T : c Jº A." - - \ THOUGHTS ON THE PRIMARY (CONIDITION Intelligent Accountable Creatures ; PRINCIPLES OF REASON, COMPARED WITH THE TESTIMONY OF INSPIRATION, AND CORRO BORATED BY * 13tferences To approved Calvinistic M/riters. *. By mill.i.am B.E.W.WET. “It is true, Mr. ------- does lay man lower than we do ; but it is observable, that so far as that is the case, it is not in the character of a SINNER, but of a CREATURE of GoD ; not on account of what he has made himself, but on account of what God hath made him : And if that is the way in which we are to be humbled, it might be done still more effectually, if we were reduced to the condition of a stock or a stone.” - Fuller's Defence of the Gospel, &c. p. 81. ººms *-*s-s-s-s-s--------ºs-ºs- * STOCKPoRT, Printed and sold by J. Dawson, Bridge-Street; Sold also by T. Conder, Buckler'sbury; Williams & Smith, Stationers' Court, Ludgate Hill ; W. Button, Paternoster Row, London;--- by Abel, Northampton; Smith, Sheffield; Crooks, Rotherham; and Richardson, Manchester. 18O8. *=mº ºne- PRICE 1s. 6d. ADPERTISEMENT. _-SSWWWee’ I am far from wishing to obtrude myself upon the public, or to cherish the spirit of a controversialist, especially on a subject of such depth and solemnity, as that of accounting for the Origin of moral evil; which, I apprehend, will never be accomplished with entire satisfaction in the present state : And I cheerfully acquiesce in the judgment of those, who think it highly unbecoming to indulge either vain curiosity, or self-applauding confidence, on a topic, over which a sacred vail has been drawn in the word of God. But, as a most disingenuous misrepresentation of my religious sentiments has been circulated in a late “Reply” to my “Remarks on a recent hypothesis respecting the origin of moral evil,” &c., by one of Dr. WILLIAMs's Students; which, from that gentleman's connection with the Dr., may have a degree of weight with some, to which it is by no means intrinsically entitled; I feel it incumbent on me, both out of justice to myself, and respect to my religious connections, to submit to public inspection the following digested view of my Thoughts on the primary condition of intelligent accountable creatures; which will not only shew what are my genuine sentiments, but, by presenting a con- nected view of the subject in its several parts and bearings, may furnish a positive Substitute for that “Hypothesis,” against which the reasoning of my “Remarks” was directed: And if they shall, either assist any in forming a consistent and scriptural judgment concerning the original probation- state of moral agents, or dispose them satisfactorily to acquiesce in the silence of God's word respecting the modus of their defection, my chief end will be answered. Stod ARD, MAY 10th, 1808. THOUGHTS ON THIE IPRIMIAIRY CONDITION OF INTELLIGENT CREATURES, &c. -**\\\\\\\\be- §. 1. IT has been a question amongst ethical and theological writers, Whether intelligent crea- tures were brought into existence in puris natura- libus * that is, in the possession of natural facul- ties only, without any moral qualities; or, in a state of mere capability of good or of evil, and in equilibrio between both. Such a contemplation of intelligent existence appears to be merely ideal ; to conceive of which the mind must divest itself of all regard to the happiness of the creature, as any way connected with the end of his creation, and to all ideas of his accountability as an intelli- gent being ; and must consider it, abstractedly, as a mere instrument of some moral effect, and not in any proper sense a personal agent, ea motu sta mentis et voluntatis. [See notes A. & D.] |B (6) S. 2. If such a state of intelligent existence be conceivable, this would clearly imply, that, as such a creature was not under any positive influ- ence ab extra, inclining him to Good morally considered, he was likewise free from, or void of, any principle or property of nature tending to moral evil. For it is obvious, that by either of these kinds of influence his state of equilibrium would be destroyed ; and in exact proportion to the prevalence of either he would incline the one way or the other. Yea, if any such principle or property existed in his nature, as a tendency or preponderance towards evil; though the natural effect of this might pro tempore be counteracted by positive divine influence, yet, in himself con- sidered, he could not be said to possess a state of mind in equilibrio between both. §. 3. Pelagians of old maintained that man was created in this state of pure or mere nature, and that moral rectitude was a quality superadded to his condition as a creature, and not strictly concreated with him ; of which though he became deprived by his subsequent conduct, yet he then remained the same in his nature, as when he came into existence. This they maintained, in order to obviate the necessary consequence of his posterity deriving from him a depraved nature, and to favour their own Scheme of doctrine, viz. that, though cliildren are born without morai. (7) rectitude, or positive holiness, they are however born without any tendency to moral evil, and therefore are not the subjects of original sin. [Note B.] §. 4. But viewing all created intelligences in their relation to GoD, and as brought into exis- tence purely by his will, for the purposes of wise and equitable government, it seems necessarily to arise out of his nature and moral perfections, that all such creatures must have been originally holy or positively inclined to Good in a moral sense. Every efficient cause imparts something, corres- pondent with itself, to its immediate effect; and therefore it may be safely affirmed, that from the First Cause, which is supremely, essentially, and unchangeably good and holy, nothing could pro- ceed, but what in a measure partakes of good- mess and holiness. But goodness and holiness, standing in direct opposition to all ideas of moral evil, must communicate to every such creature a native tendency and mental habitude towards all that was congenial with itself; and, in propor- tion thereunto, a degree of inaptitude and indis- position to moral evil. It seems also to be foun- ded in divine wisdom and equity, as well as in that benignity which the relation of a creator and father implies towards his intelligent offspring, that creatures, whose existence solely depended on Jehovah's will, and over whose conduct his (8) righteous government was to be exercised, either in conferring eternal benefits, or inflicting ever- lasting punishment, should be brought into exist- ence, and placed in circumstances of moral pro- bation, with a suitableness of nature and prin- ciples, qualifying and capacitating them for the proper discharge of all duties and obligations: otherwise it would be extreme injustice in the supreme Governor to blame and punish them for non-performance of perfect obedience. Accord- ingly man is said to have been “made upright”— created “in the image of God”— and the same we have reason to believe concerning the Angels. [Note C.] §. 5. The primary and essential cause of holi- mess in all intelligent creatures, is that Influence, which God imparts to their derived nature. Creatures have neither their existence, nor their faculties, nor their endowments sua sponte from themselves ; but receive them ea communicatione Dei, as the result of the divine will, and the effect of divine energy : And in their original formation, the same divine benevolence, which gave them being, endowed them with an holy nature, or with perfect rectitude of disposition, answerable to the state on which they entered as accountable agents. All good, therefore, is of and from GoD, the infinite, all-sufficient, self- existent good--who, solely for the manifestation of (9) his glory, communicated of his goodness both to angels and men. §. 