſs terms.
Val.
none?
,
the People?
*
Valerius and Publicola.
477
--
Val. But in this they related not at all to the Diſtribution of Property.
Pub. Why then, there is not ſuch a difference between the growing
of a Plant and of a Commonwealth, as you thought; ſeeing a Com-
monwealth knowing as little, dos no leſs.
Val. This of all others is to me a Conſideration fulleſt of comfort.
Pub, It will in time procede accordingly, thro a mere neceſſity of
nature, or by feeling; but your deſire, I ſuppoſe, is to know how it
ſhould be rationally introduc'd, or by ſeeing, and that with more eaſe
and greater ſpeed.
Val. If it might pleaſe God, I would live to have my ſhare of it,
tho I fear I never ſhall.
Pub. You carve for your ſelf ill: for by hope a man injoys even that
which he never coms to attain ; and by fear he is depriv'd even of
that which he coms not to loſe.
Val. I muſt confeſs that our Army has it now in their power to in-
troduce a Commonwealth.
Pub. And there is no other action in their power that can excuſe
them.
Val. Putting the caſe they would hearken to you, what courſe
would you adviſe?
Pub. The ſame that I have advis'd over and over.
Val. As how?
Pub. As how! is that yet a Queſtion? Let them divide the Terri-
tory into fifty equal parts.
Val. They will never make a new diviſion.
Pub. Why then they ſhall never have an equal Commonwealth.
Vil. What ill luck is this, that the firſt ſtep ſhould be ſo difficult?
Pub. You ſpeak as if never any Territory had bin divided, wheras
there is none that has not; and Surveyors will tell you, it is a work to
be perfectly ferform'd in two months, and with eaſe.
Val. Putting the caſe this were don, what is next?
Pub. The next is, that the Commonwealth were complete.
Val. Say you ſo? this indeed makes amends: but how?
· Pub. With no more addition, than that the People in every diſtinct
diviſion elect annually two Knights and ſeven Deputys.
Val. I dare ſay the People would never ſtick at this.
Pub. Not ſticking at this, they of their own power have inſtituted
the two great Aſſemblys, of which every Commonwealth conſiſts.
Val
. But in adviſing theſe things, you muſt adviſe men ſo that they
may underſtand them.
Pab. VALERIUs, could I as eaſily have advis'd men how to un-
derſtand, as what to do, there had bin a Commonwealth ere this.
Val. Com, I will have you try ſomthing of this kind, and begin
upon
ſom known Principle, as this, All Power is in the People.
Pub. Content. But the diffuſive Body of the People (at leaſt in a
Territory of this extent) can never exerciſe any Power at all.
Val. That is certain.
Pub. Hence is the neceſſity of ſom form of Government.
Val. That is, the People of themſelves being in a natural incapacity
of exerciſing Power
, muſt be brought into ſom artificial or political ca-
pacity, of exerciſing the fame.
Pub. Right. Now this may be don three ways; as firſt, by a ſin-
gle Perſon
Val
11
478
Valerius and Publicola.
Val. How !
Pub. Nay, I am not likely to trouble you much upon this point:
but as you were intimating juſt now, there are Royaliſts who derive
the original Right of Monarchy from the conſent of the People.
Val. There are ſo.
Pub. And theſe hold the King to be nothing elſe, but the Repreſen-
ter of the People and their Power.
Val. As the Turc.
Pub. Yes, as the Turc.
Val. The Peoples Power at that rate coms to the Peoples Slavery.
Pub. You ſay right; and ſo it may at other rates too.
Val. As how?
Pub. Why as I was about to ſay, The Power of the People may
be politically brought into exerciſe three ways: by a ſingle Perfon; by
an Aſſembly conſiſting of a few; or by an Aſſembly conſiſting of many.
Val. Or by a mixture.
Pub. Nay, I pray let that alone yet a while: for which way ſoever
you go, it muſt com at length to ſom mixture, ſeeing the ſingle Perſon
you nam'd but now, without his Divan or Council to debate and pro-
poſe to him, would make but bad work even for himſelf. But as the
Government coms to be pitch'd fundamentally upon one of theſe three,
ſo it differs not only in name, but in nature.
Val. I apprehend you, as Monarchy, Ariſtocracy, and Democracy.
Pub. Nay, you are out with your Learning, when you have for-
bidden it me. But in Countrys where there is not a Nobility ſuffici-
ently balanc'd or inrich'd, there can be none of your Ariſtocracy; and
yet there may (as long as it will laſt) be a Government in a few.
Val. What call you that ?
Pub. Nay, what ſay you?
Val. Com, it is Oligarchy: when all is don, ſom words of Art we
muſt uſe.
Pub. I thought you would com to it; and yet ſeeing I have pro-
mis’d, I will be ſparing. But with your pardon, you have diſorder'd
my Diſcourſe, or by this time I had ſhew'd, that if the Power of the
People be committed to a ſingle Perſon, the coinmon Intereſt is ſub-
mitted to that of a Family; and if it be committed to a few, it is ſub-
mitted to the Intereſt of a few Familys.
Val. Which, ſo many times as they are more than one, is ſo many
times worſe than Monarchy.
Pub. I am not ſorry that you are of that mind. For there is no ſuch
thing as a Commonwealth, or, as you ſay, Democracy in nature, if it
be not pitch'd upon a numerous Aſſembly of the People.
Val. What call you numerous ?
Pub. Why, an Aſſembly ſuch for number as can neither go upon the
intereſt of one ſingle Perſon or Family, nor the intereſt of a few Per-
ſons or Familys.
Val. How will you conſtitute ſuch an Aſſembly ?
Pub. Commonwealths for the Conſtitution of their Popular Aſſem-
blys, have had two ways. The firſt by inrolling all their Citizens,
and ſtating the Culorum in ſuch ſort, that all to and above the ſtated
number repairing at the time and place appointed, are impower'd to
give the Vote of the whole Commonwealth.
1
ܪ
1
Vål
1
Valerius and Publicola.
479
1
provement in the Intereſt.
Val. The Athenian Quorum was fix thouſand; which towards the
latter end of that Commonwealth came to five.
Pub. So, fo, you may quote Authors: But you may remember alſo,
that Athens was a ſmall Commonwealth.
Pal. How many would you adviſe for England ? ?
Pub. Put the caſe I ſhould ſay, ten thouſand?
Val. They will laugh at you.
Pub. What can I help that? or how many would you adviſe?
Val. I would not go above five thouſand.
Pub. Mark you then: they only that are neareſt would com; and
ſo the City of London would give Law to the whole Nation.
Val. Why really that ſame now is clear; but would there be leſs
danger of it, in caſe you ſtated your Quorum at ten, at twenty, or
tho it were at a hundred or two hundred thauſand?
Pub. No: For which cauſe, as to England, it is a plain caſe, that
this is no way for the inſtitution of a popular Aſſembly.
Val. Which way then ?
Pub. For England there is no way but by Repreſentative, to be
made to riſe equally and methodically by ſtated Elections of the Peos
ple throout the whole Nation.
Val. Needs this to be ſo numerous as the other ?
Pub. No.
Val. Why?
Pub. Becauſe it is not obnoxious to a Party, to any certain Rank,
or ſuch as are ſooneſt upon the ſpur, or that make leaſt account of their
Pains or of their Mony.
Val. Will you be ſo curious ?
Pub. Do you think this a Curioſity? How elſe will you avoid im-
of meaner rank; or in the Intereſt of the Few, to the detriment of
that of the Many?
Val. But even this way there is danger of that foul Beaſt the Oli-
garchy.
Pub. Look about you. The Parlament declares all Power to be in
the People; is that in the better fort only ?
Val. Stay; the King was to obſerve Leges de Conſtitutiones quas
vulgas elegerit : That Vulgus is to be underſtood of the Parlament;
and the Parlament conſiſted wholly of the better fort.
Pub. It is true; but then that Commonwealth acted in all things
accordingly.
Val. It was, you will ſay, no Democracy.
Pub. And will you ſay it was?
Dal. No truly: yet this deriv'd in part from the free Election of the
People.
Pub. How free? ſeeing the People, then under Lords, dard not
to elect otherwiſe thanas pleas'd thoſe Lords.
Val. Somthing of that is true; but I am perſuaded that the Peoples
nor under Lords, will yet be moſt addicted to the better fort.
Pab. That is certain.
Val. How then will you prevent the like in your Inſtitution?
Pub. You ſhall ſee preſently: The diffuſive Body of the People,
in which the Power is, and is declar'd to be, conſiſts in the far greater
part of the lower fort i wherfore their Repreſentative, to riſe natural-
ly,
f
480
Valerius and Publicola.
1
ly, and to be exactly comprehenſive of the common Intereſt, muſt
conſiſt alſo in the far greater part of the lower ſort.
Val. Of what number will you have this Repreſentative?
Pub. Suppoſe a thouſand, or therabout.
Val. What proportion will you have the meaner fort in it to hold to
che.better?
Pub. Suppoſe about ſix to four.
Val. How will you order it, that it ſhall be ſo conſtituted ?
Pub. Why thus: Let the People in every Precinct or Shire at E-
lection chuſe four under one hundred pounds a year in Lands, Goods,
or Mony, together with three at or above that proportion.
Val. I fee not but this Repreſentative muſt be exact.
Pub: It is yet none at all ; that is, unleſs you preſume Changes:
for one thouſand, without change governing the whole People, a-
mounts neither to a Repreſentative nor to a Commonwealth, but coms
ftill to your hard name.
Val. How do you order your Changes ?
Pub. By annual election of one third part for three years.
Val. So that every year onethird part of your Aſſembly fallsout of it,
and a new third part at the ſame time enters into the fame.
Pub. Even fo.
Val. This cauſes the Repreſentative to be perpetually extant.
Pub. It dos ſo: But to reſpit that a little, I ſhould be glad, before
Iftir farther, to know which way the Vote of a Repreſentative thus
conſtituted, can go one hairs breadth beſide the common and public
Intereſt of the whole diffuſive Body of the People.
Val. No way in the Earth that I can imagin, except thro igno-
rance.
Pub. No Human Ordinance is infallible; and what is don thro merë
ignorance or miſtake at one time, will be found and amended at a:
nother.
Val. A thouſand men, and fix to four of the lower fort perpetual-
ly extant! this muſt be a grievous Charge to the moſt of them; it
will be hard to bring them, and impoſſible to hold them together.
Pub. Upon ſuch as are elected and com not, conſiderable Fines
muſt be levy'd ; and ſuch as com and ſtay together muſt have good
Salarys.
Val. Salarys to ſo many ! what will that com to?
Pub. Not, with the reſt of the Commonwealth, to three hundred
thouſand pounds a year,
Val. Why? the Kings have rarely had above ſix.
Pub. And did England ever grudg them any part of that propor-
tion?
Val. I muſt confeſs the Quarrel grew when they would not be con-
tented with ſo little.
Pub. Now if England never did, nor needed grudg. a King fix
hundred thouſand pounds a year, to be ſpent among Courtiers, why
ſhould we imagin The ſhould grudg a Commonwealth three hundred
thouſand pounds a year, to be ſpent among Magiſtrats ?
Val. But Parlamentmen have taken nothing.
Pub. Have the People given nothing?
Val. That was for the maintenance of Armys.
Pub. And whether had you rather maintain Armysor Magiſtrats?
Vala
Valerius and Publicola,
481
Val
. But putting the caſe that this Aſſembly needed not to be per-
petually extant, this Charge in the whole or in the far greater part
might be abated.
Pub. I cannot tell : for how often think you fit that this Aſſembly
ſhould convene?
Val. Parlaments at moſt met nor above once a year.
Pub. If they had bin perpetually extant, there would have bin no
King.
Val. No truly, except in name only.
Pub. Therfore the Popular Aſſembly in a Commonwealth ought
not to be perpetually extant.
Val. To the end, you will ſay, that there may be fom King.
Pub. Mock not: or what other guard of Liberty is there in any
Commonwealth, but the Popular Aſſembly ?
Val. Com, let them aſſemble twice a year upon their ordinary
Guard.
Pub. And what if there be an extraordinary occaſion ?
Val. Then, as often as there is any ſuch occaſion.
Pub. How much will this abate of their neceſſary Charge, or of .
the Salarys? And how much better were it for a Repreſentative to
lead the Life of Stateſmen than of Carriers?
Val. Commonwealths, whoſe Aſſemblys have bin of the former
kind, have call’d them no otherwiſe than at ſtated times, or upon ex-
traordinary occaſions.
Pub. But then their Aſſemblys were not equal Repreſentatives, but
conſiſted of ſuch as being next at hand were ſtill ready upon any occa-
fion.
Val. That makes indeed a conſiderable difference: But were this
Repreſentative always extant, I cannot ſee but it would have nothing
to do.
Pub. And in caſe it be not always extant, you imagin that it may
have ſomthing to do.
Val. Yes.
Pub. Then whether gos it better with the Commonwealth when
the Repreſentative has fomthing to do, or when it has nothing to do?
Val. This is very quaint.
Pub. No truly, VALERIUS, it is plain, that the Guard of Liberty
perpetually extant, in doing nothing muſt do much ; and not per-
petually
extant, in doing much may do nothing.
Val. I am afraid that having nothing to do, they will make work.
Pub. Such I warrant you as the Parlament and the Army made the
other day.
Val. Nay, I am not ſo wide. A civil Council and a ſtanding Ar-
my muſt needs have Intereſts much more diſtinct than two civil Allem-
blys; and where there is not a like cauſe, I know well enough there
cannot be the like effect.
Pub. I ſhall deſire no more, than that you will hold to this; and
then tell me what Diſputes there us'd to be between the Senat of Venice
and the great Council, which is perpetually extant, and conſiſts of a-
bout two thouſand.
Val. Nay, certain it is, that between thoſe two there never was any
diſpute at all.
Qaq
Pub
1
1
482
ment.
Valerius and Publicola. .
Pub. Then tell me for what cauſe ſuch a thing ſhould any more
happen between the Aſſemblys propos’d; or, according to your own
rule, from like cauſes expect like effects.
Val. You put me to it.
Pub. Nay, it is you that put me to it; for you will be preſuming
that this Aſſembly can have nothing to do, before we com to con-
ſider what are their proper Buſineſſes and Functions.
Val. I beg your pardon, and what are thoſe?
Pub. Why ſurely no ſmall matters ; for in every Commonwealth
truly Popular, it is inſeparable from the Aſſembly of the People that
firſt they wholly and only have the right of Reſult in all matters of
Lawgiving, of making Peace and War, and in levying Men and
Mony: Secondly, That the ultimat Reſult in Judicature ly to them:
and thirdly, That they have right to call to account, and to puniſh
their Magiſtrats for all matters of Maladminiſtration of Govern-
Val. I aſſure you this muſt amount to a great deal of buſineſs.
Pub. Certain it is, that in ſom Commonwealths the Popular Aſſem-
bly by this means has bin perpetually imploy’d.
Val. And ſo I think it might be in England.
Pub. It might ; but I do not think it would. However, if it be
in the undoubted right of the Popular Aſſembly to procede againſt
their Magiſtrats for Maladminiſtration, would you leave it upon
the hand of thoſe Magiſtrats, whether this Repreſentative ſhould af-
ſemble or no ?
Val. Com, you have ſaid enough, it were not prudent: but as to
the matter of Appeals, it is certain that in Iſrael the ultimat Reſort was
to the Sanhedrim or 70 Elders.
Pub. I know it very well : nevertheleſs you ſhall find that the Cons
gregation judgʻd Benjamin ; and if you mark the Appeal to the
Elders, you ſhall find that it was not an Appeal of the Party for Relief,
but of the Judges in inferior Courts for further light and direction in
difficult caſes of the Law.
Val. Let me but know in what manner this Aſſembly is to perform
theſe Functions, and I have don.
Pub. Why as to matter of Lawgiving, I told you that they whol-
ly and only have the right and power of Reſult.
Val. But to Reſult, there muſt neceſſarily go precedent Debate ;
ſeeing a Man, much leſs an Aſſembly, reſolves not upon any thing
without ſom Conſiderations, Motives, or Reaſons therto conducing,
which ought to be firſt orderly and maturely debated : and how will
you bring a thouſand men, eſpecially being ſix to four of the lower
Tort, to debate any thing with order and maturity?
Pub. You ſay that the Popular Aſſembly in Aihens conſiſted at the
leaſt of five thouſand.
Val. And I ſaid true.
Pub. Yet this Aſſembly debated : Why may not a thouſand men
debate as well as five thouſand ?
Val. As well! Nay PUBLICOLA, if they debate no better in
your Commonwealth than they did in that, you may know what will
becom of it. And to tell you true, I do not think that a thouſand men
can debate any whit more orderly and maturely than five thouſand.
Pub. And ſo think I too.
Vali How then?
Pub.
70
1
Valerius and Publicolá.
483
1
Pub. How tlen? Why this is the reaſon of the Senat in every
Commonwealth.
Val. So there muſt be a Senat, which amounts to thus much; with-
out a Senat there can be no Commonwealth, and with a Senat there
will always be Practices upon the Liberty of the People.
Pub. How prove you that?
Val. Why by the Senat of Lacedemon in the beginning, and by the
Senat of Rome throout.
Pub. But find you the like by the Senats of Athens and Venice?
Val. No.
Pub. Conſider then that theſe were by Election of the People, and
upon frequent Removes, and that the former were defective in one or
in both theſe circumſtances.
Val. You intend your Senat upon Removes then?
Pub. Right
Val. And Elective by the People?
Pub. Yes.
Val. How? by the Popular Aſſembly, or by the body of the People
in their Precincts?
Pub. By the body of the People in their Precincts, at the ſame time
when they elect their other Deputys, and with the ſame circumſtan
ces, except that theſe be all elected out of ſuch as have a hundred
pounds a year real or perſonal.
V’al. What hurt, if they were elected by the Popular Aſſem-
bly?
Pub. They would not derive ſo immediatly, nor riſe fo equally from
thie People, as when choſen in the Precincts ; becauſe this
way every
Shire coms neceſſarily to have a ſhare in the Senat: beſides, wiſe men
and underſtanding are better known in their Tribes than they can be in
an Aſſembly out of their Tribes, eſpecially while they are new comers;
nor will the Popular Aſſembly afford ſo good a choice as the whole Peu-
ple. There are other Reaſons.
Val. Enough, enough. Of what number do you conſtitute this
Senat?
Pub. Of three hundred.
Val. Why ſhould not one hundred be full enough for a debating
Council, eſpecially ſeeing Debate is the more orderly where the
Counſillors are fewer?
Pub. You are to bear it in mind, that this Senat is upon annual change
in one third part.
Val. That is, every year one hundred having ſerv'd three years, go
out, and a new hundred coms in.
Pub. Right: for which cauſe, to have one hundred well practis'd
indebate, your Senat muſt conſiſt of three hundred.
Val. May not thoſe that go out com preſently in again by a new
Election?
Pub. Not at all; for that were yet another way of continuing the
Government in a few.
Val. Do you mean that no man ſhall ſerve in this Capacity, or in
that of the Popular Aſſembly, but once in his life?
Pub. I mean that a man, having ſerv'd his term in one of theſe,
may after a like vacation or interval be clected again to ſerve in either
of them, and not before.
099 2
Val
484
Valerius and Publicola.
Val. At what age do you make a man capable of theſe Elečtions ?
Pub. Not till thirty.
l'al. He ſtays a great while ere he coms to preferment, and is foori
out again : at which rate a man ſhould have much ado to attain to
ſufficient knowlege for the leading of the Commonwealth.
Pub. This was never objected againſt Parlaments.
Val. It is true: but then the Election of Parlamentmen was not
obligd to any Interval, and divers have bin of every Parlament that
was ſummon’d during their Lives.
Pub. Parlaments when they were the moſt frequent, aſſembld not
above once a year, very rarely ſo often; and how long, pray, did they
uſually ſit?
L'al. Som two or three months.
Pub. I allow you the moſt you ask: at which rate a man that liad
ſat in twenty Parlaments, could not have fat above four years com-
plere.
Val. And in your Parlament, at one Election he fits three.
Pub. Mark you that ?
Val. Yes, and more: Wheras a Parlamentman without interval
could in twenty years have fat bur four complete, in your Aſſenblys a
man obſerving his intervals, may in twenty years ferve ten years
complete.
Pab. You allow that, I hope, to be ſom advantage towards acqui-
ring knowlege in conduct; and yet antiently your Parlamentmen were
in this point thought able enough.
Val. Now would I deſire no more than to be as fully ſatisfy'd, that
theſe Senators pinſt be honeſt enough.
Pub. Which way can they be diſhoneſt ?
Val. Indeed I am not yet acquainted with their ways: but if no-
thing can be propos'd to the popular Aſſembly, except by theſe only,
they ſhould, I think, propoſe nothing but what is for their own ad-
vantage.
Pub. They are the Senat; and in that they have all the advantages
that a well order'd Commonwealth can give to a Serrat.
Val. But they will be ſtill hankering after more.
Pub. As what?
Val. Why Riches or Power.
Pub. All Magiſtrats are accountable to the Popular Aſſembly; and
fo, without acquiſition of Power, I cannot imagin which way they
ſhould turn themſelves to the acquiſition of Riches.
Val. They will drive then at Power ; they will be coordinat.
Pub. In the World there has never yet bin any Senar that durſt fo
much as pretend to Power.
Val. No? Had not the Senat of Iſrael, and that of Lacedemon Power?
Pub. Executive Power they had, in as much as they were Judica-
torys; but Legiſlative or Soverain Power (which is that wherof we
ſpeak) they had none at all.
Val. Other Senats have had other power, as in the managing of
foren Affairs, and the like.
Pub. Which ſtill coms not to the point in hand, becauſe in theſe
and the like matters, as the creation of divers Magiſtrats, the Senat
uſes to be made Plenipotentiary by the Popular Aſſembly, that is, by
Law
1
Vali
Valerilis and Publicola.
485
[O
Val. I hear them talk of inaking a coordinat Senat firſt, and with-
out the People, and then of allembling a Parlament in the old way to
govern with that Senat.
Pub. Things, VALERIUS, are foon ſaid; but if
any Parlament
whatever, ſo it be elected by the People (and, perhaps, if otherwiſe)
do not make it one of their first works to pull down a coordinat Senat,
I ask no credit to my Politics.
Val. This is to propheſy.
Pub. Then, to reaſon the caſe: I ſay, That the Senat aſſuming
Power, the popular Aſſembly falls immediatly to debate; and the
popular Aſſembly debating, the Senat is ipſo facto depos’d, there being
no other neceſſary uſe or function of the Senat but Debate only.
Val. You ſaid but now, That the Popular Aſſembly could not de-
bate.
Pub. Not orderly and maturely: but upon ſuch an occaſion as this,
they will do as they can; nor is it avoidable.
Val. Nay, if there be fom occaſion in which you allow that the
popular Aſſembly muſt and ought to debate, there will hardly be any
in which they will be perſuaded that they may not. So this will com
the pulling down of the Senat as often as the People pleaſe.
Pub which is ſo much the rather to be fear'd, becauſe you ſhall
never find that popular Aſſembly which did ever actually depoſe their
Senat.
Val. Our Army has pull'd down a good many Parlaments.
Pub. What is that to the purpoſe? Is our Army a popular Aſlem:
bly? Yet let them pull down a Parlament as often as they pleaſe, they
muſt ſet up another; and in this indeed there may be for reſem:
blance: for let a popular Aſſembly pull down the Senat as often as they
pleaſe, they muſt ſee
up
another.
