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D58
1890
COMMENTARIES
ON THE LAW OF
3-2024
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
BY
JOHN F.''DILLON, LL.D.,
MEMBER L'INSTITUT DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL; LATE PROFESSOR OF REAL ESTATE
AND EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE IN COLUMBIA COLLEGE LAW SCHOOL ;
FORMERLY CIRCUIT JUDGE OF THE UNITED STATES
FOR THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, AND
CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME
COURT or IOWA.
FOURTH EDITION,
THOROUGHLY REVISED AND ENLARGED.
VOL. I.
BOSTON:
LITTLE, BROWN, AND COMPANY, .
1890.
Entered, according to Act of Congress, in the year 1881,
By John F. DILLON,
In the Office of the Librarian of Congress, at Washington,
Copyright, 1890,
BY JOHN F. DILLON.
UNIVERSITY PRESS :
JOHN WILSON AND SON, CAMBRIDGB.
TO THE
HONORABLE SAMUEL F. MILLER, LL.D.,
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE UNITED STATES.
YOUR ACKNOWLEDGED MASTERY OF THE SUBJECT TO WHICH
THIS WORK RELATES MAKES IT FITTING,
YOUR ESTABLISHED AND PERMANENT RANK IN OUR JURIDICAL AND
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY AS A GREAT AND ILLUS-
TRIOUS JUDGE MAKES IT AN HONOR,
AND OUR LONG AND UNBROKEN FRIENDSHIP MAKES IT A
RENEWED PERSONAL PLEASURE,
ALBEIT THE EVENING SHADOWS OF OUR LIVES FALL
UPON THE PAGE,
TO REINSCRIBE TO YOU WITH UNALTERED REGARD AND VENERATION
THIS REVISED EDITION OF A WORK WHICH, MORE THAN
EIGHTEEN YEARS AGO, WAS ORIGINALLY
DEDICATED TO YOU.
PREFACE TO THE FOURTH EDITION.
In the nine years that have passed since the last edition
of these Commentaries appeared, constitutional provisions
have been adopted, legislative enactments passed, and
numerous State and Federal decisions made on the im-
portant subjects which are embraced in its plan. And
thus the law has not only been still further extended on
previous lines, but it has in material respects been modi-
fied, altered, and enlarged. This is well known to those
who have kept currently informed of the general progress
of our jurisprudence; it will be apparent to all who shall
compare the chapters of the present edition with the
corresponding chapters of the previous edition upon
Constitutional Limitations, Contracts, Streets, Eminent
Domain, Taxation, Actions and Liabilities.
That the work shall adequately present the law relating
to our Municipalities as it exists to-day, the author has
spared no reasonable labor. The adjudged cases to date
have been examined one by one, and the results thereof
are embodied in this edition.
Grateful to the Courts and to the Profession for the
favor with which from the first they have regarded the
work, and with, as the author trusts, a pardonable ambi-
tion on his part to improve it, he deems it to be due to
them, as well as to himself, to state that he has sought
with diligent and loving care to make the revision thor-
vi
PREFACE TO THE FOURTH EDITION.
ough, and that to this end he has personally gone over
not only every section but every sentence, and has made
such changes as the expansion of the law required and
his own maturer judgment approved. Scarcely a single
section is without alterations or additions.
A few further observations may be permitted, if, indeed,
they are not required. In this day of the unprecedented
multiplication of law books, there are two questions which
the profession may as of right put to an author. The
first is, Can your work justify its existence? The justi-
fication of the present Treatise is placed on the grounds
quite fully stated in the preface to the first edition, which
in substance are, that the subject is of acknowledged
importance in all the States and Territories of the Union;
that no English work is applicable or adequate; and that
no other American work thereon existed or exists.
The other question is, Can it justify its size ? An
elementary treatise may be wrought out upon one of two
different plans. The one is to state as clearly as may be
ultimate legal principles without any or much elaboration
of their grounds and reasons. It requires the mind of a
master to frame propositions which shall be at once com-
prehensive and exact. Instinctively the profession in both
countries has immemorially shared in Lord ElDon's fear
of the dangers that lurk in abstract and general prop-
ositions. The other is to state such propositions and
principles, but to state them in connection with the rea-
sons and grounds on which they rest, which are chiefly
to be found in the adjudged cases.
The latter course has
been here pursued, for reasons which are peculiarly forcible
in a treatise on this subject and in this country. Our
Municipalities are inseparably connected with the organic
framework and with the daily action of our political insti-
tutions. The law relating to them is developed day by
day in the actual workings of those institutions in every
PREFACE TO THE FOURTH EDITION.
vii
section of the country, and this development registers
itself in constitutional provisions, in statutory enactments,
and in judicial judgments. In this work the people, the
legislatures, and the Courts, State and National, all take
their respective parts, of which perhaps the most impor-
tant, certainly the most varied and constant, is the part
taken by the judicial tribunals. It is the high and deli-
cate office of the judiciary department to elaborate the
rough materials of our daily experience and litigation into
the enduring products of law and justice, and to place on
record for our instruction and guidance the reasons of the
Judges for every step in this wondrous, this ceaseless, this
beneficent process.
No writer on our jurisprudence is authorized to speak
oracularly, to excogitate a system, or to give to his views
any authoritative sanction. To this rule the most eminent
are no exception, since every work upon our law is neces-
sarily unauthoritative. No author can alter this inexorable
condition; and any author ought to be content, and cer-
tainly will be fortunate, if he can leave on the imperishable
structure of our jurisprudence some visible imprint, some
lasting touch, some embodied memorial, however slight, of
his labors. Even judicial judgments, if unaccompanied by
the reasons on which they rest and which give to them
their real worth, would have no recognized standing and
ought to have none—in the professional estimation and
regard.
It is the humble function — but, at the same time, the
priceless privilege of an author to traverse the wide,
rich, and varied fields which the legislative records and
the judicial reports of all the peoples in both hemispheres
who have adopted the institutions and who use the tongue
of England thus open to him; to gather, analyze, and
compare, and then to state the results of his labors and his
studies, accompanied with his own reflections, criticisms,
viii
PREFACE TO THE FOURTH EDITION.
and conclusions, which, however, have the value, and only
the value, that their reason, soundness, and justice give to
them.
The ancient mere-stones of the law must not be removed,
but reverently preserved and regarded. It is, however, a
mistake and a delusion to suppose that they either do or
can permanently mark the actual or necessary boundaries
of our jurisprudence. “In all forms of government,” said
Mr. BURKE, “ the people is the true legislator; there are
only two foundations of law, -equity and utility.” This
is especially true of the American States.
The wants
and welfare, the usages, customs, and settled notions of
our people and their collected will necessarily find ex-
pression in our constitutions, statutes, and jural system.
While the function of the judge is pre-eminently declara-
tive, it is also necessarily, though subordinately, legislative;
that is, he inevitably makes law in and by the very pro-
cess of administering it. Whatever is of worth in this or
in any legal work comes mainly from the judgments of the
courts. The author desires to add that the work is purely
technical, and is intended for the legal profession in every
part of the country, - for lawyers who have no access to
full libraries, as well as for those who have. For these
reasons he has made the notes as full as practicable within
the space allotted. If any shall complain of undue elabo-
ration in this respect swelling the size of the book, the
author craves leave to state it as his opinion that they
probably constitute its most valuable and useful feature.
J. F. D.
NEW YORK, May, 1890.
!
PREFACE TO THIRD EDITION.
A REVISION of this Treatise has for some time been needed, but
the pressure of other duties has, until recently, prevented its
preparation. During the seven years that have elapsed since the
last edition an unusual number of cases has been decided upon
the various topics embraced in the work. The reported decisions
to December 1, 1880, have all been diligently examined, and the
results of such examination wrought into the texture of the pres-
ent edition. This has necessarily increased its size, and corre-
spondingly, it is hoped, its value. More than two hundred new
sections have been written, and over three thousand additional
cases cited. Every part has been gone over with conscientious.
care, and there is scarcely a section in which, either in the text
or the notes, additions and changes have not been made. It has
been necessary to sectionize the work anew, but the numbers of
the former sections are enclosed in parentheses.
In consulting the Reports the author has been surprised and
pleased to see the extent to which this Treatise las been used by
lawyers and judges as an aid to their labors; and in again pre-
senting it, in its new and altered shape, he gladly expresses once
more his sincere and profound gratification for the favor with
which it has been received.
J. F. D.
COLUMBIA COLLEGE LAW SCHOOL, NEW YORK,
January 1, 1881.
PREFACE TO SECOND EDITION.
The favor accorded to this Treatise by the profession is gratify-
ing to the author, and compensates for the great labor of its
preparation. Nothing can be more pleasing to an author than
the knowledge that the studious care given to a work is appre-
ciated by those for whom it was written : their approving opinion
is the reward he covets and enjoys.
The First Edition, published about twelve months ago and of
nearly double the usual size, has been exhausted, and at the re-
quest of the publishers the Second Edition has been prepared.
As before, this has been the personal labor of the author. All
reported cases, decided since the first publication, have been ex-
amined, and the text and notes prepared without the assistance
of others. While this edition embraces a summary of recent
cases to the latest date, and contains substantial additions, the
structure of the work is unaltered. Some new sections have been
added, and others re-written. The principal changes have been
made in the chapters which treat of Municipal Securities, Taxes,
and Assessments. The amount of negotiable bonds of munici-
palities largely exceeds the sum of the indebtedness of all the
States, and it has been the earnest endeavor herein to exhibit
accurately the American law upon this important subject.
In conclusion, it is deemed fitting to express to the Bench and
Bar of the country a sincerely grateful appreciation of the favor-
able judgment already pronounced, and a hope that the same,
upon further examination of the work, may be neither reversed
nor modified
J. F. D.
DAVENPORT, Iowa, 1873.
PREFACE TO FIRST EDITION.
The necessity for a work upon Municipal Corporations was so
seriously felt by the author when holding a seat on the Supreme
Bench of a State where questions relating to the powers, duties,
and liabilities of municipalities were presented at almost every
term, that he resolved, eight years ago and more, to endeavor to
supply the want. Although the subject is one of unsurpassed
practical importance, since nearly every considerable city and
town in the United States is incorporated, no American work
upon it has ever appeared. A careful examination of the English
treatises satisfied the author that they were, in a great measure,
inapplicable here, and that they fail to cover a large portion of
the existing field of the law upon the subject as enlarged by
American legislation and practice. True, our municipal system,
like the body of our jurisprudence, was derived from England,
but it is remarkable how many changes were necessary to adapt
it to our system of government and mode of administration, and
to the wants and situation of our people. Accordingly, if the
municipalities of the one country be closely compared with those
of the other, it will be found that, in their structure, powers, and
workings, they present quite as many points of difference as of
similarity.
We have popularized and made use of municipal institutions to
such an extent as to constitute one of the most striking features
of our government. It owes to them, indeed, in a great degree,
its decentralized character. When the English Municipal Corpo-
rations Reform Act of 1835 was passed, there were in England
and Wales, excluding London, only two hundred and forty-six
places exercising municipal functions; and their aggregate popu-
sii
PREFACE TO FIRST EDITION.
lation did not exceed two millions of people. In this country
oúr municipal corporations are numbered by thousands, and the
inhabitants subjected to their rule by millions.
Our municipalities are habitually clothed by the legislatures
with extensive, important, and diversified powers, and con-
sequently possess a much more composite character than in
England or elsewhere. Strictly, a municipal corporation is an
institution designed to regulate and administer the mere local
or internal concerns of the incorporated place in matters per-
taining to it, and not relating directly to the people of the State
at large. But in this country, much more generally than in Eng-
land, it is the practice to make use of the municipality, or of its
officers, as agencies of the State, for the exercise, on its behalf, of
public, in addition to corporate, duties and functions. From the
difference between these two classes of powers the American
courts have deduced consequences so important that it is as ne-
cessary as it is oftentimes difficult to distinguish between them.
Besides, it has unfortunately become quite too common with us to
confer upon our corporations extraordinary powers, such as the
authority to aid in the construction of railways, or like under-
takings, which are better left exclusively to private capital and
enterprise, and to create in their corporate capacity indebtedness
therefor, enforceable by actions in the courts, and which must be
paid by taxation.
Invested, also, within certain limits, with delegated legislative
authority concerning the property and conduct of their inhabi-
tants; with capacity, more or less extensive, to acquire and dispose
of property ; with the power to elect their own officers; to make
contracts; to incur liabilities; to exercise Eminent Domain; and
the more momentous power to levy and collect taxes, general
and special, — these corporate agencies are thus brought into
intimate and daily contact with the most important rights and
interests of their inhabitants, and as a result we have an amount
and variety of litigation not to be found in the tribunals of other
countries. In no English treatise on Municipal Corporations is
there a chapter upon the subject of civil actions and liabilities,
and no discussion of the question as to their amenability to
respond civilly in damages to individuals for acts of misfeasance,
or for neglect of duty; and, for reasons not material to be here
stated, the occurrence of questions of this kind in the English
PREFACE TO FIRST EDITION.
xiii
tribunals has been comparatively infrequent. The American Re-
ports, however, teem with cases on this subject, and the civil
liability of municipal corporations upon contracts and for torts,
and the mode of enforcing it, are with us the most important
practical topics requiring treatment in a work of this character.
There being no American work on this branch of the law, and
the decisions in this country relating to it being scattered through
the reports of the federal courts, and those of thirty-seven States,
there was little to guide the author, either as to the arrangement
of his subject, or as to what had been decided by the courts con-
cerning it. Accordingly he had no resource except to delve
laboriously for his materials among hundreds of volumes; but
these have, one by one, been examined by him with a view to
find all that could be advantageously used to illustrate the sub-
ject; and the result is given, either in the text or notes, as fully
as it was practicable within the compass of a single volume.
Nor has he overlooked the aid to be derived from other sources.
Every English publication relating to the subject in its legal or
practical relations has been subjected to examination; books
which could not otherwise be had have been specially procured
from abroad. And, throughout the present volume, no incon-
siderable pains have been taken to set forth wherein the English
and American municipalities differ, so that the applicability and
precise legal value of the judicial decisions of the former country
would be better understood.
When the work was resolved upon, the author hoped to proceed
with the leisurely care that would enable him to avoid the faults
which thorough deliberation might result in correcting. This
hope has not been as fully realized as he desired, for year by year
his official duties have more and more encroached upon his time,
leaving for this work only the diminishing intervals between
courts. In its preparation he has often envied the author by
profession the opportunity for continuous and unbroken labor,
and he cannot but feel that if his work had not been prepared in
fragments, it would not have fallen both so far below his ideal,
and what, under more auspicious circumstances, he bimself might
have made it. It is hoped, however, if it shall lack the symmetry
and finish such an author would have given it, that it may have
compensating advantages in its thoroughly practical character;
and these it will surely owe to that experience to which the mere
xiy
PREFACE TO FIRST EDITION.
student or professional writer must ever be a stranger, and which
can be had only upon the Bench or at the Bar.
Some peculiarities in the manner of its preparation will be
observed. The aim throughout has been to make a work which
will be useful to the profession. Aware that in most cases access
to complete law libraries cannot be had, the author has endeav-
ored, as far as practicable, to supply this want, and to make the
text and notes exhibit the substance of the adjudications. This
explains why so much care has been taken to cite the cases bear-
ing upon the subjects discussed, and accounts for the fulness of
proofs and illustrations to be found in the notes.
He trustfully submits the work, which fills up the interstices
between judicial duties for nearly nine years, to the profession
for whose assistance it is designed, and whose final judgment on
it will not be otherwise than just. If he could be assured that it
has a value at all proportioned to the labor first and last bestowed
upon it, he would venture to hope for a judgment not altogether
unfavorable.
DAVENPORT, IOWA, 1872.
NOTE. — The first edition of this work was dedicated as follows:
TO THE
HONORABLE SAMUEL F. MILLER, LL.D.
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE UNITED STATES.
Whether I share in the general admiration of your judicial talents, or listen to the
more persuasive suggestions of a voice that comes to me from long association at the bar
and upon the bench, there is no one to whom I can inscribe, so fittingly as to yourself,
a work relating to an important branch of that science which you have studied so deeply
and understand so well.
CONTENTS OF VOLUME I.
CHAPTER I.
MUNICIPAL INSTITUTIONS.
INTRODUCTORY HISTORICAL AND GENERAL VIEW.
Ancient cities. Grecian cities. Roman municipalities. State of towns in
Europe after the fall of the Roman Empire. Mediæval charters. Charters
of community in France. Modifications of Roman municipal system. En-
franchisement of towns in Spain, and its causes. Municipal system of Great
Britain. Historical sketch of boroughs: their incorporation and distinctive
features. Origin of popular representation. London and its municipal his-
tory and charters. Corruption and abuses in the English municipal corpo-
rations. Reform Act of 1835. Lord Brougham's services in promoting
inunicipal reform. American municipal system. Its early origin. Decen-
tralized character. Operation and effects. Corruption and abuses. Reme-
dies suggested. Results summed up
S$ 1-17
CHAPTER II.
CORPORATIONS DEFINED AND CLASSIFIED.
General definition. Municipal corporations defined. Different kinds and grades
of public corporations. Quasi corporations. New England towns : powers
and mode of government. City governments. The State as a public corpo-
ration
$$ 18-31
CHAPTER III.
CREATION AND SEVERAL KINDS OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
In England. — Royal and parliamentary corporations. The old English muni-
cipal corporations. Their diverse character. Integral parts. Abuses in
municipal rule. Municipal Reform Corporations Act of 1835. Abstract of
its leading provisions. Constitutes the English corporations upon a uniform
model.
In the United States, Created by State legislative enactment. Their
great numbers. Creation by Territorial legislatures. Special charters and
xvi
CONTENTS OF VOLUME I.
general incorporating acts. Outline of ordinary municipal charter. Ad-
vantage of general incorporating acts. Creation by implication. Accep-
tance of charter. Submission to vote of inhabitants. Local option laws.
Special constitutional provisions and their construction. General and special
acts. Restriction on municipal powers. Title of incorporating charter or
acts
$$ 32-51
CHAPTER IV.
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE CORPORATIONS DISTINGUISHED. — LEGISLATIVE POWER
AND ITS LIMITATIONS.
Importance of the distinction between public and private corporations. Differ-
ence defined. Scope of legislative authority. Complex character of ordinary
municipalities. Distinction between public or State and municipal or local
powers. Legislative authority over corporate funds and revenues. Limita-
tion in favor of creditors. Power over corporate boundaries and public prop-
erty. Whether municipal corporations are in any respect private. Cases
cited and criticised. Public powers and rights held at the will of the legis-
lature. Creditor's rights cannot be impaired. Illustratious from decided
Extent of legislative power over the private property of municipal
corporations discussed. May be compelled by the legislature to pay debts not
legally binding; and to incur debts against their will. Power over trust
property.
$$ 52-80
cases.
CHAPTER V.
MUNICIPAL CHARTERS.
General Municipal Powers.
Their Nature and Construction.
Charters defined. Judicially noticed. Proof of corporate existence; user ; le-
gislative recognition. Repeals and amendments. General laws and special
charters ; conflict ; constructions.
Extent of power; limitations ; canons of construction. Usage as affecting mu-
nicipal powers. Discretionary powers not subject to judicial control. Public
powers and trusts not capable of delegation. Legislative powers iņcapable of
surrender. Mandatory and discretionary powers; difference defined and illus-
trated. Revenues exempt from judicial seizure. Garnishment. $$ 81-101
CHAPTER VI.
MUNICIPAL CHARTERS (CONTINUED).
Special Powers and Special Limitations.
1. Wharves.
2. Ferries.
3. Borrowing money.
4. Limitation on power to become indebted.
CONTENTS OF VOLUME I.
xvii
5. Rewards for offenders.
6. Public buildings.
7. Police powers and regulations.
8. Prevention of fires.
9. Quarantine and health.
10. Indemnifying of officers.
11. Furnishing entertainments.
12. Impounding animals.
13. Party walls.
14. Public defence.
15. Aid to railway companies, and herein of the constitutional power of the
legislature; cases cited. Power must be express. Construction of
special grants of power; cases cited
• $8 102-164
CHAPTER VII.
DISSOLUTION OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
In England: 1. By act of parliament. 2. By loss of integral part. 3. By sur-
render. 4. By forfeiture. These modes, except the first, not applicable in
this country. Effect of dissolution on property and debts. Authorities re-
viewed. Revival of corporation and its effect
$$ 165-174
CHAPTER VIII.
CORPORATE NAME, BOUNDARIES, AND SEAL.
Corporate name. Name as respects grants and contracts. Name as respects
suits. Corporate boundaries. Legislative enlargement of territorial limits.
Territorial division; its effect on property and rights. Corporate seal ;
proof of
$$ 175-192
CHAPTER IX.
MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS AND OFFICERS.
1. Municipal popular elections.
2. Special tribunal to determine election contests for municipal offices.
3. Power to create and appoint municipal officers.
4. Oath and official bond.
5. Duration of official term.
6. Vacancies in municipal offices.
7. Refusal to serve in office.
8. Resignation of municipal office.
9. Compensation of municipal officers.
10. Liability of the corporation to the officer.
11. Liability of the officer to the corporation and to others.
12. Amotion and disfranchisement
88 193-256
VOL. I. -6
xviii
CONTENTS OF VOLUME I.
CHAPTER X.
CORPORATE MEETINGS.
1. Common-law requisites of a valid corporate meeting.
2. Notice of corporate meetings at common law and under the English
Municipal Corporations Act.
3. New England town meetings; requisites of notice and power of ad-
journment.
4. Constitution and meetings of councils or of select governing bodies; and
herein of quorums and majorities; of integral parts; and of stated,
special, and adjourned meetings.
Mode of proceeding when convened .
SS 257-292
5
CHAPTER XI.
CORPORATE RECORDS AND DOCUMENTS.
Means of evidence. Clerk pro tem. Power to amend records. Admissibility of
parol evidence. Remedy to compel delivery of books and records. Manda-
mus. Replevin. Inspection of corporate documents and records. Records
as evidence. Originals and authenticated copies
$$ 293-305
CHAPTER XII.
MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES OR BY-LAWS.
1. Definition, general nature, and common-law requisites of ordinances.
2. Signing, publication, and recording.
3. Power to impose fines, penalties, and forfeitures.
4. On whom biuding, and notice thereof.
5. Ordinances relating to the licensing, regulating, and taxing of amuse-
ments and occupations, including the sale of intoxicating liquors.
6. Ordinances relating to public offences.
7. Ordinances relating to the public health, safety, and convenience; herein
of hospitals, cemeteries, and burials; nuisances; markets and inspec-
tion regulations ; dangerous occupations and practices; and of the
police powers and general welfare clause in charters.
8. Mode of enforcing ordinances ; herein of actions and prosecutions and
their nature; mode of pleading ordinances; requisites of complaints to
enforce ordinances; construction ; defences; evidence, &c.
$$ 306-423
CHAPTER XIII.
MUNICIPAL COURTS.
In England, and at common law. American corporation courts. Constitutional
provisions. Constructions. Right to jury trial. Competency of citizens to
CONTENTS OF VOLUME I.
xix
be local judges, jurors, and witnesses. Summary convictions, when valid.
Indictable offences. Distinctions. Extent of jurisdiction. Jury on appeal.
Review by Superior Courts
$S 424-441
CHAPTER XIV.
CONTRACTS.
1. Extent of power to contract, and how conferred.
2. Mode of exercising the power.
3. Seal not necessary unless required ; may be concluded by vote or
ordinance.
4. When bound by contracts made by agents; mode of execution.
5. Contracts beyond corporate powers void ; ultra vires a defences
6. Implied contracts; when deducible.
7. Ratification of unauthorized contracts.
8. Provisions requiring letting to the lowest bidder.
9. Contract of suretyship.
10. Rights and liabilities as respects authorized contracts; cases mentioned.
Power to settle disputed claims; to give extra compensation; to em-
ploy attorneys.
11. Contracts for public works; rights of contractors.
12. Same: corporate control under stipulation.
13. Evidences of indebtedness; negotiable bonds.
14. Ordinary warrants or orders; their legal nature.
15. Liability of indorsers thereof.
16. Payment and cancellation of orders and warrants.
17. Rights and remedies of holders thereof.
18. Defeuces thereto; ultra vires; fraud; want of consideration.
19. Orders payable out of particular fund.
20. Interest on corporate indebtedness.
21. Railroad aid bonds ; course of decision in United States Supreme Court.
22. Leading cases in the United States Supreme Court on the subject
noticed.
23. Decision in State courts referred to. Author's conclusions stated.
$$ 442-555
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
543,
A.
Page
Page Adams v. Rome (59 Ga. 765) 550, 677
Aaron v. Broiles (64 Tex. 316) 217
2. Saratoga & W. R. Co. (11
Abbett v. Johnson County (114 Ind.
Barb. 414)
853
67)
1173 v. Saratoga &. W. R. Co. (10
Abbey v. Billups (35 Miss. 618) 274, 522
N. Y. 328)
707
Abbot v. Hermon Sch. Dist. (7 Me.
v. Somerville (2 Head, 363) 947
118)
541 v. Walker (34 Conn. 466) 1320
Abbott v. Cottage City (143 Mass.
v. Whittlesey (3 Conn. 560) 323
521)
742, 760, 761, 763, 768 v. Wiscasset Bank (1 Me. 361) 1173
v. Mills (3 Vt. 521) 746,752, 763, 786 | Addis v. Pittsburgh (85 Pa. 389) 521,
v. Yost (2 Denio, N. Y. 86) 324
544
Abel v. Pembroke (61 N. H. 357) 209 Addy v. Janesville (70 Wis. 401) 1322
Aberdeen Acad. Trs. v. Aberdeen Adley v. Reeves (2 M. & S. 60) 416, 421,
(21 Miss. 645) 104, 123, 135
477
Aberdeen R. Co.v. Blaikee (1 Macq. Adolph v. Cent. Park, &c. R. Co.
A. C. 461)
514
(65 N. Y. 554)
864, 865
v. Saunderson (16 Miss. 663) 104, 135 Adriance v. New York (1 Barb. 19) 1114
Abernethy v. Dennis (49 Mo. 468) 798 Adsit v. Brady (4 Hill N. Y. 630) 325
v. Van Buren (62 Mich. 353) 1296 Aërated Bread Co. v. Gregg (L. R.
Abilene v. Hendricks (36 Kan. 196) 1298
8 Q. B. 355)
417
Achley's Case (4 Abb. Pr. 35) 292, 296, Ætna L. Ins. Co. v. Middleport (124
352
U. S. 534)
639
Ackley Sch. Dist. v. Hall (113 U. S. Ætna Mills v. Waltham (126 Mass.
135)
87, 560, 582
122)
1187
Adair w. Kingston (27 U.C.C. P. 126) 1298 African Soc. for Mut. Relief v. Varick
Adams v. Albany (29 Ga. 56) 397, 406,
(13 Johns. 38)
260, 262
431 Agawam v. Hampden County (130
v. Beale (19 Iowa, 61)
1002
Mass. 528)
53
v. Carlisle (21 Pick. 146) 1263 Agawam Nat. Bank v. South Had-
v. Clarksburg (23 W. Va. 203) 709
ley (128 Mass. 503) 536, 639, 1144
v. Emerson (6 Pick. Mass. 57). 816 Agnew v. Brall (124 Ill. 312)
551
v. Farnsworth (15 Gray, 423) 533 v. Corunna (55 Mich. 428) 1252, 1262
v. Hastings & Dak. R. Co. (18 Ahrens v. Fiedler (43 N. J. L. 400) 1014
Minn. 260)
853 Aiken T. Council v. Harbers (6
v. Hill (16 Me. 215)
560
Rich. L. 96)
431
v. Lancashire & Y. Ry. Co. (L.
v. Lithgoe (7 Rich. L. 435) 752, 757,
R. 4 C. P. 739)
1300
761, 762
v. Lindell (5 Mo. App. 197)
992 Aikin v. Albany, Vt. & C. R. Co.
o. London Ry.. Co. (2 Macn. &
(26 Barb. 289)
673
Gor. 118)
1115 v. Western R. Co. (20 N. Y. 370) 182
v. Mack (3 N. H. 493)
380 Airy Street, Re (113 Pa. St. 281) 87, 88
v. Memphis & M. R. Co. (2 Akron v. Chamberlain (34 O. St.
Coldw. 645)
649, 676
328)
1227
v. Minneapolis (20 Minn. 484) 257 Alabama & Fla. R. Co. v. Kenney
v. Natick (13 Allen, 429)
1258
(39 Ala. 307)
683
v. Newfane.(8 Vt. 271)
715 Alabama' Gold L. Ins. Co. v. Lott
v. Rivers (11 Barb. 393)
817
(54 Ala. 499)
1107
xsii
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
Page
Page
Alabama University Trs. v. Walden Alexander v. Tolleston Club (110
(15 Ala. 655)
313
Ill. 65)
671
v. Winston (5 S. & P. 17)
123
v. Wilmington & R. R. Co. (3
Alameda Macad. Co. v. Williams
Strob. L. 594)
166
(70 Cal. 534)
978 Alexandria & F. Ry. Co. v. Alexan-
Albany, Re (23 Wend. 277) 157, 1127, 1131
dria & W. R. Co. (75 Va.
v. Watervliet T. & R. Co. (108
780)
809
N. Y. 14)
694 Alexandria Bank. [See Mech. Bank
v. Cunliff (2 N. Y. 165) 519, 529,
of A.]
1184 Alexandria Canal Co. v. Swann (5
Albany Comr's, &c. (56 N. Y. 144).
How. 83)
552
See Washington Park, &c. Alger v. Lowell (3 Allen, 402) 1257,
Albany Nat. Bank v. Albany (92
1259, 1264, 1287
N. Y. 363)
539 | Allaire v. Hartshorne (21 N. J. L.
Albany Northern R. Co. v. Brownell
665)
583
(24 N. Y. 345)
776 Alleghany Co. Sch. Com’rs v. A.
Albany Street, Re (6 Abb. Pr. 273) 157
Co. Com’rs (20 Md. 449) 1013,
Re (11 Wend. 148) 693, 700, 920
1060
Alberger v. Baltimore (64 Md. 1) 152 | Alleghany Co. Sup. v. Van Campen
Albert Cheese Co. v. Leeming (31
(3 Wend. 49)
299
U. C. C. P. 272)
538 | Allegheny v. Campbell (107 Pa. St.
Albion v. Hetrick (90 Ind. 545) 1264, 1285
530)
179, 1205, 1206
Albright v. Bedford County (106
v. McClurkan (14 Pa. St. 81) 630,
Pa. St. 582)
316
531, 538
v. Chester T. Council (9 Rich.
v. Ohio & P. R. Co. (26 Pa. St.
L. 399)
516
355)
811, 850
Albritton v. Huntsville (60 Ala. 486) 138, v. Zimmerman (95 Pa. St. 287) 449
1280, 1283, 1284, 1286, 1301 Allegheny City's Appeal (41 Pa. St.
Alcona v. White (54 Mich. 503) 1128
60)
1000
Alcorn v. Horner (38 Miss. 652) 77, 920 | Allegheny County v. Gibson (90 Pa.
v. Philadelphia (44 Pa. St. 348) 1195,
St. 397)
1167, 1168
1202 v. Leckey (6 S. & R. 166)
361
v. Philadelphia (112 Pa. St. 494) 960 v. Shaw (34 Pa. St. 301)
1175
Alden v. Alameda County (43 Cal. Allen v. Balt. & O. R. Co. (Virginia
270)
1028, 1142
Coupon Cases] (114 U. S.
v. Minneapolis (24 Minn. 254) 1225,
311)
996, 1120, 1121
1319 v. Brooklyn (4 Fisher Pat. Cas.
v. Pinney (12 Fla. 348)
788
598)
1180
v. Rounsville (7 Met. 219) 272 v. Burlington (45 Vt. 202) 1148
Aldred's Case (9 Coke, 59)
889, 890 v. Chippewa Falls (52 Wis. 430) 1322
Aldrich v. Drury (8 R. I. 554)
817 v. Cooper (22 Me. 133) 360, 541
v. Gorham (77 Me. 287) 1262, 1263 v. Decatur (24 III. 332)
1188
v. Howard (7 R. I. 87; 8 R. I.
v. Drew (44 Vt. 174)
921
246)
449, 454, 475 v. Galveston (51 Tex. 302) 146, 520,
v. Londonderry (5 Vt. 441) 1143
933, 944, 957, 995, 1000
v. Pelham (1 Gray, 510)
1266 v. Hancock (16 Vt. 230)
1264
v. Providence (12 R. I. 241) 1222 0. Jay (60 Me. 124) 233, 573, 695,
v. Tripp (11 R. I. 141) 1180, 1183,
704, 895
1193, 1206, 1210 v. Jones (47 Ind. 438) 699, 705, 724
Alexander v. Alexandria (5 Cranch,
v. Louisiana (103 U. S. 80) 238, 630
2)
144 v. McKean (1 Sumn. 276) 93, 319
v. Baltimore (5 Gill, 383) 705, 716, v. Taunton (19 Pick. 485) 53, 54,
721, 726, 898, 899, 919, 1098
216, 217
v. Bennett (60 N. Y. 204)
507 v. Turner (11 Gray, 426) 1116
v. Bethlehem (29 N. J. L. 375) 483 v. Willard (57 Pa. St. 374) 1308
v. Dist. Columbia (3 Mackey, Allentown v. Grim (109 Pa. St. 113) 408
192)
735 v. Hower (93 Pa. St. 332) 1000
v. Greenville T. Council (54
v. Kramer (73 Pa. St. 406) 1282, 1320
Miss. 659)
474 Allentown Bor. v. Saeger (20 Pa. St.
v. Helber (35 Mo. 334)
997
421)
1148, 1149, 1154
v. Hoyt (7 Wend. 89)
324 Aller v. Cameron (3 Dillon C. C. 198) 614
v. McDowell (67 N. C. 330) 1059 Allerton v. Chicago (6 Fed. R. 555) 427
v. Milwaukee (16 Wis. 247) 1217, Alletson v. Chichester (L. R. 10 C.
1226, 1227
P. 319)
1802
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
xxiii
Page
Pago
Alley v. Adams Co. Sup. (76 Ill. 101) 240 Ames v. Port Huron Log. Co. (11
Alley in Pittsburgh, Re (104 Pa. St.
Mich. 139)
213
622)
762 Amesbury v. Bowditch M. F. Ins.
Allide v. Le Mars (71 Iowa, 654) 1267, 1286
Co. (6 Gray, 596)
487
Allison v.Juniata County (50 Pa. St. Amey v. Allegheny City (24 How.
351)
666, 570
364) 208, 226, 237, 407, 410, 564,
v. Louisville, H. C. & W. Ry. Co.
649, 946
(9 Bush, 247)
134, 1111 | Amite City v. Clements (24 La. An.
v. Louisville, H. C. & W.Ry. Co.
27)
95, 97, 998
(10 Bush, 1)
227 Amos v. Fond du Lac (46 Wis. 695) 1304
All Saints' Church v. Lovett (1 Hall Amperse v. Kalamazoo C. Council
(N. Y.), 191)
258
(59 Mich. 78)
1015
Allston's Lessee v. Saunders (1 Bay, Amrine v. Kan. Pac. R. Co. (7 Kan.
30)
797
178)
1124
Alpers v. San Francisco (32 Fed. R. Amy v. Des Moines Co. Sup. (11
503)
1098
Wall. 136) 325, 1008, 1044, 1045,
Altemus v. New York (6 Duer, 446) 547
1331
Alter v. Simpson (46 Mich. 138) 284 v. Dubuque (98 U. S. 470)
561
Althen v. Kelly (32 Minn. 280) 816 v. Galena (7 Fed. R. 163) 118, 675
Alton v. Hope (68 Ill. 167) 1158, 1223, 2. Selma (77 Ala. 103)
252
1282, 1321 v. Shelby Co. Tax. Dist. (114
v. Ill. Transp. Co. (12 Ill. 38) 659,
U. S. 387)
552, 995
764, 768, 769, 801 v. Watertown (130 U. S. 301) 250,
v. Kirsch (68 Ill. 261) 480, 482
254, 307, 577, 1053
0. Madison County (21 Ill. 115) 1143 v. Watertown (130 U. S. 320) 798,
V. Mulledy (21 Ill. 76) 522, 534
1053
Alton & U. A. H. R. Co. v. Deitz (50 Anderson, Re (60 N. Y. 457)
388
Ill. 210)
865 v. Commonwealth (14 Bush, 171) 78
Altoona v. Lotz (114 Pa. St. 238) 1285 v. East (117 Ind. 126) 1157, 1159, 1275
Alves' Ex. v. Henderson (16 B. Mon.
v. Hamilton Co. Com’rs (12 O.
131)
671, 769, 798, 803
St. 635)
374
Alvord v. Ashley (17 Ill. 363)
740 v. Kern's Drain. Co. (14 Ind. 199) 426,
v. Barrett (16 Wis. 175)
325
700
v. Syracuse Sav. Bank (98 N. Y.
v. O'Conner (98 Ind. 168)
152, 385
599)
560 v. St. Louis (47 Mo. 479) 707, 716, 1123
Amboy v. Sleeper (31 Ill. 499) 437 v. Santa Anna Tp. (116 U. S. 356) 134,
Ambrose v. State (6 Ind. 351)
440
579, 584, 587
Amelung v. Seekamp (9 G. & J. 468) 786 v. State (23 Miss. 459) 952, 1116, 1169
American Bible Soc. v. Marshall (15 Anderson Co. Comr's v. Beal (113
0. St. 537)
661
U. S. 227)
572, 595, 596, 599
American Emigrant Co. v. Iowa R.
v. Houston & G. N. R. Co. (52
L. Co. (52 Iowa, 325) 659
Tex. 228)
596
v. Wright County (97 U. S. 339) 514 Andover v. Grafton (7 N. H. 298) 54, 527,
American Ins. Co. v. Oakley (9
562
Paige, 496)
533 v. Sutton (12 Met. 182)
883
American L. Ins. Co. v. Bruce (105 Andover & M. Turnp. Co. v. Gould
U. S. 328)
586, 599, 601, 617
(6 Mass. 40)
815, 1231
American Nic. Pav. Co. v. Elizabeth Andrews v. King (77 Me. 224) 337
City (4 Fisher Pat. Cas.
v. Portland (79 Me. 484)
319
189)
1180 v. Pratt (44 Cal. 309) 316, 671
American Print Works v. Lawrence
v. Union M. F. Ins. Co. (37 Me.
(23 N. J. L. 590) 325, 1164
256)
394
American Ry. Frog Co. v. Haven
v. United States (2 Story C. C.
(101 Mass. 398)
1067
202)
312, 315
American Transp. Co. v. Buffalo (20 Annapolis v. Harwood (82 Md. 471) 941,
N. Y. 381)
948
999
American U. Exp. Co. v. St. Joseph
v. State (30 Md. 212)
88
(66 Mo. 675)
909, 911 Anne Arundel Co. Com'rs v. Duckett
Americus v. Eldridge (64 Ga. 524) 1215,
(20 Md. 468) 108, 391, 1013, 1282
1328 Anness v. Providence (13 R. I. 17) 1222
Amery v. Keokuk (42 Iowa, 701) 914 Anonymous (1 Barnard. 402)
378
Ames v. Kansas (111 U. S. 449) 1089 Ansley v. Wilson (50 Ga. 418) 1000
20. Lake Sup. & Miss. R. Co. (21 Anthony v. Adams (1 Met. 284) 53, 54,
Minn. 241)
724, 726
567, 1183, 1186, 1187, 1214
xxiv
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
.
139)
Page
Page
Anthony v. Brecon Markets Co. (L. Aroma v. Auditor (15 Fed. R. 843) 594
R. 2 Ex. 167)
447 | Arrowsmith v. New Orleans (24 La.
v. Halderman (7 Kan. 50)
285
An. 194)
744, 757
v. Jasper County (101 U. S. 693; Ash v. People (11 Mich. 347) 181, 425,
4 Dillon C. C. 136) 577, 594, 632,
427, 456, 458, 460
633, 634 Ashbrook v. Commonwealth (1 Bush,
Anthony Street, Re (20 Wend. 618) 711,
139)
217, 449
712, 713 Ashbury Ry. C. & I. Co. v. Riche
Antones r. Eslava’s Heirs (9 Port.
(L. R. 7 H. L. C. 653)
540
627)
740, 743, 767 Ashby v. White (1 Smith L. Ć. 264) 688
Antoni v. Greenhow (107 U. S. 769) 996 Ashley v. Port Huron (35 Mich. 296) 1188,
Appeal of A. (See A.'s Appeal.]
1217, 1230, 1321, 1324, 1325, 1329
Appeal Tax Court v. No. Cent. R.
v. Reynolds (2 Stra. 916) 1148
Co. (50 Md. 417)
969 Ashton v. Ellsworth (48 Ill. 299) 386, 416
Appleby v. New York (15 How. Pr. Ashville Com’rs v. Means (7 Ired. L.
428)
529, 543
406)
471, 940, 941
Applegate v. Ernst (3 Bush, 648) 969 Asken v. Manning (38 U. C. Q. B.
Arbegust v. Louisville (2 Bushi, 271) 972
345)
1078
Arbrush v. Oakdale (28 Minn. 61) 731 Askew v. Hale County (54 Ala. 639) 42,
Arents v. Commonwealth (18 Gratt.
43, 108, 1173, 1245
750)
661 Askin v, London (1 U. C. Q. B. 292) 312
Argenti v. San Francisco (16 Cal. Aspen v. A. Town & L. Co. (10 Col.
255) 149, 200, 521, 531, 535, 537,
191)
1006
547, 558, 568, 722, 923 Aspinwall v. Daviess Co. Com’rs (22
Argus Co. v. Albany (55 N. Y. 495) 522
How. 364) 95, 121, 230, 236, 615,
Arimond v. Green Bay & M. Canal
622, 626, 627, 639, 641, 648, 942,
Co. (31 Wis. 316) 1230, 1325
1034
Arkadelphia v. Windham (40 Ark. Assessors of Philadelphia v. Com.
1248, 1262
missioners (3 Brewster, 333) 237
Arkwright v. Cantrell (7 Ad. & E. Aston v. McClure, (102 Pa. St. 322) 1314
565)
309 v. Newton (134 Mass. 507) 1267
Arlington v. Merrick (2 Saund. 403) 301 Astor, Re (50 N. Y. 363)
89
Armington v. Barnett (15 Vt. 745) 683 Astor (J. J.) v. New York (62 N. Y.
Armstrong v. Ackley (71 lowa, 76) 1298
580)
159, 977
v. Allegheny Co. Com'rs (37 Pá. Astor (W. B.) v. New York (62 N.Y.
St. 237).
674, 1004, 1027, 1028,
567)
99, 100, 159, 360
1037, 1038, 1056, 1058, 1069 | Astor (and Bailey) v. N. Y. Arcade
v. Brunswick (79 Mo. 319) 1158
R. Co. (113 N. Y. 93) 89, 839, 840
v. Dalton (4 Dev. 568) 798, 803 Atchison v. Bartholow (4 Kan. 124) 80, 82
v. Dearborn Co. Com'rs (4
v. Butcher (3 Kan. 104) 134, 235, 618
Blackf. 208).
94 v. Byrnes (22 Kan. 65)
558
v. St. Louis (69 Mo. 309)
716 v. Challiss (9 Kan. 603) 1320, 1325,
v. St. Paul (30 Minn. 299) 1225, 1228
1328, 1334
2. Topeka (36 Kan. 432)
750
v. Jansen (21 Kan. 560) 1245, 1272,
Armstrong County v. Brinton (47
1283
Pa. St. 367)
229 v. King (9 Kan. 550) 409, 1261, 1281,
v. Clarion Co. (66 Pa. St. 218) 1144
1287, 1295
Armsworth v. Southeastern Ry, Co.
v. State (34 Kan. 379) 1118, 1152
(11 Jur. 758)
1288 v. Twine (9 Kan. 350)
1167
Arn v. Kansas City (15 Fed. R. 236) 1322 Atchison & Neb. R. Co. 2. Garside
Arnold v. Blaker (L. R. 6 Q. B. 433) 741
(10 Kan. 552) 843, 848, 855
v. Cambridge (106 Mass. 352) 978, v. Maquilkilon (12 Kan. 301) 134
1124 Atchison Street Ry. Co. v. Mo. Pac.
v. Cov. & Cinc. Br. Co. (1 Du-
Ry. Co. (31 Kan. 660) 833
vall, 372)
696, 733
v. Nave (38 Kan. 744)
879
v. Holbrook (L. R. 8 Q. B. 96) 447, Athearn v. Millersburg Indep. Dist.
741
(33 Ia. 105)
378
v. Poole (4 M. & G. 860)
221 Athens v. Carnack (75 Ga. 429) 550
v. Shields (5 Dana, 18) 717, 1133, v. Georgia R. Co. (72 Ga. 800) 423
1266 Atkins v. Randolph (31 Vt. 226) 122, 123,
Arnot v. McClure (4 Denio, 45) 709
1011
Arnott v. Bradley (23 U. C. C. P. 1) 295 Atkinson v. Goodrich Transp. Co.
Arnoult v. New Orleans (11 La. An.
(60 Wis. 141)
396
54)
88, 287
v. Marietta, &c. R. Co. (15 0. St. 21) 82
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
XXV
Page
Page
Atlanta v. Buchanan (76 Ga. 585) 1247 Attorney-General v. Gower (9 Mod.
v. Central R. & B. Co.(53 Ga. 120) 697
226)
246
v. Champe (66 Ga. 659)
1272 v. Hackney Local Bd. (L, R. 20
v. Gate City Gasl. Co. (71 Ga.
Eq. 626)
1322
106)
423, 780 v. Heelis (2 Sim. & St. 67) 1099, 1102
v. Green (69 Ga. 386) 1222, 1239 v. Heishon (18 N. J. Eq. 410) 782,
v. Macon & W. R. Co. (59 Ga.
783, 784
251)
1093 v. Holilan (29 Mich. 116)
267
v. Perdue (53 Ga. 607) 1272, 1301 v. Kerr (2 Beav. 420)
259
v. White (33 Ga. 229)
456 v. Lake County (33 Mich. 289) 211
v. Wilson (59 Ga. 544)
1259 v. Lathrop (24 Mich. 235)
542
Atlantic & Pac. R. Co. v. Cleino (2
v. Leeds (L. R. 5 Ch. App. 583) 1322
Dillon C. C. 175) 953, 1121 v. Leicester (9 Beav. 546). 259, 1102
v. St. Louis (66 Mo. 228)
000 v. Lichfield (13 Sim. 547) 185, 1101
Atlantic City W. W. Co..v. Atl. City
v. Lichfield (11 Beav. 120) 286, 1102
(39 N. J. Eq. 367) 513, 820, 828, v. Life & F. Ins. Co. (9 Paige,
829
470)
563
Atlantic M. F. Ins. Co. v. Sanders
v. Liverpool (1 Myl. & Cr. 171) 1099,
(36 N. H. 252)
363
1102, 1115
Attala Co. Pol. Bd. v. Grant (17
v. Lock (3 Atk. 164)
158
Miss. 77)
1028, 1070 1. Metrop. R. Co. (125 Mass. 515) 868
Atta way v. Cartersville (68 Ga. 740) 1197 v. Molson (10 Grant (Can.), 436) 746
Attorney-General v. Acton Local Bd.
v. Morris & E. R. Co. (19 N. J.
(L. R. 22 Ch. D. 221) 1326
Eq. 386)
851
v. Aspinwall (2 Myl. & Cr. 613;
v. Morris & E. R. Co. (20 N. J.
1 Keen, 513) 221, 285, 509, 1100,
Eq. 530)
850
1101 v. New York (3 Duer, 119) 157
v. Benzie Co. Sup. (34 Mich. 211) 211 v. Northampton (143 Mass. 589) 1129
v. Birmingham (4 K. & J. 528) 452 v. Norwich (2 Myl. & C. 406) 220,
v. Birmingham (3 L. R. Eq. 552) 1103
21, 553
v. Birmingham & O. J. R. Co.
v. Norwich (16 Sim. 225) 1101
(4 De G. & Sm. 490) 1115 v. Parker (3 Atk. 576)
278
v. Boston (123 Mass. 460) 1004, 1005, v. Paterson (1 Stock.(N. J.) 624) 716,
1018, 1057, 1060, 1061, 1084, 1085,
1092
1094, 1099, 1105, 1115 v. Plymouth (9 Beav. 67) 1096, 1102
V. Boston (142 Mass. 200) 809 v. Poole (4 Myl. & Cr. 17) 285, 509, ,
v. Boulton (21 Grant (Can.),
1100, 1101
598)
746 v. Radloff (10 Exchq. 84)
503
v. Bowman (2 B. & P. 532) 503 v. Reynolds (1 Eq. Cas. Ab. 131) 1115
v. Brailford (L. R. 2 Eq. 71) 452 v. Rye (7 Taunt. 546)
261
v. Bradley (36 Mich. 447) 88, 267
v. Salem (103 Mass. 138) 1084, 1085,
v. Brown (1 Swanst. 265) 1102
1099, 1115
v. Brown (24 N. J. Eq. 89) 454 v. Sheffield Gas Cons. Co. (19
v. Bytown & Nepeau Road Co.
Eng. L. & Eq. 639)
454
(2 Grant (Can.) 626)
789 v. Shrewsbury (6 Beay. 220) 242,
v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co. (35
663, 668
Wis. 425)
80 v. Siddon (1 C. & J. 220)
503
v. Colney (L. R. 4 Ch. 146) 452 v. Steward (20 N. J. Eq. 415) 449
v. Davis (44 Mo. 131)
333 v. Stickle (20 N. J. Eq. 530).
v. Detroit (41 Mich. 224)
545, 546
See Morris & E. R. Co. v.
v. Detroit (26 Mich. 263)
1105
Prudden.)
v. Detroit (55 Mich. 181)
521 v. Sullivan (32 L. J. Ex. 92) 503
v. Dorking Union (L. R. 20 Ch.
v. Toronto (10 Grant (Can.), 436) 746
D. 595)
1320, 1326 v. Tudor Ice Co. (104 Mass. 239) 1115
v. Dublin (1 Bligh N. R. 312) 1099, v. Utica Ins. Co. (2 Johns. Ch.
1102, 1103, 1115
371)
352, 1075
v. Earl Clarendon (17 Ves. 491) 340 v. Wigan (5 De Gex, M. & G.) 1101
v. Ely (4 Wis. 420)
281 v. Williams (140 Mass. 329) 891
v. Exeter (29 Beav. 44)
1103 v. Wilson (9 Sim. 30) 259, 1096, 1100,
v. Foote (11 Wis. 14)
1080
1102
v. Gas Consumers' Co. (19 Eng.
2. Winnebago, L. & F. Pl. R.
L. Eq. 639)
454
Co. (11 Wis. 42)
962
v. Gooderich (5 Grant (Can.)
v. Worcester (2 Phil. 3)
259
402),
746, 773 Atwater v. Baltimore (31 Md. 462) 1196
XXvi
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
Page
Page
Auburn Bd. of Ed. v. Quick (99 N. Ayers v. Lawrence (59 N. Y. 192) 1106,
Y. 138)
299
1114
Auburn Theol. Sem. v. Childs (4 Ayres v. Pa. R. Co. (48 N. J. L. 44) 767
Paige, 419)
661
Auckland v. Westm. Local Bd. (L.
R. 7 Ch. 597)
1166
B.
Auditor v. Davies (2 Ark. 494)
55
Augusta v. Ga. R. & B. Co. (26 Ga. Bab v. Clerk (F. Moore, 411)
420
651)
969 Babbit v. Savoy (3 Cush. 530) 220
v. Harper (59 Ga. 151) 1299, 1310 Babcock v. Buffalo (56 N. Y. 268)
v. Leadbetter (16 Me. 45) 53, 551, 1139
154, 450
v. North (57 Me. 392)
995 2. Fond du Lac (58 Wis. 230) 1148
v. Walton (77 Ga. 517)
665 v. Goodrich (47 Cal. 488) 199, 527,
Augusta Bank v. Augusta (49 Me.
563, 1030
507)
225 v. Helena (34 Ark. 499)
144
Augusta C. Council v. Dunbar (50 Babson v. Rockport (101 Mass. 93) 1257
Ga. 387) 942, 951, 964, 969, 999 Baby v. Baby (5 U. C. Q. B. 51.0) 518
v. Port Royal & A. Ry. Co. (74
v. Baby (8 U. C. Q. B. 76) 300
Ga. 658)
851 Bacheller v. Pinkham (68 Me. 253) 324
v. Sweeney (44 Ga. 463)
313 Bacher's Case (20 Pa. St. 425) 337
Augusta Tp. Municipality, Re (12 U. Bachler's Appeal (90 Pa. St. 207) 690
C. Q. B. 522)
1017 | Backman v. Charlestown (42 N. H.
Augusta Tp. Road, Re (17 Pa. St.
125)
533, 539
71)
366, 392 Backus v. Detroit (49 Mich. 110) 166, 171,
Augusta T'rs. v. Perkins (3 B. Mon.
176, 743, 793
437)
671, 769, 773 v. Lebanon (11 N. H. 19)
689
v. Perkins (8 B. Mon. 207) 757, 765 Bacon v. Boston (3 Cush. (Mass.)
Aull v. Lexington (18 Mo. 401) 443
174) 888, 1252, 1266, 1272, 1273,
Aurora v. Bitner (100 Ind. 396) 1295, 1297
1283
v. Colshire (55 Ind. 484)
1267 v. Robertson (18 How. 480) 242, 244,
v. Fox (78 Ind. 1)
374, 818
246, 250
v. Gillett (56 Ill. 132) 1223, 1320, 1324 v. Walker (77 Ga. 336)
1098
v. Hillman (90 Ill. 61)
1298 Badgely v. Bender (3 U. C. Q. B.
v. Love (93 Ill. 521)
1317
0. s. 221)
747
2. Pulfer (56 Ill. 270) 1259, 1260, 1263, Badger v. Bolles (93 U. S. 599) 1053
1285, 1320 v. Boston (130 Mass. 170)
735
v. Reed (57 Ill. 29) 814, 1223, 1320, v. United States (93 U. S. 599) 307,
1323, 1324
308, 1052
v. West (9 Ind. 74) 95, 164, 225 Badkins v. Robinson (53 Ga. 613) 456, 460
v. West (22 Ind. 88) 95, 235, 236, Baes v. Hewitt (20 Wis. 460)
582
560, 581, 610, 620, 641 Bagg v. Detroit (5 Mich. 336) 871, 921,
Austin 2. Allen (6 Wis. 134)
374
1116
v. Austin Gasl. & C. Co. (69 Tex. Bagg's Case (11 Coke, 93) 328, 333, 336,
180)
909, 952
338, 339
v. Bethnal Green Guardians (L.
(2 Kyd, 52)
326, 327
R. 9 C. P. 91)
538 Bagley v. People (5 N. W. R. 415) 786
v. Coggeshall (12 R. I. 329) 107, 222 Bagot's Case (7 Edw. IV. 29)
74
v. Colony (51 Iowa, 102)
185 Bailey v. Fairfield (Brayt. (Vt.) 126) 1288
v. French (7 Met. 126)
305 v. Jamieson (L. R. 1 C. P. 329) 745
v. Gulf, Col. & S. Fe R. Co. (45
v. New York (3 Hill, 531) 108, 109,
Tex. 234)
933, 957
115, 324, 1162, 1167, 1180, 1194,
v. Murray (16 Pick. 126) 213, 404,
1206, 1209, 1211, 1213
443, 444, 465, 487
[See, also, New York v.
v. Santa Fe (45 Tex. 27)
778
Bailey, 2 Denio 433)
v. Walton (68 Tex. 507)
481 v. N. Y. Arcade Ry. Co. (113
Austin's Case (1 Ventr.) 183 1240
N. Y. 615)
840
Austrian v. Guy (21 Fed. R. 500) 76 v. Paulina (69 Iowa, 463) 1150
Avery v. Springport (14 Blatchf. 272)
v. Phila., W. & B. R. Co.
639
(4 Harring. (Del.) 389) 776, 794
Ayer v. Emery (14 Allen, 67) 672 v. Woburn (126 Mass. 416) 697, 1187
v. Norwich 39 Conn. 376) 1263, 1269 Bailey's Case (2 Denio, 433). (See
Ayeridge v. Soc. Circle Com’rs (60
New York v. Bailey.]
Ga. 404)
88 Bailey ville v. Lowell (20 Me. 178) 551, 552
Ayers Re (123 U. S. 443)
996 | Baily, Re, (2 Cow. 479)
1014
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
xxvii
Page
Page
Bailiffs of Brigenoth (2 Stra. 808) 1072 Baltimore v. Black (56 Md. 333) 714
Bain v. Mitchell (82 Ala. 304)
494 v. Board, &c. (15 Md. 376).
Bainbridge v. Sherlock (29 Ind. 364) 172
[See v. State Board, &c.]
Baird v. Bank of Wash. (11 S. & R.
v. Bouldin (23 Md. 328) 709, 984
411)
670 v. Brannan (14 Md. 227) 1267, 1281
v. New York (96 N. Y. 567) 524 v. Chase (2 Gill & J. 376)
997, 999
v. Rice (63 Pa. St. 489) 738, 764, 766, v. Clunet (23 Md. 449) 389, 486, 693,
776, 794
694, 716
Baker v. Boston (12 Pick. 184) 152, 153, v. Eschbach (18 Md. 276) 518, 519,
212, 465, 1183, 1203
708, 979, 1183, 1187
v. Chambles (4 Greene (Ia.), 428) 524 v. Gill (31 Md. 375) 151, 197, 1109,
v. Cincinnati (11 O. St. 534) 908,
1111, 1117
1149, 1151 v. Green Mt. Cem. Prop. (7 Md.
v. Gartside (86 Pa. St. 498) 992
517)
954
v. Johnson (41 Me. 15) 1009, 1010 v. Hanson (61 Md. 462)
916
v. Johnson County (33 Iowa,
v. Hook (62 Md. 371)
707
151)
523, 561, 568, 798 v. Horn (26 Md. 194) 132, 695, 1099,
v. Johnston (21 Mich. 319) 738, 739,
1117
744, 745, 757, 769, 760, 761, 763, d. Howard (6 Har. & J. 383) 997, 999
764, 766 v. Johns Hopkins Hosp. (56 Md.
v. Madison (62 Wis. 137) 1255
1)
912, 933
v. Neff (73 Ind. 68)
671 v. Lefferman (4 Gill (Md.) 425) 1148,
v. Pittsburgh (4 Pa. St. 49) 313
1150, 1151
v. Portland (58 Me. 199) 387, 1264, v. Marriott (9 Md. 160) 1013, 1261,
1287
1281
v. St. Louis (75 Mo. 671)
746 v. Musgrave (48 Md. 272) 517, 518,
v. St. Paul (8 Minn. 491) 738, 739
713, 714
v. Shephard (24 N. H. 212) 321, 349 v. O'Donnell (53 Md. 110) 1303
v. State (27 Ind. 485)
325, 391
v. O'Neill (63 Md. 336) 1193, 1199
v. Urica (19 N. Y. 326) 312, 557 v. Pendleton (15 Md. 12) 1281, 1282,
v. Windham (13 Me. 74) 220, 374
1293, 1303
Balch v. Essex Co. Com'rs (103
v. Porter (18 Md. 284) 133, 1099,
Mass. 106)
702, 708
1111, 1117, 1119, 1122
Baldwin v. Bangor (36 Me. 518) 714 v. Poultney (25 Md. 18, 107) 342,
v. Buffalo (35 N. Y. 375)
745
359, 534, 1167
v. Calkins (10 Wend. 166) 1127 v. Radecke (49 Md.)
400, 414
v. Franks (120 U. S. 688) - 165 v. Reynolds (20 Md. 1) 518, 519, 521,
v. Green (10 Mo. 410) 144, 808
541
v. Greenwood's Turnp. Co. (40
v. Root (8 Md. 102)
162
Conn. 238)
1263, 1278 v. St. Agnes Hosp. (48 Md. 419) 720,
v. Montgomery C. Council (53
1188
Ala. 437)
963 v. Scharf (54 Md. 499) 154, 406
v. Murphy (82 Ill. 485)
432 v. State Bd. of Police (15 Md.
v. Otoe County (111 U. S. 1) 226
376)
81, 86, 95, 102, 269, 270,
v. Philadelphia (99 Pa. St. 164) 311
294, 562, 942, 952
Baldwin Co. Ordinary v. Liquor
v. White (2 Gill, 444) 166, 169, 172,
Dealers (42 Ga. 325)
431
174, 175, 177, 178
Balfe v. Bell (40 Ind. 337)
953 v. White (62 Md. 362)
751
Ball v. Armstrong (10 Ind. 181) 888, 1309 Baltimore & O. R. Co v. Boyd (63
v. Balfe (41 Ind. 221)
991
Md. 325)
707
v. Brigham (5 Mass. 406) 1125
v. Jefferson County (29 Fed. R.
v. Fagg (67 Mo. 481)
296
305)
88
v. Lappius (3 Or. 55)
1007 v. Mali (66 Md. 53)
857
v. Poor (81 Ky. 26)
998 v. Marshall Co. Sup. (3 W. Va.
v. Ray (L. R. 8 Ch. Ap. 467) 447
319)
952
v. Winchester (32 N. H. 435) 1172, Baltimore & Susq. R. Co. v. Nesbit
1173, 1330
(10 How. 395)
714
v. Woodbine (61 Towa, 83) 1157, Baltimore Turnp., Re (5 Binn. 484)
361
1167, 1195 Bamford v. Iles (3 Exch. 380)
301
Ballard v. Davis (31 Miss. 525) 360 v. Turnley (3 B. & S. 62)
446
Baltimore v. Balt. &0. R. Co. (6 Gill, Banbury Corp., Re (10 Mod. 346) 242, 304
288)
969 Bancroft v. Cambridge (126 Mass.
v. Balt. & O. R. Co. (21 Md. 50) 292,
438)
212
1093, 1099 v. Lynnfield (18 Pick. 566)
53, 220
xxviii
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
Page
Page
Bangor v. Lansil (51 Me. 521) 1320 Bank of Republic of N. Y. v.
Bangs v. Snow (1 Mass. 181)
147
St. Joseph (31 Fed. R. 216) 157,
Bank for Savings in N. Y. v. New
631
York (102 N. Y. 313) 207 | Bank of Rome v, Rome (18 N. Y. 38) 78,
Bank of Alexandria, &c. (5 Wheat.
86, 195, 225, 226, 235
326; and 1 Pet. 299). [See
v. Rome (19 N. Y. 20)
560, 644
Mech. B. of A., &c.]
Bank of St. Louis, &c. (65 Mo. 105).
Bank of Augusta v. Earle (13 Pet. 519) 661
See Internat. Bank of St.
Bank of Brighton v. Smith (5 Allen,
L., &c.]
415)
299 Bank of South Carolina, &c. (3 Rich.
Bank of Charlotte, etc. (92 U. S.
L, 342). [See State Bank
122). (See First Nat. B. of
of S. C., &c.]
C., &c.]
Bank of Statesville v. Statesville
Bank of Chenango v. Brown (26 N.
(84 N. C. 169)
540, 638
Y. 467)
77, 78, 391 Bank of Tenn. v. Dibrell (3 Sneed,
Bank of Chester v. Chester T. Coun-
379)
161
cil (10 Rich. 104)
968 Bank of U. S. v. Dandridge (12
Bank of Chillicothe v. Chillicothe
Wheat. 64) 296, 299, 376, 521,
Ohio, Pt. 2, 31) 149, 183, 185,
533
188, 194 Bank of Utica v. Smedes (3 Cowen,
Bank of Columbia v. Patterson's
662)
518
Adm. (7 Cranch, 299) 275, 512, Bank of Va. v. Poitiaux (3 Rand. 136) 670
514, 525, 527, 533, 539, 561 Bank
V.,
&c. [See the following
Bank of Columbus, &c. (3 0. St.
plaintiff banks which, in cit-
1). (See Exchange B. of
ing, may not always have
C., &c.]
been fully named: Che-
Bank of Commonwealth V. New
mung Canal Bank (5 De-
York (43 N. Y. 184) 1146, 1151,
nio, 517); Commercial (2
1191, 1202
Harring. 8); Great Falls
Bank of Commonwealth of Ky, v.
(41 N. H.32); Jefferson
Wister (2 Pet. 318)
275
Branch (1 Black, 436);
Bank of Dallas, &c. (51 Tex. 354).
Mech. & Traders' (30 N. J.
(See City B. of D., &c.]
L. ); Nashville (3
Bank of Dubuque, &c. (5 Kow. (U.
Humph. 522); New York
S.) 213; and 1 Greene (Ia.),
Nat. Exchange (8 R. I.
553). (See Miners' Bank
375; 108 N. Y. 660); Ston-
of D. &c.].
ington Savings (14 N. J.
Bank of Ga. v. Savannah (Dud-
Eq. 286); Susquehanna (25
ley (Ga.), 130)
968
N. Y. 312).)
Bank of Ind., &c. (7 Blackf. 395; Bankhead v. Brown (25 Iowa, 540) 701,
and 3 Ind. 43). [See State
704
Bank, &c.]
Banks v. Ogden (2 Wall. 57) 740, 774
Bank of Ireland v. Evans (32 E. L. & Bannagan v. Dist. Columbia (2
Eq. 23)
Mackey, 285)
1327, 1328
Bank of La., &c. (3 La. An. 294). Banton v. Wilson (4 Tex. 400) 1025
See Louisiana State Bank, Baptist Church, &c. (8 Bush, 508).
&c.]
[See Broadway Bapt.
Bank of Metropolis v. Güttschlick
Church, &c.]
(14 Pet. 19)
524 Baptist Church, &c. (6 Barb. 213).
Bank of Mich. v. Niles (1 Doug.401) 658,
See First Bapt. Church in
670
Schenectady, &c.]
Bank of Middlebury v. Rutland & Baptist Church, &c. (5 Robt. 849).
W. R. Co. (30 Vt. 159) 273
See Madison Av. Bapt.
Bank of Mt. Pleasant, &c. (39 Iowa,
Church, &c.]
490). (See Nat. State B. Barber v. Essex (27 Vt. 62)
1314
of Mt. P., &c.]
v. Rollinson (1 C. & M. 330) 295
Bank of New Orleans
V. New
v. Rorabeck (36 Mich. 399)
Orleans (12 La. An. 42) 1148 v. Roxbury (11 Allen, 318) 1254,
Bank of New York, &c. (13 N. Y.
1255, 1256, 1270, 1276
599). (See Mech. Bank of Barber Surgeons v. Pelson (2 Lev.
N. Y., &c.]
252)
481
Bank of No. America, &c. (108 Barbier v. Connolly (113 U.S. 27) 211, 398
Mass. 497). [See Nat. Bank Barbour v. Ellsworth (67 Me. 294) 1187,
of N. A. of B., &c.]
1201
274
781
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
xxix
99)
Page
Page
Barbour County v. Horn (48 Ala. Barraclough v. Johnson (8 A. & E.
566)
1173, 1245, 1287
741
Barclay, Re (11 U. C. Q. B. 470) 259 Barre v. Greenwich (1 Pick. 120)
278
v. Howell's Lessee (6 Pet. 498) 743, Barret v. Henderson (4 Bush, 255) 948,
744, 746, 750, 753, 755, 757, 759,
962
773, 783, 795, 811 Barrett v. Brooks (21 Iowa, 144) 27, 806,
Bard v. Augusta (30 Fed. R. 906) 572
807, 883
Bardwell v. Jamaica (15 Vt. 438) 881 v. New Orleans (13 La. An. 105) 658
Bargate v. Shortridge (5 Clark, H.
v. Schuyler Co. Ct. (44 Mo. 197) 560,
L. 297)
594
644
Barker v. Commonwealth (19 Pa. Barrickman v. Harford Co. Com'rs
St. 412)
785, 886
(11 Gill & J. 50)
324
v. Loomis (6 Hill, 463)
184 Barron v. Baltimore (7 Pet. 248) 683
v. Omaha (16 Neb. 269)
984
(2 Am. Jur. 203) 176, 1317, 1330
v. Savage (45 N. Y. 191) 811, 1266, Barrow v. Davis (46 Mo. 394) 1107, 1112
1273 v. Nashville & C. Turnp. Co.
v. State (18 Ohio, 514)
975
(9 Humph. 304)
670
Barkley v. Levee Com’rs (93 U. S. Barrs v. Jackson (1 Phillips, 582) 1078
258) 250, 254, 256, 270, 1040 Barry v. Lowell (8 Allen (Mass.),
Barling v. West (29 Wis. 307) 398, 403
127)
1320, 1328, 1332
Barlow, Re (30 L. J. Q. B. 271) 1010 v. Mercli. Exp. Co. (1 Sandf. Ch.
v. Norman (2 W. Bl. 959)
224
280)
184, 194
Barnert v. Paterson (48 N. J. L. 395) 357, v. St. Louis (17 Mo. 121) 1303, 1304,
358
1306, 1307
Barnes v. Barnes (6 Vt. 388)
139 Bertemeyer v. Iowa (18 Wall. 129) 213
v. Beloit (19 Wis. 93)
1122 Barter v. Commonwealth (3 Pa. 253) 412,
v. Chicopee (138 Mass. 67) 1257, 1258,
420, 437, 478, 496, 501, 506, 799,
1312
811, 812, 818
v. Dist. Columbia (22 Ct. Cl. 366) 551 Barthel v. Meader (72 Iowa, 125) 625
v. Dist. Columbia (91 U. S. 540)' 46, Barthet v. New Orleans (24 Fed. R.
808, 1194, 1210, 1268, 1280, 1290
563)
431
v. Dyer (56 Vt. 469) 933, 938 Bartholomew Co. Com’rs v. Bright
v. Marshall County (56 Iowa,
(18 Ind. 93)
560
20)
1029 Bartle v. Des Moines (38 Iowa, 414) 208
v. Newton (46 Iowa, 567) 1272, 1301 Bartleson v. Minneapolis (33 Minn.
v. Pennell (2 H. L. Cas. 497) 322
468)
707
v. Suddard (117 III. 237)
671 Bartlett v. Amherstberg (14 U. C. Q.
v. Ward (9 C. B. 392)
1309
B. 152)
538
Barnet v. Abbott (53 Vt. 120)
300 v. Bangor (67 Me. 460)
732
v. Newark (28 Ill. 62)
407 v. Boston Gasl. Co. (117 Mass.
Barnett v. Contra Costa County (67
533)
1311
Cal. 77)
1294 v. Crosier (17 Johns. 439) 324, 882,
v. Johnson (15 N. J. Eq. 481) 841, 886
1044, 1173
Barnett Tp. v. Jefferson County (9
v. Kittery (68 Me. 358) 1270, 1297,
Watts, 166)
272
1302
Barney v. Baltimore (1 Hughes C. C.
v. State (13 Kan. 99)
1076
118)
175, 749 Barto v. Himrod (8 N. Y. 483) 78, 226
v. Bush (9 Ala. 345)
321 Barton v. Gadsden (79 Ala. 495) 392
v. Keokuk (94 U. S. 324) 165, 168, v. Montpelier (30 Vt. 650) 1261
171, 172, 743, 748, 749, 759, 766, v. New Orleans (16 La. An. 317) 312,
776, 784, 790, 793, 819, 833, 843,
313, 443
864 v. Syracuse (36 N. Y. 54) 1204, 1297,
v. Keokuk (4 Dillon C. C. 593) 168,
1302, 1319, 1330, 1331, 1332, 1333
172, 175, 743, 759, 766, 776, 784, Bass v. Columbus (30 Ga. 845) 635
790, 793, 819, 833, 843, 864 v. Fontleroy (11 Tex. 698) 102, 111,
v. Lowell (98 Mass. 570)
1202
136
Barns v. Hannibal (71 Mo. 449) 1316, v. Shakopee (27 Minn. 250) 1072,
1317
1094
Barnum v. Baltimore (62 Md. 275) 663, Bassett v Barbin (11 La. An. 672) 1027
1099 v. Fish (12 Hun, 209; 75 N. Y.
Barnwell v. McGrath (McMullan (S.
303)
1176
C.) 174)
798 v. Porter (4 Cush. 487)
139
Barr v. Deniston (19 N. H. 170) 1112, 1119 v. St. Joseph (53 Mo. 290) 454, 1257,
v. Oskaloosa (45 Iowa, 275) 794, 796
1263, 1267, 1279, 1283, 1296
.
XXX
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
Page
Page
Bassford, Re (50 N. Y. 509)
408 Bayle v. New Orleans (23 Fed. R.
Bastable v. Syracuse (8 Hun, 587;
843)
1107, 1109, 1110
72 N. Y. 64)
1322 Bayley v. Taber (5 Mass. 286) 633
Bateman v. Ashton (3 H. & N. 322) 512, Bayne v. Jenkins (66 N. C. 356) 1070
518 Beach v. Frankenberger (4 W. Va.
v. Bluck (14 E. L. & Eq. 69) 745
712)
1312
v. Hamilton (33 U. C. Q. B.
v. Haynes (12 Vt. 15) 659, 662, 672
251)
1302 v. Leahy (11 Kan. 23) 41, 44, 83
v. Megowan (1 Met. (Ky.), 533) 285, Beachy v. Lamkin (1 Idaho T. 48) 1067,
509
1074
v. Mid Wales R. Co. (L. R. 1 C. Beals v. Amador Co. Sup. (35 Cal.
P. C. 510) 182, 185, 191, 194,
624)
924
195, 548, 571 v. Prov. Rub. Co. (11 R. I. 381) 954
v. Poplar Dist. Bd. of W. (L. Beamair v. Leake Pol. Bd. (42 Miss.
R. 33 Ch. D. 360)
1326
238; 15 Wall. 566)
184
Bates v. Bassett (60 Vt. 530)
672 Bean v. Hyde Park (143 Mass. 245) 525
v. Mobile (46 Ala. 158) 964, 965, 970 v. Jay (23 Me. 117)
349, 551
v. Plymouth (14 Gray, 163) 378, 1026, v. Thompson (19 N. H. 290)
321
1057 Bearce v. Fossett (34 Me. 575) 347
v. Riverside Indep. Sch. Dist. Beard v. Brooklyn (31 Barb. 142) 555, 557
(25 Fed. R. 192)
601
v. Decatur (64 Tex. 7)
315
Bates County v. Winters (97 U. S. Bearden v. Madison (73 Ga. 184) 386
83)
629 Beardslee v. French (7 Conn. 125) 800
2. Winters (112 U. S. 325) 622, 629, Beardsley v. Hartford (50 Conn. 529) 1238
630 v. Ontario Bank (31 Barb. 619) 969
Bath County v. Amy (14 Wall. 244) 1041, v. Smith (16 Conn. 368) 674, 1027,
1044
1032, 1172, 1173
Bath T. Com’rs v. Boyd (1 Ired. Beasley v. Beckley (28 W. Va. 81) 1131
L. 194)
766, 789 Beatty v. Gilmore (16 Pa. St. 463) 784,
Batho v. Salter (Latch, 54)
316
1284, 1286, 1305, 1309
Bathurst Bor. v. Macpherson (L. R.
v. Knowles (4 Pet. 152) 138, 940
4 App. Cas. 256) 1139, 1203, 1205, v. Kurtz (2 Pet. 566) 743, 767
1206 v. People (6 Col. 538)
251
Baton Rouge v. Crémonini (36 La. Beauchamp v. Kankakee Co. Sup. (45
An. 247)
400
III. 274)
1111
v. Deering (15 La. An. 208) 494 Beaudean v. Cape Girardeau (71 Mo.
Baton Rouge Bd. of Sel. v. Spalding
392)
1266, 1283
(8 La. An. 87)
970 Beaufort v. Duncan (1 Jones L. 234) 658,
Battersby v. New York (7 Daly, 16) 1261
680
Battle v. Mobile (9 Ala. 231) 898, 965
v. Ohlandt (24 S. C. 158)
500
Batty v. Duxbury (24 Vt. 155) 1270, 1314 ) Beaver Creek Tp. v. Hastings (52
Bauer v. Franklin County (51 Mo.
Mich. 528)
344
205)
567 | Beaver Dam 2. Frings (17 Wis. 398) 659
v. Indianapolis (99 Ind. 56) 1273 Beazan v. Mason City (58 Iowa, 233) 1272
Baugan v. Mann (59 III. 492)
750 Bechtel v. Carslake (3 Stockt. (N. J.
Bauman v. Campau (58 Mich. 444) 1157
Eq.) 500)
786, 787
v. St. Pancreas (L. R. 2 Q. B. Beck 2. Carter (68 N. Y. 283) 1312
528)
889 v. Hanscom (29 N. H. 213) 304, 362
Baumgard v. New Orleans (9 La.
v. Obst (12 Bush, 268)
932
119)
1188 Becker v. St. Charles, (37 Mo. 13) 760
Baumgartner v. Hasty (100 Ind. 575) 70, v. Washington (94 Mo. 375) 483
445, 472 Beckett v. Midland Ry. Co. (L. R. 3
Baxendale v. London, C. & D. Ry.
C. P. C. 82) 688, 1230, 1231
Co. (10 Exch. 35)
1313 Beckwith v. Racine (7 Biss. 142) 254
Baxter v. Commonwealth (3 Pa. 253) 416 v. Philby (6 B. & C. 635)
295
v. Kerr (23 Grant (Can.) 367) 1102 Bedford Bor. Sch. Dir. v. Anderson
v. Providence (12 Ř. I. 310) 1320,
(45 Pa. St. 388)
1006
1323 Bedford Union P. Guard. v. B. Impr.
v. Winooski Turnp. Co. (22 Vt.
Com'rs (7 Exch. 777) 911, 932,
114)
817, 1173, 1252
954
Bayard v. United States (127 U. S. Beebe v. Robinson (52 Ala. 66) 1095
246)
1015 Beecher v. Derby Br. & F. Co. (24
Bayerque z. San Francisco (1 McAll.
Conn. 491)
1287, 1288
175)
569 v. People (38 Mich. 289)
811
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
xxxi
Page
Page
Beekman v. Saratoga & S. R. Co. (3 Bennett v. Birmingham Bor. (31 Pa.
Paige, Ch. R. 45) 720, 726
St. 15)
425, 939, 970
Beekman Street, Re (4 Bradf. 503) 444 v. Buffalo (17 N. Y. 383) 1002 1146,
Beers v. Arkansas (20 How. 527) 55
1191
v. Beers (4 Conn. 535) 507, 726
v. Fifield (13 R. I. 139) 1257, 1263,
0. Botsford (3 Day (Conn.) 159) 1172
1269
v. Phønix Glass Co. (14 Barb.
v. Fisher (26 Iowa, 497)
695
358)
184 v. Lovell (12 R. I. 166)
1270
Beesman v. Peoria (16 III. 484) 492, 493 v. New Orleans (14 La. An. 120)
Beggar, Re (34 C. Q. B. 144)
1078
1158, 1195, 1215, 1320
Belcher v. Farrar (8 Allen, 325)
443
v. People (30 Ill. 389)
425
Belcher S. Ref. Co. v. St. Louis Gr.
v. Whitney (94 N. Y. 302) 325
Elev. Co. (82 Mo. 121) 696, 706 Bennington v. Smith (29 Vt. 254) 808
Belfast Nat. Bank v. Stockton (72 Benoist v. Carondelet (8 Mo. 240) 275
Me. 522)
1143
v. St. Louis (15 Mo. 668)
975
Belknap.v. Reinhart (2 Wend. 375) 323 v. St. Louis (19 Mo. 179) 946, 947
v. Trimble (3 Paige, 576) 787 Benoit v. Conway (10 Allen, 525) 151, 194
Bell, Re (2 U. C. C. Pl. 507)
221 ads. Wayne Co. Bd. of Aud. (20
Re (3 U. C. C. Pl. 400)
221
Mich. 176)
318, 319, 333
v. Burlington (68 Iowa, 296) 760 Benson v. Albany (24 Barb. 248) 86, 644
v. Edwards (37 La. An. 475) 852 v. Carmel (8 Me. 112) 565, 566
v. Foutch (21 Iowa, 119) 806, 807, 883 v. Monroe (7 Cush. 125) 1147, 1148,
v. Gough (23 N. J. L. 624) 659
1153, 1154
v. New York (105 N. Y. 139) 675 v. Morrow (61 Mo. 345)
749
v. Ohio & Pa. R. Co. (25 Pa. St.
v. New York (10 Barb. 223) 182
161)
771 Bentley v. Chisago Co. Com’rs (25
v. Pierce (51 N. Y. 12)
964
Minn. 259)
146, 520, 534
v. Platteville (71 Wis. 139) 54, 145,
, v. Phelps (27 Barb. 524)
319
210, 671 Benton v. City Hospital (140 Mass.
Bell County v. Alexander (22 Tex.
13)
1201
350)
662, 668 v. Hamilton (110 Ind. 294) 514
Bellamy v. Atlanta (75 Ga. 167) 1297 v. Jackson (2 Johns. C. H. 325) 75
Belleview v. Hohn (82 Ky. 1) 519, 535 v. Milwaukee (50 Wis. 368) 945
Belleville v. Stookey (23 Ill. 441) 740 Benton Street Case (9 La. An. 446).
Belleville & I. R. Co. v. Gregory (15
[See Munic. No. 2 v. White,
Ill. 20)
88
&c.]
Bellfontaine Ry. Co. v. Hunter (33 Bentz v. Armstrong (8 W. & S. (Pa.)
Ind. 335)
1300
40)
1321, 1323
Bellinger v. Gray (51 N. Y. 610) 957, 1148 Bergen v. Clarkson (1 Halst. 352) 210,
v. N. Y. Cent. R. Co. (23 N. Y,
364, 416, 421, 659, 999
42)
1215 v. State (32 N.J. L. 490)
486
Bellmyer v. Marshalltown (44 Iowa, Bergen Co. Freeh, v. Merch. Exch.
564)
522
Nat. Bank of N. Y. (12 Fed.
Bellows v. Hallowell Bank (2 Mason
R. 743)
604
C. C. 43)
257 Bergman v. Cleveland (40 O. St. 651) 432
Beloit v. Morgan (7 Wall. 619)
561, 646
v. St. L., Iron Mt. & S. Ry. Co.
Belt Line S. Ry. Co. v. Crabtree (2
(88 Mo. 678)
857
Tex. App. C. C. 662) 1244 Berkley v. Union Pac. Ry. Co. (33
Belton v. Baxter (54 N. Y. 245) 811, 1261,
Fed. R. 794)
672
1263 Berks & D. Turnp. Co. v. Myers (6
Bement v. Plattsb. & M. R. Co. (47
Serg. & R. 12)
261, 262
Barb. 314)
969 Berlin v. Gorham (34 N. H. 266)
77, 93
Bemis v. Becker (1 Kan. 226)
269 Berliner v. Waterloo (14 Wis. 378) 633,
Benbow v. Iowa City (7 Wall. 313) 1033,
645
1037 Bernhard v. Wyandotte (33 Kan. 465) 301
Benedict v. Denton (Walk. Ch. 336) 274 Beroujohn v. Mobile (27 Ala. 58) 444
v. Fond du Lac (44 Wis. 495) 1299, Berryman v. Port Burwell Har. (24
1300
U. C. Q. B. 34)
179
v Goit (3 Barb. 459) 789, 1220 v. Wise (4 D. & E. T. R. 366) 321
Benefield v. Hines (13 La. An. 420) 431 Bessonies v. Indianapolis (71 Ind.
Beniteau v. Detroit (41 Mich. 116) 544
189)
442
Benjamin v. Webster (100 Ind. 15) 147 Bestor v. Powers (7 Ill. 126)
275
v. Wheeler (8 Gray, 409) 152, 1216, Bethany Congr. Soc. v. Sperry (10
1219, 1231
Conn. 200)
303, 346
xxxii
TABLE OF CASES CITED,
297)
Page
Page
Bethum v. Turner (1 Me. 111) 768 Bishop of Rochester's Case (Owen,
Bethune v. Hughes (28 Ga. 560) 456, 460
73)
247
Betts v. Williamsburg (18 Pa. St. 26) 722 Bissell v. Collins (28 Mich. 277) 817, 818
Beveridge v. Creelman (42 U. C. Q. B.
2. Jeffersonville (24 How. 287) 134,
29)
741
366, 375, 585, 593, 601, 616, 635,
Beverley Tp. v. Barlow (7 U. C. C.
640, 644, 645, 647
P. 117)
301 v. Kankakee (64 Ill. 249) 233, 1034
v. Barlow (10 U. C.C.P. 178) 260, 301 v. Mich. So. & No. Ind. R. Co.
Bey geh v. Chicago (65. III. 189) 994
(22 N. Y. 258)
533
Bibb Co. Inf. Ct. Jus. v. Orr (12 Ga.
v. N. Y. Central R. Co. (23 N. Y.
137)
562, 568
61) 747, 790, 791, 792, 842
Bibb Co. Ord. v. Cent. R. & B. Co.
v. Saxton (77 N. Y. 191)
301
(40 Ga. 646)
968 v. Spring Valley Tp. (124 U. S.
Bickerstaff, Re (70 Cal. 35)
432
225)
561, 590, 594, 634
Biddle v. Willard, Gov. (10 Ind. 63) 305, Black, Re (1 0. St. 30)
1016
1016 Black v. Baltimore (50 Md. 236) 714
Biddle's Lessee v. Shippen (1 Dallas,
v. Cohen (52 Ga. 621) 88, 523, 594,
19)
738
635, 649
Bietry v. New Orleans (24 La. An.
v. Columbia (19 S. C. 412) 1166, 1200
21)
559 v. Phila. & R. R. Co. (58 Pa. St.
Big Grove v. Wells (65 III. 263) 564
249)
786, 833, 848
Big Rapids v. Comstock (65 Mich. Black & W. S. Soc. v. Vandyke (2
78)
796
Whart. 309)
338
Bigelow v. Chicago (90 Ill. 49) 979 Blackborough v. Davis (1 P. Wms.
v. Hillman (37 Me. 52) 366, 392
48)
1060
v. Louisville (3 Fisher Pat. Cas. Blackburn, Re (5 Ark. 21)
1132
602)
545, 1181 v. Walpole (9 Pick. 97)
349
v. Miss. C. & T. R. Co. (2 Head, Blackerby v. People (10 Ill. 266) 1074
624)
708 Blackett v. Blizzard (9 B. & C. 851) 343
v. Perth Amboy (25 N. J. L. Blackman v. Lehman (63 Ala. 547) 582
375, 377, 550 Blackstone v. Taft (4 Gray, 250) 269, 271
v. Randolph (14 Gray, 541) 1175, 2. White (41 Pa. St. 330)
139
1176, 1198, 1247 | Blackwell v. Toronto S. Ry. Co. (38
v. Randolph (2 Denio, 433) 1213
U. C. Q. B. 172)
1300
v. Rutland (4 Cush. (Mass.) 247) 1264 Bladen v. Philadelphia (60 Pa. St.
v. West Wis. Ry. Co. (27 Wis.
464)
201, 312, 521
478)
732 Blagrave's Case (2 Sid. 6)
338
v. Weston (3 Pick. 267) 1269 Blair v. Cuming County (111 U. S.
Bigg v. London (L. R. 15 Eq. 376) 1231
363)
572, 573
Bigler v. New York (5 Abb. N. Cas.
v. Forehand (100 Mass. 136) 223
51)
544, 557
v. Lantry (21 Neb. 247)
325
Bigley v. Nunan (53 Cal. 403) 843 Blaisdell v. Portland (39 Me. 113) 1258
Bilbie v. Lumley (2 East, 469) 1152 Blake v. Buffalo (56 N. Y. 485)
301
Bill v. Denver (29 Fed. R. 344) 555 v. Ferris (5 Ñ. Y. 48) 1305, 1306, 1307
Billard v. Erhart (35 Kan. 611) 446 v. Lowell (143 Mass. 296) 1261
Billings v. Monmouth (72 Me. 174) 1143 v. Macon (53 Ga. 172) 548, 1112
Bills v. Belknap (36 Iowa, 583) 791 v. Midland R. Co. (18 Q. B. 93) 1288
v. Kinson (21 N. H. 448)
223 v. Newfield (4 Gray, 365) 1270
Bingham v. Camden (29 N. J. Eq.
v. Newfield (68 Me. 365) 1257
464)
286 v. Portsmouth, &c. R. Co. (39
Bird v. Wasco Co. (3 Or. 282)
311
N. H. 435)
251
Birdsall 2. Clark (73 N. Y. 73)
154, 155
v. St. Louis (40 Mo. 569) 1281, 1283,
v. Russell (29 N. Y. 220)
650
1303, 1306
Birmingham v. Anderson (40 Pa. 506) 753 v. Sturtevant (12 N. H. 573) 321
v. Klein (Ala. 1890)
916 2. Walker (23 S. C. 517)
145
v. Rumsey (63 Ala. 352)
673 Blakely v. Devine (36 Minn: 53) 1322
Birmingham & P. M. S. R. Co. v. Blakie v. Staples (13 Grant (Can.)
Birm. S. R. Co. (79 Ala.
67)
1102
465)
146,859 Blanc v. Murray (36 La. An. 162) 446
Biscoe v. Coulter (18 Ark. 423) 952 v. New Orleans (1 Martin (o. s.)
Bislier v. Richards (9 0. St. 495) 882
65)
962
Bishop v. Centralia (49 Wis. 669) 1268 Blanchard v. Bissell (11 O. St. 96) 265,
v. Cone (3 N. H. 513)
371
267, 384, 407, 408
v. Macon (7 Ga. 200)
1164 v. Blackstone (102 Mass. 343) 524
8
t
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
xxxiii
Page
Page
Blanchard v. Kansas City (16 Fed. Board of Ed. of Van Wert V. ?
R. 444)
1224, 1242
Edson (18 O. St. 221) 769, 773
v. Porter (11 Ohio, 138)
177 Board of Freeholders of A. County,
Blanding v. Burr (13 Cal. 343) 78, 95,
&c. (See A. Co. Freeh. &c.]
130, 921, 923, 942 Board of Health of Buena Vista Tp.
Bleecker v. Ballou (3 Wend. 263) 954
v. E. Saginaw (45 Mich. 257) 271
Bleu v. Bear River, &c. M. Co. (20 Board of Health of La. v. Pooley (11
Cal. 602)
539
La. An. 743)
422
Bliss v. Ball (99 Mass. 597) 746, 791, 817 Board of Liq. of La. v. McComb (92
v. Brooklyn (4 Fisher Pat. C.
U. S. 531)
1005, 1016
596)
1180 v. Municipality (6 La. An. 21) 97,114
v. Krauss (16 0. St. 54)
920 Board of Police of A. County, &c.
v. South Hadley (145 Mass. 91) 1252,
[See A. Co. Pol. Bd., &c.]
1253, 1255 Board of Supervisors of A. County,
Block v. Bourbon Co. Com’rs (99
&c. [See A. Co. Sup. &c.]
U. S. 686)
582 Board of Trade Telegraph Co. v.
v. Jacksonville (36 Ill. 301) 409, 434
Barnett (107 Ill. 507) 831, 833,
Blodgett v. Boston (8 Allen, 237) 702,
843, 1241
1175, 1253 Board of Trustees of A. District, &c.
v. Royalton (17 Vt. 40)
761
[See A. Dist. Trs.]
Bloodgood v. Mohawk & H. Riv. R. Boardman v. Hayne (29 Ia. 339) 323, 325
Co. (18 Wend. 9) 234, 694, 700, Boaz v. Tate (43 Ind. 60) 294, 295, 296
705, 720 Bob v. State (2 Yerg. 173)
1125
Bloom v. Xenia (32 0. St. 461) 368 Bobbett v. Dresher (10 Kan. 9) 1058
Bloomer v. Stolley (5 McLean, 158) 391 Bodine v. Trenton (36 N. J. L. 198) 156
Bloomfield & R. N. Gasl. Co. v. Cal- Bodman v. Am. Tract Soc. (9 Allen,
kins (62 N. Y. 386)
822, 866
447)
262
v. Charter Oak Bank (121 U S. Bodwic v. Fennell (1 Wils. 233) 477, 484
121) 47, 51, 240, 347, 349, 1027, Boehm v. Baltimore (61 Md. 259) 441,
1032
1193
Blooming Valley Bor., Re (56 Pa. St. Boffing Bor., Re (2 Str. 1003) 1023
66)
265, 268 Bogart v. New York (7 Cow. 158) 1131
Bloomington v. Bay (42 III. 503) 1281, Bogert v. Elizabeth (25 N. J. Eq.
1295, 1297, 1302
426)
929, 1093
v. Brokaw (77 Ill. 194) 674, 675, 710, v. Elizabeth (27 N. J. Eq. 568) 929
1031, 1223, 1318, 1320, 1323 v. Indianapolis (13 Ind. 134) 443, 444
v. Chamberlain (104 III. 268) 1298 Boggs 2. Hamilton (2 Mill Const.
Bloor v. Delafield (69 Wis. 273) 1298
R. 381)
325
Bloxham v. State Bd. of Canv. (13 Bohen v. Waseca (32 Minn. 176) 1274
Fla. 55)
286 Bohlman v. Green Bay & L. P. R.
v. Wahl (46 Ill. 489)
460
Co. (30 Wis. 105)
721
Bluffton v. Mathews (92 Ind. 213) 1262 Boileau, Re (2 Pars. (Pa.) 505) 281
v. Silver (63 Ind. 262)
1132 Bolles v. Brimfield (120 U. S. 759) 134,
v. Studebaker (106 Ind. 129) 216
230, 635
Blumb v. Kansas City (84 Mo. 112) 1196, Bolling v. Petersburg (8 Leigh, 224) 672
1308
v. Petersburg (3 Rand. 563) 790, 793
Blunt v. Carpenter (68 Iowa, 265) 629 Bolte 2. New Orleans (10 La. An.
Blyth v. Birmingham W. W. Co. (11
321)
413
829 Bolton v. Crowther (4 Dowl. & Ryl.
Board of Agr. &c. (47 Ind. 407). [See
195)
324
State Board, &c.]
Bond v. Biddeford (75 Me. 538) 1301
Board of Com’rs of A. County, &c.
v. Hiestand (20 La. An. 139) 143, 997
[See A. Co. Com’rs, &c.]
v. Hoyt (13 Pet. 266)
1155
Board of Ed., &c. (56 Miss. 518).
v. Kenosha (17 Wis. 284) 910, 953,
[See State Board, &c.]
957, 1122
Board of Ed. of Auburn v. Quick
v. Newark (19 N. J. Eq. 376) 556, 559,
(99 N. Y. 138)
299
991, 1092
Board of Ed. of Dist. 3, T. 3, &c. v.
v. St. George (L. R. 6 C. P. 312) 279
Neidenberger (78 Ill. 58) 675 Bonesteel v. New York (22 N. Y.
Board of Ed. of Fairport v. Fonda
162)
523, 543, 559
(77 N. Y. 350)
299 Bonine v. Richmond (75 Mo. 437) 1297
Board of Ed. of Valley Dist. v. Al- Bonner v. State (7 Ga. 473) 1023, 1079
pena Tp. Bd. of Ed. (30 W. Booker v. Young (12 Gratt. 303) 343
Va. 424)
272 Boom v. Utica ( 2 Barb. 104) 449, 529, 1180
VOL. I. -
Exch. 781)
с
xxxiv
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
Page
Page
Boom Co. &c. (98 U. S. 403). [See Boston Soc. of Redemptorist Fatlı-
Miss. & R. R. Rivers, &c.]
ers v. Boston (29 Mass. 178) 953
Booraem v. No. Hud. County Ry. Co. Boston Turnp. Co. v. Ponifret (20
(39 N. J. Eq. 465)
760
Conn. 590)
371, 372, 375
Boorman v. Santa Barbara (65 Cal. Boston Water Power Co. v. Boston
313)
984
9 Met. (Mass.) 199)
1147
Booth v. State (4 Conn. 65)
475 Boswell v. Laird (8 Cal. 469)
1303
v. Woodbury (32 Conn. 118) 224 Bosworth v. Budgen (7 Mod. 459) 490
Boothe v. Georgetown (2 Cranch
v. New Orleans (26 La. An. 494) 312
C. C. 449)
483 Bott v. Pratt (33 Minn. 323)
422
Boothroyd, Re (15 M. & W. 1) 411, 478 Boucher v. New Haven (40 Conn.
Bordentown & S. A. Turnp. Co. v.
456)
1272, 1301, 1302
Camden & A. R. Co. (17 Boughner v. Clarksburg (15 W. Va.
N. J. L. 314)
780
394)
744, 745, 1097
Boren v. Darke Co. Com’rs (21 O. Boulder 2, Niles (9 Col. 415) 1260, 1284
St. 311)
1015 Bouldin v. Baltimore (15 Md. 18) 434, 945,
v. Smith (47 Ill. 482)
289
979, 980
Boring v. Williams (17 Ala. 510) 506 Boulton v. Crowther (2 Barn. & C.
Boro v. Phillips County (4 Dillon
703)
1225, 1233
C. C. 216)
568 Bound v. Wis. Cent. R. Co. (45 Wis.
Borough of A. &c. (See A. Bor. &c.]
543)
626, 1111
Borrowman v. Mitchell (3 U.C. Q. B. Bounds r. Kirven (63 Tex. 159) 1244
135)
746 Bourbon Co. Com’rs v. Block (99 U.
Bosley v. Davies (L. R. 1 Q. B. Div.
$. 214)
582
84)
454 Bourgeoise, Re (60 Miss. 663) 437
Bossier Par. Pol. Jury v. Shreveport Bourland v. Hildreth (26 Cal. 161) 281
(5 La. An. 661)
97 Bouton v. Brooklyn (15 Barb. 375) 763
Boston v. Baldwin (139 Mass. 315) 449 v. McDonough Co. Sup. (84 Ill.
2. Lecraw (17 How. 426; 19 How.
384)
675
263; 24 How. 188) 173, 751 Boutwell Case (17 Wall. 604). (See
v. Richardson (13 Allen, 152) 746, 790,
U. S. v. B.
816, 817, 818, 821 Bovee v. Danville (53 Vt. 183) 1284
2. Robbins (126 Mass. 384) 718 Bow v. Allenstown (34 N. H. 351) 24, 75,
v. Schaffer (9 Pick. 415) 381, 423, 427,
140, 656
429, 941 Bowditch v. Boston (101 U. S. 16) 1163,
v. Shaw (1 Met. 130) 404, 815, 977,
1164, 1165, 1196, 1197
987, 1231 Bowdoinham v. Richmond (6 Me.
2. Worthington (10 Gray, 496) 1313
112)
273
Boston & Alb. R. Co., Re (53 N. Y. Bowen v. Morris (2 Taunt. 374) 526
574)
689 v. Team (6 Rich. L. 298) 798, 801, 803
Boston & L. R. Co. v. Salem & L. Bower v. State Bank (5 Ark. 234) 260
R. Co. (2 Gray, 1)
683 Bowerbank o. Morris (Wall. C. C.
Boston & M. R. Co. v. Lowell & L.
R. 118)
319
R. Co. (124 Mass. 368) 809 Bowery Nat. Bank v. New York (63
Boston & S. Glass Co. v. Boston (4
N. Y. 336)
558
Met. (Mass.) 181) 1147, 1148, Bowie v. Kansas City (51 Mo. 451) 138
1149, 1153 Bowles v. Landaff (59 N. H. 164) 224,
Boston Beer Co. v. Massachusetts
386
(97 U. S. 25)
213, 216 Bowley 1. Walker (8 Allen, 21) 796
Boston, C. & M. R. Co. v. Gilmore Bowlin r. Furman (28 Mo. 427) 671
(37 N. H. 410)
969 Bowling Green v. Carson (10 Bush,
Boston Glass Manuf. Co. v. Langdon
64)
460
(24 Pick. 49)
243 Bowlsby v. Spear (31 N. J. L. 351) 1323
Boston Manuf. Co.v. Commonwealth Bowman v. Boston (5 Cush. 1) 760, 1258
(144 Mass. 598)
904 v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co. (125
Boston Mill Corp. v. Newman (12
U. S. 465)
213
Pick. 476)
701 v. St. John (47 III. 337)
414
Boston Overseers of the Poor v. Sears Boyce v. Russell (2 Cow. 444) 1008, 1010
(22 Pick. 122) 24, 70, 75, 303, 655 Boyd v. Chambers (78 Ky. 140) 492
Boston Rolling Mills v. Cambridge
v. Kennedy (38 N. J. L. 146) 651
(117 Mass. 396) 452, 1331 Boyden v. Brookline (8 Vt. 284) 313
Boston Seamen's Friend Soc. v. Bos- Boyer v. State (16 Ind. 451)
755
ton (116 Mass. 181) 722, 917, 932, Boyland v. New York (1 Sandf. 27) 52,
933, 954, 955
1186, 1195
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
XXXV
Page
Page
Boyle v. Brooklyn (71 N. Y. 1) 979, 1092 Brashear v. Mason (6 How. 97) 1015
v. Dundas (25 U. C. C. P. 420) 1255, Braun v. Chicago (110 Ill. 186) 427, 906
1266 Bray v. Wallingford (20 Conn. 416) 161,
v. Dundas (27 U. C. C. P. 129) 1298
1173
Boylston Market Assoc. v. Boston Brayton v. Fall River (113 Mass. 218) 176,
(113 Mass. 528)
146, 728
448, 1330, 1331
Boyter v. Dodsworth (6 D. & E. T. Brazil v. McBride (69 Ind. 244) 312, 313
R. 681)
319 Bread Co. Case (L. R. 8 Q. B. 355).
Bozant v. Campbell (9 Rob. La. 411) 401,
See Aërated, &c.]
442 Breaux's Bridge, Re (30 La. An.
Brabham v. Hinds Co. Sup. (54
1105)
408
Miss. 363)
1170, 1172 | Breed v. Cunningham (2 Cal. 368) 757
Brackenbridge v. Fitchburg (145
v. Lynn (126 Mass. 367)
452
Mass. 160)
1255 Brehm v. New York (104 N. Y. 186) 1092
Braconier v. Packard (136 Mass. 50) 1015 Brenham v. B. Water Co. (67 Tex.
Braddy v. Milledgeville (74 Ga. 516) 466
542)
146, 157, 431, 827
Bradford. v. Chicago (25 Ill. 411) 1147, Breninger v. Belvidere (44 N. J. L.
1151, 1152
350)
394, 405
Bradley v. Ballard (55 Ill. 413) 1140 Brennan v. Bradshaw (53 Tex. 330) 244,
v. Brown (32 U. C. Q. B. 463) 1264
1022, 1078
v. Eau Claire (56 Wis. 168) 1143 v. Friendship (67 Wis. 223) 1284
v. Franklin County (65 Mo. 638) 635 v. St. Louis (92 Mo. 482) 1295
v. McAtee (7 Bush, 667) 898, 918 Brevoort v. Detroit (24 Mich. 322) 543,
v. N. Y. & N. H. R. Co. (21
993, 994
Conn. 294)
1224 Brewer v. New Gloucester (14 Mass.
v. Richmond (6 Vt. 121)
161
216)
1172
v. State (22 Tex. App. 330)
1244
v. Otoe County (1 Neb. 373) 568
Bradnoc's Case (1 Vent. 196)
481 v. Springfield (97 Mass. 152) 989
Bradshaw v. Omaha (1 Neb. 16) 974 Brewer Brick Co. v. Brewer (62 Me.
Bradstreet, Re (7 Pet. 634)
1006
62)
233; 896
v. Dunham (65 Iowa, 248) 765 Brewis v. Duluth (9 Fed. R. 747; 13
Brady v. Fall River (121 Mass. 262) 1219
16. 334)
250
v. Lowell (3 Cush. 121) 1252, 1253, Brewster v. Davenport (51 Iowa, 427) 1327
1272, 1302 v. Harwich (4 Mass. 278) 269, 271
v. New York (20 N. Y. 312) 529, 539, v. Hyde (7 N. H. 206)
347
540, 542, 543, 566 v. Newark (11 N. J. Eq. 114) 984, 985
v. N. Y. Sup. (2 Sandf. S. C. R.
v. Syracuse (19 N. Y 116) 129, 130,
460; 10 N. Y. 260)
554
132, 896, 913
V. Northwestern Ins. Co. (11 Brick Presb. Church, Re (3 Edw.
Mich. 425)
472, 475
Ch. 155)
444, 954
v. Weeks (3 Barb. 157)
215 v. New York (5 Cow. 538) 157, 386,
Brady Street, Re (99 Pa. St. 591) 1221
392, 443
Brailey v. Southborough (6 Cush. Brickley v. Boston (20 Fed. R. 207) . 674
(Mass.) 141)
1252 Bridge v. Cage (Cro. Jac. 103)
209
Brainard ». Conn. River R. Co. (7
v. Grand Junc. Ry. Co. (3 M.
Cush. 506)
851
& W. 244)
1264
Braintree v. Battles (6 Vt. 395)
v. Lincoln (14 Mass. 367)
Brakken v. Minneapolis & St. L. Ry.
-Bridge Co. v. &c. (See the following
Co. (29 Minn. 41) 746, 762, 790,
plaintiff bridge companies, which,
856
in citing, may not always have
Bramah v. Roberts (3 Bing. N. C.
been fully named : Central
963)
191
Bridge Corp. (4 Gray, 474), Co-
Branahan v. Cinc. Hotel Co. (39 O.
lumbia Bridge Co. (27 S. C. 137),
St. 333)
788
Dunleith & Dub. (32 Iowa, 427),
Brander v. Chesterfield Co. Ct. Jus.
Enfield Toll (17 Conn. 40),
(5 Call, (Va.) 548)
1017
Frankfort (18 B. Mon. 41), Miss.
Brandriff v. Harrison Co. (50 Iowa,
River (58 Mo. 491), Newport &
164)
659, 1107
Cinc. (9 Bush, (Ky.) 264), Pas-
Brandt v. Craddock (27 L. J. Exch.
saic (13 N. J. Eq. 503), Red
314)
295
River (1 Sneed, 176), Wyandotte
Branham v. San Jose (24 Cal. 585) 518,
& K. C. (10 Kan. 26). ]
542, 576, 769, 794 Bridgeport v. Housatonuc R. Co. (15
Brant County, Re (19 U. C. Q. B.
Conn. 475) 133, 134, 148, 151,
450)
552
225, 255, 518, 529, 552
139
326
xxxvi
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
St. 156)
Page
Page
Bridgeport v. N. Y. & N. H. R. Co. Brocas 2. London (1 Str. 307)
380
(36 Conn. 255) 809, 921, 955 Brock Dist. v. Bowen (7 U. C. Q. B.
Bridges v. Griffin (33 Ga. 113) 969
471)
260
v. North London Ry, Co. (L. R. Broder v. Saillard (L. R. 2 Ch. 692) 447
6 Q. B. 377)
1265, 1300 Brodie & Bowmanville (3 U. C. Q. B.
Bridgford v. Tuscumbia (16 Fed. R.
580)
454
910; 4 Woods, 611) 216, 376 | Brodnax v. Groom (64 N. C. 244) 1098,
Brientnall v. Philadelphia (103 Pa.
1120
995 Brokaw v. Terre Haute (97 Ind. 176) 713
Brieswick v. Brunswick (51 Ga. 639) 87, Bronson v. Kinsie (1 How. 316) 118
420, 421
v. Wallingford(54 Conn. 513) 1333
Briggs v. Boat 17 Allen, 287) 464 Brook v. Horton (68 Cal. 554) 794, 796
v. Lewiston & A. Horse R. Co. Brookfield Park Case (48 Mo. 361). (See
(79 Me. 363)
870
Price v. Thompson.)
v. Murdock (13 Pick. 305) 347 Brookline v. Westminster (4 Vt. 224) 264
v. Whipple (6 Vt. 95) 220, 221 Brooklyn v. Breslin (57 N. Y. 591) 154,
v. Whipple (7 Vt. 15)
138
155, 404, 405, 424, 811, 939
Bright v. Chenango Co. Sup. (18
v. B. City R. Co. (47 N. Y. 475) 157,
Johns. 242)
316
846, 860, 863, 866, 1305, 1312,
v. Hewes (19 La. An. 666) 554
1313
v. McCullough (27 Ind. 223) 426 v. Cleves (4 H. & D. Sup't, 231) 461
Brightman z. Bristol (65 Me. 426) 448, v. Meserole (26 Wend. 132) 151,
449, 1167
1092
v. Kirner (22 Wis. 54)
910, 955
v. N. Y. Ferry Ço. (87 N. Y. 204) 165
Brimmer v. Boston (102 Mass. 19) 146, v. Patchen (8 Wend. 47)
725
157, 728 v. Smith (104 Ill. 429)
254
Brinck v. Collier (56 Mo. 164) 751, 760 v. Toynbee (31 Barb. 282) 437, 440
Brine v. Gt. W. Ry. Co. (2 Best & Brooklyn & N. Y. Bridge Case (5
S. 402)
1215, 1320, 1321, 1323,
Abb. N. C. 83)
126
1333 Brooklyn Cent. R. Co. v. B. City R.
Brinkmeyer v. Evansville (29 Ind.
Co. (32 Barb. 358) 117, 846, 863,
187)
217, 1193, 1199
864, 870
Briscoe v. Bank of Ky. (11 Peters, Brooklyn City & N. R. Co. v. Coney
257)
55
Island & B.R. Co. (35 Barb.
v. Drought (11 Ir. C. L. R. 250) 1316
364)
847
Bristol v. New Chester (3 N. H. 532) 77, Brooklyn Com’rs of Assess., Re (18
269
Alb. L. J. 199)
777
Bristol & N. S. R. Ry. Co., Re (L. R. Brooklyn Park Com’rs v. Armstrong
3 Q. B. D. 10)
1007
(3 Lans. 429)
690, 770
British C. Plate Co. v. Meredith (4
v. Armstrong (45 N. Y. 234) 118, 120,
D. & E. T. R. 794)
213, 1163,
690, 694, 699, 703, 768, 769, 770,
1215, 1225, 1233
771
Brittain v. Newland (2 D. & B. 363) 262 Brooklyn Steam Transit Co. v.
Britton v. Cummington (107 Mass.
Brooklyn (78 N. Y. 524) 783,
347)
1253, 1257
784, 792, 833, 850, 852
2. New York (21 How. Pr. 251) 157 Brooklyn Street, Re (19 Am. &
v. Philadelphia (32 Pa. St. 387) 1002
Eng. Corp. Cas. 584)
757
v. Platte City (2 Dillon C. C.1) 1032, Brooklyn Street, Re (118 Pa. St.
1042
640)
719
v. Steber (62 Mo. 370) 99, 101 Brooklyn W. & N. Ry. Co., Re (72
Broadhead v. Milwaukee (19 Wis.
N. Y. 245; 75 N. Y. 335;
652)
224
81 N. Y. 69)
840
Broadway & S. Av. Ry. Co. v. New Brooks v. Baltimore (48 Md. 265) 920
York (49 Hun, 126)
864 v. Mitchell (9 M. & W. 15) 582
Broadway Bap. Church v. McAtee
v, New Durham (55 N. H. 559) 528
(8 Bush, 508) 917, 918, 932, 954 v. Polk County (52 Iowa, 460) 974
Broadway Surface Ry. Case (111
v. Riding (46 Ind. 15) 796, 801, 804
N. Y. 1). [See People v. O'Brien, v. Somerville (106 Mass. 271) 1293
'&c.)
v. Topeka (34 Kan. 277)
752
Broadwell v. Chapin (2 Ill. App. 511) 323 Brookville v. Arthurs (18 Atl
. R.
2. Kansas City (75 Mo. 213) 1218,
1076)
1312, 1313
1303 v. Gagle (73 Ind. 117)
477
Broburg v. Des Moines (63 Iowa, Broome v. N. Y. & N. J. Tel. Co. (42
523)
1260
N. J. Eq. 141)
831
A
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
xxxvii
1247,
Page
Page
Brophy, Re (26 U. C. C. P. 290) 259 Brownlow v. Metrop. Bd. of W. (13
v. Hyatt (10 Col. 223) 418, 488
C. B. (N. S.) 768; 16 Ib.
v. Landman (28 O. St. 542) 944, 981
546)
1214
v. Perth Amboy (44 N. J. L. 217) 478 Brownville v. Cook (4 Neb. 101) 437, 440,
Broughton v. Manchester & S. Water
497
Works (3 B. & Ald. 1) 191 Brownsville Tax. Dist. Com'rs v.
v. Pensacola (93 U. S. 266) 141, 248,
Loague (129 U. S. 493) 1033,
250, 251, 253, 254, 255, 270, 1053
1035, 1036
Brouwer v. Appleby (1 Sandf. 158) 77, 139 Bruce v. Bruce (2 B. & P. 229) 279, 379
Brower v. New York (3 Barb. 254) 1114, v. Cromar (22 U. C. Q. B. 321) 260
1211
v. Dickey (116 Ill. 527)
539
Brown, Re (116 U. S. 401) 1006, 1015 v. U. S. (11 How. 437)
301
v. Atlanta (66 Ga. 71)
1211 Bruce's Case (2 Str. 819)
328, 336
v. Beatty (34 Miss. 227) 718, 721 Bruker v. Covington (69 Ind. 33) 1285
v. Belleville (30 U. C. Q. B. 373) 537 Brumagim v. Tillinghast (18 Cal.
v. Brown (7 Oregon, 285)
661
256)
1150
v. Cape Girardeau (90 Mo. 377) 1182 Bruner v. Bryan (50 Ala. 523)
319
v. Crego (32 Iowa, 498)
1028 Brunnetti v. New Orleans (9 La. 430) 429
v. Crippin (4 H. & M. 173) 1006 Brunswick v. Braxton (70 Ga. 193) '1297
v. Dist. Colunibia (127 U. S. 579) 359, v. Falin (60 Ga. 109)
318
551 v. Litchfield (2 Me. 28)
123
v. Duplessis (14 La. An. 842) 861, 862 Brusso v. Buffalo (90 N. Y. 679)
v. Fitchburg (128 Mass. 282) 989
1268, 1303, 1305
v. Gates (15 W. Va. 131) 40, 159, 161, Bryan v. Bates (15 Ill. 87) 294, 483
673, 674, 1027, 1028, 1031, 1032, v. Cattell (15 Iowa, 538) 309, 310, 311,
1037
1016, 1057, 1058
v. Glasgow (57 Mo. 156) 1263, 1266, v. Chicago (60 Ill. 507)
958,
1279 v. Page 151 Tex. 532) 146, 518, 520
v. Heath (45 N. H. 168)
162
521, 533, 534, 540
v. Hunn (27 Conn. 332)
475 Bryant v. Estabrook (16 Neb. 217) 758
v. Jefferson County (16 Iowa,
v. St. Paul (33 Minn. 289) 1193, 1201
339)
1282, 1300 Bryant's Lessee v. McCandless 17
v. Jerome (102 Ill. 371)
492
Ohio, Pt. 2, 135)
669, 743
v. Lindsay (35 U. C. Q. B. 509) 516, Bryson v. Philadelphia (47 Pa. St.
537, 538
329)
157
v. London (9 C. B. (n. s.) 726) 120 Buccleuch v. Metrop. Bd. of W. (L.
v. Lowell (8 Met. 172) 814, 815, 1219,
R. 5 H. L. C. 418)
1231
1225 Buchanan v. Curtis (25 Wis. 99) 752
v. Manning (6 Ohio, 298) 739, 750, v. Litchfield (102 U. S. 278) 596, 608,
753, 758, 763, 773, 787, 1116
610, 612
2. Maryland (12 Wheat. 419) 903, 970 Buck v. Danzebacker (37 N. J. L.
v. New York (63 N. Y. 239) 132, 133,
359)
510
993 v. Lockport (6 Lans. 251) 1301
v. Nicholson (5 C. B. (n. s.) 468) 478 Buckbee v. Brown (21 Wend. 110) 179
v. Painter (44 Iowa, 368) 1154 Bucknall v. Story (36 Cal. 67) 942, 1000
v. Rundlett (15 N. H. 360) 323 v. Story (46 Cal. 589)
1151
v. Sarnia (11 U. C. Q. B. 87) 1322, Buckner, Re (9 Ark. 73) 1126, 1127
1324
v. Augusta (1 A. K. Marsh. 9) 769
v. Union Ins. Co. (3 La. An. 177) 244 Bucroft v. Council Bluffs (63 Iowa,
v. United States (20 Ct. Cl. 416) 650
646)
535, 555
v. Utica (2 Barb. 104)
567 Buell r. Ball (20 Iowa, 282) 360, 390, 974
v. Vinalhaven (65 Me. 402) 213, 1187, v. Buckingham (16 Iowa, 284)
1195, 1201
357, 358
v. Watson (47 Me. 161)
1288 v. State (45 Ark. 336) 453, 469
v. Winterport (79 Me. 305) 349, 367, Buena Vista Tp. Bd. of H. v. E. Sag-
540
inaw (45 Mich. 257)
271
Brown Co. Com’rs v. Butt (2 Ohio, Buffalo, Re (64 N. Y. 547)
690
348)
1174 Re (68 N. Y. 167)
689
Browne v. Bow doinham (71 Me. 144) 742 Re (78 N. Y. 362)
707
Browning v. Camden & W.R. Co. (3
v. Bettinger (76 N. Y. 393) 1139
H. W. Green Ch. 47)
716 v. Holloway (7 N. Y. 493) 556, 1298,
v. Owen Co. Com’rs (44 Ind. 11) 1182,
1305
1184, 1186 v. Le Couteulx (15 N. Y. 451) 948,
v. Springfield (17 III. 143) 1246, 1281
949
343,
Xxxviii
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
Page
Page
Buffalo v. Webster (10 Wend. 100) 404, Burlington & H. C. Ferry Co. v.
422, 423, 456, 459
Davis (48 Iowa, 133)
180
Buffalo & H. Túrnp. Co. v. Buffalo Burlington & Mo. R. R. Co. v. Lan-
(58 N. Y. 639) 1188, 1190
caster County (4 Neb. 293) 938
Buffalo & N. F. R. Co. v. Buffalo (5
v. Mount Pleasant (12 Iowa, 112) 1122
Hill, 209)
465, 857 v. Otoe Co. Sup. (16 Wall. 667) 231,
Buffalo City Cemetery v. Buffalo (46
573, 921
N. Y. 503)
955 v. Reinhackle (15 Neb. 279) 842, 847
Buffett v. Troy & B. R. Co. (40 N. Y.
v. Spearman (12 Iowa, 112) 267, 922
168)
1140
956, 968, 974, 976
Buffington Wheel Co. v. Burnham Burlington Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Bur-
(60 Iowa, 493)
388
lington (60 Iowa, 500) 398
Bulkley v. Eckert (3 Pa. St. 368) 161 Burlington Lumber Co. 2. Willetts
Bull z. Read (13 Gratt. 78) 77, 898, 1119
(118 Ill. 559)
904
v. Sims (23 N. Y. 570) 562, 565, 569 Burlington Tp. v. Beasley (94 U. S.
Bullock v. Curry (2 Met. (Ky.) 171) 660
310)
573, 577, 704
v. Geomble (45 Ill. 218)
419 Burlington Water Co. v. Woodward
v. New York (99 N. Y. 654) 1285
(49 Iowa, 58)
204
Bullwinkle v. Guttenberg (17 Wis. Burmeister, Re (56 How. Pr. 416) 985
585)
1142 Re (76 N. Y. 174)
959
Bulow v. Charleston C. Council (1 Burnes v. Atchison (2 Kan. 454) 68, 78,
N. & M. 527)
968
235, 237, 940, 941, 946, 1107, 1116
Bummell v. Houston (68 Tex. 10) 996 Burnett, Re (30 Ala. 461) 147, 433, 434,
Bunch v. Edenton (90 N. C. 431)
1258,
471
1312 V. Abbott (51 Ind. 254)
549
Buncombe v. McCarson (1 Dev. & B.
v. Buffalo (17 N. Y. 383) 707, 940
306)
1079 v. Portage Co. Aud. (12 O. St.
Bunnell's Appeal (69 Pa. St. 59) 786
57)
1030
Burbach v. Schweinler (56 Wis. 386) 759 v. Sacramento (12 Cal. 76) · 923, 979
Burbank v. Fay (65 N. Y. 57) 659, 800 Burnham v. Boston (10 Allen, 290) 1257,
Burch v. Hardwicke (30 Gratt. 24) 99,
1312
102, 294, 1196 v. Brown (23 Me. 400)
582
Burckholter 1. McConnelsville (20
v. Byron (46 Mich. 555)
1252
0. St. 308)
431
v. Chicago (24 III. 496)
976
Burden v. Stein (27 Ala. 104)
697 v. Fond du Lac (15 Wis. 193) 161
Burdett, Re (127 U. S. 771)
1010 Burns, Re (1 Tenn. Ch. 83)
72
2. Swenson (17 Tex. 489) 446, 449 v. Baltimore (48 Md. 198)
990
Burford v. Grand Rapids (53 Mich.
v. Clarion County (62 Pa. St.
98)
449, 1158, 1160, 1205
422)
95, 130
Burges v. Mabin (70 Iowa, 633) 625 v. Elba (32 Wis. 605)
1281
Burgess v. Jefferson (21 La. An. 143) 545 v. Harper (59 Ill. 21)
162
v. Pue (2 Gill (Md.), 254) 321, 363, v. La Grange (17 Tex. 415) 1126
898, 899 v. Milw. & Miss. R. Co. (9 Wis.
v. Seligman (107 U. S. 20) 587
450)
694
Burginhofen v. Martin (3 Yeates,
v. Toronto (42 U. C. Q. B. 560) 1255,
479)
1078
1266
Burk v. State (5 Lea, 349)
141 Burr v. Atlanta (64 Ga. 225)
904
Burke, Re (62 N. Y. 224) 959, 976 2. Carbondale (76 Ill. 455) 199, 649,
v. Edgar (67 Cal. 182)
312
906
v. Elliott (4 Ired. L. 355) 1079 v. Chariton County (12 Fed. R.
v. Jeffries (20 Iowa, 145)
71
848)
632
Burleigh v. Rochester (5 Fed. R. 667) 582 v. Leicester (121 Mass. 241) 817, 1219
Burlington v. B. & Mo. R. Co. (41
v. Plymouth (48 Conn. 460) 1260
Iowa, 134) 798, 803, 995, 998, 999 | Burr's Trial, 355
332
v. B. Street R. Co. (49 Iowa, 144) 871 Burrell Tp. v. Uncapher (117 Pa. St.
v. Dankward (73 Iowa, 170) 460
353)
1269
v. Eastlow (43 N. J. L. 113) 391 Burrill v. Augusta (78 Me. 118) 1198,
2. Gilbert (31 Iowa, 356) 980, 1224
1199
v. Kellar (18 Iowa, 59)
420, 431 v. Boston (2 Cliff. 590) 54, 524, 526,
v. Palmer (67 Iowa, 681)
961, 991
527, 529, 537, 539
v. Putnam Ins. Co. (31 Iowa, Burritt v. New Haven (42 Conn. 174) 853,
102)
970
858, 881, 1224, 1252
v. Quick (47 Iowa, 222) 721, 1001 Burrton v. Harvey Co. Sav. Bank (28
v. Schwartzman (52 Conn. 181) 783
Kan. 390)
563
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
Xxxix
76, 356
89)
Page
Page
Burt v. Boston (122 Mass. 223) 1311 Butterfield v. Forrester (11 East, 60) 1264
v. Merch. Ins. Co. (106 Mass. Butternut v. O'Malley (50 Wis. 329), 551,
356)
697
553
v. Winona & St. P. R. Co. (31 Butterworth v. United States (112
Minn. 972)
U. S. 50)
1005
Burton v. Chattanooga (7 Lea, 739) 1322 Buttrick v. Lowell (1 Allen, 172) 108, 213,
v. Patton (2 Jones L. 124) 1079, 1888
293, 540, 1167, 1193, 1196, 1197,
v. Phila. W. & B. R. Co. (4 Har-
1207
ring. (Del.) 252)
865 Butts v. Little (68 Ga. 272)
203
Busbee v. Wake Co. Com’rs (93 N.C.
v. Wood (37 N. Y. 317)
514
143)
911 Butz v. Muscatine (8 Wall. 575) 82, 118,
Bush v. Beavan (1 Hurl. & C. 500) 1010
198, 237, 250, 584, 585, 586, 587,
v. Carbondale (78 Ill. 74) 151, 550
649, 942, 946, 1035, 1042, 1055
v. Dubuque (69 Iowa, 233) 150 Byars v. Mt. Vernon (77 Ill. 467) 408
v Johnston (23 Pa. St. 209) 754, 1308 Byers 2. Commonwealth (42 Pa. St.
v. Seabury (8 Jolins. 418) 459
470, 471, 479, 500
v. Shipman (5 Ill. 190) 94, 103
v. Olney Trs. (16 Ill. 35) 431, 432,
v. Whitney (1 Chip. 369) 677, 678
434
Bushel v. Commonwealth Ins. Co. Byles v. Golden (52 Mich. 612) 1012
(15 S. & R. 176)
67 | Byram v. Detroit (50 Mich. 56) 1119, 1123
Bushnell v. Beloit (10 Wis. 195) 564 Byrnes v. Cohoes (67 N. Y. 204) 1322
v. Robeson (62 Iowa, 540) 447
Bussier v. Pray (7 S. & R. 447) 315, 316
Butcher v. Camden (29 N. J. Eq. 478) 286,
C.
314
Butchers' Benefic. Assoc. (35 Pa. St. Cable Co. Case, &c. (104 N. Y. 38).
151; 38 Ib. 298)
335, 336
[See New York Cable Co.]
Butchers' Co. v. Bullock (3 B. & Pul. Cabot v. Britt (36 Vt. 349)
374
434)
414, 484 v. Rome (28 Ga. 50)
512
v. Mercy (1 H. Bl. 370)
421 Cadmus v. Farr (47 N. J. L. 208) 357
Butchers' Union, &c. Co. v. Crescent Cady v. Conger (19 N. Y. 256) 787
City Live Stock, &c. Co.
v. Watertown (18 Wis. 322) 523
(111 U. S. 746)
211 Caerdiffe Br. Case. (See King v.
Butler v. Bangor (67 Me. 388) 1268, 1303
Glamorganshire.]
v. Bray Tp. Com'rs (L. R. 11 Cagwin v. Hancock (84 N. Y. 532) 602
Ir. C. L. R. 181)
1302 Cahaba T. Council v. Burnett (34 Ala.
v. Charlestown (7 Gray, 12) 151, 521,
400) 1148, 1150, 1151, 1154
527, 551 Cahill v. Kalamazoo M. Ins. Co. (2
v. Chicago (56 Ill. 341)
984
Doug. 124)
139
v. Detroit (43 Mich. 552) 1107, 1116 Cain v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co.
v. Dunham (27 Ill. 474) 225, 518,
(54 Iowa, 255)
852
640, 646 2. Davie Co. Comºrs (86 N. C.
v. Hunter (7 H. & N. 826) 1308
8)
956
v. Milwaukee (15 Wis. 493) 563 v. Syracuse (95 N. Y. 83) 454, 1276
v. Muscatine (11 Iowa, 433) 974 Cairo v. Allen (3 Ill. App. 398) 674, 675,
v. Muscatine (8 Wall. 575) 1028
1007
v. Neosho Co. Com’rs (15 Kan.
v. Bross (101 III. 475)
74, 425
178)
316, 1144 v. Campbell (116 Ill. 305)
900
v. Nevin (88 Ill. 575) 146, 520, 944, v. Everett (107 Ill. 75)
1032
993, 995 Cairo & F. R. Co. v. Trout (32 Ark.
r. Palmer (1 Hill (N. Y.) 324)
117
17)
709, 724
v. Passaic (44 N. J. L. 71)
384 v. Turner (31 Ark. 495)
718
v. Pennsylvania (10 How. 402) 311 Cairo & St. L. R. Co. v. Sparta (77
v. Ravine Road Sewer Com'rs
Ill. 505)
122, 240, 635
(39 N. J. L. 665)
714 Cairo & V. R. Co. v. People (92 Ill.
v. Saginaw Co. Sup. (26 Mich. 22) 984
777)
854, 855
v. Thomasville (74 Ga. 570) 1092 v. Stevens (73 Ind. 278)
1319
v. Toledo (5 O. St. 225) 993, 994 Calais v. Dyer (7 Me. 155)
883
v. United States (21 Wall. 272) 298 | Calaveras County v. Brockway (30
Butler's Appeal (73 Pa. 448)
899
Cal. 325)
1008
Butman v. Fowler (17 Ohio, 101) 807 Calder v. Kurby (5 Gray, 597) 432
Butolph v. Blust (5 Lans. 84)
483 v. Smalley (66 Iowa, 219) 1309
Butt v. Imperial Gas Co. (L. R. 2 Calder & H. Nav. Co. v. Pilling (14
Ch. App. 158)
889, 890
M. & W. 76)
431
xl
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
Page
323)
Caldwell v. Alton (33 Ill. 416) 147, 455, Campbell v. Elma (13 U. C. Q. B.
457, 460
296)
518
v. Boone (51 Iowa, 687) 1196, 1197 v. Fair Haven (54 Vt. 336) 1297
v. Burke Co. Jus. (4 Jones Eq.
v. Kenosha (5 Wall. 194)
86, 120,
25, 226, 237, 898, 899
542, 584, 635
v. Harrison (11 Ala. 755)
361
v. Laclede Gas L. Co. (84 Mo.
v. Rupert (10 Bush, 179) 535, 918,
352)
749
939 v. New Orleans (2 La. An. 34) 1163
Caldwell County v. Herbert (68 Tex.
v. Philadelphia (108 Pa. Śt.
321)
798
300)
1225
Caledonian Ry. Co. v. Ogilvie (2
v. Polk County (3 Iowa, 467) 562,
Macq. 229)
1230
565, 566, 568, 569, 1009
Calhoun v. Fletcher (63 Ala. 574) 397 2. Race (7 Cush. 408) 1265, 1266
Calhoun Co. v. Am. Emigrant Co.
v. Stillwater (32 Minn. 308) 1314
(93 U. S. 124)
659 v. Wright (108 Pa. St. 300) 1221
Calhoun Co. Sup. v. Galbraith (99 Campbell's Adm. v. Montgomery C.
U. S. 214)
582, 593, 631
Council (53 Ala. 527) 1157, 1160,
California v. Cent. Pac. R. Co. (127
1167, 1174, 1186, 1194, 1197,
U. S. 1)
904
1254, 1280, 1281
California City v. Howard (78 Mo. Campbell Co. Ct. v. Newport (12 B.
88)
759, 789
Mon. 538)
757, 765, 773
Calking v. Baldwin (4 Wend. 667) 325, Canaan v. Derush (47 N. H. 211) 533
718, 720
v. Hanover (49 N. H. 415) 322
Calkins v. Hartford (33 Conn. 57) 1270 Canada Co. v. Oxford (9 U. C. Q. B.
Call v. Chadbourne (46 Me. 206) 77
567)
389
Callagan v. Hallett (1 Caines, 104; Canal Bank, &c. (5 Denio, 517). [See
Col. & C. 179)
316
Chemung Canal Bank, &c.]
Callahan v. Des Moines (63 Iowa,
Canal Co. v. &c. (See (at their al-
705)
1318
phabetical places) the following
v. New York (66 N. Y. 656) 492
plaintiff canal companies which,
Callam v. Saginaw (50 Mich. 7) 124, 129,
in citing, may not always have
210, 659
been fully named: Alexandria
Callan v. Wilson (127 U. S. 540) 502, 50.7,
(5 How. (U. S.) 83), Chesapeake
724
& (). (4 G. & J. 1), Grand Surrey
Callanan v. Madison County (45
(1 Man. & Gr. 393), Louisville &
Iowa, 561)
1154
T. (7 B. Mon. 160), Pennsylvania
Callaway County v. Foster (93 U.S.
& O. (63 Pa. St. 290), Tuckahoe
567)
593, 631
(11 Leigh, 42).]
Callender v. Marsh (1 Pick. 418) 814, Canal Fund Com’rs v. Perry (5 Ohio,
816, 1215, 1217, 1223, 1224, 1225,
57)
321
1230, 1231, 1233 Canal Nav. Prop., &c. (L. R. 1 E. &
Calvert Co. Com'rs v. Gibson (36
1. Ap. 254). (See Staffordshire
Md. 229)
1169, 1282
& W.C. N. Prop., &c.]
v. Milledgeville (48 Ga. 309) 1146 Canal Street, Re, (11 Wend. 155) 711, 713
Cambridge v. Cambridge R. Co. (10
Re(12 N. Y. 406)
510
Allen, 50)
871 Canal Trustees, &c. (11 Ill. 554; 12
v. Charlestown Branch R. Co.
Ill. 248, 403). (See Illinois &
(7 Met. 70)
1134, 1135
Mich. Canal Trustees, &c.]
2. Middlesex Co. Com’rs (125 Canning v. Williamstown (1 Cush.
Mass. 519)
1217
(Mass.) 451)
1288
Cambridge University v. Crofts (10 Cannon v. Janvier (3 Houston, 27) 1057
Mod. 208)
262 v. New Orleans (20 Wall. 577)
166
Camden v. Allen (26 N. J. L. 398) 573, Canova v. Baker Co. Com’rs (18 Fla.
995, 999
512)
254
v. Bibck (65 Ala. 236)
509 Canton v. Nist (9 O. St. 439)
406
v. Mulford (26 N. J. L. 49) 715, 979, Cantril 2. Sainer (59 Iowa, 26)
388
1126, 1129 Cape Girardeau 2. Riley (52 Mo.
Came v. Brigham (39 Me. 39)
563
389, 396, 397
Cameron, Re (13 U. C. Q. B. 190) 389 Cape Girardeau Co. Ct. v. Hill (118
Re (50 N. Y. 502)
558
U. S. 68)
119, 897, 963
v. Stephenson (69 Mo. 372) 897 | Cape May & S. L. R. Co. v. Cape
Campau v. Detroit ( 14 Mich. 276) 715,
May (35 N. J. Eq. 419) 392, 1098
725, 721 Card . Ellsworth (65 Me. 547) 1263,
Campbell, Re, (74 Cal. 20) 441, 405
1269
424)
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
xli
Page
Page
Carder v. Fayatte Co. Com’rs (16 Carroll County v. Graham (98 Ind.
0. St. 353)
262
279)
1147
Cardigan v. Page (6 N. H. 182)
347
v. Smith (111 U. S. 556) 231, 579,
Cardington v. Fredericks (46 0. St.
614, 618
000)
1281, 1295 Carroll Co. Sup. v. United States
Carleton v. Bath (22 N. H. 559) 53, 54
(18 Wall. 71) 567, 584, 1028,
v. Franconia Iron & S. Co. (99
1054, 1055
Mass. 216)
1205 Carrolton R. R. Co. v. Winthrop (5
v. People (10 Mich. 250)
356
La. An. 36)
171, 174, 658
v. Washington (38 Kan. 726) 216, Carron v. Martin (26 N. J. L. 594) 146,
563
520, 979, 981, 1092, 1126, 1129
Carli v. Stillwater Street Ry. & T. Carson v. Central R. Co. (35 Cal.
Co. (28 Minn. 373):
842
325)
841, 808
Carlisle v. Blamire (8 East, 487) 260 v. Hartford (48 Conn. 68) 711, 719
v. Brisbane (113 Pa. St. 544) 1259, Carter v. Cambridge & B. Bridge
1286, 1295
Prop. (104 Mass. 236) 125, 129
Carlton v. Salem (103 Mass. 141) 1102, v. Chicago (57 Ill. 283) 742, 783,
1115
1097, 1118
Carlton Street, Re (16 Hun, 497) 367 2. Dow (16 Wis. 298) 426, 428, 910
Carman u. Steub. & Ind. R. (4 0.
v. Harrison (5 Blackf. 138) 326
St. 339)
1306, 1308 v. La Grange (60 Tex. 636) 797
Caro v. Metrop. Ro. Cy. (14 J. & S.
v. Monticello (68 Iowa, 178) 1297
138)
878 Carter County v. Sinton (120 U. S.
Carondelet 3. McPherson (20 Mo.
517)
87
192)
771 Cartersville v. Baker (73 Ga. 686) 210
Carondelet Canal & Nav. Co.v. New
v. Lanham (67 Ga. 753)
418, 471
Orleans (38 La. An. 308) 986
v. Lyon (69 Ga. 577)
499
Carpenter v. Bristol Co. Com’rs (21 Cartwright v. Belmont (58 Wis.
Pick. 258)
1057
370)
1267
v. Cohoes (81 N. Y. 21) 1246, 1247, Cary v. Ottawa (8 Fed. R. 199) 594
1258, 1268 v. Pekin (88 Ill. 454) 974, 975
v. Ely (4 Wis. 420)
1021 Cascalvo Street, Re (20 La. An. 497) 909,
v. Jennings (77 Ill. 250)
722
924
v. Lathrop (51 Mo. 483) 593, 644 Case v. Hall (21 III. 632) 418, 471
v. Oswego & S. R. Co. (24 N. Y.
v. Johnson (91 Ind. 477)
514
655)
791, 842
v. Mobile (30 Ala. 538) 138, 481, 482,
Carpenter's Case (2 Pars. 535) 281
483
(Raym. 439) 1063 v. Waverly (36 Iowa, 545) 1301
Carpenteria Sch. Dist. v. Heath (56 Casey o. Inloes (1 Gill, 510) 720, 1188
Cal. 478)
760 v. Leavenworth (17 Kan. 189) 555,
Carr v. Northern Liberties (35 Pa.
556
St. 324)
158, 1158, 1220, 1320, Cash v. Union Depot, &c. Co. (32
1325, 1328, 1334
Minn. 101)
842
v. St. Louis (9 Mo. 190) 313, 314, Caskey v. Greensburgh (78 Ind.
397
233)
297
Carrick v. Johnston (26 U. C; Q. B. Cass v. Bellows (31 N. H. 501) 371
65)
1266 v. Dillon (2 0. St. 607) 208, 225, 631
v. Lamar (116 U. S. 423) 1015 Cass County v. Banks (44 Mich.
Carrier v. Shawangunk (10 Fed. R.
467)
745, 760, 761
220)
596 v. Gillette (100 U. S. 585) 583, 628,
Carriger v. Morristown (1 Lea, 116) 975
629, 631
Carrington v. St. Louis (89 Mo. 208) 1198, v. Johnston (95 U. S. 360) 579, 584,
1201, 1211
593, 636
Carroll v. Lynchburg (6 S. E. R. 133) 475 Cass Co. Com’rs v. Ross (46 Ind.
v. Perry (4 McLean, 25)
896
404)
554
v. St. Louis (4 Mo. Ap. 191) 1189 Cassedy v. Stockbridge (21 Vt. 391) 1255,
v. St. Louis (12 Mo. 44)
316, 554
1264, 1287
v. Siebenthaler 137 Cal. 193) 318 Castleberry v. Atlanta (74 Ga. 164) 815,
v. Tishamingo Co. Pol. Bd.' (28
1222, 1241
Miss. 38) 568, 1028, 1056, 1169 Castleton v. Langdon (19 Vt. 210) 659,
v. Tuscaloosa (12 Ala. 173) 423,
662
425, 971, 1126, 1127 Castor v. Uxbridge (39 U. C. Q. B.
v. Tyler (2 H. & G. 54)
316
113) 1247, 1255, 1258, 1264, 1269,
v. Wall (35 Kan. 36)
351
1298, 1301
xlii
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
Page
Ga. 320)
Page
Caswell v. St. Mary & P. L. J. Pl. Chadwick v. Melvin (68 Pa. St. 333) 276
R. Co. (28 U. C. Q. B. 247) 1255 Chaffee v. Granger (6 Mich. 51) 512, 1116
Catlıcart v. Comstock (56 Wis. 590) 42 Chaffee's Appeal (56 Mich. 244) 718
Catholic Soc. R. & L. Ed. v. New Chahoon's Case (21 Gratt. (Va.) 822) 493
Orleans (10 La. An. 73) 1152 Challiss v. Atchison T. & S. F. R.
Catlin v. Valentine (9 Paige, 575) 787
Co. (16 Kan. 117)
690
Cator v. Lewisham (5 B. & S. 115) 1328 Chamberlain v. Burlington (19 Iowa,
Cattel v. Ireson (E. B. & E. 91) 504
395)
236, 548
Catterlin v. Frankfort (79 Ind. 547) 1312, v. Cleveland (34 O. St. 551)
920
1313 2. Dover (13 Me. 466) 348, 350, 371,
Caulfield v. State (1 S. C. 461) 296
374
Cavanagh v. Boston (139 Mass. 426) 691, v. Eliz. S. Cord. Co. (41 N. J.
1184, 1186
Eq. 43) 835, 842, 847, 848
Cavelier's Suc. (2 Rob. (La.) 438)
668
v. Enfield (43 N. H. 356)
1270
Caverly v. Lowell (1 Allen, 289) 314 v. Evansville (77 Ind. 542) 141, 373,
Cawley v. People (95 Ill. 249)
297
392
-Cemetery v. &c. [See the following v. Sibley, Gov. (4 Minn. 309) 1016
plaintiff cemetery associations, v., West End L. & C. P. R. Co.
which, in citing, may not always
(2 B. & S. 605)
688
have been fully nanied : Buffalo Chambers v. Cinc. & Ga. R. Co. (69
City Cemetery (46 N. Y. 503),
1240
Concordia (121 III. 199), Deans- v. Green (L. R. 20 Eq. 552) 1057
ville (66 N. Y. 569), Evergreen v. St. Louis (29 Mo. 543) 135, 655,
(43 Conn. 234), Washington (68
657, 658, 660, 661, 662, 667, 670
N. Y. 591), Wyandotte City (14 v. Satterlee (40 Cal. 497) 923, 924,
Kan. 312).]
1229
Central v. Sears (2 Col. 588) 312, 313, Chambers County v. Clews (21 Wall.
384
317)
576, 589, 590, 614
v. Wilcoxsen (3 Col. 566) 566 Champaign v. Harmon (98 Ill. 491) 660,
Central Branch Union Pac. R. Co.
1000
v. Andrews (30 Kan. 590) 841 Chance v. Temple (1 Iowa, 179) 1062,
v. Smith (23 Kan. 745)
233
1063, 1074
v. Twine (23 Kan. 585)
841 Chancellor of Oxford's Case (10 Co.
Central Bridge Corp. v. Lowell (15
87 b)
261
Gray, 106)
350, 683 Chandler v. Bay St. Louis (57 Miss.
Central Land Co. v. Providence (15
327)
562, 565, 1159, 1187
R. I. 246)
759 v. Boston (112 Mass. 200) 267, 268
Central Park Com’rs, Re (61 Barb.
v. Bradish (23 Vt. 416)
303
40)
794 v. Lawrence (138 Mass. 213) 337
Central Park Com'rs, Re (50 N. Y.
v. Brown (15 R. I. 579)
757
493)
143 Chapin v. Osborn (29 Ind. 99) 1011
Central Park Ext., Re (16 Abb. Pr.
v. Sullivan R. Co. (39 N. H. 564) 817
56)
698 v. Vt. & Mass. R. Co. (8 Gray,
Central R. & B. Co. v. Claghorn
575)
560
(Speers Eq. 545)
516 v. Winchester Sch. Dist. (35
Central R. Co. of N. J. v. Penn. R.
N. H. 445)
262, 669
Co. (31 N. J. Eq. 475) 835 v. Worcester (124 Mass. 464) 721
Centralia v. Krouse (64 Iſl. 19) 1284, 1286, Chaplin v. Hill (24 Vt. 628)
541
1296 Chapman v. Brooklyn (40 N. Y. 372) 913
v. Scott (59 Ill. 129)
1281 . Charleston (28 S. C. 373) 1180
Centre Street Vac., Re' (115 Pa. St.
v. Douglas County (107 U. S.
247)
795, 912, 917
348)
1192
Centreville 2. Miller (57 Iowa, 56) 435 v. Gates (54 N. Y. 132)
720
v. Woods (57 Ind. 192) 1280, 1281, v. Gordon (29 Ga. 250)
767, 787
1283, 1287 v. Lowell (4 Cush. 378)
558
Cerro Gordo v. Wright (50 Iowa,
v. Miller (2 Speers, 769)
166
439)
1142 Chariton v. Barber (54 Iowa, 360) 394
Chad v. Tilsed: (5 J. B. Moore, 185) 150 v. Holliday (60 Iowa, 390) 389
Chadbourne v. Newcastle (48 N. H. Charity Hospital v. Stickney (2 La.
196)
1167
An. 550)
423, 909
Chaddock v. Wilbraham (5 C. B. Charles v. Finchley L. Bd. (L. R.
645)
23 Ch. D. 767)
1326
Chadwell, Re (3 Baxter, 98)
72 v. Hoboken (3 Dutch. (N. J.)
Chadwick v. Colfax (51 Iowa), 70 675
203)
331, 337, 359, 360
478
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
xliii
Page
Page
Charles River Br. Prop. v. Warren Chenango Bank v. Brown (26 N. Y.
Br. Prop. (11 Pet. 420) 180, 637,
467)
77, 78
953 Chenery v. Waltham (8 Cush. 327) 266
Charleston v. Oliver (16 S. C. 49) 424, Cheny v. Shelbyville (18 Ind. 84) 425
479, 995 Cherokee v. Fox (34 Kan. 16)
904
v. Reed (27 W. Va. 681) 145, 472, v. Sioux C. & I. F. T: Lot Co.
1230
(52 Iowa, 279)
705
Charleston C. Council v. Ahrens (4 Cherokee Co. Com’rs v. Wilson (109
Strob. 241) 397, 403, 425, 433, 904
U. S. 621)
1067
v. Benjamin (2 Strob. 508) 397, 468 Cherokee Ins. & B. Co. v. Whitfield
v. Boyd (1 Mill Const. 352) 442
Jus. (28 Ga. 121)
968
v. Chúr (2 Bailey, 164) 462, 483, 488 Chesapeake & O. Canal Co. v. Balt.
v. Condy (4 Rich. L. 254) 949
& O. R. Co. (4G. & J. 1) 144,
v. Corleis (2 Bailey, 189)
485
243
v. Dann (1 McCord, 333) 485 Chess v. Birmingham (1 Grant (Pa.)
v. Elford (1 McMullan, 234) 472
Cas. 438)
939
v. Feekman (3 Rich. Law, 385) 485 Chester County v. Brower (117 Pa.
v. Goldsmith (2 Speers, 428) 397, 462
St. 647)
1244
v. Goldsmith (12 Rich. L. 470) 429 Chestnut Av., Re (68 Pá. St. 81) 978
v. King (4 McCord, 487) 422, 498 Chestnutwood v. Hood (68 Ill. 132) 1112
v. Moorhead (2 Rich. L. 430) 274 Chicago v. Allcock (86 Ill. 384) 569
v. Payne (2 N. & McC. 475) 213, 294 v. Baer (41 Ill. 306)
922, 979
v. Pepper (1 Rich. L. 364) 422, 427, v. Bartee (100 Ill. 57)
905
498 v. Bixby (84 Ill. 82) 1259, 1261
v. Pinckney (1 Tr. Const. 42) 959
v. Chicago & W. I. R. Co. (105
v. St. Phillip's Church (1 Mc-
Ill. 73)
1179
Mullan, Eq. 139)
949 2. Colby (20 III. 614)
955
v. Seeba (4 Strob. 319)
482 v. Crooker (2 Ill. App. 279) 1272,
v. Smidt (11 Rich. L. 343) 485
1301
ads. State (2 Speers L. 623,
v. Dermody (61 Ill. 431) 324, 1196,
719)
949, 1969, 970
1306
v. Wentworth St. Bap. Church
v. Edwards (58 Ill. 252) 315, 334
(4 Strob. 306) 236, 404, 433, 443 v. Evans (24 Ill. 52) 387, 871, 1077
Charlton v. Allegheny (1 Grant (Pa.)
v. Fowler (60 Ill. 322) 1277, 1281,
Cas. 208)
1220
1297
Chase v. Cleveland (44 0. St. 505) 1260, v. Gage (95 Ill. 593)
297, 298
1297 v. Gallagher (44 III. 295) 1258, 1281
v. Lowell (7 Gray, 33) 296, 314 v. Hasley (25 Ill. 595) 161, 674, 675,
v. Merrimack Bank (19 Pick.
1031
564)
1027, 1172 v. Hesing (83 Ill. 204) 1259, 1293
Chastain v. Calhoun T. Council (29
v. Hislop (61 Ill. 86) 1259, 1260
Ga. 333)
431 v. Hoy (75 Ill. 530)
1269
Chatfield v. Wilson (28 Vt. 49) 1216 v. Huenerbein (85 Ill. 594) 1318
Chattanooga v. Geiler (13 Lea, 612) 522, v. Johnson (53 Ill. 91) 1281, 1297
731 v. Johnson (98 Ill. 618)
752
v. State (5 Sneed, 578)
1134 v. Joney (60 Ill. 383) 324, 1196, 1306
Chaunt v. Smart (1 B. & P. 477) 1072 v. Keefe (114 Ill. 222)
1283
Cheaney v. Hooser (9 B. Mon. 330) 93, v. Kelly (69 Ill. 475) 1189, 1287
267, 898, 972, 1167 v. Laflin (49 Ill. 172)
450
Cheatham 2. Shearn (1 Swan, 213) 449 v. Langlass (52 Ill. 256) 1189, 1287,
Cheek v. Aurora (92 Ind. 107) 783, 796,
1288
804 v. Langlass (66 Ill. 361) 1272, 1273,
Cheeney v. Brookfield (60 Mo. 53) 529,
1301
537, 563, 566, 567, 1140 v. Larned (34 Ill. 203) 722, 926, 927,
Cheesbrough, Re (17 Hun, 561)
701
955
Cheetham v. Hampson (4 D. & E.
v. McCarthy (75 III. 602) 1272, 1301
318)
1311 v. McGinn (51 Ill. 266)
881
Cheever v. Shedd (13 Blatch. 258) 1220 v. McGiven (78 Ill. 347)
1260, 1300
Chegaray v. Jenkins (5 N. Y. 376) 324 v. McGraw (75 Ill. 566)
1183
Chelmsford Co. v. Demarest (7
v. Major (18 III. 349) 1259, 1293
Gray, 1)
300 v. Martin (49 Ill. 241) 1287, 1288
Chemung Canal Bank v. Chemung
v. Murphy (84 Ill. 322)
1297
Co. Sup. (5 Denio, 517) 184, v. O'Brennan (65 Ill. 160) 1177, 1311
195, 219, 519, 565, 568 v. O'Brien (111 Ill. 531)
1261
xliy
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
Page
207)
Page
Chicago v. People (48 Ill. 416) 555, 556 Chicago Dock Co. v. Garrity (115
v. People (56 IN. 327) 555, 569, 994
Ill. 155)
144, 169, 855
v. Phænix Ins. Co. (126 Ill. 276) 474 Chicago, K. & W. R. Co. v. Osage
v. Powers (42 Ill. 169) 881, 882, 883
County (38 Kan. 597) 623
v. Quimby (38 Ill. 274) 415, 463 Chicago Lake Front Case (33 Fed.
v. Robbins (2 Black (U. S.) 418) 834,
R. 730)
88, 170, 171, 175, 177,
844, 1195, 1280, 1303, 1304, 1305,
697
1306, 1308, 1309, 1311, 1312, 1313 Chicago, M., & St. P. R. R. Co. v.
See also Robbins v. Chicago (4
Ackley (94 U. S. 179)
92
Wall. 657).]
Chicago, N. & S. W. R. Co. v. New-
v. Rumpff (45 Ill. 90) 180, 400, 429
ton (36 Iowa, 299)
834, 848
v. Rumsey (87 Ill. 348) 781, 1234 Chicago Packing & P. Co. 2. Chicago
v. Sansum (87 Ill. 182) 1033, 1059
(88 Ill. 221)
266, 422, 427
v. Sexton (115 Ill. 230)
322 Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. 2. Joliet
v. Sheldon (9 Wall. 50)
584, 586
(79 Ill. 25) 485, 739, 803, 804
v. Starr (42 Ill. 174)
1293 v. Reidy (66 Ill. 43)
857
v. Stearns (105 Ill. 554)
1297 Chick v. Newberry County (27 S. C.
v. Taylor (125 U. S. 161) 688, 1221,
419)
1246, 1248, 1252
1223, 1228, 1230, 1235, 1241 Chickasaw Co. Sup. v. Sumner Co.
v. Turner (80 III. 419)
1184
Sup. (58 Miss. 619)
267
v. Union Build. Assoc. (102 Ill. Chicopee Bank v. Chapin' (8 Met.
379) 794, 795, 1093, 1117, 1223,
(Mass.) 40)
583
1235, 1241 Chicot County v. Kruse (47 Ark.
v. Ward (36 III. 9)
994
80)
1034
v. Wheeler (25 Ill. 478) 710, 712, 714 Chidsey v. Canton (17 Conn. 475) 1173,
v. Wright (32 Ill. 192) 940, 941, 944,
1175, 1247, 1252, 1288
1000 Child v. Boston (4 Allen, 41) 1193, 1214,
v. Wright (68 Ill. 586) 883, 1259
1325, 1326, 1328, 1331, 1332, 1333
v. Wright (69 Ill. 318) 99, 703, 743, v. Hudson's Bay Co. (2 P. Wms.
744, 747, 789, 801
393
Chicago & Alton R. Co. 2. Adler Childress w. Nashville (3 Sneed, 347) 452
(56 Ill. 344)
91, 103 Childs r. Nelson (69 Wis. 125) 754
v. Engle (76 Ill. 317) 408, 488 Chilton v. London & C. R. Ćo. (16
Chicago & N. W. R. Co. v. Elgin (91
M. & W. 212)
420
Ill. 251)
804, 833 Chilvers v. People (11 Mich. 43) 181, 182,
2. Fort Howard Bor. (21 Wis.
427
44)
969, 1121 Chinguacousy Corp., Re (25 U. C. Q. B.
Chicago & Pac. R. Co. v. Francis
61). [See Perdue v. &c.
(70 III. 238) 1228, 1234, 1241 Chin Yan, Re (60 Cal. 78) 396, 400, 406
Chicago & R. I. R. Co. v. Whipple Chope v. Eureka (39 Alb. L. J. 426) 1294
(22 Ill. 105)
1126 Choquette v. Barada (33 Mo. 249) 679
Chicago & W. I. R. Co. v. Ayres Chosen Freeholders of A. County, &c.
(106 Ill. 511)
1242
[See A. Co. Freeh. &c.]
v. Dunbar (100 Ill. 110)
851 Christ v. Polk County (48 Iowa,
Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. v. Aurora
313
(99 Ill. 205)
644 Christ's Church v. Woodward (26
v. Banker (44 III. 26)
739
Me. 172)
347
v. Haggerty (67 Ill. '113)
857 Christian Church of Pella v. Scholte
v. Iowa (94 U. S. 155)
92
(2 Iowa, 27) 743, 755, 767, 803
v. McGinnis (79 Ill. 269)
833 Christie v. Malden (23 W. Va. 667) 146,
v. Otoe County (1 Dillon C. C.
165, 168, 172, 1118
338)
236, 561 Christopher v. New York (13 Barb.
v. Otoe County (16 Wall. 667) 614,
543, 1114
632, 636 Christy's Adm. v. St. Louis (20 Mo.
v. Payne (59 Ill. 534)
852
143)
1150
v. Siders (88 III. 321)
1107 Church v. Cherryfield (33 Me. 460) 1257,
Chicago City R. Co. v. Story (73
1270
Ill. 541)
835 v. Milwaukee (31 Wis. 512) 1227
v. Young (62 Ill. 238)
865 Church v. &c. (See the following
Chicago, D. & U. R. Co. v. Chicago
plaintiff churches which, in cit-
(121 Ill. 176)
847
ing, may not always have been
Chicago, D. & V. R. Co. v. Smith (62
fully named: Brick Presbyterian
III. 268)
225
(5 Čow. 538), Broadway Baptist
v. St. Anne (101 Ill. 151)
645
(8 Bush, 508), Christian (2 Iowa,
)
302)
567)
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
xly
1
Page
Page
Church v. fc. Continued.)
Citizens' Gasl. Co. v. Louisville Gas
27), Congregational (10 Conn.
Co. (81 Ky. 263)
827
200), First Baptist (6 Barb. 213), Citizens' Mut. F. Ins. Co. v. Sortwell
First Congregational (23 Conn.
(8 Allen, 217)
365, 369
34), First Presbyterian (36 Ind. Citizens' Sav. & Loan Assoc. v. To-
338), Madison Av. Baptist (5
peka (3 Dillon, 376) 83, 234, 238
Robt. 649), Methodist Episcopal
(20 Wall. 655) 573, 339, 895
(38 Ind. 3), Methodist Prot. (6 Citizens' Street Ry. Co. v. Jones (34
Gill, 391), St. Luke's (7 Cush.
Fed. R. 579)
826, 860
226). ]
Citizens' Water Co. v. Bridgeport H.
Churchill v. Walker (68 Ga. 681) 141,
Co. (55 Conn. 1) 134, 824, 825,
1076
826, 827
Churchill Tp. v. Cummings Tp. (51
-City v. &c. (See the following plain-
Mich. 446)
273
tiff cities which, in citing, may
Churchman v. Indianapolis (110 Ind.
not always have been fully or
259)
944, 1150
alphabetically named: Central (2
Cicero v. Williamson (91 Ind. 541) 268
Col. 588), Jeffersonville (27 Ind.
Cincinnati v. Bryson (15 Ohio, 625) 423,
100), Kenosha' (9 Wall. 477),
426, 941
Mount Pleasant (6 Iowa, 546),
v. Buckingham (10 Ohio, 257) 416,
Philadelphia (60 Pa. St. 136), St.
418, 426, 456, 941
Louis (23 Mo. 483). ]
v. Cameron (33 0. St. 336) 107 City & Suburban Ry. Co. v. Savan-
v. Coombs (16 Ohio, 181) 707, 710
nah (77 Ga. 731)
866
v. Evans (50. St. 594) 797, 803 City Bank of Dallas v. Bogel (51
v. Gwynne (10 Ohio, 192) 151, 385,
Tex. 351)
968
406, 507 City Cem. Assoc. &c. (142 Kan. 312).
v. Morgan (3 Wall. 275) 593, 617
[See Wyandotte City, &c.
v. Penny, (21 O. St. 499) 818, 821, City Fire Ins. Co. of N. Y. v. Corlies
1226
(21 Wend. 367)
1165
v. Rice (15 Ohio, 225)
468 City of London, Re, &c. (See Lon-
v. Stone (5 O. St. 38) 1293, 1306, 1307
don, Re, &c.]
v. Walls (1 O. St. 222)
177 City Railway Co. v. &c. [See the fol-
Cincinnati's Lessee v. First Presb.
lowing plaintiff city railway com-
Church (8 Ohio, 299)
797, 798
panies which, in citing, may not
2. Hamilton Co. Com’rs (7 Ohio,
always have been fully nained:
Pt. 1, 88)
739, 753
Jersey City & B. R. Co. (20 N. J.
Cincinnati & S. G. Av. S. R. Co. v.
Eq. 61), Louisville City Ry. Co.
Cumminsville (14 0. St. 523) 855,
(4 Bush, 478, and 8 Bush, 415),
803, 868, 871
and Memphis City Ry. Co. (4
Cincinnati & S. R. Co. v. Longworth's
Coldw. 406). 1
Ex. (30 O. St. 108)
734 | Claflin v. Hopkinton (4 Gray, 502) 222,
Cincinnati College v. State (19 Ohio,
1110
110)
953 2. Iowa City (12 Iowa, 284) 162
Cincinnati, H. & D.R. Co. v. Sullivan Clague v. New Orleans (13 La. An.
(32 0. St. 152)
858
275)
1197
Cincinnati Mut. Health Assoc. v. Claiborne County v. Brooks (111 U.
Rosenthal (55 Ill. 85)
905
S. 400) 187, 190, 195, 236, 573,
Cincinnati P. B. S. Packet Co. v.
584
Catlettsburg (105 U. S. 559) 165 Claiborne Street, Re (4 La. An. 7) 706,
Cincinnati So. Ry. Trs. v. Haas (42
707, 712
0. St. 39)
717 Clancy v. Byrne (56 N. Y. 129) 1276
Cincinnati Trs. v. White's Lessee (6 Clapp v. Cedar County (5 Iowa, 15) 560
Pet. 431) 739, 742, 744, 750, 752, v. Hartford (35 Conn. 66) 138, 722,
755, 763, 791, 817
914, 988, 990
Cincinnati, W. & Z. R. Co. v. Clinton
v. Walker (25 Iowa, 315)
Co. Com’rs (1 O. St. 77) 78, 225 Clarence v. Auburn (66 N. Y. 334) 1158
Circleville 2. Neuding (41 O. St. 465) Clark v. Barrington (41 N. H. 44) 1257,
1303, 1306
1264
Cisco r. Roberts (36 N. Y. 292) 166 v. Brookfield (81 Mo. 503) 656
Citizens' Coach Co. 2. Camden H.
v. Cape May 150 N. J. L. 558) 331
R. Co. (33 N. J. Eq. 267) 868 v. Commonwealth (14 Bush, 166) 784,
Citizens' Gas & M. Co. v. Elwood
806
(114 Ind. 332) 384, 400, 808, 824, v. Corinth (41 Vt. 449)
1257
1096
163
xlvi
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
Page
Page
Clark v. Cuckfield Union (11 Eng. L. Clarke v. Lyon County (8 Nev. 181) 539,
& Eq. 442)
527
553
v. Davenport (14 Iowa, 494) 147, 149, v. Newport (5 R. I. 333)
712
237, 946, 1042 v. Potter County (1 Pa. St. 163) 262
v. Dayton (6 Neb. 192)
544 V. Rochester (28 N. Y. 605)
78, 86
2. Des Moines (19 Iowa, 199) 195, v. Rochester (5 Abb. Pr. 107) 244
237, 529, 547, 560, 562, 563, 566, v. Rochester (24 Barb. 446) 70, 86,
567, 568, 569, 615, 807, 883
225
v. Dist. Columbia (3 Mackey,
v. School Dist. (3 R. I. 199) 183, 185,
79)
1260
562, 564
v. Easton (146 Mass. 43)
1187 v. Tucket (2 Vent. 182) 488, 999
v. Fry (8 O. St. 358) 884, 1307 Clarke Co. Com’rs v. State (61 Ind.
v. Hallock (16 Wend. 607) 324
75)
1067
v. Iowa City (20 Wall. 583) 560, 581 Clarke Co. Ct. Jus. v. Paris, W. &
v. Janesville (1 Biss. 98). · [See
Ky. R. Turnp. Co. (11 B.
Clarke v. J.]
Mon. 143)
627, 1070
v. Janesville (10 Wis. 136) 183, 208, Clarke's Case (5 Co. 64)
420
225, 407, 560 Clason v. Milwaukee (30 Wis. 316) 396,
v. Lewis (35 Ill. 417) 222, 419
403, 404, 513
v. Lockport (49 Barb. 580) 1300 Clay v. Grand Rapids (60 Mich. 451) 989
v. McCarthy (1 Cal. 453)
810 v. Nicholas Co. Ct. (4 Bush, 154) 238,
v. Miller (54 N. Y. 528)
325
645
v. Mobile Sch. Com’rs (36 Ala. Clay County v. Mc Aleer (115 U. S.
621)
161, 162
616)
946, 1034
v. New Brunswick (43 N. J. L.
v. Simonsen (1 Dak. Ter. 403; 2
118)
425
16. 112)
323
v. New York (4 N. Y. 338) 559 Clay Co. Sch. Dist. v. Neil (36 Kan.
v. Norton (49 N. Y: 243)
324
617)
446
v. People (15 Ill. 213) 331, 1080 Clayards 2. Dethick (12 Q. B. 439) 1300
v. Polk County (19 Iowa, 248) 529, Clayburgh v. Chicago (25 Ill. 535) 535,
562, 567
1204, 1232
v. Pratt (47 Me. 55)
679 Clayton v. Heidelbergh (17 Miss.
v. Richmond (83 Va. 355) 1257, 1268
623)
1132, 1133
V. Saline Co. Com’rs (7 Neb. Clear Lake W. W. Co. v. Lake
516)
1143, 1144
County (45 Cal. 90)
1168
v. Saybrook (21 Conn. 313) 1224 Cleary v. Trenton (50 N. J. L. 331) 331
2. School Dist. 1 T. 27 (78 Ill. Cleburne v. Gulf, Col. & S. F. R. Co.
474)
185
(66 Tex. 457)
574
v. South Bend (85 Ind. 276) 216, 393 Clegg v Richardson Co. Sch. Dist.
v. Syracụse (13 Barb. 32) 448, 450,
56 (8 Neb. 178)
81
453, 1097 Cleghorn v. Postlethwaite (43 III.
v. Union Ferry Co. (35 N. Y.
428)
984
485)
1205 Clemence v. Auburn (66 N. Y. 334) 1220,
v. Utica (18 Barb. 451)
727
1281, 1331
v. Waltham (128 Mass. 567) 1312 Clements v. Anderson (46 Miss. 581) 798,
v. Washington (12 Wheat. 40) 155,
803
522 Clerk v. Tucket (3 Lev. 281) 416, 421
v. Wilmington (5 Harr. (Del.) Clerk's Case (2 Cro. 506)
336
1323 Cleveland v. Cit. Gasl. Co. (20 N. J.
Clark Co. Sup. v. Lawrence (63 Ill.
Eq. 203)
449
32)
224 v. Jersey City (39 N. J. L. 629).
Clark's Case (2 Pars. 521)
281
1009, 1070
Clarke v. Bank of Miss: (10 Ark.
v. King (132 U. S. 295) 1174, 1280,
516)
138
1281, 1295, 1298, 1304
v. Blackmar (47 N. Y. 150) 842, 848, v. St. Paul (18 Minn. 279) 1281, 1296
849
v. Tripp (13 R. I. 50)
914
v. Dutcher (9 Cow. 674) 1148, 1152, v. Wick (18 O. St. 303) 722, 723, 920
1163, 1164 Cleveland & P. R. Co. v. Ball (5 0.
v. Farmers' Woolen M. Co. (16
St. 568)
733
Wend. 256)
275 Cleveland, P. & A. R. Co. v. Penn-
v. Hancock Co. Sup. (27 Ill. 305) 239,
sylvania (15 Wall. 300) 901
277, 564 Clifton v. Cook (7 Ala. 114)
281
v. Leicestershire, &c. Canal Co. Cline v. Cornwall (21 Grant, 129) 884,
(6 Q. B. 898)
1057
886
243)
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
1
xlvii
Page
>
Page
Clinton v. Cedar Rap. & Mo. River Cogswell v. N. Y. N. H. & H. R. R.
R. Co. (24 Iowa, 455) 94, 121,
Co. (103 N. Y. 10; rev. 26
747, 776, 834, 841, 850, 853, 863,
J. & S. 31)
782, 784, 1220
870 Coghlan v. Ottawa (1 App. (Can.) 54)
v. Howard (42 Conn. 294) 1263
1328
v. Phillips (58 III. 102)
396 Coben v. Cleveland (43 O. St. 190) 1227
v. Strong (9 Johns. 370)
1148 v. New York (113 N. Y. 532) 1162,
Clintonville Trs. v. Keating (4 Denio,
1185
341)
143, 431, 433 v. Wigfall (8 Rich. L. 237) 278
Close v. Buri. C. R. & N. Ry, Co. (64 Cohn v. Parcels (72 Cal. 367)
766
Iowa, 149)
672) Coite v. Society for Savings (32
Clothier v. Webster (12 C. B. (n. s.)
Conn. 173)
894
790)
1331 Coker v. Birge (10 Ga. 336)
449
Clough v. Hart (8 Kan. 487) 553, 554 Colbeck v. Brantford Corp. (21 U.C.
v. Unity (18 N. H. 75)
711
Q. B. 276) 1247, 1248, 1271, 1298
Cloughessey v. Waterbury (51 Conn. Colburn ». Chattanooga (17 Am.
405)
1260
Law Reg. N. s. 191) 568, 1112
Coal Float v. Jeffersonville (112 Ind. Colby v. Beaver Dam (34 Wis. 285) 1267
15)
178, 392, 405 v. Coates (6 Cush. 559)
161
Coast Line R. Co. v. Cohen (50 Ga. Colchester u. Brooke (7 Q. B. 383) 242,
451)
786, 863, 866
246
Coates v. Campbell (37 Minn. 398) 234 v. Goodwin (Carter, 121)
488
v. Canaan (51 Vt. 131) 1259, 1267, v. Lawton (i Ves. & B. 226)
671
1300 v. Seaber (3 Burr. 1866) 242, 244,
v. Dubuque (68 Iowa, 550) 814, 1217
246, 248, 257, 262
v. New York (7 Cowen, 585) 212, Coldspring Iron Works v. Tolland
215, 443, 444, 478, 483
(g Cush. 492)
263, 264
[See also Cotes, &c.]
Coldwater 2. Tucker (36 Mich. 474) 263,
Cobb v. Boston (112 Mass. 181) 212
517, 1333
v. Dalton (53 Ga. 426)
1156 Cole v. Black River Falls (57 Wis.
v. Kingman (15 Mass. 197) 271
110)
1079
v. Portland (55 Me. 381)
1198 v. Drew (44 Vt. 49)
817
v. Standish (14 Me. 198) 1264, 1284, v. Green (25 Ill. 104)
674
1296 v. Hanchett (13 Ill. 615)
1111
Cobbett v. Slowman (9 Exch. 633) 503 v. Kezler (64 Iowa, 59)
449
Coburn v. Ellenwood (4 N. H. 99) 679 v. La Grange (113 U. S. 1) 695, 895
Cochran v. McCleary (22 Iowa, 75) 289, v. Medina (27 Barb. 218) 1157
292, 340, 352, 355, 1022, 1075, v. Muscatine (14 Iowa, 296) 1224,
1076, 1095
1229, 1231
Cockburn v. Bank (13 La. An. 289) 379, v. Nashville (4 Sneed, 162) 1161,
380
1187
Cocke v. Halsey (16 Pet. 71)
304 v. Newburyport (129 Mass. 594)
Codd v. Cabe (13 Cox, 202)
295
1197, 1271
Codding v. Mansfield (7 Gray, 272) · 209 v. State (102 N. Y. 48)
130
Coe v. Caledonia & N. R. Co. (27 Colegrove v. Breed (2 Denio, 125)
321
Minn. 197)
644 Coleman z. Chester (14 S. C. 286) 1166
v. Columbus, P. & I. R. Co. (10
v. Neal (8 Ga. 560)
1030
0. St. 372)
969 v. San Rafael Turnp. Co. (49
2. Wise (L. R. 1 Q. B. 711) 179
Cal. 517)
657
v. Wise 15 B. & S. 440)
1207 v. Second Av. R. Co. (38 N. Y.
v. Wise (7 B. & S. 831)
1331
201)
860
Coffin v. Field (7 Cush. 355)
222 Colero v. Cleburne (131 U. S. 162) 371,
v. Nantucket (5 Cush. 269) 155, 359,
408, 577, 590
1165 Coles v. Madison County (1 Ill. 115) 94,
v. Plymouth (49 N. H. 173) 322
99
v. Portland (27 Fed. R. 412; 11
v. Williamsburg Trs. (10 Wend.
Saw. C. C. 600) 740, 743, 749,
658)
343, 358, 369
769, 773 Coles County v. Allison (23 Ill. 383) 281,
v. State (7 Ind. 157)
311
362, 486
Cofran v. Cockran (5 N. H. 458) 679 Collector v. Day (11 Wall. 113) 951
Coggeshall v. Pelton (7 Johns. Ch.
v. Hubbard (12 Wall. 1) 537, 1145,
292)
661, 668
1156
Coggswell v. Lexington (4 Cush. 307) College of Physiciảng v. Salmon (3
1256, 1265, 1270
Salk. 102)
258
xlviii
.
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
&c.]
Page
Page
College v. &c. (See the following Comer v. Folsom (13 Minn. 219) 224
plaintiff colleges which, in citing, Commercial Bank v. Lockwood (2
may not always have been fully
Harring. 8)
254
named : St. Mary's College (10 Commercial Nat. Bank of Cleveland
Kan. 442), Washburn College (8
v. Iola (2 Dill. 353) 82, 233, 235,
Kan. 344).]
237, 238, 587, 906
Colley v. Westbrook (57 Me. 181) 1302 v. Iola (20 Wall. 665)
233, 235
Collings v. Camden (27 N.J. Eq. 293) 1123 Commissioners for filling, &c. (62 Mo.
Collins v. Council Bluffs (32 Iowa,
247). [See St. Louis Slough
324)
1261, 1287, 1288
Coni'rs, &c.]
2. Davis (57 Iowa, 256)
1126 Commissioners of A. (city, county
v. Dorchester (6 Cush. 396) 382, 1270
or town) &c. (See A. Com’rs,
v. Hatch (18 Ohio, 523) 149, 393, 397,
406 Commissioners of Assessment, &c.
v. Holyoke (146 Mass. 298) 366, 386,
(18 Alb. L. J. 199). [See
989
Brooklyn Com’rs, &c.]
v. Louisville (2 B. Mon. 134) 423, Commissioners of the Canal Fund, &c.
403, 941, 944
(5 Ohio, 57). (See Canal
v. Macon (69 Ga. 542) 752, 754, 1183
Fund Con’rs, &c.]
v. Philadelphia (93 Pa. St. 272) 1317, Commissioners of Highways of Gen-
1328
esseo v. Harper (38 Ill. 103) 1126
v. Savannah (77 Ga. 745) 1157 | Commissioners of Highways of Niles
v. State (8 Ind. 344)
305
Tp. v. Martin (4 Mich. 557) 1173
v. Swindle (6 Grant, 282) 516 Commissioners of Highways of So-
Collinsville v. Scanland (58 Ill. 221) 471
nora v. Carthage Sup. (27
Coloma v. Eaves (92 U. S. 484) 593, 597,
Ill. 140)
1126
599, 618 Commissioners of the Poor, &c. (2
Colton v. Hanchett (13 Ill. 615) 151, 807,
Mc Cord, 170). [See St.
883, 1111
Paul's Par. Poor Com’rs,
v. Price (50 Ala. 424)
319
&c.]
v. Rossi (9 Cal. 595)
721 Commissioners of Schools, &c. (20
Columbia v. Beasly (1 Humph. 232)
Md. 449). (See Alleghany
396, 399, 425, 941, 947
Co. &c.]
v. Duke (2 Strol. 530)
469 Commissioners of Streets of George-
v. Harrison (2 Const. 213) 477, 485
town v. Taylor (2 Bay, 282) 762,
v. Hunt (5 Rich. 550) 413, 940, 941
801
Columbia Bridge Co. v. Kline (Bright.
Commissioners v. &c. [See the fol-
320)
662
lowing counties wherein the
v. Columbia (27 S. C. 137) 964
plaintiff, not being specified in
Columbia Co. Com'rs v. Bryson (13
the reporter's caption, may, in
Fla. 281)
1073, 1107
citing, not always have been fully
v. King (13 Fla. 451) 584, 1028, 1038,
named : Bourbon, &c. (99 U. S.
1052, 1060, 1064
686), Dodge &c. (96 U. S. 205),
Columbia Del. Br. Co. v. Geisse (35
Leavenworth, &c. (99 U. S. 624).
N. J. L. 558)
688
See also Drain Com’rs, &c. (57
Columbian Ins. Co.' v. Wheelright
Mich. 127).]
(7 Wheat. 534)
1074 Commonwealth v. Adams (114 Mass.
Columbian L. & F. Ins. Co. of N. Y.
323)
466, 1287
v. Wilson's Heirs (8 Pet.
V. Alburger (1 Whart. (Pa.) 469) 738,
291)
1006, 1056
744, 752, 759, 764, 769, 799
Columbus v. Arnold (30 Ga. 517) 483 v. Alger (7 Cush. 53) 165, 166, 177,
v. Cutcomp (61 Iowa, 672) 432
212
v. Dahn (36 Ind. 330) 744, 752, 759 v. Allegheny Co. Com’rs [Arni-
v. Grey (2 Bush, 476) 177, 178
strong, rel.), (37 Pa. St. 277) 674,
v. Hydr. W. Mills Co. (33 Ind.
1004, 1027, 1028, 1037, 1038, 1056,
435)
1231, 1332
1058, 1069
v. Jaques (30 Ga. 506) 765, 783, 784 V. Allegheny Co. Com’rs [Mid-
v. Sohl (44 O. St. 479)
980
dleton, rel.], (37 Pa. St. 237) 192,
v. Story (35 Ind. 97)
945
194, 618, 1059, 1061, 1069
v. Street Ry. Co. (45 0. St. 98) 966, v. Allegheny Co. Com'rs [Thom-
967
as, rel.], (32 Pa. St. 218) 1005,
Columbus & W. Ry. Co. v. Witherow
1007, 1008, 1028, 1088
(82 Ala. 190) 747, 852, 1239 v. Allegheny Co. Com’rs (16 S.
Colwell v. Peden (3 Watts, 327) 1148
& R. 317)
1030
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
xlix
Page
Commonwealth v. Allen (128 Mass.
308)
1076
v. Allen (70 Pa. St. 465)
285
v. Arrison (15 S. & R. 130) 352
v. Athearn (3 Mass. 285) 378, 1088
v. Bacon (6 S. & R. 322)
313
v. Bank of America (10 Phila.
156)
1086
v. Bank of Pa. (28 Pa. St. 389) 352
v. Baxter (35 Pa. St. 263) 285, 288,
1077
v. Bean (14 Gray, 52) 399, 471, 482
v. Bean (Thach. Crim. Cas. 86) 482
v. Belden (13 Met. 10) 754, 760, 761,
762
v. Berkshire Ins. Co. (98 Mass.
25)
904
v. Binns (17 S. & R. 219)
310
v. Blaisdell (107 Mass. 234) 785, 889
v.'Borden (61 Pa. St. 272) 483
v. Boston (97 Mass. 555)
830
v. Bowman (3 Pa. St. 203) 457, 764,
765, 766
v. Breed (4 Pick. 463)
703
v. Brennan (103 Mass. 70) 432
v. Brice (22 Pa. St. 211)
1175
v. Brooks (99 Mass. 434)
808
v. Brooks (109 Mass. 355)
465
v Brown (147 Mass. 585)
499
v. Bumm (10 Phila. 162) 1086
v. Bussier (5 S. & R. 451)
329
v. Cambridge (7 Mass. 158) 696, 796
v. Canal Com’rs (9 Watts, 466) 361
v. Cary Impr. Co. (98 Mass. 19) 904
v. Central Pass. Ry. (52 Pa. Sť.
506)
863, 1075,1083
v. Charlestown (1 Pick. 179) 705, 762
v. Chase (6 Cush. 248)
381
v. Cluley (56 Pa. St. 270) 279, 1075,
1079, 1086
v. Cole (26 Pa. St. 187)
754
v. Comly (3 Pa. St. 372)
323
v. Commercial Bank of Pa. (28
Pa. St. 389)
352
v. Coupe (128 Mass. 63)
754
v. Cuilen (13 Pa. St. 133)
244
v. Curtis (9 Allen, 266) 471, 810
v. Dallas (3 Yeates, 300) 291, 292, 494
v. Davis (140 Mass. 485) 396, 407
v. Deerfield (6 Allen, 449)
881
v. Dow (10 Met. 382)
433, 487
v. Dugan (12 Met. 233)
293
v. Duquet (2 Yeates, 493)
385
v. Ellis (11 Mass. 465)
1125
v. Emery (11 Cush. 406)
507
v. Em. Indus. Sav. Bank (98
Mass. 12)
650
v. Erie & M. F. R. Co. (27 Pa.
St. 344)
860
v. Erie & N. E. R. Co. (27 Pa.
St. 339) 811, 833, 846, 850, 851,
853
v. Fahey (5 Cush. 408) 443, 444, 480,
483, 484
VOL. I. - d
Page
Commonwealth v. Fairfax Co. Ct.
Jus. (2 Va. Cas. 9)
1006
v. Fenton (139 Mass. 195)
465
v. Ford (5 Pa. 67)
310
v. Fowler (10 Mass. 290 ; 11
Mass. 339)
1082, 1089
v. Garrigues (28 Pa. St. 9) 288, 1077
v. Gay (5 Pick. 44)
480, 483
v. Genther (17 S. & R. 135) 320
v. German Soc. (15 Pa. St. 251) 337,
339
v. Gill (3 Whart. 228)
1080
v. Goodrich (13 Allen, 546) 401, 443,
454
v. Guardians of Poor (6 S. & R.
469)
329, 335
v. Hall (7 Watts, 290)
1175
v. Hamilton Manuf. Co. (12 Al-
len, 298)
904
v. Hampden Co. Sess. Jus. (2
Pick. 414)
1057
v. Hastings (9 Met. 259) 293, 294,
295
v. Hawkes (123 Mass. 525) 308, 495
v. Henry (49 Pa. St. 530) 1014, 1015
7. Hitchings (5 Gray, 482) 487
v. Hopkinsville (7 B. Mon. 38) 1135
v. Horne (10 Phila. 164)
1086
v. Ipswich (2 Pick. 70)
356
v. Jolinson (2 Binney, 275) 1010
v. Jones (12 Pa. St. 365) 278, 1086,
1089
v. Kepner (10 Phil. 510)
352
v. King (13 Met. 115)
885
v. Lagorio (141 Mass. 81)
465
v. Lancaster (5 Watts, 152) 365, 1030
v. Lebanon Co. Q. Sess. Judges
(8 Pa. St. 391)
77, 78
v. Leech (44 Pa. St. 332) 283, 285,
287, 288, 1077
v. Low (3 Pick. 408)
754, 762
v. Lowell Gasl. Co. (12 Allen,
75)
967
2. Lyndall (2 Brewster, 425) 1070
v. Mann (5 W. & S. 418)
313
v. Markham (7 Bush, 486) 425, 944
v. McCafferty (145 Mass. 384) 396,
467
v. McCarter (98 Pa. St. 607) 1085
v. McCloskey (2 Rawle, 369) 285,
509, 1077, 1078
v. McDonald (16 S. & R. 390) 759,
799, 803
v. McWilliams (11 Pa. St. 61) 225
v. Meeser (44 Pa. St. 341) 285, 287,
1076, 1077, 1086
v. Miliman (13 S. & R. 408) 785
v. Milton (12 B. Mon. 212) 905
v. Montrose (52 Pa. St. 391) 73
v. Moorehead (118 Pa. St. 344) 762
2. Nashua & L. R. Co. (2 Gray,
54)
1134
v. New Bedford Br. Prop. (2
Gray, 339)
1133
1
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
Page
Page
Commonwealth v. Newbury (2 Pick. Commonwealth v. Smith (132 Mass.
51)
741
289)
281
v. Noxon (121 Mass. 42)
816 v. Springfield (7 Mass. 9) 1252
v. Old Col. & F. R. R. Co. (14
v. Steffee (7 Bush, 161)
396
Gray, 93)
852 v. Stodder (2 Cush. 562) 402, 403,
v. Painter (10 Pa. St. 214)
77, 78
404, 425, 427, 429, 441, 465, 466,
v. Park (9 Phila. 481)
1014
487
v. Park (10 Phil. 444)
1014 v. Sutherland (3 S. & R. 145) 329,
v. Passmore (1 S. & R. 217) 844
330, 334
v. Patch (97 Mass. 221)
399, 404
v. Swasey (133 Mass. 538)
1087
v. Patton (88 Pa. St. 258)
835 v. Taylor (36 Pa. St. 263) 1072
v. Pennsylvania Benef. Inst. (2
v. Temple (14 Gray, 69) 865, 868
S. & R. 141)
337, 338 v. Tewksbury (11 Met. 55) 212
v. Perkins (43 Pa. St. 400) 225, 674, v. Turner (1 Cush. 493) 147, 384, 393,
1028
397, 432
v. Perkins (47 Pa. St. 189) 225 v. Union Ins. Co. (5 Mass. 230)
243
v. Philadelphia (27 Pa. St. 497) 1154 v. Upton (6 Gray, 473)
446
v. Philadelphia & T. R. Co. (6
v. Van Sickle (Bright. 69)
449, 450
Whart. 25; 27 Pa. St. 339) 844 v. Vt. & Mass. R. Co. (4 Gray,
v. Philadelphia C. Council (7
22)
1133
Am. Law Reg. (n. s.) 362) 298 v. Wentworth (Bright. (Pa.) 318)
v. Phila. Co. Com’rs (1 Whart.
784
1)
1030 v. Westboro' (3 Mass. 406) 796
v. Philadelphia Co. Com’rs (2
v. Wilder (127 Mass. 1)
670
Whart. (Pa.) 286) 721, 1030 v. Wilmington (105 Mass. 599) 1257
v. Philadelphia Co. Com’rs (5
v. Woelper (3 S. & R. 29)
277
Rawle, 75)
281, 1025 v. Wolbert (6 Binn. 292)
300
v. Philanthropic Soc. (5 Binn.
v. Wood (18 Pa. St 93)
738
486)
336 v. Woods (44 Pa. St. 113)
721
v. Pindar (11 Met. 539)
507 v. Worcester (3 Pick. 462) 141, 404,
v. Pittsburgh (14 Pa. St. 177) 296,
466, 480, 483
366, 1084 Compton ». Waco Br. Co. (62 Tex.
v. Pittsburgh (34 Pa. St. 496)
715)
453
185, 192, 194, 195, 237, 564, 946, Conboy v. Iowa City (2 Iowa, 90) 407,
1004, 1007, 1013, 1027, 1028, 1037,
481, 509
1038, 1042, 1062, 1063, 1065, 1069, Concord v. Boscawen (17 N. H. 465) 660
1070 v. Portsmouth Sav. Bank (92
v. Pittsburgh (41 Pa. St. 278) 184,
U. S. 625) 121, 230, 610, 613, 622,
564
623, 625, 627
v. Pittsburgh (43 Pa. St. 391) 649 Concord Com'rs v. Patterson (8 Jones
v. Pittsburgh (88 Pa. St. 66)
970
1032 Concord R. Co. v. Greeley (17 N. H.
v. Read (1 Gray, 475)
497
47)
704
v. Rice (9 Met. 253)
462 Concordia Cem. Assoc. v. Minn. & N.
2. Roark (8 Cush. 210)
507
W. R. Co. (121 Ill. 199) 215
v. Robertson (5 Cush. 438) 396, 404, Condict v. Jersey City (46 N. J. L.
465, 486
157)
1201, 1253, 1282
v. Roxbury (9 Gray, 451) 25, 148, Condon, Re (L. R. 9 Ch. App. 609) 1153
174, 177, 246 Cone v. Hartford (28 Conn. 363) 722, 819,
v. Roy (140 Mass. 432)
394
921, 988
v. Rush (14 Pa. St. 186) 457, 763, Conery v. New Orl. W. W. Co. (39
764, 765, 769, 782, 783
La. An. 770)
1108
v. Ryan (5 Mass. 90) 498, 499 Congdon v. Norwich (37 Conn. 414) 1260
v. St. Patrick's Benev. Soc. (2 Congregational Soc. of Bethany v.
Binn. 441) 327, 329, 331, 335
Sperry (10 Conn. 200) 303, 346
2. Sawin (2 Pick. 547)
696 Congregational Soc. of Southington
v. Shaver (3 W. & S. 338)
330
v. Atwater (23 Conn. 34) 668
v. Shaw (1 Pittsburg (Pa.) 492) 495 Congressional Tp. 11 v. Weir (9
v. Shepp (10 Phila. 518)
1086
Ind. 224)
195, 529, 562
v. Shuman's Adm. (18 Pa. St. Congreve v. Morgan (6 Duer, 495) 1270
343)
694 v. Morgan (18 N. Y. 84) 1309, 1310
v. Sniall (27 Pa. St. 31)
1023 v. Smith (18 N. Y 79)
1309
v. Smead (11 Mass. 74)
1089 Conklin v. Filmore Co. Com’rs (13
v. Smith (45 Pa. St. 59)
1088
Minn. 454)
1116
1029,
L. 182)
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
li
Page
Page
Conklin v. Lyon Co. Sch. Dist. (22 Coolidge v. Learned (8 Pick. 504) 768
Kan. 521)
44 Coonbs v. Purrington (42 Me. 332)
Conner v. Bent (1 Mo. 235)
99
1266, 1273, 1284
v. New Albany (1 Blackf. 43) 182 Cooney v. Hartland (95 Ill. 516) 1187
v. New York (5 N. Y. 285) 311, 313 Cooper 2. Alden (Harr. Ch. 72) 765, 787,
Connersville v. Bank of Ind. (16 Ind.
788
105)
968 v. Atlanta (53 Ga. 638)
1183
v. C. Hydr. Co. (86 Ind. 184) 562, v. Detroit (42 Mich 584)
457
566 v. Dismal Swamp Canal Co. (2
Connett v. Green Pond, W. & B. R.
Murphey, 195)
1005
(23 S. C. 427)
602 v. Gostling (9 L. T. (N. S.) 77) 717
Conniff o. San Francisco (67 Cal.
v. Lampeter (8 Watts, 128) 361
45)
1187 v. Phibbs (L. R. 2 H. L. 149) 1153
Connolly v. Griswold ( 7 Iowa, 416) 716, v. Savannah (4 Ga. 68)
997
727 v. Smith (9 S. & R. 26)
790
Connor v. Green Pond, W. & B. R. Cope v. Hartford (28 Conn. 363) 986
Co. (23 S. C. 427)
602 v. Thames, H. D. & R. Co. (3
v. Morris (23 Cal. 447)
1030
Exch. 841)
221
Conrad v. Ithaca Trs. (16 N. Y. 158) 159, Copeland v. Packard (16 Pick. 217) 696
1176, 1201, 1204, 1267, 1280, 1293, Copes v. Charleston (10 Rich. 491) 225,
1334
236, 635
[See also Konrad, &c.]
v. Matthews (18 Miss. 398) 323
Conservators of River Tone v. Ash Copp v. Neal (7 N. H. 275)
679
(10 B. & C. 349)
74, 75 Corbett v. Duncan (63 Miss. 84) 1126
Constables of Hipperholm, Re (5 D.
v. Troy (53 Hun, 228)
1286
& L. 79)
1130 Corbin v. Am. Mills (27 Conn. 274) 1307
Converse v. Ft. Scott (92 U. S. 503) 633 Corby v. Hill (4 C. B. (n. s.) 556) 1270
v. United States (21 How. 463) 316 Cordiell v. Frizzell (1 Nev. 130.) 301
Conway v. Beaumont (61 Tex. 10) 1156 Corey v. Rice (4 Lans. (N. Y.) 141) 883
Conwell v. Emrie (2 Ind. 35) 1163 Corfield v. Coryell (4 Washi. C. C.
v. Emrie (4 Ind. 200)
324
380)
904
Cook v. Anamosa (66 Iowa, 427) 1297 Corlett v. Leavenworth (27 Kan. 673)
v. Boston (9 Allen, 393) 1147, 1148,
1285
1149, 1151 | Cornell v. Barnes (1 Denio, 35) 299
v. Buffalo (1 Clinton Dig. Buffalo,
v. Guilford (1 Denio, 510) 74, 222,
§ 2)
199
321, 518, 529
v. Burlington (30 Iowa, 94) 745, 748, v. People (107 Ill. 372)
94
757, 769, 787, 821, 849, 856 Cornell College v. Iowa County (32
v. Charlestown (98 Mass. 80) 1263
Iowa, 520)
1116
v. Charlestown (13 Allen, 190) 1270 Corning v. Greene (23 Barb. 33)
79, 84
v. Harris (61 N. Y. 448) 739, 743 v. Lowerre (6 Johns. Ch. 439) 852
v. Hillsdale (7 Mich. 115) 755, 759 | Cornish v. Pease (19 Me. 184) 349
v. Macon (54 Ga. 460)
1197 v. Toronto Street Ry. Co. (23
v. Middlesex Co. Frech. (26 N.
U. C. C. P. 355)
1300
J. L. 326)
1151 Cornman v. Eastern Counties Ry. (5
v. Milwaukee (24 Wis. 270) 1261
Jur. (N. 8.) 657)
865
v. Milwaukee (27 Wis. 191) 1260 v. Eastern Counties Ry. Co. (4
v. Racine (49 Wis. 243)
545
H. & N. 781)
1262
v. Shipman (24 Ill. 614)
532 Cornwall v. Metrop. Sewer Com’rs
v. South Park Com'rs (61 Ill.
(10 Ex. 771)
1258, 1309
115)
669, 730, 736 Corporation of A. v. &c. (See A.
v. Sumner & M. Manuf. Co. (1
Corp. v. &c.]
Sneed, 698)
235, 237 Corpus Christi v. Woessner (58 Tex.
Cook County 1. Chicago, B. & Q. Co.
462)
1032
(35 Ill. 460)
1107, 1120 Correll v. B. C. R. & M. R. Co. (38
v. McCrea (93 Ill. 236)
145, 146
Iowa, 120)
857
Cooley v. Board of Wardens (12 Corrigan v. Gage (68 Mo. 541) 397
How. 296)
166 | Corrothers v. Clinton Dist. Bd. of
v. Essex Co. Freeh. (27 N. J. L.
Ed. (16 W. Va. 527) 1107, 1119
415) 881, 1133, 1169, 1245 Corsicana v. White (57 Tex. 382) 1190
v. Granville (10 Cush. 56) 53, 147 | Corvalis v. Carlile (10 Or. 139) 145, 146,
v. Westbrook (57 Me. 181) 1301
469
Coolidge v. Brookline (114 Mass. Corwein v. Hames (11 Johns. 76) 498
692)
54 | Corwin v. Wallace (17 Iowa, 334)
541
lii
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
Page
Pago
Cosby v. Owensboro & R. R. Co. (10 Covington County v. Kinney (45
Bush, 288) 783, 788, 833, 848,
Ala. 176)
1245
854, 863 Covington Street R. Co. v. Coving-
Costar v. Brush (25 Wend. 628) 167, 180
ton (9 Bush, 127) 157, 818, 850,
Costello v. New York (63 N. Y. 48) 290
860
Coster v. Albany (43 N. Y. 399) 794, 795 v. Packer (9 Bush, 455)
865
Cotes v. Davenport (9 Iowa, 227) 1224, Cowan v. Fulton (23 Gratt. 579) 1006
1323, 1324 Cowan's Case (1 Overton, 311) 806
Cotten v. Ellis, Gov. (7 Jones (N. Cowdin v. Huff (10 Ind. 83)
311
C.) L. 545)
311, 1016 Cowdrey v. Canadea (16 Fed. R.
Cotter v. Doty (5 Ohio, 394) 413, 416,
532)
239, 529
420 Cowen v. West Troy (43 Barb. 48) 397,
Cotton v. Hamilton & T. Ry. Co. (14
540, 709, 984
U. C. Q. B. 87)
718 Cowles v. Brittain (2 Hawks, 204) 904
v. Leon Co. Com'rs (6 Fla. 610) 225 V. Gray (14 Iowa, 1)
759, 768
v. New Providence (47 N. J. L.
v. Mercer County (7 Wall. 118) 1140
401)
604 Cowley v. Rushville (60 Ind. 327) 433
v. Wood (8 C. B. (N. 8.) 568) 865, 2. Sunderland (6 H. & N. 565) 1195,
1262
1205, 1207, 1210, 1334
Cougot v. New Orleans (16 La. An. Cox v. Burlington (43 Iowa, 612) 313
21)
456, 459
v. Griffin (18 Ga. 728) 767, 783
Coulson v. Portland (Deady, 481) 152, v. Louisville, N. A. & C. R. Co.
204, 206, 716, 1111, 1119, 1121,
(48 Ind. 178) 721, 740, 747, 841,
1148, 1150
854, 856
Coulter v. Robertson (24 Miss. 278) 246, v. New York (103 N. Y. 519) 311
250 v. St. Louis (11 Mo. 431)
481
Council Bluffs v. Stewart (51 Towa,
v. Westchester Turnp. Co. (33
385)
202
Barb. 414)
1265
Counden v. Clerke (Hob. 32) 261 Coy v. Lyons (17 Iowa, 1) 1029, 1030,
County of A. v. &c. (See A. Coun-
1032, 1033, 1042
ty v. &c.]
Craft v. Jackson Co. Com’rs (5 Kan.
County Commissioners of A. v. &c.
518)
1116
[See A. Co. Com'rs v. &c.] Crafter v. Metrop. R. W. Co. (L. R.
County Court of A. v. &c. (See A.
1 C. P. 300)
1258, 1262
Co. Court v. &c.]
Craig v. Andes (93 N. Y. 405) 602
County Supervisors of A. v. &c.
v. Burnett (32 Ala. 728)
324
[See A. Co. Sup. v. &c.]
v. Leitensdorfer (123 U. S. 209) 1006
Courtright v. Brooks Tp. (54 Mich.
v. Philadelphia (89 Pa. St. 265) 937,
182)
269
983
Court Square Case (72 Cal. 170).
v. Rochester, C. & B. R. Co. (39
[See San Leandro, &c.]
N. Y. 404)
867
Cousins v. State (50 Ala. 113)
970 v. Sedalia (63 Mo. 417) 1266, 1279,
Coventry's Case (2 Salk. 429) 1072
1280, 1283, 1284, 1286
Coverdale v. Charlton (L. R. 4 Q. B.
v. Vicksburg (31 Miss. 216) 560
D. 104)
777 | Cramer v. Burlington (45 Iowa, 627)
Covill v. Phy (26 III. 432)
507
1300
Covington v. Boyle (6 Bush, 204) 390, Crandall v. Amador (20 Cal. 72) 1009
918 v. Nevada (6 Wall. 35)
902
v. Bryant (7 Bush, 248) 1281, 1293, Crane, Re (5 Pet. 190)
1006
1312 v. Des Moines (47 Iowa, 105) 314
v. Casey (3 Bush, 698) 979, 081 v. Fond du Lac (16 Wis. 196) 674,
v. East St. Louis (78 İll. 548) 71, 267,
1029
386, 401
v. Janesville (20 Wis. 305) 944
v. Hoadley (83 Ky. 444)
109 v. Urbanna (2 Ill. App. 559) 557, 564
v. Ludlow (i Met. 295) 371, 373, 374, Crangle v. Harrisburg (1 Pa. St. 132) 721
390 Cranston v. Augusta (61 Ga. 572) 211,
v. Mayberry (9 Bush, 304) 316
1197
v. Rockingham (93 N. C. 134) 1107 Craw v. Tolona (96 Ill. 255) 924, 991
Covington & L. R. Co. v. Ingles (15 Crawford v. Burrell (53 Pa. St. 219) 952
B. Mon. 637)
322 v. Delaware V. (7 Ohio St. 459) 856,
Covington & 0. R. Co. v. Barren
871, 1226
Co. (10 Bush, 604)
121 v. Mobile & G. R. Co. (76 Ga.
Covington County ' v. Dunklin (52
405)
766
Ala. 28)
1029 v. Powell (2 Burr. 1013)
378
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
lii
637
Page
Page
Crawford County v. Iowa County (2 Crossett v. Janesville (28 Wis. 420) 1180,
Chand. 14)
269
1188, 1219, 1229, 1231
v. Wilson (7 Ark. 214) 562, 566 Croton Dam Case (2 Denio, 433).
Crawfordsville v. Bond (96 Ind. 236) 1317,
(See New York 2. Bailey.]
1327, 1331 Crow v. Oxford Tp. (119 U. S. 215) 572,
v. Smith (79 Ind. 308) 1269, 1270
595, 634
Crawshaw v. Roxbury (7 Gray, 374) 208, Crowder v. Tinkler (19 Ves. 617) 449
209, 539 Crowell v. Sonoma County (25 Cal.
Craycraft v. Selvage (10 Bush, 696) 518,
313) 1169, 1172, 1174, 1175
535, 556, 558, 913, 978, 995 Crowley v. Burlington, C. R. & N.
Creal v. Keokuk (4 G. Gr. (Ia.) 47) 814,
Ry. Co. (65 Iowa, 658)
857
1224 v. Copley (2 La An. 329)
933
Creamer v. Bates (49 Mo. 523) 556 v. Davis (63 Cal. 460)
843
Creighton v. Manson (27 Cal. 613) 407, Croxall v. Sherard (5 Wall. 268)
923 Croydon Hospital v. Farley (6 Taunt.
v. Piper (14 Ind. 182)
291
467)
261
v. San Francisco (42 Cal. 446) 95, Cruger 2. Hudson River R. Co. (12
130, 131, 1011
N. Y. 190)
709, 725, 727
v. Scott (14 O. St. 438) 920, 976, 978 Cruikshanks v. Charlestown C. Coun-
v. Toledo (18 O. St. 447)
556
cil (1 McCord, 360) 722, 921, 959
Crepps v. Durden (Cowp. 640) 415 Crump v. Colfax Co. Sup. (52 Miss.
Crescent v. Anderson (114: Pa. St.
107)
534
643)
1285 Crystal v. Des Moines (65 Iowa, 502)
Cresson's Appeal (30 Pa. St. 437) 663
1266, 1279
Crete v. Childs (11 Neb. 252) 1287 Cuckfield Burial Bd., Re (19 Beav.
Crissey v. Hestonville, M. & F. Pass.
153)
717
Ry. Co. (75 Pa. St. 83) 1269 Cuddon v. Eastwick (1 Salk. 143) 412
Crist v. Brownsville Trs. (10 Ind. Cuff v. Newark (35 N. J. L. 17) 1306
452)
361 Culbertson v. Cincinnati (16 Ohio,
Crockett v. Boston (5 Cush. 182) 696, 745
579)
1116
Croft v. Peterborough (5 U. C. C. P. Cullen v. Carthage (103 Ind. 196) 220
35)
389, 1322 Culpepper Co. Sup. v. Gorrell (20
Cromarty v. Boston (127 Mass. 329) 1272
Gratt. 484)
1132
Crommett v. Pearson (18 Me. 344) 360, Culver v. Jersey City (45 N. J. L. 256) 918
374 v. Streator (22 N. E. R. 810) 1197
Crompton v. Zabriskie (101 U. S. Cumberland v. Magruder (34 Md.
601)
1109, 1118
381)
143, 198, 237
Cromwell v. Brown S. Q. Co. (50
v. Willison (50 Md. 138) 1196, 1211,
Conn. 470)
769
1214, 1215, 1230, 1316, 1318
v. Sac. County (96 U. S. 51) 561, Cumberland & O. R. Co. v. Barren
582, 583, 594
Co. Ct. (10 Bush, 604) 627
v. Sonoma County (25 Cal. 315) 1294 v. Washington County (10 Bush,
Cronan v. Municipality (5 La. An.
564)
645
537)
555 Cuming v. Grand Rapids (46 Mich.
Cronin v. Delavan (50 Wis. 375) 1268
150)
978
v. Jersey City (38 N. J. L. 410) 914 v. Prang (24 Mich. 514)
818
v. People (82 N. Y. 318) 401, 442 Cumming v. Brooklyn (11 Paige,
Crook v. People (106 Ill. 237) 140, 305,
596)
312, 557, 722, 990
1080
v. Rapides Par. Pol. Jury (9 La.
Crooke v. Flatbush Water Co. (27
An. 503)
909
Hun, 72; 29 Hun, 245) 828 v. Savannah (R. M. Charlt. (Ga.)
Crosby v. New London W. & P. R.
26)
970
C. (26 Conn. 121)
650 | Cummings v. Fitch (40 O. St. 56) 206
v. Warren (1 Rich. Law, 385) 413, v. Saux (30 La. An. 207)
516
420, 445 v. St. Louis (90 Mo. 259) 769, 1108
Cross v. Kansas City (90 Mo. 13) 815, Cummins v. Seymour (79 Ind. 491) 780,
1220
1306, 1327
v. Morristown (18 N. J. Eq. 305) 143, Cunningham v. Almonte (21 U.C.C.
385, 542, 791, 797, 800, 803, 806,
P. 459)
392
944, 1092 v. Squires (2 W. Va. 422) 510, 1126,
v. Plymouth County (125 Mass.
1127
557)
734 Curnen v. New York (79 N. Y. 511) 322
v. St. Louis, K. C. & N. Ry. Co. Curran v. Arkansas (15 How. 312) 246,
(77 Mo. 318)
842, 849
250
liv
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
72
102)
39, 41
Page
Page
Curran v. Louisville (83 Ky. 628) 704, 801 Dalzell v. Davenport (12 Iowa, 437) 1224,
v. Shattuck (21 Cal. 427)
720
1231
Currier v Lowell (16 Pick. (Mass.) Dameron v. Irwin (8 Ired. L. 421) 323
170)
1314, 1315 Damodhar Gordhani v. Deoran Kanji
Curry 2. Bank of Mobile (8 Port.
(L. R. I. App. 1), 332)
361)
274 Damon v. Granby (2 Pick. 345) 79, 343,
v. Decatur Co. Sup. (61 Iowa,
356, 359, 360, 361, 366, 525, 527,
71)
1122
528, 564
v. Mannington (23 W. Va. 14) 1279, v. Scituate (119 Mass. 66) 1284
1301, 1305 v. Scituate (20 Am. R. 315) 1300
v. Mt. Sterling (15 Ill. 320) 705, 709 Damour v. Lyons (44 Iowa, 276) 815, 863,
v. Savannah (Ga. 1879)
674, 675
1195, 1324
v. Sioux City Dist. Tp. (62 Iowa, Dana, Re (7 Bened. 1)
508
v. Jackson St. Wharf Co. (31
v. Stewart (8 Bush, 560)
310
Cal. 118)
170, 658
Curtis v. Butler County (24 How.
v. San Francisco (19 Cal. 486) 562
435)
236, 361, 564 Danaher v. Brooklyn (51 Hun, 563) 1213
v. Hope (19 Conn. 154)
760 Danbury & N. R. Co. v. Norwalk (37
v. Keesler (14 Barb. 521)
739
Conn. 109)
454, 1331
v. Leavitt (15 N. Y. 9) 184, 194 Dane v. Derby (54 Me. 95) 1070, 1075
v. Portland (59 Me. 483)
525 | Danforth v. Schoharie Turnp. Co.
v. St. Paul, S. & T. F. R. Co.
(12 Johns. 227)
533
(20 Minn. 28)
733 Daniel v. Memphis (11 Humph. 585) 135,
v. Whipple (24 Wis. 350) 234, 573
145, 553
Curtis' Adm. v. Fiedler (2 Black (U.
v. New Orleans (26 La. An. 1) 909,
S.), 461)
537
979
Curwen v. Salkeld (3 East, 538) 457 v. North (11 East, 375)
789
Cushing v. Adams (18 Pick. 110) 885 v. Potter (4 C. & P. 262) 1309
v. Bedford (125 Mass. 526) 1263, v. Richmond Trustees (78 Ky.
1269
542)
903
v. Boston (122 Mass. 173; 124
v. Sinclair (L. R. 6 App. C.
Mass. 434; 128 Mass. 330)
181)
1153
v. Frankfort (57 Me. 541) 340, 355 Danielly v. Cabaniss (52 Ga. 211) 135,
Cushman v. Smith (34 Me. 247) 718
152, 186, 649
Cusick v. Norwich (40 Conn. 376) 818, Daniels v. Burford (19 U. C. Q. B.
1301
481)
320, 389, 1102
Cutcomp v. Utt (60 Iowa, 156) 388 v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co. (35
Cuthbert v. Conley (32 Ga. 211) 431
Iowa, 129)
718
v. Lewis (6 Ala. 262)
1030 v. Denver (2 Col. 669) 1327, 1328
Cutler v. Madison Co. Sup. (56 Miss.
v. Hilgard (77 Ill. 640)
216
115)
584 v. Wilson (27 Wis. 492)
763
v. Russellville (40 Ark. 105) 368 D’Antignac v. Augusta (31 Ga. 700) 944
Cutliff v. Albany (60 Ga. 597) 910 Dantzeiser v. Cook (40 Ind. 65) 1296
Cutting, Re (91 U. S. 14)
1006 Danvers Sch. Dist. v. Tapley (1
v. Stone (7 Vt. 471)
263
Allen, 49)
272
Cuyler v. Rochester (12 Wend. 165) 529, Danville v. Shelton (76 Va. 325) 145, 388
568, 1186 v. Sutherlin (20 Gratt. 555) 569
Danville, H. & W. R. Co. v. Con-
monwealth (73 Pa. St. 38) 854
D.
Danville Lumber & M. Co. v. Parks
(88 Ill. 463)
969
Daily v. Columbus (49 Ind. 169) 185 Darby v. Crowland (38 U. C. Q. B.
2. St. Paul (7 Minn. 390)
101
338)
389, 1139, 1328
v. State (8 Blackf. 329)
291 Dargan v. Mobile (31 Ala. 469) 1197,
v. Worcester (131 Mass. 452) 1312
1200
Dair v. United States (16 Wall. 1) 298 v. Waddell (9 Ired. 244)
449
Dale County v. Gunter (46 Ala. 118) 1167 Darling v. Gunn (50 I11. 424)
984
Dallam v. Oliver (3 Gill, 445) 1001 v. St. Paul (19 Minn. 389) 154, 424,
Dalrymple v. Whittingham (26 Vt.
425
345)
562 v. Westmoreland (52 N. H. 401) 1270
Dalton v. North Hampton (19 N. H. Darlington v. Commonwealth (41 Pa.
362)
726
St. 68)
378, 410, 709, 753, 756
v. So. E. Ry. Co. (4 C. B. (n. s.)
v. Jackson County (101 U. S.
296)
1288
688)
594
784
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
lv
Page
Page
Darlington v. New York (31 N. Y. Daviess County v. Dickinson (117
164) 95, 110, 111, 112, 121, 122,
U. S. 657) 195, 236, 604, 607, 639
132, 1027, 1167, 1210 v. Huidekoper (98 U. S. 98) 593
Darrow v. People (8 Col. 414) 1126, 1128 Davis v. American Soc. (75 N. Y.
Darst v. People (51 Ill. 286)
418
362)
1038
v. People (62 Ill. 306) 286, 449, 450, v. Anita (73 Iowa, 325)
396
1077 v. Bangor (42 Me. 522) 782, 785,
Dart v. Houston (22 Ga. 506)
103
1134, 1135, 1255, 1256, 1257, 1269,
Dartmouth College v. Woodward (4
1270
Wheat. 518) 38, 92, 93, 112, 114 v. Bath (17 Me. 241)
53
Dashiell 2. Atty.-Gen. (5 H. & J.
v. Bradford Sch. Dist. (24 Me.
392)
666
349)
541
v. Baltimore (45 Md. 615)
961 v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. (46
Dassler, Re (35 Kan. 678)
467
Iowa, 389)
841
Daublin v. New Orleans (1 Martin,
v. Clifton (8 U. C. C. P. 236) 886
184)
783 v. Clinton (50 Iowa, 585) 818, 821,
Dauphin & La F. S. Ry. Co. v. Ken-
832
nerly (74 Ala. 583)
954 v. Crawfordsville (119 Ind. 1) 1319,
Davenport v. Bird (34 Iowa, 524) 437,
1322
478, 479, 496 v. Des Moines (71 Iowa, 500) 202,
v. Chicago R. I. & P. R. Co. (38
205
Iowa, 633)
996, 998 v. Dudley (4 Allen, 557) 1263, 1278
v. Dav. & St. P. Ry. Co. (38
v. Fulton (52 Wis. 657)
1261
Iowa, 99)
848 v. Graves (38 N. J. L. 104) 162
v. Dodge County (105 U. S.
v. Guilford (55 Conn. 351) 1257
237)
572, 1044 v. Harrison (46 N. J. L. 79) 1129,
v. Hallowell (10 Me. 317) 518, 524
1131
v. Kauffman (34 Iowa, 194) 973 v. Hill (41 N. H. 329)
1257
v. Kelly (7 Iowa, 102) 458, 460 v. Jackson (61 Mich. 530)
539
v. Kleinschmidt (6 Mont. Ter.
v. Lamoille Pl. R. Co. (27 Vt.
502; 13 Pac. R. 249) 146, 543,
602)
1301
826, 1108 v. Leominster (1 Allen, 182) 1314
v. Lord (9 Wall. 409) 1028, 1037 v. Lowell M. H. Prop. (8 Met.
1045, 1063, 1065, 1066, 1073
321)
184
v. Miss. & M. R. Co. (16 Iowa,
v. Macon (64 Ga. 128)
944
348) 895, 910, 948, 949, 968 v. Montgomery C. Council (51
v. Peoria M. & F. Ins. Co. (17
Ala. 139) 1157, 1160, 1199, 1281
Iowa, 276) 274, 533, 673, 674 v. New York (14 N. Y. 506) 116,
v. Richmond (81 Va. 636)
216
157, 387, 786, 842, 848, 859, 860,
v. Ruckman (37 N. Y. 568) 1264,
1114
1274, 1281, 1283, 1284, 1295, v. New York (1 Duer, 451) 1072, 1094,
1300, 1309
1098
v. Ruckman (10 Bosw. 20) 1301 v. New York (2 Duer, 663) 1104
v. Stevenson (34 Iowa, 225) 841, 854 v. Old Colony R. Co. (131 Mass.
Davenport & N. R. Co. v. Renwick
258)
548
(102 U. S. 180)
171 v. Reed (65 N. Y. 566)
958
Davenport Cent. R. Co. v. Davenport
v. Russell (5 Bing. 355)
295
Gasl. Co. (43 Iowa, 301) 860 v. Sabita (63 Pa. St. 90)
757
Davenport Gasl. Co. v. Davenport (13
v. State (7 Md. 151)
88
Iowa, 229)
203, 500
v. State (4 Stew. & P. 83)
437
David v. Portland Water Com’rs (14
v. Winslow (51 Me. 264)
885
Or. 98)
94, 102 v. Woolnough (9 Iowa, 104) 87, 492
Davidson v. New Orleans (96 U. S. Dawes v. Hawkins (4 L. T. (N. s.)
97)
684, 923, 932
288)
746
v. Portland (69 Me. 116)
1287 V. Hightsown (45 N. J. I.. 501) 809
v. Ramsey Co. (18 Minn. 482) 226 Daws, Re (8 A. & E. 736)
1131
v. Woodruff (68 Ala. 356) 287 | Dawson v. Frederick Co. Ct. Jus. (2
Davidson College v. Chambers' Ex.
H. & M. 132)
1006
(3 Jones Eq. 253) 657, 658, 670 v. St. Paul F. & M. Ins. Co. (15
Davies v. Corbin (112 U. S. 36) 1005, 1074
Mion. 136)
1116
v. Lowden (Carter, 29)
414 Dawson County v. McNamara (4 N.
v. New York (83 N. Y. 207) 678
W. R. 991)
186, 578
v. New York (93 N. Y. 250) 524 Day v. Green (4 Cush. 433) 155, 359, 425,
v. Stephens (7 C. & P. 570) 741
467, 1191
lvi
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
Page
Page
Day v. Kent (1 Or. 123)
281 | Delabigarre v. Municipality (3 La.
v. Milford (5 Allen, 98) 1274, 1276
An. 230)
801
v. Mount Pleasant (70 Iowa, Delacy v. Neuse River Nav. Co. (1
193)
1258, 1259
Hawks, 274)
338, 1026
v. Schroeder (46 Iowa, 546) 773, 796, Delafield v. Illinois (2 Hill, 159) 55, 195,
Dayton v. Pease (4 0. St. 80) 1158, 1202
519, 539, 542
1293, 1317 Delahanty v. Warner (75 Ill. 185) 339,
v. Quigley (29 N. J. Eq. 77) 396, 399
1025, 1026, 1095
v. Rounds (27 Mich. 82)
224 Delancey, Re (52 N. Y. 80)
1151
v. Rutland (84 III. 279)
760 Delaney, Re (43 Cal. 478)
475
Dean v. Borchsenius (30 Wis. 236) 545, v. Salina (34 Kan. 532)
662
977, 993, 1015 Delaplaine v. Chicago & N. W. R.
v. Charlton (23 Wis. 590) 545, 1105
Co. (42 Wis. 214)
171
v. Davis (51 Cal. 406)
91 | Delaware Co. Coni’rs v. McClintock
v. Gleason (16 Wis. 1) 910, 941, 953,
(51 Ind. 325)
647, 1111
957, 1122 Delaware Railroad Tax, Re (18 Wall.
v. Madison (7 Wis. 688)
208
206)
952
v. New Milford Tp. (5'W. & S. Delger v. St. Paul (14 Fed. R. 567) 1282
545)
1202, 1282 Delmonico v. New York (1 Sandf.
Dean & C. of Windsor, Re (Godb.
222)
1203, 1331
211)
247 | Delphi v. Bowen (61 Ind. 29) 899, 1120,
Deane v. Randolph (132 Mass. 475) 1183
1121, 1122
2. Todd (22 Mo. 90) 151, 1112, 1120 v. Evans (36 Ind. 90) 368, 373, 375,
Deansville Cemetery Assoc., Re (66
377, 814, 815, 818, 819, 945, 979,
N. Y. 569 ; rev. 5 Hun, 482) 445,
1221, 1229
696, 704 v. Lowery (74 Ind. 520) 1258, 1298
De Armas v. New Orleans (5 La.
v. Startzman (104 Ind. 343) 268
132)
772 Demarest v. New Barbadoes (40 N.
Deaton v. Polk Co. (9 Iowa, 594) 733
J. L. 604)
317
De Baum v. New York (16 Barb.
v. New York (74 N. Y. 161) 94, 140
392)
1114 v. Wickham (63 N. Y. 320) 352, 355,
De Ben v. Girard (4 La. An. 30) 400
1019, 1076, 1114
Debolt v. Cincinnati Tp. Trs. (7 O. Dempsey v. Burlington (66 Iowa,
St. 237)
316
687)
388
v. Ins. & Trust Co. (1 O. St. 564) 157 Den v. Vreelandt (2 Halst. 352) 274
Decatur v. Fisher (53 Ill. 407) 1281, 1287, Dennehy v. Chicago (120 Ill. 627) 432
1288, 1297 Denning v. Roome (6 Wend. 651)
v. Paulding: (14 Pet. 497)
1015
380, 381, 744, 1212
v. Vermillion (77 Ill. 315) 315, 317 Dennis v. Hughes (8 U. C. Q. B. 444) 707
Dechert v. Commonwealth (113 Pa.
v. Maynard (15 Ill. 477)
105
St. 229)
1014 Dennison v. Kansas City (95 Mo.
Decker v. Hughes (68 Ill. 33) 237, 646
416)
980
Decorah v. Bullis (25 Iowa, 12) 353, 355, Denniston v. Clark (125 Mass. 216) 816,
356
819
v. Dunston (38 Iowa, 96) 424 | Denton v. Jackson (2 Johos. Ch. 320) 74,
v. Gillis (10 Iowa, 234)
485
656, 660, 1116
De Cordova v. Galveston (4 Tex. Denver v. Bayer (7 Col. 113) 856, 1184,
470)
561, 568
1224, 1239
Dedham Bank v. Chickering (3 Pick.
v. Capelli (4 Col. 25) 1328, 1331, 1332
335)
301 v. Clements (3 Col. 484)
752
Deeds v. Sanborn (26 Iowa, 419)
974
v. Dean (10 Col. 375) 321, 1184,
Deeflir v. Bowen (61 Ind. 29) 1107
1204, 1279, 1283
Deehan v. Johnson (141 Mass. 23) 1015 v. Dunsmore (7 Col. 328) 1204, 1279,
Deerfield v. Conn. River R. Co. (144
1283
Mass. 325)
659 v. Mullen (7 Col. 245)
445
Deering, Re (93 N. Y. 361)
825 v. Rhodes (9 Col. 554)
1334
Deford v. Mercer (24 Iowa, 118) 694 v. Vernia (8 Col. 399)
1219
De Grave v. Monmouth (4 C. & P. Denver & S. Ry. Co. v. D. City Ry.
411)
355, 539
Co. (2 Col. 673) 784, 789, 860,
De Groot, Re (6 Wall. 497)
1015
864
Deiman v. Fort Madison (30 Iowa, Denver Bd. of Ald. v. Darrow (22
541)
974
Pac. R. 784) 1126, 1128, 1129
Deitz v. Central (1 Col. 323) 68, 431, 434, Denver Circle R. Co. v. Nestor (10
482
Col. 403)
808, 1184, 1224
367,
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
lvii
Page
Page
Department of Public Parks, Re (86 Detroit Y. M. Soc. v. Detroit (3
N. Y. 439)
90
Mich. 172)
953
De Pauw v. New Albany (22 Ind. De Varaigne v. Fox (2 Blatch. C.
204)
896
C. 95)
690, 691
De Pere v. Bellevue (31 Wis. 120) 271 De Vaux v. Detroit (Harring Ch.
Derby v. Alling (40 Conn. 410) 741, 758
Mich. 98)
796
Derecourt v. Corbishley (5 E. & B. Devereaux v. Brownsville (29 Fed.
188)
295
R. 742)
251, 253
Dermont v. Detroit (4 Mich. 435) 1328, Deverill v. Grand Trunk R. Co. (25
1331, 1333
U. C. Q. B. 517)
1262
De Russy v. Davis (13 La. An. 468) 147 | Devlin v. New York (63 N. Y. 8) 88, 513,
Des Moines v. Casady (21 Iowa,
1139
570)
1002 Devor v. McClintock (9 Watts & S.
v. Chic., R. I. & P. R. Co. (41
80)
272
Iowa, 569)
966 Devore's Appeal (56 Pa. St. 163) 265, 268
v. Gilchrist (67 Iowa, 210) 388 De Voss v. Richmond (18 Gratt.
v. Hall (24 Iowa, 234) 738, 741, 746,
338) 108, 193, 194, 560, 615, 1141
761, 792, 818, 821 Devoy v. New York (39 Barb. 169) 312
v. Hillis (55 Iowa, 643)
313 Dew v. Parsons (2 B. & Ald. 562) 1148
v. Layman (21 Iowa, 153) 724, 725 v. Sweet Springs Dist. Ct. Jus.
Des Moines Gas Co. v. Des Moines
(3 Hen. & M. (Va.) 1) 1024
(44 Iowa, 505) 152, 386, 387, 828 Dewey v. Detroit (15 Mich. 307) 1158,
Des Moines Street R. Co. v. Des M.
1197, 1296, 1301
Broad-Gauge S. Ry. Co. (73
v. Niagara Co. Sup. (62 N. Y.
Iowa, 513)
859
294)
1146
Desmond v. Dunn (55 Cal. 242) 72 Dewhurst v. Allegheny (95 Pa. St.
v. Jefferson (19 Fed. R. 483) 145, 471
437)
90
v. McCarthy (17 Iowa, 525) 378 Dewitt v. Duncan (46 Cal. 342) 814
Des Plaines v. Poyer (123 Ill. 348) 1097 v. Ithaca (15 Hun, 568)
741
Detroit v. Beckman (34 Mich. 125) 1180, v. San Francisco (2 Cal. 289) 210, 659
1181, 1212, 1215, 1220, 1293 Dexter v. Tree (117 III. 532)
757
v. Blackeby (21 Mich. 84) 1180, 1181, Dey v. Jersey City (19 N. J. Eq. 412) 342,
1245, 1249, 1252, 1253, 1275, 1282,
351, 359, 407, 521
1294, 1295 7. Lee (4 Jones, 238)
323, 367
v. Corey 19 Mich. 165) 108, 1139, De Zeng v. Beekman (2 Hill, 489) 678, 679
1293, 1303, 1307, 1331, 1333 Diamond v. Cain (21 La. An. 309) 102
v. D. & Erin Pl. R. Co. (12 Mich.
v. Lawrence County (37 Pa. St.
333)
782, 808
353)
560, 650
v. Det. & Howell Pl. R. Co. (43 Dickenson v. Fitchburg (13 Gray,
Mich. 140) 112, 115, 117, 124
546)
731
v. Det. & Milw. R. Co. (23 Mich. Dickey v. Hurlburt (5 Cal. 343) 276, 280
173) 738, 750, 752, 754, 757, 761, v. Reed (78 III. 261) 286, 288, 1077,
789
1095
v. Det. City Ry. Co. (43 N. W.
v. Worcester (7 Allen, 19) 1820
R. 447)
849, 871, 971 | Dickinson v. Me. Tel. Co. (46 Me.
v. Jackson (1 Doug. 106) 523, 539
483)
1266
v. Jepp (52 Mich. 458)
995 v. New York (92 N. Y. 584) 797
v. Martin (34 Mich. 170) 1148, 1149, v. Poughkeepsie (75 N. Y. 65) 534,
1151
543
2 Moran (46 Mich. 213)
306 v. Worcester (7 Allen, 19) 1320
v. Putnam (45 Mich. 265) 1252, 1266 v. Worcester (138 Mass. 555) 959
v. Redfield (19 Mich. 376) 315, 316 Dickinson Co. Com’rs v. Nat. Land
v. Robinson (38 Mich. 108) 545
Co. (23 Kan. 196)
1151
v. Robinson (42 Mich. 198) 545 Dickinson Tp. v. Linn (36 Pa. St. 431) 325
v. Somerset Co. Com’rs (35 Me. Dickson v. Racine (61 Wis. 545) 912
373)
374 Diefenthaler v. New York (111 N. Y.
v. Whittemore (27 Mich. 281) 554
331)
1149
Detroit, E. R. & Ill. R. Co. v. Bearss Diggle v. London & B. R. Co. (5
(39 Ind. 598)
347
Exch. 442)
521
Detroit Park Case (28 Mich. 228). Diggs, Re (52 Ala. 381)
1025
[See People v. Detroit, &c.] Dighton's Case (1 Vent. 82)
302
(44 Mich. 602). [See Mayor Dill v. Roberts (30 Wis. 178)
993
of Detroit v. Park Com'rs
v. Wareham (7 Met. 438) 53, 518,
529, 533, 1143, 1191
&c.]
lyiii
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
981
Page
Page
Dillard v. Webb (55 Ala. 468) 1079 Dolan v. Baltimore (4 Gill. 394) 955
Dillenbach v. Xenia (41 O. St. 207) 856 v. New York (62 N. Y. 472)
Dillingham v. Snow (5 Mass. 547) 53, 139 v. New York (68 N. Y. 279) 318
Dimes v. Petley (15 Q. B. 276) 447 v. New York (4 Abb. Pr. N. 8.
Dimmick H. Coni'rs v. Waltham H.
397)
445
Com’rs (100 Ill. 631)
881 Doll v. State (45 (). St. 445)
576
Dimock v. Suffield (30 Coun. 129) 1270 Dollar Sav. Bank v. United States
Dingley v. Boston (100 Mass. 544) 212,
(19 Wall. 277)
995, 998
445, 690, 691, 700 Domnestic Tel. & T. Co. v. Newark
Dinginan v. People (51 Ill. 277) 157
(49 N. J. L. 344)
820
Dislion r. Smith (10 Iowa, 212) 281 Donahue v. Graham (61 Cal. 276) 143
District of Columbia v. Armes (107 Donaldson v. Boston (16 Gray, 508) 1302
U. S. 519)
1298 Donnaher v. State (16 Miss. 619) 834,
v. Balt. & Pot. R. Co. (1 Mackey,
857
314)
1308, 1312 Donnelly v. Teasdale (21 Fla. 652) 339
v. McElligott (117 U. S. 621) 1284 v. Tripp (12 R. I. 97) 1185, 1190
v. Saville (1 McArthur, 581) 399 Donoho v. Vulcan Iron W. (75 Mo.
v. Wagaman (4 Mackey, 328) 396
401)
1284
v. Wash. & G.R. Co. (1 Mackey, Donohue v. New York (3 Daly, 165) 1331
361)
804 Donovan v. Bd. of Ed. (85 N. Y.
District of Columbia Com'rs v. Balt.
117)
1176
& Pot. R. Co. (114 U. S. 453) 780 v. New York (33 N. Y. 291) 529
Dively v. Cedar Falls (21 Iowa, 565) 500, 1. Springfield (12 Mass. 371) 734
562, 563 v. Vicksburg (29 Miss. 247) 416; 418
v. Cedar Falls (27 Iowa, 227) 203, Doolan 2. Manitowoc (48 Wis. 312) 312
883 Dooley v. Kansas City (82 Mo. 444) 1187
Diveny v. Elmira (51 N. Y. 506) 498, v. Meriden (44 Conn. 117) 1260
1281, 1283, 1295 v. Sullivan (112 Ind. 451) 959, 1193,
Divine v. Harvie (7 T. B. Mon. 440) 1016
1296, 1306
Dix v. Dummerston (19 Vt. 263) 552 Doolittle v. Broome Co. Sup. (18 N. Y.
Dixon 2. Baker (65 Ill. 518) 1223, 1323,
155) 787, 1096, 1104, 1111, 1114
1331 v. Galena & C. U. R. Co. (14 Ill.
v. Cincinnati (14 Ohio, 240) 715, 1127
381)
1126
2. Mayes (72 Cal. 166)
974 Doran v. De Long (48 Mich. 552) 284
. Robinson (3 Mod. 108) 457 Dorathy v. Chicago (53 Ill. 79) 991
Dixon County v. Field (111 U. S. 83) 186, Dorchester v. Ensor (L. R. 4 Ex. 335) 157
596, 608, 610, 611, 634 v. Wentworth (31 N. H. 451) 715,
Dodd v. Hartford (25 Conn. 232) 151,
1126
1120, 1121 Dore v. Gray (2 D. & E. T. R. 358) 920
v. Miller (14 Ind. 433)
55 2. Milwaukee (42 Wis. 18) 146, 520,
Dodge v. B. C. R. & M. R. Co. (34
815, 1219, 1229
Iowa, 276)
857 | Dorey v. Boston (146 Mass. 336) 366
v. Council Bluffs (57 Iowa, 560) 1110
386, 989
v. Davenport (57 Iowa, 560) 829 Dorgan v. Boston (12 Allen, 223) 507, 722,
v. Essex Co. Con’rs (3 Met. 380) 718,
917
721 v. Boston (94 Mass. 223)
928
v. Gridley (10 Ohio, 173) 422 Dorian v. Shreveport (28 Fed. R.
v. People (113 Ill. 491)
1089
287)
193
v. Platte County (82 N. Y. 218) 615 Dorlon v. Brooklyn (46 Barb. 504) 1297
v. Williams (46 Wis. 70)
657 | Dorman v. Jacksonville (13 Fla. 538) 1220,
Dodge Co. Com’rs v. Chandler (96
1224, 1231
U. S. 205)
577, 704 Dorrance Street, Re (4 R. I. 230) 920
Dodson v. Cincinnati (34 (). St. 276) 1227 Dorrosan v. Huttner (48 Ga. 133) 1166
Doe v. Attica (7 Ind. 641) 740, 757, 763 | Dorsey v. Ansley (72 Ga. 460) 1085
v. Barnes (8 Q. B. 1043)
356 v. Smyth (28 Cal. 21) 318, 319
v. Chunn (1 Blackf. 336) 1000 Dorwin v. Strickland (57 N. Y. 492) 324
v. Jones (11 Ala. 63) 175, 743, 748, Dosdall v. Olmsted County (30 Minn.
755, 772
96)
1174
v. Manchester, B. & R. R. Co. Dotton v. Albion (50 Mich. 129) 1297
(14 M. & W. 687)
718 Dougherty v. Hitchcock (35 Cal. 512) 945
v. Norton (11 M. & W. 913) 259 Doughty v. Hope (3 Denio, 249) 709
Doering v. State (49 Ind. 56) 293, 295 v. Somerville & E. R. Co. (21
Doherty v. Waltham (4 Gray, 596) 1257,
N. J. L. 442)
708
1270 | Douglas, Re (3 Q. B. 825)
447
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
lix
Page
Page
Douglas 2. Chatham (41 Conn. 211) Drake v. Lowell (13 Met. 292) 1266, 1274,
225, 240, 1012
1276
v. Niantic Sav. Bank (97 Ill. 228) 572 v. Phillips (40 Ill. 388) 942, 1109,
Douglas Co. Com’rs v. Bolles (94
1111, 1113
U. S. 202)
593 Draper v. Ironton (42 Wis. 696) 1299, 1300
Douglass, Re (46 N. Y. 42)
388 v. Springport (104 U. S. 501) 522
Re (i Utah Ter. 108)
435 Dreher v. Fitchburg (22 Wis. 675) 1278
v. Branch Bank (19 Ala. 659) 260 Drew v. New River Co. (6 C. & P.
v. Commonwealth (108 Pa. St.
754)
1331
559)
1007 v. Sutton (55 Vt. 586)
1312
v. Commonwealth (2 Rawle, 262) 472 Driftwood Val. Turnp. Co. v. Bar-
v. Essex Co. Freeh. (38 N. J. L.
tholomew Co. Com’rs (72
214)
291, 1021
Ind. 226)
529
2. Harrisonville (9 W. Va. 162) 1092, | Driggs v. Phillips (103 N. Y. 77) 755, 784,
1120
797
v. Lincoln County (5 Fed. R. Driscoll v. Smith (59 Wis. 38) 1131
775)
634 Drisko v. Columbia (75 Me. 73) 350
v. Placerville (18 Cal. 643) 149, 1109, Driver v. Western U. R. Co. (32
1112
Wis. 569)
731, 732
v. Pike County (101 U. S. 677) 584, Drogheda, Re (1 O'M. & H. 252) 281
587, 594, 636, 650 Droneberger v. Reed (11 Ind. 420) 720
v. State (31 Ind. 429)
319 Droz v. Baton Rouge (36 La. An.
v. Virginia City (5 Nev. 147) 184,
307)
152, 161, 1114
195, 512, 549, 564 Drucker v. Manhattan Ry. Co. (106
Douglasville v. Jones (60 Ga. 423) 1147
N: Y. 157)
877
Doulson v. Clinton (33 Iowa, 397) 1296 Drury v. Natick (10 Allen, 169) 1115
Dovaston v. Payne (2 Smith L. C.
v. Worcester (21 Pick. 44) 1258
142, 185)
791 Duane r. McDonald (41 Conn. 517) 1039
Dover v. Twombly (42 N. H. 59) 300 Duanesburgh v. Jenkins (57 N. Y.
Dover Trs. 2. Fox (9 B. Mon. 200) 740,
177)
133, 635, 645, 1011
743, 763
v. Jenkins (40 Barb. 574)
235
Dover Street, Re (18 Johns. 506) 711, 712 Dubach v. Han. & St. J. R. Co. (89
Dow v. Bullock (13 Gray, 136)
303
Mo. 483)
833, 847
v. Humbert (91 U. S. 294) 325 Dublin v. Attorney-Gen. (3 Cl. & F.
Dowdney v. New York (54 N. Y.
289)
663
186)
1002 Dublin Case (38 N. H. 450)
669
Dowell v. Portland (13 Or. 248) 536, 1000 [See also Atty.-Gen. v. Dublin.]
Dowlan v. Sibley County (36 Minn. Dubois v. Augusta (Dudley (Ga.)
430)
41
30)
393, 397, 442
Downer u. Boston (6 Cush. 277) 977, 987 v. Budlong (10 Bosw. 700) 449
Downing v. Marshall (23 N. Y. 366) 657, v. Campau (24 Mich. 360) 1000
661 v. Del. & H. Canal Co. (4 Wend.
v. Miltonvale (36 Kan. 740) 410, 488
285)
526
v. Rugar (21 Wend. 178) 324, 361, v. Kingston (102 N. Y. 219) 1255,
363
1285
Dows v. Chicago (11 Wall. 108) 1092, Dubordieu v. Butler (49 Cal. 512) 1009
1107, 1120, 1121 Dubuque v. Benson (23 Iowa, 248) 740,
v. Elmwood (34 Fed. R. 114) 88, 635
747, 821
Doyle v. Austin (47 Cal. 353) 895, 924, v. Chicago, D. & M. R. Co. (47
950, 951, 953
Iowa, 196)
940
v. Continental Ins. Co. (94 U. S.
v. Harrison (34 Iowa, 163) 999
535)
905 2. Ill. Cent. R. Co. (39 Iowa, 56) 943,
v. Falconer (1 Privy Coun. App.
968, 969, 995, 998
329)
332 v. Maloney (9 Iowa, 450) 743, 746,
v. Raleigh (89 N. C. 133) 1022
757, 783, 820, 821
Dr. Gaskin's Case (8 D. & E. T. R.
v. Miller (11 Iowa, 583)
456, 462
209)
333 v. Northwestern L. Ins. Co. (29
Drain Com’rs v. Baxter (57 Mich.
Iowa, 9)
962, 969
127)
266 v. Rebman (1 Iowa, 441)
510
Draining Co. &c. (11 La. An. 338).
v. Stout (32 Iowa, 47, 80) 175, 178
See New Orleans Draining
v. Wooton (28 Iowa, 571) 388, 710,
Co., &c.]
958
Drake v. Hudson River R. Co. (7 Dubuque County v. D. & P. R. Co.
Barb. 508)
853, 854
(4 Greene (Ia.), 1)
208, 226
Ix
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
Page
Page
Dubuque Fem. College v. Dubuque Dunleith & Dub, Br. Co. v. Dubuque
Dist. Tp. (13 Iowa, 555) 539, 542
(32 Iowa, 427) 910, 948, 968
Ducat v. Chicago (10 Wall. 410) 905 Dunlop v. York (16 Grant, 216) 717
v. Chicago (48 Ill. 172)
905 Dunmore Borough's Appeal (52 Pa.
Duchess of Kingston's Case (20 How.
St. 374)
95, 130, 270, 273, 479,
St. Tr. 355)
1078
501
Ducksworth v. Johnson (4 H. & N. Dunn v. Charleston (Harper L. 189) 692,
653)
1288
701
Duckwall ». New Albany (25 Ind.
v. St. Andrew's, &c. (14 Johns.
283)
182
118)
533
Dudley v. Frankfort Trs. (12 B. Dunning v. Aurora (40 Ill. 481) 786
Mon. 610) 798, 803, 808, 1097, v. New Albany & S. R. Co. (10
1098
Ind. 437)
139
v. Weston (1 Met. 477)
382 Dunnovan v. Green (57 III. 63) 22, 208,
v. Weston (3 N. Y. 9)
1078
238, 645, 927, 1124
Duffey v. Tilton (14 La. An. 283) 787 Du Page Co. v. Jenks (65 Ill. 275) 1107
Duffield v. Detroit (15 Mich. 474) 715 Du Pratt 2'. Lick (38 Cal. 691) 1303
Duffield's Case (Bright. Elec. Cas. Durach's Appeal (62 Pa. St. 491) 95, 103,
646)
1025, 1026
971
Duffy v. Baltimore (Taney C. C. Durango v. Pennington (8 Col. 257) 521,
200)
1167
539
v. Dubuque (63 Iowa, 171) 1275, 1277 Durant v. Albany Co. Sup. (26 Wend.
Dugan v. Baltimore (1 G. & J. 499) 997,
66)
996
998 v. Carter (L. R. 9 C. P. 261) 279
v. Baltimore (5 G. & J. 357) 175, 177, v. Iowa Co. (1 Woolw. 69) 560, 583
749 v. Jersey City (25 N. J. L. 309) 985
v. Baltimore (3 Bland Ch. 383) 165, v. Kauffman (34 Iowa, 194) 973
172, 177 v. Palmer (29 N. J. L. 544) 1267,
v. United States (3 Wheat. 172) 297,
1282, 1309, 1311
321 Durch v. Chippewa County (60 Wis.
Duggen v. McGruder (Walk. (Miss.)
227)
138
112)
1131 | Durfey v. Hoag (1 Aiken, 286)
375
Dugro, Re (50 N. Y. 513)
545 Durgin v. Lowell (3 Allen, 398) 755
Duke v. Brown (96 N. C. 127) 639 Durham's Case (1 Sid. 33). [See
v. Cahaba Nav. Co. (16 Ala.
Mayor of Durham, &c.]
372)
1079 Durkee v. Janesville (28 Wis. 464) 89,
v. Rome (20 Ga. 635)
1161
942, 1002, 1304
Duke of Buccleuch v. Metrop. Bd.
v. Kenosha (59 Wis. 123) 1190
of Works (L. R. 5 H. L. C. Durkin v. Troy (61 Barb. 437) 1261,
418)
1231
1263, 1285
Dumesnil v. Dupont (18 B. Mon. 800) 449, Durr v. Howard (6 Ark. 461)
454 Dusenbury v. Newark (25 N. J. Eq.
Dummer v. Jersey City (20 N. J. L.
295)
1123
86)
743, 767, 783, 788 v. Mut. Union Tel. Co. (11 Abb.
Dunbar v. San Francisco (1 Cal.
N. C. 440)
831
355)
1164 Dusseau v. Municipality (6 La. An.
v. Soule (129 Mass. 284)
661
575)
716, 1131
Duncan v. Hayes (22 N. J. Eq. 25) 449 Dutchess Cotton Manuf. Co. v. Davis
v. Louisville (8 Bush, 98) 712, 1011
(14 Johns. 238)
258
v. Niles (32 Ill. 532)
323 Dutchess County Ins. Co. v. Hatch-
v. Terre Haute (85 Ind. 104) 695
field (1 Hun, 675)
651
Duncombe v. Fort Dodge (38 Iowa, Dutton v. Aurora (114 Ill. 138) 548
281)
522, 524 v. Strong (1 Black, 23) 168, 169,
Dundy v. Richardson Co. Com’rs (8
170
Neb. 508)
81 Dwengen v. Chicago & G. T. Ry. Co.
Dunham v. Chicago (55 Ill. 357) 954
(98 Ind. 153)
841, 856
v. Hyde Park (75 III.: 371) 814 Dwight v. Hampden Co. Com’rs (11
v. New Britain (11 Atl. R. 354) 474
Cush. 201)
731
v. Rochester Trs. (5 Cow. 462) 396, v. Springfield (4 Gray, 107) 714,
404, 416, 425, 428, 429, 459, 460
1126, 1129, 1130
Dunion v. People (17 Ill. 416) 740 Dwight Printing Co. v. Boston (122
Dunlap v. Gallatin County (15 III.
Mass. 583)
698
9)
997 Dwyer v. Brenham (65 Texas, 526) 138,
Dunleith v. Reynolds (53 Ill. 45) 964
146
505
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
lxi
Page
Page
Dyckman v. New York (5 N. Y. 434) 699, East St. Louis v. Maxwell (99 Ill. 439)
707, 708, 940
143
Dyer v. Brogan (70 Cal. 136)
576 v. O'Flynn (119 Ill. 200) 733, 795
v. Chase (52 Cal. 440)
976 v. People (124 Ill. 655) 613, 907
v. St. Paul (27 Minn. 457) 1225, 1228 v. St. John (47 Ill. 463)
706
v. Wightman (66 Pa. St. 425) 735 v. School Tp. Treas. (102 Ill.
Dygert v. Schenck (23 Wend. 446) 882,
489)
424
1309 v. Underwood (105 Ill. 308) 946
v. United States, ex rel. Zebley
(110 U. S. 321)
946, 1034
E.
2. Wehrung (46 Ill. 392) 154, 425,
432, 958
Eager, Re (46 N. Y. 100) 543, 545, 945, v. Wehrung (50 Ill. 28)
155
976 v. Wider (46 Ill. 351)
1012
Eagle v. Charing Cross Ry. Co. (L. East Union Tp. v. Ryan (86 Pa. St.
R. 2 C. P. C. 638)
688
459)
566
v. Kohn (84 Ill. 292)
31, 646 Eaton v. Boston C. & M. R. Co. (51
Eakin v. Brown (1 E. D. Smith, 44) 1310
N. H. 504) 686, 1227, 1230, 1234,
Eaines v. New Eng. Worsted Co.(11
1335
Met. 570)
735 2. Manitowoc Co. Sup. (44 Wis.
v. Savage (77 Me. 212) 1027, 1172
489)
39, 84, 1000
Earl of Ripon v. Hobart (3 Mylne
v. State (7 Blackf. 65) 1086, 1089
& K. 169)
455 v. Woburn (127 Mass. 270) 1269
Earle v. New Brunswick (38 N. J. L. Eaves v. Shattuck (35 N. H. 189) 54
47)
750 Ebbw Vale Co. (L. R. 8 Eq. C. 14) 1140
Earle's Case (Carth. 173)
336 Ecclesiastical Com’rs v. Clerkenwell
Earley's Appeal (103 Pa. St. 273) 529
(4 L. T. (N. s.) 599)
889
East & W. India Docks Co. v. Gattke Eddy v. People (127 Ill. 428) 639, 646,
(3 McN. & G. 155)
688
618
East Anglian Rys. Co. v. E. Coun- Edenton v. Wool (65 N. C. 379) 494
ties Ry. Co. (11 C. B. 775) 1140 Edey v. Slireveport (26 La. An. 636) 658
East Hartford v. Hartford Br. Co. Edgar v. Dodge (11 Mass. 670) 1125
(10 How. 511) 97, 110, 269, 271 Edgerly v. Concord (59 N. H. 78) 1166,
East Hartford v. Hartford Br. Co.
1198, 1199
(17 Conn. 80)
179, 181 Edgerton v. Green Cove Springs (19
East Kingston v. Towle (48 N. H.
Fla. 140)
722
57)
223 v. Huff (26 Ind. 35)
692, 706
East Lincoln v. Davenport (94 U. S.
v. Municipality (1 La. An. 435) 97,
801)
593, 630
100
East Lincolnshire R. Act, Re (1 Sim. Edmunds v. Gookin (20 Ind. 477) 267
(N. s.) 260)
717 Edmundson v. Pittsb. M. & Y. R. Co.
Eastman v. Clackamas County (32
(111 Pa. St. 316) 1196, 1307
Fed. R. 24) 1246, 1248, 1252 Edwards v. Grand Junc. R. Co. (1
v. Meredith (36 N. H. 284) 51, 56,
Myl. & Cr. 650)
382
179, 1172, 1173, 1174, 1176, 1201, v. Jersey City (40 N. J. L. 176) 993
1203, 1211., 1252, 1331 v. People (88 Ill. 340)
240
East Nissouri v. Horseman (16 U. C.
1. United States (93 U. S. 599) 1053
Q. B. 588)
320, 1102
v. Vesey (Cas. t. Hardw. 128) 379
v. Horseman (9 U. C. C. P. 191) 1102 Ege v. Koontz (8 Pa. St. 109) 1148, 1153
Easton v. Callender (11 Wend. 90) 324 Egerton o. Green Cove Springs (19
v. Neff (102 Pa. St. 474)
1283
Fla. 140)
933
Easton Bor. v. Rinck (116 Pa. St. 1) 757 Eggington, Re (2 E. & B. 717) 503
Easton Road, Re (3 Rawle, 195) 808 Egleston v. Charleston C. Council
Easton's Case (12 A. & E. 645) 503
(1 Mill Const. (S. C.) 45)
492
East River Br. & C. I. S. Transit Egremont v. Benjamin (125 Mass.
Co., Re (26 Hun, 490) 872
15)
323
East River Gasl. Co. v. Donnelly (93 Egyptian Levee Co. v. Hardin (27
N. Y. 557)
324
Mo. 495)
722, 911, 933, 955
East St. Louis v. Amy (120 U. S. Egypt Street, Re (2 Grant (Pa.)
600)
143, 907, 1034, 1056
Cas. 455)
142, 143
v. E. St. L. Gas & C. Co. (98 Ill. Ehrgott v. New York (96 N. Y. 264) 1189,
415)
206, 530, 1141
1194, 1264, 1281, 1283, 1287
v. Giblin (3 Ill. App. 219) 1307 | Eichels v. Evansvills S. R. Co. (78
v. Klug (3 Ill. App. 90)
1307
Ind. 261)
144, 870, 881
lxii
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
Page
Page
Eidemiller v. Wyandotte City (2 Dil- Elmendorf v. Albany (17 Hun, 81) 921
lon C. C. 376)
716 v. Ewen (2 N. Y. Leg. Obs. 85) 244,
Eikenberry v. Bazaar (22 Kan. 556) 1174
292
Eilert v. Oshkosh (14 Wis. 637) 945 v. New York (25 Wend. 693) 244,
Ela v. Smith (5 Gray, 121)
292
263, 272, 303, 367, 407, 1131
Elder v. Dwight Manuf. Co. (4 Gray, Elmore County v. Long (52 Ala. 277) 1029
201)
507 Elmwood Tp. v. Marcy (92 U. S.
Eldon Tp. Corp, Re (6 U. C. L. J. 207) 552
289)
584, 599, 636
Eldora v. Burlingame (62 Iowa, 32) 375 Elrod v. Bernadotte (53 Ill. 368) 674, 675,
Eldred v. Seaton (5 Ohio, 215) 321
1031
Eldridge v. Smith (34 Vt. 481) 701 Elston v. Chicago (40 Ill. 514) 1148, 1150
Election Cases, &c. [See Gibbons
v. Crawfordsville (20 Ind. 272) 267
2. &c. (65 Pa. St. 20).]
Elwell v. Birmingham Canal Nav.
Elevated Railway Cases (70 N. Y.;
(3 H. of L. C. 812)
800
90 N. Y.; 105 N. Y.; 112
v. Greenwood (26 Iowa, 377) 787
N. Y. [See Gilbert, &c., Elwood v. Bullock (6 Q. B. 383) 431, 488
Kings, &c., Lahr, &c., New Ely v. Morgan Co. Com’rs (112 Ind.
York Elevated, &c., Pond,
361)
979
&c., Story, &c ]
v. Niagara Co. Sup. (36 N. Y.
Elgin v. Beckwith (119 Ill. 367) 748, 753,
297)
452, 1167
759 v. Parsons (55 Conn. 83)
754
v. Eaton (83 Ill. 535) 1222, 1228, 1230, v. Rochester (26 Barb. 133) 210
1232, 1234, 1241 Embury v. Conner (3 N. Y. 511) 690, 693,
v. Kimball (90 Ill. 356)
1324
705, 708
Elias v. Nightingale (8 E. & B. 698) 447 Emerson v. Babcock (66 Iowa, 257) 810
Elizabeth v. Force (29 N. J. Eq. 587) 650, v. Blairsville (2 Pittsb. 39) 197
651 v. Lexington (69 Mo. 157) 1216
v. Meeker (45 N. J. L. 157) 919 v. Newberry (13 Pick. 377) 539
Elizabeth Com’rs, Re (49 N. J. L.
v. Saltmarsh (7 A. & E. 266) 920
488)
88, 993 Emery v. Lowell (104 Mass. 13) 1214,
Elizabethtown & P. R. Co. v. Thomp-
1330, 1331, 1334
sun (79 Ky. 52)
841, 842
v. Lowell (127 Mass. 138) 1147, 1150
Elizabethtown, L. & B. S. R. Co. v.
v. Maria ville (56 Me. 315) 562
Combs (10 Bush, 382) 792, 854, v. San F. Gas Co. (28 Cal. 345) 722,
855, 856, 1287
923, 940, 955, 991
Elizabethtown Trs. v. Leffler (23 111.90) 481 v. Washington (1 Brayton ( Vt.),
Elkhart v. Wickwire (87 Ind. 77) 1312
128)
761
Elkins v. Athearn (2 Denio, 191) 1014 Emigrant Co. v. &c. (See Amer-
Elkton Land Co. v. Ayres (62 Ala.
ican Em. Co. &c. (97 U. S.
413)
1107
339). )
Ellerman 1. McMains (30 La. An. Eminence v. Grasser's Ex. (81 Ky.
190)
107, 110, 165, 166
52)
594
Elliot v. Concord (27 N. H. 204) 1314 Emmerton 2. Mathews (7 H. & N.
Elliott v. Fairhaven & W. R. Co. (32
586)
464
Conn. 579)
868 | Empire Tp. 3. Darlington (101 U. S.
v. Philadelphia (75 Pa. 347) 1196,
87)
629
1197, 1198 Emporia v. Bates (16 Kan. 495) 993, 994
2. Swartwout (10 Pet. 137) 326, 1148, v. Gilchrist (37 Kan. 532)
986
1155 v. Norton (13 Kan. 569, 1874) 134
v. Williamson (11 Lea, 38) 804, 996 v. Norton (16 Kan. 236)
409
Elliott County v. Kitchen (14 Bush,
v. Schoidling (33 Kan. 485) 1283,
289)
1037
1285
Ellis v. Bridgenorth (4 L. T. (N. 8.)
v. Soden (25 Kan. 588) 698, 1097
112)
457 v. Volmer (12 Kan. 622) 425, 480,
v. Iowa City (29 Iowa, 229) 1124,
481, 483, 507
1181, 1320 Enfield v. Jordan (119 U. S. 680) 40, 230,
v. Sheffield Gas Co. (23 L. J. Q.
583
821 Enfield Toll Br. Co. v. Hartford &
v. State (4 Ind. 1)
55
N. H. R. Co. (17 Conn. 40) 683
v. Washoe County (7 Nev. 291) 553 England v. Davidson (11 A. & E. 856)
Ellison v. Raleigh (89 N. C. 125) 327, 1022
209
Ellyson, Re (20 Gratt. 10) 288, 1132 English v. Chicot County (26 Ark.
Ellsworth v. Grand Rapids (27 Mich.
454)
235, 237
250)
659 v. People (91 Ill. 566) 896, 939
t
B. 42)
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
lxiii
Page
Page
Episcopal Char. Soc. v. Dedham Evansville v. Decker (84 Ind. 325) 1327,
Episcopal Churclı (1 Pick.
1329
372)
360 539 v. Evans (37 Ind. 229)
744
Erd v. St. Paul (22 Minn. 443) 1302 v. Hall (14 Ind. 27)
964, 968
Erie v. Butler (120 Pa. St. 374) 557, 991 v. Martin (41 Ind. 145)
451
v. Calkins (85 Pa. 247) 1304, 1306, v. Paige (23 Ind. 525)
755
1307 v. Pfisterer (34 Ind. 36)
1123
v. E. Canal Co. (59 Pa. St. 174) 95, v. State (118 Ind. 382)
899
125 v. State (21 N. E. R. 267) 73, 81, 100,
v. Knapp (29 Pa. St. 173)
161
101, 103
v. Magill (101 Pa. St. 616) 1286 v. Wilter (86 Ind. 414)
1297
v. Reed's Ex. (113 Pa. St. 468) 897, Evansville & C. R. Co. v. Miller (30
899, 976, 1098
Ind. 209)
727
v. Schwingle (22 Pa. St. 384) 1202, Evansville, I. & C. S. L. R. Co. v.
1205, 1281, 1286
Evansville (15 Ind. 395) 151, 193,
Erie's Appeal (91 Pa St. 398)
205, 206
194, 196, 236, 564, 569, 602, 617,
Erie Acad. Trs. v. Erie (31 Pa. St.
645
515)
141, 392, 410 Everett v. Council Bluffs (46 Iowa,
Erie County v. Erie City (113 Pa. St.
66)
449, 791, 810
368)
950 v. Grapes (3 L. T. (N. S.) 669) 446, 450
v. Erie Water Com’rs (113 Pa.
v. Marquette (53 Mich. 450) 449
St. 368)
951 Evergreen Cem. Assoc. v. New Haven
Ernst v. Kunkle (5 O. St. 520) 1231
(43 Conn. 234)
444, 705
Erskine v. Van Arsdale (15 Wall. Everson v. Syracuse (100 N. Y. 577) 1190
75)
1155 Evertson v. Newport Nat. Bank (66
Eschbach v. Pitts (6 Md. 71) 997, 1000,
N. Y. 14)
651
1001 Every v. Smith (26 L. J. Exch. 344) 746
Essex v. Day (52 Conn. 483)
582 Ewbanks v. Ashley (36 Ill. 177) 410, 477,
v. Park (11 Ex. C. C. P. 473) 301.
478, 480, 496
v. Strong (8 U. C. L. J. 15) 301 Ewing v. Filley (43 Pa. St. 384) 281, 283,
v. Strong (21 U. C. Q. B. 149) 301
288, 501, 509
Essex Co. Freeh. v. Barber (18 N. J.
v. Hoblitzelle (85 Mo. 64) 835
L. 64)
425, 944 v. St. Louis (5 Wall. 413) 715, 716,
Estabrook ads. State (6 Ala. 653) 898
1092, 1121, 1122, 1123, 1126, 1127,
Estelle v. Lake Crystal (27 Minn.
1130
243)
1268, 1285 v. Thompson (43 Pa. St. 384) 287
v. Owen (90 Mo. 113) 814, 960 Exchange Alley, Re (4 La. An. 4) 706,
Estep v. Keokuk Co. (18 Iowa, 199) 629
707
Estes v. Bethel School District (33 Exchange Bank of Columbus v.
Me. 170)
53
Hines (3 0. St. 1)
908, 962
Estey v. Starr (56 Vt. 690)
367 Exchange Bank, &c. (108 N. Y.
v. Westminster (97 Mass. 324) 542
660; 8 R. I. 375). [See
Estwick v. London (Sty. 43) 1063
New York National Ex-
Etherington v. Wilson (L. R. 1 Ch.
change Bank, &c.]
Div. 160)
278 Exeter v. Glide (4 Mod. 37)
337
Ethridge v. Hill (7 Porter, 47) 1090 v. Starre (2 Show. 158)
306
Eudora v. Miller (30 Kan. 494) 1247 Exeter Academy, &c. (58 N. H. 306).
Eufaula v. McNab (67 Ala. 588) 145, 529,
See Phillips Exeter Acad.
573, 670
Trs. &c.]
Eureka v. Davis (21 Kan. 578) 434 -Express Co., &c. (28 Iowa, 370).
Eureka Basin W. & M. Co, Re (96
See United States, &c.]
N. Y. 42)
896 Eyerly v. Jasper County (72 Iowa,
Eustace v. Johns (38 Cal. 3) 1262, 1274
149)
1029
Evan v. Avon (29 Beav. 44)
1100 Eyerman v. Blaksley (78 Mo. 145) 722,
Evans v. Erie County (66 Pa. St.
911
222)
797, 798, 800 Eyman v. People (6 Ill. 8)
1136
v. Evansville (23 Ind. 229) 753, 757
v. Job (8 Nev. 322)
84
v. Philadelphia Club (50 Pa. St.
107)
327,329, 335, 336
F.
v. Trenton (24 N. J. L. 764) 315, 316,
323 Faber v. St. Paul M. & M. Ry. Co.
v. Utica (89 N. Y. 166) 1261, 1263,
(29 Minn. 465)
857
1284 Facey v. Fuller (13 Mich. 527) 362
lxiv
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
S. 47)
Page
Page
Factors & Tr. Ins. Co. v. New Or- Fawcett v. Charles (13 Wend. 473) 329,
leans (25 La. An. 454) 1152
3:34
Fahey v. Harvard (62 Ill. 28) 1297, 1305 Fay, Re (15 Pick. 243) 152, 181, 1126,
Fair v. London & N. W. R. Co. (21
1129, 1130
L. T. R. (N. s.) 326)
1288 v. Davidson (13 Minn. 523) 1308
v. Moore (3 U. C. C. P. 484) 292, 525 v. Noble (12 Cush. 1)
184
v. Philadelphia (88 Pa. St. 309) 1320, Fayette v. Shafroth (25 Mo. 445) 507
1328 Fayette Co. Com’rs v. Chitwood (8
Fairbanks v. Fitchburg (132 Mass. 42) 989
Ind. 504)
377
2. Kerr (70 Pa. 86)
785 Fazakerly v. Wiltshire (1 Stra. 469) 412,
Fairchild v. Ogd., C. & R. R. Co. (15
421
N. Y. 337)
562, 565 Fazende v. Houston (34 Fed. R. 95) 522
Fairfield v. Gallatin County (100 U. Fearing v. Irwin (4 Daly, 385; 55
230
N. Y. 486)
794, 795
v. People (94 Ill. 244)
911 Fecheimer v. Louisville (84 Ky. 36) 904
v. Ratcliff (20 Iowa, 396) 940, 941 Feital v. Middlesex Ry. Co. (109
Fairport U. F. Sch. Bd. v. Fonda
Mass. 398)
1270
(77 N. Y. 350)
299 Feiten v. Milwaukee (47 Wis. 494) 713
Fallen v. Boston (3 Allen, 38) 1284 Feldman v. Charleston (23 S. C. 57) 234,
Fallick v. Barber (1 M. & S. 108) 209
895, 896
Falls 2. Cairo (58 Ill. 403) 1147, 1148, Fell v. State (42 Md. 71)
78, 417
1151, 1152 Fellowes ». New Haven (44 Conn.
Falmouth v. Watson (5 Bush, 660) 944
240)
1220
Fane's Case (Doug. 153)
328 Fellows v. Fayette Sch. Dist. (39 Me.
Fanning v. Gregoire (16 How. 524) 181,
559)
1148
522 v. Gilman (4 Wend. 414)
299
2. Osborne (102 N. Y. 441) 852 v. Walker (39 Fed. R. 651) 585, 1093
v. Wilson (34 Minn. 254) 212, 423 Feltmakers' Co. v. Davis (1 Bos. &
Faribault 2. Misener (20 Minn. 396) 939,
P. 98)
396, 483, 484
998 Felts v. Memphis (2 Head, 263) 659
Farmers' Loan & T. Co. v. Carroll (5 Fenelon's Petition (7 Pa. St. 175) 914
Barb. 613)
668 | Fennel v. Guelph (24 U.C. Q. B. 238) 411,
Farmington v. Pillsbury (114 U. S.
414, 461
138)
582, 1140 Fennimore v. New Orleans (20 La.
Farmington River W. P. Co. v. Berk-
An. 124)
1205
shire Co. Com’rs (112 Mass. Ferguson v. Chittenden Co. (6 Ark.
206)
1130
368
Farnsworth v. Boston (121 Mass.
v. Davis County (57 Iowa, 601) 1249
173)
712, 714, 1061, 1067 v. Earl Kinnoull (9 Cl. & F. 289) 340
v. Pawtucket (13 R. I. 82) 519 v. Selma (43 Ala. 398) 443, 450, 451
Farnum v. Concord (2 N. H. 592) 1173, Fernald 2. Boston (12 Cush. 574) 1231
1252, 1285 v. Lewis (6 Me. 264)
1172
Farr v. Lyons (13 Fed. R. 377) 561 Ferrenbach v. Davis County (57
Farrar v. Greene (32 Me. 574) 1263, 1264
Iowa, 601)
1249
v. St. Louis (80 Mo. 379) 912, 960, v. Turner (86 Mo. 416)
821
980 Ferson's Appeal (96 Pa. St. 140) 914
Farrell v. Bridgeport (45 Conn. 191) 294, Fertilizing Co., &c. (97 U. S. 659).
318
See Northwestern Fert.
King (41 Conn. 448)
372
Co., &c.]
v. London (12 U. C. Q. B. 343) 1139, Fetterly v. Russell (14 U. C. Q. B.
1140, 1204, 1329, 1331
433)
538
v. Oldtown (69 Me. 72) 1270, 1271, Field v. Carr (59 Ill. 198) 740, 744, 757,
1301
759
Farrelly v. Cincinnati (2 Disney
v. Coleman (5 Cush. 267)
223
(Ohio), 516)
1287 v. Commonwealth (32 Pa. St.
Farwell v. Cambridge (11 Gray, 413) 731
478)
319, 333, 1023
v. Smith (16 N. J. L. 133) 483 v. Des Moines (39 Iowa, 575) 1163,
Fash v. Third Av. R. Co. (1 Daly,
1164, 1188
148)
865 v. Girard College (54 Pa. St. 233) 290,
Faulkner v. Aurora (85 Ind. 130) 1205
334
Fauntleroy v. Hannibal (1 Dill. 118) 138 v. West Orange (36 N. J. Eq.
Faust v. Huntington (91 Ind. 493) 755
13, 19, 1322
Fauvia v. New Orleans (20 La. An. Fields v. Stokley (99 Pa. St. 306)
450,
410)
1167
473
479)
118)
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
lxy
387,
Page
Page
Fifth Nat. Bank of N. Y. v. N. Y. Fisher v. Boston (104 Mass. 87) 217, 1164,
Elev. R. Co. (24 Fed. R.
1166, 1195, 1199, 1201
114)
841, 875 v. Carpenter (36 Kan. 184) 759
Fifth Street, Re (17 Wend. 667) 1220 v. Charleston (17 W. Va. 595) 1032
Filbey v. Combe (2 M. & W. 677) 216 v. Graham (1 Cinc. 113)
408
Finch v. Temaha Co. Sup. (29 Cal.
v. Harrisburgh (2 Grant Cases,
455)
962
291) 396, 404, 412, 819, 986
v. Toledo Bd. of Ed. (30 O. St.
v. McGirr (1 Gray, 1) 212, 451, 487
37)
42, 1170, 1176 v. Prowse (2 Best & S. 770) 741, 745,
Findler v. San Francisco (13 Cal.
1312
534)
678 v. St. Louis (44 Mo. 482)
535
Fink v. Milwaukee (17 Wis. 26) 480, 482, v. Thirkell (21 Mich. 1) 833, 1310,
496
1311
v. Newark (40 N. J. L. 11)
719
v. Val de Travers Asphalte Co.
v. St. Louis (71 Mo. 452) 849, 1224,
(L. R. 1 C. P. D. 511) 1313
1304, 1315, 1331 v. Vaughan (10 U. C. Q. B. 492) 259,
Finley v. Dietrick (12 Iowa, 516) 1268
395
v. Philadelphia (32 Pa. St. 381) 964 Fisk v. Havana (88 Ill. 208)
752
Finnegan v. Fernandina (15 Fla.
v. Jefferson Par. Pol. Jury (116
379)
995
U. S. 131)
311, 1032, 1036
Finnell v. Kates (19 Ohio St. 405) 991 Fiske, Re (72 Cal. 125)
407, 473
Finney v. Oshkosh (18 Wis. 220) 556, 945, v. Hazzard (7 R. I. 438)
224
984 Fitch v. Pinckard (5 Ill. 76) 139, 147, 485,
Fire Department v. Helfenstein (16
944, 961
Wis. 136)
426, 910 Fitz v. Boston (4 Cush. 365)
1255
v. Kip (10 Wend. 267) 77, 139 Fitzacherly v. Wiltshire (11 Mod.
v. Wright (3 E. D. Smith, 478) 903
353)
487
First Bap. Church in Schen. v. Utica Fitzgerald v. Berlin (51 Wis. 81) 1258,
& S. R. Co. (6 Barb. 313) 780,
1265
781 v. Weston (52 Wis. 354)
1287
First Cong. Soc. of South. v. Atwater Fitzgibbon v. Toronto (25 U.C. Q. B.
(23 Conn. 34)
668
137)
789
First Eccl. Soc. of H. v. Hartford (38 Fitzhugh v. Custer (4 Tex. 391) 1062
Conn. 274)
1147 Fitzsimmons v. Brooklyn (102 N. Y.
First Evangel. Church Trs. v. Walsh
536)
319
(57 Ill. 363) 444, 744, 752 Flagg v. Hudson (142 Mass. 280) 1262
First Meth. E. Church So. v. Atlanta
v. Palmyra (33 Mo. 440) 618, 643,
(76 Ga. 181)
925
1028, 1031
First Municipality, &c. (See Muni-
v. Worcester (13 Gray, 601) 1315,
cipality No. 1, &c.]
1219, 1231, 1316, 1320, 1321,
First Nat. Bank of A. v. Americus
1328, 1334
(68 Ga. 119) 1145, 1150, 1154 Flanagan v. Plainfield (44 N. J. L.
First Nat. Bank of Charlotte v. Nat.
118)
181, 425
Exch. Bank of Balt. (92 U. Flanagan's Adm. v. Wilmington (4
S. 122)
1139
Houst. 548)
1143
First Nat. Bank of Louisville v. Com- Flanders v. Norwood (141 Mass. 17) 1251
monwealth (9 Wall. 353) 902 Flatbush, Re (60 N. Y. 398) 106, 126, 700,
First Nat. Bank of Shawneetown v.
1011
Cook (77 Ill. 622)
1107 Flatbush Avenue, Re (1 Barb. 286) 920
First Parish in Sudbury, &c. (21 Pick. Fleckner v. U. S. Bank (8 Wheat.
148). (See Sudbury First
338)
522
Par., &c.]
Fleishel v. Hightower (62 Ga. 324) 674
First Parish in Sutton, &c. (3 Pick. Fleming, Re (4 Hill, 581)
1005
232). (See Sutton First
V. Appleton (55 Wis. 90)
1142
Par., &c.]
v. Manchester (44 L. T. (N. s.)
First Presb. Church of Ft. W. v. Ft.
517)
1328
Wayne (36 Ind. 338) 938, 956 v. Mershon (37 Iowa, 413) 1113, 1119
Fish v. Rochester (6 Paige, 268) 817 v. Shenandoah (71 Iowa, 456) 1287
v. Weatherwax (2 Johns. Cas. Fleming's Appeal (65 Pa. St. 444) 219
217)
310, 1019 Flemingsburg v. Wilson (1 Bush, 203) 783
Fisher v. Attleboro Sch. Dist. (4 Fletcher v. Auburn & S. R. Co. (25
Cush. 494)
359, 541
Wend. 462)
792, 842, 854
v. Beard (32 Iowa, 346) 744, 757 v. Lowell (15 Gray, 103)
292
v. Beard 40 Iowa, 625)
763 v. Oshkosh (18 Wis. 228)
556, 945
VOL. I.
- e
lxvi
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
Page
426
Page
Fletcher v. Peck (6 Cranch, 87) 115, 319 Ford v. Santa Cruz R. Co. (59 Cal.
Flewellyn v. Webster (6 U. C. Q. B.
290)
841, 842
(o. s.) 586)
259 v. Williams (13 N. Y. 577) 526
Flint v. Clinton Co. (12 N. H. 430) 679 Foreman v. Canterbury (L. R. 6 Q. B.
v. Russell (5 Dillon, 151) 449, 455
214) 1202, 1203, 1269, 1282, 1294
Flint River Steamboat Co. v, Foster
v. Marianna (43 Ark. 324) 264
(5 Ga. 194)
479 Forest Park Case (58 Mo. 175). [See
Florence, Re (78 Ala. 419)
487
St. Louis County, &c.]
Flori v. St. Louis (69 Mo. 341) 1170, 1172, Forristal v. People (3 Ill. App. 470) 304
1177 Forster v. Forster (4 B. & S. 187) 1057
Flournoy v. Jeffersonville (17 Ind. Forsyth v. Atlanta (45 Ga. 152) 1160
169)
556, 993, 996 v. Kreuter (100 Ind. 27)
979
Flower v. Adams (2 Taunt. 314) 1264 v. Wheeling (19 W. Va. 318) 803
Floyd v. Eatonton Com’rs (14 Ga. Forsythe v. Hooper (11 Allen, 419) 1307
354) 479, 492, 496, 499, 507 Fort Dodge v. Moore (37 Iowa, 388) 950
v. Gilbreath (27 Ark. 675) 1107 Fort Edward & Ft. M. Pl. R. Co. v.
v. Turner (23 Tex. 293)
718
Payne (17 Barb. 567)
789
Floyd Acceptances (7 Wall. 666) 562, 606, Fort Smith v. Ayers (43 Ark. 82)
615, 649 v. Dodson (46 Ark. 296)
418
Floyd County v. Rome Street Ry.
v. McKibbin (41 Ark. 45) 659, 755,
Co. (77 Ga. 614) 833, 868
798
Floyd Co. Com’rs v. Day (19 Ind. Fort Wayne v. Cody (43 Ind. 197) 814
450)
185, 562, 566, 677 v. Coombs (107 Ind. 75) 1297, 1332
Flynn v. Canton County (40 Md. 312)
v. Dewitt (47 Ind. 391) 1281, 1298
1158, 1262, 1273 v. Jackson (7 Blackf. 36)
262
Fogg v. Nahant (98 Mass. 578) 1263, v. Lehr (88 Ind. 62)
529
1278 v. Rosenthal (75 Ind. 156) 514
v. Nahant (106 Mass. 278) 1263, 1284 1. Shoaff (106 Ind. 66)
912
Foley v. Haverhill (144 Mass. 352) 1127, Fort Worth v. Crawford (64 Tex.
1145
202)
1164
v. Passaic (26 N. J. Eq. 216) 1093 v. Davis (57 Tex. 225)
944
Folkenson v. Easton Bor. (116 Pa. St. Fort Worth Street Ry. Co. v. Rosen-
528)
814, 1244
dale S. Ry. Čo. 68 Tex. 169) 860
Follett v. People (12 N. Y. 273) 881 Fortin v. East Hampton (145 Mass.
Follman v. Mankato (35 Minn. 522) 1286
196)
1297
v. New Orleans (109 U. S. 285) 1168 | Fortune v. St. Louis (23 Mo. 539) 161
Follmer v. Nuckolls Co. Com'rs (6 Forward v. Bartels (7 U. C.C. P.533) 279
Neb. 204)
544, 1111 Fosdick v. Perrysburg (14 O. St. 472) 236
Folsom, Re (56 N. Y. 60)
959
237, 946
v. New Orleans (109 U. S. 285) 1168 Foss v. Chicago (56 Ill. 354) 957, 958, 994
v. School Directors (91 Ill. 402) 185 Fossett v. Bearce (29 Me. 523) 347, 371
v. Underhill (36 Vt. 580) 760, 1300 Foster v. Brown (55 Iowa, 686) 435
Fond du Lac v. Moore (58 Wis. 170) 300 v. Callaway Co. (3 Dillon C. C.
Fonda v. Canal Appr. (i Wend. 288) 1129
201)
631
Foot v. Bronson (4 Lans. 47) 1321 v. Coleman (10 Cal. 278)
567
v. Prowse (1 Str. 625) 301, 302, 304 v. Fowler (60 Pa. St. 27) 91, 673,
v. Prowse (3 Bro. P. C. 169) 301
674, 675
Foote v. Cincinnati (11 Ohio, 408) 78 v. Kansas (112 U. S. 201) 213, 1089,
v. Johnson County (5 Dillon
1095
C. C. 208, 281) 584, 636, 650 v. Kenosha (12 Wis. 616) 86, 120, 584
v. Milwaukee (18 Wis. 270) 556, 1122 v. Lane (30 N. H. 305)
44
v. Pike County (101 U. S. 688) 594 v. McKibben (14 Pa. St. 168) 325
v. Salem (14 Allen, 487)
208 v. Rhoads (19 Johns. 191)
422
Fopper v. Wheatland (59 Wis. 623) 1255 2. St. Louis (4 Mo. App. 564) 1224
Force v. Batavia (61 Ill. 99) 239, 277, 280, v. St. Louis (71 Mo. 157) 1319, 1327
638 v. Scarf (15 0. St. 535)
277
Forcheimer . Mobile (4 So. R. 113) 473 v. Shaw (7 S. & R. 163)
274
Ford, Re (6 Lans. 92)
956, 984 Fotherby v. Metrop. Ry. Co. (L. R.
v. Chicago & N. W. Co. R. Co.
2 C. P. C. 196)
712
(14 Wis. 609) 842, 850, 854, 868 Fourth Avenue, Re (4 Wend. 452) 920
v. Clough (8 Me. 334)
53 Fowle v. Alexandria (3 Peters, 398) 141,
v. Hart (L. R. 9 C. P. 273) 279
1159, 1161, 1174
v. New York (63 N. Y. 640) 519 Fowler, Re (53 N. Y. 60)
703, 819
v. Pye (L. R. 9 C. P. 269) 279 v. Pierce (2 Cal. 165)
1016, 1070
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
lxvii
Page
Page
Fowler v. St. Joseph (37 Mo. 228) 1123 French v. Quincy (3 Allen, 9) 210, 211,
v. Strickland (107 Mass. 552) 583
662, 672, 764, 773
Fox v. Glastenbury (29 Conn. 204) 1300 v. Springwells H. Com'rs (12
v. Hart (11 Ohio, 414)
801
Mich. 267)
714
v. Northern Liberties (3 W. & S.
v. Teschemaker (24 Cal. 518) 235
103)
1190 Frend v. Dennett (4 C. B. (N. s.) 576) 443,
v. Rockford (38 III. 451)
807
521
v. Sackett (1) Allen, 535) 1300 Frewin v. Lewis (4 Myl. & C. 249) 1099,
v. State (5 How. 410)
440
1118
Fox's Will (52 N. Y. 530; 94 U. S. Friday v. Floyd (63 III. 50) 223, 419
315)
661 Frisbie v. Clarksville (78 Ind. 269) 1026
[See also Philadelphia v. Fox Frith v. Dubuque (45 Iowa, 406) 854
(64 Pa. St. 169). ]
Fritsch v. Allegheny (20 A. L. J.
Francis v. Cockrell (L. R. 5 Q. B. 184) 179
373)
1255, 1269, 1282
v. Troy (74 N. Y. 338) 146, 520, 521 Fritz v. Hobson (19 Am. L. Reg.
Franey v. Miller (11 Pa. St. 435) 738
(n. 8.) 615) 447, 777, 795, 886
Frank, Re (52 Cal. 606) 147, 399, 401, v. Hobson (L. R. 14 Ch. Div. 542) 878,
404, 425, 905
886
v. San Francisco Sup. (21 Cal. Frolickstein z. Mobile (40 Ala. 725) 468
668)
141, 1032 Fronımer v. Richmond (31 Gratt. 646) 428
Frankford & Phila. Pass. R. Co. v. Frost v. Belmont (6 Allen, 152) 1101,
Philadelphia (58 Pa. St. 119) 425,
1115
427, 862, 863, 864 v. Chester (5 E. & B. 531) 304, 1022
Frankfort v. Aughe (15 N. E. R. 802) 482 v. Leatherman (55 Mich. 33) 944
Frankfort Br. Co. v. Frankfort (18
v. Waltham (12 Allen, 85) 1265, 1285,
B. Mon. 41)
533, 538
1300
Franklin v. Fisk (13 Allen, 211) 1320 Fry, Re (3 Mackey, 135)
508
v. Maberry (6 Humph. 368) 921, 927 V. Albemarle County (
Va.
v. S. E. Ry. Co. (3 H. & N. 211) 1288
(1889]
1174
Franklin Co. Com’rs v. Lathrop (9
v. Booth (19 O. St. 25)
281
Kan. 453) 740, 764, 771, 788 v. Montgomery Co. Com’rs (82
Franklin Tp. Trs. v. State (11 Ind.
N. C. 304)
1032
205)
1009 Fry's Election (71 Pa. 302)
279
Franklin Wharf Co. v. Portland (67 Fullam v. Brookfield (9 Allen, 1)
Me. 46) 176, 448, 885, 1204, 1330
527, 528
Frazee, Re (63 Mich. 396) 396, 412, 438 Fuller, Re (25 Ark. 261)
1057
Frazier v. Warfield (13 Md. 279) 151, 464 v. Atlanta (66 Ga. 80) 1217, 1222
Freburg v. Davenport (63 Iowa, 119) 1323 v. Chicago (89 III. 282)
204
Frederick v. Augusta C. Council (5
v. Edings (11 Rich. L. 239) 166
Ga. 561) 134, 237, 472, 962, 1119 v. Groton (14 Gray, 340)
220
v. Groshen (20 Md. 436)
1111 v. Heath (89 III. 296)
204
Frederick Co. v. Winchester (5 So. Fulliam v. Muscatine (30 N. W. R.
E. R. 844)
766
861)
1266, 1279, 1286
Fredericktown v. Fox (84 Mo. 59) 75 Fulton v. Davenport (17 Iowa, 404) 973,
Freedom v. Ward (40 Me. 383) 883
974
Freeholders of A. County, &c. (See
v. Dover (6 Cent. R. 848)
760
A. Co. Freeh. &c.
v. Lincoln (9 Neb. 358) 146, 520, 546,
Freeland v. Hastings (10 Allen, 570) 224,
945
234 v. Mehrenfield (8 0. St. 440) 738, 739
v. Muscatine (9 Iowa, 461) 1231 Fulton Co. Sup. 2. Miss. & W. R. Co.
Freeman v. Cornwall (10 Johns. 470) 324
(21 Ill. 338)
239
Freeport v. Bristol (9 Pick. 46) 696 Fulton Iron Works v. Kimball (52
v. Isbell (83 Ill. 440) 1257, 1268
Mich. 146)
882
v. Marks (59 Pa. St. 253) 390, 391 Fulweiler v. St. Louis (61 Mo. 479) 499
Fremont Build. Assoc. v. Sherwin Furman v. Knapp (19 Johns. 248 947
(6 Neb. 48)
578 v. New York (5 Sandf. 16; 10
French v. Boston (129 Mass. 592) 1252
N. Y. 567)
114, 177
v. Brunswick (21 Me. 29) 1256, 1270 v. Nichol (8 Wall. 44)
118
v. Burlington (42 Iowa, 614) 202, 207 Furman Street, Re (17 Wend. 649) 263,
v. Cowan (79 Me. 426) 1010, 1078
729, 730, 758, 814
v. Edwards (13 Wall. 511) 347 | Furnell v. Cotes (19 O. St. 405) 709
v. Milwaukee (49 Wis. 584) 1227 v. St. Paul (20 Minn. 117) 1272, 1281,
v. New Orleans & C. R. Co. (2
1283, 1297, 1301
La. An. 80)
768
525,
lxviii
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
G.
Page
Page Gano v. State (10 O. St. 237)
1090
Gabler v. Elizabeth (42 N. J. L. 79) 929 Garden City v. Abbott (34 Kan. 283) 394
Gabriel v. Clerke (Cro. Eliz. 76) 808 v. Johnston (12 Atl. R. 888) 760
Gachet v. McCall (50 Ala. 307) 1151 Gardiner v. Boston & Wor. R. Corp.
Gaddis v. Richland County (92 Ill.
(9 Cush. 1)
851
119)
235, 239 Gardiner Cotton & W. F. Co. v. Gar-
Gaffney v. Gough (36 Cal. 104)
1002
diner (5 Me. 133)
964
Gafney v. San Francisco (72 Cal. Gardner v. Boston (106 Mass. 549) 986
146)
815 v. Haney (86 Ind. 17) 561, 635
Gage v. Graham (57 Ill. 144)
906 v. Newburgh Trs. (2 Johns. Ch.
Gager v. Chippewa Co. Sup. (47 Mich.
162)
697, 701,716, 1317
167)
1126 v. Ogden (22 N. Y. 327)
514
Gahagan v. Boston & L. R. Co. (1 Allen
v. State (21 N. J. L. 557) 948, 967
(Mass.) 187)
858 Garland v. Towne (55 N. H. 55) 785, 1262,
Galbraith v. Littiech (73 Ill. 209) 574
1276
Galbreath v. Armour (4 Bell App. C. Garnett v. Jacks. St. A. & H. Ry. Co.
374)
821, 834, 860
(20 Fla. 889)
787
v. Moberly (80 Mo. 484)
313 Garnier v. St. Louis (37 Mo. 554) 312
Gale v. Kalamazoo (23 Mich. 344) 155, Garrett v. Janes (65 Md. 266) 889, 890
157, 429, 439, 457, 458, 459, 524, v. Memphis (5 Fed. R. 860) 250
1360 v. St. Louis (25 Mo. 505) 723, 925,
v. Mead (2 Denio, 160)
324
933, 955
v. South Berwick (51 Me. 174) 208 v. State (49 N. J. L. 94)
454
Galena v. Amy (5 Wall. 705) 118, 585, Garrigus v. Parke Co. Com’rs (39
1028, 1032, 1033, 1042
Ind. 66)
240
v. Corwith (48 Ill. 423) 193, 194, 199, Garrison v. Chicago (7 Biss. 480) 153,
511, 564
199, 823
Galesburg v. Hawkinson (75 Ill. 152) 40, v. New York (21 Wall. 196) 712, 714
264, 265 Gartside v. East St. Louis (43 Ill. 47) 811,
v. Aigley (61 Ill. 287)
1305
1093
Gall v. Cincinnati (18 O. St. 563) 456, Garvey, Re (77 N. Y. 523) 146, 520, 961
457, 751, 814 Garvie v. Hartford (54 Conn. 440) 102, 311
Gallagher v. St. Paul (28 Fed. R. Garvin v. Daussman (114 Ind. 429) 983
305)
1267 v. Wells (8 Iowa, 286)
481
Gallerie v. Lowell (144 Mass. 491) 1252 Gas Co. v. &c. (See the fol-
Gallia Co. Com’rs v. Holcomb (7 Ohio,
lowing plaintiff gas com-
Pt. 1, 232)
147, 883
panies which, in citing, may
Galliard v. Laxton (2 B. & S. 363) 295
not always have been fully
Galloway v. Chatham R. Co. (63 N.
named : Parkersburg Gas
C. 147)
1119
Co. &c. (30 W. Va. 435)
v. Corbitt (52 Mich. 460) 1131
San Francisco, &c. (6 Cal.
v. London (L. R. 1 H. L. 34)
659,
190; 9 Cal. 453), West
1097
Chester, &c. (30 Pa. St.
Gallup v. Tracy (25 Conn. 60) 131
232).]
Galveston v. Barbour (62 Tex. 172) 1180, Gaskill v. Dudley (6 Met. (Mass.)
1287, 1297
546)
1027, 1172
v. Heard (54 Tex. 420) 558, 911, 984, Gaskin's Case (8 D. & E. T. R. 209) 333
990 Gaskins v. Atlanta (73 Ga. 746) 1268
v. Loonie (54 Tex. 517)
512 Gass v. Greenville (4 Sneed, 62) 464
v. Menard (23 Tex. 349) 170, 177,798, v. State (34 Ind. 425)
281, 285
801, 803 Gassett v. Andover (25 Vt. 342) 533
v. Morton (58 Tex. 409)
539 Gatch v. Des Moines (63 Iowa, 718) 919
v. Posnainsky (62 Tex. 118) 1179, Gates v. Delaware County (12 Iowa,
1180, 1249, 1252
405)
307, 309
v. Williams (6 So. W. R. 860)
758
v. Hancock (45 N. H. 528) 542
Galveston City Co. v. Galveston (56 Gatling v. Carteret Com’rs (92 N. C.
Tex. 486)
1148, 1149
536)
995
Galveston R. Co. v. Fuller (63 Tex. Gault's Appeal (34 Pa. St. 95) 1002
467)
1224 Gaunt v. Fynney (L. R. 8 Ch. Ap. 8) 446
Galveston Wharf Co, v. Galveston Gause v. Clarksville (5 Dillon C. C.
(63 Tex. 14) 168, 949, 950
165)190, 192, 193, 194, 1140, 1144
Galway Sup. v. Stimson (4 Hill, 136) 320 v. Clarksville (1 Fed. R. 363) 636
Gamble v. St. Louis (12 Mo. 617) 755 Gavin v. Chicago (97 Ill. 66)
1283
Gannon v. Hargadon (10 Allen, 106) 1320 | Gay v. Bradstreet (39 Me. 580) 714
.
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
lxix
Page
Page
Gay v. Cadby (L. R. 2 C. P. Div. Gibson v. Preston (L. R. 5 Q. B.
391)
216
218)
1206, 1214
v. Mut. Union Tel. Co. (12 Mo. Gibson Tp. Ov. Poor v. Nicholson
App. 485)
831
Tp. Ov. Poor (2 S. & R.
Gayle v. Owen Co. Ct. (83 Ky. 61) 1019
422)
272
Gearhart v. Dixon (1 Pa. St. 224) 376, Giesy v. Cinc., W. & C. R. Co. (4 0.
380, 945
St. 308)
703, 731, 734
Gebhardt v. Reeves (75 Ill. 301) 738, 739, Gifford v. N. J. R. & Transp. Co. (10
747, 773
N. J. Eq. 171)
1109
Geddis v. Bann Reservoir (L. R. 3 Gilbert v. Boston (139 Mass. 313) 1255
App. C. 455)
1215 v. Luce (11 Barb. 91)
308
Gedge v. Commonwealth, (9 Bush, 61)
v. New Haven (40 Conn. 102) 375,
760, 762
534
Gee v. Lancashire & Y. R. Co. (6 H.
v. Roxbury /100 Mass. 185) 1261
& N. 211
1288 v. Showerman (23 Mich. 448) 449
v. Metropolitan Ry. (L. R. 8
v. Trinity House (L. R. 17 Q. B.
Q. B. 177)
1264, 1300
D. 795)
1158
v. Wilden (Lutw. 1320)
476 Gilbert Elev. R. Co., Re (70 N. Y.
Geiger v. Filor (8 Fla. 325) 166, 833, 846
361) 386, 778, 788, 819, 838, 861,
Gelpcke . Dubuque (1 Wall. 175) 196,
872
226, 236, 250, 560, 581, 582, 583, Gilchrist v. Garden (26 U. C. C. P.1)
584, 586, 593, 614, 617, 635, 645
1258
Geneseo T. H. Com’rs v. Harper (38
v. Little Rock (1 Dillon C. C.
Ill. 103)
1126
261)
579, 649
Geneva v. Cole (61 Ill. 397) 76, 997 v. Schmidling (12 Kan. 263) 419
Geneva, The (16 Fed. R. 874) 165, 172 Gilchrist's Appeal (109 Pa. St. 600) 263,
Geneva Col. Med. Inst. v. Patterson
264, 963
(1 Denio, 61)
76 | Gilder v. Brenham (67 Tex. 345) 752, 758,
Genois v. Lockett (13 La. 545) 292, 1097
761
v. St. Paul (35 Minn. 330) 814, 1225 Gildersleeve v. Alexander (2 Speers,
Gentile v. State (29 Ind. 409)
84
298)
278
George v. Oxford Tp. (16 Kan. 72) 280 Giles's Case (2 Stra. 881)
1014
Georgetown Street Com’rs v. Taylor Giles v. Sanbornton Sch. Dist. (31
(2 Bay, 282)
762, 801
N. H. 304)
44, 278, 347
Gerard v. Cook (2 Bos. & P. 109) 888 Gilfeather v. Council Bluffs (69 Iowa,
Gerberling v. Wunnenberg (51 Iowa,
310)
1318, 1323
125)
755 | Gilham v. Wells (64 Ga. 192)
396, 433
German Bank v. Brenham (35 Fed. Gilkerson v. Frederick Jus. (13 Gratt.
R. 185)
127
(Va.) 577)
909, 919, 970
German Sav. Bank v. Franklin Gilkey v. Watertown (141 Mass. 317)
County (128 U. S. 526) 586, 587,
1127
595, 599, 622, 623, 626, 627, 631, Gill v. Brown (12 Johns. 385)
323
634, 637, 638, 647 Gillery v. Madison (63 Wis. 510) 1330
German Theol. School v. Dubuque Gillespie v. Forrest (18 Hun, 110) 787
(64 Iowa, 736)
1328 Gillett v. Lyon Co. Com’rs (18 Kan.
Germania, The, v. State (7 Md. 1) 424,
410)
1175
970 Gillette v. Hartford (31 Conn. 351) 975
Gerry v. Stoneham (1 Allen, 319) 222, 347 | Gillison v. Charleston (13 W. Va.
Getchell v. Benedict (57 Iowa, 121) 755,
282)
1322
762 Gilluly v. Madison (63 Wis. 518)
Ghenn v. Provincetown (105 Mass.
1335
313)
1270, 1283, 1296 Gilman v. Deerfield (15 Gray, 577) 1284
Gibbes v. Beaufort (20 S. C. 213) 180, v. Laconia (55 N. H. 130) 1172, 1173,
1180
1317, 1330
Gibbons v. Dist. Columbia (116 U. S.
v. Milwaukee (61 Wis. 588) 145, 770
404)
902 v. Sheboygan (2 Black, 510) 120, 121,
v. Mobile & G. N. R. Co. (36 Ala.
898, 910, 942, 962
410)
208, 225
v. Waterville (59 Me. 491) 1147
0. Sheppard, (65 Pa. St. 20) 1127 Gilmer v. Atlanta (77 Ga. 688) 1298
Gibbs v. Liverpool Docks (3 H. & N.
v. Lime Point (18 Cal. 229; 19
164)
179
Cal. 47)
697, 708
Giboney v. Cape Girardeau (58 Mo. Gilmore v. Fox (10 Kan. 509) 1122
141)
267, 975
v. Hentig (33 Kan. 156)
987
Gibson o. Bailey (9 N. H. 168) 371 v. Holt (4 Pick. 258)
222
1334,
lxx
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
.
450)
Page
Pago
Gilmore v. Lewis (12 Ohio, 281) 219, 215, Goodale v. Fennell (27 O. St. 426) 118,
317
120
v. Norton (10 Kan. 491)
82 v. Tuttle (29 N. Y. 459) 1316, 1323
v. Pope (5 Mass. 491)
321 Goodall v. Milwaukee (5 Wis. 32) 814,
Girard v. Philadelphia (7 Wall. 1) 93,
1227
105, 106, 135, 140, 141, 246, 252, Goodel v. Baker (8 Cow. 286)
350
255, 257, 260, 267, 656, 662, 664 Goodell, Re (14 Johns. 325)
1012
Girard's Heirs v. New Orleans (2 La.
v. Jackson (20 Johns. 706) 656
An. 897)
660, 662, 666 Goodenow v. Buttrick (7 Mass. 140) 142
Girard Pt. S. Co. v. Southwark Foun- Goodfellow v. New York (100 N. Y.
dry Co. (105 Pa. St. 251) 673
15)
1297
Girard Will Case (2 How. 127) 669 Goodin v. Cinc. & W. Canal Co. (18
Given v. Des Moines (70 Iowa, 637) 815
0. St. 169)
729
Givens v. Van Studdiford (86 Mo. Goodloe v. Cincinnati (4 Ohio, 500) 1226
149)
145 Goodman v. Harvey (4 A. & E. 870) 582
Glantz v. South Bend (106 Ind. 305) 1293 v. Simonds (20 How. 343) 583
Glasby v. Morris (18 N. J. Eq. 72) 819, Goodnough v. Oshkosh (24 Wis. 549)
821
1301
Glascock v. Lyons (20 Ind. 1) 319 | Goodnow v. Ramsey Co. Com’rs (11
Glasgow v. Rowse (43 Mo. 479) 895, 909
Minn. 31)
562, 563
v. St. Louis (87 Mo. 678) 769 Goodrich v. Brown (30 Iowa, 291) 481,
Glass v. White (5 Sneed, 475) 974
507
Glastenbury v. McDonald (44 Vt.
v. Chicago (20 Ill. 445) 153, 158, 1013,
568
1158
Glencoe v. People (78 Ill. 382) 276, 1014, v. Detroit (12 Mich. 279) 201, 512,
1019, 1057, 1065, 1066
556, 557
Glenn v. Baltimore (67 Md. 390) 752 v. Milwaukee (24 Wis. 422) 1227
Glidden v. Unity (30 N. H. 104) 159 v. Omaha (10 Neb. 98)
1222
v. Unity (33 N. H. 571)
322 Goodson v. Des Moines (66 Iowa,
Glossop v. Heston & I. Local Bd. (L.
255)
1297
R. 12 Ch. D. 102) 1005, 1320, Goodtitle v. Alker (1 Burr. 133) 746, 791,
1326
816
Gloucester v. Osborn (1 H. L. Cas.
v. Alker (1 Kenyon, 427)
816
285)
663 Goodwin, Re (U. C. C. P. 254) 260
Glover v. Manhattan Ry. Co. (19 J.
v. Des Moines (55 Iowa, 671) 1267,
& S. 1)
874
1312
v. No. Staffordshire Ry. Co. (16
v. McGehee (15 Ala. 233)
676
Q. B. 912)
688 v. Robarts (L. R. 1 App. Cas.
Gloversville v. Howell (70 N. Y. 287) 78,
476)
582
386 Goodwine v. State (81 Ind. 109) 301
Godchaux v. Carpenter (19 Nev. 415) Gordon v. Appeal Tax (3 How. U. S.
707
133)
968
Goddard, Re (16 Pick. 504) 143, 467, 480, v. Baltimore (5 Gill, 231). 953, 968,
496
997, 1147, 1151
2. Jacksonville (15 Ill. 588) 432, 434 v. Dearborn Co. Com’rs (52 Ind.
13. Smithett (3 Gray, 116) 1075
322)
549
Goddin v. Crump (8 Leigh, 120) 225, 898 v. Farrar (2 Doug. 411)
326
Godfrey v. Alton (12 III. 29) 740, 748, 768 v. Preston (1 Watts, 385)
676
v. Claflin (21 Pick. 1)
1152 v. Richmond (83 Va. 436) 1268
Goelet v. Newport Bd. of Ald. (14 R.
v. Taunton (126 Mass. 349) 1187
754 | Gorgier v. Mierville (3 B. & C. 45) 582
Goetler v. State (45 Ark. 454) 439 Gorham v. Campbell (2 Cal. 135)
282
Gold v. Philadelphia (115 Pa. St. 184) 885 v. Cooperstown (59 N. Y. 660) 1269,
Goldschmidt v. New Orleans (5 La.
1296
An. 436)
566 v. Springfield (21 Me. 58) 77, 267, 271
Goldsmid v. Tunbridge Wells Impr. Goring v. McTaggart (92 Ind. 200) 1000
Com’rs (L. R. 1 Eq. 161) 452 Gorman v. Low (2 Edw. Ch. 324) 420
Goldsmith v. New Orleans (31 La. Goshen v. Croxton (34 Ind. 239) 480, 482
646)
434 v. Kern (63 Ind. 468)
426, 468
Goldthwaite v. East Bridgewater (5
v. Myers (119 Ind. 196) 1247, 1281
Gray, 61)
1255 Goshorn v. Ohio Co. Sup. (1 W. Va.
v. Montgomery C. Council (50
308)
237
Ala. 486)
483, 510, 970 Gosling v. Veley (19 L. J. Q. B. (N. 8)
Gooch v. Gregory (65 N. C. 142, 673, 675
135)
387
I. 295)
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
lxxi
1293,
Page
Page
Gospel Soc. v. Pawlet (4 Pet. 480) 76, Grand Rapids & I. R. Co. v. Heisel
140
(47 Mich. 393)
852, 868
v. Young (2 N. H. 310)
258 Grand Rapids El. L. & P. Co. v. G.
Gosport v. Evans (112 Ind. 133) 1285
R. Edison El. L. & F. G. Co.
Gosselin v. Chicago (103 Ill. 623) 739
(33 Fed. R. 659) 149, 405, 777,
Gosselink v. Campbell (4 Iowa, 296) 419,
808, 823, 828, 829
422 Grand Rapids, N. & L. S. R. Co. v.
Goszler v. Georgetown (6 Wheat.
Gray (38 Mich. 461)
494
593) 157, 212, 812, 813, 1220, Grand Surry Canal Co. v. Hall (1 M.
1222, 1225
& G. 392)
751, 800
Gottschalk v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Granger v. Avery (64 Me. 292) 261
Co. (14 Neb. 550) 1222, 1243 . Buffalo (6 Abb. N. Cas. 238) 900
Goudier v. Cormack (2 E. D. Smith
v. Pulaski County (26 Ark. 37) 1173,
25+)
1307
1245
Gould v. Atlanta (60 Ga. 164) 1189 | Grant v. Brooklyn (41 Barb. 381)
v. Baltimore (59 Md. 378) 956, 961
1331
v. Booth (66 N. Y. 62) 1316, 1317, v. Courter (24 Barb. 232)
86
1320, 1323, 1333 v. Davenport (18 Iowa, 179) 169, 170,
v. Gapper (5 East, 345)
1132
176, 177, 680, 759, 768
v. Hudson River R. Co. (6 N. Y.
v. Davenport (36 Iowa, 396) 202, 203,
522)
170
205, 206, 513, 823, 967, 1110,
v. Paris (68 Tex. 511) 198, 200, 203,
1113
v. Raymond (59 N. H. 260) 224, 386 v. Erie (69 Pa. 420) 158, 217, 1158,
v. Rochester (105 N. Y. 46) 448
1199, 1320, 1328
v. Sterling (23 N. Y. 439) 226, 235, v. Fancher (5 Cow. 309)
321
238, 560, 584, 615, 644 v. Sligo Harbor Com’rs (L. R. 11
v. Taylor Orphan As. (46 Wis.
Ir. C. L. 190)
1302
106)
657 v. Stillwater (35 Minn. 242) 884
v. Topeka (32 Kan. 485) 784, 1278 Grant Co. Com’rs v. Bradford (72
Goundie v. Northampton W. Co. (7
Ind. 455)
209, 553
Pa. St. 233)
670 Grassick v. Toronto (39 U. C. Q. B.
Gourley v. Allen (5 Cow. 644) 1014, 1017
306)
1240
v. Hankins (2 Iowa, 75)
679 Graves v. Colby (9 Ad. & E. 356) 484
Govan v. Jackson (32 Ark. 553) 283 v. Cole (3 Dak. Ter. 301) 1058
Governor v. Allen (8 Humph. 176) 55 v. Otis (2 Hill (N. Y.) 466) 1220
v. Clark Co. Inf Ct. Jus. (19 Ga.
v. Shattuck (35 N. H. 257) 885
97)
1174 Gray v. Brooklyn (10 Abb. Pr. (N. 8.)
v. McEwen (5 Humph. 241) 95
186)
95, 103, 110, 1167
v. Plummer (2 Humph. 500) 55 v. Danbury Bor. (54 Conn. 574) 1293
Governor & Co. &c. (4 D. & E. T. R.
v. Iowa Land Co. (26 Iowa, 387) 776,
790). (See British C. Plate
794, 795
Co. &c.
v. Knoxville (85 Tenn. 99) 1217, 1223
Goyne v. Ashley County (31 Ark.
v. Pullen (5 B. & S. 970, 980) 1299
552)
567 v. Pullen (32 L. J. R. (N. s.) Q.
Graff v. Baltimore (10 Md. 544) 713, 714
B. 169)
1307
Graffins v. Commonwealth (3 P. &
v. Rollingsford (58 N. H.)
322
W. 502)
322 v. St. Paul & Pac. R. Co. (13
Graffty v. Rushville (107 Ind. 502)
905
Minn. 315)
842
Graham v. Carondelet (33 Mo. 262) 351, v. Sheldon (8 Vt. 402)
263
373, 408
v. State (2 Harring. 76) 492, 507
v. Greenville (67 Tex. 62) 207 Grayville v. Whittaker (85 Ill. 439) 1246
v. Parliam (32 Ark. 676) 1043 Great Falls Bank v. Farmington (41
v. State (1 Ark. 171)
492
N. H. 32)
562, 564
Granby v. Thurston (23 Conn. 416) 47, Great Western R. Co. of 1859 v. De-
264, 270
catur (33 III. 381)
852, 858
Grand Chute v. Winegar (15 Wall. Great Western Railway Co., Re (23
355) 577, 593, 614, 617, 618, 619
U. C. C. P. 28)
391, 392
Grand Rapids v. Blakely (40 Mich. Greaves v. Newfoundland Co. (23 L.
367)
1146
T. 53)
717
v. Gr. Rap. & Ind. R. Co. (58
v. Jacksonville (17 Fla. 174) 891
Mich. 641)
708 Greeley v. Maine Cent. R. Co. (53 Me.
v. Hughes (15 Mich. 54) 412, 414, 510,
200)
1320
809 v. People (60 III. 19)
54, 722
v. Wyman (46 Mich 516) 1252) Green v. Canaan (29 Conn. 157) 751
lxxii
TABLE OF CASES SITED.
244
Page
Page
Green v. Cape May (41 N. J. L. 45) 146, Gregory v. Bridgeport (41 Conn. 76) 156,
147, 216, 540
220, 221
v. Cheek (5 Ind. 105)
263 v. Jersey City (34 N. J. L. 390) 513
v. Chicago (97 Ill. 370)
730, 732
v. Lincoln (13 Neb. 352)
759
v. Danby (12 Vt. 338) 1255, 1261 v. New York (40 N. Y. 273 442, 448
v. Durham (1 Burr. 131)
353 Grenada Co. Sup.v. Brogden (112 U.
v. Hotaling (44 N. J. L. 347) 950, 989
S. 261)
134, 635, 637
v. Indianapolis (25 Ind. 490) 84, 381, Gribble v. Sioux City (38 Iowa, 390) 1285
482 Gridley v. Bloomington (68 III. 47) 832,
v. Lake (60 Miss. 451)
449
1309, 1312
v. Marks (25 III. 221)
674 v. Bloomington (88 Ill. 554) 467, 942,
v. Miller (6 Johns. 39)
360
1261
v. New York (5 Abb. Pr. 503) 95, 557 Grier v. Shackleford (3 Brev. 491) 288
v. Oakes (17 Ill. 249)
754 v. Shackleford (Tr. Const. 642) 285,
v. Portland (32 Me. 431)
853
509
v. Reading Bor. (9 Watts, 382) 814, v. Taylor (4 McCord (S. C.), 206) 1077
833, 1220, 1233 Grierson v. Ontario (9 U. C. Q. B.
v. Rutherforth (1 Ves. Sr. 462) 662
623)
387, 395
v. Savannah (R. M. Charlt. 368) 87, Griffin u. Coleman (4 H. & N. 265) 295
507, 970 v. Inman (57 Ga. 370) 143, 193
v. Savannah (6 Ga. 1) 213, 450, 451 v. Martin (7 Barb. 298)
817
v. Spencer (67 Iowa, 410) 1142 v. New York (9 N. Y. 456) 1157,
v. Swift (47 Cal. 536)
213
1159, 1280, 1284, 1295, 1296, 1301,
v. Underwood (42 N. Y. 140) 450
1311
v. Ward (82 Va. 324)
939, 944 v. Rising (2 Cush. 75)
710
v. Wardwell (17 III. 278)
298 v. Steele (1 Edm. Sel. Cas. 505) 1074
Green Bay v. Brauns (50 Wis. 204) 367, v. Willow (43 Wis. 509)
1300
385 Griffin's Appeal (109 Pa. St. 150) 755
Green County v. Conness (109 U. S. Griffing v. Pintard (29 Miss. 173) 1001
104)
587, 637 Griffith v. Follett (20 Barb. 620) 325
Green Tp., Re (9 Watts & S. 22)
v. Harries (2 M. & W. 335) 478
Greencastle v. Allen (43 Ind. 347) 535 Griffon v. New Orleans (5 Martin,
v. Martin (74 Ind. 449)
1204
N. S. (La.) 279)
459
Greene v. Mumford (5 R. I. 472) 1121 Griggs v. Foote (4 Allen, 195) 719, 1140,
v. New York (60 N. Y. 303) 543, 547
1193, 1219
v. State (8 Ohio, 310)
377 Grim v. Weissenberg Sch. Dist. (57
Green County v. Daniel (102 U. S.
Pa. St. 433)
1149, 1150
187)
1031, 1044 Grimes v. Keene (52 N. H. 330) 322, 1203,
v. Eubanks (80 Ala. 204)
42
1206, 1302
Greene Co. Com’rs v. Huff (91 Ind. Grimley v. Santa Clara County (68
333)
766, 804
Cal. 575)
1145
Greene Tp. Trs. v. Campbell (16 0. Grimshawe v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co.
262
(19 U. C. Q. B. 493)
718
Greenfield v. Moore (113 Ind. 597) 1037 Grindley v. Barker (1 Bos. & P. 236) 360,
Greenhow v. Vashion (81 Va. 336) 996
361
Greenough v. Wakefield (127 Mass. Grinham v. Willey (4 H. & N. 496) 295
275)
222 Griswold v. Bay City (35 Mich. 452) 819
Greensboro v. Ehrenreich (80 Ala.
.v. Pelton (34 O. St. 482)
1120
579)
398 v. Stonington (5 Conn. 367) 552
v. Mullens (13 Ala. 341) 425, 438 Grocers' Co. v. Donne (3 Bing. N. C.
Greensburg Bor. v. Young (53 Pa.
34)
1331
St. 280)
914, 933 | Groenvelt v. Burwell (1 Ld. Raym.
Greenville v. Mason (53 N. H. 515) 136,
454)
1125
270, 271 Grogan v. Broadway Foundry Co.
Greenwich v. Easton & A. R. Co. (24
(87 Mo. 321)
1277
N. J. Eq. 217; 25 N. J. Eq.
v. Hayward (6 Saw. 498)
760
565)
788
v. San Francisco (18 Cal. 590) 95,
Greenwood ú. Freight Co. (105 U. S.
112, 130, 542, 676, 771, 1143
13)
115 Grossenbach v. Milwaukee (65 Wis.
v. Louisville (13 Bush, 226) 1197,
31)
1260, 1273
1198 Groton v. Haines (36 N. H. 388) 1317
Greer v. Covington (83 Ky. 410) 995 Grove v. Fort Wayne (45 Ind. 429)
Gregory v. Adams (14 Gray, 242) 1252,
1248, 1274, 1275, 1276
1257, 1296 | Grube v. Nichols (36 Ill. 93)
752, 755
Št. 11)
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
lxxiii
Page
Pago
Grube v. St. Paul (34 Minn. 402) 1198 Hadley v. Chamberlain (11 Vt. 618) 379
Grupibine v. Washington (2 McAr-
v. Peabody (13 Gray, 200) 161
thur, 578)
1195, 1197 2. Taylor (L. R. 1 C. P. 53) 1309
Guardians of Poor of Holborn v. Ves- Hadsell v. Hancock (3 Gray, 526) 220,
try of St. Leonard's (L. R.
349
2 Q. B. Div. 145)
216 Hafford v. New Bedford (16 Gray,
Guelph, Re (24 U. C. Q. B. 238) 461
297) 1164, 1106, 1193, 1196, 1198,
V. Canada Co. (4 Grant (Can.),
1199, 1201, 1207
632)
745, 773 Hagan v. Campbell (8 Port. 9) 170, 171
Guerin v. Reese (33 Cal. 292) 996, 1002 Hagar v. Reclamation Dist. (111 U.
Guernsey v. Burlington Tp. (4 Dillon
S. 701)
932
C. C. 372)
577, 704 v. Yolo Co. Sup. (47 Cal. 222) 894
Guerrero, Re (69 Cal. 88) 407, 408, 434 Hager v. Burlington (42 Iowa, 661) 945,
Guest v. Brooklyn (69 N. Y. 506) 715,
979
934, 1092 Hagerstown v. Dechert (32 Md. 369) 494,
Guilder v. Otsego (20 Minn. 74) 125
1167
Guilford v. Chenango Co. Sup. (13 Hagner v. Heyberger (7 W. & S. 104) 289,
N. Y. 143) 129, 130, 132, 896, 913,
352, 1077, 1095
1096 Hague v. Philadelphia (48 Pa. St.
Guillotte v. New Orleans (12 La. An.
527) 30, 519, 523, 529, 540, 541,
432)
417, 464
542, 543, 566
Gulf City Ry. Co. v. Gulf City Street Haight v. Keokuk (4 Iowa, 199) 749, 821
Ry. Co. (63 Tex. 529) 880 v. New York (24 Fed. R. 93) 1198,
Gulf City Street Ry. Co.v. Galveston
1201
City Ry. Co. (65 Tex. 502) 880 v. New York (24 Fed. R. 313) 1194
Gulf Col. & S. Fe. R. Co. v. Eddins Haines v. Readfield Sch. Dist. (41
(60 Tex. 656)
841, 1244
Me. 246)
1148
v. Fuller (63 Tex. 467) 841, 854, 1244 Halbert v. State (22 Ind. 125)
322
v. Graves (1 Tex. App. C. C. Halbut v. Forrest City (34 Ark. 246) 522,
$ 579)
1244
528
Gulf R. Čo. &c. (7 Kan. 210). (See Hale v. Cushnian (6 Met. 425) 1114
Missouri River, Ft. S. & G.
v. Houghton (8 Mich. 458) 219, 513
R. Co., &c.]
v. Kenosha (29 Wis. 599) 910, 953,
Gulick v. Connely (42 Ind. 134) 558
957, 963
v. New (14 Ind. 93) 280, 292, 493 v. People (87 Ill. 72) 222, 906, 907
Gulline v. Lowell (144 Mass. 491) 1255 Haley v. Philadelphia (68 Pa. St. 45) 719
Gunmakers' Soc. v. Fell (Willes, 384) 430 Haliburton v. Frankford (14 Mass.
Gunn's Adm. v. Pulaski County (3
214)
527
Ark. 427)
1013, 1028 Hall Re (10 Neb. 537)
391
Gunnarssolin v. Sterling (92 Ill. 569) 432 v. Baltimore (56 Md. 187)
757
Gurner v. Chicago (40 Ill. 165) 959, 994 v. Bristol (L. R. 2 C. P. C. 322) 688,
Gurnsey v. Edwards (26 N. H. 224) 374
1228, 1230, 1239
Guthrie v. Armstrong (5 B. & Ald.
v. Chippewa Falls (47 Wis. 267) 945
628)
360 v. Cockrell (28 Ala. 507)
323
v. New Haven (31 Conn. 308) 761, 807 v. Kansas City (54 Mo. 598) 1263
Gutzweller v. People (14 Ill. 142) 94, 104 v. London C. & 1). Ry. Co. (14
Guy v. Baltimore (100 U. S. 434) 902, 903
L. T. (N. S.) 351)
717
Gwynn v. Homan (15 Ind. 201) 752 v. Lowell (10 Cush. 260) 1261, 1302
Gwynne v. Cincinnati (3 Ohio, 25) 695, 750 v. McCaughey (51 Pa. St. 43) 785
v. Rees (2 U. C. P. R. 282) 259 v. Manchester (39 N. H.
295)
321
v. Manchester (40 N. H. 410) 1261,
H.
1270
v. Marysville (19 Cal. 391) 950
Haag v. Vanderburgh Co. Com’rs
v. Meriden (48 Conn. 416)
763
(60 Ind. 511) 185, 448, 1183, v. New Orleans (19 Fed. R. 870) 572
1184, 1186 v. People (57 Ill. 307) 1057, 1059
Hackett v. Ottawa (99 U. S. 86) 593 v. Smith (2 Bing. 156)
324
Hackettstown ads. Swackhamer (37
v. Somersworth Selectmen (39
N. J. L. 191) 182, 188, 193, 194,
N. H. 511)
1007
195, 563 v. State (20 Ohio, 8)
781
Hackney Election (31 L. T. N. 8. 69) 281 Hallenbeck v. Hahn (2 Ñeb. 377) 227
Haddock's Case (T. Raym. 439) 335, 490 Hallowell & A. Bank' v. Hamlin (14
Hadley v. Albany (33 N. Y. 603) 285, 288,
Mass. 178)
381, 488
318, 330, 337 | Halpin v. Campbell (71 Mo. 493) 925
lxxiv
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
Page
Page
Halpin v. Kansas City (76 Mo. 335) 1258, Hang Kie, Re (69 Cal. 149)
470
1312 Hanger v. Des Moines (52 Iowa, 193) 146,
Halstead v. Boston Pol. Board (142
209
Mass. 90)
134 Hanlon v. Keokuk (7 Iowa, 477) 1300
v. Mayor (3 N. Y. 430) 219, 529, 531, Hanna v. Allen Co. Com’rs (8
554, 562, 565, 567
Blackf. 352)
896
v. Mayor (5 Barb. 218) 218, 532 Hannewinkle 2. Georgetown (15
Ham v. Miller (20 Iowa, 450)
999
Wall. 548). 715, 1092, 1120, 1121
v. New York (70 N. Y. 459) 1194 Hanney v. Kansas City (94 Mo. 334) 1263
v. Salem (10 Mass. 350)
697 Hannibal v. Draper (15 Mo. 634) 739, 757,
Hambleton v. Dexter (89 Mo. 188) 244,
767, 789
1031 v. Fauntleroy (105 U. S. 408) 602
Hamden v. New Haven & N. R. Co.
v. Han. & St. J. R. Co. (49 Mo.
(27 Conn. 158)
851
480)
809, 852
v. Rice (24 Conn. 350)
661, 668
v. Richards (82 Mo. 330)
445, 448
Hamerick v. Rouse (17 Ga. 56) 1098 v. Winchell (54 Mo. 172) 176, 809,
Hamersley v. New York 156 N. Y.
852
533)
711 | Hannibal & St. J. R. Co. v. Husen
Hamilton v. Carthage (24 III. 22) 76, 485
(95 U. S. 465)
214
v. Columbus (52 Ga. 435) 1331 v. Marion County (36 Mo. 294) 156,
v. Dubuque (50 Iowa, 213) 1154
646
v. Fort Wayne (40 Ind. 491) 908, 910 v. Shacklett (30 Mo. 550)
952
v. McNeil (13 Gratt. 389) 263, 266 Hannon v. Agnew (96 N. Y. 439) 1196,
v. N. Y. & Harl. R. Co. (9 Paige,
1197
171)
854
v. Grizzard (89 N. C. 115)
278
v. Newcastle & D. R. Co. (9 Ind.
v. Halifax Co. Com’rs (89 N. C.
359)
522, 566, 679
123)
1021
v. State (3 Ind. 452) 1012, 1057, 1120 v. St. Louis County (62 Mo. 313) 45,
,
v. State (3 Tex. App. 643) 438
1176, 1179, 1180, 1193, 1210, 1213
Hamilton County v. Garrett (62 Tex. Hanover v. Eaton (3 N. H. 38) 527
602)
44, 1166 Hanscom v. Boston (141 Mass. 242) 1251,
v. State (115 Ind. 64)
585
1257, 1297
Hamilton Co. Com’rs v. Mighels (7
v. Omaha (11 Neb. 37) 920, 925, 933
0. St. 109) 42, 43, 147, 1174, v. Vernon (27 Iowa, 28) 97, 226, 229,
1180, 1245
237, 573, 704, 895, 897, 898
Hamlin v. Dingman (5 Lans. 61) 355 Hanson v. Eastman (21 Minn. 509) 745,
Hammar v. Covington (3 Met. (Ky.)
759
322, 1017, 1135 Harbaugh v. Monmouth (74 Ill. 371) 432
Hammarskeld v. Bull (11 Rich. L. Harbeck v. Toledo (11 O. St. 219) 705, 707,
493)
323
708, 709
Hammerslough v. Kansas City (57 Harbor Master v. Southerland (47
Mo. 219)
716
Ala. 511)
166
Hammett v. Philadelphia (65 Pa. St. Hardcastle v. Md. & Del. R. Co. (32
146) 910, 914, 915, 917, 918, 920,
Md. 32)
1008
v. So. Yorkshire Ry. Co. (4 H.
Hammond v. Haines (25 Md. 541) 78, 143,
& N. 67)
1309, 1312
431 v. State (27 N. J. L. 552)
347
v. McLachlan (1 Sandf. 323) 747 Hardenbrook v. Ligonier (95 Ind. 70) 485
Hampshire County v. Franklin Coun- Harding v. Hale (61 Ill. 192) 752, 755
ty (16 Mass. 76) 111, 269, 271, v. Rockford, R. I. & St. L. R.
273
Co. (65 Ill. 90) 239, 240, 280,
Hampson v. Taylor (15 R. I. 83)
1264
564, 641
Hamsworth v. Boston (121 Mass.
v. Vandewater (40 Cal. 77) 363
173)
1018 Hardy v. Brooklyn (91 N. Y. 435) 1313
Hancock v. Bowman (49 Cal. 413) 1001 v. Keene (52 N. H. 370) 1252, 1257,
v. Chicot Co. (32 Ark. 575) 645
1262, 1276
v. Hazzard (12 Cush. 112), 320, 323 v. Merriweather (14 Ind. 203) 185
Hancock County v. Clark (27 Ill.
v. Waltham (3 Met. 163) 53, 217
305)
239 Harker v. New York (17 Wend. 199) 481
Hand v. Brookline (126 Mass. 324) 1163, Harkins v. Sencerbox (2 Minn. 344) 1070
1206 Harlem Gasl. Co. v. New York (33
v. Newton (92 N. Y. 88)
677
N. Y. 309) 543, 546, 1105
Handy v. Collins (60 Md. 229) 961 Harlow v. Humiston (6 Cow. 189) 1309,
v. New Orleans (39 La. An. 107) 1108
1311
494)
936, 960
+
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
lxxv
Page
Page
Harman v. Brotherson (1 Denio, 537) 325 Harrison v. New Orl. Pac. Ry. Co. (34
v. Lynchburg (33 Gratt. 37) 1164
La. An. 462) 833, 834, 841, 847
v. Tappenden (1 East, 555) 339 v. Norfolk Co. Ct. Jus. (2 Leigh,
v. Tappenden (3 Espin. 278) 340
164)
1006
Harmon v. Chicago (110 Ill. 400) 448 v. Parker (6 East, 154)
746
v. Omaha (17 Neb. 548) 1222, 1243 v. Peoria, A. & D. R. Co. (77 Ill.
Harmony Tp. Trs. v. Osborne (9 Ind.
11)
1103
558)
377, 940
v. State (9 Mo. 526)
180, 182
Harness v. Ches. & O. Canal Co. (1
v. Vicksburg (11 Miss. 581) 899, 903
MJ. Ch. 248)
716 2. Williams (3 B. & C. 162) 40, 379
Harney v. Indianapolis (32 Ind. 244) 1110, Harrold v. Simcoe & O. Ry. Co. (16
1111
U. C. C. P. 43 ; 18 U. C. C.
Harpending v. Haight, Gov. (39 Cal.
P. 9)
1240, 1248, 1302
189)
1016 Harshman v. Bates Co (92 U. S.
Harper v. Brooklyn Elev. R. Co.
569; 3 Dillon, C. C. 150) 575,
(D. Reg. 000)
872
622, 627, 628, 629, 630
v. Elberton (23 Ga. 566)
962 v. Knox Co. Ct. (122 U, S. 306) 1033,
v. Milwaukee (30 Wis. 365) 448, 1211,
1035, 1036
1253, 1267, 1284, 1306, 1324, v. Winterbottom (123 U. S. 215) 324
1331 Hart v. Albany (9 Wend. 571) 171, 177,
Harper's Appeal (109 Pa. St. 9) 991
413, 415, 416, 419, 453, 785, 1212
Harpswell v. Phippsburgh (29 Me.
v. Bloomfield Tp. Trs. (15 Ind.
313)
322
226)
756
Harrington v. Berkshire Co. Com'rs
v. Bridgeport (13 Blatch. 289) 1167
(22 Pick 263)
712 v. Brooklyn (36 Barb. 226) 810, 1266,
v. Berkshire Sch. Dist. (30 Vt.
1296, 1301
155)
322, 554 v. Burnett (15 Cal. 580) 769, 771
2. Miles (11 Kan. 80)
426 v. Gaven (12 Cal. 476)
923
v. Plainview (27 Minn. 224) 618, 1107, v. New Orleans (12 Fed. R. 292) 673
1116 v. Red Cedar (63 Wis. 634) 1255
v. St. Paul & S. C. R. Co. (17
v. Stone (30 Conn. 94)
679
Minn. 215)
842 Harter v. Kernochan (103 U. S. 562) 572,
Harris, Re (52 Ala. 87) 1006, 1009, 1023
629, 630
V. Atlanta (62 Ga. 290)
1197 Hartford v. Franey (47 Conn. 76) 301
v. Baker (4 M. & S. 27)
321 v. Talcott (48 Conn. 525) 1274, 1310
v. Bradburn (6 U. C. Pr. R. 308) 281 v. West Middle Dist. (45 Conn.
v. Canaan Sch. Dist. (28 N, H.
462)
955
58)
43, 371, 539 Hartford & N. Y. S. Co. v. New York
2. Elliott (10 Pet. 25)
773, 795
(78 N. Y. 1)
1204
v. Int. of Livingston (28 Ala. Hartford Bank v. Hart (3 Day, 493) 382
577)
148, 431 Hartford Bridge Co. v. East Hartford
v. Mobbs (L. R. 3 Ex. D. 268) 885
(16 Conn. 149) 182, 269, 270, 271
v. Nesbitt (24 Ala. 398) 182, 1084 ads. East Hartford (10 How. 511).
v. Newbury (128 Mass. 321) 1257
(See East Hartford, &c.]
v. People (59 N. Y. 599)
89 v. Union Ferry Co. (29 Conn.
v. Schryock (82 Ill. 119)
1095
210)
189
2. Wakeman (Say. 254)
484 Hartford Co. Com'rs v. Hamilton (60
v. Watson (Peake, 72)
209
Md. 340)
1246
v. Whitcomb (4 Gray, 433) 376 Hartford F. Ins. Co. v. State (9 Kan.
Harris County v. Taylor (58 Tex.
210)
434
690)
753, 787 | Hartlepool Collieries Co. v. Gibb (L.
Harrisburg v. Saylor (87 Pa. St. 216)
R. 5 Ch. Div. 713)
885
1304, 1306 Hartley, Re (31 L. J. M. C. 232) 464
v. Sheck (104 Pa. St. 53) 143 Hartnan v. Greenhow (102 U. S. 672)
Harrisburg & Pot. R. Co. v. Moore
996
(1 W. N. C. 37)
733 v. Muscatine (70 Ind. 511) 1285
Harrison v. Baltimore (1 Gill, 264) 151, Hartshorn v. Potroff (89 Ill. 509) 694
218, 219, 1201 Hartwell v. Littleton (13 Pick. 229) 371
v. Bridgeton (16 Mass. 16) 135, 271 Harvard College v. Boston (104 Mass.
v. Brooks (20 Ga. 537)
449
470)
146, 728, 917, 952
v. Collins (86 Pa. 153) 1306, 1307 Harvey v. Dewoody (18 Ark. 252) 451
v. Godman (1 Burr. 12)
430 v. Olney (42 Ill. 336)
1148
v. Good (L. R. 11 Eq. Č. 338) 447 v. Rochester (35 Barb. 177) 1183
v. Milwaukee (49 Wis. 247) 945, 1148 v. Rush County (32 Kan. 159) 511
lxxvi
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
|
Page
Page
Harward v. St. Clair, &c. Levee Co. Hawley's Case (1 Vent. 143)
336
(51 Ill. 130) 122, 906, 1119 Hawthorne v. East Portland' (13 Or.
Harwood v. Lowell (4 Cush. 310) 1253,
271)
945
1288 v. Hoboken (32 N. J. L. 172) 136
v. Marshall (9 Md. 83). 1024, 1074 v. St. Louis (11 Mo. 50) 161, 162
v. Marshall 10 Md. 451) 1062, 1070 Hay v. Alexandria & W. R. Co. (20
Hasbrouck v. Milwaukee (13 Wis.
Fed. R. 15)
531
37)
122, 130 v. Cohoes Co. (2 N. Y. 159) 1308, 1324
v. Milwaukee (21 Wis. 217) 523, 543, Hayden v. Atlanta (70 Ga. 817) 925, 933
544 v. Attleborough (7 Gray, 338) 761,
v. Milwaukee (25 Wis. 122) 118, 1028
1256, 1257, 1265
Hascard v. Somany (Freem. K. B.
v. Madison (7 Me. 79)
541
504)
679
v. Middlesex Turnp. Co. (10
Hasey v. White Pigeon Sugar Co. (1
Mass. 397)
322
Doug. (Mich.) 190)
562 v. Noyes (5 Conn. 391) 263, 349, 403
Haskell v. Burlington (30 Iowa, 232) 999 Hayes v. Appleton (24 Wis. 544) 147, 403
v. New Bedford (108 Mass, 208) 176, v. Cambridge (136 Mass. 402;
452, 1214, 1330
138 Mass. 461)
1251, 1260
v. New Gloucester (70 Me. 305) 1257, v. Holly Springs (114 U. S. 120) 231,
1299
635, 637, 648
v. Penn Yan (5 Lans. 43) 1282, 1311 v. Mich. Cent. R. Co. (111 U. S.
Hassen v. Rochester (65 N. Y. 516) 953
228)
466, 857
Hastings v. Columbus (42 0. St. 585) 407 v. New York (74 N. Y. 264) 1299,
v. Thorne (8 Neb. 160)
1142
1301
Hastings's Case (1 Mod. 24)
289 v. Oshkosh (33 Wis. 314) 1164, 1198,
Haswell v. New York (81 N. Y, 255) 312
1199, 1205
Hatch v. Barr (1 Ohio, 390)
524 Hayford v. Belfast (69 Me. 63) 1147
v. Buffalo (38 N. Y. 276) 715, 1120 | Haygood v. Clark Co. Inf. Ct. Jus.
v. Mann (15 Wend. 44)
316
(20 Ga. 845)
1174
v. Pendergast (15 Md. 251) 459 Haynes v. Burlington (38 Vt. 350) 1317
Hathaway v. Cincinnatus (62 N. Y.
v. Cape May (50 N. J. L. 55) 396, 478
434)
1143 v. Covington (21 Miss. 408) 321, 518
v. New Baltimore (48 Mich. 251) 99 v. Haynes (1 D. & S. 426) 712
Haughey v. Hart (62 Iowa, 96) 1312 v. Municipality (5 La. An. 760) 97
Hausmeister v. Porter (21 Fed. R.
v. Pac. Mail. Stp. Co. (17 How.
355)
1091
598)
965
Havemeyer v. Iowa Co. (3 Wall. 294) 250, v. Thomas (7 Ind. 38) 744, 786, 787,
583, 586
795, 856
v. Mineral Pt. Sup. (22 Wis. 396)
v. Washington County (19 Ill.
1068, 1072
66)
281
Haven v. Asylum (13 N. H. 532) 381 | Hays v. State (8 Ind. 425)
738
Lowell (5 Met. 35)
361 Hayward v. Davidson (41 Ind. 212) 549,
Hawes v. Fox Lake (33 Wis. 438) 1312
658, 670
Hawk v. Marion County (48 Iowa,
v. Manzer (70 Cal. 476)
755
472)
209 v. No. Bridgewater Sch. Dist. (2
Hawkes v. Kennebec County (7
Cush. 419)
546, 541
Mass. 461)
1027 Haywood v. Savannah (12 Ga. 404) 142,
Hawkins v. Carroll County (50 Miss.
395, 397
735)
579 Hayzlett v. Mt. Vernon (33 Iowa,
v. Conway, Gov. (1 Pike (Ark.),
229)
954
570)
1016 Hazard's Case (2 Roll. 11) 307, 336
v. Huron Mun. Council (2 U. C. Hazen v. Essex County (12 Cush.
C. P. 72)
259
477)
703, 704
v. Jonesboro (63 Ga. 527)
105 v. Strong (2 Vt. 427)
443
v. Rochester (1 Wend. 54) 712 Hazlehurst Rec., v. Freeman, Tr.,
v. Sanders (45 Mich. 491)
449
(52 Ga. 245)
851
v. Starke Co. Com’rs (14 Ind. Heacock v. Sherman (14 Wend. 58) 882
521)
1007, 1012 Head v. Providence Ins. Co. (2
Hawks v. Charlemont (107 Mass. 414)
Cranch, 127) 147, 521, 564
1186 Healey o. Batley Corp. (L. R. 19 Eq.
Hawley v. Baltimore (33 Md. 270) 757
375)
741, 1240
v. Fayetteville Com’rs (82 N. C.
v. New Haven (47 Conn. 305) 1217
22)
1028 v. New Haven (49 Conn. 394) 1217,
v. Harrall (19 Conn. 142)
695, 810
1224
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
lxxvii
331)
Page
Page
Health Dept. v. Knoll (70 N. Y. 530) 443 Henderson v. Covington (14 Bush,
Heard v. Brooklyn (60 N. Y. 242) 691,
312)
149
843 v. Jackson County (2 McCrary
Heath, Re (3 Hill, 42) 282, 285, 509, 1021,
C. C. 615)
972
1025, 1078 v. Lambert (8 Bush, 607)
972
v. Barmore (50 N. Y. 302) 691, 843 v. Lambert (14 Bush, 24)
918, 992
v. Des Moines & St. L. Ry. Co.
V. Midland R. Co. (24 L. T.
(61 Iowa, 11) 846, 847, 854
(N. S..) 881)
1229
v. State (36 Ala. 273)
1079 v. Minneapolis (32 Minn. 319) 814,
Heazy v. Black (90 nd. 534)
1093
1225, 1320, 1326, 1331
Hebel v. Amazon Ins. Co. (33 Mich.
v. New Orleans (3 La. 563) 292
407)
161 Hendersonville v. McMinn (82 N. C.
Hebert v. Lavalle (27 Ill. 448)
771
532)
483
Hebrew Benev. 0. A. Soc., Re (70 Hendrick v. West Springfield (107
N. Y. 476)
956
Mass. 541)
557
Heckel v. Sandford (40 N. J. L. 180) 257 Hendrick's Appeal (103 Pa. St. 358) 1221,
Heckerman v. Hummel (19 Pa. St.
1243
64)
782, 783, 786 Henke v. McCord (55 Iowa, 378) 145
Hedges v. Dam (72 Cal. 520)
320 Henkel v. Detroit (49 Mich. 249) 446,
v. Madison County (6 11. 567) 882,
811, 1157
1169, 1173, 1174, 1245, 1246 Henker v. Fond du Lac (71 Wis. 616) 1312
Hedrick v. Olathe (30 Kan. 348) 841 Henley v. Lyme Regis (2 Cl. & F.
Heeney v. Heeney (2 Denio, 625) 169,
1205, 1208, 1280
170 Hennen, Re (13 Pet. 230) 319, 333
v. Sprague (11 R. I. 456) 158, 387, Hennepin Co. Com’rs v. Dayton (17
1158, 1262, 1274
Minn. 260)
764
Heffner v. Commonwealth (28 Pa. St. Henry v. Atkinson (50 Mo. 266) 679
108)
1059 v. Chester (15 Vt. 460)
940
Heidelberg Sch. Dist. v. Horst (62
v. Dubuque & Pac. R. Co. (10
Pa. St. 301)
525
Iowa, 540)
716
Heine v. Levee Com’rs (19 Wall. 655)
v. Pittsburg & A. Br. Co. (8 W.
250, 251, 939, 1000, 1001, 1005,
& S. 85)
833, 1220
1028, 1033, 1040, 1041, 1046, 1050 v. State (98 Ind. 81)
323
Heiple v. East Portland (13 Or. 97) 806 v. Thomas (119 Mass. 583) 979
Heirs of A. &c. See A's Heirs, &c.] Henshaw v. Hunting (1 Gray, 203) 748,
Heise v. Columbia T. Council (6 Rich.
801
L. 404)
413, 415, 417, 418 Hensoldt v. Petersburg (63 Ill. 111) 482
Heisembrittle v. Charleston (2 MC- Hentig v. Gilmore (33 Kan. 234) 987
Mullan, 233) 393, 397, 433 Hentz v. Long Island R. Co. (13 Barb.
Heiser v. New York (104 N. Y. 68) 1217,
646)
781, 857
1220, 1231, 1232 Hepburn v. Griswold (8 Wall. 603) 195
Heiskell v. Baltimore (65 Md. 125) 146, Heppe v. Johnson (73 Cal. 265) 301
357, 358 | Herbert v. Benson (2 La. An. 770) 782,
Heland v. Lowell (3 Allen, 407) 386, 387,
783, 788
421, 1287 Herhold v. Chicago (108 Ill. 467) 755
Helena v. Harvey (6 Mont. Ter. 114) 706 Hering v. Scott (107 Ill. 600)
796
v. Thompson (29 Ark. 569). 1179, Heriot's Hospt. Teoffees v. Ross (12
1180, 204, 1316, 1317
Cl. & F. 507)
1201
Hellen v. Noe (3 Ired. 493)
419 Herman v. Crete (9 Neb 350) 1142
Heller v. Sedalia (53 Mo. 159) 1199 Herne v. Garton (2 E. & E. 66) 504
v. Stremmel (52 Mo. 309) 39, 45 | Herring v. Dist. Columbia (2 Mackey,
Hemphill v. Boston (8 Cush. 195)
1327
762 v. Dist. Columbia (3 Mackey,
Hempstead v. Des Moines (52 Iowa,
572)
1322
303)
1217, 1224 Herrington v. Lansingburg (110 N. Y.
v. Des Moines (63 Iowa, 36) 815,
145) 1305, 1306, 1307, 1308
1225, 1229 Herschberger v. Pittsburgh (115 Pa.
Henback v. State (53 Ala. 523) 395
St. 78)
1001
Hendee v. Pinkerton (14 Allen, 381) 274 Hersey v. Milw. Co. Sup. (16 Wis.
Hendershott v. Ottumwa (46 Iowa,
185)
953
658)
1225 | Hershoff o. Beverly (45 N. J. L. 288) 487,
Henderson z. Baltimore (8 Md. 352) 940,
497
944, 978, 979 | Herzo v. San Francisco (33 Cal. 134) 402,
v. Barnes (32 U. C. Q. B. 176) 1262
533, 676, 1143
761,
87)
1.xxviii
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
881, 882
Page
Page
Hesketh v. Braddock (3 Burr. 1847) 478, Hill v. Boston (122 Mass. 344) 24, 46,
484, 490, 498
47, 48, 50, 108, 217, 1027, 1171,
Heslep v. Sacramento (2 Cal. 580) 316
1172, 1176, 1177, 1178, 1187, 1195,
Hess v. Pegg (7 Nev. 23)
566
1199, 1207, 1209, 1211, 1213, 1214,
Hester's Case (2 W. & S. 416) 1030
1227, 1240, 1246, 1251, 1252, 1253,
Heth v. Fond du Lac (63 Wis. 228) 1322
1289, 1294
Hewes v. Reis (40 Cal. 255) 945, 984, 985 v. Charlotte (72 N. C. 55) 1157, 1167
Hewison v. New Haven (34 Conn.
v. Chicago, St. L. & N.' O. R.
136) 1255, 1256, 1270, 1276
Co. (38 La. An. 599)
834
v. New Haven (37 Conn. 475) 1195, v. Dalton (72 Ga. 314) 492, 500
1253 v. Decatur Com’rs (22 Ga. 203) 87,
Hewitt v. Normal Sch. Dist. (94 III.
385, 431
528)
564 v. Fond du Lac (56 Wis. 242) 1260,
Hewitt's Appeal (88 Pa. St. 55) 972
1273
Hexamer v. Webb (101 N. Y. 377) 785 v. Forsythe County (67 N. C.
Hey v. Philadelphia (81 Pa. 44) 1258,
367)
226
1259, 1278, 1281 v. Higdon (5 0. St. 243) 86, 908, 920,
Heyneman v. Blake (19 Cal. 579)
957
706, 726 v. Kahoka (35 Fed. R. 32) 252
Heyward v. New York (8 Barb. 486) 821 v. La Crosse & M. R. Co. (11
v. New York (7 N. Y. 314) 659, 662,
Wis. 214)
969
690, 691 v. Livingston Co. Sup. (12 N. Y.
Heywood v. Buffalo (14 N. Y. 534) 1092,
52)
1107, 1120, 1122, 1127 v. St. Louis (59 Mo. 412) 1219
Hibbard v. People (4 Mich. 126) 451 v. Scotland County (32 Fed. R.
Hickerson v. Mexico (58 Mo. 61) 753,
716)
1045
1187 v. State (4 Sneed, 443) 1134, 1135
Hickman v. O'Neal (10 Cal. 294) 493 Hilliard v. Richardson (3 Gray, 349) 1195,
Hickok v. Plattsburg (15 Barb. 427) 159
1305, 1306, 1307
v. Plattsburg (16 N. Y. 161) 1204, Hilsdorf v. St. Louis (45 Mo. 94) 1195
1295 Himmelmann v. Byrne (41 Cal. 500) 991
Hickox v. Cleveland (8 Ohio, 543) 1226 v. Cofran (36 Cal. 411) 991, 994, 1011
Hicks v. Dorn (42 N. Y. 47)
1215 v. Danos (35 Cal. 441)
945
v. Launcelot (1 Rol. Abr. 513)
304
v. Hoadley (44 Cal. 213)
813
Hiestand v. New Orleans (14 La. An.
v. Oliver (34 Cal. 246) 945, 984
330)
315 v. Spanagel (39 Cal. 389) 991, 1001
Higbee v. Camden & A. R. & Transp. Hinchman v. Detroit (9 Mich. 103) 794
Co. (20 N. J. Eq. 435) 786 v. Paterson Horse R. Co. (17 N.
Higert v. Greencastle (43 Ind. 574) 1272,
J. Eq. 75) 787, 841, 850, 855, 860,
1275, 1281, 1286, 1295, 1300
863, 868, 869, 879
Higgins v. Chicago (18 Ill. 276) 710, 711, Hinckley v. Somerset (145 Mass.
712, 714, 719, 1001
326)
1297
v. Livingstone (4 Dow, 341) 324 Hincks v. Milwaukee (46 Wis. 559) 1304
v. Midland Co. Sup. (52 Mich. Hinde v. Wabash Nav. Co. (15 Ill.
16)
1011
73)
1195
v. Princeton (4 Halst. Ch. 309) 458 Hinds v. Hinds (1 Iowa, 36)
278
Higginson v. Nahant (11 Allen, 536) 702, Hine v. Keokuk & D. M. K. Co. (42
1253
Iowa, 636)
833, 834
High v. Shoemaker (22 Cal. 363) 924 v. New Haven (40 Conn. 478) 474
Highland Turnp. Co. v. McKean (10 Hines v. Charlotte (40 N. W. R. 333) 475
Johns. 154)
139, 380, 381 v. Fond du Lac (71 Wis. 74) 1312
Hight v. Monroe Co. Com'rs (68
v. Leavenworth (3 Kan. 186) 925,
Ind. 575)
549, 553
933, 993
Hightower v. Slaton (54 Ga. 108) 161 v. Lockport (41 How. Pr. 435) 976
Highway Com’rs, &c. (See Com-
v. Lockport (5 Lans. 17) 1281
missioners of Highways, &c.]
2. Lockport (50 N. Y. 236) 1282, 1332
Higley v. Bunce (10 Conn. 567) Hinson v. Lott (8 Wall. 151)
902
407, 408 Hinton v. Lindsay (20 Ga. 746)
305
Hilbish v. Catherman (64 Pa. St. 154) 224, Hipperholm Cons., Re (5 D. & L. 709) 1130
895 Hitchcock v. Galveston (96 U. S.
Hildreth v. Lowell (11 Gray, 345) 699,
341) 156, 196, 200, 516, 520, 531,
985, 988, 1187, 1188, 1214
958, 981, 988
Hildreth's Heirs v. McIntire's De- Hitchins v. Frostburg (68 Md. 100) 1322,
visee (1 J. J. Marsh. 206) 356
1335
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
lxxix
+
Page
Page
Hite v. Goodman (1 D. & B. Eq. 364) 323 Holdane v. Cold Springs Trs. (21 N.
Hixon v. Lowell (13 Gray, 59) 1252, 1253,
Y. 474)
745
1254, 1255, 1256, 1257, 1276, 1277 | Holdsworth v. Dartmouth (11 A. &
Hoadley v. San Francisco (50 Cal.
E. 490)
221, 274
265)
659 Holl v. Manchester (40 N. H. 410) 1257
Hoadley's Adm. v. San Francisco Holladay v. Frisbie (15 Cal. 631) 659, 671,
(124 U. $. 639)
671
673
Hoag v. Durfey (1 Aiken, 286) 271 v. March (3 Wend. 142)
422
v. Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. Holland v. Baltimore (11 Md. 186) 144,
(85 Pa. St. 293)
1262
151, 978, 979, 980, 1122
v. Lamont (60 N. Y. 96)
509 v. San Francisco (7 Cal. 361) 135
Hoagland v. Sacramento (52 Cal. Holland's Case (11 Md. 186) 1099, 1117
142)
131 Hollenbeck v. Marshalltown (62
Hoard v. Des Moines (62 Iowa, 326) 1323
Iowa, 21)
500
Hobart v. Butte Co. Sup. (17 Cal.
v. Winnebago County (95 Ill.
23)
78
148)
1172, 1173, 1174
v. Detroit (7 Mich. 246) 1105 Holliday v. People (10 Ill. 216)
94, 99
v. Detroit (17 Mich. 246)
544, 545
v. St. Leonard's Par. (11 C. B.
v. Milwaukee (27 Wis. 194) 863, 868
(N. s.) 192)
1331
Hobbs v. Lowell (19 Pick. 415) 760 Hollingsworthí v. Detroit (3 McLean,
v. Yonkers (102 N. Y. 13) 313, 317
472)
569
Hoblyn v. Regem (6 Bro. P. Ć. 520) 353 v. Tensas Par. (17 Fed. R. 109) 212,
Hoboken v. Bailey (37 N. J. L. 519) 182
719
v. Gear (27 N. J. L. 265) 314, 318, Hollister v. Union Co. (9 Conn. 436) 1224
329, 334, 407, 409 Hollwedell, Re (74 Mo. 395)
499
v. Pa. R. Co. (124 U. S. 656) 169, 170, Holman, Re (28 Iowa, 88) 1032, 1045
171, 172, 741, 748, 749 v. Townsend (13 Met. 297) 1263
Hoboken Land & I. Co. v. Harrison Holmes 2. Finklenburg (54 Ill. 203). 492
(30 N. J. L. 73)
290, 300 v. Jersey City (12 N. J. Eq. 299) 722,
v. Hoboken (36 N. J. L. 540) 171,
760, 918, 1092, 1097, 1126, 1129
172, 741, 749, 788, 795 v. Mattoon (111 Ill. 37)
552
Hobson v. Monteith (15 Or. 251) 757 v. Paris (75 Me. 559)
1297
Hodgdon v. Lincoln Co. Com’rs (68
v. Slıreveport (31 Fed. R. 113) 193
Me. 226)
1126 v. Wilson (10 A. & E. 503) 447
Hodges v. Balt. Únion Pass. Ry. Co. Holroyd v. Pumphrey (18 How. 69) 1000
(58 Md. 603)
863, 868 Holst v. Streitz (16 Neb. 249)
759
v. Buffalo (2 Denio, 110) 147, 210, Holt v. Somerville (127 Mass. 408) 691
222, 518, 519, 529, 533, 539, 540, Home v. Earl Camden (2 H. Bl. 533) 1132
542, 567, 1110 v. Rouse (8 Wall. 430)
157
v. Nashville (2 Humph. 61) 428 Home Ins., Co. v. Augusta C. Council
v. Schuler (22 N. Y. 114)
565
(93 U. S. 116)
104, 105
Hodgman v. Chicago & St. P. Ry. Homersham v. Wolverhampton W.
Co. (20 Minn. 48)
1116
W. Co. (4 Eng. L. & Eq. 426) 521
Hodgson v. Dexter (1 Cranch, 345) 323 Hood v. Lynn (1 Allen, 103)
150, 222
Hoehl v. Muscatine (57 Iowa, 444) 1317 Hooker v. New Haven & N. Co. (14
Hoff v. Jasper County (110 U. S. 53) 633
Conn. 146)
814, 1224
Hoffman v. Jersey City (34 N. J. L. Hooksett v. Amoskeag Manuf. Co.
172)
290, 406
(44 N. H. 105)
810, 883
v. St. Louis (15 Mo. 651) 814, 1223 Hoole v. Attorney-General (22 Ala.
v. Van Nostrand (42 Barb. 174) 257
190)
454, 750, 755
Hogan v. Cent. Pac. R. Co. (71 Cal. Hooper v. Bridgewater (102 Mass.
83)
841
512)
1130
Hogencamp v. Paterson H. Ry. Co.
v. Ely (46 Mo. 505)
1109
(17 N. J. Eq. 83)
855
v. Emery (14 Me. 375)
63
Hogg v. Ward (3 H. & N. 417) 295 Hope v. Deaderick (8 Humph. 1) 898
Hohl v. Westford (33 Wis. 324) 1009 Hopkins v. Mason (61 Barb. 469) 986
Hoke v. Henderson (4 Dev. 1)
311, 317 v. Mehaffy (11 S. & R. 126) 524
v. Perdue (62 Cal. 545)
91 v. Rush River (70 Wis. 10) 1285
Holberg v. Macon (55 Miss. 112) 910, v. Swansea (4 M. & W. 621) 386, 387
1126 v. Whitesides (1 Head, 31) 254
Holborn Union Guard. v. Vestry of Hopkinson v. Marquis of Exeter (L.
St. Leonard's (L. R. 2 Q.
R. 5 Eq. 63)
327
B. D. 145)
216 Hopkinton v. Springfield (12 N. H.
Holbrook v. Dickinson (46 Ill. 285) 1000
328)
322
Ixxx
TABLE OF CASES CITED,
Page
Page
Hopper v. Covington (8 Fed. R. 777) 187, Howard v. First Indep. Ch. (18 Md.
596
451)
533, 722, 919
v. Covington (118 U. S. 148) 576 v. Gage (6 Mass. 462) 1024, 1088
Horn v. Baltimore (30 Md. 218) 518, 519, v. No. Bridgewater (16 Pick.
1187
189) 1134, 1255, 1256, 1263, 1265,
v. Des Moines (63 Iowa, 447) 1199
1266
v. New Lots (83 N. Y. 100) 893, 1147 v. Providence (6 R. I. 514) 731
v. People (23 Mich. 221)
174, 176
v. Rogers (4 Har. & J. 278) 758
v. Whittier (6 N. H. 88)
300 v. San Francisco (51 Cal. 52) 1164,
Hornback v. Cinc. & Z. R. Co. (20
1198
0. St. 81)
673 v. Savannah (T. Charlt. 173) 397
Hornbeck v. Westbrook (9 Johns. 73) 655, v. Shields (16 O. St. 184)
281
668 v. Shoemaker (35 Ind. 111) 291, 292,
Hornblower v. Dunden (35 Cal. 644) 553
494
Horner v. Coffey (25 Miss. 434) 674, 1031 Howard's Case (Hutton, 87)
242
Horney v. Sloan (i Smith, 136) 422 | Howard Co. Comr's v. Legg (93 Ind.