6. Holiness in creatures, as arising from divine communication, may be viewed, either as a transient effect, or as an imparted principle and moral habit of the mind. These give us very different ideas of things; the former denoting that sort of momentary impulse, or fleeting impression, which leaves no fixedness of character, or well-grounded sentiment in the mind; the latter expressing a congeniality of the mental state with the nature of truth, and with the obligation or reasonableness of duty; out of which, as a divinely communicated principle, arise an aptitude and inclination of the moral powers to the percep- tion, approbation and pursuit of what is intrinsi- cally good and excellent. If the holiness of intel- ligent creatures, in their primitive estate, was but a transient effect, then it would seem as if they were not properly agents per se, but mere machines of divine agency, and as such only instrumentally capable of holiness which, I fear, would carry us far within the vortex of Philoso- phical Necessarianism, some of whose abettors have exploded all ideas of moral evil, on this very ground that there is properly but one Agent in the universe, by whose will and influence the wolitions and actions of all creatures are absolutely determined. [See Note D.]---It seems therefore (10) most proper to consider the original holiness of intelligent creatures, as a moral habit, or fixed principle of action in their minds ; not indeed necessarily and immutably determining their moral powers to perseverance in holiness, which would not have consisted with their state of moral probation, but yet subjectively capacitating them for, and predisposing them to it. This clearly corresponds with the Mosaic account of the crea- tion, which informs us, that man was created “in the image of God;” and that God, on beholding the whole work of creation, pronounced it to be “very good :” which appears to have had a more especial regard to the formation of man, as in some sense bearing the likeness of himself, and to have denoted, not merely a metaphysical goodness, or capability of producing a moral effect ; but posi- tive rectitude of both natural and moral powers, steadily and promptly disposing him to a full com- pliance with the will of his maker, or the law of his creation. [See Note E.] S. 7. As finite creatures, however, these pure intelligences existed in a state of dependence on their creator, and could not exercise their facul- ties and principles without influence from Him the infinite original essence ; which, so far as it extended, must have been favourable to their con- tinuance in purity and bliss, as proceeding from an infinitely holy source. This dependence of (11 ) creatures upon God may be viewed, either as natural and necessary, or as moral and voluntary; both being essential to their preservation in a state of holiness and happiness. The former of these was secured by the emergetic will of God; who, having brought them into being for the purposes of moral government, supports their physical existence and capacities by his immediate energy as the God of providence; having so constituted the principles of their nature, resting on his omnipresence and almighty power, that nothing short of his own omnipotence can reduce the lowest of created intelligences to a state of non- existence: in which state of natural and neces- sary dependence, thus constituted and supported by the will and providence of God, it is absurd to speak of their having a “Tendency to nihility, physically considered;” since the all-efficient will of Jehovah hath unchangeably established, as to all that stands connected with their physical exis- tence, a direct contrary tendency. Nor is any sentiment inconsistent with this conveyed by those words of the apostle in Acts xvii. 28. “In him we live, and move, and have our being”; but while we are hence clearly instructed into the doc- trine of God's general providence, exercised tow- ards us as creatures, in our continual preservation and support, we may likewise very properly con- sider them in connection with the purposes of (12) his moral government over us, as rational account- able creatures, in a sense most solemnly inte- resting to every intelligent being throughout the universe---viz. That the whole aggregate of intel- ligent existence, and each individual partaker, either of the human or of the angelic nature, liveth and shall eternally live, in all its essential principles (whatever modifications of being they may pass through) either in the heights of bliss, or in the depths of woe, supported by that same almighty energy, which first called them into being, without a possibility of, or the least tendency to annihilation - But with respect to the wr:LL-BEING, or conti- nued perfection and bliss, of intelligent creatures, their dependence on God is to be viewed as moral and voluntary. For, although their concreated principles of action were habitually good; capable of, fitted for, and disposed to, a life of holiness and devotedness to God and his glory, as the chief end of their creation; yet, as they derived these, together with their being, from Him the first cause of all things, and had their individual subsistence as created essences in a dependence upon him, as the ſountain of life and goodness, these very habits or principles of action could only be cherished and kept in lively exercise and in a full direction to their proper ends, by a continued. communication of holy influence from himself: ( 13 ) . even as the living branches of a tree flourish and bear their fruit by means of a constant supply from the root, or from the soil through the medium of the root. In respect of this, however, we must carefully recollect their proper character and condition as intelligent creatures, and so distin- guish between them and all parts of the inanimate and irrational creation, which involuntarily depend upon, and are mechanically influenced by, the energy of divine providence. Their dependence, as rational accountable beings, was of a moral and voluntary kind, to be maintained on their part by faith, prayer, and watchfulness, while it was encouraged on God’s part by proper views given them of his paternal character and covenant kindness. This moral dependence on God, was the prime duty and obligation of all intelligent creatures; and unquestionably implied his gra- cious readiness to impart of his communicative goodness, in answer to their faith and prayer. For, to suppose that accountable creatures were by divine constitution obligated to a devout acknowledgement of God, or a moral dependence upon him, and yet that God was not graciously disposed to own, accept and bless them in such acknowledgment of him, both contradicts every dictate of reason, and clashes with all the disco- veries of revelation. [See Note F.] To such moral dependence on God, however, they were C ( 14 ) not necessitated by any unchangeable constitution of the divine will, or positive influence of his grace absolutely securing their exercise of it, as the means of their continued preservation; but in this respect were left to their natural freedom, as