Val. Or a ſingle Perſon.
Pub. Right: for that holds both ways too, and (as to our caſe)
will ſtand neither.
Val. The People of Athens debated, yet for all that their Senat was
not depos’d.
Pub. Not formally ; but it remain'd little better than a Warren,
wherin great Men did, as it were, ſtart hares, to be hunted in the
tumult of the popular Aſſembly.
Val. Verily, PUBLICOLA, this Model of yours is a moſt intire
thing.
Pub. This with the neceſſary conſequences, as the diviſion of the
Senat into Senatorian Councils, the adorning and actuating of this and
the other Aſſembly with fit Magiſtrats, wherof I have ſufficiently
diſcours’d in other places, amounts to an intire thing.
Val. And you offer it freely.
Pub. I do.
Val. Would it not grieve you to ſee them crop a little of it, and
ſpoil it ?
Pub. They had better take it to ſom purpoſe.
Val. Nay, what they take will be to ſom purpoſe, I warrant you:
Com, there is a Party, a ſelect, a refin’d Party, a Nation in a Na-
tion, that muſt and will govern.
Pub. That is it which I deſire to fee.
Val. You are of a rare temper ; happy in unhappineſs.
Pub:
IKAT
i
486
Valerius and Publicola.
Or what
Pub. O I love frequent Changes.
Val. Is that
any
of
your Virtues ?
Pub. Yes, where we are certain never to go right, while there re-
mains a way to go wrong.
Vab. They are confident men. They cannot be perſuaded but they
can govern the World.
Pub. Till they have try’d. Such as can govern the World, are ſuch
as can be govern'd by Reaſon. Now there is no Party refin’d, ſelect,
you will in England, amounting to one twentieth part of the
whole People.
Val. One twentieth part of the People, for ought I know, may
amount to a hundred thouſand ; there is no Party any thing near this
account, I dare ſay.
Pub. A twentieth part of the People can never govern the other
nineteen, but by a perpetual Army.
Val. They do not like that the worſe.
Pub. The People having bin govern’d by a King without an Army,
and being govern'd by a Commonwealth with an Army, will deteſt
the Government of a Commonwealth, and deſire that of a King.
Val. Yes, ſuch is the ſpirit of the Nation.
Pub. Such is the ſpirit in this caſe of any Nation.
Val. And yet they make it a particular quarrel.
Pub. They make every thing particular: if you ſpeak of Ifrael,
Athens, Rome, Venice, or the like, they hear you with volubility of
countenance; and will not have it that God ever minded the matter of
Government, till he brought them in play. Nay, tho they have com
lieels over head for this very thing, I know not how often, yet they are
reſolv'd to take no warning.
Val. PUBLICOL A, you will be ſhent.
Pub. I am to perform my duty. To flatter is not my duty,
Vab. But between you and me, Do you not think that the ſpirit of
the Nation, or the main body of the People of this Land, deſires the re-
ftitution of their antient Government?
Pub. I make little doubt of it.
Val. How then in caſe of a Commonwealth are they to be truſted ?
Pub. In caſe of a Commonwealth, it is not the People that are
truſted, but the Orders of the Commonwealth.
Val. The Commonwealth muſt conſiſt of the People.
Pub. The People under the Monarchy, when that invaded them,
invaded it.
Val. True, and in ſuch a manner as has caus'd the ruin of it.
Pub. What was the ſpirit of the People then?
Val. But it is now another thing.
Pub. Nay, the very fame: for then it invaded a Government that
invaded their Liberty, and now it would invade a Government that
invades their Liberty.
Val. But how ſhould this be mended ?
Pub. Do you not ſee that this ſhould not be mended, but in-
courag'd?
Val. How ſhould it be incourag'd then?
Pub. By giving them a Form that muſt preſerve their Liberty.
Val. I' little doubt but there is in your Form a full ſecurity to the
People of their Liberty ; but do you think that there is in it any full
ſecurity
2
Valerius and Publicola.
487
ſecurity that the People ſhall not caſt off this Form?
Pub. If it ſecures their Liberty, why ſhould they?
Val
. My queſtion is not, why they ſhould, but whether they can.
Pub. They cannot, without going againſt their own intereſt.
Val. But they can go againſt their own intereſt.
Pub, Nay, remember your ſelf, whether the Form fhewn be not
ſuch, as you have already granted can in no wiſe go beſide the intereſt
of the whole People.
Val. They that are now in power, have no truſt at all in Forms.
Pub. Do they fail in Ships, not upon Planks? Do they ride Horſes,
not Hogs? Do they travel in Coaches, not upon Hurdles? Do they
live in Houſes, not in Ditches? Do they eat Bread, not Stones?
Val. Enougli
, cnough.
Pub. But in ſo doing, they acknowlege ſuch a Form to be fecurity
for ſuch a uſe or action. And muſt the form of a Commonwealth be
the only form in which they can allow no ſecurity for the
proper uſe
and action?
Val. They obſerve none of this.
Pub. Do they obſerve that there is any ſecurity in Men?
Val. That, eſpecially in our times, were ſomwhat a hard matter.
Pub. And how many Securitys are there?
Val. I know no more, than one perſonal, or in Men; another real,
or in Things.
Pub. Chuſe you whether you would have.
Val. Well, be the neceſſary action or uſe of your Form what it will,
I would ſee it mare plainly and particularly demonſtrated how the
ſpirit of the Nation, or the whole People, being freely eligible into
your Aſſemblys, muſt preſently loſe that inclination which now plain-
ly they have to ſet up Monarchy, or to perſecute for Conſcience.
Pub. You will allow no weight in the Argument, that a People in
Liberty, unleſs the Orders of their Commonwealth were firſt funda-
mentally ruin'd, that is, broken in the balance or foundation, did never
do either of theſe.
Val. What weight ſoever I allow to this Argument, it is no ways to
my preſent purpoſe.
Pub. You will put me then beſide experience, and to ſhew by what
reaſon it is that a Peartree muſt bear Pears, or why men gather not
Grapes on Thorns, or Figs on Thiſtles.
Val. Poor PublICOLA, be the task as hard as it will, I am for
this time reſolv'd to hold you to it.
Pub. What is it then that any Government can be ſufficiently founded
or balanc'd upon, but ſuch an Intereſt as is ſufficiently able to bear it?
Val. Good Sir, a Government ought to be founded upon Juſtice, I
take it.
Pub. Right: and is not that Government which is founded upon an
Intereſt not ſufficiently able to bear it, founded upon Injuſtice?
Val. I ſuſpect whither this will go. A Government founded upon
the overbalance of Property, is legitimatly founded, and ſo upon
Juſtice; but a Government founded upon the underbalance of Pro-
perty, muſt of neceſſity be founded upon Force, or a ſtanding Army.
Is not this that which you mean by Intereſt ſufficient or not fufficient
to ſuſtain a Government?
Pub. You have it right.
Val.
488
Valerius and Publicola.
Val. O Atheiſt! this damns the Government of the Saints.
Pub. Look you now, how irreligious a thing it may be made, to
ſpeak but with common honeſty. Do you think that ſuch as are
plainly Oligarchiſts, or ſhall exerciſe by a force, and without election
by the People, ſuch a Power as is both naturally and declaredly in the
People, and in them only, can eſtabliſh their Throne upon Juſtice ?
Val. No.
Pub. Do you think that ſuch as are truly Saints, can eſtabliſh their
Throne upon Injuſtice ?
Val. No.
Pub. Why then you have granted, that ſuch as are plainly Oligar-
chiſts cannot be truly Saints. Again, do you ſtill think, as you once
intimated, that a Government now introduc'd in England, exactly ac-
cording to the Principles of Prudence and Juſtice, would rule the
Earth?
Val. Yes.
Pub. Do you think, that ſuch as are truly Saints, if they introduce
a Government, ought to introduce it exactly according to the Principles
of Prudence and Juſtice?
Val. Yes,
Pub. Why then, let ſuch as are truly Saints but ſee what it is to rule
the Earth, and take the Rule of the Earth.
Val. They will not approve of this way.
Pub. How! not the Saints approve of Prudence and Juſtice! Who
is the Atheiſt now, VALERIUS?
Val. Good PUBLICOLA, let us keep to the point in hand. You
fay, That the ſecurity of Liberty lys not in the People, but in the
form of their Government; ſo I am yet to expect when you will
ſhew, what there is in your form, why it muſt be impoſſible for the
People under it to reſtore Monarchy, or to perſecute for Conſcience.
Pub. See you not, that to do either of theſe under ſuch a form, muſt
be pointblank againſt their Intereſt?
Val. But fo either of theſe is now, and yet in this poſture you will
confeſs that they would do both.
Pub. Mark how I am us’d. I ſpeak of a Form fupported by an In-
tereſt ſufficiently able to bear it, and of an Intereſt contain d'under a
Form ſufficiently able to ſecure it; and you inſtance in a Poſture which
is no form at all, but ſuch a confuſion among, and force upon the
People, as creates an Intereſt in them to rid themſelves which
way they
can of ſuch a miſery.
Val. I did acknowlege and muſt confeſs, that your popular Aſſem-
bly is ſuch as cannot err, except thro ignorance; but thro this, you
your ſelf have acknowleg’d, and muſt confeſs, that it
Pub. I retract nothing.
Val. Now firſt, or never, they will reſtore Monarchy thro igno-
Pub. But they cannot do this firſt, therfore they can never do it.
Val, Why cannot the popular Aſſembly do this firſt?
Pub. Becauſe it muſt firſt be propos’d by a Senat, that can neither do
any ſuch thing thro ignorance nor thro knowlege.
Val. Nay, then have at you; I will ſet this fame Senat and Re-
preſentative of yours to work in ſuch a manner, that you ſhall confeſs
they may ſet up Monarchy.
Pub.
h
may err.
rance.
Valerius and Publicola.
489
C
6
6
Pub. Do your worſt.
Val. Your Senat being aſſembld (I will not have them make long
Speeches;
Pub. Nor I)
Val. Riſes me up one of the Śenators, and ſays, "Mr. Speaker,
*this Nation has bin long in labor, but now thro the mercy of God,
the Child is not only com to the Birth, but there is alſo ſtrength to
'bring forth: In the number of Counſillors there is ſtrength; the
6 number of this Houſe is good (far better than has uſually bin of late)
and their Election has bin very free and fair. Here is alſo, I know
not how (but the Inventions of men are overruld by the Providence
of God) an extraordinary and exceding great confluence of honeſt
men, who are not ſo well here ; and if you determin any thing that
is good for your Country, will go
go home and pray for you. Now,
Sir (to be brief) ſince our Government conſiſted of King, Lords,
and Commons, the antient, the only, the moſt happy Government
that this Nation, nay, that the World ever knew, it is but too well
'known, that we have had no Government at all : wherfore my o-
* pinion is, that we propoſe, as they call it, to theſe honeſt men (who
you need not doubt will receive it with glad hearts) the reſtitution
of Right, and of the Government in this Nation by King, Lords,
and Commons.
As ſure as you live, PUBLICOL A, thus much being ſaid, your
whole Senat will immediatly agree to propoſe it to the Repreſentative :
and thus much being propos'd to the Repreſentative, thoſe People will
throw
up their Caps for joy, and immediatly return to their Houſes.
Pub. But VALERIUS, thus much has bin ſaid in Parlament when
the Houſe was fuller; when they who were for this Reftitution were
back'd by a ſingle Perſon in actual poſſeſſion of the Throne; when
over and above the zeal of the Presbyterians, there were Partys that
knew no other means of ſelfpreſervation; as without, Divines be-
laboring the Oak of every Pulpit ; and within, Laywers, Officers,
and Penſioners: yet was it ſo far from being carry'd, that the ſingle
Perſon has bin forc'd to diſſolve Parlaments, and that thro apparent
danger of being overrun by the Principles of a Commonwealth not in
being. But if this were ſo when a Commonwealth could ſcarce be
hop'd, what will it be when the Commonwealth ſhall be in ſuch a con-
dition as cannot be withſtood ? for the Senat can never com to propoſe
any thing to the People without firſt agreing upon debating wliat it is
they will propoſe; nor is it poſſible that ſuch Debate ſhould be
brought to any end, but by reaſons therto conducing: now it muſt not
only be impoſſible to find reaſons for the reſtitution of Monarchy, but
the reaſons why Monarchy ought not to be reſtor'd muſt be obvious;
not only in regard that it is quite contrary to the intereſt of the Naá
tion, and of theſe Aſſemblys, but to the intereſt ten to one of
every
particular man in either of theſe Aſſemblys: nor are or have the
reaſons bin leſs obvious, or leſs ventilated in Parlament, why Monar-
chy as to this Nation is impoſſible in it ſelf.
Val. Will you ſay the like for Liberty of Conſcience ?
Pub. Yes ; becauſe without Liberty of Conſcience, Civil Liberty
cannot be perfect; and without Civil Liberty, Liberty of Conſcience
cannot be perfect.
Rre
Val:
490
Valerius and Publicola.
Val. Theſe things are true, but they never will ſee them, never;
PUBLICOLA: you your ſelf ſay, That the People cannot ſee, buc
they can feel.
of any
1
.
Pub. I meant that of the diffuſive Body of the People, not of the
People under good Orders; in which caſe they are the ſharpeſt ſighted
kind of Government whatſoever : and therfore it is not modeſt
that you, or I, or any particular Man or Party, blinded with ſelfcon-
ceit, ſhould pretend to ſee with ſuch a Conſtitution; or ſhew me
that Ey under the Sun, that ſees like that of Venice. But putting the
caſe it were otherwiſe as to ſeeing, theſe things are plainly palpable or
obvious to feeling.
Val. I have indeed obferv'd, that in Commonwealths there are ve-
ry few that feeor underſtand them, and yet their affection to that way
of Government is exceding vigorous.
Pub. Whence can this otherwiſe be than from feeling? But one
thing, VALERIUS, I take at your hands extreme heavily.
Val. What is that, PUBLICOLA?
Pub. That you with one little Speech of a ſingle Senator, ſhould
run ſo regardleſly over theſe two Aſſemblys, without taking any no-
tice at all of the neceſſary Courſe of them.
Val. What Courſe, PuBLICOLA?
Pub. Why you might eaſily have thought that among three hun-
dred Senators there might have bin at leaſt one hundred as good Speak-
ers as yours.
Vál. Have I ſaid any thing to the contrary?
Pub. And do you or I what we can, ten to one of them will be
longer winded than you have allow'd.
Val. For that matter let them pleaſe themſelves.
Pub. Ay, but then
but then you ſhould not have made an end of your Debate
in a minute.
Val. What is all this?
Pub. Why I ſay, They would have bin debating on that point at
leaſt a fortnight.
Val. Well, and when that had bin don, would never have agreed.
Pub. No.
Val. Did not you ſay that before ?
Pub. Well, but I am now upon another point; that was to the mat-
ter in debate, this is to the manner of proceding: imagin the matter
had bin ſuch upon which they could have agreed.
Val. What then ?
Pub. Then ſuch an agreement had bin a Decree of the Senat.
Val. Is a Decree of the Senat binding?
Pub. If it be upon a Law made, it is binding; if upon a Law to
be made, it is to be propos'd to the People. Now every Propoſition
to the People is to be promulgated, that is, printed and publiſh'd to
the whole Nation fix weeks before the time that the Repreſentative is
to aſſemble and give the Vote of the Commonwealth, or that teſt
without which no ſuch Propoſition can be any Law.
Val. By this means it muſt follow, that the whole People both by
Diſcourſe and Letters, debate fix weeks together upon the matter.
Pub. You are right.
Val. How is it then that you ſay, The Repreſentative of the People
muſt not debate? You allow to theſe leſs privilege than to the whole
People.
Pub.
1
*
Valerius and Publicola.
491
Pub. No leſs, nor in this point any more.
Val. Yer dos this amount to Debate in thoſe that are of the Repre-
ſentative.
Pub. You ſay well, but not to any Debate at all in the Repreſen-
tative.
Val. Why this Repreſentative is nothing elſe but an Inſtrument or
Method, wherby, to receive the Reſult of the whole Nation with
order and expedition, and without any manner of tumult or con-
fuſion.
Pub. And is that any thing the worſe?
Val. No; but I am glad you have told it me : for that thoſe of the
Repreſentative would one way or other have Debate, I knew cer-
tainly.
Pub. In ſum, are you ſatisfy'd, that the Spirit of the Nation, or
the People, however they may now under no Form at all, and in de-
teſtation of ſuch as having govern'd them by force, will let them fee
no way out of confuſion, deſire their old Government, as having ne-
ver yet known any other; yet under ſuch a Form as is propos d, can
never go about to introduce Monarchy, without obvious diſcove-
ry, that as to their Intereſt it is quite contrary, and as to it ſelf im-
poffible?
Val. The ſatisfaction is pretty good.
Pub. Pretty good! give me but half ſo good, that the Spirit of the
Army, not formerly obedient to Parlaments, and now dreading or de-
ſpiſing them, muſt apprehend the reſtitution of Monarchy to be quite
contrary to their intereſt.
Val. You ſurprize me: for if the Army will have no Parlament,
and a King reſtor'd can now in England without an Army have no
Government, they may imagin this their only way to Greatneſs and
Continuance.
Pub. Had not the Oligarchy then, if they meant well, better to have
us’d ſober expreſſions, and minded what thoſe true and real Intereſts are
which in the foundation and preſervation of every kind of Government
are paramount, than to have overcaſt them with the miſt of new af.
fected Phraſes, and fallen on conjuring up Spirits ?
Val. You have conjur'd up a Spirit that will keep me waking.
Pub. Set him on pulling down the Law and the Miniſtry; when
that is don, let him blow up Windſor Caſtle, Hampton Court, and
throw Whitehall into the Thames.
Val. It is the only way, for then there can be no King.
Pub. You may be ſure of that, ſeeing the Count of Holland's Do-
main, and his Houſes are yet not only ftanding, but diligently pre
ſerv'd by the Hollanders.
Val. PUBLICOL A, have you any more to tell me?
Pub. VALERIUS, have you any more to ask me ?
Val. Not, except why you have not given the Parlament to under-
ſtand thus much.
Pub. I have printed it over and over.
Val
. They take no great notice of Books; you ſhould have laid it,
as they ſay, in their dilh by ſom direct Addreſs, asa Petition, or ſo.
Pub. I did petition the Committee for Government.
Val. What anſwer did they make you?
Pub. None at all.
Rrr 2
1
d
al.
492
Valerius and Publicola.
Val. I would have gon further, and have preſented it to the Houſe
Pub. Towards this alſo I went as far as I could.
Val. How far was that ?
Pub. Why, I think my Petition may have bin worn out in the
pockets of ſom two or three Members.
Val. Have you a Copy of it about you?
Pub. Let me ſeewrhere are many Papers; this ſame is it.
To the Parlament of the Commonwealth of
England, doc.
The Humble Petition, doc.
T
Sheweth,
HAT what neither is, nor ever was in Nature, can never be in
Nature,
THAT without a King and Lords, no Government either is, or ever
was in Nature (but in mere force) other than by a Senat indu'd with Ava
thority to debate and propoſe ; and by a numerous Aſſembly of the People
wholly and only inveſted with the right of Reſult in all matters of Law-
giving, of making Peace and War, and of levying Men and Mony.
WHERFOR E your Petitioner (to disburden his Conſcience in a mat-
ter of ſuch concern to his Country) moſt humbly and earneſtly prays
and beſeeches this Parlament to take into ſpeedy and ſerious
confideration the irrefragable truth of the Premiſes, and what
therupon muſt aſſuredly follow, that is, either the inſtitution
of a Commonwealth in the whole People of England (without
exception, or with exception for a time, of
, lo fer as may be)
by way of a Senat, and a numerous Aſſembly of the People, to
the ends, and for the reſpective Functions aforeſaid ; or the
inevitable ruin of this Nation, which God of his mercy averf.
And your Petitioner ſhall pray, &c.
Val. I would it had bin deliver'd.
Pub. Look you, if this had bin preſented to the Houſe, I intended
tohave added this other Paper, and to have printed them together.
The Petitioner to the Reader.
I
Reader,
SAT not that the form containd in the Petition (if we had it,
and no mare) would be perfect; but that without thus much (which
rightly introduc’d, introduces the rest) there neither is, was, nor can be
any ſuch thing as a Commonwealth, or Government without á King and
Lords, in Nature,
WHERE
*
Valerius and Publicola.
493
WHERE there is a coordinat Senat, there muſt be a King, or it falls
inſtantly by the People ; as the King failing, the Houſe of Peers féll by
the Commons.
WHERE there is a Senat not elective by the People, there is a per:
petual Feud between the Senat and the People, as in Rome.
TO introduce either of theſe Cauſes, is certainly and inevitably to intro-
duce one of theſe Effects; and if ſo, then who are Cavaliers, I leave you
to judg bereafter.
BUT to add farther reaſon to experience. All Civil Power among us
(not only by declaration of Parlament, but by the nature of Property) is in
and from the People.
WHERE the Power is in the People, there the Senat can legitimatly
be no more to the Popular Aſſembly, than my Counſil at Law is to me,
that is (auxilium, non imperium) a neceſſary Aid, not a Competitor or
Rival in Power.
WHERE the Aids of the People becom their Rivals or Competitors
in Power, there their Shepherds becom Wolves, their Peace Diſcord, and
their Government Ruin. Bnt to impoſe a ſelect or coordinat Senat upon
the People, is to give them Rivals and Competitors in Power.
SOM perhaps (ſuch is the temper of the times) will ſay, That ſo
much human Confidence as is expreſs’d, eſpecially in the Petition, is A-
theiſtical. But hom were it Atheiſtical, if I ſbould as confidently foretele
that a Boy muſt expire in Nonage, or becom a Man? I propheſy no other-
wiſe ; and this kind of Propheſy is alſo of God, by thoſe Rules of his Pro-
vidence, which in the known Government of the World are infallible.
In the right obſervation and application of theſe conſiſts all human Wif-
doim ; and we read that a poor man deliver'd a City by his Wiſdom, Ecclef. 9. 14
yet was this poor man forgotten. But if the Premiſes of this Petition
fail, or one part of the Concluſion coms not to paſs accordingly, let me hit
the other mark of this ambitious Addreſs, and remain a Fool upon Record
in Parlament to all Poſterity.
Val. Thou Boy! and yet I hope well of thy Reputation.
Pub. Would it were but as good now, as it will be when I cari
make po uſe of it.
Val. The Major of the Petition is in ſom other of your Writings :
and I remember fom Objections which have bin made againſt it : Asa
that à non eſſe nec fuiſſe, non datur argumentum ad non poſſe.
Pub. Say that in Engliſh.
Val. What if I cannot ? are not you bound to anſwer a thing, thio
it cannot be ſaid in Engliſh?
Pub. No truly
Val. Well, I will ſay it in Engliſh then. Tho there neither be any
Houſe of Gold, nor ever were any Houſe of Gold, yet there
a Houſe of Gold.
Pub. Right: but then, à non eſſe nec fuiſſe in natura, datur argu-
mentum ad non pofle in natura.
Val. I hope you can ſay this in Engliſh too.
Pub. That I can, now you have taught me. If there were no
ſuch thing as Gold in nature, there never could be any Houſe of
Gold.
é
may be
Vale
494
Valerius and Publicola.
Vål. Softly. The frame of a Government is as much in Art, and as
little in Nature, as the frame of a Houſe.