Hornstein v. Atl. & Gt. W. R. Co.
523)
881, 1249
(51 Pa. St. 87)
733, 1234 Howard County v. Paddock (110
Horst v. Moses (48 Ala. 129)
824
U.S. 384)
631
Horton v. Bristol (4 Lea, 39) 1157 | Howe, Re (1 Paige, 214)
668
v. Grand Haven (24 Mich. 465) 727 v. Boston (7 Cush. 273)
1147
v. Ipswich (12 Cush. 488) 1261, 1263, v. Crawford Co. Com’rs (47 Pa.
1286, 1300
St. 361)
1017
v. Mobile Sch. Com’rs (43 Ala.
v. Freeman (14 Gray, 566) 969
598)
85 v. Keeler (27 Conn. 538)
539
v. Nashville (4 Lea, 47)
1327 v. Lowell (101 Mass. 99) 1297, 1302
v. Taunton (97 Mass. 266) 1270 v. New Orleans (12 La. An. 481) 108,
v. Thompson (71 N. Y. 513) 226, 540,
1159, 1167, 1277, 1309, 1312
650, 1011 v. Norris (12 Allen, 82)
463
Hot Springs R. Co. v. Williamson
v Plainfield (41 N. H. 135) 1257, 1501
(45 Ark. 429) 1224, 1239 v. Plainfield Treas. (37 N. J. L.
Hotchin v. Kent (8 Mich. 526) 542
145)
78, 437, 494, 500
Hotchkiss v. Nat. Banks (21 Wall. Howell v. Bristol (8 Bush, 493) 722, 913,
354)
581
918
Houck v. Whitney (14 Grant, 671) 588 v. Buffalo (15 N. Y. 512) 940, 1146,
Houfe v. Fulton (29 Wis. 296) 790, 1258,
1183, 1187, 1190, 1191
1278 v. Buffalo (37 N. Y. 267) 913, 993,
v. Fulton (34 Wis. 608) 882, 1267
994
Hough v. Cook County Land Co. (73
v. Commonwealth (97 Pa. St.
Ill. 23)
671
332)
298
Houghton v. Davenport (23 Pick.
v. Peoria (90 Ill. 104)
1113
235)
347 v. Philadelphia (38 Pa. St. 471) 1000
Houghton's Case (Sir R. T. Boyd,
v. State (3 Gill, 14)
966
215)
447 Howerton v. Tate (66 N. C. 231)
1023
Hounsel v. Smyth (7 C. B. N. S. Howes v. Racine (21 Wis. 514) 1110,
729)
1312
1122
House v. Greensburg (93 Ind. 533), 138, Howland v. Luce (16 Johns. 135) 310
796 v. Vincent (10 Met. 371)
1312
v. Montgomery Co. Com’rs (60 Hoxie v. Somerset Co. Com’rs (25
Ind. 580)
1173, 1249, 1274
Me. 333)
1056
Householder v. Kansas City (83 Mo. Hoyle v. N. 0. City R. Co. (23 La.
488)
1224, 1243
An. 535)
846
Houseman v. Commonwealth (100
v. Plattsburgh & M. R. Co. (54
Pa. St. 222
328
N. Y. 314)
969
Houston v. Clay County (18 Ind. Hoyt, Re (13 Pet. 279)
1006
396)
323 v. Braden (27 Minn. 490)
644
v. Isaaks (68 Tex. 116) 1297, 1306 v. East Saginaw (19 Mich. 39) 395,
Houston & Tex. C. R. Co. v. Odum
914, 917, 919, 921, 933, 990
(53 Tex. 343)
841, 851 v. Hudson (27 Wis. 656) 1316, 1320,
Hovelman v. Kansas City H. R. Co.
1323, 1324
(79 Mo.. 632)
847, 849 v. N. Y. Tax Com’rs (23 N. Y.
Hover v. Barkhoof (44 N. Y. 113) 325
228)
964, 965
Hovey v. Mayo (43 Me. 322) 152, 814, v. Thompson's Ex. (19 N. Y.
815, 817, 819, 1223, 1231
207)
539
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
lxxxi
88
Page
Page
Hubbard v. Concord (35 N. H. 52) 1257, Hullin v. Municipality (11 Rob. 97) 711,
1261, 1266, 1269, 1272, 1273, 1296,
713
1302 Hullman v. Honcomp (5 0. St. 237) 352,
v. Fayette (70 Me. 121)
1286
1022
Lyndon (28 Wis. 674)
562 Humboldt City v. McCoy (23 Kan.
v. Mason (60 Iowa, 400)
1287
249)
84
v. St. Joseph & C. B. R. Co. (63 Huniboldt Tp. v. Long (92 U. S. 642) 581,
Mo. 68)
673
582, 593, 599, 604
v. Winsor (15 Mich. 146) 350 Hume v. New York (47 N. Y. 639) 1296,
Hubbell v. Viroqua (67 Wis. 343) 1160,
1298, 1299
1271 v. New York (74 N. Y. 264) 1274,
V. Waterloo (U. S. C. C. E.
1276
Wis.)
1046 Humes v. Knoxville (1 Humph. 403) 814,
v. Yonkers (104 N. Y. 434)
1259
1223
Huber v. Gazley (18 Ohio, 18) 757, 763, Hummel v. Brown (24 Pa. St 311) 570
787 Hummer v. Hummer (3 Greene (Ia.)
Hubert v. People (49 N. Y. 132)
42)
285, 509, 1078
Huddleson v. Ruffin (6 O. St. 604) 406, 420 Humphrey, Re (10 Wend. 612) 362
v. West Belleview (111 Pa. St.
v. Mears (1 M. & R. 187)
324
110)
1322 Humphreys v. Armstrong County
Hudmon v. Slaughter (70 Ala. 546) 1014
(56 Pa. St. 204) 881, 1285, 1300
Hudson v. Geary (4 R. I. 485) 468, 470 Hundley v. Lincoln Park Com’rs (67
v. Hoboken (41 N. J. L. 71) 425
Ill. 559)
927
v. Marietta (64 Ga. 286)
203 Huneman r. Fire District (37 Vt. 40) 216
v. Thorne (7 Paige, 261) 400, 404, Hunnewell Boston (106 Mass.
450, 472, 473, 474
350)
1124
Hudson C. Council v. Whitney (53 Hunnewinkle v. Georgetown (15
Mich. 158)
1007
Wall. 547)
1107
Hudson Co. Freeh, v. State (24 Hunt v. Ambruster (17 N. J. Eq.
N. J. L. 716) 77, 78, 363, 364,
208)
223, 224
365, 985
v. Boonville (65 Mo. 620) 957, 1187,
Hudson County Land, &c. Co. v.
1188, 1189, 1190, 1224, 1287
Seymour (35 N. J. L. 47) 102, v. Chicago (98 Ill. 147) 759, 849
107 v. Lambertville (4 N. J. L. 279) 384
Hudson River Br. Co. v. Patterson
v. New York (109 N. Y. 134) 1278,
(74 N. Y. 365)
966
1283
Hudson Teleph. Co. v. Jersey City
v. Norwich Sch. Dist. (14 Vt.
(49 N. J. L. 303)
830
300)
347, 348, 349
Huesing v. Rock Island (128 Ill. 465) 393 V. Philadelphia (35 Pa. St. 277) 429
Huff v. Knepp (5 N. Y. 65)
1044 v. Pownal (9 Vt. 418) 1263, 1264,
2. Lafayette (108 Ind. 14)
268
1278
v. Powesliek County (60 Iowa,
v. Rousmaniere's Adm. (1 Pet.
529)
1281
15; 8 Wheat. 174)
1152, 1153
Huffman v. Greenwood Co. Com'rs
v. Salem (121 Mass. 294) 1253
(23 Kan. 281)
316 v. Utica (18 N. Y. 442) 556, 707
v. San Joaquin County (21 Cal. Hunter v. Chandler (45 Mo. 452) 319,
426)
882, 1167, 1245, 1294
1088, 1089
Hugg v. Camden (29 N. J. Eq.6) 553 v. Field (20 Ohio, 340)
321
v. Camden (39 N. J. L. 620) 1012, v. Middleton (13 Ill. 50)
792
1071 v. Newport (5 R. I. 325)
705
Hughes v. Cairo (92 Ill. 339)
905 v. Sandy Hill Trs. (6 Hill (N. Y.),
v. Kline (30 Pa. St. 227)
1120
407) 738, 739, 743, 755, 767, 791
v. Parker (20 N. H. 58)
289, 352
v. Winsor (24 Vt. 327)
1203
v. Prov. & Worc. R. Co. (2 R. I. Huntington v. Breen (77 Ind. 29) 1298
493)
780, 852 Huntington Co. Com’rs v. Boyle (9
v. Sch. Dist. No. 29 (72 Mo. 643) 272
Ind. 296)
534
Huidekoper v. Dallas County (3 Dil- Huntley v. Luscombe (2 B. & P. 530) 503
Ion C. C. 171)
631 Huntsville v. Phelps (27 Ala. 55) 414
Hull v. Kansas City (54 Mo. 601) 1278 Hurber v. Baugh (43 Iowa, 514) 417
v. Marshall County (12 Iowa, Hurford v. Omaha (4 Neb. 336) - 146, 158,
142)
563
521, 898, 925, 915, 957, 1232
v. Oneida Co. Sup. (19 Johns. Hurlburt v. Litchfield (1 Root, 520) 1202
259)
1014, 1017 | Hurley 0. Miss. & R. R. Boom Co.
v. Richmond (2 W. & M. 337) 1255
(34 Minn. 143) 738, 739, 757, 769
VOL. I. - f
lxxxii
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
Page
Page
Huron D. Council v. London Dist. Illinois State Hosp. for Insane v.
Ct. (4 U. C. Q. B. 302) 1139
Higgins (15 Ill. 185) 262, 1030
Hussen v. Rochester (65 N. Y. 516) 722 Ilsley v. Stubbs (5 Mass. 283)
223
Huston o. Fort Atkinson (56 Wis.
v. Imberry (17 Ind. 175) 375, 377
350)
819 Imlay v. Union B. R. Co. (26 Conn.
Hutchings v. Scott (4 Halst. 218) 493, 507
249)
868
Hutchins v. Littleton (124 Mass. 289) Imler v. Springfield (55 Mo. 119) 814,
1302
1223, 1316, 1320, 1324, 1331, 1332
Hutchinson v. Parkersburg (25 W. Imperial Land Co. of Marseilles, Re
Va. 226)
814, 1224, 1245
(L. R. 11 Eq. 478)
594
v. Pratt (11 Vt. 402) 370, 371, 377, Inchbald v. Robinson (L. R. 4 Ch.
765, 766
Ap. 388)
448
v. Trenton Bd. of H. (39 N. J. Independence v. Moore (32 Mo. 392) 437,
Eq. 569)
398
471
Hutson v. New York (9 N. Y. 163) 1274, Independent Sch. Dist. v. Burlington
1280, 1295, 1298
(60 Iowa, 500)
398
Hutton v. Camden (39 N. J. L. 122) 443 Indiana v. Woram (6 Hill, 33)
55
v. Windsor (34 U. C. Q. B. 487) 1255, Indiana Cent. R. Co. v. Hunter (8
1265, 1266, 1300
Ind. 74)
720, 733
Huydekoper v. Buchanan County (3
v. Oakes (20 Ind. 9)
718
Dillon C. C. 175)
594 Indianapolis v. Blythe (2 Ind. 75) 440
v. Dallas County (3 Dillon C. C.
v. Cook (99 Ind. 10)
1273
171)
631 v. Croas (7 Ind. 9) 744, 753, 787, 788,
Hyatt v. Rondout Trs. (44 Barb. 385) 1267
795, 806
Hyde, Re (15 Hun (N. Y.), 477) 993 v. Doherty (71 Ind. 5)
1258
v. Franklin County (27 Vt. 185) 562 v. Emmelman (108 Ind. 530) 1259
v. Jamaica (27 Vt. 442) 760, 1252, v. Geisel (19 Ind. 344)
336
1284 V. Huegle (18 N. E. R. 172) 435
Hyde Park v. Bordon (94 Ill. 26) 795, v. Huffer (30 Ind. 235)
1327
942, 1123 v. Imberry (17 Ind. 175) 375, 377,
v. Chicago (124 Ill. 156) 1092, 1096
945
v. Dunham (85 Ill. 569)
735 v. Indianapolis Gasl. & C. Co.
v. Ingalls (87 Ill. 11)
1124
(66 Ind. 396) 140, 141, 147, 154,
v. Oakwoods Cem. Assoc. (119
157, 219, 250, 386, 393, 512, 513,
Ill. 141)
705
218, 549, 550, 823, 824, 826
v. Spencer (118 Ill. 446)
982 v. Indianapolis Home for F. W.
v. Washington Ice Co. (117 III.
(50 Ind. 213)
105
233)
735 v. Kingsbury (101 Ind. 200) 695, 746,
Hydes v. Jojes (4 Bush, 464) 154, 958
751, 759
Hymes y. Aydelott (26 Ind. 431) 726 v. Lawyer (38 Ind. 348) 957, 1317
v. McAvoy (86 Ind. 587) 263, 1146
v. McClure (2 Ind. 147)
882
I.
v. Mansur (15 Ind. 112) 921, 982
v. Murphy (91 Ind. 382)
1297
Idaho Springs v. Filteau (10 Col. 105)
v. Patterson (112 Ind. 344) 750
1184, 1186 v. Wright (19 Ind. 346)
336
v. Woodward (10 Col. 104) 1184, v. Scott (72 Ind. 196)
1297
1186 v. Skeen (17 Ind. 628)
523
Illinois v. Ill. Cent. R. Co. (33 Fed. Indianapolis & B. R. Co. v. Indian-
R. 730)
88, 170, 171, 175, 177,
apolis (12 Ind. 620) 674, 752,
748, 750
767, 770
Illinois & Mich. Canal Trs. v. Chi- Indianapolis & Cinc. R. Co. v. Law-
cago (12 Ill. 403)
706
renceburg (34 Ind. 304) 849, 852,
v. Havens (11 Ill. 554) 743, 792
1135
v. People (12 Ill. 248)
1056 v. State (37 Ind. 489) 1007, 1008,
Illinois & St. L. R. & C. Co. v. St.
1018, 1315
Louis (2 Dillon C. C. 70) 157, Indianapolis St. L. R. Co. v. Cal.
165, 168, 175
vert (110 Ind. 555)
850
Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Bloomington Indianapolis, B. & W. R. Co. v. Hart-
(76 III. 447)
866
ley (67 Ill. 439) 777, 833, 841,
v. C. B. & N. R. Co. (122 Ill. 473) 809
842, 843, 854, 856, 1241, 1316
v. Galena (40 III. 344) 808, 858 v. Smith (52 ind. 428)
1315
Illinois Ins. Co. v. Littlefield (67 Ill. Indianapolis C. Council v. McLean (8
368)
747, 752, 755, 760
Ind. 328)
952
1
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
Ixxxiii
Page
Page
Indianapolis, P. & C. R. Co. v. Hood Irwin v. Great Southern Telephone
(66 Ind. 580)
672
Co. (37 La. An. 63) 447, 780,
v. Ross (47 Ind. 25)
801, 955
830, 831
Inđianapolis Water. v. Burkhart (41
v. Lowe (89 Ind. 540)
589
Ind. 364)
692, 706 v. Mariposa (22 U. C. C. P. 367) 221
Indianola v. Jones (29 Iowa, 282) 367, v. Mobile (57 Ala. 6) 916, 982
368, 523 v. Ontario (3 Fed. R. 49)
596
Industrial School &c. (45 Md. 310). Isaacson, Re (36 La. An. 56)
325
[See St. Mary's, &c.]
Iske v. Newton (54 Iowa, 586) 1129
Industrial Sch. Dist. v. Whitehead Isom v. Miss. Cent. R. Co. (36 Miss.
(13 N. J. Eq. 290)
142
300)
733
Ingle v. Jones (43 Iowa, 286)
138 | Ison v. Manley (76 Ga. 804)
449
Inglis v. Gt. Northern Ry. Co. (16 E. Israel v. Jacksonville (2 Ill. 290) 477, 478
L. & Eq. 55)
370, 408
v. Jewett (29 Iowa, 475)
733
v. Hughes (61 Ind. 212)
43 Ives v. Hulet (12 Vt. 314)
323
v. State (61 Ind. 212)
323 Ivinson v. Hance (1 Wy. Ter. 270) 186
Ingraham, Re (64 N. Y. 310) 986 Ivory r. Deer Park (116 N. Y. 476) 1268
v. Chicago, D. & M. R. Co. (34
Iowa, 249)
841, 848
Ingram v, St. Tammany Par. Pol.
J.
Jury (20 La. An. 226) 801
Inhabitants of Congressional Tp., 11, Jacks v. Helena (41 Ark. 313) 626
&c. (9 Ind. 224). [See Con- Jackson v. Bellevieu (30 Wis. 250) 1263
gressional Tp., &c.]
v. Bowman (39 Miss. 671) 157, 518
Inhabitants of Ipswich, Pet. (13 Pick.
v. Cory (8 Johns. 385) 655, 669
431). (See Ipswich, &c.]
v. Hartwell (8 Johns. 422) 655, 662,
Inman r. Tripp (11 R. I. 520) 1222, 1318,
669
1321 v. Hathaway (15 Johns. 447) 746,
Innes v. Wylie (1 Car. & K. 257) 336, 338
817
Insane Hospital, &c. (15 Ill. 185).
v. Hyde (28 U. C. Q. B. 294) 1262
(See Illinois State Hosp., &c.]
v. Le Roy (5 Cow. 397)
656
Intendant, &c. (6 Ala. 899). (See
v. Morris (i Denio, 199)
223
Marion Council, &c.]
v. Newman (59 Miss. 385) 941
(31 Ala. 542.)
542.). (See Living
v. People (9 Mich. 111) 450, 510, 809,
ston Council, &c.]
1126, 1130
Iowa City v. Foster (10 Iowa, 189) 314 v. Phillips (14 Allen, 59)
657
Iowa College Trs. v. Davenport (7
v. Pike (9 Čow. 61)
662
Iowa, 213)
716 v. Pratt (10 Johns. 381)
274
Iowa R. Land Co. ú. Sac County (39
v. Vicksburg, S. & T.R. Co. (2
Iowa, 124)
1042
Woods, 141)
650
Ipswich, Pet. (13 Pick. 431)
264 v. York & C. R. Co. (48 Me. 147) 560
Ipswich Mills v. Essex Co. Com'rs Jackson County v. Applewhite (62
(108 Mass. 363) 698, 1187
Ind. 464)
549, 1144
Ipswich Tailors' Case (11 Rep. 54 Jackson Co. H. Ry. Co. v. Interstate
a). (See Taylors of Ips-
R. T. Co. (24 Fed. R. 306) 880
wich, &c.]
Jackson Co. Sup. v. Brush (77 Ill.
Ireland v. Metrop. Elev. Ry. Co. (20
59) 154, 239, 240, 581, 1110
J. & S. 450)
878 Jacksonport v. Watson (33 Ark. 704) 227,
Irish v. Webster (5 Me. 171)
321
236, 1110, 1111
Iron Co., &c. (7 Cow. 540). (See Jacksonville v. Ætna S. F. Engine
Peru Iron Co., &c.
Co. (20 Fla. 100)
217
Iron R. R. Co. v. Ironton (19 O. St.
v. Basnett (20 Fla. 525)
911
299)
168 v. Drew (19 Fla. 106) 881, 1304
Ironton v. Kelley (38 0. St. 50)
v. Holland (19 III. 271)
480
1296, 1303 v. Jacksonville R. Co. (67 III.
Irvin v. Devors (65 Mo. 625)
389
540) 739, 764, 768, 769, 770
v. N. O., St. L. & C. R. Co. (94
v. Lambert (62 Ill. 519)
1323
Ill. 105)
965 v. L'Engle (20 Fla. 344)
269
Irvine v. Wood (51 N. Y. 224) 832, 888, Jacksonville, N. & S. R. Co v. Vir-
1309, 1310, 1311
den (104 III. 339)
638
Irwin v. Bradford (22 U. C. C. P. Jacksonville R. Co. v. Jacksonville
19)
1270
(114 Ill. 562)
206
v. Dixion (9 How. 10) 750, 751, 752, Jacksonville Trs. v. McConnel (12
765
Ill. 138)
147, 953, 969
1295,
lxxxiv
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
Paga
Page
Jacob v. Louisville (9 Dana, 114) 733 Jeffersonville v. Weems (5 Ind. 547) 268
Jacobs, Re (98 N. Y. 98)
211 Jeffersonville, M. & I. R. Co. v. Bar-
v. Bangor (16 Me. 187)
1300
bour (89 Ind. 375)
672
v. Hamilton Co. Com’rs (4 Fisher Jefferys v. Gurr (2 B. & Ad. 841) 75
Pat. Cas. 81)
43, 1180 Jeffries v. Ankeney (11 Ohio, 374) 326
Jaeger 2. Burr (36 O. St. 164)
912 v. Lawrence (42 Iowa, 498) 626, 939
Jager v. Doherty (61 Ind. 528) 1112 Jelliff v. Newark (48 N. J. L. 101) 959
James v. Milwaukee (16 Wall. 159) 238, Jenkins v. Andover (103 Mass. 94) 234,
620
573, 906, 1098
v. Pine Bluff (49 Ark. 199) 979 v. Cheyenne (1 Wy. Ter. 287) 478
v. Portage (5 N. W. R. 31) 1267 v. Thomasville (35 Ga. 145) 500
2. Putney (Cro. Car. 498)
484 v. Waldron (11 Johns. 114) 326
v. San Francisco (6 Cal. 528) 1300, Jenks v. Chicago (56 Ill. 397)
958
1303 v. Chicago (48 Ill. 296)
984
James River Co. v. Anderson (12
v. Lima Tp. (17 Ind. 326) 1148, 1149
Leigh, 276)
776, 834
v. Osceola Tp. (45 Iowa, 554) 162,
Jameson v. People (16 Ill. 257) 139, 140,
163
776 v. Wilbraham (11 Gray, 142) 1264
Jamestown 2. Chicago, B. & N. R. Jenner v. Jolliffe (9 Jolins. 382) 326
Co. (69 Wis. 648)
850 Jenning's Case (12 Mod. 402)
307
Jamison 1. Fopiana (43 Mo. 565) 679 Jennings, Re (6 Cow. 518) 1059, 1070
v. Springfield (53 Mo. 224) 718, 733 v. Fisher (103 Ind. 112)
388
Janesville 2. Markoe (18 Wis. 350) 144 v. Le Roy (63 Cal. 397)
1225
Janey's Executors v. Latane (4 Leigh,
v. Tisbury (5 Gray, 73) 760, 761, 762
327)
668 v. Van Schaick (108 N. Y. 530) 1311
Jansen v. Atchison (16 Kan. 358) 1262, Jennings County v. Verbarg (63 Ind.
1274, 1280, 1305, 1314
107)
549
v. Ostrander (1 Cow. 670) 321 Jennison v. Kirk (98 U. S. 461) 1216
January v. Johnson County (3 Dil- Jensen v. Polk Co. Sup. (47 Wis.
lon C. C. 392)
634
298)
126
Janvrin v. Exeter (48 N. H. 83) 209 Jersey City r. Central R. Co. (40
Jarman v. Patterson (7 Mon. 644) 418
N. J. Eq. 417)
788
Jarrolt v. Moberly (5 Dillon C. C.
v. Dummer (20 N. J. L. 106) 748
253)
631 v. Fitzpatrick (30 N. J. Eq. 97) 790
v. Moberly (103 U. S. 580) 626, 630 v. Horton (38 N. J. L. 88) 162
Jarvis v. Barnard (30 Vt. 492)
1203 v. J. C. & B. R. Co. (20 N. J.
v. Dean (3 Bing. 447)
744
Eq. 360) 94, 143, 841, 849, 861
2. New York (2 N. Y. L. Obs.
v. Lembeck (31 N. J. Eq. 255) 1093
396)
319, 339
v. Morris Canal & B. Co. (12
v. Shelby (62 Ind. 257)
557
N. J. Eq. 547) 745, 748, 749, 760,
Jasper County v. Ballou (103 U. S.
800, 801, 803
745)
635, 637, 646 v. O’Callaghan (4 N. J. L. 349) 1152
Jay's Case (1 Vent. 302)
327, 340 v. Quaife (26 N. J. L. 63)
312
Jefferson Branch Bank v. Skelly (1
ads. Riker (38 N. J. L. 225) 1148,
Black, 436)
953
1152
Jefferson City v. Courtmire (9 Mo.
v. Sackett (44 N. J. L. 428) 719
683)
437, 470 v. State (30 N. J. L. 521) 366, 760,
v. Curry (71 Mo. 85)
658
794, 797, 800, 803, 1129
v. McCarty (74 Mo. 55)
998 Jersey City & B. R. Co. v. J. C. &
v. Opel (49 Mo. 190)
953
H. H. R. Co. (20 N. J. Eq. 61)
v. Whipple (71 Mo. 521) 996, 1000
841, 863, 864, 868, 869, 871, 879,
Jefferson County v. Arrighi (54
880
Miss. 668)
540, 566 Jersey City & Hob. H. R. Co. v. J.
v. Cowan (54 Mo. 234)
979
C. & B. R. Co. (21 N. J. Eq.
2. People (5 Neb. 136)
125
550)
847
v. Slagle (66 Pa. St. 202)
361 v. Hudson (13 N. J. Eq. 420) 454, 829
Jefferson Par. Pol. Jury v. McCor- Jersey City Water Com’rs Re (31 N.
mack (32 La. An. 624) 272. 769
J. L. 72)
711
29. Villabiabo (12 La. An. 788) 422 Jessen v. Sweigert (66 Cal. 182) 1312
Jefferson ville 2. Ferry Co. (27 Ind. Jeter v. Hewitt (22 How. 352) 1036
100)
172, 179, 182 Jett v. Richmond (73 Ind. 316) 435
v. Ferry Co. (35 Ind. 19) 166, 172, 534 Jex v. New York (111 N. Y. 339) 1149
v. Patterson 132 Ind. 140) 292, 996, Jewett v. New Haven (38 Conn. 368) 1198,
1107
1199
1
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
lxxxv
S. 19)
:
Page
Page
Jewhurst v. Syracuse (108 N. Y. Johnston v. Dist. Columbia (118 U.
303)
1266
1318, 1326
Johnı 2. Cincinnati, R. & Ft. W. R.
v. Irwin (3 S. & R. 291)
797
Co. (35 Ind. 539)
230 v. Macon (62 Ga. 645)
957
John & Cherry Streets, Re (19 Wend.
v. Trenton (43 N. J. L. 166) 914
659)
690, 694, 747, 771 Johnstone v. Scott (11 Mich. 232) 740
Johnes v. State Aud. (4 0. St. 493) 1063 v. Wilson (2 N. H. 202) 321, 349
Johns v. Nicholls (2 Dallas, 184) 329 Joliet v. Conway (119 Ill. 489) 1288
Johnson, Re (73 Cal. 228) 441, 452, 505 v. Harwood (86 Ill. 110)
1306
v. Alameda County (14 Cal.
v. Seward (86 Ill. 402)
1297, 1306
106)
719 v. Verley (35 Ill. 58) 158, 882, 1158,
v. Allen (62 Ind. 57)
980
1258, 1263, 1281
2. Americus (46 Ga. 80) 295, 296, 499 Jonas v. Cincinnati (18 Ohio, 318) 201,
v. Barclay (16 N. J. L. 1)
500
940, 942
v. Boston (118 Mass. 44) 1269 Jones, Re (78 Ala. 419)
149
v. Drummond (20 Gratt. 419) 965 Re (7 Exch. 586)
295
v. Haverhill (35 N. H. 74) 1255, 1257, V. Andover (9 Pick. 146) 349, 360, 361,
1283
762
v. Hudson River R. Co. ( 6 Duer,
v. Bird (5 B. & Al. 837)
1331
631)
1289 v. Boston (104 Mass. 75) 1256, 1276
v. Indianapolis C. Council (16
v. Boston (104 Mass. 401) 715, 1093,
Ind. 227)
260, 556
1125
v. Irasburgh (47 Vt. 28)
1287 v. Carmarthen (8 M. & W. 805) 312
v. Jacqui (27 N. J. Eq. 552) 828 v. Columbus (25 Ga. 610) 235
v. Joliet & C. R. Co. (23 Ill. 202) 709 v. Columbus (62 Ind. 422)
899
v. Lambpton (40 U. C. Q. B.
v. Firemen's Fund Ins. Co. (2
297)
281
Daly, 307)
386
v. Lexington (14 B. Mon. 648) 969 2. Jefferson (66 Tex. 576) 1052
v. Mann (77 Va. 265)
304 v. Lancaster (4 Pick. 149) 534
v. Milwaukee (40 Wis. 315) 914 v. Little Rock (25 Ark. 301) 563
v. Milwaukee (46 Wis. 568) 1267, v. Loving (55 Miss. 109) 318, 326, 391
1299, 1301 v. McAlpine (64 Ala. 511) 389
v. Municipality (5 La. An. 100) 1190, V. Mersey Docks (11 H. L. C.
1197
443)
1208
v. Norway (Winch, 37)
247 v. New Haven (34 Conn. 1) 108, 1201,
v. Oregon City (2 Or. 327) 969
1253, 1276, 1277, 1331
v. Parkersburg (16 W. Va. 402) 1224, v. Richmond (18 Gratt. 517) 513,
1245
1164, 1197
v. Philadelphia (47 Pa. St. 382) 201 v. Robbins (8 Gray, 329)
507
v. Philadelphia (69 Pa. St. 445) 157, v. Schulmeyer (39 Ind. 119) 1002
425, 427 v. Soulard (24 How. 41)
264
v. Simonton (43 Cal. 342) 217, 387, v. Stanstead, S. & C. R. Co. (L.
442, 468
R. 4 P. C. 98)
718
v. Stanley (1 Root, 245)
324 24. State Auditor (4 0. St. 493) 1063
v. Stark County (24 Ill. 75) 561, 569 v. Waltham (4 Cush. 299) 1257
v. Stedman (3 Ohio, 94)
321 v. Williams (Ambl. 651)
1115
v. Thorndike (56 Me. 32) 1116 Jonesboro v. Cairo & St. L. R. Co.
v. Whitefield (18 Me. 286) 1266, 1269
(110 U. S. 192)
v. Wilson County (34 Kan. 670) 1108 v. McKee (2 Yerg. 167)
997
Johnson Co. Com’rs v. Hicks (2 Ind. Jordan v. Cass County (3 Dillon C. C.
527)
1009
185, 245)
575, 631, 1054
v. January (94 U. S. 202) 593, 595 v. Hannibal (87 Mo. 673) 1247
v. January (94 U. S. 631)
593 v. Lisbon Sch. Dist. (38 Me. 164) 322,
Johnston v. Becker Co. Com’rs (27
347, 349, 377, 541
Minn. 64)
946 Joyce v. Woods (78 Ky. 386) 449, 970
v. Boyle (8 U. C. Q. B. 142) 741 Joyner v. Egremont Sch. Dist. (3
v. Charlestown (1 Bay, 441) 283, 289,
Cush. 567)
1146
741 Judge v. Meriden (38 Conn. 90) 454, 1202,
v. Charleston (3 S. C. 232) 1166, 1305,
1328, 1334
1311 Judkins v. Hill (50 N. H. 140) 283
v. Cleveland Co. Com’rs (67 N. C. Judson v. Bridgeport (25 Conn. 426) 707,
101)
1072
710
v. Dist. Columbia (1 Mackey,
v. Reardon (16 Minn. 431) 483
427)
1327 | Juilliard v. Greenman (110 U. S. 421) 195
87, 231
lxxxvi
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
L. 91)
Page
Page
Juker v. Commonwealth (20 Pa. Katzenberger v. Aberdeen (121 U.S.
484)
276
172)
134, 231, 626
Julia Build. Assoc. v. Bell Teleph.
v. Aberdeen (16 Fed. R. 745) 235
Co. (88 Mo. 258) 830, 831, 1243 Kavanaugh v. Sanders (8 Me. 442) 300
Junction R. Co. v. Philadelphia (88 Kaveny v. Troy (108 N. Y. 571) 1260
Pa. 424)
914, 921 Kayser v. Bremen Trs. (16 Mo. 88) 72,
Junkins v. Doughty Falls Union Sch.
265
Dist. 139 Me. 220) 360, 524 Kean v. Asch (27 N. J. Eq. 57) 709
Justice v. Logansport (101 Ind. 320) 899, Kearney, Re (7 Wheat. 38)
332
1002 v. Andrews (10 N. J. Eq. 70) 291,
Justices of A. County Court, &c.
298, 487
[See A. Co. Ct. Jus. &c. The
v. Covington (1 Met. (Ky.) 339) 556,
following plaintiffs may not
557
always have been fully
v. London, B. & S. C. Ry. Co.
named
in citing: Bibb
(L. R. 5 Q. B. 411)
1270
County, &c. (12 Ga. 137), Kearny, Ex p. (55 Cal. 212)
397
Clarke, &c. (11 B. Mon. Keasy v. Louisville (4 Dana, 154) 1225
143), King William, &c. (2 Keating v. Cincinnati (38 0. St.
Leigh, 168), Pike, &c. (9 Ga.
141)
1227
475) and (15 Ga. 39), and
v. Kansas City (84 Mo. 415) 518,
Randolph (13 Gratt. 523.]
1157
Justices' Opinion (38 Me. Appendix) 280 v. Sparrow (1 Ball & B. 367) 420
(58 Me. 591)
895 Keckely 2. St. John's Par. R. Com’rs
(7 Mass. 525)
47, 280
(4 McCord, 257)
423
(15 Mass. 537)
47, 280 Keeler v. Frost (22 Barb. 400)
361
(6 Cush. 580)
268, 271 v. Milledge (24 N. J. L. 142) 479, 481,
482, 483, 510
Keeley v. Atlanta (69 Ga. 583) 971
K.
Keen v. Driggs Drain Co. (45 N. J.
932
Kaime v. Harty (4 Mo. App. 357) 392, 750 Keene v. Bristol (26 Pa. St. 46) 721
Kaiser v. Weise (85 Pa. 366)
975 Keeney v. Hudson (27 N. J. L. 362) 528
Kalbrier v. Leonard (34 Ind. 497) 975 Keese v. Denver (10 Col. 112)
980, 990
Kane v. Baltimore (15 Md. 240) 690, 698, Kehrer v Richmond (81 Va. 745) 1220,
706
1320
v. People (4 Neb. 509)
285 Keith v. Brockton (136 Mass. 119) 1260
Kankakee 2. Ætna L. Ins. Co. (106
v. Easton (2 Allen, 552) 1256, 1257,
U. S. 668)
572
1265, 1267, 1270, 1276
v. K. & Ind. R. Co. (115 Ill. 88) 553 Keithsburg v. Frick (34 Íll. 405) 542, 635,
v. Potter (119 Ill. 327)
982
637, 616
Kapsas v. &c. (34 Kan. 434). See Kellar v. Savage (17 Me. 444 ; 20 Me.
State, &c.]
199)
321, 371, 374 ·
Kansas City v. Clark (68 Mo. 588) 392 Keller v. Corpus Christi (50 Tex.
v. Corrigan (86 Mo. 67)
866
614) 213, 1163, 1164, 1166
v. Flanagan (69 Mo. 22) 146, 482, 520 v. Hicks (22 Cal. 457)
565
v. Huling (87 Mo. 203)
985 v. Hyde (20 Cal. 593)
1030
v. Johnson (78 Mo. 661)
900, 947
v. State (11 Md. 525) 904, 970
v. Payne (71 Mo. 159)
1000 Kelley v. Brooklyn (4 Hill (N. Y.),
v. Swope (79 Mo. 446)
145
263) 193, 195, 521, 562, 563, 568
v. White (69 Mo. 261)
391 v. Kennard (60 N. H. 1)
662
Kansas City, St. J. & C. B. R. Co. v.
v. Lindsey (7 Gray, 287)
1144
Nodaway Co. Ct. Jus. (47
v. Milan (127 U. S. 139) 195, 235, 236,
Mo. 349)
631
237, 572, 626, 1038, 1141
Kansas Pac. R. Co. v. Wyandotte
[See also Kelley v. Milan.]
Co. Com’rs (16 Kans. 587) 1147, Kellinger v. Forty-Second Street, &c.
1148, 1149, 1151
R. Co. (50 N. Y. 206) 792, 794,
Karst v. St. Paul, S. & T. F. R. Co.
795, 863, 867, 870, 871
(22 Minn. 118) 157, 814, 852, Kellogg v. Ely (15 0. St. 64) 980, 1152
1225 v. Janesville (34 Minn. 132) 1272
v. Stillwater & T. F. R. Co. (22
v. Northampton (4 Gray, 65; 8
Minn. 118)
1219
Gray, 504) 1256, 1258, 1265,
Karwisch v. Atlanta (44 Ga. 204) 468
1266, 1269
Kathman v. New Orleans (11 La. An.
v. Thompson (66 N. Y. 88) 801, 1316,
145)
88
1317
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
lxxxvii
Page
Page
Kelly v. Baltimore (53 Md. 134) 1111, Kenosha v. Lamson (9 Wall. 477) 86,
1119
120, 184, 561, 568, 584, 586, 635
v. Baltimore (65 Md. 171) 815 Kensington Com’rs v. Wood (10 Pa.
v. Chicago (62 Ill. 279) 546, 1015,
St. 93)
1220, 1320, 1333
1116 Kent 2. Cheyenne (2 Wy. Ter. 6) 1160
2. Cleveland (34 O. St. 468) 920 v. Dickinson (25 Gratt. 817) 1006
v. Columbus (41 O. St. 263) 1259, v. Walton (7 Wend. 256)
520
1265, 1312
v. Worthing Local Bd. (L. R. 10
2. Fond du Lac (31 Wis. 179) 1267
Q. B. D. 118)
1206
v. Madison (43 Wis. 688) 1142 Kent County v. Grand Rapids (61
v. Milan (21 Fed. R. 842) 145, 235,
Mich. 144)
773
236, 572, 601 Kentucky v. Dennison (24 How..66) 55,
See also Kelley v. Milan.)
1005
v. Milwaukee (18 Wis. 83) 151, 153, Kentucky Seminary v. Wallace (15
1158
B. Mon. 35)
260, 262
v. New York (11 N. Y. 432) 1306, Keogh v. Wilmington (4 Del. Ch.
1307, 1308
491)
547, 1014
v. Pittsburgh (85 Pa. St. 170) 264, Keokuk v. Dressell (47 Iowa, 597) 478
972, 975 v. K. &c. Packet Co. (45 Iowa,
v. Pittsburgh (104 U. S. 78) 923, 972
196)
165, 168, 169, 178
v. Toronto (23 U. C. Q. B. 426) 461 v. K. Indep. Sch. Dist. (53 Iowa,
v. Wimberly (61 Miss. 548) 1028,
352)
1262, 1273, 1313
1067, 1079 v. Scroggs (39 Iowa, 447)
388
Kelly's Case (8 Gratt. 632)
760 Keokuk, &c. Packet Co. v. Keokuk
Kelly's Lessee v. Greenfield (2 H. &
(95 U. S. 80)
165
McH. 132)
798, 803 Kepner v Commonwealth (40 Pa. St.
Kelsey v. Glover (15 Vt. 708) 1255
124)
351, 385, 407
v. King (32 Barb. 410) 818, 828 Kepple v. Keokuk (61 Iowa, 653) 814,
v. King (33 How. Pr. 39)
743
1224
v. Wright (1 Root, 83) 303, 304 Kerlin v. Campbell (15 Pa. St. 500) 659
Kelsh v. Dyersville (68 Iowa, 137) 130 Kerr v. Corry (105 Pa. St. 282) 613
Kemper v. Louisville (14 Bush, 87) 499, v. Dougherty (79 N. Y. 327) 661
1.226, 1317 2. Preston (L. R. 6 Ch. D. 463) 1166
Kendall 2. King (17 C. B. 483)
184, 274
2. So. Park Com’rs (117 U. S.
v. Post (8 Or. 14)
727, 817
379)
730, 736
2:. Stokes (3 How. 87) 320, 1005, 1058 v. Trego (47 Pa. 292) 287, 289, 352,
v. United States (12 Pet. 524) 1005,
354, 355, 1020, 1021, 1023
1015, 1044, 1048 Ketchum v. Buffalo (14 N. Y. 356) 184,
Kendell 2. Camden (47 N J. L. 64) 284,
185, 194, 199, 456, 457, 564, 657,
287
784, 1113
Kenicott v. Wayne Co. Sup. (16 Wall. Kettering v. Jacksonville (50 Ill. 39) 76,
425)
593, 614
432, 485
Kennard v. Cass County (3 Dillon Kettle v. Fremont (1 Neb. 329) 787, 794
C. C. 147)
576 Keyes v. Tait (19 Iowa, 123)
754
v. Morgan (92 U. S. 480)
922 2. Westford (17 Pick. 273) 147, 360,
Kennedy v. Covington (8 Dana, 50) 175, ,
525
671, 769 Keys v. Marcellas (50 Mich. 439)
v. Covington (17 B. Mon. 567)
1259, 1266
v. Cumberland (65 Md. 514) 761, 762 Keyser v. Sunapee Sch. Dist. (35
v. Municipality (10 La. An. 54) 658
N. H. 477)
360, 539, 541
v. Newman (1 Sandf. 187) 709 Kibele v. Philadelphia (105 Pa. St
v. New York (73 N. Y. 365) 1205,
41)
1206, 1214, 1297, 1331
1259 Kidd v. Pearson (128 U. S. 1)
213
v. Phelps (10 La. An. 227) 445, 450, Kidder v. Peoria (29 III. 77) 707, 709
451, 454 Kidderminster v. Hardwick (L. R. 9
v. Phila. Bd. of H. (2 Pa. St. 369) 450
Exch. 13)
538
v. Sacramento (19 Fed. R. 580) 1028 Kidderminster T. 'Council v. Court (1
v. Sowden (1 McMullan L. 323) 413,
E. & E. 770)
346
419, 426 Kieffer v. Ehler (18 Pa. St. 388) 583
v. Troy (77 N. Y. 493)
1127 Kiernan, Re (62 N. Y. 457) 979, 981
v. Washington (3 Cranch C. C. Kilbourne v. St. John (59 N. Y. 21) 1114
596)
1014 v. Thompson (103 U. S. 168) 332
Kennison v. Beverly (146 Mass. 467) 1323, Kile v. Yellowhead (80 III. 208) 6.94
1333 | Kiley v. Cranor (51 Mo. 541)
371
1258,
177
lxxxviii
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
Page
Page
Kiley v. Forsee (57 Mo. 390) 297, 395 King v. Bird (13 East, 367)
391
v. Kansas City (69 Mo. 102) 454, v. Bond (6 D. & R. 333)
309
1277 v. Bower (2 D. & R. 761)
306
v. Kansas City (87 Mo. 103) 1159 v. Bower (1 B. & Cr. 492, 585) 306,
Kimball v. Boston (1 Allen, 417) 1193,
343
1196 v. Brecknock & A. Canal Co. (3
v. Cusliman (103 Mass. 194) 1269
A. & E. 217)
1059, 1061
v. Kenosha (4 Wis. 321) 690, 794 v. Bridgman (2 Str. 1203)
379
v. Lamprey (19 N. H. 215) 350, 378, v. Bristol (1 D. & R. 389; 5 B. &
1026
Ald. 731)
1026
v. Marshall (44 N. H. 465) 350, 362 v. Bristol Dock Co. (6 B. & C.
v. Rockland (71 Me. 137)
719
181)
1014, 1017
v. Rosendale (42 Wis. 407) 80, 635, v. Broughton (5 Burr. 2700) 1240
1304 v. Brown (3 D. & E. T. R. 574) 1086
v. Roxbury Sch. Dist. (28 Vt. 8) 541 v. Buller (8 East, 388)
1026
Kimble v. White W. Val. Canal Co.
v. Bumstead (2 B. & Ad. 699) 277,
(1 Ind. 285)
718, 720
291
Kinmish v. Ball (129 U. S. 217) 214 v. Butler (15 Johns. 281)
323
Kincaid v. Hardin County (53 Iowa,
v. Cambridge (4 Burr. 2008) 278,
430) 1170, 1172, 1173, 1174
1019, 1023, 1025, 1064
Kincaid's Appeal (66 Pa. St. 411) 444 v. Cambridge (2 D. & E. T. R.
Kinder v. Gillespie (63 Ill. 88) 418, 420,
461)
1069
471 v. Campion (1 Sid. 14) 1026, 1071
Kine v. Defenbaugh (64 Ill. 291) 727 v. Carlile (6 C. & P. 636) 785, 885,
King v. Abington (1 Ld. Raym. 561)
886
1019, 1064 v. Carlisle (Fortesc. 200)
335
v. Abington (2 Salk. 699) 1064, 1065, v. Carlisle (1 Str. 385)
364
1068 v. Carmarthen (1 M. & S. 697) 338
v. Allen (2 U. C. Q. B. 101) 746 v. Carter (Cowp. 59)
342, 343
V. Amery (2 D. & E. T. R. 515;
v. Chalke (1 Ld. Raym. 225; 5
4 16. 122; 2 Bro. P. C. 336) 241,
Mod. 257) 327, 336, 337, 338, 339,
248, 265, 1089
340
v. Andover (1 L. Raym. 710) 333 v. Chalke (Comb. 397)
335
v. Andover (3 Salk. 229)
336 v. Chase (15 N. H. 1)
1313
v. Archd. of Middlesex (3 A. &
v. Chester (1 M. & S. 101) 151, 158
E. 615)
1061 2. Chester (2 D. & E. T. R. 565) 1083
v. Ashwell (12 East, 22) 391, 414 v. Chitty (5 Ad. & E. 609) 277, 291,
v. Atkins (3 Burr. 1706)
447
336
V. Atkins (3 Mod. 3)
301, 342
v. Clapham (1 Wils. 305)
378
v. Atwood (4 B. & Ad. 481) 488 v. Clark (1 East, 38)
1078
V. Axbridge (2 Cowp. 523) 318, 338, v. Clarke (2 Ld. Raym. 848) 1068
1026, 1071 v. Cleveland (28 Fed. R. 835) 1303
v. Axbridge (2 D. & E. T. R. 182)
v. Colchester (2 D. & E. T. R.
338
259)
1019, 1023
v. Babb (3 D. & E. T. R. 579) 379, v. Com’rs of Fens (2 Keble, 43) 509
1027 v. Com’rs of Sewers (1 B. & Ad.
v. Bailiffs of Eye (1 B. & C. 86) 158
232)
221
v. Bank (2 B. & Ald. 620) 1026 v. Cotterill (1 B. & Ald. 67) 455, 457
v. Bank of England (Doug. 506)
v. Coventry (1 Ld. Raym. 391) 333
1011 2. Croke (Cowp. 29) 260, 353
v. Bankes (3 Burr. 1454) 1019 v. Cross (2 C. & P. 483)
446
v. Barber Surgeons (1 Ld. Raym.
v. Cross (3 Camp. 224) 453, 785, 884,
585)
395
885
v. Barker (3 Burr. 1265)
1004 v. Cusack (2 Roll. 113)
1083
2. Barnard (Comb. 416)
289 v. Davenport (98 Ill. 305) 445, 472
v. Bedford (6 D. & E. T. R. 560) 279 v. Davey (5 Eps. 217)
446
v. Bedford (1 East, 80)
1021 v. Dawes (4 Burr. 2022)
1086
v. Bedford (1 Barnard. 242) 1076 v. Dawes (4 Burr. 2277)
343
v. Beeston (3 D. & E. T. R. 592) 360, v. Dean (1 Str. 539)
297
361 v. Debenham (2 B. & Ad. 187) 380
v. Benchers of Gray's Inn (Doug.
v. Derby (C. T. Hardw. 155) 335, 339
339
v. Derby (7 A. & E. 419) 1019
v. Bellringer (4 D. & E. T. R.
v. Derby (2 Salk. 436) 1062, 1067
810)
342, 343
v. Devon (Ry. & M. 144)
882
1010
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
lxxxix
Page
Page
King v. Devonshire (1 B. & C. 609) 343 King v. Hereford (1 Ld. Raym. 559) 1064
v. Dimpsey (2 D. & E. T. R.
v. Hertford (1 Ld. Raym. 426) 352
96)
311 v. Hill (4 B. & C. 441)
345
v. Doncaster (Barnard. 265) 336, 340 v. Hodge (2 B. & A. 344) 1086
v. Doncaster (2 Burr. 738) 327, 333, v. Hopkins (1 Q. B. 161)
1026
345, 364 v. Huglies (5 B. & C. 886) 307, 309
v. Doncaster (2 Ld. Raym. 156+) 302, v. Hungerford (11 Mod. 132) 306
336, 340 v. Hungerford Market Co. (4 B.
v. Doncaster (Say. 38)
328, 334
& Ad. 327)
711
v. Downshire (4 A. & E. 232) 745 v. Hyde (21 L. J. Mag. C. 94) 478
v. Dublin (1 Stra. 540)
1062 v. Inciedon (13 East, 164)
477
v. Duke of Richmond (6 D. & E.
v. Ingram (1 W. Bl. 50)
378
T. R. 560)
279, 379 v. Jacksonville (3 Ill. 306) 477
v. East India Co. (4 B. & Ad.
v. Johnson (1 Wils. 325)
447
530)
1061 v. Jones (8 Campb. 229) 453, 884,
v. Eastrington (5 A. & E. 765) 1240
885
v. Ecclesfield (1 B. & Al. 348) 1240 v. Jones (6 East, 230)
884, 885
v. Egerly (3 Salk. 183)
785 v. Kent (13 East, 220)
242
v. Essex (4 D. & E. T. R. 591) 221 v. Kingston (8 Mod. 210; 11 Mod.
v. Everett (Cas. T. Hardw. 261) 1012
382; 1 Stra. 578)
1062
v. Exeter (Comb. 197)
278 v. Lancashire (12 East, 366) 1056
v. Exeter (12 Mod. 251)
1068 v. Land Tax Com’rs, &c. (1 D.
v. Exeter (1 Ld. Raynı. 223) 1068
& E. T. R. 148.) [See v.
v. Eye Bailiffs (1 B. & C. 186) 1019
St. Martin's, &c.]
v. Eye Bor. (2 D. & R. 172) 1014 v. Langhorn (4 Ad. & E. 538) 345
v. Favershan Fishermen's Co.
». Leake (5 B. & Ad. 469) 741, 762,
(8 D. & E. T. R. 356) 328, 338,
1240
339, 345
v. Lediard (Sayer, 6)
1130
v. Ford (70 Ga. 628)
223 v. Leicester (4 Burr. 2089) 338
v. Fowey (4 D. & R. 614) 1068, 1072 v. Leyland (3 M. & S. 184) 306, 1019,
v. Foxwell (1 L. R. 3 Cl. D.518) 278
1021
v. Frost (8 A. & E. 822)
1058 v. Lindsey (14 East, 317)
881
v. Gaborian (11 East, 87)
342
v. Lisle (Andr. 163)
304
v. Glamorganshire (1 Ld. Raym.
v. Liverpool 1 Barnard. 83) 1019
580)
1125 v. Liverpool (2 Burr. 723) 327, 333,
v. Glossop (4 B. & Ald. 616) 478
334, 338, 339, 345, 364
v. Gloucester (3 Bulst. 190) 1065 v. Liverpool (3 East, 86) 1240, 1315
2. Godwin (Doug. 397)
308 v. Llandilo Dist. R. Com’rs (2
v. Gordon (Doug. 593)
381
D. & E. T. R. 232)
1017
v. Grant (1 B. & Ad. 104)
142 v. Lloyd (Cald. 309)
1130
v. Greene (6 A. & E. 549) 1026 v. Lloyd (1 Campb. 260)
741
v. Greet (8 B. & C. 363)
343 v. Lloyd (4 Esp. 200) 446, 448
v. Griffiths (3 B. & Ald. 735) 338, v. London (2 Show. 263)
18
1071 v. London (6 Vin. Abr. 296) 303
2. Grimes (5 Burr. 2601) 338, 345 v. London (2 D. & E. R. 182) 318, 337,
v. Grosvenor (7 Mod. 199) 242
1026
2. Grosvenor (1 Wils. 18; 2 Str.
v. Lord Gordon (Doug. 593) 318
1193)
306 v. Lord of Milverton (3 A. & E.
v. Gwyn (1 Str. 401)
380
284)
1061
2. Hardwick (11 East, 578) 382 v. Lucas (10 East, 235) 379, 1027
v. Harris (1 B. & Ad. 936) 336, 337, v. Lyme Regis (Doug. 85, 153,
338, 346, 364, 365
177)
327, 328, 334, 339
v. Harris (6 Ad. & El.)
1087 v. Madison (17 Ind. 48)
968
v. Harrison (3 Burr.1328) 387, 395, 487 v. Malet (2 Barnard. 408)
278
v. Hastings (1 D. & R. 148) 1013 v. Marchioness of Downshire (4
v. Hastings (5 B. & Ald. 692) 158, 490
A. & E. 232)
745
v. Head (4 Burr. 2521)
353 v. Margate Pier Co. (3 B. & Ald.
v. Headley (7 B. & C. 496) 343
221)
1056
v. Hearle (1 Str. 627)
301 v. Market St. Com’rs (4 B. &
v. Heath (1 Barnard. 417) 278
711
v. Heaven (2 D. & E. T. R. 772) 327 v. Marquis of R. (4 Campb. 189) 881,
v. Hebden (Andr. 391)
343
882
v. Hereford (2 Salk. 701) 1063, 1065, v. Marshall (2 B. & A. 341) 310
1067 v. Marten (4 Burr. 2120)
1086
Ad. 335)
хс
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
362
Page
Page
King v. May (5 Burr. 2682)
345 King v. Pigram (2 Burr. 767)
378
v. May (4 B. & Ad. 843)
343 v. Plymouth (1 Barnard. 81) 1064
v. Merchant Tailors' Co. (2 Lev.
v. Ponsonby 1 Ves. Jr. 1) 327, 1088
200)
420 v. Poole (Cas. t. Hardw. 23) 304
v. Middlesex Archd. (3 A. & E.
v. Portland (2 Or. 146)
933
615)
1061 v. Powell (Sayer, 239)
1087
v. Miller (6 D. & E. T. R. 277) 242, v. Priest (6 D. & E. T. R. 538) 411
342, 343, 395, 1079 v. Purnell (1 Wils. 242)
379
v. Milverton (3 A. & E. 284) 1061 v. Radford (1 East, 80)
1019
v. Mitchell (10 East, 511) 279, 379 v. Reed (43 N. J. L. 186)
989
v. Monday (Cowp. 530) 278, 342, 343 v. Richards (8 D. & E. T. R.
v. Moore (3 B. & Ad. 184) 448, 885
634)
447
v. Morely (2 Burr. 1040) 509, 1078, v. Richardson (1 Burr. 517) 327, 328,
1131
334, 335, 336, 338, 339
v. Morris (3 East, 213)
241 v. Richmond (6 D. & E. T. R.
v. Morris (4 East, 26)
381
560)
379
v. Mothersell (1 Stra. 93) 370, 380, v. Rippon (1 Ld. Raym. 563) 307
381 v. Round (4 Ad. & El. 139) 378
v. Neill (2 C. & P. 485)
446 2. Rowe (Carth. 199)
338
v. Neville (1 Peak, 92)
446 v. Rowe (1 Show. 188)
338
v. Newcastle (2 Str. 1223) 379, 1027 v. Russell (6 B. & C. 566) 884, 885
v. Newdigate (Comb. 10)
447 v. Russell (6 East, 427) 453, 785, 884,
v. New Radnor (2 Ld. Kenyon's
886
N. 498)
1087 v. Russell (3 E. & B. 942)
447
v. New York (102 N. Y. 171) 719 v. Sadler (4 C. & P. 218)
447
v. New York C. & H. River R.
v. St. Benedict (4 B. & Ald. 447) 741
Co. (66 N. Y. 181) 1306, 1307
v. (. 1315
v. Nicholson (1 Str. 299)
243, 1076
v. St. Martin's Land Tax Coni’rs
v. Norris (1 Ld. Raym. 337) 260
(1 D. & E. T. R. 148) 1004, 1019
v. Norris (1 Barn. K. B. 385)
v. Salop (Buller's N. P. 198) 1072
v. Northampton (2 M. & S. 262) 789, v. Salop County (13 East, 95) 881
v. Salway (9 B. & C. 424)
151
v. North Curry (4 B. & C. 959) 278, v. Sandys (2 Barnard. 302)
337
379 v. Sankey (5 A. & E. 423) 221, 663
v. Norwich (2 Ld. Raym. 1244) 1069, v. Sargent (5 D. & E. T. K. 466) 279,
1070
379, 1086
v. Norwich (1 B. & Ad. 310) 1019 v. Sarinon (1 Burr. 516) 785, 886
v. Norwich (1 Stra. 55) 1065, 1067
v. Saunders (3 East, 119) 242, 246,
v. Norwich (2 Salk. 436)
1067
1081, 1082
v. Nottingham (1 Sid. 31) 378 v. Sawyer (10 B. & C. 486) 1022
v. Nottingham, W. W. (6 A. &
v. Scarborough (2 Stra. 1180) 1019
E. 355)
1007 v. Seale (8 East, 568) 411, 478
v. Nottingham Jus. (Sayer, 217) 1014 v. Severn & Wye Ry. Co. (2 B. &
v. Ogden (10 B. & C. 210) 1086
Ald. 646)
1008, 1057
v. Osbourne (4 East, 326) 242, 1079 v. Shelley (3 D. & E. T. R. 142) 379
v. Oxford (2 Salk. 428) 333, 1029 v. Shrewsbury (Cas. t. Hardw.
v. Oxford (Palm. 455) 336, 345
147)
338, 345, 1027
v. Oxford (Cas. t. Hardw. 178) 1019 v. Shrewsbury (7 Mod. 202)
338
v. Oxford 17 East, 345)
1055 v. Slatford (6 Mod. 316)
1026
v. Oxford (6 Ad. & E. 349) 1064 v. Slythe (6 B. & C. 242) 1086
v. Oxfordshire (1 B. & Ad. 289) 881 v. Smart (4 Burr. 2143)
342
2. Oxfordshire (4 B. & C. 194) 1240 v. Smith (1 Str. 126)
380
v. Oxfordshire (16 East, 223) 1133, v. Smith (2 M. & S. 598) 1063, 1064,
1135
1067
v. Pagham Sewer Com’rs (8 B.
v. Smith (5 M. & S. 133)
411
& C. 355)
1318 v. Spencer (3 Burr. 1827) 277, 291
v. Parry (6 Ad. & El. 810) 1086 v. Stacey (1 D. & E. T. R. 13) 1056
v. Pasmore (3 D. & E. T. R. 241) 241, v. Stafford (3 D. & E. T. R.
242, 244, 246, 267, 265, 304
651)
1008
v. Paterson (4 B. & Ad. 9) 307, 308 v. Stainforth & K. Canal Co. (1
v. Payne (2 Chitty, 366)
307
M. & S. 132)
1011, 1056
v. Penderryn (2 D. & E. T. R.
v. Stead (8 D. & E. T. R. 142) 447
513)
1240 v. Stewart (4 East, 17)
241
v. Philips (1 Str. 394)
302 v. Storr (3 Burr. 1698)
477
881, 882
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
xci
671, 796
Page
Page
King v. Stratford (14 East, 348) 1133 King v. Wyatt (2 Ld. Raym. 1478) 411
v. Stratford (1 Lev. 291)
333 v. Yates (Stiles ; 8 Mod. 101) 336
v. Symonds (1 East, 189)
411
v. York (4 D. & E. T. R. 669) 1019,
v. Taylor (3 Salk. 231) 327, 328, 336,
1021
337 v. York (6 D. & E. T. R. 495) 1069
v. Taylor (2 Str. 1167)
449 v. Yorkshire, &c. (1 A. & E.
v. Tenterden (8 Mod. 114) 1075
563)
1010
v. Theodorick (8 East, 545) 345, 346, v. Yorkshire (7 T. R. 467) 447
347 King William Co. Ct. Jus. v. Mun-
v. Thetford (12 Vin. Abr. 90) 380
day (2 Leigh, 165) 1006, 1008,
v. Thetford (8 East, 270)
1019
1009
v. Thompson (2 D. & E. T. R. Kingman v. No. Bridgewater Sch.
18)
478
Dist. (2 Cush. 425)
540
v. Thornton (4 East, 308)
301 v. Plymouth Co. Com’rs (6 Cush.
v. Tidderly (i Sid. 14) 307, 327
306)
714
v. Tizzard (17 Eng. C. L. 193) 309 Kingsberry v. Pettis County (48 Mo.
v. Tooley (12 Mod. 312)
1068
207)
568
2. Totness (5 D. & R. 483) 335 Kingsbury ü. Dedham (13 Allen,
2. Tower (4 M. & S. 162)
1027
186)
1270
v. Trafford (1 B. & Ad. 874) 447, 882 v. Quincy Sch. Dist. (12 Met.
v. Tregony (8 Mod. 111) 242, 355,
99) 343, 349, 359, 360, 524
1019, 1066 Kings County Elev. R. Co., Re (105
v. Trelawney (3 Burr. 1615) 308
N. Y. 97)
872
v. Trevenen (2 B. & Ald. 479) 1056, Kings County F. Ins. v. Stevens (101
1086
N. Y. 411)
v. Truro (3 B. & A. 592) 335, 1019 Kingsland v. New York (110 N. Y.
v. Varlo (Cowp. 250)
342
569)
165, 172
v. Ward (L. R. 8 Q. B. 210) 1056 Kingsley v. Brooklyn (5 Abb. N.
v. Ward (4 Ad. & El. 384) 782, 884,
C. 1)
547
885 Kingston v. Horner (Cowp. 102) 139
v. Wardroper (4 Burr. 1964) 1086 Kingston Ins. Co.v. Decker (33 Barb.
2. Warlow (2 M. & S. 76) 1087
196)
301
v. Watson (2 D. & E. T. R. 204) 322 Kinney v. Troy (108 N. Y. 567) 1260
v. Watts (M. & M. 281)
446 v. Zimpleman (36 Tex. 554) 899
v. Wells (4 Burr. 1999)
336 Kinnie v. Waverley (42 Iowa, 437) 554
2. Wells (4 Dowl. P. C. 562) 490 Kinsella v. Auburn (26 N. Y. St. R.
v. West Looe (3 B. & C. 685) 1067
884)
698
v. West Looe (5 D. & R. 416) 335 Kinsley v. Chicago (124 Ill. 359) 425, 468,
v. West Riding (2 East, 342), 881, 882
474
v. West Riding (7 East, 596) 881 v. Norris (60 N. H. 131)
539
v. Westwood (4 B. & C. 721) 353, 466 Kinzie v. Chicago (2 Scam. (III.) 188) 275
v. West Yorkshire (5 Burr. 2594) 789 Kip v. N. Y. & Harlem R. Co. (6
v. Weymouth (7 Mod. 371) 277, 291
Hun, 24; 67 N. Y. 227) 872
v. White (1 Burr. 333)
446 v. Paterson (26 N. J.L. 298) 396, 425,
v. Whitney (3 A. & E. 69) 882
462, 470, 481, 482, 496, 944, 1126
v. Whitwell (5 D. & E. T. R. 86) 306, Kirby v. Boylston Market Assoc. (14
1088
Gray, 249) 467, 1262, 1266, 1272,
v. Wigan (3 Burr. 1645)
1068
1273, 1310, 1311
v. Wildman (2 Str. 879) 378, 1062 v. Citizens' R. Co. (48 Md. 168) 988
v. Williams (1 Burr. 402)
352, 1076 v. Shaw (19 Pa. 258) 896, 910, 914,
v. Williams (2 Kenyon, 75) 1076
934, 972
v. Williams (2 M. & S. 141) 362, 1012 Kirk v. King (3 Barr, 436)
668
v. Williams (1 Russ. 321)
449 v. Nowill (1 D. & E. T. R. 118) 413,
v. Williams (1 W. Black. 93) 1087,
416, 421
1088 Kirkbride v. Lafayette County (108
v. Willis (7 Mod. 262)
1062
U. S. 208)
620
v. Wilson (1 Dillon, C. C. R.555) 226, Kirkham v. Russell (76 Va. 956) 146, 396
579, 586, 587, 1045, 1119 Kirkman v. Handy (11 Humph. 406) 479
v. Wilton (5 Mod. 259)
338 Kirtland v. Hotchkiss (100 U. S. 491) 964,
v. Wilton (2 Salk. 428)
338
969
v. Winchester (7 Ad. & E. 215) 282, v. Macon (66 Ga. 385)
1019, 1022, 1023 Kistner v. Indianapolis (100 Ind. 210) 848
v. Woodrow (2 D. & E. T. R. Kitredge v. Milwaukee (20 Wis. 46) 1252,
732)
306, 1019
1267, 1314
xcii
TABLE OF CASES CITED,
Page
Page
Kittering v. Jacksonville (50 Ill. 39) 488 Kobs v. Minneapolis (22 Minn. 159) 1202,
Kittle v. Pfeiffer (22 Cal. 490)
757
1203, 1317, 1331, 1333
Klatt v. Milwaukee (53 Wis. 196) 1257 Koehler v. Black River F. Iron Co.
Klein v. New Orleans (99 U. S. 149) 674,
(2 Black (U. S.), 715)
274
675 Koester v. Ottumwa (34 Iowa, 41) 1257,
v. Smith Co. Sup. (54 Miss. 254) 1028,
1258, 1281, 1296
1032, 1056 Kohl v. United States (91 U. S. 367) 697
v. Warren Co. Sup. (51 Miss. Kohlhepp v. W. Roxbury (120 Mass.
578)
1028, 1032, 10565
596)
374
Klingler v. Bickel (117 Pa. St. 326) 472, Kokono v. Mahan (100 Ind. 242) 814,
473
959, 1222
Klinkener v. McKeesport Sch. Dist. Konrad v. Rogers (70 Wis. 492)
671
(11 Pa. St. 444) 743, 767, 789 Koons v. Lucas (52 Iowa, 177) 814
Knapp v. Grant (27 Wis. 147) 635 Koontz v. Hancock (64 Md. 134) 355
V. Hoboken (38 N. J. L. 371 ; 39 Koppikus v. State Cap. Com’rs (16
N.J. L. 394)
193, 1031
Cal. 248)
726
Knaust, Re (101 N. Y. 188)
90 Korah v. Ottawa (32 III. 121) 810, 882,
Kneedler v. Norristown (100 Pa. St.
883
368)
396, 404 Kosmak v. New York (22 N. E. R.
Kneeland v. Milwaukee (15 Wis. 454) 953,
945)
1326
971 Kountze v. Omaha (5 Dillon, C. C.
Knibbs v. Hall (1 Esp. 279)
1154
443)
974
Knight v. Aşlıland (61 Wis. 233) 270 Kranz v. Baltimore (64 Md. 491) 754,
v. Carrollton R. Co. (9 La. An.
1330, 1332
284)
700 Krause v. Sacramento (48 Cal. 221) 1054,
v. Heaton (22 Vt. 480) 800, 803, 848
1303
2. Kansas City, St. J. & C. B. R. Kreigh v. Chicago (86 Ill. 407) 808
Co. (70 Mo. 231)
408 Krickle v. Commonwealth (1 B. Mon.
v. Nash (22 Minn. 452)
163
361)
483, 486
v. Wells (1 Ld. Raym. 80) 250 Kucheman v. Chicago, C. & D.R. Co.
v. Wells (1 Lut. 519)
246
(46 Iowa, 366)
841, 843
Kniper v. Louisville (7 Bush, 599) 424, 425, Kumler v. Silsbee (38 0. St. 445) 780
939 Kundinger v. Saginaw (59 Mich. 355) 499,
Knoblock v. Chicago & St. P. Ry.
709
Co. (31 Minn. 402)
857 Kunkle v. Franklin (13 Minn. 127) 224
Knowles v. Muscatine (20 Iowa, 248) 808 Kuntz v. Troy (104 N. Y. 344) 1297
v. Plantation No. 4 (14 Me. 25) 541 Kupper v. Augusta So. Par. (12 Mass.
v. Yates (31 Cal. 82)
277
185)
360
Knowlton v. Rock Co. Sup. (9 Wis. Kyle v. Malin (8 Ind. 34) 149, 185, 707,
410)
962
941, 975
v. Watertown (130 U. S. 327) 798, Kynaston v. Shrewsbury (2 Stra.
1053
1051)
345
Knox v. Baton Rouge (36 La. An.
437)
901, 1028
L.
v. Lee (12 Wall. 457)
195
v. Peterson (21 Wis. 247) 944, 1000 Labette Co. Com’rs v. Moulton (112
Knox Co. Com’rs v. Aspin wall (21
U. S. 217) 1033, 1044, 1063, 1067
How. 539) 226,561, 581, 585, 590, Labourdette v. Municipality (2 La.
591, 592, 503, 597, 598, 601, 615,
An. 527)
343, 359
616, 619, 643, 641, 645 Lackland v. No. Mo. R. Co. (31 Mo.
v. Aspin wall (24 How. 376) 1037,
180; 34 Mo. 259) 768, 834, 853,
1045, 1070, 1071
855
0. Jones (7 Ind. 3)
361 Lacon v. Page (48 Ill. 499) 1263, 1273
v. McComb (19 O. St. 320) 671 Laconia v. Gilman (55 N. H. 127) 810
v. Montgomery (109 Ind. 69) 1173 Lacour v. New York (3 Duer, 406) 1157,
v. Nichols (14 0. St. 260) 602, 618
1204, 1211, 1331
Knox Co. Ct. v. United States (109 Lade v. Shepherd (2 Stra. 1004) 743, 746
U. S. 229)
1034 Lafayette v. Allen (81 Ind. 166) 1198,
Knoxville v. Bell (12 Lea, 157) 1304
1199, 1204
v. Bird (12 Lea, 121)
472 v. Blood (40 Ind. 62)
1310
v. King (7 Lea, 441) 418, 419, 422, v. Bush (19 Ind. 326) 716, 720, 814,
423
1221
Knupfle v. Knick. Ice Co. (84 N. Y.
v. Cox (5 Ind. 38) 147, 149, 185, 197,
488)
1273
236
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
xciii
78, 230
Page
Page
Lafayette v. Fowler (34 Ind. 140) 814, Lancaster v. Walsh (4 M. & W.16) 209
917, 921, 960, 978, 982, 1122, 1221 Lancaster Canal Co. v. Parnaby (11
v. Jenners (10 Ind. 74) 72, 80, 806
A. & E. 222)
1208
v. Larson (73 Ind. 367)
1297 Lancaster County v. Brinthall (29
v. Male Orphan As. (4 La. An.
Pa. St. 38)
798
1)
955 Lance's Appeal (55 Pa. St. 16) 706
v. Nagle (113 Ind. 425)
1222 Lancey v. Bryant (30 Me. 466) 382
v. Schultz (44 Ind. 97) 712, 714 Land v. Coffman (50 Mo. 243) 670
v. Spencer (14 Ind. 359) 1221 | Lander v. McMillan (8 Jones L. 174) 1068
v. Timberlake (88 Ind. 330)1196, 1205 v. Smithfield Sch. Dist. (33 Me.
v. Wortman (107 Ind. 404) 814, 1219,
239)
347
1222, 1232 Landers v. Staten Island R. Co. (53
Lafayette & I. R. Co. v. Smith (6
N. Y. 450)
493, 507
Ind. 249)
718, 720 Landis v. Hamilton (77 Mo. 554) 750
Lafayette, M. & B. R. Co. v. Geiger Landolt v. Norwich (37 Conn. 615) 1260,
(34 Ind. 185)
1261, 1283
Lafon . Dufrocq (9 La. An. 350) 88, 493 Lane, Re (76 Cal. 587) 441, 476, 482, 505
La Grange v. State Treasurer (24
v. Boston (125 Mass. 519) 1219
Mich. 466)
378 v. Cotton (1 Salk. 17)
324
Lahr v. Metrop. Elev. Ry. Co. (104
v. Cronibie (12 Pick. 177) 1265
N. Y. 268) 743, 777, 778, 780, v. Embden (72 Me. 354)
596
788, 790, 793, 819, 832, 837, 850, v. Kennedy (13 0. St. 42) 796, 797,
853, 855, 856, 867, 870, 873, 874,
803
886, 889, 1230 v. Saginaw (53 Mich 442) 707
Laird v. De Soto (22 Fed. R. 421) 141, v. Schomp (20 N. J. Eq. 82) 1097
250, 253 v. Sewell (1 Chitty, 175)
316
v. De Soto (25 Fed. R. 76) 1031 v. Weymouth Sch. Dist. (10 Met.
Lake u. Aberdeen (57 Miss. 260) 450
462)
541
v. Decatur (91 Ill. 596)
979 v. Woodbury (58 Iowa, 462) 1173
2. Florida (18 Fla. 501)
84 Lane County v. Oregon (7 Wall. 71) 896,
v. Williamsburg Trs. (4 Denio,
995
520)
195, 568, 991 Lanfear v. New Orleans (4 La. 97) 417
Lake County v. Graham (130 U. S. Langan v. Atchison (35 Kan. 318) 1274
674)
202, 611 | Langdon v. Castleton (30 Vt. 285) 313,
v. Rollins (130 U. S. 662) 202, 611
554, 589
Lake Erie, W. & St. L. R. Co. v.
v. N. Y. Fire Dep. (17 Wend.
Heath (9 Ind. 558) 726, 727
234)
947
Lake Front Case (33 Fed. R. 730).
v. New York (93 N. Y. 129) 116, 165,
See Illinois v. Ill. Cent. R.
170, 172, 177, 771
Co. &c.]
Langhorne v. Robinson (20 Gratt. 661) 897
Lake Pleasanton W. Co. v. Contra Langley v. Gallipolis (2 0. St. 107) 764,
Costa W. Co. (67 Cal. 659) 697,
765, 766
825 Langsdale v. Bonton (12 Ind. 467) 375,
Lake Shore & Mich. So. R. Co. v.
376, 377
Chicago (56 Ill. 454) 958 Langworthy v. Dubuque (13 Iowa,
Lake View v. Decatur (91 Ill. 596) 979
86)
974
2. Le Bahn (120 Ill. 92) 757, 761 v. Dubuque (16 Iowa, 271) 973, 974
v. Letz (44 III. 81)
444, 445 Lanier v. Macon (59 Ga. 187)
971
v. Miller (25 Mich. 274) 1286 Lansing v. County Treasurer (1 Dil-
Lakin v. Ames (10 Cush. 198) 269, 271
lon C. C. 522) 118, 250, 942,
Lamar County v. Clements (49 Tex.
1045, 1049, 1072, 1073
347) 751, 752, 757, 758, 763 v. Smith (4 Wend. 9) 169, 177
Lamb v. Lane (4 0. St. 167)
724 v. Toolan (37 Mich. 152) 1180, 1212,
v. Lynd (44 Pa. St. 336) 285, 288, 310,
1258, 1294
1019, 1020 v. Van Gorder (24 Mich. 456)
557,
v. Shays (14 Iowa, 567)
674
1009
Lanbar 2. St. Louis (15 Mo. 610) 1320 La Pointe v. O'Malley (46 Wis. 35) 301
Lamborn v. Dickinson Co. Com'rs Laramie Co. v. Albany Co. (92 U. S.
(97 U. S. 181) 1147, 1148, 1149,
307) $ 94, 267, 270, 271, 273, 1290
1153, 1154 Laredo v. Macdonnell (52 Tex. 511) 540
Lamoille Val. R. Co. v. Fairfield (51
v. Martin (52 Tex. 548)
180
589, 630, 647 v. Nalle (65 Tex. 159)
163
v. Du Hadway (97 Ind. 565) 1000 Larkin v. Saginaw County (11 Mich.
Lancaster v. Richardson (4 Lans. 136) 470
88) 1169, 1173, 1180, 1212, 1245
Vt. 257)
Eciv
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
24)
114)
322
556
Page
Page
Larmon v. Dist. Columbia (5 Mackey, Layton v. New Orleans (12 La. An.
330)
1297
515)
105, 267, 273
Larned v. Briscoe (62 Mich. 393) 370, Lazarus v. Toronto (19 U. C. Q. B. 9) 466
1188, 1196, 1217 Lea v. Hernandez (10 Tex. 137) 244
La Rosa v. New Orleans (4 La. An.
v. State (10 Lea, 478)
251
459 Leach v. Cargill (60 Mo. 316) 944, 981
Larrabee v. Peabody (128 Mass. 561) Learned v. Burlington (2 Am. L. R.
1312
(N. s.) 394)
237, 946
Larson v. Grand Forks (3 Dak. 307) 1274 Leathers v. Aiken (9 Fed. R. 679)
)
165
Larue v. Farren Hotel Co. (116 Mass. Leavenworth v. Booth (15 Kan. 627) 425,
67)
1311
426, 905, 908
Lasala v. Holbrook (4 Paige, 169) 1229 v. Casey (McCahon (Kan. Ter.)
La Salle County v. Simmons (10 IlI.
124)
1320, 1325
513)
322, 1148, 1151 v. Kinney (99 U. S. 623) 1051
Lates v. Briggs (64 N. Y. 404) 990 v. Laing (6 Kan. 274)
957
Lathrop v. Central Iowa Ry. Co. (69
v. Mills (6 Kan. 288)
555, 556
Iowa, 105)
796, 858
v. Norton (1 Kan. 432) 237, 940, 941,
v. Com. Bank of Scioto (8 Dana,
946, 1116
274 v. Rankin (2 Kan. 357) 518, 526, 529,
v. State (6 Blackf. 502)
Lauenstein v. Fond du Lac (28 Wis.
v. Stille (13 Kan. 539)
556
336)
155, 659 Leavenworth & Des M. R. Co. v.
Lauglin v. Washington (63 Iowa,
Platte County (42 Mo. 171) 158,
652)
761, 763
644
Launder v. Chicago (111 Ill. 291) 427 Leavenworth County v. Barnes (94
Laundry License Case (22 Fed. R.
U. S. 70)
593
701)
393, 426 v. Brewer (9 Kan. 307)
316
Launtz v. People (113 Ill. 137) 290, 297, 2. Keller (6 Kan. 510) 562, 567
343, 365
v. Miller (7 Kan. 479) 208, 225
Lavalle v. People (68 Ill. 252) 1089 v. Sellew (99 U. S. 624) 1051, 1073,
Laver v. McGlachlin (28 Wis. 364)
855
1074
Law v. Crombie (12 Pick. 176) 1286 Leavitt v. Eastman (77 Me. 117) 374
v. Dodd (1 Ex. 845)
216 Leazure v. Hillegas (7 $. & R. 313) 670
v. People (87 Ill. 385) 204, 1113 | Lebanon v. Heath (47 N. H. 353) 533
Lawe v. Kaukauna (70 Wis. 306) 750 7. Ohio & Miss. R. Co. (77 Ill.
Lawhorne, Re (18 Gratt. 85)
303
539)
899, 1107
Lawrence, Re (69 Cal. 608)
432 v. Warren Co. Com’rs (9 Ohio,
v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co. (94
80)
753, 763
U. S. 164)
92 Le Claire v. Davenport (13 Iowa,
v. Fairhaven (5 Gray, 110) 1214, 1317
210)
456, 458, 460, 1160
v. Great No. Ry. Co. (16 Q. B. Le Clercq v. Trustees of Gallipolis
643)
1215
17 Ohio, Pt. 1, 218) 691, 763, 773,
v. Hedger (3 Taunt. 14)
295
786, 787
v. Ingersoll (12 S. W. R. 522) 1025 Le Couteulx v. Buffalo (33 N. Y. 333) 147,
v. Jefferson Par. Pol. Jury (35
657, 662
La. An. 601)
750 Lecraw Case (17 How. 426). [See
v. Killam (11 Kan. 499) 195, 513, 516,
Boston v. Lecraw, &c.]
976 Ledwich v. McKim (53 N. Y. 307) 650
v. Nahant (136 Mass. 477) 816, 818 Lee v. Flemingburg (7 Dana, 59) 208
Lawrence County v. Chattaroi R.
v. Lake (14 Mich. 12) 744, 750, 752
Co. (81 Ky. 225)
42 v. Minneapolis (22 Minn. 13) 1225,
Lawrence R. Co. v. Williams (35 0.
1319
St. 168)
848 v. Mound Station (118 Ill. 304) 763
Lawrenceburg v. Wuest (16 Ind. 337) 425, v. Sandy Hill (40 N. Y. 442) 745,
440
1188, 1189, 1190
Lawson v. Milw. & N. Ry, Co. (30
v. Templeton (13 Gray, 476) 1147,
Wis. 597)
226
1149
v. Scott (1 Yerg. 92)
1125 v. Thomas (49 Mo. 112)
953
Lawton v. Cambridge Com’rs (2
v. Wallis (1 Kenyon, 292) 416, 421,
Caines, 179) 509, 1078, 1124
487
v. Erwin (9 Wend. 233)
299 Lee County v. Rogers (7 Wall. 181) 118,
Lay 2. Wissman (36 Iowa, 305)
683
583, 586, 1045
Laycock v. Baton Rouge (35 La. An. Lee Co. Supervisors v. Rogers (7
475)
518, 521, 529
Wall. 175)
1049
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
XCV
Page
Page
vee Tong, Re (18 Fed. R. 253) 145, 439 Levering v. Memphis (7 Humph.
Leech v. State (78 Ind. 570)
308
553)
274
Leeds, Re (53 N. Y. 400)
544 Levy, Re (63 N. Y. 637)
959
v. Richmond (102 Ind. 372) 657, 689, v. Chicago (113 Ill. 650)
982
1184, 1188 v. New York (1 Sandf. 465) 1159
Leeper v. South Bend (106 Ind. 375) 975 v. Salt Lake City (3 Utah Ter.
Leftwich v. Plaquemine (14 La. An.
63) 145, 1169, 1204, 1206
152)
766 Lewenthal v. New York (5 Lans.
Legg v. Annapolis (44 Md. 203)
1069,
532)
1331
1071 Lewis, Re (2 Gall. 483)
172
Legrand v. Hampden & S. Col. (5
v. Atlanta (77 Ga. 756)
1258
Munf. 324)
275 v. Barbour Co. Com’rs (105 U.
Lehigh County v. Hoffort (116 Pa.
S. 739)
572, 607, 615, 633, 649
St. 119)
1158 v. Elizabeth (25 N. J. Eq. 298) 1094
v. Kleckner (5 W. & S. 181) 1143 v. Henley (2 Ind. 332).
1119
Lehigh Val. Coal Co. v. Chicago (26
v. Litchfield (2 Root, 436) 882
Fed. R. 415)
731, 1221, 1228 2. Marshall Co. (16 Can. 102) 1019
Lehigh Val. R. Co. v. Trone (28 Pa.
v. Oliver (4 Abb. Pr. R. 121) 309,
St. 206)
170
1023
Lehigh Water Čo's Appeal (102 Pa.
v. Rochester (9 C. B. N. 3. 401) 220,
St. 515)
157
553
Lehn v. San Francisco (66 Cal. 76) 1329 v. San Antonio (7 Tex. 288) 755, 801
Lehrman v. Robinson (59 Ala. 219)
984
v. Sherman Co. Com’rs (5 Fed,
Leicester v. Pittsford (6 Vt. 245) 1257,
R. 269)
577
1283 v. Shreveport (108 U. S. 282) 540
Leitch v. Wells (48 N. Y. 586)
583 v. Shreveport (3 Woods C.' C.
Leland v. Portland (2 Or. 46)
750
205)
235, 539, 635
Leloup v. Mobile Port (127 U. S.
v. State (21 Ark. 211)
505
640)
904, 905
v. Toronto (39 U. C. Q. B. 343) 389,
Leman v. New York (5 Bosw. 414) 1183
1140
Lemington v. Blodgett (37 Vt. 215) 1143 v. United States (Morris (Iowa),
Lemon v. Hayden (13 Wis. 159) 747
199)
429
Lemont r. Singer, &c. Stone Co. (98 Lewiston v. Proctor (27 Ill. 414) 478, 480,
Ill. 95)
1107
496
Le Neve v. Mile End (8 E. & B. 1054) 741 Lexington v. Butler (14 Wall. 282) 561,
Lennig v. Ocean City Assoc. (41
582, 593, 618, 620
N. J. Eq. 24)
759, 767 v. Headley (5 Bush, 508) 373, 374,
Lennon v. New York' (55 N. Y. 361) 132,
390, 945, 979
485, 695, 709, 777, 993 2. Long (31 Mo. 369) 498, 706
Lent 2. Tillson (72 Cal. 404)
984 v. McQuillan's Heirs (9 Dana,
Leominster Canal Nav. Co.
513) 722, 913, 918, 925, 933
Shrewsbury & H. R. (3 K.
v. Mulliken (7 Gray (Mass.),
& J. 654)
1115
280)
1028, 1031
Leonard v. Brooklyn (71 N. Y. 498) 675 v. Wise (24 S. C. 363)
500
v. Canton (35 Miss. 189) 149, 434, Lexington & O. R. Co. v. Applegate
1148
(8 Dana, 289) 841, 848, 863, 870
v. Storer (115 Mass. 86) 1276, 1311 | Libby v. Downey (5 Allen, 299)
463
Leroy v. New York (20 Johns. 430) 1127 Liberty Bell Case (23 Fed. R. 843).
v. Springfield (81 Ill. 114)
804
[See Bayle v. New Orleans,
Les Bois v. Bramell (4 How. 449) 771
&c. 1
Lesley v. White (1 Speers, 31) 323, 533, Lichfield v. Simpson (8 Q. B. 73) 342
1169 Liddy v. St. Louis R. Co. (40 Mo.
Leslie v. St. Louis (47. Mo. 474) 707, 716,
506)
865
1112, 1121, 1123 Liebman v. San Francisco (24 Fed.
Lessee of A., &c. [See A.'s Lessee,
R. 705)
572
&c.]
Liebstein v. Newark (24 N. J. Eq.
Lester v. Baltimore (29 Md. 415) 1154
200)
991, 1093, 1123
v. Pittsford (7 Vt. 158)
1270 Life & F. Ins. Co. of N. Y.v. Adams
Lethbridge v. Winter (1 Campb. 263) 741
(9 Pet. 571)
1006
Levant Trs. v. Parks (10 Me. 441) 75 v. Wilson's Heirs (8 Pet. 291) 1006,
Levasser v. Washburn (11 Gratt.
1056
572)
803 Life Assoc. of Am. v. St. Louis
Levee Co. &c. (27 Mo. 495). (See
Assess. Bd. (49 Mo. 512) 968
Egyptian Level Co., &c.]
Liffin v. Beverly (145 Mass. 549) 1301
v.
acvi
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
Page
412)
Page
Ligonier v. Ackerman (46 Ind. 552) 388. Little Rock v. Barton (33 Ark. 436) 212,
1147, 1149, 1151, 1152
971
Lilly v. Taylor (88 N. C. 489) 647, 1027 v. Board of Impr. (42 Ark. 152) 1052
Lima r. I. Cem. Assoc. (42 0. St.
v. Merch. Nat. Bank (98 U. S.
128)
1001
308)
520, 537, 563
Limestone Co. Com’rs Ct. v. Rather
v. Parish (36 Ark. 166)
266
(48 Ala. 433)
1037 v. State Bank (8 Ark. 227) 564
Lincoln v. Boston (148 Mass. 578) 1167 v. Willis (27 Ark. 572)
1316
v. Boston (20 N. E. R. 329) 1312 Littler v. Lincoln (106 Ill. 353) 744
v. Cambria Iron Co. (103 'U. S. Little Schuylkill Nav. R. & C. Co. 1.
599
Norton (24 Pa. St. 465) 915, 921
v. Chapin (132 Mass. 470) 320 Littleton v. Richardson (34 N. H.
v. Gillilan (18 Neb. 114)
1283
179)
1313, 1315
v. Hapgood (11 Mass. 350) 326 Livaudais v. Municipality (16 La. 512,
v. Smith (27 Vt. 354)
451
5 La. An. 8)
759, 767
v. Stockton (75 Me. 141) 529, 539 Liverpool Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts
v. Walker (18 Neb. 250)
1258
(10 Wall. 566)
905
v. Worcester (8 Cush. 55) 1145 Livingston v. Albany (41 Ga. 21) 963
Lincoln Park Case (51 Ill. 17). See
v. McDonald (21 Iowa, 160) 1321,
People v. Chicago, &c.]
1323
Linden v. Alameda Co. Sup. (45 Cal.
v. New York (8 Wend. 85) 722, 726,
6)
1059
757, 758
v. Case (46 Cal. 171)
1114 v. Paducah (80 Ky. 656)
909
Lindholm v. St. Paul (19 Minn. 245) 1279, v. Pippin (31 Ala. 542) 216, 530
1301 Livingston Council & Int. v. Pippin
Lindsay v. Chicago (115 Ill. 120) 390, 410
(31 Ala. 542)
1093
Lindsey v. Luckett (20 Tex. 516) 305, Livingston County 2. Portsmouth
1023, 1025
Bank (128 U. S. 102) 625, 629,
v. Rottaken (32 Ark. 619)
563
630
Linegar v. Rittenhouse (94 IIÍ. 208) 286 Livingston Co. Sup. v. Weider (64 III.
Linehan, Re (72 Cal. 114)
442
427)
649, 906, 927, 1111
Lining v. Charleston C. Council (1
[See also Lovingston v.
McCord, 345)
963
Linton v. Athens (53 Ga. 588) 974 Lloyd v. New York (5 N. Y. 369) 94,
Lipp r. Philadelphia (38 Pa. St. 503) 990
1156, 1203, 1204, 1280, 1293, 1331
Lippincott v. Pana (92 Ill. 24) 186, 239, 2. Queen (6 L. T. R. N. s. 610) 1082
639 Loan v. Boston (106 Mass. 450)
v. Smyth (2 L. T. (N. 8.) 79) 717
1263, 1273
Li Protti, Re (68 Cal. 635)
425 Loan Assoc., &c. (3 Dillon C. C. 376 i
Liquidators of City Debts v. Munici-
20 Wall. 665). (See Citizens'
pality (6 La. An. 21)
119
Sav. & Loan Assoc., &c.]
Liquidators of Imperial Merc. Cr. Lobdell v. New Bedford (1 Mass. 153) 882
Assoc. v. Coleman (L. R. 6 Locke v. Central (4 Col. 65) 312, 313
H. L. C. 189)
514
v. Lexington (122 Mass. 290) 1130
Litchfield v. Ballou (114 U. $. 190) 198, v. Rochester (6 Lans. 11) 348, 366,
537, 538, 539, 557, 612, 635
367
v. Polk County (18 Iowa, 70) 1122 Locke's Appeal (72 Pa. St. 491) 78
v. Vernon (41 N. Y. 123) 776, 896, Lockhart v. Troy (48 Ala. 579) 87, 134,
898, 913, 928, 979, 983, 996
355, 1080
v. Wilmot (2 Root (Conn.), 288) 800, Lockport v. Gaylord (61 Ill. 276) 88, 195
801, 803 Lockwood v. New York (2 Hilton, 66)
Little, Re (60 N. Y. 343)
388
1306
v. Madison (42 Wis. 643) 885, 1197, v. New York & N. H. R. Co. (37
1271
Conn. 391)
749
v. Madison (49 Wis. 605) 1197, 1271 v. St. Louis (24 Mo. 20) 151, 722, 911,
v. Merrill (10 Pick. 543) 324, 346, 349
933, 955, 1120, 1121, 1123
v. Union Tp. Com. (40 N. J. L. Loeb v. Attica (82 Ind. 175)
432
397)
106, 556
v. Duncan (63 Miss. 89)
1126
Littlefield v. Maxwell (31 Me. 134) 768 Loeser v. Redd (14 Bush, 18)
918
2. Norwich (40 Conn. 406) 1212, 1301 Loewer v. Sedalia (77 Mo. 431) 1286
Little Meadows Bor., Re (35 Pa. St. Lofink v. Allegheny (o W. N. C. 3;
335)
268
34 L. Int. 448)
1000
Little Miami R. Co. v. Collett (8 0. Logan v. Pyne (43 Iowa, 524) 150, 180,
733
428, 430
Wider1
1257,
St. 182)
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
xcvii
294)
Page
Page
Logan County 2. Lincoln (81 Ill. 156) 485, Lorillard v. Monroe (11 N. Y. 392) 73,
804
1096, 1159, 1173, 1191, 1202
Logansport v. Blakemore (17 Ind. Loring v. Small (50 Iowa, 271)
675
318)
523, 627 Los Angeles v. Los A. Water Co.
v. Crockett (64 Ind. 319) 368, 370,
(61 Cal. 65)
971
372, 373, 485 v. So. Pac. R. Co. (67 Cal. 433) 966
v. Dick (70 Ind. 65) 1305, 1306 Los Angeles Gas Co.v. Toberman
v. Dunn (8 Ind. 378) 752, 757, 767
(61 Cal. 199)
521
v. Humphrey (84 Ind. 467) 1000 Lott ads. Ala. Gold L. Ins. Co. (54
v. Justice (74 Ind. 378)
1297
Ala. 499)
1107
v. La Rose (99 Ind. 117)
268 v. Cox (43 Ala. 697)
966
v. Legg (20 Ind. 315) 358, 368 v. Ross (38 Ala. 156) 941, 944, 949
v. Pollard (50 Ind. 151)
1222 | Loud v. Charlestown (99 Mass. 208) 1124
v. Shirk (88 Ind. 563)
773 v. Charlestown (103 Mass. 278) 963
v. Wright (25 Ind. 512)
1331 Loughborough v. Blake (5 Wheat.
Lohrum v. Eyerman (5 Mo. App.
318)
902
481)
991 Loughlin v. Washington (63 Iowa,
Loker v. Brookline (13 Pick. 343) 529,
652)
761
530, 534, 641, 1261 Loughran vi Des Moines (72 Iowa,
v: Damon (17 Pick. (Mass.) 284) 1258
382)
1318
Lombard v. Cheaver (Morris (la.), Louisburg Com’rs v. Harris (7 Jones
473)
429
L. 281)
414, 437, 440
London, Re (3 Hargr. St. Tr. 545) 1089 Louisiana City v. Wood (102 U. S.
Re (8 Howell St. Tr. 1340) 18, 1083
537, 557, 585, 635, 1140,
v. Bernardiston (1 Lev. 16) 484
1144, 1192
v. Cox (L. R.2 H. L. C. 239) 1057 Louisiana (State) v. New Orleans
v. Lynn Regis (1 H. BI. 206)
379,
(109 U. S. 285)
1168
1072, 1094 v. Pillsbury (105 U. S. 278) 119, 392,
v. Vanacre (12 Mod. 270) 306, 423
942
v. Vanacre (1 Salk. 142)
306 v. St. Martin's Par. Pol. Jury
v. Vanaker (1 Ld. Raym. 496). 306,
(111 U. S. 716) 118, 392, 1032,
396, 421
1037
v. Wilmington (78 N. C. 109) 1107, Louisiana State Bank v. Orleans Nav.
1120
Co. (3 La. An. 294) 97, 147, 195,
v. Wood (12 Mod. 674) 420, 490
548, 561
Londonderry v. Andover (28 Vt. 416) 139, Louisville v. Bank of Ky. (3 Met.
140
148)
997
v. Derry (8 N. H. 320)
269 v. Bank of U. S. (3 B. Mon.
Long v. Battle Creek (39 Mich. 323) 374,
138)
817
745 v. Commonwealth (1 Duvall, 295) 95,
v. Fuller (68 Pa. St. 170)
721
108, 657, 673, 950
v. New York (81 N. Y. 425) 312 v. Henderson (5 Bush, 515) 556
v. Shelby Co. Tax. Dist. (7 Lea,
v. Henning (1 Bush, 381) 989, 1152
134)
396 v. Higdon (2 Met. 526)
304
Longmore v. Gt. W. R. Co. (35 L. J.
v. Hyatt (2 B. Mon. 177) 918, 979
C. P. 135)
179 v. Louisville Rolling Milí Co. (3
Longworth v. Cincinnati (34 O. St.
Bush, 416)
814, 1226
101)
721 V. McKean (18 B. Mon. 9) 143, 431,
Longworth's Ex. v. Evansville (32
1065, 1067, 1073, 1074
Ind. 322)
84 v. McKegney (7 Bush, 651) 370, 376,
Loomis v. Spencer (2 Paige, 150) 324, 326
378
Lord v. Anoka (36 Minn. 176)
v. Nevin (10 Bush, 549) 444, 535, 955
v. Bigelow (6 Vt. 465)
76 v. Osborne (10 Bush, 226)
820
v. Gov. Cop. Miners (2 Phill.740) 352 v. Portsmouth Sav. Bank (104
v. New York (3 Hill, 426) 1165
U. S. 469)
231
v. Oconto (47 Wis. 386) 146, 155, 156, v. Taylor (105 U. S. 454) 631
671, 958 v. University of Louisville (15
Lord Bruce's Case (2 Stra. 819)_328, 336
B. Mon. 642) 103, 108, 121, 123,
Lord Colchester v. Kewney (L. R. 1
136
Exch. 368)
952 v. Webster (108 Ill. 414)
473
Lord Hawley's Case (1 Vent. 143) 336 v. Wible (84 Ky. 290)
217
Lorie v. No. Chicago C. Ry. Co. (32
v. Zanone (1 Met. (Ky.) 151) 1148
Fed. R. 270)
841 Louisville & F. R. Co. v. Brown (17
B. Mon. 763)
848
VOL. I. - 9
344
xcviii
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
Page
Page
Louisville & N. A. R. Co. v. State (25 Lowell v. Oliver (8 Allen, 247) 224
Ind. 177)
969, 1009 v. Short (4 Cush. 275) 1276, 1311,
Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Davidson
1315
Co. Ct. (1 Sneed, 692)
79 v. Simpson (10 Allen, 88)
888
v. State (3 Head, 523) 1134, 1135 v. Spaulding (4 Cush. 275) 888, 1266,
Louisville & P. Canal Co. v. Com-
1272, 1311, 1315
monwealth (7 B. Mon. 160) 952 v. Watertown (58 Mich. 568) 1285
Louisville & P. Street R. Co. v. L.
v. Wentworth (6 Cush. 221) 984, 991
City R. Co. (2 Duvall, 175) 847, v. Wheelock (11 Cush. 391) 376, 991,
870
992
v. Smith (2 Duvall, 556)
865 v. Wyman (12 Cush. 273) 991, 1106,
Louisville Bridge Co. v. Louisville
1167
(81 Ky. 189)
254, 963 Lowell Five C. Sav. Bank v. Win-
Louisville, Cinc. & C. R. Co. v. Let-
chester (8 Allen, 109) 519
son (2 How. (U. S.) 497) 1140 Lower Macungie v. Merkhoffer (71
Louisville City Ry. Co. v. Louisville
Pa. 276)
1259
(4 Bush, 478) 782, 863, 864, 966, Loweree v. Newark (38 N. J. L, 151) 720
967 Lowery v. Delphi (55 Ind. 250) 1247
v. Louisville (8 Bush, 415) 157, 468, Lowndes Co. Com’rs v. Bowie (34
517, 820, 848, 860, 863
Ala. 461)
720
Louisville Gas Co. v. Citizens' Gas
v. Hearne (59 Ala. 371)
368, 373
Co. (115 U. S. 683) 117, 822, 826, v. Hunter (49 Ala. 507)
1175
827 Lownsdale v. Portland (Deady, 139) 750
Louisville N. A. & C. R. Co. v. Shires Lowry v. Rainwater (70 Mo. 162) 451
(108 Ill. 617)
139, 381 Loze v. New Orleans (2 La. 427) 486
Louisville Pol. Com'rs v. Louisville Lozier v. Newark (48 N. J. L. 452) 397
(3 Bush, 597) 100, 102, 294 Lucas, Re (29 Up. Can. Q. B. 81) 504
Louisville First Nat. Bank v. Com-
v. Lottery Com’rs (11 Gill & J.
monwealth (9 Wall. 353) 902
506)
424, 425
Loute v. Allegheny County (10 Pitts.
v. New York (21 Barb. 245) 1288
L. J. 241) 1033, 1037, 1069, 1072 v. Pitney (27 N. J. L. 221) 182, 184,
Love v. Hinckley (Abb. Adm. 436) 161
563
v. Jersey City (40 N. J. L. 456) 313, v. San Francisco (7 Cal. 463) 555
314 v. Tippecanoe Co. Com’rs (44
v. Ramsour (12 Ired. L. 328) 105, 270
Ind. 524)
95, 103, 105
v. Schenck (12 Ired. L. 304) 105, 270 Luck v. Ripon (52 Wis. 196)
1287
Loveland v. Detroit (41 Mich. 367) 208 Ludlow v. Cinc. So. Ry. Trs. (78 Ky.
Lovell v St. Paul (10 Minn. 290) 555
357)
955
Lovett v. Salem & S. D. R. Co. (9
v. Tyler (7 C. & P. 537)
259
Allen (Mass.), 557)
865 Luehrman v. Shelby Tax. Dist. (2
v. Steam S. M. Assoc. (6 Paige,
Lea, 425) 25, 59, 87, 95, 107, 251,
54)
679
292
Lovingston v. Wider (53 Ill. 302) 906, Lumbard v. Aldrich (8 N. H. 31) 381, 488
1120 Lumsden v. Cross (10 Wis. 282) 910, 957,
Low v. Commissioners of Pilotage
962
(R. M. Charlt. 302) 296, 479, 507 v. Milwaukee (8 Wis. 485) 726, 727
v. Evans (16 Ind. 486) 295, 296 Lund v. Tyngsboro' (11 Cush. 563) 1263,
v. Lewis (46 Cal. 549)
950
1270
2. Pettingill (12 N. H. 340) 371 Lutterloh v. Cedar Keys (15 Fla. 306) 416,
v. Towns, Gov. (8 Ga. 360) 1016, 1079
787
Lowber v. New York (5 Abb. Pr.
v. Cumberland Co. Com’rs (65
325; 7 Id. 248) 70, 95, 244
N. C. 403)
1071
Lowden, Re (89 N. Y. 548)
989 Lutz v. Crawfordsville (109 Ind. 466) 94
v. Cincinnati (2 Disney, 203) 555 Lycoming v. Union (15 Pa. St. 166) 130
Lowe v. Clinton (136 Mass. 24) 1267 Lyddy v. Long Island City (104 N. Y.
v. Howard County (94 Ind. 553) 674
218)
529, 553
Lowell v. Boston (111 Mass. 464) 233, 573, Lyman v. Amherst (107 Mass. 339) 1285
895, 906 v. Burlington (22 Vt. 131) 715
v. Boston & L. R. Co. (23 Pick.
v. Edgarton (29 Vt. 305) 1203
24) 851, 1308, 1313, 1314, 1315 v. White River Br. Co. (2 Aiken
v. French, (6 Cush. 223) 991, 992
(Vt.), 255)
1195
v. Hadley (8 Met. 180)
1127 Lyme Regis v. Henley (3 B. & Ad.
v. Middlesex Co. Com’rs (8 Allen,
77)
1133
660)
962 v. Henley (2 CI. & F. 331) 242
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
xcix
Page
Page
Lynah v. St. Paul's Par. Com’rs (2 Macomber v. Nichols (34 Mich. 212) 812,
McCord, 170)
1009, 1011
885
Lynch, Re (2 Hill, 45)
1010 Macon v. First Nat. Bank of Macon
v. Alexandria (9 La. An. 498) 909
(59 Ga. 648)
957
v. Eastern La F. & M. Ry. Co.
v. Franklin (12 Ga. 239) 744, 751, 787
(57 Wis. 430)
1107 v. Harris (75 Ga. 761)
854
v. Lafland (4 Coldw. 96) 303, 305 v. Hill (58 Ga. 595) 816, 819, 1222
v. New York (76 N. Y. 60) 1318, 1319, v. Huff (60 Ga. 221)
514, 516
1320, 1321, 1335 v. Jones (67 Ga. 489)
963
v. People (16 Mich. 472)
483 v. M. Sav. Bank (60 Ga. 133) 957,
v. Smith (104 Mass. 52)
1284
968
Lynchburg v. Norfolk & Ń. W. R.
v. Patty (9 Rep. 613; 57 Miss.
Co. (80 Va. 237)
971
378)
168
v. Norvell (20 Gratt. 601)
569 v. Shaw (14 Ga. 162; 16 Ga.
v. Slaughter (75 Va. 57)
560
280; 19 Ga. 468; 21 Ga. 280) 331,
Lynde v. Winnebago County (16
1126, 1129, 1131
Wall. 6) 189, 190, 238, 560, 570, v. Shaw's Adm. (25 Ga. 590) 317, 331
581, 593, 591, 614, 620, 649 Macon County v. Shores (97 Ú. S.
Lyndon v. Stanbridge (2 H. & N.
272)
582, 593, 631
45)
216 Macon Co. Case (99 U. S. 582).
Lynne Regis, Re (10 Co. 122)
260
[See U. S. v. Macon, &c.
Lyon v. Adams (4 S. & R. 443) 1030 Macy v. Indianapolis (17 Ind. 267) 814,
2. Adamson (7 Iowa, 509) 524
815, 1221, 1222
v. Cambridge (136 Mass. 419) 1268 v. Titcombe. (See Macey, &c.]
v. Commonwealth (3 Bibb, 430) 278 Maddox v. Graham (2 Met. (Ky.)
v. Elizabeth (43 N. J. L. 158) 675,
56) 225, 518, 521, 560, 569, 649,
894
1028, 1037, 1038, 1052, 1058, 1059,
v. Fishmongers' Co. (L. R. 1 App.
1061, 1065, 1069, 1070, 1073
Cas. 662)
171, 887 Madison v. Baker (103 Ind. 41) 129
y. Irish (58 Mich. 518)
324 v. Fitch (18 Ind. 33)
965
v. Rice (41 Conn. 245)
1058 v. Hatcher (8 Blackf. 341) 440
v. Tax Receiver (52 Mich. 271) 1148 v. Kelso (32 Ind. 79)
313
Lyons v. Chamberlain (89 N. Y.
v. Korbly (32 Ind. 74) 296, 330, 334,
578)
602
337, 339
v. Coolidge (89 Ill. 529)
1032 v. Ross (3 Ind. 236)
1318
v. Desolette (124 Mass. 387) 1286 v. Smith (83 Ind. 502) 589, 1014, 1111
v. Munson (99 U. S. 684)
594 v. Whitney (21 Ind. 261) 965, 968
Lyons Highway Com’rs v. People Madison Av. Bap. Church v. Oliver
(38 Ill. 347).
1063
St. Church (5 Robt. 649) 356
Madison County v. Alexander (Walker
(Miss.), 523)
1028
M.
v. Bartlett (2 Ill. 67)
570
Madison Co. Com’rs v. Brown (89 Ind.
Maas v. Missouri R. R. (11 Hun, 8) 651
48)
882, 1297
Maberry ads. Franklin (6 Humph. Magarity v. Wilmington (5 Houston,
368)
1009
530)
1323
Mabon v. Halsted (39 N. J. L. 640) 712 Magee v. Calaveras Co. Sup. (10 Cal.
Macbeath v. Haldimand (1 D. & E.
376)
1014, 1021
T. R. 172)
323 v. Commonwealth (46 Pa. St.
Macclesfield v. Pedley (4 B. & Ad.
358)
798, 915
397)
455 Maggie P., The (25 Fed. Rep. 202) 513
Macdonald v. &c. [See McDonald, Magill v. Kauffman (4 S. & R. 317) 533
&c.]
Maginnis v. Brooklin (26 N. Y. St.
Macey v. Titcombe (19 Ind. 135) 543
R. 689)
1247
Machell v. Nevinson (2 Ld. Raym. Magrath v. Brook Tp. (13 U. C. Q.
1355)
364
B. 629)
694
Mack v. Jones (21 N. H. 393)
961 Magruder v. Swann, Gov. (25 Md.
Mackey v. Vicksburg (64 Miss. 777) 1211
173)
1016
Mackinnon v. Penson (25 Eng. L. & Maguire v. Smock (42 Ind. 1) 533, 981
Eq. 457)
1171 Mahady v. Bushwick R. Co. (91 N. Y.
Macklot v. Davenport (17 Iowa,
148) 777, 864, 865, 870, 871, 885
379)
285 Mahan v. Union Depot, &c. Co. (34
Macomber ú. Godfrey (108 Mass.
Minn. 29)
857
219)
1316 | Mahaska v. Ingalls (16 Iowa, 81) 301
с
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
Page
Page
Maher v. Chicago (38 Ill. 266) 531, 533, Manning_v. Manning (L. R. 2 P. &
555
D. 223)
279
Mahomet v. Quackenbush (117 U.S.
v. Mathews (66 Iowa; 675)
509)
87 | Manns v. Givens (7 Leigh, 689) 1006
Mahon v. Columbus (58 Miss. 310) 678 Manny, Re (14 How. 24)
1006
v. N. Y. Cent. R. Co. (24 N. Y. Manrose v. Parker (90 Ill. 581) 755
658)
792, 842 Mansfield v. Fuller (50 Mo. 338) 1031
v. Utica & S. R. Co. (Hill & D.
v. Moore (124 IM. 133)
1268
Suppl. (N. Y.) 156)
854 Mansfield & S. R. Co. v. Veeder (17
Mahoney v. Bank of State (4 Ark.
Ohio, 385)
558
620)
75 Manuel 2. Cumberland Co. Com'rs
v. Metrop. R. Co. (104 Mass.
(98 N. C. 9)
42, 1246
73)
1285 Manufacturing Co., &c. (14 Johns.
Main v. Fort Smith (49 Ark. 480) 366
238). (See Dutchess Cot-
v. McCarty (15 Ill. 441) 294, 483
ton Manuf. Co., &c.]
Major v. Randolph (4 W. & S. 514) 1026 Marathon Sch. Dist. v. Gage (39
Malchus v. Highlands (4 Bush, 547) 926
Mich. 484)
161
Maleverer v. Spinke (1 Dyer, 36 0) 1163 Marble v. Worcester (4 Gray, 395) 1259,
Malloch v. Anderson (4 U. C. Q. B.
1263, 1270
481)
789 Marbury v. Madison (1 Cranch, 137) 297,
Mallory v. Courtland Co. Sup. (2
1048, 1058
Cowen, 531)
316 March v. Commonwealth (12 B. Mon.
v. Mallett (6 Jones Eq. 345) 254
25)
394, 437
Malone v. Murphy (2 Kan. 250) 507 Marchant 0. Langworthy (6 Hill,
v. Toledo (28 O. St. 643)
691
646; 3 Denio, 526)
348
Malone's Estate, Re (21 S. C. 435) 94, 108 Marcy v. Oswego Tp. (92 Ú. S. 637) 593,
Maloy v. Marietta (11 Ohio, 636) 86, 933
598, 599, 603, 604
Maltus v Shields (2 Met. (Ky.) 553) 972 v. Taylor (19 Ill. 634)
755
Manchester u. Hartford (30 Conn. Marden v. Portsmouth (59 N. H. 18) 313
118) 1266, 1270, 1296, 1301 Marietta v. Fearing (4 Ohio, 427) 95, 397,
v. Herrington (10 N. Y. 164) 321
405, 422
2. Hoag (66 Iowa, 649)
745 Mariner v. Mackey (25 Kan. 669) 674
v. Quimby (60 N. H. 10) 1311 Marini v. Graham (67 Cal. 130) 784
Manderschid v. Dubuque (25 Iowa, Marion Council & Int. v. Chandler
108)
1267
(6 Ala. 899) 148, 434, 715, 898,
2. Dubuque (29 Iowa, 73) 752, 754,
1125, 1126
755, 761, 881, 1263, 1283, 1312) Marion Co. Com’rs v. Harvey Co.
Mangan v. Atterton (L. R. 1 Ex.
Com’rs (26 Kan. 181)
88
239)
1264 Market v. St. Louis (56 Mo. 189) 1272,
Manhattan Co., Ex P. (22 Wend.
1301
653)
829 Market Street Ry. Co. v. Central Ry.
Manhattan Manuf. & Fert. Co. v.
Co. (51 Cal. 583)
864
Van Keuren (23 N. J. Eq. Markham v. Atlanta (23 Ga. 482) 814,
251)
448
1222
Manice v. New York (8 N. Y. 120) 557, Markle v. Akron (14 Ohio, 586) 151, 385,
940
406, 507
Mankato r. Arnold (36 Minn. 62) 500 v. Wright (13 Ind. 548) 352, 1077
v. Fowler (32 Minn. 364)
396 Marmet v. State (45 V. St. 63) 426
v. Meagher (17 Minn. 265) 750, 769 Marquis of Stafford v. Coyney (7
v. Manitowoc (52 Wis. 423) 1009
B. & C. 259)
741
v. Warren (20 Minn. 144) 745 Marr v. Enloe (1 Yerger, 452) 927
v. Willard (13 Minn. 13)
783 v. Vienna (10 U. C. L. J. 275) 278
Manko v. Chambersburg (25 N.J. Eq. Marriage v. Lawrence (3 B. & Ad.
168)
800, 801
144)
380
Manley v. St. Helen's Canal Co. (2 Marriott v. Baltimore (9 Md. 160) 1196
H. & N. 840)
1215 v. Hampton (2 Esp. 546 ; 2 Smith's
Manly v. Gibson (13 Ill. 312) 740, 742,
L. C. 237)
1145, 1152, 1153
747
v. Stanley (1 M. & G. 568) 1264
Mann v. Pentz (2 Sandf. Ch. 257) 274 Marsh v. Brooklyn (59 N. Y. 280) 715, 1120
Manners v. Haverhill (135 Mass.
v. Fulton County (10 Wall. 676) 235,
1187
236, 238, 518, 519, 529, 540, 542,
Manning v. Gloucester Fifth Parish
585, 594, 615, 618, 630, 639, 641,
(6 Pick. 6)
374, 381
645, 646, 648, 1034
v. Lowell (130 Mass. 21) 1322 v. Little Valley (64 N. Y. 112) 1031
165)
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
ci
247)
Page
Page
Marshall v. Anderson (78 Mo. 85) 750, Mathews v. Kelsey (58 Me. 56) 846, 885
759 Matthews v. Alexandria (68 Mo. 115) 155,
v. Elgin (8 Fed. R. 783)
637
156, 670, 671, 769, 958
v. Guion (11 N. Y. 461)
177 v. Barraboo (39 Wis. 674) 1267
v. Keras (2 Swan, 68)
277 Matthiessen & H. Zinc Co. v. La Salle
v. Silliman (61 Ill. 218) 134, 240, 280,
(117 Ill. 411)739, 740, 747, 750, 773
636, 1111 Matthiessen & W. Sugar Ref. Co. v.
v. Smith (L. R. 8 C. P. 416) 415
Jersey City (26 N. J. Eq.
v. Vicksburg (15 Wall. 146) 955
809, 1092
Marshall Co. C. v. Calloway Co. Ct. Matthis v. Cameron (62 Mo. 504) 562,
(2 Bush, 93)
270
1124
Marshall Co. Sup. v. Cook (38 Ill. Mattingly v. Dist. Columbia (99 U.
44) 239, 277, 564, 639, 645
S. 687)
133, 902
v. Schenck (5 Wall. 772) 542, 573, Matts v. Hawkins (5 Taunt. 20) 224
584, 593, 594, 598, 617, 636, 640, v. Plymouth (100 Ind. 545) 814, 1220,
646
1222
Marshalltown v. Blum (58 Iowa, Mau v. Liddle (15 Nev. 271)
1014
184)
902, 904 Mauch Chunk Bor. v. Kline (100 Pa.
v. Forney (61 Iowa, 578)
794
St. 119)
1260
Martel v. East St. Louis (94'Ill. 67) 485 v. Shortz (61 Pa. St. 399) 911, 986
Martin, Re (27 Ark. 467)
398 Maultby u. Leavenworth (28 Kan.
v. Branch Bank (15 Ala. 587) 670
745)
1285
v. Brooklyn (1 Hill (N. Y.), 541) 108, Maupin v. Franklin County (67 Mo.
157, 324, 529,532, 711, 1167, 1204,
327)
529
1331 Maurin v. Smith (8 R. I. 192) 1016
v. Caddo Par. Pol. Jury (32 La. Maxmilian v. New York (62 N. Y.
An. 1022)
560
160) 108, 115, 1180, 1193, 1194,
v. Carron (26 N. J. L. 228) 928
1198, 1199, 1201
v. Dix (52 Miss. 53)
94, 972 Maxwell v. Stanislaus Co. Sup. (53
v. Evansville (32 Ind. 85) 177, 748
Cal. 389)
543, 1129
v. Gleason (139 Mass. 183) 697 May v. Detroit (2 Mich. C. C. 230) 543
v. Lemon (26 Conn. 192)
360, 361
v. Juneau County (30 Fed. R.
v. O'Brien (34 Miss. 21)
167
241)
1181
v. People (87 Ill. 524)
40 v. Logan County (30 Fed. R.
v. People (88 Ill. 390)
432
250)
1180
v. San Francisco (16 Cal. 285) 568 v. Mercer County (30 Fed. R.
v. Tripp (51 Mich. 184)
1007
247)
1180
Martindale v. Palmer (52 Ind. 411) 292, v. Milw. & M. R. Co. (3 Wis.
351, 408, 486
219)
725
Martini, Re (23 Fla. 343) ·
421 v. Princeton (11 Met. 442) 1263
Martinsville v. Shirley (84 Ind. 546) 1179 2. School Dist. (22 Neb. 205) 798
Mason v. Bristol (10 N. H. 36) 527 Mayer, Re (50 N. Y. 504)
89
v. Ellsworth (32 Me. 271) 1288, 1302 v. New York (63 N. Y. 455) 557, 990,
v. Fearson (9 How. 248)
158
1151
v. Kennebec & P. R. Co. (31 Me. Mayhew v. Gay Head (13 Allen, 129) 368,
215)
1223
373, 375
v. Lancaster (4 Bush, 406) 944, 970 Mayo v. James (12 Gratt. 17) 616, 1132
v. Muncaster (9 Wheat. 445) 656 v. Murchie (3 Munf. 358)
752
v. Pitt (21 Mo. 391)
269 v. Springfield (136 Mass. 10) 692
v. Shawneetown (77 Ill. 533) 386 Mayor, &c. of A. City, &c. [See A.
v. Spencer (35 Kan. 512) 134, 987
City, &c.]
Mason City S. & M. Co. v. Mason (23 Mayor of Detroit, Rel. v. Park
W. Va. 211)
1097
Com’rs (44 Mich. 602) 124, 699
Massey v. Columbus (75 Ga. 658) 1283 Mayor of Durham's Case (1 Sid. 33) 301,
Massing v. Ames (37 Wis. 645) 944
1025
Masters v. Troy (50 Hun, 485) 1286 Mayor of New Orleans, Pros. v.
v. Warren (27 Conn. 293) 1287
Lockett (13 La. 545)
292
Masterson v. Mt. Vernon (58 N. Y. Mayor of New York, &c., Re Nassau
391)
1161
Street (11 Johns. 77)
573
Matheny v. Golden (5 (). St. 375) 157 Mayor of New York, Re (99 N. Y.
Mather v. Brown (L. R. 1 C. P. D.
569)
699, 927
596)
281 Mays v. Cincinnati (1 0. St. 268) 147,
v. Ottawa (114 Ill. 659) 195, 233, 906
395, 426, 429, 908, 940, 941, 1150,
Mathews v. Biddulph (3 M. & G. 390) 295
1151, 1154
cii
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
544
457)
Page
Page
Maysville v. Shultz (3 Dana, 10) 141 McComber v. Taunton (100 Mass.
Maywood Co. v. Maywood (118 Ill.
255)
1270
61)
739, 740, 764 McCombs V. Akron Council (15
McAden v. Jenkins (64 N. C. 796) 1104
Ohio, 474; 18 Ohio, 229) 1226
McAlister v. Clark (33 Conn. 91) 452 McConnel v. Lexington Trs. (12
McArthur v. Saginaw (58 Mich. 357) 1157,
Wheat. 582)
743
1252 McConnell v. Dewey (5 Neb. 385) 324,
McAvoy v. New York (54 How. Pr.
325, 1172, 1175
245)
1163 v. Hamm (16 Kan. 228)
233
McBean v. Chandler (9 Heisk. 349) 466, McConvill v. Jersey City (39 N. J.
927, 933, 938, 955, 956
L. 38)
494
McBrian v. Grand Rapids (56 Mich. McCord v. Ochiltree (8 Blackf. 15) 668
95)
v. Pike (121 Ill. 288)
1092
McBride v. Detroit (Mich. 236; 49 McCormack v. Brooklyn (108 N. Y.
Mich. 239)
316
49)
558, 719
v. Grand Rapids (47 Mich. 236) 1007 McCormick v. Bay City (23 Mich.
McCabe v. Fountain Co. Com'rs (46
457)
323, 367, 368, 389
Ind. 380)
549, 554 v. Kansas City, St. J. & C. B.
McCafferty v. Spuyten Duyvil & P.
R. Co. (57 Mo. 433)
1215
M. R. Co. (61 N. Y. 178)
1306, 2. Lafayette (1 Ind. 48)
720
1308 v. Patchen (53 Mo. 33) 814, 969, 960
McCall v. Byram Manuf. Co. (6
v. Washington (112 Pa. St. 185) 882
Conn. 428)
303, 304 v. West Chicago Park Com'rs
v. Hancock (10 Fed. R. 8) 601
(118 IIl. 655)
721
McCalla v. Multnomah County (3 01. McCoy v. Briant (53 Cal. 247) 235, 518,
424)
1246
521, 1114
McCallum v. Bethany Tp. (42 Mich.
v. Chillicothe (3 Ohio, 370) 324, 326
995 v. Harnett Co. Jus. (4 Jones L.
McCann v. Otoe Co. Com'rs (9 Neb.
180)
1068
324)
146, 728 McCracken v. San Francisco (16 Cal.
v. Sierra County (7 Cal. 121) 720,
591) 207, 358, 368, 521, 533, 534,
721
548, 542, 676, 1143
McCartee v. Orph. As. Soc. of N. Y. McCready v. Phila. Guard. Poor (9
(9 Cow. 437)
657, 658, 661
S. & R. 99)
361
McCarthy v. Boston (135 Mass. 197) 1186, McCreary v. Rhodes (63 Miss. 308) 1126
1193 McCrickart v. Pittsburg (88 Pa. St.
v. Chicago (53 Ill. 38) 297, 887
133)
1154
v. Commonwealth (110 Pa. St. McCrory v. Griswold (7 Iowa, 248) 715
243)
80 McCrowell w. Bristol (5 Lea, 685) 449,
p. De Armit (99 Pa. St. 63) 325
1134, 1135, 1159, 1199
v. Metrop. Bd. of W.(L. R. 7 C. McCubbin v. Atchison (12 Kan. 166) 557
P. C. 508; 8 Ib. 191) 688, 1228, McCulloch 2. Maryland (4 Wheat.
1231
316)
67, 894, 897, 902
v. Oshawa V. (19 U. C. Q. B.
v. State (11 Ind. 424)
391
245)
1248, 1266 McCullom v. Black Hawk County
v. Portland (67 Me. 167)
1253
(21 Iowa, 409) 807, 808, 1281
v. St. Paul (22 Minn. 527) 815, 1225 McCullough v. Brooklyn (23 Wend.
v. Syracuse (46 N. Y. 194) 779, 788,
458)
568, 1009, 1204
816, 832, 833, 1296, 1325, 1327, v. Moss (5 Denio, 567) 563, 571
1328, 1331, 1332 v. San F. B. of Ed. (51 Cal. 418) 766
McCarty v. Bauer (3 Kan. 237) 1202 McCunn's Case (19 N. Y. 188) 308
McCaughey v. Providence (12 R. I. McCutchen, Re 22 U. C. Q. B. 613) 1329
1210 McCutcheon v. Homer (11 C. L. J.
McClosky v. Kreeling (18 Pac. R.
16; 43 Mich. 483)
1245
433)
475 McCutchin v. Horner 15 N. W. R.
McClung v. St. Paul (14 Minn. 420) 313
668)
1180
v. Silliman (6 Wheat. 598) 1015, 1044 | Mc Dade v. Chester (117 Pa. St. 414)
McClure v. Bennett (1 Blackf. 189) 195
1157, 1158, 1160
v. Oxford Tp. (94 U. S. 429) 572, 590, McDermett v. Kingston (57 How. Pr.
629
196)
1295
v. Red Wing (28 Minn. 186) 724, McDermond v. Kennedy (Bright.
1322
(Pa.) 332)
942
McCluskey ». Cromwell (11 N. Y. McDermott v. Boston (133 Mass.
598)
301
349)
1205
449)
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
cui
Page
Page
McDermott v. Metrop. Pol. Board McGuiness v. New York (52 How. Pr.
(5 Abb. Pr. 422)
294, 386
460)
1205
v. Miller (45 N. J. L. 251) 357, 358, McGuinn o. Peri (16 La. An. 326) 979
1021 McGuire v. Spence (91 N. Y. 303) 1284
McDonald v. Elfe (1 Nott & McC. McInerny v. Reed (23 Iowa, 410) 958,
410)
1132
999, 1001
v. Mass. Gen. Hosp. (120 Mass. McInery v. Galveston (58 Texas,
432)
1201
334)
313
v. Murphree (45 Miss. 705) 1107 McIntire v. State (5 Blackf. 384) 733
v. Newark (42 N. J. Eq. 136) 447, McIntyre v. Easton & A. R. Co. (26
457, 784
N. J. Eq. 425)
709
v. New York (68 N. Y. 23) 200, 621, v. Sch. Trs. of Tp. 9, &c. (3 Ill.
529, 537, 538, 540
App. 77)
301
v. Red Wing (13 Minn. 38) 1164 v. Wood (7 Čranch, 504)
1044
v. Schell (6 S. & R. 240) 507, 726 McIntyre Poor School Trs. v. Zanes-
v. Schneider (27 Mo. 405)
678
ville Canal & M. Co. (9 Ohio,
McDonell v. Int. & G. N. R. Co. (60
203)
243
Tex. 590)
180 McKay v. Buffalo (74 N. Y. 619) 1197
McDonough v. Nevada City (6 Nev.
v. Detroit & E. Pl. R. Co. (2
90)
1281
Mich. 138)
808
McDonough’s Suc. (8 La. An. 171) 662, McKean v. Louisville (18 B. Mon. 9)
666
1014
McDonough Will Case (15 How. 367) McKee v. Anderson T. Council (Rice,
55, 653, 655, 661 662, 666
L. 24)
429, 1132, 1144, 1147
McDougal v. Hennepin Co. Sup. (4
v. Bidwell (74 Pa. St. 218) 1269
Minn. 184)
161 v. Brown (23 La. An. 306) 979
McDowell v. Mass. & S. Constr. Co.
v. Huron Dist. Ct. (1 U. Č. Q. B.
(96 N. C. 514)
240
368)
269
McElroy v. Albanv (65 Ga. 387) 1197 v. McKee (8 B. Mon. 433) 418, 420,
v. Kansas City (21 Fed. R. 257)
471
1224, 1242 v. Percliment (69 Pa. St. 342) 753,
McEwen v. Taylor (4 G. Greene, 532) 180
755, 757
McFarland v. Orange & N. H. C. R.
v. St. Louis (17 Mo. 184) 743, 752
Co. (13 N. J. Eq. 17, 561) 863 v. Vernon County (3 Dillon C.
McFarlane v. Kerr (10 Bosw. 249)
C. 210)
581
801 McKeigue v. Janesville (68 Wis. 50) 1285,
v. Milwaukee (51 Wis. 691) 1312
1287, 1297
v. Triton Ins. Co. (4 Denio, 392) 380 McKellar v. Detroit (57 Mich. 153) 1252,
McFee v. Greenfield (62 Ind. 21)
1262
McGaffin v. Cohoes (74 N. Y. 387) 1142 McKenna v. Boston (131 Mass. 143) 755
McGarty v. Deming (51 Conn. 442) 51
Lancaster Road Com'rs
McGary v. Lafayette (12 Rob. 668;
(Harper (S. C.) L. 381) 757
4 La. An. 440) 1189, 1190, 1287 McKenzie v. Northfield (30 Minn.
McGear 2. Bridgeton Treas. (33 N. J.
456)
1285
L, 213)
483, 500 McKevitt v. Hoboken (45 N. J. L.
McGee's Appeal (114 N. Y. 470) 478, 794
482)
814, 819
McGehee v. Columbus (69 Ga. 581) 1148 McKibbin v. Fort Smith (35 Ark.
v. Mathis (21 Ark. 40) 722, 907, 921,
352)
212, 445
933 McKinney v. O'Connor (26 Tex. 5) 281
McGinity v. New York (5 Duer, 674) McKnight v. Grant Par. (30 La. An.
1296, 1301, 1311
361)
675
v. Woodville (59 Miss. 648)
752 v. New Orleans (24 La. An. 412) 513
McGinty v. Keokuk (66 Iowa, 725) 1285 McLauchlin v. Charlotte & S. C. R.
McGlue v. Philadelphia (10 Phila.
Co. (5 Rich. L. 583)
786, 855
348)
557 | McLaughlin v. Cluley (56 Pa. St.
McGonigle v. Allegheny (44 Pa. St.
270)
279
118)
914, 978
v. Corry (77 Pa. St. 109) 1261, 1282
McGratlı v. Newton (29 Kan. 364) 970 v. Municipality (5 La. An. 504) 711,
,
McGraw v. Whitson (69 Iowa, 348) 365,
713, 1204
388 v. Stevens (18 Ohio, 94)
177
McGregor v. Boyle (34 Iowa, 268) 786, v. Stevens (2 Cranch C. C. R.
819, 1331, 1334
148)
437
v. Calcutt (18 U. C. C. P. 39) 745 McLaury v. McGregor (54 Iowa, 717)
v. Logansport (79 Ind. 166) 514
1284
659,
433
v.
civ
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
Page
Page
McLean v. Brantford Council (16 U. Meares v. Wilmington Com’rs (9
C. Q. B. 347)
538
Ired. L. 73) 1229, 1323, 1331
v. Flagg (46 N. Y. 401) 744, 823 Mears v. Graham (8 Blackf. 144) 195
v. Great W. Ry. Co. (33 U. C. Q. Mech. & Tr. Bank v. Bridges (30
B. 198)
718
N. J. L. 111)
142, 143
McLean Co. Precinct Deposit Mechanics' Bank v. Kan. City (73
Bank (81 Ky. 254) 997, 998
Mo. 555)
119
McLellan v. Young (54 Ga. 399) 161, 162 Mechanics' Bank (N. Y.) v. N. Y. &
McLimans v. Lancaster (63 Wis. 596).
N. H. R. Co. (13 N. Y. 599) 560
1297 Mechanics' Bank of Alexandria v.
McLott v. Davenport (17 Iowa, 379) 1120
Bank of Columbia (5 Wheat.
McMahon v. Cinc. & C. S. L. R. Co.
326)
524
(5 Ind. 413)
733
v. Seton (1 Pet. 299)
365
v. Savannah (66 Ga. 217) 277 Mechanicsburg v. Meredith (54 Ill.
McMasters v. Commonwealth 13
84)
881, 1246
Watts, 292)
721, 914 Medical Institution of Geneva Col.
McMaugh v. Milwaukee (32 Wis.
v. Patterson (1 Denio, 61;
200)
1300
5 Ib. 618)
76
McMicken v. Cincinnati (4 0. St. Medina v. Perkins (48 Mich. 67) 882
394)
709 Medway Cot. Manuf. Co. v. Adams
McMillen v. Boyles (6 Iowa, 304) 134, 635
(10 Mass. 360)
260
McMinn Acad. Trs. v. Reneau (2 Meech v. Buffalo (29 N. Y. 198) 551
Swan, 94)
262 Meek v Whitechapel Bd. of W. (2
McMullan v. Charleston C. Council
F. & F. 144)
1331
(1 Bay, 46)
413, 507 Meeker v. Van Rensselaer (15 Wend.
McMurray v. Baltimore (54 Md. 103) 165,
397)
378, 443, 448
175, 749 Megowan v. Commonwealth (2 Met.
McNally, Re (73 Cal. 632)
434
(Ky.) 3)
433, 469
v. Cohoes (60 Hun, 202) 1281 Mehan v. Hudson County (46 N. J.L.
McNamara v. Clintonville (62 Wis.
276)
312
207)
1287 Meinzer v. Racine (70 Wis. 561) 1219
v. Estes (22 Iowa, 246)
977 | Meissner v. Toledo (31 O. St. 387) 920
McNaughton v. Elkhart (85 Ind. 384) Melick v. Washington (47 N. J. L.
1312
254)
412, 414
McPhee v. Venable (77 Ga. 772) 1000 Mellen v. Lansing (20 Blatch. 278)
647
McPherson v. Chebanse (114 Ill. 46) 468 v. Western R. Co. (4 Gray,
v. Foster (43 Iowa, 48) 202, 203, 639,
301)
1331
1034 Mellinger v. Houston (68 Tex. 37) 996
McPike v. Parr (51 Mo. 63)
347 Melpomene Street Inhab. v. New
McRae v. O’Lain (1 McMullan L.
Orleans (14 La. An. 452) 153
328)
419 Melvin v. Lisenby (72 Ill. 63)
646, 650
McShane v. Moberly (79 Mo. 41) 750 Memphis v. Adams (9 Heisk. 518) 149,
McSpedon v. New York (7 Bosw.
274, 553, 554
601)
534, 556
v. Battaile (8 Heisk. 524)
811
McVeany v. New York (80 N. Y.
v. Brown (97 U. S. 300)
1042
185)
287, 318
v. Brown (20 Wall. 289) 316, 548,
McVoy v. Knoxville (85 Tenn. 119) 1287
553, 554, 555, 556, 583
McWhinney v. Indianapolis (98 Ind.
v. Hernando Ins. Co. (6 Baxter,
182)
1147
527)
900
McWhorter v. People (65 Ill. 290)
240,
v. Kimbrough (12 Heisk. 133) 1205
564 v. Laski (9 Heisk. 511)
161
McWilliams v. Morgan (61 Ill. 89) 767 v. Lasser (9 Humph. 757) 1331
Meacham v. Fitchburg R. Co. (4
v. Lenore (6 Coldw. 412)
801
Cush. 291)
731 v. O'Connor (53 Mo. 468)
482
Mead, Re (74 N. Y. 216) 777, 1114 v. Ray (19 Wall. 468)
431
v. Acton (139 Mass. 341)
224 v. United States (87 U. S. 293) 1042
v. Ballard (7 Wall. 290)
673 v. Winfield (8 Humph. 707) 396, 399
v. New Haven (40 Conn. 72) 1183, v. Woodward (12 Heisk. 499) 318
1198 2. Wright (6 Yerg. 497)
768
Meagher v. Storey County (5 Nev. Memphis & C. R. Co. v. Neighbors
312, 318, 494
(51 Miss. 412)
672
Mealing v. Augusta (Dud. (Ga.)
v. Payne (37 Miss. 700)
718
1132 Memphis & St. L. Packet Co. v. Gray,
Means v. Hendershott (24 Iowa, 78) 209
(9 Bush, 137) 177, 757, 759
244)
221)
.
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
CV
Page
Page
Memphis City Ry. Co. v. Memphis Merrill v. No. Yarmouth (78 Me.
(4 Coldw. 406)
860, 863
200)
1286
Memphis Freight Co. v. Memphis (4
v. Plainfield (45 N. H. 126) 220, 1109,
Coldw. 419)
701, 704
1111, 1112
Memphis K. & C. R. Co. v. Thomp-
v. Portland (4 Clif. C. C. 138) 1252,
son (24 Kan. 170)
644
1253, 1263, 1264, 1276, 1285, 1299,
Menasha v. Hazard (102 Ú. S.) 594, 629,
1301
630, 634 Merrimac River Canal, &c. Prop. v.
Mendel v. Wheeling (28 W. Va.
Lowell (7 Gray, 223) 1214, 1330,
233)
1200
1334
Mendota v. Thompson (20 Ill. 197) 76, Merritt v. Portchester (71 N. Y. 309) 940,
244, 485
944, 984
Mentz v. Cook (108 N. Y. 504) 618 Mersey Dock Cases (11 H. L. C.
Mercer v. Pittsburgh & Ft. W. & C. R.
687) 1205, 1207, 1215, 1220, 1297,
Co. (36 Pa. St. 99) 121, 705, 776,
1334
808, 833, 846, 863 Mersey Dock Trs. v. Gibbs (L. R. 1
v. Woodgate (L R. 5 Q. B. 26) 741
H. L. 93) 179, 1156, 1201, 1207,
Mercer Bor. Road, Re (14 S. & R.
1209, 1282, 1297.
447)
808 v. Penhallow (L. R. 1 H. L. 93;
Mercer County v. Hackett (1 Wall.
1 H. & N. 439; 3 H. & N.
83) 193, 226, 560, 582, 593, 602,
164; 7 H. & N. 329) 1156, 1298
614, 617, 618, 613, 644, 645 Merwin v. Chicago (45 Ill. 133) 161, 162
v. Hubbard (45 Ill. 139)
646 | Merz 0. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. (88 Mo.
v. Jackson (54 Ill. 397)
1307
672)
857
v. Pittsburgh & E.R. Co. (27 Pa. Messenger v. Buffalo (21 N. Y. 196) 523,
St. 389)
643
559
Merchants' Bank v. Cook (4 Pick. Metcalf v. St. Louis (11 Mo. 103) 385,
105)
. 1172
443
Merchants' Exch. Nat. Bank of N. Y. Metcalfe v. Hetherington (11 Exch.
v. Bergen County (115 U. S.
257)
179
384)
604, 648
v. Hetherington (5 H. & N. 719) 179
Merchants' Nat. Bank v. Little Rock Methodist Chapel Corp. v. Herrick
(5 Dill. 299)
563
(25 Me. 354)
374
Merchants' Union B. Wire Co. v. Methodist Church, Re (66 N. Y.
Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. (70
395). (See Second Av. M.
Iowa, 105)
384, 846
E. Church, &c.]
Meriden v. Camp (46 Conn. 284) 918 Methodist E. Church' v. Wyandotte
Meriwether v. Garrett (102 U. S. 472) 93,
(31 Kan. 721)
1217, 1218
107, 108, 118, 140, 160, 245, 248, Methodist E. Church of Hob.v. Hobo-
250, 251, 254, 671, 674, 997, 900,
ken (33 N. J. L. 13) 741, 745, 758,
939, 995, 1000, 1027, 1033
766, 769, 783, 789, 1222
Merrell v. Campbell (49 Wis. 535) 161 | Methodist E. Church of Wabash v.
Merriam, Re (84 N. Y. 596)
544
Ellis (38 Ind. 3)
952, 953
v. Moody's Ex. (25 Iowa, 163) 147, Methodist Prot. Church v. Baltimore
149, 999
(6 Gill, 391) 153, 387, 395, 705,
v. New Orleans (14 La. An. 318) 423
710, 716, 726
486, 909 Metropolitan Bd. of Excise v. Barrie
v. Yuba Co. Sup. (72 Cal. 517) 1114
(34 N. Y. 657)
432
Merrick v. Amherst (12 Allen, 500) 906, Metropolitan Bd. of Health v. Heister
909, 933
(37 N. Y. 661) 27, 294, 442, 776
v. Baltimore (43 Md. 219) 714 Metropolitan City Ry. Co.v. Chicago
v. Burl. & W. Pl. R. Co. (11 Iowa,
(96 Ill. 620)
454, 789
74)
539 Metropolitan Elev. R. Co., Re (18
Merrifield v. Worcester (110 Mass.
N. Y. Sup. C. 134)
872
216)
1214, 1327, 1330 Metropolitan R. Co. v. Quincy R.
Merrill v. Abbott (62 Ind. 549) 981
Co. (12 Allen, 262)
870
v. Burbank (23 Me. 538) 679 Metropolitan Ry. Co., Re (14 W. Dig.
v. Dixfield (30 Me. 157)
551
520)
872
v. Hampden (26 Me. 234) 1255 Metzger v. Áttica & Arc. R. Co. (79
v. Humphrey (24 Mich. 170) 1120,
N. Y. 170)
1106, 1114
1124 Meuser v. Risdon (36 Cal. 239) 154, 958,
v. Monticello (14 Fed. R. 628) 187
991, 993, 994
v. Monticello (22 Fed. R. 589) 185, Meyer v. Bridgeton (37 N. J. L.
187
160)
483
cvi
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
27)
Page
Pago
Meyer v. Brown (65 Cal. 583) 1027 Milhan v. Sharp (19 Barb. 435) 155
v. Burlington (52 Iowa, 560)
1217,
v. Sharp (27 N. Y. 611) 116, 157, 782,
1224
786, 787, 788, 853, 860
v. Carolan (9 Tex. 250) 1013 Military Parade Ground, Re (60 N.Y.
v. Fromm (108 Ind. 208)
407
319)
711
v. Johnson (53 Ala. 241)
969 Mill Dam Foundry Prop. v. Hovey
v. Lindell Ry. Co. (6 Mo. App.
(21 Pick. 417)
273
865 Millard v. Lafayette (5 La. An. 112) 711
v. Metrop. Elev. Ry. Co. (D. Mille Lacs Co. Treas. ads. State (20
Reg. (1886))
877
Minn. 363)
1016
v. Muscatine (1 Wall. 384)
Wall. 384) 151, 196, Miller v. Aracoma (30 W. Va. 606) 751
226, 236, 548, 560, 564, 569, 584, v. Burch (32 Tex. 209) 378, 383, 449,
593, 598, 614, 617
454
v. Newark (6 Am. L. Rev. 576) 735
v. Dearborn Co. Com’rs (66 Ind.
v. Porter (65 Cal. 67)
252
162)
185
Meyers v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co.
v. English (21 N. J. L. 317) 277
(57 Iowa, 555)
396, 857 v. Ford (4 Rich. L. 376)
323
Meylert's Ex. v. Sullivan County (19
v. Grundy (13 Mich. 540) 1116
Pa. St. 189)
1148 v. Hull (4 Denio, 144)
520
Michel v. Terribonne Par. Pol. Jury
v. Iron County (29 Mo. 122) 1175
(9 La. An. 67)
555 v. Jones (80 Ala. 89)
1126
v. West Baton Rouge Pol. Jury
v. Lerch (1 Wall. Jr. 210)
662
(3 La. An. 123)
555 v. Lynchburg (20 Gratt. 330) 563
Michener v. Philadelphia (118 Pa. St.
v. McWilliams (50 Ala. 427) 674, 1029,
535)
819
1172
Michie, Re (11 U. C. C. P. 379) 152, 980 v, Milwaukee (14 Wis. 642) 513
Michigan City v. Roberts (34 Ind.
v. Mobile (47 Ala. 163) 716, 720, 979,
471)
1014, 1017
980, 1092
Middleport v. Ætna L. Ins. Co. (82
v. No. Fredricksburgh Corp. (25
Ill. 562)
186, 239
U. C. Q. B. 31)
1248
Middlesex H. & M. Soc. v. Davis (3
v. O'Reilly (84 Ind. 168)
478
Met. (Mass.) 133)
258 v. Race (i Burr. 452)
582
Middlesex R. Co. v. Charlestown (8
v. Sacramento Co. Sup. (25 Cal.
Allen, 330)
966
93)
307
v. Wakefield (103 Mass. 261) 863 v. Savannah Fire Co. (26 Ga.
Middleton v. Allegheny Co. Com'rs
678)
217
(37 Pa. 237) 192, 194, 618, 1059, v. School Trs. (88 Ill. 26) 1125, 1126
1069 v. Stewart (9 Wheat. 680) 301
v. Lowe (30 Cal. 596)
1016 v. Thomson (3 M. & G. 576) 562
Middleton Sav. Bank v. Dubuque (15 Millers v. Augusta (63 Ga. 772) 1211
Iowa, 394)
676, 678, 679. Millerstown Bor. 2. Frederick (114
Middletown Vil., Re (82 N. Y. 196) 697
Pa. St. 435) 203, 604, 613, 639
708 Milliard v. Lafayette (5 La. An. 112) 713
Mikesell v. Durkee (36 Kan. 97) 849, 854 Milliken v. Weatherford (54 Tex.
Milan & R. Pl. R. Co. v. Husted (3
388)
332, 403
0. St. 578)
157 Millison v. Fisk (43 Ill. 112)
163
Milan Taxp. v. Tenn. Cent. R. Co. Mills v. Brooklyn (32 N. Y. 489) 1158,
(11 Lea, 330)
236, 575
1220, 1317, 1319, 1323, 1325, 1327,
Milarkey v. Foster (6 Or. 378) 781, 784,
1328, 1331, 1332, 1333, 1332
786 v. Charleton (29 Wis. 400) 122, 543,
Milburn v. Cedar Rapids (12 Iowa,
545, 993, 994, 1125
246)
820, 850, 853, 870 v. Gleason (11 Wis. 470) 183, 185, 188,
Miles v. Bough (3 Gale & D. 119) 370,
357, 542
408 v. Gleason (8 Am. Law Reg. 683) 195,
v. Chamberlain (17 Wis. 446)
539
416, 418 v. Parlin (106 IIl. 60)
855
v. Charleton (29 Wis. 400)
88 v. Thornton (26 Ill. 300)
964
v. Duncan (6 B. & C. 671) 1148 v. Williams (11 Ired. 558)
77, 91
Milford v. Holbrook (9 Allen, 17) 1076. Mill's Case (T. Raym. 152)
1072
1311, 1312, 1313 Milne 1. Davidson (5 Martin, n. s.
Milford & C. Turnp. Co. v. Brush (10
409)
385, 386, 442, 451
Ohio, 111)
261 v. Mayor (13 La. 69)
266
Milhau v. Sharp (15 Barb. 193) 822, 828, Milner's Adm. v. Pensacola (2 Woods
853, 860, 1114
C. C. 632)
141, 193, 250, 255
413,
1
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
cvii
718, 720
Page
Page
Milnes v. Duncan (6 B. & C. 671) 1153 Mitchell v. Franklin & C. Turnp.
v. Huddersfield (L. R. 10 Q. B. D.
Co. (3 Humph. 456)
125)
1205, 1213 v. Hay (37 Ga. 581)
1012
Milton Road, Re (40 P.a. St. 300) 808 v. Kirkland (7 Conn. 229) 707
Milward v. Thatcher (2 D. & E. T. R.
v. Lemon (34 Md. 176)
483
87)
308, 309 v. Milwaukee (18 Wis. 92) 544, 1122
Milwaukee v. Davis 16 Wis. 377) 1298, v. Rockland (41 Me. 363) 522, 543
1300 2. Rockland (45 Me. 496)
53, 443
v. Koeffler (116 U. S. 219) 1121 v. Rockland (52 Me. 118) 213, 293,
v. Milwaukee T. (12 Wis. 93) 271
1172, 1174, 1187, 1195, 1201
v. Milw. & Beloit R. Co. (7 Wis.
v. Rome (49 Ga. 19) 802, 1222, 1228
85)
833, 850 Mitchellville v. Polk Co. Sup. (64
Milwaukee & Minn. R. Co., Re (5
Iowa, 554)
951
Wall. 188)
1074 Mix v. Ross (57 Ill. 121) 996, 998, 1000,
Milw. & Miss. R. Co. v. Waukesha
1001, 1002
Co. Sup. (3 Am. L. Reg. Moale v. Baltimore (5 Md. 314) 684, 721,
679)
910
758, 898, 919
Milwaukee & St. P. Ry. Co. v. Fari-
v. Baltimore (61 Md. 224) 961
bault (23 Minn. 167) 689 Moberry v. Jefferson ville (38 Ind.
Milwaukee Fire Dep. v. Helfenstein
198)
945, 979
(16 Wis. 136)
426, 910 Mobile v. Allaire (14 Ala. 400) 438
Milwaukee Iron Co. i. Hubbard (29
2. Baldwin (57 Ala. 61) 940, 965, 966,
Wis. 51)
1121
1107
2:. Schubel (29 Wis. 444) 1127, 1131 v. Barton (47 Ala. 84)
475
Minden v. Silverstein (36 La. An.
v. Dargan (45 Ala. 310) 392, 899, 916,
912)
432
963
Miners' Bank of Dubuque v. United
v. Eslava (9 Port. 577)
171
States (1 G. Greene, 553) 391 v. Jones (42 Ala. 630)
480
v. United States (5 How. (U. S.)
v. Moog (53 Ala. 561)
174
213)
1090 v. Richardson (1 Stew. & P. 12) 719,
Miners' Ditch Co. v. Zellerbach (37
728
Cal. 543)
91, 519, 678, 1140 v. Rouse (8 Ala. 515)
438
Minick v. Troy (83 N. Y. 514) 1284 2. Rowland (26 Ala. 498)
162
Minneapolis v. Wilkin (30 Minn. 140) v. Royal Street R. Co. (45 Ala.
724
322)
899
Minneapolis Gasl. Co. v. Minneapolis
v. Watson (116 U. S. 289) 93, 118,
(36 Minn. 159)
154
245, 252, 253, 1053
Minnesota v. St. Paul (2 Wall. 609) 969 v. Yuille (3 Ala. 137) 148, 412, 414,
Minnesota Linseed Oil Co.
416, 417, 420, 423, 429, 464, 941,
Palmer (20 Minn. 468) 942, 976,
1092 Mobile & S. H, R. Co. v. Kennerly
Minns v. West (38 Ga. 18)
583
(74 Ala. 566)
954
Minor v. Mech. Bank of Alex. (1 Pet. Mobile County v. Kimball (102 U. S.
46, 69)
320
691)
932
Minot v. Boston Asylum (7 Met. 416) 262 Mobile Port'v. Leloup (76 Ala. 401) 905
v. Curtis (7 Mass. 441)
271 Mobile Sav. Bank 1. Oktibbeha Co.
v. West Roxbury (112 Mass. 1) 53,
Sup. (24 Fed. R. 110) 601
54, 1101 Mochler v. Shaftsbury (46 Vt. 580) 1266,
Minturn v. Larue (23 How. 435) 147, 148,
1270
180 | Mohan v. Jackson (52 Ind. 599) 291
Mirande, Re (73 Cal. 365) 364, 425 Mohawk & H. R. R. v. Clute (4
Mississippi & R. Rivers Boom Co. v.
Paige, 384)
968
Patterson (98 U. S. 403) 729, | Moir v. Munday (Sayer, 181)
486
730, 731 Moises v. Thornton (8 D. & É. T. R.
Mississippi River Br. Co. v. Ring (58
303)
274
Mo. 491)
733 Molett v. Keenan (22 Ala. 484) 709
Mississippi Society of Arts and Moliter v. Sheldon (37 Kan. 236) 747
Sciences 0. Musgrove (44 Mollandin v. Union Pac. Ry. Co. (14
Miss. 820)
439
Fed. R. 394)
1239
Missouri River, Ft. S. & G. R. Co. v. Monaghan v. Philadelphia (28 Pa. St.
Morris (7 Kan. 210)
1124
207)
1029, 1037, 1131
Mitchell v. Burlington (4 Wall. 270) 197, Monies v. Lynn (124 Mass. 165) 1302
231, 564, 586 Mon v. New Utrecht (104 N. Y.
v. Foster (9 Dowl. P. C. 527) 280
552)
1287
V.
970
cviii
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
Pago
1217,
391)
Page
Monk Election, Re (32 U. C. Q. B. Moore v. Gadsden (87 N. Y. 84 ; 93
147)
281
N. Y. 12)
1273, 1274
Monmouth v. Gardiner (35 Me. 247) 882, v. Langdon (2 Mackey, 127)
446
883 v. Little Rock (42 Ark. 66) 750, 756
Monongahela v. Fischer (111 Pa. St.
v. Los Angeles (72 Cal. 287)
9)
1266, 1279
1317
Monroe v. Gerspach (33 La. An.
v. Minneapolis (19 Minn. 300) 1272,
1011)
441, 445
1281, 1297, 1301
v. Hoffman (29 La. An. 651) 475 v. New York (8 N. Y. 110) 695, 750
v. Meuer (35 La. An. 1192) 500 v. New York (73 N. Y. 238) 530, 535,
Monroe Co. Sup. v. Clark (92 N. Y.
540, 541, 615, 1140, 1142, 1183
299 v. New York (4 Sandf. 456) 690
Montague v. Horan (12 Wis. 599) 569 v. People (14 How. 13)
440
Montclair v. Ramsdell (107 U. S. 147) 87, v. State (16 Ala. 411)
438
88, 601, 649 v. State (11 Lea, 35)
419
Monterey v. Berkshire Co. Com’rs (7
v. State (48 Miss. 147)
439
Cush. 394)
714, 1129 v. Walla Walla (2 Wash. Ter.
Montezuma 2. Minor (70 Ga. 191) 144
184)
454
v. Minor (73 Ga. 484)
498 Mootry v. Danbury (45 Conn. 550) 454,
Montgomery, ex p. (64 Ala. 463) 899,
1317, 1321
908, 971 Moran v. Elizabeth (9 Fed. R. 72) 1031
v. Hughes (65 Ala. 201) 138, 300 v. Lindell (52 Mo. 229)
978
2. M. W. Works (79 Ala. 233) 1140 v. Long Island City (101 N. Y.
v. Sayre (65 Ala. 564)
1107
439)
144
v. Scott (34 Wis. 338)
1300 v. McClears (63 Barb. 185) 1320
v. Wright (72 Ala. 411) 138, 1281, v. Miami Co. Com’rs (2 Black,
1282, 1299
722) 238, 560, 582, 585, 593, 598,
Montgomery C. Council v. Gilmer
617, 618
(33 Ala. 116) 1216, 1320, 1325, v. New Orleans (112 U. S. 69) 397;
1331, 1334
904
v. M. & W. Pl. R. Co. (31 Ala.
v. Palmer (13 U. C. C. P. 450) 292
76) 147, 468, 469, 518, 532, 533 Morange v. Mix (44 N. Y. 315) 912
v. Townsend (80 Ala. 489, 84 Morano v. New Orleans (2 La. 217) 456,
Ala. 478)
710, 732, 1221, 1238,
462
1239, 1244 Morant v. Chamberlain (6 H. & N.
v. Van Dorn (41 Ala. 505) 162
541)
741
Montgomery County v. Barber (45 Morbeck v. State (28 Ind. 86)
322
Ala. 237)
512, 521, 522 Morden v. Porter (7 C. B. N. S. 641) 504
Montgomery Co. Sch. Com’rs v. Morey v. Newfane (8 Barb. 645) 94, 1172,
Dean (2 Stew. & P. 190) 75
1174, 1247
Montpelier v. East Montpelier (27 Vt. Morford v. Barnes (8 Yerger, 444) 507,
704; 29 Vt. 12) 107, 112, 123,
726
135, 270
v. Unger (8 Iowa, 82) 87, 267, 974
Montross v. State (61 Miss. 429) 492 Morgan v. Atlanta (77 Ga. 662) 138
Montville 2. Haughton (7 Conn. 543) 300 3. Beloit (U. S. C. C. Wis.) 1046
Moody v. Niagara Co. Sup. (46 Barb.
v. Binghampton (102 N. Y. 500) 1327
659)
1167 v. Chicago & A. R. Co. (96 U.
Mooers v. Smedley (6 Johns. Ch. 28) 1092
S. 716)
744, 757
Moon v. Howard Co. Com’rs (97 Ind.
v. Cree (46 Vt. 773)
966
176)
1144 v. Des Moines & St. P. Ry. Co.
Mooney v. Kennett (19 Mo. 551) 481
(64 Iowa, 589)
843
Moor v. Cornville (13 Me. 293) 541 v. Dubuque (28 Iowa, 575) 555
v. Newfield (4 Me. 44) 346, 347, 375, v. Hallowell (57 Me. 375) 1253
381, 488 v. Menzies (60 Cal. 341)
518
Moore, Re (62 Ala. 471)
1079 v. Parham (16 Wall. 471)
965
2. Abbott (32 Me. 46) 1263, 1264, v. Quackenbush (22 Barb. 72) 282,
1265, 1286
288
v. Albany (98 N. Y. 396) 539, 1218 v. United States (113 U. S. 476) 650
v. Atlanta (70 Ga. 611) 1094, 1240 v. Waldeck (17 Fed. R. 286) 272
v. Chicago (60 Ill. 243)
958 Morgan Co. Com’rs v. Pritchett (85
v. Fayetteville Com’rs (80 N. C.
Ind. 68)
1249
154)
910 Morley v. Great Western Ry. Co. (16
v. Fitchburg R. Co. (4 Gray,
U. C. Q. B. 504)
1288
1190 | Morrell v. Dixfield (30 Me. 157) 322, 541
465)
t
.
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
cis
910, 970
Page
Page
Morrell v. Sylvester (1 Me. 248) 298 Moss v. Cummings (44 Mich. 359) 1146,
Morrill v. State (38 Wis. 428) 904, 908,
1151
v. Harpeth Academy (7 Heisk.
Morris, Re (11 Gratt. 292) 1006, 1074
283)
185
v. Baltimore (5 Gill, 244) 1148, 1151 v. Oakland (88 Ill. 109)
409
v. Bowers (Wright (Ohio), 750) 738 v. Oakley (2 Hill (N. Y.), 265) 562
v. Brower (Anth. N. P. 368) 449 Mott v..Hicks (1 Cow. 513) 323, 524, 533,
v. Burdett (1 Camp. 218)
316
563
v. Chicago (11 Ill. 650)
706 v. Pa. R. Co. (30 Pa. St. 9) 157
v. Council Bluffs (67 Iowa, 343) 1323 v. Reynolds (27 Vt. 206) 371, 372
v. Nashville (6 Lea, 337)
268 v. Schoolbred (L. R. 20 Eq. 22) 885
v. People (3 Denio, 381) 84, 219 Motz v. Detroit (18 Mich. 495) 933, 1123
v. Rome C. Council (10 Ga. 532) 470 Moulton v. Evansville (25 Fed. R.
v. Sea Girt Impr. Co. (38 N. J.
382)
600
Eq. 304)
699 v. Reid (54 Ala. 320)
1094
v. State (62 Tex. 728) 94, 118 v. Sandford (51 Me. 127) 1263, 1264,
v. State (65 Tex. 53)
245
1276, 1278
v. Underwood (19 Ga. 559) 1088 v. Scarborough (71 Me. 267) 1210
Morris & Essex R. Co. v. Newark Moultrie County v. Rockingham T.
(10 N. J. Eq, 352) 833, 848, 850 C. Sav. Bank (92 U. S. 631) 593,
v. Prudden (20 N. J. Eq. 530) 786
622
Morris Canal & Bank. Co. v. Central Moundsville v. Fountain (27 W. Va.
R. Co. (16 N. J. Eq. 419) 749
182)
431, 500
v. Fagin (22 N. J. Eq. 430) 782 Mount Carbon Coal & R. Co. v.
v. Fisher (1 Stockt. Ch. (N. J.)
Blanchard (54 Ill. 240) 1111,
667)
560
1119
v. Jersey City (12 N. J. Eq. 252, Mount Carmel v. Wabaslı Co. (50 III.
547)
748, 1092, 1126, 1129
69)
425, 434
v. Jersey City (26 N. J. Eq. 294) 720 Mount Desert v. Monmouth (72 Me.
v. State (24 N. J. L. 62)
882
348)
270
Morris County v. Hinchman (31 Mount Morris Square, Re (2 Hill,
Kan. 729)
539
14)
367, 1126, 1131
Morris Tp. v. Carey (27 N. J. L. 377) 324 Mount Pleasant v. Beckwith (100 U.
Morrison v. Hershire (32 Iowa, 271) 915,
S. 514) 120, 252, 254, 269, 271,
978, 1123
1040
v. Hinkson (87 Ill. 587) 674, 675, 829, v. Breeze (11 Iowa, 399) 394, 439,
1031
468
v. Lawrence (98 Mass. 219) 367, 368, v. Clutch (6 Iowa, 546)
423
375, 376, 1186, 1193, 1195 v. Vansice (43 Mich. 361) 432
v. McDonald (21 Me. 550) 292, 494 Mount Pleasant Bank, &c. (39 Iowa,
Morristown v. Shelton (1 Head, 24) 72
490). (See Nat. State B. of
Morrow v. Wood (56 Ala 1)
299
Mt. P. &c.]
Morse v. Belfast (77 Me. 44) 1265, 1266 Mount Vernon v. Dusouchett (2 Ind.
v. Boston (109 Mass. 446) 1272
587)
1285
v. Haynes (22 U. C. Q. B. 107) 1329 v. Hovey (52 Ind. 563)
225
v. Hodsdon (5 Mass. 314) 299 Mount Washington Road Co., Re
v. Richmond (41 Vt. 435) 1257, 1263,
(35 N. H. 134)
702, 726
1270 Mouse's Case (12 Coke, 13, 63) 1163
v. Worcester (139 Mass. 389) 1317, Mowatt v. Wright (1 Wend. 355) 1152
1326, 1330, 1334 Mower v. Leicester (9 Mass. 247) 53, 1171,
v. Zeize (34 Minn. 35) 752, 762
1174, 1175, 1176, 1252
Moses 2. Kearney (31 Ark. 261) 1057 Mowery v. Camden (49 N.J. L. 106) 1129
v. Pittsburgh, Ft. W. & C. R. Co.
v. Salisbury (82 N. C. 175) 223
(21 Ill. 516) 792, 833, 841, 846, Mowrey ». Central City R. Co. (51
851, 863, 870, 1222, 1316
N. Y. 666)
865
v. Risdon (46 Iowa, 251)
153 Moyamensing Com’rs v. Long (1
v. St. Louis Sec. Dock Co. (84
Pars. (Pa.) 145)
783, 784
Mo. 242)
708, 751 Moylan v. New Orleans (32 La. An.
Mosey v. Troy (61 Barb. 580) 1261, 1302
673)
556
Moslier v. Ackley Indep. Sch. Dist. . Moynihan v. Whidden (143 Mass.
(44 Iowa, 122)
131, 202
287)
1255
Mosley v. Walker (7 B. & C. 40) 455 | Mozley v. Alston (1 Phill. 790) 352
Moss 2. Burlington (60 Iowa, 438) 1264, Mugler v. Kansas (123 U. S. 623) 213,
1278
684
cx
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
286)
Page
Page
Mühlenbrinck v. Long Branch Com'rs Municipality No. 3 v. Blanc (1 La.
(42 N. J. L. 364)
425
An. 385)
471
Mulcairns v. Janesville (67 Wis. 24) 1193, v. Hart (6 La. An. 570)
160
1287 v. Johnson (6 La. An. 20) 962, 963
Mulherrin v. Del. L. & W.R. Co. (81
v. Levee Steam Cot. Press (7 La.
Pa. St. 366)
915, 921
An. 270)
712, 746
Mulholland v. Des Moines A. & W.
v. Michoud (6 La. An. 605)
975
R. Co. (60 Iowa, 740) 815, 843, v. Ursuline Nuns (2 La. An.
1224
611)
975
Mullarkey v. Cedar Falls (19 Iowa, Municipality of A., &c. [See A. Mu-
21)
155, 520, 883
nicipality, &c.]
Mullen v. Erie Co. Com’rs (85 Pa. St. Munn v. Illinois (94 U. S. 313) 92, 178,
288)
953
211
v. St. Johns (57 N. Y. 567) 1270 v. People (69 Ill. 80)
92
Muller v. Dist. Columbia (5 Mackey,
v. Pittsburg (40 Pa. St. 364) 1331,
1299
1333
v. Rutland (55 Vt. 77)
125 | Munsell y. Temple (8 Ill. 93)
429
Mulligan v. Smith (59 Cal. 206) 707, 979 | Munson v. New York (3 Fed. R.
Mullikin v. Bloomington (72 Ind.
338)
1180
151)
268 Murdock v. Aikin (cited 36 N. Y.
Mumma v. Potomac Co. (8 Pet. 281) 115,
224)
644
117, 243, 246 v. Memphis (20 Wall. 590) 142
Munday v. Rahway (43 N. J. L. 338) 897, v. Phillips Academy (12 Pick.
930, 1027
244)
337, 339
Munger v. Marshalltown (56 Iowa,
v. Warwick (4 Gray, 178) 1278, 1286
216)
1285 v. Woodson (2 Dillon C. C. 188) 84,
v. Tonawanda R. Co. (4 N. Y.
88
349)
1284 Murfree v. Leeper (1 Overt. 1) 1078
Municipality No. 1 v. Blineau (3 La. Murphy, Re (7 Cow. 153)
283
An. 688)
401, 454
v. Chicago (29 Ill. 279) 833, 854, 1222,
v. Cutting (4 La. An. 335) 384, 456,
1316
458, 462, 478, 480, 486 v. Dean (101 Mass. 455)
1284
v. Gas Light Co:-(5 La. An. 439) 810 v. Gloucester (105 Mass. 470) 1257,
v. Kirk (5 La. An. 34)
768
1258, 1270, 1296
v. La. State Bank (5 La. An.
v. Indianapolis (83 Ind. 76) 1278
394)
968 v. Jacksonville (18 Fla. 318) 209
v. McDonough (2 Rob. (La.) 244) 194, v. Louisville (9 Bush, 189) 95, 521,
660
537, 540, 541, 542, 557, 945
v. Orleans Theatre Co. (2 Rob.
v. Lowell (124 Mass. 564) 1206, 1306
(La.) 209)
134 v. Lowell (128 Mass. 396) 1334
v. Pauce (6 La. An. 515)
999 v. Montgomery C. Council (11
v. Pease (2 La. An. 538)
165, 178
Ala. 586)
169, 173, 178
v. Sinking Fund Com’rs (1 Rob.
v. People (2 Cow. 815)
506
(La.) 279)
141 v. People (120 Ill. 234)
906
v. Wheeler (10 La. An. 745) 911 v. Peoria (119 Ill. 509)
813
v. Wilson (5 La. An. 747) 437, 440 v. State (9 Lea, 373)
Municipality No. 2 v. Botts (8 Rob.
v. Webster (131 Mass. 482) 330
(La.) 198)
994 Murray v. Charlestown C. Council
v. Caldwell (3 Rob. (La.) 368) 323
(96 U. S. 432)
901, 964
v. Commercial Bank of N.O. (5
v. Lardner (2 Wall. 110) 561, 583,
Rob. (La.) 151)
947, 953
651
v. Dubois (10 La. An. 56) 423, 909 v. Tucker (10 Bush, 240) 940, 958,
v. Duncan (2 La. An. 182) 909, 962
991, 992
2. Dunn (10 La. An. 57) 722, 909, 913, Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land &
917, 924, 959
Impr. Co. (18 How. 272) 922
v. Guillotte (14 La. An. 297) 909, 924, Murtaugh v. St. Louis (44 Mo. 479) 1200
992 Muscatine v. Hershey (10 Iowa, 39) 177,
v. Morgan (1 La. An. 111) 487, 488
178
v. N. O. & Car. R. Co. (10 Rob.
v. Keokuk, &c. Packet Co. (45
(La.) 187)
947, 953
Iowa, 185) 174, 178, 1148, 1151
v. Orleans Cot. Press (6 Rob. (La.)
v. Miss. & Mo. R. Co. (1 Dillon
411)
947
C. C. 536) 118, 120, 910, 942, 962
v. Palfrey (7 La. An. 497) 759 v. Steck (2 Iowa, 220)
292
v. White (9 La. An. 446) 909, 913, 924 v. Steck (7 Iowa, 505) 292, 492, 510
87
t
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
cxi
&c.]
Page
Page
Muscatine Turnverein v. Funck (18 Nashville v. Towns (5 Sneed, 186) 103
Iowa, 469)
244, 254
v. Weiser (54 Ill. 245) 984, 986
Musgrave v. Nevison (1 Stra. 584) 345 Nashville Bankv. Petway (3 Humph.
v. Nevison (2 Ld. Raym. 1359) 345
522)
304
Musgrove v. Catholic Church (10 La. Nason v. Boston (14 Allen, 508) 1260
An. 431)
392, 444 Nassau Street, Re (11 Johns. 77) 573, 954,
Musselman v. Manly (42 Ind. 462) 368,
955
373 National Bank of Chemung v. El-
Musser v. Johnson (42 Mo. 74) 274
mira (53 N. Y. 49)
1146
Mutual Benefit L. Ins. Co. v. Eliza- National Bank of Louisville v. Com-
betli (42 N. J. L. 235) 604
monwealth (9 Wall. 353) 902
Mutual Sav. Inst. v. Eustin (46 Mo. National Bank of Mich. v. Green (33
200)
1153
Iowa, 140)
583
Mutual Union Tel. Co. v. Chicago (16 National Bank of No. America of
Fed. R. 309)
830
Boston v. Kirby (108 Mass.
Muzzy v. Shattuck (1 Denio, 233) 322
497)
583
Myall v. St. Paul (30 Minn. 294) 1092 | National Bank of Republic of N. Y.
Myers v. Croft (13 Wall
. 291)
670
v. St. Joseph (31 Fed. R.
v. Irwin (2 S. & R. 368)
76
216)
157, 631
v. Manhattan Bank (20 Ohio, National Bank of Washington v.
283)
68
Texas (20 Wall. 72)
583
v. People (26 Ill. 173) 492, 507 National Exchange Bank (8 R. I.
v. St. Louis (82 Mo. 367)
169
375; 108 N. Y. 660). (See
v. Simms (4 Iowa, 500)
715
New York Nat. Exch. Bank,
v. Snyder (Bright. (Pa.), 489) 1305
v. United States (1 McLean, 493) 301 National State Bank of Mt. Pleasant
v. York & C. R. (43 Me. 362) 581, 650
v. Marsliall Indep. Sch. Dist.
Mygatt v. Green Bay (1 Bissell C. C.
(39 Iowa, 490)
202
292)
594 National W. W. Co. v. Kansas City
Myrick v. La Crosse (17 Wis. 442) 709,
(28 Fed. R. 921)
822, 828
984, 1122 Natoma W. & M. Co. Clarkin (14
Mytton v. Duck (26 U. C. Q. B. 61) 739
Cal. 544)
670
Nauvoo v. Ritter (97 U. S. 389) 593
Navasota v. Pearce (46 Tex. 525) 1249,
N.
1252
Naylor v. Galesburg (56 Ill. 285) 327
Nagle v. Augusta (5 Ga. 546) 811 Neal v. Pittsburgh R. Co. (2 Grant,
Nance v. Falls City (16 Neb. 85) 1142
137)
708
Nanticoke Bor. D. Warne (106 Pa. Neale v. Allegheny Overseers (5
St. 373)
1272, 1286
Whart. 538)
298
Napa v. Easterby (61 Cal. 509) 407, 488 Neales v. State (10 Mo. 498)
495
Napa Valley R. Co. v. Napa Co. (30 Nealis v. Hayward (48 Ind. 19) 295, 857
Cal. 435)
1014 Neall v. Hill (16 Cal. 145)
329
Napier, Re (18 Q. B. 695)
1007 Nebraska City v. Campbell (2 Black,
Napman v. People (19 Mich. 352) 403,
590)
1258, 1280, 1287
465, 482, 488 v. Lampkin (6 Neb. 27) 815, 1222,
Nash v. El Dorado County (24 Fed.
1232
R. 252)
561, 570 v. Nebraska (9 Neb. 339)
546
v. St. Paul (11 Minn. 174) 540, 543, v. Rathbone (20 Neb. 288) 1262
544, 566 Neely v. Yorkville (10 S. C. 141) 257, 260,
Nash & McCracken, Re (33 U. C.
518, 528, 539
Q. B. 181)
431, 446 Neenan v. Donoghue (50 Mo. 493) 558
Nashville 2. Althrop (5 Coldw. 554) 970 v. Smith (50 Mo.525; 60 Mo. 292) 914,
v. Bank of Teun. (1 Swan, 269) 900,
978, 992, 996
951 Negus, Re (10 Wend. 34)
1125
v. Brown (9 Heisk. 1) 1304, 1307 Neiffer v. Bank of K. (1 Head, 162) 521
v. Lowry (37 Minn. 261)
847 Neitzel v, Concordia (14 Kan. 446) 481
v. Nicol (3 Baxter, 338)
1223 Nelson, Re (1 Cow. 417) 1010, 1014
v. Ray (19 Wall. 468) 187, 188, 193, v. Canisteo (100 N. Y. 89) 1281, 1282
194, 520, 560, 565, 567, 572, 576, v. Godfrey (12 Ill. 22) 788, 832
583 v. La Porte (33 Ind. 258) 822, 942
v. Smith (86 Tenn. 213)
950 2. Milford (7 Pick. 18) 220, 551
v. Thomas (5 Coldw. 600) 900, 968 v. Newark (49 N. J. L. 246) 254
v. Toney (10 Lea, 643) 538, 1143 v. New York (63 N. Y. 535) 200, 537
cxii
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
498)
Page
Page
Nelson v. St. Martin's Par.(111 U. S. New England, &c. Co. v. Robinson
716)
118, 392, 1032, 1037
(25 Ind. 536)
185
Nemaha County v. Frank (120 U. S. New Gloucester Sch. Fund Trs. v.
41)
572
Bradbury (11 Me. 118) 135, 136
Neosho Co. Com’rs v. Stoddard (13 New Hampton v. Conroy (56 Iowa,
Kan. 207)
1144
435
Neuer v. Fallon (18 Mo. 277)
161 | New Haven v. Fair Haven & W. R.
Neuert v. Boston (120 Mass. 338) 1163,
Co. (38 Conn. 422) 921, 967, 1001,
1164, 1166
1123
Neuse River Nav. Co. v. Newberne
v. Sargent (38 Copp. 50) 814, 817,
Com’rs (6 Jones L. 204) 1006,
818
1069 2. Whitney (36 Conn. 373) 977
Nevada v. Hampton (13 Nev. 441) 130 New Haven & E. H. Toll Br. Co. v.
v. Hutchins (59 Iowa, 506) 451
Betsworth (30 Conn. 380) 322
Nevill v. Ross (22 U. C. C. P. 487) 389 New Haven, M. & W.R. Co. v. Chat-
Neville v. Kelly (12 C. B. N. s. 740) 209
ham (42 Conn. 465) 240, 370, 618,
Nevin v. Roach (5 S. W. R. 546) 488
1012
Nevins v. Peoria (41 Ill. 502) 1221, 1222, New Jersey v. Yard (95 U. S. 112) 138
1223, 1316, 1320, 1321, 1323, 1329 New Jersey & N. E. Tel. Co. v. Jér-
New Albany v. Meekin (3 Ind. 481) 964
sey Co. Fire Com’rs (34 N.
v. Sweeney (13 Ind. 245) 555, 556
J. Eq. 117)
529
New Albany & S. R. Co.v. Connelly New Jersey So. R. Co.v. Long Branch
(7 Ind. 32)
718
Coni’rs (39 N. J. L. 28). 809
v. O'Daily (13 Ind. 353) 720, 792, 834, Newlin Tp. v. Davis (77 Pa. St. 317) 1259,
841, 855, 856, 863, 870
1282
New Albany Bank v. Danville (60 Newling w. Francis (3 D. & E. T. R.
Ind. 504
185
189)
277
Newark v. Elliott (5 Ohio, 113) 671, 672 New London v. Brainard (22 Conn.
v. Funk (15 Ohio, 462)
163
552) 147, 1110, 1111, 1116
v. Murphy (40 N. J. L. 145) 483 v. Montville (1 Root, 184)
269, 272
v. State (34 N. J. L. 523) 912 Newman v. Emporia (32 Kan. 456) 384,
v. Stockton (44 N. J. Eq. 179) 767,
945
770, 771, 795 v. Metrop. Elev. Ry Co. ( N.
Newark & N. Y. R. Co. v. Newark
Y. [1890] )
1241
(23 N. J. Eq. 515)
847 v. Scott Co. Jus. (5 Sneed, 695) 1027
Newark Bank v. Assessor (30 N. J.
v. Scott Co. Jus. (1 Heisk. 787) 1028
L. 22)
138 v. Sylvester (42 Ind. 106) 260, 536
New Bedford & F. Street R. Co. v. New Market Meth. Trs. v. Peaslee
Acushnet Street R. Co. (143
(15 N. H. 317)
262, 668
Mass. 200)
144 Newmeyer v. Mo. & Miss. R. Co. (52
Newberry v. New York (31 N. Y. Sr.
Mo. 81)
1111, 1112, 1124
Ct. 369)
1167 New Orleans v. Anderson (9 La. An.
New Boston v. Dumbarton (12 N. H.
323)
421
409)
139 v. Becker (31 La. An. 644) 1108
New Brighton Bor. v. Peirsol (107
2. Boudro (14 La. An. 303) 422, 481
Pa. St. 280)
1221, 1243 v. Brooks (36 La. An. 641) 364, 388
v. U. Presb. Church (96 Pa. St.
v. Carondelet C. & Nav. Co. (36
331)
1221, 1243
La. An. 396)
952
New Brunswick v. Fitzgerald (48 N.
v. Clark (95 U. Ŝ. 654) 106, 129, 130,
J. L. 457)
131, 134, 822
New Brunswick Rubber Co. v. N. B.
v. Commercial Bank of N. O.
Street Com’rs (38 N. J. L.
(10 La. An. 735) 909, 968
190)
937 v. Costello (14 La. An. 37) 413, 420,
New Buffalo v. Cambria Iron Co.
475, 492
(105 U. S. 73)
584, 630 v. Crescent Mut. Ins. Co. (25 La.
Newby v. Platte County (25 Mo. 258) 733
An. 390)
1199
Newcastle, Re (12 Clark & Fin. 402) 442, v. Daublin (í Martin, 184) 783
663 v. Davidson (30 La. An. 541) 995
Newcomb v. E. Baton Rouge Pol.
v. Elliott (10 La. An. 59)
909
Jury (4 Rob. (La.) 233) 555
v. Finnerty (27 La. An. 681) 319
Newell v. Minneapolis, L. & M. Ry.
v. Graihle (9 La. An. 561) 281, 997,
Co. (39 Minn. 112) 859, 861, 869
999
v. People 17 N. Y. 9)
197 v. Gravier (11 Martin, N, s. 662) 782,
788
334
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
cxiii
Page
Page
New Orleans v. Great So. Tel. Co. New Orleans, M. & T. R. Co. v. Eller-
(4 La. An. 41)
474
man (105 U. S. 166) 97, 110, 165,
v. Guillotte (12 La. An. 818) 456,
166, 167, 168, 172, 174, 177
549 v. So. & Atl. Tel. Co. (53 Ala.
v. Hill (30 La. An. 554)
995
211)
831
v. Home Mut. Ins. Co. (23 La. New Orleans, S. F. & L. R. Co. v. Del-
An. 61)
160, 673
amore (114 U. S. 501)
116, 847
v. Hopkins (13 La. 326) 122, 772, 773 New Orleans W. Co. v. La. Sugar
v. Hoyle (23 La. An. 740) 95, 97
Ref. Co. (35 La. An. 1111) 829
v. Kauffman (29 La. An. 283) 909 New Orleans W. W. Co. v. Rivers
v. Koen (38 La. An. 328)
425
(115 U. S. 674) 117, 822, 826, 829
v. Lambert (14 La. An. 247) 450 Newport v. Berry (80 Ky.-354) 1015
v. Leverich (13 La. 332) 772, 773 v. N. Light Co. (84 Ky. 167) 826, 827
v. Lockett (13 La. 545)
292 v. Taylor's Ex. (16 B. Mon. 699) 175,
v. Maggioli (4 La. An. 73) 801
177, 748, 749, 757, 759, 766, 768,
v. Magnon (4 Martin (La.)1) 801, 803
793
v. Mech. & T. Bank (15 La. An. Newport & Cinc. Br. Co. v. Foote (9
107)
968
Bush, 264)
1226
v. Michoud (10 La. An. 763) 975 Newport Charter, Re (14 R. I. 655) 101,
v. Miller (7 La. Ap. 651) 437, 440
277
v. Morgan (7 Martin, (N. s.) 1) 283, Newport Marsh Trs., Re (16 Sim.
385, 509
346)
75
v. Morris (105 U. S. 600)
673 New Providence v. Halsey (117 U. S.
v. Morris (3 Woods C. C. 103) 673,
336)
560, 582, 604, 1140
675 New River Co. v. Johnson (2 E. & E.
v. Mülé (38 La. An. 826)
424
435)
688
v. New Orleans, M. & C. R. Co. New Rochelle Trs. v. Pelton (7 Johns.
(27 La. An. 414)
167
Ch. 292)
661, 668
v. Peyroux (6 Martin, n. s. 155) New Salem v. Eagle Mill Co. (138
459
Mass. 8)
446
v. Philipi (9 La. An. 44) 393, 397 New Shoreham v. Ball (14 R. I. 566) 659
v. Poutz (14 La, An. 853) 134, 911 Newton v. Atchison (31 Kan. 151) · 86
v. St. Anna's Asylum (31 La.
424
An. 292)
953 2. Belger (143 Mass. 598)
397
v. St. Louis Church (11 La. An. New ville Road Case (8 Watts, 172) 808
244) 366, 392, 443, 444, 549 New York, Re (11 Johns. 77; 99 N.
v. Southern Bank (11 La. An.
Y. 569). (See Mayor of
41)
909, 968
N. Y., Re, &c.]
v. Southern Bank of N. 0. (15
v. Bailey (2 Denio, 433) 324, 698,
La. An. 89)
787
1162, 1193, 1194, 1201, 1209, 1317
v. Stafford (27 La. An. 417) 455 v. Broadway & Seventh Av. R.
v. Staiger (11 La. An. 68) 909
Co. (17 Hun, 242) 866, 967
v. Turpin (13 La. An. 56) 423, 909 v. Carleton (113 N. Y. 284) 659
v. United States (10 Pet. 662) 165, v. Cashman (10 Johns. 96) 954
178, 738, 743, 748, 755, 757, 765, v. Colgate (12 N. Y. 140) 90, 1001,
769, 771, 772, 773, 796, 801
1002
v. Wilmot (31 La. An. 65) 110, 165, v. Furze (3 Hill, 612) 158, 324, 1017,
172
1158, 1274, 1280, 1324, 1332
New Orleans & C. R. Co. v. Munici-
v. Hart (95 N. Y. 443) 169, 170, 171,
pality (1 La. An. 128) 833, 848
177, 748
v. Municipality (7 La. An. 148) 160 v. Hyatt (3 E. D. Smith, 156) 406,
New Orleans Draining Co., Re (11
437, 463
La. An. 338) 700, 723, 909, 921, v. Kelly (98 N. Y. 467)
299
956 v. Lord (17 Wend. 285; 18 Wend.
New Orleans Elev. R. Co. v. New
126)
1163, 1165, 1166
Orleans (39 La. An. 127)
408 v. N. Y.' & N. J. S. N. Co. (106
New Orleans Gas Co. v. Louisiana
N. Y. 28)
180
Light Co. (115 U. S. 650) 117,
2. Nichols (4 Hill, 209) 397, 406, 463
211, 213, 822, 823, 826 v. Ordrenan (12 Johns. 122) 412, 415,
New Orleans, J. & G. N. R. Co: v.
416
Moye (39 Miss. 374)
733 v. Pentz (24 Wend. 688) 1165, 1166
New Orleans, M. & C. R. Co. v. New
v. Scott (1 Caines, 543)
177
Orleans (26 La. An. 478) 94, 108, v. Second Av. R. Co. (32 N. Y.
122, 770, 834
261) 116, 157, 412, 425, 428, 944
VOL. I. -
cxiv
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
Page
Page
New York v. Sheffield (4 Wall. 189) New York Nat. Exch. Bank v.
1247, 1280, 1293, 1296, 1301
Metrop. Elev. Ry. Co. (108
v. Slack (3 Wheeler, 237)
143
N. Y. 660)
877, 878
v. Starin (106 N. Y. 1)
180 New York, New Haven & H. R. Co.
v. Stuyvesant's Heirs (17 N. Y.
v. New Britain (49 Conn. 40) 955
34)
759, 764 New York Presbytery Trs., Re (57
v. Tenth Nat. Bank (111 N. Y.
How. Pr. 500)
154
446)
132 New York Prot. E. Pub. School, Re
v. Third Av. R. Co. (33 N. Y.
(47 N. Y. 556)
388, 992
42)
412, 863 New York Ry., Re (99 N. Y. )
689
v. Williams (15 N. Y. 502) 475 New York, S. M. & L. Co. v. Brook.
New York African Soc. v. Varick (13
lyn (71 N. Y. 580) 1187, 1194
Johns. 38)
262 New York, W. S. & Buf. Ry. Co. v.
New York & B. Bridge, Re (72 N. Y.
Sutherland (35 Hun, 260) 872,
527)
90
877
New York & B. Lumber Co. v. Brook- Ney v. Troy (20 N. Y. St. R. 321) 1286
lyn (71 N. Y. 580) 1187, 1194 Niagara Falls Susp. Br. Co. v. Bach-
New York & Harlem R. Co. v. New
man (66 N. Y. 261) 740, 751,
York (1 Hilton, 562) 152, 157,
752, 753, 769, 760, 761
846, 863 Niblett v. Nashville (12 Heisk. 684) 448,
New York & N E. R. Co. v. Water-
1259, 1295
bury (35 Conn. 19) 351, 407 Nichol v. Nashville (9 Humph. 252) 95,
New York & N. H. R. Co. v. New
108, 149, 225, 226, 235
Haven (42 Conn. 279) 921, 938, Nicholls v. Great Western R. Co. (27
956
U. C. Q. B. 382)
300
New York Cable Co. v. New York Nichols, Re (6 Abb. N. Cas. 474; 57
(104 N. Y. 1) 777, 783, 792, 850
How. Pr. 95)
338
New York Cable Ry. Co., Re (109
V. Athens (66 Me. 402) 1270, 1278
N. Y. 32)
872 v. Boston (98 Mass. 39) 292, 322
New York Cent. & H. River R. Co., Re
v. Bridgeport (23 Conn. 189) 707,
(15 Hun, 63)
877
708, 709, 710, 722, 920, 921
v. Metrop. Gasl. Co. (63 N. Y.
v. Crabbe, Compt. (4 Stew. & P.
326)
689, 825
154)
1016
New York Cent. R. Co. v. Marvin
v. McLean (101 N. Y. 526) 319
(11 N. Y. 276)
510 v. Minneapolis (33 Minn. 430) 1285
New York Conference v. Clarkson Nicholson v. Bradford Union Guard.
(4 Halst. Ch. 541)
260
(1 L. R. E. & I. C. 620) 538
New York Dist. Ry. Co., Re (107
v. N. Y. N. & H. R. Co. (22 Conn.
N. Y. 42) 777, 778, 788, 832, 839,
74)
852
841, 844 Nickerson v. Dyer (105 Mass. 320) 323
New York Elev. Ry., Re (3 Abb. Nicolay u. St. Clair Co. (3 Dillon
N. C. 401)
872
C. C. 163)
594, 613, 631
Re (36 Hun, 427)
877 Nicoll v. Gardner (13 Wend. 289) 169
Re (70 N. Y. 327) 819, 837, 872 v. N. Y. & E. R. Co. (12 N. Y.
New York Elev. R. Cases, &c. (70
121)
652, 667
N. Y. 361; 90 N. Y. 122; Nicolson Pav. Co. v. Painter (35 Cal.
164 N. Y. 268; 105 N. Y.
699)
545, 945
97; 112 N. Y. 186). [See Nicoulin v. Lowery (49 N. J. L. 391) 397,
Gilbert, &c.; Kings, &c.;
441, 443
Lahr, &c.; Pond, &c.; Story, Nielson v. Wakefield (43 Mich. 434) 709
Nightingale, Re (11 Pick. 168) 456, 461,
New York Fire Dep. v. Kip (10 Wend.
463, 464
267)
77, 139 Niles v. Muzzy (33 Mich. 61)
369
v. Wright (3 E. D. Smith, 478) 903 v. Niles (11 Am. & Eng. C. C.
New York Institute v. How (10 N. Y.
299)
206
84)
262 Niles Tp. Highway Com'rs. v. Martin
New York, Lack. & W. Ry. Co., Re
(4 Mich. 557)
1169, 1173
(29 Hun, 1 ; 99 N. Y. 12) 872, Niles Water W. v. Niles (59 Mich.
877
311)
109, 209
New York, Lake E. & W. R. Co. v. Nill v. Jenkinson (15 Ind. 425) 1119
Yard (43 N. J. L. 121, 632) 749 Nims v. Troy (59 N. Y. 500) 1319, 1330,
New York Nat. Exch. Bank v. Hart-
1331, 1332
ford, P. & F. R. Co. (8 R. I. Ninth Ave, Re (45 N. Y. 729)
691
375)
561 | Noble v. Bullis (23 Iowa, 569)
1152
&c.)
(
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
CXV
Page
Page
Noble v. Richmond (31 Gratt. 271) 1268, North Lebanon v. Arnold (47 Pa. St.
1301
488)
1172
v. St. Albans (56 Vt. 522) 1322 North Manheim v. Arnold (119 Pa.
Nodine v. Union (13 Or. 587)
482
St. 380)
1269
Nolan v. New Orleans (10 La. An. North Missouri R. Co. 1. Maguire
106)
318
(49 Mo. 482) 130, 894, 896, 899,
Nolin v. Franklin (4 Yerg. 163) 451
969, 1112
Noonan v. Albany (79 N. Y. 470) 1322 v. Maguire (20 Wall. 46)
952
v. Stillwater (33 Minn. 198) 1272 North Pac. Lumbering & Manufac-
Norfleet v. Cromwell (70 N. C. 634) 700
turing Co. v. East Portland
Norfolk v. Ellis (26 Gratt. 224) 908, 913,
(14 Or. 3)
521, 524
933 Northrop v. Graves (19 Conn. 548) 1153
Normand v. Otoe Co. Com’rs (8 Neb. North Vernon v. Voegler (103 Ind.
18)
1109
314) 1220, 1327, 1329, 1331
Norris v. Abingdon Acad. Trs. (7 Northwestern Fert. Co. v. Hyde Park
G. & J. 7)
97, 123, 136
(97 U. S. 659) 213, 214, 215
v. Baltimore (44 Md. 606) 713, 714 Northwestern Packet Co. v. Atlee (2
v. Boston (4 Met. (Mass.) 282) 902
Dillon, C. C. 479)
165, 170
v. Litchfield (35 N. H. 271, 918) 1284, v. Atlee (21 Wall. 389)
165, 170
1286 2. Keokuk (95 U. S. 80)
966
v. Smithville (1 Swan, 164) 267 v. St. Louis (4 Dillon C. C. 10) 165,
v. Staps (Hobart, 210) 394, 396, 481,
178, 966
484, 486 v. St. Louis (100 U. S. 423) 966
v. Waco (57 Tex. 635) 895, 1119 v. St. Paul (3 Dillon C. C. 454) 106
Norristown v. Fitzpatrick (94 Pa. St. Northwestern University v. People
121)
1167, 1195, 1196
(80 III. 333)
953
v. Moyer (67 Pa. St. 355) 885, 1274, North Whitehall v. South Whitehall
1276, 1277
(3 S. & R. 117)
272
North Beach & M. Street R. Com- Northwood v. Barrington (9 N. H.
pany's Appeal (32 Cal. 499) 864,
369)
347
871, 921, 923, 966 North Yarmouth v. Skillings (45 Me.
North Chicago City Ry. Co. 2. Lake
133) 93, 135, 136, 269, 271
View (105 Ill. 183, 207) 857 Norton v. Brownsville Dist. Tax
North Dumfries v. Waterloo (12 U. C.
Com'rs (36 Fed. R. 99;
Q. B. 507)
269
129 U. S. 479)
626
Northeastern R. Co. v. Payne (8
v. Dyersburg (127 U. S. 160) 195,
Rich. L. 177)
851
235, 236, 237, 575, 1038
Northern Bank of Toledo v. Porter
v. Mansfield (16 Mass. 48)
53
Tp. (110 U. S. 608) 594, 596, 609, v. Peck (3 Wis. 714)
39
632, 634
v. Shelby County (118 U. S. 425) 356,
Northern Central R. Co. v. Baltimore
616, 626, 641, 1080, 1083
621 Md. 93) 155, 389, 849, 850, Norway Dist. Tp. v. Clear Lake Tp.
862
(11 Iowa, 506)
1143
2. Jackson (7 Wall. 262)
901 Norwich v. Breed (30 Conn. 535) 1296,
Northern Ind. R. Co. v. Connelly (10
1312
0. St. 159) 898, 908, 921, 922, v. Hubbard (22 Conn. 587) 986, 1001
925, 968, 978 7. Story (25 Conn. 44)
807
Northern Liberties v. St. John's Norwich Gasl. Co. v. Norwich City
Church (13 Pa. St. 104) 955,
Gas Co. (25 Conn. 19) 95, 822,
1001
824
Northern Liberties Tp. Com’rs v. N. Norwich Ov. Poor v. New Berlin Ov.
L. Gas Co. (12 Pa. St. 318) 396,
(18 Johns. 382)
272, 529
398, 404, 776, 794 v. Pharsalia Ov. (15 N. Y. 341) 519
Northern Pac. Terminal Co. v. Port- Nott's Case (11 Me. 208)
471
land (14 Or. 24)
707 Nottingham, Re (1 O'M & H. 245) 284
Northern Transp. Co. of O. v. Chi- Nowell v. Worcester (9 Exch. 157) 184,
cago (99 U. S. 635) 780, 781,
274, 512
1215, 1217, 1225, 1227, 1228, 1229, v. Wright (3 Allen, 166)
325, 1195
1233, 1235 Nowlin v. State (49 Ala. 41)
1134
North Hempstead v. Hempstead (2 Noyes v. Mason City (5 N. W. R.
Wend. 109) 74, 75, 270, 271, 155,
595)
147, 1229
656, 660, 168, 798 v. Morristown (1 Vt. 367) 1264
North Hudson R. Co.v. Hoboken (41
v. Ward (19 Conn. 250) 738, 740, 742,
N. J. L. 71)
428
744, 810
cxyi
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
539)
1
268)
Page
Page
Nugent v. Putnam Co. Sup., &c. (19 O'Kane v. Treat (25 Ill. 557)
807
Wall. 241) 622, 627, 629, 630 | O’Laughlin v. Dubuque (42 Iowa,
v. State (18 Ala. 521)
492
1267
Olcott v. Fond du Lac Co. Sup. (16
Wall. 678) 83, 231, 573, 579, 583,
0.
587, 636, 1011
Old Col. R. Co. v. Miller (125 Mass. 1) 719
Oakes v. Hill (10 Pick. 333) 24, 70 Old So. Soc. v. Boston (127 Mass. 378) 953
Oakey v. New Orleans (1 La. 1) 962 O'Leary v. Mankato (21 Minn. 65) 1259,
Oakland v. Carpenter (13 Cal. 640) 155,
1281
157, 325, 358, 1093, 1096 v. Sloo (7 La. An. 25) 924, 976
v. Whipple (39 Cal. 112) 965, 996 Oleson 2. Tolford (37 Wis. 327) 1300
Oakland Paving Co. v. Hilton (69 Olin v. Meyers (55 Iowa, 209)
368
Cal. 479)
1007 O’Linda v. Lothrop (21 Pick. 292) 833,
v. Rier (52 Cal. 270) 813, 923
884, 888, 889
Oakley v. Williamsburg Trs. (6 Oliphant v. Atchison Co. Com’rs (18
Paige, 262)
787, 814
Kan. 386)
374
Oates v. Hudson' (5 Eng. L. & Eq. Olive Cemetery v. Philadelphia (93
469)
1148
Pa. St. 129)
955
O'Brien v. Colusa County (67 Cal. Oliver v. Americus (99 Ga. 165) 340
503)
1145 v. Kansas City (69 Mo. 79) 1280,
v. Pa. S. Val. R. Co. (119 Pa. St.
1295, 1305
184)
1244 v. Keightley (24 Ind. 514) 1109
2. St. Paul (18 Minn. 176) 1333 v. Washington Mills (11 Allen,
v. St. Paul (25 Minn. 331) 1225, 1319,
904
1321 v. Worcester (102 Mass. 489) 108,
v. Trenton (7 U. C. C. P. 246) 746,
1139, 1175, 1180, 1199, 1201, 1211,
789
1212, 1252, 1253, 1312
O'Brien County v. Brown (1 Dillon Oliver, Information, &c. (21 S. C.
C. C. 588)
1096
318)
488
O'Byrne v. Philadelphia (93 Pa. St. Olmsted v. Dennis (77 N. Y. 379) 308, 355
225)
1000 Olney v. Harvey (50 Ill. 453) 141, 257,
O'Conner v. Memphis (6 Lea, 730) 251,
270, 674, 675, 1031, 1032
252 v. Pearce (1 R. I. 292)
298
O'Connor v. Otonabee (35 U. C. Q.
v. Wharf (115 Ill. 519) 855, 1241,
1271
1242
v. Pittsburgh (18 Pa. St. 187)
776, v. Wickes 18 Johns. 122)
323
814, 833, 844, 914, 1220, 1233 Olsen v. Worcester (142 Mass. 536) 1251
Oconto Co. Sup.v. Chicago & N. W.
1297
R. Co. (44 Wis. 231) 866 Olson v. Chippewa Falls (71 Wis.
v. Hall (47 Wis. 208)
369
558)
1257
Odell Trs. v. Schroeder (58 Ill. 353) 421, Omaha v. Hammond (94 U. S. 98) 558,
510, 675, 1159, 1196, 1197
559
O'Docherty v. Archer (9 Tex. 295) 285, v. Olmstead (5 Neb. 446) 499, 1280
288 Omaha & R. V. R. Co. v. Strudden
O'Donnell v. Bailey (24 Miss. 386) 900, 968
(22 Neb. 343)
1222
2. Philadelphia 17 Phila. 234) 562 O’Maley v. Freeport (96 Pa. St. 24) 396,
Oebricke . Pittsburgh (7 Am. L. R.
425
725)
235 O'Mally v. McGinn (53 Wis. 353) 381
O'Ferrall 2. Colby (2 Minn. 180) 1021 O'Meara v. New York (1 Daly, 425) 1198
Ogden v. Daviess County (102 Ú. S. Omnibus R. Co. v. Baldwin (57 Cal.
634)
572, 573, 630, 632
160)
81
v. Raymond (22 Conn. 379) 323 Oneida Bank v. Ontario Bank (21 N.
Ogg v. Lansing (35 Iowa, 495) 1193, 1196,
Y. 490)
194, 531
1197, 1198, 1200 O'Neil v. Detroit (50 Mich. 133) 1266
O'Gorman v. Morris (26 Minn. 267) 1296 | O'Neill v. Caddo Par. Police Jury (21
O'Hale v. Sacramento (48 Cal. 212) 1303
La. An. 586)
182
O'Hara v. New Orleans (30 La. An.
v. Hudson County (41 N. J. L.
152)
523, 543
161)
712
v. Portland (3 Or. 525)
95 v. Lowell (6 Allen, 110)
1261
v. State (112 N. Y. 146)
130, 133
v. New Orleans (30 La. An.
Ohio v. &c. (See State v. &c.]
202)
1272
Ohio L. Ins. & T. Co. v. Merchants' Onondaga Čo. Sup. v. Briggs (2
Ins. & T. Co. (11 Humph. 1) 532
Denio, 26; 2 Hill, 135) 1162, 1153
B. 73)
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
cxvii
Page
Page
Onstott v. Murray (22 Iowa, 466) 752, 754, Oswego Nat. Bank v. Walcott (7 Fed.
755, 801
R. 892)
594
Ontario Bank v. Bunnell (10 Wend. Otis v. Janesville (47 Wis. 422) 1286
106)
948, 949, 968 v. Stockton (76 Me. 506)
539
Opelika v. Daniel (59 Ala. 211) 227 Otoe County v. Baldwin (111 U. S. 1) 87,
Opelousas 2. Andrus (37 La. An.
134, 635
699)
407 Ottawa v. Carey (108 U. S. 110) 145, 187,
Opinion, &c. [See Justices, &c.
195, 236, 574, 639
Orange & A. R. Co. v. Alexandria
v. Chicago & R. I. R. Co. (25
(17 Gratt. 176) 143, 941, 948, 953,
III. 43)
984, 986, 1127
968 v. La Salle County (12 Ill. 339) 143
Ordinary of A. Co. &c. [See A. Co.
v. Macey (20 Ill. 413)
984
Ordinary, &c.]
v. People (48 Ill. 233) 88, 158, 1008,
Oregon v. Jennings (119 U. S. 74) 586,
1013, 1017, 1057, 1058
595, 612, 617, 626 v. Portsmouth First Nat. Bank
v. McKennon (8 Or. 485)
285
(105 U. S. 342)
582, 594
v. Pyle (1 Or. 149)
311 v. Spencer (36 Ill. 211; 40 Ill. 211) 722,
Oregon S. Nav. Co. v. Portland (2
926, 942, 955
Or. 81)
940 v. Sweely (65 Ill. 434)
1287
O'Reilley v. Kingston (114 N. Y. 439) 915, v. Walker (21 Ill. 605)
807
922, 923 Ottawa Co. Com'rs v. Nelson (19
Orford U. Cong. Soc. v. W. Cong.
Kan. 234)
909, 925
Soc. (55 N. H. 463)
662 Ottawa Dist. Council v. Low (6 Can.
Oridge v. Sherborne (11 M. & W.
0. s. 546)
1139
374)
582 Ottawa Glass Co. v. McCaleb (81 Ill.
Original Hart. Col. Co. v. Gibb (L.
556)
969
R. 5 Ch. D. 713)
885 Ottendorfer v. Agnew (13 Daly, 16) 1114
Orleans v. Platt (99 U. S. 676) 583, 599 Otto Tp. v. Wolf (106 Pa. St. 608) 1283
Orleans Co. Sup. v. Bowen (4 Lans. Ottumwa v. Parks (43 Iowa, 119) 1308,
24)
521, 1139
1309, 1312, 1313
Orman v. Pueblo (8 Col. 292) 299 Ouachita Packet Co. v. Aiken (121
Orme v. Richmond (79. Va. 86) 1204, 1257,
U. S. 444)
165, 166
1259 Ouachita Par. Pol. Jury v. Monroe
Oroville & V. R. Co. v. Plunas County
(37 La. An. 641)
518
Sup. (37 Cal. 354) 79, 140, 1060 v. Monroe (38 La. An. 630) 41, 551
Orphan Asylum's Appeal (111 Pa. Oubre v. Donaldsonville (33 La. An.
St. 135)
936, 960
386)
528, 560
Orr v. Baker (4 Ind. 86)
953 Ould v. Richmond (23 Gratt. 464) 958, 963,
Orth 2. Milwaukee (59 Wis. 336) 1204
970
Orton v. State (12 Wis. 509)
554 Over v. Greenfield (107 Ind. 231) 275,
Osage Street, Re (90 Pa. St. 114) 795
522
Osborn v. Bank of U.S. (9 Wheat. Overacre v. Garrett (5 Lans. 156) 301
738)
67, 902 Overing v. Foote (65 N. Y. 263)
994
v. Danvers (6 Pick. 98) 1147 | Overman v. May (35 Iowa, 89) 816
Osborne v. Adams County (7 Fed. Overseers of Poor of Boston v. Sears
R. 441)
1031
(22 Pick. 122) 24, 70, 75, 303,
v. Adams County (106 U. S.
655
181)
573 Overseers of Poor of Gibson Tp. 7.
v. Detroit (32 Fed. R. 36) 680, 1195,
Overseers, &c. Nicholson
1298
Tp. (2 S. & R. 422)
272
v. Mobile (44 Ala. 493)
898 Overseers of Poor of Norwich v.
v. Mobile (16 Wall 479) 902, 903,
Overseers, &c. New Berlin
904, 905
(18 Johns. 382)
272, 529
v. Tunis (25 N. J. L. 633)
679 v. Overseers, &c. Pharsalia (15
Osgood v. Clark (26 N. H. 307) 265
N. Y. 341)
519
v. Green (33 N. H. 318)
223 Owen v. Smith (31 Barb. 641) 246, 254
v. Manhattan County (3 Cow. Owens v. Milwaukee (47 Wis. 461) 945,
612)
382
1227
Oshkosh v. State (59 Wis. 425) 1126 Owings v. Speed (5 Wheat. 420) 139,
Osterhoudt v. Rigney (98 N. Y. 222) 1106,
381
1114 Owners, &c., Re Pine Street v. Al-
Oswald v. Genet (15 Tex. 118) 759
bany (15 Wend. 374) 699, 709,
Oswego v. Osw. Canal Co. (6 N. Y.
763
257)
758, 760 ) Oxford's Case (10 Coke, 44)
261
60
cxviii
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
Page
Page
Oxford Bank v. Wheeler (72 N. Y. Paine v. Spratley (5 Kan. 525) 85, 147,
201)
1142
955, 957, 999, 1000
Oxford Tp. v. Columbia (38 O. St. Painter v. Pittsburgh (46 Pa. St. 213,
87)
797, 803
221)
1303, 1306, 1307
Palatine v. Kreuger (121 Ill. 72) 806, 819
Palestine v. Barnes (50 Tex. 539) 459
P.
Pallister v. Gravesend (9 C. B. 744) 184,
274
Pacific v. Seifert (79 Mo. 210) 486 Palmer v. Andover (2 Cush. 600) 1257,
Pacific Hotel Co. v. Lieb (83 Ill. 602) 969
1263, 1264
Pacific Junction v. Dyer (94 Iowa,
v. Carroll (24 N. H. 314)
320
38)
902 v. Hicks (6 Johns. 133)
263
Pacific Mail Stp. Co. v. Joliffe (2
v. Lincoln (5 Neb. 136)
1307
Wall. 450)
166 v. New York (2 Sandf. 318) 315, 316
Pacific R. Co. v. Cass County (53
v. Portsmouth (43 N. H. 265) 1257
Mo. 17)
952, 969
v. Poultney (2 Salk. 458)
447
v. Chrystal (25 Mo. 544)
733 v. St. Albans (56 Vt. 522) 1295
v. Leavenworth (1 Dillon C. C.
v. Strumpf. (27 Ind. 329) 423, 933
393) 776, 846, 849, 850, 862, 870 | Palmyra v. Morton (25 Mo. 593) 709,
v. Price, Gov. (23 Mo. 353) 389, 1016
722, 911, 984, 985, 1001
v. Seely (45 Mo. 212)
657 Pana v. Bowler (107 U. S. 529) 572, 586,
Pacific R. Co., &c. (1 Dillon C. C.
599, 617, 649
314). [See Union Pacific Pangborn v. Westlake (36 Iowa,
R. Co., &c.]
546)
739
Pack v. New York (8 N. Y. 222) 1306, Papworth v. Milwaukee (64 Wis.
1307, 1308
389)
833, 1312
Packard v. New Bedford (9 Allen, Paralee v. Camden (45 Ark. 165) 453
200)
1257, 1270 Paret v. Bayonne (40 N. J. L. 333) 720
Packet Co. &c. (See the follow- Paris v. Graham (33 Mo. 94)
397
ing plaintiff packet compa-
v. People (27 Ill. 74) 322, 1135
nies, which, in citing, may Paris Tp. Trs. v. Cherry (8 0. St.
not always have been fully
564)
78, 529, 568
named : Cincinnati, &c. (105 Parish v. Eden (62 Wis. 272) 1284
U. S. 559), Keokuk, &c. (95
Parish, &c. (3 Pick. 232). [See
U. S. 80), Memphis & St.
Sutton, &c.]
L. (9 Bush, 137), Northwes-
(21 Pick. 148). [See Sudbury,
tern (21 Wall. 389; 2 Dillon
&c.]
C. C. 479; 3 Dillon C. C.
(8 Cush. 264). [See Sherburne,
454; 4 Dillon C. C. 10),
&c.]
Ouachita (121 U. S. 444).] Park Bank ū. Watson (42 N. Y. 490) 583
Padelford v. Savannah (14 Ga. 438) 970 -Park Com’rs, &c. (51 Ill. 57; 91
Paducah v. Cully (9 Bush, 323) 299, 301
Ill. 49). [See South Park
Page v. Allen (58 Pa. St. 338)
1109
Com’rs, &c.]
v. Baltimore (34 Md. 558)
168 (103 Ill. 33). (See West Chi-
v. Chicago (6) Ill. 441)
cago, &c.]
v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co.
(28 Mich. 228). [See People v.
(70 Ill. 324)
735, 1228
Detroit, &c.]
2. Clopton (30 Gratt. 415) 1006 (44 Mich. 602). [See Mayor of
v. Frankfort (9 Me. 155)
220
Detroit, Rel. &c.]
v. Graham (57 III. 144)
906 (45 N. Y. 234). [See Brooklyn
v. Hardin (8 B. Mon. 648)
319, 334
Park, &c.]
v. Heineberg (40 Vt. 81)
662 (50 N. Y. 493). [See Central
v. O'Toole (144 Mass. 303) 691
Park, &c.]
v. St. Louis (20 Mo. 136) 151, 953 (56 N. Y. 144). (See Washing-
2. State (11 Ala. 849)
431
ton Park, &c.
v. Sumipter (53 Wis. 652) 1287 Parke Co. Com’rs v. O'Conner (86
Paige v. Fazackerly (36 Barb. 392) 463,
Ind. 531)
675
464 Parker, Re (120 U. S. 736) 1006, 1015
2. Heinburg (40 Vt. 81)
657 v. Commonwealth (6 Pa. St. 507) 78
Paine, Re (1 Hill, 665)
1026 v. Great Western Ry. Co. (7 M.
v. Boston (124 Mass. 486)
391
& G. 253)
1149
v. Delhi (116 N. Y. 224)
1092 v. Green (2 B. & S. 299)
504
v. Portage Co. Com’rs (Wright
v. Lowell (11 Gray, 353) 1214, 1317,
(0.) 417)
798
1331
958
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
cxix
Page
Page
Parker v. Macon (39 Ga. 725) 454, 1276, Patterson v. Miss. & R. River Boom
1309, 1312
Co. (3 Dill. 465; 98 U. S.
v. Portland Trustees (54 Mich.
103)
683, 690, 729, 731
308)
1015 v. Vail (42 Iowa, 143)
791
v. Nashua (59 N. H. 402) 1329 Pattison v. Yuba Co. Sup. (13 Cal.
v. New Brunswick (30 N. J. L.
175)
208
395)
155 | Patton v. Springfield (99 Mass. 627) 987
v. Rutland (56 Vt. 224)
1052 v. Stephens (14 Bush, 324) 209
2. Williamsburg (13 How. Pr. Paul v. Carver (24 Pa. St. 207; 26
250)
554
Pa. St. 223)
794
Parkersburg v. Brown (106 U. S. 487) 573, v. Detroit (32 Mich. 110)
786
594, 895, 946 v. Kenosha (22 Wis. 266) 194, 538,
Parkersburg Gas Co. v. Parkersburg
1144
(30 W. Va. 435) 146, 823, 828 v. Newark (6 Am. L. R. 576) 735)
Parkhill v. Brighton (61 Iowa, 103) 1285, v. Virginia (8 Wall. 177) 903, 905
1286 Pawlet v. Člark (9 Cranch, 292) 112, 739,
Parks v. Boston (8 Pick. 218) 152, 696,
743
708, 714, 1125, 1126, 1127, 1129, Paxson v. Sweet (16 N. J. Eq. 196) 404,
1130
480, 928, 977
v. Newburyport (10 Gray, 28) 1320 Payne v. Brecon (3. H. & N. 572) 184, 274,
Parks Dep., Re (86 N. Y. 43)
90
548
Parmelee v. Chicago (60 112. 267) 586, 922, v. McKinley (54 Cal. 532) 787, 843
979 v. Treadwell (16 Cal. 222) 771
v. Youngstown (43 O. St. 162) 912 Peabody v. Flint (6 Allen, 52) 352
Parmley v. St. L., I. M. & S. R. Ćo. Peachy v. Somerset (1 Str. 447) 420
(3 Dillon, 25)
1108 Peagram v. Cleaveland Co. Com'rs
Parnaby v. Lancashire Canal Co. (11
(64 N. C. 557)
1028
A. & E. 223)
179, 1170
v. Cleaveland Co. Com’rs (65
Parr v. Atty-Genl. (8 Cl. & F. 409) 285,
N. C. 114)
1052, 1074
509, 1100, 1101 Pearce v. Augusta (37 Ga. 597) 970
v. Greenbush (72 N. Y. 463) 526 v. Madison & I. R. Co. (21 How.
Parrott v. Bridgeport (44 Conn. 180) 1009
441)
1140
v. Eyre (10 Bing. 283)
324 v. Milwaukee (18 Wis. 32) 1227
Parry r. Berry (Comyns, 269) 352 Pearl Street, Re (111 Pa. St. 565) 757
Parsel v. Barnes (25 Ark. 261) 517 Pearsall v. Post (20 Wend. 111) 763, 767,
Parsons v. Atlanta Univ. Trs. (44 Ga.
768
529) 757, 760, 761, 787, 788 [See also Post v., &c.]
v. Bethnal Green (17 L. T. n. S. Pearson v. Zable (78 Ky. 170) 1225, 1304
211)
1332 Pease v. Cornish (19 Me. 191) 53, 566,
v. Brainard (17 Wend. 522) 351
568
v. Goshen (11 Pick. 396) 52, 54, 529 v. Dayton (4 O. St. 80)
1281
v. Lindsay (26 Kän. 426) 1287 Peay v. Little Rock (32 Ark. 31) 722, 907,
v. Monmouth (70 Me. 262) 37, 63,
908, 927
1143 Peck v. Austin (2 Tex. 162)
1159
v. St. Matthew's Vestry (L. R.
v. Austin (22 Tex. 261)
459
3 C. P. 56)
1214 v. Booth (42 Conn. 271)
347
Passaic Br. Prop. v. Hoboken Land
v. Elder (3 Sandf. 126)
787
& I. Co. (13 N. J. Eq. 503) 1169 v. Ellsworth (36 Me. 393)
1252
Paston v. Urber (Hutt. 103)
330 v. Fox Lake (28 Wis. 583) 1121
Patch v. Covington (17 B. Mcn. 722)
v. Lockwood (5 Day (Conn.),
1199
22)
403
Paterson v. Barnet (46 N. J. L. 62) 385 v. Prov. S. E. Co. (8 R. I. 353) 740
v. Society for E. U. Manuf. (24
v. Sherwood (56 N. Y. 614) 913
N. J. L. 385) 77, 78, 81, 93, 94, v. Smith (1 Conn. 103) 790, 817
95, 266, 928, 955, 956, 989 Peddiсord v. Balt., C. & E. M. Pass.
Paterson & P. H. R. Co. v. Paterson
Ry. Co. (34 Md. 463)
868
(24 N. J. Eq. 158) 833, 847, 871 Pedrick v. Bailey (12 Gray, 161) 292, 396,
Paterson Gasl. · Co. v. Brady (27 N.
398, 810, 1274
J. L. 245)
825 Pees v. Leeds (1 Stra. 640) 1064, 1067
Patrick v. Cross Roads Com’rs (4 Mc- Peete v. Morgan (19 Wall. 581) 166
Cord, 540)
692 Pekin v. Brereton (67 Ill. 477) 855, 1221,
Patterson v. Bowes (4 Grant, 170) 1104,
1223, 1234, 1241, 1316, 1324
1109 v. Newell (26 III. 320)
1184
v. Duluth (21 Minn. 493) 758, 788 v. Reynolds (31 Ill. 529)
569
!
CXX
TABLE OF CASES CITED,
Page
Page
Pekin v. Smelzel (21 Ill. 464) 431, 432, People v. Adams (9 Wend. 333) 367, 381,
434
443
v. Winkel (77 Ill. 56) 1221, 1223, v. Albany (11 Wend. 539) 179, 1212
1247, 1324 v. Albany Co. Sup., (12 Johns.
Pekin, L. & D. R. Co. v. Logan Co.
414)
1014, 1017, 1043
Sup. (63 Ill. 374) 239, 1069, 1070 v. Alb. & Susq. R. Co. (5 Lans.
Pell v. Newark (40 N. J. L. 71) 835
25)
1104
Pella Christian Ch. v. Scholte (24
v. Albertson (55 N. Y. 50) 25, 28, 81,
Iowa, 283) 743, 755, 767, 798,
100, 101, 102, 294, 1081
801, 803 v. Alleghany Co. Sup. (15 Wend.
Pender v. King (6 Vin. Abr. 296) 304
198)
1127
Pendergast v. Peru (20 Ill. 51) 400 v. Assessors (1 Hill, 620)
55
Pendlebury v. Greenhalgh (1 Q. B.D.
v. Attorney-General (22 Barb.
36)
1295
114)
1057
Pendleton . Bank of Ky. (1 Mon. 177) 260 v. Bacon (18 Mich. 247)
1067
v. Perkins (49 Mo. 565)
161 v. Baker (35 Barb. 105) 1056, 1069
Pendleton County v. Amy (13 Wall.
v. Bank of Niagara (6 Cow. 196) 1089
297) 576, 593, 594, 617, 618, v. Bank of Pontiac (12 Mich.
621, 641
527)
1088
Peninsular R. R. Co. v. Howard (20
v. Baraga (39 Mich. 554)
518
Mich. 18)
613 v. Barnard (110 N. Y. 548) 850, 859
Pennington v. Baehr (48 Cal. 565) 681 v. Bartlett (6 Wend. 422)
305, 355
v. Taniere (12 Q. B. 1011) 521, 528, v. Batchelor (22 N. Y. 128) 100, 362,
678
363, 364
v. Willard (1 R. I. 93)
752 v. Batchelor (53 N. Y. 128) 125, 635,
Pennoyer v. Saginaw (8 Mich. 534) 1320,
1011, 1139
1325 v. Bearfield (35 Barb. 254) 330, 337,
Pennsylvania & O. Canal Co. v. Gra-
339
ham (63 Pa. St. 290) 1246, 1287, v. Bedell (2 Hill, 196) 290, 296
1297 v. Bennett (29 Mich. 451) 57, 72, 73,
Penn., Del. & Md. Steam Nav. Co.
107, 265, 268, 1082, 1324
v. Dandridge (8 Gill & J.
v. Benson (30 Barb. (N. Y.) 24) 822,
248)
518, 533
826
Penn. District Election (2 Pars. 526) 281 v. Benzie Co. Treas. (41 Mich.6) 211
Penn. Globe Gasl. Co. v. Scranton
2. Bissell, Gov. (19 Ill. 229) 1016
(97 Pa. St. 538)
408 v. Blake (60 Cal. 497)
754
Penn. Hall, Re (5 Pa. St. 204) 507, 1167 v. Bloomington (63 I11. 207) 1017, 1066
Penn. R. Co. v. Duquesne Bor. (46
v. Board, &c. (39 N. Y. &c.). [See
Pa. St. 223)
808, 882
v. Brooklyn, &c.]
v. Heister (8 Pa. St. 445)
733 v. Board, &c. (64 N. Y. &c.). (See
v. Jersey City (47 N. J. L. 286) 397
v. N. Y. &c.]
v. Lippincott (116 Pa. St. 472) 1221, v. Board of Trade (45 Ill. 112) 329,
1244
330
v. Marchant (119 Pa. St. 541) 1239, v. Bond (10 Cal. 563)
120
1244 v. Brenham (3 Cal. 477)
480
v. McCloskey (23 Pa. St. 526) 1288 v. Brennan (39 Barb.522), [Tay-
v. Philadelphia (47 Pa. St. 193) 229,
lor, Rel.
184, 1030
236, 237 v. Brennan (39 Barb. 651), (Op-
v. Pittsburgh Gr. Elev. Co. (50
dyke, Mayor, Rel.
1015
Pa. St. 499)
747, 791 v. Brennan (45 Barb. 457) 1010
v. Porter (29 Pa. St. 165)
708 v. Briggs (50 N. Y. 553) 89, 108
v. Rathgeb (32 O. St. 66) 1261, 1263 v. Brighton (20 Mich. 57) 707, 710,
v. St. Louis, A. & T. H. R. Co.
715
(118 U. S. 290)
678 v. Bristol & R. Turnp. Co. (23
Penn. R. Co's Appeal (93 Pa. St.
Wend. 222)
1078
150)
689 v. Broadway Wharf Co. (31 Cal.
Penny Pot Landing, Re (16 Pa. St.
33)
172, 659
79)
759, 768, 799 v. Brooklyn (21 Barb. 484) 977
Penobscot Boom Corp.v. Lawson (16
v. Brooklyn (1 Wend. 318) 712, 1009
Me. 225)
93 v. Brooklyn (4 N. Y. 419) 130, 721,
Pensacola Tel. Co. v. Western Union
722, 896, 898, 908, 913, 914, 919,
(96 U. S. 1)
830
920, 921, 922, 925, 934, 954, 983,
Pentz v. Ætna Ins. Co. (9 Paige, 568)
987
1165, 1166 v. Brooklyn (65 N. Y. 349) 866, 1314
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
cxxi
Page
Page
People v. Brooklyn (71 N. Y. 495) 979, 994 People v. Commissioners, &c. (106
v. Brooklyn Bd. of Assess." (39
N. Y., &c.). [See v. Brook-
N. Y. 81)
1127
lyn, &c.].
v. Brooklyn Bd. of Assess. (111
v. Commissioners of Highways
N. Y. 505)
949
(22 N. E. R. 696)
1017
v. Brooklyn Bd. of Com'rs, Fire,
v. Commissioners of Highways
&c. (106 N. Y. 64) 338, 1131
(88 Ill. 142)
1006
v. Brooklyn C. Council (22 Barb.
v. Commissioners of Highways
404)
1011, 1013, 1057
(6 Wend. 559)
1069
v. Brooklyn C. Council (77 N. Y.
v. Comptroller (71 V. Y.45) 1009,
503) 307, 310, 1019, 1020, 1058
1196
v. Brown (2 Utah Ter. 462) 435 v. Comptroller (20 Wend. .595) 329,
v. Buchanan (1 Idaho Ter. 681) 481
334
v. Bull (46 N. Y. 57) 100, 1079 v. Conover (17 N. Y. 64)
296
v. Butte (4 Mont. Ter. 174) 68, 77, 78 v. Conover (6 Abb. Pr. R. 220) 1089
v. Cairo (50 Ill. 155)
1032 v. Contracting Board (46 Barb.
v. Callaghan (83 Ill. 128) 1085
254; 27 N. Y. 378; 33 N.
v. Campbell (72 N. Y. 496) 1015
Y. 382)
1015
v. Canaday (73 N. C. 198) 24, 27, 69, v. Cook (14 Barb. 259) 281, 352
277, 278 v. Cook (8 N. Y. 67)
352
v. Canal Board (55 N. Y. 390) 1099 v. Coon (25 Cal. 636) 121, 236, 551
v. Canty (55 Ill. 33) 122, 290, 906, v. Cooper (6 Hill, 516)
881
927
v. Cooper (57 How. Pr. 416) 338
v. Carpenter (24 N. Y. 86) 263, 265, v. Cornell (47 Barb. 329)
379
272, 352, 1081, 1082 v. County (11 Cal. 170)
562
v. Carpenter (1 Mich. 273) 765, 782, v. Court (1 Hill (N. Y.), 674) 1130
785, 848 v. Court (5 Wend. 114)
1017
v. Carrique (2 Hill, 93) 309, 310, 1019 v. Covert (1 Hill, 674) 1128, 1138
v. Cass Co. Com’rs (77 Ill. 438) 239, v. Crissey (91 N. Y. 616) 277, 287, 313
210, 646, 1014 v. Croton Aq. Bd. (26 Barb. 240) 547
v. Cassidy (2 Lans. (N. Y.) 294) 966 v. Crotty (93 Iil. 180)
1006
v. Central Pac. R. Co. (43 Cal.
v. Cunningham (1 Denio, 524) 785, 884
398)
707, 902
v. Curly (5 Col. 412)
99, 492
v. Chapman (66 Ill. 137)
646 v. Davidson (30 Cal. 379)
379
v. Chautauqua Co. Sup. (43 N.
v. Dayton (55 N. Y. 367) 630, 896
Y. 10)
89, 838
v. Denslow (1 Caines, 177) 781
vi Chenango Co. Sup. (8 N. Y.
v. Detroit (18 Mich. 338, 445) 440, 479,
317)
1007, 1043
480, 1022, 1023
v. Chenango Co. Sup. (11 N. Y.
v. Detroit (28 Mich. 228) 24, 25, 27,
563)
1009, 1030
28, 41, 45, 48, 94, 99, 100, 101,
v. Chicago (51 Ill. 17) 27, 102, 122,
102, 108, 110, 112, 115, 123
906, 1056 v. Detroit & H. Pl. R. Co. (37
v. Chicago & A. R. Co. (67 Ill.
Mich. 195)
781
118)
858 v. Detroit Rec. Ct. Judge (40
v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. (118
Mich. 64)
809
Ill. 520)
806 v. Doe (36 Cal. 220)
771
v. Cicott (16 Mich. 283) 283, 289 v. D'Oench (111 N. Y. 359) 213
v. Clark (70 N. Y. 518)
1082 v. Draper (15 N. Y.532) 27, 80, 86, 99,
v. Clark (47 Cal. 456)
958
100, 101, 102, 269, 293, 352, 1081
v. Clark Co. Sup. (50 Ill. 213) 1030 v. Dutcher (56 Ill. 144)
644
v. Clayton (88 Ill. 45)
240 v. Dutchess Co. R. (58 N. Y. 152) 852,
v. Clunie (70 Cal. 504)
71, 144
1017, 1071, 1135
v. Clute (50 N. Y. 451) 100, 279 v Dutchess Co. Sup. (1 Hill, 50) 882,
ö. Clute (52 N. Y. 576) 1081, 1090
1014, 1017
v. Coleman (4 Cal. 46)
426, 924
v. Dutchess Co. Sup. (9 Wend.
v. Collins (7 Johns. 549)
1012
508)
1010
v. Collins (3 Mich. 347)
391 v. East Saginaw (40 Mich. 336) 1009
v. Collins (19 Wend. 66) 1004, 1052, v. Eddy (43 Cal. 333)
953
1057 v. Edmonds (15 Barb. 529) 1009, 1010
v. Columbia Co. Sup. (10 Wend.
v. Erie Co. Med. Soc. (24 Barb.
363)
1007, 1009, 1011
570)
329
v. Commissioners, &c. (59 N. Y.,
v. Esopus Aud. (74 N. Y. 310) 1203,
N. Y., &c.). (See v. N. Y.,
1246
&c.]
v. Essex Co. Sup. (70 N. Y. 228) 130
cxxii
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
Page
Page
People r. Everett (1 Caines, 8) 1072 People v. Hoge (55 Cal. 612)
72
v. Fairbury Trs. (51 Ill. 149) 244, 280, v. Holden (28 Cal. 123)
1077
281, 303, 1020 v. Holden (91 Ill. 446)
240
v. Farnham (35 Ill. 562) 140, 266 v. Holmes (2 Wend. 281)
299
v. Ferris (16 Hun, 219)
1076 2. Hopson (1 Denio, 574)
355
v. Fields (58 N. Y. 491) 105, 108, 113, v. Howard
145
115, 1104, 1106 v. Hudson, &c., Com’rs (6 Wend.
v. Finger (24 Barb. 341)
1069
559)
1069
v. Fire Com’rs (100 N. Y. 82) 1131 v. Hudson, &c., Com’rs (7 Wend.
v. Fire Com'rs (106 N. Y. 64) 338,
474)
1247
1131 v. Humphrey (23 Mich. 471) 697
v. Fire Com'rs (106 N. Y. 257) 1131 v. Hurlbut (24 Mich. 44) 24, 39, 41,
v. Fitzgerald (41 Mich. 2)
284
81, 88, 99, 100, 108, 110,
v. Flagg (17 N. Y. 584) 539, 543, 566,
112, 213, 226, 294, 899
809, 1030 v. Hyde Park (117 Ill. 462) 707, 978,
v. Flagg (46 N. Y. 401) 126, 914, 983,
1007
1011 v. Ingersoll (58 N. Y. 1) 105, 108,
v. Flanagan (66 N. Y. 237) 282, 1079
113, 115, 1102, 1104, 1106
v. Fletcher (3 Ill. 487)
1023 v. Ingham Co. Sup. (20 Mich.
v. Fort Edward (70 N. Y. 28) 230
95)
794, 795
v. Fort Street Ry. (41 Mich. 413) 866 v. Jackson (7 Mich. 432) 745, 782
v. Fulton County (14 Barb. 56) 534 v. Jackson (8 Mich. 110)
437, 440
v. Galesburg (48 Ill. 485) 1077 v. Jackson County (92 Ill. 444) 240,
v. Gilbert (18 Johns. 227)
797
1034
v. Goodwin (5 N. Y. 568)
980 v. Jaehne (103 N. Y. 182)
30, 144
v. Governor (29 Mich. 320) 1016 v. Johnson (30 Cal. 98) 412, 480
v. Granville (104 Ill. 285)
630 v. Johnson (100 Ill. 537)
562
v. Gray (23 Cal. 125)
562 v. Johr (22 Mich. 461)
300
v. Green (58 N. Y. 304)
310 v. Jones (7 Col. 475)
140
v. Green (64 N. Y. 606)
1220 v. Jones (6 Mich. 176)
739, 761
v. Greene Co. Sup. (64 N. Y. 600) 1070 v. Justices (74 N. Y. 406)
500, 501
v. Hall (80 N. Y. 117) 287, 1076, 1077 v. Keeling (4 Col. 127)
281
v. Halsey (53 Barb. 547)
1057 v. Kelly (5 Abb. N. Cas. 383) 126,
r. Hanifan (96 Ill. 420) 308, 310
1044
2. Harper (67 Ill. 62)
240 v. Kelsey (34 Cal. 470)
899
Harper (91 Ill. 357)
463 v. Kerr (27 N. Y. 188) 121, 747, 792,
v. Harris (4 Cal. 9)
210
794, 833, 834, 841, 863, 867, 870,
v. Harshaw (60 Mich. 200) 284, 351
871
v. Hartwell (12 Mich. 508) 1087, 1088 v. Kilduff (15 Ill. 492) 285, 1023,
v. Harvey (58 Cal. 337)
276
1025, 1026
v. Hatch (33 Ill. 9)
1056 v. Kimball (4 Mich. 95)
727
v. Hawley (3 Mich. 330)
213 v. Kingman (24 N. Y. 545) 745
v. Hayden (6 Hill (N. Y.), 359) 720 v. Kip (4 Cow. (N. Y.) 383) 1023
v. Hayt (66 N. Y. 606) 11056, 1063 v. Klopke (92 Ill. 134)
562
v. Head (25 Ill. 325) 1023, 1026 v. Klumpke (41 Cal. 263)
759
v. Henry (62 Cal. 557) 290, 294 v. Knight (13 Mich. 424)
281
v. Henshaw (76 Cal. 436)
493 v. Kniskern (54 N. Y. 52)
707
v. Herbel (96 Ill. 384)
750 v. Lambier (5 Denio, 9) 748, 758
v. Higgins (15 Ill. 110)
331 v. La Salle Co. Sup. (84 Ill. 303)
v. Higgins (3 Mich. 233)
281
1014, 1017
v. Highway Com’rs (88 Ill. 45) 240 v. Law (34 Barb. 494)
841
v. Highway Com’rs (22 N. E. R.
v. Lawrence (6 Hill, 244) 219, 1044
596)
1017 v. Lewis (7 Johns. 73)
320
v. Highway Com’rs (6 Wend.
v. Lieb (85 Ill. 484)
1006
559)
1069 v. Livingston Co. Sup. (34 N. Y.
v. Highway Com’rs (7 Wend.
516)
194
474)
1247 v. Loefhelm (102 N. Y. 1)
762
v. Hill (7 Cal. 97) 95, 105, 296 v. Logan Co. Sup. (45 III. 162) 644
v. Hillhouse (1 Lans, 87)
1127 v. Logan Co. Sup. (63 Hl. 374) 239,
v Hilliard (29 Ill. 413) 1023, 1026,
1069, 1070
1056, 1064
v. Londoner (22 Pac. R. 764) 1128
v. Hills (35 N. Y. 449)
v. Loomis (8 Wend. 396) 282, 1088,
v. Hillsdale & C. Turnp. Co. (2
1090
Johns. 190)
1084 v. Love (19 Cal. 676)
260
89, 90
$
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
cxxiii
1008,
73)
Page
Page
People v. Lowber (7 Abb. Pr. 158) 1104 People v. New York (32 Barb. 102) 1104
v. Lowber (28 Barb. 65)
457 v. New York (2 Hill (N. Y), 9) 509, ,
v. Lynch (51 Cal. 15) 27, 99, 100,
715, 1126, 1128, 1131
130, 133, 924, 933 v. New York (7 How. Pr. R. 81) 481
v. Mahaney (13 Mich. 481) 86, 88, v. New York 3 Johns. Cas. 79) 1073,
100, 284, 311
1078
v. Manhattan Co. (9 Wend. 351) 77, v. New York (82 N. Y. 491) 334
139 v. New York (10 Wend. 393)
v. Marsh (2 Cow. 485)
1011
1009
v. Martin (5 N. Y. 22) 350, 364 v. New York (25 Wend. 680) 1009,
v. Marx (99 N. Y. 377).
211
1010
1. Mathewson (47 Cal. 442) 280 v. N. Y. & Harl. R. Co. (45 Barb.
v. Matteson (17 Ill. 167) 282, 1022,
863
1023 v. N. Y. Bd. of Appr. (64 N. Y.
v. Mauran (5 Derio, 389)
662
627)
1031
v. May (9 Col. 81 ; 404)
202 v. N. Y. Bd. of Fire Com’rs (72
v. Maynard (15 Mich. 463) 76, 140,
N. Y. 415)
331
1082, 1110 v. N. Y. Bd. of Police (107 N. Y.
2. McAdams (82 Ill. 356)
122
235)
1007
v. McClintock (45 Cal. 11) 219, 658 v. N. Y. Bd. of Sup. (1 Hill, 362) 312,
v. McCreery (34 Cal. 432) 895, 923,
362, 530, 1014
951, 953 v. N. Y. Bd. of Sup. (32 N. Y.
v. McDonald (69 N. Y. 362) 27, 102,
473)
1010
993 v. N. Y. Bd. of Tax Com’rs (58
v. McKinney (10 Mich. 54) 321
N. Y. 242)
965
v. McKinney (52 N. Y. 374) 100, 298 v. N. Y. Bd. of Tax Com’rs (59
v. McRoberts (62 Ill. 38) 726, 727,
N. Y. 40)
964
1234 v. N. Y. Bd. of Tax Com’rs (64
v. Mead (24 N. Y. 114) 226, 566, 584
N. Y. 541)
964
v. Mead (36 N. Y. 224) 601, 615, 618, v. N. Y. Bd. of Tax Com’rs (82
644, 649
N. Y. 462)
966
v. Medical Soc (24 Barb. 570) 329 v. N. Y. Bd. of Tax Com’rs (95
v. Mellen (32 Ill. 181)
88
N. Y. 554)
952
v. Metrop. Pol. Bd. (19 N. Y.
v. Nichols (79 N. Y. 582) 334, 338
188)
278, 293 v. Niles (35 Cal. 282)
964
v. Metrop. Pol. Bd. (26 N. Y.
v. Nolan (102 N. Y. 539)
319
316)
308, 1026, 1070 v. North 172 N. Y. 124)
277, 287
v. Metrop. Pol. Bd. (39 N. Y.
v. No. Chicago Ry. Čo. (88 Ill.
506)
1127
537)
1085
v. Metzker (47 Cal. 524)
285 v. No. San F. H. & R. Assoc. (38
v. Mich. Univ. Regents (4 Mich.
Cal. 564)
1104
98)
1057 v. Nostrand (46 N. Y. 375) 159, 310,
v. Miller (24 Mich. 458)
319
355, 1018
v. Miner (2 Lans. 396)
1104
v. Nyland (41 Cal. 129)
493
2. Mitchell (35 N. Y. 651) 225, 235, v. Oakland Co. Bank (1 Doug.
635
(Mich.) 282)
147, 1088
v. Morgza (55 N, Y. 587)
647
v. O'Brien, Rec. (111 N. Y. 1) 30, 89,
v. Morrell (21 Wend. 563) 81, 272, 311
92, 105, 113, 115, 117, 243, 246,
v. Morris (13 Wend. 325) 9, 39, 77,
254, 392, 771
93, 94, 103, 107, 140 v. Ogdensburgh (48 N. Y. 390) 964,
v. Morse (43 Cal. 534)
121
969, 1127
v. Mott (1 How. Pr. 247) 379, 380
v. Oldtown (88 Ill. 202)
239, 240
v. Mulholland (82 N. Y. 324) 424, 442 v. O'Neil (109 N. Y. 251)
144
v. Murray (15 Cal. 321)
276 v. Onondaga Sup. (16 Mich. 254) 130,
v. Murray (57 Mich. 396) 381, 389
208
v. Murray (73 N. Y. 535) 253, 1089 2. Oran (121 Ill. 650)
804
2. Mut. Gasl. Co. (38 Mich. 154) 1084 v. Pacheco (29 Cal. 210)
1058
v. Nally (49 Cal. 478)
78 v. Palmer (52 N. Y. 83) 100, 159, 360
v. Nearing (27 N. Y. 306)
700 v. Park Com’rs (97 N. Y. 37) 1128
v. Nevada (6 Cal. 143)
265 v. Pearson (4 Ill. 271)
1070
v. Newton (112 N. Y. 396) 863 v. Pease (27 N. Y. 81)
289
v. New York (9 Abb. Pr. 253;
v. Peoria, D. & E. R. Co. (116 III.
10 Ib. 144)
1104
410)
900
v. New York (5 Barb. 43) 296, 557 v. Phillips (1 Denio, 388)
277
cxxiv
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
Page
People v. Police Board, &c. (26 N. Y.
39 N. Y., &c. [See v. Metro-
politan, &c.]
v. Police Board, &c. (107 N. Y.,
&c.) [See v. N. Y. Bd., &c.
v. Police Justice (7 Mich. 456) 510
v. Pope (53 Cal. 447)
659
v. Porter (6 Cal. 26)
309
v. Potter (35 Cal. 110)
138
v. Power (25 Ill. 187)
104
v. Pratt (30 Cal. 223)
1056
v. President, &c., (9 Wend. 351) 77,139
v. Prison Insp. (4 Mich. 187) 1057
v. Pueblo Co. (2 Col. 360) 237
v. Queen's Co Sup. (1 Hill, 195) 1127
v. Queen's Co. Sup. (112 N. Y. 685) 27,
28, 126
v. Ransom (2 N. Y. 490) 1007, 1056
v. Reclamation Dist. (53 Cal. 346) 91
v. Rector, &c. (48 Barb. 603) 351
v. Reynolds (10 Ill. 1)
77
v. Richardson (4 Cow. 100) 1075, 1079,
1083, 1089
v. Richmond Co. Sup. (28 N. Y.
112)
1070, 1074
v. River Raisin & L.E. R. Co. (12
Mich. 387)
147
v. Riverside (66 Cal. 288) 1085
v. Riverside (70 Cal. 461)
71
v. Rochester (21 Barb. 656) 979, 1131
v. Rochester (44 Hun, 166) 397, 438
v. Rochester (5 Lans. 142) 364, 993
2. Rochester (50 N. Y. 525)
89
v. Runkel (9 Johns 147) 261, 303, 304,
305, 355
2. St. Franciscus Benev. Soc. (24
How. Pr. 216)
338
v. St. Louis (10 Ill. 372)
454
v. Salem Tp. Bd. (20 Mich. 452) 229,
234, 579, 898
v. Salomon (46 Ill. 415) 950, 1006,
1088, 1021
v. Salomon (51 III. 37) 77, 85, 122,
463, 569, 906, 1006, 1008, 1016
v. San Francisco (36 Cal. 594) 1057
v. San F. & A. R. R. Co. (35 Cal.
606)
923, 924
v. San F. Sup. (20 Cal. 591) 1012
v. San F. Sup. (27 Cal. 655) 407, 523,
551, 618, 646, 1056, 1068
v. San Luis Obispo Co. Sup. (50
Cal. 561)
104
v. Santa Anna Co. Sup. (67 Ill.
57)
240, 280
v. Saratoga & R. R. Co. (15
Wend. 114)
1083
v. Schermerhorn (19 Barb. 540) 656
v. School Dist. (72 Mo. 643) 272
v. School Tr. (86 Ill. 613) 272, 1006
v. Schuyler (79 N. Y. 189) 1059
v. Scrugham (20 Barb. 302) 1023, 1025
v. Seaman (5 Denio, 409) 282, 1079
v. Sergeant (8 Cow. 139)
450
v. Seymour (16 Cal. 332)
996
Page
People v. Seymour (6 Cow. 579) 1059,
1070, 1074
v. Shearer (30 Cal. 645)
950
v. Shepherd (36 N. Y. 285) 100, 102
v. Slaughter (2 Doug. 334) 440, 497,
500, 505
v. Smith (21 N. Y. 595)
703, 705
v. Smith (45 N. Y. 772) 645, 1127
v. Spencer (55 N. Y. 1)
237
v. State Treasurer (4 Mich. 27) 1059
v. State Treasurer (23 Mich. 499) 579
v. Steele (1 Edm. Sel. Cas. 505) 1074
v. Stephens (62 Cal. 209)
822
v. Stephens (71 N. Y. 527) 547
v. Stevens (5 Hill, 616) 282, 305, 355,
1008, 1009, 1022, 1025
v. Stilwell (1 N. Y. 531)
715
v. Stout (23 Barb. 338) 77, 551,
1009, 1111
v. Stuart (97 Ill. 123) 725, 727
v. Sturtevant (9 N. Y. 263) 116, 387
v. Superior Court (5 Wend. 114) 1017
v. Sweeting (2 Johns. 184) 1078, 1088
v. Swift (31 Cal. 26) 539, 540
v. Syracuse (63 N. Y. 291) 159, 360,
711
v. Tazewell County (22 Ill. 147) 239,
569, 644
v. Thatcher (55 N. Y. 525) 287, 289,
1079, 1080
v. Third Av. R. Co. (45 Barb.
63)
863
v. Thompson (25 Barb. 73) 1010
v. Thompson (16 Wend. 655)
1075,
1088
[See also Thompson . People.]
v. Throop (12 Wend. 183) 396
2. Thurber (13 Ill. 554) 424, 425
v. Tieman (8 Abb. Pr. 359) 304
v. Tieman (30 Barb. 193)
304, 319
v. Toll (107 N. Y. 203)
1220
v. Tracy (1 Denio, 617)
1057
v. Treasurer (4 Mich, &c.) [See
v. State Treasurer, &c.]
v. Turner (10 Am. Law Reg.
(N. 8.) 366)
471
v. Ulster Co. Sup. (16 Johns. 59) 1011
v. Utica Ins. Co. (2 Johns. Ch.
371; 15 Johns. 358) 352, 1075,
1076
v. Vail (20 Wend. 12) 1025, 1079
v. Vanderbilt (26 N. Y. 287) 110,
171, 783, 786, 787
v. Vanderbilt (28 N. Y. 396) 171, 453,
783, 786
v. Van Slyck (4 Cow. 297) 1078,
1079, 1089
v. Vilas (36 N. Y. 459)
299
v. Waite (70 III. 25) 1075, 1085, 1086,
1087
v. Walker (9 Mich. 328)
379, 380
v. Walsh (96 Ill. 232)
v. Warfield (20 Ill. 163)
79
v. Warren (5 Hill, 440)
324
777, 794
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
CXXV
850
Page
Page
People v. Wayne Co. Aud. (13 Mich. Perin v. Concord R. Co. (44 N. H.
233)
314
223)
322, 1070
v. Wayne Co. Aud. (41 Mich. Perkins v. Corbin (45 Ala. 103) 492
4)
314 v. Fayette (68 Me. 152) 1263,
v. Wayne Co. Aud. (41 Mich.
1264, 1266, 1270, 1271, 1278, 1301
223)
1012 v. Holman (43 Ark. 219)
264
v. Waynesville (88 Ill. 469) 240, 629, v. Lawrence (136 Mass. 305) 1211,
647
1213
v. Weber (86 Ill. 283)
1079 v. Milford (59 Me. 315)
895
v. Weber (89 Ill. 347) 146, 291, 520 v. Slack (86 Pa. St. 283) 128, 129
v. Weisenbach (60 N. Y. 385) 471 v. Wash. Ins. Co. of Ń. Y. (4
v. Westchester Co. Supervisors
Cow. 645)
322
(12 Barb. 446; 15 Barb.
v. Weston (3 Cush. 519)
378
607)
1056 Perkinson v. St. Louis (4 Mo. App.
v. Wharf Co. (31 Cal. &c.). [See
322)
557
v. Broadway, &c.]
Perley v. Chandler (6 Mass. 454) 746
v. Whipple (41 Mich. 548) 172 v. Georgetown (7 Gray, 464) 1183,
v. Whitcomb (55 Ill. 172) 1084, 1092
1190
v. White (54 Barb. 622)
1011 Perrin v. N. Y. Cent. R. Co. (36
v. White (24 Wend. 520)
356
N. Y. 120)
759, 767
v. Whitlock (92 N. Y. 191) 90 Perrine v. Farr (22 N. J. L. 356) 146, 520,
v. Whitney's Pt. (102 N. Y. 81) 707
981
v. Whittemore, Treas. (4 Mich. Perry v. Cheboygan (55 Mich. 250) 312
27)
1059 v. Dover (12 Pick. 206)
346, 347
v. Whyler (41 Cal. 351) 923, 924, 953 v. Kinnear (42 Ill. 160)
1111
v. Wiant, Du Page Co. Treas.
v. New Orleans M. & C. R. Co.
(48 Ill. 263)
79, 1016
(55 Ala. 413) 742, 745, 746, 754,
v. Willsea (60 N. Y. 507)
88
777, 780, 790, 791, 842, 846, 848,
v. Wilson (15 Ill. 389)
492, 494
v. Witherell (14 Mich. 48) 285, 287, v. Ottawa (23 U. C. Q. B. 391) 638
305, 1087 v. Reynolds (53 Conn. 527) 324
v. Wood (7 Cal. 579)
120 v. Rockdale (62 Tex. 457) 899
v. Wood (4 Parker (N. Y.), Cr.
v. Superior City (23 Wis. 64) 529
144)
322 v. Torrence (8 Ohio, 522)
966
v. Works (7 Wend. 486)
422 v. Tynen (22 Barb. 137)
361
v. Wren (5 Ill. 269) 77, 94, 242, 244 v. Washburn (20 Cal. 318) 895
v. Wynhammer (12 How. Pr.
v. Worcester (6 Gray, 544)
1214,
260; 13 N. Y. 378)
1164
1215, 1317, 1334
v. Yates (40 Ill. 126)
1063 Perry County v. Selma, M. & M. R.
People's Gasl. Co. v. Jersey City (46
Co. (58 Ala. 546)
998
N. J. L. 297)
824 Perryman v. Greenville (51 Ala. 510) 138
People's Pass. R. Co. v. Memphis Perrysville & Z. Pl. R. Co. v. Ram-
C.R. Co. (10 Wall 38) 157, 521,
age (20 Pa. St. 95)
789
846, 860 v. Pineman (20 Pa. St. 99)
789
Peoria v. Calhoun (29. Ill. 317) 404, 405 v. Thomas (20 Pa. St. 91)
789
v. Johnston (56 Ill. 45) 744, 755, 783, Peru v. French (55 Ill. 317) 1281, 1287,
803, 1092, 1097
1297
v. Kidder (26 III. 351)
722 v. Gleason (91 Ind. 566)
157
v. Simpson (110 Ill. 294) 1284, 1308 Peru & I. R. Co. v. Hanna (68 Ind.
Peoria Co. Sup. v. Gordon (82 IU.
562)
922
45)
1032 Peru Iron Co., Re (7. Cow. 540) 657
Peoria Br. Assoc. v. Loomis (20 Ill. Peruvian Railways Co. v. Thames
235)
1264
& M. M. Co. (L. B. 2 Ch.
Peoria D. & E. R. Co. v. Scott (116
617)
191
Ill. 401)
901 Pesterfield v. Vickers (3 Coldw. 205) 294,
Pepper v. Smith (15 Lea, 551) 251
295, 397, 1197
Pequinot v. Detroit (16 Fed. R. 211) 1273 Peterborough v, Lancaster (14 N. H.
Perdue v. Chinguacousy Corp. (25
382)
348
U. C. Q. B. 61) 1139, 1204, 1322, Peterborough Corp., Re (15 U. C.
1324, 1329, 1331
Q B.450). (See Victoria, &c.]
v. Ellis (18 Ga. 586) 385, 397, 431, Peters v. Fergus Falls (35 Minn,
434
549)
1322
Perin v. Carey (24 How. 465) 657, 661, v. London (2 U. C. Q. B. 543) 411
662, 664, 665, 666, 669 v. Lynchburg (76 Va. 927) 939
Cxxvi
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
Page
Page
Peters v. State (9 Ga. 109)
1174 Philadelphia v. Presb. Bd. of Pub.
Petersburgh v. Applegarth (28 Gratt.
(29 Leg. Int. 53)
889
321)
448, 1180, 1181 v. Randolph (4 W. & S. 514)
814,
v. Mappin (14 Ill. 193)
551
1216, 1229, 1317
v. Metzker (21 III. 205) 147, 413, 437 v. Rule (93 Pa. St. 15) 917, 937
Peterson v. New York (17 N. Y. 449) 210, v. Tryon (35 Pa. St. 401) 812, 818,
457, 533, 534, 539, 540, 542, 543,
913, 914, 915, 988
657 v. Wister (35 Pa. St. 427) 981, 1001
Petrie v. Doe (30 Miss. 698)
361 v. Wright (100 Pa. St. 235) 1221
Pettengill 2. Yonkers (116 N. Y. Phila. & Reading R. Co. v. Phila. (47
558)
1281, 1284
Pa. St. 325)
841
Pettigrew v. Evansville (25 Wis.
v. Phila. & Trenton R. Co. Re (6
223) 1217, 1298, 1320, 1321,
Whart. 25) 771, 776, 794, 833
1324, 1329 Phila. & Wilm. R. Co. v. Md. (10
Pettis v. Johnson (56 Ind. 139) 785, 786
How. 376)
953
Petty v. Tooker (21 N. Y. 267) 277 Phila. Assessors v. Com’rs (3 Brews. ·
Peverly v. Boston (136 Mass. 366) 1286
333)
237
Peynado's Dev.v. Peynado's Ex. (82 Phila. Assoc. Dis. F. v. Wood (39
Ky. 5)
663
Pa. St. 73)
972
Peyser v. Metrop. Elev. Ry. Co. (13 Phila. W. & B. R. Co. v. Quigley
Daly, 122)
877
(21 How. 202) 1170, 1183
v. New York (70 N. Y. 497) 1147, v. App. Tax Ct. of Balt. (50 Ma.
1152
397)
969
Peyton v. St. Hospital (3 C. & P. 363) Philip Street, Re (10 La. An. 313) 706
382 Philips v. Wickham (1 Paige, 590) 244,
Pfau v. Reynolds (53 Ill. 212) 1293, 1308
304, 397
Phebe, The (1 Ware, 360)
172 Phillips, Re (60 N. Y. 16) 388, 408,959, 976
Phelps ». Lewistown (15 Blatch. 131) 596 v. Albany (28 Wis. 340)
225
u. Mankato (23 Minn. 277) 1267 v. Allen (41 Pa. St. 481) 416, 419, 464,
v. New York (112 N. Y. 216) 958,
473
1148, 1149 v. Bloomington (1 G.Greene, 498) 182
Philadelphia v. Burgin (50 Pa. St.
v. Bowers (7 Gray, 21)
817
537)
981 v. Coffee (17 Ill. 154
273
v. Cloud (4 W. N. C. 445) 995 v. Commonwealth (44 Pa. St.
v. Collector (5 Wall. 730) 1155
197)
1133, 1134
v. Collins (68 Pa. St. 106) 1210 v. Council Bluffs (63 Iowa, 576) 815
v. Cooke (30 Pa. St. 56) 1002, 1148 v. Jefferson Co. Com’rs (5 Kan.
v. Dickson (38 Pa. St. 247) 719
412)
1148
v. Dyer (41 Pa. St. 463)
719 v. New York (1 Hilton, 483) 311
v. Eastwick (35 Pa St. 75) 915 2. So. Park Com’rs (119 Ill. 626) 719,
v. Elliott (3 Rawle, 170) 662, 663,
668 Re Tecumseh (5 Neb. 305) 431
v. Field (58 Pa. St. 320) 95, 107, 122, v. Veazie (40 Me. 96)
1314
125, 130, 897, 943 2. Willow (70 Wis. 6)
1298
v. Flanigan (47 Pa. St. 21) 27, 30, Phillips Acad. Trs. v. King (12 Mass.
201, 529
546)
662
v. Fox (64 Pa. St. 169) 93, 95, 107, Phillips Exeter Acad. Trs. v. Exeter
127, 135, 663, 664
(58 N. H. 306)
953
v. Germantown Pass. R. Co. (10 Phinizey v. Augusta C. Council (47
Pa. 165)
699
Ga. 260)
1317
v. Gilmartin (71 Pa. St. 140) 1196 Phipsburg v. Dickinson (78 Me. 457) 301
v. Given (60 Fa. St. 136) 298, 312, Phænixville, Re (109 Pa. St. 44) 87, 88
319 Physicians' College 2. Salmon (3
v. Greble (38 Pa. St. 339) 1000
Salk. 102)
258
v. Hays (93 Pa. St. 72)
539 Piatt v. People (29 Ill. 54)
281
v. Linnard (97 Pa. St. 242) 733 Piatt County v. Goodell (97 III. 84) 804
v. Lombard & S. S. P. R. Co. (3 Pickard v. Collins (23 Barb. 444) 449
Grant, 403)
846, 863
v. Howe (12 Met. 198)
223
v. Miller (49 Pa. St. 40)
984 Pickering v. Shotwell (10 Pa. St. 27) 662
v. Phila. & Reading R. Co. (58 Pickett v. Hastings (47 Cal. 269) 769
Pa. St. 253) 671, 797, 799, 803, v. School District (25 Wis. 551) 369
808, 848 Pickhard v. Smith (10 C. B. n. 8. 470) 1270
v. Phila., W. & B. R. Co. (33 Pa. Pickles 2. McLellan Dry Dock Co.
St. 41)
915, 921
(38 La. An. 412)
95
721
!
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
cxxvii
Page
Page
Pierce v. Bartrum (Cowp. 270) 421, 422, Pittsburgh, Ft. W. & C. R. Co. v.
455, 459
Reich (101 Ill. 157) 1223, 1242
v. Boston (3 Met. 520)
995 Pittsburgh & S. R. Co. v. Allegheny
v. Cambridge (2 Cush. 611) 953
County (79 Pa. St. 210) 623
v. Carpenter (10 Vt. 480) 263, 272 Pittsburgh Junction R. Co.'s Appeal
v. Chamberlain (82 Mo. 618) 752
(6 Atl. R. 564)
809
v. Drew (136 Mass. 75)
831 Pittsburgh, Va. & C. Ry. Co. v. Com-
v. Emery (32 N. H. 484)
969
monwealth (101 Pa. St. 192) 852,
v. New Bedford (129 Mass. 534) 1205
1135
v. Richardson (37 N. H. 306) 321, 371, Pittsburgh's Appeal, (118 Pa. St.
372, 651
458)
1096
v. Somerworth (10 N. H. 369) 260 Pittsfield v. Barnstead (40 N. H. 477) 322
v. Tripp (13 R. I. 181)
1187 Pittson v. Clark (15 Me. 460)
53
Pieri v. Shieldsboro (42 Miss. 493) 449, 1097 Pittston v. Hart (89 Pa. St. 389) 1257,
Pierpoint v. Harrisonville (9 W. Va.
1258, 1259
215)
744, 745 Pitzman v. Freeburg (92 Ill. 111) 535
Pike v. Megam (44 Mo. 491)
391 Place v. Providence (12 R. I. 1) 1100,
v. Middletown (12 N. H. 278) 54, 220,
1111, 1113, 1117
221 Placerville v. Wilcox (35 Cal. 21) 961
v. N. W. R. Co. (94 U. S. 164) 92 Plainview v. Winona & St. Peter R.
Pike Co. Com’rs v. State (11 Ill. 202) 1057
Co. (36 Minn. 505)
584, 618
Pike Co. Inf. Ct. Jus. v. Griffin & W.
Plank-road Co., &c. (3 Ohio,
P. Pl. R. Co. (9 Ga. 475; 15
578). [See Milan & R., &c.]
Ga. 39)
1094 (20 Pa. St. 91, 95, 99.). [See
Pilie v. New Orleans (19 La. An. 274) 316
Perrysville & B., &c.
Pillsbury v. Brown (47 Cal. 478) 496 | Plant v. Long Island R. Co. (10
v. Springfield (16 N. H. 565) 711
Barb. 26)
853
Pim v. Ontario Council (9 U.C. C. P. Plaquemines Par. Pol. Jury v. Foul-
304)
538
houze (30 La. An. 64) 670, 675,
Pimental v. San Francisco (21 Cal.
747, 801
351) 358, 368, 521, 534, 542, 676, Platt v. Rice (10 Watts, 352)
952
1143 v. Weymouth (147 Mass. 245) 1256
Pinckney v. Henegan (2 Strob. 250) 1074 Platter v. Elkhart County (103 Ind.
Pine Grove Tp. v. Talcott !19 Wall
.
360)
395
666)
573, 574, 584, 636 v. Seymour (86 Ind. 323) 1187
Pine Street, Re (15 Wend. 374) 699, 709, Platteville v. Bell (43 Wis. 488) 470
763 v. Hooper (63 Wis. 381)
300
Pine Tp. v. Huber Manuf. Co. (83 Plattsmouth v. Mitchell (20 Neb.
Ind. 121)
529
228)
1272, 1297
Piper v. Chappell (14 M. & W. 624) 411, Platz v. Cohoes (89 N. Y. 219) 1204, 1287
414, 476, 483 Player v. Jenkens (1 Sid. 284) 455
v. Moulton (72 Me. 155)
662 Plimpton v. Somerset (33 Vt. 283) 110,
v. Singer (4 S. & R. 354) 900, 950
479, 501
Piqua v. Zimmerlin (35 0. St. 507) 487 Plum v. Morris Canal & B. Co. (10
Piqua Branch Bank v. Knoop (16
N. J. Eq. 256)
814, 1222
How. 380)
94 Plunkett's Creek Tp. v. Crawford
.
Pittsburgh v. Cluley (74 Pa. St. 262) 374
(27 Pa. St. 107) 269, 272
v. Craft (1 Pitts. 158)
260 Plymouth v. Jackson (15 Pa. St. 44) 95,
v. Grier (22 Pa. St. 54) 46, 179, 1205
135, 270
2. Knowlson (92 Pa. St. 116) 1000
v. Painter (17 Conn. 585)
305
v. McKnight (91 Pa. St. 202) 995 Plymouth Com’rs v. Pettijohn (4
v. Scott (1 Pa. St. 309)
783
Dev. L. 591)
422, 904
v. Walter (69 Pa. St. 365) 979 Poillon v. Brooklyn (101 N. Y. 132) 148,
v. Woods (44 Pa. St. 113) 914
152
Pittsburgh, Alley in, Re (104 Pa. St. Polack v. San F. Orphan As. (48 Cal.
622)
762
490)
794, 795
Pittsburgh & B. Pass. R. Co. v. Birm- Police Com’rs of A., &c. (See A.
ingham Bor. (51 Pa. St. 41) 863
Police Com’rs, &c.]
v. Pittsburgh (80 Pa. St. 72) 1282 Police Jury of Bossier Par.v. Shreve-
Pittsburgh & Č. R. Co. (63 Pa. St.
port (5 La. An. 661) 97, 110
126)
623 Police Jury of Jefferson Parish v.
Pittsburgh, Ft. W. & C. R. Co. v.
McCormack (82 La. An.
Commonwealth (66 Pa. St.
624)
272
73)
896 v. Villaviabo (12 La. An. 788) 422
сxxviii
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
Page
160
Page
Police Jury of Quachita Parish v. Port Huron v. Chadwick (52 Mich.
Monroe (37 La. An. 641) 518
320)
742, 747
v. Monroe (38 La. An. 630) 41, 551 v. McCall (46 Mich. 565)
149
Police Jury of Right Bank, &c. v. Portland z. Bangor (42 Me. 403) 471
McDonough's Suc. (8 La.
2. Bangor (65 Me. 120) 471, 501
AR. 341)
225 v. Kamm (10 Or. 383)
735
Police Jury of Tensas Par. v. Britton
v. Lee Sam (7 Or. 397)
735
(i5 Wall. 566) 190, 193, 194, 199, v. O'Neill (1 Or. 218) 425, 971
238, 520, 564, 570 v. Richardson (54 Me. 46) 1311, 1312,
Police Jury of West Baton Rouge v.
1313
Michel (4 La. An. 84)
v. P. Water Co. (67 Me. 135) 967
Polk v. Plummer (2 Humph. 500) 55 v. Schmidt (13 Or. 17) 145, 434
Polk Co. Sav. Bank v. State (69
v. Whittle (3 Or. 126) 757, 768
Iowa, 24)
535, 912 Portland & 0. C. R. Co. v. Hartford
Pollard v. Woburn (104 Mass. 84) 1285
(58 Me. 23)
239, 590
Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan (3 How. Portland & W. V. Ř. Co. v. Portland
212)
165, 166, 171
(14 Or. 188) 94, 121, 689, 740,
Pollock v. Lawrence County (7 Pitts.
750, 769, 773
L. J. 373) 1033, 1037, 1069 Portland Lumb. & Manuf. Co. v. Sch.
Pollock's Adm. v. Louisville (13
Dist. No. 1 (13 Or. 283) 675
Bush, 221) 1195, 1197, 1198 Portland, S. & P. R. Co. v. Saco (60
[See also Polack, &c.]
Me. 196)
952
Pomeroy v. Mills (3 Vt. 279) 746, 752, 765, Portsmouth Livery Co. v. Watson
790
(10 Mass. 91)
138
2. Milw. & C. R. Co. (16 Wis. Portsmouth Say. Bank v. Springfield
640)
842, 868
(4 Fed. R. 276)
594
Pomeroy Salt Co. v. Davis (21 O. St. Port Wardens v. Pratt (10 Rob. (La.)
555)
964
459)
166
Pomfrey v. Saratoga (104 N. Y. 459)
v. Ship (14 La. An. 289)
166
1260, 1297 | Port Whitby, L. S. & H. R. Co. v.
Pompton v. Cooper Union (101 U. S.
Whitby (18 U. C. Q. B. 40) 789
196)
135, 594 Posey v. Mobile County (50 Ala. 6) 554
Pond v. Metrop. Elev. Ry. (42 Hun, Posey Co. Coni’rs v. Saunders (17
567)
877
Ind. 437)
185
v. Metrop. Elev. Ry. Co. (112 Post v. Boston (141 Mass. 189) 1251, 1257
N. Y. 186)
784, 856, 877 v. Pearsall (22 Wend. 425) 743, 767, 768
v. Negus (3 Mass. 230) 367, 391 v. Supervisors (105 U. S. 667) 631
v. Parrott (42 Conn. 13) 1012, 1014 | Postmaster-General v. Rice (Gilpin,
Pontiac v. Axford (49 Mich. 69) 373
554)
300
v. Carter (32 Mich. 164) 816, 1180, Potomac Steamboat Co. v. Upper
1212, 1215, 1220, 1228
Pot. S. Co. (109 U. S. 672) 169,
Pool v. Boston (5 Cush. 219) 209, 317
170, 175, 177, 748, 749, 770
ole v. Bentley (12 East, 168) 678 Pottawatamie Co. Com’rs v. Sulli-
v. Huskinson (11 M. & W. 827)
741
van (17 Kan. 58)
734
Pope v. Headen (5 Ala. 433) 1000 Potter v. Castleton (53 Vt. 435) 1267
v. St. Luke's Par. Com'rs (12
• v. Chaffee Co. Com’rs (33 Fed.
Rich. 407)
808
R. 614)
604, 611
v. Union (18 N. J. Eq 282) 757, v. Luther (3 Johns. 431)
321
761 v. Menasha (30 Wis. 492) 451, 787
Poppen v. Holmes (44 Ill. 362) 418, 419 Potts v. Henderson (2 Ind. 327) 323
Port v. Russell (36 Ind. 60)
514 Pottsville Bor. 2. Curry (32 Pa. St.
Port Jervis v. P. J. First Nat. Bank
443)
1131
(96 N. Y. 550)
1309 Potwin v. Johnson (108 III. 70) 138
Port of, &c. (76 Ala. 401). (See Poulters Co. v. Phillips (6 Bing. N. C.
Mobile Port, &c.]
315)
404, 486
Porter v. Androscoggin & K. R. Co. Poultney v. Wells (1 Aik. 180) 123, 135,
(87 Me. 349)
273
534
v. Blakely (1 Root, 440)
262 Pound v. Chippewa Co. Sup. (43
v. Janesville (3 Fed. R. 617) 1140
Wis. 63)
944
v. No. Mo. R. Co. (33 Mo. 128) 834, Pow v. Beckner (3 Ind. 475)
295
844, 863, 856 Powell v. Commonwealth (114 Pa.
v. Rockford, R. I. & St. L. R.
St. 265)
211
Co. (76 Ill. 561) 969, 1107 v. Madison (21 Ind. 335)
966
Port Gibson v. Moore (21 Miss. 167) 264 v. Madison (107 Ind. 106)
203, 204
1
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
cxxix
Page
Page
Powell v. Parkersburg (28 W. Va. Price v. Harned (1 Iowa, 473) 1062
698)
144, 1121 v. Meth. E. Church ( 4 Olio, 514) 773
v. Pennsylvania (127 U. S. 678) 211 v. Phila. Com'rs (1 Whart. 1) 840
v. St. Joseph (31 Mo. 347) 976 v. Plainfield (40 N. J. L. 608) 764
Powers, Re (25 Vt. 261)
506 v. Thompson (48 Mo. 363) 740, 763,
v. Council Bluffs (45 Iowa, 652) 804
767, 769, 773, 788
v. Council Bluffs (50 Iowa, 197) 1195, Prideaux v. Mineral Point (43 Wis.
1298, 1305, 1317
513)
1267, 1286, 1300
v. Sanford (39 Me. 183)
1147 Pridgen v. Bannerman ( 8 Tones L. 53) 714
2. Superior Court (23 Ga. 65) 225 Priestley v. Foulds (2 Scott N. R. 205) 242
v. Wood County (8 Ohio, 285) 267 Primm v. Belleville (59 Ill. 142) 899, 906,
Powesheik County v. Ross (9 Iowa,
927, 961, 962
511)
378 v. Carondelet (23 Mo. 22)
333
Powles v. Page (3 Com. B. 31) 382 Prince v. Quincy (105 Ill. 138, 215) 204,
Powsheik Co. Sup. v. Durant (9
205
Wall. 736)
1063 Prince George Co. Com'rs v. Bla-
Prairie v. Lloyd (97 Ill. 179) 572, 646
densburg (51 Md. 465) 264, 1285,
Prather 2. Lexington (13 B. Mon.
1286
559)
1167, 1196, 1197 Princeton v. Gebhart (61 Ind. 187) 43
v. New Orleans (24 La. An. 41) 513 v. Vierling (40 Ind. 340)
1148
Pratt u. Aniherst (140 Mass. 167) 1255 Princeville v. Auten (77 Ill. 325) 752, 753,
v. Des Moines (72 Iowa, 249) 815
763, 766
v. Hillinan (4 B. & C. 269) 223 Prindle 2. Fletcher (39 Vt. 255) 1257,
v. Luther (45 Ind. 250)
388
1266, 1301
v. State (5 Conn. 388)
263 Pringle, Re (10 U. C. Q. B. 254) 312
v. Swanton (15 Vt. 147) 347, 348, 541 Pritchard v. Keefer (53 Ill. 117) 324
v. Weymouth (147 Mass. 245) 1193 2. Stevens (6 D. & E. T. R. 522) 223
Pray v. Jersey City (32 N. J. L. 394) 1169, Pritchett v. People (6 Ill. 529) 355
1245, 1253, 1282 v. Stanislaus County (73 Cal. 310) 72
v. Northern Liberties (31 Pa. St. Pritz, Re (9 Iowa, 30)
84
69)
573, 955 Proctor v. Lewiston (25 Ill. 153) 741
Preachers' Aid Soc., Re (45 Me. 552) 262 Proprietors, &c. (7 Gray, 223). [See
Preble 2. Portland (45 Me. 241) 366, 714
Merrimac, &c.]
Prell v. McDonald (7 Kan. 426) 138, 292, (2 Beasley, 503). (See Passaic,
294, 409, 483
&c.]
Presbyterian Church, &c. (5 Cow.
(6 Hill, 501). (See Southold,
538). [See Brick Presb.
&c.]
Church, &c.]
Prospect Park & C. I. R. Co.v. Wil-
(36 Ind. 338). [See First Presb.
liamson (91 N. Y. 552) 689
Church, &c.]
Prosser v. Ottumwa (47 Iowa, 509) 1284,
Presbytery of N. Y. Trs., Re (57
1287
How. Pr. 500)
154 v. Wapello County (18 Iowa, 327) 181
Prescott v. Duquesne Bor. (48 Pa. Protestant Orphan Asylum's Ap-
St. 118)
179, 1006
peal (111 Pa. St. 135) 936, 960
v. Gonser (34 Iowa, 175) 371, 1012, Protzman v. Indianapolis & Cinc. R.
1056
Co. (9 Ind. 467) 792, 841,854,856,
President, &c., of the A. Co., &c.
860, 870
[See A. Co., &c.]
Providence v. Clapp (17 How. 161) 1251,
Preston v. Bacon (4 Conn. 471) 316
1255, 1261, 1280
v. Boston (12 Pick. 7) 1147, 1148, 2. Merch. Mut. F. Ins. Co. (12
1155
R. I. 435)
969
v. Hall (23 Gratt. 600)
651 v. Miller (11 R. I. 272)
526
v. Louisville (84 Ky. 118) 804 Providence & Worc. R.Co.v. Wright
v. Navasota (34 Tex. 684)
757
(2 R. I. 459) 966, 967, 968
v. Roberts (12 Bush, 570) 918, 932 Providence Bank v. Billings (4 Pet.
v. Rudd (84 Ky. 150)
935
514)
952, 953
Prettyman v. Tazwell Co. Sup. (19 Providence Gas Co. v. Thurber (2
Ill. 406)
196, 208, 225
R. I. 15)
966
Price v. Baker (41 Ind. 572)
280 Provident Inst. for Sav. v. Allen (37
v. Breckenridge (92 Mo. 378) 752,
N. J. Eq. 36)
919
759, 760, 763 v. Jersey City (113 U. S. 506) 1001
v. Grand Rapids & Ind. R. Co. Pruden v. Love (67 Ga. 190)
325
(13 Ind. 58)
369 Pruyn v. Milwaukee (18 Wis. 367) 569
v. Grantz (118 Pa. St. 402) 447' Pryor v. Pryor (26 L. T. N. 8. 758) 741
VOL. I. - ¿
CXXX
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
Page
Page
Public School Trs. 2. Taylor (30 N. J.
Eq. 618)
144
Public Schools, Ře (N. Y. App. 1872) 806
Puffer v. Orange (122 Mass. 389) 1258
Pugh v. Little Rock (35 Ark. 75) 528
Pulaski v. Gilmore (21 Fed. R. 870) 236
Pulaski County v. Lincoln (9 Ark.
320)
361, 568
v. Reeve (42 Ark. 55)
43
Pullen v. Wake Co. Com’rs (66 N. C.
361)
895
Pumpelly v. Green Bay & Miss. Canal
Co. (13 Wall. 166) 1217, 1227,
1230, 1234, 1324, 1925, 1329
Pumphrey v. Baltimore (47 Md. 145) 125,
711, 1017, 1057
Purcell v. Parks (82 Ill. 346)
312
Purdy v. Lansing (128 U. S. 557) 639, 647
v. People (4 Hill, 385)
84, 94
Purple v. Greenfield (138 Mass. 1) 1311
Pursley v. Hays (17 Iowa, 310) 694
Pusey v. Allegheny (98 Pa. St. 522) 844,
1221, 1243
Putnam v. Douglas Co. (6 Oreg.
318)
1234
v. Fife Lake (45 Mich. 125) 995
v. Grand Rapids (58 Mich. 416) 555,
1123
v. Johnson (10 Mass. 488)
278
v. Langley (133 Mass. 204) 1021
Putnam Co. Com'rs v. Allen Co.
Aud. (1 0. St. 322)
1030
Pye v. Mankato (36 Minn. 373) 1317, 1322
v. Peterson (45 Tex. 312) 449, 472, 474
Pym v. Great Northern Ry. Co. (2
B. & S. 759; 4 B. & S.
396)
1288
Queen v. Boycott (14 L. T. N. S. 599)
279
v. Bradburn (6 U. C. P. R. 308) 281
v. Bradley (3 E. & E. 634) 283
v. Bridgewater (2 P. & D. 558) 221
v. Bristol & E. Ry. Co. (4 Q. B.
162)
1059
v. Bristol Dock Co. (2 Q. B. 64) 1007
v. Bristol Dock Co. (2 Eng. Ry.
& Canal Cas. 599)
1013
v. Brown, &c. (13 U. C. C. P.
356)
789
v. Cæsar (11 U. C. Q. B. 461) 279
v. Chapman (12 Cox, 4)
295
v. Chapman (6 Mod. 152) 1068
v. Charlesworth (16 Q. B. 1012) 821,
834, 860
v. Chester (5 El. & Bl. 581) 1078
v. Chorley (12 Q. B. 515)
447
v. Conyers (8 Q. B. 981) 1062, 1063
v. Cottle (3 Eng. L. & Eq. 474) 808
v. Cousins (28 L. T. N. S. 116) 281
v. Crawley (3 F. & F. 109) 464
v. Cridland (7 E. & B. 853) 478
v. Cumberlege (36 L. T. N. s.
700)
312
v. Davis (24 U. C. C. P. 575) 885
2. Davis (35 U. C. Q. B. 107) 746
v. Deighton (5 Q. B. 896)
283
v. Derby Bor. Council. 17 A. &
E. 419)
280, 1022, 1078
v. Derbyshire (2 Q. B. 745) 881, 882
v. Donaldson (24 U. C. C. P.
148)
741
v. Durham (10 Mod. 146)
304
v. Eastern Counties Ry. Co. (10
A. & E. 531; 2 Q. B. 347) 688,
1060
v. East Mark (11 Q. B. 877) 789
v. Epsom Union Guard. (8 L. T.
N. S. 383)
1247, 1271
v. Exeter (L. R. 4 Q. B. 110) 279
v. Eye (9 A. & E. 676) 1067, 1074
v. Farrell (9 Cox C. C. 446) 453
v. Fitzgerald (39 U. C. Q. B.
297)
790, 1265
v. Glamorganshire (2 East, 356) 789
v. Gloucester (Holt, 450)
307
v. Gloucestershire (1 C. & M.
506)
822
v. Gordon (6 U. C. C. P. 213) 789
v. Governors (8 A. & E. 632) 319, 333
v. Great Northern Ry. Co. (14
Q. B. 25)
688
v. Great No. of Eng. Ry. Co. (9
Q. B. 315)
1133
v. Great Western Ry. Co. (32
U. C. Q. B. 506)
746
v. Greene (2 Q. B. 460)
1086
v. Greenhow (L. R. 1'Q. B. D.
703)
1302
v. Grimshaw (10 Q. B. 747) 346, 365
v. Haldimond County (7 Ú. C.
L. J. 266)
1017
Q.
Queen v. Anderson (2 Q. B. 740) 1086
v. Archb. of Cant. (11 Q. B. 578) 1057
v. Atlanta (59 Ga. 318)
318
V. Avery (18 Q. B. 576)
283
v. Balby & W. Tp. R. Trs. (16
Eng. L. & Eq. 276)
1069
v. Bamber (5 Q. B. 279)
1302
v. Barnhart (7 U. C. L. J. 103) 343
v. Barrett (1 Salk. 383)
478
v. Bartels 17 U. C. C. P. 533) 279
v. Belmont (35 U.C. Q. B. 298) 431
v. Bewdley (1 P. Wms. 207) 242, 257
v. Birm. & Gl. Ry. Co. (9 Car. &
P. 469)
1133, 1135
v. Birm. & Gl. Ry. Co. (3 Q.
B. 223)
1133
v. Birm. & O. Ry. Co. (1 El. &
BI. 293)
1068
v. Blizard (L. R. 2 Q. B. 634) 1087
v. Boardman (30 U. C. Q. B.
553)
504
v. Boucher (2 Q. B. 644)
58
. Boulton (15 U. C. Q. B. 272) 789
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
CXXXI
Page
Queen v. Halifax Road Trs. (12 Q.
B. 442)
1056
v. Hammond (17 Q. B. 772) 283
v. Harrald (L. R. 7 Q. B. C.
361)
63
2. Hatfield Peverel (14 Q. B.
298)
1130
v. Haynes (7 Ir. L. R. 2)
477
v. Heathcote (10 Mod. 49) 1008, 1072,
1074
v. Hertford Col. (L. R. 2 Q. B.
D. 590)
1078
v. Hiorns (7 Ad. & E. 960) 280, 1019.
1022
v. Holmes (3 C. & K. 360)
453
v. Horley (8 L. T. N. S. 382) 1240
v. Hornsea (Dears. C. C. 291) 1302
v. Ipswich (2 Salk. 435) 336, 1067
v. Ipswich Bailiffs (2 Lá. Raym.
1232) 260, 262, 336, 338, 339, 378,
1026, 1067, 1072
v. Jackson (40 U. C. Q. B. 290) 447
2. Jarvis (3 F. & F. 108)
463
v. Johnson (38 U. C. Q. B. 549) 431
v. Johnson (8 Q. B. 102)
411
v. Justices of Shropshire (8 Ad.
& E. 173)
280
v. Kendall (1 Q. B. 366)
1060
v. Kennett (L. R. 4 Q. B. 567) 417
v. Kitchener (L. R.2 C. C. 88) 1240
v. Lane (Fortesc. 275; 11 Mod.
270)
336
2. Lane (2 Ld. Raym. 1304) 307
v. Ledgard (1 Q. B. 616) 1064, 1065
v. Ledgard 18 Ad. & E. 535) 280
v. Leeds (7 A. & E. 963) 282, 1019
v. Leeds (11 A, & E. 512) 1022, 1078
v. Leeds ( 4 Q. B. 796)
221
v. Leeds & Liv. Canal Co. (11 A.
& E. 316)
1056
v. Levecque (30 U. C. Q. B. 44) 452
v. Lichfield (4 Q. B. 891) 185, 191,
194, 220, 274
v. Light 27 L. J. Mag. C. 1) 295
v. Lincomb (2 Chit. 214)
447
v. Lindsay (18 U. C. Q. B, 51) 1078
v. Liverpool (9 A. & E. 435) 1102
ads. Lloyd (6L. T. R. N. S. 610) 1082
v. Local Gov. Board (L. R. 8
Q. B. 227)
267
v. Longton Gas Co. (2 E. & E.
651)
829, 834, 860
v. Lordsmere (19 L. J. M. C. 215) 1240
v. Loughton (3 Smith, 575) 447
v. Louth (13 U. C. C. P. 615)
789
v. Maybury (4 F. & F. 90) 447
v. McGowan i11 A. & E. 869) 302
v. McRae (5 U. C. P. R. 309) 300
v. Mitchell (4 U. C. P. R. 218) 281
v. Monmouth (L. R. 5 Q. B. 251) 1020
v. Morton (4 Q. B. 146)
307
v. Munro (24 U. C. Q. B. 44) 452
v. Murray (1 U. C. L. J. N. s.
104)
343
Page
Queen v. Mutters (10 Cox C. C. 6) 448
v. Mutters (Leigh & Co's C. Cas.
491)
308
v. Newbury (1 Q. B. 751) 327, 336,
1063
v. Newbury (2 Kyd, 50)
327
v. Nott (4 Q. B. 773)
1133
v. O'Hare (24 P. R. 18)
1078
v. Oldham Bor. (L. R. 3 Q. B.
474)
954
v. Orchard (3 Cox C. C. 248) 453
v. Osler (32 U. C. Q. B. 224) 387
v. Owens (2 E. & E. 86)
304
v. Oxford & W. Turnp. R. Trs.
(12 A. & E. 427)
1017
2. Paget (3 F. & F. 29)
447
v. Paramore (10 A. & E. 286) 40, 342
v. Paris (12 U. C. C. P. 445) 789
v. Pembroke (8 Dowl. P. C. 302) 1019
v. Petrie (4 E. & B. 737)
789
v. Plenty (L. R. 4 Q. B. 346) 281
v. Plunkett (21 U. C. Q. B. 536) 746
v. Pomfret (10 Mod. 107) 336, 1069
v. Ponsford (1 D. & L. 116) 223
v. Purdy (10 U. C. Q. B. 545) 745
v. Quayle (11 A. & E. 508) 1086
v. Registrar Joint Stock Cos.
(10 Q. B. 839)
260
v. Rice (L. R. 1 C. C. 21)
452
v. Rickets (7 Ad. & El. 966) 330
v. Roberts (36 L. T. R. 690) 321, 356
v. Roberts (Am. L. R. 414) 321, 356
v. Roddy (41 U. C. Q. B. 291) 504
v. Rogers (2 Ld. Raym. 777) 336, 490
v. Rowley (3 Q. B. 143; 6 Q. B.
668)
282
v. Rubidge (25 U. C. Q. B. 299) 745
v. Sadlers' Co. (10 H. L. Cas.
404)
338
v. St. Ives (L. R. 7 Q. B. 467) 279
v. St. Luke's (L. R. 6 Q. B. C.
572)
688, 1220
v. St. Margaret's (8 A. & E.
889)
1061, 1062
v. St. Margaret's (1 P. & D.
116)
1061, 1062
v. St. Martin's (17 Q. B. 149) 1078
v. St. Mary's (8 A. & E. 356) 281
v. St. Peter's Jus. (2 Ld. Raym.
1249)
1240
v. Salford Tp. Ov. (18 Q. B.
687)
1130
v. Saunders (L. R. 1 Q. B. 15) 453
v. Scott (2 Ld. Raym. 922) 1240
v. Sheffield (L. R. 6 Q. B. 662) 221
v. Sheffield Gas Co. (22 Eng. L.
& Eq. 518)
821
v. Slatter (11 A. & E. 502) 1022
v. Smith (35 U. C. Q. B. 518) 452
v. Southampton (1 Ellis, B. & S.
5)
1069
v. Southeastern Ry. Co (4 H. L.
Cas. 471)
1062
v. Spence (11 U. C. Q. B. 31) 745, 789
cxxxii
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
L. 273)
179,
Page 1
Page
Queen v. Stamford (6 Q. B. 433) 221, 1064 Racine v. Crotsenberg (61 Wis. 481) 789
v. Stevenson (3 F. & F. 106) 463 Rackham v. Bluck (9 Q. B. 691) 503
v. Sutton (10 Mod. 76)
330 Radcliff's Ex. v. Brooklyn (4 N. Y.
v. Tart (1 E. & E. 618)
283
195) 1215, 1216, 1220, 1221, 1222,
· v. Tewkesbury (L. R. 3 Q. B.
1225, 1226, 1227, 1230, 1319, 1324
629)
280 Rader v. Union Road Dist. (36 N. J.
v. Thallman (9 Cox C. C. 388) 453
94
v. Thomas (8 Ad. & El. 183) 346 Radich v. Hutchins (95 U. S. 210) 1150
v. Touchburn (6 U. C. P. R. 344) 281 Radway v. Briggs (37 N. Y. 256)
v. Train (9 Cox Cr. Cas. 180) 821,
1205
834, 860 Ragan v. McCoy (29 Mo. 356) 738, 739,
v. Treasury Com’rs (10 Ad. & E.
744
374)
336 Ragatz v. Dubuque (4 Iowa, 349) 716, 727
v. Truebody (2 Ld. Raym. 1275; Ragnet r. Wade (4 Ohio, 107)
324
11 Mod. 75)
338 Rahway Sav. Inst. v. Rahway (49
v. United K. El. Tel. Co. (9 Cox
N. J. L. 384)
1038
C. C. 174)
830 Railroad Co. v. &c. [See the
v. United K. El. Tel. Co. (3 F.
following wherein the plain-
& F. 74)
1265
tiff, not being specified in
v. Walker (23 L.J. Mag. C. 123) 295
the reporter's caption, may,
v. Wallesey L. Bd. of H. (L. R.
in citing, not always have
4 Q. B. 351)
1230
been fully named: Burling-
v. Ward (L. R. 8 Q. B. 210) 281
ton & Mo. (16 Wall. 667),
v. Watson (2 Cox C. C. 376) 453
Hannibal & St. Jo. (95 U.S.
v. Webb (1 Den. C. C. 338) 453
465), No. Central (7 Wall.
v. Whipp (4 Q. B. 141)
346
262) ; Richmond, F. & P.
v. Wilts & B. Canal Co. (8 Dowl.
(96 U. S. 521), St. Paul &
P. C. 623)
1011
Pac. (7 Wall. 272), Sioux
v. Wood (5 E. & B. 49)
216, 466
City & Pac. (17 Wall. 657),
2. Wood (L. R. 4 Q. B. 559) 417
Union Pac. (22 Wall. 444;
v. York (2 Q. B. 850)
40, 342
98 U. S. 541), Union Pass.
v. Yorkville (22 U. C. C. P. 431) 790,
(101 U. S. 528), Washington
1240
& G. (15 Wall. 401.]
Queen Elizabeth's Hospital v. Nor- Railroad Nat. Bank v. Lowell (109
ton (11 M. & W. 913) 259
Mass. 214)
1144
Queen's Bench Rule (11 A. & E. 2) 1086 Raisler 2. Athens (66 Ala. 194) 1154
Queensbury Tp. 2. Culver (19 Wall. Raleigh v. Dougherty (3 Humph. 11) 438
83)
574, 581, 1041 Raleigh & G. R. Co.v. Davis (2 Dev.
Quin v. Moore (15 N. Y. 432) 1288
& B. L. 451)
690
Quincy v. Ballance (30 Ill. 185) 478, 480 Raleigh Com’rs 2. Sorrell (1 Jones
v. Barker (81 Ill. 300) 1259, 1260,
L. 49)
352, 463, 464
1261 Raley v. Umatilla County (15 Or.
v. Bull (106 Ill. 337)
828
172)
670
v. C. B. & Q. R. Co. (92 Ill. 21) 804, Ralls County v. Douglass (105 U. S.
833
728)
584, 631, 1080
v. Jackson (113 U. S. 332) .237, 946 Ralls Co. Court v. United States (105
v. Jones (76 Ill. 231) 783, 802, 811,
U. S. 733) 901, 939, 940, 946,
1220, 1222, 1228, 1331
1028
v. Warfield (25 Ill. 317)
569 Ramsay v. Clinton County (42 Ill.
Quinette v. St. Louis (76 Mo. 402) 385
225)
804
Quinlan v. Utica (11 Hun, 217). 1298 v. Western Dist. Council (4 U.
Quinn v. Anderson (70 Cal. 454) 752, 756
C. Q. B. 374)
519
v. Paterson (27 N. J. L. 35) 795, 808, Ramsey v. Riley (13 Ohio, 157) 324, 326
980, 1222 Ramshay, Re (83 Eng. C. L. 174) 319,
Quinney v. Stockbridge (33 Wis.
333
505)
1121 Rand v. Townsend (26 Vt. 670) 715
Quong Woo, Re (13 Fed. R. 229) 424 v. Wilder (11 Cush. 294) 347, 349
Randall v. Eastern R. Co. (106 Mass.
276)
1268
R.
v. Elwell (52 N. Y. 522)
969
v. Van Vetchten (19 Johns. 60) 525,
Raab v. Maryland (7 Md. 483)
527, 528, 533, 539, 564, 809
Rabassa v. New Orleans (3 Martin Randle v. Pac. R. Co. (65 Mo. 325) 842,
0. 8. 218)
902, 961
854
263
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
cxxxiii
709,
Page
Page
Randolph v. Bayne (44 Cal. 366) 996 Rector v. Hartt (8 Mo. 448)
753
v. Braintree (4 Mass. 315) 269 v. State (6 Ark. 187)
504
v. Gawley (47 Cal. 458)
958 Red v. Augusta (25 Ga. 386)
366
Randolph County v. Hutchins (46 Red River Br. Co. v. Clarksville (1
Ala. 397)
1029
Sneed, 176)
683
Randolph Co. Ct. Jus. v. Stalnaker Red Rock v. Henry (106 U. S. 589) 572
(13 Gratt. 523)
1006 Red Star Stp. Co. v. Jersey City (45
Rankin v. Beaird (1 Ill. 123)
99
N. J. L. 246)
401
v. Buckman (9 Or. 253) 1280 Redd v. Henry Co. Sup. (31 Gratt.
v. Great Western Ry, Co. (4 U.
685)
646
C. C. P. 463)
718 Reddall v. Bryan (14 Md. 444) 697, 716
Ranlett v. Leavenworth (1 Dillon Reddick v. Amelia (1 Mo. 5) 68, 181
C. C. 263)
579 Redfield v. Utica & S. R. Co. (25
v. Lowell (126 Mass. 431) 1328
Barb. 54).
791
Ranney v. Bader (67 Mo. 476) 650, 1112, Redman v. Phila. M. & M. R. Co. (33
1117
N. J. Eq, 165)
720
Ransom v. Boal (29 Iowa, 68) 671, 769 Reed, Ex p. (4 Cranch C. C. 582) 483
v. New York (1 Fisher Pat. Cas.
v. Bainbridge (1 South. 351) 158
254)
1180 v. Belfast (20 Me. 246) 1175, 1252,
Raphael v. Bank of Eng. (17 C. B.
1287, 1288
161)
651 v. Hamilton (5 U. C. C. P. 269) 1322
Rapho v. Moore (68 Pa. St. 404) 1282, v. Home Sav. Bank (130 Mass.
1296, 1298
443)
1170
Rastrick v. Great Western Ry. Co.
v. Lynn (126 Mass. 367)
171
(27 U. C. Q. B. 396) 1300 v. Northfield (13 Pick. 94) 762, 1270,
Rathbun v. Acker (18 Barb. 393)
1285, 1296, 1300, 1301
940, 944, 984 v. People (1 Parker Cr. R. 481) 422,
Ratterman v. Western Union Tel.
423
Co. (127 U. S. 411)
831 v. State (108 N. Y. 407) 855, 856,
Rau v. Little Rock (34 Ark. 303) 313,
877
487 r. Toledo (18 Ohio, 161)
710
Ravenswood v. Flemings (22 W. Va.
v. Tyler (56 III. 288)
1002
52)
166 | Reedie v. London & N. W. Ry. Co.
Ray v. Jeffersonville (90 Ind. 567) 912
(L. R. 4 Exch. 244)
1308
v. Lynes (10 Ala. 63)
1212 Rees v. Chicago (38 Ill. 322)
694, 75:
v. Manchester (46 N. H. 59) 1257, v. Watertown (19 Wall. 107) 250,
1270
1005, 1028, 1038, 1040, 1046, 1048,
v. Petrolia (24 U. C. C. P. 73) 1255,
1049
1266 Reeside v. Walker (11 How. 272) 1015
Ray County v. Vansycle (96 U. S. Reeve v. Wood (5 B. & S. 364) 503
675)
629 Reeves 2. Toronto (21 U. C. Q. B.
Raymond v. Fish (51 Conn. 80)
324
157) 1139, 1204, 1328, 1329
v. Lowell (6 Cush. 524) 1257, 1266, v. Wood Co. Treas. (8 0. St. 333)
1270, 1272, 1273, 1283, 1287
700, 908, 957, 989
v. Sheboygan (70 Wis. 318) 1312 | Regents, etc. (9 G. & J. 365.) [See
Read v. Atlantic City (49 N. J. L.
University of Md. &c.]
558)
198 (12 Mich. 138.) [See University
v. Buffalo (74 N. Y. 463)
488
of Mich. &c.]
v. Perrett (L R. 1 Ex. Div. 349) 885 (5 Neb. 423.) [See University
v. Plattsmouth (107 U. S. 568) 572
of Neb. &c.]
Reading v. Althouse (98 Pa. St. 196) 844 Reggio v. Braggiotti (7 Cush. 166) 1313
v. Commonwealth (11 Pa.St. 196) 108, Regina, &c. [See Queen, &c.]
122, 776, 782, 1059 Rehberg v. New York (91 N. Y. 137) 1297
v. Keppleman (61 Pa. St. 233) 140, Reich v. State (53 Ga. 73)
438
1220 Reichard v. Warren County (31 Iowa,
v. Savage (120 Pa. St. 198) 73, 80
381)
541
v. Wedder (66 Ill. 80)
630 Reid, Re (50 Ala. 439)
1022
Reading R. Co. v. Pennsylvania (15
V. Atlanta (73.Ga. 523)
1327
Wall. 232, 284)
902 v. Edina Bd. of Ed. (73 Mo. 295) 739,
Ready v. Tuskaloosa (6 Ala. 327) 1195,
750, 759
1197 v. Wiley (46 N. J. L. 473) 931
Reardon v. St. Louis (36 Mo. 555) 1173 Reif v. Paige (55 Wis. 496)
317
v. San Francisco (66 Cal. 492) 1225, Reiff v. Conner (10 Ark. 241)
366, 392
1239 | Reilly v. Albany (112 N. Y. 30) 557
cxxxiv
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
148)
Page
Page
Reilly v. Chouquette (18 Mo. 220) 798 Rhodes v. Cleveland (10 Ohio, 159) 1211,
v. Philadelphia (60 Pa. St. 467) 512,
1226
555, 556, 981, 1195 v. Dunbar (57 Pa. St. 274) 449
v. Racine (51 Wis. 526) 750, 761, 796 Rice v. Austin, Gov. (19 Minn. 103) 1016
Reimer's Appeal (100 Pa. St. 182) 213 v. Des Moines (40 Iowa, 638) 208,
Reinboth v. Pittsburgh (41 Pa. St.
1285, 1301
278)
192, 194
v. Evansville (108 Ind. 7) 1317, 1327
Reineman v. Cov., C. & B. H. R. CO.
v. Foster (4 Harr. (Del.) 479) 391
(7 Neb. 310)
899 v. Keokuk (15 Iowa, 579) 208
Reining v. Buffalo (102 N. Y. 308) 804 v. Montpelier (19 Vt. 470) 1255
Reis v. Graff (51 Cal. 86) 146, 521, 984, v. Osgood (9 Mass. 38)
767
994 v. Shuey (5 N. W. R. 435) 211
Reitenbaugh v. Chester Val. R. Co.
2. Smith (9 Iowa, 570) 1021, 1112
(21 Pa. St. 100)
708 v. State (3 Kan. 141) 437, 439, 507
Remington v. Millard (1 R. I. 93) 754, Rice B. & F. Mach. & I. Co. r.
760, 762
Worcester (130 Mass. 575) 1014
Remsen v. Wheeler (105 N. Y. 573) 984 Rich v. Chicago (59 Ill. 286)
368
Remy v. Municipality (11 La. An.
v. Mentz (19 Fed. R. 725)
239, 580
658 v. Minneapolis (37 Minn. 423) 1217
Rensselaer v. Leopold (106 Ind. 29) 697 | Richards v. Clarksburg (30 W. Va.
Rensselaer & S. R. Co. v. Davis (43
491)
325, 327
N. Y. 137)
657 v. Daggett (4 Mass. 534) 271, 272
Rensselaer Co. Sup. v. Bates (17
v. Enfield (13 Gray, 344) 1265, 1267
N. Y. 242)
519 v. Waupun (59 Wis. 45)
1328
Renthrop 1. Bourg (4 Mart. (La.) 97) 772 Richardson v. Baltimore (8 Gill, 433) 716,
Renwick v. Davenport & N. W. R.
1098
Co. (47 Iowa, 511)
226
v. Boston (19 How. 270) 177, 1330,
v. Hall (84 Ill. 162)
1082
1333
v. N. Y. Cent. R. Co. (36 N. Y.
v Boston (24 How. 188)
177, 658
133)
1300 v. Grant County (27 Fed. R. 495) 534
Reock v. Newark (33 N. J. L. 129) 158, v. Heydenféldt (46 Cal. 68) 958
555, 558, 815, 1011, 1160, 1232 v. Royalton & W. Turnp. Co. (6
Repair of Bridges (13 Rep. 33) 1240
V t. 496)
881, 1296
Republic L. Ins. Co. v. Pollak (75
v. Scott River W. & M. Co. (22
Ill. 292)
969
Cal. 150)
526
Requa v. Rochester (45 N. Y. 129) 761, v. Spencer 16 Ohio, 13)
1174
882, 1274, 1281, 1284, 1295, 1296 Richardson Co. Sch. Dist. 56 v. Ins.
Respublica v. Callwell (1 Dal. 150) 453
Co. (103 U. S. 707)
81, 83
v. Dallas (3 Yeates, 316) 310 Richeson v. People (115 Ill. 450) 227, 646
v. Duquet (2 Yeates, 493) 474 Richland County v. Lawrence County
v. Sparhawk (1 Dallas, 337) 1163
(12 Ill. 1)
94, 104
Rex, &c. (See King, &c.]
Richman v. Muscatine Co. Sup. (70
Rexford v. Knight (11 N'Y. 308)
Iowa, 627)
979
720 Richmond u. Courtney (32 Gratt.
Reynolds v. Albany (8 Barb. 597) 210
792)
1281, 1283, 1287
v. Baldwin (1 La. An. 162) 97, 292, v. Crenshaw (76 Va. 936) 1107, 1119
352, 1022, 1075, 1076 v. Daniel (14 Gratt. 385) 940, 941, 969
v. Los Angeles Co. Supr. Ct. (64
v. Davis (103 Ind. 449) 663, 1108,
Cal. 372)
1131
1111
v. New Salem (6 Met. 340) 346, 347 v. Henrico County (83 Va. 204) 443
v. Schweinefus (1 Sr. Ct. Cinc.
v. Judah (5 Leigh, 305)
1150
113)
368
v. Leeds, &c., Municipality (8
v. Shreveport (13 La. An. 426) 198,
U. C. Q. B. 567)
518
1222, 1229 v. Long's Adm. (17 Gratt. 375) 108,
v. Taylor (43 Ala. 420) 1010, 1030
1156, 1180, 1197, 1200, 1204
Reynold's Heirs v. Stark Čo. Com'rs
v. McGirr (78 Ind. 192) 145, 152,
(5 Ohio, 204) 121, 657, 662, 671,
183, 185, 195, 197, 201, 210
691, 763, 767 v. Poe (24 Gratt. 149)
803
Rhine r. McKinney (53 Tex. 354) 705, v. R. & D. R. Co. (21 Gratt. 604) 95,
724
104, 900, 953, 968
Rhinebeck R. Co., Re (67 N. Y. 242) 711, v. Smith (15 Wall. 429)
513
714 v. State (5 Iud. 334)
668
Rhines v. Clark (51. Pa. St. 96) 479, 501, Richmond & Al. R. Co. v. Lynch-
506
burg (81 Va. 473) 908, 924, 933
719,
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
CXXXV
Page
Page
Richmond County Gasl. Co. v. Mid- Ritchie v. Franklin County (22 Wall.
dletown (59 N. Y. 228) 156, 251,
67)
635
822, 823, 860 v. So. Topeka (38 Kan. 368) 1123
Richmond, F. & Pot. R. Co. v. Louisa. River Rendering Co. v. Behr (77
R. Co. (13 How. 71)
683
Mo. 91)
398, 450
v. Richmond (96 U. S. 521) 400, 465, Rivers v. Augusta C. Council (65 Ga.
847, 849, 857
376)
1157, 1160
Richmond Mayoralty Case (19 Gratt.
Road, &c. (17 Pa. St. 71). (See
673)
100, 492, 493
Augusta Tp. Road, &c.
Ricket v. Metrop. R. Co. (L. R. 2
(3 Rawle, 195). (See Easton
H. L. 175)
878, 1231
Road, &c.]
Ricket's Case (2 E. & I. App. 175) 688 (14 Serg. & R 447). [See Mer-
Riddle v. Bedford County (7 S. & R.
cer Bor. Road Co., &c.]
386)
298, 319, 355 (40 Pa. St. 300.) [See Milton
v. Merrimac, &c., Canal Prop.
Road, &c.]
(7 Mass. 169) 243, 1170, 1171, Roake v. Am, Tel. & T. Co. (41 N.
1174, 1176, 1247
J. Eq. 35)
831
Rideout v. Dunstable Sch. Dist. (1 Roanoke City v. Berkowitz (80 Va.
Allen, 232)
347
616)
727
Ridge Av., Re (99 Pa. St. 469) 1221 Robb v. Carter (65 Md. 321)
311
Ridge Av. Pass. Ry. Co. v. Philadel-
v. Indianapolis (38 Ind. 49) 422
phia (1) Phila. 37)
1093 Robbins v. Chicago (2 Black, 418; 4
Ridge St., Re (29 Pa. St. 391) 1220
Wall. 657)
1307, 1309
Ridgeway v. West (60 Ind. 371) 439 v. Jones (15 C. B. N. 8. 221) 741
Ridley v. Lamb (10 U. C. Q. B. 354) 885 v. Lexington (8 Cush. 292) 1130
Rielist v, Goshen (42 Ind. 339) 1285 v. Lincoln Co. Ct. (3 Mo. 57) 569
Rieman v. Shepard (27 Ind. 288) 965 v. Milw. & H. R. Co. (6 Wis. 636) 731,
Riggs vs. Detroit Bd. of Ed. (27 Mich.
733
262)
764, 794 v. Shelby Co. Tax. Dist. (120 U.
v. Johnson County (6 Wall. 166) 585,
S. 489)
904
1032, 1037, 1041, 1045, 1073 Roberson 2. Lambertville (38 N. J.
Right Bank, &c. Pol. Jury.v. Mc-
L. 69)
483
Donougli’s Suc. (8 La. An. Robert v. Sadler (104 N. Y. 229) 778, 788,
341)
225
816, 817, 832
Righter 2. Newark (45 N. J. L. 104) 993, Roberts, Re (6 Pet. 216)
1006
994 v. Bolles (101 U. S. 119) 594, 629
Rigney v. Chicago (102 Ill. 64) 686, 688, v. Brown Co. Com’rs (21 Kan.
1215, 1221, 1228, 1230, 1235, 1241
247)
734
Rigony v. Schuylkill (103 Pa. St.
v. Chicago (26 Ill. 249) 1222, 1229
382)
1282 v. Easton (19 O. St. 78)
863, 864
Riker v. Jersey City (38 N. J. L.
v. Karr (1 Campb. 262) 741, 755
225)
1148, 1151 v. New York (5 Abb. Pr. 41) 1110
Riley v. Rochester (9 N. Y. 61) 660 v. Ogle (30 III. 459) 406, 445, 450, 471
v. St. Joseph (67 Mo. 491) 993 Robertson v. Breedlove (61 Tex. 316) 183,
v. Western Union Tel. Co. (47
190, 1107
Ind. 511)
1107 v. Rockford (21 Ill. 451)
225
Rindge v. Colrain (11 Gray, 157) 1285 v. Wabash, St. L. & Pac. Ry.
Ring v. Cohoes (77 N. Y. 83) 1264, 1270,
Co. (84 Mo. 119)
857
1278 Robie v. Sedgwick (35 Barb. 319) 140
v. Johnson County (6 Iowa, 265) 275, Robin Street, Re (1 La. An. 412) 364
561 Robins, Re (7 Dowl. 566)
1008
Ringland v. Toronto (23 U. C. C. P. Robinson Re (12 Nev. 263)
894
98)
1255 v. Benton County (49 Ark. 49) 494
Ripley v. Essex Co. Freeh. (40 N. J.
v. Bidwell (22 Cal. 379)
225
L. 45)
1245 2. Burlington (50 Iowa, 240) 1152
v. Gelston (9 Johns. 201) 1147 v. Butte Co. Sup. (43 Cal. 353) 1042
Ripley County v. Ward (69 Ind. 441) 553 v. Charleston C. Council (2 Rich.
Ripon v. Bittel (30 Wis. 614) 1284, 1287
L. 317)
1148, 1150, 1154
v. Hobart (3 Mylne & K. 169) 455 v. Dodge (18 Johns. 351)
958
v. Joint School District (17 Wis.
v. Evansville (87 Ind. 334) 1199
83)
1152 v. Franklin (1 Humph. 156) 431
Risley v. St. Louis (34 Mo. 404) 709, 984, v. Gov. London Hospital (21 E.
985. 992
L. & Eq. 371)
1079
v. Smith (64 N. Y. 570)
1009 v. Greenville (420. St. 625) 1167
cxxxvi
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
432)
Page
Page
Robinson v. Groscourt (5 Mod. 104) 430 Rolfs, Re (30 Kan. 178)
503
v. Jefferson County (6 W. & S. Roll v. Augusta C. Council (34 Ga.
16)
1131
326) 853, 1222, 1228, 1320
v. Jones (14 Fla. 254)
1085 v. Indianapolis (52 Ind. 547) 1332
v. Lane (19 Ga. 337)
254 Rollersville Turnp. R. Com'rs v. San-
v. N. Y. & E. R. Co. (27 Barb.
dusky Co. Com’rs (1 O. St.
512)
854
149)
1017
v. Robinson (1 Duval, 162) 733 Rollins v. Lake County (34 Fed. R.
v. St. Louis (28 Mo. 488)
216, 526
845)
611
v. Western Pac. R. Co. (48 Cal. Roman v. Strauss (10 Md. 89)
786
409)
1273 Rome v. Cabot (28 Ga. 50)
219
Robinson Drain Com’rs v. Baxter
v. Jenkins (30 Ga. 154)
719
(57 Mich. 127)
266 v. McWillians (52 Ga. 251) 963, 970
Roby v. Chicago (64 III. 477)
485 v. McWilliams (67 Ga. 106) 946
Rochedale Canal Co.v. Radcliffe (18
v. Omberg (28 Ga. 46) 223, 1222, 1228
Q. B. 287)
800 Rome Bank v. Rome (18 N. Y. 38) 78, 86
Rochester v. Alfred Bank (13 Wis. Rome R. Co. v. Rome (14 Ga. 275) 969
633 Romeo v. Chapman (2 Mich. 179) 262
v. Collins (12 Barb. 559) 1212 Rooney v. Milw. Co. Sup. (40 Wis.
v. Lee (15 Sim. 376)
259
23)
1304
v. Montgomery (72 N. Y. 65) 1312 v. Randolph (128 Mass. 580) 1251
v. Pettinger (17 Wend. 265) 462 Roosevelt v. Draper (34 N. Y. 318) 1096,
2. Queen (27 Law J. Q. B. 436) 1020
1111, 1114
v. Randall (105 Mass. 295) 301 | Roosevelt Hospital v. New York (84
v. Rood (H. & D. Supt. 146) 461
N. Y. 108)
908, 954
v. Rush (80 N. Y. 302)
Root . Shields (Woolw. C. C. 340)
657
v. Upman (19 Minn. 108) 913 Roper v. Lawrinburg (90 N. C. 427)
Rochester's Case (Owen, 73)
247 v. McWhorter (77 Va. 214) 179, 671,
Rochester Water Com'rs, Re (66 N.
1100, 1107
Y. 413)
689, 690, 697, 825 Rosa v. New Orleans (1 La. 126) 459
Rochester White Lead Co. v. Roch-
Rose v. Groves (5 M. & G. 613) 887
ester (3 N. Y. 463) 1202, 1203, v. Hardie (98 N. C. 44) 141, 418, 422
1211, 1317, 1331 v. Roseburg & M. Turnp. Co.
Rock Creek v. Strong (96 U. S. 271) 574,
(3 Watts, 46)
244
601 v. St. Charles (49 Mo. 509) 761, 1316,
Rockford v. Hildebrand (61 Ill. 155) 1272,
1317
1274, 1278, 1281, 1283, 1285, 1297 Rosebaugh v. Saffin (10 Ohio, 31) 28, 416,
v. Tripp (83 Ill. 247) 1259, 1270
418
Rock Island Co. Sup. v. United Rosenbaum v. Bauer (120 U. S. 450) 572,
States (4 Wall. 435) 1014, 1032,
1005, 1041, 1041
1037, 1042 v. San Francisco Sup. (28 Fed.
Rodman 1. Musselman (12 Bush,
R. 223)
1010
354)
162 Rosenberg 1. Des Moines (41 Iowa,
Roeller v. Ames (33 Minn. 132) 161
415)
1301
Roffignac Street, Re (4 Rob. (La) Rosewell v. Prior (1 Salk. 460) 447
357)
711, 713 Ross v. Butler (19 N. J. Eq. 294) 449
Rogan v. Watertown (30 Wis. 259) 87, v. Clinton (46 Iowa, 606) 1324
226, 229, 551 v. Curtis (31 N. Y. 606)
644
Rogers, Re (7 Cow. 526) 343, 360, 363, v. Davenport (66 Iowa, 548) 1285
1059, 1070 v. Madison (1 Ind. 281) 377, 378, 522,
v. Burlington (3 Wall. 654) 193, 194,
1317, 1333
195, 197, 231, 236, 548, 564, 573, v. St. Charles (49 Mo. 509) 499
585, 586, 593, 618, 640 v. Wimberly (60 Miss. 345) 250
2. Collier (43 Mo. 359)
155 Rossin v. Walker (6 Grant (Can.),
v. Greenbush (58 Me. 390) 1147
789
v. Jones (5 D. & R. 484)
379 Rossire v. Boston (4 Allen, 57) 659
v. Jones (1 Wend. 237) 406, 437, 463, Rothschild v. Darien (69 Ga. 503) 394
487 Rouede v. Jersey City (18 Fed. R.
v. Lee County (1 Dillon, C. C.
719)
599
529)
569 Rounds v. Mansfield (38 Me. 586) 222, 326
v. People (9 Col. 450)
452 v. Mumford (2 R. I. 154) 486, 1215,
v. People (68 III. 154) 44, 1032
1222, 1229
v. St. Charles (54 Mo. 229) 723 v. Stetson (45 Me. 596)
222
v. Shirley (74 Me. 144)
1301 v. Stratford (26 U. C. C. P. 11) 1270
619)
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
сxxxvii
Page
Page
Roundtree v. Galveston (42 Tex. 613) 933, Rushville Gas Co. v. Rushville (Ind.
957
Sup. Ct. 1889] (41 Alb. L. J.
Rowan's Ex. v. Portland (8 B. Mon
143)
369
232) 749, 757, 787, 798, 801, 803 Russ v. New York (12 N. Y. Leg. Obs.
Rowe v. Addison (34 N. H. 306) 1202
38)
400
v. Kern County (72 Cal. 353) 312 Russell, Re (51 Conn. 577)
317
v. Leeds (13 U. C. Q. B. 575) 1248 v. Burlington (30 Iowa, 262) 12:24
v. Portsmouth (56 N. H. 291) 1230, v. Canastota (98 N. Y.496) 1272, 1274
1325, 1329, 1320 v. Chicago (22 III. 285)
296
v. Rochester (29 U. C. Q. B. 590) 1139,
.
v. Columbia (74 Mo. 480) 1296
1332 v. Devon County (2 D. & E. T.
Rowell v. Lowell (7 Gray, 100) 1257, 1263,
R. 661)
1171, 1174, 1206, 1209,
1265, 1267, 1286
1280
v. Montville ( 4 Me. 270)
762 v. New Haven (51 Conn. 259) 899
v. Williams (29 Iowa, 210) 1195, 1281, v. New York (2 Denio, 461) 1164,
1298, 1305, 1308, 1312
1166, 1167, 1193
Rowland v. Gallatin (75 Mo. 134) 1187 v. Steuben (57 Ill. 35)
1246, 1282
v. Kalamazoo (49 Mich. 553) 1211 0. The Swift (Newb. R. 553) 172
Rowley v. London & N. W Ry. Co. Russellville v. White (41 Ark. 485) 426
(L. R. 8 Ex. 221) 1288, 1289 Rutherford v. Holly (105 N. Y. 632) 1322
Roxbury v. Boston & P. R. Co. (6
v. Taylor (38 Mo. 315) 740, 765, 769,
Cush. 424)
851, 1314
787
Royal Brit. Bank v. Turquand (6 El. Rutherford's Case (72 Pa. 82)
700
& Bl. 325)
594, 598 Rutter v. Chapman (8 M. & W. 1) 58
Royal Street, Re (16 La. An. 393) 707, 979 Ryan v. Boston (118 Mass. 248) 1219
Royall v. Virginia (116 U. S 572) 996 v. Copes (11 Rich. L. 217) 449
Rozell v. Anderson (91 Ind. 591) 1328 v. Gallatin County (14 III. 83) 997
v. Andrews (103 N. Y. 150) 751 v. Leavenworth Co. Com'rs (30
Rubey v. Shain (54 Mo. 207)
1112
Kan. 185)
1120
Ruby v. Abysinian Society (15 Me. Rychlicke v. St. Louis (11 S. W. R.
306)
541
1001)
1322, 1324
Rucker v. Pocahontas Co. Sup. (7 Ryder v. Alton & S. R. Co. (13 III.
W. Va. 661)
312
523)
139
Rude v. St. Louis (93 Mo. 408) 887 Rylands v. Fletcher (3 H. L. C. 330) 1323
Rudolphe v. New Orleans (11 La.
An. 242)
1201, 1229
Ruggles v. Collier (43 Mo. 359) 154
S.
v. Fond du Lac (53 Wis. 136) 1149
v. Nantucket (11 Cush. 433) 155, Sackett v. New Albany (88 Ind. 473) 205,
1164, 1165
1107
v. Nevada (63 Iowa, 185) 1298 Sackett, Douglas, &c. Streets, Re
Ruhlman v. Commonwealth' (5 Bin-
(74 N. Y. 95)
777, 916
715, 1125 Sacramento v Crocker (16 Cal. 119) 924,
Ruland v. So. New Market (59 N. H.
970
251)
754 v. Kirk (7 Cal. 419)
523, 627
Rulison v. Post (79 Ill. 567)
397 v. Str. New World (4 Cal. 41) 178
Rumford Sch. Dist. v.. Wood (13 Sadler v. Evans (4 Burr. 1984) 319
Mass. 193)
53, 75, 678 Sadler's Case (104 N. Y. 229) 778, 788,
Rumsey v. Campton (16 N. H. 567) 278
816, 817
Rundle v. Baltimore 28 Md. 356) 1131 Safford v. Drew (3 Duer, 627) 1288
v. Del. & R. Canal Co. (1 Wall. Sage v. Brooklyn (89 N. Y. 189) 557, 720
Jr. 275)
94 Saginaw Gasl. Co. v. Saginaw (28
Rung v. Shoneberger (2 Watts, 23) 764,
Fed. R. 529)
827
799, 803 St. Albans v. Noble (56 Vt. 525) 1326
Runyan v. Coster's Lessee (14 Pet. St. Catharines v. Gardner (20 U. C.
122)
661
C. P. 107; 21 1b. 190) 789
Runyon v. Bordine (2 J. S. Green St. Charles v. Meyer (58 Mo. 86) 437,
(N. J.), 472) 782, 784, 786
476, 486
Ruppert v. Baltimore (23 Md. 184) 556 v. Nolle (51 Mo. 122) 422, 806, 811,
Rusch v. Davenport (6 Iowa, 443) 1205,
897
1281, 1286 v. O'Mailey (18 Ill. 407) 371, 409
v. Des Moines County (1 Woolw. St. Charles County v. Powell (22
C. C. 313)
30
Mo. 525)
798, 803
Rushville v. Adams (107 Ind. 475) 1269 v. Rogers (49 Mo. 530)
1126
ney, 26)
сxxxviii
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
Page
Page
St. Charles Tp. Sch. Dir. v. Goerges St. Louis v. Gleason (89 Mo. 67 ; 93
(50 Mo. 19+)
798, 803
Mo. 33)
707
St. Clair Co. v. Keller (85 IU. 396) 1006 v. Gorman (29 Mo. 593)
659
St. Clair Co. Turnp. Co. v. Illinois
v. Green (7 Mo. App. 468) 1070
(96 U. S. 63)
807 v. Grove (46 Mo. 574)
428
St. George's Vestry v. Sparrow (16
v. Gurno (12 Mo. 414) 814, 1223, 1228,
C. B. N. S. 209)
889
1324
St. Helena J. Burton (35 La. An.
v. Indep. Ins. Co. of Mass. (47
521)
297
Mo. 146)
969
St. Helen's Chem. Co. v. St. Helen's
v. Jackson (25 Mo. 37)
456
Corp. (L. R. 1 Exch. D. 196) 446 v. Laughlin (49 Mo. 559) 899, 940,
St. Helen's Smelting Co. v. Tipping
971
(11 H. L. C. 642)
446 v. Manuf. Sav. Bank (49 Mo.
v. Tipping (4 B. & S. 608) 485
574)
386
St. John v. East St. Louis (50 Ill. 92) 928 v. McCoy (18 Mo. 238)
443
v. McFarlan (33 Mich. 72) 473 V. Meier (77 Mo. 13)
742, 745
v. New York (6 Duer, 315) 456
v. Merton (6 Mo. 476)
678
v. New York (3 Bosw. 483) 457, 884 v. Newman (45 Mo. 138) 798, 996
St. John's College v. State (15 Md.
v. Russell (9 Mo. 507) 56, 107, 267,
330)
103
975, 999
St. Johnsbury v. Thompson (59 Vt.
v. St. Louis Gas Co. (5 Mo. App.
300)
144, 146, 386, 426
484)
513
St. Joseph 1. Anthony (30 Mo. 537) 992 v. St. Louis R. Co. (50 Mo. 94) 966
v. Hamilton (43 Mo. 282)
711 v. St. Louis R. Co. (89 Mo. 44) 488,
v. Hannibal & St. J. R. Co. (39
857
Mo. 476)
965 v. St. Louis Univ. (88 Mo. 155) 760,
v. O'Donoghue (31 Mo. 345) 911, 955
761
v. Saville (39 Mo. 460)
965
v. Schnuckelburg (7 Mo. App.
St. Joseph & D. C. R. Co. v. Bu-
536)
1123
chanan Co. (39 Mo. 485) 158, 644 v. Schoenbush (8 S. W. R. 791) 470,
St. Joseph Asylum (69 N. Y. 353) 956
471, 472
St. Joseph Sup. v. Coffenbury (1
v. Schoenemann (62 Mo. 348) 994
Mich. 355)
300 v. Shields (52 Mo. 351) 103, 121, 177
St. Joseph Tp. v. Rogers (16 Wall.
v. Shields (62 Mo. 247) 76, 84, 85,
644) 79, 231, 235, 579, 582, 588,
594
593, 599, 617, 618, 635, 638, 639, v. Smith (2 Mo. 113)
434
645 v. Smith (10 Mo. 438) 482, 483
St. Louis v. Alexander (23 Mo. 483) 78,
v. Spiegel (90 Mo. 587) 925, 943
142, 144, 225, 235, 236, 409, 643, v. Steinberg (4 Mo. App. 453) 971
646
v. Steinberg (69 Mo. 289)
909
v. Allen (13 Mo. 400) 56, 107, 267, v. Vert (84 Mo. 204)
478
975, 999
v. Weber (44 Mo. 547) 399, 404, 456,
v. Allen (53 Mo. 44) 923, 925, 996
460
v. Armstrong (56 Mo. 298)
542
v. Western Union Tel. Co. (39
v. Bentz (11 Mo. 61) 397, 487, 470
Fed. R. 59)
830
v. Boatmen's Ins. & T. Co. (47
v. Wiggins Ferry Co. (11 Wall.
Mo. 150)
944
423)
894, 963, 964, 966
v. Boffinger (19 Mo. 13) 386, 443
v. Wiggins Ferry Co. (40 Mo.
v. Bucher (7 Mo. App. 169) 944
580)
964, 966
v. Cafferata (24 Mo. 94) 397, 437, 468 v. Withaus (90 Mo. 646)
345
v. Cleland (4 Mo. 84)
534 v. Woodruff (4 Mo. App. 169) 427
v. Clemens (36 Mo. 467) 911, 978, 979, St. Louis A. & T. H. R. Co. v. Belle-
991, 992, 996
ville (122 Ill. 376)
858
v. Clemens (43 Mo. 395)
154 St. Louis & Cinc. R. Co. v. Dalby
v. Clemens (49 Mo. 552) 914, 978
(19 Ill. 353)
67
v. Clemens (52 Mo. 133) 154, 911, St. Louis Br. Co. v. E. St Louis (121
958, 994
Ill. 238)
254, 964
v. Coons (37 Mo. 44)
993 v. People (125 Ill. 226) 820, 988
v. De Noue (44 Mo. 136) 992, 996 St. Louis Build. & Sav. Assoc. v.
v. Eters (36 Mo. 456)
154
Lightner (47 Mo. 393) 953
v. Fitz (53 Mo. 582)
399, 482 St. Louis Co. Court v. Griswold (58
v. Foster (52 Mo. 513) 367, 386, 389,
Mo. 175) 101, 262, 691, 700, 703,
409, 410
704
v. Franks (78 Mo. 41)
718 v. Sparks (10 Mo. 117)
1023
!
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
cxxxix
53)
Page
Page
St. Louis Gas Co. v. St. Louis (46 Salisbury Com’rs v. Powe (6 Jones
Mo. 141)
268
L. 134)
443
St. Louis Hospital v. Williams (19 Salmon v. Haynes (50 N. J. L. 97) 283, 306
Mo. 609)
261 Saloy v. New Orleans (33 La. An.
St. Louis Pub. Schools v. St. Louis
79)
159
(26 Mo. 468)
955 Salsbury v. Philadelphia (44 Pa. St.
St. Louis Slough Coin’rs v. Shields
303)
534
(62 Mo. 247)
76, 84, 85 Salter v. Reed (15 Pa. St. 260) 1002
St. Louis, V. & T. H R. Co. v. Capps Salt Lake City v. Hollister (118 U. S.
(67 III. 607)
853, 854, 856
256)
529, 1170, 1192
v. Haller (82 III. 208)
851 v. Wagner (2 Utah, 400)
433
v. Surrell (88 Ill. 535)
969 Saltonstall v. Banker (8 Gray, 195) 450
St. Luke's Church Prop. v. Slack (7 Salvin v. No. Brancepeth Coal Co.
Cush. 226)
1007, 1057
(L. R. 9 Ch. Ap. 705)
447
St. Martinsville v. Str. Mary Lewis Samis v. King (40 Conn. 298) 282, 296,
(32 La. An. 1293) 165, 174
319, 372, 1080
St. Mary's 2. Jacobs (L. R. 7 Q. B. Sampson v. Goochland Co. Jus. (5
741, 746
Gratt. 241)
760, 882
St. Mary's College v. Crowl (10 Kan. Sams v. Toronto (9 U. C. Q. B. 181) 261
442)
953 Samuels v. Nashville (3 Sneed, 298) 765
St. Mary's Indus. School v. Brown Samyn v. McCloskey (2 0. St. 536) 1311
(45 Ind. 310)
940 San Antonio v. Barnes (96 U. S. 315) 593
St. Paul v. Colter (12 Minn. 41) 87, 385, v. Gould (34 Tex. 76)
534
404, 405, 456, 460 v. Jones (28 Tex. 19)
225
v. Gilfillan (36 Minn. 298) 445, 449 v. Lane (32 Tex. 405) 582, 649
v. Kirby (8 Mino. 154)
1281 v. Lewis (9 Tex. 69)
377, 523
v. Laidler (2 Minn. 190)
460 v. Lewis (15 Tex. 388)
769
v. Marvin (16 Minn. 102) 1126 v. Mehaffy (96 U. S. 312)
593
v. Seitz (3 Minn. 297) 1281, 1303, Sanborn v. Deerfield (2 N. H. 253) 54
1307 v. Minneapolis (35 Minn. 314) 742
v. Smith (27 Minn. 364)
465 Sanbornton . Iilton (53 N. H. 438;
v. Stoltz (33 Minn. 233)
429
55 N. H. 603)
272
v. Tredeger (25 Minn. 248) 425, 426, Sandford v. Tremlett (42 Mo. 384) 275
429, 460, 461 San Diego v. S. D. & L. A. Co. (44
v. Troyer (3 Minn. 291)
431
Cal. 106)
678, 679
St. Paul & P. R. Co. v. St. Paul 21 San Diego Water Co. v. San Diego
Minn. 526)
921, 925
(59 Cal. 517)
540
2. Schurmeir (7 Wall. 272) 169, 170, Sands v. Edmunds (116 U. S. 585) 996,
748
1012
St. Paul, M. & M. Ry. Co. v. Minne-
v. Richmond (31 Gratt. 571) 913, 919
apolis (35 Minn. 141) 689, 709 Sandwich v. Queen (10 Q. B. 574) 1065
St. Paul Union Depot Co.v. St. Paul Sanford v. Augusta (32 Me. 536) 1252,
(30 Minn. 359)
689
1288
St. Paul Water Co. v. Ware (16 Wall. San Francisco 2. Calderwood (31 Cal.
566)
1308
585)
659, 751
St. Paul's Par. Poor Com’rs ads.
2. Canavan (42 Cal. 541) 94, 105, 118,
Lynah (2 McCord, 170) 1009,
744, 745, 752, 754, 769, 1011
1011 v. Cent. Pac. R. Co. (63 Cal. 467) 904
St. Peter v. Bauer (19 Minn. 327) 492, 499, v. Hazen (5 Cal. 169)
358
510 v. Holliday (76 Cal. 18)
753
v. Dennison (58 N. Y. 416) 1216, 1220 7. Kinsman (51 Cal. 92)
994
St. Peter's Church ». Scott Co. Com'rs
v. McGinn (67 Cal. 110)
899
(12 Minn. 395)
952 v. O'Neil (51 Cal. 91)
994
Salamanca v. Wilson (109 U. S. 627) 1053 v. Real Estate (42 Cal. 517) 734
Salem v. Eastern Co. (98 Mass. 431) 212, v. Spring Val. W. W. (48 Cal.
445, 450
493)
83, 85, 747, 791, 794
v. Goller (76 Ind. 291)
1285 San Francisco & O. R. Co. v. Oak-
Salem Mill Dam v. Ropes (6 Pick. 23) 53
land (53 Cal. 502)
544
Salina v. Trosper (27 Kan. 544) 1297 San Francisco Gas Co. v. Brickwedel
Saline County v. Anderson (20 Kan.
(62 Cal. 641)
201
298)
318 v. Dunn (62 Cal. 580)
157
Salisbury v. Andrews (128 Mass. 336) v. San Francisco (6 Cal. 190) 384, 407
891 v. San Francisco (9 Cal. 453) 108,
v. Herchenroder (106 Mass. 458) 1276
533, 538, 539
cxl
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
Page
Ill. 66)
476)
415)
&c.]
163)
Page
Sangamon & M. R. Co. v. Morgan Savannalı v. Steamboat Co. of Ga.
County (14 Ill. 163) 964, 968
(R. M. Charlt. 342) 141, 743, 789
Sangamon County v. Springfield (63
v. Waldner (49 Ga. 316) 1276, 1304,
94, 103, 104, 112, 270,
1306
535, 1143, 1444 v. Wilson (49 Ga. 476)
784
Sanger v. Kennebec Co. Com'rs (25 Savannah, A. & G. R. Co. v. Shiels
Me. 291)
1057
(33 Ga. 601) 787, 848, 850, 852
San Jose v. Reed (65 Cal. 241) 730 Savannah & T. R. Co. v. Savannah
v. S. J. & S. C. R. Co. (63 Cal.
(45 Ga. 602) 833, 834, 868
970 Savings & L. Assoc., &c. (3 Dill. 276;
Sank v. Philadelphia (1 Pa. Leg. Gaz.
20 Wall. 655). [See Citizens'
259; 8 Phila. 117) 366, 367
Savings, &c.]
San Leandro v. Le Breton (72 Cal. Savings & L. Soc. v. Austin (46 Cal.
170) 659, 740, 743, 757, 760, 763
1107
San Luis Obispo v. Hendrick's (71 Savings Bank, &c. (8 Allen, 109).
Cal. 242)
432
[See Lowell Five Cent, &c.]
Sansom v. Mercer (68 Tex. 488) 1014 Savings Bank, &c. (14 N.J. Eq. 286).
Santa Cruz v. Santa C. R. Co. (56
See Stopington Sav. Bank,
Cal. 143)
478
Santa Rosa v. Coulter (58 Cal. 537) 974, (102 N. Y. 313). [See Bank for
976
Savings, &c.]
Santo v. Iowa (2 Iowa, 165)
391 | Savings Fund Soc., &c. (13 Pa. St. 175).
Sargeant's Heirs v. State Bank of
[See Western Sav. Fund, &c.]
Ind. (4 McLean, 339) 740 Savings Soc., &c. (29 Conn. 174). [See
Sargent v. Cornish (54 N. H. 18) 661, 663,
Society for Savings, &c.]
669 Saw-Mill Run Bridge, Re (85 Pa. St.
v. Ohio & M. R. Co. (1 Handy,
917
52)
868 Sawyer, Re (124 U. S. 200) 286, 287, 289,
Sarnia v. Great Western Ry. Co. (21
330, 340, 352, 354, 1022, 1076,
U. C. Q. B. 62)
789, 790
1077, 1091, 1094
Sater v. Burl. & Mt. P. Pl. R. R. Co.
v. Alton (4 Ill. 130)
807, 939
(1 Iowa, 393)
733 v. Concordia Par. (12 Fed. R. 754) 118,
Satterlee v. Mathewson (2 Pet. 380) 637
737
v. San Francisco (23 Cal. 214) 676, v. Corse (17 Gratt. 230)
1204
1143 v. Northfield (7 Cush. 490) 1135, 1315
Saukville v. State (69 Wis. 178) 1134 v. Williams (25 Vt. 311)
272
Saulet v. New Orleans (10 La. An. Saxon Life Ass. Co., Re (2 J. & H.
81)
744, 755, 759
408)
1153
Saulsbury v. Ithaca (94 N. Y. 27) 1272, Saxton v. Beach (50 Mo. 488) 353, 389, 535,
1281, 1297
556, 558, 991
Sault Ste. Marie H. Com'rs v. Van
v. St. Joseph (60 Mo. 153) 353, 389,
Dusan (40 Mich. 429)
540, 566
535, 553, 555, 558, 1204, 1327
Saunders v. Haynes (13 Cal. 145) 279 Saylor v. Harrisburg (87 Pa. St. 216) 1202
v. Lawrence (141 Mass. 380) 291 Sayre v. Tompkins (23 Mo. 443) 1107, 1112
v. McLin (1 Ired. L. 572) 947 Scadding v. Lorant (5 Eng. L. & Eq.
Savacool v. Boughton (5 Wend. 170) 234
356, 364
Savage ». Bangor (40 Ñe. 176) 1261, 1266 Scales v. Chattahoochee Co. Ord. (41
v. Gulliver (4 Mass. 178) 1125
Ga. 225)
44, 1174
Savannah v. Charlton (36 Ga. 460) 424, Scammon c. Chicago (25 Ill. 424) 784, 1306,
425
1306, 1307
v. Cleary (67 Ga. 153)
1331 v. Chicago (40 Ill. 146) 941, 985
v. Crawford (75 Ga. 35)
1119 1. Chicago (42 III. 192)
979
2. Cullens (38 Ga. 334)
1212 v. Scammon (28 N. H. 429) 371
v. Donnelly (71 Ga. 258) 1293 Scarborough v. S. Rural San Auth.
v. Feeley (66 Ga. 31)
1150
(L. R. 1 Ex. D. 344)
447
v. Hancock (91 Mo. 54)
704 Scarning v. Cryer (3 Leon. 7)
414
v. Hartridge (8 Ga. 23) 423, 941, 963, Scates v. King (110 Ill. 456)
614
968 Schaeffer v. Bonham (95 Ill. 368)
646
v. Hartridge (37 Ga. 113) · 733 Schaefler v. Sandusky (33 Ohio St.
v. Hussey (21 Ga. 80) 437, 438, 500
246)
1259, 1261, 1263
v. Jesup (106 U. S. 563)
947 Schaffer v. Cadwallader (36 Pa. St.
v. Kelly (108 U. S. 184)
235
126)
674, 1032
v. Spears (66 Ga. 304) 1327, 1331 Schalle v. Omaha (23 Neb. 325) 1243
v. State (4 Ga. 26) 87, 1012, 1056 l Schanck v. Mayor (69 N. Y. 444)
153
16)
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
cxli
Page
Page
Schattner v. Kansas City (53 Mo. 162) 814 School Trustees of Lake View v.
1223, 1320
People (87 Ill. 303)
397
Schenck ads. Marshall Co. Sup. (5 School Trustees of Tp. 1, Clinton
Wall. 772)
646
Co. v. Tatman (13 Ill. 30) 94, 97,
v. Peay (1 Dillon C. C. 267) 361
110
Schenley v. Allegheny (25 Pa. St. 128) 722, School Trustees of Tp. 7, Macoupin
910, 914
Co. v. People (63 Ill. 299)
906
v. Commonwealth (36 Pa. St. 29) 134, School Trustees of Tp. 9, Green Co.
156, 750, 757, 958, 977, 993, 994
v. McIntyre (3 Ill. App. 77) 301
Schmidt, Re (24 S. C. 363) 500, 1126 Schoonmaker v. Ref. Prot. D.Church
v. Stearns County (34 Minn. 112) 539
(5 How. Pr. 265)
755
Schneider v. Jacob (5 So. W. R. 350) 757 Schott v. People (89 Ill. 195)
489
Schofield v. Lansing (17 Mich. 437) 958 Schriber v. Langlade (66 Wis. 616) 244,
School, &c., Re (47 N. Y. 556). [See
270
New York School, &c.]
Schroder v. City Council (2 Const.
School Com’rs, &c. (2 Stew. & P.
Rep. 726)
413, 492
190). [See Montgomery Co. Schroth v. Prescott (68 Wis. 678) 1255,
Sch. Com’rs, &c.]
1260, 1273
School Directors, &c. (50 Mo. 194). Schuchardt v. New York (53 N. Y.
See St. Charles Tp. Sch.
202)
735
Dir., &c.
Schuchman v. Homestead Bor. (111
(6 Pa. St. 31). [See Tyrone Tp.
Pa. St. 48)
759
Sch. Dir., &c.]
Schultes v. Eberly (82 Ala. 242) 41
(45 Pa. St. 388). (See Bedford Schultz v. Milwaukee (49 Wis. 254) 1197,
Bor. Sch. Dir., &c.
1205
School Dir. of Dist No. 5, Union v. Schumacher v. St. Louis (3 Mo. App.
Sch. Dir. of Dist. No. 1 (105
297)
1224
Ill. 653)
804 Schumacker v. Toberman (56 Cal.
School Dist. in Clay County v. Neil
508)
99, 100, 133
(36 Kan. 17)
446 Schumm v. Seymour (24 N. J. Eq:
School Dist. in Danvers v. Tapley (1
143)
351, 991, 1123
Allen, 49)
272 Schurmeier v. St. Paul & Pac. R. Co.
School Dist. in Faulkner County v.
(10 Minu. 82; 7 Wall. 272) 738,
Williams (38 Ark. 454) 41
739, 741, 792
School Dist. in Marathon v. Gage Schuster v. State (48 Ala. 199)
451
(39 Mich. 328)
161 | Schuyler Co. Sup. v. Farwell (25 Ill.
School Dist. in Richardson County
181)
564
v. Insurance Co. (103 U. S.
v. People (25 Ill. 181) 239, 368, 639
707)
v. Thomas (98 U. S. 169)
593
School Dist. in Rumford v. Wood (13 Schwab v. Madison (49 Ind. 329) 413
Mass. 193)
53, 75 Schwartz 1. Flatboats (14 La. An.
School Dist. in Sanford v. Lord (44
243)
958
Me. 374)
378 v. Oshkosh (55 Wis. 490)
407
School Dist. in Steamboat Rock, &c. Schweitzer v. Liberty (82 Mo. 309) 407,
v. Stone (106 U. S. 183) 600
434
School Dist. in Stoneham v. Rich- Schwuchow v. Chicago (68 Ill. 444) 432
ardson (23 Pick. 62)
271 Scioto Val. Ry. Co. v. Lawrence (38
School Dist. in Stoughton 1. Ather-
O. St. 41)
843
ton (12 Met. 105) 303, 346, 347, Scipio v. Wright (101 U. S. 665) 226
349, 371, 375 Scircle v. Neeves (47 Ind. 289) 295, 296
School Dist. in Wright County v. Scofield v. Council Bluffs (68 Iowa,
Thompson (5 Minn. 280) 562
695)
535, 555
School District, &c. (13 Conn.
v. Eighth Sch. Dist. (27 Conn.
227). [See South Sch. Dist.,
499)
211, 1110
&c.]
Scollay v. Butte County (67 Cal. 249) 152
Schoolfield v. Lynchburg (78 Va. Scotland Co. v. Hill (132 U. S. 107) 626,
366)
939, 951
630, 631, 637
School Fund Trs. 2. Bradbury (11
v. Thomas (94 U. S. 682) 593, 630,
Me. 118)
135, 136
631
School Trustees, &c. v. Taylor (30 Scott v. Alexander (23 S. C. 120) 1107
N. J. Eq. 618)
144 v. Chicago (1 Bissell, 510) 882, 883
School Trustees, &c. (9 Ohio, 203).
v. Davenport (34 Iowa, 208) 204
[See McIntyre Poor School,
v. Des Moines (84 Iowa, 552) 753,
807
81, 83
&c.]
cxlii
TABLE OF CASES CITED,
!
Page
Pa:e
Scott v. Firth (4 F. & F. 349) 418 Seebold v. Shitler (34 Pa. St. 133) 661.
v. Hanskeer (94 Ind. 1) 267, 625
770
v. Layng (59 Mich. 43) 174, 176 Seele v. Deering (79 Me. 343) 1186
2: Manchester (1 H. & N. 59; 2 Seeley v. Litchfield (49 Conn. 134) 1260,
11. & N. 204) 1203, 1205, 1206,
1271
1207, 1215 Seely v. Pittsburgh (82 Pa. St. 360) 914,
v. Montgomery (95 Pa. St. 444) 1258,
917, 934, 935, 936, 937, 989, 990
1259, 1287 Seguin v. Ireland (58 Texas, 183) 766,
v. Phila. (81 Pa. St. 80)
983
787
v. Shreveport (20 Fed. R. 714) 145, Seibert v. Lewis (122 U. S. 284) 118, 120,
* 540
249, 1039, 1045, 1073
Scovil v. Geddings (7 Ohio, pt. 2. 211) 1226 Seibrecht v. New Orleans (12 La. An.
Scoville v. Cleveland (10. St. 126) 140,
491)
529, 534, 519
355, 721, 896, 920, 978 Seifert v. Brooklyn (101 N. Y. 136) 1092,
Scrafford v. Gladwin County (41
1157, 1158, 1213, 1317, 1319, 1320,
Mich. 647)
1083
1321, 1322, 1323, 1325, 1327, 1328,
Scranton v. Catterson (94 Pa. St.
1329, 1331, 1332, 1334
202)
1295 v. Brooks (34 Wis. 443)
709
v. Dean (2 W. N. C. 467) 1259 Seiple v. Elizabeth (27 N. J L. 407) 158,
v. Hill (102 Pa. St. 378) 1266, 1267,
300
1312 Selby v. Portland (14 Or. 243) 312, 317,
v. Pa, Coal Co. (105 Pa. St. 445) 917,
1010
937, 972 Selectmen, &c. (8 La. An. 87). [See
Scranton's Appeal (121 Pa. St. 97) 1244
Baton Rouge, &c.]
Scroggie 2. Guelph (36 U. C. Q. B. Selleck v. South Norwalk (40 Conn.
534)
1331
359)
285
Scudder v. Trenton D. F. Co. (Saxt. Selma v. Mullen (46 Ala. 411)
257, 522
694)
703, 705 2. Perkins (68 Ala. 145) 138, 1283
Scully & O'Leary, Re (11 Chic. L. N.
v. Selma Press & W. Co. (67
27)
495
Ala. 430)
963
Seagraves v. Alton (13 Ill. 371) 534 Selma & Gulf R. Co., Re (45 Ala.
Seale v. Mitchell (5 Cal. 403)
493
696)
227
Seaman v. New York (3 Daly, 147) 179 Re (46 Ala. 230) 1011, 1016, 1069
r. New York (80 N. Y. 239) 1158, Semmes v. Columbus (19 Ga. 471) 550
1205 Semple v. Vicksburgli (62 Miss. 63) 1332
v. Patten (2 Caines, 312) 520 | Serrill v. Philadelphia (38 Pa. St. 355) 975
Seamen's Hosp. Soc. v. Liverpool (4 Serrot v. Omaha (1 Dillon, C. C.
Exch. 180)
478
312) 1295, 1296, 1297, 1301
Searcy 1. Yarnell (47 Ark. 269) 672 Sessions v. Newport (23 Vt. 9) 1255
Searing v. Saratoga (39 Hun, 307) 1332 Seventh Ward Nat. Bank 1. N. Y.
Searle v. Abraham (73 Iowa, 507) 1110
Elev. R. Co. (12 J. & S.
Sears v. Dennis (105 Mass. 310) 1263
412)
878
v. Marshalltown S. Ry Co. (65 Severin v. Eddy (52 III. 189) 1308, 1312
Iowa, 742) 856, 868, 869, 870 Severy v. Central Pac. R. Co. (51
v. West (1 Murph. 291) 424, 970
Cal. 194)
788
Seattle v. Buzby (2 Wash. Ter. 25) 1303 Sewall v. St. Paul (20 Minn. 511)
1. Tyler (Wash. Ter. 1877) 68
939, 944, 984, 1183, 1187, 1195
Seay u. Hunt (55 Tex. 545) 278, 284 | Seward v. Milford (21 Wis. 485) 1267,
Second Av. M. E. Church, Re (66
1283, 1284
N. Y. 395) 939, 942, 954, 956, 1034 Sewell v. Cohoes (75 N. Y.45) 1247, 1267
Second Municipality, &c. (See Mu- Sewickley Bor. v. Sholes (118 Pa.
nicipality No. 2, &c.]
St. 165)
951
Second Nat. Bank of Albany v. Dan- Seybell v. Nat. Currency Bank (54
ville (60 Ind. 504)
185
N. Y. 288)
651
Secord v. Great Western Ry. Co. (15 Seybert o. Pittsburgh (1 Wall. 272) 193,
U. C. Q. B. 631)
1288
194, 237, 564, 585
Secretary of Int. v. McGarrahan (9 Seyner v. Lake (66 Wis. 651) 1287
Wall. 298) 1015, 1044, 1048, 1074 Seymour v. Cummins (119 Ind. 148) 1318,
Sedberry v. Chatham Co. Coni’rs (66
1319
N. C. 486) 1007, 1070, 1072 Shackford v. Newington (46 N. H.
Sedgwick County'v. Bailey (11 Kan.
416)
224
600)
88 Shafer v. Mumma (17 Md. 331) 292, 438,
v. Bailey (13 Kan. 631) 105, 270
462, 470, 479, 493, 494
Seebold v. People (86 Ill. 33) 145 | Shaffer v. Weech (34 Kan. 595)
979
925,
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
cxliii
y
Page
Page
Shaffner 2. St. Louis (31 Mo. 264) 705, Sheffield Sch. Tp.v. Andress (56 Ind.
706, 708, 720
157)
43, 185, 564
Shallcross o. Jeffersonville (27 Ind. Shelby Co. Com'rs v. Deprez (87
193)
182
Ind. 509)
1184
Shannon v. O’Boyle (51 Ind. 565) 550, 671 Shelby Co. Ct. v. Cumb. & C. R. Co.
v. Portsmouth (54 N. H. 483) 333
(8 Bush, 209) 121, 623, 627, 1012
Shapleigh v. Pillsbury (1 Me. 271) 767 v. Shelby R. Co. (5 Bush, 225) 130,
Sharett's Road (8 Pa. St. 89)
808
897
Sharon Iron Co. v. Erie (41 Pa. St. Sheldon v. Centre Sch. Dist. (25
341)
672
Conn. 224)
151, 1121
Sharp, Re (56 N. Y. 257) 979, 980 v. Kalamazoo (24 Mich. 383) 1188,
v. Dunoven (17 B. Mon. 223) 972
1195
v. Johnson (4 Hill, 92) 708, 940, 954, Sheley v. Detroit (45 Mich. 431) 914, 959
979, 1000 Shelley v. St. Charles County (17
2. Speir (4 Hill, 76) 708, 940, 954,
Fed. R. 909)
580
1000 v. St. Charles County (30 Fed.
Sharpe v. St. Louis & S. W. Ry. Co.
R. 603)
1027
(49 Ind. 296)
790 Shellhouse v. State (110 Ind. 509) 751
Sharpless v. Philadelphia (21 Pa. St. Shelton v. Mobile (30 Ala. 540) 459, 462,
147) 225, 228, 236, 573, 895, 972
487, 810
v. West Chester (1 Grant (Pa.), Shenandoah Val. R. Co. v. Clarke
257)
726
County (78 Va. 269) 1107
Shartle v. Minneapolis (17 Minn. 308) 761, Shepardson v. Colerain (13 Met. 55) 1256,
1281, 1287
1265, 1266
Shattuck v. Woods (1 Pick. 175) 316 Shepherd v. Chelsea (4 Allen, 113) 1263
Shaubut r. St. Paul & S. C. R. Co. (21
v. Municipality (6 Rob. La. 349) 177
Minn. 502)
783, 786, 788 Sherbourne v. Yuba County (21 Cal.
Shaver v. Starrett (4 O. St. 494) 724
113) 1172, 1173, 1174, 1200
Shaw v. Allegheny (115 Pa. St. 46) 1148 Sherburne Par. v. Fiske (8 Cush.
v. Charlestown (3 Allen, 538) 719
264)
320
v. Crocker (42 Cal. 435)
1225 Sheridan v. Colvin (78 III. 237) 152, 286,
v. Dennis (10 Ill. 405) 225, 897
387, 1095
2. Hill (67 III. 455)
286 v. Fitchburg (131 Mass. 523) 991
v. Kennedy (N. C. Term, 158) 419 v. Salem (14 Or. 328)
1246
v. Macon (19 Ga. 468 ; 21 Ga. Sherlock v. Bainbridge (41 Ind. 35) 170,
280)
317, 331, 1129, 1226
172
v. Norfolk R. Co. (5 Gray, 180) 637 v. Winnetka (59 Ill. 389) 1101, 1111,
v. Pickett (26 Vt. 486)
1118
v. Thompson (L. R. 3 Ch. 233) 281 v. Winnetka (68 Ill. 530) 570, 927
v. Trenton (49 N. J. L. 339) 543 Sherman v. Carr (8 R. I. 431) 220, 1111
Shawangunk Kill Br., Re (100 N. Y.
v. Granada (51 Miss. 186) 1159, 1187
642)
754 v. Kane (86 N. Y. 57)
754
Shawnee County v. Carter (2 Kan.
v. Kortright (52 Barb. 267) 1270
115)
543 v. McKeon (38 N. Y. 266) 747, 774,
Shawneetown v. Baker (85 Ill. 563) 552
790, 791
v. Mason (82 Ill. 337) 1223, 1227, Sherman County v. Simons (109
1228, 1234, 1241, 1321, 1324
U. S. 735)
604, 612
Shea v. Lowell (8 Allen, 136) 1261 Sherrard v. Lafayette County (3
v. Milford (145 Mass. 528) 361
Dillon C. C. 236)
632
v. Ottumwa (67 Iowa, 39) 755, 757 Sherwin v. Bugbee (16 Vt. 439) 139, 140,
v. Potrero & B. V. R. Co. (44
151, 348, 349
Cal. 414)
865 v. Bugbee (17 Vt. 337) 347, 349, 377
Sheaff v. Colwell (87 Ill. 189)
746 Sherwood V. Dist. Columbia (4
Sheehan v. Gleason (46 Mo. 100) 154,
Mackey, 276)
1297
958 v. Hamilton (37 U. C. Q. B.
v. Good Samar. Hosp. (50 MO.
410)
1264, 1278, 1299
155)
964, 955 Shillito v. Thompson (L. R. 1 Q. B.
Sheehy v. Kan. City Cable Ry. Co.
112)
464
(94 Mo. 574)
1224, 1243 Shinbone v. Randolph County (56
Sheel 2. Appleton (49 Wis. 125) 1143,
Ala. 183)
1029
1287, 1297 Shinkle v. Covington (1 Bush, 617) 179,
Sheff 2. Huntington (16 W. Va. 307)
401, 1098
1253, 1298 Shipley v. Balt. & Pot. R. Co. (34
Sheffield v. Watson (3 Caines, 69) 323
Md. 336)
733
995
cxliy
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
Page
804
469
Page
Shipley v. Fifty Associates (101 Simplot v. Dubuque (49 Iowa, 630)
Mass. 251)
1262
659, 798, 804
Fifty Associates (106 Mass. Simpson, Ex p. (47 Cal. 127)
71
194)
1276, 1277, 1311 v. Savage (1 Mo. 359)
142
Shipman v. State (43 Wis. 381) 530 v. Westm. Pal. Hotel Co. (8
Shirk v. Pulaski County (4 Dillon
H: L. C. 712)
671
C. C. 209) 194, 562, 567, 568, 583 Sims v. Butler County (49 Ala. 110) 1245
Shirley v. Lunenburg (11 Mass. 379) 506 v. Chattanooga (1 Lea, 694) 798, 799,
Shoalwater v. Armstrong (9 Humph.