moral agents, endowed with all suitable prin- ciples of good action, sufficiently instructed into the knowledge of their duty and happiness, and furnished with all proper motives to a cheerful and steady compliance therewith. Whence it is evident, that the whole state of dependence, which properly belonged to the nature of intel- ligent creatures, was so far from being any way disadvantageous to their continued perfection as moral agents, that it most favourably contributed thereunto; and in the fullest exercise of depen- dence, both physical and moral, their safety consisted. The more they felt, acknowledged, and duly improved their dependence on divine influence, the better capacitated and prepared they must have been, for properly discharging the duties, and fulfilling the conditions, of their probationary state. Nor have we hitherto seen any thing in their nature and constitution, as holy perfect creatures, that should in the least militate against, or indispose them to, the fullest exercise of such moral dependence. This acknowledgment of the creature's depen- dence on God, has bcen represented by some, as necessarily implying what they denominate “Passive Power", or an essential “tendency to defection morally considered.” But surely they have not closely examined this point, nor have allowed themselves to distinguish between that weakness and insufficiency, abstractedly consi- dered, which may be a property of MERE CREA- TURESHIP, and the qualified condition of PURE and PERFECT creatures, made “after the image of God, in knowledge, righteousness and true holiness.” Now, though physical weakness in a creature devoid of moral rectitude would have a “tendency to defection,” if not supported ab evtra; yet a proper sense of such weakness in a pure and perfect creature must have a direct tendency to engage and preserve his moral depen- dence on God, in which his safety consisted: and it surely cannot be questioned whether Adam, in his original state of knowledge and moral rectitude, had both a proper sense of his own weakness as a creature, and a disposition of mind to a due acknowledgement of it. [See Note G.] The creature's dependence, therefore, both that which is natural and necessary, and that which is moral and voluntary, hath a quite contrary tendency to what they understand by “Passive Power;” which, according to their mode of reasoning upon it, and the use to which they apply it, should rather denote some principle in ( 16 ) the nature of holy creatures, which stands in opposition to their due dependence on their Maker, and is continually tending to sink them into Self-sufficiency. §. 8. Such holy creatures, nevertheless, could have no claim to, nor in equity any right to expect, any such kind or degree of divine influence, as should render them IMPEccABLE: neither have we any ground to suppose that such creatures, even from the first moment of their existence, were under any such positive divine influence, as rendered them incapable of moral evil. [See Note H.] This is a point of no small moment, which deserves to be closely examined; as it seems to have been taken for granted by some, that, “ while Adam stood in his uprightness,” he was under a special degree of Sovereign favour, abso- lutely determining the exercise of his moral powers to good only, his “passive power” (as they express themselves) being then “controlled” by efficacious grace : and therefore, in order to establish their “hypothetical necessity” of his moral defection, recourse is had by them to a supposed “suspension of all sovereign or bene- volent influence,” leaving him in the state of his “proper passive power,” or natural “tend- ency to defection." There is indeed a degree of divine influence { ( 17 ) on the minds of intelligent creatures in certain circumstances, which absolutely raises them into a state of infallibility, and secures them effectually against all danger of sin. What has been called the Inspiration of immediate suggestion, in the certain prediction of far distant events, and the unerring declaration of such doctrines as wholly depend on divine revelation, comes under the former ; by which “holy men of God spake, as they were moved by the Holy Ghost." The absolute Impeccability of the human nature in the person of Jesus Christ and the Confirmation of “elect Angels” and of “the spirits of just men made perfect" in a state of indefectible purity and bliss in heaven, come under the latter. But besides these, we know not of any other intel- ligent creatures, on whose minds such a degree of divine influence ever was exerted, as absolutely raised them above all danger and possibility of moral evil. The creative energy of God, indeed, by which our first parents were called into existence “in his image," as perfect and holy creatures, was exerted by that kind of positive and direct influence, which infallibly and instantaneously secured its effect, without any co-operation of motives, or concurrence of their wills. But, between creative energy and that kind of divine influence, which these holy creatures were under, ( 18 ) from the first moment of their happy existence to that of their incipient defection, we may rationally conclude that there was a real and important difference; the former having given positive entity to what existed not before, the latter only sustaining in existence, and morally exciting to exercise, those mental powers and spiritual principles, with which human nature in them, was originally endowed. Hence the pro- priety and utility of those symbolical represen- tations, explicit admonitions, solemn denuncia- tions, and implied promises, whereof we are summarily informed in the Mosaic account of their entrance into paradise. We have not therefore, I apprehend, any substantial ground to suppose that Adam, after the first moment of his existence, was under any such positive divine influence, as rendered him impeccable, or that absolutely and efficaciously “controlled" any one principle in his holy nature; any more than we have reason to imagine that there existed in his nature, as a pure and perfect creature, any principle, however latent, which needed such control: But, being “created up- right"---aſter “the image of God"---in “know- ledge, righteousness and true holiness”---he was dealt with by his Maker, as became a rational accountable creature, with Benigmily as well as with Equity, through the medium of proper mo- ( 19 ) tives, which were morally adapted, though not rendered absolutely effective, to secure his conti- nuance in holiness and bliss. And consequently, such being most probably the case, there is no proper ground to assert or suppose that Adam, before he sinned, suffered any privation of spiritual endowment through “a suspension of divine fa- vour,” or withdrawment of positive influence ab extra by which he was left of God to what has been called his “proper passive power,” or a “privative tendency" in his nature to moral evil. [See Note I.] * §. 