Pub. Both ſoftly and ſurely. The Materials of a Government are as
much in Nature, and as little in Art, as the Materials of a Houſe.
Now as far as Art is neceſſarily diſpos’d by the nature of its Foundation
or Materials, ſo far it is in Art as in Nature.
Val. What call you the Foundation, or the Materials of Govern-
ment?
Pub. That which I have long ſince prov'd, and you granted, The
Balance, the diſtribution of Property, and the Power thence natural-
ly deriving; which as it is in one, in a few or in all, dos neceſſa-
rily diſpoſe of the form or frame of the Government accordingly.
Val. Be the Foundation or Materials of a Houſe what they will,
the Frame or Superſtructures may be diverſly wrought up or ſhapen ;
and fo may thoſe of a Commonwealth.
Pub. True: but ler a Houſe be never fo diverſly wrought up or
ſhapen, it muſt conſiſt of a Roof and Walls.
Vali That's certain.
Pub. And ſo muſt a Commonwealth of a Senat and of a Popular
Aſſembly, which is the ſum of the Minor in the Petition.
Val. The Mathematicians ſay, They will not be quarrelſom; but
in their Sphere there are things altogether new in the World, as the
preſent poſture of the Heavens is, and as was the Star in Caffiopæia.
Pub. VALERIUs, if the Major of the Petition extends as far as
is warranted by SOLOMON, I mean, that there is nothing new under
the Sun, what new things there may be, or have bin above the Sun,
will make little to the preſent purpoſe.
Val. It is true ; but if you have no more to ſay, they will take this
but for ſhifting
Pub. Where there is Sea, as between Sicily and Naples, there was
antiently Land; and where there is Land, asin Holland, there was an-
tiently Sea.
Val. What then?
Pub. Why then the preſent poſture of the Earth is other than it
has bin, yet is the Earth no new thing, but conſiſts of Land and Sea,
as it did always; ſo whatever the preſent poſture of the Heavens be,
they conſiſt of Star and Firmament, as they did always.
Val
. What will you ſay then to the Star in Caſſiopæia ?
Pub. Why I ſay, if it conſiſted of the fame matter with other
Stars, it was no new thing in nature, but a new thing in Caſſiopæia ;
as were there a Commonwealth in England, it would be no new thing
in Nature, but a new thing in England.
Val. The Star you will ſay in Caſſiopæia,to have bin a new thing in na-
ture, muſt have bin no Star, becauſe a Star is not a new thing in nature.
Pub. Very good.
Val. You run upon the matter, but the newneſs in the Star was in
the
manner of the generation.
Pub. At Putzuoli near Naples, I have ſeen a Mountain that roſe
up from under water in one night, and pour'd a good part of the Lake
anciently calld Lucrin into the Sea.
Val. What will you infer from hence ?
Pub. Why that the new and extraordinary generation of a Star,
or of a Mountain, no more cauſes a Star, or a Mountain to be a new
thing
H
*
Valerius and Publicola.
495
thing in nature, than the new and extraordinary generation of a
Commonwealth cauſes a Commonwealth to be a new thing in nature.
ARISTOTLE reports, that the Nobility of Tarantum being cut off
in a Battel, that Commonwealth became popular. And if the Pouder
Plot in England had deſtroy'd the King and the Nobility, it is poſſible
that Popular Government might have riſen up in England, as the
Mountain did at Putzuoli
. Yet for all theſe, would there not have
bin any new thing in nature.
Val. Som new thing (thro the blending of unſeen cauſes) there
may ſeem to be in ſhuffling; but Nature will have her courſe, there
is no other than the old game.
Pub. VALERIUS, let it rain or be fair weather, the Sun to the
diſſolution of Nature ſhall ever riſe; but it is now ſet, and I
appre-
hend the miſt.
Val. Dear PUBLICOLA, your Health is my own; I bid you
goodnight.
Pub. Goodnight to you, VALERIU S.
Val. One word more, PUBLICOLA : Pray make me a preſent of
thoſe fame Papers, and with your leave and licenſe, I will make uſe
of my Memory to commit the reſt of this Diſcourſe to writing, and
print it.
Pub. They are at your diſpoſing.
Val. I will not do it as has bin don, but with your name to it.
Pub. Whether way you like beſt, moſt noble VALERIUS.
otob. 22.
1659.
}
1
A
496
Chap. I.
A
1
Syſtem of Politics
Delineated in ſhort and eaſy
APHORISMS
Publiſh'd from the Author's own Manuſcript.
CH A P. I.
Of GOVERNMENT.
"A
Í.
PEOPLE is either under a ſtate of Civil Government,
or in a ſtate of Civil War; or neither under a ſtate of
Civil Government, nor in a ſtate of Civil War.
2. CIVIL Government is an Art wherby a Peo-
ple rule themſelves, or are ruld by others.
3. THE Art of Civil Government in general is twofold, Na-
tional, or Provincial.
4. NATIONAL Government is that by which a Nation is
go-
vern’d independently, or within it ſelf.
5. PROVINCIAL Government is that by which a Province
is govern’d dependently, or by ſom foren Prince or State.
6. A PEOPLE is neither govern'd by themſelves, nor by others,
but by reaſon of ſom external Principle therto forcing them.
7. FORCE is of two kinds, Natural and Unnarural.
8. NATURAL Force conſiſts in the vigor of Principles, and
their natural neceſſary Operations.
9. UNNATURAL Force is an external or adventitious oppo-
ſition to the vigor of Principles, and their neceſſary working, which,
from a violation of Nature, is calld Violence.
10. NATIONAL Government is an effect of natural Force, or
Vigor.
11. PROVINCIAL Government is an effe&t of unnatural
Force, or Violence.
12. THE natural Force which works or produces National Go:
vernment (of which only I ſhall ſpeak hereafter) conſiſts in Riches.
13. THE Man that cannot live upon his own, muſt be a Servant;
but he that can live upon his own, may be a Freeman.
14. WHERE a People cannot live upon their own, the Govern-
ment is either Monarchy, or Ariſtocracy : where a People can live
upon
1
*
A Syſtèmi of Politics.
497
upon their own, the Government may be Democracy.
Chap. II.
PSA MAN that could live upon his own, may yet, to ſpare his
own, and live upon another, be a Servant: but a People that can live
upon their own, cannot ſpare their own, and live upon another; but
except they be no Servants, that is, except they com to a Democracy)
they muſt waft their own by maintaining their Maſters, or by having
others to live upon them.
16. WHERE a People that can live upon their own, imagin that
they can be govern'd by others, and not liv?d upon by ſuch Governors,
it is not the Genius of the People, it is the Miſtake of the People.
17.
WHERE a People that can live upon their own, will not be
govern'd by others left they be liv'd upon by others, it is not the
Miſtake of the People, it is the Genius of the People.
18. O F Government there are three Principles; Matter, Priva-
tion, and Form.
CHA P. II,
1
Of the Matter of Government.
I.
TH
HAT which is the Matter of Government, is what we call
an Eſtate, be it in Lands, Goods, or Mony.
2. If the Eſtate be more in Mony than in Land, the port or garb
of the Owner gos more upon his Monys than his Lands; which with
privat Men is ordinary, but with Nations (except ſuch only as live
more upon their Trade than upon their Territory) is not to be found :
for which cauſe overbalance of Riches in Mony or Goods, as to the
fequel of theſe Aphoriſms, is altogether omitted.
3. If the Eſtare be more in Land than in Goods or Mony, the
garb and port of the Owner (whether a Man or a Nation) gos morc
if not altogether upon his Land.
4. If a Man lias ſom Eſtate, he may have ſom Servants or a Fa-
mily, and conſequently fom Government, or ſomthing to govern: if
he has no Eſtate, he can have no Government.
5. WHERE the eldeſt of many Brothers has all, or ſo much
that the reſt for their livelihood ſtand in need of bim, that Brother is
as it were Prince in that Family.
6. WHERE of many Brothers the eldeſt has but an equal ſhare,
or not ſo inequal as to make the reſt to ſtand in need of him for their
livelihood, tliat Family is as it were a Commonwealth.
7. DISTRIBUTION of ſhares in Land, as to the three grand
Intereſts, the King, the Nobility, and the People, muſt be equal or
inequal.
8. EQUAL diſtribution of Land, as if one man or a few men
have one half of the Territory, and the People have the other half,
cauſes privation of Government, and a Itate of Civil War: for the
Lord or Lords on the one ſide being able to aſſert their pretenſion or
right to rule, and the People on the other their pretenſion or right
to Liberty, that Nation can never com under any form of Govern-
ment till that Queſtion be decided; and, Property being not by any.
Law to be violated or mov'd, any ſuch Queſtion cannot be decided
but by the Sword only.
SIS
9. İN.
1
498
A Syſtem of Politics.
Chap. III.
9. INEQUAL diſtribution of ſhares in Land, as to the three
vgrand Intereſts, or the whole Land in any one of theſe, is that which
cauſes one of theſe three to be the predominant Intereſt.
10. ALL Government is Intereſt, and the predominant Intereſt
gives the Matter or Foundation of the Government.
11. IF one man has the whole, or two parts in three of the whole
Land or Territory, the Intereſt of one man is the predominant Inte-
reſt, and cauſes abſolute Monarchy.
12. If a few men have the whole, or two parts in three of the
whole Land or Territory, the Intereſt of the few or of the Nobility
is the predominant Intereſt; and, were there any ſuch thing in na-
ture, would cauſe a pure Ariſtocracy.
13. IT being ſo that pure Ariſtocracy, or the Nobility having the
whole, or two parts in three of the whole Land or Territory, with-
out a Moderator or Prince to balance them, is a ſtate of War, in which
every one, as he grows eminent or potent, aſpires to Monarchy; and
that not any Nobility can have Peace, or can reign without having
ſuch a Moderator or Prince, as on the one ſide they may balance or
hold in from being abſolute, and on the other ſide may balance or
hold them and their Factions from flying out into Arms: it follows,
that if a few men have the whole, or two parts in three of the whole
Land or Territory, the Intereſt of the Nobility being the predomi-
nant Intereſt, muſt of neceſſity produce regulated Monarchy.
14. IF the Many, or the People, have the whole, or two parts
in three of the whole Land or Territory, the Intereſt of the Many or
of the People is the predominant Intereſt, and cauſes Democracy.
15. A PEOPLE neither under abſolute or under regulated
Monarchy, nor yet under Democracy, are under a privation of Go-
vernment.
CHA P. III.
Of the Privation of Government.
+
1.
WH
HERE a People are not in a ſtate of Civil Government,
but in a ſtate of Civil War; or where a People are neither
under a ſtate of Civil Government, nor under a ſtate of Civil War,
there the People are under Privation of Government.
2. WHERE one Man, not having the whole, or two parts in
three of the whole Land or Territory, yet aſſumes to himſelf the
whole Power; there the People are under Privation of Government,
and this Privation is call'd Tyranny.
3. WHERE a few Men, not having the whole, or about two
parts in three of the whole Land or 'Territory, yet aſſume to them
ſelves the whole Power; there the People are under Privation of Go-
vernment, and this Privation is call's Oligarchy.
4. WHERE the Many, or the People, not having the whole, or
two parts in three of the whole Land or Territory, yet aſſume to
themſelves the whole Power; there the People are under Privation of
Government, and this Privation is call'd Anarchy.
5. WHERE the Tyranny, the Oligarchy, or the Anarchy, not
having in the Land or Territory ſuch a full ſhare as may amount to
the
A Syſtem of Politics
499
.
the truth of Government, have nevertheleſs ſuch a ſhare in it as may Chap. IV.
maintain an Army; there the People are under privation of Govern-
inent, and this Privation is a ſtate of Civil War.
6. WHERE the Tyranny, the Oligarchy, or the Anarchy, have
not any ſuch ſhare in the Land or Territory as may maintain an Ar-
my, there the People are in privation of Government; which Priva-
tion is neither a ſtate of Civil Government, nor a ſtate of Civil War.
7. WHERE the People are neither in a ſtate of Civil Gorern-
ment, nor in a ſtate of Civil War, there the Tyranny, the Oligarchy, or
the Anarchy, cannot ſtand by any force of Nature, becauſe it is void of
any natural Foundation; nor by any force of Arms, becauſe it is not
able to maintain an Army; and ſo muſt fall away of it ſelf thro the
want of a Foundation, or be blown up by ſom tumult: and in this
kind of Privation the Matter or Foundation of a good orderly Govern-
ment is ready and in being, and there wants nothing to the perfection
of the ſame, but proper Superſtructures or Form.
!
CHAP. IV.
Of the Form of Government.
I.
T
HAT which gives the being, the action, and the deno:
mination to a Creature or Thing, is the form of that
Creature or Thing.
2. THERE is in Form ſomthing that is not Elementary but Di-
vine.
3. THE contemplation of Form is aſtoniſhing to Man, and has a
kind of trouble or impulſe accompanying it, that exalts his Soul to
God.
4. AS the Form of a Man is che Image of God, ſo the Form of a
Government is the Image of Man.
5. MAN is both a ſenſual and a philoſophical Creature.
6. SENSUALITY in a Man is when he is led only as are the
Beaſts, that is, no otherwiſe than by Appetit.
PHILOSOPHY is the knowlege of Divine and Humani
7.
Things.
8. T O preſerve and defend himſelf againſt Violence, is natural to
Man as he is a ſenſual Creature.
9. TO have an impulſe, or to be rais'd upon contemplation of
natural things to the Adoration or Worſhip of God, is natural to
Man as he is a Philoſophical Creature.
10. FORMATION of Government is the creation of a Po-
litical Creature after the Image of a Philoſophical. Creature; or it is
an infuſion of the Soul or Facultys of a Man into the body of a Mul-
titude.
11. THE more the Soul or Facultys of a Man (in the manner
of their being infus'd into the body of a Multitude) are refin’d or
made incapable of Paſſion, the more perfe&t is the Form of Govern-
12. NOT the refin'd Spirit of a Man, or of ſom Men, is a good
Form of Government; but a good Form of Government is the refin'd
Spirit of a Nation.
Sff 2
ment.
13. THE
500
A Syſtem of Politics.
Chap. IV.
14.
.
13. THE Spirit of a Nation (whether refind or not refin'd) can
neither be wholly Saint nor Atheiſt: Not Saint, becauſe the far
great-
er part of the People is never able in matters of Religion to be their
own Leaders; nor Atheiſts, becauſe Religion is every whit as inde-
lible a Character in man's Nature as Reaſon.
LANGUAGE is not a more natural intercourſe between
the Soul of one man and another, than Religion is between God and
the Soul of a man.
15. AS not this Language, nor that Language, but ſom Language;
ſo not this Religion, nor that Religion, yet ſom Religion is natural to
every Nation.
16. THE Soul of Government, as the true and perfect Image of
the Soul of Man, is every whit as neceſſarily religiousas rational.
17. THE Body of a Government, as conſiſting of the ſenſual part
of Man, is every whit as preſervative and defenſive of it ſelf as ſenſual
Creatures are of themfelves.
18. THE Body of a Man, not actuated or led by the Soul, is a
dead thing out of pain and miſery; but the Body of a People, not
actuated or led by the Soul of Government, is a living thing in pain
and miſery
19. THE Body of a People, not led by the reaſon of the Go-
vernment, is not a People, but a Herd; not led by the Religion of the
Government, is at an inquiet and an uncomfortable loſs in it ſelf; noc
diſciplin’d by the conduct of the Government, is not an Army for de-
fence of it felf, but a Rout; not directed by the Laws of the Govern-
ment, las not any rule of right; and without recourſe to the Juſtice
or Judicatorys of the Government, has no remedy of wrongs.
20. IN contemplation of, and in conformity to the Soul of man, as
alſo for ſupply of thoſe his Neceſſitys which are not otherwiſe ſupply'd,
or to be ſupply'd by Nature, Form of Government conſiſts neceſſarily
of theſe five parts: The Civil, which is the Reaſon of the People';
the Religious, which is the Comfort of the People; the Military,
which is the Captain of the People ; the Laws, which are the Rights
of the People; and the Judicatorys, which are the Avengers of their
Wrongs.
21. THE parts of Form in Government are as the Offices in a
Houſe; and the Orders of a Form of Government are as the Orders of
a Houſe or Family.
22. GOOD Orders make evil men good, and bad Orders make
good menevil.
23. OLIGARCHISTS (to the end they may keep all others
out of the Government) pretending themſelves to be Saints, do alſo
pretend that they in whom Luſt reigns, are not fit for Reign or for
Government. But Libido dominandi, the Luſt of Government, is the
greateſt Luſt, which alſo reigns moſt in thoſe that have leaft right, as
in Oligarchiſts: for many a King and many a People have and had un-
queſtionable Right, but an Oligarchiſt never ; whence from their own
argument, the Luft of Government reigning moſt in Oligarchiſts, it
undeniably follows that Oligarchiſts of all men are leaſt fit for Govern-
24. AS in Houſes not differing in the kinds of their offices, the
Orders of the Familys differ much; ſo the difference of Form in dif-
ferent Governments conſiſts not in the kinds or number of the Parts,
which
ment.
-
A Syſtem of Politics.
501
vihich in every one is alike, but in the different ways of ordering Chap. V.
hoſe parts. And as the different Orders of a Houſe ariſe for the molti
part from the quantity and quality of the Eſtate by which it is de-
fray'd or maintain’d, according as it is in one or more of the Family as
Proprietors, ſo is it alſo in a Government.
25. THE Orders of the Form, which are the manners of the mind
of the Government, follow the temperament of the Body, or the di-
ſtribution of the Lands or Territorys, and the Intereſts thence ari-
ſing.
26. THE Intereſt of Arbitrary Monarchy is the abſoluteneſs of
the Monarch; the Intereſt of Regulated Monarchy is the greatneſs
of the Nobility ; the Intereſt of Democracy is the felicity of the Peo-
ple: for in Democracy the Government is for the uſe of the People,
and in Monarchy the People are for the uſe of the Government, that is,
of one Lord or more.
27.
THE uſe of a Horſe without his Provender, or of the Peo:
ple without fom regard had to the neceſſitys of Human Nature, can
be none at all : nor are thoſe neceſſitys of Nature in any form what:
ſoever to be otherwiſe provided for than by thoſe five parts already
mention'd; for which cauſe every Government conſiſts of five parts:
the Civil, the Religious, the Military, the Laws, and the Judicatorys:
CHAP. V.
1
Of Forn in the Civil part.
1.
T
HOSE Naturaliſts that have beſt written of Generationi,
do obſerve that all things procede from an Eg, and that there
is in every Eg a Punkt um ſaliens, or a part firſt movd, as the purple
Speck obſervd in thoſe of Hens; from the working wherof the other
Organs or fit Members are delineated, diſtinguiſh'd, and wrought into
one Organical Body
2. Å NATION without Goveroment, or fallen into privation
of Form, is like an Eg unhatch'd; and the Panctum (aliens, or first
mover from the corruption of the Former to the generation of the
ſucceding Form, is either a ſole Legiſlator or a Council.
3. A SOLÉ Legiſlator, proceding according to Art of Knowa
lege, produces Government in the whole piece at once and in perfection:
But a Council (proceding not according to Art, or what in a new
caſe is neceſſary or fit for them, but according to that which they call
the Genius of the People ſtill hankering after the things they have bin
us’d to, or their old Cuſtoms, how plain foever it be made in reaſon
that they can no longer fit them) make patching work, and are Ages
about that which is very feldom or never brought by them to any per-
fe&tion ; but commonly coms by the way to ruin, leaving the nobleſt
Attemts under reproach, and the Authors of them expos’d to the
greateſt miſerys while they live, if not their Memorys when they are
dead and gon' to the greateſt infámy.
4. If the Punctum ſaliens, or firſt mover in generation of the
Form be a ſole Legiſlator, his proceding is not only according to Na
ture, but according to Art alſo, and begins with the Delineation of
diſtinct Orders or Member's.
5. DE
502
A Syſtem of Politics.
Cliap. V. Š. DELINEATION of diſtinct Organs or Members (as to
wrw the Form of Government) is a diviſion of the Territory into fit Pre-
cincts once ſtated for all, and a formation of them to their
proper
Offices and Functions, according to the nature or truth of the Form to
be introduc'd.
6. PRECINCTS in abſolute Monarchy are commonly calld
Provinces; and as to the delineation or ſtating of them, they may be
equal or inequal. Precincts in regulated Monarchy, where the
Lords or Nobility as to their Titles or Eſtates ought not to be equal,
but to differ as one Star differs from another in Glory, are commonly
calld Countys, and ought to be inequal. Precincts in Democracy,
where without equality in the Electors there will hardly be any e-
quality in the Elected ; or where without equality in the Precincts,
it is almoſt, if not altogether impoſſible there ſhould be equality in
the Commonwealth, are properly call’d Tribes, and ought by all
means to be equal.
7. EQUALITY or Parity has bin repreſented an odious thing,
and made to imply the levelling of mens Eſtates; but if a Nobility,
how inequal ſoever in their Eſtates or Titles, yet to com to the trutlı
of Ariſtocracy, muſt as to their Votes or participation in the Govern-
ment be pares regni, that is to ſay Peers, or in parity among them-
ſelves : as well likewiſe the People, to attain to the truth of Demio-
cracy, may be Peers, or in parity among themſelves, and yet not as
to their Eftates be oblig'd to levelling.
8. INDUSTRY of all things is the moſt accumulative, and
Accumulation of all things hates levelling : The Revenue therfore of
the People being the Revenue of Induſtry, tho ſom Nobility (as that
of Ifrael, or that of Lacedemon) may be found to have bin Levellers,
yet not any People in the World.
9: PRECINCTS being ſtated, are in the next place to be form’d
to their proper Offices and Functions, according to the truth of the
Form to be introduc'd; which in general is to form them as it were into
diſtinct Governments, and to indow them with diſtinct Governors.
10. GOVERNMENTS or Governors are either Supreme or
Subordinat. For abſolute Monarchy to admit in its Precincts any Go-
vernment or Governors that are not ſubordinat but ſupreme, were a
plain contradiction. But that regulated Monarchy, and that Demo-
cracy may do it, is ſeen in the Princes of Germany, and in the Cantons
of Switzerland : Nevertheleſs theſe being Governments that have de-
riv'd this not from the Wiſdom of any Legiſlator, but from accident,
and an ill diſpoſition of the matter, wherby they are not only incapable
of Greatneſs, but even of any perfect ſtate of Health, tlicy com not
under the conſideration of Art, from which they derive not; but of
Chance, to wbich we leave them. And, to ſpeak accordiog to Art,
we pronounce that, as well in Democracy and in regulated as in abſoluté
Monarchy, Governors and Governments in the ſeveral diviſions ought
not to be Soveraintys, but ſubordinat to one common Soverain.
11. SUBORDINAT Governors are at will, or for life, or upon
Rotation or Changes.
12. I N abſolute Monarchy the Governors of Provinces muſt ei-
ther be at will, or upon Rotation, or elſe the Monarch cannot be
abſolute. In regulated Monarchy the Governors of the Countys may
be for life or hereditary, as in Counts or Lords ; or for fom certain
term
A Syſtem of Politics
503
term and upon rotation, as in Viſcounts or Sherifs
. In Democracy Chap. V.
the People are Servants to their Governors for life, and ſo cannot be u V
free; or the Governors of the Tribes muſt be upon rotation and for
ſom certain term, excluding the Party that have born the Magiſtracy
for that term from being elected into the like again, till an equal In-
terval or Vacation be expir’d.