801, 802, 801
217)
947 v. Estates Co. (14 L. T. N. 8.
Shoemaker v. Grant Co. Com’rs (36
55)
224
Ind. 175)
1148, 1152 l'. Frankfort (79 Ind. 446)
v. Goshen (14 O. St. 587) 640, 645 Sinclair v. Baltimore (59 MU. 592) 888,
Shook v. State (6 Ind. 113)
320
1258
Shoolbred v. Charleston (2 Bay, 63) 1011 Singleton v. Eastern Counties R. Co.
Short v. New Orleans (4 La. An. 281) 566
(7 C. B. N. s. 287)
1264
Shorter 2. Rome (52 Ga. 621) 694 Sinking Fund Cases (99 U. S. 700) 115,
Shotwell v. Mott (2 Sand. Ch. 46) 669
117
Shrader, Re (33 Cal. 279)
442 Sinton v. Ashbury (41 Cal. 525) 122, 130,
Shreveport v. Jones (26 La. An. 708) 899
131, 706, 777, 781, 808, 911, 921,
v. Levy (26 La. An. 671)
1011
v. Roos (35 La. An. 1010) 452 v. Carter County (23 Fed. R.
v. Walpole (22 La. An. 526) 801
535)
93
Shrewsbury v. Brown (25 Vt. 197) 533 Sioux City v. S. C. Indep. Sch. Dist.
Shriver v. Pittsburgh (66 Pa. St.
(55 Iowa, 150)
912
446)
970 v. Weare (59 Iowa, 95)
193
Shuey v. U. S. (92 U. S. 73)
208 Sioux City & P. R. Co. v. Stout (17
Sibley v. Mobile (3 Woods, 535) 225
Wall. 657)
1299
Sic, Re (73 Cal. 142) 437, 441, 505 ads. Stout (2 Dillon C. C. 294)
Sides v. Portsmouth (59 N. H. 21) 1314 v. Washington County (3 Neb.
Sidway v. So. Park Com’rs (120 III.
30)
146, 728
496)
315 Sisson v. New Bedford (137 Mass.
Siebenhauer, Re (14 Nev, 365) 142
255)
1127
Siebrecht v. New Orleans (12 La. Sixth Av. R. Co. v. Kerr (72 N. Y.
An. 496)
512
330)
690, 863
Sights v. Yarnalís (12 Gratt. 292) 944, v. Kerr (45 Barb. 63)
847
1013 Skeen v. Lynch (1 Rob. (Va.) 186) 743,
Sikes v. Hatfield (13 Gray, 347) 312, 527
755
v. Ransom (6 Johns. 279) 1004 Skellinger v. Yendes (12 Wend. 306) 299
Sill v. Corning (15 N. Y. 297) 269, 406, Skerritt's Case (2 Pars. (Pa.) 516) 281
507 Skinkle v. Covington (1 Bush, 617) 1205
Silliman o. Wing (7 Hill, 169) 1148 Skinner v. Hartford Br. Co. (29 Conn.
Silsby v. Dunville (31 U. C. C. P.
623)
1224
301)
519 Skinners' Co. v. Irish Soc. (12 CI.
Silver r. Tobin (28 Fed. R. 545) 165
& F. 487)
1100
Silver Lake Bank v. North (4 Johns. Skinner's Ex. v. Hutton (33 Mo. 244) 807,
Ch. 373)
531
938
Silverthorn v. Warren R. Co. (33 Slack v. East St. Louis (85 Ill. 377) 1223
N. J. L. 173)
1070 v. Maysville & L. R. Co. (13 B.
v. Warren R. Co. (33 N. J. L.
Mon. 1)
151, 208, 225, 898
372)
1007 | Slater v. Wood (9 Bosw. 15)
292
Simar 2. Canaday (53 N. Y. 298) 695 | Slatten v. Des Moines Val. R. Co. (29
Simmons v. Camden (26 Ark. 276) 1224
Iowa, 148) 846, 848, 856, 863
v. Cornell (1 R. I. 519) 799, 803 Slattery, Re (3 Ark. 484)
v. Gardner (6 R. I. 255) 984, 985 | Slaughter v. Commonwealth (13
v. Mumford (2 R. I. 172)
712
Gratt. 767)
423, 905, 909
v. Nahant (3 Allen, 316)
272 v. People (2 Doug. (Mich. 334) 440,
v. Providence (12 R. I. 8) 1226
497, 500
v. State (12 Mo. 268) 970, 971 Slaughter House Cases (16 Wall. 36) 167,
Simon v. Atlanta (67 Ga. 618)
784
827
Simplot v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Slee v. Bloom (5 Johns. Ch. 366) 303, 304
Co. (16 Fed. R. 350) 804 Sleeper v. Bullen (6 Kan. 300) "555, 556,
v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry, Co.
1122, 1124
(5 McCrary C. C. 158) 841 v. Sandown (52 N. H. 244) 1265, 1285
402, 505
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
cxly
Pr. 1)
Page
Page
Slessman v. Crozier (80 Ind. 487) 411, 416 Smith v. Lock (18 Mich. 56)
758
Sloan v. Beebe (24 Kan. 343)
992 v. Lowell (6 Allen, 39)
1300
Sloane v. McConaly (4 Ohio, 157) 668 v. Madison (7 Ind. 86) 149, 425, 450
v. State (8 Blackford, 361)
94, 140 v. Magourich (44 Ga. 163) 1112
Slusser 1. Burlington (42 Iowa, 378) 992 v. Marston (5 Tex. 426)
902
Small v. Danville (51 Me. 359) 108, 1195 v. McCarthy (56 Pa. St. 359) 77, 78,
Smalley v. Appleton (70 Wis. 340) 1272,
267, 282, 387, 1077
1305 v. Metropolitan Gas Co.(12 How.
v. Blackburn Ry. Co. (2 H. & N.
Pr. 187)
822
158)
718 v. Milwaukee (18 Wis. 63) 556, 945,
v. Yates (36 Kan. 519) 1006, 1007
1298, 1323
Smead v. Indianapolis P. &C. R. Co.
v. Moore (1 C. B. 438)
209
(11 Ind. 104)
529, 548 v. Morse (2 Cal. 524) 119, 130, 155,
Smelson v. State (16'Ind. 29)
946
157, 199
Smeltzer v. White (92 U. S. 390) 274 2. Nashville (4 Lea 69)
553
Smith, Re (52 N. Y. 526) 388, 959 v. Natchez S. Co. (1 How. (Miss.)
Re (Hemp. 201)
437
479)
303
v. Aberdeen (25 Miss. 458) 722, 898, v. Newark (32 N. J. Eq. 1) 1093
899, 920
v. Newbern (70 N. C. 14)
145, 456
v. Adrian (1 Mich. 495)
269
v. Newburgh (77 N. Y. 130) 146, 520
v. Albany (61 N. Y. 444) 360, 516
v. New Orleans (23 La. An. 5) 563
v. Alexandria (33 Gratt. 208) 1218 v. New York (21 How. (N. Y.)
v. Appleton (19 Wis. 468) 120, 251
543
2. Atlanta, (75. Ga. 110)
1327 v. New York (10 N. Y. 504) 547
. Bangs (15 Ill. 399)
1092 v. New York (37 N. Y. 518) 283, 311,
2. Barrett (1 Sid. 162)
671
318
v. Boston & M. R. Co. (120 Mass.
v. New York (66 N. Y. 295) 1296,
490)
1287
1297, 1317, 1318, 1319, 1320, 1332,
v. Bourbon County (127 U. S.
1333
105) 1005, 1006, 1012, 1044 v. Oconomowoc (49 Wis. 694) 1092
2. Cheshire (13 Gray, 318) 151, 562 v. Philadelphia (81 Pa. St. 38) 829,
v. Cincinnati (4 Ohio, 514) 1226
1162
v. Clark County (54 Mo. 58) 594, 031, v. Philadelphia County (2 Pars.
633, 651
293)
313
v. Commonwealth (41 Pa. St.
v. Portland (30 Fed. R. 734) 757, 759
335)
312, 313
v. Readfield (27 Me. 145)
1150
2. Cronkhite (8 Ind. 134)
297 v. Rochester (76 N. Y. 506) 1103,
3. Cumberland Co. Com'rs (42
1183, 1184, 1186, 1198
Me. 395)
374
2. Rome (19 Ga. 89) 816, 819
2. Dedham (8 Cush. 522) 1232 v. Sac County (11 Wall. 139) 649
v. Donelly (66 Ill. 464)
295 v. Sacramento (13 Cal. 531) 553
v. Duncan (77 Ind. 92)
981 v. San Antonio (17 Tex. 643) 506
v. Eaton Co. Sup. (56 Mich. 217) 1021 v. Sheely (12 Wall. 35)
670
v. Emporia (27 Kan. 528)
388 v. Sherwood Tp. (62 Mich. 159) 1263
v. First Nat. Bank of Tecumseh
v. Smith (3 Desaus. 557)
242, 329
(17 Mich. 479)
940 v. Smith (1 Bailey, 70)
316
v. Fletcher (3 Eng. 305)
1323 v. Smith (2 Pick. 621)
1264
v. Flora (64 Ill. 93)
744 v. St. Joseph (45 Mo. 449) 1281, 1283,
v. Fond du Lac (8 Fed. R. 289) 226
1285
v. Gardner (12 Or. 221)
754 v. State (19 Conn. 493)
305
v. Gates (21 Pick. 55)
222 2. State (23 N. J. L. 712) 752, 75+,
v. Gould (61 Wis. 31)
1327
756, 782, 784, 800
v. Heath (102 Ill. 130)
750 v. Stephan (66 Md. 381) 321, 512
v. Helmer (7 Barb. 416)
84 v. Tallassee, &c., Pl. R. Co. (30
v. Heuston (6 Ohio, 101) 763, 767, 787
Ala. 650)
258
2:. Huntington (3 N. H. 76) 223 v. Tecumseh Nat. Bank (17 Mich.
v. Hutchinson (8 Rich. L. 260) 1150
479)
1146
1. Inge (80 Ala. 283) 105, 754, 755 v. Tripp (13 R. I. 152) 1222, 1318,
v. Janesville (52 Wis. 680) 138
1321
v. Kernochen (7 How 198) 144 v. Turner (7 How. (U. S.) 283) 902
v. Kinard (2 Hill (S. C.) 642) 763 v. Warden (19 Pa. St. 426) 604
v. Knoxville (3 Head, 245)
397 v. Washington Corp. (20 How.
v. Law (21 N. Y. 296) 194, 363, 364
135) 814, 816, 1218, 1220, 1225,
v. Leavenworth (15 Kan. 81) 1310
1233
VOL. I. - ;
cxlvi
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
264)
Page
Page
Smith v. Waterbury (54 Conn. 174) 811 Sonora Highway Com’rs v. Carthage
v. Wendell (7 Cush. 498) 1256, 1265,
Sup. (27 Ill. 140)
1126
1266, 1269, 1270, 1273 Soon Hing v. Crowley (113 U. S.
v. Whitney (116 U. S. 167) 1132
703)
211, 897
v. Wildes (143 Mass. 556) 1265 Soper v. Henry County (26 Iowa,
v. Wilmington (98 N. C. 343) 644
43, 1169, 1245, 1281, 1282
v. Wingate (61 Tex. 54)
300 Sorensen v. Greeley (10 Col. 369) 856
Smith's Case (4 Mod. 53; 12 Mod. Sorocco v. Geary (3 Cal. 69)
1164
17; Skin. 311; 1 Show. 278) 242, Soulard v. St. Louis (36 Mo. 546) 1187,
247
1188
Smith's Case (8 Howell, St. Tr. 1342) 247 Soule v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co. (21
Smoot v. Hart (33 Ala. 69)
162
U. C. C. P. 308)
1270
v. Wetumpka (24 Ala. 112) 138, 881, v. New York R. Co. (24 Conn.
882, 1281
575)
1288
Smyth v. Bangor (72 Me. 249) 1261 Southampton v. Graves (8 D. & E.
v. Darley (2 H. L. C. 789) 345, 363
T. R. 592)
379
Snell, Re (30 U. C. Q. B. 81) 411, 461, South Bay Mill Dam Co. v. Gray (30
464
Me. 547)
303
Re (58 Vt. 207)
450 South Bend v. Notre Dame Univ.
v. Belleville Ins. Co. (98 U. S.
(69 Ind. 344)
952
85)
1153 v. Paxon (65 Ind. 228)
1331
v. Leonard (55 Iowa, 553
226 South Boston Iron Co. v. United
Snelson v. State (16 Ind. 29)
1153
States (118 U. S. 37)
551
Snook v. Brantford (14 U. C. Q. B. South Brooklyn R. & T. Co., Re (50
255)
1322
Hun, 405)
872
Snow v. Adams (1 Cush. 443) 1269 South Carolina R. Co. v. Steiner (44
v. Fitchburg (136 Mass. 179) 987,
Ga. 546)
834, 844
1127 Southern Bank, Rel., &c. (105 U. S.
v. Housatonic R. Co. (8 Allen,
278). [See Louisiana v. Pils-
441)
1300
bury, &c.]
v. Provincetown (109 Mass. 123) Southern Express Co. v. Mobile (49
1.219
Ala. 404)
905
Snyder 2. Lawrence (8 Kan. 82) 428 Southern Minn. R. Co. v. Coleman
v. Rockport (6 Ind. 237) 174, 856,
(94 U. S. 181)
92
1215, 1221, 1229 Southern Pac. R. Có. v. Reed (41
Society for Prop. Gospel, &c. v. Paw-
Cal. 256) 841, 842, 844, 846, 853,
let (4 Pet. 480)
76, 140
854, 864
v. Young (2 N. H. 310)
258 v. Wilson (49 Cal. 256) 396, 707
Society for Savings 2:. New London Southern Pl. R. Co., Re (5 Ind. 165) 338
(29 Conn. 174) 225, 602, 618, Southern Steamship Co. v. Port
633, 645, 649
Wardens (6 Wall. 31) 166
Society for Visitation, &c. 2. Com- Southgate v. Covington (15 B. Mon.
monwealth (52 Pa. St. 125) 335,
491)
972
336, 339 Southhampton, &c. Br. Co. v. S.
Society, &c. (46 Cal. 415). (See
Local Bd. (8 El. & Bl. 812) 1156
Savings & Loan, &c.]
See also South Hampton, &c.]
(3 Mich. 172).
[See Detroit South Hampton v. Fowler (52 N. H.
Young Men's, &c.]
225)
272
(44 Miss. 820). [See Miss. Soc. Southington First Cong. Soc. 2. At-
of Arts, &c.]
water (23 Conn. 34)
668
(2 Whart. 309). [See Black & South New Market Methodist Semi-
White Smiths, &c.]
nary v. Peaslee (15 N. H.
Solberg v. Decorah (41 Iowa, 501) 798
317)
Solomon City v. Hughes (24 Kan. Southold Prop. v. Horton (6 Hill,
211)
138, 367
501)
Somerset Tp. 2. Parson (105 Pa. St. South Ottawa v. Foster (20 Ill. 296) 1246
360)
361 v. Perkins (94 U. S. 360)
631
Somerville v. Dickerman (127 Mass. South Park Com’rs v. Dunlevy (91
272)
146, 728
Ill. 49)
569
v. O'Neil (114 Mass. 353)
781 v. Williams (51 III. 57)
698
Somerville & E. R. Co. v. Doughty South School Dist. v. Blakeslee (13
(22 N. J. L. 495) 731, 734
Conn. 227)
260, 348, 380
Sonoma Co. Bank v. Fairbanks (52 Southwark Com’rs v. Ñeil (3 Yeates,
Cal. 196)
122
54)
177
258, 669
77, 139
!
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
cxlvii
Page
Page
Southwark R. Co. v. Philadelphia Springfield v. Green (120 IlI. 269) 914,
(47 Pa. St. 314)
776
915
Southworth v. Palmyra & J. R. Co.
v. Hampden County (10 Pick.
(2 Mich. 287)
84
59)
1063
South Yorkshire Ry. Co. v. Great
v. Harris (107 Mass. 532) 523, 532
Northern Ry. Co. (9 Exch.
v. Le Claire (49 Ill. 476) 1297, 1302,
55)
274
1303, 1306, 1307
Soutter v. Madison (15 Wis. 30) 118, 250, v. Schmook (18 Mo. 394)
733
1028, 1029, 1032, 1052, 1067, 1069, v. Spence (40 O. St. 665)
1320
1073, 1074 Springfield Ry. Co. v. Springfield
Sower v. Philadelphia (35 Pa. St.
(85 Mo. 674)
1096
231)
384, 710, 716, 718 Spring Val. W. W. v. Bartlett (16
Spangler v. Jacoby (14 III. 297) 368
Fed. R. 615)
1098
Spann v. Webster County (64 Ga.
v. San Mateo W. W. (64 Cal.
498)
203
123)
697
Sparhawk v. Salem (1 Allen, 30) 1256, v. Schottler (110 U. S. 347) 1098
1258, 1265, 1267 Spring Wells v. Wayne County (58
Sparr v. St. Louis (4 Mo. App. 572) 1269
Mich. 240)
272
Spaulding v. Andover (54 N. H. 38) 104, Sprowl v. Laurence (33 Ala. 674) 297
108 Squires v. Chillicothe (89 Mo. 226) 1297
v. Lowell (23 Pick. 71) 48, 53, 54, Staats v. Washington (44 N. J. L.
147, 150, 151, 153, 456, 529
605)
470
Speaker v. Glass (3 P. C. App. 560) 332 v. Washington (45 N. J. L. 318) 470,
Spear v. Robinson (29 Me. 531) 279, 349
487
Specht v. Commonwealth (8 Pa. St. Stack v. East St. Louis (85 Ill. 377) 777,
312)
468
1221, 1241, 1316, 1317, 1321
v. Detroit (20 Mich. 168) 707, 709 v. Portsmouth (52 N. H. 221) 1257,
Speed v. Crawford (3 Met. (Ky.) 207) 100
1272, 1297
Speer v. Blairsville Bor. Sch. Dir. Stackpole v. Healy (16 Mass. 33) 817
(50 Pa. St. 150) 229, 972 Stadler ». Detroit (13 Mich. 346) 291, 317,
Spelman v. Portage (41 Wis. 144) 1204
334, 337
Spencer v. Merchant (100 N. Y. 585) 983 Stafford, Re (1 O'M. & H. 234) 281
v. Merchant (125 U. S. 345) 923, 983 v. Albany (7 Johns. 541)
714
v. Nemaha Sch. Dist. (15 Kan.
v. Hamston (2 B. & B. 691) 920
259)
1116 v. Oskaloosa (57 Iowa, 748; 64
v. People (68 Ill. 510)
906
Ib. 251)
1266, 1279
v. Pt. Pleasant & O. R. Co. (23
v. Providence (10 R. I. 567) 730, 731
W. Va. 406)
1235, 1245 Staffordshire & W. C. Nav. Prop. v.
Spengler v. Trowbridge (62 Miss. 46) 146,
Birmingham Co. Nav. Prop.
149
L. R. (i E. & I. App. 254)
800
Sperry v. Horr (32 Iowa, 184) 224 Stainton v. Metrop. B. of W. (23
Spiceland v. Aller (98 Ind. 467) 1296
Beav. 225; 3 Jur. N. S. 257) 1328
Spiegel v. Gansberg (44 Ind. 418) 794, Staley v. Columbus (36 Mich. 38) 995
796 | Stanchfield v. Newton (142 Mass.
Spiritual Atheneum Soc. of W. R.
110)
1317, 1319
v. Randolph (58 Vt. 192) 1005, Standiford, Re (5 Mackey, 549) 408
1032 Standley v. Perry (23 Grant, 507) 518
Spitler v. Young (63 Mo.42) 419, 422 Stange v. Hill & W. D. St. Ry. Co.
Spokes v. Banbury (L. R. 1 Eq. 42) 452
(54 Iowa, 669) 852, 1185, 1271
Spooner v. Holmes (102 Mass. 503) 650 Stanila nd v. Hopkins (9 M. & W.
Sprague v. Coenen (30 Wis. 309) 1000
178)
307, 309
v. Norway (31 Cal. 173)
281 Stanley v. Colt (5 Wall. 119)
637
v. Tripp (13 R. I. 38)
1189 v. Davenport (54 Iowa, 463) 860, 868.
v. Worcester (13 Gray, 193) 1215,
1162, 1185, 1269, 1271
1317, 1334 Stanton v. Camp (4 Barb. 274) 524
Spray v. Thompson (9 Iowa, 40) 715, 716 v. Salem (145 Mass. 476) 1297
Springer v. Bowdoinham (7 Me. 442) 1269, v. Springfield (12 Allen, 566) 1251,
1302
1260, 1261, 1302
v. Clay County (35 Iowa, 243) 274 Staple v. Spring (10 Mass. 72) 735
Springfield v. Conn. River R. Co. (4 Staples v. Canton (69 Mo. 592) 1259, 1281
Cush. 63) 696, 833, 850, 869 Starin v. Edson (112 N. Y. 206) 1114
v. Doyle (76 Ill. 202)
1297 v. Genoa (23 N. Y. 439) 225, 226, 235,
v. Edwards (84 Ill. 626) 197, 204,
238, 584, 615, 643, 644
1112, 1113 Stark v. Lancaster (57 N. H. 88) 1267
cxlviii
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
Page
Starkey v. Minneapolis (19 Minn.
203)
561
Starr v. Burlington (45 Iowa, 87) 386,
946, 984
v. Camden & Atl. R. Co. (24
N. J. L. 592)
811, 869
v. Rochester (6 Wend. 564) 509, 1186
State V. Adams Co. Road Com'rs
(Walk. (Miss.) 368)
322, 323
v. Addington (77 Mo. 110) 211
v. Addison (2 S. C. 499)
954
v. Allen (21 Ind. 516)
308
v. Ambs (20 Mo. 214)
468
v. Ames (31 Minn. 440)
1014
v. Ancker (2 Rich. L. 245) 307, 310
v. Anderson (18 Atl. R. 584) 1016
v. Anderson (45 O. St. 196) 1076
v. Arnistrong (3 Sneed, 634) 72
v. Atkinson (24 Vt. 448) 662, 765,
782
v. Atlantic C. Council (34 N. J.
L. 99)
155, 409, 709, 847, 921
v. Auditor (34 Mo. &c. [See v.
State Auditor, &c.]
v. Axtell (41 N. J. L. 117) 953
v. Babcock (19 Neb. 230) 572, 579
v. Babcock (22 Neb. 614)
183, 186
v. Bacon (6 Neb. 286)
1027
v. Bailey, Chickasaw Co. Judge
(7 Iowa, 390) 1005, 1021, 1056,
1058, 1063
v. Baltimore & O. R. Co. (12
Gill & J. 399)
98
v. Baltimore & O. R. Co. (3 How.
(U. S.) 534)
420, 677
v. Bank of Smyrna (2 Houst.
(Del.) 99)
952
v. Barbour (53 Coon. 76)
291
v. Barksdale (5 Humph. 154) 1134
v. Barlow (48 Mo. 17) 543, 1015
v. Bartlett (35 Wis. 387)
1304
v. Bayonne (35 N. J. L. 335) 384,
385, 985
v. Bean (91 N. C. 554)
424
v. Bechell (22 Neb. 158)
240
v. Bell (34 O. St. 194) 154, 155
v. Beloit Sup. (20 Wis. 79) 674, 1029,
1032
v. Bennett (19 Neb. 191)
910
v. Bergen (29 N. J. L. 266) 914
v. Bergen (33 N. J. L. 39) 385, 388
v. Bergen (34 N. J. L. 439) 138
v. Bill (13 Ired. L. 373) 476, 1125,
1126, 1130, 1131
v. Binder (38 Mo. 450) 79, 144, 356,
395
v. Blanchard (6 La. An. 515) 277
v. Blaser (36 La. An. 363) 462
v. Blundell (24 N. J. L. 402) 900
v. Board A. Council (18 Atl. R.
571)
1024
v. Board of Com’rs of A. County.
[See v. A. County Com’rs,
&c.]
Page
State v. Board of Education, &c. (24
Wis. &c.). (See v. Fond du
Lac, &c.]
v. Board of Equalization, &c.
(10 Iowa, &c.). [See v.
Johnson Co., &c.]
v. Board of Supervisors of A.
County. (See v. A. Co.
Sup. &c.]
v. Bollinger Co. Ct. Jus. (48 Mo.
475)
1030
v. Bonnell (21 N. E. R. 1101) 417
l'. Bonner (Busbee (N. C.) L.
257)
1016
v. Boone Co. Ct. (50 Mo. 317) 84
v. Boscawen (32 N. H. 331) 882, 1134
v. Botkin (71 Iowa, 87)
452
v. Bradbury (40 Me. 154) 754, 760,
762
v. Bradford (32 Vt. 50)
1083
v. Branin (23 N. J. L. 485) 94, 143,
947
v. Brassfield (67 Mo. 331) 636, 650
v. Brewer (64 Ala. 287)
942
v. Bright (38 La. An. 1)
411
v. Brittain (89 N. C. 574) 397, 435
v. Brown (27 N. J. L. 13)
657
v. Brown (31 N. J. L. 355) 1082
v. Bryce (7 Ohio, 414) 329, 330, 337,
338, 339, 1078
v. Bryson (44 0. St. 457)
334
v. Buffalo (2 Hill; 434) 292, 475, 530,
532
v. Buffalo Co. Com’rs (6 Neb.
454)
1028
v. Burbank (22 La. An. 318) 1028,
1037, 1061
v. Burlington (45 Iowa, 87)
980
v. Burlington (36 Vt. 521) 322, 1135,
1252
v. Burnett (2 Ala. 140)
1090
v. Butler (11 Lea, 418)
1154
v. Buttz (9 S. C. 156)
308
v. Cadwalader (36 N. J. L. 283) 449
v. Caliaba T. Council (30 Ala.
66)
1084
v. Cainan (94 N. C. 863) 412, 476,
482
v. Camden (35 N. J. L. 217) 1076
2. Campton (2 N. H. 513)
882
v. Canterbury (28 N. H. 195) 77, 263,
882
v. Cantieny (34 Minn 1)
414, 487
v. Carbondale Indep. Sch. Dist.
(29 Iowa, 264)
1081
v. Carroll (12 Am. L. Reg. 165) 1080
v. Carroll (38 Conn. 449) 319, 356,
1080
v. Carver (5 Strob. 217)
760, 762
v. Cassidy (22 Minn. 312) 425, 908,
942
v. Catlin (3 Vt. 530)
743, 744, 752,
763
v. Cavanac (30 La. An. 237)
1014
TABLE OF CASES CITED
cxlix
Page
State v. Central Pac. R. Co. (9 Neb.
79; 10 Neb. 47) 902, 962
v. Chamberlain (37 N. J. L. 51) 987
v. Chamberlain (37 N. J. L. 388) 488,
990
v. Chamber of Commerce (20
Wis. &c.). [See v. Milwau-
kee, &c.]
v. Charles (16 Minn. 474) 440
v. Charleston (1 Mill S. C. Const.
36)
949, 1075, 1084
v. Charleston C. Council (4 Rich.
L. 286)
166
0. Charleston C. Council (5 Rich.
L. 561)
949, 968
v. Charleston C. Council (10
Rich. L. 240)
904, 949
v. Charleston C. Council (12
Rich. L. 702)
722
v. Charleston C. Council (14
Rich. L. 480)
492
v. Charleston C. Council (2
Speers L. 623; 719) 949, 969, 970
v. Charleston C. Council (4
Strob. L. 217)
949
v. Chase, Gov. (50. St. 528) 1016
v. Chillicothe C. Clerk (70. St.
355)
391
v. Choate (11 Ohio, 511)
1078
v. Christ Ch. Par. Com’rs (1 Mill
S. C. Const. 55) 1075, 1132
v. Cincinnati (19 Ohio, 178)
1009
v. Cincinnati (20 0 St. 18)
82, 83
v. Cincinnati Gas & C. Co. (18
0. St. 262) 95, 157, 391, 782, 797,
822, 823, 826,1075, 1083, 1088,1089
v. Clark (28 N. H. 176) 385, 393, 433,
470
v. Clarke (54 Mo. 17) 144, 145, 405,
452
v. Clarke (25 N. J. L. 54) 143, 144,
437
v. Clay County (46 Mo. 231) 1030,
1031
v. Clay Co. Sch. Dist. (8 Neb.
98)
1059
v. Cleaveland (3 R. I. 1.17) 412
v. Clegg (27 Conn. 593)
507
v. Clinton Co. Com'rs (6 O. St.
280)
225, 1037, 1038
v. Clunet (19 Md. 351)
714
v. Cockrell (2 Rich. ú.6) 288, 714, 716,
1130, 1132
2. Coffee (59 Mo. 59)
1082
v. Collins (34 Kan. 434)
905
v. Columbia (6 S. C. 1)
424
v. Columbia (12 S. C. 370) 551
v. Columbia (16 S. C. 412) 1133
v. Columbia (27 S. C. 137) 254, 964
v. Commissioners of Printing (18
0. St. 386)
1015
v. Commissioners of A. County,
&c. (See v. A. Co. Com’rs,
&c.]
Page
State v. Common Council, City, &c.
[See v. Charlston u. Water-
town, &c.]
v. Conlin (27 Vt. 318)
500
v. Cooke (24 Minn. 247)
78, 417
v. Copeland (3 R. I. 33)
958
v. Cornville (43 Me. 427)
1258
v. County Ct. Jus., &c. (See v.
Boone, &c., v. Davis, &c., v.
Floyd, &c., v. Jolinson, &c.,
Marshall, &c., 2. Nodaway,
&c.]
v. Cowen (29 Mo. 330) 437, 439, 468,
470
v. Crawford (36 N. J. L. 394) 944, 945
v. Crenshaw (94 N. C. 877) 412
v. Crowell, (4 Halst. 390) 1075
v. Crummey (17 Minn. 72) 439
v. Curran (12 Ark. 321)
77
v. Custer (11 Ind. 210) 1005, 1006,1008
v. Cymis (26 O. St. 400)
426
v. Davenport (12 Iowa, 335)
1029,
1031, 1037, 1038
v. Davey (39 La. An. 992) 1126
v. Davis Co. Judge (2 Iowa,
280)
88, 1058
2. Dawson (3 Hill (S. Č.) 100) 692
v. Dean (23 N. J. L. 335)
918
v. De Bar (58 Mo. 395) 144, 452
v. Debnan (98 N. C. 712)
476
v. De Casinova's Adm. (1 Tex.
401)
279
v. De Gress (53 Tex. 387) 1076
v. Delesdenier (7 Tex. 76)
55
v. Deliesseline (1 McCord, 52) 288,
343, 359, 1023, 1076
v. Denny [Holt, Rel.] (118 Ind.
449)
899
v. Denny [Jameson, Rel.] (118
Ind. 382)
899
v. Denny, Mayor (21 N. E. R.
252, 274), 73, 81, 100, 101, 103
v. Dews (R. M. Charlt. 397) 102
v. Digby (5 Blackf. 543)
733
v. Dike (20 Minn. 363)
1016
v. Dir. & W. of Penit. (5 O. St.
234)
547
v. Dodge Co. Com’rs (8 Neb.
129)
906, 920
v. Doherty (25 La. An. 119) 331
v. Donahay (30 N. J. L. 404) 347,
1129
v. Douglass (50 Mo. 593) 1080
v. Douglass (33 N. J. L. 363) 144
v. Douglass (26 Wis. 428)
310
v. Dousman (28 Wis. 541)
80
v. Dowling (50 Mo. 134) 968, 1112,
1126
v. Dubuclet (24 La. An. 16) 1016,
1061
v. Dunn (1 Minor (Ala.) 46) 1023
v. Dunnington (12 Md. 340) 324, 325
v. Duval Co. Com’rs (23 Fla.
483)
88
cl
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
Page
322
Page
State v. East Orange (41 N. J. L. 127) 400 State v. Gibson Co. Com’rs (80 Ind.
v. Eberly (12 Neb. 616)
161
478)
1249
v. Edens (85 N. C. 452)
450 v. Giles (1 Cland. 112) 279, 280
v. Elizabeth (30 N, J. L. 176) 979 v. Gilmanton (14 N. H. 467) 263
v. Elizabeth (30 N. J. L. 365) 928, v. Glasgow (N. C. Conf. 186)
976, 977, 985 v. Gleason (12 Fla. 190)
1080
v. Elizabeth (31 N. J. L. 547) 985 v. Glennon (3 R. I. 276)
47
v. Elizabeth (32 N. J. L. 357) 709, 784 v. Goodwin (69 Tex. 55)
1079
v. Elizabeth (37 N. J. L. 142) 924 v. Gordon (60 Mo. 383)
439
v. Elizabeth (37 N. J. L. 432) 385, v. Gorham (37 Me. 451) 881, 1135,
758, 795
1314
v. Elizabeth (40 N. J. L. 274) 928, v. Governor, &c. (See 2. Chase,
929, 988
v. Kirkwood, v. Price, v.
v. Elizabeth Treas. (42 N. J. L.
Towns, v. Warmouth, &c.]
79)
1032 v. Graham (13 Kan. 136) 1078
v. Elkinton (30 N. J. L. 335) 1067, v. Graham (24 La, An. 429) 1016
1068, 1070, 1074 v. Graham (16 Neb. 74)
72
v. Elvins (32 N. J. L. 362)
88 V. Graves (19 Md. 351) 157, 392, 711,
v. Elwood (11 Wis. 17)
1063
713, 714, 726, 1006, 1056
v. Essex Co. Freeh. (23 N. J. L.
.v. Great Works Mill. & M. Co.
211)
1017
(20 Me. 41)
1135
v. Estabrook (6 Ala. 653) 431, 891 v. Green (37 0. St. 227)
357
v. Fagan (42 Conn. 32)
303 v. Greene County (54 Mo. 540) 631
v. Fairchild (22 Wis. 110) 1061 v. Gregg (2 Hill (S. C.) 388) 763
v. Falconer (44 Ala. 696) 1022 v. Griffey (5 Neb. 161)
282
v. Fayetteville Com’rs (2 N. C.
v. Griscom (3 Halst. 136) 1069
L. Repos. 617)
322 v. Gummersall (24 N. J. L. 529) 1089
v. Fenley (18 Mo. 445)
562 v. Guttenberg (38 N. J. L. 419) 237,
v. Ferguson (33 N. H. 424) 393, 433
914, 924, 985
v. Ferguson (31 N. J. L. 107) 307, 309 v. Guttenberg (39 N. J. L. 660) 940,
v. Findley (10 Ohio, 51) 297, 298
1008, 1028, 1034
v. Fishblate (83 N. C. 654) 322 v. Guttierrez (15 La. An. 190) 492,
v. Fisher (52 Mo. 174)
404
499, 504, 507
v. Fitzgerald (44 Mo. 425) 283, 285, v. Haben (22 Wis. 660)
1056
286, 509, 1078 v. Hackensack Impr. Co. (45 N.
v. Flanders (24 La. An. 57) 105
J. L. 113)
918
v. Floyd Co. Judge (5 Iowa,
v. Halifax Com’rs (4 Dev. L.
380)
1029, 1030, 1031
345)
322, 939, 1134
v. Foley (31 Iowa, 527)
865 v. Hall (97 N. C. 474)
328
v. Fond du Lac (42 Wis. 298) 709 v. Hall (32 N. J. L. 158)
450
v. Fond du Lac Bd. of Ed. (24
v. Hamilton (5 Ind. 310)
1120
Wis. 683)
1015 v. Hamilton Co. Aud. (19 Ohio,
v. Fort (24 S. C. 510)
1126
116)
1030
v. Foster (2 Halst. 101)
366 v. Hanmer (42 N. J. L. 435) 835
v. Freeman (38 N. H. 426) 393, 396, v. Hammonton (38 N. J. L. 430) 220
433, 451, 470 v. Hand (31 N. J. L. 547)
979
v. Freeman (86 N. C. 683)
296 v. Hannibal & St. J. R. Co. (75
v. Frost (4 Harring. 558)
279
Mo. 208)
v. Fuller (34 N. J. L. 227) 94, 918, 928 v. Hannon (38 Kan. 593) 1009
v. Fuller (39 N. J. L. 576)
918 v. Hardie (1 Ired. 42)
1078
v. Fullerton (7 Rob. (La.) 210) 902 v. Hardy (7 Neb. 377)
488
o. Funck (17 Iowa, 365) 285, 287, 509 v. Harper (58 Mo. 531)
439
v. Gaffney (34 N. J. L. 131) 949, 950 v. Harper (6 0. St. 707)
323
v. Garlock (14 Iowa, 444)
v. Harris (23 Eng. & An. Corp.
v. Garroute (67 Mo. 445)
629
C. 43)
589
v. Gastinel (20 La. An. 114) 279 v. Harris (10 Iowa, 441)
431
v. Gates (35 Minn. 385)
237 v. Hartford & N. H. R. Co. (29
v. Gates (67 Mo. 139)
323
Conn. 538)
1057
v. Gates (22 Wis. 210) 1067, 1074 v. Hartshorn (17 Ohio, 135)
272
v. Gazlay (5 Ohio, 14)
995 v. Haskell (20 Iowa, 276)
518
v. George (23 Fla. 585) 99, 278
v. Hastings (10 Wis. 518)
v. Georgia Med. Soc. (38 Ga.
v. Hauser (63 Ind. 155)
608; 8 Am. L. Reg. N. S.
v. Hauss (43 Ind. 105)
309
533)
327, 329 v. Hay (29 Me. 457)
451
953, 961
431
1063
154, 300
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
cli
Page
Page
State v. Hayes (61 N. H. 264) 386 State v. Jersey City (25 N. J. L. 309) 154,
v. Hayne (4 S. C. 403)
424
155, 350, 363, 365, 707, 710, 944,
2. Hedlund (16 Neb. 566)
144
984
v. Helfrid (2 N. & McC. 233) 492 v. Jersey City (25 N. J. L. 525) 170,
2. Helmes (Penn. (N. J.) 1050) 138
264
v. Henderson (38 0. St. 644) 407 v. Jersey City (25 N. J. L. 536) 264,
v. Hennepin Co. D. Ct. (33 Minn.
328, 329, 330, 331, 332, 333, 339,
235)
912
1025
v. Henshaw (76 Cal. 436)
492 v. Jersey City (26 N. J. L. 444) 155,
v. Herod (29 Iowa, 123) 427, 863, 864,
291, 388, 465, 707, 726, 808, 940,
966
984, 985, 986
v. Hewett (31 Me. 396)
1288 v. Jersey City (27 N. J. L. 493) 359,
2. Hibbard (3 Ohio, 63)
995
384, 385, 395, 986
v. Highland (25 Minn. 355) 647 v. Jersey City (27 N. J. L. 536) 366,
v. Hilbert (72 Wis. 184)
474
984
v. Hill (10 Ind. 219)
738 v Jersey City (29 N. J. L. 441) 986,
v. Hill (32 Minn. 275)
1006
988, 1092
v. Hoblitzelle (85 Mo. 620) 1027 v. Jersey City (29 N. J. L. 170) 143,
2. Hoboken (30 N. J. L. 225) 808,
145, 445, 858, 863
863 v. Jersey City (30 N. J. L. 93) 351,
v. Hoboken (33 N. J. L. 280) 425, 943,
373, 407
944 v. Jersey City (30 N. J. L. 148) 385,
v. Hoboken (35 N. J. L. 205) 833, 847,
986
818, 850, 861 v. Jersey City (30 N. J. L. 521) 928,
v. Hoboken (36 N. J. L. 291) 918
1092
2. Hoboken (38 N. J. L. 110) 388, 407 v. Jersey City (34 N. J. L. 33) 145,
v. Hodgdon (41 Vt. 139)
905
174, 387, 809, 985
v. Holcomb (68 Iowa, 107) 404 v. Jersey City (34 N. J. L. 277) 814,
v. Holladay (72 Mo. 499)
584
960
2. Hoyt (2 Dr. 246)
310, 366 v. Jersey City (34 N. J. L. 390) 168
2. Hudson (27 N. J. L. 214) 707 v. Jersey City (35 N. J. L. 401) 351,
2. Hudsou (29 N. J. L. 104) 146, 520,
984
914, 981, 988 v. Jersey City (37 N. J. L. 348) 809
v. Hudson (29 N. J. L. 115) 914 v. Jersey City (38 N. J. L. 259) 1059
2. Hudson (29 N. J. L. 475) 368, 407, v. Jersey City (40 N. J. L. 483) 753,
709, 984
914
v. Hudson (32 N. J. L. 365) 1126, 1129 v. Jersey City (41 N. J. L. 489) 988
v. Hudson (31 N. J. L. 531) 980 v. Jersey City Treas. (42 N. J.
v. Hudson (44 O. St. 137)
334
L. 79)
1032
v. Hudson County (30 N. J. L.
v. Jersey City W. Com’rs (30
137)
1133, 1136, 1173
N. J. L. 247)
1129
v. Hudson Co. Freeh. (35 N. J.
v. John (81 Mo. 13)
1022
L. 269)
1070 v. Johnson (17 Ark. 407) 284, 509
v. Hugg (44 Mo. 116) 711, 719, 1032 v. Johnson (11 Ired. L. 647) 760
v. Huggins (Harper, L. 94) 288, 343, v. Johnson (1 Kan. 178)
84
359 v. Johnson Co. Bd. of Equal. (10
v. Huggins (47 Ind. 586)
794
Iowa, 157)
1056
v. Hundehausen (26 Wis. 432) 95 v. Johnson Co. Judge (12 Iowa,
v. Hunter (38 Kan. 578)
99
237)
1063, 1072
v. Ill. Cent. R. Co. (33 Fed. R.
v. Johnson's Adm. (52 Ind. 197) 533
730) 88, 170, 171, 175, 177, 697, v. Jones (19 Ind. 356)
281
757 v. Jones (10 Iowa, 65)
1070
v. Irvington (50 N. J. L. 361) 488 v. Jones (1 Ired. L. 129) 1010, 1062,
v. Jackson (8 Mich. 110)
496
1063, 1070
2. Jackson Co. Com'rs (19 Fla.
v. Jones (18 Tex. 874)
806
17)
1032 v. Judge, Ninth C. Č. (13 Ala.
2. Jacobs (17 Ohio, 143) 272, 305,
805)
1021
355, 1088, 1090 v. Justices, &c. (See v. Lenoir, v.
v. Jefferson Par. Pol. Jury (22
Orleans, &c ]
La. An. 611)
1017 v. Kansas City (89 Mo. 34) 1131
v. Jenkins (46 Wis. 616)
1090 v. Kansas City, St. J. & C. B. R.
v. Jennings (27 Ark. 419) 74, 94
Co. (45 Iowa, 139)
755
2. Jersey City (24 N. J. L. 662) 709, v. Kantler (33 Minn. 69)
363, 487
710, 914, 944, 985 v. Kaufman (51 Iowa, 578) 495
clii
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
Page
Page
State v. Keith (94 N. C. 933) 435 State v. Marlow (15 0. St. 114) 285, 288,
v. Kelly (34 N. J. L. 75)
142
509, 1077
v. Kempf (69 Wis. 470)
509 v. Marshall Co. Judge (7 Iowa,
v. Keokuk (9 Iowa, 438) 710, 712, 719,
186) 1020, 1057, 1058, 1074
1011 v. Marston (6 Kan. 524) 1021, 1079
v. Keokuk (18 Iowa, 388)
1063
v. Maynard (14 III. 419) 292, 492, 493,
v. Kirk (44 Ind. 401)
291
494
v. Kirkley, Mayor (29 Md. 85) 389, v. Mayor, &c. of A. [See v. A.
518, 519, 1005, 1007, 1183,
&c.]
1187 v. Maysville (12 S. C. 76) 900, 939
v. Kirkwood, Gov. (14 Iowa,
v. McArthur (13 Wis. 383) 507
162)
1016 v. McCrillus (4 Kan. 250) 1009
v. Kispert (21 Wis. 387)
1073 v. McDowell (Dud. L. (S. C.) 346)
v. Kline (23 Ark. 587)
281
452
v. Knoxville (12 Lea, 146)
449
v. McDowell (19 Neb. 442) 312
v. Krollman (38 N. J. L. 323) 953 v. McGarry (21 Wis. 496)
330
v. Lafferty (5 Harring. 491) 294, 483 v. McLaughlin (15 Kan. 228) 1124
v. Lamberton (37 Minn. 362) 1128 v. McReynolds (61 Mo. 203) 72, 267,
v. Lancaster Co. Bank (8 Neb.
975, 1082, 1086
218)
1142 v. Merrill (37 Me. 229)
468, 470
v. Langston (88 N. C. 692) 435, 436 o. Merry (3 Mo. 278)
142
v. Laverack (34 N. J. L. 201) 458, v. Miller (67 Mo. 604)
121
784
v. Miller (30 N. J. L. 360)
143
v. Lean (9 Wis 279) ·
1062 v. Mills (34 N. J. L. 177)
144
v. Leatherman (38 Ark. 81) 74, 76 v. Milwaukee Ch. of Commerce
v. Ledford (3 Mo. 102)
437
(20 Wis. 63) 329, 330, 332
v. Lee (29 Minn. 445) 435, 500 v. Milwaukee C. Council (20
v. Leffingwell (54 Mo. 458) 39, 43,
Wis. 87) 674, 1028, 1029, 1032,
45, 85, 699, 911, 917, 960
1038
v. Lehre ( 7 Rich. 234) 1059, 1060, v. Milwaukee C. Council (22
1081
Wis. 397)
1062, 1063, 1068
v. Lenoir Co. Jus. (4 Hawks,
v. Milwaukee C. Council (25
194)
322
Wis. 122)
118, 1028
v. Leovy (21 La. An. 538) 102 v. Milwaukee Gas, &c. Co. (29
v. Lewenthall (55 Miss. 589)
323
Wis. 454)
95, 824, 826
v. Lewis (51 Conn. 113)
284 v. Milwaukee, L. S. & W. Ry.
v. Lieber (11 Iowa, 407)
456
Co. (45 Wis. 579)
1075
v. Lincoln (4 Neb. 260)
v. Mineral Pt. Sup. (22 Wis.
v. Lindsay (34 Ark. 372)
435
396)
1068, 1072
v. Lingo (26 Mo. 496) 329, 330, 332 v. Minneapolis (32 Minn. 501) 589
v. Linn Co. Ct. (44 Mo. 504) 628 v. Missouri Pac. - Ry. Co. (33
v. Lockwood (43 Wis. 403) 495
Kan. 176)
858
v. Louisville, N. A. & C. Ry. Co.
v. Mitchell (2 Tr. Const. (S. C.)
(86 Ind. 114)
885
703)
1010, 1011
v. Ludwig (21 Minn. 202)
440 v. Mobile (24 Ala. 701) 95, 140, 141
v. Lyle (100 N. C. 497)
720 v. Mobile (5 Porter, 279) 147, 457,
v. Lyon (32 N. J. L. 360)
953
765, 783, 784
2. Lyons (31 Iowa, 432)
1084 v. Moffit (5 Ohio, 356) 1016, 1021,
v. Maberry (3 Strob. 144)
321
1028
20. Macon Co. Ct. (41 Mo. 453) 631 v. Montclair Ry. Co. (35 N. J. L.
9. Macon Co. Ct. (68 Mo. 29)
1030,
328)
825
1034 v. Montgomery (74 Ala. 226) 590
v. Madison C. Council (7 Wis.
v. Morris & E. Ř. Co. (23 N. J.
688) 183, 185, 560, 657, 659
L. 360)
782, 784, 1133
v. Madison C. Council (15 Wis.
v. Morris Common Pleas (36 N.
30) 118, 250, 1028, 1029, 1032,
J. L. 72)
78
1052, 1067, 1069, 1073, 1074 v. Morristown (33 N. J. L. 57) 143,
v. Maloy (20 Kan. 619)
83
394, 806, 809
v. Mansfield (41 Mo. 470)
495 v. Moss (2 Jones (L.) 66)
504
v. Mansfield Com’rs (23 N. J. L.
v. Mott (61 Md. 297)
510)
657 v. Moultrieville (Rice L. 158)
415
v. Marble (4 Ired. L. 318)
v. Mount (20 La. An. 352)
v. Marion Co. Com’rs (21 Kan.
v. Mount Pleasant C. Council (8
419)
146, 520, 1113
Rich. L. 214)
948
309
403, 449
744
1030
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
cliii
1017
Page
State v. Mount Pleasant Sup. (16
Wis. 613)
1017
v. Municipal Court (32 Minn.
&c.) [See v. St. Paul, &c.]
v. Murfreesboro (11 Humph.
217)
138, 322, 1134, 1281
v. Nashville (15 Lea, 697) 314, 317,
394
v. Nashville Univ. (4 Humph.
157)
659
v. Natal (39 La. 439)
455
v. Nelson [Hymer, Rel.] (21
Neb. 572)
1006
v. Nelson [Iola Sup. Rel.] (57
Wis. 147)
979
v. Newark (25 N. J. L. 399) 351, 407,
408, 985, 1092, 1126, 1127
v. Newark (26 N. J. L. 515) 896, 953
v. Newark (27 N. J. L. 185) 134, 290,
407, 918, 923, 928, 955, 956
v. Newark (28 N. J. L. 491) 158
v. Newark (30 N. J. L. 303) 407, 808
v. Newark (34 N. J. L. 236) 88, 486,
993, 994
v. Newark (35 N. J. L. 171) 984
v. Newark (36 N. J. L. 168) 928
v. Newark (36 N. J. L. 478) 923, 955,
956
v. Newark (37 N. J. L. 415) 531, 914,
918, 929, 937, 979, 989, 990
v. Newark (38 N. J. L. 264) 454
v. Newark (40 N. J. L. 297) 1070
v. Newark (40 N. J. L. 550) 82
v. Newark (44 N. J. L. 344)
828
v. Newark Pol. Com’rs (49 N. J.
L. 170)
1129
v. Newberry Council (12 Rich.
339)
953
v. New Boston (11 N. H. 413) 761
v. New Brunswick (30 N. J. L.
395)
154, 156, 921, 928, 959
v. New Brunswick (32 N. J. L.
548)
975
v. New Brunswick (44 N. J. L.
116)
959
v. Newman (91 Mo. 445) 279, 1006,
1021
v. New Orleans (20 La. An. 172) 554
v. New Orleans (23 La. An. 358) 199
v. New Orleans (30 La. An. 82) 1030
v. New Orleans (30 La. An. 129) 1031,
1042
v. New Orleans (30 La. An. 705) 1032
v. New Orleans (35 La. An. 68) 1032,
1067
v. New Orleans (35 La. An. 221) 1032
v. New Orleans (36 La. An. 687) 119
v. New Orleans (37 La. An. 13,
436, 528)
119
v. Nodaw Co. Ct. Jus. (47 Mo.
349)
631
v. North (42 Conn. 79)
1083
v. North (27 Mo. 464)
903, 904
v. Norwood (12 Md. 177)
300
Page
State v. Noyes (30 N. H. 292) 24, 28, 78,
898
v. Ocean (39 N. J. L. 75) 1075
v. Omaha (14 Neb. 265) 884, 1006
v. Orange (31 N. J. L. 131)
v. Orange (32 N. J. L. 49) 709, 979
v. Orleans Par. Dist. Judge (21
La. An. 741)
1074
v. Orleans Par. Dist. Judge (35
La. An. 1075)
327
v. Osawkee Tp. (14 Kan. 418) 233
v. Pacific T. Trs. (61 Mo, 155) 569,
1030, 1031, 1062
v. Palmer (10 Neb. 203)
1022
v. Palmer (4 N. W. Rep. 966) 140
v. Paris Ry. Co. (55 Tex. 76) 486
v. Parker (25 Minn. 215) 1082
v. Parker (32 N. J. L. 426) 952
v. Parker (26 Vt. 362)
958
v. Parsons (40 N. J. L. 1) 84, 1089
v. Passaic (37 N. J. L. 65)
914, 928
v. Passaic (41 N. J. L. 90) 146, 520,.
980
v. Passaic Clerk (25 N. J. L.
354)
285
v. Passaic Turnp. Co. (27 N. J.
L. 217)
808
v. Patamia (34 La. An. 750) 413
v. Paterson (34 N. J. L. 163) 157, 387
v. Paterson (35 N. J. L. 190) 291
v. Paterson (36 N. J. L. 159) 709,
985, 986
v. Paterson (37 N. J. L. 380) 747
v. Paterson (38 N. J. L. 190) 1025
v. Paterson (40 N. J. L. 186) 553
v. Paterson (40 N. J. L. 244) 986
v. Paterson & H. Turnp. Co. (21
N. J. L. 9)
1075
v. Paterson Av. R. Com’rs (41
N. J. L. 83)
985
v. Pawtuxet Turnp. Co. (8 R. I.
521)
1088
v. Pender (66 N. C. 313)
494
v. Perkins (24 N. J. L. 409) 298, 494
v. Perry Co. Com'rs (5 O. St.
497)
1058, 1116
v. Perth Amboy (29 N. J. L 259) 709,
984, 985, 986
v. Perth Amboy (38 N. J. L. 425) 944,
945
v. Pettis (7 Rich. L. 390) 798, 801,
803
v. Philbrick (49 N. J. L. 374) 1079
v. Pillsbury (30 La. An. 705)
566
v. Pinckney (10 Rich. L. 474) 904
v. Pitot (21 La. An. 336)
1026
v. Plainfield (38 N. J. L. 95) 485, 709,
710, 944, 985, 993
v. Plunkett (3 Harr. (N.J.) 5) 431,437
v. Police Jury, &c. [See v. Jef-
ferson Par., &c.; v. St. Mar-
tin's Par., &c.; v. Orleans
Par., &c.; v. Terrebonne
Par., &c.]
cliy
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
Page
682)
Page
State v. Pollard (6 R. I. 290)
437 State v. Severance (55 Mo. 378) 143, 963,
v. Portage (12 Wis. 562) 722, 910, 921,
969, 998
957, 978 v. Seymour (35 N. J. L. 47) 102
v. Porter (7 Ind. 204)
297 v. Shelby Co. Tax. Dist. (16 Lea,
v. Porter (113 Ind. 79)
358
240)
251
v. Powell (67 Mo. 395)
323 v. Shelbyville (4 Sneed, 176) 322, 1135
v. Powell (97 N. C. 417)
502 v. Sherman (20 Mo. 265)
431
v. Price, Gov. (25 N. J. L. 331) 285, v. Sherwood (42 Mo. 179)
319
1016 v. Shields (8 Blackf. 151)
322
v. Pritchard (36 N. J. L. 101) 1075 v. Simons (32 Minn. 540)
74
v. Pugh (43 O. St. 98)
82 v. Sims (16 S. C. 486)
294, 469
v. Putnam Co. Com’rs (23 Fla.
v. Smith (31 Iowa, 493)
970
804 v. Smith (22 Minn. 218) 363, 365, 388,
v. Rahway (39 N. J. L. 646) 914
1020
v. Ralıway Council (33 N. Í. L.
v. Smith (44 O. St. 348)
109
110) 287, 310, 1019, 1020, 1021, v. Smith (14 Wis. 497)
279
1022, 1057, 1658, 1059, 1061 v. Sohn (97 Ind. 101)
334
v. Rainey (74 Mo. 229)
1045 v. So. Stp. Co. (13 La. An. 497) 997
v. Ranos (10 La. An. 420) 330, 1022 v. Springfield (6 Ind. 83)
136
v. Ramsey (8 Neb. 286)
1059 v. Stanley (14 Ind. 409)
694
v. Ramsey Co. D. Ct. (33 Minn.
v. Stark (18 Fla. 255)
000
295)
919, 938 v. State Auditor (34 Mo. 375;
v. Raymond (27 N. H. 388) 1133
36 Mo. 70)
1010
v. Rice (2 S. E. R. 180)
478 2. State Board" (13 Fla. 55) 286, 1063
v. Richland Township (20 O. St.
v. State Canvassers (3 Kan. 88) 1060
362)
224 v. Stearns (31 N. H. 106) 480, 496
v. Richmond (1 R. I. 49) 641, 762 v. Stephens (4 Tex. 137)
896
v. Ricker (32 N. H. 179)
507
v. Stevens (23 Kan. 456)
434
v. Riordan (24 Wis. 484)
80 v. Stewart (5 Strobh. L. 29) 715,
v. Roberts (68 Mo. 234)
301
1126, 1130
v. Roberts (11 G. & J. 506) 941 v. Stout (7 Neb. 89)
1142
v. Robinson (1 Kan. 188) 1014 v. Sullivan County Ct. (51 Mo.
v. Roggen (22 Neb. 118)
240
631
v. Rolle (30 La. An. 99)
971 v. Supervisors, &c. [See v. Min-
v. Ruff (30 La. An. 497)
421
eral Pt, &c., v. Mount Pleas-
v. Rush (7 Ind. 221)
260
ant, &c.]
v. St. Joseph (37 Mo. 270)
79 v. Swearingen (12 Ga. 23) 154, 278,
v. St. Louis (90 Mo. 19) 334, 338
279, 280
v. St. Louis Co. Court (34 Mo.
v. Swift (1 Hill (S. C.), 360) 715,
546)
94, 101, 103, 213, 1175
1126, 1130
v. St. Louis Co. Court (62 Mo.
v. Swisher (17 Tex. 441)
958
244)
723, 1112 v. Tappan (29 Wis. 664) 122, 129,
v. St. Martin's Par. Pol. Jury
224, 896
(32 La. An. 884)
1032 v. Taylor (59 Md. 338)
1000
v. St. Paul (34 Minn. 250) 1129 v. Terrebonne Par. Pol. Jury (30
v. St. Paul (36 Minn. 529)
952
La. An. 287)
581
v. St. Paul M. & M. Ry. Co. (35
v. Thomaston (74 Me. 198) 266
Minn. 131)
851, 852, 854 v. Thompson (36 Mo. 70) 1023
v. Saline County (45 Mo. 242)
626,
2. Thompson (34 O. St. 360) 1086
643, 645, 1060 v. Tiedeman (69 Mo. 306)
674
v. Saline County (48 Mo. 390) 644 v. Tipton (109 Ind. 73)
72
v. Saline County (51 Mo. 350) 1104, v. Tolan (33 N. J. L. 195) 1020, 1075,
1112, 1224
1079, 1086, 1087
v. Savannah (R. M. Charlt. 250) 94, v. Toomer (7 Rich. L. 216) 298
102
v. Topeka (30 Kan. 653; 31
v. Sayre (41 N. J. L. 158) 1222
Kan. 452)
432
. Schlier (3 Heisk. 281)
970 2. Tosney (26 Minn. 262)
138
v. Schnierle (5 Rich. L. 299) 289, v. Towns Gov. (8 Ga. 360)
1016
1086 v. Trask (6 Vt. 355)
763
v. School District. (See v. Clay,
v. Trenton (12 Atl. R. 902) 543
&c.; v. York, &c.]
v. Trenton (36 N. J. L. 198)
143
W. Scott (17 Mo. 521)
77 v. Trenton (36 N. J. L. 499) 385, 985
v. Sellers (7 Rich. L. 368)
321 v. Trenton (36 N. J. L. 79) 854, 860
v. Severance (49 Mo. 401) 486 v. Trenton (42 N. J. L. 74)
155
531)
$
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
clv
Page
Page
State v. Trenton Street Com’rs (36 State v. Wilson (42 Me.9) 754, 760, 762,
N. J. L. 283)
443, 483,
768
2. Troth (34 N. J. L. 379)
140 v. Wilson Sup. (17 Wis. 687) 1032
v. Trumpf. (50 Wis. 103)
279 v. Winkelmeier (35 Mo. 103) 79
v. Trustees, &c. [See v. Paci-
v. Wister (62 Mo, 592)
439
fic, &c., v. Union, &c. v. Vin-
v. Wood Co. Treas. (17 Ohio,
cennes Univ., &c.]
184)
1007
v. Tryon (39 Conn. 183) 386, 441 v. Woodruff (37 N. J. L. 139) 953
v. Tupper (Dudley (S. C.) L.
v. Woodward (23 Vt. 92) 659, 662,
135)
857
672, 751, 752, 765, 782
v. Union (33 N. J. L. 350) 88, 486 v. Woody (17 Ga. 612)
1098
v. Union Tp. Com. (37 N. J. L.
v. Worth (95 N. C. 615)
412
84)
1031 v. Wright (14 Or. 365)
87
v. Union Tp. Trs. (8 Ohio, 394) 631, v. Wrotnowski (17 La. An. 156) 1016
647 v. York Co. Sch. Dist. (8 Neb.
v. University, &c. [See v. Nash-
92)
1059
ville, &c., 2. Vincennes, &c.
v. Young (3 Kan. 445) 68, 493, 507
v. Valle (41 Mo. 29)
101 v. Young ( 17 Kan. 414) 144, 434
v. Van Buskirk (40 N. J. L. 463) 640, v. Zanesville & M. Turn. Co. (16
647
0. St. 308)
1058
v. Van Every (75 Mo. 530) 939 v. Zeigler (32 N. L. J. 262) 412, 414,
v. Van Horne (7 O. St. 331) 640,
477, 494, 1126
647 State Bank, &c. (16 How. 369). (See
v. Van Winkle (25 N. J. L. 73) 380
Piqua Branch, &c.]
2. Vermont Cent. R. Co. (27 Vt.
(3 La. An. 294). {See Louisiana
103)
1133
v. State, &c.]
v. Vincennes Univ. Trs. (5 Ind.
(39 Iowa, 490). [See National
77) 55, 241, 246, 250, 329, 330,
State, &c.]
337 State Bank of Ind. v. Brackenridge
v. Volkman (20 La. An. 585) 909
(7 Blackf. 395)
658, 967
v. Wakely (2 N. & McCord, 410) 714, v. Madison (3 Ind. 43) 948, 967, 968
716, 1131, 1132 State Bank of S. C. v. Charleston C.
v. Wapello County (13 Iowa,
Council (3 Rich. L. 342) 000
388)
208, 226, 895 State Board of Agr. v. Citizens S.
v. Ware (13 Or. 380)
1058
R. Co. (47 Ind. 407)
531, 536
v. Warmouth Gov. (22 La. An. State Board of Ed. v. Aberdeen (56
1)
1016
Miss. 518)
533, 537
v. Warren, F. & Mach. Co. (32 State Center v. Bárenstein (66 Iowa,
N. J. L. 439)
1008
249)
396
2. Washington (1 Kan. 188) 1014 State Freight Tax, Re (15 Wall, 232) 902
v. Watertown C. Council (9 Wis. State Hist. Assoc. v. Lincoln (14 Neb.
254)
336, 337, 1025
336)
759
v. Weatherly (45 Mo. 17) 1082 State Railroad Tax Cases (92 U. S.
v. Welch (36 Conn. 215) 397, 406,
675) 1108, 1120, 1121, 1124
469, 470 State Tax on Foreign held Bonds,
v. Welch (21 Minn. 22)
482
Re (15 Wall
. 300)
901
v. Wells (15 Cal. 636)
650 State Tax on Ry. Gross Receipts,
v. Wells (46 Iowa, 662)
499
Re (15 Wall. 284)
v. West Hoboken (37 N. J. L. State Treasurer v. Somerville & E.
177)
705
R. Co. (28 N. J. L. 21) 969
v. West Orange (40 N. J. L. 122) 918 State University', &c. (5 Neb. 423).
v. White (20 Neb. 37)
141
[See University of Neb., &c.]
v. Whittingham (7 Vt. 390) 1135 Steamboat Rock Indep. Sch. Dist. u.
v. Wilcox (42 Conn. 364)
78
Stone (106 U. S. 183) 600
v. Wilcox (45 Mo. 458)
78 Steam Nav. Co., &c. (8 G. & J.
v. Wilkesville (20 O. St. 288) 369
248). [See Penn. Del. &
v. Wilkinson (2 Vt. 480) 752, 755,
Md., &c.]
763, 782 Steamship Co., &c. (2 Wall.
v. Williams (25 Me. 564) 347, 371
450). (See Pacific Mail, &c.]
v. Williams (11 S. C. 288)
(6 Wall. 31). [See Southern
v. Wilmington C. Council (3
Steamship, &c.]
Harring. 294) 286, 291, 294, 357, Stebbins v. Jennings (10 Pick. 172) 75, 76
494, 1014 v. Keene Tp. (60 Mich. 214) 882
v. Wilson (12 Lea, 246)
143, 303
v. Mayer (38 Kan. 573) 388, 503
902
452, 468
clvi
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
Page
Page
Stebbins v. Merritt (10 Cush. 27) 273, 370 Stevens' & C. Transp. Co.v. Central
Steckert v. East Saginaw (22 Mich.
R. Co. (33 N. J. L. 229) 138
104) 368, 369, 373, 390, 945, 977, Stevens' Point Boom Co. v. Reilly
1123
(44 Wis. 295)
80
Stedman v. San Francisco (63 Cal. Steward v. Jefferson (3 Harr. (Del.)
193)
1197
335)
899
Steel v. Davis County (2 Greene Stewart v. Baltimore (7 Md. 500) 507,
(Iowa), 469)
566, 568
710, 716, 719, 726
v. Boston (128 Mass. 583) 1205 v. Clinton (79 Mo. 603)
1320, 1324
Steele v. Burkhardt (104 Mass. 59) 1287 v. Commonwealth (10 Watts,
v. Martin (6 Kan. 430) 284, 1077
307)
475
v. Sullivan (70 Ala. 589) 744, 754, v. Council Bluffs (58 Iowa, 642) 713
757 v. Davis (3 Murph. (N. C.) 244) 952
Steers v. Brooklyn (101 N. Y. 51) 170, v. Frink (94 N. C. 487)
754
748, 749
v. Hinds Co. Pol. Bd. (25 Miss.
v. Stienville W. S. Co. (34 Fed.
479)
709
R. 145)
822, 826 v. Jefferson Par. Pol. Jury (116
Stein v. Ashby (30 Ala. 363)
828
U. S. 135)
311, 1032
v. Burden (24 Ala. 130) 219, 828, 899 v. Kalamazoo (30 Mich. 65) 1110
v. Mobile (17 Ala. 234)
967 v. New Orleans (9 La. An. 461) 1195,
v. Mobile (24 Ala. 591) 225, 226, 967
1197, 1200
v. Mobile (49 Ala. 362) 967, 971 v. Otoe Co. (2 Neb. 177) 146, 728
Steines v. Franklin County (48 Mo.
v. Polk County (30 Iowa, 1) 226, 898
167) 158, 584, 593, 635, 640, 649, v. Rutland (58 Vt. 12)
735
1112, 1158 v. Southard (17 Ohio, 402) 324, 326
Steinmeyer v. St. Louis (3 Mo. App.
v. State (4 Ind. 396)
303, 304
256)
1328 v. Stewart (6 Cl. & F. 911; 2
Stephan v. Daniels (27 (). St. 527) 1148
Smith's L. C. 403) 1148, 1153
Stephani v. Brown (40 III. 428) 1311, 1312 v. Woodstock & H. Pl. R. Co.
Stephens v. Macon (83 Mo. 345) 888,
(15 U. C. Q. B. 427) 1260
1295, 1298 Stickford v. St. Louis (7 Mo. App.
v. People (89 Ill. 337) 276, 277
217)
1224
Stephenson v. Chattanooga (20 Fed. Stickney v. Maidstone (30 Vt. 738) 1263
R. 586)
746, 757 v. Salem (3 Allen, 374)
1175, 1253
2. Galt (117 III. 11)
957, 982 Stier v. Oskaloosa (41 Iowa, 353) 138
Stephenson Co. Sup. v. Manny (56 Stiles v. Curtis (4 Day (Conn.) 328) 747,
Ill. 160)
1145, 1146, 1151
790
Sterling, Re (1 Sid. 340)
1062 Stilk v. Myrick (2 Camp. 317) 209
v. Merrill (124 Ill. 522)
1297 Still v. Lansingburg (16 Barb. 107) 671,
v. Thomas (60 III. 264)
1311
678
v. West Felic. Par. (26 La. An. Stilling v. Thorp (54 Wis. 538) 1260, 1273
59)
565 Stillman v. Isham (11 Conn. 123) 161
Sterling's Appeal (111 Pa. St. 35) 822 Stillwater v. Green (4 Halst. 59)
Stern v. People (76 Ill. 475)
301 Stilson v. Lawrence Co. Com’rs (52
Sterrett v. Houston (14 Tex. 153) 1204
Ind. 213)
533
Stetson v. Chicago & Ev. R. Co. (75 Stiltz v. Indianapolis (55 Ind. 515) 103,
732, 1240, 1241
265
v. Faxon (19 Pick. 147) 176, 783, v. Indianapolis (81 Ind. 582) 1107
785, 786, 1317 Stinson v. Gardiner (42 Me. 248) 1253,
v. Kempton (13 Mass. 272) 52, 53,
1257
54, 147, 210, 224, 527, 529, 1147 Stock v. Boston (149 Mass. 410) 1163
Steuben ville . Culp (38 0. St. 18) 318 Stockbridge v. West Stockbridge (12
v. McGill (41 O. St. 235) 1314
Mass. 400)
139
Stevens v. Boxford (10 Allen, 93) 1257 Stocking v. State (7 Ind. 326) 305
v. Buffalo & N Y. C. R. Co. (31 Stockton v. Newark (42 N. J. Eq.
Barb. 591)
969
531)
767
v. Chicago (48 Ill. 498)
488 Stockton & V. R. Co. v. Stockton C.
v. Eden M. H. Soc. (12 Vt. 688) 348,
Council (41 Cal. 147)
377 Stockwell v. Fitchburg (110 Mass.
v. Paterson & N. R. Co. (34
305)
1257, 1267
N. J. L. 532). (See also Stoddard v. Gilman (22 Vt. 568) 367, 392
Stephens, &c.]
749 v. Kimball (6 Cush. 469)
583
v. Rutland & R. Co. (29 Vt. 546) 1109 Stokes v. New York (14 Wend. (N.
Sterens' Case (T. Raym. 432) 1070
Y.) 87)
87, 415, 164, 481
217
Ill. 74)
227, 895
!
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
clvii
Page
Page
Stone v. Attleboro (140 Mass. 328) 1267 Street v. Holyoke (105 Mass. 82) 1261,
2. Boston (2 Met. 220) 7.14, 1129
1286
v. Brooks (35 Cal. 489) 745, 757 Street Case (1 La. An. 412). [See
v. Cambridge (6 Cush. 270) 710
Robin Street, &c.]
v. Cheshire R. Co. (19 N. H.
(10 La. An. 313). [See Philip
427)
1308
Street, &c.]
v. Commercial Ry. Co. (4 M. &
(14 La. An. 452). (See Melpo-
C. 122)
711
mene Street, &c.]
v. Elliott (11 O. St. 252)
583 (16 La. An. 393). (See Royal
v. Fairbury, P. & N. W. R. Co.
Street, &c.
(68 Ill. 394) 777, 856, 1223, 1228, (20 La. An. 497). [See Cascalvo
1241
Street, &c.]
v. Godfrey (5 DeG., M. & G. 76) 1163 Street R. Co. &c. (32 Cal. 499).
v. Hamilton Sch. Dist. (8 Cush.
(See North Beach & M.
592)
347
Street, &c.]
• v. Hubbardston (100 Mass. 49) 1201, (2 Duvall (Ky.), 175, 556). (See
1278
Louisville & P. Street, &c.]
v. Huggins (28 Vt. 617)
323 (14 0. St. 523). (See Cincinnati
v. Mobile (57 Ala. 61)
940, 1122
& S. G. Av. Street, &c.]
v. New York (25 Wend. 157) 1127, Strickland v. Railroad Co. (Miss.
1131, 1165, 1166
[MSS.] )
225
v. Oconomowoc (71 Wis. 155) 671 Striker v. Kelly (3 Denio, 323) 367
v. Wisconsin (94 U. S. 181) 92 v. Kelly 17 Hill, 9) 272, 367, 407, 709
Stoneburgh v. Brighton (5 U. C. L. J. Strohm v. Iowa City (47 Iowa, 42) 358,
38)
519, 525
1110
Stoneham Sch. Dist. v. Richardson Strong, Re (20 Pick. 484) 1021, 1024,
(23 Pick. 62)
271
1057
Stonehouse v. Elliott (6 D. & E. T. R.
Re (Kirby (Conn.), 345) 1007, 1012
315)
295 v. Darling (9 Ohio, 201) 269, 739
v. Enniskillen (32 U. C. Q. B.
v. Dist. Columbia (1 Mackey,
562)
1139
265)
539
Stonington Sav. Bank v. Davis (14
v. Stevens Pt. (62 Wis. 255) 1285
N. J. Eq, 286)
143 Strosser v. Fort Wayne (100 Ind. 443) 266,
Storm v. Odell (2 Wend 287) 1131
268, 804
Stormfeltz v. Manor Turnp. Co. (13 Stroud v. Philadelphia (61 Pa. St.
Pa. St. 552)
776, 781
255) 721, 911, 914, 986, 988
Storrs v. Utica (17 N. Y. 104) 556, 1280, Strusburgh v. New York (87 N. Y.
1298, 1303, 1305, 1306, 1307, 1308
452)
1092
Story v. N. Y. Elev. R. Co. (90 N. Y. Struthers v. Dunkirk, W. & P. Ry.
122) 743, 750, 777, 778, 780, 788,
Co. (87 Pa. St. 282) 841, 844, 855
790, 793, 819, 832, 837, 847, 850, Stryker v. New York (19 Johns. 179) 263
852, 855, 856, 862, 867, 870, 871, Stuart v. Cambridge (125 Mass. 102) 543,
873, 874, 875, 886, 889, 1230
559
Stotesbury v. Smith (2 Burr. 921) 209 v. Machiasport (48 Me. 477) 1264
Stoudinger v. Newark City (28 N. J.
v. Palmer (74 N. Y. 183) 983, 984
Eq. 187)
819 Stubenrauch v. Neyenesch (54 Towa,
Stoughton Sch. Dist. v. Atherton (12
567)
1091, 1126
Met. 105) 303, 346, 349, 371, 375 Stuber's Road (28 Pa. St. 199) 776, 794
Stover v. Blue Hill (51 Me. 439) 1288 Studley v. Oshkosh (45 Wis. 380) 1272,
Stow 2. Wyse (7 Conn. 214)
363
1301
Stowell v. Milwaukee (31 Wis. 523) 1227 Stuhr v. Hoboken (47 N. J. L. 147) 407
Strahl, Re (16 Iowa, 369) 285, 287, 289, Sturgeon v. Daviess Co. Com’rs (65
292, 352, 355, 509
Ind. 302)
677
Strange v. Dubuque (62 Iowa, 303) 397 Sturtevant v. Alton (3 McLean, 393) 275,
Stratman, Re (39 Cal. 517)
493
613, 518
Stratton v. Allen (16 N. J. Eq. 229) 182, v. Liberty (46 Me. 457)
562
184, 571 Stuyvesant ů. New York' (7 Cow.
v. Oulton (28 Cal. 44) 318, 319
588)
157, 387, 395
Straus v. Eagle Ins. Co. (50. St. 59) 512, v. Woodruff (21 N. J. L. 133) 752
549, 563, 571 Sublett 2. Bedwell (47 Miss. 266) 279
Strauss v. Pontiac (40 Ill. 301) 386, 422, Submarine Tel. Co. v. Dickson (15
434
C. B. N. s. 759)
1298
Street v. Francis (3 Ohio, 277) 1125 Succession of A., &c. (See A.'s Suc-
v. Gallatin Co. Com’rs (1 Ill. 25) 1026
cession, &c.]
clviii
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
Page
Page
Sudbury First Par. v. Stearns (21 Swain v. Comstock (18 Miss. 463) 140
Pick. 148) 283, 356, 357, 362, 378 Swamp Land Dist. v. Haggin (64
Suffell v. Bank of Eng. (9 Q. B. D.
Cal. 204)
939
555)
650 Swan v. Williams (2 Mich. 427) 705, 709
Suffield v. Hathaway (44 Conn. 521) 1093 Swan Pt. Cemetery v. Tripp (14 R.
Suffolk v. Parker (79 Va. 660) 1211
I. 199)
952
Sugar Co., &c. (26 N. J. Eq. 247). Swann v. Buck (40 Miss. 268) 311
[See Matthiessen, &c.]
v. Cumberland (8 Gill, 150) 715, 978,
Sullivan v. Boston (126 Mass. 540) 1176,
1126, 1127
1267 Swanzea v. Somerset (132 Mass. 312) 881
v. Holyoke (135 Mass. 273) 11, 93 Swartz v. Flatboats (14 La. An. 243) 169
v. Leadville (1 Col. 483)
488 v. Page (13 Mo. 603) 679, 771
v. McCammon (51 Ind. 264) 1147, Sweeney v. Port Burwell (17 U. C.
1151
C. P. 574; 19 U.C.C.P.376) 179
v. New York (53 N. Y. 652) 89, 290 v. Spooner (3 B. & S. 329) 505
v. Phillips (110 Ind. 320) 1093 Sweet v. Carver County (16 Minn.
v. Walton (20 Fla. 552)
551
106)
565
Summers v. Daviess County (103
v. Wabash (41 Ind. 7)
425
Ind. 262)
1200 Sweetzer v. Hay (2 Gray, 49)
300
Sumner u. Dor. First Par. (4 Pick.
v. Mead (5 Mich. 107)
524
361)
1147 Swenson ». Lexington (69 Mo. 157) 842
Sunbury & Erie R. Co. v. Cooper (33 Swift v. Berry (1 Root, 448)
882
Pa. St. 278)
391
v. Newport (7 Bush, 37)
972
Sun Mut. Ins. Co. v. New York (8
2. New York (17 Hun, 518) 557
N. Y. 241)
896, 913
v. New York (83 N. Y. 528) 1140, 1194
Supervisors of A. County, &c. [See
v. Poughkeepsie (37 N. Y. 514) 1151
A. Co. Sup., &c.]
v. Williamsburgh (24 Barb. 427) 519,
Supervisors v. &c. (See the fol-
556, 1186
lowing counties, wherein the Switzer v. Wellington (28 Am. L. R.
plaintiff, not being specified
281)
163
in the reporter's caption, Swords v. Edgar (59 N, Y. 28) 1205
may, in citing, not always Sykes v. Columbus (55 Miss. 115) 635,
have been fully named:
639, 647, 1034
Calhoun, &c. (99 U. S. 214),
v. Lafferty (27 Ark. 407)
520
Carroll, &c. (18 Wall. 71),
v. Pawlet (43 Vt. 446)
1266
Lee, &c. (7 Wall. 175), Symmers v. Regem (Cowp. 502) 334, 340
Powsbiek, &c. (9 Wall. 736), Symonds ». Clay Co. Sup. (71 Ill.
Rock Island, &c. (4 Wall.
355)
1172, 1174
435), Washington, &c. (9 Syracuse Nat. Bank v. Seneca Falls
Wall. 415).]
(15 Fed. R. 783)
594
Surgi r. Snetchman (11 La. An. 367) 956 Syracuse Water Co. v. Syracuse (26
Susquehanna Bank v. Broome Co.
N. Y. State R. 364)
827
Sup. (25 N. Y. 312) 1092, 1120
Susquehanna Depot Bor. v. Simmons
(112 Pa. St. 384) 1304, 1306
T.
Sussex Co. Freeh. v. Strader (18
N. J. L. 108) 881, 882, 1133, 1169, Taber v. Grafmiller (112 Ind. 451) 959, 975
1173, 1174, 1245, 1282 v. New Bedford (135 Mass. 162) 1127
Sutherland v. Carr (85 N. Y. 105) 300 Tackaberry v. Keokuk (32 Iowa, 155) 949
Sutton v. Carroll Co. Pol. Board (41 Taft v. Montague (14 Mass. 285) 541
Miss. 236) 1159, 1173, 1187, 1198, v. Pittsford (28 Vt. 286) 518, 559,562
1245 Taggart v. Newport St. Ry. Co. (16
v. Clark (6 Taunt. 28) 1225, 1233,
R. I.)
893
1234 Tainter v. Morristown (19 N. J. Eq.
v. Wauwatosa (29 Wis. 21) 1287
791, 1097
Sutton First Par. v. Cole (3 Pick.
v. Worcester (123 Mass. 311) 217,829,
232) 261, 353, 360, 656, 661, 670
1199
Sutton's Heirs v. Louisville (5 Dana, Talbot v. Dent (9 B. Mon. 526)
28)
733
v. Hudson (16 Gray, 417)
Sutton's Hospital Case (10 Rep. 31) 396 v. Taunton (140 Mass. 552)
1255
Suydam v. Keys (13 Johns. 444) 324 v. Whipple (7 Gray, 122) 1317
Swackhamer v. Hackettstown' (37 Talbot Co. Com’rs v. Queen Anne
N. J. L. 191) 182, 188, 193, 194, 195
Co. Com’rs (50 Md. 245)
42
Swails v. State (4 Ind. 516)
138 | Talbott v. Grace (30 Ind. 389)
172, 754
46)
79, 225
700, 704
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
clix
54 a)
Page
Page
Talbott v. Richmond & D. R. Co. Taylor v. Metrop. Elev. Ry. Co. (21
(31 Gratt. 685)
747, 752
J. & S. 412)
878
Talcott v. Pine Grove Tp. (1 B. &
v. Metrop. Elev. Ry. (23 J. & S.
B. N. S. 50)
579
555)
878
Tallahassee v. Fortune (3 Fla. 19) 1281 v. Newberne Com’rs (2 Jones
1295
Eq. 141) 77, 226, 237, 898
Tallapoosa Co. Com’rs Ct. v. Tarver
v. New York (82 N. Y. 10) 1142
(21 Ala. 661) 361, 1069, 1070 2. Northampton Co. Sch. Com'rs
Tallant v. Burlington (39 Iowa, 543) 981,
(5 Jones L. 98)
1010
1146 v. Palmer (31 Cal. 240) 351, 407, 923,
Tallman v. Janesville (17 Wis. 71) 911
955, 996
Talman v. Butler County (12 Iowa,
v. Parish, &c. (L. R. 6 C. P.
531)
896
309)
279
Tanner v. Albion (5 Hill, 121) 450 v Peckham (8 R. I. 349) 1256, 1276
Tarlton, Re (2 Ala. 35) 715, 1125, 1126 v. People (66 Ill. 322)
1146
Tarner v. Walker (L. R. 1 Q. B. C.
v. Phila. Bd. of H. (31 Pa. St.
641)
209
73)
1149, 1151, 1154
v. Walker (L. R. 2 Q. B. 301) 209 v. Pine Bluff (34 Ark. 603) 403
Tarry 1. Ashton (L. R. 1 Q. B. D.
v. Plymouth (8 Met. 462) 1163, 1164,
314)
1270
1166
Tarver v. Tallapoosa Co. Com’rs (17
v. Porter (4 Hill, 140) 694, 704
Ala. 527)
1069 v. St Louis (14 Mo. 20) 814, 1223,
Tash v. Anams (10 Cush. 252) 53, 222,
1228
1110 v. Strong (3 Wend. 384)
294
Tate v. Mo., K. & T. R. Co. (64 Mo.
v. Taylor (10 Minn. 112)
281
149)
849, 1220 v. Yonkers (105 N. Y. 202) 1261
v. Ohio & Miss. R. Co. (7 Ind. Taylor's Case (3 Bulst. ; 1 Rol.; 3
470)
795, 834, 846
Salk., &c.). [See King v.
Tatem v. Wright (23 N. J. L. 429) 905
Taylor, &c.]
Tavener's Cise (T. Raym. 446) 1063 Taylors of Ipswich (11 Rep.
Tawney v. Lynn & Ely Ry. Co. (16
486
L. J. N. s. Eq. 282)
711 Taymouth v. Koehler (35 Mich. 22)
540
Tax Collector v. Dendinger (38 La. Tear v. Freebody (4 C. B. n. s. 228) 889
An. 261)
146 Tearney v. Smith (86 Ill. 391) 1223
Tax Court, &c. (50 Md. 417). [See Tecumseh v. Phillips (5 Neb. 305) 88, 321
Appeal Tax. Ct., &c.]
Teegarden v. Davis (36 O. St. 601) 1119
Taylor, Ex p. (58 Miss. 478)
903 v. Racine (56 Wis. 545)
152
2. Americus (39 Ga. 59) 509, 1126 Teft v. Size (10 Ill. 432)
488
v. Austin (32 Minn. 247) 1329 Tegarden v. McBean (33 Miss. 283) 760,
v. Boulware (17 Tex. 74)
268
763
v. Boyd (63 Tex. 533) 923, 956, 957 Telegraph Co., &c. (76 Ill. 172).
v. Cæsar (11 U. C. Q. B. 461) 279
(See Western Union, &c.]
v. Carondelet (22 Mo. 105) 386, 416, Temperance Hall Assoc. v. Giles (33
420, 677
N. J. L. 260)
1309
v. Cedar Rap. & St. P. R. Co. Templin v. Iowa City (14 Iowa, 59) 1323
(25 Iowa, 371)
672 Ten Eyck v. Del. & R. Canal Có.
v. Chandler (9 Heisk. 349) 926,
(18 N. J. L. 200)
97
927 ) Tennessee & Ala. R. Co. v. Adams
v. Cumberland (64 MA. 68) 1160, 1205
(3 Head, 596) 833, 853, 863
v. Douner (31 Cal. 480)
940 Tenney v. East Warren Lumber Co.
v. Fort Wayne (47 Ind. 281) 265, 266,
(43 N. H. 343)
273
268, 740
v. Lenz (16 Wis. 566) 426, 428
v. Gloucester (1 Roll. 409) 337 Tensas Par. Pol. Jury v. Britton (15
v. Gloucester (3 Bulst. 190) 337, 339
Wall. 566) 190, 193, 194, 199, 238,
v. Greenhalgh (L. R. 9 Q. B.
531
487)
1295 Terre Haute v. Beach (96 Ind. 143) 268
v. Griswold (17 N. J. Eq. 222) 394, v. Hudnut (112 Ind. 542)
13:27
397, 403 v. Lake (43 Ind. 480) 391, 521, 524
v. Henry (2 Pick. 397) 350, 371, 374, v. T. H. Water Works (94 Ind.
377, 378, 381
305)
672
2. Lake Shore &. M. S. R. Co.
v. Turner (36 Ind. 522) 808, 819, 945,
(45 Mich. 74)
1312
1220, 1221
v. Lambertville (43 N. J. Eq. Terre Haute & I. R. Co. v. Scott (74
107)
384, 523, 533
Ind. 29)
750
clx
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
Page
Page
Terre Haute & L. R. Co. 1. Bissell Thomas v. Scotland County (3 Dillon
(108 Ind. 113)
856
C. C.7)
630, 631
Terrett v. Sharon (34 Conn. 105) 1109, v. West Jersey R. Co. (101 U. S.
1110
70)
516, 678, 1191
v. Taylor (9 Cranch, 43) 112, 115, 655
v. White (12 Mass. 369) 299, 300
Terry v. New York (8 Bosw. 594) 1210 Thomason v. Ashworth (73 Cal. 73) 144
v. Wis. M. & F. Ins. Co. Bank
v. Ruggles (69 Cal. 465).
1007
(18 Wis. 87)
119 Thompson, Re (52 Ala. 98)
1009
Tesh v. Commonwealth (4 Dana,
v. Abbott (01 Mo. 176)
254
522)
492 v. Allen County (115 U. S. 550) 1040
Texas & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Rosedale
v. Bridgewater (7 Pick. 188) 1265
Street Ry. Co. (64 Tex. 80) 868
v. Carroll (22 How. 422) 394, 961
Texas Transp. Co. v. Boyd (67 Tex.
v. Floyd (2 Jones, L. 313) 898
153)
923, 956 v. Gibson (7 M. & W. 546) 447
Textor v. Balt. & O. R. Co. (59 Md.
v. Keokuk (61 Iowa, 187)
813
63)
212, 465
v. Moran (44 Mich. 602) 124, 660
Thacher v. Jefferson Co. Com’rs (13
v. Mt. Vernon (11 O. St. 688) 406
Kan. 182)
553 v. New York (11 N. Y. 115) 172, 177
Thatcher v. Adams County (19 Neb.
v. Nicholson (12 Rob. (La.) 320) 298
485)
1007 v. Northeastern Ry. Co. (3 L.T.
v. England (3 C. B. 254)
209
N. S. 618)
1298
Thayer v. Boston (19 Pick. 511) 176, 754, v. People (23 Wend. 537) 1089
854, 1183, 1187, 1188, 1189, 1195, v. Perrine (103 U. S. 806) 572, 635,650
1203, 1211, 1317 v. Perrine (106 U. S. 589) 561,572, 582
v. Montgomery Co. (3 Dillon
v. Pittston (59 Me. 545) 224, 234
C. C. 389)
575, 576
v. Schermerhorn (6 N. Y. 92) 154, 155,
v. Tyler (5 Allen, 95)
161
707, 958
Theobold v. Louisville, &c. Ry. Co.
v. Stickney (6 Ala. 579) 323, 326
(40 Alb. L. J. 336)
846 v. Sunderland Gas Co. (L. R. 2
Theological Sem. of
Auburn v.
Ex. D. 429)
821
Childs (4 Paige, 418) 661 v. Waters (25 Mich. 214)
656
Thetford's Case (12 Vin. Alir. 90) 488 v. Wiley (46 N. J. L. 476) 931
Thibodeaux v. Maggioli (4 La. An. Thompson, Mayor, v. Park Com’rs
73)
801
(44 Mich. 602)
124
Thicknesse v. Lancaster Canal Co. Thomson v. Boonville (62 Mo. 282) 957,
(4 M. & W. 472)
242
1224, 1229
Third Av. R. 2. New York (54 N. Y.
v. Lee County (3 Wall. 327) 149, 226,
159)
1097, 1098
235, 250, 561, 583, 586, 635
Third Municipality, &c. [See Muni-
v. Union Pac. R. Co. (9 Wall. 579) 67,
cipality No. 3.]
902
Third Nat. Bank of Syracuse v. Thorndike v. Boston (1 Met. 245) 278
Seneca Falls (15 Fed. R. Thornton v. Grant (10 R. I. 477) 170
783)
594 v. Smith (1 Wash. (Va.) 106) 507
Thirty-Second Street, Re (19 Wend. Thorpe . Brumfitt (L. R. 8 Ch. Ap.
128)
758
650)
885, 886
Thomas, Ex p. (71 Cal. 204)
904 Threadgill v Anson Co. Com'rs (99
v. Ashland (12 0. St. 124) 71, 80, 213,
N. C. 352)
1175
294, 507 Thurlow v. Bogart (15 U. C. C. P.1) 789,
v. Brooklyn (58 Iowa, 438) 1272
790
v. Burlington (69 Iowa, 140) 1149 Thurston v. Hancock (12 Mass. 220) 1230
v. Clay Co. Com’rs (5 Ind. 4) 84 v. St. Joseph (51 Mo. 510) 768, 1223,
v. Dakin (22 Wend. 9)
75
1230, 1319, 1327, 1329, 1332
v. Gaines (35 Mich. 166) 920, 935, 937, | Tidderley's Case (1 Sid. 14)
328
938, 976, 1989, 990 Tidewater Co. v. Coster (18 N. J. Eq.
v. Hot Springs (34 Ark. 553) 452
518) 703, 917, 920, 933, 937, 983,
v. Leland (24 Wend. 65) 125, 130
989
2. Mt. Vernon (9 Ohio, 290) 433, 487, Tie Loy, Re (26 Fed. R. 611)
397
497 Tierney v. Dodge (9 Minn. 166) 79, 143,
v. Port Hudson (27 Mich. 320) 190,
492, 499, 504, 509, 1126
194, 538 Tiffin v. McCormick (34 O. St. 638) 1308
v. Richmond (12 Wall. 349) 149, 195, v. Shawhan (43 0. St. 178)
678
394, 406, 518, 519, 529, 537, 563, Tifft v. Buffalo (82 N. Y. 204)
134
567 Tileson v. Newman (23 Vt. 421)
272
v. Ringwood Bd. (L. R. 9 Eq. 418) 745 Tillman v. People (12 Mich. 401) 745, 761
$
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
clxi
;
Page
Page
Tillmes v. Marsh (67 Pa. St. 512) 790 Toms v. Whitby (35 U.C. Q. B. 195;
Tillson v. Putnam Co. Com’rs (19
37 U. C. Q. B. 100) 1258, 1264
Ohio, 415)
1033 Tonawanda R. Co. v. Munger (5
Tilton v. N. 0. City R. Co. (35 La.
Denio, 255)
1284
An. 1062)
833 Tone v. Columbus (39 O. St. 281) 980
v. Sanbornton (55 N. H. 610) 272 v. New York (70 N. Y. 157) 537,558,
Times v. State (26 Ala. 165)
506
1194
Timothy v. Simpson (1 C. M. & R. Tone River Cons. v. Ash (10 B. &
757)
295
C. 349)
74, 75
Timson, Re (L. R. 5 Exch. 257) 295 Toomey v. London, B. & C. R. Co.
Tindley v. Salem (137 Mass. 171)
1177,
(3 7. B. N. 8. 146)
1262
1178, 1182, 1215, 1246, 1251 Topeka v. Gillett (32 Kan. 431)
Tinges v. Baltimore (51 Md. 600) 751, 757 v. Tuttle (5 Kap. 425)
1281
Tinkham v. Tapscott (17 N. Y. 144) 463 Topping v. Gray (7 Hill, 259)
352
Tinsley v. Kirby (17 S. C. 1) 298, 356 Topsham v. Rogers (42 Vt. 199) 539
Tinsman v. Belvidere Del. R. Co. (26 Torbush v. Norwich (38 Conn. 225) 1198,
N. J. L. 148)
94, 95
1199
Tintagel Bor., Re (2 Str. 1003) 1023 Toronto v. Bowes (4 Grant, 489) 514, 516
Tipling v. Texall (2 Bulst. 233) 37 v. Bowes (6 Grant, 1)
1105
Tippecanoe Co. Com’rs v. Cox (6 Torpedo Co. v. Clerendon (19 Fed.
Ind. 403) 241, 246, 250, 529, 568
R. 231)
1098
v. Lucas (93 U. S. 108)
104 Torrent v. Muskegon (47 Mich. 115) 146,
V. Reynolds (44 Ind. 509)
514
152, 211
Tipping v. St. Helen's Smelting Co. Torrey v. Milbury (21 Pick. 64) 53, 349
(4 B. & S. 608)
485 Totten v. Halligan (13 U. C. C. P. 567) 789
Tipton v. Jones (77 Ind. 307)
558 Totterdell v. Glazby (2 Wils. 266) 484
v. Norman (72 Mo. 380) 410, 488, 939 Touchard v. Touchard (5 Cal. 306) 108
v. Rogers Locomotive Works Tounier v. Municipality (5 La. An.
(103 U. S. 523)
672
298)
555
Tisdale v. Minnonk (46' Ill. 9) 485 Tower v. Rutland (56 Vt. 28)
761
v. Norton (8 Metc. 388) 1265, 1267 Towle v. State (3 Fla. 202)
1016
Titler v. Iowa County (48 Iowa, 90) 1173 Towles v. Chatham Co. Inf. Ct. Just.
Titus v. Northbridge (97 Mass. 258) 1278
(14 Ga. 391)
882
Tobacco Pipe Makers' Co. v. Wood- Town v. Blackberry (29 Ill. 137) 694
roffe (7 B. & C. 838)
486 Town Com’rs of A., &c. [See A.
Tobey v. Hudson (2 N. Y. Sup. 180) 1286
T. Com’rs, &c.]
v. Wareham (2 Allen, 594) 347 Town Council of A., &c.
[See A.
Todd v. Birdsall (1 Cow. 260)
321
T. Council, &c.]
v. Perry (20 U. C. Q. B. 649) 301 Towns v. Tallahassee (11 Fla. 130) 429
v. Pittsburg, Ft. W. & C. R. Co. Townsend, Re (34 N. Y. 174)
704
(19 O. St. 514)
750, 767
v. Des Moines (42 Iowa, 657) 1301
v. Troy (61 N. Y. 506) 1261, 1267, v. Everett (4 Ala. 607)
301
1284, 1296
v. Hoyle (20 Conn. 1) 531, 705, 807
Tolan v. Lansing (38 Mich. 315) 1181 Township of A., &c. [See A. Tp.,
Toledo & W. R. Co. v. Lafayette (22
&c.]
Ind. 262)
968 Tracy v. Swartwout (10 Pet. 80) 326
Toledo P. & W. R. Co. v. Chenoa (43 Trafton v. Alfred (15 Me. 258) 320
III. 209)
140, 808, 858 Trammell v. Russellville (34 Ark.
Toledo, W. & W. R. Co. v. Jackson-
105)
1157, 1187
ville (67 Ill. 37)
858 Transportation Co., &c. (20 N.
Tolland v. Willington (26 Conn. 578) 881,
Y. 381). (See American
882, 1258
Transp. Co., &c.];
Toll Bridge Co., &c. (17 Conn. 40).
U. S. 273; 107 U. S. 691;9
See Enfield Toll Br. Co.,
W. Va. 170.) [See Wheel-
&c.]
ing, P. & C. Transp. Co.,
(30 Conn. 380). [See New
&c.) (99 U. S. 635). (See
Haven & E. H. Toll Bridge
Northern Transp. Co., &c.]
Co., &c.]
Tranter v. Sacramento (61 Cal. 271) 1169,
Tolman v. Marlborough (3 N. H. 57) 1191
1294
Tomlin v. Dubuque, B. & M. R. Co. Traphagen 0, Jersey City (29 N. J.
(32 Iowa, 106)
171
Eq. 206)
819, 1123
Tomlinson v. Branch (15 Wall. 460) 953 Trask v. Maguire (18 Wall. 206) 952
Tompert v. Lithgow (i Bush, 176) 287, Treadway v. Schnauber (1 Dak. Ter.
330, 337, 339
236)
518
VOL. I. - K
(99
clxii
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
Page
Page
Treadwell v. Hancock Co. Com'rs Tucker v. Iredell Co. Jus. (13 Ired.
(11 O. St. 190) 43, 615, 618, 647,
L. 434)
323, 367
1173 v. Randolph (75 N. C. 267) 193
v. New York (1 Daly, 123) 1210, 1211 v. Rochester (7 Wend. 254) 1191
Treat v. Middletown (8 Conn. 243) 1007, v. Shorter (17 Ga. 620)
323
1017 v. Tower (9 Pick. 109)
816
Treise v. St. Paul (36 Minn. 526) 1279 v. Virginia City (4 Nev. 20) 217, 442
Trent & F. Road Co. v. Marshall Tuff v. Warman (2 C. B. N. s. 740;
(10 U. C. C. P. 336)
260
5 C. B. N. 8. 573)
1264
Trenton v. Shaw (10 Atl. R. 273; Tufts v. Charlestown (98 Mass. 583) 984
49 N. J. L. 339)
543 Tugman v. Chicago (78 Ill. 405) 396, 400,
Trenton & N. B. Turnp. Co.v. Am. &
401, 443
E. N. Co. (43 N. J. L. 381) 831 Tuley v. State (1 Ind. 500) 303, 304
Trenton Railroad Case ( Whart. Tullos v. Sedan (31 Kan. 165)
424
25). (See Phila. & T. R. Tupelo v. Beard (56 Miss. 532) 1154
Co., &c.]
Turnbull v. Alpena Sch. Dist. (45
Trenton Water P. Co. v. Raff (36
Mich. 496)
271
N. J. L. 335)
1222 Torner, Re (5 Ohio, 542) 1004, 1014
Trescott v. Waterloo (26 Fed. R.
v. Althaus (6 Neb. 64) 696, 974, 1151
592)
1157, 1190 v. Brantford (13 U. C. C. P. 109)
Trigally v. Memphis (6 Coldw. 382) 385,
1248
412, 507
v. Buchanan (82 Ind. 147) 1269, 1270
Trigg v. Glasgow (2 Bush, 594) 963 v. Clark County (67 Mo. 243) 300
Trimble v. Bucyrus (21 Alb. L. J. 76) v. Cruzen (70 Iowa, 202)
539
438 v. Dartmouth (13 Allen, 291) 1320
Tripp v. Lyman (37 Me. 250) 1261, 1302 v. Forsyth (3 $. O. E. R. 649) 1032
Tripp, Treas. v. Merch. Mut. F. Ins.
v. Indianopolis (96 Ind. 51) 1195, 1199,
Co. (12 R. I. 435)
969
1296
Trippe v. Frazier (4 H. & J. 446) 666 v. Newburgh (109 N. Y. 301) 1278,
Tritz v. Kansas City (84 Mo. 632) 1157,
1297, 1303
1173, 1279, 1283 v. Omaha (6 Neb. 54)
899
Trombley v. Humphrey (23 Mich.
v. People's Ferry Co. (21 Fed. R.
471)
697
90)
166, 748, 752
Trott v. Warren (11 Me. 227) 539 Turney v. Bridgeport (55 Conn. 412) 524
Trowbridge v. Albany (7 Hill, 429) 177 v. Chamberlain (15 Ill. 271) 659, 801
v. Brookline (144 Mass. 139) 820 Turnpike Co., &c. (5 Ind. 286).
v. Newark (46 N. J. L. 140) 290, 296
[See Wayne Bo., &c.] (72
Troy v. Atchison & N. R. Co. (13
Ind. 226). [See Driftwood,
Kan. 70)
376, 389
&c.] (11 Johns. 154). [See
v. Cheshire R. Co. (23 N. H. 83) 810,
Highland, &c.] (17 N. J.
L. 314). (See Bordentown,
v. Mut. Bank (20 N. Y. 387) 948
&c.) (96 U. S. 63). [See
v. Troy & L. R. Co. (49 N.Y.657) 1304,
St. Clair Co., &c.]
1313 Turpen v. Tipton Co. Com’rs (7 Ind.
Truax v. Pool (46 Iowa, 256)
268
172)
311
Truchelut v. Charleston C. Council Turrill v. Grattan (52 Cal. 97)
979
(1 N. & McC. 227) 134, 409, 485, Tuskaloosa v. Wright (2 Porter, 230) 382
507 Tutill v. West Ham L. Bd. of H. (L.
True v. Melvin (43 N. H. 503) 1056
R. 8 C. P. 447)
1265
Truesdale v. Peoria Grape Sugar Co. Tuttle v. Everett (51 Miss. 27) 1146, 1150
(115 Ill. 155)
855 v. Holyoke (6 Gray, 447) 1263
Truheart v. Addicks (2 Tex. 217) 281 2. State (4 Conn. 68)
475
Trumbull v. White (5 Hill, 46) 958 Twenty-Ninth Street, Re (1 Hill
Trumpler v. Bemerly (39 Cal. 490) 707
(N. Y.), 189)
758
Trustees of A., &c. (See A. Trs., &c.] Twiss v. Port Huron (63 Mich. 528) 544
Trustees of Schools of A., &c. [See Twogood v. New York (102 N. Y.
School Trustees, &c.]
216)
1297
Tubbesing v. Burlington (68 Iowa, Tyler v. Hudson (147 Mass. 609) 690, 697
691)
973 v. People (66 Ill. 322)
950
Tuckahoe Canal Co. v. T. & J. River
v. Sturdy (108 Mass. 196) 740
R. Co. (11 Leigh, 42) 430 Tyler's Ex. v. Eliz. & P. R. Co. (9
Tucker v. Aikin (7 N. H. 113) 321, 349
Bush, 510)
633
v. Eldred (6 R. I. 404)
816 | Tyrone Tp. Sch. Dir. v. Dunkle-
v. Hennecker (41 N. H. 317) 1264
berger (6 Pa. St. 31)
668
883
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
clxiii
Page
Page
Tyson v Halifax Sch. Dir. (51 Pa. Union Pac. R. Co. v. Smith (23 Kan.
St. 9)
234
745)
233
v. Milwaukee (50 Wis. 78) 1225, 1227 v. United States (99 U. S. 700) 115,
117. [See also Central
Branch, U. P., &c.]
U.
Union Pass. R. Co. v. Philadelphia
(47 Pa. St. 314)
Udall v. Brooklyn Trs. (19 Johns. 175) 203 v. Philadelphia (101 U. S. 528) 907
Uhl v. Shelby Co. Tax. Dist. (6 Lea, Union R. Co. v. Cambridge (11 Allen,
610)
251
287)
467
Uhrig v. St. Louis (44 Mo. 458) 933 Uniontown Bor. v. Commonwealth
Ulam v. Boyd (87 Pa. St. 477)
526
(34 Pa. St. 293)
1017
Uline v. N. Y. Cent. & H. R. R. Co. Union Tp. v. Gibboney (94 Pa. St.
(101 N. Y. 98) 855, 856, 876
534)
45
Underhill v. Calhoun (63 Ala. 216) 160, United Brethren Church v. Van Du.
102
sen (37 Wis. 54)
369
v. Manchester (45 N. H. 214) 1167 United States, Re (96 N. Y. 227)
720
v. Smith (Chip. (Vt.) 81) 1000 v. Addison (6 Wall. 291) 317, 319
v. Sonora Trs. (17 Cal. 172) 561 V. Addison (22 How. 174) 1024, 1074
Underwood v. Bailey (59 N. H. 480) 696 v. Balt. & O. R. Co. (17 Wall.
v. Brockman (4 Dana, 309) 1153
322) 93, 94, 108, 125, 129, 160,
v. Carney (1 Cush. (Mass.) 285) 888
951, 952, 1290
v. Green (42 N. Y. 140) 449, 450 v. Barker (2 Paine, 152)
321
v. Newport Lyceum (5 B. Mon.
v. Boice (2 McLean, 352)
321
130)
538 v. Boutelle (17 Wall. 604) 1047, 1048,
v. Stuyvesant (19 Johns. 186) 758
1051, 1061
Union v. Crawford (19 Conn. 331) 1172 v. Boyd (5 How. 29)
301
Union Bank v. State (9 Yerg. 490) 900 v. Bradley (10 Pet. 343) 297, 299
Union Build. Assoc. v. Chicago (61
v. Brooklyn (8 Fed. R. 473) 1032
Ill. 439)
994 v. Brown (9 How. 487)
312
Union Co. v. Peckham (12 Atl. R.
v. Chicago (7 How. 185) 697, 739, 750,
130)
757
756, 759
Union Co. Com’rs v. Mason (9 Ind.
v. City Bank of Columbus (21
97)
569
How. 356)
615
Union Depot Co. v. Brunswick (31
v. Clark County (96 U. S. 211) 1034
Minn. 297)
169 v. County Court (3 Fed. R. 1) 118
v. St. Louis (76 Mo. 393) 1140 v. Duluth (1 Dill. 469)
165
Union Ferry Co. Re (98 N. Y. 139) 826 v. Edmunds (3 Mackey, 142) 1010
Union Nat. Bank v. Matthews (98
v. Fanning Morris (Iowa), 348)
182
U. S. 628)
671 v. Fillebrown (7 Pet. 28)
376
v. New York (51 N. Y. 638) 1146, v. Fort Scott (99 U. S. 152) 196, 200,
1147
1033
Union Pac. R. Co. v. Buffalo County
v. Guthrie (17 How. 284) 1015
(9 Neb. 449)
206 v. Hart (Pet. (C. C.) 390)
785
v. Cheyenne (113 U.S. 516) 143, 148, v. Hodsen (10 Wall. 395)
299
152, 1121
v. Hoar (2 Mason C. C. 134) 797
v. Folfax Co. Com’rs (4 Neb.
v. Holly (3 Cranch, 656)
437
450)
575 v. Hudson (7 Cranch, 32)
332
v. Davis Co. Com’rs (6 Kan.
v. Johnson County (5 Dillon C. C.
256)
121, 626, 1060
207 n.)
1040
v. Dodge Com’rs (98 U. S. 541) 1147, v. Keokuk (6 Wall. 514) 1032, 1045
1149, 1150, 1154, 1155 v. Kirkpatrick (9 Wheat. U. S.
v. Hall (91 U. S. 343) 1057, 1058
735)
797
v. Lincoln County (1 Dillon, C.
v. Land Commissioners (5 Wall.
C. 314)
67, 902
563)
1015
v. Lincoln County (2 Dillon, C.
v. Lawrence (3 Dallas, 42)
1006
1107 v. Le Baron (19 How. 73)
297
v. Lincoln County (3 Dillon, C.
v. Lincoln County (5 Dillon C. C.
0. 300)
590
184)
1036, 1040
v. McShane (22 Wall. 444) 1156 v. Linn (15 Pet. 290) 297, 299
v. Merrick County (3 Dillon, C.
v. Macon Co. Ct. (99 U. S. 582) 946,
590
1028, 1033, 1034, 1035
v. Penniston (18 Wall. 5)
902 v. McKelden (McAr. & M. 162) 348,
v. Ryan (2 Wy. 408)
148, 152
350
C. 297)
C. 359)
clxiv
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
Page
Pago
United States v. Memphis (97 U. S. Upton v. Starr (3 Ind. 638)
321
284) 00, 105, 106, 207, 281, 932, Urmey's Ex. v. Wooden (1 0. St.
972, 1042
160)
608
v. Miller County Ct. (4 Dillon, Urquhart v. Ogdensburgh (97 N. Y.
233)
567
238)
1273, 1323
v. Mobile Port (12 Fed. R. 768) 118 | Utica v. Miller (02 Ind. 230)
567
v. New Orleans (17 Fed. R. 483) 1028 Utica Ins. Co. v. Scott (8 Cow. 708) 1089
v. New Orleans 31 Fed. R. 637) 152
v. New Orleans (98 U. S. 381) 674,
901, 939, 940, 946, 1028, 1030,
V.
1038
v. New Orleans (2 Woods, 230) 226 | Vail v. Beach (10 Kan. 214)
952
v. Oswego Tp. (28 Fed. R. 65) 1033 Vale Mills v. Nassau (63 N. H. 180) 1326
v. Ottawa Aud. (28 Fed. R. 407) 1030, Valentine v. St. Paul (34 Minn. 446) 1147
1032 | Valley Dist. Bd. of Ed. v. Alpena Tp.
v. Pacific R. Co. (120 U. S. 227) 1104
Bd. of Ed. (30 W. Va. 424) 272
v. Prescott (3 How. 678)
328 Valparaiso v. Gardner (07 Ind. 1) 203,
v. Railroad Br. Co. ( McLean,
205, 206, 550, 1109, 1113, 1116,
517)
696
1117
3. Seaman (17 How. 225) 1015 | Valpey v. Manley (1 C. B. 502) 1149
v. Silverman (4 Dillon C. C. Van Antwerp, Re (56 N. Y. 261) 90, 895,
224)
1045
912, 993
v. Thompson (98 U. S. 487) 797 | Vanarsdall v. State (65 Ind. 176) 677
v. Tingey (5 Pet. 115)
207 Vanblaricum v. State (7 Blackf. 209) 733
v. Union Pac. R. Co. (4 Dillon Vance v. F. & N. Bank (1 Blackf. 80) 08,
C. C. 479)
1063, 1071
138
v. Union Pac. R. Co. (91 U. S.
v. Little Rock (30 Ark. 435) 105, 147,
343)
862, 870
939, 1028
v. Union Pac. R. Co. (91 U. S. Vanderbilt v. Adams (7 Cowen, 840) 212,
72)
582
210, 465, 472
v. Vernon Co. Ct. (2 Cent. L. Vanderslice v. Philadelphia (103 Pa.
J. 771; 3 Dillon Ç. C. 281) 1066
St. 102)
1297, 1331
v. Wright (1 McLean, 609) 307, 300 Vandersmithi’s Case (10 Pa. Law J.
United States Bank, &c. (12 Wheat.
523)
788
64). [See Bank of U. S., Vanderwiele v. Taylor (65 N. Y.
&c.]
341)
1316, 1323
United States Distilling Co. v. Chi- Vandeveer v. Mattocks (3 Ind. 479) 295
cago (112 Ill. 19)
424 Vandine, Re (0 Pick. 187)
404, 441
United States Exp. Co. v. Ellyson Vandyke v. Cincinnati (1 Disney,
(28 lown, 370)
910
532)
445, 1202, 1297
University of Ala. v. Walden (16 Van Epps v. Mobile Com’rs' Ct. (26
Ala. 655)
313
Ala. 460)
1173
v. Winston (5 S. & P. 17) 103, 128 Van Hook v. Selma (70 Ala. 361) 424,
University of Md. v. Williams (9 G.
944
& J. 865) 97, 123, 241, 307, 308, Van Horn v. Des Moines (83 Iowa,
367
447)
1200
University of Mich. v. Detroit (12 Van Hostrup v. Madison City (1
Mich. 138)
624
Wall. 201) 151, 585, 503, 018, 620
University of Neb. v. McConnell (5 Van Keuren v. Johnson (3 Denio,
Neb. 423)
97, 103, 321
182)
321
University of N. Car. v. Maultsby (8 Van Ness v. Washington (4 Pet. 232) 770
Ired. Eq. 267)
108 Van Orsdall v. Hazard (3 Hill, 243) 278,
University, &c. (80 Ill. 333).
[See Northwestern Univer- Vanover v. Davis, Jus. Terrell Co.
sity, &c.]
Inf. Ct. (27 Gr. 354)
210, 1119
Updegraff v. Crans (47 Pa. St. 103) 862, Van Pelt v. Davenport (42 Iowa, 808) 807,
1095
1195, 1298, 1316, 1328
Updike v. Campbell (4 E. D. Smith, Van Riper v. Essex Pub. R. Bd. (38
570)
450
N. J. L. 23)
1222
Upham v. Worcester (118 Mass. 97) 734 Vansantv. Harlem Stage Co. (50 Md.
Upper Alloways Creek Tp. v. String
830)
(5 Halst. 323)
260 v. Roberts (3 Md. 119)
Upton v. So. Reading R. Co. (8 Cush. Van Sicklen v. Burlington (27 Vt. 70) 53
600)
731
807, 308
425, 940
202
217
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
CIXv
R. 749)
Page
Pago
Van Swartow v. Commonwealth (24 Village of A., &c. [See A. Village,
Pa. St. 131) 492, 501, 506
&c.]
Vantilburglı v. Shann (24 N. J. L. Villavoso v. Barthet (30 La. An. 247) 449,
740)
086
487
Van Valkenburgh v. Milwaukee (30 Vinal v. Dorchester (7 Gray, 421) 1262,
Wis. 338)
759
1315
Van Wert Bd. of Ed. v. Edson (18 Vincennes v. Richards (23 Ind. 381) 1221
0. St. 221)
769, 773 Vincennes University v. Indiana (14
Van Wickle ». Camden & A. R. Co.
How. 268) 68, 243, 244, 246
(14 N. J. L. 162)
707 | Vincent v. Lincoln County (30 Fed.
Van Wormer v. Albany (18 Wend.
1140
109)
443 v. Nantucket (12 Cush. 103) 53, 147,
Varden v. Mount (78 Ky. 86) 416, 418
221, 529
Varick v. New York (4 Johns. Ch. Vintners’ Co. v. Passey (1 Burr. 237) 2899,
53)
808, 1094, 1097
806, 404, 481, 486
v. Smith (5 Paige, 137) 694, 700, 703 Vionet v. Municipality (4 La. An. 42) 442
Varner v. Martin (21 W. Va. 534) 696 | Virginia v. Hall (96 III. 278)
991
2. Nobleborough (2 Me. 121) 566 Virginia & Tenn. R. Co. v. Washing-
v. St. Louis & C. R. Co. (55
ton County (30 Gratt. 471) 900,
Iowa, 677)
672
940
Varnham v. Council Bluffs (52 Iowa, Virginia Com’rs, Ex p. (112 U. S.
098)
1297
177)
1010
Vars v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co. (23 U. Virginia Coupon Case (114 U. S. 311).
C. C. P. 143)
885, 1270
(See Allen v. Balt. &0., &c.]
Vason v. Augusta (38 Ga. 542) 168, 291, Virginia City v. Chollar-Potosi Co.
438, 499, 500
(2 Nev. 86)
79, 140
v. So. Car. R. Co. (43 Ga. 031) 834 Visalia v. Jacobs (65 Cal. 434) 754
Vassault v. Austin (36 Cal. 091) 493 Visitors of St. John's Col. v. State
Vawter v. Franklin College (53 Ind.
(15 Md. 330)
103
88)
368, 373 Vogel v. New York (92 N. Y. 10) 1303
Verle v. Boston (135 Mass. 187) 1268 Volk v. Newark (47 N. J. L. 117) 397
Veazie v. China (50 Me. 518) 158, 224 Volkenning, Re (52 N. Y. 650)
89
v. Mayo (45 Me. 500 ; 49 Me. Von Hoftian v. Quincy (4 Wall. 535) 118,
156)
859
121, 250, 586,642, 042, 1027, 1028,
v. Penobscott R. Co. (49 Me.
1032, 1037, 1030
119)
1311, 1313 Von Phul v. Hammer (29 Iowa,
v. Rockland (68 Me. 511) 1143
222)
Venzie Bank v. Fenno (8 Wall. 533) 896 Vorrath v. Hoboken (49 N. J. L.
Veeder v. Lima (19 Wis. 280) 2:37, 644,
285)
1253
645, 647 Vosper v. New York (49 N. Y. Supr.
v. Little Falls (100 N. Y. 343) 1247,
Ct. 290)
1276
1258, 1268 | Vosse v. Memphis (9 Lea, 294) 971
Venice in Breed (65 Barb. 597) 584
v. Murdock (92 U. S. 494) 584, 593,
601, 002, 644
Ventura County v. Thompson (51
W.
Cal. 577)
707, 733
Vermilye v. Adams Express Co. (21 Wabash v. Alber (88 Ind. 428) 1222
Wall. 138)
661 Wabaunsee Co. Com’rs v. Mullen-
Vernon Soc. Trs. v. Hills (6 Cow.
backer (18 Kan. 129)
434
23)
304, 305, 365 v. Walker (8 Kan. 431)
1148
Verrill v. Minot (31 Me. 299) 1288 | Wachita, &c. [See Ounchita, &c.]
Verrior v. Sandwich (1 Sid. 305) 308 Waco v. Powell (32 Tex. 258)
471
Vespra v. Cook (26 U. C. C. P. 182) 790 Waddell v. New York (8 Barb. 95) 657,
Vick v. Vicksburg (1 Miss. 379) 743
220
Vicksburg v. Hennessey (54 Miss. Waddington v. St. Louis (14 Mo.
303)
1205, 1283
190)
166, 108
v. Lombard (51 Miss. 125) 193, 684 Wade v. Brantford (19 U. C. Q. B.
v. Marshall (59 Miss. 673)
757, 804
207)
1142, 1183
v. Tobin (100 U. S. 430)
165 v. Richmond (18 Gratt. 583) 267,
Victory v. Baker (67 N. Y. 366) 1312
1109, 1111
Vidal v. Phila., Girard's Ex., &c. (2 Wadleigh v. Gilman (12 Me. 403) 212,
How. 127)
162, 663, 664, 169,
216, 303, 472, 474
1115 v. Sutton (6 N. H. 15)
541
79, 84
clxvi
TABLE OF CASES CITED,
286,
Page
Page
Wadsworth v. Eau Claire Co. Sup. Waller v. Dubuque (69 Iowa, 541) 1202,
(102 U. S. 534)
641
1220
Waffle v. N. Y. Cent. R. Co. (58 Barb. Wallich v. Manitowoc (57 Wis. 9) 1218
413)
1333 | Walling v. Shreveport (5 La. An.
v. N. Y. Cent. R. Co. (53 N. Y.
660) 713, 1186, 1187, 1189, 1204
11)
1330 | Walnut Tp. v. Jordan (38 Kan. 562) 255,
Wager v. Troy Union, &c. R. Co. (25
552
N. Y. 526) 747, 791, 841, 842, 870 v. Rankin (70 Iowa, 65)
552
Wahle v. Reinbach (76 IIl. 322) 449 Walsh v. Augusta (67 Ga. 293) 203
Wain v. Philadelphia (99 Pa. St. 330)
v. Matthews (29 Cal. 123)
923
407 v. New York (41 Hun, 299; 107
Waite v. No. E. R. Co. (E. B. & E.
N. Y. 220)
1196
719)
1264 v. New York & B. Br. Trs. (96
Wakefield 2. Newport (60 N. H. 374) 1182
N. Y. 429)
1196
v. Pawtucket (12 R. I. 75) 1222, 1318 v. People (65 Ill. 58)
1134
v. People (17 Nich. 68)
971 Walston v. Nevin (128 U. S. 578) 932
v. Swampscott (1 Allen, 101) 1193, Walter v. Columbia (61 Ind. 24) 433
1202 Waltham v. Kemper (55 III. 346) 1173,
v. Walcott (19 Vt. 37)
361
1246, 1253
Walden v. Dudley (49 Mo. 419) 953 Waltman v. Rund (109 Ind. 366) 740
Waldo r. Wallace (12 Ind. 569) 292, 440, Walton v. Develing (61 Ill. 201)
493
1077
Waldraven v. Memphis (4 Coldw. Walworth Co. Bank v. Farmer's L.
431)
296, 314
& T. Co. (16 Wis. 629)
369
Waldron 2. Berry (51 N. H. 136) 324, Wamesit P. Co. v. Allen (108 Mass.
1202
352)
698
v. Haverhill (143 Mass. 582) 1187, Wammack v. Holloway (2 Ala. 31) 283,
1211
285, 509, 1078
v. Lee (5 Pick. 323)
272 Wanstead L. Bd. of H. v. Hill (13
Wales v. Muscatine (4 Iowa, 302) 162
C. B. N. S. 479)
449, 450
Walker v. Charleston C. Council (1 Wapello County Case (13 Iowa, 405)
Bailey Eq. 443)
1096
[See State v. Wapello, &c.]
v. Chicago (62 III. 286)
958 Ward, Re (52 N. Y. 395)
915
v. Cincinnati (21 O. St. 14)
229
v. Bartholomew (6 Pick. 409) 679
v. Cook (129 Mass. 577)
161 v. Hartford County (12 Conn.
v. Decatur County (67 Iowa,
404)
162, 1174
307)
1286 v. Jefferson (24 Wis. 342) 1257, 1260,
v. Eastern Counties Ry. Co. (6
1261, 1296
Hare, 544)
711 v. Little Rock (41 Ark. 526) 445
v. Hallock (32 Ind. 239)
325 v. Louisville (16 B. Mon. 184) 1167
v. Mad River & L. E. R. Co. (8
v. Maryland (12 Wall. 418) 902, 904,
Ohio, 38)
710
943
v. New Orleans (31 La. An. 828) 428 v. Morris (4 H. & McH. (Md.)
v. St. Louis (15 Mo. 563) 1148, 1150
340)
904
v. St. Paul (33 Minn. 87) 1297 v. Newark & P. Turnp. Co. (20
v. Springfield (94 III. 364) 905, 910
N. J. L. 323)
1170
v. State Harbor Coni’rs (17 Wall.
v. North Haven (43 Conn. 148) 1258
648)
170 v. State (48 Ala. 161)
426
v. Swartwout (12 Johns. 444) 328 v. State (31 Md. 279)
v. West Boylston (128 Mass. Warden v. Fond du Lac Sup. (14
550)
281
Wis. 618)
1107
Walkley v. Muscatine (6 Wall. 481) 1005, Wardin v. Chandler, Sec. Navy (122
1028, 1033, 1037, 1040
U. S. 643)
1048
Wall, Re (48 Cal. 279)
78, 386 Waring v. Mobile (24 Ala. 701) 269
Wallace v. Fee (50 N. Y. 694) 774 Warner v. Knox (50 Wis. 429)
959
v. Lawyer (54 Ind. 501) 161, 162 v. Mower (11 Vt. 385)
364
v. Menasha (48 Wis. 79) 1190, 1205 v. Myers (3 Or. 218)
v. Muscatine (49 G. Greene.
v. People (2 Denio, 272)
373)
1324 v. People (7 Hill, 81)
311
v. San Jose (29 Cal. 180) 149, 201, Warnock 0. Lafayette (4 La. An.
206, 208, 518
419)
358
v. Sharon Trs. (84 N. C. 164) 140, 674 Warren v. Charlestown (2 Gray, 84) 48,
v. Shelton (14 La. An. 498) 722, 909,
924 v. Chicago (118 Ill. 329)
927
902, 904
1078
311, 313
50, 77, 268, 487
!
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
clxvii
. . v
Page
Page
Warren 2. Grand Haven (30 Mich. Washington Co. Sup. v. Durant (9
24)
938, 990
Wall. 415) 1037, 1045, 1073
v. Henly (31 Iowa, 31) 895, 896, 913, Washington Park Com’rs, Re (56 N.
915, 919, 921, 976, 1224
Y. 144)
711, 712
2. Holyoke (112 Mass. 362) 1258 Washington University v. Rowse (42
v. Lyons City (22 Iowa, 351) 769, 770,
Mo. 308)
952
771, 773, 776, 795 Waterbury v. Laredo (68 Tex. 565) 180,
v. Portsmouth Sav. Bank (97
553, 1098
U. S. 110)
583 (14 Cal. 544). (See Natoma, &c.]
v. Post (97 U. S. 110)
583 Water Co., &c. (41 Ind. 364).
v. St. Paul & Pac. R. Co. (18
[See Indianapolis, &c.]
Minn. 384)
727 (31 N. J. L. 72). [See Jersey
v. Wis., &c., R. Co. (6 Biss. C. C.
City, &c.]
425)
683 (16 Wall. 566.) [See St. Paul, &c.]
v. Wright (3 Ill. App. 602) 1272, Waterloo v. Union Mill Co.(59 Iowa,
1273, 1301
437)
759, 762, 804
Warren Bor. v. Geer (117 Pa. St. Waterman v. New York (7 Daly,
207)
904
489)
316
Warren County v. Marcy (97 U. S. Waters v. Bay View (61 Wis. 642) 1322,
96)
583, 593
1331
Warren Co. Coni’rs v. State (15 Ind.
v. Leech (3 Ark. 110) 396, 469
250)
1012 2. State (1 Gill, 302)
323
Warren Co. Sup. v Patterson (56 Ill.
v. Waterman (2 Root, 214) 324
111)
671, 672 Watertown v. Cady (20 Wis. 501) 1032
Warrensburg v. Miller (77 Mo. 56) 945 Watertown Tr. v. Cowen (4 Paige,
Warsaw v. Duplap (112 Ind. 576) 1283,
)
763, 783
1297 v. Fairbanks (65 N. Y. 588)
88, 986
Warsop v. Hastings (22 Minn. 437) 280 v. Mayo (109 Mass. 315)
212, 473
Wartman r. Philadelphia (33 Pa. St.
v. Robinson (69 Wis. 230) 1053
202)
456, 457, 458, 462 Waterville v. Kennebec Co. Com’rs
Warwick '. Butterworth (17 Ind.
(59 Me. 80)
897
129)
534 Watkins v. Milwaukee (52 Wis. 98;
v. Mayo (15 Gratt. 528) 510, 716, 790,
55 Wis. 335)
914
793, 809, 1132 v. Zwietusch (47 Wis. 513) 914
Washburn v. Cass County (3 Dillon, Watson v. Aquackanomck Water Co.
C. C. 251)
575, 630
(36 N. J. L. 195)
707
v. Franklin (35 Barb. 597) 520 v. Kingston (114 N. Y. 88) 1318, 1326,
2. Oslıkosh (60 Wis. 453) 267, 974
1328
Washburn College v. Shawnee Co.
v. Mercer (8 Pet. 88)
637
Com’rs 18 Kan. 344)
952, 953
v. Pittsburgh & C. R. Co. (37 Pa.
Washburn Manuf. Co. v. Worcester
St. 469)
733
(116 Mass. 458)
1331 v. South Kingston (5 R. I. 562) 705
Washer v. Bullitt County (110 U. S.
v. Tripp (11 R. I. 98) 1304, 1315
558)
881 v. Turnbull (32 La. An. 856) 169, 174
Washington v. Cooly (4 Cranchi, C. Wattles v. Lapeer (40 Mich. 624) 947,
C. 103)
483
1146
v. Frank (1 Jones, L. 436) 476
v. People (13 Mich. 446)
322
v. Finley (10 Ark. 423)
138 Watts v. Carroll Par. Pol. Jury (11
v. Harvard (8 Cush. 66)
1110
La. An. 141)
1057, 1058
v. Meigs (1 McArthur, 53) 426 v. Scott (1 Dev. 291)
484
v. Nashville (1 Swan, 177) 466, 921, Waugh v. Leech (28 Ill. 488) 740, 743,
927, 984
807
v. Small (86 Ind. 462)
1283 Waupun v. Moore (34 Wis. 450) 473
v. State (13 Ark. 752) 898, 907, 908 Waverly v. Auditor (100 Ill. 354) 1107
Washington & G. R. Co. v. Gladmon Waverly W. W. Co., Re (16 Hun. 57) 712
(15 Wall. 401) 865, 1286, 1299 Waxahatchie v. Brown (67 Tex. 519) 198,
Washington Avenue, Re (69 Pa. St.
203
352) 721, 723, 897, 916, 917, 934, Wayland v. Middlesex Co. Com’rs
935, 936, 937, 975, 983, 989, 990
(4 Gray, 500) 697, 828
Washington Benef. Soc. v. Bacher Wayne County v. Benoit (20 Mich.
(20 Pa. St. 425)
337
176)
318, 319, 333
Washington Cemetery v. Prospect
v. Detroit (17 Mich. 390) 440, 479,
Park & C. I. R. Co. (68 N.
480, 533
690, 961 v. Miller (31 Mich. 447)
760
Y. 591)
clxviii
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
1
Page
Page
Wayne Co. Turnp. Co. v. Berry (5 Weisbrod v. Chicago & N. W.R. Co.
Ind. 286)
881, 882
(18 Wis. 35) 744, 745, 755, 774,
Weaver v. Devendorf (3 Denio, 117) 325,
792
391, 1127 Weisenberg v. Appleton (26 Wis. 56)
v. State (39 Ala. 535)
1107
1267, 1284, 1288, 1297, 1301
Weaver, &c. Trs. &c. (8 Ó. St. 564).
v. Truman (58 Cal. 63)
767
[See Paris Tp., &c.]
v. Winneconne (56 Wis. 667) 1175,
Webb v. Herne Bay Com’rs (L. R.
1252
5 Q. B. 642)
594, 1061 Weismer v. Douglas V. (64 N. Y. 91) 130,
v. Lafayette County (67 Mo.
233, 238, 704, 895, 897, 1011, 1139
353)
650 Welch v. Boston (126 Mass. 442) 212
v. Moler (8 Ohio, 552)
773 v. Bowen (103 Ind. 252)
391
v. Neal (5 Allen, 575)
662 v. Cook (97 U. S. 541)
902
v. New York (64 How. Pr. 10) 114 v. Hotchkiss (39 Conn. 140) 425, 427,
v. Port Bruce (19 U. C. Q. B. 626) 179
474
Webber v. Eastern R. Co. (2 Met. 149) 817 v. Mahaska Co. Sup. (23 Iowa,
v. Gray (24 Wend. 485)
324
199)
1015
v. Virginia (103 U. S. 344) 904 v. Marion (48 Ala. 291)
1150
Weber v. Cal. Harbor Com’rs (18
v. Milw. & St. P. R. Co. (27 Wis.
Wall. 57)
165, 166, 169, 170,
108)
732
171, 172, 178 v. People (2 Doug. 332)
505
v. Lee County (6 Wall. 210) 1032, v. Portland (77 Me. 384)
1301
1045 v. Post (99 Ill. 471)
235
v. Reinhard (73 Pa. St. 370) 917, 972 v. Ste. Genevieve (1 Dillon, 130) 242,
v. Traubel (95 Ill. 427)
946
244, 245, 250, 254, 351, 354, 356,
v. San Francisco (1 Cal. 455) 1123,
1045, 1049
1152
v. Stowell (2 Doug. 332) 450, 452, 453
v. Zimmerman (23 Md. 45) 1070, Weld v. Androscoggin Boom Prop.
1072
(6 Me. 93)
1170
Webster v. Chicago (62 Ill. 302) 927 | Welker v. Potter (18 O. St. 85) 72, 80,
v. Harwinton (32 Conn. 131) 25, 47,
708, 709, 945, 984
1109, 1110 Welland County v. Buffalo & L. H.
v. People (98 Ill. 343)
940
Ry. Co. (30 U. C. Q. B. 147;
Webster County v. Taylor (19 Iowa,
31 Ib. 539)
718
117)
567, 568 Wellcome ». Leeds (51 Me. 313) 851, 1314
Weckler v. Chicago (61 IlI. 142) 707, 722 Weller v. McCormick (47 N. J. L.
Weed v. Balston (76 N. Y. 329) 1204,
397)
1273
1265, 1282, 1285 Welles v. Battelle (11 Mass. 477) 371
v. Greenwich (45 Conn. 170) 1173, Wellington v. Gregson (31 Kan. 99) 1279,
1188
1283
Weeks v. Forman (16 N. J. L. 237) Wellington County v. Waterloo (8 U.
477, 496, 507
C. C. P. 258)
269
v. Gilmanton (60 N. H. 500) 138 v. Wilmot (17 U. C. Q. B. 82) 269
v. Milwaukee (10 Wis. 242) 910, 913, v. Wilson (14 U. C. C. P. 299;
919, 925, 953, 954, 956, 957, 961,
16 16. 124)
789, 790, 1240, 1248
962, 1227, 1323 Wells, Ex p. (21 Fla. 280)
72
2. Shirley (33 Me. 271)
1288 v. Atlanta (43 Ga. 67)
152, 512
Weeping Water v. Reed (21 Neb.
v. Burbank (17 N. H. 393)
76
764, 789 v. Burnham (20 Wis. 112)
544, 979
Weet v. Brockport (16 N. Y. 161) 108, v. McLaughlin (17 Ohio, 99) 807
1181, 1211, 1267, 1280, 1293 v. Mason (23 W. Va. 456) 1032
Wegman v. Jefferson (61 Mo. 55) 1224 v. Pontotoc Co. Sup. (102 U. S.
Wehn v. Gage Com'rs (5 Neb. 494) 43,
625) 195, 235, 236, 573, 630
1175 v. Weston (22 Mo. 384)
897
Weightman v. Clark (103 U. S. 256) 899 Wells Co. Road, Re (7 O. St. 16) 724
v. Washington Corp. (1 Black, Welsford v. Weidlein (23 Kan. 601) 434,
39) 108, 1172, 1173, 1199, 1280,
979
1296, 1301 Welsh v. Rutland (56 Vt. 228) 1199
Weil v. Ricord (24 N. J. Eq. 169) 441, v. St. Louis (73 Mo. 71)
1303
443 v. Wilson (101 N. Y. 254)
785
Weir v. St. Paul, S. & T. F. R. Co. (18 Welton v. Missouri (91 U. S. 275) 902, 904
Minn. 155)
726, 727 Wendell v. Brooklyn (29 Barb. 204) 316
Weis v. Madison (15 Ind. 241) 1221, 1319, v. Troy (39 Barb. 329; 4 Abb.
1327, 1329, 1834, 1535
Ct. App. 563) 1293, 1295, 1305
261)
!
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
clxix
Page
Page
Wentworth v. Hamilton (34 U. C. Q. Weston v. Syracuse (17 N. Y. 110) 199
B. 585)
537, 538 | West Orange v. Field (37 N. J. Eq.
v. Jefferson (60 N. H. 168) 1287
600)
1322
Werth v. Springfield (78 Mo. 107) 1224, West River Bridge Co. v. Dix (6
1242, 1243
How.507) 683, 689, 696, 701, 705,
Wertheimer v. Boonville (29 Mo. 254) 510
707
West v. Bancroft (32 Vt. 367) 818, 820 Wetherell v. Devine (116 Ill. 631) 906
v. Blake (4 Blackf. 234) 138, 705
v. Newington (54 Conn. 67) 747
v. Greenville (39 Ala. 69) 431 Wetmore v. Brooklyn Gas Co. (42
v. Lynn (110 Mass. 514)
1276
N. Y. 384)
170, 171
v. New York (10 Paige, 539) 1097 v. Story (22 Barb. 414) 365, 787
West Bath v. Lincoln Co. Com'rs
v. Tracy (14 Wend. 250) 1212
(36 Me. 74)
374 Wetumpka v. Wetumpka Wharf Co.
West Baton Rouge Pol. Jury v.
(63 Ala. 611)
138, 235
Michel (4 La. An. 84)
160 v. Winter (29 Ala. 651)
532, 575
Westberg v. Kansas City (64 Mo. Wewell v. Cincinnati (45 O. St. 407) 989
493)
333 Weyauwega v. Ayling (99 U. S. 112) 577,
West Carroll Par. v. Gaddis (34 La.
593
An. 928)
270, 769 Weyl v. Sonoma Val. R. Co. (69 Cal.
Westchester v. Apple (35 Pa. St.
202)
841
284)
1303, 1313 Weymouth, &c. Fire Dist. v. Nor-
West Chester Gas Co. v. Cliester
folk Co. Com’rs (108 Mass.
County (30 Pa. St. 232) 966, 967
142)
103
West Chicago Park Com’rs v. West. Whalen v. La Crosse (16 Wis. 270) 556,
Union Tel. Co. (103 Ill. 33) 122,
945
705 Whalin v. McComb (76 Ill. 49) 242, 480
West Covington v. Freking (8 Bush, Wharf Case, &c. (3 Bland. Ch. 383)
121)
757, 791
[See Dugan v. Baltimore,
Westerhaven v. Clive (5 Ohio, 136) 377
&c.]
Western Col. of Hom. Med. v Cleve- Wharton v. Birmingham Bor. (37
land (12 O. St. 376) 108, 529, 1258,
Pa. St. 371)
1154
1164, 1167 | Wheelen's Appeal (108 Pa. St. 162) 146,
Western Md. R. Co. v. Owings (15
529
Md. 199)
716 | Wheeler v. Bedford (54 Conn. 244) 763
Western Pa. R. Company's Appeal
v. Chicago (24 Ill. 105)
535
(99 Pa. St. 155)
851 v. Chicage (57 Ill. 415)
945
Western R. Co. v. Nolan (48 N. Y.
v. Cincinnati (19 O. St. 19) 217, 1164,
513)
1127
1166, 1198, 1199, 1207
Western Say. Fund Soc. v. Philadel-
v. Kirtland (27 N. J. Eq. 534) 695
phia (31 Pa. St. 175, 185) 95, 108, v. Philadelphia (77 Pa. St. 338) 229,
112, 118, 123, 124, 157, 522, 550,
613
627, 1162, 1180, 1206, 1211 v. Rochester & S. R. Co. (12
Western Union Tel. Co. v. Lieb (76
Barb. (N. Y.) 227)
968
Ill. 172)
905 v. Westport (30 Wis. 392) 1256,
v. Mass. Att'y-Gen. (125 U. S.530) 904,
1281, 1285
905 v. Worcester (10 Allen, 591) 1214,
v New York (38 Fed. R. 552) 830
1317, 1331
v. Philadelphia (22 W. N. C. 39) 830 Wheeling v. Black (25 W. Va. 266) 304,
r. Texas (105 U. S. 460)
904
481, 498
Westfall v. Hunt (8 Ind. 174) 762, 735, v. Campbell (12 W. Va. 36) 803
765 Wheeling, P. & C. Transp. Co. r.
Westfield v. Mayo (122 Mass. 100) 1313
Parkersburg (107 U. S. 691) 165,
West Gwillimbury v. Hamilton & N.
1121
W. R. Co. (23 Grant, 383) 1109 v. Wheeling (99 U. S. 273) 965
West Jersey R. Co. v. Cape May
v. Wlieeling (9 W. Va. 170) 965
S. L. R. Co. (34 N. J. Eą. Wheelock v. McDowell (20 Neb. 442) 312
164)
868 v. Noopan (108 N. Y. 179) 855, 856,
Westlake v. St. Louis (77 Mo. 47) 1150
877
West Mahanoy Tp. v. Watson (116 Whicker 2. Hume (14 Beav. 509) 655
Pa. St. 344)
1262 | Whidden v. Drake (5 N. H. 13) 162
Weston v. Arnold (L. R. 8 Ch. App. Whitaker v. Eighth Av. R. Co. (51
1084)
224
N. Y. 295)
865
v. Charleston C. Council (2 Pet.
[See also Whittaker, &c.]
449)
896, 897, 902) Whitby v. Flint (9 U. C. C. P. 449) 301
clxx
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
Page
Page
Whitby v. Harrison (18 U. C. Q. B. Whittaker v. West Boylston (97
603)
260, 301
Mass. 273)
1285, 1300
White v. Bayonne (49 N. J. L. 311) 397 Whittier v. Varney (10 N. H. 291) 371
0. Bond County (58 Ill. 297) 1173, 1 Wichita & W. R. Co. v. Fechheimer
1246, 1282
(36 Kan. 45)
847
v. Charleston C. Council (2 Hill Wickliffe v. Lexington (11 B. Mon.
(S. C.) 571)
1166, 1174
155)
757
v. Chowan Co. Com’rs (90 N. C. Wicks v. De Witt (54 Iowa, 130) 1327
437)
41, 1173 | Wider v. East St. Louis (56 Ill. 133) 906,
v. Cower (4 Paige, 510)
757
927
v. Flannigain (1 Md. 525) 758, 786, Wier v. Bush (4 Litt. 433) 303, 304
787 v. St. P., S. & T. F. R. Co. (18
v. Fuller (39 Vt. 193)
123, 135
Minn. 169)
732
v. Godfrey (97 Mass. 472) 746, 791, Wiggin v. New York (9 Paige, 16) 153
817 | Wiggins v. Chicago, (68 Ill. 372) 904
v. Hindley L. Bd. of H. (L. R.
v. McCleary (49 N. Y. 346) 757
10 Q. B. 219)
1206, 1214 v. Philadelphia (2 Brews. 444) 547
v. Kent (11 Ohio St. 550) 213, 294, Wiggins Ferry Co. v. E. St. Louis
456, 809
(102 Ill. 560)
424
v. Levant (78 Me. 568)
312 v. East St. Louis (107 U. S. 365) 966
v. Lincoln (5 Neb. 505) 88, 1142 Wigon v. Pilkington (1 Keble, 597) 327
v. McKeesport (101 Pá. St. 394) 812, Wilbrand v. Eighth `Av. R. Co. (3
815
Bosw. 314)
864
v. Nashville (2 Swan, 364) 155, 396, Wilbur v. Taunton (123 Mass. 522) 1219
400, 401, 722, 920, 978, 984 Wilcox v. Chicago (107 Ill. 334) 1198
v. New Orleans (15 La. An. 667) 521, v. Deer Lodge County (2 Mont.
543
574)
575
v. New York (4 E. D. Smith, 563) 318 v. Hemming (58 Wis. 144) 416, 418
v. People (94 III. 604) 912, 924
v. Smith (5 Wend. 233)
321
v. Phillipston (10 Met. 108) 320, 1193 Wild v. Deig (43 Ind. 455)
374, 701
v. Polk County (17 Iowa, 413) 316 v. Paterson (47 N. J. L. 406) 1198,
v. Quincy (97 Mass. 430) 1316
1199, 1253
v. Smith (37 Mich. 291)
760 Wilde v. New Orleans (12 La. An.
v. Stamford (37 Conn. 587) 86
15)
1189, 1190
v. Tallman (26 N. J. L. 67) 222, 290, Wilder v. Chicago (26 Ill. 182) 296
416, 419, 420, 421 v. Savannah (70 Ga. 760)
971
v. Vt. & Mass. R. Co. (21 How. Wildy v. Waslıburn (16 Johns. 49) 1125
575)
560, 582 Wiles v. Hoss (114 Ind. 371)
522, 959
v. Washington (2 Cranch C. C. Wiley v. Bluffton (111 Ind. 152) 140
337)
483 v. Brimfield (59 Ill. 306)
239
v. Yazoo City (27 Miss. 357)
v. Minneapolis Bd. of Ed. (11
1161, 1225
Minn. 371)
561
Whitehead v. Lowell (124 Mass. 281) 1302 v. Owens (39 Ind. 429)
970
Whitehouse v. Fellowes (10 C. B.
v. Parmer (14 Ala. 627)
902, 904
N. S. 765) 1214, 1215, 1220 v. Silliman (62 Ill. 170) 280, 564, 636
Whitely v. Lansing (27 Mich. 131) 993 / Wilhelm v. Cedar County (50 Iowa,
Whiteside v. People (26 Wend. 634) 362
254)
540, 542, 554
Whitfield v. Longest (6 Ired. 268) 418, Wilkes 2. Dinman 7 How. 89) 324
419, 421, 422, 904 v. New York (79 N. Y. 621) 1151
Whithorn v. Thomas (7 M. & G. 1) 379 Wilkesbarre's Appeal (109 Pa. St.
Whiting v. Boston (106 Mass. 89) 713, 715,
554)
203
1093, 1124, 1125 Wilkesbarre Hospital v. Luzerne
v. New Haven (45 Conn. 303) 986
County (84 Pa. St. 55) 229
v. Potter (2 Fed. R. 517)
594 Wilkey v. Pekin (19 Ill. 160)
965
v. Quackenbush (54 Cal. 306) 912 Wilkin v. St. Paul (33 Minn. 181) 815
v. Sheboygan & F. R. Co. (25
v. St. Paul & Pac. R. Co. (16
Wis. 167)
225, 229, 573
Minn. 271)
709
Whitlock v. West (26 Conn. 406) 486 Wilkins v. Detroit (46 Mich. 120) 959
Whitney 1. Clifford (46 Wis. 138) 1306 Wilkinson v. Albany (28 N. H. 9)
443
v. Milwaukee(57 Wis. 639) 1273 v. Cheatham (43 Ga. 258)
896
Whitson v. Franklin (34 Ind. 392) 482, v. Leland (2 Pet. 627)
637
857, 858 v. Peru (61 Ind. 1)
594
Whitsett v. Union D. & R. Co. (10
v. Providence Bank (3 R. I. 22) 1005
Col. 243)
794 Will Co. Sup. v. People (110 Ill. 512) 906
1157,
I
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
clxxi
Page
Page
Willard v. Comstock (58 Wis. 565) 1107 Williams v. Shelby Co. Tax Dist. (16
v. Killingworth (8 Conn. 247) 149,
Lea, 531)
1280
349, 403
v. Smith (2 Hill (N. Y.), 301) 583
v. Newbury (22 Vt. 458) 1270, 1314, v. Stein (38 Ind. 89)
277
1315 Williamson v. Cass County (84 III.
v. Newburyport (12 Pick. 227) 48, 53,
361)
725
54, 147, 150, 360, 524 v. Commonwealth (4. B. Mon.
v. Presbury (14 Wall. 676) 919
146) 477, 478, 484, 497, 500, 505
v. Sherborne (8 Atl. R. 735) 1251 v. Keokuk (44 Iowa, 88) 88, 639, 1034
Willard's Appeal (4 R. I. 597) 329. 333 v. Love (52 Tex. 335)
284
Willcocks, Re (7 Cow. 402) 343, 357, 360 v. N. J. So. R. Co. (29 N. J. Eq.
Willett v. Bellville (11 Lea, 1)
72
311)
969
Willey v. Allegheny (118 Pa. St. 490) 169, Williamsport v. Commonwealth (84
179, 264, 1205, 1206
Pa. St. 487) 184, 186, 192, 193,
v. Ellsworth (64 Me. 57) 1257
564, 812, 818, 988, 1007
v. Greenfield (30 Me. 452) 566 v. Kent (14 Ind. 306
945
William & Anthony Streets, Re (19 Willimantic Sch. Soc. v. Windham
Wend. 678)
730, 920
Sch. Soc. (14 Conn. 457) 270
Williams, Re. (4 Ark. 537) 717, 1132 Willis v. Booneville (28 Mo. 543) 507
v. Augusta C. Council (4 Ga.
v. Legris (45 Ill. 289) 222, 419
509) 393, 397, 472, 479, 496, 499, Willoughby v. Jenks (20'Wend. 96) 747,
500, 507
758
v. Boardman (9 Allen, 570) 162 Wilmington v. Horn (2 Harring. 190) 300
v. Cammack (27 Miss. 209) 722, 896, v. Yopp (71 N. C. 76)
933
919, 933 Wilmington Com’rs v. Roby (8 Ired.
v. Carwadine (4 B. & A. 621) 209
L. 250)
898, 904
v. Clinton (28 Conn. 264) 1258, 1283, Wilson, Re (32 Minn. 145) 432, 1128, 1129
1300 v. Atlanta (60 Ga. 473) 1259, 1284
v. Cooper Co. Com. Pl. J. (27 Mo.
v. Berkstresser (45 Mo. 283)
1011
225)
1010 v. Blackbird Cr. Marsh Co. (2
v. Davidson (43 Tex. 33)
145
Pet. 251)
705
v. Detroit (2 Mich. 560) 722, 898, v. Burks (71 Ga. 862)
1131
917, 921, 942, 959, 971, 976, 977, v. Charlestown (8 Allen, 137) 1260,
984, 985, 1116
1263, 1286, 1300
v. Dunkirk (6 Lans. 44)
1191 v. Chester Sch. Dist. (32 N. H.
v. First Pres. Church in Cinc. (1
118)
44, 539, 540, 541
0. St. 478)
738, 739, 773 v. Goodman (4 Hare, 54)
324
v. Grand Rapids (59 Mich. 51) 1157 v. Granby (47 Conn. 59) 882, 1253
v. Grant Co. Ct. (26 W. Va. 488) 1117 v. Halifax (L. R. 3 Ex. 114) 1258
v. Kenney (98 Mass. 142)
162 v. Hardesty (1 Md, Ch. 66) 637
v. Larkin (3 Denio, 114)
348 v. Huntingdon Co. Com’rs (7
v. Lincoln Co. Com'rs (35 Me.
W. & S. 197)
675, 1030
345)
1056 v. Inloes (11 G. & J. 351) 166, 172,
v. Lunenburg Sch. Dist. (21
177
Pick. 75) 347, 355, 356, 371, 953, v. Jefferson County (13 Iowa,
1147
181)
882, 1172, 1174
v. Natural Br. Pl. R. Co. (21
v. Neal (23 Fed. R. 129)
570
Mo. 580)
342 v. New Bedford (108 Mass. 261) 1163,
2. New Orleans (23 La. An.
1206, 1211
507)
1167 v. New York (1 Denio, 595) 158, 320,
v. New Orl., M. & F. R. Co. (60
1157, 1158, 1220, 1319, 1320, 1323,
Miss. 680)
721
1324, 1325, 1329, 1331, 1332, 1335
v. New York (105 N. Y. 419) 165, 172 v. Poole (33 Ind. 443)
991
v. N. Y. & N. H. R. Co. (39
v. Salamanca (99 U. S. 499) 593, 630
Conn. 509)
750 v. Sexon (27 Iowa, 15) 752, 755
v. N. Y. Cent. R. Co. (16 N. Y.
v. Wheeling (19 W. Va. 323) 1279,
97) 792, 841, 842, 844, 870
1283, 1287, 1303, 1305, 1306
v. Peyton's Lessee (4 Wheat. Wilson County v. Third National
77)
517
Bank of Nashville (103 U. S.
v. Pinney (25 Iowa, 436) 1107
770)
582
2. Richards (3 C. & K. 81) 865 Wilton v. Falmouth (15 Me. 476) 279
v. Roberts (88 III. 13) 239, 240, 638 Wimbledon Local Bd. v. Croydon R.
v. Sacramento Co. Sup. (65 Cal.
S. A. (L. R. 32 Ch. D. 421)
160)
1131
1326
865 Wilton
clxxii
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
551)
Page
Page
Winants v. Bayonne (44 N. J. L. Wolf v. Lansing (53 Mich. 367) 431, 434
114)
155 v. Philadelphia (105 Pa. St. 25) 914
Winbigler v. Los Angeles (45 Cal. Wolff v. New Orleans (103 U. S. 358) 118,
36) 1169, 1252, 1253, 1294
251, 942
Winch v. Thames Cons. (L. R. 7 Wolfe v. Covington & L. R. Co. (15 B.
C. P. 471)
179
Mon. 404)
846, 848, 863
v. Thames Conservators (L. R. Wood v. Bartling (16 Kan. 109) 279
9 C. P. C. 378)
1156 v. Brooklyn (14 Barb. 425) 406, 1098
Winckler v. Great Western R. Co.
v. Draper (24 Barb. 187)
1112
(18 U. C. C. P. 250)
1300
v. Election Com’rs (58 Cal. 561) 141,
Windham v. Portland (4 Mass. 384) 269,
143
271, 2733 v. Jefferson Co. Bank (9 Cow.
Windsor v. Hallett (97 Ill. 204) 572
194)
77, 139, 380, 381
Wingate v. Enniskillen Oil Ref. Co.
v. Louisiana City (5 Dillon C.
(14 U. C. C. P. 379)
538
C. 122)
635, 1140, 1144
Winn v. Lowell (1 Allen, 177) 1265, 1270, [See also Louisiana City 2.
1273, 1284
Wood (102 U. S. 294).]
v. Macon (21 Ga. 275)
133, 542
v. Lynn (1 Allen, 108)
529
v. Rutland (52 Vt. 481)
1331 v. Macon & B. R. Co. (68 Ga.
Winnetka v. Prouty (107 Ill. 218) 744
539)
767
Winnsboro v. Smart (11 Rich. L.
v. Mears (12 Ind. 515) 785, 884, 888,
459
1309
Winona v. Huff (11 Minn. 119) 738, 743, v. Mitchell Indep. Sch. Dist. (44
757, 763, 783, 789
Iowa, 27)
1307
Winona & St. Peter R. Co. v. Blake
v. Nat. Water W. Co. (33 Kan.
(94 U. S. 181)
92
590)
742, 743, 828
Winpenny v. Philadelphia (65 Pa. St.
v. Oxford (97 N. C. 227)
574
135)
179 v. Peake (8 Johns. 54)
1125
Winship v. Enfield (42 N. H. 197) 1255, v. Searl (Bridg. 139)
534
1263, 1264, 1270, 1278, 1314 v. Stourbridge Ry. Co. (16 C. B.
Winslow v. Perquimans Co. Com'rs
N. 8. 222)
688
(64 N. Č. 218) 673, 675, 1139 v. Veal (5 B. & A. 454)
745
Winston v. Mosely (35 Mo. 146) 1010, 1023 v. Ward (3 Exch. (W. H. & G.)
v. Taylor (99 N. C. 210)
944
748)
1316
v. Westfeldt (22 Ala. 760)
583 v. Waterville (5 Mass. 294) 534
Winter v. Montgomery C. Council Woodbridge v. Detroit (8 Mich. 274) 919,
465 Ala. 403 ; 79 Ala. 481) 573,
921, 971
954, 962, 998, 1145 v. Hall (47 N. J. L. 388)
323
Winthrop v. Farrar (11 Allen, 398) 473 Woodbury v. Dist. Columbia (5
Winzer v. Burlington (68 Iowa, 279) 1149
Mackey, 127)
1297
Wirt v. McEmery (21 Fed. R. 233) 795 2. Hamilton (6 Pick. 101)
53
Wisby v. Boute (19 O. St. 238) 738, 739, Woodfolk v. Nashville & C. R. Co.
740, 761
(2 Swan, 422)
733
Wisconsin v. Duluth (2 Dillon C. C. Woodrufi v. Neal (28 Conn. 168) 747,771,
406)
455
Wisconsin River Impr. Co. v. Lyons
v. No. Bloomfield Gravel Co. (16
(30 Wis. 61)
170
Fed. R. 25)
1216
Wistar v. Philadelphia (80 Pa. 505) 917, v. Parham (8 Wall. 139)
902, 903
936 v. Stewart (63 Ala. 206)
324, 408
v. Philadelphia (80 Pa. 112) 960 v. Trappall (10 How. 206)
118
v. Philadelphia (111 Pa. St. 604) 936 Woods v. Colfax Co. Com’rs (10
Wigwall v. Hall (3 Paige, 313) 172
Neb. 552)
1173
Witham v. Portland (72 Me. 539) 1257 v. Henry (55 Mo. 560)
Witherley v. Regent's Canal Co.(12
v. Lawrence County (1 Black,
C. B. N. S. 2)
1264
386) 238, 581, 593, 614, 617, 619,
Withers v. Buckley (20 How. 84) 683
647
Withorn v. Thomas (7 M. & G. 1) 279 Woodson v. Skinner (22 Mo. 13) 677,771,
Wixon v. Newport (13 R. I. 454) 1174
776
Woelpper v. Philadelphia (38 Pa. St. Woodstock v. Gallup (28 Vt. 587;
203)
462
29 Vt. 347)
Wolcott v. "Lawrence County (26 Woodward r. Calhoun County Sup-
Mo. 272)
1143
ervisors (2 Cent. L. J. 396) 631,
Wolf, Re (14 Neb. 24)
350, 891
v. Keokuk (48 Iowa, 129)
915 v. Sarsons (L. R. 10 C. P. 743)
281
776, 790
72, 267
701, 715
632, 633
.
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
clxxiii
v.
Page
Woodyer v. Hadden (5 Taunt. 125)
) 195,
756
513, 518, 1245
Woolf 1. Beard (8 C. & P. 373) 1264 Wyandotte & K. C. Br. Co. v. Wyan-
Woolrich v. Forrest (1 Pa. St. 115) 260
dotte Co. Com’rs (10 Kan.
Woolsey, Re (95 N. Y. 135)
99, 100
326)
1058
Worcester v. Eaton (13 Mass. 371) 661, Wyandotte City Cem. Assoc. v.
671
Meineger (14 Kan. 312) 704, 755
v. Walker (9 Gray, 78)
294 Wyandotte Co. Com’rs First
Worcester County v. Worcester (116
Presb. Church (30 Kan.
Mass 193)
900, 950, 966
620)
752
Worden v. New Bedford (131 Mass. Wyatt v. Harrison (3 B. & Ad. 871) 1228
23)
1211, 1212 Wyley v. Wilson (44 Vt. 404) 347
Work v. State (2 0. St. 296)
507 Wylie v. Mo. Pac. R. Co. (MSS.) 650
Workingham v. Johnson (Cas. temp.
v. Wausau (48 Wis. 506) 1287
Hardw. 285)
404 Wyman ». New York (11 Wend. 487) 757
Worley v. Columbia 88 Mo. 106) 1182, Wyncoop v. Cong. Soc. of Bellevue
1196
(10 Iowa, 185)
208
v. Harris (82 Ind. 39)
139 | Wynehamer v. People (13 N. Y.
Worrell v. Munn (5 N. Y. 229) 526
429)
86, 1164
Worsley v. Municipality (9' Rob. Wynne v. Wright (1 Dev. & B. L.
(La.) 324)
165, 166, 1152
19)
423, 904
Worster v. Canal Br. Prop. (16 Pick.
541)
1296
X.
Worth v. Kayetteville Com’rs (1
Winst. (N. C.) Pt. 2, 70) 969, Xiques v. Bujac (5 La. An. 499) 759, 764,
1119
767, 793
Worthington v. Covington (82 Ky.
265)
521
Y.
v. Jeffries L R. 10 C P. 379) 1057
Worthley v. Steen (43 N. J. L. 542) 140, Yahn v. Ottumwa (60 Iowa, 429) 1284
1022, 1076 Yale v. Hampden & B. Turnp. Co.
Wortley v. Nottingham (21 L. T.
(18 Pick. 357)
1301
N. S. 582)
457 | Yarish v. Cedar Rap., I. F. & N. R.
Wragg v. Penn. Tp. (94 III. 11) 752
Co. (72 Iowa, 556)
240
Wray :. Ellis (1 E. & E. 276)
478 Yarmouth v. North Yarmouth (34
v. Pittsburgh (46 Pa. St. 365) 914
Me. 411)
93, 136
v. Toke (12 Q. B. 492)
411 Yarmouth Bor., Re (2 Br. & G. 292) 75
Wreford v. People (14 Mich. 41) 441, 445 Yarnold v. Lawrence (15 Kan. 126) 543,
Wren v. Indianapolis (96 Ind. 206) 1065
545
Wright v. Bishop (88 Ill. 302) 240, 1111 | Yates v. Judd (18 Wis. 118) 748, 759
v. Boston (9 Cush. 233) 933, 987, 988, v. Milwaukee (10 Wall. 497) 169, 170,
989, 1147
171, 172, 177, 449, 456, 748
v. Chicago (20 Ill. 252)
941 v. Milwaukee (12 Wis. 752) 403, 464
v. Chicago (46 Ill. 44)
933 Yeager, Re (11 Gratt. 665)
1006
v. Defrees (8 Ind. 298)
391 Yeakel v. Lafayette (48 Ind. 116) 814
v. Fawcett (4 Burr. 2044) 1069 | Yeatman v. Crandell (11 La. An.
v. Holbrook (52 N. H. 120) 324, 1210,
229)
924, 933, 956
1306 Yeaw v. Williams (15 R. I. 20) 1255
v. Hughes (13 Ind. 113)
520 Yick Wo, Re (68 Cal. 294) 397,472, 486
v. Linn (9 Pa. St. 433) 659, 668 v. Hopkins (118 U. S. 356) 397
v. M. E. Church (1 Hoff. Ch. York v. Spellman (19 Neb. 357) 1296
225)
661 York Bor. v. Forscht (23 Pa. St. 391) 208,
v. Stockman (59 Ind. 65)
43
437
v. Templeton (132 Mass. 49) 1284 v. Welsh (117 Pa. St. 174) 695
v. Victoria (4 Tex. 375) 672, 751 | York Buildings Co. v. Mackenzie (8
v. Wilmington (92 N. C. 156) 1229,
B. P. C. 42)
514
1328 Yost’s Report (17 Pa. St. 524) 695
Wrought Iron Bridge Co. v. Utica Young v. Bank of Alex. (4 Cranch,
(17 Fed. R. 316)
719
138
Wulflange v. McCollom (83 Ky. 361) 1012 v. Boston (104 Mass. 95)
1116
Wurts v. Hoagland (114 U. S. 606) 932 v. Buckingham (5 Ohio, 485) 343, 360
Wyandotte v. Corrigan (25 Kan. 21) 847 v. Camden County (19 Mo. 309) 563
v. Gibson (25 Kan. 236)
1258 v. Charleston (20 S. C. 116)
v. Wood (5 Kan. 603)
80, 82
1252
384)
1248,
clxxiv
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
Page
Z.
Young v. Clarendon Tp. (26 Fed. R.
Page
805)
623, 625 Zabriskie v. Cleveland, C. & C. R.
v. Clarendon Tp. (132 U. S. 340) 1028
Co. (23 How. 381) 77, 226
v. Edgefield Road Com’rs (2 N.
v. Jersey City & B. R. Co. (13
& McC. 537) 323, 1169, 1172,
N. J. Eq. 314) 454, 850, 855
1174 Zanesville v. Richards (5 Ohio St.
v. Harrison (17 Ga. 30)
729
589)
908, 939, 940, 962
v. Harvey (16 Ind. 314) 1312 Zanone v. Mound City (103 Ill. 552) 400,
v. Leedon (67 Pa. St. 351) 1321
434, 1006
v. New Haven (39 Conn. 435) 1269 Zeigler v. Hopkins (117 U. S. 683) 707,
v. St. Louis (47 Mo. 492) 395
979, 1123
v. Yarmouth (9 Gray, 386) 830, 1130, Zettler v. Atlanta (66 Ga. 195) 1207
1316 Zimmerman ~. Snouden (88 Mo. 218) 979
Youngblood v. Sexton (32 Mich. 406) 425, Zinc Co., &c. (117 Ill. 411). [See
432, 970, 971, 1121
Matthiesen, &c.]
Young Men's Soc. v. Detroit (3 Mich. Zoeller v. Kellogg (4 Mo. App. 163) 732
172)
953 Zottman v. San Francisco (20 Cal.
Youngs v. Hall (9 Nev. 212) 105, 120,
96)
521, 541, 545, 945
896 Zwietusch v. Milwaukee (55 Wis.
Youngstown v. Moore (30 O. St. 133)
369)
914
1226 Zylstra v. Charleston (1 Bay, 382) 412, 413,
415, 437, 441, 497, 506, 507, 1132
COMMENTARIES
ON THE LAW OF
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
A TREATISE
ON THE
LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
CHAPTER I.
MUNICIPAL INSTITUTIONS. INTRODUCTORY HISTORICAL VIEW.
MUNICIPAL ABUSES. REMEDIES SUGGESTED,
§ 1. As this treatise is designed strictly for the practising lawyer,
it does not fall within its scope to give a detailed account of the
origin and rise of cities and towns, or to trace minutely the history
of the rights, powers, and jurisdiction with which they are now gen-
erally invested. Such inquiries more appropriately belong to the
legal antiquary, to the historian, or to the general scholar; and yet
a brief historical survey of municipalities will conduce to a more
intelligent understanding, even in its practical bearings, of the sub-
ject of which it is proposed to treat.1 The existence of towns and
cities, and probably the exercise by them, to a greater or less ex-
tent, of local jurisdiction, may be ascribed to a very remote period.
PHENICIA and EGYPT were noted for their large and splendid
1 Mr. Dicey has some just observations Dicey, Law of the Constitution (2d ed.),
on the different purposes of the historical Lect. I. The present work is intended
and of the legal inquirer. “An historian for the use of courts and lawyers, and the
is primarily occupied with ascertaining the historical view of the development of mu-
steps by which a constitution has grown nicipal institutions in this country is
to be what it is. He is deeply, sometimes entirely subordinated to the legal and
excessively, concerned with questions of strictly technical view. In the course
origins. He is only indirectly con- of the present chapter and elsewhere, the
cerned in ascertaining what are the rules sources of historical information are more
of the Constitution in the year 1886. To or less indicated, and the author specially
a lawyer on the other hand, the primary refers with pleasure to the valuable series
object of study is the law as it now stands ; of publications on Local Government in
he is only secondarily occupied with as- the United States, in The Johns Hopkins
certaining how it came into existence." University Studies.
- 1
VOL. I.
2
§ 2
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
cities. In the latter country we find Memphis, one of the Old
World's proudest capitals, even whose site was, until recently, a mat-
ter of learned conjecture. It was, centuries ago, buried beneath the
sands of the encroaching desert, and in our own day it has been ex-
humed in the midst of Bedouins too wild to be interested in the
wondrous revelations of its entombed mysteries. Temples and
buildings, vast and magnificent, dating probably fifteen centuries
before the Christian era, and preserved by burial from decay and
spoliation, may to-day be seen almost in their original perfection.
“The pyramids themselves," as Fuller quaintly says, “doting with
age, have forgotten the names of their founders." There, too, in
"old, hushed Egypt and its sands," on the banks of the Nile, are
the massive ruins of Thebes (Diospolis), the city of “the hundred
gates,” antedating secular history, and claimed by the Egyptians to
have been the first capital, as undoubtedly it was one of the oldest
cities of the historic world. As the eye runs along the colonnades
of ruined temples, the mind runs back through the Egypt of the
Ptolemies to the Egypt of the Pharaohs, four thousand years ago,
when Thebes was in its glory and its pride. But in the midst of
these stupendous remains of an early civilization, we find but little
evidence of their municipal history and organization, The chief
lesson they teach is that they were the centres of great wealth and
power in the ruling classes, and that the people, who constitute
the true wealth of modern cities, were at the absolute disposal
of their masters, bound down and degraded by servitude and op-
pression.
§ 2. Notwithstanding the people of GREECE were of a common
blood, language, and religion, Greece was never politically united.
Political power resided not in a number of independent states, but
in a large number of free, independent, and autonomous cities, with
districts of country adjoining or attached to them. Each city, except
in Attica, was sovereign; was the sole source of supreme authority,
and possessed the exclusive management of its own affairs.1 The
citizen of one was a foreigner in the others, and could not, without
permission or grant, acquire property, make contracts, or marry out
of his own city. The Grecian heart always glowed with patriotic
fervor for the city, but it rarely, except in times of great common
danger, kindled with a love for the whole country. Although, ac-
cording to Chancellor Kent, the "civil and political institutions of
1 Hearn, Government of England, chap. xvii. p. 467; Grote, Hist. Greece, ii. 302 ;
ib. 348.
1 Kent, Com. 268, note.
2
§ 3
3
INTRODUCTORY HISTORICAL VIEW.
some of the states of Greece bear some analogy to the counties,
cities, and towns in our American States,” the analogy, it must be
confessed, is remote, uncertain, and without practical value in the
inquiries we are to prosecute.
$ 3. Municipal Corporations, as well as Private Corporations,
were familiar to the Roman Law. The learned Savigny, under
the style of Juristical Persons, has traced the origin and stated the
nature of Corporations in the Roman law with great clearness. It
corresponds in essentials almost exactly with our own conceptions
of corporations. Thus, he says, “The essential quality of all Cor-
porations consists in this, that the Subject of the right does not
exist in the individual members thereof (not even in all the Mem-
bers taken collectively ;) but in the ideal Whole; hence, by a change
of an individual member, indeed even of all the members, the Es-
sence and Unity of a Corporation is not affected."1 Communities,
towns, and villages are, he says, mostly older than the State, and
have therefore a natural existence. Their Unity is of a geographical
character, since it is based upon the local condition of dwelling and
ownership of land. The governing body represents the collective
Whole. Such corporations are to be distinguished from the State,
since the State is not the subject of private law relations. The
communities (i. e., municipal corporations as we style them) “had
on the one hand need of property, and the opportunity for its acqui-
sition, but, on the other hand, such a dependent character that they
could be arraigned (unlike the State) before a court of justice." 3 In
the required sanction of the State to their existence, in the power of
the majority,4 in responsibility for the obligations and frauds of their
representatives,5 in their property rights, it is interesting to observe
the close analogy between the concept of the Roman Corporations
and our own.
Other aspects of the subject may be briefly noticed.
ceive," says a modern author, “of ancient Rome as the capital
of Italy in the same sense that London is the capital of Eng-
land, or Paris of France, would be a great mistake. London and
Paris are the chief cities of their respective countries, because they
are the seat of government. The people of these cities and their
surrounding districts have no privileges superior to those of other
English or French citizens. But the city of ancient Rome, with her
surrounding territory, was a great corporate body or community,
« To con-
1 Jural Relations, by Rattigan, sec. 86.
2 Ib: sec. 86.
8 Ib. sec. 87; post, sec. 556.
4 Ib. sec. 97.
6 Ib. secs. 92, 95.
6 Ib. secs. 90, 91.
4
§ 3
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
holding sovereignty over the whole of Italy and the provinces.
None but persons enrolled on the lists of the tribes had a vote in
the popular assemblies or any share in the government or legislation
of the city.” 1 The common division of civic communities estab-
lished by the Roman government was three, - prefectures, municipal
towns, and colonies. The prefectures did not enjoy the right of self-
government, but were under the rule of prefects, and the inhabitants
were subjected to the burdens without enjoying the privileges of Ro-
man citizens. But with the municipal towns it was different. They
at length received the full Roman franchise; "and hence,” says the
writer just named, "arose the common conception of a municipal
town; that is, a community of which the citizens are members of
the whole nation, all possessing the same rights, and subject to the
same burdens, but retaining the administration of law and govern-
ment in all local matters which concern not the nation at large,"
a description which answers almost perfectly to municipal organiza-
tions in England and America. The colonies, composed of Roman
citizens, were established by the parent city, sometimes to reward
public services, but generally as a means of securing and holding the
country which had been subdued by Roman arms. The consti-
tution of these colonies, and the rights of the citizens and com-
munities composing them, varied; but it is not necessary for our
purpose to trace these differences. The colonies were obliged to
provide for the erection of a city, and cities thus erected were called
municipia. We thus perceive the justness of the observations of a
distinguished modern historian and statesman, who says that "the
history of the conquest of the world by Rome is the history of the
conquest and foundation of a vast number of cities. In the Roman
world in Europe there was an almost exclusive preponderance of
cities and an absence of country populations and dwellings.” 2 The
1 Dr. Liddell, Rome, chap. xxvii. sec. 8. Rome we find great roads extending from
2 M. Guizot, History Civilization in city to city ; but the thousands of little
Europe, Lect. II. “ · Rome, in its origin, by-paths now intersecting every part of
was a mere municipality, a corporation. the country were unknown. Neither do
In Italy, around Rome, we find nothing we find traces of the immense number
but cities, no country places, no vil- of churches, castles, country seats, and
lages. The country was cultivated, but villages which were spread all over the
not peopled. The proprietors dwelt in country during the Middle Ages. The
cities. If we follow the history of Rome, only bequests of Rome consist of vast
we find that she founded or conquered a monuments impressed with a municipal
host of cities. It was with cities that she character, destined for a numerous popu-
fought, it was with cities she treated, into lation, crowded into a single spot. A
cities she sent colonies. In the Gauls and municipal corporation like Rome might
Spain we meet with nothing but cities ; be able to conquer the world, but it was
the country around is marsh and forest. a much more difficult task to mould it
In the monuments left us of ancient into one compact body." Ib. See also 2
!
$ 3a
5
INTRODUCTORY HISTORICAL VIEW.
nation was a vast congeries of municipalities bound together by the
central power of Rome. When the Romans colonized and settled
the countries they had conquered they established fixed govern-
ments, and carried with them, and to some extent necessarily im-
parted their arts, sciences, language, and civilization to their new
subjects. Although the political condition of the vanquished peo-
ple was far from being desirable, still the immediate residence
among
them of the civilized Roman did not fail to produce effects
more or less beneficial; and thus the municipia, securing what the
Roman arms had achieved, became the efficient means of spreading
civilization throughout the Roman world.
$ 3 a. The City of Ancient ROME had, in what we would call its
municipal aspects, many features which correspond with those of
the large cities of our own day, and whose study will afford us les-
sons of interest and value, since it shows that large and compact ag-
gregations of people necessarily give rise to conditions and create
wants peculiar to such circumstances, and which, as pointed out in
the preceding section, are not common to rural populations and to
the state at large. Special provisions are therefore necessary for the
health, safety, convenience, and good government of populous.com-
munities crowded within a narrow space, and these must be sup-
plied. In its essential municipal wants and in the means of
meeting them Ancient Rome bears a close analogy to London, Paris,
or New York. To secure the comfort and health of the city, and to
prevent and extinguish fires, Rome in the course of time provided
itself with a magnificent water supply. Its system consisted of
fourteen aqueducts whose aggregate length was 359} miles, of
which 304 miles were underground, often through mountains and
along valleys, and 55 miles were above ground, the channel being
carried on what is really triumphal arcades, sometimes rising to
the height of more than 100 feet. As a sanitary necessity, the
city constructed drains to carry off the sewage. The Cloaca Max-
ima is not only a large but it is a wonderful work -- "an immense
sewer, built twenty-five centuries ago, on unstable ground, under
enormous practical difficulties, which still answers its purpose well,
and which ranks among the greatest triumphs of engineering skill.”
For the health and pleasure of the people Rome also supplied itself
with public places of resort more adequately, perhaps, than have any
of the great modern cities. Lanciani, as the result of explorations
and of his own examinations and researches, says that “towards the
Kent's Com. 270, note ; Dr. Adam Smith's Book III. chap. ii. ; Hearn, Government
interesting chapter, Wealth of Nations, of England, chap. xvii. p. 468 et seq.
.6
§ 3 a
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
end of the third century after Christ, there were in Rome eight
campi or commons, green spaces set apart mostly for foot-races and
gymnastic exercises; eighteen fora or public squares, and about
thirty parks or gardens, which, first laid out by wealthy citizens
for their private comfort or that of their friends, had been absorbed
into the imperial domain by purchase, by bequest, or by confisca-
tion. The city was not only surrounded and enclosed by them, but
intersected by them in every direction.” Modern cities have noth-
ing fully answering to these forums or public squares, either in cost,
area, or magnificence. They gave to the people of Rome more
than twenty-five acres in extent for various public uses. In the
public baths 62,800 citizens could bathe at the same moment. Rome
had also its Police and Fire Departments. The public safety was
entrusted to a select body of 7,500 men, whose function corresponds
to that of the 9,000 policemen of London. The Roman policeman,
however, performed the double duty of fireman and policeman.
In a most important particular, however, Rome suffers by compari-
son with modern cities. Its public places were not lighted. All
business closed with the daylight. The streets at night were dan-
gerous. Property was insecure. No attempt at public illumination
was made.
The idea does not seem to have occurred to them.
Persons who ventured abroad on dark nights were dimly lighted by
lanterns and torches. Its condition was similar to that of London
two hundred years ago, so graphically described by Macaulay, and
whose description is partly given in the note. No more forcible
1 The data for this section so far as re- house, or of a rope or small chain drawn
lates to Ancient Romne, are derived from across the street to support lamps or lan-
Professor Lanciani's late work (1889), terns, has as yet been found, and probably
Ancient Rome in the light of Recent Dis- none ever will be." Ib., chap. viii.
coveries. Indeed the text is simply an 2 Macaulay's History of England, vol. I,
abridgment or transcript of those portions chap. iii., entitled “The State of England
of his work which treat of the Sanitary in 1685." “When the evening closed in,
Condition of Ancient Rome (chap. iii.), of the difficulty and danger in walking about
Public Places of Resort (chap. iv.), and London became serious indeed. The gar-
of the Police and Fire Department (chap. ret windows were opened, and pails were
viii). Modern excavations and archæo- emptied, with little regard to those pass-
logical researches have enabled us to see ing below. Falls, bruises and broken
for the first time Ancient Rome as it was, bones were of constant occurrence.
For
and have invested it with an interest more till the last year of the reign of Charles II.
intense and absorbing than ever. • The most of the streets were left in profound
principal cause of disorder was that the darkness. Thieves and robbers plied their
metropolis was kept in perfect darkness at trade with impunity ; yet they were hardly
night. Why the idea of a system of pub- so terrible as another class of ruffians. It
lic illumination was not conceived and was a favorite amusement of dissolute young
adopted, is a mystery hard to solve. Ex- gentlemen to swagger by night about the
cavations fully confirm the fact. Not a town, breaking windows, upsetting sedans,
trace of a bracket fixed to the front of a beating quiet men, and offering rude ca-
t
§ 3 a
7
INTRODUCTORY HISTORICAL VIEW.
illustration of the necessity and advantages of lighting a city can be
given than the pictures drawn by Lanciani and Macaulay of the state
of a great city buried in the darkness of night; and they show how
clearly the power to provide for this is essentially and peculiarly
one pertaining to municipal rule and regulation. Nor are these
studies, and the facts that they reveal, without practical value to
the jurist. They demonstrate that a large and dense collection of
human beings occupying a limited area have needs peculiar to
themselves, which create the necessity for municipal or local gov-
ernment and regulation, and this in its turn the necessity for cor-
porate organization. The body thus organized, as it has duties, so it
acquires rights peculiar to itself as distinguished from the Nation
or State at large, which rights, especially those that pertain
to property acquired under legislative sanction, it is a mistake to
suppose have nothing individual in their nature, and that they
are subject to the absolute and unlimited power of the legislature.
Subject they are indeed to the largest measure of legislative regu-
lation for the general good, but not subject to absolute destruction.
Modes of life, modes of thought, conceptions of rights and of duties,
and the essential conditions of existence, precede constitutions, whose
resses to pretty women. I am confident London. He undertook, for a moderate
that Milton was thinking of these pests consideration, to place a light before every
when he dictated the noble lines :-
tenth door, on moonless nights from
And in luxurious cities, when the noise
Michaelmas to Lady Day, and from six
Of riot ascends above their loftiest towers,
to twelve of the clock. Those who now
And injury and outrage, and when night see the capital all the year round, from
Darkens the streets, then wander forth the sons
dusk to dawn, blazing with a splendor be-
Of Belial, filown with insolence and wine.'
side which the illuminations for La Hogue
The machinery for keeping the peace was and Blenheim would have looked pale,
utterly contemptible. There was an Act may smile perhaps to tlfink of Heming's
of the Common Council, which provided lanterns, which glimmered feebly before
that more than a thousand watchmen one house in ten, during a small part of
should be constantly on the alert in the one night in three. But such was not the
city from sunset to sunrise, and that every feeling of his contemporaries. There were
inhabitant should take his turn of duty. quarters of London peopled by the out-
But this act was negligently executed. casts of society where even the warrant of
Few of those who were summoned left the Chief Justice of England could not
their homes; and those few generally be executed without the help of a com-
found it more agreeable to tipple in the pany of musketeers. Such relics of the
ale-houses than to pace the streets. barbarism of the darkest ages (sanctuaries
“In the last year of the reign of for criminals) were to be found within a
Charles II. began a great change in the short walk of the chambers where Somers
police of London, a change which has, was studying history and law, of the
perhaps, added as much to the happiness chapel where Tillotson was preaching, of
of the body of the people as revolutions of the coffee-house where Dryden was pass-
much greater fame. An ingenious pro- ing judgment on poems and plays, and of
jector, named Edward Heming, obtained the hall where the Royal Society was ex-
letters-patent conveying to him, for a term amining the astronomical system of Isaac
of years, the exclusive right of lighting up Newton."
8
§ 4
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
chief value is to give organic security to such antecedent and exist-
ing conditions and rights as are deemed to be vital and fundamental.
Accordingly the Constitutions of the American States recognize the
existence and contemplate the continuance of incorporated com-
munities, and that they shall enjoy, in accordance with immemorial
usage the right of local government; and it is a fair inference, even
in the absence of special provision, that their property rights and
rights of a pecuniary character are within the protection of im-
portant provisions of the State and Federal Constitutions. Consti-
tutions are not to be interpreted alone by their words abstractly
considered, but by their words read in the light of the conditions
and necessities in which the provisions originated, and in view of
the purposes sought to be attained and secured. Constitutions are
devised not so much to create rights, as to guarantee and secure
the enjoyment of those which are considered primordial and inde-
structible. The subject of the extent of legislative authority over
municipalities and its limitations is considered in subsequent
chapters,
§ 4. After the subversion of the Roman Empire the towns of
EUROPE from the fifth to the tenth century were in a state neither of
servitude nor liberty, though their condition differed greatly in dif-
ferent countries. During this period the power and influence of
the towns were, in general, on the decline. The power of the
church was great, and the inhabitants found their chief protection
in the clergy.
The establishment of the feudal system worked a great change in
the condition of the towns. Before that, towns, as we have seen,
were the centres of wealth and population. The ruling class lived
within them. The land was cultivated by persons who were not
recognized as having political rights. After feudalism was estab-
lished this changed. The proprietor then lived upon his estates,
instead of living within a town; the town became part of the lands
of the lord, or enclosed within his fief. It, with its population,
thus became subject to his arbitrary exactions, oppression, and pil-
lage. Still the towns gradually prospered; with prosperity came
wealth ; and with wealth came power. Such, in general, was the
condition of the towns of continental Europe down to the eleventh
century. About this time, without any union or concert, many of
them in most of the countries of Europe rose against the lords, and
demanded for the burgesses, commonalty, or inhabitants a greater or
2 Post, chaps: iv., vii., viii.
§ 5
9
INTRODUCTORY HISTORICAL VIEW.
less measure of enfranchisement. Sometimes a town failed in its
struggle, and its oppression was redoubled by the victorious lord.
Sometimes the towns were aided by the king, who was frequently
not unwilling to humble the arrogant and baughty nobility, and
thereby acquire the influence and affection of those whom he had
assisted. Not unfrequently, however, the struggle had to be main-
tained by their own unaided resources, and when successful, the
result was the granting by the lords to the burghers of CHARTERS,
conferring more or less extensive municipal immunities and rights.
These charters, as Guizot justly observes, were in the nature of
“ treaties of peace between the commons and their lords;" were in
fact, “ bills of rights” for the people. During the twelfth century
“all Europe, and especially France, which for a century had been
covered with insurrections by burghers against their lords, was
covered by charters more or less favorable; the corporators enjoyed
them with more or less security, but still they enjoyed them.” 2
§ 5. After the overthrow of the Roman Empire and the decay of
the civilization which accompanied the Roman power, Europe be-
came largely indebted to cities and to the authority and jurisdiction
which they acquired and exercised for the creation of the third
estate, -— popular power, and for the development of the principles
of constitutional or free government.3
THE ITALIAN CITIES, especially Venice, Genoa, and Pisa, grew
rich out of the commerce resulting from the vast armies that the
Crusaders for two hundred years had successively pushed forward
into the Holy Land. The oppressive feudal system was at this
time in full force throughout Europe. These Italian cities used
their power and wealth to secure their independence. Cities and
towns, as well as people who dwelt in the country, were alike sub-
1 People v. Morris, 13 Wend. (N. Y.) cipal jurisdiction, contributed more, per-
325, 334, per Nelson, J.
haps, than any other cause, to introduce
2 Guizot, History Civilization in Eu- regular government, police and arts, and
rope, Lect. VII. This philosophic and to diffuse them over Europe. Robert-
valuable work is the source from whence son's Charles V. ; see Hallam's Middle
are drawn most of the statements of the Ages, chap. ii. Part II. M. Guizot consid-
text as to the condition of the towns of ers the three great elements of modern
Europe from the fifth to the tenth century.. civilization to be the Feudal System, the
See similar account, Wealth of Nations, Christian Church, the Commons, or free
Book III. chap. iii. ; Hallam's Middle corporate cities. Civilization in Europe,
Ages, chap. ii. Part II., and notes to later Lect. VII. ; see also Wealth of Nations,
editions.
Book III. chap. iii., on “The Rise and
8 " The institution of cities into com- Progress of Cities and Towns, after the
munities, corporations, or bodies politic, Fall of the Roman Empire.”
and granting them the privilege of muni.
10
§ 6
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
cerns.
ject to the arbitrary domination of their feudal masters. Some of
the cities, in the eleventh century, obtained their freedom by pur-
chase, some by force, and some by gift. They, in effect, constituted
so many little republics, with the right to manage their own con-
In this way, before the end of the thirteenth century, nearly
every considerable city of Italy was enfranchised or had received
extensive corporate immunities from the sovereign or lord. The
happy effects were soon perceived in the increased population and
improved condition. Liberty and prosperity ever go hand in hand.
§ 6. Whether from example, as asserted by Dr. Robertson, or
from other causes, the same course was pursued by the cities of other
states in Europe. The King of FRANCE, Louis le Gros, and his great
barons granted many charters of community, by which the inhabi-
tants were freed from feudal servitude and erected into municipal
corporations, with the power of local government. These charters
contained grants of new privileges, and prescribed salutary methods
for the enforcement of rights and the redress of grievances. They
are interesting and instructive, and a brief view of their general
character is given in the note.1
1 Abstract of municipal charter in the authorized to issue the necessary process
Middle Ages.- In those turbulent times for the seizure and sale of property,
personal safety was an object of the first humane and necessary exemptions being
importance, and this was usually afforded allowed. (2) Every member was obliged
to the vassal by the baron or lord. The to bring some of his property into the
communities or free towns which were town, or build a house, or buy land; and
instituted undertook to provide for the in some places the members were bound
safety of their members, independent of for each other. (3) Judgments by magis-
the nobles. For, (1) All the members trates, duly selected, took the place of the
were bound by oath to assist and defend arbitrary and capricious decisions of the
each other against all aggressors. (2) All baron or feudal lord. (4) Arbitrary tax-
residents in a town made free were ation was prohibited, and regulations for
obliged to take part in the mutual de- an equal tax were sometimes especially
fence of its members. (3) The communi. prescribed. Digested from Robertson's
ties could execute the judgments of their Charles V., Vol. I. note xvi., Proofs and
magistrates by coercion, if necessary.
necessary. Illustrations,
communities of
(4) The practice of making private satis- France never aspired," says this accurate
faction for crimes was abolished, and and elegant historian, “to the same in-
provision made for the regular punish- dependence with those in Italy. They
ment of offenders. (5) A person reason- acquired in France new privileges and
ably suspected to be about to injure immunities ; but the right of sovereignty
another might, as with us at the present remained entire to the king or baron
day, be compelled to give security to keep within whose territories the respective
the peace. These communities also under- cities were situated, and from whom they
took to provide for the security of prop received the charter of their freedom.” 16.
erty by the following: (1) Abolishing the Charters defined, post, secs. 32,82. Munici-
right of the creditor to seize the effects of pal charters, treated of, post, chaps. V., vi.
his debtor with his own hand and by his Outline of modern municipal charters in
private authority, and compelling him to the United States, post, sec. 39.
proceed before a magistrate, who was
66 The
$ 6
11
INTRODUCTORY HISTORICAL VIEW.
We meet in FRANCE with great diversity in the origin and gov-
ernment of towns and cities. In some of them, especially in south-
ern France, the Roman municipal system, more or less modified from
time to time, was perpetuated. The Roman system was formed
upon an aristocratic model. In each municipium there was a
senate, called an ordo or curia. This was, politically considered,
the city ; it was the governing body. The mass of the population,
except in a few cases, had no voice in municipal affairs. This senate
was composed of a comparatively small number of families, and the
office was hereditary. When the body became reduced in numbers
by death or otherwise, it was not filled by the people, but by the
survivors. Other towns or communities originated, in the most
natural manner, upon the fiefs or estates of the feudal proprietors.
Many of these estates became centres or agglomerations of popula-
tion, composed of the working and industrial classes. Trade sprang
up, and towns and cities originated. The lord, or proprietor, was in-
terested in and derived profit from their prosperity. To induce others
to settle there, he frequently conceded certain privileges. He did not
emancipate them from all feudal restraints and burdens, but these
he mitigated. Often he granted lands and privileges to all who
settled in towns on his domains, on receiving a moderate fixed rent
and specified military services. These concessions had no higher
origin than the personal interest of the proprietor, and were often
violated. They did not constitute the towns locally independent,
or make them true corporations. But, limited and uncertain as
these concessions were, the towns which received them prospered
and became more or less important.
Other places in FRANCE were chartered towns and true corpora-
tions. In the twelfth century there was the general movement,
before noticed, on the part of the towns of France for their enfran-
chisement, or delivery from feudal bondage. The extent of this
movement may be judged from the fact that the royal charters of
this period are numbered by hundreds, and those granted by the
lords, by thousands. These were, in general, wrested from the
feudal proprietors by force, or the fear of it, and conferred an almost
independent political existence upon the commune, or town. These
charters gave the community the power of having its people judged
for offences by magistrates of their own choosing; crimes and pun-
ishments were defined; arbitrary rents and taxes were abolished, and
fixed rents and regular taxes substituted; main-morte and other re-
straints upon the alienation and enjoyment of property were removed.
The government of towns thus created, unlike those which were
mere perpetuations of the Roman system, was formed upon a demo-
12
$ 7
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
cratic model. A voice was given to all burghers, or persons of a
certain fortune, or who exercised a trade or calling. In a word,
with considerable diversity, this class of towns was independent,
and
possessed, in local matters, the power of self-government. From
and after the fourteenth century, the political power and influence
of the towns of France decayed. The causes of this decline have
been traced with a masterly hand by M. Guizot, but they do not
relate to our purpose. In the course of change, we may remark
that the royal power over them became predominant, and instead
of being self-governed, they were administered by the intendants, or
officers of the king or emperor, or the central authority at Paris.
Towns, or communes in modern FRANCE are governed by a mayor
and council. By the law of 1855, in all communes of 3,000 inhabi-
tants and upwards, these officers are appointed by the emperor; while
in small communes the appointment is made by the prefect of the
department, himself appointed by the emperor. The prefect may
suspend municipal councillors, but the emperor alone can dismiss
them. Under the present republic the prefect is appointed by the
president; and in the larger towns the mayor is nominated by the
government at Paris, but he must be selected from the municipal
council, which is chosen by universal suffrage.3
§ 7. It seems to be well established that the towns and cities of
SPAIN acquired charters of freedom at an earlier period than those
in France, England, or Germany. The cities of Italy, as we have
seen, owed their freedom, to a large extent, to their commercial
importance and wealth; but those of Spain owed their privileges
1 History Civilization in France, Lect. Charles V., Introductory View), who
XIX.; see also Hallam's Middle Ages, wrote when the constitutional antiquities
chap. ii. Part II., and notes.
of Castile had been but slightly investi-
% American Encyclopædia, Commune. gated, would seem to have no authority,
8 Encyclopædia Brit. (9th ed.), 509, therefore, for deriving the establishment
511, title France,
of communities from Italy, and still less
4 The most ancient of these regular for tracing their progress through France
charters of incorporation now extant was and Germany to Spain. Prescott, Fer-
granted by Alfonso V., in 1020, to the dinand and Isabella, Introduction, Vol. I.
city of Leon and its territory. It pre- note 24.
ceded by a long interval those granted Hallam, who, as well as Prescott, founds
to the burgesses in other parts of Europe, his judgment upon the historical works
with the exception, perhaps, of Italy. of Marina and Sempere, expresses a simi-
Acts of enfranchisement became frequent lar opinion as to the early period at which
in Spain during the eleventh century, the towns of Spain were invested with
several of which are preserved, and ex- chartered rights and privileges. Middle
hibit with sufficient precision the nature Ages, chap. iv.; Ib. chap. ii. Part II. and
of the privileges accorded to the inhabi- notes.
tants. Robertson (in his History of
1
$ 7
13
INTRODUCTORY HISTORICAL VIEW.
.
and jurisdiction to an entirely different cause. For nearly eight
hundred years the Gothic inhabitants of Spain had been engaged
in an almost uninterrupted struggle against the Moors, who occu-
pied the southern part of the peninsula. It was obviously the
dictate of policy, as the Spaniards gradually narrowed the boun-
daries of their enemies' territory, to make provision for securing and
holding the ground thus gained. With this view, and for the pur-
pose of protecting themselves from the frequent raids of their Arab
neighbors, liberal charters were granted to towns, with extensive
districts of country subject to their municipal jurisdiction.
By these grants or charters the citizens selected their own officers,
including judges and a cominon council, and enjoyed many of the
essential rights of freemen. In return, the community or city paid
à certain (no longer an arbitrary) tax or rent, and owed military
service. For more effectual protection, the charters frequently pro-
hibited the nobles from acquiring real property or erecting for-
tresses or palaces within the limits of the community, and subjected
them to its jurisdiction when within its territory. Large sections
of the adjacent country, as we have said, often embracing towns and
villages, were annexed to the city or community and placed under
its laws and jurisdiction. “Thus," says Mr. Prescott,2 to whom we
are indebted for this sketch of the early municipalities of Spain,
“ while the inhabitants of the great towns in other parts of Europe
were languishing in feudal servitude, the members of the Castilian
corporations, living under the protection of their own laws and
magistrates in time of peace, and commanded by their own officers
or
1 Mr. Irving's fine reflections, in his manent root in the soil it embellished.
Alhambra, upon this protracted and fa- Severed from all their neighbors in the
mous contest between the Crescent and west by impassable barriers of faith and
the Cross, are not inappropriate: “The manners, and separated by seas and des-
singular fortunes of the Arabian erts from their kindred of the east, the
Morisco-Spaniards form one of the most Morisco-Spaniards were an isolated peo-
anomalous yet splendid episodes in his ple. Their whole existence was a pro-
tory. A remote wave of the great Ara- longed, though gallant and chivalric,
bian inundation caşt upon the shores of struggle for a foothold in a usurped land.
Europe, they seem to have all the impe- They were the outposts and frontiers of
tus of the first rush of the torrent. But Islamism. The peninsula was the great
repelled (by unsuccessful battle) within battle-ground where the Gothic conquer-
the limits of the Pyrenees, they gave up ors of the north and the Moslem conquer-
the Moslem principle of conquest, and ors of the east met and strove for mastery;
sought to establish in Spain a peaceful and the fiery courage of the Arab was at
and permanent dominion. Generation length (after eight hundred years) sub-
after generation, century after century dued by the obstinate and persevering
passed away, and still they maintained valor of the Goth."
possession of the land. With all this, 2 History Ferdinand and Isabella, Vol.
however, the Moslem empire in Spain was I., Introduction, sec. 1.
but a brilliant exotic that took no per-
14
§ 7 a
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
in war, were in full enjoyment of all the essential rights and privi-
leges of freemen."
§ 7 d. The modern municipal institutions of PRUSSIA and their
workings are full of interest and instruction. The aim has there
been to embody the principle of local self-government, with central
limitations upon the exercise of certain of the more important
powers. They are so constructed as to attempt to give to the citizen
such a method of government as will enlist the best character and
talent in the service of the municipality, and yet prevent it from
inconsiderately engaging in enterprises which might unduly burden
it with obligations too great to be borne. The scheme of organiza-
tion gives to the municipality very general powers, with the limita-
tion on the exercise of many of them, that they shall be approved
by some superior administrative officer of the central government.
This administrative control over the acts of the municipality does not
in practice seem to be carried to so great an extent as the control
actually although irregularly exercised by the State legislatures over
our American municipalities; so that although the municipal ad-
ministration is apparently more centralized than here, the Prussian
cities in fact enjoy, it is said, a greater degree of freedom from
central interposition than with us. In order to ensure the services
of the best citizens, penalties are imposed on those who refuse to
serve for at least half of the time for which they have been elected
or appointed, that they shall lose their municipal suffrage and have
their taxes increased. Suffrage, though very general, is not univer-
sal. A small property qualification is required, which may consist
in the payment of taxes. But in order to give property a certain
degree of influence or control, the voting population is divided into
three classes: the first consisting of the largest taxpayers, who pay
a third of all the direct taxes; the second class consisting of the next
largest taxpayers, who pay the next third of the taxes; the third
class consisting of the remaining taxpayers. Each of these classes
elects a third of the members of the municipal council. This
system is similar to that adopted in elections to the Prussian diet;
and it is represented to work satisfactorily, and to account in a
large measure for the great success of the municipal government of
the Prussian cities.1
1 See Political Science Quarterly, Vol. has recently given it as his opinion that
III., December, 1888, p. 714, where Mr. Berlin is the best governed large munici-
Goodnow reviews Steffenhagen's Handbuch pality in the world. Opinions may differ
der städtischen Verfassung und Verwaltung whether this high eulogiuin is merited;
in Preussen.
but undoubtedly it is a well governed city.
An enlightened observer (Professor Ely) The essential features of its municipal
$ 8
15
INTRODUCTORY HISTORICAL VIEW.
§ 8. BRITAIN was one of the last conquests of the Cæsars, and was
one of the first of the western provinces upon which they released
their hold. The Latin language did not become the language of
the people; nor did the Romans, as in many of the continental
provinces, fill the country with memorials of their skill and arts.
The impressions made by the mastery of the Roman were not des-
tined to be permanent. According to an accurate explorer and
philosophic modern historian, Britain, when subject to Rome, was
divided into thirty-three townships, with a certain share of local
self-government; and quasi municipal institutions, for a long time
after the withdrawal of the Roman power, constituted whatever of
government the people possessed. At the time of the conquest of
England by William of Normandy (A. D. 1066) the towns and
organization are in substance stated by divided into three classes, as stated in the
Mr. Baxter (lecture on Berlin) as follows: text. The result is that a majority of
All male persons of the age of twenty- the assembly is chosen by a minority of
four, who pay a tax on an income of $150, the voters. The next feature, so far as our
obtain the electoral franchise upon a observation goes, is almost wholly un-
year's residence. Over ten thousand cit- known in this country. These two
izens take part in the administration of chambers are supplemented in Berlin by
municipal affairs. The most distinguished a body of 70 citizen deputies, selected by
and substantial citizens consider it an the municipal assembly from leading
honor to do so. Penalties are imposed citizens, to serve in joint committees for
for a refusal to serve in any position to the administration of special affairs, such
which a citizen may be elected. The as the relief of the poor, schools, &c. At
municipal assembly is con posed of 126 the meetings of these committees an alder-
members, representing 326 wards. One- man acts as chairman. Under this execu-
half at least must be bouse-owners. The tive staff of 230 members, all honorary offi-
members are chosen for six years, one- cials and men of independent means, there
third retiring every two years, thus giv. is a large staff of paid officials, appointed
ing permanency to the governing body for life, as is the rule in the German civil
by making the changes gradual. This service. The police is administered by the
body controls the affairs of the city. It State instead of the city, the force consist-
chooses, also, the upper branch of the city ing of abouť 3,000 men.
government, known as the magistracy, (about $400,000 a year) is borne by the
composed of the mayor and the board of city. The streets of Berlin are now taken
aldermen, 32 in number, 15 of whom are care of by the city instead of the State,
salaried, and 17 are honorary members. which up to 1874 had the maintenance.
The term of the mayor is twelve years ; The revenue of the city, so far as raised
the salary about $7,500. It is regarded as by taxation, comprises an annual income
a position of high honor. The salaried tax of three per cent on all incomes above
aldermen are elected for twelve years by a certain amount; house rent and tax,
the municipal assembly, with special re- divided between landlord and tenant; and
gard to their qualifications. Their sal- various minor special taxes. The net
aries are higher than those of the local debt of the city is about four millions, a
judges. The custom is to re-elect good decrease of nearly two millions since 1876.
The term of the unpaid aldermen This is a striking contrast to New York,
is six years, and they are usually chosen whose debt is over one hundred millions.
from men who have distinguished them- i Sir James Mackintosh, History of
selves for efficient public service. Voters England, Vol. I. p. 30.
who elect the municipal assembly are
The expense
men.
16
$ 8
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
boroughs were dependent upon the uncertain protection of the king
or lord, to whom they owed rents or service, and were liable to dis-
cretionary, that is, arbitrary rates or talliages. They were not in-
corporated, and did not constitute bodies politic; and being composed
mainly of tradesmen and the lower classes, were regarded by their
feudal masters as possessed of no political and of but few civil rights.
None of them enjoyed the right of representation in the council of
the nation, and, with the exception perhaps of London and a few
of the greater towns, did not have the right of internal or self-
government. Sometime between 1100 and 1125 Henry I. granted
to London the original charter, in which were conferred many valu-
able municipal privileges, with the right, among others, to choose
certain of their own officers, such as sheriff, justice, and the like.
But the right of local self-government was not, in general, conferred
upon towns and boroughs until the time of John, who reigned from
1199 to 1216.2 Meantime the towns and cities continued to grow in
population and wealth, and as these increased, their disposition to
submit to arbitrary exactions proportionately diminished, and their
independent spirit and desire for freedom from oppressive restraints
became more manifest; but still they did not acquire sufficient
influence or importance to be allowed a representation in the states
of the kingdom for more than two centuries after the Conquest.3
It was not until the time of Edward I. that cities and boroughs,
then mostly incorporated, obtained the right of returning members
to parliament. The legislative power of the kingdom was at this time
vested in the king and the council, afterwards called the parliament.
This council was constituted of the spiritual and lay peerage. The
commonalty of England had no voice or part in the legislature.
This wise and politic prince was greatly distressed for money, and
instead of attempting to raise it by the levy of arbitrary taxes,
1 This famous charter has no date. Its 2 Hallam, Middle Ages, Vol. III. chap.
substance is given in Norton's Comment viii. Stephen thus describes the muni.
aries on the History, Constitution, and cipal institutions of England in the time
Chartered Franchises of the City of Lon- of John: “The principal liberties granted
don ; and its various provisions explained in the early charters are exclusive jurisdic.
and commented on. Book II. chap. ii. tion, a merchant guild, the appointment
p. 337. In the latter clause of this charter of the various officers for the administra-
is an allusion to the very ancient custom tion of justice, fairs and markets, with
of foreign attachment, in which is to be freedom from all tolls; in fact all of the
found the germ of all our foreign attach- privileges granted by the borough charters
ment laws. Pulling, Laws, etc., of Lon- were of a local character in every respect.”
don, 188; Hallam, Middle Ages, Vol. 1 English Constitution, chap. iii. p. 62.
III. ch. viii. Part III. Mr. Norton gives
8 It is clear that at Runimede no rep-
the substance of all the charters of London resentatives of cities or boroughs were
from the time of William the Conqueror present.” 1 Stephen, English Constitu-
to the present.
tion, chap. iii. p. 71.
!
§ 8
17
INTRODUCTORY HISTORICAL VIEW.
which were submitted to with murmurs and yielded sparingly, pre-
ferred to obtain it by the prior voluntary consent of the cities, towns,
and boroughs. Accordingly he caused writs to be issued to about
one hundred and twenty cities and boroughs, enjoining them to send
to parliament, along with the two knights of the shire, two deputies
from each borough within their county, with authority from their
respective communities to consent to what the king and his council
should require of them. As the experiment proved successful, more
money being obtained, and with less trouble, than in the former
way, the practice was continued. And this, according to the best
opinions of learned and careful inquirers," is the definite commence-
ment of popular representation, and of the House of Commons
itself, the latter constituting, as Macaulay well observes, “the
archetype of all the representative assemblies which now meet,
either in the old or new world." 3
The political powers thus acquired by boroughs and cities gave
them political importance. This power was courted and controlled
by the crown. The king's judges decided that no corporation was
valid without the sanction of the king, and most of the corporations
from time to time applied to the crown for a grant or confirmation
of privileges. Their dependence upon the crown was thus estab-
lished, and the crown, as a check upon the nobles, encouraged popu-
lar elections by the whole corporate assembly. In the course of time
ance.
I "In words that well became the noble village or town, but not a city. Ameri-
King of a free people he acknowledged can Cyclopædia, title, Borough.
that what touched all should be ap- 8 History England, Vol. I. chap. i. ;
proved by all.'” Prof. Hearn, Govern-
Prof. Hearn, Govern. "The Crown! it is the House of Commons!"
ment of England, chap. xv. sec. iii. p. said an English statesman in 1858 ; and
423.
the recent history of Great Britain, in
2 Hallam, Middle Ages, Vol. III. chap. several memorable instances, shows that
viii.; 1 Stephien, Eng. Const. chap. iii. against the declared and positive determi-
p. 95 et seq. ; Hearn, Government of Eng. nation of the commons neither the crown
land, pp. 428, 480, 539; Hume, England, nor the lords, in any struggle relating to
Vol. I. App. II. ; Dr. Adam Smith, popular rights, can make effectual resist-
Wealth of Nations, Book 3, ch. iii., whose
In the United States all depart-
account of the condition of the towns ments of the government ultimately re-
and boroughs at this period, and the decay spond, of course, to the public will, which
of the power of the lords and the growth is here the real sovereign power, and elects
of the power of the inhabitants of the at short periods the executive and legis-
cities is, though brief, perspicuous and lative branches.
satisfactory. Norton, Com. Lond. 109.
. 4 An English municipal corporation, as
A distinctive feature of boroughs, in Eng- will be explained hereafter, consisted
land, is the right of the borough to elect usually of one or more select or definite
members of parliament. There the term bodies, and an indefinite body, the latter
"borough" includes cities as well as vil. being generally composed of the burgesses
lages, but in the United States the term or citizens, that is, the inhabitant house-
" borough" is not in very general use, and, holders; and a corporate assembly was a
when used, designates an incorporated meeting of all the bodies, and not of the
VOL. 1. - 2
18
8
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
8
§ it was found that these representatives were more formidable to the
power of the crown than the nobility had been. In Elizabeth's
reign compliant judges decided that, although the right of election
was, by the original constitution or charter, in the whole assembly,
still from usage, even when within the time of memory, a by-law
may be presumed giving the right of election to a select class (more
readily controlled by the crown) instead of the whole body.1
Afterwards, to increase the power of the crown, James incor-
porated towns or boroughs, endowing them with the parliamentary
franchise, but confining the exercise of the right to vote to select
classes. The immense power of popular representation was a most
active agency in the overthrow of Charles I. This power proving
inimical to the arbitrary schemes of the Protector, he expelled the
members by violence, and subdued their authority in parliament by
force. He then secured this power in his own favor by expelling
all hostile magistrates and officers and supplanting them with others
of his own creation.
On the Restoration, Charles II. found the principal opposition to
the court to come from the cities and boroughs. He commenced
his reign by reconstructing the corporations and filling them with
his own creatures. Judges, also creatures of the king, holding com-
missions during his pleasure, aided him in his scheme to acquire
absolute control over the corporations of the realm. London, as the
largest and most influential, was selected as an example, and in 1683
the famious quo warranto was issued against the city to deprive it of
its charter, for two alleged violations, one of which was stale and
both were frivolous. Judgment passed, of course, against the city,
and its ancient charter was abrogated. As a condition of its restor-
ation, it was, among other things, provided that thereafter the mayor,
sheriff, clerk, &c., should not exercise their office without the king's
consent; and that if the king twice disapproved of the officers
elected by the corporation, he might himself appoint others. In
short, the city was deprived of the right of choosing its own officers,
and was made dependent upon the crown. Such also was the fate
of most of the considerable corporations in England. The whole
power was in the hands of the king 3
select or definite bodies alone. Post, sec. seizure of the city franchises, by virtue
35.
of the writ of quo warranto, is given at
1 Willcock on Municipal Corp. 8; 3 some length by Norton, Com. on the His-
Hallam, Const. History, 52; 1 Stephen, tory, &c. of London, Book I. chap. xx. ;
English Const. chap. vi. p. 277 et scq. .see also The Case of the City of London,
2 Rex v. City of London, Mich. 33 8 How. State Trials, 1340 et seq.
Car. II. ; 2 Show. 262, Pulling, Laws, 8 There were eighty-one quo warranto
&c. of London, 14. The history of the informations brought against municipal
$ 8
19
INTRODUCTORY HISTORICAL VIEW.
+
Nor were these arbitrary proceedings confined to England. In
1683 writs of quo warranto and scire facias were issued for the pur-
pose of abrogating the charter of MASSACHUSETTS. Patriotism and
religion mingled their fervors and combined in its defence, but in
vain. Servile judges, in June, 1684, one year and six days after
judgment against the city of London, adjudged the charter to be con-
ditionally forfeited. The charter government was displaced, and
popular representation superseded by an arbitrary commission. In
1687 similar writs were issued against the charters of Rhode Island
and Connecticut; when, as is well known, the people of the latter
colony unsuccessfully endeavored to preserve this cherished muni-
ment of their liberties by concealing it in the charter oak. The
colonies, as a result of the English Revolution of 1688, had their
charters restored. Very shortly after the accession of William and
Mary a bill to restore the rights of those English corporations which
had surrendered their charters to the crown during the reigns of
James II. and Charles II. was introduced into parliament, and
became a law, with the general applause of men of all parties.1
Reference has already been made to the fact that in the time of
Elizabeth, the controlling power of corporations was virtually vested
in select bodies.” The abuses in the corporations arising out of
select bodies continued after the revolution of 1688, and until act
of parliament in 1835, next to be mentioned. To remedy these and
many other abuses, the MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS REFORM ACT
(5 and 6 Will. IV. ch. 76, A. D. 1835) (referred to more fully in a
subsequent chapter 9) was passed. This statute sought to restore
corporations to their original design, as institutions for the local
government of the place, to be controlled by those interested in it,
and not by a favored few. It is undoubtedly true, as remarked by
Mr. Hallam, that "no political institution can endure which does
not rivet itself to the hearts of men by ancient prejudice or acknowl-
edged interest.” That is, it cannot permanently endure, although it
may exist long after it ought to cease. If ever an institution out-
lived its usefulness — lived long after it became a positive evil — it
was the municipal corporations of England, prior to the reform act of
1835. In many important places in England the number of corpo-
rators ranged as low as from ten to thirty. In a large majority of
the municipalities, the corporations were close; that is, the govern-
corporations by Charles II. and James II. 2 1 Stephen, Eng. Const. chap. vii.
2 Chandl. Com. Debs. 316 ; 1 Stephen, p. 479.
English Const. chap. vii. p. 455.
8 Chap. III. infra, secs. 35, 36, and
1 Macaulay, History of England, Vol. noto.
III. chap. xv., where a graphic account of
the history of its passage is given.
20
$ 8
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
ing body had the power to determine who should be admitted to
freedom or membership; and often the privilege was conferred upon
non-residents and the residents excluded. The most important
franchise they possessed was that of electing members of parliament,
and this, in many places, was the principal function of the corpora-
tion. Not only were the councils self-elective, but their tenure was
for life. They were frequently controlled by a single party, and all
persons entertaining other opinions were excluded. The corpora-
tions were not in sympathy with, nor did they reflect the wishes of,
the people over whom they exercised local jurisdiction. There was
no check upon mal-adniinistration. The property was wasted;
extravagance characterized the expenditures of money; officers were
elected by the irresponsible councils from favoritism or devotion to
party. One of the first acts of the Reformed House of Commons
was the overthrow, in 1835, of this intolerable system, by the pas-
sage of the above-mentioned Municipal Corporations Statute, to
which we shall have frequent occasion to refer in the subsequent
pages of this work.
Lord Brougham has many claims to the regard of posterity. Few
of these are stronger, however, than those which arise from his faith-
ful and effective services in promoting the reform of the Municipal
Corporations of Great Britain, by abolishing these self-elected and
perpetual councils, by organizing the corporations upon a uniform
model, and by establishing in the act the principle that the councils
should be selected for short and fixed periods by the votes of the
burgesses, thus recognizing and adopting the representative system
based upon the vote of persons actually interested in the municipal-
ity. Mr. Willcock, in concluding his treatise, had recommended
1 Glover on Corp. xxxviii. et seq. ; known as the London Corporation Reform
Report of Commissioners of Corporate In- Act of 1849. See Supplement to Pulling's
quiry, 32 ct seq. On January 1, 1883, Laws, &c., of London.
the Municipal Corporations Act of 1882 (45 On the 15th day of August, 1867, after
and 46 Vic. chap. 50) went into force, re- a memorable struggle between the lords
pealing, re-enacting, and consolidating the and the commons, what is known as the
previous Acts. Post, sec. 35.
Disraeli Reform Bill became a law, by
2 Post, sec. 35, note, where the leading which the right to vote for members of
provisions of this important enactment are parliament for boroughs was greatly ex-
given.
tended. This right was, in boroughs, ex-
8 Willcock, Municipal Corp. 513, 514. tended to all occupiers of dwelling-houses
London, with its “great and notable which were rated to the poor rates, and
franchises, liberties, and customs," to treat to lodgers occupying lodging-houses of
of which, says Lord Coke (4 Inst. 250), the annual value of £10, unfurnished.
“ would require a whole volume of itself," It practically enfranchised the working
was not embraced in the general act of 5 class.
and 6 Will. 4, chap. 76, but there was Referring to the English system of cor-
subsequently passed an important statute porate local government and administra-
3 87
21
INTRODUCTORY HISTORICAL VIEW.
similar reform, but disclaimed being so visionary as to suppose it.
would soon be effected, since parliament would not willingly relin-
quish its influence over venal boroughs, and members elected by
corporations would not be allowed by their constituents to abandon
their ancient though unjust privileges ; but within ten years from
the time his language was written, the reform of which he almost
despaired was accomplished. Fifty years' experience has vindicated
its wisdom.
§ 8 a. Coming now, in this general survey, to the municipal insti-
tutions of the UNITED STATES, the great fact which first meets our
view is that the common law is the basis of the laws of every State
and Territory of the Union, with comparatively unimportant excep-
tions. It is indeed a most fortunate circumstance, that, divided as our
territory is into so many States, each supreme within the limits of
its power, a common and uniform general system of polity underlies
and pervades them all. The common law, as well as the institu-
tions which it developed or along side of which it grew up, IS PER-
VADED BY A SPIRIT OF FREEDOM, which distinguishes it from all other
systems and peculiarly adapts it to the institutions of a self-governed
people. It is established by the learned researches which have been
more recently made that the germs and elements of this law and of
English polity are of Germanic origin. The Saxon conquerors of
Great Britain were not mere bodies of armed invaders. They went
to England, during two or more centuries, in families and commu-
nities. What manner of men were they? Guizot dwells upon the
fact that the distinguishing character of the Germans was "their
powerful sentiment of personal liberty, personal independence and
individuality.” He affirms and repeatedly reiterates, that it was
they who “ introduced this sentiment of personal independence, this
love of individual liberty, into European civilization; that this was
unknown among the Romans; unknown in the Christian Church;
and unknown in nearly all the civilizations of antiquity. The lib-
erty which we meet with in ancient civilizations is political liberty,
the liberty of the citizen, not the personal liberty of the man
himself."2
$ 86. Thus conquering and colonizing England, the Saxons car-
ried with them “ from lands where the Roman eagle bad never been
seen, or seen only during the momentary incursions of Drusus and
tion, Mr. Gladstone declared that “Our 1 Stubbs, Const. Hist. chap. i. et seq. ;
municipalities produce qualities which are Prof. Adams, Germanic Origin of New
the best safeguards of England's greatness." England Towns, in Johns Hopkins Uni-
Williams & Vine, English Munic. Code, versity Studies,
2 Hist. Civ. Europe, Lect. II.
p. 12.
22
8
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
$ 8C
Germanicus," I their language, their religion, their customs, their laws,
and their organizations. These were indigenous, - homebred, with-
out trace or tincture of the Roman law and institutions. They
borrowed nothing from antiquity or from surrounding peoples.
They founded, and in the course of centuries their successors and
descendants, the people of England, built up their institutions on
their own model. Macaulay speaks of this with his accustomed
vividness : “The foundations of our Constitution," he says, “were
laid by men who knew nothing of the Greeks, but that they had
denied the orthodox procession and cheated the Crusaders; and
nothing of Rome but that the Pope lived there. Those who followed
contented themselves with improving on the original plan. They
found models at home; and therefore they did not look for them
abroad.” 3 This love of personal freedom and independence was im-
pressed upon the institutions they founded, or adopted, or modified.
§ 8 C. Learned investigators differ concerning the extent to which
Roman law existed and prevailed at the time of the Saxon conquest,
and the extent to which it was adopted or incorporated into the
English laws, usages, and institutions. But there is a general assent
to these propositions, viz. : that the Saxon spirit of freedom was em-
bodied in the various local courts; that it was in these popular tribu-
nals that the principles of law and local government were cultivated
and disseminated; that the Saxons breathed into the English gov-
ernment and institutions "a spirit of equity and freedom which has
never entirely departed from them," 4 and that in the course of time
the common law intertwined its roots and fibres inseparably into
the constitution, polity, local and municipal institutions, the civil
and criminal jurisprudence, the family relation, and the rights of
person and of property. So, as we have above seen, from an immemo-
rial or early period the local territorial subdivisions of England,
such as shires, towns, and parishes, enjoyed a degree of freedom, and
were permitted to assess upon themselves their local burdens and to
manage their local affairs. The ratepayers were thus dignified by
being an integral part of the communal life; the foundations of mu-
nicipal liberty were laid ; administrative power was decentralized ;
knowledge of the laws and reverence for and obedience to them
were constantly taught by a participation in their administration
and enforcement. This was exactly the opposite of the systems
which concurrently prevailed on the Continent, where the central
1 Digby, Real Prop. 11, 12.
4 Mackintosh, Hist. Eng. Vol. V.
2 Freeman, Norman Conquest, chap. i. chap. i.; Rooves, Hist. Com. Law, In-
8 Essay on History.
troduction by Finlason,
§ 8d
23
AMERICAN MUNICIPAL INSTITUTIONS.
power absorbed, governed, regulated everything, thereby destroying
municipal freedom and the capacity to enjoy and exercise it, as well
as the power to defend and preserve it.
$ 8 d. Our ancestors in the settlement of this country brought with
them these. notions of English liberty and polity, and they found
here a field of unexampled extent for their free development. AC-
cordingly the system of intrusting the direction of local affairs to
the local constituencies, has from the earliest colonial periods been
carried by us to a much greater extent than in England. As you
pass from one end of this country to the other, alike in the older
regions and in the newest organized settlement, you find the affairs
of each road-district, school-district, township, county, town and city,
locally self-ınanaged, including the adrninistration of local justice.
Every township in the United States has a local court with power
to summon a jury of the vicinage, thereby bringing justice home to
the business and bosoms of the people, and making it their own
affair. It is in no slight degree instructive, and certainly in the
highest degree interesting, to trace the institutions of this new
country back to their germs in the Saxon or Anglo-Saxon polity; for
when we touch to-day, even in our frontier settlements, the electric
chain wherewith Providence hath bound the ages and the genera-
tions of men together, we discover that we are in historic com-
munion with rude and remote ancestors although separated from us
by seas, mountains, and centuries.
Each State binds together the local institutions which it creates
and regulates independent of Federal control; thus happily prevent-
ing a concentration at the national centre of the power and duty of
legislating for and regulating the affairs of local communities through-
out a country of such extent, that with its exact situation, wants,
and interests, it would be impossible for Congress to become ade-
quately acquainted. So, in the ascending scale, THE FEDERAL CON-
STITUTION constitutes the States and the people thereof into a
National Government. It defines the relations of the States to each
other and to the national government, and limits the power of the
States to deprive any citizen, however humble, of the great essential
rights of freedom and equality before the law.
MAGNA CHARTA remains to-day one of the main foundations of
English liberty. Its chief glory is the provision" that no freeman
1 Post, sec. 45, note.
Const. Hist. Vol. I. chap. xii.) Magna
2 « The whole of the constitutional Charta “is the keystone of English
history of England is little more than a liberty.” (Hallam, Middle Ages, Vol.
commentary on Magna Charta." (Stubbs, II. chap. viii.)
24
CO
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
9
$ shall be imprisoned or disseized of his freehold, but by the lawful
judgment of his peers or the law of the land.” This memorable
provision, which was from the first embodied in all of the State Con-
stitutions, has been carried into the Federal Constitution, thereby
placing the rights of life, liberty and property, as against invasion by
the States, under the protection of the national authority.
§ 9. In general, all of our AMERICAN cities, towns, and counties
are public corporations, full or quasi. They are created by the
legislature, and are invested with power to decide and control local
and subordinate matters pertaining to their respective localities.
The number and freedom of these local organizations, whereby
political power is exercised by the citizens of the various local
subdivisions of a State who have a right to vote and to regulate
their own domestic concerns, constitute a marked feature in our
system of government. They are simply the administrative form
of the fundamental American idea of government, viz., that the
people are the source of all political power and have the right to ex-
ercise it. This is with us no mere rhetorical declamation, but a
foundation principle upon which our political institutions rest. As
local matters can better be regulated by the people of the locality
than by the central power, we provide that each road-district, each
school-district, each city and each county shall, as to its local con-
cerns, be self-governed. These organizations are, of course, subject
to the legislature of the State, and their acts, if in violation of law
or where they affect private rights, are also subject to judicial cog-
nizance and judgment. They are under the law and are bound to
obey it. The policy of creating local public and municipal corpo-
rations for the management of matters of local concern, runs back
to the earliest period of our colonial history, is exhibited in all our
legislation, and expressly or impliedly guaranteed in our State con-
stitutions.3 “It is a fundamental principle in this State, recognized
1 Amendment XIV.
the requisite length of time) whatever may
2 "In all quasi corporations, as cities, be the desire of himself or the town. See
towns, parishes, school-districts, member- post, chaps. ii. and iii.; People v. Cana-
ship is constituted by living within cer- day, 73 N. C. 198 ; s. C. 21 Am. Rep.
tain limits.” Per Shaw, C. J., Overseers, 465. Post, sec. 195.
of Poor, &c., v. Sears, 22 Pick. 122, 130; 8 Kent, Com. 275; Cooley, Const. Limit.
Hill z. Boston, 122 Mass. 344, 356 (1877); chap. viii. See also this learned author's
S. C. 23 Am. Rep. 332. Post, sec. 40. opinion in the Supreme Court of Michigan,
“When a man,” says Mr. Justice Mor- in the People v. Hurlbut, 24 Mich. 44, ,
ton, Oakes v. Hill, 10 Pick. 333, 346, (1871); State v. Noyes, 10 Fost. 30 N. H.
moves into a town, he becomes a citizen 292 ; Bow v. Allenstown, 34 N. H. 351 ;
thereof (if possessed of the requisite qual- S. C. 9 Am. Rep. 103, and in People v.
ifications as to age, &c., and if he remains Detroit, 28 Mich. 228 ; S. C. 15 Am. Rep.
§ 9
25
AMERICAN MUNICIPAL INSTITUTIONS.
and perpetuated by an express provision of the Constitution, that
the people of every hamlet, town, and city of the State are entitled
to the benefits of local self-government.” 1
The elective franchise is not, as was the case until the compara-
tively recent reform legislation in England, a privilege dependent
upon custom or usage, or confined to certain classes, but is uniformi
and universal, extending to all of the adult male citizens. Old
Sarums and rotten boroughs, as well as property qualifications, are
unknown. The effect of this policy of establishing cities, towns,
and districts of country into bodies politic, and investing the citi-
zens thereof with the power of self-government in respect of their
local affairs, has, upon the whole, been most happy. One of the
most philosophical and fair of foreign observers 2 was much struck
202. Post, secs. 58, 73. Text approved. been allowed in England, and, indeed, re-
Luehrman v. Taxing Dist., 2 Lea (Tenn.), quired, to lay rates on themselves for local
425. Caldwell v. Justices, &c., 4 Jones purposes. It is most convenient that the
(N. C.) Eg. 323 ; Comw. v. Roxbury, 9 local establishments and police should
Gray, 503, 510, 511, note written by Mr. be sustained in that manner; and, indeed,
Gray, afterwards the Chief Justice of the to the interest taken in them by the in-
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, habitants of the particular districts, and
and now one of the Justices of the Su. the information upon law and public mat-
preme Court of the United States; Web- ters generally thereby diffused through
ster v. Harwinton, 32 Conn. 131 ; People the body of the people, has been attrib-
V. Albertson, 55 N. Y. 50 (1873). Post, uted by profound thinkers much of that
sec. 58. In Mr. Quincy's Municipal His spirit of liberty and capacity for self-gov-
tory of Boston, chap. i., will be found ernment, through representatives, which
an interesting historical account of the has been so conspicuous in the mother
constitution of towns in Massachusetts, and country, and which so eminently distin-
of their mode of organization and opera- guishes the people of America. From the
tion, particularly of the town of Boston. foundation of our government, colonial
Post, sec. 28.
and republican, the necessary sums for
1 Per Cooley, J., in People, esc rel. Park local purposes have been raised by the
Comm’rs (Detroit Park Case), 28 Mich. people or authorities at home. Court-
228 (1873); s. C. 15 Am. Rep. 202, re- houses, prisons, bridges, poor-houses, and
ferred to post, secs. 72, 73,
the like are thus built and kept up; and
2 M. De Tocqueville, Democracy in the expenses of maintaining the poor, and
America : “ Local assemblies of citizens of prosecutions and jurors, are thus de-
constitute the strength of free nations. frayed, and of late (in North Carolina) a
Municipal institutions are to liberty what portion of the common-school fund, and a
primary schools are to science; they bring provision for the indigent insane, are thus
it within the people's reach ; they teach raised, while the highways are altogether
men how to use and how to enjoy it. A constructed and repaired by local labor,
nation may establish a system of free gove distributed under the orders of the county
ernment, but without the spirit of munici- magistrates. When, therefore, the Consti-
pal institutions it cannot have the spirit of tution vests the legislative power in the
liberty.” M. De Tocqueville's Democracy General Assembly, it must be understood
in America, chap. v. Post, sec. 28, note. to mean that power as it had been exer-
“From time immemorial," says one of cised by our forefathers, before and after
the ablest of American comnon-law judges, their migration to this continent." Per
“ the counties, parishes, towns, and terri. Ruffin, J., in Caldwell v. Justices, &c., 4
torial subdivisions of the country have Jones (N. C.) Eq. 323 (1858).
26
$ 10
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
with the institutions of New England towns; and considered them
as small independent republics in all matters of local concern, and
as forming the principle of the life of American liberty existing
at this day! Not only the New England towns, but the underlying
and universal prevalence of local government and administration,
rural and urban, throughout the United States, and its effect upon
the general life and well-being of the American people, have been
not only noticed bui intelligently described and enforced in a late
work of great interest and value, by a distinguished English writer,
who criticises freely indeed, but with no conscious bias and with no
unfriendly spirit.?
§ 10. The value of our system of municipal institutions, to which
we have thus alluded, may be seen on comparing the political con-
dition of the people of the United States with that of the people
of modern France, --selected as a fair example of a government
without municipal freedom. France is a highly centralized govern-
ment. The state there is everything, Municipal institutions, with
the power of independent local self-government, belong there to
the past. The central power governs and regulates everything. It
provides amusements; constructs roads, bridges, internal improve-
ments; controls trade; inspects manufactures. The effects of this
system are thus described : “Develop in the slightest degree a
Frenchman's mental faculties, and he flies to a town as surely as
steel filings fly to a loadstone. From all parts of France men of
great energy and resource struggle up, and fling themselves on the
world of Paris. There they try to become great functionaries.
Through every department of the eighty-four, men of less energy
and resource struggle up to the provincial capital. All who have,
or think they have, heads on their shoulders, struggle into town to
fight for office which the government alone can confer. The whole
energy and knowledge and resource of the land are barrelled up
in the towns : all between towns is utter intellectual barrenness.
Such are the withering effects of a centralized despotism. How
1 Post, secs. 28, 29, and notes.
result of a popular uprising against central-
2 Prof. Bryce's American Common. ized power. But it went to the other ex-
wealth, 1888, vol. I. chaps. 48-51. See treme, and contemplated, without a nation-
also the useful and valuable monographs al compact, a league of 36,000 independent
on Local Government in the several communes. Their declared scheme was this:
States, in the Johns Hopkins University “France shall no longer be one and indi-
Studies.
visible, empire or republic; she shall form
8 But under the laws of 1866, 1871, a federation, not of small states or prov-
and 1884, the French municipalities have inces, but of free cities, linked together
a large degree of independence. The com- only so far as shall be consistent with the
mune movement of 1871 was the natural most absolute decentralization and local
§ 11
27
AMERICAN MUNICIPAL INSTITUTIONS.
different with the decentralized system of government in the United
States, where each local constituency chooses its own officers; each
road-district, school-district, village, town, city, and county admin-
isters its own local affairs by the people and for the people.
1
§ 11. To civil territorial divisions, erected into corporations full
or quasi, with defined powers of local administration, and the exten-
sion of the right to vote for officers to all who are to be affected by
their action, are due that familiarity with public affairs, that love
of liberty, that regard for private rights and property, and that uni-
versal reverence for and obedience to law, which are characteristic
of the best government in Europe, — Great Britain, and the best
in America, the United States.?
government.” (Journal Officiel de la Con- this power had been vested in the legisla-
mune, April, 1871.) But a scheine which tive department, and not with subordi-
made cities, and not the nation, practically nate officers, Ayneu, J., observed : “It
the sovereign, is radically defective, and is manifest that the city government is
open to all the objections wliich M. Maz- founded, in its leading thought, upon the
zini has so forcibly pointed out against it. American idea of a popular representative
(Contemporary Review, 1871; reprinted government, its immediate prototype being
Littell's Liviog Age, July, 1871, p. 112.) the form of the State government. The
1 Barrett v. Brooks, 21 Iowa, 144, 151. right of supervision and control is there-
By constitutional provision in New York, fore vested in the councils as the imme-
"it belongs exclusively to the local power diate representatives of the popular will,
to fill the offices, either by election or ap- which exerts and enforces its determining
pointment, as the legislature may direct.” power by means of constantly recurring
Met. Bd. Health v. Heister, 37 N. Y. 661, elections. Subject to this primary power
667; People v. McDonald, 69 N. Y. 362 the affairs of this people, great in num-
(1877); People v. Supervisors, 112 N. Y. bers, wealth, intelligence, and influence,
585 (1889); People v. Lynch, 51 Cal. 15 are conducted by departments and offi.
(1875); S. C. 21 Am. Rep. 677. Opin- cers. Philadelphia v. Flanigen, 47 Pa.
ion of McKinstry, J. See also Constitu-
See also Constitu- St. 21 (1864).
tion of Illinois, art. ix. sec. 5 ; construed "What," inquired the Abbé Sièyes, in
People v. Chicago, 51 111. 17 (1869); S. C. a book which gave a powerful impulse to
2 Am. Rep. 278 ; Constitution of Cali- the publie mind at the beginning of
fornic, art. xi., entitled “Cities, Coun- the French Revolution of 1789,
ties, and Towns," secs. 13, 15. Provisions is the liers etat ?" And he answered,
exist in most, if not all, of the State con- "Nothing." What ought it to be ?
stitutions, which place the right of local Everything." Thiers, French Rev., vol.
government, and to some extent the au- I. p. 27; Guizot, Hist. Civ. Lect. VII.
tonomy of municipalities, beyond the On this popular foundation rests not
power of legislative destruction. Consti- only our national government, but as well
tutional provisions as to qualification of all of our State governments and mu-
electors and the right of equal representa- nicipal institutions. People v. Detroit,
tion held to apply to municipal corpora- 28 Mich. 228 ; s. C. 15 Am. Rep. 202
tions. People v. Canaday, 73 N. C. 198 (1873). Post, secs. 58, 72, 73.
(1875) ; s. C. 21 Am. Rep. 465.
2 After alluding to the antiquity of this
Speaking of the power of creating debts system in England, Mr. Justice Brown, in
and expending money by the city of Phil- the important case of the People v. Dra-
adelphia, under the Consolidation Act of per (15 N. Y. 532, 562), says :
1854, in a case where it was held that ever the Anglo-Saxon race have gone,
"What
- Wher-
28
§ 11
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
But the picture is not without its shadows. The usefulness of
our municipal corporations has been impaired by evils that are
either inherent in them or that have generally accompanied their
workings. Some of these may be briefly indicated : 1. Men the
best fitted by their intelligence, business experience, capacity, and
moral character, for local governors or counsellors are not always,
it is feared, - it might be added, are not generally, - chosen. This
is especially true of populous cities. 2. Those chosen are too apt
to merge their individual conscience in their corporate capacity.
Under the shield of their corporate character, men but too often do
acts which they would never do as individuals. The public, as if
wherever they have carried their language how it permeates the whole political sys-
and laws, these communities, each with a tem, and how it protects and secures the
local administration of its own selection, individual man in all of his fundamental
have gone with them. It is here that legal rights, viz., that no man shall be
they have acquired the habits of subor. punished except for a breach of law, and
dination and obedience to the laws, of that all classes are subject to the ordinary
patient endurance, resolute purpose, and law of the land administered in the ordi-
knowledge of civil government, which dis- nary law courts, with no inmunity from
tinguish them from every other people. liability of any officer or official however
Here have been the seats of modern civ. high (the King only excepted) who vio-
ilization, the nurseries of public spirit, lates the legal rights of any other man,
and the centres of constitutional liberty. however humble, are so clearly set forth
They are the opposites of those systems in the instructive work just cited, that it
which collect all power at a common cen- gives us pleasure to commend it to our
tre, to be wielded by a common will and readers.
to effect a given purpose, which absorb “The city corporations," remarks a
all political authority, exercise all its func- modern jurist, “which have grown up in
tions, distribute all its patronage, repress modern times, are of infinite advantage to
the public activity, stifle the public voice, society ; they bind men more closely to.
and crush out the public liberty.”
gether than does any other form of political
Whoever,” says De Tocqueville, Euvres association. But that which most re-
Complètes, VIII., “travels in the United markably distinguishes them from the
States is involuntarily and instinctively close corporations which formerly existed,
so impressed with the fact that the spirit is the general spirit of freedom which has
of liberty and the taste for it have per. been breathed into them. More especially
vaded all the habits of the American peo- is this the case with town corporations in
ple, that he cannot conceive of them under America, which are as different from those
any but a Republican government. In of England as the latter are from similar
the same way it is impossible to think of corporations in Scotland and Holland.”
the English as living under any but a free Per Grimke, J., Rosebaugh v. Saffin, 10
government. After quoting these words, Ohio, 31, 37 ; see also State v. Noyes, 10
Prof. Dicey, in his work on the Law of the Fost. (N. H.) 292; and the opinion of
Constitution, says (2d ed., 1886, p. 173) Allen, J., in People v. Albertson, 55 N.Y.
that “they point in the clearest manner 50, 57 (1873), where he says:
to the rule, predominance, or supremacy of of (local) self-government lies at the foun-
law as the distinguishing characteristic dation of our institutions.” People v. Su-
of English institutions " ; institutions pervisors, 112 N. Y. 585. Post, secs. 45,
which we have fully inherited or adopted. note, 58, 72, 73, 183 ; People v. Detroit, 28
What is meant by absolute supremacy of Mich. 228 (1873); S. C. 15 Am. Rep.
the rule of law in England and America, 202.
- The right
!
§ 12
29
AMERICAN MUNICIPAL INSTITUTIONS.
to retaliate, acts towards corporations in the same spirit. The no-
tion, though not avowed, is quite too much acted upon, that all
that can be obtained from a public, or, indeed, from any corpora-
tion, is legitimate spoil. Against these, men, usually honest and
fair in their dealings, do not scruple to make demands which they
would never make against an individual.1 3. As a result, the ad-
ministration of the affairs of our municipal corporations is too often
unwise and extravagant.
§ 12. Municipal corporations are institutions designed for the local
government of towns and cities; or, more accurately, towns and
cities, with their inhabitants, are, for purposes of subordinate local
administration, invested with a corporate character. To clothe
them with powers to accomplish purposes which can better be left
to private enterprise, is unwise. Their chief function should be to
regulate and govern in respect of local affairs, which can be dealt
with better by the people concerned than by the distant central
power. To invest them with the powers of individuals or of private
corporations, for objects not pertaining to municipal rule, is to per-
vert the institution from its legitimate ends, and to require of it
duties which it is not adapted satisfactorily to execute. Some of
the evil effects of municipal rule have arisen from legislation un-
wisely conferring upon municipalities, at the suggestion often of
interested individuals or corporations, powers foreign to the nature
of these institutions, and not necessary to enable them to dis-
charge the appropriate functions and duties of local administra-
tion. Among the most conspicuous instances of such legislation
may be mentioned the power to aid in the building of railways, to
incur debts, often without any limit or any which is effectual, and
to issue negotiable securities. The result has too often been that
debts are incurred so large that they press with disastrous weight
on the municipality and its citizens. Extraordinary and extra-
municipal powers have been too often incautiously or unwisely
granted, and the charters or constituent acts carelessly worded and
loosely construed. The remedy suggested by experience consists,
in part, in constitutional provisions prohibiting the granting of
special charters, and requiring all municipal corporations to be
1 These effects are not confined to this shrink from, did he feel personally re-
side of the Atlantic. “It is a familiar sponsible." Essays, No. VII. p. 261, Am.
fact," says Mr. Herbert Spencer, “that ed. 1865 ; and see Ib., Essays No. 5, for a
the corporate conscience is ever inferior to description - perhaps too highly colored
the individual conscience - that a body of - of the unsatisfactory working of the
men will commit, as a joint act, that English reformed municipal corporations.
which every individual of them would 2 See post, secs. 117, 153.
30
porno
§ 12 a
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
organized under general laws. The legislature ought also to be pro-
hibited from allowing municipal corporations to engage in extra-
municipal projects, or to incur debts or levy taxes for such purposes.
The powers granted to such corporations, and especially the power
to levy taxes, ought to be more carefully defined and limited, and
should embrace such objects only as are necessary for the health,
welfare, safety, and convenience of the inhabitants. The amount
of indebtedness that may be incurred, even for municipal purposes,
ought also to be limited beyond the power to be evaded.?
§ 12 a. Unrestrained power in the central legislative authority to
bestow valuable franchises affecting cities and property therein, with-
out the consent of the municipal authorities and of the property
owners who are injuriously affected, necessarily makes the city and
such owners the sufferers from inconsiderate grants. Administered
on business principles, a city ought to derive large revenues from
the use of wharves, from railways occupying streets with their
tracks, from gas, water, and other companies to which are given
the right to lay mains in the streets and public places. Effective
1
“The great increase of corruptions in revealed in 1871, in the local administra-
municipal bodies, growing out of the abil- tion of the affairs of the great city of New
ity to create by taxation a fund which York, have awakened public attention to
may be squandered, has made many think the necessity of more efficient checks upon
ing men doubt the wisdom of endowing the misuse of municipal powers. The legis-
them with the power.” Mr. Justice Mil- lation which was thereupon enacted to pre-
ler, in Rusch v. Des Moines County, 1 vent.frauds in the future, cannot be said, in
Woolw. C. C. 313, 322 (1868). And note view of disclosures in 1886 in reference to
the striking observations of Mr. Justice the Broadway railway franchises, to have
Agnew on the abuses which attend the been adequate to the end proposed. It
administration of finances by municipal was judicially established that a large ma-
bodies and officers, and the too prevalent jority of the board of aldermen had been
frauds in the procurement and execution guilty of accepting bribes. People v.
: of public contracts. Philadelphia v. Flani- Jachne, 103 N. Y. 182 ; People v. O’Prien,
gen, 47 Pa. St. 21 ; Hague v. Philadel- 111 N. Y. 1 (1888). Legislation based
phia, 48 Ib. 527. In the Pennsylvania upon the principles suggested in the text
case first cited, the suggestion of the text (secs. 13–15) would, it is believed, have
as to the wisdoin of strictly guarding and prevented these shocking and scandalous
limiting the power to create debts is well corruptions. The mayor was without real
enforced by this learned judge. He truly power in the matter of the granting of
says : “A valid contract is uncontrollable, these franchises by the common council.
demanding its performance at the hands His veto was overridden.
of the judiciary, and calling to their aid 2 As we shall hereafter see, nearly all of
the whole power of the government. If the States which have revised or adopted
an appropriation for its payment is not constitutions since the above was written,
made this year, it must be in the next or have ordained provisions limiting the
some following.” Agnew, J., 47 Pa. St. power of the State legislatures and of
21. The gigantic and astounding frauds nunicipalities in respect of each of the
and corruption perpetrated by what is four important subjects referred to in the
known as the.“ Tweed ring,” which were text.
§ 13
31
REMEDIES SUGGESTED.
I'S pro-
organic limitations on the power both of the legislature and of the
local authorities to make grants of this character ought to be de-
vised, and the proprietary rights of adjoining property
tected. Accordingly in late years several States have ordained
constitutional provisions of this character. And generally it may
be said that experience has shown the necessity of organic provis-
ions more exactly defining and limiting the power of the legislature
to enact laws which affect the local and private or distinctly cor-
porate rights of chartered cities, and which involve expenditures of
money, the creation of debts and consequent pecuniary burdens,
without the consent, or against the will of the local authorities of
the municipality or the people thereof.2
§ 13. Experience with us has also demonstrated the necessity of
more power and more responsibility in the executive head of our muni-
cipal institutions. Too often the duties of the mayor or executive
officer are only nominal, and to these he gives but little attention,
-- a natural result of his want of importance, and of his inability
to control the administration of municipal affairs. If the office
were clothed with dignity and real authority; if the mayor were
invested with the veto power, if he had the sole right to appoint
and the. unrestricted power to suspend or remove subordinate
officials or heads of departments, then the citizens could justly
demand of him that he should be individually responsible for the
proper conduct of the concerns of the municipality, and if griev-
i By the amended Constitution of New larly amended their constitutions. Post,
York, which took effect January 1, 1875, chap. xviii., on Streets.
it is provided (art. 3, sec. 18) that "the The legitimate sources of revenue that
legislature shall not pass any private or may be thus opened to cities is well illus-
local bill granting to any corporation, as- trated by the case of the city of Berlin.
sociation, or individual a right to lay down In that city, it is stated on good authority
railroad tracks, or any exclusive privilege, that the street railway company not only
immunity, or franchise whatever. The
paves a portion of all the streets it occu-
legislature shall pass general lavis provid- pies, but pays a percentage of its receipts
ing for the cases enumerated in this sec- to the city, whose revenue from this source
tion, and for all other cases which, in its is about $250,000 a year; and in 1911 the
judgment, may be provided for by general street railway, with all of its equipment,
laws; but no law shall authorize the con- will become the property of the city. Mu-
struction or operation of a street railroad nicipal gas-works yield about 18 per cent
except upon the condition that the con- of the entire annual expenditure of the
sent of the owners of one-half in value of city as profit ; the water-works also yield
the property bounded on, and the consent an annual profit of about $220,000; and
also of the local authorities having control even the great sewerage system produces
of that portion of the street or highway something like a net revenue of the same
upon which it is proposed to construct figure through the annual rates iniposed
and operate such railroad, be first ob- upon householders for the use of sewers.
tained." Several other States have simi- 2 Mr. Low, describing his experience as
32
§ 14
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
ances exist, they would know to whom to apply for remedy, or
upon whom to fix the blame.1
§ 14. Municipal corporations, as they exist in this country, it
may be further observed, are of exceedingly complex character.
Not here to allude to the legal complexity which inheres in their
corporate nature, we may mention that which arises from the
exceedingly diverse character of the multiform duties which are
confided to their agency and management, requiring the delega-
tion of corresponding powers and provisions for their execution.
mayor of Brooklyn (1 Bryce, Amer. Com- nicipal charters with a masterly hand,
monwealth, chap. lii.), says: “The habit of and shows great familiarity with the sub-
interference in the details of city action has ject of which he treats. Many of his sug-
become to the legislature almost a second gestions may be profitably studied by the
nature. In every year of his term [as mayor] legislator. It may be observed that in
the writer was compelled to oppose at Al. England, under the reformed municipal
bany unwise and adverse legislation on system, the right to a voice in municipal
the part of the State. No law objected management is not universal, but is re-
to by the mayor during this interval was stricted to occupiers of houses and tax-
placed upon the statute book. It is not payers, and yet we have, as we have seen,
too much to say, however, that the great complaints of municipal extravagance,
est anxieties of his term sprang from the corruption, and abuse. In the existing
uncertainties and difficulties of this annual system of municipal government in Great
contest, on the one hand to advance the Britain, the function of the mayor, as we
interest of the city, and on the other to shall point out in a subsequent chapter, is
save it from harm in its relations to the in many respects essentially different from
law-making power of the State."
the function of the corresponding officer
1 Extended observation of the work in our American municipalities. There the
ings of our municipal institutions has sat- actual work of municipal administration is
isfied the author that the views expressed in effect carried on by the councils and
in the text are sound, and he is glad to committees, upon whom, rather than upon
find them confirmed by the Hon. Josiah the mayor, rests the responsibility of the
Quincy, in his Municipal History of Bos- success of municipal rule. Political Science
ton, published in 1852. Mr. Quincy was Quarterly, vol. iv., 215 et seq.
mayor of the city of Boston from 1823 to The charter of the city of Brooklyn
1828, inclusive, and his opinions are en- which went into effect January 1, 1882,
titled to great respect, not only from his and which has been declared by the high-
known ability, but large experience in est authority to be such a vast improve-
municipal affairs. It is interesting to ob- ment on any system of government
serve the striking coincidence of his views which the city had tried before, “that no
with the recommendations of the “Com. voice is raised against it," is based in its
mittee of Seventy," of New York, respect reform features essentially upon the prin-
ing municipal administration and the im- ciples suggested in the text. See on this
portance of efficient executive superin subject chap. lii. vol. I. Bryce's Ameri-
tendence, control, and responsibility. Mil- can Commonwealth, written by the Hon.
nicipal History of Boston, chap. v. And Seth Low (the first mayor of Brooklyn
to the same effect is Mr. Charles Nordhoff's under this charter), entitled “An Ameri-
interesting article in the North American can View of Municipal Government in the
Review for October, 1871, entitled “The United States.
- The United States." It is replete with that
Misgovernment of New York, --A Rem- wisdom and instruction that come, and
edy Suggested." This vigorous writer can only come, from careful study com.
sketches the defects in the ordinary mu. bined with practical experience.
§ 15
33
REMEDIES SUGGESTED.
Some of these powers are civil or political, and not peculiar to the
people of the municipality; others are purely local, of which some
concern all the inhabitants, and some affect only, or mainly, the
property owners, on whom exclusively or largely the burden of
their exercise or administration falls. In the ordinary municipal
charters, the essential differences between these powers have not
been sufficiently regarded, and in consequence adequate checks
upon their abuse have not been provided.
§ 15. The general right of suffrage will remain, and in the au-
thor's judgment, ought, at least, as respects the popular branch of
the municipal council, to remain as extensive in the municipality
as in the state; and all schemes of municipal reform, whatever
their merit, based upon restricting it within narrower limits than
those here suggested, are simply impracticable. But if special or
extra-municipal powers be granted, not affecting civil, political, or
other rights which concern all, but which involve directly the ex-
penditure and payment of money, it is but just that the project
should be required to have the support of a majority in value of
1 The observations upon this subject stantial measure of reform would elevate
of Mr. Seth Low in his chapter in Bryce's and strengthen the character of our pop-
work, before referred to, are sound and ulation' ; that, in the language of the
weighty. We extract one or two sentences : beautiful prayer read here every day, it
"Every one understands that universal would tend 'to knit together the hearts
suffrage has its drawbacks, and in cities of all persons and estates within this
these defects become especially evident. realm.' I believe it would add to the
As it exists in the United States, it is authority of the decisions of Parliament,
not only a great element of safety, but is and I feel satisfied it would confer a lus-
perhaps the mightiest educational force to tre, which time could never dim, on that
which the masses of men have ever been benignant reign under which we have the
exposed. In a country where wealth has happiness to live.” And later, in 1865,
,
no hereditary sense of obligation to its he exclaimed to a Birmingham audience :
neighbors, it is hard to conceive what Who is there that will meet me on this
would be the condition of society if uni- platform, or will stand upon any platform,
versal suffrage did not compel every one and will dare to say, in the hearing of an
having property to consider, to some ex- open meeting of his countrymen, that
tent at least, the well-being of the whole these millions for whom I am now plead-
community.” 1 Bryce, Am. Com., 634, ing are too degraded, too vicious, and too
635.
destructive to be entrusted with the elec-
Mr. Bright gave eloquent expression to tive franchise ? I, at least, will never
similar sentiments in the peroration of his thus slander my countrymen. I claim
speech in the House of Coinmons, March for them the right of admission, through
24, 1859, on Lord Derby's Reform Bill :“I their representatives, into the most
have endeavored to stand on the rules of ancient and the most venerable Parlia-
political economy, and to be guided by the ment which at this hour exists among
higher rules of true morality; and when men ; and when they are thus admitted,
advocating a measure of reform larger and not till then, it may be truly said.
than some are prepared to grant, I appear that England, the august mother of free
in that character, for I believe that a sub- nations, herself is free."
VOL. I. - 3
34
§ 17
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
those who must pay the expense. No small proportion of cor-
ruption and abuse in municipalities has had its source in their
authority to make public and local improvements. The power is
usually conferred without sufficient care, and the rights of the prop-
erty owners (often made liable for the whole cost of the improve-
ment or amount of the expenditure) are not sufficiently respected
and guarded. In many of its more important aspects a modern
American city is not so much a miniature State as it is a business
corporation, — its business being wisely to administer the local
affairs and economically to expend the revenues of the incorporated
community. As we learn this lesson and apply business methods
to the scheme of municipal government and to the conduct of muni-
cipal affairs, we are on the right road to better and more satisfactory
results.
$ 16. As it is the part of wisdom to organize municipal corpo-
rations under general laws so that defects and abuses, being gen-
erally seen and felt, will be the more speedily and better remedied
by the legislature, so municipal corporations should be shorn of
the power to grant special privileges, except under ordinances
general in their character, and which, on equal or fair terms, will
make them available to all. The courts, too, have duties, the most
important of which is to require these corporations, in all cases, to
show a plain and clear legislative grant for the authority they assume
to exercise; to lean against constructive powers, and, with firm hands,
to hold them and their officers within chartered limits. As a rule
this duty has, in our judgment, been faithfully performed.
§ 17. If we analyze the complex powers usually conferred upon a
municipality in this country we shall discover that these are of two
general classes, viz., 1. Those which relate to health, good govern-
ment, efficient police, &c., in which all the inhabitants have an
equal interest and ought to have an equal voice. 2. Those which
directly involve the expenditure of money, and especially those
relating to local improvements the expense of which ultimately
falls upon the property owners. As respects these, the controlling
voice ought to be with those who have to bear the burden. No
municipal management, will, in the long run, be other than extrav-
agant and unwise where the members of the governing body have
no substantial interests in the municipality, and where they have
more to gain by plundering than by protecting it. To insure good
government there must be a real identity of interest between the
1 1 Bryce, Am. Com., chap. lii. p. 625. Ante, sec. 12 a and note.
$ 17
35
REMEDIES SUGGESTED.
members of the governing body and the municipality. The prob-
lem of satisfactory municipal rule in populous cities is one which
is urgently demanding solution, but it is also one which, it is feared,
must be slowly wrought out by experience. It is estimated that
the indebtedness of the public and municipal corporations in this
country already exceeds $1,000,000,000; much of it was created
without the sanction of those who will have to pay it, and it is in
many places, especially in the newer States, pressing with heavy
weight upon the burdened taxpayer. A remedy is imperatively de-
manded, and suggestions herein made have been offered in the hope
that some of them may not be wholly undeserving of attention.
But with all the drawbacks we have mentioned (many of which
are remediable) our system of popular municipal organization and
local administration is, beyond controversy, the fairest to the indi-
vidual citizen, and, on the whole, the most satisfactory in its opera-
tions and results, of any that have yet been devised. Any other
conclusion would be equivalent to admitting that the people are
incapable of enlightened self-government; that holders of property
ought alone to be respected, and alone to be invested with political
and municipal rights; that the few ought to govern the many; and
that our representative system, the flower of modern civilization,
based upon the equal right of every man to a voice in the local and
general government, is a failure. That it is a failure we cannot admit.
That it is not a failure is demonstrated by the experience of more
than two centuries. It is not improbable that we sometimes over-
estimate the shortcomings, chiefly felt in the larger cities, in the
practical workings of our municipal system, for the system is an open
one, in which all are interested to bring its abuses into the light of
day. The fine observation of Lord Bacon fitly applies : “ The best
governments are always subject to be like the fairest crystals, wherein
every icicle or grain is seen, which in a fouler stone is never perceived.?”
1 It is frequently said that New York of the city of New York for 1888 and 1889
is among the worst governed of cities. The will appear from the following table:-
complexity and magnitude of its munici-
pal functions necessarily present great
$287,000 00
difficulties in the way of thorough and Law Department
216,544 00
efficient administration. Abuses
3,180,309 00 3,124,221 00
difficult entirely to suppress.
The city
1,014,650 00 1,212,200 00
has charge of charities and corrections, a
2,343,372 00 2,197,050 00
law department, a department of public Health Department
413,300 00
parks, of public works, of health, of po-
4,415,255 66 4,409,550 94
lice, of street cleaning, of fire, of educa-
1,259,459 00 1,272,040 54
tion. Appropriations for these purposes Taxes and assess-
1,976,492 00 2,136,043 00
for the year 1889 amounted to nearly
112,000 00
twenty millions of dollars. The aggregate Education
4,303,167 00 4,079,008 86
appropriations for the several departments
$19,525,525 66 $19,464,158 34
Finance
ment
Depart-
1889.
1888.
$276,000 00
250,544 00
.
are
Public Works
Public Parks
Charities and Cor-
rections
394,277 00
Police
Street cleaning
Fire
ments
117,200 00
0
36
§ 17
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
To enable it to pay interest on its pub- and made productive, and there are no
lic debt and for other purposes twelve or claims against the city of any considerable
thirteen millions more is required; so magnitude. The credit of the city, as in-
that at this time the annual operations of dicated by the prices bid for its bonds, has
the city government require to be raised never been so high as at the present time.
by taxation between thirty-three and Its securities command a higher price
thirty-four millions of dollars, necessitat- than those of any other city in the world.
ing a tax rate of somewhat over two per At the outset of my term of office I
cent on the assessed values of taxable adopted the principle of calling together
property The official statement of the the heads of departments to consult as to
retiring mayor, Honorable Abram S. legislation which might be required for
Hewitt, made the 31st of December, 1888, the advantage of the city and the better
at the end of his term of two years, shows conduct of its business. Every act pro-
the condition of the city government to be posed was carefully considered by this
much better than is commonly supposed. conference. One hundred and ninety-one
He says: “Every department of the city bills directly affecting the city of New
government is in admirable working or- York were passed by the legislature during
der. No private business is better organ- the last year. The passage of many ob-
ized or more closely attended to than the jectionable bills was thus defeated, but in
public service in this city. Every outstand- some important cases the legislature acted
ing claim that could be collected has been; directly against the recommendations of
all disputes have been adjusted ; the pub- the city authorities.
lic property has been carefully conserved
§ 18
37
CORPORATION DEFINED.
CHAPTER II.
CORPORATIONS DEFINED AND CLASSIFIED.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS DISTINGUISHED.
PRIVATE, PUBLIC, AND
THE NEW ENGLAND
TOWN.
§ 18 (9a). Corporation defined. — A corporation is a legal institu-
tion, devised to confer upon the individuals of which it is composed
powers, privileges, and immunities which they would not other-
wise possess, the most important of which are continuous legal
identity or unity, and perpetual or indefinite succession under the
corporate name, notwithstanding successive changes, by death or
otherwise, in the corporators or members. It conveys, perhaps,
as intelligible an idea as can be given by a brief definition to say
that a corporation is a legal person, perfectly distinct from the mem-
bers which compose it, having a special name, and having such
powers, and such only, as the law prescribes. The most accurate
notions of complex subjects come not from definition, but descrip-
tion; and in the course of the present work we shall describe the
class of corporations with which it deals, by their creation, consti-
tution, faculties, powers, objects, duties, and liabilities. Some of
the definitions and deductions in the earlier reports amuse by their
quaintness, but are without much practical value. “As touching
corporations," says Lord Coke, “the opinion of Manwood, chief
baron, was this : that they were invisible, immortal, having no
conscience or soul; and therefore, no subpoena lieth against them;
they cannot speak, nor appear in person, but by attorney.” 1
Chief-Justice Marshall's description of a corporation is remarkable
for its general accuracy and felicitous expression: “A corporation
is an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in con-
templation of law. Being the mere creature of the law, it possesses
only those properties which the charter of its creation confers upon
it, either expressly or as incidental to its very existence. These
are such as are supposed to be best calculated to effect the object
for which it is created. Among the most important are immortality
[in the legal sense that it may be made capable of indefinite duration),
and, if the expression may be allowed, individuality, - properties
by which a perpetual succession of many persons are considered
1 2 Bulst. 233; Willc. Corp. 15. Ante, sec. 3.
38
§ 19
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
as the same, and may act as a single, individual. They enable
a corporation to manage its own affairs, and to hold property with-
out the perplexing intricacy, the hazardous and endless necessity, of
perpetual conveyances for the purpose of transmitting it from hand
to hand. It is chiefly for the purpose of clothing bodies of men,
in succession, with these qualities and capacities that corporations
were invented and are in use. By these means a perpetual suc-
cession of individuals are capable of acting for the promotion of
the particular object like one immortal being."1 Thus, though the
members change, the corporation itself remains in its legal person-
ality and unity the same, all of its members, past and present,
constituting in law but one person, in the same manner as the
Thames or the Mississippi is still the same river, though the parts
composing it are constantly changing The above observations
are, in general, applicable to all corporations, private as well as
public and municipal.
§ 19 (96). Municipal Corporations defined. — A municipal corpo-
ration, in its strict and proper sense, is the body politic and corpo-
rate constituted by the incorporation of the inhabitants of a city or
town for the purposes of local government thereof. Municipal
corporations as they exist in this country are bodies politic and
corporate of the general character above described, established by
law partly as an agency of the State to assist in the civil gov-
ernment of the country, but chiefly to regulate and administer
the local or internal affairs of the city, town, or district which is
incorporated.
1 Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 tive language, but the simile of the ele-
Wheat. 636, 1819. Other definitions : 4 gant English commentator is not only
Black. Com. 37 ; 1 Kyd, Corp. 13; Grant, striking, but accurate. "All of the indi.
Corp. 3, 4 ; Angell & Ames, Corp. sec. 1; vidual members," present and future,
Glover, Corp. 3, 6. Willcock declines to but one person in law,
a person that
define, but describes corporations. Munic. never dies, in like manner as the river
Corp. 15. The last-named author ob- Thames is still the same river, though the
serves that “a corporation continues the parts which compose it are changing every
same body politic from its creation to its instant." 1 Black. Com. 468.
dissolution, unaltered by the revolution 8 "A body politic," says Lord Coke,
of ages or the successive changes of its “is a body to take in succession, framed
Inenbers, so that it is unnecessary to as to its capacity by policy, and therefore
make grants to them and their succes- is called by Littleton (sec. 413) a body
sors, or to declare their obligations bind- politic; it is called a corporation, or body
ing on their successors. Ib. 16 ; Glover, corporate, because the persons are made
8 ; Grant, 5; 7 Vin. Abr. 358, 363. Ante, into a body, and are of capacity to take,
sec. 3.
grant, &c., by a particular name." Viner,
2 Glover, 8; 1 Black. Com. 468. It is Abr. Corp. (a 2). A municipal corporation
scarcely ever quite safe to express or even is also defined to he “An investing the
to illustrate a legal proposition in figura- people of a place with the local govern-
66 are
§ 20
39
CORPORATION DEFINED.
§ 20. Same subject. - We may, therefore, define a municipal cor-
poration in its historical and strict sense to be the incorporation,
by the authority of the government, of the inhabitants of a par-
ticular place or district, and authorizing them in their corporate
capacity to exercise subordinate specified powers of legislation and
regulation with respect to their local and internal concerns. This
power of local government is the distinctive purpose and the dis-
tinguishing feature of a municipal corporation proper. The phrase
“municipal corporation " is used with us in general in the strict and
proper sense just mentioned; but sometimes it is used in a broader
sense that includes also public or quasi corporations, the principal
purpose of whose creation is as an instrumentality of the State, and
not for the regulation of the local and special affairs of a compact
community.
2
ment thereof." Salk. 183. This latter legislative powers for the local civil gov-
description,” says Mr. Justice Nelson, in ernment and police regulation of the in-
the People v. Morris, 13 Wend. 325, 334 habitants of particular districts included
(1835) " is the most appropriate, and is jus- in the boundaries of the corporation ;”
tified by the history of these institutions, and it was accordingly held that an in-
and the nature of the powers with which corporated board of public schools was not
they were, and are, invested.” It is also
a municipal corporation within the mean-
quoted by Campbell, C. J., in the People ing of an Act declaring that no person
v. Hurlburt, 24 Mich. 44 (1871). Post, shall be eligible to a certain office who
sec. 183. The English Municipal Corpora- shall hold any office under a municipal
tions Act 1882 applies to certain described corporation. Heller v. Stremmel, supra.
incorporated towns, cities, and places; and In Wisconsin the term "municipal cor-
it clearly defines the words “municipal poration," as used in the Constitution of
corporations” as used in the Act, thus: the State, does not include towns (Norton
“ Municipal corporation means the body v. Peck, 3 Wis. 714); and when used in
corporate constituted by the incorporation Statutes it is presumed to be used in the
of the inhabitants of a borough” (sec. 7). sense in which the term is used in the
" The municipal corporation acts by its Constitution, unless a different legislative
council, which shall exercise all the pow- intention appears; and under the legisla-
ers vested in the corporation. The coun- tion of that State municipal corporations,
cil consists of the mayor, aldermen, and properly and strictly so called, do not in-
councillors.” (sec. 10.)
clude towns not chartered, school dis-
1 2 Bouv. Law Dict. 21 ; 2 Kent, 275; tricts, or other quasi corporations. Ea-
People v. Morris, supra. Anté, secs. 9, 12, ton v. Manitowoc Co. (power to purchase
14, 17, 19; post, secs. 21, 22, 23, 46, 58. and hold tax certificates), 44 Wis. 489
2 Heller v. Stremnel, 52 Mo. 309 (1873); (1878). Post, sec. 48, note. 6. The word
State v. Leffingwell, 54 Mo. 458, 471, ‘municipal,' as originally used in its
(1873). This last case discusses the mean- strictness, applied to cities only. The
ing of the terms “municipal corpora-
municipal corpora. word now has (in the legislation of Iowa)
tions” and “corporations - for municipal a much more extended meaning, and when
purposes," as used in the Constitution of applied to corporations, the words 'polit-
the State. Post, sec. 49. The defini. ical,' 'municipal,' and 'public ' are used
tion of a municipal corporation,” says the interchangeably." Rothrock, J., in Curry
Supreme Court of Missouri, “would only v. District Township of Sioux City, 62
include organized cities and towns and Iowa, 102, construing a special act. Post,
other like organizations with political and sec. 22, n. In the legislation of Illinois
40
$ 21
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
§ 21. Creation and Powers. — Like other corporations, municipal
corporations must with us be created by statute. They possess no
powers or faculties not conferred upon them, either expressly or by
fair implication, by the law which creates them or by other statutes
applicable to them. Persons residing in or inhabiting a place to
be incorporated, as well as the place itself, are - both the persons
and the place — indispensable to the constitution of a municipal
corporation. Artificial succession also is of the essence of such a
corporation. Municipal corporations are created and exist for the
public advantage, and not for the benefit of their officers or of par-
ticular individuals or classes. The corporation is the artificial body
created by the law, and not the officers, since these are, from the
lowest up to the councilmen or mayor, the mere ministers of the
corporation. Even the council, or other legislative or governing
body, constitutes, as it has been well remarked, neither the corpora-
tion, nor in themselves a corporation. It is quite impossible in
any brief space to convey an adequate idea of the exact nature and
properties of an American municipal corporation. There is nothing
in the law more complex and abstruse. Although the inhabitants
of a place be incorporated, they do not constitute the corporation;
neither, as we have just observed, is it constituted by the governing
body. Notwithstanding Mr. Kyd's criticism, the corporation is in-
visible, for, although we may see all the inhabitants, or all of the offi-
cers, we do not see the legal body — ideal person, --- which makes
the corporation, as we see au army; but this is a property common
to all corporations.3 · An additional complexity in municipal cor-
porations arises out of the various and diverse powers usually
conferred, giving them, as they exist among us, an extremely compos-
ite character. The primary and fundamental idea of a municipal
corporation is an institution to regulate and administer the internal
concerns of the inhabitants of a defined locality in matters peculiar
to the place incorporated, or at all events not common to the state
or people at large; but it is the constant practice of the States in
this country to make use of the incorporated instrumentality, or of
its officers, to exercise powers, perform duties, and execute functions
an incorporated “town” and an incorpor- 1 Galesburg v. Hawkinson, 75 III. 156
ated “village” are one and the same (1874). Post, sec. 183.
thing. Enfield v. Jordan, 119 U. S. 680; 2 Reg. v. Paramore, 10 Ad. & El. 286 ;
Martin v. People, 87 Ill. 524. Mr. Jus- Reg. v. York, 2 Q. B. 850; Grant, 357;
tice Bradley, in Enfield v. Martin, supra, Glover, 4; Harrison v. Williams, 3 Barn.
at page 685, considers the meaning of the & Cress. 162 ; Brown v. Gates, 15 W. Va.
words “town” and “ village" as used in (citing text) 131. Post, sec. 40.
New England, New York, the Southern, 8 Ante, sec. 3.
the Middle, and the Western States.
§ 22 PUBLIC AND MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS DISTINGUISHED.
41
that are not strictly or properly local or municipal in their nature,
but which are, in fact, state powers, exercised by local officers,
within defined territorial limits; and it is important, as we shall
hereafter see, to keep this distinction in mind. In theory, the two
classes of powers are distinct; but the line which separates the one
from the other is often difficult to trace. The point may be illus-
trated from the English law: If the king incorporate a town, its
officers will have no implied power as conservators or justices of
express words are necessary to confer this power; and
when they act in the latter capacity, it is not because they are cor-
porate officers, but because of powers expressly annexed to their
corporate offices; and the two capacities remain distinct, although
united in the same person. The subject itself will be elsewhere
discussed. The name of the municipal corporation, its boundaries,
its officers, its powers, its duties, and the like, are subjects regulated
by legislative enactment, and will be hereafter noticed.
the peace,
§ 22 (10). Public and Municipal Corporations distinguished. Cor-
porations intended to assist in the conduct of local civil government
are sometimes styled political, sometimes public, sometimes civil,
and sometimes municipal, and certain kinds of them with very re-
stricted powers, quasi corporations, -- all these by way of distinction
from private corporations. All corporations intended as agencies in
the administration of civil government are public, as distinguisbed
from private corporations. Thus an incorporated school-district, or
county, as well as city, is a public corporation ; but the school-dis-
trict or county, properly speaking, is not, while the city is a muni-
cipal corporation. All municipal corporations are public bodies,
created for civil or political purposes; but all civil, political, or
1
1 Kyd, 327 ; People v. Hurlburt, 24 be sued, but not liable for trespasses com-
Mich. 44 (1871), per Campbell, C. J.; s. C. mitted by their officers. School District
6 Am. Law Rev. 376; s. C. 9 Am. Rep. 103; v. Williams, 38 Ark. 454. In Toua a
S. P. People v. Detroit, 28 Mich. 228 school district is a municipal corporation
(1873) ; S. C. 15 Am. Rep. 202 (post, secs. within the meaning of the act authorizing
72, 73), in which the nature of municipal the issue of bonds by such corporations.
corporations and the purposes of their cre- Curry v. District Township of Sioux City,
ation are fully discussed by Cooley, J. 63 Iowa, 102. In Louisiand the police
The text quoted and the distinction ap- juries of the several parishes are munici-
proved, and made the basis of the decision, pal corporations. Police Jury of Ouachita
in Beach v. Leahy, 11 Kansas, 23, 30 v. Monroe, 38 La. An. 630. “Municipal
(1873).
corporations," as used in the amendment
2 Ante, sécs. 9, 12, 14, 17, 19, 20, and to the Constitution of Minnesota relating
note. White v. Commissioners, 90 N. C. to the assessment of property for local
437 ; Schultes v. Eberly, 82 Ala. 242. In improvements, held to include counties.
Arkansas, school-districts are by statute Dowlan v. County of Sibley, 36 Minn.
quasi corporations, with power to sue and 430. Supra, sec. 20, and note.
42
3
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
§ 23
public corporations are not, in the proper use of language, muni-
cipal corporations. The phrase "municipal corporations,” in the
contemplation of this treatise, has reference to incorporated villages,
towns, and cities, with power of local administration, as distin-
guished from other public corporations, such as counties and quasi
corporations.1
$ 23. Same subject. - The distinction between municipal corpora-
tions proper, such as chartered towns and cities, or towns and cities
voluntarily organized under general incorporating acts, such as
exist in a number of the States, and involuntary quasi corporations,
such as counties, has been very clearly drawn by the Supreme Court
of Ohio: " Municipal corporations propor are called into existence
either at the direct solicitation or by the free consent of the persons
composing them, for the promotion of their own local and private
advantage and convenience.” On the other hand,“ Counties are at
most but local organizations, which, for the purposes of civil admin-
istration, are invested with a few functions characteristic of a cor-
porate existence. They are local subdivisions of the State, created
by the sovereign power of the State, of its own sovereign will, with-
out the particular solicitation, consent, or concurrent action of the
people who inhabit them. The former (municipal) organization is
asked for, or at least assented to, by the people it embraces; the
latter organization (counties) is superimposed by a sovereign and
paramount authority.” 2 “A municipal corporation proper is created
mainly for the interest, advantage, and convenience of the locality
and its people ;: a county organization is created almost exclusively
with a view to the policy of the State at large, for purposes of polit-
ical organization and civil administration, in matters of finance,
of education, of provision for the poor, of military organization, of
the means of travel and transport, and especially for the general ad-
i Hamilton Co. v. Mighels, 7 Ohio St. local affairs of the community; and, being
109 (1857); Finch v. Board, &c., 30 Ohio in its nature and objects a municipal or-
St. 37 ; Askew v. Hale, 54 Ala. 639, - ap- ganization, the legislature may, unless re-
proving text; Greene County v. Eubanks, strained by the Constitution, or some one
80 Ala. 204 ; Lawrence County v. Chat- of those fundamental maxims of right and
teroi R. R. Co., 81 Ky. 225 ; Manuel v. justice with respect to which all govern-
Commissioners, 98 N. C. 9; Cathcart v. ments and society are supposed to be or-
Comstock, 56 Wis. 590.
ganized, exercise control over the county
2 Hamilton Co. v. Mighels, supra. A agencies, and require such public duties
county is one of the public territorial divis- and functions to be performed by them as
ions of a State, created and organized for fall within the general scope and objects
public political purposes connected with of the municipal organization. Talbot v.
the administration of the State govern- Queen Anne's County, 50 Md. 245. Post,
ment, and specially charged with the su- chaps. iv., xxiii.
perintendence and administration of the 8 Post, sec. 183. Ante, sero. 19-22.
.
$ 24 PUBLIC AND MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS DISTINGUISHED.
43
ininistration of justice. With scarcely an exception, all the powers
and functions of the county organization have a direct and exclusive
reference to the general policy of the State, and are, in fact, but a
branch of the general administration of that policy.” 1
§ 24. Same subject. -- An incorporated city or town sometimes
embraces by legislative provision two distinct corporations, as for
example, the municipal and the school corporation existing within
the same territory. It is in such cases a distinct corporation for
school purposes, and under the statute or charter may be bound as
such for the contract price of materials furnished and labor per-
formed by another in the erection of a school building for such cor-
poration. More generally, however, school-districts are organized
under the general laws of the State, and fall within the class of cor-
porations known as quasi corporations.3
i Hamilton Co. v. Mighels, 7 Ohio St. we think such liability cannot be derived
109. In this case, from which we have from the relations of the parties, either
quoted, the learned judge, adverting to on the principles or the precedents of the
the case in hand, in which it was sought common law." Followed, Jacobs z. Ham-
to make the county liable in damages to ilton Co., 4 Fisher Pat. Cases, 81 (1862).
one who suffered a personal injury from Also cited and followed in Wehn v. Gage
the neglect of the commissioners of the Co., 5 Neb. 494 (1877), where it was held
county in the discharge of their official that, in the absence of a statute creating
duties, says : “ But, it is said, the mem- the liability, the county was not liable to
bers of the board of county commissioners an action by reason of its jail being so
are chosen by the electors of the county, erected and kept as to become an actual
and hence the board is to be regarded as nuisance to persons residing near it. Sec.
the agents of the county, for whose torts 22, cited and approved. Pulaski County
in the performance of official duties the v. Reeve, 42 Ark. 55 ; State v. Leffingwell,
county ought to be responsible. True, 54 Mo. 458 (1873); Askew v. Hale Co., 54
the people of the county elect the board Ala. 639 (1875); S. C. 25 Am. Rep. 730.
of county commissioners ; but they also See also Soper v. Henry Co., 26 Iowa,
elect the sheriff and treasurer of the 264 (1868); Treadwell v. Commissioners,
county. Are the people of the county, 11 Ohio St. 190; Angell & Ames, secs. 14,
therefore, responsible for the malfea- 23, 24, 25. Post, secs. 57, 66, also chapter
sances in office of the sheriff or for the on Actions, secs. 963, 965, 966, 1014.
official defalcations of the county treas. 2 Princeton v. Gebhart, 61 Ind. 187;
urer ? This will not be pretended. Inglis v. Hughes, 61 Ind. 212 ; Wright v.
We cannot but think that county com- Stockman, 59 Ind. 65 ; Sheffield 2. An-
missioners are not agents or representa- dress, 56 Ind. 157.
tives of the county in any such sense or 8 Harris v. School District, 8 Foster,
manner as to render the people of the 28 (N. H.) 58, 61 (1853). Speaking of
county justly answerable for their neg. the powers of separate school-districts not
lect; even if the neglect be such as would included in a municipality, and of their
create a civil liability against a natural officers, Bell, J., in the case just cited,
person or a municipal or private corpora- observes : “These little corporations have
tion. It is,” he adds, " undoubtedly com- sprung into existence within a few years,
petent for the legislature to make the and their corporate powers and those of
people of a county liable for the official their officers are to be settled by the con-
delinquencies of the county commission- structions of the courts upon a succession
ers; but this has not yet been done, and of crude, upconnected, and often experi-
.
11
§ 25
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
$ 25 (10 a). Same subject. Distinction between Public and
quasi and Municipal Corporations. — Civil corporations are of dif-
ferent grades or classes, but in essence and nature they must all be
regarded as public. The school-district or the road-district is usually
invested by general enactments operating throughout the State
with a corporate character, the better to perform within and for the
locality its special function, which is indicated by its name. It is
but an instrumentality of the State, and the State incorporates it
that it may the more effectually discharge its appointed duty. So
with counties. They are involuntary political or civil divisions of
the State, created by general laws to aid in the administration of
government. Their powers are not uniform in all the States, but
these generally relate to the administration of justice, the support of
the poor, the establishment and repair of highways, — all of which
are matters of State, as distinguished from municipal concern.
They are purely auxiliaries of the State ; and to the general statutes
of the State they owe their creation, and the statutes confer upon
them all the powers they possess, prescribe all the duties they owe,
and impose all liabilities to which they are subject. Considered
with respect to the limited number of their corporate powers,
the bodies above named rank low down in the scale or grade of
corporate existence; and hence have been frequently termed quasi
corporations. This designation distinguishes them on the one hand
mental enactments. School-districts are in powers. The liability of such powers to
New Hampshire quasi corporations of the abuse furnishes the strongest arguments
most limited powers known to the laws. against their existence," as a committee
They have no powers derived from usage. might load the district with debts, though
They have the powers expressly granted the district had expressly limited their
to them, and such implied powers as are authority. See also Wilson v. School
necessary to enable them to perform their Dist., 32 (N. H.) 118 (1855); Foster v.
duties, and no more. Among them is the Lane, 10 Foster, 30 (N. H.) 305, 315;
power to vote inoney for specified purposes, Giles v. School Dist., 11 Fost. 31 (N. H.)
and the power to appoint committees 'to 304 ; Scales v. Chattahoochee County, 41
carry their votes' relative to those pur. Ga. 225 (1870); Rogers v. People, 68 Ill.
poses 'into effect.'
The district may 154 (1873), citing text. So also Beach v.
clearly, by their votes for building and Leahy, 11 Kansas, 23, 30 (1873). A school-
repairing school-houses, limit the expense district is bound by the contract of its
to a definite sum ; and they may limit the board for repairs of its school-house, not-
precise repairs or the exact description of withstanding that a given sum had been
the school-house to be built, and when voted for such repairs and expended for
this is done the committee (appointed to such object. Conklin. v. School Dist. 22
carry the votes into effect') cannot bind Kansas, 521. And under a parol contract.
the district by exceeding those limits. Cases in note 2, supra.
These committees are special agents, with- 1 Ante, secs. 9, 12, 14, 17, 19-23. Post,
out any general powers over the affairs of secs. 46, 963-966, 1014.
the district, and their powers are confined 2 Hamilton County v. Garrett, 62 Tex.
to a special purpose ; and no inference can 602.
be drawn from the general nature of their
!
$ 27 PUBLIC AND MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS DISTINGUISHED.
45
from private corporations aggregate, and on the other from muni-
cipal corporations proper, such as cities or towns acting under
charters, or incorporating statutes, and which are invested with
more powers and endowed with special functions relating to the
particular or local interests of the municipality, and to this end are
granted a larger measure of corporate life.
§ 26. Same subject. — It will appear hereafter that nearly all
of the courts have drawn a marked line of distinction between muni-
cipal corporations and quasi corporations, in respect to their liability
to persons injured by their neglect of duty; holding the former liable,
without an express statute giving the action, in cases in which the
latter are not considered liable unless made so by express legislative
enactment. One reason given for the distinction is, that with re-
spect to local or municipal powers proper (as distinguished from
those conferred upon the municipality as a mere agent of the State)
the inhabitants are to be regarded as having been clothed with them
at their request and for their peculiar and special advantage, and
that as to such powers and the duties springing out of them, the
corporation has a private character, and is liable, on the like prin-
ciples and generally to the same extent as a private corporation,
This subject will be fully examined in its appropriate place, and is
alluded to here only for the purpose of noting the distinction which
has been made between municipal and public corporations. But
that a municipal corporation is in any just view a private corpora-
tion, or possesses a double character, the one private and the other
public, although often asserted, is only true in a modified sense. In
their nature and purposes, municipal corporations, however numer-
ous and complex their powers and functions, are essentially public.?
$ 27. Same subject. Concerning the distinction mentioned in the
preceding section, the following views may, perhaps, on principle be
1 Post, ch. xxiii. Text approved. Han- the last two sentences of the text, as they
non v. St. Louis County, 62 Mo. 313, 316 appeared in the third edition, to stand.
(1876); Heller v. Stremmel, 52 Mo. 309 But to prevent misconception he now adds
(1873); State v. Leffingwell, 54 Mo. 458, that while, in his judgment, a inunicipal
471 (1873); Union Township v. Gibboney, corporation is essentially a public and not
94 Pa. St. 534.
in any true sense a private corporation, still
2 The doctrine of the private character it does not follow that it may not have,
of municipal corporations, as respects under the Constitutions of the States, cer-
their property rights, is argued with great tain primordial and fundamental rights,
force by Cooley, J., in People v. Detroit, which, although they are not beyond legis-
28 Mich. 228 ; S. C. 15 Am. Rep. 202. See lative regulation, are nevertheless beyond
post, ch. iv, secs. 58, 72, 73. In the Roman legislative destruction. See post, ch. iv.
law, see ante, sec. 3. The author allows
46
§ 28
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
considered as sound. As respects the usual and ordinary legisla-
tive and governmental powers conferred upon a municipality, the
better to enable it to aid the State in properly governing that por-
tion of its people residing within the municipality, such powers are
in their very nature public, although embodied in a charter and not
conferred by laws general in their nature and applicable to the en-
tire State. But powers or franchises of an exceptional, or extraordi-
nary or non-municipal nature may be, and sometimes are, conferred
upon municipalities, such as are frequently conferred upon individ-
uals or private corporations. Thus, for example, a city may be ex-
pressly authorized in its discretion to erect a public wharf and charge
tolls for its use, or to supply its inhabitants with water or gas, charg-
ing them therefor and making a profit thereby. In one sense such
powers are public in their nature because conferred for the public ad-
vantage. In another sense they may be considered private, because
they are such as may be, and often are, conferred upon individuals
and private corporations, and result in a special advantage or benefit
to the municipality as distinct from the public at large. In this
limited sense, and as forming a basis for the implied civil liability
for damages caused by the negligent execution of such powers, it
may be said that a municipality has a private as well as a public
character. And so, as hereafter shown, a municipality may have
property rights which are so far private in their nature that they
are not held at the pleasure of the legislature.4
§ 28 (11) The New England Town. - In the New England
States, public corporations have, in many respects, a peculiar char-
acter. In some instances, there are acts incorporating cities, giving
them defined powers and providing a special mode of government;
but even then the general laws in relation to towns, when not incon-
sistent with the provisions of the local act, ordinarily apply to the
places specially incorporated. In the New England town proper,
the citizens administer the general affairs in person, at the stated
corporate or town meetings, and through officers elected by them-
selves. The towns are charged with the support of schools, the
i See cases cited post, sec. 66; and for 2 Pittsburg v. Grier, 22 Pa. St.53 (1853);
illustrations and application of the doc- post, sec. 113, note, and the chapter xxiii.
trine, post, secs. 57, 58, 775 ; also chap. on Actions, secs. 966, 967, 980.
xxiii., Actions, secs. 963-967, 1014, 1018. 8 1b., post, chap. xxiii. on Actions.
See. observations of Hunt, J., in Barnes 4 Chap. iv., post.
V. District of Columbia, 91 U. S. 540 5 In towns, according to the use of the
(1875); and of Gray, C. J., in Hill v. Bos- word in the New England States and some
ton, 122 Mass. 344 (1877), noted infra, of the others, the citizens administer the
sec. 965.
general affairs in person, in town meet
t
§ 28
47
THE NEW ENGLAND TOWN.
relief of the poor, the laying out and repair of highways, and are
empowered to preserve peace and good order, maintain internal po-
lice, and direct and manage generally, in a manner not repugnant
to the laws of the State, their prudential affairs; and for defraying
these and all necessary and lawful charges, they may levy and col-
lect taxes. Speaking generally, the New England towns are organ-
ized after the same model; and an exact notion of their character
will be best obtained by reference to the leading statutory provisions
in Massachusetts respecting them, given in the note. The town in
ings. In cities, this is done by means of a Harwinton, 32 Conn. 131 ; Dillon, Mun.
mayor, aldermen, and council, to whom Corp., secs. 28–30.
the citizens entrust most of the legislative SUMMARY of the leading statutory
and executive powers of the place. State provisions in MASSACHUSETTS respecting
v. Glennon, 3 R. I. 276, 278, per Staples, towns : –
C. J. In New England, “town” is a 1. As to powers and duties. They are
generic term, and it will embrace cities, "bodies corporate, with all the powers here-
unless the contrary appears in other parts tofore exercised by them, and subject to
of the statute to have been the intent of all the duties to which they have hereto.
the legislature. Ib. The reader will find fore been subject. Gen. St. 1860, chap.
the opinion of Gray, C. J., in Hill v. Bos- xviii. sec. 1. Towns may, in their cor-
ton, 122 Mass. 344 ; s. C. 23 Am. Rep. porate capacity, sue and be sued in the
332, 1877, highly instructive as to the name of the town." Ib. sec. 8. They
character of New England towns and may hold real estate and personal prop-
cities. As to general liabilities, there is erty "for the public use of the inhabit-
no substantial distinction between cities ants,” and also "in trust for the support
and towns under the legislation of Massa- of schools and the promotion of education
chusetts. Ib. p. 354.
within the limits of the town,'
Ib. sec.
1 Every town has the corporate right to 9. They may make contracts necessary
send representatives to the General Court and convenient “for the exercise of their
(the legislature). If by a majority vote a corporate powers," and may dispose of
town declines to send a representative, the their corporate property. Ib. secs. 8, 9.
dissenting minority cannot legally choose "They may, at legal meetings, grant and
one. Opinion Justices Sup. Court, 7 Mass. vote such sums as they judge necessary
526 ; 15 Mass. 537. “ Towns in Connecti- for the following purposes : For the sup-
cut, as in the other New England States, port of town schools; for the relief, &c.,
differ from trading companies, and even and employment of the poor; for the lay-
from municipal corporations elsewhere. ing out and discontinuing and repair of
They are territorial corporations, into highways; for procuring the writing and
which the State is divided by the legis- publishing of town histories; for burial
lature, from time to time, at its discre- grounds; for encouraging the destruction
tion, for political purposes and the con- of noxious animals ; for all other neces-
venient administration of government; sary charges arising therein." Ib. sec. 10.
they have those powers only which have May make necessary by-laws, not repug.
been expressly conferred upon them by nant to the laws of the State, for directing
statute, or which are necessary for con- and managing the prudential affairs, pre-
ducting municipal affairs; and all the in- serving the peace and good order, and
habitants of the town are members of the maintaining the internal police thereof."
quasi corporation.” Per Gray, J., Bloom- Ib. sec. 11.
Ib. sec. 11. But such by-laws must, be-
field v. Charter Oak Bank, 121 U, S. 121, fore taking effect, be approved by the
citing 1 Swift's System, 116, 117 ; Granby Superior Court, or, in vacation, a judge
V. Thurston, 23 Conn. 416 ; Webster v. thereof. Ib. sec. 14. They are binding
و
48
§ 28
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
New England, while somewhat anomalous, has some of the usual
powers of a regular municipal corporation, and some of the charac-
66 The
upon all within the limits of the town, provisions of the acts establishing cities,
strangers as well as inhabitants. Ib. sec. apply to them; and cities are subject to
15.
the liabilities, and city councils have the
2. Corporate or Town Meetings. “Ev- powers of towns. The mayor and aldermen
ery male citizen of twenty-one years of shall have the powers and be subject to the
age and upwards (except paupers, &c.), liabilities of selectmen, &c., if no other
who has resided within the State one year, provisions are made in relation thereto.”
and within the town in which he claims Gen. St. 1860, chap. xix. 166.
the right to vote, six months, and who has marked and characteristic distinction be-
paid a State or county tax, &c., shall have tween a town organization (in Massachu-
à right to vote upon all questions at all setts) and that of a CITY is, that in the
meetings for the transaction of town af- former all of the qualified inhabitants
fairs, and no other person shall be entitled meet, deliberate, act, and vote in their
to vote." Ib. sec. 19. "The annual meet-
The annual meet- natural and personal capacities ; whereas,
ing of each town shall be held in Febru- under a city government, this is all done
ary, March, or April ; and other meetings by their representatives.” Per Shaw, C. J.,
at such time as the selectmen may order.” in Warren v. Charlestown, 2 Gray, 84,
Ib. sec. 20. Warrants issue for all meet- 101. As to the origin and power of towns
ings, under the hands of the selectmen, in Massachusetts, consult Commonwealth
directed to constables or others, who no- v. Roxbury, 9 Gray, 451 (1857); opinion
tify such meeting in the manner pre- of Shaw, C. J., 476, and the valuable note
scribed by the by-laws or vote of the of Mr. (since Chief Justice) Gray, pp. 503,
town. Ib. sec. 21. “The warrant shall 528; and the opinion of the same eminent
express the time and place of the meeting judge in Hill v. Boston, 122 Mass. 344
and the subjects to be there acted upon; (1877); s. C. 23 Am. Rep. 332 ; Quincy's
and nothing acted upon shall have Municipal History of Boston, chap. i. ;
a legal operation unless the subject matter ante, chap. i. Towns were not expressly
thereof is contained in the warrant." Ib. authorized to sue and be sued until 1694,
sec. 22. [See infra, secs. 266-268, as to nor formally incorporated until 1785. Ib.
necessity and requisites of the notice or 9 Gray, 511, note “G”; 2 Dana's Ab.
warning.] If selectmen unreasonably re- 698 ; Willard v. Newburyport, 12 Pick.
fuse to call a meeting, any justice of the 227, 231 ; Spaulding v. Lowell, 23 Pick.
peace may do so upon the application of 77, 78. Post, sec. 187, note.
The neces-
ten or more legal voters of the town. ib. sity of the representative system in a popu-
sec. 23. Provision is made for moderat- lous place is strikingly illustrated in The
ing and conducting the meeting. Ib. secs. People v. Detroit, 28 Mich. 228 (1873);
25–30. Town oficers are elected at the S. C. 15 Am. Rep. 202, where the legis-
annual meeting, who serve for one year, lature had provided that an important
and until others are chosen and qualified. question should be decided by a vote of
These consist of selectmen, assessors, treas- a citizens' meeting. Two meetings were
urer, constables, who are ex-officio collec- held, but the noise, confusion, and vio-
tors unless others be specially chosen ; lence prevented discussion and determina-
field-drivers, fence-viewers, surveyors of tion, and this provision was subsequently
lumber, measurers of wood, unless select- repealed. Speaking of the representative
men appoint, “and all other usual town system in general, the learned Dr. Lieber
officers." Ib. sec. 31. Then follows a calls it “a flower of civilization, such as
variety of provisions respecting the duties neither antiquity nor the Middle Ages
of these several officers, and the manner of either enjoyed or suspected ; something
their performance. In addition, there are direct and positive in it self ;
one of
acts incorporating and establishing cities. the very greatest political institutions
• The laws in relation to towns, where not which adorn the pages of the history of
inconsistent with the general or special civilization, for through it alone can be
$
§ 28
49
THE NEW ENGLAND TOWN.
teristics of the county organizations in many of the States. The
New England town is especially interesting as affording, perhaps,
an example of as pure a democracy as anywhere exists. All of the
qualified inhabitants meet and directly act upon and manage, or di-
rect the management of, their own local concerns. Each citizen has
a vote and an equal voice. This form of government was adopted
at a very early period, and is firmly adhered to and deeply cherished
by the people of the New England States. The result has demon-
strated how well adapted it is to promote the well-being of the
communities that for so long a space of time have thus governed
themselves. The remarkable growth and prosperity of the New
England States, not the most favored by nature, and the intelli-
gence and character of the people, are known to all; and it is not
strange that these results should be attributed, in a large measure,
to this system of local popular government. But, in the course of
time, many of the towns, or portions thereof, grew to be large and
populous, and the system of meetings of the electors, in their origi-
nal capacity, became inconvenient and almost impracticable. When
the population of a town or place exceeds 10,000 or 12,000 persons,
the need for the representative system is urgently felt. Accord-
ingly, in the New England States, there are now, in addition to
towns, a large number of incorporated cities, with charters or consti-
tuent statutes, organized upon the usual representative model, with a
legislative or governing body, and an executive head and subordi-
nate officers. The people of the large city of Boston, in particular,
obtained real civil liberty, broad, extensive, of New England. At the town meeting
and natural freedom.” 2 Pol. Ethics, 489. one is impressed with the accumulat-
History of Political Representation in Eng. ed virility of the four or five men who
land, — why it was unknown in antiquity, speak so well to the point, and so easily
and why it was used and developed in handle the affairs of the town, - only four
England, - see Hearn, Government of last night, and all so good that they
England, chaps. xvii., xviii. The general would have satisfied me had I been in
justice of Dr. Lieber's eulogium cannot be Boston or Washington. The speech of
denied ; but this system has worked every- was perfect, and to that handful of
where better than it has in our large cities, people, who heartily applauded it.” And
where the representative is often elected again, “The most hardfisted, disagreeably
by those who do not pay the taxes, the restless, thought - paralyzing companion
expenditure of which it is his principal sometimes turns out in the town meet-
function to direct and control. See chap. i. ings to be a fluent, various, and effective
ante, for a discussion of the defects in the orator. Now I find what all that excess
practical working of our municipal corpor- of power which chafed and fretted me so
ations, and for some suggestions as to the much in was for.” This illustrates
best method of remedying them.
what De Tocqueville means in the passages
1 Mr. Ralph Waldo Emerson took quoted ante, sec. 9, “that local assemblies
great interest in the practical workings of citizens constitute the strength of free
of the town meeting system. He writes, nations,” &c.
“I see in them the safety and strength
VOL. I.
-4
50
§ 28
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
were wedded to the town system, and struggled long against the in-
evitable change to the representative plan; and five successive times
between 1784 and 1821 they rejected well-considered schemes for a
city government. The town continued to be governed by meetings
of the electors en masse, acting through boards and officers, until the
place had 40,000 inhabitants, of whom seven thousand were qualified
voters. In 1822, however, the legislature, at the desire of a major-
ity of the voters, granted the place a city charter, by which it was
provided that the control of its affairs should be in a mayor and
city council. After this, other towns, from time to time, made the
change from the town to the city plan; so that, as before observed,
we have in the New England States both modes of local administra-
tion. The town system is the general one; the city, or representative
system, is the exceptional one, and is confined to places of compact
population and considerable size.I
i No city was incorporated in Massa- inhabitants. Those who thus came were,
chusetts until after the amendment of the for the most part, drawn to it from some
Constitution of that State in 1820. Per official duty or private interest, which,
Shaw, C. J., in Warren v. Charlestown, when performed or obtained, they gen-
2 Gray, 84. The purpose and effect of the erally troubled themselves but little, or
change in the form of municipal govern- not at all, about the other business of the
ments in Massachusetts under the con- meeting. In assemblies thus composed,
stitutional provision authorizing the estab. by-laws were passed, taxes, to the amount
lishment of cities, is discussed by Gray, of one hundred or one hundred and fifty
C. J., in Hill v. Boston, 122 Mass. 344 thousand dollars, voted, on statements
(1877); s. C. 23 Am. Rep. 332. After re- often general in their nature, and on re-
ferring to the previous attempts in 1784, ports, as it respects the majority of voters
1785, 1791, 1804, and 1815, to change the present, taken upon trust, and which no
town government of Boston, Mr. Josiah one had carefully considered, except per-
Quincy, in his Municipal History of Bos- haps the chairman. In the constitution
ton, p. 28, continues: “Iu 1821 the in- of the town government there had resulted,
practicability of conducting the municipal in the course of time, from exigency or
interests of the place, under the form of necessity, a complexity little adapted to
town government, became apparent to the produce harmony in action, and an irre-
inhabitants. With a population upwards sponsibility irreconcilable with a wise and
of forty thousand, and with seven thou- efficient conduct of its affairs. On the
sand qualified voters, it was evidently agents of the town there was no direct
impossible calmly to deliberate and act. check or control ; no pledge for fidelity
When a town-meeting was held on any but their own honor and sense of character.
exciting subject, in Faneuil Hall, those The prosperity of the town of Boston,
only who obtained places near the mod- under such a form of governinent; the few
erator conld even hear the discussion. A defalcations which had occurred; the fre-
few busy or interested individuals easily quent, and often, for years, uninterrupted
obtained the management of the most re-election of the same members to the
important affairs, in an assembly in which officiating boards, are conclusive evidence
the greater number could have neither of the prevailing high state of morals and
voice nor hearing. When the subject intelligence among the inhabitants.
was not generally exciting, town-meet- After mentioning the different boards
ings were usually composed of the select- among which the executive power was
the town officers, and thirty or forty divided, and which acted independently
men,
t
§ 29
51
THE NEW ENGLAND TOWN.
$ 29 (12). Same subject. — The character of towns in New Eng-
land, and in what respects they differ from English municipal cor-
porations, existing by prescription or special charter, prior to the
legislation by parliament in 1835, before mentioned, and the care
to be observed in applying the English cases relating to such cor-
porations to the town and city organizations of New England, are
instructively set forth by the learned Chief-Justice Perley, in deliv-
ering the opinion of the Supreme Court of New Hampshire, in an
important case to which we shall again have occasion to allude.?
of each other, and which were invested board of aldermen, consisting of eight,
with the expending power, and, in effect, and common council, of forty-eight inhabi-
with exercise of the whole power of tax. tants, to be called, when conjoined “The
ation, Mr. Quincy proceeds : “A con- City Council." (3) The city to be divided
viction of the want of safety and of re- into twelve wards. The mayor and alder-
sponsibility in a machine thus complicated men and common-council to be chosen an-
and loosely coinbined became at length nually, by ballot, by and from inhabitants;
so general that the inherited and invet four of the common council from and by
erate antipathy to a city organization be- those of each of the wards. (4) The city
gan perceptibly to diminish. About this clerk to be chosen by the city council.
time, also, one of the most common and (5) The mayor to receive a salary. His
formal objections to a city organization duty, to be vigilant and active in causing
was removed. The constitution of Massa- the laws to be executed ; to inspect the
chusetts, which was passed in 1780, con- conduct of all subordinate officers ; to
tained no express authority to establish a cause carelessness, negligence, and posi-
city organization ; and in every attempt tive violation of the laws to be prosecuted
to change that of the town, it never failed and punished; to summon meetings of
to be zealously contended that the legis either or both boards; to communicate
lature of the commonwealth possessed no and recommend measures for the improve-
such power. But by the amendments to ment of the finances, the police, health,
the constitution made by the convention security, cleanliness, comfort, and orna-
of 1820, and adopted by the people, this ment of the city. (6) The mayor and
power was expressly recognized. The aldermen are vested with the administra-
question, therefore, now stood on its own tion of the police and executive power of
merits, and independent of constitutional the corporation generally, and with spe-
objections. The debates, also, which oc- cific enumerated powers. (7) All other
curred in this convention had a tendency powers belonging to the corporation are
to open the eyes of the inhabitants to their vested in the mayor, aldermen, and com-
own interests, and to allay some of the mon council, to be exercised by concurrent
long-cherished prejudices against a city vote. Post, sec. 187, note. Boston has
organization.” In 1821 the people voted an amended or reformed charter dating
to make the change, and measures were from 1854, but the changes are not struc-
immediately taken to obtain the sanction tural. They give the mayor increased
of the legislature. The legislature, on power. The City Council still consists of
the 23d day of February, 1822, passed two branches. Certain executive officers
“ An Act establishing the City of Boston," are elected by the people, and others are
commonly called "the city charter.” The appointed by the mayor and aldermen.
following is a brief outline of the prin. See Bugbee, City Government of Bos-
cipal features of this charter, taken from ton," in Johns Hopkins University Studies,
Quincy's Municipal History of Boston, 1887, fifth series.
p. 41: (1) The title of the corporation to 1 Ante, chap. i.; post, chap. iii.
be, “The City of Boston." (2) The control 2 Eastman v. Meredith, 36 N. H. 284,
of all its concerns is vested in a mayor, a
52
§ 30
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
He says: “It is to be observed that municipal corporations in Eng-
land are broadly distinguished in many important respects from
towns in this and the other New England States. There is no uni-
formity in the powers and duties of English municipal corporations.
They were not created and established under any general public
law, but the powers and duties of each municipality depended upon
its own individual grant or prescription. Their corporate franchises
were held of the crown by the tenure of performing the conditions
upon which they had been granted, and were liable to forfeiture
for breach of the conditions. They indeed answered certain public
purposes, as private corporations do which have public duties to per-
form, and some of them exercised political rights. But they are not
like towns (with us) general political and territorial divisions of the
country, with uniform powers and duties, defined and varied, from
time to time, by general legislation. Towns (in New England) do
not hold their powers ordinarily under any grant from the govern-
ment to the individual corporation; or by virtue of any contract
with the government, or upon any condition, express or implied.
They give no assent in their corporate capacity to the laws which
impose their public duties or fix their territorial limits." And re-
ferring to the case then before the court, he added : “ In all that is
material to the present inquiry, municipal corporations in England
bear much less resemblance to towns in this country than to pri-
vate corporations which are charged with the performance of public
duties; and for these reasons the English authorities on the subject
are but remotely applicable to the present case.” 1
§ 30 (12 a). Legal powers of New England towns. The distinc-
tive character of the New England towns, and particularly the limited
nature of their powers, will be further seen by a brief glance at the
course of judicial decisions with respect to their authority to make
contracts and to obtain revenue. Money can only be raised by
them for the purposes expressed in the statute, and for expenses
incident to such purposes. The power of the majority is wisely
limited by law to the object and cases which are clearly provided
for and defined by statute.?
290 (1858). And see also Hill v. Boston, B. Adams has an essay on the “Germanic
supru ; post, secs. 32, 35, 37, 183.
Origin of New England Towns," in Johns
1 Mr. Bryce, in his “ American Com- Hopkins University Studies, first series.
monwealth,” has two interesting chapters 2 Stetson v. Kempton, 13 Mass. 272
on the subject of rural local government (1816); Parsons v. Goshen, 11 Pick. 396
in the United States. He traces the origin (1831). “ This limitation," says Mr. Jus-
and influence of the New England town tice Wilde, with great truth, in the case
(chaps. xlviii. and xlix.). Prof. Herbert last cited, " upon the power and authority
§ 30
53
LEGAL POWERS OF NEW ENGLAND TOWNS.
Thus a town, under a statute which restricts it to raising money
to provide for “the poor, for schools, for the support of public wor-
>>
of towns to enter into contracts and stip. (1839); Estes v. School Dist., 33 Maine,
ulations, is a wise and salutary provision 170 (1871); Mitchell 2. Rockland, 45
of law, not only as it protects the rights Maine, 496, 504 (1858); Salem Mill Dam
and interests of the minority of the legal v. Ropes, 6 Pick. 23, 32; School Dist.,
voters, but as it may not unfrequently &c. v. Wood, 13 Mass. 193 (1816), per
prove beneficial to the interests of the Parker, C. J. ; Mower v. Leicester, 9 Dass.
majority, who may be hurried into rash 247, 250 (1812). The legislature may au-
and unprofitable speculations by some thorize and require a town in Massachu-
popular or delusive excitement, to the in- setts to raise and expend money for public
fluence of which even wise and consider. use within its limits, or for reimbursing
ate men are sometimes liable. A town in money paid for such public use. Agawam
its corporate capacity will not be bound, v. Hampden, 130 Mass. 528, and cases
even by the express vote of the majority, cited. Non-residents of municipalities.
to the performance of contracts or other Post, sec. 195.
legal duties, not coming within the scope Where the legislature has prescribed
of the objects and purposes for which they the purposes for which money may be
are incorporated. The power of towns raised by taxation, it cannot be raised for
to raise money is discussed at large by other and distinct purposes ; nor when it
Endicott, J., in Minot v. West Roxbury, is raised and collected for authorized and
112 Mass. 1 (1873); s. C. 17 Am. Rep. 52; proper purposes can it be appropriated to
cited post, ch. xxii. Anthony v. Adams, or expended upon other and different ob-
1 Met. (Mass.) 284, 286 (1840), per Shaw, jects. This would be to break down and
C. J. ; quoted and followed in Vincent v. defeat the limitation. Hence towns can-
Nantucket, 12 Cush. 105 (1853). See also not give away or distribute, per capita or
Norton v. Mansfield, 16 Mass. 48 ; Dill v. otherwise, money collected by taxation.
Wareham, 7 Met. (Mass. 1844) 438 (con. Hooper v. Emery, 14 Maine (2 Shep. ),
tract by the town, undertaking to transfer 375, explaining Ford v. Clough, 8 Greenl.
the right of taking oysters within its (Maine) 334 ; Davis v. Bath, 17 Maine,
limits).
141 (1840); Pease v. Cornish, 19 Maine,
Whether towns in Massachusetts are (1 Appl.), 191 (1841); Stetson v. Kemp-
authorized by statute to make any con- ton, 13 Mass. 272 ; Dillingham v. Snow,
tracts which involve the payment of 5 Mass. 547 ; Spaulding v. Lowell, 23
money, unless the contracts are such that Pick. 71 (1830) ; Woodbury v. Hamilton,
a tax on the inliabitants may be laid to 6 Pick. 101 ; Cooley v. Granville, 10
raise the money, does not seem to be set- Cush. 56.
tled by express adjudication. Bancroft The Vermont statute respecting the
v. Lynnfield, 18 Pick. 566 (1836), per powers of towns is nearly a transcript of
Shaw, C. J.; Tash v. Adams, 10 Cush. that of Massachusetts.
The Supreme
252 (1852).
Court of Vermont approves of the expo-
“The inhabitants of every town in this sition of the statute given by the Supreme
state' Maine says Shepley, C. J., in Court of Massachusetts in Willard v.
Hooper v. Emery, 14 Maine (2 Shep.), 375 Newburyport, 12 Pick. 230 ; Allen v.
(1837), “are declared to be a body politic Taunton, 19 Pick. 485 ; Torry v. Milbury,
and corporate by the statute ; but these 21 Pick. 64 ; Spaulding v. Lowell, 23 Pick.
corporations derive none of their powers 71 ; Hardy v. Waltham, 3 Met. 163, per
from, nor are any duties imposed upou Isham, J., in Van Sicklen v. Burlington,
them by the common law. They have 27 Vt. (1 Wms.) 70. For discussion of
been denominated quasi corporations, and powers and duties of selectmen, and digest
their whole capacities, powers, and duties of previous decisions in New Hampshire,
are derived from legislative enactments.” see Carleton v. Bath, 2 Fost. (22 N. H.)
See also Pittson v. Clark, 15 Maine, 460, 559. Have no general authority to bind
463; Augusta v. Leadbetter, 16 Maine, 45 the town by contract. Andover v. Graf-
54
§ 30
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
ship, and other necessary charges," cannot raise money, even in the
time of war, and when the town is in immediate danger from the
enemy, for the payment of additional wages to the drafted and en-
listed militia, and for other purposes of defence. This is not a cor-
porate duty, but the duty of the general government. Nor can it
appropriate money, contract for, or levy a tax to aid in the construc-
tion of a road, which, by law, is to be made at the expense of the
county, and not the town. A town may, it is said, raise money to
meet ordinary expenditures, such as the payment of officers, the
support and defence of actions, the expenses incident to discharging
duties imposed by law, looking to the safety and convenience of the
citizens. Thus it can erect a town or city hall, or market-house, but
not a theatre, a circus, or any place of mere amusement, nor even a
statue or monument, unless in populous and wealthy towns as
suitable ornaments to public buildings or squares. So towns may
provide for the support of a public clock, hay-scales, burying-ground,
wells, reservoirs, and many other like objects, which relate to the
accommodation and convenience of the inhabitants, and which have
been placed under the municipal jurisdiction of towns by statute or
by usage. 4
ton, 7 N. H. * 300. But are confined to (1816), where the phrase, necessary town
such acts as are necessary to the discharge charges, is construed by Parker, C. J.;
of their duties. Sanborn v. Deerfield, 2 and see comment of Shaw, C. J., 12 Pick.
N. H. 253. Cannot, ex-officio, adjust con- 227, 230 ; S. C. 23 Pick. 74 ; and of Dewey,
troversies of suits, or release a cause of J., in Allen v. Taunton, 19 Pick. 485, 487;
action. Carleton v. Bath, 2 Fost. (22 18 Pick. 566 ; 10 Cush. 57 ; of Clifford,
N. H.) 559. May indemnify town offi- J., in Burrill v. Boston, 2 Clifford, C. C.
cers in proper cases. Pike v. Middleton, 590 (1867).
12 N. H. 278. Post, sec. 147. But there 2 Parsons v. Goshen, 11 Pick. 396
is no promise implied in law against a (1831); Anthony V. Adams, 1 Met.
town to indemnify selectmen in any case (Mass.) 284 (1840).
for damages which they have been com- 8 Stetson v. Kempton, 13 Mass. 272
pelled to pay, arising out of the discharge (1816), per Parker, C. J. ; Allen v. Taun-
of official duty. Eaves v. Shattuck, 35 ton, 19 Pick. 485, 487, opinion by Dewey,
N. H. 189. Are supposed to be liable to J., as to power of towns in Massachusetts ;
the corporation for gross neglect of official Spaulding v. Lowell, 23 Pick. 71 ; opin-
duty. Sanborn v. Deerfield, 2 N. H. 253, ion of Shaw, C. J., on same subject.
by Woodbury, J. Notes made by a treas- 4 Willard v. Newburyport, 12 Pick.
urer of a New England town to a bank, 227, 230 (1831). General municipal
in payment for money borrowed without powers held to include power to erect a
the knowledge of the town, are not bind- town-hall. Greeley v. People, 60 Ill. 19
ing upon the town, unless authorized by (1871); Bell v. Platteville, 71 Wis. 139.
a vote of the town at a meeting duly But does not include power to defray ex-
warned for that purpose, or ratified by the penses of a committee to petition the le-
vote of such a meeting duly warned for gislature to destroy the existence of the
the purpose of such ratification. Bloom- town by annexing it to another town.
field v. Charter Oak Bank, 121 U. S. 121 Minot v. West Roxbury, 112 Mass. 1
(1886). See infra, secs. 266-268.
(1873) ; s. c. 17 Am. Rep. 52 ; Coolidge
1 Stetson v. Kempton, 13 Mass. 272 v. Brookline, 114 Mass. 592 (1874). Lia-
$ 31
55
THE STATE AND ITS CORPORATIONS DISTINGUISHED..
§ 31 (14). Each one of the United States, in its organized politi-
cal capacity, although it is not in the proper use of the term a corpo-
ration, yet it has many of the essential faculties of a corporation,
a distinct name, indefinite succession, private rights, power to sue,
and the like. Corporations, however, as the term is used in our
jurisprudence, do not include States, but only derivative creations,
owing their existence and powers to the State acting through its
legislative department. Like corporations, however, a State, as it
can make contracts and suffer wrongs, so it may, for this reason
and without express provision, maintain in its corporate name
actions to enforce its rights and redress its injuries. But a State
is not liable to be sued without its consent;2 although it is not
unusual for States, by special provision, to authorize suits to be
brought against them, but, as the permission is voluntary, they may
prescribe the terms, and, unless it impairs the obligation of existing
contracts, may withdraw the consent at pleasure. The like dis-
tinction between the State and its corporate creations existed in the
Roman law. The State like the corporation was a Juristical Per-
son, but unlike corporations it was not subject to the jurisdiction of
any judge. Corporations were the subject of Private-law relations,
but not so the State or Fiscus. The jural relations of the State and
of corporations are, in many respects, essentially dissimilar. A de-
vise to a State for any object which it may properly aid or provide
for is valid. Extended consideration of the powers of the States,
and of their relation to the United States and to each other, is not
within the scope of the present work, which is limited strictly to
municipal corporations.
bility of towns in actions of tort. See post, 2 Briscoe v. Bank, 11 Pet. 257, 321.
chap. xxiii. Private property of the inhab- 8 Beers v. Arkansas, 20 How. 527
itants may be taken to satisfy a judgment (1857); Dodd v. Miller, 14 Ind. 433 ;
against the town. Post, sec. 962, note Auditor v. Davies, 2 Pike (Ark.), 494 ;
and cases, chap. xxii.
Ellis v. State, 4 Ind. 1 ; State v. Trustees,
1 Delafield v. Illinois, 2 Hill (N. Y.), 5 Ind. 77. The Supreme Court of the
159, 162 ; 26 Wend. 192 (1841), affirming United States has original jurisdiction in
s. C. 8 Paige, 531 ; Indiana v. Woram, 6 cases in which a State shall be a party, as
Hill (N. Y.), 33 (1843). These cases also in suit between States. Kentucky v.
hold that States may sue as plaintiff in the Dennison, 24 How. 66 ; Wisconsin v.
State courts. State v. Delesdenier, 7 Tex. Duluth, 2 Dillon, C. C., 406 (1872).
76; People v. Assessors, 1 Hill (N. Y.), 'he United States Circuit Court has not.
620. The governor of a State, as the head Ib.
of the executive department, is a corpora- 4 Savigny, Jural Relations (Rattigan's
tion sole, and bonds made payable to him Translation, secs. 86, 87). Ante, sec. 3.
may be enforced for the benefit of those Post, sec. 45, note.
interested. Governor v. Allen, 8 Humph. 6 McDonough Win Case, 15 How. 367,
(Tenn.) 176 (1847); Polk, Governor, v. 382 (1853); post, sec. 569.
Plummer, 2 Humph. 500.
56
$ 32
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
CHAPTER III.
CREATION, AND SEVERAL KINDS OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS IN
ENGLAND AND IN THE UNITED STATES.
In England. - Difference between Regal and Parliamentary Corpora-
tions. - Municipal Corporations Act of 1835.
$ 32 (15). Creation and kinds in England ; Charter defined.
In England, corporations can be created only in one of two ways :
1, by the king's charter : 2, by act of parliament. They exist there,
however, — 1, by the common law; 2, by prescription ; 3, by royal
charter ; 4, by authority of parliament. Corporations at common
law are those which derive their existence and powers from imme-
morial usage, although they may have had their origin in an act
of parliament or royal grant, no longer discoverable. Those by
prescription presuppose a grant by charter or act of parliament,
which has been lost. Into corporations created by regal or legisla-
tive grant may be resolved what have been styled corporations by
implication, which is, where a body, lawfully constituted, cannot
carry into effect its purposes without attributing to it a corporate
character. The franchise of being a corporation, and the right to
exercise corporate powers and to enjoy corporate privileges, can be
claimed in no other way than as above stated. A legal sanction
to the corporate character is, therefore, absolutely necessary, and is
always implied.
The distinction between corporations deriving their existence
from the king's charter and those which derive their existence
from parliament is important. A royal charter is a written instru-
ment, in the form of letters-patent, under the great seal, addressed
to all the subjects of the realm, containing a grant by the crown to
the persons named, of the franchises, powers, and privileges therein
mentioned. A charter of incorporation, therefore, is the written in-
strument by which the king creates the corporate body, names it,
defines its objects, and confers its powers. Unless restricted in the
charter, all of the common-law incidents of a corporation attach to
1 Willc. 21 ; Glover, 23; Grant, 6, 7; Louis v. Allen, 13 Mo. 400 ; St. Louis v.
1 Kyd, 39 ; Angell & Am. sec. 69 ; Bro. Russell, 9 Mo. 503. Post, secs. 42, 84,
Corp. 65; Eastman v. Meredith, 36 N. H. note.
284, 290 (1858), per Perley, C. J.; St.
1
.
!
$ 34
57
ASSENT AND ACCEPTANCE OF GRANTEE : REVOCATION.
it, but no corporation can pursue objects not warranted by its char-
ter. The charter is the organic act which gives to the corporation
both its existence and its peculiar character.1
$ 33. Royal and Parliamentary Charters. The king's charter
may confer upon the corporation it institutes all the usual and
ordinary powers of a corporate body, but it cannot invest such a
body with extraordinary powers, such as proceeding in a manner
different from the common law, or punishing by forfeiture or im-
prisonment, or conferring an exclusive right of trading. When the
king grants clauses which are illegal they are void; and if illegal
and not confirmed by parliament, no length of time or of usage
will make such clauses valid. But parliament, in the fulness of
its power, may grant to corporations which it erects such powers,
ordinary and extraordinary, as it deens proper; and it may, as it
has often done, confirm clauses in royal charters which were void,
because beyond the king's power to grant.
$ 34. Assent and Acceptance of Grantee; Revocation. The
king cannot incorporate a body of men without their assent. Until
his charter has been accepted, it is therefore inoperative. When
once accepted, the acceptance is irrevocable. The acceptance must
be by the grantees; and it is held that a valid acceptance may
be made by a majority of the grantees. The charter must be
accepted in toto, or not at all, for there can be no partial
acceptance without the assent of the crown, which must be shown
by matter of record. If the corporation be a new one, acceptance
of part of the charter is taken as acceptance of all. Acceptance
may be shown by user, -- by acting under it, as well as by the
formal action of the corporate body. After acceptance the crown
cannot resume the grant, or dissolve or destroy the corporation, with-
out the consent of the grantees or their successors. The crown, at
common law, can create a corporation for municipal government in
any place where there is not at the time an existing corporation
1 Outline of municipal charter of the offices. Per Campbell, J., in People v.
Middle Ages. Ante, sec. 6. Charters Bennett, 29 Mich. 451 (1874); s. C. 18
defined. Post, sec. 82.
Am. Rep. 107. Towns and cities, that is,
2 Acceptance of charter. Post, secs. 44, compact bodies of people, have a natural
54, 65 ; chap. xxi. As acceptance was existence, and what may be called a nat-
necessary to make the king's charter ural quasi corporate character. It was so
operative, the municipal charters which he in Rome. Ante, sec. 3. And so in Eng-
gave were all given to existing communi- land. " Each town was regarded as a
ties having a recognized and organized corporate community," prior to any actual
existence, and in the habit of acting as grant of a charter. Hearn, Government
one body, through elections or agencies or of England, 475, 501. Post, secs. 58, 183,
58
$ 35
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
of the same kind, but there cannot be concurrently two corpora-
tions for the same place, having the same or similar powers or juris-
diction. But the limitations upon the power of the crown do not
apply with respect to municipal corporations created by parliament.
Its power is, legally speaking, illimitable. It may create or
abolish and change at its pleasure, with or without the assent of the
people or corporation to be thereby affected. It may change royal
charters; but parliamentary corporations cannot be affected, without
the consent of parliament, by charters granted by the crown. Except
as to the extent of powers which may be conferred, a parliamentary
corporation is, at common law, similar to that which is created by
the crown.1
$ 35 (16). Constitution of an old English Municipality.
Prior
to 1835 many of the towns, boroughs, and cities of England were incor-
porated in one of the ways mentioned; that is to say, there were
in them bodies corporate, established for the local government
thereof. There was no uniformity in the constitution or powers
of these corporate bodies. The corporation proper was not the
town or place, but a corporate body constituted within it, with powers
or jurisdiction, more or less extensive, to govern the inhabitants.
These bodies were established at different times, and from different
motives. The first distinct recognition of a municipal corporation
was in the 18th of Henry VI. (A. D. 1439), with reference to King-
ston-upon-Hull, which had an express charter of incorporation
granted to it, for the first time, in that year.
Charters had pre-
viously been granted to it by different sovereigns, at various times,
giving it various privileges, but they did not incorporate the place,
nor was it incorporated until the charter of 18th Henry VI.,
which is the first that uses terms of incorporation. Subsequently
such corporations were erected from time to time, each with its
peculiar constitution, depending on the provisions of the charter or
prescriptive usage.
The constitution of the corporations was so va-
rious, and is so different from the American model, that it requires
care to get an accurate idea of it. For illustration, we will take
a simple form, viz. : where by charter or by prescription the cor-
poration consists of the mayor, aldermen, and commonalty of a
town. Here there are three ranks, classes, or parts : 1, the mayor,
or head officer; 2, the aldermen, the number of whom is definite,
1 Authorities last cited. Respecting see Rutter v. Chapman, 8 M. & W. 1
the authority of the crown to grant char- Reg. v. Boucher, 3 Q. B. 654 ; s. C. 2 G.
ters to incorporate towns, since the Gen- & D. 737.
eral Municipal Corporations Act of 1835, 2 Glover on Munic. Corp. 16.
§ 36
59
ENGLISH MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS ACT,
1835.
being fixed by the charter, or by prescriptive usage; 3, the com-
monalty, that is, the common freemen, whose number is indefinite,
and whose rights in the course of time were largely usurped or
destroyed. These 'three classes were denominated the integral
parts of the corporation, and no corporation was complete (except
it be otherwise provided by the charter) unless the mayor, or head
officer, a majority of the definite class (that is, a majority of the
aldermen), and some members of the indefinite class, or commonalty,
be in existence. Hence, during a vacancy in the office of mayor, no
valid corporate act can be done except to elect another, since with-
out a mayor the corporate body is incomplete. Hence, also, at
every corporate meeting it was essential, at common law, that there
should be present the mayor, or head officer, whose duty it was to
preside, also a majority of each definite integral class, and some
members of each indefinite class, if there be more than one such
class.
§ 36. Municipal Corporations Reform Act of 1835, and Re-
vised Act of 1882. In the course of time, as we have already
pointed out, great abuses had crept into these bodies, which parlia-
ment had frequently been obliged to redress. Complaints of griev-
ances were universal, and misrule, confusion, and internal disputes
were so general that the municipal system of government fell into
great and deserved disrepute. As a measure of reform, the MUNI-
CIPAL CORPORATIONS ACT of 5 and 6 Wm. IV. ch. lxxvi., was devised
and enacted. “I cordially concur," said the king, “in this im-
1 Ante, sec. 8.
municipal functions. The population of
2 Introductory chapter, ante, sec. 8. these corporate places exceeded two mil-
Luehrman v. Taxing Dist., 2 Lea (Tenn.), lions of people. Some of these corpora-
425.
tions claimed to act under prescriptive
8 The reformed House of Commons custom, but most of them under several
presented an address to William IV., re-
charters, forming a continued series from
questing the appointment of a commission
à very early date, but generally under
to inquire into the state of the municipal charters granted from the reign of Ed-
corporations in England and Wales. The ward I. down to the reign of George IV.
commission which was appointed made a inclusive. The number of corporators
thorough examination of the condition of stated to be defivite, in fifty boroughs,
the various boroughs, and their report dis- varied in most cases from under ten to
closed abuses and defects which it seems thirty, and those indefinite, in one hun.
marvellous that any spirited people so long dred and sixty-two boroughs, varied from
endured. See chap. i., ante, sec. 8. twelve to five thousand, but usually aver-
OFFICIAL REPORT as to the ABUSES aged from fifty to two hundred corpora-
AND DEFECTS found to cxist in the muni- tors. The titles to freedom, or citizenship,
cipal corporations of England and Wales. generally comprehended those arising from
- The commission ascertained the exist birth, servitude, marriage, purchase, gift,
ence of two hundred and forty-six corpo- or election. The governing bodies were
rations in England and Wales, exercising formed by the close and corrupt system
60
§ 36
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
portant measure, which is calculated to allay discontent, to promote
peace and union, and to procure for those communities the ad-
of self-election in a great majority of the public property committed in trust to the
municipalities. The corporate officers, corporation would, if duly administered,
such as the mayor, or other head of the be amply sufficient to provide. Having
corporation, the recorder — frequently un. given a general view of the ordinary con-
professional - and the town-clerk, were stitution of the various municipalities, the
appointed by the self-elected governing commissioners next proceeded to specify
body from its own immaculate conclave. some of their defects. The most common
Some of the municipalities possessed ex- and most striking defect in the constitu-
clusive criminal jurisdiction, extending to tion of the municipal corporations was,
the trial of felonies and all other offences, that the corporate bodies existed indepen-
whereas many appear never to have had dently of the communities among which
any criminal jurisdiction. Several bor- they were found. The corporators looked
oughs had civil jurisdiction extending to upon themselves, and were considered by
the decision of all actions, some extend the inhabitants, as separate and exclusive
ing to the decision of personal and mixed bodies; they had powers and privileges
actions ; others to the decision of personal within the towns and cities from which
actions; while in a considerable number they were named, but in most places all
no civil jurisdiction appeared ever to have identity of interest between the corporation
existed. The property in some few bor- and the inhabitants disappeared. That
oughs was trivial, but the revenue gener- was the case even where the corporation
ally averaged from £500 to £1,000 in included a large body of inhabitant free-
each, while in some the property exceeded men. It appeared in a more striking de-
£50,000 per annum. In a few towns cor- gree as the powers of the corporation had
porate the accounts were printed for dis- been restricted to smaller numbers of the
tribution and audited publicly ; but in resident population, and still more glar-
most cases the accounts were neither duly ingly when the local privileges had been
kept, nor audited, nor published, besides conferred on non-resident freemen, to the
being inaccurate and in a generally unsat- exclusion of the inhabitants to whom they
isfactory state. The annual income of rightfully ought to belong. The privilege
these municipal corporations amounted to of electing members of parliament being
abont £366,000, and the expenditure to that which, before the passing of the Re-
£377,000, while the debt in one hundred form Act, conferred upon the self-elected
and thirty-three exceeded the sum of two governing bodies of close corporate towns
millions sterling. Throughout the course their principal importance, and the re-
of the investigation of the comunissioners wards for political services which the
there were perceptible the same com- patron was accustomed to distribute among
plaints, -- of magistrates ill-qualified by them, caused this function to be consid-
education and habits for their situations, ered in many places as the sole object of
generally partial, and sometimes corrupt; their institution. The power so monopo-
of courts, which might be made the instru- lized, and employed in a mode unsuitable
ments of much local advantage, falling to the altered circumstances of the times,
into disuse through defects of their origi- led to various abuses of the system. The
nal constitution and their recent malad- custom of keeping the number of corpo-
ministration; of juries improperly selected rators as low as possible may be referred
by reason of notorious party bias ; of rev- to the wish for preserving the parliamen-
enue misapplied ; of debt contracted and tary franchise rather than to the desire
of property alienated ; of the absence of of monopolizing the municipal authority,
all accounts and the denial of all accoun- which had been coveted only as a means
tability by certain corporations; of the of securing the other and more highly
insufficiency of the police, the neglect of prized privilege. A great number of cor-
paving and lighting, and the want of those porations were preserved solely as political
municipal accommodations for which the engines, and the towns to which they be-
8 36
61
ENGLISH MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS ACT, 1835.
vantages of responsible government." This act organizes all of
the municipal corporations of England and Wales upon a uniform
model. It does not altogether destroy their previously existing law-
ful corporate powers, but it does sweep away all laws, statutes,
charters, and usages inconsistent with or contrary to its provisions.
It defines who shall be burgesses or citizens, making the right
essentially to depend upon occupancy of houses or shrps within the
longed derived no benefit, but often much magistrates, of the civil and criminal
injury, from their existence. To maintain judges, often of the superintendents of
the political ascendency of a party, or the police, and were, or ought to have been,
political influence of a family, was the one the leaders in every measure that con-
end and object for which the powers en- cerned the interests and prosperity of the
trusted to a numerous class of these bodies town. So far from being the representa-
have been exercised. This object was sys- tives either of the population or of the
tematically pursued in the admission of property of the town, they did not repre-
freemen, resident or non-resident; in sent even the privileged class of freemen;
their election of municipal functionaries and being elected for life, their proceed.
for the council or the magistracy; in the ings were unchecked by any feeling of
appointment of subordinate officers and responsibility. The commissioners re-
the local police ; in the administration of ported that there prevailed aniongst the
charities entrusted to the municipal au- inhabitants of a great majority of the in-
thorities ; in the expenditure of the cor- corporated towns a general and a just dis-
porate revenue, and in the management of satisfaction with their municipal councils,
the corporate property. The most flagrant whose powers were subject to no proper
abuses arose from this perversion of muni control, whose acts and whose proceedings,
cipal privileges to political objects. Thus being secret, were unchecked by the influ-
the inhabitants had to complain, not only ence of public opinion ; a distrust of the
that the election of their magistrates and municipal magistracy, tainting with sus-
other municipal functionaries was made picion the local administration of justice,
by an inferior class of themselves, or by and often accompanied with contempt of
persons unconnected with the town, but the persons by whom the law was admin-
also of the disgraceful practices by which istered ; a discontent under the burdens of
the magisterial office was frequently ob- local taxation, while revenues that ought
tained ; while those who, by character, to be applied for the public advantage
residence, and property, were best quali- were diverted from their legitimate use,
fied to direct and control its municipal and sometimes wastefully bestowed for the
affairs were excluded from any share in benefit of individuals, sometimes squan-
the elections or management. The exclu- dered for purposes injurious to the char-
sive and party spirit belonging to the acter and morals of the people. The com-
whole corporate body appeared in a still missioners therefore felt it their duty to
more marked inanner in the councils by represent to his Majesty that the muni-
which in most cases it was governed. cipal corporations of England and Wales
These councils were usually self-elected, neither possess nor descrve the confidence
and held their offices for life. They were or respect of his Majesty's subjects, and
commonly of one political party, and their that a thorough reform must be effected
proceedings were mainly directed to se- before they can become what they ought
cure and perpetuate the ascendency of the to be, useful and efficient instruments
party to which they belonged. Individu- of local government. Glover's Historical
als of adverse political opinions were, in Summary of the Corporate System of
most cases, systematically excluded from Great Britain and Ireland, pp. 38 to 45.
the governing body. These councils, which The result was the municipal Corporations
embodied the opinions of a single party, Act of 5 & 6 Wm. IV. chap. Ixxvi. See
were entrusted with the nomination of chap. 1, ante, sec. 8.
62
§ 36
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
borough, and the payment of taxes for the relief of the poor. These
burgesses or citizens elect, from time to time, a fixed number of
proper persons to be councillors, and the council (composed of the
mayor, aldermen, and councillors) elect, from qualified persons, the
aldermen, and also the mayor and the ministerial and inferior cor-
porate officers. The council is the governing body of the corpo-
ration, and its most important powers are defined by various acts of
parliament. It will thus be perceived that the original power is in
the burgesses or citizens; that the act adopts the representative
system, and proceeds upon the idea that a substantial interest in
the incorporated place, which is made necessary in order to be a
burgess or citizen, will induce care in the selection of councillors;
and that frequent elections will prove the most effectual check on
those entrusted with the administration of the municipal authority,
which is carefully limited and defined.
The act of 1835, with its amendments, re-enacted and consolidated
by the Municipal Corporations Act of 1882, 45 and 46 Vict. ch. 50;
L. R. 18 Stats. 205, which went into force January 1, 1883, consti-
tutes the body of the existing English municipal corporations system.
The leading provisions of the Act of 1835 are so important to be
understood in the study and application of the English cases decided
thereunder to questions arising in this country, and contain so much
of interest to the lawyer, the legislator, and the municipal inquirer,
that they are given or referred to in the note to this section. Be-
1 MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS ACT OF 5 franchises to the freemen or citizens.
AND 6 WM. IV. CHAP. LXXVI., ENACTED (Secs. 2-5.) These schedules contain an
Sept. 9, 1835, AND CODIFIED BY THE alphabetical list of all the incorporated
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS ACT OF 1882, boroughs, with the number of wards,
45 AND 46 VICT. CHAP. L. — NAME, etc. number of aldermen, and number of coun.
* This act commences by reciting, that cillors, and style of the corporate body
" whereas divers bodies corporate at sun- in each ; thus : “ Bath, — Seven wards,
dry times have been constituted within fourteen aldermen, forty-two councillors.
the cities, towns, and boroughs of Eng- Corporate name, — Mayor, Aldermen, and
land and Wales, to the intent that the Citizens of the City of Bath.” If it be a
same might forever be and remain well borough instead of a city, the word “ Bur.
and quietly governed ; and it is expedient gesses” is used instead of “ Citizens.”
that the charters by which said bodies cor- The act provides that the body corporate
porate were constituted should be altered in each of said places 6 shall take and
in the manner hereinafter mentioned; be bear the name of the Mayor, Aldermen,
it therefore enacted, that so much of all and Burgesses for Citizens, in case of a
laws, statutes, and usages, and so much of city] of such borough, and by that name
all royal and other charters, now in force, shall have perpetual succession, and shall
relating to the several boroughs named in be capable in law, by the council hereinafter
schedules (A and B) annexed, as are incon- mentioned of sucli borough, to do,” &c.
sistent with, or contrary to, this act, shall (Sec 6.) Name under Act of 1882 is
be, and the same are hereby, repealed and
(Sec. 8.) “ MUNICIPAL CORPO-
annulled” (sec. 1), with the reservation of RATION," as used in the Act of 1882,
certain rights, beneficial exemptions, and means the body corporate constituted by
same.
§ 36
63
ENGLISH MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS ACT, 1835.
tween 1835 and 1882, not less than fifty-five acts were passed more
or less relating to municipal corporations, and in general amenda-
the incorporation of the inhabitants of a 9), which first admitted women to the mu-
borough. Act 1882, sec. 7. “The muni. nicipal franchise. The Married Woman's
cipal corporation of a borough shall be Property Act (33 & 34 Vict. chap. xciii.),
capable of acting by the council of the does not remove or affect the political dis-
borough, and the council shall exercise all abilities of married women. See Regina
the powers vested in the corporation by v. Harrald, L. R. 7 Q. B. 361.
this act or otherwise. The Council shall COUNCILLORS, HOW CHOSEN, &c.
consist of the Mayor, Aldermen, and Coun. Upon the first day of November, in every
cillors.” Act 1882, sec. 10.
year, the burgesses so enrolled in every
MEMBERSHIP. Before the passage of borough shall openly assemble, and elect
the act under consideration, the qualifica- from the persons qualified to be councillors
for members or officers of municipal (who must have the qualifications of a bur-
corporations depended upon the charter, gess, and also increased pecuniary and rat-
usage, or by-laws of the particular cor- ing qualifications] the councillors of the
poration, the usual qualifications being borough” (sec. 40), of whom one-third
that the person claiming to be admitted part go out of office annually. The elec-
to the freedom of the corporate town tions are held before the mayor and asses-
should be the son of a freeman, or should sors, and the mode of voting (which is
have served an apprenticeship to a free- exactly the opposite of the ballot in Amer-
man, or (in some instances) married his ica), is by delivering to the officers of elec-
daughter, or acquired the privilege by tion a voting-paper containing the name
gift or purchase ; but this act provides and abode of the person voted for, and
that hereafter “no person shall be elected, signed with the name and abode of the
maile, or admitted a burgess or freeman voter. It is thus seen that the burgesses
of any borough by gift or purchase.' elect the councillors, whose qualifications
(Sec. 3.) It fixes the qualification of bur. are fixed by the statute, and whose num-
gesses or citizens, thus: “Every male per- ber in each incorporated place is definite.
son, of full age, who shall have occupied Under Act 1882, the term of councillor is
any house, warehouse, counting-house, or three years, and his qualifications are
shop, within any borough” for three years, somewhat changed from those in the Act
“and during the time of such occupation of 1835.
been an inhabitant householder within the ALDERMEN, HOW CHOSEN. On the
borough, or within seven miles of the bor. ninth day of November, in every third
ough, shall, if duly enrolled, be a burgess succeeding year, the council for the time
of such borough and a member of the body being are directed to elect," from the coun-
corporate of the mayor, aldermen, and bur. cillors, or from persons qualified to be coun-
gesses of such borough, provided he shall cillors, the aldermen of the borough,” who
have been rated in respect to the premises are one-third in number of the councillors.
so occupied by him to all rates made for (Sec. 25.) The manner of election is pre-
the relief of the poor within the parish." scribed, namely, by every member of the
(Sec. 9.) Such resident occupiers and tax council delivering to the mayor or chair-
payers, only, are members of the corporate man a voting-paper signed by the mem-
body of the place; all the other inhabi- ber voting, which the mayor or chairman
tants are no part of the municipal corpo- is directed openly to read.
is directed openly to read. (Act. 7 Wm.
ration, though subject to its government. IV. and 1 Vict. chap. lxxviii. sec. 14 ; 16
The Act 1882 changes the qualifications and 17 Vict. chap. lxxix. sec. 13.) Term
of a burgess from three years to one year,
of aldermen under Act of 1882, is six
and in some other minor respects. (Sec. 9.) years. (Sec. 14.)
Women may vote at municipal elections MAYOR, HOW CHOSEN. At the meet-
if otherwise qualified, but not married ing of the council, to be held on the ninth
Act 1882, sec. 63, based on the day of November, each year, the council
Act of 1872 (32 & 33 Vict. chap. lv. sec. are directed to elect, out of the aldermen or
women.
64
§ 37
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
1
tory of the Act of 1835. The Act of 1882 revises or codifies all the
legislation, including the Act of 1835 upon the subject of the Muni-
cipal Corporations of England. The substance of the Act of 1835
still remains as re-enacted in the Act of 1882. Its provisions ex-
tend to Wales, but not to Scotland or Ireland.
In the United States.
§ 37 (17). Legislative Sanction essential to Corporate Existence;
Prescription. — The proposition which lies at the foundation of the
councillors, a fit person to be the mayor, xxviii.; 8 and 4 Vict. chap. xxviii.; 4 and
who shall continue in office for one year 5 Vict. chap. xlviii. ; 5 and 6 Vict. chap.
(sec. 49), and until his successor shall xcviii.) ; power to sell and mortgage prop-
have accepted and qualified. (6 and 7 erty and to charge rates given (5 and 6
Wm. IV. chap. cv. sec. 4.). So by the Vict. chap. xcviii. ; 23 and 24 Vict. chap.
Act of 1882, sec. 15, except that the xvi.) ; provision made as to maintaining
mayor may be elected from any persons bridges (13 and 14 Vict. chap. lxiv. 1850);
who are qualified to be aldermen or coun- to promote public libraries (18 and 19 Vict.
cillors.
chap. lxx. 1855 ; 29 and 30 Vict. chap.
Who COMPOSE THE COUNCIL, &c. xciv.); in relation to the police, 19 and
The mayor, the aldermen, and the coun- 20 Vict. chap. lxix. (27 and 28 Vict.
cillors, for the time being, constitute the chap. lxiv.; 28 and 29 Vict. chap. xxxv.);
Council of the borough. (Sec. 25.) So the nianagement of highways, by enabling
by the Act of 1882, sec. 10. The council, councils to adopt parish roads and apply
as we have seen, elect the mayor and the their funds to their repair (25 and 26 Vict.
aldermen, and it also appoints the clerk, chap. lxi.); for safe keeping of petroleum
treasurer, and other corporate officers. (25 and 26 Vict. chap. lxvi.); for the pro-
The corporate body acts by and through tection of gardens and ornamental grounds
the council, who have the authority of the (26 and 27 Vict. chap. xiii.); in relation
old corporations, except as modified. Pro- to prisons (28 and 29 Vict. chap. cxxvi.
vision is made for the stated and special known as “The Prisons Act, 1865" ; 29
meetings of the council ; the notice pre- and 30 Vict. chap. c.); the Ballot Act
scribed, the quorum fixed, the presiding and Corrupt Practices Act of 1872; the
officer defined, &c. Power is given to Municipal Elections Act of 1875; the
make by-laws, and the powers of the coun- Registration Act of 1878; the Town
cil defined, and provision is made for Council and Local Boards Act 1880.
powers vested in trustees, under sundry A variety of other statutos, of less im-
local acts of parliament, for paving, light- portance, in relation to municipal corpo-
ing, supplying with water or gas, cleans- rations, have been passed since the general
ing, watching, regulating, or improving, Act of 1835, some amendatory of it and
or for providing or maintaining a ceme- sone making new and additional provis..
tery or market in the boroughs being ions, and all have been consolidated, as
transferred to the body corporate of the before stated, in the Municipal Corpora-
borongh. (Sec. 75, 20 and 21 Vict. chap. tions Act of 1882, 45 and 46 Vict. chap.
i.) By other acts of parliament the l. ; L. R. 18 Stats. 205. By the famous
boundaries of boroughs are fixed (6 and Disraeli reform bill of 1867, the right to
7 Wm. IV. chap. ciii. 1836); the “ad- vote for a member, or members, to serve
ministration of the borough fund” regu- in parliament for boroughs was extended
lated (Ib. chap. civ.); "the administra- to large numbers or classes of persons who
tion of justice” provided for (Ib. chap. did not before possess the franchise. New
cv. ; 13 and 14 Vict. chap. xci.) ; borough American Cyclopædia, 1868, p. 327. Ante,
rates regulated (7 Wm. IV. and 1 Vict. chap. i. sec. 8.
chap. lxxxi. 1837; 2 and 3 Vict. chap.
$ 37
65
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES.
law of corporations of this country is, that here all corporations,
public and private, exist and can exist only by virtue of express legis-
lative enactment, creating, 'or authorizing the creation or existence of
the corporate body. Legislative sanction is with us absolutely es-
sential to lawful corporate existence. The public welfare is the
ground of this doctrine. It would be unwise to allow corporate
powers to be assumed and exercised except for purposes and on
terms previously defined by the legislature. That a corporation
may here exist by prescription, and its existence be established by
long and undisputed user of corporate powers, may (as the cases
hereafter referred to will show) be true, but such prescription and
user suppose a legislative grant. Instances of prescriptive corpora-
tions, with us, are rare and exceptional. But corporations, public
and private, by virtue of direct legislative authorization under
special or general laws, are being created in such vast numbers as
to constitute one of the most marked and important features of the
polity of the present time. Speaking of “corporations by statute,"
in England, Mr. Willcock says that “the legislature has not often
exercised the power of creating municipal corporations, because it
has been esteemed a flower of the prerogative."1 This has reference
to a period anterior to the famous Municipal Corporations Act of
September 9, 1835 (5 and 6 Wm. IV. ch. lxxvi.), by which parlia-
ment undertook the regulation of this important subject;2 and
to the Companies Acts of a later date which liberally authorize the
formation of companies for private enterprises with the powers and
privileges of corporations.3
1 Willc. on Munic. Corp. 25.
towns, are of still more recent incorpora-
2 Ante, secs. 8, 35.
tion. And not a few of those whose char-
8 Existing Municipal Government in ters are of earlier date, as Liverpool, Leeds,
Great Britain “In the recent progress and Nottingham, are just as essentially
of Great Britain," says Mr. Shaw (Politi- modern, their earlier municipal history
cal Science Quarterly, vol. iv. p. 197, June having little or no importance. There
1889), “few things are more remarkable are now 284 incorporated towns and cities
than the development of urban life and in England and Wales, and 106 of these
municipal institutions. It is true that have received their charters since the Mu-
the towns and their constitutions must nicipal Reform Act of 1835. The new
be studied historically in order to be manufacturing towns are decideilly more
thoroughly understood ; but it happens populous than the old seaports and county
that as a rule the historic towns are no capitals. Thus I find that of towns hav-
longer the important ones, and that the ing a population of 25,000 or more there
greater municipalities of England are quite are nearly sixty which have been incor-
as distinctively nineteenth century de- porated since 1825, while there are only
velopments as are those of America. As about forty-five whose charters are of ear-
corporations, Manchester and Birming- lier date. One-half of the more recent
ham are only fifty years old, having pro- corporations have the above-named mini-
cured their charters in 1838. Sheffield, mum of population, while only one-fourth
Bradford, Salford, and many other large of the older places have it.
VOL. I. - 5
66
$ 37 a
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
§ 37 a. Number and frequency of Corporate Creations. The
existing law of corporations is essentially of modern growth, and is
yet in a state of development. Having occasion to refer to this
“So far then as the great modern towns than that of a shifting, unprofitable, and
owe their forms of government to the past, illogical compromise.
it is to the general past of municipal insti- “It would seem a little strange that the
tutions in Englaud rather than to any- one school of reformers should not have
thing of a determining kind in their own been opposed by another which would ad-
individual histories. The Municipal Cor- vocate the concentration of authority and
porations Reform Act of 1835 preserved the responsibility in the council. Logically,
old government of towns by a mayor, al- the mayor must eventually swallow the
dermen, and councillors, while throwing council or the council must swallow the
open the franchise to the new.classes of mayor, if political forces are to be ac-
electors who had received the borough corded some degree of natural play ; and
parliamentary franchise in the reform of the one-man power is on the decline every-
1832, and making the councillors directly where in this age. Municipal govern-
representative of the burgesses. Since ments, elsewhere than in the United
1835, the framework of English municipal States, after having constituted a ruling
government has been simple, definite, reg. body do not erect a separate one-man
ular, and easily understood ; and the new power and give it the means to obstruct
fabrics have been elaborated upon that the ruling, administrative body and to
framework."
diminish its scope and responsibility.
Practical workings of the English sys- The mayor elsewhere is an integral part
ten contrasted with those of the American of the council. English, Scotch and Irish
systein. The writer last quoted (Ib. municipal government is simply govern-
pp. 216, 217), thus contrasts the theory ment by a group of men who are to be
and workings of the English system with regarded as a grand committee of the cor-
those of our American municipalities : poration, the corporation consisting of
Many earnest and intelligent muni. the whole body of burgesses or qualified
cipal reformers, especially in New York citizens. In Glasgow it is a committee of
and the Eastern States, have advocated fifty ; in Edinburgh, of forty-one ; in Man-
the plan of greatly increasing the author- chester, of seventy-six ; in Birmingham,
ity of the mayor, so that he may be held Liverpool and most of the large English
more definitely responsible for the admin. towns, of sixty-four ; in Dublin, of sixty ;
istration of the various executive depart. in Belfast, of forty; and in the other in-
ments. It is the plan of a periodically corporated towns of the United Kingdom
elective dictatorship. As a remedy for it varies from twelve to sixty-four, accord-
the evils that grow out of interferences ing to their size. So far as these bod-
by the State and the farming out of cer- ies have authority to pass by-laws at all,
tain departments such as parks or water- their authority is complete, and nobody
supply to special boards or commissions obtrudes a veto. They appoint and re-
not responsible to the mayor or the coun- move all officials. They have entire charge
cil or the people, and further as a tem- of municipal administration, distributing
porary measure of defence against un. the work of departmental management
trustworthy and corrupt counsels, this and supervision to standing committees
somewhat heroic plan of making the of their own number, which they organ-
mayor a dictator, or to use the Crom- ize and constitute as they please. If such
wellian euphemism, 'a protector,' seems a local government cannot be trusted, the
to have a great deal in its favor. But it fault is with popular institutions. It is
is unrepublican, and it does not at all quite certain to be as good a government
solve the difficult problem of harmonizing as the people concerned deserve to hare.
the authority of the mayor and the au- The location of responsibility is. perfectly
thority of the council. The relation be- definite. When the Glasgow city improve-
tween the two cannot at best be other ment scheme became unpopular with the
§ 38
67
POWER OF CONGRESS TO CREATE CORPORATIONS.
subject, a distinguished judge said : “Formerly but few private cor-
porations were created, and these cut so small a comparative figure
in the destinies of states, that they attracted but little attention
on the part of law-makers, and were but little studied by the courts.
Even in England, until a very recent period, both public and pri-
vate corporations were created by royal prerogative, without the
intervention of parliament, and were invested with such powers and
privileges as favorites might ask, or the public good be supposed to
require. But even then such corporations were rare.
Now they
have become among the greatest means of state and national pros-
perity. It is probably true that more corporations were created by
the legislature of Illinois, at its last session, than existed in the
whole civilized world at the commencement of the present cen-
tury.”] This state of things has necessarily led to a more careful
study of the whole subject, both by legislators and the courts. Not
only are commercial or business corporations being thus multiplied,
but public and municipal corporations, in all of the States and Ter-
ritories of the United States, are constantly created and universally
adopted as part of the ordinary machinery of government, so that it
is perhaps impossible to find a town or city of any considerable size
not incorporated and invested with the power of local government.
There are in this country many hundreds of incorporated places
acting under special charters granted by the States or general incor-
poration acts passed by them.
§ 38 (18). Congress may create. The power of Congress to cre-
ate or authorize the creation of corporations, public or private, when-
ever these become an appropriate means of exercising any of the
constitutional powers of the general government, or of facilitating
its lawful operations in the States or Territories, must be taken to
be conclusively settled by the Supreme Court.2 This power has
voters because it was proving more expen- system, by which the people give the en-
sive than its projectors had promised, the tire management of their affairs to a big
chairman of the committee was retired by committee of their own number, which
his constituents at the end of his terin. they renew from time to time."
The taxpayers hold every member of coun- 1 Per Caton, J., Railroad Co. v. Dalby,
cil responsible for his votes. The system 19 Ill. 353 (1857). See also similar obser-
is as simple, logical, and effective as the vations of Rogers, J., in Bushell v. In-
American system is complicated and in- surance Co., 15 Serg. & Rawle (Pa.), 176,
compatible with harmonious and respon- 177.
sible administration. City government in 2 McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat.
America defeats its own ends by its 316; Osborn v. Bank of U. S., 9 Wheat.
'checks and balances,' its partitions of 738 ; Thompson v. Pacific Railroad Co., 9
duty and responsibility, and its grand Wall. 579; Pacific Railroad v. Lincoln
opportunities for the game of hide-and- Co., 1 Dillon, C. C. 314 (1871); Moraweta
seek. Infinitely superior is the English on Corp. (2d ed.) sec. 9.