9. There is clearly a distinction to be made, between the Sustentation of Providence, and the EFFICIENCY of GRACE ; or, between the crea- ture's being upheld in a matural capability of exer- cising his powers and principles freely, and his being positively determined to a right or holy exercise of them. The former seems, not only a natural result of that paternal relation which God sustained towards innocent creatures, his intelligent offspring, but an exercise of justice towards them, as accountable agents: nor have we any authority from scripture to imagine, that, in any part of God's righteous procedure towards them, as a moral Governor, he once intermitted the display of his kindness and favour towards them, until by their disobedience they justly incurred his displeasure: on the contrary, from | ( 20 ) the Mosaic account of the primitive condition of our first parents it may rather be concluded, that, so far were they from being dealt with in “rigid equity, to the exclusion of all sovereign favour,” there was much GRACE and BENIGNITY inter- mingled with the whole of that original consti- tution, under which they were placed as moral probationers. Hence some of our most eminent orthodox Divines have not scrupled to call God's entering into covenant with man, and vouch- safing him a promise of eternal life and confirmed happiness, on the condition of his perfect com- pliance with the terms of that covenant, which were summarily comprised in his abstaining from the fruit of one particular tree, a SPECIAL ACT of GRACE both to himself and to the whole of his posterity in him. [See Note K.] And assur- edly, when we recollect what a pure and perfect creature man was made---with what physical and moral powers he was endowed---what communi- cations of light and truth he was honoured with ---and what excellent motives to love, honour and delight in his creator surrounded his primeval estate---we must see good reason for admitting such a reprentation of what is generally called “ the covenant of works.” flow then it should enter into any one's thoughts, that the infinitely good and wise author of all things dealt with creatures made in his own image, antecedently ( 21 ) to their having once offended against him in thought, word or deed, on such harsh and rigid principles, as cannot even be applied to his present dealings with rebellious men, who richly share in his unmerited mercies, and are “drawn as with cords of love,” is indeed passing strange, and can only be resolved into systematic accommodation. A thousand times better it would be to have no sentiment at all concerning the particular Modus of sin's origination, than that we should represent the character of the “blessed God" in this unami- able and forbidding aspect. Whilst, however, it appears congenial with the character and relation of God to his intelligent. creatures, that, in placing them in a probation-, state of such an awful and eternally interesting nature, he should both amply qualify them for it. by inmate principles of good action---surround them with strong and well adapted motives to the proper exercise of those principles---instruct them clearly into the nature and extent of their duty while he explicitly revealed the Test of their obe- dience---and sustain them by his providential influ- ence in a capacity of acting with perfeet freedom as accountable creatures; it cannot be inferred from any sound principles of reason or justice, that the divine author of their being was any way obliged to deal with them in a way of BENEvo- LENCE ONLY ; or to do the utmost that his wisdom, JD ( 22 ) power and goodness could have done to secure their continuance in purity and bliss. This would have absolutely precluded all moral-probation strictly so called, and have rendered the defection of intelligent creatures IMPossIBLE ; the permis- sion of which, as an event to be over-ruled by infinite wisdom unto ends worthy of God, and somehow calculated to display his glory in the view of the intelligent universe, however scanty and defective our apprehensions thereof may be, we may reasonably contemplate with most humble reverence, and adoring faith. Therefore, §. 10. In respect of positive Efficiency, and of that only, we may conceive of a suspension of divine influence, or rather we may call it the Nox. ExERTION of conFIRMING GRACE ; since it dotl: not appear from any scriptural evidence, nor cats. be consistently maintained, that any divine com- munication, which had been once imparted to the creature, was withdrawn, or withheld, antecedentiy to his abuse of liberty as a moral agent. [See: Note L.J.---Could any such act of privation be ascertained, it would clearly follow, that the crea- ture, from that moment ceased to be what he was, when he came into existence; and this, not through any act or choice of his own, but purely as the result of the divine will, which now changed the circumstances of his being, and deteriorated his mental endowments, without his having done ( 23 ) arly one thing to occasion a suspension, or depri- vation, of what he had before enjoyed as a perfect and holy creature. Even on the supposition that no such principle or property existed in his nature as “a tendency to moral defection,” still such act of privation or withdrawment of any divine influ- ence, which had previously been granted him, would affect the original perfection of his nature, and supersede the advantage of what was concre- ated with him: But, on the supposition of there existing in his very nature such a principle as “Passive power,” or an essential “tendency to moral evil, which nothing in the universe could possibly counteract,” but that very influence which is supposed to have been withdrawn, and this antecedently to any exercise of the creature's choice, is certainly to be viewed as giving up the unoffending creature to the full and irresistible effect of a principle, which must wholI.Y Dispose him to Evil, without the least power or advantage against it. Whereas, if we take a different view of the divine conduct towards intelligent creatures, and consider them as originally possessing concreated principles of moral rectitude, without any positive divine influence absolutely determining their proper exercise ; but left in their CREATION- STATE, to the due exercise and inprovement of those principles under the influence of proper (24) motives, in a state of moral and voluntary depend- ence on God, whose revealed will both instructed them into the necessity, and encouraged them in the exercise, of such dependence by faith, prayer and watchfulness; then no such thing as a priva- tion, or suspension, or withdrawment of any positive divine influence is introduced into the moral economy, to affect or deteriorate the primary condition of the creature; only a sove- REIGN ACT of GRACE was not vouchsafed, of which the moral agent could have no ground to complain, seeing he was neverthcłess dealt with by his maker and lawgiver in the united exercise of benignity and justice. - §. 