13. THE term in which a man may adminiſter Government to
the good of it, and not attemt upon it to the harm of it, is the fitteſt
term of bearing Magiſtracy; and three years in a Magiſtracy deſcrib'd
by the Law under which a man has liv'd, and which he has known
by the carriage or practice of it in others, is a term in which he can-
not attemt upon his Government for the hurt of it, but may adminiſter
it for the good of it, tho ſuch a Magiſtracy or Government ſhould con-
fift of divers Functions.
14. GOVERNORS in ſubordinat Precincts have common-
ly three Functions; the one Civil, the other Judicial, and the third
Military.
15. Í N abſolute Monarchy the Government of a Province conſiſts
of one Beglerbeg, or Governor for three years, with his Council or
Divan for Civil matters, and his Guard of Janizarys and Spahys, that
is, of Horſe and Foot, with power to levy and command the Tima-
riots or Military Farmers.
16. IN regulated Monarchy the Government of a County con-
ſiſts of one Count or Lord for Life, or of one Viſcount or Sherif for
fom limited term, with power in certain Civil and Judicial matters,
and to levy and command the Poſſe Comitatus.
17. IN Democracy the Government of a Tribe conſiſts of one
Council or Court, in one third part elected annually by the People of
that Tribe for the Civil, for the Judicial, and for the Military Govern-
ment of the ſame; as alſo to preſide at the Election of Deputys in that
Tribe towards the annual ſupply in one third part of the common and
ſoverain Aſſemblys of the whole Commonwealth, that is to ſay, of
the Senat and of the Popular Aſſembly; in which two theſe Tribes,
thus delineated and diſtinguiſh'd into proper Organs or fit Members to
be actuated by thoſe foverain Aſſemblys, are wrought up again by
connexion into one intire and organical Body.
18. A PARLAMENT of Pliyſicians would never have found
out the Circulation of the Blood, nor could a Parlament of Poets have
written VIRGIL's Æneis; of this kind therfore in the formation of
Government is the proceding of a ſole Legiſlator. But if the People
without a Legiſlator fet upon ſuch work by a certain Inſtinct that is in
them, they never go further than to chuſe a Council; not conſidering
that the formation of Government is as well a work of Invention as
of Judgment; and that a Council, tho in matters laid before them
they may excel in Judgment, yet Invention is as contrary to the nature
of a Council as it is to Muſicians in confort, who can play and judg
of any Ayr that is laid before them, tho to invent a part of Muſic they
can never well agree.
19. IN Councils there are three ways of Reſult, and every way
of Reſult makes a different Form. A Council with the Reſult in the
Prince makes abſolute Monarchy. A Council with the Reſult in tlie
Nobility, or where without the Nobility there can be no Reſult,
makes Ariſtocracy, or regulated Monarchý. A Council with the Re-
ſule
504
A Syſtem of Politics.
Chap. V. ſult in the People makes Democracy. There is a fourth kind of Re-
fult or Council which amounts not to any Form, but to Privation of
Government; that is; a Council not conſiſting of a Nobility, and yet
with the Reſult in it ſelf, which is rank Oligarchy: ſo the People, ſel-
dom or never going any further than to elect a Council without
any
Reſult but it ſelf, inſtead of Democracy introduce Oligarchy.
20. THE ultimat Reſult in every Form is the Soverain Power.
If the ultimat Reſult be wholly and only in the Monarch, that Mo-
narchy is abſolute. If the ultimat Reſult be not wholly and only in the
Monarch, that Monarchy is regulated. If the Reſult be wholly and
only in the People, the People are in Liberty, or the Form of the Go-
vernment is Democracy.
21. IT may happen that a Monarchy founded upon Ariſtocracy,
and ſo as to the Foundation regulated, may yet com by certain Ex-
pedients or Intruſions (as at this day in France and in Spain) as to the
Adminiſtration of it to appear or to be call’d abſolute; of which I ſhall
treat more at large when I com to ſpeak of Reaſon of State, or of Ad-
miniſtration.
22. THE ultimat Reſult in the whole body of the People, if the
Commonwealth be of any conſiderable extent, is altogether impracti-
cable; and if the ultimat Reſult be but in a part of the People, the
reſt are not in Liberty, nor is the Government Democracy.
23. A S a whole Army cannot charge at one and the ſame time, yet
is ſo order'd that every one in his turn coms up to give the Charge of
the whole Army; ſo tho the whole People cannot give the Reſult at
one and the ſame time, yer may they be ſo order'd that every one in
his turn may com up to give the Reſult of the whole People.
24. A POPULAR Aſſembly, rightly order'd, brings up every
one in his turn to give the Reſult of the whole People.
25. If the popular Aſſembly conſiſts of one thouſand or more,
annually changeable in one third part by new Elections made in the
Tribes by the People, it is rightly order'd; that is to ſay, fo conſti-
tuted that ſuch an Aſſembly can have no other Intereſt wherupon to
give the Reſult, than that only which is the Intereſt of the whole
People.
26. BUT in vain is Reſult where there is not Matter to reſolve
upon ; and where maturity of Debate has not preceded, there is not
yet Matter to reſolve upon.
27. DEBATE to be mature cannot be manag’d by a Multitude;
and 'Reſult to be popular cannot be given by a Few.
28. IF a Council capable of Debate has alſo the Reſult, it is Oli-
garchy. If an Aſſembly capable of the Reſult has Debate alſo, it is
Anarchy. Debate in a Council not capable of Reſult, and Reſult in
an Aſſembly not capable of Debate, is Democracy.
29. IT'is not more natural to a People in their own affairs to be
their own chufers, than upon that occaſion to be provided of their
Learned Counſil; in ſo much that the ſaying of Pacuvius, That
either a People is govern’d by a King or counſild by a Senat, is univer-
fally approv'd.
30. WHERE the Senat has no diſtinct Intereſt, there the People
are counſillable, and venture not upon Debate: where the Senat has
any diſtinct Intereſt, there the People are not counſillable, but fall
into Debate among themſelves, and ſo into Confuſion.
31. OF
M
505
A Syſtem of Politics.
.
ži. O F Senats there are three kinds: Firſt, A Senát eligible out of Chap. VI.
the Nobility only, as that of Rome, which will not be contented to be
merely the Council of the People, but will be contending that they
are Lords of the People, never quitting their pretenſions till they have
ruin'd the Commonwealth. Secondly, A Senat elected for life, as
that of Sparta, which will be a ſpecies of Nobility, and will have a
kind of Spartan King, and a Senat upon rotation; which being right-
ly conſtituted is quier, and never pretends more than to be the learned
Council of the People.
32. THIRDLY, Three hundred Senators, for example, change-
able in one third part of them annually by new Elections in the
Tribes, and conſtituted a Senat to debate upon all Civil matters, to
promulgat to the whole Nation what they have debated, this Promul-
gation to be made fom ſuch convenient time before the Matters by
them debated are to be propos’d, that they may be commonly known
and well underſtood, and then to propoſe the fame to the Reſult of
the Popular Aſſembly, which only is to be the Teſt of every public
Act, is a Senat rightly order'd.
FORM of Government ( as to the Civil part ) being thus completed
is ſum'd up in the three following Aphoriſms.
+
33. ABSOLUTE Monarchy (for the Civil part of the Form)
conlífts of diſtinct Provinces under diſtinct Governors, equally ſub-
ordinat to a Grand Signor or ſole Lord, with his Council or Divan de
bating and propoſing, and the Reſult wholly and only in himſelf.
34. REGULATED Monarchy (for the Civil part of the
Form) conſiſts of diſtinct Principalitys or Countys under diſtinct
Lords or Governors, which if rightly conſtituted are equally ſubordi-
nat to the King and his Peerage, or to the King and his Éſtates aſ-
fembld in Parlament, without whoſe Conſent the King can do now
thing.
35. DEMOCRACY (for the Civil part of the Form) if
rightly conſtituted, conſiſts of diſtinct Tribes under the Government
of diſtinct Magiſtrats, Courts, or Councils, regularly changeable in one
third part upon annual Elections, and ſubordinat to a Senat conſiſting
of not above three hundred Senators, and to a popular Aſſembly con
fiſting of not under a thouſand Deputys; each of theſe alſo regular-
ly changeable in one third part upon annual Elections in the Tribes,
the Senat having the Debate, and the Popular Aſſembly the Reſult of
the whole Commonwealth.
+
CH A P VI. .
Of Form in the Religious parts
1.
F
ORM for the Religious part either admits of Liberty of
Conſcience in the whole or in part; or dos not admit of Li-
berty of Conſcience at all.
2. LIBERTY of Conſcience intire, or in the whole, is where
a man according to the dietats of his own Conſcience may have the
Tot
free
7
506
+
A Syſtem of Politics.
4.
Chap. VI. free exerciſe of his Religion, without impediment to his Preferment
or Imployment in the State.
3. LIBERTY of Conſcience in part is, where a man according
to the dietats of his Conſcience may have the free exerciſe of his Re-
ligion ; but if it be not the National Religion, he is therby incapable of
Preferment or Imployment in the State.
WHERE the Form admits not of the free exerciſe of
any
other Religion except that only which is National, there is no Liberty
of Conſcience.
5. MEN who have the means to aſſert Liberty, of Conſcience,
have the means to aſſert Civil Liberty; and will do it if they are op-
preſt in their Conſciences.
6. MEN participating in Property, or in Imployment Civil or
Military, have the means to aſſert Liberty of Conſcience.
7. ABSOLUTE Monarchy, being ſole "Proprietor, may admit
of Liberty of Conſcience to ſuch as are not capable of Civil or Milita-
ry Imployment, and yet not admit of the means to aſſert Civil Liber-
ty; as the Greec Chriſtians under the Turk, who, tho they injoy Li-
berty of Conſcience, cannot aſſert Civil Liberty, becauſe they have
neither Property nor any Civil or Military Imployments.
8. REĠU'LATED Monarchy, being not fole Proprietor, may
not admit naturally of Liberty of Conſcience, left it admits of the
means to aſſert Civil Liberty, as was lately ſeen in England by pulling
down the Biſhops, who, for the moſt part, are one half of the
Foundation of regulated Monarchy.
9. DEMOCRACY being nothing but intire Liberty; and
Liberty of Conſcience without Civil Liberty, or Civil Liberty without
Liberty of Conſcience being but Liberty by halves, muſt admit of
Liberty of Conſcience both as to the perfection of its preſent being,
and as to its future ſecurity : As to the perfection of its preſent be-
ing, for the Reaſons already ſhewn, or that ſhe do not injoy Liberty
by halves; and for future ſecurity, becauſe this excludes abſolute Mo-
narchy, which cannot ſtand with Liberty of Conſcience in the whole,
and regulated Monarchy, which cannot ſtand ſafely with it in
any
part.
10. If it be faid that in France there is Liberty of Conſcience in
part, it is alſo plain that while the Hierarchy is ſtanding this Liberty
is falling, and that if ever it coms to pull down the Hierarchy it pulls
down that Monarchy alſo: wherfore the Monarchy or Hierarchy will
be beforehand with it, if they ſee their true Intereſt.
11. THE ultimat Reſult in Monarchy being that of one Man, or
of a few Men, the National Religion in Monarchy may happen not
to be the Religion of the major part of the People; but the Reſult
in Democracy being in the major part of the People, it cannot happen
but that the National Religion muſt be that of the major part of the
People.
12. THE major part of the People, being in matters of Religion
inable to be their own Leaders, will in ſuch caſes therfore have a pub-
lic leading; or, being debard of their Will in that particular, are
debar'd of their Liberty of Conſcience.
13. WHERE the major part of the People is debard of their
Liberty by tlię minor, there is neither Liberty of Conſcience nor
Democracy, bur Spiritual or Civil Oligarchy.
14. WHERE
*
A Syſtem of Politics.
507
14. WHERE the Major part is not debard of their Liberty of Chap. VI.
Conſcience by the Minor, there is a National Religion.
15. NATIONAL Religion is either coercive, or not coercive.
16. RELIGION is not naturally ſubſervient to any corrupt or
worldly Intereſt, for which cauſe to bring it into ſubjection to Intereſt
it muſt be coercive.
17. WHERE Religion is coercive, or in ſubjection to Intereſt,
there it is not, or will not long continue to be the true Religion.
18. WHERE Religion is not coercive, nor under ſubjection to
any
Intereſt, there it either is (or has no obſtruction why it may not
com to be) the true Religion.
19. ABSOLUTE Monarchy pretends to Infallibility in matters
of Religion, imploys not any that is not of its own Faith, and pu-
niſhes its Apoftats by death without mercy.
20. REGULATED Monarchy coms not much ſhort of the
ſame pretence; but conſiſting of Proprietors, and ſuch as if they diſſent
have oftentimes the means to defend themſelves, it dos not therfore
always attain to the exerciſe of the like power.
21. DEMOCRACY pretends not to Infallibility, but is in mat-
ters of Religion no more than a Seeker, not taking away from its
People their Liberty of Conſcience, but educating them, or fo many
of them as ſhall like of it, in ſuch a manner or knowlege in Divine
things as may render them beſt able to make uſe of their Liberty of
Conſcience, which it performs by the National Religion.
22. NATIONAL Religion, to be ſuch, muſt have a National
Miniſtry or Clergy.
23. THE Clergy is either a landed or a ſtipendiated Clergy.
24. A LANDED Clergy, attaining to one third of the Territory,
is Ariſtocracy; and therfore equally incompatible with abſolute Mo-
narchy, and with Democracy: but to regulated Monarchy for the
moſt part is ſuch a Supporter, as in that cafe it may be truly enough
ſaid, that NO BISHOP, NO KING.
25. THE Soverainty of the Prince in abſolute Monarchy, and
of the People in Democracy, admitting not of any Counterpoiſe, in
each of theſe the Clergy ought not to be landed; the Laborer never-
theleſs being worthy of his hire, they ought to be ſtipendiated.
26. A CLERGY well landed is to regulated Monarchy a very
great Glory; and a Clergy not well ſtipendiated is to abſolute Monar-
chy or to Democracy as great an Infamy.
27. A CLERGY, whether landed or ſtipendiated, is either Hie-
rarchical or Popular.
28. A HIERARCHICAL Clergy is a Monarchical Ordinati-
on; a Popular Clergy receives Ordination from Election by the People.
FORM of Government ( as to the Religious part ) being thus
completed, is ſum'd up in the three following Aphoriſms.
29. ABSOLUTE Monarchy (for the Religious part of the Form)
conlífts of ä Hierarchical Clergy, and of an Alcoran (or fom Book
receiv'd in the nature of Scripture) interpretable by the Prince only
and his Clergy, willingly permitting to them that are not capable of
Imployments a Liberty of Conſcience.
Ttt 2
30. R EGU.
1
*
508
A Syſtem of Politics.
Ch. VII.
30. REGULATED Monarchy (for the Religious part of the
Form) conſiſts of an Ariſtocratical Hierarchy, of the Liturgy, and of
the Holy Scriptures (or fom ſuch Book receiv’d for a Rule of Faith)
interpretable only by the Clergy, not admitting Liberty of Conſcience,
except thro mere neceſſity.
31. DEMOCRACY (for the Religious part of the Form)
conſiſts of a Popular Clergy, of the Scriptures (or fom other Book
acknowleg'd divine) with a Directory for the National Religion,and a
Council for the equal maintenance both of the National Religion, and
of the Liberty of Conſcience.
CH A P. VII,
Of Form in the Military part.
"A
MAN may periſh by the Sword; yet no man draws the
Sword to periſh, but to live by it.
2. SO many ways as there are of living by the Sword, ſo many
ways there are of a Militia.
3.
IF a Prince be Lord of the whole, or of two parts in three of
the whole Territory, and divides it into Military Farms at will and
without rent, upon condition of Service at their own charge in
Arms whenever he commands them, it is the Sword of an abſolute
Monarchy
4. IF the Nobility, being Lords of the whole, or of two parts in
three of the whole Territory, let their Lands by good pennyworths to
Tenants at will, or by their Leaſes bound at their Commands by whom
they live to ſerve in Arms upon pay, it is the Sword of a regulated
Monarchy.
5. IN Countrys that have no Infantry, or Militia of free Commo-
ners, as in France and Poland, the Nobility, themſelves are a vaſt Body
of Horſe, and the Sword of that Monarchy.
6. IF a People, where there neither is Lord nor Lords of the
whole, nor of two parts in three of the whole Territory, for the com-
mon defence of their Liberty and of their Livelihood, take their turns
upon the Guard or in Arms, it is the Sword of Democracy.
7. THERE is a fourth kind of Militia, or of men living more
immediatly by the Sword, which are Soldiers of Fortune, or a mer-
cenary Army.
8. ABSOLUTE Monarchy muſt be very well provided with
Court Guards, or a mercenary Army; otherwiſe its Military Farmers
having no bar from becoming Proprietors, the Monarchy it ſelf lias
no bar from changing into Democracy.
FORM of Government (as to the Military part) being thus com-
pleted, is ſum'd up in the three following Aphoriſms.
9. IN a regulated Monarchy where there is an Infantry, there
needs not any Mercenary Army'; and there the People live tolerably
10. IN a regulated Monarchy where there is no Infantry, but the
Nobility themſelves are a vaſt Body of Horſe, there muſt alſo be
well.
ķ
A Syſtem of Politics.
509
a mercenary Infantry, and there the People are Peaſants or Slaves. Ch. VIII.
11. THERE is no ſuch thing in nature as any Monarchy (whe-
ther abſolute or regulated) ſubſiſting merely by a mercenary Army,
and without an Infantry or Cavalry planted upon the Lands of the Mo-
narch, or of his whole Nobility.
CHAP. VIII.
Of Form in the Legal part.
I
I. | F Juſtice be not the Intereſt of a Government, the Intereſt of
that Government will be its Juſtice.
2. LET Equity or Juſtice be what it will, yet if a man be to
judg or reſolve in his own cafe, he reſolves upon his own Intereſt.
3. EVER Y Government, being not obnoxious to any Superior,
reſolves in her own caſe.
4. THE ultimat Reſult in every Government is the Law in that
Government.
5. IN abſolute Monarchy, the ultimat Reſult is in the Monarch.
6. IN Ariſtocracy, or regulated Monarchy, the ultimat Reſult is
in the Lords or Peers, or not without them.
7. IN Democracy the ultimat Reſult is in the People.
8. L AW in abſolute Monarchy holds ſuch a diſproportion to na-
tural Equity, as the Intereſt of one Man to the Intereſt of all Man-
kind.
9. LAW in Ariſtocracy holds ſuch a diſproportion to natural E-
quity, as the Intereſt of a few Men to the Intereſt of all Mankind.
10. LAW in Democracy holds ſuch a diſproportion to natural E-
quity, as the Intereſt of a Nation to the Intereſt of all Mankind,
II. ONE Government has much nearer approaches to natural
Equity than another ; but in caſe natural Equity and Selfpreſervation
com in competition, fo natural is Selfpreſervation to every Creature,
that in that caſe no one Government has any more regard to natural
Equity than another.
12. A Man may devote himſelf to death or deſtruction to ſave a
Nation, but no Nation will devote it ſelf to death or deſtruction to
ſave Mankind.
13. MACCHIAVE L is decry'd for ſaying, that no conſideration
is to be had of what is juſt or injuft, of what is merciful or cruel, of what
is honorable or ignominious, in caſe it be to ſave a State, or to preſerve Li-
berty; which as to the manner of expreſſion is crudely ſpoken. But
to imagin that a Nation will devote it ſelf to death or deſtruction any
more upon Faith given or an Ingagement therto tending, than if therc
had bin no ſuch Ingagement made or Faith given, were not picty but
folly.
14. WHERSOEVER the power of making Law is, there
only is the power of interpreting the Law ſo made.
15. GOD who has given his Law to the Soul of that man who
ſhall voluntarily receive it, is the only Interpreter of his Law to that
Soul; ſuch at leaſt is the judgment of Democracy. With abſolute Mo-
narchy, and with Ariſtocracy, it is an innat Maxim, That the People
are to be deceiv'd in two things, their RELIGION and their LAW;
Or
510
A Syſtem of Politics.
Chap. IX.or that the Church orthemſelves are Interpreters of all Scripture, as
the Prieſts were antiently of the Sibyls Books.
FORM of Government (as to the Legal part) being thus completed,
is ſum'd up in the three following Aphoriſms.
16. ABSOLUTE Monarchy (for the Legal part of the Form)
conſiſts of ſuch Laws as it pretends God has deliver'd or given the
King and Prieſts power to interpret ; or it conſiſts of ſuch Laws as the
Monarch ſhall chuſe or has choſen.
17. ARISTOCRACY (for the Legal part of the Form) con-
ſiſts of ſuch Laws as the Nobility ſhall chuſe or have choſen ; or of
ſuch as the People ſhall chuſe or have choſen, provided they be agreed
to by their Lords, or by the King and their Lords.
18. DEMOCRACY (for the Legal part of the Form) conſiſts
of ſuch Laws as the People, with the advice of their Council, or of
the Senat, ſhall chufe or have choſen.
1
Ć H A P. IX.
Of Form in the Judicial part.
*M
1. ULTIPLICITY of Laws, being a multiplicity of Snares
for the People, cauſes Corruption of Government.
2. PAUCITY of Laws requires arbitrary Power in Courts, or
Judicatorys.
3. ARBITRAR Y Power (in reference to Laws) is of three
kinds. (1) In making, altering, abrogating, or interpreting of Laws,
which belong to the Soverain Power. (2) In applying Laws to Caſes
which are never any one like another. (3) In reconciling the Laws
among themſelves.
4. THERE is no difficulty at all in judging of any caſe what-
ſoever according to natural
Equity.
5. ARBITRARY Power makes any man a competent Judg
for his Knowlege; but leaving him to his own Intereſt, which often-
times is contrary to Juſtice, makes him alſo an incompetent Judg, in
regard that he may be partial.
6. PARTIALITY is the cauſe why Laws pretend to abhor
Arbitrary Power ; nevertheleſs, ſeeing that not one caſe is altogether
like another, there muſt in every Judicatory be ſom arbitrary Power.
7. PAUCITY of Laws cauſes arbitrary Power in applying
them; and Multiplicity of Laws cauſes arbitrary Power in reconci-
ling and applying them too.
8. ARBÍTRAR Y Power where it can do no wrong, dos the
greateſt right; becauſe no Law can ever be ſo fram’d, but that without
arbitrary Power it may do wrong.
9. ARBITRAR Y Power, going upon the Intereſt of One or of
a Few, makes not a juft Judicatory.
10. ARBITRARY Power, going upon the Intereſt of the
whole People, makes a juſt Judicatory.
11. ALL Judicatorys and Laws, which have bin made by Arbi-
trary Power, allow of the Interpretation of Arbitrary Power, and
acknowlege an appeal from themſelves to it.
1
12. THAT
1
A Syſtem of Politics.
511
#
12. THAT Law which leaves the leaſt arbitrary Power to the Chap. IX.
Judg or Judicatory, is the moſt perfect Law.
13. LAWS that are the feweſt, plaineſt, and briefeſt, leave the
leaſt arbitrary Power to the Judg or Judicatory ; and being a Light to
the People, make the moſt incorrupt Government.
14. Î AWS that are perplext, intricat, tedious, and voluminous,
leave the greateſt arbitrary Power to the Judg or Judicatory; and
raining ſnares on the People, make the moſt corrupt Government.