68
$ 39
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
been exercised on important occasions, such as incorporating the
banks of the United States, the national banks, and the various
Pacific railroad companies; and, within the above limitations, it is
no longer disputed. Congress habitually passes acts for the organ-
ization of Territorial governments, the local legislatures of which
may, under congressional authority, create corporations, public and
private, in the Territories; but it is not within the power of Con-
gress to establish municipal corporations within the limits of the
States, and it has never attempted to exercise it.
A provision in a Territorial Organic Act, that the power of the
territorial legislature “shall extend to all rightful subjects of legisla-
tion,” authorizes the legislature to create municipal corporations,
and to invest them with the power to make ordinances, and to pro-
vide corporation courts in which to enforce them. And such courts
may be provided, although by the organic act it is declared that the
judicial power of the Territory shall be vested in a supreme court,
district courts, probate courts, and justices of the peace.
§ 39 (19). Outline of ordinary Municipal Charter.
In this coun-
try, until comparatively a recent period, municipal corporations
have been created singly, each with its special or separate charter
passed by the legislature of the State. These charters, in all of the
States, were framed after the same general model; but in the extent
i State v. Young, 3 Kan. 445 (1866); legislative assembly had no power to con-
People, ex rel. v. City of Butte, 4 Mont. fer upon a justice of the peace a denomina-
174 ; Burnies v. Atchison, 2 Kan. 454 ; s. tion not warranted by the organic act;
P. Reddick v. Amelia, 1 Mo. 5 (1821). and, in so far as a municipal charter
In this case the objection made was, that undertook to confer upon a justice of the
such a legislature was not sovereign, and peace exercising jurisdiction under the or-
that nothing short of sovereign power dinances of the city the name of "police
could create a corporation. The answer magistrate,” it is void. Ib.
given was, that Congress could give, and It is now provided by act of Congress,
had given, the power to legislate on such "That the legislative assemblies of the
subjects. That a Territorial legislature, several Territories of the United States
vested with general legislative powers, shall not, after the passage of this act,
may create a corporation which is not grant private charters or especial privi.
affected by the subsequent adoption of a leges, but they may, by general incorpo-
State constitution, was held in Vincennes ration acts, permit persons to associate
University v. Indiana, 14 How. 268 (1852). themselves together as bodies corporate
See also Vance v. Bank, 1 Blackf. (Ind.) for mining, manufacturing, and other in-
80; Myers v. Bank, 20 Ohio, 283. Under dustrial pursuits.” Act of March 2, 1867, ,
the Territorial organic act of Colorado, the 14 Stats. at Large, 426, sec. 1; Rev. Stats.
legislative assembly has power to establish of U. S. sec. 1889. In Seattle v. Tyler,
a municipal corporation, but the question Wash. Territory, 1877, this section was
of such establishment by special or general held by Ch. J. Lewis of Washington Terri-
law is not discussed. Deitz v. City of tory to extend to and embrace municipal
Central, 1 Col. 323 (1872). Under the corporations within its prohibition.
same organic act it was decided that the
§ 39
69
OUTLINE OF ORDINARY MUNICIPAL CHARTER.
of the special powers conferred, and in the peculiar constitution of
the governing body, and the like, there was great variety. It will
be useful to notice the outline features of one of these charters, since
it constitutes the organic act of the corporation, and bestows upon
it its legal character. Such a charter usually sets out with an in-
corporating clause declaring "that the inhabitants of the town of
(naming it), or city of (naming it), are hereby constituted a body
politic and corporate by the name of the 'town of —' or 'city
of ; and by that name shall have perpetual succession, may
use a common seal, sue and be sued, purchase, hold, and sell prop-
erty," &c.1 The charter then defines the territorial boundaries of
the town or city thus incorporated. After that follow provisions
relating to the governing body of the corporation, usually styled the
town or city council. This is generally composed of one body,
though in some instances of two; the members being called alder-
men, councilmen, or trustees. The corporate territory is divided
into wards, and each ward elects one or more aldermen, the number
being specified and definite. The charter fixes the qualifications of
the voters, which are usually that the voter shall be a male citizen
of the United States and of the State, be of age, and a resident, for
a specified time, within the limits of the corporation. The mode of
holding elections is prescribed; and the power is often given to the
council to canvass returns, and to settle disputed elections to cor-
porate offices. Provision is made for the election of a mayor, or
other chief executive officer of the corporation, and his duties de-
fined. The charter contains a minute and detailed enumeration of
the powers of the city council, which are usually numerous; 6 the
most important of which are, the authority to create debts (some-
times restricted); to levy and collect taxes within the corporation,
for corporate purposes ;7 to make local improvements, and assess-
ments to pay therefor; to appoint corporate officers ; 8 to enact ordi-
nances to preserve the health of the inhabitants, to prevent and
abate nuisances, to prevent fires, to establish and regulate markets,
to regulate and license given occupations, to establish a police force ;
to punish offenders against ordinances; to open and grade and
improve streets ;9 to hold corporation courts, 10 &c.
1 Post, chap. viii.
2 Post, chap. viii.
8 Post, chap. x.
4 Constitutional provisions to secure
equality of representation held applicable
to municipal corporations and to disable
the legislature to divide a city into wards,
in some of which a voter should have
sėveral times as much power as a voter in
another. People v. Canaday, 73 N. C. 198
(1875); s. C. 21 Am. Rep. 465.
6 Post, chap. ix.
6 Post, chaps. V. and vi.
? Post, chap. xix.
8 Post, chap. ix.
9 Post, chap. xii. 10 Post, chap. xiii.
70
§ 41
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
When it is remembered that the charter of such a corporation is
its constitution, and gives to it all the powers it possesses (unless
other statutes are applicable to it), its careful study, in any given
case, is indispensable to an understanding of the nature and extent
of the powers it confers, the duties it enjoins, and liabilities it
creates. The construction of its various provisions, and the deter-
mination of the relation which these bear to the general statutes of
the State, how far the charter controls, or how far it is controlled
by other legislation, are often among the most difficult problems
which perplex the lawyer and the judge. The study of a question
of corporation law begins with the charter ; but it must oftentimes
be pursued into the constitution, the general statutes and legislative
policy of the State, and after this into the broad field of general
jurisprudence.
$ 40. Corporators and Members. — In municipal and public cor-
porations, as cities, towns, parishes, school-districts, and the like,
membership, so to speak, is, under the legislation and polity of this
country, usually constituted by living within certain limits, whatever
may be the desire of the individual thus residing or that of the mu-
nicipal or other incorporated body. In private corporations, on the
other hand, especially those organized for pecuniary profit, member-
ship is constituted by subscribing to or receiving, with the assent of
the corporation when that is necessary, transfers of its stock. It is
the citizens or inhabitants of a city, not the common council or local
legislature, who constitute the “corporation” of the city. The
members of the council and other charter officers are the agents or
ministers of the corporation.2
§ 41 (20). General municipal Incorporating Acts in the United
States. — Within a period comparatively recent, the legislatures of
a number of the States, following in this respect the example of the
English Municipal Corporations Act of 5 and 6 Wm. IV. ch. lxxvi.,
heretofore mentioned, have passed general acts respecting municipal
corporations. These acts abolish all special charters, or all with
enumerated exceptions, and enact general provisions for the incor-
poration, regulation, and government of municipal corporations.
The usual scheme is to grade corporations into classes, according to
their size, as into Cities of the First class, Cities of the Second Class,
1 Overseers of Poor, &c. v. Sears, 22
Pick. 122, 130, per Shaw, C. J. ; Oakes v.
Hill, 10 Pick. 333, 346, per Morton, J.;
ante, sec. 9, and notes.
2 Ante, sec. 21; Lowber v. Mayor, &c.
of N. Y., 5 Abbott's Pr. R. 325; Clarke
v. Rochester, 24 Barb. 446 (1857); Baum-
gartner v. Hasty, 100 Ind. 575.
§ 41
71
GENERAL INCORPORATING ACTS.
and Towns or Villages, and to bestow upon each class such powers
as the legislature deems expedient; but the powers and mode of
organization of corporations of each class are uniform. 1
1 Ohio. – By the Towns, Cities, and tional legislation. It will be a work of
Villages' Act of May 3, 1852 (Swan's Stat. care and time to perfect an orderly aud
954), all corporations existing for the pur harmonious system.” Per Gholson, J., in
poses of ruunicipal government are thereby Thomas v. Ashland, 12 Ohio St. 124, 130
organized into cities and incorporated vil- (1861). Infra, sec. 46.
lages. (Sec. 1.) In respect to the exer- California. Constitution, Art. XI., on
cise of certain corporate powers, municipal Cities, Counties, and Towns, contains pro-
corporations are divided into classes, thus: visions as to their incorporation, organiza-
1. Cities of the first class, which comprise tion, and government. The entire subject
all cities having a population exceeding of the creation and government of cities is
twenty thousand inhabitants ; 2. Cities of provided for in Part IV, title iii. of the
the second class, which comprise all cities Political Code. It does not apply to cities
not embraced in the first class ; 3. Incor- existing at the time of its adoption. Ex
porated villages ; and 4. Incorporated vil- parte Simpson, 47 Cal. 127; People v.
lages for special purposes. Ib. sec. 39 et seq. Clunie, 70 Cal. 504.
If the course pur-
These are “declared to be bodies politic sued in establishing a municipality is
and corporate, under the name and style substantially such as is pointed out in the
of the city of , or the incorporated act, courts will not disturb it, the pro-
village of
as the case may be, ca- priety of establishing a municipality, and
pable to sue and be sued; to contract and of including particular territory within its
be contracted with ; to acquire, hold, and boundaries, being a political question for
possess property, real and personal; to the legislature to determine. People v.
have a common seal; and to exercise such City of Riverside, 70 Cal. 461.
other powers, and to have such other priv- Illinois. — The General Assembly has
ileges, as are incident to municipal cor- the power to delegate legislative authority
porations of like character or degree, not incident to municipal government to cities;
inconsistent with this act or the general but this can only be done by general law,
laws of the State." Ib. sec. 18. These under the Constitution of 1870. When,
powers and privileges are then specified however, it is done by such law, the con-
with great minuteness, twenty sections of stitutional mandate is fully complied with,
the act being devoted to this purpose. In- and the ordinances to be adopted by dif-
corporated villages are governed by one ferent municipalities, under the power so
mayor, one recorder, and five trustees, conferred, may be as variant in their terms
elected annually; the mayor, recorder, as the varying municipal necessities or
and trustees constituting the village coun- sense of public policy in those who exer-
cil, any five of whom make a quorum. cise the legislative authority inay require.
Ib. sec. 43. The corporate authority of Covington v. East St. Louis, 78 Ill. 548
cities is vested in the mayor, one board (1875).
of trustees (two from each ward), who Iowa. The Obio act is, in substance,
compose the city council, together with adopted in Iowa. Revision 1860, chap. li.
such officers as are mentioned in the act, But it does not apply to cities having spe-
or as may be created under its authority. cial charters, unless adopted by them.
Ib. sec. 52 et seq.
Burke v. Jeffries, 20 Iowa, 145.
“The governing all cities and villages Kansas. — The act of Kansas (Comp.
under one general law was a new experi- Laws 1885, chaps. 18, 19, 20) provides
ment, supposed to be required by the for three classes of cities, and is in other
present Constitution. It was to be ex- respects similar to that of Ohio. It has
pected that, in the working of the experi- been decided in that State that a supple-
ment, omissions, if not mistakes, would mental act by which it was intended to
be discovered, to be corrected by addi- extend corporate powers, but which was so
72
§ 41
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
These acts are generally held not to violate constitutional pro-
visions against local or special legislation. General incorporation
special in its provisions that it could by lation in this State establishing Taxing
no possibility apply to more than three Districts, see post, ch. vii.
certain cities, was void, as being in viola- Missouri. A general act for the incor-
tion of the State Constitution forbidding poration of towns was passed in Missouri
the legislature from conferring corporate in 1845, and it was held not unconstitu-
powers by special act. Topeka v. Gillett, tional by reason of certain duties which it
32 Kan, 431.
imposes on the County Court with refer-
In Tennessee (Acts 1849, chap. xvii.) ence to organization of towns under the
provision is made by general act for the act, as these duties are not legislative but
incorporation of towns, cities, and villages. judicial, and the law itself, and not the
The constitution of Tennessee declares court, declares the powers of which the
that “the legislature shall have power to corporation shall be possessed. Kayser v.
grant charters of incorporation as they Trustees, &c. 16 Mo. 88 (1852). Con-
may deem expedient for the public good. struction of statute. Woods v. Henry, 55
Art. XI. sec. 7. In the State v. Arm- Mo. 560; State v. McReynolds, 61 Mo.
strong, 3 Sneed (Tenn.), 634, it was held 203 (1876). The case of Kayser v. Trus-
that the act of 1856, by which full power tees, &c. supra, is thought by Campbell,
to create corporations, and determine the J., to conflict with the general course of
extent of their powers, was given to the decision, since such duties are in their
Circuit Courts, was unconstitutional, on nature administrative or political rather
the ground that the legislature could not than judicial. People v. Bennett, 29
delegate its authority to the courts. But Mich. 451 ; s. 0. 18 Am. Rep. 107. See
in the Mayor, &c. v. Shelton, 1 Head, 24 Damodhar Gordhani v. Deoran Kanji,
(1858), it was held that the act of 1849 – L. R. 1 App. Div. 332.
which was a general statute for the incor- Indiana. — The general law of 1857,
poration of towns and cities, and by which for the incorporation of cities, is not un-
à petition was to be presented by the in- constitutional for want of uniformity in
habitants of a place proposing to organize the mode of their organization. Lafayette
under the act to the County Court, which v. Jenners, 10 Ind. 70, 80 (1857). See
had power simply to record the petition also Welker v. Potter, 18 Ohio St. 85. In
and designate the boundaries of the cor- the Revised Statutes of 1881, secs. 3031-
poration was not in conflict with the 3406 are collected the statutory law of the
Constitution, as the statute, and not the State relating to cities and towns, their
court, determined the extent and nature organization, powers, methods of taxa-
of the powers of the corporation. In Ex tion, opening of streets, &c. In an election
parte Chadwell, 3 Bax. 98, s. C. 1 Tenn. held under its provisions to determine
Ch. 95, and Ex parte Burns, 1 Tenn. Ch. whether a town shall become a city, a
83, the act of 1871, under the Constitution majority of the votes cast is sufficient to
of 1870, was declared void in so far as it decide; it is not essential that there be a
undertook to confer upon the Court of majority of the legal voters. State v. Tip-
Chancery the power to grant corporate ton, 109 Ind. 73.
franchises. See also Willett v. Bellville, The Supreme Court of Indiana, in the
11 Lea (Tenn.), 1. For abstract of legis- recent cases (April, 1889) of the State v.
1 State v. Graham, 16 Neb. 74; Pritch- A constitutional provision authorizing
ett v. Stanislaus Co., 73 Cal. 310. An cities having over 100,000 inhabitants to
act known as the “ McClure charter," frame charters for their own government
held not to be a "general law" for the held to be self-acting and not to require
incorporation of cities under the Constitu- legislation to give it effect. People v.
tion of California. Desmond v. Dunn, 55 Hoge, 55 Cal. 612.
Cal. 242 ; Exc parte Wells, 21 Fla. 280.
$ 41
73
GENERAL INCORPORATING ACTS.
acts, rather than special charters, would seem clearly to be the best
inethod of creating and organizing municipal corporations. 1. Such
was
Denny, 21 Northeast. Rep. 252, and stead of to corporate authorities or local
Evansville v. State, 21 Northeast. Rep. boards of oflicers. People v. Bennett,
267, has asserted and maintained the con- 29 Mich. 451 (1874); s. C. 18 Am. Rep.
stitutional right of local self-government in 107.
that State in opinions of marked ability New York. — In this State there are
and learning. Post, sec. 58.
cities with local and special charters, and
Pennsylvania. — A general act also towns whose powers, duties, and privi-
passed in 1851, designed to form a system leges are particularly prescribed by stat-
for the regulation of boroughs incorporated ute. Each town is a body corporate for
thereafter. Commonwealth v. Montrose, specified purposes ; but it is declared that
52 Pa. St. 391. Course of legislation and no town shall possess or exercise any
decision in Pennsylvania as to the incor- corporate powers except such as are enu-
poration of boroughs discussed in People merated in this chapter, or shall be spe-
v. Bennett, supra. A general act for the cially given by law, or shall be necessary
incorporation and regulation of municipal to the exercise of the powers so enumerated
corporations, dividing them into three or given.' Rev. Stats. Part I. chap. xi.
classes, and having other features similar p. 337, secs. 1, 2. "The several towns in
to the Ohio act, was adopted in this state this State," says Denio, J., in Lorillard v.
May 3, 1874. It has since been amended. The Town of Monroe, 11 N. Y. (1 Kern.)
Reading v. Savage, 120 Pa. St. 198 (1888). 392 (1854), are corporations for certain
North Carolina. - By general act, every special and very limited purposes, or, to
incorporated town may elect, each year, speak more accurately, they have a certain
not less than three nor more than seven limited corporate capacity. They may
commissioners, who are a body corporate purchase and hold lands within their own
and the governing body of the town. limits for the use of their inhabitants.
These commissioners are elected by the They may, as a corporation, make such
vote of the citizens of the place. At the contracts and hold such personal property
same time they are also to elect a mayor, as may be necessary to the exercise of their
who presides at the meetings of the com- corporate or administrative powers, and,
missioners, but who has no vote except in as a necessary incident, may sue and be
case of a tie. The mayor is both a peace sued, where the assertion of their corporate
officer and a judicial officer, with the same rights, or the enforcement against them of
jurisdiction as a justice of the peace, with their corporate liabilities, shall require such
power also to "hear and determine all proceedings. (1 Rev. Stats. 337, sec. 1 et
cases that may arise upon the ordinances seq.) In all other respects—for instance,
of the commissioners," &c. The commis- in everything which concerns the admin-
sioners may levy certain specified taxes, istration of civi] or criminal justice, the
and make ordinances in relation to their preservation of the public health and mor-
officers, records, markets, nuisances, the als, the conservation of highways, roads,
repair of streets and bridges in the town, and bridges, the relief of the poor, and
&c.
These general provisions apply to the assessment and collection of taxes
all incorporated towns when not incon- the sereral towns are political divisions,
sistent with special charters or acts in organized for the convenient exercise of
reference thereto. Rev. Code 1854, chap. portions of the political power of the
iii. p. 586.
State, and are no more corporations than
Michigan. — The general act of 1873 the judicial, or the senate and assembly
for the incorporation of villages within districts. 16. sec. 2. The functions and
any two square miles of territory was held duties of the several town officers respect-
unconstitutional because the rights of the ing these subjects are judicial and admin-
people concerned were not respected, and istrative, and not in any sense corporate
the legislature had attempted to delegate functions or duties," and hence, as to such
legislative powers to private citizens in- subjects, the towns as corporations are not
74
§ 42
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
acts tend to prevent favoritism and abuse in procuring extraordinary
grants of special powers. 2. They secure uniformity of rule and of
construction. All being created and endowed alike, real wants are
the sooner felt and provided for, and real grievances the sooner
redressed.
Creation by Implication.
§ 42 (21). No Precise Form of Words essential. — It is well set-
tled in England that, while a corporation must commence or be in-
stituted by the proper authority, yet no fixed, prescribed, or precise
form of words is necessary in order to create a corporation. While
the words “ to found "to erect or establish," or "to incorporate,"
are commonly used to evince the intention to erect or create a body
politic, they are not necessary.2 The king grants a charter to the
men of Dale, that they may annually elect a mayor, and plead and
be impleaded by the name of the mayor and commonalty. This is
considered to be sufficient to incorporate them. So a grant by a
charter containing no direct clause of incorporation to the inhabi-
tants of a town," that their town shall be a free borough," incorpor-
ates it. So, also, a grant by the king to the men of Dale that they
be discharged of tolls incorporates them for this particular purpose,
but does not enable them to purchase. The settled doctrine is that
a corporation may be created by implication, as well as by the use of
words. But this implication, to be sufficient, must clearly manifest
or express the intention to establish or constitute a body politic or
corporate, that is, to invest it with corporate powers and privileges.
But the absence of express provision respecting the incidents which the
law tacitly annexes to corporations is considered immaterial. Thus
the omission in the charter or act of the words “to plead and be im-
pleaded," or "to have a seal,” or “to make by-laws," would not
make it essentially defective. So it would not be essentially de-
liable for any default or malfeasance of 2 10 Co. 27a, 28a, 29b, 30; 1 Kyd, 62;
these officers. See, as to the corporate 2 Kent, Com. 27.
capacity of towns in New York, Denton 8 21 Edw. IV. 56. The doctrine of a
V. Jackson, 2 Johns. Ch. R. 320; North corporation by implication originated in
Hempstead v. Hempstead, 2 Wend. 109; the time of Edward IV. Ib. 8 Edw. IV.
affirming s. C. Hopk. 288; Cornell v. 28. Post, sec. 560.
Guilford, i Denio, 510.
4 Kyd, 62, cites Firm. Burg. ch. ii. ;
Arkansas. State v. Jennings, 27 Ark. Madox, Hist. Exch. 402.
419 (1872). The legislature cannot dele- 6 Vin. Abr. Corp. F. pl. 6; Ib. pl. 4;
gate the power to create municipal cor- Bagot's Case, 7 Edw. IV. 29; Grant on
porations, — as, in this case, to a district Corp. 43, note e, and cases cited.
court. State v. Simons, 32 Minn. 540 ; 6 Rol. Abr. 513; 1 Kyd, 63. The Con.
State v. Leatherman, 38 Ark. 81.
servators, &c. v. Ash, 10 Barn. & Cress.
1 Cairo v. Bross, 101 Ill. 475 (1882), 349 (21 Eng. C. L. 97), 1829. “It is
quoting text. Post, sec. 46, and note. not necessary," says Mr. Kyd," that the
§ 43
75
NO PRECISE FORM OF WORDS ESSENTIAL.
fective were the name omitted, if the name could be ascertained from
the terms of the charter or act, or from the nature of the thing
or matters granted. Certain attributes or powers are absolutely
essential to constitute a body corporate, such as perpetual succession,
the right to contract, to sue and be sued as a corporation, &c. Now
if the charter or act which is relied upon as creating a body cor-
porate by implication, instead of simply omitting to express these
essential properties, negatives and excludes them, it is plain that
the body would not be deemed to be incorporated.?
§ 43 (22). Same subject. — Although corporations in this country
are created by statute, still the rule is here also settled that not only
private corporations aggregate, but municipal or public corporations,
may be established without any particular form of words or technical
mode of expression, though such words are commonly employed.3
If powers and privileges are conferred upon a body of men, or upon
the residents or inhabitants of a town or district, and if these can-
not be exercised and enjoyed, and if the purposes intended cannot
be carried into effect, without acting in a corporate capacity, a cor-
poration is, to this extent, created by implication. The question
turns upon the intent of the legislature, and this can be shown
constructively as well as expressly. This is well illustrated in a
case in Massachusetts, where the question was whether the plain-
charter should expressly confer those Barn. & Cress. 349 (21 Eng. C. L. 97).
powers without which a collective body Ante, sec. 32 ; post, sec. 84.
of men cannot be a corporation, such as 1 Trustees v. Parks, 10 Me. (1 Fairf.)
the power of suing and being sued, and 441 ; School Com. v. Dean, 2 Stew. &
to take and grant property, though such Port. (Ala.) 190 (1832).
powers are in general expressly given.” 2 Grant on Corp. 30.
1 Kyd, Corp. 63. Thus, in the case of the 8 Thomas v. Dakin, 22 Wend. 9, 84,
Borough of Yarmouth, 1609, 2 Brownlow per Cowen, J., and authorities cited ; Bow
& Goldsb. 292, Part II., it was decided by V. Allentown, 34 N. H. 351, 372; Steb-
the common bench, per Lord Coke, that a bios v. Jennings, 10 Pick. 172; Benton v.
grant of incorporation to the burgesses or Jackson, 2 Johns. Ch. 325, 326 (1817);
citizens of a borough or city, which, being Mahoney v. The Bank of the State, 4
an old grant, should be favorably con- Ark. 620 (1842); s. C. well digested in
strued, was good without the words "their Angell & Ames on Corp., sec. 77; North
And see, on this subject, the Hempstead v. Hempstead, 2 Wend. 109,
learned opinion of Shaw, C. J., in Over 133, opinion by Savage, C. J. ; Conserva-
seers of Poor, &c. v. Sears, 22 Pick. 122, tors of River Tone v. Ash, 10 Barn. &
130 (1839). He says : “The mode of per- Cress. 349; Jefferys v. Gurr, 2 B. & Adol.
petuating the existence of a corporate body 841; Newport Trustees, In re, 16 Sim.
is not essential ; all that is essential is 346; 2 Kent, Com. 27.
that some mode be provided by the charter 4 Same cases last cited.
or act by which it is constituted, or by the 5 Inhabitants, &c. v. Wood, 13 Mass.
general laws of the government, by means 193 (1816). Mr. Fessenden for the plain-
of which it shall be so perpetuated.” 22 tiff, and Mr. Greenleaf for the defendant.
Pick. 130; The Conservators v. Ash, 10 In Bow v. Allentown, 34 N. H. 351, it was
successors.
76
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
§ 43 a
, . , , &c. v.
tiffs were a corporate body with power to sue. They were not
incorporated expressly. But, by statute, the inhabitants of the
several school-districts were empowered, at any meeting properly
called, to raise money to erect, repair, or purchase a school-house,
to determine its site, &c., the majority binding the minority.
The cause was argued by able counsel, and, after several consulta-
tions, the judges of the Supreme Judicial Court finally agreed in
the opinion that the plaintiffs possessed sufficient corporate powers
to maintain an action on a contract to build a school-house, and to
make to them a lease of land. But the intention of the legislature,
where it is sought to show that a corporation has been created by
implication, must satisfactorily appear.1
§ 43 a. Corporate Existence not open to Collateral Attack.
Where a municipal corporation is acting under color of law, and
its existence is not questioned by the State, it cannot be col-
laterally drawn in question by private parties; and the rule is not
different although the Constitution may prescribe the manner of
incorporation.
held that the annexation by the legisla- to recover penalties imposed by its ordi-
ture of other territory to the town of Allen- nances, nul tiel corporation is not a good
town made that a corporate town by plea. Mendota v. Thompson, 20 Ill. 197;
implication, if it was not so before ; and Hamilton v. Carthage, 24 Ill. 22; Ket-
such also was the effect, under the Consti- tering v. Jacksonville, 50 Ill. 39; Geneva
tution of New Hampshire, of a grant to a v. Cole (action to recover a tax), 61 Ill.
place having less than one hundred and 397 (1871); Burt v. Winona & St. Peter
fifty polls to send a representative. A Ry. Co., 31 Minn. 472; Fredericktown v.
legislative grant gives capacity to hold Fox, 84 Mo. 59; Austrian v. Guy, 21
the thing granted. Lord v. Bigelow, 6 Fed. Rep. 500.
Vt. 465.
In State v. Leatherman, 38 Ark. 81,
1 Medical Institute V. Patterson, 1 Ealin, J., said : “We are emboldened to
Denio, 61 ; s. C. affirmed in Court of Er- declare in behalf of the public good, that
rors, 5 Denio, 618 (1846); Myers v. Irwin, the State herself may, by long acquies-
2 Serg. & Rawle, 368 (1816); Angell & cence, and by the continued recognition
Ames, sec. 79, and cases cited ; Wells v. through her officers, State and county, of
a municipal corporation, be precluded from
Town of Pawlet, 4 Pet. (U. S.) 480, 502. an information to deprive it of franchises
To establish a corporation by implication, long exercised in accordance with the gen-
says Shaw, C. J., in Stebbins v. Jennings, eral law.” In this case the proceedings to
10 Pick. 172, it must appear that the incorporate the city were had in a court
rights and powers conferred can only be not empowered to entertain them. People
enjoyed by the exercise of corporate v. Maynard, 15 Mich. 463, 470. See post,
powers, and, therefore, if such powers chap. xxi., Quo Warranto. Entering into
are not necessary, they are not impliedly an obligation with a corporation admits
given.
the corporate capacity, and precludes a
2 St. Louis v. Shields, 62 Mo. 247 plea of nul tiel corporation. St. Louis v.
(1876); Cooley, Const. Lim. 180, 254. Shields, 62 Mo. 247, 251, and cases cited.
Hence in an action by such a corporation Post, sec. 449.
$ 44
77
ACCEPTANCE OF CHARTER MAY BE REQUIRED.
Acceptance of Charter.
§ 44 (23). Incorporating Act may be made binding without Con-
sent, or only upon Consent. The rule which applies to private
corporations, that the incorporating act is ineffectual to constitute
a corporate body until it is assented to or accepted by the corpo-
rators, has no application to statutes creating municipal corpora-
tions. These are laws, and as such are imperative and binding
according to their terms without any consent, unless the act is
expressly made conditional.2 All who live within the limits of
the incorporated district are bound by them, and can withdraw
from their operation only by removal. Over such corporations the
legislature, except as restrained by the Constitution, has entire con-
trol; and unless otherwise provided by the act itself, or a different
intention be manifested, the public corporation is legally constituted
as soon as the incorporating act declaring it to exist goes into
effect. But while the legislature is not bound to obtain the accep-
tance or assent of the municipal corporation, it is well established
that a provision in a municipal charter that it sball not take effect
unless assented to or accepted by a majority of the inhabitants, is
not unconstitutional, it being in no just sense a delegation of legis-
lative power, but merely a question as to the acceptance or rejection
of a charter. So a provision in a charter, or the constituent act
1 Post, secs. 54, 84, note, 183.
524, 532 (1826); State v. Canterbury, 8
2 It is competent for the legislature to Fost. (28 N. H.) 218 ; People v. City of
make the acceptance or rejection of a char Butte, 4 Mont. 174. Acceptance, when
ter dependent upon the result of an elec- requisite, may doubtless be implied in
tion by the qualified voters of the territory proper cases, as where no particular mode
to be affected by it. Clarke v. Rogers, 81 of expressing acceptance is prescribed,
ky. 43.
from corporate acts and conduct, as in
3 Berlin v. Gorham, 34 N. H. 266 cases of private corporations. Taylor v.
(1856), per Bell, J., where it is accord. Newberne, 2 Jones Eq. N. C. 141 (1855).
ingly held that to make an incorporation See Zabriskie v. Railroad Co., 23 How.
of a town effectual it is not necessary that (U. S.) 381, 397 (1859). Post, sec. 270,
there should be a legal town meeting note.
holden in it. See also People v. Wren, 4 4 People v. Salomon, 51 Ill. 53 (1869);
Scam. (5 Ill.) 269 ; Warren v. Charles- Alcorn v. Horner, 38 Miss. 652 (1860);
town, 2 Gray, 104 ; Mills v. Williams, 11 Patterson v. Society, &c., 4 Zabr. (24 N. J.
Ire. 558; State v. Curran, 7 Eng. (12 L.) 385 (1854); Smith v. McCarthy, 56 Pa.
Ark.) 321 ; Fire Department v. Kip, 10 St. 359; Commonwealth v. Quarter Ses-
Wend. 267; People v. Morris, 13 Wend. sions, 8 Pa. St. 395; Commonwealth v.
325, 337; Brouwer v. Appleby, 1 Sandf. Painter, 10 Pa. St. 214; and see also Bull
158 (1847); People v. President, 9 Wend. v. Read, 13 Gratt. (Va.) 78 (1853); People
351; Wood v. Bank, 9 Cow. 194, 205 v. Reynolds, 5 Gilm. (10 Ill.) 1; State v.
(1828); Proprietors, &c. v. Horton, 6 Hill, Scott, 17 Mo. 521; Hudson Co. v. State,
501 ; Gorham v. Springfield, 21 Maine, 58 4 Zabr. (24 N. J. L.) 718; Bank v.
(1842); People 1. Stout, 23 Barb. 349 Brown, 26 N. Y. 467 (1863); Call v.
(1856); Bristol v. New Chester, 3 N. H. Chadbourne, 46 Maine, 206 ; State v. Wil-
1
78
§ 44
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
of a municipal corporation, by which the right to make certain
improvements or to create certain liabilities is made to depend upon
a vote of the people interested, has frequently been upheld as valid.
So an act directing an election to be held by the qualified electors
interested to determine, by ballot, whether a newly-erected town-
ship should be continued, is constitutional. On the same principle
cox, 45 Mo. 458; Hobart v. Supervisors, 17 N. J. L. 72 ; s. C. 13 Am. Rep. 422. See
Cal. 23 ; People v. City of Butte, supra; also Howe v. Plainfield (intoxicating li-
Lafayette, &c. R. R. Co. v. Geiger, 34 quors), 37 N. J. L. 146; Hudson County
Ind. 185. This case asserts a distinction v. State (power of local body to fix rates
between a bill submitted to the people of of ferriage), 4 Zabr. (24 N. J. L.) 718.
the whole State for adoption or rejection, Validity of Local Option Laws denied,
and an act which leaves it to the inhabi. and the subject fully examined, in Wall,
tants of a particular locality whether they In re, 48 Cal. 279 (1874); S. C. 17 Am.
will avail theniselves of its provisions. It Rep. 425 ; People v. Nally, 49 Cal. 478
has been held in New Hampshire that it (1875); Anderson v. Commonwealth, 14
was competent for the legislature, under Bush, 171 ; State v. Cook, 24 Minn. 247 ;
the Constitution of the State, to enact a Fell v. State (Liquor Law), 42 Md. 71
penal law which shall have effect only in (1875); s. C. 20 Am. Rep. 83. See also
those towns which adopt it by vote. State in Pennsylvania the case which involved
v. Noyes, 10 Fost. (30 N. H.) 279 (1855). the question of the validity of the act of
An amendment to a city charter was to May, 1871, "to allow the voters of the
take effect only when adopted " by a ma- 22d Ward of Philadelphia to vote on the
jority of the voters of the city.” This was question of granting licenses to sell intox-
considered to manifest the intention to icating liquors.” Locke's Appeal, 72 Pa.
present the question of acceptance to the St. 491; s. C. 13 Am. Rep. 716 ; Glovers.
voters at a regular city election. The ville v. Howell (intoxicating liquors), 70
council ordered the vote to be taken at N. Y. 287 (1877); State v. Wilcox, 42
the township polls; the voters of the two Conn. 364 (1875); s. c. 19 Am. Rep. 536;
organizations possessing different qualifi. Cooley, Const. Lim. 124, 125. Post, sec.
cations, but the township and city occu- 308.
pied precisely the same territory. Held, 1 Clarke v. Rochester, 28 N. Y. 605;
that the election was of no validity, and Patterson v. Society, &c., 4 Zabr. (24 N. J.
that the amendment had never been duly L.) 385 ; Bank of Rome v. Rome, 18 N.Y.
accepted. Foote v. Cincinnati, 11 Ohio, 38 ; Trustees v. Cherry, 8 Ohio St. 564 ;
408 (1842).
Burnes v. Atchison, 2 Kan. 454 (1864);
. Local Option Laws. A useful article Bank v. Brown, 26 N. Y. 467; Hammond
upon the Constitutionality of Local Option v. Haines, 25 Md. 541
v. Haines, 25 Md. 541 ; Railroad Co. v.
Laws will be found in 12 Am. Law Reg. Commissioners, 1 Ohio St. 77 ; Foote v.
(v. s.) March, 1873, p. 129. Affirming Cincinnati, 11 Ohio, 408 (1842) ; St. Louis
the principle that municipal or public cor- v. Alexander, 23 Mo. 483 ; Blanding v.
porations or the people thereof may by the Burr, 13 Cal. 343. These cases are dis-
legislature be invested with the power to tinguishable from Barto v. Himrod, 4
regulate or prohibit the retail of intoxi. Seld. (8 N. Y.) 483.
cating drinks, the Supreme Court of New 2 Cominonwealth v. Judges, &c., 8 Pa.
Jersey decided the Chatham Local Option St. 391 ; distinguished from Parker v.
Law, which declared the retail of ardent Commonwealth, 6 Pa. St. 507 ; Common-
spirits without license to be unlawful, and wealth v. Painter, 10 Pa. St. 214 (1849) ;
which provided that no license should be Smith v. McCarthy, 56 Pa. St. 359. So
granted if a majority of the voters of a the question may be submitted whether a
township voted “no license,” to be con- portion of an adjoining county shall be
stitutional. State v. Morris Common Pleas, annexed. People v. Nally, 49 Cal.
12 Am. Law Rey. (x. s.) 32 ; s. C. 36 478 (1875). Where the authority to act de-
!
$ 45
79
CREATION BY SPECIAL ACT AND BY GENERAL LAWS.
the legislature may provide that a statute shall cease to exist unless
the municipal corporation to be affected by it shall, within a pre-
scribed period, assent to it. Permitting the voters of a munici-
pality to decide upon questions of local interest or expediency, such
as those mentioned in this section and in the notes, seems to the
author to be conformable to those ideas of self-government and self-
regulation by the people concerned, which lie at the basis not only
of our municipalities but of our institutions. The only limit is
that the legislature must not delegate its function as the law-
making branch of the government.
Special Constitutional Provisions relating to Municipal Corporations.
§ 45 (24). Creation by special Act and by general Laws. The
Constitutions of many of the States contain provisions respecting
the creation and powers of municipal corporations. In some of the
Constitutions the legislature is in terms allowed to create corpora-
tions for municipal purposes by special act, and in others it is in
a
pends upon the prior sanction of "a major- 1 Corning v. Greene, 23 Barb. 33 (1856).
ity of the qualified voters " residing in the 2 Post, chap. iv. New York Constitu-
corporation, the presumption is that all tion, 1846, art. viii. sec. 1 ; Illinois Con-
who vote are legal voters; and the better stitution, 1847, art. x. sec. 1 ; see, also,
vici probably is, that those who do not new Constitution, 1870; Michigan Con-
vote acquiesce in the result, and that a stitution, 1850, art. xv. sec. 1 ; California
majority of those actually voting is suffi- Constitution, 1849, art. iv. sec. 31 ; con-
cient, though in point of fact it may not strued, Railroad Co. v. Plumas Co., 37
be a majority of all who would be entitled Cal. 354. The Constitution of California
to vote. State v. Binder, 38 Mo. 450 of 1879 ordains that " Corporations for
(1866); State v. Mayor, &c. 37 Mo. 270. municipal purposes shall not be created
And of this opinion is the Supreme Court by special laws, but by general laws.”
of the United States, in which, in an ac- Art. xi. sec. 6. Minnesota Constitution,
tion on municipal bonds, the phrase, 1857, art. x. sec. 2; Tierney v. Dodge, 9
majority of the legal voters of the town- Minn. 171; 12 Minn. 41; Oregon Constitu-
ship," was held to mean a majority of the tion, 1857, art. xi. sec. 2; Louisiana
legal voters of the township voting at the Constitution, 1864, title vii. art. cxxi. ;
election. St. Joseph Township v. Rogers, Nevada Constitution, 1864, art. viii. sec.
16 Wall. 644 (1872); People v. Warfield, 1; construed, Virginia City v. Mining Co.,
20 I11. 163 ; People v. Wiant, 48 Ill. 263; 2 Nev. 86. In Missouri it is provided
Railroad v. Davidson County, 1 Sneed that no municipal corporation shall be
(Tenn.), 692 ; Talbot v. Dent, 9 B. Mon. created by special act, except cities of at
526; Angell & Ames, Corp.,09 ed. secs. least 5,000 inhabitants, the special act to
499, 500. But compare State v. Winkel- be approved by a vote of the inhabitants.
meier, 35 Mo. 103, which construes such Constitution 1865, art. viii. sec. 5. Un-
language to require a "majority of all the der a constitutional provision in Pennsyl-
legal voters of the city, and not merely of vania, that “the General Assembly shall
all who might, at a particular time, choose not pass any local or special law regu-
to vote upon it." See Damon 2. Granby, lating the affairs of counties, cities, town-
2 Pick. 345, 355 (1824), and chapter on ships," &c., it was held that an act
Corporate Meetings, post. Infra, secs. 47, providing that in counties the popula-
note 277.
tion of which exceeds 100,000 and is less
80
§ 45
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
.
terms forbidden to do this, and required to provide a general law
for all corporations, public and private. So far as municipal cor-
porations and their rights are protected by constitutional provisions,
express or implied, they are removed from legislative control, but no
further, as we shall see in a subsequent chapter. But the provis-
ions of the several Constitutions in reference to municipal institu-
tions and local government are sufficient, it is believed, to establish
that the legislative power over them and their existence is not
transcendental and unlimited. Although the Constitution of a State
than 150,000, the fees that belong to cer- the abuse of such power.” Constitution
tain county officers shall be turned over A. D. 1851, art. xiii. sec. 6. Under this
to another, is unconstitutional, being an section the legislature, by the Towns'
attempt to legislate directly for certain and Cities' Act of May 3, 1852 (Swan &
counties (there being only four falling Critchf. Stats. 1497), undertook to pro-
within the limits mentioned in the act) vide for the government of all such places
selected from all others. This is local or by a general statute. Thomas v. Ashland,
special legislation within the meaning of 12 Ohio St. 124. An act applying to all
the constitutional prohibition. McCarthy cities of the first class containing less than
v. Commonwealth, 110 Pa. St. 243, fol. 100,000 inhabitants is not in conflict
lowing previous cases in the same State to with the provision of the Constitution
the same effect. “Wherever the provis- which requires all laws of a general nature
ions of an act are compulsorily binding to have a uniform operation throughout
upon every city of the particular classifica- the State. Welker v. Potter, 18 Ohio St.
tion, the legislation is general and consti- 85 (1868); see also Lafayette v. Jenners,
tutional. Wherever the provisions are 10 Ind. 70, 80, (1857). Construction of
binding at the option of the local author- constitutional provision that there shall be
ities, the legislation is special, local, and but one system of town and county gov-
unconstitutional.” Reading 2. Savage, 120 ernment,” which “ shall be as nearly uni-
Pa. St. 198 (1888).
form as practicable.” State v. Dousman,
1 Iowa Constitution, 1857, art. iii, sec. 28 Wis. 541 (1871); State v. Riordan, 24
30 ; Von Phul v. Hammer, 29 Iowa, 222; Wis. 484 (1869).
Florida Constitution, 1863, art. iv. sec. 20; In Morawetz on Corp. (2d ed.) secs.
Nebraska Constitution, art. viii. secs. 1 9–13, the cases relating to constitutional
and 2. By the new Constitution of Illi- limitations on the powers of the States
nois, special legislation is forbidden “in- in respect of the mode of creating cor-
corporating cities, towns, or villages, or porations are referred to, and the judi.
changing or an ending the charter of any cial construction of special constitutional
town, city, or village.” Wisconsin con- provisions on this subject stated.
stitution amendment, 1871. Atty.-Genl. 2 People v. Draper, 15 N. Y. 561,
v. Railroad Co., 35 Wis. 425; Kina ball v. Brown, J., says: “When the present Con-
Rosendale, 42 Wis. 407 ; Stevens Point & stitution was formed, the entire territory of
Co. v. Reilly, 44 Wis. 295 ; Kansas Con- the State was separated, and appropriated
stitution, art. xii. secs. 1 and 5 ; construed, by its civil divisions, its counties, cities,
Wyandotte City v. Wood, 5 Kan. 603 ; and towns. These civil divisions are coeval
Atchison v. Bartholow, 4 Kan. 124. with the government.
The State has
The Constitution of Ohio is as follows : never existed a moment without them.
"The General Assembly shall provide All our thoughts and notions of civil gov.
for the organization of cities and incor- ernment are inseparably associated with
porated villages by general laws, and re- counties, cities, and towns. They are per-
strict their power of taxation, assess-
manent elements in the frame of govern-
ment, borrowing money, contracting debts, ment; they are institutions of the State,
and loaning their credit, so as to prevent durable and indestructible by any power
!
§ 46
81
PROHIBITION OF SPECIAL ACTS.
may recognize the municipal corporation of an important city by
fixing the number of certain officers, and providing for their election,
&c., yet this does not make the charter of the city a constitutional
charter conferring powers beyond the control of the legislature.1
ers.
§ 46 (24a). Prohibition of special Acts conferring Corporate Pow-
The Constitution of Kansas as well as of Ohio, in the article
entitled “Corporations," contains a provision that "the, legislature
shall pass no special act conferring corporate powers," 2 and the Su-
less than that which gave being to the post, sec. 58, the Supreme Court of Indi-
organic law. They are however, subject ana holds that the Constitution of that
to control and regulation by the legisla- State secures to the people of its incorpo-
ture. It may enlarge or circumscribe their rated municipalities the right to local self-
territorial limits, increase or diminish government, and that this right is there-
their numbers, separate them into parts, fore incapable of legislative destruction.
and annex some of the parts to parts of The opinions of Elliott, C. J., and of
others ; but they must still assume the Coffey, Berkshire, and Olds, JJ., are re-
form and be known and governed only as plete with learning, and are of unusual
counties, cities, or towns. The State at interest. Mitchell, J., dissented on the
large is, and ever has been, an aggregate ground that the legislative acts in question
of these local bodies. To same effect in were not in conflict with the Constitution
same case, 15 N. Y. 541, per Denio, C. J.; of the State as it now stands. See Consti.
and see also opinion of Allen, J., in Peo- tution of California of 1879, art. xi., en-
ple v. Albertson, 55 N. Y.50 (1873). See titled “ Cities, Counties, and Towns," for
also People v. Morrell, 21 Wend. 563 provisions which declare or presuppose the
(division of counties); ante, sec. 9 et seq. continued existence of these organizations.
In People v. Hurlbut, decided by the Su- 1 Baltimore v. Board of Police, 15 Md.
preme Court of Michigan, in 1871, 24 376. See also Patterson v. Society, &c.
Mich. 44 ; s. C. 9 Am. Rep. 103, this sub- 4 Zabr. (24 N. J. L.) 385 (1854).
ject is largely and learnedly examined by ? Constitution of Kansas, art. xii.
Mr. Justice Cooley, who, conceding to the Secs. 1 and 2 of art. xiii. of the Constitu-
State full authority to shape and control tion of Ohio are the same as sec. 1, art. xii.
municipal organizations at its will, never- of the Constitution of Kansas. Sec. 6,
theless maintained that there were, in the art. xiii. of the Ohio Constitution is the
Constitution of that State, both express same as sec. 5, art. xii. of the Kansas
and implied restrictions upon the legisla. Constitution. There is a similar constitu-
tive dominion over municipal institutions, tional provision in Nebraska, and perhaps
and that local governments and the right in other States. This provision construed
of the people to them were secured by the (Clegg v. Richardson Co., 8 Neb. 178 ;
Constitution, and did not exist by the favor Dundy v. Richardson Co., 8 Neb. 508),
and at the mere pleasure of the legislature. and held to invalidate certain bonds issued
And in the same case the court decided, under a special law. S. P. School District
under a special provision of the Constitu- v. Insurance Co., 103 U. S. 707. The
tion of the State, elsewhere noticed, that Constitution of California declares that
the legislature could not appoint, for a “all laws of a general nature shall have
city corporation, officers whose duties were
a uniform operation." Under this clause
purely local and strictly municipal. The it is held that an act exempting particular
discussions by all of the judges are un- cases from the operation of a general law
usually interesting. Ante, secs. 8 a-8 d, is unconstitutional. Omnibus R. R. Co.
11 ; post, chap. iv. In The State v. Dennyv. Baldwin, 57 Cal. 160, where a special
and Evansville v. State (April, 1889), 21 act authorizing the construction of a street
North East. Rep. 252, 267, 274, noted railway was held void for attempting to
VOL. I. - 6
82
§ 46
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
preme Courts of those States have decided that the provision ap-
plied to municipal as well as private corporations ;' and that the
effect was to compel the legislatures of those States to regulate the
grant of powers to municipal corporations by general laws. Hence
an act specially amending the charter of a city in respect to mak-
ing local improvements or assessments, or specially extending the
limits of a particular city, is unconstitutional; and so it seems is
an act which authorizes a city by name to issue its scrip for a par-
ticular purpose, and to levy taxes to pay it in aid of a single enter-
prise, - the court inclining to hold such an enactment to be a
special act, and one which undertook to confer corporate powers.4
0
exempt the railway company from the “These provisious of the Constitution are
operation of the general law relating to too explicit to admit of the least doubt that
street railways. Ante, sec. 45 ; post, they were intended to disable the General
sec. 49.
Assembly from either creating corpora-
1 Atchison v. Bartholow, 4 Kan. 124 'tions, or conferring upon them corporate
(1866); Wyandotte City v. Wood, 5 Kan. powers, by special acts of legislation. It
603 (1870); The State v. Cincinnati, 20 was intended to correct an existing evil,
Ohio St. 18 (1870); following Atkinson v. and to inaugurate the policy of placing all
Railroad Co., 15 Ohio St. 21 (1864). In corporations of the same kind upon a per-
New Jersey a similar provision is held to fect equality as to all future grants of
apply exclusively to private corporations. power ; of making such law applicable to
State v. Newark, 40 N. J. L. 550, 558 all parts of the State, and thereby secur-
(1878).
ing the vigilance and attention of its
2 Atchison v. Bartholow, supra; Gil. whole representation; and finally, of
more v. Norton, 10 Kan. 491 (1872); State making all judicial construction of their
v. Pugh, 43 Ohio St. 98 (an act to reorgan- powers, or the restrictions imposed upon
ize cities of the first grade of the second them, equally applicable to all corpora-
class, and to reduce their tax levy, held tions of the same class. We must give
to be unconstitutional because it granted such a construction to the Constitution as
authority to such cities to appoint a board will preserve its leading objects intact.”
of control, thus conferring corporate powers Supra, secs. 41, 45.
by special act).
4 Commercial National Bank v. City
3 Wyandotte v. Wood, supra ; State v. of Iola, 2 Dillon, C. C. R. 353 (1873). In
Cincinnati, supra. In the case last cited, this case the Circuit Judge, delivering the
the Supreme Court of Ohio, under the opinion of the court, and referring to the
constitutional provision quoted in the opinion of Ranney, J., quoted in the last
text, held that the legislature cannot by note, observed : " One of the objects of
special act create a corporation, nor by the constitutional provision in Kansas, as
special act confer additional powers on a
well as in Ohio, was to cut up by the
corporation already existing ; and that in roots the mischief of special legislation,
these respects there was no difference particularly in respect to corporations,
between private and municipal corpora- both public and private. This object
tions, since the Constitution equally em- would be defeated if the special act relat-
braced and equally applies to both classes ; ing to the city of Iola could stand. If
and, therefore, the act of April 16, 1870, under the doctrine of Butz v. Muscatine, ,
“to prescribe the corporate limits of Cin- 8 Wall. 575, this court is not absolutely
cinnati,” being considered a special act, bound, in this class of cases, to follow the
was adjudged void. See also Atkinson v. interpretation of the State Constitution
Railroad Co., supra. In this case, Ran- given by its highest court, yet it seems
ney, J., thus expounds the Constitution : that it ought to follow it where it appears
1
3 46
83
PROHIBITION OF SPECIAL ACTS.
It was decided that while the provision of the Constitution of
Kansas that forbids the legislature to pass “any special act con-
ferring corporate powers” includes municipal corporations proper,
it does not embrace quasi corporations, such as school districts, al-
though the latter are declared by statute to be bodies corporate.
In California an act of the legislature which grants to individuals
and their assigns certain powers and privileges, and then provides
that the act shall not take effect unless such persons within a given
time shall organize themselves under existing laws into a corpora-
tion, is a grant, not to the individuals as persons, but to the corpo-
ration when formed.2
to rest upon solid grounds, and was made Cincinnati, 20 Ohio St. 18. Morawetz on
in cases and in respect to questions where Corp. (2d ed.) secs. 10–13, and cases cited.
there was nothing to warp the judgment Construction of constitutional prohibi-
of its judges, and where the interpretation tion against granting right "to lay down
was settled or had been declared at the railroad tracks in streets by local or private
time the act in controversy was passed. act," see post, chap. xviii. on Streets.
In the latest case on this subject, decided · 1 Beach v. Leahy, 11 Kan. 23 (1873).
by the Supreme Court of the United Under the constitutional provision in
States, it is not denied that the Supreme question the Supreme Court of Kansas, in
Court of a State is the appointed expositor the State v. Maloy, 20 Kan. 619 (1878
of its Constitution and laws, and that the ruled the following points as stated by the
Federal courts will adopt as rules for their judges : The act of the legislature en-
oin judgments the decisions of the highest titled " An act authorizing cities therein
courts of the State respecting local ques- named to become cities of the second
tions peculiar to itself, or respecting the class," approved February 29, 1872, is a
construction of its own Constitution and special act, conferring corporate powers
laws.' It only denies the binding force upon four particular municipal corpora-
of State adjudications which rest upon the tions, and is therefore unconstitutional
general principles of law, and not upon and void, being in contravention of sec. 1
the meaning of special constitutional or of art. xii. of the Constitution, which
legislative provisions. Olcott v. Super- provides that “the legislature shall pass
visors, 16 Wall. 678 (1872). I think the no special act conferring corporate pow-
present case is one in which it is the dutyers. 2. The city of Council Grove was
of this court to follow the decisions of the organized as a city of the second class,
State Supreme Court; and so far as my under said special act, and was never
judgment rests upon the special provisions organized as a city of the second class
of the Constitution above referred to, I under any other act, and has never had
place it upon the State adjudications with- a population of two thousand inhabitants.
out an inquiry into their soundness." The And it was therefore held that said city is
bonds in this case were held invalid not legally a city of the second class.
mainly on the ground that they were not 2 San Francisco v. S. V. W. W., 48
issued for a public purpose. The judg. Cal. 493 (1874). Such an act is an at-
ment of the Circuit Court was affirmed. tempt by the legislature in violation of
20 Wall. 655 (1874). See also Savings the Constitution to confer powers and
Assoc. v. Topeka, 3 Dillon, 376 (1874); privileges upon a corporation by special
post, sec. 159; also chap. xiv. on Contracts. act. Tb.; post. sec. 49. The Constitution
Further as to the construction of the of Florida provides that "the legislature
provision that “ corporate powers " shall shall establish a uniform system of county,
not be conferred by special act. School township, and municipal government.
Dist. v. Ins. Co., 103 U, S. 707 ; State v. An act authorizing the dissolution of mu-
84
§ 48
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
A con-
§ 47 (25). “Any Body Politic or Corporate" construed.
stitutional provision that two thirds of the General Assembly “shall
be requisite to every bill creating, continuing, altering, or renewing
any body politic or corporate,” was held by a majority of the court
of errors, reversing the majority view of the Supreme Court in the
same case, to extend to public and municipal, as well as private cor-
porations. The constitutional provision, however, that “no bill
shall contain more than one subject, which shall be clearly ex-
pressed in its title,” is limited to State legislation and has no appli-
cation to municipal ordinances.?
§ 48 (26). “Where General Law can be made applicable.” — Under
a Constitution which provides that "in all cases where a general law
can be made applicable, no special law shall be enacted,” the better
view, and the one supported by the decided weight of authority, is
that it is for the legislature to determine whether its purpose can
or cannot be expediently effected by a general law; and a special
act, as, for example, one providing for the location of the county
seat of a specified county, will not be held invalid by the courts.3
nicipal corporations having a bonded in- a special act amending the charter of a
debtedness, the bonds being due, unpaid and city was held invalid because all such laws
unprovided for, upon the written applica. were, by the Constitution of the State, re-
tion of one-half of the owners or holders of quired to be, and could be, made general.
the bonds, and providing for their rein. Von Phul v. Hammer, 29 Iowa, 222. It
corporation, was held to be in violation of is for the legislature, and not the courts,
this provision and void. State v. Stark, to determine when a general law can be
18 Fla. 255. See on this subject, however, made applicable. Gentile v. State, 29
chap, vii., post. But an act creating a new Ind. 409, overruling Thomas v. Board of
class of municipal corporations, imposing Commissioners, 5 Ind. 4; Longworth's
upon all the cities of the new class the Executors v. Evansville, 32 Ind. 322 ;
same powers and duties, is lawful ander Cooley, Const. Lim. 129, note; State v.
the provision. Lake v. Florida, 18 Fla. County Court, 50 Mo. 317 (1872); S. C. 11
501. See post, chaps. vii. and viii. Am. Rep. 415 ; Murdock v. Woodson, 2
1 Purdy v. People, 4 Hill (N. Y.), 384 Dillon, C. C. 188 (1873); Board of Com-
(1842) ; reversing 2 Hill, 31. What is an missioners v. Shields, 62 Mo. 247 (1876);
alteration within this provision. Corning Evans v. Job, 8 Nev. 322 (1873), where the
v. Green, 23 Barb. 33 ; Smith v. Helmer, decisions in that State and elsewhere are
7 Barb. 416 ; Morris v. People, 3 Denio, reviewed by Hawley, J. The word
381. Where a Constitution requires that 'town as used in constitutional in-
acts of incorporation shall have "the hibition of special laws regulating the
assent of at least two-thirds of each internal affairs of towns and counties -
house," the word "house" means the is a generic term, including cities. State
members present doing business,- these v. Parsons, 40 N. J. L. 1. But in the
being a quorun, and not a majority of absence of any clear expression of a con-
all the members elected. Southworth v. trary intent, the term “municipal cor-
Railroad Co., 2 Mich. 287.
poration" in any statute must be taken
2 Humboldt v. McCoy, 23 Kan. 249; in the strict constitutional sense as not in-
Green v. Indianapolis, 25 Ind. 490. cluding towns. Eaton v. Manitowoc, 44
8 State v. Johnson, 1 Kan. 178 (1862); Wis. 489. Ante, sec. 20, and note.
contra, Pritz, in re, 9 Iowa, 30 (1859), where
1
§ 50
85
LEGISLATIVE DUTY DISCRETIONARY.
§ 49.
“Municipal Purpose," what? — The Constitutions of some
of the States contain a provision that corporations shall not be createl
by special acts except for municipal purposes.
What is a municipal
purpose within this provision has been several times considered.)
An act incorporating a board of commissioners for filling up certain
slough ponds in the city of St. Louis was held to create a corpora-
tion for municipal purposes within the meaning of the Constitution.2
An act creating a board of park commissioners was considered to
constitute them a corporate authority, the object of their creation
being municipal in its character. So a corporation to carry on a
public school and raise funds for its support.4
§ 50 (27). Legislative Duty held to be discretionary. The Con-
stitutions of several of the States contain, substantially, this provis-
ion, derived from the Constitution of New York: “ It shall be the
duty of the legislature to provide for the organization of cities and
incorporated villages, and to restrict their power of taxation, assess-
ment, borrowing money, contracting debts, and loaning their credit, so
as to prevent abuses in assessments, and in contracting debts by
such municipal corporations." 5 This obviously enjoins upon the
legislature the duty of providing suitable and proper restrictions
upon the enumerated powers; but in what these restrictions shall
consist and how they shall be imposed are subjects left to the dis-
cretion or sense of duty of the legislative department, with the
exercise of which the courts cannot interfere. The Supreme Court
1 State, ex rel. Choteau v. Leffingwell, corporation by special act. Ib. ante, sec.
54 Mo. 458 (1873), where the subject is 46.
elaborately discussed, and the conclusion 2 St. Louis v. Shields, 62 Mo. 247
reached was that corporations for “muni. (1876).
cipal purposes” under the Constitution of 8 People v. Salomon, 51 Ill. 37.
Missouri must be connected with the mu- 4 Horton v. Mobile School Comm’rs, 43
nicipal corporation itself, and be instituted Ala. 598. See comment of Wagner, J.,
for the purpose of carrying out some of on this decision in St. Louis v. Shields, 62
the objects of the municipality. Under Mo. 251 (1876).
the Constitution of California, which pro- 5 New Yoric Constitution 1846, art. viii.
vides that “corporations may be formed sec. 9; Wisconsin Constitution 1848, art.
under general laws, but shall not be cre- xi. sec. 3 ; Michigan Constitution 1859, art.
ated by special act, except for municipal xii. sec. 13 ; Oregon Constitution 1857,
purposes," a corporation cannot exercise art. xi. sec. 5; Kansas Constitution 1859,
any powers except those conferred by gen- art. xii. sec. 5; see Paine v. Spratley, 5
eral laws. The legislature cannot confer Kan. 525 ; Nevada Constitution 1864, art.
on such corporations any powers or grant viii. sec. 8; Nebraska Constitution, art.
them any privileges by special act. San viii. sec. 4 ; California Constitution 1849,
Francisco v. S. V. W. W., 48 Cal. 493 sec. 37 ; Ohio Constitution 1851, art. xiii.
(1874). A grant of an easement in a sec. 6. Post, sec. 750, note. See also
street made by the legislature to a corpo- chapters relating to Contracts and Tax-
ration, is purely a grant of corporate power, ation, post.
and therefore cannot be made to a private
6 The failure of the legislature to per:
86
$ 51
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
of Wisconsin, in the case cited in the note, holds to some extent a
contrary view, but its judgment was in effect, although not in terms,
overruled by the Supreme Court of the United States, and it is not,
in its full extent, in harmony with the view elsewhere taken in the
State courts. 1
$ 51 (28). 'Only One Object, which shall be expressed in the
title.” – Many of the State Constitutions contain in substance a pro-
vision that no legislative act shall embrace more than one object or, as
some of them phrase it, one subject, which shall be expressed in its title.
In some of the Constitutions this prohibition is limited to local and
private acts. The purpose of such prohibitions is obvious. The
unity of object or subject is to prevent “log-rolling legislation," by
prohibiting the joining of distinct measures with a view to combine
votes for all. Requiring such subject or object to be expressed in
the title is to prevent deceptive titles, and to enable members of the
legislature, and the people, through the usual publication of legisla-
tive proceedings, to form from the title an opinion of the nature and
form the duty relative to restricting the White v. Stamford, 37 Conn. 587 ; New-
power of taxation, &c., enjoined by the ton v. Atchison, 31 Kan. 151 (quoting
constitutional provision above cited, the text).
“may," says Ranney, J., in Hill v. Hig. 1 Foster v. Kenosha, 12 Wis. 616
don, 5 Ohio St. 248, “ be of very serious (1860). The legislature cannot, consist-
import, but lays no foundation for judicial ently with this restriction, confer upon a
correction." See įMaloy v. Marietta, 11 municipal corporation an unlimited power
Ohio St. 636, 638, where this view is left to levy taxes and raise money for extra
open, but holding that the legislature municipal purposes, such as aiding rail-
alone has the power to determine the road companies ; and an amendment to
mode and measure of the restriction to be the charter of a city, authorizing its coun-
imposed. It was also left open in the cil “to levy and collect special taxes for
People v. Mahaney, 13 Mich. 481, but any purpose (aside from what may be
this case illustrates what is a sufficient re- specially provided for in the city charter)
striction on the power of taxation to meet which may be considered essential to pro-
the constitutional requirement. See also mote or secure the common interests of
Cooley, Const. Lim. 518; Railroad Co. v. the city, or borrow, on the corporate
Connelly, 10 Ohio St. 165. To the effect credit of the city, any sum of money at
that the constitutional provision quoted in
a rate of interest not exceeding ten per
the text does not take away, but recog- cent," on obtaining the previous sanction
nizes, the discretion of the legislature in of a majority of the voters of the city, is
conferring powery of the enumerated char- void, and the requirement of the sanction
acter upon municipal corporations, and of the voters is not a restriction on the
that such discretion is not reviewable by power to levy taxes or contract debts,
the courts, see Bank of Rome v. Rome, 18 within the meaning of the Constitution,
N. Y. 38 (1858); Benson v. Mayor, &c. the court being of opinion that the duty
of Albany, 24 Barb. 248 (1857); Clarke v. of imposing the limitation rests on the
Rochester, 24 Barb. 446; Grant v. Courter, legislature. 16. But see Campbell r.
24 Barb. 232; Wynehamer u. People, 13 Kenosha, 5 Wall. 194 (1866); City v.
N. Y. 429 ; Baltimore v. State, 15 Md. Lampson, 9 Wall. 477 (1869); and the
376; People v. Draper, 15 N. Y. 532; authorities cited in the last note. See
§ 51
87
REQUIREMENTS AS TO TITLE OF ACT.
.
objects of the bill. Subject to the foregoing fundamental require-
ments the provision has been frequently and properly construed to
require only the general or ultimate object to be stated in the title,
and not the details by which the object is to be attained. Any pro-
vision fairly and reasonably connected with and calculated to carry
the declared object into effect is unobjectionable, although not
specially indicated in the title. It is sufficient if the title fairly
expresses or plainly gives notice or warning of the subject dealt
with in the body of the act. Thus, where a Constitution provides
that no bill or act shall pass containing any matter different from
what is expressed in the title thereof, an act, the title of which
declares it to be for the better regulation of a certain town (naming it),
or to amend or enlarge the powers of the corporation thereof, is suffi-
cient, without enumerating the particulars in which the powers are
enlarged or extended. So a provision in an act entitled merely, “An
act to amend the act incorporating the city of M.," extending the
city limits, does not conflict with the constitutional requirement
that “every law shall embrace but one object, which shall be ex-
pressed in its title.”3 Many illustrations of the judicial construction
Rogan v. Watertown, 30 Wis. 259 (1872), court), 9 Iowa, 104; S. P. St. Paul v. Coul-
as to loaning credit.
ter, 12 Minn, 41, 50 (1866).
For other restrictions upon the power to The subject of a law to incorporate a
contract debts and limitations upon such city or town is the charter of incorporation,
power, see chapters on Charters and Con- and the title need not enumerate all the
tracts, post.
powers intended to be conferred. Lock-
1 Carter County v. Sinton (Const. Ky.), hart v. Troy, 48 Ala. 581 (1872). Where
120 U. S. 517; Montclair v. Ramsdell the title to an act is “to consolidate and
(Const. New Jersey), 107 U. S. 147 ; Jones- amend the several acts incorporating the city
boro v. Cairo, &c. R. R. (Const. Ill.), 110 of Brunswick, and for other purposes therein
U. S. 192; Mahomet v. Quackenbush mentioned," and the act contains a provi-
(Const. Ill.), 117 U. S. 509 ; Otoe County sion to make valid and confirm “all the
v. Baldwin (Const. Neb.), 111 U. S. 1; Ack- ordinances of the mayor and city council of
ley School Dist. v. Hall (Const. Iowa), 113 the city of Brunswick heretofore passed,
U. S. 135; Re Phønixville, 109 Pa. St. and not in conflict with the Constitution
44 Re Airy Street, 113 Pa. St. 281 ; of the State of Georgia or of the United
Cooley, Const. Lim. 141-151, and au- States," it was held that it was in viola-
thorities.
tion of the Constitution of 1868, which
2 Green v. Mayor, R. M. Charlt. (Ga.) declares : “Nor shall any law or ordi-
368 (1832), per Law, J. ; Mayor v. State, nance pass which refers to more than one
4 Ga. 26 ; Hill v. Decatur, 22 Ga. 203. subject-matter, or contains matter differ-
Text affirmed. Luehrman v. Taxing Dist., ent from what is expressed in the title
2 Lea (Teun.), 425 ; Murphy v. State, 9 thereof.” Brieswick v. Brunswick, 51
Lea (Tenn.), 373. An act which, in effect, Ga. 639 (1874). And in a later case it
amended the charters of cities of a certain was held that the Act of 1872, entitled
class held void because this purpose did “to prescribe the manner of incorpo-
not appear in its title. State v. Wright, rating towns and villages," not hav.
14 Ore. 365.
ing indicated by its title the provision
3 Morford v. Unger, 8 Iowa, 82 (1859); making the act an amendment of ex-
Davis v. Woolnough (act establishing city isting municipal charters, is unconsti-
88
§ 51
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
of this constitutional provision as applicable to municipalities are
given in the note.
tutional. Ayeridge v. Comm’rs, 60 Ga. 23 Fla. 483 (1887). See, also, State v.
404.
Elvins, 32 N. J. L. (3 Vroom), 362 ; State
A statute designated in its title as an v. Newark, 34 N. J. L. (5 Vroom) 236 ; In
amendment to a city charter, but which re Comm’rs of Elizabeth, 49 N. J. L. (20
embraces objects foreign to the charter, is Vroom), 488; Sedgwick Co. v. Bailey, 13
in conflict with the Constitution and void. Kan. 600 (1874); Comm’rs of Marion Co.
Williamson v. Keokuk, 44 Iowa, 88 v. Comin'rs of Harvey Co., 26 Kan. 181 ;
(1876). The judgment in the case last Devlin v. New York, 63 N. Y. 8 (1875);
cited would seem to be of doubtful cor- People v. Willsea, 60 N. Y. 507 (1875);
rectness upon the facts.
Tecumseh v. Phillips, 5 Neb. 305 (1877);
In determining whether a law be in Dows v. Town of Elmwood, 34 Fed. Rep.
conflict with the provision of the Consti- 114 ; Baltimore & Ohio R. R. Co. v.
tution, the unity of the object is to be looked County of Jefferson, 29 Fed. Rep. 305.
for in the ultimate end to be attained, An act public in its nature, in which the
and not in the details leading to that end. people of the whole State have an interest,
State, &c. v. Co. Judge, 2 Iowa, 280 ; but which specially concerns the property
People v. Mahaney, 13 Mich. 481 (1865), and rights of a portion of the people of the
holding that the title of “an act to estab. State, is a local act within the meaning
lish a police government for the city of of the Constitution of Illinois, 1848 (art.
Detroit,” was sufficiently specific ; ap. 3, sec. 23), requiring the subject thereof
proved, White v. Lincoln, 5 Neb. 505, to be expressed in the title (citing and re-
(1877); Atty. Gen. v. Bradley, 36 Mich. viewing various cases in Illinois and else-
447 (1877); People v. Hurlbut, 24 Mich. where on this subject). Applying these
44 (1871); s. C. 9 Am. Rep. 103. Construc- principles to an act of the Illinois legis-
tion of similar constitutional provision. lature of April 16, 1869, known as the
Arnoult v. New Orleans, 11 La. An. 54; Lake Front Act, entitled "An act in re-
Kathman v. New Orleans, 11 La. An. lation to a portion of the submerged lands
145 ; People v. Mellen, 32 Ill. 181 ; Rail- and Lake Park grounds lying on and ad.
road Co. v. Gregory, 15 Ill. 21 ; Davis v. jacent to the shore of Lake Michigan
State (inspection act for Baltimore), 7 Md. on the eastern frontage of the City of
151 ; Annapolis v. State, 30 Md. 212; Chicago," it was held that since the gene-
Lafon v. Dufrocq, 6 La. An. 350 ; Re ral subject of that act was the disposal of
Airy Street, 113 Pa. St. 281 (1886); Re lands on and adjacent to the shore of
Phænixville, 109 Pa. St. 44 ; Ottawa v. Lake Michigan on the eastern frontage
People, 48 Ill. 233 (1868); Miles v. of Chicago, the subject was sufficiently
Charleton, 29 Wis. 400 (1872); Murdock expressed in the title within the meaning
v. Woodson, 2 Dillon, C. C. R. 188 (1873); of the Constitution, which provides that
Hubert v. People, 49 N. Y. 132 (1872); all local laws must contain but one sub-
State v. Union, 33 N. J. L. 350 (4 Vroom), ject, which must be expressed in the title.
where the subject is fully discussed. Mont. Illinois v. Ill. Cent. R. R. Co. (Lake Front
clair v. Rámsdell, 107 U. S. 147, in which Case), 33 Fed. Rep. 730 (Harlan and
Mr. Justice Harlan quoted the opinion in Blodgett, JJ.). Where the act has but
State v. Union, supra, and added, “The one general object it is sufficient if the
objections should be grave, and the con object or subject is fairly expressed in
fict between the statute and the Constitu- the title. White v. Lincoln, 5 Neb. 505
tion palpable, before the judiciary should (1877); Black v. Cohen, 52 Ga. 621
disregard a legislative enactment upon the (1874); Lockport v. Gaylord, 61 Ill.
sole ground that it embraced more than 276 (1871), where a curative act legal.
one object, or if but one object, that it izing warrants was held invalid because
was not sufficiently expressed by the it did not set forth the subject-matter in
title." Montclair v. Ramsdell, supra, fol- the title. In Watertown v. Fairbanks, 65
lowed in State v. Comm’rs of Duval Co., N. Y. 588 (1875), a legislative act vali-
!
§ 51
89
REQUIREMENTS AS TO TITLE OF ACT.
no
}
dating previous illegal assessments was (not yet reported, but will probably ap-
held to conflict with the constitutional pear in 113 or 114 N. Y. Rep.), relating
requirement (art. 3, sec. 16), that " to the right of the defendant company to
private or local bill shall embrace more construct an underground railway in
than one subject, and that shall be ex- Broadway and Madison Avenue in New
pressed in the title.” An act entitled York City. It was incorporated in 1868,
“ An act to legalize and authorize the as- by a local and private act to transmit
sessment of street improvements and as- packages and merchandise by means of
sessments," not specifying any city or pneumatic tubes. In 1873, by local and
locality, held not sufficiently to express private act its charter was amended, and
the subject of the act, which was solely the title thereof expressed that it was an act
to legalize certain proceedings of the com- to provide for the transportation of pas-
mon council of a single city. Durkee v. sengers in said (pneumatic] tubes." In
City of Janesville, 26 Wis. 697. Under the body of this amended act, however, the
an act to revise the charter of a specified corporation was given authority to con-
city, there may be conferred upon the struct and operate an ordinary railway
municipality the usual legislative, taxing, under the said streets. The amended
judicial and police powers, including the act of 1873 was held to be unconstitu-
creation of a city court. This is but one tional because the title was deceptive.
subject, and a charter with such a title Giving the judgment of the court on this
does not infringe the provision of the Con- point, Earl, J., said: “The construction
stitution that no local bill shall embrace of such a railway [an ordinary railroad]
more than one subject which shall be ex- by such a corporation is certainly a subject
pressed in its title. Harris v. People, 59 not expressed in the title of the act. The
N. Y. 599 (1875), where Folger, J., ex- only subject there indicated is the transpor-
plains the object of this constitutional tation of passengers and property through
provision to be “to prevent the joining pneumatic tubes by atmospheric pressure.
of one local subject to another or others A title purporting that an act provides
of the same kind, or to one or more gene- for pneumatic transportation, would not
ral subjects, so that each should gather be sufficient for an act authorizing the con-
votes for all ; and to advise the public struction and operation of a horse railway
and the locality, and the representatives or a steam railway, as a title purporting
of the locality and of other parts, of the that an act authorizes a line of omnibuses
general purpose of the bill, so that those for the transportation of passengers would
interested might be on their guard as to not be sufficient for an act authorizing the
the whole or as to the details." People v. construction of a railway for the same pur-
Supervisors, 43 N. Y. 10. See also Sul- pose. The constitutional provision re-
livan v. New York, 53 N. Y. 652 (1873); ferred to has been deemed by statesmen and
Volkening, In re, 52. N. Y. 650 (1873); jurists conditores leguin - of so much
Astor, In re, 50 N. Y. 363 (1872); Mayer, importance that it is found in the funda-
In re, 50 N. Y. 504 (1872); and People mental law of most of the States. Its
v. Briggs, 50 N. Y. 553, where the pur- purpose is to prevent fraud and deception
pose of the constitutional provision is well by concealment in the body of acts suh-
expounded by Church, C. J. People v. jects not by their titles disclosed to the
Rochester, 50 N. Y. 525 (1872). The general public, and to legislators who may
word "private" (art. 3, sec. 16, supra) rely upon them for information as to
refers to “persons,” the word “local” to pending legislation. When the subject is
“territory.” People v. O'Brien, 38 N. Y. expressed, all matters fairly and reason-
193 ; People v. Supervisors, 43 N. Y. 10; ably connected with it, and all measures
People v. Hills, 35 N. Y. 449, 451. which will or may facilitate its accomplish-
The constitutional provision in New ment, are proper to be incorporated in the
York as to the title of local and private act, and are germane to the title. The
bills (art. 3, sec. 16, supra), underwent title must be such at least as fairly to sug-
careful consideration in the Court of Ap- gest or give a clue to the subject dealt with
peals in the great cases of Astor and Bailey in the act, and unless it comes up to this
v. New York Arcade Railway Co. (1889) standard it falls below the constitutional
90
§ 51
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
requirement (The Mayor, &c. v. Colegate, vided for in the act. But a person read-
12 N. Y. 146 ; People v. Hills, 35 N. Y. ing the title alone would have no clue
449, 452 ; Matter of New York, &c. Bridge, whatever to the great railway scheme ac-
72 N. Y. 527 ; Matter of Application of tually authorized by the act."
Department of Public Parks, 86 N. Y. If, however, a local act contains a sub-
439; People v. Whitlock, 92 N. Y. 191 ; ject which is properly expressed in its title
Dlatter of Knaust, 101 N. Y. 188; Cooley, it is valid as to that subject although it is
Constitutional Limitations, 141). Here invalid as to a subject not expressed. Van
the only subject suggested by the title is Antwerp, In re, 56 N. Y. 261, 267 (1874);
the transportation of passengers and prop- S. P. McGee's Appeal, 114 Pa. St. 470,
erty through pneumatic tubes, by atmos- 478 (1886); Dewhurst v. Allegheny City,
pheric pressure, and everything appropriate 95 Pa. St. 437; Cooley, Const. Lim. 148.
and germane to that subject could be pro-
$ 52
91
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE CORPORATIONS.
CHAPTER IV.
LEGISLATIVE
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE CORPORATIONS DISTINGUISHED.
AUTHORITY AND ITS LIMITATIONS.
6 Cor-
§ 52 (29). Public and Private. A fundamental division of cor-
porations, heretofore adverted to, is into public and private. The
1 Ante, chap. ii. secs. 19–27. In Mills Court of California, corporations should
v. Williams, 11 Ired. (N. C.) Law, 558, be divided into three classes, to wit :
(1854). Pearson, J., commenting on the Public municipal corporations, the object
common division of corporations, says: of which is to promote the public interest;
“The purpose in making all corporations corporations technically private, but of a
is the accomplishment of some public gocd. quasi public character, having in view
Hence, the division into public and pri- some public enterprise in which the pub-
vate has a tendency to confuse and lead to lic interests are involved, such as railroad,
error in investigation ; for, unless the turnpike, and canal companies; and cor-
public are to be benefited, it is no more porations strictly private. Miner's Ditch
lawful to confer exclusive rights and Co. v. Zellerbach, 37 Cal. 543 (1869). The
privileges' upon an artificial body than opinion of Sawyer, C. J., in this case, is
upon a private citizen. The substantial able and instructive.
The author pre-
distinction is this : Some corporations are fers the ordinary division of corpora-
created by the mere will of the legislature, tions into public (which includes mu-
there being no other party interested ornicipal) and private. The Civil Code
concerned. To this body a portion of the of California thus defines public and
power of the legislature is delegated to be private corporations (sec. 284):
exercised for the public good, and it is porations are either public or private.
subject at all times to be modified, changed, Public corporations are formed or organ-
or annulled. Other corporations are the ized for the government of a portion of
result of contract. The legislature is not the State ; all other corporations are pri-
the only party interested ; for, although vate." Construing this section, it was
it has a public purpose to be accomplished, held in Dean v. Davis, 51 Cal. 406, 410,
it chooses to do it by the instrumentality that a levee district formed under an act
of a second party. These two make a con- of the legislature for reclamation purposes
tract. The expectation of benefit to the was a public corporation. Crockett, J.,
public is the moving consideration on one
says :
“It is true, perhaps, that it was
side ; that of expected remuneration for not formed or organized for the govern-
the outlay is the consideration on the ment of a portion of the State, in the
other. It is a contract, and, therefore, broadest sense of the term ; nevertheless
cannot be modified, changed, or annulled it exercises certain governmental functions
without the consent of both parties. within the district. To constitute a pub-
Counties are an instance of the former, lic corporation, it is not essential that
railroad and turnpike companies of the it shall exercise all the functions of gov-
latter class of corporations." , This recog.
This recog- ernment within the prescribed district."
nizes the substantial difference between
S. P., see, also, People v. Reclamation
the two classes of corporations, and is, in District, 53 Cal. 346; Hoke v. Perdue,
effect, a criticism upon the names by 62 Cal. 545. See Foster v. Fowler, 60
which they are distinguished.
Pa. St. 27 (1868), in which a company
According to the view of the Supreme created to supply a city with water was
92
§ 53
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
importance of this distinction cannot be too much emphasized, since
upon it are based the legal principles which so broadly distinguish
the two classes of corporations. With private corporations the pres-
ent work has no other concern than to point out by way of illustra-
tion wherein they differ from those which are public. Both classes
are alike created by the legislature, and in the same way, - by
special charter or under general incorporation acts.
§ 53. “Private" defined; Dartmouth College Case. --- Private cor-
porations are created for private, as distinguished from purely public
purposes, and they are not, in contemplation of law, public, because
it may have been supposed by the legislature that their establish-
ment would proinote, either directly or consequentially, the public
interest. They cannot be compelled to accept a charter or incor-
porating act.? . The assent of the corporation is necessary to make the
incorporating statute operative; but when assented to, the legislative
grant is irrevocable, and it cannot, without the consent of the corpo-
ration, be impaired or destroyed by any subsequent act of legisla-
tion, unless the right to do so was reserved at the time. The
celebrated Dartmouth College Case,2 by its construction of the Federal
Constitution, incorporated, wisely or otherwise, into American juris-
prudence the principle which has been attended with such important
practical consequences, namely, that privileges and franchises granted
by legislative act to a private corporation, when accepted, constitute
held to be a public, as distinguished from right remain to be yet fully determined.
a private corporation. Unless there is An enactment exercising this right might
some special constitutional restriction, the be of such a nature as to deprive the cor-
legislature of a State may regulate the poration of its property without due
compensation of grain elevators and pub- process of law.
lic warehouses, and fix a maximum rate of 1 Ante, sec. 44.
charges. Munnv. People, 69 Ill. 80 (1873).
2 Dartmouth College v. Woodward,
Affirmed in the Supreme Court of U. S. 4 Wheat. 518. All attempts to overthrow
Munn v. People, 94 U. S. 313 (1876). The this judgment have failed
In the great
same principle, as respects the legislative case of the People v. O'Brien, Receiver,
right to regulate the charges for railway arising out of the acts of the legislature of
transportation services, was asserted and New York in 1886, repealing the charter
applied by the Supreme Court of the of the Broadway Surface Railway Com-
United States in what is popularly known pany, and dissolving that corporation,
granger cases. Chicago, B., & decided by the Court of Appeals of New
Q. R. R. Co. v. Iowa, 94 U. S. 155 ; Pike York (111 N. Y. 1, 1888), Ruger, C. J.,
v. Chicago & N. W. R. R. Co., 94 U. S. speaking of the Dartmouth College Case,
164 ; Lawrence v. Chicago & N. W. R. says : “Although it has sometimes been
Co., 94 U. S. 164; Chicago, M., & St. P. criticised, it has been uniformly acquiesced
R. Co. v. Ackley, 94 U. S. 179; Winona iu by the courts of the several States as
& St. P. R. Co. v. Blake, 94 U. S. 181 ; the law of the land, and may be regarded
Southern Minn. R. R. Co. v. Coleman, 94 as too firmly settled to admit of question
U. S. 181; Stone v. Wisconsin, 94 U. S. or dispute." Infra, sec. 68 a;. post, soc.
181. The limitations upon this general 112.
as the "
$ 54
93
PUBLIC CORPORATIONS DEFINED.
a contract within the meaning of the clause of the Constitution which
secures inviolability of contracts by ordaining that no State shall
pass any law impairing their obligation; and hence a law materially
altering the charter of such a corporation is unconstitutional, unless
the_power to alter it was reserved, either generally or specially,
when the grant was made.
$ 54 (30). Public Corporations defined. - Public including muni-
cipal corporations are called into being at the pleasure of the State,
and while the State may, and in the case of municipal corporations
usually does, it need not, obtain the consent of the people of the
locality to be affected. The charter or incorporating act of a muni-
cipal corporation is in no sense a contract between the State and the
corporation, although, as we shall presently see, vested rights in
favor of third persons, if not indeed in favor of the corporation or
rather the community which is incorporated, may arise under it.
Public corporations within the meaning of this rule are such as are
established for public purposes exclusively, – that is, for purposes
connected with the administration of civil or of local government,
and corporations are public only when, in the language of Chief-
Justice Marshall, " the whole interests and franchises are the exclusive
property and domain of the government itself, such as quasi corpo-.
rations (so called), counties and towns or cities upon which are
conferred the powers of local administration.. Subject to consti-
tutional limitations presently to be noticed, the power of the legisla-
ture over such corporations is supreme and transcendent: it may,
where there is no constitutional inhibition, erect, change, divide, and
even abolish them, at pleasure, as it deems the public good to
require.
1
9.
P.
1 Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 could not be impaired by subsequent legis-
Wheat. 518 (1819); Allen v. McKean, 1 lation. But, said Nelson, J., with his
Sumuer, 276 (1833) (the Bowdoin College usual clearness, “It is an unsound and
Case elaborately considered by Story, J.); even absurd proposition that political
see reference to this case, 2 Story's Life power conferred by the legislature can
and Letters, 150 ; Patterson v. Society, become a vested right as against the govern-
&c., 4 Zabr. (24 N. J. L.) 385 ; Cheany ment in any individual or body of men.
v. Hooser, 9 B. Mon. 330 ; Berlin v.
Penobscot Boom Corporation v.
Gorham, 34 N. H. 266 ; Meriwether v. Lawson, 16 Me. 224 ; Yarmouth v. North
Garrett (repeal of charter of city of Mem- Yarmouth, 34 Me. 411 (1852); Story,
phis), 102 U. S. 472, 511, (1880), citing Com. Const., secs. 1385, 1388 ; North
text; Sinton v. Carter Co., 23 Fed. Rep. Yarmouth v. Skillings, 45 Me. 133 (1858);
535; People v. Morris, 13 Wend. 325 Girard v. Philadelphia, 7 Wall. 1 (1868);
(1835). In this case the defendant insisted United States z. Railroad Co., 17 Wall. 322;
that the rights and privileges conferred Philadelphia v. Fox, 64 Pa. St. 169 ;
upon the village of Ogdensburg by the Mobile v. Watson, 116 U. S. 289 (1885);
act incorporating it were vested rights, and ante, sec. 9; Jersey City v. Railroad Co.,
94
§ 55
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
$ 55.
Form of Grant does not affect Extent of Power. The extent
of the legislative control over public or municipal corporations is not
20 N. J. Eq. 360 ; Rundle v. Del. &c. was held that the general governinent could
Canal Co., 1 Wall. Jr. 275, S. C. 14 not tax the income or property of the city of
How.. 80 ; Tinsman v. Railroad Co., 2 Baltimore under the Internal Revenue
Dutch. (N. J.) 148 ; State v. Brannin, 3 Act (post, sec. 775), the court discusses
Zabr. (23 N. J. L.) 485 ; State v. Fuller, and examines the nature of níunicipal
5 Vroom (34 N. J. L.) 227 ; Patterson v. corporations and the relation they sustain
Society, &c., 4 Zabr. (24 N.J.L.) 385; ante, to the State, of which they are treated as
sec. 44; Statev. Jennings, 27 Ark.419(1872); arms or agencies. The court says, A
Clinton v. Railroad Co., 24 Iowa, 455; municipal corporation like the city of
San Francisco v. Canavan, 42 Cal. 541 ; Baltimore is a representative not only of
Demareste v. New York, 74 N. Y. 161, the State, but is a portion of its govern-
S. C. below, 11 Hun, 19; Cornell v. Peo- mental power. It is one of its creatures,
ple, 107 Ill. 372 ; Lutz v. Crawfordsville, made for a specific purpose, to exercise
109 Ind. 466 ; Wood v. Town of Oxford, within a limited sphere the powers of the
97 N. C. 227 ; David v. Portland Water State. The State may withdraw these
Comm’rs, 14 Oreg. 98; Portland & W. V. local powers of government at pleasure,
R. R. Co. v. Portland, 14 Oreg. 188 ; In re and may, through its legislature or other
Malone's Estate, 21 S. C. 435; Morris v. appointed channels, govern the local
State, 62 Tex, 728. "A municipal cor- territory as it governs the State at large.
poration, in which is vested some portion It may enlarge or contract its powers or
of the administration of the government, destroy its existence. As a portion of the
may be changed at the will of the legisla- State, in the exercise of a limited portion
ture. Such is a public corporation, used of the powers of the State, its revenues,
for public purposes.” Per McLean, J., in like those of the State, are not subject to
State Bank v. Knoop, 16 How. U. S. 369, taxation." Post, secs. 100, 773, 775.
380 (1853). " Public or municipal cor- As to extent of LEGISLATIVE CONTROL,
porations are established for the local gove and the distinction between PUBLIC and
ernment of towns or particular districts. PRIVATE corporations in this respect, see
The special powers conferred upon them infra, secs. 66, 68 a, 72-74 a, and cases ;
are not vested rights as against the State, Cooley, Taxation (2d ed.), 688. See, also,
but, being wholly political, exist only dur. People v. Wren (division of a county), 4
ing the will of the general legislature; Scam. (Ill.) 273 ; Martin v. Dix, 52 Miss.
otherwise, there would be numberless 53 (1876); People v. Detroit, 28 Mich.
petty governments existing within the 228 (1873); 8. c. 15 Am. Rep. 202 ; New
State and forming part of it, but indepen- Orleans, &c. Co. v. New Orleans, 26 La.
dent of the control of the sovereign power. An. 517; Coles v. Madison County,
Such powers may at any time be repealed
any time be repealed Breese (Ill.), 120; Laranie County v.
or abrogated by the legislature, either by Albany County, 92 U. S. 307 (1875) ; C. &
a general law operating upon the whole A. R. R. Co. v. Adler, 56 Ill. 344 ; State
State, or by a special act altering the pow- v. Brannin, 3 Zabr. (23 N. J. L.) 485 ;
ers of the corporation." Sloan v. State Rader v. Road Dist., 7 Vroom (36 N. J.
(implied modification of charter as to vend- L.), 273 ; Bush v. Shipman, 4 Scam.
ing liquor by subsequent general law), 8 (5 111.) 190 ; Holliday v. People, 5 Gilm.
Blackf. (Ind.) 361 (1847), per Smith, J. (10 Ill.) 216 ; Richland County v. Law-
Approving People v. Morris, 13 Wend. rence County, 12 Ill. 8; Trustees, &c. v.
325 ; Arnistrong v. Comm. (as to removal Tatman, 13 Ill. 30 ; Gutzweller v. People,
of county seat), 4 Blackf. (Ind.) 208 14 Ill. 142 ; Sangamon County v. Spring-
(1836); post, secs. 62, 183.
field, 63 11). 66 (1872) ; State v. Mayor,
In the case of the United States v. The R. M. Charlt. (Ga.) 250 ; State, &c. v.
Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company, St. Louis County Court, 34 Mo. 546 ;
decided by the United States Supreme Purdy v. People, 4 Hill (N. Y.), 385;
Court, 17 Wall. 322 (1872), in which it Morey v. Newfane, 8 Barb. 645; Lloyd v.
$ 56
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE CORPORATIONS DISTINGUISHED.
95
impaired by reason of the fact that the charter is granted in the
same act that creates a private corporation, whose rights cannot be
changed without its consent. Where, in incorporating a gas com-
pany, the legislature reserved the power to alter, modify, or repeal
the charter, it is competent for it, by subsequent legislation, to
subject the company to supervision and control, and to confer upon
the municipal corporation in which the works of the company
are erected the power to regulate the price of gas, and ordinances
duly passed in pursuance of such power are binding upon the
company?
§ 56 (31). Differences between Public and Private Corporations
illustrated. — Some of the leading differences between public and private
Mayor, &c. of New York, 5 N. Y. (1 Seld.) 64 Pa. St. 169 (1870). The doctrine is
369; Lowber v. Same, 7 Abb. Pr. R. 248 ; here laid down that since the legislature
Gréen v. Same, 5 Abb. Pr. R. 503 ; Aurora cannot alienate any part of its legislative
v. West, 9 Ind. 74 ; Plymouth v. Jackson, power, it cannot therefore by legislative
15 Pa. St. 44 ; Louisville v. Common- act or contract invest auy municipal cor-
wealth, 1 Duvall (Ky.), 295; Murphy v. poration with an irrevocable franchise of
Louisville, 9 Bush (Ky.), 189 (1872); government over any part of its territory.
O'Hara v. Portland, 3 Oreg. 525; Gray Ib. 181; post, secs. 64, 68, 72–74 a, 80,567.
v. Brooklyn, 10 Abb. (N. Y.) Pr. Rep. In Louisiand the recall and abrogation by
N. S. 186 ; State v. Hundelhausen, 26 the legislature of powers conferred upon a
Wis. 432 (1870); Tinsman v. Railroad municipal corporation and vesting them
Company, 2 Dutch. (N. J.) 148 ; Marietta in another, is said to be a proper exercise
v. Fearing, 4 Ohio, 427; Richmond v. of the police power of the State. Pickles v.
Richmond, &c. Railroad Co., 21 Gratt. Dry Dock Co., 38 La. An. 412. Police
(Va.) 604 (1872); State v. Mayor, &c., 24 power is, however, a very indefinite term,
Ala. 701 ; Governor v. McEwen, 5 Humph. and is often used to express the sum of the
(Tenn.) 241 ; Grogan v. San Francisco, legislative power of the State not within
18 Cal. 590 ; Darlington v. Mayor, &c. of the limitations of the Federal and State
New York, 31 N. Y. 164 ; Savings Fund Constitutions. Dissolution and legislative
Society v. Philadelphia, 31 Pa. St. 175, extinction of municipal corporation, by
185; Philadelphia v. Field, 58 Pa. St. repeal of its charter, see post, secs. 170,
320 ; infra, sec. 80; Erie v. Canal Com. 185, 189; also, 21 Am. Law Review, 14.
pany, 59 Pa. St. 174 ; Dunsmore's Ap- 1 Patterson v. Society, &c., 4 Zabr.
peal, 52 Pa. St. 374 ; Blanding . Burr, (24 N. J. L.) 385 (1854). See, also, Bal.
13 Cal. 343 (1859) ; People v. Hill, 7 Cal. timore v. Board of Police, 15 Md. 376
97 (1857); Nichol v. Mayor, &c., 9 (1859). Text approved. Luehrman
Humph. 252 ; Creighton v. San Francisco, Taxing District, 2 Lea (Tenn.), 425.
42 Cal. 446 (1871) ; Lucas v. Tippecanoe 2 State v. Cincinnati Gas Co., 18 Ohio
Co., 44 Ind. 524 (1873); Burns v. Clarion St. 262 (1868). See, also, Norwich Gas-
County, 62 Pa. St (1869) ; Durach's Ap- light Co. v. Norwich City Gas Co., 25
peal, 62 Pa. St. 491; New Orleans v. Hoyle, Conn. 19 (1856); State v. Milwaukee Gas-
23 La. An. 740;Amite City v. Clements, 24 light Co., 29 Wis. 454 (1872). It is, we
La. An. 27 (1872) ; 21 Am. Law Review suppose, to be implied that ordinances such
14.
as those mentioned in the text shall be
This subject is discussed in an inter- reasonable, and not confiscatory, in their
esting manner by Sharswood, J., in his nature and operation.
learned judgment, in Philadelphia v. Fox,
V.
96
$ 56
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
ter;
corporations are well illustrated and clearly stated in a case decided
in New Jersey. In an action by a riparian proprietor against a
canal company, for obstructing a water-course, the company insisted
that it was not liable, because the work was authorized by its char-
that the acts it did were legal; that the injury complained of
was consequential; that the enterprise was a public work, designed
for public purposes, and that the company, in executing it, acted as
the public agents of the State and, therefore, possessed the State's
immunity from liability. But the court held that the company was
not a public corporation. On this point Nevius, J., the organ of the
court, observed : “Public corporations are political corporations, or
such as are founded wholly-for public purposes, and the whole inter-
est in which is in the public. The fact of the public having an
interest in the works or the property or the object of a corporation
does not make it a public corporation, All corporations, whether
public or private, are, in contemplation of law, founded upon the
principle that they will promote the interest or convenience of the
public. A bank is a private corporation, yet it is, in the eye of
the law, designed for public benefit. A turnpike or a canal com-
pany is a private company, yet the public have an interest in the use
of their works, subject to such tolls and restrictions as the charter
has imposed. The interest, therefore, which the public may have in
the property or in the objects of a corporation, whether direct or
incidental (unless it has the whole interest), does not determine its
character as a public or private corporation... In the present case,
whatever may have been the objects of the corporation, whether to
erect a public navigable highway or to improve the navigation of
the Raritan River, or whether the public have a right to the use and
enjoyment of these improvements, when made, or not, the company
are essentially a private company, and are not in the sense which
will confer the State's exemption from liability] the agents of the
State. Their works are not constructed by the requirement of the
State, or at the expense of the State, nor does the stock belong to
the State, nor is the State answerable for the lands or materials used
in the construction of these works, or responsible for the debts of
the company, or for injuries committed by them in the execution of
their work. The State could not compel the company to construct
this canal or improve the navigation of the river; it has permitted
them to do so at their own request. The company might have
abandoned the work whenever they saw fit; they may now aban-
don it without responsibility to the State. The corporation itself,
the property of the corporation, the object of the corporation, are
essentially private, subject only to public use, under their own
§ 57 CONSTITUTIONAL RESTRAINT UPON LEGISLATIVE POWER.
97
restrictions, and from which use the company are to derive the
profits.” 1
§ 57 (32). Scope of Legislative Authority. - The adjudged cases
exhibit some contrariety of opinion respecting the scope of legislative
authority over municipal corporations, or rather respecting the ques-
tion how far such corporations, viewed as legal personalities, and as
1 Nevius, J., Ten Eyck v. Canal Co., nothing more than mandates of the sov-
3 Harrison (N. J.), 200, 203 (1841); ap- ereign power, and those laws may be re-
proved, Hanson v. Vernon, 27 Iowa, 28, pealed or altered at the will of the legis-
53 (1869).
lature, except so far as the repeal or change
In an elaborate and well-considered may affect the rights of third persons
opinion, in which the court of appeals of acquired under them.” Police Jury u.
Maryland held the regents of the university Shreveport (repeal of corporation ferry
of that State to be a private corporation, right), 5 La. An. 661 (1850); State
though its ends were public, Buchanan, Bank v. Navigation Co. (construction of
C. J., delivering the judgment of the charter), 3 La. An. 294 (1848); Reynolds
court, thus defines a public corporation : V. Baldwin, 1 La. An. 162 ; Haynes v.
“A PUBLIC CORPORATION is one that is Municipality, 5 La. An. 760 ;. Edgerton v.
created for political purposes, with politi- Municipality, 1 La. An. 435; Board v.
cal powers, to be exercised for purposes Municipality, 6 La. An. 21 (1851). The
connected with the public good in the ad- same doctrine is affirmed, and the suprem-
ministration of civil government; an in- acy of the legislature over municipal cor-
strument of the government, subject to the porations and their funds and franchises
control of the legislature, and its members is asserted, in Amite City v. Clements, 24
officers of the government, for the admin- La. An. 27 (1872).
istration or discharge of public duties, as In the opinion of the Supreme Court of
in the cases of cities, towns, &c.; so where the United States, holding that the legis-
a bank is created by the government for lature of a State might lawfully repeal or
its own uses, and the stock belongs ex- discontinue a ferry franchise granted to a
clusively to the government, it is a public municipal corporation, it is remarked that
corporation ; and so of a hospital created towns and cities, “which are public mu-
and endowed by a government for general nicipal and political bodies, are incorpo-
purposes of charity.” Regents of Univer- rated for public, and not private, objects.
sity v. Williams, 9 Gill & Johns. (Md.) They are allowed to hold privileges or
365, 397 (1838). See, also, Norris v. property only for public purposes. The
Trustees, 7 Gill & Johns. 7. The Univer members are not shareholders, nor joint
sity of the State of Nebraska is a public partners in any corporate estate, which
corporation. Regents v. McConnell, 5 they can sell or devise to others, or which
Neb. 423 (1877); post, sec. 60, note. can be attached or levied on for their debts.
Speaking of public corporations, and the Hence, generally, the doings between them
relations they sustain to the State, the and the legislature are in the nature of
Supreme Court of Louisiana uses this lan- legislation rather than compact, and sub-
guage : “The government of cities and ject to all the legislative conditions named,
towns, like that of the police jury of par- and therefore to be considered as not vio-
ishes (counties), forms one of the sub- lated by subsequent legislative changes.”
divisions of the internal administration of Per Woodbury, J., in East Hartford v.
the State, and is absolutely under the con- Hartford Company, 10 How. (U. S.) 511,
trol of the legislature. The laws which 531 (1850) ; Railroad Co. v. Ellerman,
establish and regulate municipal corpora- 705 U. S. 166 (1881). See also Trustees
tions are not contracts, but ordinary acts of v. Tatman, 13 Ill. 30; New Orleans v.
legislation, and the powers they confer are Hoyle, 23 La. An. 740.
VOL. I. -7
98
§ 57
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
such representing special rights of the community that is incorpo-
rated, are within the operation or protection of the usual constitu-
tional restraints upon legislative power. The present chapter will
be devoted to a consideration of this subject. In dealing with
questions of this delicate and complex nature we must beware of
broad propositions, and avoid general speculations. The only wise
and safe course is to keep near the shore and within the light of
actual adjudications, accompanying these with such observations as
seem to be required. The extent of the authority of the legislature
over public corporations is strikingly illustrated by an important
case decided by the court of appeals in the State of Maryland. The
legislature in incorporating a railroad company made it its duty to
locate its road through three towns specially named, and provided
that if it failed to do so, “then and in that case said company shall
forfeit $1,000,000 to the State of Maryland for the use of Washing-
ton County." The action was instituted for the benefit of the county
to recover the $1,000,000, it being alleged that the defendant had
not constructed its road in the manner required. The defendant
pleaded that since the last continuance of the cause the legislature
had passed an act repealing that portion of the charter of the com-
pany requiring it to build its road through those towns, and specially
remitting and releasing the forfeiture of $1,000,000. The leading
question, which was argued on either side by distinguished counsel,
was, whether the provision in favor of the county was one of con-
tract (the railroad company having assented to the act), and hence
claimed to be inviolable by legislative interference, or whether it
was one of penalty and therefore subject to unlimited legislative
control. The court held the latter view to be the true one, and that
the defendant was not liable. The court also expressed the opinion
that if it should be treated as a contract made by the State, yet it was
a contract for the benefit of one of its counties, to which the money,
if collected, would belong in its political and public capacity as part
of the State; and that such a contract did not come within the
meaning of that provision of the national Constitution which pro-
hibits a State from impairing the obligation of a contract, so as to
prevent the legislature from releasing it at pleasure or discontinuing
an action brought for its enforcement in the name of the State.1
1 State v. Railroad Co., 12 Gill & would have applied, if the forfeiture had,
Johns. (Md.) 399 (1842). Afirmed on in such a case, been to a city or municipal
3 How. (U. S.) 534 (1844); C. & corporation. Infra, sec. 61.
A. R. R. Co. 0. Adler, 56 Ill. 344 (1870). A public corporation has no vested right
Although the forfeiture in the case men- to fines directed to be paid to it, and the
tioned in the text was to the county (a legislature may release them. No con-
public corporation), the same doctrine tract in such cases is thereby violated, for
1
error.
$ 58
99
OFFICES AND OFFICERS.
§ 58 (33). Offices and Officers; Municipal Officers defined;
Mode of Appointment. - Questions have arisen under special Consti-
tutional provisions respecting the authority of the legislature over
municipal offices and officers, And here it is important to bear in
mind the before mentioned distinction between State officers - that
is, officers whose duties concern the State at large, or the general
public although exercised within defined territorial limits -- and
municipal officers, whose functions relate exclusively to local con-
cerns of the particular municipality. The administration of justice,
the preservation of the public peace, and the like, although confided
to local agencies, are essentially matters of public concern; while the
enforcement of municipal by-laws proper, the establishment of gas-
works, of water-works, the construction of sewers, and the like, are
matters which pertain to the municipality as distinguished from the
State at large. The Constitution of Michigan enjoined upon the le-
gislature to “provide for the incorporation and organization of cities
and villages,” gave it authority to confer upon them such powers of
a local legislative and administrative character as it should deem
proper, and contained the further provision that “judicial officers of
cities and villages shall be elected, and all other [municipal] officers shall
be elected or appointed, at such time and in such manner as the legisla-
ture may direct "
direct”; and it was held by the Supreme Court of the State
in a cause that underwent great consideration, and in which the
judges delivered separate opinions, that while the legislature was left
free to appoint officers not municipal, — such, for example, as a board
of police commissioners in and for a city, - yet that it was restrained
by the above mentioned provisions, especially by the one last quoted,
from itself directly appointing municipal officers whose duties and
none exists. Coles v. Madison County, Mo. 370 (1876). See and compare People
Breese (111.), 115; Holliday v. People, 5 v. Lynch, 51 Cal. 15 (1875); s. c. 15 Am.
Gilm. (10 Ill.) 216; Conner v. Bent, 1 Mo. Rep. 677 ; Schumacher v. Toberman, 56
235; Rankin v. Beaird, Breese (Ill.), 123 ; Cal. 508. Opinion of McKinstry, J., and
post, sec. 62. Effect of executive pardon of Cooley, J., in People v. Detroit, 28
on fines going to county. Holliday v. Mich. 228 ; s. C. 15 Am. Rep. 202. Text
People, 5 Gilm. (10 III.) 216.
approved. Burch v. Hardwick, 30 Gratt.
1 People v. Hurlbut, 24 Mich. 44 24; U. S. v. Memphis, 97 U. S. 284.
(1871); s.c. 9 Am. Rep. 108. The distinc- Post, secs. 72, 74 a; People v. Curley, 5
tion mentioned in the text is there accu- Col. 412; State v. Hunter, 38 Kan.
rately drawn, and clearly stated and illus- 578 (metropolitan police act giving the
trated in the admirable opinion of Camp- city council power to appoint a board of
bell, C. J. It is approved and applied in police commissioners held constitutional);
Chicago v. Wright, 69 Ill. 326 (1873); infra, sec. 60 ; Hathaway v. New Balti-
People v. Draper, 15 N. Y. 543, Denio, more, 48 Mich. 251 ; State v. George, 23
J.; Re Woolsey, 95 N. Y. 135; Astor v. Fla. 585 (1887); ante, secs. 19, 22, 28.
New York, 62 N. Y. 567. The text is See chapter on Corporate Officers, post.
cited and applied in Britton v. Steber, 62
100
§ 58 a
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
authority were plainly and exclusively local, such as the board of
water commissioners and board of sewer commissioners for a partic-
ular city:
1
2
§ 58 a. Same subject.
The Constitution of New York
pro-
vides that municipal officers shall be elected by the electors of the muni-
cipality, or appointed by the authorities thereof. The purpose of this
provision is to secure to the political and municipal divisions of the
State the right of local self-government, and to prevent the legislature
from depriving the inhabitants of the several counties, cities, towns,
and villages of the right to choose their officers.3 The Supreme
Court of Indiana has sustained the right of local self-government
1 People v. Hurlbut, supru, distin-
2 Art. x. sec. 2.
guished from People v. Mahaney, 13 Mich. 8 People v. Albertson, 55 N. Y. 50
481 ; ante, sec. 9, and notes. In People (1873), criticising People v. Draper, 15
v. Detroit, 28 Mich. 228 (1873) ; s. C. 15 N. Y. 532; and People v. Shepherd, 36
Am. Rep., The People v. Hurlbut is ex- N. Y. 285; People v. Bull, 46 N. Y. 57 ;
plained, and its doctrine adhered to, and People v. McKinney, 52 N.Y. 374 (1873),
it was held that the board of Park Com- overruling People v. Batchelor, 22 N. Y.
missioners for Detroit, selected by the 128. And see People v. Palmer, 52 N. Y.
legislature without its consent, were not 83 (1873); People v.
83 (1873); People v. Clute, 50 N. Y. 451
the officers or representatives of the city. (1872); ante, sec. 9, and note. The legisla-
Infra, secs. 72–74 a. So, under the Con- ture may, notwithstanding the constitu-
stitution of Kentucky, which contains a tional provision mentioned in the text
provision that “officers of towns and cities and others, provide for the improvement
shall be clected for such terms, and in such of city streets through commissioners ap-
manner, and with such qualifications, as pointed by legislative act, instead of be-
may be prescribed by law," and 'shall ing chosen by the municipal authorities.
reside within their respective districts," it Rc Woolsey, 95 N. Y. 135 ; Astor v. New
was held that the legislature could not York, 62 N. Y. 567. Infra, sec. 74, note.
authorize the governor to appoint municipal It is otherwise under the Constitution of
officers, since the Constitution requires that California. People v. Lynch, 51 Cal. 15;
they shall be elected by the voters of the Schumacher v. Toberman, 56 Cal. 508.
town or city : Speed v. Crawford, 3 Met. Concerning the general inquiry how far
(Ky.) 207 (1860); but it was also likewise right of local government and municipal
lield that it was within the power of self-regulation, including the right of the
the legislature to pass an act depriv. · local citizens to select local officers, is rooted
ing the mayor and council of a desig- in our American Constitutions, the reader
nated city of the power to elect the police will find the opinion of Cooley, J., in the
force thereof, and establishing, instead, a People v. Detroit, 28 Mich. 228 (1873);
board of police for the city and the county S. C. 15 Am. Rep. 202, in connection with
in which the city was situate, to be elected the opinions in The People v. Hurlbut, 24
by the qualified voters of the city and Mich. 44 (1871) ; s. c. 9 Am. Rep. 103,
,
county, and that this board, thus elected, highly instructive. See ante, chap. i.
should select and enroll the permanent where the subject is viewed in its general
police force of the city, which, it was pro- historical aspects. In Indiana, see State v.
vided should be taxed to pay them. Denny (two cases), 21 Northeastern Rep.
Police Commissioners · 2. Louisville, 3 252 and 274 ; Evansville v. State, 21
Bush (Ky.), 597 (1868). See Richmond Northeastern Rep. 267. Post, secs. 72–
Mayoralty Case, 19 Gratt. (Va.) 673.
Infra, secs. 60, 72–74 a.
74 a.
$ 59
101
OFFICES AND OFFICERS.
in that State in opinions of marked ability, vigor, and learning,
which hold to be unconstitutional two acts of the legislature
which deprived certain classes of municipalities of the usual
rights of municipal control and local regulation. It has elsewhere
been held, however, that administrative agencies and officers, such
as police boards, and even boards of water commissioners, park com-
missioners, &c.; may, in the absence of special constitutional limita-
tion, be authorized by the legislature to assist in local or municipal
administration,
§ 59. Same subject. — Recognizing and applying the distinction
in the preceding section between State officers and municipal officers,
the Supreme Court of Missouri held that the mayor of a city was not
an officer under the State, within the meaning of a constitutional pro-
vision, giving the Supreme Court jurisdiction only when title to an
office under the State is in contest.3
1 In The State v. Denny (Ind. 1889), of the property of the city used in them,
21 Northeastern Rep. 252, an act of the as well as of the purchase of supplies for
legislature creating a board of public works them. It was held void as being an at-
and affairs for cities having 50,000 inhab- tempt to deprive the people of the cities
itants, to consist of three members selected affected by the act of the right of local
from the two leading political parties, and self-government. Ante, secs. 9, 11, 45,
to be appointed by the legislature, and giv- and note; post, sec. 183.
ing to such board exclusive power and 2 County Court v. Griswold, 58 Mo. 175,
jurisdiction over streets, alleys, sewers, 198 (1874); People v. Draper, 15 N. Y.
water supply, and lights, was held uncon- 532 ; Daily v. St. Paul, 7 Minn. 390,
stitutional, as infringing the right of local following People v. Draper. See People v.
self-government vested in the people of Albertson, 55 N. Y. 50 (1873), where Peo-
such cities. In Evansville v. State (Ind. ple v. Draper is questioned and dis-
1889), 21 Northeastern Rep. 267, and The tinguished. State v. Valle, 41 Mo. 29 ;
State v. Denny, Mayor, Ib. 274, an act State v. St. Louis County Court, 34 Mo.
creating metropolitan police and fire boards 546. Limitations on the right suggested.
for cities having over 29,000 inhabitants, People v. Detroit, 28 Mich. 228 (1873 );
provided that no persons should be eligible S. C. 15 Am. Rep. 202.
as commissioners of the police board un- 8 Britton v. Steber, 62 Mo. 370 (1876).
less they had resided in the respective A State officer may be connected with
cities for five years, and that the officers some of the municipal functions, but he
and employees of the police board should must derive his powers from a State stat-
be selected from the two leading political ute, and execute his powers in obedience
parties. It was held that these provisions to a State law. State 2. Valle, 41 Mo, 29.
as to residence and politics were repugnant Aldermen and common councilmen are
to Art. 1, sec. 23 of the Constitution of considered « civil officers' within the
Indiana, prohibiting the legislature from meaning of the provisions of the Constitu-
granting to any citizen or class of citizens tion of Rhode Island relating to the quali-
privileges or immunities which, upon the fications of voters. In re The Newport
same terms, shall not belong equally to all Charter, 14 R. I. 655. Water committee
citizens. The act also gave to the boards, with statute authority to construct and
whose members were to be selected by the manage the water-works of a city, was
legislature, supreme and exclusive control held to be agents, and not "officers,'
over the fire and police departments, and within the meaning of the constitutional
102
§ 60
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
.
§ 60 (34). Same subject. Police Officers ; Mode of Appoint-
ment. — And it has been several times determined that the legisla-
ure may, unless specially restricted in the Constitution, take from a
municipal corporation its charter powers respecting the police and their
appointment, and by statute itself directly provide for a permanent
police for the corporation, under the control of a board of police not
appointed or elected by the corporate authorities, but consisting of
commissioners named and appointed by the legislature. Police of-
ficers are in fact State or public officers, and not private or cor-
porate officers. And a provision in such a law, transferring to such
commissioners, for the purposes of the new police, the use of the
police-telegraph, station-houses, watch-boxes, &c., provided by the
corporation, is valid since it only takes city property dedicated to a
particular use and applies it to the same purpose, changing only
the agency by which the use is directed; the property is still the
city's.
provision that the legislature “shall not
"shall not and People v. Shepherd, 36 N. Y. 287, is
create any office, the term of which shall doubted ; People v. McDonald, 69 N. Y.
be longer than four years." But a provi. 362 (1877); People v. Detroit, 28 Mich.
sion in the Constitution of Connecticut 228, 236; People v.
228, 236 ; People v. Chicago, 51 Ill. 17.
prohibiting an increase of the compensa. Text approved. Burch v. Hardwick, 30
tion of any public officer during his term, is Gratt. 24; Police Comm’rs v. Louis-
violated by a resolution of the common ville, 3 Bush, 597 ; Diamond v. Cain, 21
council to pay compensation to a com- La. An. 309 (1869); State v. Leovy, 21 La.
mittee of the council who were entitled to An. 538 ; ante, sec. 58 n. The cases concur
no salary, for customary services rendered in holding that police officers are, in fact,
during the year. Garvie v. Hartford, 54 State officers and not municipal, although
Conn. 440 ; David v. Portland Water a particular city or town be taxed to pay
Committee, 14 Oreg. 98.
them. Post, sec. 210,and chap. xxiii. Cooley,
1 Baltimore v. Board of Police (affirm. Taxation (2d ed.), 681. An act which
ing validity to the Baltimore Police Bill), makes the mayor and aldermen of a cor-
15 Md. 376 (1859). There is nothing in poration commissioners of the court-house
the maxim that “Taxation and represen- and jail may be repealed by the legisla-
tation go together," that can preclude the ture, and these buildings placed under the
legislature from establishing in a city a control of county or other officers. State
metropolitan police board, with power to v. Mayor, R. M. Charlt. (Ga.) 250 ; see also
estimate the expenses of the police, and State v. Dews, R. M. Charlt. 397. A grant
compelling the city authorities to raise by to a city to aid in building a court-house, and
taxation the amount so estimated. Every for educational purposes, is subject, until
city is represented in the State legislature; executed, to legislative resumption and
and it is for that body to determine how control. Bass v. Fontleroy, 11 Texas,
much power shall be conferred by the 698. In the absence of constitutional re-
municipal charters which it grants. Peo- striction the
striction the legislature
legislature may directly
ple v. Mahaney, 13 Mich. 481; see also appoint officers to act within the munici-
same principle, People v. Draper, 15 N. pality. Hudson, &c. Co. v. Seymour
Y. 532 (1857), where the act to establish (highway commissioners), 6 Vroom, 35 N.
the metropolitan police district was held J. L. 47. Many of the recent Constitu-
constitutional. But see People v. Albert- tions contain prohibitions against such
son, 55 N. Y. 50 (1873), where People v. appointments. See for example Const. of
Draper is questioned and distinguished, California 1879, Art. xi. secs. 12–14.
$ 61
103
OFFICES AND OFFICERS.
$ 61.
Same subject. — Mode of Payment. In the absence of
special constitutional restriction it is competent likewise to the legis-
lature of a State to enact that the county shall pay a portion of the
expenses of a police force in a city situated wholly within, and forming
part of the county. Police officers really execute public or State as
distinguished from corporate duties. It may even direct a county
to appropriate part of its revenue already collected in this way,
since such legislation is not unconstitutional, as being retrospective
in its operation, or as taking away vested rights, or impairing the
obligation of contracts, or violating the principles of taxation. As
moneys acquired by taxation are not strictly the private property
of the county, such legislation is not the application of private prop-
erty to public use without compensation, since the police board, by
virtue of the act creating it, was an agency of the State government
and performed public duties.1 Such is the legislative power over
counties and their property paid for by taxation that the General
Assembly may constitutionally enact a law to take railroad stock
from the county after it has been subscribed and paid for out of
funds raised by taxation, and transfer it to those from whom the
money was collected, and, in the event they do not apply for it, to
vest it in townships for school purposes.?
Infra, sec. 74 a. So held in Indiana. State be committed to the corporate authorities
v. Denny, 21 Northeastern Rep. 252 ; Ev- of a municipality, and if there are no
ansville v. State, 16. 267 ; State v. Denny, special constitutional restrictions on the
Ib. 274.
power of the legislature, it may authorize
The management and mode of electing the assessment of a tax upon the keepers
trustees of an incorporated academy, which of saloons and restaurants in the munici-
is endowed entirely by the State, may be 'pality for the purpose of maintaining such
changed by the legislature at its pleasure. police force therein, to be levied and col-
Dart v. Houston, 22 Ga. 506 ; see also lected as other taxes. Durach's Appeal,
University of North Carolina v. Maultsby, 62 Pa. St. 491 (1869) ; post, secs. 746, 750,
8 Ired. Eq. 257 ; University of Alabama v. 793 ; Railroad Co. v. Adler, 56 Ill. 344
Winston, 5 Stew. & Port. 17 ; Louisville (1870).
v. University of Louisville, 15 B. Mon. School districts being public corpora-
645 ; Visitors, &c. v. State, 15 Md. 330; tions, under legislative control, a law pro-
Regents v. McConnell, 5 Neb. 423 (1877). viding that school debts may be paid in
I State, ex rel. St. Louis Police Com- bills of the State bank of the State, is valid
m’rs v. St. Louis County Court (man- as against the objection that the legisla-
damus), 34 Mo. 546 (1864); contra, Mayor, ture had no power to direct that anything
&c. v. Tows, 5 Sneed (Tenn.), 186. The except gold and silver should be received
view of the Supreme Court of Missouri is in payment of debts. Bush v. Shipman,
undoubtedly the correct one. Approved. 4 Scam. (5 Ill.) 190.
St. Louis v. Shields, 52 Mo. 351 (1873); A municipal corporation may constitu-
People v. Morris, 13 Wend. 325; Sangamon tionally be exempted from prospective
Co. v. Springfield, 63 Ill. 66 ; Weymouth, liability for non-feasance of its officers or
&c. Fire Dist. v. County Comm’rs, 108 liability for torts. Gray v. Brooklyn, 10
Mass. 142; Stilz v. Indianapolis, 55 Ind. 515. Abb. Pr. R. N. S. 186; post, chap. xxiii.
The maintenance of a police force may 2 Lucas v. Tippecanoe Co., 44 Ind. 524
104
§ 62
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
§ 62 (35). Legislative Power over Revenues. The legitimate
authority of the legislature over municipal corporations extends to
making provisions concerning their funds and revenues, and the au-
thority is not abridged because the purpose to which the revenue is
to be appropriated is specified in the charter; and the ground of the
doctrine is that such corporations have no vested rights in powers
conferred upon them for civil, political, or administrative purposes.
Thus, the legislature may repeal the power it had given to cities to
grant licenses for the sale of intoxicating liquors, although the
money to be derived from the sale of such licenses was directed to
be appropriated to the support of paupers within the city. Such
an authority, it was remarked, “gives the city no more a vested
right to issue licenses, because the legislature specified the objects
to which the money should be applied, than if it had been put into
the general fund of the city.” 3
(1873); Downey, Worden, and Osborn, JJ., 93 U. S. 116 (1876); People v. Super-
concurring, Buskirk and Pettit, JJ., dis- visors, 50 Cal. 561 ; People v. Power, 25
senting. The opinions are elaborate, and Ill. 187 ; Richmond v. Richmond, &c.
refer to the leading authorities on the Railroad Co., 21 Gratt. (Va.) 604 (1872),
subject. The dissenting judges consider holding that the State may exempt property
Spaulding v. Andover, then recently de- from municipal taxation. By the charter
cided by the Supreme Court of New of a municipal corporation there was
Hampshire, as strongly sustaining their granted to it sole power to grant licenses
views. In the Board of Comm’rs of Tip to sell spirituous liquors within its limits,
pecanoe County v. Lucas, Treasurer, the and to appropriate the money arising
Supreme Court of the United States, 93 therefrom to city purposes. Subsequently
U. S. 108 (1876), was of the opinion, as the legislature passed an act directing the
counties were mere agencies of government money thus raised to be paid by the cor-
whose powers may be changed at pleasure, poration to an academy located within the
that revenues raised by taxation, although town. Tho municipal corporation refused
levied for specific public purposes, are so to pay over to the academy an amount re-
far subject to the legislature that it may ceived for licenses after the passage of the
direct them to be applied to other uses of last-named act, and the academy brought
the municipality; and, therefore, that it an action to recover it. The court held
was competent for the legislature to direct the subsequent act to be unconstitutional,
restitution to the taxpayer of property ex- and that the town was not liable. The
acted from him by taxation in whatever court were of opinion, that, by its charter,
form the property may have been changed, the town had a vested right in the profits
so long as it remained in the possession of arising from licenses. It admitted that
the municipality
the legislature might altogether take away
1 Ante, secs. 57, 60, 61, and notes. from the town the power to grant licenses ;
2 Gutzweller v. People, 14 Ill. 142 but if it allowed the power to remain, it
(1852); ante, sec. 54, note.
denied the right of the legislature "to
8 Gutzweller v. People, 14 Ill. 142, make a different disposition of the funds
(1852), per Caton, J. See, also, Richland arising from such licenses from that con-
Co. v. Lawrence Co., 12 Ill. 1 (1850); tained in the charter, unless with the con-
adhered to, Sangamon Co. v. Springfield, sent of the corporation." Trustees of
63 Ill. 71 (1872) ; Spaulding v. Andover Aberdeen Academy v. Aberdeen, 13 Sm. &
(full discussion by Foster, J.), 54 N. H. M.(21 Miss.) 645 (1850). See, also, Aber-
38 (1871); Home Ins. Co. r. City Council, len v, Saunderson, 8 Sm. & M. 663. The
1
§ 63
105
LEGISLATIVE POWER OVER MUNICIPAL CHARTERS.
§ 63 (36). Legislative Power over Municipal Charters. Legisla-
tive acts respecting the political and governmental powers of muni-
cipal corporations not being in the nature of contracts, the provisions
thereof may be changed at pleasure where the constitutional rights
of creditors and others are not invaded. By act of the legislature
the separate city of Lafayette was added to and incorporated with
the city of New Orleans, with a provision that the added district,
which was less in debt than the city of New Orleans, should be
charged only with its own debts; and by a subsequent act of the
legislature it was provided that taxes should be equal and uniform
throughout the entire limits of the city; the effect of which was to
increase the amount of taxes to be raised within that portion of the
corporation which was formerly the city of Lafayette. A bill was
filed by residents and property owners of the annexed district to
enjoin the collection of the excess of taxes beyond the amount fixed
by the act incorporating the annexed district into the “old city,”
claiming that the act was a contract, and the levy of taxes under the
latter act, so far as regards debts due antecedently to the annexation,
violated the vested rights of the inhabitants of the annexed district.
The Supreme Court, on the ground that public corporations are
wholly under the control of the legislature, which has the power to
provide in what manner taxes shall be levied for their support, and
how their debts shall be paid on their dissolution, held the act au-
thorizing increased taxation to be valid, and dismissed the bill.2 So
doctrine that the town corporation had a v. Board, &c., 44 Ind. 524); Indianapolis
vested right in profits arising froin licen- v. Indianapolis Hone, &c., 50 Ind. 215
ses cannot, we think, be sustained, and (1875).
is not in harmony with the decisions 1 Smith v. Inge, 80 Ala. 283. Rights
elsewhere. Indianapolis v. Indianapolis of creditors of municipal corporations,
Home, &c., 50 Ind. 215 (1875).
see post, sec. 68 a, chaps. vii. viii., and xiv.
City, county, and township funds are As to constitutional rights of creditors,
under legislative control. · County v. State, mortgagees, contractors with and share.
11 Ill. 202 ; County v. County, 12 Ill. 1; holders, of private corporations, as against
Dennis v. Maynard, 15 Ill. 477 ; Love v. the legislative power of the State, see opin-
Schenck, 12 Ired. Law, 304 ; Love v. Ram- ion Ruger, C. J., in People v. O'Brien, 1888,
sour, Ib. 328 ; Youngs v. Hall, 9 Nev. 212 known as the Broadway Surface Railway
(1874); People v. Ingersoll, 58 N. Y. 1;
Ingersoll, 58 N. Y. l; Case, 111 N. Y. 1. In.fra, sec. 68 a.
People v. Fields, 58 N. Y. 491 (1874); 2 Layton v. New Orleans, 12 La. An.
Home Ins. Co. v. City Council, 93 U. S. 515 (1857). See, also, Girard v. Philadel-
116 (1876); ante, sec. 57, note ; Indian- phia, 7 Wall. 1 (1868); People v. Hill, 7
apolis v. Indianapolis Home, &c., 50 Ind. Cal. 97 (1857); post, chap. viii. ; State v.
215 (1875). The Indianapolis Home for Flanders, 24 La. An. 57; U. S., ex rel.
Friendless Women is so far a public cor- Brown v. Memphis, 97 U. S., 300 ; Vance
poration or institution, that an appropria- v. Little Rock, 30 Ark. 435, 439 ; Haw-
tion by the legislature of fines, collected kins v. Jonesboro, 63 Ga. 527 ; Sedgwick
for the violation of certain city ordinances, Co. v. Bailey, 11 Kan. 631 (1873); San
to its support, is not the appropriation Francisco v. Canavan, 42 Cal. 541 (1872).
of money to a private purpose (Lucas A statute extinguishing one corporation
106
61
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
§
where, after a contract for paving streets had been made, but before
it was fully executed, certain wards were added to the city in which
wards, however, no part of the paving was ever done), and no pro-
vision as to the debts of the corporation was made in the act of
annexation, it was held that the legislature might afterwards consti-
tutionally enact, as against the contractor, that the people within
the wards thus added should not be taxed to pay any part of the debt
of the city contracted prior to the passage of the act by which they
were brought within the limits of the corporation. And the same
principle was asserted by the Supreme Court of the United States,
which held to be valid a legislative act by which the city of Carroll-
ton was annexed to New Orleans, with a provision that the latter
city should succeed to all the rights and property, and assume and
pay all of the debts of the former,2
§ 64 (37). Same subject. — The power of the legislature to alter
and abolish municipal corporations, to erect new corporations in the
place of the old, to add to the old, or to carve out of the old a new
corporation, or the power to divide and dispose of the property held
by such corporations for municipal purposes, is not defeated or
affected by the circumstance that the corporation is, by its charter,
made the trustee of a charity, or of other private rights and interests.
Where the legal existence of the municipal trustee is destroyed by
legislative act, the Court of Chancery will assume the execution of
the trust, and, if necessary, will appoint new trustees to take charge
of the property and carry into effect the trust.3
and throwing its obligations on another sessment for public use, and enforceable as
raises an implied promise on the part of such, says : “But such is not this case.
the successor to pay the same.
Little v. There is no principle that I am
Union Township Committee, 40 N. J. L. aware of which sanctions the doctrine
397. Post, secs. 170, 186-189.
that it is within the taxing power of the
i United States, ex rel. Brown v. Mem- legislature to compel one town, city, or lo-
phis, 97 U. S. 300 (1877). Further as cality to contribute to the payment of the
to effect of dissolution and of change of debts of another. The government has 110
boundaries, see post, sec. 68 c; chaps. vii. such authority, and this case is entirely
and viii. In town of Flatbush, In re, 60 without a precedent. If such assessments
N. Y. 398 (1875), the court of appeals ex- were authorized they might not be limited
pressed the opinion that it was beyond to adjoining towns, cities, or villages, but
the competency of the legislature to assess applied to those located at great distances
lands in the town of Flatbush to pay debts from each other. Such legislation would
previously incurred by the adjoining city be unjust, mischievous, and oppressive,
of Brooklyn under prior acts for a park, and cannot be tolerated.
although the portion of the park was 2 New Orleans v. Clark, 95 U. S. 644
carved out of the corporate limits of (1877). Such legislation is not within
Flatbush. Miller, J., after stating that the prohibition of the State Constitution
had an original assessment for benefits against the passage of retroactive law's. Ib.
been made it might be said to be an as- 8 Girard v. Philadelphia, 7 Wall. 1
.
$ 66
107
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE RIGHTS.
$65 (38). Legislative Power not wholly Unlimited. --The suprem-
acy of the legislative authority over municipal corporations is not,
however, in all respects, unlimited ; but the limitations must be sought
either in the national or State Constitution; and except as there
found, in terms or by fair implication, they do not exist. In Eng-
land it is settled that the Crown has no power, without the consent
of those to be affected thereby, to alter or abolish municipal charters,
or to impose new ones on the corporation. But Parliament may
create new corporations, or abolish or alter charters, or impose new
ones, at its will, and without the consent of the inhabitants. And
so may the State legislatures in this country, if there be no consti-
tutional restriction upon the power.1
§ 66 (39). Public and Private or Proprietary Rights distinguished.
- It assists to an understanding of the extent of legislative power
over municipal corporations proper (incorporated towns and cities) to
observe that these, as ordinarily constituted, possess a double charac-
ter: the one governmental, legislative, or public; the other, in a sense,
proprietary or private. The distinction between these, though some-
times difficult to trace, is highly important, and is frequently re-
ferred to, particularly in the cases relating to the implied or common-
law liability of municipal corporations for the negligence of their
servants, agents, or officers in the execution of corporate duties and
powers. On this distinction, indeed, rests the doctrine of such im-
plied liability. In its governmental or public character, the corpora-
Text ap-
(1868); Meriwether v. Garrett, 102 U. S. courts, arose between the prerogative of
472, 528 (1880); Philadelphia v. Fox, 64 the crown and the corporation. The right
Pa. St. 169 (1870); infrat, secs. 74 a, 80, or power of parliament in England, or of
DIontpelier v. East Montpelier (division of the legislature here, would present (and
town, and contest as to trust property held was decided to present) quite a different
for the benefit of the inhabitants of the question." Per Nelson, J., in People v.
original township), 29 Vt. (3 Wms.) 12 Morris, 13 Wend. 325, 334 (1835) ; Phila-
(1856); same controversy at law, 27 Vt. delphia v. Field, 58 Pa. St. 320 (1868);
704. · See infra, sec. 80, and chapters on Hudson County v. Seymour, 6 Vroom
Corporate Property and Remedies against (35 N. J. L.), 47 ; People v. Bennett, 29
Illegal Corporate Acts, post.
Mich. 451 (1874); S. C. 18 Am. Rep. 107;
proved. Luehrman v. Tax. Dist., 2 Lea Austin v. Coggeshall, 12 R. I. 329, citing
(Tenn.), 425; Ellerman v. McMains, 30 and approving text.
La. An. 190 ; infra, sec. 68 ; Cincinnati v. 2 Ante, secs. 22, 25, 28. " The dis-
Cameron, 33 Ohio St. 336.
tinctiou is well established between the
1 St. Louis v. Allen (extension of city responsibilities of towns and cities for acts
limits), 13 Mo. 400 (1850); St. Louis v. done in their public capacity, in the dis-
Russell, 9 Mo. 503 (1845). Ante, sec. 54. charge of duties imposed on them by the
It is justly observed, that “most, if not legislature for the public benefit, and for
all, of the leading cases in the books, in- acts done in what may be called their pri-
volving the question of the inviolability vate character, in the inanagement of prop-
of municipal charters, in the English erty and rights voluntarily held by them
108
§ 66
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
tion is made, by the State, one of its instruments, or the local
depositary of certain limited and prescribed political powers, to be
exercised for the public good on behalf of the State rather than for
itself. In this respect it is assimilated, in its nature and functions,
to a county corporation, which, as we have seen, is purely part of
the governmental machinery of the sovereignty which creates it.
Over all its civil, political, or governmental powers, the authority
of the legislature is, in the nature of things, supreme and without
limitation, unless the limitation is found in the Constitution of the
particular State But in its proprietary or private character, the
theory is that the powers are supposed not to be conferred, pri-
marily or chiefly, from considerations connected with the govern-
ment of the State at large, but for the private advantage of the
compact community which is incorporated as a distinct legal per-
sonality or corporate individual; and as to such powers, and to
property acquired thereunder, and contracts made with reference
thereto, the corporation is to be regarded quo ad hoc as a private
corporation, or at least not public in the sense that the power of
the legislature over it or the rights represented by it, is omnipotent.
for their own immediate profit or advan- Western College v. Cleveland, 12 Ohio
tage, as a corporation, although inuring, St. 375 (1861); Howe r. New Orleans, 12
of course, ultimately to the benefit of the La. An. 481 ; Martin v. Mayor, &c., 1
public.” Per Gray, J., in Oliver v. Wor- Hill, 545; Buttrick v. Lowell, 1 Allen,
cester, 102 Mass. 489, 499 (1869) ; S. P. 172 ; Oliver v. Worcester, 102 Mass. 489
Detroit v. Corey, 9 Mich. 165, 184 (1861); (1869) ; Touchard v. Touchard, 5 Cal. 306 ;
Hill v. Boston, 122 Mass, 344, 359 ; S. C. Gas Co. v. San Francisco, 9 Cal. 453
23 Am. Rep. 332. In the one case, no
Commissioners v. Duckett, 20 Md. 468 ;
private action lies unless it be expressly Weet v. Brockport, 16 N. Y. 161, note;
given ; in the other, there is an implied or Louisville v. University of Louisville, 15
common-law liability for the negligence of B. Mon. 642 ; Louisville v. Common-
their officers in the discharge of such du- wealth, 1 Duvall (Ky.), 295 ; Weightman
ties. In further illustration of this dual v. Washington, 1 Black (U. S.), 39 (1861);
character, the reader is referred to the Reading v. Commonwealth, 11 Pa. St.
cases cited in the next note. See reference 196 (1849) ; Richmond v. Long's Admr.,
to this section of the text in Spaulding v. 17 Gratt. (Va.) 375 ; De Voss v. Rich-
Andover, 54 N. H. 38, 54 (1873); and in mond, 18 Gratt. 338; s. C. 7 Am.. Law
Meriwether v. Garrett, 102 U. S. 528; Reg. (N. s.) 589; New Orleans, &c. R.
post, secs. 72-74 a, and chap. xxiii., and R. Co. v. New Orleans, 26 La. An. 478;
S. C. Ib. 517 (1874); Askew v. Hale Co.,
1 West Sav. Fund Soc. v. Philadel- 54 Ala. 639 ; Detroit v. Corey, 9 Mich. 165,
phia, 31 Pa. St. 175; Ib. 185; Bailey v. 184 (1861); People v. Hurlbut, 24 Mich.
Mayor, &c. of New York, 3 Hill, 531; 44 (1871), opinion of Cooley, J. ; S. C. 9
People v. Fields, 58 N. Y. 491 ; People v. Am. Rep. 103; People v. Detroit, 28
Ingersoll, 58 N. Y. 1 (1874); Maxmillian Mich. 228 (1873) ; s. C. 15 Am. Rep. 202.
V. Mayor, &c. of New York, 62 N. Y. In re Malone's Estate, 21 S. C. 435. As
160 (1875); People v. Briggs, 50 N. Y. to what are municipal duties, and what
553, 560 (1872) ; Nichol v. Nashville, 9 falls within the scope of municipal powers,
Humph. 252 ; Small v. Danville, 51 Me. see United States v. Baltimore & Ohio
359; Jones v. New Haven, 34 Conn. 1; Railroad Co., 17 Wall. 332 (1872); post,
;
cases.
§ 67
109
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE RIGHTS.
§ 67. Same subject. — This division of the powers of a municipal
corporation into two classes, one public and the other private, has
been before alluded to, and is well established, but the private char-
acter thus ascribed to such powers it is difficult exactly to define.
It is easy to understand that if under the exercise of lawful powers
by the authority of the legislature, property has been acquired by a
municipality, such property may not be subject to legislative appro-
priation to uses distinctly foreign to the interests of the munici-
pality; but in what sense are powers conferred and to be exercised
for the good of all the people of the place private ? Wherein do
such powers, in their origin or nature, differ from those admitted to
be public ? Are not all powers conferred upon municipalities,
whether many or few, given, and given only, for their better regula-
tion and government, and to promote their welfare as parts of the
Commonwealth? The small municipality, with few and simple
powers, is no more completely under the supreme dominion of the
legislature than the more populous one, requiring for its proper
government organs and powers peculiar to itself. Are the latter,
therefore, private? If so, it must be in a qualified and peculiar
sense. Contracts in favor of the creditor are protected by the
national Constitution; but as against a State, the difficulty is to find
a logical and sound basis on which to rest private rights in favor of
a municipality, if, under the Constitution of the particular State, it is
within the power of the State which breathed into it the breath of
life utterly to extinguish its existence at pleasure. The distinction
originated with the courts, to promote justice, and has been most
frequently applied to escape technical difficulties in order to hold
such corporations liable to private actions. The distinction, how-
sec. 775 et seq. ; Niles Water Works v. (1865), may be read with profit. The
Niles, 59 Mich. 311. On the ground that Chief-Justice there asserts the unlimited
legislation concerning municipal corpora- power of the legislature over municipal
tions is of a peculiar character on account corporations and their property. He main-
of their being agencies of the government, tains that such corporations are altogether
the Court of Appeals of Kentucky held public, and all their rights and powers
that a charter provision limiting the right public in their nature, and that their prop-
to bring actions to recover money improp- erty, though held for income or sale, and
erly paid for taxes to six months, when the unconnected with any use for the purposes
general statute of limitations allowed five of the municipal government, is under
years in such cases, was not unconstitu- the control of the legislature, and not
tional for granting a special privilege. within the provisions of the Constitution
Covington v. Hoadley, 83 Ky. 444. protecting private property. He denies
1 Ante, secs. 25, 26.
the correctness of the distinction taken in
2 Section approved in State, ex rel. v. Bailey v. The Mayor, &c. of New York, 3
Smith, 44 Ohio St. 348. On this subject Hill, 531, and other cases, between the
the opinion of Chief-Justice Denio, in public and private functions of city gov- .
Darlington v. Mayor, &c., 31 N. Y. 164 ernments, and maintains that, as respects
110
§ 68
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
ever, is generally recognized, and it may be invoked as the basis of
property rights in favor of the municipality which are not wholly
withdrawn from the protection that our Constitutions extend to
property
1
§ 68 (40). Same subject. - It is, perhaps, at present, impossible
to define with precision what limitations exist upon the power of the
legislature over municipal corporations, as ordinarily constituted. It
is practicable only to refer to the leading cases upon the subject, and
attempt to extract the principles upon which they rest.
It is decided that a grant by the legislature of the State to a town
of the right to establish a ferry is not in the nature of a contract;
hence the grant is repealable, and the corporation may constitu-
tionally be deprived of the franchise. So the powers conferred by
the legislature upon a municipality in respect of wharves and wharf-
age may be revoked by it at pleasure if it does not touch property
acquired by the municipality under the sanction of the legislature.3
An act conferring upon a municipal corporation a public trust, and
the State, all their powers and functions by Matthews, J., in Railroad Co. v. Eller-
are public. He affirms that the legisla- man, just cited (p. 172), “the municipal
ture may compel a municipal corporation body (of New Orleans] rightfully enjoys
to subinit to arbitration claims as to which over the subject [of wharves and wharf-
private corporations and natural persons age] is derived from the legislature. They
would be entitled by the Constitution to a are merely administrative, and may be re-
trial by jury. The opposite view is no- voked at any time, not touching, of course,
where more ably presented than by Camp- any property of the city actually acquired
bell, C. J., in The People v. Hurlbut, 24 in the course of administration. The sole
Mich. 44 (1871) ; s. C. 9 Am. Rep. 103, ground of the right of the city to collect
and by Cooley, J., in People v. Detroit, 28 wharfage at all is that it is a reasonable
Mich. 228 (1873); S. C. 15 Am. Rep. 202; compensation, which it is allowed by law
Gray v. Brooklyn, 10 Abb. Pr. Rep. N. S. to charge for the actual use of structures
186; post. chap. xxüi. See as to jury, provided at its expense for the conveni-
Dunsmore's Appeal, 52 Pa. St. 374. ence of vessels engaged in the navigation
Consult on this subject Plimpton v. Som- of the river. And while it may be true,
erset, 33 Vt. 283 (1860). See also chap- as was decided by the Supreme Court of
ters on? Yunicipal Courts, Property, and Louisiana, in Ellerman v. McMains (30
Ordinances, post.
La. An. pt. 1, 190), that the city cannot
1 See ante, sec. 30; post, secs. 68 and lawfully be required to permit the use of
note 68 a, 69, as to the rationale and its wharves, without compensation, on the
grounds of the distinction.
ground that they are private property, it
2 East Hartford v. Hartford Bridge Co., is equally true, as decided by the same
10 How. 511 (1850) ; s. C. 16 Conn, 149; court in City of New Orleans v. Wolmot
17 Conn. 79; Trustees v. Tatman, 13 Ill. (31 Ia. An: 65), that the city cannot for-
30 ; Police Jury v. Shreveport, 5 La. An. bid any water-craft from using the banks
661 (1850); Darlington v. Mayor, 31 of the navigable waters of the State for
N. Y. 164, 202, 203, per Denio, C. J. the purposes of navigation and commerce,
Post, secs. 114-116.
and cannot compel them to pay to it
8 Railroad Co. v. Ellerman, 105 U.S. wharfage except for the use of wharves of
166 (1881). •Whatever powers," says which it is the proprietor.” Post, chap.
the Supreme Court of the United States, ri. secs. 103-113.
§ 68
111
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE RIGHTS.
the title to land as ancillary to its execution, is not a contract, but
may be repealed at the will of the - legislature. But suppose the
legislature had granted in fee to the corporation a tract of land
within its limits, is such a grant, or is an ordinary grant of land to
the corporation from others, a contract as respects the State, and pro-
tected by the Constitution from legislative invasion, the same as if
the grant had been made to, or the property acquired by, an indi-
vidual or private corporation? The question thus stated has never
arisen directly for adjudication in the Supreme Court of the United
States; but, in the celebrated Dartmouth College Case, two of the
judges expressed the opinion that the legislative control over public
and municipal corporations was not so transcendent and absolute as
to extend to an arbitrary divestiture of its private property and the
destruction of rights of a private nature. On the other hand, it is
the opinion of a distinguished and able judge in New York, in a
case already mentioned, that the authority of the legislature over
the powers, rights, and property of municipal and public corpora-
tions, is, as respects the corporations, quite without limit. That
property acquired and owned by a municipal corporation by legisla-
tive consent is not subject to an unlimited power of the legislature
over it, is consonant with natural justice. The need of having
property and of property rights is one of the main reasons why
municipal corporations are created. This is strongly expressed by
Savigny in respect of municipal corporations in ancient Rome. If
a municipal corporation, as representing a distinct community, be re-
garded as a legal person, the legislature in effect says to it, “ You
may at your own expense acquire property;" and if it acts on such
People v. Vanderbilt, 26 N. Y. 287 the counties the legislature had entire
(1863); post, sec. 114. Where an act in control over the fund, and might resume
corporating a city donated lands included or change the purposes for which it was
therein for the erection of certain public originally designed to be expended, or
buildings, and the residue to be applied to provide for the payment by an old county,
education, and the charter was afterwards which had received, but not experted, its
repealed, it was held that until the trust proportion of such fund, to a new county
had been executed it was competent for the erected out of the old county, of an equita.
legislature to change or abolish it, and ble share of the fund. Richland County
that the repeal of the charter extinguished v. Lawrence County, 12 Ill. 1 (1850),
the trusts, they being public, unexecuted, distinguished from Hampshire v. Franklin,
and conditional. Bass v. Fontleroy, 11 16 Mass. 76. Post, chap. viii.
Tex. 698-708 (1854). Where an act of 2 Denio, C. J., in Darlington v. New
the legislature, instead of granting certain York, 31 N. Y. 164 (1865). See post,
moneys received by the State for the pur-
poses of internal improvements to certain 8 Savigny, Jural Relations (translated
counties absolutely, simply appropriated it by Rattigan). sec. 85. " Property Capacity
to be drawn by such counties and expended is the essential quality of a Juristical
by them in the improvement of roads, &c., Person," i. l., a corporation. Ib. secs.
it was held that before its expenditure by 86, 87.
1
sec. 68 a.
112
§ 68
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS,
1
permission, the courts may, perhaps, fairly deduce a contract that
the legislature, while it may regulate or change the uses of such
property, will not deprive the corporation of it. Accordingly, the
weight of opinion seems to be in favor of the doctrine that there may
be, in such corporations, rights under contracts and grants which
are beyond destruction by the legislature, though not beyond legiti-
mate legislative authority and control ;but in the present state of
1 In Richland County v. Lawrence Coun- respect, also, to public corporations, which
ty, 12 Ill. 1 (1850), while the plenary exist only for public purposes, such as
power of the legislature over the public, counties, towns, cities, &c., the legislature
civil, or political rights of public corpora- may, under proper limitations, have a
tions was asserted and declared, still it right to change, modify, enlarge, or re-
was admitted by the very able and cau- strain them, securing, however, the prop-
tious judge who delivered the opinion, that erty, for the uses of those for whom and
“the State may make a contract with, or at whose expense it was originally pur-
a grant to, a public municipal corporation chased." Followed by Chancellor Kent,
which it could not subsequently resuine ; 2 Com. 305 ; by Mr. Justice Washington,
but in such case the corporation is to be Dartmouth College Case, 4 Wheat. 518,
regarded as a private company." Per 663. In the last case, Mr. Justice Story
Trumbull, J. Sangamon Co. v. Spring- said : “But it will hardly be contended,
field, 63 lll. 66 (1872). See West Sav. that even in respect to such [public] cor-
Fund Society v. Philadelphia, 31 Pa. St. porations, the legislative power is so trans-
175; Ib. 185.
cendent that it may, at its will, take away
* But while the legislative power (to the private property of the corporation, or
enlarge, restrain, or even destroy munici- change the uses of its private funds ac-
pal corporations, as the public interest quired under the public faith.” 4 Wheat.
may require) may be exercised over public 518, 694, obiter. And such is Mr. Justice
and municipal corporations, it has as uni. Cooley's view in his valuable treatise,
formly been held that towns, and other Constitutional Limitations, 238. He re-
public corporations, may have private rights iterates it in his learned opinion in People
and interests vested in them under their v. Hurlbut, 24 Mich. 44 ; s. C. 6 Am. Law
charter; and as to those rights, they are to Rev. 376 (1871); S. C. 9 Am. Rep. 103,
be regarded and protected the same as if and also in his elaborate judgment in the
they were the rights and interests of indi- important case of The People v. Detroit,
viduals or of private corporations; and 28 Mich. 228 (1873); S. C. 15 Am. Rep.
grants of property in trust for other than 202 ; Detroit v. Detroit & Howell P. R.
corporate and municipal use (that is, as Co., 43 Mich. 140. In Grogan v. San
we understand, for private, as distin- Francisco, 18 Cal. 590, Mr. Chief-Justice
guished from public, purposes) are no Field, delivering the opinion of the Su-
more the subject of legislative control preme Court of California, takes the ground
than are the private and vested rights of that the real estate or private property of
individuals.' Per Isham, J., aryuendo, in a municipal corporation is protected by
Montpelier v. East Montpelier, 29 Vt. (3 the clause in the national Constitution
Wins.) 12, 19 (1856); S. C. 27 Vt. 704. securing the inviolability of contracts ;
Legislative grants of property to private, that all legislative authority over it must
and it seems, also, to public and municipal be exercised in subordination to this guar-
corporations, cannot be repealed so as to di- anty; and that it is subject to legislative
vest the rights of the grantees. Town of control to the same extent, but no greater
Pawlet v. Clark, 9 Cranch (U. S.), 292, extent, than all other property in the
336 (1815), per Story, J., obiter; Terret v. State. But in Darlington v. Mayor, &c.
Taylor, Ib. 43, 52. In this last case, Mr. of New York, 31 N. Y. 164, 193, 205,
Justice Story remarks, arguendo: • Ini Mr. Chief-Justice Denio observes : “ Let
"
$ 68
113
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE RIGHTS.
the decisions the point cannot fairly be said to be settled. It has
however been adjudged that the rights of the city of New York to
us suppose the city to be the owner of a
1 (1888), express the opinion that the pri-
parcel of land not adapted to any muni- vate property of municipalities and of
cipal use, but valuable only for sale to corporations is protected by the contract
private persons for building purposes, or clause of the Federal Constitution. Since
the like, no one, I think, can doubt but the opinion of Mr. Justice Field was
what it would be competent for the legis- given, the Fourteenth Amendment has
lature to direct it to be sold, and the pro- been adopted. It provides that no person
ceeds devoted to some municipal or other shall be deprived of property without due
public purpose, within the city, as a court- process of law, and the property rights of
house, a hospital, or the like. ... It is private corporations are held by the Su-
unnecessary to say whether the legislative preme Court of the United States to be
jurisdiction would extend to diverting the within the Amendment. A compact body
city property to other public use than of people, such, for example, as the city of
such as concerns the city and its inhabi. New York, have needs not common to the
tants.” And he considers the expression body of the State at large; hence, their
of Chancellor Kent (2 Com. 305) and of incorporation with a distinct capacity to
Mr. Justice Story, that where a municipal acquire and hold property for the use and
corporation is empowered to have and to benefit of this distinct body of people.
hold private property, such property is It is their property.
No reason sug.
invested with the security of other private gests itself to us why their ownership, as
rights, to mean only that it possesses such against a total diversion of use, is not
rights against wrong-doers, and not that protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.
it is exempt from legislative control. 31 See further, infra, secs. 68 A, 72, 73.
N. Y. 164, 196.
In two cases arising out of the Tweed
Let us consider this interesting subject frauds in New York, the conclusion was
a moment longer. The city of New York reached that, as between the State and
is the owner of valuable real property in the municipal corporation, the funds of
fee made by ancient grants, from which the corporation owned and held for the
it derives large revenues. No one denies public uses of the corporation are dis-
that the legislature may regulate or direct tinctively and exclusively the property of
the uses of this property, provided it is the corporation ; and the opinion was ex-
not diverted from the municipality or ap- pressed arguendo that such funds were
propriated to extra-municipal purposes. invested with the security of other private
But could the legislature require it to be property, subject to the plenary power of
sold and the proceeds given to the city of the legislature, as declared in Darlington
Albany, or covered into the State treas- v. Mayor, &c. suprat, to direct their appro-
ury ? The injustice of such an act is so priation to any use or purpose for the
striking that it suggests that it must be benefit of the municipality or its inhabi.
beyond the legislative power, even if there tants. People v. Ingersoll, 58 N. Y. 1
are no special limitations in the Constitu- (1874); People v. Fields, 58 N. Y. 491
tion. The text (sec. 68) states a ground (1874). The exact point, however, which
on which the denial of such a power in was adjudged in these cases is that, unless
the legislature can be rested. A chartered expressly given by statute, an action conlu
municipality is certainly a distinct legal not be maintained in the name of the State
personality ; and it is a familiar principle by the attorney-general, to recover a judg.
that property acquired by a corporation ment for moneys of the county and city
under its franchises is invested with all of New York, fraudulently taken by the
the attributes of property, although the defendants, as such right of action was
franchises of such corporation may be exclusively in the municipality, which was
absolutely subject to legislative control. the owner of moneys illegally appropriated.
Mr. Justice Field, supra, and Ruger, Post, chap. xxii.
C. J., in People v. O'Brien, 111 N. Y.
VOL. I. -8
11+
§ 68
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
real estate which it owns in fee simple absolute, under grants made to
it in its ancient charters, which grants were confirmed by the Con-
stitution of the State, are as indestructible by legislative act as are
the like property rights of citizens; and, applying this principle, it
was held, that the legislature had no authority to pass an act order-
ing the demolition of a reservoir, part of the water system of New
York, built by the city at the expense of its citizens, upon property
which it thus owned in fee simple and upon the demolition of such
reservoir further enacting that the lands covered by it, together with
other lands adjoining the same owned in like manner by the city,
should be converted into, and maintained as one of the public parks
of the city, except upon making compensation to the city therefor.1
1 Webb v. Mayor, &c. of New York, 64 all other cities, should have all their lib-
How. Pr. Rep. 10 (Supreme Court, special erties and free customs; and that no free-
term, 1882). In giving the judgment of man should be disseized of his freehold or
the court, Macomber, J., after observing liberties, or free customs, but by lawful
that the land in question was granted to judgment of his peers or by the law of the
the city in fee simple by the Dongan land. Corporate franchises in this coun-
charter in 1686, and was also substantially try rest on a basis which ought to be at
embraced in the Montgomerie charter of least as solid as Magna Charta, for they
1730, which was confirmed by the colonial are founded on grants which are contracts,
legislature in 1732, and by the Constitu- and “no State," says the Constitution of
tions of New York of 1777, 1821, and the United States, can pass any law
1846, says : “ The lands in question, impairing the obligation of contracts.'
therefore, are owned by the city in fee “I perceive," continues Macomber, J.,
simple absolute. (Citing Furman v. New no difference between the tenure of
York, 5 Sandf. (S. C.) 16 ; s. C. 10 N. Y. property thus held by the city and the
567.] If, therefore, the legislature has proprietary rights of natural persons or
undertaken by its acts to destroy the private corporations. This privilege, how-
property of this corporation, or to deprive ever, is peculiar in this State to the city
the city of its use, without just compen- of New York. [Not meaning by this to
sation, it has violated a fundamental law decide that property owned in fee simple
of the State. Chancellor Kent (City Char- absolute by other cities is not equally pro-
ter in Kent's Notes), in commenting upon tected by the Constitution.]
the provisions of the ancient charters on “Nor is this property, with other real
the city, says : 'It may not be amiss to estate owned by the city, held in trust for
state here, once for all, that it is an ac- any person ; nor is it stamped with any
knowledged and settled principle that no mere political trust of which the city may
vested right of property, whether it be- be deprived, and thus its claim to the
longs to private individuals or be in the right to the possession of the property de-
shape of a corporate franchise, can ever stroyed. The title to the land rests some-
be lawfully taken away without some de- where, and, as has been shown above, so
fault or forfeiture, to be ascertained by far as the records extend, no one claims it
a fair trial and pronounced by judicial except the city itself.
decree. The English statute of Magna “It seems to me that the weight of au-
Charta establishes as a great principle the thority is to the effect that the property
sanctity of rights and privileges then ex- which New York holds in its proprietary
isting or thereafter to be lawfully pro- or private character, though originally de-
cured ; and that principle was intended to rived from the power claiming the ulti-
be of general and perpetual application. mate title, and which concerns the private
It provided that the city of London, and advantage of the corporation, as a distinct
§ 68 a
115
REPEAL OR DISSOLUTION.
§ 68 a. Same subject. Effect of Repeal or Dissolution. Where
the Constitution or laws have reserved to the legislature absolute and
unrestricted power to repeal the charters of private corporations and
to dissolve them at will, the legislative supremacy over their exist-
ence would seem to be as complete as it is over that of municipal
corporations; and by analogy the limitations on the legislative
power over the property and contract rights or other vested rights of
private corporations throw light upon like questions as respects mu-
nicipal corporations. As to private corporations it can, we think,
safely be affirmed that while the legislature inay, under and pursu-
ant to such reserved power, annul and dissolve them at pleasure, it
is not within its competency, under the Federal Constitution as
amended, or under like provisions in the Constitutions of the States,
to impair or affect the property or property rights of the dissolved
corporation, but only its right to exist, and such other rights as are
directly and necessarily dependent on the continued existence of the
corporation. The rights of mortgagees, of creditors generally, and
rights arising under valid contracts with the corporation, survive the
repeal and dissolution. And the same doctrine, doubtless, applies
to
legal personality, is stamped with so many 99 U. S. 700 (1878); Greenwood v.
of the rights and powers of natural per- Freight Co., 105 U. S. 13 (1881); Detroit
sons or private corporations as that the v. Howell Plank Road Co., 43 Mich. 140,
city cannot be deprived of this reservoir 147.
without due process of law and without Broadway Surface Railway Case: While
just compensation. It admits of no doubt the legislature of New York, under the
that the legislature may change, modify, power reserved in the Constitution
enlarge, or restrain the powers of a cor- alter or repeal,” from time to time, laws
poration which it has created. But under which corporations are formed, and
whenever this is done, and a municipal under a general reserved power by statute
corporation is relieved of the privilege that “all corporations shall be subject to
and duty of maintaining a jurisdiction alteration, suspension, and repeal in the
over the property and property rights, care discretion of the legislature," may annul
has invariably been taken to restore to or repeal the charter of a corporation or
the original owner or proprietor the rights dissolve it; yet it cannot, by virtue of
which the municipal corporation were for such an act, or any act, impair or affect
a time permitted to exercise. Terret v. the property or property rights of the cor-
Taylor, 9 Cranch, 52; 2 Kent, Commen- poration. The extent and limits of legis-
taries, 257; Dartmouth College Case, 4 lative power our corporations and their
Wheat. 694 ; People v. Detroit, 28 Mich. rights and the rights of their mortgagees,
228 ; Bailey v. Mayor, &c. of New York, and of persons having contracts with
3 Hill, 531 ; People v. Fields, 58 N. Y. the dissolved corporations, underwent the
591 ; People v. Ingersoll, Id. 1 ; Maxmil- most thorough and deliberate considera-
lian v. New York, 62 N. Y. 160.”
tion of the Court of Appeals of New York
1 People v. O'Brien, Receiver (Broadway in Broadway Surface Railway Case. Peo-
Railway Case), 111 N. Y. 1 (1888) ; ple v. O'Brien, Receiver, et al., 111 N. Y.
Mumma v. Potonac Co., 8 Pet. 285 ; 1 (1888). În that case the Broadway Sur-
Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch, 135 ; Sinking face Railway Company was, in 1884, duly
Fund Cases (arising under reserved power incorporated. It acquired from the muni-
to amend or repeal Pacific Railway acts), cipal authorities the right to lay down
116
§ 68 a
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
to property rights acquired by virtue of valid municipal grants ;1 and
it has also been declared in respect of the property rights of muni-
cipalities, though as to this, the doctrine remains, perhaps, to be
fully settled, defined, and its limitations ascertained by actual judi-
cial judgments. It is agreed by all the authorities that under the
cars
0
tracks and to run over Broadway for its railway, says: “Grants similar in all
from the Battery to Fourteenth street. It material respects to the one in question
was authorized by statute to mortgage its have heretofore been before the courts of
property and franchises, and also to make this State for construction, and it has been
contracts with connecting railroad com- quite uniformly held that they are grants
panies for the use of their tracks. It in fee vesting the grantee with an interest
executed mortgages on its property and in the street in perpetuity to the extent
franchises to secure negotiable boods, necessary for the purposes of a street rail-
which were sold in the market. After- road. People v. Sturtevant, 9 N. Y. 263 ;
wards it appeared to the legislature prob- Davis v. The Mayor, &c., 14 N. Y. 506 ;
able, if not certain, that the corporation Milhau v. Sharp, 27 N. Y. 611 ; Mayor v.
acquired the right to occupy the streets by Second Ave. R. R. Co., 32 N. Y. 261 ;
means of bribery of a majority of the board Sixth Ave. R. R. Co. v. Kerr, 72 N. Y.
of aldermen; and this was the motive, 330. Other cases are also reported in the
doubtless, that led the legislature, in 1886, books, but it is deemed unnecessary to ac-
to repeal the charter of the Broadway cumulate authorities on this point.
Company, to dissolve the corporation, and We are therefore of the opinion that the
to provide for winding up its affairs and Broadway Surface Railroad Company took
disposing of and distributing its property. an estate in perpetuity in Broadway
The opinion of the court, delivered by through its grant from the city under the
Ch.-Judge Ruger, discusses the interest. authority of the Constitution and the act
ing questions involved with learning and of the legislature. It is also well settled
marked ability. The court held that the by authority in this State that such a right
franchise of the corporation, under its constitutes property within the usual and
charter, and the grants froin the muni- common signification of that word. Sixth
cipal authorities to lay down tracks and Ave. R. R. Co. v. Kerr, 72 N. Y. 330;
operate its railroad, was a property right People v. Sturtevant, 9 N. Y. 263.
which survived the dissolution of the It is, however, earnestly contended for the
corporation ; so were the rights of the State that such a franchise is a mere li-
corporation under its contracts with con- cerise or privilege enjoyable during the
necting railroads, and also the rights of life of the grantee oily, and revocable at
the mortgagees to the continued use of the the will of the State. We believe this
street in connection with the railroad, proposition to be not only repugnant to
under the municipal consent to the use justice and reason, but contrary to the
thereof for railway purposes. The special uniform course of authority in this coun-
provisions of the repealing act as to wind- try. The laws of this State have made
ing up the affairs of the dissolved corpora- such interests taxable, inheritable, aliena-
tion and disposing of and distributing its ble, subject to levy and sale under execu-
property, were held to be unconstitutional. tion, to condemnation under the exercise
1 R. R. Co. v. Delamore, 114 U. S. 501; of the right of eminent domain, and in-
Langdon v. Mayor, &c., 93 N. Y. 129; vested them with the attributes of prop-
People v. O'Brien, supra, and cases cited. erty generally."
Concerning rights acquired under muni- 2 Mayor, &c. v. Second Ave. R. R. Co.,
cipal grants to others, Ruger, C. J., in The 32 N. Y. 261. In this case Brown, J.,
People v. O'Brien, supra, speaking of the said : "The rights of municipal corpora-
grant by the corporation of New York tions to property in lands and its usual
City to the Broadway Surface Railway incidents, and to create ferries and railroad
Company to use the streets of New York franchises, are quite distinct and separate
1
$ 68 a LEGISLATIVE POWER OVER CONTRACTS OF MUNICIPALITY. 117
power to repeal the charters of private corporations the legislature
cannot take away property acquired under the operation of the
charter;1 and as to municipal corporations the only question is
whether the legislature can deprive them, or rather, perhaps, their
inhabitants, of their property. It is believed by the author, for the
reasons suggested in this chapter, that while the legislature has full
from their duties as legislatures, having pra, Ruger, C. J., said : “ It is also to be
authority to pass ordinances for the con- observed that in none of the provisions for
trol and government of persons and inter- l'epeal in this State is there anything con-
ests within the city limits. The latter tained which purports to coufer power to
are powers held in trust, as all legislative take away or destroy property or annul
powers are, to be used and exercised for
contracts, and the contention that the
the benefit and welfare of the whole com- property of a dissolved corporation is for-
munity, while the former are property, in feited, rests wholly upon what is claimed
the ordinary sense, to be acquired and to be the necessary consequence of the
conveyed in the same manner as natural extinction of corporate life. We do not
persons acquire and transfer property." think the dissolution of a corporation
The same learned judge said, in Brooklyn works any such effect. It would not
Cent. R. R. Co. v. Brooklyn City R. R. naturally seem to have any other opera-
Co., 32 Barb. 364: “The grant to the tion upon its contracts or property rights
City Railroad Company and its acceptance than the death of a natural person upon
of the conditions annexed, with the duties his. Mumma v. Potomac Co., 8 Pet. 285.
and obligations and large expenditures re- The power to repeal the charter of a cor-
sulting therefrom, would seem, therefore, poration cannot, upon any legal princi-
to invest the company with the right of ple, include the power to repeal what is in
property in the franchise, of which it can- its nature irrepealable, or to undo what
not be deprived without its consent or has been lawfully done under power law-
against its will."
fully conferred. Butler v. Palmer, 1 Hill,
1 See cases cited in note 1 to this sec- 335."
tion. In Detroit v. Howell Plank Road A legislative grant of an exclusive right
Co., 43 Mich. 140, 147, Cooley, J., said : to supply gas to a municipality and to its
“ It is immaterial in what way the prop- inhabitants, through pipes and mains laid
erty was lawfully acquired, whether by in the public streets, and upon condition
labor in the ordinary vocations of life, by of the performance of the service by the
gift or descent, or by making profitable grantee, is, after acceptance and perform-
Use of a franchise granted by the State ; it ance by the grantee, à contract protected
is enough that it has become private prop- by the Constitution of the United States
erty, and it is then protected by the ‘law against subsequent State legislation which
of the land.'"
impairs it. The legislature, however, retains
Speaking of the reserved power to its police power, including the duty to pro-
"amend or repeal" the charter of the tect the public health, morals, and safety.
Union Pacific Company, Waite, C. J., in New Orleans Gas Company v. Louisiana
the Sinking Fund Cases, 99 U. S. 700 Light Company, 115 U. S. 650 (1885);
(1878), delivering the opinion of the Louisville Gas Company v. Citizens' Gas
court, said : “All agree that it cannot be company, 115 U. S. 683. The same prin-
used to take away property already ac- ciple applied to a legislative grant of an
quired under the operation of the charter, escclusive right to supply water to a inunici-
or to deprive the corporation of the fruits, pality and its inhabitants. New Orleans
actually reduced to possession, of contracts Water-Works Company v. Rivers, 115
lawfully made.
U. S. 674 (1885).
In same case (p. 73), Strong, J., defines 2 Ante, sec. 68; post, sec. 69, and note.
property. In The People v. O'Brien, su-
118
§ 69
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
power of legitimate regulation and control, it cannot deprive them
(that is, in essence, the people of the locality at whose expeuse it
has been acquired or for whose benefit it was granted) of such prop-
erty. It is in effect fastened with a trust for the incorporated muni-
cipality as long as the legislature suffers it to live, and for the benefit
of the people of the locality if the corporate entity which represents
their rights shall be dissolved.
§ 69 (41). Legislative power over Contracts of Municipality. It
is an interesting question, which has not yet arisen for judgment,
whether the legislature of the State has the right, in virtue of its
control over municipal corporations, to annul or interfere with con-
tracts between two municipalities. This would depend perhaps upon
the nature of the contracts, that is, whether they were public or
corporate. If, however, a municipal corporation becomes indebted,
the rights of the creditor based upon the obligation of the contract can-
not, it is clear, be impaired by any subsequent legislative enact-
ment. Thus, where an act of the legislature was passed to provide
i Von Hoffman v. Quincy, 4 Wall. (1885); United States v. County Court, 3
535 (1866); approved in Wolff v. New Fed. Rep. 1. Where a contract was made
Orleans, 103 U. S. 358 ; Galena v. Amy, by a municipal corporation while a law
5 Wall. 705; Amy v. Galena, 7 Fed. Rep. providing a remedy by compulsory taxa-
163 ; and see Meriwether v. Garrett, 102 tion was in force, the repeal of the law
U. S. 472 ; Butz v. Muscatine, 8 Wall. and the adoption of a new Constitution
575; Lee County v. Rogers, 7 Wall. forbidding the levy of a tax in such case,
185; Furman v. Nichol, 8 Wall. 44 ; were held invalid as impairing the ob-
Woodruff v. Trapnall, 10 How. 206 ; ligation of the contract. Sawyer v.
Bronson x. Kinsie, 1 How. 316 ; Lansing Concordia, 12 Fed. Rep. 754.
v. County Treasurer, 1 Dillon Cir. C. R. Where there is a mode prescribed by
522 ; Muscatine v. Railroad Co., Ib. 536 ; statute for levying taxes to pay the princi-
State v. Milwaukee, 25 Wis. 122 ; Brook- pal and interest of bonds which may be
lyn Park Comm’rs v. Armstrong, 45 N. Y. issued by inunicipal corporations in aid of
234 (1871); Soutter v. Madison (act for- railroads, it is considered a part of the ob-
bidding city to levy taxes to pay judg- ligation; and any subsequent change of
ments held void), 15 Wis. 30 ; Western it by the legislature which substantially
Savings Fund Society v. Philadelphia, 31 modifies that mode so as to affect rights
Pa. St. 175, 185 ; San Francisco v. Cana- under the contract, is void as impairing
van, 42 Cal. 541 (1872); Goodale v. Fen- the obligation of the contract. No rule
nell, 27 Ohio St. 426 (1875); s. C. 22 can be laid down as to what constitutes
Am. Rep. 321. The power of taxation by such impairment, and each case must de-
a municipal corporation, and its limitation pend upon its own circumstances. Sei-
at the date of a contract, become a part of bert v. Lewis, 122 U. S. 284. A contract
the contract, and continue to exist in made with a municipal corporation upon
favor of a creditor under such contract the faith of taxes to be levied, cannot be
without regard to subsequent reduction of altered by the repeal or modification of
the limitation or restriction of the power. the power of the municipality to levy the
Morris v. State, 62 Tex. 728 ; United taxes ; such legislation is void for being
States v. Port of Mobile, 12 Fed. Rep. an impairment of the obligation of a con-
768 ; Mobile v. Watson, 116 U. S. 289 tract. Nelson v. St. Martin's Parish, 111
.
§ 69 LEGISLATIVE POWER OVER CONTRACTS OF MUNICIPALITY. 119
for the payment of the debts of a municipal corporation, and author-
izing the creation of a sinking fund, to be deposited and applied
in a particular manner, and where creditors acting thereunder
have surrendered the evidences of their debts and received
new bonds, for the payment of which the fund stands pledged
by the act, it is not competent because it impairs the obliga-
tion of contracts — for a subsequent legislature, in providing for
the liquidation of the corporate debts, to give a different destin-
ation to the sinking fund by changing the depository of the
fund.1
So where the effect of an act of the legislature authorizing a city
to fund its floating debt was, in substance, a pledge to those who
surrendered their claims and received new obligations, of a portion
of its revenues and property, to be applied to the payment of its
obligations in a specified mode, this, if acted on, constitutes a contract
which cannot be materially altered, either by the municipality or
the legislature, without the consent of the creditors; but it was
held that a subsequent act, simply changing the mode of levying
U. S. 716 ; Louisiana v. Pillsbury, 105 was based upon a contract entered into in
U. S. 278. Post, sec. 854.
1874, after the adoption of an amendment
But where, by the change, additional to the Constitution, providing that the
property is made taxable to pay the city should not increase its debt under
bonds, a levy of taxes upon both species any pretext, and forbidding the drawing
of property may be ordered. Cape Girar- of warrants except against cash actually
deau County v. Hill, 118 U. S. 68. Pre- in the treasury, it was held, by the same
vious to 1879 the city of New Orleans court, that the contract was restricted as
had the power to tax for general pur- to satisfaction to the revenues of the year,
poses to the extent of 121 per cent. The and imposed no obligation upon the city
Constitution adopted in that year reduced to exercise in the future the power of taxa-
the limit to 10 per cent. On an applica- tion possessed by it at that time ; and it
tion for a mandamus brought by a judg. was also held that the provision in the
ment creditor whose judgment was founded Constitution of 1879 limiting the rate of
upon a contract entered into in 1873, taxation to 10 per cent was not a violation
the Supreme Court of that State held, of the obligation of the contract. It re-
that the power of taxation as it existed at fused to compel the city to levy a tax in
the date of the contract was read into it, excess of that limit. State, ex rel. Gas
and that so far as was necessary to satisfy Light Co. v. New Orleans, 37 La. An.
the contract the power of taxation had 436.
not been affected by the new Constitution; Further, see chapter on Contracts,
and the writ was issued directing the levy post. sec. 511 et seq. For effect of judi-
of a tax within the 12 per cent limit to cial determination of the law at the
satisfy the judgment. State, ex rel. Mar- time a contract is entered into, see
chand v. New Orleans, 37 La. An. 13. post, sec. 517.
See, also, State, ex rel. Thorn v. New Or- | Liquidators v. Municipality, 6 La. An.
leans, 37 La. An. 528 ; State ex rel. Car- 21 (1851). . As to sinking fund, see Terry
rière v. New Orleans, 36 La. An. 687 ; V. Bank, 18 Wis. 87 ; post, chapter on
State, cx rel. Stewart v. Police Jury, 34 Charters. Fraudulent transfers of prop-
La. An. 673. In a later case, upon a erty by municipal corporations. Smith v.
similar application, where the judgment Morse, 2 Cal. 524.
120
· $ 70
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
taxes, and which did not and could not affect the result or impair
the security of the creditors, was not invalid.
So, also, where the legislature authorized an indebted city to issue
bonds to a specified amount, in payment of a like amount of its
outstanding bonds, and among other provisions, plainly intended to
induce creditors to make the exchange, was one prohibiting the city
from thereafter issuing its bonds, "except in payment of its bonded
debt," and this authority having been acted on, the arrangement
accepted by the creditors, and new bonds issued, it was decided by
the Supreme Court of Wisconsin that the prohibition against the
issue of further bonds constituted, in favor of the holders of the new
bonds, a contract which the legislature could not impair by a subse-
quent enactment authorizing the inunicipality to issue additional
bonds for other purposes.?
$ 70 (42). Same subject. — But authority to a city to borrow
money, and to tax all the property therein to pay the debt thus
incurred, does not necessarily deprive the State of the power to modify
taxation so as to exempt portions of the property, if the rights of
creditors be not thereby impaired. So authority given in a railroad
1 People v. Bond, 10 Cal. 563 (1858). ever, it is to be remembered that the
And see People v. Wood, 7 Cal. 579 legislative power, as respects creditors, is
(1857) ; Brooklyn Park Comm'rs v. Arm- restrained by the provision of the Federal
strong, 45 N. Y. 234 (1871).
Coustitution that no State shall pass any
2 Smith v. Appleton, 19 Wis. 468 (1865). act impairing the obligation of contracts.
Text cited and approved. Mount Pleas- 8 Gilman v. Sheboygan, 2 Black, 510
ant v. Beckwith, 100 U. S. 514. Extent (1862); Muscatine v. Railroad Co., 1 Dil-
of legislative power over municipal indebt- lon C. C. 536 ; Seibert v. Lewis, 122 U. S.
edness as against the municipality, see 284 (1886) ; Goodale v. Fennell, 27 Ohio
City v. Lamson, 9 Wall. 477 ; and read, St. 426 (1875) ; s. C. 22 Am. Rep. 321 ;
in connection therewith, Campbell v. Ke- holding a subsequent act restricting power
nosha, 5 Wall. 194, in effect overruling of assessment inoperative against a con-
the practical application of Foster v. Ke- tractor who had agreed to take his pay-
nosha, 12 Wis. 616 (1860). Further as ment in assessments.
to rights of creditors, see post, chapters As against a municipal corporation, the
on Charters, Contracts, and Mandamus. legislature may, it has been decided by
Youngs v. Hall, 9 Nev. 212.
the Supreme Court of Missouri, repcal its
When the performance of the obligation powers to levy and collect wharfage, al-
of a public or municipal corporation has though the proceeds of the public wharf
becn rendered impossible by act of the law, had been pledged by the corporation,
as, for example, by a subsequent statute, under legislative authority, as a fund in
the obligation is discharged, and no action connection with other revenues for the
against the corporation will lie thereon. payment of bonds issued for money bor-
This principle is well exemplified in Brown rowed by the corporation to maintain and
1. Mayor &c. of London, 9. Com. B. improve the wharf. After the issue of
(N. s.) 726 (1861), respecting the liabil. such bonds, which were outstanding, and
ity of London on bonds payable out of after the passage of a subsequent act re-
tolls and duties levied on vessels navigat. pealing all acts which authorized the mu-
ing the Thames. In this country, how- nicipality to collect wharfage, it sued the
!
§ 71
121
LEGISLATIVE POWER OVER PUBLIC PROPERTY.
charter to a county to take stock and issue bonds therefor, if a ma-
jority of the voters so determine, is not a contract, but a mere au-
thority couferred upon the county in its public capacity, and may
be repealed after a vote at any time before the subscription has been
made, or agreed to be made.2
§ 71 (43). Legislative power over Public Property of Municipality.
- The legislature, as the trustee for, and the representative of, the
general public, has full control over the public property and the public
rights of municipal corporations. Accordingly, it may authorize a
railroad company to occupy the streets in a city without its consent
and without payment to it;3 but it could not, probably, authorize
the taking of the private property of a city by a railroad company,
except for public purposes, and upon compensation being made. 4
recover.
defendant for refusing to pay wharfage, 604 (1874); Shelby Co. v. Cumberland &
on the ground that the repealing act was C. R. R. Co., 8 Bush (Ky.), 299.
unconstitutional ; but the Supreme Court, In California it is held that while the
assimilating the case to that of Gilman v. legislature cannot require the creditors of
Sheboygan, 2 Black, 510, and distinguish- a county to surrender their evidences of
ing it from Von Hoffman v. Quincy, 4 indebtedness, and accept new ones differ-
Wall. 535, held that the city could not ent in terms from the old, it may refuse to
The language of the judge de- provide funds to pay any portion of the
livering the opinion would seem to imply old indebtedness, unless the creditors will
that the repealing act would not be invalid accept new evidences in place of the old,
as to creditors unless other funds should and for a less sum, and that there is no
prove insufficient; but it should be ob-
constitutional objection to a law which
served that this was not a point adjudged provides a county fund, out of which the
in the case.
St. Louis v. Shields, 52 Mo. holders of county indebtedness can obtain
351 (1873).
50 per cent of the nominal value of their
1 Aspinwall v. County of Jo Daviess, demands, whenever they may choose to
22 How. 364 (1859). When such repeal accept the same. People v. Morse, 43
is effectual, see People v. Coon, 25 Cal. Cal. 534 (1872).
635 ; Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. Davis 2 Town of Concord v, Portsmouth Sav.
County, 6 Kan. 256 (1870); compare Town Bank, 92 U. S. 625. More fully on this
of Concord v. Portsmouth Sav. Bank, 92 subject, see infra, chapter xiv.
U. S. 625 ; infra, chapter on Contracts. Contracts.
In The State v. Meller, 67 Mo. 604, it was 8 Post, sec. 701 et seq.
held by the Supreme Court of that State 4 Ante, sec. 68, and note, sec. 68, C,
that while municipal corporations cannot, and notes; see post, secs. 72, 73. Dar-
as between the legislature and themselves, lington v. Mayor, &c., 31 N. Y. 164
place their privileges on the ground of (1865); Reynolds v. Stark County, 5
contract, yet where the State creates a Ohio, 204 ; 5 Ohio St. 113; Clinton v.
municipal corporation, and through it con- Railroad Co., 24 Iowa, 455 (1868); Louis-
tracts with a third person, whereby rights ville v. University of Louisville, 15 B.
become vested in the latter, it is beyond Mon. 642 (1855); Portland & W. V. R.
the power of the State to impair the obli- R. Co. v. Portland, 14 Oreg. 188. See fur-
gations of the contract when the contract ther, chapter on Streets and on Dedication,
to subscribe for stock is completed. C. & post; People v. Kerr, 27 N. Y. 188 ; Mer-
0. R. R. Co. v. Barren Co., 10 Buish (Ky.), cer v. Railroad Co., 36 Pa. St. 99 ; Mayor,
011
:
122
§ 71
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
It may authorize corporations to make contracts, but it is, perhaps,
more doubtful how far it can compulsorily make, in the legal sense
of the word, contracts for them, since the essence of a contract con-
sists in the agreement of the parties. And on this view it has been
held, in Vermont, that the legislature cannot without the consent of a
municipal corporation, appoint an agent for it, and authorize him, as
such agent, to purchase property and bind the corporation to pay
for it. So the Supreme Court of Illinois has decided that the le-
gislature, under peculiar provisions in the Constitution of that State,
has no power to compel a city to incur a debt against its will.
was
etc. v. Hopkins, 13 La. 326 ; New Orleans, Am. Rep. 662, referred to infra, sec. 75,
&c. Railroad Co. v. New Orleans, 26 La. and note. And see Philadelphia v. Field,
An. 517 ; Ib. 478 (1874); Reading 2. 58 Pa. St. 320 (1868). Post, sec. 831,
Commonwealth, 11 Pa. St. 196 ; post, sec. note; sec. 72 et scq.
Hasbrouck v. Mil-
701 et seq.
waukee, 13 Wis. 37 ; Mills v. Charlton,
1 Cooley on Taxation (2d ed.), 688 ct 29 Wis. 400.
seq., where the subject is discussed and the 8 Cairo & St. Louis R. R. Co. v. City
leadiny cases referred to.
of Sparta, 77 Ill. 505 (1875); People v.
2 Atkins v. Randolph, 31 Vt. 226 Chicago (Lincoln Park Case), 51 Ill. 17
(1858).
The case
was this : Plaintiff (1869); People v. Salomon (South Park
sued the town of Randolph in assumpsit Case), Ib. 37 ; Harard v. Drainage Com-
for liquor sold to an “agent” appointed pany, Ib. 130. Though the reasoning of
by the county commissioners to purchase the court is general, yet the point decided
liquors (under the act of 1852, “to pre-
that the city could not be compelled to
vert the traffic in intoxicating liquors "), contract a debt against its consent-
at the expense of the town for which he influenced by, if it does not rest upon, a
was appointed. The town never gave any constitutional provision (art. ix. sec. 5),
assent, express or implied, to this appoint- which was construed to restrict the legis-
ment; nor did it receive any benefit from lature from granting the right of local or
the sale of the liquors, or have any knowl- corporate taxation to any other than the
edge that the agent was purchasing liquors corporate authorities of the municipality
on its credit. The court held the act or district to be taxed. In Illinois an act
of 1852 unconstitutional, and that the authorizing police commissioners to issue
plaintiffs could not recover. The decision certificates of indebtedness without its con-
was put mainly upon the ground that the sent is unconstitutional. People v. Can-
legislature could not authorize a binding ty, 55 Ill. 33; ante, sec. 60 ; People v.
contract to be made creating a debt against McAdams, 82 Ill 356 ; Park Comm’rs v.
a public corporation without its consent. Tel. Co., 103 Ill. 33. Compare Darlington
Bennett, J., dissented, not on the ground v. Mayor, &c. of New York, 31 N. Y. .
that the corporation was bound by force of 164. See Dunnovan v. Green, 57 Ill. 63;
any contract, but because the act of 1852 Sinton v. Ashbury, 41 Cal. 525 (1871).
imposed a duty upon the towns, as muni- In California it is held that the legisla-
cipal corporations, to pay for the liquors, ture may empower the authorities of a city
and this for public purposes, and to carry to purchase an agricultural park, and to
out a police regulation. Chief-Justice issue its bonds in payment therefor, and to
Denio criticises this case, and considers it levy a tax for their payment. Sonoma
standing upon no principle.” Dar. County Bank v. Fairbanks, 52 Cal. 196.
lingtou v. Mayor, &c. of New York, 31 Infra, sec. 72 et seq.
N. Y. 164, 205 (1865). On the other The general propositions in the text as
hand it is approved by Lyon, J., in State to the restrictions on legislative power over
v. Tappan, 29 Wis. 664 (1872); s. C. 9 municipal corporations will be found to be
as
$ 72
123
COMPULSORY CONTRACTS ; DETROIT PARK CASE.
The Supreme
§ 72. Compulsory Contracts; Detroit Park Case.
Court of Michigan, in a case arising under a statute relating to a pub-
lic park for the city of Detroit, which created a Board of Park Com-
missioners for the city, the act naming the commissioners and
investing them with power to acquire by purchase the necessary
lands, at a cost not exceeding $300,000, and imperatively requiring
the city council, without its assent to the appointment of the com-
missioners or to the purchase of the lands by them selected, to pro-
vide the money to pay therefor by the issue and sale of the bonds
of the city, held that the city could not be compelled against the will
of the council, to issue its bonds; and the decision was placed on the
ground that a park was purely a matter of local, as distinguished
from State, concern, and that it was beyond legislative competency
to coerce a municipal corporation to contract a debt for local pur-
poses without its consent.1
sustained by the following cases : Atkins performance of local duties, either by em-
v. Randolph, 31 Vt. 226 (1858); White ploying local officers for the purpose, or
v. Fuller, 39 Vt. 193 ; Louisville v. The through agents or officers of its own ap-
University, 15 B. Mon. 642; Western pointinent. ... The proposition which
Savings Fund Society v. Philadelphia, 31 asserts the amplitude of legislative control
Pa. St. 175, 185; Montpelier v. East over municipal corporations, when con-
Montpelier, 29 Vt. 12 ; Poultney v. Wells, fined, as it should be, to such corporations
1 Aik. (Vt.) 180 ; Trustees v. Winston, 5 as agencies of the State in its government,
Stew. & Port. (Ala.) 17 ; Norris v. Trus- is entirely sound. They are not created
tees Abingdon Academy, 7 Gill & Johns. exclusively for that purpose, but have
(Md.) 7 ; Regents of University v. Wile other objects and purposes peculiarly local,
liams, 9 Gill & Johns. 365 ; Trustees of and in which the State at large, except in
Academy v. Aberdeen, 13 Sm. & M. 21 conferring the power and regulating its
Diss. 645 ; Brunswick v. Litchfield, 2 Me. exercise, is legally no more concerned than
(2 Greenl.) 28, 32.
it is in the individual and private con-
1 People, ex rel. Park Comm’rs v. Com- cerns of its several citizens. Indeed it
mon Council of Detroit. (nandamus to would be easy to show that it is not from
compel the council to raise money to pay the standpoint of State interest, but from
for lands for the park), 28 Mich. 228 that of local interest, that the necessity of
(1873) ; s. C. 15 Am. Rep. 202. The incorporating cities and villages most dis-
ground upon which the judgment in the tinctly appears. State duties of a local
Detroit Park Case, just mentioned, rests, nature can for the most part be very well
as appears by the opinion of the court de performed through the usual township-and
livered by Cooley, J., is that a municipal county organizations. It is because,
corporation like that of Detroit will be where an urban population is collected,
found to be in part a mere public agency many things are necessary for their com-
of the State, and in part possessed of pecu- fort and protection which are not needed
liar and local franchises and rights which in the country, that the State is then
appertain to it as legal personality for its called upon to confer larger powers and to
private (as distinguished from the public) make the locality a subordinate common-
advantage. It is admitted that “in all wealth. . . . It is a fundamental prin-
matters of general concern there is no ciple in this State, recognized and perpet-
local right to act independently of the uated by express provision of the Constitu-
State, and the State may exercise tion, that the people of every hamlet, town,
compulsory authority, and enforce the and city of the State are entitled to the bene-
124
§ 73
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
§ 73. Same subject. — The judgment of this able court in the De-
troit Park Case, as well as the argument of the eminent judge in
the opinion by which it is supported, is in the author's judgment
not only sound, but it is in accordance with the weight of judicial
expression on the subject." There are difficulties attending the
assertion of unlimited legislative power over municipalities, and
difficulties, also, in assigning limits to that power. The legislative
power of the State ought to be at all times comprehensive enough
and penetrating enough to enforce all duties and to redress all evils.
Abuses will inevitably arise which nothing but legislative surgery
can remedy. It seems to be right and just that the citizens of
Detroit should not be compelled to incur a large debt for a park,
which after all is a matter of luxury and ornament rather than a
prime necessity. But change the instance. Suppose the city should
refuse to provide a system of sewers or drainage, whereby the health
of its people was injuriously affected: may it say that this does not
concern the people of the State outside the city, that it is peculiarly
a local matter, and therefore is beyond the power of the State to
compel the city to make such a provision, and to raise the necessary
taxes or make the necessary assessments to that end? On the whole,
the question whether a city may be compelled to create a debt or lia-
bility against its will must be answered, we think, with reference
fits of local self-government. But authority tionable of all has been this : that the
in the legislature to determine what shall people shall vote the taxes they are to
be the extent of the capacity in a city to pay, or be permitted to choose representa-
acquire and hold property is not equivalent tives for the purpose.
to, and does not contain within itself Suprli, sec. 71 n.
Callam v. Saginaw,
authority to deprive the city of property 50 Mich. 7, cited infra, sec. 140, note.
actually acquired by legislative permission. See, also, Detroit v. Plank Road Co., 43
As to property it thus holds for its own Mich. 140; Mayor v. Park Comin’rs, 44
private purposes, a city is to be regarded Mich. 602, cited infra, sec. 565, note.
as a constituent in State government, and The city's ownership of gis works is in
is entitled to the like protection in its its local or private, as distinguished from
property rights as any natural person who its public character. Western Sav. Fund
is also a constituent. The right of the Soc. v. Philadelphia, 31 Pa. St. 183.
State is a right of regulation, not of ap-
- Provisions for local conveniences for the
propriation. It cannot be deprived of citizens, like water, light, public grounds
such property without due process of law. for recreation, and the like, are manifestly
And when a local convenience or need is matters which are not provided for by
to be supplied in which the people of the municipal corporations in their political
State at large, or any portion thereof out- or governmental capacity, but in that
side the city limits, are not concerned, quasi private capacity in which they act
the State can no more by process of taxa for the benefit of their corporators ex.
tion take from the individual citizens the clusively." Cooley on Taxation (2d ed.),
money to purchase it, than they could, if 688.
it had been procured, appropriate it to the 1 See supra, sec. 68, and note ; sec. 68 a,
State use.
From the very dawn of and notes.
our liberties the principle most unques-
§ 74
125
COMPULSORY CONTRACTS; DETROIT PARK CASE.
not only to the constitutional provisions of the State, but to the
nature of the purposes for which the debt or liability is to be
incurred.
$ 74. Same subject. — Thus, if there is no special limitation in the
Constitution, and the debt or liability is one to be incurred in the
discharge of a public or State duty, which it is proper for the legis-
lature to impose upon the municipality, it can constitute no objection
to the validity of the Act that the debt or liability is to be created
i without its consent. Accordingly, in the absence of constitutional
restriction, it has been decided, and the decision is doubtless correct,
that it is competent for the legislature to direct a municipal corpora-
tion to build a bridge over a navigable watercourse within its limits,
or the State may appoint agents of its own to build it, and em-
power them to create a loan to pay for the structure, payable by
the corporation. Thus also, since municipal corporations are instru-
ments of government, created for political purposes, and subject to
legislative control, and since it is one of the ordinary duties of such
corporations, under legislative authority, to make and keep in repair
the streets and highways and bridges connected therewith, the Court
of Appeals in Maryland sustained an act mandatory in its terms,
which not only empowered but required the city of Baltimore in its
corporate capacity to take charge of and maintain as a public highway
a specified bridge within that city, and enforced the duty created by
the act of mandamus. But the legislature cannot by an imperative
1 Philadelphia v. Field, 58 Pa. St. 320 therein, the legislature may require it to
1868), approving Thomas v. Leland, 24 issue its bonds to pay such indebtedness.
Wend. 65 ; Guilder v. Otsego, 20 Minn. Jefferson County v. People, 5 Neb. 136
74 (1873); supra, sec. 54, note, and cases (1876). The power of the legislature over
cited. United States v. B. & 0. R. R. municipal contracts and liabilities was
Co., 17 Wall. 322 (1872) ; post, sec. 775; very fully considered in The People v.
Carter v. Bridge Proprietors, 104 Mass. Batchellor, 53 N. Y. 128 (1873) ; s. C. 13
236 (1870). But the legislature would not, Am. Rep. 480, and the conclusion was
of course, possess such extensive powers reached that while municipalities may be
over a private corporation. Erie v. Canal, compelled by the legislature, without their
59 Pa. St. 174. Public highways and consent, to construct and maintain im-
bridges are matter of general, or State, provements of a public character, and
rather than of municipal concern. Cooley, even enter into contracts for this purpose,
Taxation (2d ed.), 682. A city street, they could not be compelled, without
however, while its character is chiefly their consent or that of their taxable in-
public, has also a local and peculiar and habitants, to become stockholders in a
quasi-public or corporate character ; which railway corporation ; and therefore a man-
is shown in chap. xviii. on Streets and datory statute requiring a municipal or
chap. xxiii. on Actions.
public corporation to subscribe for stock in
Pumphrey v. Baltimore, 47 Md. 145. a railway corporation, and issue its bonds
A county being justly indebted under a con- in payment therefor, without such consent,
tract for the erection of public buildings was unconstitutional. The opinion of
2
126
§ 74 a
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
statute compel a municipality, without its consent or that of its in-
habitants, to create a debt to aid in the construction of a railway.1
§ 74 a. Same subject. Compulsory liability ; City Hall building
in Philadelphia. — If the legislature has unlimited power to deter-
mine for what purposes and in what amounts indebtedness charge-
able upon a municipality and payable by its inhabitants may be
created without their consent or that of their local authorities, it is a
power of such a nature as to be certain to lead to abuse and oppres-
sion. This is strikingly illustrated by the experience of the city of
Philadelphia, which it is profitable to record for instruction and warn-
ing. At an early day the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, under
the lead of Chief Justice Gibson, asserted, in a great variety of cases,
a measure of legislative power almost as unlimited as that of Parlia-
ment. It came to be the accepted doctrine in that State, that
municipalities held not only their existence but all of their rights
cities may
be a
Grover, J., contains a valuable review of that the erection of a bridge to connect two
many of the leading decisions upon the ex-
city purpose,” for which
tent of legislative control over municipali- indebtedness may be incurred under the
ties. And the case is distinguished from late constitutional amendment upon that
The People v. Flagg, 46 N. Y. 401, where a subject.
subject. In deciding such a question the
mandatory act of the legislature, requir- court said that great weight should be
ing the town of Yonkers, without its con- given to the determination of the legisla-
sent, to issue bonds to raise money to be ture. A constitutional provision that no
expended in the construction of highways county, city, or town shall give money or
in the town, was held to be constitutional. loan its credit to any individual or cor-
The case of Batchellor was also dis- poration, or become the owner of cor-
tinguished, or attempted to be, from the porate stock or bonds, is not in conflict
decisions of the Supreme Court of the with a statute authorizing two cities al-
United States and of the State courts, to ready owning stock in a company organ-
the effect that railway corporations are
ized to build a bridge between such cities,
public, and erected for public purposes in
to become the owners of the whole stock,
such a sense as that the taxing power may by purchasing the stock of the private
be employed to aid in their construction, stockholders, or, in case of a failure to
unless there is some special limitation in agree, by taking it by eminent domain.
the Constitution of the particular State. A statute authorizing the erection of a
The case of People v. Flagg, supra, was certain bridge, provided that the trustees
decided before the constitutional amend- should call on the cities who were to pay
ment of 1874, prohibiting local legislation for it for the funds necessary, “provided,
on the subject of laying out and working however, that the whole amount to be
highways, but permitting such power to paid by both cities shall not exceed eight
he delegated to the local authorities by million dollars.” Hcld that this was not
general laws. People v. Supervisors, 112 an absolute limit against a greater cost,
N. Y. 585 (1889), distinguishing People v. but only a direction that no more should
Flagg. See Town of Flatbush, In re,
be called for without further legislative
60 N. Y. 398 (1875), cited, ante, sec. 63, authority. (Church, C. J., Folger and
note ; Jensen v. Supervisors, 47 Wis. 298; Miller, JJ., dissenting.) People v. Kelly,
post, sec. 831, note.
5 Abb. N. Y. New Cas. 383.
In the Brooklyn and New York Bridge 1 People v. Batchellor, supra.
Case, the court of appeals have declared
§ 74 a
127
COMPULSORY CONTRACTS.
at the absolute will of the legislature, which, if it chose, could
govern the inhabitants of municipalities by its own appointees.1
Acting under this view, the legislature in 1870 passed an act “ To
provide for the erection of all public buildings required to accommo-
date the courts for all the municipal purposes within the city
of Philadelphia.” By this act the legislature decided that the city
should have new .public buildings. The act selected certain citizens
by name, whom it appointed commissioners for the erection of the
buildings. It made this body perpetual by authorizing it to fill
vacancies. It was not chosen by the inhabitants or taxpayers, or
removable by them, or accountable to them. It was authorized
without the consent of the municipal authorities to make contracts
to construct the buildings, which the act declared should be bind-
ing at law upon the city and the contractors. It was authorized
prior to December 1 of each year to make requisitions on the
common councils for the amount of money required for the succeed-
ing year; and the act made it the duty of the common councils to
levy a special tax sufficient to meet the requisition, and to do all
such acts as the commission might from time to time require. This
commission was imposed by the legislature upon the city, and
given absolute control to create debts for the purpose named, and
1 Philadelphia v. Fox, 64 Pa. St. 160, and jurist, who has given much attention
180, 181, per Sharswood, J., who, giving to this subject. In the course of an in-
the judgment of the court, says : “A mu- teresting chapter on local taxation un-
nicipal corporation is merely an agency of der legislative compulsion,” Judge Choley
government fully subject to the control of (Taxation, 2d ed. chap. 21. p. 678) says :
the legislature, who may enlarge or di- As “local powers of taxation must come
minish its territorial extent, or its func- from the State, it might seem to follow, as
tions, may change or modify its internal a corollary, that the State could, at pleas-
arrangement, or destroy its very existence, ure, withhold the grant and exercise the
with the mere breath of arbitrary discre- power itself. But in the general frame-
tion. ... The sovereign may continue its work of our republican governments noth-
(the city's] corporate existence, and yet ing is more distinct and unquestionable
assume or resume the appointments of all than that they recognize the existence of
of its officers and agents into its own local self-government and contemplate its
for the power which can create and permanency. Some State Constitutions
destroy can modify and change.”
do this in express terms, others by neces-
It may, we think, be doubted whether, sary implication ; and probably in no one
upon full and mature consideration, the of the States has the legislature been en-
Constitutions of the several American trusted with the power which would en-
States do not contain express or implied able it to abolish the local government.
limitations upon the autocratic power of It has usually a large authority in dle-
the legislature asserted in the paragraph terniining the extent of local powers and
quoted, which, however, is typical of the framework of local government; but
many to be found in the judicial discuss while it may shape the local institutions,
sions on this subject. We are inclined to it cannot abolish them, and, without
concur in the soundness of the observa- substituting others, take all authority to
tions quoted below, of an eminent judge itself.”
hands;
128
§ 74 a
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
to require the levy of taxes for their payment. A scheme more
repugnant to all notions of local self-government than that which
was forced upon the city and committed to this legislative oligarchy
cannot well be conceived. “They projected (according to a learned
judge of that State) structures at the corner of Broad and Market
streets upon a scale of magnificence better suited for the capital
of an empire than the municipal buildings of a debt-burdened
city.”)
Acts vesting the ordinary municipal functions in commissions
appointed by the legislature would seem in this State not to have
been unfrequent. Public discontent was exhibited, and at length
found its expression in the amended Constitution of 1874, which
prevents for the future the creation of such commissions, by ordain-
ing “That the General Assembly shall not delegate to any special
commission, private corporation or association, any power to make,
supervise, or interfere with any municipal improvement, money,
property, or effects, whether held in trust or otherwise; or to levy
taxes, or to perform any municipal function whatever.” 2 This con-
stitution also provided that “no debt shall be contracted or liability
incurred by any municipal commission except in pursuance of
appropriations previously made by the municipal government.” 3
These provisions failed however to give relief in respect to the build-
ings in question, for the construction of which the commission had,
prior to 1874, entered into contracts. The provision first quoted
was held to be prospective only, and not to apply to special com-
missions existing before the adoption of the amended Constitution.
And as to the second provision above quoted, it was held that while
it would prevent the commission thereafter from entering into any
contract until an appropriation had been made by the municipal
government, it did not repeal the obligation imposed by the above
mentioned Act of 1870 upon the common councils to raise the
amount required by the commissioners and to levy the necessary
taxes. Accordingly, the Supreme Court, on the relation of the
commission, decided that it was entitled to a peremptory mau-
damus to compel the common councils (they having refused to do
so) to levy a special tax to meet a requisition of the commission
for $1,500,000, this being the amount found by the commission
1 Per Paxson, J., in Perkins v. Slack, pulsorily expended upon an enormous pile
86 Pa. St. 283 (1878). Speaking of this which surpasses the town halls and ca-
building, Judge Hare says (1 Am. Const. thedrals of the Middle Ages in extent, if
Law, 630): “For nearly twenty years all not in grandeur."
the money that could be spareil from im- 2 Art. 3, sec. 20, Constitution of 1874.
mediate and pressing needs has been com- 8 Art. 15, sec. 2, Constitution of 1874.
§ 75
129
CLAIMS NOT ENFORCEABLE IN LAW..
that the claim has been rejected by the thorize the levy of a tax for the purpose
to be necessary for the succeeding years for the city hall building
before mentioned.1
$ 75 (44). Mandatory Statutes to pay Claims not legally binding
on the Municipality. - The fact that a claim against a municipal or
public corporation is not such an one as the law recognizes as of
legal obligation has often been decided, by courts of the highest
respectability and learning, to form no constitutional objection to
the validity of a law imposing a tax and directing its payment;2
1 Perkins v. Slack, 86 Pa. St. 270 (1878). the legislature authorizing such submis-
It is confessedly difficult in many cases to sion, and declaring that their decision
define the line of demarcation between should be final and conclusive.
public or State powers and duties which This cuse has been approved, arquendo,
municipalties may be compelled to perform by the Supreme Court of the United
as State agencies, and those of a private States. The United States v. Baltimore &
or quasi private or corporate nature which Ohio Railroad Co., 17 Wall. 322 (1872);
pertain to municipalities as the organized New Orleans v. Clark, 95 U. S. 654
representatives of compact communities (1877). Infra, sec. 76 a.
for their own special local benefit and On the other hand, the same case has been
convenience. General usage and practice disapproved by the Supreme Court of Wis
must largely guide the inquiry. A county consin, in The State v. Tappan, 29 Wis.
may doubtless be compelled to build a 664 (1872); 8. C. 9 Am. Rep. 622, and an
court-house if no special constitutional act of the legislature of Wisconsin, similar
restriction stands in the way. But the in its nature and principles to that involved
building of a city hall of the character of in Guilford v. Supervisors, supra, was held
the one in Philadelphia would seem rather unconstitutional. The opinion of Lyon,
to belong to the category of local or mu- J., evinces great care in its preparation ;
nicipal, as distinguished from State or pub- but it has failed to satisfy us that, in the
lic objects, which, therefore, cannot, or, if absence of special constitutional restraints,
it can, ought not to be forced by central the extent of the legislative power of tax-
legislative dictation upon a reluctant com- ation depends upon the consent of the
munity, which alone must bear the bur- municipality or the people therein, or that
den. In Michigan the State cannot the special act before the court exceeded
compel, but it may authorize, an incor- the rightful power of the legislature. The
porated city to erect a court-house for principle has been reaffirmed, in Massa-
the county in which the city is situated. chusetts, that the discretionary power of
Callam v. Saginaw, 50 Mich. 7.
the legislature in the distribution of pube
2 Guilford v. Supervisors, &c., 13 N. Y. lic burdens embraces the power to author-
(3 Kern.) 143 (1855). This case holds
This case holdsize an assessment on one district for part
the following propositions : 1. That the of the expense of repairing a portion of a
legislature has power to levy a tax upon bridge in another.
bridge in another. Carter v. Bridge Pro-
the taxable property of a town, and ap- prietors, 104 Mass. 236 (1870); post, sec.
propriate the same to the payment of a 737. See Mr. Sedgwick's opinion of this
claim made by an individual against the legislation, Const. and St. Law, 313, 314.
town. 2. That it is not a valid objection The principle of Guilford v. Supervisors
to the exercise of such power that the was applied in Brewster v. Syracuso, 19
claim, to satisfy which the tax is levied, N. Y. 116 (1859), where it was decided by
is not recoverable by action against the all of the judges of the Court of Appeals
town. 3. That it does not alter the case that the legislature has the power to au-
voters of the town, when submitted to of paying to one who has constructed a
them at a town meeting, under an act of municipal improvement (a street sower)
- 9
VOL. I,
130
$ 75
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
but the validity of legislation of this character, if it interferes with
what has been called the private contracts of such corporations, must
be sustained on the ground that such contracts, so far as the corpo-
rations are concerned, are under the absolute control of the legisla-
ture, and not within the protection of the contract clause of the
national Constitution. The cases on this subject, when carefully
examined, seem to the author to go no further, probably, than to
assert the doctrine that it is competent for the legislature to compel
municipal corporations to recognize and pay debts or claims not
binding in strict law, and which, for technical reasons, could not be
enforced in equity, but which, nevertheless, are just and equitable
in their character, and involve a moral obligation. To this extent
an addition to the contract price, which penses, the legislature may give this a legal
the corporation was forbidden to pay by effect by a subsequent act. Lycoming v.
its charter. The court did not consider Union, 15 Pa. St. 166 (1850); O'Hara v.
that there was any contract in the case, State, 112 N. Y. 146 (1889); Cole v.
and sustained the legislation on the ground State, 102 N. Y. 54. Rights of trial by
that it was warranted by the taxing power, jury may be denied by the legislature to
which, in that State, was not restrained, municipal corporations, these being mere
thus leaving it in the discretion of the creatures of its policy, with such rights
legislature to recognize and direct the mly as it sees proper to confer. Borough
payment of claims founded in equity and of Dunmore's Appeal, 52 Pa. St. 374;
justice, or in gratitude or charity. People Kelsh v. Dyersville, 68 Iowa, 137 ; but
3. Mayor, &c. of Brooklyn, 4 Comst. see ante, sec. 66, note.
(N. Y.) 419. And see Thomas v. Leland, 1 Blanding v. Burr, 13 Cal. 343 (1853);
24 Wend. 65 (1840); People v. Dayton, Lycoming v. Union, 15 Pa. St. 166 ;
55 N. Y. 367 (1874); infra, sec. 76 a; Guilford v. Supervisors, 13 N. Y. 144
Shelby Co. v. Railroad Co., 5 Bush (Ky.), (1855); Brewster v. Syracuse, 19 N. Y.
225 ; Philadelphia v. Field, 58 Pa. St. 116 (1859); Thomas u. Leland, 24 Wend.
320 (1868). This seems to be carrying 65 (1840); Hasbrouck v. Milwaukee, 21
the doctrine of the control of the legisla- Wis. 217 (1866); Smith v. Morse, 2 Cal.
ture over public corporations to its extreme 524 ; Grogan v. San Francisco, 18 Cal.
limit. See Mr. Justice Cooley's views, 590 ; Sinton v. Ashbury, 41 Cal. 525
Const. Lim. 380, 491, notes. Taxation (1871); New Orleans v. Clark, 95 U. S.
(2d ed.), 685, 698. The Suprerne Court 644 (1877); People v. Lynch, 51 Cal. 15
of California has followed and approved (1875); Creighton v. San Francisco, 42
Guilford v. Supervisors. Blanding v. Burr, Cal. 446 (1877); People v. Supervisors,
13 Cal. 343 (1859); North Mo. R. R. 70 N. Y. 228 (1877). Text approved.
Co. v. Maguire, 49 Mo. 490, 500, (1872). Nevada v. Hampton, 13 Nev. 441; infra,
And more recently in New York the Court sec. 76 a, sec. 77, note.
of Appeals, while not questioning the The legislature, in favor of a county col-
judgment in Guilford v. Supervisors, &c., lecting officer, who has settled and paid
criticised and limited some of the dicta in a claim against him, may pass an act au-
that case as to the extent of the legislative thorizing the settlement to be opened and
power. Weismer v. Village of Douglass, equitably adjusted, and such an act is an
64 N. Y. 91 ; 8. C. 21 Am. Rep. 586. implied direction that the rule of law as
See infra, sec. 76 a. Under special pro- to voluntary payments, shall not apply.
visions of Michigan Constitution, see Peo- Burns v. Clarion Co., 62 Pa. St. 422
ple v. Onandaga, 16 Mich. 254. Where (1869). In California the legislature can-
one county is under a moral obligation to not compel a city to pay a claim which it
reimburse another county for certain ex- is under no obligation whatever to pay ;
§ 76 a
131
CLAIMS NOT ENFORCEABLE IN LAW.
and with this limitation, the doctrine is unobjectionable in princi-
ple, and must be regarded as settled, although it asserts a measure
of control over municipalities, in respect of their duties and liabili-
ties, which probably does not exist as to private corporations and
individuals.
§ 76. Same subject. Accordingly, in a case where a munici-
pality, after the passage of an act of the legislature which provided
that towns and cities should not thereafter “have power to contract
any debt without fully providing in the ordinance creating the debt
the means of paying the principal and interest,” issued bonds with-
out such a provision as the above statute required, and used them in
payment of an authorized indebtedness, the Supreme Court of the
United States held that inasmuch as the bonds represented an equita-
ble claim against the city, it was competent for the legislature to
interfere and require the city to pay them. “The power of the
legislature,” says Field, J., delivering the judgment of the court,
" to require the payment of a claim for which an equivalent has
been received, and from the payment of which the city can only
escape on technical grounds, would seem to be clear. . . . A very
different question,” the learned judge cautiously adds, “would be
presented if an attempt were made to apply the means raised [by
taxation] to the payment of claims for which no consideration had
been received by the city.” 1
$ 76 a. Same subject. — A bank advanced money to commission-
ers for the construction of the New York City court-house. In
making these advances the bank was represented by its president,
nor require a court to render judgment on should in no event be liable for any por-
proof of the amount thereof. Hoagland tion of the expenses thereof, was held
V. Sacramento, 52 Cal. 142. See infra, not to affect or in any manner invalidate
sec. 76.
an act subsequently passed by the legisla-
i New Orleans v. Clark, 95 U. S. 644, ture requiring the city to pay him a debt
652 (1877). The power of the legislature which in good conscience it ought to
to appropriate the moneys of municipal cor- pay. Creighton v. San Francisco, 42 Cal.
porations in payment of claims ascertained 446 (1872); Sinton v. Ashbury, 41 Cal.
by it to be equitably due to individuals, 525 (1871); New Orleans v. Clark, 95
though such claims be not enforceable in U. S. 644 (1877); supra, secs. 75, 76.
the courts, depends largely, in the view of In Iowa it appears to be regarded as not
the Supreme Court of California, upon the within the power of the legislature to
legislative conscience, and will not be inter- provide a means for the collection of an
fered with by the judicial department unconstitutional obligation against a pub-
unless in exceptional cases; and the cir- lic corporation, as where a debt had been
cumstance that the contract under which incurred in excess of the limit fixed by
the plaintiff did certain work in San Fran- the Constitution. Mosher V. School
cisco, expressly provided that the city District, 44 Iowa, 122 (1876).
132
§ 77
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
and it made the advances in good faith without notice of any con-
spiracy or misappropriation ; but in fact the commissioners had
entered into a fraudulent conspiracy to raise bills for work above the
true amount and to divide the excess among themselves. Part of
the money advanced went into the court-house, but the larger por-
tion of it was fraudulently diverted by the commissioners. Three
of the conspirators were directors of the bank, but were not present
when any action was taken in respect of the advances by the bank.
After this, the legislature passed an act directing the city to pay
back to the various banks all moneys which had been advanced by
them for the use of any of the departments of the city or county,
which act included the advance above mentioned. This act was
held to be a valid exercise of the legislative power.1
§ 77 (45). Ratifying void Local Assessments. It has, however,
been decided in Maryland, that, as against the abutters, the legisla-
ture could not ratify an assessment for a local improvement in front
of their property, which had been adjudged to be void, and com-
pel them to pay for the same. In the case just mentioned, the
legislature, in an act relating to the grading and paving of an avenue
in the city of Baltimore, among other things required, as prelim-
inary to proceedings thereunder, that the mayor and council of the
city should determine the proposed work to be consistent with the
public good. An application by property owners for the improve-
ment was inade to the city commissioners instead of the mayor and
council, and the commissioners determined to grade the avenue,
awarded the contract, and the contractor did the work at the cost
of over $100,000. The abutters instituted no proceedings to stop
the work ; and after it was completed the city passed an ordinance
ratifying the contract to grade, and all the acts of the officers of the
1 Mayor, &c. of New York v. Tenth city was not liable for the advances made
National Bank, 111 N. Y. 446 (1888). to them by the bank, this retroactive act
Earl, J., says :
“ The legislature may de- imperatively requiring the city, without
termine what moneys they may raise its consent, to make good to the bank the
and expend, and what taxation for muni- large amount which the conspirators put
cipal purposes may be imposed ; and it into their pockets and which never went
certainly does not exceed its constitutional into the work, seems to carry the legis-
authority when it compels a municipal lative power beyond the just limits of
corporation to pay a debt which has some equitable or moral obligation, which the
meritorious basis to rest on " ; citing author cannot but think is the true
Town of Guilford v. Supervisors ; Brew- measure of legislative power of this char-
ster v. City of Syracuse; Darlington v. acter.
Mayor, 31 N. Y. 164 ; Brown v. Mayor, 2 Baltimore v. Horn, 26 Md. 194 (1866);
63 N. Y. 239.
compare with cases cited in secs. 75 and
Assuming that the commissioners had 79; Lennon v. New York, 55 N. Y. 361
no power to borrow money, and that the (1874).
§ 79
133
CURATIVE ACTS.
city in relation to the grading of the avenue. An assessment being
made upon their property, to pay the expense of the grading, they
filed a bill for an injunction and relief, and it was judicially deter-
mined that the proceedings of the city commissioners were coram
non judice and void, and that they could not be ratified by ordi-
nance. After this judicial determination, the legislature passed an
act directing the city to pay the contractors for the work done by
them and accepted by the city, to borrow the money for the pur-
pose, and levy a tax for its payment, which the city did. But at
the same session, the legislature, to reimburse the city treasury,
empowered the city to collect from the abutters on the avenue
graded the amounts which had been assessed and ascertained by the
city commissioners; and this last act was held by the court of
appeals to be void, because it was an assumption of judicial power
by the legislature, and, in effect, a legislative reversal of the former
judgment of the court.
$ 78. Same subject. -- In levying a local assessment upon the
abutting property, a lot within the district declared to be benefited
was omitted, after which the legislature validated the assessment,
this omission and exemption being retained and preserved; and it
was held by the Supreme Court of California that the validating"act
was unconstitutional. The ground for this judgment is satisfactory;
since the legislature could not prospectively have exempted the
property omitted because it would have violated the constitutional
requirement of uniformity, it could not do this retrospectively.
$ 79 (46). Curative Acts. --- In general, however, the legislature
may, by subsequent act, validate and confirm previous acts of the cor-
poration otherwise invalid. If the act could have been lawfully
performed or done under precedent legislative authority, the legisla-
ture may subsequently ratify it and give it effect. Merely because
1 Baltimore v. Porter, 18 Md. 284 an incorporated city.” Infra, secs. 79,
(1861); see infra, sec. 814. In Brown v. 544.
Mayor, &c. of New York, 63 N. Y. 239 8 Post, sec. 755, and cases cited in note.
(1876), a legislative ratification of an ultra For construction of constitutional provis-
vires contract for street improvements was ion in California in respect of equality and
sustained. Duanesburg v. Jenkins, 57 uniformity of taxation, the opinion of
N. Y. 177 (1874). Infra, secs. 79, 544. McKinstry, J., in The People v. Lynch,
O'Hara v. State, 112 N. Y. 146 (1889). supra, will repay reading.
2 People v. Lynch, 51 Cal. 15 (1875); 4 Bridgeport v. Railroad Co., 15 Conn.
S. C. 21 Am. Rep. 676. Followed in 475 (1843), in which it was held that the
Schumacher v. Toberman, 56 Cal. 508, legislature might validate prior subscrip
where McKinstry, J., said : “ The legisla- tion of city to stock of railroad company.
ture cannot legalize a void assessment, nor S. P. Winn v. Macon, 21 Ga. 275 (1857);
by direct act make an assessment within Mattingly v. District of Col., 97 U. S.
134
§ 79
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
such legislation, in matters not relating to crimes, is retrospective,
does not make it void. If in addition to its being retrospective,
it unjustly impairs or abrogates vested rights, and, without reason-
able cause, imposes upon third persons new duties in respect to
past transactions, it will be void because in conflict with the
Constitution.1
687;
McMillen v. Boyles, 6 Iowa, 304 ; from Illinois. Adhered to in Bolles v.
Ib. 391; New Orleans v. Poutz, 14 La. Bromfield (a case from Illinois), 120 U. S.
An. 853 ; Bissell v. Jefferson ville, 24 759 (1886), although after the issue of the
How. 287, 295 (1860); Atchison v. bonds in suit by the municipality the Su-
Butcher, 3 Kan. 104 (1865); Frederick v. preme Court of the State of Illinois had
Augusta, 5 Ga. 561 ; Allison v. R. W. Co., decided against the validity of such cura-
9 Bush (Ky.), 247 (1872); Truchelut v. tive legislation. Otoe County v. Baldwin,
City Council, 1 Nott & McCord (S. C.), 111 U. S. 1; Grenada Co. v. Brogden,
227; Citizens' Water Co. v. Bridgeport 112 U. S. 261, 262. Curative act held in-
Hydraulic Co., 55 Conn. 1 ; Tifft v. Buf- effectual by reason of original want of
falo, 82 N. Y. 204 ; Cooley, Const. Lim. power in municipality to issue bonds, and
371, 379; post, secs. 419, 551, 814 ; con- of a disabling provision in the Constitu-
tra, under Constitution of Illinois ; Mar- tion of Mississippi. Katzenberger v. Aber-
shall v. Silliman, 61 Ill. 218 ; but see deen, 121 U. S. 172. But a retrospective
infra, sec. 544, note. A healiny statute act, to make valid a tax upon property not
is not unconstitutional by reason of giving within the corporation when levied, was
validity to an act irregularly done which held void. Atchison, &c. R. R. Co. v.
the legislature could have authorized to be Maquillon, 12 Kan. 301 (1873).
done in the irregular way in the first in- 1 Bridgeport v. R. R. Co., 15 Conn.
stance. Lockhart v. Troy, 48 Ala. 579 475, 497, and cases cited per Church, J.
(1872).
Laws passed to remedy defective execution
It is competent for the legislature, by of powers of public corporations, or their
subsequent enactment, to cure defects or officers, are valid, though retrospective in
omissions in the proceedings of the super- their operation, unless they contravene
intendent of streets. San Francisco v. some provision of the State Constitution.
Certain Real Estate, 42 Cal. 517 (1872). State v. Newark, 3 Dutch. (N. J.) 187
Where the original purpose for which the (1858); Bissell v. Jeffersonville, 24 How.
power of taxation is invoked is one of the 287, 295, where such curative acts are said
ordinary purposes of municipal govern. to be valid when contracts are not im-
ment and within the powers granted, and paired, or the rights of third persons
where there is no fraud or oppression in injuriously affected. New Orleans v. Clark,
the creation of the debt or burden, and no 95 U. S. 644 (1877).
inequality or injustice in the apportion- It is competent for the legislature to
ment of the tax, the legislature may by validate a city ordinance which had become
subsequent enactment cure any defect in the null and void for want of being recorded,
proceedings to collect the tax which it could and to provide that the omission to record
in the first instance, by prior enactment, shall not impair the lien of the assess-
have made immaterial. Emporia v. Nor- ments against the lot-owners. Schenley
ton, 13 Kan. 560; approved in Mason v. v. Commonwealth, 36 Pa. St. 29 (1859).
Spencer, 35 Kan. 512. (An act curing The legislature may ratify, and thereby
defect in mode of collecting a sewer tax make binding an unauthorized municipal
held valid.) Subsequent legislative ratifi- subscription to the stock of an incorpor.
cation of the acts of a municipal corpora- ated theatre company. Municipality v.
tion, which might lawfully have been Theatre Company, 2 Rob. (La.) 209
performed under precedent legislative au- (1842); but, quære, whether, if the legis-
thority, is valid and effectual. Ander. lature had the power, the act in this caso
son v. Santa Anna, 116 U. S. 364, a case was properly held to be a ratification. Dan.
$ 80
135
LEGISLATIVE POWER OVER TRUST PROPERTY.
$ 80 (47). Legislative Power over Property held in trust for
Specific Uses. — While it is undeniable that the legislature has full
control over public corporations, and over the funds which belong
to them as such, and held for strictly public purposes, yet where
by authority of law such corporations hold property or funds in trust
for specific uses, it is left in doubt by the cases how far the legisla-
lature can, unless the uses be public or charitable, interfere with or
control such trust property or funds. In a case of great interest,
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania decided that it was within the
power of the legislature to deprive the city of Philadelphia of the
right to administer charitable trusts under the will of Mr. Girard
and others, which had been granted to and accepted by it, and to
confer the administration of these trusts upon a separate body called
“ Directors of City Trusts,” appointed by the judges of the Supreme
Court and other judges named in the act. It is to be remarked,
however, that the legislature did not attempt to change or pervert
the trusts themselves. Certain it is, that without legislative au-
thority a municipal corporation holding the legal title to property
in trust cannot use the funds derived from such property for corpo-
rate purposes, or indeed for any except the trust purposes.?
ielly v. Cabaniss, 52 Ga. 211 (1874). See, A conveyance was made in 1873, by
further on this subject, chapter on Con- the proprietors of the lands, to the select-
tracts, post, sec. 544. Text cited and men of North Yarmouth, of "all the
approved. Pompton v. Cooper Union, 101 flats, sedge banks, and muscle beds in
U. S. 196.
said town, lying below high-water mark,
| Philadelphia v. Fox, 64 Pn. St. 169 . . for the sole use and benefit of the
(1870). Such a power has since been taken present inhabitants, and of all such as
away from the legislature. Const. Pa., may or shall forever inhabit or dwell in
1874, art. 3, sec. 20; supra, sec. 74 a ; said town," &c. It was decided that this
post, sec. 567 et seq.
property was held by the town as a public
2 White v. Fuller, 39 Vt. 193; ante, corporation, subject to legislative control,
sec. 64 ; Montpelier v. East Montpelier in trust for the use of all of the inhabi-
(contest as to trust property on division tants, and that upon a division of the
of town), 27 Vt. (1 Wms.) 704 (1854); town, it was competent for the legislature
same controversy in chancery, 29 Vt. to provide that the original town should
(3 Wms.) 12. See, also, Trustees, &c. v. still hold such property in trust for the
Bradbury, 2 Fairf. (Me.) 118; Poultney inhabitants of both towns. North Yar-
v. Wells, 1 Aik. (Vt.) 180 ; Plymouth v. mouth v. Skillings, 45 Me. 133 (1858) ;
Jackson, 15 Pa. 44 ; Harrison v. Bridge- post, sec. 187.
ton, 16 Mass. 16; Daniel v. Memphis, 11 To another town in Maine, lands were
Humph. (Tenn.) 582 ; Trustees of Acadgranted by Massachusetts prior to the
emy v. Aberdeen, 13 Sm. & M. (21 Miss.) separation of Maine therefrom, for the use
645, as to which, quloore.
Aberdeen v. of its schools. The legislature, in 1803,
Sanderson, 8 Sm. & M. 670 ; Chambers v. on the application of the town, authorized
St. Louis, 29 Mo. 543; Holland v. San the sale of the lands, and gave to certain
Francisco, 7 Cal. 361 ; Girard v. Philadel. designated trustees the right to control the
phia, 7 Wall. 1. See, post, chapters on funds raised by the sale of the lands.
Corporate Property and Remedies against · This was considered as constituting a
Illegal Corporate Acts.
contract, and it was accordingly held that
136
§ 80
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
a subsequent act of the legislaturė, au- That the legislature cannot in dividing
thorizing the town to choose a new set of a town violate the provisions of the donor
trustees, and directing the first trustees to of a fund held by a municipality in spe-
deliver over the trust property, was, ag. cific trusts is affirmed by the Supreme
reeably to the principles settled in the Court of New Hampshire in a recent
Dartmouth College Case, unconstitutional judgment. The case was this : In 1856
and void. The Trustees, &c. v. Bradbury, the town of M. received from John Boyn-
11 Me. 118 (1834); Yarmouth v. North ton the sum of $10,000 as a fund for the
Yarmouth, 34 Me. 411 (1852). In this support of its public schools, on the ex-
last case the trustees of the funds were a press condition that, unless the income
private corporation, and not subject to thereof should be forever divided and
legislative control. In North Yarmouth applied, according to the number of
v. Skillings, 45 Me. 133 (1858), the trustees scholars between the ages of five and
of the property or fund in question were fifteen in the several schools or districts
a public corporation, and subject to such of the town, the fund should be repaid to
control. The rule as to private and pub- the donor, his executors, administrators,
lic corporations is well exemplified in these or assigns. In 1872, the town of G. was
two cases. See, also, Norris v. Abingdon created by act of the legislature out of
Academy, 7 Gill & Johns. (Md.) 7 ; Bass part of the territory and inhabitants of M.,
v. Fontleroy, 11 Tex. 698 ; Louisville v. and it was provided that all property, real
University of Louisville, 15 B. Mon. 642. and personal, and all school and other
In The State v. Springfield Township, funds belonging to the original town of M.
6 Ind. (Porter) 83 (1854), it was held that should be divided in the proportion of
a law of the State (act of 1852), so far as it seven to M. and thirteen to G. It was
diverted the proceeds of the sale of the held that the legislature had no constitu-
sixteenth section (granted by act of Con- tional power to direct a division or dis-
gress of April 19, 1816) from the use of tribution of the fund different from that
schools in the congressional township prescribed by the donor ; and that, there-
where the land was situated, to the use of fore, no legal provision for the division of
the school system of the State at large, the fund in controversy having been made,
was in contravention of that section of the rights of the town of M. therein were
the State Constitution (sec. 7, art. viii.) unaffected by the act, and the new town
which provides, that "all trust funds of G. was not entitled to any portion of
held by the State shall remain in violate, the fund or income. Greenville v. Mason,
and be faithfully and exclusively applied 53 N. H. 515 (1873); post, sec. 187,
to the purpose for which the trust was note,
created."
$ 82
137
CHARTERS DEFINED.
CHAPTER V.
MUNICIPAL CHARTERS.
General Municipal Powers. Their Nature and Construction.
§ 81 (48). Subject outlined. - This chapter will treat of Muni-
cipal Charters and the principles upon which they are construed,
and of the general nature of the powers which they confer upon the
corporation or upon its legislative or governing body. The subject
will be considered under the following heads :
1. Charters defined. $ 82.
2. Judicially noticed. $ 83.
3. Proof of Corporate Existence. § 84.
4. Repeal and Amendment of Charters. $$ 85, 86.
5. Conflict between General Laws and Special Charters. $$ 87,
88.
6. Extent of Corporate Powers, Limitations thereon, and Canons
of Construction. $$ 89, 90, 91.
7. Usage as affecting Powers and their Interpretation. $$ 92, 93.
8. Discretionary Powers. $$ 94, 95.
9. Public Powers incapable of Delegation. $ 96.
10. Public Powers cannot be surrendered or bargained away.
§ 97.
11. Imperative and Discretionary Powers. $$ 98, 99.
12. Exemption of Revenues from Judicial Seizure, and herein
of Garnishment. $$ 100, 101.
§ 82 (49). Charters defined. We have before seen that in this
country municipal corporations are created by legislative act, either
in the form of a special legislative charter or under general incor-
porating statutes. A MUNICIPAL CHARTER granted by the crown in
England is a written instrument in the form of letters-patent, with
the Great Seal appended to it, addressed to all the subjects, and con-
stituting the persons therein named and their successors a body
corporate for or within the place therein specified, and prescribing
the powers and duties of the corporation thereby created. But such
charters are inoperative until accepted. But in this country, as
1 Ante, secs. 39, 41.
Ante, secs. 32, 44. Outline of charter of the Middle Ages, ante, sec. 6.
138
§ 83
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
we have elsewhere shown, the legislature creates, alters, and, in the
absence of constitutional restriction, can repeal charters and incor-
porating statutes and abolish municipal and public corporations at
its will, and it invests them with such powers, mandatory and dis-
cretionary, and requires of them such duties, as it deems most
expedient for the general, good, and for the benefit of the particular
locality. No precise form of words is necessary to create a corpo-
ration, and a corporation may be created by implication.?
$ 83 (50). Charters judicially noticed. — Courts will judicially
notice the charter or incorporating act of a municipal corporation
without being specially pleaded, not only when it is declared to be
a public statute, but when it is public or general in its nature or pur-
poses, though there be no express provision to that effect. But the
acts, votes, and ordinances of the corporation are not public matters,
and must, unless otherwise provided by statute, be pleaded and
proved.4
1 Weeks v. Gilmanton, 60 N. H. 500. (1857); Clarke v. Bank, 5 Eng. (10 Ark.)
Ante, secs. 8, 9, 22.
516 ; State v. Mayor, 11 Humph. (Tenn.)
2 Ante, secs. 3, 42, 43.
217 (1850); see Vance 2. Bank, 1 Blackf.
3 Albrittin v. Huntsville, 60 Ala. 486 ; (Ind.) 80, and note (2); 6 Bac. Abr. 374,
Smoot v. Wetumpka, 24 Ala. 121 ; Case note ; Young v. Bank, &c., 4 Cranch,
V. Mobile, 30 Ala. 538 ; Perryman v. 384 ; Swails v. State, 4 Ind. 516 (1853);
Greenville, 51 Ala. 510 ; Montgomery v. Portsmouth, &c. Co. v. Watson, 10 Mass.
Wright, 72 Ala. 411 ; Selma v. Perkins, 91; Clapp v. Hartford, 35 Conn. 66 ;
68 Ala. 145; Montgomery v. Hughes, 65 People v. Potter, 35 Cal. 110, where a city
Ala. 201; Wetumpka v Wetumpka is incorporated under a general act, the
Wharf Co., 63 Ala. 611 ; Potwin v. fact of its corporate character must be
Johnson, 108 Ill. 70; Dwyer v. Bren- averred and proved. Ingle v. Jones, 43
ham, 65 Tex. 526 ; Solomon v. Hughes, Iowa, 286 (1876); post, sec. 177, note;
24 Kan. 211 ; State v. Tosney, 26 Minn. Morgan v. Atlanta, 77 Ga. 662.
A city
262 ; Durch v. Chippewa Co., 60 Wis. charter being declared to be a public act,
227 ; Smith v. Janesville, 52 Wis. 680. supplements and amendments to it are
In Indiana, if a city is a party to a suit likewise public. Newark Bank v. Asses-
and the pleadings do not show otherwise, sors, 30 N. J. L. 22; State v. Bergen, 34
the presumption is that it is incorporated N. J. L. 439; New Jersey v. Yard, 95 U.
under the general incorporation law. S. 112 (1877). See post, chapter on Ordi-
House v. Greensburg, 93 Ind. 533.
nances, sec. 422.
Where a public law
Beatty v. Knowles, 4 Pet. (U. S.) creates the mayor and aldermen an incor-
152, 157 (1830); Stier v. Oskaloosa, cit- porated body, no averment or proof is
ing and approving text, 41 Iowa, 353 ; necessary to establish the existence of the
Ingle v. Jones, 43 Iowa, 286 (1876); corporation. State v. Mayor, 11 Humph.
Aldermen v. Finley, 5 Eng. (10 Ark. 423 (Tenn.) 217 (1850); State v. Helmes
(1850) ; Fauntleroy v. Hannibal, 1 Dillon (prescriptive corporations), Pen. (N. J.)
C. C. 118 (1971); Prell v. McDonald, 7 1050 ; Hawthorne v. Hoboken (supple-
Kan. 426 (1871) ; s. C. 7 Am. Rep. 423 ; mental act), 3 Vroom, 32 N. J. L. 172;
West v. Blake, 4 Blackf. (Ind.) 234 Stevens Co. v. Railroad Co., 4 Vroom, 33
(1836) ; Briggs v. Whipple, 7 Vt. 15, 18 N.J.L. 229; Bowie v. Kansas City, 51 Mo.
(1835); Case 1. Mobile, 30 Ala. 538 454 (1873).
4
§ 84
139
FROOF OF CORPORATE EXISTENCE.
§ 84 (51). Proof of corporate Existence; User ; Legislative
Recognition. — The primary evidence of a special charter or act of
incorporation in this country is the original or an authenticated
copy, or, under statute regulation, a printed copy published by au-
thority. But if primary evidence cannot be had, parol or secondary
evidence of its existence is admissible. Thus, where a public corpo-
ration had existed for a long space of time in the instance before
the court, for forty years), the court allowed evidence of its incorpo-
ration by reputation, the original act not being found, and it being
probable that it had been destroyed by fire. So evidence that a
town has for many years exercised corporate privileges, no charter
after search being found, is competent to go to the jury to establish
that it was duly incorporated. And where there is no direct or
record evidence that a place has been incorporated, and it is
sought to show the fact of incorporation from circumstantial evi-
dence, the question is ordinarily for the jury, and not the court;
that is, the jury, under the circumstances determine whether there
is or is not sufficient ground to presume a charter or act of incorpo-
ration, or the due establishment and existence of a corporate dis-
trict under some general act. So corporate existence may be
1 Stockbridge v. West Stockbridge, 12 Where a corporation is created, and
Mass. 400 (1815); Braintree v. Battles, 6 declared to exist as such, by the legisla-
Vt. 395 (1834) ; Blackstone v. White, 41 ture without condition, proof of organiza-
Pa. St. 330.
tion or user is not necessary to enable it
2 Dillingham v. Snow, 5 Mass. 547 to maintain an action. Cahill v. Insur-
(1809); S. P. Bassett v. Porter, 4 Cush. ance Company, 2 Doug. (Mich.) 124 ;
487 (1849). In view of the defective man- Fire Department v. Kip, 10 Wend. 266
ner in which the records of quasi corpora. (1833). And see Proprietors, &c. v. Hor-
tions -- such as school and road districts, ton, 6 Hill (N. Y.), 501 ; People v. Presi-
and the like are kept, the courts, in the dent, 9 Wend. 351; Wood v. Bank, 9
absence of any statute requiring record Cowen, 194, 205. When construed to be
evidence, will permit the existence and immediately created, the omission to do
organization of the corporation to be certain acts prescribed to organize the in-
proved by reputation and acts, where these stitution, was held immaterial as respects
facts do not appear of record. Barnes v. persons contracting with the corporation.
Barnes, 6 Vt. 388 (1834); Londonderry v. Brouwer v. Appleby, 1 Sandf. 158 (1847);
Andover, 28 Vt. 416, (1856) ; Sherwin v. S. P. People v. President, 9 Wend. 351.
Bugbee, 16 Vt. 439 ; Ryder v. Railroad See also ante, sec. 44.
Co., 13 Ill. 523; Highland Turnpike v. 8 New Boston v. Dumbarton, 15 N. H.
McKean, 11 Johns. 154 ; Owings v. 201 (1844) ; Mayor of Kingston v. Horner,
Speed, 5 Wheat. 420. See chapter on Cowp. 102, per Lord Mansfield ; Worley
Corporate Records and Documents, post. v. Harris, 82 Ind. 493. Where the fact of
Irregularities in the proceedings to or- incorporation arises as a collateral question,
ganize a corporation are not favored when it is only necessary to show that a city is
set up long afterwards to defeat the cor- de facto à corporation. Louisville N. A.
porate existence. Jameson v. People, 16 & Chic. Ry. Co. v. Shires, 108 Ill. 617.
Ill. 257 (1855) ; Dunning v. Railroad Co., 4 Bassett v. Porter, 4 Cush. 487 (1849);
2 Ind. 437 (1850); Fitch v. Pinckard, 4 New Boston v. Dumbarton, 12 N. H. 409,
Scam. 5 Ill. 76.
412 (1841); S. C. 15 N. H. 201 ; Robie v.
140
§ 85
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
inferred and judicially noticed, although the incorporating act or
charter cannot be found, if the fact of incorporation is clearly rec-
ognized by subsequent legislation not in contravention of any consti-
tutional provision respecting the mode of creating corporations.1
§ 85 (52). Repeals and Amendments, and their Effect. The
powers conferred upon municipal corporations may at any time be
altered or repealed by the legislature, either by a general law oper-
ating upon the whole State, or, in absence of constitutional restric-
tion, by a special act. A charter may be amended, the name of the
Sedgwick, 35 Barb. 319 (1861). The Sloan v. State, 8 Blackf. (Ind.) 361 (1847),
exercise of corporate powers by a place for approving People v. Morris, 13 Wend.
twenty years, without objection, and with 325 ; Daniel v. Mayor, &c. 11 Humph.
the knowledge and assent of the legisla- (Tenn.) 582 ; State v. Mayor, 24 Ala. 701
ture, furnishes conclusive evidence of a (1854); Girard v. Philadelphia, 7 Wall.
charter, which has been lost; or, in other 1 (1868); State v. Troth, 5 Vroom (34
words, of a corporation by prescription, N. J. L.), 379; Worthley v. Steen, 43
which supposes a grant. Bow v. Allen- N. J. L. 542; Wallace v. Trustees, 84
town, 34 N.H. 351 (1857). In this case it N. C. 164 ; post, secs. 171, 172 ; State v.
was also held that an act of incorporation Palmer, 4 N. W. Rep. 966 ; Indianapolis
subsequently passed does not raise any con- v. Indianapolis Gas Co., 66 Ind. 396 ; ante,
clusive presumption that the town was secs. 45, 52 et seq. Crook v. People, 106
not before incorporated. Long use and Ill. 237 ; Churchill v. Walker, 68 Ga.
acquiescence are evidence in support of the 681. The adoption of a new State Consti-
legal existence of a municipal corporation. tution does not abrogate a special charter
People v. Farnham, 35 Ill. 562 ; Jameson unless in conflict with it. People, ex rel.
v. People, 16 Ill. 257 (1855); People v. Mills v. Jones, 7 Col. 475. The power of
Maynard, 15 Mich. 463 (1867). Long ac- the legislature to amend a special charter
quiescence in the proceedings of a school is not impaired by the fact that the char-
district is presumptive evidence of the ter has been continued in force by a new
regular organization of such district. Constitution of the State. Wiley v. Bluff-
Sherwin v. Bugbee, 16 Vt. 439 (1844); ton, 111 Ind. 152. The provisions of an
Londonderry v. Andover, 28 Vt. 416. “It amendatory act reducing the number of
is now well settled in this State, that the councilmen, though the act took effect at
mere fact of a school district maintaining once, were postponed until the next year,
its existence and operation for a great when they could be called into requisition
number of years
say fifteen - is suffi- at the election, no earlier election being
cient evidence of its regular organization, provided for ; and meanwhile the exist-
The same rule of presumption must be ap- ing council remained unaffected by the
plied to the subdivision of the town into amendment. Scovill v. Cleveland, 1 Ohio
districts." Per Redfield, J., in Sherwin v. St. 126 (1853). Same principle applied.
Bugbee, supra.
Reading v. Keppleman, 61 Pa. St. 233
1 Jameson v. People, 16 Ill. 257 (1855); (1869).
Swain v. Comstock, 18 Wis. 463 (1864) ; A legislative amendment to charter
People v. Farnham, 35 Ill. 562 ; Bow v. abolishing assistant aldermen, and declar-
Allentown, 34 N. H. 351 (1857); Society, ing board of aldermen to be common
&c. v. Pawlet, 4 Pet. 480 (1830); Railroad council, is a valid exercise of legislative
Co. v. Chenoa, 43 Ill. 209 ; Virginia City authority ; a public corporation's charter
v. Mining Co., 2 Nev. 86 (1866); Rail being always subject to legislative amend-
road Co. v. Plumas County, 37 Cal. 354 ; ment or alteration. Demarest v. New
ante, sec. 42.
York, 74 N. Y. 161. An act repealing a
2 Meriwether v. Garrett, 102 U. S. 472; charter and imposing upon the sheriff of
$ 86
141
REPEAL AND AMENDMENT.
place and of the governing body may be changed, and its boundaries
altered, while in law the corporation remains the same. The inser-
tion in an amended charter of the same provisions that were con-
tained in the old is not, unless such upon the whole act appears to
have been the intention of the legislature, a repeal of the latter.
The law on this subject is thus stated: “Where a statute does not,
in express terms, annul a right or power given to a corporation by a
former act, but only confers the same rights and powers under a new
name, and with additional powers, such subsequent act does not annul
the rights and powers given under the former act and under its
former name," there being no express repeal. The change of a city
charter does not affect existing ordinances in harmony with new
provisions.3
§ 86 (53). Repeating Clause; Substitutionary Charter; Repeals
by Implication - A repeating clause in a revised and amendatory
the county the duty of enforcing its ordi- Justice Strong, “than that a change in
nances as the town narshal might have the form of government of a community does
done, held valid. Rose v. Hardee, 98 not ipso facto abrogate pre-existing law,
N. C. 44. Where a town was incorpor- either written or unwritten. This is true
ated under a general act and afterwards in regard to what is strictly municipal law,
accepted and organized under a special even when the change is by conquest.
charter, it was held that the repeal of the The act of assembly converting a borough
special charter did not revive its incorpor. into a city did not, therefore, of itself, and
ation under the general act, and that it in the absence of express provisions to that
was no longer a municipal corporation. effect, either repeal the former acts of as-
Burk v. State, 5 Lea (Tenn.), 349.
sembly relative to the borough, or annul
1 Wood v. Board of Election, 58 Cal. existing ordinances. It was solely a
561 ; post, secs. 171, 182 et seq. ; State, change in the organic law for the future,
ex rel. v. White, 20 Neb. 37, holding that and left unaffected the existing ordinances,
a mere change of a city from one grade to precisely as a change of a State Constitu-
another, under the general law of Ne- tion leaves undisturbed all prior acts of
braska, does not change the corporation assembly.” Trustees of Academy v. Erie,
itself, and that, in consequence, a police 31 Pa. St. 515, 517 (1858). As to trans-
judge elected before the change was made fer to new or reorganized corporation of the
was entitled to hold his office for the full property and rights of the old or former
term for which he was elected. To same corporation, see Girard v. Philadelphia, 7
effect, State v. Hedlund, 16 Neb. 566. See Wall. 1 (1868); Savannah v. Steamboat
post, sec. 172.
Company, R. M. Charlt. (Ga.) 342 ; Fowle
2 State, &c. v. Mobile, 24 Ala. 701 v. Alexandria, 3 Pet. 398, 408 ; Munici-
(1854); Girard v. Philadelphia, 7 Wall. pality v. Commissioners, 1 Rob. (La.) 279.
1 (1868) ; Broughton v. Pensacola, 93 Transition from town to city organization
U. S. 266 (1876). Approving Milner's does not dissolve the corporation or extin-
Admx. v. Pensacola, 2 Woods, 632 ; Laird guish its indebtedness. Olney v. Harvey,
v. De Soto, 22 Fed. Rep. 421 ; Indianapolis 50 Ill. 453 (1869) ; Maysville v. Shultz,
v. Indianapolis Gas Co., 66 Ind. 396. 3 Dana, 10 (1865); Frank v. San Fran-
Approving text. Commonwealth v. Wor. cisco, 21 Cal. 668 ; post, chap. vii. secs.
cester, 3 Pick. (Mass.) 474 (1826) ; Grant 171, 172.
on Corp. 24, and cases cited ; Ib. 305. 8 Chamberlain v. Evansville, 77 Ind.
See chapter on Dissolution, post. “There 542 ; Trustees of Academy v. Erie, supra.
is no doctrine better settled,” says Mr.
142
§ 86
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
charter whereby a former provision is included in the revised act,
does not, as to such provision, interrupt the continuity of the origi-
nal act.1 Where the original charter of a city prescribed the quali-
fications required to make a person eligible to the office of mayor,
and contained a proviso that a certain fact disqualified, and an
amendatory act, in dealing in the same subject, copied all of the origi-
nal act except the proviso, which was omitted, the court held that the
proviso in the original act was not repealed, placing stress, however,
upon the express declaration that all parts of the new act incon-
sistent with or contrary to the old one were repealed. There is,
however, much room to contend that the subject matter having
been revised in the amendatory act in the manner it was, the legis-
lative intention was to repeal, and not to continue in force, the pro-
viso. A general law forbidding the opening of streets through
cemeteries is not repealed by a subsequent act extending the limits
of a town, and appointing commissioners with authority "to survey,
lay out, &c., streets and alleys, as they shall deem necessary within
said limits," since both acts can stand, and repeals by implication are
not favored. So a general statute, expressly prohibiting a muni-
cipal corporation from debarring citizens from selling at wholesale in
the city market, is not repealed by implication by a subsequent act,
by which the city authorities are invested with power to pass such
ordinances as appear to them necessary for the security, welfare, &c.,
of the city. So, also, where a State statute required auctioneers to
take out a State license, and a subsequent charter to a city gave it
power “to provide for licensing, taxing, and regulating auctions,"
&c., it was held that a license granted by the city corporation to an
auctioneer did not relieve him of the necessity of obtaining, also, a
license from the State authorities, the court being of opinion that
both statutes could and ought to stand, as they were not incon-
sistent.5
8
1 St. Louis v. Alexander, 23 Mo. 483 Stats. 126 ; Bank v. Bridge, 1 Vroom (30
(1856).
N. J. L.), 112 ; Industrial School v.
2 State v. Merry, 3 Mo. 278 (1833). Whitehead, 2 Beasley, N. J. 290 ; State
Consult Goodenow v. Buttrick, 7 Mass. V. Kelly, 5 Vroom (34 N. J. L.), 75.
140, 143 ; King v. Grant, 1 Barn. & Egypt Street, 2 Grant (Pa.) Cas. 455
Adol. 104. Where a later statute under. (1854). See, further, infra, sec. 87, as to
takes to revise the entire subject-matter of a repeals by implication.
prior statute, it will generally be taken as 4 Haywood v. Savannah, 12 Ga. 404
intended to be a substitute for the former (1853).
statute unless a contrary purpose appears. Simpson v. Savage, 1 Mo. 359 (1823);
It is entirely a question of legislative in- infra, sec. 87. Text approved. Sieben-
tention. Murdock v. Memphis, 20 Wall. hauer, In re, 14 Nev. 365.
590, 617, and cases cited. Sedgwick on
5
§ 87
143
REPEAL AND AMENDMENT.
§ 87 (54). General Laws and Special Charters; Repeals by
Implication; Conflict; Construction.
It is a principle of very
extensive operation that affirmative statutes of a general nature do
not repeal by implication charters and special acts passed for the
benefit of particular municipalities; 1 but they do so when this
clearly appears to have been the purpose of the legislature. If both
the general and the special acts can stand, they will be construed
accordingly. If one must give way it will depend upon the sup-
posed intention of the law-maker, to be collected from the entire
legislation, whether the charter is superseded by the general statute,
or whether the special charter provisions apply to the municipality,
in exclusion of the general enactments. So particular provisions of
charters should be read and construed in the light of the whole
instrument, of all preceding charters, of the general legislation of the
1 Bond v. Hiestand, 20 La. An. 139; a question of intention,” says Wagner, J.,
Railroad Co. v. Alexandria, 17 Gratt. (Va.) and the intention was regarded as manifest
176 (1867); Hammond v. Haines, 25 Md. from the scope and purpose of the whole
541 ; Louisville v. McKean, 18 B. Mon. act, although negative words, or words of
9 ; Cumberland v. Magruder, 34 Md. 381 repeal, were not used. State v. Sevarance,
(1871) ; Comm'rs Central Park, In re, 55 Mo. 378 (1874) ; Union Pacific Ry.
50 N. Y. 493 (1872) ; Mayor v. Inman, Co. v. Cheyenne, 113 U. S. 516 (1884);
57 Ga. 370 (1876); post, secs. 137, 162 ; post, sec. 770.
State, ex rel. v. Wilson, 12 Lea (Tenn.), The principle that general legislation on
246 ; Wood v. Board of Election, 58 a particular subject must, in the absence
Cal. 561 ; East St. Louis v. Maxwell, 99 of anything showing a different intent on
Ill. 439. A provision in a new State the part of the legislature, give way to
Constitution held to remove a limitation inconsistent special legislation on the same
in a municipal charter upon the power of subject, is recognized and applied in the
taxation for the payment of bonded in- following cases. State v. Morristown, 33
debtedness. East St. Louis v. Amy, 120 N. J. Law, 57 (1868); Cross v. Morristown,
U. S. 600. In Donahue v. Graham, 61 3 C. E. Green (18 N J. Eq.), 305 ; State
Cal. 276, a "street law" contained in a v. Trenton, 7 Vroom (36 N. J. L.), 198,
city charter which was inconsistent with 201 ; State v. Branin, 3 Zabr. (23 N. J. L.)
the provisions of a new Constitution, was State v. Clark, 1 Dutch. (N. J.) 54;
held to be repealed by it. Repeals by im- State v. Jersey City, 5 Dutch. 170; Jersey
plication are not favored ; and special laws City 2. Railroad Co., 20 N. J. Eq. 360 ;
conferring particular rights upon munici- Goddard, In re, 16 Pick. 504 ; Railroad
pal corporations were held not to be re- Co. v. Alexandria, supra.
In Bank v.
pealed by subsequent statutes general in Bridges, 1 Vroom (30 N. J. L.), 112, and
their character. Ottawa v. County, 12 Ill. State v. Miller, Ib. 368, special laws gave
339; Egypt Street, 2 Grant (Pa.) Cas. way to general laws, because the legisla-
455 (1854); Harrisburgh v. Sheck, 104 ture had annexed to the latter a repealing
Pa. St. 53 ; supra, sec. 87. A general clause abrogating all inconsistent local or
statute, repealing all acts contrary to its special acts. Per Depue, J., 33 N. J. 57,
provisions, held not to repeal a clause in 60. See Bank v. Davis, 1 McCarter Ch.
the charter of a municipal corporation (N J.) 286 ; Clintonville v. Keeting, 4
upon the same subject. State v. Branin Denio, 341 ; Tierney v. Dodge, 9 Minn.
(taxation), 3 Zabr. (23 N. J. L.), 484 166. Other illustrations will be found in
(1852). But a general railroad tax law held the chapters on Ordinances and Taxation,
to repeal by implication prior special char- post, sec. 773 ; ante, sec. 86.
ter powers of municipalities. “It is really
484 ;
1
144
§ 88
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
State, and of the object of the legislature in the erection of munici-
palities, as before explained.
§ 88. Implied Repeal of General Laws. — The presumption is not
lightly to be indulged that the legislature has by implication repealed,
as respects a particular municipality, or as respects all municipal-
ities, laws of a general nature, elsewhere in force throughout the
State ; yet a charter or special act passed subsequent to the general
law, and plainly irreconcilable with it, will to the extent of the con-.
flict operate a repeal of the latter by implication. But by a well-
known rule, founded on solid reasons, such repeals are not favored;
and the principle of implied repeals ought to be applied with ex-
treme caution?
1 Alexander v. Alexandria (taxing lecting their taxes, was held not to alter
power), 5 Cranch, 2 (1809); Grant on the powers and practice of the city under
Corp. 27; Canal Company V. Railroad its charter. People v. Clunie, 70 Cal.
Company, 4 Gill & Johns. 1 ; Smith v. 504. When general revenue laws are ap-
Kernochen, 7 How. 198 ; Janesville v. plicable to incorporated places, see post,
Markoe, 18 Wis. 350 ; Powell v. Parkers- secs. 770–774. Provisions in a city charter
burg, 28 W. Va. 698 ; Thomason v. Ash- inconsistent with annendments to the Con-
worth, 73 Cal. 73; Babcock v. Helena, stitution of the State afterwards adopted
34 Ark. 499 ; Eichels v. Evansville Street are void. Public School Trustees v. Taylor,
Ry. Co., 78 Ind. 261 ; Chicago Dock Co. 30 N. J. Eq. 618.
V. Garrity, 115 lll. 155. Where there 2 See cases cited to last preceding sec-
was a charter provision in reference to tion; also, St. Louis v. Alexander, 23
bribery committed by a municipal officer, Mo. 483 ; Baldwin v. Green, 10 Mo. 410;
and the same crime was made punishable State 1. Binder, 38 Mo. 451; State v.
by a greater penalty in a code subsequently Young (intoxicating liquors), 17 Kan.
adopted by the legislature, it was held 414 (1877) (where the Kansas cases on the
that, as to crimes committed after the subject are discussed by Horton, C. J.);
code was adopted, the charter provision State v. Clarke, 1 Dutch. (N. J.) 54;
was repealed. People v. Jaehne, 103 State v. Douglass, 4 Vroom (33 N. J. L.),
N. Y. 182 ; People v. O'Neil, 109 N. Y. 363 ; State v. Mills, 5 Vroon (34 N. J. L.), ,
251 ; ante, secs. 9, 22, 29. Acts in pari 177, 180 ; Montezuma v. Minor, 70 Ga.
materia should be construed together ; and 191 ; St. Johnsbury v. Thompson, 59 Vt.
on this principle, the definition of the 300. The case of The State v. Clark, 54
word “owner,
in a subsequent paving Mo. 17 (1873), s. C. 14 Am. Rep. 471, and of
act, was considered as proper to be ad- The State v. De Bar, 58 Mo. 395 (1874),
verted to, and as applicable to the same relating to the social cvil powers of the city
word in prior acts on the same subject. of St. Louis, are highly instructive on the
Holland v. Baltimore, 11 Md. 186 (1857); question on the effect of a special act upon
New Bedford & F. Street Ry. Co. v. Acush- the gencral law. In each case the defend-
net Street Ry. Co., 143 Mass. 200 ; Moran ant was ind
ant was indicted under the general crim-
v. Long Island City, 101 N. Y. 439. inal code of the State, which prohibited
Where a city charter adopted the general the keeping of bawdy houses.
In the first
revenue act as to the mode of assessing and case the defendant pleaded a license from
collecting municipal taxes, the subsequent the city to keep such a house. In 1870 the
repeal of the revenue act and the passage charter of the city was amended, and the
of a general law concerning the creation previous power to “
suppress" such houses
and government of municipalities, which was changed to the power “ to pass ordi-
contained provisions for assessing and col- nances, not inconsistent with any law of
$ 89
145
SUMMARY OF CORPORATE POWERS.
§ 89 (55). Extent of Power ; Limitations ; Canons of Construc-
tion. It is a general and undisputed proposition of law that a mu-
nicipal corporation possesses and can exercise the following powers,
and no others: First, those granted in express words ; second, those
necessarily or fairly implied in or incident to the powers expressly
granted; third, those essential to the declared objects and purposes
of the corporation, - not simply convenient, but indispensable. Any
fair, reasonable doubt concerning the existence of power is resolved
by the courts against the corporation, and the power is denied. Of
the State, to regulate or suppress" such power to “regulate." See also Givens v.
houses. Under this power to regulate, Van Studdiford, 86 Mo. 149. General
the city regulated such houses by passing power in a inunicipal charter held not to
an order licensing them; and such an repeal by implication the chartered rights
ordinance was held to be valid notwith- of a railroad company. State v. Jersey
standing the general law, and to have the City, 5 Dutch. 170. Or to interfere with
effect to prevent the enforcement of the vested rights. State v. Jersey City, 5
general criminal law of the State within Vroom (31 N. J. L.), 32.
the city of St. Louis. The question was A charter which confers exclusive juris-
a close one, but the majority opinion of diction upon municipal authorities oper-
Napton, J., in view of the legislation 18- ates to repeal the general law on the same
cited in it, seems to be sound. State v. subject within the municipality ; not so
Clark, 54 Mo. 17 (1873). The next year, ordinarily when the charter confers con-
1874, in consequence of the decision, the current authority. Seebold v. People, 86
charter of the city was amended in this nl. 33 (1878).
respect, by substituting the words " to 1 Smith v. Newbern, 70 N. C. 14
suppress, but not to license, bawdy houses.” (1874); s. C. 16 Am. Rep. 766. Referring to
After this act went into effect the State v. the text, McAllister, J., in People v. How-
De Bar, supra, arose. The defendant was ard, not officially reported, says, “ It is the
indicted nnder the general law of the best summary of all the decisions upon
State for keeping such a house. There that point to be found in all the books."
was another provision in the general law, Text cited and approved in the following
that the repeal of a law shall not by im- cases : Cook Co. v. McCrea, 93 Ill. 236 ;
plication revive a former law. And it Ottawa v. Carey, 108 U. S. 110 ; Kelly v.
was held by a majority of the court that Town of Milan, 21 Fed. Rep. 842 ; Scott
the amendment of 1874, which repealed V. Shreveport, 20 Fed. Rep. 714 ; Des-
the former amendment of 1870, did not mond v. City of Jefferson, 19 Fed. Rep.
thereby revive the general criminal statute 483 ; In re Lee Tong, 18 Fed. Rep. 253 ;
in the city of St. Louis, and, as a conse- City of Eufaula v. McNab, 67 Ala. 588 ;
quence, that the defendant could not be Henke v. McCord, 55 Iowa, 378 ; Ravenna
convicted. This last decision seems to the v. Pennsylvania Co., 45 Ohio St. 118 ;
author to be erroneous, on the ground that City of Corvallis v. Carlile, 10 Oreg. 139 ;
the act of 1870 did not ipso facto repeal Danville v. Shelton, 76 Va. 325 ; Bell v.
the general law in the city, but such re- Platteville, 71 Wis. 139 ; Gilman v Mil-
peal, or suspension rather, was only ef- waukee, 61 Wis. 588 ; Blake v. Walker,
fected when the city passed the ordinance. 23 S. C. 517; Charleston v. Reed, 27 W.
If so, a repeal of the ordinance by the Va. 681; City of Kansas v. Swopa, 79 Mo.
council, without the act of 1874, would 446; City of Portland v. Schmidt, 13 Oreg.
have left the general law of the State in 17; Levy v. Salt Lake City, 3 Utah, 63;
force within the city, and its repeal by Richmond v. McGirr, 78 Ind. 192, 197
the act of 1874 would have precisely the (1881).
same effect. These cases may be usefully 2 Text quoted with approval. Wil-
consulted on the nature and scope of the liams v. Davidson, 43 Tex. 33; Brenham
VOL. I. -10
146
§ 90
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
every municipal corporation the charter or statute by which it is
created is its organic act. Neither the corporation nor its officers
can do any act, or make any contract, or incur any liability, not
authorized thereby, or by some legislative act applicable thereto.
All acts beyond the scope of the powers granted are void. Much
less can any power be exercised, or any act done, which is forbidden
by charter or statute. These principles are of transcendent impor-
tance, and lie at the foundation of the law of municipal corporations.
Their reasonableness, their necessity, and their salutary character
have been often vindicated, but never more forcibly than by the late
learned Chief-Justice Shaw, who, speaking of municipal and public
corporations, says: " They can exercise no powers but those which are
conferred upon them by the act by which they are constituted, or
such as are necessary to the exercise of their corporate powers, the
performance of their corporate duties, and the accomplishment of
the purposes of their association. This principle is derived from the
nature of corporations, the mode in which they are organized, and in
which their affairs must be conducted."
$ 90. Same subject. — “In aggregate corporations, as a general
rule," continues Chief-Justice Shaw," the act and will of a majority
is deemed in law the act and will of the whole, -as the act of the
v. Water Co., 67 Tex. 542; Hanger v. Des County Comm'rs, 25 Minn. 259; Fulton v.
Moines, 54 Iowa, 193; City of Corvallis v. Lincoln, 9 Neb. 358; Hurford v. Omaha,
Carlile, 10 Oreg. 139; Kirkham v. Russell, 4 Neb. 350 ; Reis v. Graff, 51 Cal. 86.
76 Va. 956; Tax Collector v. Dendinger, Text cited with approval in Cook Co. v.
38 La. An. 261.
McCrea, 93 Ill. 236; Birmingham & Pratt
1 McCann v. Otoe Co., 9 Neb. 324; M. Ry. Co. v. Birmingham Street Ry. Co.,
Stewart v. Otoe Co., 2 Neb. 177; 8. C. & 79 Ala. 465; Davenport v. Kleinschmidt,
P. R. R. Co. v. Washington Co., 3 Neb. 6 Mont. 502 ; Heiskell v. Baltimore, 65
42 ; Somerville v. Dickerman, 127 Mass. Md. 125 ; Dwyer v. City of Brenham, 65
272; Boylston Market v, Boston, 113 Tex. 526; St. Johnsbury v. Thompson, 59
Mass. 528; Harvard College v. Boston, Vt. 300; Christie v. Malden, 23 W. Va.
104 Mass. 470; Brimmer v. Boston, 102 667; Spengler v. Trowbridge, 62 Miss. 46
Mass. 19; People v. Webber, 89 Ill. 347; (an appropriation to pay expenses of a
Bryan v. Page, 51 Tex. 532; Francis v. committee in endeavoring to obtain legis.
Troy, 74 N. Y. 338; State v. Passaic, 41 lation from Congress held illegal, and pay.
N. J. L. 90; Perrine v. Farr, 2 Zabr. (22 ment enjoined); Gas Co. v. Parkersburg,
N. J. L.) 356; Carron v. Martin, 2 Dutch. 30 W. Va. 435 (1887). The citizens of a
(N. J.) 594; State v. Hudson, 5 Dutch. city cannot confer upon its common coun-
(N. J.) 104; State v. Marion Co., 21 Kan. cil powers not granted by charter. Torrent
419; Green v. Cape May, 41 N. J. L. 45; v. Muskegon, 47 Mich. 115. Applying
Lord v. Oconto, 47 Wis. 386; Garvey, In the rule in the text, an act authorizing the
re, 77 N. Y. 523; Smith v. Newburgh, 77 sale of municipal bonds at not less than
N. Y. 130; Allen v. Galveston, 51 Tex. par was held not to warrant the allowance
302 ; Dore v. Milwaukee, 42 Wis. 18; of a commission to a purchaser of the
Butler v. Nevins, 88 Ill. 575; Kansas bonds from the city at par. Whelen's Ap-
City v. Flanagan, 89. Mo. 22; Bentley v. peal, 108 Pa. St. 162, 197.
1
$ 90
147
SUMMARY OF CORPORATE POWERS.
corporate body. The consequence is that a minority must be bound
not only without, but against, their consent. Such an obligation
may extend to every onerous duty, — to pay money to an unlimited
amount, to perform services, to surrender lands, and the like. It is
obvious, therefore, that if this liability were to extend to unlimited
and indefinite objects, the citizen, by being a member of a corpora-
tion, might be deprived of his most valuable personal rights and
liberties. The security against this danger is in a steady adherence
to the principle stated, viz., that corporations can only exercise their
powers over their respective members, for the accomplishment of limited
and defined objects, And if this principle is important, as a general
rule of social right and municipal law, it is of the highest importance
in these States, where corporations have been extended and multi-
plied so as to embrace almost every object of human concern. The
language of another learned judge on this subject is well chosen, and
fittingly supplements that which we have quoted in the preced-
ing section. “In this country,” says Church, J., “all corporations
whether public or private, derive their powers from legislative grant,
and can do no act for which authority is not expressly given, or may
not be reasonably inferred. But if we were to say that they can do
1 ܙܙ
1 Per Shaw, C. J., in Spaulding v. cited ; Le Couteulx v. Buffalo, 33 N. Y.
Lowell, 23 Pick. 71, 74 (1839); Bangs 333 ; Hayes v. Appleton, 24 Wis. 544;
v. Snow, 1 Mass. 181; Stetson v. Kemp People v. Railroad Co., 12 Mich. 389;
ton, 13 Mass. 272; Willard v. Newbury- Vance v. Little Rock, 30 Ark. 435 (1876);
port, 12 Pick. 227; Keyes v. Westford, 17 Indianapolis v. Indianapolis Gas Co., 66
Pick. 273, 279; Comw. v. Turner, 1 Cush. Ind. 396. Text approved in the follow-
493, 495 (1848); Cooley v. Granville, 10 ing cases : Noyes v. Mason, 5 N. W. R.
Cush. 57 (1852); Merriam v. Moody, 25 595 ; Frank, In re, 52 Cal. 606; Green v.
Iowa, 163 (1868); Minturn v. Larue, 23 Cape May, 41 N. J. L. 45.
How. 435; Lafayette v. Cox, 5 Ind. “ The powers of all corporations are lim-
(Port.) 38 (1854); Paine v. Spratley, 5 ited by the grants in their charters, and
Kan. 525; Vincent v. Nantucket, 12 Cush. cannot c.xtend beyond them." Per Breese,
103, 105 ; Clark v. Davenport, 14 Iowa, J., Petersburg v. Metzger, 21 Ill. 205.
494 ; Mays v. Cincinnati, 1 Ohio St. 268 ; Corporations have only such rights and
Gallia Co. v. Holcomb, 7 Ohio, Part I. powers as are expressly granted to them,
232; Comm’rs v. Mighels, 7 Ohio St. or as are necessary to carry into effect the
109; Fitch v. Pinckard (taxing power) 4 rights and powers so granted.” Per Storrs,
Scam. (5 Ill.) 78; Caldwell v. Alton (mar. J., in New London v. Brainard (illegal ap-
ket ordinance), 33 Ill. 416; Trustees, &c. propriation of money to celebrate Fourth
v. McConnel, 12 Ill. 140; Louisiana State of July), 22 Conn. 552 (1853), approving
Bank v. New Orleans Nav. Co., 3 La. An. Stetson v. Kempton, 13 Mass. 272; Hodges
294; State v. Mayor, &c. (market-house v. Buffalo, 2 Denio, 110. So, where the
case), 5 Port. (Ala.) 279; Head v. Ins. statute placed the care of fire departments
Co.
, 2 Cranch, 168 ; DeRussey v. Davis in the hands of chief engineers, a power
(sale of ferry lease), 13 La. An. 468; Peo- "to regulate and protect fire engines,”
ple v. Bank, &c., i Doug. (Mich.) 282; &c., was held not to authorize a city to
City Council v. Plank Road Co., 31 Ala. establish a "fire board” to have charge of
76; State v. Mayor, 5 Port. (Aln.) 279; that department. Benjamin v. Webster,
Burnett, In re, 30 Ala. 461, and cases 100 Ind. 15. Ante, sec. 29.
148
§ 91
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
nothing for which a warrant could not be found in the language of
their charters, we should deny them, in some cases, the power of
self-preservation, as well as many of the means necessary to effect
the essential objects of their incorporation. And therefore it has
long been an established principle in the law of corporations, that
they may exercise all the powers within the fair intent and purpose of
their creation which are reasonably proper to give effect to power's ex-
pressly granted. In doing this, they must (unless restricted in this
Tešpect] have a choice of means adapted to ends, and are not to be
confined to any one mode of operation.” 1
§ 91. Same subject. Principles of Construction. - The extent of
the powers of municipalities, whether express, implied, or indispensa-
ble, is one of construction. And here the fundamental and univer-
sal rule, which is as reasonable as it is necessary, is, that while the
construction is to be just, seeking first of all for the legislative in-
tent in order to give it fair effect, yet any ambiguity or doubt as to
the extent of the power is to be determined in fayor of the State or
general public, and against the State's grantee. The rule of strict
construction of corporate powers is not so directly applicable to the
ordinary clauses in the charter or incorporating acts of municipali-
ties as it is to the charters of private corporations; but it is equally
applicable to grants of powers to municipal and public bodies which
are out of the usual range, or which may result in public burdens,
or which, in their exercise, touch the right to liberty or property or,
as it may be compendiously expressed, any common-law right of the
citizen or inhabitant. The subject is copiously illustrated in the
notes.?
2
1 Bridgeport v. Railroad Co., 15 Conn. (license to bakers); Harris v. Intendant,
475, 501 (1843), per Church, J. So 28 Ala. 577 (retailing liquors); Intendant
where power is conferred upon a city v. Chandler, 6 Ala. 899 (retailing liquors).
council to levy and collect taxes, and no
}
Courts aclopt a strict, rather than
officer for the purpose is provided in the ' liberal construction of powers: “It is a
charter, the authority to use and employ well settled rule of construction of grants
the necessary machinery to make the levy by the legislature to corporations, whether
and collection was held to be implied. public or private, that only such powers
Union Pacific Ry. Co. v. Ryan, 2 Wyo. and rights can be exercised under them as
408. But see s. c. in Supreme Court of are clearly comprehended within the words
United States, 113 U. S. 516, where the of the act, or derived therefrom by neces-
judgment was reversed on other grounds. sary [fair and reasonable) implication, re-
Express authority to establish and main- gard being had to the objects of the grant.
tain a public bath includes the power to Any ambiguity or doubt arising out of the
secure a proper location for it. Poillon v. terms used by the legislature must be re-
Brooklyn, 101 N. Y. 132. The incidental solved in favor of the public." Minturn v.
powers of a municipal corporation must be Larue, 23 How, 435, 436 (1859). Per
germane to the purposes for which it is Nelson, J., construing municipal charter
created. Mayor 0. Yuille, 3 Ala. 137 as to ferry rights of corporation there-
§ 91
149
PRINCIPLES OF CONSTRUCTION.
The general principles of law, stated in this and in the preceding
sections, are indisputably settled, but difficulty is often experienced
under. In subsequent cases, the Supreme : are not to be defeated or impaired by a
Court has said that a municipal corpora- stringent construction.” Smith v. Madi-
tion can exercise no power which is not, son, 7 Ind. 86; Kyle v. Malin, 8 Ind. 34;
in express terms or by fair implication, 57, per Stuart, J.; Memphis v. Adams
conferred upon it." Thomson v. Lee Co. (implied power to employ an attorney), 9
(municipal bond case), 3 Wall. 320; Heisk. (Tenn.) 518; S. C. 24 Am. Rer.
Thomas v. Richmond, 12 Wall. 349 331. Per Nicholson, C. J. A municipal
(1871); s. P. Clark v. Davenport, 14 corporation has no right to appropriate
Iowa, 495; Merriam v. Moody's Executors, its revenues to obtain an increase of its
25 Iowa, 163; Nichol v. Mayor, &c., 9 powers, through persons sent by the city i
Humph. 252 ; Leonard v. Canton, 35 council to appear before the State General
Miss. 189; where Fisher, J., gives a clear Assembly and Congress. Henderson v.
exposition of the rationale of the doctrine Covington, 14 Bush (Ky.), 312; Spenzler
that corporate grants should be strictly v. Trowbridge, 62 Miss. 46.
constrned. Douglass v. Placerville, 18 In concluding this note, the author may
Cal. 643, 647 ; Argenti v. San Francisco, be permitted to observe that the principle
16 Cal. 282; Wallace v. San Jose, 29 Cal. of strict construction should not be pressed
180. With us, cities, towns, and mu- in any case to such an unreasonable ex-
nicipal corporations of all kinds are cre- tent as to defeat the legislative purpose,
ated and endowed with powers by the fairly appearing upon the entire charter
legislature. These are of a legislative and or enactment. Perhaps the rule as it is
administrative character, to aid in the briefly expressed in the text (secs. 90, 91)
better government of localities or por- best embodies the result of the adjudica-
tions of the State. This power exists no tions upon this point, namely : If, upon
further than it has been delegated. And the whole, there be fair, reasonable, sub-
municipal corporations, in their action, stantial doubt whether the legislature in-
are confined “to a strict construction of tended to confer the authority in question,
the grants of powers contained in their particularly if it relates to a matter extra-
charters ” or acts of incorporation. La municipal or unusual in its nature, and
fayette v. Cox, 5 Ind. (Porter) 38 (1854). the exercise of which will be attended
"It is proper, too, that these powers with taxes, tolls, assessments, or burdens
should be strictly construed, considering upon the inhabitants, or oppress them, or
with how little care chartered privileges abridge natural or common rights, or di-
are these days granted.” Bank v. Chili- vest them of their property, the doubt
cothe, 7 Ohio, Part II. 31, 35 (1836), per should be resolved in favor of the citizen,
Hitchcock, J.; Collins v. Hatch, 18 Ohio, and against the municipality. The rule
523 ; Port Huron v. McCall, 46 Mich. as here expressed has been cited and ap-
565 ; “Boroughs and towns are, confes. proved in Ex parte Mayor of Florence, in
sedly, inferior corporations. They act not re Jones, 78 Ala. 419; Grand Rapids Elec-
by any inherent right of legislation, like tric, &c. Co. v. Grand Rapids Edison, &c.
the legislature of the State, but their au-, Co., 33 Fed. Rep. 659 (holding that a
thority is delegated, and their powers, there. power to make, amend, and repeal ordi-
fore, must be strictly pursued. Within nances deemed advisable for lighting streets
the limits of their charter, their acts are did not confer control of the streets to the
valid ; without it they are void." Wil. exclusion of the legislature, or authorize
lard v. Killingworth, 8 Conn. 247, per the city to grant the exclusive use of the
Daggett, J., approved 10 Conn. 442. “The streets for electric lights for fifteen years).
action of municipal corporations is to be Power to fill up and drain lots holding
held strictly within the limits prescribed stagnant water, at the expense of their
by statute. Within these limits, they are owners, was held not to authorize filling
to be favored by the courts. Powers ex- them up to a greater height than was
pressly granted, or necessarily implied, necessary to abate the nuisance. Bush v.
:
150
§ 93
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
in their application, on account of the complex character of munici-
pal duties, and the various, miscellaneous, and frequently indefinite
purposes or objects which municipalities are authorized to execute
or carry into operation.
Usage as affecting Municipal Powers and their Construction.
§ 92 (56). Usage and Prescription. — In England municipal cor-
porations claim and exercise many powers wholly in virtue of long-
established usage, or of prescription, which implies a lost charter
conferring such powers. Indeed, from immemorial usage, powers
are recognized as valid which could not lawfully originate in a royal
charter. A usage to give a right must, however, be long established,
and forty years' duration was not considered of itself to be suffi-
cient for this purpose. But usage in this country has a much more
limited operation. It is a necessary result of the manner in which
our municipal corporations are created — viz., by express legislative
act, wherein their powers and duties are wholly prescribed — that
the powers themselves cannot be added to enlarged, or diminished
by proof of usage.
$ 93 (57). Same subject. — In a case in Massachusetts, the learned
Chief-Justice Bigelow,after stating the decision of the Supreme Court,
that towns in Massachusetts had no authority to appropriate money
for the celebration of the Fourth of July, remarks, in relation to the
attempt to sustain the appropriation on the ground of usage: "Usage
cannot alter the case. An unlawful expenditure of money by a
town cannot be rendered valid by usage, however long continued.
Abuses of power and violations of right derive no sanction from
time or custom. A casual or occasional exercise of a power by one
or a few towns will not constitute usage. It must not only be gen-
eral and of long continuance, but, what is more important, it must
also be a custom necessary to the exercise of some corporate power,
or the enjoyment of some corporate right, or which contributes es-
sentially to the necessities and convenience of the inhabitants. The
usage relied on in the present case would not satisfy either of these
last-named requisites, which are necessary to give it validity.” But
Dubuque, 69 Iowa, 233. `Infra, sec. 109; 3 Chad v. Tilsed, 5 J. B. Moore, 185.
Logan v. Pyne, 43 Iowa, 524 (1876); $. C. As to the proper office of usage in Eng.
22 Am. Rep. 261.
land, both as a source of power and to aid
1 Spaulding v. Lowell, 23 Pick. 71; in the interpretation of charters, see Grant
ante, secs. 8–28; post, ch. vi., where some on Corp. 19, 27, 28, 29, 552, 564.
of these miscellaneous or special powers 4 Hood v. Lynn, 1 Allen (Mass.), 103
are considered.
(1861). Further as to usage consult Wil-
2 Ante, ch. ii. sec. 29; ch. ii, sec. 32. lard v. Newburyport, 12 Pick. 227; Spaul-
.
$ 94
USAGE; DISCRETIONARY POWERS.
151
general and long-continued usage is not without its importance, and
usage of this character may be resorted to in aid of a proper. con-
struction of the charter or statute, but no further. If the language
be uncertain or doubtful, a uniform, long-established, and unques-
tioned usage will be regarded by the courts in determining the
mode in which powers may be exercised, and to a reasonable ex-
tent in determining the scope of the powers themselves; but usage
can have no room for operation where the language of the en-
actment is plain and the legislative intent is clear upon the face
of it.1
ܗܲ
§ 94 (58). Discretionary Powers not subject to Judicial Control.
Power to do an act is often conferred upon municipal corporations,
in general terms, without being accompanied by any prescribed mode
of exercising it. In such cases the common council, or governing
body, necessarily have, to a greater or less extent, a discretion as
to the manner in which the power shall be used. This discretion,
ding v. Lowell, 23 Pick. 71; Smith v. third parties from denying its construc-
Cheshire, 13 Gray (Mass.), 308 (1859); tion to be the true one. Van Hostrup v.
Butler v. Charlestown, 7 Gray, 12, 16 Madison City (on railroad bonds), 1 Wall.
(1856); Benoit v. Conway, 10 Allen, 528. (U. S.) 291 (1863); Meyer v. Muscatine
1 Smith v. Cheshire, 13 Gray, 308; (on railroad bonds), Ib. 384, 391. Post,
Butler v. Charlestown, 7 Gray, 12, 16; secs. 420, 457, 560 n., 562 n., 591 n.;
Sherwin v. Bugbee (validity of school chaps. xxii. xxiii.
meeting), 16 Vt. 439, 444, where Redfield, 2 Railroad Co. v. Evansville (power to
J., remarks : “In construing statutes ap- subscribe stock and to borrow money), 15
plicable to public corporations, courts will Ind. 395 (1860); Kelly v. Milwaukee, 18
attach no slight weight to the uniform Wis. 83; Slack v. Railroad Co., 13 B.
practice under then, if this practice has Mon. 1; Bridgeport v. Railroad Co., 15.
continued for a considerable period of Conn. 475, 501 (1843), per Church, J.;
time." It is a rule “founded on reason Harrison v. Baltimore, 1 Gill (Md.), 264
and common sense, says the Court of (1843); Cincinnati v. Gwynne, 10 Ohio,
Appeals of Maryland, that “ doubtful 192; Markle v. Akron, 14 Ohio, 586.
words in a general statute may be ex- Where a municipal corporation is en-
pounded with reference to a general usage; trusted with the execution of a power,
and when a statute is applicable to a par- and is not confined to a particular mode,
ticular place only, such words may be con- but has a discretion in the choice of
strued by usage at that place.” Frazier v. means, a plain case of abuse must be
Warfield (Inspection Act for Baltimore), shown, resulting in an injury to the pe-
13 Md. 279, 303; S. P. Love v. Hinckley, titioner, to warrant an injunction against
Abt. Adm. 436; see, also, Rex v. Chester, the corporation. Page v. St. Louis (spe-
1 Maule & Selw. 101; Rex v. Salway, 9 cial assessment), 20 Mo. 136 (1853); Col-
B. & C. 424.
ton v. Hanchett, 13 Ill. 615; Bush v.
Where the true construction of a char- Carbondale, 78 Ill. 74 (1875); Mayor of
ter adinits of doubt, and the construction Baltimore v. Gill, 31 Md. 375; Holland v.
adopted by the city authorities has been Baltimore, 11 Md. 186 ; post, sec. 146;
acquiesced in generally, and acted upon Dodd v. Hartford, 25 Conn. 232; Sheldon
by third persons in good faith, in their v. School District, Ib. 224; Lockwood v.
transactions with the city, it will be pre- St. Louis, 24 Mo. 20; Deane v. Todd, 22
cluded by the courts in actions by such Mo. 90; Mayor, &c., v. Meserole, 26
152
§ 94
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
where it is conferred or exists, cannot be judicially interfered with
or questioned except where the power is exceeded or fraud is im-
puted and shown, or there is a manifest invasion of private rights.
Thus where the law or charter confers upon the city council, or
local legislature, power to determine upon the expediency or necessity
of measures relating to the local government, their judgment upon
matters thus committed to them, while acting within the scope of
their authority, cannot be controlled by the courts. In such case
the decision of the proper corporate body is, in the absence of fraud,
final and conclusive, unless they transcend their powers. Thus, for
example, if a city has power to grade streets, the courts will not in-
quire into the necessity of the exercise of it, or the refusal to exer-
cise it, nor whether a particular grade adopted, or a particular mode
of executing the grade, is judicious. So if a city has power to build
ter's on
Wend. 132 ; Union Pacific Ry. Co. v. officer. See Michie and the Corporation
Ryan, 2 Wyo. 408 ; S. c. on appeal sub of the City of Toronto, In re, 11 Upper
nom. Union Pacific Ry. Co. 2. Chey. Can. C. P. 379.
enne, 113 U. S. 516; Poillon v. Brooklyn, Powers which involve the exercise of
101 N. Y. 132. A power “to remove or judgment or discretion -
- as whether to
confine persons having infectious or pesti- commence a suit in the name of a county,
lential diseases " confers authority to select &c., cannot be delegated to others. Scol.
the means of carrying it out, and a city lay v. County of Butte, 67 Cal. 249.
may, under such a power, rent a house to 1 Baker v. Boston, 12 Pick. 184; Ho-
be used as a small-pox hospital. Ander- veyv. Mayo, 43 Me. 322 (1857); Fay,
son v. O'Conner, 98 Ind. 168. See chap- Petitioner, 15 Pick. 243 (1834); Parks v.
Contracts and Taxation, post; Boston, 8 Pick. 218 (1829); Danielly v.
Wells v. Atlanta, 43 Ga. 67 (1871); Coul. Cabaniss, 52 Ga. 211 (1874); Sheridan
son v. Portland, Deady R. 481 (1868); v. Colvin, 78 Ill. 237 (1875); Droz v.
post, sec. 112, also ch. xxiii. In respect Baton Rouge, 36 La. An. 307; Alberger
to the legislative functions of a municipal v. Baltimore, 64 Md. 1; United States v.
body, the courts are bound to presume New Orleans, 31 Fed. Rep. 537; Torrent
that they will exercise any discretion with v. Muskegon, 47 Mich. 115. Where a
which they are clothed properly, and that common council was authorized by the
they had sufficient reasons for doing an city charter to construct breakwaters, &c.,
act, the result of such discretion. Rail- and to defray the cost thereof by special
road Co. v. Mayor of New York, 1 Hilton, assessments upon the property benefited,
562 (1858); Des Moines Gas Co. v. Des and was required to determine the amounts
Moines, 44 Iowa, 508 (1876); s. C. 24 to be charged to each lot, it was held that
· Am. Rep. 756; post, sec. 379.
the action of the council in determining
By statute in Canada, certain superior what property would be benefited was
courts have power in their discretion to conclusive, while its decision of what
set aside by-laws for illegality, on the ap- amounts shonld be charged to each lot
plication of persons interested, but these could be reviewed. Teegarden v. Racine,
courts will not entertain an application to 56 Wis. 545.
set aside a by-law on a matter of fact, 2 Hovey v. Mayo, street commissioner,
which, according to municipal act, or a 43 Me. 322 (1857); Benjamin v. Wheeler,
by-law passed under it, should be ascer- 8 Gray, 409, 413 (1857); Richmond v.
tained and finally determined by an officer McGirr (purchase of land for public build-
of the corporation, unless perhaps fraud ings), 78 Ind. 192 (1881), citing text.
or corrupt conduct be imputed to such
§ 95
153
DISCRETIONARY POWERS.
u market-house, the courts cannot inquire into the size and fitness of
the building for the object intended. So, in the absence of fraud,
the court refused to interfere by injunction with the action of the
city council in agreeing to rent a room for city purposes for twenty
years and to pay for the same in advance. So, also, the use of the
revenue of a city, above that set apart by law for the payment of
interest on its bonded debt and for a sinking fund, is within the
discretion of the municipal authorities, and the court will not in-
terfere by mandamus to require a part of it to be applied to the
payment of a judgment before there is an ascertained surplus over
expenditures.
3
$ 95 (59). The Subject illustrated. — So, also, where, by its char-
ter, a municipal corporation is empowered, if it deems the public
welfare or convenience requires it, to open streets or make public im-
provements thereon, its determination, whether wise or unwise, can-
not be judicially revised or corrected. On the ground that it is the
province of the municipal authorities, and not of the judicial tribu-
nals, to determine what improvements shall be made in the streets
and highways of the corporation, the court, on application of citizens,
refused to compel a city to cover over an open draining canal of long
standing, it “not appearing to be a nuisance in the legal sense of
the word.”5 So where it is made the duty of a city to remove, as
far as they may be able, every nuisance which may endanger health,
the courts, unless the power be transcended, cannot ordinarily inter-
fere to control the manner in which this shall be done.6 But the
power to abate nuisances, like all other municipal powers, must be
reasonably exercised; and although the power be given to be exer-
cised in any manner the corporate authorities may deem expedient,
it is not an unlimited power, and such means only are intended as
are reasonably necessary for the public good; wanton or unueces-
sary injury to private property and private rights are not thereby
1 Spaulding v. Lowell, 23 Pick. 71, 80 Gill (Md.), 391 (1848.) Passing ordi-
(1839). So where a city has power to nances in relation to opening, &c., of
lease real estate at a “reasonable rent," streets, is the exercise of legislative, not
the council is to determine what is reason- judicial power. Wiggin v. Mayor, &c. of
able, and their discretion in the absence New York, 9 Paige, 16 (1841). See chap-
of fraud cannot be judicially revised. ter on Eminent Domain, post.
Schanck v. Mayor, 69 N. Y. 444 (1877). 5 Inhabitants v. New Orleans, 14 La.
2 Moses v. Risdon, 46 Iowa, 251 (1877); An. 452 (1859).
quære, and compare Garrison v. Chicago, 6 Baker v. Boston, 12 Pick. 184 (1831);
7 Bissell, 480 (1877).
see also Kelly v. Milwaukee, 18 Wis. 83
8 East St. Louis v. Zebley, 110 U.S. (1864); Goodrich v. Chicago, 20 Ill. 445.
321. More fully post, chap. xiv.
Further as to nuisances, see chapter on
4 Methodist P. Church v. Baltimore, 6 Ordinances, poste Index — Nuisances.
154
§ 96
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
authorized. And generally the judicial tribunals will not interfere
with municipal corporations in their internal police and administra-
tive government, unless they are transcending their powers or some
clear right has been withheld or wrong perpetrated or threatened.?
§ 96 (60). Public Powers and Trusts incapable of Delegation.
The principle is a plain one, that the public powers or trusts de-
volved by law or charter upon the council or governing body, to be
exercised by it when and in such manner as it shall judge best, can-
not be delegated to others. This principle, its scope and limitations,
is best shown by examples of its application to actual cases. Thus,
where by charter or statute, local improvements, to be assessed upon
the adjacent property owners, are to be constructed in "such man-
ner as the common council shall prescribe” by ordinance, it is not
competent for the council to pass an ordinance delegating or leaving
to any officer or committee of the corporation, the power to deter-
mine the mode, manner, or plan of the improvement. Such an
ordinance is void, since powers of this kind must, as above shown,
be exercised in strict conformity with the charter or incorporating
act.4 1
1 Babcock v. Buffalo, 56 N. Y. 268 city council shall deem it necessary," it
(1874), where the city was enjoined from could not by ordinance make the mayor
filling up plaintiff's slip in the canal, be- the judge of the necessity for paving. Re-
cause, under the circumstances, it was not affirmed but distinguished, Shehan v.
a proper exercise of the power to abate Gleeson, 46 Mo. 100 (1870); East St.
nuisances.
Louis v. Wehrung, 50 nl. 28 (1869). So,
2 State v. Swearingen, 12 Ga. 23; post, where the charter gives the city council
chap. xxii.
power to construct sewers, of such “di-
8 Supra, secs. 90, 91.
mensions as may be prescribed by ordi-
4 State v. Hauser, 63 Ind. 155; State Dance," the council cannot by ordinance
v. Bell, 34 Ohio St. 194; Birdsall v. Clark, require sewers to be constructed of such
73 N. Y. 73; N. Y. &c. Trustees, In re, dimensions as may be deemed requisite by
57 How. Pr. 500 ; Thompson v. Scher- the city engineer. St. Louis v. Clemens,
merhorn, 6 N. Y. (2 Seld.) 92 (1851), re- 43 Mo. 395 (1869), overruling St. Louis
lating to grading and levelling streets; v. Eters, 36 Mo. 456; reaffirmed, St. Louis
affirming s. c. 9 Barb. 152, and approving v. Clemens, 52 Mo. 133 (1873); Jackson
in the main the views there expressed by Co. v. Brush, 77 Ill. 59 (issuing bonds).
Mr. Justice Cady. Brooklyn v. Breslin, See further, State v. New Brunswick, 1
57 N. Y. 591 (1874), distinguishing Vroom (30 N. J. L.), 395 (1863); Meuser
Thompson v. Schermerhorn, supra ; State v. Risdon, 36 Cal. 239; Hydes v. Joyes, 4
v. Jersey City, 1 Dutch. (N. J.) 309; see Bush (Ky.), 464; Darling v. St. Paul, 19
4 Dutch. 500; post, secs. 357, 716, 780; In- Minn. 389, (1872), citing text. When a
dianapolis v. Indianapolis Gas Co., 66 Ind. charter authorized a city by ordinance " to
396 ; Baltimore v. Scharf, 54 Md. 499, erect lamps and to provide for lighting the
citing this section. Same principle ap- city,” &c., the delegation of the power so
plied in similar case, Ruggles v. Collier, conferred to a committee whose action was
43 Mo. 359 (1869), holding that where to be final, was declared illegal. Minne-
the charter gave the city power to require apolis Gas Light Co. v. Minneapolis, 36
streets to be paved, "in all cases where the Minn. 159. The doctrine of the text ap-
$ 96
155
DELEGATION OF POWERS.
same.
So, where a power, for example, the power to issue licenses, is
granted by law, or by an ordinance duly passed, to the mayor and
aldermen, they are constituted to act as one deliberative body, to the
end that they may assist each other by their united wisdom and
experience, and the result of their conference be the ground of their
determination: where this is the case, the board of aldermen cannot,
even by a vote, delegate the power to the mayor alone. But the
plied where a city, empowered to erect Const. Lim. 204; Railway Co. v. Balti-
and regulate public wharves, and fix the more, 21 Md. 93 (1863); Winants v. Bay-
rates of wharfage thereat, undertook to onne, 44 N. J. L. 114; State v. Patterson,
lease the wharf, farm out its revenues, 34 N. J. L. 163. Power of mayor and
and delegate a person to fix the rates. aldermen as to choosing site for markets
Matthews v. Alexandria, 68 Mo. 115; cannot be delegated to commissioners. Ib.
post, chapter on Taxation. So, where a A grant by the council of a corporation
charter directed the common council to ap- to build a street railroad must be made by
point a time when persons interested in ordinance directly to the parties to be
an application for opening a street would therein named, and the authority to make
be heard, the council must itself fix the the grant cannot be delegated by the coun-
time, and cannot delegate that duty to cil to any officer or board. State v. Bell,
the clerk. If it does so, its proceedings 34 Ohio St. 194. So where the city built
will be set aside on certiorari or other a pier in respect of which it was author-
direct proceeding. State v. Jersey City, 1 ized to fix tolls for its use and collect the
Dutch. (N. J.) 309 (1855); State v. Jersey It leased it to a party; failing to
City, 2 Dutch. 444, 447; State v. Pat- keep the pier in repair the lessee brought
terson, 34 N. J. L. 163 (1870). The an action for damages; the power of the
text is cited and approved in the fol- council not being subject to delegation
lowing cases : Birdsall v. Clark, 73 N. the lease was declared void. Lord v.
Y. 73; State v. Trenton, 42 N. J. L. Oconto, 47 Wis. 386; S. P. Lauenstein
74; Parker v. New Brunswick, 1 Vroom v. Fond du Lac, 28 Wis. 336; Mullarky v.
(30 N. J. L.), 395; State v. Patterson, Cedar Falls, 19 Iowa, 21; Gale v. Kala-
5 Vroom (34 N. J. L.), 163. A mu- mazoo, 23 Mich. 344; Milhau v. Sharp, 19
nicipal corporation cannot delegate powers Barb. 435; Rogers v. Collier, 43 Mo. 359;
conferred upon and to be exercised by East St. Louis v. Wehrung, 50 Ill. 28.
it to a street committee or others. Whyte Any work not done within the time speci-
v. Mayor (sidewalk assessment), 2 Swan fied, the common council was required to
(Tenn.), 364 (1852). See Smith v. cause to be done by contract or otherwise.
Morse, 2 Cal. 524; Oakland v. Carpentier, An ordinance directed that the superin-
13 Cal. 540; White v. Nashville, 2 Swan tendent of streets should “cause the work
(Tenn.), 364; compare State v. Atlantic to be done,” thus delegating the precise
City, 5 Vroom (34 N. J. L.), 99, 108. authority conferred upon it.
See Brooklyn v. Breslin, 57 N. Y. 591 held to be unauthorized. The charter
(1874), distinguishing Thompson v. Scher- conferred the power, said the court, to
merhorn, supra. A delegation of power cause it to be done by contract or other-
is of course valid when expressly author- wise; this required the exercise of dis-
ized by the legislature. Brooklyn v. Bres- cretion and judgment as to the manner in
lin, supra; State v. Patterson, 5 Vroom which the work should be done. The le-
(34 N. J. L.), 163; post, secs. 716, 779. gislature said it must be the judgment of
1 Day v. Green, 4 Cush. 433 (1849), the council, and they attempted to invest
and cases there cited. Further, as to the superintendent of streets with its ex-
delegation of power, Coffin v. Nantucket, ercise. This they had no power to do;
5 Cush. 269 (1850); Ruggles v. Nan- they could not delegate the power thus
tucket, 11 Cush. 433; Clark v. Wash- conferred. Birdsall v. Clark, 73 N. Y.
ington, 12 Wheat. 40, 54 (1827); Cooley, 73.
This was
156
§ 97
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS,
principle that the exercise of municipal powers or discretion cannot
be delegated does not prevent a corporation from appointing agents
and empowering them to make contracts, or from appointing com-
mittees and investing them with duties of a ministerial or adminis-
trative character.1
A municipal council having authority to pave streets at the
primary expense of the city, directed the making of the pavements
.of one or the other of specified materials, but giving to the owners
of abutting lots, on whom the expense would ultimately fall, the
privilege of selecting which, and reserving to the street committee
the authority to select, in case the lot-owners failed, and authorized
the mayor to execute a contract accordingly, which was done. It
was objected by the city that this contract was invalid: (1) because
the city could not delegate the power to the mayor to make it; and
(2) because the mayor could not delegate to the lot-owners the power
of determining the kind of materials. The Supreme Court of the
United States, while admitting that “the council could not delegate
all the power conferred upon it” in this respect, yet held that it
could do its ministerial work by agents, and that there was here no
unlawful delegation of power.2
ş'97 (61). Legislative Powers cannot be surrendered or bargained
away.- Powers are conferred upon municipal corporations for public
purposes; and as their legislative powers cannot, as we have just
seen, be delegated, so they cannot without legislative authority, ex-
press or implied, be bargained or bartered away. Such corporations
may make authorized contracts, but they have no power, as a party,
to make contracts or pass by-laws which shall cede away, control, or
embarrass their legislative or governmental powers, or which shall
disable them from performing their public duties. The cases cited
1 Railroad Co. v. Marion Co., 36 Mo. the making of regulations which the char-
294; Schenley v. Commonwealth, 36 Pa. ter gave the council alone the power to
St. 62; Stewart v. Council Bluffs, 58 make. Gregory v. Bridgeport, 41 Conn.
Iowa, 642. Where the charter
Where the charter gave the 76 (1874). See chapters on Contracts and
common council power to “ordain by- Corporate Meetings, post.
laws relating to wharres, and the anchor- 2 Hitchcock v. Galveston, 96 U. S. 341
ing, moving, and mooring of vessels," and (1877). If a contract should be invalid
to appoint all necessary oficers to carry because of the delegation of powers, it
the by-laws into effect," and the council may be ratified by the council. Ib.
passed a by-law creating the office of su- 8 Richmond Gaslight Co. v. Middle-
perintendent of wharves, and giving him town (gas contract), 59 N. Y. 228 (1874);
“full power to order and regulate, when- Lord v. Oconto, 47 Wis. 386, approving
ever requested by the owner or lessee of text; Matthews v. Alexandria, 68 Mo.
any wharf, the mooring of vessels at such 115; Bodine v. Trenton (boundaries of
wharf,” such a by-law is not void as dele- streets), 7 Vroom (36 N. J. L.) 198; State
gating to the superintendent of wharves V. New Brunswick; 1 Vroom (30 N. J.
.
$ 98 IMPERATIVE AND DISCRETIONARY POWERS DISTINGUISHED. 157
mark the scope and illustrate the application of this salutary princi-
ple in a great variety of circumstances, and, for the protection of the
citizen, it is of the first importance that it shall be maintained by
the courts in its full extent and vigor.
$ 98 (62). Imperative and Discretionary Powers distinguished. — It
is often material to determine whether a duty, imposed by law or
charter upon municipal corporations or public officers, is imperative
or discretionary. This is always a question of legislative intention,
and, therefore, of construction. The general tests to ascertain this
intention, propounded in the cases cited, are of doubtful value. The
words that a corporation or officer “may” act in a certain way, or
that it “shall be lawful” to act in a certain way, may be imperative.
On this subject some of the cases declare the doctrine that what
public corporations or officers are empowered to do for others, and
L.), 395 ; Indianapolis v. Indianapolis son v. Bowman, 39 Miss. 671 (1861); Oak-
Gas Co., 66 Ind. 396, approving text. land v. Carpentier, 13 Cal. 540 (1859),
Milhau v. Sharp, 27 N. Y. 611 (1863); opinion of Baldwin, J.; Smith v. Morse,
IV. &c. Co. v. St. Louis, 2 Dillon C. C. 2 Cal. 524; Louisville City Railway v.
Rep. 70; Gale v. Kalamazoo (market- Louisville, 8 Bush (Ky.), 415; Karst v.
house contract), 23 Mich. 344 (1871); St. Paul, &c. R. R. Co., 22 Minn. 118
8. C. 9 Am. Rep. 80; Louisville City Rail. (1875); Peru v. Gleason, 91 Ind. 566;
road Co. v. Louisville, 8 Bush (Ky.), 415 Brenham v. Water Co., 97 Tex. 542;
(1871); Covington, &c. R. R. Co. v. National Bank v. St. Joseph, 31 Fed.
Covington, 9 Bush (Ky.), 127; People's Rep. 216; ante, sec. 54 and note; post,
Railroad v. Memphis Railroad, 10 Wall. secs. 116, 692, 716. Compare Attorney-
38, 50 (1869); Presb. Church v. Mayor, General v. Mayor &c. of New York, 3
&c. of New York, 5 Cow. 538 (1826); Duer, 119, 131, 147; Davis v. Same, 14
followed, Stuyvesant v. Mayor, &c. of N. Y. (4 Kern.), 506, 532; Costar v.
New York, 7 Cow. 588 ; Sav. Fund v. Brush, 25 Wend. 628; Brooklyn v. City
Philadelphia, 31 Pa. St. 175; Lehigh Railroad Co., 47 N. Y. 475 (1872). One
Water Co.'s Appeal, 102 Pa. St. 515; San legislature, in the enactment of laws, can-
Francisco Gas Light Co. v. Dunn, 62 Cal. not, by contract, put it out of the pourer of
580 ; Mayor, &c., of Albany, In re, 23 a subsequent legislature to repeal or amend
Wend. 277; Railroad Co. v. Mayor, &c., 1 them; cannot thus surrender a portion of
Hilt. 562, 568; Martin v. Mayor, &c., 1
its sovereign power.
Debolt v. Ins. and
Hill (N. Y.), 545 (1841); Goszler v. Trust Co., 1 Ohio St. 564; Plank R. Co. v.
Georgetown, 6 Wheat. 593 ; Sedgw. Husted, 3 Ohio St. 578, per Bartley, C. J.,
Const. and St. Law, 634; State v. Graves, dissenting ; Matheny v. Golden, 5 Ohio
19 Md. 351, 373 (1862); Bryson v. Phila- St. 375; Mott v. Pa. Railroad Co., 30 Pa.
delphia, 47 Pa. St. 329 ; Cooley, Const. St. 9 (1858). But see, in Supreme Court
Lim. 206; Albany St., 6 Abb. Pr. R. of the United States, Home v. Rouse, 8
273 ; Britton v. Mayor, &c. of New Wall. 430, and prior cases cited, and the
York, 21 How. Pr. R. 251; New York vigorous dissent (Ib. 441), which seems,
0. Second Av., &c., Co., 32 N. Y. 261; were the question open, to be the sound
Dingman v. People, 51 Ill. 277; Brimmer view. Cooley, Const. Lim. 127, 280 ;
v. Boston, 102 Mass. 19 (1869); Johnson Sedg. Const. and St. Law, 616, 633; post,
v. Philadelphia, 60 Pt. St. 445; State v. secs. 385, 692, 716.
Cin. Gas Co., 18 Ohio St. 262, 295; Jack-
158
§ 98
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
that which is beneficial to them or to the public to have done, the
law holds they ought to do, especially if the law specifically or ade-
quately supplies them with the means of executing the power. The
power in such cases is conferred for the benefit of others or of the
public; and the intent of the legislature, which is the test in such
cases, ordinarily seems, under such circumstances, to be to impose a
positive and absolute duty. But, under other circumstances, where
the act to be done does not affect third persons, and is not clearly
beneficial to them or the public, and the means for its performance
are not thus supplied, the words, “may” do an act, or it is “ lawful”
to do it, do not mean “must,” but rather indicate an intent in the
legislature to confer a discretionary power. Each case, we repeat,
must be largely decided on its own circumstances, and the legis-
lative intent gathered from the whole act. No positive, inflexible,
or stereotyped rule can be laid down.
1 Mason v. Fearson (duty of city under Rex v. Mayor, &c. of Hastings, 5 Barn.
tax law), 9 How. (U. S.) 248, 259, per & Ald. 692, note; Attorney-General v.
Woodbury, J., and authorities there cited. Lock, 3 Atk. 164; Rex v. Mayor, &c. of
In Hurford v. Omaha, 4 Neb. 336, 350 Chester, 1 Maule & Sel. 101; Rex 2. Bail-
(1876), the subject is fully examined, and iffs, &c., 1 Barn. & Cress. 86; 3 Barn. &
certain tests to ascertain the legislative Cress. 272; Railroad Co. v. Platte Co. 42
intention are stated. Veazie v. China, 50 Mo. 171; Railroad Co. v. Buchanan Co., 39
Me. 526. It is the settled doctrine in Mo. 485; Grant v. Erie, 69 Pa. St. 420; S. C.
New York, that where a public or munici- 8 Am. Rep. 272; Goodrich v. Chicago, 20
pal corporation or body is invested with Ill. 445, authority to city "to remove all
power to do an act which the public inter- obstructions in the harbor,” held not im-
ests require to be done, and the means for perative. Ib. Ottawa v. People, 48 Ill.
its complete performance are placed at its 233; Carr v. North Liberties, 35 Pa. St.
disposal, not only the execution, but the 324; Joliet v. Verley, 35 Ill. 58; Wilson
proper execution of the power, may be in- V. Mayor, &c., 1 Denio, 595. An act
sisted on as a duty, though the statute that “ the city council are hereby author.
conferring it be only permissive in its ized to elect a recorder, in whom they
terms. Mayor, &c. of New York v. may vest exclusive jurisdiction of all vio-
Furze, 3 Hill, 612, holding corporation lations of their ordinances,” imposes the
liable for omitting its duty to repair sew- duty to elect this officer. The language
ers, although it would not have been lia- is mandatory, and not discretionary. Va-
ble for having omitted to construct them son v. Augusta, 38 Ga. 542 (1868). The
originally. Approved 16 N. Y. 162, note, expression, in a supplemental charter,
per Selden, J.; per Denio, J., 9 N. Y. 168, " it shall be lawful,” construed not to en-
458; per Allen, J., 16. 461. The same join an imperative duty on the corpora-
doctrine has been declared in New Jersey, tion. Seiple v. Elizabeth, 3 Dutch. (N.
State v. Newark, 4 Dutch. 491 ; Seiple J.) 407; Steines v. Franklin Co., 48 Mo.
v. Elizabeth, 3 Dutch. 407; Reed v. 167 (1871). Private action for breach of
Bainbridge, 1 Southard, 351, 358. Com- statutory duty, when, Heeny v. Spragnie,
pare Réock v. Newark, 4 Vroom (33 N. 11 R. I. 456; s. C. 23 Am. Rep. 502. Rule
J. L.), 129. See, further, the chapter on in the English courts. Addison on Torts
Actions, post, chap. xxiii.
(4 Eng. ed.), 1054. See, further, post, secs.
When words are imperative, and when 468, 832, 836, 857, 908, 934, 949.
directory, see further, Grant, Corp. 34, 35;
$ 100
159
EXEMPTION FROM JUDICIAL PROCESS.
$ 99 (63). Same subject. — It is also sometimes difficult to deter-
mine whether specific duties prescribed by the charter or incorpo-
rating act rest upon the corporation or upon the aldermen or other
officers named in their individual capacity. The question also is one
of construction. The general rule is this : that where powers per-
taining to the duties of a corporation are conferred upon those who
officially represent the corporation, such powers, unless the contrary
appears, are deemed to be conferred upon them in their corporate,
not their individual character; in other words, upon the corporation
itself.1
$ 100 (64). Exemption of Municipal Revenues from Judicial Seiz-
ure for Debts. — Municipal corporations are instituted by the supreme
authority of a State for the public good. They exercise, by delega-
tion from the legislature, a portion of the sovereign power. The
main object of their creation is to act as administrative agencies for
the State, and to provide for the police and local government of cer-
tain designated civil divisions of its territory. To this end they are
invested with governmental powers and charged with civil, political,
and municipal duties. To enable them beneficially to exercise these
powers and discharge these duties, they are clothed with the author-
ity to raise revenues, chiefly by taxation, and subordinately by other
modes, as by fines and penalties. The revenue of the public corpo-
ration is the essential means by which it is enabled to perform its
appointed work. Deprived of its regular and adequate supply of
revenue, such a corporation is practically destroyed, and the ends of
its erection thwarted. Based upon considerations of this character,
it is the settled doctrine of the law that not only the public property
but also the taxes and public revenues of such corporations cannot
be seized under execution against them,4 either in the treasury or
when in transit to it. Judgments rendered for taxes, and the pro-
i Conrad v. Ithaca, 16 N. Y. 158, per provided for filling the vacancy in the
Selden, J., p. 170; Hickok v. Plattsburg, commission.
15 Barb. S. C. 427; Glidden v. Unity, 10 Where all are notified to attend, a ma-
Fost. (30 N. H.) 104, 119; post, secs. 208, jority may act. Post, secs. 221, note, 283;
236, 237, 974 et seq. A power conferred Astor v. New York, 62 N. Y. 567 (1875);
by statute upon three or more persons as Astor v. New York, 62 N. Y. 580. Pre-
commissioners, or otherwise, for a public sumption as to notice, Ib.; post, chap.
purpose, is not extinguished by the death xxiii.
of one, where no provision exists for fill- 2 Ante, chap. ii. secs. 9, 28.
ing the vacancy, but vests in the sur- 8 Text approved. Saloy v. New Or-
vivors. People v. Palmer, 52 N. Y. 83 leans, 33 La. An. 79.
(1873); People v. Mayor, &c. of Syracuse, 4 Brown v. Gates, Treasurer, &c., 15
63 N. Y. 291, 297 (1875), distinguishing W. Va. 131.
People v. Nostrand, where the statute
160
§ 101
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
ceeds of such judgments in the hands of officers of the law, are not
subject to execution unless so declared by statute. The doctrine of
the inviolability of the public revenues by the creditor is maintained,
although the corporation is in debt, and has no means of payment
but the taxes which it is authorized to collect.1
as
an
§ 101 (65). Garnishment. — Upon similar considerations of pub-
lic policy, municipal corporations and their officers have usually,
though not uniformly, been considered not to be subject to garnish-
ment, although private corporations, equally with natural persons,
are liable to this process. The cases on the subject, as respects
1 Edgerton v. Municipality, 1 La. An. nicipal powers of police and local govern-
435 (1846), where the subject is ably dis- ment, cannot be sold on execution against
cussed in the opinion of Rost, J. He says: the corporation. In Police Jury v. Mich.
“On the first view of this question there ael, 4 La. An. 84, a seizure of public build-
is something very repugnant to the moral ings, &c., by a creditor was enjoined.
sense in the idea that a municipal corpo- The public nature of municipal corpo-
ration should contract debts, and that, rations is well illustrated by the decision
having no resources but the taxes which of the Supreme Court of the United
are due to it, these should not be sub- States, in the case of The United States v.
jected by legal process to the satisfac- The Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co., 17
tion of its creditors. This considera- Wall. 322 (1872). The case involved the
tion, deduced from the principles of moral right of Congress to levy a tax
to levy a tax upon the
duty, has only given way to the more en- income or property of a municipal corpo-
larged contemplation of the great and ration, and viewing such a corporation
paramount interests of public order and
arm of the State, and partak-
the principles of government." Ib. 440; ing of the State's exemption from lia-
S. P. Municipality v. Hart, 6 La. An. bility to be taxed upon the means and
570 (1851). This case holds that a judg. instrumentalities employed in conducting
ment in favor of the corporation for a fine its operations, it was held that the tax
incurred for a violation of a municipal sought to be enforced under the Internal
ordinance is exempt from execution; but Revenue Act could not be collected. Post,
that an ordinary debt due the corporation sec. 775. The still later and notable case
(as on a bond taken for paving) is liable of Meriwether v. Garrett, 102 U. S. 472
to be seized. But qucrc. In Edgerton (1880), noted, infra, chap. vii., still more
v. Municipality, supra, it was decided distinctly illustrates the principles of the
that the public taxes and revenues of the text. Post, sec. 169 et seq. See chapter
corporation could not be seized under exe- on Taxation, post. Property owned by a
cution, notwithstanding the general provis- city as an investment of funds merely,
sion of the Code of Practice of Louisiana, held liable to seizure on execution. New
authorizing the seizure, under execution, Orleans v. Insurance Co., 23 La. An. 61
of “all sums of money which may be (1871). In this case the court declare a
due to the debtor in whatsoever right," distinction between it and Edgerton v.
– this general language being construed Municipality, supra, and Police Jury v.
to refer alone to rights of property, and Michael, 4 La. An. 84; but
84; but qucere. Un-
not to taxes imposed for the protection of derhill v. Calhoun, 63 Ala. 216, approv.
those rights. So in The Railroad Co. v. ing the text. Post, secs. 576, 850, 861,
Municipality, 7 La. An. 148 (1852), it 884. The remedy of creditors of municipal
was held that perpetual ground rents, cre- corporations is discussed in the subse-
ated and intended by the legislature to quent chapters on Contracts and Manda-
form part of the permanent revenue of
the city to enable it to exercise its mu.
mus.
§ 101
GARNISHMENT.
161
municipal corporations, are referred to in the note; and it will be
seen, on examination, that some of them turn on the construction of
particular statutes, and that the judges differ in opinion respecting
the policy and expediency of subjecting, upon general principles,
such corporations to the process of garnishment. The author's
view, where the question is left entirely open by statute, is, that, on
principle, a municipal corporation is exempt from liability of this
character with respect to its revenues and the salaries of its officers,
but that where it owes an ordinary debt to a third person, the mere
inconvenience of having to answer as garnishee furnishes no suffi-
cient reason for withdrawing it from the reach of the remedies
which the law gives to creditors of natural persons and of private
corporations."
1 The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania account of salary due to their officers.
is of the opinion that, on principle, a mu- Hawthorne v. St. Louis, 11 Mo. 59
nicipal corporation or its officers are not (1847); S. P. Fortune v. St. Louis, 23 Mo.
subject to garnishment or attachment or 239 (1856), where the decision is placed
execution, and that by the statutes of that upon the broad ground that such corpo-
State they are not made liable thereto. rations are not liable to be garnished, and
Erie v. Knapp, 29 Pa. St. 173 (1857); not on the ground that an officer's salary
Bulkley v. Eckert, 3 Barr (Pa.), 368, per is exempt from such process. See also
Sargeant, J.; S. P. McDougal v. Super- Neuer v. Fallon, 18 Mo. 277. Since the
visors, 4 Minn. 184; Bradley v. Richmond, first edition of this work the Supreme
6 Vt. 121; Burnham v. Fond du Lac, 15 Court of Missouri has modificd in an im-
Wis. 193 (1862), where the inconvenience portant respect the broad statement of
of the opposite doctrine is forcibly pointed the doctrine held in the former cases.
out by Paine, J.; Merrell v. Campbell, 49 See Pendleton v. Perkins and the City of
Wis. 535; Drake on Attach., sec. 516, 10; St. Louis, 49 Mo. 565 (1872). It was
Hadley v. Peabody, 13 Gray, 200; Brown there held, after great consideration, that
V. Gates, 15 W. Va. 131. Approving a city corporation in that State is subject
text, Droz v. Baton Rouge, 36 La. An. to garnishment, where the main debtor
310; Walker v. Cook, 129 Mass. 577; has absconded so that judgment cannot
State v. Eberly, 12 Neb. 616. That the be obtained against him, and he has no
salary of an officer of a municipal corpo- property in the State subject to attach-
ration cannot be garnished, see School ment, but has money in the city treas-
District, &c. v. Gage, 39 Mich. 484; ury belonging or due to him; and that
Hebel v. Amazon Ins. Co., 33 Mich. 407; it may in such case be reached by bill
Wallace v. Lawyer, 54 Ind. 501; Merwin in equity in the first instance without
v. Chicago, 45 Ill. 133; Chicago v. Halsey, a previous judgment at law, and without
25 Ill. 595; Thayer v. Tyler, 5 Allen, 95; showing fraud or other ground of equi-
Colby v. Coates, 6 Cush. 559; Clark v. table jurisdiction. It was so decided, not-
Mobile, 36 Ala. 621 (salary of school withstanding the garnishment act in terms
teacher); Hightower v. Staton, 54 Ga. exempts municipal corporations from its
108; McLellan v. Young, 54 Ga. 399; $. C. operation. The opinion of Bliss, C. J., is
21 Am. Rep. 276; Hadley v. Peabody, 13 very full and elaborate.
Gray, 200; or be reached by proceedings In Tennessee, a municipal corporation
supplementary to execution. Roeller v. is not subject to garnishment at the suit
Ames, 33 Minn. 132.
of a creditor of one of its employees; citing
In Missouri, also, it is held upon gen- Bank v. Dibrell, 3 Sneed, 379; Burnham
eral principles that municipal corpora-
v. Fond du Lac, 15 Wis. 193; Chicago v.
tions are not subject to garnishment on Hasley, 25 Ill. 596; Baltimore v. Root, 8
VOL. I. - 11
162
§ 101
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
Md. 102; Hawthorne v. St. Louis, 11 Mo. fees. Williams v. Boardman, 9 Allen,
59; Memphis v. Laski, 9 Heisk. 511 570. In Maryland, notwithstanding a
(1877); s. C. 21 Am. Rep. 327. So in general statute of the State authorized
Georgia, McLellan v, Young, 54 Ga. the garnishment of any
the garnishment of any “person or per-
399; s. c. 21 Am. Rep. 276. So in 112- sons whatever, corporate or sole,” it was
diana, Wallace v. Lawyer, 54 Ind. 501; Held that municipalities were not included,
S. C. 23 Am. Rep. 661. In Kentucky a and that, upon general grounds of public
city may be garnished in respect of salary policy and convenience, the city could not
due to officers. Rodman v. Musselman, be garnished in respect of money due from
12 Bush, 354 (1876); S. C. 23 Am. Rep. the salaries of its officers, although the
7 24.
officer whose salary was attached could
In Connecticut, public officers having have sued the city therefor. Baltimore v.
money in their hands, to which an indi- Root, 8 Md. 95 (1855). The city, in this
vidual is entitled, are not subject to gar- case, was garnished in respect of money
nishment at the suit of the creditors of due fron it to a police officer.
such individual. Stillman v. Isham, 11 But in New Hampshire, under a statute
Conn. 123 (1835), and cases cited; Ward making “any corporation possessed of any
v. County of Hartford, 12 Conn. 404, 408. money" of the debtor subject to garnish-
And in that State a county, not having ment, a town was held to be included.
power to contract a debt for which an Whidden v. Drake, 5 N. H. 13. See
action will lie against it, is not subject to Brown v. Heath, 45 N. H. 168. In Iowa
garnishment in such a case.
Ward v.
it was held that the words “ debtor or per-
County of Hartford, 12 Conn. 404. But son holding property,” in the attachment
under a statute enabling towns and cities act, extended to municipal corporations,
to contract debts, and which provides and that they were subject to garnishment
that debts due from "any person” to a with respect to ordinary debts which they
debtor may be attached, these corpora- owed the main debtor. Wales v. Musca-
tions may be factorized or garnished. tine, 4 Towa, 302 (1856). The decision of
Bray v. Wallingford, 20 Conn. 416 (1850). the court asserts the liability to garnish.
In New Jersey a municipal corporation ment on geveral principles ; but subse-
may be garnished. Davis v. Graves, 9 quently the legislature enacted that "
Vroom (38 N. J. L.), 104; see Jersey municipal or political corporation should
City v. Horton, 9 Vroom (38 N. J. L.) 88. not be garnished." Rev. 1860, sec. 3196.
Alabama : In Underhill v. Calhoun, 63 Under the legislation of Iowa, the exemp-
Ala. 216 (overruling Smoot v. Hart, 33 tion from garnishment is complete and
Ala. 69), it was held that on grounds of universal. Jenks v. Township, 45 Iowa,
public policy a judgment creditor of a mu- 554. Requisites of notice to corporation,
nicipal corporation cannot reach by gar- Claflin v. Iowa City, 12 Iowa, 284; Wil-
nishment funds accruing to it by taxation liams v. Kenney, 98 Mass. 142. In Ohio,
whether in course of collection or after under a statute which provides that "any
being paid into the treasury. Mayor v. claims or choses in action, due or to be-
Rowland, 26 Ala. 498, holds that a mu- come due” to the judgment debtor, or
nicipal corporation cannot be garnished “money which he may have in the hands
as respects accruing salaries to its offi- of any person, body politic or corporate,"
See also Clark v. School Comm’rs, are subject to execution, salaries of offi-
36 Ala. 621. But by act of the legisla- cers of incorporated cities, due and un-
ture (1866), process of garnishment lies paid, may be subjected by the judgment
against a municipal corporation to sub- creditors of such officers to the payment of
ject the wages or salary of a policeman to their judgments, and municipal corpora-
the satisfaction of a judgment obtained tions may be garnished with respect to
against him. City Council v. Van Dorn, such salaries. The court admits the con-
41 Ala. 505, overruling Mobile v. Row- flict in the decisions of other States upon
land, and Clark v. Mobile S. C., 36 similar statutes, but regards the construc-
Ala. 621. In Massachusetts a county is tion above given as being in accordance
not chargeable as a garnishee for jurors' with public policy and the meaning of
а.
cers,
1
§ 101
163
GARNISHMENT.
the statute. Newark v. Funk, 15 Ohio adopted, and, in the absence of a statute, 1
St. 462 (1864). In Illinois, municipal city is subject to garnishment for an ordi-
corporations are not subject to garnish- nary debt due by it to a third person.
ment in any case, no matter what may be City of Laredo V. Nalle, 65 Tex. 359
the character of the indebtedness. This (quoting text).
position is maintained by Lawrence, J., In Kansas a city cannot be garnished
with great force. Merwin v. Chicago, 45 and made liable to pay a creditor of its
Ill. 133; Burns v. Harper (money in creditor without express statutory pro-
hands of school . directors), 59 Ill. 21 vision. Switzer v. Wellington (Sup. Ct.
(1871); Millison v. Fisk, 43 Ill. 112. Kansas, 1889), 28 Am. Law Reg. 281,
So in Iowa, Jenks v. Township, supra. and note citing and reviewing the cases.
Waiver. Clapp v. Walker, 25 Iowa, 315. Holt, C., said: “Cities are a part of the
In Minnesota a judgment debtor may be government, and should not be required to
ordered to assign to his creditor a debt become involved in litigation in which
due him from a municipal corporation. they have no interest. This exemption
Knight v. Nash, 22 Minn. 452 (1876). In from garnishment process is based entirely
Texas the view suggested in the text is upon the ground of public policy.”
164
§ 102
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS,
CHAPTER VI.
MUNICIPAL CHARTERS
CONTINUED.
· Special Powers and Special Limitations upon ordinary Municipal
Powers.
$ 102 (66). Outline of Subject. — While municipal corporations
are everywhere instituted for the same general purposes, heretofore
explained, and while there is a striking resemblance in the author-
ity with which they are clothed, yet, except when organized under
general acts, the powers given to them in their single and separate
charters are various, both in character and extent. True policy,
indeed, requires, as before suggested, that the powers of these bodies
should, in general, be confined to subjects connected with civil
government and local administration; but legislatures are usually
liberal in grants of this character, and there is no limit to the facul-
ties and capacities with which municipal creations may be endowed,
except as that limit is contained in the State or Federal Constitu-
tion. The leading powers ordinarily granted to municipalities, such
as those relating to contracts, eminent domain, streets, taxation,
ordinances, corporate officers, actions, and the like, will be hereafter
separately treated. But it will be convenient to notice in this place
certain special powers usually or often conferred upon municipalities,
and some special limitations upon ordinary municipal powers, and
the construction which such provisions have judicially received.
We shall here consider the following subjects as they relate to
municipal corporations :
1. Wharves, $$ 103-113.
2. Ferries, $$ 114-116.
3. Borrowing Money, $$ 117-129.
4. Limitations on the Power to create Debts, $$ 130–138.
5. Rewards for Offenders, $ 139.
6. Public Buildings, $ 140.
7. Police Powers and Regulations, $$ 141, 142.
8. Prevention of Fires, $ 143.
1 Ante, chaps. i. ii.; supra, secs. 99, 100. 8 Ante, secs. 12, 14, 73, and chap. iv.
2 Ante, sec. 39, where the general passim. Aurora v. West, 9 Ind. 74
model of an ordinary municipal corpora- (1857).
tion is given.
1
§ 103
WHARVES AND WHARFAGE.
165
9. Quarantine and Health, $$ 144–146.
10. Indemnifying Officers, $$ 147, 148. .
11. Furnishing Entertainments, $ 149.
12. Impounding Animals, $ 150.
13. Party Walls, 151.
14. Public Defence, $ 152.
15. Aid to Railway Companies, $ 153.
§ 103 (67). Wharves and Wharfage. — Among the special powers
often conferred by the legislature upon municipal corporations
bordering upon the high seas or navigable waters is the authority to
erect wharves, and charge wharfage as a compensation for making
and keeping the same and their approaches in a proper and safe
condition for the landing, loading, and unloading of vessels.1 The
1 Commonwealth v. Alger, 7 Cush. 53, New York, 105 N. Y. 419; Langdon v.
82 (1851); Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 3 Mayor, &c. of New York, 93 N. Y. 129,
How. (U. S.) 212; Municipality v. Pease, and cases cited; Turner v. People's Ferry
2 La. An. 538 (1847); Worsley v. Munici. Co., 21 Fed. Rep. 90. Brooklyn : Brook-
pality, 9 Rob. (La.) 324; New Orleans v. lyn v. New York Ferry Co., 87 N. Y.
United States, 10 Pet. 662, 737; The 204. New Orleans: The Lizzie E., 30
Wharf Case, 3 Bland Ch. (Md.) 383; Ill. Fed. Rep. 876; Silver v. Tobin, 28 Fed.
&c. Co. v. St. Louis, 2 Dillon C. C. R. Rep. 545; Railroad Co. v. Ellerman, 105
70 (1872); Packet Co. v. Keokuk, 95 U. U. S. 166; New Orleans v. Wilmot, 31
S. 80 (1877); distinguished, Baldwin v. La. An. 65.
Franks, 120 U. S. 688; Barney v. Keokuk, Wharfage charges must be reasonable (see
94 U. S. 324 (1876); Weber v. Harbor infra, sec. 112), and may be graduated by
Comm’rs, 18 Wall. 57 (1873); Packet Co. the tonnage of vessels using a wharf; and
v. St. Louis, 100 U. S. 423 (1879); Vicks- this is not a duty of tonnage within the
burg v. Tobin, 100 U. S. 430 (1879); meaning of the Constitution of the United
Railroad Co. v. Ellerman, 105 U. S. 166 States. Ouachita Packet Co. v. Aiken, 121
(1881); note to 18 Am. and Eng. Corp. U. S. 444 (1886); Packet Co. v. Catletts-
Cas. 511; Mayor of St. Martinsville v. burg, 105 U. S. 559;. Packet Co. v. St.
Steamer Mary Lewis, 32 La. An. 1293; Louis, 100 U. S. 423 ; Packet Co. v. Keo-
The Geneva, 16 Fed. Rep. 874; Leathers kuk, 95 U. S. 80; Transportation Co. v.
v. Aiken, 9 Fed. Rep. 679. Such a power Parkersburg, 107 U. S. 691 (“wharfage
does not violate the Coustitution of the and “duty of tonnage" defined and dis-
United States, Packet Co. 2. Catletts- tinguished); N. W. Packet Co. v. St.
burg, 105 U. S. 559. The right of a mu- Louis, 4 Dillon, 10 (1876); Keokuk v.
nicipality to collect wharfage is in com- Packet Co., 45 Iowa, 196 (1876); s. C.
pensation for actual use of structures pro- affirmed, 95 U. S. 80 (1877); Ellerman
vided by the municipality. Railroad v. v. McMains, 30 La. An. 190. See, also,
Ellerman, 105 U. S. 166; New Orleans v. United States v. Duluth, 1 Dillon C. C.
Wilmot, 31 La. An. 65. An incorporated 469; Packet Co. v. Atlee, 2 Dillon, 479
town cannot charge wharfage for the use (1873); s. C. 21 Wall. 389. In McMur-
of an unimproved river bank in front of ray v. Baltimore, 54 Md. 103, it was held
it. Christie v. Malden, 23 W. Va. 667 that the
that the “ dedication of a street to public
(1884). See infra, sec. 112, note. For use as a street extending to the water carried
rights and powers of City of New York, in with it by necessary implication the right
respect to wharves, see Kingsland v. New of the city to extend it into a harbor by
York, 110 N. Y. 569 (1888); Williams v. the construction of a wharf at the end
166
§ 103
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
authority of the State over navigable waters and the shores is, of
course, subject to the Constitution of the United States, and the laws
made in pursuance thereof regulating commerce, and to the admi-
ralty jurisdiction of the Federal courts. Although the power to
erect wharves and charge wharfage is not strictly one relating to
municipalities in their private or local character, it is, nevertheless,
competent for the legislature to make them, in such measure as it
deems expedient, the repository of it. Such power may be modi-
thereof." To same effect, Backus v. De- man, 105 U.S. 166. A city has no vesterk
troit, 49 Mich. 110. Infra, sec. 109 and right to wharfage.
right to wharfage. “Whatever powers the
note ; sec. 110.
municipal body rightfully enjoys over the
i State and authorized municipal pilot subject are derived from the legislature,
and harbor regulations, when not in con- and may be revoked at any time, not
flict with the Federal Constitution or Fod touching, of course, any property of the
eral legislation, are valid. Steamship Co. city actually acquired in the course of ad-
v. Joliffe, 2 Wall. 450; Cooley v. Board of ministration.' Railroad Co. v. Ellerman,
Wardens, 12 How. (U. S.) 296; Pollard's 105 U.S. 166, 172 (1881), per Matthews, J.
Lessee v. Hagan, 3 How. 212; Ouachita 2 Fuller v. Edings, 11 Rich. (S. C.)
Packet Co. v. Aiken (wharfage charges), Law, 239 (1858); Waddington v. St.
121 U. S. 444 (1886); Cisco v. Roberts, Louis, 14. Mo. 190 (1851); Baltimore
36 N. Y. 292; Port Wardens v. Ship, &c., v. White, 2 Gill (Md.), 444 (1845); Wil-
14 La. An. 289 (1859); Same v. Pratt, 10 son v. Inloes, 11 Gill & J. (Md.) 351;
Rob. (La.) 459; Chapman v. Miller (pi- Weber v. Harbor Comni'rs, 18 Wall. 57
lotage fee), 2 Speers (S. C.) Law, 769; (1873); Railroad Co. v. Ellerman, 105
Alexander v. Railroad Co. (duty on ton- U. S. 166 (1881); Town of Ravenswood
runge), 3 Strob. (S. C.) Law, 594(1847); v. Flemings, 22 W. Va. 52, where an act
State v. City Council, 4 Rich. (S. C.) conferring upon a town the exclusive right
Law, 286; Commonwealth v. Alger, 7 to erect wharves within its limits between
Cush. 53, 82 (1850); Worsley v. Mu- ordinary high-water mark and low-water
nicipality, above cited ; Jefferson ville mark without compensation to the ad-
V. Ferry Boat, 35 Ind. 19 (1870); jacent lot-owners, was held constitutional,
Harbor-master v. Southerland, 47 Ala. and an adjacent owner enjoined from con-
511 (1872). But State enactments, which structing a wharf within those limits with-
amount to a regulation of commerce or
out the consent of the town. The owner
impose a duty on tonnage, are of course of a private wharf, whose land is com-
void. Cannon v. New Orleans, 20 Wall. pulsorily taken for a public wharf, is not
577 (1874); Packet Co. v. St. Paul, 3 necessarily entitled to be compensated for
Dillon, 454; Peete v. Morgan, 19 Wall. loss of income from his private wharf, re-
581 (1873); Steamship Co. v. Port Ward- sulting from the establishment of the pub-.
ens, 6 Wall. 31 (1867). The collection lic wharf near to the private one. Fuller
of wharfage dues does not violate any v. Edings, supra. The grant of an exclu-
provision of the United States Constitu- sive right to keep a wharf, in order to se-
tion. Where a municipal corporation cure its erection, does not violate the pro-
under express legislative authority is vision of a State Constitution, declaring
clothed with the exclusive right to col- “that no man or set of men are entitled
lect wharfage rates from all vessels that to exclusive, separate public emoluments
make use of its wharves, it is a vested or privileges from the community, but in
right that cannot be impaired by the consideration of public services.” Such
legislature. Ellerman v. McMains, 30 an improvement is beneficial to the public,
La. An. pt. 1, 190. But this is denied and, in order to secure it, the exclusive
and overruled by the Supreme Court of profits for a given period may be granted
the United States. Railroad Co. v. Eller to the contractor. Martin v. O'Brien, 34
$ 103
WHARVES AND WHARFAGE.
167
fied or revoked by the legislature at its pleasure if it does not deprive
thie municipality of property actually acquired under the exercise of
the power. It may authorize a municipal corporation to establish
a public wharf upon private property •on making compensation to
the owner of the land; and the power, when conferred upon the
Miss. (5 George) 21, (1857); see, also, that inasmuch as under its franchise to
Geiger v. Filor, 8 Flor. 325 (1859). Ef- construct wharves it had expended large
fect of 14th Amendment to the Federal sums in making wharves for the public
Constitution on the power of the legisla- convenience, it had a vested right to the
ture to grant exclusive privileges. See franchise and its revenues, of which it
Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall. 36 could not be deprived, as the legislature
(1872).
had sought to do, by the act of 1869.
i Railroad Co. v. Ellerman, 105 U. S. Second, it was also contended that it was
166 (1881). This case adjudged two im- a violation of the city's rights for the
portant points. The city of New Orleans railroad company to permit the use and
was empowered by the legislature to con- employment of their property as a wharf
struct levees and wharves on the banks of hy persons not engaged in conducting the
the Mississippi River within its limits, proper business of the railroad company,
and to charge reasonable compensation for thus opening a rival wharf business in
their use.
Under this authority the city, competition with the city ; and that the
at its expense, graded the banks of the act of 1869, if it authorizes this to be
river at certain points, drove piles, covered done, is in violation of the Constitution of
them with plank flooring, and thus con- the United States, which forbids the tak.
structed wharves for the convenient land- ing of private property without due pro-
ing of vessels. The legislature also au- cess of law. See ante, sec. 68, note.
thorized the defendant railroad company,
The Supreme Court decided that the
whose terminus was in New Orleans, to action could not be maintained; that the
construct, manage, use, and enjoy, not act of 1869 did not infringe any vested
only its railroad property and appurte- rights of the city, and that the question
nances, but also any steamboat piers and as to whether the company in constructing
wharves that the directors might deem its wharf and in leasing it out, as above
necessary or convenient. And afterwards, stated, acted ultra vires, could not be
by an act passed in 1869, the legislature raised by the city, which was not a stock-
authorized this railroad coinpany to en-
holder in the defendant company.
close a portion of the banks of the river The decision below (2 Woods, 120), fol-
(at a place never improved or used by the lowing the decision of the Supreme Court
city as a wharf), and to use the place thus of Louisiana in New Orleans v. The Rail-
enclosed for the purposes of a wharf for road Co. (27 La. An. 414), based on the
vessels; and the act further provided that proposition that the act of 1869 did not
no vessel should use such wharf without confer upon the railroad company the
the consent of the railroad company, and right to charge wharfage dues against ves-
that all vessels so using such wharf and sels landing at the said wharf which were
not using any other wharf in the city in no way connected with the business of
should be exempt from the payment of the railroad company, and the right to
levce and wharf dues to the city. The maintain a free wharf for such vessels,
railroad company afterward leased its was reversed. On this point the Supreme
wharf to others, which lease provided that Court was of opinion that the city was
vessels coming to the consignment, cus- not entitled to raise the question that the
tody, or care of the lessees might load and company was violating its charter in this
unload their cargoes on the said wharf, respect, and under that cover to create
exempt from wharf and levce dues to the and protect a monopoly which the law
city. The city made two points : First, did not give to it.
168
§ 105
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
municipality, cannot be arrested by an offer on the part of the land-
owner himself to erect a wharf.1
§ 104 (68). Public and Private. — Wharves, piers, quays, and
landing places may be either public or private. They may be, in
their nature, public, although the property be owned by an indi-
vidual. If private, the public have no right to use the erection
without the owner's consent, express or implied ;2 if public, they may
be used by persons generally upon the payment of a reasonable com-
pensation. Whether they are public or private depends, in case of
dispute, upon circumstances, such as the purpose for which they
were built, the uses to which they have been applied, the place
where situated, and the character of the structure.3
§ 105 (69). Duties and Rights of Owner. — The keeping of a
wharf or dock, erected and opened to the public, like the keeping of
an inn, confers a general license to boats and vessels to occupy it for
lawful purposes, -- a license which can be terminated only by notice
1 Waddington v. St. Louis, above vessel attached to it without a license if
cited ; Iron Railroad Co. v. Ironton, 19 the pier be thereby endangered, no matter
Ohio St. 299 (1869); Page v. Baltimore, how great the stress of the weather or the
34 Md. 558 (1871); State v. Jersey City, peril to which the vessel inay be thereby
34 N. J. I. 390. Municipalities may subjected. That compensation is received
under legislative grant build wharves and for the use of a public wharf does not de-
levees on streets burdering on the Mis prive it of its public character. Galves-
sissippi River, and make or authorize the ton Wharf Co. v. Galveston, 63 Tex. 14.
making of other improvements thereon ; Wharf: What constitutes. Upon a non-
such as a steamboat depot building, for the tidal stream, any construction of timber
storage of freight and the convenience of or stone upon the bank, of such shape
travellers. Barncy v. Keokuk, 94 U. S. that a vessel may lie alongside of it, with
324 (1876); s. C. below, 4 Dillon, 593; its broadside to the shore, constitutes a
Ill. &c. Co. v. St. Louis, 2 Dillon, 70. wharf; and a paved strect extending to the
Although its charter and the statutes give water's edge, and used by vessels as a
a city power to maintain wharves and col- place for receiving and discharging freight
lect wharfage, the legislature may law- and passengers, may be so designated.
fully grant to a railroad company a por- Keokuk v. Keokuk, &c. Packet Co., 45
tion of the water front for its own wharf Iowa, 196 (1876).
purposes, free from the control of the city. Expenditures in providing wharves is
Railroad Company v. Ellerman, 105 U. S. the basis of the municipality's right to
166.
collect wharfage. Railroad Co. v. Eller-
2 A town incorporated under the code man, 105 U. S. 166 (1881). A pavcd
of West Virginia has no power to assess street extending a sufficient depth into the
and collect wharfage from the owner of a water, and used by the citizens generally for
private wharf who uses it as the landing all purposes of a street and by vessels for a
of a ferry of which he is the proprietor. landing place, is a sufficient wharf to jus-
Christie v. Malden, 23 W. Va. 667. tify a city in charging wharfage on a non-
8 Dutton v. Strong, 1 Black (U. S.), tidal stream like the Mississippi River.
23 (1861). The owner of a private pier Keokuk v. Keokuk &c. Packet Co., 45
may, it was beld in this case, cut loose a Iowa, 196, 206 (1876).
$ 106
169
RIGHT OF RIPARIAN OWNER.
and request to remove the vessel. When thus established, the
owner at common law is, as respects the public, bound to keep it in
good repair.2 In view of these obligations on the part of the owner
of the wharf, the common law gave him the right to distrain for his
wharfage or toll.3
§ 106 (70). Right of Riparian Owner. — By the common law,
the riparian owner has the right to establish a wharf on his own soil,
this being a lawful use of the land. The right is judicially recog-
nizel in this country, and riparian proprietors on ocean, lake, or
navigable river havé, in virtue of their proprietorship, and without
special legislative authority, the right to erect wharves, quays, piers,
and landing places on the shore, if these conform to the regulations
of the State for the protection of the public, and do not become a
nuisance by obstructing the paramount right of navigation. This
right has been exercised by the owners of the adjacent land from the
first settlement of the country. The right terminates at the point
of navigability, unless special authority be conferred, because at this
point the necessity for such erections ordinarily ceases. Such
1 Heeney v. Heeney, 2 Denio, 625; Keokuk Packet Co., 45 Iowa, 196 (1876).
Nicoll z. Gardner, 13 Wend. 289 (1835); If a city is entitled to the wharfage from
Lansing v. Smith, 4 Wend. 9; Dutton v. public wharves, and the owner of a lot
Strong, 1 Black, 23, distinguished from adjacent to such wharf receives wharfage,
Heeney v. Heeney, supra; Chicago Dock he is liable to the city therefor. Balti-
Co. v. Garrity, 115 Ill. 155.
more v. White (assumpsit), 2 Gill (Md.),
2 A municipality owning a wharf is 444. The right, as between private per-
bound to exercise the same
care as is
sons and a city corporation, to the money
required of an individual owner, for the collected for wharfage, may be tried in an
convenience and safety of boats, &c., action for money had and received. Mur-
using it. Willey v. Allegheny, 118 Pa. phy v. City Council, 11 Ala. 586 (1847).
St. 490. See, also, Watson v. Turnbull, See Grant v. Davenport, 18 Iowa, 179.
32 La. An. 856; infra, sec. 114.
4 Nicoll v. Gardner, 13 Wend. 289,
8 Hale de Port. Maris, 77; Bradley on (1835), per Nelson, J.; Lansing v. Smith,
Distress, 133; Nicoll v. Gardner, 13 4 Wend. 9, affirming s. c. 8 Cow. 146.
Wend. 289. The right of distress is reg. See observations of Finch, J., in Mayor
ulated by statute in the city of New v. Hart, 95 N. Y. 443, 457 (1884), as to
York, and it was there held, that where nature of riparian rights and privileges.
wharfage accrued in the seventh ward, Heeney v. Heeney, 2 Denio, 625; Myers
the owner of the wharf might distrain v. St. Louis, 82 Mo. 367; s. c. below, 3
therefor in the eleventh ward. 13 Wend. Mo. App. 266; Union Depot Co. 1.
289. See Lansing v. Smith, 4 Wend. 9, Brunswick, 31 Minn, 297; R. R. Co. v.
21. Wharfage is not properly a tax, like Schurmeir, 7 Wall. 272 ; Yates v. Mil-
that levied to support government, but waukee, 10 Wall. 497 ; Weber v. Harbor
rather compensation paid by owners of Comm'rs, 18 Wall. 57; Potomac Steam-
vessels for accommodation for their boats boat Co. v. Upper Potomac &c. Co., 109
and merchandise. Swartz v. Flatboats, U. S. 472; Hoheken v. Pern. R. R. Co.,
14 La. An. 243 (1859); S. P. Keokuk v. 124 U. .S. 656. Infra, sec. 107, and note.
}
170
§ 106
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
structures are presumptively lawful where they are confined to the
shore, and no positive law is violated in their erection.
1 Heeney v. Heeney, 2 Denio, 625; the plaintiff could compel the city to ac-
Thornton v. Grant, 10 R. I. 477 (1873); count by way of damages for all of the
S. C. 14 Am. Rep. 701; Sherlock v. Bain. wharfage received by the city, without al-
bridge, 41 Ind. 35 (1872); s. C. 13 Am. lowance for any expense of collecting the
Rep. 302; Wisconsin, &c. Co. v. Lyons, same,
which latter seems to be a very
30 Wis. 61; Dutton v. Strong (action of rigid rule, as it apparently goes beyond the
trespass by owner of vessel against own- line of compensation. Steers v. Brooklyn,
er of private pier for cutting the vessel 101 N. ¥. 51 (1885).
loose), 1 Black (U. S.), 23 (1861), distin- Riparian rights such as wharfage, do
guished from Heeney v. Heeney, above not necessarily attuch to grants of land by
cited. Same principle reaffirmed, Rail- the State under tide water below the shore
road Co. v. Schurrneir, 7 Wall. 272; Yates line, or low-water mark. In such case the
V. Milwaukee, 10 Wall. 497; approved, right to wharfage depends upon the terms
Weber v. Harbor Comm’rs, 18 Wall. 57 of the grant, or its intent as shown by its
(1873); Illinois v. Illinois Central R. R. declared purpose or by fair inference from
Co. (Chicago lake front case), 33 Fed. its terms and the surrounding circum-
Rep. 730; State v. Jersey City, 1 Dutch. stances, such as long continued prior use,
(N. J.) 525, 530; Wetmore v. Brooklyn &c. Weber v. Harbor Comm’rs, 18 Wall.
Gas Co., 42 N. Y. 384; Galveston v. 57 (1873); Potomac Steamboat Co. v.
Menard, 23 Tex. 349; Grant v. Davenport, Upper Potomac Co., 109 U. S. 672. The
18 Iowa, 179, per Wright, J. But in principles of these cases were applied in
California, see Dana v. Jackson, &c. Co., Turner v. People's Ferry Co. (U. S. Cir.
31 Cal. 118. As to right to erect wharf Court, N. Y.), 21 Fed. Rep. 90 (1884),
by other than riparian owner on a tidal where, under the circumstances, it was held
river, below high-water mark, quære ; see
that the owner or lessee of premises along
Hagan v. Campbell, 8 Port. (Ala.) 9. In the bulkhead line at the head of a slip,
this case it is said : “It is clear that no between two wharves owned by the city of
part of such erections can be rested upon New York, was not entitled to an injunc-
the lands of the riparian proprietor, nor tion to restrain the erection of a ferry rack
can he be excluded from the use of the and structures under authority of the
water, or denied other riparian rights." State and the city in the slip in front of his
See People v. Davidson, 30 Cal. 379; premises, which structures when erected,
Walker v. State Harbor Comm’rs, 17 although they would impair, would not
Wall. 648 (1873); Packet Co. v. Atlee, 2 cut the complainant off from free and open
Dillon, 479 (1873); s. C. 21 Wall. 389. access to his premises. The legislation of
The plaintiff owned in fee, subject to the New York applicable to the question and
public easement of travel thereon, land to the cases bearing upon it are clearly pre-
the centre of a street extending to the sented in the opinion of Brown, J.
See
water line of the East River, on which he great case of Langdon v. Mayor, &c. of
had constructed a bulkhead and wharf, New York, 93 N. Y. 129 (1883), and ob-
and had the right to collect wharfage; servations of Earl, J. pp. 144, 145, as
the city of Brooklyn, without plaintiff's to construction of water grants by the
consent and wrongfully, built a pier at State and by the city. Hoboken v.
the end of the street, which pier was at- Penn. R. R. Co., 124 U. S. 656, discusses
tached to the plaintiff's soil and between the power of the legislature in respect of
his land and the water line, and shut off making grants of land under the naviga-
the water from the plaintiff's wharf; and ble waters of the State. Gould v. Hudson
afterwards the city collected wharfage River R. R. Co., 6 N. Y. 522; Langdon v.
from all persons using the same. It was Mayor, &c. of New York, 93 N. Y. 130,
held that the pier in front of the plain. 144; Mayor &c. v. Hart, 95 N. Y. 443
tiff's half of the street became the prop- (1884); Lehigh Valley R. R. Co. v. Trone,
erty of the plaintiff by accretion, and that 28 Pa. St. 206 ; Tomlin v. R. R. Co.,
§ 107
171
LIMITATIONS ON RIPARIAN RIGHT.
§ 107 (71). Limitations on Riparian Right. — The rights of ripa-
rian proprietors in respect to the erection of wharves, are subject to
such reasonable limitations and restraints as the legislature may
think it necessary and expedient to impose. Therefore it is compe-
tent for the legislature to pass acts establishing harbor and dock lines,
and to take away the right of the proprietors to build wharves on
their own land beyond the lines, even when such wharves would be
no actual injury to navigation. But the right of wharfage held by
32 Towa, 106; Ingraham v. R. R. Co., to his title, and are of such a nature that
34 Iowa, 249.
the legislature cannot authorize a rail-
1 Commonwealth v. Alger, 7 Cush. 53 way company to build in front thereof so
(1851). This subject is here very fully as to cut off access to the water, without
and learnedly discussed and examined. such company being liable for damages to
See also, Hart v. Mayor, 9 Wend. 571, the riparian proprietor. Delaplaine v. C.
valuable case, affirming 3 Paige, 213; & N. W. Ry. Co., 42 Wis. 214 (1887).
Wetmore v. Brooklyn Gas Co., 42 N. Y. The judgnient is largely founded on and
384; People v. Vanderbilt, 26 N. Y. 287; approves the opinions in Lyon v. Fish-
Same v. Same, 28 N. Y. 396; Pollard's mongers' Co., I.. R. 1 App. Cas. 662. As
Lessee v. Hagan, 3 How. (U. S.) 212; to power of the legislature in respect of
Hagan v. Campbell, 8 Port. (Ala.) 9; making grants of lands under navigable
Mobile v. Eslava, 9 Port. (Ala.) 577, waters, see Hoboken v. Penn. R. R. Co.,
(1839); Railroad Co. v. Winthrop, 5 La. 124 U. S. 656, distinguishing Hoboken
An. 36. In Yates v. Milwaukee, 10 Wall. Land and Improvement Co. v. Hoboken,
497, Mr. Justice Miller, on behalf of the 36 N. J. Law, 540, and other cases in
court, speaking of an existing wharf, de- New Jersey. See Yates v. Milwaukee, 10
nied that the city of Milwaukee, under Wall. 497; Weber v. Harbor Comm’rs, 18
the power to establish dock and wharf lines, Wall. 57; Railway Co. v. Renwick, 102
could create an artificial and imaginary U. S. 180. The leading case in New
dock line, hundreds of feet away from the York as to construction and effect of
navigable part of the river, and, without grants of land under water is Langdon v.
making the river navigable up to that Mayor, &c. of New York, 93 N. Y. 129.
line, deprive the riparian owners of the Referring to the conflicting cases as to
right to avail themselves of the advantages the nature and extent of the rights of the
of the navigable channel by building riparian proprietor, Cooley, J., said: “In
wharves and docks to it for that purpose; Railway Co. v. Renwick, 102 U. S. 180,
and said that if the city deemed the re- the better and more substantial doctrine
moval of the wharf in question necessary is laid down, that the land under the water
in the prosecution of any general scheme in front of a riparian proprietor, though
of widening the channel or improving the beyond the line of private ownership, can-
navigation of the river, it must first make not be taken and appropriated to a pub-
the owner compensation for his property lic use by a railway company under its
thus taken for the public use. As to this right of eminent domain without making
case, see infra, sec. 111. Nature and compensation to the riparian proprietor."
extent of riparian rights fully considered in Backus v. Detroit, 49 Mich. 110, 114
Lyon v. Fishmongers’ Co., L. R. 1 App. (1882). Contra, Langdon v. Mayor of
Cas. 662 (1876); Barney v. Keokuk, 94 New York, 93 N. Y. 129, and New York
V. S. 324 (1876). The riparian proprie- cases there cited. See interesting opinion
tor upon a navigable lake, subject to the of Finch, J., in Mayor v. Hart, 95 N. Y.
rights of the public, has the right to build 443, 457 (1884).
piers and wharf in aid of navigation in In the Chicago Lake Front Case, 33
front of his land, not interfering with the Fed. Rep. 730, U. S. Cir. Court, Harlan
public easement ; which rights appertain and Blodgett, JJ. (Illinois v. Illinois Cent.