1 1. This concreated principle of holiness, or perfect rectitude of all natural and moral powers, which intelligent creatures originally possessed, contained a DERIVED DEPENDENT SUFFICIENCY for what was required of them as moral agents, if duly exercised and improved : and, in the probation-state of creatures, proper objective means were afforded for such due exercise and improve- ment of this principle. The latter part of this position, I apprehend, will not be disputed by any one ; but against the former part of it a specious argumentation may be attempted from what has been called a “natural defect” essentially belong- ing to all intelligent creatures as such viz, their Jinite or limited mature, which necessarily distin- (25) guisheth them as derived dependent beings, and stands in direct natural contrast with the abso- lute perfection, independence, self-existence, and immutability of Jehovah. This therefore deserves our serious attention. - r And undoubtedly it is to be acknowledged, and by every pious heart will be most humbly and devoutly admitted, that the very best of creatures, and in their best estate, when compared with the infinite nature and absolute perfection of God, are inexpressibly disproportionate and defective. Before Him they are “less than nothing and vanity.” But, let us not lose ourselves, nor overlook the wisdom and glory of the great creator, by contemplating the original effect of his will and goodness only in a way of contrast with HIs natural and incommunicable perfections, or with that INFINITY of moral excellence, which He essentially and necessarily possesseth. Such infinite excellency of nature and attributes ExcLU- sIvELY belongs to GOD, and never should be viewed as the rule of creature-perfectness. It never existed as such, either in the divine counsel, or in God’s declared will. The creature's inad- equacy to THIS, therefore, is not strictly and properly to be viewed as an essential deſect of his nature ; otherwise every work of God had been necessarily imperfect. The line of creatural perfection is drawn er beneplacito Dei, according (26) to God's good pleasure; who in infinite wisdom hath fixed different orders of created intelligences in different degrees on the progressive scale of Being, and appropriately fixed a line of essential perfection to each. Whatever creature, then, in these several orders, possesseth all that complete- ness of natural and moral powers, which appertains to that degree of perfection on the scale of Being, in which his intelligent nature was originally placed ea beneplacito Dei, he is properly to be deemed a perfect, and not a defective creature. He is not the subject of any radical imperfection, implying a negation or absence of what essentially belongs to his nature in its purest state, as a creature ; and therefore in his primaeval circum- stances cannot be the subject of any “negative tendency” to moral evil. Accordingly it is said, “Thou hast made him (i.e. man) a little lower than the angels.” Ps. viii. 5. with reference to which natural distinction and subordination of created essences, the pious and ingenious Mr. Shaw, in his treatise on the “Angelical life,” thus expresseth himself. “ It “seemeth that the natural capacity of an Angel “is greater than of a Man, and so shall continue; “for they are distinct hinds of creatures. As a “beast cannot become so wise and intelligent as “a man, for then he would cease to be a Beast; “so neither can a man become so large and capa- (27) * ble as an Angel, for then he would cease to be “a man. Whether also they (the glorified saints) “shall be equal to them (the Angels) in positive “holiness or mo, I know not; whether they shall “ understand, and know, and love God, in all “degrees, as much as the angels: It seems rather “ that they shall not; because their capacity shall “not be so large. But if in this they be not “altogether equal to the angels, yet it implies “No IMPERFECTION ; for they shall be positively “holy as far as their NATURE is CAPABLE, and so “shall be PERFECT in THEIR KIND.” This also cuts the sinews of that subtle reason- ing in which some indulge, when they speak of some principle or property essentially belonging to all creatures, “ of which God is not the author” ---which is “not an object of his Will, any more “ than the essential nature of things.” For, as thè infinitely wise and holy creator did not bring into existence any order of intelligent creatures under a negation or defect of any principle or property essential to creatural-perfection ; so it was His good pleasure, which marked the exact boundary of that sphere, in which they were destined by him to move. And why, let me ask, should it be thought incompatible with an exercise of the divine // ill, that all creatures should be of a limited nature and capacity ? since it might easily be shewn, that this very circumstance or (28) property of their existence is most wisely con- nected with, and even necessary to, their existing in a state of moral probation, and subjection to equitable government. It will doubtless be allowed, that it was a proper object of Jehovah's Will, whether any creature should exist or not? and in his willing that they should exist, he also willed that they should commence their existence in a certain degree on the scale of Being ; and that they should respectively possess that very quantum of physical and moral power, which was exactly commensurate with the rule of perfection in that degree. The limitation of their nature therefore was both worthy of his wisdom, and properly an object of his will; unless it is to be: thought, either that any order of intelligent creatures approached, sua sponte et absºlue concilio divino, to the utmost degree of approximation to Deity, or that they all exist, by necessity of nature, in the same degree of entity and power, each of which is obviously absurd. And, as in their original constitution they laboured under no essential defect, whatever principles or properties. inhered in them as pure creatures of God, they may in strictness be said to have received them from him, as the author of their existence; being exactly what he willed them to be, and whose formation, as such, he looked upon with pleasure, and pronounced to be “very good.” (29 ) Hence therefore it may reasonably be conclud- ed, that the principles of moral rectitude, which all intelligent creatures possessed in their primitive estate, contained a derived dependent sufficiency for what was required of them as moral agents, if duly exercised and improved: Otherwise it would follow, that the creature in his most perfect state was necessarily under a suljective incapacity for that obedience, on which his everlasting welfare depended; which would be strange and unrea- sonable to suppose in the government of infinite wisdom and goodness over pure and accountable creatures. [See Note M.] The simple fact of the creature's subsequent failure cannot be satis- factorily adduced to disprove his original derived sufficiency of power to have stood; unless we must at once confound ACTUALs with POSSIBLEs, and deny all distinction between them ; which would strangely pervert the system of morals, and effectually preclude all just remorse, and sense of culpability, for past neglects of duty. For who would ever blame or reproach himself for his past conduct, if he were either conscious, or could satisfy his judgment by solid argument, that in the nature of things it was utterly impossible for him to have acted any otherwise than he did Nor are we now representing these holy creatures, as then possessing an independent sufficiency, in and of themselves, but a derived sufficiency, in E ( 30 ) the evercise of such dependence on God, as we have before spoken of; into the nature, necessity and advantage of which they were doubtless well instructed and informed. Therefore, §. 