15. SEEING no Law can be ſo perfect as not to leave arbitrary
Power to the Judicatory, that is the beſt Conſtitution of a Judicatory
where arbitrary Power can do the leaſt hurt, and the worſt Conftitution
of a Judicatory is where arbitrary Power can do the moſt ill.
16. ARBITRARY Power in one Judg dos the moſt, in a few
Judges dos leſs, and in a multitude of Judges dos the leaſt hurt.
17. THE últimat Appeal from all inferior Judicatorys is to ſom
ſoverain Judg or Judicatory.
18. THE ultimat Reſult in every Government (as in abſolute Moi
narchy, the Monarch; in Ariſtocracy, or Ariſtocratical Monarchy, the
Peers ; in Democracy, the Popular Aſſembly) is a ſoverain Judg or
Judicatory that is arbitrary.
19. ARBITRARY Power in Judicatorys is not ſuch as makes
no uſe of the Law, but ſuch by which there is a right uſe to be made
of the Laws.
20. THAT Judicatory where the Judg or Judges are not obnoxi-
ous to Partiality or privat Intereſt,cannot make a wrong uſe of Powere
21. THAT Judicatory that cannot make a wrong uſe of Power,
muſt make a right uſe of Law.
22. EVERY Judicatory conſiſts of a Judg or ſom Judges without
a Jury, or of a Jury on the Bench without any other Judg or Judges,
or of a Judg or Judges on the Bench with a Jury at the Bar.
FORM of Government (as to the Judicial part) being thus completed,
is ſum'd up in the three following Aphoriſms.
23.
ABSOLUTE Monarchy (for the Judicial part of the Form)
admits not of any Jury, but is of ſom ſuch kind as a Cadee or Judg in
a City, or as we ſay in a Hundred, with an Appeal to a Cadaliskar or a
Judg in a Province, from whom alſo there lys an Appeal to the Muph.
ti, who is at the devotion of the Grand Signor or of the Monarch.
24. ARISTOCRACY or Ariſtocratical Monarchy (for the
Judicial part of the Form) may admit of a Jury, ſo it be at the Bar on.
ly, and conſiſts of ſom ſuch
kind as Delegats or ordinary Judges, with
an Appeal to a Houſe of Peers ; or ſom ſuch Court, as the Parlaa
ment at Paris, which was at the inſtitution in the Reign of Hugit
CAPET, a Parlament of foverain Princes.
25.- DEMOCRACY (for the Judicial part of the Form) is of
ſom ſuch kindas a Jury on the Bench in every Tribe, conſiſting of thirty
perſons or more annually cligible in one third part by the People of that
Tribe, with an Appeal from thence to a Judicatory reſiding in the Ca-
pital City of the like Conſtitution, anqually eligible in one third part
out of the Senat or the popular Aſſembly, or out of both; from
which alſo there lys an Appeal to the People, that is to the Popular
Aſſembly.
С НА Р.
C
។
512
A Syſtem of Politics.
Chap. X.
CH A P. X.
Of the Adminiſtration of Goveriment, or
REASON OF STATE.
1.
* A
to his
दा
S the Matter of a Ship or of a Houſe is one thing, the Form
of a Ship or of a Houſe is another thing, and the Admini-
ſtration or Reaſon of a Ship or of the Houſe is a third thing; ſo the
Matter of a Government or of a State is one thing, the Form of a Go-
vernment or of a State is another, and the Adminiſtration of a Govern-
ment (which is what's properly and truly calld Reaſon of State) is
a third thing.
2. THERE are thoſe who can play, and yet cannot pack the
Cards; and there are who can pack the Cards, and yet cannot play.
3. ADMINISTRATION of Government, or Reaſon of
State, to ſuch as propoſe to themſelves to play upon the ſquare, is one
thing; and to ſuch as propoſe to themſelves to pack the Cards, is ano-
ther.
4. REASON of State is that in a' Kingdom or a Common-
wealth, which in a Family is callid THE MAIN CHANCE.
5. THE Maſter of a Family that either keeps himſelf
up
antient bounds, or increaſes his Stock, looks very well to the main
Chance, at leaſt if his play be upon the ſquare, that is, upon his own
Abilitys, or good Fortune, or the Laws; but if it were not upon the
ſquare, yet an Eſtate however gotten, is not for that a leſs Eftate in
it ſelf, nor leſs deſcending by the Law to his Succeſſors.
6. ÍF a People thro their own Induſtry, or the prodigality of
their Lords, com to acquire Liberty; if a few by their Induſtry, or
thro the folly or ſlothfulneſs of the People, com to eat them
make themſelves Lords; if one Lord by his Power or his Virtue, or
thro their Neceſſity, their Wiſdom, or their Folly, can overtop the
reſt of theſe Lords, and make himſelf King, all this was fair play and
upon the ſquare.
7. REASON of State, if we ſpeak of it as fair play, is foren
or domeſtic
8. REASON of State, which is foren, conſiſts in balancing foren
Princes and States in ſuch a manner, as you may gain upon them, or
at leaſt that they may not gain upon you.
9. REASON of State, which is domeſtic, is the Adminiſtra-
tion of a Government (being not uſurp'd) according to the Founda-
tion and Superſtructures of the ſame if they be good, or fo as not being
good that they may be mended, or ſo as being good or bad they may
be alter'd ; or, the Government being uſurp'd, the Reaſon of State
then is the way and means wherby ſuch a Uſurpation may be made
good or maintain’d.
10. REASON of State, in a Democracy which is rightly founded
and rightly orderd, is a thing of great facility, whether in a foren or in
a domeſtic relation. In a foren, becauſe one good Democracy, weigh-
ing two or three of the greateſt Princes, will eaſily give the Balance
abroad at its pleaſure ; in a domeſtic, becauſe it conſiſts not of any
out, and
more
A
A Syltem of Politics.
513
more than giving ſuch a ſtop in accumulation that the State coins nok Chap. X.
to be Monarchical : which one Reaſon of State being made good,
all the reſt gos well; and which one Reaſon of State being neglected,
all the reſt coms in time to infallible ruin.
11. REASON of State in a Democracy, which is not right in its
Foundations, may flouriſh abroad, and be one: but at home will lan-
guilh or be two Reaſons of State, that is, the Reaſon of the State or
Orders of the Nobility, which is to lord it over the People; and the
Reaſon of the popular State or Order, which is to bring the Commona
wealth to equality: which two Reaſons of State, being irreconcilable,
will exerciſe themſelves againſt one anotlier, firſt by Diſputes, then by
Plots, till it coms at laſt to open Violence, and ſo to the utter ruin of
the Commonwealth, as it happen'd in Rome.
12. REASON of State in an abſolute Monarchy (whether
Foren or Domeſtic) is but threefold; as firſt, to keep its Military
Farmers or Timariots
. to the firſt Inſtitution; next to cut him that grows
any thing above his due Stature, or lifts up his head above the reſt, by
ſo much the ſhorter; and laſt of all to keep its Arms in exerciſe.
13. IN Ariſtocratical Monarchy Reaſon of State (as to the whole)
is bút one thing, that is, to preſerve the Counterpoiſe of the King and
the two or the three, or the four Eſtates: For in ſom Countrys, as
in Poland, there are but two Eftates, the Clergy and the Nobility, in
others, as in Sweden, there are four, the Nobility, the Gentry, the
Clergy, and the Commons; in moſt others there are but three, the
Lords Spiritual, the Lords Temporal, and the Commons.
14. IN Ariſtocratical Monarchy Reaſon of State (as to the parts)
is a multifarious thing, every State having its peculiar Reaſon of State,
and the King alſo his Reaſon of State : with the King it is to balance
the Nobility, that he may hold them under; Reaſon of Státe with
the Nobility is to balance the King, left he ſhould grow abſolute;
Reaſon of State both with the King and the Nobility is to keep down
the People; and Reaſon of State with the People is to drive at their
Liberty.
15. IN Forms that are pure, or in Governments that have no more
than an abſolute Prince or one State, as abſolute Monarchy and equal
or pure Democracy, there is but one Reaſon of State, and that is to
preſerve the Form intire. In Forms that are mix'd (as in an inequal
Commonwealth where there are two Eſtates, and in Ariſtocracical
Monarchy where there is a King and two if not three Eſtares) there
are ſo many Reaſons of State to break the Form, that there las not
bin any inequal Commonwealth which either the People have not
brought to Democracy, or the Nobility to Monarchy. And ſcarce
was there any Ariſtocratical Monarchy, where (to omit the Wars of
the Nobility with their King, or among themſelves) the People have
not driven out the King, or where the King has not brought the Pco-
ple into Slavery. Ariſtocratical Monarchy is the true Theatre of Ex-
pedientmongers and Stateemperics, or the deep Waters wherin that
Leviathan the Miniſter of State takes his paſtime.
16. THE Complaint that the Wiſdom of all theſe latter times in
Princes Affairs conſiſts rather in fine deliverys and ſhiftings of Dangers
or Miſchiefs when they are near, than in ſolid and grounded courſes
to keep them off, is a Complaint in the Streets of Ariſtocratical Mo-
narchy; and not to be remedy'd, becauſe the Nobility being not bro-
Uuu
ken,
15
514
A Syſtem of Politics.
Chap. X. ken, the King is in danger, and the Nobility being broken, the Mo-
narchy is ruin'd.
17. AN Abſurdity in the form of the Government (as that in a
Monarchy there may be two Monarchs ) ſhoots out into a miſchief
in the Adminiſtration, or ſom wickedneſs in the Reaſon of State, as
in Romulus's killing of REMUS, and the monſtrous Aſſocia-
tions of the Roman Emperors.
18. USURPATION of Government is a Surfeit that converts
the beſt Arts into the worſt: Nemo unquam imperium flagitio acquiſt-
tum bonis artibus exercuit.
19. AS in the privation of Virtue, and in Beggery, men are Sharks
or Robbers, and the reaſon of their way of living is quite contrary to
thoſe of Thrift ; ſo in the privation of Government, as in Anarchy,
Oligarchy, or Tyranny, thảr which is Reaſon of State with them is
directly oppoſit to that which is truly fo: whence are all thoſe black
Maxims ſet down by ſom Politicians, particularly MACCHIAVEL
in his Prince, and which are condemn'd to the fire even by them who,
if they liv’d otherwiſe, might blow their fingers.
20. WHERE the Government from a true Foundation riſes up
into proper Superſtructures or Form, the Reaſon of State is right
and ffreight; but give our
Politician 'peace when you pleaſe, if your
Houſe ſtands awry, your Props do not ſtand upright.
21. TAKE a Jugler, and commend his Tricks never ſo much,
yet if in ſo doing you ſhew his Tricks you ſpoil him ; which has bin
and is to be confeſs”d of MACCHIAVE L.
22. CORRUPTION in Government is to be read and conſider'd
in MACCHIAVEL, as Diſeaſes in a man's Body are to be read and
conſider'd in HIPPOCRATES.
23. NEITHER HIPPOCRATES nor MACCHIAVEL in-
troduc'd Diſeaſes into man's Body, nor Corruption into Government,
which were before their times; and ſeeing they do but diſcover them,
it muſt be confeſt that ſo much as they have don tends not to the in-
creaſe but the cure of them, which is the truth of theſe two Authors.
1
+
1
POLI-
7
515
:
POLITICAL
APHORISMS.
Obſequium amicos, veritas odium parit. Terent.
I.
"T
.
#
HE Errors and Sufferings of the People are from their
Governors.
2. WHEN the Foundation of a Government coms
to be chang'd, and the Governors change not the Super-
ſtructures accordingly, the People becom miſerable.
3.
THE Monarchy of England was not a Government by Arms,
but a Government by Laws, tho imperfect or ineffectual Laws.
4. THE later Governments in England ſince the death of the King,
have bin Governments by Arms.
5. THE People cannot fee, but they can feel.
6. THE People having felt the difference between a Government
by Laws and a Government by Arms, will always deſire the Govern-
inent by Laws, and abhor that of Arms.
7. WHERE the Spirit of the People is impatient of a Govern-
ment by Arms, and deſirous of a Government by Laws, there the ſpi-
rit.of the People is not unfit to be truſted with their Liberty.
8. THE ſpirit of the People of England, not truſted with their
Liberty, drives at the reſtitution of Monarchy by Blood and Vio-
lence.
9.
THE Spirit of the People of England, truſted with their Li-
berty, if the Form be ſufficient, can never fet up a King; and if the
Form be inſufficient (as a Parlament with a Council in the intervals,
or two Aſſemblys coordinat) will ſet up a King without Blood or Vio
lence.
10. T O light upon a good Man, may bein Chance; but to be ſure
of an Aſſembly of good Men, is not in Prudence.
11. WHERE the Security is no more than perſonal, there may
be a good Monarch, but can be no good Commonwealth.
12. THE neceffary Action or Uſe of each thing is from the nature
of the Form.
13. WHERE the Security is in the Perſons, the Government
makes good men evil; where the Security is in the Form, the Go-
vernment makes evil mengood.
14. ASSEMBLYS legitimatly elected by the People, are that
only Party which can govern without an Army.
15. NOT the Party which cannot govern without an Army, but
the Party which can govern without an Army, is the refin'd Party, as
to this intent and purpoſe truly refin'd ; that is, by Popular Election,
according to the Precept of Moses, and the Rule of Scripture:
Uuu 2
Take
:
$16
Political Aphoriſms.
Take ye wiſe men, and underſtanding, and known among your Tribes,
and I will make them Rulers over you.
16. THE People are deceiv'd by Names, but not by Things.
17. WHERE there is a well order'd Commonwealth, the Peo-
ple are generally ſatisfy'd.
18. W HERE the People are generally diſſatisfy'd, there is no
Commonwealth.
19. THE Partys in England declaring for a Commonwealth, hold
every one of them fomthing that is inconſiſtent with a Common-
wealth.
20. TO 1:old that the Government may be manag’d by a few, or
by a Party, is inconſiſtent with a Commonwealth, except in a Si-
tuation like that of Venice.
21. TO hold that there can be any National Religion or Miniſtry
without public Indowment and Inſpection of the Magiſtracy, or any
Government without a National Religion or Miniſtry, is inconſiſtent
with a Commonwealth.
22. TO hold that there may be Liberty, and not Liberty of Con-
ſcience, is inconſiſtent with a Commonwealth that has the Liberty of
her own Conſcience, or that is not Popiſh.
23. WHERE Civil Liberty is intire, it includes Liberty of Con.
fcience.
24. WHERE Liberty of Conſcience is intire, it includes Civil
Liberty.
25. EITHER Liberty of Conſcience can have no ſecurity at
all, or under Popular Government it muſt have the greateſt ſecurity.
26. TO liold that a Government may be introduc'd by a little at
once, is to wave Prudence, and commit things to Chance.
27. TO hold that the Wiſdom of God in the formation of a Houſe
or of a Government, gos not univerſally upon natural Principles; isin-
conſiſtent with Scripture.
28. To hold that the Wiſdom of Man in the formation of a
Houſe, or of a Government, may go upon ſupernatural Principles, is
inconſiſtent with a Commonwealth, and as if one Nould ſay, God
ordain’d the Temple, therſore it was not built by Maſons ; le ordain'd
the Snuffers, therfore they were not made by a Smith.
29. TO hold that Hirelings (as they are term’d by ſom) or an in-
dow'd Miniſtry, ought to be remov'd out of the Church, is incon-
ſiſtent with a Commonwealth.
30. NATURE is of GOD.
31. SOM part in every Religion is natural.
32. A UNIVERSAL Efect demonftrats a univerſal Cauſe.
33. A UNIVERSAL Cauſe is not ſo much natural, as it is
Nature it ſelf.
34. EVERY man, either to his terror or confolation, has ſom
35. MAN may rather be defin'd a religious than a rational Crea-
ture; in regard that in other Creatures there may be ſomthing of Rea-
ſon, but there is nothing of Religion.
36. GOVERNMENT is of human Prudence, and human
Prudence is adequat to man's Nature.
37. THE Prudence or Government that is regardleſs of Religion,
is not adequat nor ſatisfactory to man's Nature.
38. WHERE
ſenſe of Religion.
นะ
.
Political Aphoriſms:
517
nor.
..38. WHERE the Government is not adequat or ſatisfactory to
man's Nature, it can never be quiet or perfect.
39. THE major part of Mankind gives it ſelf up in the matter of
Religion to the public leading.
40. THAT there may be a public leading, there muſt be a Na-
tional Religion.
41. WHERE the minor part takes away the National Religion,
there the major part is depriv’d of Liberty of Conſcience by the mi-
.
42. WHERE the major part is depriv'd of Liberty of Conſcience
by the minor, there they will deprive the minor of that Liberty of
Conſcience which they might otherwiſe injoy..
43. IN Iſrael there was an indow'd Clergy or Prieſthood, and a
National Religion under inſpection of the Magiſtrat : whence the
Chriſtians in Apoſtolic Times, defraying their own Miniſtry, could
have Liberty of Conſcience; wheras if the Chriſtians by going about
to take away Tithes, and aboliſh the National Religion, had indea,
vor'd to violat the Conſciences of the unconverted Jews, theſe being
far
greater in number, muſt needs have taken away the Liberty of
Conſcience from the Chriſtians.
44. PAUL in Athens could freely and undiſturbedly convert D10
NYSIUS and others; therfore in Athens there was Liberty of Con-
ſcience : but if Paul and his Converts had gon about to drive Hire-
lings, or an indow'd Prieſthood or Clergy out of that Church, who
ſecs not that the Athenians would have driven PAUL and his Converts
out of Athens ?
45. THAT there may be Liberty of Conſcience, there muſt be
a National Religion.
46. THAT there may be a National Religion, there muſt be an
indow'd Clergy.
47. COMMONWEALTHS have had three ways of U.
nion. As the Athenians, by bringing their Confederats to ſubjection :
As the United Provinces by an equal League: or as the Romans by
an inequal League. The firſt way is tyrannical. In the ſecond, one
Commonwealth under the League is no more than another, and each
one as to her ſelf hias a Negative : which kind of Union is not only
obſtructive, but tends (as we have ſeen both. in Holland and Svitzer-
land) towards Diviſion. In the third way, the Commonwealth u.
niting other Commonwealths, retains to her ſelf the leading of the
whole League, leaving to each of the reſt her own Laws, and her
own Liberty..
48. TILL a Commonwealth be firſt fram'd, how ſuch a Com-
monwealth ſhould make an effectual Union with another Nation, is
not poſſible to be ſeen.
49. THE new, unpractis’d, and heretofore unheard Union (as it
is vulgarly ſpoken) with Scotland, byuniting Deputys of divers Na-
tions, not in a Council apart, or by way of States General, as in the
United Provinces, but in the ſtanding Councils of fom one Common-
wealth in the League, is deſtructve to Liberty both in England and
in Scotland.
50.
If the Commonwealth of England receives Deputys from Scot-
land in a greater number than that of her own, ſhe receives Law from
foren Intereſt, and ſo loſes her own Liberty.
- 51. FF
ܕܬܙ
a
518
Political Aphoriſms.
al
si. IF Scotland be receiv'd in an equal number, it obſtructs the
freedom of both, or cccaſions War or Diſſenſion.
52.
IF Scotland be receiv'd in an inferior number, ſhe receives
Law from England, and ſo loſes her Liberty. The like is underſtood
of Ireland.
53.
WHERAS a well order'd Commonwealth ſhould give the
Balance to her Confederats, and not receive it from them; the Coun-
cils, in which divers others are thus united, tho in a far inferior num-
ber of Deputys, yet if theſe ly in wait, or lay their heads together,
may be overrul'd, obſtructed, or overbalanc'd by foren Intereſts.
54. WHERE Countrys are divers in their Laws, and yet are to
receive Laws one from the other, neither the Commonwealth giving
Law, knows what to give, nor the Commonwealth receiving Law,
underſtands what ſhe receives: in which caſe the Union rerurns to
Force or Confuſion.
55. THE beſt way of holding a Nation different or not different
in Laws, is the Roman, that is, by way of Province.
56. A PROVINCE, cſpecially if ſhe has ſtrong holds, may
by defraying of a ſmall Guard, be kept to a juſt League, and for the
reſt injoy her own Laws, her own Government, and her perfect Li-
berty. Other ways of Union will be found more chargeable, and leſs
effeétual, on both ſides: for if England has no Army in Scotland, Scot-
land will receive no Law from England; and if England has an Army
there, her hold conſiſts not in the Union, but in the Force. The like
is to be underſtood of Ireland.
57: IF a Country be very ſmall, and not able to ſubſiſt of it felf,
as Wales, it may be ſafely united and held: but the advantage that
Wales has in participation of all Magiſtracys and Offices, is not that
which England is able to afford to ſuch a Country as Scotland, without
ſubjecting
her neck to the yoke.
58. THE order of a Commonwealth requires, that it conſiſts,
firſt, of a Civil; fecondly, of a Religious; thirdly, of a Military;
and fourthly, of a Provincial part. The manner of uniting Provin-
ces or different Nations, pertains to the laſt part; and in the forma-
tion of a Commonwealth, to begin with that firſt, which is naturally
laft, is to invert the Order, and by conſequence the Commonwealth
it ſelf, which indeed is nothing but Order.
59. WHERE there can be any other Government, there can be
no Commonwealth.
60. WHERE there can be a Commonwealth,what tumults ſoever
there happen, and which ſoever prevail, there can be no other Govern-
ment; that is to ſay, without foren Invaſion, which throout I muſt
be underſtood to except.
61. IF Sir GEORGE Booth had prevaild, he muſt either have
introduc'd a Commonwealth, or have reſtor’d the King.
62. If the King were reſtor’d, he muſt either govern by an Army,
or by Parlaments.
63. A KING governing now in England by an Army, would for
the fame Cauſes find the fame Effects with the late Protector.
64. A KING governing now in England by Parlaments, would
find the Nobility of no effect at all.
65. A PARLAMENT, where the Nobility is of no effect at
all, is a mere Popular Council.
1
66. A
Political Aphoriſms.
519
66. A MERE Popular Council will never receive Law from a
King.
67. A MERE Popular Council giving Law to a King, becomis
therby a Democracy, or equal Commonwealth; or the difference
is no greater than in the imperfection of the Form.
68. A COMMONWEALTH or Democracy to be perfect
in the Form, muſt conſiſt eſpecially of ſuch an Aſſembly, the Reſuli
wherof can go upon no Intereſt whatſoever, but that only which is
the common intereſt of the whole People.
69. AN Aſembly conſiſting of a few, may go upon the Intereſt
of one man, as a King; or upon the Intereſt of one Party, as that of
Divines, Lawyers, and the like; or the Intereſt of themſelves, and the
perpetuation of their Government.
70. THE Popular Aſſembly in a Commonwealth may conlilt
of 'too few, but can never conſiſt of too many. .
71. IN every Commonwealth there has bin a Popular Aſſembly.
This in Iſrael at leaſt conſiſted of twenty four thouſand, upon a month-
ly Rotation. In Athens, Lacedemon, Rome, it conſiſted of the whole
Citizens, that is, of all ſuch as had a right in the Commonwealth,
whether they inhabited in City or Country. In Venice it conſiſts of
about two thouſand. In the Province of Holland only, which con-
tains eighteen or nineteen Soveraintys, the Popular or reſolving Aſſer-
blys conſiſt at leaſt of five hundred Perſons: theſe in the whole Union,
may amount to five or ſix thouſand; in Switzerland I believe tliey
com to a greater number. And the moſt of theſe Aſſemblys llavé
bin perpetually extant.