172
$ 109
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
a grantee under a valid city grant, although it is an incorporeal
right, is nevertheless property, or a property right. which can only
be taken away by the legislature by the exercise of the right of
eminent domain, on making compensation to the owner of the
wharfage right.1
§ 108 (72). Right to erect Public Wharves.
While the riparian
proprietor has the right to erect wharves which are private in their
nature, but which may be used by the public with the consent of the
owner, express or implied, the right to erect public wharves and to de-
mand tolls or fixed rates of wharfage is, according to the better view,
a franchise, which must have its origin in a legislative grant.2
as
§ 109 (73). By Municipality. — If a municipality is itself a ripa-
rian proprietor, this will probably give to it, in the absence of any
R, R. Co.), it was held that the defendant a wharf upon the condition that its ex.
railroad
company, as the riparian owner of terior margin' should constitute a public
certain water lots in Chicago, had the wharf. Baltimore v. White, supra.
right, by virtue of such ownership, to 1 Langdon v. Mayor, &c. 93 N. Y.
connect the shore-line by artificial con. 129; Williams v. Mayor, &c. 105 N. Y.
struction with outside waters that were 419. For measure of compensation to
navigable in fact, in the absence of legis- the wharf proprietor in such case, see
lative or governmental direction to the Kingsland v. Mayor, &c. 110 N. Y. 569.
contrary ; although the court added, that 2 People v. Wharf Co., 31 Cal. 34;
the exercise of that right is at all times The Wharf Case, 3 Bland Ch. (Md.) 383;
subject to such regulations - at least, Wiswall v. Hall, 3 Paige Ch. 313; Houck
those not amounting to prohibition on Rivers, sec. 282 ; Thompson v. Mayor,
the State may establish ; citing text, 11 N. Y. 115. Text approved : Christie v.
secs. 70-77; Yates v. Milwaukee, 10 Malden, 23 W. Va. 667; The Geneva,
Wall. 397, and other cases. It was also 16 Fed. Rep. 874. See, as to navigator's
declared in the same case that the State of right to moor and land, Bainbridge v.
Illinois had the power, by legislation, to Sherlock, 29 Ind. 364 ; modified, Sher-
fix pier, dock, or wharf lines, other than lock v. Bainbridge, 41 Ind. 35 (1872);
those erected under authority of the Talbot v. Grace, 30 Ind. 389; Jefferson-
United States, to which riparian owners ville v. Ferry Co., 27 Ind. 100; S. C. 35
in waters navigable in point of fact must Ind. 19 (1870); Railroad Co. v. Ellerman,
conform.
105 U. S. 166; New Orleans v. Wilmot,
Municipal control, under legislative 31 La. An. 65. Right of city as to grant
grant, over right of riparian owner to to it of land under water, and the construc-
wharf out. Baltimore v. White, 2 Gill tion of such grant. Langdon v. Mayor,
(Md.), 444 (1845); Wilson v. Inloes, 11 &c. of New York, 93 N. Y. 129 ; Weber
Gill & J. (Md.) 351; Barney v. Keokuk, V. Harbor Comm’rs, 18 Wall. 57 ; Ho-
94 U. S. 324 (1876); S. C. 4 Dillon, 593; boken v. Pa. R. R. Co., 124 U. S. 656,
Weber v. Harbor Comm’rs, 18 Wall. 57 distinguishing Hoboken Land Imp. Co. v.
(1873). Where, under acts of the legisla- Hoboken, 36 N. J. L. 540 ; supra, sec.
ture, a city had the power to refuse assent 107, note. State courts have jurisdiction
to riparian owners to erect wharves, or to of suits for wharfage against domestic
allow it upon such terms as they deemed vessels. Jeffersonville v. Ferry Co., 35
beneficial to navigation and the use of the Ind. 19, 23; The Phebe, 1 Ware Rep.
port of that city, it was held that the city 360 ; Russell v. The Swift, Newb. R. 553 ;
might make the grant of the right to erect Lewis, In re, 2 Gallis. 483.
.
C
$ 109
173
AUTHORITY TO ERECT WHARVES.
restrictive provision in its organic act, the implied authority to erect
a wharf thereon, and it would have the incidental right, the same as
a private owner, to charge compensation for its use. 1
Its rights
1 Murphy v. City Council, 11 Ala. 586 426, the Supreme Court decided that the
(1847).
The court say:
“The title to City of Boston, as the proprietor of the
the wharf is in the city, and, such being land under water at the foot of Summer
the fact, it had the same right as any other Street, might reclaim the land under water
proprietor to collect wharfage from those by filling up the space and building there-
landing goods there. This right, result- on, and thus exclude the public, including
ing from its proprietary interest, is not a the plaintiff, from its use for navigation
franchise, but a right of property.” Ib., when covered by the tide ; but that until
per Ormond, J., p. 558. The city of the owner (the city) did so the public
Boston has, under the laws of Massachu- night lawfully use the same; and that
setts, the same rights as other littoral such use is not adverse to the city or the
proprietors, and was held not to dedicate owner of the land, and lays no foundation
a dock, which it owned, to the public, by for a claim of dedication of the land to
merely abstaining from any control over that use, since the right of navigation is
it. The court observe: “The people of the paramount right, but was a right de-
Boston, who owned the land as their com- feasible by the exercise of the city's right
mon and private property, acted through to reclaim its land under water by wharf-
a corporation (the city), whose corporate ing out or making erections thereon bene-
grants and licenses are matters of record. ficial to itself; and the court held that
Their own use of their own property for there was no evidence whatever that the
their own benefit cannot be called a dedi- city or the people of Boston had dedicated
cation of it to any other public of wider the slip or dock between the plaintiff's
cxtcnt. Whether it was called 'town wharves to any public use, and that the
dock' or 'public dock' which were used city had the right to drive piles or extend
as synonymous terms), it would furnish its sewers in the locus in quo to low-water
no ground to presume that they had parted mark. In the case in 19 How. 263, the
with their right to govern and use it in court decided that if the city had deter-
the manner most beneficial to the people mined to reclaim this dock or land under
or public of the town or city." Boston v. water between the plaintiff's wharves, and
Lecraw, 17 How. (U. S.) 426 (1854). The had laid out and constructed a street
title and right involved in the Lecraw case, thereon or continued the street to low.
just cited, were before the Supreme Court water mark, then the right to use it as a
of the United States three times (17 How. street or highway on land became appurt-
426; 19 How. 263; 24 How. 188). The enant to the wharf property of the adjoin-
plaintiff was the owner of two wharves, ing owners; and also that if the city in
called the Price Wharf and the Bull Wharf, the exercise of its power to make drains
which extended from high to low water under the streets should so construct them
mark. The City of Boston (the defendant) as to hinder the public in their use of the
laid out Summer Street thirty feet in width streets as streets, or to create a puisance to
to the water, and the lines of the street if the adjoining properties, it would be liable
extended into the water would separate therefor, since if such a street be made the
the plaintiff's two wharves. The land plaintiff would have a riglıt to pass along
under the waters within such extended the same as well as the public. In the
space between high and low water mark case in 24 How. 188, it appeared that
belonged to the city. The action was the space had not been reclaimed from the
brought by the wharf owner or his tenant water, and that no street on land had been
against the city for nuisance, charging that made ; and the court decided that though
the city had erected piles in the said water the city was the owner of the land at the
space, or dock, between the plaintiff's two foot of the street between high and low
wharves ; also a drain in the dock for car- water mark, it could not lay out a street
rying off sewage. In the case in 17 How. or highway in the water of the ocean for
174
§ 110
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
would be the saine as those of any similar proprietor, and no greater,
unless enlarged by legislative grant.
$ 110 (74). Powers of Municipality.- Except as mentioned in
the last section, all of the powers of a municipality in respect to
wharves and docks must, like all its other powers, be derived from
the legislature. Where streets terminating or fronting on navigable
boats and vessels; and that on the facts of The discretion of the city authorities
the case the city was not liable to the in determining what are proper and
plaintiff, the owner of the wharves, for needed facilities for commerce, and on
erecting drains and sewers on the city's what part of the river bank, within her
own land at the foot of the street, for the limits, they should be established, is mani-
preservation of the health of the city. festly not a proper subject for judicial
Commonwealth v. Roxbury, 9 Gray, 514, control or interference. Whatever inci-
519, and note ; Railroad Co. v. Ellerman, dental damage may result to proprietors
105 U. S. 166. Bona fide purchaser of a from the exercise of these unquestionable
wharf in the city of Baltimore, erected corporate rights, it is damnum absque
under contract with the city, and in which injuria.” Per Fenner, J., in Watson v.
the city had certain rights, held affected Turnbull, 34 La. An. 856.
with notice of those rights. Baltimore v. 1 Snyder v. Rockport, 6 Ind. (Porter)
White, 2 Gill (Md.), 444. A city, author- 237 (1855); Railroad Co. v. Winthrop,
ized by its charter to build wharves on its 5 La. An. 36; State v. Jersey City, 34
own property, and to obtain by contract N. J. L. 31; Mayor of St. Martinsville v.
or purchase the title or the control of other Steamer Mary Lewis, 32 La. An. 1293.
wharves in the city, and to raise a revenue As the municipality derives such powers
therefrom by establishing and collecting from the legislature, the legislature may
a rate of dockage and wharfage, had no repeal or revoke them at pleasure, if it
power to take a lease of a wharf contain- does not deprive the municipality of prop-
ing a provision that it should be kept as a erty acquired by it under the legislative
free wharf. Mobile v. Mood, 53 Ala. 561. grant. Railroad Co. v. Ellerman, 105
Wharves, whether terminating streets or U.S. 166 (1881). Under the charter of a
not, are not streets ; if owned by the city city providing that the city u shall have
they may be leased to private persons. In control of the landings of the Mississippi
such case the title is not a public ease- River, and the right to build wharves and
ment, but proprietary. Hom v. People, regulate the landing, wharfage, and dock-
26 Mich. 221; and see Scott v. Layng, 59 ing of boats," it may establish and con-
Mich. 43; supra, sec. 103, note; infra, sec. struct wharves, and collect a reasonable
110, note ; sec. 114, note, as to ferry land- compensation for their use. Muscatine v.
ing at foot of street.
" Within the cor- Keokuk, &c. Packet Co., 45 Iowa, 185
porate limits, the city of New Orleans, (1876); post, sec. 112. While a city may
under her charter and under the general be enjoined, at the instance of a taxpayer,
law, has the right to control, manage, and from raising taxes or appropriating money
administer the use of the river banks for for the unauthorized construction of a
the public convenience and utility ; to wharf, it will not be restrained from exer-
establish wharves and landings ; to erect cising a clear power to grade streets,
works and provide facilities for the use of merely because, by such grading, a wharf
vessels and water craft; and to charge just at the river end of the street will incident-
compensation for the use thereof. Ripa- ally result. Snyder v. Rockport, above
rian proprietors have no right to appro- cited. The city of Dubuque, under its
priate to their exclusive these charter, was held to have power to prohibit
banks, and they have no private prop- all persons, including riparian owners,
erty in the use thereof, which is public. from using any place but the public wharf
use
$ 110
WHARVES; POWERS OF MUNICIPALITY.
175
waters have been established, whether by condemnation or dedica-
tion, and whether the fee is in the municipality or in the adjoining
proprietor, the municipality, under legislative authority to establish
and regulate wharves, may cause public wharves to be constructed
at the ends or in front of such streets and receive the wharfage from
the same; and this is no invasion of the rights of the owner of pri-
vate property abutting on such streets, or of the rights of the adjoin-
ing riparian proprietor. In regard to private wharves lawfully
In
without paying wharfage. Dubuque v. ing on this point. It was decided in City
Stout, 32 Iowa, 80 ; s. C. 7 Am. Rep. of Baltimore v. White, 2 Gill (Md.), 444
171; post, sec. 112, note.
As to the use, (1845), that under an act of the legisla-
under municipal authority, of streets ture prohibiting any person from making
bordering on a navigable river for struc- or extending any wharf in Baltimore, with-
tures for the accommodation of passengers out the city's consent to the plan thereof
and the storage of freights, &c., see Bar- first obtained, the city may refuse its as-
ney v. Keokuk, 94 U. S. 324 (1876); s. C. sent to the erection of a wharf except
below, 4 Dillon, 593; Ill. &c. Co. v. St. upon the condition that its exterior mar-
Louis, 2 Dillon, 70.
gin shall constitute a public wharf. If
1 McMurray 2. Mayor, &c. of Balti- private persons accept or act upon the city's
more, 54 Md. 104 (1880); Dugan v. assent thus conditioned, and thereupon
Mayor, 5 Gill & Johns. 375; Haight v. build the wharves, they consent to the
Keokuk, 4 Iowa, 199; Barney v. Keokuk, dedication of its exterior margin for that
94 U. S. 324 ; Rowans' Ex’rs v. Portland, purpose ; and in the absence of a contract
8 B. Monroe, 253 ; Newport v. Taylor's or legislative provision as to who is en-
Ex'rs, 16 B. Monroe, 700; Barney v. titled to the wharfage at such a wharf, it
Mayor, 1 Hughes (C. C.) 118 ; Potomac was held under the circumstances to be-
Steamboat Co. v. Upper Potomac, &c. Co., long to the city, and not to the riparian
109 U. S. 672 (1883), and cases cited by proprietor who constructed the same.
Matthews, J., on pp. 682, 683. The gen- Newport, &c. v. Taylor's Ex’rs, 16 B.
eral ground of the doctrine is that streets Monroe, 699, 804 (1855), it was decided
terminating or fronting on the water may that where a proprietor of lands laid out a
be legitimately used for wharf purposes; town on a navigable river and dedicated
and the cases show that there is a very the land along it to be a common, that
general legislative recognition of this such dedication conferred upon the public
right and usage. In accordance therewith, authorities of the town the right to build
it was held in the Chicago Lake Front wharves. S. P. as to lands dedicated as
case by the United States Circuit Court a street on the river bank of a town.
(Harlan and Blodgett, JJ.), 33 Fed. Rep. Rowan's Executors v. Portland, 8 B. Mon.
730 (1888), that the city of Chicago, as 232, cited with approval by Matthews, J., in
the riparian owner of ground on the shore Potomac Steamboat Co. v. Upper Potomac
of the lake, having, also, under its char. &c. Co., 109 U. S. 686, 687; Louisville v.
ter, power to maintain wharves and Bank, 3 B. Mon. 144 ; Kennedy v. Cov-
slips at the ends of streets, and to main ington, 8 Dann, 61. A city in Alabana
tain a breakwater to protect the shore, constructed a wharf at the end of a dedi-
could delegate the power to construct cated street leading to the water ; held
such breakwater to a railroad company that the adjoining proprietor was not the
as consideration for allowing the road owner of the wharf, and could not eject the
to enter the city; and that upon the city therefrom. Doe v. Jones, 11 Ala. 63
erection of the breakwater and the filling (1847). In Michigan, a dedicated street
in of the space between the breakwater and terminating upon a navigable water gives
the shore line, the land thus reclaimed be- to the city, having power to erect and
longed to the city, — Blodyett, J., dissent- regulate public wharves and docks at the
176
§ 110
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
erected, the municipal authorities have only such powers of local
regulation and government as their charters or constituent acts, in
general or special terms, confer upon them. Their own right to
erect wharves may be express or implied. The power, even when
conferred in terms, is, like other powers, to be construed somewhat
strictly when it affects private rights, but not so strictly as to defeat
ends of streets, the right, as against a pro- ness, and the extent of its cargo. All that
prietor whose property fronts on the is meant in the charter by a 'public wharf’
street and the navigable water, to erect a is a wharf belonging to the city, and to be
wharf for public purposes, and this irre- used like any other wharf property. The
spective of whether the city holds the fee term is applied as well to wharves on city
of the street or not. Backus v. City of property away from streets, as to wharves
Detroit, 49 Mich. 110 (1882). In this at the end of streets." See also, Scott v.
case Cooley, J., said: “The dedication Layng, 59 Mich. 43, 49 (1886). See post,
passed [by the statute] the fee in all streets chap. on Dedication.
marked upon it to the county in which the 1 Grant v. Davenport, 18 Iowa, 179
city was situated. But this was only in (1865). Where the charter of a city
trust for street purposes. We attach no authorizes it " to regulate the erection and
special importance to the fact that the repair of private wharves and the rates of
title passed instead of a mere easement. wharfage thereat, the city,” says Wright,
The purpose of the statute is not to give C, J., “may regulate, but not destroy ;
the county the usual rights of a proprietor, may exercise control, as over other private
but to preclude questions which might property within its limits, but not to the
arise respecting the public uses, other than extent of appropriating the use and enjoy-
those of mere passage, to which the land ment thereof to the public without com-
might be devoted.” The city of Detroit pensation.” Ib. Liability of city corpo-
is, by its charter, authorized “to erect, ration for an injury to a private wharf,
repair, and regulate 'public wharves' and caused by diverting streams of water to a
docks at the ends of streets, and on the point near the wharf, thereby causing a
property of the corporation, and to fix lines great deposit of sand and earth, which
beyond which private docks shall not ex- lessened the depth of water at the wharf
tend, and to lease wharf and wharfage and impaired its value. Barron v. Balti-
privileges at the ends of streets," &c. This more, 2 Am. Jurist, 203, cited and ap-
gives the power to the city to authorize a proved in Stetson v. Faxon, 19 Pick. 147
wharf to be built at the end of a street (1858); and see, also, Thayer v. Boston,
terminating on the navigable water. It 19 Pick. 510. If the deposits from sewers
was held in Horn v. People, 26 Mich. 222, constructed by the city cause a peculiar
that wharves constructed by the city injury to the wharf owner, the city is liable
under this power, whether at the end of to the latter in damages. Franklin Wharf
highways or on its property, are the prop- Co. v. Portland, 67 Me. 46 (1877); S. C.
erty of the city, and may be leased as such. 24 Am. Rep. 1, and Mr. Thompson's note;
Campbell, J., thus defines the words Haskell v. New Bedford, 108 Mass. 208;
"public wharf,” as used in the charter Brayton v. Fall River, 113 Mass. 218 ;
(16. p. 224): “There is no instance in S. C. 18 Am. Rep. 470; post, chap. xxiii.
which the term 'public wharf' has been Power to erect public wharves and to con-
used in our legislation to indicate any demn private property therefor includes
thiny analogous to a dedication to any the power to extend a wharf already estab-
public use, like that of highways. Such lished, and compulsorily to appropriate
a public right is unknown to the common the necessary land for that purpose, on
law. Wharfage involves exclusive use, making compensation to the
for longer or shorter periods, by each ves- Hannibal v. Winchell, 54 Mo. 172 (1873).
sel, depending on the nature of its busi-
owner.
§ 111
177
WHARVES ; SCOPE OF MUNICIPAL POWER.
the purpose of the grant. Thus, although the corporate boundaries
may by the charter be extended to low-water mark, and the corpo-
ration has express power “to regulate the erection and occupation of
all wharves or levees within the corporate limits,” this does not give
the corporation, as against the riparian proprietor (whose right was
construed to extend to low-water mark), the power to control the
river bank so as to require such proprietor or his lessee to take out
a license for his wharf-boat, fastened to the shore of his own land,
and used for business purposes.2
§ 111 (75). Scope of Municipal Power. — So where a riparian
proprietor had constructed a wharf which extended to, but did not
encroach upon the navigable part of the river, and which was not
shown to be a nuisance in fact, it was held by the Supreme Court
of the United States that the city within which the wharf was sit-
uated could not, under the charter power to establish dock and wharf
lines and restrain and prevent encroachments upon the river and ob-
structions thereto, pass an ordinance declaring the wharf to be an
obstruction to navigation, and a nuisance, and ordering it to be sum-
marily abated. 3
1 As to the extent of municipal power Hill (N. Y.). 429; s. C. 5 Hill, 71; Hart
over public and private wharves and the 2. Mayor, 9 Wend. 571; Lansing v.
respective rights of the riparian owner and Smith, 4 Wend. 4; Thompson v. Mayer,
municipal authorities, concerning wharves 11 N. Y. 115; Marshall v. Guion, Ib.
and wharfage : Railroad Co. v. Ellerman, 461; Corporation v. Scott, 1 Caines, 543;
105 U. S. 166 (1881); Grant v. Daven- Mayor, &c. v. Hart, 95 N. Y. 443 (1884);
port, 18 Iowa, 179 (1865); Cincinnati v. Langdon v. Mayor, &c. N. Y. 93 N. Y.
Walls, 1 Ohio St. 222; Muscatine v. Her- 129, and cases cited; Potomac S. B. Co.
shey, 18 Iowa, 39; Galveston v. Menard, v. Upper Potomac, &c. Co., 109 U. S. 672
23 Tex. 348; Baltimore 2. White, 2 Gill (1883). Principles of construction, ante,
(Md.), 444 (1845); Furman v. New York, sec. 89, and notes; post, 113, note.
5 Sandf. S. C. 16; affirmed, 10 N. Y. 567; The charter powers of a municipality
Dugan v. Baltimore, 5 Gill & Johns. in respect to wharfage are subject to the
(Md.) 357 (1833); reversing s. C. 3 Bland, unlimited control of the legislature, ex-
Ch. 361; Wilson v. Inloes, 11 Gill & cept so far as the rights of creditors may
Johns. (Md.) 358; Shepherd v. Munici- be impaired. St. Louis v. Shields, 52
pality, 6 Rob. (La.) 349; Columbus v. Mo. 361 (1873); Railroad Co. v. Eller-
Grey, 2 Bush (Ky.), 476 ; Kennedy v. man, 105 U. S. 166 (1881); ante, sec. 69.
Covington, 17 B. Mon. 567; Memphis, &c. 2 McLaughlin v. Stevens, 18 Ohio, 94,
Packet Co. v. Grey, 9 Bush (Ky.), 137 (1849); Blanchard v. Porter (extent of
(1872); Comm’rs v. Neil, 3 Yeates (Pa.), riparian right), 11 Ohio, 138, 144; Mus-
54; Richardson v. Boston, 24 How. (U. S.) catine v. Hershey, 18 Iowa, 39; Martin v.
188; S. C. 19 How. 263; 17 How. 426; Evansville, 32 Ind. 85 (1869).
Newport v. Taylor, 16 B. Mon. 699 8 Yates v. Milwaukee, 10 Wall. 497
(1855); Commonwealth v. Roxbury, 9 (1870). Yates v. Milwaukee was ap-
Gray, 514, 519, and note by Mr. (now proved and applied in the Chicago Lake
Justice) Gray; Trowbridge v. Mayor (right Front case by Harlan and Blodgett, JJ.,
of Albany under Dongan charter), 7 in State of Illinois v. Illinois Central R.
VOL. I. - 12
178
$ 113
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
$ 112 (76). Tolls and Wharfage. - If the right to impose wharf-
age is given to a municipality, but not limited, the question of the
amount which the municipal authorities may exact is confided
to their discretion, and is one with which the courts cannot inter-
fere, unless, perhaps, in a case where the by-law imposing it is
plainly unreasonable. But the amount of tolls or wharfage may,
of course, be regulated by the legislature.3
$ 113 (77). Duties and Liability of Municipality. – The interests
of commerce imperatively require that public wharves should be in a
R. Co., 33 Fed. Rep. 730 (1888). Ap- chap. xxiii. Packet Co. v. St. Louis,
proved and distinguished, Weber v. Har- Dillon, 10 (1876); ante, secs. 94, 95.
bor Comm’rs (San Francisco), 18 Wall. 2 See ante, sec. 94 and note, as to when
57 (1873). See supra, sec. 107, note. and how far discretionary powers are sub-
1 Municipality v. Pease, 2 La. An. ject to judicial cognizance. As to reason-
538 (1847); Muscatine v. Hershey, 18 / ableness of wharfage charges : supra, sec.
Iowa, 39, 42 (1864), per Wright, J.; Coal / 103 note. Coal Float v. Jeffersonville,
Float v. Jeffersonville, 112 Ind. 15 (1887). ! 112 Ind. 15 (1887). As to general re-
The erection of a wharf by a city was quirem.ent of law that all ordinances or
presumed to be for the benefit of the pub. by-laws must be reasonable, see infra,
lic, and in the absence of an ordinance fix- chap. xii. Municipal Ordinances and By-
ing the wharfage dues or providing for Laws.
the payment of a compensation for the 8 Baltimore v. White, 2 Gill (Md.), 414
use of its wharves, it was held that such (1845); Murphy v. City Council, 11 Ala.
compensation could not be collected by the 586 (1847): Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S.
city. Muscatine v. Keokuk, &c. Packet 113. Authority to a city “to crect, re-
Co., 45 Iowa, 185 (1876). A city may pair, and regulate wharves and the rates
prescribe by ordinance the fees which shall of wharfage," authorizes it to collect wharf-
be paid for the use of the wharves within age upon goods landed on the bank, the
its limits, and this power is impliedly space in front of the city being dedicated
suhject only to the limitation that such to the public, although no artificial wharf
fees shall be reasonable. Keokuk v. Keo- was erected.
Sacramento v. Steamer, 4
kuk Northern Line Packet Co., 45 Iowa, Cal. 41.
. This subject is discussed by
196 (1876). As to right of a city to Wright, J., in Muscatine v. Hershey, 18
charge wharfage fees when vessels or boats Iowa, 39, but the point is not decided by
are moored at places where no wharves the court. See Dubuque v. Stout, 32
have been founded. Ib.; Dubuque v. Iowa, 47, 80 (1871); 3. C. 7 An. Rep.
Stout, 32 Iowa, 80; S. C. 7 Am. Rep. 171. 171. In Kentucky, however, it is held
Voluntary Payment. Where the own- that the owner of the land must build
ers of boats have paid wharfage fees under wharves, or improve the shore, or make
protest, which were demanded and col. some preparation for the reception or de-
lected in the absence of authority to make livery of goods, or accommodation of ves-
the demand, they cannot recover them sels, before he is entitled to collect tolls
back in an action against the city. Mus. or wharfage. Columbus v. Grey, 2 Bush
catine v. Keokuk, &c. Packet Co., 45 (Ky.), 476. See supra, sec. 103, note. If
Iowa, 185 (1876). The mere danger that he permits the municipal authorities so to
an action at law will be commenced to improve the wharves, he will only be en-
enforce payment does not make the pay- titled to reasonable compensation for the
ment of a demand unjustly and illegally use of the river bank. Ib. The word
made a compulsory payment.
Ib. See "quay" defined by McLean, J., in New
cases on the subject of voluntary and com- Orleans v. United States, 10 Pet. 661,
pulsory payment, cited at large, post, 715.
(
§ 114
FERRIES.
179
safe condition ; and if a municipal corporation is in possession of
such a wharf and exercises control over it, and receives tolls for its
use,
it owes a duty to the public to keep it in proper and secure con-
dition for use, and it is liable, without statutory enactment to that
effect, to an action for any special injuries to boats and vessels
caused by its failure to discharge this duty. In such a case it is
not material whether the city had adopted ordinances for the regu-
lation of the wharf, or, having such, neglected to enforce them, as in
either event the responsibility is the same.1
§ 114 (78). Ferries ; Nature of Ferry Grant to a Municipality.
It is not unusual for the legislature to make to a municipal cor-
poration a more or less extensive grant respecting ferries and ferry
franchises. Such a grant is not, unless otherwise expressed, a com-
pact which cannot be impaired, but in the nature of a public law,
subject to be repealed or changed, as the public interests may de-
mand. If the legislature has conferred, as in some of the ancient
1 Pittsburgh v. Grier, 22 Pa. St. 54 (1870); Winpenny v. Philadelphia, 65 Pa.
(1853). This case," says Perley, C. J., St. 135 (1870). Where it was rendered
in Eastman v. Meredith, 36 N. H. 284, unsafe by acts of others, notice, express
295, "is put distinctly upon the ground or implied, is an element necessary to lia-
that the public duty, which was the foun- bility, the same as in the case of defective
dation of the action, arose out of the con- highways. Seanian v. New York, 3 Daly
trol which the city exercised over the (N. Y.), 147; post, chap. xxiii., where the
wharf, and the income received for the subject and the ground of the liability of
use of it.
That the right to collect the corporation for torts is considered at
wharfage by the city imposes the duty large.
to keep in repair, and a correlative lia- The duty of those having control of a
bility, has been often determined. City harbor is, so long as it is open to the pub-
not liable for filling up slip from a sewer. lic, to have it reasonably safe for the pub-
Reed v. Lynn, 126 Mass. 367; Shinkle v. lic use, and this whether tolls are collected
Covington, 1 Bush (Ky.), 617, where or not for the use of it. Parnaby v. Lan-
there was a failure to provide proper fas- cashire Canal Co., 11 A. & E. 223 ; Met-
tenings for boats.
Allegheny v. Camp- calfe v. Hetherington, 11 Ex. 257; s. c. 5
bell, 107 Pa. St. 530; Willey v. Alle- H. & N. 719; Gibbs v. Liverpool Docks,
gheny, 118 Pa. St. 490; supra, sec. 105, 3 H. & N. 164; s. c. L. R. 1 H. L. C. 93,
and note.
People v. Albany, 11 Wend. 104, 122 ; Longmore v. Great Western
539, 543; Buckbee v. Brown, 21 Wend. Railway Co., 35 L. J. C. P. 135; Francis
110; Mersey Dock Trustees v. Gibbs, Law v. rockrell, L. R. 5 Q. B. 184; Webb v.
R. 1 H. L. 93. Lessee of city is under like Port Bruce Harbor Co., 19 Upper Can. Q.
liability. Radway v. Briggs, 37 N. Y. B. 626; Coe 2. Wise, L. R. 1 Q. B. 711;
256 (1867). In form, the action in such Winch v. Conservators of the Thames, L.
a case against the city may be either case R. 7 C. P. 471; see Sweeney v. Port Buir-
or assumpsit. Pittsburgh v. Grier, 22 Pa. well Harbor Co., 17 Upper Can. C. P.
St. 54 (1853). But it is no defence to an 574; reversed, 19 Upper Can. C. P. 376;
action by a city for wharfage that the Berryman v. Port Burwell Harbor Co., 24
wharf was not well built and needed further Upper Can. Q. B. 34.
improvement or repairs. Prescott v. Du- 2 East Hartford v. Hartford Bridge
quesne, 48 Pa. St. 118; Jeffersonville v. Co., 10 How. (U. S.) 511 (1850); Roper
Ferry Co., 27 Ind. 100; s. C. 35 Ind. 19 V. McWhorter, 77 Va. 214; ante, sec.
180
Ş 114
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
charters in England and in this country, upon a municipal corpora-
tion its whole power to establish and regulate ferries within the cor-
porate limits, the corporation thus representing the sovereign power
may make an exclusive grant. But such a corporation has not an
exclusive power over the subject, unless, by express words or neces-
sary inference, it be plainly given to it by the legislature. Hence,
power to a municipality to establish and regulate ferries within its
limits does not give it an exclusive power, and consequently does not
authorize it to confer an exclusive privilege upon others to establish
a ferry.?
this case,
68. As to extinguishment of ferry fran. Greene (Iowa), 532; ante secs. 89-91,
chise by a subsequent legislative grant to and cases in notes. While the exclusive
build a bridge at the site of the ferry, and power conferred by the legislature upon a
take tolls, see the famous case of Charles city to grant a ferry license does not au-
River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 11 Pet. thorize it to grant an ecclusive license, yet
(U. S.) 420 (1837). The dissenting opin the power to grant an exclusive license is
ion of Mr. Justice Story, on the impor. conferred when the city is authorized " to
tant constitutional question involved in grant or refuse a license.” B. & H. Ferry
is referred to by Mr. Webster, Co. v. Davis, 48 Iowa, 133 (1878). The
in a letter to Judge Story, as "thé ablest power to refuse gives the power to limit
and best written opinion I ever heard you the issue of licenses; if it can limit, there
deliver; it is close, searching, and scrutin- is no reason why it cannot bind itself to
izing; the opposite opinion has not a foot issue no other; but the power to license,
nor an inch of ground to stand on.” 2 or to license and regulate certain occupa-
Story, Life and Letters, 268. Chancellor tions, does not, it seems, include the
Kent expressed the same opinion. Ib. power to create a monopoly. Chicago v.
270. But fifty years' subsequent experi- Rumph, 45 Ill. 90; Logan v. Pyne, 43
ence has vindicated the judgment of the Iowa, 524; B. & H. Ferry Co. v. Davis, 48
court and placed it upon an immovable Iowa, 133. But “the grant of exclusive
and unquestioned foundation. Construc- ferry licenses rests upon peculiar grounds.
tion of special grant. Hartford Bridge Co. It is in some sense an extension of a pub-
v. Ferry Co., 29 Conn. 210, where a ferry lic road. The objection to the creation of
had been maintained by a city for a time a monopoly is overcome in the matter of
beyond the memory of living men, it was a few by the consideration of the public
held, in the absence of other evidence, that necessity or advantage." Ib., per Adams,
its franchise was established by prescription; J. The question whether the grant of a
and also, that while the State could di- ferry to individuals by the legislature de-
vest the city of the franchise, its purpose prives a municipal corporation possessing
and intent to do so must clearly appear, the usual powers to provide for the con-
and cannot be left to implication. City venience and prosperity of its citizens, of
of Laredo v. Martin, 52 Tex. 548 (1880). the right to establish a competing ferry,
As to corporations by prescription, see ante, discussed but not decided, in Gibbes v.
secs. 32, 37.
Beaufort, 20 S. C. 213. A city owning a
1 Costar 2. Brush, 25 Wend. 628 ferry must administer the public trust
(1841). See also Mayor, &c. of New thus imposed as the public interest may
York v. Starin, 106 N. Y. 1; Mayor, &c. require. Waterbury v. Laredo, 68 Tex.
of New York v. New York & N. J. S. N. 565 (a contract by which a city gave to
Co., 106 N. Y. 28.
an attorney one third of the rents of a
2 Minturn v. Larue, 23 How. (U. S.) ferry, and bound itself not to make any
435 (1859); Harrison V. State, 9 Mo. engagement which would interfere with
526 (1845); McEwen v. Taylor, 4 G. its terms, held void as being against pub-
$ 116
181
FERRIES; POWER TO TAX, LEASE, COVENANT, ETC.
§ 115 (79). License Fee and Tax; Construction of Special Grant.
By its charter a city was empowered " to license, continue, and regu-
late” as many ferries within its limits, to the opposite shore of a
river bounding it, as the public good required, and the common
council were further authorized“ to direct the manner of issuing
and registering the licenses, and to prescribe the sum of money to be
paid therefor into the treasury of the corporation." Under this, an
ordinance prohibiting all persons from ferrying, without a license
from the mayor, and authorizing this officer to grant licenses to any
person upon payment into the treasury of the city of the sum of
fifty dollars, was sustained against the objections that there was no
power to prohibit ferrying without a license, and that the license fee
was a tax. The words of the charter, “To prescribe the sum of
money to be paid into the treasury of the corporation," were re-
garded by the court as showing a clear intent to make licenses a
source of revenue to the city; and the court added that the amount
charged as a license fee did not appear to be unreasonable.
§ 116 (80). Power to Lease, Covenant, etc. — If a municipal cor-
poration, seized of a ferry, lease the same, through the agency of the
mayor and aldermen, with a covenant for quiet enjoyment, this cove-
nant will not restrain the mayor and aldermen from exercising the
powers vested in them by statute, to license another ferry over
the same waters, if in their judgment (which cannot be reviewed by
the courts) the public necessity and convenience require it. On such
a covenant the city may be liable to the covenantees; but the powers
vested in the city officers as trustees for the public cannot be thus abro-
gated. If, however, the city in its corporate capacity is the legal
owner of an exclusive franchise, its grantees or lessees would hold it,
notwithstanding any license to others, whether granted by the mayor
and aldermen or any other tribunal.2
lic policy).
Whether the dedication of J. L. 118, and the chapters op Ordi-
land for a highway or street terminating nances and Taxation. Post, secs. 357, 768.
on a river will authorize the use of the Amount of license city may exact, the
same for a ferry landing, that is, for fas- State law on the subject being held to
tening boats and receiving and discharg- affect the city. Reddick v. Amelia, 1 Mo.
ing freights and passengers, without the 5 (1821).
consent of the abutting owner, see Prosser 2 Fay, In re, 15 Pick. (Mass.) 243
v. Wappello County, 18 Iowa, 327, and (1834). The court will not try on certio-
cases cited; also 4 Am. Law Reg. (N. s.) rari the conflicting titles of parties to a
519 (1865) ; supra, sec. 103, note ; sec. ferry franchise. Ib.; ante, chap. v. sec. 97.
109, note.
Rights of municipal corporations in con-
1 Chilvers v. People, 11 Mich. 43 nection with ferries, and extent of legisla-
(1862). As to distinction between a li- tive control. See Fanning v. Gregoire
cense fee and a tax, see Ash v. People, 11 et al., 16 How. (U. S.) 524 (1853); East
Mich. 347; Flanagan v. Plainfield, 44 N. Hartford v. Hartford Bridge Co., 10 How.
182
§ 117
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
§ 117 (81). Borrowing Money ; concerning Implied Power to
borrow Money.
We shall hereafter treat of the implied power of
municipal corporations to issue negotiable securities. But this is a
different question from the power to borrow money. The power to
borrow may be given in express language, in which case the terms
and purpose of the grant will, of course, measure its extent. But
suppose the power is not expressly conferred, does it exist by impli-
cation? It is perhaps settled law in this country that private cor-
porations, organized for pecuniary profit, have, in the absence of
special limitation or restriction, an implied or incidental authority
to borrow money for their legitimate purposes, and to give negotia-
ble obligations for its repayment. The question of the incidental
authority of municipal corporations to borrow money has not been so
thoroughly considered and so often decided as to be entirely closed
to controversy. In view of the legislative practice to confer, in
terms, all powers so important as this, the dangerous nature of this
power, by reason of the temptation it holds out to incur needless
debts and to make extravagant expenditures, and the facilities it
511; affirming s. C. 16 Conn. 149; 17 the ferries to private persons, the fran-
Conn. 80, 96; Chilvers v. People, 11 Mich. chise being a public trust which they
43; O'Neill v. Police Jury, 21 La. An. could not, without legislative sanction,
586; Aikin v. Railroad Co., 20 N. Y. dispose of or delegate. Roper v. Mc.
370 (1859), relating to the ferry rights of Whorter, 77 Va. 214. Upon division of
the city of Albany; Benson ». Mayor, &c. an old town owning ferry franchise, the
of New York, 10 Barb. 223 ; Harris v. new town owns no interest therein except
Nesbit, 24 Ala. 398; United States v. so far as conferred by the legislature.
Fanning, Morris (Iowa), 348; Conner v. Hartford Bridge Co. v. East Hartford, 16
New Albany, 1 Blackf. (Ind.) 43; City Conn. 149; post, chaps. vii., viii.
v. Ferry Co., 27 Ind. 100; Shallcross v. i Stratton v. Allen, 16 N. J. Eq. 229;
Jeffersonville, 26 Ind. 193. The right of
The right of see ante, sec. 50, and chapter on Contracts,
a city, given by charter, to license and tax post, sec. 488. Lucas v. Pitney, 3 Dutch.
ferries, is not, unless so expressed, exclu- (N. J.) 221; Hackettstown v. Swack-
sive of a like right in the State or county. hamer, 8 Vroom (37 N. J. L.), 191;
Harrison v. State, 9 Mo. 526 (1845). construction of specific grant, Mayor, &c.
“ Power to regulate ferries,” given to mu- v. Bailey, 8 Vroom (37 N. J. L.), 519.
nicipal corporations in general incorpora. But see observations of Byles, J., in
tion act, construed. Duckwall v. New Bateman v. Mid-Wales Railway Co.,
Albany, 25 Ind. 283. When equity will L. R. 1 C. P. 510 (1866), as to powers of
annul lease. Phillips v. Bloomington, 1 common-law corporations in England in
G. Greene (Iowa), 498. A power con- respect to drawing, accepting, or indors-
ferred upon a city to establish ferries and ing negotiable securities. The court in
to fix the rates, fees, and rents, author- this case deny (in the absence of express
izes it to rent the ferry, but it cannot sur legislative authority conferring the power)
render its control and supervision wholly that it is competent to a company incor-
to another Macdonell v. International porated in the usual way for the forma-
& G. N. Ry. Co., 60 Tex. 590. See supra, tion and working of a railway to draw,
secs. 96, 97. In Virginia it was held that accept, or indorse bills of exchange. In-
acounty and a city, being joint grantees fra, sec. 125.
of ferry franchises, had no power to lease
§ 118
POWER TO BORROW MONEY.
183
offers for frauds, and the settled and salutary doctrine that such cor-
norations have no powers but such as are expressly conferred, and
those which are necessary to effect the objects of the corporation,
and those which are incidental to the express grants, the author,
where the legislative will is wholly silent, is strongly inclined to
deny the existence of a general implied or incidental power to borrow
money. But it must be admitted that down to the present time a
majority of the express adjudications on the subject favor the con-
trary opinion.
2
§ 118 (82). The Subject considered in Ohio and elsewhere. The
question arose in Ohio, in 1836, and was fully argued and considered.
The town of Chillicothe possessed authority to purchase real estate,
erect public buildings, repair streets, and the usual municipal pow-
ers. The right to borrow money was not expressly granted, and the
only question in the case (an action upon the bonds of the town
given for borrowed money) was, whether it was granted by impli-
cation. The case was regarded as of the first impression, no author-
ities in point being produced. The court distinctly decided that in
carrying out the express powers, or in effecting any'legitimate mu-
nicipal object, the corporation possessed the incidental or implied
right to borrow money: Subsequently the Supreme Court of Wis-
consin affirmed the implied authority of a municipal corporation, as
incidental to the execution of the general powers granted by its
charter, and in the absence of a special restriction, to borrow money
and issue its bonds therefor, it appearing that the proceeds thereof
went into the treasury of the city and were expended by it. “The
charter," says the court, stating its reasons, “ does confer the power
to purchase fire apparatus, cemetery grounds, etc., to establish mar-
kets, and to do many other things, for the execution of which money
would be necessary as a means. It would seem, therefore, that in
the absence of any restriction, the power to borrow money would
1 Ante, secs. 90, 91.
notes given for the money borrowed ; it is
2 Text cited Robertson v. Breedlove, 61 not held that notes so given under the
Tex. 316; Richmond v. McGirr, 78 Ind. incidental power to provide for the pay-
ment of debts have all the qualities of
8 Bank v. Chillicothe, 7 Ohio, Part II. commercial paper. In State, ex rel. v.
p. 31 (1836).
Babcock, 22 Neb. 614 (1888), it was held
4 Mills v. Gleason, 11 Wis. 470 (1860); that a power to make regulations to secure
S. C. 8 Am. Law Reg. 692 ; State v. Mad- the general health of a city and to con-
ison, 7 Wis. 688 ; Clark v. Janesville, 10 struct sewers and to regulate their use,
Wis. 136 ; Clarke v. School District, 3 conferred necessarily the power to provide
R. I. 199 (1855), in which it is held that money for the construction of a sewer for
when money is borrowed to pay a law. the purpose of draining its principal
ful debt of a corporation, and it is so street, by issuing bonds therefor. See
applied, the corporation is liable on the infra, secs. 120, 125, 126.
192.
184
$ 118
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
pass as an incident to these general powers, according to įhe well-
settled rule that corporations may resort to the usual and conven-
jent means of executing the powers granted; for certainly no means
is more usual for the execution of such objects than that of borrowing
money.” In this case, as in the other, the question was not raised
until the money had been borrowed and the rights of third persons
had attached.1
1 City v. Lamson, 9 Wall. 477, 486 ient. Supra, secs. 89-91, and notes.
(1869), where the Wisconsin cases are re- As applicable to municipal corporations,
ferred to by Nelson, J.; ante, sec. 50, and there is great and almost convincing
notes. The right of private corporations force in the argument of Selden, J.,
generally to borrow money, as incidental to in Curtis v. Leavitt, supra, 267, 268.
the express powers granted, is extensively And see Ketchum v. City of Buffalo,
considered upon principle and authority, 14 N. Y. 356, 365 (1856), where the
in the important case of Curtis v. Leavitt, subject is considered by the same judge,
15 N. Y. 9 (1857). See,, also, Barry v. and the power of a municipal corpora-
Merch. Ex. Co., 1 Sandf. Ch. 280 ; Beers tion to contract debts on credit, for le-
v. Phønix Glass Co., 14 Barb. 358 ; Strat- gitimate purposes, is admitted to be a
ton v. Allen, 16 N. J. Eq. 229; Lucas v. question which has “yet to be judicially
Pitney (power of railroad company), 3 settled.” Infra, secs. 125, 126. See, on
Dutch. (N. J.) 221 ; Fay v. Noble (inanu. the general subject, Canal Bank e. Super-
facturing corporation), 12 Cush. 1 ; Davis visors, 5 Denio, 517 (1848); Barker v. .
v. Prop. &c. of Meeting-house (religious Loonis, 6 Hill, 463 (1844); People v.
corporation), 8 Met. 321. Perhaps it is
Perhaps it is Brennan, 39 Barb. 522 (1863). In Com-
difficult to draw a distinction between monwealth v. Pittsburgh, 41 Pa. St. 278,
private and municipal corporations in re- Strong, J., says that the power to execute
spect to the incidental right to borrow and issue bonds is inseparable from the
money. But we see much more reason for existence of all corporations, public and
affirming the existence of an incidental private. Douglass v. Virginia City, 5
power of this kind with respect to trading, Nev. 147 (1869). In New Yor/c, see Stat.
banking, manufacturing, and railroad cor- 1853, 1135, chap. 603. In Mississippi,
porations, than in relation to municipal Boards of Police of counties have no im-
corporations. There is a difference be- plied power to borrow money ; and when
tween contracting a debt in the prosecu- special power to borrow money is conferred
tion of an ordinary legitimate corporate it must be fairly pursued ; and it was
purpose and borrowing money for that held that where a warrant properly signed
purpose. In the one case, the application did not (as required by the statute) state
of the credit is necessarily secured to the on its face the object for which it was
advancement of the authorized object, issued, nor upon what fund drawn, it
while money borrowed is liable to be lost could not be enforced. Beamair » Board
or to be diverted to illegitimate purposes. of Police, 42 Miss. 238 ; s. C. 15 Wall.
This difference is insisted on with great 566. There may be ground for a distinc-
force by Agnew, C. J., in the dissent- tion as to the implied power to borrow
ing opinion in Williamsport v. Common- money, between counties and ordinary
wealth, 84 Pa. St. 487, 507 (1877). It city corporations.
should be remembered, also, that the ex- English Decisions. - Bond for borrowed
press powers can be executed without money, given after the Municipal Corpora-
holding that there is an implied power to tions Act, held valid. Pallister v. Mayor,
borrow money.
The revenue provisions &c., 67 Eng. C. L. (9 C. B.) 774 ; Payne
of charters supply the municipality with v. Mayor, &c., 3 Hurl. & Nor. 572. See
the means designed to furnish it with Nowell v. Mayor, &c., 9 Exch. 457 ;
money. And powers are not held to Kendall v. King, 84 Eng. C. L. (17 C. B.)
exist merely because they are conven- 483. Note for borrowed money held in-
t
§ 119
POWER TO BORROW MONEY.
185
$ 119. Same subject. — In Indiana, the doctrine that corpora-
tions, along with the express and substantive powers conferred by
their charters take by implication all the reasonable modes of exe
cuting such powers which a natural person may adopt, is so applied
as to hold that it is a power incident to corporations, in the absence
of positive restriction, to borrow money as means of executing their
express powers.". In Iowa, school districts have the power to borrow
money to discharge debts legitimately created and to pledge the
credit of the district for that purpose. In Illinois, the same power
exists if authorized by a vote of the people of the district. But where
a law authorizes the donation of money by a municipal corporation
to aid in the construction of a railroad, and provides for levying a
tax to raise the amounts donated as they become due, neither the
corporation nor its officers. have the power to borrow money or to
valid under the act. Attorney-General and to incur a debt on petition of tax-
V. Lichfield, 13 Sim. 547; Rey. v. Lich- payers, levy a tax, &c., the board of town
field, 4 Q. B. 893. See Bateman v. Mid- trustees has power to purchase such ap-
Wales Railway Co., L. R. 1 C. P. 510 paratus on credit, and direct a note there.
(1866); ante, secs. 117, note, secs. 125, for to be issued in the name of the town.
126.
And this power is not exhausted by the
1 New England, &c. Co. v. Robinson, passage, pending the negotiation there.
25 Ind. 536 ; Lafayette v. Cox, 5 Ind. 38; for, of an ordinance for issuance of bonds
Poard, &c. v. Day, 19 Ind. 450 ; Kyle v. to realize means to purchase the apparatus,
Malin, 8 Ind. 34; Hang v. Board, &c., if no bonds are in fact issued thereunder.
60 Ind. 511 ; Second, &c. Bank v. Dan- New Albany Bank v. Danville, 60 Ind.
ville 60 Ind. 504; Richmond v. McGirr 504. So, in Richmond v. McGirr, 78 Ind.
(quoting text), 78 Ind. 192, 198 (1881); 192, 198, unrestricted power in the city to
Board v. Saunders, 17 Ind. 437. See, also, purchase real estate for public buildings
Merrill v. Town of Monticello, 22 Fed. gives to the council implied power, in its
Rep. 589.
discretion, to purchase on credit, and to
2 Board v. Day, 19 Ind. 450 ; Miller v. issue negotiable bonds for the purchase
Board, 66 Ind. 162, citing Ketchum v. money ; the court refused to enjoin the
Buffalo, 14 N. Y. 356 ; Mills v. Gleason, issue of such bonds. Infra, sec. 127, and
11 W19. 470; State v. Madison, 7 Wis. note. As to power to issue bonds for sub-
688; Bank v. Chillicothe, 7 Ohio, 354; scriptions in aid of railroads, see post,
Moss v. Harpeth Academy, 7 Heisk. 283 ; sec. 161.
Commonwealth v. Pittsburgh, 34 Pd. St. 8 Austin v. Colony, 51 Iowa, 102.
496 ; Clark v. School Dist., 3 R. I. 199 ; 4 Folsom v. School Directors, 91 Ill.
Hardy v. Merriwether, 14 Ind. 203 ; Shef- 404, where it is held that the power to
field v. Andress, 56 Ind. 157. Where a borrow money carries with it at common
city negotiated its bonds to raise means law, independent of the statute, the power
to construct water-worlos, and the city to give evidence of the loan. The power
treasurer misapplied a part of the funds so to give bonds for money borrowed is not
realized, leaving debts unpaid on account a limitation but an enlargement of their
of such works, it was competent for the powers, and an order given by them on
city council to issue and sell other bonds their treasurer is valid and may be en-
to make up such deficiency. Daily v. Co- forced against the district. Ib. The court
lumnbus, 49 Ind. 169 (1874). Under Ind. limits and distinguishes the case of Clark
Rev. Stat. (1876), authorizing towns to v. School Directors, 78 Ill. 474.
provide apparatus for extinguishing fires,
186
$ 120
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
issue bonds in payment of such donation, and bonds issued in pay-
ment thereof are void. 1
§ 120. Same subject. Doctrine in Pennsylvania. The subject of
the incidental or implied power of a municipal corporation to borrow
money to pay pre-existing indebtedness, and also to enable it to grade
and pave its streets, and to issue negotiable paper for this purpose, is
elaborately discussed by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.2 It
was admitted that "taken in its broad sense, the power to borrow
money and issue bonds therefor cannot be said to be among the im-
plied powers of a municipal corporation."'/ But, nevertheless, the
majority of the court, after examining the subject and reviewing the
authorities, sums up the result in guarded language, as follows:
The foregoing cases rest upon the principle, which we think a
sound one, that where a municipal corporation has lawfully con-
tracted a debt, it has the implied power, unless restricted by its
charter or prohibited by statute, to evidence the same by a bill,
bond, note, or other instrument; that the power to contract a debt
carries with it by necessary implication the right to give an appro-
priate acknowledgment of such debt, and to agree with the creditor
as to the time and mode of payment; that in the absence of statu-
tory provision there is no rule of law limiting the extent of the
credit." There was a dissent by three judges on the ground that
1 Lippincott v. Pana, 92 Ill. 24; Mid- trustees contract to keep up, in the build-
dleport v. Ætna Life Ins. Co., 82 Ill. 562; ing, a public school. Quare. Danielly et
Dixon County v. Field, 111 U. S. 83. In al. v. Cabaniss, 52 Ga. 211 (1874). In
Nebraska, county bonds may be issued to Wyoming, the law prohibiting the trustees
raise money to meet current expenses in of a municipal corporation from incurring
case of a deficit in the county revenue, any debt or borrowing money for the use
but this must first be authorized by a of the city, without having the concur-
vote of the electors of the county. Daw- rence of five-eighths of the taxable property
sou Co. v. McNamar, 4 N. W. Rep. 991. owners,
to be ascertained by a petition
As to implied power in Nebraska to for that purpose, does not preclude the
issue municipal bonds, see State v. Bab- trustees from issuing warrants on the treas-
cock, 22 Neb. 614 (1888), cited supra, ury, to be used as evidences of indebt-
sec. 118 r. In Georgia, it is held to be edness, although there is no money in the
within the purpose and scope of a nuni. municipal treasury at the time, nor any
cipal corporation to apply the corporate special authority therefor in the city
funds or to create a corporate debt for the charter. Ivinson v. Hance, i Wy. Ter.
purchase of an interest in a building to be 270. Difference between warrants and
used as a public school or college for the negotiable paper, infra, sec. 487.
accommodation of the people of the town ; 2 Williamnsport v. Commonwealth, 84
and the fact that superintendence of the Pa. St. 487 (1877). Paxson, J., delivered
school is left in the hands of trustees not the opinion of the court, in which Shars-
elected by the corporation does not render wood, Mercur, and Gordon, JJ., concurred;
the appropriation of the corporate funds Agnew, C. J., delivered the dissenting
illegal, it appearing that the enterprise is opinion, in which Woodward and Sterrett,
not for any private gain, and that the JJ., concurred.
!
$ 122
187
DECISIONS OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT.
part of the bonds in question were issued in advance of any debt in-
curred for grading and paving, and as a means of raising money to
pay for future improvements; that they were sold at a heavy dis-
count, and the proceeds only thus applied ; and while admitting
that a municipal corporation may have the implied power to give
suitable evidences of an authorized debt actually incurred, they de-
nied any incidental power in such corporations, as a means of rais-
ing money to execute its ordinary charter powers or duties,“ to issue
commercial paper, be it bonds or notes, payable to bearer, and nego-
tiable according to the law merchant or general usage, and either
to sell them in the market or pass them off to individuals by way
of a general loan." The dissenting judges admitted that where ex-
press power to borrow is given, the municipality has the implied
right to issue negotiable evidences of the debt; and they also seemed
to concede that if an authorized debt is actually incurred for paving
or other proper purposes, the municipality has the right to issue a
bond or note or warrant as evidence of it; but it was not said that,
even when thus issued, that is, issued by virtue of a merely inciden-
tal power, the instrument partook of all the attributes of commercial
paper, especially the one which protects such paper in the hands of
a holder for value before maturity, from defences of which he has no
notice.
$ 121. Author's comment. - If the judgment of the court in this
case is to be taken as holding that a municipal corporation, merely
by virtue of its authority to pave streets, may, without any express
power to borrow money, issue its negotiable bonds in advance, and
sell them as a means of raising money to be applied to this purpose;
may issue them in any sum it pleases and sell them for any price it
can obtain, and that bonds so issued are commercial paper with all
the qualities and incidents of such paper, — if such is the doctrine of
the court, we feel constrained to say that we are unable, notwithstand-
ing the ability with which it is supported, to regard, it as otherwise
than unsound and daugerous.
§ 122. Decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States. The
question under consideration has been considered and discussed by
the Supreme Court of the United States. Four of the justices as-
1 Mayor of Nashville v. Ray, 19 Wall. 111 U. S. 400, the same court decided that
468 (1873) ; Ottawa v. Carey, 108 U. S. the power to issue commercial paper can-
110 ; Hopper v. Covington, 8 Fed. Rep. not be conceded to counties and townships,
777 ; Merrill v. Monticello, 14 Fed. Rep. which are political divisions, unless it is
In Claiborne County v. Brooks, authorized by express legislation or by
628.
188
§ 123
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
sented to the proposition that a municipal corporation pussessed no
inherent or incidental power to raise loans or to borrow money for
that purpose; such a power must in their judgment be conferred by
legislation, expressly or by plain implication. Indebtedness may be
created, it was conceded, for authorized purposes, to the extent per-
mitted, but the legitimate means of paying such indebtedness was
by taxation in the usual mode and not by the issue of commercial
paper for sale in the market; and such paper, if issued without the
sanction of the legislature, although it may be valid as a voucher, is
open, into whosesoever hands it may come, to all defences.
§ 123. Same subject. It was not denied by the Supreme Court
of the United States, in the case referred to in the preceding section,
that the power to borrow might be implied from the existence of express
1
very strong implication from such legis- time he wrote, the opposing cases just
lation.
cited. In this state of the authority, it
This subject being under consideration cannot be claimed that the principle is so
in Hackettstown v. Swackhamer, 37 N. J. settled that the judgment of this court
L. 191, the able and learned judge who cannot be freely exercised with respect to
delivered the opinion of the court said, this important subject. My conclusion
Municipal corporations, in the absence is that already expressed, that a right to
of a specific grant of power, do not in borrow money is not to be inferred from
general possess the capacity to borrow any of the ordinary powers conferred in
money. A note given by such corpora- the charters of municipal corporations,
tion for an unauthorized loan cannot be and that, under ordinary circumstances,
enforced, even though the money bor- such a power can proceed only from an
rowed has been expended for municipal express grant to that effect.
purposes. Seemingly, a promissory note "The further question was discussed at
given for legitimate purposes by a mu-
the bar, whether a municipal corporation,
nicipal corporation will not have the lacking a special authority to that end, can
effect, when in the hands of a bona fide execute a promissory note. I have exam.
holder, of cutting off the equities existing ined the subject, but the views already ex-
between such corporation and the payee. pressed render it unnecessary to pronounce
An examination of the books will show any final conclusion with respect to it; for
that this question has not as yet received the purposes of the present case, I may
much judicial consideration. The courts say, however, that my present view is,
of Wisconsin and Ohio have had this mat- that a corporate body of this character has
ter before them, and have arrived at a re- the general and inherent right to excecute a
sult the opposite of that which has just note as a voucher of indebtedness, but that
been stated. I have carefully weighed the such note will not have the effect, when in
arguments of these learned tribunals, but the hands of a bona fide holder before ma-
they have failed to convince my under turity, of cutting off the equities existing
standing. The cases referred to are those between the maker and payee. In this re-
of Mills v. Gleason, and Bank v. Chilli- spect I fully concur in the learned opinion
cothe. As a counterpoise to these views of Mr. Justice Bradley, recently read in
stands the weighty opinion of Judge Dillon the Supreme Court of the United States,
in his treatise on Municipal Corporations, in the case of The Mayor v. Ray, 19 Wall.
Vol. I, sec. 117. Much emphasis is added 468.” Per Beasley, C. J.
to this expression of opinion from the fact 1 Mayor of Nashville v. Ray, 19 Wall.
that this author had before him, at the 468.
!
§ 123
189
DECISIONS OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT.
powers of such a nature as to be beyond the ordinary range of mu-
nicipal expenditure, and which are usually executed by means of
borrowing; but it was denied by four of the judges that such a
power was incidental to the ordinary grants of municipal authority.
To the author, the brief and compact opinion of Mr. Justice Bradley
seems to be a careful and accurate exposition of the law on the sub-
ject; but the remaining four justices appear to have considered that
it unduly restricted the powers of municipal corporations. The
court has since decided that quasi corporations, such as counties,
have no implied power to issue commercial paper unless by virtue
of express legislation or by very strong implication therefrom, and
1 Infra, secs. 127, 161, and note ; ante, requires the proposition to borrow to be
sec. 118, note.
submitted to the vote of the people of the
2 The prior case of Lynde v. The county. No proposition to borrow money
County of Winnebago, decided by the and to issue bonds was in terms submitted
Supreme Court of the United States, to the people ; but there was submitted
16 Wall. 6 (1872), when carefully viewed this question, viz., Shall the county
with reference to the legislation of Iowa judge, in 1860, levy a tax of seven mills
as to the powers of the county judge in for constructing a court-house in the
the erection of court-houses, and the cxpress county, said tax to be levied from year to
power to borrow money for this purpose year until a sufficient amount is raised for
when the proposition to borrow is sanc- that purpose, not, however, to exceed ten
tioned by a popular vote, will be found to years. The proposition having been
assert or involve no general principle, but carried, a majority of the court (three
to turn upon the special statutory pro- judges dissenting) held that under the
visions, and on the construction and effect Iowa statute the vote gave the authority
to be given to the particular proposition to borrow money and issue the bonds.
that was submitted to the people. That Mr. Justice Swayne said, “It was ex-
proposition, having been adopted by the pressed in this formula (of the vote taken),
voters, was held by the majority of the that a court-house was to be built, and we
court to imply the power to borrow money think that it was implied that money was
to accomplish the object in view ; and as- to be borrowed to accomplish that ohject.
suming the construction adopted to be the Otherwise the vote gave no authority
true one, the result reached logically fol- which did not already exist, and was an
lowed. That this judgment of the Supreme idle ceremony. The statute authorized
Court in the case just referred to is not an appeal to the voters only that they
authority in favor of the broad proposition might give or refuse authority to incur a
that the power to make contracts, – for debt. It could not have been intended that
example, as in that case, the building of a the erection should be delayed till a suni
court-house,
carries with ic the power to sufficient to pay for the structure had
borrow money, and, as incidental to that, been realized from the tax authorized to
the power to issuc negotiable bonds for be imposed, or that the work should pro-
the money borrowed, will clearly appear ceed only pari passu with the progress of
when the statutory provisions and the its collection from year to year. What
facts in that case are considered. Power is implied is as effectual as what is
to build court-houses when payment there. expressed."
for is to be made out of the ordinary The dissenting judges said, “We can.
revenue is conferred by statute upon the not find in this vote any authority in the
county judge without the sanction of a county judge to issue the bonds of the
popular vote. When, however, money is county."
to be borrowed for this purpose the statute
190
§ 125
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
although the county may have power to erect a court-house and
other necessary public buildings, this does not authorize the issue of
commercial paper for that purpose.
)
§ 124. When Power will be held to exist. The nature and extcoot
of the power to borrow money and issue negotiable paper therefor was
considered at length by the United States Circuit Court for Missouri,
in which after a review of the decisions English and American-
the following conclusions were reached : Whether a municipal cor-
poration possesses the power to borrow money, and to issue nego-
tiable securities therefor, depends upon a true construction of its
charter and the legislation of the State applicable to it It has no
incidental or inherent authority under the usual grants of municipal
powers as a means of discharging its ordinary municipal functions.
Such authority may be inferred from special and extraordinary
powers, which require the expenditure of unusual sums of money,
when it is usual to execute such powers by means of borrowing, and
when, upon the whole legislation applicable to the municipality,
such appears to have been the legislative intent3 These principles
were applied ; and coupon bonds to borrow money to erect and repair
wharves and to open streets, issued under the general grants of mu-
nicipal power in the charter, were held not to be binding upon the
city, while other bonds issued under a special act of the legislature,
in payment of stock in companies organized to construct macadamized
roads from the city, were held to be valid.
§ 125. Author's Views and Conclusions summed up.
Whether
there is power in a municipal corporation to borrow money and to
issue negotiable paper depends, we think, upon the legislative intent,
to be collected from statutes, general and special, applicable to the
municipality or to the particular case in hand. The American
cases are conflicting and cannot be harmonized.
The following summarizes our view of the sound and true doc-
trines on this subject:
i Claiborne County v. Brooks, 111 be for the money or property received.
U. S. 400 (1883); approving Police Jury Post, secs. 125, 126, 161 and notes. The
v. Britton, 15 Wall. 566 ; distinguishing remedy where bonds of a city are issued
Lynde v. County of Winnebago, 16 Wall. without authority and the money thereon
6, where the county had express legislative is actually received by the city, is not an
authority to borrow money for the erec- action on the bonds, but to recover the
tion of public buildings when authorized money. Gause v. Clarksville, supra.
by the voters at an election called for the See also Robertson v. Breedlove, 61 Tex.
purpose. Ante, sec. 122, and notes. 316. Infra, sec. 126 note.
2 Gause v. Clarksville, 5 Dillon, 165, 8 Infra, sec. 161, and note; and post,
183 (1879). Thomas v. Port Hudson, 27 chap. xiv. on Contracts.
Mich. 320 (1873), declares the remedy to
!
$ 125
191
AUTHOR'S VIEWS AND CONCLUSIONS.
וגן
1. The power to porrow money as a means of raising a fund to
make future local improvements, or to carry on the ordinary opera-
tions of the municipality, cannot be implied from the mere authority
to make such improvements or from the usual grants of municipal
power. These contemplate that the expense of the execution of the
ordinary municipal powers shall be met by the revenues derived
year by year from taxation.
2. It does not follow because banking, trading corporations and
other private corporations organized for pecuniary profit are held in
this country to possess the incidental power to borrow money, and
to issue commercial paper having all the qualities attributed to such
paper by the law merchant, that a like power is inherently possessed
by public and inunicipal corporations. The analogy is false and
1 As-to the power of corporations to the decision rested on the technical ground
issue commercial paper, the law of Eng- that a corporation can only contract under
land is settled. In England no corpora- seal.
seal. It was placed upon the broad
cion, whether municipal (Reg. v. Lich- ground that there was no act of parlia-
field, 4 Ad. & El. N. S. 891, 906) or ment, general or special, which conferred
private (Bateman v. Mid-Wales Railway the power. It was admitted by all the
170., L. R. 1 C. P. 499, 1866), has the judges that the railway company might
Incidental right to make commercial incur debts in the construction or opera-
paper, except the Bank of England, which tion of the road ; “but it is one thing,"
was incorporated for the very purpose, says Keating, J., “to say that they shall
and trading corporations strictly, such as be liable to be sued for goods sold and de-
the East India Company. Accordingly livered or for work done, and an entirely
it is laid down by Mr. Justice Byles, in different thing to say that they may
his work on bills, that, “without special accept bills in payment.” And to the
authority, expressed or implied, a corpora- same effect was the opinion of the other
tion has no power to make, indorse, or judges. The principle of this case was
accept bills or notes." Byles on Bills approved in The Peruvian, &c. Railway
(8th Eng. ed.), 62; Grant on Corp. 276. Co. v. Thames, &c. Insurance Co., L.
Thus, a water-works company (Broughton R. 2 Ch. 617, when a general incidental
v. Manchester Water-Works, 3 Barn. & power to issue bills of
power to issue bills of exchange and
Ald. 1), a gas joint-stock company negotiable instruments under the Com-
(Bramah v. Roberts, 3 Bing. N. C. 963), panies Act of 1862 was denied, and the
or even trading companies, unless such a power held to depend upon the proper
power is essential to the purposes for construction of the memorandum and
which they are formed (Bateman v.
articles of association. The companies
Railway Co., supra), have no general or organized under that act may communi-
implied authority to make commercial cate this power to their directors, but it
paper. In Bateman's case, last cited, the must be given expressly or by fair intend.
question for the first time arose in Eng- ment in the memorandum and articles of
land, as late as 1866, as to the right of a association of the company, or it will not
railway company, with an authorized exist. In England, as shown by Bate-
capital of £170,000, to make or accept man's case, supra, it is held that, inasmuch
bills of exchange, and it was unanimously as the corporation has no power to accept
decided, by judges of great eminence bills, it cannot be made liable on its ac-
(Erle
, C. J., Byles, Keating, and Moniague ceptance, though the bill was drawn for
Smith, JJ.), that the company had no a valid and binding debt. On this point
such power. The acceptance was undei Erle, C. J., says : “The bill of exchange
seal, and it is a mistake to suppose that is a cause of action, a contract, by itself
,
192
$ 125
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
delusive. The purposes of the two classes of corporations, tie
powers of their officers, and the means of making provision for
meeting their liabilities, are all essentially different. The nature of
the usual duties devolved by law upon municipalities does not make
it necessary to imply the existence of a general power to borrow
money and to issue commercial paper. The consequences of recog-
nizing such a power, in the extravagance it will stimulate, in the
frauds it will engender, and in the onerous indebtedness it will in-
evitably produce, are alarming to contemplate. The history of the
express power given to municipalities to aid railways by borrowing
money and issuing commercial obligations is full of warning and
instruction.
3. The power to issue commercial paper which is unimpeachable
in the hands of the holder is not among the ordinary incidental
powers of a public or municipal corporation. It must be conferred
expressly, or by fair implication, as a necessary, or at least a reasona-
ble and usual means of executing the particular power to which it
is claimed to be incidental.
4. Express power to borrow money, perhaps in all cases, but es-
pecially if conferred to effect objects for which large or unusual sums
are required, as for example subscriptions to aid railways and other
public improvements, will ordinarily be taken, if there be nothing
in the legislation to negative the inference, to include the power (the
same as if conferred upon a corporation organized for pecuniary
profit) to issue negotiable paper with all the incidents of negotia-
bility.1
which binds the acceptor in the hands be sued by an indorsee, but in respect
of an indorsee for value ; and I conceive of the latter, not. See subject dis-
it would be altogether contrary to the cussed in Gause v. Clarksville, 5 Dillon,
principles of the law which regulates 165 (1879).
such instruments that they should be valid In America the courts, however, have
or not according as the consideration be- generally held that banking, trading,
tween the original parties was good or commercial, railway, and other private
bad, or whether, in the case of the corpo- corporations, organized for pecuniary
ration, the consideration in respect of profit, have an incidental power to issue
which the acceptance is given is suffi- commercial paper when such power is
ciently connected with the purpose for not negatived by a true construction of
which the acceptors are incorporated. It their charters or constituent acts. See
would be inconvenient to the last degree ante, secs. 117, 118; also chapter on
if such an inquiry could be gone into. Contracts, post.
Some bills might be given for a consid- 1 Ante, sec. 117, note; post, secs. 127,
eration which was valid, as for work '161, note, and chap. xiv. on Contracts, sec.
done for the company, and others as a 507 et seq.; Williamsport v. Common-
security for money obtained on loans be- wealth, 84 Pa. St. 487; Commonwealth
yond their borrowing powers. It would v. Pittsburg, 34 Pa. St. 496; Rein both v.
be a pernicions thing to hold that, in re- Pittsburg, 41 Pa. St. 278; Middleton v.
spect of the former the corporation night Allegheny Co., 37 Pa. St. 241; Seybert v.
.
§ 126
193
AUTHOR'S VIEWS AND CONCLUSIONS.
5. When it is expressly provided by statute, that public and
municipal corporations shall audit all claims presented, and shall
issue to the creditor warrants or orders, and no other provision is
made, this will not authorize as a means of payment the issue of
negotiable or commercial paper which shall possess all the incidents
of negotiability; and if issued, it is subject to all defences in the
hands of a transferee to which it would be subject in the hands of
the original holder.1
6. Although a municipal corporation proper, in the execution of
its ordinary corporate powers and the discharge of its corporate
duties, may make contracts and create debts, and may, when not
restrained by statute, evidence the liabilities thus incurred, yet if
the instrument is made to assume the form of negotiable paper, such
paper is always open to defences in the hands of transferees when
it is issued without express authority from the legislature, or au-
thority fairly to be implied from the charter or legislation applicable
to the municipality.”
$ 126. Same subject. — Stated in other words, the author regards
it as the true doctrine that, merely as incidental to the discharge of
Pittsburg, 1 Wall. 272; Galena v. Cor. 140, where a municipality is given express
with, 48 Ill. 423; Kelly v. Mayor, 4 Hill power to “negotiate loans in anticipation
(N. Y.), 265; DeVoss v. City Richmond, of the revenues thereof,” bonds negotiable
18 Gratt. 338; R. R. v. Evansville, 15 in form are not void, but they lack the
Ind. 395; Police Jury v. Britton, 15 Wall. characteristics with which actual negoti-
572; Daniel on Nego. Inst. secs. 1527 and ability would clothe them. Sioux City
1531; Rogers v. Burlington, 3 Wall. 654, v. Weare, 59 lowa, 95.
666 ; Milner's Admr. v. Pensacola, 2 1 For difference between such warrants
Woods, 637; Mayor v. Inman, 57 Ga. and orders and negotiable paper, see post,
370; Tucker v. City of Randolph, 75 N. sec. 487.
C. 267; City of Vicksburg v. Lombard, 51 2 The arguments in support of the prop-
Miss. 125; Mercer Co. v. Hacket, 1 Wall. ositions of the text embodied in this section
95. See cases cited in notes to sec. 488, will be found to be ably presented by
post. In Holmes v. Shreveport, 31 Fed. Bradley, J., in The Mayor of Nashville v.
Rep. 113 (1887), the Circuit Court of the Ray, 19 Wall. 468 (1873); by Beasley,
United States, Boarman, J., while recog- C. J., in Hackettstown v. Swackhamer,
nizing the rule that there is no implied 37 N. J. L. (8 Vroom) 191 (1874); and
general power to issue commercial paper by Agnew, C. J., dissenting in Williams-
(Ib. p. 115), held that a city vested with port u. Commonwealth, 84 Pa. St. 487,
extensive powers and authorized to con- 505 (1877). See also Gause v. Clarks-
tract for the construction of public works, ville, 5 Dillon, C. C. R. 165 (1879); Knapp
to give bonds, &c., had power to issue
power to issue v. Hoboken, 39 N. J. L. (10 Vroom)
bonds to evidence the credit part of the 394 (1877).
price agreed to be paid to the contractor The authorities in favor of the other
for certain public works, and that such view are collected, and the argument in
bonds are protected by the law merchant support of that view is presented with
in the hands of a bona fide holder. See fulness, in the opinion of the majority of
also Dorian v. Shreveport, 28 Fed. Rep. the court, delivered by Paxson, J., in Wil.
287. As to public buildings, post, sec. liamsport v. Commonwealth, supra.
- 13
VOL. I.
194
§ 127
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
its ordinary corporate functions, no municipal or public corporation
has the right to invest any instrument it may issue, whatever its
form, with that supreme and dangerous attribute of commercial
paper
which insulates the holder for value from defences and equi-
ties which attach to its inception. This point ought to be guarded
by the courts with the utmost vigilance and resolution.
§ 127 (83). Express Power to borrow Money; Negotiable Paper.
Express power to a municipal corporation “to borrow money” is
usually held to include the power to issue its negotiable bonds, or
other securities to the lender. But it does not include the power
1 If money is improperly borrowed in dleton v. Allegheny Co., 37 Pa. St. 241;
advance of liabilities actually created, and Reinboth v. Pittsburg, 41 Pa. St. 278;
reaches the municipal treasury, and is ex. Seybert v. Pittsburg, 1 Wall. 272; Rogers
pended by direction of the governing body v. Burlington, 3 Wall
. 654, 666, per Clif-
for authorized municipal objects, the mu- ford, J.; DeVoss v. Richmond, 18 Gratt.
nicipality may then in the absence of con- (Va.) 338; s. C. 7 Am. Law Reg. (N. S.)
trolling statute or constitutional provision 589 ; Galena v. Corwith, 48 Ill. 423
to the contrary (see post, secs. 130–138) (1868); post, sec. 488 ; German Bank v.
be liable in the proper action or suit; but Brenham, 35 Fed. Rep. 185 (1888). Money
the action should be, we think, for money borrowed, and note given by officers of a
had and received or by suit in equity, and town, without authority, does not bind
not upon the invalid bonds. Bateman v. the town in case it never receives the
Mid-Wales Railway Co., L. R. 1 C. P. benefit of it. Benoit 2. Conway, 10
499 (1866); Thomas v. Port Hudson, Allen, 528; People v. Supervisors, 34 N.
27 Mich. 320; Hackettstown v. Swack. Y. 516; Police Jury v. Britton, 15 Wall.
hamer, 37 N. J. L. 191; Reg. v. Lich. 566.
field, 4 Ad. & El. N. S. 891, 906; Mayor The ground has been broadly taken,
&c. v. Ray, 19 Wall. 468, 480, per Brad- that for debts and obligations lawfully
ley, J.; ante, sec. 124, note. The holder created, any corporation, public as well as
of such bonds, will, it seems, be considered private, has the implied authority, unless
as the assignee and owner of the original prohibited by statute, charter or by-law,
claim of the payee.
Oneida Bank v. On- to evidence the same by the execution of
tario Bank, 21 N. Y. 490; Mayor &c. v. a bill, note, bond, or other contract, and
Ray, 19 Wall. 468, 484, per Hunt, J.; to secure the same by a mortgage, pledge,
Shirk v. Pulaski County, 4 Dillon, 208 or other proper disposition of its property;
(1877); Paul v. Kenosha, 22 Wis. 266; that power to contract a debt carries with
Gause v. Clarksville, 5 Dillon, C. C. 165 it the power to give a suitable acknowl-
(1877); post, secs. 130–138, note ; chapter edgment of it; and there is no rule of
xiv. on Contracts. In Hackettstown v. law in the absence of a statute limiting
Swackhamer, supra, any remedy upon the the length of the credit. Municipality v.
unauthorized note was denied, and Beasley, Mc Donough, 2 Rob.
Mc Donough, 2 Rob. (La.) 242, 250
C. J., seemed to think the only remedy (1842); Barry v. Merchants' Express
was in equity to be subrogated to the Company, 1 Sandf. Ch. 280; cited with
rights of the creditors of the corporation approval in Curtis v. Leavitt, 15. N. Y.
who had been paid by the proceeds of the 9, 62, and in Smith v. Law, 21 N. Y.
money improperly borrowed ; but no ne- 296, 299 (1860); Bank, &c. v. Chillicothe,
cessity is perceived for so strict a doctrine. 7 Ohio, Part II. 31 (1836); Ketcham v.
2 Commonwealth v. Pittsburg, 34 Pa. Buffalo, 14 N. Y. 356 (1856), market-
St. 496, 511 (1859); Railroad Co. v. house bonds given on twent.y-five years'
Evansville, 15 Ind. 395, 412 (1860); Mid- time held valid ; and see cases cited on
ܪ
§ 127
195
EXPRESS POWER TO BORROW MONEY.
to issue notes to circulate as money, in violation of the statute law
and public policy of the State.
Such a
page 375, by Wright, J.; Douglass v. 199, 213. In Inhabitants, &c. v. Weir, 9
Virginia City 5 Nev. 147; Richmond v. Ind. 224 (1857), an action against a con-
McGirr, 78 Ind. 192 (1881), noted supra, gressional township upon a promissory
sec. 119, note. See, also, and compare, note made by the trustees, the court, per
Bateman v. Mid-Wales Railway Co., L. R. Stuart, J., says: “There is no power to
1 C. P. 510; Hackettstown v. Swack- make notes conferred by the act of 1841.
hamer, 37 N. J. L. 191; Wyandotte v. That act was the charter under which
Zeitz, 21 Kan. 649; Lawrence v. Kellam, they acted. The trustees, as a corpora-
11 Kan. 512.
tion, had no power but such as that act
As to express power to issue bonds, &c., expressly conferred, and such as might
see also Bank of Roine v. Village of arise by implication, or be essential to
Rome, 18 N. Y. 38, 44, and cases cited; the exercise of those granted.
Mills v. Gleason, 8 Am. Law Reg. 683; power is always expressed, even in bank
Louisiana State Bank v. Orleans Naviga- charters. In so limited a corporation as
tion Co., 3 La. An. 294. State bonds a congressional township, the power to
negotiable. Delafield v. Illinois, 2 Hill, make promissory notes could hardly be
159.
implied. The case at bar cannot easily be
Express power to a municipal corpora distinguished in principle from McClure
tion to subscribe for stock in a railroad cor- v. Bennett, 1 Blackf. 189, and Mears v.
poration does not carry with it the power Graham, 8 Blackf. 144." Power to bor-
to issue negotiable bonds in payment of row money, if granted on condition of a
the subscription, unless the power to issue previous popular vote, must be exercised
such bonds is expressly, or by reasonable in conformity with the condition or the
implication, conferred by the statute; orders issued therefor will be void. Lock-
and such power is negatived where the port v. Gaylord 61 Ill. 276 (1871). What
statute authorizing the subscription is amounts to a borrowing. Ib. In Illinois
silent as to the issue of bonds, and makes the Constitution of 1848 gave to municipal
special provision for the payment of the corporations the power to assess and collect
subscription by taxation. Kelley v. Mi- taxes for corporate purposes. This was con-
lan, 127 U. S. 139, 150, and cases cited; strued to be a limitation upon the taxing
Norton v. Dyersburg, 127 U. S. 160, and power of the State, under which such cor-
cases cited. Post, sec. 161, pote. As to porations could not be taxed except for cor.
the implied power to issue municipal porate purposes; and, consequently, bonds
bonds, see further, Wells v. Supervisors, issued "for the use of said city, to be ex-
102 U. S. 625; Claiborne County V. pended in developing the natural advan-
Brooks, 1ļi U. 8. 400; Ottaway 7. Carey, tages of the city for manufacturing pur-
108 U. S. 110, 123; Daviess County v. poses," were declared void, although the
Dickinson, 117 U. S. 657, 663.
enterprise intended to be aided was recog-
Power "to borrow money" held to in- nized as being of general interest and of
clude power to issue negotiable bonds or great value to the city. Mather v. Ot.
other usual securities to the lender. Comº tawa, 114 Ill. 659. Post, secs. 159, 736.
monwealth v. Pittsburg, 34 Pa. St. 496, 1 Thomas v. Richmond, 12 Wall. 349
511; Rogers v. Burlington, 3 Wall. 654 [1871).
(1865); ante, sec. 117. Board of Super- Construction of the constitutional power
visors of a county have not power to issue of the general government to "borrow
bill of exchange. Canal Bank v. Super- money." See Hepburn v. Griswold, 8
visors, &c., 5 Denio, 517 (1848). Nor Wall. 603, Knox v. Lee, 12 Wall. 457
have village trustees. Lake v. Trustees, (1871), and Juilliard v. Greenman, 110
4 Denio, 520. Corporate city has the U. S. 421 (1884), known as the “legal-
power. Kelly V. Mayor, 4 Hill, 263; tender cases:'
compare Clark v. Des Moines, 19 Iowa,
196
§ 129
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
§ 128. The Subject illustrated; Place of Payment, etc. Express
charter power to borrow money for general purposes, not exceeding a
specified sum, was held by the Supreme Court of the United States,
upon an examination of the nature of other powers contained in the
charter, not to prohibit or limit the city in incurring an indebted-
ness for authorized purposes greater than the sum it was empowered
to borrow.)
§ 129 (84). What is a borrowing; Power construed.
A CON-
tract whereby a city agrees with an individual that if the latter will
pay or advance the amount of interest due and to become due on
certain bonds of the city already issued, the city will pay or refund
the amount, is “not a borrowing of money” within the terms or
spirit of the charter prohibiting the municipal authorities from bor-
rowing money unless authorized by a prior vote of the citizens;
such a contract being one simply for the payment of a debt.?
Under authority to a city to borrow money, it may, if there be no
statutory restriction, make the principal and interest payable at the
place where the money is borrowed or where it pleases, though beyond
the limits of the State. Among certain powers of a strictly muni-
cipal nature conferred upon a city was the power “to borrow money
for any object in its discretion," or "for any public purpose," on a
two-thirds vote of the citizens; and this was held, in connection
with a general statute of the State, recognizing by implication (as
construed) the validity of city and county bonds generally, to au-
thorize such city to issue bonds to aid in the construction of a
railway or plank road leading to, through, or from the city.4
1 Hitchcock v. Galveston, 96 U. S. 341 pay where they are found, or elsewhere.
(1877); approved, United States v. Fort The principal power, when expressed,
Scott, 99 U. S. 152.
draws to it, by necessary implication, the
2 Gelpecke v. Dubuque, 1 Wall. (U. S.) means of its execution. This is the
221 (1863), Miller, J., dissenting. Where settled rule in the construction of all
a city can make such a contract, with the grants of authority, whether to govern-
sanction of a prior vote, the sanction will, ments or individuals." Express authority
in an action on such a contract, be pre- to a city" to borrow money” necessarily im.
sumed until the contrary is shown by the plies the power to determine the time of
city. Ib. per Swayne, J.
payment, and to issue bonds or other evi.
8 Meyer v. Muscatine, 1 Wall. (U. S.) dence of indebtedness, to borrow within
384 (1863). In this case, the court, per
or without the State, and to agree to
Swayne, J., say (1 Wall. 391): "The pay where borrowed. Railroad Co. v.
power of a municipal corporation to make Evansville, 15 Ind. 395, 412 (1860), dis-
any contract does not depend upon the tinguished as to place of payment from
place of performance, but upon its scope Prettyman v. Tazwell Co., 19 Ill. 406 ; 22
and object. A city authorized to estab- Ill. 147, which were regarded as turning
lish gas-works and water-works, and to upon peculiar statutory provisions. See
gravel its streets, may buy water, coal, further, chapter xiv. on Contracts, post.
and gravel beyond its limits, and agree to 4 Meyer v. Muscatine, 1 Wall. (U. S.)
!
$ 130
197
LIMITATIONS OF INDEBTEDNESS.
poses, and not for any or all purposes, at
§ 130 (85). Special Limitations on the Power to become in-
debted; Creation of Debt defined. —Provisions are frequently made
in Constitutions or in charters or legislative acts to prevent the crea-
tion or increase of municipal indebtedness beyond specified limits or ex-
cept upon certain conditions. Such limitations have been found by
experience to be necessary to prevent extravagance, are remedial in
their nature, are based upon the wise policy of paying as you go, and
ought, therefore, to be construed and applied to secure the end
sought. The cases referred to will show that the courts have fairly
given them full effect. The judicial construction of some of these
provisions will be noticed in this place,
The Constitution of Maryland contains a provision that "no debt
shall be created by the mayor and city council of Baltimore" (except
for specified temporary purposes), unless it shall be first sanctioned
by the legislature and approved by the voters of the city. The city,
being the owner of a large amount of stock in the Baltimore and
Ohio Railroad Company, without previous legislative authority or the
approval of the voters passed an ordinance to provide for the raising
of one million of dollars by hypothecating its railroad stock, and for
the investment of the same in the bonds of another railroad company
whose road was in process of construction. The validity of this ordi-
nance being drawn in question, the court considered it to be plain that
the constitutional provision quoted was intended to prohibit the city
from aiding in the construction of works of internal improvement
without the previous assent of the legislature and of a majority of
the voters of the city; and that the ordinance (notwithstanding the
ingenious use of the phrase raising instead of borrowing money, and
the further provision that the parties furnishing the money should
look for its repayment exclusively to the stock pledged, and that
the city should not be responsible for any deficit) did create a debt
within the meaning of the Constitution, and was therefore void. 1
384 (1863), Miller, J., dissenting, in an 1 Baltimore v. Gill, 31 Md. 375 (1869),
opinion of marked ability; Mitchell v. distinguished, Richmond v. McGirr, 78
Burlington, 4 Wall. 270 (1866); Rogers v. Ind. 192, 196 (1881). That a debt niay
Burlington, 3 Wall. 654 (1865). General be created by borrowing money, although
power granted to a city to create a debt there be a provision exempting the bor-
will be construed to mean debts for speci- rower from liability beyond the property
fied, legitimate, and proper municipal pur- pledged, see Newell v. People, 3 Seld. (7
the discretion of the city council or in- poration is forbidden by the Constitution to
habitants. Lafayette v. Cox, 5 Ind. become indebted in any amount exceeding
(Porter) 38 (1854). Limitation on taxing a specified limit, held, 1, that if it exceed
power does not limit power to contract debts. the limited amount it may be enjoined;
Emerson v. Blairsville, 2 Pittsb. (Pa.) 2, that the bill is maintainable by a citizen
Rep. 39; post, sec. 162. See, further, and taxpayer of the place. Springfield v.
ch. xiv. on Contracts, post.
Edwards, 84 IlI. 626 (1877). Remedy of
198
§ 131
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
Under a
§ 131 (86). Special Charter Limitations construed.
charter prohibiting the common council of a city from "authorizing
any excpenditure for any purpose,” in the current political year, ex-
taxpayer, see post, secs. 914-922. Such a not to be construed as limited to obliga-
limitation was held to forbid implied as tions which are debts eo nomine, but are
well as express indebtedness, and to be to be extended to all contracts for the pay-
binding equally upon courts of equity and ment of money or contracts whereon the
of law. Litchfield v. Ballou, 114 U, S. 190 payment of money may be enforced. But
(where relief in equity was denied to one where the money to be paid upon such con-
who had loaned money to a city, in excess tracts is provided for, to be raised by tax-
of its constitutional limit of indebtedness, ation upon some fixed and definite scheme,
which had been used in constructing pub- such contracts are not, in my judgment,
lic works, and who prayed for a return of within such prohibitions. Where, how-
the money). Where the contract of a ever, the money required to meet such
town to issue its bonds was illegal because contracts is not provided for, either by
the issue would create a debt in excess of being legally ordered to be raised by tax-
its power under the Constitution to con- ation and appropriated for that purpose,
tract, the fact that it afterwards, under or hy soine legislative scheme which pos-
the general municipal incorporation law, itively prescribes that it shall be raised by
became a city with power to create a debt taxation and appropriated for its payment
in a greater amount, was held not to as needed, then such contracts do increase
validate the contract made while it was the indebtedness or debt of municipal cor-
a town, and that the city could not ratify porations within the meaning of such pro-
the contract. Waxahachie v. Brown, 67 hibitions. Any other construction would
Tex. 519; Gould v. Paris, 68 Tex. 511. deprive these restrictions of the force
The charter of Atlantic City in New requisite to reach and cure the evil in-
Jersey contained a limitation that its debt tended to be prevented thereby." Read
"shall at no time exceed $35,000. The v. Atlantic City, 49 N. J. L. (20 Vroom)
city was indebted in this sum when it 558.
entered into a contract with a water com- In Louisiana it was held that an act
pany to supply itself with water for public of the legislature prohibiting counties and
purposes for an indefinite period, making cities from thereafter contracting any
no provision, however, to raise by taxation debt or pecuniary liability, without fully
the amount that the city could be called on providing, in the ordinance creating the
to pay under the contract. On certiorari, debt, the means of paying the principal
bringing up the contract for judicial re-
and interest of the debt so contracted,"
view, it was held that the contract and does not extend to a liability for ordinary
ordinances were ultra vires, and the same street work, which forms part of the cur-
were set aside. After reviewing the cases rent expenses of the corporation, and which
cited infra, sec. 136 et seq., from ſowa, may be paid out of its current revenues.
Illinois, Indiana, and Pennsylvania, Ma- Reynolds v. Shreveport, 13 La. An. 426
gie, J., said : “It is impossible, perhaps, (1858). A provision in a city charter that
to entirely reconcile these cases. The the council shall not have power to pledge
true interpretation of such restrictions on the credit of the city for more than a speci-
municipal indebtedness, in my judgment, fied sum without submitting the question to
lies between the extremes they exhibit. the voters of the city was regarded as a defi-
The plain object of such restrictions is to nite restriction on the power; and hence a
require that all moneys which are to be statute authorizing the city to issue bonds
paid for municipal expenses, after the debt to defray the expenses of building a bridge
has reached the fixed limit, shall be raised is subordinate to, and does not override,
by taxation. In view of this object, it is the restriction in the charter. Cumber-
clear (and all the cases agree in this) that land v. Magruder, 34 Md. 381 (1871).
prohibitions against increasing the indebt. But see Butz v. Muscatine, 8 Wall. 575
edness, or the debt, of a municipality are (1869); post, sec. 162.
1
§ 132
199
SPECIAL CHARTER LIMITATIONS CONSTRUED.
ceeding the amount of the annual tax levy, the council cannot author-
ize any expenditure to be made within the year exceeding the limit;
but they are not forbidden to authorize in that year an expenditure
to be made in a subsequent year, for services to be performed in
such subsequent year. The charter of Chicago contained the pro-
vision that «
no contract shall be made by the common council, and
no expense incurred unless an appropriation shall have been previously
made concerning such expense,” and the comptroller is required to
submit each year an estimate of the amount necessary to defray the
expenses of the city for the current year. With this provision in
force the city made a contract with a gas company whose works
were already complete to take gas for its streets and public build-
ings at a specified price for the period of ten years. This contract
was held invalid on the ground that under the above charter pro-
vision there was no actual or reasonable necessity to make a contract
extending over ten years, no appropriation having been made coin-
mensurate with the obligations of the contract; and aside from the
special provision of the charter, the court inclined to the same re-
sult on the ground that the power was legislative and that the
council could not, without any reasonable necessity appearing, bind
their successors for ten years or indefinitely. Drummond, J., added,
“In all cases of contracts to run for years, the authority to make
thein should be clear. It is better that all parties should under-
stand there is a limit to the power of municipal bodies in such
cases.
"2
§ 132. Special Charter Limitation construed. - The city of Gal-
veston under a provision of its charter authorizing it to construct
sidewalks and make street improvements and to reimburse itself for
sec.
1 Weston v. Syracuse, 17 N. Y. 110 Burr v. Carbondale, 76 Ill. 455, 474 (1875).
(1858). See, also, Cook v. City of Buffalo, See Smith v. Morse, 2 Cal. 524 ; Police
1 Clinton's N. Y. Digest, “Buffalo, Jury v. Britton, 15 Wall. 566 ; ante, secs.
2. Limitation on rate of tax to be an- 63, 69.
nually levied construed. State v. Mayor, 2 Garrison v. Chicago, 7 Biss. 480
23 La. An. 358. Funded debts. - The (1877), Drummond, J.; ante, sec. 97. The
charter of a city provided that “no funded statute of California, which declares that
debt shall be contracted.” It was decided, the board of supervisors must not contract
that a city bond, issued on time, for the debts and liabilities which, added to the
purchase of market grounds, was not a salaries of officials, will exceed the reve-
funded debt. Ketchum v. Buffalo, 14 nue of the county for the year, does not
N. Y. 356. Meaning of “funded debt" mean by “revenue" the actual amount of
and "funding" considered by Selden, J., money received into the County Treasury,
Ib. p. 367, and by Wright, J., p. 378. but the estimate of the board of super-
City may fund valid bonds and issue new visors of what the revenue will be. Bab-
bonds therefor, without express authority. cock v. Goodrich, 47 Cal. 488 (1874).
Galena v. Corwith, 48 Ill. 423 (1868);
200
§ 134
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
the expense from abutting lot owners, made a contract for local
improvements of this character which created a liability exceeding
$50,000. This contract was claimed by the city to be invalid by
reason of another provision of the charter, that the council shall
not borrow money for general purposes to an amount greater than
$50,000. The Supreme Court of the United States held the objec-
tion to the validity of the contract not to be well taken ; and the
reasons for its judgment, as stated by Mr. Justice Strong, are given
in the note.1
§ 133. Prohibitory Statute construed. Under a statute which
was passed to prohibit the making of contracts by unauthorized official
agents for supplies for the use of the city of New York, if a con-
tractor makes a contract without observing the protective require-
ments of the statute and furnishes supplies thereunder, the city is
not bound, although the materials supplied were used by it, and an
implied liability cannot be raised in the face of the words and pur-
pose of the statute.2
§ 134 (87). Special Charter Provision construed. - A municipal
charter provided that it should not be lawful for the city council to
1 Hitchcock v. Galveston, 96 U. S. It is for a new work, unlike the work of
341 (1877). Approved, U. $. v. Fort keeping in repair. Conceding that it is
Scott, 99 U. S. 152 (1878). “The limita- a purpose of the act incorporating the
tion," says Strong, J., in the case first city, it cannot be regarded as a general
cited, “is upon the power to borrow purpose, for if it is, all purposes of the
money, and to borrow it for general pur- charter are general. Grading a street or
poses. It implies that there may be law- making a sidewalk, where none had ex-
ful purposes which are not general in the isted before, is a special improvement, not
sense in which that word is used in the like repairs of constant recurrence. By
charter. An examination of the whole another article of defendant's charter the
instrument, and of the numerous and city council was authorized to provide by
large powers conferred upon the council, ordinance special funds for special pur-
as well as duties imposed, makes it evident poses, and to make the same disbursable
that the provision could not have been in- only for the purpose for which the fund
tended to prohibit incurring an indebted- was created. For these reasons we are of
ness exceeding the sum named. It is in opinion that the limitation upon the
no sense a limitation of the debt of the power of the council to borrow for general
city. If it is, the grant of power the purposes did not make the agreement
charter contains was an idle thing, and with the plaintiffs invalid."
the duties imposed could not be performed. 2 McDonald v. New York, 68 N. Y.
The council, as we have seen, is em- 23 (1876); s. C. 23 Am. Rep. 144, dis-
powered to grade and pave the streets, and tinguishing Nelson v. Mayor, &c., 63 N.
to construct sidewalks. There is no ex- Y. 535; and Argenti v. San Francisco, 16
press limitation of these powers. Their Cal. 255, as to implied liability.
See
exercise necessarily involves large ex- Gould v. Paris, 68 Tex. 511 ; post, secs.
penditure. Such expenditure is, there. 135, note, 460 ; ante, secs. 124, note,
fore, authorized. It is a plain incident of 126, note.
the power, and it is a special expenditure.
§ 134 a
201
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS CONSTRUED.
make, or authorize to be made, "any contract for the payment of
money beyond the current fiscal year," declaring every such prohib-
ited contract “illegal and void.” In construing this language the
court says : "By this section of the charter, the legislature have, in
the most explicit manner, prohibited the city council from contract-
ing any debt beyond the fiscal year. If the city council had, at
the time the contract was made in 1845, passed an ordinance that
the expense of lighting the streets of the city for that year should
be paid in 1848, by a tax then assessed for that purpose, it would
have come within the letter of the prohibition. It is none the less
a violation of its spirit that the council did not pass the ordinance
providing for its payment until 1848.” 1
§ 134 a. Constitutional Provisions of California and of Colorado
construed. The Constitution of California provides that no mu-
nicipal corporation “shall incur any indebtedness or liability in any
manner or for any purpose, exceeding in any year the income and
revenue provided for it for such year, without the assent of two-
thirds of the qualified electors thereof voting at an election to be
held for that purpose,” &c.; and this provision is held to mean that,
subject to the exception, “each year's income and revenue must pay
each year's indebtedness and liability, and that no indebtedness or
liability in any one year shall be paid out of the income or revenue
of any future year."2 By the Constitution of Colorado "no county
shall contract any debt by loan in any form except for the purpose
of
erecting necessary public buildings,” &c., and “the aggregate amount
of indebtedness of any county for all purposes exclusive of debts
contracted before the adoption of this Constitution, shall not exceed
at any time” a specified rate. The Supreme Court of that State,
ruling upon a contention that the limitation was upon indebtedness
" by loan,” held that, “while these two propositions are associated
they are none the less independent declarations;" that in deter-
1 Per Caldwell, J., Jonas v. Cincinnati, made. Where a charter forbade a city to
18 Ohio, 318, 322 (1849); distinguished, contract a debt exceeding in any one year
Richmond v. McGirr, 78 Ind. 192, 197 the revenue for that year, a contract for a
(1881). Construction of similar provision term of thirty years for the use of water
in other charters. Goodrich v. Detroit, 12 was held to create a liability to the full
Mich. 279 ; Philadelphia v. Flanigen, 47
extent of the term, and that as the aggre-
Pr. St. 21; Johnson v. Philadelphia, Ib. gate liability was in excess of the revenue
382; Wallace v. San Jose, 29 Cal. 180; of any one year the contract was void.
Bladen v. Philadelphia, 60 Pa. St. 464, Niles Water Works v. Niles, 59 Mich.
construing an act applying to the city, to 311. Infra, secs. 135, note, 136, 136 a.
the effect that no lebt shall be binding 2 San Francisco Gas Co. v. Brickwedel,
unless authorized by law or ordinance, 62 Cal. 641.
and a sufficient appropriation therefor be
A
202
§ 135
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
mining the amount of indebtedness at any time county warrants are
to be taken into the account, all those which increase the indebted-
ness beyond the amount limited being void ; that the county au-
thorities as well as the parties dealing with them are bound to take
notice of the limit prescribed in the Constitution;1 and that the limi-
tation includes debts incurred by operation of law as well as those
arising upon express contracts, but does not include involuntary
liability arising ex clelicto.2
§ 135 (88). Constitutional Provisions construed. The Consti-
tution of Towa contains the provision that "no county or other
political or municipal corporation, shall be allowed to become indebted
in any manner, or for any purpose, to an amount exceeding five per
cent on the value of the taxable property within such county or
corporation, to be ascertained by the last State and county list,
previous to the incurring of such indebtedness.” Under this pro-
vision, as construed by the Supreme Court of the State, no in-
debtedness, for whatever purpose created, is exempted from the
operation of the prohibition, and it applies to negotiable bonds
issued under legislative authority as well as to other debts; and the
creditor or bondholder must at his peril take notice that the con-
stitutional limit is not exceeded. 3 Substantially similar provisions
in other Constitutions, referred to in the note, have received a like
construction. If a municipal corporation has the means in its treas-
1 People v. May, 9 Col. 81 (1885). The debt, whether the identical money received
Supreme Court of the United States has for the bonds could be recovered of the
recently construed this provision of the municipality, the court left undecided.
Colorado Constitution. Lake County v. Ib. See ante, secs. 124, note, 126. In
Rollins, 130 U. S. 662 (1889) (county Mosher v. School District, 44 Iowa, 122
warrants); Lake County v. Graham, 130 (1876), the doctrine of the preceding
U. S. 674 (1889) (county bonds). These cases was adhered to, and the attempt
cases are more fully considered, post, ch. of the legislature to give a remedy
xiv.
was held to be ineffectual. A contract
2 People v. May, 9 Col. 404 (1886). for building a sewer, by which the con-
Infra, sec. 137.
tractor was to receive certificates of assess-
8 Bank v. School District, 39 Iowa, ments upon owners of adjacent property
490 ; French v. Burlington, 42 Iowa, 614 in full payment, held not to create a
(1876); Grant v. Davenport, 36 Iowa, debt within the meaning of the con-
396 (1873); McPherson v. Foster, 43 stitutional limitation. Davis Des
Iowa, 48 (1876); Council Bluffs v. Moines, 71 Iowa, 500.
Stewart, 51 Iowa, 385. The fact that tho 4 The courts of Indiana have decided
corporation received the value of its bonds, that a constitutional provision similar to
and that the purchaser acted in good faith, that of Iowa is prospective in its operation,
and without notice, does not entitle him and does not prevent the issue of new
to recover the amount paid therefor. honds bearing interest for the purpose of
Since, in the view of the court, the receipt funding debts and interest in existence
of value for the bonds does not create a when the constitutional amendment was
§ 135
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS CONSTRUED.
203
ury to meet its indebtedness, the issue of warrants to an amount larger
than five per cent of its taxable property is not a violation of the
section of the State Constitution which provides that “no municipal
corporation shall be allowed to become indebted, in any manner or
for any purpose, to an amount exceeding five per cent of the taxable
property within the corporation." In such case it would not be-
come indebted within the meaning of the constitutional clause. I
adopted. Powell v. City of Madison, the one being prepared, as it is under-
107 Ind. 106.
stood, by Mr. Justice Beck, and the other
Under a constitutional provision in by Mr. Justice Cole, of the Supreme Court
Pennsylvania, similar to that in Iowa, of Iowa. The proposition upon which
municipal bonds (as to which see more they differ is wliether the power given to
fully, post, chap. xiv. on Contracts) is- a city to issue its bonds absolutely ceases,
sued in violation of the provision were as to innocent holders, the moment the
held void in the hands of bona fide holders. constitutional limit is reached, the same
Millerstown v. Frederick, 114 Pa. St. 435; as if it had never been conferred. Sub-
see also appeal of Wilkes-Barre, 109 Pa. sequently the Supreme Court of the State
St. 554. The Constitution of Georgia decided that bonds issued in excess of the
contains a like provision. Butts v. Little, constitutional limit were void in the
68 Ga. 272; Walsh 1. Augusta, 67 Ga. hands of innocent holders for value ; and
293 ; Hudson v. Marietta, 64 Ga. 286; denies any liability on the part of the
Spann v. Webster County, 64 Ga. 498. municipality, either on the bonds or in
Construction of like provisiou of Consti- respect of the value it received for them.
tution of Texas, Gould v. Paris, 68 Tex. McPherson v. Foster, 43 Iowa, 48 (1876).
511 ; Waxahatchie v. Brown, 67 Tex. The subject is further discussed in chap.
519.
xiv. post, on Contracts. Ante, secs. 126,
i Dively v. Cedar Falls, 27 Iowa, 227 note, 130, note.
(1869). A contract by the corporation to The provision of the Iowa Constitution,
pay for work when it shall be performed above quoted, was expounded in the case
in the future, does not constitute an in- of Grant v. Davenport, 36 Iowa, 396
debtedness, within the meaning of this (1873), which involved the validity of a
provision of the Constitution, until the contract by the city to supply itself with
performance of the work. Ib. Valparaiso pater ; and it was held that where a con-
Gardner, 97 Ind. 1. But quære. tract made by a municipal corporation
See Davenport, &c. Gus Co. v. Davenport, 'pertains to its ordinary expenses, and is,
13 Iowa, 229. Supra, sec. 134, and note. together with other like expenses, within
The meaning and effect of the Town Con- the limit of its current revenues and such
stitution quoted above were much dis- special taxes as it may legally levy, and
cussed before the Supreme Court of Toura, in good faith intends to lery therefor,
in which the question was, “Is a city such contract does not constitute - the
corporation liable to a bona fide holder, incurring of indebtedness" within the
upon its negotiable bonds issued for value, meaning of the constitutional provision
when at the time of such issue the city limiting the power of municipal corpora-
was indebted to the full extent of the tions to contract debts.
constitutional limit?” The cause wars An ordinance authorizing a corporation
settled before being decided, and no to construct water-works within a city upon
opinions were filed ; but the judges dif- certain conditions prescribed, and provid-
fered in their judgment. In the Western ing that the city may, whenever its finan-
Jurist (Vol. VI. p. 1, January, 1872) will cial condition will permit, purchase and
be found two able and interesting articles control them, is not an “incurring of in-
upon the question above stated, contain- debtedness" within the constitutional pro-
ing the arguments upon both sides of it, vision ; it is only assuming an obligation,
71
204
§ 136
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
0
§ 136. Constitutional Provisions construed. Under the consti-
tutional provision in Illinois (quoted in the note 1) the Supreme
Court of the State has established the doctrine that a corporation
is prohibited from becoming indebted in any manner or for any pur-
pose beyond the limit, even for necessary current expenses. It can-
not incur corporate indebtedness beyond the limit in anticipation of
the collection of taxes levied; and such indebtedness and the evi-
dences thereof are void.4 But a corporation may issue a warrant for
authorized expenses drawn against taxes actually levied and to be
collected for the purpose, which warrant, while not creating a debt
or liability against the corporation, may yet operate as an assign-
ment of so much of the particular taxes when collected, and such
warrant may be made receivable for taxes.
The Constitution of Indiana contains a provision substantially
identical with that of Iowa and Illinois before referred to under
which, without further action on the part manner or for any purpose, to an amount,
of the city, will not ripen into a debt that including existing indebtedness, in the
is thus forbidden. The city may provide aggregate exceeding five per centum on
a tax not exceeding five mills for the the value of the taxable property therein,
maintenance of water-works, and a sink- to be ascertained by the last assessment
ing fund to reduce the debt thereon. The for State and county taxes, previous to the
fact that, by the levy of the tax, the city incurring of such indebtedness." Const. .
may in time become the owner of the 1870, art. 9, sec. 12.
works does not render the ordinance liable 2 Springfield v. Edwards, 84 111. 626.
to the objection that it permits the city to 3 Prince v. Quincy, 105 Ill. 138; Prince
do indirectly what it cannot do directly, v. Quincy, 105 lll. 215. See Gould v.
because none but legal and constitutional Paris, 68 Tex. 511.
means are employed. Burlington Water 4 Law v. People, 87 Ill. 385; Fuller v.
Co. v. Woodward, 49 Iowa, 58. See supra, Chicago, 89 Ill. 282.
sec. 134, note.
5 Fuller v. Heath, 89 Ill. 296; Law v.
The charter of the city of Portland, People, 87, Ill. 385.
Oregon, prohibited the city from con- A debt already in existence at the time
tracting an indebtedness exceeding $50,- of the adoption of such constitutional
000; and it was held by Judge Deady provision, although in excess of the limit,
that an ordinance assuming a liability of may, of course, be refunded, and such re-
$350,000, to be paid in semi-annual instal- funding is not a violation of the Consti-
ments extending through twenty years, tution. Powell v. Madison, 107 Ind. 106.
was in violation of the charter, and this, “ The fact that the property, for which
although the ordinance made provisions the debt is contracted, is valuable, and a
for the payment of such instalments as source of profit or revenue, does not remove
they fell due, by the levy of taxes for that or change the character of the indebted-
purpose.
Coulson v. Portland, Deady,
Per Miller, J., in Scott v. Daven-
481 (1868).
port, 34 Iowa, 208, 213. The property in
As to constitutional provision requiring question was water-works.
the legislature to restrict the power of mu-
6 The 13th article of the Constitution
nicipalities to levy taxes, borrow money, of Indiana, adopted in 1881, ordains that,
&c., see ante, chap. iii. sec. 50.
“No political or municipal corporation in
1 “No county, city, township, school this State shall ever become indebted, in
district, or other municipal corporation, any manner or for any purpose, to an
shall be allowed to become indebted in any amount in the aggregate exceeding two pei
ness.
.
§ 136 a
205
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS CONSTRUED.
which it is held that a city whose indebtedness has reached the
limit cannot create a further debt even for necessaries. 1
The Constitution of Pennsylvania provides that “ The debt of any
city, except as herein provided, shall never exceed seven per centum
upon the assessed value of the taxable property therein.” The city
of Erie made a contract with private persons for the erection of a
market-house, by the terms of which the city agreed to pay for
twenty-five years a rental of $1500 per annum.
A bill in equity
was filed by taxpayers stating the above contract, also that the
indebtedness of the city was already in excess of the seven per
centum limit, and praying for an injunction to restrain the city
from paying any money on the said contract. The defendant filed
a general demurrer. As it did not appear upon the face of the bill
that the annual revenue, after meeting the other municipal liabili-
ties, was sufficient to meet the proposed contract liability, the court
held, on the facts before it, that the contract created an indebtedness
in violation of the Constitution, and granted the injunction
§ 136 a Same subject. - Under the constitutional provisions in
Iowa, Illinois, Indiana and Pennsylvania, referred to, it is held
centum on the value of the taxable prop faith intends to levy therefor, such cou-
erty within such corporation, to be ascer- tract does not constitute the incurring
tained by the last assessment for State and of indebtedness within the meaning of
county taxes previous to the incurring of the constitutional provision limiting the
such indebtedness; and all bonds or ob- power of municipal corporations to con-
ligations in excess of such amount, given tract debts." And adds : “ This, we hesi-
by such corporation, shall be void.” The tate not to say, is a sound constitu-
provisions as to the limit of municipal in- tional interpretation, and in a similar case
debtedness in the Constitutions of Illinois might well be adopted in the construction
and Indiana were probably copied from of our own Constitution. If the contracts
the Constitution of Iowa. See Prince v. and engagements of municipal corpora-
Quincy, 105 Ill. 215; Valparaiso v. Gard- tions do not overreach their current reve-
ner, 97 Ind. 1, 9.
nues, no objections can lawfully be made
1 Sackett v. New Albany, 88 Ind. 473. to them, however great the indebtedness
This case was substantially like Prince v. ef such municipalities may be ; for in
Quincy, 105 Ill. 138, and Prince v. such case their engagements do not ex.
Quincy, 105 Ill. 215, and the decision tend beyond their present means of pay.
was the same. See also Valparaiso v. ment, and so no debt is created." So a
Gardner, 97 Ind. 1.
contract entered into by a city for the
Appeal of City of Erie, 91 Pa. St. building of a sever, whereby the con.
398. In giving the opinion of the court tractor agrees to accept, in full satisfac-
Gordon, J., quotes the following from Grant tion for the whole work, certificates of as-
v. Davenport, 36 Iowa, 396:
r. When a
sessment made upon the property adja-
contract made by a municipal corporation cent to the sewer, held not to create a debt
pertains to its ordinary expenses, and is, against the city, and so not to be within
together with other like expenses, within the constitutional prohibition. Davis v.
the limit of its current revenues and such Des Moines, 71 Iowa, 500.
special taxes as it may legally and in good
2
206
§ 136 6
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
that a corporation may make a contract (at least for necessaries)
covering a series of years, upon which an obligation to pay may
arise from year to year as the thing contracted for is furnished; and
in such case, the whole amount which may ultimately become due
does not constitute a debt within the constitutional prohibition. But
in order to ascertain whether the corporation by such contract is
transgressing the limit, regard is had only to the amount which may
fall due within a certain year or other period; and if the revenues
for that year or other period are sufficient, over and above the pay-
ment of the other expenses, to pay such amount, there is no debt
incurred within the constitutional prohibition,
§ 136 b. City Stock in Sinking-Fund not a Debt. The Con-
stitution of New York (sec. 11, art. 8) was in 1884 amended, inter
alia, by ordaining that “No county containing a city of over one
hundred thousand inhabitants, or any such city, shall be allowed to
become indebted for any purpose or in any manner to an amount
which, including existing indebtedness, shall exceed ten per centum
1 Grant v. Davenport, 36 Iowa, 396 v. San Jose, 29 Cal. 180; Niles v. Niles, 11
(water supply); E. St. Louis v. E. St. Am. & Eng. Corp. Cases, 299.
Louis, &c. Co., 98 Ill. 415 (gas supply); A statute in Nebraska provided that
Valparaiso v. Gardner, 97 Ind. 1 (water “it shall not be lawful for any warrants
supply); Appeal of City of Erie, 91 Pa. to be issued for any amount exceeding in
St. 398, semble (city market-house). the aggregate the amount levied by tax for
Compare Coulson v. Portland, Deady, the current year.” The county commis-
481, where the debt was for a railroad sioners after the exhaustion of the levy
subsidy, and it seems there would have allowed claims against the county, and
been an absolute debt for the whole amount levied a tax under the name of a “sink-
immediately, though payable in futuro. ing-fund tax” for their payment. The
In Jacksonville Ry. Co. v. City of Jack. tax was held illegal, because under the le-
sonville, 114 Ill. 562 (1885), an assess- gislation of the State a sinking-fund tax is
ment had been made by the municipal au- authorized only in the case of loans, and
thorities, pursuant to statute, against the an audited claim is not a loan. U. P. R.
property of the railway company for its R. Co. v. Buffalo County, 9 Neb. 449.
ratable portion of the estimated cost of a A city council in Ohio was authorized
pavement, the construction of which was to levy not to exceed fifteen mills on the
proposed and authorized. The municipal dollar for all municipal purposes. It first
ordinance which authorized the construc- levied for fifteen mills, and later made an
tion and assessment contained a provision additional levy of two mills for the same
that the part of the cost of the pavement year. The additional levy of two mills
that would fall on the city should be raised was held void. In 1874 the same city
by general taxation. In a proceeding to council had authority to make the same
review the validity of the assessment, the levy as in 1871. It first levied ten and
railway company offered to show that the five-tenths mills, and later made an addi-
city was already indebted in excess of tional levy of sixteen mills. The addi-
the constitutional limit. The court held tional levy of sixteen mills was held void
that as the ordinance did not create a debt throughout. Cummings v. Fitch, 40 Ohio
it did not violate the constitutional pro- St. 56.
vision. See supra, sec. 130, note; Wallace
§ 137
207
LIABILITIES EX DELICTO.
of the assessed valuation of the real estate of such county or city
subject to taxation, as it appeared by the assessment rolls of the
said county or city on the last assessment for State or county taxes
prior to the incurring of such indebtedness; and all indebtedness in
excess of such limitation, except such as may now exist, shall be
absolutely void, except as herein otherwise provided. No such
county or such city whose present indebtedness exceeds ten per
centum of the assessed valuation of its real estate subject to taxa-
tion shall be allowed to become indebted in any further amount
until such indebtedness shall be reduced within such liniit." Con-
struing this provision, it was held by the Court of Appeals that
" city stock" of the city of New York held by the Commissioners of
the Sinking Fund for that city is not an indebtedness of the city
within the meaning of the constitutional provision, since such city
stocks are not debts which the municipality can be called upon to
pay, and that the indebtedness referred to in the Constitution is an
indebtedness to be met in the future by taxation.1
$ 137 (89). Liabilities ex delicto. — A restrictive provision in a
city charter, that the "council shall not create or permit to accrue
any debts or liabilitiểs which shall exceed" a specified sum, unless a
certain course be pursued by the council and approved by a vote of
the people, has been considered to have no relation to liabilities
arising ex delicto, or to those which the law may cast upon the cor-
poration, and to apply at most only to contracts or liabilities volun-
tarily created. The court, indeed, seems to consider the provision
as directory simply, and not as a limitation on the power of the
council to create debts. The provision in the Constitution of Iowa
referred to in a preceding section, although it is construed by the
Supreme Court of the State to fix an absolute limit to the amount
of indebtedness which a municipality has the power to incur, is by
1 Bank for Savings v. Grace, Mayor, &c. charge upon the taxpayer and a burden
of New York, 102 N. Y. 313. After re- for him to remove ;not a formal obliga-
ferring to the constitutional amendment tion which may remain as evidence of a
and reviewing the legislation respecting the once existing debt, but which can in no
sinking fund of the city of New York, the way be regarded as a present debt to be en-
court said: “This construction cannot forced, and which, if not before cancelled
lead to a diversion of the sinking fund, but in the discretion of the commissioners,
to the accomplishment of its object. It sat- becomes waste paper by the mere efflux of
isfies also the intent of the constitutional time."
prohibition. That is aimed at an actual, 2 McCracken v. San Francisco, 16 Cal.
not a theoretical indebtedness, at a sub- 591 (1860); supra, sec. 134 a.
stantial liability which can be discharged 8 French v. Burlington, 42 Iowa, 614
only by the enforcement of a tax or an (1876); supra, sec. 135.
assessment which, when levied, will be a
208
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
§ 139
Mich. 254, and Mr. Justice Lowe's indi. officers of the city upon which the incen.
the same court held to have no application to liabilities arising in
tort; and it is, therefore, no defence in an action against the muni-
cipality for damages caused by a defective street or sidewalk that it
was indebted at the time of the accident up to or beyond the con-
stitutional limit.l
§ 138 (90). Limitation on State Indebtedness. Constitutional
limitations on State indebtedness apply to the State alone, and not to
her political and municipal subdivisions.? A legislative provision
prohibiting the city authorities from incurring an indebtedness
beyond a designated amount does not apply to the legislature
of the State ; and the latter may, of course, by a subsequent act,
authorize an increase of the amount.3
§ 139 (91). Rewards for Apprehension of Offenders.
ing body of a municipal corporation (which has express power to pro-
tect the property and promote the welfare of its inhabitants) may, it
has been held, offer a reward for the detection of offenders against
the general safety of its people, as, for example, those guilty of the
crime of arson within the corporate limits. The contrary doctrine
has also been held. If the reward be offered by the mayor of a
1 Bartle v. Des Moines, 38 Iowa, 414 180; Wyncoop v. Society, 10 Iowa, 185;
(1874); Rice v. Des Moines, 40 Iowa, 638 Rice v. Keokuk, 15 Iowa, 579; Gibhon v.
(1875); supra, sec. 134 a.
Railroad Co., 36 Ala. 410; Foote v. Sa-
2 Pattison v. Supervisors, 13 Cal. 175 lem, 14 Allen, 487; Dunnovan v. Green,
(1869); Cass v. Dillon, 2 Ohio St. 607 57 Ill. 63.
(1853); Slack v. Railroad Co., 13 B. Mon. 4 York v. Forscht, 23 Pa. St. 391
16 ; Clark 1. Janesville, 10 Wis. 136; (1854); Crawshaw v. Roxbury, 7 Gray,
Prettynian v. Supervisors, 19 Ill. 406. A 374 (1856). An offer of a reward is rev-
constitutional provision that “the State ocable at any time before its terms have
shall never be a party to carrying on any been complied with, and may be revoked
works of internal improvement” does not in the sanie manner in which it was made,
disable the legislature from authorizing yet it is immaterial that the claimant of
municipalities and counties to subscribe for the reward was ignorant of its withdrawal.
the stock of railway companies and issue Shuey v. United States, 92 U. S. 73
their bonds to pay therefor. Comm'rs v. (1875). Such an offer is not void for am-
Miller, 7 Kan. 479 (1871); S. C. 12 Am. biguity, and entitles a person to the re-
Rep. 425. See People v. Supervisors, 16 ward who gives information to the police
The govern-
vidual opinion - not the court's — in diary is arrested, he being afterwards con-
State o. County of Wapello, 13 Iowa, 388, victed.
418-422 ; Dubuque County v. Railroad 6 The power of towns in Maine to offer
Co., 4 G. Greene (Iowa), 1; Dean v. Madi. rewards denied. Gale v. South Berwick,
son, 7 Wis. 688.
51 Me. 174. See Lee v. Fleminsburg, 7
8 Amey v. Allegheny City, 24 How. Dana, 59, and Loveland v. Detroit, 41
(U. S.) 364 (1860). Construction of par. Mich. 367. In Iowa it is held that "in
ticular limitation. Ib. See, on the gen. the absence of express statutory authority
eral subject, Wallace v. Mayor, 29 Cal. a city has no power to offer a reward for
!
§ 140
PUBLIC BUILDINGS.
209
Such a
city which has such power, it may be ratified by the city council
subsequently, and is binding upon the city, though not so ratified
until after the performance of the service for which the reward is
claimed.1 A promise to reward an officer for doing that which,
without such reward, it was his duty to do, is void.
promise is, on general principles, without consideration, if, indeed,
it be not illegal. Therefore, a watchman of a city, who, while in
the discharge of his duty as such, discovers a person in the act
of committing a crime, cannot recover from the city a reward
offered by it.
§ 140 (92). Public Buildings. Power to the officers, or to one
of the departments of a municipal corporation, to provide for repairs
to public buildings, does not give authority to erect a new building,
the apprehension of criminals, such power any town, to offer and pay from the treas-
not being included in the general author- ury of such city or town a suitable reward,
ity given to the city council to pass ordi- not exceeding $300, for apprehending and
nances for the preservation of peace and securing a person charged with a capital
good order in the city." Hawk v. Marion or other high crime, any city or town may
Co., 48 Iowa, 472; Hanger v. Des Moines, be bound by an offer of a reward in such
52 Iowa, 193; s. C. 9 C. L. J. 478. So in cases; and any person who performs the
Kentucky. Patton v. Stephens, 14 Bush service, relying upon such offer, may, in
(Ky.), 324, where the court says, “The action of assumpsit, recover the amount
power to pass all needful by-laws and ordi- offered of such city or town. Janvrin v.
nances for the due and effectual adminis. Exeter, 48 N. H. 83. If two persons
tration of justice in said city,” and to jointly perform the service they must be
" “ legislate upon all subjects which the joined as plaintiffs. Ib. Requisites of
good government of said city shall re- declaration where reward is offered by a
quire,” does not authorize an appropria- town, see Codding v. Mansfield, 7 Gray,
tion of money to enforce laws of the Com- 272. In order to recover the reward the
monwealth, wherein every other commu- plaintif must in general prove perform-
nity thereof has the same interest. In ance according to the terms of the adver-
New Hampshire the power to offer re- tisement. See Neville v. Kelly, 12 C. B.
wards for offenders is conferred upon N. S. 740; Smith v. Moore, 1 C. B. 438;
towns by statute. It is there held that, Thatcher 'v. England, 3 C. B. 254; Eng.
under the statute, a reward cannot be land v. Davidson, 11 A. & E. 856; Lan-
claimed for services rendered before it is caster v. Walsh, 4 M. & W. 16; Fallick
offered. Abel v. Pembroke, 61 N. H. 357. v. Barber, 1 M. & S. 108; Williams v.
The Constitution of Florida authorizes the Carwardine, 4. B. & Ad. 621; Tarner v.
imposition of taxes for “corporation pur- Walker, L. R. 1 Q. B. 641; s. C. L. R. 2
poses and for no other purpose," and the Q. B. 301.
courts there hold that cities are not liable 2 Stotesbury v. Smith, 2 Burr. 924 ;
to pay rewards offered for the detection Harris v. Watson, Peake, 72 ; 3 Kent
and punishment of criminals. Murphy v. Com. 185 ; Stilk v. Myrick, 2 Campb.
Jacksonville, 18 Fla. 318. A county in 317 ; Bridge v. Cage, Cro. Jac. 103. See
Indiana has no such power.
Board of chapter on Corporate Officers, post, secs.
Commissioners v. Bradford, 72 Ind. 455. 233, 234.
1 Crawshaw v. Roxbury, supra. Under 3 Pool v. Boston, 5 Cush. 219 (1849);
a statute authorizing the mayor and city Gilmore v. Lewis, 12 Ohio, 281 ; Means v.
council of any city, or the selectmen of Hendershott, 24 Iowa, 78; chap. ix. post.
VOL. I. — 14
210
§ 140
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
It is also very
2
and certainly not a large and expensive edifice. But power to a
municipal corporation to build or repair carries with it the right to
determine plan and mode.2
1 Peterson v. Mayor, &c., 17 N. Y. inhabitants.':.
There is no lack of au-
449, 455, por Denio, J. Contract between thority for allowing municipal corpora-
city and county in respect to public build- tions to aid, or in some cases to establish,
ings. Bergen v. Clarkson, 1 Halst. (N.J.) improvements which are not purely for
352 (1796); De Witt v. San Francisco, 2 municipal purposes.
Cal. 289 (1852). In Georgia it has been common both in this country and in Eng-
held that the power to build a school-house land, from which we have drawn the prin-
is within the scope of the general power ciples of our common law, for cities, in
of a municipal corporation in that State, building their municipal buildings, to
without express authority, unless the char- furnish accommodations, gratuitously or
ter forbids. Cartersville v. Baker, 73 Ga. otherwise, for public officers and bodies
686.
which do not represent the city. ...
Ely v. Rochester, 26 Barb. 133 ; Bell The question whether the city of Saginaw,
v. Platteville, 71 Wis. 139. An upre- which must, at the present ratio of tax-
stricted power to purchase real estate for ation, bear about one-fifth of the expense
the erection of public buildings held to of a court-house, may be authorized to
give, by implication, the exclusive right raise money enough to build the whole of
to the City Council to determine the ex- it, does not therefore seem to be so much
pediency of purchasing, the power to pur- whether it can raise anything more than
chase on credit and to issue bonds for the its ratable proportion for what is not
purchase money. Richmond v. McGirr, strictly a municipal purpose, hut how
78 Ind. 192 (1881); ante, secs. 119, 124, much it can raise without violating prin-
125. As to power to build town-house. ciple. It seems to us that if the duor can
French v. Quincy, 3 Allen, 9. Incidental be opened at all, this is not a matter for
power to provide suitable accommodations the courts to decide.' The legislature can-
for the transaction of the business of the not compel a city to be generous to the
corporation. People v. Harris, 4 Cal. 9 ; State or county ; but we do not think the
see Vanover v. Davis, 27 Ga. 354; chapter Constitution forbids a city — if authorized
on Corporate Property, post. In Callam by statute — from determining for itself
v. Saginaw, 50 Mich. 7, a taxpayer filed a whether such an investment of city money
bill for an injunction to restrain the issue for purposes in which the city is directly
of bonds of the city of Saginaw to pay for concerned in part, will not be wise and
the erection of a court-house for the county profitable. If it may put up handsome
at the sole expense of a city, under an instead of mean buildings for its own uises,
act authorizing such action. The court, and may accommodate the county in those
Campbell, J., said: “It is claimed, and is buildings upon as easy terms as it chooses,
true, that the legislature cannot compel a we do not see that what is now proposed
city to bear the whole cxpense of county involves substantially any very different
buildings (see ante, secs. 72, 73). ... The principle.” The action of the court below
question therefore arises whether a, city in dismissing the bill was, however, re-
can be authorized to raise by corporate versed on other grounds.
funds and taxes the entire money required Council have power to fit up and fur-
for a court-house for the county. nish the room in which they meet, and
No precedents have been found precisely the court refused to enjoin them from fur-
analogous. The power is rested by the nishing the council chamber with por-
defence on the validity of city expend- traits of the governors of the State.
itures for purposes of a public character Reynolds v. Mayor of Albany, 8 Barb.
which make a city more desirable as a 597 ; People v. Harris, 4 Cal. 9; but seo
residence, promote its improvement and Hodges v. Buffalo, 2 Denio, 110; Stetson
the increase of its taxable property, and v. Kempton, 13 Mass. 272 (1816), per
add to the comforts or prosperity of its Parker, C. J. Proper uses of public build.
1
§ 141
211
POLICE POWERS AND REGULATIONS.
§ 141 (93). Police Powers and Regulations. Many of the
powers exercised by municipalities fall within what is known as
the police power of the State, and are delegated to them to be
exercised for the public good. Of this nature is the authority to
suppress nuisances, preserve health, prevent fires, to regulate the
ings.
Scofield v. School District, 27 98 N. Y. 98 (1885) (prohibiting manufac-
Conn. 499; French v. Quincy, 3 Allen, 9. ture of cigars in tenement houses); and
Market Houses, post, secs. 380-385, 562, the views of Mr. Justice Pield in Munn v.
648. Equity will not interfere to prevent Illinois, 94 U. S. 113, 142 (1876), and in
the erection of suitable public buildings Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U. S. 687.
unless the provisions of the charter forbid. We cannot refrain from expressing our
Torrent v. Muskegon, 47 Mich. 115. full concurrence in the views and conclu-
In organizing a county the legislature sions of the Court of Appeals of New York
may delegate the authority to locate the in The People v. Marx, supra. It will not
county scat to the county commissioners. escape observation that the Court of Ap-
Rice v. Shuey, 5 N. W. R. 435. But the peals of New York and the Supreme Court
county seat cannot be changed at the of Pennsylvania reached opposite conclu-
will of the county board after they have sions on a question relating so vitally to
canvassed the vote and located it in ac- the natural, inalienable, and primordial
cordance with the result. People v. Ben- rights of the citizen. The judgment of
zie Co., 41 Mich. 6; Attorney-General v. the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania sus-
Lake Co., 33 Mich. 289 ; Attorney-General taining the Act of 1885, was affirmed by
v. Benzie, 34 Mich. 211.
the Supreme Court of the United States ;
1 Ante, chap. iv. The power of a corpor- and on like grounds, if the New York
ation to exercise police jurisdiction is a statute (which was in judgment in the
power delegated by the State. Cranston v.
case of The People v. Marx) had been
Augusta, 61 Ga. 572. The police power of before the Supreme Court of the United
a State is not impaired by the Fourteenth States, its validity would have been up-
Amendment to the Constitution of the held, unless the Supreme Court had fol-
United States. Barbier v. Connolly, 113 lowed the judgment of the Court of
U. S. 27 (1885). Ordinance of San Fran- Appeals. We have, at all events, that
cisco prohibiting washing and ironing in which is regarded as a fundamental right
public laundries within a specified district, in New York considered not to be such in
from ten o'clock at night to six in the Pennsylvania. The Pennsylvania Act of
morning held valid under the police power. 1885, under which Powell was convicted,
S. P. Soon Hing v. Crowley, 113 U. S. makes the manufacture and sale of oleo-
703 (1885). See full discussion in New margarine, though open and unconcealed,
Orleans Gas Co. v. Lousiana Light Co., a crime. We cannot but express our re-
115 U. $. 650, 661 (1885); Butchers' gret that the Constitution of any of the
Union Co. v. Crescent City, &c. Co., 111 States, or that of the United States, ad-
U. S. 746 (1883) (Slaughter-house case).
mits of a construction that it is competent
An act prohibiting the manufacture and for a State legislature to suppress (instead
sale of oleomargarine or keeping the same of regulating) under fine and imprison-
with intent to sell, is valid as a legitimate ment the business of manufacturing and
exercise of the police power of the State, selling a harmless, and even wholesome,
and is not in conflict with the Fourteenth article, if the legislature chooses to affirm,
Amendment of the Federal Constitution. contrary to the fact, that the public health
Powell v. Commonwealth, 114 Pa. St. 265 or public policy requires such suppression.
(1886). Affirmed by Supreme Court of The record of the conviction of Powell for
the United States, 127 U. S. 678 (1888); selling without any deception a healthful
S. P. State v. Addington, 77 Mo. 110 and nutritious article of food makes one's
(1882). Contra : People v. Marx, 99 blood tingle.
N. Y. 377. See, also, Matter of Jacobs,
212
§ 141
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
use and storing of dangerous articles, to establish and control
markets, and the like. These and other similar topics will be con-
sidered in appropriate places. But it may here be observed that
every citizen holds his property subject to the proper exercise of
this power, either by the State legislature directly, or by public
or municipal corporations to which the legislature may delegate it.1
Laws and ordinances relating to the comfort, health, convenience,
good order, and general welfare of the inhabitants are comprehen-
sively styled, “ Police Laws or Regulations.” It is well settled
that laws and regulations of this character, though they may dis-
turb the enjoyment of individual rights, are not unconstitutional,
though. no provision is made for compensation for such disturbances.
They do not appropriate private property for public use, but simply
regulate its use and enjoyment by the owner.
If he suffers injury,
it is either damnum absque injuria, or, in the theory of the law, he
is compensated for it by sharing in the general benefits which the
regulations are intended and calculated to secure. The citizen
owns his property absolutely, it is true; it cannot be taken fromi
him for any private use whatever, without his consent, nor can it
be taken for any public use without compensation; still he owns it
subject to this restriction, namely, that it must be so used as not
unreasonably to injure others, and that the sovereign authority may,
by police regulations, so direct the use of it that it shall not prove
pernicious to his neighbors, or the citizens generally. These reg-
ulations rest upon the maxim, Salus populi suprema est lex. This
power to restrain a private injurious use of property, is essentially
different from the right of eminent domain. It is not a taking of
private property for public use, but a salutary restraint on a nox-
ious use by the owner, contrary to the maxim, Sic utere tuo ut
alienum non loedas.2
1 McKibbin v. Fort Smith, 35 Ark. Boston, 100 Mass. 544; Cobb v. Boston,
352 ; Textor v. Baltimore & O. R. R. Co., 112 Mass. 181; Bancroft v. Cambridge,
59 Md. 63 (gates at railroad crossings). 126 Mass. 438; Welch v. Boston, 126
2 Baker v. Boston, 12 Pick. 184 (1831) Mass. 442; Little Rock v. Barton, 33
(as to nuisances); Wadleigh v. Gillman, Ark. 436, citing and approving text.
12 Me. 403 (as to wooden buildings); Hollingsworth v. Parish of Tensas, 17
Vanderbilt v. Adams, 7 Cow. 349 (as to Fed. Rep. 109 ; Coates v. Mayor, &c. of
harbor regulations, where the general prin- New York, 7 Cow. 585 (1826) (as to ordi-
ciple upon which police laws rest is very nance prohibiting the interment of the
satisfactorily discussed by Woodworth, dead within the city); Goszler v. George-
J.); Commonwealth v. Alger, 7 Cush. 53, town, 6 Wheat. 593 (as to power to grade).
84 (valuable opinion by Shaw, C. J.); The power to regulate the keeping of
Fisher v. McGirr, 1 Gray, 1; Common- dogs and to enforce such regulations by
wealth v. Tewksbury, 11 Met. 55; Salem forfeitures, fines, and penalties is recogo
v. Eastern Railroad, 98 Mass. 431; Water- nized as one within the police power.
town v. Mayo, 109 Mass. 315; Dingley v. City of Faribault v. Wilson, 34 Minn. 254.
§ 142
POLICE POWER; CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROL.
213
§ 142. Subject to Federal Constitution. All-embracing and
penetrating as the police power of the State is, and of necessity
must be, it is nevertheless subject, like all other legislative powers, to the
The legislature may, it seems, pass an act
it seems, pass an act to be protected did not constitute a body
limiting the height of dwelling-houses in politic. Ib. A power “ to make and
cities. The New York act of 1885 con- establish rules for the regulation of jut
strued not to extend to buildings designed or bay windows” does not authorize the
for hotels. People v. D'Oench, 111 N. Y. council to pass an ordinance granting per-
359 (1888).
mission to an individual to construct a
In the case of the Boston Beer Co. v. bay window projecting beyond the build.
Massachusetts, 97 U. S. 25 (1877), Mr. ing line. Reimer's Appeal, 100 Pa. St.
Justice Bradley, speaking for the court, 182. See post, secs. 660, 734.
said: " Whatever differences of opinion Speaking of turnpike acts, paving acts,
may exist as to the extent and boundaries &c., Lord Kenyon, in the case of the Gov-
of the police power, and however difficult ernor &c. v. Meredith, 4 Term Rep. 790,
it may be to render a satisfactory defini- 796, says: “Some individuals suffer an
tion of it, there seems to be no doubt that inconvenience under all these acts of par-
it does extend to the protection of the liament; but the interests of individuals
lives, health, and property of the citizens, must give way to the accommodation of
and to the preservation of good order and the public." And per Buller, J., in the
the public morals.” See also New Orleans same case:
There are many cases in
Gas Co. v. Louisiana Light Co. 115 which individuals sustain an injury, for
U. S. 650, 661 (1885). Prohibitory liquor which the law gives no action; for in-
laws valid. Bartemeyer v. Iowa, 18 Wall. stance, pulling down houses, or raising bul.
129 (1873); Foster v. Kansas, 112 U. S. warks, for the preservation and defence of
201 (1884); Kidd 2. Pearson, 128 U. S. 1 the kingdom against the king's enemies."
(1888); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623 But "the law will not allow the right of
(1887); Bowman v. Railway Co., 125 U. S. property to be invaded under the guise of
465 (1888), sustaining a statute of a State a police regulation for the preservation of
prohibiting common carriers from bringing health, when it is manifest that such is
intoxicating liquors into the State without not the object and purpose of the regula-
first having a certificate from the county tion.” Per Wilde, J., in Austin v. Mur-
auditor that the consignee is authorized ray, 16 Pick. 126; Green v. Savannah, 6
to sell in the county. See also Fertiliz- Ga. 1 (1849); People v. Hawley, 3 Mich.
ing Co. v. Hyde Park (village of), 97 330; Ames v.P.H.L. Co., 11 Mich.139. The
U. S. 659 (1878). In the last case Mr. extent of the police power will be further
Justice Swayne says:
Perhaps the most discussed in the chapter on Ordinances,
striking application of the police power is post. See also Cooley, Const. Lim. 572-
in the destruction of buildings to prevent 594. How far and when cities, in exe-
the spread of a conflagration. This right cuting police duties, are agents of the State,
existed by the common law, and the and not of the municipality. See But-
owner was entitled to no compensation. trick v. Lowell, 1 Allen (Mass.), 172 ;
2 Kent's Com. 339 (marg. paging), and Mitchell v. Rockland, 51 Me. 118, 122; 52
notes 1 and a and b.' Post, chap. xxiii. Me. 118 ; Brown v. Vinalhaven, 65 Me.
It is within the police power of the State 402 (1876); Keller v. Corpus Christi, 50
to authorize the channel of a river to be Tex. 614, approving text ; State v. St.
turned or straightened, in order to protect Louis Court, 34 Mo. 546; White v. Kent,
from threatened inundation a populous 11 Ohio St. 550; Thomas v. Ashland, 12
portion of the State; and such work is of Ohio St. 127; City Council v. Payne, 2
a public character. Green v. Swift, 47 Nott & McCord (S. C.), 475; People v.
Cal. 536 (1874). In such case, the au- Hurlbut, 24 Mich. 44 (1871); s. C. 9 Am.
thority of the State is none the less in de- Rep. 103; ante, sec. 60; post, secs. 253,
gree, even if the inhabitants of the district 393, 396, 768.
214
§ 142
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
paramount authority of the State and Federal Constitutions. A right
conferred or protected by the Constitution cannot be overthrown
or impaired by any authority derived from the police power. Thus
the police power of the State must be exercised in subordination to
the Federal Constitution, and, as was held by the Supreme Court
of the United States, in respect of State laws forbidding the truns-
portation of Texas cattle, it cannot extend to interstate transporta-
tion of the subjects of commerce. In a subsequent case 2 the
rights claimed by a private corporation, chartered by an act of the
legislature, and authorized by its charter to establish and carry on
a business which was intrinsically and unavoidably a nuisance to
the inhabitants in the neighborhood, came in conflict with the
police power of the State, subsequently delegated to a municipality
within whose limits the offensive and unhealthy business of the
private corporation was conducted. The subject was thoroughly
considered. The court did not deny that by a specific contract the
legislature might surrender for a limited period the right to inter-
fere with a business which was a positive nuisance. On the
ground, however, that the private corporation, when its charter was
tested by the principles of strict construction applicable to such
grants,' had no specific legislative authority to maintain its works
1 Railroad Co. v. Husen, 95 U. S. 465 authority subsequently conferred upon it .
(1877). In Kimmish v. Ball, 129 U, S. the municipality of Hyde Park passed an
217 (1889), an Iowa statute making per- ordinance absolutely prohibiting the trans-
sons having “Texas cattle” in their pos- portation of offal through the village. The
session which have not been wintered majority opinion sustaining the ordinance
north of a certain point, liable for damages is based upon two propositions: 1. That
which may accrue from allowing them to the chartered rights of the Fertilizing
run at large, and thereby spread “ Texas Company were subject to the police power
fever," was sustained.
of the State, which was delegated to the
2 Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park (village municipal authorities. 2. The charter of
of), 97 U. S. 659 (1878).
the company is not a contract guaran-
8 The Fertilizing Company obtained by teeing in the locality originally selected,
its charter from the State (which was a exemption for fifty years from the exer-
legislative contract), for the period of fifty cise of the police power of the State, how-
years, three rights, among others; first, a ever serious the nuisance night become in
right to establish and maintain at a place the future, by reason of the growth of
in Cook County, south of the dividing-line population around it. Mr. Justice Miller
between townships thirty-seven and thirty- limited his judgment to a concurrence on
eight, works for converting offal and ani- the second point, and denied the first.
mal matter; and the works had been es- Strong, J., dissented. Field, J., did not
tablished there at a cost of more than two sit. Critically viewed, the case is perhaps
hundred thousand dollars; second, they only an authoritative decision on the sec-
obtained the right to establish receiving ond ground, since it is relied on in both
depots for receiving and carrying such concurring opinions, and is amply sufi-
matter from Chicago; and third, they ob- cient to sustain the judgment, which
tained the right to carry such matter from affirmed that of the Supreme Court of Illi-
their receiving depots to their converting nois.
works in Hyde Park. Under legislative 4 Ante, secs. 89-91, and cases.
1
§ 142
215
POLICE POWER; CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROL.
on the site where they were established, if not, indeed, on the
broader ground that all legislative charters to private corporations
are subordinate to the police power in all cases whatsoever, or, at
all events, in all cases except where it is otherwise provided by the
express terms of the contract, or by what is necessarily implied,
the municipal ordinances to abate the nuisance were sustained, al-
though the corporation had erected expensive works, and the effect
of enforcing the ordinance would be to prevent the further carrying
on of the business in that locality. Similar results in favor of the
police power as against alleged vested rights under charters have
been reached in other cases.1
1 Coates v. Mayor, &c. of New York, 7 the ordinance was sustained. The court
Cow. 585 (1826), referred to in the case of held that “the act under which it was
the Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park, supra, passed was not unconstitutional, either as
and thus stated by Swayne, J.: In Coates in pairing the obligation of contracts, or
v. The Mayor, &c. of New York, 7 Cow. taking property for public use without
585, a law was enacted by the legislature compensation, but stands on the police
of the State, on the 9th of March, 1813, power to make regulations in respect to
which gave to the city government power nuisances.” It was said: ." Every right,
to pass ordinances regulating, and if ne- from absolute ownership in property down
cessary preventing, the interment of dead
to a mere easement, is purchased and
bodies within the city; and a penalty of holden subject to the restriction that it
$250 was authorized to be imposed for the shall be so exercised as not to injure
violation of the prohibition. On the others.
others. Though at the time it be remote
seventh of October, 1823, an ordinance and inoffensive, the purchaser is bound to
was adopted forbidding interments or the know at his peril that it may become
depositing of dead bodies in vaults in the otherwise by the residence of many people
city south of a designated line. A pen- in its vicinity, and that it must yield to
alty was prescribed for its violation. The by-laws and other regular remedies for the
action was brought to recover the penalty suppression of nuisances." In such cases
for depositing a dead body in a vault in prescription, whatever the length of time,
Trinity church-yard. A plea was inter- has no application. Every day's continu-
posed setting forth that the locus in quo ance is a new offence, and it is no justifi-
was granted by the King of Great Britain cation that the party complaining came
on the 6th of May, 1697, to a corporation voluntarily within its reach. Pure air and
by the name of the “ Rector and Inhabi- the comfortable enjoyment of property are
tants of the City of New York in Com- as much rights belonging to it as the right
munion with the Protestant Episcopal of possession and occupancy.
Church of England," and their successorslation, where there was none before, ap-
forever, as, and for a church-yard and proaches a nuisance, it is the duty of those
burying place, with the rights, fees, &c.; liable at once to put an end to it. Brady
that immediately after the grant the land V. Weeks, 3 Barb. (N. Y.) 157. Post,
was appropriated and thenceforward was sec. 372. Cemetery associations and their
used as and for a cemetery for the inter- franchises are subject to regulation under
ment of (lead bodies ; that the rector and the police power. Cemetery Ass. v. Rail-
wardens of Trinity Church were the same road Co., 121 Ill. 199 (1887). So where a
corporation, and that the body in question city had conveyed land to indiriduals for
was deposited in the vault in the church- the purpose of crecting powder magazines
yard by the license of that corporation. thercon, and afterwards passed an ordi-
A general demurrer was filed, and the case nance declaring the magazines so erected
was elaborately argued. The validity of dangerous to life and property, and direct-
If popus
216
§ 143
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
§ 143 (94). Prevention of Fires. — The prevention of damage by
fire is usually an object within the scope of municipal authority
either by express grant or by the power, in a chartered town or
city, to make police regulations or needful by-laws. Under such
power, it may establish fire limits, prevent the erection of wooden
buildings, regulate the mode and removal of asbes, and make
any other reasonable regulations to prevent and extinguish fires.
Under such power the town or municipal body is authorized to
appropriate money for the purchase of engines, or for the repair
thereof, if to be used for the purpose of extinguishing fires there-
in; and this, whether they belong to the corporation or were pur-
chased by private subscription. And money may also be appro-
ing them to be removed at the expense of regulation adapted to aid in the protec-
the owners, it was held that the ordinance tion of life and health, is properly one
was a valid exercise of the police power, of legislative determination, and a court
and did not impair the obligation of the should not lightly interfere with such
contract under the deed, nor was it a tak- determination, unless the legislature has
ing of private property without compen- manifestly transcended its province. Dan.
sation. Davenport v. Richmond City, 81 iels v. Hilgard, 77 Ill. 640 (1875).
Va. 636 (1887). So in the case of the 1 Post, sec. 405.
Boston Beer Company, where the legisla- 2 Post, sec. 405.
ture of Massachusetts, on the 1st of Feb- 3 Many fires are said to be “ acciden-
ruary, 1827, incorporated the “Boston tal” which are the result of neglect to
Beer Company,” “ for the purpose of keep ashes in fire-proof utensils; and yet
manufacturing malt liquors in all their regulations for the safe keeping of ashes
varieties in the city of Boston," &c. By are seldom made, and when made, rarely
an act of June, 1869, the manufacture of enforced. Filbey v. Combe, 2 M. & W.
malt liqnors to be sold in Massachusetts, 677; Law v. Dodd, 1 Ex. 845; Lyndon v.
and brewing and keeping them for sale, Stadbridge, 2 H. & N. 45. See further,
were prohibited under penalties of fine and The Queen v. Wood, 5 E. & B. 49; Guar-
imprisonment and the forfeiture of the dians of Holborn Union v. Vestry of St.
liquors to the Commonwealth. In The Leonard, Shoreditch, L. R. 2 Q. B. Div.
Boston Beer Co. v. The Commonwealth, 145; Gay v. Cadby, L. R. 2 C. P. Div.
the Supreme Court of Massachusetts held 391; Harrison's Munic. Manual, 4th ed.;
that "the act of 1869 did not impair the Clark v. South Bend, 85 Ind. 276 (ordi-
obligations of the contract contained in the nance regulating the storage of straw).
charter of the claimant, so far as it relates 4 Allen v. Taunton, 19 Pick. 485 (1837).
to the sale of malt liquors, but is binding Hunneman v. Fire District, 37 Vt. 40;
on the claimant to the same extent as on Robinson v. St. Louis, 28 Mo. 488 (re-
individuals. The act is in the nature of pair of engine-house); Wadleigh v. Gill-
a police regulation in regard to the sale of man, 12 Me. 403; Vanderbilt v. Adams,
a certain article of property, and is appli- 7 Cow. 349, 352; post, secs. 405, 572 n.,
cable to the sale of such property by indi- 690, chap. xxiii. Text approved. Green
viduals and corporations, even where the v. Cape May, 41 N. J. L. 45. A town
charter of the corporation cannot be al- possesses implied power, in the absence
tered or repealed by the legislature.” This of express legislative enactment, to pur-
judgment was affirmed by the Supreme chase fire-engines. Bluffton v. Studa.
Court of the United States, 97 U. S. 25. baker, 106 Ind. 129; Carleton v. Wash-
The question whether certain require ington, 38 Kan. 726; Bridgford v. Tus-
ments are a part of a system of police cumbia, 16 Fed. Rep. 910.
!
$ 144
217
7
QUARANTINE; PUBLIC HEALTH.
priated for the benefit of engine and hook and ladder companies
therein.
1
$ 144 (95). Quarantine and Health ; Scope of Power to preserve
the Public Health. -- The preservation of the public health and safety
is often made in express terms a matter of municipal duty, and it
is competent for the legislature to delegate to municipalities the
power to regulate, restrain, and even suppress, particular kinds of
business, if deemed necessary for the public good. The subject
will be considered more in detail in the chapter on Ordinances.3
The general nature and scope of the authority, as it is not unfre-
quently bestowed, are well illustrated by a case in Maryland. By
its charter the city of Baltimore was vested with “full power and
authority to enact all ordinances necessary to preserve the health of
the city, prevent and remove nuisances, and to prevent the intro-
duction of contagious diseases within the city and within three
miles of the same.” Commenting on this provision of the charter,
the Court of Appeals say: “The transfer of this salutary and
essential power is given in terms as explicit and comprehensive as
could have been used for such a purpose. To accomplish, within
1 Van Sicklen v. Burlington, 27 Vt. Cincinnati, 19 Ohio St. 19; Brinkmeyer
(1 Wms.) 70 (1854). Approving Allen v. Evansville, 29 Ind. 187 ; Fisher v.
v. Taunton, supra. See post, chapter on Boston, 104 Mass. 87; Hill v. Boston,
Ordinances. Power of council over fire 122 Mass. 344. The mere fact that a
companies, and to appoint officers there- voluntcer fire association renders services
for. See Miller v. Savannah Fire Co., 26 in extinguishing fires imposes no obliga-
Ga. 678.
tion upon a municipal corporation to pay
The protection of all the buildings in its members therefor. Jacksonville v. Ætna
a city or town from destruction or injury Fire Engine Co., 20 Fla. 100. Post, sec.
by fire is for the benefit of all the inhabi- 976 and cases.
tants, and for their relief from a common ? Shrader, In re, 33 Cal. 279 (1867);
danger; and cities and towns are therefore Ashbrook v. Commonwealth, 1 Bush (Ky.),
authorized by general law in Massachu- 139 (1866) ; Tucker v. Virginia City, 4
setts to provide and maintain fire engines, Nev. 20; Johnson v. Simonton, 43 Cal.
reservoirs, and hydrants to supply water 242 (1872). Aaron v. Broiles, 64 Tex.
for the extinguishment of fires. Allen v. 316; post, chap. xxiii. The power of the
Taunton, 19 Pick. 485; Hardy v. Wal- State to protect the public health cannot
tham, 3 Met. 163; Fisher v. Boston, 104 be surrendered; but a municipality en-
Mass. 87; Tainter v. Worcester, 123 trusted with the execution of this power
Mass. 311. The question whether and may make contracts to accomplish the
where public hydrants should be erected purpose, and while the State or the muni-
is within the exclusive control of the cipality may recall or modify such con-
municipal authorities, as the public inter- tracts, they cannot do so from mere caprice
ests may from time to time require; and or to gain pecuniary advantage. Louis-
such municipality does not assume any ville v. Wible, 84 Ky. 290, where a con-
liability to the owners of property to tract giving the exclusive right to remove
furnish means of extinguishment of fires dead animals for five years was held
upon which an action can be maintained. valid.
Grant v. Erie, 69 Pa. 420; Wheeler v. 8 Post, secs. 369 et seq., 374-378.
218
$ 145
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
the specified territorial limits, the objects enumerated, the corporate
authorities were clothed with all the legislative powers which the
general assembly could have exercised. Of the degree of necessity
for such municipal legislation, the Mayor and City Council of Balti-
more were the exclusive judges. To their sound discretion is com-
mitted the selection of the means and manner (contributory to the
end) of exercising the powers which they might deem requisite to
the accomplishment of the objects of which they were made the guar-
dians. "To prevent the introduction of contagious diseases within
the city, and within three miles of the same, they might impose
heavy penalties on the captain, owner, or consignee of any ship or
other vessel entering the port of Baltimore, on board of which
small-pox or other contagious diseases might prevail, or they might
seek the accomplishment of their object by causing the vessel and
all persons to be taken possession of and controlled until their
purification and disinfection were effected, and impose on the
captain, owner, or consignee, the payment or reimbursement of
all the expenses incurred by such proceedings; or they might
adopt, at the same time, both suggested remedies, if for the success-
ful and faithful execution of their powers they deemed it necessary
to do so.”
§ 145 (96). Same subject. Appointment of Health Officers and
their Powers. And it was held that, under this authority, it was
competent for the city to pass an ordinance providing for the ap-
pointment of a “health officer," prescribing his duties and powers; 2
and that the city might recover from the consignee of a vessel, and
was not confined to the charterer, the expenses incurred by it in
disinfecting and purifying the vessel, persons, and baggage on
board of her at the time of her arrival, froin the infection of the
small-pox. Respecting the extent of liability, the court decided
that the defendant was not entitled to an instruction that the
recovery must be limited to the amount of expenses absolutely
necessary to preserve the health of the city, or to prevent the
introduction of the small-pox. On this point the court expressed
its judgment to be that, "if the health officer" (on whom the duty
of disinfecting the vessel was imposed by ordinance), in causing
expenses, "acted bona fide, within the limits of a sound discretion,
and with reasonable skill and judgment, in the discharge of his
official duties, the reasonable expenses thus incurred must be
paid.” Concerning the power of the corporation over the persons
1 Harrison v. Baltimore, 1 Gill (Md.), 2 Post, sec. 370, and note, as to Health
264 (1843); ante, sec. 94.
Officers and their powers.
1
$ 147
219
PUBLIC HEALTH: INDEMNIFYING OFFICERS.
on board of an infected vessel, the court was of opinion that it was
competent for the health officer to be authorized by ordinance to
send persons laboring under infectious disease to the hospital, and
also those on board of the vessel liable to be affected by the disease,
if, in his opinion, such a course be necessary to prevent the spread
of disease; and the owner, master, or consignee may be liable for
expenses thus incurred, if the health officer acts with reasonable
skill and judgment, and exercises a sound and honest discretion 1
§ 146 (97). Water Supply. — A city having power to pass or-
dinances respecting the police of the place, and to preserve health, is
authorized, as a sanitary and police regulation, to contract to pro-
cure a supply of water, by boring an artesian well on the public
square, or otherwise, and is the judge of the mode best adapted to
accomplish the object.2
§ 147 (98). Indemnifying Officers. — Where a municipal corpora-
tion has no interest in the event of a suit, or in the question involved
in the case, and the judgment therein can in no way affect the
corporate rights or corporate property, it cannot assume the defence
of the suit, or appropriate its money to pay the judgment therein;
and warrants or orders for the payment of money based upon such a
consideration are void.3 But such a corporation has power to
1 Harrison v, Baltimore, 1 Gill (Md.), owner have no capacity to act at all.
264 (1813).
Suffield v. Hathaway, 44 Conn. 521 ; ante,
2 Livingston v. Pippin, 31 Ala. 542 sec. 30 ; post, secs. 1038–1046. Power to
(1858); Indianapolis 2. Indianapolis Gas purchase or condemn lands for water-
Co., 66 Ind. 396, approving text ; ante, works. People v. McClintock, 45 Cal.
sec. 94.
As to water-works, Rome v. 11 (1872); post, secs. 561, 562, 597, 610.
Cabot, 28 Ga. 50 ; Hale v. Houghton, 8 Regulations of water supply. Post, sec.
Mich. 458 ; ante, sec. 58 ; post, sec. 443. 320. Pipes in streets. Post, sec. 697.
A municipal corporation owning lands on As to liability for wrongful acts of fire-
& water-course, distant from the city, to men, post, sec. 976.
supply its inhabitants with water, has no 3 Halstead v. Mayor, &c. of N. Y.,
right (unless acquired by purchase or by 3 Comst. (3 N. Y.) 430 (1850), affirming
the exercise of the right of eminent do- S. C. 5 Barb. 218, and deciding that cor-
main) to divert water to the injury of porate funds cannot be appropriated to
other riparian proprietors. Stein v. Bur- pay penalties personally incurred by offi-
den, 24 Ala. 130 (1854) ; Fleming's Ap- cers for refusing to discharge their official
peal, 65 Pa. St. 444. As against the duties; see, in explanation, Morris v.
owner of the fee abutting on a highway The People, 3 Denio, 381. And see, also,
the selectmen of a town have a right to People v. Lawrence, 6 Hill, 244, holding
drain a spring on the owner's side of such that the supervisors of a county had no
road, and dispose of the water in such mode right to appropriate money to defray the
as to protect the highway from overflow; costs of a justice of the peace who had
but if they divert the water for any other been prosecuted for official misconduct
purpose, they act individually, and not and acquitted ; recognized in Bank v.
for the public good, and as against the Supervisors, 5 Denio, 517, 521. Sanie
220
§ 148
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
indemnify its officers against liability which they may incur in the
bona fide discharge of their duties, although the result may show
that the officers have exceeded their legal authority. Thus, it may
vote to defend suits brought against its officers for acts done in
good faith in the exercise of their office. So, if a public corpora-
tion is charged with the duty of repairing highways, and is made
liable for defects therein, it has the incidental power to indemnify
an officer who digs a ditch for the purpose of raising a legal ques-
tion as to the boundary line of the highway.3
§ 148 (99). Same subject. Refund-Taxes illegally assessed.
So, a vote by a town to refund money paid by assessors of the town
on an illegal assessment made by them of a town tax, is an express
promise, founded upon a meritorious and legal consideration, and
is irrevocably binding upon the town. And this, although without
such vote the town could not have been compelled to refund or
indemnify the assessors. But such a vote, by a town, would be
without consideration in respect to State and county taxes. So, if
principle, Merrill v. Plainfield, 45 N. H. Phelps, J., cites the text, and refers to
126. The trustees of a town may employ other cases to the same point.
counsel to defend an action against the 1 Pike v. Middleton (indemnifying tax
marshal for false imprisonment brought collector), 12 N. H. 278 (1841); Fuller
by a person arrested by him for violating v. Groton, 14 Gray, 340 ; Sherman v.
an ordinance of the town. Cullen v. Car- Carr (indemnifying executive officer), 8
thage, 103 Ind. 196.
R. I. 431 (1867); Briggs v. Whipple, 6
The common council of a city in Con- Vt. 95 (1834) ; Bancroft v. Lynnfield, 18
necticut, under authority of the city Pick. 566 (1836); Nelson v. Milford, 7
charter, enacted a by-law with respect to Pick. 18, 26 (1828); Babbitt v. Savoy,
wharves, and the anchoring, moving, 3 Cush. 530 (1849); Hadsell v. Hancock,
and mooring of vessels in the harbor, and 3 Gray, 526 (1853); State v. Hammon-
appointed a superintendent of wharves, to ton, 9 Vroom (38 N. J. L.), 430 (1876) ;
discharge the duties provided for in the S. C. 20 Am. Rep. 404, where many of the
by-law; the performance of his duties cases are referred to by Dixon, J. ; Text
was not enforced by a penalty, and he approved in Roper v. Laurinburg, 90 N.
acted only upon application of parties C. 427 ; Lewis v. Rochester, 9 C. B.
interested and at their expense. In the (n. s.) 401 ; Queen v. Litchfield, 4 Ad. &
discharge of his duties, and while acting E. (n. s.) 897 ; Attorney-General v. Nor-
in good faith, he ordered a vessel lying at wich, 2 Mylne & Cr. 406. In Page v.
a wharf to be hauled astern to make more Frankford, 9 Greenl. (Me.) 115, this was
room for another at an adjoining wharf, left an open question.
and was sued by the owner of the wharf 2 Ib. Baker v. Windham, 13 Me. (1.
for damages. It was held, on the princi- Shep.) 74 (1836); Cullen v. Carthage,
ciple stated in the text, that the city could 103 Ind. 196. See infra, sec. 148.
not legally indemnify him for the ex- 8 Bancroft v. Lynnfield, supra.
penses incurred by him in defending 4 Nelson v. Milford, 7 Pick. 18 (1828).
against the suit, and a threatened payment A separate action, on such a vote, lies
of such expenses by the city was enjoined against the town in favor of each assessor
at the suit of a resident and taxpayer. for his share, which does not include,
Gregory v. Bridgeport, 41 Conn. 76, 87 however, his own tax, paid by him volun-
(1874); s. C. 19 Am. Rep. 485, where tarily. Ib.
$ 149
221
FURNISHING ENTERTAINMENTS.
the town is not concerned, having nothing to lose or gain in the
result of the litigation, a vote to indemnify an officer would be in
excess of its power, and void ;1 but it would be otherwise if the
suit against the officer was in respect to matters in which the cor-
poration was interested.2
Without express
§ 149 (100). Furnishing Entertainments.
power, a public corporation cannot make a contract to provide for
celebrating the Fourth of July, or to provide an entertuinment for
its citizens or guests. Such contracts are void, and, although the
1 Vincent v. Nantucket, 12 Cush. 105 acts gives him no claim for compensation
(1853) ; Gregory v. Bridgeport, 41 Conn. against the consequences of unlawful acts.
76 (1874). “A promise to indemnify a Irwin v. Mariposa, 22 Upper Can. C. P.
tax collector if he would collect, by pre- 367. By-law to indemnify a councillor
tence of his official authority, a tax which for the costs of a contested election would
he knew was illegal, would be an agree- be illegal. Bell and Manvers, In re, 2
ment to violate the law, and could not be Upper Can. C. P. 507; 3 Ib. 400. In
enforced.” Pike v. Middleton, 12 N. H. England an agreement by a corporation
231, per Gilchrist, J. Selectmen, under with one of its officers for an increase of
their authority “to order and manage all the salary of an office retained by him as
of the prudential affairs of the town," compensation for the loss of an office of
may bind the town thus to indemnify its which he was deprived, is not binding un-
officers. 12 N. H. 281, supra ; ante, sec.
less under the seal of the corporation.
30, and notes.
The Queen v. Stamford, 6 Q. B. 433 ; see
2 Briggs v. Whipple, 6 Vt. 95 (1834). also Cope v. Thames, &c., Dock and Rail-
A by-law declaring that the officers of the road Co., 3 Ex. 841. So the appointment
corporation shall be indemnified for all of a corporation solicitor should be regu-
lawful acts done in an official capacity is larly under the corporation seal. Arnold
not illegal. Irwin v. Mariposa, 22 Upper %. Poole, 4 M. & G. 860. A town clerk,
Can. C. P. 367. The principles laid down if a solicitor, may have a lien on papers of
in the text are applied to municipal cor- the corporation, with respect to which he
porations in England. Thus, where the has done work as an attorney or solicitor.
suits are of such a nature that the rights The King v. Sankey, 5 A. & E. 423. But
of the corporation are not in any way af- qucere in this country. .
fected by the result, costs and expenses for Where persons entrusted with the ad-
attorneys cannot be defrayed out of the ministration of a fund have incurred legit-
corporate funds; as, for example, in Reg. imate and proper expenses thrown 11pon
v. Leerls, 4 Q. B. 796, where the question them by their fiduciary situation, they
was which of two councillors was legally have a right to reimburse themselves out
elected. So costs of defending Quo war- of the funds. See The King v. The Inhab-
ranto against an alderman of a borough itants of Essex, 4 T. R. 591 ; The King v.
cannot be paid by the corporation. Reg. The Commissioners of Sewers for the
v. Bridgewater, 2 P. & D. 558. But Tower Hamlets, 1 B. & Ad. 232 ; Attor-
where the object of the Quo warranto or ney-General v. Mayor of Norwich, 2 M. &
other proceeding or suit is to affect the C. 406 ; Regina v. The Mayor and Town
legal rights of the corporation, or to ques. Council of Sheffield, L. R. 6 Q. B. 652.
tion its legal existence, the expenses may An attempted appropriation contrary to
be defrayed out of the corporate funds. the terms of the trust may be restrained.
Holdsworth v. Dartmouth, 11 Ad. & El. Attorney-General v. Aspinall, 2 M. & C.
490.
613; Harrison's Municipal Manual, 4th
An indemnity to an officer for lawful ed. ; post, chap. xxii. sec. 709 et seq.
222
$ 150
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
plaintiff complies therewith on his part, he cannot recover of the
corporation.
$ 150 (101). Impounding Animals. — Power to impound and
forfeit domestic animals inust be expressly granted to the corpora-
tion, and laws or ordinances authorizing the officers of the corpora-
tion to impound, and upon taking specified proceedings to sell the
property, are penal in their nature, and where doubtful in their
meaning will not be construed to produce a forfeiture of the prop-
erty, but rather the reverse. The pound-kceper cannot justify in an
action brought against him by the property-owner unless he has
strictly complied with all the requirements of the law under which
he acts. Thus, if he sells without giving the requisite notice, or
for the full length of time required, he is liable although the owner
sustains no actual injury from the omission, or the owner may treat
the sale as void and recover his property. A statute directing the
i Hodges v. Buffalo, 2 Denio (N. Y.), gave a ball and banquet ; certain tax-
110 (1846). Same principle. Cornell v. payers obtained a temporary injunction
Guilford, 1 Denio, 510; Hood v. Lynn, 1 restraining the treasurer from paying the
Allen (Mass.), 103 (1861); Gerry v. bills, which, upon final hearing, was sus-
Stoneham, Ib. 319 ; Hale v. People, 87 tained and made perpetual. Austin v.
Ill. 72. Nor to celebrate surrender of Coggeshall, 12 R. I. 329 ; S. P. Green-
Cornwallis. Tash v. Adams, 10 Cush. ough v. Wakefield, 127 Mass. 275 ; post,
252 (1852). Nor can towns in Massachu- chap. xxii. sec. 916 et seq.
setts vote money for the purchase of uni- 2 White v. Tallman, 2 Dutch. (N. J.)
forms for an artillery company. Claflin v. 67 (1856); Willis v. Legris, 45 Ill. 289;
Hopkinton, 4 Gray, 502 (1855). “Cor- Ib. 218 ; Rounds v. Stetson, 45 Me. 596
porations,” says Jewett, J., in Hodges 2. (1858); Gilmore v. Holt, 4 Pick. 258
Buffalo, 2 Denio, 110, “have no other (1826); Rounds v. Mansfield, 38 Me. 586
powers than such as are expressly granted, (1854); Smith v. Gates, 21 Pick. 55,
or such as are necessary to carry into effect where the rule in the text was applied,
the powers expressly granted.” Antc, although the sale was made only twenty
secs. 89-91. In New York there is a minutes before the expiration of the time
statutory declaration of this common-law required by law. So actual knowledge,
principle. 1 Rev. Sts. 599, secs. 1-3. by the owner of the beasts, of the im-
“ Until the case of Hodges v. Buffalo, 2 pounding thereof, is not equivalent to
Denio, 110, nothing," says Pratt, J., 3 the written notice required by the statute.
Comst. 433, was more frequent than for Coffin v. Field, 7 Cush. 355. Abridgment
city authorities to vote largesses and give of the required notice for the shortest
splendid banquets for objects and pur- period avoids the sale ; and so does a sale,
poses having no possible connection with at one bidding, of two animals having
the growth or weal of the body politic, different owners. Clark v. Lewis, 35 Ill.
thus subjecting their constituents to un- 417 (1864). Purchaser must show a regu-
necessary and oppressive taxation. Un lar and authorized sale when his title is
der a clause in a charter providing that questioned by the former owner. Ib.
“nothing in this charter shall be con- Breach of a pound, and liberating an ani-
strued. as giving the power to vote mal therein confined, is no violation of an
money for any ordinary ohject except for ordinance prohibiting “any person from
the regular, ordinary, and usual expenses opposing or interrupting any city officer
of the city," the city council of Newport in the execution of the ordinances of the
t
§ 151
223
PARTY WALLS.
mayor to issue a warrant annually, within ten days from July 1,
commanding police officers to “kill all dogs not licensed according
to law, whenever and wherever found,” is not in conflict with the
Constitution of Massachusetts, or of Kansas.
§ 151 (102). Party Walls. Power in a charter to pass ordi-
nances “to authorize the erection of party walls and fences, and
to regulate them,” includes the power to authorize their erection
upon the application of either owner, and without the consent of the
other; and such an ordinance is not unconstitutional because com-
pensation is not provided for the land occupied by the wall.3
city." Mayor, &c. v. Omburg, 22 Ga. 67 mals, at large, see also chapter on Ordi-
(1857). Marshal must strictly comply nances, post ; infra, sec. 348.
with the ordinance, or he becomes a tres- 1 Blair v. Forehand, 100 Mass. 136.
passer from the beginning. 13 Pick. 384; Approved in Mowery v. Salisbury, 82 N.
4 Pick. 258 ; 21 Pick. 55 ; 13 Met. 407 ; C. 175. The Act of July 3, 1863, eu-
7 Cush. 355 ; 9 Pick. 14 ; 12 Met. 118 ; 23 titled "An Act in Relation to Damages
Pick. 255 ; 12 Met. 198. Owner cannot occasioned by Dogs," so far as it under-
legally break pound and rescue animals. takes to charge the owner with the amount
5 Pick. 514; 5 Cush. 267. Pound defined. of damage done by his dog, as fixed by
2 Cush. 305. Marshal cannot delegate his the selectmen of the town, without an op-
authority to others to impound for him portunity to be heard, is unconstitutional;
generally, and in his absence, but may because it is contrary to natural justice
have assistants to act in concert with him. and not within the scope of legislative
Jackson v. Morris, 1 Denio, 199. See authority conferred by the Constitution on
Friday v. Floyd, 63 Ill. 50 (1872). Offi- the general court; and also because it is in
cers must use the public pound. 1 R. violation of the provision of the Bill of
I. 219. Replevin does not lie against Rights, which secures the right of trial by
a pound-keeper, at common law, while jury in all controversies concerning prop-
the creatures are in his legal custody. erty, except in cases where it had not
Co. Litt. 47 B. ; Ib. 145 B. ; 1 Chit. Pl. theretofore been used and practised. East
159 ; Pritchard v. Stevens, 6 Durn. & E. Kingston v. Towle, 48 N. H. 57. The
522 ; Ilsley v. Stubbs, 5 Mass. 283 ; Smith legislature have power to make towns
v. Huntington, 3 N. H. 76; King v. liable for damage done within their limits
Ford, 70 Ga: 628 ; but it does lie if he by dogs, and to give towns a right of
voluntarily parts with his legal control action to recover the actual damage from
over them, or if he impounds them in any the owners of the dogs. Ib.
other places than those prescribed by the 2 State v. Topeka, 36 Kan. 76, where the
law, as, for example, in his pasture or constitutionality of ordinances regulating
barn, although this be done the more con- the keeping, registering, and destruction
veniently to furnish them with food and of dogs is fully considered, and many
drink. Bills v. Kinson, 1 Foster (N. H.), authorities cited in the opinion, by Val-
448 (1850). In New Hampshire if crea-
entine, J.
tures are found “doing damage," they 8 Hunt v. Ambruster, 17 N. J. Eq.
may be impounded, and appraisers are to (2 C. E. Green) 208 (1865).
ascertain “whether any damage was Regulations as to party-walls must be
done." Held that the statute contem- strictly followed. If a person, under color
plated actual, and not merely nominal of such regulations, does injury to his
damages, to justify impounding. Osgood neighbor, he is liable to be sued. Pratt
v. Green, 33 N. H. 318, and cases cited. v. Hillman, 4 B. & C. 269 ; see also The
As to power to take up and forfeit ani- Queen v. Ponsford, 1 D. & L. 116. No
224
§ 153
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
§ 152 (103). Public Defence ; Loans and Taxation to pay Boun-
ties. — During the Rebellion acts were passed by many of the legis-
latures of the adhering States in effect authorizing municipalities to
raise money by loans and taxation, to pay bounties to volunteers to
enable the municipality to fill its quota under the calls of the Presi-
dent for troops, and thereby avoid an anticipated draft. The con-
stitutional principles involved in legislation of this character will
be found learnedly discussed in the cases below cited, which fully
establish the validity of such legislation. But without express
authority a municipality possesses no such power;2 yet if exercised,
it may be validated by subsequent legislative action.3
$ 153 (104). Aid to Railroad Companies; Municipal Subscrip-
tions and Bonds, and Taxation to pay the Same. The most noted
of extraordinary powers conferred upon municipal and public corpo-
man has a right to presume that his 150, two judges dissenting. See Hilbish
neighbor will hereafter build a house ad- v. Catherman, 64 Pa. St. 154 (1870), where
joining to his, and erect half of his out. the prior cases in that State are commented
side wall on his neighbor's ground in on by Agnew, J. State v. Richland Town-
consequence of such presumption. Bar- ship, 20 Ohio St. 362; Thompson v. Pitt-
low v. Norman, 2 W. Bl. 959. An exter- son, 59 Me. 545; Broadhead p. Milwaukee,
nal wall cannot be said to be a party. 19 Wis. 652 ; State v. Tappen, 29 Wis.
wall. Sims v. Estate Company, 14 L. T. 664 ; s. C. 9 An. Rep. 622 ; Sperry 2.
N. S. 55. A party-wall is a wall which Horr, 32 Iowa, 184; Booth v. Woodbury,
belongs to two persons as part-owners, or 32 Conn. 118 ; Shackford 2. Newington,
divides two buildings one from another. 46 N. H. 415 ; Lowell v. Oliver, 8 Allen
Weston v. Arnold, L. R. 8 Ch. Ap. 1084. (Mass.), 247 ; Freeland v. Hastings, 10
The English Stat., 14 Geo. III. ch. lxxviii., Allen, 570 ; Comer v. Folsom, 13 Minn.
was held not to make party-walls conimon 219; Dayton v. Rounds, 27 Mich. 82 ;
property. Matts v. Hawkins, 5 Taunt. 20. Cooley, Const. Lim. 219-229. Cooley on
If one proprietor added to the height of Taxation (2d ed.) 136, collects the cases
such a party-wall
, and the other pulled and states the result. Veazie v. China, 50
down the addition, the first might main- Me. 518 ; Clark Co. v. Lawrence, 63 Ill.
tain trespass for pulling down so much of 32 ; Ib. 40 ; Bowles v. Landaff, 59 N.H.
it as stood on the half of the wall which 164; Gould v. Raymond, Ib. 260.
was erected on his own soil. Ib. The 2 Stetson v. Kempton, 13 Mass. 272 ;
property in a wall, though erected at joint Fiske v. Hazzard, 7 R. I. 438; Shackford
expense, follows the property of the land v. Newington, supra; ante, sec. 30. It
whereon it stands. Ib. Power to pass is not the duty or function of a town
ordinances "to authorize the erection of to procure the passage of an act by the
party-walls, &c., and to regulate them,” legislature, authorizing it to pay bounties.
has been held to include the power to an appropriation for that purpose is ille-
authorize their erection upon the appli- gal. Mead v. Acton, 139 Mass. 341.
cation of either owner, and without the 8 Booth v. Woodbury, 32 Conn. 118;
consent of the other. Hunt v. Ambrus. Kunkle v. Franklin, 13 Minn. 127; Comer
ter, 17 N. J. Eq. 208; Harrison's Muni- v. Folsom, 13 Minn. 219; Hilbish v. Cath-
cipal Manual, 4th ed. Further as to erman, 64 Pa. St. 154 (1870); State v.
party-walls: McAdam on Landlord and Richland Township, 20 Ohio St. 362
Ten. 145-160, and works on Easements. (1870); ante, sec. 79.
1 Speer v. School Directors, 50 Pa. St.
§ 153
225
SUBSCRIPTIONS IN AID OF RAILWAYS.
rations is the authority to aid in the construction of railways by sub-
scribing to their stock, issuing negotiable bonds as a means of paying
their subscription, and taxing the inhabitants or the property within
their limits to pay the indebtedness thereby incurred. Legislation
of this kind belongs to a period comparatively recent, and has been
niore or less resorted to at times, by almost every State in the
Union. As it is an author's duty to state what the law is rather
than what, in his judgment, it ought to be, he is constrained to
admit that a long and almost unbroken line of judicial decisions in
the courts of most of the States has established the principle that,
in the absence of special restrictive constitutional provisions, it is
competent for the legislature to authorize a municipal or public
corporation to aid, in the manner above indicated, the construction
of railways running near, or to, or through its territory. The cases
on the constitutional validity of such legislation are referred to in
the note. Notwithstanding the opinion of so many learned and
1 Goddin v. Crump (act authorizing v. Rochester, 24 Barb. 446 (1857); Bank
the city of Richmond to subscribe stock of Rome v. Rome, 18 N. Y. 38 (1858);
in a company incorporated to improve Starin v. Genoa, 23 N. Y. 439 (1861);
the navigation of the James River, and to People v. Mitchell, 35 N. Y. 551 (1866);
build a road to the falls of the Kanawha Police Jury v. Succession of McDonough,
River). 8 Leigh (Va.), 120 (1837). This 8 La. An. 341; Aurora v. West, 9 Ind. 74
is the earliest case of the class. Brislge- (1857); 22 Ind. 88; Mt. Vernon v. Hovey,
port v. Railroad Co., 15 Conn. 475 (1843); 52 Ind. 563 (1876); Robinson v. Bidwell,
Society, &c. v. New London, 29 Conn. 22 Cal. 379; Stein v. Mayor, &c., 24 Ala.
174; Douglass v. Chatham, 41 Conn. 211 591 (1854); Gibbons v. Railroad Co., 36
(1874); Nichol v. Nashville, 9 Humph. Ala. 410; Prettyman, v. Supervisors, 19
(Tenn.) 252 (1848); Powers v. Superior Ill. 406 (1858); S. P. 24 Ill. 75, 208;
Court, 23 Ga. 65 (1857); Talbot v. Dent, Butler v. Dunham, 27 Ill. 474 (1861);
9 B. Mon. (Ky.) 526 (1849); Slack v. Rail- Robertson v. Rockford, 21 Ill. 451; Chi-
road Co., 13 B. Mon. (Ky.) 1 (1852); cago, &c. Railroad Co. v. Smith (donation
Maddox v. Graham, 2 Met. (Ky.) 56; to Railroad Co.), 62 Ill. 268 (1871); S. C.
Commonwealth v. McWilliams, 11 Pa. St. 14 Am. Rep. 99; Sibley v. Mobile, 3 Woods
61 (1849); Sharpless v. Mayor, etc., 21 C. C. 535; and see also as to authority to
Pa. St. 147 ; Ib. 188; Commonwealth v. precinct to levy tax to maintain a bridge,
Perkins, 43 Pa. St. 410; 47 Pa. St. 189; Shaw v. Dennis, 5 Gilm. (Ill.) 405 ; San
Cotton v. County Comm’rs, 6 Flor. 610 Antonio v. Jones, 28 Tex. 19 ; Copes v.
(1856); Railroad Co. v. Comm’rs, 1 Ohio Charleston, 10 Rich. (S. C.) 491 (1857);
St. 77 (1852); Cass v. Dillon, 2 Ohio St. Augusta Bank v. Augusta, 49 Me. 507;
607 (1853); Ohio v. Comm’rs, &c. 6 Clark v. City, &c., 10 Wis. 136; Ib. 195
Ohio St. 280; 7 Ohio St. 327; 8 Ohio St. (1859) (compare Whiting v.
Sheboygan
394; 12 Ohio St. 596, 624; 14 Ohio St. Railroad Co., infra). The Supreme Court
569; Strickland v. Railroail Co., (Miss.) of Wisconsin, in an opinion delivered in
MSS. ; City v. Alexander, 23 Mo. 483 (1856); Phillips v. Albany, 28 Wis. 340 (1871),
39 Mo. 485; Leavenworth County v. Miller, say the power of the legislature to author-
Supreme Court of Kansas (1871), 7 Kan. ize municipal subscriptions to the stock of
479; S. C. 12 Am. Rep. 425. The opinion railroads is settled by former decisions in
of Valentine, J., covers the whole ground this State, as well as in other States,
of controversy. Kingman, C. J., con- though the majority of this court would
curred, and Brewer, J., dissented. Clarke be disposed to deny the power, if it were
VOL. I. – 15
226
§ 153
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
eminent judges, there remain serious doubts as to the soundness of
the principle, viewed simply as one of constitutional law. Regarded
a new question. S. P. Rogin v. Water- to aid in the construction of a railroad,
town, 30 Wis. 259 (1872); Lawson v. Rail- even though the road extends beyond the
way Co., 30 Wis. 597; U. S. v. New Or- limits of the corporation, or even of the
leans, 2 Woods C. C. 230. The Supreme State. So held in Stein v. Mobile, 24 Ala.
Court of the United States have decided 591 (1854). An act authorizing a mu-
that the power may be conferred by the nicipal corporation to borrow money to
legislature. Infra, sec. 158; Thompson v. aid in the construction of a railroad, upon
Lee County, 3 Wall. 327; Knox County the written assent of two-thirds of the
V. Aspinwall, 21 How. (U. S.) 539, 547 resident taxpayers, or upon the approval
(1858); Zabriskie v. Railroad Co., 23 How. of two-thirds of the taxpaying electors,
381 ; Amey v. Mayor, 24 How. 365, 376; is constitutional and valid ; and it is not
Gelpecke v. Dubuque, 1 Wall. 175 (1863); open to the objection that it submits a
Mercer County v. Hacket, Ib. 81; Meyer legislative question to the town. Starin
v. Muscatine, Ib. 384; Baldwin v. Otoe v. Genoa, 23 N. Y. 439 (1861); Gould 1.
County, 111 U. S. 1 ; Caldwell v. Justices, Sterling, Ib. 439, 456; Bank of Rome v.
4 Jones (N. C.) Eq. 323; Taylor v. New Rome, 18 N. Y. 38; People v. Mead, 24
berne, 2 Jones, 141 (1854); S. P. Hill v. N. Y. 124; Horton v. Thompson, 71 N.
Forsythe Co., 67 N. C. 367 (1870). In Y. 513; affirmed in Town of Scipio v.
Iowa the constitutionality of railroad sub- Wright, 101 U. S. 665; s. C. 21 Alb. L.
scriptions by municipalities was first (1853) Jour. 476. These cases distinguished on
affirmed in Dubuque County v. Railroad this point from Barto v. Hinrod, 4 Seld.
Co., 4 G. Greene (Iowa), 1; afterwards (8 N. Y.) 483. Ante, sec. 44. Since the
(1862) denied, State v. Wapello County, common law does not favor the principle
13 Iowa, 388; denial adhered to down to that a majority of taxpayers of a muni-
1869, Hanson v. Vernon, 27 Iowa, 28; but cipal corporation may encumber the prop-
note the virtual, yet not acknowledged erty of a minority against their will, in
overthrow of the line of decisions denying aid of a railroad or other corporation, the
the power, in Stewart v. Polk County, 30 requirements of statutes authorizing such
Iowa, 1 (1870); Renwick v. Daveu port, aid must be strictly observed. People v.
etc. Railway Co., 47 Iowa, 511; Snell v. Hulburt, 46 N. Y. 110; Cowdrey v. Town
Leonard, 55 Iowa, 553. The legislative
The legislative of Canadea, 16 Fed. Rep. 532. In Smith
and judicial history of the subject is fully v. Fond du Lac, 8 Fed. Rep. 289, Har-
stated in King v. Wilson, 1 Dillon's C. C. lan, J., decided that a statute authorizing
R. 555 (1871). By the Constitution of a city to subscribe for railroad stock and
Tennessee, the legislature has power to au- issue its bonds therefor, after a vote passed
thorize counties and incorporated towns by a majority of the voters, without limit-
to impose taxes for “county and corpo- ing the amount, was not in conflict with a
ration purposes." In Nichol v. Mayor, constitutional provision in Wisconsin l'e-
&c. of Nashville, 9 Humph. 252 (1848), it stricting the power of municipalities to
was held, notwithstanding this provision, borrow money, contract debts, and loan
that the legislature possessed the power their credit.
to authorize municipal corporations to The Supreme Court of Minnesota has
subscribe for the stock of railway com- affirmed the validity of compulsory aid to
panies whose roads run to or near such railways, saying that it is wholly for the
corporations, and that this was a legitimate legislature to determine whether the aid
corporate purpose. So in Florida, held to shall be by subscribing to the stock and
be a county purpose," within the mean- issuing bonds in payment, or by a donation
ing of the Constitution; but quære. There of money or bonds to secure their con-
is nothing in the Constitution of Alabama struction, the court in either case regard-
prohibiting the legislature from authoriz- ing the use to be a public use for which
ing a municipal corporation to levy a tax taxation may be authorized. Davidson v.
on the real estate within the corporation Ramsey County, 18 Minn. 482 (1872). And
1
§ 155
227
MUNICIPAL INDEBTEDNESS; NEGOTIABLE BONDS.
in the light of its effects, however, there is little hesitation in
affirming that this invention to aid the enterprises of private cor-
porations has proved itself baneful in the last degree.
1
§ 154. Municipal Indebtedness ; Negotiable Bonds. It is esti-
mated that the indebtedness of municipal and public corporations in
this country has already reached the enormous sum of $1,000,000,000,
and it is constantly increasing. A large portion of this indebtedness
is evidenced by negotiable bonds, which are held by thousands of per-
sons, at home and abroad, as an investnient. These bonds have been
issued for a great variety of purposes, such as the erecting of public
buildings, the making of municipal improvements, and in payment
of subscriptions for the stock of railway corporations, or as dona-
tions to aid them in the construction of their roads located in or
near the municipality or public corporation thus extending its
assistance.
$ 155. Same subject. — The power conferred upon municipal and
public corporations to issue commercial securities for such purposes
is of comparatively recent origin, and it has undeniably been
attended with very serious, and it is perhaps not too strong a
statement to add, disastrous consequences. One of these is the
stimulus which the long credit commonly provided for effectually
supplies to over-indebtedness. The bonds usually fix a time, twenty
or thirty years distant, for payment of the principal. Those who
vote the debt, and the councils or bodies which create it and issue
the bonds, do so without much hesitation, as the burden is expected
to fall principally on posterity. A learned justice of the Supreme
Court of the United States 3 has very fitly described the effect wit-
nessed as a mania for ruvning in debt for public improvements.
It has elsewhere been characterized as an "epidemic insanity” in-
ducing extravagant corporate subscriptions to public works.
the validity of such legislation has also sonport v. Watson, 33 Ark. 704; Richeson
been affirmed by the Supreme Court of v. People, 115 111. 450.
Nebraska, Crounse and Lake, JJ.,
1 Cooley, Const. Lin. 5th ed. 264 ct seq.,
curring, and Mason, C. J., dissenting, discusses the constitutional principles in-
the opinion of Crounse, J., reviews the volved in such legislation with his accus-
principal cases ; Hallenbeck v. Hahn, 2 tomed clearness and ability.
Neb. 377; and by the Supreme Court of 2 As to coupon bonds, see Daniel on
California, Stockton, &c. Railroad Co. v. Neg. Instr. sec. 1486 et seq. Post, chap-
City of Stockton, 41 Cal. 147 (1871); and ter xiv. on Contracts, where the subject of
in Alabarna, Opelika v. Daniel, 59 Ala. Municipal Bonds is considered at large.
211; Selma & Gulf Railroad, In re, 45 Ala. The mode of enforcement is presented in
696 (1871); and in Kentucky, Allison v. ch. xx. post, on Mandamus.
Lou., H. C. & W. Railway Co., 10 Bush 8 Mr. Justice Davis.
(Ky.), 1 (1873). Text approved. Jack-
con-
228
§ 157
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
§ 156. The Abuse of the Power. -In many parts of the country,
and particularly in the West, this mania has become general in
cities, counties, townships, and school-districts, and large and bur-
densome debts have been thoughtlessly created. The author has
known new counties in a western State not containing over 10,000
inhabitants, vote for a single railway, bonds to the amount of $300,-
000, drawing ten per cent interest, payable annually; and instances
are not infrequent where bonds have been issued greater than the
assessed value of all the taxable property at the time within the
municipal or territorial subdivision. No check against the incurring
of over-indebtedness is so effectual as the one that you must pay as
you go; but this is wholly disregarded in the legislation which
authorizes bonds payable at a remote period. Another serious con-
sequence of this policy is that even the interest on these bonds
often proves to be a heavy burden upon the community, and in
many. instances the bonds have been issued fraudulently by the
public or municipal officers, and no consideration or none of value
has been in fact received therefor. They may, indeed, have the
stock of the railway company; but in most cases, under the pre-
vailing mode of constructing railways, the stock is utterly valueless.
When the sting of taxation is felt, and when the taxpayer knows
that the bonds were fraudulently issued, and even when he feels
that their issue was improvident, experience shows that repudiation,
or attempted repudiation is the next stage, involving a forfeiture of
the public faith pledged for their payment. Occasionally it has
been witnessed that the State in all its departments has actively
sympathized with the repudiating municipality, and the public faith
has been redeemed only, if at all, through the coercion of the Su-
preme Court of the United States. In a few instances, indeed, the
States have set the example of repudiating their own obligations
issued in aid of railways; and it was in a case of this kind that the
Supreme Court at Washington felt itself bound to declare that the
faith of the State of Minnesota), solemnly pledged, has not been
kept; and were she amenable to the tribunals of the country, as
private individuals are, no court of justice would withhold its judg-
ment against her.” Examples of this kind are demoralizing, and
cannot safely become general or frequent.
It is not pro-
§ 157 (105). Constitutional Principles involved.
posed here to enter into a discussion of the constitutional principles
involved in such legislation. The arguments in favor of the power
are fully presented in the leading case of Sharpless v. The Mayor,
1 Sharpless v. Mayor, 21 Pa. St. 147. See, also, Am. Law Rev. Oct. (1870); infra,
sec. 158.
!
$ 157
229
CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES INVOLVED.
and against it in Hanson v. Vernon, in Whiting v. Sheboygan Rail-
way Company, and in The People v. Township Board of Salem,3 to
1 Hanson v. Vernon, 27 Iowa, 28 or loan its credit to, or in aid of, any such
(1869).
company, corporation, or association;" and
2 Whiting v. Sheboygan Railway Co., this was held not to prohibit the legisla-
25 Wis. 167 (1870), opinion by Dixon, ture from authorizing a municipal corpo-
C. J. ; s. C. 3 Am. Rep. 30 ; s. C. 9 Am. ration to engage in building a railroad
Law Reg. (N. s.) 156, and note ; Rogan mainly outside of the State on its own
v. Watertown, 30 Wis. 259 (1872).
account. Walker v. Cincinnati, 21 Ohio
3 People v. Township Board of Salem, St. 14 (1871); S. C. 11 Am. Law Reg.
9 An. Law Reg. (N. s.) 487, and notes (N. s.) 346, and note of Judge Redfield;
(1870); s. C. 20 Mich. 452.
- Bonds like S. C. 8 Am. Rep. 24. Considering the evil
these are of modern invention, and when which this provision of the Constitution
counties and towns were decoyed into the was aimed at, it seems difficult to avoid
use of them for the purpose of railroad the conclusion that this construction
corporations they had to obtain enabling thwarts the intention and purpose for
statutes before they could prostitute mu- which the provision was designed and
nicipal seals to any such purpose. And adopted.
as soon as the people [of Pennsylvania] This case illustrates the dangerous na-
began to feel the consequences of apply- ture of the invention of bringing the taxing
ing the fundamental principle of commer- power to aid in the building of railway
cial paper to their bonds, they altered lines, and particularly does it subvert all
their organic law so as to render such previous notions of the appropriate powers,
bonds and enabling statutes impossibili- functions, and duties of municipalities.
ties in the future." Per Woodward, C. J., Here a single city, in the face of the Con-
County v. Brinton, 47 Pa. St. 367 (1864). stitution, was authorized to borrow $10,-
The evil of these subscriptions was the 000,000, and issue its bonds in payment,
cause of the amendment to the Constitu- to be appropriated to the construction of
tion. Per. Read, J., Pennsylvania Rail- a long railroad line by itself and for itself,
road Co. v. Philadelphia, Ib. 193. The Con- lying chiefly in other States; and yet the
stitution of Pennsylvania (1874) provides: validity of the act giving the authority
'The General Asseinbly shall not author- was sustained. In May, 1873, the same
ize any county, city, borough; township, constitutional provision was before the
or incorporated district to become a stock Supreme Court of the State, and the act
holder in any company, association, or of 1872, mentioned below, was held to be
corporation, or to obtain or appropriate in conflict with it, since the legislature
money for, or to loan its credit to, any could not do indirectly what it was pro-
corporation, association, institution, or in- hibited from doing directly. The court
dividual.” This is in substance the amend- held: 1. Taxation can only be authorized
ment to the Constitution made in 1857. for public purposes. When, therefore, a
Construed in Pennsylvania Railroad Co. v. statute authorizes a county, township, or
Philadelphia, 47 Pa. St. 189; Wheeler v. municipality to levy taxes not above a
Philadelphia, 77 Pa. St. 338 ; Wilkes barre given per cent on the taxable property of
Hospital v. Luzerne County, 84 Pa. St. 55. the locality for the purpose of building
Bounty tax to volunteers not within the so much of a railroad as can be built for
prohibition. Speer v. School Directors, that amount, and the part of a railroad
50 Pa. St. 150.
so to be built can be of no public utility
The Ohio Constitution (art. viii. sec. 6) unless used to accomplish an unconstitu-
provides that “The General Assembly tional purpose, such tax is illegal and can-
shall never authorize any county, city, not be enforced. 2. Where public credit
town, or township, by vote of its citizens or money is furnished by any of the sub-
or otherwise, to become a stockholder in divisions of the State named in the Con-
any joint stock company, corporation, or stitution, to be used in part in the con-
association whatever; or to raise money struction of a work which, uuder the
230
$ 157
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
which, and to the other cases before cited, the reader is referred.
.
The judgments affirming the existence of the power have generally
met with strong judicial dissent and with much professional dis-
approval, and experience has demonstrated that the exercise of it
has been productive of bad results. Taxes, it is everywhere agreed,
can only be imposed for public objects, and taxation to aid in build-
ing the roads of private railway companies, even if the use is a pub-
lic use, is hardly consistent with our traditional respect for the
inviolability of private property and individual rights. Fraud often
accompanies the exercise of the power, and extravagant indebtedness
is the result; and, sooner or later, the power will be denied by con-
stitutional provision, as it already is in Pennsylvania, Ohio, Illinois,
statute authorizing its construction, must (1870), where the subject is very elaborately
be completed, if completed at all, by other considered by Buskirk, J. John v. Cin.,
parties out of their own means, who are &c. Railroad Co., 35 Ind. 539 ; Aspinwall
to own, or have the beneficial control and V. Jo Daviess Co., 22 How. 364. The
management of the work when completed, new Constitution of Missouri cuts up the
public money or credit thus used can only business by the roots. Art. iv. sec. 47.
be regarded as furnished for or in aid of 1 The Constitution of Illinois, which
such parties. The act of April 23, 1872, went into effect July 2, 1870, provided
to authorize counties, townships, and other that no municipality should “ ever become
municipalities therein named to build rail- subscriber to the capital stock of any rail.
roads, &c. [59 0. L. 84], authorizes the road or private corporation, or make do-
raising of money by taxation, which is nation to, or loan its credit in aid of,
equally applicable to the unlawful pur- such corporation. Provided, however, That
pose of aiding railroad companies and the adoption of this article shall not be
others engaged in building and operating construed as affecting the right of such
railroads, as it is to any lawful purpose, municipality to make such subscriptions
and gives to the officers entrusted with the where the same have been authorized under
control and operation of the money thus existing laws, by a vote of the people of
raised no means or power of discrimina- such municipalities prior to such adoption."
tion as to the lawfulness of the work or It has been held that the effect of this
purpose to which it is to be applied ; and section was to withdraw a power, previ.
this is in contravention of sec. 6. art viii. ously conferred by the legislature, to issue
of the Constitution, and therefore void. bonds in payment of subscriptions and
By amendment of the Constitutio:l of donations duly voted to railroads, when
New York, which took effect January 1, the power had not been exercised before it
1875, “No county, town, or village shall went into effect; but that subscriptions
hereafter give any money or property, or and donations legally voted before that
loan its money or credit to or in aid of time could be completed after it. Concord
any individual, association, or corpora- v. Robinson, 121 U. S. 165. As to the
tion." People v. Ft. Edward, 70 N. Y. 28 power of the legislature of Illinois under
(1879).
the Constitution of 1348 to validate the
The Constitution of Indiana provides action of a town in voting a subscription
that "no county shall subscribe for stock to railway stock without authority, see
in any incorporated company, unless the Bolles v. Brimfield, 120 U. S. 759. The
same be paid for at the time of such sub- proviso includes donations as well as sub-
scription." Art. x. sec. 10. What is scriptions. Fairfield v. County of Gal-
an "incorporated company," and how and latin, 100 U. S. 47, overruling Concord
when stock may be paid for, see Lafayette, v. Portsmouth Savings Bank, 92 U. S.
&c. Railroad Co. v. Geiger, 34 Ind. 185 625 ; Enfield v. Jordan, 119 U. S. 680.
t
$ 158
231
NEGOTIABLE BONDS ; FEDERAL DECISIONS.
New York, Missouri, and possibly some of the other States, or by
legislative enactment. It is too late to expect, in view of the line
of decisions referred to, that the courts in the States which have
already passed upon the question will retrace their steps, and too
much to hope that the courts in other States will have the boldness
successfully to stem the strong tide of authority, strengthened, as it
will be, by temporary popular feeling and corporate influence.
$ 158 (105 a). Same subject. Decisions of the Supreme Court of
the United States. Since the first edition of this work, the Su-
preme Court of the United States, following repeated intimations of
its judges in previous cases, have directly sustained the validity of
legislative acts authorizing municipal aid to railways. In view of
the prior adjudications of that tribunal in the municipal bond cases,
hereafter referred to in the chapter on Contracts, and of the almost
uniform holding of the State courts, no other result could have been
anticipated. This ends judicial discussion if it does not terminate
doubts. The Supreme Court, in reaching this result, places its judg-
ment upon the ground that highways, turnpikes, canals, and rail-
This section did not take away the power, vision went into effect, under a law which,
which the legislature had under the pre- though constitutional when enacted, was
vious Constitution, of passing a curative not within the terms of the provision.
act declaring an election in favor of au- Katzenberger v. Aberdeen, 121 U. S. 172.
thorizing a subscription to a railroad valid Held, also, under the same provision, that
and giving power to issue bonds therefor, an act ratifying all subscriptions to the
when the election was held under a mere capital stock of a corporation made by
power to borrow money and issue bonds, any county, city, or town in this State,
the statute being insufficient to warrant a which were not made in violation of the
subscription to a railroad. Jonesboro City Constitution," did not with sufficient cer-
v. Cairo & St. Louis R. R. Co., 110 U. S. tainty ratify a subscription made in pur-
192. The section held not to invalidate suance of a vote, when neither the election
township bonds, which were issued in pur- nor the subscription had been authorized
suance of a vote held on the same day by the legislature; and that bonds issued
the new Constitution was adopted (July 2, under authority of the pretended act of
1870). Louisville v. Savings Bank, 104 ratification were void for want of power to
U, S. 469.
issue them. Hayes v. Holly Springs, 114
The Constitution of Mississippi of 1869, U. S. 120. This provision requires the
art. xii. § 14, provides that, “The legisla- assent of only two-thirds of those actually
ture shall not authorize any county, city, voting, not two-thirds of all those qualified
or town to become a stockholder in, or to vote. Carroll County v. Smith, 111
lend its credit to, any company, associ- U. S. 556.
ation, or corporation, unless two-thirds of 1 Olcott v. Supervisors, 16 Wall. 678
the qualified voters of such county, city, (1872); Railroad Co. v. Otoe County, 16
or town, at a special election, or regular Wall. 667 (1872); S. C. reprinted, 2 Neb.
election, to be held therein, shall assent 496; St. Joseph Township v. Rogers, 16
thereto." Under this provision it is held Wall. 664 (1872) ; s. c. 7 Albany Law
that the legislature of that State has no Journal, 362 ; Rogers v. Burlington, 3
authority to pass an act validating an issue Wall. 654; Mitchell v. Burlington, 4
of bonds, illegally issued before the pro- Wall, 270.
232
§ 159
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
ways, although owned by individuals under public grants or by
private corporations, are publici juris ; that they have always been
regarded as governmental affairs, and their establishment and main-
tenance recognized as among the most important duties of the State,
in order to facilitate transportation and easy communication among
its different parts ; and hence the State may put forth, in favor of
such improvements, both its power of eminent domain (as it con-
stantly does) and its power to tax, unless there be some special re-
striction in the Constitution of the particular State. These powers
may, in the judgment of the court, be lawfully exerted, because the
use is in its nature a public use, and these works are subject to pub-
lic control and regulation (except so far as this right has been law-
fully parted with by valid legislative contract), notwithstanding they
may be exclusively owned by private persons or corporations. It
must be admitted that compulsory taxation in favor of railways and
like public improvements owned by individuals or companies is an
exercise of power going quite to the verge of legislative authority.
Although it is a doctrine that must now be considered as judicially
settled, still it is one which has, as we think justly, encountered a
vigorous opposition, both on the ground of expediency and of power;
and the exercise of authority has, as before noticed, been so disas-
trous as already, in some of the States, to have led to constitutional
provisions for the protection of the citizen.
§ 159 (105 6). Principle does not extend to compulsory Taxation
for Private Enterprises. It is obvious, from the foregoing statement
of the grounds upon which the validity of such legislation is made
to rest," that it furnishes no support for the validity of taxation in
favor of enterprises, and objects which are essentially private. We
consider the principle equally sound and salutary, that the mere
incidental benefits to the public or the State, or to any of its munici-
palities or divisions, which result from the pursuit by individuals or
corporations of ordinary branches of business or industry, do not
constitute a public use in the legal sense, which justifies the exercise
either of the power of eminent doinain or of taxation. It would
have been well, in our judgment, if this doctrine had been extended
in its application to railway companies ; but the doctrine that pri-
vate enterprises or objects cannot be aided by taxation is so funda-
mental that it cannot be denied or disregarded without unsettling
the foundations of individual rights, without recognizing legislative
omnipotence over private property, or the irresponsible despotism
of a local majority, and unwisely opening the way for frauds and
1 Supra, sec. 157.
t
$ 159
233
NEGOTIABLE BONDS; PRIVATE ENTERPRISES.
abuses which, in view of the past, cannot be contemplated without
deep anxiety.
1 The doctrine of the text finds inter- its essential character, a private and not
esting illustrations and authoritative sup- a public object. That the incidental
port in several adjudged cases determined advantages to the public or to the State
by courts of great respectability. One is which result from the promotion of pri-
Lowell v. Boston, decided by the Supreme vate interests, or the prosperity of private
Judicial Court of Massachusetts in 1873. enterprises or business, does not justify
111 Mass. 463 ; 3. C. 15 Am. Rep. 39. their aid by taxation. .. That, as a judi-
After the great fire in Boston, in 1872, the cial question, the case is not changed by
legislature enacted that the city might the magnitude of the calamity which has
issue its bonds to the amount of $20,000,- created the emergency.” And finally the
000, the proceeds of which three commis- court say, “The expenditure authorized
sioners, appointed by the mayor, were
were by this statute being for private and not
authorized to loan in a safe and judicious for public objects, in a legal sense, it ex-
manner “in such sums as they shall de- ceeds the constitutional power of the legis-
termine to the owners of land, the buildings lature, and the city cannot legally issue
upon, which were burned by the fire in said the bonds for the purposes named in the
Boston on the ninth and tenth days of act.” 111 Mass. 463. This case is fol-
November, 1872, upon the notes or bonds lowed and approved in State v. Osawkee
of said owners secured by first mortgages Township, 14 Kan. 418 (1875), and the
of said land ; said mortgages to be con- "relief bonds" which the township was
ditioned that the rebuilding shall be com- authorized to issue were held not to be for
menced within one year from the first day. a public purpose, and therefore void. S. C.
of January, 1873, and said commissioners 19 Am. Rep. 99; McConnell v. Hamm,
to have full power to apply the proceeds of 16 Kan. 228 ; C. B. U. P. Railroad Co.
said bonds in making said loans in such v. Smith, 23 Kan. 745.
manner, and to make such further pro- Another case is Allen v. Inhabitants of
visions, conditions, and limitations in Jay, 60 Me. 124 (1871); 12 Am. Law
reference to said loans, and securing the Reg. (N. s.) 481. The legislature author-
same, as shall be best calculated, in their ized the town of Jay to lend $10,000
judgment, to ensure the employment of to enable the borrowers to build a saw-
the same in rebuilding upon said land mill and grist-mill, and to exempt the
burned over, and the payment thereof to mills from taxation for ten years. On the
the said city.”
ground that the purpose was not a public
It will be seen that the object of this one, the act was adjudged unconstitu-
act, as shown by its provisions, was "to tional. See opinions of the judges, 58
ensure the speedy rebuilding on land the Me. Appendix, 590 et seq., given to the
buildings upon which were burned by House of Representatives. The doctrine
the great fire ; and the question was as was adhered to in Brewer Brick Co. v.
to the right of the State to impose any Brewer, 62 Me. 62 (1873) ; s. C. 16 Am.
taxes for this object, and this depended Rep. 395, and ably vindicated by Appleton,
upon the further question, whether this C. J.; Bissell v. Kankakee, 64 Ill. 249
object was, in a legal sense, à public (1872); Mather v. Ottawa, 114 Ill. 659,
object.
noted supra, sec. 127, note.
The court distinctly held, to use the Another case is The Commercial National
language of the rescript sent down in the Bank v. City of Iola, decided by the U. S.
case, that taxes can only be laid "for Circuit Court for the district of Kansas,
some public service or some object which June, 1873, reported in 2 Dillon, C. C.
concerns the public welfare ;" that “the 353, affirmed 20 Wall. 655 (1874). For
preservation of the interests of individuals, the same reasons the act of the legislature
either in respect of property or business, which authorized the city of Iola to ap-
although it may result incidentally in the propriate $50,000 to aid private persons
advancement of the public welfare, is, in in the erection und equipment of buildings,
234
$ 160
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
$ 160. The Field reviewed; The Lessons it teaches. Hundreds
of municipal and public corporations in the country have rendered
themselves bankrupt by the mania to aid railways, and hundreds of
others are groaning under oppressive burdens thereby occasioned.
Iu looking over the field, it is now plain that most of the evils
originating from this source, and from which the municipalities are
suffering, have sprung not so much from the mere power to aid rail-
ways, as from the manner in which the power has usually been con-
ferred. If municipalities had been forbidden to issue their bonds,
and permitted to give such aid only to the extent of taxes, to be
levied within a short limited period of time, this pay-as-you-go policy
would have been an effectual restraint upon extravagance in this
direction. But the power to give the aid was usually accompanied
with express authority to issue bonds, payable twenty or thirty years
distant, in general without limit as to amount; and thus those who
created the debt were almost indifferent as to the amount of it, since
the main burden was expected to fall on posterity. This led to the
wildest extravagance. Bonds thus issued have been treated by the
Supreme Court of the United States as possessing all the attributes
of commercial paper, and unimpeachable in the hands of innocent
holders for value, notwithstanding the frauds of the municipal offi-
cers, or non-compliance with the conditions upon which the bonds
were authorized to be issued. Under the doctrine of the Supreme
Court the usual restraints and checks upon the power have proved
at or near the city, to be used for manu- paid by taxation, to aid in the improve-
facturing purposes, was held unconstitu- ment of a water-power, and, connected
tional, and the bonds void which had been therewith, authorizing the council of the
issued to raise the money thus appropri. municipality to secure such water-power
ated. The case was distinguished from as might be deemed needful for the use of
those relating to railway aid bonds, and the fire department, held to be unconsti-
also construes the provision of the Consti- tutional, as authorizing a debt and tax for
tution of the State that "the legislature a private purpose. Coates v. Campbell,
shall pass no special act conferring corporate 37 Minn. 498.
powers." Ante, sec. 46. And more re- Further, as to extent and nature of the
cently the Court of Appeals of New York taxing power, and distinction between
have decided in the same way, holding an public and private use, see post, secs. 735,
act to authorize municipal bonds to pay 736 ; Bloodgood v. Railroad Co., 18 Wend.
for stock in a private corporation to con- 65 ; Jenkins v. Andover, 103 Mass. 94,
struct a water privilege and to manufacture holding invalid a statute authorizing tax-
lumber, to be void. Weismer v. Village ation in favor of a private incorporated
of Douglass, 64 N. Y. 91 (1876). Text ap- academy. Same principle: Curtis v.
proved in Feldman v. Charleston, 23 S. C. Whipple, 24 Wis. 350 ; People v. Salem,
57, where bonds issued by a city, under 20 Mich. 452 ; Freeland v. Hastings, 10
legislative authority, for the purpose of Allen, 570; Tyson v. School Directors,
lending them to individuals to assist them in 51 Pa. St. 9; Thompson v. Pittson, 59
rebuilding the edifices destroyed by a great Me. 545 (1871); Savings Assoc. v. To-
fire, were held void. A statute anthoriz- reka, 3 Dillon, 376; note 15, Am. &
ing a municipality to issue bonds, to be Eug. Corp. Cas. 356.
§ 161
235
EXPRESS POWER ESSENTIAL.
practically valueless, since if they were disregarded or evaded and
the bonds issued and negotiated, they became valid and enforceable
obligations. The result of legislative authority thus conferred and
thus construed is seen in the vast municipal debt of the country,
largely created in aid of railways, and in our municipalities, blighted
and burdened with debt. This retrospect after the battle has been
lost will tend to confirm the dissenting judges in their opinions,
although they are compelled to acknowledge the law to be otherwise
settled. 1
§ 161 (106). Express Power essential. The courts concur, how-
ever, with great unanimity, in holding that there is no implied
authority in municipal corporations to incur debts or borrow money
in order to become subscribers to the stock of railway companies, and
that such power must be conferred by express grant.? To become
stockholders in private corporations is manifestly foreign to the
purposes intended to be subserved by the creation of corporate
municipalities; the practice of bestowing such an abnormal power
is of modern origin, and hence the rule that the authority must be
specially conferred, and cannot be deduced by inference or implica-
tion from the ordinary municipal grants.3
1 See further, chapter xiv. on Con- tonic Railway Co., 15 Conn. 475; Marsh
tracts, post.
v. Fulton Co., 10 Wall. 676 (1870); Cook
2 The power to become a stockholder v. Manufacturing Co., 1 Sneed (Tenn.),
in a railroad company must be expressly 698 (1854); Gaddis v. Richland Co., 92
conferred upon a municipal or public cor- Ill. 119; Pitzman v. Freeburg, 92 Ill.
poration, Kelley v. Milan, 127 U. S. 139; 111 ; McCoy v. Brant, 53 Cal. 247 ; Lewis
Norton v. Dyersburg, 127 U. S. 160 ; v. Shreveport, 3 Woods C. C. 205 ; Nichol
Wells v. Supervisors, 102 U. S. 625; v. Nashville, 9 Humph. (Tenn.) 252;
Concord v. Robinson, 121 U. S. 165 ; Kelly City and County of St. Louis v. Alex-
v. Town of Milan, 21 Fed. Rep. 842; ander, 23 Mo. 483 (1856); Jones v.
Wetumpka v. Wetunipka Wharf Co., 63 Mayor, &c., 25 Ga. 610 (1858); Debricke
Ala. 611; Welch v. Post, 99 Ill. 471; v. Pittsburg, U. S. C. C. (1859); 7 Am.
Katzenberger v. Aberdeen, 16 Fed. Rep. Law Reg. 725 ; Duanesburg v. Jenkins,
745. Authority "to obtain money on 40 Barb. 574; French v. Teschemaker,
loan on the faith and credit of a city 24 Cal. 518 (1864); People v. Mitchell,
for the purpose of contributing to works 35 N. Y. 551 (1866); St. Joseph Town-
of internal improvement" held to au-
held to au- ship v. Rogers, 16 Wall. 644 (1872);
thorize the city to guarantee payment of the English v. Chicot County, 26 Ark. 454
bonds of a railroad company. Savannah (1871); Thompson v. Lee County, 3 Wall.
v. Kelly, 108 U. S. 184. See post, sec. 327; Commercial Bank v. Iola, 2 Dillon
C. C. R. 353 (1873); $. C. 20 Wall. 655.
8 Aurora v. West, 22 Ind. 88, 508 " It is well settled, that a municipal cor-
(1864); Starin v. Genoa, 23 N. Y. 439 poration, in order to exercise the power
(1869); Gould v. Sterling, Ib. 439, 456; of becoming a stockholder in a railroad
Atchison v. Butcher, 3 Kan. 104.(1865); corporation, must have such power ex-
Buines v. Atchison, 2 Kan. 454 ; Bank v. pressly conferred upon it by a grant from
Rome, 18 N. Y. 38; Bridgeport v. Housa- the legislature; and that even the power
507 et seq.
236
§ 161
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
Accordingly, where a city was, by charter, specifically authorized
to construct wharves, docks, piers, water-works, works for lighting
the city, &c., and was also authorized upon certain conditions to
create a debt, this was considered to mean a debt for some of these
specified purposes, and not to empower the corporate authorities to
issue bonds to aid in the construction of a railroad. So there is no
to subscribe for such stock does not carry it the implied power to issue bonds there-
with it the power to issue negotiable bonds for. Wells v. Supervisors, 102 U. S.
in payment for the subscription, unless 625; Claiborne County v. Brooks, 111
the power to issue such bonds is expressly U. S. 400; Norton v. Dyersburg, 127
or by reasonable implication conferred by U. S. 160 ; Kelley v. Milan, 127 U. S.
statute." Blatchford, J., in Kelley v. Milan, 139 (but holding that the power to issue
127 U. S. 139, citing Pulaski v. Gilmore, bonds may be conferred by a reasonable
21 Fed. Rep. 870; Milan v. Tennessee implication from the power granted), ante,
Central R. R., 11 Lea, 330 ; Marsh v. secs. 123, 124, 127 ; post, sec. 507 et seq.
Fulton County, 10 Wall. 676 ; Wells v. Nor does a grant of power to appropriate
Supervisors, 102 U. $. 625; Ottawa v. money to aid a railroad, with a provision
Carey, 108 U. S. 110; Daviess County v. directing a levy of taxes to meet the ap-
Dickinson, 117 U. S. 657.
propriation, include power to issue bonds.
It is also held in this case (Kelley v. Concord v. Robinson, 121 U. S. 165;
Milan, supra) that where the power to Wells v. Supervisors, 102 U. $. 625.
subscribe for railroad stock and to issue 1 Lafayette v. Cox, 5 Ind. (Port.) 38
bonds therefor is wanting, an agreement (1854). As to rights of bondholders, how-
made by the mayor of the municipality, ever, see post, ch. xiv. on Contracts, and
by which a decree recognizing the validity decisions in the national and State courts,
of the bonds is entered, is ineffectual for there cited. Power in general to the city
that purpose. More fully on this point council of Charleston, by the charter of
see post, chap. xiv. "No lawyer doubts 1783, to pass, inter alia, "every other by-
that a borough can only subscribe to a law as shall appear to the city council
railroad when expressly authorized by requisite and necessary for the security,
law." Black, C. J., in Sharpless' Case, welfare, and convenience of said city," was
cited Pennsylvania Railway Co. v. Phila- held by the Court of Errors to authorize
delphia, 47 Pa. St. 189. A railroad is the city to subscribe to the stock of rail-
such a
"road" as is embraced in the road companies within or without the
terms of a charter by which the common State. Copes v. Charleston, 10 Rich.
council of a city were authorized " to take (S. C.) Law, 491 (1857); see City Coun-
stock in any chartered company for mak- cilv. Baptist Church, 4 Strob. Law,
ing roads to said city." Railroad Co. v. 306, 308, for preamble to the charter of
Evansville, 15 Ind. 395 (1860); Aurora Charleston. There can be little doubt
v. West, 9 Ind. 74 ; post, chap. xiv., that this is pressing the constructive pow-
Contracts. The legislature may, before ers of the corporation to an unwarrantablo
(Aspinwall v. Daviess County, 22 How. extent.
364), if not, indeed, after the subscription Construction of special acts or charters
is made, but before it is paid for, annul held to give power to take stock and issue
the proceeding and authorize the muni- bonds. Meyer . Muscatine, 1 Wall. 384
cipal corporation to withdraw the sub-(1863); Curtis v. Butler County, 24 How.
scription and release its right to the stock. 435; Gelpcke v. Dubuque, 1 Wall. 220 ;
People v. Coon, 25 Cal. 635. Extent of City and County of St. Louis v. Alexan-
legislative power. Ante, chap. iv. Text der, 23 Mo. 483 ; Railroad Co. v. Otoe
approved. Jacksonport v. Watson, 33 County, 1 Dillon C. C. 338 (1871) ; Rog-
Ark. 704.
ers v. Burlington, 3 Wall. 654 (compare
Authority to subscribe for stock in a Chamberlain v. Burlington, 19 Iowa, 395);
railroad company held not to carry with Fosdick v. Perrysburg, 14 Ohio St. 472 ;
§ 162
237
SPECIAL POWER AND TAXING POWER.
.
power in a municipal corporation (even supposing it to be competent
for the legislature to confer such power), as incidental to the usual
grants of municipal authority, to take stock in a manufacturing com-
pany located in or near the corporation, or to aid or engage in other
enterprises, essentially private.?
§ 162 (107). Effect of Special Power on existing Charter Limita-
tions of the Taxing Power. Whether special authority to a munici-
pality to borrow money to pay for stock subscribed to a railway
company will impliedly repcal, pro tanto, existing charter limitations
upon the rate of taxation, is a question depending upon construction,
and in relation to which the courts have differed. But the strong
inclination of the Supreme Court of the United States seems to be in
favor of that construction which restricts such limitations to the
exercise of the power of taxation in the ordinary course of municipal
action.3
Goshorn v. County, 1 West Va. 308 ; quire, and gave “full power and authority
Taylor v. Newberne, 2 Jones (N. C.) to make such assessinents on the inhab-
Eq. 141 ; Caldwell v. Justices, 4 Ib. 323 ; itants of the city, or those who hold tax-
People v. Spencer, 55 N. Y. i (1873); able property therein, for the safety, bene-
Decker v. Hughes, 68 Ill. 33 (1873); Peo- fit, and advantage of the city, as shall
ple v. .Pueblo Co., 2 Col. 360 (1875); appear to them expedient,” the court
English v. Chicot Co., 26 Ark. 454 (1871); were of opinion that the city might assess
distinguishing Seybert v. Pittsburgh, 1 a tax upon the real estate within the cor-
Wall. 272; Veeder v. Lima, 19 Wis. poration for the purpose of constructing a
280 (1865). The opinion of Dixon, C. J., canal “ for manufacturing purposes, and
contains an interesting discussion of the for the better securing an abundant sup-
questions presented by that case.
ply of water for the city," and if it could
Construction of acts held not to grant not, yet that it was competent for the
power to subscribe for stock and issuc bonds. legislature, as it did by a subsequent act,
Kelley v. Milan, 127 U. S. 139; Norton to adopt and confirm the action of the
v. Dyersburg, Ib. 160.
city in passing such an ordinance. Fred-
1 Cook v. Manufacturing Co., 1 Sneed erick v. Augusta, 5 Ga. 561 (1848). Aside
(Tenn.), 698 (1854); Com. Nat. Bank v. from the curative act, the correctness of
Iola, 2 Dillon C. C. R. 353 (1873). the view taken by the court is by no
2 Clark v. Des Moines, 19 Iowa, 199 means clear. Ante, secs. 79, 158, 159.
(1865); Hanson v. Vernon, 27 Iowa, 28; 8 Butz v. Muscatine, 8 Wall. 575
Cooley, Const. Lim. 212. A city corpora- (1869). Contra, Clark v. Davenport, 14
tion cannot subscribe for stock in a steam- Iowa, 494 ; Learned v. Burlington, 2
ship line without express legislative au- Am. Law Reg. (n. s.) 394, and note;
thority. Pennsylvania Railroad Co. v.
Leavenworth v. Norton, 1 Kan. 432;
Philadelphia, 47 Pa. St. 189; and since Burnes v. Atchison, 2 Kan. 454. And
the new Constitution of Pennsylvania (art. see Commonwealth v. Pittsburgh, 34
xi. sec. 7, Amendment to Constitution, Pa. St. 496 ; Amey v. Allegheny City, 24
1857, supra, sec. 157, note), the legislature How. (U. S.) 364; Fosdick v. Perrys-
cannot give that power. Where a charter burg, 14 Ohio St. 472 ; Cumberland v.
recited its purpose to delegate to the city Magruder, 34 Md. 381 (1871) ; see Asses-
authorities power to make such ordinances sors v. Commissioners, 3 Brews. (Pa.)
as the “contingencies, or the local cir- 333; State v. Guttenburg, 39 N. J. L.
cumstances” of the corporation might re- 660. In Quincy v. Jackson, 113 U. S.
238
§ 163
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
§ 163 (108). Power to issue Bonds absolutely essential; Condi-
tions precedent to its Exercise must be complied with. If the
power to issue bonds in aid of railway and other like public enter-
prises does not exist, they are void into whosesoever hands they may
come. The power, when it has been conferred, to aid or engage in
extra-municipal enterprises, being extraordinary in its nature and
burdensome to the citizen, must (except as modified by the doctrine
of estoppel in favor of the bona fide holders of the securities) be
strictly pursued according to the terms and conditions of the grant
conferring it. Thus, under an act authorizing town officers to bor-
row money upon the credit of the town, and to pay it over to a rail-
road corporation, to be expended by it" in grading and constructing
a railroad," taking in exchange its stock at par, it is not within the
power of municipal officers to make a direct exchange of the bonds
of the town, even for an equal nominal amount of stock, as this
leaves it in the power of the railroad corporation to sell such bonds
at a discount. So in a case where a county had by the legislative
act no authority to issue its bonds to the railroad company unless
upon the sanction of a previous vote after thirty days' notice of the
election to be held for that purpose, the Supreme Court of Illinois
con-
332, the Supreme Court of the United 16 Wall. 6 (1873); James v. Milwaukee,
States held that a power to levy taxes, to 16 Wall. 159 (1872); post, sec. 553 ;
pay debts, and for general expenses, not Police Jury v. Britton, 15 Wall. 566 ;
exceeding fifty cents on each hundred Gould v, Paris, 68 Tex. 511.
dollars, related only to debts and expenses 2 Starin v. Genoa, 23 N. Y. 439 ;
for the ordinary purposes of the city, and Gould v. Sterling, Ib. 439, 456. In the
not to such as were incurred under a special case last cited, Selden, J., p. 460, remarks:
authority, — as, a debt incurred by sub- “In the present case the only authority
scribing to the stock of a railroad under given (to the town) by the act is to bor-
authority of a statute which was row upon the bonds of the town. No
strued to confer authority to make a levy, express power to sell the bonds is given,
for the payment of the debt, in excess of and no such power, can, I think, be im-
the limitation above recited. This case plied. To borrow money, and give a bond
distinguished from United States v. Macon or obligation for it, and to sell a bond or
County, 99 U. S. 582; for a statement of obligation for money, are by no means
which see post, sec. 851.
identical transactions. In the one case
1 Marsh v. Fulton County, supra; the money and the bond would, of course,
Allen v. Louisiana, 103 U. S. 80 ; Com. be equal in amount ; in the other they
Bank v. Iola, 2 Dillon, 353 (1873), af- might or might not be equal." Whether
firmed in Supreme Court, 20 Wall. 655; such a defence would be available against
Sav. Assoc. v. Topeka, 3 Dillon, 376 a bona fide, holder of the bonds was not
(1874); Weismer v. Village of Douglass, determined. See post, sec. 526. As to
64 N. Y. 91 (1876) ; Clay v. County, 4 these cases, see chapter xiv, on Contracts,
Bush (Ky.), 154. See further, chapter post. See Woods v. Lawrence County, 1
xiv. on Contracts, post, where the rights of Black, 386 ; Moran v. Miami County, 2
bona fide holders of such instruments are Black, 722. That such a defence is not
considered at length. Dunovan v. Green, available against a holder for value, see
57 Ill. 63; Lynde v. Winnebago County, post, sec. 515 et seq.
t
$ 164
239
BONA FIDE HOLDER; ESTOPPEL.
held, in a direct proceeding against the county to enjoin it from issu-
ing its bonds, that although there was an election at which a majority
voted in favor of the subscription, yet the failure to give the thirty
days' notice was a fatal defect, and the issue of the bonds was
restrained.1
§ 164.
Estoppel in favor of bona fide Holder of Negotiable
Bonds. - It may be observed in conclusion that the Supreme Court
of the United States, in the municipal railway aid bond cases referred
to in a subsequent chapter,4 have held the doctrine, in favor of the in-
nocent holders for value of such securities, that the municipality may
be estopped by recitals in the bonds, by the subsequent levy of taxes to
pay interest thereon, and by retaining the stock which was received
in exchange for the bonds or purchased with their proceeds, to set
up in defence a non-compliance with preliminary conditions. This
is a doctrine, however, which is asserted for the protection of such
holders, and has ordiuarily no place in controversies which arise
before the issue of the bonds, between the taxpayers or municipality
on the one hand, and the company on the other. In such cases the
sound doctrine is that compliance with all substantial or material
conditions is essential.4
1 Harding v. Rockford, &c. Railroad &c., 27 III. 307 ; Force v. Batavia, 61 Ill.
Co., 65 Ill. 90 (1873).
99 ; Harding v. R. R. I. & St. L. R. R.
In delivering the opinion of the court, Co., 65 Ill. 90; Lippincott v. Pana, 92 Ill.
Thornton, J., remarks : "Such municipal- 24 ; Gaddis v. Richland Co., 92 Ill. 119 ;
ities were not created with the view to en. Supervisors of Schuyler Co. v. The People,
gage in commerce, or to aid in the con-
25 Ill. 181; Supervisors of Hancock
struction of railways, but for govern- County v. Clark, 27 Ill. 305; Marshall
mental purposes only. When they exer- County v. Cook, 38 Ill. 44 ; Wiley v. The
cise the functions given by the statutes Town of Brimfeld, 59 Ill. 306 ; People v.
under consideration, the powers granted Cass Co., 77 Ill. 438 (1875).”
must not only be clearly conferred, but If aid has been conditionally voted, the
strictly pursued. If the mode prescribed condition must be complied with before
for carrying into effect the right to issue the company can demand the aid. Rail-
bonds is not complied with in all material road Co. v. Hartford, 58 Me. 23 ; Cow-
matters, then the bonds should not be drey v. Town of Canadea, 16 Fed. Rep.
issued, and thus the taxpayer will be ex- 532 ; Rich v. Town of Mentz, 19 Fed.
empt from the imposition of illegal taxes, Rep. 725.
and a grievous burden upon his property. 2 Post, chap. xiv. on Contracts, sec.
These principles have been so elaborately 511 et seq.
discussed and fully settled by this court, 8 Post, sec. 519 et seq.
that we need only refer to some of the 4 Jackson Co. v. Brush, 77 Ill. 59
The People v. Tazwell County, 22 (1875).
Ill. 147 ; Fulton County v. The Missis- The Supreme Court of Connecticut,
sippi & Wabash Railroad Co., 21 Ill. 338 ; under peculiar circumstances, held the
Middleport v. Ætna Life Ins. Co., 82 111. town voting aid to a railroad company
562; People v. Logan Co., 63 Ill. 384; estopped to show, as against the railroad
Williams v. Roberts, 88 Ill. 11; People v. company (equitable rights of material-men
Oldtown, 88 Ill. 202; Clarke v. Board, and contractors having intervened), that
cases,
.
240
§ 164
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
the vote at the town meeting had not been subsequent one is ultra vires : qucere. A
taken by ballot as required by the act of the subscription cannot be made to a division
legislature, but by a division of the house, of a road. McWhorter v. People, 65 Ill.
without ballot. New Haven, &c. Rail- 290 (1872). Power to issue upon compli-
road Co. v. Chatham, 42 Conn. 465 (1875). ance with conditions cannot be delegated.
This case pronounced exceptional, Bloom- Jackson County v. Brush, 77 Ill. 59
field v. C'harter Oak Bank, 121 U. S. 121, (1875); People v. Waynesville, supra;
citing the foregoing. See also Douglas v. People v. Harper (vote need not fix time
Chathan, 41 Conn. 211. In submitting for bonds to run), 67 Ill. 62 (1873). Can-
the question to vote whether a township not make a contract with railroad company
will take stock in a railroad con pany, the for subscription before election. People v.
township has the right to impose such Cass County, 77 Ill. 438 (1875). Submit-
conditions in regard thereto as it deems ting two propositions at same election. Mar-
proper; and such conditions when im• shall v. Silliman, 61 Ill. 218 (1871); see
posed are binding, and the company will also Garrigus v. Park County, 39 Ind. 66
have no right to the subscription, or to (1872); State v. Roggen, 22 Neb. 118.
compel the issue of the bonds, until the Conditions, effect of non-observance. Alley
conditions are fully performed on its part, V. Adam County, 76 Ill. 101 (1875). Vou
if the authorities have a discretion. Peo- tiny on unauthorized proposition. Cairo,
ple v. Holden, 91 Ill. 446. If the county &c. Co. v. Sparta, 77 Ill. 505 (1875).
authorities have a discretion to subscribe Election must be held according to the law
on a vote without conditions, the annex- governing it. The People, &c. v. Super-
ing of conditions will not deprive them visor, &c., 67 Ill. 57 (1873). See also the
of its exercise. People, ex rel., &c. v. following cases : Wright v. Bishop, 88 Ill.
County Board of Cass County, 77 Ill. 438 302 ; Edwards v. People, 88 Ill. 340 ; Wil.
(1875).
liams v. Roberts, 88 Ill. 11; People v.
Except in controversies with bona fide Clayton, 88 Ill. 45 ; People v. Oldtown,
bondholders for value, the State courts 88 Ill. 202 ; Yarish v. R. R. Co., 72 Iowa,
have generally and properly, held, that 556. What is a majority vote. McDowell
the power of a municipality to issue rail- v. Const. Co., 96 N. C. 514 ; State v.
road aid bonds is dependent upon a strict Bechell, 22 Neb. 158 ; anté, sec. 44, note
compliance with the statute authorizing and cases.
the issue of such bonds; and that when The reader is referred to chap. xiv. on
the power is conditional on a prior vote of Contracts, post, where the subject of M2-
the electors the statutory notice must be nicipal Bonds is considered at large, with
given. People v. Jackson County, 92 Ill. special reference to the decisions of the Su-
444 ; Harding v. R. R. I. & St. L. R. R.
preme Court of the United States, which,
Co., 65 Ill. 90 (1872); People v. Waynesgenerally speaking, are more favorable on
ville, 88 Ill. 469, in which it is held that certain points to the bona fide holders of
one submission exhausts the power, and a such bonds than those of the State courts.
!
§ 165
241
DISSOLUTION.
CHAPTER VII.
DISSOLUTION OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS AND REPEAL OF CHARTERS.
In England.
§ 165 (109). How dissolved. — In England, a municipal corpo-
ration may be dissolved,
1. By an act of parliament, this power being a necessary con-
sequence of the omnipotence of that body in all matters of political
institution. The king may, by his prerogative, create, but cannot
dissolve or destroy a corporation; may grant privileges, but when
vested, cannot take them away?
It has there often been declared that a municipal corporation may
also be dissolved, --
2. By the loss of an integral part, or the loss of all or of the
majority of the members of any integral part, without which it
cannot transact its business, unless the parts that remain have the
right to act or to restore the corporate succession.3
1 Co. Litt. 176, note ; 2 Kyd, 447 ; declared it to be “an atrocious violation
Rex v. Amery, 2 Term R. 515.; Glover, of private property, which cut every Eng-
408 ; Angell & Ames, chap. xxii. sec. 767; lishman to the bone.”
2 Kent Com. 305 ; County Comm'rs v. 8 Willc. on Corp. 325, chap. vii. This
Cox, 6 Ind. 403 ; State v. Trustees, &c., chapter contains an interesting discussion
5 Ind. 77; ante, sec. 32, as to distinction of the question of dissolution, and it would
between Royal and Parliamentary Corpo- seem that the author, notwithstanding the
rations.
occasional judgments and the many and
2 Ante, secs. 32, 35; Rex v. Amery, broad dicta in the books, doubts whether
supra ; Regents of University v. Williams, there can be an actual and total dissolution
9 Gill & Johns. 365, 409 (1838). In this of a municipal corporation, either by the
case, Buchanan, J., in substance, observes : loss of an integral part, or by surrender, or
The crown may create, but cannot, at by forfeiture. But see 2 Kyd, chap. v. ;
pleasure, dissolve a corporation, or, with. Glover, chap. xx.; Angell & Ames, sec.
out its consent, alter or amend its charter. 769 ; and particularly Rex v. Morris and
Parliament may do this; but, restrained Rex v. Stewart, 3 East, 213 ; 4 East, 17.
by public opinion, it has not undertaken Integral parts defined. Ante, sec. 35. In
to dissolve any private corporation since Rex v. Passmore, 3 Term R. 241, where
the time of Henry VIII., so that the power the subject was much considered, Lord
to do so rests wholly in theory. In 1783 Kenyon observed, “When an integral part
a bill was proposed to remodel the East of a corporation is gone, without whose ex-
India Company. Lord Thurlow opposed istence the functions of the corporation
it as subversive of the law and constitu- cannot be exercised, and the corporation
tion, and, in strong, nervous language, has no manner of supplying the integral
VOL. I. -16
242
§ 165
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
3. By a surrender of the franchise of being a corporation to the
crown, whose acceptance is necessary; and to be effectual the sur-
render must be enrolled in chancery. The power to surrender has
been much questioned; the argument in favor of it being, that since
by royal grant and acceptance a corporation may be created, so by
surrender and acceptance it may be annulled. It is admitted, how-
ever, that a corporation created or confirmed by parliament or statute
cannot dissolve itself by a surrender of its charter or franchise.
4. By forfeiture of its charter, through negligence or abuse of its
franchise, judicially ascertained by proceedings in quo warranto or
scire facias. This mode of dissolution proceeds upon the doctrine,
well settled as to private corporations, both in England and in this
country, and perhaps settled in that country, also, as respects the
old municipal corporations when created by royal charter, that there
is a tacit or implied condition annexed to the grant of every act or
charter of incorporation that the grantees shall not neglect to use
and shall not misapply the powers granted, and that if they do, the
condition is broken upon which the corporation was created, and the
corporation thereupon ceases to exist. And in the cases in the time
of Charles II. it was held that the corporation might forfeit its
franchise by reason of the neglect or misconduct of its officers.?
part, the corporation is dissolved as to 1 Rex v. Osbourne, 4 East, 326; Rex
certain purposes. But the king may ren- v. Miller, 6 Term R. 277 ; Willc. 332, pl.
ovate either with the old or new corpor. 861 ; Howard's Case, Hutt. 87 ; Grant on
ators.
Corp. 306, 308; Thicknesse v. Canal Co.,
The leading authorities respecting the 4 M. & W. 472.
effect of the loss of an integral part are, 1
2 Black. Com. 485; 2 Kyd, 447 ;
Rol. Abr. 514 ; Regina v. Bewdley, 1 P. Willc. chap. vii. 325 et seq.; Taylors of
Wms. 207 ; Banbury's Case, 10 Mod. Ipswich, 1 Rol. 5; Rex v. Grosvenor, 7
346 ; Rex v. Tregony, 8 Mod. 129 ; Col. Mod. 199 ; Smith's Case, 4 Mod. 55, 58;
chester v. Seaber, 3 Burr. 1870 ; S. C. 1 S. C. 12 Mod. 17 ; Skin. 311; 1 Show.
Wm. Bl. 591, which, however, is said not 278; Rex v. Saunders, 3 East, 119 ; Mayor,
to be a case of the loss of an integral &c. of Lyme v. Henley, 2 Cl. & F. 331 ;
part, but of magistrates. Grant Corp. Rex v. Kent, 13 East, 220 ; Priestly v.
305, note ; Rex v. Passmore, 3 Term R. Foulds, 2 Scott N. R. 205, 225; Attorney-
241. The foregoing cases are succinctly General v. Shrewsbury, 6 Beav. 220. See
stated by Mr. Kyd, 2 Corp. chap. v. See, reference arguendo to subject of forfeiture
also, Mayor, etc. of Colchester v. Brooke, of municipal charter, in Whalen v. Macomb,
7 Queen's B. 383, and Mr. Justice Camp- 76 Ill. 49 (1875). The earlier American
bell's learned opinion in Bacon v. Robert- cases relating to the dissolution of private
son, 18 How. (U. S.) 480 (1855); infra, corporations by forfeiture of their charters ;
sec. 169, note ; People v. Wren, 4 Scam. what will constitute sufficient ground of
(5 Ill.) 275, citing and relying on Colches. forfeiture; and the mode of proceeding
ter v. Seaber, supra; Smith's Case, 4 Mod. to ascertain and enforce the forfeiture, are
53 ; Smith v. Smith, 3 Desaus. (S. C.) collected, and the result very clearly and
557 ; Welch v. Ste. Genevieve, 1 Dillon satisfactorily stated, in Angell & Ames on
C. C. 130 ; chapters on Corporate Officers Corporations, chap. xxii. See, also, 2
and Corporate Meetings, post.
Kent Com. 305.
!
$ 166
243
HOW DISSOLVED.
In the United States.
§ 166 (110). How dissolved. These various modes of dissolu-
tion, except the first, are believed by the author to be inapplicable
to municipal corporations in this country as they are generally
created and constituted. Here it is the people of the locality who
are erected into a corporation, not for private, but for public or quasi
public purposes. The corporation is mainly and primarily if not
wholly an instrument of government. The officers do not consti-
tute the corporation, or an integral part of it. The existence of the
corporation does not depend upon the existence of officers. The
qualified voters or electors have, indeed, the right to select officers,
but such officers are the mere agents or servants of the corporation,
and hence the doctrine of a dissolution by the loss of an integral
part has, in such cases, no place. If all the people of the defined
locality should wholly remove from or desert it, the corporation
would, from necessity, be suspended or dormant, or perhaps entirely
cease; but the mere neglect or mere failure to elect officers will not
dissolve the corporation, certainly not while the right or capacity to
Private corporations may lose their legal creditors may enforce their claims against
existence, 1. By the act of the legisla- any property belonging to the corporation
ture; 2. By the death of all their mem- which has not passed into the hands of
bers ; 3. By a forfeiture of their franchises, bona fide purchasers ; second, every credi-
and 4. By a surrender of their charter. No tor is presumed to contract with reference
other mode of dissolution is anywhere al- to a possibility of the dissolution of a cor-
luded to. Boston Glass Manuf. v. Lang- porate body. Mumma v. Potoinac Co.
don, 24 Pick. 49, 52, per Morton, J.; Com- (holding that on sci. fa. a judgment could
monwealth v. Union Ins. Co., 5 Mass. 230, not be revived, or costs adjudged, against
232; Riddle v. Locks and Canals, 7 Mass. a corporation legislatively annulled), 8 Pet.
169; School v. Canal, &c. Co., 9 Ohio, (U. S.) 281 (1834). Of dissolution by act
203 ; Canal Co. v. Railroad Co., 4 Gill & of the legislature and its effect on the cor-
Johns. 1; Vincennes University v. Indi- poration, its property and creditors, see
ana, 14 How. 268. Legislative power
Legislative power the recent case decided by the Court of
under the head of various constitutional Appeals of New York, in reference to the
provisions concerning the division, annex. surface railway on Broadway in New York
ation and consolidation, modification of city. People v. O'Brien, 111 N. Y. 1
charter, dissolution, and nature of corpo- (1888). Ante, chap. iv., sec. 68a et seq.
rate property as affecting the rights of Mr. Grant, in his work on Corpora-
creditors and others. See 21 American tions, considers it doubtful whether an
Law Review, 14. The dissolution of a information in the nature of quo warranto
private corporation by authorized legisla- will lie, in England, against parliamen-
tive act or judicial sentence, does not im- tary or statute corporations, for usurping
pair the obligation of a contract any more powers not given, or misusing those con-
than the death of a private person impairs ferred (Corp. 307, 308 ; Rex v. Nicholson,
the obligation of his contract. This doc- 1 Str. 299); but in this country, the law
trine was based by the court (8 Pet. as to private corporations is indisputably
281, cited, infra), upon two grounds : settled, that in such cases an information
First, the obligation survives, and the of this kind may be brought.
244
§ 167
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
elect remains. In this respect municipal corporations resemble
ordinary private corporations, which exist per se, and consist of
the stockholders who compose the company. The officers are their
agents or servants, but do not constitute an integral part of their cor-
poration, the failure to elect whon may suspend the functions, but
will not dissolve the corporation.
§ 167 (111). Surrender of Charter. Since all of our charters
of incorporation come from the legislature, a municipal corporation
cannot dissolve itself by a surrender of its franchise. The State
creates such corporations for public ends, and they will and must
continue until the legislature annuls or destroys them, or authorizes
it to be done. If there could be such a thing as a surrender, it
would, from necessity, have to be made to the legislature, and its
acceptance would have to be manifested by appropriate legislative
action.4
1
1 Willc, chap. vii. and observations at solve the corporation, there being no ex-
pp. 325, 326, 327, pl. 852 ;, Colchester v. press provision of the charter to the con-
Senber, 3 Burr.(1866); Colchester v. Brooke, trary. But no authorities are cited and no
7 Queen's B. 383; Rex v. Paysmore, 3 reasons given, and the conclusion that an
Terin R. 241; Grant on Corp. 308 ; Ba actual dissolution of the corporation re-
con v. Robertson, 18 How. 480 ; Lowber sulted froin a failure to elect, is believed to
v. Mayor, &c, of New York, 5 Abb. Pr. be unsound.
325 ; Clarke v. Rochester, 5 Abb. Pr. 107; The existence of a municipal corpora-
Welch v. Ste. Genevievo, 1 Dillon C. C. tion is not considered to be interrupted in
130 (1871). That the failure to elect offi- consequence of a change in the council.
cers does not dissolve, while the capacity to Elmendorf v. Ewen, 2 N. Y. Leg. Obs. 85;
elect remains, see, also, Philips v. Wick- Elmendorf v. Mayor, &c. of New York, 25
am, 1 Paige Ch. 590; Commonwealth v. Wend. 693. Further, sce chapters relating
Cullen, 1 Harris (Pa.), 133 ; President v. to Corporate Officers and Corporate Mect-
Thompson, 20 11. 197 ; Rose v. Turnpike ings, post.
Co., 3 Watts (Pa.), 46 ; People v. Wren, 4 2 Angell & Ames on Corp. sec. 771, ani
Scam. (5 III.) 275 ; Brown v. Insurance cases there cited ; People v. Fairbury, 51
Co., 3 La. An. 177 ; Welch v. Ste. Gene Ill, 149 (1869).
vievc, supra; Green Township, 9 Watts & 8 Ante, secs. 37, 43, 54.
S. (Pa.) 22 ; Vincennes University v. In- 4 "The creation of a corporate fran-
diana, 14 How. 268 ; Muscatine Turnve- chise is an attribute of sovereignty to bo
rein v Funck, 18 Iowa, 469 ; Schriber v. exercised solely by the supreme power
of
Langdale, 66 Wis. 616. In Lea v. Her- the State. Such franchise being amenable
nandez, 10 Tex. 137 (1853), it appeared only to the power of its creation, it follows
that a place was incorporated as a town that this power alone can question the le-
prior to 1848, that in the year just named gality of its existence, by such proceedings
the legislature passed an act to incorporate as in its wisdom it may adopt.”_Bonner,
the town, and that no election for officers J. Brennan v. Bradshaw, 53 Tex. 330.
nor any organization was had thereunder Municipal corporations incorporated under
for three years and down to the commenie- a general act, containing provisions for
ment of the action, nor were there any offi- their dissolution, can be disincorporated in
eers de facto acting. The court held that the method prescribed in the act. Ham.
the failure to elect officers operated to dis- bleton v. Town of Dexter, 89 Mo. 188
$ 168
245
FORFEITURE OF CORPORATE EXISTENCE.
I
§ 168 (112). Forfeiture of Corporate Existence. The doctrine of
a forfeiture of the right to be a corporation has also, it is believed by
the author, no just or proper application to our municipal corpora-
tions. If they neglect to use powers in which the public or indi-
viduals have an interest, and the exercise of such powers be not
discretionary, the courts will interfere and compel them to do their
duty. On the other hand, acts done beyond the powers granted
are void. If private rights are threatened or invaded, the courts
will, as hereafter shown, restrain or redress the injury. With what
surprise would we hear of a proceeding to forfeit the charter of the
city of New York or Chicago because of the misconduct of its offi-
cers, or because the cominon council, as in the famous case against
the city of London, were assuming to exercise unauthorized powers
by ordaining an oppressive by-law. In short, unless otherwise spe-
cially provided by the legislature, the nature and constitution of our
municipal corporations, as well as the purposes they are created to
subserve, are such that they can, in the author's judgment, only be
dissolved by the legislature, or pursuant to legislative enactment.5
They may become inert or dormant, or their functions may be
suspended, for want of officers or of inhabitants ; but dissolved, when
created by an act of the legislature, and once in existence, they can-
not be, by reason of any default or abuse of the powers conferred,
either on the part of the officers or inhabitants of the incorporated
place. As they can exist only by legislative sanction, so they
cannot be dissolved or cease to exist except by legislative consent or
pursuant to legislative provision.
It is also held, in accordance with the “ It is extremely doubtful whether a mu-
text, that franchises granted to munici- nicipal corporation can, by a mere dis-
pal corporations cannot be surrendered by claimer, surrender a franchise in which
them. A city owning the franchise of not only the corporation, but a large por-
collecting toll on freight passing through tion of the State's population residing
the channel of a river, contracted with within the city's limits, as well as of the
& firm that, in consideration of city commercial world, are interested.” Morris
bonds delivered, the firm should construct v. Stato, 65 Tex. 53.
and maintain the channel, collect tolls, 1 See Welch v. Ste. Genevieve, 1 Dil-
and, with the proceeds, pay off the bonds. lon C. C. 130 (1871), arguendo.
In answer to an information in the na- % Ante, chap. V. sec. 98 ; post, chapter
ture of quo warranto requiring the city on Mandamus.
and the firm to show cause why they as- Ante, sec. 89, and notes.
sumed authority to collect tolls, the city * See chaptor xxii. on Remedies to pre-
disclaimed all right to collect them, and vent, correct, and redress Illegal Corporate
asked that the proceeding be dismissed as Acts, post, secs. 906-934.
to it. Field, that the city could not be di- 6 Meriwether v. Garrett, 102 U. S.
vested of so valuable a right without a 472 (1880); Mobile v. Watson, 116 U. S.
hearing in court, and was a necessary party 289 (1885). Moro fully see, ante, chap. iv.
to the proceeding. Willic, C. J., said :
secs. 57–69, and post, secs. 169 , 170.
8
246
$ 169
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
At common
$ 169 (113). Effect of Dissolution at Common Law.
law, a corporation, of whatever kind, which was wholly dissolved,
was considered to be civilly dead; and the effect was that their lands
reverted to the grantor or his heirs, and the debts of the corporation,
whether owing to or by it, were extinguished. Leases made by the
corporation would cease because of the reversion of the lands to the
original owners; and, for the same reason, lands given to or held by
the corporation for charitable purposes would be lost. These in-
conveniences and results are so disastrous that the English courts,
as the more recent cases before cited will show, have doubted and
limited, although they may not have overthrown, the doctrine that
municipal corporations may be totally dissolved. These consequen-
ces of a dissolution of a corporation attached to all corporations,
eleemosynary, municipal, and private; and since this doctrine has,
in this country, been generally rejected as to private corporations
organized for pecuniary profit, and rests upon no foundation in
reason or justice, it may perhaps safely be affirmed that it would not,
on full consideration, be applied to the dissolution of a municipal
corporation by an absolute and unconditional repeal of its charter,
or to the case where the charter of such a corporation is forfeited, if
that may be done, by judicial sentence. Therefore, the leases of
a corporation would not be disturbed by its dissolution, nor would
its lands held in fee revert, nor would those held in trust for
charitable purposes be lost, since equity would supply trustees.2
i Co. Litt. 13; 1 Lev. 237; Knight v. of New York, 1888. People v. O'Brien,
Wells, 1 Lut. 519; Rex v. Sanders, 3 East, 111 N. Y. 1. Ante, sec. 68 a.
119 ; Attorney-General v. Gower, 9 Mod. The general subject of the effect of a
226 ; 1 Rol. Abr. 816 ; Colchester v. Sea- dissolution of a private corporation is ex-
ber, 3 Burr. (1866); Willc. 330, pl. 858; 2 tensively discussed by Mr. Justice Camp-
Kyd, 516 ; Rex v. Passmore, 3 Term R. bell, in Bacon v. Robertson, supra. The
247; Grant, Corp. 305 ; Colchester v. case was a bill in chancery by the stock-
Brooke, 7 Queen's B. 383 ; Commonwealth holders of a bank, whose charter had been
v. Roxbury, 9 Gray, 510, note.
judicially forfeited, for a distribution of
2 Ante, secs. 64, 80; chapters on Cor- the surplus after the payment of the debts,
porate Boundaries and Property, post. Ba- and the relief was granted. The Supreme
con v. Robertson, 18 How. (U. S.) 480 Court of the United States seemed to be
(1855); Girard v. Philadelphia, 7 Wall. 1 of opinion that, upon the general princi-
(1868); Mumma v. Potomac Co., 8 Pet. ples of equity jurisprudence, and without
281 (1834); Curran v. Arkansas, 15 How. statutory aid, the surplus of the assets of a
(U. S.) 312 ; 2 Kent, 307, note; Angell corporation for pecuniary profit, after the
& Ames, Corp. 779 a; Coulter v. Robert payment of debts and expenses, belonged
son, 24 Miss. 278 ; County Comm’rs v. to the shareholders ; that the creditor of
Cox, 6 Ind. 403 ; State v. Trustees, &c. such a corporation, dissolved or declared
5 Ind. 77 ; Vincennes University v. Indi- forfeited by judgment upon quo warranto
ana, 14 How. 268 ; Owen v. Smith, 31 or judicial sentence, has, without a statute
Barb. 641 ; Commonwealth v. Roxbury, 9 to that effect, a claim in equity upon the
Gray, 510, note. See also Broadway Rail- corporate property for the satisfaction of
way Case, decided by the Court of Appeals his debt; that lands conveyed to the cor-
!
$ 169 a
247
EFFECT OF DISSOLUTION IN THIS COUNTRY.
§ 169 d. Effect of Dissolution in this country.
The correctness
of the prediction which the author ventured in the last section to
make, that the common-law consequences of the dissolution of a corpo-
ration would not be applied in this country to the dissolution of a
municipal corporation, has since been adjudged by the Supreme
Court of the United States, and by other tribunals. The legislature
absolutely repealed the charter of an indebted city, abolished all of
the municipal offices therein, and established in the place of the late
city government, a new local organization with the means of self-
government. The acts which abolished the old and established the
new organization made no provision for the payment of debts of the
annihilated city corporation, and, in fact, provided that the succes-
sor organization should not be liable therefor, and that any taxes
raised within the new organization should not be applied for the
payment of the debts of the late corporation.
case.
poration in fee and for a full price do not lexfen in the argument of the quo warranto
revert, and that the stockholder, as to the against the city of London, was, perhaps,
surplus after paying the debts, stands non definitur in jure." (See ante, Intro-
upon grounds as high and has claims as ductory Chapter, sec. 8.) Solicitor Finch,
irresistible as the creditor before had. who argued for the crown in that cause,
The usual consequences of a dissolution, admitted : "I do not find any judgment
as stated by the text-writers, if correct, in a quo warranto of a corporation being
which was doubted, were deemed inap. forfeited." Treby, on behalf of the city,
plicable to moneyed or trading corpora- said: “The dissolving a corporation by a
tions.
judgment in law, as is here sought, I be-
In the course of his admirable opinion, lieve is a thing that never came within the
the learned justice observed : “The con- compass of any man's imagination till
nion law of Great Britain was deficient now; no, not so much as the putting of a
in supplying the instrumentalities for a For in all my search (and upon this
speedy and just settlement of the affairs of occasion I have bestowed a great deal of
an insolvent corporation whose charter had time in searching), I cannot find that it
been forfeited by judicial sentence. The even so much as entered into the concep-
opinion usually expressed as to the effect tion of any man before ; and I am the
of such a sentence was unsatisfactory and more confirmed in it because so learned a
questioned. There had been instances in gentleman as Mr. Solicitor has not cited
Great Britain of the dissolution of public or any one such case wherein it has been (I
ecclesiastical corporations by the exertion do not say adjudged, but) even so much as
of public authority, or as a consequence of questioned or attempted ; and, therefore, I
the death of their members; and parlia- may very boldly call this a case primæ in-
ment and the courts had affirmed, in these pressionis." The argument of Pollefen
instances, that the endowments they had was equally positive.
received from the prince or pious founders The power of courts to adjudge a for-
would revert in such a case." Stat, de feiture so as to dissolve a corporation
Terris Templuriorum, 17 Edw. II. ; Dean was affirmed in that case, but the effect
and Canons of Windsor, Godb. 211; John. of that judgment was not illustrated by
son v. Norway, Winch. 37 ; Owen, 73; 6 any execution, and the courts were re-
Vin. Abr. 280. What was to become of lieved from their embarrassment by an act
their personal estate, and of their debts of parliament annulling it. Smith's case,
and credits, had not been settled in any 4 Mod. 53 ; Skin. 310 ; 8 St. Trials, 1342.
adjudicated case, and, as was said by Pol- Sue ib. 1042. Nor have the discussions
248
§ 1.69 a
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
The Supreme Court of the United States dismissed a bill in
equity of a creditor seeking for relief. It decided that the property
held by the repealed corporation for public uses, such as public
buildings, wharves, fire engines, and, generally, all property held
for governmental purposes, could not be subjected to the payment
of the debts of the city. It further decided that upon a repeal of
its charter such property passed under the immediate control of
the State, since the power delegated to the city in that respect had
been withdrawn. It also decided that the private property of in-
dividuals could not be subjected to the payment of the debts of
the city, except through taxation, and that the power of taxation
being legislative it could not be exercised otherwise than under
the authority of the legislature. As to private property — that
is, such as was owned by the municipality, not for public or nu-
nicipal uses it would of course be liable to the claims of cred-
itors, but subject thereto, it would be under the control of the
legislature.
since the Revolution extended our knowl. The question occurs here, Could parlia-
edge upon this intricate subject. The ment interfere ? And the answer would
case of Rex v. Amery, 2 Term R. 515, be by their authorizing a suit to be
has exerted much influence upon text- brought, notwithstanding the dissolution.
writers. The questions were, whether a These are all cases of niunicipal corpora-
judgment of seizure quosque upon a de- tions where the corporators had no rights
fault was final, and if so, whether the in the property of the corporation in
king's grant of pardon and restitution severalty."
would overreach and defeat a charter 1 Substantially the same principles as
granting to a new body of men the same to the effect of the dissolution of a muni-
liberties, intermediate the seizure and the cipal corporation by a repeal of its charter
pardon. The king's bench, relying upon upon its property rights, are laid down in
the Year-Book, discovered that it did not the opinion of Mr. Justice Field in
support the conclusion drawn from it, and Broughton v. Pensacola, 93 U. S. 266
Chief Baron Eyre says that “Lord Coke (1876), at pp. 268, 269 ; noted infra, sec.
had adopted the doctrine too hastily.” 170, note.
The discussions upon this case show how 2 Meriwether v. Garrett, 102 U. S.
much the knowledge of the writ of quo 472 (1880). Precisely what the court
warranto, as it had been used and applied means by the statement “that the power
under the Plantagenets and Tudors, had of taxation is legislative and cannot be
gone
from the memories of courts and law- exercised otherwise than under the author.
yers. 4 Term R. 122 : Tan. on Quo War. ity of the legislature" remains to be de-
24. In Colchester v. Seaber, 3 Burr termined in that tribunal. It certainly
(1866), where the suit was upon a bond, meant in that case that the power could
and the defence was that certain facts not be set in motion by a bill in equity.
had occurred to dissolve the corporation, Whether it meant that the power of taxa-
and that the creditor's claim was extin- tion as a means of paying the debts of the
guished on the bond, Lord Mansfield said, repealed corporation did not survive such
“Without an express authority, so strong repeal and the legislative prohibition of
as not to be gotten over, we ought not to the exercise of such power, can only be
determine so much against reason; as that known when this precise question arises
parliament should be obliged to interfere. for judgment.
!
§ 170
249
RIGHTS OF CREDITORS ON A DISSOLUTION.
$ 170 (114). Rights of Creditors on a Dissolution. — The rights
of creditors of municipal corporations are elsewhere more fully con-
sidered. The doctrines of the Supreme Court of the United States
may be thus briefly summed up:-
1. The rights of creditors, based upon the obligation of their con-
tracts, are protected by the Constitution of the United States against
subsequent legislation impairing the same.
2. It has often been decided, and is the settled doctrine of the
Supreme Court, that the remedies subsisting in a State when and
where the contract is made and is to be performed, are a part of its
obligation, and that any subsequent law of the State which so affects
those remedies as substantially to impair and lessen the value of the
contract, is forbidden by the Constitution of the United States, and is
therefore void. Applying this principle, it is held, that if the inuni-
cipality agrees, as a part of its contract, that the creditor shall have
the right to a special tax, the statute' giving this right cannot as to
such creditor be repealed, unless there be substituted in its place a
remedy legally equivalent in value and efficacy.?
3. The legislature in its sympathy with insolvent and repudiat-
ing municipalities has sometimes gone so far as absolutely to repeal
their charters, and in some form to. substitute or authorize new
municipal organizations in their place. Instances of such legisla-
tion in respect of the cities of Memphis, of Brownsville, of Mobile,
and of some other places, are given in the notes to this section.
The State's plenary power over its municipal corporations to change
their organization, to modify their method of internal government,
or to abolish them altogether, is not restricted by contracts entered
into by the municipality with its creditors or with private persons.
An absolute repeal of a municipal charter is therefore effectual so
far as it abolishes the old corporate organization; but where the
same, or substantially the same inhabitants are erected into a new
corporation, whether with extended or restricted territorial limits,
such new corporation is treated as in law the successor of the old,
entitled to its property rights, and subject to its liabilities.
4. As to the mode of enforcing such liabilities difficult questions
have arisen, some of which cannot at this time be said to be clearly
settled. It may, however, we think, be considered as definitively
determined by the Supreme Court, that the levy and collection of
1 Ante, chap. iv. ; post, secs. 853 et seq., the indebted municipality is left un-
touched by the legislature, but the subse-
2 Seibert v. Lewis, 122 U. S. 284 quent legislation impairs the creditor's
(1886), noted more fully post, sec. 854, remedy as it existed at the date of the
stands as the type of this class of cases, contract. Many other cases to the same
that is, where the corporate existence of effect are cited in the notes to this section.
861 a-861 C.
250
$ 170
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
taxes cannot be enforced in or by the Circuit Courts exercising equity
jurisdiction, but only by appropriate remedies in the court of law,
chief among which is the remedy by mandamus. 1
5. If the legislature repeals the charter of the debtor corporation
and dissolves it, and makes no provision for its debts, and it has no
private property subject to execution, and there is no resource for
the payment of such indebtedness but taxation, then if no new or
successor corporation be organized, and if no instrumentalities of the
taxing power remain subject to the process of the courts, the rights
of creditors are, in fact, impaired or destroyed, and it would seem
that the courts are in such case practically powerless to prevent this
result; and that the creditor's only remedy, which he would be very
apt under the circumstances to consider illusory, is to appeal for re-
lief to the legislative department of the government, that is to say,
to the very department that of set purpose adopted the hostile en-
actments that cut down and destroyed his rights and remedies.?
1 Thompson v. Allen County, 115 U. existing creditors, of the remedies in force
S. 550 (1885). Mr. Justice Miller here when their contracts were entered into, or
reviews the previous cases on the point, of others legally equivalent thereto, may,
and re-affirms the want of any jurisdiction we think, be regarded as yet open to
in equity to levy and collect taxes for the further discussion and more definite ascer-
satisfaction of judgments against munici- tainment,
palities. The doctrine of want of jurisdic- On the general subject of the right of
tion in equity is maintained, although creditors of indebted and dissolved muni-
the remedy at law by mandamus has cipalities, see : Ante, chap. iv. passim ;
proved ineffectual, and no officers can be particularly, secs. 69, 70, 71; post, secs. 171,
found to perform the duty of levying and 186–189; Cooley, Const. Lim. 290, 292;
collecting the taxes. See, further, cases Cooley, Taxation (2d ed.) 75 ; Curran v.
cited in the note to this section ; also post, Arkansas, 15 How. (U. S.) 312 ; Bacon
chaps. xx. and xxii.
V. Robertson, supra; 2 Kent, 307, note ;
2 Heine v. Levee Commissioners, 19 Broughton v. Pensacola, 93 U. S. 266
Wall. 655 ; Rees v. Watertown, 19 Wall. (1876): Observations of Field, J., p. 269 ;
107 ; Barkeley v. Levee Commissioners, Milner's Admx. v. Pensacola, 2 Woods, C.C.
93 U. S. 258 ; Meriwether v. Garrett, 102 642 (1875); Laird v. City of De Soto, 22
U. S. 472 ; Thompson v. Allen County, Fed. Rep. 421 ; Ross v. Wimberly, 60
115 U. S. 550; Amy v. Watertown, 130 Miss. 345; Brewis v. Duluth, 13 Fed.
U. S. 301 (1888).
Rep. 334 ; s. C. 9 Fed. Rep. 747 ; Garrett
Mr. Hare regards such legislation as a v. Memphis, 5 Fed. Rep. 860 ; Indianapo-
fraud upon the constitutional prohibition lis v. Indianapolis Gas Co., 66 Ind. 396,
against the legislative impairment of con- approving text ; County Comni’rs v. Cox,
tract, and consequently invalid. 1 Am. 6 Ind. 403 ; State v. Trustees, 5 Ind. 77 ;
Const. Law, 640. But the view that such Coulter v. Roberson, 24 Miss. 278; Gel-
legislation is invalid does not seem to be pcke v. Dubuque, 1 Wall. 175 (1865);
consistent with the decisions of the Su- Von Hoffman v. Quincy, 4 Wall. 535;
preme Court on the precise point. The Welch v. Ste. Genevieve, i Dillon C. C.
exact limits, however, of legislative power, 130 ; Thomson v.
130 ; Thomson v. Lee County, 3 Wall.
in respect of depriving the creditors, even 327 ; Haveneyer v. Iowa County, 3 Wall.
by a general repeal of the charter and in 294 ; Butz v. Muscatine, 8 Wall. 575;
connection therewith by prohibitions of the Lansing v. Treasurer, &c., 1 Dillon C.
exercise of the taxing power in behalf of C. 522 ; Soutter v. Madison, 15 Wis. 30;
$ 171
251
CHANGES NOT AMOUNTING TO A DISSOLUTION.
The
§ 171 (115). Changes not amounting to a Dissolution.
name of an incorporated place may be changed, its boundaries
Smith v. Appleton, 19 Wis. 468 ; Blake 551. The prohibitions against exercising
v. Railroad Co., 39 N. H. 435; coinpare the taxing power held to be void so far as
Richmond Gaslight Co. v. Middletown, they affect the taxing powers of the former
59 N. Y. 228 (1874); post, 692; Wolff v. corporations, which became a part of the
New Orleans, 103 U. S. 358 ; Beatty v. contracts entered into by them. Dever-
The People, 6 Col. 538.
eaux v. City of Brownsville, 29 Fed. Rep.
Memphis City Case : The city of Mem- 742 (mandanuus issued to the taxing
phis, in Tennessee, having become insol. district to enforce, by taxation, the pay-
vent and unable to meet its obligations, ment of judgments against the old corpo-
the legislature of that State in 1879 re- rations). Compare with Meriwether v.
pealed all laws by which it had been incor. Garrett, Heine v. Levee Comm’rs, and
porated, and passed a general act estab- other like cases in the Supreme Court of
lishing what were termed " Taxing Dis-
the United States, as to the power to com-
tricts" as a means of local government pel the levy of taxes, notwithstanding the
for the peace, safety, and general welfare” repeal of the charter and the prohibition
of communities embraced in the territo- by the legislature to the new officers to
rial limits of all such municipal corpora levy and collect taxes for the payment of
tions " as had, or might have, their charters the debts of the dissolved municipality.
abolished or might surrender them under Mobile City Case : The City of Mobile
the act. In 1881 a similar act established being largely in debt, the legislature
"taxing districts of the second class” for passed an act repealing the charter of the
communities having a population of less city and declaring that the corporation was
than 30,000. They were invested with thereby dissolved and abolished. The act
practically all the powers usually conferred provided for the appointment by the Gov-
upon municipal corporations, except that ernor of three commissioners to take pos-
of levying taxes, which was expressly re- session of the property and assets of the
served to the legislature, and that of issu- city, except property held for the public
ing evidences of indebtedness.
It was
use and governmental purposes, and apply
also expressly provided that the taxing the same under the orders of the Court of
districts, so created, should not pay, or be Chancery to the payment of the debts of
liable for, any debt created by the extinct the city, giving preference to the floating
corporations, and that no taxes collected debt. On the same day the legislature in-
under the act should ever be used to pay corporated the Port of Mobile, which in-
such debts. (For a succinct statement of cluded all the thickly settled and closely
the principal features of this legislation, built portion of the former City of Mobile;
see Meriwether v. Garrett, 102 U. S. 472, and all of the $16,000,000 of the taxable
by Mr. Justice Field. Ante, sec. 169 a.) property of the city but $900,000 was
The organizations formed under these included within the limits of the Port
acts are uniformly held to be municipal of Mobile, and fourteen-fifteenths of the
corporations. State v. Taxing District of inhabitants of the City were inhabi-
Shelby Co., 16 Lea (Tenn.), 240 ; Lea tants of the Port of Mobile. It limited
v. State, 10 Lea (Tenn.), 478 (districts the powers of the Port of Mobile to the
of the second class) ; Luehrman v. Taxing levy of a tax of six-tenths of one per cent,
District, 2 Lea (Tenn.), 425; O'Connor and prohibited its authorities from exer-
2. Memphis, 6 Lea (Tenn.), 730; (holding cising any other powers. Two questions
also, that a suit against the old corpora- arose, namely: Whether a preceding cred-
tion may be revived against the taxing itor was entitled to a judgment against
district). They may be sued as any other the Port of Mobile on the obligations of
municipality Uhl v. Taxing District, the City of Mobile ; and second, whether
6 Lea (Tenn.), 610. As to who may vote the powers of taxation in existence at the
on proposition to organize under the act date of the creation of the debt by the
see Pepper v. Smith, 15 Lea (Tenn.), City of Mobile could be enforced in favoi
252
§ 171
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS,
enlarged or diminished, and its mode of government altered, and
yet the corporation not be dissolved, but in law remain the same.1
of the creditor. Both of these proposi. legislation, or if changed, a substantial
tions were decided in favor of the creditor: equivalent must be provided ; that no
The court stated the general proposition such equivalent was here provided. The
involved as follows:
court enforced the contract by which the
“We are of opinion, upon this state City of Mobile, in issuing the bonds,
of the statutes and facts, that the Port agreed to levy a special tax for the pay-
of Mobile is the legal successor of the ment of the principal and interest, and
City of Mobile, and liable for its debts. held that as to the holder of such bonds
The two corporations were composed of the obligation to levy such special tax
substantially the same community, in- was in force, and rested upon the Port of
cluded within their limits substantially Mobile, and accordingly directed a per-
the same taxable property, and were or- emptory mandamus to issue for the satis-
ganized for the same general purposes. faction of the judgment in accordance
“ "Where the legislature of a State has with the provisions in that behalf in force
given a local community, living within when the obligation was created. Mobile
designated boundaries, a municipal or- v. Watson, 116 U. S. 289 (1885).
ganization, and by a subsequent act, or City of Selma Case : In Amy v. Selma,
series of acts, repeals its charter and dis- 77 Ala. 103, it was held that a new corpo-
solves the corporation, and incorporates ration named "Selma," erected to replace
substantially the same people as a muni- one named “City of Selma," which had
cipal body under a new name for the same been dissolved, was its successor, and
general purpose, and the great mass of liable for its debts as here in an action
the taxable property of the old corpora- upon a judgment l'ecovered against its
tion is included within the limits of the predecessor.
predecessor. See, also, Meyer v. Porter,
new, and the property of the old corpora- 65 Cal. 67.
tion used for public purposes is trans- Town of Kahok Case : In Hill v.
ferred without consideration to the new Kahoka, 35 Fed. Rep. 32 (1888), it ap-
corporation for the same public uses, the peared that the town of Kahoka was duly
latter, notwithstanding a great reduction incorporated under the general statute of
of its corporate limits, is the successor in Missouri, in 1869, and performed various
law of the former, and liable for its debts; corporate acts, among others issuing cer-
and if any part of the creditors of the old tain railroad aid bonds. In 1886, its
corporation are left without provision for charter was forfeited for non-user in a pro-
the payment of their claims, they can en-. ceeding by quo warranto, and thereupon
force satisfaction out of the new.
the city of Kahoka, embracing practically
The court considered this conclusion to the same territory and population, was
be supported by Girard v. Philadelphia, incorporated under existing laws as a city
7 Wall. 1 ; Broughton v. Pensacola, 93 of the fourth class. Held, in an action
U S. 266, 270 ; Mount Pleasant v. Beck-
upon the coupons, that the city of Kahoka
with, 100 U. S. 514; O'Connor v. Mem- was liable for the bonds. “Municipal
phis, 6 Lea (Tenn.), 730; and Any v. corporations cannot extinguish their debts
Selma, 77 Ala. 103.
by changing their names or organizing
It held that the remedies in existence under new charters. A debt once con-
for the enforcement of the obligations tracted by a municipal corporation will
could not be impaired by subsequent survive as a debt against whatever corpo-
1 Ante, sec. 85, and cases cited; post, Wall. 1 (1868), noted fully, infra, sec.
chap. viii. secs. 176, 177 ; and see ante, 172, note. Broughton v. Pensacola, 93
chap. iv., where the extent of the legisla. U. S. 266 (1876); and see notes to sec.
tive authority over municipal corporations 170, supra, and cases there cited.
is considered. Girard v. Philadelphia, 7
!
$ 172
253
CHANGES NOT AMOUNTING TO A DISSOLUTION.
§ 172. Same subject. — Accordingly, the substitution of a new
municipal charter in the place of a previous charter, or a change in
rate entity is subsequently created to take “ The ancient doctrine, that, upon the
its place and exercise its power of local repeal of a private corporation, its debts
government over substantially the same were extinguished, and its real property
people and territory," citing Broughton reverted to its grantors, and its personal
v. Pensacola, 93 U. S. 266 ; Mobile v. property vested in the State, has been so
Watson, 116 U. S. 289 ; Laird v. De Soto, far inodified by modern adjudications, that
22 Fed. Rep. 421 ; People v. Murray, 73 a court of equity will now lay hold of the
N. Y. 535. Per Thayer, J.
property of a dissolved corporation, and
City of Brownsville Case: In Dever- administer it for the benefit of its credit-
eaux v. City of Brownsville, 29 Fed. Rep. ors and stockholders. The obligation of
742, the ruling in Mobile v. Watson, contracts, made whilst the corporation
supra, was followed and extended, it was in existence, survives its dissolution ;
being declared not only that the succeed- and the contracts may be enforced by a
ing corporation was liable for the existing court of equity, so far as to subject for
debts of its predecessor, but that all the their satisfaction any property possessed
powers of taxation possessed by such pre- by the corporation at the time. In the
decessor, which had been conferred as a view of equity, its property constitutes
part of the remedy to which its creditors a trust fund pledged to the payment of
were entitled, survived to the new corpo- the debts of creditors and stockholders ;
ration, and that their exercise could be and, if a municipal corporation, upon the
compelled by mandamus. It was also held surrender or extinction in other ways of
that statutes which prohibited the exer- its charter, is possessed of any property
cise of these powers of taxation were void, (not of a public nature, see Meriwether v.
as impairing the obligation of contracts. Garrett, supra), a court of equity will
Pensacola City Case : In Broughton v. equally take possession of it for the benefit
Pensacola (City of), 93 U. S. 266 (1876), of the creditors of the corporation. In
an indebted city which had contracted this case, it is averred in the bill that the
with the creditor to levy a special tax city of Pensacola, upon the surrender of
upon real estate within its limits to pay its original charter, did not possess any
his debt, surrendered its charter, and the property. It is not necessary, however,
inhabitants residing within the limits of the in the view we take of the proceedings for
city organized themselves into a municipal the reorganization of the city government,
government under the general incorpora- to consider the effect of an absolute repeal
tion act of the State, in the same way that of the charter of a municipal corporation
inhabitants might do who had not been upon its obligations. It is sufficient that
previously incorporated. The creditor filed here, in our judgment, there was a contin-
a bill in equity asking for a decree for uation of the corporation of Pensacola,
the amount of his debt, and that the city with its original rights of property and
be compelled to levy a tax to pay the obligations, not a new and distinct crea-
The bill was dismissed by the tion or corporate -capacity and liability.”
Circuit Court, and its decree was affirmed Case of Mount Pleasant v. Beckwith :
by the Supreme Court of the United Here an indebted municipal or public cor-
States. The court held that the new poration was legislated out of existence, and
organization, embracing substantially the its territory was annexed to similar corpo-
same corporators and the same territory, rations. In the absence of legislative pro-
although different powers were possessed vision otherwise, it was held that the
under the new charter and different offi- latter corporations became entitled to all
cers administered its affairs, was in law to the property of the abrogated corporation,
be deemed the successor of the previous and severally liable for a proportionate
corporation and entitled to its rights. share of its then subsisting legal debts,
Mr. Justice Field, delivering the opinion and that they were vested with the power
of the court, said :
to raise revenue with which to pay such
same.
254
§ 172
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
such a charter in whole or in part, where substantially the same
territory and the same inhabitants are concerned, will not be pre-
sumed, or be held to be the creation of a new corporation, but the
debts by levying taxes upon the property tion to the amount of territory each ob-
thus annexed and the persons residing tained. See Mount Pleasant v. Beckwith,
thereon ; and a bill in equity by the supra; post, sec. 186.
creditors of the extinguished corporation In Nelson v. Newark & Belleville, 49
against the corporatious thus succeeding N. J. L. 246, where by statute, the terri-
to its property and powers was sustained tory of a township had been divided between
to the extent that the amount of the debt a city and another township, with a direc-
was ascertained, and the sum apportioned tion that its debts should be paid propor-
among the corporations to which the ter- tionately by the city and the township
ritory of the indebted corporation had acquiring its territory, it was held that
been annexed, and a decree rendered for the duty of paying the debts was imposed
the amounts thus apportioned to be col- upon them, and that the creditors could
lected in the manner provided by law. enforce the duty by suit against them
Mount Pleasant v. Beckwith, 100 U. S. directly. See also Canova v. Commission-
514 (1879). There is no intimation in laterers, 18 Fla. 512 ; case of Elizabeth City
decisions of the Supreme Court that they N. J. Post, chap. xix. sec. 760 a.
are, in any respect, inconsistent with this In the case of the town of Port Gibson
judgment. See Meriwether v. Garrett, v. Moore, 13 Sm. & Marsh. (21 Miss.) 157
102 U. S. 472 ; Barkley v. Levee Com- (1849), it was held, indeed, that the re-
missioners, 93 U, S. 258 ; Broughton v. peal of the charter of an indebted muni-
Pensacola, 93 U. S. 266; Thompson v. cipal corporation dissolved it; that such
Allen County, 115 U. S. 550; Amy v. dissolution extinguished debts to and from
Watertown, 130 U. S. 301 (1888). The act the corporation, and that a subsequent act
ual judgments in all these cases may not be re-incorporating the place did not make it
in conflict with each other, but it seems diffi- liable for a debt existing anterior to the
cult to the author to reconcile all of the act repealing its charter. The court over-
reasoning by which the different judg- looked the constitutional provision pro-
ments are supported. See, also, Beckwith tecting contracts, and the case as to the
v. Racine, 7 Biss. 142 (1876), Drun- effect of a dissolution upon the rights of
mond and Dyer, JJ. The point decided creditors seems to conflict with those
may be briefly stated thus :
Where a above cited. Contra, Broadway Railway
municipality owing railroad aid bonds, Case, decided by the Court of Appeals of
which it was provided by statute should be New York ; People v. O'Brien, 111 N. Y.
paid by an annual tax upon the property 1 (1888), and see cases cited in this note.
within it, was legislated out of existence, See further, as to extinguishment of
and the territory was included in three debts by dissolution of corporation, Mal-
other municipalities without any provision lory v. Mallett, 6 Jones Eq. 345 ; Hop-
being made in respect to the payment of kins v. Whitesides, 1 Head (Tenn.), 31 ;
the bonds, it was held that the legislature Bank v. Lockwood, 2 Harring. (Del.) 8;
had the power to make these changes, but Robinson v. Lane, 19 Ga. 337; Muscatine
that the obligations of the contract and Turnverein v. Funck, 18 Iowa, 469; Owen
the power of taxation still remained. It v. Smith, 31 Barb. 641 ; Welch v. Ste.
was further held that in consequence of Genevieve, 1 Dillon C. C. 130 ; Thompson
these changes the creditor could not sue v. Abbott, 61 Mo. 176 (1875) ; post, chap.
at law, as service of process on the old xiv. ; Louisville Bridge Co. v. Louisville,
corporation could not be made, but that 81 Ky. 189; St. Louis Bridge Co. v. East
equity would give the creditor a remedy St. Louis, 121 Ill. 238 ; State, ex rel.
by requiring the existing corporations, Bridge Co. v. Columbia, 27 S. C. 137;
within whose boundaries the property in- post, sec. 786 ; Brooklyn v. Smith, 104
cluded in the old is situate, to levy the Ill. 429.
necessary taxes to pay the debt in propor-
1
§ 172
255
CHANGES NOT AMOUNTING TO A DISSOLUTION.
assumption by the old one of new powers and privileges. And
where the rights of creditors are involved, the presumption is ex-
tremely strong that the identity of the corporation continues, not-
withstanding different powers are possessed by the new organization,
and different officers administer its affairs."
1 State v. Natal, 39 La. An. 439, where establishes notwithstanding the change of
it was said, “The city of New Orleans charter the continuous legal identity of the
founded by Bien ville about 1718 has never new city corporation with the old.
ceased to exist as an agglomeration of hu- 2 Broughton v. Pensacola, 93 U. S. 266
man beings for social, commercial, and (1876); approving Milner's Admx. v. Pen-
industrial purposes.
. . In 1805 those sacola, 2 Woods, 632 ; Walnut Township
inhabitants were given a charter, for the v. Jordan, 38 Kan. 562 ; ante, sec. 85, and
first time since the cession of 1803, and cases cited, sec. 170, note; post, secs. 173,
that charter has been altered and amended 176, 177.
some way or other, in subsequent years, In delivering the judgment of the court
viz. : 1812, 1818, 1833, 1835, 1837, 1846, in Broughton v. Pensacola, Mr. Justice
1850, 1852, 1870, and 1882 ; but the city, Field observes :
the existence of which was generally recog- Although a municipal corporation, so
nized by the various Constitutions, has far as it is invested with subordinate
retained its identity, not only as a mat- legislative powers for local purposes, is a
ter of fact, but also as a matter of legal mere instrumentality of the State for the
necessity." See supra, sec. 170, and cases
convenient administration of government;
in note.
yet, when authorized to take stock in a
Mr. Girard's will of 1831 gave the resi- railroad company, and issue its obligations
duum of his estate by its corporate name to in payment of the stock, it is to that ex-
the old city of Philadelphia in trust for tent to be deemed a private corporation,
certain objects, the primary one being the and its obligations are secured by all the
college, and the secondary ones “to enable guiaranties which protect the engagements
the city to improve its police, to improve of private individuals. The inhibition of
the city property and the appearance of the Constitution, which preserves against
the city itself, and to diminish taxation.' the interference of a State the sacredness
The old city accepted the trust. By 1854 of contracts, applies to the liabilities of
twenty-eight distinct suburban municipal municipal corporations created by its per-
ities had grown up around the old city, and mission ; and although the repeal or modi-
by an act of that year all of their charters fication of the charter of a corporation of
and that of the old city itself were abol- that kind is not within the inhibition, yet
ished, and their rights of property trans- it will not be admitted, where its legisla-
ferred to the new consolidated corporation tion is susceptible of another construction,
of the city of Philadelphia, which instead of that the State has in this way sanctioned
being two miles square has about one hun- an evasion of or escape from liabilities the
dred and twenty-nine square miles. The creation of which it authorized. When,
heirs of Mr. Girard claimed that the anni. therefore, a new form is given to an old
hilation of the old city and its merger into municipal corporation, or such a corpora-
the immense consolidated corporation de- tion is reorganized under a new charter,
feated the object of the testator. But the taking in its new organization the place of
court held that “the identity of the cor- the old one, embracing substantially the
poration was not destroyed, and that the same corporators and the same territory, it
change in its name, the enlargement of its will be presumed that the legislature in-
area, &c., did not affect its title to prop- tended a continued existence of the same
erty held at the time of such change, or its corporation, although different powers are
capacity to execute the trusts of the will." possessed under the new charter, and dif-
Girard v. Philadelphia, 7 Wall. 1 (1868). ferent officers administer its affairs ; and
The essential point in this case is that it in the absence of express provision for
256
§ 173
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
§ 173. Same subject. — The case contemplated in the preceding
sections, in which the continuous legal escistence and identity of a
municipality will be held to exist, where substantially the same in-
habitants and the same territory are concerned, notwithstanding a
change in boundaries and form of organization has taken place, is
one of quite common occurrence and of easy solution. But suppose
the legislature absolutely repeals the charter or constituent act of an
indebted municipality, and makes no provision for the payment of
its debts, or, instead of an absolute repeal, it makes such changes as
do not relate substantially to the same inhabitants and the same
territory, as for example supersedes or dissolves the indebted muni-
cipality, and annexes what constituted its territory and people to
other municipalities, and makes no provision for its debts or their
mode of payment. Is the creditor remediless except by an appeal
to the legislature? This is a difficult inquiry, and we have endeav-
ored to answer it in the preceding sections and in the cases referred
to in the notes, as far as it has been possible to do so in the existing
state of the adjudications of the Supreme Court of the United States,
whose determination of such questions is final and authoritative.
The author ventures the suggestion that the true solution of the
many difficulties may possibly be found in the consideration that
the power of a municipality to levy taxes to pay its debts as the
power
existed at the time when the debts were created, is in its es-
sence not the grant of a power to the incorporated body, but to the
inhabitants of the incorporated territory. In this view the power or
the contract obligation and duty of its exercise survives the repeal
of the charter and the dissolution of the old corporation, and passes,
equally with the obligation to pay the debt, to the inhabitants who
continue to reside, under any form of organization, within the muni-
cipal area in behalf of which the debt was created; the exercise of
which power and consequent duty may be compelled by the judicial
process of mandamus whenever there are officers in existence who,
under the general legislation of the State, have the power to levy
and collect taxes.
their payment otherwise, it will also be portion and placing the other under the
presumed in such case that the legislature charge of the local authorities, and where
intended that the liabilities as well as the under the circumstances a judgment cred-
rights of property of the corporation in its itor was held to be without legal remedy.
old form should accompany the corpora. See also cases of the city of Memphis, city
tion in its reorganization." See and com- of Mobile, and city of Brownsville, ante,
pare Barkley v. Levee Comm'rs, 93 U. 8. sec. 170, note.
258, where a levee district — a quasi pub- 1 Ante, secs. 3 d, 170-172, and cases as
lic corporation was superseded in its to the nature of incorporated municipal.
functions by a law dividing the district, ities.
and creating a new corporation for one
.
§ 174
257
REVIVAL BY NEW CHARTER AND ITS EFFECT.
It is usual, however, for the legislature, on the change or division
of municipal and public corporations, to make provision concerning
existing indebtedness; and its power to do so, unless restrained by
special constitutional provision, is clear and ample.
§ 174 (116). Revival by new Charter and its Effect. It is the
doctrine of the English courts that where the functions of an old
corporation are suspended, or where the corporation, by loss of all its
members, or of an integral part, is dissolved as to certain purposes,
it may be revived by a new charter, and the rights of the old corpora-
tion be granted over to the same, or a new set of corporators, who in
such case take all the rights and are subject to all the liabilities of
the old corporation, of which it is but a continuation.”
1 Ante, chap. iv.; post, secs. 185, 187, tention of the legislature. Ante, chap. V.;
188, 189; ante, sec. 170 and notes, 172, Bellows v. Bank, &c., 2 Mason C. C. 43,
173. When two municipal corporations per Story, J.; Angell & Ames, sec. 780;
(St. Anthony and Old Minneapolis) were Grant on Corporations, 304, 305 ; Hoffman
merged, by legislative act, into a new cor- v. Van Nostrand, 42 Barb. 174 ; Girard v.
poration, it was held that the new corpo- Philadelphia, 7 Wall. 1; Olney v. Harvey,
ration, by force of provisions in the act, was 50 Ill. 453 (1869); supra, secs. 170, 171,
liable for a tort, for which one of the con- 172, 173; post, secs. 176, 177 ; Neely v.
stituent corporations would have been re- Yorkville, 10 S. C. 141. Approving text,
sponsible if the merger had not taken as to whom the revenue is to be paid on
place. Adams v. Minneapolis, 20 Minn. the dissolution of a corporation in New
484 (1874).
Jersey. See Heckel v. Sandford, 40 N. J.
2 Rex v. Passmore, 3 Term R. 119, 1.. 180.
I. 180. The late civil war did not sus-
247 ; Regina v. Bewdley, 1 P. Wms. 207; pend the right to the exercise of the fran-
Colchester v. Brooke, 7 Queen's Bench, chises of an incorporated town within the
383 ; Colchester v. Seaber, 3 Burr. 1866; lines of the insurrectionary forces, and it
Grant on Corporations, 304 and note ; 2 might still make valid contracts, notwith-
Kyd, 516. Whether a statute or legisla- standing it was under the control of the
tive charter will operate to revive or insurgent power. Selma v. Mullen, 46
continue an old, or to create a new and Ala. 411 (1871).
distinct corporation, depends upon the in-
VOL. I. – 17
258
§ 176
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
CHAPTER VIII.
CORPORATE NAME, BOUNDARIES, AND SEAL.
$ 175 (117). Name by Grant, by Implication, and by Prescrip-
tion; Power to change. — Every corporation must have a name.
This is essential to distinguish it from other corporations. In Eng-
land, before the Municipal Corporations Act of 5 and 6 Will. IV.
ch. lxxvi., 1835,1 such corporations obtained their name by having it
expressed in their charter (whether royal or parliamentary), or by
usage or by implication. If a particular name be given to a corpo-
ration in its charter, the corporation can no more change it at its
pleasure than a man can at pleasure change his baptismal name.
If no name be given to a corporation by its charter or by statute,
it may obtain one by implication. Where a corporation exists by
prescription, it may have more than one name, but the names, to be
recognized as valid, must be prescriptive, and cannot be acquired by
usage within the time of memory. It has been decided, in England,
that a corporation may have one name by prescription and another
by grant; but it is said that the same corporation cannot, at the
same time, have two different names by different grants, for the
name in the last grant will take the place of the other.3
§ 176 (118). Name under English Municipal Corporations Act.
But the English Municipal Corporations Act, just mentioned,
which changed the corporate constitution of the cities, towns, and
boroughs of England and Wales, and reduced them to a uniform
model, made this provision as to the name of the corporation, under
the new act: “Said body, or reputed body, corporate shall take and
bear the name of the mayor, aldermen, and burgesses of such
borough, and, by that name shall have perpetual succession, and
shall be capable, in law, by the council hereinafter mentioned of
such borough, to do and suffer all acts which now lawfully they and
1 Ante, sec. 36, and note.
1 Str. 614; Smith v. Tal. Pl. R. Co., 30
2 Glover, 52, 53 ; Willc. 35; Grant, 50; Ala. 650 (1857). See also, All Saints
ante, sec. 42. As to usage, see ante, chap. Church v. Lovett, 1 Hall (N. Y.), 191 ;
V. sec. 92.
Manufacturing Co. v. Davis, 14 Johns.
8 Knight v. Wells, 1 Ld. Raym. 80; 238 ; Middlesex, &c. v. Davis, 3 Met. 133;
Physicians v. Salmon, 3 Salk. 102 ; Com. Trustees v. Peaslee, 15 N. H. 317 ; Soci-
Dig. Franch. F. 9; per Holt, 1 Salk. 191; ety, &c. v. Young, 2 N. H. 310.
§ 177
259
CORPORATE NAME.
act.” 1
» 2
their successors may do and suffer, by any name or title of incorpo-
ration, so far as not altered or annulled by the provisions of this
It is settled by the decisions under this act that the true or
proper corporate name for boroughs mentioned in it is “mayor, alder-
men, and burgesses of the borough of "and (under the inter-
pretation clause, sec. 142 of the act) for cities, "mayor, aldermen,
and citizens of the city of
It may also be here observed
that the courts have determined that, though this act changed the
name and made new and important alterations in the constitution
of the corporations, yet that its effect was not in any case to create a
new corporation, but to continue the old, with all its rights, privi-
leges, and franchises, except so far as inconsistent with the pro-
visions of the act. But the name mentioned in the act would
doubtless govern, and by that they would have to sue and be
sued.
are
$ 177 (119). Name under Charter or Legislative Act in this
country. - Municipal Charters granted by legislative enactment in
this country almost invariably prescribe the name of the corporate
body thus : “The inhabitants of the city or town of
hereby constituted a body politic and corporate, by the name and
style of city of or 'town of
So the general muni-
cipal incorporation acts usually contain a provision to the effect
that “ cities and towns organized or to be organized thereunder are
declared to be bodies politic and corporate, under the name and
style of the city of or town of - as the case may be," &c.
794
6
2
15 and 6 Will. IV. chap. lxxvi., sec. of electing members were changed, the
; ante, sec. 35, and note. By the Con- identity of the body itself was not affected.”
solidated Municipal Corporations Act of Ante, chap. vii. secs. 171, 176.
1882, ser.. 8, it is provided that “the Mu- 4 Ante, sec. 39. Harrison, Munic. Man-
nicipal Corporation of a borough shall bear ual, 4th ed. 11.
the name of the mayor, aldermen, and The proper corporate name of a munici-
burgesses of the borough, or in the case of pal corporation ought always to be used.
a city, the mayor, aldermen, and citizens But it has been decided in Canada that a
of the city.”
by-law of a municipal council is valid if it
Attorney-General v. Corporation of appear on the face of it to have been en-
Worcester, 2 Phillips, 3; Corporation of acted by a municipal body having author-
Rochester v. Lee, 15 Sim. 376; Grant, ity to make the by-law under the muni-
342 ; Rawlinson, 13.
cipal laws. Flewellyn v. Webster, 6 U.C.
Corporation of Ludlow v. Tyler, 7 Q. B.586; Hawkins v. Huron, Perth and
Car. & P. 537 ; Attorney-General v. Wil- Bruce, in re, 2 Upper Can. C. P. 72 ;
son, 9 Sim. 30, 48; Attorney-General v. Fisher v. Vaughan, 10 Upper Can. Q. B.
Kerr, 2 Beav. 420, 429 ; Attorney-General 492; Barclay and Darlington, In re, 11
v. Corporation of Leicester, 9 Beav. 546; Upper Can. Q. B. 470 ; Brophy and Gan-
Doe, &c. v. Norton, 11 M. & W. 913, 928. anoque, 26 Upper Can. C. P. 290 ; see
Parke, B., there said, Though the name also Gwynne v. Rees, 2 Upper Can. P. R.
and style of the corporation, and the mode 282.
8
260
§ 179
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
Where such an act authorized any existing town or city to adopt
its provisions in place of its special charter, and was silent as to
the corporate name after the change was made, it was held that the
former name was retained.1
§ 178 (120). Change of Name; Name by Reputation. Where
a name is given to a municipal corporation by charter or statute, this
cannot be changed by the act of the corporation. But in this coun-
try, general statutes are not unfrequent, authorizing the creation of
quasi corporations, without making it necessary to designate the
name by which a particular district shall be called; in such case it
may acquire a name by reputation, and sue and be sued by such
name.8
$ 179 (121). Misnomer and Effect thereof. A misnomer, or
variation from the precise name of the corporation, in a grant or
obligation by or to it, is not material, if the identity of the corpora-
tion is unmistakable, either from the face of the instrument or from
the averments and proof.
1 Johnson v. Indianapolis, 16 Ind. 227 Halst. Ch. (N. J.) 641 (1851); Angell &
(1861). Corporate name of the city or- Ames, sec. 185; Pendleton v. Bank of
ganized under a general act not judicially Kentucky, 1 Mon. 177 ; Medway Cotton
noticed. lb. Limits of Indianapolis are Manufacturing Co. v. Adams, 10 Mass.
fixed by public law, and public records 360 ; People v. Love, 19 Cal. 676 ; African
open to all. Newman v. Sylvester, 42 Ind. Society v. Varick, 13 Johns. 38; Woolrich
106 (1873); ante, secs. 41, 83.
v. Forrest, 1 Pa. 115 ; Bower v. State
2 Willcock, 34, 37, 38 ; Regina v. Re- Bank, 5 Ark. 234 ; Pierce v. Somerworth,
gistrar Joint Stock Cos., 10 Q. B. 839. See 10 N. H. 369 ; Pittsburgh v. Craft, 1
Episcopal, &c. Society v. Episcopal Church, Pitts. (Pa.) 158 (1871); Douglas v. Branch
1 Pick. 372. Change of name does not Bank, &c., 19 Ala. 659. Slight variances
necessarily involve a change of identity. in the use of corporate names, where sub-
Girard v. Philadelphia, 7 Wall. 1 ; ante, stantially correct, have been held immate-
chap. vii. sec. 174.
rial even in matters of contract. Brock
8 School District v. Blakeslee, 13 Conn. District v. Bowen, 7 Upper Can. Q. B.
227 (1839); The Queen v. The Registrar 471 ; The Trent and Frankford Road Co.
of Joint Stock Cos., 10 Q. B. 839 ; Episco- v. Marshall, 10 Upper Can. C. P. 336 ;
pal Charitable Society v. Episcopal Church, Whitby v. Harrison, 18 Upper Can. Q. B.
1 Pick. 372; see further, The King v. 603 ; Bruce v. Cromar, 22 Upper Can.
Norris, 1 Ld. Raym. 337; The Queen v. Q. B. 321. See also Mayor and Bur-
Bailiffs of Ipswich, 2 Ld. Raym. 1232, gesses of Lynne Regis, 10 Coke Rep. 120,
1238, 1239. As to quasi corporations, 122; Mayor of Carlisle v. Blamire et al.,
ante, sec. 22, and note ; post, chapter on 8 East, 487 ; The King v. Croke, Cowp.
Actions.
29 ; Beverley v. Barlow, 10 Upper Can.
4 Inhabitants v. String, 5 Halst. (N. J.) C. P. 178 ; Goodwin and The Ottawa and
323 (1829); Neely v. Yorkville, 10 S. Prescott Railway Co., In re, 13 Upper
C. 141, approving text; Kentucky Sem- Can. C. P. 254. It was, however, held
inary v. Wallace, 15 B. Mon. 35 (1854); differently as to the entitling of a rule in
New York Conference v. Clarkson, 4 a proceeding against a municipal corpora-
§ 180
261
MISNOMER AND EFFECT THEREOF.
§ 180 (122). Same subject. — Where the intention of the testator
is clear, a mistake in the name or description of the object of his
bounty will not make the devise void. This general principle is
applicable to all corporations, private and public. But the intention
must be so clear as to remove all reasonable doubt as to the cor-
poration meant. This rule may be illustrated by a few examples.
Thus, a devise to a college by its common name, though not the
true corporate name, is good. So where the devisees were called
by their popular name, " The South Parish in Sutton," their legal
name being "The First Parish in Sutton," the devise was sustained.2
So, also, the "Mayor, Jurats, and Commonalty of the Town of
Rye,” that being the corporate name, were held entitled to lands by
a devise to “The Right Worshipful the Mayor, Jurats, and Town
Council of the Town of Rye," although there was no town council
in the town, and although the court admitted the proposition of
counsel against the will, that if the "intent appears to give to a
part of the corporation, although that intent fails of effect, the
whole corporation cannot take.” 3 So, also, a devise to the Mayor,
Chamberlain, and Governors, is valid to a corporation whose true
name is Mayor, Citizens, and Commonalty. So, a legacy may be given
tion. Sams v. Toronto, 9 Upper Can. &c. v. Myers, 6 Serg. & Rawle, 12 ; S. P.
Q. B. 181 ; Harrison, Munic. Manual, 4th Milford, &c. Co. v. Brush, 10 Ohio, 111.
ed. 11.
When an act of parliament nakes a
“The general rule to be collected from grant to a corporation, it takes effect
the cases is,” says Chancellor Kent, “that though the true corporate name be not
a variation from the precise name of the used, provided the corporation intended
corporation, when the true name is neces- be sufficiently identified or described. 1
sarily to be collected from the instrument, Kyd, 256 ; Chancellor of Oxford's Case, 10
or is shown by proper averments, will not Co. 44, 576.
invalidate a grant by or to a corporation, 1 Chancellor of Oxford's Case, 10 Co.
or a contract with it, and the modern 87b.
cascs show an increased liberality on this 2 First Parish in Sutton v. Cole, 3 Pick.
subject.” 2 Kent Com. 292; approved, 232 (1825), and cases there cited.
St. Louis Hospital v. Williams, Adminis- 8 Attorney-General v. Mayor of Rye,
trator, 19 Mo. 609 (1854). “We adopt 7 Taunton, 546 ; 2 Eng. Com. Law, 213
the more reasonable rule laid down by Mr. (1817).
Kyd (Corp. Vol. I. pp. 286, 288), that 4 Owen, 35 (14 Eliz. ). "The devise
the variance must be materially different held good by Dyer, Weston, and Manwood,
in substance, to injure." Per Curiam, for it shall be taken according to the in-
People v. Runkle, 9 Johns. 147, 157. tent of the devisor." See also Counden v.
“I take the law of the present day to Clerke, Hobart, 32; Croydon Hospital v.
be, that a departure from the strict style Farley, 6 Taunton, 467; 1 Eng. Com.
of the corporation will not avoid its con- Law, 457 (1816), where Gibbs, C. J., justly
tracts, if it substantially appear that the condemns the absurd nicety of many of
particular corporation was intended, and the decisions from the reign of Edward
that a latent ambiguity may, under proper VI. to the end of James I., on the subject
averments, be explained by parol evidence of the names and description of corporate
in this as in other cases, to show the in- bodies.
tention." Per Gibson, J., in President,
262
§ 182
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
or a devise made to a corporation either by its corporate name or by
a description which clearly distinguishes and identifies the legatee.
§ 181 (123). Corporate Name in Suits. Where the name of
the corporation is expressly defined by charter or statute, it is usu-
ally provided in terms that by such name it may sue and be sued.
In such case the true corporate name should be used both in suits
by and against the corporation. A name in a grant or obligation to
or by a corporation may be sufficient to enable the corporation to
enjoy or to make it liable, which would not be sufficient in an action
by or against it. If the name of a corporation is lawfully changed,
not the identity of the corporation itself, suit should, in general,
unless provision be otherwise made, be in the new name. If a
note, bond, or other promise be made to a corporation by a name
differing from the corporate name, the corporation may sue in
its true name, and allege that it is the party to whom the promise
or obligation was made.4
§ 182 (124). Corporate Boundaries must be definite. Since
the leading object of an American municipal corporation is to invest
v.
1 New York Institute v. How, 10 N. Y. Comm’rs, 16 Ohio St. 353 ; Trustees v.
(6 Seld.) 84 (1854). In this case the Campbell, 16 Ohio St. 11.
plaintiff, whose corporate name was " The 3 Colchester Seaber, 3 Burr.
New York Institution for the Blind," was 1866 ; Regina v. Ipswich, 2 Ld. Raym.
decided to be entitled to a legacy given to 1232, 1238; Angell & Ames, sec. 644 ;
the “ Trustees of the Institution for the Glover, 63. Mr. Kyd says :
6. Where a
Maintenance and Instruction of the Indi- corporation becomes liable to any duty,
gent Blind," there being no other institu- and then its name is changed, the writ
tion in the city of New York for the blind. brought against it should be in the new
See also Vansant v. Roberts, 3 Md. 119; name.” 1 Corp. 288. On a merger, hy
Preachers' Aid Society, 45 Me. 552 ; Cha- statute, of a town into a city corporation, it
pin v. School District, &c., 35 N. H. 445 ; was provided that all of the books, papers,
Minot v. Boston Asylum, 7 Met. 416. moneys, and effects of the former should
Parol evidence may, in proper cases, be re- vest in the latter. Held, that a suit on a
ceived to identify the corporation intended. bond made to a town before the transfer
Trustees v. Peaslee, 15 N. H. 317 ; Bod- could not afterwards be instituted in the
man v. American Tract Society, 9 Allen, name of the town, but should be brought
447.
in the corporate name of the city. Fort
2 Cambridge University v. Crofts, 10 Wayne v. Jackson, 7 Blackf. (Ind.) 36
Mod. 208 ; 1 Kyd, 253 ; Willc. 37 ; Brit (1843).
tan v. Newland, 2 Dev. & Bat. (N. 4 10 Co. 125 b; 1 Kyd, 287 ; African
C.) 363 ; Insane Asylum v. Higgins, 15 Society v. Varick, 13 Johns. 38 (1816);
Ill. 185 ; Berks Co., &c. v. Myers, 6 Serg. Trustees v. Reneau, 2 Swan (Tenn.), 94
& Rawle (Pa.), 12; Clarke v. Potter Co., 1 (1852); Fort Wayne v. Jackson, 7 Blackf.
Barr (Pa.), 163; Porter v. Blakely, 1 Root (Ind.) 36 (1843). Ap allegation that the
(Conn.), 440 ; Kentucky Seminary v. defendants acknowledged themselves to be
Wallace, 15 B. Mon. 35 ; Romeo v. Chap- bound unto the plaintiffs, by the descrip-
man, 2 Mich. 179; County Court v. tion, &c., is equivalent to such an aver-
Griswold, 58 Mo. 175 (1874); Carder v. ment. 13 Johns. 38, supra.
+
$ 182
263
BOUNDARIES MUST BE DEFINITE.
the inhabitants of a defined locality or place with a corporate ex-
istence, chiefly for the purposes of local government, it is obvious
that the geographical limits or boundaries of the corporation ought
to be defined and certain. These boundaries are usually described in
the charter or constituent act, or a method is prescribed therein, by
which they may be ascertained and settled. Because residence
within the corporation confers rights and imposes duties upon the
residents, and the local jurisdiction of the incorporated place is, in
most cases, confined to the limits of the corporation, it is necessary
that these limits be definitely fixed. They are established by legis-
1 Cutting v. Stone, 7 Vt. 471 ; Gray v. and down the river, extend to the centre
Sheldon, 8 Vt. 402; Pierce v. Carpenter, of the river, and this principle is held to
10 Vt. 480. The general rule is that mu- apply to the great streams, the Connecti-
nicipal corporations cannot exercise their cut and the Merrimack. State v. Canter-
powers beyond their own lirnits, but there bury, 8 Fost. (28 N. H.) 195 (1854);
are some escceptions, as for example to pro- State v. Gilmanton, 14 N. H. 467. See,
vide for the discharge of sewage. Cold- also, Cold Springs, &c. v. Tolland, 9 Cush.
water v. Tucker, 36 Mich. 474 (1877); 492.
9. C. 24 Am. Rep. 601 ; Gilchrist's Ap- In Connecticut, towns bounded on riv.
peal, 109 Pa. St. 600. Whether particular ers in some instances take the land on
property is within the boundaries of a city each side of the river, in which case the
is a question of fact. Indianapolis v. Mc- whole river is within the jurisdiction of
Avoy, 86 Ind. 587.
the town. In other instances, where
As to boundaries generally, and con- towns are bounded on rivers, the jurisdic-
struction of acts relating thereto, see Ham- tion thereof is construed, without any ex-
ilton v. McNeil, 13 Gratt. (Va.) 389; press provision to that effect, and in vir-
Raab v. Maryland, 7 Md. 483; Green v. tue of ancient usage to that effect, to
Cheek, 5 Ind. 105; People v. Carpenter, extend to the centre of the stream. Op-
24 N. Y. 86; Elmendorf v. Mayor, &c., posite towns have each political and civil
25 Wend. 693 ; post, secs. 562, 634. Ajurisdiction to the centre, though the
municipal corporation cannot usually ex- charter limits extend only to the stream
ercise its powers beyond its own limits. or margin or channel thereof. Pratt v.
Considerations of public policy sometimes State (assault on officer on the river Con-
induce the legislature to grant authority necticut), 5 Conn. 388 (1824); Hayden v.
to do so, as where a water supply must be Noyes (oyster fishery on the Connecticut
obtained from a distance, Coldwater v. River), 5 Conn. 391, 395. Hosmer, C. J.
Tucker, 36 Mich. 474 (1877).
(5 Conn. 395), remarks : “ Every part of
Places bounded on rivers : The following the Connecticut River, so far as it relates
cases relate to questions which have arisen to jurisdiction, is within some town in the
with respect to places bounded on rivers. .State ; or these waters would be a sanctu.
An act extending the bounds of a town ary for debtors or criminals. Such has
over the adjacent navigable waters does been the invariable usage.”
not thereby grant to the town the land The jurisdiction of Brooklyn, for police
covered by the water, and consequently purposes, extends to low-water line whether
confers no right to make rules to regulate formed naturally or artificially Furman
the use of such land, although such an act Street, 17 Wend. 649, 661. See Udall v.
will bring the territory within the limits Trustees, 19 Johns. 175; Stryker v. Mayor,
of the town for the purpose of civil and 19 Johns. 179 ; as to boundary of Nero
criminal jurisdiction. Palmer v. Hicks, 6 York City. By statute, the bounds of
Johns. 133 (1810).
Albany extend to the middle of the Hud-
In New Hampshire, towns bounded by son River.
son River. 9 Wend. 602. Eastern boun- .
or on rivers not navigable, or by lines up dary line of St. Louis was defined by the
264
$ 183
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
lative authority. The power to incorporate a place necessarily in-
cludes the power to fix its boundaries. I
.
§ 183. Legislative Power to fix and determine Geographical Limits;
Delegation of such Power. The fundamental idea of a municipal
corporation proper, both in England and in this country, is to invest
compact or dense populations with the power of local self-government.
Indeed, the necessity for such corporations springs from the exist-
ence of centres or agglomerations of population, having, by reason
of density and numbers, local or peculiar interests and wants, not
common to adjoining sparsely settled or agricultural regions. It is
necessary to draw the line which defines the limits of the place and
people to be incorporated. This is with us a legislative function.
And, therefore, in a special charter incorporating a place, the boun-
daries are expressly defined in the charter itself, and the power of
the legislation by its direct action thus to determine the extent of the
geographical limits of the corporation is very broad, and in fact
unlimited, except where the provisions of the charter are such as
would contravene constitutional limitations, express or implied.
But where municipalities are organized under general statutes no
charter to be the Mississippi River, and it 1 Galesburg v. Hawkinson, 75 Ill. 156 ;
was held to extend to the middle of the Kelly v. Pittsburgh, 104 U. S. 78. The
stream, and not simply to the bank. Jones power to change the territorial limits of a
v. Soulard, 24 How. 41 (1860).
municipal corporation cannot, in Tennes-
In Pennsylvania if a municipal corpo- see, be delegated to a court. Willett v.
ration is bounded by a navigable river its Bellville, 11 Lea (Tenn.), 1. “It is cer-
low-water mark is the limit. Gilchrist's tainly not within the power of the legisla-
Appeal, 109 Pa. St. 600.
ture to give to a municipal corporation the
Where the riparian proprietor only power of absorbing as much of the property,
owns to high-water mark, and all below and as many of the people, of a county, as
belongs to the State, a city cannot tax it may suit the wishes of the municipal
lots covered by water beyond high-water authorities to make subjects of their taxa-
mark. State v. Jersey City, 1 Dutch. tion and ordinances.” Irving, J., County
(N. J.) 525 ; 1 Dutch. 530.
Commissioners v. Bladensburg, 51 Md.
Statute duty as to bridges of adjacent 465. The legislature may, in Arkansas,
towns bounding on a river running be- vest in a court the power to determine
tween them. Brookline v. Westminster, when the limits of a town may be ex-
4 Vt. 224 ; Granby v. Thurston, 23 Conn. tended. Foreman v. Town of Marianna,
416. The same construction that is given 43 Ark. 324. A petition praying for a
to grants is given to statutes which pre- certiorari to bring up the record of such a
scribe the boundary of incorporated terri- court, must show that the petitioners are
tories. Thus, where a stream not naviga- interested in the question as residents or
ble is made the boundary, the centre of property owners, either in the old town or
the stream is the true line. Cold Springs, in the district sought to be annexed. Per-
&c. v. Tolland, 9 Cush. 492 (1852) (action kins v. Holman, 43 Ark. 219.
for defective bridge); Inhabitants of Ips- 2 Ante, secs. 9, 19, 22, 28, 29, 32, 37,
wich, 13 Pick. 431 ; Granger v. Avery, 64 41, 44, 54, 58, 72, 73.
Me. 292 (1874).
1
§ 183
265
POWER TO FIX LIMITS.
expression of the legislative will as to the exact boundaries of any
particular place proposing to become incorporated can be made. The
vital question of boundaries must then be determined in some other
mode. The legislation of the different states in which this system of
organizing municipal corporations has been adopted, is not uniform
in its details; but the authority to incorporate has usually been
restricted as in England to cases in which communities more or
less dense and populous already exist, and who desire to take on
a corporate character in order to exercise the powers of local gov-
ernment. When duly organized their powers are prescribed and
defined by the general incorporating statutes. But how and by
whom is the extent of territory to be included within the corporate
limits (which necessarily settles what property and what persons
will become subject to municipal rule) to be determined ? Unless
specially restrained by the State Constitution, the legislature may
delegate this power to appropriate local bodies or boards or officers; 2
but it has in several cases been made a question how far this power,
which is essentially political or administrative, may be conferred
upon the judicial courts. This depends somewhat upon local con-
stitutions, laws, and usages; and the principal cases on the subject
are referred to in the note.3
2
1 People v. Bennett, 29 Mich. 451 two village settlements separated by in-
(1874); s. C. 18 Am. Rep. 107, where tervening farins. It was held that the
this subject is, with his usual ability, statute was unconstitutional, because it
learnedly examined by Campbell, J., from allowed the petitioners for incorporation
whose opinion the doctrines of the text to decide upon extent of territory to be in-
have mainly been deduced.
corporated, and because the legislature had
People v. Bennett, supra; Blanchard attempted to delegate legislative powers in
v. Bissell, 11 Ohio St. 96 (1860); People this respect to private citizens, instead of
v. Carpenter, 24 N. Y. 86 (1861); Devore's legal bodies, boards, or officers, no notice,
Appeal, 56 Pa. St. 163; Borough of no hearing, and no right to a hearing
Blooming Valley ; Ib. 66; Osgood v. being provided.
Clark, 6 Fost. (26 N. H.) 307.
“ Acts
8 People v. Bennett, supra, and cases
of the legislature conferring upon muni- cited in last note. But compare with
cipal corporations the power to extend their People v. Nevada, 6 Cal. 143, in which it
limits have been generally upheld ;” per was held that the judicial courts could not
Henry, C. J. Kelly v. Meeks, 87 Mo. be empowered to act in the incorporation
396, citing Stilz v. Indianapolis, 55 Ind. of towns, because it was not a judicial act.
515; Taylor v. Fort Wayne, 47 Ind. 274; Contra, Kayser v. Trustees, &c., 16 Mo.
People v. Bennett, 29 Mich. 451 ; Blan- 88; ante, sec. 4), note ; sec. 182, note
chard v. Bissell, 11 Ohio St. 96; People v.
and cases.
In Illinois it has been decided
Carpenter, 24 N. Y. 86; Devore's Appeal, that the legislature cannot constitution-
56 Pa. St. 163, and the text.
ally confer upon the judicial courts the
In The People v. Bennett, supra, aris- power to change the boundaries of muni.
ing under the Michigan Statute of 1873, cipalities by annexing or disannexing terri.
for the general incorporation of villages tory, as such acts are legislative and not
within any two square miles of territory, judicial. Galesburg v. Hawkinson, 75 Ill.
an attempt was made to incorporate as one 152. See, however, Blanchard v. Bissell,
1
266
§ 184
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
§ 184 (125). Only one Corporation of Same Kind in Same Area.
There cannot be, at the same time, within the same territory, two dis-
tinct municipal corporations, exercising the same powers, jurisdictions,
and privileges."
11 Ohio St. 96 (1860); post, sec. 185, note. their immediate vicinity, would have re-
In Arkansas the determination of what pealed the charter of the latter, or at least
the boundaries are is within the power of curtailed their power. What in the open
the courts. Little Rock v. Parish, 36 and thinly settled country would not be ob-
Ark. 166.
noxious as a nuisance, would in the heart
1 Willc. on Corp. 27 ; Patterson v. of a city be a terrible nuisance. Persons
Society, &c., 4 Zabr. (24 N. J. L.) 385, then desiring to engage in particular avoca-
399, per Green, C. J. (1854); Rex v. tions in or near to cities, must submit to
Passmore, 3 Term R. 243 ; Rex v. Amery, have their pursuits limited and contracted.
2 Bro. P. C. 336; Grant on Corp. 18. Whilst trade, manufactures, and commerce
This," says Osborn, J., “is a self-evi- have large claims on the laws for protection,
dent proposition.” Taylor v. Fort Wayne, theirs is not the only, nor have they the
47 Ind. 281 (1874); Strosser v. Fort highest claims. To accomplish this
Wayne, 100 Ind. 443 ; Drain Commis- purpose (protect health and lives), the
sioner v. Baxter, 57 Mich. 127.
power was conferred by the legislature
The city of Chicago adopted an ordi- upon cities and villages to regulate these
nance prohibiting any person, company, or establishments for the distance of one mile
corporation within the city, or within a beyond their corporate limits, even if that
mile of the city limits, from engaging in should lap over and embrace a portion of
the business of slaughtering animals for territory embraced in the boundaries of
food, or packing them for market, or ren- another municipality." Chicago Packing
dering the offal, bones, &c., of any dead Co. v. Chicago, 88 Ill. 221 (1879). Where
animal matter, &c., . until they shall the boundary line of a corporation was
have obtained a license therefor. The vague and indefinite, the practical inter-
defendant was a corporation, organized pretation which had been given to the
under the laws of the State, and when the statute by the citizens of the disputed
suit was instituted against the company it district in exercising municipal privileges,
was carrying on the kind of business men- such as voting, &c., was adopted by the
tioned in the ordinance. Its factory was court. Milne v. Mayor, &c., 13 La. 69
in Cook County, outside of the city limits, (1838). See, also, Hamilton v. McNeil,
and within the town of Lake, in that 13 Gratt. (Va.) 389 (1856); post, sec. 420
county, and it had then a license froin note. Where the middle of a road is the
the town of Lake to carry on the kind dividing line between two towns, each is
of business it was engaged in, but bound for defects within its own limits.
had no license from the city of Chi. They cannot be jointly indicted for a de-
cago. It was urged that the city of Chi- fect within the jurisdiction of one. In
cago had no power to pass or enforce the this case the defect was in a bridge form-
ordinance. Walker, J., who delivered the ing part of the road. State v. Thomaston
opinion, after a careful discussion of the and Rockland, 74 Me. 198. Boundaries
questions, viz. : 1. Whether the General may be defined by long use, confirmed by
Assembly had granted the power to the a legislative recognition. People v. Farn-
city of Chicago to pass an ordinance of ham, 35 Ill. 562. If a dwelling-house is
such a character ; 2. Whether the power divided by the boundary line between two
was also granted to exercise police restraint towns, that portion of the house which
outside of the city limits, and within the occupant mainly and substantially
another municipality, says : “We must makes his home (as by sleeping, eating,
conclude that the General Assembly, &c.) fixes his residence, and he cannot
rather than subject one large city to such elect to reside and be taxed in the other
hazards from smaller municipalities in town. Chenery v. Waltham, 8 Cush. 327.
$ 185
267
ENLARGEMENT OF BOUNDARIES.
§ 185 (126). Enlargement of Boundaries. — Not only may the
legislature originally fix the limits of the corporation, but it may,
unless specially restrained in the Constitution, subsequently annex, or
authorize the annexation of, contiguous or other territory, and this
without the consent, and even against the remonstrance, of the
majority of the persons residing in the corporation or on the annexed
territory. And it is no constitutional objection to the exercise of
this power of compulsory annexation that the property thus brought
within the corporate limits will be subject to taxation to discharge
a pre-existing municipal indebtedness, since this is a matter which,
in the absence of special constitutional restriction, belongs wholly to
the legislature to determine.
a very
In Indiana the qualified voters of a quire," says Swan, J., in Powers v. Wood
city within the limits of a township are County, 8 Ohio St. 285, 290,
held to be voters of the township for the artificial and unsound mode of reasoning
purpose of a township tax in aid of a rail- to hold that territory could not be an-.
road, and their property taxable within nexed to a town which owed debts, until
the township for that purpose. Scott v. the owners of such territory were paid a
Hausheer, 94 Ind. 1.
compensation in money for a proportional
1 Blanchard v. Bissell, 11 Ohio St. 96 part of such debts, on the ground that the
(1860), defining contiguity and construing property annexed was condemned for pub-
statute authorizing county commissioners lic use. It is not to be presumed that a
to annex ; following and approving Pow- municipal corporation has contracted a
ers v. Wood County, 8 Ohio St. 285 debt without being correspondingly bene-
(1858). Ante, sec. 63 and cases. See fited." The doctrine of the text approved.
also Laramie County v. Albany County, United States v. Memphis, 97 U. S. 284
92 U. S. 307 (1875); Queen v. Local Gov- (1877); noted, ante, sec. 63. In Michi-
erning Board, L. R. 8 Q. B. 227 ; Woods gan there are constitutional limitations on
v. Henry, 55 Mo. 560 ; Giboney v. Girar- the right of the legislature to change,
deau, 58 Mo. 141 ; State v. McReynolds, except as provided in the Constitution,
61 Mo. 203 (1875); Layton v. New municipal boundaries so far as to interfere
Orleans, 12 La. An. 515 (1857) ; Arnoult with representative districts. Attorney-
v. New Orleans, 11 La. An. 54 ; Cheany v. General r. Bradley, 36 Mich. 447 (1877) ;
Hooser, 9 B. Mon. 330 ; Gorham v. Attorney-General v. Holihan, 29 Mich.
Springfield, 21 Me. 59 ; Morford v. Unger, 116.
8 Iowa, 82 (1859); St. Louis v. Russell,
, The tenacity with which the people
9 Mo. 507 (1845); St. Louis v. Allen, 13 of New England cling to the popular or
Mo. 400 (1850); Smith v. McCarthy, 56 town form of government has been before
P'a. St. 359 ; Chandler v. Boston, 112 noticed (ante, secs. 28, 29); and the Con-
Mass. 200 (1873); Railroad Co. v. Spear- stitution of Massachusetts in the second
ian, 12 Iowa, 112; Wade v. Richmond, amendment, accepted in 1821, contains
18 Gratt. (Va.) 583 (1868); Norris v. the provision that the legislature “shall
Mayor, &c., 1 Swan (Tenn.), 164 ; Elston have full power and authority to erect and
v. Crawfordsville, 20 Ind. 272; Edmunds constitute municipal or city governments,
v. Gookins, Ib. 477 ; Girard v. Philadel- in any corporate town or towns in this
phia, 7 Wall. 1 (1868); Covington v. commonwealth, , , . provided, that no
East St. Louis, 78 Ill. 548; Graham v. such government shall be erected or con-
Greenville, 67 Tex. 62 (citing text); stituted in any town not containing 12,000
Board, &c. of Chickasaw Co. v. Board, &c. inhabitants, nor unless it be with the con-
of Sumner Co., 58 Miss. 619 ; Washburn sent and on the application of a majority
V. Oshkosh, 60 Wis. 453. " It would re- of the inhabitants of such town present
و
268
§ 186
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
Where no
§ 186. Property and debts on Legislative Extinction.
constitutional restriction exists, the corporate existence and powers of
and voting thereon at a meeting duly within the city limits by resolution of
warned and holden for that purpose. the common council. Contiguous territory
The legislature, without any application not thus laid off, &c., can only be an.
by a majority of the inhabitants of the nexed by petition to the board of county
town of Brookline, which contained a commissioners. Jeffersonville v. Weems,
population of about 6,500, annexed it to 5 Ind. (Porter) 547 (1854). Annexed
the city of Boston, the act to take effect if tracts, under this act, need not all be con-
accepted by a majority of voters voting at tiguous to the city; if they are contiguous
meetings to be held for that purpose. In
to each other and one is contiguous to the
the case of Chandler v. Boston, 112 Mass. city, it is sufficient. Huff v. Lafayette,
200 (1873), the question was presented 108 Ind. 14. One or more citizens of the
whether an entire town with less than territory sought to be annexed may main-
12,000 inhabitants can be annexed to a tain injunction to prevent an illegal an-
city, and also whether a previous applica- nexation (Delphi v. Startzman, 104 Ind.
tion of a majority of the inhabitants of the 343), but he is estopped from objecting if he
town is not essential to the erection or con- delays taking action when he knows the
stitution of a city government therein or city is spending large sums of money upon
over the inhabitants thereof. The validity the annexed district, even though its pro-
of the act providing for such annexation ceedings are void by reason of mistake
was sustained. See opinion of Justices, 6 of fact by its officers. Strosser v. Fort
Cush. 580 ; Warren v. Charlestown, 2 Wayne, 100 Ind. 443. See also as to
Gray, 104, as to general power of the laches, Logansport v. La Rose, 99 Ind.
legislature to change the boundaries of 117. Where there is jurisdiction in the
towns and cities. Owners of property in annexation proceedings, irregularities and
a territory proposed to be annexed have errors will not render them void so that
such an interest in the matter of annexa- they may be attacked in collateral pro-
tion as will entitle them to resort to the ceedings. Terre Haute v. Beach, 96 Ind.
courts to question the validity of an elec- 143 ; s. P. Cicero v. Williamson, 91 Ind.
tion to determine it. Morris v. Nashville, 541. An individual cannot question the
6 Lea (Tenn.), 337.
right of the corporation to exercise the
It is held in Pennsylvania that under functions, powers, and authority of an in-
the terms of the act of the legislature au- corporated city. This can only be done
thorizing the incorporation of villages, the by quo warranto in behalf of the State.
boundaries cannot be extended so as to in- Mullikin v. Bloomington, 72 Ind. 161,
clude a large body of farm lands; but the (application for injunction to restrain col-
district to be incorporated should be re- lection of taxes on the ground that the
stricted by the courts in which the pro- corporate existence was unlawfully changed
ceeding is had, so as to include no more from that of a town to that of a city, re-
than the village itself and its proper terri- fused). Construction of existing laws on
tory. Borough of Little Meadows, 35 Pa. subject of annexation of Platte Territory.
St. 335 (1860); Devore's Appeal, 56 Pa. Taylor v. Fort Wayne, 47 Ind. 274 (1874).
St. 163; Blooming Valley, 56 Pa. St. Effect of extension of corporate limits
66. These cases commented on by Camp- on homestead right, where different provis-
bell, J. People v. Bennett, 29 Mich. 451 ions are made for country and town home-
(1874); S. C. 18 Am. Rep. 107. As to steads. Taylor v. Boulware, 17 Tex. 74 ;
taxation, for general municipal purposes, Finley v. Dietrick, 12 Iowa, 516 ; Truax
of rural property within corporate limits, v. Pool, 46 Iowa, 256.
and the restrictions on the right, see chap- Ordinances or contracts designed to
ter on Taxation, post, secs. 794, 795. operate throughout the city at large, ex-
In Indiana, under act of June 18, 1852, tend to and operate within subsequent en-
lots adjoining a city, which are laid off, larged municipal limits. St. Louis Gas
platted, and recorded, may be included Co. v. St. Louis, 46 Mo. 121 (1870).
$ 187
269
PROPERTY AND DEBTS ON DIVISION OF TOWN.
counties, cities, and towns are subject to legislative control. Where
a municipal or public corporation is legislated out of existence and its
territory annexed to other corporations, the latter, unless the legis-
lature otherwise provides, are entitled to its property, and severally
liable for a proportionate share of its then subsisting legal debts, and
vested with the power to raise revenue wherewith to pay them by
levying taxes upon the property transferred and the persons residing
therein. The creditors of the extinguished corporation were held in
the case cited in the note to have a remedy in equity against the cor-
porations succeeding to its property and powers, to have the amount
ascertained, apportioned, and adjudged to be paid.1
In con-
$ 187 (127). Property and debts on Division of Town.
nection with the power of the legislature to create municipal
corporations and to determine their territorial extent, reference
may be made to the division of towns or public corporations by legis-
lative act or authority. There is no restriction on the general power,
unless it be found in the Constitution of the State.2 In case of
division, the legislature may, as we have already seen, apportion the
burden between the two, and determine the proportion to be borne
by each.3 In Connecticut," the legislature," says the Supreme Court,
Recording town plats. Bemis v. Becker, ville, 1 Root (Conn.), 184; North Yar-
1 Kan. 226 ; Mason v. Pitt, 21 Mo. 391 ; mouth v. Skillings, 45 Me. 133; Lakin v.
Strong v. Darling, 9 Ohio, 201 ; post, sec. Ames, 10 Cush. 198; Brewster v. Har-
628. Where the power to alter boundaries wich, 4 Mass. 278; Randolph v. Brain-
is committed to local tribunals their acts tree, 4 Mass. 315 ; Blackstone v. Taft, 4
must be strictly within the powers granted, Gray, 250 ; Hartford Bridge Co. v. East
otherwise they will be void. Jacksonville Hartford, 16 Conn. 149 ; East Hartford v.
v. L'Engle, 20 Fla. 344.
Hartford Bridge Co., 17 Conn. 80; Craw-
Locality, under the Canadian system of ford County v. Iowa County, 2 Chand.
municipal government, is subject to taxa- (Wis.) 14.
tion. Each portion of a county therefore 1 Mount Pleasant v. Beckwith, 100
should bear its proper proportion of the U. S. 514 (1879); noted more fully ante,
taxation of the whole county. Where a sec. 170, note.
portion is detached from one and added to 2 Ante, chap. iv. secs. 54 63 ; supra,
another county, some mode of adjustment sec. 186.
sec. 186. Where part of a township is set
of existing liabilities becomes indispensa- off to form another, the two townships are
ble. See McKee v. Huron District Court, not both new corporations, the old corpo-
1 Upper Can. Q. B. 368 ; North Dumfries, ration continues as before, and remains
v. The County of Waterloo, 12 Upper Can. chargeable with its former obligations.
Q. B. 507 ; County of Wellington v. Courtright v. Brooks Township, 54 Mich.
Township of Waterloo, 8 Upper Can. C. 182.
P. 358 ; County of Wellington 2. Town- 8 Ante, sec. 63, et seq.; Londonderry v.
ship of Wilmot, 17 Upper Can. Q. B. Derry, 8 N. H. 320 (1836); Bristol v. New
82. See, also, Windham v. Portland, 4 Chester, 3 N. H. 532 ; Sill v. Corning, 15
Mass. 384 ; Hampshire v. Franklin, 16 N. Y. 297 ; People v. Draper, 15 N. Y.
Mass. 76 ; Plunkett's Creek v. Crawford, 532 ; Smith v. Adrian, 1 Mich. 495 ; War.
27 Penn. St. 107; New London v. Mont- ing v. Mobile, 24 Ala. 701 ; Mayor v.
270
§ 188
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
“have immemorially exercised the power of dividing towns at its
pleasure, and upon such division, apportioning the common property
and common burdens in such manner as to it shall seem reasona-
ble and equitable.”1 Accordingly, it may impose on one town, upon
such division, the entire expense of erecting and maintaining a
bridge across a river which is the dividing line between the two
towns.2
§ 188 (128). Property on Division. On the division of a town
or public corporation possessing corporate property, into two separate
towns or communities, each, in the absence of a different provision
by the legislature, was considered by the Supreme Court of New
York to be entitled to hold in severalty the public property which fell
within its limits. In Connecticut, it is declared to be “ well settled
State, 15 Md. 376 ; Love v. Schenck, 12 by taxation (Plymouth v. Jackson, 15 Pa.
Ire. Law, 304 (1851); Love v. Ramsour, St. 44), or direct a division of the funds
12 [re. Law, 328 (1855); Olney v. Harvey, between two towns different from that
50 Ill. 453 ; Sedgwick Co. v. Bailey, 11 which is prescribed in the will of the
Kan. 631 (1873); Sangamon County v.
donor. Greenville v. Mason, 53 N. H.
Springfield, 63 Ill. 66 (1873); Dunmore's 515 (1873). See, also, Montpelier v. East
Appeal, 52 Pa. St. 374 ; Barkley v. Levee Montpelier, 27 Vt. 704 ; 29 Vt. 12 ; ante,
Comm'is, 93 U. S. 258 (1876); Broughton secs. 64, 80, 85, 171.
v. Pensacola, 93 U. S. 266 (1876); County 2 Granby v. Thurston, supra; ante, sec.
Court v. County Court, 2 Bush (Ky.), 93; 71.
Schriber v. Langdale, 66 Wis. 616 ; Knight 8 North Hempstead v. Hempstead, 2
v. Town of Ashland, 61 Wis. 233. The Wend. 109 (1828). Suppose," says Sav-
parent town, being liable for the whole age, C. J., delivering the opinion of the
debt, is the agent of the new town in de- court in this case, “the State to be divided
fending an action on the liability, and into two States : without some special
when it acts in good faith and with dili- agreement, each would own the public
gence skill, the new town is bound by property within its limits. So of coun-
the result of the action. Mt. Desert v. ties: the public buildings remain the
Monmouth, 72 Me. 348. And see ante, property of the old county ; yet public
chap. iv. for a general view of the extent of buildings are as much public property as
the legislative authority over public and public lands. So as to the plains, mead-
municipal corporations and their rights, ows, and marshes which are the subject of
liabilities, property, and contracts; and this suit. A bill filed by a new county for
chap. vii. as to the dissolution of munici- the partition of the gaol and court-house,
pal corporations and its effect upon their which had been common property, would
creditors and property.
be the same in principle as the bill in this
1 Granby v. Thurston, 23 Conn. 416, suit. Would not such a suit be consid-
419, per Waite, C. J.; Willimantic Society ered preposterous ? Suppose a religious
v. School Society (division of school so- corporation possessed of a church and par-
cieties and funds), 14 Conn. 457; Hart- sonage; it becomes expedient to erect part
ford Bridge Co. v. East Hartford (ferry into a new corporation : would not the old
franchise), 16 Conn. 149; affirmed, 10 corporation retain the property, unless an
How. (U. S.) 511, 541 ; Laramie County agreement was made as to the partition of
v. Albany County, 92 U. S. 307 (1875). it?" 2 Wend. 109, 135 ; Laramie County
Legislature cannot control an educational v. Albany, 92 U. S. 307 (1875); West
fund raised by individual bounty and not Carroll v. Gaddis, 34 La. An. 928. Incor-
1
& 189
271
APPORTIONMENT BY LEGISLATURE.
that when part of the inhabitants and territory of an older town are
erected into a new corporation, the old town retains all of the prop-
erty, rights, and privileges formerly belonging to it, and is subject
to all its former duties and liabilities, at least as it regards property
which has no fixed location in the new town, as lands, buildings,
etc.” Accordingly,“ upon the division of Hartford, no part of the
ferry franchise would pass to the new town of East Hartford, except
by virtue of a legal provision to that effect."i So it has been fre-
quently held that if a new corporation is created out of the territory
of an old corporation or if part of its territory or inhabitants is
annexed to another corporation, unless some provision is made in
the act respecting the property and existing liabilities of the old
corporation, the latter will be entitled to all the property, and be
solely answerable for all the liabilities.3
§ 189 (129). Power of Legislature to apportion Debts and Prop
erty. — But upon the division of the old corporation, and the creation
of a new corporation out of part of its inhabitants and territory, or
upon the annexation of part to another corporation, the legislature
may provide for an equitable appropriation or division of the prop-
erty, and impose upon the new corporation, or upon the people and
territory, thus disannexed, the obligation to pay an equitable pro-
portion of the corporate debts. The charters and constituent acts of
poration of a part of a town into a city, 250 (1855); North Yarmouth v. Skillings,
held not to divest the title of the town to 45 Me. 133, 142 (1858); Cobb v. King-
a tract of land owned by it in fee simple, man, 15 Mass. 197; Minot v. Curtis, 7
“in trust, for the use of the town for- Mass. 441, 445 ; Opinion of Supreme
ever.” Milwaukee v. Milwaukee, 12 Wis. Judges, 6 Cush. 575 ; Ib. 578; Laramie
93.
County v. Albany County, 92 U. S. 307
In Michigan, it is held that when a city (1875), where the cases are cited, and the
is incorporated from part of the territory subject learnedly discussed by Clifford, J.
of a township the property rights of the Greenville v. Mason, 53 N. H. 515 (1873);
township are not affected unless provi. Depere v. Bellevue, 31 Wis. 120 (1872);
sion is made therefor by statute. Board of S. C. 11 Am. Rep. 602.
Health v. East Saginaw, 45 Mich. 257. 8 Text cited and approved. Mount
1 Per Church, J., in Hartford Bridge v. Pleasant v. Beckwith, 100 U. S. 514 ;
East Hartford, 16 Cond. 149, 171 (1844); Turnbull v. Alpena School Dist., 45 Mich.
affirmed by Supreme Court of the United 496.
States, 10 How. (U. S.) 511, 541. Ap- 4 Gorham v. Springfield, 21 Me. 61 ;
proving Windham v. Portland, 8 Mass. North Yarmouth v. Skillings, 45 Me. 133
384; Hampshire v. Franklin, 16 Mass. 76; (1858); Brewster v. Harwich, 4 Mass. 278;
North Hempstead v. Hempstead, 2 Wend. Ib. 315 ; Ib. 384 ; Harrison v. Bridgton,
109; ante, sec. 9.
16 Mass. 16; Ib. 76 (1819); Lakin v.
2 Windham v. Portland, 4 Mass. 384 Ames, 10 Cush. 198 (1852). See School
(1808); Richards v. Daggett, 4 Mass. 539; District v. Richardson, 23 Pick. 62 (1839),
Hampshire v. Franklin, 16 Mass. 76 as to the effect in Massachusetts upon the
(1819); Richland County v. Lawrence, 12 title to property of the abolition of old
Ill
. 1 (1850); Blackstone v. Taft, 4 Gray, school districts and the formation of new
272
§ 189
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
public and municipal corporations are not, as we have before seen,
contracts, and they may be changed at the pleasure of the legislature,
ones ; followed by School District v. Tap- and made binding. Sawyer v. Williams,
ley, 1 Allen, 49 ; but a dictum therein 25 Vt. 311 ; Pierce v. Carpenter, 10 Vt.
questioned by Hoar, J. Simmons v. Na- 480 ; Alden v. Rounsville, 7 Met. 219.
hant, 3 Allen, 316, as to necessity of a Unless otherwise provided by legisla-
deed of conveyance for real estate. San. tion the detachment of territory from a
bornton v. Tilton, 55 N. H. 603 (1875); township does not affect its ownership of
S. C. 53 N. H. 438; Tilton v. Sanbornton, anything but lands ; debts and other in-
55 N. H. 610. Note relating to division corporeal rights - as here, liquor taxes
of property under legislative act. South- previously due - still belong to the town-
ampton v. Fowler (Little Islands on divi- ship. Springwells v. Wayne County, 58
sion of town), 52 N. H. 225 (1872); Tile- Mich. 240.
son v. Newman, 23 Vt. 421 ; Richards v. The mode of proceeding, under the stat-
Daggett, 4 Mass. 534 ; Waldron v. Lee, 5 ute of New York, in the division of old
Pick. 323. In Pennsylvañia it was held and the erection of new towns, the direc-
that on a division of a township, each tory nature of the statute as to mode of
fraction remains liable for the whole debt proceeding, and the presumption in favor
due by the old township; if one pays the of the regularity of the proceedings, are
whole amount, it lays the foundation for clearly set forth in the case of The People
contribution. Plunkett Township v. Craw- v. Carpenter, 24 N. Y. 86.
ford, 27 Pa. St. 107 (1856). See New As illustrating the directory nature of
London v. Montville, 1 Root (Conn.), such statutes, see Elmendorf v. Mayor,
184 ; Hughes v. School District, 72 Mo. 25 Wend. 693 ; Striker v. Kelly, 7 Hill
643. On annexation of a portion of a (N. Y.), 9.
(N. Y.), 9. But an agreement in such
township to a city, the residue retains all division, transcending the powers of the
its property, real and personal, unless a officers who make it, is not binding on
different disposition has been made by the the town. Overseers v. Same, 18 Johns.
terms of the division. People v. School 382. Effect of erection of a new out of a
Trustees, 86 Ill. 613. As to right to col. portion of an old county on the terms of
lect taxes on such division, see Barnett officers who respectively reside in the new
Township v. Jefferson County, 9 Watts, and old portions, see People v. Morrell, 21
166 ; Devor v. McClintock, 9 Watts & S. Wend. 563 (1839), and authorities cited
80 ; Police Jury, &c. v. McCormack, 32 by Cowen, J., p. 580. County commis-
La. An. 624; sustaining text, Board, &c. sioners must, by law, reside in the county ,
v. Board, &c., 30 W. Va. 424 (1887). In and on the erection of a new county in
Morgan v. Town of Waldeck, 17 Fed. Rep. which their residence is included they
286, it appeared that the town, which had become residents of the new county and
been carved out of another, had, through non-residents of the old county, and can-
its officers and people, repeatedly recog- not legally act for it, unless they remove
nized its liability for its portion of the within it; though if they continue to act
debt of the town out of which it was without such removal their acts are valid,
created, and it was decided that it was lia- being officers de facto. State v. Harts-
ble for its proportion of the debt, although horn, 17 Ohio, 135 ; State: v. Jacobs, 16.
there was doubt whether the proceedings 143. A bill in equity will not lie to set
in setting it off were legal.
aside a settlement of accounts made by two
As to support of poor in case of division. boards of supervisors upon the division of
North Whitehall v. South Whitehall, 3 a township by creating a new one, on the
Serg. & Rawle (Pa.), 117; Overseers, &c. ground that one of the boards was inferior
v. Overseers, &c., 2 Ib. 422 ; Stillwater v. to the other in ability and experience, or
Green, 4 Halst. (N. J.) 59.
that it was misled as to the financial con.
Where there has been an insufficient dition of its own township. The law pre-
legal division and organization of a new sumes such a board to be competent to
district, this may be afterwards ratified transact the business entrusted to it.
Ş 190
273
CORPORATE SEAL ; POWER TO ADOPT AND ALTER.
subject only to the restraints of special constitutional provisions, if
any there be. And it is an ordinary exercise of the legislative
dominion over such corporations to provide for their enlargement
or division; and, incidental to this, to apportion their property and
to direct the manner in which their debts or liabilities shall be met,
and by whom. The opinion has been expressed that the partition
of the property must be made at the time of the division of, or change
in, the corporation, since otherwise the old corporation becomes,
under the rule just before stated, the sole owner of the property,
and hence cannot be deprived of it by a subsequent act of the legis-
lature. But, in the absence of special constitutional limitations
upon the legislature, this view cannot, perhaps, be maintained, as
it is inconsistent with the necessary supremacy of the legislature
over all its corporate and unincorporate bodies, divisions, and parts,
and with several well-considered adjudications.?
§ 190 (130). Corporate Seal; Power to adopt and alter. The
charters of municipal corporations usually contain a clause authoriz-
ing them to have and use a common seal, and to alter the same at
pleasure. Without an express grant it is, however, incident to every
corporation to adopt and use a corporate seal. The essential impor-
tance which the common law anciently attached to seals, and the
modern relaxation of the rule, are well known. Respecting seals,
the same general principles apply to private and to municipal corpor-
ations. Thus, a corporation of the latter class would doubtless be
bound equally with a private corporation by any seal which has been
authoritatively affixed to an instrument requiring it, though it be not
the seal regularly adopted. On the other hand, it would not be
Township of Churchill v. Township of vide for an equitable adjustment of the in-
Cummings, 51 Mich. 446.
debtedness among them all, by commis-
1 Hampshire v. Franklin, 16 Mass. 76 ; sioners to be appointed by a designated
Windham v. Portland, 4 Mass. 390 ; Bow- court, and from whose determination no
doinham v. Richmond, 6 Greenl. (Me.) appeal was allowed. As to extent of legis-
112, holding that subsequent legislation lative control over public and municipal
could not change the apportionment of corporations, and their rights, liabilities,
the debts between an old town and one property, and contracts, see ante, chap. iv.
created from it, since such an apportion- and cases there cited ; Cooley, Const. Lim.
ment was in the nature of a contract. 193, 231, 232 ; ante, secs. 172, 173 ; post,
But see, ante, chap. iv. secs. 64, 75. chapter on Taxation.
Layton v. New Orleans, 12 La. An. 8 Bank, &c. v. Railroad Co., 30 Vt. 159
515 (1857), cited, ante, sec. 63 ; Laramie (1858), per Redfield, C. J.; Tenney v.
County v. Albany County, 92 U. S. 307 Lumber Co., 43 N. H. 343 ; Mill Dam
(1875); Dunmore's Appeal, 52 Pa. St. Foundry v. Hovey, 21 Pick. 417 ; Porter
374. In this last case one borough was v. Railroad Co., 37 Me. 349 ; Angell &
divided into four, and the legislature was Ames, Corp. sec. 217; Phillips v. Coffee,
held to have the power afterwards to pro- 17 Ill. 154 ; Stebbins v. Merritt, 10 Cush.
VOL. I. - 18
2
274
$ 191
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
bound by the affixing of either the regular or temporary seal by a
person not legally and duly authorized. So, under the modern
doctrine, a corporation can do an act in pais by an attorney in
fact, and such attorney need not necessarily be appointed under
seal.2
1
$ 191 (131). Seal, how proved. - The seal of a private corpo-
ration attached to an instrument does not prove its own authenticity;
but it should be shown by evidence aliunde to be really the seal of
the corporation. The same doctrine is, probably, applicable to the
seal of a municipal corporation, except where changed by charter or
statute, although it seems that it is usual in England to allow deeds
and other instruments relating to real estate to go to the jury when
authenticated by the corporate seals of London, Edinburgh, or
Dublin,
these being corporations of great antiquity, or recognized
by the legislature. The corporate seal attached to an instrument,
attested by the signatures of the proper officers, is prima facie but
not conclusive evidence that it was lawfully placed there, and that
the instrument is the act of the corporation.
27 ; City Council v. Moorehead, 2 Rich. end, 9 C. B. 774 ; Nowell et al. v. Wor-
Law, 430 ; Grant on Corp. 59, and cases ; cester, 9 Ex. 457 ; Kendall v. King, 17
and note author's opinion and his doubt C. B. 483.
as to the existence of any common law 2 Curry v. Bank, 8 Porter (Aln.), 361
right to change the common seal. An in-
An inn- (1839); Lathrop v. Bank, 8 Dana, 114 ;
pression of a corporate seal stamped upon Abby v. Billups, 35 Miss. 618.
and into the substance of the paper contain- 8 Den v. Vreelandt, 2 Halst. (N. J.)
ing the instrument is sufficient, without 352 (1800); Gilbert, Ev. 19; Jackson v.
wafer or wax. Hendee v. Pinkerton, 14 Pratt, 10 Johns. 381 ; Moises v. Thorn-
Allen, 381.
ton, 8 Term R. 303; City Council v.
| Koehler v. Iron Co., 2 Black, 715 Moorehead, 2 Rich. (S. C.) Law, 430;
(1862); Bank of Ireland v. Evans, 32 Foster v. Shaw, 7 Serg. & Rawle (Pa.),
Eng. Law & Eq. 23. “ But where a cor- 163; Ib. 318; Mann v. Pentz, 2 Sandf.
poration is created by an act for particular Ch. 257.
purposes with special powers, then another 4 Per Kinsey, C. J., Den v. Vreelandt,
question arises ; their deed, though under 2 Halst. (N. J.) 352.
their corporate seal, and that regularly 5 Levering v. Mayor, 7 Humph, (Terin.)
affixed, does not bind them if it appear by:553 (1847); Memphis v. Adams, 9 Heisk.
the express provisions of the statute cre- (Tenn.) 518 (1872); Abbott, Corp. Digest,
ating the corporation, or by necessary or tit. Seal, p. 725, sec. 56, and the many
reasonable inference from its enactments, cases there cited ; Benedict v. Denton
that the deed was ultra vires; that is, Walk. Ch. 336 ; Railway Co. v. Railway
that the legislature meant that such a deed Co., 9 Exchq. 55, 84 ; Musser v. Johnson,
should not be made." Per Parke, B., in 42 Mo. 74. In Iowa, the county seal held
South Yorkshire Railway Co. v. Great to be essential to the validity of a county
Northern Railway Co., 9 Ex. 55, 84; warrant. Prescott v. Gouser, 34 Iowa,
adopted by Martin, B., in Payne v. Bre- 178 ; Springer v. Clay Co., 35 Iowa,
con, 3 H. & N. 579. See also Holdsworth 243 ; Smeltzer v. White, 92 U. S. 390
v. Dartmouth, 11 A. & E. 490 ; Regina v. (1875).
Lichfield, 4 Q. B. 893 ; Pallister v. Graves-
$
§ 192
275
SEAL, WHERE NOT NECESSARY.
§ 192 (132). Seal, where not necessary.
The modern rule is
that corporations may be bound by contracts not under seal, and the
circumstances under which they will be bound have been stated by
Story, J., in terms which have been approved by the courts of
nearly every State in the Union. “Wherever a corporation is acting
within the scope of the legitimate purposes of its institution, all
parol contracts made by its authorized agents are express promises
of the corporation; and all duties imposed on them by law, and all
benefits conferred at their request, raise implied promises, for the
enforcement of which an action lies.” 1
1 Bank of Columbia v. Patterson, 7 held void for want of the corporate seal.
Cranch (U. S.), 299, 306 (1813); Bank Kinzie v. Chicago, 2 Scam. (Ill.) 188.
v. Wister, 2 Pet. 318 ; Davenport v. In- But otherwise of an authorized agreement
surance Co., 17 Iowa, 276; Ring v. John- by an agent of a corporation to sell lands
son County, 6 Iowa, 265 ; Over v. Green. (Legrand v. The College, 5 Munf. (Va.)
field, 107 Ind. 231. See further, Chaps. 324), or authorized assignment of a lease.
on Contracts and Property, post, secs. Sanford v. Tremlett, 42 Mo. 384. Corpo-
459, 936. Corporate seal affixed to the rate seal to conveyance by county commis-
note of the corporation makes it a spe- sioners. Bestor v. Powell, 2 Gilm. (7 Ill.)
cialty, having in this respect the same 126. Further, see Index “Seal.” Mr.
effect as the seal of a natural person. Broom gives an excellent view of the ex-
Clarke v. Farmers', &c. Co., 15 Wend. ceptions to the rule that corporations
256 ; Ib. 265; Benoist v. Carondolet, 8 must contract by deed, as recognized and
Mo. 240 ; Sturtevant v. Alton, 3 McLean, established by the modern English deci-
393. But corporate seals attached to sions. Broom, Com. on Com. Law, 562-
municipal bonds payable to order or bearer 569. Seals in connection with municipal
do not destroy or affect their negotiability. bonds. See chapter xiv. on Contracts,
See post, chap. xiv. on Contracts. Lease post.