12. In the very moment of their incipient defection they had a derived sufficiency to have stood in their integrity and bliss, if they had not neglected that moral dependence on God, in which as a means their safety consisted. There was no subduction, nor weakening of any principle, which had been concreated with their nature ; neither did their kind creator withdraw his providential influence from them, or deny them any wonted communications of his favour and love, while they conversed with, and looked up to him, by medi- tation, faith and prayer: and, though their finite capacities and their state of moral probation neces- sarily rendered their happy condition mutable, and themselves liable to defection and loss of purity and bliss: there was nothing, either in the essential principles of their nature, or in the circumstances of their primaeval estate, which, with such habitual dependence on God as most honourably became them, rendered it NATURALLY IMPossIBLE, or impracticable in the nature of things, for them to have continued in their original holiness and felicity. They were under no positive influence ab extra, either from the decretive will of God, or from the effective energy of his provi- ( 31 ) dence, impelling them to any sinful volitions: They were, in the perfection of their nature, adequate to the right performance of duty, in a state of moral dependence on God: and, as rational beings, it was in their option to exercise such moral dependence, in the centemplation of any motives which presented themselves before their minds. Their conduct therefore, as moral agents, was free, voluntary, and self-determined; and for any thing which we are able to discover in their nature, either internally or externally, might with high probability have terminated in their adherence to virtue and happiness. [See Note N.] §. 13. In thus expressing myself, however, I do not mean to call in question the eventual certainty of the creature's defection, as an object of divine Foreknowledge, nor to insinuate any thing, from such eventual certainty, against the wisdom and goodness of the divine conduct in the formation of intelligent accountable creatures. To imagine that the final result of a state of moral probation should not be perfectly ascertained in the counsel of an eternal, omnipresent, all-wise and unchangeable Being, would be inconsistent with all ideas of infinite perfection ; and would imply, either that no absolute plan of his own conduct existed in his all-comprehending mind, or that the uniformity of his might be interrupted by unforeseen occurrences, through the miscon- ( 32 ) duct of dependent creatures. The designation of his “only begotten Son,” however, to the office of mediator, “before the mountains were brought forth."---his purpose of grace in Christ Jesus, respecting the salvation of individuals, “from before the foundation of the world"---and that “counsel of his will,” according to which he is said to “work all things” in the course of his providence, are plain scriptural evidences that the moral defection of intelligent probationers was infallibly ascertained in the view of his infinite understanding from everlasting ages. But, with respect to the practicability of our explaining the modus of this ; or the consistency of God's infal- lible foreknowledge of contingent events, and of his decrees concerning them, with the free agency of intelligent creatures, all attempts hitherto made have proved in great measure unsatisfactory; and, most probably, the investigation is of too sublime a nature for the present state of our faculties to reach. Suffice it therefore to say, that, although with finite capacities, free agency, or a state of perfect liberty in a moral agent, must occasion such contingency of events as will preclude certain foreknowledge; yet the same doth not apply to God's infinite and absolutely perfect nature, whose 'Capacity and Modes of knowledge, as an eternal, omnipresent Being, essentially differ from, and inconceivably surpass, the greatest stretch of cre- ( 33 ) ated intellect. Unless therefore we could com- prehend the infinite excellencies of Deity, we can never feel ourselves warranted to argue from the effect of contingency amongst men, against the possibility of His most certainly knowing the result of all combinations of circumstances, in which moral agents are at any time left to act with absolute freedom of choice, even should it amount to a “Self-determining power." It is undeniable, however, that God's foreknowledge, simply consi- dered, had not the least causal influence on the declination of the creature's mind from a state of perfect rectitude: and as to any concurrence of his providence with the sinful acts of moral agents, this can only be viewed in the sustentation and excitement of their physical emergies, without in the least affecting or interfering with, either their natural freedom, or their moral quality; and in his eventually over-ruling them to the manifesta- tion of his own glory, as the first and noblest end of creation. ( 34 ) IREFLECTIOJWS. __***\\\\ee’ 1. According to the statement which has been given of the primary condition of intelligent creatures it may be seen, how reasonably depen- dent existence and moral agency are to be viewed with pleasure and thankfulness, as effects of the divine will, wisdom and goodness! the glory of God, in the display of all his perfections, is un- doubtedly the first, the highest, and the worthiest end of all his works and ways ; in subserviency to which we should always contemplate the existence of intelligent creatures, and not consider their happiness as the only or supreme end of their introduction into being. Yet we have good reason to believe that the creature's duty is inse- parably connected with his happiness ; and that the more he is concerned to glorify God, in the consecration of his natural and moral powers to their proper uses, the more certainly will he contribute to secure his own true honour and felicity. Neither can pure intelligences have cause to complain of their being placed under any ( 35 ) circumstances of moral probation, in subserviency to the glory of their creator, when it can be made appear, that those circumstances were equitably and wisely adapted to their original capacities, and also attended with high moral advantages for their continuance in purity, obedience and bliss. 2. According to this view of the primary condition of man, as a moral agent, no reasonable objection can be raised against the equity and goodness of that faederal constitution, which was settled with Adam, as the head and representative of his whole posterity. Had it been possible that the whole race of Adam, existing in a state of moral rectitude, could have been previously con- sulted on the proposal of such a plan for ascer- taining the disposition, and securing the happiness of their common nature; there seems little reason to doubt that every individual, judging either according to the degree of capacity and suitable- ness in the agent, or according to the weight of motive, or moral inducement, to a proper and vigi- lant discharge of duty, as well as in cheerful agree- ment with the sovereign good-pleasure of their maker---would have approved, acquiesced in, and even admired the plan of establishing a covenant with their natural head on the behalf of himself and his whole posterity; especially when the test of his obedience was so explicitly defined, so reasonable, and so easy: Neither is it probable, ( 36 ) if the result of Adam's probation had been the con- firmation of human nature in purity and bliss, that any one of his descendants would ever have ques- tioned the propriety and excellency of that original constitution. In its most unfavourable issue, how- ever, the moral principles of this faederal establish- ment remained the same, as if a contrary result had taken place; and it is but reasonable that the constitution be estimated from its own principles and provisions antecedently considered, and not: by the event of its experiment, which would be overlooking all moral advantages in the sphere of human agency. - & ." The direct tendency of this whole establish- ment, including the purity of human nature, the perfect knowledge which Adam had of the circum- stances of his own condition as a creature, and the suitableness of all the motives with which he was surrounded, to engage his love of God, and his moral dependence on him by faith and prayer--- was clearly favourable to his continuance in a state of holiness and bliss.