72. I F the Popular Aſſembly conſiſts of ſo few, and ſo eminent
Perſons as are capable of any orderly Debate, it is good for nothing
but to deſtroy the Commonwealth
73. IF the Popular Aſſembly conſiſts of ſo many, and for the
greater part of ſo mean Perſons as are not capable of Debate, therë
muſt be a Senat to help this defect.
74. THE Reaſon of the Senat is, that a Popular Aſſembly riglitly
conſtituted, is not capable of any prudent debate.
75. THE Reaſon of the Popular Aſſembly is, that a Senat right-
ly conſtituted for Debate, muſt conſiſt of ſo few and eminent Perſons,
that if they have the Reſult too, they will not reſolve according to
the Intereſt of the People, but according to the Intereſt of themſelves.
76. A POPULAR Aſſembly without a Senat cannot be wiſe.
27. A SENAT without a Popular Aſſembly will not be honeft.
18. THE Senat and the Popular Aſſembly being once rightly con-
ſtituted, the reſt of the Commonwealth will conſtitute it ſelf.
79. THE Venetians having ſlain divers of their Dukes for their
Tyranny, and being aſſembld by ſuch numbers in their great Council
as were naturally incapable of Debate, pitch'd upon thirty Gentlemen
who were calld Pregati, in that they were pray'd toʻgo apart, and,
debating upon the Exigence of the Commonwealth, to propoſe as they
thought good to the great Council: and from thence firſt aroſe the
Senat of Venice (to this day calld the Pregati) and the Great Council,
that is, the Senat and the Popular Aſſembly of Venice. And from theſó.
two aroſe all thoſe admirable Orders of that Commonwealth,
80. THAT
pi
1
520
Political Aphoriſms.
is rare.
+
80. THAT a People of themſelves ſhould have ſuch an uider-
ſtanding as when they of Venice did inſtitute their Pregati or Senat,
81. THAT a Senat or Council of Governors having ſupreme
Power, ſhould inſtitute a popular Aſſembly, and propoſe to it
, tho
in all reaſon it be the far more facil and practicable, is that which is
rarer.
82. THE diffuſive body of the People is not in a natural capacity
of judging; for which cauſe the whole judgment and power of the
diffuſive Body of the People muſt be intirely and abſolutely in their
collective Bodys, Aſſemblys or Repreſentatives, or there can be no
Commonwealth.
83. TO declare that the Aſſemblys or Repreſentatives of the Peo-
ple have power in fom things, and in others not, is to make the diffu-
live Body, which is in a natural incapacity of judging, to be in a politi-
cal capacity of judging.
84. To bring a natural incapacity of judging to a political capacity
of judging, is to introduce Government. To bring a natural' incapa-
city of judging to ſuch a collective or political capacity of judging,
as yet neceſſarily muſt retain the Intereſt of the diffuſive Body, is to
introduce the beſt kind of Government. But to lay any appeal whatſo-
ever from a political capacity of judging, to a natural incapacity of
judging, is to fruſtrat all Government, and to introduce Anarchy.
Nor is Anarchy, whether impos'd or obtruded by the Legiſlator firſt,
or by the People, or their Demagogs or Incendiarys afterwards, of
any other kind whatſoever than of this only.
85. To make Principles or Fundamentals, belongs not to Men, to
Nations, nor to human Laws. To build upon ſuch Principles or Fun-
damentals as are apparently laid by God in the inevitable neceſſity
or Law of Nature, is that which truly appertains to Men, to Na-
tions, and to human Laws. To make any other Fundamentals, and
then build upon them, is to build Caſtles in the Air.
86. WHATEVER is violent, is not ſecure nor durable; what-
ever is ſecure or durable, is natural.
87. GOVERNMENT in the whole People, tho the major
part' were diſaffected, muſt be ſecure and durable, becauſe it waves
Force, to found it ſelf upon Nature.
88. GOVERNMENT in a Party, tho all of theſe were well
affected, muſt be inſecure and tranſitory, becauſe it waves Nature, to
found it ſelf upon Force.
89. COMMONWEALTHS, of all other Governments, are
more eſpecially for the preſervation, not for the deſtruction, of Man-
kind.
90.
COMMONWEALTHS, that have bin given to cut off
their diſeas'd Limbs (as Florence) have brought themſelves to impo-
tence and ruin. Commonwealths that have bin given to healing
their diſeas'd Limbs (as Venice) have bin healthful and flouriſhing.
91. ATHENS under the Oligarchy of four hundred, was infi-
nitly more afflicted and torn with Diſtraction, Blood and Animoſity
of Partys, than is England; yet by introduction of a Senat of four
hundred, and a Popular Aſſembly of five thouſand, did therupon, ſo
ſuddenly as if it had bin a Charm, recover Might and Glory. See
the
Politi cal Aphoriſms.
521
the eighth Book of THUCYDIDES; A Story in theſe Timės mnoſt nea
ceſſary
to be conſider’d.
92. To leave our ſelves and Poſterity to a farther purchaſe in
Blood or Sweat of that which we may preſently poſſeſs, injoy, and
hereafter bequeath to Poſterity in Peace and Glory, is inhuman and im-
pious.
93. AS certainly and ſuddenly as a good ſtate of health diſpels the
peeviſhneſs and peril of Sickneſs, dos a good ſtate of Government the
animoſity and danger of Partys.
94.
THE Frame of a Commonwealth having firſt bin propos'd
and conſider'd, Expedients (in caſe ſuch ſhould be found neceſſary
for the ſafe, effectual, and perfect introduction of the fame) may
with ſom aim be apply'd or fitted; as to a Houſe, when the Mo-
del is reſolv'd upon, we fit Scaffolds in building. But firſt to re-
ſolve upon Expedients, and then to fit to them the Frame of a Com-
monwealth, is as if one ſhould ſer
as if one ſhould ſet up Props, and then build a Houſe
to lean upon them.
95. AS the chief Expedients in the building of a Houſe are Axes
and Hammers; fo the chief Expedient in the building of a Govern-
ment, is a ſtanding Army.
96. A S the Houſe which, being built, will not ſtand without the
perpetual noiſe or uſe of Axes and Hammers, is imperfect; fo is the
Government which, being form’d, cannot ſupport it ſelf without the
perpetual uſe of a ſtanding Army.
97. WHILE the Civil and Religious parts of a Commonwealth
are in forming, there is a neceſſity that ſhe ſhould be ſupported by an
Army; but when the Military and Provincial parts are rightly formid,
ſhe can have no farther uſe of any other Army. Wherfore at this
point, and not till then, hier Armys are by the practice of Common-
wealths, upon ſlighter occaſions, to have half pay for life, and to be
disbanded:
98. WHERE there is a ſtanding Army, and not a form’d Go:
vernment, there the Army of neceſſity will have Dictatorian Power.
99. WHERE an Army ſubſiſts upon the Pay or Riches of a
ſingle Perſon, or of a Nobility, that Army is always monarchical.
Where an Army ſubſiſts not by the Riches of a ſingle Perſon, nor of a
Nobility, that Army is always popular.
100. THE Engliſh Armys are popular Armys.
101. WHERE Armys are popular, and exerciſe Dictatorian
Power in depoſing ſingle Perſons, and monarchical Aſſemblys, there
can be no greater, nor needs any other Expedient for the introduction
of a Commonwealth. Nevertheleſs to this may be added ſom ſuch
moderat Qualifications as may prune the Commonwealth, not lop of
her Branches. Whom theſe will not ſatisfy, it is not a Common-
wealth, but a Party, that can.
102. If the late King had freely permitted to the People the ex:
erciſe of the Power inevitably devolv'd upon them by the change of
the Balance, he had not bin deſtroy'd. If either of the late lingle
Perſons had brought the People into an orderly exerciſe of the Power
devolv'd upon them, he had bin great. What Party ſoever ſhall
hinder the People from the exerciſe of the Power devolv'd upon
tiem, ſhall be certainly
, ryin'd: who or what Party ſoever ſhall in-
Xxx
troduce
522
Political Aphoriſms.
1
troduce the People into the due and orderly exerciſe of the Power
devolvéd upon them, ſhall be forthwith ſecure and famous for ever.
103. A MAN uſes, nouriſhes, and cheriſhes his Body, with
out underſtanding it; but he that made the Body underſtood it.
104. THE reaſon why the Nations that have Commonwealths,
uſe them ſo well, and cheriſh them ſo much, and yet that ſo few Na-
tions have Commonwealths, is, That in uſing a Commonwealth, it is
not neceſſary it ſhould be underſtood; but in making a Common-
wealth, that it be underſtood, is of abſolute neceſſity. Caput Rei-
publice eſt noffe Rempub. CICERO.
105. As the natural Body of a Chriſtian or Saint can be no other,
for the frame, than ſuch as has bin the natural Body of an Iſraelit or
of a Heathen; ſo the political Bodsy, or Civil Governments of Chriſtia
ans or Saints can be no other, for the frame, than ſuch as have bin
the political Bodys or Civil Governments of the Iſraelits, or of the
Heathens.
106. IT ſhall be as ſoon found when and where the Soul of a Man
was in the Body of a Beaſt, as when or where the Soul or Freedom
natural to Democracy, was in any other Form than that only of a
Senat, and an Aſſembly of the People.
107. IŅ thoſe things wherin, and ſo far as Art is directed or li-
mited by the nature of her Materials, it is in Art as in Nature.
108. THAT Democracy, or equal Government by the People,
conſiſt of an Aſſembly of the People, and a Senat, is that wherby
Art is altogether directed, limited, and neceſſitated by the nature of
her Materials.
109. AS the Soul of Man can never be in the Body of a Beaſt, un-
leſs God make a new Creation; ſo neither the Soul or Freedom na-
tural to Democracy in any other Form whatſoever, than that only of
a Senat, and a Popular Aſſembly.
110. THE right Conſtitution, Coherence, and proper Symme-
try of a Form of Government gos for the greater part upon Inven-
tion.
111. REASON is of two parts ; Invention, and Judgment.
112. JUDGMENT is moſt perfect in an Aſſembly.
113. INVENTION is moſt perfect in one Man.
114. IN one Man, Judgment wants the ſtrength which is in a
multitude of Counſillors.
115, IN a multitude of Counſillors, Invention is none at all.
116. THRO the defect of Invention, the wiſeft Aſſemblys in
the formation or reformation of Government, have pitch'd upon a
ſole Legiſlator.
117. IT is not below the Dignity of the greateſt Aſſembly, but
according to the practice of the beſt Commonwealths, to admit
of
any man that is able to propoſe to them, for the good of his
118. TO the making of a well order'd Commonwealth, there
gos little more of pains or charge, or work without doors, than
the Eſtabliſhment of an equal or apt Diviſion of the Territory, and
the propoſing of ſuch Election to the Diviſions fo made, as from an
equal Foundation may raiſe equal Superſtructures; the reſt being
but paperwork, is as ſoon don, as faid or voted.
Country:
119. A
Political Aphoriſms.
523
119. WHERE fuch Elections are propos’d, as being made by
the People, muſt needs produce a well order'd Senat and Popular
Aſſembly, and the People (who, as we have already found by ex-
perience, ſtick not at the like work) elect accordingly; there not
The Propoſers of any power in themſelves, but the whole People by
their peculiar and natural right and power, do inſtitute and ordain their
whole Commonwealth.
120. THE higheſt earthly Felicity that a People can ask, or
God can give, is an equal and well order'd Commonwealth. Such
a one among the Iſraelits, was the Reign of God; and ſuch a one
(for the ſame reaſon ) may be among Chriſtians the Reign of
CHRIST, tho not every one in the Chriſtian Commonwealth
ſhould be any more a Chriſtian indeed, than every one in the Iſraeil.
tilla Commonwealth was an Ifraelit indeed.
Xxx 2
Seven
..
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:
Seven Models of a Commonwealth ;
OR BRIEF
DIRECTIONS
Shewing how a fit and perfect MODEL
OF
1
Popular Government
May be made, found, or underſtood.
T
HERE is nothing more apparent, than that this Nation is
greatly diſquieted and perplex'd thro a complication of two Cau-
Jes : The one, that the preſent ſtate therof is not capable of any
other Form than that only of a Popular Government; the o-
ther, that they are too few who underſtand what is the Form or Model na-
turally neceſſary to a Popular Government, or what is requir'd in that Form
or Prudence for the fitting of it to the uſe of this Nation. For theſe
Infirmitys I ſhall offer fom Remedy by a brief Diſcourſe or Direction con.
fiſting of two parts.
THE firſt ſbewing thoſe Forms or Models of Popular Government, or
of Commonwealths, which have bin hitherto extant, whether fit or unfit
for the preſent ſtate of this Nation : The ſecond, ſhewing a Model or Form
of Popular Government fitted to the preſent ſtate of this Nation. In the
firſt part I ſhall propoſe ſeven Models roughly and generally : In the ſecond,
one, but more particularly and exactly.
THE FIRST PAR T.
N every Frame of Government, either the Form muſt be fitted to the
Property as it ſtands, and this only is practicable in this Nation; or
the Property muſt be alter'd and fitted to the Frame, which without
force has bin ſomtimes, but very ſeldom, practicable in any other Nation.
Nevertheleſs, for the better knowlege of the one way, it will be beſt to propoſe
in both ways.
THE
of Popular Government.
525
THE
!
F I R S T M O DEL
OF
POPULAR GOVERNMENT
PROPOS 'D.
The Commonwealth of Iſrael.
TI
HAT the Nobility, the Gentry, and the People, be per-
ſuaded to give up their whole Lands to the Commonwealth.
THAT if the whole People ſhall fo give up their Lands, they
be divided into twelve equal Precincts, calld Tribes.
THAT the man of greateſt quality in every Tribe have about ten
thouſand pounds a year given to him and his Heirs, with the heredi-
tary Dignity of Prince of his Tribe.
THAT ſom ten other men of the next quality under the Prince
in every Tribe, have about two thouſand pounds a year in the ſame
given to each of them and their Heirs, with the hereditary Dignity
of Patriarchs, or Chief of the Fathers.
THAT the remaining part of the Lands, except forty eight Ci-
tys
and their Suburbs, be diſtributed to the whole People equally by
Lots.
THAT it be not lawful for any Prince, Patriarch, or other, to fell
or alienat his Land, or any part therof, in ſuch manner, but that
up-
on every fiftieth year, being for this cauſe a year of Jubile, all Lands
within that compaſs ſold or alienated return to the antient Poffeffors or
lawful Heirs.
THAT there be one other Tribe added to the twelve; that this
Tribe ſo added be not local, nor ſuffer'd to have any Lands at all, ex-
cept the forty eight Citys above reſerv’d, with their Suburbs, that is,
with a quantity of Land to each of them, being in depth two thouſand
Cubits round.' That theſe be ſettld upon them and their Heirs for
ever, beſides the annual Tithe of the whole Territory, and a piece of
Mony, every year upon every Head under the notion of an Offering, in
regard that other Offerings are now unlawful; and that this Tribe con-
fiſt of Clergy, having cne hereditary Archbiſhop, or High Prieſt,
for the Head and Prince of their Tribe.
THAT there be no other Law than that of the Word of God
only, and that the Clergy being beſt skill'd in this Law, te eligible
into all Courts of Juſtice, all Magiſtracys and Offices whatſoever.
THAT the Prince of a Tribe, together with one or more Courts,
conſiſting of twenty three Judges elected by the People of that Tribe
for life, be the Government of the ſame.
THAT the People of the twelve local Diviſions take by the Bal-
lot wiſe men and underſtanding among their Tribes, and of theſe
con.
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Divers Models
conſtitute a Senat for the whole Commonweath conſiſting of ſeventy
Elders for life.
THAT every local Tribe monthly elect two thouſand of their
own number; and that theſe Elections amounting in all to four and
twenty thouſand, aſſemble at the Metropolis or Capital City, and be
the monthly Repreſentative of the People.
THAT the Senat be a ſtanding Judicatory of Appeal from all
other Courts, with power to ſhew the Sentence of the Laws of God.
THAT beſides the Law of God, whatever ſhall be propos'd by
the ſeventy Elders, and reſolv’d by the monthly Repreſentative of the
People, be the Law of the Land,
A SECOND MODEL
OF
.
A COMMON WEALTH
PROPOS’D.
THAI
HAT there be a King without Guards.
THAT the Word or Command of this King be the Law.
THAT this King ſtirring out of his Palace, it may be lawful for
any man to ſlay him.
2
IN this Model there wants but Security, that while the People are dif-
pers’d the King can gather no Army, to demonſtrat, That either the Peo-
ple muſt be free, or the King a Priſoner.
A THIRD MODEL
OF
A COMMONWEALTH
PROPOS’D.
1.
The Commonwealth of Sparta.
T!
HAT the Nobility, the Gentry, and the People, having upon
perſuaſion given up their Lands to the Public, the whole Tera
ritory be divided into one hundred thouſand equal Lots, and two more,
being each of ten thouſand Acres.
THAT the inferior Lots be diſtributed to the People.
THAT every man poſſeſſing a Lot, be a Citizen.
THAT the reſt, except only the Children of Citizens, be Ser
vants to, and Tillers of the ground for the Citizens.
THAT there be no profeſs’d Students.
THAT
of Popular Government.
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THAT no Citizen exerciſe any Trade, but that of Arms only ;
and that the uſe of Mony, except it be made of Iron, be wholly
baniſh'd.
THAT there be two Kings hereditary: That each of them
poffefs one of thoſe Lots of ten thouſand Acres.
THAT they be Preſidents of the Senat, with ſingle Votes; and
that in War they have the leading of the Armys.
THAT there be a Senat conſiſting, beſides the Kings, of twenty
eight Senators, elected for life by the People.
THAT whatever be propos’d by this Senat to the whole Peo-
ple, or any ten thouſand of them, and ſhall be reſolv'd by the ſame,
be the Law.
THAT there be a Court conſiſting of five annual Magiſtrats e-
lected by the People; and that this Court have power to bring a
King, a Senator, or other, that ſhall openly or ſecretly violat the
Laws, or invade the Government, to Juſtice.
A FOUR TH MODEL
OF
A COMMONWEALTH
PROPOS'D.
The Commonwealth of Athens.
TI
HAT there be a Repreſentative of the People, conſiſting of
five thouſand.
THAT theſe annually elect by lot a Senat conſiſting of four
hundred, and a Signory by ſuffrage conſiſting of nine annual
Princes.
THÁT each fourth part of the Senat, forone fourth part of their
annual term, be a Council of State.
THAT the Council of State may aſſemble the Senat, and propoſe
to the fame: That the Senat may aſſemble the People, and propoſe to
them. And that what is propos'd by the Senat, and reſolv'd by the
People, be the Law.
THAT the executive Power of the Laws made, be more efpe-
cially committed and diſtributed in various Functions, and divers Ad-
miniſtrations, to the nine Princes.
A
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A FIFTH MODEL
OF
A COMMONWEALTH
PROPOS’D.
The Commonwealth of Rome.
T
HAT the whole Nation be divided into three diſtinct Orders:
the one Senatorian, or Nobility ; the other Equeſtrian, or Gen-
try; and the third Plebeian, or Popular.
THAT the Equeſtrian Order be the Cavalry of the Common-
wealth, and the Plebeian the Foot.
THAT there be a Senat conſiſting of the Senatorian Order, and
of three hundred Senators for life.
THAT there be two Magiſtrats elected by the People, for five
years term, call'd Cenſors.
THAT the Cenſors have power upon cauſe ſhewn to remove a
Senator out of the Senat; and to elect a Nobleman, or ſomtimes a Ple-
beian, therby made Noble, into the Senat.
THAT there be two annual Magiſtrats elected by the People,
callid Conſuls.
THAT 'the Conſuls be Preſidents of the Senat, and have the
leading of the Armys.
TÅ AT the Senat (as they ſhall ſee occaſion) may nominat one
perſon to be Dictator for ſom ſhort term.
THAT the Dictator for his term have Soverain Power.
THAT there be a Diviſion of the whole People, of what Orders
ſoever, into fix Claſſes, according to the valuation of their Eſtates.
For example: That the firſt Claſſis conſiſt of all ſuch as have two
thouſand pounds a year, or upwards; the ſecond of all ſuch as have
one thouſand pounds a year, or upwards, under two; the third, of
all ſuch as have fix hundred pounds a year, or upwards, under one
thouſand; the fourth, of all ſuch as have three hundred pounds a year,
or upwards, under ſix hundred; the fifth, of all ſuch as have under
the former proportion; the ſixth, of all ſuch as pay no Taxes, or have
no Land, and that theſe be not us’d in Arms.
THAT the Senat propoſe all Laws to be enacted, to an Aſſembly
THAİ all Magiſtrats be elected by the ſame.
THAT this Aſſembly of the People conſiſt of the five Claſſes, in
fucli manner, that if the Votes of the firſt and ſecond Claſſes be near
equal, the third Claſſis be calld; and if theſe agree not, the fourth be
calld; and ſo for the reſt.
THAT what is thus propos’d by the Senat, and reſolv'd by the
People, be the Law.
of the People.
1*
IN
of Popular Government.
529
Í N this Frame the Senat, by the optimacy of the firſt and ſecond Claſſes
(which
ſeldom or never diſagree) carrys all, to the excluſion of the main Body
of the People : whence ariſes continual feud or enmity between the Senat and
the People ; who conſulting apart, introduce Popular Debate, ſet up fom other
way of Aſſembly, as by Tribes, or by Pariſhes, with more equality of Votes ;
elet Magiſtrats of their own, make Decrees binding the Senat or Nobi-
lity, indeavor to curb their Power by weakning their Balance, or diminiſhing
their Eſtates: All theſe tumultuouſly, and to the alteration of the Governa
ment, with ſo frequent Changes under ſo divers ſhapes, as make a very
Proteus of the Commonwealth, till having bin all her lifetime afflicted with
Anarchy, ſhe ends her days in Tyranny.
A SIXTH MODEL
OF
A COMMONWEALTH
PROPOS’D.
The Commonwealth of Venice.
TH
HAT the Soverain Power be eſtated upon four thouſand ſelect
men, to them and their Heirs for ever:
THAT there be a great Council conſiſting of theſe four thouſand;
and that their Sons at five and twenty years of age have right to the
fame.
THAT the great Council elect one Duke for life: That the
Duke have a Royal Palace aſſign’d, with a Guard, at the States charge,
and a Revenue of fifteen hundred pounds a year; and that he bear the
Soverain Dignity of the Commonwealth.
THAT this Duke have fix Counſillors annually choſen by the
great Council
. That he have no power to ſign any Writing, tho in
his own Name, nor to do any of his political Functions without his
Counſillors. That his Counſillors have power to ſign any Writing in
the Duke's name, or to do any of his political Functions without him;
and that the Duke with theſe fix Counſillors be the Signory of the
Commonwealth.
THAT the Signory of this Commonwealth have ſeſſion and ſuf-
frage in all the Councils of the ſame, with right alſo to propoſe to
each or any of them, either jointly or ſeverally.
THAT one hundred and twenty elected annually by the great
Council, together with other Councils and Magiſtrats
, to whom of
courſe the like Honor is appertaining, be the Senat.
THAT fixteen other Magiſtrats propos'd by the Senat, and con-
firm'd by the great Council for the term of ſix months, be a Couna
cil apart, with three weekly Provoſts or Propoſers, call'd the Col.
lege.