276
§ 194
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
CHAPTER IX.
MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS AND OFFICERS.
§ 193 (133). Subject outlined. -- In considering the Creation
and Constitution of Municipal Corporations, we have now reached,
in its order, the subject of MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS AND OFFICERS. It
will be treated under the following heads :
1. Municipal Popular Elections — secs. 195–199.
.
2. Special Tribunal to determine Election Contests for Muni.
cipal Offices -- secs. 200–205.
3. Power to create and appoint Municipal Officers —- secs. 206–
213.
4. Oath and Official Bond of Municipal Officers -- secs. 214-
216.
5. Duration of Official Term of Municipal Officers — secs. 217–
221.
6. Vacancies in Municipal Offices — sec. 222.
7. Refusal to serve in Municipal Offices — sec. 223.
8. Resignation of Municipal Officers --- secs. 224–228.
9. Compensation of Municipal Officers — secs. 229-234.
10. Liability of the Corporation to the Officer. Right of Officer
to salary -- sec. 235.
11. Liability of the Officer to the Corporation and to Others —
sec. 236.
12. Amotion and Disfranchisement - secs. 238–256.
§ 194. Municipal Popular Elections. Elections must be held at
the time and place provided by the charter or by statute. Where the
law fixes no time, but leaves the time and place to be fixed by some
authority named therein, it is essential to the validity of the election
that it be called and the time and place thereof fixed by the agency
designated by law, and none other; as where the mayor and city
council are the designated authority, neither the mayor alone nor the
council alone has power to call such an election; if either neglect its
duty, mandamus is the remedy.
1 Stephens v. People, 89 Ill. 337; 15 Cal. 221 ; People v. Harvey, 58 Cal.
Glencoe v. People, 78 Ill. 382 ; Dickey v. 337 ; Juker v. Commonwealth, 20 Pa. St.
Hurlbut, 5 Cal. 343 ; People v. Murray, 484; Chadwick v. Melvin, 68 Pa. St.
1
$ 195
277
BALLOT; QUALIFICATION OF VOTERS; RESIDENCE.
$ 195 (134). Ballot; Qualification of Voters; Residence. Elec-
tions by the people, with exceptions in a few States, are by folded
or secret ballot, and not open or viva voce. The qualifications of
electors or voters are fixed by the Constitution and laws, and cannot
be changed by any ordinance or act of the corporation. Residence
for a certain period within the municipality is almost invariably re-
quired in express terms, as one of the qualifications of the right to
vote at elections therein and as one of the conditions of eligibility
to hold a municipal office. Non-residents of the corporation have,
however, been held competent to be elected to office when residence
was not expressly required, but the decisions cannot, perhaps, be
333; Knowles v. Yates, 31 Cal. 82 ; in the Municipal Corporations Act of
Clarke v. Board, &c., 27 Ill. 310 ; Miller 1882, 45 and 46 Vic. chap. 50, referred to
v. English, 1 Zabr. (21 N. J. L.) 317; in a previous chapter. In 1869, it passed a
Marshall v. Cook, 38 Ill. 44 ; Marshall v. Municipal Corporations Election Act, and
Kerns, 2 Swan (Tenn.), 68 ; Force v. Ba- in 1872 the Corrupt Practices (Municipal
tavia, 61 Ill. 99; Foster v. Scarf, 15 Ohio Elections) Act, and in 1877 the Municipal
St. 535. As to mandanus to compel the Corporations New Charters Act, and in
holding of an election, see post, secs. 1878 the Registration Act, by which the
197, 838, 839. If such an election is held subject of elections is minutely regulated.
it is void, and cannot be ratified by the These Acts contain many provisions which
municipal authorities. Stephens v. Peo- are worth the study of the American le-
ple, supra. An election is not complete gislator. Pol. Science Quarterly, vol. iii.
and the candidate is not qualified to serve 664-676 (Decr., 1888); Ib. vol. iv. p. 204
unless the requirements of the statutes pro- et seq. (June, 1889).
viding a mode for determining and de- 2 Petty v. Tooker, 21 N. Y. 267; Com-
claring the result of the election have monwealth v. Woelper, 3 Serg. & Rawle
been complied with. People v. Crissey, (Pa.), 29 ; People v. Phillips, 1 Denio
91 N. Y. 616 ; People v. North, 72 N. Y. (N. Y.), 388 ; Rex v. Spencer, 3 Burr.
124 (1878).
1827 ; Rex v. Mayor of Weymouth, 7
1 Cooley, Const. Lim. chap. xvii. 598, Mod. 371 ; Newling v. Francis, 3 T. R.
where the subject of popular elections, the 189; Rex v. Chitty, 5 Ad. & E. 609;
right to participate therein, the conditions Rex v. Bumstead, 2 B. & Ad. 699. The
necessary to the exercise of the right, provision of the Constitution that "
every
the manner of voting, the conduct and male person twenty-one years old, resident
sufficiency of elections are satisfactorily in the State twelve months and in the
presented. The rules and doctrines de county thirty days, shall be an elector,”
duced from the cases are, in general, appli- applies in corporated cities, and disables the
cable to popular municipal elections. legislature from requiring ninety days resi-
Ante, sec. 39. A ballot implies absolute dence in a city as a qualification for voting
secrecy, and where the Constitution of for city officers. People v. Canaday (char-
State declares that “all elections by the ter of Wilmington), 73 N. C. 198 (1875);
people shall be by ballot,” the legislature S. C. 21 Am. Rep. 465. Ante, sec. 39,
cannot by law require the outside of the note ; post, sec. 207. A charter provision
ballot to be numbered so as to correspond requiring the registration of the voters in a
with the number placed opposite the city held constitutional. McMahon v
name of the voter on the poll list. Wil. Savannah, 66 Ga. 217. As to the qualifi-
liams v. Stein, 38 Ind. 89 (1871); S. O. cations of voters for city officers under the
10 Am. Rep. 97.
Constitution of Rhode Island, see In re
In 1872, Parliament passed a Ballot the Newport Charter, 14 R. I. 655.
Act, which with modifications is embraced
278
§ 195
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
1
;
said to conclude the point, and, if extended to the higher offices,
are hardly consistent with the fundamental idea of municipal or
local self-government.
Municipal officers may be elected paying scot and lot. Willcock on Munic.
from non-residents of the corporation Corp. 188, pl. 472 ; Ib. 191, pl. 481 ; Ib.
when there is no statute or Constitution 193, 488 ; Rex v. Monday, Cowp. 539 ;
prohibiting it, particularly when the office Rex v. Mallet, 2 Barnard. 408 ; Rex v.
to be filled is one requiring professional Cambridge, 4 Burr. 2008 ; Rex v. Heath,
skill, and not representative or legislative i Barnard. 417, These rules seem to the
in its character. State v. Blanchard (city author of very doubtful application in
surveyor), 6 La. An. 515 (1851). The this country, since here all of the inhab-
conclusion was reached with hesitation, itants are members of the corporation, and
but the whole court concurred. Ib. State non-residents cannot become such. See
v. George, 23 Fla. 585 (1887). So in The on this point opinion of Read, J., in Peo-
State v. Swearingen, 12 Ga. 23 (1852), it ple v. Canaday, supra. Ante, chap. 1.
was decided where the charter of the town And, in general, it may be said that a
provided "for the election of city officers person is an inhabitant or resident who
by the people of the city qualified to has his domicile or home in the place
vote," and was silent as to requiring the but it is foreign to the purpose of this
officers to be residents, that a person work to enter into the difficult questions
might legally be elected and qualified who which have arisen with respect to resi-
was not a resident of the place, Residence dency and domicile. Hinds v. Hinds, 1
as a qualification for municipal office. See Iowa, 36 ; Story, Confl. Laws, sec. 43 ;
Commonwealth v. Jones, 12 Pa. St. 365. Putnam v. Johnson, 10 Mass. 488; Thorn.
As to residency and inhabitancy, and dike v. Boston, 1 Met. (Mass.) 245. Pub-
who are residents. Cohen v. Wigfall, 8 lic officers vacate their office by perma-
Rich. Law, 237 ; 2 Ib. 489 ; Gildersleeve nent removal from territorial limits of the
V. Alexander, 2 Speer (S. C.), 298 ; Seay · corporation. Barre v. Greenwich, 1 Pick.
v. Hunt, 55 Tex. 545. In England by (Mass.) 120; Rumsey v. Campton, 16
the Municipal Corporations Act (sec. 9), N. H. 567; Giles v. School District, 11
inhabitant householders resident within Fost. (31 N. H.) 304 ; infra, sec. 228.
the borough, or within seven miles of the But a temporary removal with an inten.
borough, and rated to the relief of the tion to return, will not, of itself, have this
poor, are made burgesses or citizens. effect. Van Orsdall v. Hazard, 3 Hill
Before that act was passed, residence in (N. Y.), 243 (1842) ; People v. Metropol-
the freeman or citizen was sometimes re- itan Police Board, 19 N. Y. 201 ; Lyon v.
quired to render him eligible to office, Commonwealth, 3 Bibb (Ky.), 430; Rex
although non-residents, wherever residing, v. Exeter, Comb. 197; Hannon v. Grizzard,
might, hy a similar perversion of the pur- 89 N. C. 115.
poses of a municipal corporation, be ad- “Nice questions," says Mr. Harrison
mitted to freedom or membership, unless (Munic. Manual for Upper Canada, 2d
expressly restrained by the charter ; and ed. 60, note), " arise as to when a party
if residence was expressly required as a can or cannot be said to be a resident of a
condition of eligibility, it was not neces- municipality.” Attorney-General v. Par-
sary that the officer should continue to ker, 3 Atk. 576 ; Etherington v. Wilson, ,
reside in the place while holding the office. L. R. 1 Ch. Div. 160 ; King v. Foxwell,
Not only so, but it was held that where L. R. 3 Ch. Div. 518. A man cannot,
residence was necessary as a qualification within the meaning of the municipal laws
during office, it was not, by implication, of Canada, be said to be resident in two
necessary that the person elected should municipalities at the same time. Marr v.
have been a resident at the time of the Vienna, 10 Upper Can. L. J. 275. A
election. And when inhabitancy was man's residence is where his home is situ-
requisite, it meant not merely residence, ate, — where his family live. The King v.
but keeping a house within the place, and Inhabitants of North Curry, 4 B. & C.
$ 196
279
ELECTING DISQUALIFIED PERSON.
§ 196 (135). Electing disqualified Person. The choice of a
disqualified person is ineffectual. Thus, if the law requires free-
holders to be chosen for certain offices, the election of a person not
a freeholder is void. But unless the votes for an ineligible person
are expressly declared to be void the effect of such a person receiv-
ing a majority of the votes cast is, according to the weight of Ameri-
can authority, and the reason of the matter (in view of our mode
of election, without previous binding nominations, by secret ballot,
leaving each elector to vote for whomsoever he pleases), that a new
election must be held, and not to give the office to the qualified
person having the next highest number of votes.?
959. An occasional absence from his (1849); State v. Swearingen, 12 Ga. 23
home to attend to business in another (1852); State v. Gastinel, 20 La. An. 114
municipality does not make his home less (1868); see also, State v. Newman, 91
his residence. Withorn v. Thomas, 7 Mo. 445 ; State v. Trumpf, 50 Wis. 103.
M. & G. 1. Where A. had a dwelling- 2 State v. Swearingen, 12 Ga. 23 ; Sub-
house at Bowmanville, where his wife and lett v. Bedwell, 47 Miss. 266 ; s. C. 12
family lived, but had a saw-mill and store Am. Rep. 338 ; State v. Giles, 1 Chand.
and was postmaster in the towuship of (Wis.) 112 ; State v. Smith, 14 Wis. 497 ;
Cartwright, which occasioned him fre- Saunders v. Haynes, 13 Cal. 145; State v.
quently to visit that place, and who, Gastinel (under charter), 20 La. An. 114;
while there, used to board with one of his Cooley, Const. Lim. 620 ; Commonwealth
men in a house owned by himself,— Held, ex rel. McLaughlin v. Cluley (Sheriff), 56
that after voting in Bowmanville, he had . Pa. St. 270 (1868); People v. Clute, 50
no right to vote in Cartwright. The Queen, N. Y. 451 (1872); s. C. 10 Am. Rep. 508 ;
ex rel. Taylor v.. Cæsar, 11 Upper Can. Wood 1. Bartling, 16 Kan. 109, 114
Q. B. 461. Infra, sec. 198, note. Mere (1876). Infra, secs. 198, note, 199, uote.
colorable residence is in no case sufficient. The following points are ruled in People
The King v. Duke of Richmond, 6 T. R. v. Clute, supru. Where a majority of the
560. Each case must, to a great extent, electors, through ignorance of the law or
depend on its own circumstances. As to the fact, vote for one ineligible to the
what is sufficient, see The King v. Sar- office, the votes are not nullities ; but
geant, 5 T. R. 466 ; Bruce v. Bruce, 2 while they fail to elect, the office cannot
B. & P. 229; The King v. Mitchell, 10 be given to the qualified person having
East, 511 ; Withorn v. Thomas, 7 M. & the next highest number of votes. The
G. 1; The Queen, cx rel. Forward v. Bar- election is a failure, and a new election
tels, 7 Upper Can. C. P. 533 ; Queen v. must be had. A minority of the whole
Boycott, 14 L. T. n. S. 599 ; Queen v. body of qualified electors may elect to an
Exeter, L. R. 4 Q. B. 110 ; Manning v. office where the majority decline to vote,
Manning, L. R. 2 P. & D. 223 ; Taylor or where they vote for one who is ineligi-
v. Parish, &c., L. R. 6 C. P. 309; Bond ble to the office, knowing of the disqualifi-
v. St. George, L. R. 6 C. P. 312 ; Queen cation. Notice of the disqualifying fact,
v. St. Ives, L. R. 7 Q. B. 467 ; Durant v. and of its legal effect, may be given so
Carter, L. R. 9 C. P. 261; Ford v. Pye, directly to the voter as to charge him
L. R. 9 C. P. 269 ; Ford v. Hart, L. R. 9 with actual knowledge of the disqualifica-
C. P. 273 ; Wilton v. Falmouth, 3 Shep. tion; or the disqualifying fact may be so
479 ; State v. Decasinova, 1 Tex. 401; patent or notorious as that his knowledge
State v. Frost, 4 Harring. 558; Fry's of the ineligibility may be presumed as
Election, 71 Pa. St. 302 ; s. C. 10 Am. matter of law. But not only the fact
Rep. 698.
which disqualifies, but also the rule or
Spear v. Robinson, 29 Me. 531 enactment of law which makes it thus
1
280
§ 197
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
$ 197 (136).
(136). Unauthorized Election; Notice. Where it is dis-
cretionary with the municipal authorities whether they will hold
an election or not, votes at an unauthorized election are simply nul-
lities.) Elections fisced by law at a certain time and place may be
legally holden, although notice has not been published or given;
but if the time be not defined by statute, and is to be fixed by no-
tice, the notice required is imperative. Time and place are gener-
ally essential, but many of the details as to the conduct of elections
are usually regarded as directory:
effectual, must be brought home so clearly til recently, have been open, and there are
to the knowledge or notice of the elector cases there which decide or favor the
as that to give his vote therewith indicates proposition, that votes for a disqualified
an intent to waste it in order to render his person, given after notice of disqualifica-
vote a nullity.
tion, are thrown away, and the other can-
But in Indiana the view is taken that, didate is elected. Grant on Corporations,
whether an election, because of the ineli- 203-208, and cases cited. But see, as to
gibility of the candidate receiving the disqualification and notice, Regina v.
highest number of ballots, is a failure, Hiorns, 7 Ad. & E. 960 ; Regina 2. Coun-
and must be held over, or whether the cillors of Derby, 7 Ad. & E. 419; and
highest eligible candidate is elected, de particularly Regina v. Mayor of Tewkes-
pends upon circumstances : 1. If the can- bury, Law Rep. 3 Q. B. 629 (1868);
didate receiving the highest number of Regina v. Ledyard, 8 Ad. & E. 535; Raw.
votes is ineligible, but from a cause un- linson on Corporations (5th ed.), 64, note,
known to the voters, and which they were and authorities. "The principle of these
not bound to know, — as, for example, in- decisions," says the London Law Times,
fancy, want of naturalization, and the January 25, 1873, must be materially
like, -- the result is a failure, and there affected by secret voting." This subject
must be another election. 2. If the voters was much discussed in the debates before
know, or are bound to know, the ineligi- the Electoral Commission created by Con-
bility of a candidate, the election is not a gress to decids the presidential contest of
failure, as the eligible candidate receiving 1876. In 1872, Parliament passed a
the highest number of votes is legally Ballot Act, applicable to municipalities.
elected. 3. Where the ineligibility of a Ballot papers are to be provided by the
candidate arises from his holding, or hav- mayor, and the form thereof is prescribed.
ing held, a public office, the people within 1 Opinions of Judges, 7 Mass. 525;
the jurisdiction of such office are held in Same, 15 Mass. 537 ; Cooley, Const. Lim.
law to know are chargeable with notice 603; People v. Mathewson, 47 Cal. 442
of —such ineligibility, and votes given (1874); George v. Oxford Township, 16
for such a candidate are of no effect, and Kan. 72, 80 (1876); Force v. Batavia, 61
his highest eligible competitor is elected. Ill. 99 ; Marshall v. Silliman, 61 Ill. 218;
Gulick v. New, 14 Ind. 93, 102 (1860), Wiley v. Silliman, 62 Ill. 170 ; Harding
per Perkins, J. ; commenting on State v. v. R. I. & St. L. R. R. Co., 65 Ill. 90 ;
Swearingen (case of non-residency), 12 People v. Santa Anna, 67 Ill. 57. Ante,
Ga. 23 ; Price v. Baker, 41 Ind. 572
sec. 194.
(1873); s. C. 13 Am. Rep. 346, where the 2 Cooley, Const. Lim. 303, and cases
extent of this rule is stated by Downey, J. cited ; People v. Brenham, 3 Cal. 477
Opinion of Judges, 38 Me., appendix, (1851); People v. Fairbury, 51 Ill. 149
where a portion of the people voted for a (1869). Computation of time of notice.
person not in being. State v. Giles, 1 Queen v. Justices, 8 Ad. & E. 173; Mitch-
Chand. (Wis.) 112.
ell v. Foster, 9 Dow). P. C. 527 ; Warsop
In England, candidates are previously v. Hastings, 22 Minn. 437.
nominated and known, and the votes, un- Dickey v. Hurlbut, 5 Cal. 343; Peo-
8
|
$ 197
281
NOTICE OF ELECTION.
A
Courts are anxious rather to sustain than to defeat the popular
will.1
ple v. Knight (essentialness of place), 13 Taylor v. Taylor, 10 Minn. 112; Bourland
Mich. 424; Gass v. State, 34 Ind. 425 v. Hildreth, 26 Cal. 161 ; Day v. Kent, 1
(1870). Where the legislature provided Oreg. 123 ; Piatt v. People, 29 Ill. 54 ;
that the polls of the different wards should Ewing y. Filley, 43 Pa. St. 384 ; Howard
be kept open until 10 o'clock P. M. and v. Shields, 16 Ohio St. 184; McKinney v.
they were closed at 8 o'clock, the election O'Connor, 26 Tex. 5 ; Sprague v. Norway,
was set aside.
Pennsylvania District 31 Cal. 173; Fry v. Booth, 19 Ohio St. 25.
Election, 2 Par. (Pa.) 526 ; Clark's Case, But where it appears that the irregularity
Ib. 521. Illegal adjournment of election is of such character and of such magni-
to a different place from the one designated tude that it may have affected the result,
in the notice. Commonwealth v. Com- the election ought to be set aside. Hack-
missioners, &c., 5 Rawle (Pa.), 75. Where ney Election, 31 L. T. N. S. 69 ; Wood-
an election is held on a day subsequent to ward v. Sarsons, L. R. 10 C. P. 743;
that named in the charter, the acts of Mather v. Brown, L. R. 1 C. P. Div.
officers thus elected are valid, as respects 596 ; Johnson v. Lambton, 40 Upper Can.
the public and third persons, and cannot Q. B. 297 ; Harrison's Municipal Manual,
be collaterally inquired into. Coles 4th ed.
County v. Allison, 23 Ill. 437, dis- " If rioting takes place to such an ex-
tinguished from Haynes v. Washington tent that ordinary men, having the ordi-
County, 19. Ill. 66, and approved in Peo- nary nerve and courage of men, are there.
ple v. Fairbury, 51 III. 149 (1869). As to by prevented from recording their votes,
election held on a day prior to the date the election is void by the common law,
provided by law, see People v. Keeling, for the common law provides that an elec-
4 Col. 129. Title of officers elected before tion should be free in the sense that all
the legal incorporation of a place may be persons shall have an opportunity of com-
validated by the legislature.
State v.
ing to the poll and voting without fear or
Kline, 23 Ark. 587 ; post, secs. 256, 276, molestation.” Nottingham, In re, 1 O'M.
892, note.
& H. 245 ; Stafford, In re, Ib. 234 ; Drogh-
It is a canon of election law that an eda, In re, 1b. 252. The freedom of elec-
election is not to be set aside for a mere tions is of the utmost importance. Any
informality or irregularity which cannot attempt to interfere with the electors
be said in any manner to have affected the in the peaceable and quiet exercise of
result of the election. Commonwealth v. their rights or to improperly influence
Smith, 132 Mass. 289; Walker v. West them against their judgment or desire
Boylston, 128 Mass. 550 ; The Queen v. is a crime, and in addition to the ordi-
The Rector of St. Mary, Lambeth, 8 Ad. nary punishment of the crime of bribery
& E. 356 ; Regina, ex rel. Walker v. Mitch- of an elector it is a constitutional pro-
ell et al., 4 Upper Can. P. R. 218 ; Monk vision in
vision in many States that whoever
Election, In re, 32 Upper Can. Q. B. 147; shall be convicted of the crime shall for-
The Queen v. Plenty, L. R. 4 Q. B. 346 ; feit the right to any office of profit or
The Queen v. Ward, L. R. 8 Q. B. 210 ; trust under the State. McCrary, Elec- .
Regina v. Cousins, 28 L. T. N. S. 116; Re- tions, sec. 432.
gina, ex rel. Harris v. Bradburn, 6 Upper
1 Skerritt's Case, 2 Par. (Pa.) 516 ;
Can. P. R. 308 ; Regina, ex rel. Preston v.
Boileau's Case, 2 Par. (Pa.) 505 ; Carpen-
Touchburn, Ib. 344 ; Shaw v. Thompson, ter’s Case, 2 Par. (Pa.) 537 ; New Orleans
L. R. 3 Ch. Div. 233; People v. Cook, v. Graihle, 9 La. An. 573; Clifton v.
14 Barb. (N. Y.) 259 ; Clifton v. Cook, 7 Cook, 7 Ala. 114; People v. Cook, 14
Ala. 114 ; Truehart v. Addicks, 2 Tex. Barb. (N. Y.) 259 ; 8 N. Y. 67; Regina
217; Dishon v. Smith, 10 Iowa, 212; Atty. v. Touchburn, 6 Upper Can. P. R. 344 ;
Gen. v. Ely, 4 Wis. 420 ; State v. Jones, United States v. Memphis, 97 U. S. 284,
19 Ind. 356 ; People v. Higgins, 3 Mich. approving text. The rule as therein stated
233 ; Gorham v. Cainpbell, 2 Cal. 135; is regarded by Mr. Justice Cooley, as "an
+
282
§ 198
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
§ 198 (137). Subject illustrated. Thus, an inaccurate designa-
tion of the name of the office voted for, — as, for example, “Police
Justice," instead of “Police Magistrate” (the term used in the
statute), — will not render the votes invalid, where the legis-
lative provisions make clear the intention of the voters in thus
casting their ballots, - to which intention effect should be given.
But if a specific number of officers only can be chosen, --for ex-
ample, four, - ballots containing the names of more than four
persons for the office in question must be rejected. Any other
doctrine might result in giving the elector two votes. There
are usually two competing tickets, and if an elector can, in the
case supposed, cast a ballot containing five names, he may one of
eight, and thus vote (if he chooses to insert the names) for both
tickets.2
eminently proper one, and to furnish a Regina v. Hoyle, H. L. 1855, cited in
very satisfactory test of what is essential, Rawl, on Corp. 65, note. His remedy is,
and what not, in election laws." Const. by mandamus, to have a new election held
Lim. 618. See, also, as to charter elec- for councillor, or (if the office be filled) by
tions and returns, Heath, In re, 3 Hill a quo warranto.
Ib. The voting papers
(N. Y.), 42, 53; People v. Stevens, 5 Hill, (corresponding in function to the Ameri-
616 ; Morgan v. Quackenbush, 22 Barb. can ballot, except that it is to be signed
(N. Y.) 72. Courts will not enjoin muni- by the voter and openly voted) must dis-
cipal elections unless the power and right tinguish between different classes of candi-
to do so plainly exist. Smith v. McCar. dates; and hence where an election of
thy, 56 Pa. St. 359 ; post, sec. 308, note. four councillors had taken place on the 1st
The legislature may ratify the title to an of November, three of whom were to sup-
office, in which case it cannot be questioned ply ordinary vacancies, and one an extra-
on quo warranto. People v. Flanagan, 66 ordinary vacancy, but no distinction had
N. Y. 237 (1876). Acts of officers de facto, been made between them in the notice of
post, secs. 221, note, 256, 276, 763, note, election, in the voting papers, or in pub-
892, note; compensation or salary of offi- lishing the names of the persons elected,
cers de facto. Samis v. King, 40 Conn. the election was irregular and void. Re-
298 (1873).
gina v. Rowley, 3 Q. B. 143 ; s. 0. in Ex-
1 People v. Matteson, 17 Ill. 167 chequer Chamber, 6 Q. B. 668. See sec.
(1855).
47, Municipal Corporations Act, and also
2 People v. Loomis, 8 Wend. (N. Y.) 7 Will. IV. and 1 Vict. chap. lxxviii. sec.
396 (1832); People v. Seaman, 5 Denio 11. Patterson, J., says : “There is no
(N. Y.), 409 ; State v. Griffey, 5 Neb. 161 objection to the votes all being given on
(1876). Where only one vacancy exists, the same paper, if a proper distinction were
votes given for two persons jointly are made.” Regina v. Rowley, supra; and
thrown away. Rex v. Mayor of Leeds, 7 see Reg. v. Winchester, 7 Ad. & E. 215.
Ad. & E. 963; and in this case it was By the English Municipal Corporations
held that a third candidate chosen by a Act of 1835, sec. 32, the voting paper is
single regular vote was elected ; but as to required to contain “the Christian and
votes being thrown away, see supra, sec. surnames of the persons for whom the
196. Where, by an erroneous construction burgess votes, with their respective places
of the act, an election has been held for of abode, such voting paper being previ.
but one councillor, instead of two, tha ously signed with the name of the burgess
candidate second on the poll cannot have voting and the name of the street in which
A mandamus to admit him to the office. the property for which he appears to be
§ 200
283
ILLEGAL VOTES; ELECTION CONTESTS.
§ 199 (138). Effect of Illegal Votes being received. — Receiving
illegal or improper votes will not alone vitiate an election. It must
be shown affirmatively, in order to overturn the declared result, that
the wrongful action changed it. This rule applies to corporation
elections as well as others.1
$ 200 (139). Special Tribunal to decide Election Contests for
Municipal Offices. — A constitutional provision that the judicial power
of the State shall be vested in a supreme court and inferior courts,
does not disable the legislature, in creating municipal corporations,
from providing that the city council shall be the judge of the election
of its mayor, members, and other officers, and from prohibiting the
ordinary courts of justice from inquiring into the validity of the
determination of the city council.2
2
on.
rated is situate. In construction of this of valid votes, the council should send the
section, it is held that the Christian naine matter back to the people." Ante, sec.
of the person voted for need not be writ. 196, and note.
ten out in full ; the contraction ordinarily Mayor, &c. v. Morgan, 7 Martin, La.
used is sufficient. Regina v. Bradley, 3 (N.s.) 1; 9 Ib. (n. s.) 381 (1828); infra,
E. & E. 634. But it seems that an initial secs. 202, pote, 235, note, 244, 250, note.
letter only would not be sufficient. Ib. While the duty and power in the city
Though it would be in the signature of the council to adjudicate or decide cannot be
voter. Regina v. Avery, 18 Q. B. 576 ; delegated to a committee, it is competent
Regina v. Tart, 1 E. & E. 618. “Places for the council to appoint a committee to
of abode” held to mean places of resi. take testimony and to report the same and
dence, not of business.' Regina v. Ham- the facts to the council for its action there-
mond, 17 Q. B. 772; ante, sec. 195 ; Re- Salmon v. Haynes, 50 N. J. L. 97
gina v. Deighton, 5 Q. B. 896 ; Dav. & (1888). In Wammacks v. Holloway, 2
M. 682.
Ala. 31 (1841), a shrievalty contest, it was
The Ballot Act of 1872, now enibraced denied that it was within the constitu-
in the Municipal Corporations Act of 1882, tional power of the legislature to deprive a
prescribes the form of the ballot papers, party claiming a public office of the right
and these are required to be furnished by to a jury trial by making the summary or
the Mayor.
extra-judicial method conclusive. And to
1 Murphy, In re, 7 Cow. (N. Y.) 153 this effect was the opinion of two of the
(1827); People v. Cicotte, 16 Mich. 283 judges in The People v. Cicotte, 16 Mich.
(1868); First Parish v. Stearnes, 21 Pick. 283. Since elections to offices are not in
(Mass.) 148 ; Judkins v. Hill, 50 N. H. the nature of contracts, there does not
140 (1870); Johnston v. Charleston, 1 seem to be any substantial reason, in view
Bay (S. C.), 441 (1795). In this last case of the plenary authority of the legislature
the city council was specially authorized over offices and officers, to doubt its power,
to judge of elections of corporation officers, in the absence of special constitutional re-
and the court, respecting a contest before striction, to provide, prospectively, by a
the council, said: “If the bad votes be de- general act, the mode in which contests
ducted from the highest candidate, and he shall be determined. See Govan v. Jack-
still has a majority, his election is good; son, 32 Ark. 553 (1877); State v. Fitzger-
but if, after such deduction, the next can- ald, 44 Mo. 425 (1869); Ewing v. Filley,
didate has an equal or greater number of 43 Pa. St. 384 ; Commonwealth v. Leech,
votes than the other, and it is doubtful 44 Pa. St. 332 ; Cooley, Const. Lim. 276;
which candidate had the greatest number Ib. 623, 624, note ; Smith v. New York,
284
§ 202
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
§ 201 (140). Same subject. — Where, by the charter, the council
are authorized to provide, by ordinance, a special tribunal before
which contested municipal elections shall be tried, and to provide
the mode of procedure, it may pass such ordinance after an election
has been held, and authorize it to determine contests arising out of
a previous election. After such determination, quo warranto will
lie against the party who was unsuccessful before the local tribunal,
if he continue to claim and exercise the office. 1
§ 202 (141). Jurisdiction of the Courts of Law. Common law
courts of general and original jurisdiction have the admitted power
to inquire into the regularity of elections, corporate and others, by
quo warranto, or an information in that nature, and, in certain cases,
by mandamus. It is not unusual for charters to contain provisions
to the effect that the common council or governing body of the muni-
cipality “shall be the judge of the qualifications,” or “of the qualifica-
tions and election of its own members," and of those of the other
officers of the corporation. What effect do such provisions have
upon the jurisdiction of the superior courts? The answer must
depend upon the language in which these provisions are couched,
viewed in the light of the general laws of the State on the subjects
of contested elections and quo warranto. The principle is, that the
jurisdiction of the court remains unless it appears with unequivocal
certainty that the legislature intended to take it away. Language
like that quoted above will not ordinarily have this effect, but will
be construed to afford a cumulative or primary tribunal only, not an
exclusive one. A provision that no court should take cognizance of
37 N. Y. 518 ; People v. Mahaney, 13 the charter makes the council the judges of
Mich. 481 ; Steele v. Martin, 6 Kan. 430 ; the election or qualification of its mem-
State v. Lewis, 51 Conn. 113; William. bers, the power cæpires with the council
son v. Love, 52 Tex. 335 ; Seay v. Hunt, which admits the member ; the question
55 Tex. 545. If the charter provides that cannot be opened by a subsequent council.
the common council shall be the judge Doran v. De Long, 48 Mich. 552 ; in frirl,
of the election and qualifications of its own sec. 204, note. Quorum of council, post,
members, and shall have the power to de- sec. 278 et seq.
termine contested elections,” its action i State v. Johnson, 17 Ark. 407 (1856),
under and pursuant to this power is final (mayoralty contest). See pust, chap. xxi.,
and not subject to review. People v.
quo warranto.
Harshaw, 60 Mich. 200.
2 Text quoted and approved in Kendall
When a city charter makes the common v. Camden, 47 N. J. L. (18 Vroom) 64.
council the final judges of the election of The decision of a city council as to the
aldermen, mandamus will not lie to com- eligibility of a member is not revievable in
pel them to reinstate one whom they had A proceeding by quo warranto. Seay v.
excluded without a proper hearing on the Hunt, 55 Tex. 545.
Hunt, 55 Tex. 545. See ante, secs. 200,
merits. People v. Fitzgerald, 41 Mich. 2; 201 ; post, secs. 255, note, 892.
Alter v. Simpson, 46 Mich. 138. Where
§ 202
285
JURISDICTION OF THE COURTS OF LAW.
election cases by quo warranto, etc., would doubtless be sufficient to
divest the jurisdiction of the judicial tribunals. And so, in general,
of a provision that the council should have the sole or the final power
of deciding elections.
1 Heath, In re, 3 Hill (N. Y.), 42, 52, (Ky.) 533 ; Wammacks v. Holloway, 2
and cases cited by Cowen, J., who is of Ala. 31 (1841) (shrievalty contest); Hum-
opinion that no mere negative words, and mer v. Hummer, 3 G. Greene (Iowa), 42;
that nothing less than express words, will Macklot v. Davenport, 17 Iowa, 379 ;
oust the supervisory jurisdiction of the Gass v. State, 34 Ind. 424 (1870); State v.
courts. Infra, secs. 204, note, 205, note. Marlow, 15 Ohio St. 114 ; distinguished,
The amended charter of a city provided Kane v. People, 4 Neb. 509 (1876); post,
" that the board of councilmen shall be chapters on Quo Warranto, Mandamus,
the final judges of the election returns, and Remedies against Illegal Corporate
and of the validity of elections and quali- Acts. Action of board of canvasscrs is not
fications of its own members.” Park, J., conclusive of the right of the party to an
says : “ The statute in question was clearly office, though it may deprive him, in the
intended to apply to cases of this kind. first instance, of a commission or certifi-
It makes the common council of the city cate. Quo warranto lies notwithstanding
final judges of the election returns and the determination of the board of canvas-
qualifications of its members. By the use sers, on which full investigation may be
of the word ' final' the legislature intended had. State v. Governor, 1 Dutch. (N. J.
)
to divest the superior court of jurisdiction 331 (1856); State v. The Clerk, 16. 354;
in such cases, and make the common coun- People v. Kilduff, 15 Ill. 492 ; Cooley,
cil the sole tribunal to determine the legal- Const. Lim. 623, and cases cited ; Hadley
ity of the election of its inembers.' Sel- v. Mayor, 33 N. Y. 603 (1865); Anthony
lick v. Common Council, &c., 40 Conn. 359 v. Halderman, 7 Kan, 50 (1871).
(1873); citing, inter alia, Commonwealth Conformably to the vicws cxpressed in
v. Baxter, 35 Pa. St. 263 ; Commonwealth the text it has been decided by the Su-
v. Leech, 44 Pa. St. 332 ; Lamb v. Lynd, preme Court of Pennsylvania, that the
44 Pa. St. 336 ; Commonwealth v. Meeser, right given to city councils to be the judges
44 Pa. St. 341 ; People v. Witherell, 14 of the qualification of their own members
Mich. 48 ; O'Docherty v. Archer, 9 Tex. "in like manner as each branch of the
295. In Linegar v. Rittenhouse, 94 Ill. legislature," does not preclude the juris-
208, and Oregon v. McKennon, 8 Oreg. diction of the courts to try the question of
485, the rule referred to in the text is qualification by quo warranto, though the
cited and applied. In California, when
In California, when opinion of the profession seems to be other-
the charter of a city provides that the wise, and it was otherwise held in the
common council “shall judge of the qual- court below. Commonwealth v. Allen, 70
ifications, elections, and returns of their Pa. St. 465 (1872).
own members,” the council possesses the ex- A special remedy given by statute is 016-
clusive authority to pass on the subject, mulative, and not exclusive of the ordinary
and the courts have no jurisdiction to in- jurisdiction of the courts, unless sucb be
quire into the qualifications, elections, or the manifest intention of the statute. At-
returns of members of the council. People torney-General v. Corporation of Poole, 4
v. Metzker, 47 Cal. 524 (1874). See, in Mylne & Cr. 17, overruling 2 Keen, 190 ;
support of the text, Grier v. Shackelford, see, also, Attorney-General v. Aspinwall,
Const. Rep. 642 ; State v. Fitzgerald, 44 2 Mylne & Cr. 613. And bence a breach
Mo. 425 (1869); Commonwealth v. Mc- of a public trust by a municipal corpora-
Closkey, 2 Rawle (Pa.), 369 (two judges tion is held, in England, to be cognizable
dissenting); Strahl, In re, 16 Iowa, 369 in chancery, notwithstanding a special ap-
(1864); State v. Funck, 17 Iowa, 365 peal be given in the particular matter
(1864); Kane v. People, 4 Neb. 509 to the lords of the treasury. 16. Parr v.
(1876); Bateman v. Megowan, 1 Met. Attorney-General, 8 Cl. & F. 409 ; Attor-
286
$ 203
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
§ 203 (142). Same subject. — Agreeably to the rule just stated, a
clause in the charter of a municipal corporation, that the city coun-
cil “shall be the judges of the election, returns, and qualifications of
their own members, and of all other officers of the corporation," was
held by the Supreme Court of Delaware not to oust the Superior Court
of the State (invested with the usual powers of the King's Bench) of
its superintending jurisdiction over corporations, and it was declared,
if the council should erroneously decide that a person duly elected
by the people to an office was not qualified to hold it, a mandamus
might issue commanding them to admit him to the office.
ney-General v. Corporation of Litchfield, requires the board to proceed by a certain
11 Beav. 120 ; see chapter on Remedies day, is unauthorized. State, ex rel. Blox-
against Illegal Corporate Acts, post, sec. ham v. State Board of Canvassers, 13 Fla.
910.
55 (1869). Equity will not interfere, by
Jurisdiction and powers of courts of injunction, to restrain persons from cxer-
chancery. A court of chancery has no ju- cising the functions of public offices on the
risdiction to enjoin the holding of an elec- ground of the want of binding force in the
tion by the people, and a writ issued for law under which their appointments were
that purpose is void, and disobedience made, but will leave that question to be
thereof will not subject a party to punish- determined at law. Sheridan v. Colvin,
ment as for a contempt of court. Darst v. 78 Ill. 237 (1875). In this case it was
People, 62 Ill. 306 (1872); Walton v. sought to enjoin the city council from en-
Develing, 61 Ill. 201 (1871). As to juris- forcing an ordinance on the sole ground
diction of federal courts of equity in re- that, if the ordinance was enforced, it
spect of State or municipal offices, see Re would deprive the complainants of the
Sawyer, 124 U. S. 200 ; post, secs. 205, functions of offices which they held in the
255, 275, 890, 906, note. Courts of equity city; and it was held that a court of
have no inherent power to try contested chancery had no jurisdiction. Ib. Infra,
elections, and have never exercised it ex- secs. 245, 255, 275, and note. Jurisdiction
cept in cases where it has been conferred in equity over contested county seat elec-
by express enactment or necessary inpli- tions in Illinois. Dickey v. Reed, 78 Ill.
cation therefrom. Dickey v. Reed, 78 Ill. 261 (1875); Shaw v. Hill, 67 Ill. 455
261 (1875). Where an election was held (1873).
in a city on the question of whether the The expenses of a municipal clection
municipality should become incorporated must be borne by the municipality, and
under the general incorporation act for not in whole, or in part, by the county ;
cities and villages, and a writ of injunction but to a bill by resident taxpayers to re-
was issued out of the Circuit Court enjoin- strain the city from paying the election
ing the board of canvassers from canvassing officers for their services, such officers are
the returns and declaring the result, it was necessary parties. Bingham v. Camden,
held that the Circuit Court, unaided by 29 N.J. Eq. (2 Stew.) 464 (1878); Butcher
statute and exercising jurisdiction only ac- v. Camden, Ib. 478 ; post, sec. 911 et seq.
cording to the general usage and practice 1 State v. Wilmington, 3 Harring.
of courts of equity, had no power to issue (Del.) 294 (1840); S. P. State v. Fitzger-
the writ; that it was utterly void ; that ald, 44 Mo. 426 (1869). So in Iowa,
the canvassers were not bound to obey it, where the city charter provided that the
and could not be punished for contempt council should be “the judge of the elec-
for refusing to do so. Ib. An injunction tion and qualifications of its own mem-
restraining a board of canvassers from pro. bers,” but no ordinance had been passed
ceeding to canvass and certify the result of prescribing any method of trial, it was
an election until the further order of the held that the rnere provision in the charter
judge granting the same, where the statute did not preclude a contestant from a resort
§ 205
287
STATUTORY JURISDICTION ; QUO WARRANTO.
$ 204 (143). Same subject. - Where the legislative intent is clear
that the action of the council in contested election cases shall be final,
the court will not inquire into election frauds, since the council is
the judge of this matter as of others pertaining to the election ;
but the courts will inquire whether, in point of law, there was an
office or vacancy to be filled.
§ 205 (144). Special Statutory Jurisdiction held to exclude Quo
Warranto. – Where, by statute, the returns of all municipal elections
to an information in the nature of a quo judges ; but the council, when sitting as a
waryanto. State V. Funck (mayoralty tribunal to judge of the election of unem-
contest), 17 Iowa, 365 (1864). In a pre- bers of their body, may go behind the re-
vious case the same court decided that turns and inquire into the fact as to who
under a charter making the council is elected. State v. Rahway, 33 N. J. L.
“judges of the election, returns, and 111 (1868).
111 (1868). Under special charter the
qualifications of their own neinbers," it declaration and decision of the council as
was competent for the council to pass a to who are elected, held essential to a
general ordinance providing for the trial complete election. People v. North, 72
of contested elections of city officers, and N. Y. 124 (1878); People v. Crissey, 91
making the council the tribunal for the N. Y. 616. A charter provision inaking
trial of the same, such an ordinance being the board of aldermen the judge of the
consistent with the general laws of the election, &c., of its own members, subject,
State, which, in providing special tribu. however, to the review of any court of com-
nals for contesting State, county, and petent jurisdiction," held not to oust the
township offices, omitted to make any courts of jurisdiction or prevent them
special provision for contested elections to from entertaining original proceedings.
municipal offices. Strahl, In re, 16 Iowa, People v. Hall, 80 N. Y. 117 ; McVeany
369 (1864) (mayoralty contest). See sec. v. Mayor, &c. of New York, 80 N. Y. 185,
202, note. Re Sawyer, 124 U. S. 200. where the charter provided that the city
1 Commonwealth v. Leech, 44 Pa. St. council should "be the judges of the elec-
332 (1863); Commonwealth v. Meeser, Io. tion and qualification of their own rem-
341. Construction of words making the bers," without indicating an intention to
number of members of the council from make their action final, it was held that
a ward depend upon "the list of the taxa- the jurisdiction of the courts to try the
ble inhabitants." Ib.; People v. With question of such an election was not ex-
erell, 14 Mich. 48 ; Tompert v. Lithgow, cluded. State v. Gates, 35 Minn. 385 ;
1 Bush (Ky.), 176 (1866).
ante, secs. 202, and note, 255, note. When
Pending legal proceedings, the court, a council, being by charter the sole judge
in favor of the officer apparently entitled, of the election of its members, has investi-
enjoined the adverse claimant from at gated and seated a member, it cannot re-
tempting to take possession of the office. open the matter and order a second investi-
Ewing v. Thompson, 43 Pa. St. 384 (1862); gation. Kendell v. Camden, 47 N. J. L.
Kerr v. Trego, 47 Pa. St. 16, 292 (1864), (18 Vroom) 64; supra, sec. 200, note ;
noted, infrů, sec. 275. Ante, sec. 202, infra, sec. 205, note. And where the
note ; infra, sec. 255, note. Certificate of charter provided for contesting elections
election is the prima facie written title to before the judge of the Circuit Court, who
office, and remains so until regularly set was empowered "to pronounce judgment
aside or annulled. Ib.; post, sec. 275; in the case according to the facts," it was
People v. Thatcher, 55 N. Y. 525 (1874). held that his judgment was conclusive,
The council, as board of canvassers, can- and admissible in evidence in an action to
not investigate the legality of an election, recover the office. Davidson v. Wood.
but are concluded by the returns of the ruff, 68 Ala. 356.
2
288
§ 205
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
were declared to be “subject to the inquiry and determination of
the Court of Common Pleas upon the complaint of fifteen or more
voters filed in said court within twenty days, and the court, in
judging of such elections, was directed to proceed upon the merits
thereof, and determine finally concerning the same according to the
laws of the Commonwealth," this was held to exclude the remedy
by quo warranto and all common-law remedies as to matters which
might have been investigated in the special mode prescribed by
the statute. The opinion was expressed that the judgment of the
Common Pleas was final; that it could not be reversed by quo
warranto or in any other collateral manner; and that even a
certiorari would enable the appellate court to examine only the
regularity of the proceedings of the Common Pleas, but not to
examine the case on its merits as disclosed in the evidence.1
1 Commonwealth v. Garrigues, 28 Pa. held that the judgment of the county court
St. 9 (1857); Conmonwealth v. Baxter, could not be revised either upon appeal or
35 Pa. St. 263 ; Commonwealth v. Leech, certiorari, and was final. O’Docherty v.
44 Pa. St. 332; followed and approved, Archer, 9 Tex. 295 (1852). The special
State v. Marlow, 15 Ohio St. 114 ; see mode provided by law for contesting elec-
Ewing v. Filley, 43 Pa. St. 386 ; Lamb v. tions must be followed. Dickey v. Reed,
Lynd, 44 Pa. St. 336. Ellison, In re, 20 78 Ill. 261 (1875); post, chap. xxii.
Gratt. (Va.) 10, 29 (1870), commenting The Constitution of Ohio requires the
on Commonwealth v. Garrigues, supra. General Assembly “to determine by law
Function and powers of common council before what authority, and in what man-
as election canvassers. Morgan v. Quack. ner, the trial of contested elections shall
enbush, 22 Barb. (N. Y.) 72. A city be conducted ;” and accordingly a specific
council, under authority "to canvass re- mode of contesting elections in that State
turns, and determine and declare the re- was provided by statute ; and this mode
sult” of elections to municipal offices, was held to exclude the common-law mode
exhausts its power when it has once legally by proceedings in quo warranto, and the
canvassed the returns and declared the result to bind the State as well as individ-
result, and it cannot at a subsequent meet- uals. State v. Marlow, 15 Ohio St. 114
ing make a re-canvass and reverse its (1864).
prior determination. Hadley v. Mayor, In South Carolina it was held, where
33 N. Y. 603 (1865), supra, sec. 204, note. the legislature had authorized managers
The rule stated in the text (sec. 202), that of elections to hear and determine"
the original or superintending jurisdiction cases of contested elections, without mak-
of the superior courts should not be held ing any provision for an appeal, or any
to be taken away by any language which reference in the act to proceedings by quo
does not expressly, or by unequivocal im- warranto, that their decision was, with-
plication, show this to have been the out any express statutory declaration to
legislative intention, is a salutary one, that effect, final and conclusive, and that
but seems in some cases not to have been courts had no control over it. Grier v.
very strictly observed. In Texas, where Shackelford, 3 Brevard (S. C.), 491
the statute conferred upon the county (1814) (Nott, J., dissenting) ; followed
court the power to determine contested in The State v. Deliesseline, 1 McCord
elections of county officers, and gave no (S. C.), 52 (1821) (two judges dissenting).
right to appeal, it was considered to be the See State v. Huggins, Harper, Law, 94
policy of the statute to secure an early (1824). But note remarks of Evans, J.,
determination of such disputes, and it was in State v. Cockrell, 2 Rich. Law (S. C.),
§ 207
289
POWER TO CREATE OFFICES.
§ 206 (145). Power to create and appoint Municipal Officers.
At common law, municipal corporations may appoint officers, but
only such as the nature of their constitution requires. The right of
electing such officers as they are authorized to have is incidental to
every corporation, and need not be expressly conferred by charter.
The power of appointing officers is, at common law, to be exercised
by the corporation at large, and not by any select body, unless it is
so provided in the charter. The powers of corporate officers proper
at common law are very limited, extending only to the administra-
tion of the by-laws and charter regulations of the corporation.
§ 207 (146). Power to create Offices. In this country the
charter or constitution of the corporation usually provides with care
as to all the principal officer's, such as mayor, aldermen, marshal,
clerk, treasurer, and the like, and prescribes their general duties.
This leaves but little necessity or room for the exercise of any in-
plied power to create other offices and appoint other officers. It is
6, who, speaking of the subsequent Bay (S. C.), 441 (1795). But the city
act of 1839 (requiring the managers to council, in order to determine a contest
hear and determine the validity of the for a municipal office, cannot swear the
election, and providing that their “de- individual voters to compel them to de-
cisions shall be final”), says : “I take it clare for whom they voted. This is an in-
to be clear that the validity of an election, quisitorial power unknown to the prin-
in all cases, must (under the act), in the first ciples of our government, and of danger-
instance, be decided by the court of manag- ous tendency. Ib. See, also, People v.
ers duly authorized according to law. Pease, 27 N. Y. 81 ; People v. Thacher,
All questions, whether of law or fact, must 55 N. Y. 525 (1874); People v. Cicotte,
be submitted to this tribunal. Their deci- 16 Mich. 283 ; Cooley, Const. Lin. 604-
sions, on questions of fact, must neces- 606. Election contests for office will not
sarily be final, as no appeal is given ; but be determined on habeas corpus (Strahl,
I do not mean to say that their errors of In re, 16 Iowa, 369), nor in general on
law may not be corrected by certiorari, or bill in equity. Hagner u. Heyberger, 7
such of the prerogative writs as may be Watts & S. (Pa.) 104 ; but see Kerr v.
best suited to the case.” Accordingly, Trego, 47 Pa. St. 292 ; supra, sec. 202,
where an election within the act had not note ; post, sec. 275; Hughes v. Parker;
been contested before the managers, the 20 N. H. 58 ; Cochran 2. McCleary, 22
court refused leave to file an information Iowa, 75 (1867); Re Sawyer, 124 U. S.
in the nature of a quo warranto.
200, and chapter on Corporate Meetings,
afterwards stated, by a distinguished judge post, also chap. xxii. post. But as to
in that State, that the scrutiny of muni- county seat contest, where fraud is alleged,
cipal elections, as an incidental power, see Boren v. Smith, 47 Ill. 482.
belongs in the first place to the city coun- 1 Willc. 234, pl. 598 ; Ib. 297, pl. 767;
cil ; and if they abuse that power, the Ib. 298, pl. 769 ; Glover, 220 ; Vintners
correction of that abuse devolves upon the v. Passey, 1 Burr. 237 ; Hastings' Case, 1
courts by information in the nature of a Mod. 24 ; Rex v. Barnard, Comb. 416.
quo warranto. Per O'Neall, J., in State 2 Where it was manifest, from the
v. Schnierle, 5 Rich. Law (S. C.), 299, whole tenor of a city charter, that it was
301 (1852) (quo war. to test validity of the intention of the legislature itself to
defendant's election as mayor of Charles- specify therein all the offices, and desig.
ton). S. P. Johnston v. Charleston, 1 nate all the officers to be elected or chosen,
VOL. I. - 19
It was
290
$ 207
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
supposed, however, when not in contravention of the charter, that
municipal corporations may, to a limited extent, have as incidental to
express powers the right to create certain minor offices of a ministerial
or executive nature. Thus, if power be conferred to provide for the
health of the inhabitants, this would give the corporation the right
to pass ordinances to secure this end, and the execution of such
ordinances might be committed to a health officer, although no such
officer he specifically named in the organic act, if this course would
not conflict with any of its provisions. But the power to create
offices even of this character would be limited to such as the nature
of the duties devolved by charter or statute on the corporation
naturally and reasonably required. The provisions of the charter as
to time and mode of election, the appointment, qualifications, and
duration of the terms of officers, must be strictly obscrved. Therefore,
and to regulate the mode of appointment, is vacated “by death or disability,” held
it was held that the city council could not, to authorize appointment where a vacancy
by virtue of an inherent or implied power, is caused by resignation. State v. New-
create another officer, fix his term, provide ark, 3 Dutch. (N. J.) 185. Authority to
for his appointinent, and clothe him with a municipal corporation to appoint an
the powers of a municipal officer. Hoboken oficer was inferred from the frequent
v. Harrison, 1 Vroom (30 N. J. L.), 73 mention of the office and its duties in the
(1862). It is said, in the opinion, that charter. People v. Bedell, 2 Hill (N. Y.),
the power to create municipal officers 196 ; see, also, Field v. Girard College,
should be expressly conferred. In New 54 Pa. St. 233. Legislative prohibition
Jersey, pound-keepers, from a very early to common council against creating new
period, had been public township officers, offices extends to clerks, but not to janitors
elected in the same way as other officers and ordinary servants. Costello v. Mayor,
of the township. Under these circum- &c. of N. Y., 63 N. Y. 48 (1875); Sulli-
stances it was held that a municipal corpo- van v. Mayor, &c. of N. Y., 53 N. Y. 652.
ration other than, but situate within the Power to appoint marshal under charter of
township, could not, without express au- East St. Louis. See People v. Canty,
thority therefor, establish another public 55 Ill. 33. A police judge is held to be a
pound within the limits of the township, municipal officer in California. People v.
and prescribe regulations and fees variant Henry, 62 Cal. 557. Police officers and
from those prescribed by the general law; power to appoint. Infra, sec. 210, and
and it was further held, that the office of note. Where an appointment is to be made
pound-keeper could not be considered as by a city council, if a quorum be present, a
one essential to the business of the corpora- person who receives a majority of the votes
tion ; nor is a pound-keeper one of those cast will be elected although a majority
subordinate officers which all municipal of the council may abstain from voting.
corporations may, as of course, appoint. Launtz v. People, 113 Ill. 137 ; post,
It was, however, admitted by the court sec. 278 et seq.
that where such a corporation has power i Quoted with approval in Trow-
to do an act, it has the incidental power bridge v. Newark, 46 N. J. L. (17
to appoint persons to carry it into effect. Vroom) 140, where, by charter, the ap-
White v. Tallman, 2 Dutch. (N. J.) 67 pointment of a prosecuting attorney was
(1856). Infra, sec. 210, note. Construc- committed to a
common council, but
tion of power to appoint weigh-master. there was no direction as to the mode of
Hoffman v. Jersey City, 5 Vroom (34 N. appointment, held, by a divided court,
J. L.), 172. Power to appoint when office that having chosen one person by ballot
§ 208
291
THE MAYOR.
373; Rex V. Bumstead, 2 B. & Ad. 699; any civil office in this State, or from being
an ordinance which makes eligible those who, by the charter, are
not so, or which abridges the term of officers, as fixed by the
charter, is unauthorized and void.? Where provisions for the elec-
tion of municipal officers are made by ordinance in pursuance of
charter powers, they must also be strictly observed.3
§ 208 (147). The Mayor. — Every municipal corporation is pro-
vided with an executive head, usually styled the mayor. In the
chapter on Corporate Meetings we will point out the difference, in
some respects, between the mayor of an old corporation in England
and the officer known by that name in this country. In both coun-
tries the mayor is the head officer or executive magistrate of the
corporation; but with us it is important to bear in mind that all his
powers and duties depend entirely upon the provisions of the charter
or constituent act of the corporation, and valid by-laws passed in
pursuance thereof, and these vary, of course, in different munici-
palities. It is usually made his duty, however, to see that muni-
cipal ordinances are executed, and to preside at corporate meetings;
and he is frequently expressly declared to be a member of the
council or local legislative body. Properly and primarily his duties
are executive and administrative, and not judicial or legislative.
But judicial duties are often superadded to those which properly
the council had exhausted its power, and (1865); Vason v. Augusta, 38 Ga. 542
that a subsequent resolution declaring (1868). Chapter on Ordinances, post.
another person to be elected was of no The office of treasurer of a municipal cor-
effect. State, ex rel. v. Barbour, 53 poration is not a “civil office” within the
Conn. 76.
meaning of the provision of the Constitu-
1 Rex v. Mayor of Weymouth, 7 Mod. tion excluding the clergy from " holding
Rex v. Spencer, 3 Burr. 1827 ; Rex v. members of the legislature.” State v.
Chitty, 5 Ad. & E. 609. Ante, sec. 195. Wilmington, 3 Harring. (Del.) 294
A city council cannot elect its own mem- (1840) ; see Commonwealth v. Dallas, 3
bers when the law provides that they shall Yeates (Pa.), 300. Inucrative offices,"?
be elected by ballot by the electors of in the constitutional sense, defined to em-
the city. Kearney v. Andrews, 2 Stockt. brace county recorder, commissioner, town
(N. J.) 70. Majority of council essential ship trustee, and supervisor. Daily v.
to valid appointment of city treasurer. State, 8 Blackf. 329 ; Creighton v. Piper,
State v. Patterson, 6 Vroom (35 N. J. L.), 14 Ind. 182 ; Howard v. Shoemaker, 35
190. See Douglass v. Essex, 9 Vroom Ind. 111. The office of city councilman
(38 N. J. L.), 214; State v. Jersey City, is not “lucrative” within the prohibition
2 Dutch. (N. J.) 444, 447. The appoint- of the State Constitution against the same
ment of a person to a city office by a person holding more than one lucrative
mayor under a law which requires con- office at the same time. State v. Kirk, 44
firmation by the council gives the ap- Ind. 401 (1873); S. C. 15 Am. Rep. 239. As
pointee no right to the office without such to office of city clerk, Mohan v. Jackson,
confirmation by the proper and legal city 52 Ind. 599 (1876).
council. People v. Weber, 89 Ill. 347. 8 Saunders v. Lawrence, 141 Mass. 380,
% Stadler v. Detroit, 13 Mich. 346 4 Post, sec. 270 et seq.
292
$ 209
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
appertain to the office of mayor, and he is invested by legislative
enactment with the authority to administer not only the ordinances
of the corporation, but also judicially to administer the laws of the
State, 1
$ 209 (148). Same subject. — The office of mayor has long existed
in England,? and many of its general features have been adopted in
1 Waldo v. Wallace, 12 Ind. 569 tion of works and buildings in public
(1859), and growing out of it, see, also, places. Henderson v. Mayor, 3 La. 563.
Gulick v. New, 14 Ind. 93 (1860) ; How- Mayor may sanction an ordinance passed
ard v. Shoemaker, 35 Ind. 111 (1871); by a common council, whose term has ex-
Reynolds v. Baldwin, 1 La. An. 162 pired. Elmendorf v. Ewen, 2 N. Y.
Leg.
(1846); Muscatine v. Steck, 7 Iowa, 505; Obs. 85. Notice to mayor. Nichols v.
2 Iowa, 220; Strahl, In re, 16 Iowa, 369; Boston, 98 Mass. 39. • Police and exccu-
Shafer v. Mumina, 17 Md. 331 ; Luehrman tive power of mayor. Shafer v. Mumma,
v. Taxing District, 2 Lea (Tenn.), 425. 17 Md. 331 ; Slater v. Wood, 9 Bosw.
Approving text. Slater v. Wood, 9 Bosw. (N. Y.) 15 ; Pedrick v. Bailey, 12 Gray
(N. Y.) 15; ante, chap. iii. Morrison v. (Mass.), 161 ; Nichols v. Boston, 98
McDonald, 21 Me. 550 (1842); State v. Mass. 39. Alderman acting as inayor.
Maynard, 14 Ill. 419 ; Commonwealth v. State v. Buffalo, 2 Hill (N. Y.), 434.
Dallas, 3 Yeates (Pa.:), 300 (1801); State Judicial power of mayor. See Municipal
V. Wilmington, 3 Harring. (Del.) 294 Courts, post ; Prell v. McDonald, 7 Kan.
(1839); Prell v. McDonald, 7 Kan. 426 426 ; Howard v. Shoemaker, 35 Ind. 111
(1871). This section of the text cited (1871). Presence and functions of mayor
and followed. Martindale v. Palmer, 52 at meetings of the council. See chapter
Ind. 411 (1876).
on Corporate Meetings, post.
Power of mayor, iu his official name, o Liability of mayor in Upper Canada to
bring suit to prevent or restrain violations private actions in respect to his official
of law by other municipal officers, de acts. Fair v. Moore, 3 Up. Can. C. P. 484;
clared. Genois, Mayor, &c. v. Lockett, Moran v. Palmer, 13 Up. Can. C. P. 450,
13 La. 545 (1838). But quære. · The 528. Fraud of mayor restrained and re-
mayor of a city has no incidental power to lieved against. Patterson v. Bowes, 4
execute an appcal bond for the corpora- Grant, 170 ; Ib. 489 ; post, sec. 910, note.
tion ; and such a bond was regarded as 2 History and nature of office of mayor.
not even incidental to the power of taking Consult 4 Jacob's Law Dict. 264, 265 ;
an appeal, but must be authorized by the 2 Toml. Law Dict. 540 ; 2 Bouv. 150 ;
council. Baltimore v. Railroad Co., 21 Spelm. Gloss. “Mayor ” ; Ela v. Smith,
Md. 50 (1863). A precept to collect a 5 Gray (Mass.), 121 (1855); Achley's Case,
street assessment, signed by a member of 4 Abh. Pr. Rep. 35 (1856); Cochran v.
the council acting temporarily as president McCleary, 22 Iowa, 75, 82 (1867); Nich-
thereof, is void, when the statute requires ols v. Boston, 98 Mass. 39 ; Fletcher v.
the signature of the mayor. Jeffersonville Lowell, 15 Gray (Mass.), 103 ; ante, secs.
v. Patterson, 32 Ind. 140 (1869). Injunc- 13, 174 ; post, secs. 253, 260, 271, 331, 428.
tion will lie to restrain a sale on such a The office in England is quite ancient. In
precept. Ib. See chapter on Remedies 1204 King John made the bailiff of King's
against Illegal Corporate Acts, post. Lynn a mayor, with administrative pow-
As to nature and extent of authority of The title was a common one
mayors and other civil officers to employ early as the time of Bracton.
force for the prevention or suppression of Mr. Norton, in his valuable - Com-
mobs, riots, &c., see Ela v. Smith, 5 Gray mentaries on the History, Constitution,
(Mass.), 121 (1855), arising out of the and Chartered Franchises of the City of
arrest of Anthony Burns as a fugitive London," says, that the first special grant
slave. Power of mayor to order demolic of the mayoralty to the city of London
ers.
as
§ 210
293
POLICE OFFICERS; ARREST UPON VIEW.
this country. In a former page, suggestions have been made in favor
of increasing the powers, dignity, and responsibility of this office as
a means of ensuring, under existing conditions in this country, more
satisfactory municipal rule; but the subject is not sufficiently con-
nected with practical law to warrant a more extended reference to it
in a work of this character.1
§ 210 (149). Police Officers ; Power to make Arrests upon View.
- The office of a police officer is not known to the common law; it
is created by statute, and such an officer has, and can exercise, only
such powers as he is authorized to do by the legislature, expressly
or derivatively. He is an officer of the State rather than of the
a
was made by King John in a charter dated 244, and elsewhere. He is cx officio
on the ninth day of May, in the sixteenth justice for the borough," sec. 155. Mr.
year of his reign, A. D. 1215. This charter Shaw ju describing the workings of the mu-
declares that the king has granted and uicipal system of Great Britain points out
confirmed to the barons of London the the great difference between the functions
right of choosing a mayor every year, and and duties of an English and American
at the end of the year of removing him mayor. Pol. Science Quarterly, Vol. IV.
and substituting another, if they will, or p. 209, June, 1889.
electing the same again. He is to be pre- 1 Ante, chap. i. sec. 13, and notes.
sented to the king, and swear to be faith- 2 Commonwealth v. Dugan, 12 Met.
ful to him. The use of the word con- (Mass.) 233 (1847); Commonwealth v.
firmed, in this charter, shows that the Hastings, 9 Met. (Mass.) 259; ante, secs.
name and officer existed before. The first 58, 60. Where a policeman is duly ap-
civic magistrate had begun to be called by pointed under charter authority to or-
the name of mayor toward the end of the ganize and regulate a city watch and the
reign of King Richard. The denomina- general police of the city, the presump-
tion of mayor, it is said on the authority tion is that he possesses the powers of
of legal antiquaries, can be traced to a very ordinary peace officers at common law.
far date among the German and French Doering v. State, 49 Ind. 56 (1874). In
nations of Europe. The chief governor of Massachusetts policemen are peace officers,
the town communities which arose in
and a person who assaults or obstructs
France in the eleventh century was often them in the discharge of their duties is
styled the mayor. It is a matter of his indictable, though they have not been
tory that in France, the mayor of the pals sworn, the statute not requiring this.
ace was the governor of Paris, often hold. Buttrick v. Lowell, 1 Allen (Mass.), 172 ;
ing sovereign power, and, indeed, in time Mitchell v. Rockland, 52 Me. 118, 122.
usurping it, since it was from one of the In The People v. Metropolitan Police
mayors of the palace that the family of Board, 19 N. Y. 188 (1859), growing out
Charlemagne descended. And it is sug- of the act to establish a Metropolitan Po-
gested by Mr. Norton that the term lice District, it was decided by a majority
mayor,” familiar to the Normans, may of the Court of Appeals that, although the
have been originally, though remotely, office was a new one, yet the mode of fill-
derived from the same source. Norton's ing it not being provided by the Constitu-
Com., pp. 90, 402, 403 ; see, also, Pull. tion, it was in the power of the legislature
ing's Laws, Customs, &c., of London, to confer it upon persons discharging sub-
chap. ii. 16 m. The powers and duties of stantially the same duties within a more
mayor are prescribed with particularity in limited territorial jurisdiction, and to dis-
the Municipal Corporations Act of 1882, pense with an oath of office. See, also,
secs. 15, 16, 53, 60, 61, 66, 67, 68, 148, People v. Draper, 15 N. Y. 532 (1857), ,
294
§ 210
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
municipality in which he exercises his office. Where police offi-
cers are, by statute, invested with all the powers of constables, as
conservators of the peace, this gives them authority to arrest upon
view intoxicated persons while guilty of disorderly conduct, or other
persons violating the laws, and to detain them until they can be
brought before a magistrate. If such an officer releases an intoxi-
where the Court of Appeals held the “ Act cases, see 1 Hale P. C. 587; Hawkins P.
to establish a Metropolitan Police District” C. Book II. chap. xiii. sec. 8.
valid ; approved, Metropolitan Board of Authority to arrest upon view, and with-
Health v. Heister, 37 N. Y. 661 (1868); out warrant. Where such a course is not
McDermott r. Metropolitan Police Board, repugnant to the general law of the State,
5 Abb. Pr. 422 ; Police Commissioners v. the proper officers of a municipal corpora-
Louisville, 3 Bush (Ky.), 597 (1868); tion may be authorized to arrest without
ante, sec. 58, and notes. See People v. warrant, or upon view, offenders who
Albertson, 55 N. Y. 50 (1873), where violate ordinances in the presence of such
People y. Draper, supra, is limited, ques- officers. Bryan v. Bates, 15 Ill. 87 (1853);
tioned, and distinguished. Extent of legis- Main v. McCarty, 15 Ill. 442 ; State
lative power and control over appointment, v. Lafferty, 5 Harring. (Del.) 491 ; State v.
powers, &c. of police, health, and other Sims, 16 S. C. 486, post, sec. 414, note. If
local officers. Baltimore v. Board of an offence is committed in view of the
Police (Baltimore Police Act), 15 Md. 376 officer, he may arrest immediately, or as
(1859) ; Metropolitan Board of Health v. soon thereafter as he can. Boaz v.
Boaz v. Tate,
Heister, 37 N. Y. 661 (1868); People v. 43 Ind. 60 (1873). See chapter on Muni-
Hurlbut, 24 Mich. 44 (1871); Police cipal Courts, post.
Comm’rs v. Louisville, above cited ; ante, Power to a city corporation to make
sec. 58, note. Mode of compensation. Wor- ordinances for the security, or good order,
cester v. Walker, 9 Gray (Mass.), 78. or government of the place, and to appoint
Under authority to make rules necessary or elect officers to carry out ordinances,
to good order and public peace, the power authorizes the appointment of city guards,
to appoint policemen is implied. State v. or police officers, or peace officers; and
Sims, 16 S. C. 486 ; ante, sec. 207. such officers may arrest, without a warrant,
1 Burch v. Hardwicke, 30 Gratt. 24. persons engaged in breaches of the peace.
While a mayor under the Constitution City Council v. Payne, 2 Nott & McCord
may remove officers of a municipality, he (S. C.), 475 (1820). A city council may
cannot remove a State officer though authorize arrests upon view, without war-
elected or appointed by the people of the rant, for violation of its by-laws; when
municipality and paid by them ; if the not inconsistent with the general statutes or
mayor removes him from office he ex- policy of the State (White v. Kent, 11
ceeds his authority and is responsible to Ohio St. 550 (1860); Thomas v. Ashland,
the officer in a civil action for damages. 12 Ohio St. 127), but not otherwise.
Ib. A police judge held to be a municipal Thus, where the city charter declared all
officer. People v. Henry, 62 Cal. 557. by-laws inconsistent with the general law
A policeman of a city is a public officer, to be void, and where the general law did
holding his office as a trust from the State, not allow an officer to arrest for a misde.
and not as a matter of contract between meanor not committed in his presence,
himself and the city. Farrell v. Bridge without a warrant, it was held that an
port, 45 Conn. 191.
ordinance authorizing police officers to
2 Taylor v. Strong, 3 Wend. (N. Y.) make arrests, without a warrant, for vio-
384 (1829); Bacon, Ab. Constable, C.; lation of ordinances not committed in
Commonwealth v. Hastings, 9 Met. (Mass.) their presence, was void, and would not
259 (1843); Prell v. McDonald, 7 Kan. 426 protect the officer against a suit for tres-
(1871). As to power of constables in such pass. Pesterfield v. Vickers, 3 Coldw.
?
§ 211
295
ARREST UPON VIEW ; ILLUSTRATIONS.
cated person, whom he had arrested while conducting himself in a
disorderly manner, upon his promise to go directly home, he may
lawfully retake him, on his going into a bar-room before he is out
of the officer's sight; and such arrest is justified, whether it be re-
garded as a recaption for the original purpose, or as a new arrest for
disorderly conduct still continuing:1
§ 211 (150). The Subject illustrated. — Charters authorizing
municipal officers to make arrests upon view and without process, are
to be viewed in connection with the general statutes of the State,2
and being in derogation of liberty, are strictly construed ; hence an
officer making such an arrest, though on the Sabbath day, should, in-
stead of imprisoning, take without unreasonable delay the person
arrested before the proper tribunal and prefer a complaint against
him, as provided by the statutes of the State.3
(Tenn.) 205 (1866). Further as to arrests, way with intent to commit a felony (Tim-
on view, withont information, and the son, In re, L. R. 5 Ex. 257 ; see, also,
duty of the officer, see Doering v. State, Jones, In re, 7 Ex. 586), or in arrest-
49 Ind. 56 (1874); Johnson v. Americiis, ing a person for a misdemeanor without a
46 Ga. 80 (1872); Nealis v. Hayward, warrant (Mathews v. Biddulph, 3 M. &
48 Ind. 19 (1874); Boaz v. Tate, 43 Ind. G. 390 ; Griffin v. Coleman, 4 H. & N.
60 (1873); Smith v. Donelly, 66 Ill. 464 265); unless there be a breach of the peace
(1873); Scircle v. Nevis, 47 Ind. 289 in his presence (Timothy v. Simpson, 1 C.
(1874); Galliard v. Laxton, 2 B. & S. M. & R. 757 ; Derecourt v. Corbishley,
363; Codd v. Cabe, L. R. 1 Ex. Div. 332; 5 El. & B. 188), or danger of a renewal of
s. C. 13 Cox, 202 ; Regina v. Chapman, it. The Queen v. Light, 27 L. J. Mag.
12 Cox, 4. If a private individual state Cas. 1 ; The Queen v. Walker, 23 L. J.
facts to an officer, who thereupon, on his Mag. Cas. 123; Pesterfield v. Vickers, 3
own responsibility, arrests a person, or if Coldw. (Tenn.) 205. It would seem that
a private person procure a magistrate to a constable having a warrant to arrest is
issue a warrant for taking a person, the not bound to accept a tender of the fine
imprisonment is not his act, and he may and costs. See Arnott v. Bradley, 23
show this under the plea of not guilty. Upper Can. C. P. 1. Although police
Barber v. Rollinson, 1 C. & M. 330; officers may arrest without warrant for
Stonehouse v. Elliott, 6 T. R. 315 ; Brandt crimes, it does not follow that they have
v. Craddock, 27 L. J. Ex. 314 ; Grinham the power to do so in the case of lesser
2. Willey, 4 H. & N. 496. An officer is offences. Galliard v. Laxton, 2 B. & S.
justified in arresting without a warrant 361 ; Regina v. Chapman, 12 Cox, 4;
upon a reasonable suspicion of a felony Codd v. Cabe, 13 Cox, 202 ; s. C. L. R. 1
having been committed, and of the per- Ex. Div. 352.
son being guilty of it, although no felony 1 Commonwealth v. Hastings, supra.
has in fact been.committed, and whether the It follows that an obstruction offered by a
reasonable grounds for suspicion are mat- third person to the officer in making such
ters within his own knowledge or facts an arrest would be unjustifiable. Ib.
stated to him by another. Lawrence v. 2 Supra, sec. 210, note.
Hedger, 3 Taunt. 14 ; Davis v. Russell, 5 8 Low v. Evans, 16 Ind. 486 (1868),
Bing. 355 ; Beckwith v. Philby, 6 B. & (action for false imprisonment); Pow v.
C. 635 ; Hogg v. Ward, 3 H. & N. 417. Becker, 3 Ind. 475 (1852); Vandever v.
But an officer is not in general justified in Mattock, 3 Ind. 479. The delay in taking
arresting a person who frequents a high- the person arrested before a magistrate must
296
§ 213
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
§ 212 (151). Mode of Election; Power over its own Officers.
- A city council authorized to elect certain officers, may, where no
mode of election is prescribed, appoint them by resolution, and is not
bound to elect them by ballot; 1 and the corporation has full con-
trol, unless specially restricted, over all offices and officers existing
only under by-laws. A vote of an authorized committee of a city,
electing their clerk to be the city engineer for a year from a sub-
sequent day, duly recorded, and signed by him as their clerk, is
sufficient to take his appointment out of the statute of frauds.3
$ 213 (152). Presumption of due Appointment. --- The same pre-
sumptions which are applicable to acts of individuals are, in general,
applicable to acts of corporations. Thus, if a person acts notoriously
as the officer of a corporation, and is recognized by it as such offi-
cer, a regular appointment will be presumed, and his acts will bind
the corporation, although no written proof is or can be adduced of
his appointment.
not be unreasonable. Johnson v. Ameri-
.
over, 17 N. Y. 64 (1858); Waldraven v.
cus, 46 Ga. 80 (1872). In Low v. Evans,
In Low v. Evans, Memphis (right to abolish office), 4 Coldw.
it was held that there was no authority in (Tenn.) 431 (1867); infra, sec. 231;
the officer making the arrest to imprison Madison v. Korbly, 32 Ind. 74, 79 (1869);
the party arrested for an indefinite time Samis v. King, 40 Conn. 298 (1873). The
(e. g., from Sunday until the next day) power to appoint implies, in general, the
because he might be subject to a pen- power to remove the appointees. People v.
alty, to be recovered in a suit in the nature Hill, 7 Cal. 97. Thus a municipal cor-
of an action of debt. If the court is not
If the court is not poration appointing commissioners in
in session the officer may confine the per- cases of local improvements, may remove
son arrested until he can be brought be- them. People v. Mayor, &c. of New
fore the court, which should be done at York, 5 Barb. (N. Y.) 43 (1848). Post,
the earliest period. Boaz v. Tate, 43 Ind. sec. 238 et seq. But in South Carolina,
60 (1873) ; State v. Freeman, 86 N. C. see Caulfield v. State, 1 S. C. 461 (1869),
683. An intoxicated person, arrested late the exercise of the power to appoint to
at night, may be detained until the next office is an executive, not a legislative act.
day before being taken to the court. Achley's Case, 4 Abb. Pr. 35 (1856).
Scircle v. Nevis, 47 Ind. 289 (1874). Power to suspend officer. Post, sec. 247,
1 Low v. Comm’rs of Pilotage, R. M. note. A provision that the city council
Charlt. (Ga.) 302 (1830), per Law, J.; “may” by ordinance provide for the
ante, sec. 94. Power of council to appoint, election, by the qualified voters, of any of
and when it may delegate this power to a the officers named in the act, held to leave
committee. People v. Bedell, 2 Hill (N. it to the discretion of the city council
Y.), 196 ; Commonwealth v. Pittsburgh whether the office of city attorney should
(police force), 14 Pa. St. 177 (1850); be elective or not. Ball v. Fagg, 67 Mo.
Wilder v. Chicago, 26 Ill. 182 ; Russell v. 481.
Chicago (collectors), 22 Ill. 285 ; Trow- 8 Chase v. Lowell, 7 Gray (Mass.), 33
bridge v. Newark, 46 N. J. L. (17 Vroom) (1856).
140 ; ante, sec. 96.
4 Bank of United States v. Dandridge,
2 As to plenary power and control, 12 Wheat. (U. S.) 64, 70, where Mr. Jus-
when not restricted, of a municipal cor- tice Story cites many cases, establishing
poration over offices and officers existing the principle “ that the acts of artificial
only under ordinances, see People v. Con- persons afford the same presumptions as
§ 214
297
OATH AND OFFICIAL BOND.
§ 214 (153). Oath and Official Bond.
Public officers are usu-
ally required to take an oath of office, and those entrusted with money
or property are also generally required to give bond and sureties for
the faithful performance of their duties. In England it is said that
an oath of office cannot be required to be taken by a by-law when
none is required by the charter. But in this country the oath of
office is, in substance, only that the officer will support the Consti-
tution and faithfully perform his official duties. And such an oath
may, doubtless, be required by ordinance, to be taken by every mu-
nicipal officer before entering upon his office. Statutes requiring an
oath of office and bond are usually directory in their nature; and
unless the failure to take the oath or give the bond by the time pre-
scribed is expressly declared, ipso facto, to vacate the office, the oath
may be taken or the bond given afterwards, if no vacancy has been
declared.2
the acts of natural persons." Infra, sec. Carthy z'. Chicago, 53 Ill. 38 (1870). A
237, note and cases. The doctrine that prospective appointment to public office,
not only the appointment, but the made by a body which, as then constituted,
authority of an agent of a corporation may is empowered to fill the vacancy when it
be implieù fron the adoption or recogni- arises, was held to be legal in the absence
tion of his acts (Angell & Ames Corp. sec. of any express statutory provision to the
284), was applied in Killey v. Forsee, 57 contrary, and to vest title to the office in
Mo. 390 (1874), to municipal corporations; the appointee. State v. Van Buskirk, 40
and it was held that the failure of a deputy N. J. L. 463. The power of appointment
city engineer to file a certificate of his to office, when executed by the perform-
appointment, as provided by the charter, ance of the last act made necessary in its
did not vitiate his acts.
execution, is not revocable without the con-
1 Rex v. Dean, &c., 1 Str. 539 ; Glover, sent of the appointee. Ib. In England
305; Willc. 133; Grant, 76. It is the the oath of allegiance and the judicial
settled doctrine of the Supreme Court that oath are imperative. The Mayor is re-
the United States, being a body politic, quired also to take an oath as Mayor.
with a capacity to enter into contracts, may Munic. Corp. Act 1882, sec. 15; 31 and 32
within the sphere and in the execution of Vict. chap. 72.
its appropriate powers, take bonds and 2 Smith v. Cronkhite, 8 Ind. 134 ;
securities, which are not prohibited by law, State v. Findley, 10 Ohio, 51, 59, and
though such bonds and securities may not cases cited ; State v. Porter (failure to
have been prescribed by any pre-existing give bond by city marshal in time), 7 Ind.
legislative act. These, though voluntary, 204 ; Sprowl v. Laurence, 33 Ala. 674 ;
that is, not extorted or coerced, -if Bank v. Dandridge, 12 Wheat. 64 ; United
taken for a lawful purpose and upon a States v. Le Baron, 19 How. 73 ; s. C. 4
good consideration, are valid. United Wall. 642; Marbury v. Madison, i
States v. Tingey, 5 Pet. (U. S.) 114, 128 Cranch, 137 ; Launtz v. People, 113 Ill.
(1831) ; approved, Same v. Linn, 15 Pet. 137 ; Cawley v. People (county treasurer's
(U. S.) 290 (1841); and see Dugan v. bond), 95 Ill. 249 (1880) ; Chicago v.
United States, 3 Wheat. (U. S.) 172; Gage (city treasurer's boud), 95 Ill. 593
United States v. Bradley, 10 Pet. (U. S.) (1880); Caskey v. Greensborough, 78 Ind.
343. Infra, sec. 216. Right of city to re- 233; St. Helena v. Burton, 35 La. An.
quire bond of indemnity from the owner,
521. It is no defence to an action upon an
who proposes to excavate sidewalk to make official bond that the oath required by law
cellars, vaults, or improvements. Mc- was not taken within the prescribed time.
298
$ 215
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
Ib.
$ 215 (154). Oath when a Condition Precedent; Acts of de
facto Officer. When the statute requires a prescribed oath of
office before any person elected “shall act therein," a person cannot
justify as such officer unless he has taken an oath in substantial, not
necessarily literal, compliance with the law. Third parties, how-
ever, acting in good faith with him as such officer, are protected,
notwithstanding his failure to take the requisite oath.1
Charter provision that oaths of office monwealth r. City Council of Philadelphia,
be taken and subscribed within ten days is 7 Am. Law Reg. (N. s.) 362. Effect of
directory, and may be complied with after signing official bonds in blank, see Chicago
that time. Kearney v. Andrews, 2 Stockt. v. Gage (bond of city treasurer), 95 Ill.
(N. J.) 70. In New York it is held that 593 (1880). Mr. Justice Sheldon cites
a town collector elect, in order to qualify and reviews many of the cases on this sub-
for the office, is required by the Constitu- ject. Butler v. United States, 21 Wall.
tion to take and subscribe an oath of 272 ; Dair v. United States, 16 Wall. 1.
office, and until he has thus qualified, the Murfree on Official Bonds, sec. 20 et seq.,
,
incumbent inay hold over. People v. sec. 42, and cases.
McKinney, 52 N. Y. 374 (1873). But as 1 Olney v. Pearce, 1 R. I. 292 (1850),
no time is limited for taking such oath it and authorities cited by Mr. Angell in
may be taken before the office is forfeited note ;-Riddle v. Bedford County, 7 Serg.
by the neglect to execute the required & Rawle (Pa.), 392 ; Neale v. Overseers,
bond. 16. A town may lawfully require 5 Watts (Pa.), 538. Where an officer,
a collector of taxes or other officer to fur- before acting, is required to qualify by
rish sureties for the faithful discharge of taking an oath of office, he has no leyal
the duties of his office. This power is in- right, until he qualifics, to recover fees of
cidental, and need not be express. If the an incumbent received after the plaintiff's
person chosen neglects, or is unable, to appointment or election, and before he
furnish sureties, this amounts to a non- qualifies. Thompson v. Nicholson, 12
acceptance of the trust, although he has Rob. (La.) 326 (1845). See City v. Given,
taken the oath of office. Morrell v. Sylves- 60 Pa. St. 136 ; supra, sec. 214, note ;
ter, 1 Greenl. (Me.) 248. While it is the post, sec. 235.
duty of an officer to perfect his title to his If inembers of a common council, who
office by complying with the directions of are required by the charter to be sworn
the law as to taking oath, depositing before they enter on the duties of their
bonds, &c., yet his failure to do so is his office,are sworn before an officer not author-
own wrongful neglect, and is no defence to ized to administer the oath, they are still
his sureties in an action on his official officers de facto, and a tax levied by them
bond. State v. Toomer, 7 Rich. (S. C.) is not invalid, and will not be set aside even
Law, 216 (1854); State v. Findley, 10 in a direct proceeding. State v. Perkins,
Ohio, 51 (1840). The giving of a bond 4 Zabr. (24 N. J. L.) 409 (1854). Infra, ,
and having it approved were held in the secs. 216, note, 221, note, 230, note,
case in juilgment to be conditions precedent 237, note. Bond of de facto officer bind-
to the right of occupying a municipal ing upon him and his sureties. Green v.
office. Howell v. Commonwealth, 97 Pa. Wardwell, 17 Ill. 278; infra,sec. 216, note.
St. 332 ; post, sec. 235, note. Rule in Murfree, Official Bonds, secs. 70, 71. But
Virginia, see infra, sec. 220, note. this principle does not apply where there
A city council, whose duty it is to decide is no office de jure. Tinsley v. Kirby, 17
upon the sufficiency of the sureties of a city S. C. 1, 8. Post, sec. 276.
officer, cannot refuse to do so or postpone An act of Congress provided that pay-
its decision because the title to the office masters should, "previous to entering upon
is elsewhere disputed ; and a mandamus the duties of their office, give good and
will lie to compel it to act upon the suf- sufficient bonds,” &c. It was held that an
ficiency of the securities offered. Com- appointment as paymaster was completo
!
$ 216
299
OFFICIAL BONDS.
§ 216 (155). Conditions of official Bond ; Voluntary and Com-
mon-Law Obligations. - The principle is well settled, that oficial
bonds are valid if the condition complies substantially with the re-
quirements of the statute. The exact form prescribed is not essen-
tial unless made so by the charter or act.1 Duties of a nature and
character similar to those belonging to the office may be added to it or
imposed upon an officer; and these are held to be within the contem-
plation and the liability of obligors upon the bond.2 As such bonds are
1
when made by the President and confirmed office ; and this having been done by a
by the senate; that the giving of the bond general statute, the sureties on an official
was a mere ministerial act for the security bond, conditioned as required by the
of the government, and not a condition statute, are liable for their principal's de-
precedent to his authority to act as pay- fault in reference to additional duties sub-
master; and that a recital in the bond of sequently imposed, unless the statute in-
the appointment estops the principal and posing such duties shows an intention
sureties to deny the fact. United States that they shall not be so liable. Morrow.
v. Bradley, 10 Pet. (U. S.) 343 (1836); v. Wood, 56 Ala. 1. Infra, secs. 230, 233.
and see, also, United States Bank v. Dan- In Orman v. Pueblo, 8 Col. 292, Helm,
dridge, 12 Wheat. 64. Sureties of muni- J., enumerated the following propositions
cipal treasurer were estopped to show that concerning the liability of sureties upon
the election of the treasurer was unauthor- official bonds as elementary : “ First, that
ized because the time of the election had the sureties on such bonds enter into con.
not been fixed and the duties of the of- tract thereof with reference to existing
fice prescribed by ordinance. Paducah v. statutes on the subject, and that therefore
Cully, 9 Bush (Ky.), 323 (1873); and see the law becomes a part of the contract.
post, 216 note.
Second, that the engagement or the obli-
Allegheny County v. Van Campen, gation of the surety cannot be extended
3 Wend. 49 (1829); People v. Holines, 2 beyond the strict terms of the bond. Third,
Wend. 281 ; Ib. 615 ; Fellows v. Gilman, that when a breach thereof is assigned
4 Wend. 414 ; Lawton v. Erwin, 9 Wend. and an attempt is made to hold the surety,
233 ; Cornell v. Barnes, 1 Denio, 35. such breach must be based upon some of-
Bond without seals held valid as a com- ficial misconduct on the part of the
mon-law obligation. Board of Education principal.”
v. Fonda, 77 N. Y. 350 ; S. P. U. S. v. So under the laws of Indiana, - provid-
Lim, 15 Pet. 290 ; U. S. v. Hodson, 10 ing for the issuance and sale of bonds to
Wall. 395; Skellinger v. Yendes, 12 complete water-works, -- it is the duty of
Wend. 306 ; Morse v. Hodsden, 5 Mass. the common council, and not of the city
318 ; Thomas v. White, 12 Mass. 369 ; treasurer, to negotiate and sell such bonds;
Bank v. Smith, 5 Allen, 415. So a bond but the city treasurer is liable on his of-
without any specified obligee. Fellows v. ficial bond for moneys received by him
Gilman, 4 Wend. 414, 419.
from the sale thereof, by whomsoever
2 Board, &c. of Auburn v. Quick, 99 made. Such duty cannot be delegated by
N. Y. 138 ; People v. Vilas, 36 N. Y. 459, the council, by ordinance or otherwise, to
and cases cited. Mayor, &c. of New York the treasurer or any other person. Under
v. Kelly, 98 N. Y. 467. See, also, Board an ordinance designating the city treasurer
of Supervisors v. Clark, 92 N. Y. 391. It by name as agent for the sale of such
is competent for the legislature, in exact- bonds, his acts in negotiating such sales
ing official bonds and prescribing their con- are simply those of an agent of the common
ditions, to require that they shall be con- council ; and he is not liable on his official
ditioned for the faithful performance of all bond for the mere sale, assignment, and
duties that may be imposed by subsequent delivery thereof by him pursuant to such
statutes during the officer's continuance in agency. In an action on his official bond
300
$ 216
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
intended to secure the public the courts do not favor mere technical
defences. Accordingly, actions have been sustained on bonds not
required by law, when executed voluntarily, and with proper con-
ditions, to secure the performance of official duty. And when re-
quired by law, bonds are good, as common-law obligations, though
they do not conform to the statute, if they contain no condition con-
trary to law. In such case the obligor voluntarily agrees to make
the obligee named a trustee for the persons interested in the due
performance of the condition. Thus, an action may be maintained
on a bond given to the "selectmen" instead of to the “town," by
a town treasurer, conditioned for the faithful performance of his
duties,
of se-
012
for moneys alleged to have been received there may be no statute requiring one.
by him as such treasurer, an answer that Supervisors v. Coffinbury, 1 Mich. 355 ;
by the terms of the negotiation, which was People v. Johr, 22 Mich. 461 (1871);
approved by the common council, the pro- Platteville v. Hooper, 63 Wis. 381. The
ceeds remained in the hands of the pur fact that there is already a valid official
chaser, to be used only as needed in con- bond with solvent sureties does not pre-
structing the water-works, and that the clude a county court from taking from a
purchaser had become insolvent while the delinquent county officer, by way
funds yet remained in his hands, — Held, curity for his delinquency, a bond and
to be sufficient. Iu such case, a report by mortgage on real estate. Turner v. Clark
the treasurer to the council, as to the Co., 67 Mo. 243 (1878).
condition of the fund, charging himself Municipal corporations may sue
with funds remaining in the hands of the official bonds of public officers when inter-
purchaser, Held, not to estop him to ested therein. State, &c. v. Norwood, 12
deny his liability. State v. Hauser, 63 Md. 177 (1858). In an action on the
Ind. 155 ; as to liability for misapplica- official bond of an officer appointed by a
tion of funds, see Robinson v. State, 60 municipal corporation, reciting the ar-
Ind. 26.
pointment of the principal as such officer,
1 Supra, sec. 214, note ; Postmaster- neither he nor his sureties can set up the
General v. Rice, Gilpin, 554 ; Montville invalidity of his appointment as a defence
v. Haughton, 7 Conn. 543; Common- to an action for moneys collected. Hobo-
wealth v. Wolbert, 6 Binney, 292; Baby ken v. Harrison, 1 Vroom (30 N. J. L.),
v. Baby, 8 Upper Can. Q. B. 76.
73 ; Seiple v. Elizabeth, 3 Dutch. (N. J.)
2 Thomas v. White, 12 Mass. 369; 5 407 ; supra, sec. 215, note. Sureties on
Mass. 314 ; Kavanaugh V. Sanders, 8 official bond of de facto municipal officer are
Greenl. (Me.) 442; Sweetzer v. Hay, 2 liable for moneys collected by him ; and
Gray, 49, and cases there cited ; Smith this though he held an office which in
v. Wingate, 61 Tex. 54 ; Sutherland v. point of fact, the corporation could not
Carr, 85 N. Y. 105; Barnet v. Abbott, create. 1 Vroom (30 N. J. L.), 73, supr.
53 Vt. 120 (bond executed near the close Supra, sec. 215, note ; post, secs. 221, note,
of an officer's term of office, but antedated, 230, note. A surety in an official bond of an
to cover the entire term, held good). See, officer whose term is limited to a year, is
also, Fond du Lac v. Moore, 58 Wis. 170. not liable beyond the year, though the
8 Sweetzer v. Hay, 2 Gray, 49 ; Horn officer continues by law until a successor
v. Whittier, 6 N. H. 88. A bond given is provided. Dover v. Twombly, 42 N. H.
by the treasurer of a county for the faith- 59 (1860); Chelmsford Co. v. Deniorest
ful performance of his official duties, to the 7 Gray (Mass.), 1 (1856); Mayor v. Horn,
board of supervisors of the same county, 2 Harring. (Del.) 190 (1833) ; Regina v.
is a good and valid bond, notwithstanding McRae, 5 Upper Can. P. R. 309; Mont-
§ 217
301
OFFICIAL TERM ; HOLDING OVER.
§ 217 (156). Duration of Official Term; Power to hold over;
English Statutes and Decisions. It was a settled rule of law re-
specting the old corporations in England that the office of the
mayor or other head officer was annual, and absolutely expired at
the end of the year; and that without an express clause in the
charter, he could not hold over until his successor was provided.
The right, in such case, to hold over did not exist by implication,
and was not an incident to the office. In some charters, however,
gomery v. Hughes, 65 Ala. 201. A change tor, holding office for three successive
in a statute by which the time for the an- years, and giving a different bond each year,
nual settlements of county collectors is was delinquent, and there was no evidence
fixed a month later, and additional time showing the time when the deficit occurred,
is allowed in which to pay after settlement, it was held that the loss should be divided
releases the sureties on a collector's bond between the three bonds in proportion to
executed before the change. The effect is to the suis collected during the time for
postpone the State's right of action against which each bond was given. Phipsburg
the collector. The rule that an extension of 2. Dickinson, 78 Me. 457. But in Cali-
time given the principal releases the surety fornia, in a similar case, it was recently
applies between the State and an individ- (1887) held that, in absence of evidence
nal. State v. Roberts, 68 Mo. 234. to the contrary, the presuniption is that
Sureties upon an official bond are not the misappropriation happened at the end
liable for a defalcation of their principal, of the last term, for which the sureties on
occurring during a term preceding that for the last hond are liable. Heppe v. John-
which the bond was given. Paducah v. son, 73 Cal. 265. As to a breach of an
Cully, 9 Bush (Ky), 323 (1872) ; Bissell official bond, see La Pointe v. O'Malley,
v. Saxton, 77 N. Y. 191 ; Myers v. U. S. 46 Wis. 35.
1 McLean, 493 ; Mahaska v. Ingalls, It is no objection to the bond that it
16 Iowa, 81 ; Townsend v. Everett, 4 Ala. was executed before the appointment to
607 ; U. S. v. Boyd, 5 How. 50 ; Bruce office was made.
Essex v. Strong, 8
v. U. S., 17 How. 437; McIntyre v. School Upper Can. L. J. 15 ; s. c. 21 Upper Can.
Trustees, 3 Ill. App. 77 ; Arlington v. Q. B. 149. The imposition of additional
Merrick, 2 Saund. 403 ; Overacre v. Gar- taxes to those assessed at the time of tak-
rett, 5 Lans. 156 ; Rochester v. Randall, ing the security and the increase of risk
105 Mass. 295 ; Bamford v. Iles, 3 thereby has been held not to violate a
Exch. 380 ; Austin v. French, 7 Met. bond given for the general performance of
126 ; Kingston Ins. Co. v. Decker, 33 duties and payment of moneys. Beverley
Barb. 196 ; Dedham Bank », Chickering, v. Barlow et al., 10 Upper Can. C. P.
3 Pick. 335 ; Blake v. Buffalo, &c., 56 N. 178 ; s. C. 7 Upper Can. L. J. 117.
Y. 485 ; McClusky v. Cromwell, 11 N. Y. Nor is it a deſence that the money
598 ; Miller v. Stewart, 9 Wheat. 702 ; received by the treasurer was not de-
Stern v. People, 96 Ill. 475 ; Goodwine v. manded by the government, which was
State, 81 Ind. 109, where a city treasurer entitled thereto. Essex v. Park, 11 Up-
served two successive terms under bonds, per Can. C. P. 473. Nor are irregularities
with the same suretics on each bond, it was in the mode of appointment a defence.
presumed, in a suit upon the second bond, Whitby v. Harrison, 18 Upper Can. Q. B.
that, at the time it was given, he was in 603 ; Whitby v. Flint, 9 Upper Can. C. P.
possession of all the money which he 449 ; Todd v. Perry et al., 20 Upper Can.
should have had, if an accounting had Q. B. 649.
been had, and he and his sureties were 1 Rex v. Atkins, 3 Mod. 12; Rex v.
held liable therefor. Bernhard v. Wyan- Hearle, 1 Str. 627; Mayor of Durham's
clotte, 33 Kan. 465; and see Hartford v. Case, 1 Sid. 33 ; Rex v. Thornton, 4 East,
Francy, 47 Conn. 76. And where a collec. 308 ; Foot v. Prowse, 1 Str. 625; 3. O.
302
§ 219
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS,
was
it was in terins provided that the mayor or other chief officer,
though elected for a year, should hold until his successor
chosen.1 When this right existed it was frequently abused, by
neglecting to hold an election on the charter day, by which means
the officer continued his term. It was this abuse that gave rise
to the Statute of Anne, which enacted "that no person in such
annual office for one whole year should be capable of being chosen
into the same office for the year immediately ensuing," and imposed
a fine upon every such officer who "should voluntarily and unlaw-
fully obstruct and prevent the choosing of another person to succeed
into such office at the time appointed for making another choice." 2
Under the Municipal Corporations Act the provision is that the
mayor shall be elected each year, at the meeting fixed for the ninth
of November, and shall “continue in his office for one whole year," 3
and by an amendment, until his successor shall have accepted the
office of mayor, and made and subscribed the requisite oath ;4 and
subsequently the Statute of Anne above mentioned was repealed,
as being no longer necessary.5
§ 218 (157). Same subject. — At common law, the office of an
alderman, jurat, capital burgess, or other member of a select body,
is a franchise for life, though by prescription or charter it may be
limited to a definite period, but the office was so much in the nature
of a freehold that there was an implied right to hold over, unless it
was otherwise provided. So with respect to recorder, town-clerk,
and the like officers, the duration of the office depended upon the
particular charter, but presumptively it was not limited, and their
offices were so much in the nature of a freehold that if they were
"eligible for a year" and were constituted in general terms, they did
not expire with the year, but the possessors were entitled to hold
over until others were elected. But it was considered that if they
were “eligible for a year only," the office ipso facto determined on
the expiration of a year.?
§ 219 (158). American Doctrine; Right to hold over. — In this
country, however, a public office is not considered as being in the
nature of a grant or contract, and the officer, as against the public,
3 Bro. P. C. 169 ; Willc. 293 ; Glover,
173.
1 Ib.; Rex v. Phillips, 1 Str. 394.
2 9 Anne, chap. xx. sec. 8.
8 5 and 6 Wm. IV. chap. lxxvi. sec.
49 ; ante, sec. 35, and notes ; Reg. v.
McGowan, 11 Ad. & E. 869.
4 6 and 7 Wm. IV. chap. cv. sec. 4.
5 3 and 4 Vict. chap. xlvii.
6 Rex v. Doncaster, 2 Ld. Raym. 1564:
Foot v. Prowse, supra.
7 Willc. 296, pl. 766 ; Reg.v. Durham,
10 Mod. 147; Dighton's Case, 1 Vent.
82.
!
1
$ 220
303
OFFICIAL TERM; HOLDING OVER.
has no freehold or property in the office; and it is almost an inva.
riable provision of law that all officers shall be elected or appointed
for a fixed and definite period. To guard against lapses, sometimes
unavoidable, the provision is almost always made in terms that the
officer shall hold until his successor is elected and qualified. But even
without such a provision, the American courts have not adopted the
strict rule of the English corporations which disables the mayor or
chief officer from holding beyond the charter or election day, but
rather the analogy of the other corporate officers who hold over
until their successors are elected, unless the legislative intent to the
contrary be manifested. Thus in Vermont it is held, — there being
no statute to the contrary, and such having been the practice, -
that school officers elected at the annual meeting hold over until
others are elected at another annual meeting, whether more or less
than a year from the time of their election.2
§ 220 (159). Holding over. — The law on the subject of holding
over by corporate officers has been thus stated by a learned American
judge: “Where, in the charter or organic law of a corporation, there
is an express or implied restriction upon the time of holding office,
as that the officers shall be annually elected on a particular day, and
that they shall hold from one charter (election) day till the next, or
that they shall be elected for the year ensuing only,' in such case
they cannot hold over beyond the next election day or the end of
the year." 3 “But where, by the constitution of the corporation, the
1 People v. Runkel, 9 Johns. 147 ; Slee 149 (1869). So in Connecticut, an officer
v. Bloom, 5 Johns. Ch. 366, 378 ; 2 Kent elected for the year ensuing" is, in the
Com. 238; Kelsey v. Wright, 1 Root absence of any other restrictive provision,
(Conn.), 83 ; Smith v. Natchez Steamboat entitled to hold beyond the year, and un-
Co., i How. (Miss.) 479 ; Lynch v. Laff- til he is superseded by the election of
land, 4 Coldw. (Tenn.) 96 ; South Bay, another person in his place. McCall v.
&c. Co. v. Gray, 30 Me. 547 ; Elmendorf Byram Manuf. Co., 6 Conn. 428 (1827),
v. Mayor, &c. of New York, 25 Wend. where the authorities are reviewed and com-
(N. Y.) 693 ; State v. Wilson, 12 Lea mented on by Hosmer, C. J. ; S. P. Cong.
(Tenn.), 246. And see cases infra. For Soc. &c. v. Sperry, 10 Conn. 200 ; State z.
the rule when officers resign to avoid service Fagan, 42 Conn. 32 (1875); Wier v. Bush,
of process, see post, sec. 887.
4 Litt. (Ky.) 433. Where, by statute, an
2 Chandler v. Bradish, 23 Vt. 416 officer holds for a given term, and "
(1851).
til his successor is elected and qualified,'
“ The better opinion,” says Shaw, C.J. he continues in office until his successor
arguendo, in Overseers of Poor, &c. v. is duly elected and qualified, though this
Sears, 22 Pick. 122, 130,“ is that town (from failure to elect, or from other
officers annually chosen hold their offices causes) be after the expiration of the term.
until others are chosen and qualified in Stewart v. State, 4 Ind. 396 (1853);
their place." School District v. Atherton, Tuley v. State, 1 Ind. 500, 515; Law.
12 Met. (Mass. ) 105 (1846); Dow v. Bul- horne, In re, 18 Gratt. (Va.) 85.
lock, 13 Gray (Mass.), 136 (1859). So 3 Tuley v. State, 1 Ind. (Cart.) 500.
in Illinois. People v. Fairbury, 51 Ill. 502 (1849), per Perkins, J. ; King v.
un.
304
§ 221
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
officers are elected for a term, and until their successors are elected
and qualified, or where they are elected 'for the year ensuing,' and
the charter or organic law contains no restrictive clause, the officers
may continue to hold and exercise their offices, after the expiration
of the year, until they are superseded by the election of other
persons in their places.” 1
As against
§ 221 (160). Right to hold over as against the State.
the public, however, officers cannot found a valid title or right to
Mayor, &c., 6 Vin. Abr. 296 ; Corpora- Hicks v. Launcelot, 1 Rol. Abr. 513 ;
tion of Banbury, 10 Mod. 346 ; Rex v. Bank v. Petway, 3 Humph. (Tenn.) 522 ;
Passmore, 3 Term R. 199; 6 Petersd. Stewart v. State, 4 Ind. 396; Rex v.
Abr. 738. But whether a provision Poole, C'as. temp. Hardw. 23, and
merely that an officer shall " be annually Phillips v. Wickham, 1 Paige Ch. 590,
elected on a particular day” is an implied were considered to have a contrary bear.
restriction that he shall not hold over, ing. It was decided, in Beck v. Hanscom,
see the cases in Vermont, Massachusetts, 9 Fost. (29 N. H.) 213, 222 (1854), that
New York, Illinois, and Connecticut, above where the charter or incorporating act
cited. The weight of authority in this made no provision for the continuance of
country is the other way. Where a city corporate officers in office after the expira-
charter gave the mayor power to hold until tion of the term for which they were
his successor was elected and qualified, elected, they could not hold over until
but denied this power to the members of others should be chosen and qualified ;
the city council by providing that they citing the opinion of Chancellor Walworth,
should be elected for a specified term, in Phillips v. Wickham, 1 Paige, 590 ;
" and no longer," and that their seats but admitting that The People v. Runkle,
should be vacated at the end of such term, 9 Johns. (N. Y.) 147, and Trustees v.
they cannot hold over, and their action, Hills, 6 Cow. (N. Y.) 23, held a different
after the time thus fixed, is void, and does view. In People v. Tieman, 8 Abb. Pr.
not bind the corporation. Louisville v. 359 ; S. C. 30 Barb. (N. Y.) 193, the
Higdon, 2 Met. (Ky.) 526 (1859). When Supreme Court, at special term, denied
the law is silent as to the term, but re- that the officer himself could hold over
quires an election to be held every two unless authorized by statute, though to
years, an officer holds over until his suc- protect the public his acts are sustained.
cessor is provided. Cordiell v. Frizzell, See Cocke v. Halsey, 16 Pet. 71. One
1 Nev. 130.
holding a municipal office, under a valid
1 Per Perkins, J., Tuley v. State, 1 Ind. appointment, is not precluded from con-
(Cart.) 500, 502 (1849) (action on official tinuing to act thereunder until his succes-
bond against sureties).
The Queen v. sor is elected and qualified, by the mere
Owens, 2 E. & E. 86 ; Frost 2. Chester, 5 fact that he has taken an oath and filed
E. & B. 531 ; Foot v. Prowse, Str. 625 ; an official bond under an illegal election.
Queen v. Durham, 10 Mod. 146; King v. Forristal v. People, 3 Ill. App. 470. Under
Lisle, Andrews, 163; McCall v. Manu- the Constitution and laws of Virginia, of-
facturing Co., 6 Conn. 428 ; 9 Conn. 536; ficers must qualify before the day on whic
10 Conn. 200; 17 Conn. 588 ; Kelsey v. their terms begin, and on failure to do so
Wright, 1 Root, 83 ; Wier v. Bush, 4 the offices are vacant. In such case the
Litt. (Ky.) 429 ; Wheeling v. Black, 25 incumbents continue to perform the duties
W. Va. 266 ; People v. Runkel, 9 Johns. of the office after the expiration of their
(N. Y.) 147 ; Vernon Society v. Hills, 6 own terms until their successors are quali-
Cow. (N. Y.) 23 ; Slee v. Bloom, 5 Johns. fied. Johnson 2. Mann, 77 Va. 265; see
Ch. (N. Y.) 366 ; Pender v. King, 6 Vin. supra, sec. 214, note. .
Abr. 296 ; 2 Kent Com. 295, note b;
§
305
222
VACANCIES IN OFFICES, WHEN FILLED.
hold over upon their own neglect of duty. Therefore, where the char-
ter made it the express duty of the trustees in office to give notice
of, and themselves to hold, the annual elections, it was held that if
they omitted to discharge this duty, though inadvertently, in con-
sequence of which omission there was and could be no election, that
they were not entitled to hold over, although by the charter it was
provided that they should continue in office until a new election
should be made and their successors should qualify.
1
§ 222 (161). Vacancies in Municipal Offices, when filled. At
common law there must be a vacancy in the office existing at the
time of the election;" for one cannot,” says Mr. Willcock, “be elected
to a corporate office in reversion.” 2 The same doctrine has been
recognized in this country, and a vacancy must exist before an
election to fill it can be ordered, and an election to fill an antici-
pated vacancy is not valid unless expressly authorized by the charter
or statute. Elections, however, in advance of the expiration of the
regular term of the incumbent of an office, are always provided for
and held, but such cases are not elections to vacancies within the
meaning of the rule under .consideration. Where the charter pro-
vides that in case of the absence of the mayor from the city, another
1 People v. Bartlett, 6 Wend. (N. Y.) Biddle v. Willard, 10 Ind. 63 (1857);
422 (1831). In such a case, being trus People v. Witherell, 14 Mich. 48.
tees de facto, their acts would be good. * Biddle v. Willard, supra.
In this
And their titie would also be good except case it was said, that a resignation to take
when called in question by quo warranto. effect at a fixed future time may, if no
Ib.; Lynch v. Lafland, 4 Coldu. (Tenn.) new rights have attached, be withdrawn,
96 (1867). Validity of acts of officers de even after acceptance, by the consent of
facto. Ante, secs. 215, note, 216, note. the party accepting ; and under the laws
People v. Stevens, 5 Hill (N. Y.), 616, per of that State it was held that such a res-
Bronson, J.; People v. Runkle, 9 Johns. ignation did not create a vacancy which
(N. Y.) 147 ; Trustees v. Hill, 6 Cow. would authorize an election at a period
(N. Y.) 23 ; Plymouth v. Painter, 17 prior to the taking effect of the resigna-
Conn. 585; Smith v. State, 19 Conn. 493; tion. See infra, secs. 225, note, 226,
People v. Bartlett, 6 Wend. (N. Y.) 422; note.
State v. Jacobs, 17 Ohio, 143; Hinton v. There is no technical or peculiar mean-
Lindsay, 20 Ga. 746 ; post, secs. 276, 892. ing to the word “vacant," as used in the
The unconditional repeal of a municipal Constitution. It means empty, unoccupied,
charter abolishes all the offices under it; so as applied to an office without an incum.
also does the substitution of a new charter bent. There is no basis for the distinction
having inconsistent provisions, and not urged that it applies only to offices vacated
providing for the rights of officers under the by death, resignation, or otherwise. An
olà charter. Crook v. People, 106 Ill. existing office, without an incumbent, is
237. See this case also as to who are “the vacant, whether it be a new or an old one.
city officers then in office,” as used in the Per Stuart, J., Stocking v. State (vacancy
Incorporation Law of Illinois.
in new judicial circuit), 7 Ind. 326 (1855);
2 Willc. Corp. 207, pl. 526 ; Hob. 150 ; followed, Collins 0 State, 8 Ind. 344
Skin. 45; Glover, 216.
(1856).
Lindsey v. Luckett, 20 Tex. 516;
VOL. 1. — 20
8
.306
$ 223
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
officer shall act as mayor only such an absence as will render the
mayor unable to perform the duties of his office is intended."
§ 223 (162). Refusal to serve in Office. It is an established
common-law principle in England, that since a municipal corporation
is entitled to the official service of its eligible members, it may, by
virtue of its inherent or incidental power, pass a by-law imposing
a pecuniary penalty upon such as refuse, without legal excuse, an
office to which they have been duly elected. The ground of this
doctrine is clearly set forth by Lord Holt in Vanacker's Case, and
although all of his reasoning is not applicable to our American
municipal corporations, still it is believed that under the usual
general welfare clause or under their incidental power to pass rea-
sonable and necessary by-laws, they would be authorized, where
such an ordinance did not contravene the charter or statute, or public
legislative policy respecting offices, to impose a reasonable fine for
refusing corporate offices. In this country, however, offices have not.
usually been regarded as burdens to be avoided, but rather as dis-
tinctions to be coveted, and hence there has been little occasion to
call into exercise the power of the courts, or to test the authority
of the corporations to enforce the undertaking of their offices. If,
however, under the charter or statute, or the law or policy of the
State, an officer has the right to resign or lay down his office at
pleasure, as is usually the case with us, the authority to impose a
fine for refusing to serve would probably not exist.3
1 Detroit v. Moran, 46 Mich. 213. councillor, auditor, or assessor, or mayor,
2 City of London v. Vanacker, 1 Ld. to accept the office or pay a fine to the
Raym. 496; s. C. Carth. 482 ; s. C. 12 borough fund. The refusal to take the
Mod. 272 ; 1 Salk. 142; Rex v. Bower, 2 requisite oaths is a refusal of the office.
Dowl. & R. 761, 842 ; s. C. 1 Barn. & Exeter v. Starre, 2 Show. 159. As there is
Cress. 587 ; Vintners' Co. v. Passey, 1 a common-law duty to serve in an office to
Burr. 239; Willc. 230; Glover, 181; which a person has been duly elected, this
Grant, 211. If of a public and magisterial duty may, if the office be sufficiently im-
nature, the penalty for refusal may be im- portant, be enforced by mandamus, and
posed, though the person be also liable to the payment of the fine is not in lieu of
be punished by indictment, or, in the dis- · service, unless the statute or by-law re.
cretion of the court, by criminal informa. lease him from service by treating the
tion. London v. Vanacker, 1 Ld. Raym. penalty as compensation. Rex v. Borer,
499 ; Rex v. Grosvenor, 1 Wils. 18 ; s. C. 1 Barn. & Cress. 585; S. C. 2 Dowl. & R.
2 Str. 1193; Rex v. Hungerford, 11 Mod. 842; Rex v. Leyland, 3 Maule & Sel. 184;
182, 142; Rex v. Woodrow, 2 Term R. Rex v. Woodrow, 2 Term R. 731 ; post,
732 ; Rex v. Whitwell, 5 Term R. 86 ; sec. 830. By the above-mentioned pro-
Rex v. Leyland, 3 M. & S. 184. The vision of the Municipal Corporations Art
Municipal Corporations Act (5 and 6 Wm. of 5 and 6 Wm. IV., the fine is in lieu of
IV. chap. lxxvi. sec. 51, Munic. Corp. Act. the acceptance of the office. Grant on
1882, sec. 34) requires every qualified Corp. 222.
person elected to the office of alderman, 8 See Willc. 133, pl. 308 ; Grant, 221,
§ 224
307
RESIGNATION OF OFFICE.
§ 224 (163). Resignation of Municipal Offices. An office must
be resigned either (first) expressly, or (second) by implication. If
the charter prescribes the mode in which the resignation is to be
made, that mode should of course be complied with. Acceptance
by the corporation is, at .common law, necessary to a consummation
of the resignation, and until acceptance by proper authority, the
tender or offer to resign is revocable. But if the statute provides
that an officer may resign at pleasure and that his resignation shall
take effect when filed, the principle just stated does not apply, and
when his resignation is filed, he ceases to be an officer. The right
to accept a resignation is a power incidental to every corporation.5
It is also a common-law principle that the right to accept the resig-
nation of an officer is incidental to the power of appointing him..
If no particular mode is prescribed, neither the resignation nor
acceptance thereof need be in writing, or in any form of words.?
The "
222 ; post, sec. 226, note ; Gates v. Dela- he has qualified and become an incumbent
ware County, 12 Iowa, 405; United of it. Miller v. Supervisors, &c., 25 Cal.
States v. Wright, 1 McLean, 509 ; State 93; Willc. 236.
&c. v. Ferguson, 31 N. J. L. (2 Vroom) 4 Amy v. Watertown (No. 1), 130
107.
U. S. 302 (1889), distinguishing Badger
1 Regents of University v. Williams, 9 v. United States, supra. Post, sec. 887 A.
Gill & J. (Md.) 365, 422 (1838); Willc. 5 Rex v. Tidderley, 1 Sid. 14 ; Hazard's
132, 238 ; Grant, 268, 246, note e; Ib. Case, supra.
common council
221, 222.
may regulate resignations by by-laws, and
2 Willc. 239 ; Rex v. Hughes, 5 Barn. it may accept resignations, as it represents
& Cress. 886, 896 ; Rex v. Mayor of Ripon, the corporation at large. Rawlinson (5th
1 Ld. Raym. 563 ; Rex v. Payne, 2 Chitty, ed.) 317, note ; Staniland v. Hopkins, 9
366 ; Reg. v. Morton, 4 Q. B. 146. The M. & W. 178 ; Willc. 240, pl. 615.
statute may provide that the officer shall 6 Van Orsdall v. Hazard, 3 Hill (N.Y.),
continue until his successor is elected and 243 ; asserting, arguendo, the incidental
qualified, and in such case he will not power of municipal corporations, as such,
cease to be an officer merely by resigning to accept resignations, and approving the
so as to be relieved from the discharge of opinion of Mr. Willcock (Munic. Corp.
his duties as such officer. Baiger 2. 240), who observes, respecting the cases
United States, 93 U. S. 599 (1876) (min- on this subject : “I presume that a right
dumus); Amy v. Watertown, 130 U. S. to accept a resignation passes incidentally
302 (1889). See, further on this point, with a right to elect." See, also, Rex v.
post, sec. 887.
Tidderley, 1 Sid. 14, per Hale, Ch. B.;
3 Reg. v, Lane, 2 Ld. Raym. 1304 ; Jenning's Case, 12 Mod. 402 ; Taylor's
Rex v. Ripon, supra ; Hazard's Case, 2 Case, Poph. 133. The English Municipal
Rol. 11; Jenning's Case, 12 Mod. 402; Corporations Act 1882, sec. 36, provides
Rex v. Patteson, 4 B. & Ad. 9; 1 Nev. & that any “person elected to a corporate
Mann. 612. The acceptance may be by office may at any time by writing signed
entry in books, by vote, or resolution, or by him, and delivered to the town-clerk,
by treating the place as vacant and elect- resign the office, on payment of the fine
ing another to fill it, or ordering an elec- provided for non-acceptance thereof."
tion if to be filled by a popular vote. Van 7 Same authorities ; and see, also, Rex
Orsdall v. Hazard, 3 Hill (N. Y.), 243; v. Ripon, 1 Ld. Raym. 563 ; s. c. 2 Salk.
State v. Ancker, 2 Rich. (S. C.) 245. One 433 ; Regina v. Lane, 1 Ld. Raym. 1304;
elected to an office cannot resign it before Jenning's Case, 12 Mod. 402; Regina v.
308
$ 226
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
$ 225 (164). Implied Resignation ; Incompatible Office. -- An
office may be impliedly resigned or vacated by the incumbent being
elected to and accepting an incompatible office. The rule, says
Parke, J., in a leading English case on this subject, that where two
offices are incompatible they cannot be held together, is founded on
the plainest principles of public policy, and has obtained from very
early times. The principle applies not only where the second office
is the superior and more important one, but also where it is not.?
The rule has been generally stated in broad and unqualified terms,
that the acceptance of the incompatible office, by whomsoever the
appointment or election might be made, absolutely determined
the original office, leaving no shadow of title in the possessor, whose
successor may be at once elected or appointed, neither quo warranto
nor amotion being necessary:
$ 226 (165). Same subject. Acceptance of Resignation. — The
doctrine just stated is undoubtedly true where the acceptance of the
second office is made by or with the privity of that authority which
has the power to accept the surrender of the first or to amove from
it; but "such acceptance does not operate as an absolute avoidance,
in cases where a person cannot divest himself of an office by his own
mere act, but requires the concurrence of another authority to his
resignation or amotion, unless that authority is privy and consent-
Gloucester, Holt R. 450 ; Van Orsdall v. other, but his acceptance of the second
Hazard, 3 Hill (N. Y.), 243, 248 ; State office is in law an implied resignation of
v. Allen, 21 Ind. 516 (1863); People v. the first, whenever it may be resigned by
Police Board, 26 N. Y. 316 ; McCunn's the mere act of the incumbent without the
Case, 19 N. Y. 188, distinguished. Stat- assent or concurrence of a superior author-
utory limitation on the right to resign ity. Per Gray, C. J., in Commonwealth
before successor is chosen and qualified. v. Hawkes, 123 Mass. 525 (1878). The
Badger v. United States, 93 U. S. 599 rule that one vacates an office by accept-
(1876); People v. Common Council, 77 ing another office incompatible therewith,
N. Y. 503, approving text. A resigna- - applied to a solicitor's acceptance of the
tion made to the officer who makes the office of representative in Congress. State
appointment vacates the office as soon as v. Butz, 9 S. C. 156 ; post, sec. 427, note.
it is received ; there is no acceptance neces- 2 Milward v. Thatcher, 2 Term R. 87,
sary. Gilbert v. Luce, 11 Barb. (N. Y.) which settled this point conclusively;
91 ; Olmsted v. Dennis, 77 N. Y. 379. Rex v. Trelawney, 3 Burr. 1615; Gabriel
i Per Parke, J., Rex v. Patteson, 4 v. Clerke, Cro. Eliz. 76 ; Rex v. Godwin,
Barn. & Adol. 9 (1832) ; 1 Nev. & Mann. Doug. 397, note 22 ; Willc. 240, pl. 617 ;
612 ; Regents of the University v. Wil- Glover, 139. .
liams, 9 Gill & Johns. (Md.) 365 (1838); 8 Gabriel v. Clerke, supra; Verrior v.
1 Kyd, 369-375 ; State v. Butz, 9 S. C. Sandwich, 1 Sid. 305; Milward v. Thatch-
156 ; People v. Hanifan, 96 111. 420.
er, supra; Glover, 329; Willc. 240, pl.
By the common law, when two offices 617. Where a resignation is to take effect
or public trusts are incompatible with each at a future day the council may fill the
other, a person holding the one is not dis- vacancy before that day. Leech v. The
qualified to be appointed or elected to the State, 78 Ind. 570. Supra, sec. 222, note.
!
§ 227
309
INCOMPATIBLE PUBLIC OFFICES.
ing to the second appointment.” 1 If one holding an office in a cor-
poration be by that corporation elected to an incompatible office,
this, of course, is a consent on the part of the corporation that the
first office be vacated ; and if the second office be accepted, the first
is at once and ipso facto determined. But, until acceptance, the for-
mer office is not vacated.2
§ 227 (166). Incompatible public Offices. The rule under con-
sideration is not limited to corporate offices, but extends, both in its
principle and application, to all public offices. Thus, if a judge of
the Common Pleas accepts an appointment to the King's Bench,
the first office is vacated, since it is the duty of the one to correct
the errors of the other. Whether offices are incompatible depends
upon the charter or statute, and the nature of the duties to be per-
formed. The same man cannot be judge and minister in the same
court, and hence the offices are not compatible. Where the re-
Rex v.
ance.
1 Parke, J., Rex v. Patteson, supra. It (1864); see Lewis v. Oliver, 4 Abb. Pr.
has been held in this country, however, 121. Acceptance of an incompatible of-
that an incumbent of a public office may fice, even under a void election, puts an
lay it down at his pleasure, and that the end to the first office ; and the officer, on
officer to whom the resignation, by law, being ousted from the second office, can-
is to be made cannot forbid it or refuse not be restored to the first.
it; and that when received by such offi- Hughes, 5 B. & C. 886 ; Rex v. Bond, 6
cer it operates to vacate the office re- D. & R. 333.
signed. Gates v. Delaware County, 12 8 Glover on Corp. 139.
Iowa, 405; United States v. Wright, 1 4 Milward v. Thatcher, supra, per Bul-
McLean, 509. The delivery by a city ler, J.; People v. Carrique, 2 Hill (N. Y.),
engineer, whose office was elective, of a 93, and cases cited ; Staniland v. Hopkins,
written resignation to the mayor and 9 M. & W. 178.
council, takes effect without any accept- Incompatibility in offices exists where
State v. Mayor of Lincoln, 4 Neb. the nature and duties of the two offices
260 (1877). Lake, C. J., says : “In ab- are such as to render it improper, from
sence of statute, there is no rule requiring considerations of public policy, for one
acceptance of resignation to make it ef- incumbent to retain both. It does not
fective. The refusal of the municipal necessarily arise when the incumbent
authorities to accept it will not conipel places himself, for the time being, in a
the officer to retain the office against his position where it is impossible for him to
will." Ib. Compare State v. Ferguson, 2 discharge the duties of both offices (Bryan
Vroom (31 N. J. L.), 107, 129; Lewis v. V. Cattell, 15 Iowa, 538 (1864), per
Oliver, 4 Abb. Pr. R. 121 ; People v. Por- Wright, C. J.); and accordingly that case
ter, 6 Cal. 26. Denying right under stat- held that the office of district attorney
ute to withdraw resignation after deliver and of captain in the volunteer service of
ing it. State v. Hauss (sheriff), 43 Ind. the United States were not legally incom-
105 (1873); S. C. 13 Am. Rep. 314. Ante, patible. Two offices are incompatible
sec. 222, note.
where the holder cannot, in every in-
Milward v. Thatcher, supra ; Rex stance, discharge the duties of each. Per
v. Pateman, supra; Willc. 243, pl. 623; Bailey, J., Rex v. Tizzard, 17 Eng. C. L.
Arkwright v. Cantrell, 7 Ad. & E. 565. 193.
Acceptance necessary ; see, also, State v. 5 Poph. 28, 29; 1 Sid. 305; 2 Keb.
Ferguson, 2 Vroom (31 N. J. L.), 107 93 ; Glover, 139.
2
1b.;
310
§ 229
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
corder is an adviser to the mayor, the two offices cannot be held
together.1 So a representative in Congress holds a public office,
within the meaning of a charter which prohibits an alderman from
holding “any other public office;” and upon his election to and
acceptance of “such public office" during his term as alderman, his
office as alderman immediately becomes vacant. The proper pro-
ceeding is by mandamus: to compel the common council to order a
special election to fill such vacancy, and not by quo warranto to try
the title to such office, such representative being neither a de facto
nor de jure officer,
§ 228 (167). Abandonment of Office. An office may be vacated
by abandonment. A voluntary enlistment by a civil officer in the
military service of the United States for three years, or during the
war, vacates the civil office, being a constructive resignation by
abandonment. So where residence within the corporation is neces-
sary in order to be eligible to hold an office, permanent removal
from the municipality may undoubtedly be taken as evincing an
intention to resign, and as an implied resignation.
§ 229 (168). Compensation of Municipal Officers. — We have had
occasion to discuss the complete supremacy of the legislature over pub-
lic corporations, limited only by constitutional restraints. Its au-
thority over public offices, which are created or authorized solely for
the public convenience, is equally great, and may be conferred upon
municipal corporations with respect to municipal offices. The le-
gislature, in the absence of constitutional limitation, may create and
abolish offices, add to or lessen their duties, abridge or extend the
1 Willc. 241, pl. 518 ; Rex v. Marshall, 8 Lamb v. Lynd, 44 Pa. 336 ; State v.
cited, 2 B. & A. 341. Clerk of a school Rahway, 33 N. J. L. 110; Fish y. Weath-
district and collector of the district were erwax, 2 Johns. Cas. 217.
held not incompatible, and the same per- 4 Willc. 238 ; State v. Allen, 21 Ind.
son may, therefore, be appointed to both 516 (1863). In People v. Hanifan, 96
offices, there being no prohibition in the Ill. 420, the refusal of an alderman to at-
act. Howland v. Luce, 16 Johns. (N. Y.) tend council meetings was held to be an
135 (1819). The offices of councilman abandonment of the office.
and city marshal are incompatible. State 5 State v. Allen, 21 Ind. 516 (1863).
v. Hoyt, 2 Oreg., 246. See generally as But see Bryan v. Cattell, 15 Iowa,
to incompatible State and Federal offices, 538.
Respublica v. Dallas, 3 Yeates (Pa.), 316; 6 Willc. 238 ; ante, sec. 195 ; Curry v.
S. C. 4 Dall. 229; Commonwealth v. Binns, Stewart, 8 Bush (Ky.), 560 (1871).
17 Serg. & Rawle (Pa.), 219 ; Common- .7 Ante, chap. iv.
wealth v. Ford, 5 Barr (Pa.), 67.
8 Ante, chap. iv.; State v. Douglass, 26
2. People v. Common Council, 77 N. Y. Wis. 428 (1870); s. C. 7 Am. Rep. 87,
503 ; People v. Carrique, 2 Hill (N. Y.), and note. As to special constitutional res
93 ; People v. Nostrand, 46 N. Y. 381 ; strictions, ante, secs. 58, 60.
People v. Green, 58 N. Y. 304.
!
$ 230
311
COMPENSATION OF OFFICERS.
term of office, and increase, diminish, or regulate the compensation
of officers at its pleasure. But after the services are rendered there
is an implied (if not express) contract to pay therefor at the rates
fixed by the ordinance or law in force, at the date when the ser-
vices were rendered, which contract cannot be impaired by subse-
quent legislation. Hence, where the law in force at the date when
a county district attorney rendered services, provided for the levy of
taxes for county purposes at a specified maximum rate, and after
the services were rendered a constitutional provision was adopted
restricting the limit of taxation, it was held that such restrictive
provision impaired the obligation of the plaintiff's contract pro tanto,
and was, to that extent, void, and that the plaintiff was entitled to
a mandamus to the county officers, to levy and collect a tax under
the law on this subject which was in force when his services were
rendered.2
$ 230 (169). Compensation of Officers. — There is no such implied
obligation on the part of municipal corporations, and no such relation
1 Ante, chap. iv.; and see also Conner continuance in office refers only to his
v. Mayor, &c. of New York, 1 Seld. (5 holding under one appointment. Smith v.
N. Y.) 285 (1851); affirming s. c. 2 Sanılf. City of Waterbury, 54 Conn. 174. The
S. C. R. 355 ; Warner v. People, 7 Hill same provision was declared to render il-
(N. Y.), 81 ; 2 Denio, 272; People v. legal a vote of a city council to pay a joint
Morrell, 21 Wend. (N. Y.) 563 (1839); standing committee for services rendered,
Phillips v. Mayor, &c. of New York, 1 though the office of councilman had no
Hilt. (N. Y. Com. Pl.) 483 ; Bryan v. compensation attached to it.
Garvie v.
Cattell, 15 Iowa, 538, 553, per Wright, Hartford, 54 Conn. 441. A salary may
C. J.; Coffin v. State, 7 Ind. 157 (1855); be reduced during an official term. Harvey
People v. Mahaney, 13 Mich. 481 ; Tur- v. Rush County, 32 Kan. 159. An ordi-
pen v. County Comm'rs, 7 Ind. 172 ; Ore- nance of a city is not a “law" within the
gon v. Pyle, 1 Oreg. 149; Bird v. Wasco meaning of the Constitution of Pennsyl-
Co., 3 Oreg. 282 (1871); Cowdin v. vania providing that “no law shall ex-
Huff, 10 Iud. 83 ; Cooley, Const. Lim. tend the term of any public officer or in-
276 ; Butler v. Pennsylvania, 10 How. crease or diminish his salary, &c., after
402; Smith v. New York, 37 N. Y. 518 his election." Baldwin v. Philadelphia,
(1868); Swann V. Buck, 40 Miss. 268 99 Pa. St. 164 (1881). Statute author-
(1866). While the office is continued, izing the common council to increase con-
and the officer not removed, he is entitled pensation of police justices for additional
to salary. Hoke v. Henderson, 4 Dev. duties imposed upon them, was held to
(N. C.) 1 ; Cotton v. Ellis, 7 Jones (N. authorize only one increase, and a second
C.) Law, 545. An officer holding over increase was held to be invalid. Cox v.
and continuing to discharge his official New York, 103 N. Y, 519.
duties until his successor was qualified, 2 Fisk v. Jefferson Police Jury, 116
was held to be entitled to compensation U. S. 131 (1885). Limit of taxation fixed
for the time without an express provision when debt was created cannot be exceeded
to that effect. Robb v. Carter, 65 Md. unless the limit has been enlarged by sub-
321. A constitutional amendment prohib- sequent statutes. Stewart v. Jefferson
iting the legislature from increasing the Police Jury, 116 U. S. 135.
compensation of a public officer during his
312
§ 230
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
353;
between them and officers which they are required by law to elect,
as will oblige them to make compensation to such officers, unless the
right to it is expressly given by law, ordinance, or by contract. Offi-
cers of a municipal corporation are deemed to have accepted their
office with knowledge of, and with reference to, the provisions of
the charter or incorporating statute relating to the services which
they may be called upon to render, and the compensation provided
therefor. Aside from these, or some proper by-law, there is no im-
plied assumpsit on the part of the corporation with respect to the
services of its officers. In the absence of express contract, these
determine and regulate the right of recovery, and the amount. If
the charter or by-laws provide for a peculiar mode of compensation,
as, for example, to a city surveyor for superintending grading of
streets, by an assessment upon the property owners, the city is not
liable before it collects the money, if it makes the requisite assess-
ments, and is proceeding with proper diligence to enforce them.3
1 Sikes v. Hatfield, 13 Gray (Mass.), minishing the salary of an officer during
347 (1859); Barton v. New Orleans, 16 his term of office. State, ex rel. v. McDow-
La. An. 317 ; Garnier v. St. Louis, 37 Mo. ell, 19 Neb. 442 ; Wheelock v. McDowell,
554; Rowe v. County of Kern, 72 Cal. 20 Neb. 160. See also Purcell v. Parks,
White v. Levant, 78 Me. 568 ; Perry 82 Ill. 346 ; Rucker v. Supervisors, 7 W.
v. Cheboygan, 55 Mich. 250 ; Haswell v.. Va. 661. If the legislature shortens an
New York, 81 N. Y. 255. It is advisable officer's term of office he cannot recover
that salaries should be fixed by ordinance, his salary for his unexpired term. Long
and not voted as a matter of grace and v. New York, 81 N. Y. 425. A de facto
favor. Smith v. Commonwealth, 41 Pa. officer cannot recover the salary annexed
St. 335; Devoy v. New York, 39 Barb. to the office ; the salary is an incident to
(N. Y.) 169 ; Bladen v. Philadelphia, 60 the office and not to its occupation. Burke
.Pa. St. 464. See opinion of Thompson, v. Edgar, 67 Cal. 182; Meehan v. Hud.
C. J., Philadelphia v. Given, Ib. 136. son, 46 N. J. L. (17 Vroom) 276. Fur-
Municipal corporations are not liable for ther as to de facto officers, see ante, secs.
services performed by an officer under 215 n., 221 n., 230 n., 235 n., 237 n.,
an unconstitutional statute. Meagher v. 256 and note.
County, 5 Nev. 244 (1869); post, sec. 910; 2 Locke v. Central City, 4 Col. 65. A
City of Central v. Sears, 2 Col. 588 (1875). public officer is not entitled to payment
The first sentence of this section of the for duties imposed upon him by statute in
text cited and applied in Bosworth v. New the absence of an express provision for
Orleans, 26 La. An. 494, 495 (1874). An such payment. Jones v. Carmarthen, 8
officer suspended without sufficient cause M. & W. 605; Askin v. London, 1 Upper
and another appointed in his place cannot Can. Q. B. 292 ; Pringle and McDonald,
recover for salary subsequently accruing In re, 10* Upper Can. Q. B. 254 ; Regina
until there has been an adjudication in a v. Cumberlege, 36 L. T. N. s. 700; Brazil
direct proceeding declaring him entitled v. McBride, 69 Ind. 244 ; Doolan v. Mani.
to the office and that the incumbent was a towoc, 48 Wis. 312 ; supra, sec. 216.
usurper. Selby v. Portland, 14 Oreg. 243. 8 Baker v. City of Utica, 19 N. Y. 326;
Where, at the time an officer is elected, People v. Supervisors, 1 Hill (N. Y.), 362;
his salary has not been fixed, an ordi- Cumming v. Mayor, &c. of Brooklyn, 11
nance passed during his term fixing his Paige, 596; Jersey City v. Quaife, 2
salary, is not a violation of the constitu- Dutch. (N. J.) 63 ; Andrews v. United
tional restriction upon enlarging or di- States, 2 Story C. C. 203; United States
{
§ 231
313
CHANGE OF COMPENSATION.
§ 231 (170). Power to abolish Office, and to regulate and to
change Salary. – A municipal corporation may, unless restrained
by charter, abolish an office created by ordinance; and may also, un-
less the employment is in the nature of a contract, reduce or other-
wise regulate the solaries and fees of its officers, according to its view
of expediency and right. Although an officer may be elected or ap-
pointed for a fixed period, yet where he is not bound, and cannot
be compelled to serve for the whole time, such election or appoint-
ment cannot be considered a contract to hire for a stipulated term.
Ordinances fixing salaries are not in the nature of contracts with
officers. 1
6. It is very
v. Brown, 9 How. 487; Barton v. New administration of tho criminal law. Christ
Orleans, 16 La. An. 317 ; McClung v. St. v. Polk County, 48 Iowa, 302. A muni.
Paul, 14 Minn. 420 (1869); Smith v. Con- cipal officer is presumed to know the city
monwealth, 41 Pa. St. 335.
ordinances and orders which fix his salary,
plain to us that a town officer, as such, and his acceptance of the amount so fixed
has no legal claim against the town to re- will estop him from claiming more. Gal-
cover pay for services rendered, unless by breath v. Moberly, 80 Mo. 484 ; Rau v.
an express vote of the town, or a uniform Little Rock, 34 Ark. 303. As to estoppel
usage to pay that particular officer from by acceptance see also Hobbs v. Yonkers,
year to year, for his services. And in the 102 N. Y. 13 ; McInery v. Galveston, 58
latter case, it would be very questionable Tex. 334.
whether a recovery at law could be had, i Commonwealth v. Bacon, 6 Serg. &
if it had all along been left to the town to Rawle (Pa.), 322 (1820); followed, Baker
make such compensation as they should v. Pittsburgh, 4 Pa. St. 49 (1846) (abol-
deem reasonable after the services had ishing annual salary of collector of tolls);
been rendered. ... The same principle also, approved, University v. Walden, 15
has always been recognized in this State Ala. 655 (1849); but distinguished, Carr
in regard to all officers. If no law of the 2. St. Louis, 9 Mo. 190 ; Comw. v. Mann,
State fixed their fees or pay, their services 5 W. & S. (Pa.) 418; Smith v. County, 2
must be gratuitous.” Per Redfield, J., Par. (Pa.) 293 ; Madison v. Kelso, 32 Ind.
Boyden v. Brookline, 8 Vt. 284 (1836). 79; Warner v. People, 2 Denio (N. Y.),
But the decision (in Boyden v. Brookline, 272 ; Conner v. Mayor, &c. of New York,
8 Vt. 284) does not extend strictly be- 1 Seld. (5 N. Y.) 285, 296 ; Augusta v.
yond official services; and when a town Sweeny, 44 Ga. 463 ; Brazil v. McBride,
agent, acting for the town, or the town it- 69 Ind. 244 ; Des Moines v. Hillis, 55
self, employs an attorney at law to prose. Iowa, 643 ; Marden v. Portsmouth, 59
cute or defend suits against the town, the N. H. 18. Under special circumstances,
latter is liable for the services. And the Held, that the salary of a city officer
rule is the same if the “ town agent,” be- could be diminished by the council. Cox
ing an attorney, renders for the towu v. Burlington, 43 Iowa, 612 (1876). A
professional services, in suits which the legislature may authorize the reduction of
proper authorities of the town directed to the salary of a city officer during his term.
be instituted. Langdon v. Castleton, 30 Love v. Jersey City, 40 N. J. L. 456. A
Vt. 285 (1858); City of Central v. Sears, statutory provision that “the compensa-
2 Col. 588 ; Locke v. Central City, 4 Col. tion or salary of any officer shall be fixed
65. A provision that a city marshal shall before his appointment” does not require
have the same duties, responsibilities, and that it be fixed before every new appoint-
fees as sheriffs does not import that he ment; it is sufficiently complied with
may recover from the county in which the when the salary is once fixed. People v.
city is located for services rendered in the Crissey, 91 N. Y. 616. A statute or city
314
§ 232
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
§.232 (171). Same subject. Exception to Rule resting on Con-
tract. -- But where the services to be performed are professional or
private, rather than public or official, an employinent under an ordi-
nance for a fixed time, at a fixed sun for the period, has been held
to be a contract, and not subject to be impaired by the corporation.
Thus the appointment or election by a city council, for a fixed and
definite period, of a city officer, — for example, a city engineer, for
one year, at the rate of one thousand dollars per year, if accepted
by him, constitutes, in the opinion of the Supreme Court of Massa-
chusetts, a contract between him and the city; and the city, in
such a case, has no authority, unless expressly conferred, to abolish or
shorten the term of office, so as to deprive the officer, without his
consent, of the right to compensation for the full period, unless for
misbehavior or unfitness to discharge the duties of the place.1
ordinance fixing the amount of the salary is no contract between corporation and
of a city officer is not in the nature of a officer that the service shall continue, or
contract. Love v. Jersey City, 40 N. J. L. the salary not be changed. Waldraven
456. Such officer, by continuing in office v. Memphis, 4 Coldw. (Tenn.) 431 (1867);
and receiving warrants for monthly pay. Hoboken v. Gear, 3 Dutch. (N. J.) 265
ments of his salary during the term, waives (1859). The power to abolish municipal
all objections to the reduction. Ib. In offices was reaffirmed, citing text, in
an action against a city treasurer, on his Butcher v. Camden (fire marshal of city),
official bond, for moneys received by him, 29 N. J. Eq. (2 Stew.) 478 (1878). Gen-
he cannot charge commissions for the eral power to a corporation to fix the com-
whole term at the rate allowed by law at pensation of its officers does not authorize
his accession to office, when his compensa- it to take away the fees of an officer, which
tion has been changed to a lower rate sub- are specifically fixed by the same charter.
sequently. Iowa City v. Foster, 10 Iowa, Carr v. St. Louis, 9 Mo. 190 (1845). The
189. Where a police judge agreed to legislature may provide that the salary of
accept the compensation fixed by the city an officer may be fixed by one board, e. g.,
council in payment of his services, if the a common council, though it is payable
council would by a change of ordinance by another, e. g., a county, or board of
provide compensation for the clerk of the supervisors; and in that case, the latter
Held, that the agreement was have no authority to change it when once
based on a valid consideration ; but that fixed. People v. Auditors of Wayne, 13
in cases where judgment was rendered Mich. 233; People v. Wayne Co. Audi-
against the city before such change, no tors, 41 Mich. 4. Where by the general
fees could be recovered. Crane 1. Des law the compensation of the mayor, which
Moines, 47 Iowa, 105 ; supra, sec. 212. was specified, could be changed by ordi-
In Commonwealth v. Bacon, supra, it was " but not during his term of ofice,"
held that an ordinance which reduced the an ordinance providing that “after the
salary of the mayor after the commence expiration of the term of the present mayor
ment of his term was valid. The court of the city, the mayor shall serve without
said, “This cannot be considered in the compensation" was held to be ultra vires
nature of a hiring for a year, because it and void, on the ground that a power to
was not obligatory on the mayor to serve change the salary was not a power to abol-
out the year.” Though an ordinance may ish it altogether. State, ex rel. v.
Nash-
fix term and compensation of officer, the ville, 15 Lea (Tenn.), 697.
office may be abolished, if its abolition be i Chase v. Lowell, ï Gray (Mass.), 33
not forbidden, or salary reduced. There (1856); and see Caverley v. Lowell, 1
court,
nance
.
$ 233
315
EXTRA COMPENSATION.
$ 233 (172). Extra Compensation. — It is a well-settled rule
that a person accepting a public office, with a fixed salary, is bound
to perform the duties of the office for the salary. He cannot legally
claim additional compensation for the discharge of these duties, even
though the salary may be a very inadequate remuneration for the
services. Nor does it alter the case that by subsequent statutes or
ordinances his duties within the scope of the charter powers pertain-
ing to the office are increased and not his salary.1 Whenever he
considers the compensation inadequate, he is at liberty to resigu.
The rule is of importance to the public. To allow changes and
additions in the duties properly belonging or which may properly be
attached to an office to lay the foundation for extra compensation,
would introduce intolerable mischief. The rule, too, should be
rigidly enforced. The statutes of the legislature and the ordinances
of our municipal corporations seldom prescribe with much detail
and particularity the duties annexed to public offices; and it re-
quires but little ingenuity to run nice distinctions between what
duties may and what may not, be considered strictly official; and if
these distinctions are much favored by courts of justice, it may lead
to great abuse.
Allen (Mass.), 289 (1861), as to ordinance 1 Ante, sec. 216. Though the duties of
constituting a contract with city attorney. a municipal officer may be increased by a
These cases, if really distinguishable from city council, it has no power to confer
the others, should not, it is believed, be upon another officer the duties, powers,
extended, but the principle limited to in- and rights appertaining to his office by
stances where the services are not essen- statute. So, a treasurer duly appointed
tially official in their nature, and where the and qualified, whose duty it was by law
officer or other party is bound to serve to receive and pay out the money belong-
for the fixed and definite period. Ap- ing to a city, was held to be entitled to
pointment of police officer for a year, con missions upon the proceeds of bonds
held not to create a contract, and he was sold by the mayor under authority of the
removable, without cause, within that council. Beard v. Decatur, 64 Tex. 7.
period. Chicago v. Edwards, 58 Ill. 252 2 Per Potts, J., in Court of Errors and
(1871).
Appeals, Evans v. Trenton, 4 Zabr. (24
A resolution of the council empower- N. J. L.) 766 (1853); ante, sec. 216. The
ing an individual to collect the taxes due text cited and approved in Decatur v.
the city, at a given rate per cent on the Vermillion, 77 Ill. 315 (1875). See, also,
amount collected for his compensation, Andrews v. United States, 2 Story C. C.
may be repealed or modified at any time 202 ; Palmer v. The Mayor, &c. of New
by the corporation, on the sole condition York, 2 Sandford (N. Y.) 318 ; Bussier v.
that it shall be liable for any compensa- Pray, 7 Serg. & Rawle (Pa.) 447 ; Angell
tion earned under the resolution previous & Ames on Corp. sec. 317 ; Gilmore v.
to its repeal or modification. Hiestand v. Lewis, 12 Ohio, 281 ; Detroit v. Redfield,
New Orleans, 14 La. An. 330 (1859). The 19 Mich. 376 ; Sidway v. South Park Com-
court did not regard the resolution as missioners, 120 Ill. 496. A salaried offi-
creating a contract, or, if so, it was one of cer cannot sue the city for a balance of
mandate, revocable at the will of the salary due unless there has been some de-
principal. Ib.
fault on the part of the city in making the
316
§ 234
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
§ 234 (173). Same subject. — Not only has an officer, under
such circumstances, no legal claim for extra compensation, but a
promise to pay him an extra fee or sum beyond that fixed by lay
is not binding, though he renders services and exercises a degree of
diligence greater than could legally have been required of him.1
01-
necessary appropriations. Waterman v. tion for the duties of the office be binding
New York, 7 Daly (N. Y.), 489. It has on the corporation. But for services per-
been held in Pennsylvania that where an formed by request, not part of the duties
officer's con pensation is fixed by statute he of his office, and which could as appropri-
cannot recover extra compensation for ex- ately have been performed by any other
penses incurred in performing his duties, person, such officer may, in proper cases,
even when the custom had been for a long recover a just remuneration.
Evans v.
time that the corporation should bear Trenton, 4 Zabr. (24 N. J. L.) 764 (1853);
them. Albright v. County of Bedford, 106 S. P. Detroit v. Redfield, 19 Mich. 376
Pa. St. 582.
(1869); Converse v. United States, 21
A salaried officer of a public corpora- How. 463. For services required by
tion has no claim for compensation cxtra ordinances, the city attorney is entitled
his salary, on the ground that the duties to the compensation fixed by ordinance,
of his office have been increased, or new and no other; and the mayor, by vir-
duties added since the salary was fixed. tue of his duty to see that the
People v. Supervisors, 1 Hill (N. Y.), dinances are duly enforced,” cannot bind
362 ; Wendell v. Brooklyn, 29 Barb. (N. the corporation to pay more than the
Y.) 204 ; Palmer v. Mayor, &c. of New fixed sulary or compensation, and this
York, 2 Sandf. (N. Y.) 318; ante, sec. duty does not authorize that officer to
216; Covington v. Mayberry, 9 Bush enploy assistant or independent counsel
(Ky.), 304 ; Andrews v. Pratt (compensa. in any case, at the expense of the corpo-
tion for sale of county's railroad stock), 44 ration. Carroll v. St. Louis, 12 Mo. 44
Cal. 309.(1872). Special instances, where (1849); Memphis v. Brown, 20 Wall. 289,
a claim for compensation, in the absence 321 (1873); post, sec. 479. Further, as to
of express provision, has been sustained, liability of city to attorneys, see the chap-
where the law has required a public officer ter on Contracts.
to perform a duty, attended with trouble i Heslep v. Sacramento, 2 Cal. 580
and expense, clearly outside of his regular (vote of $10,000 to mayor for meritorious
official duties, see People v. Supervisors, services, held void); Hatch v. Mann, 15
12 Wend. (N. Y.) 257 ; Bright v. Super- Wend. (N. Y.) 44 ; reversing, s. C. 9 Ib.
visors, 18 Johns. (N. Y.) 242; Mallory v. 262; approved, Palmer v. Mayor, &c. of
Supervisors, 2 Cowen (N. Y.), 531 ; Ib. New York, 2 Sandf. (N. Y.) 318; Ba-
Detroit v. Redfield, 19 Mich. 376 tho v. Salter, Latch, 54; W. Jones, 65 ;
(1869); McBride v. Detroit, 47 Mich. 236; s. C. Lane v. Sewell, i Chitty, 175 ; Ib.
8. C. 49 Mich. 239. If a county attorney 295; Morris v. Burdett, 1 Camp. 218; 3
goes beyond the limits of his county, at Ib. 374; Callaghan v. Hallett, 1 Caines
the instance and with the consent of the (N. Y.), 104 ; s. C. Col. & C. Cas. 179 ;
county board, he may recover reasonable Preston r. Bacon, 4 Conn. 471 ; Shattuck
compensation in addition to his salary. v. Woods, 1 Pick. (Mass.) 175 ; Bussier
Huffman v. Greenwood Co., 23 Kan. 281 ; v. Pray, 7 Serg. & Rawle (Pa.), 447 ; ('ar-
Butler v. Neosho Co., 15 Kan. 178 ; Leav- roll v. Tyler, 2 Har. & Gill, 54 ; Smith v.
enworth Co. v. Brewer, 9 Kan. 307. Smith, I Bailey (S. C.), 70 ; Debolt v.
This subject is discussed in White v. Polk Cincinnati, 7 Ohio St. 237; Pilie v. New
Co., 17 Iowa, 413; post, sec. 479.
Orleans, 19 La. An. 274. Payments re-
Where salary is fixed by ordinance, it ceived by one, knowing the agent to be
cannot be changed by a committee or in- unauthorized to make them, may be re-
dividual members of the corporation ; nor covered by the principal as money wrong.
Will their promise to pay extra compensa- fully had and received. The people are
533;
§ 235
317
OFFICERS' SALARIES.
§ 235 (174). Liability of Corporation to the Officer; Right of
Officer to Salary. — Where an officer of a municipal corporation,
elected by the people for a specified term, is improperly removed by
the city council, he may sue the corporation for his salary and per-
quisites for the time intervening between his removal and the
expiration of his term. It is a defence to the corporation that the
officer was legally removed ; but if he was removed contrary to law,
it is no answer to the action that the corporation, in making the
removal, acted judicially, and therefore is not liable for the error
it committed.2
not bound by acts of a township commit- (1856). The court, in considering the rule
tee, ultra vires, sanctioning unlawful pay- of damages in such a case, holds that the
ments to a collector. Demarest v. New officer cannot recover of the corporation
Barbadoes, 40 N. J. L. 604. The princi- counsel fees for defending himself against
ple in the text operates to deprive a pub- the charges preferred against him, but
lic officer, or an officer of a municipal cor-
may recover such "
damages as necessa-
poration, of a claiın for a reward offered for rily resulted from his amotion from office,
à service which is embraced in his official viz., his salary and perquisites.” 19 Ga.
or legal duties. Gilmore v. Lewis, 12 468, supra. But the corporation, it is
Ohio, 281, where a constable who arrested suggested, may recoup the same as indi-
a thief was held not entitled to a reward viduals who improperly dismiss servants
offered by the defendant; $. P. Pool v. employed for a determinate period. 2
Boston, 5 Cush. (Mass.) 219; the doc- Greenl. Ev. sec. 261 a. But see United
trine of the text approved. Decatur v. States v. Addison, 6 Wall. 291 ; Hoke v.
Vermillion, 77 Ill. 315; Matter of Russel, Henderson, 4 Dev. (N. C.) 1. That the
51 Conn. 577. Where a fireman employed corporation cannot thus reduce the amount
as such by a city brought suit for a reward of recovery, see cases cited in the notes to
offered by a husband for the rescue of the this section.
this section. An action against a city to
dead body of his wife from a burning recover salary cannot be maintained, while
building, it was held that, as it was not the office is occupied by a de facto officer, or
his duty to rescue a person from a burning until the right to the office has been adju-
building at the imminent peril of his own dicated. Selby v. Portland, 14 Oreg. 243;
life, the rescue could not be said to be in
supra, sec. 230, note ; post, sec. 276.
the line of his duty so as to preclude him 2 Shaw v. Mayor, &c., 19 Ga. 468
from claiming the reward. Reif v. Paige, (1856); Shaw v. Mayor, &c., 21 Ga. 280 ;
55 Wis. 496. Where a person before be- see s. C. Mayor, &c. v. Shaw's Adminis-
ing appointed city treasurer agreed in trator, 25 Ga. 590. In the case last cited
writing to repay to the city all fees, &c., in it was decided that if the removal of a
excess of $2,000, and the council failed to city officer be for a specified cause, not
fix his compensation, it was held that, warranting the removal, and the officer
while the agreement was invalid, he was sue the corporation for his salary, as a
estopped, by having rendered and settled defence to such action it may aver and
his accounts, from claiming more than the prove other matters, good in law, to jus-
$2,000. Hobbs v. Yonkers, 102 N. Y. tify such removal. In thus holding, the
13. A promise by a candidate to serve say ; “ If his term of office had not
without compensation will not estop him expired when this suit was instituted, and
from claiming his salary. State, ex rel. he had moved for a mandamus to restore
v. Nashville, 15 Lea, 697. See ante, chap. him, instead of bringing an action for his
vi. sec. 139.
salary, the court would not have inter-
1 Stadler v. Detroit, 13 Mich. 346 fered, if good cause for his removal could
(1865); Shaw v. Mayor, &c., 19 Ga. 468 have been shown, although he may have
court say ;
318
$ 236
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
§ 236 (175). Liability of the Officer to the Corporation and to
Others. - Public officers (as distinguished from corporate officers),
been removed without notice.
Rex v. the cause of dismissal was not inquirable
Mayor, &c., 2 Cowp. 523 ; The King v. into in the action. Nolan v. New Or-
The Mayor, &c., 2 Term R. 182.” — per leans, 10 La. An. 106 (1855). Ante, sec.
McDonald, J.; 25 Ga. 590, 592. See 200.
Hoboken v. Gear, 3 Dutch. (N. J.) 265. Declaring an office and the prospective
Aldermen held not to be individually lia- fees of the officer not to be property, and
ble for passing an unauthorized ordinance that the right to fees grows out of scrvices
depriving a mayor of his office. Jones v. performed, it was decided by the Court of
Loring, 55 Miss. 109; infra, sec. 237, Appeals that a municipal officer who had
note. An incumbent was appointed by been kept out of his office, and had not
the aldermen and removed by the mayor, performed its duties, could not maintain
who nominated a successor; the incuni- an action against the city to recover the
bent's salary did not cease until his suc- amount of fees accruing from the office.
cessor was confirmed. White v. Mayor, Smith v. New York, 37 N. Y. 518 (1868);
&c. of New York, 4 E. D. Smith, 563 Saline Co. v. Anderson, 20 Kan. 298 ; Do-
(1855). A person is not entitled to the lan v. Mayor, 68 N. Y. 279; Hadley v.
salary of a public office unless he both ob- Mayor, 33 N. Y. 603, 607, per Denio,
tains and exercises the office. Farrell v. C. J. In a later New York case the court
Bridgeport, 45 Conn. 191. Thus, a city reviewed the previous decisions, and held
treasurer, being indicted for forgery, the that the payment of the fees or salary
mayor and council elected another in his provided by law, to an officer de facto for
stead for the balance of his term. Upon services rendered before a judgment of
his acquittal, - Held, that he could not re- ouster, will protect a municipality against
cover the salary for such balance of his the claim of the officer de jure for the same
term. If the prosecution was malicious, compensation ; but after the judgment,
he could recover in tort from the wrong- the compensation for services rendered,
doer. Brunswick v. Fahm, 60 Ga. 109. which has not been paid, may be recovered
So a policeman who has been found guilty by the officer de jure. McVeany v. New
of immoral conduct and discharged from York, 80 N. Y. 185; Steubenville v.
his office by a board of police commis- Culp, 38 Ohio St. 18. See Benoit v.
sioners having jurisdiction, cannot re- Wayne County, 20 Mich. 176, Cooley, J.,
cover from the city his salary for the dissenting. It has, however, several times
remainder of his term. It makes no dif- be
It makes no dif- been decided in California that the salary
ference that the comniissioners may have annexed to a public office is incident to the
erred in their judgment on the evidence, title to the office, and not to its occupancy
no appeal having been taken. Queen v. and exercise, and that the right to com-
Atlanta, 59 Ga. 318. By charter, the pensation is not affected by the fact that
power to appoint policemen was conferred an usurper, officer de facto, has discharged
on a board of police, composed of the the duties of the office. Dorsey v. Smith,
mayor and recorders, and this board was 28 Cal. 21 ; Stratton v. Oulton, Ib. 44;
authorized to discharge policemen, for Carroll v. Siebenthaler, 37 Cal. 193 (1869);
cause, and to “decide on all police mat- approved, Meagher v. County, 5 Nev. 244
ters pertaining to appointments, dismis- (1869); where a city physician, who was
sals, &c., finally and without appeal.” In duly elected, but kept out of his office by
an action for wages, brought against the the prior incumbent, who drew the salary
city by a policeman, who claimed that he for some months, was permitted to collect
had been appointed for a year, and dis- his back salary from the city. Memphis
missed at the end of a month, without v. Woodward, 12 Heisk. 499. An officer
good cause, the Supreme Court decided unlawfully deprived of his office may main-
that the board having dismissed the plain- tain an action against the intruder for
tiff for what it deemed sufficient cause, its damages; in such case the measure of
decision was final, and the sufficiency of damages is generally the salary or fees re-
1
§ 236
319
LIABILITY OF THE OFFICER.
elected pursuant to statute by a municipal corporation, are not the
servants or agents of the corporation in such a sense as will enable
the corporation, in the absence of a statute giving the remedy, to
ceived by the intruder. Nichols v. Mc- the measure of damages is the full amount
Lean, 101 N. Y. 526 ; People v. Nolan, of the salary (where the office has a fixed
102 N. Y. 539. “The salary follows the salary) received by the intruder pending
legal title." Libbey, J., in Andrews v. the operation of the supersedeas. United
Portland, 79 Me. 484 (holding also that States v. Addison, 6 Wall. 291. See Peo-
in an action by an officer de jure for his ple v. Miller, 24 Mich. 458 (1872).
salary during the time of his unlawful re- "It is a grave question," says Scy-
moval from office, the city is not entitled mour, C. J., whether a merely de facto
to have deducted from the sum due the officer, even when he actually performs
amount earned by him in other ways dur- the whole duties of the office, can enforce
ing that time. To same effect is Fitzsim- the payment of the salary. The authori.
mons v. Brooklyn, 102 N. Y. 536). See, ties seem to be that he cannot.
State v.
further, ante, secs. 215, note ; 230, note; Carrol, 38 Conn. 471; Riddle v. Bedford
People v. Miller, 24 Mich. 458 (1872); County, 7 Serg. & Rawle (Pa.), 386 ;
Benoit v. Wayne County, supra ; Phila- Bently v. Phelps, 27 Barb. (N. Y.) 524;
delphia v. Given, 60 Pa. St. 136, per People v. Tieman, 30 Barb. (N. Y.) 193.
Thompson, C. J. Right of municipal offi- However this may be, it is clear, we think,
cer to retain his salary in his own hands, that the salary of an officer is not due to
denied, where it was his duty to pay all parties who are neither officers de jure, nor
sums received into the treasury. New de facto." Samis v. King, 40 Conn. 298
Orleans v. Finnerty, 27 La. An. 681 (1873).
(1875); s. C. 21 Am. Rep. 569, referred to Respecting liability of an intruder to
infra, note.
the officer de jure for salary and fees re-
The legal incumbent of a municipal ceived, and when an action will lie for
office rendering service is entitled to com- money had and received, Glascock v. Ly.
pensation until he has actual notice of ons, 20 Ind. 1; Douglas v. State, 31 Ind.
his removal. Jarvis v. Mayor, &c. of New 429; Dorsey v. Smythe, 28 Cal. 21; Strat-
York, 2 N. Y. Leg. Obs. 396. Equity will ton v. Oulton, Ib. 44; City v. Given, 60
not ordinarily enjoin the payment of the Pa. St. 136; Allen v. McKean, 1 Sumn.
salary to the incumbent pending a contest; 276; State v. Sherwood, 42 Mo.179; Hun-
the bill must show grounds for equitable ter v. Chandler, 45 Mo. 452; s. C. 10
relief. Colton v. Price, 50 Ala. 424 Am. Law Reg. (N. s.) 440, and note;
(1874); Bruner v. Bryan (against inter- Boyter v. Dodsworth, 6 Term R. 681;
loper), 50 Ala. 523 (1874); Field v. Com- Sadler v. Evans, 4 Burr. 1984; People v.
monwealth, 32 Pa. St. 478 (1849); Ram- Miller, 24 Mich. 458; Nichols v. McLean,
shay, In re, 83 Eng. C. L. 174 (1852); 101 N. Y. 526; People v. Nolan, 102 N.
Hennen, In re, 13 Pet. 230; Queen 2. Y. 539. The right of sct-off in respect of
Governors, &c., 8 Ad. & El. 632 ; Page v. his salary was denied to a municipal officer
Hardin, 8 B. Mon. (Ky.) 648 ; Bowerbank where it was the duty of the officer to de-
v. Morris, Wall. C. C. R. 118. In The posit all moneys received in the treasury,
City v. Given, 60 Pa. St. 136, the plain- and where it was provided his salary was
tiff acted as city commissioner for some to be paid in a specific manner. The
months, when it was decided that he had decisions of the Supreme Court of the
not been duly elected, and in a suit (nited States, allowing equitable set-off
brought for his salary, it was held that he in such cases, were distinguished. New
could not recover, because he had not Orleans V. Finnerty, 27 La. An. 681
qualified by giving security. See, ante, (1875); s. C. 21 Am. Rep. 569. If the
sec. 214, note. In an action by the right city is liable at once to suit by the officer,
ful officer on a supersedeas bond given in a why deny the right of set-off?
quo warranto proceeding by an intruder,
320
§ 237
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
maintain actions against such officers for negligence in the discharge
of their official duty. This principle does not, it is believed, apply
where the corporation is injured by the negligence of its own officers;
but even in such case the recovery in the absence of statute can
only be for want of fidelity and integrity, not for honest mistakes.?
To protect the public, however, officers are usually required to give
bonds, in which case they are of course liable, as we have seen, ac-
cording to the conditions thereof. They are also liable on common-
law principles to individuals who sustain special damage from the
failure to perform imperative and ministerial duties.3
§ 237 (176). Same subject. — In this country the officers of mu-
nicipal corporations are, in many respects, public officers, being charged
by legislative enactment with duties which concern both the corpo-
ration and the public at large. The duties and liabilities of such
officers to the corporation fall within the scope of this treatise, and
have been considered. But their individual rights and their duty
and liability to others, upon contracts and for torts, are not, strictly
speaking, embraced in the plan of the work. They are, however, so
germane to it, and reflect so much light upon the subjects which
are herein treated, that it has been thought that a brief reference
to some of the more important rules and adjudications was desirable,
and this has accordingly been made in the note.
1 Parish in Sherburne v. Fiske, 8 cover money illegally allowed for claims,
Cush. (Mass.) 264, 266 (1851), opinion by the complaint should aver the nature of
Dewey, J.; cites White v. Philipson, 10 the claims : it should be brought by the
Met. (Mass.) 108; Trafton v. Alfred, 3 legal officer of the county, but if by a tax-
Shepl. (15 Me.) 258; Kendall v. Stokes, 3 payer, the complaint should allege facts
How. 87; Commonwealth v. Genther, 17 showing the officer's neglect or refusal to
Serg. & Rawle (Pa.), 135; Wilson v. Mayor, act. Hedges v. Dam, 72 Cal. 520.
&c. of New York, 1 Denio (N. Y.), 595; Personal liability of municipal council-
Hancock v. Hazzard, 12 Cush. (Mass.) lors to the corporation for misappropria-
112; Lincoln v. Chapin, 132 Mass. 470; tion of its funds ; see Municipality of East
Minor v. Bank, 1 Pet. (U. S.) 46, 69. Nissouri v. Horseman, 16 Upper Can. Q.
Where a surveyor of highways has, by B. 588; of treasurer for paying money
law, a discretion as to the kind of repairs, on an illegal order or resolution. Daniels
and exercises his best judgment and acts v. Burford, 10 Upper Can. Q. B. 481.
in good faith, the corporation for which 2 Supra, secs. 214-216.
he acts is bound, and cannot defeat his 8 Infra, sec. 237, note and cases; post,
recovery for the price of materials fur- chap. xxiii.
nished, by evidence to show that the re- 4 SUITS BY PUBLIC OFFICERS. - Pub-
pairs were not, in fact, necessary. But it lic officers have, in general, a power to sue
would be otherwise if fraud or corruption commensurate with their duties. If offi-
were shown. Palmer v. Carroll, 4 Fost. cers of a corporate body, suit should be
(24 N. H.) 314 (1851). See, also, People brought in the name of the corporation,
v. Lewis, 7 Johns. (N. Y.) 73; Seaman v. unless the statute direct otherwise. Shook
Patten, 2 Caines (N. Y.), 312.
v. State, 6 Ind. 113; State v. Rush, 7 Ind.
action against county supervisors to re- 221; Supervisors V. Stimpson, 4 Hill
In an
t
§ 238
321
AMOTION; DISFRANCHISEMENT.
§ 238 (177). Amotion and Disfranchisement; the two distin-
guished; English decisions as to Disfranchisement inapplicable in
this country. - The elementary works treat of Amotion and Dis-
(N. Y.), 136, and cases cited; Todd v. EVIDENCE; PROOF OF TITLE OR OF-
Birdsall, 1 Cow. (N. Y.) 260, and cases FICIAL CHARACTER; ACTS AND DECLA-
cited in note; Jansen v. Ostrander, 1 Cow. RATIONS ; RES GESTAE. Where the au-
(N. Y.) 670; Cornell v. Guilford, i Denio, thority of an officer of a public corpora-
(N. Y.) 510; compare Commissioners v. tion comes incidentally in question in an
Perry, 5 Ohio, 57; Barney v. Bush, 9 Ala. action in which he is not a party, it is suf-
345; Van Keuren v. Johnson, 3 Denio, 182; ficient to show that he was an acting offi-
Tecumseh v. Phillips, 5 Neb. 305 (1877); cer, and the regularity of his appointment
Regents of State University v. McCon- or election cannot be made a question.
nell, 5 Neb. 423 (1877). But it has been Proof that he is an acting officer is prima
held that a public officer cannot, without facie evidence of his election or appoint-
the aid of a statute, maintain a suit in his ment, as well as of his having duly quali-
own name, although he may have taken a fied. But if he relies alone on proof of a
note or contract to himself individually, if due election or appointment, such election
the consideration for such a note or con- or appointment must be legally established.
tract be a liability to the State. The Pierce v. Richardson, 37 N. H. 306 (1858);
ground of this rule is public policy, — to Tucker v. Aiken, 7 N. H. 113; Johnson
discourage public officers from transacting v. Wilson, 2 N. H. 202; Baker 1. Shep-
in their own name the business of the hard, 4 Fost. (24 N. H.) 212 (1851), and
public. Hunter v. Field, 20 Ohio, 340 cases cited; Bean v. Thompson, 19 N. H.
(1851); Irish v. Webster, 5 Greenl. (Me.) 290; Blake v. Sturdevant, 12 N. H. 573;
171; Gilmore v. Pope, 5 Mass. 491. If Burgess v. Pue, 2 Gill (Md.), 254. Ante,
the obligation is taken to the officer as sec. 213.
An officer, even when justify-
agent, or in his official capacity, the action ing may prima facie establish his official
is properly brought in the name of the character by proof of general reputation,
government beneficially interested. Du- and that he acted as such officer. John-
gan v. United States, 3 Wheat. 172; S. P. son v. Steadnan, 3 Ohio, 94; followed,
United States v. Boice, 2 McLean, 352; Eldred v. Seaton, 5 Ohio, 215; Berry-
United States v. Barker, 2 Paine C. Ct. man v. Wise, 4 Term R. 366; Potter ».
152; 2 Parsons on Notes and Bills, 451, Luther, 3 Johns. 431; Wilcox v. Smith, 5
and other cases cited. An action by a Wend. 233; People v. McKinney, 10 Mich.
public officer does not abate by the expi- 54. But it is not enough to show that
ration of his term of office. The suit may the officer was acting officially in the par-
be continued in his name until its termi- ticular instance in controversy in the case
nation, or, by the practice in many of the upon trial, and in which his authority is:
States, his successor may be substituted. questioned. Hall v. Manchester, 39 N. H.
Kellar v. Savage, 20 Me. 199 (1841); 295 (1859). “The mere acting in a public
Todd v. Birdsall, 1 Cow. (N. Y.) 260; capacity is sufficient prima facie proof of
Haynes v. Covington, 13 Sm. & Mar. (21 proper appointment; but it is only prima
Miss.) 408; Grant v. Fancher, 5 Cow. facie presumption and is capable of being
(N. Y.) 309; Colgrove v. Breed, 2 Denio rebutted." Per Lord Coleridge, C. J., in
(N. Y.), 125; Manchester v. Herrington, Regina v. Roberts, 36 Law Times Rep.
10 N. Y. 164; Upton v. Starr, 3 Ind. 538; 690 (1878); s. C. 6 Am. Law Rep. 414.
Denver v. Dean, 10 Col. 375. Officers Post, sec. 276, note. An acting officer is
cannot be impleaded as individuals for estopped to dispute the validity of his
acts done in the exercise of their corporate own appointment and election. State v.
powers. Smith v. Stephan, 66 Md. 381 Sellers, 7 Rich. Law, 368; State v. May.
(injunction against officers, as individuals, berry, 3 Strob. 144.
to restrain them from issuing funding ACTS AND DECLARATIONS of officers,
bonds, as authorized by law, denied). when evidence for or against the corpo-
VOL. I. – 21
322
§ 238
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS,
franchisement together: indeed, formerly, the important distinction
between the two was not observed. Amotion relates alone to offi-
ration. Mitchell v. Rockland, 41 Me. officer, not authorized to act upon the
363; Jordan v. School District, 38 Me. 164 notice. Nichols v. Boston, 98 Mass. 39
(1864); Morrell v. Dixtield, 30 Me. 157; (1867); ante, secs. 208, 209; post, chap.
County v. Simmons, 5 Gilm. (10 Ill.) 516; xxiii. Index, title Notice.
Railroad Co. v. Ingles, 15 B. Mon. (Ky.) INDICTMENT OF PUBLIC AND Corpo-
637; Glidden v. Unity, 33 N. H. 577; RATE OFFICERS. “ A public officer,” it
Toll Co. v. Bettsworth, 30 Conn. 380; is declared in North Carolina, “entrusted
Barnes v. Pennell, 2 H. of L. Cas. 497; with definite powers to be exercised for
Curnen v. New York, 79 N. Y. 511. See the benefit of the community, who wick-
chapter on Corporate Records and Docu- edly abuses or fraudulently exceeds them,
ments, post. The acts of the officers of is punishable by indictment.
State v.
municipal corporations in the line of their Glasgow, N. C. Conf. R. 186, 187 (indict.
official duty, and within the scope of their inent of Secretary of State); State v. Jus-
authority, are binding upon the body tices, &c., 4 Hawks (N. C.), 194 (when
they represent; and declarations and ad- county authorities indictable for non-
missions accompanying such acts as part repuir of jail); see Paris v. People, 27 Ill.
of the res gesta, calculated to explain and 74; State v. Comm’rs of Fayetteville (non-
unfold their character, and not narrative repair of streets), 2 N. C. Law, 617 ; Ib.
of past transactions, are competent evi- 633; 2 Murph. 371; State v. Fishblate, 83
dence against the corporation. To render N. C. 654; State v. Hall, 97 N. C. 474.
such declarations and admissions evidence, But see as to street commissioner, Graf-
they must acccompany acts, which acts fins v. Commonwealth, 3 Pa. (Penn. &
must be of a nature to bind the corporate W.) 502; State v. Comm’rs, Walk. (Miss.)
body. Glidden v. Unity, 33 N. H. 571 368. Indictinent of municipal officers for
(1856); Perkins v. Railroad Co., 44 N. H. violation of charter. People v. Wood, 4
223; Grimes v. Keene, 52 N. H. 330; Park. Cr. R. 144; Hammar v. Covington,
Harpswell v. Phippsburg, 29 Me. 313; 3 Met. (Ky.) 494; State v. Shelbyville, 4
Coffin v. Plymouth, 49 N. H. 173; Hop- Sneed (Tenn.), 176; State v. Shields, 8
kinton v. Springfield, 12 N. H. 328; Pitts- Blackf. (Ind.) 151; Lathrop v. State, 6
field v. Barnstead, 40 N. H. 477; Canaan Blackf. (Ind.) 502; State v. Burlington,
v. Hanover, 49 N. H. 415; Gray v. Rol- 36 Vt. 521. Requisites of indictment for
linsford, 58 N. H. 253 (1878); s. C. 21 Alb. non-performance of official duty. Wattles
L. Jour. 76. A municipal corporation v. People, 13 Mich. 446; State v. Mayor,
may be estopped by the action of its proper 11 Humph. (Tenn.) 217; State v. Comm’rs,
officers, when the corporation is acting in 4 Dev. (N. C.) 345; 3 Chitty Crim. Law,
its private, as contradistinguished from 586, 606, for precedents of indictments
its governmental, capacity, and has lawful against corporations. Criminal informa-
power to do the act." Per Scholfield, J.,
Per Schol field, J., tion against municipal officers. Willc.
Chicago v. Sexton, 115 Ill. 230.
Corp. 315-318; Rex v. Watson, 2 Term
NOTICE TO OFFICERS. Where the offi- R. 204; 16. 198. Indictment against mu-
cers or agents of a public corporation have nicipal Corporations. See chapter on
no powers or duties with respect to a given Remedies against Illegal Corporate Acts,
matter, their individual knowledge, or the post, secs. 931, 933.
individual knowledge of the inhabitants or LIABILITY OF OFFICER FOR MONEYS
voters, does not bind or affect the corpora- RECEIVED. — A public or municipal offi.
tion. Harrington v. School District, 30 cer, who is required to account for and pay
Vt. 155 (1858); Angell & Ames Corp. sec. over money that comes into his hands, is
239; Hayden v. Turnpike Co. 10 Mass. liable though it be stolen without his
397. The niayor is chief executive offi- fault, unless relieved from this responsi-
cer of the city, and notice to him of a bility by statute. Halbert v. State, 22
nuisance is sufficient, when it would not Ind. 125 (1864); Muzzy v. Shattuck, 1
be to the clerk, who is only a recording Denio, 233; Morbeck ů. State, 28 Ind.
§ 238
323
AMOTION; DISFRANCHISEMENT.
cers; disfranchisement, to corporators or members of the corporation.
Amotion, therefore, is the removal of an officer in a corporation from
86 ; Hancockv. Hazzard, 12 Cush. (Mass.) Belknap v. Rheinhart, 2 Wend. (N. Y.)
112 ; Clay Co. v. Simonsen, i Dak. Ter. 375 ; Adams v. Whittlessey, 3 Com. 560 ;
403 ; affirmed, Clay County v. Simonsen, 8 Conn. 329; Hammarskold Bull, et
2 Dak. Ter. 112 ; Egremont v. Benjamin, ul. (“State capitol commissioners " ) 11
125 Mass. 15; State v. Lewenthall, 55 Rich. (S. C.) Law, 493 ; Lesley v. White,
Miss. 589 ; State v. Powell, 67 Mo. 395 ; 1 Speers, 31 ; Young v. Commissioner's
State v. Gates, 67 Mo. 139 ; Inglis v. of Roads, 2 Nott & McC. 537 ; Miller
State, 61 Ind. 212 ; United States v. v. Ford, 4 Rich. (S. C.) Law, 376; $. C.
Prescott, 3 How. (U. S.) 578; Comnion- 4 Strob. 213 ; Copes v. Mathews, 10 Sm.
wealth v. Comly, 4 Pa. St. 372 ; State & Marsh. (18 Miss.) 398 ; Tucker v.
v. Harper, 6 Ohio St. 707 ; Henry v. Shorter, 17 Ga. 620 ; Woodbridge v. Hall,
State, 98 Ind. 381. And a direction to a 47 N. J. L. (18 Vroom) 388; Hall v.
public officer (e. g. a county treasurer) how Cockrell, 28 Ala. 507 (1856); but quare,
and where to keep the money (e. g. in a as to its correctness. In Nickerson v.
safe provided by the county), if made by Dyer, 105 Mass. 320, the agents or com-
a board or authority having no legal con- mittce of a town were held not to be per-
trol or power over the matter, will not be sonally liable. A public officer contracting
a defence to such officer if the money is with a party who knows the 'extent of his
stolen from the safe. Halbert v. State, authority is not personally liable, unless
supra. In a suit against a tax-collector to such intent is clearly expressed. Broad-
recover money received by him, it is no well v. Chapin, 2 Ill. App. 511; post,
defence that he received the money on chap. xiv. In the absence of a provision
account of taxes which the legislature had to the contrary, an officer of a municipal
no constitutional power to impose. Waters corporation is not disabled from entering
v. State, 1 Gill (Md.), 302 (1843); Thomps into a contract with it. Municipality v.
son v. Stickney, 6 Ala. 579 ; Evans v. Caldwell, 3 Rob. (La.), 368 (1842). See
Trenton, 4 Zabr. (24 N. J. L.) 764. Treas- on this point, post, sec. 292 and note. It
urer held not entitled to credit for money is held that where the officers of a pub-
paid contractors upon warrants not drawn lic or municipal corporation, acting offi.
according to the charter. McCormick v. cially and under an innocent mistake of
Bay City, 23 Mich. 457.
the law, in which the other contracting
LIABILITY or OFFICER ON CONTRACTS. party equally participated, with equal op-
- Public and municipal officers are not portunities of knowledge, neither party at
personally liable on contracts within the the time looking to personal liability, the
scope of their authority and line of duty, officers are not, in such case, personally
unless it is very apparent that they in- liable, nor is the corporation liable. Hous-
tended to bind themselves personally. ton v. Clay County (unauthorized contract
Macbeath v. Haldimand, 1 D. & E. Term. 172, by township trustees for the erection of a
and Hodgson v. Dexter, 1 Cranch, 345, bridge), 18 Ind. 396 (1862); Boardman v.
are the leading cases. The question is, Hayne, 29 Iowa, 339 (1870); Duncan v.
To whom was the credit given? Did the Niles, 32 Ill. 532 (1863), and cases cited ;
defendant contract in his public or private Ogden v. Raymond, 22 Conn. 379 (1853);
capacity ? See Olney v. Wickes, 18 Johns. Dameron v. Irwin, 8 Ire. Law (N. C.),
(N. Y.) 122, where the promise was held 421 (1848); Hite v. Goodman, 1 Dev. &
not personal. Compare King v. Butler, Bat. Eq. (N. C.) 364 (1836); Ives v. Hu-
15 Johus. (N. Y.) 281 ; Gill v. Brown, 12 let, 12 Vt. 314 (1840); Stone v. Huggins,
Johns. (N. Y.) 385 ; Walker v. Swartout, 28 Vt. 617 ; Tucker 2. Justices, 13 Ire.
Ib. 444 ; Mott v. Hicks, 1 Cow. (N. Y.) Law (N. C.) 434; Dey v. Lee, 4 Jones
513; Sheffield v. Watson, 3 Caines (N. Y.), (Law), 238 ; Tucker v. Shorter, 17 Ga.
69; commented on, 12 Johns. 448; Brown
12 Johns. 448; Brown 620 ; Copes v. Mathews, 10 Sm. & Marsh.
v. Rundlett (full discussion), 15 N. H. (18 Miss.) 398; Hall v. Cockrell, 28 Ala.
360 (1844), and cases cited and criticised; 507; compare Potts v. Henderson, 2 Ind
324
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
§ 238
(1842); affirmed in error, 2 Denio, 433 mond v. Fish, 51 Conn. 80 (health officer
his office, but it leaves him still a member of the corporation. Dis-
franchisement is to destroy or take away the franchise or right of
(Carter) 327 (1850); Lyon 0. Irish, 58 ard v. Keefer, 53 Ill. 117 ; Humphreys
Mich. 518. Liability under statute of v. Mears, 1 Man. & Ryl. 187; Bolton v.
trustees or directors of public works who Crowther, 4 Dowl. & Ryl. 195; Harris v.
make unauthorized contracts. Higgins v. Baker, 4 Maule & Selw. 27; Bacheller
Livingstone, 4 Dow, 341; Parrott v. Eyre, v. Pinkham, 68 Me. 253. See also Lane
10 Bing. 283 ; Wilson v. Goodman, 4 v. Cotton, 1 Salk. 17 ; Story on Agency,
Hare, 54.
320 et seq. ; Story on Bail. 300, 302;
TAX-COLLECTOR'S PERSONAL LIABIL- Martin v. Mayor, &c., 1 Hill (N. Y.),
ITY TO THIRD PERSONS. Tax-collector 545, 551 ; Mayor, &c. v. Furze, 3 Hill
liable in trespass who seizes without color (N. Y.), 612, 618. City liable for negli-
of law for tax assessment, or under an un- gence in making public improvements,
constitutional law. McCoy 2. Chillicothe, though it let the contract to a contractor
3 Ohio, 370; Ragnet r. Wade, 4 Ohio, who is to perform it under the supervision
107; Loonis v. Spencer, 2 Paige, 150. and direction of the city. Chicago v. Der-
But a collector whose warrant is in due mody, 61 lll. 431 ; Chicago v. Joney, 60
form, with nothing on its face to show the Ill. 383. More fully on this point see post,
illegality of the tax or the want of author- chap. xxiii.; Wright v. Hoebrook (full dis-
ity in the assessors or previous officers, cussion), 52 N. H. 120 (1872); s. C. 13
will be protected in executing it, even Am. Rep. 12.
though the tax be not lawfully assessed. LIABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS FOR
Chegary v. Jenkins, 1 Seld. (5 N. Y.) 376 ACTS JUDICIAL IN THEIR NATURE.
(1861); affirming s. C. 3 Sandf. Sup. Ct. Officers are not liable for honest errors or
R. 409 ; Abbott v. Yost, 2 Denio (N. Y.), mistakes of judgment as to acts within
Savacool v. Boughton, 5 Wend. (N. the scope of their authority, judicial in
Y.) 170 (1830), leading case; Downing v. their nature, in the absence of malice or
Rugar, 21 Wend. 178 (warrant of justice corruption, or statute imposing the lia-
to overseers of poor); Alexander v. Hoyt, bility. Post, chaps. xxii. and xxiii. ; Ram-
7 Wend. (N. Y.) 89; Clark v. Halleck, 16 sey v. Riley, 13 Ohio, 157 ; Steward v.
Wend. (N. Y.) 607; People v. Warren, Southard, 17 Ohio, 402; Conwell v. Em-
5 Hill (N. Y.), 440 ; Webber v. Gray, 24 rie (road supervisor), 4 Ind. 209; Bartlett
Wend. (N. Y.) 485 ; Loomis v. Spencer, v. Crozier (highway overseer), 17 Johns.
2 Paige, 153; Little v. Merritt, 10 Pick. (N. Y.) 439; Freeman v. Cornwall (high-
(Mass.) 547 ; see Suydam v. Keys, 13 way overseer), 10 Ib. 470; McConnell 2.
Johns. (N. Y.) 444 ; Gale r. Mead, 2 Dewey (road supervisor), 5 Neb. 385
Denio (N. Y.), 160 ; Ib. 232 ; Easton v. (1877); Johnson v. Stanley, 1 Root
Callender, 11 Wend. (N. Y.) 90 ; Clark (Conn.), 245 ; Township v. Carey, 3
v. Norton, 49 N. Y. 243. Liability of as- Dutch. (N. J. L.) 377 ; Waters v. Water-
Dorwin v. Strickland, 57 N. Y., man, 2 Root, 214 ; Craig v. Burnett, 32
492 (1877); Harshman v. Winterbottom, Ala. 728 ; State v. Dunnington, 12 Md.
123 U. S. 215.
340 ; Commissioners v. Nesbitt, 11 Gill &
PERSONAL LIABILITY OF PUBLIC OF J. (Md.) 50; Woodruff v. Stewart, 63
FOR ActS OF SUBORDINATES; Ala. 206 (action against mayor acting as
RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR. — Public officers judge for false imprisonment). East River
are not liable for the misconduct or mal. Gas-Light Co. v. Donnelly, 93 N. Y. 557.
feasance of such persons as they are obliged Liability where the officer's function is
to employ ; the reason here being that the quasi judicial. Wilkes v. Dinman, 7 How.
maxim of respondeat superior has no appli- 89 (where the subject is much considered,
cation, there being no freedom of choice as and malice or wilful wrong held to be es-
to the selection and control of agents. sential), Waldron v. Berry, 51 N. H. 136;
Bailey v. Mayor, &c., 3 Hill (N. Y.), 531 Perry v. Reynolds, 53 Conn. 527 ; Ray-
86 ;
sessor.
FICERS
(1845); Hall v. Smith, 2 Bing. 156; Pritch-
not liable for mere error of judgment);
!
$ 238
325
AMOTION ; DISFRANCHISEMENT.
being any longer a member of the corporation.American municipal
corporations are, in many respects, essentially different in their con-
Matter of Isaacson, 36 La. An. 56 (failure Carthy v. DeArmit, 99 Pa. St. 63 (unlawful
to levy a tax for payment of judgment). arrest and imprisonment. See also as to
The members of a city council are not in- measure of damages). Liability for non-
dividually liable, in a civil or criminal ac- feasance or misfcasance, where the duty is
tion, for acts involving the exercise of dis- specific, inperative, and not judicial, in
cretion, unless they act corruptly. Walker its nature. Griffith v. Follett, 20 Barb.
v. Hallock, 32 Ind. 239 (1869); Baker v. (N. Y.) 630 (1855); Weaver v. Devendorf,
State, 27 Ind. 485. Liability of minis- 3 Denio (N. Y.), 117 ; Harmon v. Broth-
terial officer, charged by statute with an erson, i Denio (N. Y.), 537 ; Ib. 595 ;
absolute and certain duty. Clark v. Mil. Adsit v. Brady, 4 Hill (N. Y.), 630 (1843).
ler, 54 N. Y. 528, and cases cited. But see “ It is settled in this court that oue who
reference to this case, cited by Miller, J., in assumes the duties and is invested with
Dow v. Humbert, 91 U. S. 294, 302 (1875). the powers of a public officer is liable to an
Public duty, not ordinarily enforceable by individual who sustains special damage by
private action against the officer, unless a veglect properly to perform such duties.”
given by statute. Foster v. McKibben, 14 Finch, J., in Bennett v. Whitney, 94
Pa. St. 168; McConnell v. Dewey (road su- N. Y. 302 (leaving a temporary opening
pervisor), 5 Neb. 385 (1877). Misappli- in a street unguarded and unlighted). Ho-
cation of public funds by officer. Town- ver 2. Barkhoof, 44 N. Y. 113 (failing to
ship, &c. 2. Linn, 36 Pa. St. 431. Ante, keep a bridge in repair). More fully, post,
secs. 214–216, notes. Neglect to take a
Neglect to take a chap. xxiii. The principle on which a
bond required by law. Boggs v. Hamilton, public officer is held personally liable for
2 Const. (S. C.) R. 381 ; State v. Dun- injuries resulting from improper execution
nington, 12 Md. 340. A municipal officer of official duties is well stated in Nowell
misled into issuing order, not liable to the v. Wright, 3 Allen (Mass.), 166 ; Blair v.
holder. Boardman v. Hayne, 29 Iowa, Langtry, 21 Neb. 247. În Amy v. Super-
339.
visors, 11 Wall. 136 (1870), where county
PERSONAL LIABILITY OF OFFICER FOR supervisors were held to be personally liable
TORTS. Alvord v. Barrett (town clerk), for failing to lcvy a tax, as commanded by
16 Wis. 175; American Print Works v. the court, to pay the plaintiff's judgment,
Lawrence, 3 Zabr. (23 N. J. L.) 590, 601. Mr. Justice Swayne, stating the principle
No liability for acts done by a public offi- of the decision, says: “The rule is well
cer under lawful authority and in a proper settled, that where the law requires abso-
16. Full discussion and cases lutely a ministerial act to be done by a
cited by Carpenter, J.; s. p. in s. c. l public officer, and he neglects or refuses
Zabr. (21 N. J. L.) 248, 260, per Green, to do such act, he may be compelled to re-
C. J.; Calking v. Baldwin, 4 Wend. spond in damages to the extent of the in-
(N. Y.) 667; and cases cited. How far jury arising from his conduct; mistake of
protected by an unconstitutional statute. duty and honest intentions will not excuse
Ib. But if officers act maliciously, oppres- the offender. Measure of damages. Dow
sively, corruptly, or without authority of v. Humbert, 91 U. S. 294 (1875). Liabil-
law, they may be held personally liable. ity for fraud. Oakland v. Carpenter, 13
Pruden v. Love, 67 Ga. 190 (declaring a Cal. 540 ; ante, sec. 208, n.; post, sec.
building a nuisance and tearing it wn 910, n. A ministerial officer, acting in
without proper notice to the owner). Mc- good faith, is liable for actual, but not for
manner.
1 2 Kyd, 50–94; Willc. 245-276; Glov. Corp. chap. xii., where the earlier cases
er, chap. xvi. pp. 327, 328; Grant, 250, are quite fully collected, and the doctrine
263. And see 2 Kent, Com. 278, 297, of the English decisions satisfactorily pre-
where amotion and disfranchisement are sented. Richards v. Clarksburg, 30 W.
used as convertible terms; Angell & Ames, Va. 491 (1887), citing the text.
326
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
§ 239
and also, frequently, the other cc
stitution from the old English municipal corporations, under which
most of the cases on the subject of amotion and disfranchisement
usually cited in the books arose. These cases, especially those re-
lating to disfranchisement are, in general, inapplicable here, and
should, it is believed by the author, be followed by our courts as
precedents with unusual caution, and only when they rest upon or
declare principles general in their nature, and which embrace in
their operations municipal institutions possessing the distinctive
characteristics of ours. Here, the inhabitants of the municipality
are, by legislative enactment, the corporators; certain of those in-
habitants (usually all of the adult male residents) have the constitu-
tional or statutory right to elect the legislative or governing body,
ration. It would seem that the English doctrine of disfranchisement
of a corporator or member has no application to our municipal cor-
porations, whether the corporator be considered the “inhabitant" or
the "voter.”
here.
§ 239 (178). Disfranchisement; English Doctrine not applicable
Whether the power of disfranchisement be incidental to
the corporation, or must be expressly conferred, respecting which
there is in England some contrariety of view, we need not inquire,
exemplary damages, for illegal acts injuri- Johns. (N. Y.) 114; Lincoln v. Hapgood,
ous to private persons. Tracy v. Swart- 11 Mass. 350; Bridge v. Lincoln, 14 Mass.
out, 10 Pet. (U. S.) 80 (1836) (action 367. Collection and revenue officers not
against collector of customs); Ib. 137 ; liable to the party paying for money vol-
Jenner v. Joliffe, 9 Johns. 382. As no untarily paid to them. Elliott v. Swart-
one is bound by an unauthorized ordi- out, 10 Pet. 137 (1836); Thompson v.
nance, the municipal authorities enacting Stickney, 6 Ala. 579. More fully, post,
the same are not individually liable there- chap. xxiii. When liable in trespass.
for. So held, in action by an ex-mayor McCoy V. Chillicothe, 3 Ohio, 370 ;
against aldermen for depriving him of his Loomis v. Spencer, 2 Paige, 153. Re-
office. Jones v. Loving, 55 Miss. 109; cording officer. Ramsey v. Riley, 13 Ohio,
supra, sec. 235. A provision of law mak- 157 ; approved, Stewart v. Southard, 17
ing a civil corporation liable “ for the ille- Ohio, 402.
gal doings and defaults" of its officers I Grant, 263. “This right (of disfran-
(there being no provision that the officers chisement] has been but sparingly exer-
shall not also remain liable), does not de- cised, though it is undoubtedly an incident
prive the party injured of his right to to every corporation, with, perhaps, some
proceed personally against the officer or exceptions in cases of trading and mone.
agent who committed the injury. Both tary bodies.” 16. Willcock (271, pl. 709)
are liable. Rounds v. Mansfield, 38 Me. denies that it is an incidental right, and
(3 Heath) 586 (1854). Election officers for claims that the rule laid down in the
refusing vote, when liable. Gordon v. Far- second resolution (Bagg's Case) on this
rer, 2 Doug. (Mich.) 411 ; Carter v. Har point,
no freeman of any corpo-
rison, 5 Blackf. 138; Jeffries v. Ankeny, ration can be disfranchised by the corpo-
11 Ohio, 374 ; compare Ramsey v. Riley, ration, unless they have authority to do so
13 Obio, 157. See Jenkins v. Waldron, 11 by the express words of the charter, or by
that "c
§ 240
327
AMOTION; DISFRANCHISEMENT.
for here (were there no constitutional obstacles) the legislature never
bestows upon the council, or governing body which represents the
corporation, the right to disfranchise the citizen or corporator; and
it is clear that such a formidable and extraordinary authority does
not exist, and cannot be exercised by the council, as an incidental
or implied right. To burn or destroy the charters of the corpora-
tion, or wilfully to falsify its books, were in England considered
such breaches of duty on the part of a corporator as would work a
forfeiture of the corporate character, there being, according to Lord
Coke, "a tacit condition annexed to the franchise, which, if he break,
he may be disfranchised.” 2 Surely, there is here no such tacit con-
dition annexed to the constitutional or statutable right of a resident
of a municipality to be and remain a corporator, though there may
be a similar condition annexed to municipal offices. Wilfully to
destroy or falsify the charter or books of a municipal corporation is
an act which is punishable by the criminal codes of the different
States; and if the offender is convicted and imprisoned, it may re-
sult as an incident of such conviction that he will cease, for the time,
to be a resident, and hence will cease to be a member of the corpo-
ration; but the corporation itself has no power to disfranchise him,
that is, to deprive him of the privileges and rights, without absolv-
ing him from the liabilities of other citizens, while he remains within
the limits of the municipality.
§ 240 (179). Amotion; Rex v. Richardson. The power to amove
a corporate officer from his office, for reasonable and just cause, is
one of the common-law incidents of all corporations. This doctrine,
prescription," is the law. Mr. Glover 2 13 Coke, 98 a.
simply adopts Mr. Willcock's language. 8 Rex v. Richardson, 1 Burr. 517 ; Rex
Glover, 335. Mr. Kyd's exposition of the v. Liverpool, 2 Burr. 723 ; Rex v. Don-
second resolution in Bagg's Case, 2 Kyd, caster, 2 Burr. 738 Jay's Case, 1 Vent.
52. And see leading case of Rex v. Rich. 302 ; Lord Bruce's Case, 2 Stra. 819 ; Rex
ardson, 1 Burr. 517, which was a case of v. Ponsonby, 1 Ves. Jr. 1; Rex v. Lyine
amotion, but has been often taken as Regis, Doug. 153; Rex v. Tidderley, 1 Sil.
asserting an incidental power to disfran- 14, per Hale, C. B.; Rex v. Taylor, 3 Salk.
chise for cause as well as to amove. Angell 231; 1 Roll. Rep. 409; s. C. 3 Bulst. 189;
& Ames, secs. 408, 409. See, generally, Rex v. Chalke, 1 Lord Raym. 225 ; Rex
Commonwealth v. St. Patrick's Society, 2 v. Heaven, 2 Term R. 772 ; Reg. v. New-
Binn. (Pa.) 448 (1810); Evans v. Phila- bury, 1 Queen's Bench, 751 ; 2 Kyd, 50–
delphia Club, 50 Pa. St. 107; Hopkinson 94, where the old cases are digested ;
v. Marquis of Exeter, Law Rep. 5 Eq. 63; Glover, chap. xvi. ; Willc. 246 ; Grant,
State v. Georgia Med. Soc., 38 Ga. 608 ; 240 ; Angell & Ames, chap. xii.; 2 Kent,
S. C. 8 Am. Law Reg. (n. s.) 533, Mr. Com. 297 ; Richards v. Clarksburg, 30 W.
Mitchell's note.
Va. 491 (1887); State v. The Judges, 35
1 Mayor v. Pilkinton, 1 Keb. 597 ; Rex La. An. 1075 ; Ellison v. Raleigh, 89 N. C.
v. Chalke, 5 Mod. 257 ; 1 Lord Raym. 125 ; ante, sec. 212, note.
226 ; Grant, Corp. 265.
328
§ 242
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
though declared before, has been considered as settled ever since
Lord Mansfield's judgment in the well-known case of The King v.
Richardson. It is there denied that there can be no power of
amotion unless given by charter or prescription; and the contrary
doctrine is asserted, that from the reason of the thing, from the
nature of corporations, and for the sake of order and government,
the power is incidental.
§ 241 (180). Where Power of Amotion resided in old English
Corporation. — But the power to amove, like every other incidental
power, is incident to the corporation at large, and not to any select
body or particular part of it, and unless delegated to a select body
or part, it must be exercised by the whole corporation, and at a cor-
porate assembly regularly and duly convened. The power to hold
such an assembly is, however, implied in the power of amotion.
§ 242 (181). Power of Amotion in this country. - By the corpo-
ration at large, as used in the preceding section, is meant the differ-
ent ranks and orders which compose it, including the definite and
indefinite bodies. The essentials in such a corporation of a valid
corporate assembly have previously been described. Our American
corporations, however, have no ranks, orders, or integral parts corre-
sponding to the constitution of an old English corporation. Here
the common council, or the elective governing body (whatever name
be given to it), exercises all of the powers of the incorporated place.
Has the council, as the representative of the corporation, the inci-
dental powers of a corporation, such as the power to amove, or the
1 Lord Bruce's Case, 2 Stra. 819, 820 ; but, unless expressly changed or limited
Tidderley's Case, i Sid. 14, per Hale, by charter, it belongs to the corporation
C. B.
at large. Lord Mansfield seemed to be
2 Rex v. Richardson, 1 Burr. 517, noted of opinion that it was competent to trans-
infra, sec. 231. “It is necessary to the fer this power from the whole body to a
good order and government of corporate select body by an ordinance or by-law.
bodies that there should be such power Bagg's Case, 11 Co. 99 a; Rex v. Rich.
[amotion), as much as the power of mak- ardson, i Burr. 539. But this question
ing by-laws." Ib.
seems not to have been directly deter-
8 Lord Bruce's Case, 2 Stra. 819; Rex mined. Willc. 247, pl. 634 ; IV. 248, pl.
v. Lyme Regis, Doug. 153 ; Rex v. Rich- 635 ; State 2. Jersey City, 1 Dutch. (N. J.)
ardson, supra ; Rex v. Doncaster, Say. 38; 536. Under the Constitution of Pennsyl-
Rex v. Taylor, 3 Salk. 231 ; Rex v. Faver- vania municipal officers who hold their
sham, 8 T. R. 356 ; Fane's Case, Doug. offices by appointment may be rcmovcil at
153 ; Willc. 246, pl. 629; Grant, 240, the pleasure of the power appointing them.
241 ; 2 Kyd, 56 ; Glover, 329 ; State v. Houseman v. Commonwealth, 100 Pa. St.
Jersey City, 1 Dutch. (N. J.) 536 (1856). 222.
Even if the right to elect an officer be in 4 Fane's Case, Doug. 153 ; Rex v. Lyme
à particular person or select class, the Regis, Ib. 149.
power to amove is not incidental to it,
.
§ 243
329
POWER OF AMOTION IN THIS COUNTRY.
גן
power to ordain by-laws ? Or is the council in the nature of a
select body, possessing no right to exercise any of the ordinary in-
cidental powers of the corporation, unless expressly authorized by
charter or legislative grant? The question not being judicially set-
tled as to our municipal corporations, the opinion is ventured that,
in the absence of an express grant or statute conferring or limiting
the power, the common council of one of our municipal corporations
as ordinarily constituted, does possess, in the absence of any express
or implied restriction in the charter, the incidental power, not only
to make by-laws, but, for cause, to expel its members, and, for cause,
to remove corporate officers, whether elected by it or by the people.
$ 243. Same subject. - Whatever necessity or reason exists for
the right of amotion at common law, with respect to the corporation
at large, would, in the absence of any controlling legislative pro-
vision, seem to exist here not only as to the doctrine itself, but also
with respect to that authorized body by which alone the corporation
acts, and which exercises all the corporate powers and functions.
All of the inhabitants cannot meet and act in their primary capacity,
except in organizations like the towns in the New England States;
and if an implied or incidental right of amotion exists at all, it must
be exercised by the council or governing body of the corporation.
If it does not exist in the council, it cannot be delegated to it by an
ordinance or by any act of the corporation, though if the right does
exist, its exercise may, of course, be regulated by ordinance or by-
law. And the right may doubtless, we think, be inferred from the
1 See, generally, Willard's Appeal, 4 Law Reg. (N. s.) 533, and note ; Smith
R. I. 597 ; State, &c. v. Trustees, &c., 5 v. Smith, 3 Desaus. 557. But see State
Ind. 89 ; State v. Bryce, 7 Ohio, part II. v. Jersey City, 1. Dutch. (N. J.) 536, in
[82] 414; Commonwealth v. St. Patrick's which the power to expel a member of the
Society, 2 Binn. (Pa.) 448 ; Common- council was expressly conferred, but where
wealth v. Bussier, 5 Serg. & Rawle (Pa.), Mr. Justice Potts, delivering the opinion
451 ; Commonwealth v. Guardians, &c., of the court, says: “The rule is well set-
6 Serg. & Rawle (Pa.), 469 ; Common- tled that a corporation has, at common
wealth v. Sutherland, 3 Serg. & Rawle law, an inherent jurisdiction to expel a
(Pa.), 145; Johns v. Nicholls, 2 Dall. 184; member for sufficient cause." After no-
1 Yeates, 80; People v. Comptroller, &c., ticing the offences which will justify ex-
20 Wend. (N. Y.) 595 ; State, &c. 19. pulsion, he adds: “But the jurisdiction
Lingo, 26 Mo. 496 ; Fawcett v. Charles, in this case is not derived from the com-
13 Wend. 473; Hoboken v. Gear, 3 Dutch. mon law. The common council is not the
(N. J.) 265; People v. Board of Trade, corporation, and, whatever powers a mu.
45 Ill. 112 (1867); Neall v. Hill, 16 Cal. nicipal corporation may have to amove or
145 ; State v. Chamber of Commerce, 20 expel a member at common law, it is clear
Wis. 63; People v. Medical Society, 24 that the corporation itself has not, by
Barb. (N. Y.) 570 ; Evans v. Philadelphia any by-law, delegated any of them to the
Club, 50 Pa. St. 107; State v. Georgia common council, and that body, therefore,
Medical Society, 38 Ga. 608 ; s. C. 8 Am. cannot avail itself of the common-law
330
§ 245
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
express power to make needful or reasonable by-laws, if there is
nothing in the charter or legislation to rebut the inference.
§ 244 (182). Special Statutory Tribunal. — A provision in a city
charter vesting the board of aldermen with the sole power to try all
impeachments of city officers, the judgment only extending to removal
and disqualification to hold any corporate office under the charter,
is not unconstitutional as authorizing the exercise of judicial powers
by a legislative or municipal body, but is rather the exercise of a
power necessary for its police and good administration.
§ 245 (183). Power to amove to be Strictly Pursued. When
the terms under which the power of amotion is to be exercised are
prescribed, they must be pursued with strictness. Whether, if the
jurisdiction, vested as an inherent right in State v. Trustees of University, 5 Ind. 77,
the corporation itself, to expel a member 89 (1854); State v. Bryce, 7 Ohio, part II.
of their own body. 2 Bac. Abr. 21, title [82] 414; State v.Chamber of Commerce, 20
Corporations; Willc. on Corp. 629. The Wis. 63; Regina v. Sutton, 10 Mod. 76;
council derives its jurisdiction from the Paston v. Urber, Hutt. 103; Regina v.
charter of the corporation.” This case Ricketts, 7 Ad. & El. 966; Rex v. Ox-
rules that where, in express terms, the foru, 6 Ad. & El. 349; Commonwealth v.
right of the council to expel a member for Sutherland, 3 Serg. & Rawle (Pa.), 145;
certain causes is given, it cannot exercise Commonwealth v. Shaver, 3 Watts & S.
the power for any other cause. And it (Pa.) 338; Murphy v. Webster, 131 Mass.
would seem to be the opinion of the court, 482. In the Queen 2. Sutton, supra, so
or at least of the judge delivering the strictly was a clause in a charter confer-
opinion, that the common-law power of ring the right of removal construed, that
expulsion belonging to a corporation could it was held that where acts were to be done
not be exercised by the common council, by a majority, that word was to be under-
that body not being the corporation in stood as a majority of the whole corpora-
which the power is vested. Infra, secs. tion, and that if the officer whose removal
245, note, 280. Same principle as to pri- was proposed was a member it could be ef-
vate corporations. State v. Chamber of fected only by a majority of all the mem-
Commerce, 20 Wis. 72. Compare People bers, including himself, and that his per-
v. Board of Trade, 45 Ill. 113.
sonal interest did not exclude him from
i State v. Ramos, 10 La. An. 420. See voting as a member upon the question.
People v. Bearfield, 35 Barb. (N. Y.) 254, See, also, State v. Jersey City, 1 Dutch.
supra, sec. 200. A board of aldermen, (N. J.) 536; Madison v. Korbly, 32 Ind.
sitting in a judicial capacity as a court of 74; State v. McGarry, 21 Wis. 496, where
impeachment to try charges preferred
66 other cause
for removal was held to
against a city officer by another branch of
- other like cause. The Circuit
the municipal governing body, is a court Court of the United States has no jurisdic-
of limited jurisdiction, and, if not sworn, tion to restrain the mayor or city authori.
or not sworn by an officer authorized to ties from removing a city officer, upon
administer oaths, their proceedings and charges of malfeasance in office. An in-
judgment of guilty are void, and create no junction issued in such a case and pro-
vacancy. Tompert v. Lithgow, 1 Bush ceedings in contempt for disobedience of
(Ky.), 176 (1866). See Hadley v. Mayor the writ, held void. Re Sawyer, 124 U.
&c., 33 N. Y. 603; cited infra, sec. 253, S. 200; supra, sec. 202, note ; more fully,
note.
post, chap. xxii.
2 State v. Lingo, 26 Mo. (5 Jones) 496;
mean
!
$ 246
331
OFFICERS; POWER OF EXPULSION.
power to expel or remove be given for certain causes, this excludes the
right to exercise the power in any other case, will depend upon
the intent of the legislature to be gathered from a consideration of
the whole charter or statute. Power to appoint“subject to removal
only for,” &c., clearly limits the power of removal to the specified
causes.1 Express power of expulsion or removal for specified rea-
sons was, in New Jersey and in Georgia, considered to exclude any
implied power, and to limit the right to the enumerated causes.?
§ 246 (184). Power of Expulsion for Specified Causes construed.
- A charter of a municipal corporation gave to the common council
express power to "expel a member for disorderly conduct," and one
of the aldermen, being guilty of official corruption in receiving
bribes, was, after a hearing, expelled from the council. The court
was of opinion that the question as to the right to expel for the
conduct charged, depended upon the construction of the words
"disorderly conduct;” and it held that receiving bribes for his
official influence and votes was disorderly conduct, within the
meaning of the charter.3 In another case, the charter authorized
the council “to dismiss the marshal for malpractice in office, or
neglect of duty;" and it was held that the council could not remove
this officer for the crime of gambling, as this was neither malpractice
in office nor official neglect, within the meaning of the charter.4
i People v. Higgins, 15 Ill. 110. See 4 Mayor v. Shaw, &c., 16 Ga. 172
supra, sec. 243, note.
(1854). Relator was removed from the
2 State v. Jersey City, 1 Dutch. (N. J.) office of policeman of the city of New York,
536 (1856); The Mayor, &c. v. Shaw, by the board of police, under the charge
16 Ga. 172 (1854). See s. c. 19 Ga. 468; of “conduct unbecoming an officer,” this
21 Ga. 280; 25 Ga. 590; Cleary v. Tren- being one of the offences for which, under
ton, 50 N. J. L. 331 (1888); Clark v. the statute, a policeman can be removed.
Cape May, 50 N. J. L. 558 (1888). But The specifications were that he was ap-
see Commonwealth v. St. Patrick's So- pointed policeman contrary to law when
ciety, 2 Binn. (Pa.) 441; 4 Binn. (Pa.) he was more than thirty years of age, and
448; Angell & Ames, sec. 415. Under that he had been appointed after having
the Illinois statute, it is held that the resigned from the force without a vote by
county authorities do not possess general yeas and nays, contrary to the require-
powers of removal, and that they cannot ments of law. It was held that these
remove a treasurer elected by the people, specifications had only reference to rela-
except for causes specified in the statute; tor's title to the office, and not to his
but it may be observed that a county conduct while an officer, and did not au-
treasurer is a public and not a corporate thorize the removal. People, es rel. Clapp
officer. Clark v. The People, 15 Ill. 213 v. Board of Police, 72 N. Y. 415 (1878).
(1853). So a power of removal conferred Reported below, 5 Hun, 457.
upon the mayor and common council can- Power to punish for contempt. Whethor
not be exercised by the council alone. the council possesses the power to punish
Charles v. Hoboken, 3 Dutch. (N.J.) 203. for contempt depends upon the provisions
8 State v. Jersey City, 1 Dutch. (N.J.) of the charter. The power must, as the
536 (1856).
author conceives, be conferred either ex-
332
§ 247
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
- The power
§ 247 (185). Power to Expel construed and limited.
to expel a member of the council does not authorize a resolution by
it that “the president of the council be directed not to appoint a
certain member on any committee, nor call his name, nor allow him
to take part in the action of the board,” since this would create no
vacancy which could be supplied, but would leave the seat occu-
pied, while it silenced the occupant, and left his constituents un-
represented.
a
pressly or as incidental to some power city,' and provided for trial before the
which is conferred, or it will not exist. board of aldermen, who were empowered to
In Doyle v. Falconer, 1 Privy Council enter judgment of removal against him
Appeals, 329, it was held that the colonial upon finding that the charges were “a suf-
parliament of Dominica had not the in- ficient cause for removal from office,” it
herent privilege of parliament as a court, was held that the aldermen were not in-
and could not therefore punish for con- vested with unlimited discretion, without
tempt; but in the later case of The regard to whether he was guilty of an
Speaker v. Glass, 3 Privy Council Ap- offence in law or not; and that a viola-
peals, 560, it was decided that the dele- tion of an ordinance which was void for
gation of legislative authority to the being unreasonable and in contravention
Victoria parliainent was broad enough to of common right, did not furnish proper
include this power. These cases afford ground for removal. Milliken v. Weather-
very interesting illustrations of the nature ford, 54 Tex. 388.
of the power to punish for contempt. 1 State v. Jersey City, 1 Dutch. (N. J.)
Power of courts of the United States to 536 (1856). See State v. Chamber of Com.
punish for conteinpt. Burr's Trial, 355; merce, 20 Wis. 72. Power to suspcnd.
United States v. Hudson, 7 Cranch, 32; Whether, pending proceedings to expiel,
Kearney, In re, 7 Wheat. 38. Power of member can be suspended from his duties,
Congress. 11 U. S. Stats. at Large, 155; was a question not determined in the
12 U. S. Stats. at Large, 333.
The Con- case; but in The State, &c. v. Lingo, 26
stitution of the United States vests no Mo. 496 (1858), it was held that the
general power in either House of Congress power to provide for removing from office
to punish for contempt. Either House corporate officers gives the power to sus-
may punish its own members for dis- pend from office during the investigation
orderly conduct, or for failure to attend of the charges for which the suspensioni
its sessions, and may impeach officers was made. The court say, “The power
of the government, and may, where an to remove necessarily includes the minor
examination of witnesses is necessary in power to suspend." Ib. 499.
the performance of these duties, fine or im- The charter of a city empowered the
prison a contumacious witness; but neither mayor and aldermen for sufficient cause to
house can commit a witness for contempt remove constables and police officers. By
for refusing to answer questions concerning a vote of the mayor and aldermen, the
the private affairs of citizens; for example, plaintiff, a constable and police officer,
is the real estate pool” in the District of suspended from duty on the po-
Columbia, such an investigation being lice," and from that time was not permit-
judicial, not legislative, and the sergeant- ted to perform the duties of the office,
at-arms cannot justify in an action for false although he was ready and offered to do
imprisonment under such an order. Kil- so, until he was afterwards reinstated. It
bourn v. Thompson, 103 U. S. 168 (1880). was held that he could not recover for
Where the General Incorporation Act services during the period of his suspen-
authorized the removal of the mayor, sion. Ladd, J., says: “It does not seem
among other things, for “ wilful violation to require argument to show that the
of any of the ordinances of such town or power to remove must include the power
was
$
$ 250
333
OFFICERS; POWER OF REMOVAL.
§ 248 (186). Re-election of expelled Member of Council. The
expulsion of a member of the common council does not disqualify
him from being re-elected to the same office, unless it is expressly so
provided by the charter; for where the law annexes a disqualifica-
tion to an offence, it does so in terms. Hence, if a member, hav-
ing been expelled even for bribery, be re-elected, he cannot be
expelled a second time for the same identical act for which he had
before been expelled. 1
§ 249 (187). Instance of implied Power of Removal for Cause
by the appointing Power. - It was held in a case in Rhode Island
that a clerk of a school committee an officer created by the school
law, and necessary to the organization and legal action of the com-
mittee inay, after an election by the committee, be removed from
office by the committee, but only for cause, as the statute gives no
express power to remove, and after due notice and opportunity given
him to defend himself upon the charges presented.?
$ 250 (188). Power of Removal. — Where an officer is appointed
during pleasure, or where the power of removal is discretionary, the
power to remove may be exercised without notice or hearing. But
where the appointment is during good behavior, or where the re-
moval can only be for certain specified causes, the power of removal
cannot, as will presently be shown, be exercised, unless there be a
formulated charge against the officer, notice to him of the accusa-
tion, and a hearing of the evidence in support of the charge, and an
opportunity given to the party of making defence.3
to suspend.” Shannon v. Portsmouth, 54 less expressly forbidden by law, is inci-
N. H. 183 (1874); Westberg v. Kansas dental to the committee, as necessary to
City, 64 Mo. 493 (1877); Wayne Co. v. enable it duly to perform its functions."
Benoit, 20 Mich. 176; Attorney-General Ib. p. 601. It is sufficient cause for the re-
v. Davis, 44 Mo. 131; Primm v. Caron- moval of such a clerk that he refuses to
delet, 23 Mo. 22. Infra, sec. 248, note. produce papers which belong to the body
i State v. Jersey City, 1 Dutch. (N. J.) which elected him, and of which he is
536 (1856). If the common council, simply the custodian, or refuses to keep
without authority, suspend a member from or amend the records when duly ordered
the duties of his office, mandanrus is a
to do so.
16.
proper remedy to restore him to the exer- 3 Field v. Commonwealth, 32 Pa. St.
cise of his legal rights. Ib.; supra, sec. 478 (1859); Ramshay, In re, 83 Eng. Com.
247, note; Willc. on Municipal Corpora- Law, 174, 189 (1852); Hennen, In re, 13
tions, 368, pl. 74, 75; Ib. 377, pl. 96; 3 Pet. (U. S.) 230; Queen v. Governors,
Black. Com. 110; Rex v. Barker, 3 Burr. &c., 8 Ad. & El. 632; Bagg's Case, 11
1266; Angell & Ames on Corporations, Coke, 93 (6); Rex v. Coventry, 1 Ld.
secs. 702, 706.
Raym. 391; Dr. Gaskin's Case 8 T. R.
2 Willard's Appeal, 4 R. I. 595, 597, 209; Rex v. Oxford, 2 Salk. 428; Rex v.
per Ames, C. J., who says, “Such a Mayor, &c., 1 Lev. 291; 2 Kyd, 58, 59;
power with regard to such an officer, un- Willc. 253, 254; Grant, 244; Rex v. An.
.
334
§ 251
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
§ 251 (189). Incidental power to remove for Cause ; Rex v.
Richardson. — In the leading case of The King v. Richardson, the
point was decided, as above mentioned, that a corporation, in the
absence of an express grant of authority, had the incidental power
to make a by-law to remove officers for just cause. Lord Mansfield
in that case classified the offences which would justify the exercise
of the power; and his judgment therein has been followed both in
England and in this country, in cases arising in private corporations
not of a pecuniary character. According to Lord Mansfield, there
are three sorts of offences for which an officer or corporator may be
discharged: 1. Such as have no immediate relation to his office, but
are themselves of so infamous a nature as to render the offender unfit
to execute any public franchise. 2. Such as are only against his
oath and the duty of his office as a corporator, and amount to
breaches of the tacit condition annexed to his franchise or office.
3. Offences of a mixed nature, as being an offence not only
against the duty of his office, but also a matter indictable at the
common law. In offences of the first class the removal can only
dover, 1 Ld. Raym. 710; Page v. Hardin, declare vacancy, and appoint another per-
8 B. Mon. 648; Hoboken v. Gear, 3 son in his place. State v. Bryson, 44
Dutch. (N. J.) 265; Madison v. Korbly, Ohio St. 457; State v. Hudson, 44 Ohio
32 Ind. 74 (1869); Stadler v. Detroit, 13 St. 137. Power to remove officers under
Mich. 346 (1865). Charter power of re- a special statute and charter provision,
moval, without cause, at any time, of a see Ham v. Police Board, 142 Mass. 90;
police patrol appointed for a year, see New Brunswick v. Fitzgerald, 48 N. J. L.
Chicago v, Edwards, 58 Ill. 252 (1871). 457.
As to the removal, by the appointing
It is the law in England, as applied to
power, of officers, the duration of whose the old corporations, that causes which
term is not fixed, see People v. Comp. disqualify the person to be an officer will
troller, &c., 20 Wend. (N. Y.) 595; Com- not authorize the corporation to amove
monwealth v. Sutherland, 3 Serg. & Rawlė him, but he must be ousted by quo war-
(Pa.), 145; Field v. Girard College, 54 ranto. The reason given is that one so
Pa. St. 233; State v. Doherty, 25 La. An. disqualified is not, in law, a corporate
119 (1873); s. C. 13 Am. Rep. 131; State officer, and hence cannot be amoved as
v. St. Louis, 90 Mo. 19; People v. Nich- such by the corporation. Rex v. Don-
ols, 79 N. Y. 582. A resolution to "dis- caster, Say. 40; Buller N. P. 203; Rex
pense with the services” of an officer, passed v. Lyme Regis, Doug. 85; Symmers v.
by a council having power to remove him Regem, Cowp. 502; Willc. 259, pl. 669;
at its pleasure, was held to be a removal Willc. 281, pl. 728. And see Fawcett v.
in State v. Sohn, 97 Ind. 101. Where cx- Charles, 13 Wend. 473 (1835). It has
press power is given by statute to the elsewhere been shown (ante, sec. 200 et
mayor to remove an officer at his pleasure, seq.) that with us the councils of munici-
it seems to be clear that the mayor is the pal corporations are often made judges of
exclusive judge of the propriety of exer- the qualifications of their members and
cising the power. People v. New York, officers, and this may modify or change
82 N. Y. 491. The mayor of a city held the rule above mentioned, which seems to
to have no power to suspend the fire-engi. rest on narrow and technical grounds.
neer duly appointed by the mayor with 1 Rex v. Richardson, 1 Burr. 517, 538,
the advice and consent of the council, and (1758); followed, Rex v. Liverpool, 2
$
§ 251
335
OFFICERS ; IMPLIED POWER OF REMOVAL.
be made after there has been a previous conviction in a court of
law; and an amotion will not be sustained by a subsequent con-
viction. In offences of the second class the corporation may try,
and if the charge is established, remove, without any previous or
other proceeding in the courts. In offences of the third class the
English judges have differed on the point whether the officer may
or may not be removed before a conviction in a court of justice.
The principal cases and the result on this point are briefly stated in
the note.3
Burr. 723; supra, sec. 240. So, also, in amove. Although there might have been
Commonwealth v. St. Patrick's (Benevo- à previous conviction, yet this being a
lent) Society, 2 Binn. (Pa.) 441 (1810); great offence against the duty of his office,
Commonwealth v. Guardians, &c., 6 Serg. the corporation might amove without a
& Rawle (Pa.), 469 (1821). These cases conviction. In Rex v. Derby, Cas. temp.
adopt Lord Mansfield's classification, and Hardw. 155, Lord Hardwicke mistook the
assert the inherent power of corporations above case on this point, and inclined to
to expel for offences falling within any think there ought to be a previous con-
of the three classes. See, also," Butch. viction. And such seemed also to be the
Benef. Assoc. 35 Pa. St. 151; 38 Pa. St. inclination of Holt, C. J., in Rex v.
298; Evans v. Philadelphia Club, 50 Pa. Chalke, Comb. 397, where the removal
St. 107; Society, &c. v. Commonwealth, was before conviction, for criminally raz.
52 Pa. St. 125.
ing entries in the corporation books which
The courts in a proper case may, by were at first proper, but the point was not
mandamus, conipel a corporation to amove decided. In Haddock's Case, T. Raym.
an officer; and the result of the English 439, the amotion was for riotously assem-
cases on this point is considered to be bling and assaulting several corporators,
that where the offence of the officer is thereby impeding the business of the cor-
such that the corporation has the power poration. It was considered that the of-
to amove, the court will only compel it fence was two-fold, one against the
to do so where some one is injured by duty of his office as a corporator, the other
the omission to remove; but where it is (wholly disconnected) of a riot. And as
required to amove, or the office is declared he might be guilty of one and yet be ac-
by the charter or statute to be void if quitted of the other, the corporation might
such an act be done or omitted, there the amove without conviction; and the case
court will compel it to amove, though no is said to be different from that of Chalke
one be shown to have been aggrieved. (supra), for there the officer could not
Rex v. Truro, 3 Barn. & Ald. 592; Rex v. have been guilty of the offence at law
West Looe, 5 Dowl. & R. 416; Rex v. without at the same time having been
Totness, 5 Dowl. & R. 483; Grant on guilty of a breach of his duty. The cases
Corp. 243, and note.
decided are considered to favor this view,
1 Rex v. Richardson, supra, and cases viz., if the act is criminal and single in
cited in last note.
its nature, so that a conviction or acquit-
2 Rex v. Richardson, supra; Common- tal in the courts of law will necessarily
wealth v. St. Patrick's Society, supra, and determine the guilt or innocence of the
cases cited in last note but one.
party, there must be a conviction, but
8 Rex v. Carlisle, Fortesc. 200; 8. C. 11 otherwise there may be a removal with-
Mod. 379. In this case the corporation, out, or independent of, a conviction.
before conviction, amoved a capital citizen Buller's N. P. 206; Willc. 249–252 ;
for giving a bribe to a freeman, and offer- Glover, 331, 338 ; Grant, 240 ; 2 Kyd,
ing him another to influence his vote at 88–94, where the prior cases are digested
the election for a mayor. The court's and stated. Lord Mansfield, in Rex v.
judgment was in favor of the right to Richardson, 1 Burr. 538, leaves the point
336
§ 252
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
§ 252 (190). Scope of implied Power of Removal. Principle
and sound policy require that the implied power of removal for of-
fences against the corporation be restricted to acts of a serious
nature directly affecting the rights and interests of the corporation.
Causes for removal have, in some instances, been held sufficient in
England which would not probably be so regarded in this country.
The principal English cases are given in the note. The sufficiency
and reasonableness of the cause of removal are questions for the
courts.2
untouched. A removal for a riot in or hinder the business of the corporation
the council-chamber, without a previous or officer from being done.
conviction, is said to have been held good. Habitual drunkeness, disqualifying
Rex v. Yates, Stiles, cited 8 Mod. 101. from the performance of duty, is a suf-
See, further, Earle's Case, Carth. 173; ficient cause to remove an alderman or
Rex v. Wells, 4 Burr. 1999; Regina v. officer charged with magisterial functions.
Newberry, 1 Q. B. 751; 2 Bac. Abr. Rex v. Taylor, 3 Salk. 231; 1 Rolle, 409;
(Bouv. ed.) 476, and cases cited.
3 Bulst. 190. But casual intoxication, or
1 Evans v. Philadelphia Club, 50 Pa. bring drunk by accident, is not a sufficient
St. 107; Butch. B. Assoc., 35 Pa. St. cause, for the reason (charitably allowed)
151; 38 Pa. St. 298; Society, &c. v. Comº that this is likely to happen to the best.
monwealth, 52 Pa. St. 125; Common- Rex v. Taylor, supra, A. D. 1616. Old
wealth v. Philanthropic Society, 5 Binn. age is insufficient. Bac. Abr. Corp. E. 9;
(Pa.) 486; State v. Common Council, 9 Hazard's Case, 2 Rolle, 11.
Wis. 254; Mayor, &c. v. Geisel, 19 Ind. Mere threats or attempts, no injury re-
344; Same v. Wright, 19 Ind. 346. sulting, not sufficient. Bagg's Case, 11
2 Rex v. Andover, 3 Salk. 229. Pov- Coke, 93. Insulting language, or libel
erty of alderman, so that he could not pay upon mayor or officers, held insufficient,
taxes, sufficient cause for amoving him. on the ground that personal offences are
Ib. But not applicable here. But bank-
But bank- to be punished by law, and not by the
ruptcy insufficient cause of amotion of corporation. Rex v. Oxford, Palm. 455;
councilman. Rex v. Liverpool, 2 Burr. Bagg's Case, 11 Coke, 93, 96, 97, 98, 99;
723; see Rex. v. Chitty, 5 Ad. & E. 609. Clerk's Case, 2 Cro. 506; Buller's N. P.
Total desertion of duties of office sufficient 203; Reg. v. Lane, Fortesc. 275; 8. c. 11
Buller's N. P. 206; Rex v. Rich- Mod. 270 ; Earle's Case, Carth. 174;
ardson, 1 Burr. 541. When absence and Willc. 261, pl. 680. See Regina v.
non-attendance upon meetings, and neglect Rogers, 2 Ld. Raym. 777; Innes v. Wylie,
of duty, will be sufficient cause. See Rex 1 Carr. & K. 257; Regina v. Treasury, 10
v. Richardson, supra; Rex v. Wells, 4 Ad. & E. 374; 2 Perr. & D. 498.
Burr. 2004; 1 Hawk. P. C. chap. lxvi. Official misconduct, amounting to mis.
sec. 1, as to official neglect of duty; ap. demeanor, has been before mentioned, and
proved by Lord Mansfield, in case last the cases cited. The misconduct must,
cited; Lord Bruce's Case, 2 Stra. 819, and it seems, specially relate to the execution
notes; Reg. v. Ipswich, 2 Ld. Raym, 1233; of the office. Rex v. Wells, 4 Burr. 1999;
S. C. Salk. 443; Buller's N. P. 206, 207; see Regina v. Newberry, 1 Q. B. 751. If
Lord Hawley's Case, 1 Vent. 146; Rex v. the same person hold two offices, miscon-
Harris, 1 Barn. & Ad. 936; Queen v. duct with respect to one will authorize
Mayor, &c., of Pomfret, 10 Mod. 107; 2 removal from that one, but not from both;
;
Kyd, 65 et seq., where the older cases are but if the offence is against the duties
stated. Willc. 255-264; Angell & Ames, of both, the removal may be from both.
sec. 427, giving summary of English cases. Rex v. Chalke, 1 Ld. Raym. 226; s. C. 5
Much depends upon the cause of the neg- Mod. 257; Rexv. Doncaster, 2 Ld. Raym.
lect, and whether the effect is to obstruct 1566; 8. c. 1 Barnard. 265; Rex v. Wells, ,
cause.
!
§ 254
337
OFFICERS; PROCEEDINGS TO AMOVE; NOTICE.
§ 253 (191). Proceedings to amove. Respecting the proceed-
ings to amove, it has already been observed that they must be had
by and before the authorized body duly assembled, in conformity with
the rules on that subject, which are elsewhere stated. The pro-
ceeding in all cases where the anotion is for cause is adversary or
judicial in its character; and if the organic law of the corporation
is silent as to the mode of procedure, the substantial principles of
the common law as to proceedings affecting private rights must be
observed.2
$.254 (192). Notice of Proceeding to amove. And first, the
officer is entitled to a personal notice of the proceeding against him,
4 Burr. 1999; Rex v. Harris, 1 B. & Ad. is essential to the constitution of the legal
936. Misemployment of corporate funds body, and if one act in the trial of such a
in his custody is not sufficient cause of charge as mayor, who is not such de jure
amotion, though generally it is good cause (or de facto], the order of removal is void.
of suspension from a financial office; for Hadley v. Mayor, &c., 33 N. Y. 603; see
the court will not grant a mandamus to supra, sec. 244. Special provision of
restore until the accounts are made up and charter construed to give the power of re-
submitted to the corporation.
Rex v.
moval to the mayor and council, and not
Chalke, 1 Ld. Raym. 226; s. C. 5 Mod. to the council alone. Charles v. Hoboken,
259 ; Rex v. London, 2 Term R. 182 ; 3 Dutch. (N. J.) 203. Andrews v. King,
Willc. 262, pl. 685; Angell & Ames, sec. 77 Me. 224, where the officer was “sub-
428. On principle, it may be suggested ject after hearing to removal by the mayor,
that if an implied power of amotion exists by and with the advice and consent of the
at all, it should extend to a case where aldermen," it being held that the hearing
the financial officer of a corporation is should liave been by the “board of mayor
misemploying its funds entrusted to his and aldermen; a hearing by the alder-
safe keeping
men alone being held insufficient though
1 Rex v. Taylor, 3 Salk. 231; Rex v.
the officer had consented to it. In this case
Sandys, 2 Barnard. 302; Taylor v. Glou- it was also held that the mayor and alder-
cester, 1 Roll. 409; S. C. 3 Bulst. 190; men should first find as a fact, and adjudi-
Rex v. Chalke, 1 Ld. Raym. 226; 2 Kyd. cate, that sufficient cause for removal ex-
57; Grant, 245, 275; Willc. 264, pl. 691; isted, before a valid order of removal could
Willc. 266, pl. 698. Necessity for vote be made.
or corporate act, declaring the removal or 2 State v. Bryce, 7 Ohio, part II. [82],
expulsion. Commonwealth v. Pennsyl. 414, 416 (1836). " This proceeding,
vania, &c. Institute, 2 Serg. & Rawle (amoval of a trustee of the university) "is
(Pa.), 141 ; Commonwealth v. German essentially adversary; the justice of the
Society, 15 Pa. St. 251; Stadler v. De- common law permits no investigation of
troit, 13 Mich. 346. Where the ordinance facts which may be followed by a loss of
creating an office expressly reserves to the a right or by the infliction of a penalty, to
city council the power to remove the in- be conducted ex parte." Ib., per Lane, J.,.
cumbent at pleasure, the repeal of the Murdock v. Academy, 12 Pick. 244; State:
ordinance and notice to him of the repeal v. Trustees, &c., 5 Ind. 77.
Charter
operate as a removal. Chandler v. Law- mode, if prescribed, must be pursued.
rence, 128 Mass. 213.
Ib.; Bacher's Case, 20 Pa. St. 425; see
Where, by statute, the mayor, recorder, People v. Bearfield, 35 Barb. (N. Y.) 254;
and an alderman were constituted a body State v. Common Council, 9 Wis. 254;
to try charges against policemen appointed Madison v. Korbly, 32 Ind. 74; Tompert
by the corporation, with power to sus- v. Lithgow, 1 Bush, (Ky.) 176 (1866).
pend or remove, the presence of the mayor
VOL. 1. - 22
338
§ 254
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
and of the time when the trial body will meet. It is not necessary
that the notice, citation, or summons set out the charges in detail,
but it should contain the substantial fact that a proceeding to amove
is intended. The analogies of the ordinary procedure in the courts
of the State (in the absence of statute or by-law) may be followed,
respecting such details as the notice or summons, mode of service,
&c. Notice may be dispensed with : 1. By appearance and answer
to the charges. 2. By a total desertion of the place, so that it is
not practicable to give the notice; as where the officer has perma-
nently, not temporarily, left the municipality and resides constantly
elsewhere with his family. Though he may have been absent or
left the borough, yet if he return and be in the place at the time of
the amotion, he is entitled to notice. If the amotion be for good
cause, such as conviction of an infamous crime, or the repeated
declaration of the officer that he would not discharge the duties of
his office, while it would be more regular to give the notice, yet its
omission will not entitle him to a mandamus to be restored; for if
restored he could be amoved again, and the courts will not order
a restoration where they can see that there is good ground of re-
moval, and that the order to restore would be without practical and
useful effect. With these exceptions, the party is entitled to no-
I Queen v. Saddlers’ Co., 10 House of the acts in question are not of an official
Lords Cases, 404; State v. Bryce, supra; nature. Ib. Where power is given to
Rex v. Richardson, 1 Burr. 540; Rex v. remove for cause, a specification of the
Doncaster, 2 Burr. 738; see 1 B. & Ad. charges, notice, and an opportunity to be
942; Rex v. Liverpool, 2 Burr. 731 ; heard, are essential, though the charter be
Bagg's Case, 11 Rep. 99 a; Rex v. Wilton, silent as to the procedure to be adopted in
5 Mod. 259; Exeter v. Glyde, 4 Mod. 37; such a case. State v. St. Louis, 90 Mo. 19.
Reg. v. Ipswich, 2 Ld. Raym. 1240; Willc. 2 Willc. 264; Rex v. Wilton, 2 Salk.
264, 265; Innes v. Wylie, 1 C. & K. 257; 428; Reg. v. Ipswich, 2 Ld. Raym. 1240;
South P. R. Co., 5 Ind. 165; People v. Rex v. Feversham, 8 Term R. 356; Rex
Benevolent Society, 24 How. Pr. 216; v. Carmathen, 1 Maule & Sel. 697; s. P.
Delacey v. Neuse, &c. Co., I Hawks Commonwealth v. Pennsylvania Benef.
(N. C.), 274; Commonwealth v. Pennsyl. Institute, 2 Serg. & Rawle, 141.
vania Benef. Institute, 2 Serg. & Rawle 8 Willc. 265, 266; Grant, 245; Rex v.
(Pa.), 141; Society v. Vandyke, 2 Whart. Harris, 1 B. & Ad. 936; Rex v. Shrews-
(Pa.) 309; Nichols, In re, 6 Abb. New bury, Cases temp. Hardw. 151; 7 Mod.
Cas. 474; S. C. 57 How. Pr. 395; People, 202; Reg. v. Trueboy, 2 Ld. Raym. 1275;
ex rel. v. Commissioners, &c., of Brook- 11 Mod. 75; Rex v. Grimes, 5 Burr. 2601;
lyn, 106 N. Y. 64; People v. Nichols, 79 Rex v. Leicester, 4 Burr. 2089.
N. Y. 582. Where the power of re-
4 Rex v. Leicester, 4 Burr. 2089.
moval is vested in the mayor for cause, 5 Angell & Ames Corp. sec. 422, where
he acts judicially, and a writ of prohibi- this opinion is expressed; Grant, 265; Rex
tion will lie against him, if he exceeds his v. Chalke, 1 Ld. Raym. 226.
jurisdiction. People v. Cooper, 57 How. 6 Rex v. Axbridge, Cowp. 523; see 2
Pr. 416. If the incumbent of an office Term R. 182; Grant Corp. 245.
uses the office as a means of wrong-doing, 7 Rex v. Griffiths, 5 B. & Ald. 735;
this is a good cause of removal, though seo Blagrave's Case, 2 Sid. 6, 49, 72; Rex
§ 255
339
OFFICERS; AMOTION; CHARGES.
tice of the intention to amove, so that he may have full and fair
opportunity to be heard in his defence.
§ 255 (193). The Charges must be formulated : Opportunity to
defend. — There must be a charge, or charges, against him, specifically
stated, with substantial certainty ; yet the technical nicety required
in indictments is not necessary. And reasonable time and opportu-
nity must be given to answer the charges and to produce his testi-
and he is also entitled to be heard and defended by counsel,
and to cross-examine the witnesses, and to except to the proofs
against him. If the charge be not denied, still it must, if not
admitted, be examined and proved.8 Where the specific charge
stated is insufficient to justify the removal, or where the removal is
erroneous and no good and sufficient ground therefor appears, the
officer is entitled to a mandamus to restore him. But where the
proceedings are in conformity with the charter, and are regular,
the sentence will not be inquired into collaterally, nor its merits
examined by mandamus or action.5
v. Rowe, '1 Show. 188; S. C. Carth. 199; be receives such notice. Jarvis v. Mayor,
Grant, Corp. 245. If one irregularly &c. of New York, 2 N. Y. Leg. Obs.
amoved for good cause be restored by 396.
mandamus, he may be again amoved by 4 Reg. v. Ipswich, 2 Ld. Raym. 1240;
regular proceedings de novo. Taylor v. Madison v. Korbly, 32 Ind. 74 (1869);
Gloucester, 3 Bulst. 190; Reg. v. Ipswich, Commonwealth v. German Society, 15 Pa.
2 Ld. Raym. 1233. In such case the St. 251 (1850); State v. Jersey City, 1
office is vacated from the time of the sec- Dutch. (N. J.) 536. The restoration puts
ond amotion; the proceedings do not re- him in the same situation that he was be-
late back to the former irregular amotion. fore the attempted removal. Willc. 269;
Willc. 269, pl. 707.
post, sec. 847. Since there is an adequate
1 Tompert v. Lithgow, 1 Bush (Ky.), remedy at law by quo warranto (post,
176 (1866); Rex v. Lyme Regis, Doug. chap. xxi.) or by mandamus to restore
179; Bagg's Case, 11 Co. 99 C; s. c. 1 (post sec. 847), equity, will not enjoin the
Roll. 225; Glover, 334; Willc. 267. corporate authorities from making an un-
2 State v. Bryce, 7 Ohio, part II. [82], lawful removal or appointing a successor.
414 (1836); Rex v. Richardson, 1 Burr. Delahanty v. Warner, 75 Ill. 185 (1874);
540; Rex v. Liverpool, 2 Burr. 734; Mur- S. C. 20 Am. Rep. 237. Post, sec. 275.
dock v. Academy, 12 Pick. (Mass.) 244, Under the statute of Florida the action of
where the requisites of a valid proceeding a council in amoving an officer is review-
to amove are stated. Rex v. Chalke, 1 able by mandamus, and in that proceeding
Ld. Raym. 226 ; Rex v. Derby, Cas. the court will review all the action of the
Temp. Hardw. 154. Ante, sec. 254, note. council and the testimony adduced before
8 Rex v. Faversham, 8 Term R. 356; it. Donnelly v. Teasdale, 21 Fla. 652.
Harman v. Tappenden, 1 East, 562; Willc. Society, &c. v. Commonwealth, 52
267; Glover, 334; Murdock v. Academy, Pa. St. 125 (1866); People v. Bearfield, 35
12 Pick. (Mass.) 244. A municipal offi- Barb. (N. Y.) 254. Though the amotion
cer, when removed by the corporation ap- be illegal, the officers who took part in it
pointing him, is entitled to actual notice are not personally liable, unless both
of his removal, and to compensation until malice and want of probable cause be
5
340
§ 256
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
$ 256 (194). Effect of Valid Amotion; Vacancy. – If the amo-
tion be legal and authorized, the office becomes ipso facto vacant from
the time the amotion is declared, and another person may be elected
or appointed to fill it. If the removed officer afterward continues
to act, he is a mere usurper, and may be ousted on quo warranto and
punished. Amotion from one office does not, of course, affect the
party's title to another.1
shown. Harman v. Tappenden, 3 Espin. language is adopted by Glover (Corp.
278; 8. 0. 1 East, 555; Ferguson v. Earl 334), states that if a person legally amoved
of Kinnoul, 9 Cl. & F. 289.
continues to act, he is a mere usurper,
Jurisdiction as to the election and and that “all corporate acts in which he
amotion of officers in corporations, when has concurred are equally void, as though
not changed by statute belongs to the com- he had never been elected or admitted."
mon-law courts and not to equity. At- But if he is permitted to act after amotion,
torney-General v. Earl Clarendon, 17 Ves. it would probably be considered, in this
491; Dyer, 332; Cochran v. McCleary, 22 country, that his acts would, as to third
Iowa, 75. See, also, In re Sawyer, 124 persons, be valid, like those of an officer
U. S. 200 (1887); ante, secs. 202, note, de facto. If the removal be unauthorized,
204, note, 275, and note. Where, by Mr. Willcock states the rule to be, “ That
charter, a city council had power to re- all corporate acts in which he has con-
move police officers, and the mayor had curred between the moment of his removal
power also to increase or diminish their and restitution are of equal validity as if
number at discretion, it was held, in an he had never been amoved," &c. Willc.
action brought by a policeman, removed by 269, pl. 707. If he was regularly present
the mayor for malfeasance, for his salary, and concurred, it can well be seen how
that in the former case the judgment of this should be so ; but his concurrence
the council, being judicial, was conclusive, when not regularly acting, or when a de
while the action of the mayor, being facto successor has taken his place and is
ministerial, was not conclusive upon the acting, would not seem to alter the legal
officer. Oliver v. Americus, 69 Ga. 165; quality of the act. In this country the
ante, sec. 202; post, sec. 275.
acts of a de facto officer of a de jure offico
1 Jay's Case, 1 Vent. 302; Symmers v. are everywhere considered valid as re-
Regem , Cowp. 503; Willc. 268, pl. 704; spects the public. Ante, secs. 215, note,
Rex v. Doncaster, 2 Ld. Raym. 1566; 1 221, note, 230, note, 235, uote, 237, note.
Barnard. 265; Rex v. Chalke, 1 Ld. Raym. Post, secs. 276, 892, note; Cushing v.
226. Mr. Willcock, 267, pl. 704, whose Frankfort, 57 Me. 541.
$ 259
341
CORPORATE MEETINGS.
CHAPTER X.
CORPORATE MEETINGS.
§ 257 (195). Subject outlined. — The subject of Corporate Meet-
ings will be considered under the following general heads :-
1. Common Law Requisites of a Valid Corporate Meeting -
secs. 258-261.
2. Notice of Corporate Meetings at Common Law and under the
English Municipal Corporations Act -- secs. 262–265.
3. New England Town Meetings; Requisites of Notice and Power
of Adjournment-secs. 266-269.
4. Constitution and Meetings of Councils, or of Select Governing
Bodies, and herein of Quorums and Majorities; of Integral Parts;
and of Stated, Special, and Adjourned Meetings ---- secs. 270-287.
5. Mode of Proceeding when convened — secs. 288–292.
§ 258 (196). Common-Law Requisites of a Valid Corporate
Meeting. — As respects their mode of action, municipal corporations
in this country are of two general classes. In the one, as in the
organization of towns in the New England States, heretofore adverted
to, all of the qualified inhabitants meet, act, and vote, in person.
In the other, which is the kind that prevails generally throughout
the States, and even in many of the larger places in New England,
the affairs of the town or city are administered by a select or repre-
sentative body, usually denominated the council, and which is elected
by the qualified voters of the incorporated place, not assembled to-
gether in a meeting, but at an election, where each elector votes
separately and by ballot.2
§ 259 (197). Corporate Meetings. -The latter class of corpo-
rations is properly municipal. The former class is not so strictly
municipal as it is public in its character.3 Where there is a council
or governing body, the inhabitants or voters, in their natural capacity,
have no power to act for or to bind the corporation, but the corpora-
i Ante, chap. ii. sec. 28.
8 Ante, chap. i. sec. 9; chap. ü. secs.
? Ante, chap. ii. sec. 28 et seq.; chap. 22, 23, and note.
ix. sec. 194 et seq.
342
§ 260
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS,
tion must act, and can be bound only through the medium of this
body. Therefore, authorized acts done by the council are not their
acts, but those of the corporation. The council is a body which is
constantly changing ; it is simply the agent of the corporation. But
its members, it has been well observed, are not only not the muni-
cipal corporation, but are not even a corporation. Whether the cor-
poration be of the one class or the other, its affairs must be transacted
at a corporate meeting, in the one case of the qualified inhabitants,
and in the other of the members of the council or governing body,
duly convened at the proper time and place, and upon due notice
in cases where notice is requisite.?
§ 260 (198). Requisites of a valid Corporate Meeting of the old
English Municipal Corporations. --- In England, prior to the General
Municipal Corporations Act of 1835,3 the requisites of a valid corpo-
rate meeting depended upon the constitution of the particular cor-
poration under its charter, or prescriptive usage.
To constitute a
corporate assembly there must at common law be present the mayor
or other head-officer (he being considered an integral part of the
corporation,4 in whose absence no valid corporate act could be done),
a majority of the members of each select or definite class (these
classes being also considered integral parts), and some members of
the indefinite body (indefinite in point of numbers) usually styled
the commonalty, and of each of the indefinite classes if there be
more than one. If there be no indefinite class, and the governing
body consist of a select or definite class, the common-law requisite
of a valid corporate assembly is, that a majority of the select class
must be present; and if there be more than one such class, then a
majority of each of the select classes of which the corporation is
constituted; and the presence of the mayor at a select assembly of
this kind is not necessary, unless it is expressly required. But
where a common council exists (which, in contemplation of the an-
cient law, is a meeting of the body at large, or those of them who
1 Regina v. Paramore, 10 Ad. & El. 4 Ante, chap. iii. sec. 35. Further as
286; see Regina v. York, 2 Queen's B. to mayor, see ante, chap. ix., relating to
850 ; Mayor v. Simpson, 8 Queen's B. 73; Municipal Elections and Officers, sec. 208.
ante, sec. 39. The Municipal Corpora-
ö Willc. 52, 53, 66; Rex u. Atkyns, 3
tions Act 1882, sec. 10, expressly pro. Mod. 23; 1 Rol. Abr. 514; Rex v. Carter,
vides that “the council shall exercise all Cowp. 59; Rex v. Smart, 4 Burr. 2143;
the powers vested in the corporation by Rex v. Gaborian, 11 East, 87, note; Rex
this Act or otherwise." Post, sec. 265. v. Morris, 4 East, 26; Rex v. Bellringer,
2 Dey v. Jersey City, 19 N. J. Eq. 412 4 Term R. 823; Rex v. Miller, 6 Term R.
(1869); Baltimore v. Poultney, 25 Md. 18 278; Rex v. Varls, Cowp. 250; Rex v.
(1866).
Monday, Cowp. 539.
8 Ante, chap. iii. sec. 35 et seq.
6 See authorities cited in the last note,
!
§ 261
343
REQUISITES OF VALID CORPORATE MEETINGS.
thought proper to attend, or were considered by their fellow freemen
the men best fitted to attend), though such council has become a
select or definite class, there the presence of the mayor or head pre-
siding officer is necessary to a valid assembly, though such presence
be not required by the charter.1
§ 261 (199). Same subject. — A majority of each definite part
means a majority of the number of members of which that part con-
sists, not merely a majority of the existing members of the part;
but if the act is to be done by an indefinite body alone, it is valid if
done at a meeting duly convened, although but a small fraction of
the whole body at large be present. But while the presence of a
majority of each definite integral part was necessary to a valid cor-
porate meeting, yet it is settled law that a majority of those present,
when legally assembled, will bind the rest. Not only did the law
of the old corporations in England require the presence of a majority
of the members of each definite integral part, but it went to the
extreme length of holding that where the presence of the mayor
was necessary, he must be the legal mayor, and if he be merely an
officer de facto, and afterwards be ousted on quo warranto, all corpo-
rate acts done under the sanction of his office are voidable. By
reason of the change in the constitution of municipal corporations
in England, wrought by the Corporations Act of 1835, many of the
rules respecting corporate meetings are no longer applicable, though,
as we shall see, some of them still are. Under that statute the cor-
poration acts, and can only act, through the council; and it is pro-
vided that all questions shall be decided by a majority of all the
councillors present, including questions of adjournment; that one
1 Willc. 67.
Young, 12 Gratt. (Va.) 303 (1855), ap-
2 Rex v. Bellringer, 4 Term R. 810 proving Willc. 216, pl. 546; Labourdette
(1792), and cases cited; Rex v. Miller, 6 v. Municipality, 2 La. An. 527 (1847);
Term R. 268; Rex v. Monday, Cowp. Kingsbury v. School District, 12 Met.
531, 538; Rex v. Devonshire, 1 Barn. & (Mass.) 99 (1846); Damon v. Granby, 2
Cress. 609; Rex v. Bower, 1 Barn. & Pick. (Mass.) 345, 355 (1824); Coles v.
Cress. 492; Rex v. May, 4 Barn. & Ad. 843; Trustees, &c., of Williamsburg, 10 Wend.
Rex v. Headley, 7 Barn. & Cress. 496; (N. Y.) 658 (1833); Rex v. Greet, 8 Barn.
Willc. 216, pl. 546; Blacket v. Blizard, 9 & Cress. 363; The Queen, ex rel. Hyde v.
Barn. & Cress. 851; Rogers, In re, 7 Cow. Barnhart, 7 Upper Can. L. J. 126 ; The
(N. Y.) 526 (1827); Ib., note a, 764; Queen, ex rel. Heenan v. Murray, 1 Upper
Willcocks, In re, 7 Cow. (N. Y.) 402, Can. L. J. N. S. 104; 2 Kent Com. 293;
;
and note 462, 463 (1827); Young v. Buck- Angell & Ames Corp. sec. 501; Launtz v.
ingham, 5 Ohio, 485, 489 (1832); Buell v. People, 113 Ill. 137.
Buckingham, 16 Iowa, 284 (1864), and 8 Rex v. Carter, Cowp. 59; Rex v.
cases cited; State v. Deliesseline, 1 Mc Hebden, Andr. 391; Rex v. Dawes, 4
Cord (S. C.), 52 (1821); State v. Huggins, Burr. 2279; Willc. 54, 55.
Harper (S. C.), 94 (1824); Booker v.
::
و
344
§ 263
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
third part of the number of the whole council shall be a quorum;
that the mayor, if present, shall preside, and if absent, that a pre-
siding officer shall be chosen, who shall have a second or casting
vote.1
§ 262 (200). Notice of Corporate Meetings at Common Law, and
under the English Municipal Corporations Act. — Due notice of the
time and place of a corporate meeting is, by the English law, essen-
tial to its validity, or its power to do any act which shall bind the
corporation. Respecting notice, the courts in England adopted cer-
tain rules, which, since they form the basis of much of the statute
law in this country upon the subject, and have in the main been
followed by our courts, and are founded on reason, may advan-
tageously be here mentioned. All corporators are presumed to know
of the days appointed by the charter, statute, usage, or by-laws, for
the transaction of particular business, and hence no notice of such
meeting for the transaction of such business is necessary, or for the
transaction of the mere ordinary affairs of the corporation on such
days; yet if it is intended to proceed to any other act of importance,
a notice is necessary, the same as at any other time.
§ 263 (201). Notice how Given and how Waived. — A notice,
when necessary, must, if practicable, be given to every member who
has a right to vote, where the act is one to be done by a body con-
sisting of a definite class or classes, and it must be given by, or
issued by order of, some one who has the authority to convene a
corporate meeting. But notice may be altogether dispensed with
or its necessity waived, by the presence and consent of every one of
those entitled to it. It must be served personally upon every resi-
dent member, or left at his house. If temporarily absent, it may be
left with his family, or at his house or last place of abode. An
order to serve all is not sufficient; all, if practicable, must be served,
but if the party entitled to notice has entirely quit the municipality,
and has no family or house within its limits, notice is not necessary.
It must be served a reasonable time before the hour of meeting, of
which the court will judge from all the circumstances, including
usage. If the charter provides a method by which the notice shall
be served, its provisions must be strictly obeyed.
15 and 6 Wm. IV. chap. lxxvi. sec. 2 Beaver Creek v. Hastings, 52 Mich.
69; Rawlinson on Corp. (5th ed.) 136; 528; Lord v. Anoka, 36 Minn. 176; State
ante, chap. iii. secs. 35, 37; English Mu- v. Smith, 22 Minn. 218.
nicipal Corporations Act 1882, sec. 21. .
3 Lord v. Anoka, 36 Minn. 176.
$ 265
345
MEETINGS; NOTICE UNDER ENGLISH ACT,
§ 264 (202). Requisites of Notice; Time and Place; Waiver.
The notice must state the time of meeting, and the place, if it be not
the usual place. It is not necessary to state what business is to be
done, when the meeting relates only to the ordinary affairs of the
corporation; but when it is for the purpose of electing or removing
officers, passing ordinances, and the like, the fact should be stated, so
that members may know that something more than the usual routine
of business will be transacted. Such great importance is attached to
notice that it can only be waived by universal consent; but if every
member of a select body be present at a regular or stated meeting
or at a special meeting, they may, if every one consents, but not
otherwise, transact any business, ordinary or extraordinary, though
no notice was given, or an insufficient notice, but the unanimity of
consent should plainly appear from their recorded declaration, acts,
or conduct.
This unanimity is only necessary in order to enter
upon the business ; once commenced, the usual rules which govern
the body and its actions apply. It is to be observed that the fore-
going rules are not applicable where they are in conflict with the
charter; and hence, if this imperatively requires a special notice, it
cannot be waived, even by consent of all. The guild hall is the
proper place for the meeting; if there be none, the meeting should
be at the usual place; and if at any other place, it should be stated,
to prevent fraud or surprise. Acts done at an unusual place will be
closely scrutinized. 1
$ 265 (203). Notice under English Act. - By the English Muni-
cipal Corporations Act, the subject of meetings, stated and special,
1 Authorities in support of the last and both select and indefinite bodies of public
two preceding sections of the text: Willc. corporations. Rex v. Langhorne, 4 Ad. &
chap. i. sec. 42, et seq.; Rex v. Hill, 4 B. El. 538. See, also, Rex v. Faversham, 8
& C. 441; Rex v. Liverpool, 2 Burr. 794; Term. R. 356, per Lord Kenyon, arguendo.
Rex v. Doncaster, 2 Burr. 744; Rex v. Where the city charter provided that the
Theodorick, 8 East, 545; Rex v. May, 5 mayor might call special sessions of the
Burr. 2682; Rex v. Oxford, Palm. 453; council, and that he should “ specially
Rex v. Grimes, 5 Burr. 2601; Kynaston v. state to them when assembled the objects
Shrewsbury, 2 Stra. 1051; Musgrove v. for which they have been convened, and
Nevison, 1 Stra. 584; s. C. 2 Ld. Raym. their action shall be confined to such ob-
1359; Rex v. Mayor of Shrewsbury, Cases jects,” an ordinance, passed at a meeting
temp. Hardw. 147; Smyth v. Darley, 2 so called, having no reference to anything
House of Lords Cases, 789; Grant on alluded to in the mayor's message, was de-
Corp. 154–156; Glover on Corp. chap. clared void. St. Louis v. Withaus, 16
viii. pp. 146–173. Formerly the rule that Mo. App. 247; affirmed on appeal, 90 Mo.
where notice was necessary every member 646.
must be notified, was applied only to the 2 5 and 6 Win. IV. chap. lxxvi. sec.
case of definite bodies, but it has more 69; ante, secs. 35, 37; Consolidated Act
recently been declared to be applicable to 1882, sec. 22.
346
§ 266
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
and the notice and summons required are made matter of express
regulation. It provides for every borough or city four quarterly
meetings of the council in each year, to be held at a fixed date. No
notice of the business to be transacted at these quarterly meetings is
necessary; but three days' notice, by posting on or near the town
hall, is required of the time and place of every intended meeting.
Power is given to the mayor to call special meetings, or, on his
refusal, to five members of the council, in which case the notice on
or near the town hall shall state therein the business proposed to be
transacted at such meeting, and in every case a summons (in addi-
tion to the notice) must be left at the usual place of abode of every
member of the council, or at the premises occupied by him, in
respect of which he is enrolled as a burgess, at least three clear days
before the meeting, and no business can be transacted not specified
in the summons. Power to adjourn meetings is expressly conferred
upon the council by the same section.
§ 266 (204). New England Town Meetings; Notice and Ad-
journment. --- In New England the inhabitants are required to be
notified or warned of town meetings. The requisites of such notice,
and manner of giving it, are prescribed by statute. The provision
is quite general that the articles or matters to be acted upon shall be
specified or inserted in the notice or warrant. The courts in those
States concur in requiring the statute as to notice to be faithfully
observed by the officers charged with the duty of calling meetings.
Meetings, to be valid, must be warned or notified according to law.
The rule of the English courts applied to indefinite corporate bodies,
that if all are present notice may, by unanimous consent, be waived,
is not regarded as applicable to the town meetings of New England,
and hence a de facto meeting, not duly notified, though attended by
all the voters capable of attending, is not a valid meeting, and its
acts are void.3
1 In construing this statute, it has notice. Town Council, &c. v. Court, 1 E.
been held that where the meeting is an & E. 770; Regina v. Whipp, 4 Queen's
adjourned quarterly meeting, notice is Bench, 141. Ante, sec. 259, note.
necessary as to any business which was 2 Rex v. Theodorick, 8 East, 545; ante,
not actually entered upon at the general sec. 28.
or regularly quarterly meeting, but not 3 Hayward v. School District, 2 Cush.
otherwise; and hence, a coroner cannot be (Mass.) 419 (1848); Moor v. Newfield, 4
eiected at such an adjourned quarterly Greenl. (Me.) 44 (1826); School District
meeting without the notice and summons V. Atherton, 12 Met. (Mass.) 105 (1846);
which the statute requires. Regina v. Little v. Merrill, 10 Pick. (Mass.) 543;
Grimshaw, 10 Queen's Bench, 747, 755. Perry v. Dover, 12 Pick. (Mass.) 206;
See Regina v. Thomas, 8 Ad. & El. 183; Reynolds v. New Salem, 6 Met. (Mass.)
Rex v. Harris, 1 Barn. & Ad. 936. As to 340; Congregational Society v. Sperry, 10
?
$ 267 MEETINGS; REQUISITES OF NOTICE; OBJECT OF MEETING. 347
” future
§ 267 (205). Requisites of Notice; Object of Meeting. — It is,
however, sufficient if the purpose or object of the meeting can fairly
Conn. 200; Bloomfield v. Charter Oak point the statutes and decisions of Con-
Bank, 121 U. S. 121, 130; Rand v. Wilder, necticut are perfectly clear.” Per Gray,
11 Cush. (Mass.) 294 (1853); Stone v... J., Bloomfield v. Charter Oak Bank, 121
School District, 8 Cush. (Mass.) 592; U. S. 129 (1886). A tax voted at a meet-
Brewster v. Hyde, 7 N. H. 206; North- ing not legally warned is illegal, and may
wood v. Barrington, 9 N. H. 369; Giles v. be recovered back if the party did not pay
School District, 11 Fost. (31 N. H.) 304; it voluntarily. Rideout v. School Dis-
Lander v. School District, 33 Me. 239 trict, 1 Allen (Mass.), 232 (1861). So it
(1851); Jordan v. School District, 38 Me. may be recovered back if the assessinent is
164 (1854.) So in Vermont it has been void. Gerry v. Stoneham, 1 Allen (Mass.),
decided that it cannot be shown, by parol, 319 (1861); Tobey v. Wareham, 2 Allen
to validate the levy of tax by a meeting. (Mass.), 594; post, chap. xxiii. See Mas-
not legally warned, that all the legal voters sachusetts act of 1859, chap. cxviii., limit-
of the district were present at the meet- ing, in such cases, the plaintiff's right of
ing. Sherwin v. Bugbee, 17 Vt. 337 recovery to illegal e:ccess of taxation.
(1845); distinguished by the court from Authority to the clerk to call and warn
Rex v. Theodorick, 8 East, 543. And " the annual meetings," does not author-
see, also, Hunt v. School District, 14 Vt. ize him to call and warn special meetings;
300; Pratt v. Swanton, 15 Vt. 147. Requi- and the acts and doings of a special meet-
sites of notice and sufficiency. Wyley v. ing thus called are wholly void. School
Wilson, 44 Vt. 407 (1872). Under the District v. Atherton, 12 Met. (Mass.) 105
legislation of Connecticut, although it is (1846). And authority “to warn
held that the right to call a borough meet- meetings does not authorize him “to
ing for any lawful purpose is a legal right call” such meetings. Stone v. School
of every freeman, yet as it is shared District, 8 Cush. (Mass.) 592 (1851).
with all other freemen it can be enforced As to proof of notice, and the return of
only by a proceeding in the name of the the person or officer making the warning,
State. Peck v. Booth, 42 Conn. 271 and what it shall show, see State v. Wil-
(1875). But see post, secs. 865, 900, 921, liams, 25 Me. 564 (1846), and the Massa-
923, n. “A town (in Connecticut] can- chusetts and Maine decisions therein cited
pot make a contract, or authorize any offi- and commented on. Christ's Church v.
cer or agent to make one in its behalf, Woodward, 26 Me. (13 Shep.) 172 (1846);
except by vote in a town meeting duly Fossett v. Bearce, 29 Me. 523 (1849);
notified or warned ; and the notice or Bearce v. Fossett, 34 Me. 575 (1852); Jor-
warning must specify the matter to be dau v. School District, 38 Me. 164 (1854);
acted on, in order that all the inhabitants Perry v. Dover, 12 Pick. 206; Houghton
(whose property will be subject to be v. Davenport, 23 Pick, 235; Williams 2.
taken on execution to satisfy the obliga- Lunenberg, 21 Pick. 75; Briggs v. Mur-
tions of the town) may know in advance dock, 13 Pick. 305; Rand v. Wilder, 11
what business is to be transacted at the Cush. (Mass.) 294 (1853); Cardigan v.
meeting. If the subject of the vote is not Page, 6 N. H. 182 ; State v. Donahay, 1
specified in the notice or warning, the Vroom (30 N. J. L.), 404; Hardcastle v.
vote has no legal effect, and binds neither State (27 N. J. L.), 552; Detroit, &c. R. Co.
the town nor the inhabitants. No one v. Bearss, 39 Ind. 598; McPike v. Parr,
can rely upon a vote as giving him any 51 Mo. 63; French v. Edwards, 13 Wall.
rights against the town, without proving a 511. In Sherwin v. Bugbee, 17 Vt. 337,
sufficient notice or warning of the meeting the strict view is held that the notice or
at which the vote was passed. Reynolds warning must be recorded by the clerk. If,
v. New Salem, 6 Met. 340 ; Stoughton as recorded, the time for which the meet-
School District v. Atherton, 12 Met. 105; ing was to be holden is not specified, the
Moor v. Newfield, 4 Greenl. 44; Dillon defect cannot be supplied by parol evidence
Mun. Corp. secs. 266-268. Upon this that in the original warning the hour for
348
§ 267
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS,
We
be understood from the notice or warrant.1 And where the statute
requires the time and place to be stated in the notice, its require-
ments must be observed, and there can be no legal meeting unless
it originally assembles at the prescribed time and place. The law
is strictly held as to the important particulars of time and place, as
will appear by the illustrations in the notes.2
the meeting was named. This decision was 2 Sherwin 2. Bugbee, 16 Vt. 439, 444,
not put upon the ground that the statute (1844). In reference to town meetings,
expressly required the warning to be re- the statute of Vermont requires that the
corded (which it did not), but upon the notice shall be in writing, and shall
ground that the statute intended that the specify the business to be done, and the
records should furnish all the means for time and place of holding said meeting.”
testing the validity of the proceedings. Referring to this statute, Redfield, J. (in
See, also, Stevens v. Society, &c., 12 Vt. Sherwin v. Bugbee, supra), says :
688 (1839); post, sec. 310. Where the have no doubt the place of holding the
place of an annual meeting is not fixed by meeting must be definitely specified. It
statute or charter, notice of the meeting would hardly do to warn a meeting to be
and place is essential. United States v. held at some place in the district, or at a
McKelden, 8 Rep. Dec. 1879, p. 778; designated village, or at one of two or
McArthur & Mackey, 162. Presumption in more dwelling-houses. So, too, in regard
favor of legality of meeting after lapse of to time, there seems to be a propriety in
long time. Peterborough v. Lancaster, 14 having it definitely fixed. If the day,
N. H. 382, 392 ; post, secs. 267, note, 285, only, is named, the question immediately
note. Length of notice. Hunt v. School arises, Shall the inhabitants be required
District, 14 Vt. 300; Pratt v. Swanton, 15 to attend the whole day? or, When can
Vt. 247; post, sec. 285, note.
the meeting transact the business for
Under a statute of New York, the notice which they meet, so as to bind the absent
it required of school meetings held to be members ? The fact that the meeting
directory only, and the want of notice, adjourned to another day and hour will
when not fraudulently or wilfully omit- not help the matter, on the obvious prin-
ted, does not render the meeting invalid, ciple that the adjourned meeting could
and its proceedings void. Marchaut v. have no more authority than the original
Langworthy, 6 Hill (N. Y.), 646; af- meeting, which was void.”
firmed in error, 3 Denio (N. Y.), 526. Where it appears that a meeting was
See, also, Williams 2. Larkin, 3. Denio, held on the day appointed, it will be pre-
114; post, sec. 290. Where the charter sumed that it was held at a suitable time
required the clerk to publish a notice re- in the day, and pursuant to the notice.
quiring all persons interested in and op- A meeting should be opened within a
posed to a local improvement to attend reasonable time after the hour specified ;
before the council at a day named, and but what is such reasonable time depends
such notice was given and a hearing had, upon circumstances. School District v.
it was held that since the charter pro- Blakeslee, 13 Conn. 227. Where a meet-
vided for but one notice and one hearing, ing was called at a certain school-house,
it was a matter of discretion with the it was held to mean within the walls of
council whether another hearing should the building. An assemblage of some of
be allowed, and that subsequent action by the citizens in the highway near the
the council without such notice or second school-house, and an adjournment to an-
hearing was not, under the circumstances, other place, was not a legal meeting, and
invalid. Locke v. Rochester, 5 Lansing its transactions were not binding, though
(N. Y.), 11 (1871); post, secs. 803, 804, the school-house was locked, and the
927, vote.
weather cold and no fire in the building.
1 School District v. Blakeslee, 13 Conn. Chamberlain v. Dover, 13 Me. 466 (1836).
227.
See, also, Haines v. School District, 41
$ 269
349
MEETINGS; POWER TO ADJOURN.
$ 268 (206). Specification of Object of the Meeting. — Where the
statute requires the notice "to specify the business to be done,” an
omission to comply with this requirement makes the meeting void,
and it is held that a notice stating generally “to do any proper
business," is insufficient, and the acts and votes of a meeting held
under it are of no binding or legal force. Indeed, the rule is gen-
eral that where the statute requires the business to be stated in the
warrant or notice, this is absolutely essential, and the meeting must
be confined to those matters.2
$ 269 (207). Power to adjourn. - At a meeting duly constituted
and organized, a majority of the members, electors, or corporators
present, in the absence of any statute either conferring or denying
the power, have, in the absence of any restrictive statute, the implied
incidental corporate right to adjourn the meeting to another time,
Me. 246 (1856); Kingsbury v. School essentials of its validity, such as the due
District, 12 Met. 99. But, in Maine, passage, publication, &c. Ib.
where a meeting had, been called for the Where the statute requires that all
basement of a building, the fact that the matters to be acted upon at the meeting
meeting, which was crowded, being un- shall be inserted in the warrant or notice,
able to take a division within the walls a failure to do this will avoid as to both.
with ease or comfort, by unanimous con- parties any contract that may be made, or
sent and without protest from any one any act that may be done, with respect to
passed out into the open air, where the a matter not embraced in the warrant or
count was made, was held not to render notice. Cornish v. Pease, 19 Me. (1 Appl.)
its proceedings invalid. Brown v. Win-
Brown v. Win. 184 (1841); Spear v. Robinson, 29 Me.
terport, 79 Me. 305.
(14 Shep.) 531 (1849); Little v. Merrill,
1 Hunt 1. School District, 14 Vt. 300 10 Pick. (Mass.) 543 ; Blackburn v. Wal-
(1842); Sherwin v. Bugbee, 16 Vt. 439; pole, 9 Pick. (Mass.) 97; Torrey . Mill-
S. C. 17 Vt. 337, 444 (1844). “Such bury, 21 Pick. (Mass.) 64; Ib. 75; Had-
meetings are void for all purposes of sell v. Hancock, 3 Gray (Mass.), 526;
transacting business not specified” in the Jones v. Andover, 9 Pick. (Mass.) 146
written notice required by the statute. (1829); Kingsbury v. School District, 12
16., per Redfield, J.
Met. (Mass.) 99 (1846); Rand v. Wilder,
2 Ib.; Johnson v. Wilson, 2 N. H. 202; 11 Cush. (Mass.) 294 (1853). But if the
Tucker v. Aiken, 7 N. H. 113; Baker v. matter is embraced in the warrant or
Shepherd, 4 Fost. (24 N. H.) 208. notice, and the meeting duly met, it is no
By-laws passed at a town meeting not ohjection to its action that it was had
duly warned (as, for example, where the near the close of the meeting, and when
notice did not “ specify the objects of a portion of the voters had retired. Bean
the meeting as required by statute) are V. Jay, 23 Me. (9 Shep.) 117 (1843).
void. Hayden v. Noyes, 5 Conn. 391 Subsequent legal meeting may ratify acts
(1824); Willard v. Killingworth, 8 Conn. of previous meeting not duly notified.
247; Bloomfield v. Charter Oak Bank, Jordan v. School District, 38 Me. 164.
121 U. S. 121, 130. The party claiming By participating in a meeting illegally
under a by-law must show it was passed called, a party is not estopped to deny its
at a meeting duly warned. 8 Conn. 247, legality. School District v. Atherton, 12
supra, And must, perhaps, show all the Met. (Mass.) 105.
350
§ 270
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
either on the same or to a future day, and, if fairly done, to another
place within the corporate limits.
§ 270 (208). Constitution and Meetings of Councils or select
Governing Bodies ; and herein of Quorums and Majorities, of Inte-
gral Parts, and of stated, special, and adjourned Meetings. — Unlike
the towns of New England, in which all the qualified voters meet
and act in their primary capacity, the councils of cities and towns are
representative bodies, the number of whose members is fixed by law,
and they are elected by the legal voters of the incorporated place.
This council is the governing body of the municipal corporation,
and the corporation, unless it is otherwise provided, can act and be
bound only through the medium of the council. The charter or
1 Chamberlain v. Dover, 13 Me. (1 valid. Kimball v. Lamprey, 19 N. H.
Shep.) 466 (1836); People v. Martin, 1 215. In Massachusetts, an adjournment
Seld. (5 N. Y.) 22 (1851); Hubbard v. of a meeting should appear of record, and
Winsor, 15 Mich. 146; Kimball v. Mar- parol evidence of an adjournment to an-
shall, 44 N. H. 465 (1863); Drisko v. other day is held to be inadmissible. Tay.
Columbia, 75 Me. 73; Ex parte Wolf, 14 lor v. Henry, 2 Pick. (Mass.) 397 (1824).
Neb. 24; Goodell v. Baker, 8 Cowen See State v. Jersey City, 1 Dutch. (N. J.)
(N. Y.), 286; infra, secs. 285, 287. Elec- 309, and chapter on Corporate Records
tors exclusive judges of necessity of ad- and Documents, post, sec. 298. An ad-
journment of town meeting ; and such journed meeting of a meeting not legally
adjournment to next day, and at another called cannot validate the former meeting,
place, in the town twenty miles distant, nor itself legally act. United States v. Mc-
was considered lawful. Ib. The statute Kelden, Vol. VIII. Rep. 1879, McArthur
provided that if at any annual town meet- & Mackey, 162; ante, sec. 268, note. The
ing no place is fixed by the electors for statute of New York (1 Rev. Sts. 342) only
the next annual town meeting, such town requires the town meeting to be kept open
meeting shall be held at the place of the during the daytime, or some part thereof,
last annual town meeting. 1 Rev. Sts. but not that it shall be kept open during
N. Y. 340, sec. 3. Held, in People v. the whole and every part of the day, be-
Martin, 1 Seld. (5 N. Y.) 22, that though tween the rising and setting of the sun.
the place of meeting was thus contin People v. Martin, 1 Seld. (5 N. Y.) 22
gently fixed by statute, the electors, being (1851).
duly assembled, might adjourn it for the 2 Central Bridge Corp. v. Lowell, 15
residue of the day to another place in the Gray (Mass.), 106, 116 (1860), where an
town. Concluding his opinion in this act affecting a city was, by its terms, to
case, Paige, J., well remarks : "I confess take effect on acceptance by the city, it
that I have had some difficulty in coming was held that the acceptance might be
to this conclusion, and I think the power made by the governing body. The legis-
(which is decided to exist] of adjourning a lative and corporate powers of a munici-
town meeting to another time and place, pality, whose exercise is, by the charter
may, under peculiar circumstances, be op- or constituent act, committed to the coun.
pressively exercised, and lead to a defeat cil or governing body, can be exercised
of the popular will. This power ought only at a corporate meeting duly held; and
not to be exercised except in a case of the corporate will must be ascertained hory
extreme necessity.” People v. Martin, 1 vote and embodied in a definite form.
Seld. (5 N. Y.) 27.
The form which the corporate will assumes
After a valid adjournment, acts by a is usually either a resolution or ordi-
portion of the voters who remain are in- nance, or something equivalent thereto.
§ 271
351
MEETINGS; MAYOR'S PRESENCE AND FUNCTION.
1
constituent act of the place usually contains provisions as to the con-
stitution of the council, its stated and special meetings, and the
notice thereof requisite to be given, how many shall constitute a
quorum, and an enumeration of its powers. The usual scheme of
the organization of the council is to divide the territory of the incor-
porated place into districts or wards, the voters in each of which
elect one or more representatives, annually, called aldermen or
councilmen; and these, when duly convened, constitute the council,
over which the mayor or head executive officer of the corporation pre-
sides, sometimes constituting a member of the council, and in other
instances, having power to vote only when there is a tie or to give
a second vote in case of a tie.1
§ 271 (209). Mayor's Presence and Function. The doctrine of
the English courts as to the old corporations in that country, that the
mayor was an integral part of the corporation, whose presence, unless
otherwise provided in the charter, was necessary to a valid corporate
meeting ; that, during a vacancy in the office of mayor, the corpora-
tion could do no valid act, unless expressly empowered, except to
elect another and thus complete the body; and that the acts of the
corporation under the presidency of any other than a mayor de jure,
were voidable, has, it is believed, no application to the office of mayor
in the corporations of this country.?
Schumm v. Seymour, 9 C. E. Green (24 may make a valid order, though it he by
N. J. Eq.), 143; State v. Jersey City, 6 parol only, for the removal of a disorderly
Vroom (35 N. J. L.), 404. See chapter on person who disturbs the business of the
Ordinances, post, sec. 307, note.
meeting. Parsons v. Brainard, 17 Wend.
1 Power to preside and give casting (N. Y.) 522 (1837). Approval by the
vote at meetings of a religious corporation mayor of proceedings of the council may,
construed. People v. Rector, &c., 48 by special requirement of charter, be
Barb. (N. Y.) 603. A mayor of a city of essential to their validity. Graham v.
the second class in Kansas may give the Carondolet, 33 Mo. 262 (1862); Kepner v.
casting vote to confirm an officer appointed Comnimonwealth, 40 Pa. St. 124. A
by him. Carroll v. Wall, 35 Kan. 36. charter required every resolution of the
Post, sec. 288, note.
council to be sent to the mayor, who should
2 Infra, sec. 284. The text approved, either approve it, in which case it would
Martindale v. Palmer, 52 Ind. 411 (1876); become operative and effectual, or disap-
Welch v. Ste. Genevieve, 1 Dillon C. C. prove it, in which case he should return it.
130 (1871). And see ante, chap. ix., as to It was held that his approval was to be
powers and duties of the mayor, secs. 208, made known by a written declaration at-
209. A provision in a charter that "the tested by his signature. N. Y., &c. R. Co.
mayor, recorder and aldermen, when as- V., Waterbury, 55 Conn. 19.
sem bled together, shall constitute the com- proval by mayor not necessary. State v.
mon council,” makes the mayor a member Jersey City, 1 Vroom (30 N. J. L.), 93,
of the council. People v. Harshaw, 60 148; see Dey v. Jersey City, 19 N. J. Eq.
Mich. 200. Infra, sec. 273.
412; Taylor v. Palmer, 31 Cal. 241; State
The presiding officer of a town meeting, v. Newark, 1 Dutch. (N. J.) 399; post,
with statute authority to maintain order, sec. 331, note.
When ap-
352
§ 273
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
§ 272 (210). Same subject. — The right of the mayor or other
officer to preside over the meeting of the council is a franchise, and
may be tested by an information in the nature of a quo warranto,
but cannot be determined, at least ordinarily, unless by statute pro-
vision, on a bill in chancery to enjoin, or in any other indirect or
collateral proceeding.?
$ 273 (211). Constitution of Council. — Who shall compose the
council or governing body of the corporation is in all cases prescribed
by the charter or incorporation act, but the language used has been
such as sometimes to lead to controversy.3 The organic act of a city
provided" that the intendant of police shall have a seat in the board
of commissioners [the governing body of a city corporation), and
when present shall preside therein; in his absence, the board shall
appoint a chairman pro tempore.” It was held that the intendant
was thereby constituted one of the commissioners, and had the right
to participate in making ordinances. Where the power to legislate
1 Cochran v. McCleary, 22 Iowa, 75 2 Cochran v. McCleary, 22 Iowa, 75,
(1867), and authorities there cited ; Re 86 (1867); Re Sawyer, 124 U. S. 200
Sawyer, 124 U. S. 200 (1887); Reynolds (1887); post, chap. xxii. ; Topping v.
v. Baldwin, 1 La. An. 162 (1846); Rex v. Gray, 7 Hill (N. Y.), 259; affirming s. C.
Williams, 1 Burr. 402 ; Willc. 456, pl. 9 Paige, 507; Markle v. Wright, 13 Ind.
337; Rex v. Hertford, 1 Ld. Raym. 426; 548; Hullman v. Honcomp, 5 Ohio, 237;
approved, Commonwealth v. Arrison, 15 People v. Cook, 4 Seld. (9 N. Y.) 67; af-
Serg. & Rawle (Pa.), 130; ante, chap. ix. firming s. C. 14 Barb. 257; Mayor v. Con-
sec. 208. In Cochran 2. McCleary, supra, ner, 5 Ind. 171; Mozley v. Alston, 1
it was held that the mayor, in cities of Phill. 790; Lord v. The Governor, &c., 2
the second class, organized under the Gen- Phill. 740; Peabody v. Flint, 6 Allen
eral Incorporation Act (Rev. of Iowa, (Mass.), 52 ; Hagner v. Hey berger, 7
1860, chap. li.), is not ex officio a member Watts & Serg. (Pa.) 104; People v. Car-
of, nor has he any right to preside over, penter, 24 N. Y. 86; People v. Draper, 15
the city council; that the council was N. Y. 532 ; People v. Insurance Co., 2
composed exclusively of trustees' or alder- Johns. Ch. 371; People v. Same Co. (quo
men, and elected its own presiding officer. warranto), 15 Johns. .358"; Demarest v.
The mayor of New York was held not to Wickham, Mayor, &c., 63 N. Y. 320
be a member of the common council; and (1875); Commonwealth v. Bank (quo war.
the common council, having the power by ranto), 28 Pa. St. 389; in chancery, Ib.
statute to appoint to office, may exercise 379; Hughes v. Parker, 20 N. H. 58 ;
it without the concurrence of the mayor, Strahl, In re, 16 Iowa, 369; Updegraff v.
who has no veto power upon the appoint Crans, 47 Pa. St. 103; Facey v. Fuller,
,
ment. Achley's case, 4 Abb. Pr. Rep. 13 Mich. 527; see Kerr v. Trego, 47 Pa.
35 (1856). The burgess of a borough in. St. 292, cited infra, sec. 275.
corporated under the Pennsylvania Gen- 3 Cochran v. McCleary, 22 Iowa, 75
eral Borough Law of 1851 has no right to (1867).
act as a member of the town council, and 4 Raleigh v. Sorrell, 1 Jones (N. C.)
cannot refuse to sign ordinances regularly Law, 49 (1853). In this case the Su-
passed by the town council, on the ground preme Court of North Carolina admit
that he was not present as a member when (arguendo) that an officer - as, for ex-
they were adopted. Commonwealth v. ample, the intendant -- has no right,
Kepner, 10 Phila. (Pa.) 510.
under the act of incorporation, to sit
1
!
§ 274
353
MEETINGS ; PROPER CORPORATE BODY MUST ACT.
for the corporation is vested in “the mayor and councilmen,” the
council by itself cannot legislate, but must act in conjunction with
the mayor.' In deciding the point the court observes: “If a simple
resolution (instead of an ordinance] would be sufficient, yet, before
it would have any validity, it would necessarily have to be signed
by the mayor as a part of the law-making power: the co-ordinate
action of both is required.
» 1
§ 274 (212). Proper Corporate Body must act. — It is undoubtedly
true, as already stated, that the corporate authority must be exercised
by the proper body. Thus, where a town was organized under a
charter which vested the corporate powers of the place in a presi-
dent and six trustees, and subsequently a general incorporation act
was passed which was erroneously supposed to apply to the town,
and under which the town elected different officers from those pro-
vided in the special charter, at a different time and constituting a
different body, it was held, in the absence of legislative ratification,
that this latter body could not exercise the authority of the corpora-
tion, since they were a body without any legal existence, and were
not the body authorized to act for the corporation. The principle
that the acts of de facto officers are valid was considered not to be
applicable.
with the legislative body of the corpora- Bro. P. C. 329; Rex v. Westwood, 4 B.
tion; but if he does so and acts with them, & C. 799, 818; Green v. Durham, 1 Burr.
that an ordinance thus passed will be 131; see post, sec. 276, and note. Whether
void, because the powers given to the cor- the mere fact that a single unauthorized
poration must be exercised in strict con- person is, by a mistaken construction of
formity to the special delegation of au- the charter, allowed to participate in the
thority, and because, in the case supposed, transactions of a meeting of the council,
the ordinance is not passed by the body would, in this country, be held necessarily
to which the power is given; citing Rex to avoid them, is a question which per-
v. Croke, Cowp. 26. The view of the haps remains yet to be settled. It has
court is in accordance with the rule of the been held, that if persons who are not
English courts as applied to their corpo qualified vote at a town, parish, or dis-
rations. Thus, Mr. Willcock says: “It trict meeting, without objection or chal-
may be unnecessary to add that whenever lenge at the time, proof of that fact can-
a particular business is delegated to a not afterwards be made with a view to in-
select body, if others join in the perform- validate the proceedings. Sutton v. Cole,
ance of it, the act is void ; as if the mayor, 3 Pick. (Mass.) 232 (1825). So if such a
aldermen, and commonalty join in making meeting is called by persons acting under
a by-law which is directed to be made by color of authority, it will be legal if no
the mayor and aldermen. For if others exception to their authority is taken at
are allowed to vote, a by-law might be es- the time. Ib.
tablished, although all those to whom the 1 Saxton v. Beach, 50 Mo. 488 (1872),
power is specifically delegated should be per Wagner, J. Sequel of the case, Sax:
in the minority.
Corp. 68, pl. 128; ton v. St. Joseph, 60 Mo. 153 (1875).
Parry v. Berry, Comyns, 269; Rex v. Ante, sec. 271, note.
Head, 4 Burr. 2521; Hoblyn v. Regem, 2 2 Decorab v. Bullis, 25 Iowa, 12 (1868);
23
VOL. I.
354
$ 275
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
§ 275 (213). Injunction where two conflicting Municipal Bodies
are concurrently acting. Where there are two bodies, each of which
claims to be the regularly organized municipal council and each is
acting as such, to the detriment and confusion of the public, the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania awarded to the body which was,
prima facie, legally entitled to act, a provisional injunction to re-
strain the other body from interference with them. The bill in the
case was filed by the body which, prima facie, had the written or
legal title, as against the other and presumptively usurping body.
Neither the Attorney-General nor any public officer was a party.
To the defendants' objection that in such a case the Attorney-
General alone can file a bill, the court replied: "We do not think
It is right for those to whom public functions are entrusted to
see that they are not to be usurped by others.” 1
SO.
Welch v. Ste. Genevieve, 1 Dillon C. C. Court of Pennsylvania rested the right to
130 (1871); infra, sec. 276.
grant a provisional injunction upon the
1 Kerr 2. Trego, 47 Pa. St. 292 (1864), ground, very brondly stated, that all cor-
Author's Comments. In reference to the porate bodies and officers are under law and
important point decided in the case just that “this remedy [by injunction] extends
cited it may be observed that, in the ab- to all acts that are contrary to law and
sence of statute, chancery has no jurisdic- for which there is no adequate remedy at
tion over corporate elections, or to deter- law; and we can hardly imagine any act
mine the title to corporate offices. In a that more clearly falls within this de-
case like that above mentioned, prompt scription than one that casts so deep a
and efficacious judicial intervention such shade of doubt and confusion on the pub.
as chancery only can afford is extremely lic affairs of a city as this does. In such
convenient, or even needful, but the diffi- a case no remedy is adequate that is not
culty is to find, aside from statutory aid, prompt and speedy." Similar views are
an acknowledged head of equitable juris- expressed in the dissenting opinion of
diction under which such a case can be Waite, C. J., In re Sawyer, 124 U. S.
brought. The general doctrine of our 223. The stress of the question therefore
jurisprudence undoubtedly is that which is, whether the jurisdiction in equity is to
is thus stated by Gray, J., In rc Sawyer, be strictly limited by the existing land-
124 U. S. 212 (1887): “The jurisdiction marks and to the acknowledged heads of
to determine the title to a public office that jurisdiction, or whether, agreeally to
belongs exclusively to the courts of law, the principles in which one source of
and is exercised either by ccrtiorari, error, equity jurisdiction has had its origin,
or appeal, or by mandamus, prohibition, namely, the inadequacy of common-law
quo warranto, or information in the nature remedies, the jurisdiction of the court
of a writ of quo warranto, according to the may, by a species of judicial legislation
circumstances of the case and the mode of which, consciously or otherwise, is al-
procedure established by the common law ways in operation, be extended to a case
or by statute. No English case has been of such an urgent and extraordinary nature
found of a bill for an injunction to re- as that which was presented by the facts
strain the appointment or removal of a in Kerr v. Trego. On the whole it seems
municipal officer. In the courts of the to the author that Kerr v. Trego may be
several States such a power in a court of regarded as a sound, or at least an allow-
equity has been denied in many well-con- able, application of the principles of equi.
sidered cases," citing them.
ty jurisdiction to a 'case of great public
In Kerr v. Trego, supra, the Supreme urgency, where, under the legislation of
t
$ 276 MEETINGS ; ACTS OF DE FACTO COUNCILS AND OFFICERS. 355
$ 276 (214). Acts of de facto Councils and Officers. In this
country the doctrine is everywhere declared, that the acts of de facto
officers, as distinguished from the acts of mere usurpers, are valid,
and the principle extends not only to municipal officers generally,
but also to those composing the council, or legislative or governing
body of a municipal corporation. But in order that there may be,
the State as it existed in Pennsylvania, under an alleged unconstitutional act, and
the common-law remedies were not only to restrain this alleged illegal and usurping
inadequate, but wholly unsuited to the body from the exercise of unauthorized
emergency in hand. The temptation to powers. It was held that the action could
supply serious defects and lacunae which not be maintained, and that the remedy
experience from time to time discloses in under the legislation of New York was an
common-law remedies, by a judicial ex- information in the nature of a quo warranto
tension of the principles of equity juris. by the Attorney-General in the name of the
diction, so as to secure justice or prevent its State. The case is distinguishable from
failure, is always strong, and on the whole Kerr v. Trego. Mode of organizing councils
resistless. A conservative chancellor may to which new members are to be adınitted,
say here and there, “I have no power -- the and tests in case of conflicting councils,
case is one for the legislature ;” but the for determining which is the legal or-
natural and general tendency when such a ganization. Kerr v. Trego, 47 Pa. St. 292;
course is not contrary to existing legisla. supra, secs. 202, note, 204, 255, note, 272.
tion or policy, is to assert in the particu- 1 Scoville v. Cleveland, 1 Ohio St. 126
lar case a power felt to be necessary, and (1853); Decorah v. Bullis, 25 Iowa, 12
whose exercise promises to be beneficial. (1868); Cochran v. McCleary, 22 Iowa,
This, it is true, is judiciary law; but it is 75, 84; Strahl, In re, 16 Iowa, 360; Peo-
law which is necessarily evolved in the ple v. Stevens, 5 Hill (N. Y.), 616; State
very process of legal administration. So
v. Jacobs, 17 Ohio, 143; People 2. Bart-
it has been in the past, and so from the lett, 6 Wend. (N. Y.) 422; Pritchett v.
very nature of the case it must continue People, 1 Gilm. (6 IN.) 529; People v.
in the future. Law thus originating in Runkle, 9 Johns. (N. Y.) 147; Trustees,
actual experience, and limited by the &c. v. Hill, 6 Cow. (N. Y.) 23; Williams
judges in its application to the exigency v. School District, 21 Pick. 75; see Rex
which calls it into existence, must on the v. Mayor, &c., 8 Mod. 111; DeGrave v.
whole be excellent, though likely to be in- Monmouth, 4 Car. & P. 111; Laver v. Mc-
complete. It will be observed that the Glachlin, 28 Wis. 364; post, sec. 892,
court did not undertake on the bill filed to note ; Cushing v. Frankfort, 57 Me. 541;
adjudge the questions of title between the Lockhart v. Troy, 48 Ala. 579 (1872);
conflicting bodies. It disclaimed the right Riddle v. Bedford, 7 S. & R. (Pa.) 386;
to do so. Its injunction, granted in the pub- People v. Hopson, 1 Denio (N. Y.), 574;
lic interest, simply maintained the existing Hamlin v. Dingman, 5 Lans. (N. Y.) 61;
prima facie legal status until the question People v. Nostrand, 46 N. Y. 375; Olm-
of title should be determined in the usual sted v. Dennis, 77 N. Y. 378; Koontz v.
mode and by the proper tribunals. Dema- Hancock, 64 Md. 134. As to de facto
rest v. Wickham, Mayor, 63 N. Y. 320 officers, ante, secs. 197 note, 221 note, 256,
(1875), was an action by two assistant post, 763 note, 892 note. In a case in the
alderrnen in their own names to restrain House of Lords, decided in 1851, it was
the defendant, as mayor, from recognizing held that an act done by a definite body,
the board of aldermen, organized as the under authority of parliament, was not
common council and usurping the rights invalid because officers de facto joined with
of the board of assistant aldermen, of officers de jure in the doing of it. The
which the plaintiffs were members, on judges having unanimously declared this
the ground that they had usurped the to be their opinion, the Lord Chancellor
office in question, having been elected said : The opinion of the judges as to
350
§ 277
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
within the meaning of the above rule, a de facto officer, there must
be a de jure office; and the notion that there can be a de facto office
has been characterized as a political solecism, without foundation in
reason and without support in law; and, therefore, a person cannot
claim to be a de facto officer of a municipal corporation when the
corporation or people have, in law, no power, in any event, to elect
or appoint such an officer.1
$ 277 (215). Action by Indefinite Body; Majority present may
act. The common-law principle, that if an act is to be done by an
indefinite body it is valid if passed by a majority of those present at
a legal meeting, no matter how small a portion they may constitute
of the whole number entitled to be present, has been deemed appli-
cable to the towns of New England. In those towns the corporate
power resides, as we have seen, in the inhabitants, or citizens at
large, and these form the constituent body. If the meeting has been
duly called and warned, those who assemble, though less than a
majority of the whole, have the power to act for and bind the whole,
unless it is otherwise provided by law. Those who remain away
are justly and conclusively presumed to assent to what may law-
fully be done by those who attend.2
vestrymen de facto and de jure was of (1868); Hildreth's Heirs v. McIntire's
great importance. When it was consid- Devisees, 1 J. J. Marsh. (Ky.) 206; People
ered that there were many persons who v. White, 24 Wend. (N. Y.) 520, 540,
were charged with very important duties, 541; Carleton v. People, 10 Mich. 250;
and whose title to perform those duties or Welch v. Ste. Genevieve, 1 Dillon C. C.
to exercise the powers necessary for their 130 (1871). In Norton v. Shelby Co.,
performance the public could not easily 118 U, S. 425 (1885), the doctrine of the
ascertain at the time, and when it was text was asserted and enforced as sound.
remembered what inconveniences would Mr. Justice Field reviews the cases, and
arise if the validity of their acts depended distinguishes The State v. Carroll, 38
on the propriety of the election of the Conn. 449. See post, chap. xiv.; Burt v.
persons who had to perform them, the Winona & St. Peter Ry. Co., 31 Minn.
value of the clear enunciation of the prin- 472 (approving text). De facto officer's
ciple thus made by the judges was very official bond not obligatory there being no
great, and in the correctness of it he such de jure office. Tinsley v. Kirby, 17
begged to declare his entire concurrence. S. C. 1, 8; supra, sec. 274 ; post, chap.
Scadding v. Lorant, 5 Eng. Law & Eq. xxi.; sec. 892.
16, 30, per Lord Chancellor Truro. See 2 Damon v. Granby, 2 Pick. (Mass.)
ante, sec. 273, note. A person acting in 345, 355 (1824); Commonwealth v. Ips-
the capacity of a public officer is prima wich, 2 Pick. (Mass.) 70; Williams v.
facie taken to be so. Doe v. Barnes, 8 Q. Lunenburg, 21 Pick. (Mass.) 75; Church
B. 1043; Regina v. Roberts (crown cases Case, 5 Robt. (N. Y.) 649 (1867); First
reserved), 36 Law Times Rep. 690; s. c. 6 Parish v. Stearns, 21 Pick. (Mass.) 148
Am. Law Rep. 414. Ante, sec. 237, note, (1838); State v. Binder, 38 Mo. 450
as to powers, duties, and liabilities of pub. (1866).
lic officers.
At a popular election, a candidate for a
1 Decorah 2. Bullis, 25 Iowa, 15, 18, municipal office received a plurality of all
§ 278 MEETINGS ; QUORUM AND MAJORITY OF DEFINITE BODY. 357
$ 278 (216). Quorum and Majority of Definite Body. – The
common-law rules as to quorums and majorities, established with
reference to corporate bodies consisting of a definite number of
corporators, have also, in general, been applied to the common
council, or select governing body of our municipal corporations,
where the matter is not specially regulated by the charter or
statute. Thus, to use Mr. Dane's illustration, if the body consists
of twelve common councilmen, seven is the least number that can
constitute a valid meeting, though four of the seven [the seven be-
ing duly assembled and present] may act.2 Thus, where a council
consisted of eighteen members, exclusive of the mayor, the election
of a clerk by nine votes was held lawful and valid, the other mem-
bers remaining present, though protesting against the method of
electing and refusing to vote. It was held that the legal effect of
their refusal to vote while remaining present, was an acquiescence
in the action of those voting. So, also, a statute in reference to
a definite body, declaring that a “ majority of those present at any
regular meeting shall be competent” to transact business, leaves the
number which may form a quorum to be determined by the com-
mon law; that is, there must be at least a majority present, and
such a provision, it was considered, did not authorize a minority of
the whole body to act.4
the votes cast, but not a majority. There As to municipal elections. Ante, chap. ix.
was no provision of the charter and no by.
sec. 196.
law on the subject. The usage in the cor- 1 Text approved in Heiskell v. Baltimore,
poration seemed to have been to consider 65 Md. 125, where Stone, J., said : “But
the person having the highest number of when in the case, like the present, of a
votes, although not a majority of the municipal corporation, the statute law
whole, as duly elected. The statute in creating it is silent as to what shall con-
relation to State elections expressly pro- stitute a legal assembly, the common law
vided that "plurality, or the highest both in England and in this country is
number of votes, should make a choice. well settled, that the majority of the
Under these circumstances, the majority of members elect shall constitute the legal
the court were of the opinion that the body." To same effect, Barnert v. Pater-
common-law rule, that a majority is neces. son, 48 N. J. L. (19 Vroom) 395; Cadmus
sary to a valid election, applied, and was v. Farr, 47 N. J. L. (18 Vroom) 208; MC-
not controlled by the terms or spirit of Dermott v. Miller, 45 N. J. L. 251.
the general election law of the State. 2 5 Dane, Abr. 150; Willcocks, In re,
State v. Wilmington, 3 Harring. (Del.) 7 Cow. (N. Y.) 402, 410 (1827), note d,
294 (1840). Harrington, J., dissented, and criticism on the rule stated, in 1 Kyd
holding (and, as it would seem, with on Corp. 418, 425 ; 2 Kent Com. 293;
reason) that the plurality principle had Buell v. Buckingham, 16 Iowa, 284 (1864);
been the one “invariably adopted as most Regents, &c. v. Williams, 9 Gill & Johns.
in consonance with our institutions in all (Md.) 365; Mills v. Gleason, 11 Wis. 470.
cases where the law of election is silent in 3 State v. Green, 37 Ohio St. 227.
this respect.
Ib., p. 305. See First 4 Willcocks, In re, 7 Cow. (N. Y.) 402
Parish v. Stearns, 21 Pick. (Mass.) 148. (1827); Ib. 463, and note ; Ib. 526,
358
§ 282
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
$ 279 (217). Same subject. Quorum. - So, if a board of village
trustees consists of five members, and all, or four, are present, two can
do no valid act, even though the others are disqualified by interest
from voting, and therefore omit or decline to vote; their assenting to
the measure voted for by the two will not make it valid. If three
only were present they would constitute a quorum; then the votes
of two, being a majority of the quorum, would be valid ;1 certainly
so where the three are all competent to act.?
§ 280 (218). Legal Quorum defined. — In another case, the power
of amotion was conferred upon a city council to be exercised “by a
vote of two-thirds of that body," and this was considered to give the
power of removal to two-thirds of a legal quorum. Two-thirds of
the whole number of members composing the council were held not
to be required. The point was admitted to be close, and the French
text of the charter was regarded as favoring the conclusion reached.3
§ 281 (219). Quorum under Special Charter Provision. The
charter of a city contained a provision that no ordinance should be
passed by the common council, except by a majority of all the mem-
bers elected. Eight were elected; and it was decided, under the
above-mentioned requirement of the charter, that an ordinance
could not be passed by a vote of four against three, since four did
not constitute a majority of all the members elected, although it did
constitute a majority of the legal quorum present at the meeting.
4
§ 282 (220). Majority of Quorum must concur. In the absence
of special provision, the major part of those present, at a meeting of
a select body, must concur in order to do any valid act. Therefore,
when it appeared that thirteen ballots were cast when the members
16 all
and note ; Heiskell v. Baltimore, 65 Md. stitute a quorum. Heiskell v. Baltimore,
125 ; Barnert v. Paterson, 48 N. J. L. 65 Md. 125; Barnert v. Paterson, 48
395; ante, sec. 207, note ; infra, secs. N. J. L. 395.
282, 283. In Iowa, by statute
1 Coles v. Williamsburgh, 10 Wend.
ordinances and resolutions, or orders for (N. Y.) 658 (1833); McDermott v. Miller,
the appropriation or payment of money 45 N. J. L. (16 Vroom) 251.
shall require for their passage or adop- · Buell v. Buckingham, 16 Iowa, 284
tion the concurrence of a majority of all (1864), and cases cited. Post, sec. 292, n.
the trustees of any municipal corpora. 8 Warnock v. Lafayette, 4 La. An. 419.
tion," &c. A resolution for a change of See, on this point, Logansport v. Legg, 20
the boundaries of a city does not require Ind. 315 ; State v. Porter, 113 Ind. 79.
such majority concurrence.
Strohm v. 4 San Francisco v. Hazen, 5 Cal. 169
Iowa City, 47 Iowa, 42. Authorizing a (1855). See, also, Oakland v. Carpentier,
city council to “settle their rules of pro. 13 Cal. 540; McCracken v. San Francisco,
cedure held not to confer upon it the 16 Cal. 591 ; Pimental v. San Francisco,
power of doclaring what number shall con. 21 Cal. 351.
$ 283
359
MEETINGS ; QUORUM; MAJORITY.
present were only entitled to give twelve votes, of which seven were
for one person and six for another, there was no election, and the
council, though it had declared that the person receiving seven votes
was duly elected, might subsequently rescind its action and proceed
to a new election. And in South Carolina the general rule is rec-
ognized, and a majority of the board of managers of elections -
having power, by statute, to determine the validity of contested
elections --- is a quorum, and a majority of that quorum may act
and decide.2
§ 283 (221). Extent of the Majority Principle ; application to
Committees, Public Officers, &c. And, as a general rule, it may be
stated that not only where the corporate power resides in a select
body, as a city council, but where it has been delegated to a committee
or to agents, then, in the absence of special provisions otherwise,
a minority of the select body, or of the committee or agents, are
powerless to bind the majority or do any valid act. If all the
members of the select body or committee, or if all the agents are
assembled, or if all have been duly notified, and the minority refuse
or neglect to meet with the others, a majority of those present may
act, provided those present constitute a majority of the whole num-
ber. In other words, in such case, a major part of the whole is
necessary to constitute a quorum and a majority of the quorum
may act. If the major part withdraw so as to leave vo quorum, the
power of the minority to act is, in general, considered to cease.
But where the duties are purely ministerial, and not judicial, or are
of such a nature as to exclude the idea of action as a body or board,
and where they are devolved on public officers or agents rather than
on the agents of corporations, the rule above stated (as the cases
1 Labourdette v. Municipality, 2 La. 8 Kingsbury v. School District, 12 Met.
An. 527 (1847).
(Mass.) 99 (1846); Day v. Green, 4 Cush.
2 State v.Deliesseline, 1 McCord (S.C.), (Mass.) 438, 439 (1849); Fisher v. School
52 (1821), where the subject is elaborately District, 4 Cush. (Mass.) 494 (1849);
considered by Nott, J.; S. P. State v. Hug- Coffin v. Nantucket, 5 Cush. (Mass.) 269
gins, Harper (S. C.) Law, 94 (1824), fur- (1850); 11 Cush. 433; Damon v. Granby,
ther holding that where, of eighteen man- 2 Pick. (Mass.) 345, 355 (1824); State v.
agers appointed by the legislature, two Jersey City, 3 Dutch. (N. J.) 493; Charles
refused to qualify, one was disqualified, v. Hoboken, 3 Dutch. (N. J.) 203; Dey
and one dead, the remaining fourteen (from v. Jersey City, 19 N. J. Eq. 412 (1869);
necessity and public convenience) properly Baltimore v. Poultney, 25 Md. 18 (1866).
constituted the board, and might act by a Text quoted and approved, Brown v. Dis-
majority of the fourteen. The decision trict of Columnbia, 127 U. S. 57.9, 586
rests upon the legislative intent, deduced (1887).
from various provisions of the act, to com-
mit the matter to the acting managers.
360
§ 283
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
below referred to will show) has been relaxed, and in some instances
deemed to be wholly inapplicable.1
1 With respect to persons or officers party.
party. Post, sec. 452. But it will be
appointed by law to act judicially in a binding if the authority was joint and
public matter, it is generally held, there several, or if ratified. Adams v. Hill, 16
being no provision of statute to the Me. (4 Shep.) 215 (1839); Kupfer v.
contrary, that where all meet and act, a South Parish, &c., 12 Mass. 185 (1815);
majority may decide and bind the rest, Allen v. Cooper, 22 Me. 133 (1842). In
and this notwithstanding the express dis- Damon v. Granby, 2 Pick. (Mass.) 345
sent of the minority, or their wrongful (1842), this distinction is taken. If a
withdrawal before the act is consummated public corporation appoints a committee
Rogers, In re, 7 Cow. (N. Y.) 526 (1827) of its own members, a majority may bind,
(appraisal of damages by canal appraisers), for such is the usage and the common law
and see 16. note ali, and the cases there in relation to corporations. But if the
cited and reviewed ; Ib. 764, explanation. authority is given to persons not mem-
See, further, Willcocks, In re, 7 Cow. bers of the body, such persons are agents,
(N. Y.) 402, and note; Ib. 462, 463; and not technically a committee, and all
Young v. Buckingham, 5 Ohio, 485, 489 must concur, unless it appear that it was
(1832); Charles v. Hoboken, 3 Dutch. intended that a majority should act. See
(N. J.) 203; Martin v. Lemon, 26 Conn. authorities cited by Solicitor-General Davis
192 (1857); Astor v. New York, 62 N. Y. in same case, p. 350; Viner's Ab. title
567, 580 (1875); People v. Paliner (effect Authority, B. pl. 7. Further as to bind-
of death of one of the members or offi- ing force of the act of majority of a coin-
cers), 52 N. Y. 83; People v. Syracuse, 63 mittee or board of selectmen, see Jones v.
N. Y. 291; ante, sec. 99, note; post, chap. Andover, 9 Pick. (Mass.) 146; Crommett v.
xxiii.
Pearson, 18 Me. (6 Shep.) 344 (1841); Jun-
The statute authorized the appoint kins v. School District, 39 Me. 220 (1855);
ment of three levee inspectors, and pre- Inhabitants, &c. v. Cole, 3 Pick. (Mass.)
scribed their duties, which involved the 232, 244 ; Kingsbury v. School District,
exercise of judgment. Held, that all must 12 Met. (Mass.) 99 (1846); Keyes v. West-
meet and act, and that the action of a ford, 17 Pick. (Mass.) 273 (1835); Green
majority in the absence of the third was v. Miller, 6 Johns. (N. Y.) 39 (1810);
void. Ballard v. Davis, 31 Miss. 525 Grindley v. Barker, i Bos. & Pul. 236,
(1856).
per Eyre, C. J.; King v. Beeston, 3 Term
Where a majority of a committee is au- R. 592 ; Guthrie v. Armstrong, 5 Barn. &
thorized to act, they constitute a party Ald. 628 (1822), where it was held that a
capable of contracting; and another mem- power given to fifteen jointly and sever-
ber of a committee, not acting as such, ally was well executed by four. A school
but as an individual, constitutes another committee appointed according to and
party capable of being contracted with. under a statute are public officers within
It is accordingly held that a majority of the nieaning of the statute which gives a
such a committee may contract with or majority of such officers authority to act
employ one of their own number, and such for the whole. Keyser v. School District,
contract, if fairly made and without fraud 35 N. H. 477 (1857). Where an authority
or corruption, will be binding upon the is given, by law, to a committee, or to
corporation. Junkins v. Union School more persons than one, to do an act of a
District, 39 Me. 220; Buell v. Bucking public nature, one alone, unless there be
ham, 16 Iowa, 284; post, sec. 443, note; something to show such intention, cannot
post, sec. 292; Willard v. Newburyport, act independently and without the con-
12 Pick. (Mass.) 227. Compare Smith v. currence of the others, or at least of a ma-
Albany, 61 N. Y. 444 (1875). But a con- jority. If the act is ministerial, a ma-
tract made by less than a majority of a jority at least must concur: but unless
committee of the corporation, though in required, or such is the practice, they need
the name of the whole, binds neither not act as a board, and be convened or
3
§ 284
361
MEETINGS; MAJORITY PRINCIPLE; JOINT ASSEMBLIES. .
§ 284 (222). Application of Majority Principle to Joint Assemblies.
- The doctrine of the English courts is, that all of the integral parts
of a corporation necessary to do an act must not only meet, but
notified to be convened as such. But if lb. 185. “It is a general principle that
the act is judicial in its nature, that is, where a board of officers (for example,
requiring the exercise of judgment, unless overseers of the poor) is constituted to
special provision is otherwise made, all perform a duty provided by law, the act
must meet or have notice to meet, a ma- of the majority is the act of the whole
jority will constitute a quorum, and a body." Per Bennett, J., Walcott v. Wal,
majority of the quorum will be compe- cott, 19 Vt. 37, 39 (1846). See, also,
tent to act. Martin v. Lemon, 26 Conn. King v. Beesten, 3 Term R. 592; Jones v.
192 (1857). In this case it was ruled that Andover, 9 Pick. (Mass.) 146.
one of a committee of three to remove Under the statutes of Pennsylvania, all
encroachments on highways could not act powers conferred upon county cominis-
alone. Committees of public corporations sioners may be legally executed by two
have sometimes been held to be governed, without the concurrence of the third.
with respect to meeting and notice, by Commissioners v. Leckey, 6 Serg. &
different rules from a board which has Rawle (Pa.), 166 ; Cooper v. Lampeter, 8
necessarily to be assembled or convened Watts (Pa.), 128; Curtis v. Butler Co.,
before it can act. And the acts of a ina- 24 How. 435; Jefferson Co. v. Slagle, 66
jority of such committees have been con- Pa. St. 202, where it is held that a con-
sidered valid, though some member of the tract by two county commissioners within
committee was not notified. Gallup v. the scope of their authority bound the
Tracy (town committee to stake out oyster county, although not made at their office.
grounds), 25 Conn. 10 (1856). But com- Where three commissioners are ap-
pare Martin v. Lemon, 26 Conn. 192. pointed to contract for site for poor-house,
And see Damon v. Granby, 2 Pick. (Mass.) two of them cannot make a valid purchase.
345, 354; Grindley v. Barker, 1 Bos. & Pulaski Co. v. Lincoln, 4 Eng. (9 Ark.)
Pul. 229; Keeler v. Frost, 22 Barb. (N. Y.) 320 (1849). Action of less than a ma-
400; Perry v. Tynen, 22 Barb. (N. Y.) 137. jority of commissioners of public build-
Town committee held to be an agent of ings, appointed by act of legislature, is
the town, and not a board of public offi- void. Petrie v. Doe, 30 Miss. 698 (1856).
cers or a judicial body, and may act by A statute declaring that every board of
the agreement of the individual mem- township trustees, " and the members
bers separately obtained. Shea v. Mil. thereof," shall be overseers of the poor
ford, 145 Mass. 528 (1888); Haven was construed to make each member an
v. Lowell, 5 Met. (Mass.) 35. Where
Where overseer, with power to act. County
a public authority is to be exercised by Commisssoners v. Jones, 7 Ind. 3, 5
two officers a number not admitting (1855).
of a majority — regularly, both should When majority may lawfully execute
act; yet, to prevent a failure of justice, powers of a public nature. Commissioners
it seems one may, in certain cases, as V. Leckey, 6 Serg. & Rawle (Pa.), 170;
where the other is dead, disqualified, or Baltimore Turnpike, 5 Binn. (Pa.) 484;
absent, act alone. But certain it is, that McCready v. Guardians, 9 Serg. & Rawle
where one only acts, the consent of the (Pa.), 99; Commonwealth v. Commis-
other will be presumed. This is an appli- sioners, 9 Watts (Pa.), 466, 471; Cooper v.
cation of the strong presumption which Lampeter, 8 Watts (Pa.), 128 ; Caldwell
obtains in favor of the performance of v. Harrison, 11 Ala. 755; Commissioners
official duty. Downing v. Rugar, 21 v. Tarver, 21 Ala. 661 ; Crist v. Town
Wend. (N. Y.) 178 (1839), and authori. Trustees, 10 Ind. 462; Somerset v. Par-
ties cited. This case also holds that the son, 105 Pa. St. 360; Schenck v. Peay, 1
presumption of consent should be rebutted Dillon C. C. R. 267.
only by the testimony of the other officer.
362
§ 284
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
remain present till the act is completed ; and therefore if one of such
parts deserts or withdraws, though wrongfully and to defeat any
action, before the act is consummated, the act is not valid. The
liability of this rule to abuse, since it enables one of the parts of a
joint meeting or assembly to defeat any action whatever, has led the
courts in this country to deny its applicability here, or to apply it
with caution.2
1 King v. Williams, 2 Maule & Sel. mon council and these aldermen, twenty-
141; following King v. Buller, 8 East, three in all, being a majority of both
389 ; questioning King v. Norris, 1 Bar- boards, proceeded to elect city officers ;
nard. K. B. 385; cited and reviewed, 7 and it was held, ist, that the election
Cow. 526, note; King v. Miller, 6 Term was valid ; and 2d, that a majority of
R. 278; 2 Kent's Com. 292. Mr. Will the twenty-three present could elect. In
cock vindicates the rule, but on grounds reference to this decision it may be ob-
not very satisfactory. Corp. 53, 54. served that the court take no notice of
Supra, sec. 271.
the power of compelling the attendance
2 Humphrey, In re, 10 Wend. N. Y. of the absentees, and that this provision
612 (1834); People v. Batchelor, 22 N. Y. seemed to contemplate the presence of a
128, 146 ; per Denio, J.; First Parish v. majority of cach of the constituent bodies.
Stearns, 21 Pick. (Mass.) 148 (1838); The court cite and approve Whiteside v.
Coles Co. v. Allison, 23 Ill. 437. Ante, People, 26 Wend. 634, and Huniphrey,
sec. 271.
In re, 10 Wend. 612; in both of which,
The comnion-law rule, that to the due however, the constituent bodies, so to call
constitution of a corporate assembly a ma- them, duly met, but refused to act. It is
jority, at least, of each integral or compo. substantially admitted by the court that
nent part or body must necessarily be the decision they make is not in conform-
present, was departed from by the Su- ity with the English rule, but they con-
preme Court of New Hampshire in the sider it to be the one " which will best
case of Beck v. Hanscom. By the charter, enable the government of the city to pro-
the city government of Portsmouth was ceed with regularity ;
" and that " after
vested in a mayor,
one council of seven, every preliminary step has been properly
to be denominated the board of aldermen, taken, the mere neglect of one of the
and one council of twenty-one, to be de- constituent bodies to carry its previous
nominated the common council, which vote into effect ought not to hinder the
boards should, in their joint capacity, be other bodies from performing the duties
denominated the city council.” It was required by the charter.' Per Gilchrist,
further provided by the charter that a C. J., in Beck v. Hanscom, supra, 9 Fost.
“majority of each board shall constitute (29 N. H.) 213, 226. In Kimball v. Mar-
a quorum ;" that the two bodies shall sit shall, 44 N. H. 465 (1863), Bell v. Hans-
and act separately, except “when the two com, supra, is approved, and its doctrine
are required to meet in convention;" that applied to a different state of facts.
at the meeting of the city council in Effect of refusal of one of two distinct
convention, if it shall appear that a ma- bodies to go into a joint meeting, or, aſter
jority of either of said bodies is not pres. being assembled in joint meeting, to par-
ent,” the members may compel the ato ticipate in "the joint ballot” by which
tendance of the absentees, &c. The board officers (by statute) are to be removed or
of aldermen and the common council
council appointed, see, in Court of Errors, Whit-
separately voted to meet in convention on side v. The People, 26 Wend. (N. Y.) 634
the 12th of June, for the choice of city (1841), reversing decision of Supreme
officers ; but when the time arrived, only Court in same case, 23 Wend. 9. See
a minority (three out of seven) of the Act of Congress of July 25, 1866 (14
board of aldermen appeared. The com- Statutes at Large, 243), regulating the
.
$ 286 MEETINGS; NOTICE OF SPECIAL MEETINGS; HOW GIVEN. 363
§ 285 (223). Stated and Special Meetings; Power to adjourn;
Notice. - The usual division of the meetings of corporate bodies is
into (1) stated or regular, and (2) special meetings; and meetings of
either class possess an incidental power of adjournment, from whence
we have another class known as adjourned meetings. The time of
holding regular or stated meetings is fixed by the charter, or by
ordinance or by-law passed in pursuance thereof; and, in either
case, the time thus appointed is presumed to be known to the
members of the body; and unless the charter or by-law otherwise
provides, it is their duty to attend such meetings without further
or special notice. Absent members, equally with those who are
present, are bound by whatever is lawfully done at a regular or
stated meeting, or any regular and valid adjourned meeting: 1
§ 286 (224). Notice of Special Meetings; how given. - If the
meeting be a special one, the general rule is, unless modified by
the charter or statute, that notice is necessary, and must be person-
ally served, if practicable, upon every member entitled to be present,
so that each one may be afforded an opportunity to participate
and vote. By the charter of a city, the power of imposing taxes
election of United States senators by the cases cited in valuable note ; Downing v.
legislatures of the several States in joint Rugar, 21 Wend. (N. Y.) 178; Burgess
assembly, containing provisions (the neces- v. Pue, 2 Gill (Md.), 254; Stow v. Wyse,
sity for which has been shown by expe- 7 Conn. 214 ; Harding v. Vandewater, 40
rience) to prevent one of the bodies from Cal. 77 ; Smyth v. Darley, 2 House Lords
defeating action.
Cases, 789. (1849). A charter provision
1 People v. Batchelor, 22 N. Y. 128 that the council shall meet at such time
(1860); Smith v. Law, 21 N. Y. 296 ; and place as they may by resolution di-
ante, secs. 277, 278 ; State v. Smith (pre- rect does not preclude other meetings
sumptions of regularity), 22 Minn. 218 than those fixed by such resolution, and
(1875); (inte, secs. 266, note, 269 ; post, such other meetings are valid if all the
secs. 286, note, 287, note, as to presump- members actually attend and participate
tion of regularity ; Hudson Co. v. State in the proceedings, and they are otherwise
(presumptions of regularity), 4 Zabr. (24 regular. State v. Smith, 22 Minn. 218.
N. J. L.) 718 ; Insurance Co. v. Sanders, Presumption that all members were pres-
36 N. H. 252. See and compare State ent and acted. Ib. Ante, secs. 266, note,
v. Jersey City, 1 Dutch. (N. J.) 309. If 269, 285, note ; post, 292, note.
the charter does not provide for the man- At a stated meeting of a select body at
ner in which the time for holding “stated which all the members are not present, it
meetings ” shall be fixed, the city council is not competent, in the opinion of the
may fix or change the time by simple Court of Appeals of New York, in the
motion, though it has previously been absence of a statute or by-law to that
fixed by a formal resolution, approved effect, to appoint a future new or special
and published. State v. Kantler, 33 Ineeting to determine independent matters
Minu. 69.
not taken up, and which could not legally
· People v. Batchelor, 22 N. Y. 128, have been taken up at the stated meeting,
134, per Selden, J.; 16. 146, per Denio, J.; and to act at such future time, unless all
Rogers, In re, 7 Cow. (N. Y.) 526, and have actual notice. If any one thus en-
364
§ 287
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
belonged to the inhabitants assembled in annual town meeting.
It was provided that if at this meeting no tax was voted, or an
insufficient tax, the common council “should call a meeting of the
inhabitants, by advertisement or otherwise,” for the purpose of
having them vote a tax. The court seemed to be of opinion that
the common council were obliged to specify the objects of the call in
their notice, it being a special meeting; and it decided that if it did
specify a particular purpose, that any act of the meeting “wholly
beside the special purpose of the meeting as stated," was void.
$ 287 (225). Adjournment of Regular Meeting. — A regular meet-
ing, unless special provision is made to the contrary, may adjourn
to a future fixed day; and at such meeting it will be lawful to
transact any business which might have been transacted at the
stated meeting, of which it is, indeed, but the continuation. Unless
such be the special requirement of the charter or of a by-law, or the
established or general usage, the adjourned regular meeting would
not, it is supposed, be limited to completing particular items of
business which had been actually entered upon and left unfinished
at the first meeting; but might, if the adjournment was general, do
any act which might lawfully have been done had no adjournment
taken place. Where the meeting, if a regular one, can only act
upon a specific matter, or, if a special one, can only act upon matters
of which notice has been given to the members, while it is com-
petent in either case to adjourn, the adjourned meeting is in both
cases limited, equally with the first meeting, to the specified
matters.3
titled to notice does not receive it, and is Brooks, 36 La. An. 641 ; Ex parte Mi-
not present, the action is void. People v. rande, 73 Cal. 365. Ante, secs. 269, 285.
Batchelor, 22 N. Y. 128 (1860); to be Adjournment by minority to day ap-
read in connection with Smith v. Law, 21 pointed for regular meeting. People
N. Y. 296.
v. Rochester, 5 Lansing (N. Y.), 142
1 Bergen v. Clarkson, 1 Halst. (N. J.) (1871).
352 (1796). See, also, Rex v. Liverpool, 8 Scadding v. Lorant, 5 Eng. Law and
2 Burr. 735 ; Rex v. Doncaster, Ib. 738; Equity, 16 ; s. C. 17 Law T. 225, H. of
King v. Mayor, &c., 1 Str. 385 ; Machell L. (1851). In this case, the statute (a local
v. Nevinson, 2 Ld. Raym. 1355 ; 2 Bac. act) required notice to be given of a meet-
Abr. 18.
ing of vestrymen to be held for the pur.
2 Smith v. Law, 21 N. Y. 296 ; War. pose of incling a rate for the relief of the
ner v. Mower, 11 Vt. 385 ; People v. poor. Such notice was given, specifying
Batchelor, 22 N. Y. 128 ; Rawlinson on the purpose of the meeting ; the meeting
Corp. (5th ed.) 136, note ; Rex v. Harris, was held accordingly on the 12th of Au-
1 B. & A. 936 ; Scadding v. Lorant, 5 Eng. gust, when it was resolved that a rate
Law and Equity, 16 (1851); People v. should be made ; but as the details could
Martin, 1 Seld. (5 N. Y.) 22 ; Street Case, not be completed, the meeting was ad-
1 La. An. 412; Hudson Co. v. State, 4 journed, and at an adjourned meeting the
Zabr. (24 N. J, L.) 718; New Orleans v. matter of the rate was completed ; but the
1
§ 288 MEETINGS ; MODE OF PROCEEDING WHEN CONVENED.
365
After a
§ 288 (226). Mode of Proceeding when convened.
meeting of the council is duly convened, the mode of proceeding is
regulated by the charter or constituent act, by ordinances passed
for that purpose, and by the general rules, so far as in their nature
applicable, which govern other deliberative and legislative bodies.
If the council consists of two boards, the concurrence of both is
essential to valid legislation, and this concurrence must be by simul-
taneously existing bodies. The rule of legislative bodies consisting
of two branches, that unfinished business at the end of a session is
discontinued, and must be afterwards taken up anew, if at all, was
considered applicable to the legislative acts of the common council
of New York, composed of a board of aldermen and a board of
assistant aldermen.3
notice for the adjourned meeting contained as it seems to be understood in this coun.
no mention of the purpose for which the try, viz. that under the conditions stated
meeting assembled. And the question in the text the adjourned meeting may
which the House of Lords put to the transact any business which might have
judges in reference to the adjourned meet- been transacted by the regular meeting.
ing, was: “Supposing the rate to be Presumption as to regularity of ad-
otherwise valid, was it invalid by reason journment when proceedings of the ad-
of the notice not stating the purpose for journed meeting come before the court.
which the [adjourned] meeting assem-
Hudson Co. v. State, 4 Zabr. (24 N. J. L.)
bled ?” The judges answered : “We are 718 ; Insurance Co. v. Sortwell, 8 Allen
unanimously of opinion that the rate was (Mass.), 217; State v. Jersey City, 1
not rendered invalid by reason of the Dutch. (N. J.) 309 ; State V. Smith,
alleged defect in the notice of the ad. 22 Minn. 218 (1875). Supra, sec. 285,
journed meeting. It was sufficient to give note.
notice (as required by the act] on the 1 Where an ordinance is enacted in ac-
church door, of the purpose for which cordance with the provisions of a statute,
the first meeting was to be held, and, that the fact that in its passage a parliamen-
notice having been duly given, we think tary rule was violated, will not render it
that the notice so given extended to all invalid. McGraw v. Whitson, 69 Iowa,
the adjourned meetings, such adjourned 348. Where the mayor has the right to
meetings being held for the purpose of vote only in case of a tie, he may law-
completing the uufinished business of the fully exercise the power when one half the
first meeting, and being in continuation members of the council have voted and
of that meeting.” And such was the the other half have abstained from voting.
judgment of the House of Lords. See, Launtz v. People, 113 Ill. 137. Ante, sec.
also, Rex v. Harris, 1 Barn. & Ad. 936. 270.
“
Meetings may be adjourned, but noth- 2 Wetmore v. Story, 22 Barb. (N. Y.)
ing may be transactel at any adjourned 414 (1856).
meetiny save the unfinished business of 8 Wetmore v. Story, 22 Barb. (N. Y.)
the former meeting.” Brice's Ultra Vires, 414 (1856). A subsequent council is
Green's Am. ed. 534, citing Reg. v. Grim- bound by knowledge duly communicated
shaw, 10 Q. B. 747, which holds that at to a previous council. Bank v. Seton, 1
an adjourned quarterly meeting notice Pet. (U. S.) 299 (1828). In Common
must be given of any business not actually wealth v. Lancaster, 5 Watts (Pa.), 152,
begun at the quarterly meeting, but of Gibson, C. J., expressed his opinion to be
business actually begun no notice is ne- that, notwithstanding a by-law or rule re-
cessary. The text, sec. 287, states the rule quires certain corporate acts to be in a
366
$ 290
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
§ 289 (227). Committees of Council. — The council may ascertain
facts through the medium of a committee, and the members of the
council may, where they know the facts of their personal knowledge,
act without further inquiry. As a public corporation may entirely
revoke the powers of a committee it has appointed, so it may con-
trol the execution of those powers by increasing the number of the
committee. If the new members, either by design or mistake, are
excluded from acting, the proceedings of the others will be
irregular.2
§ 290 (228). Right to rescind Previous Acts. At any time
before the rights of third persons have vested, a council or other
corporate body may, if consistent with its charter and rules of
action, rescind previous votes and orders. Thus a vote levying a
given form, and that alterations of such designate the place for themselves, at
by-law or rule shall only be made by a any time before the ground was pre-
vote of two thirds of the members, yet pared," on indemnifying the plaintiff for
that a majority may repeal the by-law or any extra labor or expense which their
rule, and may, without such repeal, do fluctuating proceedings may have occa-
valid acts, not in the prescribed form, by a sioned. A notice to appear before a com-
majority vote.
mittee to whoin a matter, as, for example,
1 Bissell V. Jeffersonville, 24 How. the laying out or altering of a street, has
(U. S.) 287, 296, per Clifford, J.; Com- been duly referred, is equivalent to a
monwealth v. Pittsburgh, 14 Pa. St. 177 ; notice to appear before the city council,
Main v. Ft. Smith, 49 Ark. 480. Coun- as, for this purpose, the committee repre-
cil may order sewer to be built by a com- sent the council. Preble v. Portland, 45
mittee. Collins v. Holyoke, 146 Mass. Me. 241 (1858).
298 (1888); Dorey v. Boston, 146 Mass. 8 Bigelow v. Hillman, 37 Me. 58 ; Reiff
336, 339, and cases cited. As to power of v. Conner, 5 Eng. (10 Ark.) 241 ; State v.
council to appoint officers, and when it Hoyt, 2 Oreg. 246 ; ante, sec. 69 ; Road
may delegate its powers to a committee. Case, 17 Pa. St. 71, 75 ; New Orleans v.
Ib.; Preble v. Portland, 45 Me. 241 ; Sal- St. Louis Church, 11 La. An. 244. Recon-
mon v. Haynes, 50 N. J. L. 97 (1888); sideration at subsequent meeting. Locke
ante, secs. 96, 200, 283, note. The English v. Rochester, 5 Lansing (N. Y.), 11
Municipal Corporations Act 1882, sec. 22, (1871); Sank v. Philadelphia, 1 Pa. Leg.
provides that "the council may appoint Gaz. Rep. 259. “The right of reconsider.
out of their own body such and so many ing lost measures (at the same meeting, or
committees as they think fit, for any pur- pursuant to its rules] inheres in every
poses which in the opinion of the council body possessing legislative powers.” Per
would be hetter regulated and managed by Whelpley, G. J., Jersey City v. State, 1
means of such committees ; but the acts of Vroom (30 N. J. L.), 521, 529 (1863);
every such committee shall be submitted Red v. Augusta, 25 Ga. 386. “ All delib-
to the council for their approval.”
erative assemblies, during their session,
2 Damon v. Granby, 2 Pick. (Mass.) have a right to do and undo, consider and
345 (1824). In this case it was further reconsider, as often as they think proper,
held, where the agents of a town con- and it is the result only which is done.
tracted with the plaintiff “to erect a Per Kirkpatrick, C. J., in State v. Foster,
meeting-house on a place to be designated 2 Halst. (N. J.) 101, 107 (1823). See,
hy a committee of the town," that the also, State v. Jersey City, 3 Dutch. (N. J.)
town might disagree to the selection, and 536. While public money is in the pos-
1
§ 291
367
MEETINGS : VOTE BY AYES AND NAYS.
tax, so long as it rests in mere resolution, and has not been acted
upon, may be reconsidered, and, if rescinded, the collector cannot
legally proceed to collect the tax.1
. 291 (229). Charter requirement of Vote by Ayes and Nays.
A provision of a city charter, that the ayes and rays shall be called
and published whenever the vote of the common council shall be
taken on any proposed improvement involving a tax or assessment
upon the citizens, was considered, by two of the three of the mem-
bers of the Supreme Court of New York, notwithstanding the use
of the word “shall,” to be directory merely, “the essential requisite
being the determination of the corporation, and not the form or
manner of expressing that determination.” 2 But an opposite view
has elsewhere, as we think properly, been taken of similar provi-
sions, the courts regarding the requirement that votes shall in such
cases be entered at large on the minutes, as intended to accomplish
session of the proper officer, the proper 24, 29 (1844), Bronson, J., dissenting;
authorities have entire control over it, S. C. in Error, 2 Denio, 323. Under a law
and they may, so far as the officer holding requiring a vote of the common council,
it is concerned, rescind a prior order (not where more than a majority is required,
yet complied with) to pay money to an to “be taken by the yeas and nays, which
individual. Tucker v. Justices, 13 Ire. shall be entered on the journal,” the pro-
(N. (.) Law, 434; Dey v. Lee, 4 Jones ceeding, to he valid, must appear from the
(N. C.) Law, 238. A resolution is not journal itself, and cannot be proved by
invalid because passed upon a reconsidera- evidence aliunde. Carlton Street, In rc,
tion of a negative vote moved by one who 16 Hun (N. Y.), 497. See McCormick v.
voted originally with the minority. Locke Bay City, 23 Mich. 457 (1871); Indianola
v. Rochester, 5 Lansing (N. Y.), 11 (1871). v. Jones, 29 Iowa, 282; Mount Morris
But in Sank v. Philadelphia, 8 Phila. Rep. Square, In re, 2 Hill, 20 ; Elmendorf v.
(by Wallace) 117, a nisi prius decision of Mayor, &c. of N. Y., 25 Wend. 693. See
the Supreme Court, it was held that the also, Solomon City v. Hughes, 24 Kan.
city councils, having once voted to sustain 211. The view expressed in the New York
the mayor's veto of an ordinance passed by cases, referred to and approved. St. Louis
them, could not reconsider this vote, nor v. Foster, 52 Mo. 513 (1873); per Wagner,
take any further action on the measure. 6 J.; post, sec. 450, note. In Morrison v.
Am. Law Rev. 720.
Lawrence, 98 Mass. 219, the grant of an
The vote of a town meeting rescinding important special power was construed to
its former action in authorizing a subscrip- require, as a condition to its exercise, the
tion in aid of a railroad held to be lawful, taking of the ayes and nays, and a record
no rights of third parties having vested, of the vote. The decision or determina.
and nothing having been done under the tion of a question by a town meeting or
authority to subscribe. Estey v. Starr, common council should be, and probably
56 Vt. 690. A vote ratifying a contract must be, by a formal vote or resolution.
made by town officers without due author. People v. Adams, 9 Wend. (N. Y.) 333
ity cannot be rescinded so as to affect the (1832); Denning v. Roome, 6 Wend.
validity of the contract. Brown v. Win. (N. Y.) 651 (1831). A requirement that
terport, 79 Me. 305.
the vote “shall in all cases be taken by
1 Stoddard v. Gilman, 22 Vt. 568; Pond ayes and noes " held not to apply to votes
v. Negus, 3 Mass. 230.
on motions to adjourn. Green Bay v.
2 Striker v. Kelly, 7 Hill (N. Y.), 9, Brauns, 50 Wis. 204.
368
$ 292
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
an important public purpose, and therefore consider the provision as
mandatory, and its observance essential to valid corporate action.
The proper remedy for the council is to cause a nunc pro tunc entry
to be made. This it has power to do.3 Statutory provision re-
quiring for the passage of municipal ordinances of a general nature
that they be read on three different days, unless three-fourths of all
the members elected shall dispense with the rule, is mandatory.
Thus where two ordinances were reported for passage, and the
requisite number voted in favor of suspending the rule for reading
on different days, and the ordinances were respectively passed, it
was held that the vote suspending the rules applied only to the first
ordinance, and that the second was not legally adopted.
§ 292 (230). Acts by less than Quorum void. — Acts done when
less than a legal quorum is present, or which were not concurred in
by the requisite number, are void. This is a fundamental rule in
1 Steckert v. East Saginaw, 22 Mich. of all the aldermen present, such vote
104 (1870), where the purpose of the re- to be by ayes and nays on the record
quirement is well expounded; Spangler of the common council ; if, when the
v. Jacoby, 14 Ill. 297 ; Supervisors, &c. v. record is presented, it does not appear that
People, 25 Ill. 181 ; Morrison v. Law- the improvement was ordered by a vote
rence, supra; McCormick v. Bay City, 23 of three-fourths of the aldermen present,
Mich. 457 (1871); Delphi v. Evans, 36 by vote entered by ayes and nays, the
Ind. 90 (1871); Cutler v. Russellville, 40 ordinance is void, and judgment for a sale
Ark. 105 ; Town of Olin v. Meyers, 55 of the property to pay the local assessment
Iowa, 209. Accordingly a provision of cannot rightfully be entered.
Rich v.
statute that no ordinance for the improve. Chicago, 59 Ill. 286 (1871).. Effect of
ment of a street should be adopted, except such a provision on the power to make a
upon the report and recommendation of contract by parol. Indianola v. Jones,
the city board of improvements, and re- 29 Iowa, 282 (1870); post, sec. 449, and
quiring that such report be recorded in its note.
proceedings, is mandatory, and the report 2 Logansport v. Crockett, 64 Ind. 319;
and recommendation were held jurisdic- Mayhew v. Gay Head, 13 Allen, 129;
tional, and not provable by párol evidence. Steckert v. East Saginaw, 22 Mieh. 104;
Reynolds v. Schweinefus, 1 Sup. Court, Delphi v. Evans, 36 Ind. 90; Commis.
Cin. (Ohio) Rep. 215.
sioners v. Hearne, 59 Ala. 371; Musselman
Where a general law required the yeas v. Manly, 42 Ind. 462 ; Vawter v. Frank.
and pays to be called and recorded on the lin College, 53 Ind. 88.
passage of all ordinances, it was held by 8 See preceding note.
the Supreme Court of Colorado that when 4 Bloom v. City of Xenia, 32 Ohio St.
the record failed to show such calling and 461 ; ; S. P. Morrison 1. Lawrence, 98
recording as to an ordinance concerning Mass. 219 ; State v. Hudson, 5 Dutch.
misdemeanors, the ordinance was a nullity (N. J.) 478 ; Delphi v. Evans, 36 Ind. 90.
and a conviction under it void. Tracy v. This is not the rule in New York. Cases
The People, 6 Col. 151.
supra.
Where a local improvement is proposed, 6 Logansport v. Legg, 20 Ind. 315
and it is not petitioned for by a majority (1863); Ferguson v. Chittenden Co., 1 Eng.
of the owners of property to be assessed, (6 Arle) 479 (1846); Price v. Railroad
the charter declares that it shall be ordered Company, 13 Ind. 58 (1859); McCracken
only by the vote of at least three-fourths v. San Francisco, 16 Cal. 591; Pimental
!
$ 292
369
ACTS BY LESS THAN QUORUM VOID.
the law of corporations; but whether, in favor of the holder of ne-
gotiable securities issued, or purporting to be issued, under authority
conferred by the legislature, the corporation might not, in some
cases, be estopped to show that a quorum was not present or that
the requisite number did not concur in the act, is a question which
remains, perhaps, to be settled. It is clear that members of a
council cannot properly act upon questions in which their own
pecuniary interest is directly and specially involved. But it has
been held in Michigan that proceedings on the part of a municipal
corporation ordering a paving improvement are not rendered invalid
on the ground that two of the aldermen who formed part of the
quorum of the common council which ordered the improvement,
and without whose presence there would have been no quorum,
were petitioners for the improvement and owners of property liable
to assessment therefor. It might be otherwise, the court concede,
if the common council acted as cominissioners of apportionment
in making the assessment upon the property that was to bear the
burden, or on the confirmation of a report in which the interest of
these aldermen was directly involved.
v. San Francisco, 21 Cal. 351 ; State v. express provision to this effect in the
Wilkesville, 20 Ohio St. 288. Number English Municipal Corporations Act of
present and acting, how proved. 13 Ind, 1882, sec. 22.
58, suprul.
Presence of quorum, when 8 Steckert v. East Saginaw, 22 Mich.
presumed. Insurance Company v. Sort- 104 (1870), where the reasons for the dis-
well, 8 Allen (Mass.), 217. Ante, secs. tinctions taken are clearly stated by
266, note, 267, note, 285, note, 286, note. Cooley, J. In the same State it was also
1 See ante, sec. 89; post, chapter on held that the mayor of a city, who was a
Contracts. Construction of charter pro- practising lawyer, might lawfully be emr-
vision requiring unanimity. Post, sec. ployed, when there was no collusion or
310.
fraud, and no doubt as to the necessity
2 Members of a municipal board are and value of his services, by a resolution
disqualified to vote therein on proposic of the council to appear and defend a suit
tions in which they have a direct pecu. against the city, and that he could recover
niary interest adverse to the municipality the value of his services. Niles, Mayor,
they represent. Oconto County Sup. v. &c. v. Muzzy, 33 Mich. 61 (1875); s. C.
Hall, 47 Wis. 208; Pickett v. School Dist., 20 Am. Rep. 670.
25 Wis. 551 ; Coles v. Williamsburgh, 10 Right of corporation to contract with its
Wend. 659; Walworth Bank v. F. L. & T. officers or councilmen. Ante, sec. 283,
Co., 16 Wis. 629 ; United Brethren Church note, and cases cited ; post, sec. 443,
v. Vandusen, 37 Wis. 54. Post, chap. Dote.
xiv. ; ante, sec. 237, note. There is an
NOTE. In Rushville Gas Co. v. Rushville (Ind. Sup. Ct. 1889, MSS., 41 Alb. L.
J. 143), the city council was composed of six members, all of whom were present and
qualified to vote upon a resolution, which, when submitted, was voted for by three
members, the other three, though present, refusing to vote. The court held that the
resolution, having received the vote of a majority of a quorum, although not of a major-
ity of all present, was legally adopted. It deserves further consideration whether this
result is consistent with the majority rule applicable to definite bodies.
VOL. I.
- 24
370
$ 294
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
CHAPTER XI.
CUSTODY. --- RIGHT OF
CORPORATE RECORDS AND DOCUMENTS.
INSPECTION.
§ 293 (231). Power to appoint Clerk pro tem. — Corporations
have the incidental power, if the regular clerk is temporarily absent,
to appoint a private person a clerk pro tem., for the purpose of mak-
ing the entries of what is transacted at the corporate meeting. His
entries, made by the direction of the corporate authorities, or en-
tries made by the regular clerk from memoranda furnished by the
clerk pro tem., are competent evidence of the proceedings of the
meeting 1
$ 294 (232). Amendment of Record. The clerk or officer of a
New England town,? who has made an erroneous record, may, while
in office (but not afterwards), or after a re-election to the same office,
amend the same according to the truth, being liable, like a sheriff who
amends his return, for any abuse of the right; as, where he makes a
fraudulent or untruthful amendment, the town is not concluded or
1 Hutchinson v. Pratt, 11 Vt. 402 331 ; Logansport v. Crockett, 64 Ind. 319
(1839). See also Rex v. Mothersell, 1 Stra. (1878), citing text.
93, also referred to infra. Board of public 2 Ante, secs. 29, 30, as to New Eng.
works of a city is a quasi corporation, land towns. New Haven, &c., Railroad
and the nature of its duties, laying out Co. v. Chatham, 42 Conn. 465. Speaking
streets, establishing grades, sewers, &c., of the records of the town of Concord,
requires it to keep a record of its proceed Massachusetts, Ralph Waldo Emerson in
ings, although no such record is in terms his Concord Address says: “I have read
provided for. Larned v. Briscoe, 62 Mich. with care the town records themselves.
393 (1886). Sufficiency of memoranda. They exhibit a pleasing picture of a com.
Louisville v. McKegney, 7 Bush (Ky.), munity almost exclusively agricultural,
651 (1870). Failure of clerk to take oath where no man has much time for words,
of office does not invalidate his record. in his search after things ; of a community
Stebbins o. Merrit, 10 Cush. (Mass.) 27 ; of great simplicity of manners, and of a
ante, sec. 214. Signature of chairman manifest love of justice. I find our annals
to minutes affixed at a day subsequent to marked with a uniform good sense. The
the meeting held sufficient, under a statute tone of the record rises with the dignity of
requiring the minutes of corporate meetings the event. These soiled and musty books
to be signed by the chairman. Miles v. are luminous and electric within. The
Bough, 3 Gale & D. 119 ; Inglis v. Rail- old town clerks did not spell very correctly,
way Co., 16 Eng. Law & Eq. 55. See but they contrive to make intelligible the
also ante, chapters relating to Corporate will of a free and just community."
Meetings and Corporate Officers ; post, sec.
1
§ 294
371
CORPORATE RECORDS ; AMENDMENT OF RECORD.
bound by an erroneous record, whether made by design or accident,
unless when it would on general principles be estopped.1
i Cass v. Bellows, 11 Fost. (31 N. H.) upon the committee, was not a legal one,
501 (1855); Harris v. School District, 8 because not held at the time and place
Fost. (28 N. H.) 58, 66 (1853); Gibson v. appointed ; and it was considered by the
Bailey, 9 N. H. 168; Whittier v. Varney, court that the plaintiff's remedy was against
10 N. H. 291; Welles v. Battelle, 11 Mass. the committee, and not against the town,
477; Low v. Pettengill, 12 N. H. 340 ; if the former acted without authority.
Pierce v. Richardson, 37 N. H. 306; Scam. See further as to correcting and aniending
mon v. Scammon, 8 Fost. (28 N. H.) 429; records, Williams v. School District, 21
President, &c. v. O'Malley, 18 [ll. 407 Pick. 75, holding that where two different,
(1857); Mott v. Reynolds, 27 Vt. (1 Wms.) but not contradictory records were made
206 (1855); Boston Turnpike Co. v. Pom- up by the clerk from memoranda taken at
fret, 20 Conn. 590 (1850); compare Cov- the meeting, both were originals and com-
ington v. Ludlow, 1 Met. (Ky.) 295, below petent testimony.
cited.
Clerk cannot amend records after he is out
The necessity and reasonableness of the of office. School District v. Atherton, 12
doctrine stated in the text are thus ex- Met. (Mass.) 105 (1846); Hartwell v. Lit-
pounded by Parker, C. J., in Welles v. tleton, 13 Pick. (Mass.) 229, 232 (1832).
Battelle, 11 Mass. 477, 481 (1814): “We Contra, to the effect that he may amend,
have had frequent occasion to perceive the though out of office at the time, see Gib-
great irregularity which prevails in the son v. Bailey, 9 N. H. 168 (1838); Gibson
records of our towns and other municipal v. Bailey followed in Missouri in one case,
corporations; and the courts have always Kiley v. Cranor, 51 Mo. 541, 543 (1873).
been desirous to uphold these proceedings, But may, while he is in office. Bishop v.
where no fraud or wilful error was discov- Cone, 3 N. H. 513 (1821); Hoag v. Durfey,
erable. Too much strictness on subjects of 1 Aiken (Vt.), 286 (1826); Chamberlain v.
this nature would throw the whole body Dover, 13 Me. 466 (1836). That successor
politic into confusion (Kellar v. Savage, cannot make the amendment. State v.
17 Me. 444). For it cannot be expected Williams, 25 Me. 555, 561 ; 29 Me. 523 ;
that, in all corporations, persons will be Taylor v. Henry, 2 Pick. (Mass.) 397.
every year selected who are capable of But the corporation might, in proper cases,
performing their duty with the exactness anthorize the successor to supply the
which would be useful or convenient. ... omitted, or correct the erroneous, entry.
The first entry made by the clerk here Hutchinson v. Pratt, 11 Vt. 402, 419.
(that an officer was sworn into office) was Bonds of a city which by statute are
certainly defective, but the defect is prop. directed to be signed by the mayor, but
erly cured by the subsequent entry of the which were in fact signed by the ex-mayor,
existing clerk, he being the same person were held to be void even in the hands of
that officiated at the time of the first entry. a bona fide holder for value. Coler v.
He will be sufficiently watched by in- Cleburne, 131 U, S. 162 (1889).
terested parties, to render a deviation from In New Hampshire it is the practice to
truth neither safe nor easy.” The doctrine allow these amendments only upon the
of the case in 11 Mass. 477 was followed order of the Supreme Court or Court of
and applied in Chamberlain v. Dover, 13 Common Pleas by the officer by whom
Me. 466 (1836), where it was further held they were made, even after he has ceased
that the municipal body was not bound by to hold the office. A clear case must be
an erroneous record of a clerk, even though made out. The court do not permit any
the plaintiffs, confiding in its correctness, erasures or interlineations of the original
had made a building contract with the record, but require the amendment to be
“contracting and building committee" written upon a separate piece of paper,
named in the record. The meeting in this signed by the proper officers, and with it
case, which attempted to confer this power a copy of the order allowing the amend.
372
$ 296
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
$ 295 (233). Same subject. — In a case in Vermont, the clerk of
the town, pending the trial, amended the record by adding his signa-
ture as clerk to the record of the warning for the meeting in ques-
tion. His right to do so, though he had meantime been out of
office, but was again restored, was sanctioned by the Supreme Court,
Redfield, C. J., remarking: “We think, in general, it must be
regarded as the right of the clerk of a town or other municipal
corporation, while having the custody of the records, to make any
record according to the facts. His having been out of office, and
restored again, could not deprive him of that right. But even an
officer could not alter or amend a record upon the testimony of
third persons ordinarily, and ought not to do it upon his own
recollection, unless in very obvious cases of omission or error, of
which the present might fairly be regarded as one, probably. Such
amendments should ordinarily be made by the original documents
or minutes.” 1
The right
§ 296. Right of Clerk to amend Records ex parte.
of the clerk ex parte to amend the records of the proceedings of town
corporations was very thoroughly considered in a case in Connecticut.2
The statute of that State requires town-clerks to keep the record
books of their respective towns, and to enter truly all the votes and
proceedings of the town. The town-clerk made an entry showing
that at a town-meeting held in 1843, the town assumed to the
plaintiff a liability to commence January 1, 1844. If the time
thus stated was the true time, the plaintiff had a cause of action
against the town. In 1849 the clerk, not upon his own personal
knowledge, or upon any written memorandum, but on the informa-
tion of others (with the correctness of which, however, he was per-
fectly satisfied), amended the record so as to show that the liability
of the town was not, by the vote, to commence until April 1, 1844.
If this was the true time, the plaintiff had no cause of action. The
majority of the court (three judges against two) held that the clerk,
ment; and this paper is annexed to the 2 Boston Turnpike Co. v. Pomfret, 20
original record. Pierce v. Richardson, 37 Conn. 590 (1850). The subject of amend.
N. H. 306, 311, per Bell, J.
ments of the records of the proceedings
1 Mott v. Reynolds, 27 Vt. (1 Wms.) of a common council in Connecticut, when
206, 208 (1855). Amendments in open it can be made by the clerk and when by
court of town record by clerk of the order of court upon mandamus, is con.
town, pending trial to which the clerk is sidered in Samis v. King, 40 Conn. 298
a party, and to meet a particular decision (1873). Parties to mandamus to compel
of the court, disregarded. Hadley v. the clerk of a city to amend record.