---But on this point I have. elsewhere more fully expressed my thoughts; and therefore refer the reader to “Remarks on a recent hypothesis respecting the origin of moral evil”---pp. 84, 85. 3. According to the preceding statement of the primary condition of intelligent agents, it will follow, that the only consistent way of accounting ( 37 ) for their eventual defection, must be by tracing out, if possible, the commencement and progress of that state of mind, in which by some means, they were inadvertently induced to neglect a moral dependence on their maker; in which (mediate) by way of means, their safety consisted. I say inadvertently induced ; for to imagine that intel- ligent creatures, duly acquainted with the proper- ties of their own nature, and the circumstances of their condition, should at once knowingly, wil- fully, and designedly withdraw their practical reverence of God, and moral dependence upon him, must imply that in themselves considered, they were not only weak, but wicked---not only defec- tible but diabolical, in their state of mere creature- ship; and would contradict all the ordinary pheno- mena of moral action even amongst the subjects of a fallen nature, unless when judicially given over to a reprobate mind. It is likewise worthy of attention, under what differing circumstances the defection of angels, and that of man took place, according to the best information we have concerning them ; the former having failed, and fallen into a state of rebellion against the authority of God, without the previous existence of any temptation; the latter being deceived and drawn into sin, by means of a tempter, who was permitted to assail and make trial of his virtue by the most artful insinu- F ( 38 ) ations. Under these differing circumstances it is to be supposed, that there was a difference in the species of their sin; and it may reasonably be concluded, that their minds, at first imperceptibly to themselves, and in gradual progression, declined from a state of rectitude and moral dependence upon God, not exactly in the same way, but by Some different kind of process. Here then seems to be the grand Desideratum, viz. how to conceive of their passing from the qualified condition of perfect and holy creatures, to the weakness of mere creatureship, without any privation or withdrawment on God's part of any moral or spiritual endowment which had been concreated with them Which privation would have deteriorated their mental state, and in propor- tion have disqualified them for good action, ante- cedently to, and independently of, their own choice or improper exercise of any one power they possessed.---As to this, however, we are not furnished with any decisive information in the scriptures; which do not profess a theoretical solution of recondite metaphysical questions, but content themselves with declaring the awful fact of the creature's defection, and with revealing God's gracious plan of human Salvation by Jesus Christ. - To resolve this into an essential “Tendency to defection morally considered, of absolute neces- (39) sity belonging to the nature of all intelligent creatures as such,” seems to be rather a cutting of the Gordian Knot, than satisfactorily solving the difficulty on any admissible data. For, according to this hypothesis, no created nature, abstractedly considered, can be said to possess even a negative goodness, or indisposition towards evil: In itself, uninfluenced by a sovereign act of grace, it verges or inclines to its own corruption. And how is this to be distinguished from what Pelagius and his followers stiled Inclinatio ad vitia, vel ad peccandum an inclination to vice, or to sin 2 For it is plain that they meant not a moral incli- nation, or sinful exercise of the Will, which they represented as counteractcd or prevented by the superadded principle of righteousness; but a dispo- sition and preponderance of the created NATURE, abstractedly considered, arising as they expressed themseves, “ ea conditione materia;” which there- fore, under a suspension or privation of what they called a supernatural and superadded grace, benefit or endowment, immediately and spontaneously disposed, influenced and determined the will and inferior appetites to the choice of what was evil and sinful. And, although the much respected author of a recent hypotheis calls this “Tendency to moral evil,” a dormant, inactive and wholly passive principle, yet the language in which he generally “expresseth himself concerning it, clearly implies (40) the contrary ; else why speak of its being “con- trolled” and “counteracted by sovereign favour;” and of its necessarily influencing the will to a wrong choice? “We may go on,” as a sensible writer observes, “to distinguish an evil propensity from its exercise, till we use words without ideas; for what is an evil propensity, but an evil bias, or a bias of the soul towards evil And whether it is possible to conceive of an inactive propensity in a rational being is doubtful.”---But even on the supposition of such a principle existing in every created intelligence, before the operation of that principle can take effect, we have to conceive of a contrary tendency being superseded, and the effect of it discontinued, that tendency I mean, of a sentimental and moral kind, which ariseth out of proper knowledge and innate rectitude of all the mental powers, into a holy disposition of heart, and a corresponding uprightness of action. It is mere begging of the question, to say that God dealt with the creature in “rigid justice to the exclusion of all sovereign favour,” or, that the creature was left of God “ under a suspension of benevolent influence, in the state of his proper passive power.” There is nothing like this revealed in the scriptures; yea, the entire constitution of the * Fuller's Answer to Philanthropos, p. 32. (41 ) first covenant clashes with this, being rather a condescending and benevolent establishment, by the sovereign will of God, resting indeed on the basis of the law of nature, but accompanied with encouraging views of the divine character, and with inviting motives to obedience. We have then still to contemplate the profound question, how perfect and holy creatures, duly instructed into all the circumstances of their con- dition, and having a proper knowledge of God, were drawn off from a moral dependence on Him, in which their safety and happiness consisted 2 That moral evil originated with THEMSELVEs, and in the voluntary exercise of their own minds--- not in any positive efficiency, or approving will of God---cannot for a moment be doubted by such as entertain any consistent views of truth---or have any reverence for the scriptures; which assure us that “God cannot be tempted of evil, neither tempteth he any one” of his creatures. But as to the particular modus of this origination of evil, it has always appeared to the best informed Moralists and Metaphysicians a subject of extreme difficulty, which most probably lies beyond the reach of human