THAT the Signory may aſſemble the College, and propoſe co
them; that the College may aſſemble the Senat, and propoſe to them;
and
YYY
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and that the Senat may aſſemble the great Council
, and propoſe to
them. And that whatever is reſolv'd by the Senat, and not contra-
dicted, nor queſtion'd by the great Council
, be the Law.
THAT there be a Council of Ten elected annually by the
great
Council; and that this Council of Ten, with the Signory, and ſom of
the College, having right of Seſſion and Suffrage in the ſame, may
upon occaſion exerciſe Dictatorian Power in this Commonwealth.
THAT the reſt of the People under the Empire of this
Commonwealth, be diſarm’d, and govern'd by Lieutenants of Pro-
vinces. That the Commonwealth have a ſtanding Army of ſtrangers
or others, in Diſciplin and Pay. And that the City wherin ſhe ſhall re-
ſide, be founded in the Sea, after ſuch a manner, that it can no more be
approach'd by a Fleet, than by an Army without a Fleet. Otherwiſe, this
Commonwealth is expos’d both to the Provinces, and to a mercenary Army.
A SEVENTH MODEL
OF
A COMMONWEALTH
PRO PO S'D.
The Commonwealth of Holland.
T
"HAT the People in every City, and in every Province or
County within theſe three Nations, elect to every City, Pro-
vince, or County of the fame, a matter of twenty, thirty, or forty
Magiſtrats for life. That theſe Magiſtrats being fó elected, be the
Senat of that reſpective City, Province or County.
THAT the Senats, thus elected, thenceforth have and injoy the
Soverain Power within their reſpective Juriſdiction, for ever.' That
every Senat annually elect two or four Burgomaſters or Conſuls, to be
Preſidents of the ſame. That they alſo elect ſeven Magiſtrats, or
preſent fourteen perſons to the Governor of the Province; and that he
elect ſeven. That the ſeven ſo elected be Judges, or have the Execu-
tive Power of the Laws for their term, and within their reſpective
Juriſdiction.
THAT in caſe of Affairs of more public and general concern, as
War or Peace, levy of Men or Mony, and the like, the Governor of
the Province give information of the things to be conſiderd, to the
Nobility, and to the Senats of that Province; therwith appointing a
time and place for the Aſſembly of the States Provincial. That each
of the Senats, having debated the matter propos’d, delegat one Conſul,
with ſom other Senators well inform’d and inſtructed with their Will
and Pleaſure, to the Aſſembly of the States Provincial. That the No-
bility of the ſame Province delegat ſom of their Order likewiſe to the
Provincial States. That the Delegats both of the Nobility and of the
Senats, give the Yote of their Principals according to inſtruction ;
and
of Popular Government.
531
A
and that neither the Nobility, nor any Senat or Soverainty be other:
wiſe bound, than by their own Vote.
THAT the Provincial Eſtates elect one Magiſtrat for life, or du-
ring pleaſure, to be Provincial Governor: That they elect one or more
other Magiſtrats for life, or during pleaſure, to be States General.
THAT the States General being elected, and well inſtructed by
their Provinces, have the direction of the whole League: That each
give not his own Vote, but the Vote of his Province; and that no
Province be otherwiſe bound, than by her own Vote:
F theſe Models (in which I claim to be the firſt that has laid the whole;
and the higheſt Myſterys of the antient Commonwealths, to the loweſt
capacity of vulgar Debate) be not all in the mouths of great men, and in
Pamphlets, for Chimeras or Utopias, it is great chance : Tet contain
they no leſs than the whole Revolution of Popular Prudence. Nor is it
more certain, that no one of them would fit the preſent ſtate of this Nation,
than that he or they, whoſe Contemplation and Underſtanding is not well
vers’d in the moſt, or in the beſt of theſe, ſhall never fit a Model of Popu-
lar Government to the preſent ſtate of this Nation, or of any other. In
which aſſurance, I com to fulfil my promiſe in the Second Part, or to pro-
poſe ſuch a Model as is fitted to the preſent ſtate of this Nation.
FI
THE
SECOND PART,
Propoſing a Model of
A COMMONWEALTH
Fitted to the
Preſent State of this Nation.
3
B В
VT ſo it is ever, that the Humors or Intereſts of predominant Par-
tys hold themſelves to be National : and that which fits them, can
never fit a Nation; nor that which fits a Nation, ever fit them.
This in the introduction of Government, is always the main difficulty.
But where Partys are no better founded, or fitted for vſurpation, than now
in England, they are rather to be ſlighted than conſider'd, as thoſe, the
ſtouteſt wherof have but given this Example to the rest, that they who in
this ſtate of Affairs ſhall obſtruct an equal and well orderd Government, fall
but ruin themſelves. For which cauſe it is propos’d:
1
1.
HAT all Citizens, that is, Freemen, or ſuch as are not
Servants, be diſtributed into Horſe and Foot. That ſuch
of them as have one hundred pounds a year in Lands, Goods, or Mo-
Yyy 2
ny;
T
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ny, or above this proportion, be of the Horſe; and all ſuch as have
under this proportion, be of the Foot.
2. THAT all Elders, or Freemen, being thirty years of
age or
upwards, be capable of civil Adminiſtration, and that the Youth, or
ſuch Freemen as are between eighteen years of age and thirty, be not
capable of civil Adminiſtration, but of military only, in ſuch manner
as Thall follow in the military part of this Model.
3. THAT the whole native, or proper Territory of the Com-
monwealth be caſt with as much exactneſs as can be convenient, into
known and fix'd Precincts, or Pariſhes.
4. THAT the Elders reſident in each Pariſh annually aſſemble in
the ſame, for example upon Monday next inſuing the laſt of Decem-
ber: That they then and there elect out of their own number every
fifth man, or one man of every five, to be for the term of the
ycar
in-
ſuing a Deputy of that Pariſh ; and that the firſt and ſecond ſo elected
be Overſeers, or Preſidents for the regulating of all Parochial Congre-
gations, whether of the Elders, or of the Youth, during the term for
which they were elected.
5. THAT ſo many Pariſhes lying neareſt together, whole Deputys
ſhall amount to one hundred or therabouts, be caſt into one Precinct
call'd the Hundred; and that in each Precinct callid the Hundred,
there be a Town, Village, or place appointed to be the Capital of the
fame.
6. THAT the Parochial Deputys elected throout the Hundred
aſſemble annually, for example upon Monday next inſuing the laſt of
January, at the Capital of their Hundred. That they then and there
elect out of the Horſe of their number one Juſtice of the Peace, one
Juryman, one Captain, one Inſign; and out of the foot of their num-
ber one other Juryman, one High Conſtable, &c.
7:
THAT every twenty Hundreds lying neareſt, and moſt con-
veniently together, be caſt into one Tribe; that the whole Territory
being after this manner caſt into Tribes, ſom Town or place be
ap-
pointed to every Tribe for the Capital of the fame; and that theſe
three Precincts* (that is, the Pariſh, the Hundred, and the Tribe )
whether the Deputys thenceforth annually choſen in the Pariſhes or
Hundreds, com to increaſe or diminiſh, remain firm and inalterable
for ever, ſave only by Act of Parlament. The Tribes are preſurn'd thro-
out theſe Propoſitions to amount to fifty.
8. THÁÍ the Deputys elected in the ſeveral Pariſhes, together
with their Magiſtrats and other Officers both Civil and Military elected
in the ſeveral Hundreds, aſſemble or muſter annually, for example
upon Monday next inſuing the laſt of February, at the Capital of their
Tribe, for the ſpace of two days.
9. THAT this whole Body thus aſſembl’d, upon the firſt day of
their Aſſembly elect out of the Horſe of their number, one high
Sherif, one Lieutenant of the Tribe, one Cuſtos Rotulorum, one Con-
ductor, and two Cenſors. That the High Sherif be Commander in
chief, the Lieutenant Commander in the ſecond place, and the Con-
ductor in the third place, of this Band or Squadron: That the Cuſtos
Rotulorum be Muſtermaſter, and keep the Rolls ; that the Cenſors be
Governors of the Ballot: and that the term of theſe Magiſtracys be
annual,
10. THAT
of Popular Government.
533
10. THAT the Magiſtrats of the Tribe (that is to ſay, the High
Sherif, Lieutenant, Cuſtos Rotulorum, the Cenſors, and the Conductor,
together with the Magiſtrats and Officers of the Hundreds, that is to
fay, the twenty Juſtices of the Peace, the forty Jurymen, the twenty
High Conſtables) be one Troop, or one Troop and
one Company a-
part, call’d the Prerogative Troop or Company. That this Troop
bring in and aſſiſt the Juſtices of Aſlize, hold the Quarter Seſſion in
their ſeveral Capacitys, and perform their other Functions as formerly.
II. THAT the Magiſtrats of the Tribe (that is to ſay, the High
Sherif, Lieutenant, Cuftos Rotulorum, the Cenſors, and the Conductor,
together with the twenty Juſtices elected at the Hundreds) be a Court
for the Government of the Tribe calld the Phylarch; and that this
Court procede in all matter of Government as ſhall from time to time
be directed by Act of Parlament.
12. THAT the Squadron of the Tribe on the ſecond day of their
aſſembly, elect two Knights, and three Burgeſſes out of the Horſe of
their number, and four other Burgeſſes out of the Foot of their number:
that each Knight upon election forthwith make Oath of Allegiance to
the Commonwealth, or refuſing ſuch Oath, the next Competitor in
Ele&tion to the faine Magiſtracy, making the ſaid Oath, be the Magi-
ſtrat. The like for the Burgeſſes. That the Knights thus ſworn, have
Seſſion in the Senat for the term of three years; and that the Burgeſſes
thus ſworn, be of the Prerogative Tribe or Repreſentative of the Peo-
ple for the like term.
13. THAT for the full and perfect inſtitution of the Aſſemblys
mention'd, the Squadron of the Tribe in the firſt year of the Com,
monwealth, elect two Knights for the term of one year, two other
Knights for the term of two years, and laſtly two Knights more for the
term of three years; the like for the Burgeſſes of the Horſe firſt, and
then for thoſe of the Foot. And that this Propoſition be of no farther
uſe than for the firſt years Election only.
14. THAT a Magiſtrat or Officer elected at the Hundred be ther-
by bard from being eleated a Magiſtrat of the Tribe, or of the firſt
day's Election ; but that no former Election whatſoever bar a man of
the ſecond day's Election at the Tribe, or to be choſen a Knight or
Burgeſs. That a man being choſen a Knight or Burgeſs, who be-
fore was choſen a Magiſtrat or Officer of the Hundred, or Tribe,
may delegar his former Office or Magiftracy in the Hundred, or in
the Tribe, to any other Deputy, being no Magiſtrat nor Officer, and
being of the ſame Hundred, and of the ſaine Order, that is, of the
Horſe or Foot reſpectively.
15. THAT the Knights of the annual Election take their places
on Monday next inſuing the laſt of March in the Senat ; that the like
number of Knights whoſe Seſſion determins at the ſame time, recede.
That every Knight or Senator be paid out of the public Revenue quar-.
terly, one hundred twenty five pounds during his term of Seſſion, and
be oblig'd to ſit in purple Robes.
16. THAT annually on reception of the new Knights, the Senat
procede to election of new Magiſtrats and Counſillors. That for Ma-
giftrats they elect one General, one Speaker, and two Cenſors, each for
the term of one year, theſe promiſcuouſly; and that they electone Com-
miſſioner of the great Seal, and one Commiſſioner of the Treaſury, each
for the term of three years, and out of the new Knights only.
17. THAT
534
Divers Models
17. THAT the General and the Speaker, as Conſuls of the Com-
monwealth, and Preſidents of the Senat, be during the term of their
Magiſtracy paid quarterly out of the public Revenue five hundred
pounds; that the Inſigns of theſe Magiſtracys be a Sword born before
the General, and a Mace before the Speaker ; that they be oblig'd to
wear Ducal Robes. And that what is ſaid of the General in this Pro-
poſition, be underſtood only of the General ſitting, and not of the Ge-
neral marching.
18. THAT the General. ſitting, in caſe he be commanded to
march, receive Fieldpay; and that a new General be forthwith elected
by the Senat to ſuccede him in the Houſe, with all the Rights, In-
ſigns and Emoluments of the General fitting; and this ſo often as
one or more Generals are marching.
19. THAT the three Commiſſioners of the Great Seal, and the
three Commiſſioners of the Treaſury, uſing their Inſigns and Habit,
and performing their other functions as formerly, have paid quarterly
to each of them three hundred ſeventyfive pounds.
20. THAT the Cenſors govern the Ballot ; that they be Preſi-
dents of the Council for Religion ; that each have a ſilver Wand for
the Inſign of his Magiſtracy; that each be paid quarterly three hun-
dred ſeventy five pounds, and be oblig'd to wear ſcarlet Robes.
21. THAT the General ſitting, the Speaker, and the ſix Com-
miſſioners aboveſaid, be the Signory of this Commonwealth.
22. THAT there, be a Council of State conſiſting of fifteen
Knights, five out of each Order, Liſt, or Election; and that the ſame
be perpetuated by the annual election of 'five out of the new Knights,
or thoſe laſt elected into the Senat.
23.
THAT there be a Council for Religion conſiſting of twelve
Knights, four out of each Order, and perpetuated by the annual electi-
on of four out of the Knights laſt elected into the Senat. That there
be a Council for Trade, confiſting of a like number, elected and
per-
petuated in the ſame manner.
24. THAT there be a Council of War not elected by the Senat,
bur elected by the Council of State out of themſelves. That this
Council of War conſiſt of nine Knights, three out of each Order,
and be perpetuated by the annual election of three out of the laſt
Knights elected into the Council of State.
25. THAT in caſe the Senat add nine Knights more elected
pro-
miſcuouſly, or not promiſcuouſly, out of their own number, to the
Council of War, the faid Council of War be underſtood by ſuch
addition to be Dictator of the Commonwealth for the term of three
months and no longer, except by farther Order of the Senat the ſaid
Dictatorian Power be prolong'd for a like term.
26. THAT the Signory have ſeſſion and ſuffrage, with right
alſo jointly or ſeverally to propoſe both in the Senat, and in all Sena-
torian Councils.
27.
THAT each of the three Orders or Diviſions of Knights,
in each Senatorian Council, elect one Provoſt for the term of one
Week; and that any two Provoſts of the ſame Council ſo elected,
may
propoſe to the fame Council for their term, and not otherwiſe.
28. THAT ſom fair Room, or Rooms well furniſb’d and attend-
ed, be allow'd at the States charge, for a free and open Academy to
all comers, at ſom convenient hour or hours towards the Evening:
That
of Popular Government.
535
That this Academy be govern'd according to the rules of good Breed-
ing, or civil Converſation, by ſom one or more of the Provoſts; and
that in this Academy it be lawful for any man, by word of mouth, or
by writing, in jeſt or in earneſt, to propoſe to the Propoſers.
29. THAT for Embaſſadors in Ordinary, there be four Reſiden-
ces, as France, Spain, Venice, and Conſtantinople; and that every Re-
ſident upon election of a new Embaſſador in Ordinary, remove to the
next Reſidence in order liereby mention'd, till having ſerv'd orderly in
all the ſaid Reſidences, he returns home. That upon Monday next
inſuing the laſt of November, there be
every ſecond
year elected by
the Senat ſom fit perſon, being above twenty five and under thirty five
years of age, and not of the Senat, nor of the Popular Aſſembly.
That the Party ſo elected repair on Monday next inſuing the laſt of
March following, asan Embaſſador in Ordinary to the Court of France,
and there reſide for the term of two years to be computed from the
firſt of April next inſuing his election. That every Embaſſador in
Ordinary be allow'd three thouſand pounds a year during the term of
his Reſidences. And that if a Reſident coms to dy, there be an ex-
traordinary Election into his Reſidence for his term, and for the re-
mainder of his removes and progreſs.
30. THAT all emergent Elections be made by ſcrutiny, that is
by a Council, or by Commiſſioners propoſing, and by the Senat re-
ſolving in the manner following: That all Field Officers be propos'd
by the Council of War : That all Embaſſadors Extraordinary be
pro-
pos’d by the Council of State: That all Judges and Serjants at Law be
propos'd by the Commillioners of the Great Seal: That all Barons
and Officers of truſt in the Exchequer be propos’d by the Commiſſio-
ners of the Treaſury; and that ſuch of theſe as are thus propos'd to,
and approv'd by the Senat, be held lawfully elected.
31. THAT the cognizance of all foren Negotiation, and of all
matter of State to be conſider'd, or Law to be enacted, whether Pro-
vincial or National, Domeſtic or Foren, pertain to the Council of
State. That all ſuch Affairs of like kind as the Council of State ſhall
judg fit to be carry'd with more than ordinary ſecrecy, be committed
by them, and pertain to the cognizance and truſt of the Council of
War, to this end conſiſting of a ſelect Part, or Committee of the
Council of State. That the Cognizance and Protection both of the
National Religion, and of the Liberty of Conſcience, equally eſta-
bliſh'd in this Nation, after the manner provided in the religious part
of this Model, pertain to the Council for Religion. That all matter
of Traffic, and regulation of the ſame pertain to the Council for
Trade. That in the exerciſe of theſe ſeveral Functions, each being
naturally Senatorian or Authoritative only, no Council aſſume any o-
ther Power than ſuch only as ſhall be particularly or expreſly eſtated
upon the ſame by Act of Parlament.
32. THAT'what ſhall be propos’d to the Senat by any one or
more of the Signory, or of the Propoſers General; or whatever was
propos’d by any two of the Provoſts, or particular Propoſers to their
reſpective Council, and upon debate at that Council Thall com to be
propos'd by the ſame to the Senat, be neceſſarily debatable, and de-
bated by the Senat.
33. THAT in all caſes wherin Power is deriv'd to the Senat by
Law made, or by Act of Parlament, the reſult of the Senat be ultimat':
That
1
1
536
Divers Models
That in all caſes of Law to be made, or not already provided for by
Act of Parlament, as ſom particular Peace or War, levy of Men or
Mony, or the like, the Reſult of the Senat be not ultimat, but prepa-
ratory only, and be propos'd by the Senat to the Prerogative Tribe, or
Aſſembly of the People, except only in caſes of ſuch ſpeed or ſecrecy,
wherin the Senat ſhall judg the neceſſary ſlowneſs or openneſs of like
proceding to be of detriment or danger to the Commonwealth.
34. THAT if upon the motion or propoſition of a Council
, or
Propoſer General, the Senat add nine Knights, promiſcuouſly or not
promiſcuouſly choſen out of their own number, to the Council of War,
the ſaid Council of War be therby made Dictator, and have power
of Life and Death, as alſo to enact Laws in all caſes of ſpeed or ſe-
crecy, for and during the term of three months and no longer, except
upon new Order from the Senat: And that all Laws enačted by the
Dictator, be good and valid for the term of one year, and no longer,
except the ſame be propos’d by the Senat, and reſolv'd by the People.
35. THAT the Burgeſſes of the annual Election return’d by the
Tribes, enter into the Prerogative Tribe on Monday next inſuing the
laſt of March ; and that the like number of Burgeſſes whoſe term is
expir’d, recede at the ſame time. That the Burgeſſes thus enter'd, e-
led to themſelves out of their own number two of the Horſe, one to
be Captain, and the other to be Cornet of the fame; and two of the
Foot, one to be Captain, the other to be Inſign of the fame, each for
the term of three years. That theſe Officers being thus elected, the
whole Tribe or Aſſembly procede to the election of four annual Ma-
giſtrats, two out of the Foot to be Tribuns of thic Foot, and two out
of the Horſe to be Tribuns of the Horſe. That the Tribuns be Com-
manders in chief of this Tribe ſo far as it is a Military Body, and Preſi-
dents of the ſame as it is a Civil Aſſembly. And laſtly, that this whole
Tribe be paid weekly as follows: to each of the Tribuns of the Horſe
ſeven pounds, to each of the Tribuns of the Foot fix pounds; to each of
the Captains of Horſe five pounds, to each of the Captains of Foot four
pounds; to each of the Cornets three pounds, to each of the Inſigns
two pounds ſeven ſhillings; to every Horſeman one pound ten ſhil-
lings, and to every one of the Foot one pound.
36. THAT inferior Officers, as Captains, Cornets, Inſigns, be
only for the Military Diſciplin of the Tribe. That the Tribuns have
Seſſion in the Senat without Suffrage: That of courſe they have Sef-
fion and Suffrage in the Dictatorian Council
, ſo often as it is created by
the Senat. That in all caſes to be adjudg’d by the People they be Preſi-
dents of the Court or Judicatory.
37. THAT Peculat or Defraudation of the Public, and all Ca-
ſes or Crimes tending to the ſubverſion of the Government, be tri-
able by the Prerogative Tribe or the Aſſembly of the People ; and that
to the ſame there ly an Appeal in all Cauſes, and from all Courts, Ma-
giſtrats, or Councils, National or Provincial.
38. THAT the right of Debate, as alſo of propoſing to the Peo-
ple, be wholly and only in the Senat, without any power at all of
Reſult not deriv'd from the People, and eſtated upon the Senat by act
of Parlament.
39. THAT the power of Reſult be wholly and only in the People,
without any right at all of Debate.
*
40. THAT
of Popular Government.
537
40. THAT the Senat having debated and agreed upon a Law to be
propos’d, cauſe promulgation of the ſaid Law to be made for the ſpace
of ſix weeks before Propoſition; that is, cauſe the Law to be written
fair, and hung up for the time aforeſaid in fom of the moſt eminent
places of the City, and of the Suburbs.
41. THAT promulgation being made, the Signory demand of
the Tribuns fitting in the Senat, an Aſſembly of the People. That
the Tribuns upon ſuch demand of the Signory, or of the Senat, be
oblig'd to aſſemble the Prerogative Tribe in Arms by ſound of Trum-
pet, with Drums beating, and Colors flying, in any Town, Field, or
Marketplace, being not above ſix miles diſtant, upon the day, and at
the hour appointed, except the meeting, thro inconvenience of the
Weather, or the like, be prorogu'd by conſent of the Signory and of the
Tribuns. That the Prerogative Tribe being aſſembld accordingly,
the Senat propoſe to them by two or more of the Senatorian Magi-
ſtrats therto appointed, at the firſt promulgation of tlie Law. That
the Propoſers for the Senat open to the People the occaſion, motives,
and reaſons of the Senat for the Law to be propos'd, and that the ſame
being don, they put the Law or Propoſition by diſtinct clauſes to the
Ballot of the People. That if any material Clauſe or Clauſes of the
Propoſition, or Law ſo propos'd, be rejected by the People, the Clauſe
or Clauſes ſo rejected may be review'd, alter'd, and propos'd again
to the third time, if the Senat think fit, but no oftner.
42. THAT what is thus propos'd by the Senat, and reſolv'd by
the People, be the Law of the Land, and no other, except what is
already receiv'd as ſuch, or reſerv'd to the Dictatorian Council.
43; THAT every Magiſtracy, Office, or Election throout this
whole Commonwealth, whether annual or triennial, be underſtood
of courſe or conſequence to injoin an interval or vacation equal to the
term of the ſame. That the Magiſtracy or Office of a Knight, and of
a Burgeſs, be in this relation underſtood as one and the ſame; and that
this Order regard only ſuch Elections as are National or Domeſtic,
and not ſuch as are fóren, or contain'd in the Provincial part of this
Model.