Chamberlin, 11 Vt. 618 (1839). Com- Farrell v. King, 41 Conn. 448 (1874);
mented on and distinguished. Mott v. Logansport v. Crockett, 64 Ind. 319
Reynolds, 27 Vt. (1 Wms.) 206 (1855). (1878).
!
.
§ 297 CORPORATE RECORDS; WHEN AMENDED, AND BY WHOM. 373
still continuing in office, was competent to amend the record ; that
this power is derived solely from his official character and does not
depend on the permission of the court in which the record is offered
as an instrument of evidence, nor on inquiry into the truth of it as
originally made, or as amended, and that such a record is, in such
an action, conclusive evidence of its own truth. The dissenting
judges, without denying the power of amendment in all cases, were
of opinion that, in view of the lapse of time and the absence of
written memoranda or personal recollection by the clerk, the clerk
had no authority to make the amendment, and that the correct
course would have been to make application to the proper court by
legal process, e. g., mandamus, to correct the mistake in the record,
if one existed, and thus give the opposite interested party an oppor-
tunity to show that the record was already right. It would seem,
under the special circumstances, that the dissenting view was the
better one.
§ 297 (234). When Record amended, and by whom. Where
the clerk makes up the record of the proceedings of the council, and
it is read and approved at the same or at a subsequent meeting, the
author doubts the authority of the clerk, on his own motion, to amend
it afterwards without the direction of the council. The council,
unless private rights have attached, may, doubtless, order the record
of its own proceedings, even after it has once been approved, to be
corrected according to the facts. The Court of Appeals of Kentucky,
without determining the extent of the power of the same council at
a subsequent meeting to correct errors and omissions in the journal
entry of proceedings at a previous meeting, decided that this could
not be done by an entirely new board in respect to the official action
of their predecessors; and it was accordingly held that where the
records, as kept, showed only that in August, 1854, an ordinance
was reported, a new council could not, in 1856, add to the records
words showing that the ordinance had passed, nor could the fact of
its passage be shown by extrinsic evidence.
1 Covington v. Ludlow, 1 Met. (Ky.) 371 ; Musselman v. Manly, 42 Ind. 462 ;
295 (1858); see, also, Lexington v. Head- Yawter v. Franklin College, 53 Ind. 88;
ley, 5 Bush (Ky.), 508 (1869); Graham Logansport v. Crockett, 64 Ind. 319;
0. Carondolet, 33 Mo. 262 ; State v. Jer Mayhew v. Gay Head, 13 Allen, 129 ;
sey City, 1 Vroom (30 N. J. L.), 93, 148, Steckert v. East Saginaw, 22 Mich. 104 ;
and ante, chapters on Corporate Meetings Poutiac v. Axford, 49 Mich. 69 ; Delphi
and Ordinances ; post, sec. 310; ante, sec. v. Evans, 36 Ind. 90 ; Chamberlain v.
290. A public corporation may, like every Evansville (nunc pro tunc entry supply.
court of record, amend its records nunc pro ing clerical omission), 77 Ind. 542 (1881),
tunc. Commissioners v. Hearne, 59 Ala. citing text.
374
$ 299
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS,
§ 298 (235). When Parol Evidence admissible, and when not.
Parol evidence may, if necessary, be admitted to apply a resolution or
recorded vote of a town to its proper subject-matter, but not, in general,
to explain, enlarge, or contradict its terms or meaning, in respect to
matters (as, for example, laying out a highway or street) regularly
within the jurisdiction of the town or its officers, and where the en-
try of record is made in pursuance of statute requirement. Where
the record of a meeting states that “the inhabitants met and ad-
journed the meeting," parol evidence may be admitted to show when
and where the meeting was held, how many were present, and how
many afterwards came, and, finding no meeting, went home.3
§ 299 (236). Same subject. — Parol evidence in a collateral action
cannot be received to contradict the records of a public corporation,
required by statute to be kept in writing, or to show a mistake in
the matters as therein recorded. Thus, if the records of a school
1 Baker v. Windham, 13 Me. (1 Shep.) for not producing the record of proceed.
74 (1836). In this case the town of Wind- iugs, which is the primary evidence. Au-
ham entered upon its records the follow- rora v. Fox, 78 Ind. 1 (1881).
ing : "Voted to indemnify Benj. Baker 3 Chamberlain v. Dover, 13 Me. 466
in his costs in the action against A. Small, (1836). But paro) evidence of an adjourn- .
which have or may arise in the same on ment to another day cannot be given so
account of Gray line,” In an action by as to validate acts done on the day ad-
Baker against the town to recover costs journed to. Taylor v. Henry, 2 Pick.
of a suit which he had brought against (Mass.) 397. Where a statute requiring
Small, parol evidence was adjudged to a record to be made of the persons sworn
have been rightly admitted to show that into office is directory, if the record is
Baker brought the action in his name not made, the fact may be shown by
against Small, on account of the Gray parol or other competent evidence. Kel.
line, at the request of the selectmen of lar v. Savage, 17 Me. (5 Shep.) 444 (1840).
Windham, for the purpose of settling a In Meth. Chapel Corp. v. Herrick, 25
disputed line between that and the ad- Me. 354, it was held, that to establish a
joiving town, with the express agreement resulting trust in the corporation (with
that the town should pay all costs, and respect to lands), it could not prove by
to show that these facts were before the parol evidence the authority of the com-
town when the vote was passed, and also mittees to act for it; the authority should
to show that the suit so instituted was appear, and could only be shown by its
conducted under the advice and direction records. Further, as to what facts may
of the authorities of the town.
be shown by parol, West Bath v. Co.
Manning v. Fifth Parish, &c., 6 Pick. Comm’rs, 36 Me. 74 ; 35 Me. 373; Smith
(Mass.) 16 ; Wild v. Deig, 43 Ind. 455 v. County Comm’rs, 42 Me. 395 ; Leavitt
(1873); Crommett v. Pearson, 18 Me. v. Eastman, 77 Me. 117 ; Long v. Battle
344 ; see Leavitt v. Eastman, 77 Me. 117; Creek, 39 Mich. 323 ; Kohlhepp v. West
Covington v. Ludlow, 1 Met. (Ky.) 295 ; Roxbury, 120 Mass. 596 ; Oliphant v.
Cabot v. Britt, 36 Vt. 349 ; Lexington v. Comm’rs, 18 Kan. 386 (1877); Austin v.
Headley, 5 Bush (Ky.), 508 (1869) ; Gal. Allen, 6 Wis. 134 ; Anderson v. Comm’rs,
braith v. Littiech, 73 Ill. 209; Pittsburgh 12 Ohic St. 635 (1861) ; Gurnsey v. Ed-
v. Cluley, 74 Pa. St. 262 ; post, sec. 310; wards, 26 V. H. 224; Lewis, Em. Dom.
ante, sec. 291. Parol evidence is not ad- sec. 605, and cases ; ante, sec. 268, and
missible where no sufficient reason is shown note ; post, sec. 310.
l
$ 300
375
CORPORATE RECORDS; PROOF OF OMITTED FACTS.
district show that the district voted to authorize their clerk to call
and warn "their annual meetings," parol evidence in an action
by the district is not admissible to prove that the real vote of the
district was to authorize the clerk to call and warn all district meet-
ings. So, where the record of a town stated the warning to have
been on the 17th, and the meeting to have been held on the 19th
of January, parol evidence cannot be admitted to show that, by
mistake, the clerk inserted the "19th " instead of the “29th.” The
remedy is, to have him correct the record, if in office, according to
the truth.2
$ 300 (237). Proof of omitted Facts by Parol. But a distinction
has sometimes been drawn between evidence to contradict facts
stated on the record and evidence to show facts omitted to be stated
upon the record. Parol evidence of the latter kind is receivable
unless the law expressly and imperatively requires all matters to
appear of record, and makes the record the only evidence. Thus,
1 School District v. Atherton, 12 Met. ing certain streets without expense to the
(Mass.) 105 (1846); Morrison v. Law- city, he should not be called on to pay
rence, 98 Mass. 219; Mayhew v. Gay any assessment when the street in ques-
Head, 13 Allen (Mass.), 129. The cases tion should at some future time be laid.
are not uniform on the subject of the
out.
It seems that such an agreement,
collateral impeachment of the record of however proved, would be of no validity.
public boards and bodies. See Lewis, Em. Gilbert v. New Haven, 40 Conn. 102
Dom. chap. xxvi. and cases,
(1873); see Nichols v. Bridgeport, 23
2 Durfey v. Hoag, 1 Aiken (Vt.), 286 Conn. 189 ; post, chap. xix. ; supra, sec.
(1826). Where the record recited that the 295.
ruies were suspended, without showing by Purchasers of such paper [bonds issued
what vote, it was conclusively presunied by cities for stock in railroads] look at the
in a collateral proceeding to be correct, form of the paper, the law which author-
and oral evidence to prove otherwise was ized it to be issued, and the recorded pro-
rejected. Eldora v. Burlingame, 62 Iowa,' ceedings on which it is based. Therefore,
32. So in Connecticut, if a town corpora- as against purchasers, the record cannot
tion makes an erroneous record of its pro- be contradicted by parol evidence. Per
ceedings, this cannot be contradicted in a Clifford, J., in Bissell v. Jeffersonville (ac-
collateral action. In such an action the tion on municipal bonds), 24 How. (U. S.)
record is conclusive. If false, and the 287, 298. See chapter xiv. on Contracts,
corporation will not correct the record, a post, as to the rights of holders of such
party interested may, by mandamus, com- securities.
pel it to make the correction. Boston 3 Moor v. Newfield, 4 Greenl. (Me.) 44
Turnpike Co. v. Pomfret, 20 Conn. 590 (1826). "The only legal mode of proving
(1850). Upon this point, all the judges, facts on record is by the record itself, or
though differing on other points, seened by an attested copy of it.” Ib., per Mellen,
to agree. So, on an appeal from an assess- C. J. ; School District v. Atherton, 12
ment for a city street, – Held, that parol Met. (Mass.) 105, 113 (1847), per Dewey,
evidence was not admissible to prove that J. ; Langsdale v. Bonton, 12 Ind. 467 ;
the common council agreed to an arrange- Indianapolis v. Imberry, 17 Ind. 175, 179;
ment proposed by the appellant and recom- Delphi v. Evans (referring to previous
mended by the committee on streets, that cases), 36 Ind. 90 (1871); Bigelow v.
in consideration of his opening and grad- Perth Amboy, 1 Dutch. (N. J.) 297
ון
376
9.300
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
in a well-considered case in the Supreme Court of the United States,
it was held that the acts of a corporation might be proved otherwise
(1855); Gearhart v. Dixon, 1 Pa. St. 224 1 Bank, &c. v. Dandridge, 12 Wheat.
(1845); Bridgford v. Tuscuinbia, 4 Woods, 64. Delivering the opinion of the court,
611; s. C. 16 Fed. R. 910. Where the Mr. Justice Story, arguendo, makes these
law or charter requires the clerk to keep a important observations: 6. Would the
journal of all of the acts and proceedings omission of the corporation to record its
of the city council, that, or a copy, is the own doings have prejudiced the rights of
proper evidence of the official doings of the party relying upon the good faith of
the body. Lowell v. Wheelock, 11 Cush. an actual vote of the corporation ? If such
(Mass.) 391 (1853); Harris v. Whitcomb, omission would not be fatal to the plaintiff
4 Gray (Mass.), 433; Morrison v. Law- in suits against the corporation (as, in our
rence, 98 Mass. 219; Louisville v. Mc- opinion, it would not be), it establishes the
Kegney, 7 Bush (Ky.), 651 (1870); post, fact that acts of the corporation, not re-
sec. 310.
corded, may be established by parol proofs,
The Supreme Court of Kansas, advert- and, of course, by presumptive proofs.
ing to the distinction in the text, sus- In reason and justice, there does not seen
tained under the circumstances stated any solid ground why a corporation may
below the introduction of parol testimony not, in case of the omission of its officers
as a means of establishing in part the pas. to preserve a written record, give such
sage of an ordinance. Troy v. Atchison, proofs to support its rights as would be
&c. Railroad Co., 13 Kan. 70 (1874); admissible in suits against it to support
S. C. 11 Kan. 519. The exact point de adverse rights. The true question in such
cided appears from the syllabus settled case would seem to be, not which party
by the judges, which is as follows : Where was plaintiff or defendant, but whether
a city fails to provide any book for the the evidence was the best the nature of
record of its ordinances, but its ordin. the case admitted of, and left nothing be-
ances, after their passage and approval, are hind in the possession or control of the
placed and kept on file in the office of the party higher than secondary evidence.
city clerk, and a third party obtains a duly We do not admit, as a general prop-
certified copy of an ordinance so placed osition, that the acts of a corporation are
and kept on file, and acts in good faith invalid merely from an omission to have
upon such ordinance, and is induced them reduced to writing, unless the stat-
partly thereby to make large expendi. ute creating it makes such writing indis-
ture of money, in a subsequent contro pensable as evidence, or gives to them an
versy between the city and such third obligatory force. If the statute imposes
parties or their assigns the rule of equita- such restriction, it must be obeyed.” (12
ble estoppel will apply to the city, and Wheat. 69, 74.) This was the case of a
the due passage and existence of said private corporation. The same principle
ordinance may be shown by parol testi- was applied, in the case of the United
mony. Troy v. Atchison, &c. Railroad States v. Fillebrown, 7 Pet. 28, to the acts
Co. et al., 13 Kan. 70 (1874); post, secs. of boards of public agents or officers, and
310, 422. In a case where the authority it was in that case accordingly held that
for grading a street was in question, parol the board of commissionery of the navy
testimony was held properly admitted to hospital fund, not being required by law
show that a clause in an ordinance grant- to reduce its proceedings to writing in or.
ing the authority had been struck out be- der to make them binding, oral evidence
fore its passage, and bad been reinstated of such proceedings (no record having
by a clerk, by whose direction it was been made) was competent. See Langs-
printed, and a printed copy thus altered dale v. Bonton, 12 Ind. 467. In a case in
placed by him in the record book. Dyer Verinont in respect of a town which is re-
v. Brogan, 70 Cal. 136. Proof of estab. quired to keep a record, it is said that it
lishment and change of grade of streets, see appears to us that in the absence of all
post, chap. xxiii.
record, it might be competent for the des
§ 301
377
CORPORATE RECORDS; PROOF OF OMITTED FACTS.
than by its records or some written document, even although it was
its duty " to keep a fair and regular record of its proceedings.” The
statute did not prescribe that nothing but a recorded vote or written
document should bind the corporation or be received as evidence.
Such written evidence was not deemed indispensable unless posi-
tively required. The direction to keep a record was regarded as
directory.
$ 301 (238). Same subject. — Where the records of a municipal
corporation have been so carelessly and imperfectly kept as not to show
the adoption of a resolution or other acts of the city council, and
there is no written evidence in existence, parol testimony may be
admitted, e. g., to show that certain work was done by authority of
the city, by proving the passage of a resolution of the council, the
appointment of a committee to make the expenditure, their report
after the work was done, and its adoption by the council.1
fendants (trustees and collector of the cor. State, however, county commissioners and
poration justifying under its proceedings) township trustees are required by law to
to show, by parol, the proceedings of the keep a true record of their proceedings,
meeting. Where there is a record, it can- and it was held under the circumstances
not be added to or varied by parol. Tay- appearing in the cases below cited, that
lor v. Henry, 2 Pick. (Mass.) 403. But they “can only speak by their record
where there is an omission to make rec- when legally assembled. County Com-
ords, the rights of other persons, acting m’rs v. Chitwood, 8 Ind. 504, 507 (1851);
under or upon the faith of a vote not re- Trustees v. Osborne, 9 Ind. 458. So, in
corded, ought not to be prejudiced. And Maine, "school districts are required by
it would seem that the right in such a law to keep an account of their proceed.
case is reciprocal in the corporation and in ings by a sworn clerk, and such proceed-
those who claim adversely to it.” Per ings can be proved only by the record or a
Williams, C. J., Hutchinson v. Pratt, 11 copy thereof duly authenticated.” Jordan
Vt. 402, 421. But compare Stevens v. v. School District, 38 Me. 164 (1854).
Eden, &c. Society, 12 Vt. 688; 16 Vt. The records of public or quasi corporations
439 ; 17 Vt. 337.
are not, in Ohio, considered to be " of
The rights of creditors or of third per. that absolute verity that any person shall
8ons cannot be prejudiced by the neglect be estopped to show the truth, in conse-
of the council to keep proper minutes ; quence of any matter which they contain
against the corporation, what the council or omit to contain ; and it was accordingly
in fact did may be shown by evidence adjudged that the fact whether an official
aliunde the record kept by it. Bigelow bond was received or refused and rejected
v. Perth Amboy, 1 Dutch. (N. J.) 297 may be shown by parol evidence, on which
(1855); San Antonio v. Lewis, 9 Tex. 69 point the record was silent. Westerhaven
(1852).
v. Clive, 5 Ohio, 136 (1821), as to records
Proof of the action and orders of a muni. of township trustees. See Green v. State,
cipal board of health, see chapter on Ordi. 8 Ohio, 310 (1838), in which it was queried
nances, post, sec. 371, note.
whether the county commissioners could
1 Ross v. Madison, 1 Ind. (Carter) 281 appoint an agent by parol or only by
(1848); Langsdale v. Bonton, 12 Ind. 467; record. In Iowa, it has been held that
Indianapolis v. Imberry, 17 Ind. 175, 179; where no record entry is made, such an
Delphi v. Evans (reviewing previous appointment may be shown by parol tes.
cases), 36 Ind. 90 (1871). In the same timony, and that the agent acted accord.
378
§ 302
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
§ 302 (239). Mandamus to enforce Delivery of Corporate Books
and Records; Replevin. — Mandamus is an appropriate remedy for
the duly elected and authorized officer of a public or municipal cor-
poration to compel the delivery to him by his predecessor, or by an
usurper, of the books, papers, records, and seal pertaining to the office.1
And such a corporation, it has been held (though the cases are con-
flicting), may maintain replevin in its name for the possession of its
record; and this action is maintainable against a stranger or any
officer or person not legally entitled to the custody of the records.2
.
ingly. Powesheik County v. Ross, 9 Iowa, point another to receive them ; and if
511 ; Athearn v. District, 33 Iowa, 105 they are not delivered over after demand,
(1871); and see acc. Ross v. Madison, 1 the corporation may obtain possession of
Ind. (Carter) 281 ; compare Meeker v. them by an action of detinue, or the court
Van Rensselaer, 15 Wend. 397. Where will compel a delivery by mandamus. Ib.
recording is not required by charter or If the predecessor in office, or, he being
law, resolutions of a council are admissi. dead, his personal representative, or an.
ble in evidence, although not recorded. other person having possession of corporate
Darlington v. Commonwealth, 41 Pa. St. documents under him, refuse to deliver
68. See post, sec. 310; Louisville v. Mc. them over to the successor or the corpora-
Kegney, 7 Bush (Ky.), 651, construing tion, on a proper application, the court
charter as to requisites of the journal re- will grant a mandamus to compel him to
quired to be kept by each board of the do so. Rex v. Nottingham, 1 Sid. 31;
council.
Anonymous, 1 Barnard. 402 ; Willc. 345;
1 Proprietors of Church v. Slack, 7 Glover, 260. This writ is said, indeed, to
Cush. (Mass.) 226, 239 (1851); Conmon. lie to any person, whether stranger or cor-
wealth v. Athearn, 3 Mass. 285; Rex v. porator, who happens to be in possession
Wildman, 2 Strange, 879; King v. In- of the books of a corporation, and who re-
gram, 1 W. Bl. 50 ; King v. Round, 4 Ad. fuses to deliver them up. Proprietors of
& El. 139; Cranford v. Powell, 2 Burr. Church v. Slack, 7 Cush. (Mass.) 226
1013; Rex v. Clapham, 1 Wils. 305 ; 3 Bl. . (1851) per Fletcher, J.; Rex v. Ingram, 1
Com. 310 ; Kimball v. Lamprey, 19 N. E. W. Bl. 50 ; Willc. 246 ; Glover, 231 ; post,
215 (1848), where the above authorities chap. xx.
are cited and digested by Gilchrist, C. J.; 9 Parish, &c. v. Stearns, 21 Pick.
Taylor v. Henry, 2 Pick. (Mass.) 397; (Mass.) 148 ; School District v. Lord, 44
Parish, &c. v. Stearns, 21 Pick. (Mass.) Me. 374 (replevin for records of dis-
148, 156 ; Bates v. Plymouth, 14 Gray trict). The court, holding that replevin
(Mass.), 163 ; Perkins v. Weston, 3 Cush. would lie, say: " The action is, there-
(Mass.) 549.
fore, rightfully brought, and may be
The following points have been ruled maintained if the defendant was not the
in respect to corporations in England: legal clerk of the district." Per Rice, J.,
If the custody of their documents belong 44 Me. 374, 384. The right or title of
to one of their officers in virtue of his an office cannot be determined by a civil
office, the corporation cannot compel him action between the respective claimants,
to deliver them up, but may require that as by au action of replevin for the official
he submit them to their inspection when- books and papers, and until the issue as
ever they think proper. Reg. v. Ipswich, to the right is determined, by quo warranto
2 Ld. Raym. 1238; Rex v. Pigram, 2 or other proper proceeding, no suit in
Burr. 767 ; Willc. 345 ; Glover, 260. replevin can be maintained by one claim.
Sometimes the custody of these docu- ant against the other for the possession of
ments is entrusted to the town-clerk or the appurtenances of the office. Des-
other officer, merely as the servant of the mond v. McCarty, 17 Iowa, 525. In La
corporation, in which case they may ap- . Grange v. State Treasurer, 24 Mich. 466,
$ 303
379
CORPORATE RECORDS, INSPECTION OF.
$ 303 (240). Inspection of Records and Papers. - Concerning
the right to inspect corporate documents and papers, the following
points have been ruled as stated by Mr. Willcock: Every corpora-
tor has a right to inspect all the records, books, and other documents
of the corporation, upon all proper occasions; and if, upon applica-
tion for that purpose, the officer who has the custody refuse to show
them, the court will grant a mandamus to enforce his right. One
who has a prima facie title to a corporate office has a right to inspect
such documents as relate to that title, and may obtain a mandamus
for this purpose before any suit has been instituted. A corporator
has a right to inspect these documents, to obtain information as to
his rights, whether in dispute with a stranger or the corporation
itself, or any of its members. hen the corporator's application
to inspect is founded on his general right, he has a mandamus, but
when it is founded on a suit pending, he obtains a rule. In an
action by one corporation against another, rules were made absolute
for each corporation to inspect so much of the books and records as
related to the subject in dispute. The motion for the rule to inspect
and to have copies should be supported by affidavits showing the
foundation of the claim, the application, the proper officer, and his
the court decided that replevin does not Bridgeman, 2 Stra. 1203; Grant on Corp.
lie for papers filed in a public office. Post, 312.
sec. 848.
In England the right to inspect the
1 Rex v. Shelley, 3 Term R. 142; Rex auditor's report extended o “any inhabi-
v. Babb, Ib. 580; Harrison v. Williams, 3 tant or ratepayer.” The difference be-
Barn. & Cress. 162 ; Rogers v. Jones, 5 D. tween an inhabitant and a ratepayer is
& R. 484 ; Willc. 347 ; Glover, 262. Any. that “inhabitant” means a resident,
person sufficiently interested is entitled to whether a ratepayer or not, and that a
inspect entries in books of public corpora- "ratepayer" is a person who pays taxes,
tions relating to public matters of the cor- whether a resident or not.
resident or not. The King v.
poration, where the evidence is required North Curry, 4 Barn. & Cress. 961. Mere
in a civil action. Grant, Corp. 311. In colorable residence is insufficient to consti-
People v. Cornell, 47 Barb. (N. Y.) 329, tute a person an inhabitant. The King v.
it is held that a corporator without any Sargent, 5 Term R. 466 ; The King v.
special or private interest has the right Duke of Richmond, 6 Term R. 560 ; Bruce
to inspect and take copies of all public v. Bruce, 2 B. & P. 229, note ; The King
documents and records, under reasonable V. Mitchell, 10 East, 511; Whithorn v.
restrictions to secure the safety of the Thomas, 7 M. & G. 1. The English Mu-
originals.
nicipal Corporations Act 1882, sec. 233,
9 Rex v. Newcastle, 2 Stra. 1223 ; Rex provides that any burgess may inspect the
v. Lucas, 10 East, 235 ; Rex v. Purnell, i proceedings of the council on payment of
Wils. 242 ; Rex v. Bridgeman, 2 Str. 1203; a fee of one shilling, and may make copy
People v. Mott, 1 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 247; thereof; may also inspect the treasurer's
Cockburn v. Bank, 13 La. An. 289 ; Peo- accounts and Freemen's Roll.
ple v. Walker, 9 Mich. 328; People v. 4 Rex v. Shelley, 3 Term R. 142.
Cornell, 47 Barb. (N. Y.) 329 ; post, chap. 6 Mayor of London v. Lynn Regis, 1
H. Bl. 206 ; Mayor, &c. of Southampton
* Edwards v. Vesey, Cas. temp. Hardw. v. Graves, 8 Term R. 592.
128 ; Rex v. Babb, 3 Term R. 580 ; Rex v.
IX.
380
§ 304
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
refusal. The rule will require the expense attending obedience to
be borne by the applicant, and will, in proper cases, allow the officer
a remuneration for his trouble. If the officer disobey, without suf-
ficient reason, the rule to allow an inspection or to give copy of, or
to produce corporate documents, the court will grant an attachment
against him.
§ 304 (241). Records as Evidence for the Corporation. -A public
or municipal corporation, required by law to keep a record of its
public, or official proceedings, may itself use such records as evi-
dence in suits to which it is a party ; but the records must first be
properly authenticated.2 Indeed, in actions generally, including
1 Willc. 352, 353 ;. Grant, 311 et seq. may be good, if the town-clerk be sick or
See, also, People v. Mott, 1 How. Pr. refuses to attend — which, however, must
(N. Y.) 247 ; Cockburn v. Bank, 13 La. be proved, and the reason why they were
An. 289; People v. Walker, 9 Mich. 328. not made by the proper officer shown.
2 School District v. Blakeslee, 13 Conn. Rex v. Mothersell, 1 Stra. 93 ; Brocas v.
227 (1839) ; Denning v. Roome, 6 Wend. Mayor, &c. of London, 1 Stra. 307 ; Rex
(N. Y.) 651 ; Wood v. Jefferson County v. Gwyn, Mayor, &c., 1 Stra. 401 ; Willc.
Bank, 9 Cow. (N. Y.) 205 ; State v. Van 343 ; Glover, 258 ; Rex v. Smith, 1 Stra.
Winkle, 1 Dutch. (N. J.) 73; McFarlan 126; Grant, 318. Whoever produces the
v. Triton Ins. Co., 4 Denio (N. Y.), book must establish its authority before ho
392 ; Highland Turnp. Co. v. McKean, 11 delivers it in, and may be required to
Johns. (N. Y.) 154. Denning v. Roome, show where it has been kept, and how it
above cited, holds that the original minutes came into his possession. Rex v. Mother-
or records of the corporation of a city were sell, 1 Stra. 93 ; Rex v. Thetford, 12 Vin.
competent evidence of corporate acts, with Abr. 90, p. 16 ; Willc. 344 ; Glover, 258.
out further proof of their verity. Records A book containing minutes of some corpo-
of corporation held admissible, though not rate acts which occurred ten years ago, en-
required by law to be kept, and, where tirely written by the relator's clerk, who
defective, explainable by parol evidence. was not an officer of the corporation, and
Gearhart v. Dixon, 1 Pa. St. 224 (1845); appearing never to have been kept among,
Adams v. Mack, 3 N. H. 493, 499, per or esteemed as, one of the corporate docu-
Richardson, C. J.
ments, or even seen before the present
The following points have been decided application for an information, is not ad.
respecting English corporations : Where missible as a corporate document. Rex v.
charters or corporation books are to be Mothersell, 1 Stra. 93. Nor is the copy
given in evidence, being records or instru. of a letter made fifty years ago and found
ments of a public nature, they may them in the corporation chest ; but the original
selves be produced ; and examined copies must be first accounted for, as though it
of their contents may also be given in evi. had been found in the possession of a
dence. The Court of King's Bench will private person. Rex v. Gwyn, 1 Stra.
not make a rule to produce the originals, 401. Nor are entries of a private nature,
unless it be shown by affidavit that a new in the public books of a corporation, evi.
entry, rasure, or some other circumstance, dence for the corporation in support of a
renders an inspection necessary. To give right which they claim, for this were
books this public character, it must ap- allowing the party to fabricate evidence
pear, if they be questioned, that they for themselves. Rex v. Debenham, 2 B.
have been publicly kept, and that entries & Ald. 187 ; Marriage v. Lawrence, 3 B.
have been made by the proper officer ; & Ald. 144; Grant on Corp. 318, 319,
not but that entries made by other persons and cases; 2 Phil. Ev. 122 ; Angell &
§ 305
381
CORPORATE RECORDS ; COMMITTEE'S REPORT.
actions against agents or officers of the corporation, as individuals,
the original minutes or records of the corporation are competent
evidence of the acts and proceedings of the corporation. Duly
authenticated copies have often been received in evidence where the
original document or proceeding was of a public nature.
§ 305 (242). Evidential Force of Committee's Report.
An
admission by a corporation of a fact or of a liability, duly and prop-
erly made, is, of course, evidence against it. But a municipal
corporation, by accepting, that is, receiving the report of a committee
Ames Corp. sec. 679 ; Willc. 344. The Cush. (Mass.) 248 (1850). Where the
English Municipal Corporations Act 1882, original document is of a public nature,
sec. 22, provides that “a minute of the and would be evidence if produced, it is
proceedings at a meeting of the council," not necessary to show the document itself,
duly signed as specified in the act, “shall for it may be required at many places at
be received in evidence without further the same time ; for that reason an imme.
proof;" and are presumed to be regular diate sworn copy, made by the proper
and valid, “ until the contrary is proved." officer, will be admitted. Rex v. Lord
How such proof must be made, see Reg. v. George Gordon, Doug. 593 ; 1 Phil. Ev.
Thomas, 8 A. & E. 183.
405; Willc. 344 ; Glover, 259. Grant,
1 Denning r. Roome, 6 Wend. (N. Y.) 318, lays down the rule generally, that
651 (1831) ; citing Owings v. Speed, 5 sworn copies of public entries in books of
Wheat. 424 ; Rex v. Mothersell, 1 Stra. public corporations are admissible wher-
93 ; 12 Vin. Abr. 90, pl. 16. See also, over the originals would be, and the cor-
People v. Adams, 9 Wend. (N. Y.) 333; poration will not be compelled to produce
Wood v. Jefferson County Bank, 9 Cow. their books in court except for reasons
(N. Y.) 194, 205 ; Angeli & Ames on shown. It has, however, been held that
Corp. sec. 679 ; Turnpike Co. v. McKean, the by-laws of a corporation, in the ab-
11 Johns. (N. Y.) 154 ; People v. Mur-
of special provision, must be
ray, 57 Mich. 396 ; O'Mally v. McGinn, proved by the production of the by-laws
53 Wis. 353. In Denning v. Roome, themselves, as these are the primary evi-
supra, the defendant was sued in his in- dence. Lumbard v. Aldrich, 8 N. H.
dividual capacity for removing, by order of 31 ; Moor v. Newfield, 4 Greenl. (Me.)
the city council, a certain fence erected by 44 ; Hallowell Bank v. Hamlin, 14 Mass.
the plaintiff. The defendant (although it 178. So, of the votes of a corporation,
was argued that, being the agent of the the record is the best evidence. Haven
corporation, the latter should be consid- V. Asylum, 13 N. H. 532. See also Man- .
ered as the party and its own records as ning v. Parish, 6 Pick. (Mass.) 6 ; Taylor
incompetent in its own favor to justify v. Henry, 2 Pick. (Mass.) 403 ; Green v.
its acts) was allowed to show by the rec- Indianapolis, 25 Ind. 490. It may be re-
ords of the corporation that the fence was marked that there are statutes in various
on a portion of the public street.
States under which certified copies would
The clerk of a city or town is, by law, be receivable in evidence instead of the
the proper certifying officer to authenti- originals. Licenses from a city or town
cate copies of the votes and ordinances authorizing persons to pursue particular
thereof. Such copies are admissible in employments, &c., need not be in writing.
evidence without preliminary proof, as in Boston v. Shaffer, 9 Pick. (Mass.) 415
ordinary instruments, of the genuineness (1830). An ordinance of a city of another
of the clerk's signature, but are, of State may be proved by producing the
course, only prima facie evidence; and book in which it is recorded, or by a
they may be shown to be inaccurate, false, sworn copy. Louisville, N. A., & Chic.
or forged. Commonwealth v. Chase, 6 Ry. Co. v. Shires, 108 Ill. 617.
sence
382
§ 305
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
of inquiry, does not admit the truth of the facts stated therein; and
such a report, though accepted by a vote of the corporation, is not
admissible in evidence against it. In an action of assumpsit against
a town corporation, to support his cause of action, the plaintiff pro-
duced the books of the corporation, by which it appeared that the
sum demanded in the declaration had been allowed by the council
to the plaintiff on the 5th of September, on final settlement, at which
time the plaintiff was present and assented to the settlement. The
defendant contended that the resolution had been passed by mis-
take, and offered to show, by the same books, the passage, three days
afterwards, in the plaintiff's absence, of a resolution rescinding the
amount of the plaintiff's account. It was held that the subsequent
resolution was not competent evidence, the court basing this opinion
on the proposition that the books of a corporation are evidence
against it, but not in its favor, in an action against the corporation by
a stranger.2
1 Dudley v. Weston, 1 Met. (Mass.) Notice to corporator or member is not
477 (1846); followed by Collins v. Dor- notice to the corporation ; it should be
chester, 6 Cush. (Mass.) 396 (1850); and formally given as such to the authorized
both relating to defective highways. In head or proper officer. Powles v. Page,
The King v. Hardwick, 11. East, 578, a 3 Com. B. 31; Edwards v. Railroad Co.,
rated parishioner made a confession, which i Myl. & Cr. 659 ; Grant Corp. 315. Lan-
was admitted in evidence against the par- cey brought an action for libel against the
ish, on the ground that the parish was mayor and clerk of the city of Bangor
an aggregate corporation or company, of for the following statement contained in
which he was a member ; compare May- their annual report : " Balance due from
or, &c. v. Long, 1 Camp. 22. But this John Lancey, Collector, $6,004.50.” The
is not the law in this country, and it may balance was shown to be less. It was
be safely laid down that the admission of a held that there was no presumption of
corporator cannot be received against the law that the officers of a city or town
body. Hartford Bank v. Hart, 3 Day knew the contents of the city records, and
(Conn.), 493, denying The King v. Hard- no rule of law obliging them to be ac-
wick, supra ; Osgood v. Manhattan Co., 3 quainted therewith ; and unless the de-
Cow.(N. Y.) 612, 623. But the admission fendants made the publication maliciously
of an officer when made in the ordinary they were entitled to a verdict. Lancey
course of his official duty, and within the v. Bryant, 30 Me. (10 Shep.) 466 (1849);
scope of his powers, may be admissible ante, sec. 237, note, and cases.
against the corporation. Peyton v. Hos- 2 Mayor v. Wright, 2 Port. (Ala.) 230
pital, 3 C. & P. 363 ; Angell & Ames on (1835), citing 1 Stark Ev. 292; but is not
Corp. sec. 309 ; Ib. sec. 659 ; ante, sec. the proposition too broadly stated ?
237, note, and cases.
!
§ 307
383
MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES; DEFINITION.
CHAPTER XII.
MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES OR BY-LAWS.
§ 306 (243). Subject outlined. - This subject will be considered
under the following heads :-
1. Definition, General Nature and Common-Law Requisites of
Ordinances -- secs. 307-330.
2. Of the Signing, Publication, and Recording — secs. 331-335.
3. Of the Power to impose Fines, Penalties, and Forfeitures
secs. 336–353.
4. On Whom Binding, and Notice thereof - secs. 354–356.
5. Ordinances relating to the Licensing, Taxing, and Regulation
of Amusements and Occupations, including the Sale of Intoxicating
Liquors — secs. 357–365.
6. Ordinances relating to Public Offences — secs. 366-368.
7. Ordinances relating to the Public Health, Safety, and Conve-
nience: Herein of Hospitals, Cemeteries, and Burials; Nuisances;
Markets and Inspection Regulations; Dangerous Occupations and
Practices; and of the Police Power and General Welfare Clauses in
Charters secs. 369-407.
8. Mode of enforcing Ordinances : Herein of Actions and Prosecu-
tions, and their Nature; Mode of pleading Ordinances; Requisites
of Complaints to enforce Ordinances ; Construction, Defences, Evi-
dence, &c. secs. 408-422.
Definition, General Nature, and Common-Law Requisites of
Ordinances.
§ 307 (244). Definition. — Under the general term of “ordinances"
have been sometimes included all the regulations by which a cor-
poration is itself governed, including special charter or statute regu-
lations, as well as by-laws. In this country, the term “ordinance
is not usually applied, if ever, to charters, or acts of the legislature
respecting municipal corporations regulating their powers and mode
of action, but is limited in its application to the acts or regulations,
in the nature of local laws, passed by the proper assembly or gov-
erning body of the corporation, Indeed, in general and professional
use the term "ordinance” is almost, if not quite, equivalent in meaning
384
§ 307
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
to the term “by-law," and is the word most generally used to denote
the by-laws adopted by municipal corporations. According to Lord
Coke, the word “by" or "bye" signifies a habitation; and thence a
by-law in England, and a by-law or ordinance in this country, may
be defined to be the law of the inhabitants of the corporate place or
district, made by themselves or the authorized body, in distinction
from the general law of the country or the statute law of the partic-
ular State. 1
1 Willc. 73 ; 2 Kyd, 95, 98.
council of a special and temporary char-
Definition and Nature of Ordinances or acter ; an ordinance prescribes a perma-
By-Laws. In a case in Massachusetts, nent rule of conduct
nent rule of conduct or government.
deuying to towns in that State power un- Blanchard v. Bissell, 11 Ohio St. 96, 103,
der the statute to prohibit by ordinance per Scott, J. Where the charter commits
the sale of intoxicating liquor, Mr. Chief the decision of a matter to the council
Justice Shaw observed that the term “by- and is silentras to the mode, the decision
law” has a limited and peculiar nieaning, may be evidenced by a resolution, and
and is used to designate such ordinances need not necessarily be by an ordinance.
or regulations which a corporation, as one State v. Jersey City, 3 Dutch. (N. J.)
of its legal incidents, has power to make 493 ; Morch. Union B. Wire Co. .
with respect to its own members and its Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. Co., 70 Iowa, 105 ;
own concerns. "In respect to municipal Butler v. Passaic, 44 N. J. L. *171. But
and quasi corporations this meaning has if the organic law requires an act to be
been somewhat extended, but even here dono by ordinance, or if such requirement
the word is used to designato such ordin- is implied by necessary inference, a reso-
ances and regulations as have reference lution is not sufficient. Newman v. Em-
to legitimate and proper municipal or poria, 32 Kan. 456; Hunt v. Lambertville,
corporate purposes. There is a brond dis- 45 N. J. L. (16 · Vroom) 279 (a resolution
tinction between the power of a public granting authority to build a sewer set
corporation to make “by-laws" and the aside).
general power to make “laws : " author- Resolution or vote held equivalent
ity to make the former does not include to formal ordinance in a case where the
the power to legislate upon general sub- latter was not expressly required by the
jects. Commonwealth v. Turner, 1 Cush. charter or statute. Merch. Union B. Wiro
(Mass.) 493. See also Taylor v. Lambert Co. v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 70 Town,
ville, 43 N. J. Eq. (16 Stew.) 107. “ It 105. In State v. Bayonne, 6 Vroom (38
means a local law prescribing a general N. J. L.), 335, resolutions and ordi.
and permanent rule.” Elliott, J., Citizens' nances are discriminated, and the latter
Gas. & M. Co. v. Elwood, 114 Ind. 332 said to require more solemnity than the
(1887). A municipal by-law, according former. A resolution adopted by a city
to the definition of a distinguished Eng. council, not approved by the mayor, and
lish judge, is a rule obligatory over a par- not published in the manner required by
ticular district, not being at variance with the charter, has not the effect of an or-
the general laws of the realm, and being dinance. Central v. Sears, 2 Col. 588
reasonable and adapted to the purposes of (1875). The legislative powers of a city
the corporation ; and any rule or ordin. council, as in fixing the compensation of
ance of a permanent character which a city officers (it was held, construing tho
corporation is empowered to make, either charter), must be exercised by ordinanco,
by the common or statute law, is a by. when this is intended to be permanent.
law. Per Parke, B., Gosling v. Veley, 19 16. A resolution has ordinarily the same
L. J. (N. 8.) Q. B. 185.
effect as an ordinance, as both are legisla-
Resolutions and Ordinances discrimie tive acts. Sower v. Philadelphia, 35 Pa.
nated. — A resolution is an order of the St. 231 (1860); Gas Co. v. San Francisco,
§ 308
385
ORDINANCES; AUTHORITY TO ENACT.
§ 308 (245). Authority delegated to Municipalities; Nature of
Ordinances ; Repeal. — Although the proposition that the legislature
of a State is alone competent to make laws is true, yet it is also set-
tled that it is competent for the legislature to delegate to municipal
corporations the power to make by-laws and ordinances.. with appro-
nance
6 Cal. 190. Where the power to make v. Jersey City (building sewers), 3 Dutch.
ordinances and by-laws is general, and (N. J.) 493 ; IV. 185, 196 ; State v. Jersey
no form in which those shall be enacted City (signature of mayor), 1 Vroom (30
or passed is prescribed, it was held that N. J. L.), 148; State v. Tronton, 7 Vroom
an ordinance containing a prohibition and (36 N. J. L.), 499, 503. Instances where
annexing a penalty was valid, notwith- an ordinance was held essential. State v.
standing it purported by its terms to be a Bayonne (grading street), 6 Vroom (35
resolution. In substance it was an ordin N. J. L.), 335; Ib. 205; Cross v. Morris-
or regulation, and the forin in town (alteration of width of street and
which it was passed did not make it void. sidewalk), 3 C. E. Green (N. J.), 305 ;
Municipality v. Cutting, 4 La. An. 335 State v. Bergen (appointment of commis-
(1849). Where a city has power, by char- sioners to assess damages), 4 Vroom (33
ter, to make “ ordinances, rules, resolu- N. J. L.), 39, 72 ; Paterson v. Barnet, 46
tions, and by-laws,” which are required N. J. L. (17 Vroom) 62 ; ante, sec. 258,
to be passed by the vote of a majority of note ; sec. 270, note.
the council and signed by the mayor, any Mode of Exercising Power. Where
form of procedure may be adopted if it the power to do certain acts or pass cer-
appears upon the record in a permanent tain ordinances is conferred upon the
form, as, by a record in the minutes of council, but the particular mode of exor-
an oral imotion with the vote thereon. cising the power is not prescribed, this
Green Bay u. Brauns, 50 Wis. 204. By may be done by ordinance, and any mode
ono section of the charter the council may be adopted which does not infringe
was authorized to make "by-laws, ordi- the charter or general law of the land.
nances, resolutions, and regulations," and Thus, for example, power was given to a
by another "by-laws and ordinances city "to levy and collect a special tax,"
were to be submitted to the inayor for not specifying the mode of collection.
his approval, and it was held that there Held, that an ordinance requiring the
was no such distinction as to require that mayor to enforce the collection of the tax
" by-laws and ordinances" must, and by suit in the nature of an action for
" regulations and resolutions” need not, debt, was valid, as it did not violate tho
be submitted to the mayor, to be approved charter or the general law. Cincinnati v.
by him. Kepner v. Commonwealth, 40 Gwynne, 10 Ohio, 192 ; Markle v. Akron,
Pa. St. 124. The words regulation," 14 Ohio, 686 (1846). Prescribed mode.
“ resolution," and "ordinance," as used essential. Cross v. Morristown, 18 N. J.
in the charter, defined by Lourie, C. J. Eq. 305 ; Anderson v. O'Conner, 98 Ind.
16. How construcd. The charter of a city 168 ; post, chap. xix.
bears the same general relation to the ordi- 1 Perdue v. Ellis, 18 Ga. 586 (1855);
nances of a city that the Constitution of a St. Paul v. Coulter, 12 Minn. 41 (1866) ;
State bears to its statutes, and the general Commonwealth v. Duquot, 2 Yeates (Pr.),
rules applicable to unconstitutional stnt- 493 ; Hill v. Decatur, 22 Ga. 203 ; Stnte
utes may be applied in construing ordi- v. Clark, 8 Fost. (28 N. H.) 176 (1854) ;
Quinetto v. St. Louis, 76 Mo. Milne v. Davidson, 5 Martin, n. S. (La.)
402.
588 ; Markle v. Akron, 14 Ohio, 586, 590
Construction of particular charter pro- (1846); Mayor, &c. v. Morgan, 7 Martin,
visions when corporate purpose may be N. 8. (La.) 1, per Martin, J. ; Trigally
cxpressed in the form of a resolution. v. Memphis, 6 Coldw. (Tenn.) 382 (1869);
State v. Elizabeth (acceptance of dedica- Metcalf v. St. Louis, 11 Mo. 103 (1847).
tion), 8 Vroom (37 N. J. L.), 432 ; State That such a power may be delegated to
25
Dances.
VOL. I.
386
§ 308
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
cases.
priate sanctions, which, when authorized, have the force, in favor of
the municipality and against persons bound thereby, of laws passed
by the legislature of the State. A penalty imposed by an ordinance
municipal corporations is admitted even was intended to be a delegation of legisla-
in those States which deny the validity of tive power, and that, while the principle of
what are known as Local Option Laws. local government authorizes the grant of
Wall, In re, 48 Cal. 279 (1874); S. C. 17 limited powers of local legislation to mu.
Am. Rep. 425; ante, sec. 44, note ; Glov. nicipalities, the power of general State
ersville v. Howell (local option as to sale legislation cannot be so delegated. See
of intoxicating liquors), 70 N. Y. 287 also Bowles v. Landaff, 59 N. H. 164, and
(1877); Gilbert Elevated Railway Co., In Gould v. Raymond, Ib. 260. Council may
re, 70 N. Y. 361 (1877); Covington v. order sewer to be built by a conimittee.
East St. Louis, 78 Ill. 548 (1875). In Collins v. Holyoke, 146 Mass. 298 (1888).
Strauss v. Pontiac, 40 Ill. 301 (1866), the See Dorey v. Boston, Ib. 336, 339, and
Supreme Court held that a provision in
Ante, secs. 97, 289.
a town charter forbidding any person to 1 Heland v. Lowell, 3 Allen (Mass.),
do a certain act, fixing the amount of 407 (1862); Brick Presb. Church v. City,
fine and prescribing the penalty, was a &c., 5 Cow. 538 ; St. Louis v. Boffin-
complete enactment of itself ; that an or. ger, 19 Mo. 13, 15, per Gamble, J.; St.
dinance to the same effect was void; and Louis v. Bank, 49 Mo. 574 ; Jones v. Ins.
that a party could be prosecuted only Co., 2 Daly (N. Y.), 307; McDermott v.
under the charter, and not under the or- Board of Police, 5 Abb. Pr. (N: Y.) 422
dinance. In view of the general authority (1857); Mason v. Shawneetown, 77 Ill.
given in the same charter to make all 533 (1875); Des Moines Gas Co. v. Des
ordinances necessary to carry into effect Moines (city of), 44 Iowa, 508 ; 8. c. 24
the powers granted in the charter, the Am. Rep. 756, citing text; State v. Tryon,
correctness of this decision may admit of 39 Conn. 183 (1872); Indianapolis v. In-
fair debate, although it is undoubtedly dianapolis Gas Co., 66 Ind. 396, citing
true that no ordinance is necessary where text; Bearden v. Madison, 73 Ga. 184;
the prohibition in the charter is com- St. Johnsbury v. Thompson, 59 Vt. 300;
plete, the penalty fixed, and the remedy Starr v. Burlington, 45 Iowa, 87. A city
prescribed. Ashton v. Ellsworth, 48 III. council is “a miniature general assembly,
299.
and their authorized ordinances have the
The subject of the power of the legisla. force of laws passed by the legislature of
ture to delegate the legislative function to the State.” Per Scott, J., Taylor v. Car- .
municipalities was considered in an able ondelet (forfeiture clause in lease), 22 Mo.
opinion by Chief Justice Doe, in State, 105 (1855); St. Louis v. Foster, 52 Mo.
ex rel. v. Hayes, 61 N. H. 264, 314 (1881), 513 (1873). In Hopkins v. Mayor of
in which he reviews the authorities in ex- Swansea, 4 M. & W. 621, 640, Lord Abin.
tenso. The facts, briefly stated, were that ger said: "The by-law has the same effect
the legislature had submitted a proposition within its limits, and with respect to the
as to whether an act authorizing share. persons upon whom it lawfully operates,
holders in corporations to cast all their as an act of parliament has upon the sub-
votes for one candidate for director or to jects at large.” Valid ordinances of cor-
distribute them among two or more candi. porations are as binding on the corporators
dates, should become a law, to the vote of and inhabitants of the place as the general
the people of the State, voting in their laws of the State upon the citizens at
several towns and wards. The election large. Milne v. Davidson, 5 Martin N. S.
having been held and the law having been (La.) 586. And therefore it has been
declared adopted and put into effect, the held that contracts between the inhabitants
validity of the proceeding was tested by of a city, in violation of the express provis-
quo warranto proceedings against one who ions of a valid ordinance of a municipal
had been declared elected a director of a corporation, are illegal, and cannot be en-
railroad company. It was held that the act forced. Milne v. Davidson (lease of house
§ 309
387
ORDINANCES ; BY WHAT BODY ENACTED.
authorized by the legislature for the doing of certain specified acts
amounts to a prohibition, and the prohibited acts become thereby
unlawful.1
§ 309 (246). Ordinances must be adopted by Proper Body and in
the Prescribed Mode. --- Ordinances being among the most important
and solemn acts of a corporation, it is essential to their validity that
they shall be adopted by the proper body, duly assembled, and in the
manner prescribed by the charter. What is necessary to constitute
for private hospital), 5 Martin, supra erning it, so by-laws or statutes are a sort
(1827); Heland v. Lowell, 3 Allen (Mass.), of political reason to govern the body
407 (1867); but compare Baker v. Port. politic." 1 Bl. Com. 476. Though the
land, 58 Me. 199; A. C. 10 Am. Law Reg. power to make by-laws is unquestionably
(N. S.) 559, and see Judge Redfield's an incident of every corporation, it is
note. And see also Heeny v. Sprague, 11 rarely left to implication ; but is usually,
R. I. 456 (1877); s. C. 23 Am. Rep. 502, as in the present case, conferred by the
holding that no private action for dama- express terms of the act of parliament. A
ges impliedly exists in favor of a person by-law is a rule obligatory over a particu-
injured by a breach of duty imposed by a lar district, not being at variance with the
municipal by-law against the person who general laws, and being reasonably adapted
violated the by-law. A distinction be- to the purposes of the corporation. Gosling
tween by-laws and statutes suggested and v. Veley et al., 19 L. J. (N. S.) Q. B. 135.
discussed by Durfee, C. J.; see Johnson v. Hopkins v. Swansea, 4 M. & W. 621 ; The
Simonton, 43 Cal. 242 (1872). The courts Queen v. Osler, 32 Upper Can. Q. B. 324.
will not enjoin the passage of. unauthorized The courts upon general principles recog.
ordinances, and will ordinarily act only nizo judicially what municipal councils are
when steps are taken to make them avail. competent to do, and hold that it is not
able. Chicago v. Evans, 24 Ill. 52 (1860); necessary for them to recite in a by-law
Smith v. McCarthy, 56 Pa. St. 359 ; Des all that is requisite to show that they
Moines Gas Co. v. Des Moines (city of), 44 have proceeded regularly in passing it.
Iowa, 505 (1870); 8. C. 24 Am. Rep. 758, Grierson v. Ontario, 9 Upper Can. Q. B.
distinguishing Davis v. Mayor, 14 N. Y. 623 ; Fisher v. Vaughan, 10 Upper Can.
506; People v. Sturtevant, 9 N. Y. 263. Q. B. 492 ; The King v. Harrison, 3 Burr.
Ante, sec. 197, note; post, chap. xxii. 1328; Methodist Prot. Church v. Balti-
But if a party is injuriously affected by an more, 6 Gill (Md.), 394 ; Stuyvesant v.
ordinance, lie may have its validity judi- New York, 7 Cow. (N. Y.) 588 ; Harr.
cially determined before it is attempted to Munic. Manual, 4th ed.
be executed. State v. Paterson, 34 N. J. 1 Johnson v. Simonton (swill milk or-
Law, 163 ; State v. Jersey City, Ib. 31, dinance of San Francisco), 43 Cal. 242
390 (1870). But see Sheridan v. Colvin, (1872). Thus a city ordinance, duly au-
78 Ill. 237.
thorized, imposing a penalty for feeding
The jurisdiction of every council is not distillery slops to cows, and also for vend-
only to be confined to the municipality ing the milk of cows so fed, amounts to
the council represents, but is to be exer- an authoritative prohibition in both re-
cised, when not otherwise provided for spects; and the acts thus prohibited are
by by-law. When a corporation is duly illegal. Ib.
erected, the law tacitly annexes to it the The code of Iowa (sec. 489), requires
power of making by-laws or private stat. that “no ordinance shall contain more
utes. This power is included in every act than one subject, which shall be clearly
of incorporation ; for, as is quaintly ob- expressed in its title." Under it an ordi-
served by Blackstone, “as natural reason nance entitled “Regulating the use and
is given to the natural body for the gov. sale of intoxicating liquors" was declared
388
§ 309
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS,
a valid corporate meeting, and the manner of performing valid cor-
porate acts, are subjects treated of in another chapter. When the
mode of enacting ordinances is prescribed, it must be pursued.
Thus, if the charter provides that no by-law shall be passed unless
introduced at a previous regular meeting, this is a restriction on the
power, and must be observed; and, accordingly, an ordinance for
opening a street was adjudged void, on the ground that the name of
one of the commissioners was changed without laying the ordinance
over until another meeting. So where by the charter the mayor is
void, its subject being entirely prohibitory. recovery of assessments provided for by
Town of Cantril v. Sainer, 59 lowa, 26. See them. Jennings v. Fisher, 103 Ind. 112,
also Dempsey v. Burlington, 66 Iowa, 687. overruling Ligonier v. Ackerman, 46 Ind.
There is a similar statutory provision in 552, and Pratt v. Luther, 45 Ind. 250.
Kansas. Smith v. Emporia, 27 Kan. 528; Where the statute authorized an ordinanco
Stebbins v. Mayer, 38 Kan. 573. See, prohibiting the erection of wooden build.
ante, secs. 51, 270-287.
ings in any block, upon the petition of
1 Ante, chap. X.
two-thirds of the property owners thereon,
2 State v. Bergen, 33 N. J. Law, 39 an ordinance adopted without a petition
(1868), distinguished from State v. Jersey being first made was declared void. Des
City, 2 Dutch. (N. J.) 448, where the vari- Moines v. Gilchrist, 67 Iowa, 210; compare
ance was immaterial. New Orleans v. Keokuk v. Scroggs, 39 Iowa, 447. Where,
Brooks, 36 La. An. 641 ; Danville ?'. under a rule of a city council, a council-
Shelton, 76 Va. 325. See as to constitu- man was not allowed to vote upon ques.
tional requirement that bills shall be read tions in which he was directly interested,
on successive days before their passage, an ordinance passed by the lowest number
Cooley Const. Lim. 139, and cases there necessary, of which one vote was cast by
cited. Construction of similar restriction an interested councilman, was declared in.
requiring previous publication. Douglass, valid. Buffington Wheel Co. v. Burnham,
In re, 46 N. Y. 42; N. Y. &c. School, In 60 Iowa, 493. By the Iowa code, sec. 489, an
re, 47 N. Y. 556 ; Dubuque v. Wooton, 28 ordinance containing more than one subject
Iowa, 571. Where a statute requires that is void. Under this clause an ordinance,
no vote shall be taken upon an assessment the first section of which vacated an alley,
ordinance or resolution until it has been and the second granted the vacated land
published three days, a resolution passed to a private person, was held to be valid,
without such prior publication was held its purpose being to transfer the title.
illegal, and the assessment founded upon Dempsey v. Burlington, 66 Iowa, 687.
it void. Addison Sinith, In re, 52 N. Where the law required the reading of
Y. 526. The provision is held to be the ordinance on three different days, the
mandatory. Phillips, In re, 60 N. Y. 16 ; fact that the third reading was after the
Little, In re, 60 N. Y. 343 ; Anderson, In annual election and entrance upon office
re, 60 N: Y. 457 ; Donglass, In re, 46 of a new mayor and four new aldermen,
N. Y. 42 ; State v. Hoboken, 38 N. J. L. was held to be a sufficient compliance with
110 ; State v. Smith, 22 Minn. 218. Un- it. McGraw v. Whitson, 69 Iowa, 348.
der a provision that no act or ordinance of The readings may be at "adjourned
any board of trustees of a town should be meetings ; three general meetings of the
valid until the certificates of their election council are not intended. Cutcomp v.
should be filed, the filing to be within ten Utt, 60 Iowa, 156. Where the minutes
days after the election, it was held that of the council showed the adoption of a
the effect of filing the certificates a year or motion to reduce certain licenses, and stated
more after the election was to legalize and that “the mayor was instructed to prepare
validate ordinances previously made for an ordinance covering said changes," it
street improvements, and to authorize the was held, on an application for a man.
§ 310
389
ORDINANCES ; EVIDENCE OF ADOPTION.
part of the law-making power, his concurrence in legislative action
is essential to its validity.1 Municipal ordinances, otherwise valid,
may, like an act of the legislature, be adopted to take effect in future
and upon the happening of a contingent event. The ordaining clause
of an ordinance has been held, under the circumstances stated in the
note, not to be essential to its validity, although the charter contains
a provision requiring such a clause and prescribing the form, the
court considering the provision to be directory only:
§ 310 (247). Evidence of Adoption of Ordinances. In the absence
of required record evidence of the passage of an ordinance, it is not
damus to compel the issue of a license at Municipal corporations, however, may
the reduced rate, that the record did not become liable as wrong-doers for things
show a complete legislative act, and that done by direction of the councils without
the resolution did not effect a change in by-laws. Croft v. Peterborough, 5 Upper
the rate of license. Jones v. McAlpine, Can. C. P. 35 ; Nevill v. Ross, 22 Upper
64 Ala. 511.
Cap. C. P. 487 ; Darby v. Crowland, 38
1 Saxton v. Beach, 50 Mo. 488 (1872); Upper Can. Q. B. 338 ; Lewis v. City of
Saxton v. St. Joseph, 60 Mo. 153 (1875); Toronto, 39 Upper Can. Q. B. 343. The
therefore a resolution without the mayor's power to make by-laws or ordinances
signature ordering local improvements is a necessarily supposes the power to enforce
nullity. Ib.; Irvin v. Devors, 65 Mo. 625 them by pecuniary penalties, competent
(1877). The act of a mayor in announcing and proportionable to the offence. In con-
that a motion is lost does not amount to struing a by-law, &c., the court will look
an adjudication, so as to prevent its being at the whole of it, to ascertain its meaning,
attacked collaterally. Chariton v. Holli- and construe one part with another or other
day, 60 Iowa, 391. Ante, sec. 272 et seq. parts, so as, if possible, to give full effect
2 Baltimore v. Clunet, 23 Md. 449 to the whole. Cameron and East Nissouri,
(1865); Northern C. R. Co. v. Baltimore, In re, 13 Upper Can. Q. B. 190.
21 Md. 93 (1863); State v. Kirkley, 29 8 St. Louis V. Foster, 52 Mo. 513
Md. 85 (1868); ante, sec. 44. See Troy (1873). The Supreme Court of Missouri
v. Atchison, &c. Railroad Co., 13 Kan. 70 having decided in the Pacific Railroad v.
(1874); ante; sec. 300, note. Another com- Governor, 23 Mo. 353, and Cape Girar-
mon but erroneous belief is, that a muni deau v. Riley, 52 Mo. 424, that the validity
cipal council can by order or resolution do of a statute, duly authenticated, could
that which, if done through a by-law or not be impeached by showing a departure
ordinance, would be illegal. This it can- from the forms prescribed in the Consti-
not do. No municipal council can do that tution in the passage of laws, applied the
informally which it has no power to do same principle to the passage of ordi-
directly and formally. Daniels v. Bur.
Therefore, although the charter
ford, 10 Upper Can. Q. B. 478. A by-law, required that the style of ordinances shall
order, or resolution which revives an illegal be, “Be it ordained,” &c., yet this is di-
by-law is of course itself illegal. Canada rectory; and omitting the enacting clause,
Co. v. Oxford, 9 Upper Can. Q. B. 567. A or using an imperfect enacting clause does
order or resolution duly signod and sealed not invalidate the ordinance. St. Lonis v.
is virtually a by-law or ordinance, but Foster, supra. To same effect, People v.
many orders and resolutions pass by mere Murray, 57 Mich. 396. As to the con-
vote, without being thus authenticated. ficting decisions in respect to whether the
The municipal rules of proceeding gen- forms prescribed in Constitutions to be
erally require more formal steps to be observed in the enactment of laws are
taken, in passing a by-law or ordinance, imperative or directory only, see Cooley
than in adopting an order or resolution. Const. Lim. chap. vi.
nances.
390
§ 312
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
competent, except possibly under peculiar circumstances, to establish
its adoption by extrinsic testimony;1 but where unanimity is neces-
sary to legal authority to make an order, and an order is entered, it
will be presumed, when the contrary does not appear, that it was
made with the required unanimity.?
§ 311. Motives for adopting Ordinances not subject to Judicial
Inquiry. - It is well settled that the judicial branch of the govern-
ment cannot institute an inquiry into the motives of the legislative
department in the enactment of laws. Such an inquiry would not
only be impracticable in most cases, but the assumption and exer-
cise of such a power would result in subordinating the legislature to
the courts. In analogy to this rule it is doubtless true that the
courts will not, in general, inquire into the motives of the council'in
passing ordinances. But it would be disastrous, as we think, to
apply the analogy to its full extent. Municipal bodies, like the
directories of private corporations, have too often shown themselves
capable of using their powers fraudulently, for their own advantage
or to the injury of others. We suppose it to be a sound proposition
that their acts, whether in the form of resolutions or ordinances, may
be impeached for fraud at the instance of persons injured thereby.
§ 312 (248). Same subject. - Accordingly, in Ohio, in a case
where the legislature chartered a gas company, reserving the power
of control, and subsequently empowered the city council to regulate
the price of gas, the court considered the intention to be to limit the
1 Covington v. Ludlow, 1 Met. (Ky.) 120 ; infra, sec. 334. Where a record is
295 (1858). See ante, secs. 297, 300, silent as to proceedings required by law to
note, 304, note ; post, sec. 335.
to be taken, as that the yeas and nays
? Lexington 2. Headley, 5 Bush (Ky.), shall be called,
no presumption arises
508 (1869); Covington v. Boyle, 6 Bush that other proceedings than those men-
(Ky.), 204 (1869) ; McCormick v. Bay tioned in the record took place. Tracey v.
City, 23 Mich. 457 (1871); see Steckert The People, 6 Col. 151.
v. East Saginaw, 22 Mich. 104 ; post, sec. 8 Cooley Const. Lim. 186, 187, where
800. The final action of a city council, or many of the cases are collected.
other deliberative body, on any measure, 4 Freeport v. Marks, 59 Pa. St. 253 ;
is shown by its adjournment thereon, the Buell v. Ball, 20 Iowa, 282 (collateral ac-
public promulgation of its action, or sub- tion between third persons). It being
sequent proceedings inconsistent with a well settled that the courts may decide
purpose to review. State v. Van Buskirk, upon the reasonableness of ordinances,
40 N. J. L. 463. In Illinois a book or they will in general judge of these, what-
pamphlet containing the ordinances of a ever their purpose, by considering their
municipal corporation and purporting to nature and effect, rather than by institut-
be published by its authority, is evidence ing an inquiry into the motives of the
of the passage and contents of the ordi- members of the council ; although where
nances contained in it, and of their legal the latter is material and relevant, it may
publication. Lindsay v. Chicago, 115 111. in the author's judgment be done.
$ 314
391
DURATION AND REPEAL OF ORDINANCES.
company to a fair and reasonable price, and that it must be fairly
exercised; and, if, in the colorable exercise of the power, a majority
of the members, for a fraudulent purpose, combined to fix the price
at a rate at which they knew it could not be made and sold without
loss, their action would not bind the company, and in such a case,
their good faith, it was held, might be inquired into.1
§ 313. Legislative Officers are not personally liable for Adoption
of Ordinances. — Where the officers of a municipal corporation are
invested with legislative powers, they are of course exempt from
individual liability for the passage of any ordinance within their
authority, and their motives in reference thereto will not be in-
quired into; nor are they individually liable for the passage of any
ordinance not authorized by their powers; for such ordinance is
void, and need not be obeyed.?
§ 314 (249). Duration and Repeal of Ordinances. Since a valid
by-law never becomes obsolete, it remains in force until repealed by
the legislature or the corporation. The power to make includes the
power to repeal without reference to the people of the municipality.3
The repeal cannot operate retrospectively to impair private rights
vested under it. Therefore, the legislature, having authorized a
1 State v. Cincinnati Gas Company, 18 Railway Co. and North Cayuga, In re, 23
Ohio St. 262 (1868), distinguished from Upper Can. C. P. 28 ; Bloomer v. Stolley,
Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch, 87; Bank v. 5 McLean, 158; Santo et al. v. State of
United States, 1 G. Greene (Iowa), 553. Iowa, 2 Iowa, 165 ; Bank of Chenango v.
The courts will not inquire, even on the Brown, 26 N. Y. 467 ; Rice v. Foster, 4
complaint of the State, into the motives Harring. (Del.) 479; The People v. Col-
which governed members of the legisla- lins, 3 Mich. 347 ; Welch v. Bowen, 103
ture in the enactment of a law, or allow Ind. 252 ; Greeley v. Jacksonville, 17 Fla.
to be shown, for the purpose of defeat 174. In re Mollie Hall, 10 Neb. 537,
ing the operation of the law, that it was where an ordinanee to suppress houses of
passed by fraud, corruption, and bribery prostitution, passed under the authority of
of the members. Wright v. Defrees, 8 the general incorporation law, was held
Ind. 298 ; followed, McCulloch v. State, not to be repealed by the adoption of a
11 Ind. 424, 431 (1858); S. P. Sunbury, new incorporation law by the legislature,
&c. Railroad Co. v. Cooper, 7 Am. Law contaiuing authority for cities to
Reg. 158 (1858); Cooley Const. Lim. 135, strain, prohibit, and suppress” such houses,
136, 186, 208.
and expressly repealing the old law.
2 Jones v. Loving, 55 Miss. 109 ; Paine A provision in an ordinance which is
v. Boston, 124 Mass. 486; Freeport v. plainly repugnant to an ordinance previ.
Marks, 59 Pa. 257 ; Baker v. State, 27 ously adopted repeals the latter ordinance
Ind. 485 ; Commissioners v. Ducket, 20 to the extent of the conflict between them.
Md. 468 ; Weaver v. Devendorf, 3 Denio Ex parte Wolf, 14 Neb. 24; Burlington v.
(N. Y.), 117; Pike v. Megoun, 44 Mo. Estlow, 43 N. J. L. 13.
491.
4 Rex v. Ashwell, 12 East, 22; 3 Term
3 Kansas City v. White, 69 Mo. 261; R. 198 ; The King v. Bird, 13 East, 379 ;
The King v. Ashwell, 12 East, 22 ; The Terre Haute v. Lake, 43 Ind. 480 (1873);
King v. Bird, 13 East, 367 ; Great Western State v. City Clerk, &c., 7 Ohio St. 355 ;
l'e-
392
§ 315
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
religious corporation to establish a cemetery within the limits of
a city, on obtaining the consent of the city, and such consent having
been given, the city authorities cannot, after their consent has been
acted upon, repeal the resolutions giving it, and enjoin the religious
corporation from the use of the cemetery, unless, indeed, it is shown
to be an actual nuisance, detrimental to the health of the city, in
which case its police and governmental powers might doubtless be
exercised.
§ 315 (250). Mode of conferring the Power; Construction of
Grants of Authority. — Municipal charters, or incorporating acts, are
sometimes silent as to the power to pass by-laws or ordinances; and
where this is the case, the municipal body has the power, incidental
to all corporations, to enact appropriate by-laws. Occasionally, the
charter or incorporating act, without any specific enumeration of
the purposes for which by-laws may be made, contains a general
and comprehensive grant of power to pass all such as may seem
necessary to the well-being and good order of the place.. More
frequently, however, the charter or incorporating act authorizes the
enactment of by-laws in certain specified cases, and for certain pur-
poses; and after this specific enumeration a general provision is
added, that the corporation may make any other by-laws or regula-
tions necessary to its welfare, good order, &c., not inconsistent with
Stoddard v. Gilnian, 22 Vt. 568; Pond v. Church, 10 La. An. 431 ; ante, sec. 97.
Negns, 3 Mass. 230; ante, chap. x.; State The repeal of an ordinance puts an end to
2. Graves, 19 Md. 351 (1862); Bigelow v. a pending prosecution under the repealed
Hillman, 37 Me. 52; Reiff v. Conner, 5 ordinance, unless there be a saving clause.
Eng. (10 Ark.) 241 ; Road, In re, 17 Pa. The contrary rule as to State statutes held
St. 71, 75; Nelson v. St. Martin's Parish, not to apply to by-laws or ordinances.
111 U. S. 716 ; Louisiana v. Pillsbury, Naylor v. Galesburg, 56 Ill. 285 (1870);
105 U. S. 278.; Cape May & S. L. R. R. Kansas City v. Clark, 68 Mo. 588 ; Barton
Co. v. Cape May, 35 N. J. Eq. 419 ; Peo- v. Gadsden, 79 Ala. 495, which also holds
ple v. O'Brien, 111 N. Y. 1 (1888); Cun- that an ordinance prohibiting the sale of
ningham 2. Almonte, 21 Upper Can. C. liquor under a penalty is repealed by an
P. 459; Great Western R. Co., &c., In re, ordinance prohibiting such sale without a
23 U. C. C. P. 28. An act changing an license, because of inconsistency and re-
incorporated town into a city does not of pugnancy. The fact that an ordinance
itself repeal pre-existing ordinances. Per directing a certain street improvement to
Strong, J., Erie Academy Trus. v. Erie, be made was repealed, held, to be conclu-
31 Pa. St. 515 (1858); ante, sec. 85, note. sive in favor of a perpetual injunction,
Subsequent constitutional provision or le- restraining the contractor or the city from
gislative enactment, in conflict with existing proceeding. Kaime v. Harty, 4 Mo. App.
by-laws, renders the latter roid. Mobile 357.
v. Dargan, 45 Ala. 310 (1871).
2 A Coal-Float v. Jeffersonville, 112
i New Orleans v. St. Louis Church, 11 Ind. 15, citing the text. Supra, sec. 308,
La. An. 244 (1856), distinguished from note. Chamberlain v. Evansville, 77 Ind.
Brick Presb. Church v. Mayor, 5 Cow. 542.
(N. Y.) 538 ; "Musgrove v. Catholic
+
$ 316
393
ORDINANCES: SPECIAL AND GENERAL GRANTS.
the Constitution or laws of the State. This difference is essential
to be observed, for the power which the corporation would possess
under what may, for convenience, be termed “the general welfare
clause," if it stood alone, may be limited, qualified, or, when such
intent is manifest, impliedly taken away by provisions specifying
the particular purposes for which by-laws may be made. It is clear
that the general clause can confer no authority to abrogate the
limitations contained in special provisions.
+
§ 316. Special and general Grants of Authority. — When there
are both special and general provisions, the power to pass by-laws
under the special or express grant can only be exercised in the cases
and to the extent, as respects those matters, allowed by the charter
or incorporating act; and the power to pass by-laws under the gen-
eral clause does not enlarge or annul the power conferred by the
special provisions in relation to their various subject-matters, but
gives authority to pass by-laws, reasonable in their character, upon
all other matters within the scope of their municipal authority, and
not repugnant to the Constitution and general laws of the State.1
1 State v. Ferguson, 33 N. H. 424 Wadleigh v. Gilman, 3 Fairf. (12 Me.)
(1856), where this subject is ably treated 408 ; State v. Clark, 8 Fost. (28 N. H.)
in a judgment delivered by Mr. Justice 176, and comments in 33 N. H. 432;
Foster, holding a by-law of the city of State 1. Freeman, 38 N. H. 426 ; Com-
Concord, in relation to the sale of intoxi- monwealth v. Turner, 1 Cush. (Mass.)
cating liquor, invalid, as contravening the 493 ; Collins v. Hatch, 18 Ohio, 523 ; see
special provisions of the charter, and New Orleans v. Philippi (taxation), 9 La.
therefore not sustainable under the gen. An. 44 ; Indianapolis v. Indianapolis Gas
eral welfare clause of the charter.
Co., 66 Ind. 396, citing text; Laundry
“ The power to make by-laws, when License Case, 22 Fed. R. 701 ; Clark v.
not expressly given, is implied as an inci. South Bend, 85 Ind. 276. Huesing v.
dent to the very existence of a corpora- Rock Island, Supreme Court, Ill. MSS.
tion; but in the case of an express grant 1889, applying text. Post, sec. 432 et seq.,
of the power to enact by-laws limited to and cases.
.
certain specified cases and for certain pur- In Georgia, the Superior Courts adopt
poses, the corporate power of legislation is the following as the true rule for ascer-
confined to the objects specified, all others taining the extent of the power of a city to
being excluded by implication.” Per Saw- pass ordinances. “The city council is
yer, J., arguendo, in State v. Ferguson, 33. restrained to such matters, whether spe-
N. H. 424, 430 (1856); citing 2 Kyd on cially. enumerated or included under gen-
Corp. 102 ; Angell & Ames on Corp. 177 ; eral grant, as are indifferent in themselves,
and Child v. Hudson's Bay Co., 2 P. such matters as are free from constitu-
Wms. 207. The true rule in such cases tional objection and have not been the
may, perhaps, be correctly expressed to subject of general legislation ; or, as it is
be, that the enumeration of special cases expressed in the charter, are not repug-
does not, unless the intent be apparent, vant to the constitution or laws of the
exclude the implied power any further land.” Dubois v. Augusta (health ordi-
than necessarily results from the nature of nance), Dudley (Ga.) Rep. 30 (1831);
the special provisions. Heisembrittle a. Williams v. Augusta (powder ordinance),
Charleston, 2 McMullan (S. C.), 233; 4 Ga. 509, 514 (1848). Power to pass
394
§ 317
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
And it has been very properly held that a special grant of power to
a municipal corporation to adopt ordinances on enumerated subjects
connected with municipal concerns is in addition to the incidental
power of the corporation.
§ 317 (251). Ordinances cannot enlarge or change the Charter or
Statute. — Since all the powers of a corporation are derived from
the law and its charter, it is evident that no ordinance or by-law of
a corporation can enlarge, diminish, or vary its powers. A similar
necessary by-laws is incidental, but this 2 Thompson v. Carroll, 22 How. 422
power is limited not only by the terms, (1859); Andrews v. Insurance Co., 37 Me.
but the spirit and design, of the charter, 256 (1854); Thomas v. Ricbmond, 12
and the general principles and policy of Wall. 349 (1871); Garden City v. Abbott,
the common law. Taylor v. Griswold, 2
Taylor v. Griswold, 2 34 Kan. 283, (license tax upon non-resi.
J. S. Green (N. J.), 222 ; Mount Pleas- dent attorneys, imposed by ordinance un-
ant v. Breeze, 11 Iowa, 399 (1860), per der a law authorizing such a tax upon
Wright, J.
residents only held unlawful); Common-
A power to pass ordinances to “im- wealth v. Roy, 140 Mass. 432 ; State v.
prove the morals and order" of the peo- Municipal Court of St. Paul, 32 Minn.
ple does not authorize an ordinance to 329 ; State, ex rel. v. Nashville, 15 Lea,
“punish” the offence of keeping houses 697 (power to change a salary confers no
of ill-fame. Whether the legislature can power to abolish it). “A power vested by
constitutionally confer power upon cities legislation in a city corporation, to make
to punish acts made crimes by the laws of by-laws for its own government and the
the State, not decided. Chariton v. Bar- regulation of its own police, cannot be
ber, 54 Iowa, 360 (1880), Beck, J.; S. C. construed as imparting to it the power to
11 Cent. Law J. 358; 37 Am. Rep. 209. repeal the (general) laws in force, or to
More fully, post, sec. 432 et seq.
supersede their operation by any of its
i State v. Morristown, 33 N. J. L. 57 ordinances. Such a power, if not expressly
(1868). Depue, J. in his opinion, distin- conferred, cannot arise by mere implica-
guishes such a case from Norris v. Staps, tion, unless the exercise of the power given
Hobart, 210, where the corporation was be inconsistent with the previous law,
created by the crown, and where it was and does necessarily operate as its repeal
held that a special clause in the letters- pro tanto. Nor can the presumption be
patent authorizing the corporate body (a indulged, that the legislature intended
fellowship of weavers) to make by-laws, that an ordinance passed by the city
did not add to implied powers, and that should be superior to, or take the place
its by-laws were subject to the general of, the general law of the State upon the
law of the realm and subordinate to it. same subject.” Simpson, C. J., March v.
“ But," he adds, " a special grant of Commonwealth, 12 B. Mon. (Ky.) 25,
power to a municipal corporation is an 29 (1851); Rothschild v. Darien, 69 Ga.
entirely different thing; it is a delegation 503 ; Breninger v. Belvidere, 44 N. J. L.
of authority to legislate by ordinance on 350. “Huckster" means a petty dealer
the enumerated subjects, and does add to or retailer of small articles of provisions,
the powers incident to the creation of the &c., and an ordinance cannot enlarge the
corporation. The numerous instances, in ordinary meaning so as to embrace " any
own State, of the grant of such person not a farmer or butcher who should
powers in relation to the opening and im- sell, or offer for sale, any commodity not
provement of streets, the making of of his own manufacture," and subject such
sewers, and the assessment of taxes, af- person to a penalty ; it not being, says
ford illustrations of this distinction.” Ib. Ranney, J., "part of the franchise of mu-
62.
nicipal corporations to change the mean-
our
§ 319
395
ORDINANCES MUST BE REASONABLE AND LAWFUL.
rule obtains in England, where it is held that neither the king's
charter nor any by-law can introduce an alteration in rules which
have been prescribed to a corporation by an act of parliament.1
By-laws are in their nature strictly local, and subordinate to the
general laws.
§ 318 (252). Ordinance need not recite Authority to pass it.-
It is not essential to the validity of an ordinance executing powers
conferred by the legislature that it should state the power in exe-
cution of which the ordinance is passed. If it state no particular
power as its basis, it will be judicially regarded as emanating from
that power which would have warranted its passage. If two such
powers exist, it may be imputed to either, in conformity to which
its provisions and prerequisites show that it has been adopted.
in these respects it is in accordance with both, nu injustice can result
in regarding it as the offspring of both or either of the powers.?
If,
§ 319 (253). Must be Reasonable and Lawful. - In England,
the subjects upon which by-laws may be made were not usually
specified in the king's charter, and it became an established doctrine
of the courts that every corporation had the implied or incidental
right to pass by-laws; but this power was accompanied with these
limitations, namely, that every by-law must be reasonable, and not in-
consistent with the charter of the corporation, nor with any statute
ing of English words." Mays v. Cin- nance, nor averred in proceedings to en-
cinnati, i Ohio St. 268, 272 (1853). force it. Stuyvesant v. Mayor, &c. of
"Butcher" defined. Henback v. State, New York, 7. Cow. (N. Y.) 588; S. P.
53 Ala. 523 (1875); S. C. 25 Am. Rep. Young v. St. Louis, 47 Mo. 492 (1871).
650 ; 18 Alb. Law Jour. 364.
This case reaffirmed in Kiley v. Forsee, 57
1 Rex v. Miller, 6 Term R. 277 ; Rex Mo.390 (1874); Platter v. Elkhart County,
v. Barber Surgeons, i Ld. Raym. 585. It 103 Ind. 360. But the charter may be
has even been said that the general as- imperative in requiring the necessity to be
sembly cannot authorize a municipal cor- expressed by ordinance or resolution ; so
poration to repeal, by ordinance, a statute held in Hoyt v. East Saginaw, 19 Mich.
of the State. Haywood v. Mayor, &c., 12 39 (1869). So, in England it is not ne-
Ga. 404, per Lumpkin, J. But it may pro- cessary that the preamble to a by-law
vide that on the passage of an ordinance should state the reasons for making it.
of a certain character, the State law on the Rex v. Harrison, 3 Burr. 1328. See, also,
subject shall not be in force in the corpo- Grierson v. Ontario, 9 Upper Can. Q. B.
rate limits. State v. Binder, 38 Mo. 450; 623 ; Fisher v. Vaughan, 10 Upper Can.
post, chap. xxiii.
Q. B. 492. If a municipal corporation
2 Per Dorsey, C. J., Methodist P. attempt to act according to a statute not
Church v. Baltimore, 6 Gill (Md.), 391 in force, this does not invalidate their pro-
(1848). Under power to pass an ordi- ceedings, if the same are in accordance
nauce if found necessary, the necessity for with existing statutes. State v. Jersey
its enactment, being implied from its mere City, 3 Dutch. (N. J.) 493.
passage, need not be recited in the ordi.
396
§ 319
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
of parliament, nor with the general principles of the common law
of the land, particularly those having relation to the liberty of the
subject or the rights of private property.1 In this country the courts
have often affirmed the general incidental power of municipal corpo-
rations to make ordinances, but have always declared that ordinances
passed in virtue of the implied power must be reasonable, consonant
with the general powers and purposes of the corporation, and not
inconsistent with the laws or policy of the State.?
1 Sutton's Hospital Case, 10 Rep. 31 a; son v. Goodrich Transportation Co., 60
Feltmakers v. Davis, 1 Bos. & P. 98, 100; Wis. 141 (ordinance requiring spark cer-
Norris v. Staps, Hob. 211; Rex v. Maid- rester on steam-boats). An ordinance re-
stone, 3 Burr. 1837 ; Com. Dig. Franch. quiring druggists to furnish quarterly veri-
F. 10; London v. Vanacre, 1 Ld. Raym. fied statements of the kind and quantity of
496 ; 2 Kyd, chap. iv. sec. 10, p. 95, and intoxicating liquors sold, to whom, &c.,
cases cited ; Bac. Abr. tit. By-law. was held unreasonable and oppressive.
2 An ordinance which is within express Clinton (city of) v. Phillips, 58 Ill. 102;
powers granted cannot be held to be unrea- S. C. 11 Am. Rep. 52. An 'ordinance for.
sonable and void. Haynes v. Cape May, bidding the placing or carrying of sign-
50 N. J. L. 55 (1887). In such case the boards on side-walks is reasonable and
court can only construe the extent of the valid. Commonwealth v. McCafferty, 145
grant, and has nothing to do with the rea- Mass. 384. An ordinance exacting a li-
sonableness of an ordinance carrying it conse from peddlers of “not less than one
into effect. District of Columbia v. Wag- nor more than twenty-five dollars for a
gaman, 4 Mackey, 328. Must be reason- fixed time, in the discretion of the mayor,'
able. Kip v. Paterson, 2 Dutch. (N. J.) held unreasonable. State Center v. Baren).
298; Dayton v. Quigley (citing text), 29. stein, 66 Iowa, 249. An ordinance re-
N. J. Eq. 77 (1878); Comm’rs v. Gas quiring cotton merchants to keep a record of
Co., 12 Pa. St. 318 (1859); Fisher v. Har- the name of the seller of loose cotton, and
risburg, 2 Grant (Pa.) Cases, 291 (1854); the quantity of each purchase, also held
Comnionwealth v. Robertson, 5 Cush. to be against the principles of personal lib.
(Mass.) 438 (1850); Waters v. Leech, 3 erty and common right. Long v. Taxing
Ark. 110; Mayor v. Winfield, 8 Humph. District, 7 Lea, 134. An ordinance forbid-
(Tenn.) 707 (1848); Davis v. Anita, 73 ding preaching, lecturing, frc., on a public
Iowa, 325 (1887). Text approved. Frank, common, held reasonable. Commonwealth
In re, 52 Cal. 606. Commonwealth v. v. Davis, 140 Mass. 485; Mankato v.
Steffee, 7 Bush (Ky.), 161 (1870); Peo- Fowler, 32 Mind. 364 (license fee of $300
ple v. Throop, 12 Wend. (N. Y.) 183, upon auctioneers unreasonable). An ordi.
186 (1834); Mayor v. Beasly, 1 Humph. nance absolutely prohibiting (not regulat-
(Tenn.) 232 (1839); State v. Freeman, 38 ing) street processions with musical in-
N. H. 426 (1859); White v. Mayor, &c., struments, banners, torches, &c., or while
2 Swan (Tenn.), 364 (1852); Pedrick v. singing or shouting, without the consent
Bailey, 12 Gray (Mass.), 161; Dunham v. first obtained of the mayor, under a penalty
Rochester, 5 Cow. (N. Y.) 462 ; Clason of a fine not exceeding $500, and costs, and
v. Milwaukee, 30 Wis. 316 (1872); Tug- in default of payment, imprisonment not
man v. Chicago, 78 Ill. 405 (1875); Ex exceeding ninety days, was held, in the
parte Chin Yan, 60 Cal. 78; Gilham v. absence of any express legislative author-
Wells, 64 Ga. 192 ; Meyers v. Chicago, ity therefor, to be unreasonable and void,
R. I., & P. R. Co., 57 Iowa, 555, approv. and for this reason a member of the Sal-
ing text ; Cape Girardeau v. Riley, 72 Mo. vation Army, convicted thereunder, was
220 ; Kneedler v. Norristown, 100 Pa. St. discharged on habeas corpus. Re Frazee,
368 ; O'Maley v. Freeport, 96 Pa. St. 24 ; 63 Mich. 396 (1886); s. C. 30 N. W. Rep.
Kirkham v. Russell, 76 Va. 956 ; Atkin- 72; 35 Alb. Law J., 6. The opinion of
S 320
397
ORDINANCES MUST BE REASONABLE AND LAWFUL.
§ 320 (254). Same subject. — The principle of law, that ordi-
nances passed under the general authority to enact all such as will be
Campbell, C. J., states the grounds of this mals at large), 18 Ohio, 523 (1849);
conclusion with great, and almost convin- Mayor, &c. of New York v. Nichols (in-
cing, force. See People v. Rochester, 51 spection laws), 4 Hill (N. Y.), 209 (1843);
N. Y. Sup. Ct. (44 Hun) 166 (Salvation Commonwealth v. Turner (liquor traffic),
Army walking through streets with ban. 1 Cush. (Mass.) 493 (1848); Philips v.
ners). “An ordinance, general in its Wickham, 1 Paige (N. Y.) Ch. 590; How-
scope, may be adjudged reasonable as ap- ard v. Savannah, T. Charlt. R. 173 ;
plied to one state of facts, and unreasonable Smith v. Knoxville, 3 Head (Tenn.), 245
when applied to circumstances of a differ- (1859); Cowen v. West Troy, 43 Barb.
ent character.” Knapp, J., in Nicoulin v. (N. Y.) 48 (1864); Pesterfield v. Vickers,
Lowery, 49 N. J. Law, 391 ; Pennsylva- 3 Coldw. (Tenn.) 205 ; City Council v.
nia R. R. Co. v. Jersey City, 47 N. J. Benjamin, 2 Strob. (S. C.) 508 ; City
Law, 286.
Council v. Ahrens, 4 Strob. (S. C.) 241 ;
The trustees of public schools had stat- Heisenbrittle a. Charleston Council, 2 Mc-
utory authority to direct what branches Mul. (S. C.) 233; City Council v. Gold-
should be taught, and to adopt and en- smith, 2 Speers (S.C.), 435; State v.Welch,
force all necessary rules and regulations 30 Conn. 215; Newton v. Belger, 143 Mass.
for the management and government of 598; White v. Bayonne, '49 N. J. L.
schools. A candidate for adınission passed 311; Lozier v. Newark, 48 N. J. L. (19
a satisfactory examination in everything Vroom) 452 ; Volk v. Newark, 47 N. J.
but grammar, and was refused admission L. (18 Vroom) 117 ; Ex parte Kearny, 55
on that account. Held, a rule or regula- Cal. 212; Cape Girardeau v. Riley, 72
tion denying him admission on that ac- Mo. 220 ; State v. Brittain, 89 N. C. 574.
count was unreasonable, and that manda- An ordinance authorizing the tax-collector
mus would lie to compel his admission to and police to put the purchaser of land at a
study the other branches. Trustees v. sale for taxes in possession thereof, held
People, &c., 87 Ill. 303 ; S. P. Rulison v. void for violating the constitutional pro-
Post, 79 Ill. 567.
vision declaring that no person shall be
Ordinance may be shown to be un deprived of property without “due pro-
reasonable, as that one for building a side- cess of law."
Calhoun v. Fletcher, 63
walk was unnecessary and oppressive, it Ala. 574. An ordinance imposing a li-
being located in an uninhabited portion of cense tax upon the owners of towboats run-
the city and disconnected with any other ning between New Orleans and the Gulf
street or sidewalk. Corrigan v. Gage, 68 of Mexico held to be a regulation of com-
Mo. 541.
merce between the States, and void under
Must not conflict with the charter or stat. art. 1, sec. 8, par. 3, of the U. S. Consti-
ute, or be repugnant to fundamental rights. tution. Moran v. New Orleans, 112 U. S.
Dubois v. Augusta (health ordinance), 69. An ordinance which
69. An ordinance which gave to the mu-
Dudley (Ga.) Rep. 30 (1831); Williams nicipal authorities arbitrary power to give
v. Augusta (powder ordinances), 4 Ga. or withhold consent for carrying on the
509 (1818); Adams v. Mayor, &c. (liquor laundry business, without regard to legal
statute), 29 Ga. 56 ; Taylor v. Griswold, discretion or to the competency of persons
2 Green (N. J.), 222 (1834); New Orleans applying therefor, and the administration
v. Philippi (taxation), 9 La. An. 44 ; Per- of which caused
Per- of which caused unjust discriminations
due v. Ellis (liquor traffic), 18 Ga. 586; founded on differences of race, declared to
Haywood v. Mayor, 12 Ga: 404 ; Paris v. be in violation of the Fourteenth Amend.
Graham (tax on dram-shops), 33 Mo. 94 ; ment to the U. S. Constitution. Yick Wo
St. Louis v. Cafferata, 24 Mo. 94 ; St. v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356, reversing Mat-
Louis v. Bentz, 11 Mo. 61 ; Carr v. St. ter of Yick Wo, 68 Cal. 294. See also In
Louis (fee of officers), 9 Mo. 191 (1845); re Tie Loy, 26 Fed. Rep. 611.
But a
Marietta v. Fearing (estray animals), 4 municipal ordinance prohibiting washing
Ohio, 427 (1831); Collins v. Hatch (ani. and ironing in public laundries, in speci-
398
§ 320
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
necessary, must be reasonable, or they will be void, is well iliustrated
by a case in Pennsylvania. A municipal corporation passed two
ordinances in relation to a gas company, - a private corporation,
with a special charter authorizing the construction and maintenance
of suitable gas-works within the limits of the municipal corporation,
and the use of the streets for the laying down of pipes. The first
ordinance prohibited the gas company from opening paved streets
from December to March in each year, for the purpose of laying gas
mains. This ordinance the court considered to be reasonable, in
view of the difficulty of repairing the paved streets during the win-
ter months. And the other ordinance prohibited the gas company
from opening a paved street at any time, for the purpose of laying
pipes from the main to the opposite side of the street. The court
say: “The effect of this ordinance is to compel the company to
construct two mains, one on each side of the street instead of one;
fied territoriai limits, from ten at night tin, In re, 27 Ark. 467 (1872). An ordi-
till six in the morning, and operating upon nance prohibiting heavy awnings over
all engaged in the same business under sidewalks, without consent of municipal
like conditions, sustained as a legitimate authorities, is reasonable and valid. Ped-
police regulation, within the competency rick v. Bailey, 12 Gray (Mass.), 161.
of a municipality possessed of the ordinary Under the general welfare clause an ordi.
powers, and is not in conflict with the nance forbidding sale of lemonade, cake,
Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitu- &c., at a temporary stand without paying
tion of the United States, since this a license tax is unauthorized and unrea.
Amendment does not impair the police sonable. Barling v. West, 29 Wis. 307;
power of the State. Barbier v. Con. S. C. 9 Am. Rep. 576 ; post, sec. 387.
nolly, 113 U. S. 27 (1884); Soon Hing An ordinance conferring upon une per-
V. Crowley, Ib. 703. Index title, “Po- son the right to remove and convert to his
lice Power”; infra, secs. 324, 325, 357, own use dead animais, to the exclusion of
and note. When a legislature has no their owners' rights, held unconstitutional
power, under the Constitution, to author- as being a taking of private property for
ize a municipal corporation to pass an or- public use without compensation, and as
dinance (as here, to permit a railway to depriving a person of his property without
i construct its road upon certain streets) it due process of law. River Rendering Co.
cannot, by a special act, legalize such an v. Behr, 77 Mo. 91. Where power was
ordinance adopted by a city without au. conferred upon a town “to prevent the in-
thority. Strange v. Dubuque, 62 Iowa, troduction of infectious or contagious dis-
303. And see Independent School Dist. eases, and to preserve the health of the
of Burlington v. Burlington, 60 Iowa, 500. inhabitants," an ordinance forbidding any
A power to construct sewers when, in the person “ to import, sell, or otherwise deal
judgment of the council, “the public in second-hand or cast-off garments," &c.,
good required,” held not to confer power with a proviso excepting the sale of such
to grant the use of a public street to an articles when not imported or when they
individual for a private sewer. Hutchin. had not been used by persons having in-
son v. Trenton Board of Health, 39 N. J. fectious diseases, was held not included in
Eq. (12 Stew.) 569.
the power conferred, and unlawful as be-
An ordinance prohibiting any auctioneer ing in restraint of lawful trade. Greens-
to make any sale "except to the highest boro v. Ehrenreich, 80 Ala. 579.
bidder" was held void for want of legisla- 1 Commissioners of North Liberties v.
tive or charter authority to enact it. Mar. Gas Co., 12 Pa. St. 318 (1849).
!
§ 321
399
ORDINANCES MUST NOT BE OPPRESSIVE.
thereby materially increasing the expense to the company, and con-
sequently enhancing the price of gas to the inhabitants of the dis-
trict.” And this ordinance was declared to be void. So, where the
city owns water-works, its by-laws in respect to the supply of water
to the citizens must be reasonable; and a supply cannot be refused
on the application of the owner, because the tenant was in arrears for
water supplied to him while he occupied another house owned by
anotber landlord. 1
$ 321 (255). Must not be Oppressive. Courts will declare
ordinances to be void that are oppressive in their character. Thus,
the Supreme Court of Tennessee, in a judgment which reflects credit
upon the tribunal that pronounced it, declared void an ordinance of
the city of Memphis which ordered the arrest, imprisonment, and
fine of all free negroes who might be found out after ten o'clock at
night, within the limits of the corporation. So, an ordinance forbid-
ding, under penalty, the “knowingly associating with persons having
the reputation of being thieves and prostitutes,” can only be sus-
tained, by construing it to require proof of complicity, actual or
intended, with the persons named in the complaint as the reputed
thieves and prostitutes; otherwise it would be void, as an invasion
of the right of personal liberty:3 So, where the common council of
1 Dayton v. Quigley, 29 N. J. Eq. (2 2 Mayor v. Winfield, 8 Humph. (Tenn.)
Stew.) 77 (1878); see cases cited in report- 707 (1848). The oppressiveness and in.
er's note at end of the opinion. The equality, alleged to invalidate a by-law,
Chaucellor in substance says : “The must be made apparent to the court.
water-works belong to the municipality, Mayor v. Beasly, 1 Humph. (Tenn.) 232
and are for the benefit of the inhabitants (1839); St. Louis v. Weber, 44 Mo. 547
of the city. The inhabitants are entitled (1869). A by-law prohibiting swine run-
to the use of the water on compliance ning at large in a city is presumptively
with reasonable regulations. The use of reasonable as a sanitary or police regula-
the water for the complainant's tenants is tion. Commonwealth v. Patch, 97 Mass.
necessary to the full enjoyment hy him of 221 ; Commonwealth v. Bean, 14 Gray
his property. To refuse to furnish water (Mass.), 52.
to his tenant there unless the complainant Ordinances to regulate callings and
pays a debt due from the tenant to the trades must not be unreasonable, partial,
city for water furnished to him elsewhere, in restraint of trade, or in contravention
on premises not belonging to the com- of public policy. Frank, In re, 52 Cal.
plainant, would, obviously, be to compel 606 (1877). Thus a statute forbidding the
him to pay the tenant's debt as a condi- reservation of seats at public exhibitions,
tion precedent to obtaining the water for upon the sale of tickets of admission,
his premises while occupied by the tenant. after the opening of the doors, is an un-
The regulations must be reasonable. 1 constitutional interference with private
Dill. on Mun. Corp. secs. 319, 320. The property. Dist. of Columbia v. Saville,
refusal to furnish water to complainant is, 1 McArthur, 581.
under the circumstances, unjustifiable, and 8 St. Louis v. Fitz, 53 Missouri, 582
is an injury for which he is entitled to re- (1873).
lief in this court. High on Inj. sec. 787."
400
§ 322
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
Baltimore, by ordinance, forbade any person to erect or maintain any
steam-engine or boiler without authority from the mayor, and author-
ized the mayor, upon six months' notice, to revoke any permit to use
or maintain a steam-engine or boiler, and that thereupon the same
should be removed, under a heavy penalty for failure to remove it,
in an action to restrain the prosecution of a suit for the penalty by
one maintaining a steam-engine after notice to remove the same by
the mayor, it was held that, by itself, a stationary steam-engine is not
a nuisance; and that an ordinance which commits to the unrestrained
will of a single public officer a power practically absolute over the
use of steam within a city, so that he might prohibit its use altogether,
the exercise of which may proceed from enmity or prejudice, from
partisan zeal or animosity, from favoritism and other improper influ-
ences, and motives easy of concealment and difficult to be detected
and exposed, does not fall within the domain of law, and is void
and inoperative.1
§ 322 (256). Must be
Must be Impartial, Fair, and General. - As it
would be unreasonable and unjust to make, under the same circum-
stances, an act done by one person penal, and if done by another
not so, ordinances which have this effect cannot be sustained.
Special and unwarranted discrimination, or unjust or oppressive in-
terference in particular cases, is not to be allowed. The powers
vested in municipal corporations should, as far as practicable, be ex-
ercised by ordinances general in their nature and impartial in their
operation.
1 Baltimore v. Radecke, 49 Md. 217; (1877); S. C. 10 Chicago Legal News, 379.
s. 0. 21 Alb. Law Jour. 117.
So an ordinance compelling a railroad
2 Russ v. Mayor, &c. of New York, 12 company to station flagmen wherever the
N. Y. Leg. Obs. 38; White v. Mayor, 2 railroad may cross streets, &c., is a valid
Swan (Tenn.), 364 (1852); De Ben v. exercise of legislative power, as a police reg-
Gerard, 4 La. An. 30; Chicago v. Rumpff, ulation for the safety of the public and pas-
45 Ill. 90; Hudson v. Thorne, 7 Paige, sengers on the trains. Such ordinance when
261 ; Baton Rouge Council v. Crémonini, passed is a judicial act, imposing pecuniary
36 La. An. 247; Ex parte Chin Yan, burden and loss on the railroad company,
60 Cal. 78; Zanone v. Mound City, and is subject to review by courts, which
103 Ill. 552; Citizens' Gas & M. Co. v. will determine whether the power con-
Elwood, 114 Ind. 332 (1887). The doc- ferred was exercised in a legal and reason-
trine of the text approved and applied. able manner. State v. East Orange, 41
Tugman v. Chicago, 78 Ill. 405 (1875). N. J. L. 127.. So, also, a resolution of a
An ordinance prohibiting a particular rail- water board, under authority of a city
road corporation by name from running charter, requiring certain consumers to put
locomotives by steam on a specified street in expensive meters, without their consent,
is valid, and does not contravene the prin- under the penalty of cutting off the water
ciple stated in the text. Richmond, &c. for non-payment of the price of the meters,
Railroad Co. v. Richmond, 96 U. S. 521 was declared void as being an unwarranted
§ 323
401
ORDINANCES: REGULATION AND RESTRAINT OF TRADE.
§ 323 (257). May regulate, but not restrain Trade. — In England,
certain customs prevail in prescriptive corporations restrictive of
freedom of trade and against common riglit. Such customs, from
long usage and unknown origin, are regarded in the light of regula-
tions prescribed by a charter which is supposed to have existed, but
is lost. Such customs, while not favored by the English courts, are
yet held legal, but must be incontrovertibly established. But by
the Municipal Corporations Act of 1835 (5 & 6 Wm. IV. chap.
lxxvi. sec. 14), exclusive rights of trading have been abolished, and
discrimination. Red Star Steamship Co. act in a partial and oppressive manner;
2. Jersey City, 45 N. J. L. (16 Vroom) therefore it cannot select particular indi.
216, citing the text.
viduals by name, and require them to
Ordinances should be general, or, at all construct pavements or local improve.
events not discriminating in their opera- ments in front of their lots, and omit
tion. They may, it is said, impose fines others in the same improvement district, if
on persons violating their provisions with this be done without good cause or reason
in the corporation or within a designated for the distinction. White v. Nashville,
district therein, or in a certain street ; but 2 Swan (Tenn.), 364 (1852); post, sec. 799.
an ordinance naming one individual and 1 Ante, chap. iii. sec. 35, and note.
directing him to do certain acts with re. Post, sec. 362, note and cases as to monop-
spect to a building alleged to be a nui- olies and ordinances in restraint of trade.
sance, and in default of compliance, im- Criminal conspiracies in restraint of trade
posing a fine of a specific amount upon and the various English statutes in respect
him, was held to be unreasonable, con. thereof are instructively presented by Mr.
trary to common right, and void. Muni- Justice Stephen, 3 Hist. Criminal Law,
cipality v. Blineau, 3 La. An. 688 (1848). chap. XXX. The fact that certain per-
Compare Bozant v. Campbell, 9 Rob. (La.) sons were engaged in a particular kind of
411 (1845), where, without repealing an business in a given locality, at the time of
ordinance prohibiting private hospitals, the adoption of an ordinance, would not
the grant of permission to one or more in authorize the municipal corporation, by
dividuals to erect such hospitals was sus- such ordinance, to permit such persons to
tained. And see, also, Commonwealth v. continue their business, whilst it prohib-
Goodrich, 13 Allen (Mass.), 545, where a ited others from engaging in the same
municipal regulation, limited in its charac- business in the same locality. Tugman:
ter, was considered valid. Such cases de. V. Chicago, 78 Ill. 405 (1875).
pend upon their special circumstances. A statute authorizing municipal au-
The test is that the regulation must be thorities to license and regulate such call-
reasonable as applied to the subject ings, trades, and employments as the
matter.
public good may require, will empower
If an ordinance is general in its applica- them to exact a license for revenue pur-
tion, the mere fact that it peculiarly affects poses, if that construction is not incon-
a particular person raises no presumption sistent with the whole charter and the
that it was enacted for the purpose of an general legislation of the state. An ordi-
noying him or depriving him of his rights. nance fixing one rate of license for selling
Shinkle v. Covington, 83 Ky. 420. Or. goods which are within or in transit to the
dinances may be adapted to the varying city, and another rate for goods not within
municipal necessities and exigencies. Cov- or in transit to the city, is invalid. Frank,
ington v. East St. Louis, 78 Ill. 548 In re, 52 Cal. 606; 8. P. Mayor v. Althrop,
(1875); post, sec. 394. In exercising its 5 Coldw. 554; Cronin v. People, 82 N. Y.
power to require adjacent lot-owners to 318 (an ordinance regulating the slaughter
make local improvements, the corporation, of animals held valid). Supra, sec. 319,
it has been held in Tennessee, must not note.
- 26
VOL. I.
402
§ 324
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
it is enacted “that, notwithstanding such custom or by-law [to the
contrary], every person in any borough may keep any shop for the
sale of all lawful wares and merchandise, by wholesale or retail, and
use every lawful trade, occupation, mystery, and handicraft, for hire,
gain, sale, or otherwise, within any borough."
§ 324 (258). Customs in Restraint of Trade.
In this country
corporations derive all their powers from legislative acts of compara-
tively modern date, and prescriptive customs in restraint of trade or
against common right are unknown. No inconsiderable portion of
the cases in the old books in England relate to these customs, their
validity and mode of proof, but they are in the main inapplicable to
the present period and to the institutions in this country, where
freedom in the choice and pursuit of all occupations never has been
denied. The inapplicability of the English decisions is noticed by
Mr. Justice Dewey, in delivering the opinion of the Supreme Court
of Massachnsetts in an important case involving the validity of an
ordinance of the city of Boston regulating the use of hackney coaches
and other vehicles within the city. He observes that “in the argu-
ments addressed to the court, the question was somewhat discussed
as to the power incident to municipal corporations to create by-laws
of the character here adopted ; and a reference was made to various
cases in the English courts, where questions of this nature had
arisen. Upon examination of those cases they will be found less
important and less satisfactory as guides here, inasmuch as it is quite
obvious that in many of them, and particularly those where the
ordinance seemed most questionable as not being within the ordi-
nary exercise of municipal authority, the by-laws were sustained
upon the ground of ancient and long-continued usage, ripening into
a prescriptive right on the part of the municipal corporation." But
“no such ground," he adds, "can be urged here; and the present
ordinance, if sustained at all, must be shown to be authorized by the
express provision of the charter, or be derived as an incidental power
resulting from its incorporation as a city, or be found in some gen-
eral or special statute.” 1
i Commonwealth v. Stodder, 2 Cush. as will authorize one city, unless it has
(Mass.) 562, 568 (1848). See as to Eng. express and direct authority so to do from
lish decisions, remarks of Rhodes, J., in the legislature, to pass an ordinance re-
Herzo v. San Francisco, 33 Cal. 134, 145 quiring the inhabitants of other towns to
(1867). Post, sec. 362, note. In the case obtain from it a license before exercising
first cited the court decided that the busi- that employment in carrying persons to or
ness of carrying persons for hire from town from it. Such an ordinance was consid-
to town in stage-coaches and omnibuses is ered to be an unnecessary restraint upon
not so far a territorial or local occupation business, and is not binding upon citizens
!
$ 326
403
ORDINANCES MUST NOT CONTRAVENE COMMON RIGHTS.
§ 325 (259). Must not contravene Common Right. An ordi-
nance cannot legally be made which contravenes a common right,
unless the power to do so be plainly conferred by a valid and com-
petent legislative grant; and in cases relating to such a right, au-
thority to regulate, conferred upon towns of limited powers, has been
held not necessarily to include the power to prohibit. Thus, in
Connecticut, it is held that every one has, presumptively, a common-
law right to fish in navigable rivers, and that, though every town
may, by statute, have the power to make by-laws to regulate fish-
eries of clams and oysters within its limits, yet this power does not
authorize a by-law prohibiting all persons except its own inhabitants
from taking shell-fish in a navigable river, within the limits of such
town; such a by-law, being in contravention of a common right, is
void.2
§ 326 (260). Same subject. But there is, however, no conmon
right to do that which, by a valid law or ordinance, is prohibited ;
and hence courts will not declare an authorized ordinance void be-
cause it prohibits what otherwise might lawfully be done. In dis-
cussing the subject, Mr. Justice Evans illustrates it in this wise :
“If there was no law interfering, the butcher might kill his beeves
and hogs in the street. If the butcher could do it, any man
might, and it might, therefore, be said to be a common right; but
when the law prohibited it, it was no longer a common right. A
legal restraint may be imposed on a few for the benefit of the
Therefore, while ordinances which unnecessarily restrain
" 3
many."
of other places. The court does not ques-
The court does not ques. Taylor v. Griswold, 2 Green (N. J.), 222
tion the right of the city, by reasonable (1834); ante, sec. 89, and note.
by-laws, 'to require inhabitants, whose 1 Taylor v. Griswold, 2 Green (N. J.),
business is local and carried on within 222 (1834); State v. Mott, 61 Md. 297 ;
the city, to obtain a license before exercis- Milliken v. Weatherford, 54 Tex. 388,
ing certain employments. Per Dewey, J., where an ordinance prohibiting the rent-
Commonwealth v. Stodder, 2 Cush. (Mass.) ing of private property to lewd women was
562, 575 ; see also Napman v. People, 19 declared void.
Mich. 352 (1869) ; Barling v. West, 29 ? Hayden v. Noyes, 5 Conn. 391 (1824);
Wis. 307 ; s. C. 9 Am. Rep. 576 (1871); Peck v. Lockwood, 5 Day (Conn.), 22;
Hayes v. Appleton, 24 Wis. 542 ; Taylor Willard v. Killingworth, 8 Conn. 247 ;
V. Pine uff, 34 Ark. 603 (excessive Clason v. Milwaukee, 30 Wis. 316. The
charge for weighing cotton); post, sec. general welfare clause does not authorize
369.
the imposition of a license tax for engaging
Whenever a by-law seeks to alter a well. in a lawful business, – sale of lemonade,
settled and fundamental principle of the cake, &c., at temporary stands on sidewalk.
common law, or to establish a rule interfer- Barling v. West, 29 Wis. 307 (1871); S. C.
ing with the rights of individuals or the 9 Am. Rep. 576 ; see post, sec. 387; ante,
public, the power to do so must come from sec. 89.
plain and direct legislative enactment. 8 Per Evans, J., in City Council v.
404
§ 327
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
trade or operate oppressively upon individuals will not be sustained,
yet such as are reasonably calculated to preserve the public health
are valid although they may abridge individual liberty and indi-
vidual rights in respect of property. Accordingly, in a populous
city an ordinance is valid as a sanitary regulation which prohibits
the purchasing of carcasses of animals for boiling, steaming, or
rendering the same, and the rendering and steaming of the same,
within the city, except in certain enumerated cases and under speci-
fied conditions of a reasonable character.2
§ 327 (261). Validity is for the Court, and not the Jury, to
determine. Whether an ordinance be reasonable and consistent
with the law or not is a question for the court, and not the jury, and
evidence to the latter on this subject is inadmissible. But in deter-
mining this question the court will have to regard all the circum-
stances of the particular city or corporation, the objects sought to be
attained, and the necessity which exists for the ordinance. Regula-
tions proper for a large and prosperous city might be absurd or op-
pressive in a small and sparsely populated town, or in the country.3
Ahrens. 4 Strob. (S. C.) Law, 241, 257 being unreasonable in the exercise of it.
(1850); City Council v. Baptist Church, Per Lowrie, J., Fisher v. Harrisburg, 2
16. 306, 310; Peoria v. Calhoun, 29 Ill. 317, Grant (Pa.) Cases, 291 (1854); S. P. St.
(1862); St. Paul v. Colter, 12 Minn. 41, Louis v. Weber, 44 Mo. 547. "The
(1866).
courts," says Dewey, J., “doubtless have
1 Text approved, State v. Holcomb, 68 the power to deny effect to a by-law ob-
Iowa, 107 ; Commonwealth v. Patch, 97 noxious to the objection that it is unrea.
Mass. 221.
sonable. It is, however, a power to be
· State v. Fisher, 52 Mo. 174 (1873). cautiously exercised,” especially where
8 Kneedler v. Norristown, 100 Pa. St. the question is a practical one, - for ex-
368, approving text. Bacon Abr. tit. By- ample, the length of time which ought to
Law; Commonwealth v. Worcester, 3 Pick. be allowed to vehicles to remain in the
(Mass.) 462 (1862); Paxson v. Sweet, 1 street, and as to which the city authori-
Green (N. J.), 196 (1832); Vandine, Peti. ties, it is to be presumed, can judge bet.
tioner, &c., 6 Pick. (Mass.) 187 (1828). ter than the court. Commonwealth v.
Boston v. Shaw, 1 Met. (Mass.) 130, 135 Robertson, 5 Cush. (Mass.) 438, 442 (1850).
(1840); Austin v. Murray, 16 Pick. (Mass.) See, also, Vintners v. Passey, 1 Burr. 239 ;
121,125 (1834); Hudson v. Thorne, 7 Paige Workingham v. Johnson, Cas. temp.
Ch. (N. Y.) 261; Commonwealth v. Stod. Hardw. 285; Poulters' Co. v. Phillips, 6
der, 2 Cush. (Mass.) 562, 575 (1848); Bing. N. C. 314; St. Paul v. Colter, 12
Commissioners v. Gas Co., 12 Pa. St. 318; Minn. 41; Commonwealth v. Patch, 97
Dunham v. Rochester, 5 Cow. (N. Y.) 462, Mass. 221.
465 (1826); Buffalo v. Webster, 10 Wend. The doctrine of the text that the valid.
(N. Y.) 100; Brooklyn v. Breslin, 57 ity of a by-law is in all cases a question for
N. Y. 591, 596 (1874); Frank, In re, 52 the court, and that evidence to the jury
Cal. 606, approving text. Ante, sec. 319. is inadmissible, has been denied by the
“Where the municipal legislature has Supreme Court of Wisconsin, which, in
authority to act, it must be governed, not Clason v. Milwaukee, 30 Wis. 316 (1872)
by our discretion, but by its own; and we (involving the validity of an ordinance
shall not be hasty in convicting them of to protect the harbor, and also the city,
1
§ 329
405
ORDINANCES MUST NOT VIOLATE LEGISLATIVE POLICY.
$ 328 (262). Legislative Authority to adopt what would other-
wise be Unreasonable Ordinances. Where the legislature, in terms,
confers upon a municipal corporation the power to pass ordinances
of a specified and defined character, if the power thus delegated be
not in conflict with the Constitution, an ordinance passed pursu-
ant thereto cannot be impeached as invalid because it would have
been regarded as unreasonable if it had been passed under the inci-
dental power of the corporation, or under a grant of power general
in its nature. In other words, what the legislature distinctly says
may be done cannot be set aside by the courts because they may
deem it to be unreasonable or against sound policy. But where the
power_to_legislate on a given subject is conferred, and the mode of
its exercise is not prescribed, then the ordinance passed in pursuance
thereof must be a reasonable exercise of the..power, or it will be
pronounced invalid.T
§ 329 (263). Must be consistent with Public Legislative Policy.
The rule that a municipal corporation can pass no ordinance
which conflicts with its charter or any general statute in force and
applicable to the corporation, has been before stated. Not only so,
but it cannot, in virtue of its incidental power to pass by-laws, or
under any general grant of that authority, adopt by-laws which in-
fringe the spirit or are repugnant to the policy of the State as de-
clared in its general legislation. This principle is well exemplified
by a case in Ohio, in which incorporated towns were, by statute,
from inundation by preserving the shore Louis, authorizing the city authorities "to
or 'beach), considered it to be no violation regulate," and, by construction, to per-
of principle, in a case where the reason- mit bawdy houses, and the objection made
ableness of the ordinance depended upon by counsel to an ordinance licensing such
extrinsic facts, to submit testimony to the houses, Napton, J., says: “It is naked
jury bearing upon the reasonableness of assumption to say that any matter allowed
the requirements of the ordinance. But by the legislature is against public policy.
the argument of the counsel for the city, The best indications of public policy are
that this view makes the same by-law to be found in the enactments of the legis.
"valid in one case and invalid in another, lature. To say that such a law is of un-
according to the varying weight of testi- usual tendency is disrespectful to the
mony and the varying views of juries," legislature, who, no doubt, designed to
seems unanswerable, and the text states promote the morals and health of the citi-
probably the true doctrine. See Glover on Whether the ordinance in question
Corp. 297, and cases in this note.
is calculated to promote the object is a
1 Peoria v. Calhoun, 29 Ill. 317 (1862); question with which the courts have no
St. Paul v. Colter, 12 Minn. 41 (1866); concern,” when the legislative will has
Brooklyn v. Breslin, 57 N. Y. 591, 596 been plainly expressed. State v. Clarke,
(1874); A Coal-Float v. Jeffersonville, 112 54 Mo. 17, 36 (1873).
Ind. 15; Breninger v. Belvidere, 44 N. See ante, secs. 89, 317, 319.
J. L. 350 ; post, sec. 420. Speaking of a 8 Marietta v. Fearing, 3 Ohio, 427
provision of the charter of the city of St. (1831). See also Grand Rapids Electric,
zens.
406
§ 330
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
prohibited from subjecting stray animals owned by persons not resi-
dents of such towns to their corporation ordinances. It was held
that an ordinance operating, not on the animals but on the non-resi-
dent owner, in the shape of a penalty, violated the spirit of the
statute, and was void. So, in a later case in the same State, it was
shown that the general policy of the State was to allow animals to
run at large; and it was ruled that a municipal corporation with
power to pass “all by-laws deemed necessary for the well-regulation,
health, cleanliness, &c.," of the borough, and with power to “abate
nuisances," had no authority to pass a by-law restraining cattle from
running at large, such a by-law being in contravention of the gen-
eral law of the State.1
§ 330 (264). Same subject. - The general statutes of the State
abolished the system of inspecting hay, and, in the place of it, the
seller was required to prepare the article for market in a particular
manner, at the peril of being subjected to certain designated penal-
ties. In other words he was at liberty to dispose of his hay without
inspection if he chose to do so. Under these circumstances, it was
decided that a city ordinance, prohibiting the sale of pressed hay
without inspection, was void, because it conflicted with the laws of the
State upon the same subject.2
&c. Co. v. Grand Rapids Edison, &c. Co., cases of necessity, charity, &c., prohibited
33 Fed. Rep. 659 ; Ex parte Chin Yan, the opening of shops for business on
60 Cal. 78; Baltimore v. Scharf, 54 Md. Sunday. Followed, Thompson v. Mount
499.
Vernon, 11 Ohio St. 688, adjudging an or-
1 Collins v. Hatch, 18 Ohio, 523 (1849), dinance to be invalid because inconsistent
But in Illinois it has been decided that a with the liquor law of the State. And
town, authorized by its charter to declare see Adams v. Mayor, &c., 29 Ga. 56; Sill
what should be nuisances, and to provide v. Corning, 1 E. P. Smith (15 N. Y.), 297;
for the abatement thereof by ordinance, Cincinnati e. Gwynne, 10 Ohio, 192 ;
may pass an ordinance declaring swine Wood v. Brooklyn, 14 Barb. (N. Y.) 425;
running at large within the corporation Markle v. Akron, 14 Ohio, 586; Thomas
to be nuisances, and providing for the v. Richmond, 12 Wall. 349 (1870). But
taking up of the same, &c., and this a corporation may, in some cases, consist-
though under the laws of the State the ently with general law, further regulate by
owners of stock may lawfully allow it to ordinance subjects already regulated by
run at large upon the common, the court statute. Huddleson v. Ruffin, 6 Ohio St.
regarding the power named in the charter 604; Rogers v. Jones, 1 Wend. (N. Y.)
as abridging or limiting any right of com- 237; State v. Welch, 36 Conn. 215
mon which might otherwise exist. Rob. (1869).
erts v. Ogle, 30 Ill. 459 (1863). By-laws 2 Mayor, &c. of New York v. Nichols,
which contravene the policy of the gen. 4 Hill (N. Y.), 209_(1843). Compare
eral statutes of the State, by undertaking Mayor v. Hyatt, 3 E. D. Smith (N. Y.),
to punish acts which those statutes au- 156 ; Rogers v. Jones, 1 Wend. (N. Y.)
thorize, are void. Canton v. Nist, 9 Ohio 237. Construction of power to appoint
St. 439, holding void a by-law, which, weighmasters. Hoffman v. Jersey City,
disregarding the statutory exceptions of 34 N. J. L. 172 (1870).
§ 331
ORDINANCES : SIGNING, PUBLICATION, AND RECORDING. 407
Of the signing, Publication, and Recording of Ordinances.
§ 331 (265). Signing, Publication, and Recording. When ordi-
nances are required to be published before they shall go into effect,
this requirement is essential, and the publication must be in the
designated mode. Until such publication be made, or until they
have gone into operation, no penalty can be enforced under them.
Whether the mayor's signature is essential to the validity of an ordi-
nance depends upon the charter; but unless made essential, such
provisions, where the ordinance is duly enacted, have sometimes
been regarded as directory.?
1 Barnett v. Newark, 28 Ill. 62 (1862); law without publication. Schweitzer v.
Conboy v. Iowa City, 2 Iowa, 90 (1855); Liberty, 82 Mo. 309. When no provi-
Higley v. Bunce, 10 Conn. 567 (1835); sion for the publication of ordinances is
Meyer v. Fromm, 108 Ind. 208 ; Napa contained in a special charter, the promul-
v. Easterby, 61 Cal. 509 ; Waln v. Phil- gation should be reasonably sufficient to
adelphia, 99 Pa. St. 330 ; Schwartz v. notify all parties interested, and the pre-
Oshkosh, 55 Wis. 490. Specified mode of sumption is in favor of the reasonableness
publishing the proceedings of the council of the time adopted by the corporation,
is essential. State v. Hoboken, 9 Vroom which must prevail unless countervailing
(38 N. J. L.), 110; Ib. 113; Hoboken v. facts are proved. Pitts v. Opelika, 79 Ala.
Gear, 3 Dutch. (N. J.) 265. Failure to 527, which further decides that a provi
publish ordinance held not to affect va- for publication contained in a general law
lidity of bonds issued under a subsequent applies only to municipalities organized un-
act authorizing the corporation to incur a der that law. Publication held not neces-
debt. Amey v. Allegheny City, 24 How. sary when not required by the charter. In
364 ; Clark v. Janesville, 10 Wis. 136 re Guerrero, 69 Cal. 88. In Massachusetts
(1859); State v. Newark, 1 Vroom (30 a provision by ordinance for the publication
N. J. L.), 303 ; People v. San Francisco, of ordinances is held to be directory, and
27 Cal. 655. Where publication for five not a condition precedent to their validity.
successive days is required, a publication Commonwealth v. Davis, 140 Mans. 485.
for five successive week-days is sufficient, 2 Blanchard v. Bissell, 11 Ohio St. 96,
though a Sunday intervenes when no paper 101, 103 (1860); Striker v. Kelly, 7 Hill
is issued. Ec parie Fiske, 72 Cal. 125. (N. Y.), 9; Elmendorf v. Mayor of New
Publication in a newspaper published only York, 25 Wend. (N. Y.) 693. See, how-
on Sunday held valid under the Ohio ever, Conboy v. Iowa City, supra; State
statute. Hastings v. Columbus, 42 Ohio v. Newark, 1 Dutch. (N. J.) 399; State v.
St. 585. Under a charter forbidding the Hudson, 5 Dutch. (N. J.) 475 ; Kenner
increase of salaries during terms of of- v. Commonwealth, 40 Pa. St. 124 ; State
fice, and providing that ordinances should v. Jersey City, 1 Vroom (30 N. J. L.), 93 ;
not take effect until after publication for Creighton v. Manson, 27 Cal. 613 ; Taylor
twenty days, an ordinance respecting sala- v. Palmer, 31 Cal. 241 ; Dey v. Jersey
ries, adopted before a term began, but the City, 19 N. J. Eq. 412 ; State v. Jersey
last publication of which was after that City, 1 Vroom (30 N. J. L.), 93 ; 16. 148;
time, was held to fix the salaries for that State v. Newark, 3 Dutch. (N. J.) 185
term. Stuhr v. Hoboken, 47 N. J. L. (18 (1876); Gas Co. v. San Francisco, 6 Cal.
Vroom) 147. Where the charter pro- 190 ; State v. Henderson, 38 Ohio St.
vided that a failure to publish should not 644 ; Walı v. Philadelphia, 99 Pa. St.
make ordinances void unless the delay 330 ; Opelousas v. Andrus, 37 La. An.
caused them to operate retrospectively, 699 ; New York & N. E. R. R. Cn. v.
it was held that an ordinance became a Waterbury, 55 Conn. 19 (holding also that
408
§ 333
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
$ 332 (266). Alternate Modes of Publication. Where alternate
modes of publication of a by-law are allowed by statute, and the
statute requires the corporation to direct which mode shall be
adopted, a publication made by order of the clerk, without direction
from or selection of the mode having been made by the corporation,
is not valid. 1
§ 333 (267). Time of Publication. — A municipal charter re-
quired every ordinance to be published for the space of twenty days
the fact that there was a practice of treat- Pa. St. 113. Where the charter required
ing votes of the common council as ap- the mayor to sign ordinances or return
proved by the mayor unless disapproved them within five days with his reasons
in writing, was immaterial). See ante, for not doing so, an ordinance passed by
chapter on Corporate Meetings, sec. 293. the council, but which was not signed
Signing minutes not equivalent to signing nor returned by the mayor, was held in-
resolution, when latter is essential. Gra- valid. In re Standiford, 5 Mackey (Dist.
ham 2. Carondelet, 33 Mo. 262 (1862); of Col.), 549, and see Pennsylvania Globe
but see Woodruff v. Stewart, 63 Ala. 206, Gas Light Co. v. Scranton, 97 Pa. St. 538.
where signing minutes was held sufficient. Injunction does not lie to prevent a mayor
When to be signed. Miles v. Bough, 3 from signing an ordinance, even when the
Gale & D. 119 ; Inglis v. Railway Co., 16 intended ordinance is a repeal of one under
Eng. Law & Eq. 55. Where another offi- which a valid contract has been entered
cer is cx-officio clerk of the council his into. New Orleans Elevated Ry. Co. v.
signature to an ordinance as clerk of New Orleans, 39 La. An. 127. As to
the council" is a proper authentication of what may be considered sufficient proof of
it. In re Guerrero, 69 Cal. 88. A legis.
A legis. an ordinance having been signed by the
lative provision requiring the presiding mayor, see Knight v. Kansas City, St. J. &
officer of the council to sign all ordinances C. B. R. R. Co., 70 Mo. 231. Bonds of a
is directory in its nature. If regularly city signed by an ex-mayor held invalid.
passed, an ordinance is valid, though not Coler v. Cleburne, 131 U. S. 162 (1889).
thus authenticated. It is, of course, com- 1 Higley v. Bunce (restraining cattle),
petent for the legislature to make the sig. 10 Conn. 435 ; S. C. Ib. 567 (1835). The
nature an essential condition of validity. language of the statute was this : “Such
Blanchard v. Bissell, 11 Ohio St. 96, 101, by-laws shall not be in force until pub-
103 (1860); Fisher v. Graham, 1 Cin. (Ohio) lished four weeks in a newspaper printed
113 (1870); ante, sec. 293. See State v. in such town, or in the town nearest to
Newark, 1 Dutch. (N. J.) 399. Signature such town in which a newspaper is printed,
of mayor not essential under general in- or in some other newspaper generally cir-
corporation laws of Indiana. Martindale culated in the town where such by-law is
v. Palmer, 52 Ind. 411 (1876). No muni- made, as the town shall direct." Rev. 1821,
cipal ordinance is binding unless signed by p. 458. Held, that the town must point
the mayor and promulgated in the English out one of the three descriptions of news-
language. Breaux's Bridge, In re, 30 La. papers in which the by-law should be
An. 1105 ; ante, sec. 271, note. Where, printed. Ib. Mode of publication under
by mistake, the date of approval by the the general incorporation law of Illinois
mayor was entered as of a day prior to the of 1872. Byars v. Mt. Vernon, 77 Ill.
passage of an ordinance, it was held, in a 467 (1875). Special provisions construed.
suit to collect a tax under the ordinance, Phillips, In re, 60 N. Y. 16 (1875); Bass-
that as all other requisites had been com. ford, In re, 50 N. Y. 509 (1872). Certifi-
plied with and no one's rights had been cate of city clerk of due publication not come
prejudiced, the validity of the ordinance petent evidence unless made so by statute.
was not affected. Allentown v. Grim, 109 R. R. Co. v. Engle, 76 Ill. 317 (1875).
.
§ 334
409
ORDINANCES: PROOF OF PUBLICATION.
in at least one newspaper before it should go into effect; and it was
held that an ordinance would go into force in twenty days after its
publication in the first number of the paper; that twenty days need
not intervene between the first and last insertions; that it is clearly
sufficient if it be published in each number of the paper issued
within the twenty days, and probably sufficient if there is but one
insertion, twenty days after which the ordinance will go into effect.1
Where an ordinance has been once duly published, and it is after-
wards included in a revision or digest of ordinances, no additional
publication is necessary.?
§ 334 (268). Proof of Publication. — A charter provided that no
ordinance should be in force until published in some newspaper of
the place, and also declared that ordinances should be sufficiently
proved in any court (among other modes) by a printed copy taken
from the newspaper or printed pamphlet in which the same bad
been published, provided the same purports to have been done by
authority of the corporation. Under this provision, the production
of a newspaper published in the town, containing what appears as
an ordinance, with a caption, " Published by Authority," duly signed,
is evidence of the existence and adoption of the ordinance. So
where the charter provides that ordinances published by authority of
the corporation shall be received in evidence without further proof,
a book of ordinances, purporting to be thus published, is competent
1 Hoboken v. Gear, 3 Dutch. (N. J.) which were in force before it was made."
265 (1859). Where a city is required to St. Louis v. Alexander, 23 Mo. 509. Ex.
promulgate its ordinances, it is sufficient to ception to rule, see Emporia v. Norton, 16
publish thein in the newspaper in which Kan. 236 (1876).
the ordinances are usually published, 8 Block v. Jacksonville, 36 Ill. 301
though there may be other newspapers (1865). Authorized book of ordinances
within the city. Truchelut v. City Coun. is prima facie evidence of due passage and
cil, 1 Nott & McC. (S. C.) 227 (1818); publication of the ordinances therein con-
and see cases noted in sec. 331, note, ante. tained. Prell v. McDonald, 7 Kan. 426
2 St. Louis v. Foster, 52 Mo. 513 (1871); s. C. 12 Am. Rep. 423. See Pen-
(1873). “It would be of the most mis- dergast v. Peru, 20 Ill. 51. Proof of pub-
chievous consequence to hold that the lication under special charter provision.
revision of a law had the effect of making. St. Charles v. O'Malley, 18 Ill. 407;
the revised law entirely original, to be Moss v. Oakland, 88 Ill. 109. In an action
considered as though none of its provi- against a city, plaintiff need not prove
sions had effect but from the date of the the publication of an ordinance offered
revised law. When a former provision is in evidence, where he shows that the city
included in a revised law, it is only there. had for several years acted upon the or-
by intended to continue its existence, not dinance as in force. Atchison v. King, 9
to make it operate as an original act, to Kan. 550 (1872); State v. Atlantic City
take effect from the date of the revised (burden of proof), 5 Vroom (34 N. J. L.),
law. The revision has not the effect to 99, 106. A note upon the record of an
break the continuity of those provisions ordinance stating that it had been duly
410
§ 336
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
evidence, without further authentication ; but it is not, of course,
conclusive.1
§ 335 (269). Recording Ordinances. — A provision in a statute
changing an incorporated town into a city, that the existing town
ordinances shall remain in force provided they shall be recorded
within four months thereafter, is merely directory, and such ordi-
nances are valid, though not recorded within the designated period.2
Nor is it a valid objection to a municipal ordinance, that it is re-
corded in print (being printed and pasted in the proper book), and
not in manuscript.
3
Of the Power to impose Fines, Penalties, and Forfeitures.
$ 336 (270). Common-Law Principles adopted. - That by-laws
or ordinances may not be inoperative or useless, it is necessary that
some penalty should be annexed to the breach of them; and it is set-
tled in England, in accordance with the principles of Magna Charta,
that without the express sanction of parliament, no by-law can be
enforced by disfranchisement of the offender, or by his imprison-
nient, or by forfeiture of his goods or property. Under incidental
power to pass by-laws, a corporation may, in England, annex pecu-
viary penalties of a certain, fixed and reasonable character, but with-
out express authority given by a statute, the only penalty it can
prescribe is a pecuniary one, usually called a fine. Therefore in the
absence of a statute or special custom justifying it, a by-law cannot
give a power of distress and sale of the goods of the offender, since
such a power is contrary to the common law. And where a corpor-
ation is empowered to enforce its by-laws in a special manner, as
by fine, it is limited to the manner prescribed. These safe, salu-
tary, and enlightened principles of law have been recognized by the
American courts as applicable to the ordinances of our municipal
corporations, as the cases to which reference is made fully show.
published, held prima facie proof of the competent where the charter does not re-
fact of publication. Downing v. Milton- quire them to be recorded, and no record
vale, 36 Kan. 740.
thereof has been made. Darlington v.
1 St. Louis v. Foster, 52 Mo. 513 (1873); Commonwealth, 41 Pa. St. 68. See ante,
Lindsay v. Chicago, 115 Ill. 120 ; ante, sec.
310, note.
4 In Louisiana, in a case where an or.
2 Trustees of Academy v. Erie, 31 Pa. dinance required property owners to make
St. 515 (1858); Amey v. Allegheny City, their sidewalks conform to a uniform grade
24 How. 364 ; Tipton v. Norman, 72 Mo. under pain of a fine or in prisonment, in
380. See chapter on Corporate Records default of payment of the fine, it was held
and Documents, ante.
by Bermudez, C. J., citing this section,
3 Ewbanks 1. Ashley, 36 Ill. 177 that “a municipal corporation has no
(1864). Parol evidence of resolutions is right to enforce obedience to the ordi-
sec. 310.
!
§ 337
411
ORDINANCES ; FINES AND PENALTIES,
$ 337 (271). Statutory regulation of Fines and Penalties under
Ordinances. — By the Municipal Corporations Act, the subject of
by-laws and their penalties is regulated. It is declared "that it
shall be lawful for the council of any borough to make such by-laws
as shall to them seem meet for the good rule and government of the
borough, and for the prevention and suppression of all such nuisan-
ces as are not already punishable in a summary manner by virtue of
an act in force throughout such borough, and to appoint, by such by-
laws, such fines as they shall deem necessary for the prevention and
suppression of such offences; provided that no fine, to be so ap-
pointed, shall exceed the sum of five pounds, and that no such by-law
shall be made, unless at least two-thirds of the whole number of the
council shall be present.”] Respecting the fines mentioned in this
section, Mr. Rawlinson suggests the inquiry whether it be necessary
or not that the exact amount of each fine should be mentioned in the
by-law, the limit, to wit, 51., being fixed by the act. It is contended,
he observes, by some persons, that the amount may be left open, and
that a by-law, enacting that the offence shall be punishable by a fine
not less than 10s. and not exceeding 51., would be valid. This
would be convenient, but some have doubted whether the corpora-
tion could enforce it by the usual common-law remedies, viz., by an
act of debt or assumpsit. It is believed, he adds, that by-laws have
invariably fixed the exact sum ; but, nevertheless, it would seern that
a fine of 51., with power to the mayor or other officer to reduce it to
auy sum not exceeding a specified amount, would be good.? In this
country, the practice, if not general, is at least not uncommon, to
prescribe limits to fines, and allow them to be imposed within those
limits, at the discretion of the magistrate or court entrusted with
jurisdiction to hear complaints for breaches of municipal ordinances.3
nances which it has the power to pass, by 24 Upper Can. 'Q. B. 238, 243 ; Snell,
fine or imprisonment, or other penalty, In re, 30 Upper Can. Q. B. 81.
unless that right has been unquestionably 8 In England it is held that where the
conferred by the lawgiver ; for this is in statute gives a discretion, either as to the
flicting a punishment for the commission amount of the penalty or its application,
or omission of an act declared an offeuce, a the justice must, on the face of the con-
prerogative which, as a rule, appertains to viction, show in what manner the discre-
the sovereignty only." State v. Bright, 38 tion has been exercised. The King v.
La. An. 1; see also Slessman v. Crozier, 80 Dimpsey, 2 Term R. 96; The King v.
Ind. 187.
Symonds, 1 East, 189 ; Boothroyd, In re,
15 & 6 Wm. IV. ch. lxxvi. sec. 90 ; 15 M. & W. 1; The King v. Seale, 8
ante, sec. 35, and note ; post, sec. 408. East, 568, 573 ; The King v. Smith, 5
2 Rawlinson on Corp. (5th ed.) 165, M. & S. 133; The Queen v. Johnson, 8 Q.
166, note ; post, sec. 341 ; Piper v. Chap. B. 102 ; Wray v. Toke, 12 Q. B. 492;
pell, 14 M. & W. 624 ; Peters v. London, see also The King v. Wyatt, 2 Ld. Raym.
2 Upper Can. Q. B. 543 ; Fennell, In re, 1478; The King v. Priest, 6 Term R. 538.
412
$ 339
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
1
§ 338 (272). Implied Power to annex Pecuniary Penalties.
Since an ordinance or by-law without a penalty would be nugatory,
municipal corporations have an implied power to provide for their
enforcement by reasonable and proper fines against those who break
them. So the right to make by-laws gives to the corporation, with-
out any express grant of power, the incidental right to enforce them
by reasonable pecuniary penalties. What is reasonable depends
upon the nature of the offence and the circumstances.3
§ 339 (273). Charter Mode governs. Where the charter or
organic act prescribes the manner in which by-laws are to be
enforced, or the sanctions or punishments to be annexed to their vio-
615;
It was held in New Jersey, where the Avenue Railroad Co., 32 N. Y. 261.
charter authorized the council to enforce Municipal fine," as used in the Constitu-
their ordinances by a penalty not exceed- tion of California, means a fiue imposed
ing fifty collars, that the council must by local laws of particular places, such as
prescribe a precise penalty for each of- incorporated towns and cities, and not a
fence, and therefore an ordinance declaring fine imposed by the general laws of the
a penalty for its violation not exceeding State. People v. Johnson, 30 Cal. 98
fifty dollars was void. State v. Zeigler, 3 (1866).
Vroom (32 N. J. L.), 262; followed in 2 Fisher v. Harrisburg, 2 Grant (Pa.)
Melick 2. Washington, 47 N. J. L. (18 Cas. 291 (1854); Barter v. Commonwealth,
Vrooni) 254. In North Carolina the law 3 Pa. (Pen. & W.) 253 ; Trigally v. Mem-
is that fines imposed by ordinances must be phis, 6 Coldw. (Tenn.) 382 (1869). The
fixed in amount and cannot be left to the amount must be reasonable. Zylstra v.
discretion of the court. Ordinances pre- Charleston, 1 Bay (S. C.), 382. Tho
scribing a fine of “not more than” a sum penalty, says. Mr. Willcock, must be im-
specified are therefore void for uncertainty posed on the person who violates the by.
and vagueness. State v. Worth, 95 N. C. law. Thus, if goods be sold by an un-
State v. Crenshaw, 94 N. C. 877; authorized person within the city, the
State v. Cainan, 94 N. C. 883. The pro- penalty must be imposed on the seller,
vision for a fine not exceeding $500 for and not on the buyer; for how can he
şuch trivial offences as most of those coy- distinguish between those authorized to
ered by the ordinance before the court sell and those who are not? Willc. on
(one prohibiting processions without the Corp. 154, pl. 369, 370 ; Cuddon v. East-
consent of the mayor, ante, sec. 319, note), wick, 1 Salk. 143, 192 ; s. C. 6 Mod. 124;
the council exercising no discretion, but and see, also, Fazakerly v. Wiltshire, 1
turning this great power over to the courts, Stra. 469. The rule stated above, as to
without any classification, held void. How the person on whom penalties must be
far a sliding scale of penalties is allowable iniposed, may be extended or enlarged by
not decided, but the court said they must express provisions of the organic act of the
be reasonable whether sliding or fixed. corporation.
Per Campbell, C. J., In re Frazee, 63 8 Mayor, &c. of Mobile v. Yuille, 3
Mich. 396 (1886); s. C. 30 N. W. Rep. Ala. 137 (1841). A penalty, although
35 Alb. L. J. 6, citing Grand Rapids small, fixed on every stroke of the ham-
v. Hughes, 15 Mich. 54; see post, secs. mer which an unauthorized person uses in
340, 341, 410; Harr. Munic. Man. 360. his trade of a goldsmith, is unreasonable.
i State v. Cleaveland, 3 R. I. 117. But Willc. 154, pl. 368. Same principle,
no penalty can be enforced for an illegal Mayor, &c. of New York v. Ordrenan,
exaction. Mayor v. Third Avenue Rail- 12 Johns. (N. Y.) 122 (1815). See, ante,
road Co., 33 N. Y. 42 ; Mayor v. Second chap. x., Municipal Courts.
72;
!
§ 340
413
ORDINANCES : MODE OF ENFORCEMENT.
lation, this constructively operates to negative the right of the
corporation to proceed in any other manner or to inflict any other
punishment. Thus, in the leading case 1 on this subject, the char-
ter prescribed in what manner by-laws should be enforced, namely,
by fine and amerciament, or either, and it was decided that the cor-
poration was precluded from declaring a forfeiture of property, or
from inflicting any other punishment; and the doctrine of this case
has been everywhere followed in the courts of this country.
§ 340 (274). Same subject. - A charter of a city specifically
enumerated various powers, which the council was expressly author-
ized to enforce by a penalty not exceeding one hundred dollars for
their violation; and the same charter empowered the council to pre-
vent and remove encroachments upon the streets, but was silent as
to the imposition of penalties for a violation of its provisions. The
council passed an ordinance imposing a continuing penalty of ten
dollars a day for every day's failure to remove an encroachment,
after notice; and it was held, and properly so, that it possessed no
1 Kirk 2". Nowill, 1 Term R. 118, 124 ganic act, that power to punish by “fine"
(1786), per Mansfield and Buller : fol. is exclusive, and that it is not compe-
lowed in ilart v. Mayor, &c. 9 Wend. tent to order a forfeiture in addition, see
(N. Y.) 571, 588, 606 (1832); Cotter v. Schroder v. City Council, 2 Const. Rep.
Doty, 5 Ohio, 393 (1832); Heise v. Town (S. C.) 726 ; s. C. 3 Brev. 533 (1815);
Council, 6 Rich. (S. C.) Law, 404 (1853); McMullen v. City Council, 1 Bay (S. C.),
Miles v. Chamberlain, 17 Wis. 446 (1863). 46 ; Zylstra v. Charleston, Ib. 382; New
In Hart v. Mayor, supra, it was accord- Orleans v. Costello, 14 La. An. 37 ; Co-
ingly decided that a corporation having lumbia v. Hunt, 5 Rich. (S. C.) 550, 558;
authority "to inflict penalties for the vio- Kennedy v. Sowden, 1 McMullan (S. C.),
lation of any by-law, not exceeding $25 328 ; compare Crosby v. Warren, 1 Rich.
for any one offence," could not pass a by- (S. C.) Law, 385. An ordinance treated
law subjecting property to seizure and as wholly void because it fixed the mini-
sile, or forfeiting it, even though it was mum fine for an offence at five dollars
useil contrary to the by-law, which was in when the law required it to be three dol-
other respects valid, the remedy for eň- lars. Petersburg v. Metzker, 21 Ill. 205
forcing their by-laws having been speci- (1859). A party cannot enjoin the collec-
fied. Hurt v. Mayor, 9 Wend. (N. Y.) tion of a fine and costs imposed for the
571 ; ante, sec. 248 ; post, sec. 818. violation of a city ordinance, on the
Where specific modes of procedure and ground of there being no offence charged
penalties are prescribed against persons or cause of action stated before the mayor.
failing to take out license for keeping The remedy in Indiana in such case is by
drinking-houses, as fines, suits, and prose- appeal. Schwab v. Madison, 49 Ind. 329
cutions, a municipal corporation, in the (1874). The city of New Orleans has
absence of express grant, has no right to power to inflict fines and imprisonment
close the doors of a drinking-house sum- under its police power only, and cannot
marily, because the keeper has failed to apply them to violators of ordinances for
take out a license. Bolte 2. New Orleans, the raising of a revenue, as for selling
10 La. An. 321 (1855). That a municipal vegetables without paying for the privi.
corporation cannot annex other or greater lege. State v. Patamia, 34 La. An. 750.
penalties than those authorized in its or-
414
§ 342
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
power to impose such a penalty; but the decision was put upon the
ground that the specific enumeration of the powers which might be
rendered effectual by penal provisions was an implied exclusion of
the right to impose any penalties whatever in other cases.
§ 341 (275). Penalty may be within Fixed Limits. — A muni-
cipal corporation, with power to pass by-laws and to affix penalties,
may, if not prohibited by the charter, or if the penalty is not fixed
by the charter, make it discretionary, within fixed reasonable limits,
for example, "not exceeding fifty dollars." The maximum limit
must of course be reasonable. This enables the tribunal to adjust
the penalty to the circumstances of the particular case, and is just
and reasonable. The older English authorities, so far as they hold
such a by-law void for uncertainty, are regarded as not sound in
principle, and ought not to be followed.?
§ 342 (276). Single Offence cannot be made Double. As the
power to pass ordinances and to punish for their violation must be
reasonably exercised, the corporation cannot multiply one offence into
many, and punish for each. Thus, where an authorized ordinance
prohibited "any person from cutting down and making use of cedar
and other trees,” within a specified locality, a complaint, charging
the defendant“ with having cut down a cedar tree at various times,
1 Grand Rapids v. Hughes, 15 Mich. Fennell, In re, 24 Upper Can. Q. B. 238 ;
54 (1866). Whether there is such an ini. State v. Cantieny, 34 Minn. 1. A by-law
plied exclusion must depend in each case fixing one penalty for the first offence,
upon the supposed intention of the legis- and a larger for the second, and a still
lature, to be gathered from a survey of larger one for every subsequent offence,
the whole charter. The authority to adopt does not appear to be bad for uncertainty.
an ordinance implies the right to enforce Butchers' Co. v. Bullock, supra. Where
it by proper pecuniary penalties, and this the penalty is fixed by by-law, it can only
right exists unless excluded by other pro- be changed by the same authority which
visions of the charter. Supra, sec. 338. affixed it. Pex v. Ashwell, 12 East, 29;
In Maryland it is held when a municipal Scarning v. Cryer, 3 Leon. 7; Moore, 75;
corporation is seeking to enforce an ordi- Bendl. 159 ; Davies v. Lowden, Carter,
rance which is void, that a court of equity 29. A penalty fixed either by the char-
has jurisdiction, at the suit of any person ter or by-law is essential. Bowman v. St.
who is injuriously affected thereby, to stay John, 43 Ill. 337; Ashton v. Ellsworth,
its execution by injunction. Baltimore v. 43 Ill. 299 ; supra, secs. 337, 338; infra,
Radecke, 49 Md. 217; s. c. 21 Alb. Law sec. 343. The old English rule stated in
Jour. 117; but see Index, tit. Injunction. the text was followed in New Jersey (State
Mayor, &c. v. Phelps, 27 Ala. 55 v. Zeigler, 3 Vroom (32 N. J. L.), 262;
(1855), overruling, on this point, Mayor, Mellick v. Washington, 47 N. J. L. (18
&c. v. Yuille, 3 Ala. 137 ; compare Com Vroom) 254); but the reason of the matter
m’rs v. Harris, 7 Jones (Law), 281. See, and the general practice in this country is
also, Piper v. Chappell, 14 Mees. & W. otherwise, and the text states correctly,
624, 649 (1845); Butchers' Co. v. Bullock, we think, the American doctrine. See
3 B. & Pul. 434 ; Grant on Corp. 84 ; cases in note to sec. 337, supra.
2
§ 344
415
ORDINANCES : LIMITATION OF AMOUNT OF PENALTIES.
and that he continued to do so, from time to time, until he had com-
mitted one hundred violations of the ordinance, by cutting down one
hundred cedar trees,” was held to set forth but a single offence; for,
said the court, “the matter charged is a trespass with a continuando,
which in law is but one offence, and it may well be that every tree
cut by the defendant was cut on one day, and, under the ordinance,
the cutting of more trees than one, at one time, would be but one
offence.”
» 1
§ 343 (277). Limitation of Amount of Penalties. — Where there
is a limitation upon the corporation as to the amount of penalties to
be imposed for the infraction of by-laws, they cannot exceed the
limit directly, nor can they do so indirectly by multiplying what is
in substance one offence into several, or subdividing one transaction
or violation into a number of offences, and annexing a penalty to
each.2 But where each offence is distinct, and the punishment for each
* is within the power of the corporation to impose, the punishment is
not made illegal, though the separate fines in the aggregate exceed
the limit allowed by the charter, and are imposed by the same
magistrate or tribunal at one sitting3
$ 344 (278). Same subject. — By its charter, the power of a city
corporation to impose fines for breaches of its ordinances was limited
to one hundred dollars. By the charter the city had also the power
to regulate the inspection of flour, and it passed an ordinance by
which any person selling flour without inspection should be fined
“five dollars for each barrel so sold.” It was held that this ordinance,
as to the penalty, was valid so far as to authorize a fine not ex-
ceeding one hundred dollars; that if a single sale exceeded twenty
barrels, the fine could be but one hundred dollars, while if it was
less than twenty barrels, the fine would be five dollars on each
barrel. The court observed that a recovery on a single transaction
where more than twenty barrels were sold would bar any future pro-
ceeding for the balance.4
1 State v. Moultrieville, Rice (S. C.) Corporation of New York, 14 Wend.
Law, 158 (1839); Harr. Munic. Man. 361. (N. Y.) 87. Continuing offence. Marshall
2 Mayor, &c. of New York v. Ordre- v. Smith, L. R. 8 C. P. 416. Supra, secs.
nan, 12 Johns. (N. Y.) 122 (1815) (pen- 337, 341.
alty for illegally keeping powder), citing 8 Heise v. Town Council, 6 Rich. (S. Ć.)
and approving opinion of Lord Mansfield Law, 404 (fines for violating liquor ordi.
in Crepps v. Durden, Cowp. 640. See nance); compare State v. Moultrieville,
also, Hart v. Mayor, &c., 9 Wend. 571, supra.
588, 606 (1832) ; Zylstra v. Charleston, 4 Chicago v. Quimby, 38 Ill. 274
1 Bay (S. C.), 382 1794); vide Stokes 2. (1865).
416
$ 346
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
§ 345 (279). Power of Forfeiture must be Expressly Conferred.
A corporation, under a general power to make by-laws, cannot make
a by-law ordaining a forfeiture of property. To warrant the exercise
of such an extraordinary authority by a local and limited jurisdic-
tion, the rule is reasonably adopted that it must be plainly, if not,
indeed, expressly conferred by the legislature.1 And even if the
power to declare a forfeiture is conferred, still no person can, by
ordinance, be deprived of his property by forfeiture without notice
or without legal investigation or adjudication; an ordinance in vio-
lation of this principle is void, as "contrary to the genius of our
laws and institutions."? In England the power of municipal cor-
porations to impose a forfeiture for offences created by ordinances
or by-laws has been, in many cases, sanctioned by usage, without
any express power in the charter to impose the forfeiture. But in
this country, inasmuch as corporations derive all their power from
charter or act of the legislature, the right to inflict a forfeiture must
be plainly given, and cannot be derived from usage.3
$ 346 (280). Power to Fine does not include Power to Forfeit.
How strictly the courts hold that municipal corporations cannot, in the
absence of clear statute authority, pass by-laws ordaining a forfeiture,
is strikingly illustrated by the case of Heise v. The Town Council
of Columbia. The town council had power to enforce obedience to
their ordinances " by fine, not exceeding fifty dollars.” Special au-
thority was given to municipal corporations to grant licenses to retail
liquor. The council passed an ordinance relating to this subject, the
penalty for violating which was a “fine of not more than fifty dol-
lars for each offence, and also a forfeiture of the license.” It was
1 Kirk v. Nowill, 1 Term R. 118, 124, Bergen v. Clarkson, 1 Halst. (N. J.) 352;
per Mansfield and Buller, followed by Taylor v. Carondelet (forfeiture of lease),
Court of Errors of New York, in Hart v. 22 Mo. 105, 112 ; Mayor, &c. of Mobile
Mayor, &c. of Albany, 9 Wend. (N. Y.) 2. Yuille, 3 Ala. 137 (1841); Miles v.
571, 588, per Sutherland, J.; p. 605, per Chamberlain, 17 Wis. 446; Donovan v.
Edmonds, Senator ; 2 Kyd on Corp. 110; Vicksburg, 29 Miss. 247 ; Cincinnati v.
Willcock on Municipal Corporations, 180, Buckingham, 10 Ohio, 257; Wilcox
pl. 449; Angell & Ames on Corp. sec. V. Hemming, 58 Wis. 144; post, sec.
360 ; Cotter v. Doty, 5 Ohio, 394 (1832); 348; Harr. Munic. Man. 311, 313.
White v. Tallman, 2 Dutch. (N. J.) 67 2 Cotter v. Doty, 5 Ohio, 393, 398 ;
(1856); Clerk v. Tucket, 3 Lev. 281 ; Lee Rosebaugh v. Saffin, 10 Ohio, 32 (1840);
v. Wallis, 1 Kenyon, 292; Adley v. Slessman v. Crozier, 80 Ind. 487.
Reeves, 2 Maule & S. 60 ; Phillips v. Al- 3 Taylor v. Carondelet, 22 Mo. 105,
len, 41 Pa. St. 481. In further illustra. 112; Kirk v. Nowill, 1 Term R. 118 ;
tion see Mayor, &c. v. Ordrenan, 12 Adley v. Reeves, 1 Maule & Sel. 60 ;
Johns. (N. Y.) 122; Dunham v. Rochester, Varden v. Mount, 78 Ky. 86, citing
5 Cowen (N. Y.), 462 (1826); Baxter 2. text.
Commonwealth, 3 Pa. (Pen. & W.) 253 ;
§ 348
417
ORDINANCES : POWER TO FORFEIT PROPERTY.
held that the license which was granted and paid for was essentially
property; that the council could only impose fines, and that it had
no power to ordain a forfeiture of the license, there being (in the
opinion of the court) no difference between the forfeiture of a license
and of goods and chattels.1
§ 347 (281). Judicial Procedure necessary in some Instances.
An ordinance of the city of New Orleans authorizing without any
prior judicial proceedings, a sale, under the orders of the mayor, of
all property suffered to remain on the levee beyond a specified period,
is invalid, since it makes the corporation judges and parties in the
same cause, and enforces a forfeiture, and divests the owner of his
property without a trial in due course of law. Such a power is not
similar to that exercised by a corporation in removing nuisances, as
that power arises from necessity and ceases with that necessity. It
would be competent for the corporation to ordain that the property
should be removed at the expense of the proprietor, and to recover
these expenses, and any fine which might be imposed, by judicial
proceedings.
2
§ 348 (282). Forfeiture of Animals at Large; Notice; Legal Pro-
ceedings. — The right to denounce a forfeiture against animals run-
ning at large in a town or city, contrary to the provisions of ordinances
forbidding it, must be plainly conferred or it will not be held to
1 Heise v. Town Council, &c., 6 Rich. bread illegally baked in violation of an
(S. C.) Law, 404 (1853). As to revo- authorized by-law of the corporation, is
cation of unexpired license for sale of not contrary to a constitutional provision
intoxicating liquors, State o. Cook, 24 declaring that vested rights shall not be
Minn. 247 (1877). License to sell liquor divested unless for purposes of public
under the laws of the State is not a con- utility and for adequate compensation
tract, and may be terminated by a repeal previously made. It may be observed
of the law. Fell v. State, 42 Md. 71 that the court, without any special dis-
(1875); s. C. 20 Am. Rep. 83.
State v.
cussion, assumed that power “to regu-
Bonnell (Sup. Ct. Ind.), 21 N. E. Rep. late everything which relates to bakers
1101 (1889). The revocation by a muni- gave authority to denounce a forfeiture of
cipal corporation of a license to sell intox- bread baked contrary to the provisions of
icating liquors upon certain specified con- the ordinance of the city. See, on this
ditions, a violation of which, according to point, Mayor, &c. of Mobile v. Yuille, 3
the terms of the license, should have the Ala. 137 (1841). Assize of bread has
effect to revoke it, is not a forfeiture be- been deemed necessary from an early pe-
yond the powers of the corporation. Hur- riod in England. Burn's Justice, title
ber v. Baugh, 43 Iowa, 514 (1876). “ Bread.” Construction of English statute
2 Lanfear v. Mayor, 4 La. 97 (1831). regulating sale of bread. Queen v. Wood,
Compare with Guillotte v. New Orleans, L. R. 4 Q. B. 559 ; Queen v. Kennett,
12 La. An. 432 (1857), in which it was L. R. 4 Q. B. 567; Aerated Bread Co.
held that an ordinance providing a forfeit- v. Gregg, L. R. 8 Q. B. 355.
ure, for the use of the city workhouse, of
VOL. I. — 27
418
§ 349
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
exist. This is in accordance with the rule of the English courts,
that a statute will not be taken to invest, by implication, a muni-
cipal corporation with the extraordinary powers of forfeiting the
property of the subject, and that, if it be intended that any such
power shall be given, it must be by express words to that effect.
The cases agree in holding that when the power to denounce the
forfeiture against such animals is given, there should be notice, either
actual or constructive, or prior legal proceedings. The view of the
courts will be best understood by referring to some of the cases
upon the subject. In Mississippi, an ordinance authorizing the
seizure and sale of hogs running at large, without notice or trial,
or opportunity for trial, and providing that one balf of the pro-
ceeds of the sales should go to the hospital and the other half
to the city marshal, was held to be in violation of the constitu-
tional provision that no person “can be deprived of his property
but by due course of law," and securing right to a jury trial.2
$ 349 (283). Same subject. In a similar case in Ohio, Grimke, J.,
delivering opinion of the court, observes : “The ordinance commands
the marshal to seize and impound the hogs, and then, without any
reserve, without any notice, by means of which the owner might be
able to exculpate himself, directs them to be sold and the proceeds
placed in the city treasury. Such an ordinance is as contrary to
the spirit of the charter (Cincinnati) as it is alien from the general
genius of our institutions." 3
1 Varden v. Mount, 78 Ky. 86; Wilcox costs and expenses, but not imposing a
2. Hemming, 58 Wis. 144; Knoxville v. penalty, held valid under a charter au-
King, 7 Lea (Tenn.), 441, approving the thorizing the impounding and sale “for
text.
any penalty imposed by any ordinance or
2 Donovan v. Vicksburg, 29 Miss. (7 regulation, and all costs.” Fort Smith v.
Cush.) 247 (1855); Poppen v. Holmes, 44 Dodson, 46 Ark. 296. Such an ordinance
Ill. 362; Darst v. People, 51 Ill. 286 ; is valid, and takes effect whether the owner
Heise v. Columbia, 6 Rich. 404; Whitfield resides in the town or not. Rose v. Har-
v. Longest, 6 Ire. (N. C. Law) 268 ; Mc- die, 98 N. C. 44 ; infra, sec. 355, note.
Kee ». McKee, 8 B. Mon. (Ky.) 433; 3 Rosebaugh v. Saffin, 10 Ohio, 32, 37
Jarman v. Patterson, 7 Mon. (Ky.), 647; (1840). However it may be when the
Varden v. Mount, 78 Ky. 86 (1879); power to forfeit without notice or prior
S. C. 10 C. L. J. 73. Power to impose legal proceedings is explicitly conferred, it
penalties on the owners of animals run- is clear that the power, unless plainly and
ning at large excludes, by implication, expressly given, cannot be exercised th-
the power to enforce a by-law upon out such notice and previous adjudication;
the subject in any other way ; as, for but with these the remedy may, if need-
example, by a sale of the animals found at ful, be “ prompt and strong.” Cincinnati
large. Miles v. Chamberlain, 17 Wis. 446 V. Buckingham, 10 Ohio, 257, 262, per
(1863); supra, secs. 338, 339; Brophy v. Lane, C. J.
What is a running at large.
Hyatt, 10 Col. 223 ; Cartersville v. Lan- Kinder v. Gillespie, 63 Ill. 88 (1872);
ham, 67 Ga. 753. An ordinance directing Case v. Hall, 21 Ill. 632.
the impounding and sale of animals for
1
$ 351 ORDINANCES : POWER TO FORFEIT PROPERTY ; NOTICE.
419
Notice.
$ 350 (284). Same subject.
In North Carolina the
general principle was declared that an ordinance of an incorporated
town which authorizes the property of one man to be taken froin hini
and given to another, without any notice to the owner or trial of his
rights, was unlawful. The town authorities, under power given to
make ordinances for the removal of nuisances and for the good gov-
ernment of the town, passed an ordinance to this effect: “That every
hog at large in the said town shall be taken up and penned, and ad-
vertised to be sold on the third day; and unless the owner should pay
the charges (specified in the ordinance for taking up and keeping
such hog, and a sale is effected, the money arising therefrom, after
paying the charges, shall be paid over to the owner of the said hog."
The validity of this ordinance was drawn in question, and two points
were ruled by the Supreme Court: 1. That the ordinance was rea-
sonable, and the corporation, under the power above referred to, had
authority to pass it; 2. That it sufficiently provided for notice to
the owner by the impounding of the animal, and the three days'
public advertisement, and that personal notice was not necessary.
In a subsequent case in the same court a similar ordinance was sus-
tained. It was objected that it was invalid, because it provided for
no judicial decision condemning the property to be sold. This ob-
jection the court regarded as insufficient, “since the owner may, if
he choose, have a full investigation of the case by bringing an action
of replevin, as in any other case of distress.” 2
$ 351 (285). Same subject. -- In South Carolina it has been held
that under authority to enforce by-laws by fine, an ordinance, other-
wise legal, which authorized the marshal to kill hogs running at
large, contrary to the ordinance, and appropriate them to his own
use, was void.3
1
1 Shaw v. Kennedy (N. C.), Term R. Albany, 9 Wend. (N. Y.) 571 (1832);
158 (1817); Hellen v. Noe, 3 Ire. (N. C. White v. Tallman, 2 Dutch. (N. J.) 67
Law) 493 (1843). Same principle. Spit- (1856); Phillips v. Allen, 41 Pa. St. 481 ;
ler v. Young, 63 Mo. 42 (1876), holding Moore v. State, 11 Lea, 35; Knoxville v.
that such an ordinance was unauthorized King, 7 Lea, 441. Power must be strictly
as a sanitary or police regulation under pursued, or the sale will he void, and the
power to abate nuisances
officer a trespasser. Clark v. Lewis, 35
9 Whitfield v. Longest, 6 Ire. (Law) Ill. 417. See Friday v. Floyd, 63 Ill. 50
268 (1846). In Iowa a similiar ordinance (1872), three judges dissenting. Sale is
was sustained. Gosselink v. Campbell, 4 void where two animals belonging to dif-
Iowa, 296 (1856); Gilchrist v. Schmidling, ferent owners are sold at once. Ib.
12 Kan. 263 (1873). Contra, Willis v. 8 McRae v. O'Lain, cited Kennedy v.
Legris, 45 Ill. 289 (1867); Bullock v. Sowden, 1 McMillan (S. C.) Law, 328.
Geomble, Ib. 218 ; Poppen v. Holmes, 44 But authority to impose " fines and penal- .
Ill. 360. But see Hart v. Mayor, &c. of ties" authorizes a fine against those who
420
§ 353
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
§ 352 (286). Equity will not ordinarily relieve against Valid For-
feitures. — A forfeiture imposed by a municipal corporation, under
legislative authority, for a violation of a valid by-law, and inflicted
as a penalty for such violation, cannot be relieved against in equity,
unless, perhaps, where peculiar circumstances furnish grounds for
equitable interposition, the general doctrine being that equity may
relieve against forfeitures declared by contract, but not against those
expressly declared or authorized by statute.
§ 353 (287). Power to enforce by Imprisonment must be ex-
pressly given. --- In this country it is not unusual to provide, in the
organic act of municipal corporations, that if fines for violation of
by-laws or ordinances are not paid, the offender may be committed to
prison for a limited period. And in respect to some offences pub-
lic in their character, the power to imprison in the first instance is
often conferred. It is scarcely necessary to add that unless the au-
thority be plainly given, it does not exist; and when given, before
it can be exercised there must be a judicial ascertainment by a con-
petent tribunal or magistrate of the guilt of the party.3
violate the ordinance forbidding hogs run- (forfeiture clause in lease); Peachy v.
ning at large, and the seizure, impound- Somerset, 1 Str. 447; Gorman v. Low, 2
ing, and sale (upon notice) of the animals Edw. Ch. 324; Keating v. Sparrow, i
to pay the fine, whether they belong to Ball & Beat. 367; State v. Railroad Co.,
residents or non-residents. Kennedy v. 3 How. (U. S.) 534.
Sowden, supra ; S. P. Crosby v. Warren, 2 Barter v. Commonwealth, 3 Pa. (Pen.
1 Rich. (S. C.) Law, 385 (1845), Ward- & W.) 253 (1831); New Orleans v. Cas-
law, J., dissenting ;. McKee v. McKee, 8 tello, 14 La. An. 37 ; Burlington v. Kel-
B. Mon. (Ky.) 433 (1848); see Kinder v. lar, 18 Iowa, 59; London v. Wood, 12
Gillespie, 63 Ill. 88 (1872). But it seems Mod. 686; Bab v. Clerk, F. Moore, 411;
doubtful, upon the principles adopted in Clarke's Case, 5 Co. 64; 1 Roll. Abr. 364;
the construction of powers of this charac. Com. Dig. By-Law, E. 1 ; Chilton v. Rail.
ter, whether authority to impose fines and way Co., 16 M. & W. 212; King v. Mer-
penalties extends any further than to the chant Taylors' Co., 2 Lev. 200.
imposition of pecuniary fines and penal- 8 Burnett, In re, 30 Ala. 461 (1857).
ties. See Mayor of Mobile v. Yuille, 3 Charter power to punish violations of or-
Ala. 137; White v. Tallman, 2 Dutch. dinances “by fines, imprisonment, labor,
(N. J.) 67 (1856). The power to forfeit, or other penalty prescribed by ordinance
like the power to tax, should be given will authorize the city council to prescribe
either expressly, or, at all events, by as punishment cither fine or imprisonment
necessary implication. And it has been (not both), and not even imprisonment
held that it cannot be implied from the as means of enforcing payment of a fine.
power "to impose reasonable fines," and Brieswick v. Brunswick, 51 Ga. 639
to cause “all such fines and all such for- (1874); 8. C. 21 Am. Rep. 240. Fines
fcitures and penalties as may be incurred for the violation of ordinances, held, under
under the laws and ordinances of the cor- special charter provisions, collectible by
poration, to be assessed, levied, and col. commitment of the persons, or by fieri
lected." Cotter v. Doty, 5 Ohio, 395 facias. Huddleson v. Ruffin, 6 Ohio St.
(1832).
604. The power to punish offenders by
1 Taylor v. Carondelet, 22 Mo. 105 fine or imprisonment, conferred upon a
$ 355
421
ORDINANCES: ON WHOM BINDING.
On whom Ordinances are binding, and who must notice them.
§ 354 (288). Who bound. — In England the by-laws of a muni-
cipal corporation bind not only the members, but, if they are general
in their nature and purposes, and not limited to any particular class
or description, but intended to extend to all persons coming within
the local jurisdiction of the corporation, they bind all, whether mem-
bers or strangers, and all must take notice of them at their peril. And
by-laws made by a municipal corporation with respect to a liberty
or franchise granted them, with local jurisdiction beyond the limits
of the municipality, are as binding upon persons going into the lib-
erty, as the by-laws of the city upon those who come within its
walls.1
$ 355 (289). Same subject. — So, also, in this country it is settled
that valid ordinances bind not only the inhabitants of the corporation,
but also strangers or non-residents coming within its limits. These,
for the time being, are regarded as inhabitants, and liable in the same
manner for violations of ordinances. So far is plain. But suppose
municipal corporation, does not include 281 ; 8. C. 2 Vent. 183; Lee v. Wallis, 1
the authority to coerce the payment of a Kenyon, 295; Sayer, 263; Adley v.
fine by imprisonment. Brieswick v. Bruns- Reeves, 2 Maule & Sel. 60; Willc. 179 ;
wick, 51 Ga. 639 (1874). Where an ordi- Glover, 311. Verbal order of police ma-
nance provided that a convicted person gistrate will not justify police officer in
should forfeit a sum “not exceeding five holding a person in custody for the non-
hundred dollars, and may be imprisoned payment of a fine imposed for the breach
not exceeding sixty days, or both," a sen- of a municipal ordinance. Board of
tence to pay a fine of one hundred dollars Trustees v. Schroeder, 58 Illinois, 353
or perform sixty days' work on the public (1871).
streets, was held to be void, the latter 1 Willc. 105, 107; Glover, 289, 290 ;
clause being unauthorized by the ordi- London v. Vanacre, 1 Ld. Raym. 498 ;
nance, and the whole sentence being un- Salk. 143; Pierce v. Bartrum, Cowp. 270;
certain and in the alternative. Ex parte Fazakerly v. Wiltshire, 1 Stra. 462; Kirk
Martini, 23 Fla. 343 (1887). Authority to V. Nowill, 1 Term R. 118; Butchers'
enforce penalties for violations of ordi- Co. v. Morey, 1 H. Bl. 370. Do not bind
nances by " distress and sale" of property beyond limits of authorized jurisdiction.
must be expressly or plainly granted. See 3 Mod. 158 ; T. Jones, 144 ; 2 Brownl.
White v. Tallman, 2 Dutch. (N. J.) 67 177 ; Hob. 211; Hutt. 6; 11 Rep. 53 ;
(1856); Bergen v. Clarkson, 1 Halst. Godb. 252. An ordinance passed in 1834,
(N. J.) 352. A law authorizing a munici. prohibiting the erection of “stables, &c.,
pal corporation to recover a fine for breach in the interior of the city of New Orleans,
of a police regulation does not, without ex- or any of its incorporated suburbs," held
press provision therefor, authorize the ar- not to extend to the city of Lafayette,
rest and criminal prosecution of the offend- subsequently added, by act of the legisla-
State v. Ruff
, 30 La. An. 497. And tare, to the city of New Orleans. New
in England, likewise, such a power cannot Orleans V. Anderson, 9 La. An. 323
be conferred by the crown, and can only (1854).
exist by authority of parliainent or a spe- 2 Heland v. Lowell, 3 Allen (Mass.),
cial custom. Clerk v. Tucket, 3 Lev. 407 (1862); Whitfield v. Longest, 6 Ire.
er.
422
$ 355
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
a person living without the limits of the corporation suffers his cattle
or property to stray into it and violate its ordinances. Here two
questions may arise : 1. Can such property, being within the cor-
poration, be dealt with the same as if it belonged to an inhabitant
of the corporation ? It is held that it can. 2. Can such non-resident
owner be made amenable personally to a penalty to the corporation ?
In other words, has a corporation power, unless expressly conferred,
to provide for collecting a penalty from a non-resident wlio suffers
liis property to violate an ordinance, but who himself was at the
time without the corporate limits? This remains, perhåps, to be
settled; though it is certain that ordinances will not be construed
to extend to persons living without the corporation and not being
within it, unless such an intention plainly appears.?
ܪ
(Law) 268 (1846); approving Pierce v. 2 Plymouth v. Pettijohn, 4 Dev. (Law)
Bartran, Cowp. 269. See also Buffalo v. 591. Inability to punish non-resident
Webster, 10 Wend. (N. Y.) 99 ; Comin'rs owner criminally in respect to property
of Wilmington v. Roby, 8 Ire. (Law) 250 ; within corporate limits, see Reed v. Peo-
Comm’rs of Plymouth v. Pettijohn, 4 ple, 1 Park. Cr. Rep. 481. Power “to
Dev. (Law) 591 ; Strauss v. Pontiac, 40 make such prudential rules and regula-
Ill. 301 (1866); City Council v. Pepper, 1 tions as may seem necessary for the bet-
Rich. (S. C.) Law, 364 (1845); City ter improving of the common lands of a
Council v. King, 4 McCord (S. C.), 487; town," &c., extends only to regulations
Marietta v. Fearing, 4 Ohio, 427 (1831) ; as between those who have the right to
Dodge v. Gridley, 10 Ohio, 173; Horney enjoy them in common, but does not con-
v. Sloan, 1 Smith (Ind.), 136; Kennedy fer the power of imposing a penalty for
v. Sowden, i McMullan (S. C.), 323; trespasses by strangers; for such acts the
Bott v. Pratt, 33 llinn. 323 ; Knoxville town must pursue its common-law rem-
v. King, 7 Lea, 441. Taxation of non- edy. Foster v. Rhoads, 19 Johns. (N. Y.)
residents using streets. Post, sec. 682, 191 (1821).
191 (1821). See, also, People v. Works,
note.
7 Wend. (N. Y.) 486; Holladay v. Marsh,
1 Whitfield v. Longest, 6 Ire. (Law) 3 Wend. (N. Y.) 142. City held not to
268 (1846); Gosselink v. Campbell, 4 have power to require a license tax from
lowa, 296, 300 (1856); Reed v. People, 1 non-resident owners of wagons engaged
Park. Cr. Rep. 481; Rose v. Hardie, 98 in hauling into and out of the city for
N. C. 44. Supra, sec. 348, note. The point hire. St. Charles v. Nolle, 51 Mo. 122
was also ruled the same way in Spitler v. (1872). See Index, Vehicles. Ordinances
Young, 63 Mo. 42 (1876); but the ordi- cannot have an exctra-territorial effect, un-
nance was construed not to apply to a case less the power be plainly conferred upon
where the hogs owned outside of the cor- the corporation. Strauss v. Pontiac (liquor
poration escaped from a pen in conse- ordinance), 40 Ill. 301 (1866); Gosselink
quence of a flood, over which the owner v. Campbell, 4 Iowa, 296 ; Robb v. Indi-
had no control, which washed the pen anapolis, 38 Ind. 49 (1871); Chicago
away, and where the owner was using dil- Packing Co. v. Chicago, 88 Ill. 221 (1878).
igence to reclaim them.
Wagner, J., Whether a. party resides within the limits
says, “ While the hogs in this case were embraced by an ordinance is a question
found in the streets, yet they were not of fact. Board v. Pooley, 11 La. An.
there within the meaning and spirit of the 743 ; Police Jury v. Villaviabo, 12 La.
ordinance, which was designed to prohibit An. 788 ; New Orleans v. Boudro, 14 La
hogs from running at large in the ordinary An. 303.
sense."
!
§ 357
423
ORDINANCES: NATURE OF LICENSE POWER.
$ 356 (290). Notice. — All persons upon whom ordinances are
binding are bound to take notice of them. But where a party is
liable to a penalty if he does not do a given act upon notice, a news-
paper notice is not sufficient, unless that mode is pointed out by the
law, or general power is given to the corporation embracing within
it the authority to prescribe the kind and manner of notice.2
Ordinances relating to the Licensing, Regulation, and Taxing of
Amusements and Occupations, including the sale of Intoxicating
Liquors.
§ 357 (291). Nature of License Power. Charters not unfre-
quently confer upon the corporation the power “to license and
regulate” or to "license, regulate, and tax” certain avocations and
employments, and to “tax and restrain” or “prohibit” exhibitions,
shows, places of amusement, and the like; and unless there is some
specific limitation on the authority of the legislature in this respect,
such provisions are constitutional.3 Where, by the charter of a city,
1 Palmyra v. Morton (sidewalk ordi- 137 (1841), it was determined that there
nance), 25 Mo. 593 (1860); Buffalo v. was nothing in the Constitution of the
Webster, 10 Wend. (N. Y.) 99 (1833). State which would invalidate a grant of
See Reed v. People, 1 Park. Cr. Rep. 481; power to a municipal corporation “ to
City of London v. Vanacre, 12 Mod. 270, license bakers, and regulate the weight and
272 ; Glover on Corp. 207, 290 ; Knox- price of bread, and to prohibit the baking,
ville v. King, 7 Lea (Tenn.), 441 (citing for sale, except by those licensed.” Such
text); Faribault v. Wilson, 34 Minn. 254 a grant of power does not unlawfully in-
(as all persons within the city limits are terfere with the right of citizens to pur-
bound to take notice of the ordinances, a sue their lawful occupations. In the City
complaint setting forth a violation of an of Boston v. Schaffer, 9 Pick. (Mass.) 415
ordinance need 110t recite it, a reference (1830), it was decided that it is compe-
to its number is sufficient). Infra, sec. tent for the legislature to grant a city or
413. Where a city having an ordinance town power to require the payment of
prohibiting the storage of fertilizers within money as the condition of exercising par-
the corporate limits, allowed, without ob- 'ticular employments, e. g. giving theatri-
jection or warning, a railroad company to cal or other exhibitions. This is not in
erect expensive storehouses to accommo- the nature of a tax, which must be gen-
date its traffic in such merchandise, it eral, but of an excise on special vocations.
was held that the city was estopped from Approved, Cincinnati v. Bryson, 15 Ohio
asserting its ordinance against the com- 625 ; New Orleans v. Turpin (auctioneers),
pany ; and that the railroad, being bound 13 La. An. 56 (1858); Municipality v.
to deliver its freight in the city, was not Dubois (livery-stable keeper), 10 La. An.
included in the terms of the ordinance. 56 ; Charity Hospital v. Stickney, 2 La.
Mayor of Athens o. Georgia R. R., 72 Ga. An. 550 ; Slaughter v. Commonwealth, 13
800. As to estoppel see also Atlanta v. Gratt. (Va.) 767 ; Carroll v. Tuskaloosa,
Gate City Gas-Light Co., 71 Ga. 106 ; post, 12 Ala. 173; Merriam v. New Orleans, 14
secs. 606, 803.
La. An. 318 ; Wynne v. Wright, 1 Dev. &
2 Keckely v. Commissioners of Roads, & B. (N. C.) Law, 19; Savannah v.
4 McCord (S. C.), 257 (1828).
Hartridge, 8 Ga. 23 ; Cincinnati v. Bry-
8 Mount Pleasant v. Clutch, 6 Iowa, son, 15 Ohio, 625, dissenting opinion or
546 (1858). In Mobile v. Yuille, 3 Ala. Burchard, J.; Collins v. Louisville, 2 B.
424
$ 357
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
the power to license a particular occupation within its limits is given
to the common council, such power involves the necessity of deter-
mining with reasonable certainty both the extent and duration of
the license and the sum to be paid therefor; and must be exercised
by the common council, and cannot be delegated by it, in whole or
in part, to any person or authority. Concerning useful trades and
employments, a distinction is to be observed between the power to
“ license" and the power to “ tax.” In such cases the former right,
unless such appears to have been the legislative intent, does not
vive the authority to prohibit, or to use the license as a mode of
taxation with a view to revenue, but a reasonable fee for the license
and the labor attending its issue may be charged. Respecting
Mon. (Ky.) 134; The Germania v. State, 7 ordinances of this character ought not to
Md. 1; Lucas v. Lott. Comm’rs, 11 Gill & be sustained, unless the authority be ex-
Johns. (Md.) 506 ; Sears v. West, 1 Murph. pressly or otherwise unequivocally con-
(N. C.) 291 ; People v. Thurber, 13 Ill. ferred. Newton v. Atchison, 31 Kan. 151
557 ; Savannah v. Charlton, 36 Ga. 460 (quoting the foregoing with approval). In
(1867). Forbidding driving of carts with this case a license tax upon merchants,
out license. Who are cartmen? Brooklyn graduated according to their average stock
2. Breslin, 57 N. Y. 591 (1874); post, secs. on hand, was held valid, and not in any
785, 791; East Louis v. Trustees, 102 illegal sense double taxation. In Tulloss
Ill. 489 ; Wiggins Ferry Co. v. East St. v. Sedan, 31 Kan. 165, the same court
Louis, 102 Ill. 560 (the lllinois Constitu- held a license tax upon diuggists, which was
tion of 1870 did not affect the power of much larger for those not having permits
the legislature in regard to conferring the to sell liquors than for those having such
right upon cities to require licenses); State permits, was not illegal or void.
v. Hayne, 4 S. C. 403 ; State v. Columbia, 1 Darling v. St. Paul, 19 Minn. 389
6 S. C. 1 ; Charleston v. Oliver, 16 S. C. (1872). Compare this case, however, with
47 ; United States Distilling Co. v. Chi- Decorah v. Dunstan, 38 Iowa, 96 (1874),
cago, 112 Ill. 19 (brewers and distillers); in which it was held that where an incor-
Information against Oliver, 21 S. C. 318; porated town had the power to regulate
Van Hook v. Selma, 70 Ala. 361 ; People and license auction sales, &c., and to pass
v. Mulholland, 82 N. Y. 324 (delivering all ordinances necessary to exercise that
milk from vehicles). A power to “levy a power, an ordinance authorizing the mayor
license tax” is discretionary and not man- to fix the aimount of the license within a
datory. Under it a city may abstain from specified sum was held not to be invalid.
taxing any occupation. New Orleans v. The general doctrine on the subject of the
Mülé, 38 La. An. 826 ; see chapter on delegation of municipal powers is elsewhere
Taxation, post; ante, sec. 115 ; Kniper v. discussed ; and the line drawn between
Louisville, 7 Bush (Ky.), 599.
duties of a ministerial and executive char-
The cases show some diversity of acter which may be delegated, and legisla-
opinion as to the right to tax particular tive or discretionary powers which may
employments as distinguished from prop- not be delegated. An ordinance which
erty ; but the correct view, it is submitted, required the recommendation of twelve cit-
is this: Unless specially restrained by izens and taxpayers in the block where it
the Constitution, the legislature may pro- was proposed to establish a laundry, be-
vide for the taxing of any occupation or fore the authorities should issue a license
trade, and may confer this power upon therefor, held illegal. In re Quong Woo,
municipal corporations. But such taxes 13 Fed. Rep. 229 ; supra, sec. 319, and
are apt to be inequitable, and the principle note. Ante, sec. 96; post, secs. 716, 780.
not free from danger of great abuse. Hence 2 State v. Bean, 91 N. C. 554 (quoting
!
§ 357
425
ORDINANCES : NATURE OF LICENSE POWER.
amusements, exhibitions, &c., the authority of the corporation under
the power to license has been regarded as greater than when the
same word is employed as to trades and occupations. Words of
و
text, and holding that a power to license 627 (1875); Welch v. Hotchkiss (building
the carrying on of trades, &c., is a police license fee of fifty cents sustained), 39
power, and does not confer power to use the Conn. 140 (1872); S. C. 12 Am. Rep. 383;
license as a mode of raising revenue). See post, sec. 405, note. St. Paul v. Treager,
also Ex parte Mirande, 73 Cal. 365; 25 Minn. 248, approving text ; Bennett v.
O'Maley v. Freeport, 96 Pa. St. 24 ; Van People, 30 Ill. 389; East St. Louis v.
sant v. Harlem Stage Co., 59 Md. 330 ; Wehrung, 46 Ill. 392 ; Savannah v. Charl-
Mühlenbrinck v. Commissioners, 42 N. ton, 36 Ga. 460 ; Darling v. St. Paul, 19
J. L. 364. Compare Flanagan v. Plain Minn. 389 (1872), citing text; post, chap.
field, 44 N. J. L. 118; Clark 6. New xix.
Brunswick, 43 N. J. L. 175.
Power “to regulate the sale of meat,"
A general incorporation act conferring &c., held to authorize a city to require
power to license certain enumerated occu- that a license shall be obtained for the
pations is to be construed as if inhibiting selling of meat, &c. Kinsley v. Chicago,
the licensing of those not enumerated. 124 Ill. 359 (1888).
Cairo v. Bross, 101 Ill. 475.
Where a Distinction between taxation and police
charter provided that licenses should be regulation well stated by Depue, J., in
proportioncd to the amount of business, an State v. Hoboken, 33 N. J. L. 280 (1869);
ordinance varying the amount according Commonwealth v. Markham, 7 Bush
to the number of persons employed was (Ky.), 486 (1870); State v. Cassidy, 22
held lawful. Ex parte Sisto Li Protti, Minn. 312 ; post, sec. 768 ; see, also, Kip
68 Cal. 635. One who transacts business v. Patterson, 2 Dutch. (N. J.) 298 ; Mayor
both as a wholesale and retail merchant v. Avenue Railroad Conipany, 32 N. Y.
may be required to take out licenses in 261 ; 33 N. Y. 42, distinguished and
each capacity. New Orleans v. Koen, 38 questioned in Frankford and Phila. P.
La. An. 328.
R. Co. v. Philadelphia, 58 Pa. St. 119
1 Ash v. People, 11 Mich. 347; ante, (1868); Johnson v. Philadelphia, 60 Pa.
sec. 115 ; Youngblood v. Sexton (distinc- St. 445 ; Freeholders v. Barber, 2 Halst.
tion between license and taxation), 32 (N. J.) 64. Difference between tax and a
Mich. 406 (1875) ; s. C. 20 Am. Rep. 654; license to exercise particular callings upon
St. Paul v. Traeger, 25 Minn. 248 (1878). making pecuniary compensation for the
Power " to exact license money" and "to privilege. People v. Thurber, 13 Ill. 557;
regulate ” the sale of liquors held not to Mount Carinel v. Wabash Co., 50 Ill. 69;
confer power to prohibit the sale thereof. Kniper v. Louisville, 7 Bush (Ky.), 599.
Sweet v. Wabash, 41 Ind. 7 (1872); Free Smith v. City of Madison, 7 Ind. 86
holders v. Barber, 2 Halst. (N. J.) 64; Car- (1855), so far as it holds that authority
roll v. Tuskaloosa, 12 Ala. (n. s.) 173; "to suppress and restrain " bowling sa-
Greensboro v. Mullins, 13 Ala. (N. s.) loons confers the power to license and tax
341; Lucas v. Lott. Commn'rs, 11 Gill & them, cannot, as it seems to us, be sus-
Johns. (Md.) 506; City Council v. Ahrens, tained. Mayor, &c. v. Beasley, 1 Humph.
4 Strob. (S. C.) 241 ; Kip v. Paterson, 2 (Tenn.) 240, holds that power in a charter
Dutch. (N. J.) 298 ; Portland v. O'Neill, to regulate and restrain tippling-houses
1 Oreg. 218; Bennett v. Birmingham, did not confer the power to tax them.
31 Pa. St. 15; Commonwealth v. Stodder, The word " restrain" (Emporia v. Volmer,
2 Cush. (Mass.) 562 ; Day v. Green, 4 12 Kan. 622, 630 (1874) held not to be
Cush. (Mass.) 433 ; Dunham v. Rochester, synonymous with the word "prohibit" or
5 Cow. (N. Y.) 462 ; Lawrenceburg v. suppress." Approving text. Frank, In
Wuest, 16 Ind. 337 ; Cheny v. Shelby- re, 52 Cal. 606; Hudson, &c. v. Hoboken,
ville, 19 Ind. 84 ; Leavenworth v. Booth 41 N. J. L. 71. A power "to regulate”
(construing words "license tax"), 15 Kan. victualling houses held to include the
426
§ 358
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
this character, however, do not always have exactly the same
meaning, and the intention of the legislature in using them must
often be gathered from the whole charter and the general legislation
of the State respecting the subject matter.
$ 358 (292). Same subject. Regulation of Occupations. — In
harmony with the foregoing principles, it has been held that, under
authority "to license and regulate” draymen, &c., a municipal cor-
poration may, by ordinance, require a license to be first taken out,
and charge a reasonable sum for issuing the same and keeping the
necessary record, but cannot, by virtue of this authority, without more,
levy a tax upon the occupation itself; and, under the power to regu-
late, it may make proper police regulations as to the mode in which
the employment shall be exercised.
.
is an
power to license them. St. Johnsbury v. theory the police power would be shorn
Thompson, 59 Vt. 300.
of all efficiency. We have no doubt,
One who sells his own goods at public therefore, that the legislature may, in
auction, as well as one who sells another's, regulating any matter that is a proper
auctioneer," allowing the common subject of the police power, impose sucli
council of any municipality to require a sums for licenses as will operate as partial
license, &c. Goshen v. Kern, 63 Ind. 468. restrictions upon the business, or upon
The power thus conferred on a common the keeping of the particular kinds of
council is in the nature of a police regula- property regulated.” See, also, Fire De-
tion. 16.
partment v. Helfenstein, 16 Wis. 136.
1 Cincinnati v. Bryson, 15 Ohio, 625 Special constitutional provisions in refer-
(1846). As to correctness of application ence to taxation have been held to have
of the principle of law to the facts, quære. no reference to license taxes. Leaven-
Consult, in connection with the above worth v. Booth, 15 Kan. 627, 635, 636
case, Mays v. Cincinnati, 1 Ohio St. 268 (1875); Anderson v. Kerns Drain. Co., 14
(1853); with which compare Cincinnati v. Ind. 201; Bright v. McCullough, 27 Ind.
Buckingham, 10 Ohio, 261 ; and see cases 223, 232; People v. Coleman, 4 Cal. 46.
cited supra, sec. 357 ; Mays v. Cincinnati, The law recognizes property in dogs,
supra, cited by Cornell, J., in St. Paul and a city ordinance requiring the owner
v. Traeger, 25 Minn. 248 (1878); The of such property to obtain a license to keep
Laundry License Case, 22 Fed. Rep. 701; the same, and subjecting him to arrest,
Marmet v. State, 45 Ohio St. 63; Fort fine and imprisonment, for not procuring
Smith v. Ayers, 43 Ark. 82; Russellville such license, is invalid. Washington v.
v. White, 41 Ark. 485. An act to reg- Meigs, 1 McArthur, 53; Harrington v.
ulate and license the keeping of dogs Miles, 11 Kan. 480. See, on this general
was regarded as an exercise of the police, subject, State v. Cymis, 26 Ohio St. 400;
and not the taxing power of the State, Ward v. State, 48 Ala. 161; post, sec. 768;
and not to be within the constitutional ante, sec. 141.
provision requiring uniformity of taxation. The legislature may, for police pur-
Carter v. Dow, 16 Wis. 298 (1862); Ten- poses, prescribe the limits of municipal
ney v. Lenz, Ib. 566. In the case last bodies, enlarging or contracting them at
cited, Paine, J., observes : “We cannot pleasure, and give them power to pass or-
assent to the position that, if the sum re- dinances to prevent nuisances beyond their
quired for a license exceeds the expense of boundaries. Thus a packing house which
issuing it, the act transcends the licens. has been licensed by the town where it is
ing power, and imposes a tax. By such a located, but within one mile of the corpo.
!
§ 359
427
ORDINANCES : SCOPE OF LICENSE POWER.
§ 359 (293). Same subject. — So authority to a city to adopt
rules and orders “for the due regulation of omnibuses, stages, &c.,"
was held not to authorize the adoption of an ordinance requiring the
payment of a tax or duty on each carriage licensed, varying from one
to twenty dollars, according to the different kinds of carriages, and
the stands occupied. This was regarded as a direct tax upon the
vehicle used, or its owner, and not necessary to secure the objects of
the above grant of power to the city. So where, under an act
rate limits of a city, does not exempt the cost of granting such licenses may be
same from an ordinance of that city re- properly charged to the persons procur.
quiring it to be licensed by that munici- ing them, although the power to do so is
pality. The person using the establishment not expressly given in the charter. Welch
is liable to be charged a license by both v. Hotchkiss, 39 Conn. 140 (1872). Under
the town and city. Chicago Packing Co. a power to “license, tax, regulate, sup-
v. Chicago, 88 Ill. 221.
press, and prohibit hawkers, peddlers,
In Ash v. People, 11 Mich. 347 (1863), pawnbrokers,” &c., a city may grant li-
it appeared that, by its charter, authority censes imposing such conditions and bur-
was given to a city to erect, establish, dens as it sees fit. Launder v. Chicago,
and regulate markets and market-places, 111 Ill. 291. In Illinois the legislature is
and to license and regulate butchers and
not restricted to immoral or injurious
shop-keepers at any other place in the occupations in authorizing a city to impose
city, for the sale of meats, &c., and to au- license fees, nor is a power to suppress any
thorize the mayor to grant such licenses business necessary in order to warrant the
and to prescribe the sum of money to be exercise of a power to license.
Braun v.
paid into the treasury of the city therefor. Chicago, 110 Ill. 187; post, secs. 405, note,
An ordinance prohibiting the keeping of 768.
meat-shops outside of the public markets 1 Commonwealth v. Stodder, 2 Cush.
without a license, and requiring the pay. (Mass.) 562, 572 (1848); distinguished
ment of a license fee of five dollars, was from Boston v. Schaffer, 9 Pick. (Mass.)
sustained, although the amount exceeded 415, as to licenses for theatrical exhibi-
the expense of making and registering tions. Power to the city council of Charles-
the license. The court denied that the ton to make, inter alia, "such ordinances
fee demanded was a tax, and regarded it respecting streets, carriages, wagons, carts,
as but a reasonable compensation for the drays, &c., as to them shall seem expedi-
additional expense of municipal supervi. ent and neeessary," was held to anthorize
sion orer the business at the place licensed. an ordinance requiring all persons who
A ferry license fee of fifty dollars was
drive for hire any cart, dray, wagon, or
held not to be a tout, within the meaning omnibus, within the city, to take out a
of the terın, as used in the Constitution of license, and to require the vehicle to be
Michigan and the charter of the city of numbered, or on failure to do so to pay a
Detroit. Chilvers v. People, 11 Mich. 43 fine. City Council v. Pepper, i Rich.
(1862); ante, sec. 115. “The power to li- (S. C.) Law, 364 (1845). A street-
cense and regulate carries with it the right sprinkling cart is a "public vehicle” on
to require the payment of a (reasonable] which a license tax is properly imposed.
sum in consideration of the license.” St. Louis v. Woodruff, 4 Mo. App. 169.
Per Wright, J., in State 2. Herod, 29 Iowa, A similar ordinance, imposing annual
123 (1870). Whenever a municipal cor- charge on each car of a street-railway
poration is authorized to make by-laws company, was sustained as a police regu-
relative to a given subject, and to require lation. Frankford Railway Company v.
of those who desire to do any act or trans. Philadelphia, 58 Pa. St. 119 (1868); S. P.
act any business pertaining thereto to Johnson v. Philadelphia, 69 Pa. St. 445 ;
obtain a license therefor, the reasonable and Allerton v. Chicago, 6 Fed. Rep. 555
428
§ 360
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
authorizing the trustees of a village corporation to make ordinances
“in relation to hucksters, and for the good government of the vil-
lage," it was held that an ordinance was unauthorized which required
that hucksters should, before exercising their employment, take a
license, and be taxed a sum varying from five to thirty dollars.
§ 360 (294). Same subject. - On the other hand, the power to
' license, regulate, and restrain amusements," it was admitted or
taken for granted, would authorize an ordinance taxing, or requiring
exhibitors to pay a specific sum for the privilege, this being con-
sidered as a means of regulating and restraining them. So a grant
of power to a city or town to license exhibitions on such terms
A municipal corporation may under its does power to license, tax, and regulate
ordinary powers of local government pass authorize the grant of an exclusive right
ordinances requiring a street-railway com- to run omnibuses within the limits of the
pany incorporated by legislature, and city. Logan v. Pyne, 43 Iowa, 524 (1876);
having its rails down and in use through Snyder v. North Lawrence (hackney coach,
the streets under legislative sanction, to what is), 8 Kan. 82 (1871).
make its tracks conform to the grade, 1 Dunham v. Rochester, 5 Cow. (N. Y.)
to keep in repair the space between the 462, 466 (1826). See further, Index, Mar.
rails, and to remove snow and the like. kets.
But it has no power to require such a com- Under a charter authorizing the license
pany so organized to take out a license of wagons, &c., and requiring owners and
and pay license fee as a means of taxa- keepers of wagons, &c., using them in the
tion, unless power is given to resort to city, to take out a license, all hucksters,
licenses and license fees for revenue pur- gardeners, &c., who are not residents and
poses. A provision in the charter, grant- taxpayers of other towns, may be com-
ing power
“to license and regulate," does pelled to take out a license. Frommer v.
not authorize the exaction of license fees Richmond, 31 Gratt. 646. A city has no
for revenue purposes. Power to license right to require that persons owning vehi-
when specially given in a charter is never- cles for hire within its limits and who
theless a police power. The exaction of have paid their city licenses shall obtain
license fees for revenue purposes is the from the city, at a certain fixed and ex-
exercise of the power of taxation. The orbitant price, the plates which an ordi-
distinction between the power to license nance of the city has prescribed for the
as a police regulation and the same power convenient identification of the vehicles.
as a revenue measure is of the utmost Such an exaction is another license in
importance. If granted with a view to disguise, and therefore unconstitutional.
revenue, the amount of tax, if not limited Walker v. New Orleans, 31 La. An. 828.
by charter, is in the discretion and judg- 2 Hodges v. Mayor, 2 Humph. (Tenn.)
ment of the authorities; if given as a police 61. See also, Carter v. Dow, 16 Wis.
power, it must be exercised as a means of 299; Tenney v. Lenz, Ib. 566. Speaking
regulation only, and cannot be used as a of this subject, Mr. Justice Coolcy ex-
source of revenue. North Hudson Railway presses it as his opinion that where the
Co. v. Hoboken, 41 N. J. L. 71 ; Mayor v. right to impose license fees to operate as
Avenue Railroad Co., 32 N. Y. 261. Power a restriction upon the business or thing
to license, tax, and regulate horse rail- licensed can be fairly deduced from the
roads, hackney carriages, &c., does not taxing power conferred upon the corpora-
extend to taxation of private vehicles used tion, it should be done, rather than to
by a merchant or manufacturer. St. derive the right solely from the power to
Louis v. Grove, 46 Mo. 574 (1870). Nor regulate. Const. Lim. 202, note.
§ 362
429
ORDINANCES : MONOPOLIES INVALID.
and conditions as to it may seem just and reasonable,” authorizes it
to exact money for the license; it is not confined to regulating time
and place, establishing police regulations, &c.1
§ 361 (295). Right must be plainly conferred. Even the right
to license must be plainly conferred, or it will not be held to exist.
Thus, power to make "by-laws relative to hucksters, grocers, and
victualling shops" does not authorize the corporation to exact a
license from persons carrying on such business. Nor does the gen-
eral power to pass prudential by-laws, not inconsistent with the
laws of the State, confer the authority to demand a license.
§ 362 (296). Monopolies Invalid. — The power to license and
regulate a lawful and necessary business will not give the corpora-
tion the power to make contracts which create or tend to create a
топороlу.
3
1 Boston v. Schaffer, 9 Pick. (Mass.) to make a license valid ; and licenses are
415 (1830); distinguished from Common. generally considered personal, ceasing with
wealth v. Stodder, 2 Cush. (Mass.) 562, the life of the license, and not transfera-
572 (1848).
ble without consent. Munsell v. Teniple
2 Dunham v. Rochester, 5 Cowen, (grocery license), 3 Gilm. (8 Ill.) 96;
(N.Y.) 462 (1826); Commonwealth v. Stod. Lewis v. United States, Morris (Iowa),
der, 2 Cush. (Mass) 562 (1848); Mays v. 199; Lombard v. Cheever (ferry license),
Cincinnati, 1 Ohio St. 268 (1853); Gale Ib. 473 ; Brunetti 2. New Orleans, 9 La.
v. Kalamazoo (market-house contract), 23 430. As to power to revoke licenses.
Mich. 344 (1871) ; s. C. 9 Am. Rep. 80 ; Towns v. Tallahassee, 11 Fla. 130 (1866).
St. Paul v. Traeger, 25 Minn. 248 (1878); “Junk shops," defined by O'Neall, C. J.,
St. Paul v. Stoltz, 33 Minn. 233 (ordi- "to be a place where odds and ends are
nance requiring license to peddlers held purchased or sold," and cities are often
void). By-laws requiring a license, which empowered to exact,a license from keepers
may be so heavy as to amount to a pro- thereof. City Council v. Goldsmith, 12
hibition, were justly considered to be in Rich. (S. C.) Law, 470 (1860). "Shows"
restraint of trade, which the general law defined: McKee v. Town Council, Rice
favors, and in this case were adjudged (S. C.) Law, 24. Licensed auctioneer
void, “ both for want of jurisdiction" in held not liable to the payment of a pawn-
the corporation to pass them, and for want broker's license, under a city ordinance.
of "conformity to the general law.” 1 Hunt v. Philadelphia, 35 Pa. St: 277.
Ohio St. 268. Where the charter gave 8 Chicago v. Rumpff, 45 Ill. 90 (1867).
the corporation the power “to license In this case, under a power granted to the
bakers, and to prohibit sales of bread ex- city, in its charter, to regulate and license
cept by those licensed," the court doubted the slaughtering of animals within the
whether under this, aside from the taxing corporate limits, the common
power of the corporation, an ordinance passed an ordinance, whereby a particu-
could be supported which required twentylar building was designated for the slaugh.
dollars to be paid by the baker for a license, tering of all animals intended for sale or
although it admitted that the corporation consumption in the city, the owners of
could require a fee for issuing and register which were granted the exclusive right, for
ing the license. Mayor, &c. of Mobile v. a specified period, to have all such ani.
Yuille, 3 Ala. 137 (1841). Statutory con- mals slaughtered at their establishment,
ditions precedent must be complied with they to be paid a specific sum for the
council
430
§ 363
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
§ 363 (297). Intoxicating Liquors. — The authority of munici-
palities to license, tax, restrain, or prohibit the traffic in or sale of
privilege by all persons exercising it, and working, using of a thing, &c., are void.
to have the option of accepting such And any one grieved, &c., may have an
proposition, but which was not to take action on the statute, and recover treble
effect until they executed a certain bond damages and double costs. So monopolies
therein required; and it was held that are contrary to Magna Charta. 2 Inst.
this action of the corporate authorities 63. By statute, 38 Edw. III. a merchant
could not be regarded as regulating or may freely deal in all manner of merchan-
licensing the business, but was simply a dise. The statute of 21 Jac. II. does not
conditional proposition, which, if accepted, extend to letters-patent for inventions, &c.
would constitute a contract. It was also The first part of this section is simply a
held that this contract tended to create a declaration of the common law. When-
monopoly, and was therefore void. And ever a by-law seeks to alter a well-settled
the opinion was expressed that, under the and fundamental principle of the common
charter, authority was conferred simply law, or to establish a rule interfering with
to pass ordinances to locate and construct, the rights of individuals or the public,
and to regulate, license, restrain, abate, the power to do so must come from plain
or prohibit slaughtering establishments and direct legislative enactment. Ante,
within the prescribed limits; and to that secs. 319, 323, 325, 326. Post, sec. 369,
end the corporate authorities inay so as to power to preserve the Public Health,
regulate the business as to prohibit its Safety and Convenience. Legal restraints
exercise, except in a particular place; in the form of regulations, may, however,
but the spot so designated must be open be imposed upon the few for the benefit
to the enjoyment of all persons alike, of the many. It is sometimes difficult to
upon the same terms and conditions. A determine when a by-law is in restraint of
monopoly cannot be implied, but must trade, and when it is a mere regulation of
rest upon express grant. Tuckahoe Canal trade. The former is illegal, the latter
Co. v. Railroad Co., 11 Leigh (Va.), 42, per legal. The following have been held to be
Tucker, President. A city charter grant- bad, as in restraint of trade : That no
ing the city the right to "exercise and member should sell the barrel of any hand-
enjoy all the rights, immunities, powers, gun, &c., ready proved, to any person of
and privileges appertaining to a municipal the trade not a member in London, or
corporation," and to "license, tax, and within four miles thereof. The Master,
regulate hackney carriages, omnibuses," &c., of Gunmakers, &c., v. Fell, Willes,
&c., does not authorize the city authori. 384. No member should strike his stamp
ties to grant to one person the sole and or mark on the barrel of any person not a
exclusive right to run omnibuses in the city. member of the company, &c. Ib. That
Logan v. Pyne, 43 Iowa, 524 (1876); s. C. every person not being already free of the
22 Am. Rep. 261; Gale v. Kalamazoo, 23 city, occupying, using, or exercising, or
Mich. 344 (1871); . C. 9 Am. Rep. 80, in who shall occupy, use, or exercise the art,
which the opinion of Cooley, J., will be trade, or mystery of a butcher within the
found to be highly instructive. Monopo- said city or its liberties, shall take upon
lies are odions to the law. A monopoly himself the freedom of the Company of
exists when the sale of any merchandise or Butchers, and that if any person or per-
cominodity is restrained to one or to a cer- sons (except such as are already free,
tain number (11 Co. 86); and it has three &c.) shall use the trade of a butcher, not
inseparable consequents, — the increase being free of this company, he shall pay,
of the price, the badness of the wares, the &c. Harrison v. Godman, 1 Burr. 12.
impoverishment of others. Ib. Statute So as “to persons using the occupation of
of Monopolies : By statute, 21 Jac. I. ch. music and dancing." Robinson v. Gros-
iii., all monopolies and all commissions, court, 5 Mod. 104. That no person should
grants, licenses, &c., to any person, &c., erect any booth, for the purpose of any
for any sale, buying, selling, making, show or public entertainment, in any
1
§ 363
431
ORDINANCES : INTOXICATING LIQUORS.
intoxicating liquors, is so differently conferred, and so largely in-
fluenced by the general legislation and policy of the State on the
subject, that the decisions relating to it are mostly of local applica-
tion. Sometimes the State laws are manifestly intended to repeal
or modify prior special charter provisions, which gave the control of
the matter to the local authorities; and at other times incorporated
places have, by the course of legislation, been excepted from the
general operation of the State laws, and have been allowed to license,
regulate, or prohibit the traffic, as they deemed best.2
public place within the borough, without tion of a general law regulating the sale of
license from the mayor, which license liquors does not estop the State from
should not be given at or for any other granting power to municipal corporations
time than during the annual fairs, if three to further regulate the traffic by requiring
inhabitant householders, residing within licenses of retail dealers. Wolf v. Lan-
100 yards of the place intended to be sing, 53 Mich. 367.
used, should have previously memorialized 2 Perdue v. Ellis, 18 Ga. 586 ; Trustees
the mayor to withhold such license, &c. v. Keeting, 4 Denio (N. Y.), 341; Phillips
Elwood v. Bulloch, 6 Q. B. 383. So where v. Tecumseh, 5 Neb. 305 (1877). Con.
it was provided that those only to whom struction of charters in connection with
licenses were granted should have slaugh. State laws on the subject. Town Council
ter-houses within the city. Nash v, Mc- v. Harbers, 6 Rich. (S. C.) Law, 96 ;
Cracken, In re, 33 Upper Can. Q. B. 181. Ib. 404 ; State v. Estabrook, 6 Ala. 653;
Or that none but three persons appointed West v. Greenville, 39 Ala. 69 ; Adams v.
by the city should sweep for hire or gain Mayor, 29 Ga. 56; Chastain v. Town
any chimney or flue in the city. The Council, 29 Ga. 333 ; Cuthbert v. Conley,
Queen v. Johnson, 38 Upper Can. Q. B. 32 Ga, 211 ; State v. Garlock, 14 Iowa,
549. Probibiting the use of canals on 444; Harris v. Intendant, &c. 28 Ala.
Sundays. The Calder and Hebble Navi- 577 ; Robinson v. Mayor, &c. 1 Humph.
gation Co. v. Pilling, 14 M. & W. 76. (Tenn.) 156 ; Pekin v. Smelzel, 21 Ill.
Prohibiting licensed tavern-keepers from 464 ; State v. Plunkett, 3 Harr. (N. J.) 5;
having a light in their bars. Regina v. both held consistent and able to stand to-
Belmont, 35 Upper Can. Q. B. 298. Harr. gether. Byers v. Olney, 16 Ill. 35; Page
Munic. Manual (Canada), 5th. ed. 313. v. State, 11 Ala. 849 ; Benefield v. Hines,
Criminal conspiracies in restraint of trade 13 La. An. 420 ; Louisville v. McKean, 18
fully discussed. 3 Stephen, Hist. Criminal B. Mon. (Ky.) 9; Deitz v. Central, 1 Col.
Law, chap. xxx., pp. 202-227.
323 (1871); Burckholter v. McConnells-
Power of the legislature to grant or ville, 20 Ohio St. 308; Baldwin Co. 2.
authorize the granting of monopolies, or Liquor Dealers, 42 Ga. 325; State v. Sher-
exclusive privileges, as affected by the 13th man, 20 Mo. 265. A general law author-
and 14th amendment to the Federal Con- izing towns to require licenses of persons
stitution, see Slaughter-house Cases, 16 selling liquor held to be constitutional.
Wall. 36 (1872); Barthet o. New Orleans, Moundsville v. Fountain, 27 W. Va. 182.
24 Fed. Rep. 563; post, chap. xviii., as to A general power in a city or town
gas companies ; post, sec. 385, note. An charter to prohibit the sale of intoxicat-
ordinance granting to a water company the ing liquors is sufficient to authorize the
exclusive right to furnish water to the in- adoption of an ordinance for any partial
habitants held to be void as creating a prohibition deemed advisable. Under a
monopoly. Brenham v. Brenham Water section giving the exclusive power to
Co., 67 Tex. 542.
license, prohibit or regulate in any manner
1 State v. Harris, 10 Iowa, 441 ; Bur. they may see fit, the sale, &c., of liquors
lington v. Kellar, 18 Iowa, 59; Ham. within the said city, an ordinance pro-
mond o. Haines, 25 Md. 541. The adop- hibiting the sale, &c., in less quantities
432
§ 364
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
§ 364 (293). Effect of General Laws respecting the Liquor Trade.
- Where there are general laws of the State respecting the sale of
intoxicating liquors, a public corporation, by virtue of a general
power“ to make all by-laws that may be necessary to preserve the
peace, good order, and internal police" therein, is not authorized to
pass an ordinance requiring a corporate license, and punishing per-
sons who sell such liquors without being thus licensed.
than five gallons, is valid and may be eu- towns and cities in which the business
forced. Where the power is conferred on was carried on, was held to be a tax and
the municipalities by the legislature it is not a licensing of the sale, and not to be
wholly discretionary with the municipality unconstitutional because unjust or unequal,
to license and regulate, or partially or en- nor because the municipality had no voice
tirely to prohibit the traffic. Gunnarssohn in the levy. Youngblood v. Sexton, 32
v. Sterling, 92 Ill. 569; Goddard v. Jack- Mich. 406 (1875) ; s. C. 20 Am. Rep. 654.
sonville, 15 Ill. 588; Kettering v. Jack- “Licenses to sell liquors are not contracts
sonville, 50 Ill. 39 ; Pekiu v. Smelzel, 21 between the State and the person licensed,
Ill. 464; Harbaugh u. Monmouth, 74 Ill. giving the latter vested rights, and par-
371 ; Schwuchow v. Chicago, 68 Ill. 444; taking of the nature of contracts, but are
Baldwin v. Murphy, 82 Ill. 485 ; Byers v. merely teniporary permits to do what
Olney, 16 Ill. 35 ; Martin v. People, 88 otherwise would be an offence, issued in
Ill. 390. Where the power is to “ license, the exercise of police powers, and subject
regulate and prohibit,” the prohibition to the direction of government, which may
recd not be total, but applies to any sales revoke them as it deems fit.” Per Day,
not licensed by law. Dennehy v. Chicago, Ch. J., in Columbus City v. Cutcomp, 61
120 Ill. 627. A power to regulate places Iowa, 672, citing Metropolitan Board of
where liquors are sold held sufficient to val. Excise v. Barrie, 34 N. Y. 657 ; Calder v.
idate an ordinance preventing the employ- Kurby, 5 Gray, 597 ; Commonwealth v.
ment of women in them. Bergman v. Cleve. Brennan, 103 Mass. 70. A municipal
land, 40 Ohio St. 651. A power “ to license ordinance imposing a license upon the
saloons, taverns, and eating houses" held, sale of liquor without prohibiting it,
under the legislation applicable to the ques- does not abridge the right of a citizeu to
tion, not to authorize licensing the sale of pursue a lawful employment, within the
liquors. Mount Pleasant v. Vansice, 43 meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment to
Mich. 361. Prohibiting by ordinance the the Constitution of the United States.
sale of liquor on Sunday is not a violation In re Bickerstaff, 70 Cal. 35. The
of the constitutional provision forbidding payment of a license tax upon the sale
the establishment of any religion by law. of liquor imposed by a city does not ex-
Minden v. Silverstein, 36 La. An. 912. empt the person who pays it from lia-
A power to regulate the liquor traffic con- bility to pay a similar tax imposed by the
fers the power to confine it to designated county. In re Lawrence, 69 Cal. 608. In
parts of a city. In re Wilson, 32 Minn. Kansas the power to license or authorize
the sale of intoxicating liquors is not
Liquor license fee held not a tax, in the vested in the cities, but is conferred upon
constitutional sense of the term, compel- the probate judges.' Kansas v. Topeka, 31
ling uniformity of taxation. East St. Kan. 452. See also State v. Topeka, 30
Louis v. Wehrung, 46 Ill. 392. Special Kan. 653. A license tax has been held
provision of charter construed not to give not to be a penalty but a debt, so far as
power to prohibit absolutely the sale of relates to the application of the Statute of
liquor in the town. Hill ». Decatur, 22 Limitations. San Luis Obispo v. Hen-
Ga. 203. A State law providing for the dricks, 71 Cal. 242.
assessment of a specified tax on liquor 1 Cominonwealth v. Turner, 1 Cush.
dealers, the money raised to be devoted to (Mass.) 493 (1848): Loeb v. Attica, 82
145.
§ 365
433
ORDINANCES : INTOXICATING LIQUORS.
§ 365 (299). Power to license Sale of Liquor under the General
Welfare Clause. - In the absence, however, of controlling general
legislation, power to a city to pass “in general, every other by-law
or regulation that shall appear to the city council requisite and neces-
sary for the security, welfare, and convenience of the city, or for
preserving the peace, order, and good government within the same,”
was held to authorize an ordinance (and the same is constitutional)
to prevent shopkeepers, unless licensed by the city, from keeping
spirituous liquors in their shops or in any adjacent room.
Ind. 175; and see notes to sec. 363, ante; service at any time thereafter to be held
post, sec. 436. The limitations on such a by any denomination of Christian people
general power to make by-laws, discussed within the corporate limits, providing that
by Shuw, C. J. As to text, see Common- the prohibition should cover the entire
wealth v. Dow, 10 Met. (Mass.) 382 appointed time for divine worship from
(1845). General welfare clause does not its commencement to its final close, and
authorize a municipal corporation to pass on all protracted occasions covering inter-
an ordinance prohibiting the retail of in- missions by day and night: Held invalid,
toxicating liquors, when this is repug- as the element of time was not fixed by
nant to the State laws on the subject. the corporate will, but left to a casual and
Burnett, In re, 30 Ala. 461 (1857). But incidental control, dependent upon the
under a different state of general legis- will and pleasure of the various denomina-
lation, see State v. Clark, 8 Foster (28 tions of Christian people, and ignoring all
N. H.), 176 (1854); Heisenbrittle v. City others. Gilham v. Wells, 21 Alb. Law
of Charleston, 2 McMullan (S. C.), Jour. 319; 64 Ga. 192 (1880).
233; State v. Ferguson, 33 N. H. 424 1 Heisembrittle v. City Council, 2 Mc-
(1851); distinguished froin and comnient- Mullan (S. C.) Law, 233 (1842). Fol-
ing on the above cases. State v. Freeman lowed and affirmed. City Council v. Ah.
38 N. H. 426, approving and following rens, 4 Strob. (S. C.) Law, 241 (1850).
State v. Clark, 8 Fost. (28 N. H.) 176; See City Council v. Baptist Church (giv-
Megowan v. Commonwealth, 2 Met. (Ky.) ing preamble to charter in question), Ib.
3 (1859). Where there is no legislation 306, 308. A town had exclusive authority
authorizing township officers incorporated over the sale of liquors therein, and it was
under general laws of the State to regulate held that power to “regulate, restrain,
and license the sale of intoxicating liquors, and suppress shops and places for the sale
or to exact a fee for such license, there is of ardent spirits by retail” amounted to an
no power in the board of trustees either to authority to forbid the sale ; for if there
pass an ordinance requiring, or to grant is a sale it must be made in some shop or
à license for this purpose. A provision place. Clintonville v. Keeting, 4 Denio
limiting the amount that may be charged (N. Y.), 341 (1847); Thomas v. Mt.
for liquor licenses by cities and towns does Vernon, 9 Ohio, 290. Requiring a license
not give the power. They have just such tax from the owner of a saloon situated
powers as the law has conferred upon the three miles from the settled portions of a
board, and none other. Walter v. Colum- city, though within its limits, held un.
bia City, 61 Ind. 24 ; Cowley v. Rushville, lawful on the ground that the benefits of
60 Ind. 327 ; McFee v. Greenfield, 62 the parties should be reciprocal, and in
Ind. 21.
this case the saloon owner received no
Ordinance ultra vires. License to sell benefits whatever from the city govern.
liquors at retail. Subsequent ordinancement. Salt Lake City V. Wagner, 2
restricting sale invalid. A. obtained a Utah, 400. Construction of charter pro-
license to sell liquors ; subsequently an visions holding that the sale of intoxicat.
ordinance was passed prohibiting the sale ing liquors might be declared a nuisance
of liquor during the continuance of divine by the municipal authorities.
Block v.
VOL. 1.
- 28
434
§ 366
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
A corporation whose charter contained the general welfare clause,
and also specific power “to license persons to retail spirituous liquors,
and to prohibit persons from selling without such license,” and was,
it seems, silent as to the amount which might be demanded for a
license, was adjudged competent to enact an ordinance demanding
$500 as a fee for a retail license.1
Power by its charter to a city "to tax, or entirely suppress, all
petty groceries,” was held, in connection with other provisions of
the charter expressly authorizing certain other subjects to be
licensed, not to confer upon the corporation the power to grant
licenses for retailing viuous liquors, and to demand a sum of money
therefor.2
Ordinances Relating to Public Offences.
§ 366 (300). Distinction between Laws and By-Laws; Concur-
rent Prohibitions, &c. Statute law and by-laws are intended to
Jacksonville, 36 Ill. 301 ; Goddard v. amount of a license tax upon selling
Same, 15 Ill. 588 ; Byers v. Trustees, &c., liquor is unreasonable, oppressive or
16 Ill. 35; Pekin v. Smelzel, 21 Ill. 464. prohibitory. In re Guerrero, 69 Cal. 88.
i Perdue v. Ellis, 19 Ga. 586 (1855). Ex parte McNally, 73 Cal. 632.
But see Burnett, In re, 30 Ala. 461, and 2 Leonard v. Canton, 35 Miss. (6
compare that with Intendant v. Chandler, George) 189 (1858). Power “to prohibit
6 Ala. 899. See, also, St. Louis v. Smith, tippling-houses," does not authorize an
2 Mo. 113; where there was charter ordinance prohibiting sales of beer by
power to “ restrain and prohibit tippling. brewers. Strauss v. Pontiac, 40 III. 301
houses," and the corporation was held en- (1866). Prohibition in ordinance to sell
titled to impose a license fee. Power to liquors without license held not to apply
tax” and “restrain ” sale of liquor in. to sales by manufacturers, but to retail
cludes power to grant licenses. Mt. Car. dealers. St. Paul v. Troyer, 3 Minn. 291.
mel v. Wabash County, 50 Ill. 69; Under a law requiring a majority of
Schweitzer v. Liberty, 82 Mo. 309; Port. citizens to petition for a license to the
land v.
Schmidt, 13 Oreg. 17. Where «city council, a license granted upon a
authority was conferred upon a corpora- petition signed by a less number is void
tion to suppress and prohibit the sale of and affords no protection. Eureka v.
intoxicating drinks, as well as to license Davis, 21 Kan. 578; and the mayor is not
the same, an ordinance which imposes a bound to sign any license so ordered.
penalty for selling such drinks without Welsford v. Weidlein, 23 Kan. 601 ; S. P.
license, which penalty exceeds that fixed State v. Young, 17 Kan. 414 ; Ins. Co. v.
by the general law of the Territory, is State, 9 Kan. 210; Eureka v. Davis, 21
reasonable. Deitz v. Central, i Col. 323 Kan. 578; Wabaunsee Co. v. Muhlen.
(1872).
backer, 18 Kan. 129; Bouldin v. Baltimore,
There should be no arbitrary discrimina- 15 Md. 18. Cannot compel its issue by
tion in granting such licenses. Zanone v. mandamus. State v. Stevens, 23 Kan.
Mound City, 103 Ill. 552. If the power 456. Where there is no law governing
to fix the fee is granted to the municipal the amount, it is a question of expediency,
corporation its discretion in fixing it can- of which the city authorities are the sole
not be reviewed by the courts. Wolf v. judge. Goldsmith v. New Orleans, 31
Lansing, 53 Mich. 367. Courts will not La. 646.
presume, matter of law, that the
as
§ 367
435
ORDINANCES RELATING TO PUBLIC OFFENCES.
meet different wants and exigencies, and to serve different purposes.
The former, when general in its nature and operation, is intended to
furnish a rule for the government of the people of the State every-
where. The latter, made by the corporation under derivative au-
thority, are local regulations for the government of the inhabitants
or the regulation of the local concerns of the incorporated place;
and of course they must be void, unless specially authorized by the
charter or organic act of the corporation, whenever they are repug-
nant to, or inconsistent with, the general law of the land. No im-
plied power to pass by-laws, and no express general grant of the
power, can authorize a by-law. which conflicts with the statutes of
the State, or with the general principles of the common law adopted
or in force in the State.
§ 367 (301). Same subject. - The laws of the State operate
within the limits of municipal corporations and upon their inhabi-
tants the same as elsewhere, unless it is otherwise clearly provided
in the charter, or by some statute of the State ; and unless so pro-
vided, in case of conflict between laws and by-laws, the latter must
give way. But the State may, and as to local matters frequently
does, except municipal corporations from the operation of its laws,
and either provides a special law for them or authorizes them to pro-
vide special regulations for themselves; and when this is done
there is no conflict. But these local laws and regulations are at all
times subject to the paramount authority of the legislature. Ques-
tions of difficulty have arisen in consequence of grants of power to
municipal corporations to make ordinances respecting matters and
acts already regulated by general statute, and, if criminal in their
nature, punishable under the laws of the State. Hence, the same
1 Ante, secs. 317, 319, 320-330; see, 76 N. C. 33; State v. Langston, 88 N. C.
also, post, sec. 429 et seq., 432, et seq. and 692; State v. Brittain, 89 N. C. 574; Cen-
cases. New Hampton v. Conroy, 56 Iowa, terville v. Miller, 57 Iowa, 56; People v.
498 ; Foster v. Brown, 55 Iowa, 686; State Brown, 2 Utah, 452 (an ordinance creating
v. Lee, 29 Minn. 445. An ordinance au- and punishing the offence of assault and
thorizing the licensing of an occupation battery declared void). But see Ex parte
which is illegal and criminal under the Douglass, 1 Utah, 108, where an ordinance
general law of the State is null and void. to punish persons keeping a house for
A license issued under such an ordinance gaming purposes was held to be authorized
is no defence against an indictment under by the charter of Salt Lake City, though
the general law. State v. Lindsay, 34 the offence was punishable by the general
Ark. 372 (keeping a gaming table). law of the State. In Indiana a statute
An ordinance making that which is a forbidding towns to punish offences which
crime under the general law an offence are provided for by general law, is held
against the town, held to be void. State constitutional. Jett v. Richmond, 78 Ind.
v. Keith, 94 N. C. 933 (resisting officer), 316; Indianapolis v. Huegle, 18 N. E.
citing Town of Washington v. Hammond, Rep. 172.
436
§ 368
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
act comes to be forbidden by general statute and by the ordinance
of a municipal corporation, each providing a separate and different
punishment. The same transaction may, if complex in its nature,
be in one part of it an offence against the general law, and in
another against the by-law; but such cases present no difficulty.
But can the same act be twice punished, once under the ordinance
and once under the statute ? The cases on this subject cannot be
reconciled. Some hold that the same act may be a double offence,
one against the State and one against the corporation. Others
regard the act as constituting a single offence, and hold that it can
be punished but once, and may be thus punished by whichever
party first acquires jurisdiction.
§ 368 (302). Author's Conclusions. — In view of the somewhat
strict construction of grants of corporate powers, elsewhere ex-
plained and illustrated, and of the subordinate nature and purposes
of by-laws, the following rules, although seeming to rest on sound
principles, are, in view of the decisions, stated with some distrust of
their entire correctness : I. A general grant of power, such as mere
authority to make by-laws, or authority to make by-laws for the
good government of the place, and the like, should not be held to
confer authority upon the corporation to make an ordinance punish-
ing an act – for example, an assault and battery -- which is made
punishable as a criminal offence by the laws of the State. The
intention of the State that the general laws shall not extend to the
inhabitants of municipal corporations, or that these corporations
shall have the power, by ordinance, to supersede the State law, will
not be inferred from grants of power general in their character; nor
will such authority in the corporation be held to exist as an implied
or incidental right. II. Where the act is, in its nature, one which
constitutes two offences, one against the State and one against the
municipal government, the latter may be constitutionally authorized
to punish it, though it be also an offence under the State law; but
the legislative intention that this may be done ought to be manifest
and unmistakable, or the power in the 'corporation should be held
not to exist. III. Where the act or matter covered by the charter
or ordinance, and by the State law, is not essentially criminal in its
nature, and is one which is generally confided to the supervision
and control of the local government of cities and towns, but is also
of a nature to require general legislation, the intention that the
municipal government should have power to make new, further,
1 Text approved State v. Langston, 88 N. C. 692.
§ 368 ORDINANCES : BY-LAWS RELATING TO PUBLIC OFFENCES. 437
and more definite regulations, and enforce them by appropriate
penalties, will be inferred from language which would not be suf-
ficient were the matter one not specially relating to corporate duties,
and fully provided for by the general laws. Such are the general
principles to be extracted from the authorities, but the exact state
of the law will more satisfactorily appear, and indeed, can only
be seen, by reference to the adjudicated cases; accordingly, the lead-
ing cases upon the subject are stated in the note, and in some of
1 Smith, In re, Hempst. 201 (1832); corporation, and both may punish it with-
Mayor, &c. of Savannah v. Hussey, 21 out violation of any constitutional prin-
Ga. 80 (1857); Brownville v. Cook, 4 Neb. ciple.” Const. Lim. 199; S. P. March v.
101 (1875); St. Charles v. Meyer, 58 Mo. Commonwealth, 12 B. Mon. (Ky.) 25, 29,
86 (1874); New Orleans v. Miller, 7 La. per Simpson, C. J.; Howe v. Plainfield,
An. 651 (1852); Municipality v. Wilson, supra ; Brownville v. Cook, 4 Neb. 101
5 La. An. 747; State v. Cowan, 29 Mo. (1875). In England a by-law imposing a
330 (furious driving); St. Louis v. Caf- penalty on a corporator for refusing to
ferata, 24 Mo. 94 (Sunday ordinances); serve in a corporate office, is valid, not.
Amboy v. Sleeper, 31 Ill. 499; State v. withstanding the party may be indicted
Ledford, 3 Mo. 102 ; Independence v. for the same refusal, as he may be in all
Moore, 32 Mo. 392; McLaughlin v. Ste- cases of municipal offices necessary or
phens, 2 Cranch C. C. 148 ; St. Louis v. proper to carry on the government of the
Bentz, 11 Mo. 61 (ordinance against va- corporation. Grant on Corp. 82. A dis-
grants); United States v. Holly, 3 Cranch tinction was there early made between
C. C. R. 656; Jefferson City v. Courtmire, grave offences classified as pleas of the
9 Mo. 693 (ordinance against riots); Davis crown, and triable upon an issue of not
v. State, 4 Stew. & Port. (Ala.), 83; State guilty between the king and the defendant,
v. Plunkett, 3 Harrison (N. J.), 5 (1840); and lesser or petty offences punishable
Rica v. State, 3 Kan. 141 (1865); Rogers by fine or amerciament upon presentinent
v. Jones, 1 Wend. (N. Y.), 261; Mayor, &c. in court leet, or inferior jurisdictions. See
of New York v. Hyatt, 3 E. D. Smith (N. Hale, P. C., Vol. I. ch. lii.; Vol. II. ch.
Y.), 156; Borough of York v. Forscht, 23 xix.; Norton's Com. London, 370, 453.
Pa. St. 391; March v. Commonwealth, 12 The history of Courts of Summary Juris-
B. Mon. (Ky.) 25; Commissioners v. Har- diction in England, and an outline of their.
ris, 7 Jones (Law), 281; Brooklyn v. Toyn- jurisdiction under the Summary Jurisdic-
bee, 31 Barb. (N. Y.) 282; Davenport v. tion Act of 1879, will be found in Mr.
Bird, 34 Iowa, 524 (1872); Zylstra v. Justice Stephen's History of Criminal
Charleston, 1 Bay (S. C.), 382; Peters, Law, Vol. I., ch. iv. Post, secs. 428, 432,
burg v. Metzker, 21 Ill. 205 (1859); Howe 433.
v. Treasurer of Plainfield, 37 N. J. L. In Georgia the general welfare clause
145; Barter v. Comnionwealth, 3 Pa. 253; in a charter was decided not to authorize
State v. Clark, 1 Dutch. (N. J.) 54 ; State the passage of an ordinance prescribing a
v. Pollard, 6 R. I. 290; People v. Jack- different mode of trial and punishment in
son, 8 Mich. 110; post, sec. 376 n.; sec. addition to that provided for by the gen.
411; State v. Topeka, 36 Kans. 76; In re eral criminal code of the State, for har.
Sic, 73 Cal. 142, approving text; Ex parte boring and enticing seamen. Savannah
Bourgeois, 60 Miss. 663.
v. Hussey, 21 Ga. 80 (1857). The power
Treating of the constitutional question of municipal corporations to legislate re-
involved, Mr. Justice Cooley remarks that, specting offences fully covered by the
although the decisions are not uniform, State law is denied, and the general sub-
the clear weight of authority is, "that ject is largely and satisfactorily discussed;
the same act may constitute an offence and it is well remarked that, in such
both against the State and the municipal cases, "the law of the State is the law of
438
§ 368
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
its aspects the matter is further considered in the chapter on Mu-
nicipal Courts.
the corporation ; and they cannot make law for the same act is no bar to a prose-
another law for themselves." The fol. cution under the ordinance. Collier, C. J.,
lowing is extracted from the opinion de delivering the opinion of the court, says:
livered by a very able judge : “Under “The object of the power conferred by
the general grant of power [to pass all the charter, and the purpose of the ordi-
such ordinances as may seem necessary nance itself, was not to punish an offence
for the security, welfare, &c., of the city] against the criminal justice of the coun-
the city authorities may cover all (proper] try, but to provide a mere police regulation
cases not provided for by the paramount for the enforcement of good order and
authorities of the State. All those or- quiet within the limits of the corporation.
dinances regulating cemeteries, commons,
. . The offences against the corporation
markets, vehicles, fires, exhibitions, and the State are distinguishable and
lamps, licenses, water-works, watch, po- wholly disconnected, and the prosecution
lice, city taxes, city officers, health, nui- at the suit of each proceeds upon a differ-
sances, &c., are legitimate and proper. ent hypothesis: the one contemplates the
Nay, I might go further, and concede observance of the peace and good order
that where a State law defines an offence of the city; the other has a more enlarged
generally, and prescribes a punishment object in view, the maintenance of the
without reference to the place where it is peace and dignity of the State.” Mayor,
committed, in town or country, and the &c. of Mobile v. Allaire, 14 Ala. 400
act, when committed in the streets and (1848). If the principle stated in the
public places of the city, would be attend. text be correct, the soundness of this de-
ed with circumstances of aggravation, cision under the powers conferred upon
such as an affray, for instance, the corpo. the corporation may admit of doubt, but
rate authorities, with a view to suppress the same view had been previously taken
this special mischief, might probably pro- in the same court in' The Mayor, &c. of
vide against it by ordinance. And this Mobile v. Rouse (liquor law), 8 Ala. 515
is going quite far enough.' But I deny (1845); and see Moore v. State, 16 Ala.
a municipal corporation can legis- 411; Greensboro '0. Mullins, 13 Ala.
late criminaliter upon a case fully covered 341. Post, secs. 407, 428, 432, 433.
by the State law, though aware that decis- In Texas it is held that an offence com:
ions may be found to support" that view. mitted against the proper police regulations
Per Lumpkin, J., in Savannah v. Hussey, of a municipal corporation, which at the
21 Ga. 80, 86 (1857). And it is settled same time violates the penal laws, can
in Georgia, that where an act amounts to legally be prosecuted under either, and a
an indictable offence it cannot be punished prosecution under one will be no bar to a
under municipal ordinances, but the of- legal prosecution under the other. Ham.
fender must be bound over to the proper ilton v. State, 3 Tex. App. 643 (1878).
court; if it does not amount to an indict- Extent of police power. Shafer v. Mumma,
able offence, the offender may be punished 17 Md. 331; ante, secs. 141, 144, 357, 358.
under the ordinances of the municipality, In Ohio an ordinance prohibiting singing,
and if it is a nuisance, steps may also be speech-making, &c., in the streets was
taken to have it abated. Vason v. Au- held valid. Trimble v. Bucyrus, 3 Bates
gusta, 38 Ga. 542 (1868); Reich v. State, Ohio St. Dig. 419; 21 Alb. Law Jour. 176.
53 Ga. 73 (1874).
See on this point ante, sec. 319.
But in Alabama it is held that a muni. Frazee, 63 Mich. 396; People v. Rochester,
cipal corporation with power to enact 51 N. Y. Sup. Ct. (44 Hun) 166.
ordinances " for the good government of the Authority to pass ordinances “to pre-
place, not contravening the laws of the serve the health and comfort of the town
State," may pass an ordinance imposing a does not empower the corporation to pass
fine for an assault and battery within its an ordinance to prevent or punish breaches
limits, and a punishment under the State of the peace. Raleigh v. Dougherty, 3
that "o
Re
3 369
439
ORDINANCES : HEALTH; HOSPITALS; BURIALS.
Ordinances relating to the Public Health, Safety, and Convenience.
§ 369 (303). Health Ordinances; Hospitals and Burials. — Our
municipal corporations are usually invested with express power to
l{umph. (Tenn.) 11 (1842); see chapter on 820; s. C. 7 Am. Rep. 723; Moore v. State,
Municipal Courts, post.
48 Miss. 147 ; S. C. 12 Am. Rep. 367.
Where gambling and the keeping of In Missouri it is held that where the
gambling-houses are made public offences same act (as, for example, furious driving
by the State laws, offenders may be
be in highways and public places) is a viola-
prosecuted in the State courts for the tion of a valid municipal ordinance and
violation of these laws, notwithstanding of the general criminal statutes of the
the organic acts of cities may give state, the offender can be punished but
to the city council power “to restrain, once ; and hence, to an indictment in the
prohibit, and
suppress games and State court, he may plead a former con-
gambling-houses.” In thus holding, the viction under the ordinance of the muni-
court adds, “It is not necessary, in cipal corporation. State v. Cowan, 29 Mo.
this case, to decide whether both the 330 (1860). But quære. The opinion in
State and the city can punish for the this case assumes, without discussion,
same act; but we have no doubt that that the offence is single. Ib. The later,
the one which shall first obtain jurisdic. and it would seem the correct doctrine on
tion of the person of the accused may this subject, is thus expressed by Wagner,
punish to the extent of its power." Rice J., in The State v. Gordon, 60 Mo. 383,
V. State, 3 Kan. 141 (1865). The same 385 (1875):-
point has been decided the same way in a “The legislature has the undoubted
later case, by the Supreme Court of Min- right, in reference to statutory misde-
nuesota. State v. Crummey, 17 Minn, 72 meanors, to say in what particular juris-
(1871). Gambling being punishable under diction they shall be tried, and to inake
the general law, a city council “invested that jurisdiction exclusive of all others.
with authority to make ordinances to se. When the power to hear and determine
cure the inhabitants against fire, against these minor offences is given to a municipal
violations of the law and the public peace, corporation, but no words of exclusion or
to suppress riots, gambling, drunkenness, restriction are used, the remedies between
indecent and disorderly conduct, to pun- the State and corporation will be construed
ish lewd behavior in public places, to be concurrent; but where the manifest
and, generally, to provide for the safety, intention is that the prosecution shall be
prosperity, and good order of the city," limited exclusively to one jurisdiction,
possesses, by virtue thereof, no power to that intention must prevail."
make the keeping of any gambling device In State v. Wister, 62 Mo. 592 (1876),
a misdemeanor, and to punish the same. the defendant, indicted for keeping a
Mount Pleasant v. Breeze, 11 'Iowa, 399 bawdy house, pleaded autrefois convict,
(1860). This case was approved In re upon a complaint before the city recorder.
Lee Tong, 18 Fed. Rep. 253. A power to
A power to As the charter did not confer upon the
suppress gambling does not include a
city exclusive cognizance of this class of
power to license it. Goetler v. State, 45 offences the plea was held bad, although
Ark. 454.
the recorder was invested with “exclusive
Police officers in Indiana held to have jurisdiction of all cases arising under
no power to scize and destroy gambling any ordinance of the city." S. P. State
apparatus without an ordinance being v. Harper, 58 Mo. 531. In State v. Gor-
passed, but no opinion was expressed as don, 60 Mo. 383, the charter in terms
to the validity of such an ordinance. conferred exclusive jurisdiction on the
Ridgeway v. West, 60 Ind. 371 (1878). municipal authorities in respect of a cer-
Power
to suppress gambling-houses. tain class of misdemeanors, in which was
Society of Arts, &c. v. Musgrove, 44 Miss. included the one in question in this case.
440
§ 369
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
preserve the health and safety of the inhabitants. This is, indeed, one
of the chief purposes of local government, and reasonable by-laws in
In Nebraska the doctrine is maintained anapolis v. Blythe, 2 Ind. (Carter) 75
that “the same act inay constitute an of- (1850). In this case the city unsuccess-
fence against both the State and the fully sought to recover a penalty pre-
municipal government, and both may scribed by ordinance for an assault and
punish it without infringing any constitu- battery committed by the defendant with-
tional right.” Brownville v. Cook, 4 Neb. in the city. Saine principle, City of
101, 105 (1875), per Lake, C. J. In this Madison v. Hatcher, 8 Blackf. (Ind.) 341
case an ordinance was sustained punish. (1846). But these cases were overruled
ing “wilful, malicious, and mischievous by Ambrose v. State, 6 Ind. 351, in which
meddling with or trespasses upon prop- it was held that a single act might con-
erty.” The ordinance was more specific stitute two offences, one against the State
than the criminal code of the State on this and one against the municipal govern-
subject, but this was not made the basis ment, and “that each might puuish in its
of the decision.
own mode, by its own officers, the same
In Minnesota it is held that the legisla- act as an offence against each.” Perkins,
ture may authorize a city to in pose new J., in Waldo v. Wallace, 12 Ind. 582
and additional penalties for acts in this (1859), where prior cases in that State are
case the selling of liquors on Sunday) al referred to. See, also, Lawrenceburg v.
ready made penal by the general laws of Wuest, 16 Ind. 337 ; Fox v. State, 5 How.
the State. State v. Ludwig, 21 Minn. 202. 410; Moore v. People, 14 How. 13; post,
“The principle established by the weight sec. 432.
of authority, and we think in accordance In Louisiana, municipal corporations
with sound reason, is that the legislature are held to have no power to impose a
of the State may authorize a municipal penalty on that which is made punishable
government to impose new and additional as a criminal offence by the laws of the
remedies for acts already penal. by the State. But it is admitted that there is a
laws of the State. Per McMillan, C. J., class of offences against public order not
citing State v. Charles, 16 Minn. 474; made punishable by the State law, which it
Brooklyn v. Toynbee, 31 Barb. 282; 1 is within the power of such corporation to
Dillon on Mun. Corp. sec. 368 ; Cooley suppress. New Orleans v. Miller, 7 La.
Const. Lim. p. 199; and notes 1 and 2.” An. 651 (1852); Municipality v. Wilson,
In Michigan, in Slaughter v. People, 2 5 La. An. 747. This case seems to concede
Dong. (Mich.) 334, the principle was de- that the city corporation cannot punish
cided that it was not competent to punish, for an act identical with that punished by
under a city ordinance, an act which was the State law. See, also, Comm’rs v. Har-
indictable. Illustrating the difference be- ris, 7 Jones (Law), 281 ; People v. Jack-
tween prosecutions, under special penal son, 8 Mich. 110. The charter of a city
provisions of a city charter, of acts with authorized the common council to pass
specified fines and penalties affixed by ordinances' upon certain subjects pertain-
the charter, but which acts are breaches ing to the police, good order, and welfare
of the law of the State wherever com- of the city, and provided that a violation
mitted, and ordinary prosecutions under of certain of such ordinances should be
municipal ordinances, see Wayne County a misdemeanor, and might be prosecuted
v. Detroit, 17 Mich. 390 (1868); People before the police court of the city like
v. Detroit, 18 Mich. 445 (1869); People v. other offences, which court might inflict
Jackson, 8 Mich. 110; post, chap. xiii. the penalty named in such ordinance, pro-
In Indiana it was first held that where vided that no penalty should exceed the
the act complained of is indictable as a sum of fifty dollars for a single offence.
criminal offence against the laws of the It was held that the charter did not
State, a person could not be punished for attempt to confer upon the
such act under or hy virtue of the ordi- council the power to define and determine
nances of a city. City Council of Indi- crime, and was not therefore inconstitu-
common
1
§ 369
441
ORDINANCES: PUBLIC HEALTH AND SAFETY.
2
relation thereto have always been sustained in England as within the
incidental authority of corporations to ordain. It will be useful to
illustrate the subject by reference to some of the adjudged cases.
An ordinance of a city prohibiting, under a penalty, any person, not
duly licensed therefor by the city authorities, from “ removing or
carrying through any of the streets of the city any house-dirt, refuse,
offal, or filth,” is not improperly in restraint of trade, and is reason-
able and valid. Such a by-law is not in the nature of a monopoly,
but is founded upon a wise regard for the public health. It was
contended that the city could regulate the number and kind of
horses and carts to be employed by strangers or unlicensed per-
sons, as well as they could those of licensed persons; but practi-
cally it was considered that the main object of the city could be
better accomplished by employing men over whom they have en-
tire control, night and day, who are at hand, and able from habit
to do the work in the best way and at the proper time.3
one.
tional. State v. Tryon, 39 Conn: 183 the limits of the city, says, “I am willing
(1872).
to admit that the by-law itself is a valid
The Constitution of California (art. 11, If it restrained an inoffensive trade
sec. 11), ordains that cities and towns may it would not be so; but it is made to re-
pass and enforce within their limits such strain one that is both offensive and dan-
local police, sanitary, and other regulations gerous. It is, therefore, calculated to
as do not conflict with general laws." An guard the comfort and safety of the citi-
ordinance of a city aimed at opium dens zens ; and the benefit of a by-law is, gener-
was held to be invalid because it punished ally, the touchstone of its validity.” The
precisely the same acts made punishable courts will not interfere with the legiti-
by the Penal Code. Text, sec. 368, quoted, mate exercise by municipal bodies of their
and the court adds, “These rules express police powers by which the peace, health,
the law as we understand it.” Re Sic, 73 comfort, and general welfare are secured or
Cal. 142 (1877). Re Johnson, Ib. 228, promoted. Weil v. Ricord, 9 C. E. Green
ordinance prohibiting persons to visit, for (24 N. J. Eq.), 169; Boehm v. Baltimore,
piirposes of prostitution, houses of ill-fame 61 Md. 259.
sustained, not being in conflict with the “The proper control of the time and
general law of the State. Re Campbell mode of cleansing such receptacles for ref-
(ordinance to suppress tippling-houses use matter (sinks, cesspools, &c.], and re-
sustained), 74 Cal. 20 (1877); Lane, E. moval of their contents, is not only a
parte, 76 Cal. 587 ; post, sec. 436, note. legitimate subject of municipal concern,
i Text approved, Mayor of Monroe v. but is imperatively demanded by a just
Gerspach, 33 La. An. 1011.
regard for the comfort and health of the
2 Ante, chap. vi. secs. 141, 142, 144. citizen." Legislation for the protection of
8 Vandine, In re, 6 Pick. (Mass.) 187 the public health and for establishing
(1828); commented on in Commonwealth boards of health “ought not to be regarded
2. Stodder, 2 Cush. (Mass.) 562, 575, 576 as detracting from the general powers of
(1848). Ante, sec. 362, note. In Zylstra municipal governments, unless that legisla-
v. Corporation of Charleston, 1 Bay (S. C.), tive intent clearly appears.” Knapp, J.
382 (1794), Mr. Justice Waties (one of in Nicoulin v. Lowery, 49 N. J. Law, 391.
the most accomplished of early American A power to
A power to “exclude from certain lim-
.
judges), speaking of an ordinance prohib- its or to regulate all occupations, houses,
iting the making of soap or candles con- &c., which are against good morals,
trary to the mode prescribed and within or dangerous to the public safety,"in-
442
§ 371
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
$ 370 (304). Same subject. - Authority by charter to pass ordi-
nances respecting the harbors and wharves, and “every other by-law
necessary for the security, welfare, and convenience of the city,” gives
to the city council power to pass a health ordinance requiring boats
coming from infected places to anchor before landing and to submit
to an examination, provided such ordinance be not repugnant to the
general law of the State. And it was further held that a general
law of the State, prohibiting “any person coming into the State from
an infected place, and in violation of quarantine regulations," was
not repugnant to and did not render the ordinance invalid.1
$ 371 (305). Hospitals. — Authority to the corporation of New
Orleans “to pass such by-laws as they shall deem necessary to main-
tain the cleanliness and salubrity of the city," was considered in view
of its extensive nature, certain provisions of the civil code, and the
liability of the city to epidemics, as conferring power upon the city
council to prohibit the erection and maintenance of private hospitals ;
the court admitting that the same question had been decided other-
wise by tribunals governed by the common-law jurisprudence.?
cludes the power to confine the keeping of Powers with respect to privies. Greg.
more than two cows within prescribed lim. ory v. New York, 40 N. Y. 273. Pow-
its. Re Linehan, 72 Cal. 114.
ers under legislative authority with respect
Power to a city council to compel the to swill milk. Johnson v. Simonton, 43
ourners and occupants of slaughter-houses Cal. 242 (1872). Power to regulate the
to cleanse and abate them whenever ne- sale of milk from vehicles by requiring a
cessary for the health of the inhabitants, license sustained. People v. Mulholland,
was considered not to authorize an ordi- 82 N. Y. 324 (1880).
nance entirely prohibiting the slaughter- 1 Dubois v. Augusta, Dudley (Ga.), 30
ing of animals within certain limits of the (1831); ante, sec. 144, as to Quarantine
city. Wreford v. People, 14 Mich. 41 and Health Powers of municipalities.
(1865); see Metropolitan Board of Health, 2 Milne 2. Davidson, 5 Martin, 409.
37 N. Y. 661 ; Shrader, In re, 33 Cal. 279 A power to “erect and establish .
(1867). In Cronin v. People, 82 N. Y. pest-houses and hospitals" does not ali-
318 (1880); s. C. 22 Alb. Law J. 430, it thorize a city to enact an ordinance to reg.
appeared that by the charter of the city of ulate and license private hospitals ; nor
Albany, the common council was author- does a general power to make by-laws
ized by ordinance “ to regulate the erection,
“
' necessary to carry out the objects of the
use, and continuance of slaughter-houses. corporation." Bessonies v. Indianapolis,
It was held that the power to "regulate," 71 Ind. 189.
as thus used, gave the council the right to As to city hospitals, see Vionet v.
determine and fix the limits and localities Municipality, 4 La. An. 42; Bozant v.
within which new slaughter-houses may be Campbell, 9 Rob. (La.) 411 ; City Coun-
erected, and from which they may be ex- cil v. Boyd, 1 Const. Rep. A. D. 1817
cluded, and also to prohibit their continu- (S. C.), 352 ; Tucker v. Virginia City, 4
ance whenever and wherever they endanger Nev. 20. Municipal corporation may
the health and comfort of the community, found hospitals for the poor under 39 Eliz. .
of which the common council was to judge chap. v. Newcastle, In re, 12 Clark &
for itself, and its judgment was implied Fin. 402. Where a city has power to
from the ordinance, and need not be recited. “ establish" a hospital, the purchase, an-
!
§ 372
443
ORDINANCES : CEMETERIES AND BURIALS.
§ 372 (306). Cemeteries and Burials. — The public health, com-
fort, and convenience are concerned in the proper regulation of
burials; and the evils resulting from its neglect are especially to
be apprehended in the crowded populations of cities. Power to
regulate this matter may properly be conferred upon municipal cor-
porations. And such power will be held to be given by authority to
inake police regulations or to pass by-laws respecting the health,
good government, and welfare of the place. Power to city corpora-
is an
cording to existing law, of a farm and the board of health held to be advisory and
buildings thereon specially for the purpose executive, not legislative, and a resolution
establishing” of the hospital. of the board that a specified tannery was
Richmond v. Henrico County, 83 Va. 204 a nuisance was unauthorized and void.
(1887).
State v. Trenton, 7 Vroom (36 N. J. L.),
Quarantine ordinances of a municipal 283. Such a board held not to have the
corporation, passed by virtue of a grant power to absolutely prohibit carrying on a
of power from the State, whereby passent lawful business not necessarily a nuisance.
ger vessels are required to remain in Weil v. Ricord, 9 C. E. Green (24 N. J.
quarantine for a specified period, are not Eq.), 169. Regularly the orders of a board
repugnant to the commerce clause of the of health, directing the abatement of a
Federal Constitution. St. Louis v. McCoy, nuisance, should be in writing. Such or-
18 Mo. 238 (1853); S. P. St. Louis v. Bof. ders may be proved by the ininutes of the
finger, 19 Mo. 13 ; Metcalf ů. St. Louis, board, by the written orders themselves,
11 Mo. 103. In modern usage, quarantine or by being recited in the proceedings of
is not confined to vessels having on board the Corporation of which the board of
the plague, but extends to vessels having health are members. How far parol evi-
on board other contagious diseases. Per dence may be received of such orders, when
Tenney, C. J., Mitchell v. Rockland, 41 it appears that no record or written evi.
Me. 363 (1856); 8. C. again, 45 Me. 496 dence ever existed, is not free from doubt.
(1858); ante, sec. 144.
Meeker v. Van Rensselaer, 15 Wend.
Boards of health. An ordinance cre- (N. Y.) 397 (1836), where parol evidence
ating and giving to the board of health of this kind was held inadmissible by the
general supervision over the health of Supreme Court. But see, in Court of
the city," and "all necessary power to Errors, Van Wormer v. Albany, 18 Wend.
carry the ordinance into effect," was con- (N. Y.) 169, affirming s. C. 15 Wend.
sidered to include the power to rent a 262. See also, People v. Adams, 9 Wend.
building for a temporary hospital to pro- (N. Y.) 333 ; 6 Wend. (N. Y.) 651 ; ante,
tect the city from an apprehended visita- chap. xi.; Health Department v. Knoll, 70
tion of the cholera, and to make the cor- N. Y. 530 (1877).
poration liable for the rent, although it Bogert v. Indianapolis, 13 Ind. 134
did not become necessary to use the house. (1859), per Perkins, J.; Mayor, &c. of New
Aull v. Lexington, 18 Mo. 401 (1853). York v. Slack, 3 Wheel. Cr. Cas. 237
Power of board of health. Frend v. Den. (1824); Brick Presbyterian Church v.
nett, 4 C. B. (N. s.) 576 ; Barton v. New New York, 5 Cow. (N. Y.) 538 (1826);
Orleans, 16 La. An. 317 ; Hutton v. Cam- ante, sec. 142, note; Coates 2. Same, 7
den, 39 N. J. L. 122 (1876); Nicoulin v. Cow. (N. Y.) 585 (1827); Austin v. Mur-
Lowery, 49 N. J. Law, 391 ; Ferguson v. ray, 16 Pick. (Mass.) 121 (1834) ; Com-
Selma, 43 Ala. 398 (1869); Tugman v. monwealth v. Fahey, 5 Cush. (Mass.) 408
Chicago, 78 Ill. 405 (1875); Belcher v. Far (1850); New Orleans v. St. Louis Church,
rar, 8 Allen (Mass.), 325 ; Hazen v. Strong, 11 La. An. 244 (1856); distinguished from
2 Vt. 427 ; Commissioners v. Powe, 6 Brick Presbyterian Church v. New York,
Jones (Law), 134 ; Wilkinson 1. Albany, supra; Commonwealth v. Goodrich, 13
8 Fost. (28 N. H.) 9. The powers of a Allen (Mass.), 546 ; ante, secs. 141, 142.
1
414
§ 373
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
tion, after enumerating various objects, " in general to pass every
other by-law that to it shall seern requisite and necessary for the
security, welfare, and convenience of the city,” &c., was, by the
Court of Appeals of South Carolina, considered to give authority
to regulate the burial of the dead, and particularly to prevent the
establishment of new burial grounds within the limits of the city,
end, in the opinion of the organ of the court, also to regulate the
time of burial, the manner of interment so as to prevent noxious
effluvia, and to prohibit interments in the private gardens, yards,
and by-places of the city. But as every by-law must be reason-
able, an arbitrary or unnecessary or oppressive restraint upon the
right of burying the dead is invalid.2
$ 373 (307.) Same subject. — Where the burden to support a
public cemetery is required to be borne by all the citizens, an ordi-
nance throwing that burden upon a particular class is unreasonable
and void.3 Cemeteries in cities are not per se nuisances, but special
circumstances may make them so. It is not, however, sufficient that
they affect the market value of property in the vicinity. A city
The power of disinterment may be dele- the right to select and change the place
gated by the legislature to municipalities. of sepulture at pleasure. 3. If place of
Kincaid's Appeal, 66 Pa. St. 411 (1870). burial is taken for public use the next
1 City Council v. Baptist Church, 4 of kin may claim indemnity for expense of
Strob. (S. C.) Law, 306, 309 (1850), per removing and suitably re-interring their
Frost, J.; S. P. Bogert v. Indianapolis, remains. Beekman Street, In re, 4 Bradf.
13 Ind. 134, per Perkins, J.; New Orleans (N. Y.) 503, 532 (1856); Bogert v. City
v. St. Louis Church, 11 La. An. 244 ; dis- of Indianapolis, 13 Ind. 134 (1859), per
tinguished from 5 Cowev, 538, supra; Perkins, J. Many cases relating to the
Musgrove v. St. Louis Catholic Church, law of cemeteries are collected in Mr.
10 La. An. 431.
Thompson's note to Louisville v. Nevin,
2 Austin v. Murray, 16 Pick. (Mass.) 19 Am. Rep. 78, 79 (1874); S. C. 10 Bush
121 (1834); Coates v. Mayor, &c. of New 549. See, also, Brick Presb. Church, In
York, 7 Cow. (N. Y.) 585; Common- re, 3 Edw. Ch. Rep. (N. Y.) 155. Laying
Wealth v. Fabey, 5 Cush. (Mass.) 408 streets and highways through cemeteries.
(1850).
Cemetery Assoc. v. New Haven, 43 Conn.
The law of burials, in some of its rela- 234 (1875); 8. C. 21 Am. Rep. 643, and
tions to property and municipal rights, note and cases cited. Trustees v. Walsh,
was ably considered by the Hon. Samuel 57 Ill. 363 ; s. c. 11 Am. Rep. 21. Local
B. Ruggles, referee, in the matter of the assessments for improvements of adjoin-
opening of Beekman Street, in New York ing streets. Louisville v. Nevin, 10 Bush
City, whose report, establishing the fol- (Ky.), 549 (1874); s. C. 19 Am. Rep. 78.
lowing principles, was confirmed by the See on this point, post, sec. 776.
Supreme Court: 1. In this country, 8 Beroujohn v. Mobile, 27 Ala. 58
corpses and their burials are not matters (1855).
of ecclesiastical cognizance. 2. That the 4 New Orleans v. St. Louis Church, 11
right to bury a corpse and preserve its La. An. 244 (1856); Musgrove v. Same,
remains is a legal right, belonging, in the 10 La. An. 431; Lake View v. Letz, 44 III.
absence of testamentary disposition, ex- 81 (1867).
clusively to the next of kin, and includes
!
$ 374 ORDINANCES : POWER TO PREVENT AND ABATE NUISANCES. 445
corporation had power, by charter, “to establish cemeteries or burial
places within or without the city.” It was held that this would
authorize the city to establish cemeteries of its own, and regulate
them; but that it did not empower the council to subject to the
control of the city sexton cemeteries other than those belonging to
the city, nor to pass an ordinance prohibiting lot owners in private
cemeteries, though within the city limits, from entering to bury
without the permission of the city sexton, to be obtained only by
paying him the price of digging a grave. Certain statutes of New
York, authorizing incorporated rural cemetery associations to con-
demn lands for cemetery purposes, where no right on the part of the
public to buy lots or bury their dead there, or to fix the price of
lots, is secured, were held to be unconstitutional, on the ground that
the use was private and not public.2
.
§ 374 (308). Nuisances, and of the Power to prevent and abate.-
It is to secure and promote the public health, safety, and conven-
ience that municipal corporations are so generally and so liberally
endowed with power to prevent and abate nuisances. This authority
and its summary exercise may be constitutionally conferred on the
incorporated place, and it authorizes its council to act against that
which comes within the legal notion of a nuisance; but such power,
conferred in general terms, cannot be taken to authorize the extra-
judicial condemnation and destruction of that as a nuisance which,
in its nature, situation, or use, is not such.3 Speaking upon this
i Bogert v. Indianapolis, 13 Ind. 134 575), or by a trial by jury. King v. Daven-
(1859).
port, 98 Ill. 305; s. C. 38 Am. Reg. 89.
2 Deansville Cemetery Association, In That which is authorized by legislative
re, 66 N. Y. 569; overruling s. C. 5 Hun, authority cannot be declared a nuisance by
482.
a city corporation. Cases supra. The
8 Crosby v. Warren, 1 Rich. (S. C.) power to abate nuisances is a portion of
385; Roberts v. Ogle, 30 Ill. 459; Salem police authority necessarily vested in the
v. Eastern R. Co., 98 Mass. 431; Ding- corporation of all populous towns. Ken.
ley v. Boston, 100 Mass. 544; Van Dyke nedy V. Phelps, 10 La. An. 227, per
v. Cincinnati, l Disney (Ohio), 532; Buchanan, J. A city cannot create a nui-
Lake View v. Letz, 44 Ill. 81; Wreford sance upon private property, as, in this
v. People, 14 Mich. 41 (1865); State v. case, by diverting a stream, and compel its
Jersey City, 5 Dutch. (N. J.) 170; Ward owner to abate it. Hannibal v. Richards,
v. Little Rock, 41 Ark. 526; City of Den- 82 Mo. 330. Nuisances are of two kinds,
ver v. Mullen, 7 Col. 345; McKibbin v. public or common nuisances, which
Fort Smith, 35 Ark. 352; Mayor of Mon- affect people generally, and private nui-
roe v. Gerspach, 33 La. An. 1011; St. Paul sances, which may be defined as anything
v. Gilfillan, 36 Minn. 298. The legisla. done to the hurt of the lands, tenements,
ture may invest a municipal corporation or hereditaments of another. Russell on
with power to abate nuisances summarily, Crimes, 4th ed. 435. A public nuisance
without requiring resort to legal proceed. can only be abated by a public prosecution,
ings (Baumgartner v. Hasty, 100 Ind. or by a party whose damages are special,
446
$ 374
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
subject in a very important case, where a city, under authority to pre-
vent and restrain encroachments on rivers running through it, com-
and different from those sustained by the within the said borough from 1st Febru-
public generally. School District, &c. v. ary to 31st October inclusive, in any
Neil, 36 Kan. 617; Billard v. Erhart, 35 year.” Everett. v. Grapes, 3 L. T. N. S.
Kan. 611; Blanc v. Murray, 36 La. An. 669. A resolution or license from the cor-
162. See also Moore v. Langdon, 2 poration held to be no defence to a prose-
Mackey, 127. A public nuisance is not cution for a public nuisance. The King
made legal by having been maintained for 2. Cross, 2 C. & P. 483. « This certifi.
twenty years. Commonwealth v. Upton, cate is no defence; and even if it were a
6 Gray, 473; New Salem v. Eagle Mill license from all the magistrates in the
Co., 138 Mass. 8. The erection of a county to the defendant to slaughter
building in a public street to be used as a horses in this very place, it would not en-
market, and as a pound for confining title the defendant to continne the busi-
swine, would be both a public and a pri- ness there one hour after it became a puh-
vate nuisance, and may be enjoined at the lic nuisance to the neighborhood. ... If
suit of any one threatened with injury the defendant's slaughtering house was so
thereby. Lutterloh v. Cedar Keys, 15 conducted as to be a public nuisance at
Fla. 306. But see Henkel v. Detroit, 49 common law, the parish might at any
Mich. 249; Index, tit. Injunction. That time have caused it to be removed; and I
which affects only three or four persons is am clearly of opinion that in this case it
a private and not a public nuisance. The was so conducted as to be a nuisance at
King v. Lloyd, 4 Esp. 200. The term common law, and that the defendant
"nuisance" is well understood, and means would not have been and is not entitled to
literally annoyance, — anything that work. any compensation.” It was in this case
eth hurt. The King v. White, 1 Burr. proved that smells proceeded from the
333; The King v. Davey, 5 Esp. 217; slaughter-house which were a great nuisance
Burditt v. Swenson, 17 Tex. 489.
to persous passing along the public high-
Offensive Trades and Occupations. It way. If a certain noxious trade is already
is not necessary, to constitute a nuisance, to established in a place remote from habita-
show that the smell, &c., produced should tion and public roads, and persons after-
be unwholesome. It is enough if it
, ren- wards come and build houses within reach
ders the enjoyment of life and property un- of its noxious effects, or if a public road
comfortable. Per Lord Mansfield, in The be made so near to it that the carrying on
King 2. White et al., 1 Burr. 337; The of the trade becomes a nuisance to the
King v. Neil, 2 C. & P. 485; St. Helen's persons using the road, in those cases the
Chemical Co. v. Corporation of St. Hel. party would be entitled to continue his
en's, L. R. 1 Ex. Div. 196. “If there trade, because his trade was legal before
he smells offensive to the senses, that is the erection of the houses in the one case,
enough, as the neighborhood has a right and the making of the road in the other.
to fresh and pure air. Per Abbott, C. J., Per Abbott, C. J., in The King v. Cross,
The King v. Neil, 2 C. & P. 485. “The 2 C. & P. 484. But quære ; and see cases
only question therefore is, Is the business supra.
But if the man so situated in.
(slaughter-house), as carried on by the crease the nuisance by the manner or ex-
defendant, productive of smells to persons tent to which he carries on the trade he is
passing along the public highway ?" Ib. liable to indictment. The King v. Watts,
A by-law providing “that no person shall M. & M. 281 ; The King v. Neville, 1
keep a slaughter-house within the city Peake, 92. In countries, however, where
without a special resolution of the coun- great works are carried on, which are the
cil” was held bad, tending to create a means of developing national wealth, per-
monopoly. Nash v. McCracken, In re, 33 sons must not stand on extreme rights.
Upper Can. Q. B. 181. So a by-law im- Bamford v. Turnley, 3 B. & S. 62–66; Tipp-
posing a fine upon every person “who ing v. St. Helen's Smelting Co., 4 B. & S.
shall keep or suffer to be kept, any swine 608; 8. C. 11 H. L. C. 642; Gaunt v.
!
$ 374 ORDINANCES : POWER TO PREVENT AND ABATE NUISANCES. 447
menced summary proceeding to remove a private wharf, an eminent
judge uses this language : “ But the mere declaration by the city
Fynney, L. R. 8 Ch. Ap. 8; Harrison v. the case will lie for the continuance of a
Good, L. R. 11 Eq. 338 ; Salvin 2. North nuisance after recovery for its erection.
Brancepeth Coal Co., L. R. 9 Ch. Ap. 705; Rosewell v. Prior, 2 Salk. 460. Though
Ball v. Ray, L. R. 8 Ch. Ap. 467 ; Broder an indictment for a nuisance is in form a
v. Saillard, L. R. 2 Ch. Div. 692; Harr. criminal, it is in substance a civil pro-
Munic. Man. 5th ed. 397.
ceeding remedial in its object. The King
But a private individual cannot justify v. Sadler, 4 C. & P. 218; Holmes v. Wil-
damaging the property of another ou the son, 10 A. & E. 503 ; Douglas, In re, 3 Q.
ground that it is a public nuisance, unless B. 825 ; Thompson v. Gibson, 7 M. & W.
it do him a special and particular injury. 456 ; The Queen v. Chorley, 12 Q. B. 515 ;
Dimes v. Petley, 15 Q. B. 276 ; Arnold v. The King v. Russell, 3 E. & B. 912;
Holbrook, L. R. 8 Q. B. 96; The Mayor, The Queen v. Loughton, 3 Smith, 575;
&c. of Scarborough v. Rural Sanitary The Queen v. Lincombe, 2 Chit. 214.
Authority of Scarborough, L. R. 1 Ex. Upon an indictment for a continuing
Div. 344; Price v. Grantz, 118 Pa. St. nuisance — such as a wall across a high-
402. A distinction must be drawn be- way — the proper judgment is, that it be
tween a house which is a nuisance per se, abated (The King v. Stead, 8 T. R. 142;
and one that is only a nuisance by reason The King v. Yorkshire, 7 T. R. 467), and
of its use or abuse. In the latter case when the court is satisfied before judg.
there is no legal right to destroy the prop- ment that a nuisance has been abated,
erty. In several parts of England public the judgment need not be pronounced.
slaughter-houses are established, under a The King v. Incledon, 13 East, 164; The
provision that "no person shall slaughter Queen v. Paget, 3 F. & F. 29. The prac-
any cattle or dress any carcass for sale as tice followed is to respite judgment until
food for man in any place within the it be seen whether or not the nuisance is
limits other than a slaughter-house. It abated, and, if not, to inflict a heavy fine
was held that the enactment only applied to compel the abatement. There may be
to the slanghtering of beasts intended by an indictment for the continuance of a
the person slaughtering the same for sale nuisance (The Queen v. Maybury, 4 F.
for human food. Elias v. Nightingale, 8 & F. 90), and in such a case the former
E. & B. 698; see further, Anthony v. The judgment is conclusive that the locus in
Brecon Markets Co., L. R. 2 Ex. 167 ; re- quo was a highway, and that the erection
versed, L. R. 7 Ex. 399. An indictment upon it was a nuisance.
This being so,
wil lie for a public nuisance, but not for upon proof of the continuance of the nui-
a private nuisance. The King v. Atkins, sance the jury must find the defendant
3 Burr. 1706. That which is not of pub- guilty. See further, Regina v. Jackson,
lic concern is a mere civil injury. The 40 Upper Can. Q. B. 290.
King v. Storr, 3 Burr. 1698; The King v. As to the right of an adjoining owner
Johnson, 1 Wils. 325. The non-repair of to recover damages for a private injury
a private road, even by a public body, is resulting from a public nuisance in a public
not indictable. The King v. Richards, 8 highway, where there is a direct and par-
T. R. 634 ; The King v. Trafford, 1 B. & ticular damage, such as that arising from
Ad. 874. The writ quod permittat lay at unreasonable obstruction to the access to
common law to prostrate a public nui- his premises from the highway. Fritz v.
sance (Palmer v. Poultney, 2 Salk. 458), Hobson, 19 Am. Law Reg. 615 (1880),
and after judgment on an indictment for and note ; Bushnell v. Robeson, 62 Iowa,
a nuisance, a writ of prostration may 540 ; (Slaughter-house) Irwin v. Telephone
still be issued. The King v. Newdigate, Co., 37 La. An. 63 ; McDonald v. Newark,
Comb. 10; Houghton's Case, Sir T. Boyd, 42 N. J. Eq. (15 Stew.) 136. A dense
215 ; Vin. Abr. “Nuisance," A; Ib. “Che- smoke which is detrimental to certain
min," Fitz. Nat. Brev. 124 ; The Queen classes of property and business and is a
v. Haynes, 7 Ir. L. R. 2. An action on personal annoyance to the public at large
148
§ 374
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
an
council that a certain structure was an encroachment or obstruction
did not make it so, nor could such declaration make it a nuisance
unless it in fact had that character. It is a doctrine not to be
tolerated in this country that a municipal corporation, without any
general laws either of the city or of the State within which a given
structure can be shown to be a nuisance, can, by the mere declara-
is a public nuisance whether declared so 184. So, by means of powder, working
by ordinance or not. Harmon v. Chicago, stone quarries near the public streets and
110 111. 400; see cases below cited.
dwelling-houses. The Queen v. Mutters,
Ringing of bells, blowing of horns, and 10 Cox, 6; Harr. Munic. Man. 5th ed.
other unusual noises, are treated as nui- 401, 402.
sances. They may or may not be nui- A corporation has no more right to
sances according to circumstances. It is license or maintain a nuisance than an indi-
in the power, however, of the corporation vidual would have, and for a nuisance
at any time to treat all such, when in maintained upon its property the same
streets and public places, as nuisances, liability attaches against a city as to an
and prevent them. It is difficult to de- individual. Haag v. Co. Comm’rs, 60 Ind.
.scribe, though easy to imagine, such" 511; Petersburg v. Applegarth, 28 Gratt.
unusual noise" as would be a nuisance. 321 ; Brayton v. Fall River, 113 Mass.
Some examples may, however, be given. 218; Franklin Wharf Co. v. Portland,
The noise of a tinsmith in carrying on 67 Me. 46 ; Harper v. Milwaukee, 30 Wis.
his trade, if in a neighborhood where 365; Hannibal v. Richards, 82 Mo. 330 ;
there is a number of offices, and of suffi- Wood on Nuisances, sec. 742. Infra, sec.
cient volume to prevent the occupants 375, note. A city was held liable for crect-
from following their lawful business, will, ing a pest-house whereby plaintiff's prem-
if it affect a considerable number of in- ises became unliealthful and infected with
habitants, be deemed a public nuisance. the same disease, and the occupancy ren-
The King v. Lloyd, 4 Esp. 200.
dered unsafe and unpleasant. Niblett v.
A circus, the performances in which Nashville, 12 Heisk. 684. May pass ordi-
were to be carried on for eight weeks nances to prevent as well as to remove
near the plaintiff's house, and the per- nuisances. Gregory v. New York, 40
forinances, which took place every even- N. Y. 273 ; see Wood on Nuisances, secs.
ing, lasted from about half-past seven till 740, 741, and cases cited. A city held to
half-past ten o'clock. The noise of the have no power to destroy a dam across a
music and shouting in the circus could be creek within its limits as a nuisance.
distinctly heard all over the house, and Clark v. Mayor, &c. of Syracuse, 13 Barb.
was so loud that it could be heard above (N. Y.) 32. Abatement by individuals
the conversation in the dining-room, and by public officers. Manhattan Manuf.
though the windows and shutters were & Fert. Co. v. Van Keuren, 23 N. J.
closed. This was held to be a nuisance. Eq. 251; Meeker v. Van Rensselaer, 15
Inchbald v. Robinson, L. R. 4 Ch. App. Wend. (N. Y.) 397. Destruction of build-
388. If a man builds a rolling-will close ing by mob. Brightman v. Bristol, 65
to inhabited cottages, so that the vibra. Me. 426 ; s. C. 20 Am. Rep. 711. Under
tion produced by the hammers cracks the the laws of New York establishing boards
walls of the cottages, and the noise of the of health, while the board of health of a
mill causes them to become and remain town cannot go outside of its own boun.
uninhabited, the rolling-mill will be a daries to abate a nuisance summarily, it
nuisance. Scott v. Firth, 4 F. & F. 349 ; may restrain the violation of its order and
S. C. 10 L. T. N. S. 240.
enforce abatement, though the cause of
A shooting ground near a public high- the nuisance arises in an adjoining mu-
way, where persons come to shoot with nicipality. Gould v. Rochester, 105 N. Y.
rifles at pigeons, targets, &c., may be a 46.
nuisance. The King v. Moore, 3 B. & Ad.
§ 374 ORDINANCES : POWER TO PREVENT AND ABATE NUISANCES. 449
tion that it is one, subject it to removal by any person supposed to
be aggrieved, or even by the city itself. This would place every
house, every business, and all the property in the city, at the uncon-
trolled will of the temporary local authorities.” 1
1 Per Miller, J., Yates v. Milwaukee, 406 ; Coker v. Birge, 10 Ga. 336. A tan-
10 Wall. 497 (1870); Pieri v. Shieldsboro, nery is not, per se, a nuisance. State v.
42 Miss. 493; Underwood v. Green, 42 Cadwalader, 7 Vroom (36 N. J. L.), 283.
N. Y. 140; Darst v. People, 62 Ill. 306 Brick-making : Wanstead, &c. v. Hill, 13
(1869); Miller 2. Burch, 32 Tex. 208 C. B. (N. s.) 479. Slaughter-house : Du-
(1869); Everett v. Council Bluffs, 46 Iowa, bois v. Budlong, 10 Bosw. (N. Y.) 700 ;
66 (1877), approving Yates v. Milwaukee; Atty.-General v. Steward (5 C. E. Green),
Pye v. Peterson, 45 Tex. 312 (1876); S. C. 20 N. J. Eq. 415 ; Villavaso v. Barthet,
23 Am. Rep. 608, approving Yates v. 39 La. An. 247; see cases in this note
Milwaukee. Çole v. Kezler, 64 Iowa, 59; supro.. Powder-house, with large quanti-
Everett v. Marquette, 53 Mich. 450 (a ties of powder therein, located in a city, is a
staircase in a sidewalk is not a nuisance nuisance.
nuisance. Cheatham v. Shearon, 1 Swan
per se); St. Paul v. Gilfillan, 36 Minn. (Tenn.), 213, 216 ; Dumesnil v. Dupont,
298 (dense smoke not a nuisance per se); 18 B. Mon. (Ky.) 800. The manufactur-
Joyce v. Woods, 78 Ky. 386 ; Green v. ing and keeping large quantities of gun-
Lake, 60 Miss. 451; McCrowell v. Bristol, powder in towns or closely inhabited
5 Lea (Tenn.), 685 ; Ison v. Manley, 76 places is an indictable offence at common
Ga. 804. A person sick, even with con. law. Rex v. Williams, 1 Russ. on Cr. * 439;
tagious disease, in his own house or at a The King v. Taylor, 2 Str. 1167; Crowder
hotel, is not a nuisance. Boom v. Utica, v. Tinkler, 19 Ves. 617. Planing mill:
2 Barb. (N. Y.) 104 (1848).
Rhodes v. Duubar, 57 Pa. St. 274 ; Dun-
Works that amount to a private nui- can v. Hayes, 22 N. J. Eq. 25 (1871).
sance, causing actual damage to private As to gas-works : Cleveland v. Cit. Gasl.
persons, cannot be justified, under a license Co., 20 N. J. Eq. 201. Steam flouring
from the city council to erect them. But mill: Gilbert v. Showerman, 23 Mich.
the fact of such license is evidence of great 448. Stock-yards : Ib. 296 ; Ashbrook v.
but not conclusive weight in favor of the Commonwealth, 1 Bush (Ky.), 139. Porgy
party erecting and owning the works claimed oil factory : Brightman v. Bristol, 65 Me.
to be a nuisance. Ryan v. Copes, 11 Rich. 426 (1876); S. C. 20 Am. Rep. 711. Privies:
(S. C.) Law, 217 (1858) A piy-sty in Wahle v. Reinbach, 76 Ill. 322.
Gas com-
a populous place is, per se, a nuisance. panies : Cleveland v. Citizens' Gasl. Co., 5
Com'lth v. Van Sickle, Bright. (Pa.) 69. C. E. Green (20 N. J. Eq.), 203. Potteries:
Livery stable in a town is not, per se, a Ross v. Butler, 19 N. J. Eq. 294. Glass
nuisance, it depends upon its location and and broken-ware in public place. Ex parte
the manner in which it is built, kept, or Casinello, 62 Cal. 538. Smoke and noxious
used. Aldrich v. Howard, 7 R. I. 87; vapors caused by burning, under public
8. C. 8 R. I. 246; Burditt v. Swenson, 17 Authority, clothing, bedding, &c., to pre-
Tex. 489 (1856); Morris v. Brower, An- vent the spread of contagious diseases is
thon's N. P. (N. Y.) 368; Flint v. Russell, not an indictable nuisance. State v. Knox-
5 Dillon C. C. R. 151 (1879); Harrison v. ville, 12 Lea, 146. Coasting on a public
Brooks, 20 Ga. 537 (1856); Wood on street held not necessarily a nuisance.
Nuisances, secs. 528, 529; Pickard v. Burford v. Grand Rapids, 53 Mich. 98;
Collins, 23 Barb. (N. Y.) 444 ; Shiras v. see post, chap. on Streets. A wooden awn-
Olinger, 50 Iowa, 571; 20 Alb. L. J. 56. ing over a side-walk is not a nuisance per se.
Nor is a liberty pole a nuisance per se. Hawkins v. Sanders, 45 Mich. 491; see
Allegheny v. Zimmerman, 10 Pitts. Leg. Index, tit. Awning. Whether a particular
Jour. 168 ; s. C. 95 Pa. St. 287 ; Dargan lime kiln is & nuisance or not is a mixed
V. Waddell, 9 Ire. (N. C. Law) 244 ; question of law and of fact. State v. Mott,
Kirkman v. Handy, 11 Humph. (Tenn.) 61 Mil. 297. A market-cart in a street held
29
VOL. I.
450
§ 375
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
§ 375 (309). General Power over Nuisances. Power to muni-
cipal corporations to make “by-laws relative to nuisances generally"
has been decided to authorize an ordinance prohibiting the keeping,
in any manner whatsoever, of a bowling-alley for gain or hire, such
a place being a public nuisance'at common law. So under power
not a nuisance per se.. State v. Edens, 85 to interfere with the municipal authori-
N. C. 522. A wooden building in a city ties in removing nuisances. Ferguson v.
is not a nuisance per se, but may become Selma, 43 Ala. 398 (1869).
so by the way in which it is used. Fields Under the English Municipal Corpora.
v. Stokley, 99 Pa. St. 306. Dead animals tions Act the council of any borough is
are not nuisances per se, but may become empowered to make by-laws for the good
such. River Rendering Co. v. Behr, 77 rule and government of the borough, and
Mo. 91 ; Underwood v. Green, 42 N. Y. the prevention and suppression of nuisances
140. Flouring Mill: Under the power to (ante, sec. 337); and it is held that this
prevent nuisances and dangerous manufac- power respecting the suppression of nui-
tories, a municipal corporation cannot, on sances is confined to the suppression and
petition of citizens, deal with a flouring prohibition of acts which, if done, must
mill as a nuisance, unless it is shown by necessarily and inevitably cause a nuisance,
the record to fall within some law or ordi- and it does not empower the council to
nance previously passed. Lake v. Aber. impose penalties for the doing of things
deen, 57 Miss. 260. In Louisiana, where which may or may not be a nuisance ac-
the civil code (art. 655) provides that cording to circumstances. Thus, where
works, &c., causing annoyance "shall be the town council imposed a fine upon every
regulated by the rules of the police or the person who should " keep or suffer to be
customs of the place” where located, an kept any swine within the borough be-
ordinance of a city council ordering a black tween the first of May and the first of
smith shop to be closed as a nuisance is October," it was held that the by-law was
authorized by law, and may be carried into wholly invalid, as the keeping of a pig did
effect by an injunction, procured by the not necessarily create a nuisance. Addi-
city in its corporate name, restraining the son on Torts, 34, citing Everett v. Grapes,
owner from continuing the shop. New 3 Law T. R. N. S. Q. B. 669; Wanstead
Orleans v. Lambert, 14 La. An. 247 (1859). Local Board v. Hill, 13 C. B. N. S. 479.
Power of municipal corporations to re- 1 Tanner v. Albion, 5 Hill (N. Y.), 121
move nuisances, and how far their decision (1843); followed, Updike v. Campbell, 4
as to fact of nuisance is conclusive. Welch E. D. Smith (N. Y.), 570 (1855); The Peo-
v. Stowell, 2 Doug. (Mich.) 332 ; Ken ple v. Sergeant, 8 Cow. (N. Y.) 139, which
nedy v. Board of Health, 2 Pa. St. 366; held that a room kept for the playing of
Com'lth v. Van Sickle, Bright. (Pa.) 69; billiards was not a public nuisance, though
Green v. Savannah, 6 Ga. 1; Roberts v. a profit was made of it, commented on and
Ogle, 30 Ill. 459 ; Clark v. Mayor, &c., 13 distinguished, and by Cowen, J., doubted,
Barb. (N. Y.) 32 ; Saltonstall v. Banker,
in 5 Hill, supra.
A power to suppress
8 Gray (Mass.), 195; Kennedy v. Phelps, and restrain" gaming held to grant power
10 La. An. 227 ; Green v. Underwood, 42 to license billiard playing. In re Snell,
N. Y. 140 ; Mayor of Hudson v. Thorne, 58 Vt. 207. Whether a ball alley could
7 Paige (N. Y.), 261; Salem v. Eastern be prohibited under the general authority
R. Co., 98 Mass. 431 ; Chicago v. Laflin, to pass by-laws relative to good goveru-
49 Ill. 172 ; Babcock v. Buffalo, 56 N. Y. ment, &c., was alluded to, but not deter-
268; Darst v. People (intoxicating liquors), mined. See Jackson v. People, 9 Mich.
51 Ill
. 286 (1869). The power of munici- 111; Smith v. Madison, 7 Ind. 86. In
cipal corporations, with respect to nui. The State v. Hall, 32 N. J. 158 (1867), it
sances, is treated in the chapter xxii. of was held that a ten-pin alley kept for gain
Mr. Wood's work on the Law of Nuisances. and public use in a town is not, per se, a
Instance of refusal hy a court of chancery nuisance. The law on the subject is very
!
§ 375
451
ORDINANCES: GENERAL POWER OVER NUISANCES.
to pass by-laws to prevent and remove nuisances, an ordinance may
be passed inflicting a fine on any person who should exhibit a stud-
horse in the streets of the corporation.1
fully examined in the opinion of Beasley 1 Nolin v. Franklin, 4 Yerger, 163
C. J., and the case of Tanner v. Albion, (1833). Under power " to prevent and
supra, reviewed and disapproved. Where remove nuisances,” a corporation may, if
a city bas, by its charter, the power to de- a vacant building is so used as to endanger
termine whether bowling alleys should be by fire the property of others, or the health
allowed, and, if so, under what restric- of the community, declare the same a nui-
tions, an ordinance requiring them to be sance, and notify owner to abate it, and
closed at a certain hour is valid. State v. if he fails, the individual officer of the cor-
Hay, 29 Me. (15 Shep.) 457 (1849); State poration who abates the nuisance may,
v. Freeman, 38 N. H. 426; supra, sec. 368, on being individually sued, justify the act.
note. A statute of Missouri designed to Harvey v. Dewoody, 18 Ark. 252 (1856).
suppress gambling in St. Louis authorized Where a city council has authority
the police to seize gaming tables and gam- under its charter to prevent and remove
ing devices used for gambling, and made it all nuisances within the city,
- such as all
the duty of the president of the police to decayed and dilapidated houses and struc-
cause the same to be publicly destroyed. tures calculated to produce disease of any
This could be done without notice to the kind, or unfit for use or habitation," &c., il
owner or any semblance of judicial inves- court of chancery will not interfere to pre-
tigation. The statute was declared un- vent the removal of such nuisance unless
constitutional as depriving the owner of it appears that the complainant's right is
such gambling tables, &c., of his property illegally assailed, or threatened with an
without due process of law. Lowry v. irreparable injury, and there is no suf-
Rainwater, 70 Mo. 152 (1879); S. C. 35 ficient remedy at law. Ferguson V.
Am. Rep. 420 (1879); 21 Alb. Law Jour. Selma, 43 Ala. 398 (1869). In this case
72; Fisher v. McGirr, 1 Gray (Mass.), 1; the court denied an injunction to prevent
Hibbard v. People, 4 Mich. 126; Lincoln the removal by the city authorities of two
v. Smith, 27 Vt. 354. Under authority old, dilapidated, substantially valueless
to pass such ordinances as the council houses, on a lot in an improving and
may consider fit and proper to remove flourishing part of the city, which were
nuisances or causes of disease," &c., it was filthy, and crowded with filthy tenants,
held that the city of Savannah might and which had also been condemned as a
prohibit the growing of rice within the cor- nuisance by the board of health of the
porate limits, as being injurious to the city. Ib.; infra, secs. 377, 405, note.
health of the city, and abate the same, But a city under a charter authorizing the
and that such an ordinance was valid as a common council "to regulate all wharves
police regulation. Green v. Savannah, on the shore of the Ohio River adjoining
6 Ga. 1 (1849). City held to have no said city," cannot by ordinance define the
power to license a keno table to be kept for line of high-water mark, and declare the
gaming. Schuster v. State, 48 Ala. 199 erection of buildings below said line a
(1872). Where proceedings in respect to nuisance, and impose a fine upon persons
nuisances are instituted by order of the erecting such buildings on their own
city council, chancery will not enjoin or lands. Evansville v. Martin, 41 Ind. 145
interfere, “ unless the municipal corpora. (1872). In Nevada v. Hutchins, 59 Iowa,
tion have clearly transcended their pow. 506, it was held that, under a power to
ers." Kennedy v. Phelps. 10 La. An. abate nuisances, an incorporated town is
227 (1855) (building for curing hides); not authorized to pass an ordinance im-
8. P. Milne . Davidson (private hospital), posing a fine for maintaining a nuisance;
5 Mar. (La.) 586 (1827); Potter v. Me- but quaere.
nasha, 30 Wis. 492 (1872); post, sec. 405, If a sewer is declared to be a private
note.
nuisance to property, the owner is entitled
os
452
§ 376
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
Power “to sup-
§ 376 (310). Suppression of Houses of Ill-fame.
press bawdy-houses” gives the corporation authority, by implication,
to adopt by ordinance the proper means to accomplish the end;
and among the methods which may be adopted is one forbidding
the owners of houses from renting or letting the same for this pur-
pose or with knowledge that they are to be thus used." But power
to the common council of a city “to make all such by-laws as it
may deem expedient for effectually preventing and suppressing
houses of ill-fame," does not authorize the council to decide that
a given house is kept for that purpose, nor, if kept for that pur-
pose, does it authorize the council to order it to be demolished; nor
if thus demolished, will it justify the officers of the city who did it,
in execution of the ordinance and resolution of the council.2 Neither
to an injunction against the city as he 297; Shaffer v. Mumma, 17 Md. 331 (1861).
would be against a private individual; In prosecutions for keeping bawdy-houses,
but a court in granting such injunction the law, it has been said, so far relaxes the
will postpone its operation a reasonable ordinary rule that common reputation as
time in order to enable the city to take to the character of the defendants, and of
adequate measures to remove the nuisance the houses which they keep, is admissible.
without unnecessary injury to the public State 2. McDowell, Dudley (S. C.), Law,
health and interests. Haskell v. New 346. A power to “repress and restrain
Bedford, 108 Mass. 208; Boston Rolling disorderly houses " held to confer power
Mills v. Cambridge, 117 Mass. 396 ; At- to make it penal to visit such houses.
torney-General v. Birmingham, 4 K. & J. State v. Botkin, 71 Iowa, 87; 8. P. Re
528 ; Spokes v. Banbury, L. R. 1 Eq. 42; Johnson, 73 Cal. 228 (1887). A power to
Goldsmid v. Tunbridge, L. R. 1 Eq. 161 ; "license, regulate, and suppress” includes
Attorney-General v. Bradford, L. R. 2 Eq. power to prevent soliciting for bawdy.
71 ; Attorney-General v. Colney, &c., L. R. house, &c. Thomas v. Hot Springs, 34
4 Ch. 146 ; Breed v. Lynn, 126 Mass. 367; Ark. 553. Keeping house of ill-fame,
supra, sec. 374, note.
what ? Queen v. Rice, L. R. 1 C. C. 21.
1 Childress v. Mayor, &c., 3 Sneed Sufficient to charge that the defendant did
(Tenn.), 347 (1855); Shreveport v. Roos, on, &c., in the city of, &c., keep a com-
35 La. An. 1010. The legislature may mon disorderly bawdy-house on a specified
confer exclusive power upon a city to pro- street in said city, as a place of resort for
hibit and suppress bawdy-houses ; in such both men and women of lewd character.
case the general State law upon the sub- Queen v. Munro, 24 Upper Can. Q. B. 44;
ject was held to be superseded by an ordi- Queen v. Levecque, 30 Upper Can. Q. B.
nance passed to enforce the power. Rogers 509; Queen v. Smith, 35 Upper Can. Q. B.
v. The People, 9 Col. 450 (quacre); suprll, 518; Harr. Mun. Man. 5th ed. 395.
sec. 366; post, secs. 396, note, 432–436 and An ordinance to prevent the keeping of
notes. Construction of power “to regu- bawdy-houses held to be clearly within a
late or suppress bawdy-houses." State v. charter authority to adopt by-laws “for
Clarke, 54 Mo. 17 (1873); State v. De Bar, preserving peace, order, and good govern-
58 Mo. 395 (1874); commented on, ante, ment." State v. Williams, 11 S. C. 288.
sec. 87, note; post, sec. 436. Power to make 2 Welch v. Stowell, 2 Doug. (Mich.)
by-laws relative to nuisances gives authori- 332 (1846). In England municipal corpo-
ty to impose penalties on the keepers of rations have the power to prevent indecent
houses of ill-fame, and on persons owning public exposure of the person and other inde-
houses used, with their knowledge, for this cent exhibitions. In order to render a per-
purpose. McAlister v. Clark, 33 Conn. 91 son liable to an indictment for indecently
(1865); see Ely v. Supervisors, 36 N. Y. exposing his person in a public place, it is
.
§ 378
453
ORDINANCES : NUISANCES ; INDICTMENT.
1
does such a power authorize an ordinance making it a misdemeanor
for a prostitute to reside or be found within the corporate limits,
nor to return to a city.?
A city
§ 377 (311). Nuisances upon Rivers within City Limits.
charged by law with the duty of preventing obstructions of a river
within its limits may, by its own act, and without proceeding by
indictment, abate or remove anything which obstructs the free and
public use of the river, such as a floating storehouse, calculated to re-
main stationary in the water, and which exclusively occupies a por-
tion of the river, such a structure being a public nuisance. It is
no answer to this right of abatement that room enough is left for the
public, or that the structure is beneficial, or that the party erect-
ing it is the owner of the adjacent lots.
§ 378 (312). Power to demolish; Indictment. — But under the
power to abate nuisances, property lawfully erected and existing, or a
house which is only a nuisance because occupied by a business which
is such, cannot be destroyed or demolished. The public can proceed by
indictment, or the business carried on in the house be suppressed.
not necessary that the exposure should be 248. Keeping a booth in a public place
made in a place open to the public. The containing an indecent exhibition for hire,
Queen v. Thallman, 9 Cox C. C. 388; S. C. is an indictable offence. Regina v. Saund-
9 L. T. N. S. 425. If the act is done where ers, L. R. 1 Q. B. Div. 15; Harr. Munic.
a great number of persons may be offend. Manual, 5th ed. 394, 397.
ed by it, and several see it, it is sufficient. i Buell v. State, 45 Ark. 336.
Ib. If the indictment, however, charge 2 Paralee v. Camden, 49 Ark. 165.
the offence to have been committed on a 8 Hart v. Mayor, &c. of Albany, 9
highway, such an indictment will not be Wend. (N. Y.) 571 (1832), a valuable
sustained by evidence that the offence was and very carefully considered case, affirm-
committed in a place near the highway, ing s. c. 3 Paige (N. Y.), Ch. 213 ;
Peo-
though in full view of it. The Queen v.
The Queen v. ple v. Vanderbilt, 28 N. Y. 396. See
Farrell, 9 Cox C. C. 446. An indecent Dutton v. Strong, 1 Black, 23.
The cor-
exposure in a place of public resort, if ac- porate body may abate or remove the pui-
tually seen by only one person, no other sance ; but without express authority can-
person being in a position to see it, is not ordain a forfeiture of the structure, or
not an indictable offence. The Queen v. seize and sell it, or convert the materials
Webb, 1 Den. C. C. 338 ; The Queen v. to their own use. Hart v. Mayor, 9 Wend.
Watson, 2 Cox C. C. 376; The Queen (N. Y.) 571, 609, supra; Compton v. Waco
v. Farrell, 9 Cox C. C. 446. A party was Bridge Co., 62 Tex. 715.
indicted for an indecent exposure in an 4 Ib.; Respublica v. Caldwell, 1 Dal.
oinnibus, several passengers being therein. 150 ; King v. Russell, 6 East, 427 ; King
Held, a public place. The Queen v. v. Cross, 3 Camp. 224 ; King v. Jones, 3
Holmes, 3 C. & K. 360. But a urinal, Camp. 229.
with boxes or divisions for the conven- 5 Hart v. Mayor, &c., 9 Wend. (N. Y.)
ience of the public, though situated in an 571, 608 ; Strange R. 1247 ; 3 Bac. Abr.
open market, was held not to be a public 686 ; 1 Hawk. P. C. 363, note 1.
place within the meaning of the allega- 6 Clark v. Syracuse, 13 Barb. (N. Y.)
tion. The Queen v. Orchard, 3 Cox C. C. 32; Welch v. Stowell, 2 Doug. (Mich.)
454
$ 379
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
A
$ 379. Extent of Authority over Nuisances. Finally, it may be
remarked that the extent of municipal authority over nuisances de-
pends, of course, upon the powers conferred in this regard upon the
municipality. They may be general or specific, or both. The au-
thority to preserve the health and safety of the inhabitants and their
property, as well as the authority to prevent and abate nuisances, is
a sufficient foundation for ordinances to suppress and prohibit what-
ever is intrinsically and inevitably a nuisance. The authority to
declare what is a nuisance is somewhat broader; but neither this nor
the general authority mentioned in the last preceding sentence will
justify the declaring of acts, avocations, or structures not injurious
332 (1846); Miller v. Burch, 32 Tex. 208 person for keeping a nuisance, which can.
(1869); s. C. 5 Am. Rep. 242. A license not be lawfully done. Kennedy 1. Phelps,
from a board of health to carry on a man- 10 La. An. 227 (1855). See Commons
ufactory of fertilizers cannot be urged as wealth v. Goodrich, 13 Allen (Mass.),
a defence to an indictment for creating a 545; Municipality v. Blineau, 3 La. An.
public nuisance by the process of manu- 688. The power to abate nuisances must
facturing. Garrett v. State, 49 N. J. L. be reasonably exercised, so as to do the
94.
least practicable injury to private rights.
When equity will interfere to prevent State v. Newark, 5 Vroom (38 N. J. L.),
and remove nuisances which affect the pub- 264 ; Wood on Nuisances, sec. 741. Power
lic generally. People v. St. Louis, 5 Gilm. to suppress gambling-houses does not, it is
(10 Ill.) 372; Hoole v. Attorney-General, apprehended, authorize the corporation to
22 Ala. 190 ; Attorney-General v. Gas Co., demolish the houses so used. All com-
19 Eng. Law & Eq. 639; Aldrich v. How- mon gaming-honses are nuisances in the
ard, 7 R. I. 87; Zabriskie v. Jersey City eye of the law, being detrimental to the
& B. R., 13 N. J. Eq. 314 ; Jersey City v. public, as they promote cheating and
Hudson, Ib. 420; Attorney-General v. other corrupt practices, and entice num-
Brown, 9 C. E. Green (24 N. J. Eq.), 89; bers of persons to idleness, whose time
Moore v. Walla Walla, 2 Wash. Ter. 184; might be otherwise employed for the good
Metropolitan City Ry. Co. v. Chicago, 96 of the community. 1 Hawk. P. C. cap.
Ill. 620 ; Wood on Nuisances, chap. xxv.; 32, s. 4; Bosley v. Davies, L. R. 1 Q. B.
Dumesnil v. Dupont, 18 B. Mon. (Ky.) Div. 84; Brodie & Bowinanville, 38 Upper
800 (1857). “It is now well settled that, Can. Q. B. 580 ; Harrison Munic. Manual,
in addition to the purely legal remedies, 5th ed. 396. As to liability of a city au-
which may be resorted to in such cases, thorized to abate nuisances for failure to
courts of equity will take jurisdiction of exercise the power. Kiley v. Kansas, 69 Mo.
such public nuisances, and, in proper 102; Parker v. Macon City, 39 Ga. 729 ;
cases, afford relief by injunction, especially Bassett v. St. Joseph, 53 Mo. 290 ; Cain v.
where the nuisance threatened or com- Syracuse, 95 N. Y. 83. Post, chap. xxiii.
mitted is of a nature to be permanent or con- Where a municipal corporation does an
tinuous.” Dickinson, J., Stearns County act, lawful in itself, in such a manner as
v. St. Cloud, M. & A. R. Co., 36 Minn. to create a nuisance, it is liable in the
425 ; see post, sec. 405, note; Index, title same manner that an individual would be.
Injunction. A city council may, by reso- Judge v. Meriden, 38 Conn. 90 (1871);
lution, direct its officers to proceed against Railroad Co. 1. Norwalk, 37 Conn. 109;
a specified establishment as a nuisance, Mooty v. Danbury, 45 Conn. 550 (1878).
and cause the same to be abated under a More fully, post, chap. xxiii.
general ordinance of the corporation ; this 1 Ante, secs. 141, 144, 369 et seq., 374;
is a different thing from passing an ordi- post, sec. 396, and note.
nance inflicting a fine upon a particular
§ 380
455
ORDINANCES : ESTABLISHMENT OF MARKETS.
to health or property to be nuisances. Much must necessarily be
left to the discretion of the municipal authorities, and their acts will
not be judicially interfered with unless they are manifestly unrea-
sonable and oppressive, or unwarrantably invade private rights, or
clearly transcend the powers granted to them ;2 in which case the con-
templated action may be prevented or the injuries caused, redressed
by appropriate suit or proceedings. As there is in such cases a
judicial remedy in favor of the citizen, so on principle the right of
the corporate authorities to resort at their election to the courts in
proper cases, to aid them when the citizen is in the wrong, should, in
the author's judgment, be also recognized. 3 It is not unusual to
invest the municipal council with special authority in respect of par-
ticular avocations, trades, acts, omissions, and structures, with a view
to conserve the public health and safety, of which many examples
have been given in the notes to this chapter. The terms in which
such authority is conferred measure its scope, but in view of the
end for which it is given, it is not subjected to a hostile or even a
narrow construction.!
§ 380 (313). Markets, and of the Power to establish and regu-
late. — The States, under their police power, may delegate to muni-
cipal corporations the authority to establish, or authorize the establish-
ment of markets, and it is competent to such corporations, under
proper grants of power, to enact ordinances forbidding sales and
purchases of marketable articles, except at designated market-places.
The extent of the power possessed by a particular corporation de-
pends upon its charter. In England the regulation of markets by
by-laws has long been exercised, and such by-laws are sustained as
being reasonable, and conducive to the health and good government
of the municipality. In this country the practice is almost uni-
Supra, sec. 374, and uotes.
Corp. 166, as to exclusive privileges in
2 Ante, secs. 94, 95, 319, 320 et seq. England as to markets and market tolls.
3 Post, sec. 405, note. The principles Definition. A market is a franchise or
upon which courts of equity interfere by liberty derived from the crown, by grant,
injunction in the case of nuisances are or prescription which presupposes a grant.
clearly stated by Ld. Chancellor Brougham 2 Black. Com. 37. " It is a designated
in Earl of Ripon v. Hobart, 3 Mylne & place in a town or city to which all per-
Keen, 169, 179. See also Flint v. Rus- sons can repair who wish to buy or sell
sell, 5 Dillon, 151, where the authorities articles there exposed for sale." Per
are collated.
Breese, J., Caldwell v. Alton, 33 Ill. 416.
4 Post, sec. 396, and note.
Under the police power it is competent for
5 Pierce v. Bartram, Cowp. 270 ; Player the legislature to prohibit private markets
v. Jenkens, 1 Sid. 284 ; Rex 2. Cottrell, 1 within a reasonable designated distance of
B. & Ald. 67 (1817). See also Mosley v. the public market. New Orleans v. Staf-
Walker, 7 Barn. & Cr. 40; Macclesfield ford, 27 La. An. 417; s. C. 21 Am. Rep.
v. Pedley, 4 Barn. & Adol. 397 ; Grant on 563.
456
$ 381
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
versal on the part of the legislature to confer upon the municipal
agencies more or less authority with respect to markets and market-
places, and such grants are not so strictly construed as those which
invest the corporation with powers of a more extraordinary or un-
usual character; at least such is the case unless a monopoly in favor
of private individuals is sought to be sustained, against which the
courts strongly lean.1
has power
§ 381 (314). Power to Build and Establish. — Incorporated cities
and towns may have the power to build market-houses without an
express grant. Thus it has been held that a town having authority
to make by-laws for managing and ordering its prudential affairs'
the court looking somewhat to usage and custom to
ascertain what subjects of common interest are embraced under the
term "prudential” — to appropriate money for the erection of a
market-house, and to raise the amount by taxation. This power,
it was admitted, more clearly exists in the case of large towns and
populous villages.2
“A municipal market consists : 1. In a 407 ; Dubuque v. Miller, 11 Iowa, 583 ;
place for sale of provisions and articles of Morano v. New Orleans, 2 La. 217 ; St.
daily consumption. 2. Convenient fix- Paul v. Coulter, 12 Minn. 41 ; Atlanta v.
tures. 3. A system of police regulations, White, 33 Ga. 229.
fixing market bours, making provisions The power to , establish and regulate
for lighting, watching, cleaning, detect- markets, like most other municipal pow-
ing false weights and unwholesome food, ers, is a continuing one, and markets once
and other arrangements calculated to established may be abandoned or changed
facilitate the intercourse and ensure the at the pleasure of the corporation, and
honesty of buyer and seller. 4. Proper the taxpayers or property owners can-
officers, to preserve order and enforce not restrain the action or determination of
obedience to the rules.” Per Lane, C. J., the council entrusted by the charter with
Cincinnati v. Buckingham, 10 Ohio, 257 the exercise of the power. Gall v. Cincin-
(1840).
nati, 18 Ohio St. 563 (1869).
1 Wartman v. Philadelphia, 33 Pa. St. 2 Spaulding v. Lowell, 23 Pick. (Mass.)
202, 209 (1854); LeClaire v. Davenport, 71 (1839). If the real and principal ob-
13 Iowa, 210 ; White v. Kent, 11 Ohio St. ject is the building of a market-house, the
550 ; St. John v. Mayor, &c. of New York, appropriation of a portion of the building
6 Duer (N. Y.), 315; Ash v. People, 11 for other purposes, as the holding of courts,
Mich. 347 ; St. Louis v. Jackson, 25 Mo. does not render the erection of the build-
37 ; St. Louis v. Weber, 44 Mo. 547 ing illegal. If, however, the building of
(1869); Nightingale, In re, 11 Pick. the market-house is merely colorable, that
(Mass.) 168 ; Cougot v. New Orleans, 16 is, done for the purpose of accomplishing
La. An. 21 ; Buffalo v. Webster, 10 Wend. distinct and unauthorized objects, it would,
(N. Y.) 99; Yates v. Milwaukee, 12 Wis.. says Chief Justice Shaw, probably be
673 ; Bethune v. Hughes, 28 Ga. 560; treated as an abuse of power and a nullity.
distinguisb.ed, Badkins v. Robinson, 53 Ib. Power “to appoint market-places
Ga. 613 (1875); Ketchum v. Buffalo, 14 and to regulate the same" was held, in
N. Y. 356 ; Municipality v. Cutting, 4 La. connection with a general welfare clause,
An. 336 ; New Orleans v. Guillotte, 12 to authorize the corporation to build a
La. An. 818 (corporate partnership with market-house. Smith v. Newbern, 70
individuals) ; State v. Lieber, 11 Iowa, N. C. 14 (1874); 8. C. 16 Am. Rep. 766.
§ 383
457
ORDINANCES : POWERS RELATING TO MARKETS.
§ 382 (315). Power to Establish and Regulate. - Power conferred
upon a municipality " to establish and regulate markets," authorizes,
as a necessary incident, the purchase of ground upon which to erect
a market building. If the title to land purchased for the erection
of a market-house be taken by the municipal corporation in fee, no
length of use of the same for a market will dedicate it for market
purposes; and the markets may be abandoned or changed at the
will of the council, and the land thus acquired and held be sold.2
It is incident to the general power to build a market to determine
upon the form, dimensions, and style of the edifice, and therefore to
employ an architect to prepare plans, specifications, &c.3
§ 383 (316). Limitation of such Power. But power to a mu-
nicipal corporation to establish markets and build market-houses
will not give the authority to build them on a public street. Such
erections are nuisances though made by the corporation, because
the street, and the entire street, is for the use of the whole people.
They are nuisances when built upon the streets, although sufficient
space be left for the passage of vehicles and persous. Such erec-
tions may, it seems, be legalized by an express act of the legislature.
But unless so legalized, a nuisance erected and maintained by a
public corporation may be proceeded against, criminally or other-
wise, the same as if erected by private persons.
1 Ketchum v. Buffalo, 14 N. Y. 356; market established within the extended
17 N. Y. 449 ; Caldwell v. Alton, 33 Ill. limits. Mayor, &c. of Dorchester v. En-
416. It is immaterial whether this power sor, L. R. 4 Ex. 335.
But this is subject
is conferred in express or direct terms, or to the rights of any person owning prop-
given only as part of the power to make erty adjoining the site of the old market.
by-laws, ordinances, &c. Per Selden, J., Ellis v. The Corporation of Bridgnorth, 4
in Ketchum v. Buffalo, 14 N. Y. 356, L. T. N. s. 112 ; 2 Johns. & H. 67 ; 15
362. Purchase of land for market. Peo- C. B. N. s. 52; Harr. Munic. Manual,
,
ple v. Lowber, 28 Barb. (N. Y.) 65 ; S. C.
5th ed. 451 et seq.,
and cases.
more fully, 7 Abb. (N. Y.) Pr. 158 ; Gale 8 Peterson v. Mayor, &c. of New York,
v. Kalamazoo, 23 Mich. 344 (1871). 17 N. Y. 449 (1858). His unauthorized
2 Gall v. Cincinnati, 18 Ohio St. 563 ; employment by a committee is ratified by
Cooper v. Detroit, 42 Mich. 584. Con- a resolution of the council passed with no-
struction of market-grants in England. tice of the facts, adopting his plans, draw-
Where according to the grant of a marketings, &c., and he may recover of the city
it was to be held in a town, the grantee for the labor and service of preparing
might from time to time remove the place them. Ib.
for holding it according to the conveni- 4 Wartman v. Philadelphia, 33 Pa. St.
ence of the inhabitants for the time being. 202, 210 (1854); St. John v. New York,
Dixon v. Robinson, 3 Mod. 108 ; Curwen 3 Bosw. (N. Y.) 483 ; State v. Mobile, 5
v. Salkeld, 3 East, 538 ; The King v. Cot- Port. (Ala.) 279 (1837); Commonwealth
terill, 1 B. & Al. 67 ; Wortley v. The Not- v. Rush, 14 Pa. St. (2 Harris) 186 ; Con-
tingham Local Board, 21 L. T. N. S. 582. monwealth v. Bowman, 3 Pa. St. (3 Barr)
And this applies, although the limits of 202, 206 ; McDonald v. Newark, 42 N. J.
the town be afterwards extended and the Eq. (15 Stew.) 136. See chapter on
458
§ 385
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
§ 384 (317). Power under General Welfare Clause. Every mu-
nicipal corporation which has power to make by-laws and establish
ordinances to promote the general welfare and preserve the peace of
a town or city may fix the time or places of holding public markets
for the sale of food, and make such other regulations concerning
them as may conduce to the public interest. The right to establish
a market includes the right to abandon it, or shift it to another
place when the public convenience demands it; and of this the
council is the judge.?
A city
§ 385 (318). Nature of Power to Establish and Regulate.
corporation was invested by its charter with power “to erect market-
houses, to establish markets and market-places, and to provide for
the.government and regulation thereof," and it was at first decided,
and in the author's judgment properly decided, by the Supreme
Court of the State, that this did not authorize the corporation to
pass an ordinance delegating to an individual the right to erect
market-houses, and to charge rent for the use of the stalls therein,
reserving to itself no power to control the same, and that the cor-
poration could not compel persous to go to such markets; but sub-
sequently this ruling was reversed, and it was held that such an
ordinance was valid, and that the city had the power to authorize
the erection of market-houses by an individual, and to declare the
same a public market, and to covenant to protect the owner in the
exclusive privilege thereof; and that the city was liable for failing
to protect him by the passage of the requisite ordinances, he having,
on the faith of the ordinance, erected an expensive market-house.3
Streets, post, secs. 657, 660. Under the (1862); overruling Davenport v. Kelly, 7
Constitution of New Jersey, the legisla- Iowa, 102. It may be suggested that the
ture cannot authorize a market in the right to pass such an ordinance, and the
public streets without providing compen- liability for failing to pass others, may
sation to adjoining lot owners. State v. admit, at least, of fair debate, in view of
Laverack, 34 N. J. Law, 201 (1870); the surrender by the city of its charter
Higgins v. Princeton (injunction refused), powers, and its inability in law to make
4 Halsted Ch. 309, 320.
binding contracts with reference to the
1 Per Black, C. J., Wartman v. Phila- future exercise of its legislative author-
delphia, 33 Pa. St. 202, 209 (1854). Note ity. The soundness of this suggestion is
his observations in this case upon the ne- confirmed by the decision in Gale v. Kala-
cessity and convenience of markets. mazoo, 23 Mich. 344 (1871), post, chap.
2 Ib. “ The right to establish markets is xxiii. In the Kelly case, supra, the point
a branch of the sovereign power, and the was decided, and is not overruled, that
right to regulate them is necessarily a the charter power to establish markets,
power of municipal police.” Per Eustes, &c., conferred upon the council the au-
C. J., Municipality v. Cutting, 4 La. An. thority to prohibit the exposing and offer-
335.
ing for sale meat in any other places than
8 Le Claire v. Davenport, 13 Iowa, 210 those the ordinance designated. Ash v,
!
$ 386
459
ORDINANCES : POWERS RELATING TO MARKETS.
§ 386 (319).
(319). Construction of Special Powers in Relation to
Markets. Power to make “by-laws relative to the public mar-
kets,” &c., while it would not authorize a corporation entirely to
prohibit the sale of meats, &c., within its limits, because this would
be in general restraint of trade, will nevertheless authorize a by-law
forbidding the hawking about or selling by retail, meats, &c., except
at the public markets and within certain liinits about the same.I
The courts differ somewhat in their construction of the extent of the
power to establish and regulate markets, as will be seen by the cases
cited in the note.2
People, 11 Mich. 347 ; Hatch v. Pender. 1 La. 126; New Orleans y. Peyroux, 6 Mar-
gast, 15 Md. 251.
tin, N.s. (La.) 155; Griffon v. New Orleans,
A city in granting a license and sell. 5 Martin, N. S. (La.) 279. City corporation
ing to a party the right to occupy a stall cannot agree to abdicate its legislative
in the market does not impliedly contract powers in relation to markets, nor contract
to protect the lessee from competition by to create a monopoly. Gale v. Kalamazoo,
unlicensed persons ; nor can such a con- 23 Mich. 344 (1871); ante, sec. 362.
tract be implied against the corporation 1 Buffalo v. Webster, 10 Wend. (N. Y.)
from the existence of an ordinance prohib- 100 (1833). Chief Justice Savage affirmas,
iting the same ; and the failure of the offi- arguendo, that such an ordinance would
cers of the corporation, though wilful, to be valid under the common-law power of
enforce the ordinance against unlicensed corporations to make by-laws for the gen-
sellers, is no defence to a bond given by eral good of the corporation.
Ib. AP-
the lessee for the payment of stall rent. proving Pierce v. Bartram, Cowp. 269;
Peck v. Austin, 22 Texas, 261 (1858). following Bush v. Seabury, 8 Johns. (N.
Nor does a city owning and leasing a Y.) 418 (1811), and distinguished from
market-house impliedly engage or cove-
Dunham v. Rochester, 5 Cow. (N. Y.)
nant that it will not exercise its power to 462 ; Shelton v. Mobile, 30 Ala. 540
establish markets by erecting other mar. (1857). “The fixing the place and times
ket-houses and leasing them to others; if at which markets shall be held and kept
it does so, the injury to the first lessees is open,” says the Supreme Court of New
damnum absque injuria. Cougot v. New York in Bush v. Seabury, 8 Johns. (N. Y.)
Orleans, 16 La. An. 21 (1861). A muni- 418, "and the prohibition to sell at other
cipal corporation may contract for build- places and times, are among the most
ing a market-house with an individual ordinary regulations of a city or town
or corporation, conceding in consideration police, and would naturally be included
of such building, and the use of part of in the general power to pass by-laws rel-
the same, exclusive market privileges in ative to the public markets.
If the cor-
such city, with rights to lease stalls, col. poration had not the power in question,
lect rents, and exemption from taxes for it is difficult to see what useful purpose
twenty-one years; but a purchaser at a could be effected, or what object was in-
sale under a judgment against the owner tended, by the grant of power to pass
takes only the right of the owner bound laws relative to the public markets.'
by the judgment, but this will not affect 2 Power to make ordinances concern-
the rights of the city to use of the rooms ing “markets, health, and good order'
contracted for, of which it had posses. of the town authorizes an ordinance
sion. Palestine v. Barnes, 50 Tex. 539. prohibiting the sale of butcher's meat
As to duty of corporation where they within the corporate limits, excepting
sell or farm out an exclusive privilege to at the public market. Winnsboro V.
vend articles, to enforce ordinances de Smart, 11 Rich. (S. C.) Law, 551 (1858).
signed to protect the privilege. La Rosa It seems the defendant was convicted,
v. New Orleans, 4 La. 24 ; Rosa v. Same, though he sold the meat inside his own
460
§ 387
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
§ 387 (320). Stands in Streets. In a well-considered case in
Massachusetts it is decided that a city corporation has the clear right
blacksmith shop.
Such ordinances are to its views in a subsequent case, in which
sustained, says the court, on the ground it was held that power "to erect market-
that they are not in restraint of trade, houses, establish markets and market-
but a proper regulation of it. Ib. Legis- places, and provide for the government
lative power to a city “to erect markets and regulation thereof," does not author-
houses, establish markets and market- ize the council of a large and growing
places, and provide for the government town to fix upon one market-place, and
and regulation thereof,” authorizes an prohibit all persons at all hours of the
ordinance with a pecuniary penalty, pro- day from selling fresh meats elsewhere.
viding that fresh beef shall not be sold Such an ordinance was regarded as un-
in the city less than by the quarter at reasonable, in. restraint of trade, and
any other than the market-place during tending to create a monopoly. It was
market hours. Bowling Green v. Car- admitted, however, that if the ordinance
son, 10 Bush (Ky.), 64 (1873). So, in had fixed a reasonable number of hours
St. Louis v. Jackson, 25 Mo. 37 (1857), each day in which the prohibition should
where it appeared that the city, under operate, leaving persons free to sell out-
proper authority, had erected a public, or side of market hours, it would probably
city, market-house, and that by its char- be unobjectionable. Bloomington v. Wahl,
ter it had power also, “ to regulate," by 46 Ill. 489 (1868). So, in Bethune v.
ordinance, the sale of meats, it was held Hughes, 28 Ga. 560 (1859), the court,
that this gave the city authority to pro- leaning against exclusive privileges, held
vide, by ordinance, that "no person, not that power by the charter to the corpora-
a lessee of a stall in the market, shall tion "to establish and keep up a public
sell, or offer for sale, meat in less quan- market in the city for the sale of,” &c.,
tities than one quarter.” The court con- does not confer upon the city power to
sidered such an ordinance as reasonable, pass an ordinance prohibiting the sale of
highly proper, and not in restraint of marketable articles elsewhere than at the
trade, and not embraced in the reasoning market-place. Distinguished, Badkins v.
in the case of Dunham v. Trustees of Robinson, 53 Ga. 613 (1875); S. P. St.
Rochester, 5 Cow. (N. Y.) 462; S. P. see, Paul V. Laidler, 2 Minn. 190 (1858);
also, St. Louis v. Weber, 44 Mo. 547 commented on and disapproved in St.
(1869) ; Le Claire v. Davenport, 13 Iowa, Louis v. Weber, 44 Mo. 547 (1869); see
210 ; Davenport v. Kelley, 7 Iowa, 102; St. Paul v. Coulter, 12 Minn. 41. Char-
Ash v. People, 11 Mich. 347. But in ter power to a city, "to establish public
Caldwell v. Alton, 33 Ill. 416 (1864), markets and other public buildings, and
where the city, by its charter, had power make rules and regulations for the govern-
"to establish and regulate markets," and ment of the same, to appoint suitable
under the power passed an ordinance for- officers for overseeing and regulating such
bidding, during market hours, the sale of markets and to restrain all persons from
vegetables outside the limits of the mar- interrupting or interfering with the due
ket, it was held that the city could not observance of such rules and regulations,”
restrain a regular dealer or merchant from does not confer upon its common council
vending vegetables at his place of business authority to pass an ordinance prohibiting
outside of market limits during any part every farmer, gardener, or person pro-
of the day, such a restraint of trade being ducing vegetables " from selling the same
unreasonable. The court reviewed many in and along its streets without first pro-
of the cases in other States on this subject, curing an annual license from the city
and were of opinion that the power to authorities, paying therefor into the city
regulate could only extend to the market treasury the sum of twenty-five dollars.
limits, and that these limits could not, St. Panl v. Traeger, 25 Minn. 248 (1878);
under this power, be made to extend and see Burlington v. Dankwardt, 73
throughout the city. The court adhered Iowa, 170 (1887). The nature of the
§ 387
461
ORDINANCES : MARKET STANDS IN STREETS.
to prohibit, by ordinance, the occupation of a stand for the vending of
commodities in the streets. It may thus prohibit not only its own
inhabitants, but others. It may make the prohibition absolute, or
it may make it conditional on obtaining license or permission. It is
in the nature of a police regulation, and does not violate private
rights or improperly restrain trade.
power “to establish public markets," &c., Standing Committee on Public Markets
is very satisfactorily discussed in this case may appoint," was held good. Io. But
by Cornell, J. An ordinance regulating a by-law enacting " that no person should
the killing and bleeding of meats is au- expose for sale any meat, fish, poultry,
thorized by power to regulate butchers, eggs, butter, cheese, grain, hay, straw,
the place and mode of selling, and to cord-wood, shingles, lumber, flour, wool,
prevent unlicensed persons from acting as meal, vegetables, or fruit (except wild
butchers. City of Brooklyn v. Cleves, fruit), hides or skins, within the town, at
Hill & Denio (N. Y.) Suppl. 231 (1843). any place but the public market, without
Under power to regulate the vending of having first paid the market fee thereon
meats, a conviction under an ordinance as therein provided, except all hides and
forbidding the sale of unwholesome meats skins from animals slaughtered by the
and other provisions cannot be sustained licensed butcher of the corporation, hold-
for selling putrid eggs. Mayor, &c., of ing a stall in the market," was held bad.
Rochester v. Rood, Hill & Denio (N. Y.), Fennell and the Corporatiou of the Town
Suppl. 146.
of Guelph, In re, 24 Upper Can. Q. B. 238.
By the Municipal Act of Canada the Also, “that meat, fish, poultry, eggs, cheese,
council may pass by-laws “for establish. grain, hay, straw, cord-wood, shingles, lum-
ing and regulating all markets; for pre- her, flour, wool, meal, vegetables, or fruit
venting or regulating the sale by retail in (except wild fruit), should not be exposed
the public streets of any meat, vegetables, for sale within the municipality, except in
fruit, or beverages ; for regulating the the market, before 12 o'clock, noon,” was
place and manner of selling and weighing held bad as to the articles mentioned in
butcher's meat, fish, hay, straw, fodder, italics. 16. See In re Snell and Belle-
wood, and lumber, &c. Harr. Munic. ville, 30 Upper Can. Q. B. 91; Harr.
Manual, 5th ed. p. 451. The following Munic. Man. 5th ed. 452, 457, and cases.
cases, digested by Mr. Harrison, show the 1 Nightingale, In re, 11 Pick. (Mass.)
judicial construction of the act.
168 (1831). In this case the ordinance of
The power under the act is to regu- the city (Boston) provided “that no in-
late all markets established, apparently habitant of the city of Boston, or of any
including those established by the Crown, town in the vicinity thereof, not offering
as well as those established by municipal for sale the produce of his own farnı, &c.,
authority. “Regulation must of neces- should, without the permission of the
sity include the appropriation of one or clerk of Faneuil Hall market, he suffered
more parts of the market for one purpose, to occupy any stand with cart, sleigh, or
and other part or parts for other purposes; otherwise, for the purpose of vending
of providing that free passage through the commodities in either of the streets men-
market be kept open for ready access to tioned in the first section of this ordin-
shops, stalls, or other places where differ- ance," &c. It was objected against this
ent commodities are exposed for sale. Per ordinance that it was void : 1. Because it
Draper, C. J., in Kelly and the Corpora- was partial, not operating upon all the
tion of the City of Toronto, 23 Upper Cán. citizens of the State equally. 2. Because
Q. B. 426.” A by-law enacting "that no it was uncertain, the term "vicinity" be-
butcher or other person shall cut up or ex- ing indefinite. And, 3. Because it was iu
pose for sale any fresh meat in any part of restraint of trade. But neither of these
the city except in the shops and stalls in objections was considered tenable. The
the public markets, or at such places as the validity of such an ordinance was again
462
$ 390
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
§ 388 (321). Power to Tax Marketmen must be Plainly Con-
ferred. — But authority to erect a market, and power “ to regulate
the general police,” and “to preserve the peace and good order of
the city,” do not authorize the corporation to impose a tax for reve-
nue purposes upon persons occupying market stands in the streets, or
selling produce therein. Such a power must be plainly conferred
or it will not be held to exist.1
§ 389 (322). Power to Regulate is a Police Power.
The right
to regulate markets established by a city under its charter is one of
municipal police. The city authorities may, if their action be not
unreasonable, provide what articles shall or shall not be sold at the
public markets, and may impose penalties on those who violate their
ordiuances. They may, for example, prohibit groceries and oysters
from being sold at the public markets, and require oysters, which
have a great tendency to putrefaction, to be sold at certain desig-
nated stands, and prevent their being sold elsewhere.?
$ 390 (323). Inspection Ordinances. — A municipal corporation,
says Mr. Willcock, may regulate the manner of carrying on trade
within a municipality so far as to prevent monopolies or the sale
of unfit commodities, and to ensure proper conduct in those who
affirmed by the same court in Common- "farmer" within the meaning of the pro-
wealth v. Rice, 9 Met. (Mass.) 253 (1845). viso, although the meats which he sold
See this case also as to requisites in cer- came from sheep fattened on his farm, if
tain respects of complaints for the viola- the farm was only a convenient appendage
tion of such an ordinance, and as to what to his business as a butcher. Rochester u.
acts will be deemed to be violations. Pettinger, 17 Wend. (N. Y.) 265 (1837);
In Louisiana, on the other hand, an St. Paul v. Traeger, 25 Minn. 248 (1878),
ordinance imposing a tax upon every load cited supra, sec. 386, note.
of supplies carried to the public markets 1 Kip v. Paterson, 2 Dutch. (N. J.)
by persons not occupying stalls in the mar- 298 (1857). This power, it was said,
kets, was held to be void as being a tax would authorize “the renting of stalls in
for revenue and not in the exercise of the the market-house, and perhaps of even
police power. State v. Blaser, 36 La. An. prohibiting sales in the public streets.'
363.
Sce supra, sec. 319, note; Shelton Ib. per Elmer, J.
v. Mayor, &c., of Mobile, 30 Ala. 540 2 Municipality v. Cutting, 4 La An.
(1857); Wartman v. Philadelphia, 33 Pa. 335 (1849); Morano v. New Orleans, 2 La.
St. 202 (1854). An ordinance forbade the 217. Power of city to vacate leases and
sale of fresh meats except by persons stalls in public market, under ordinance
licensed, but contained a proviso in favor reserving the right, see City Council
of farmers, authorizing them to sell meats, v. Goldsmith, 2 Speers (S. C.) Law, 428.
the produce of their own farms. The evi. Occupant of city market failing to pay
dent object was considered to be to pro- rent in advance, according to contract, held
tect licensed butchers, and at the same a tenant at will. Dubuque v. Miller, 11
time to allow farmers to come in and sell Iowa, 583. Control over tenants. Woelpper
the produce of their own farms. It was v. Philadelphia, 38 Pa. St. 203.
held that an unlicensed butcher was not a
!
§ 390
463
INSPECTION ORDINANCES.
practise it within their jurisdiction. In general, it may be said
that incorporated cities and larger towns in this country have
conferred upon them the power to pass ordinances regulating, to a
reasonable extent, the mode in which the traffic of the place shall
be conducted; but they can exercise no powers in this respect not
conferred.2 Laws requiring articles to be inspected or weighed and
measured before being sold are in the nature of police regulations,
and are valid in the absence of special constitutional provisions.
When reasonable in their nature, they are not regarded as being in
restraint of trade 8
66 All
Or
1 Willc. Corp. 142, pl. 332.
(N. Y.) 237; Yates v. Milwaukee, 12
2 Nightingale, In re, 11 Pick. (Mass.) Wis. 673. The systein of inspection laws,
168 ; Stokes v. New York, 14 Wend. (N. and the hosts of officers which they en-
Y.) 87; Raleigh v. Sorrell, 1 Jones gendered, were considered by the constitu-
(N. C.) Law, 49; Chicago v. Quimby, tional convention of New York to entail
38 Ill. 274 (1858); Howe v. Norris, 12 annoyances and burdens upon the com-
Allen (Mass.), 82 ; Libby v. Downey, 5 munity sufficient to outweigh any benefits
Allen (Mass.), 299; Collins v. Louisville, resulting from them; and the Constitution
2 B. Mon. (Ky.), 134 (1841). Power to of 1846 (art. V. sec. viii.) abolished all
appoint measurers of wood, and affix a such offices and forbade the legislature to
reasonable allowance to them, does not re-create them, in this language :
justify the imposition of a tax for revenue. offices for the weighing, measuring, cull-
16. The legislature created a board of ing, or inspecting of any merchandise,
railroad and warehouse commissioners produce, manufacture, commodity
composed of three persons, appointed by whatever, are hereby abolished, and no
the governor and confirmed by the such offices shall hereafter be created by
senate for the term of two years, and em- law." See Tinkham v. Tapscott, 17 N. Y.
powered them to fix the rate of charges 144, 147 (1858), where the origin, scope,
for the inspection of grain in cities. The and purpose of this provision are very
court sustained this legislation. It re- satisfactorily discussed by Denio, J. In
garded the board as a quasi public corpora. Illinois it is held that inspection power
tion, and held that it was competent for conferred upon a board of trade, to be ex-
the legislature to delegate the power of ercised when requested by its members,
inspection to it, instead of to the corporate may co-exist with like power in the city
authorities of the city of Chicago, and authorities, to be exercised in all cases
that the official bond of such inspector when requested. Chicago v. Quimby, 38
was a valid obligation against him and his Ill. 274 (1858).
sureties.
People v. Harper, 91 Ill. 357 The following cases are referred to as
(1878), distinguishing it from People v. showing the solicitude of the law to pre-
Salomon, 51 Ill. 50, and other cases hold- serve the public health ; but in this coun-
ing, under the Constitution of Illinois, that try the power of municipal corporations
local and municipal taxation can only be in this respect depends on their charters
imposed by the local "corporate authori. or other legislative provision.
ties."
Knowingly to expose for sale in a pub.
8 Cooley Const. Lim. 596; Raleigh v.
lic market meat which is not fit for human
Sorrell, supra; Stokes v. New York, food is indictable. Regina v. Stevenson,
supra ; Paige v. Fazackerly, , 36 Barb. 3 F. & F. 106. So knowingly taking unfit
(N. Y.) 392; Mayor, &c. of New York meat to public market for sale. The
v. Nichols, 4 Hill (N. Y.), 209 (1843); Queen v. Jarvis, 3 F. & F. 108. But in
compare Mayor v. Hyatt, 3 E. D. Smith either event the knowledge of the unfit-
(N. Y.), 156 ; Rogers v. Jones, 1 Wend. ness of the food is essential to the creation
464
§ 393
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
$ 391 (324). Weighing. — Power to a city" to regulate the pub-
lic market, and to pass such other ordinances as shall seern meet for
the improvement and good government of the city,” authorizes an
ordinance requiring oats, hay, dc., to be weighed by the public weigh-
master before being offered for sale, and imposing a penalty for its
violation.1
$ 392 (325). Same subject. - A grant to the common council
of “ all powers, rights, &c., incident to municipal corporations and
necessary to the proper government of the same," might authorize a
city to prevent the sale of bread made out of unwholesome flour, and,
as a consequence, to provide for its inspection, but it would not give
the power to regulate the assize, that is, the weight and price of
bread, for the latter is a power not absolutely necessary for the
proper government of a city. Power, however, to a city, "to regu-
late everything which relates to bakers," does authorize an ordi-
nance regulating the weight, size, and, it seems, the price, of bread,
and the forfeiture of bread illegally baked ; and such an ordinance,
it has been held, is not in violation of any provision of the Consti-
tution of Louisiana.2
§ 393 (326). Police Regulations respecting the Public Peace and
Safety; Use of Streets. — Our city governments usually possess the
of the offence. Regina v. Crawley, 3 F. & and the payment of his salary. 1 Jones,
F. 109. The offence is a niisance at com. 49, supra. Construction of ordinance as
mon law. Shillito'v. Thompson, L. R. 1 to weighing hay on public scales. Gass v.
Q. B. Div. 12. Each single act of ex- Green ville, 4 Sneed (Teun.), 62 ; Yates
posure of tainted meat is a distinct offence. V. Milwaukee, 12 Wis. 752. Construc-
Hartley, 112 re, 31 L. J. M. C. 232. A tion of statute as to mode of measuring
salesman who sells in a public market grain. Frazier v. Warfield, 13 Md. 279.
meat which is afterwards found to be unfit Of ordinance as to survey of lumber before
for human food, but which he has no sale. Briggs v. Boat, 7 Allen (Mass.), 287.
means of knowing or reason to suspect An ordinance requiring that every person
was other than good and wholesome meat, selling meat or articles of provision by
is not liable to an action upon an implied retail, whether hy weight, count, or meas-
warranty or for money had and received. ure, should provide himself with scales,
Emnerton v. Mathews, 7 H. & N. 586; weights, and measures, but that no spring
but a person who sends animals destined balance, spring scale, spring steelyards, or
for human food to a public market for sale spring weighing machine should be used
impliedly represents that they are, so far for any market purpose, was held valid.
as he knows, not infected with any con- Snell and Belleville, In re, 30 Upper Can.
tagious disease dangerous to life or health. Q. B. 81.
1 Raleigh v. Sorrell, 1 Jones (N. C.) 2 Guillotte v. New Orleans, 12 La. An.
Law, 49 (1853) ; approving Nightingalo's 432 (1857); Paige v. Fazackerly, 36 Barb.
Case, 11 Pick. (Mass.) 168 ; Stokes v. Cor. (N. Y.) 392. But as to forfeiture, quære,
poration of New York, 14 Wend. (N. Y.) in absence of express power, and see
87. This power was also held to authorize Phillips v. Allen, 41 Pa. St. 481 ; Mobile
the creation of the office of weighmaster v. Yuille, 3 Ala. 139.
§ 393
465
ORDINANCES : PUBLIC SAFETY.
power, either by express grant or by virtue of their authority, to
make by-laws relating to the public safety and good order of the
inhabitants, to regulate the rate of speed of travel in the public
streets; the route or streets over which omnibuses, stage coaches,
drays, &c., may run; the time of day in which the streets may be
used for certain purposes; to interdict stoppages in the street to
the delay of others; to exclude vehicles of all kinds' from entering
upon or passing over the sidewalks, &c. The public safety and
convenience may require regulations of this character; but they
must not, unless made by virtue of specific authority, be unrea-
sonable or improperly in restraint of trade, Power to make by-
1 Commonwealth v. Stodder, 2 Cush. fere with any vested rights; and legis-
(Mass.) 562 (1848), where the subject of lative authority to a specified railway
the power of cities over streets, partic- company to construct its road “from
ularly in reference to omnibuses, is fully some point within the corporation of
considered by Mr. Justice Dewey ; Com- Richmond to be approved by the com-
monwealth v. Robertson, 5 Cush. (Mass.) mon council," does not give it a vested
438 (1850), as to stoppages in streets con- right to the use of a particular street free
trary to ordinance ; Baker v. City of Bos- from municipal control, when the city, in
ton, 12 Pick. (Mass.) 184 (1831) ; Van- consenting to such use, reserved its char-
derbilt v. Adams, 7 Cow. (N. Y.) 349; tered powers in that behalf. Richmond,
Ib. 385 ; Austin v. Murray, 16 Pick. F. & P. R. Co. v. Richmond, 96 U. S.
(Mass.) 126 ; St. Paul v. Smith, 27 Minn. 521 (1877). Special charter construed to
364. A regulation or ordinance prohibit- authorize an ordinance for filling a street,
ing the stoppage of vehicles in a public although it is covered by a plank road
street for a longer time than twenty min- laid under special, legislative authority.
utes is a valid police regulation. Com- State v. Jersey City, 2 Dutch. (N. J.) 444;
monwealth v. Brooks, 109 Mass. 355 ; post, chapter on Streets, sec. 713. In
Commonwealth v. Fenton, 139 Mass. 195. Napman v. People, 19 Mich. 352 (1869),
The license of a hawker or peddler does a lawful arrangement between a railroad
not authorize him to violate such an ordi- company and an omnibus company as to
nance. Commonwealth v. Fenton, supra; the delivery of passengers was held to be
Commonwealth v. Lagorio, 141 Mass. 81. beyond municipal interference. Cities hav-
Power to a city “to regulate the running ing exclusive control of streets may take
of railroad cars authorizes the adoption such precautions as are necessary for the
of an ordinance prohibiting the propulsion safety of their inhabitants in the use of
of cars by steam within the corporate them, as by erecting gates at railroad
limits. Buffalo & N. F. R. Co..v. Buffalo, crossings or by permitting the railroad
5 Hill (N. Y.), 209 (1843).
company to erect them. Textor v. Balti-
Power to the city of Richmond to more & O. R. R. Co., 59 Md. 63.
make "ordinances, not contrary to the Charter power to a municipal corpora-
Constitution and laws of the State, as tion to require railroad companies to fence
shall be thought necessary for the good their respective railroads within the muni-
ordering and government” of its inhab- cipal limits, to keep flagmen at street
itants, was considered by the Supreme crossings, and to provide protection against
Court of the United States to imply the injury to persons and property in the use
power to ordain and establish suitable of such railroads, confers plenary police
police regulations, and that includes the powers over railroads within the corporate
power to prohibit the use of locomotive limits to provide protection against inju-
engines propelled by steam on the public ries to person and property ; and the grant
streets, when such action does not inter- of a right of way to a railroad company by
VOL. I. - 30
466
$ 394
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
laws for “ the good rule and government” of the borough (ante, sec.
337), has reference to the government of the borough as a corpo-
ration, and the making of regulations for carrying into effect the
purposes for which it was incorporated. (Post, sec. 408.) General
powers of this character, without more, do not enable a town council
to carry out any unreasonable ideas of general good government, and
to impose penalties for the doing of things which are not prohibited
by any public statute, nor by the common law.1
Under a gen-
$ 394 (327). Same subject. Salutary By-Laws.
eral power to make "needful and salutary by-laws," a city ordinance
of Boston, requiring the tenant or occupant, or, in case there shall
be no tenant, the owners of buildings bordering on certain streets,
to clear the snow from the sidewalks adjoining their respective build-
ings, is reasonable and valid. It was objected against this ordi-
nance that it violated the fundamental maxim that all burdens and
an ordinance which provides that the com- chapter on Streets, sec. 713. Where an
pany shall erect suitable fences, &c., is intent to injure is not made an essential
not a inere contract, but is an exercise of ingredient of the offence of rapid driving
the right of municipal legislation, and as under the ordinance the intent necessary
such has the force of law within the cor- to a criininal assault and battery is not
porate limits. Hayes v. Michigan Central supplied by a mere intent to violate the
R. R. Co., 111 U. S. 228 (1883). The ordinance. Commonwealth V. Adams,
duty thus devolved on the railroad is one 114 Mass. 323 ; s. C. 19 Am. Rep. 362.
due, not to the city as a municipal body, An ordinance prohibiting “night-walk.
but to the public considered as composed ing" is not class legislation
but a
of individuals, and each person specially proper police regulation. Braddy v. Mil-
injured by breach of the obligation is en- ledgeville, 74 Ga. 516.
titled to his individual compensation, and There is no obligation, in the absence
to an action for its recovery.
Ib, and of a valid municipal by-law or statute, on
cases cited.
the part of people to keep roofs clear of
A by-law prohibiting rapid driving in snow, or to detain the snow so that it can-
the streets of a city by carters and others is not slide into the street, though there
not in restraint of trade, and is reasonable may be, it seems, such a faulty construc-
and valid ; and in a prosecution for its tion of roof as, on proof thereof, would
violation, it is not necessary to prove that involve a liability on the part of the
any individual was actually endangered owner or occupier for accidents. Lazarus
by the fast driving. As the mayor and v. Toronto, 19 Upper Can. Q. B. 13, per
aldermen have no authority to give a per. Robinson, C. J. Power to local board to
son permission to violate an ordinance, provide for the removal of “ dirt, ashes,
evidence of such permission, as well as rubbisb, filth, dung, and soil” does not
evidence of the defendant's general char. authorize a by-law for the removal of
acter as a careful driver, is inadmissible.
Reg. v. Wood, 5 E. &. B. 49.
Commonwealth v. Worcester, 3 Pick. Infra, sec. 394, note. See post, chap.
(Mass.) 462 (1826); Commonwealth v. xxiii.
Stodder, 2 Cush. (Mass.) 562, 570 (1848); 1 Addison on Torts, 34 ; Rex West-
Washington v. Nashville, 1 Swan (Tenn.), wood, 4 B. & C. 781 ; Reg. v. Wood, 5
177. Commented on. McBean v. Chand. Ell. & Bl. 55 ; post, secs. 396, 408.
ler, 9 Heisk. (Tenn.) 349 (1872); post,
snow.
!
§ 396
467
ORDINANCES : POLICE POWER.
taxes laid upon the people for the public good shall be equal. The
objection was overruled. And it was justly regarded by the court
as in the nature of a police regulation, requiring a duty to be per-
formed highly salutary and advantageous to the citizens of a popu-
lous and closely built city, and imposed upon the persons named
because they are so situated that they can promptly and con-
veniently perform it; and it is laid not upon a few, but upon a
numerous class, and equally upon all who are within the descrip-
tion composing the class and who commonly derive a peculiar bene-
fit from the duty required. It would doubtless be otherwise if the
ordinance arbitrarily imposed this duty upon the mechanics or
merchants, or any other class of citizens between whose convenience
and the labor required there is no natural relation.1.
§ 395 (328). Same subject. — The power to make "salutary by-
laws" with respect to the use of streets, will, it seems, authorize a
city to pass by-laws regulating the removal of buildings and the
temporary use of the streets and highways for that purpose.?
§ 396 (329). Ordinances under Police Power and General Wel-
fare Clause. - Other illustrations of what a municipal corporation
may do under the general welfare clause in its organic act, or under
its police power or its implied right to pass by-laws, or under a gen-
eral grant of authority for that purpose, may be here given.
Under authority "to ordain and publish such acts, laws, and
regulations, not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the
1 Goddard, In re, 16 Pick. (Mass.) 504 than any other citizen. Gridley v. Bloom-
(1835); Union Railway Co. v. Cambridge, ington, 88 Ill. 554; supra, sec. 393, note.
11 Allen (Mass.), 287; Kirby v. Boylston An ordinance requiring personal labor
Market Assoc., 14 Gray (Mass.), 252 ; upon streets, or, in lieu thereof, payment
post, chap. xxiii., note and cases cited. of a specified sum, held valid ; held also
The same power held to authorize an ordi- that labor so required is not “invol-
nance to prevent the placing of show boards untary servitude” within the meaning of
and signs upon the side-walks so as to the Constitution of Kansas or of the
obstruct them, and also to prevent the United States. In re Dassler, 35 Kan.
carrying of placards and signs on the side. 678.
walk for the purpose of displaying them. 2 Day v. Green, 4 Cush. (Mass.) 433,
As the tendency of this is to collect crowds 437, per Shaw, C. J. And where such a
and thus to interfere with the use of the by-law prohibits the moving without a
side-walks by the public, such an ordinance license granted by the mayor and alder-
is not unreasonable. Commonwealth v. men, a license granted by the mayor is
McCafferty, 145 Mass. 384 (1888).
void, even though the board of aldermen,
In Illinois it is held that a city has by a vote, had previously undertaken to
no power by ordinance to compel an abut- delegate the power to grant such license
ter, under penalty, to remove the snow to the mayor alone. The by-law contem-
from the sidewalk within a certain time. plates that the mayor and aldermen should
He has no more interest in such removal act unitedly as one body. Ib.
468
$ 397
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
State, as shall be needful to the good order of the city," it can, says
Howard, J., “subject to these restrictions and certain statute regula-
tions, establish all suitable ordinances for administering the govern-
ment of the city, the preservation of the health of the inhabitants,
and the convenient transaction of business within its limits, and
for the performance of the general duties required by law of munici-
pal corporations." 1
ex-
$ 397 (330). Same subject. Observance of the Sabbath.
Power to pass such ordinances “to maintain the peace, good govern-
ment, and order of the city, and the trade, commerce, and manu-
factures thereof, as the council may deem expedient, not repugnaut
to the Constitution and laws of the State," authorizes an ordinance
prohibiting the keeping open of stores, shops, and places of business on
Sunday, if its provisions do not conflict with State legislation.? But
1 Per Howard, J., State v. Merrill, 37 such use. Louisville City Railway Co. v.
Me. (2 Heath) 329 (1853). Such would Louisville, 8 Bush (Ky.), 415 (1871).
undoubtedly be the proper construction if The statute of California, authorizing
this were the only power given to the city supervisors of San Francisco “to make
to pass ordinances or by-laws. It should all regulations which may be necessary or
then be somewhat liberally construed., expedient for the preservation of the pub-
But if such a general grant is given in lic health,” is within the constitutional
connection with, or at the end of, a long power of the legislature to enact ; and
list of specific powers, . perhaps so under it the supervisors may pass an ordi.
tended a construction might not then be nance against feeding cows on distillery
due to it. The power conferred by the slops, and vending the milk of cows thus
general welfare clause is restricted by ref- fed. Johnson v. Simonton, 43 Cal. 242
erence to other provisions of the charter (1872); ante, secs. 141, 144, 369, 374, 379.
or constituent act., Montgomery City A common council has power to adopt
Council v. Montgomery & W. Pl. R. Co., a penal ordinance requiring auctioneers to
31 Ala. 76 (1857); Mount Pleasant v. procure licenses from the city. This power
Breeze, 11 Iowa, 399, 400 (1860), per is in the nature of a police regulation.
Wright, J. Under the general welfare Goshen v. Kern, 63 Ind. 468; Kinsley v.
clause a city may require sellers of meat, Chicago, 124 Ill. 359 (1888). See further,
&c., to take out licenses. Kinsley v. Chi- Index, title Licen-se.
cago, 124 Ill. 359 (1888). The general 2 St. Louis v. Cafferata, 24 Mo. 94
welfare clause has been held to confer power (1856); see State v. Cowan, 29 Mo. 330 ;
to prevent the keeping of bawdy-houses. State v. Ambs (constitutionality of Sunday
State v. Williams, 1] S. C. 288. See ante, laws affirmed), 20 Mo. 214; S. P. Frolick-
secs. 376, 393 ; post, secs. 432–436.
stein v. Mobile, 40 Ala. 725 (1367); Hud.
A city government under the usual son v. Geary, 4 R. I. 485 (1857); Specht
grants of power has the general authority v. Commonwealth, 8 Pa. St. 312; Cincin-
to so regulate the use and enjoyment of nati v. Rice, 15 Ohio, 225; Karwisch v.
private property in the city as to prevent Atlanta, 44 Ga. 204 (1871); McPherson
its proving pernicious to the citizens gen- v. Chebanse, 114 Ill. 46. In the case of
erally, and may, when the use to which the City Council v. Benjamin, 2 Strob.
the owner devotes his property becomes a (8. C.) Law, 508 (1846), it was decided
nuisance, compel him to cease so to use it, by the Court of Appeals of South Carolina
and punish him for refusing to obey its that an ordinance of the city of Charleston,
ordinances and regulations concerning prohibiting “public exposures for sales,
!
$ 399 ORDINANCES : GOOD ORDER CLAUSE; TREES IN STREETS. 469
the general welfare clause does not authorize a city to construct, or
aid in constructing, a plank road or toll bridge built by a private
company beyond the corporate limits of the city.1
$ 398 (331). Limitation of Power under the General Welfare
Clause. — The general welfare clause to pass ordinances for the good
government, &c., of the corporation does not authorize an ordinance
requiring the proprietor of a theatre, circus, or other exhibition
licensed by the corporation, to pay a peace or police officer of the
place two dollars, or any sum, for each night's attendance upon such
place for the purpose of enforcing order. Such an ordinance is un-
reasonable, and can only be passed when clearly authorized.? Under
such a clause an ordinance subjecting to a fine “any person whose
known character is that of a prostitute," was held to be unlawful.3.
1
§ 399 (332). Good Order Clause; Trees in Streets. Where a
city corporation is authorized“ to ordain such laws not inconsistent
with the Constitution and laws of the State as shall be needful to the
good order of the city," it may pass an ordinance imposing a penalty
upon any person who shall “mutilate or destroy any ornamental tree
planted in any of the streets, lanes, or other public places within the
limits of the city.” Such an ordinance is not inconsistent with a
State law punishing the malicious or wanton destruction of trees
or sales of merchandise, on Sunday," was limits, the sale of liquor on Sunday.
not a violation of that section of the State Megowan v. Commonwealth, 2 Met. (Ky.)
Constitution which declares that "the free 3 (1859); State v. Welch, 36 Conn. 215
exercise and enjoyment of religious pro- (1869). In Shreveport (city of) v. Levy,
fession or worship, without discrimination 26 La. An. 671 (1874); $. c. 21 Am. Rep.
or preference, shall forever hereafter be 553, an ordinance forbidding the sale of
allowed within this State to all mankind." goods on Sunday, but excepting those per-
In that case the defendant was a Jew, and sons keeping their places closed on Satur-
the city was not denied to be possessed of day, was held to be unconstitutional as
all the power on the subject which the giving to Jews a privilege denied to
legislature could constitutionally bestow. others. Power to make rules for the good
In the case of Columbia v. Duke and order and public peace of a city held to
Marks, cited 2 Strob, 530, and approved, imply power to appoint policemen. State
a similar decision was made at nisi prius v. Sims, 16 S. C. 486. A mere power to
by Mr. Justice Martin. And in this last secure the health, peace, and improve-
case it was further ruled, that power in ment of the city" held not to authorize
the charter to “establish such by-laws as an ordinance prohibiting the keeping open
may tend to the quiet, peace, safety, and of stores on Sunday. Corvallis v. Carlile,
good order of the inhabitants," authorized 10 Oreg. 139.
the passage of such an ordinance. Under 1 Montgomery City Council v. Mont-
"full power to pass such ordinances as the gomery & W. Pl. R. Co., 31 Ala. 76
city council shall deeni expedient for the (1857); ante, sec. 161.
government of the city, not contrary to 2 Waters v. Leech, 3 Ark. 110 (1840);
the Constitution of the State or the United supra, sec. 319; post, sec. 663.
States," a city may prohibit, within its 8 Buell v. State, 45 Ark. 336.
470
§ 401
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS,
growing for ornament or use. Under the ordinance it is not neces-
sary to allege or prove that the mutilation was malicious or wanton,
and it would seem to be considered that it was no defence that the
tree alleged to be mutilated was upon the street in front of the lot of
the accused, who owned, subject to the public easement, ad medium
filum vice.
$ 400 (333). Regulation of Saloons, &c., under General Welfare
Clause. -Under a general power to pass “any other by-laws for the
well-being of the city,” its council may, by ordinance, prohibit
saloons, restaurants, and other places of public entertainment, to be
kept open after ten o'clock at night. The objections that such a by-
law was unreasonable, and deprived the citizen of the constitutional
right of "acquiring property," were not considered to be well taken.
It regulates, but does not deprive the party of his rights. Under
similar powers an ordinance confining the carrying on of the laun-
dry business to a certain portion of a city, is a police regulation
and reasonable.3
§ 401 (334). Powers under Authority to regulate the Police.