investigation; though the attempt, if conducted with modesty and diffidence, is neither sinful nor unbecoming. - From the clearest conceptions we are able to form of the abstract theory of Minds, both angelic (42) and human, Intellect and Will are the primary faculties, and the former influential on the latter Through the medium of that, all motives are presented, and all objects are contemplated, either as true and good, or false and undesirable; agree- ably to which the exercise of the will inclines, either in embracing, or in rejecting, that which stands in the view of the mind, whether it be of a speculative, or of a practical nature. It seems therefore, that moral defection in a holy creature must have commenced with the exercise of the Intellect, in the judgment which it formed of some object, about which the mind was employed; for it is according to the established course of nature, that the will should be under the direction of the understanding, and in obeying its dictates a con- sequence maturally ensues. Since therefore the creature's nature was necessarily finite, and his primitive condition by divine constitution mutable, it may be supposed, without any impeachment of his moral qualities, that some objects of enquiry, connected with the natural and moral perfections of Deity, or with the immensity of his works and ways, far exceeded the comprehension even "of Angels; from the contemplation of which, how- ever, we do not know that they were prohibited by any express revelation of the divine will; and that, through inadequate reasonings on some of these topics, those high and holy intelligences (43) might be inadvertently led into incorrect and injurious conclusions, of practical influence on such active minds; which, as the result of deep research, would naturally interest their own feel- ings, and, imperceptibly to themselves, weaken their due attention to the circumstances of their condition, and thus gradually superinduce a degree of disorder into their mental powers ; which having once acquired an improper direction, not counteracted by sovereign grace, would in- creasingly decline from a due dependence on God, and become more and more alienated from him in self-admiration, till at length their spirits became elated with pride, impatient of control, and so fell off from a moral subjection to divine authority. In this way some have ingeniously attempted to deduce the possibility and probability of angelic defection, which inspired men seem to represent under the species of Pride. (1. Tim. iii. 6. com- pared with Jude, v. 6.) from the unforbidden exercise of their finite powers on subjects of pro- found enquiry, either maturally transcending their comprehension, or sovereignly enveloped in the sublimest mystery. (See Southwell's “Intellectual freedom.” Pp. 46--70.) In relation also to the Fall of man, whose actual transgression of God's covenant was his eating of the forbidden fruit, but whose sin espe- cially consisted in unbelief, we have scripture- (44) evidence that this state of his mind was superin- duced through the deceptive influence of temptation, imposing upon his fallible judgment, and leading him into improper conclusions; which not only weakened the due authority of his reason over his sensitive appetites, but betrayed him into a false apprehension of objects insidiously presented before his mind by the tempter, and then, by natural consequence, occasioned his will to make choice of that, as the medium of a desirable good, which was expressly forbidden in the terms of God's covenant with him, as the positive test of his obedience. [See Note O.] Accordingly we not only read that “the woman being deceived was in the transgression” (1. Tim. ii. 14.) and that “Satan beguiled Eve by his great subtilty”. (2. Cor. xi. 3.) but, in immediate connection with the account of man's primitive integrity, we are led to contemplate his Fall, and perhaps that of Angels, through such deceptive process of mind, in Eccles. vii. 29. “God made man upright: but they have sought out many inventions :" or, as a learned Critic interprets the word, ingenious con- jectural reasonings; which served only to perplex the judgment, to pervert the will, and to disorder the affections of the heart. [Note P.] The particular and mediate occasion of this disordered state of mind in Man was the temptation of Satan, the nature, circumstances and progress of ( 45 ) which, I have elsewhere considered; see “Remarks on a recent hypothesis,” &c. pp. 98--102: And therefore I conclude these Thoughts with observing that, whether this mode of accounting for the defection of intelligent holy creatures be deemed satisfactory or not, it has at least the advantage of not affirming any thing, as an essential property of their nature, which is palpably inconsistent with moral rectitude, or obviously repugnant to the dictates of sound philosophy. ( 46 ) JVOTIES ,A1JVI) REIFERIEJV(CjES, ~$\\\\\.-.•^ [A.] ** Homo in puris naturalibus dicitur, Saith Turrettine, qui constat partibus et proprietatibus essentialibus, absque done justitiæ originalis et sine ullis qualitatibus vel habitibus superad- ditis, bonis vel malis. Et status purae naturae vocatur puritate negativa, non positiva, qua scilicet naturae superadditum, bonum vel malum, nihil habet. Non quæritur, an concipere possimu8 hominem in puris naturalibus, cogitando de ejus bonitate, ve! malitia, quod utrinque est in confesso: Sed an homo, qualis e manu Dei prodiit, in tali statu conditus sit, vel condi saltem potuerit ? quod negamus.'' Inst. theol. de Creatione, Q. ix. §. 1 & 2. [B.] '' Res nobis hic est cum Pelagianis veteribus et novis ; quorum illi, ut peccatum originale destruerent, et liberum arbi- trium stabilirent, finxerunt statum puræ naturæ, in quo homo conditus fuerit ab initio, et quotidie etiam nascatur. Quo pertinent illa Pelagii apud Augustinum de peccato originali, Cap. 13. ** Omne bonum ac malum, quo vel laudibiles, vel illaudabiles $umus, Inon nobiscum oritur, sed agitur a nobis. Capaces enim utriusque rei, non pleni nascimur ; et, ut sine virtute, ita et sine vitio procreamur, atque ante actionem propriæ voluntatis, id solum in homine est quod Deus condidit.” Isti vero illis in eo adstipulantur, ut facilius tueantur Justitiam originalem fui$$e donum superwaturale, superadditum naturae, tanquam aureum frænúm, et remedium langwori et norbo ( 47 ) *iaturae, qui ex conditione materiæ oriebatur ; unde naturam puram et lapsam non aliter differre volunt, quam nudum a spoliato, ut Bellarminus loquitur de gratia primi hominis, Cap. 5. qui non aliter inter se discrepant, nisi quod hic amiserit, quod alter nondum habuit ; ut proinde pura natura se habeat instar negationis, lapsa vero instar privationis ; atque ita volunt Adamum creatum fuisse in puris naturalibus.” Idem---de Creatione, Q. ix. §. 4. [C.] ** Ubi duo sunt mediate opposita, quæ subjecto alicui competunt, eorum alterutrum necesse est illi inesse. At justitia et peccatum de homine predicantur, tanquam subjecto eorum 3exr!«os, et sibi ea saas opponuntur : Ergo necesse est alterutrum iJli inesse ; nec potest dari homo, quin sit vel justus, vel peccator.---Deus poterat quidem hominem non creare, sed posito quod voluerit creare, non poterat illum creare exlegem, et homini creato non pomere legem ; quia, ut depen- dentia physica essentialis creaturae a Creatore datur semper in . genere Entis, ita et ethica dari debet in genere Moris : Imo quamvis Deus nullam legem externam illi posuisset, Conscientia,