44. THAT for an Exception from this Rule, where there is but
one Élder of the Horſe in one and the ſame Pariſlı, that Elder be eli-
gible in the ſame without interval; and where there be above four
Elders of the Horſe in one and the ſame Pariſh, there be not above
half, nor under two of them eligible at the fame Election.
45. THAT throout all the Aſſemblys and Councils of this Com-
monwealth, the Quorum conſiſt of one half in the time of health, and
of one third part in a time of ſickneſs, being ſo declar'd by the Senat.
THE uſe of the Ballot, being as full of prolixity and abſtruſeneſs in
writing, as of diſpatch and facility in practice, is preſum'd throout all E-
lections and Reſults in this Model, and for the reſt refer'd rather to practice
than writing. There remain the Religious, Military and Provincial parts
of this Frame : But the Civil part being' approv'd, they follow, or being
not approv’d, may be Spard.
Zzz
CON-
ho
538
CONCLUSION; or, the uſe of theſe
,
PROPOSITIONS,
T
5
HESE Propoſitions are ſo laid out to debate or examination, that
a man having the mind to weigh, diſcourſe upon, or object againſt
this Model, may do it in the parts with the greateſt convenience.
ANY examination of, or objection againſt the whole, or any part in
print or in writing, the Author holds himſelf bound to acknowlege or an.
fwer: But as to mere diſcourſe upon matters of this compaſs, it is uſually
narrow; beſides that in writing a man muſt put himſelf upon better aim than
he can be oblig'd to take in diſcourſe.
ANY ore objection Lying in writing againſt any one Order in this part
of the Model, after ſuch manner as to shew that the Part or Order jo in-
vaded ought to be expung’d, alter'd, or amended, unleſs it may be expung’d,
alter'd, or amended accordingly, deſtroys the whole.
AŃD any one or more Objections ſo lying againſt any one or more of
theſe Orders or Propoſitions, that therby they may be expung’d, alter?dor á-
mended, muſt in the whole or in part make a better Model.
IN this caſe therfore, or in cafe no Obječtion lys, the uſe of theſe Pro-
poſitions will be ſuch, as therby any Man or any Aſſembly of men, conſider-
ing or debating upon them in order, may find or make a true Model of a
well order'd Commonwealth.
AND that an Aſſembly can never make or frame a Model of any Go-
vernment otherwiſe than in fom ſuch manner, is provable first by a de-
monſtration from the effect; and ſecondly by a demonſtration from the cauſe.
THE demonſtration from the Effect is, that an Aſſembly no otherwiſe
frames a Law or Order, than by having it firſt pen’d by ſom one man, and
then judging upon it ; and the Model of a Commonwealth muſt conſist of
many Laws or Orders.
THE demonſtration from the Cauſe
, is, that wheras Reaſon conſiſts of
two parts, the one Invention, and the other Judgment, a Man may be as
far beyond any Aſſembly for Invention, as any Aſembly can be beyond a Man
for Judgment; or which is more, that the formation of a Model of Go-
vernment requires a ſtrong faculty of Invention, and that an Aſſembly is
naturally void of all manner of Invention.
Nov. 13.
1658.
%
THE
539
THE
Ways and Means
ܪ
Wherby an Equal and Laſting
COMMONWEALTH
May be ſuddenly introduc'd, and perfectly found-
ed, with the free Conſent and actual Confirma-
tion of the Whole People of England.
Scire tuum nihil eſt, niſi te ſcire hoc ſciat alter. Perf.
A
WORD fitly ſpoken is like Apples of Gold in Pictures
of Silver.
THE Deſire of the People of England now runs ſtrong-
ly to have a Free Parlament.
LET there be a free Parlament.
TO the end that the People may be moſt equally repreſented, or
that the Parlament may be Freeft,
LET there be a new Diviſion of England and Wales, with as
much equality as may ſtand with convenience, into fifty Shires.
LET every Shire elect annually two Knights to be of one Houſe,
and ſeven Deputys to be of another Houſe of Parlament, for the term
of three years. For the firſt year only, let the Deputys in each Di-
viſion be elected triple, that is, ſeven for the term of one year, ſeven for
the term of two years, and ſeven for the term of three years. The like
for the Knights; ſave only that the preſent Parlament remain; that is,
let two Knights in each Diviſion be elected the firſt year only for the
term of one year, two other Knights at the ſame time for the term of
two years; and let the preſent Parlament be the triennial part of the
Knights Houſe for the firſt Election.
THE Houſe of Knights and the Houſe of Deputys being aſſembľd,
let the Houſe of Knights debate and propoſe.
LET what is propos’d by the Houſe of Knights, be promulgated
for
the ſpace of ſix weeks.
PROMULGATION being thus made, let the Houſe of Den
putys meet; and give their Reſult
upon the Propoſition.
LET what was thus propos’d by the Senat or Houſe of Knights;
and reſolv'd by the People or Houſe of Deputys, be the Law.
IN this Conſtitution theſe Councils muſt of neceſſity contain the
Wiſdom, and the Intereſt of the Nation.
IN this method, Debate muſt of neceſſity be mature,
ΖΖΖ 2
I#
540
The Ways and Means, &c.
IF it be according to the Wiſdom and the Intereſt of the Nation
upon mature debate that there be a King, let there be a King.
I F it be according to the Wiſdom and the Intereſt of the Nation
upon mature debate, that there be a Commonwealth; two Aſſemblys
in this Order are actually a Commonwealth, and ſo far a well order'd
Commonwealth, that they are capacitated and inclin'd to reach to
themſelves whatever furniture ſhall be further neceſſary in more par-
ticular Orders, which alſo is at hand.
TILL this or the like be don, the Line of the late King and the
People muſt be fellowſufferers; in which caſe the impatience of the
People muſt be for the reſtitution of that Line at all adventures.
BUT this or the like being once don, immediatly the Line of the
late King and the People becom Rivals, in which caſe they will never
reſtore Monarchy.
WILL never, may ſom ſay? But if the Senat and the Popular
Aſſembly be both Royaliſts, they both will and càn reſtore Monar,
chy.
THO both Royaliſts, they neither will nor can : for let them,
that look no further than home or ſelf, ſay what they will, to affirm
that a Senat, and a Popular Aſſembly thus conſtituted can procreat
Monarchy, is to affirm that a Horſe and a Mare can generat a Cat;
that Wheat being rightly fown may com up Peaſe; or that a River in
its natural channel may run upwards.
IN the preſent caſe of England, Commonwealthſmen may fail
thro want of Art, but Royaliſts muſt fail thro want of Matter; the
former may miſs thro impotence, the latter muſt thro impoſſibility.
Or where the State is purely popular, that is, not overbalanc'd by a
Lord or Lords ; let there be one Example, or one Reafon given that
there is, was, or ever can be Monarchy." There will be this when all
fails, for the aftergame, tho the work ſhould fall, as is like enough,
into the hands of Royaliſts.
CERTAIN it is, that where any privat Citizen or Freeman
might not (ſom way or other) propoſe, there never was a well or-
der'd Commonwealth.
UPON this incouragement I offer'd this Paper to good hands, but
it was (according to cuſtom) thrown after me.
So it went in the Protector's time, in every Revolution ſince.
La fortuna accieca gli animi de gli huomini; but that is Atheiſm, that's
MACCHIAVEL.
WELL, but now ſays the Protectorian Family, O that we had
ſet the equal Commonwealth! So fay broken Parlaments and Stateſ-
men; fo ſay the ſadly miſtaken Sectarys; fo ſay the caſhier'd Oficers;
ſo fays he that would have no nay, but Oligarchy was a good
word.; and ſo will more fay after thefe, except they learn to ſay
after another, Aut reges non exigendi fuerunt, aut plebi re, non verbo,
danda libertas ; either the Kings ought not to have bin driven out, or
the People to have their Liberty not in word, but in deed : but that is
Heatheniſm, that's CICERO; well this is Chriſtian, if there will be
no ſuch ſaying, I would tliere might be no ſwearing,
Feb. 6. 1659.
up
THE
541
THE HUMBLE
+
PETITION
OF DIVERS
4
Well affected Perſons,
Deliver'd the 6th day of July, 1659,
With the PARLAMENT's Anſwer therto.
TO THE
SUPREME AUTHORITY ,
1
THE
Parlament of the Commonwealth of England;
The Humble Petition of divers well affected Perſons,
T
SHEWS,
HAT your Petitioners have for many years obſerv'd the
breathings and longings of this Nation after Reſt and Settle-
ment, and that upon miſtaken grounds they have bin ready
even to ſacrifice and yield up part of their own undoubted
right, to follow after an appearance of
it.
AND your Petitioners do daily ſee the bad effects of long conti-
nu'd Diſtractions, in the ruins and decays of Trade foren and domeſtic;
and in the advantages that are taken to make Confederacys to involve
the Nation in Blood and Confuſion, under pretence of procuring a
Settlement.
THAT it has'bin the practice of all Nations, on the ſubverſion of
any form of Government, to provide immediatly a new Conſtitution
futable to their condition; with certain Succeſſions and Deſcents, that
ſo both their Lawgivers and Magiſtrats might uſe their ſeveral
Truſts, according to the eſtabliſh'd Conſtitution; and the Peoples
minds be ſettld ſecure, and free from attemts of introducing ſeveral
forms of Government, according to the variety of their Fancys, or
corrupt Intereſts.
THAT God has preſerv'd this Nation wonderfully without ex-
ample many years, ſince the diſſolution of the old form of Govern-
ment by King, Lords and Commons; there having bin no fundamental
Conſtitutions of any kind duly ſettld, nor any certain Succellon pro-
vided
542
The Humble Petition
vided for the Legiſlative Power; but even at this inſtant, if by any
ſudden ſickneſs, deſign, or force, any conſiderable numbers of
your
Perſons ſhould be render'd incapable of meeting in Parlament, the
Commonwealth were without form of ſucceſſive Legiſlature or Ma-
giſtracy, and left to the mercy of the ſtrongeſt Faction. Yet we have
reaſon to remember in theſe years of unſettlement, the inexpreſſible
ſufferings of this Nation in their Strength, Wealth, Honor, Liberty,
and all things conducing to their welbeing, and we have like reaſon
now fadly to apprehend the impending ruin. And we cannot diſcern a
poſſibility of your Honors unanimous and expeditious procedings to-
wards our Countrys preſervation, and relief from its heavy preſſures,
while your minds are not ſettl'd in any known Conſtitution of Govern ,
ment or fundamental Orders; according to which, all Laws ſhould be
made: but divers or contrary Intereſts may be proſecuted on different
apprehenſions of the Juſtice and Prudence of different forms of Go-
vernment, tho all with good intentions.
YOUR Petitioners therfore conceiving no remedy ſo effe£tual againſt the
preſent Dangers, as the ſettlement of the Peoples minds
, and putting
them into aštual ſecurity of their Propertys and Libertys, by a due eſta-
bliſhment of the Conſtitution under which they may evidently appre-
hend their certain injoyment of them; and therüpon, a return of
thesr Trade and free Commerce, without thoſe continual fears that
make ſuch frequent ſtops in Trade, to the ruin of thouſands.
AND your Petitioners alſo obſerving, that the Intereſt of the late
King's Son is cry'd up, and promoted daily, upon pretence, that
there will be nothing but Confuſion and Tyranny, till he com to
govern ; and that ſuch as declare for a Commonwealth, are for
Anarchy and Confuſion, and can never agree among themſelves,
what they would have.
UPON ſerious thoughts of the Premiſes, your Petitioners do
preſume with all humility, and ſubmiſſion to your Wiſdom, to
offer to your Honors their Principles and Propoſals con-
cerning the Government of this Nation : Wherupon, they
humbly conceive, a juft and prudent Government ought to
be eſtabliſb’d, viz.
i.
:
f
1. THAT the Conſtitution of the Civil Government of
England by King, Lords, and Commons, being diſſolvid, what-
ever new Conſtitution of Government can be made or fetel'd accord-
ing to any rule of Righteouſneſs, it can be no other than a wiſe Order
or Method, into which the free Peoples Deputys ſhall be form’d for
the making of their Laws, and taking care for their common ſafety
and welfare in the execution of them : For, the exerciſe of all juſt Aus
thority over a free People, ought (under God) to ariſe from their
own Conſent.
2. THAT the Government of a free People ought to be ſo ſettld,
that the Governors and Governd may have the ſame Intereſt in pre-
ſerving the Government, and each others Propertys and Libertys re-
ſpectively; that being the only ſure foundation of a Commonwealth's
Unity, Peace, Strength, and Proſperity.
*
3. THAT
of divers well affe&ted Perſons.
543
3.
THAT there cannot be a Union of the Intereſts of a whole
Nation in the Government, where thoſe who ſhall fomtimes govern,
be not alſo ſomtimes in the condition of the Govern'd; otherwiſe thé
Governors will not be in a capacity to feel the weight of the Govern-
ment, nor the Govern’d to injoy the advantages of it: And then it
will be the intereſt of the major part to deſtroy the Government, as
much as it will be the intereſt of the minor part to preſerve it.
4:
THAT there is no ſecurity that the Supreme Authority ſhall
not fall into Factions, and be led by their privat Intereſt to keep them-
ſelves always in power, and direct the Government to their privat ad-
vantages, if that Supreme Authority be ſettld in any fingle Aſſem-
bly whaſoever, that ſhall have the intire power of propounding, de-
bating and reſolving Laws.
5. THAT the Soverain Authority in every Government, of what
kind foever, ought to be certain in its perpetual Succeſſions, Revolu-
tions, or Deſcents; and without poffibility (by the judgment of hu-
man Prudence) of a death or failure of its being, becauſe the whole
form of the Government is diffolv'd if that ſhould happen, and the
People in the utmoſt imminent danger of an abſolute Tyranny, or a
War among themſelves, or Rapin and Confuſion. And therfore
where the Government is Popular, the Aſſemblys in whom reſide the
Supreme Authority, ought never to dy or diſſolve, tho the Perſons be
annually changing: neither ought they to truſt the Soverain care of the
ſtrength and ſafety of the People out of their own hands, by allow-
ing a Vacation to themſelves, leſt thoſe that ſhould be truſted be in
love with ſuch great Authority, and aſpire to be their Maſters, or
elſe fear an Account, and ſeek the diffolution of the Commonwealth
to avoid it.
6. THAT it ought to be declar'd as a Fundamental Order in the
Conſtitution of this Commonwealth, that the Parlament being the
Supreme Legiſlative Power, is intended only for the exerciſe of all
thoſe Acts of Authority that are proper and peculiar to the Legiſlative
Power; and to provide for a Magiſtracy, to whom ſhould appertain
the whole Executive Power of the Laws: and no Caſe either Civil
or Criminal to be judgʻd in Parlament, ſaving that the laſt Appeals in
all Caſes, where Appeals ſhall be thought fit to be admitted, be only
to the Popular Aſſembly; and alſo that to them be refer'd the Judg-
ment of all Magiſtrats in Caſes of Maladminiſtrations in their
Offices.
AND in proſecution of theſe Principles,
TOUR Petitioners humbly propoſe for the ſettlement of
this Commonwealth, that it be ordain’d,
1. THAT the Parlament or the ſupreme Authority of England, be
choſen by the free People, to repreſent them with as much equality as may
be.
2. THAT a Parlament of England ſhall conſiſt of two Aſſemblys,
the leſſer of about three hundred, in whom ſhall reſide the intire power of
conſulting, debating, and propounding Laws: the other, to conſist of
far greater number, in whom ſhall reſt the ſole power of reſolving all
Laws to propounded.
3. THAT
4
544
The Humble Petition
1
3. THAT the free People of England, in their reſpective diviſions at
certain days and places appointed, ſhall for ever annually chuſe one third part
to each Aſſembly, to enter into their Authority, at certain days appointed :
the ſame days, the Authority of a third of each of the ſaid Aſſemblys to
ceale, only in the laying the firſt Foundation in this Commonwealth's
Conſtitution : the whole number of both the Aſſemblys to be choſen by the
People reſpectively, viz. one third of each Aſſembly to be choſen for one
year, one third for two years, and one third for three years.
4.
THAT ſuch as ſhall be choſen, having ſerv’d their appointed time
in either of the ſaid Aſſemblys of Parlament, ſhall not be capable to ſerve in
the ſame Aſſembly during fom convenient interval or vacation.
5. THAT the Legiſlative Power do wholly refer the execution of the
Lavs to the Magiſtracy, according to the sixth Principle herein men-
tion'd.
6. THAT in reſpect to Religion and Chriſtian Liberty, it be ordain'd
that the Chriſtian Religion by the appointment of all ſucceding Parlaments,
be taught, and promulgated to the Nation, and public Preachers therof main-
tain'd: and that all that ſhall profeſs the ſaid Religion, the of different
Perſuaſions in parts of the Doctrin, or Diſciplin therof, be equally protected
in the peaceable profeffion, and public exerciſe of the Same; and be equally
capable of all Elections, Magiſtracys, Preferments in the Commonwealth,
according to the order of the Jame. Provided always, that the public ex-
erciſe of no Religion contrary to Chriſtianity be tolerated; nor the public
exerciſe of any Religion, tho profeſſediy Chriſtian, grounded upon, or incor,
porated into the Intereſt of any Foren State or Prince.
THESE your Petitioners humbly conceive to be the Eſſentials
of the form of a free Commonwealth, which if they were made fit
for practice by your Honors appointing the numbers, times, places,
and all other neceſſary circumſtances, and ſettld as the fundamentaſ
Orders of the Commonwealth, would naturally diſpoſe thoſe that
ſhould hereafter be choſen into the Parlaments, from the love of their
own intereſt to ſeek the common good, being oblig'd by the Conſti-
tutions here humbly offer'd to partake with the whole body of the
People, of the good or evil that ſhall happen to the Commonwealth,
having no probable temtations or means left to compaſs any privat
or factious ends in matters Religious or Civil
. And your Petitioners
cannot imagin a greater ſecurity for the Cauſe and Intereſt contended
for with ſuch effuſion of Blood, than by diſpoſing the free People
into this kind of order, wherby the ſame Cauſe would becom their
common Intereſt. Yet if your Honors ſhould think it neceſſary or
convenient for ſecuring the minds of ſuch as are doubtful and jealous
that the People may betray their own Libertys, there may be inſerted
into the fundamental Orders of the Commonwealth, theſe following
Expedients, viz.
I. THAT for ſecuring the Government of this Commonwealth,
and of the Religious and Civil freedom of the good People therof,
it may be for ever eſteem'd and judg’d Treaſon againſt the Common-
wealth, for any Member of either Aſſembly of Parlament, or any
other perſon whatſoever, to move or propoſe in either of the ſaid
Aſſemblys, the reſtitution of Kingly Government, or the introducti-
on of any ſingle Perſon to be chief Magiſtrat of England, or the alte-
ration of that part of the fundamental Order herein contain’d that
X
concerns
of divers well affected Perſons.
545
concerns the equal freedom and protection of Religious perſons of dif-
ferent Perſuaſions.
2. THAT about the number of twelve perſons of the moſt un-
doubted Fidelity and Integrity, may be authoriz’d and impower'd, for
ſom certain number of years next inſuing, to ſeize, apprehend, and in
faſe cuſtody to detain any perſon or perſons whatſoever, till he or they
be in due form of Law delivered, as is hereafter ſpecify'd, that ſhall
move or propoſe in either of the ſaid Aſſemblys of Parlament the re-
ſtitution of Kingly Government, or the introduction of any ſingle
Perſon to be chief Magiſtrat of this Commonwealth, or the alteration
of that part of the fundamental Order herein contain'd, that con-
cerns the equal freedom and protection of religious perſons of different
perſuaſions; but for no other matter or cauſe whatſoever. And when
it ſhall happen that any perſon or perſons ſhall be arreſted or ſeiz'd for
any
of the cauſes aforeſaid, in manner aforeſaid, then a Commiſſion
of Oyer and Terminer may iſſue forth in due form of Law to the faid
twelve, or any ſix of them, to procede in due form of Law, within one
month after the apprehenſion of any ſuch perſon or perſons, to the
arrainment and public trial of every ſuch perſon or perſons; and up-
on the legal conviction of him or them by the teſtimony of two ſuf-
ficient Witneſſes of any of the Treaſons herein declar'd, to condemn to
the pains of death, and to cauſe the ſame Judgment to be duly exe-
cuted: and the Keeper or Keepers of the Great Seal of England that
ſhall be for the time being, may be authoriz’d and requir'd from time
to time during the term of years, to iſſue out Commiſſions to the
ſaid twelve or any fix of them, authorizing them to procede as aforeſaid.
AND if your Honors ſhall further judg it convenient, the fun-
damental Orders of the Government may be conſented to or ſubſcrib'd
by the People themſelves, if their expreſs Pact ſhall be eſteem'd
any
additional ſecurity; other Nations, upon the like occaſions of expul-
fion of their Kings, having taken the Peoples Oaths againſt their return-
ing: And the fame may be proclaim'd as often as our Anceſtors provi-
ded for the proclaiming of Magna Charta, and any further ſecurity alſo
added, if any can be found among men, that has a foundation in Ju-
ſtice.
NOW your Petitioners having, with humble ſubmiſſion to your
grave Wiſdoms, thus declar'd their apprehenſions of the preſent con-
dition of this diſtracted Nation, and the only effectual means under
God to prevent the impending Miſchiefs ; They do muſt humbly pray,
THAT ſuch ſpeedy conſiderations may be had of the Premiſes
as the Condition of this Nation requires; and that ſuch a
method may be ſettled for the debating and conſulting about
the Government, that your wife Reſults may be ſeaſonable
for the healing all the breaches of the Commonwealth, and
eſtabliſhing the ſure foundations of Freedom, Juſtice, Peace,
and Unity.
And your Petitioners fball always pray, &c.
Аааа
Wedneſ-
546
The Parlament's Anſwer.
Wedneſday July the 6th, 1659.
T
HỂ Houſe being inform’d that divers Gentlemen were at the door
with a Petition, they were call'd in, and one of the Petitioners in
behalf of himſelf and the reſt ſaid, We humbly preſent you a Petition, to
which we might have had many thouſand hands, but the Matter rather
deferves your ſerious Conſideration than any public Atteſtation; and ther-
fore we do humbly preſent it to this Honorable Houſe. Which, after the Pea
titioners were withdrawn, was read, and was intitľd, The humble Petition
of divers wellaffected Perſons.
1
Reſolv’d,
THAT the Petitioners have the Thanks of the Houſe.
THE Petitioners were again callà in, and Mr. Speaker gave
them
this Anſwer.
Gentlemen,
THE Houſe has read over your Petition, and find it without any
privat end, and only for the public Intereſt; and I am commanded to let you
know that it lys much upon them to make ſuch a Settlement as may be moſt for
the good of Poſterity : and they are about that work, and intend to go for-
ward with it with as much expedition as may be. And for your parts they
have commanded me to give you Thanks : and in their names I do give you
the Thanks of this Houſe accordingly.
Tho. St. Nicholas Clerc of the Parlament.
;
F 1 N I S.
1
.
?
1
D
Price 15 s.
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Iſcourſes concerning Government, by ALGERNON SIDNEY,
Son to ROBERT Earl of Leiceſter, and Ambaſſador from
the Commonwealth of England to CHARLES GUSTAVUs King
of Sweden. Publiſhed from an Original Manuſcript of the Author.
A Complete Collection of the Hiſtorical, Political, and Miſcella-
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Both printed by J. DARB Y, and fold by the Bookfellers.
3
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