Power" to regulate the police of the city," and to pass ordinances
not inconsistent with law, authorizes an ordinance for arresting and
fining vagrants, although, by the general law of the State, vagrants
may be proceeded against before a justice of the peace, the court
considering that this did not forbid the corporation to make a
local regulation on the same subject not in conflict with the gen-
eral law.4
1 State v. Merrill, 37 Me. (2 Heath) terfere with the unlimited exercise of
329 (1853). Contra, as to right of adjoin private rights." Per Bell, J., in State v.
ing owner. Lancaster v. Richardson, 4 Freeman, 38 N. H. 428 ; State v. Welch,
Lansing (N. Y.), 136 (1871); see post, sec. 36 Conn. 215 (1869). In further support
663, note. The case in Maine is a quite of text, Platteville v. Bell, 43 Wis. 488
liberal construction of the words “good (1878); Staats v. Washington, 45 N. J. L.
order.” But it is necessary that cities (16 Vroom) 318 ; Staates v. Washington,
should have such an authority, and the 44 N. J. L. (15 Vroom) 605.
power to pass the ordinance could, perhaps, 8 Matter of Hang Kie, 69 Cal. 149; see
be sustained as incidental to the power Index, tit. Laundry.
of the city over its streets and public 4 St. Louis v. Bentz, 11 Mo. 61 (1857);
places. Post, chapter on Streets. Further distinguished from Jefferson City v. Court-
as to shade trees. Post, sec. 663, note. mire, 9 Mo. 692, which was a summary
2 The State v. Freeman, 38 N. H. 426 proceeding for an indictable offence. See
(1859); following and approving on this State v. Cowan, 29 Mo. 330 ; St. Louis
point, State v. Clark, 8 Fost. (28 N. H.) v. Schoenbush, (Mo.) 8 S. W. Rep. 791;
176; Morris v. Rome City Council, 10 S. C. 95 Mo. 618 (1888); Byers v. Com.
Ga. 532; Hudson v. Geary, 4 R. I. 485. monwealth, 42 Pa. St. 89, per Strong, J. ;
" It is an unavoidable consequence of city Shafer v. Mumma, 17 Md. 331 (1861);
ordinances, that they in some degree in- supra, sec. 440 ; post, sec. 427, note.
t
§ 403
471
ORDINANCES UNDER THE POLICE POWER.
§ 402 (335). Same subject. — By virtue of its police power a
municipal corporation may pass an ordinance imposing a fine upon
the owner of any animal found astray or at large within the limits
of the corporation."
§ 403 (336). Power under Authority to preserve Good Order, &c.
– If a municipal corporation has, by its charter, power to pass ordi-
nances to preserve the peace and good order of the place, this gives
it authority to provide for the punishment, in the nianner allowed
by its charter, of persons who shall rescue, or attempt to rescue
prisoners from the lawful custody of municipal officers. But the
general power, though expressly conferred, to enact by-laws for
the good government of the town, does not confer the power to levy
taxes of any kind, not even upon retailers of ardent spirits.3
A statute by which "two or more over- Portland v. Bangor, 65 Me. 120 (1876);
seers of the town" were authorized to S. C. 20 Am. Rep. 681. See Byers v. Com-
commit to the workhouse, until discharged monwealth, 42 Pa. St. 89; post, sec. 427,
by law, by writing under their hands, to note, sec. 433. ln a late case in Illinois,
be there employed and governed accord- the Supreme Court of that State decided
ing to the rules and orders of the house, that the act creating the Reform School
&c., "all persons, able of body to work, was unconstitutional, and that the act, so
and not having estate or means other. far as it restrained liberty for any cause
wise to maintain themselves, who refuse except actual crime, was in violation of
or neglect to do so, live a dissolute, va- the Bill of Rights. People v. Turner, 10
grant life, and exercise no ordinary call- Am. Law Reg. (N. s.) 366, and approving
ing or lawful business sufficient to gain note of Judge Redfield ; s. C. 55 Ill. 280 ;
an honest livelihood," does not violate People v. Weissenbach (power to bind out
the constitutional right to “life and lib- children), 60 N. Y. 385.
erty," or the right, in “criminal proceed- 1 Municipality v. Blanc, 1 La. An. 385.
ings, to be heard by counsel, confronted (1846); Case v. Hall, 21 Ill. 632; Common-
with witnesses," &c. The court did not wealth v. Bean, 14 Gray (Mass.), 52; Com-
regard it as a criminal proceeding, but as monwealth v. Curtis, 9 Allen (Mass.),
a reformatory or correctional ove, so far 266; Roberts v. Ogle, 30 Ill. 459; McKee
as the person proceeded against was con- v. McKee, 8 B. Mon. (Ky.) 433 (1848);
cerned, and designed to protect the com- Waco v. Powell (hogs at large), 32 Texas,
munity from becoming chargeable with 258 (1869); Cartersville v. Lanham, 67 Ga.
the person's support.
Nott's Case, 11 753 ; ante, sec. 321, note; supra, sec. 348.
Me. (2 Fairf.) 208 (1834); S. P. Portland Construction of ordinance prohibiting the
v. Bangor, 42 Me. 403 (1856), Rice, J., suffering of animals to run at large, and
dissenting. It is now admitted by the what must be shown to subject a person to
Supreme Court of Maine that this statute liability under such an ordinance. Col-
is in conflict with the 14th amendment of linsville v. Scanland, 58 Ill. 221 (1871) ;
the Constitution, “That no State shall Kinder v. Gillespie, 63 Ill. 88 (1872).
deprive any person of life, liberty,” &c., % Independence v. Moore, 32 Mo. 392
“ without due process of law," and that (1862); St. Louis v. Schoenbush, 95 Mo.
Nott's Case and Portland v. Bangor, supra, 618 (1888).
are no longer the law. Now there can be 8 Comm’rs of Ashville v. Means, 7 Ire.
no restraint of liberty without first hav. (N. C. Law) 406 (1847); Burnett, In re,
ing a judicial investigation of the charge. 30 Ala. 461 (1857); post, chap. xix.
472
§ 405
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
$ 404 (337). General Welfare Clause continued. — The general
welfare clause, in a charter empowering the city council to pass
such other ordinances as appear necessary for the security of the
city, authorizes an ordinance regulating the mode of keeping and the
sale of gunpowder, within the limits of the corporation, such as re-
quiring all gunpowder brought into the city to be conveyed to the
public magazine of the city, except when it is to be retailed, and
then to be kept in limited quantities and in secure canisters. And
it was so held, notwithstanding the point was made in argument
that the general welfare clause in the charter could not enlarge the
powers of the corporation further than is necessary to carry into
effect the specific grants of power.
$ 405 (338). Public Safety; Fire Limits. — Municipal corpora-
tions, with general power to provide for the safety of their inhabi-
tants, may prohibit the throwing of heavy or dangerous articles from
the upper stories of buildings into the streets or open spaces near
them, where persons are in the habit of passing; and may, where
this is consistent with the general and special legislation applicable to
the municipality, establish fire limits, and prevent erection therein
of wooden buildings.2
1 Williams v. Augusta City Council, 4 tract to build was made before the passage
Ga. 509 (1848); Frederick v. Augusta of the ordinance. In Pye v. Peterson, 45
City Council, 5 Ga. 561, where the charter Tex. 312 (1876); s. C. 23 Am. Rep. 608,
of Augusta is more fully given.
the conclusion was reached in view of the
In Californix it has been held that, legislation of the State that a general grant
under such a power, a municipality may of power to a city “to ordain such ordi-
prohibit the carrying on of a laundry Dances, not inconsistent with the laws of
within the city limits in any building not the State, as shall be needful for the govern-
constructed of brick or stone. Matter of ment, interests, welfare, and good order of
Yick Wo, 68 Cal. 294 ; and in Missouri a the corporation," did not authorize the
city may, under the general welfare clause, city to establish fire limits and to prevent
prohibit cruelty to animals. St. Louis v. the erection of wooden buildings within
Schoenbusch, 95 Mo. 618 (1888).
such limits. The text is referred to, and
2 City Council v. Elford, 1 McMullan, it is admitted that it is supported by Wad.
(S. C.), Law, 234 (1841); Brady v. N. W. leigh v. Gilman, and, on the other hand,
Insurance Co., 11 Mich. 425 ; Douglass the Mayor of Hudson v. Thorne is con-
v. Commonwealth, 2 Rawle (Pa.), 262; sidered as opposed to it. Of course the
Wadleigh v. Gilman, 12 Me. 403 ; Van- question in each case must be decided in
derbilt v. Adams, 7 Cow. (N. Y.) 349, 352, view of all the legislation of the State
per Woodruff, J., arguendo. Charleston bearing upon it. The text in this edition
v. Reed, 27 W. Va. 681, quoting text; has been slightly modified. The preven.
King v. Davenport, 98 Ill. 305; Baum- tion of fires in towns and cities is pecu-
gartner v. Hasty, 100 Ind. 575 ; Klingler liarly a matter for local regulation, and is
v. Bickel, 117 Pa. St. 326; Knoxville v. universally so regarded. Ante, secs. 141,
Bird, 12 Lea, 121 ; holding also that the 143. It belongs to the ordinary police
exercise of this power does not "impair powers of a city; and unless such a course
the obligation of a contract,” where a con- is inconsistent with the legislation of the
§ 406
473
ORDINANCES : PUBLIC SAFETY ; HOISTWAYS.
§ 406 (339). Public Safety; Hoistways. — Under authority to
make police regulations, or to pass by-laws for the good rule and
State touching the subject (as Mr. Jus- be brought against any person about to
tice Gould shows it to have been in Texas), erect a wooden building contrary to its
it seems to us to be presumptively author. provisious. Waupun v. Moore, 34 Wis.
ized by a general grant of power to provide 450 (1874); s. c. 17 Am. Rep. 446. Lyon,
for the safety and welfare of the in- J., says that “ equity will not lend its
habitants.
aid to enforce by injunction the by-laws
A power to establish fire limits should or ordinances of a municipal corporation,
be strictly construed in favor of the owners restraining an act, unless the act is shown
of buildings which are subject to be re- to be a nuisance per se. High on Injunc.
moved. Louisville v. Webster, 108 Ill. sec. 788; Hudson v. Thorne, 7 Paige, 261;
414.
Phillips v. Allen, 41 Pa. St. 481."
An ordinance establishing fire limits is In Massachusetts, on the other hand,
not in violation of the Fourteenth Amend. a city or town is held entitled to main-
ment to the United States Constitution ; tain a bill in equity to prevent the carry-
nor is it oppressive, unreasonable, oring on of trades or occupations therein
special in its operation ; it is not an un- which are intrinsically nuisances, con-
warrantable delegation of power to muni. trary to the regulations which the town
cipal officers. Ex parte Fiske, 72 Cal. or city, by delegated authority from the
125. An ordinance prohibiting the erec- legislature, is authorized to make. Win-
tion of wooden buildings within prescribed throp v. Farrar (offensive trade), 11 Allen
limits does not violate either the Consti- (Mass.), 398. So where a statute pro-
tution of Pennsylvania or the Fourteenth hibited the use, in cities and towns of a
Amendment to the Constitution of the specified size, of any building not then so
United States. Klingler v. Bickel, 117 in use, for carrying on the business of
Pa. St. 326. In an action of trespass the “slaughtering cattle,” &c., without the
officers of a city may justify the demolition permission of the municipal or town
of a wooden building in course of construc- authorities, it was held that the act was
tion in violation of the ordinance. Ibid., constitutional as an exercise of the police
distinguishing Fields v. Stokley, 99 Pa. power, and that the town or city night,
St. 306.
in the corporate name, file a bill in equity
A court of equity will not enjoin the to restrain the use of a building therein
erection of a wooden building within the for the prohibited purpose, where the
fire limits although such erection is for required consent of the local authorities
bidden by ordinance. St. Johns (village had not been obtained. Watertown v.
of) v. McFarlan, 33 Mich. 72 (1875); S. C. Mayo, 109 Mass. 305 (1872); S. C. 12 Am.
20 Am. Rep. 671. Marston, J. says : “A Rep. 694. No solid reason, in the au-
court of chancery has no jurisdiction to thor's judgment, exists, why, in proper
restrain the threatened violation of a cases, a municipal corporation may not
village ordinance, unless the act threat resort to a court of equity to aid it in
ened to be done, if carried out, will be a enforcing its public duties to preserve
nuisance. If a proper ordinance was the health and property of the inhabi-
framed with an appropriate penalty, we tants ; and by proper cases is meant those
think the remedy at law would be found which fall within some recognized bead of
adequate." Compare City Council v. equity jurisdiction. Ante, sec. 375, note.
Louisville &c. R. R. Co. (Ala.), 4 Southern In Connecticut, where the city charter
Rep. 626; see Forcheimer v Port of authorized the common council of a city
Mobile (Ala.), Ib. 112.
to make ordinances to protect a city from
Whether the municipality may resort to fire, and to establish districts within
equity to aid it in enforcing its public which it should not be lawful without a
duties : Equity will not enjoin, at the in- license to erect, enlarge, or place any
stance of the municipality itself, even wooden building, the council passed an
where the ordinance directs such a suit to ordinance establishing a fire district and
.
474
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
§ 406
within the fire limits of a city in violation part the expense of issuing and recording
government of the corporation, it has the power to require hoistways
inside of stores (usually places of public resort) to be enclosed by a
forbidding the erection or placing of any Where the ordinance passed under the
wooden building therein, without license authority above referred to provided that
given by the board of aldermen, declaring no person shall build or enlarge any
that such building should be deemed a building within the fire limits, without a
common nuisance, and making it the license first issued by the fire marshal,
duty of certain officers after reasonable for which a license fee of fifty cents was re-
notice, to abate it; and it was held that quired to be paid, it was held that the
the ordinance was fully authorized by the license fee thus required was not a reve-
charter and was reasonable.
Hine .
nue tax, in any proper sense, but rather a
New Haven, 40 Conn. 478 (1873). In the reasonable sum collected of the party
case of a building erected without license interested for the purpose of defraying in
of such an ordinance, it is not sufficient the license, and that the power to require
reason for the interference of a court of such a fee was conferred by the charter
equity by injunction, at the instance of the by intendment, as convenient, if not essen-
owner, that he had obtained the consent tial to full enjoyment of the powers ex.
individually of a majority of the alder- pressly granted. Welch v. Hotchkiss, 39
men, notice being given him that the Conn. 140 (1872).
board when in session might refuse its As to license fee, see ante, secs, 357, 358;
assent, as it afterwards did ; nor that he Kinsley v. Chicago, 124 Ill. 359 (1888),
had, after placing the building, covered holding that a license fee may be exacted
it with a sheathing of iron and tinned the under a mere power to regulate a calling
roof, before proceedings were instituted or business without express power of taxa-
against him, and had by further work tion. Such a fee is not illegal for being
upon it during the pendency of the pro- in excess of the necessary or probable ex-
ceedings made it substantially fire-proof. pense of issuing the license and inspecting
The city authorities were considered by the business. In Chicago v. Phoenix Ins.
the court to be the proper judges as to Co., 126 Ill. 276 (1888), it was held that
how far these facts should affect their an ordinance prohibiting foreign insur-
action. The court expressed the further ance companies from doing business in a
view that the prompt enforcement of an city, without taking out a license which
ordinance establishing fire limits in a called for the payment of two per cent of
city is important to the public safety, their gross receipts from business done in
and a court of equity ought not to inter- the city, was not sustainable as an exercise
fere, in a case like that before the court, of the police power granted to the city by
by injunction to prevent such enforce- its charter. New Orleans v. Great South
ment, but leave the party aggrieved to Tel. Co., 40 La. An. 41 ; State v. Hilbert
his legal remedy, if he is entitled to any (license fees on cars), 72 Wis. 184 ;
remedy. Nor was it a reason for the in- 39 North West. Rep. 326. Post, chap. on
terference of chancery that the building Taxation.
erected in such fire limits had become real Instance of a want of power to restrict
estate, since it had become so by the un- erection of wooden buildings. Hudson v.
lawful act of the owner, and was such only Thorne, 7 Paige, 261 ; Pye v. Peterson, 4
in the most technical sense, and the value Tex. 312; Alexander v. Greenville T. C.,
of the building could be easily ascertained 54 Miss. 659; approving text.
Cities
and proved. Ib. City enjoined at instance may constitutionally be authorized to pre-
of owner from such an enforcement of fire vent the erection of wooden buildings in cer-
limit ordinance as would violate the owner's tain portionsthereof. Respublicav. Duquet,
legal rights. City Council v. Louisville 2 Yeates (Pa.), 493. In Wadleigh v. Gil-
&c. R. R. Co. (Ala. ), 4 South Rep. 626. man, supra, it was decided that the removal
Compare Dunham v. New Britain (Conn.), of a wooden building to the prohibited dis-
11 At. Rep. 354.
trict, or even from one part of the district
S. C.
!
§ 407
475
ORDINANCES : PRESERVATION OF ORDER.
railing, and closed by a trap-door after business hours each day. It
was justly regarded as a reasonable police regulation not unneces-
sarily interfering with private rights. I
§ 407 (340). Preservation of Order. — Power “to prevent dis-
turbances and disorderly assemblages, and maintain the good gov-
ernment of the city,” authorizes it to take measures to preserve the
peace and to protect the lives and property of the citizens, and the
acts of the city in procuring a loan of arms and giving a bond for
their return are valid and binding upon it.? Authority to preserve
the peace and quiet of the place authorizes an ordinance forbidding
nance,
.
to another, was an “erection " within the
Hines v. Charlotte (Mich.), 40
meaning of the term “erection," as used N. W. Rep. 333 ; post, chap. xxiii.
in the ordinance. “The mischief,” says 1 Mayor, &c. of New York v. Wil-
Weston, C. J., “did not consist in the act liams, 15 N. Y. 502 (1859). Johnson, J.,
of erecting, but in the continuance of the observes :
observes : “ The danger is not confined to
erection. The ordinance did not meddle the owner and ordinary occupants of the
with erections as they stood ; this would building. The ordinance, in that respect,
have transcended their power." Differ- stands on the same footing as a regulation
ence between “erecting” and “repair prohibiting a well or cistern in a man's
ing." Brady v. N. W. Ins. Co., 11 Mich. yard unprotected by curb or cover, the
425, 449, opinion of Campbell, J.; City reasonableness of which could not be
Council v. Louisville &c. R. Co. (Ala.), 4 doubted. In case of fire, these openings
South. Rep. 626 ; Carroll v. Lynchburg would tend directly and powerfully to
(Va.), 6 South East. Rep. 133; Brown allow the fire to extend through all parts
v. Hunn, 27 Conn. 332 ; Booth v. State, 4 of the building, and if left uncovered,
Conn. 65; Tuttle v. State, 16. 68; Stewart would also tend to endanger those whom
v. Commonwealth, 10 Watts (Pa.), 306. duty might require to enter to effect the
Remedy against wrong-doer, by private extinguishment of the fire." Paige, J.,
action in favor of an adjoining owner
considered the ordinance the same in
specially injured by a violation of a stat principle as fire laws, prescribing the
ute in relation to the erection of wooden height, thickness of walls, and materials
buildings. Aldrich v. Howard, 7 R. I. of buildings within the city.
199. See Index - Fire. Ante, sec. 109. 2 State v. Buffalo, 2 Hill (N. Y.), 434
A municipal corporation has inherent (1842); New Orleans v. Costello, 14 La.
power, independent of legislative grant, to An. 37. An ordinance against disorderly
forbid the erection within the densely built conduct has no reference to a simple tres.
up parts of a town, and compel the removal pass on a vacant lot, though committed
therefrom, of buildings formed of combus- in an attempt to assert an adverse right
tible materials. Monroe v. Hoffman, 29 to the property. Mobile v. Barton, 47
La. An. 651. An ordinance prohibiting Ala. 84 (1872). A municipal legislative
-the erection or enlargement of any building body, empowered by law to prohibit or
except with brick or stone ; that no wooden suppress practices against good morals or
building should be enlarged without a per- public decency, may, by ordinance, punish
mit from the local authorities, was sus- the utterance of profane language, whether
tained. McCloskey v. Kreling (Cal.), 18 uttered frequently or only once by the
Pac. Rep. 433 (1888). A municipality is same person. The decision of the council
under no implied or common-law liability that the use of profane language is against
in damages for a loss caused by a fire ori- good morals will not be judicially reviewed.
ginating in a wooden building erected and Delaney, In re, 43 Cal. 478 (1872).
maintained in known violation of an ordi.
476
§ 408
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
“all disorderly shouting, dancing, &c., in the streets and public
places,” though such conduct violates no existing State law.?
Mode of enforcing Ordinances.
§ 408 (341). In England; Civil Actions and Complaints. In the
old corporations in England, by-laws were usually made in virtue of
their implied power; they did not extend to matters criminal in
their nature, and could only be enforced, unless by virtue of a stat-
ute or valid custom, by fines, or pecuniary penalties, commonly for
a small sum, and always, or almost always, in a fixed or certain
amount. So, by the Municipal Corporations Act of 1835, the
council are empowered to make such by-laws as to them shall seem
meet for the good rule and government of the borough, and for the
prevention and suppression of all such nuisances as are not punish-
able by act of parliament in force in the borough, and to appoint
such fines as they shall deem necessary for the prevention and sup-
pression of such offences, with the proviso that no fines shall exceed
the sum of five pounds. The act provides that prosecutions for a
breach of by-laws made under it shall be commenced within three
months after the commission of the offence; that the charge shall
be made on oath; that a summons shall issue and be served, with
power to the magistrate to proceed without the appearance of the
defendant, or to issue a warrant for his arrest; that if convicted, the
penalty shall be paid, either immediately or within such period as
the magistrate shall think fit; that it may be levied by distress and
sale of the goods and chattels of the offender, and for want of suf-
ficient distress the offender may be imprisoned for a term not ex-
ceeding one month; the imprisonment to cease upon payment of
the sum due. It is suggested that the remedy thus prescribed is
cumulative, and will not de bar the corporation from availing itself
1 Washington v. Frank, 1 Jones (N. C.) held valid. Lane, ex parte, 76 Cal. 587;
Law, 436; State v. Debnam, 98 N. C. S. C. 18 Pac. Rep. 677.
712; State v. Cainan, 94 N. C. 880; 2 Gee v. Wilden, Lutw. 1320, 1324 ;
construction of ordinance in respect to Wood v. Searl, J. Bridg. 139; Piper v.
disturbing public peace.
Charivari, St. Chappell, 14 M. & W. 624; Rawlinson
Charles v. Meyer, 58 Mo. 86. As to what on Corp. 665, note. Post, sec. 424 et seq.
regulations of this kind are necessary, See post, chapter on Municipal Courts,
“much,” says the court, “must be left to sects. 426, 427, 432 et seq.
the judgment and discretion" of the 8 5 and 6 Wm. IV., chap. lxxvi., sec.
corporate authorities. Washington v. 90. Ante, secs. 35, 336, 337, 393 ; post,
Frank, 1 Jones (N. C.) Law, 436 ; ante,
sec. 319; State v. Bill, 13 Ire. (N. C. 4 5 and 6 Wm. IV., chap. lxxvi., seco
Law), 378; post, chap. xiii. Ordinance 139; secs. 187-193; supra, sec. 266.
prohibiting the visiting of gambling houses
sec. 426.
§ 410
477
ORDINANCES : ACTIONS TO ENFORCE.
of the usual common-law mode of enforcing a by-law by action of
debt or assumpsit. But the point seems not to have been yet
adjudged.
§ 409 (342). Same subject. — Aside from statutory regulation, ,
the general method of enforcing a by-law in England is, as just
stated, by bringing, in the name of the proper party or corporation,
an action, in the proper court, against the person who has violated
the by-law, to recover the penalty which it imposes; and this action
may be either debt or assumpsit. By the common law, assumpsit may
be maintained for the breach of any duty which the defendant has
been legally liable to perform in favor of the plaintiff
, the law imply-
ing a promise to perform the particular act, and hence no principle
was violated in holding that assumpsit would lie to recover the penalty
of a by-law. As the penalty was for a sum certain, and was con-
sidered to be in the nature of liquidated damages, an action of debt
would also lie to recover the amount of the penalty ; but where the
by-law itself provided that the penalty should be recovered by debt,
then that form of action alone could be maintained. But, aside
from statute authority or a valid custom, it was not competent for
the by-law to provide that its penalty should be recovered by “dis-
tress and sale” of goods, that being contrary to the common law.?
§ 410 (343). Same subject. In America. — In this country, the
courts hold that where the mode of enforcement is prescribed by the
charter, that mode must be pursued ; 3 but if the mode or form of
1 Rawlinson on Corp. (5th ed.) 167, 213, per Nott, J. ; Brookville v. Gagle, 73
note. See Adley v. Reeves, 2 Maule & Ind. 117 ; supra, secs. 336–346.
Sel. 61 ; Bodwic v. Fennell, 1 Wils. 233. 8 Weeks v. Forman, 1 Harris. (N. J.)
On the other hand, Mr. Grant is of opin- 237 (1837); State v. Zeigler, 3 Vroom (32
ion that the remedy prescribed by the N. J. L.), 262; Ewbanks v. Ashley, 36
act is exclusive, and supersedes the com- II. 177 (1864); Israel v. Jacksonville, 1
mon-law remedy of debt or assumpsit Scam. (2 Ill.) 290 ; Williamson 2. Com-
for the amount of the fine or penalty. monwealth, 4 B. Mon. (Ky.) 146, 151
Grant on Corp. 364 ; supra, secs. 337, (1843). An action may be brought for
341.
the fines and penalties incurred for the
2 Willc. 164–181 ; 1 Saund. Pl. & Ev. violation of ordinances, and it is not
683; 2 Wheat. Selw. 1178; 2 Chitty Pl. necessary that the fine be assessed before
401, where form of declaration in debt is the suit is brought. King v. Jacksonville,
given ; Adley v. Reeves, 2 M. & S. 60. 2 Scain. (3 Ill.) 306. In Weeks v. Fore.
The law implies a promise on the part of man, 1 Harris. (N. J.) 237 (1837), it was
a corporator to pay all penalties incurred held that although certain corporate offi-
for his violation of by-laws; and if the cers were ex-officio justices of the peace
mode of enforcing such penalties is not within the city, with power to take cogni.
pointed out, the corporation may sue zance of violations of by-laws, they could
therefor in any competent court. Colum. not entertain or try actions of debt, to
bia v. Harrison, 2 Mill Const. (8. C.) recover a debt or penalty for a breach of
478
§ 410
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
action is not prescribed, then the recovery of the penalty or fine for
the violation of a valid municipal ordinance may be as at common
law, by an action of debt or assumpsit, or where these forms are abro-
gated, by a civil action in substance the same. And where such
an action is brought, the proceeding is civil and not criminal, and
the rules of procedure in civil cases, unless otherwise provided, are
applicable to it. The penalties to ordinances are often fixed upon
a movable scale; and this would appear to be done under the sup-
position that they will be enforced, not by a common-law action in
the common-law courts to recover the amount of the penalty, but by
a complaint or proceeding before the proper municipal magistrate,
who will, within the prescribed limits, determine the amount of the
fine or penalty to be paid, by reference to the circumstances of the
particular case.3
an ordinance, although it was conceded ableness of an ordinance fixing a fine with-
that they had jurisdiction of the quasi in the prescribed statutory limit. Haynes
criminal proceeding founded upon a com- v. Cape May, 50.N. J. L. 55; s. 0. 11
plaint or information, resulting in what is Cent. Rep. 578.
. If the statute under
technically called a conviction ; but quære. which the conviction takes place applies
Supra, secs. 336–353.
the penalty with certainty, it is suffi-
1 Ewbanks v. Ashley, 36 Ill. 178 (1864); cient for the justice to award the penalty
Israel v. Jacksonville, 1 Scam. (2 Ill.) to be paid and applied according to law.
290 ; Coates v. Mayor, 7 Cow. (N. Y.) Queen v. Barrett, 1 Salk. 383; The
585, 608 (1827). Unless it is otherwise King v. Seale, 8 East, 573 ; The King v.
provided by statute or charter, it is con- Thompson, 2 T. R. 18; The King v.
sidered that corporations have an inherent Hyde, 21 L. J. Mag. Cas. 94 ; Boothroyd,
power to provide for the recovery of a In re, 15 M. & W. 1; The Queen v. Crid-
penalty by an action of debt in their own land, 7 E. & B. 853; The Queen v. John-
courts. Hesketh v. Braddock, 3 Burr. son, 8 Q. B. 102 ; see also The King v.
1858 ; Barter v. Commonwealth, 3 Pa. Glossop, 4 B. & Ald. 616; Brown v. Nichol.
(Pen. & W.) 253. Where a city, by ordi- son, 5 C. B. N. S. 468; Seamen's Hos-
nance, requires the taking out of licenses pital v. Liverpool, 4 Ex. 180 ; Wray
to carry on business, it has no right of Ellis, 1 E. & E. 276. If there be any
action for the amount of such licenses be material variance between the conviction
fore they are taken out, but is confined and the statute as to the appropriation of
to enforcing the penalty for doing business the penalty, the conviction will be bad.
without license. Santa Cruz v. Santa Griffith v. Harries, 2 M. & W. 335; Chad-
Cruz R. R. Co., 56 Cal. 143 ; supra, sec. dock v. Wilbraham et al., 5 C. B. 645;
341.
Harr. Munic. Man. (Canada), 5th ed. 313,
2 Ib. ; Municipality v. Cutting, 4 La. 314. A city ordinance prescribing a terni
An. 335 ; Lewiston v. Proctor, 27 Ill. 414 of imprisonment which may, but does not
(1860); Quincy v. Ballance, 30 Ill. 185; necessarily exceed that authorized by the
Davenport v. Bird, 34 Iowa, 524 (1872); Constitution, may be enforced within the
Williamson v. Commonwealth, 4 B. Mon. constitutional linit. Keokuk v. Dressell,
(Ky.) 146, 151 (1843); Jenkins v. Chey- 47 Iowa, 597. Ordinance held void because
enne, 1 Wy. Ter. 287 ; St. Louis v. Vert, the fine or penalty was uncertain in amount,
81 Mo. 204 ; Miller v. O'Reilly, 84 Ind. the provision being that the offender should
168 ; Brophy v. Perth Araboy, 44 N. J. L. be fined not exceeding five dollars, and one
217, approving text.
dollar for each day's neglect to do a certain
8 Ante, secs. 337, 341. Conrt held not act. State v. Rice (N. C.), 2 Southeast.
to be authorized to inquire into the reason- Rep. 180.
§ 411
479
ORDINANCES : PROCEEDINGS TO ENFORCE.
§ 411 (344). Nature of Proceeding, Civil or Criminal. Where,
instead of a civil action to recover the pecuniary fine or penalty, the
proceeding is in the nature of a complaint for the violation of the
ordinance, this has sometimes been considered to be a criminal or
quasi criminal, and not a civil, proceeding. The cases on this sub-
ject are not harmonious, but the difference in them depends, to a
large extent, upon the character of the act or offence charged, the
nature of the charter, and of the legislation in the particular State
as to the extent of jurisdiction intended to be conferred upon the
municipal authorities. The Constitution of Georgia declares that
“ trial by jury, as heretofore used in this State, shall remain invio-
late." It was claimed that the legislature could not constitutionally
confer on the city council the power to pass an ordinance inflicting
a fine for its violation, where the guilt of a party was to be tried by
the council, without a jury. The court held that the objection was
not sound, observing that violations of ordinances are not criminal
cases within the meaning of the State Constitution, and “that, inas-
much as the right of trial by jury existed in England, and was
secured by Magna Charta, and municipal corporations in that couu-
try enforced their by-laws by pecuniary penalties in a summary
manner, and the same right being conferred upon similar corpora-
tions in this State anterior to the adoption of the Constitution, and
constantly exercised, 'the right of trial by jury, as heretofore used
in this State,' was not violated by the city council of Augusta, by
the imposition of the penalty for the breach of the local police regu-
lations of that city.” 2
1 Wayne County v. Detroit, 17 Mich. R. M. Charlt. (Ga.) 316 ; Flint River
390 ; People v. Detroit, 18 Mich. 445 ; Steamboat Co. v. Foster, 5 Ga. 194; Floyd
Davenport v. Bird, 34 Iowa, 524 (1872) ; v. Comm'rs, &c., 14 Ga. 354; ante, sec.
Charleston v. Oliver, 16 S. C. 47, which 432 et seq., and notes ; Kip v. Paterson,
was an action for carrying on business 2 Dutch. (N. J.) 298 ; Keeler v. Milledge,
without license, in which the municipal 4 Zab. (24 N. J. L.) 142; Shafer v.
court held the defendant liable “for the Mumma, 17 Md. 331.
“Summary con-
amount of the license and penalty, and, victions for petty offences against stat-
in default of payment, to an imprisonment utes were always sustained, and they were
of thirty days." The court said that never supposed to be in conflict with the
“where, as in this case, no mode of en- common-law right to a trial by jury."
forcement is prescribed by the charter, we Per Strong, J., Byers v. Commonwealth,
see no reason why the mode pursued in 42 Pa. St. 89, 94 (1862). In the case
this case is not sufficient," citing the text. last cited, the extent of the right of jury
See chapter on Municipal Courts, post, trial at common law is learnedly examined
sec. 427, and note, sec. 432 et seq., and by Mr. Justice Strong. See, also, Dun-
notes ; supra, secs. 347, 366, 368, and more's Appeal, 52 Pa. St. 374 ; Rhines v.
note.
Clark, 51 Pa. St. 96 (1865). Compare
2 Williams v. Augusta (gunpowder or Plimpton v. Somerset, 33 Vt. 283 (1860);
dinance), 4 Ga. 509 (1848), per Warner, sea post, Municipal Courts, sec. 432 et seq.
J., approving Low v. Comm’rs of Pilotage, History of Courts of Summary Juris.
480
§ 412
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
§ 412 (345). Same subject. In Massachusetts. On the other
hand, in Massachusetts, prosecutions for breaches of by-laws or ordi-
nances made to enforce police regulations are regarded as substan-
tially public prosecutions, and in such prosecutions it is competent,
though confessed not to be very just, to disallow the defendant
costs. Applying this doctrine, it is held that a statute providing
that prosecutions for violations of city ordinances in the name of
the State or commonwealth is not unconstitutional, notwithstanding
the result is that the defendant does not recover costs on acquittal.1
diction in England and extent of their Similar observations in relation to making
powers under the Summary Jurisdiction sidewalks, by Ford, J., in Paxson v. Sweet,
Act of 1879, see 1 Stephen, Hist. of Crim- 1 J. S. Green (N. J.), 200 (1832). So, in
inal Law, chap. iv. A statute requiring New Hampshire, a public prosecution for
security for costs, in prosecutions for an offence made penal by a city ordinance
“penal statutes,” does not embrace pros- because of its supposed evil consequences
ecutions under city ordinances which im- to society
as, for example, the offence
pose penalties for their violation, such of unlawfully keeping a bowling-alley -
ordinances not being "statutes" within is considered to be a criminal, and not a
the meaning of the act. Lewiston v. civil, proceeding. State v. Stearns, 11
Proctor, 27 Ill. 414 (1860); S. P. Quincy Fost. (31 N. H.) 106 (1855). In Ala-
Ballance, 30 Ill. 185. Further, as to bama such a prosecution is considered
the nature of the proceeding and kind of quasi criminal, and the defendant cannot
process. Alton v. Kirsch, 68 Ill. 261 testify in his own behalf as he may in a
(1873); and see, also, Municipality v. civil action. Mobile v. Jones, 42 Ala.
Cutting, 4 La. An. 335; Ewbanks v. 630 (1868); Fink v. Milwaukee, 17 Wis.
Ashley, 36 Ill. 177 ; Wayne County 26 (1863), is decided upon the basis that
v. Detroit, 17 Mich. 390 ; People v. De- a prosecution of a party for the violation
troit, 18 Mich. 445, construing the phrase of a city ordinance, where the penalty is a
“penal laws,” as used in the Michigan fine, is a criminal prosecution to which
Constitution. Phrase "municipal fine," the Bill of Rights applies, which declares
in the Constitution of California, con- that “in all criminal prosecutions, the
strued. People v. Johnson, 30 Cal. 98 accused shall be entitled to demand the
(1866). Violations of ordinances impos- nature and cause of the accusation against
ing fines and penalties are in the nature him.” But a principle so broad, it is be-
of torts, and actions for such violations lieved by the author, can hardly be main-
may be prosecuted against one or more tained where the act charged is not a crime
of the offending parties; they need not all at common law or in its essential nature.
be joined. Jacksonville v. Holland, 19 See chapter on Municipal Courts, post.
Ill. 271 (1857). The defendant in such In Indiana an action to recover the pen-
a prosecution cannot raise the question alty of a by-law, though a warrant for
whether the charter of the city is forfeit- the arrest of the defendant be issued and
ed. Whalin v. Macomb, 76 Ill. 49 (1874). served, is considered to be a civil suit, and
1 Goddard, In re, 16 Pick. (Mass.) 504 governed by the rules of practice in such
(1835); Commonwealth v. Worcester, 3 suits. Goshen v. Croxton, 34 Ind. 239
Pick. (Mass.) 462. “If,” says Chief Jus- (1870), and notes.
tice law, in the case first cited, "the In Emporia v. Volmer, 12 Kan. 622
prosecution were to enforce a private right (1874), it was decided that the provision
by the city, there would be weight in the of the Constitution, that all prosecutious
objection, and it would stand on different shall be in the name of the State, did not
grounds." 16 Pick. 508 ; see Common- include prosecutions by a municipality in
wealth v. Gay, 5 Pick. (Mass.) 44 ; Com- its own courts for a violation of its ordi-
monwealth v. Fahey, 5 Cush. (Mass.) 408. nances, and that such prosecutions might
§ 413
-481
ORDINANCES : MODE OF PLEADING.
§ 413 (346). Mode of pleading Ordinances. The courts, unless
they are the courts of the municipality, do not judicially notice the ordi-
nances of a municipal corporation, unless directed by charter or statute
to do so. Therefore, such ordinances, when sought to be enforced by
action, or when set up by the defendant as a protection, should be
set out or stated in substance in the pleading. It has been some-
times decided that it is not sufficient that they be referred to gener-
ally by the title or section. It is, however, believed to be sufficient,
in the absence of special legislative provision prescribing the manner
of pleading, to set forth the legal substance of that part of the ordi-
nance alleged to have been violated, it being advisable, for purposes
of identification, to refer also to the title, date, and section. The
liberal rules of pleading and practice which characterize modern
judicial proceedings should extend to, and doubtless would be held
to embrace, suits and prosecutions to enforce the by-laws or ordinances
of municipal corporations.?
be in the name of the municipality. But nox's Case, 1 Vent. 196 ; Barber Surgeons
in Neitzelv. Concordia, 14 Kan. 446 v. Pelson, 2 Lev. 252 ; Norris v. Staps,
(1875), it was held, without professing to
Hob. 211. In Conboy v. Iowa City, 2
overrule the previous decision, that a pros- Iowa, 90, it was held that the mayor, on
ecution in a municipal court, under a city whom was conferred exclusive jurisdic-
ordinance, for a matter made penal by tion of the violation of the ordinances of
the laws of the State or because of its evil the city, was authorized to take judicial
consequences, was a criminal proceeding. notice, ex officio, of the city ordinances.
Whether the rule would be the same if The provision of a city charter that its
the prosecution was to enforce a private published and printed ordinances shall be
right of the city, the court left open for received in evidence in all courts without
further consideration. Ante, secs. 366- proof does not dispense with the neces-
369; post, secs. 429, 432.
sity of making them part of the record in
1 See ante, sec. 83.
Elizabethtown v. order to bring them to the knowledge of
Leffler, 23 Ill. 90; Mooney v. Kennett, 19 an appellate court. Cox v. St. Louis, 11
Mo. 551 (1854); New Orleans v. Boudro, 14 Mo. 431 (1848); New Orleans v. Boudro,
La. An. 303 (1859); Harker v. Mayor, 17 14 La. An. 303 (1859).
Wend. (N. Y.) 199 (1837) ; Case v. Mo- 2 Harker V. New York, 17 Wend.
bile, 30 Ala. 538 (1857); People v. Mayor, (N. Y.) 199 (1837). Text cited, Emporia
&c. of New York, 7 How. Pr. R. (N. Y.) v. Volmer, 12 Kan. 622, 628 (1874). See
81 (1851); Cox v. St. Louis, 11 Mo. 431 Stokes v. Corporation of New York, 14
(1848); Garvin v. Wells, 8 Iowa, 286; Wend. (N. Y.) 87 ; Mooney v.
(Kennett, ,
Goodrich v. Brown, 30 Iowa, 291 (1870); 19 Mo. 551 (1854); Austin v. Walton, 68
Austin v. Walton, 68 Tex. 507 ; Wheeling Tex. 507; ante, sec. 356, note. In justify.
v. Black, 25 W. Va. 266 ; People v. Bu- ing, the defendant must set out in his plea
chanan, 1 Idaho, 681. In England, when or answer the ordinance, or so much thereof
an action on a by-law founded on a cus- as will show on what the defence rests.
tom is brought in a court of the munici. Ib. ; Keeler v. Milledge, 4 Zabr. (24 N. J.
pality the court will take judicial notice L.) 142 (1857). It is sufficient to set out
of it, but in an action in the Superior the substance of that part of the ordinance
Courts the custom and the by-law must which has been violated, with a reference
be set out, for these courts will not take to the title, date, and section. Ib. Ap-
notice of them. Willc. 166, pl. 403 ; 15. proved, Kip v. Paterson, 2 Dutch. (N. J.)
172, pl. 423 ; Ib. 173, pl. 425; Brad. 298. Regularly, the by-law or its sub-
VOL. I. — 31
482
§ 414
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
§ 414 (347). Requisites of Complaints. -- Under a charter au-
thorizing "complaint" to be made of the violation of ordinances, but
not prescribing the mode or requisites, a complaint is not in the
nature of an information by a common informer, and the same
strictness is not required as in an information or indictment. It
is sufficient if it sets out with clearness the offence charged, and the
substance of that part of the ordinance which has been violated,
with a reference to the title, date, or section.”1
stance should be set forth. Case v. Mo- alleged to be violated, but refers only to
bile, 30 Ala. 538 (1857); Charleston v. the number of the section, the validity of
Chur, 2 Bailey (S. C.), 164. By-law the ordinance was presumed. Frankfort v.
need not be pleaded in full ; complaint is Aughe (Ind.), 15 N. E. Rep. 802. In
sufficient if it refers to the ordinance and North Carolina, it is held not to be neces-
alleges facts showing a violation thereof. sary to set forth an ordinance alleged to
Lane, Ex parte, 76 Cal. 587 ; s. C. 18 Pac. have been violated ; it is sufficient to refer
Rep. 677; infra, sec. 414, note. Defective to it by indicia, pointing it out with rea-
pleading of an ordinance held to be waived sonable certainty. State v. Cainan, 94
by a plea of not guilty and going to trial N. C. 880. Unless required by law or
on the merits. State v. Welch, 21 Minn. ordinance a complaint, not under oath,
22. In England, the by-law itself must will not necessarily vitiate the proceed-
be fully set out in an action of debt upon ings if the magistrate has jurisdiction of
it, and not by way of recital ; but in as- the subject. Alton v. Kirsch, 68 Ill. 261
sumpsit upon the same by-law, latitude is (1873). Several breaches of an ordi-
allowed. Willcock, 173, pl. 425. But in nance may be sued for in one suit, if the
this country it is said that “it is not ne- judgment does not exceed the amount of
cessary to hold to the strictness anciently the magistrate's jurisdiction. Hensoldt v.
required.” Keeler v. Milledge, 4 Zabr. Petersburg, 63 Ill. 111 (1872). Where a
(24 N. J. L.) 142. In Missouri by stat- charter provides that “ a warrant shall
ute, fines and penalties accruing to any issue in favor of a city . for a viola-
town may be recovered by civil action ; tion of any ordinance when, &c., or upon
but the complaint, while it need not con- affirmation by the city attorney, there is
tain all the requisites of an indictinent, no authority for a deputy city attorney
must specify the offence with reasonable to swear to a complaint ; power thus
certainty. St. Louis v. Smith, 10 Mo. provided must be exercised by the city
438. This is the true rule. Hence a attorney in person.” Kansas City v. Flan-
. complaint charging only that "the de- agan, 69 Mo. 22.
fendant committed an offence (naming it] 1 Keeler v. Milledge, 4 Zabr. (24 N. J.
contrary to an ordinance of the town" is L.) 142 (1857).
L.) 142 (1857). Approved, Kip 2. Pater-
insufficient. Memphis v. O'Connor, 53 son, 2 Dutch. (N. J.) 298 ; City Council
Mo. 468 (1873). So a charge that “the de- v. Seeba, 4 Strob. (S. C.) Law, 319 ; Com-
fendant knowingly associated with thieves monwealth v. Bean, Thach. (Mass. Crim.
previous to August 21, 1871," is too vague, Cas.) 85. Compare Fink v. Milwaukee,
no place being named and the names of 17 Wis. 26 (1863); see, also, Common-
the thieves not being given. St. Louis v. wealth v. Bean, 14 Gray (Mass.), 52 ; Deitz
Fitz, 53 Mo. 582 (1873). In Indiana, v. City, 1 Col. 323 ; Napman 1. People,
before the act of 1867, it was necessary to 19 Mich. 352 (1869); Goshen v. Croxton,
file with the complaint a copy of the ordi- 34 Ind. 239 (1870); Frankfort v. Aughe
nance or section thereof alleged to have (Ind.), 15 N. E. Rep. 802 ; Whitson v.
been violated. Green v. Indianapolis, 25 Franklin, 34 Ind. 392 (1870); State v.
Ind. 490; Whitson v. Franklin, 34 Ind. 392 Cainan, 94 N. C. 880; Nodine v. Union,
(1870). On demurrer to a complaint 13 Oreg. 587. Where the process did not
which does not set out the ordinance state what ordinance had been violated,
.
§ 415
483
ORDINANCES: REQUISITES OF COMPLAINTS.
§ 415 (348). Same subject. - In an action or proceeding to re-
cover a penalty for the violation of a by-law or ordinance of a cor-
poration, the declaration or complaint should state facts which make
the liability of the defendant distinctly to appear. And regularly,
cases:
nor the time or manner, the proceedings person is deprived of his liberty without
were held defective. State v. Trenton, 7 due process of law, and because his right
Vroom (36 N. J. L.), 283 ; Henderson- to trial by jury is invaded. The court dis-
ville v. McMinn, 82 N. C. 532. The com- tinguish between an arrest of this kind
plaint need not state the number of the and where the purpose of the arrest is pre-
section violated. Meyer v. Bridgeton, liminary to and contemplates a judicial ex-
8 Vroom (37 N. J. L.) 160. The ordinance anrination. Judson v. Reardon, 16 Minn.
need not be recited in full. Emporia v. 431 (1871). Under the charter of Newark
Volmer, 12 Kan. 622 (1874); Goldthwaite a violator of an ordinance of that city can-
v. Montgomery, 50 Ala. 486 (1874); St. not, without his consent, be brought into
Louis v. Smith, 10 Mo. 438. Supra, sec. court for trial, unless by a warrant or
413, and note. An allegation in a plead- summons. Newark v. Murphy, 40 N. J.
ing that an ordinance was duly passed L. 145; ante, secs. 210, 211 ; Mitchell v.
held to imply, by necessity, that all Lemon, 34 Md. 176 (1870); Butolph v.
essential antecedents for its legal enact- Blust, 5 Lansing (N. Y.), 84 (1871). Re-
ment had been observed. Becker v. Wash- quisites of warrants for the violation of
ington, 94 Mo. 375 (1888). By statute, municipal ordinances. White v. Wash-
prosecutions for the violations of the ington, 2 Cranch Cir. C. 337. Other
ordinances of Boston may be prosecuted
Ib. 356;
Ib. 459; 4 Cranch
in the name of the commonwealth ; and Cir. C. 103 ; Ib. 582; Prells v. Mc-
it is decided that in a complaint for Donald, 7 Kan. 426 (1871). A penalty
such a violation it is not sufficient that it cannot be imposed without notice. Alex-
concludes "against the form of the by- andria v. Bethlehem, 5 Dutch. (N. J.) 375,
laws of the said city," but it must con- 377. Sufficiency of notice to the accused
clude also against the form of the statute. under special charter provisions, Keeler v.
Commonwealth ». Gay, 5 Pick. (Mass.) Milledge, 4 Zabr. (24 N. J. L.) 142. Es-
44 (1827); Commonwealth v. Worcester, sentials of summary convictions. Com-
3 Pick. (Mass.) 462 (1826). Complaint monwealth v. Borden, 61 Pa. St. 272.
must be in the name of the treasurer of the 1 Saund. Pl. & Ev. 324 ; Comyns Dig.
city or town, and not in that of the com- tit. Pleader (2 W. 11); Feltmakers v.
monwealth, for violation of health ordi- Davis, 1 Bos. & Pul. 98 ; Piper v. Chap-
nances, since the statute of 1849. Ch. pell, 14 M. & W. 623 ; Case v. Mobile, 30
ccxi. sec. 7; Commonwealth v. Fahey, 5 Ala. 538 (1857); Coates v. Mayor, 7 Cow.
Cush. (Mass.) 408 (1850). Policemen, (N. Y.) 585, 608 (1827), where the sub
marshals, and other officers of a municipal stance of a declaration in debt is given ;
corporation, where such a course is not re- Charleston v. Chur, 2 Bailey (S. C.), 164;
pugnant to the Constitution or general law Krickle v. Commonwealth, 1 B. Mon.
of the State, may be empowered by an (Ky.) 361 (1841). Pleader need not deg.
ordinance to arrest offenders without war- ative exception in a proviso to the en-
rant, for breaches of ordinances committed acting clause of an ordinance or in a sub-
in their presence. Bryan v. Bates, 15 Ill. sequent section, this being a matter of
87 ; Main v. McCarty, 15 III. 442 ; State defence. Lynch v. People, 16 Mich. 472
v. Lafferty, 5 Harring. (Del.) 491. Ante, (1868). See Roberson v. Lambertville, 9
secs. 210, 211. A city ordinance provid. Vroom (38 N. J. L.), 69; McGear v.
ing that any person who shall refuse to Bridgeton, 4 Vroom (33 N. J. L.), 213;
obey an order at a fire given by any officer Farwell v. Smith, 1 Harr. (N. J.) 133.
duly authorized, "may be arrested and The conviction must be for the same of-
detained in custody until the fire is extin- fence for which the defendant is prosecuted.
guished,” is unconstitutional, because the Columbus v. Arnold, 30 Ga. 517.
484
§ 416
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
as before stated, the by-law should be set forth or its substance
stated, as well as the breach and the plaintiff's right to sue for
the penalty. But where the charter or organic act of the corpora-
tion will be judicially noticed, it cannot be necessary to set out,
as it has been held to be in England, the authority of the corporation
to make the by-law.1
$ 416 (349). Action in Corporate Name ; Prescribed Method to be
strictly followed; Demand; Notice. — Where the penalty is given
in general terms, it is understood to be to the use of the corporation,
and the action or prosecution must be by and in the name of the
corporation. In England, it was the practice, in many cases, to ap-
point in the by-law the penalty to be sued for in the name of the
chamberlain, treasurer, or some other officer of the corporation; and
though the power of thus suing for the penalty could not be
given to a mere stranger, yet it was not absolutely necessary that
the penalty should be given to the corporation, but it might be
given to the informer. 3
Whenever the mode of enforcing obedi-
ence to a by-law is prescribed by such by-law, that mode must be
strictly pursued, and the plaintiff (where the rules of common-
law pleading prevail) must be the party to whom the penalty is
given. Where it is given to the chamberlain for the use of the
corporation, the action must be in the name of the chamberlain, and
not in that of the corporation. And when the chainberlain may
sue, he need not set out his election or appointment, but may aver
generally that he is chamberlain, and set forth his right to sue and
to recover.4 Unless the ordinance show that it was intended that no
action for a penalty should lie without a previous demand, it is not
necessary to aver one.5 Nor is it necessary to aver that the de-
fendant had notice of the ordinance, for this is conclusively pre-
sumed with respect to all on whom it is binding:
6
1 Norris v. Staps, Hob. 211.
4 Harris v. Wakeman, Say. 254 ; Ex-
2 Bodwic v. Fennell, 1 Wils. 233; eter v. Starre, 2 Show. 159. Under con-
Vintners' Co. v. Passey, 1 Burr. 235; stituent act, town treasurer held entitled
Glover, 313 ; 2 Kyd, 157 ; Graves v. Col. to sue in his own name for penalties.
by, 9 Ad. & El. 356 ; Williamson v. Com- Watts v. Scott, 1 Dev. (N. C.) 291; Com-
monwealth, 4 B. Mon. (Ky.) 146, 151 monwealth 2. Fahey, 5 Cush. (Mass.) 408
(1843); ante, chap. viii.
(1850).
8 Glover, 313, 314, 315; Feltmakers' Co. 5 Butchers' Co. v. Bullock, 3 Bos. & P.
v. Davis, 1 B. & P. 101; Bodwic v. Fen- 434, 437.
nell, 1 Wils. 233; Totterdell 2. Glazby, 6 London v. Bernardiston, 1 Lev. 16 ;
2 Wils. 266 ; Hesketh v. Braddock, 3 James v. Putney, Cro. Car. 498.
Burt. 1848 ; Wood v. Searl, Bridg. 141;
Graves v. Colhy, 9 Ad. & El. 356.
§ 419
485
ORDINANCES : PROCEDURE TO ENFORCE.
§ 417 (350). Mode of Procedure, Defences, Evidence, &c. In
prosecutions to enforce ordinances, the ordinary rules of evidence
apply, except so far as specially modified by statute; and it is not
competent for a municipal corporation, without express authority,
to make or alter the rules of evidence or of law.1 It is, however,
competent for a city to provide by general ordinance, after suit com-
menced to recover a penalty for acting without a license, that the
granting of a license, though by its terms it takes effect from a day
previous to the commission of the offence, shall not (as might
otherwise be the case) release or waive the penalty?
§ 418 (351). Corporate Existence not to be questioned in such
actions. - In proceedings to enforce ordinances, the illegality of the
corporate organization cannot be shown to defeat a recovery ; in
such a collateral proceeding, evidence that the corporation is acting
as such is all that is required.
$ 419 (352). Ratification of Illegal Ordinances by Legislature.
The legislature may ratify ordinances not otherwise binding; and
offenders should thereafter be prosecuted under the ordinances, and
not under the validating act.
1 City Council v. Dunn, 1 McCord what its officers had done, will work an
(S. C.), 333; Fitch v. Pinckard, 4 Scam. estoppel. Martel v. East St. Louis, 94 11].
(5 Ill.) 78. The defendant's admission of 67; Roby v. Chicago, 64 Ill. 447; Chi-
a violation of an ordinance is competent cago, R. I. & P. R. Co. v. Joliet, 79
evidence. Columbia v. Harrison, 2 Const III. 39; Logan County v. Lincoln, 81 Ill.
R. (S. C.) 213 (1818).
156.
2 City Council v. Schmidt, 11 Rich. 8 Hamilton v. Carthage, 24 Ill. 22;
(S. C.) Law, 343 ; City Council v. Corleis, Mendota v. Thompson, 20 Ill. 197 ; Coles
2 Bailey (S. C.), 189. Commented on by County v. Allison, 23 Ill. 437; Decorah
O'Neall, J., in City Council v. Feckman, v. Gillis, 10 Iowa, 234; Kettering v. Jack-
3 Rich. (S. C.) Law, 385. And see case sonville, 50 Ill. 39 ; Tisdale v. Minonk,
last cited as to other circumstances, in 46 III. 9 (1867); Hardenbrook v. Ligonier,
which it was held that a prior penalty 95 Ind. 70.
was not waived by a subsequent accept- 4 Truchelut v. City Council, 1 Nott &
ance of the amount of a license for a year. McC. (S. C.) 227 (1818); Lennon v. New
A license granted by a de facto officer York, 55 N. Y. 361 (1874); ante, chap.
of a municipal corporation is valid ; if the iv. sec. 79, and note. Post, sec. 544;
city receives and retains the money, it is Logansport v. Crockett, 64 Ind. 319, ap-
estopped from maintaining an action for proving text. In State v. Plainfield, 9
selling liquor without license. Martel v. Vroom (38 N. J. L.), 95, where an ordi-
East St. Louis, 94 Ill. 67 (1880); S. C. 21 nance was void for want of proper notice
Alb. L. J. 195.
to the persons interested, it was held that
Any positive acts (infra vires) by muni. the error could not be remedied by subse-
cipal officers which may have induced quent legislation. But see cases cited post,
the action of the adverse party, and where sec. 814, note. And in New Jersey also it
it would be inequitable to permit the has been frequently held that the legisla-
corporation to stultify itself, by retracting ture may validate informal or irregular
486
§ 420
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
§ 420 (353). Ordinances to be construed reasonably. - In prose-
cutions or actions to enforce ordinances, or in considering the ques-
tion of their validity, courts will give them a reasonable construction,
and will incline to sustain rather than to overthrow them; and
especially is this so where the question depends upon their being
reasonable or otherwise. Thus, if by one construction an ordinance
will be valid, and by another void, the courts will, if possible, adopt
the former. But an ordinance which transcends the power vested
in the body which passed it is void, and may be takeu advantage of
by plea or answer to an action to recover the penalty, or other pro-
ceedings to enforce it. Its validity may also be tested in proper
cases by suits against the corporation or its officers for acts done
under it," or by a return to a mandamus where the party justifies his
municipal action, when the matters dis- be applied to the by-laws or ordinances of
pensed with or cured did not relate to the municipal corporations. It is well re-
jurisdiction of the courts. Bergen v. State, marked that “the by-laws of very few of
3 Vroom (32 N. J. L.), 490 ; State v these corporations could stand such a test.
Union, 4 Vroom (33 N. J. L.), 350 ; State They should receive a reasonable construc-
v. Newark, 5 Vroom (34 N. J. L.), 236. tion, and their terms must not be strictly
1 Commonwealth 2. Robertson, 5 Cush. scrutinized for the purpose of making them
(Mass.) 438, 442; Vintners' Co. v. Pas- void.” Per Eustis, C. J., Municipality v.
sey, 1 Burr. 239; Poulters' Co. v. Phillips, Cutting, 4 La. An. 335; Merrian v. New
6 Bing. N. C. 314, 323 ; Taylors of Ips- Orleans, 14 La. An. 318; S. P. Loze v.
wich, 11 Rep. 5460; Norris v. Staps, Hob. Mayor, &c., 2 La. 427. If, however, the
211 ; Tobacco, &c. Co. v. Woodroffe, 7 ordinance is, in its nature, highly penal, it
B. &C. 838; Moir v. Munday, Sayer, 181, will and ought to be construed strictly,
185 ; Rounds v. Mumford, 2 R. I. 154 and it must clearly embrace the offence
(1852). The rules for the construction of charged. Krickle v. Commonwealth, 1
ordinances are the same as for statutes. B. Mon. (Ky.) 261 (1841). See also
Matter of Yick Wo, 68 Cal. 294. Where Pacific v. Seifert, 79 Mo. 210, stating
the legislature has conferred full and ex- the rule in Missouri to be that an ordi-
clusive jurisdiction on a municipal corpor-
"in its nature penal must be strictly
ation over a certain subject, the acts of construed, and its provisions cannot be
the corporation will be supported by every carried beyond its express terms." In
fair intendment and presumption. Balti- State v. Paris Ry. Co., 55 Tex. 76, the
more v. Clunet, 23 Md. 449 (1865). The court, referring to an ordinance author-
title and the body of the ordinance may izing a railroad company to extend its
be taken together to give it the necessary track to a certain point, said, — "There
certainty to sustain it. Martindale v. is no ambiguity in the ordinance author-
Palmer, 52 Ind. 411 (1876). In view of izing its explanation by parol evidence of
the inartificial character of town by-laws, representations made prior to its passage,
they are especially entitled to a reasonable or of the actual intention or understanding
construction. Whitlock v. West, 26 Conn. of those by whom it was passed, as to the
406 ; Willc. Mun. Corp. 159, pl. 382. precise point at which the road was to be
By-laws with penalties are not properly constructed.” Contemporaneous construc-
penal statutes. The penalty is in the tion often of great weight in interpreting
nature of liquidated damages, established doubtful provisions. State v. Severance,
as such in lieu of damages which a court 49 Mo. 401 (1872); ante, sec. 93, note;
would be authorized to assess. Therefore sec. 184, note.
the strict rules by which the validity of 2 Moir ». Munday, Sayer, 181, 185.
penal statutes are to be tested are not to St. Charles v. Meyer, 58 Mo. 86 (1874).
nance
§ 421
487
ORDINANCES VOID IN PART.
refusal to comply with the writ on the ground that the ordinance
is invalid, or, as elsewhere shown, in cases of equitable cognizance,
by bill in chancery to enjoin proceedings thereunder.
$ 421 (354). Ordinances void in part. — If part of a by-law be
void, another essential and connected part of the same by-law is also
void. But it must be essential and connected to have this effect.3
Thus, if an ordinance, or even the same section of an ordinance, con-
tains two separate prohibitions relating to different acts, with distinct
penalties for each, one of which is valid and the other void, the
ordinance may be enforced as to that portion of it which is valid.4
See protective provisions to corporate offi- (Mass.) 562 (1848); Fisher v. McGirr,
cers and agents in Municipal Corpora- 1 Gray (Mass.), 1; Warren v. Mayor, &c.,
tions, Act 5 and 6 Wm. IV. chap. lxxvi. 2 Gray (Mass.), 84 ; Commonwealth v.
secs. 132, 133. In the Canadian Munici- Hitchings, 5 Gray (Mass.), 482 ; Hershoff
pal Act, sec. 332 (Harrison's Munic. Man. v. Beverly, 45 N. J. L. (16 Vroon) 288.
5th ed. p. 238), there is what the author 8 Villavaso v. Barthet, 39 La. An. 247.
would suppose to be a very useful pro- 4 Commonwealth v. Dow, 10 Met.
vision to test summarily the validity of (Mass.) 382 (1845); Amesbury v. Bow-
by-laws, to the effect that a resident of a ditch M. F. Insurance Co., 6 Gray, 596 ;
municipality or any other person inter- Warren v. Charlestown, 2 Gray, 84 ;
ested in a by-law, order, or resolution Shelton v. Mobile (market ordinance),
may, within one year, apply to either of 30 Ala. 540 (1857); Rogers v. Jones, 1
the superior courts of common law to Wend. (N. Y.) 237; Thomas v. Mount
have it quashed, and the court, after Vernon, 9 Ohio, 290; 1 Stra. 469; Sir T.
notice to the corporation, may quash the Raym. 288, 294 ; Sayer, 256 ; 1 B. & Ad.
by-law, order, or resolution, in whole or 95 ; 7 Term R. 549; Staats v. Washing-
iu part, for illegality; and it is further ton, 45 N. J. L. (16 Vroom) 318; Piqua
provided (sec. 338), that in case anything v. Zimmerlin, 35 Ohio St. 507 ; State v.
has been done under such illegal by-law, Kantler, 33 Minn. 69. Where a charter
order, or resolution, which gives any per- authorized the penalty of fine and impris-
son a right of action, no action shall be onment, an ordinance imposing in addition
brought until one month's notice thereof thereto " costs of prosecution
was de
be given to the corporation, and such clared void as to such addition, but valid
action must be brought against the corpo- as to the remainder. State v. Cantieny,
ration and not against any person acting 34 Minn. 1. “If a by-law be entire, each
under the by-law, order, or resolution. part having a general influence over the
Construction of provision, see Harrison's rest, and one part of it be void, the entire
Munic. Man. (5th ed.) pp. 239, 245. by-law is void.” Willcock on Corp. 160,
1 Rex v. Harrison, 3 Burr. 1322; Grant pl. 384; approved, Municipality v. Mor-
on Corp. 89. An ordinance may be void gan, 1 La. An. 111, 116 (1846); Ex parte
for uncertainty in its provisions, as, for Mayor, &c. of Florence, 78 Ala. 419;
example, one which alters street grades, Rau v. Little Rock, 34 Ark. 303. But
without referring to any plan or establish- if a by-law consist of several distinct and
ing new grades. Kearney v. Andrews, 2 independent parts, although one or more
Stock. (N. J.) 70.
of them may be void, the rest are equally
2 Austin v. Murray, 16 Pick. (Mass.) valid as though the void clauses had been
121, 126 (1834), Com. Dig. By-law, chap. omitted.” Willcock, 161, pl. 389; Fitz-
vii. ; Rex v. Faversham Fishermen's Co., acherly v. Wiltshire, 11 Mod. 353 ; Lee v.
8 Durnford & East Term Rep. 356. Walis, 1 Kenyon, 295. In a leading case,
See Commonwealth v. Stodder, 2 Cush. Rex v. Faversham Fishermen's Co., 8 D. &
"
488
§ 423
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
$ 422 (355). Proof of Ordinances. — When not specially regu-
lated by charter or statute, the proof of ordinances must be by the
production of the originals or the books in which they are regis-
tered, as these are the primary evidence. Printed copies, or au-
thenticated copies, are often made competent evidence by the
legislature.
§ 423. Presumption of Validity. -- Where authority to pass an
ordinance on a given subject was conditioned that it should be first
E. T. R. 356, Lord Kenyon said: "With S. C. 319, McGowan, J., said, that in a
regard to the form of the by-law indeed, municipal court, “it was no more neces-
though a by-law may be good in part and sary to offer proof of a public ordinance,
bad in part, yet it can be so only when the under the seal of the city council, than in
two parts are entire and distinct from each the courts of the State to prove a public
other.” Approved, Municipalityv. Morgan, act of the legislature. Municipal ordin-
1 La. An. 111, 116 (1846). The fact that ances are private laws when brought be-
certain provisions of an ordinance are void fore the superior judiciary of a State, but
does not authorize the court to declare not when brought before a city court."
void those provisions which relate to the See chapter on Corporate Records and
subject-matter of the ordinance, when they Documents, ante, sec. 293 et seq. Proof
are distinct and separate from those which may be made by the clerk that he posted
are void and useless. State v. Hardy, 7 up copies of an ordinance appearing on
Neb. 377. It is stated in Grant on Cor- the records, without producing such copies
porations, 88, that it is “now fully settled or accounting for their absence. Teft v.
that a by-law that is void in part is void Size, 5 Gilm. (10 Ill.) 432. As to pro-
wholly ; e. g. if the penalty be unreasonable mulgation and publication of ordinance.
the rest of the by-law is vitiated thereby, Charleston v. Chur, 2 Bailey (S. C.), 164;
and becomes wholly inoperative and null.” Kittering v. Jacksonville, 50 Ill. 39; Napa
Citing Com. Dig. By-Law, chap. vii. ; v. Easterby (Cal.), 18 Pac. Rep. 253 ;
Colchester v. Godwin, Carter, 121 ; El. Nevin v. Roach (Ky.), 5 Southwest.
wood v. Bullock, 6 Q. B. 383; Clarke v. Rep. 546; Downing v. Miltonvale (record
Tucket, 2 Vent. 182; Rex v. Atwood, of ayes and nays) (Kan.), 14 Pac. Rep.
4 B. & Ad. 481. But the rule in the text 281; Brophy v. Hyatt (Col.) (record of
is well sustained, and is reasonable ; and ayes and nays), 15 Pac. Rep. 399; Sullivan
it is not true that the void part of a by- v. Leadville, 11 Col. 483; s. C. 18 Pac. Rep.
law will make null complete and indepen- 736; State v. Irvington (what is sufficient
dent parts of the same by-law which would publication), 50 N. J. L. 361; supra, secs.
otherwise be good. State v. Clarke, 54 MO. 331-335; infra, sec. 423 ; Chicago & A.
17, 36 (1873). The act authorizing a R. Co. v. Engle, 76 Ill. 317 (1875).
sewerage system being unconstitutional in Where the charter provides that the
part, so that the scheme adopted could not printed volume of City Ordinances shall
be made available, the undertaking was be evidence in all courts, the ordinances
arrested. State v. Chamberlin, 8 Vroom printed therein will be judicially noticed
(37 N. J. L.), 388.
the same as public statutes. Napman v.
1 Lumbard v. Aldrich, 8 N. H. 31 ; People, 19 Mich. 352 (1869); St. Louis v.
Stevens v. Chicago, 48 Ill. 498 ; Moor v. St. Louis Railroad Co., 89 Mo. 44. In
Newfield, 4 Greenl. (Me.) 44; Hallowell Kansas the appellate court, upon the trial
Bank v. Hamlin, 14 Mass. 178; Case of of an appeal from a conviction under an
Thetford, 12 Vin. Abr. 90 ; ante, sec. 300, ordinance, will take judicial notice of the
note ; infra, sec. 423. Stewart v. Clinton, existence and substance of the ordinance.
79 Mo. 603 ; Tipton v. Norman, 72 Mo. Downing v. Miltonvale, 36 Kan. 740; ante,
380. In Information against Oliver, 21
sec. 83.
§ 423
489
ORDINANCES : PRESUMPTION OF VALIDITY.
submitted to the voters of the municipality and adopted by a ma-
jority vote, in a prosecution for a breach thereof it was held that the
further provision of the charter, that an ordinance might be proved
by a copy thereof duly certified, &c., did not dispense with the
necessity of proving that the ordinance was submitted to the voters
and adopted, and that it had been published as required by law,
the ouly effect of the charter provision being to dispense with the
production of the original ordinance by making the certified copy
evidence. 1
1 Schott v. The People, 89 Ill. 195 presumptions in favor of the validity of
(1878). Scholfield, J., adds: “Municipal their ordinances. If in conformity with
corporations exercise only delegated and the express or necessarily implied grant of
limited powers, and, in the absence of the charter, they are valid; otherwise
express statutory provisions to that effect, not."
courts are authorized to indulge in no
490
§ 426
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
CHAPTER XIII.
MUNICIPAL COURTS.
fa
Municipal Courts in England and at Common Law.
424 (356). At Common Law.— A municipal corporation may, at
common law, enjoy the franchise of holding a court; and corporation
or municipal courts, which were local or inferior tribunals, were
not uncommon. They were treated as the tribunals of the corpora-
tion; but since courts of justice are for the public benefit, words in
a charter permitting the corporation to hold a court are imperative.?
Such public right cannot be lost by a non-user; and therefore the
mere disuse, for two hundred years, of a court granted to a corpora-
tion by charter is no answer to a rule for a mandamus commanding
them to hold it, though it was alleged that there were no sufficient
funds for the purpose.3
$ 425. Jurisdiction; Parties ; Jurors. The common-law doctrine
respecting municipal courts was settled to be that the municipal cor-
poration could bring no action therein against a stranger where the
effect would be to benefit the corporation or increase its funds, for
that would be to make the corporation itself both judge and party,
which an inflexible and fundamental maxim of the common law
prohibited; and the same principle was considered to operate to dis-
qualify corporators to sit as jurors in such cases; but this objection
did not apply when both parties were corporators.
§ 426. Existing Borough Courts. - The English Municipal Cor-
poration Act of 1835 provides for the establishment of borough courts,
1 Inst. 114 ; 4 Inst. 78, 224; Cro. Jac. the court for the benefit of the inhab.
313; Haddock's Case, Sir Thomas Ray- itants. 16.; Grant on Corp. 34.
mond, 435.
3 Rex v. Mayor, &c. of Wells, 4 Dowl.
2 Rex v. Mayor, &c. of Hastings, 5 B. P. C. 562.
& Ald. 692, n. The language of the charter 4 Hesketh v. Braddock, 3 Burr. 1856–
was "that the mayor may for the pur. 1868; cited infra, sec. 431, note ; Grant
pose hereafter have and hold and have on Corp. 194; London v. Wood, 12 Mod.
power to hold a court of record," and it 674 ; 1 Salk. 398 ; Bosworth v. Budgen,
was held that these words, though per. 7 Mod. 461; Reg. v. Rogers, 2 Lc. Raym.
missive in form, were imperative, and 778; Willc. on Corp. 157, 165. See infra,
that the corporation was bound to hold
sec, 431.
§ 426 a MUNICIPAL COURTS : INTRODUCTORY OBSERVATIONS.
491
defines their jurisdiction and powers, makes burgesses or citizens
competent jurors, contains an express provision that no witness or
magistrate shall be incompetent or disqualified by reason of his being
liable to contribute to the fund of the corporation, and regulates in
general the proceedings therein for violation of by-laws or ordinances,
and the collection and enforcement of penalties.
It may, however, be observed that under the act the power to
make by-laws is limited, and does not extend to acts criminal in
their nature, and which are punishable by criminal statutes in force
throughout the realm.
American Corporation Courts; Constitutional Provisions.
§ 426 a. Introductory Observations. Here, as elsewhere, the
composite type of the usual American municipality in its local and
private, as well as its general and public character, distinctly reveals
itself. Although often material it is not always easy to trace the line
of demarcation. To ascertain and define it as applicable to this chap-
ter we have to resort to the construction which well-known provis-
ions of Magna Charta relating to personal rights and liberty have
received in Great Britain and here, and to the legislative enactments
and polity in both countries, and in this country to special constitu-
tional provisions relating thereto, and to the powers and jurisdic-
tion of the judicial tribunals. The subject is obviously important.
Statutory provisions concerning the constitution and powers of the
municipal government and those of the local tribunals, especially
provisions authorizing summary proceedings in municipal courts
without trial by jury and without the usual formulae of an adver-
sary proceeding in the superior judicial tribunals, have frequently
been found to be in conflict with organic provisions to secure funda-
mental rights of property and the liberty of the citizen. Summary
powers, properly defined and limited, are essential to the well-being
of local communities, and when thus limited and defined are per-
fectly consistent with the liberty of the citizen, that is, liberty regu-
lated by law, which is the only true liberty. These limits must be
sought largely in the polity, practice and traditions, and in the judi-
cial judgments in England and in this country relating thereto, in
15 and 6 Wm. IV. chap. lxxxvi, secs. lation authorizing the infliction of sum-
90, 91, 118–134, 270-341 (1835). Mr. mary penalties of different kinds upon a
Justice Stephen traces the history of great variety of offenders, ending in the
Borough Courts prior to the act of 1835, Summary Jurisdiction Act of 1879 (42 &
and states the changes made by that act. 43 Vict. chap. 49). Ib., chap. iv. p. 122.
Hist. Criminal Law, vol. i. chap. iv. p. Post, sec. 337 et seq.
116 ct seq. He also summarizes the legis-
492
§ 427
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
the light of which constitutional provisions must be construed.
Some pains have therefore been taken to exhibit in the text the
material doctrines of our jurisprudence on these subjects, and in the
notes to furnish the reader with the data for full research, critical
consideration, and the formation of his own conclusions.
§ 427 (357). Creation, Jurisdiction, and Powers.
In this coun-
try it is usual to provide in the charter or organic act of a municipal
corporation for a local or special tribunal, called by different names,
such as the mayor's court, recorder's court, city court, and the like;
and which is invested with jurisdiction over complaints and prosecu-
tions for the violation of the ordinances of the corporation, and often,
for public convenience, with special civil and limited criminal juris-
diction under the laws of the State. It is competent for the legisla-
ture to provide for the establishment of these inferior courts, and to
invest them with such measure of power and jurisdiction as may be
deemed expedient, if no provision of the Constitution of the particu-
lar State be infringed. It may also abolish them.?
1 State v. Mayor of Charleston, 12 v. State, 18 Ala. 521 (1821), holding the
Rich. (S. C.) Law, 480 ; State v. Helfrid, city court of Mobile, which is invested
2 Nott & McCord (S. C.), 233 (1820); with criminal jurisdiction, and from whose
infra, sec. 432, note; Callahan v. New judgment an appeal lies, to be constitu-
York, 66 N. Y. 656 ; People v. Curley, 5 tional, and defining meaning of inferior
Col. 412.
court. Perkins v. Corbin, 45 Ala. 103
Constitutional provisions concerning the (1871), holding that a city court is an
establishment and powers, local, civil, and inferior court within the meaning of the
criminal, of Inferior Courts : The power Constitution, which may be created and
conferred on police magistrate to issue abolished at the pleasure of the legislature,
process against the body of an offender is and that the abolition of the court carries
constitutional. Brown v. Jerome, 102 with it the office of the Judge. New
Ill. 371. The legislature has no power . Orleans v. Costello, 14 La. An. 37 ; Myers
to confer upon local municipal courts v. People, 26 Ill. 173; Davis v. Wool.
a jurisdiction which is exclusive of that nough, 9 Iowa, 104 ; People v. Wilson,
which, by the Constitution, is given 15 Ill. 389; State v. Maynard, 14 Ill.
to another court. Montross v. State, 61 419; Beesman v. Peoria, 16 Ill. 484;
Miss. 429. Full discussion of legislative Holmes v. Fihlenburg, 54 Ill. 203 (1870);
power to create inferior courts, and define Van Swartow v. Commonwealth, 24 Pa.
jurisdiction. Callahan u. New York, 66 St. 131 (1854); Tierney v. Dodge, 9 Minn.
N. Y. 656 ; Gray v. State, 2 Harring. St. Peter V. Bauer, 19 Minn. 327
(Del.) 76 (1835). Mayor's court an infe- (1872); infra, sec. 432, note ; Burns v.
rior court within meaning of State Consti- La Grange, 17 Texas, 415 (1856); Slattery,
tution. 16.; Egleston v. City Council, 1 In re, 3 Ark. 484 ; Ib. 561 ; Graham v.
Mill Const. (S. C.) 45. As to official
As to official State, i Pike (1 Ark.), 171 ; Floyd v.
character of city recorder. Ib. ; Schroder Eatonton Comm’rs, 14 Ga. 354 (1853);
v. City Council, 2 Const. R. 726 ; s. C. 3 Hill v. Dalton, 72 Ga. 314; State v.
Brev. 533 ; post, sec. 430 ; Tesh v. Com- Gutierrez, 15 La. An. 190 ; Muscatine v.
monwealth, 4 Dana (Ky.), 522 ; Nugent Steck, 7 Iowa, 505; Richmond Mayoralty
166 ;
2 Boyd v. Chambers, 78 Ky. 140 ; State v. Henshaw, 76 Cal. 436 (1888).
$ 428
493
MUNICIPAL COURTS : SUMMARY TRIALS.
§ 428 (358). Summary trials for Violations of Ordinances. We
have elsewhere shown that the courts have uniformly held that it
Case, 19 Gratt. (Va.) 673 (1870). The 331. In Hutchings v. Scott, 4 Halst.
superior court of the city of San Francisco (N. J.) 218 (1827), the objection was made
is constitutional. Seale v. Mitchell, 5 Cal. that the legislature could not constitu-
403 ; Vassault v. Austin, 36 Cal. 691 ; tionally confer the powers of justices of
Hickman v. O'Neal, 10 Cal. 294. The the peace on the mayor, recorder, or alder.
Constitution of California as aniended in mer of a city, or borough, the argument
1862 authorized the legislature to establish being that since the Constitution provided
“recorder's or other inferior courts in any for the appointment of justices of the peace
incorporated city or town ;” and it was only, and not for corporate officers, offi-
held, in view of the prior decisions in the cers exercising the authority and powers
State just cited, that the muuicipal crim- of a justice of the peace should be ap-
inal court of the city and county of San pointed as such ; but the objection was
Francisco was an inferior court, and con- not sustained. In Illinois, mayors of cit-
stitutional. People v. Nyland, 41 Cal. ies cannot, it was held, be constitutionally
129 (1871); Stratman, In re, 39 Cal. 517 invested with judicial power. The State,
(1870). An act “to provide for police &c. v. Maynard, 14 Ill. 420 ; Beesman v.
courts in cities having 30,000 and under Peoria, 16 Ill. 481. By the general law
100,000 inhabitants" sustained as against of Indiana of 1857, for the incorporation
the constitutional objections that it was of cities, mayors, in addition to their du-
a law of a general nature,” and was ties proper, have, “within the limits of
“not uniform in its operation," and that cities, the jurisdiction and powers of a
its title was not sufficiently explicit and justice of the peace in all matters, civil
comprehensive. People v. Henshaw, 76 and criminal, arising under the laws of
Cal. 436 (1888).
the State, and for crimes and misdemean.
The Hustings Court of Richmond is ors a jurisdiction co-extensive with the
constitutional. Chahoon's Case, 21 Gratt. county.” The Constitution of the same
(Va.). 822 (1871); Richmond Mayoralty State (art. VII, sec. 16) declared that “10
Case, 19 Gratt. (Va.) 673 (1870). Judi- person elected to any judicial office shall,
ciary article of State Constitution of during the term; be eligible to any office
New York as to the jurisdiction of certain of trust or profit under the State, other
city courts construed. Landers v. Staten
Landers v. Staten than a judicial office.” One Wallace was
Island Railroad Co., 53 N. Y. 450 (1873). elected mayor of Indianapolis, and within
Under a constitutional provision declar- his term he resigned and received a ma-
ing that “the judicial power shall be vested jority of votes for sheriff of the county.
in a Supreme Court, in district courts. It was held by the Supreme Court of
and in justices of the peace," an act con- Indiana (Waldo v. Wallace, 12 Ind. 569
ferring judicial powers on the mayor of a (1859); Gulick v. New, 14 Ind. 93) that
city was considered void, and it was held Wallace was a "judicial officer,” and
that for violations of its ordinances the therefore ineligible to the office of sheriff ;
corporation should resort to the judicial that the voters of the county were charge-
tribunals organized under the Constitu- able with notice of his ineligibility ; that
tion. Lafon v. Dufrocq, 9 La. An. 350 votes cast for him were therefore ineffect-
(1854). But see The State v. Young, 3 ual, and that his competitor, having re-
Kan. 445 (1866), where a provision in an ceived the greatest number of legal votes,
organic act that the judicial power shall though not a majority of the ballots, was
be vested exclusively in a Supreme Court, duly elected. Notwithstanding the great
district, probate, and justice courts, was consideration which these cases received,
held not to prohibit the legislature from the author ventures with great deference
establishing municipal courts for the en- to state that it is by no means clear to his
forcement of municipal regulations and mind that the mayor was a “judicial offi.
ordinances. And this seems to be the cer," within the meaning of the Constitu-
correct view. Shafer v. Mumma, 17 Md. tion. See, as bearing upon the above
494
§ 428
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
was competent for the State legislatures to create municipal corpora-
tions with powers of local government, and to authorize them to
.
decision, and illustrative of the nature of The Constitution of Nevada provided
the office of mayor, Howard v. Shoemaker, that “the legislature may also establish
35 Ind. 111 (1871); Morrison v. McDonald, courts for municipal purposes only, in in.
21 Me. 550 (1842); State v. Maynard, 14 corporated cities and towns," and it was
Ill. 419 (1853); Commonwealth v. Dallas, held that an act authorizing the city re-
4 Dallas, 229 ; s. C. more fully, 3 Yeates corder to exercise the duties of commit-
(Pa.), 300 (1801); State v. Wilmington, ting magistrates in respect to offences
3 Harring. (Del.) 294 (1839). Authority against the public laws of the State was in
of a mayor under a statute investing him conflict with the Constitution. Meagher
with the powers of a justice of the peace. v. Storey Co., 5 Nev. 244. The Consti-
State v. Perkins, 4 Zabr. (24 N. J. L.) tution of Muryland contains a provision
409; 1 Harr. (N. J.) 237; Howe v. that “the judicial power of the State shall
Plainfield, 8 Vroom (37 N. J. L.), 145.; be vested in a court of appeals, in circuit
State v. Zeigler, 3 Vroom (32 N. J. L.), courts, in such courts for the city of Balti-
262 ; explained, McCon vill v. Jersey City, more as may be hereafter prescribed, and
10 Vroom (39 N. J. L.), 38, 42 ; Bain v. in justices of the peace ;” and it was held
Mitchell, 82 Ala. 304 ; Robinson v. Benton that the legislature might authorize mu-
County, 49 Ark. 49. See Baton Rouge v. nicipal courts to try and punish disorderly
Dearing, 15 La. An. 208. A constitutional persons and lewd women within the cor-
provision as to eligibility “to the office of porate limits, and gencrally to authorize
judge of any court of the State," &c., the corporate authorities to exercise police
and requiring a two years' residence “in powers, which were distinguished from the
the division, circuit, or county," was con- ordinary judiciary powers of the State.
sidered to have no reference to the office Shafer v. Mumma, 17 Md. 331 (1861).
of recorder of a city. The People v. Further as to construction of Constitution
Wilson, 15 Ill. 389.
of Maryland as to judicial powers of
In Michigan, under constitutional pro- mayors. Hagerstown v. Dechert, 32 Md.
visions dividing the State into judicial 369 (1869).
circuits, and establishing, circuit courts Under the Constitution of North Caro-
as the courts of general original jurisdic- lina “special courts" are authorized "for
tion, but authorizing the establishment, the trial of misdemeanors in cities and
by the legislature, of municipal courts in towns where they may be necessary ;
cities : Held, that the original purpose of and it was held to be no objection to an
such municipal courts was not to destroy act of the legislature that it did not au-
cr materially change the jurisdiction of thorize the officers of such court to try
the circuits, but to relieve them of part persons charged with misdemeanors, but
of the increased litigation resulting from only to bind them over. State v. Pen-
the growth of large cities. Such courts der, 66 N. C. 313 (1872). But under the
cannot have, in any class of cases, a juris. Constitution the legislature cannot confer
diction territorially coextensive with the upon mayors the judicial powers of jus-
limits of the county, much less of the tices of the peace in civil actions. Eden-
entire State. They were designed to ton v. Wool, 65 N. C. 379.
meet the wants of the cities wherein they The amendment of the Constitution of
are established. A statute which gives Massachusetts of 1821 provided that “no
a municipal court jurisdiction, where ori- judge of any court of this commonwealth
ginal process is served within the city, shall at the same time hold the office of
though neither party is a resident, or governor, &c., or have a seat in the senate
where service is had anywhere in the or house of representatives.” A judge
county, if plaintiff resides in the city, is of a police court for the city of Lynn was
unconstitutional and void. Grand Rapids, elected a member of the house of repre-
N. & L. S. R. Co. v. Gray, 38 Mich. 461 sentatives, and took his seat as such. Po-
(1878).
lice courts were created after the adoption
1
§ 429
495
MUNICIPAL COURTS ; STATUTE LAW AND BY-LAWS.
adopt ordinances or by-laws, with appropriate penalties for their vio-
lation. The power to do this includes, by fair implication, the
power to authorize violations of ordinances (where the acts are not
criminal in their nature, or within the meaning of constitutional pro-
visions requiring an indictment and securing the right to a jury trial)
to be tried and determined in a summary manner by a local or cor-
poration tribunal.1
ors.
§ 429. How and in what Name prosecuted. The distinction be-
tween statute law and municipal by-laws has been pointed out, and
the subject of concurrent prohibitions of the same act by the general
law and by the local ordinances of a municipality treated in the chap-
ter on Ordinances. The distinction is there drawn, and is to be ob-
served, between acts not essentially criminal, relating to municipal
police and regulation, and those intrinsically criminal, and which are
made punishable as public offences by the general laws of the State.
The pecuniary penalties which are annexed to violations of the for-
of the constitutional amendment in ques- says in substance that a plea of not guilty
tion, and were vested at first with the same to an information or indictment for crime,
civil and criminal jurisdiction as justices whether felony or misdemeanor, puts the
of the peace. The courts thus established accused upon the country, and can be tried
were organized judicial tribunals, having by a jury only. The rule is universal as
attributes and exercising judicial functions to felonies ; not quite so as to misdemean-
independently of the magistrates desig- But the current of authority appears
nated to hold them, and were thus distin- to apply it to both classes of crime ; and
guished from justices of the peace, on this court holds that to be safer and better
whom personally certain judicial powers alike in principle and practice. Cooley's
are conferred by law; and the judges of Const. Lim. 319, 410, n. : Proffatt's Jury
such courts must, by the Constitution, be Tr. sec. 113 ; Neales v. State, 10 Mo. 498;
appointed during good behavior instead State v. Mansfield, 41 Mo. 470 ; Common-
of for seven years, as in the case of jus. wealth v. Shaw, 1 Pittsburg (Pa.), 492.
tices of the peace. It was held that a In the latter case will be found a collection
police court is a court of the commonwealth of authorities bearing on the question of
within the constitutional amendment, and waiver of the right to a jury trial in crim-
that the judge thereof vacated his office as
inal cases.
such judge by accepting another official The Constitution of Illinois of 1870 pro-
trust incompatible therewith. Common- vides that “the right of trial by jury, as
wealth v. Hawkes (quo warranto), 123 heretofore enjoyed, shall remain inviolate."
Mass. 525 (1878). Mr. Chief Justice Under this provision the vagrant act, deny.
Gray's opinion is highly instructive. ing to persons arrested for vagrancy the
In Wisconsin, says Ryan, C. J., in right of trial by jury, was considered by
State v. Lockwood, 43 Wis. 403 (1878), McAllister, J., in view of the previous
the right of trial by jury upon information legislation and constitutional provisions
or indictment for crime is secured by the referred to by him, to be unconstitutional.
Constitution, and cannot be waived ; and Scully and O'Leary, In re, 11 Chicago
the trial of an information by a judge of Legal News, 27 (1878). See ante, sec.
a municipal court without a jury was 401 ; post, sec. 433. Defendant may waive
held not to be a legal trial, and the judg. statute provision. State v. Kaufman, 51
ment of the municipal magistrate was Iowa, 578.
declared to be void. The chief justice 1 Thrfra, sec. 432 et seq; ante, sec. 368.
496
§ 429
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
mer class, the legislature may, we think, authorize the corporation to
enforce in its own name, by civil action or by complaint, and provis-
ion need not necessarily be made that they shall be prosecuted in
the name of the people or of the State.
same.”
1 Barter v. Commonwealth, 3 Pa. (Pen. with the constitutional provision before
& W.) 253 ; Weeks v. Forman, 1 Harri- referred to? We are of opinion that it is
sou (N. J.), 237 ; Ewbanks v. Ashley, 36 not. This clause of the Constitution oc-
Ill. 177 ; Williams v. Augusta, 4 Ga. 509 ; curs in Art. V., which treats of the judi-
Floyd v. Commissioners, 14 Ga. 354 ; Kip cial department of the government. This
v. Paterson, 2 Dutch. (N.J.) 298 ; Lew. article vests and defines the judicial power
iston v. Proctor, 23 Ill. 533 ; State v. of the State, establishes the tenure of
Jackson, 8 Mich. 110. See State v. Stearns, office of the judges, and defines the mode
11 Fost. (31 N. H.) 106 ; Goddard, Peti- of their election ; fixes their salary and
tioner, 16 Pick. (Mass.) 504 ; Fink v. Mil- limits the number of judicial districts ;
waukee, 17 Wis. 26 ; ante, secs. 411, 412 provides for the election of an attorney-
and cases ; post, sec. 431 et seq., and cases general, and other matters pertaining to
in notes. The legislature may enact that the judicial arm of the State, among which
suits for the violation of municipal ordi- is the clause under consideration. From
nances shall be prosecuted in the name of all this it seems manifest that the re-
the people of the State. Pillsbury V.. quirement that all prosecutions shall be
Brown, 47 Cal. 478 (1874).
conducted in the name of " The State of
The Constitution of the State of Iowa Iowa," ' contemplates such criminal prose-
contains this provision : “The style of cutions as shall be instituted and prose.
all process shall be “The State of Iowa,' cuted before the tribunals which are
and all prosecutions shall be conducted in provided for in that article of the Consti-
the name and by the authority of the tution under the statutes of the State. It
Constitution of Iowa, Art. v. is fitting and appropriate that prosecu-
sec. 8. The charter of the city of Daven- tions for violations of the criminal laws
port in terms authorized prosecutions for of the State should be carried on in the
violations of municipal ordinances to be name of the government. But there is
instituted in the name of the city, and no fitness or propriety in requiring the
it was contended that this portion of the State to be a party to every petty prose-
charter was in conflict with the above cution under the police regulations of a
quoted provision of the Constitution. But municipal corporation. Such a construc-
the Supreme Court, in the case of Dav- tion of this article of the Constitution
enport u. Bird, 34 Iowa, 524 (1871), held seems to us to be unwarranted, and not in-
otherwise. It was a prosecution in the tended by the framers of the Constitution.
name of the city against the defendant It was held by the Supreme Court of Penn-
for a violation of an ordinance of a po sylvania that the word 'process,' in the
lice nature, but for which, under the 12th section of the 5th article of the Con-
charter, the city was authorized to punish stitution of the State, which provides that
by a limited fine and imprisonment. In 'the style of all process shall be the Com-
giving the opinion of the court, Miller, J., monwealth of Pennsylvania,' was intended
says : “Is it necessary, under the Con- to refer to such writs only as should be-
stitution, that all prosecutions for viola- come necessary to be issued in the course
tions of municipal police ordinances shall of the exercise of that judicial power which
be conducted in the name and by the au- is established and provided for in the ar-
thority of the State of Towa? Or, in other ticle of the Constitution, and forms exclu-
words, is that clause of the city charter sively the subject-matter of it. On the
of Davenport, which directs that all
same principle, we are of opinion that the
suits, actions, and prosecutions be insti. word 'prosecutions,' in the 8th section of
tuted, commenced, and prosecuted in the art. V. of our Constitution, was intended
name of the city of Davenport,' in conflict to refer only to such criminal prosecutions
$ 431 MUNICIPAL COURTS : JUDGES, JURORS, AND WITNESSES.
497
§ 430 (359). Constitutional Limitations on Jurisdiction; Powers.
- In creating local tribunals, however, and in prescribing their
jurisdiction, the legislature should keep in view two cardinal con-
siderations: First. That these inferior courts will have only such
jurisdiction, and can exercise only such powers, as are expressly given
or necessarily implied, and that fair doubts as to the extent of juris-
diction are resolved against the corporation; to this effect are all the
authorities. Second. Regard must also be had to constitutional pro-
visions intended to secure the liberty and to protect the rights of
the citizen. The State Constitutions contain the substance of the
clauses of Magna Charta, to the effect that no citizen shall be de-
prived of life, liberty, or property but by the judgment of his peers or
by the law of the land, and also provisions, more or less extensive,
securing the right of trial by jury. These and other requirements of
the fundamental law cannot be violated in acts of the legislature
establishing and fixing the jurisdiction of the corporation court or
tribunal.1
Citizens competent to be Local Judges, Jurors, and Witnesses.
§ 431 (360). Municipal Judges, Jurors, and Witnesses. The
maxim of the common law above adverted to, that no one shall be a
judge in his own case, has no just application to legislation creating
municipal courts, and investing them with jurisdiction to try com-
plaints for breaches of municipal ordinances. The mayor, though a
citizen of the corporation, may be clothed with judicial powers of
this character, and the inhabitants, though interested in a minute
degree in the recovery, are, or at least may be declared, competent
witnesses. In this respect the common-law rules have not been
adopted and applied by the American courts to our municipal cor-
porations ;3 or the courts have considered the common-law doctrine
under State laws as should be cognizable imprisonment; but qucere, Brownville v.
by the judicial power, which is estab. Cook, 4 Neb. 101 (1875). As to mode of
lished and provided for in that article, enforcement of ordinances and requisites
and that it was not intended to include of complaints, vide chapter on Ordinances,
prosecutions under ordinances of muni- secs. 408-412, and notes.
cipal corporations cognizable before local Zylstra v. Charleston, 1 Bay (S. C.),
police magistrates.”
ates.” And the same view 382 (1794); Slaughter v. People, 2 Doug.
is held by the Court of Appeals of Ken- (Mich.) 334 (1842). Ante, sec. 427, note
tucky. Williamson v. Commonwealth, 4 and cases; post, sec. 432.
A municipal
B. Mon. (Ky.) 146 (1843). But in Ne- court cannot sit outside the limits of the
braska the Constitution provides that "all city. Hershoff v. Beverly, 43 N. J. L.
process and other proceedings shall run in 139.
the name of the State," and this was held 2 Supra, sec. 425.
to include prosecutions under municipal 8 Thomas v. Mount Vernon, 9 Ohio,
ordinances, where the penalty was fine anil 290 (1839); Commonwealth 2. Read, i
VOL. I. 32
498
§ 431
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
1
as to the disqualifying effect of interest upon jurors and witnesses
as expressly or impliedly abrogated by the usual legislative or char-
ter provisions for the constitution of municipal courts, and confer-
ring upon them jurisdiction to hear and try certain actions and
proceedings by and against the municipality. But a distinction has
been well drawn between corporation courts proper and the general
courts of record; and in respect of ordinary actions in the latter
class of courts, a taxpayer of a municipality is incompetent to serve
as a juror where the municipality is a party, unless made competent
by legislative provision, expressly or by implication.
Gray (Mass.), 475 ; Lexington v. Long, 4 McCord (S. C.) 487 ; Corwein v. Hames,
31 Mo. 369 (1861); Commonwealth v. 11 Johns. (N. Y.) 76 (1814). The mayor
Ryan, 5 Mass. 90 ; Cooley Const. Lim. is not disqualified from presiding in the
410, 412; Wheeling v. Black, 25 W. Va. mnayor's court, before which the proceedings
266.
are held, by the fact that he is the owner
In the City Council v. Pepper, 1 Rich. of a lot on the street sought to be widened.
(S. C.) Law, 364 (1845), the defendant, Lexington 2. Long, 31 Mo. 369 (1861).
a non-resident of the city, was prosecuted The mayor and council having jurisdic-
in the city court, established by act of the tion to declare what is a nuisance, the
legislature, for violation of a city ordinance. fact that they have employed an attorney
The defendant inade the point that, as the to prosecute a case does not disqualify
judge of that court, the sheriff, and jurors them, nor does the interest which they
were corporators, and therefore interested have in common with other citizens.
in the penalty, they were incompetent to Montezuma v. Minor, 73 Ga. 484.
try the cause. In holding this objection 1 Diveny v. Elmira, 51 N. Y. 506
unsound, the Court of Appeals, after allud. (1873). This was action of tort in the
ing to Hesketh v. Braddock, 3 Burr. Supreme Court of the State against the
1847, cited ante, sec. 425, relied on by city of Elmira for damages to the plaintiff
the defendant, remarks : "The statutory caused by a defective sidewalk, which the
authority given to the city court to try all city was bound to repair. The question
offenders against city ordinances impli. was whether a taxpayer of the city was a
edly declares that, notwithstanding the competent juror. It was held by the Com-
common-law objection, it was right and mission of Appeals that at common law the
proper to give it the power to enforce the interest of such a juror would be a suffi-
city laws against all offenders. The in- cient objection unless removed by statute,
terest is too minute, too slight to excite and that as respects the defendant city it
prejudice against a defendant ; for the had not been thus removed. Mr. Com-
judge, sheriff, and jurors are members of a missioner Earl, in delivering the judgment
corporation of many thousand members. of the court, said : “ The charter of Elmira
What interest of value bave they in a fine provides for the election of justices of the
of twenty dollars? It would put a most peace, clothed with authority to hear and
eminent calculator to great trouble to try actions in the same manner as justices
ascertain the very minute grain of interest of towns, and the city may sue before such
which each of these gentlemen might have. justices to recover penalties and forfeitures,
To remove so shadowy and slight an ob- and such suits must be tried like civil
jection, the legislature thought proper to actions before justices of towns. The
clothe the city court, consisting of its defendants in such action may, of course,
judge, clerk, sheriff, and jurors, with demand jury trials, and jurors must be
authority to try the defendant, and he summoned from the city, and cannot be
cannot now object to it." Per O'Neall, J., summoned elsewhere. Hence, it may be
City Council v. Pepper, 1 Rich. (S. C.) well that in such actions before justices of
Law, 364 (1845). City Council v. King, the peace the incompetency of juries on
$ 432 MUNICIPAL COURTS: SUMMARY PROCEDURE; JURY TRIAL. 499
Summary Proceedings may, in Certain Cases, be authorized. - Jury
Trial.
§ 432 (361). Summary Procedure; Jury Trial. — Proceedings for
the violation of municipal ordinances are frequently summary in
their character, and it has been made a question how far statutes or
charters authorizing such proceedings are valid, especially where no
provision is made for trial by jury. This must depend upon the
nature of the act or omission, and upon the Constitution of the State
and the extent to which the power of the legislature is therein re-
stricted. Offences against ordinances properly made in virtue of
the implied or incidental power of the corporation, or in the exer-
cise of its legitimate police authority for the preservation of the
peace, good order, safety, and health of the place and which relate
to minor acts and matters not embraced in the public criminal
statutes of the State, are not usually or properly regarded as crimi-
nal, and hence need not necessarily be prosecuted by indictment or
tried by a jury. An act of the legislature authorizing the arrest
account of interest is, by implication, laid out held not disqualified to act as a
removed, for otherwise the justices would juror in proceedings for the taking of pri-
be practically deprived of jurisdiction to vate property for the purposes of the
try the causes which are authorized to be street. Kundinger v. Saginaw, 59 Mich.
cominenced before them. Commonwealth
355.
See Kemper v. Louisville, 14 Bush
v. Ryan, 5 Mass. 90. But there is no such (Ky.), 87.
practical difficulty in courts of record hell By statute of Massachusetts an inhabi-
in the city; and hence there is no reason tant of the city of Boston is competent as
for holding that in actions tried in them, a juror in such cases, but this provision
in which the city is interested, the incom- does not make a member of the common
petency of jurors on account of interest council of that city competent. Boston v.
has been removed. I therefore conclude Baldwin, 139 Mass. 315. The inhabitants
that the common-law rule of incompetency of a town are not disqualified froin serving
on account of interest applied to these as grand jurors in presenting an indictment
jurors, and that they were properly chal- for forgery with intent to defraud the town,
lenged and excluded. Whatever incon- - the interest is too reinote and is differ-
venience may flow from such a holdling ent from a direct financial interest. Con-
may be remedied by the legislature. We monwealth v. Brown, 147 Mass. 585 (1888).
must administer the law as we find it." Knowlton, J., reviews the cases and con-
51 N, Y. 512. And it has also been else- siders the question with care. Juror not
where decided that in an action to recover disqualified to sit on a trial for a violation
damages against a municipality, a resident of the ordinance of his own city. State v.
taxpayer is not competent to sit as a juror Wells, 46 Iowa, 662.
if challenged for cause. Fulweiler v. 1 Ex parte Hollwedell, 74 Mo. 395.
St. Louis, 61 Mo. 479 (1876); Rose v. 2 Williams v. Augusta, 4 Ga. 509 (1848);
St. Charles, 49 Mo. 509; Johnson v. approved, Floyd v. Commissioners, 14 Ga.
Americus, 46 Ga. 80 ; but under the code 358 (1853); Vason v. Augusta, 38 Ga. 542
of Georgia this rule does not obtain. Car- (1868); post, sec. 411, and notes ; State v.
tersville v. Lyon, 69 Ga. 577 ; see Omaha Guttierrez, 15 La. An. 190 ; Tierney v.
v. Olmstead, 5 Neb. 446 (1877). One who Dodge, 9 Minn. 166, 169 ; see St. Peter v.
is specially interested in having a street Bauer, 19 Minn. 327, 332, (1872), where
500
§ 432
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
of professional thieves and burglars frequenting any railroad depot
&c., in the city of Philadelphia, and their commitment by the
mayor, without a trial by jury, is not in conflict with the pro-
vision of the Constitution of the State which guarantees “that
trial by jury shall be as heretofore, and the right thereof remain
inviolate.” 1
the text is cited and the subject considered Georgia, vesting the jurisdiction of all
by Ripley, C. J.; Byers v. Commonwealth, criminal cases in tribunals other than cor-
42 Pa. St. 89 ; 1 Bish. Cr. Pr. sec. 758 ; poration courts, the court being of opinion
State v. Conlin, 27 Vt. 318. Thus, in that the term “criminal cases," as used in
New Jersey, it is held that legislative au- the Constitution, had reference to such acts
thority to municipal courts to punish vio and omissions as are in: violation of the
lations of ordinances by a limited fine and public laws of the State, and not to viola-
imprisonment, without providing for a tions of local ordinances made for the
trial by jury, is not in conflict with the internal police and government of the city.
constitutional provision that “the right in this State the settled rule is that the
of trial by jury shall remain inviolate." same act cannot be twice punished,
McGear v. Woodruff, 33 N. J. Law, 213 once by the municipality and once by the
(1868); Johnson v. Barclay, 1 Harr. (N.J.) State, and the rule is adopted that the
1 ; s. P. Howe v. Plainfield, 8 Vroom (37 municipal power ends where the right to
N. J. L.), 145 ; People v. Justices, 74 N. indict under State authority exists, as any
Y. 406 ; 18 Alb. Law Jour. 254 (1878); other rule would deprive the accused of
ante, secs. 366, 412, 413, 427 et seq. ; State the right to a jury trial. Jenkins v.
v. Lee, 29 Miun. 445; Mankato v. Arnold, Thomasville, 35 Ga. 145 (1866) ; Vason v.
36 Minn. 62 ; Esc parte Schmidt, 24 S. C. Augusta, supra; Savannah v. Hussey, 21
363 (quoting text); Moundsville v. Foun- Ga. 80 (1857); ante, sec. 316, note. So
tain, 27 W. Va. 182, 204 ; Hill v. Mayor in Michigan : Slaughter v. People, 2 Doug.
of Dalton, 72 Ga. 314 ; Dively v. Cedar (Mich.) 334 (1842). Otherwise in Ken-
Falls, 21 Iowa, 565 ; Davenport G. L. & tucky: Williamson v. Commonwealth, 4
C. Co. v. Davenport, 13 Iowa, 229 ; State B. Mon. (Ky.) 146 (1843). Where a char-
v. Topeka, 36 Kan. 76; Monroe v. Meuer, ter vested in a municipal officer "all the
35 La. An. 1192 ; see also Hollenbeck v. power and jurisdiction given to trial jus-
Marshalltown, 62 Iowa, 21.
tices" in the State, it was held that per-
Treating of this subject, Mr. Sedgwick sons charged with violations of ordinances
says :
“Extensive and summary police wero entitled to a trial by jury and to an
powers are constantly exercised in all the appeal. Beaufort v. Ohlandt, 24 S. C.
States of the Union for the repression of 158 ; Lexington v. Wise, Ib. 163; ante,
breaches of the peace and petty offences ; secs. 316, 366, 411, 428 et seq.
and these statutes are not supposed to 1 Byers v. Commonwealth, 42 Pa. St.
conflict with the constitutional provisions 89. In this case the extent of the right
securing to the citizens a trial by jury," of trial by jury at common law is thor-
Stat. and Const. Law, 548, 549; Cooley oughly examined in a valuable opinion
Const. Lim. 596. What offences may be by Strong, J., afterwards one of the
proceeded against in England in a sum- justices of the Supreme Court of the
mary manner are determined by acts of United States, and the validity of sum-
Parliament, and the later acts include some mary convictions sustained. See chapter
cases of serious crime. 1 Stephen, Hist. on Ordinances, ante, secs. 366, 408, 411.
Cr. Law, chap. iv. pp. 122–126. In Wil. The doctrine may be considered as settled
liams v. Augusta, supra, proceedings before in Pennsylvania that municipal corpora-
a city council for violations of its ordi. tions are not within the constitutional
nances, although punishable by fine, were guaranty of jury trial, and that the right
considered not to be "criminal cases ' to a trial by jury may be withheld by the
within the meaning of the Constitution of legislature from new offences, and from new
$ 433
501
MUNICIPAL COURTS: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT.
§ 433. Magna Charta ; The Fourteenth Amendment. - The Four-
teenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States contains a
provision similar to that found in many of the State Constitutions,
" that no State shall deprive any person of life, liberty, &c., without
due process of law.”1 Thus the principles of Magna Charta, mem-
orable in their assertion, historic in their associations, and luminous
with the light of liberty, are part of the fundamental law of this
country, and they cannot be contravened in the powers granted to
inunicipalities, nor in the jurisdiction with which municipal courts
are invested, or in the proceedings therein authorized. One of the
jurisdictions created by statute without N. Y. 406; 18 Alb. Law Jour. 254
common-law powers, and from proceed- (1878); ante, chap. iv. ; supra, secs. 366–
ings out of the course of the common law. 368, 411, 412; infra, secs. 434–438.
Rhines v. Clark, 51 Pa. St. 96 (1865), 1 Construed Portland v. Bangor (va-
per Woodward, C. J.; Dunmore's Ap- grants), 65 Me. 120 (1876); s. C. 20 Am.
peal, 52 Pa. St. 374 (1866); Ewing v. Rep. 681 ; ante, sec. 401.
Filley, 43 Pa. St. 384 (1862); Van Swar- 2 The words referred to in the text, in
tow v. Commonwealth, 24 Pa. St. 131 substance the sanie as Article 39 of Magna
(1854). See Barter v. Commonwealth, 3 Charta, are the “ essential clauses," being
Pa. (Pen. & W.) 253 (1831) ; post. sec. those that “protect the personal liberty
438, and note. Such a constitutional and property of all freemen by giving
provision does not apply in New York to security from arbitrary imprisonment and
petty offences made triable by statute before arbitrary spoilation." Hallam Mid. Ages,
a court of special sessions. People v. II. 324. “ These three words [nul-
Justices, 74 N. Y. 406 (1878) ; 18 Alb. lus liber homo) are worth," says Lord
Law Jour. 254. A different view is, to Chatham, "all the classics." In time
some extent, taken by the Supreme Court they came to embrace every person in the
of Vermont under the Constitution of that realın. The eloquent eulogium of Sir
State, whose language is, that “when an James Mackintosh upon Magna Charta is
issue of fact proper for cognizance of a well known. He justly says that whoever
jury shall be joined in a court of law, the appreciates it “is sacredly bound to speak
parties have a right to trial by jury which with reverential gratitude of the authors
ought to be held sacred.” In the opinion of the Great Charter. To have produced
of the court, a public corporation, although it, to have preserved it, to have matured
the liability on the corporation be created it, constitute the immortal claim of Eng-
by statute, is entitled to a jury trial, and land upon the esteem of mankind." In
therefore a statute providing for a coin- enumerating its advantages and its bless-
pulsory and final reference of a case in ings, it seems to the author that Sir James
its nature one at common law, is void; has omitted to notice its crowning glory,
and the Constitution applies to all contro- and that is its assertion of the principle of
versies fit to be tried by a jury, although such priceless value to mankind which
the particular right was created by statute Magna Charta alike in its origin and in
enacted, after the adoption of the Consti. its general and specific provisions declares
tution. Plimpton v. Somerset, 33 Vt. 283 and illustrates, and which is the founda-
(1860). It would, perhaps, be going too tion principle of English and American
far to say that municipal corporations are liberty, viz.: that the Law as distinguished
not in any case within the constitutional from arbitrary power or discretionary au-
guaranty of a trial by jury, and yet it thority is supreme over all ; that all per-
would not follow that provision might sons from those in the highest station to
not be made for the trial in a summary the humblest individual are equally en-
way, before municipal courts, of petty or titled to its protection, and are equally
police offences. People v. Justices, 74 bound to render it obedience ; that all
502
$ 433
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
questions which most frequently arises is whether the defendant is
entitled to a trial by jury, and the cases on this subject cannot all
be reconciled. The general principles applicable to its solution,
however, are plain. Violations of municipal by-laws proper, such
as fall within the description of municipal police regulations, as for
example those concerning markets, streets, waterworks, city officers,
&c., and which relate to acts and omissions that are not embraced in
the general criminal legislation of the State, the legislature may
authorize to be prosecuted in a summary manner by and in the
name of the corporation, and need not provide for a trial by jury.
Such acts and omissions are not crimes or misdemeanors to which
the constitutional right of trial by jury extends.?
In England violations of municipal by-laws where the penalty is
a fine, or by authority of Parliament a fine and imprisonment, have
always been prosecuted in a summary manner, although Magna
Charta secures the right of trial by jury. Summary prosecutions,
however, have always been, it is believed, in virtue of Acts of Parlia-
ment. The distinction there is between offences known as pleas of
the crown, where the trial must be by jury, and petty offences pun-
ishable by fine or amerciament in the inferior jurisdictions. And
a by-law with appropriate penalties is not necessarily invalid, be-
cause the party may also be indicted for the same act.5 So here
where the act or omission sought to be punished by imprisonment
under a municipal ordinance is in its nature not peculiarly an of-
fence against the municipality, but rather against the public at
large, and where it falls within the legal or common-law notion of a
crime or misdemeanor, and especially where, being of such a nature,
it is embraced in the criminal code of the State, then the constitu-
tional guarantees intended to secure the liberty of the citizen and
the right to a trial by jury cannot be evaded by the nature of the
powers vested in the municipal corporation or the nature of the
men are governed by the general law of 2 Text quoted by the Supreme Court of
the land and by that alone, and are amena- the United States in Callan v. Wilson, 127
ble only to that law as administered in the U. S. 540 (1888); -where, however, the
Judicial Courts; that the entire structure crime in question - conspiracy
was held
of our polity, Constitutions, and laws rests not to be included in the class referred to
upon the right of the individual to the in the text. See also State v. Powell, 97
security and enjoyment of his freedom and N. C. 417, and post, sec. 439.
his property ; that the individual is every- 8 1 Stephen Hist. Crim. Law, chap. iv.
thing and the government nothing except p. 122.
so far as it is an institution that protects 4 Ante, sec. 368, and authorities cited
his liberties and his rights.
in note.
1 Ante, secs. 366-368, and cases in note; 5 Grant on Corp. 82 ; ante, sec. 368,
secs. 408-414, and notes ; secs. 427, 428- note.
432.
$ 433
503
MUNICIPAL COURTS : THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT.
one.
jurisdiction conferred upon the municipal courts. If no imprison-
ment for the violation of the municipal regulation is authorized, it is
clear that the prosecution is not criminal, and there is no constitu-
tional right to a trial by jury. But if a limited imprisonnient on
default of paying a fine, or even as part of the punishment, is au-
thorized by the legislature, this does not necessarily make the case,
if it be for a violation of a mere municipal regulation, one to which
the right of a trial by jury extends. The question depends rather,
we think, upon the intrinsic nature of the offence. It is very geuer-
ally agreed in this country that certain minor or petty offences may
be summarily prosecuted and tried without indictment or a jury,
but there is a class of cases so near boundary line that the courts
have differed as to which side of it they belong.? On the principles
1 In re Rolfs, 30 Kan. 758, quoting ing is in general looked upon as a criminal
text, and holding that maintaining a nui-, Per Platt, B., Attorney-General v.
sance — as keeping a hog-pen -- being at Radloff, 10 Exchų. 84. There are many
common law a criminal offence for which crimes, properly so called, which are liable
fine and imprisonment may be imposed, to be punished on summary conviction.
one accused thereof is entitled to a jury, i Steph. Hist. Cr. Law, chap. iv. p. 122.
in a trial before a police-judge under an But there are a vast number of acts, which
ordinance of the city. Stebbins v. Mayer in no sense are crimes, which are also
(Kan.), 16 Pac. Rep. 745.
punishable ; such, for instance, as keeping
% Ante, secs. 366, 368 and note, 408 open house after certain hours, and a
et seq., 414, 427, 428. In England, under variety of breaches of police regulations
various Acts of Parliament from an early which will readily occur to the mind of any
period, certain magistrates have been one. Per Baron Martin, s. c. 96. Where
authorized “to inflict in a summary way the proceeding is conducted with a view
penalties of different kinds upon a great and for the purpose of obtaining redress
variety of offenders. These penalties have for the violation of a private right only,
consisted in the infliction of fines of the proceeding is a civil one ; but, on the
greater or less amount, and sometimes in other hand, where the proceeding is di-
imprisonment, and occasionally in setting rected for the punishment of an offence
the offender in the stocks. Most offences which inilitates against the general in-
created by legislation of this sort have terest of the community, and for the
consisted in the violation of rules laid punishment of the infraction of some
down for some administrative purpose, public duty, such proceeding is a crim-
and so belong rather to administrative law inal proceeding. Per Sir Alexander Cock-
than to criminal law as usually under burn, in arguing same case, p. 86.
It is
stood.” 1 Stephen Hist. Cr. Law, chap. not an easy matter to draw a line, and so
iv. p. 122. In the later acts in England be able to decide on which side of it each
the summary powers of magistrates “in case should be placed. Reference may be
cases of serious crimes have been consider made to the following cases : Attorney-
ably enlarged." Ib. The following refer- General v. Bowman, 2 B. & P. 532, n. ;
ence to some additional authorities, Eng. Attorney-General v. Siddon, 1 C. & J.
lish and Canadian, respecting the question, 220 ; Huntley v. Luscombe, 2 B. & P.
What is a crime? is taken from Chief 530 ; Rackham v. Bluck, 9 Q. B. 691 ;
Justice Harrison's Municipal Manual for Cobbett v. Slowman, 9 Exchq. 633 ; Eg.
the Province of Ontario (5th ed. 1878), p. gington, In re, 2 E. & B. 717 ; Sweeney v.
Spooner, 3 B. & S. 329; Reeve v. Wood,
“If imprisonment may in the first in- 5 B. & S. 364; Attorney-General v. Sulli-
stance follow the conviction, the proceed- van, 32 L. J. Exchq. 92 ; Easton's Case,
312 : -
504
§ 435
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
here laid down those which most commonly present themselves
may be satisfactorily determined.
$ 434. (362). Criminal Charges; Jury Trial. - Where the legis-
lature undertakes to confer upon the courts of the corporation, or
where the corporation seeks to give to its court summary jurisdiction
to try persons for acts which are indictable, or are criminal offences, it
not unfrequently happens that some provision of the Constitution,
designed to protect the rights or liberty of the citizen, is violated.
Thus, under a Constitution declaring " that no freeman shall be put
to answer any criminal charge but by indictment,” &c., and "that no
freeman shall be convicted of any crime but by the unanimous ver-
dict of a jury of good and lawful men in open court, as heretofore
used,” an act of the legislature which gives to an officer of an in-
corporated town the power of trying assaults and batteries, or
other crimes, is, in the opinion of the Supreme Court of North
Carolina, void, because it violates both of these provisions of the
Constitution,
no
§ 435 (363). Same subject. — A similar view was taken in the
State of Arkansas, the Constitution of which provided that
man shall be put to answer any criminal charge but by present-
ment, indictment, or impeachment;" and it was held that the legis-
lature could not confer upon the corporation courts of a city the
power to punish an assault and battery - this being a criminal
charge — without presentinent or indictment; and it was conse-
quently decided that the judgment of conviction of such a court for
an assault and battery is coram non judice, and constitutes no bar
to a prosecution by indictment in the courts of the State for the
same offence.2
12 A. & E. 645; Cattell v. Ireson, E., B. & “the mayors, recorders, &c., may be com-
E. 91 ; Morden v. Porter, 7 C. B. N. S. missioned, and the legislature may vest
641 ; Herne v. Garton, 2 E. & E. 66; in them such criminal jurisdiction as
Parker v. Green, 2 B. & S. 299 ; Lucas & may be necessary for the punishment of
McGlashan, In re, 29 Upper Can. Q. B. minor crimes and offences, as the police
81 ; The Queen v. Boardman, 30 Upper and good order of the city of New Orleans
Can. Q. B. 553 ; The Queen v. Roddy, 41 may require.' It was held that art. 103
Upper Can. Q. B. 291."
laid down the general rule, to which art.
1 State v. Moss, 2 Jones (N. C.) Law, 124 was an exception, and that under
66 (1854). See Tierney v. Dodge, 9 the latter article it was competent for
Minn. 166 (1864). The Constitution of the legislature to provide for the prose-
Louisiana (art. 103) requires that “prose-
prose- `cution of minor offences, without in-
cutions shall be by indictment or informa- dictment or jury trial, in the Recorder's
tion. The accused shall have a speedy Court. State v. Guttierrez, 15 La. An.
trial by an impartial jury of the vicin- 190 (1860).
age.” Another article (124) provides that 2 Rector 2. State, 6 Ark. (1 Eng.) 187
§ 437 MUNICIPAL COURTS : CRIMINAL CHARGES ; JURY TRIAL.
505
that «
§ 436 (364). Same subject. — The same doctrine was declared
in Michigan. The Constitution of the State contained a provision
no person shall be held to answer for a criminal offence unless
on the presentment of a grand jury, except cases cognizable by
justices of the peace,” &c.; and by the statutes of the State, the
keeping of a bawdy-house was declared to be an offence punishable
by fine and imprisonment. Under this state of the law the city of
Detroit was empowered by the legislature “ to make all such by-
laws and ordinances as may be deemed expedient by the common
council for effectually preventing and suppressing houses of ill-fame
within the limits of the city.” It was held that the term “criminal
offence" in the Constitution included both felonies and misde-
meanors, and embraced the offence (which was such both at com-
mon law and by the statute of the State) of keeping a house of
ill-fame; and therefore an ordinance of the common council pre-
scribing the punishment for keeping such a house within the city
and providing for the trial and conviction of the offenders in the
municipal court without indictment, was unconstitutional, the judg-
ment of the court resting upon the principle that, under the con-
stitutional provision quoted, there could be no summary conviction
under an ordinance for that which is a criminal offence by the gen-
eral laws of the State.1
§ 437 (365). Same subject. — So, by the Constitution of Texas,
it is provided that “in all cases in which justices of the peace or
no per-
(1845); Durr v. Howard, 6 Ark. 461; as to an ordinance against opium dens,
Lewis v. State, 21 Ark. 211. It is held as precisely the same acts are made
in the same State that a corporation court punishable by the Penal Code. Re Sic, 73
may punish a person for using obscene Cal. 142 (1887). In Kentucky, the Con-
language in the streets, because such an stitution of which provides that "
offence is not declared criminal by any son shall, for any indictable offence, be
statute of the State. Slattery, In re, 3 proceeded against criminally by informa-
Ark. 484.
tion," and that “all prosecutions shall be
1 People v. Slaughter, 2 Doug. (Mich.) carried on in the name and by the au-
334 (1842), note ; and see Welch v. People, thority of the commonwealth," the legis-
Ib. 332 (1846). Under the present Con- lature may authorize a city corporation
stitution of California an ordinance prohi- to proceed in its name against offenders
biting persons from visiting, for purposes of for violating its ordinances, and punish
prostitution, houses of ill-fame, was sus- them by fine, although the offence, as in
tained, the same “not being in conflict the case before the court (an assault and
with the general laws” of the State. Re battery), is indictable under the laws of
Johnson, 73 Cal. 228 (1887). So as to the State. The court regarded the pro-
ordinance to suppress tippling-houses. Pie ceeding in the name of the corporation as
Campbell, 74 Cal. 20 (1887). So as to of a quasi civil or penal nature, and not as
ordinance making it unlawful to visit a criminal. Williamson v. Commonwealth,
place for the practice of gambling. Lane, 4 B. Mon. (Ky.) 146 (1843); ante, șecs.
Ex parte, 76 Cal. 587. But otherwise 88, 411, 429 ; supra, sec. 432, note.
506
§ 438
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
inferior tribunals shall have jurisdiction of causes where the penalty
is fine and imprisonment (except in cases of contempt), the accused
shall have the right of trial by jury," and under this it was held
that the mayor's court could not constitutionally be invested with
power to try summarily, and without a jury, a person for assault
and battery, in violation of the ordinances of the corporation,
where the mayor was authorized to impose a fine.
§ 438 (366). Same subject. — In Zylstra v. The Corporation of
Charleston, it appeared that the organic act of the city gave to the
common council power to affix and levy fines for all offences against
their by-laws, and there was no limitation of the amount of the fines.
In this respect the charter was silent. The “Court of Wardens'
(the corporation tribunal) had the power expressly given to it to
commit for fines and penalties. Under these circumstances the
corporation of Charleston passed an ordinance prohibiting the
exercise of the trade of candle and soap making within the limits
of the city, under a penalty of £100. Zylstra was prosecuted in
the Court of Wardens - composed of members of the city coun-
cil — for a violation of this by-law, and fined by this court £100.
On his motion to obtain a prohibition it was held, under the
Constitution of that State, that the proceedings of the Court of
Wardens were void, not being according to the lex terræ recog-
nized by Magna Charta, and expressly adopted by the State Con-
stitution. And the judges who expressed themselves on that
point were of opinion, under the State Constitution, that that tri-
bunal could not be invested with a jurisdiction greater than that
exercised by justices of the peace, unless there was provision for
securing a trial by jury, which in the instance before the court
had not been made.?
1 Burns v. La Grange, 17 Texas, 415 and void.” Barter v. Commonwealth, 3
(1856); S. P. Smith v. San Antonio, 16. Pa. (Pen. & W.) 253 (1831).
643.
A statute providing for summary con-
2 Zylstra v. Charleston, 1 Bay (S. C.), viction for a new offence before inferior
382 (1794).
jurisdictions, without a jury, does not
In holding that the charter of the city violate the provision of the Constitution
of Lancaster did not confer upon the that “trial by jury shall be as heretofore,
councils the right to vest in the mayor and the right thereof remain inviolate.”
and aldermcn jurisdiction to convict sun- Van Swartow v. Commonwealth, 24 Pa.
marily, and imprison in default of payment St. 131 (1854). Ante, sec. 432, note ;
of the penalty affixed to an ordinance, Rhines v. Clark, 51 Pa. St. 96. See, also,
Gibson, C. J., remarked : “Now, if the Boring v. Williams, 17 Ala. 510; Times
charter even purported to confer a power v. The State, 26 Ala. 165; Powers, In rc,
to imprison on summary conviction (for a 25 Vt. 261 ; Murphy v. People, : 2 Cow.
misdemeanor) and without appeal to a (N. Y.) 815; Shirley v. Lunenburg, 11
jury, it would be so far unconstitutional Mass. 379.
§ 439
507
MUNICIPAL COURTS: JURY TRIAL.
§ 439 (367). Where the Right of a Jury Trial is given by
Appeal. - It has, however, been decided in the courts of several
of the States that although the charge or matter in the municipal
or local courts be one in respect of which the party is by the Con-
stitution entitled to a trial by jury, yet if by an appeal, clogged
with no unreasonable restrictions, he can have such a trial as a matter
of right in the appellate court, this is sufficient, and his constitu-
tional right to a jury trial is not invaded by the summary proceed-
ing in the first instance. The Supreme Court of the United States
has, however, very recently emphatically disapproved of this doc-
trine, in a case where the charge against the defendant was criminal
in its nature, affecting the public at large, and was not one of
the class of petty offences which, at the common law, may be
proceeded against summarily, without a jury: The question came
before the court upon an application for the writ of habeas corpus
in favor of one who had been convicted in the Police Court of
the District of Columbia, of the offence of conspiracy, without a
jury which he had duly demanded.3 The distinction is sharply
As to the right, under particular con- City Council, 1 Nott & McC. 227 ; Thorn-
stitutional and statutory provisions, to a ton v. Smith, 1 Wash. (Va.) R. 106 ;
jury trial, for violations of municipal by- McMullen v, City Council, 1 Bay (S. C.),
laws. Thomas v. Ashland, 12 Ohio St. 46; Zylstra v. Charleston, Ib. 382;
124 ; Work v. State, 2 Ohio St. 296 ; Gray Willis v. Boonville, 28 Mo. 543 ; Fayette
v. State, 2 Harring. (Del.) 76 (1836); v. Shafroth, 25 Mo. 445 ; Sill v. Corning,
Low v. Commissioners of Pilotage, R. M. 15 N. Y. 297; Landers v. Staten Island
Charlt. (Ga.) 302; Green v. Savannah, lb. Railroad Co., 53 N. Y. 450 (1873); Good-
368, 371; Williams v. Augusta, 4 Ga. 509. rich v. Brown, 30 Ia. 291 (1870); Penn-
Approved, Floyd v. Eatonton Comm’rs, sylvania Hall, In re, 5 Pa. St. 204 (1847);
14 Ga. 354 (1853); State v. Guttierrez, 15 Alexander v. Bennett, 60 N. Y. 204 (1875).
La. Au. 190 ; Trigally v. Memphis, 6 Extent of jurisdiction territorially.
Coldw. (Tenn.) 382 (1869); Anderson v. State v. Clegg, 27 Conn, 593 ; Covill v.
O'Donnell, 7 Southeast. Rep. 524. Ante, Phy (process), 26 Ill. 432; State v.
secs. 427, 432.
McArthur, 13 Wis. 383 ; Hoag v. Lamont,
Jurisdiction of mayor's, recorder's, and 60 N. Y. 96 (1875).
police courts under statutes or special char- 1 Stewart v. Mavor, 7 Md. 501 ; Mor-
ters. Commonwealth v. Pindar, 11 Met. ford r. Barnes, 8 Yerger (Tenn.), 444 ;
(Mass.) 539; Commonwealth v. Roark, McDonald v. Schell, 6 Serg. & Rawle
8 Cush. (Mass.) 210 ; Same v. Emery, 11 (Pa.), 240 ; Beers v. Beers, 4 Conn. 535 ;
Cush. (Mass.) 406 ; Elder v. Dwight Jones v. Robbins, 8 Gray Mass.), 329
Manufacturing Co., 4 Gray (Mass.), 201; Dorgan v. Boston, 12 Allen (Mass.), 223 ;
State v. Ricker, 32 N. H. 179; Myers v. Sedg. St. and Const. Law, 549 ; Cooley
People, 26 Ill. 173; Rice v. State, 3 Kan. Const. Lim. 410. Text cited and followed.
141 ; State v. Young, 3 Kan. 445 ; Malone Emporia v. Volmer, 12 Kan. 622, 631
v. Murphy, 2 Kan. 250 ; Gray v. State, 2 (1874); post, sec. 813.
Harring. (Del.) 76 ; Hutchings v. Scott, 4 2 Callan v. Wilson, 127 U. S. 540
Halst. (N. J.) 218 ; Cincinnati v. Gwynne, (1888).
10 Ohio, 192; 14 Ohio, 250, 403 ; Markle 3 Callan v. Wilson, supra. · Mr. Justice
V. Akron, 14 Ohio, 586 ; Weeks v. For Harlan, delivering in this case the opinion
man, 1 Harris. (N. J.) 237 ; Truchelut v. of the court, said: “It [conspiracy] is an
;
508
§ 440
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
drawn by the Supreme Court in the case cited, between offences
essentially criminal, affecting the public at large, and petty
offences which at the common law may be proceeded against in
a summary manner, which latter would include violations of muni-
cipal ordinances concerning local affairs in respect of matters non-
criminal in their nature. This distinction would appear to be
sound, and the doctrine of the Supreme Court is consonant with
the established and traditionary regard of our jurisprudence for
the rights of the citizen and for the trial by jury in criminal cases.
To this extent only is the doctrine of the Supreme Court in
necessary conflict with the judgments of the State courts referred
to in the text.1
§ 440 (368). Revisory Power of the Superior Courts ; Review
of Proceedings by Superior Tribunals. -- With respect to in-
ferior jurisdictions, the right to review their proceedings by the
superior tribunals will not be taken away unless the intention
offence of a grave character, affecting the or by or under the authority, of the United
public at large, and we are unable to hold States, secures to him the right to enjoy
that a person charged with having com- that mode of trial from the first moment,
mitted it in this District is not entitled and in whatever court he is put on trial
to a jury, when put upon his trial. The for the offence charged. In such cases a
jurisdiction of the Police Court, as defined judgment of conviction, not based upon a
by existing statutes, does not extend to verdict of guilty by a jury, is void. To
the trial of infamous crimes or offences accord to the accused a right to be tried
punishable by imprisonment in the peni- by a jury, in an appellate court, after he
tentiary. But the argument made in be- has been once fully tried otherwise than
half of the government, implies that if by a jury, in the court of original jurisdic-
Congress should provide the Police Court tion, and sentenced to pay a fine or be
with a grand jury, and authorize that imprisoned for not paying it, does not
court to try, without a petit jury, all per satisfy the requirements of the Constitu-
sons indicted even for crimes punish- tion. When, therefore, the appellant was
able by confinement in the penitentiary brought before the Supreme Court of the
such legislation would not be an invasion District, and the fact was disclosed that
of the constitutional right of trial by jury, he had been adjudged guilty of the crime
provided the accused, after being tried of conspiracy charged in the information
and sentenced in the Police Court, is in this case, without ever having been
given an unobstructed right of appeal to, tried by a jury, he should have been re-
and trial by jury in, another court to stored to his liberty."
The Supreme
which the case may be taken. We can- Court of the District had previously ex-
not assent to that interpretation of the pressed its doubt upon the question. In
Constitution. Except in that class or re Fry, 3 Mackey, (D. C. 135. See also
grade of offences called petty offences, In re Dana, 7 Benedict, 1.
which, according to the common law, 1 It is certainly very difficult to define
may be proceeded against summarily in view of the English legislation what
in any tribunal legally constituted for are such petty offences. 1 Stephen, Hist.
that purpose, the guarantee of an impar. Cr. Law, chap. iv. p. 122, where the his-
tial jury to the accused in a criminal tory and character of such legislation are
prosecution, conducted either in the name, given.
§ 440
509
MUNICIPAL COURTS : REVISORY POWER OVER.
of the legislature to this effect is expressed with unequivocal
clearness. The authorities cited in the note will show the great
length to which the courts go in preserving the right to review
the proceedings of subordinate tribunals, administered frequently
by men without professional or judicial knowledge or experience.
A declaration by the statute concerning au inferior tribunal,
that its proceedings “shall be final and conclusive,” or “without
appeal," &c., will not deprive a party of the right of review by
certiorari, error, or the proper proceeding But where it is
The power
1 Rex v. Commissioners, 2 Keeble, 43; The Supreme Court of Michigan, in
Rex v. Moreley, 2 Burr. 1040 ; Lawton v. reviewing, on certiorari, the legality of a
Commissioners, 2 Caines (N. Y.), 179, conviction of a defendant in the recorder's
181 ; Starr v. Trustees, 6 Wend. (N. Y.) court on a complaint for violating a muni- .
564 ; People v. Mayor, 2 Hill (N. Y.), 9; cipal ordinance, speaking of the extent of
Tierney v. Dodge, 9 Minn. 166; Heath, the revisory power of the superior tribus
In re, 3 Hill (N. Y.), 42, 52, and cases nals, and the nature and purposes of the
cited and reviewed by Cowen, J.; Camden municipal tribunals, says :
v. Bloch, 65 Ala. 236.
of reviewing upon certiorari judicial pro-
A kindred subject is treated in the ceedings of inferior tribunals and bodies
chapter on Municipal Officers: " Special not according to the course of the common
Tribunal to determine Election Contests law has been long exercised in England,
for Municipal Offices," ante, sec. 200, as well as in this country. The power has
and it is there shown that the ordinary been jealously maintained, and has been
constitutional provision that the judicial deemed necessary to prevent oppression.
power shall be vested in certain courts There are certain classes of questions
does not disable the legislature from pro- which, by common understanding, from
viding that the council of municipal cor- time immemorial belong to the course of
porations may finally determine the valid- the judicial inquiry under the laws of the
ity of the election of corporation officers. land. The common law and the various
New Orleans v. Morgan, 7 Martin (La.), charters and bills of rights recognized and.
N. S. 1,
9 Martin, repr. 381 ; State v. assured the right to such an inquiry; and
Fitzgerald, 44 Mo. 425 (1869) ; Ewing v. the Constitution, in apportioning the judi-
Filley, 43 Pa. St. 384 ; State v. Johnson, cial power, as well as in affirming the im-
17 Ark. 407. But the supervisory juris- munity of life, liberty, and property, has
diction of the superior courts will not be always been understood to guarantee to
held to be taken away by mere negative each citizen the right to have his title to
words. Grier v. Shackleford, Const. Rep. property, and other legal privileges, de-
642 ; State v. Fitzgerald, supra; Com- termined by the general tribunals of the
monwealth v. McCloskey, 2 Rawle (Pa.), State. These municipal courts, so far as
369 ; Strahl, In re, 16 Iowa, 369 ; State they act under city by-laws, are not de-
v. Funck, 17 Iowa, 365; Bateman v. signed to decide between man and man,
Megowan, 1 Met. (Ky.) 533 ; Wammack or to administer general laws. They are
v. Holloway, 2 Ala. 31 ; Hummer v. ordained to prevent disorder in matters of
"Hummer, 3 G. Greene (Iowa), 42; State local convenience, and to regulate the use
v. Marlow, 15 Ohio St. 114; Attorney. of public and quasi public easements, so
General v. Corporation of Poole, 4 Mylne as to prevent confusion. If in exercising
& Cr. 17; Attorney-General v. Aspinall, this power they can incidentally decide
2 Mylne & Cr. 613; Parr v. Attorneyupon the rights of private property so as
General, 8 Cl. & F. 409; Taylor v. Ameri- to determine its enjoyment without re-
cus, 39 Ga. 59 ; State r. Kempf, 69 Wis. view, there would seem to be a practical
470 ; post, chaps. XX. xxi., xxii.; post, sec. annihilation of the right to resort to the
926.
general tribunals and the common law."
510
§ 441
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
declared with respect to a court of general and superior jurisdiction,
as of the Supreme Court of New York, that its action (for example,
in confirming appraisements for opening streets, or under a rail-
road act) “shall be final and conclusive upon the parties interested
and upon all other persons,” the right of appeal, which would
otherwise exist, from the decision of such court to a still higher
tribunal, as to the Court of Appeals, is destroyed.1 A charter
provision to the effect that appeals and writs of error from
judgments of the mayor, in cases arising under the charter, should
only be allowed in cases where the fine was over five dollars,
was considered as evincing the legislative intention that in cases
where the fine was under that sum the judgment should be
final, and hence a writ of prohibition will not lie to restrain its
collection, nor can it be reviewed on certiorari.2
§ 441 (369). Same subject. — In Virginia it is decided that
in a proceeding before the mayor or a justice to impose a penalty
on a party for obstructing a street, the mayor or justice cannot,
if the defendant bona fide sets up title to the land claimed as
a street, inquire into the validity of the claim, the court holding
that by the principles of the common law (which are not changed
by the statutes), a bona fide assertion of title to property or to
an incorporeal hereditament or real franchise ousted the juris-
diction of these inferior magistrates or tribunals.3
Per Campbell, J., Jackson v. People, 9 2 Wertheimer V. Boonville, 29 Mo.
Mich. 111, 117 (1860). Further see chap. 254 (1860).
xxii. post, sec. 925 et seq.
8 Warwick v. Mayo, 15 Gratt. (Va.)
An appeal from inferior tribunals does 528 (1860). To the same effect, see Jack-
not exist unless plainly given. People v. son v. People, 9 Mich. 111 (1860); Grand
Police Justice, 7 Mich. 456 ; Conboy v. Rapids v. Hughes, 15 Mich. 54 (1866).
Iowa City, 2 Iowa, 90 ; Muscatine v. See chapter on Streets. What record of
Steck, 7 Iowa, 505 ; Dubuque v. Rebman, conviction before corporation officers or
1 Iowa, 444; McGarty v. Deming, 51 courts should show. Keeler v. Milledge,
Conn. 422, where, however, the charter 4 Zabr. (24 N. J. L.) 142 ; Muscatine v.
denied the right of an appeal. Certiorari, Steck, 7 Iowa, 505; Buck v. Danzen.
ou the other hand, will lie unless plainly backer, 8 Vroom (37 N. J. L.), 359 ; St.
denied, or other specific remedy be given. Peter v. Bauer, 19 Minn. 327 (1872);
Cunningham v. Squires, 2 West Va. 422 Goldthwaite v. Montgomery, 50 Ala. 486
(1865); post, sec. 611, and chap. xxii. on (1874). See chap. xxii. post.
Remedies against Illegal Corporate Acts, A town officer who holds in custody a
post.
person committed by a verbal order of a
i Canal and Walker Streets, In re, 12 police magistrate for non-payment of a fine
N. Y. (2 Kern.) 406 (1855); New York, imposed for the breach of a town ordi-
Central R. Co. v. Marvin, 11 N. Y. (1 nance, acts not only without authority
Kern.) 276.
but in violation of law. Odell Trustees
v. Schroeder, 58 Ill. 353 (1871).
§ 442
511
SUBJECT OUTLINED.
CHAPTER XIV.
CONTRACTS.
§ 442 (370). Subject outlined. - The mode of enforcing the con-
tracts of municipal corporations will be considered hereafter. In
this chapter we shall treat, in the order below indicated, of the
power of such corporations to make contracts of different kinds, the
mode of exercising the power, and the effect of transcending it.
1. Extent of Power to contract, and how conferred — secs. 443–
448.
2. Mode of exercising the Power - sec. 449.
3. Seal not necessary unless required — May be concluded by
Vote or Ordinance secs. 450, 451.
4. When Corporation bound by Contracts made by Agents -
Mode of Execution -- secs. 452-456.
5. Contracts beyond Corporate Powers void - Ultra Vires a
Defence secs. 457, 458.
6. Implied Contracts — When Deducible — secs. 459, 460.
7. Ratification of Unauthorized Contract - secs. 463-465.
8. Provision requiring Letting to Lowest Bidder - secs. 466-
470.
9. Contract of Suretyship - sec. 471.
10. Rights and Liabilities as respects Authorized Contracts --
Illustrations - Cases mentioned - Power to settle Disputed Claims
- To give Extra Compensation - To employ Attorneys ---secs.
472-479.
11. Contracts for Public Works — Rights of Contractors
480-483.
12. Same - Corporate Control under Stipulation to that effect -
secs. 480-483.
13. Evidences of Indebtedness Negotiable Bonds -- secs. 484,
485.
14. Ordinary Warrants or Orders — Their Legal Nature ---secs.
487, 488.
15. Liability of Indorsers thereof -- sec. 489.
secs.
1 See post, chaps. XX., xxii., xxiii. contracts made by municipal corporations.
Legislative power over and in respect of See chaps. iv., vii., and viii., ante.
512
§ 443
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
.
16. Payment and Cancellation of Orders and Warrants, - sec.
500.
17. Rights and Remedies of Holders thereof -- secs. 501, 502.
18. Defences thereto- Ultra Vires - Fraud Want of Consid-
eration
sec. 504.
19. Orders payable out of a Particular Fund — sec. 505.
20. Interest on Corporate Indebtedness — sec. 506.
21. Railroad Aid Bonds - Course of Decision in U. S. Supreme :
Court secs. 511-515.
22. Leading Cases in National Supreme Court on the Subject
noticed — secs. 521-534.
23. Decisions in State Courts referred to - Conclusions stated
secs. 550-554.
§ 443 (371). Extent of Power to make Contracts; and how con-
ferred. - In determining the extent of the power of a municipal cor-
poration to make contracts, and in ascertaining the mode in which the
power is to be exercised, the importance of a careful study of the char-
ter or incorporating act, and of the general legislation of the State
on the subject, if there be any, cannot be too strongly urged. Where
there are express provisious on the subject, these will, of course,
measure, as far as they extend, the authority of the corporation. The
power to make contracts, and to sue and be sued thereon, is usually
conferred, in general terms, in the incorporating act. But where the
power is conferred in this manner it is not to be construed as author-
izing the making of contracts of all descriptions, but only such as
are necessary and usual, fit and proper, to enable the corporation to
secure or to carry into effect the purposes for which it was created ;
and the extent of the power will depend upon the other provisions
of the charter prescribing the matters in respect of which the corpo-
ration is authorized to act. To the extent necessary to execute the
special powers and functions with which it is endowed by its charter,
there is, indeed, an implied or incidental authority to contract obli-
gations, and to sue and be sued in the corporate name.
11 Kyd, 69, 70; 2 Kent Com. 224 ; v. Worcester, 9 Exch. 457 (1854). Indian-
Angell & Ames, secs. 110, 271 ; Galena v. apolis v. Indianapolis Gas Co., 66 Ind. 396,
Corwith, 48 111. 423 (1868); Straus v. approving text; Montgomery County v.
Eagle Ins. Co., 5 Ohio St. 59 (1855); Barber, 45 Ala. 237 (1871); Smith v.
Chaffee v. Granger, 6 Mich. 51 ; Douglass Stephan, 66 Md. 381; Galveston v. Loonie,
v. Virginia City, 5 Nev. 147 (1869); 54 Tex. 517.
Goodrich v. Detroit, 12 Mich. 279; Bank Under general authority to make all
of Columbia v. Patterson, 7 Cranch, 299 contracts necessary for its welfare, a city
(1813); Siebrecht v. New Orleans, 12 La. may contract for water-worlcs.
Cabot v.
An. 496 (1857 ; Bateman v. Ashton-nn. Rome, 28 Ga. 50 ; see Wells v. Atlanta,
der-Lyne, 3 H. & N. 822 (1858); Nowell 43 Ga. 67. A contract granting the exclu-
§ 444
513
CONTRACTS : EFFECT OF FIDUCIARY RELATIONS.
§ 444. Contracts with Municipal Oficers; Fiduciary Relations.
It is a well established and salutary doctrine that he who is en-
sive right to furnish water to a city, made tions of the city council was presented to
under a power “to provide a supply of the United States Supreme Court in Rich-
water," sustained, and the city was en- mond v. Smith, 15 Wall. 429 (1872); and
joined from granting the right to lay pipes it followed, without examination into its
to another company, on the ground that correctness, the exposition of the charter
its power was exhausted. Atlantic City given by the State court in Jones v. Rich-
Water-Works v. Atlantic City, 39 N. J. mond, supra. Upon the general principles
E. (12 Stew.) 367. See Index, titles, of construction, the author doubts whether
Monopolics; Water and Water-Works. the order for the destruction of the liquors
Duty and power of municipality as owner was within the scope of the corporate pow-
of water-works. McKnight v. New Orleans, ers of the city. Ante, seuS. 89, 90, 91,
24 La. An. 412 (1872); Grant v. Daven- and notes. Contract made by a city, un.
port, 36 Iowa, 396 (1873); Hale v. Hough. der government therein set up by the
ton, 8 Mich. 458. May contract for United States military authority, held
lighting streets, &c., Indianapolis v. Indi. valid. Prather v. New Orleans, 24 La.
anapolis Gas Co., 66 Ind. 396. For gra- An. 41. Special prohibition in a city
ding streets. Sturtevant v. Alton, 3 Mc- charter construed to extend to rell con-
Lean, 393. To build sidewallcs. Wyan- tracts of sale to the city. Gregory v.
dotte v. Zeitz, 21 Kan. 649 ; Lawrence v. Jersey City, 5 Vroom (34 N. J. L.), 390.
Killam, 11 Kan. 512, approving text. Where an executory contract with a mu-
For “breakwaler to protect streets of a nicipal corporation is not in its nature
city on the lake. Miller v. Milwaukce, 14 necessarily personal, as, for, example, a
Wis. 642; approved, arguendo, by Cole, contract for cleaning streets, it may, cer-
J., in Clason o. Milwaukee, 30 Wis. 316, tainly with the assent, express or implied,
321 (1872). Supra, sec. 261, note. Le of the city, be assigned, if there be no re.
gislative power over municipal controcls. striction on the right, and the city retains
Ante, chap. iv.; Grant v. Davenport, 38 the personal obligation of the original con-
Iowa, 396 (1873). Post, Acc. 544.
tractor and of his suretics. Devlin v. New
The city of Richmond possessed, un- York, 63 N. Y. 8 (1875).
der its charter, all the powers of munici- No corporation can make a valid con-
pal corporations, including the power "to tract not to cccrcise part of the franchise
contract and be contracted with," and committed to it by the State for public
its council was specially empowered “to purposes. St. Louis v. St. Louis Gaslight
pass all by-laws which they shall decm Co., 5 Mo. App. 484, 529. Sce opinion
necessary for the peace, comfort, conven- of the Supreme Court of Missouri on Ap-
ience, good order, good morals, health, peal, in the case last cited ; and see ante,
or safety of the city, or of the people or hecs. 90, 97, 357, and post, secs. 716, 780;
property therein."
In April, 1865, in see also Index, title Delegation of Public
anticipation of the evacuation of the city Powers.
by the confederatc army and the entry of In The Maggie P., 25 Fed. Rep. 202, it
the national forces, the city council ordered appeared that the city of St. Louis, which,
the destruclion of all the liquor in the city, by its charter, had general control over the
and pledged tho faith of the city for the harbor and improvements therein, includ-
payment of its value. It was decided by ing power “ to keep the wharf and the
the Court of Appeals that under the pro- river along the shore free from wrecks and
vision of the charter above mentioned the other improper obstructions," cntcreil into
council had authority to make the order a contract with the owner of a steamboat
and pledge, and hence the city was re- which had sunk, to use the city's harbor
sponsible for the value of liquor destroyed boat in pumping out the wreck, for a con-
under the order of the council. Jones v. sideration ; and the question was presented
Richmond, 18 Gratt. (Va.) 517 (1888). whether the city could be held liable for
The same question upon the same resolu. damages caused by its failure to carry out
VOL. I. — 33
514
S. 444
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
trusted with the business of others cannot be allowed to make
such business an object of pecuniary profit to himself. This rule
does not depend on reasoning technical in its character, and is not
local in its application. It is based upon principles of reason, of
morality, and of public policy. It has its foundation in the very
constitution of our nature, for it has authoritatively been declared
that a man cannot serve two masters, and is recognized and enforced
wherever a well-regulated system of jurisprudence prevails. The
law will in no case permit persons who have undertaken a character
or a charge to change or invert that character by leaving it and act-
ing for themselves in a business in which their character binds
them to act for others. The application of the rule may in some
instances appear to bear hard upon individuals who have committed
no moral wrong; but it is essential to the keeping of all parties
filling a fiduciary character to their duty, to preserve the rule in its
integrity, and to apply it to every case which justly falls within its
principle. The principle generally applicable to all officers and
cers,
the contract. Brewer, J., said: "I sup- enacted declaring void all contracts made
pose a city can make no contract for the. by municipal corporations with their offi-
discharge of a purely public duty, — such a
In Indiana such a statute was
contract as in case of performance it can strictly enforced. Case v. Johnson, 91
enforce compensation for, or for non-per. Ind. 477 ; approved Benton v. Hamilton,
formance expose itself to liability. It 110 Ind. 294.
cannot use public funds in any such direc- 2 Port v. Russell, 36 Ind. 60 ; s. C. 10
tion. . . . At the same time, when it has Am. Rep. 5; Board of Comm'rs v. Rey-
in its possession instrumentalities, and nolds, 44 Ind. 509; 8. C. 15 Am. Rep. 245 ;
hires employees for the purpose of dis- Macon v. Huff, 60 Ga. 221 ; York Build.
charging some public duty, I see no rea- ings Co. v. Mackenzie, 8 Brown, P. C.
son why, when the exigencies of public · 42 ; Liquidators, &c. v. Coleman, L. R.
duties do not require the use of those in- 6 E. & I. App. C. 189; Aberdeen R. Co.
strumentalities and employees, it may not v. Blaikie, 1 Macq. App. Cases, 461. See
make a valid contract to use them in some full review of authorities in Gardner v. Og-
private service. .. And, generally den, 22 N. Y. 332; Butts v. Wood, 37
speaking, when public duty does not in- N. Y. 317, and cases cited ; McGregor v.
terfere with private service, a city may Logansport, 79 Ind. 166; Fort Wayne v.
make a valid contract for the use of its in- Rosenthal, 75 Ind. 156; Emigrant Co. v.
strumentalities in the latter. The Wright Co., 97 U. S. 339 (1877). In this
testimony shows that the city, through its case the Supreme Court of the United
officers, has been in the habit of making States, by Mr. Justice Miller, in declaring
these contracts and receiving compensation a contract void, say:
“It appears that for
therefor; and having made that a busi- some time before this contract was made
ness, so to speak, having received gain the county had been urging her claim to
from such contracts, it does not lie in its swamp lands before the department at
mouth to say now that there was no off. Washington, through Mr. S. who acted
cer authorized by ordinance to make this as her agent.
A short time before this
kind of contract.'
contract was made Mr. S. informed the
1 Toronto v. Bowes, 4 Grant (Canada), authorities of the county that their claim
504, where the subject is fully considered. had been rejecteil, and that this rejection
In some of the States statutes have been
was accompanied by the announcement of
.
$ 444
515
CONTRACTS : EFFECT OF FIDUCIARY RELATIONS.
directors of a corporation is that they cannot enter into contracts
with such corporation to do any work for it, nor can they subse-
quently derive any benefit personally from such contract. To deny
the application of the rule to municipal bodies would, in the opinion
of the Canadian chancery court, whose views we adopt and approve,
be to deprive the rule of much of its value; for the well working of
the municipal system, through which a large portion of the affairs
of the country are administered, must depend very much upon the
freedom from abuse with which they are conducted. Nothing can
more tend to correct the tendency to abuse than to make abuses un-
profitable to those who engage in them, and to have them stamped
as abuses in courts of justice. The tendency to abuse may indeed
be in part corrected by public opinion; but public opinion itself is
acted upon by the mode in which courts deal with such abuses as
are brought within their cognizance. Accordingly, where in the
case just referred to, the mayor of a city secretly contracted to purchase
at a discount, a large amount of the debentures of the city, which were
expected to be issued under a future by-law of the city council, and
was himself afterwards an active party in procuring and giving effect
to the by-law which was subsequently passed, the court of chancery
held him to be a trustee for the city of the profit he derived from
a rule which left but little to hope for to the supervisors. We are not convinced
on the part of the county. Very shortly that any false representations were made
after this Mr. C., as the agent of the emi. by the agents or officers of the emigrant
grant company, made his appearance in company. But the impression made upon
Wright County and procured the contract us by the whole testimony is that the
we have mentioned. As soon as this was officers and citizens of the county were in
done, Mr. S., as the agent of the emigrant gross ignorance of the nature and value of
company, by the assistance, as he says, of what they were selling; that the emigrant
able lawyers, and in the cases of other company, on the other hand, were well
counties with whom the company had informed in regard to both, and withheld
similar contracts, inaugurated proceedings this information unfairly from the officers
to procure the reversal of the rule an-
of the county. That the sudden change of
nounced by the department. Succeeding the relationship of Mr. S. from an unsuc-
in this he presented the renewed claim of cessful agent of the county to a successful
Wright County, and secured the allowance agent of the company requires an explana.
of several hundred acres still unsold in the tion which has not been satisfactorily given.
county, and money and scrip for six thon- That the fact that all partics knew they
sand acres to be located elsewhere in lieu
were dealing wilh a trust fund devoted by
of swamp lands sold by the government. the donor to a specific purpose demanded
It is not a violent presumption, under all the utmost good faith on the part of the
the circumstances of this case, that when, purchaser. That so far from this there is
just after Mr. S. had made the impression a provision for a diversion of the fund to
on the supervisors of Wright County that other purposes, a gross inadequacy of con-
their case was hopeless, Mr. C. appeared sideration, and a successful speculation at
in Wright County, he had some informa- the expense of the rights of the public."
tion of a different character on which he 1 Cases, supra, note 2.
acted, and which was not communicated
516
§ 444
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
the transaction. So, where a member of a municipal corporation
agreed with another party to take a contract from the corporation
for the execution of certain works in his name, the profits whereof
were to be divided between the parties, it was held that such a con-
tract was in contravention of law, and the court of chancery refused
to enforce the agreement for a partnership. An action at law on a
contract for the sale of goods by a trading partnership, of which a
member is also a meraber of the municipal council, may, where the
contract is not executed, be resisted on the ground that one of the
plaintiffs is a member of the municipal council. A distinction to
be borne in mind is this: if the contract is void as against public
policy or is ultra vires in the true and strict sense of that expres-
sion, there can be no recovery based on the executory provisions of
the contract; but if it has been executed in whole or in part, there
may be an estoppel or other ground of recovery based upon what
has been done. It is obvious, however, that when such is the case the
right of recovery is not upon the contract, but upon facts and cir-
cumstances independent of the notion that the contract is valid.
1 Toronto v. Bowes, 4 Grant (Canada), celebrate the Fourth of July, under which
504.
resolution a committee of the members
2 Collins v. Swindle, 6 Grant (Canada), employed the plaintiff to furnish horses
282 ; Cummings v. Saux, 30 La. An. 207; and carriages for the celebration, it was
Doll v. State, 45 Ohio St. 445.
held (assuming the appropriation of
8 Brown v. Lindsay, 35 Upper Can. Q. B. money for this purpose to be valid under
509. A contract made by a mayor, while the charter) that the plaintiff's employ-
in office, with the city council, to lease a ment was against public policy and void,
city parlc for five years, and for an annual and that he could not recover against the
sum paid hini to keep the park in repair, city for the fuir value of the use of the
-Held, to be against public policy and horses and carriages furnished by him.
void. Macon v. Huff, 60 Ga. 221. But Smith v. Albany, 61 N. Y. 444 (1875). But
after such contract had been ratified by a contract entered into with an officer
a subsequent mayor and council, and of the corporation, whereby such officer
large suns expended by the contractor agreed to keep the streets in repair, was
in fencing, draining, and ornamenting the held valid. Albright v. Chester T. C., 9
park, a court of chancery will not set Rich. (S. C.) Law, 399. See, also, Central
aside the contract without compelling the R. & B. Co. v. Claghorn, Speers Eq. 545,
city to do equity. Ib. The New York 562 ; ante, sec. 283, note; sec. 292 ; Law-
Commission of Appeals regarded an act rence v. Killanı, 11 Kan. 499 (1873).
of the legislature making it unlawful for 4 Thomas v. West Jersey R. R. Co. 101
a member of the common council to be- U. S. 71; Pennsylvania R. Co. v. St.
come a contractor under any contract Louis, A. & T. H. R. Co., 118 U. S. 290.
authorized by the council, and declaring Compare Hitchcock v. Galveston, 96 U. S.
such contract to be void at the instance 341, quoted infra. The cases, however,
of the city, as but declaratory of the com- are conflicting upon the point whether the
mon law, which on grounds of public recovery may not be upon the contract, if
policy, prohibits a trustee from contract- there be a right of recovery at all. In
ing with himself. Accordingly where the Morawetz on Corporations (2d ed.) secs.
plaintiff, a member of the council, voted 648, 653, 689–706, the leading authorities
for a resolution to appropriate money to as to private corporations are collected and
$ 447
517
CONTRACTS : POWER OF PUBLIC OFFICERS,
§ 445. Powers of Public Agents and Officers to make Contracts.
Public corporations may by their officers and properly authorized
agents make contracts the same as individuals and other corpora-
tions, in matters that appertain to the corporation; being artificial
persons, they cannot contract in any other way. Public officers
or agents are held more strictly within their prescribed powers
than private general agents; and a contract made by a public
agent within the apparent scope of his powers does not bind his
principal in the absence of actual authority. There is a broad
distinction between the acts of an officer or agent of a public
municipal corporation and those of an agent for a private individual.
In cases of public agents the public corporation is not bound unless
it manifestly appears that the agent is acting within the scope of
his authority, or he is held out as having authority to do the
act, or is employed in his capacity as a public agent to make the
declaration or representation for the government.3
$ 446. Contracts in Respect of Drainage. Although the general
doctrine is that a municipal corporation cannot usually exercise its
powers beyond its corporate limits, yet this right may be given
either expressly or by implication; and a city with express author-
ity to provide drainage was held, in the absence of any restriction,
to possess the implied power, in order to find an outlet for sewage
beyond its limits, to make a contract with an adjoining landowner
giving it such an outlet.
§ 447 (372). Implied and Incidental Powers ; Market Powers;
All persons bound to take Notice of Exxtent of Corporate Powers.
If a municipal corporation is authorized to erect markets, it may
contract to buy, or may receive a grant of, land on which to place
market buildings, and it may make contracts for the erection of
market-houses. As it is the general practice, in granting muni-
cipal charters and in general acts for the incorporation of towns
and cities, to enumerate their powers and define their duties, it
will suffice in this place to remark generally that the authority
to enter into contracts necessary and proper to carry into effect
their powers and discharge their duties is impliedly given to such
corporations. But this implied authority is only co-extensive with
commented on. See ib. secs. 621, 718, as 8 Baltimore v. Musgrave, 48 Md. 272 ;
to muncipal corporations.
infra, sec. 450, note.
1 Louisville City R. Co. v. Louisville, 4 Coldwater v. Tucker, 36 Mich. 474
8 Bush (Ky.), 415 (1871).
(1877); 8. 0. 24 Am. Rep. 601. Ante,
2 Parsel v. Barnes, 25 Ark. 261 ; Wil- secs. 354, 355, 356, as to extent of corpor-
liams v. Poyton's Lessee, 4 Wheat. 77. ate jurisdiction.
518
§ 417
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
the powers and duties of the corporation; and if any greater au-
thority is claimed it must be sought for in an express or special
grant from the legislature. It is scarcely necessary to observe
that no contract can be made by a corporation which is prohibited
by its charter or by the statute law of the State.1 And it is a
general and fundamental principle of law that all persons contract-
ing with a municipal corporation must at their peril inquire into
the power of the corporation or of its officers to make the contract;
and a contract beyond the scope of the corporate power is void,
although it be under the seal of the corporation. This principle
is more strictly applied, and properly so, than in the law of private
1 Jackson v. Bowman, 39 Miss. 671 V. Ashton, 3 Hurl. & Nor. 323 ; State v.
(1861); Indianapolis v. Indianapolis Gas Haskell, 20 Iowa, 276 ; Baltimore v. Mus-
Co., 66 Ind. 396, citing text. Contracts grave, 48 Md. 472 ; People v. Baraga, 39
to violate the charter, or to bargain away Mich. 554 ; Neely v. Yorkville, 10 S.
or restrict the free exercise of legislative C. 141, approving text; Bryan v. Page,
discretion, vested in a municipality or its 51 Tex. 532; Baby v. Baby, 5 Upper Can.
officers, in reference to public trusts, are Q. B. 510 ; Richmond v. Municipality, 8
void. Ib. ; Thomas v. Richmond, 12 Wall. Upper Can. Q. B. 567; Campbell v. Elma,
349 (1870), in which notes issued by the 13 Upper Can. C. P. 296; Standly v.
city to circulate as money in contraven- Perry, 23 Grant (U.C.), 507; Craycraft v.
tion of law were adjudged void, and the Selvage, 10 Bush (Ky.), 696 (1874);
city held not to be liable either in special Treadway v. Schnauber, 1 Dak. Ter. 236 ;
or general assumpsit ; Morgan v. Menzies, Ouachita P. J. v. Monroe, 37 La. An.
60 Cal. 341. In this case the statute hav- 641 ; Laycock v. Baton Rouge, 35 La. An.
ing exempted cities, &c. from giving bond 475 ; Keating v. Kansas, 84 Mo. 415.
in civil actions, a bond in attachment pro. Within the scope of its power à corpora.
ceedings given by a city was held void. tion may contract to do an act at any place
Ante, secs. 89–92, and cases there cited; other than the one where it is located.
post, sec. 487, and cases cited.
Bank of Utica v. Smedes, 3 Cow. (N. Y.)
2 Marsh v. Fulton County, 10 W2.11. 662; Maddox v. Graham, 2 Met. (Ky:) 56.
676 (1870); ante, sec. 89; infra, sec. 457; Or prospective in its terms. Davenport v.
Leavenworth v. Rankin, 2 Kan. 357 (1864); Hallowell, 10 Me. 317. As to corporate
Wyandotte v. Zeitz, 21 Kan. 649; Horn v. scal. Ante, sec. 190. Where a public cor-
Baltimore, 30 Md. 218 (1868); Bridgeport poration, transcending its legal power,
V. Housatonuc R. Co., 15 Conn. 475, 493; assumes to direct its officers - for exam-
Haynes v. Covington, 13 Sm. & Mar. (21 ple, commissioners of highways - to
Miss.) 408 (1850); Taft v. Pittsford, 28 Vt. bring an action in their own names, or in
286 (1856); Montgomery City Council v. their name of office, against third persons
M. & W. P. R. Co., 31 Ala. 76 (1857); Pa., for trespasses upon the highways, and the
D. & M. Steam Nav. Co. v. Dandridge, 8 action is accordingly brought and the
Gill & J. (Md.) 248,319; Hodges v. Buffalo, officers are defeated, they cannot sustain
2 Denio (N. Y.), 110; Baltimore v. Esch- an action against the corporation to be
bach, 18 Md. 276, 282 (1861); Baltimore v. reimbursed their costs and expenses ; and
Reynolds, 20 Md. 1; Dill v. Wareham, the reason is, that the action of a corpo-
7 Met. (Mass.) 438 (1844); Branham v. ration directing such a suit to be brought,
San Jose, 24 Cal. 585, 602; McCoy v. being in excess of its lawful power, is
Brant, 53 Cal. 247, approving text; Stur- void, and cannot be the foundation of any
tevant v. Alton, 3 McLean, 393 (1844); contract, express or implied. Cornell v.
Wallace v, San Jose, 29 Cal. 180 ; State Guilford, 1 Denio (N. Y.), 510; ante, sec.
v. Mayor, 29 Md. 85, 111 (1868); Bateman 147.
$ 448
519
CONTRACTS: SCOPE OF POWER TO CONTRACT.
corporations. So, also, those dealing with the agent of a municipal
corporation are likewise bound to ascertain the nature and extent
of his authority. This is certainly so in all cases where this
authority is special and of record, or conferred by 'statute. The
fact that in such a case the agent made false representations in
relation to his authority and what he had already done, will not
aid those who trusted to such representations, to establish" a
liability on the part of his corporate principal.1
§ 448. Scope of power to Contract. Although it is true, as
stated in the last section, that a contract made by a municipality
in violation of an express legislative prohibition is void, yet, in the
absence of special legislative restriction, the municipal authorities
possess the same power as other debtors to make a new contract
in any proper form, purging the former contract of its illegality.
This principle is distinctly affirmed and well illustrated in a
judgment by the Supreme Court of the United States. A city, in
violation of local statutes forbidding the issue, circulation, or receipt of
scrip or currency intended to circulate as money, issued such cur-
rency, engraved in the similitude of bank-paper, and by means
1 Baltimore v. Eschbach, 18 Md. 276, Hohn, 82 Ky. 1; Farnsworth v. Paw-
282; Baltimore v. Reynolds, 20 Md. 1 tucket, 13 R. I. 82.
(1862); Delafield v. State of Illinois, 2 Special and limited authority to bor-
Hill (N. Y.), 159, 174 ; 26 Wend. (N. Y.) row money conferred upon the town treas-
192 (1841); affirming s. C., 8 Paige, 531, urer, when exercised, is exhausted, and
restraining unauthorized sale of bonds. the town is not liable for money he sub-
Hodges v. Buffalo, 2 Denio (N. Y.), 110; sequently borrows and converts to his own
3 Comst. 430 ; 2 Barb. 104 ; Supervisors, use, although he assumed to act, and was,
&c. v. Bates, 17 N. Y. 242 (1858). This by the lender, supposed to be acting under
case also determines how far, in such a the authority conferred upon him. Say.
case, the sureties of such an agent or ings Bank 2. Winchester, 8 Allen (Mass.),
officer are liable for his acts.
And see
109 (1864); ante, sec. 117.
cases cited Ib. p. 245. Chemung Canal So in Upper Canada it is held that
Bank v. Chemung Co. Sup., 5 Denio, 517; an individual dealing with a corporation
Overseers, &c. of Norwich v. Overseers, &c. through its council or the members of the
of Pharsalia, 15 N. Y. 341 ; Albany v. governing body, is bound to notice the
Cunliff, 2 Comst. 178, per Strong, J.; objects and limits of their powers, and
Marsh v. Fulton Co., 10 Wall. 676 the manner in which those powers are to
(1870); Miners' Ditch Co. v. Zellerbach, be exercised, since their acts, when beyond
37 Cal. 543 (1869); Swift v. Williams- the scope of their authority or done in a
burg, 24 Barb. (N. Y.) 427 ; Hagne manner unauthorized, are in general nu-
v. Philadelphia, 48 Pa. St. 527 ; State v. gatory and wot binding on the corpora-
Mayor, &c., 29 Md. 85, 111 ; Horn v. Bal- tion. Ramsay et al. v. The Western Dis-
timore, 30 Md. 218 (1868); Thomas v. trict Council, 4 Upper Can. Q. B. 374 ;
Richmond, 12 Wall. 349 1870), per Brad- Silsby v. Dunville, 31 Upper Can. C. P.
ley, J. ; Ford v. Mayor, &c. of New York, 301; Harr. Manual (5th ed.) p. 12; Mora-
63 N. Y. 640 (1875); Stoneburgh v. Bright wetz on Corp. (2d ed.) secs. 621, 718.
on, 5 Upper Can. L. J. 38; Belleview v.
520
§ 449
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
thereof paid valid debts against itself; subsequently the holders
of this illegal currency, at the instance of the city, surrendered
the same, and received therefor new obligations of the city in the
forms of bonds, to which there was no legal objection except that
the consideration was illegal; it was held by the Supreme Court
of the United States that the city was liable on the new bonds.1
§ 449 (373). Mode of exercising the Power. Respecting the
mode in which contracts by corporations should be made, it is
important to observe that when, as is sometimes the case, the mode
of contracting is specially and plainly prescribed and limited,
that mode is exclusive and must be pursued, or the contract will
not bind the corporation ; 2 but the courts have sometimes regarded
1 Little Rock v. Merchants' National notes issued by us, and delivering to you
Bank, 98 U. S. 308 (1878); s. c. below, obligations in the form of bonds, to which
5 Dillon, 299. The statement of the form there is no legal objection.'” See,
text as to the substance of the statutes also, Hitchcock v. Galveston, 96 U. S.
of Arkansas in this regard is accurate. 350; Nashville v. Ray, 19 Wall. 468; Police
Mr. Justice Hunt supported the judgment Jury v. Britton, 15 Wall. 570; Mullarky
of the Supreme Court of the United States V. Cedar Falls, 19 Iowa, 24 ; Sykes v.
by the following argument :-
Iafferry, 27 Ark. 407; Wright v. Hughes,
“It can scarcely be doubted that who- 13 Ind. 113. See also the cases cited post,
ever is capable of entering into an ordi- sec. 487, note. Where a city borrowed
nary contract to obtain or receive the nioney of a bank upon its note at usu- .
means with which to build houses or rious interest, and the bank had subse-
wharves or the like, may, as a general quently cancelled the illegal note, had
rule, bind himself by an admission of refunded the excessive interest, and re-
his obligation. The capacity to make ceived a new note for a lawful amount, the
contracts is at the basis of the liability. new note is valid. Miller v. Hull, 4 Denio
The first liability of the city was dis- (N. Y.), 104 ; Kent v. Walton, 7 Wend.
puted by it. It had gone beyond its (N. Y.) 256.
(N. Y.) 256. So it has been held that
power, as it said, in making a debt in the where the consideration of a contract de-
form of bank-notes. If it had not denied clared void by statute is morally good, a
its power, judgment and an execution repeal of the statute will validate the con-
might have gone against it, and the cred- tract. Washburn v. Franklin, 35 Barb.
itor would have obtained his money. (N. Y.) 599 ; 13 Abb. P. R. 140, same
This privilege of non-resistance every case. Infra, sec. 487, note.
person retains, and continues to retain. 2 People v. Weber, 89 Ill. 347 ; Bryan
He can reconsider at any time, and con- v. Page, 51 Tex. 532, approving text;
fiss and admit what the moment before Francis v. Troy, 74 N. Y. 338 ; State v.
he denied. In 1874 the city of Little Passaic, 41 N. J. L. 90 ; Perrine v. Farr,
Rock did reconsider. It said, 'We will 2 Zabr. (22 N. J. L. ) 356 ; Carron v. Mar-
purge the transaction of its illegality. tin, 2 Dutch. (N.J.) 594; State v. Hudson,
We had the authority to accept from you 5 Dutch. (N. J.) 104 ; State v. Marion
in satisfaction of amounts received by County, 21 Kan, 419 ; Garvey, In re, 77
us for legitimate purposes the sums in N. Y. 523 ; Smith v. Newburgh, 77 N. Y.
qnestion. We did so receive and ex- 130 ; Allen v. Galveston, 51 Tex. 302 ;
pend for legitimate purposes. We erred
We erred Dore v. Milwaukee, 42 Wis. 18; Butler ».
in making the payment to you in an ob- Nevin, 88 Ill. 575; Kansas City v. Flan-
jectionable form. We now pay onr just agan, 69 Mo. 22 ; Bentley v. County
and lawful debt by cancelling the bank- Comm’rs, 25 Minn. 259; Fulton v. Lincoln,
§ 449
521
CONTRACTS: MODE OF EXERCISING THE POWER.
provisions on this subject as directory. Thus, where the charter
directed the mode in which moneys should be drawn from the
treasury to be by an order of the council, signed by the mayor,
such an order, issued upon a memorandum in the minutes of the
corporation, without a formal order being entered, was adjudged
a sufficient compliance with the charter. But unless the mode be
prescribed and limited, valid contracts within the scope of the
corporate powers may be made, as we shall see, otherwise than
under seal or in writing. A contract with a municipal corpor-
ation, which by its terms is not to be performed within one year
9 Neb. 358; Hurford v. Omaha, 4 Neb. 351 ; Zottman v. San Francisco, 20 Cal.
350 ; Reis v. Graff, 51 Cal. 86; Addis v. 96 ; Argenti v. San Francisco, 16 Cal. 255,
Pittsburgh, 85 Pa. St. 379; McDonald v. 282, opinion of Field, C. J.; post, chapter
Mayor, &c. of New York, 68 N. Y. 23 on Taxation and Local Assessments. If a
(1876); s. C. 23 Am. Rep. 144 ; Leaven- corporation sue upon a contract though it
worth v. Rankin, 2 Kan. 357; McCoy v. be executory on their part, and not exe-
Brant, 53 Cal. 247, approving text; Mur- cuted, this amounts to a conclusive admis-
phy V. Louisville, 9 Bush (Ky.), 189 sion that the contract was duly entered
(1872); post, sec. 481, note; Montgomery into by them. Grant on Corp. 63; 5
County v. Barber, 45 Ala. 237; Terre Man. & G., 192. A contract by a city with
Haute v. Lake, 43 Ind. 480; Head v. a street railway company held not con-
Prov. Ins. Co., 2 Cranch, 127 (1804). cluded, something remaining to be done.
White v. New Orleans, 15 La. An. 667; People's Pass. R. Co. v. Memphis City R.
infra, sec. 466 ; Dey v. Jersey City, 19 Co., 10 Wall. 38. Where a charter liinits
N. J. Eq. 412 (1869); Baltimore v. Rey- the exercise of power the mayor and coun-
nolds, 20 Md. 1; Town of Durango v. cil cannot, in a different mode, make a
Pennington, 8 Col. 257 ; Worthington v. valid contract, nor can they, by any sub-
Covington, 82 Ky. 265; Laycock v. Baton sequent approval or conduct, impart valid-
Rouge, 35 La. An. 475 ; North Pac. L. & ity to such contract, nor would the law
M. Co. v. E. Portland, 14 Oreg. 3; Los An- imply any such contract : the law never
geles Gas Co. v. Toberman, 61 Cal. 199. implies an obligation to do that which it
Speaking of this subject in a case above forbids the party to agree to do. Bryan v.
cited, Marshall, C. J., says : “ The act of Page, 51 Tex. 532 ; S. P. Francis v. Troy,
incorporation is to them an enabling act; 74 N. Y. 338. In the absence of proof of
it gives them all the power they possess ; bad faith, or of a usurpation of authority,
it enables them to contract, and when it or that a public loss or private injustice
prescribes to them a mode of contracting, will result from a contract made by a
they must observe that mode, or the in- municipal council without complying
strument no more creates a contract than strictly with charter provisions, the State
if the body had never been incorporated.” will not be warranted in interfering to set
Approved, Bank of United States v. Dand. it aside. Attorney-General v. Detroit, 55
ridge, 12 Wheat. 64, 68 (1827); see, also, Mich. 181.
Angell & Ames Corp. sec. 253 ; Diggle v. 1 Kelley v. Mayor, &c. of Brooklyn, 4
Railway Co., 5 Exch. 442 ; Homersham v. Hill (N. Y.), 263 (1843); see Neiffer v.
Wolv., &c. Co., 4 Eng. Law & Eq. 426; Bank, 1 Head (Tenn.), 162; Pennington
Frend v. Dennett, 4 C. B. (N. S.) 576 ; v. Taniere, 12 Q. B. 998, 1013; Maddox
Butler v. Charlestown, 7 Gray (Mass.), v. Graham, 2 Met. (Ky.) 56 ; ante, sec.
12 ; Trustees v. Cherry, 8 Ohio St. 564 291. Under charter, executory contracts
(1858); Bladen v. Philadelphia, 60 Pa. St. for grading, &c., must be in writing.
464 ; McCracken v. San Francisco, 16 Cal. Starkey V. Minneapolis, 19 Minn. 203
591 ; Piinental v. San Francisco, 21 Cal. (1872).
522
§ 450
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
from the making thereof, is within the statute of frauds; but an
entry in the official minutes of the corporation of a resolution
passed by the governing body expressing the terms of the con-
tract, sigued by the clerk, constitutes a note or memorandum in
writing sufficient to take the case out of the statute and to bind
the corporation."
§ 450 (374). Seal not Necessary; How concluded. — Modern
decisions have established the law to be, that the contracts of mu-
nicipal corporations need not be under seal unless the charter or
other legislative enactinent so requires. The authorized body of
a municipal corporation may bind it by an ordinance, which in
favor of private persons interested therein may, if so intended,
operate as a contract ; 8 or they may bind it by a resolution, or by vote
clothe its officers, agents, or committees, with power to act for it;
and a contract made by persons thus appointed by the corporation,
though by parol (unless it be one which the law requires to be
in writing), will bind it.
1 Argus Co. v. Albany, 55 N. Y. 495 21 Ill. 76 (1859); Western Sav. F. Soc. v.
(1874), Grover and Rapallo, JJ., dissenting. Philadelphia, 31 Pa. St. 175; 16. 185 ;
Municipal corporations may contract by Clark v. Washington, 12 Wheat. 40 (1827);
parol through their duly authorized Hamilton v. Newcastle & D. R. Co., 9
agents, and such contracts cannot be Ind. 359 ; Ross v. Madison, 1 Ind. 281
changed without the consent of the par. (1848); Bellmyer v. Marshalltown, 44
ties to be affected thereby. Duncombe Iowa, 564 (1876); Chattanooga v. Geiler,
v. The City of Fort Dodge, 38 Iowa, 281 13 Lea, 611 ; where a contract is accepted
(1874).
unconditionally by the resolution of a city
2 Draper v. Springport, 104 U. S. 501; council the proceedings by which the reso-
Halbut v. Forrest City, 34 Ark. 246. Alution was adopted are presumed to be
written proposal by a town to have work regular. Over v. Greenfield, 107 Ind. 231.
done, a written bid to do it and a written Not essential that vote of directors appear
acceptance of the bid, held to constitute on the record.
Story Agency, sec. 52,
together a sufficient contract.
Wiles v. where it is said that, as the appointment
Hoss, 114 Ind. 371 (1887).
of an agent of a corporation may not always
3 The obligation of a contract, made by be evidenced by written vote, it is now
an ordinance, cannot be impaired by a the settled doctrine - at least in America
subsequent ordinance, though it be author- that it may be inferred and implied
ized by a new city charter. Ante, sec. 314. from the adoption or recognition of the
So where the revenues of a market were, acts of the agent by the corporation."
by ordinance, appropriated to pay munici- Post, sec. 459. And when this is the
pal bonds, a later ordinance passed under case an action of assumpsit lies against
a power granted by a new charter, diverting such corporation upon an express or im-
the revenues, was declared void. Fazende plied promise. Post, sec. 459. Parol con-
v. Houston, 34 Fed. Rep. 95. Ante, sec. tract hy council with city physician.
314, as to repeal; and chaps. iv. and vii., Selma v. Mullen, 46 Ala. 411 (1871).
passin, as to extent of legislative power See also, Broom Com. on Com. Law, 561-
over Municipal Corporations.
570 ; Montgomery Co. 2. Barber, 45 Ala.
4 Fanning v. Gregoire, 16 How. (U. S.) 237 (1877).
524 (1853); ante, sec. 192; Abbey v. Bil. In Fleckner v. United States Bank,
lups, 35 Miss. 618 ; Alton v. Mulledy, 8 Wheat. (U. S.) 338, 357 (1823), it was
$ 451
523
CONTRACTS : MODE OF EXERCISING POWER.
§ 451 (375). Mode of exercising Power. The assent of a muni-
cipal corporation to the variation or modification of a contract need
not necessarily be expressed by the formal action or resolution of
the common council; but it may be implied from acts relating to
the contract work subsequent to the date of the contract;1 but
urged that 4 corporation could not author. the council for either his appointment or
ize any act to be done by an agent by a his instructions, since they were not neces-
mere vote of the directors, but only by an sarily of record there ; but persons deal-
appointment under its corporate seal. But ing with such an agent are, of course,
the court declared that such a doctrine, bound to ascertain the fact of his appoint-
whatever may have been its original cor- ment and the extent of his authority, but
rectness as applied to common-law cor. not his private instructions. Authority
porations, had a
no application to modern of agent to negotiate sales of bonds. Cady
corporations created by statute, whose v. Watertown, 18 Wis. 322.
charters contemplate the business of the 1 Messenger v. Buffalo, 21 N. Y. 196
corporation to be transacted by a special (1860). Where certain work is stipulated
body or board of directors. And the acts to be done under the direction of a street
of such a body or board, evidenced by a commissioner of a city, this officer has
written vote, are as completely binding authority, without a vote of the council,
upon the corporation, and as complete to authorize extra work to be done, or ma-
authority to their agents, as the utmost terials to be furnished, where these are
solemn acts done under the corporate rendered necessary by the action of the
seal.” Per Slory, J. Further, as to com- city authorities subsequent to the making
mon seal, see ante, sec. 190. Authority of the contract, and where, without such
of agent, in absence of special restriction, extra work or materials, it would be im-
may be given by parol or inferred from possible to fulfil the requirements of the
acts. Detroit v. Jackson, 1 Doug. (Mich.) contract. Ib. Modification of contracts
106. See ante, sec. 190 ; infra, sec. 459. by unauthorized officers not binding upon
A provision in the organic act of a the corporation. Bonesteel v. Mayor, &c.
city, that "on the passage of every by- of New York, 22 N. Y. 162 (1860); Hague
law or order to enter into a contract by v. Philadelphia, 48 Pa. St. 527 ; O'Hara
the council, the ayes and nays shall be v. New Orleans, 30 La. An. pt. 1, 152.
called and recorded," prescribes how the As to changes in contracts by parol, see
order to contract shall be made and evi Hasbrouck v. Milwaukee, 21 Wis. 217
denced when directed by the council, but (1866); compare Sacramento v. Kirk, 7
it is not a limitation on the power of au- Cal. 419; infra, sec. 459. Acceptance by
thorized agents to make a contract by city of proposals to it, see Springfield v.
parol. Indianola v. Jones, 29 Iowa, 282 Harris, 107 Mass. 532 (1871). Where a
(1870); ante, sec. 291 ; Baker v. Johnson city made a contract with a gas com-
Co. (parol contract), 33 Iowa, 151.
pany for a year, and continued to observe
Contract may be concluded by ordinance its terms in subsequent years without
or action of the council (accepting pro- renewing it, and then made a new con-
posals), without signature by parties. tract for a year, which was likewise
People v. San Francisco, 27 Cal. 655 observed in later years without being form-
(1865); Sacramento v. Kirk, 7 Cal. 419; ally renewed, it was held that the city was
Logansport v. Blakemore, 17 Ind. 318. uncler an implied obligation to pay for gas
How shown. San Antonio v. Lewis, for an entire year, when it had accepted
9 Texas, 69. In Indianapolis v. Skeen, gas for a considerable portion of that year.
17 Ind. 628 (1861), it was held that third Taylor v. Lambertville, 43 N. J. Eq.
persons dealing with an agent of the city (16 Stew.) 107.
appointed by the council “to negotiate its Defendant's council passed a resolution
bonds at not less than" a specified rate, ordering a public square to be graded, and
were not obliged to look to the records of plaintiff, under an agreement with defend-
524
$ 452
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
where the contract is made by ordinance in the prescribed statutory
mode, it can only be repealed or annulled in the same manner.1
§ 452 (376). Contracts made by Agents; Mode of Execution.
Where officers or agents of a corporation, duly appointed, and acting
within the scope of their authority, in executing an instrument in
behalf of the corporation sign their own names and affix their own
seals, such seals are simply nugatory, and the instrument, according
to the weight of modern judicial opinion, is to be regarded as the
simple contract of the corporation, and will bind the corporation and
not the individuals executing it, where the purpose to act for the
corporation is manifest from the whole paper, and where there are
no words evincing an intention to assume a personal liability. 3
ant's officers, advanced the money for the Cranch, 299, 307; Hatch v. Barr, 1 Ham.
work, which was done in a satisfactory (Ohio) 390.; Baker v. Chambles, 4 G.
manner. Held, that a subsequent resoluz- Greene (Iowa), 428 ; Lyon v. Adamson, 7
tion, of which plaintiff had no notice, Iowa, 509; 1 Am. Lead. Cas. 602 ; Mott
limiting the expenditure, would not defeat v. Hicks, i Cow. (N. Y.) 513, 534; Blan-
recovery of an amount expended in excess chard v. Blackstone, 102 Mass. 343; Stan-
of that limit. Duncombe v. Fort Dodge, ton v. Camp (contract signed individually
38 Iowa, 281 (1874).
with addition of "committee"), 4 Barb.
1 Terre Haute v. Lake, 43 Ind. 480 (N. Y.) 274 ; Mechanics' Bank v. Bank
(1873); see also North Pacific L. & M. Co. of Columbia, 5 Wheat. 326 ; Hopkins v.
v. East Portland, 14 Oreg. 3.
Mehaffy, 11 Serg. & Rawle (Pa.), 126 ;
2 " The general rule is unquestionable Angell & Ames, secs. 293, 295; Gale v.
that a municipal corporation is not bound Kalamazoo, 23 Mich. 344 (1871) ; Burrill
by the unauthorized act of an individual, V. Boston, 2 Clifford C. C. 590 (1867).
whether an officer of the corporation or a To justify the setting aside of a contract
mere private person. But the corporation made by an agent of a municipal corpora-
may so deal with third persons as to jus- tion on the ground of fraud, the fraud
tify them iu assuming the existence of an must be clearly proved : circumstantial
authority in another which in fact has evidence, if relied upon, must be such as
never been given." Andrews, J. Davies is not fairly reconcilable with any other
v. Mayor, &c. of New York, 93 N. Y. theory than one of fraud by the agent.
250. This principle, it is supposed, would Baird v. Mayor, &c. of New York, 96
not be applicable where the matter so dealt N. Y. 567. Where a town clothes its
with was under all circumstances ultra agent, or its committee, with full power
vires the corporate power.
Where a com-
to make a contract, and it is accordingly
mittee was empowered to contract for the made, it is valid and binding, notwith-
erection of a building at a price not to exceed standing there has been no formal accept-
a specified sun, it was held they had no ance by a vote, or even if it be afterwards
power to contract for a larger sum, and that rejected by the corporation. Davenport
the
rson contracting with them was V. Hallowell, 10 Me. 317; Junkins v.
bound to take notice of the extent of their School District, 39 Me. 220 (1855); Wil.
power. Turney v. Town of Bridgeport, lard v. Newburyport, 12 Pick. (Mass.)
55 Conn. 412.
227; Kingsbury v. School District, 12 Met.
Regents, &c. v. Detroit, &c., 12 Mich. (Mass.) 99 (1846).
138 ; Sweetzer v. Mead, 5 Mich. 107; The selectinen of towns iu Massachusetts
Bank of Metropolis v. Gottschalk, 14 Pet. have no authority to construct a way and
19; Story Agency, secs. 154, 260, 276, pledge the credit of the town therefor,
277; Bank of Columbia v. Patterson, 7 unless they are authorized by a vote of the
8
$ 453
525
CONTRACTS : EXECUTION BY AGENTS.
§ 453 (377). Same subject. Illustrations.
Illustrations. — A few cases will be
referred to, illustrating the rule just stated. A contract in relation
to the survey of a city, a subject exclusively appertaining to the
corporation, was entered into “ between T. Van V., J. W., C. D. C.,
a committee appointed by the corporation of the city of Albany for
that purpose, of the first part, and John R., Jr., of the second part.”
The parties of the first part agreed to pay for the work to be done,
and signed their individual names and affixed their individual scals
to the agreement. The authority of the committee to act for the
corporation and to make the contract being conceded, it was ruled
that they were not personally liable, and that it must be enforced
by and against the corporation. In another case, a contract for the
town. Bean v. Hyde Park, 143 Mass. purpose, the court being of opinion that
245.
the making of contracts was essential to
Where school directors gave an author- the building of the house. Damon v.
ized bond for borrowed money, in their Granby, 2 Pick. (Mass.) 345 (1824); ante
individual names, as school directors, chaps. ix., X. Majority of committee must
though signed and sealed in their indi. sign contract. So held, Curtis v. Portland,
vidual names, the corporation, and not 59 Me. 483 (1871); ante, sec. 283, and note,
the individuals, are liable thereon. Hei- as to powers of a majority of committee;
delberg School Dist. v. Horst, 62 Pa. St. post, sec. 455, note.
301 (1869).
It has been held in Upper Canada,
The power of a committee, appointed by where work was done under a contract not
a vote of a town in Massachusetts “to let made with the corporation, or any of its
out and superintend the making" of a known officers, but merely with persons
highway, is completely executed by the assuming to act as a duly appointed com-
making of a contract with a third person mittee, that no action would lie against
embracing the whole subject-matter of the the corporation. Stoneburgh v. The Mu-
vote, and by the superintending of the con- nicipality of Brighton, 5 Upper Can. Law
struction of the highway. And therefore, J. 38. No action can be sustained for a
if the person contracted with fails to com- breach of duty against the head of a cor.
plete the road according to his contract, poration in not applying the seal to make
this is a matter for the town to deal with, a contract between a corporation and an
and the committee have no power, without individual, founded on a refusal which, if
new authority from the town, to enter there had been a previous valid contract,
into a contract with another person for its would have constituted a breach of it ; in
completion. If they do so, and pay money other words, there cannot be a remedy
in pursuance thereof, the town is not against the head of a corporation, equiva-
liable to them therefor. Nor is it liable lent to a remedy on the contract against
if they transcend their power, and make a the corporation, had the contract been
contract for a more expensive road than duly made so as to create a valid and bind-
they were authorized to do. Keyes v. ing agreement. Fair v. Moore, 3 Upper
Westford, 17 Pick. (Mass.) 273 (1835). Can. C. P. 484 ; Harrison Munic. Manual
Power of New England towns, ante, secs. for Upper Can. (5th ed.) p. 12.
29, 30 ; post, sec. 961.
1 Randall v. Van Vechten, 19 Johns.
Power to a town committee "to superin- (N. Y.) 60 (1821); compare, however,
tend the building of a house for the town," Fullam v. Brookfield, 9 Allen (Mass.), i
was adjudged to include the power to (1864), where the court denies the doctrine
make the necessary contracts, it not ap. of Randall v. Van Vechten ; Bank, &c. v.
pearing that any other or special com- Patterson, 7 Cranch, 299, and certain dicta
mittee or agent was appointed for that in Damon v. Granby, 2 Pick. (Mass.) 345.
526
§ 454
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
repair of an engine house of a city was entered into by the inspector
of the fire department in his own name, describing himself as
“G. N. S., inspector, &c., of the first part," and signed in the same
way. It was, in fact, made for and on account of the city, and it
was held that the city was liable thereon, although its agent did not
use its name in contracting, the court being of opinion, however,
that the contract on its face showed it was made for the city.
§ 454 (378). Same subject. Illustration. — So, where on a sale
of real property by a corporation, a memorandum of the sale was
signed by the parties, on which it was stated that the sale was made
to A. B., the purchaser, and that he, C. D., “mayor of the corpora-
tion, in behalf of himself and the rest of the burgesses and common-
alty of the borough of Caermarthen, do mutually agree to perform
and fulfil, on each of their parts respectively, the conditions of the
sale," and then came the signature of the purchaser, and of “C. D.,
Mayor," it was held that the agreement was that of the corporation,
and not that of the mayor personally; and that, consequently, the
mayor could not sue thereon.2
But the text states the prevailing. Ameri- award any contract therefor to the lowest
can rule. See also Dubois v. Canal Co. bidder. In an action by P. for labor and
4 Wend. (N. Y.) 285; Worrell v. Munn, materials, in pursuance of the resolution,
1 Seld. (5 N. Y.) 229; Ford v. Williams, &c.--- Held, l. That no abandonment of
3 Kern. (13 N. Y.) 577, 585 ; Richardson the contract was established. 2. That
v. Scott, &c. Co., 22 Cal. 150.
the contract was not affected by the sub-
1 Robinson v. St. Louis, 28 Mo. 488 sequent amendment. 3. That the resolu-
(1859). Where the corporate name of a tion was illegal, and no recovery could be
village was “the president and trustees of had by P. for the gravel and grading,
the village of G," a contract reciting that either upon contract or upon the quantum,
it was made by the president and trustees meruit. 16. Where A., B., and C., a
of the 16
corporation " of G ---, held, to committee appointed by a meeting of citi-
warrant a finding that the contract was zens, make a contract with D., signing
made by the boarul officially. Parr v. the contract as a committee, and affixing
Greenbush, 72 N. Y. 463. In 1870 a their seals thereto, they make themselves
village board, without advertising for pro- personally liable under the contract. The
posals, contracted with P. to lay a side- only effect of the word “committee" is
walk in May, 1871; the work, however, like that of “executor" in a personal
did not proceed, owing to the failure of obligation, to identify the transaction, not
the board to furnish the gravel and grade to qualify the act. Ulam v. Boyd, 87
ing, as required by the contract and P.'s Pa. St. 477.
notification. In 1873 the board passed a 2 Bowen v. Morris, 2 Taunt. 374, 387.
resolution requiring P. to go on, and if The case of Burrill v. Boston, 2 Clifford
the necessary. gravel and grading be not C. R. R. 590 (1867), presents also an in-
furnished, to furnish the same himself ; stance in which it was considered that a
whereupon he furnished the materials contract signed by the mayor was one in-
and did the work. In 1871 the village tended to be made on behalf of the cor-
charter was so amended as to require the poration. But in Providence v. Miller,
board to advertise for proposals for grad. 11 R. I. 272 (1876) ; s. C. 23 Am. Rep.
ing and paving any sidewalk, and to 453, a contract under seal between certain
$ 456
527
SPECIALTY CONTRACTS.
§ 455 (379). Action must be Corporate, not Individual. But
the action or contract of the officers of a public corporation in their
individual capacity is not binding upon the corporate body. For
example: If the selectmen of a town in New England, as individ-
uals, request a citizen to furnish supplies to a public enemy, to pre-
vent violence to the town, this gives no legal right of recovery
against the town; and as the transaction was wholly beyond the
official duty of selectmen, or the duty of the town as a corporation,
it was doubted whether a regular vote to pay the plaintiff would
have been legal, though it was admitted that a voluntary agreement
among the inhabitants to this effect would have been binding, being
founded on a meritorious consideration, as it was their property, and
not that of the town, which was in danger.2
$ 456 (380). Specialty Contracts. — While the agent of a public
corporation, who by its vote or authority contracts for its use, can-
not bind the corporation by making a contract by dced, yet if such
agent had authority to make the contract, it is binding upon the
corporation as evidence of such contract. It follows that a contract
of an agent or committee of a town, under his or their own seals,
cannot be declared on, in covenant or debt, as the deed of the town.
The form of the remedy against the town 8 is for damages, or in
persons of the first part and one Doyle “in Mason v. Bristol, 10 N. H. 36; Hanover
behalf of the city," party of the second v. Eaton, 3 N. H. 38. Powers of towns
part, Doyle being the mayor, and the con- in New England. Antc, secs. 29, 30;
tract relating to municipal matters, was supro, sec. 452, note.
held upon its face to be the contract of Contracts made by a majority of the
Doyle personally, and not that of the city. board of aldermen, without any official
1 Haliburton v. Frankford, 14 Mass. action of the city council, are not binding
214 (1817); Butler v. Charlestown, 7 upon the city ; so decided where counsel
Gray (Mass.), 12 (1856).
were thus employed' who rendered legal
2 Haliburton V. Frankford, supra; services beneficial to the corporation.
Stetson v. Kempton, 13 Mass. 272 (1816); Butler v. Charlestown, 7 Gray (Mass.), 12
Burrill v. Boston, 2 Clifford C. C. R. 590 (1856); see, also, Sikes v. Hatfield, 13
(1867); ante, sec. 30. A majority of se-
A majority of se- Gray (Mass.), 347 (1859); see chapter on
lectmen may, by statute, bind a town in Corporate Meetings, ante. A contract
New Hampshire by their written contract entered into by a board of supervisors, for
when acting within the limits of their and on behalf of the county, and signed
authority. But a contract signed by one by the chairman of the board, is the con-
only of the selectmen in his own name, tract of the county. Babcock v. Good-
“for the selectmen," does not bind the rich, 47 Cal. 488 (1874).
town, nor will it be rendered valid by 8 Randall v. Van Vechten, 19 Johns.
proof that another selectnian authorized (N. Y.) 60, 65 (1821); Damon v. Granby
him so to sign the contract, or by proof 2 Pick. (Mass.), 345 (1824); comparo
that such was the practice in the town. Fullam v. Brookfield, 9 Allen (Mass.), 1;
If the corporate name had been affixed by Bank of Columbia v. Patterson's Adminis-
one, such proof might have been sufficient. trator, 7 Cranch, 299, and rule as stated
Andover v. Grafton, 7 N. H. 298, 305: by Story, J., 306 (1813) ; Clark v. Cuck-
528
§ 457
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
assumpsit. Although in Damon v. Granby 1 it was left an open ques-
tion whether a vote of a town having no corporate seal, expressly
authorizing an agent to make a deed of land, or other contract,
under seal, would, if executed according to the power, become tech-
nically the deed of the town, no substantial reason is perceived why
such an instrument, thus executed, should not be treated as having
all the attributes and qualities of a sealed instrument. If the cor-
poration, however, has a common seal, which is the case with towns
in many of the States, and with cities generally, and it is affixed to
an instrument in pursuance of the vote of the corporation, or by the
proper officer, such an instrument is, beyond doubt, technically the
deed of the corporation.2
§ 457 (381). Contracts in Excess of Corporate Power; Ultra
Vires as a Defence. The general principle of law is settled be-
yond controversy, that the agents, officers, or even city council of a
municipal corporation, cannot bind the corporation by any contract
which is beyond the scope of its powers, or entirely foreign to the
purposes of the corporation, or which not being legislatively au-
thorized) is against public policy. This doctrine grows out of the
nature of such institutions, and rests upon reasonable and solid
grounds. The inhabitants are the corporators; the officers are but
the public agents of the corporation. The duties and powers of the
officers or public agents of the corporation are prescribed by statute
or charter, which all persons not only may know, but are bound to
know. The opposite doctrine would be fraught with such danger
and accompanied with such abuse that it would soon end in the
ruin of municipalities, or be legislatively overthrown. These con-
siderations vindicate both the reasonableness and necessity of the
rule that the corporation is bound only when its agents or officers,
by whom it can alone act, if it acts at all, keep within the limits of
field Union, 11 Eng. Law and Eq. 442 ; Fullam v. Brookfield, 9 Allen (Mass.), 1.
Pennington v. Taniere, 12 Queen's B. 1011. Corporate seal. Ante, secs. 190, 192;
Covenant cannot be naintained against a Neely v. Yorkville, 10 S. C. 141, approv.
city on a contract with the water commis- ing text. An agreement in writing by an
sioners of the city, although the statute attorney to refer a certain cause acted on
declares that their contracts should be by the court was held to bind his client.
binding upon and be considered as done Brooks v. New Durham, 55 N. H. 559
by the mayor and council. Keeney v. (1875).
Hudson, 3 Dutch. (N. J.) 362; cnte, sec. 8 Halbut v. Forrest City, 34 Ark. 246;
192 ; Providence v. Miller, 11 R. I. 272; Oubre v. Donaldsonville, 33 La. An. 386;
S. 0. 23 Am. Rep. 453.
Pugh v. Little Rock, 35 Ark. 75 (approv.
1 Damon v. Granby, 2 Pick. (Mass.) ing text), where an ordinance authorizing
345, 352 (1824).
the issue of certificates of indebtedness at
2 Tb.; Randall v. Van Vechten, 19 a discount was held not admissible as evi-
Johns. (N. Y.) 60, 65 (1821). But see dence against the city.
§ 457
529
CONTRACTS : DEFENCE OF ULTRA VIRES.
1
the chartered authority of the corporation. The history of the
workings of municipal bodies has demonstrated the salutary nature
of this principle, and that it is the part of true wisdom to keep the
corporate wings clipped down to the lawful standard. It results
from this doctrine that contracts not authorized by the charter or
by other legislative act, that is, not within the scope of the powers
of the corporation under any circumstances, are void, and in actions
thereon the corporation may successfully interpose the plea of ultra
vires, setting up as a defence its own want of power under its
charter or constituent statute to enter into the contract.3 In favor
1 Text approved. City of Eufala :v. Mc- ham, 7 Met. (Mass.) 438 (1844); Vincent
Nab, 67 Ala. 588; Fort Wayne v. Lehr, v. Nantucket, 12 Cush. (Mass.) 103, 105
88 Ind. 62; Pine Civil Township v. Huber (1858), per Merrick, J.; Stetson v. Kemp-
Manuf. Co., 83 Ind. 121 ; Cowdrey v. ton, 13 Mass. 272 ; Parsons v. Inhabitants
Caneadea, 16 Fed. Rep. 532.
of Goshen, 11 Pick. (Mass.) 396 ; Wood
2 This subject is touched upon in the v. Lynn, 1 Allen (Mass.), 108 (1861);
concluding portion of chap. i., ante. Prin- Spalding v. Lowell, 23 Pick. (Mass.) 71 ;
ciple of construction of corporate powers. Mitchell v. Rockland, 45 Me. 496 (1858);
Ante, secs. 89-92. See also ante, sec. 447. 8. C. 41 Me. 363; Western College v. Cleve-
Lyddy v. Long Island City, 104 N. Y. 218 land, 12 Ohio, 375; Tippecanoe Co. Com-
(contractor chargeable with notice of limi- m’rs v. Cox, 6 Ind. 403 (1855); Inhabitants
tations upon agent's authority); Appeal of v. Weir, 9 Ind. 224 (1857); Sinead v. In-
Whelen, 108 Pa. St. 162.
dianapolis, P. & C. R. Co., 11 Ind. 104
* Post, chap. xxiii., sec. 935, where the (1858); Brady v. New York, 20 N. Y. 312;
subject of ultra vires is further considered; Appleby v. New York, 15 How. Pr. (N. Y.)
and see also the following cases : Cheeney 428 ; Estep v. Keokuk County, 18 Iowa,
v. Brookfield, 60 Mo. 53 (1875), citing 199, and cases cited by Cole, J. ; Clark v.
text; Marsh v. Fulton County, 10 Wall. Polk County, 19 Iowa, 248 (1865); supra,
676 (1870); Thomas v. Richmond, 12 Wall. sec. 447; post, sec. 935; Perry v. Superior
349 (1870); Bridgeport v. Housatonuc Rail. City, 23 Wis. 64 (1870); McDonald v.
road Co., 15 Conn. 475, 493 (1843); Bur New York, 68 N. Y. 23 (1876); s. 0. 23
Till v. Boston, 2 Clifford C. C. 590 (1867); Am. Rep. 144 ; Maupin v. Franklin Co.,
Martin v. Brooklyn, 1 Hill, 545 ; Nor- 67 Mo. 327; Driftwood Val. Turnp. Co. v.
wich Overseers, &c. v. New Berlin, &c., 18 Bartholomew County Comm'rs, 72 Ind.
Johns. 382; Donovan v. New York, 33 226 ; New Jersey & N. E. Tel. Co. v. Firo
N. Y. 291 ; Seibrecht v. New Orleans, 12 comm'rs, 34 N. J. Eq. 117; Laycock v.
La. An. 496 (1857); Clark v. Des Moines, Baton Rouge, 35 La. An. 475; Lincoln v.
19 Iowa, 199, 209 (1865); Loker v. Brook- Stockton, 75 Mo. 141 ; Karley's Appeal,
line, 13 Piek. (Mass.) 343, 348 ; Phila- 103 Pa. St. 273, where the purchase from
delphia v. Flanigen, 47 Pa. St. 21; Paris Tp. a third party of a judgment against a cred-
Tr. v. Cherry, 8 0. St. 564; Hague v. Phil. itor of a city for the purpose of setting it
adelphia, 48 Pa. St. 527; Albany v. Cunliff, off against his claim was held ultra vires
2 Comst. (2 N. Y.) 165 (1849), reversing and void. Salt Lake City v. Hollister, 118
S. C. 2 Barb. 190; Cuyler v. Rochester, 12 U. S. 256, affirming s. c. 3 Utah, 200; but,
Wend. (N. Y.) 165 (1834); Hodges v. Buf- in this case the city, having engaged in the
falo, 2 Denio (N. Y.) 110 (1846); Hal- business of distilling liquors without power
stead v. New York, 3 N. Y. 430 (1850); so to do, was held liable for the United
Martin v. Mayor, 1 Hill (N. Y.), 545; States taxes thereon. In Illinois it is held
Boom v. Utica, 2 Barb. (N. Y.) 104 ; Cor- that, where a municipal corporation enters
nell v, Guilford, 1 Denio (N. Y.), 510; into a contract which, although not ex-
Boyland v. Mayor, &c., of New York, 1 pressly authorized by its charter, is not
Sandf. (N. Y.) 27 (1847); Dill v. Ware. in violation of the charter or of any stat.
VOL. I. – 34
530
§ 457
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
of bona fide holders of negotiable securities, the corporation may be
estopped to avail itself of irregularities in the exercise of power con-
ferred; but it may always show that under no circumstances had
the corporation power to make a contract of the character in ques-
tion. This subject has been already referred to, and will be con-
sidered in a subsequent portion of the present chapter.1 The mere
fact, however, that a city, in making a contract for a public im-
provement within its corporate powers, promises to make pay-
ment in negotiable bonds, which it has no power to issue, does not
ute, and has thereby induced the other of accomplishing the purpose in view.
party to it to expend money in the per. Livingston v. Pippin, 31 Ala. 542 (1858).
formance of his part of it, the municipal The case of The State v. Buffalo, 2
corporation may be held liable. East St. Hill (N. Y.) 434, determines an interest-
Louis v. East St. Louis Gas L. & C. Co., ing point. Arms belonging to the State
98 Ill. 415. Supra, sec. 444. Corporation were loaned to the city authorities to
may defend against unauthorized contract, suppress disorderly assemblages. The
although its seal is attached to it. Leaven- keeper of the arsenal had no right to
worth v. Rankin, 2 Kan. 358 (1864); ante, make the loan, but it was made in good
sec. 192.
faith, and the bond of the city taken for
Mr. Justice Coulter, in delivering the their return on demand. The city being
opinion in Alleghany City v. McClurkin, sued on this bond made the point that it
14 Pa. St. 81, expresses the opiniou that was void for illegality ; but the court re-
a municipal corporation may be liable for garded it rather as a bona fide excess of
the contracts ultra vires of its officers, authority simply, and held that though
when these are publicly entered into with the loan was unauthorized the State might
the knowledge of the people, and not ob- waive the tort committed on the property
jected to until after the rights of third and seek a remedy upon the bond. See
persons have attached. Such a principle infra, sec. 458, and note.
is believed to be both unsafe and unsound; The power of State building commis-
the only true and safe view being that all sioners to discharge at their discretion
persons are bound to take notice of the the building superintendent whom they
powers and authority which the law con- employ is vested in them for the public
fers upon the officers of such corporations. benefit, and they cannot be divested of
See Loker v. Brookline, 13 Pick. (Mass.) that power by any contract entered into hy
343. Any liability in such cases must, them with the person so employed, where
according to the present weight of author- such contract is not ratified by the legis-
ity, be independent of the contract, and can- lature. If the legislature, with full knowl.
not be asserted in an action based upon the edge of the contract entered into by the
contract to enforce its executory provisions. commissioners with the plaintiff
, and of
Sura, séc. 444. Auditing and paying all the facts relating thereto, recognizes
part of a claim presented, accompanied and acts upon it, making appropriations
with a denial of liability for the residue, to complete the building in question upon
does not estop the corporation from contest- its assumed validity, that will constitute
ing the resiilue, even though it be ripon a ratification of the contract; but such
grounds which show the former allowance ratification can be shown only by some
to have been improper. People v. N. Y. action of both houses by statute or reso-
Sup., 1 Hill (N. Y.), 362 (1841). . In an lution. Shipman v. The State, 43 Wis.
action on a contract for doing work which 381 (1877).
a municipal corporation had the power to 1 Ante, sec. 163; infra, secs. 511-553;
make, it is no defence that the city ought Moore v. New York, 73 N. Y. 238,
to have adopted some less expensive means approving text.
§ 457
531
CONTRACTS: DEFENCE OF ULTRA VIRES.
make the entire contract ultra vires; and therefore if work be done
under such contract the city will be liable therefor.1
1 Hitchcock v. Galveston, 96 U. S. be a difference between the case of an
341(1877). In this case the city made a con- engagement made by a corporation to do
tract with the plaintiffs to pave streets. It an act expressly prohibited by its charter,
had the power to make a valid contract for or some other law, and a case of where
this purpose : but the city having in the legislative power to do the act has not
contract agreed to make payment for the been granted. Such a distinction is as-
work in negotiable city bonds payable at serted in some decisions. But the present
a future day, it was objected that, since is not a case in which the issue of the
no express power was given to issue bonds bonds was prohibited by any statute. At
for this purpose, the whole contract was most, the issue was unauthorized ; at
therefore inoperative and void ; and the most, there was a defect of power. · The
lower court so decided, and its ruling was promise to give bonds to the plaintiffs in
supposed to be supported by the cases of payment of what they undertook to do
Tenzas Parish Police Jury v. Britton, 15 was, therefore, at farthest, only ultra vires;
Wall. 570, and Memphis v Ray, 19 and in such a case, though specific per-
Wall. 468. [See ante, secs. 117–126.] formance of an engagement to do a thing
But the Supreme Court held otherwise, transgressive of its corporate power may-
and in giving its judgment on this point, not be enforced, the corporation can be
Mr. Justice Strong observed : • In the held liable on its contract. Having re-
view which we shall take of the present ceived benefits at the expense of the other
case, it is perhaps not necessary to inquire contracting party, it cannot.object that it
whether those cases justify the court's con- was not empowered to perform what it
clusion; for if it were conceded that the promised in return, in the mode in which
city had no lawful authority to issue the it promised to perform. This was directly
bonds described in the ordinance and men. ruled in The State Board of Agriculture v.
tioned in the contract, it does not follow The Citizens' Street Railway Co., 47 Ind.
that the contract was wholly illegal and 407. There it was held that although
void, or that the plaintiffs have no rights there may be a defect of power in a cor-
under it. They are not suing upon the poration to make a contract, yet if a con-
bonds, and it is not necessary to their tract made by it is not in violation of its
success that they should assert the validity charter, or of any statute prohibiting it,
of those instruments. It is enough for and the corporation has by its promise
them that the city council have power to induced a party relying on the promise
enter into a contract for the improvement and in execution of the contract to ex-
of the sidewalks ; that such a contract was pend money, and perforin his part thereof,
made with them ; that under it they have the corporation is liable on the contract.'
proceeded to furnish materials and do See, also, substantially to the same effect,
work, as well as to assume liabilities; Alleghany City v. McClurkin, 14 Pa. St.
that the city has received and now en- 81 ; and, more or less in point, Maher v.
joys the benefit of what they have done Chicago, 38 Ill. 266 ; Oneida Bank v. On-
and furnished ; that for these things the tario Bank, 21 N. Y. 495; Argenti v. San
city promised to pay ; and that after hav. Francisco, 16 Cal. 256; Silver Lake Bank
ing received the benefit of the contract the v. North, 4 Johns. (N. Y.) Ch. 373." But
city has broken it. It matters not that quore as to the liability in such case being
the promise was to pay in a manner not on the contract. See ante, secs. 89-91,
authorized by law. If payments cannot 444 ; post, sec. 459, note. A charter pro-
be made in bonds because their issue is vision that after a pavement has been laid
ultra vires, it would be sanctioning rank at the expense of the abutter, “the city
injustice to hold that payment need not shall take charge of and keep the same in
be made at all. Such is not the law. repair, without further assessment,” is not
The contract between the parties is in a contract exempting the owners from future
forre so far as it is lawful. There may assessments. State v. Newark, 8 Vroom,
5 32
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
§ 458
lot.'
§ 458 (382). Contracts ultra vires or invalid.- Agreeably to the
foregoing principles, a corporation cannot maintain an action on
a bond or a contract which is invalid, as where a city, without
authority, loaned its bonds to a private company, and took from it
a penal bond, conditioned for the faithful application of the city
bonds to payment for works which the city had no power to construct
or assist in constructing. The remedy in such case must be in some
other form than in an action to enforce the contract. So, a contract
by a city to waive its right to go on with the laying out of a street or
not, as it might choose, is, it seems, against public policy, and it
is void if it amounts to a surrender of its legislative discretion.2
So, a promise to pay a public corporation, or its agents, a premium
for doing their duty is illegal and void; and a contract will not be
sustained which tends to restrain or control the unbiased judgment
of public officers. But a promise by individuals to pay a portion of
the expenses of public improvements does not necessarily fall within
this principle, and such a promise is not void as being against public
policy; and if the promisors have a peculiar and local interest in
the improvement, their promise is not void for want of consideration,
and may be enforced against them. So, on the other hand, a party
415 (37 N. J. L.), reversing s. C. 6 Vroom, Corrupt agreements with aldermen, to
168.
influence them to a particular course in
1 City Council v. Plank Road Co., 31 the discharge of official duties, are, of
Ala. 76 (1857). See Wetumpka v. Win- course, void, no matter to whom executed.
ter, 29 Ala. 651 ; Halstead v. New York, Cook v. Shipman, 24 Ill. 614.
3 N. Y. 430 ; s. C. 5 Barb. 218; Bridge- Contracts with niunicipal officers. Ante,
port v. Housatonuc R. Co., 15 Conn. secs. 283, 292, 444.
475, 493. But see State v. Buffalo, 2 8 Townsend v. Hoyle, 20 Conn. 1 (1849).
Hill (N. Y.), 434, cited supra in note to This case holds that a promise by the de-
sec. 457. Where a city having, without fendants to pay the city the expense of
proper authority, guarauteed the payment laying a certain street was binding; and
of railroad bonds which were secured by a Ellsworth, J., in delivering the opinion,
trust deed, and become the owner of the said : “We cannot assent to the proposi-
bonds from having paid them at maturity, tion that a promise by individuals to pay
it was held that, while the city might have a part of the expenses of public improve-
successfully contested its liability on the ments, ordered by public authority, is, of
bonds, yet the want of authority to guar- course, illegal and void. The amount or
antee the bonds did not affect the lien cre- cost may properly enough enter into the
ated by the deed in its favor as against question of expediency or necessity. If
other creditors of the railroad company. made in one way or in one place, it will
Hay v. Alexandria & W. R. Co., 20 Fed. be much better for the public, though
Rep. 15. Infra, sec. 471, as to suretyship. more expensive; but individuals specially
2 Martin v. Mayor, &c., 1 Hill (N. Y.), benefited stand ready, by giving their
545 (1841); ante, sec. 97. As to public land, their money, or their labor, to meet
policy, see Ohio Life Ins. & T. Co. v.
the extra expense.
Will these promises
Merchants Ins. & T. Co., 11 Humph. be void, as being without consideration or
v. Indianapolis Gas L. & C. Co., 66 Ind. See chapter on Streets, post ; Springfield
396, citing text.
v. Harris, 107 Mass. 532. An arrange-
§ 459
533
IMPLIED CONTRACTS.
making with a city a contract which is ultra vires is not estopped,
when sued thereon by the corporation for damages, to set up its want
of authority to make it.
1
§ 459 (383). Implied Contracts. — The present state of the
authorities clearly justifies the opinion of Chancellor Kent, that
corporations may be bound by implied contracts within the scope
of their powers, to be deduced by inference from authorized cor-
porate acts, without either a vote, or deed, or writing. This doc-
mønt or combination among the parties limits ; contract held wholly void. See
applying, whereby a few individuals, de- also, McCracken v. San Francisco, 16 Cal.
sirous of causing paving and grading to 591 ; infra, secs. 459, 460 ; compare Herzo
be done, procured the signatures of others v. San Francisco, 33 Cal. 134. That the
to the application by paying them a con- contract of agents within the scope of cor-
sideration therefor, directly or indirectly, porate power may be ratified, or a contract
is a fraud in law and contrary to public implied from the enjoyment of the benefit
policy. Howard v. The Church, 18 Md. of the consideration. San Francisco Gas
451. If executory, such an agreement can- Co. v. San Francisco, 9 Cal. 453 (1858),
not be enforced. Maguire v. Smock, 42 opinion of Field, J. ; Backman v. Charles-
Ind. 1 (1873); S. C. 13 Ain. Rep. 353. A town, 42 N. H. 125; see Bissell v. Rail-
written promise to pay into the county road Co., 22 N. Y. 258 ; post, secs. 935–
treasury a certain sum of money, upon the 938.
condition that the county commissioners, 2 2 Kent Com. 291 ; Bank of Columbia
who had removed the county court-house v. Patterson, 7 Cranch, 299 (1813) (a lead-
from the public square, and were build- ing American case); Mott v. Hicks, 1 Cow.
ing a new court-house elsewhere, would (N. Y.)513; Dunn v. Rector, &c., 14 Johns.
remove it back to said square, which (N. Y.) 118; Bank of U. S. v. Dandridge,
offer was accepted by said commissioners, 12 Wheat. 74; Perkins v. Wash. Ins. Co.,
who entered on their records an order for 4 Cow. (N. Y.) 645; Davenport v. Peoria
such relocation, was not void as against Insurance Co., 17 Iowa, 276, and cases
public policy, though the commissioners cited by Cole, J. ; American Insurance Co.
were not expressly authorized by statute 2. Oakley, 9 Paige (N. Y.), 496; Magill
to receive such donations. Stilson v. Law. v. Kauffman, 4 Serg. & Rawle (Pa.), 317;
rence Co., 52 Ind. 213 (1876); State v. Randall v. Van Vechten, 19 Johns. (N. Y.)
Johnson's Admr., 52 Ind. 197 (1876); 60; Wayne County v. Detroit, 17 Mich.
post, sec. 596.
390 ; Lesley v. White, 1 Speers (S. C.)
1 Montgomery City Council v. Mont. Law, 31 ; Canaan v. Derush, 47 N. H.
gomery & W. Pl. R. Co., 31 Ala. 76 (1857); 212 ; Lebanon v. Heath, Ib. 353 ; Adams
Penn., Del. & Md. Steam Nav. Co. v. v. Farnsworth, 15 Gray (Mass.), 423 ;
Dandridge, 8 Gill & J. (Md.) 248, 319, Shrewsbury v. Brown, 25 Vt. 197 ; Gas-
320 ; Hodges v. Buffalo, 2 Denio (N. Y.), sett v. Andover, Ib. 342 ; Peterson v.
110. If a corporation has received money Mayor, &c., of New York, 17 N. Y. 449,
in advance on a contract void on account 453 (1858); Danforth v. Schoharie Turn-
of want of authority to make it, and after pike Co., 12 Johns. (N. Y.) 227 ; Angell
wards refuses to fulfil the contract, the & Ames, sec. 237; Maher v. Chicago, 38
party advancing the money may, without Ill. 266 ; Frankfort Bridge Co. v. Frank-
demand, recover it back in an action for fort, 18 B. Mon. (Ky.) 41 ; Bryan v. Page,
money had and received. Dill v. Ware- 51 Tex. 532 ; State Board v. Aberdeen,
ham, 1 Met. (Mass.) 438 (1844). In this 56 Miss. 518, approving text; Taylor v.
case the corporate defendant undertook, Lambertville, 43 N. J. Eq. (16 Stew.) 107
without authority, to transfer to the plain- (for brief statement of facts of this case,
tiff the right of taking oysters within its see sec. 451, note); supra, sec. 450; Broom,
534
§ 459
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
trine is applicable equally to public and private corporations, but in
applying it, however, care must be taken not to violate other princi-
ples of law. Thus it is obvious that an implied promise cannot be
raised against a corporation, where by its charter it can only contract
in a prescribed way, except it be a promise for money received or
property appropriated under the contract.So, where the corporation
orders local street improvements to be made, for which the abutters
Commentaries on Com. Law, 561-570, An. 496, (1857), carpets were furnished for
where the English cases are collected.
certain corporation courts, by order of the
The reader will be interested in the letter clerks or judges, but without any author-
of Mr. Justice Story to Mr. Justice Cole- ity of the common council, and were worn
ridge on the subject of corporate liability out before the plaintiff presented his bill.
for the parol contracts, intra vires, of the It was contended that the city was liable
authorized agents of the corporation. 2 ex æquo et bono, having used, and not re-
Story's Life and Letters, 335, 337. He turned the carpets ; but it did not appear
there adds, what is now settled law," that that the council knew that they had been
all duties imposed upon a corporation by purchased for the city, and were being
law, and all services performed at its re- used in its buildings. The court denied
quest, raise implied promises binding on the liability, saying that “the only safe
the corporation, if, of course, no statute rule is to hold that the city cannot be
be thereby infringed.” Ib.
bound for any contract made without its
1 Peterson v. Mayor, &c. of New York, authorization, expressed by a resolution
17 N. Y. 449, 453 ; Poultney v. Wells, 1 of the common council.” That an unau-
Aiken (Vt.), 180. Where a city con- thorized contract, however advantageous,
tracted with a railroad company to do does not bind the corporation, see Loker
certain work, and the company employed v. Brookline, 13 Pick. (Mass.) 343 ; Jones
persons to do it, there is no implied con- v. Lancaster, 4 Pick. (Mass.) 149 ; Wood
tract on the part of the city to pay them, v. Waterville, 5 Mass. 294.
although the city saw them at work. A contract was inplied on the part of
Alton v. Mulledy, 21 Ill. 76 (1859). a city, which was bound to support its
When contracts can only be proved by paupers, and which had refused to pay a
the record ; and when there is no implica person who had furnished a pauper with
tion as to contracts; and when they must necessaries. Seagraves v. Alton, 13 lll.
appear by the records of the corporate 371. Here it will be noticed that there
proceedings. See Crump v. Colfax Co. was an express refusal on the part of the
Supervisors, 52 Miss. 107; Huntington city to support the pauper, and yet a
County Comm’rs v. Boyle, 9 Ind. 296; promise was implied. This implication is
Warwick v. Butterworth, 17 Ind. 129 ; a pure fiction to support what the court
St. Louis v. Cleland, 4 Mo. 84; Alton v. regarded as a just claim. A contract
Mulledy, 21 Ill. 76 (1859); San Antonio made by one member of a committee or
v. Gould, 34 Tex. 76 ; People v. Fulton county board for services which are au-
Co., 14 Barb. (N. Y.) 56 ; Bryan v. Page, thorized to be obtained is not obligatory
51 Tex. 532 ; Gilbert v. New Haven, 40 on the municipality. The power is vested
Conn. 102 (1873).
in the whole body, and no one member
Must be an authorized request. “No can bind the corporation. Bentley v.
person can make himself a creditor of an Chisago Co. Comm’rs, 25 Minn. 259.
other by voluntarily discharging a duty 2 McSpedon v. Mayor of New York,
which belongs to that other.” Strong, J., 7 Bosw. (N. Y.) 601; McCracken v. San
in Salsbury v. Philadelphia, 44 Pa. St. Francisco, 16 Cal. 591 ; Pimental v. San
,303 ; Baltimore v. Poultney, 25 Md. 18; Francisco, 21 Cal. 351; Dickinson v.
Jeffersonville v. Ferry Boat, 35 Ind. 19 Poughkeepsie, 75 N. Y. 65; Richardson
(1870). In Seibrecht v. New Orleans, 12 La. v. County of Grant, 27 Fed. Rep. 495.
$ 459
535
IMPLIED CONTRACTS.
are the parties ultimately liable, and which by the charter must be
made in a prescribed mode, if made without any contract or a valid
one, the doctrine of implied liability does not apply in favor of
the contractor, unless, indeed, the corporation has collected the
amount from the adjoining owners and has it in its treasury.
1
1
Argenti v, San Francisco, 16 Cal. of the resolution) from the adjoining own-
255, opinion of Field, C. J. A municipal ers (Saxton v. Beach, 50 Mo. 488, 1872);
corporation was holden liable, under its and having expended a considerable suni
charter, upon an implied assumpsit to in an unsuccessful attempt to charge the
collect and pay over assessments awarded abutting property, he brought suit against
to property owners for the opening of a the city to recover the sun so expended
street. Wheeler v. Chicago, 24 Ill. 105 in
in testing the validity of the resolution of
(1860); see infra, secs. 466, 480, 483; the council. The Supreme Court of Mis-
Sangamon Co. v. Springfield, 63 Ill. 66 souri held that the city was not liable,
(1872). Where a contractor has entered distinguishing Clayburgh v. Chicago, 25
into a contract in good faith, relying upon Ill. 535, and Fisher v. St. Louis, 44 Mo.
the regularity of the proceedings of the 482; Saxton v. St. Joseph, 60 Mo. 153
common council, the city, having received (1875). In Kentucky it is held there.is
the benefit of the performance, is estopped no liability unless the city has the right
fron questioning the regularity in that to proceed to make property-holders liable.
regard. Moore v. New York, 73 N. Y. But if the nature or ownership of the ad-
238. Where certificates of assessments jacent property is such that no stops which
against property owned by the State for a could have been taken would have ren-
sewer tax, were declared void for want of dered it or its owner liable, then the city
power in the city to make the assessment, must pay for the improvement, or it will
it was held that the city was liable to tho have as to such work no ineans of exe-
contractor for the amount thereof. Polk cuting its general power to improve all
County Savings Bank v. State, 69 Iowa, streets. Caldwell v. Rupert, 10 Bush
24. So also .where assessments are void (Ky.), 179; Louisville v. Nevin, 10 Bush
for other reasons, the municipality has (Ky.), 549 ; Craycraft v. Selvage, 10 Bush
been held liable. Scofield v. Council (Ky.), 696 (1874).
Bluffs, 68 Iowa, 695. Compare Bucroft Where a city, organized and acting
v. Council Bluffs, 63 Iowa, 646. Post, under a general law, which provides :
sec. 480. But where a contractor for the “The city shall be liable to the contractors
improvement of streets agreed that he for so much thereof only as is occupied by
would not look to the town in any event public grounds of the city bordering there-
for compensation, and it was afterwards on, and the crossings of streets and alleys,"
decided that the contract was ultra vires makes a contract for the improvement of
and void, and that the lot-owners were not a street at the expense of the property
liable for the work, it was held that the holders, and the contractor does the work
town was not liable to him, by reason of in whole or in part, and the engineer re-
its inherent power to improve streets. Belle- fuses to make an estimate, and the council
view v. Hohn, 82 Ky. 1. Post, secs. 467, refuses to issue precepts upon the proper
480. So where the charter of a city de- application against the property holders, a
clared that it should not be liable in any suit cannot bo maintained by the con-
manner for local improvements which are tractor against the city for damages. The
made a charge upon the adjacent property; remedy in such case is by mandate to
and the council by a resolution which was compel the engineer and council to per-
a nullity, because of the non-concurrence. forin their duties.
forin their duties. Greencastle v. Allen,
of the mayor, ordered a certain local im- 43 Ind. 347 (1873). If the members of
provement to be made, and the work let the common council of a city, in passing
to the plaintiff, who did it, and failed to an ordinance and letting a contract for
collect the same (by reason of the nullity the improvement of a street, act in good
536
§ 460
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
§ 460 (384). Same subject. “ The doctrine of implied muni-
cipal liability,” says Mr. Chief Justice Field, in a case where the
subject underwent very thorough examination, "applies to cases
where money or other property of a party is received under such
circumstances that the general law, independent of express contract,
imposes the obligation upon the city to do justice with respect
to the same. If the city obtain money of another by mistake, or
without authority of law, it is her duty to refund it, --- not from
any contract entered into by her on the subject, but from the
general obligation to do justice which binds all persons, whether
natural or artificial.1 If the city obtain other property which does
not belong to her, it is her duty to restore it; or if used by her,
to render an equivalent to the true owner, from the like general
obligation : the law, which always intends justice, implies a promise.
In reference to money or other property, it is not difficult to deter-
mine in any particular case whether a liability with respect to the
same has attached to the city. The money must have gone into
her treasury, or heen appropriated by her;2 and when it is property
other than money, it must have been used by her, or be under her
control. But with reference to services rendered, the case is different.
Their acceptance must be evidenced by ordinance (or express cor-
porate action to that effect. If not originally authorized, no lia-
bility can attach upon any ground of implied contract. The
acceptance, upon which alone the obligation to pay could arise,
would be wanting.”
faith, under a misapprehension, they and relying upon such promise and in execu-
the contractor, as well as the adjacent tion of the contract, to expend money and
owner of real estate, believing the street perform his part of the contract, the cor-
to be within the corporate limits of the poration is liable on the contract. The
city, the contractor having like knowledge State Board of Agriculture v. The Citi-
with the members of the council, they zens' Street Railway Co., 47 Ind. 407
cannot be held liable for the cost of such (1874). See on this point and as to this
improvement, though the place where the case supra, sec. 457, note.
same is made is not within the corporate i See Dowell v. Portland, 13 Oreg. 248.
limits. Newman v. Sylvester, 42 Ind. 2 The power of the Massachusetts towns
106 (1873).
to appropriate money is derived wholly from
It is the general doctrine that corpora- the statutes (antc, sec. 30), and when they
tions possess the powers expressly con- are confined to a particular mode of creat-
ferred by law, and such implied powers ing a debt, the mode is a limitation of the
as are necessary to enable them to exer-
power.
One, therefore, who loans money
cise the powers expressly granted, and no to a town treasurer in a manner not au-
others; yet, although there may be a de- thorized by statute has no right of action
fect of power in a corporation to make a against the town to recover it, although
contract, if a contract made by it is not the money was used in paying the debts
in violation of the charter of the corpora- of the town. Agawam Nat'l Bank v.
tion or any statute prohibiting it, and the South Hadley, 128 Mass. 503.
corporation by its promise induced a party,
§ 461
537
IMPLIED CONTRACTS.
§ 461.
Same subject. — “As a general rule, undoubtedly, a city
corporation is only liable upon express contracts, authorized by
ordinance for other due corporate proceedings]. The exceptions
relate to liabilities from the use of money or other property which
does not belong to her, or to liabilities springing from the neglect
of duties imposed by the charter, from which injuries to parties are
produced. There are limitations even to these exceptions in many
instances, as where property or money is received in disregard of
positive prohibitions ; as, for example, the city would not be liable
for moneys received upon the issuance of bills of credit, -as this
would be, in effect, to support a proceeding in direct contravention
of the inhibition of the charter.” 1 But it may in a proper case make
a new contract purging a former contract of its illegality. Nor is a
city liable for money received for notes issued by it to circulate as
money, in violation of an express statute and the public policy of the
State.3
1 Per Field, C. J., in Argenti v. San Court in City of Louisiana v. Wood, 102
Francisco, 16 Cal. 255, 282 (1.860). Where U. S. 294 ; see secs. 459 and 938, where
statute provisions enacted to prevent the the subject is further considered ; and see
making of certain contracts are disregarded Litchfield v. Ballon, 114 U. S. 190. Mor-
and a contract made without observing awetz on Corp. (2d ed.) secs. 689-706, 714-
them, the contractor cannot recover the 724, collects and reviews the authorities
value of articles supplied under the con- as to the rights and obligations arising out
tract upon an implied liability ; in such a of the performance or part performance of
case no liability can be implied. McDon- contracts in excess of corporate power.
ald v. New York, 68 N. Y. 23 ; s. c. 23 2 Little Rock v. Merch. Nat. Bauk, 98
Am. Rep. 144, commenting on Nelson v. U. S. 308, quoted supra, sec. 448, note.
New York, 63 N. Y. 535; and Argenti v. 3 Thomas v. Richmond, 12 Wall. 349
San Francisco, supra.
(1870). The principles upon which the
“The law,” says an eminent judge, decision rests are admirably stated in the
never implies a promise to pay unless opinion of Mr. Justice Bradley. Cheeney
some duty creates such an obligation, and v. Brookfield, 60 Mo. 53 (1875), citing
more especially it never implies a promise text ; State Board v. Aberdeen, 56 Miss.
to do an act contrary to duty or contrary 518 (approving text); Brown v. Belleville,
to law. Assumpsit may be maintained 30 Upper Can. Q. B. 373 ; Wentworth v.
against a municipal corporation in certain Hamilton, 34 Upper Can. Q. B. 585;
cases upon an implied promise, but the Brown v. Lindsey, 35 Upper Can. Q. B.
better opinion is that a promise to pay 509 ; Parsons v. Monmonth, 70 Me. 262
can never be implied in a case where the (1879), approving text. Supra, sec. 448 ;
corporation possesses no power to con- post, sec. 938.
tract.” Per Clifford, J., in Burrill v. In Cheeney v. Brookfield, 60 Mo. 53
Boston, 2 Clifford C. C. 590, 596 (1867). (1875), it was held that a municipal corpo-
The subject is further expounded hy the ration is not liable upon a warrant issued
same learned justice in his opinion in The to a bank-note company in payment of a
Collector v. Hubbard, 12 Wall. 1, 12 debt to the company for engraving and
(1870). See, also, Curtis v. Fiedler, 2 printing on bank-note paper notes paya-
Black (U. S.), 478 ; Murphy v. Louisville, ble to bearer, to be put into circulation
9 Bush (Ky.), 189 (1872).
by the corporation as money without au-
See on subject of implied liability, the thority of law. The court held that there
judgment of the United States Supreme could be no implied assumpsit in such a
538
§ 462
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
1
§ 462. Contracts; Ultra Vires ; Assumpsit. Where a city, with-
out authority of law, issued its bonds in exchange for the bonds of
a railroad company, which remain wholly unpaid, the city is not lia-
ble on its bonds. If in such case value has been received by the
city, the remedy, if any exists under the special circumstances, must
be for the money or property received without consideration,
case, and distinguished it from Allegheny Albert Cheese Co. v. Leeming, 31 U. C. C.
City v. McClurkan, 14 Pa. St. 81, and de- P. 272. One of some moment has been
nied Underwood v. Newport Lyceum, 5 B. created with regard to municipal corpora-
Mon. (Ky.) 130.
tions. It is that such a corporation is liable
Illustrations of implied liability.— City to be sued in an action of debt on simple
is liable for gas furnished to it with knowl- contract for the price of goods furnished,
edge of the council, though no ordinance or labor done at their request and accepted
or resolution was passed authorizing it to by them. Fetterly v. The Municipality of
be furnished. Gas Co. v. San Francisco, Russell and Cambridge, 14 Upper Can.
9 Cal. 453, 466 (1958), opinion of Field, Q. B. 433. Though in such a case there
J. If a city sells its void bonds, there is' be no contract under seal, the law implies
an implied assumpsit to repay the pur- an undertaking by a corporation to pay
chase-money. Paul v. Kenosha, 22 Wis. for labor and materials employed in their
266 (1867). See and compare Litchfield service, and of which they have accepted
v. Ballou, 114 U.S. 190. Assumpsit held and are enjoying the benefit, provided the
to lie against a city which had availed purpose for which the labor and materials
itself of the property and services of an have been applied is one clearly within the
individual in the care of the indigent sick. legitimate object of their charter. Bart-
Nashville v. Toney, 10 Lea, 643. Where lett v. The Municipality of Amherstburg,
a bridge corporation was requested by the 14 Upper Can. Q. B. 152 ; Fetterly v. The-
city authorities to communicate to them Municipality of Russell and Cambridge,
the terms upon which the city might at- 14 Upper Can. Q. B. 433 ; Pim v. The
tach its water-pipes to the bridge, to carry Municipal Council of Ontario, 9 Upper
the water from oue side of the river to the Can. C. P. 302 ; Perry v. The Corporation
other, which the bridge company an- of Ottawa, 23 Upper Can. Q. B. 391 ;
swered, fixing a sum, upon which the city Brown v. Belleville, 30 Upper Can., Q.
council took no action, but proceeded to B. 373 ; Wentworth 2. Hamilton, 34
extend the water-works and used the Upper Can. Q. B. 585 ; Brown v. Lind-
bridge, the court held the city was liable. say, 35 Ib. 509.
The exception, how-
Bridge Co. v. Frankfort, 18 B. Mon. (Ky.) ever, does not extend to executory con-
41 (1857). Broom Commentaries on Com. tracts, such as work, &c., to be done,
Law, 567, where the English cases are cited but is confined to work in fact done and
in which corporations have been held liable accepted. McLean v. The Town Coun-
by reason of enjoying the benefits resulting cil of the Town of Brantford, 16 Upper
from particular contrarts. See McDonald Can. Q. B. 347 ; Wingate v. The Ennis-
v. New York, 68 N. Y. 23 (1876); s. c. 23 killen Oil Refining Co., 14 Upper Can.
An. Rep. 144, Folger, J., suggests in- C. P. 379 ; Mayor, &c. v. Hardwick,
stances of implied liability ; post, secs. L. R. 9 Exch. 13; Austin v. Guardians,
938, 939.
&c., L. R. 9 C. P. 91; Houck v. Whitty,
Chief Justice Harrison, in his excellent 14 Grant, 671."
'Municipal Manual for Upper Canada," 1 Thomas v. Port Hudson, 27 Mich.
has digested the decisions in the Province 320 (1873). In this case Cooley, J., ob-
on the subject of the power of corporations
• A municipal corporation has no
to contract. He says (5th ed. p. 11), “ It general authority to exchange promises
is a principle applicable to all corporations with other corporations or persons ; its
that they must contract under seal. To contracts, to be valid, must be within the
this principle there are soine exceptions. scope of the authority conferred upon it
serves :
§ 463
539
RATIFICATION OF UNAUTHORIZED CONTRACT.
§ 463 (385). Ratification of Unauthorized Contract. --- A muni-
cipal corporation may rutify the unauthorized acts and contracts of
its agents or officers, which are within the scope of the corporate powers,
but not otherwise. Ratification may frequently be inferred from acqui-
escence after knowledge of all the material facts, or from acts incon-
sistent with any other supposition. The same principle is applicable
to corporations as to individuals. But a subsequent ratification cannot
by law, and for municipal purposes. And Law Reg. 693 ; Dubuque Fem. College
if, under pretence of law, its officers in its v. Dubuque, 13 Iowa, 555; Merrick v.
name obtain money, property, or rights Plank Road Co., 11 lowa, 74, per Wright,
in action which equitably belong to all- J. ; Detroit v. Jackson, 1 Doug. (Mich.)
other, the fact may entitle the party to 106; Crawshaw V. Roxbury, 7 Gray
the proper remedy, but it cannot make (Mass.), 374; Burrill v. Boston, 2 Clifford
good bonds issued in violation of law, C. C. 590 (1867); Albany National Bank
unless it is to be held (which is not the V. Albany, 92 N. Y. 363; City v. Hays,
law] that the power of municipal corpora- 93 Pa. St. 72; Galveston r. Morton, 58
tions to make legal promises is co-exten- Tex. 409; Strong v. District of Columbia,
sive with that of individuals, and that 1 Mackey, 265; Town of Durango v.
any contracts they inay make are valid Pennington, 8 Col. 257 ; Town of Bruce
where it can be said that anything of v. Dickey, 116 Ill. 527; Morris County v.
value was given or inconvenience sub- Hinchman, 31 Kan. 729; Lincoln v. Stock-
mitted to in exchange.”
ton, 75 Me. 141; Davis v. Mayor of
If the consideration received under an Jackson, 61 Mich. 530 ; Schmidtv. County
ultra vires contract can be restored, equity of Stearns, 34 Minn. 112; Kinsley v.
will not relieve a municipal corporation Norris, 60 N. H. 131 (a vote authorizing
from the contract without providing for an attorney to compromise or settle suits
its restoration. Turner v. Cruzen, 70 held a ratification of authority to com-
Iowa, 202. See Litchfield v. Ballou, 114 mence them); Moore v. Albany, 98 N. Y.
U. S. 190, where bonds were issued by a 396; Lewis v. Shreveport, 108 U. S. 282
city in excess of a constitutional limita- (a city cannot ratify a subscription to a
tion, and the holder was adjudged to have railroad, which it had no power to make,
no remedy against the city. Post, sec. unless authorized to do so by statute).
529 a.
Mere silence on the part of a town will
People v. Swift, 31 Cal. 26 (1866); not create a ratification. Otis v. Stock-
Blen v. Bear River Co., 20 Cal. 602 ton, 76 Me. 506 ; post, sec. 779, note.
(1862) ; Peterson v. Mayor, 17 N. Y. 449, A municipal corporation may ratify un-
453 (1858), and authorities cited, revers- authorized expenditures, not ultra vires,
ing s. 0. 4 E. D. Smith, 413; San Fran- which they neem beneficial to it, and such
cisco Gas Co. v. San Francisco, 9 Cal. 453; ratification, as in the case of natural per-
Hoyt v. Thompson, 19 N. Y. 207, 218
sons, is equivalent to previous anthority.
(1859); Clarke v. Lyon Co., 8 Nev. 181 Backman v. Charlestown, 42 N. H. 125 ;
(1873) ; Howe v. Keeler, 27 Conn. 538; Harris v. Canaan School District, 8 Fost.
Emerson v. Newberry, 13 Pick. (Mass.) (28 N. H.) 65; Wilson v. Chester School
377 ; Hodges v. Buffalo, 2 Denio (N. Y.), District, 32 N. H. 118; Keyser v. Suna-
110 (1846) ; 5 Denio (N. Y.) 567 ; People pee Charitable School District, 35 N. H.
V. Flagg, 17 N. Y. 584 ; s. C. 16 How. 477 ; Episcopal Society v. Dedham Episco-
(N. Y.) Pr. 36; Brady v. Mayor, &c. of pal Church, 1 Pick. (Mass.) 372 ; Bank of
New York, 20 N. Y. 312; affirming s. C. Columbia v. Patterson, 7 Cranch, 299 ; Ran-
2 Bosw. 173 ; Delafield 2. State of Illinois, dall v. Van Vechten, 19 Jolins. (N. Y.) 60 ;
2 Hill (N. Y.), 159, 176 (1841); S. 0.8 Trott v. Warren, 2 Fairf. (11 Me.) 227;
Paige, 531, and 26 Wend. 192; Mills v. Topsham v. Rogers, 42 Vt. 199 ; People v.
Gleason, 11 Wis. 470 (1960); s. C. 8 Am. Swift, 31 Cal. 26. In DeGrave v. Mon-
1
540
§ 464
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
make valid an unlawful act without the scope of corporate authority.
An absolute excess of authority by the officers of a corporation, in
violation of law, cannot be upheld ; and where the officers of such a
Lody fail to pursue the requirements of a statutory enactinent under
which they are acting, the corporation is not bound. In such cases
the statute must be strictly followed; and a person who deals with
a municipal body is obliged to see that its charter has been fully
complied with: when this is not done, no subsequent act of the cor-
poration can inake au ultra vires contract effective. The enıploy-
ment, however, by a municipal council, of an attorney to defend a
policeman charged with an assault, does not adopt his act so as to
render the city liable for the damages recovered against him.
§ 464 (386). Assent and Ratification. Where work done for a
corporation without complete legal authorization is for a corporate
purpose and is beneficial to it, and the price reasonable, strong evi-
dence of the assent of the corporation is not required; but such assent
must be shown. Ratification of the acts of a committee in building
upon the land of a school district a more expensive house than they
were authorized to do by the vote of the corporation cannot be in-
ferred from the mere fact that the school is kept in it for a few
weeks, there being no evidence that the corporation had knowledge
of the over-expenditure, or bad taken any action on the subject.3
mouth, 19 Eng. C. L. 300, it was held that (N. Y.) 48; Brown v. Mayor, 63 N. Y.
the examination of weights and measures, 239; Hodges v. Buffalo, 2 Denio (N. Y.),
which had been ordered by a mayor de 110; McDonald v. Mayor, 68 N. Y. 23;
facto, and which were the subject of the Smith v. Newburgh, 77 N. Y. 130;
controverted contract, at a meeting of the Green v. Cape May, 41 N. J. L. 45, ap.
corporation, and the subsequent use of proving text; Taymouth v. Koehler, 35
some of them, recognized the contract for Mich. 22; Marsh v. Fulton Co., 10 Wall.
their purchase and made the corporation 676 ; Horton v. Thompson, 71 N. Y. 513;
liable to pay for them. As to ratification McCracken v. San Francisco, 16 Cal. 591;
of contracts for local improvements when Ashbury Railway Carriage & Iron Co. v.
not primarily a charge on the city, see
Riche, L. R. 7 E. & I. App. C. 653;
Murphy v. Louisville, 9 Bush (Ky.), 189 Lewis v. Shreveport, 108 U. S. 282 ; Scott
(1872); post, sec. 481, note; infra, secs. v. Shreveport, 20 Fed. Rep. 714 ; San
465, 813; 4 Broon Commentaries on Com. Diego Water Co. v. San Diego, 59 Cal.
Law, 567. A vote ratifying an unauthor- 517; Bank v. Statesville, 84 N. C. 169 ;
ized contract cannot be rescinded at a sub- City of Laredo v. Macdonnell, 52 Tex.
sequent meeting. Brown v. Winterport, 511.
79 Me. 305.
2 Buttrick v. Lowell, 1 Allen (Mass.),
i Sault Ste. Marie Co. v. Van Dusan, 172 (1861); post, secs. 479, 975 ; Moore v.
40 Mich. 429; Jefferson Co. v. Arrighi, 54 Mayor, 73 N. Y. 238, approving text;
Miss. 668; Nash v. St. Paul, 11 Minn. 174; Bryan v. Page, 51 Tex. 352 ; Wilhelm v.
Hague v. Philadelphia, 48 Pa. St. 528; Cedar Co., 50 lowa, 254, approving text.
Brady v. Mayor, 20 N. Y. 312; Bryan v. 8 Wilson v. School District, 32 N. H.
Page, 51 Tex. 332; Peterson v. Mayor, 17 118 (1855). See, further, as to effect of
N. Y. 449; Cowen v. West Troy, 43 Barb. Use as a ratification, Kingman v. School
.
§ 465
541
CONTRACTS: ASSENT AND RATIFICATION,
$ 465 (387). Same subject. — The ratification, whatever its
form, must be by the principal or by authorized agents. This is well
illustrated by a case where, by statute, certain agents or officers of a
State were authorized to borrow money for public use, and for that
purpose to sell its bonds at not less than their par value. They ex-
ceeded their power by selling for less than par, and on credit. It
و
District, 2 Cush. (Mass.) 425; Davis v. these are afterwards used by the public
School District, 24 Me. 319; Lane v. or the district. Loker v. Brookline, 13
School District, 10 Met. (Mass. } 462; Pick. (Mass.) 343 (1832); Knowlton v. In-
Chaplin v. Hill, 24 Vt. (I Dean) 628 ; habitants, &c., 14 Me. (2 Shep.) 25, where
Fisher v. School District, 4 Cush. (Mass.) note critique on, and remarks of Mellen,
494 ; Taft v. Montague, 14 Mass. 285 ; C. J., as to Hayden v. Madison, 7 Greenl.
Keyser v. School District, 35 N. H. 477; (Me.) 79; Morrell v. Dixfield, 30 Me. (16
Pratt v. Swanton, 15 Vt. 147 (use of Shep.) 157, 160 ; Davis v. School Dis-
bridge by public).
trict, 24 Me. (10 Shep.) 349; Hayward
In Wilson v. School District, above v. School District, 2 Cush. (Mass.) 419
cited, Mr. Justice Bell well remarks : “In (1848); Ib. 426 ; Moor v. Cornville, 13 Me.
most cases where work and labor is per- 293 (1836) (where the action was brought
formed upon real estate by contract, the by the surveyor or supervisor of high-
mere fact that the owner makes use of the ways, who built a bridge without pur-
building or structure built upon his land suing the course pointed out by law);
furnishes no evidence of approval or ac- Allen v. Cooper, 22 Me. 133 (deciding
ceptance, because he has no choice to that the power of a committee with au.
reject it. Alone, the use of such build. thority to contract to make a road, does
ings gives no evidence of acceptance. not embrace power to accept the work or
Accompanied by silence and absence of waive performance). But if the work be
complaint, where to complain would be done under belief of authority, as where
natural and suitable, or by any circum- it was performed under a contract with a
stance indicating acquiescence, it would committee who assumed to have author.
be sufficient.” 32 N. H. 125. As to ef. ity, but who, in fact, had none, then if
fect of acceptance of public work by the the corporation accept it, or even know-
agents of the town, see Wadleigh v. Sut- ingly avail itself of it, it will be liable
ton, 6 N. H. 15 (1832). Of school-house to pay a reasonable compensation ; and a
built upon a quantum meruit employment promise thus to pay may be implied on
by a committee, but without a legal con- the part of a corporation from the acts of
tract. Kimball v. School District, 28 Vt. its general agent, or an agent with powers
8 (1855). See, also, Corwin v. Wallace, 17 of a general character [?]. Abbot v. Her-
Iowa, 334 ; Zottman v. San Francisco, 20 man, 7 Me. (Greenl.) 118 ; Hayden v.
Cal. 96 (valuable discussion): approved, Madison, Ib. 79. “ Perhaps these two
Murphy v. Louisville, 9 Bush (Ky.), 189 cases carry the doctrine of the implied
(1872); Jordan v. School District, 38 Me. responsibility of corporations as far as it
164 (1854); Reichard v. Warren County, ought to be carried.” Per Emery, J., in
31 Iowa, 381 (1871). Surveyor of high- Ruby u. Abysin. Society, 15 Me. 306, 308
ways cannot recover of the town for work (1839). As to extent of powers of New
voluntarily performed, there being no England towns, see antė, secs. 29, 30.
contract, not even if beneficial. Sikes v.
And see, particularly, Jordan v. School
Hatfield, 13 Gray (Mass.), 347 (1859); District, and other cases cited, supra ;
infra, sec. 466.
Baltimore v. Reynolds, 20 Md. 1 (1862);
A public corporation is not liable for Hague v. Philadelphia, 48 Pa. St. 527 ;
work done against, or even without, its Moore v. Mayor, 73 N. Y. 238, approving
direction or authority (such as building a text.
bridge, road, school-house, &c.), although
542
§ 465
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
was contended that this contract was ratified, becausa the governor,
after he knew of the contract, signed the bonds and caused them to
be delivered, and because the auditor and some of the other State
officers acted under the contracts, drawing money and receiving pay-
meuts. But it was held that these officials were likewise agents of
limited authority; that, as they would have had no power to make
the contracts originally, they could not ratify them; that ratifica-
tion must come from the principal, — the State, represented by its
legislature.
i Delafield v. State of Illinois, 2 Hill for the cost of the sewer, was a question
(N. Y.), 159, 175, where difference be- not involved, and not decided.
tween ratification by a state and by other In applying the doctrine that unauthor-
corporations or by individuals is clearly ized corporate acts may be ratified, other
set forth by Bronson, J. ; affirning s. C. 8 principles of law niust be borne in mind.
Paige, 531 ; S. C. further, 26 Wend. 192. The cale which, in this respect, should
In further illustration of the text, see be observed, is very clearly set forth by
Hague v. Philadelphia, 48 Pa. St. 527; Denio, J., in giving judgment in Peterson
Hotchin v. Kent, 8 Mich. 526 ; Murphy v. v. Mayor, &c. of New York, 17 N. Y.
Louisville, 9 Bush (Ky.), 189 (1872); 449, 454 (1858). “For instance, no sort
Marsh v. Fulton County, 10 Wall. 676 of ratification can make good an act with.
(1870), (a leading case in the Supreme out the scope of the corporate authority.
Court of the United States on the subject So where the charter or a statute binding
of ratification); Dubuque Fem. College v. upon the corporation has committed a class
Dubuque, 13 Iowa, 555 ; Estey v. Inhab- of acts to particular officers or agents,
itants of Westininster, 97 Mass. 324 ; other than the governing body, or where
Branham v. San Jose, 24 Cal. 585 ; At- it has prescribed certain formalities as
torney-General v. Lathrop, 24 Mich. 235 conditions to the performance of any de-
(1872); Wilhelm v. Cedar County, 50 scription of corporate business, the proper
Towa, 254. The case of the City [of St. functionaries must act, and the designated
Louis] v. Armstrong, 56 Mo. 298 (1874), forms must be observed, and generally no
is a strong instance in which the city was act of recognition can supply a defect in
held to ratify the acts of its officers by these respects.
these respects.” Brady v. Mayor, &c., 20
availing itself of the benefit of their acts. N. Y. 312 ; Hodges v. Buffalo, 2 Denio
The case was this : The city wished to (N. Y.), 110; 17 N. Y. 584 ; Gates v.
build a sewer through the defendant's lot; Hancock, 45 N. H. 528 ; Reilly v. Phila-
it was necessary to condemn or get his delphia, 60 Pa. St. 467 ; supra, secs. 463,
consent; he consented on condition that 464 ; Wilhelm v. Cedar County, 50 Iowa
he could have three years in which to pay 254.
his proportion of the cost of the sewer ; Where the corporation can only act by
the officers of the city, without any ex- ordinance, the ratification must be by or-
press authority, so agreed. The sewer was dinance. McCracken v. San Francisco,
built, and before the three years expired 16 Cal. 591 (1860); Pimental v. San
the city sued the defendant for his por Francisco, 21 Cal. 351 ; Cross v. Morris-
tion of the cost of the sewer; and it was town, 18 N. J. Eq. 305 (1867); ante,
held that the suit was prematurely chap. xii.
brought, and that the city, by using the Legislature may, within constitutional
defendaut's land under the agreement of limits, ratify or authorize ratification.
its officers, was bound by that agreement. Campbell v. Kenosha, 5 Wall. 194; Super-
What would have been the rights if the visors v. Schenck, Ib. 772 ; Keitlisburg v.
city had put the defendant in statu quo, Frick, 34 Ill. 405; Mills v. Gleason, il
by condemning the right of way, and Wis. 470 ; Winn v. Macon, 21 Ga. 275 ;
tendering the amount before bringing suit Grogan v. San Francisco, 18 Cal. 590
§ 466
513
CONTRACTS: LETTING TO THE LOWEST BIDDER.
§ 466 (388). Letting to the Lowest Bidder. Where the charter
or incorporating act requires the officers of the city to award con-
tracts to the lowest bidder, a contract made in violation of its require-
ments is illegal; and in an action brought on such contract for the
work, the city may plead its illegality in defence;1 and neither the
(1861); Hasbrouck v. Milwaukee, 21 Wis. (1871); post, sec. 832, note ; Breevort v.
217 (1866); Mills v. Charleton, 29 Wis. Detroit, 24 Mich. 322 (1872); May v.
400 (1872); $. C. 9 Ann. Rep. 578 and Detroit, 2 Mich. N. P. Rep. 235 (1871);
note ; ante, sec. 79 ; sec. 161, note. In Slaw v. Trenton, 49 N. J. Law, 339 ;
Shawnee County v. Carter, 2 Kan. 115 State v. Trenton (N. J.), 12 At. Rep. 902
(1863), the Supreme Court of Kansas held (1888); Trenton v. Shaw (N. J.), 10 At.
invalid, as not being within the rightful Rep. 273 (1887); Davenport v. Klein-
scope of legislative power, an act of the schmidt (contract to take water), Mont.,
legislature which declared valid and bind- 13 Pac. Rep. 249. There can be no recov-
ing bonds which had been issued by the ery against a municipal corporation for ex-
county officers on account of the county tra work where the officers who requested
court-house, and which bonds were not en- it to be done had no authority. Hague v.
forceable against the county because dif-'Philadelphia, 48 Pa. St. 527 ; O'Hara v.
fering in form and substance from the New Orleans, 30 La. An. 152; Addis v.
warrants authorized by the statute. Such Pittsburg, 85 Pa. St. 379 (1877); Bone-
a strict limitation on legislative power is steel v. Mayor, &c. of New York, 22 N, Y.
not generally asserted. See, on this point 162. Thus a contract by S. to erect a
chap. iv, ante, and post, sec. 544.
building for a city stipulated that the work
1 Brady v. Mayor, &c. of New York, should be done according to certain plans
20 N. Y. (6 Smith) 312 (1859). It is and specifications; that a certain commit-
intimated that it is not essential to the tee, or the architect, might direct in writing
defence that the city should show a fraudu- any deviations therefrom, in which case such
lent collusion between the bidder and the sums of money should be added to or de-
officers awarding the contract. Whether ducted from the agreed price as the parties
the city is liable on a quantum meruit to should judge the increase or diminution to
one who has bona fide performed labor un- be worth, and that no alterations should
der a void contract, where the work has be paid for unless directed in writing. In
been accepted and used, was not deter. excavating, the soil was found by the
mined. Ib.; S. C. 2 Bosw. 173 ; 7 Abb. Pr. architect to require piles to be driven to
R. 234; 16 Abb. Pr. R. 432. As further il- secure a firm foundation ; whereupon he
Justrating the text, see People v. Flagg, 17 furnished piling plans, directed S. to do
N. Y. 584 ; Peterson v. Mayor, &c., 17 the work, and orally promised him that
N. Y. 457, referring to but expressing no he should be paid for it. Held, that the
opinion upon Christopher v. Mayor, &c., city was not bound by the architect's oral
13 Barb. (N. Y.) 567 ; Appleby v. Mayor, promise. Stuart v. Cambridge, 125 Mass.
&c., 15 How. (N. Y.) Pr. 428 ; Harlem 102.
Gas Co. v. Mayor, &c. of New York, 33 If the lowest bidder is required to give
N. Y. 389; Macey v. Titcombe, 19 Ind. security and the law requires public notice
135 (1862); Bonesteel v. Mayor, &c., 22 of proposals, any contract without a com-
N. Y. 162 ; Smith v. Mayor, &c., 21 How. pliance with the law is unauthorized and
(N. Y.) Pr. 1 ; Greene v. Mayor, 60 N. Y. void. Dickinson v. Poughkeepsie, 74 N.
303 (1875) ; reversing s. C. 1 Hun, 29 ; Y. 65 ; Eager, In re, 46 N. Y. 100; Max-
Yarnold v. Lawrence, 15 Kan. 126 (1875); well v. Stanislaus, 53 Cal. 389.
Dickinson v. Poughkeepsie, 75 N. .Y. 65, A provision that the “commissioners
citing text ; Eager, In re, 46 N. Y. 100; shall in no case proceed with the construc-
Nash v. St. Paul, 8 Minu, 172 (1863); S. C. tion of any sewer except upon advertise-
11 Minn. 174; White v. New Orleans, 15 ment" to be let to the lowest bidder,
La. An. 667 ; State v. Barlow, 48 Mo. 17 applies only to a contract for original con-
544
§ 467
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
municipality nor its subordinate officers can make a binding con-
tract for such work except in compliance with the requirements of
the law. So where the charter requires any sale or lease of the real
estate of a city to be made at public auction to the highest bidder, an
ordinance of the council of the city making a lease of a portion of its
realty, upon the payment of a rent reserved, is void.2
$ 467 (389). Lowest Bidder; Patented Inventions. The Su-
preme Court of Michigan has affirmed, while the Supreme Court of
Wisconsin and of other States have denied, the proposition that
where a city charter provides that no contracts shall be made by the
city except with the lowest bidder, after advertisement of proposals,
it does not prohibit the corporation from contracting to lay Nicholson
pavement, though the right to lay it is patented and owned by a
struction. If the original contractor The New York city charter of 1873,
abandons the work, it is not necessary to containing a provision similar to that
re-advertise and let to the lowest bidder, stated in the text, was construed to re-
the original contractor being liable for the quire a submission for competition of
excess of cost over his contract price, every important item of a contemplated
Leeds, In re, 53 N. Y. 400 (1873). work. Matter of Merriam, 84 N. Y. 596.
Where contracts for public work are Where the charter is imperative that con-
required by law to be made by advertising tracts for public works should be let to
proposals and specifications, for the purpose the lowest bidder and the lowest bidder
of securing competitive bidding, such withdraws his bid, it is the duty to adver.
specifications must be definite as to the tise again and not to award the contract
quantity as well as the quality of materials to the next lowest bidder. Twiss v. Port
required, or the contract will be Foid. Huron, 63 Mich. 528 (1886); s. C. 30
Bigler v. New York, 5 Abb. (N. Y.) N.' N. W. Rep. 177.
Cas. 51.
1 Addis v. Pittsburg, 85 Pa. St. 379
Construction of New York Act of 1886, (1877).
chap. 142, requiring sale at auction by 2 San Francisco & Oakland R. Co. v.
municipal corporations of right to build Oakland, 43 Cal. 502 (1872).
and operate railways on streets to the Where the charter requires that all
highest bidder. See People v. Barnard, work for the city shall be let to the lowest
110 N. Y. 548 (1888).
bidder, after a prescribed notice of the
A bid for street-paving is not defective time and place of letting shall have been
in not distinguishing between the portions given, and requires that similar notice
of the improvement chargeable to the lots shall be given where work is re-let, an
fronting on the street, and the portion assessment upon a lot for work done is
chargeable to the city, where the relative void if the contract was let or re-let with-
proportions have already been fixed. out notice. Mitchell v. Milwaukee, 18
Beniteau v. Detroit, 41 Mich. 116. Rem- Wis. 92 (1864) ; see, also, Wells v. Burn-
edy of taxpayer. Follmer v. Nuckolls ham, 20 Wis. 112 ; Hasbrouck v. Milwaul-
Co., 6 Neb. 204 ; compare Clark v. Day- kee, 21 Wis. 217 (1866). Owner may, in
ton, 1b. 192. Whether, when the work is such case, restrain the sale. Ib. The con-
of such a character that its ultimate cost tract must be the same that was advertised.
cannot be foreseen, there can be any choice Nash v. St. Paul, 11 Minn. 174.
among bids, quære. McBrian v. Grand
Rapids, 56 Mich. 95.
§ 468
545
CONTRACTS : LOWEST BIDDER ; PATENTED INVENTIONS.
single firm. The question is close; but there seems, so far, to be a
tendency in the courts to adopt the Wisconsin view.1
§ 468 (390). Same subject. — Where the municipal authorities
were required by law to advertise for sealed proposals for making
local improvements, and award the work to the lowest responsible
bidder, to publish a notice of the award, and to allow the owners of
the major part of the frontage to take the contract upon the same
terms if they should desire, the court were of opinion that the city
authorities had no power to do work which could not be contracted
for in this mode, or which the abutters could not themselves per-
form, and that the award of a contract for a patented pavement to
the assignee of the patentee, who had the exclusive right to lay the
same, was unauthorized, and the contract void.2
As the purpose of such a provision in the charter is to secure,
through competition, the most advantageous terms, something is
necessarily left to the discretion, to be fairly exercised of course, of
i Dean v. Charlton, 23 Wis. 590 (1869); Detroit v. Robinson, 38 Mich. 108 ; post,
Nicholson Pavement Co. v. Painter, 35 Cal. secs. 468, 370, note, 909, 791, note. Sequel
699 ; Hobart v. Detroit, 17 Mich. 246 to Dean v. Charlton, supra, see Mills v.
(1868). Dean v. Charlton, supra, was Charleston, 29 Wis. 400, and Dean v.
approved by Sutherland, J., in Dolan v. Borchenius, 30 Wis. 236, the legislature
Mayor, &c. of New York, 4 Abb. Pr. (N. s.) having valiilated the assessment. Post,
397 (1868), and followed by the Supreme sec. 814 and note. See, also, Eager, In ?
ere,
Court of Louisiana in Burgess v. Jefferson, 46 N. Y. 100 (1871). Liability of city
21 La. An. 143 (1869), in which it appeared to patentee to pay him "royalty.” Bige-
that the contractors with the city had the low v. Louisville, 3 Fish. Pat. Cas. 602
exclusive right to lay the patented pave- (1869); post, sec. 966. Where a charter
ment in the State. But under provisions does not require a contract to be let to the
of law relating to the city of New York, lowest bidder after advertising for propo-
which require all work to be done and sals at the expense of abutters, although
supplies to be furnished to be by contract, such contracts may be made by private
where the expenditure will exceed $1,000, agreement with the city, they must be
and which direct all contracts to be made fairly made at reasonable prices, with due
or let, after advertisement, to the lowest regard to the lot-owners' interests, or equity
bidder, the city council is not, in the will relieve against them. Cook v. Racine,
opinion of the Court of Appeals, prohibited. 49 Wiś. 243 ; s. C. 5 N. W. Rep. 352.
from making or paving a street in the 2 Nicholson Pavement Company v.
manner or with materials which do not Painter, 35 Cal. 699 (1868).
This case
admit of competitive bids. Dugro, In re, was decided before Dean v. Charlton,
50 N. Y. 513 (1873). The subject is supra, and the opinion of Sanderson, J.,
discussed by Breuer, J., in Yarnold v. in its general scope, sustains the view of
Lawrence, 15 Kan. 126 (1875), who in. the Wisconsin court; and approving of
clined to the Michigan view, but the the language of Field, C. J., in Zottman's
question was not decided by the court. Case, 20 Cal. 102, treats “the mode as
Further, as to rights of lowest bidders, see constituting the measure of the power.”
Attorney-General v. Detroit, 41 Mich. 224; Post, chap. xix. ; ante, sec. 98 ; post, sec.
S. C. 12 Am. Law Reg. (N. s.) 149; see
also Detroit v. Robinson, 42 Mich. 198;
VOL. I. - 35
669.
546
§ 470
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
the council, in the adoption of the course which will best attain
the end; and it does not contravene this restriction to call for bids
for putting down various kinds of wood and stone pavements, some
patented and some not, and afterwards, when all the proposals are
in, selecting the one which is relatively the lowest or the most satis-
factory, all things considered; but when the kind is thus selected,
the lowest responsible bidder who has the lawful power to perform
his undertaking, has the absolute legal right to have the contract
awarded to him.1
§ 469 (391). Lowest Bidder; Exclusive Right. — In an action on
a contract for lighting certain streets in New York City with gas, it
appeared that the company had, by law, the exclusive right to fur-
nish that part of the city with gas. The charter of the city, how-
ever, required all contracts for wants and supplies beyond a certain
value, which the contract in suit exceeded, to be let to the lowest
bidder, and the contract not being so let, it was claimed to be void.
It was held that since the company had the exclusive right to fur-
nish the gas (which prevented competition), the provision of the
charter requiring contracts, to be let to the lowest bidder (with a
view to secure competition) was inapplicable, and the contract was
sustained under the general corporate power of the city to contract
for the lighting of its streets.2
$ 470 (392). When Contract completed. — Although notice has
been published inviting proposals to do public work, yet the contract
is incomplete until the proposal is actually accepted, and the cor-
poration inviting the proposal is not, it seems, liable to damages
for refusing to accept an offer, even though it be the lowest regular
offer made. It is certainly not thus liable where the notice and the
proposals with respect to the amount and form of the security, do
1 Attorney-General v. Detroit, 41 Mich. 2 Harlem Gas Co. v. New York, 33
224; s. C. 12 Am. Law Reg. (N. s.) March, N. Y. 309. Where a city has authority to
1873, p. 149. Remedy of lowest bidder contract therefor, it cannot resist payment
when contract is awarded to another. Ib.; for gaslight furnished, because of illegal
Kelly v. Chicago, 62 Ill. 279 (1871); promises as to the particular fund from
post, chap. xxii. sec. 917.
which payment would be made. The
The council of a city held to have no consideration of such promises being legal,
power to contract for the grading of a the price would be payable, if not other-
street until they first shall have enacted wise, out of the general fund; and the
an ordinance for the said improvement, objectionable provisions may be rejected,
nor except such contract be let to the and the rest of the contract permitted to
lowest bidder, after publication of notice stand. Nebraska City v. Nebraska Gas
and fair competition. Fulton v. Lincoln, Co., 9 Neb. 339.
9 Neb. 358.
.
§ 471
547
CONTRACTS OF SURETYSHIP.
not comply with the requirements of the ordinances of the city, and
where these provided that contracts should not be executed until
laid before the common council. The rule against combinations to
prevent bidding at auction sales applies to proposals for government
work, in response to a call therefor, aiming at a contract with the
lowest bidder; and a combination of contractors whereby the privi-
lege of bidding is secured by one, without competition, is against
public policy and illegal; and if it results in a letting at unreason-
able prices, it authorizes a rejection of the proposal or a repudiation
of the contract.2
§ 471 (393). Contracts of Suretyship. — A municipal corpora-
tion cannot, without legislative authority, become surety for another
corporation or an individual; cannot guarantee the bonds or obliga-
tions of another, or make accommodation indorsements.
authority cannot be implied or deduced from the general and usual
powers conferred upon such corporations. Although such a corpo-
i Smith v. Mayor, &c. of New York, ing of extensive water-works, considered.
10 N. Y. (6 Seld.) 504 (1853), affirming A provision in the act authorizing the
8. C. 4 Sandf. S. C. R. 221. “The notice work, for the preliminary adoption of a
inviting proposals to do the work,” says "plan" therefor by the city, does not
Willard, J., delivering the opinion of the prevent subsequent changes in the details
Court of Appeals (10 N. Y. 504), “did of the work. And where, after alterations
pot, in my judgment, bind the street com- had been made and extra work directed
missioner of the corporation to accept, during the progress of the undertaking,
at all events, the lowest bid, even though the contractors were stopped by the city
in all respects formal. Until the bid is before completing it, - Held, that they
accepted by some act on the part of the could recover for work done up to the
corporation, no obligatory contract was livnits of the appropriation authorized by
created." See, also, People v. Crotou the act, though the work was incomplete,
Aqueduct Board, 26 Barb. (N. Y.) 240; the legislature having recognized the
Greene v. Mayor, &c. of New York, 60 necessity of further outlay by an act
N. Y. 303 (1875); State v. Directors, &c., authorizing an additional appropriation.
5 Ohio St. 234 (1855); Altemus v. Mayor, Where a public work is, under a statute,
&c., 6 Duer (N. Y.), 446 ; Argenti v. San to be contracted for by city officers ac-
Francisco, 16 Cal. 255 ; Wiggins v. Phila- cording to a plan to be adopted by the
delphia, 2 Brews. (Pa.) 444; Ib. 443; city, with a proviso that the whole ex-
Keogh v. Wilmington, 4 Del. Ch. 491. pense shall not exceed a certain sum, to
A board of commissioners charged with be raised by issuing city bonds, a contract
the duty of contracting for a public work for doing the work for a sum within that
need not call for bids or proposals unless amount is valid, although it reserves
expressly required. But if they choose authority to the officers directing the work
to invite competition, they may, after to make such changes of detail as may be
accepting a bid, alter the specifications necessary, and fix the price of whatever
furnished by the bidder before executing extra work may be required. Tb.
the contract; and this without the knowl. Further as to lowest bidder, see chapter
edge of competing bidders. Kingsley v. on Mandamus, post, sec. 832, note; sec.
Brooklyn, 5 Abb. (N. Y.) N. Cas. 1. 1027, note.
The duties and liabilities of a city and 2 People v. Stephens, 71 N. Y. 527.
its officers under a contract for the build-
548
§ 472
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS,
ration may have power directly to accomplish a certain object, and
itself expend its revenues or money therefor, yet this does not give
or include the power to lend its credit to another who may be em-
powered to effect the same object. Expending money by a city
council, as agents or administrators of their constituents, is a very
different thing from binding their constituents by a contract of
suretyship, -- "a contract which carries with it a lesion by its very
nature.” Thus, the indorsement of the bonds of a street railroad
company in a city, by the city authorities, is not within the ordinary
administrative powers of the corporation, and requires express legis-
lative grant."
§ 472 (394). Authorized Contracts; Rights and Liabilities. But
with respect to authorized contracts a municipal corporation has the
1 Louisiana State Bank v. Orleans enable them to execute private enter-
Navigation Co., 3 La. An. 294 (1848). In prises. Clark v. Des Moines, 19 Iowa,
this case the municipal corporation was 199, 224 (1865); 1 Parsons N. & B. 166 ;
sought to be made liable upon its guar. Smead v. Indianapolis, P. & C. R. Co., 11
anty of bonds issued by the Navigation Ind. 104.
Company, which the mayor, in the name The power to borrow money for any pub-
of the municipality, was authorized, by lic purpose does not authorize the loan of
certain resolutions of the council, to in- the credit of the city. Chamberlain v.
dorse. It was held that the council trans. Burlington, 19 Iowa, 395 ; contra, Rogers
cended its powers, and the guaranty did V. Burlington, 3 Wall. 654, four judges
not impose any legal obligation upon the dissenting. In Dutton v. Aurora, 114 III.
municipality. The disability of such cor- 138, Schol field, J., said :
Having power
porations, without express power, to enter to borrow money, the power to issue bonds
into contracts of suretyship is shown in therefor results as a necessary incident."
the masterly and exhaustive opinion de- Ante, sec. 117. And see Meyer v. Mus.
livered by Eustes, C. J. See, also, Blake catine, 1 Wall. 384. The author can
v. Mayor, &c. of Macon, 53 Ga. 172 (1874). but think that power to a corporation to
In this case McCay, J., says : “The ob- borrow money should not be construed to
jects of a municipal corporation are, in give the power to loan its credit, but only
the main, the preservation of order, and to borrow money for legitimate and proper
the doing of such acts for the public good municipal objects, as shown by the charter
as cannot well be done by private enter- or constituent act of the corporation. See
prise. But here is a private enterprise; Payne v. Brecon, 3 Hurl. & Nor. 572;
and it is insisted that it is within the ante, sec. 117; Bateman v. Mid-Wales
scope of municipal power not to build a Railway Co., Law Rep. 1 C. P. C. 510.
street road, but to aid, by a donation of Power to guarantee payment of authorized
the credit of the city, a private corpora- contracts. Memphis 2. Brown, 20 Wall.
tion to build it, and to take the profits of 289 (1873). If city pays its unauthorized
it. We do not think this is within the guaranty it is subrogated to the rights
ordinary scope of municipal authority, and lien of the creditor.
and lien of the creditor. Supra, sec. 458,
nor can any authorities, as we believe, be note. Private corporations cannot without
found carrying the objects of a corporation legislative sanction guarantee obligations
that far. We are clear that the proposed which are beyond the scope of their char-
indorsement is witra vires.'
tered powers. Davis v. Old Colony R. R.
A municipal corporation has no implied Co., 131 Mass. 258. Morawetz on Corp.
power to lend its credit or make accommo- (2d ed.) 423.
dation paper for the benefit of citizens, to
$ 473
549
CONTRACTS : POWER TO CONTRACT ILLUSTRATED.
same rights and remedies, and is bound thereby and may be sued
thereon in the same inanner as individuals.1 Thus, if such a cor-
poration, duly empowered, enters into a partnership relation with
private individuals with respect to the profits to be derived from a
market-house, its rights, especially as regards the copartners and the
financial administration of the partnership property, are not different
from those of an ordinary partner.2
§ 473. Power to Contract illustrated. - A city incorporated
under the general law of Indiana has power, with respect to the light-
ing of its streets and public buildings, &c., to contract with a gas
company on that subject, and may exercise such power within the
limits of its franchise according to its own discretion. Such a con-
tract, when made, must be regarded as made by such city in the
exercise of its power to contract and not in its power to legislate,
although the power to make the contract be authorized by an ordi-
nance. And when, by the terms of such contract, the city is not
restricted from the legitimate exercise of its public power touching
the subject-matter thereof, but expressly reserves its administrative
authority to keep the posts, lamps, and burners in good repair if
the company should fail to do so, and also reserves the right to test
the quality of the gas furnished by said company, and the capacity
of the burners at all times, and is not restricted from extending its
streets, establishing an additional number of lamps, obtaining gas
from other sources, or establishing its own gas-works as the public
interests may require, such contract, not being a restriction upon its
legislative power nor fraudulent nor against public policy, is valid
1 Corporations may make contracts 2 New Orleans v. Guillotte, 12 La. An.
within the powers expressly granted by, 818 (1857). In New Orleans v. St. Louis
the acts of their creation and the im. Church, 11 La. An. 244 (1856), it was
plied powers incidental and necessary to contended by the counsel for the city that
the execution of such expressed powers even if certain resolutions, in favor of the
and the performance of the duties enjoined defendants, allowing them to establish a
upon them. For these purposes it will be cemetery within the city, amounted to a
bound to perform them the same as indi contract, and though their repeal he not
viduals. Hight v. Monroe Co., 68 Ind. justified by the facts, and be a violation of
576 ; Seibrecht v. New Orleans, 12 La. the contract by the city, yet that the lat-
An. 496; Strauss v. Ins. Co., 5 Ohio St. ter has the power to violate its contracts,
59 ; Donglass v. Virginia City, 5 Nev. and the defendants have no redress ex-
147 ; Hayward v. Davidson, 41 Ind. 212; cept in an action for damages. But this
McCabe v. Fountain Co., 46 Ind. 380; doctrine was rejected by the court, which
Burnett v. Abbott, 51 Ind. 254 ; Gordon declared it to be as unsound as it is
v. Dearborn Co., 52 Ind. 322 ; Jackson novel," since a liability for damages is
Co. v. Applewhite, 62 Ind. 464 ; Jennings "the very opposite of a recognition of a
Co. v. Verbarg, 63 Ind. 107; Indianapolis right to violate the contract.” Per Bum
v. Indianapolis Gas Co., 66 Ind. 396, cit- chanan, J.
ing and approving text.
550
§ 476
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
and binding upon such city, and may be enforced in the same mau-
ner as the contract of a person or business corporation, and cannot
be repealed, impaired, or changed by the city, by ordinance or
otherwise. 1
§ 474 (395). Same subject. — So where a municipal corpora-
tion, acting within the scope of its powers, in order to secure the
erection of gas-works, passed an ordinance whereby the gas-works
and their income were placed in the hands of trustees for the benefit
of those who loaned money to execute the undertaking, such ordi-
nance is a contract, and cannot be violated by the city, although it
may deem it for the interest of its citizens to do so; nor is it in the
power of the legislature to authorize its violation.2
§ 475 (396). Same subject. — So where the mayor and council
have, by the charter, power to make, in their corporate capacity,
all such contracts as they may deem necessary for the welfare of
the corporation, they may contract to sell stock owned by the city in
a private corporation, to enable the city to pay its debts; and the
discretionary power with which the mayor and council are in-
vested cannot, when bona fide exercised, be controlled by a court
of equity, at the instance of property owners and taxpayers.3
§ 476 (397). Same subject. - Power to a city corporation to
pave streets at the expense of the owners and recover the amount
from them if they fail themselves to pay when required by ordi-
nance, gives the corporation the power to purchase paving materials
and incur a debt for that purpose ; and in a suit by the vendor of
such materials against the corporation, it is no defence that the
council had not passed an ordinance before they purchased the
materials, requiring the owners to pave: this is a matter to which
a creditor is not bound to look. The question would be different
if the city had sought to make the lot-owner liable for the cost of
paving; in such case, it must show a strict compliance with the
requirements of its charter.4
1 Indianapolis v. Indianapolis Gas Co., (1856); followed and text approved, Shan-
66 Ind. 396 ; Valparaiso v. Gardner, 97 non v. O'Boyle, 51 Ind. 565 (1876); Ath-
Ind. 1.
ens v. Carnak, 75 Ga. 429; Adams v.
2 Western Savings Fund Society v. Rome, 59 Ga. 771 ; ante, sec. 94; post,
Philadelphia, 31 Pa. St. 175 (1858); Same chapter on Corporate Property, sec. 575;
v. Same, 31 Pa. St. 185 (1858); Indian- post, chap. xx.; Bush v. Carbondale, 78 111.
apolis v. Indianapolis Gas Co., 66 Ind. 74 (1875).
396, citing and approving text; ante, 4 Bigelow v. Perth Amboy, 1 Dutch.
chap. iv. sec. 69.
(N. J.) 297 (1855); post, chap. xix.
8 Semimes v. Columbus, 19 Ga. 471
§ 477
551
CONTRACTS : SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTED CLAIMS, ETC.
§ 477 (398). Settlement of Disputed Claims, &c. — Growing
out of its authority to create debts and to incur liabilities, a
municipal corporation has power to settle disputed claims against
it, and an agreement to pay these is not void for want of consid-
eration. If it has obtained a contract which, by mistake or a
change of circumstances, it deems to operate oppressively upon
the other party, an agreement to make an additional compensation,
or to modify or annul it, is not invalid for want of consideration.2
1
Augusta v. Leadbetter, 16 Me. 45 Pick. (Mass.) 18 (1828), valuable opinion
(1839); Bean v. Jay, 23 Me. 117, 121 of Parker, C. J.; see People v. Stout, 23
(1843); People v. Supervisors, 27 Cal. 655; Barb. (N. Y.) 349 ; ante, chap. iv. sec. 75.
People v. Coon, 25 Cal. 648. A municipal The power to sue and be sued gives to a
corporation has power to settle disputed corporation the right to settle or compro-
claims. In this case the acceptance by a mise claims. Where a city has a judg-
city council of $100 in payment of a judg- ment, from which an appeal is about to be
ment for $200 obtained before a justice of taken, the council may, if done in good
the peace, from which the defendant was faith, cancel the judgment on the payment
about to appeal, was held a proper exercise of costs; and such an agreement, when
of corporate power. Agnew v. Brall, 124 executed, is binding upon the corporation.
Ill. 312 (1888). A town board of super. Petersburg v. Mappin, 14 Ill. 193 (1852);
visors held to have no power, unless ex- Orleans Co. Sup. v. Bowen, 4 Lansing
pressly conferred, to discharge a judgment (N. Y.), 24. The cases above cited in this
in favor of the town except upon full pay- note are reviewed by Richardson, C. J., in
ment thereof, nor to allow credits upon it of Barnes v. District of Columbia, 22 Court
sums not allowed by the court. Butternut of Claims Rep. 366 (1887), and the con-
v. O'Malley, 50 Wis. 329. It may annex clusion reached that the doctrine of the
conditions to a proposal of settlement, and text did not apply to the case before the
is not liable unless the conditions are met. court, under the legislation of Congress as
Merrill v. Dixfield, 30 Me. 157 (1849). A to the power of the Board of Public
municipality may, without special grant, Works of the District of Columbia to
issue new bonds in the place of old bonds make contracts, under which it is held that
which had been issued according to law. such legislation provides how contracts
Rogan v. Watertown, 30 Wis. 259 (1879). by the Board for public improvements
Bonds issued to raise money to pay bonds shall be made, and that if there is mate-
of an older issue will be declared valid in rial departure from the requirements of
equity, though the statute authorizing the statute the contract is not binding.
them required the recall and cancellation South Boston Iron Co. v. U. S., 118
of the old bonds before their issue. State U. S. 37, affirming 18 Court of Claims,
v. Columbia, 12 S. C. 370. Where new 165 ; Brown v. District of Columbia, 127
bonds were issued to replace old ones, a U. S. 579 (1887). In Louisiana the pres-
recital by the mayor and council in a pro- ident of a police jury lias no power to in-
clamation submitting the question of issu- stitute a suit in its behalf without special
ing them to a vote, that they were assured authority conferred by ordinance or resolu-
the old bonds wonld be surrendered, was ion, and parol testimony is not admissible
held not to be a condition for issuing the to prove either. Police Jury of Ouachita
new bonds; if otherwise lawful they were v. Monroe, 38 La. An. 630. The legisla-
valid obligations. Sullivan v. Walton, ture may authorize municipal corporations
20 Fla. 552; infra, sec. 504, note.
to sue, without payment of costs or com-
2 Bean v. Jay, 23 Me. 117, 121; Meech plying with other requirements imposed
v. Buffalo, 29 N. Y. 198 (1864). Further, upon natural persons or private corpora-
as to consideration, Baileyville v. Lowell, tions. In this case an appeal by a city
20 Me. 178 (1841); Nelson v. Milford, 7 without having given a supersedeas bond
552
§ 478
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
A town may make a contract with a creditor whereby the latter
agrees to discount or throw off a portion of his debt, and such an
agreement, if founded on a sufficient consideration, will be en-
forced.1
$ 478. Power to arbitrate Claims. -- As a general proposition,
municipal corporations have, unless specially restricted, the same
powers to liquidate claims and indebtedness that natural persons
have, and from that source proceeds power to adjust all disputed
claims, and when the amount is ascertained to pay the same as
other indebtedness. It would seem to follow therefrom that a
niunicipal corporation, unless disabled by positive law, could sub-
mit to arbitration all unsettled claims with the same liability to
perform the award as would rest upon a natural person, provided,
of course, that such power be exercised by ordinance or resolution
of the corporate authorities. It is no objection to the validity
of such ordinance that it was passed at a meeting of the city council
at which all members were not notified to be present, provided
that the ordinance be approved at a subsequent regular meeting.
Nor is the ordinance an act ultra vires the corporation, although
the work for which damages are claimed was done outside of the
city limits, provided it is a part of a work which the corporation
has power to perforın.8 In some cases it is held that a city has
no power to submit to arbitration claims for damages arising under
the power of eminent domain.4
was sustained. Holmes v. Mattoon, 111 and set them off against his debt is not
Ill. 37.
unconstitutional for divesting creditors of
1 Baileyville v. Lowell, 20 Me. 178 their vested rights, or as impairing the
(1841). In this case, the town, against obligations of contracts. Any v. Shelby
which the creditor had an execution, had County Taxing District, 114 U. S. 387.
the option, and was authorized, to raise 2 Text approved, Springfield v. Walker,
the money by loan or by assessment; and 42 Ohio St. 543, holding also that muni-
if in the latter mode, either at onco or by cipal corporations are “persons" within
instalments. If not raised and paid, the the meaning of the statute of Ohio - R. S.
creditor was authorized to cause the prop- sec. 4947 — concerning arbitrations.
erty of the inhabitants to be distrained 8 City of Shawneetown v. Baker, 85
upon his writ. It was held under these Ill. 563; Dix v. Dummerston, 19 Vt.
circumstances, that an agreement by the 263 ; Griswold v. Stonington, 5 Conn.
creditor, which was accepted and compliel 367; Alexandria Canal Co. v. Swanı, 5
with by the town, that if the town would How. (U.S.) 83. Power exists unless the
at once assess the amount required, and corporation be disabled. Eldon Tp., In re,
collect the same, he would abate a portion 6 Upper Can. Law Jour. 207 ; Brant
of his debt, was founded upon a sufficient County, In re, 19 Upper Can. Q. B. 450 ;
.consideration, and was binding upon him. District Township of Walnut v. Rankin,
A statute which allows a deblor of a muni- 70 lowa, 65.
cipal corporation to procure its obligations 4 Post, chap. xvi.
$ 479
553
CONTRACTS WITH ATTORNEYS.
§ 479 (399). Contracts with Attorneys. - Resulting also from
the power to make contracts, to own property, and to incur
liabilities, is the authority in a municipal corporation, in the
absence of express or implied restriction, to employ an attorney
1
1 Smith v. Sacramento, 13 Cul. 531; funds in payment of such services. Daniel
State v. Paterson, 40 N. J. L. 186. May V. Memphis, 11 Humph. (Tenn.) 582
employ, unless specially restricted, an (1851); ante, sec. 147 ; post, sec. 910,
attorney in addition to the city attorney. note. A municipal corporation has no
Ib. The employment of outside counsel power to enıploy counsel to defend a suit
must, of course, be duly authorized by the exclusively directed against its officers,
municipality. Memphis v. Brown, 20 though its object be to enjoin them from
Wall. 289, 321 (1873); Memphis v. Adams, performing their official functions and to
9 Heisk. (Tenn.) 518 (1872) ; s. C. 24 Am. appoint a receiver of its corporate prop-
Rep. 331; Clark v. Lyon Co., 8 Nev. 181, erty. Sinith v. Nashville, 4 Lea (Tenn.),
(1872); Ellis v. Washoe Co., 7 Nev. 291; 69; ante, sec. 147. When suit is brought
Butternut v. O'Malley, 50 Wis. 333 (to in the name of a municipal corporation
make substitution); Roper 2. Laurinburg, without authority it may be dismissed, on
90 N. C. 427 (counsel employed to defend notion of the defendant, or by the court of
police officers in actions for false imprison- its own motion when its attention is called
ment); Waterbury v. Laredo, 60 Tex. 519, to the fact. Kankakee v. Kankakee &
where a power to establish ferries was Ind. R. R. Co., 115 Ill. 88.
held to imply a power to enploy counsel Unless there is some special restriction
to represent the city in a matter involving the corporation may incur liability to com-
their establishnient, and to secure his fees. pensate an attorney employed by it to con.
Ante, sec. 147; see Hornblower v. Duden, duct or defend suits which relate to the
35 Cal. 664 ; compare Clough v. Hart, 8 due performance of the duties or trusts
Kan. 487. This case holds that there is with which, in its corporate capacity, it
prima facie, if not absolutely, an implied is charged by law. Attorney-General v.
restriction upon city and county corpora- Mayor, &c. of Norwich, 2 Myl. & Cr. 406;
tions to employ other attorneys to perform Lewis v. Mayor, &c. of Rochester, 9 Com.
the precise duties, as prescribed hy law, of B. (N. s.) 401 (1860); ante, sec. 147. A
the city and county attorneys elected by city owning stock in a railroad company in
the people or provided for by incorporating another State may, in virtue of such own-
statutes. Compare Thacher v. Jefferson ership, unless specially restricted, employ
Co., 13 Kan. 182, and cases cited; Hugg counsel to attend to its interests in such
v. Camden (right to employ counsel in ad- State. Memphis v. Aclams, supra. The
dition to the city solicitor), 29 N. J. Eq. Supreme Court of Wisconsin hold that no
(2 Stewart) 6 (1878). . Where a charter action will lie against a city having "the
gave power to a municipal corporation to general powers of municipal corporations
employ an attorney when necessary, and a at common law," to recover compensation
subsequent, statute provided for a law de- for services of counsel to aid in criminal
partment, and a chief officer to be called prosecutions against persons who had lately
Attorney and Counsel, with a salary, the been officers of the city, for offences com-
department to have charge of and conduct mitted under color of their official duties,
all the law business of the corporation, it resulting in pecuniary injury to the city.
was held that the subsequent statute was Butler v. Milwaukee, 15 Wis. 493. In
an implied repeal of the power to enploy Indiana a county board has no power to
an attorney under the charter. Lyddy v. employ counsel to conduct criminal prose-
Long Island City, 104 N. Y. 218 (1887). cutions, and cannot be compelled to pay
A municipal corporation which has em- for services renderer. Hight v. Monroe
ployed an attorney to file a bill seeking to Co., 68 Ind. 575 ; Ripley Co. v. Ward, 69
destroy by suit the existence of the cor- Ind. 441 ; Grant Co. v. Bradford, 72 Ind.
poration itself, cannot apply the corporate 455. In Iowa, the board of supervisors
554
§ 479
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
to conduct or defend suits in which the corporation is interested
in its corporate capacity; and the corporation is bound to pay for
services rendered by him on due employment, without an express
vote to that effect.1 If a corporation attorney, after his term of
office has expired, continues in the management of suits in which
the corporation is interested, without objection from, and with the
knowledge of, the corporation and of his successor, he may, it has
been held, recover for such services. An attorney was employed
upon a quantum meruit by the city to conduct a case to a final
termination, and pending the litigation was appointed city coun-
sellor, when it became his official duty to act for the city; and
it was held that, in the absence of an express contract, he could
not recover for the value of such services as were rendered after
his appointment. It might be otherwise if the original employ.
ment had been to carry the suit through for an agreed sum.3
may employ special agent or attorney to 666 ; Parker v. Williamsburg, 13 How.
assist in the collection of taxes not collecti- Pr. (N. Y.) 250 ; Clough v. Hart, supra,
ble by county treasurer in the discharge of and cases cited by Valentine, J. Proof of
his duty. Withelm v. Cedar Co., 50 lowa, employment. Butler v. Charlestown, 7
524. Compare ante, sec. 139, and cases Gray (Mass.), 14; Memphis v. Brown, 20
there cited, as to power to offer rewards Wall. 289, 321; Memphis v. Adams, 9
for offenders. Buttrick v. Lowell, 1 Allen Heisk. (Tenn.) 518; s. C. 24 Am. Rep.
(Mass.), 172. Cannot recover for defend. 331 ; Cass Co. v. Ross, 46 Ind. 404 (1874);
ing pauper criminals in Alabama. Posey McCabe v. Fountain Co., 46 Ind. 380.
v. Mobile Co., 50 Ala. 6 (1873). A duly 8 Detroit v. Whittemore, 27 Mich. 281
qualified city attorney, having charge of (1873). Construction of power to employ
the interests of a city in its legal contro- private counsel. Ib. In employing coun-
versies, has power to pray an appeal from sel the board of county commissioners
a judgment against it, and to take the
acts as a corporation, and like other cor-
necessary steps to perfect the same. Con- porations, may, unless the statute other-
nett v. Chicago, 114 Ill. 233.
wise requires, employ agents and attorneys
1 Langdon v. Castleton, 30 Vt. 285 without making such employment a mat-
(1858); ante, sec. 147.
ter of record, but this must be done by the
2 Ib. ; see Harrington v. School Dis- concurrent act of a majority of the board at
trict, 30 Vt. 155 ; supra, sec. 459, as to im- a legal session. Such attorney may recover
plied contracts. Compare Clough v. Hart, compensation for his services. McCabe
8 Kan. 487. Compensation of city attorney. v. Fountain Co. Comm'rs, 46 Ind. 380
See Carroll v. St. Louis, 12 Mo. 444; Orton (1874). The city council under the laws of
v. State, 12 Wis. 509; also, chapter on Iowa, while acting as a board of equaliza-
Corporate Officers, ante. Liability for tion, is discharging a corporate function and
attorney's fee under charter or special acting as a representative of the city, and
statutes, see Brady v. Supervisors, 2 if its action is appealed from, the city so-
Sandf. S. C. R. 460, affirmed 10 N. Y. licitor is justified in defending it in the
(6 Seld.) 260 (1851), for reasons given by appellate court; for which service he is
Oakley, C. J., in 2 Sandf. 460 ; Halstead v. entitled to reasonable compensation, even
Mayor, &c. of New York, 3 Comst. (3 N. though the service or the compensation
Y.) 430 ; Memphis v. Brown, 20 Wall. be not provided for by city ordinance.
289 (1873); State v. New Orleans, 20 La. Kinnie v. Waverly, 42 Iowa, 437 (1876).
An. 172 ; Bright v. Hewes, 19 La. An. Extra compensation. Ante, sec. 233.
$ 480
555
CONTRACTS FOR LOCAL IMPROVEMENTS,
§ 480 (400). Contracts for Local Improvements. — A municipal
corporation contracted with a paver to do certain work at a fixed
price, of which it was to pay one third, and the owners of the
abutting property two thirds. It was judicially determined that
the proprietors were, in law, liable to pay only one third; and it
was held, in an action by the paver against the corporation, that
it was a warrantur for the remaining one third ; and it was held
liable accordingly. But where the charter or constituent act in
reference to improving streets provides that the city shall be liable
to the contractor for so much only of the improvement as is occupied
by streets and alleys crossing the same, and that the owners of
adjacent lots shall be liable for the rest, the city is not liable for
the deficiency in case the adjacent property does not sell for
enough to pay the assessment, and though the owner be a non-
resident2
1 Tounier v. Municipality, 5 La. An. against the owners of the property. See
298. So where a city by ordinance di- Michel v. Police Jury, 9 La. An. 67 ; New-
rected that a sewer be constructed, recit- comb v. Same, 4 Rob. La. 233 ; Michel
ing that the action was taken upon peti- v. Same, 3 La. An. 123; Leavenworth v.
tion of a majority of property owners, and Mills, 6 Kan. 288 (1870); distinguished,
the work was discontinued because it ap- Casey v. Leavenworth, 17 Kan. 189. Com-
peared that a majority had not petitioned, pare Reock v. Newark, 33 N. J. L. 129.
the city was held to be liable to pay for Further, as to local improvements, see chap.
the services of an inspector employed by xix. ; post, sec. 810; supra, secs. 459, 467.
it for the work, on the ground that there In Memphis v. Brown, 20 Wall. 289
was an implied guaranty that the petition (1873), it was held that under its charter
was sufficient. Bill v. Denver, 29 Fed. the city had full power to make paving
Rep. 344. See also Cronan v. Municipality, contracts, and to pay either in cash or in
5 La. An. 537, where by the construction bonds, or both, and to guarantee payment
of the contract, the city was held liable for of the assessment bills against abutters.
the whole expense, the proprietors having See also, Saxton v. St. Joseph, 60 Mo.
refused to make payment. A contractor 153 (1875). Towers for electric lights
failing, for want of power in a city, to be held not "local improvements," where the
able to get his pay from special assess- lighting system is not owned by the city.
ments, the city was held liable to hiin, it Putnam v. Grand Rapids, 58 Mich. 416.
being regarded as guaranteeing that it 2 New Albany v. Sweeney (construing
possessed the specific powers relied on General Towns and Cities Act), 13 Ind.
by the contractor for his compensation. 245 (1859); Lucas v. San Francisco, 7
Maher v. Chicago, 38 Ill. 266 (1865); Cal. 463; Lovell v. St. Paul, 10 Minn.
Scofield v. Council Bluffs, 68 Iowa, 695 ;
Contracts with municipal corpora-
Bucroft v. Council Bluffs, 63 Iowa, 646. tions are construed with reference to the
But see Chicago v. People, 48 Ill. 416, chartered or corporate powers of the city.
where the first case is explained and dis-
13 Ind. 245, supra.
tinguished. See also Reilly v. Philadel- If the municipal corporation agrees with
phia, 60 Pa. St. 467 ; Sleeper v. Bullen, 6 the contractor to collect the assessments
Kan. 300 (1870); Chicago v. People, 56 from the abutting owners, a failure to
Ill. 327 ; Lowden v. Cincinnati, 2 Disney do so will render it liable. Morgan v.
(Ohio), 203. Right of contractor to sue the Dubuque, 28 Iowa, 575 (1870). See, how-
corporation where, in consequence of its ever, Beard v. Brooklyn, 31 Barb. (N. Y.)
neglect, it would be nugatory to proceed 142; Saxton v. St. Joseph, 60 Mo. 153
290.
556
$ 481
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
§ 481 (401). Contracts for Local or Public Improvements.
A city charter required the consent of a majority of property-owners
to make certain improvements, which, when made, were chargeable
upon the adjacent property. An ordinance provided that con-
tractors doing such work should look to the adjacent property,
and not to the city, for their pay. Under these circumstances,
the city entered into a contract with the plaintiff to grade a certain
street, the plaintiff agreeing that he should receive his pay from the
adjoining property. The plaintiff performed the work ; and, inas-
much as the adjacent owners had never given their consent to the
making of the improvement, he sued the city on the contract, to
recover for the work done; and it was held that the action could
not be maintained.1
(1873); Saxton v. Beach, 50 Mo. 488 the published notice,
the published notice, “the expense of the
(1872). A creditor of a municipality is work to be assessed," &c., was part of the
not obliged to wait, before he sues, until contract, no other provision for payment
the money can be collected from the land. having been made, and that the plaintiff
owners benefited, and on whom the could not maintain an action against the
charter imposes the expense of the im- city until after the assessment and collec-
provement whence his claim accrued. tion of his compensation, or until it or its
Little v. Union Township Committee, 40 officers failed to proceed with reasonable
N. J. L. 397.
diligence, after the expense of the work
1 Leavenworth v. Rankin, 2 Kan. 357 was ascertained, to make and collect an
(1864); Swift v. Williamsburg, 24 Barb. assessment, and to pay over money thus
(N. Y.) 427; Goodrich v. Detroit, 12 collected. Hunt v. Utica, 18 N. Y. 442
Mich. 279; Johnson v. Common Council, (1858).
16 Ind. 227; New Albany v. Sweeney, Extent of recovery by contractor against
13 Ind. 245 ; Moylan v. New Orleans, 32 abutter where the work is done in a man.
La. An. 673.
ner inferior to that stipulated for in the
Where the contractor has agreed to look contract. Creamer v. Bates, 49 Mo. 523.
for payment to the lot benefited, or to the (1872).
owner, he cannot hold the city, unless it Further as to the rights and remedies of
may be in cases where the whole proceed the contractor, of the property-owner, and
ing is void, or the city neglects its duty. the liabilities of the municipal corpora.
Kearney v. Covington, 1 Met. (Ky.) 339. tion. Memphis v. Brown, 20 Wall. 289
The subject is very fully discussed and the (1874); Smith v. Milwaukee, 18 Wis. 63 ;
previous cases in the State commented on Foote v. Same, 16. 270 ; Bond v. Newark,
in Craycraft v. Selvage, 10 Bush (Ky.), 19 N.J. Eq. 376 ; Fletcher v. Oshkosh, 18
696 (1874); Casey 2. Leavenworth, 17 Wis. 228, 232 ; Palmer v. Stump, 29 Ind.
Kan. 189 (1876); Memphis v. Brown (an 329 ; McSpedon v. New York, 7 Bosw.
important case), 20 Wall. 289 (1873); (N. Y.) 601 ; Reilly v. Philadelphia, 60
Smith v. Milwaukee, 18 Wis. 63 (1864); Pa. St. 467 ; Whalen v. La Crosse, 16
Finney v. Oshkosh, Ib. 220; Chicago v. Wis. 271 ; Flournoy v. Jefferson ville, 17
People, 48 Ill. 416 ; Ruppert v. Baltimore, Ind. 169; Creighton v. Toledo, 18 Ohio
23 Md. 184; Louisville v. Henderson, 5 St. 447 ; Goodrich v. Detroit, 12 Mich.
Bush (Ky.), 515 (1869).
279; Buffalo v. Holloway, 7 N. Y. (3
A city advertised for proposals to do Seld.) 493 ; Storrs v. Utica, 17 N. Y. 104;
certain public work, and the plaintiff made Leavenworth v. Mills, 6 Kan. 288 (1870);
proposals, which were accepted, without followed, Leavenworth v. Stille, 13 Kan.
qualification, by an entry on city records ; 539 (1374), and distinguished Casey v.
and it was decided that the statement in Leavenworth, 17 Kan. 189 (1876); Sleeper
§ 482
557
CONTRACTS FOR LOCAL OR PUBLIC IMPROVEMENTS.
§ 482 (402). Same subject. - It has been several times decided
that where the expense of making a local improvement is not to be
raised by a general tax, but solely upon the property benefited, a
failure of the corporation, though it is only the agent of the owners
to be assessed, to discharge its duty, by making the necessary assess-
ment, or its unreasonable delay in collecting and paying over the
money, gives the contractor a right to recover his compensation in
an action against the corporation. The cases on the point are con-
flicting. The right to a general judgment should, in our opinion,
v. Bullen, 6 Kan. 300 ; Lansing v. Van phy v. Louisville, 9 Bush (Ky.), 189
Gorder, 24 Mich. 456 (1872); post, chapter (1872). Quantum meruit will not lie
on Taxation and Local Improvenients ; against a city for materials furnished for
supra, sec. 460; infra, sec. 810; Hen- a public work under a contract which is
drick 2. West Springfield, 107 Mass. 541; void as not in conformity with statutes
Mayer v. Mayor, &c. of New York, 63 requiring such coutracts to be made in a
N. Y. 455 (1875); Tone v. Mayor, &c. of particular manner. Bigler v. New York,
New York, 70 N. Y. 157 (1877). Assign- 5 Abb. (N. Y.) N. Cas. 51.
When city
ment of contract. McCubbin v. Atchison, not liable on contracts of police and
12 Kan. 166; McGlue v. Philadelphia, 10 school boards, see Swift v. New York, 17
Phila. (Pa.) 348 ; Perkinson v. St. Louis, Hun (N. Y.), 518; Utica v. Miller, 62
4 Mo. App. 322. Where a contractor re- Ind. 230; Jarvis v, Shelby, 62 Ind. 257 ;
ceives assessment bills in payment, with Crane v. Urbana, 2 Ill. App. 559.
the right to use the name of the city in As to implied municipai liability, see
filing liens against the abutting owners, the important opinion of the United States
such owners may defend by questioning Supreme Court in Louisiana (City of) v.
the character of the work though they are Wood, 102 U. S. 294 ; compare Litchfield
not nominal parties to the contract. Erie V. Ballou, 114 U. S. 190. Supra, secs.
City v. Butler, 120 Pa. St. 374 (1888). 460, 461, and notes.
An ordinance of the city of Louisville 1 Beard v. Brooklyn, 31 Barb. (N. Y.)
ordained “that no contract should be 142 (1860). See Goodrich v. Detroit, 12
binding on the city until it is approved Mich. 279 (1864); Cumming' v. Mayor, &c.
by both boards of the general council, and of Brooklyn, 11 Paige (N. Y.) Ch. 596
this shall be necessary to make a contract (1845); Baker 2. Utica, 19 N. Y. (5 Smith)
complete and binding upon the city." A 326 (1859); Green v. Mayor, &c. of New
contract was made for a certain street im- York, 5 Abb. Pr. (N. Y.) 503. See, gen-
provement, which was signed by the erally, as to assessinents for public works,
mayor, but was never approved by both Doughty v. Hope, 3 Denio (N. Y.) 249 ;
boards, but by one of them only. If the Manice v New York, 8 N. Y. 120 ;
contract had been executed as required People v. New York, 5 Barb. (N. Y.)
by the ordinance, the contractor would " 43; 8 Barb. 95; 23 Barb. 390. Where
have been entitled to recover against the the contractor agreed with the city to take
adjacent property-holders the agreed price. his pay out of assessments when collected,
It was conceded that he could not recover but the city and its officers failed to exer-
against them, because the contract had not cise its duty and power to levy and collect
been thus executed. He thereupon sought the assessments, it was held that the city
to make the city liable for the work done ; was liable to an action by the contractor
but the Court of Appeals, distinguishing for the damages for such neglect of duty,
the case from Kearney v. Covington, i 1. e., the contract price, he having per-
Met. (Ky.) 345, held that no contract formed the contract on his part. Reilly
binding on the city was ever made, and v. Albany, 112 N. Y. 30 (1889), approving
that he could not recover, there having Cumming v. Brooklyn, supra; Sage v.
been no ratification of the contract. Mur. Brooklyn, 89 N. Y. 189 (1882); McCor-
558
§ 483
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
be limited, in any event, to cases where the corporation can after-
wards reimburse itself by an assessment. For why should all be
taxed for the failure of the council to do its duty in a case where the
contractor has a plain remedy, by mandamus, to compel the council
to make the necessary assessment and proceed in the collection
thereof with the requisite diligence ? 1
§ 483 (403). Same subject. Corporate Control by Stipulation. -
An agreement by a contractor to execute a public improvement, under
the general direction and supervision of a committee of a city, makes
such committee - acting reasonably and honestly, not arbitrarily
and capriciously-exclusively the judge, not only as to materials
and manner, but also as to the time of doing the work. But where
cer,
mack v. Brooklyn, 108 N. Y. 49; Galves- approved, and it was held that the city
ton v. Heard, 54 Tex. 420. Where a city was concluded by the action of the offi-
fails to levy a tax, or refuses to issue tax Omaha v. Hammond, 94 U. S. 98
warrants in payment of a contract for grad. (1876). As to power of chancery to cor-
ing and improving streets, and otherwise rect mistake of the engineer or other person
neglects to provide means, the city is lia- whose decision both parties to the con-
ble, and the contractor may, in an action, tract have agreed to abide by, see Rail-
recover the amount due. Atchison v. road Co. v. Veeder, 17 Ohio, 385. Where
Byrnes, 22 Kan. 65 ; Craycraft v. Selvage, there is a condition precedent that con-
10 Bush (Ky.), 696 (1874). In princi- tractor shall have certificate of perforin-
ple sustaining the view suggested in the ance by corporation. See Bowery Na-
text : Reock v. Newark, 33 N. J. L. 129; tional Bank v. Mayor, &c. of New York,
post, chap. xxiii., note. And see opinion 63 N. Y. 336 (1875) ; Cameron, In re,
of Field, C. J., in Argenti v. San Fran. 50 N. Y. 502 (1872). Condition precedent
cisco, 16 Cal. 255, 282 (1860); post, chap. that payment was not to be made to con-
XX., on Mandamus. Where the city coun- tractor until confirmation of the assess-
cil can only legislate in conjunction with ment, and whose duty to have confirma-
the mayor as part of the law-making tion made, construed. Tone v. Mayor, &c.
power, if the council order local improve. 70 N. Y. 157 (1877). The contract be-
inents by a resolution without the signa- tween the contractor and the city provided
ture or concurrence of the mayor, and the that the contractor should be entitled to
work is done by a contractor under such payment when the work was accepted by
authority, he cannot recover of the abutter the Board of Public Works, and it was held
(Saxton v. Beach, 50 Mo. 488, 1872), nor that the contractor, who had, in fact,
from the city, it seems, where the charter completed his work, might recover of the
declares that the city shall in no manner abutter, although a majority of the board
be liable for local improvements. Saxton refused or neglected to examine or accept
v. St. Joseph, 60 Mo. 153 (1875).
the work. Neenan v. Donoghue, 50 Mo.
1 Text approved. Town of Tipton v. 493 (1872). It is held that the acceptance
Jones, 77 Ind. 307 ; see, however, Reilly by the city authorities of work done under
v. Albany, supra.
a contract for a street improvement is only
2 Chapman v. Lowell, 4 Cush. (Mass.) prima facie evidence that the work has
378 (1849), relating to drains in the streets been done in substantial compliance with
of the city. Certain wells were, by con-
the terms of the contract. Gulick v. Con- .
tract, to be constructed under the super- nely, 42 Ind. 134 (1873); but see Omaha
vision and to the satisfaction of a specific v. Hammond, supra.
city officer ; they were so constructed and
$ 485
559
CONTRACTS : TWO CLASSES OF MUNICIPAL SECURITIES.
a written contract has been entered into between a municipal cor-
poration and a contractor, a general provision of an ordinance that
the work shall be done under the directions of certain officers confers
no authority upon them essentially to change or modify the provis-
ions of the contract. If, in a contract for a public work, the corpo-
ration employer reserves the right to make alterations in the form,
dimensions, or materials of the work, the contractor is bound by any
such alterations made in good faith ; but such a clause does not au-
thorize the employer to annul the agreement, or to stop the work in
an unfinished state.
§ 484 (404). Evidences of Indebtedness; Negotiable Bonds. —
We have elsewhere discussed the power of the legislature to author-
ize the issue of municipal bonds in aid of railway and other like
enterprises, and have also considered the express and implied power
of municipal corporations to borrow money and issue obligations
therefor. It appropriately belongs to this place, however, to no-
tice more at length the different kinds of corporate evidences of debt,
and the rights and remedies of the holders thereof, and to this gen-
eral subject will the remainder of the present chapter be devoted.
§ 485. Two Great Classes of Municipal Securities : 1. Ordinary
Warrants; 2. Negotiable Bonds; Form, Execution, and Attributes of
each. — It is material to bear in mind the different kinds of corpo-
rate evidences of debt. These are of two general classes. FIRST,
there is the usual municipal or county warrant or order. These are
commonly drawn by one or more of the officers upon the treasurer,
directing him to pay to the person named, or bearer, a given sum of
1 Bonesteelv. Mayor, &c. of New Comst. (N. Y.) 338 (1850). Remedy of
York, 22 N. Y. 162 (1860); Bond v. New- contractor, and measure of damages in
ark, 4 C. E. Green (19 N. J. Eq.), 376; such a case, considered. 16. It is held,
compare Omaha v. Hammond, 94 U. S. in Vermont, that a person who has con-
98 (1876). But the authority of the cor- tracted with the proper town officers to
poration may be implied from its having build a road cannot proceed with his con-
by its own act rendered extra materials tract after notice of an appeal, and recover
necessary to conform the work to the of a town therefor. This decision is based
conditions of the contract. Messenger upon a construction of the statute of that
v. Buffalo, 21 N. Y. 196 (1860); see, also, State by which the appeal is intended to
Stuart v. Cambridge, 125 Mass. 102. Ef- stay or suspend all proceedings toward
fect of certificate of approval of a city offi- building the road, and the contractor was
cer where, by the contract, the work is to bound to take his contract subject to the
be done to his approval. Bond v. Newark, contingency of the appeal allowed by law.
4 C. E. Green (19 N. J. Eq.), 376.
Taft v. Pittsford, 28 Vt. 286 (1856).
As to reserved right to discontinue work 8 Ante, sec. 119 et seq., and see post, sec.
and annul contract. Bietry v. New Or. 511 et seq.
leans, 24 La. An. 21 (1872).
4 Ante, sec. 117 et seq.; supra, sec. 470,
2 Clark v. Mayor, &c. of New York, 4 note.
560
§ 486
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
.
money. The power to issue them, and the mode in which it is to
be exercised, are usually prescribed by charter or statute. They are
vouchers or "necessary instruments for carrying on the machinery
of municipal administration and for anticipating the collection of
taxes,” 1 out of which they must be paid. The power to issue such
warrants or orders may, where not expressly conferred or denied, be
implied as incidental to carrying out the objects of a municipal or
public corporation. SECOND, there is the municipal bond, negotiable
in form, payable at a future day, intended for sale in the market,
issued under express authority of the legislature.?
§ 486. Municipal Bonds. - Such bonds, negotiable in form, not-
withstanding they are under seal, are clothed with all the att ntes
of commercial paper, pass by delivery or indorsement, and are not
subject to equities (where the power to issue them exists) in the hands
of holders for value before due, without notice. Such bonds usually
have coupons attached, which partake of the nature of the bond, are
likewise negotiable, may be detached and held separately from the
bond, and the holder may sue thereon in his own name, without pro-
ducing or being interested in the bonds to which they were originally
attached. Such securities are made to raise money by their sale,
and this object would be defeated if they were subject to equities
(where the power to issue exists) in the hands of bona fide holders.
The propositions in this section of the text are so well settled as to
be no longer open to question.3
1 Per Bradley, J., in Nashville v. Ray, bonds), 16 Wall. 6 (1872); Gould v. Ster-
19 Wall. 468, 477 (1873).
ling, 23 N. Y. 464; s. C. 1 Am. Law Reg.
2 The legislature may confer upon (N. S.) 290, and note; Clark v. Des Moines,
municipal bonds all the characteristics of 19 lowa, 199, 213 (1865), and cases cited;
commercial paper, such as negotiability White v. Railroad Co., 21 How. 575 ;
and protection in the hands of innocent Bank v. Railroad Co., 3 Kem. (13 N. Y.)
holders for value. Alvord v. Syracuse Sav- 599 ; S. C. 4 Duer, 480 ; Bank v. Rome,
ings Bank, 98 N. Y. 599.
19 N. Y. 20 ; Aurora v. West, 22 Ind. 88;
8 Mercer County v. Hacket, 1 Wall. Comm’rs v. Bright, 18 Ind. 93; Barrett
83 (1863), denying Diamond v. Lawrence v. Schuyler County, 44 Mo. 197; DeVoss
County, 37 Pa. St. 353 ; Meyer v. Musca- v. Richmond, 18 Gratt. 338 ; s. c. 7 Am.
tine, 1 Wall. 384 ; Gelpecke v. Dubuque, Law Reg. (N. s.) 589 ; Lynchburg 2.
16. 175; Moran v. Miami County, 2 Black, Slaughter, 75 Va. 57 ; Durant v. Iowa
732 (1862) ; Clapp v. Cedar County, 5 County, Woolworth C. C. R. 69 ; State v.
Iowa, 15; Morris Canal Co. v. Fisher, 1 Madison, 7 Wis. 688; Clark v. Janes-
Stockt. Ch. (N. J.) 667 (1855); Craig v. ville, 10 Wis. 136 (1859); Maddox v.
Vicksburg, 31 Miss. 216 ; Jackson v. Graham, 2 Met. (Ky.) 56 (1859); Kerr v.
Railroad Co., 48 Me. 147 ; s. 0. 2 Am. Corry, 105 Pa. St. 282 ; Ackley School
Law Reg. (n. s.) 585; 8. C. Ib. 748, and District v. Hall, 113 U. S. 135; New
note of Judge Redfield; Chapin v. Rail. Providence v. Halsey, 117 U. S. 336 ;
road Co., 8. Gray (Mass.), 575 ; Lynde v. Oubre v. Donaldsonville, 33 La. An. 386 ;
Winnebago County (Iowa court-house Martin v. Police Jury, 32 La. An. 1022.
§ 487
561
CONTRACTS: CORPORATION ORDERS OR WARRANTS,
§ 487 (406). Ordinary Corporation Orders or Warrants. But
ordinary city, county, and town orders or warrants are in some re-
spects different from bonds of the character just mentioned, and, in
the author's judgment, the better opinion, as well as decided weight
of authority, is that there is no implied power in the officers of a
town, county, or city corporation to issue warrants or orders which
shall be free from equities in the hands of holders; that the exist-
ence of such a power is not necessary as an incident to powers
ordinarily granted, or to carry out the purposes of the corporation,
and would be attended with abuse and fraught with danger. Ordi-
nary warrants or orders, negotiable in form, may be made by the
proper officers; and in many of the States such instruments may be
Municipal bonds payable to bearer are them on their bonds payable at a fixed
negotiable by delivery. Gardner v. Haney, time. De Cordova v. Galveston, 4 Tex.
86 Ind. 17 ; Farr v. Lyons, 13 Fed. Rep. 470 (1849); see Underhill v. Sonora Trs.,
377. Post, sec. 513.
17 Cal. 172; Baker v. Johnson Co., 33
COUPONS Coupons attached to such Iowa, 151 ; post, sec. 668 et seq.
bonds are negotiable, and the holder may The statute of limitations commences to
sue thereon in his own name without being run on coupons detached from the bonds
interested in or producing the bonds to and negotiated separately, from the time
which they were originally attached. the coupons mature, and the operation of
Thomson v. Lee County, 3 Wall. 327 the statute, in such a case, is not deferred
(1865); Murray v. Lardner, 2 Wall. 110 until the maturity of the bonds to which
(1864); Knox County v. Aspinwall, 21 the coupons belonged. This point has
How. 539 (1858); Johnson v. Stark been expressly adjudged by the Supreine
County, 24 Ill. 75; Kenosha v. Lamson, 9 Court in Clark v. Iowa City, 20 Wall. 583
Wall. 478 (1869); Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. (1874), and the prior decisions, which had
v. Otoe County, 1 Dillon C. C. R. 338. been supposed to hold otherwise, explained
Form of coupons, dec., post, sec. 512, note. to mean only that when the bonds were
Judgment in suit on coupons or for in- specialties, the coupons, though detached,
terest, when a bar to subsequent suit. partook of the same nature, and therefore
Louisiana State Bank v. Orleans Nav. the same statute of limitations applied to
Co., 3 La. An. 294 ; Beloit v. Morgan, both the coupons and the bonds ; that is,
7 Wall. 619; Bissell v. Spring Valley if the bonds were specialties, so were the
Township, 124 U. S. 225 ; compare Crom. coupons, and the statute of limitations as
well v. Sac County, 96 U. S. 51.
to sealed instruments, and not the more
An action on a coupon is not barred in restricted statute applicable to simple con-
less time than the bond to which it was tracts, applied. Kenosha v. Lamson, 9
originally attached. Kenosha v. Lamson, Wall. 477 ; Lexington v. Butler, 14 Wall.
supra; Lexington v. Butler, 14 Wall. 282 282. The statute also begins to run on
(1871). Explained, Clark v. Iowa City, coupons from the tiine they respectively
20 Wall. 583 (1874). How declared on. mature, although they remain attached to
Ring v. County, 6 Iowa, 265 ; Railroad the bond which represents the principal
Co. v. Otoe County, supra; Wiley v. debt. Amy v. Dubuque, 98 U. S. 470 ;
Board, &c., 11 Minn. 371. The better Nash v. Eldorado Co., 24 Fed. Rep. 252.
practice, in the author's judgment, is to As to negotiability of coupons which are
set out in the declaration the bond to due detached from bonds not due. Thomp-
which the coupon in suit was attached, or son v. Perrine, 106 U, S. 589. Payment
to allege its legal effect and recitals. of bonds does not extinguish detached
Municipal corporations may plead the coupons not paid. Bank v. Hartford, &c.
statute of limitations in actions against R. R. Co., 8 R. I. 375.
VOL. I. - 36
562
§ 487
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
transferred by delivery or indorsement, and the holder sue thereon
in his own name; yet they are not commercial or negotiable paper
in the hands of holders, so as to exclude inquiry into the legality
of their issue, or to preclude defences thereto. Ordinary warrants
drawn by one officer on another officer of the same corporation are
not bills of exchange, as such bills involve the idea of two parties;
but are orders by the corporation on itself, — mere directions to the
treasurer to pay the amount to the bearer.2
1 Emery v. Mariaville, 56 Me. 315; interest" may sue in his own name. In
Shirk v. Pulaski Co., 4 Dillon, 209, 213 Vermont, as to right of holder of town
(1877), and cases cited; Clark v. Des and county orders to sue in his own name,
Moines, 19 Iowa, 199, 211-214 (1865), and see Dalrymple v. Whittingham, 26 Vt.
cases cited; Clark v. Polk County, Ib. 345 ; compare Taſt v. Pittsford, 28 Vt.
248 ; Mathes v. Cameron, 62 Mo. 504 286, 289; Hyde v. Franklin, 27 Vt. 185.
(1876); People v. County, 11 Cal. 170 Right of indorsee to sue or enforce by man-
(1858); Sturtevant v. Liberty, 46 Me. dainus in his own name. Kelly v. Mayor,
457 ; Smith v. Cheshire, 13 Gray (Mass.), &c., 4 Hill (N. Y.), 263; Clark v. School
318 (1859); Andover v. Grafton, 7 N. H.
N. H. District, 3 R. I. 199 ; Moss v, Oakley, 2
298 (1834); compare, however, Bank v. Hill (N. Y.), 265; Commissioners 1. Day,
Farmington, 41 N. H. 32 ; Dalrymple v. 19 Ind. 450; Dively v. Cedar Falls, 21
Whittingham, 26 Vt. 345 ; Inhabitants v. Iowa, 565 ; Justices v. Orr, 12 Ga. 137.
Weir, 9 Ind. 224 (1857); Connersville v. Statutory form of assignment must be ob-
Connersville Hydraulic Co., 86 Ind. 184; served. Int. Bank v. Franklin Co., 65 Mo.
School District v. Thompson, 5 Minn. 280 105 (1877); post, chap. xx. sec. 849.
(1861); S. P. Goodnow v. Commissioners, 2 Miller v. Thompson, 3 Man. & Gr.
11 Ib. 31 (1865); Hyde v. Franklin, 27 576; Fairchild v. Ogdensburg, C. & R. Co.,
Vt. 185 (1855); approved, Taft v. Pitts- 15 N. Y. 337; Bull v. Sims, 23 N. Y. 570,
ford, 28 Vt. 286; Halstead v. Mayor, 3 572 ; Clark v. Polk County, 19 Iowa, 247;
Comst. (3 N. Y.) 430 ; 8. C. 5 Barb. 218; Hasey v. White Pigeon Beet Sugar Co.,
The Floyd Acceptances, 7 Wall. 666, and 1 Doug. (Mich.) 193; Dana v. San Fran-
reasoning of Mr. Justice Miller ; People v. cisco, 19 Cal. 486 ; Bibb County Inf. C.
Gray, 23 Cal. 125 ; Ib. 447 ; Hubbard v. Justices v. Orr, 12 Ga. 137. Municipal
Lyndon, 28 Wis. 674 (1871). Warrants, certificates of indebtedness are not "bills
duly signed and sealed, are prima facie of credit" within the meaning of the pro-
valid, but open to defences. Commis. hibition (art. 1, sec. 10) of the National
sioners v. Keller, 6 Kan. 510; Commis. Constitution (Baltimore v. Board of Police,
sioners v. Day, 19 Ind. 540 (1862); People 15 Md. 376, 1859), and possess no ele-
v. Johnson, 100 ill. 537 ; infra, sec. 502. ments of commercial paper. Chandler v.
Transferee or holder may sile in his own Bay St. Louis, 57 Miss. 327. As a county
name. Emery v. Mariaville, 56 Me. 315; warrant is an instrument by which the
Crawford County v. Wilson, 2 Eng. (7 money, property, or rights of a county
Ark.) 214; Clark v. Des Moines, 19 Iowa, may be affected, it is such an one as may
199 ; Campbell v. Polk County, 3 Iowa, be forged. State v. Fenley, 18 Mo. 445
467; Clark v. Polk County, 19 lowa, 248; (1853). Requisites of indictment in such
Int. Bank v. Franklin Co., 65 Mo. 105 a case. Io. Without the sanction of the
(1877). Otherwise in Massachusetts. Smith county board the clerk has no authority
v. Cheshire, 13 Gray (Mass.), 318, treat- to issue, or the treasurer to pay or coun-
ing a town order, payable to bearer, as tersign, any warrant. People v. Klopke,
a mere chose in action, which could not 92 Ill. 134.
be enforced in the name of an assignee. Bonds issued by the city of Little Rock
's. P. O'Donnell 0. City, 7 Phil. (Pa.) 234. on bank-note paper, engraved with vig-
In many of the States, “the real party in nettes, in the similitude of bank-bills, in-
§ 488
563
CONTRACTS :
POWER TO MAKE NEGOTIABLE PAPER.
§ 488 (407). Power to make and issue Negotiable Paper. Bank-
ing and trading corporations have implied or incidental power to
make negotiable paper ; 1 and the same rule has, in some cases, been
applied to municipal corporations. The ordinary warrants of such
corporations, it is clear, do not cut off equities, and it is doubtful
whether they have an incidental power to make paper which shall
have this effect. The subject has been discussed in a previous
chapter 3
tended to circulate as money, were held Orleans, 23 La. An. 5 (1871); Clark v.
to be illegal and void under the legisla. Des Moines, 19 Iowa, 199 (1865) ; Dively
tion of Arkansas, both by the State and v. Cedar Falls, 21 Iowa, 565 ; s. c. 27 Iowa,
Federal courts. Lindsey v. Rottaken, 32 227; Black v. Cohen, 52 Ga. 621 (1874);
Ark. 619 (1878); Jones v. Little Rock, 25 Cheeney v. Brookfield, 60 Mo. 53 (1874);
Ark. 301 (1868); Merchants' Nat. Bank v. Hackettstown ads. Swackhamer, 37 N.
Little Rock, 5 Dillon, 299 (1878); S. C. 98 J. L. 191 (1874); Lucas v. Pitney, 3 Dutch.
U. S. 308. In the last-named case it was (N. J.) 221.
decided that this illegal money having 1 McCullough v. Moss, 5 Denio (N.Y.),
been paid out by the city to bona fide 567 ; Straus v. Eagle Insurance Co., 5
creditors for valid claims, and the city Ohio St. 59; Mott v. Hicks, 1 Cow. (N.Y.)
having afterwards called it in, and by the 513; Attorney-General v. L. & F. Ins. Co.,
action of the municipal council acknowl. 9 Paige (N. Y.), Ch. 470 ; 2 Kent Com.
edged an indebtedness for the amount to 299; 1 Parsons N. & B. 165; Clark v.
the holders and promised to pay the same,
Des Moines, 19 lowa, 212; ante, secs. 117,
it was liable on such acknowledgment and 118 ; Lucas v. Pitney, 3 Dutch. (N. J.)
new promise. In Jones v. Little Rock, 221. Morawetz on Corp. (2d ed.) secs.
supra, the court refused to interfere by 350–352. Post, sec. 507.
injunction at the instance of a taxpayer % Kelley v. Brooklyn, 4 Hill (N. Y.),
to prevent that city from issuing paper of 263 ; Clark v. Des Moines, 19 Iowa, 199
this character.
213; Came v. Brighan, 39 Me. 39 ;
Liability as respects scrip issued to cir. Clarke v. School District, 3 R. I. 199;
culate as inoney. Thomas Richmond, Goodnow v. Remsey Co. Comm’rs, 11
12 Wall. 349 (1870), and in which the city Minn. 31; Burrton v. Harvey Co. Sav-
was held not to be liable. See on this ings Bank, 28 Kan. 390 ; Carleton v.
subject, supra, sec. 443, note, sec. 448, Washington, 38 Kan. 726 ; Little Rock
and, also, Alleghany City v. McClurkan, v. Merchants' Nat. Bank, 98 U. S. 308,
14 Pa. St. 81 (1850); Jones v. Little Rock, citing and approving text; ante, secs. 117–
25 Ark. 301 ; Miller v. Lynchburg, 20 127. In Indiana the common-law doc-
Gratt. (Va.) 330 (1871) ; Smith v. New trine that a corporation could not make a
8 The author's views are expressed and departure from this form is no defence to
the cases on the subject are referred to, an action on the warrant. Young v. Cam-
ante, sec. 117 et seq., and are approved in den County, 19 Mo. 309 (1854). A con-
Parsons v. Monmouth, 70 Me. 262 (1879). tract made by a county with another party,
Statutory power " to issue county or'ders' in which the county agrees to pay for
gives no authority to issue negotiable bonds services rendered, in county warrants, is
payable at a future day, with interest in effect a contract payable in money, and
coupons attached. The difference is sub- is not void. Babcock v. Goodrich, 47 Cal.
stantial. Goodnow v. Comm’rs, 11 Minn. 488 (1874).
31 (1865). County Comm’rs v. Carter, Express authority to a city to subscribe
2 Kan. 115 (1860); Hull v. County, 12 for stock, to be paid for by “certificates of
Iowa, 142. Statutory form of county war- loan," authorizes it to issue negotiable
rants held to be directory, and a mere bonds with coupons attached, such"
cer-
564
$$ 489–499
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
SS 489 – 499 (408). Liability of Indorser of Warrants. Warrants
or orders of a municipal corporation for the unconditional payment
cer's.
promissory note is exploded, and corpora- demand payable out of a fund over which
tions can now make contracts intra vires its charter gives a board of education con-
in writing not under seal. Municipal and trol to the exclusion of the municipal offi.
quasi corporations can make in a proper Crane v. Urbana, 2 Ill. App. 559.
case a promissory note (citing Ketchum v. That public corporations have no author.
Buffalo, 14 N. Y. 356 ; Railroad Co. v. ity to make and place in market commer-
Evansville, 15 Ind. 395); a promissory cial paper without express poweſ. See
note of a school township in payment for Hewitt v. School Dist., 94 Ill. 528 ; Super..
building a school-house held valid. Shef- visors v. Farwell, 25 Ill. 181 ; Clark v.
field School Tp. v. Andress, 56 Ind. Hancock Co., 27 Ill. 305; Marshall Co.
157 (1877). See Douglass v. Virginia City, v. Cook, 38 Ill. 44 ; Wiley v. Silliman,
5 Nevada R., 147 (1869), as to power to 62 Ill. 170; Harding v. Railroad Co., 65
make notes unless specially restricted. Ill. 90; McWhorter v. People, 65 Ill. 290;
Power to fund debts and to issue new bonds, Big Grove v. Wells, 65 Ill. 263 ; Williams-
notes, or evidences of indebtedness. Ga- port v. Commonwealth, 84 Pa. St. 487
lena v. Corwith, 48 Ill. 423. An action (1877), quoted ante, secs. 120, 121. Ante,
cannot be maintained against a city on a secs. 117–125. Post, sec. 507, 507 a.
tificates of loan
loan” and “bonds" being Little Rock v. State Bank, 3 Eng. (8 Ark.)
considered identical. Amey v. Allegheny 227 ; see Damon v. Granby, 2 Pick. (Mass.)
City, 24 How. (U. S.) 364 (1860); see 345; Randall'v. Van Vechten, 19 Johns.
Commonwealth v. Pittsburgh (power “to (N. Y.) 60; Bank v. Patterson, 7 Cranch,
borrow money"), 34 Pa. St. 496, 511 ; 299 ; Head v. Prov. Ins. Co., 2 Cranch,
Same v. Same, 41 Pa. St. 278. Power by 127. Where towns were required “to
public corporations to issue negotiable purchase” liquors, and the selectmen were
bonds may be inferred from the power to indictable if they failed to make provision
subscribe for stock in railroad companies for executing the law, it was held that a
and to make payment for it in bonds. town might give a negotiable note for
Curtis v. Butler County, 24 How. (U. S.) liquors actually purchased, and that the
435; Bushnell v. Beloit, 10 Wis. 195. town could not defend against it in the
Express legislative authority to a city to hands of a bona fide holder, on the ground
subscribe for stock in a railroad “as fully that the liquors were sold in violation of
as any individual," authorizes the issue by the law of the State. Great Falls Bank v.
the city of negotiable bonds in payment Farmington, 41 N. H. 32 (1860). What
therefor. Seybert v. Pittsburgh, 1 Wall. an indorsee is bound to inquire about,
(U. S.) 272 (1863); approving Common- stated. 16. 42.
wealth v. Same, 41 Pa. St. 278; Rogers v. The general doctrines of the text in sec-
Burlington (power to “borrow money for tions 485-488 are coincident with the
any public purpose"), 3 Wall. 654 (1865); views of the United States Supreme Court
Meyer v. Muscatine, 1 Wall. 385; Mitchell in the case of the Police Jury v. Britton,
V. Burlington, 4 Wall. 270. By resolu- 15 Wall. 566 (1872), where it was held
tion, the council authorized the mayor to that county officers in Louisiana, with the
borrow money of a bank, and execute the usual powers of such officers, have no in-
note of the corporation therefor, instead of plied authority to issue negotiable paper
which he executed the bond of the corpora- (bonds with coupons), payable in the future,
tion under the seal of the corporation. In to raise money or to fund an existing debt,
an action on this bond by the payee, it which will cut off equities in the hands of
was held that the corporation could plead bona fide holders. Such a power is not
non est factum, since the act of the mayor necessarily incident to the power to make
in executing a writing obligatory instead specified expenditures or improvements,
of a note did not bind the corporation. though it may be implied from certain
1
501
565
WARRANTS : RIGHTS AND REMEDIES OF HOLDER.
of money to a person named, or order, or to bearer, have the character
of negotiable paper, so far, at least, as to render parties indorsing
them liable as indorsers,1
$ 500 (409). Payment and Cancellation of Warrants. — Pay-
ment by the treasurer or proper officer of a municipal corporation
of its orders or warrants ipso facto extinguishes them. If lent.
reissued, or put into circulation again by the officer, after he had
once obtained credit therefor, they are not valid securities, not even,
it seems, in the hands of an innocent holder.2
§ 501 .
(410). Rights and Remedies of Holder of Warrants.
A creditor of a town is not bound to receive an order on the treas-
urer, but may sue upon his original cause of action. But if he
express powers, as, for example, the power It was held that the defendant incurred
to borrow money.
After stating other the responsibility of an indorser of negotia-
instances in which the power has been ble paper, and that the plaintiff was not
implied, Mr. Justice Bradley, observes : bound to show the existence of funds in
“But in our judgment these implications the city treasury sufficient to pay the war-
should not be encouraged or extended be- rants, and not specially appropriated at
yond the fair inferences to be gathered from the time of its maturity. Campbell v.
the circumstances of each case. It would Polk County, 3 Iowa, 467; Hodges v.
be an anomaly, justly to be deprecated, for Shuler, 22 N. Y. 114; Fairchild v. Ogdens-
all our limited territorial boards, charged burgh, &c. Railroad Co., 15 N. Y. 337.
with certain objects of necessary local Compare as to liability of indorser, Keller
administration, to become fountains of v. Hicks, 22 Cal. 457.
commercial issues, capable of floating about 2 Canal Bank v. Supervisors, 5 Depio
in the financial whirlpools of our large (N. Y.), 517 (1848). In this case it was
cities.” 15 Wall. 572. But see, on this held that where, without any fraudulent
point of the incidental power of municipal intent, the holder of valid county orders
corporations to borrow money, and to issue exchanged them with the treasurer for
commercial paper, the later case of Mayor others which were in fact paid, but which
of Nashville v. Ray, 19 Wall. 468 (1873); had never been allowed him in his ac-
ante, sec. 117 et seq., and notes ; Ster- counts, the debt represented by the valid
ling v. West Feliciana, 26 La. An. 59 orders was not extinguished, and was a
(1874). Post, secs, 507, 507 a.
sufficient consideration to support a set-
1 Bull v. Sims, 23 N. Y. 570 (1861). tlement with the county allowing it. As
In this case the action was by an indorsee to illegal orders in hands of bona fide
against the defendant as indorser of the holder. Halstead v. The Mayor, &c. of
following instrument:-
New York, 3 Comst. (N. Y.) 430, affirm-
ing s. C. 5 Barb. 218; Mayor of Nash.
MILWAUKEE, Aug. 1, 1859. ville v. Ray (important case), 19 Wall.
The treasurer will, on or before the 468 (1873). A municipal corporation is
1st day of February next, pay to the order not liable for the increased face value of
of E. Sims, fifty dollars, out of any funds warrants which the clerk has fraudulently
belonging to the city not before specially raised after issuance. Chandler v. Bay
appropriated, the same having been this St. Louis, 57 Mich. 327. Payınent to
day allowed for dredging, and chargeable bearer in good faith exonerates the cor-
to the general city fund.
poration. Sweet v. Carver Co., 16 Minn,
H. L. PAGE, Mayor. 106 (1871).
R. R. LYNCH, Clerk.
8 Benson v. Carmel, 8 Greenl. (8 Me.)
566
§ 503
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
does receive such an order he is charged with the duty of present-
ing it to the treasurer upon whom it is drawn, or of alleging facts
which excuse presentment, before he can maintain an action upon
it. As such an instrument is, in effect, au order by the debtor on
himself, if presented and payment be refused, the town is liable
instantly, and without notice of non-payment."
$ 502 (411). Presumption of Liability. — County and city orders
signed by the proper officers are prima facie binding and legal.
These officers will be presumed to have done their duty. Such orders
make a prima facie cause of action. Impeachment must come from
the defendant.2
§ 503. Warrants not Negotiable Paper.
Such warrants or orders
drawn for ordinary municipal expenses are not intended to have the
.
112; Willey v. Greenfield, 30 Me. 452 extinguishment or novation of the original
(1849). No misapplication of a special debt. Goldschmidt v. New Orleans, 5 La.
fund by the officers of a municipal corpo- An. 436 ; Short v. New Orleans, 4 La. An.
ration can defeat the rights of creditors 281.
entitled to be paid therefrom. State v. 2 Floyd Co. Comm’rs v. Day, 19 Ind.
Pilsbury, 30 La. An. 705.
450 (1862); Hainilton v. Newcastle &
1 Varner 2. Nobleborough, 2 Greenl. D. R. Co., 9 Ind. 359; Leavenworth
(2 Me.) 121, where Mellen, C. J., says : County Comm’rs v. Keller, 6 Kan. 510
“No sound reason can be given why a (1870); Clark v. Des Moines, 19 Iowa,
town should be subjected to the perplex- 211 (1865); Cheeney v. Brookfield, 60 Mo.
ity of costs of an action before the payee 53 (1875); Connersville v. Connersville
of an order will do his duty and request Hydraulic Co., 86 Ind. 184. Such debts
the payment.
. There is an implied “ do not stand on the footing of those con-
engagement to conform to established tracted under a special conditional grant of
usage, and present the order for pay- power.” Comm’rs v. Day, supra; People
ment." Benson v. Carmel, supra; Pease v. Mead, 24 N. Y. 114 ; ante, chap. ix. sec.
v. Cornish, 19 Me. (1 Appl.) 191 (1841). 213 ; supra, sec. 487. County warrants are
An action cannot be maintained on war- valid instruments only when the board of
rants drawn on a municipal treasurer, supervisors had legal authority to issue
without allegation and proof of their pres- them, or to contract the obligation on which
entation to him, or of facts which will they were founded, and are not binding
excuse the presentation. Central v. Wil. when issued in violation of law or in
coxen, 3 Col. 566 ; East Union v. Ryan, fulfilment of a contract that the board
86 Pa. St. 459. As to mode of present- was prohibited from making. See cases,
ment. Steel v. Davis County, 2 G. Greene supra, in this note ; Sault Ste. Marie v.
(Iowa), 469; Campbell v. Polk County, Van Dusan, 40 Mich. 429 ; Jefferson
3 Iowa, 467. Where the payee has ac- County v. Arrighi, 54 Miss. 668 ; Nash v.
cepted county orders for a debt against the St. Paul, 11 Minn. 174; People v. Flagg,
county, and has parted with such orders, 17 N. Y. 589; Brady v. New York, 20
he cannot sue the county for the original N. Y. 312 ; Hague v. Philadelphia, 48 Pa.
debt. Crawford County v. Wilson, 2 Eng. 528. A law creating the liability of a
(7 Ark.) 214 (1846). See Allison v. Ju- county is a condition precedent to the ex-
niata County, 50 Pa. St. 351. An unpaid action of payment from the county. Hess
and dishonored warrant on the corporation v. Pegg, 7 Nev. 23 (1871).
treasurer is not, prima facie at least, an
$ 504
567
CONTRACTS : WARRANTS ; DEFENCES.
qualities of commercial paper, but are instruments authorized for
convenient use in conducting the current and ordinary business of
the corporation and as a means of anticipating its ordinary revenue.
It would overwhelm municipalities with ruin to hold that such
warrants or orders have the qualities of negotiable paper, especially
that quality which protects an innocent holder for value from
defences of which he has 110 notice, actual or constructive. All
holders of such warrants or orders, even when payable to order or
bearer, stand in the shoes of the payee, and their rights and remedies
are often essentially different from those of the holders of authorized
negotiable municipal bonds. Such is the sound doctrine, and such
is the doctrine of the authorities almost without exception.
Without express authority from the legislature a municipality
cannot discount its warrants to its creditors so as to make them
equivalent to cash, or issue warrants for more than the sum act-
ually due the claimant; and as to the excess they are void, and
the holder will be treated only as the equitable assignee of the
valid legal claim of the payee.?
$ 504 (412). Defences. — A municipal corporation is not estopped,
after a warrant upon its treasury has been issued, to set up the
defence of ultra vires, or fraud, or want or failure of consideration.3
And it may maintain a bill in equity to cancel warrants illegally
i Carroll Co. Sup. v. U. S. (nature York, 3 N. Y. 430 ; Brown v. Utica, 2
of warrants and remedy), 18 Wall. 71; Barb. (N. Y.) 104 ; Anthony v. Adams,
Shirk v. Pulaski County, 4 Dillon, 209, 1 Met. (Mass.) 286. The allowance of
213 (1877), and cases cited ; Clark v. Des à claim by a county board is not final
Moines, 19 Iowa, 199; Mayor of Nash- and conclusive. Such allowance is prima
ville v. Ray, 19 Wall. 468 ; United facie evidence of the correctness of the
States v. Miller County, 4 Dillon, 233 claim ; " but,” says Kingman, C. J., “the
(1878).
settlement of an account by the county
2 Shirk v. Pulaski County, 4 Dillon, board is not more sacred than a settlement
209 (1877); Goyne v. Ashley County, made by individuals.” The court therefore
31 Ark. 552 (1876); Bauer v. Franklin held, and properly so, that the allowance of
County, 51 Mo. 205 (1873). "The fln- a. claim by the county was not an adjudica-
grant abuses,” which, as IVagner, J., says, tion in the sense that it would conclude
in the case last cited, would follow any the county as to the amount allowed when
other doctrine, are well exemplified in Shirk sued upon the warrant drawn in pursuance
v. Pulaski County. Foster v. Coleman, 10 of such allowance. Comm’rs v. Keller, 6
Cal. 278; Clark v. Des Moines, 19 Iowa, Kan. 510 ; Nashville v. Ray, 19 Wall.
199.
468 (1873); Shirk v. Pulaski County, 4
8 Thomas v. Richmond (scrip to circu- Dillon, 209 (1877); Cheeney v. Brookfield,
late as money), 12 Wall. 349 (1870); Web- 60 Mo. 53 (1875); post, chap. xxiii. War-
ster County v. Taylor, 19 Iowa, 117 (1865); rants may, it seems, he usurious. Clark
Clark 2. Des Moines, Ib. 199; Clark v. v. Des Moines, supra; post, sec. 506,
Polk County, Ib. 248; Hodges 2. Buffalo, note.
2 Denio (N. Y.), 110 ; Halstead 2. New
568
§ 505
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
issued. Taxpayers may enjoin the issue of illegal warrants or
scrip.
§ 505 (413). Payable out of a Particular Fund. — If by law a
particular claim is to be paid out of a special fund, a warrant or
order issued therefor should be made payable out of such fund ; if
made payable from the treasury generally by the officers issuing it,
the corporation is not bound by their act.3 An order or warrant,
concluding with the words " and charge the same to the account of
Union Avenue,” is payable out of the particular fund indicated, and
is not a claim against the corporation. But the distinction must
be observed between orders payable out of a particular fund, and
those which evidence a general corporate liability, but are directed
to be charged to a particular account.5
1 Pulaski County v. Lincoln, 4 Eng. 17 Am. Law Reg. N. s. 191 ; post, secs.
(9 Ark.) 320 (1849); Webster County v. 914, 921, 923.
Taylor, 19 Iowa, 117 ; Paris Tp. Trs. v. 3 Tippecanoe Co. Comm'rs v. Cox, 6
Cherry, 8 Ohio St. 564 (1858); Glasten- Ind. 403 ; Campbell v. Polk County, 49
bury v. McDonald, 44 Vt. 450 (1872). In Mo. 214 (1872); Boro v. Phillips County,
Mississippi a board known as the board of 4 Dillon, 216, 223 (1877), citing text; post,
police are authorized by law to audit and chap. xx.
allow, upon due proof, all claims against 4 Lake v. Williamsburgh, 4 Denio,
the county ; and counties in that State 520 (1847), remedy of holder discussed ;
cannot be sued directly. The action of distinguished from Kelly v. Mayor, &c. of
the board in allowing claims for matters of Brooklyn, 4 Hill (N. Y.), 263; and see
county charge, and in ordering warrants McCullough v. Brooklyn, 23 Wend.
to issue therefor, is final and conclusive on (N. Y.) 458; Cuyler v. Rochester, 12
the county, in the absence of fraud, until Wend. (N. Y.) 165; Argenti v. San Fran-
it is reversed or vacated.
Carroll v.
cisco, 16 Cal. 255, and note remarks of
Board, &c., 28 Miss. (6 Cush.) 38 (1854). Field, C. J. ; Martin v. San Francisco, Ib.
But the weight of authority is otherwise. 285 ; Kingsberry v. Pettis Co., 48 Mo.
Shirk v. Pulaski County, 4 Dillon, 209 207 (1871). An instrument in this form :
(1877). Effect of issuing new orders for old.
DECEMBER, 31, 1836.
See Clark v. Des Moines, 19 Iowa,
City of Brooklyn, ss. To the City
199 ; Chemung Canal Bank v. Cheniung Treasurer. Pay A. L. or order $1500 for
Co. Sup., 5 Denio (N. Y.), 517; Lake v.
award No. 7, and charge to Bedford road
Trustees, 4 Denio (N. Y.), 520 ; Shirk v.
assessment, &c.
Pulaski County, 4 Dillon, 209 (1877). On
J. T., Mayor.
warrants or orders the statute of limitations
A. G. S., Clerk.
does not begin to run until payment is
denied. Justices of Bibb Co. Inferior Held, ist. Negotiable, and not payable
Courtv. Orr, 12 Ga. 137 (1852). See Carroll out of any special fund. 2d. The corpora-
1. Tishamingo County Board of Police, 28 tion was not discharged by failure to present
Miss. 38; De Cordova v. Galveston and give notice, no damage or injury being
(honds), 4 Tex: 470 ; Kenosha v. Lamson sustained in consequence of the omission.
(coupons), 9 Wall. 478; supra, sec. 487, Kelley v. Brooklyn, 4 Hill (N. Y.), 263
note ; Baker v. Johnson County, 33 Iowa, (1843); Steel v. Davis County, 2 G. Greene
151. In Nebraska, county warrants are (Iowa), 469 ; Campbell v. Polk County,
not within the limitation statutes. Brewer 3 Iowa, 467.
v. Otoe County, 1 Neb. 373.
5 Clark v. Des Moines, 19 Iowa, 199,
2 Colburn v. Chattanooga, Tenn. ; S. C. 222; Edwards on Bills, 143; Pease v.
$ 506
569
CONTRACTS : INTEREST ON CORPORATE INDEBTEDNESS.
can-
§ 506 (414). Interest on Corporate Indebtedness. The rule in
respect to interest on debts against municipal corporations does not
ordinarily differ from that which applies to individuals.1 Under
the Missouri statute, providing generally that creditors shall be al-
lowed interest at the rate of six per cent per annum, &c., it is held
that county warrants draw interest after presentment to the treasury
and refusal of payment by the treasurer, the court regarding the
general statute as to interest broad enough to embrace all debtors,
counties as well as individuals.2 . But in Illinois it is held that the
debts of municipal corporations are payable at the treasury of the
body; that interest on coupons that is, interest on interest
not be recovered, unless there be a special agreement to that effect,
since such corporations are not named in the act regulating interest.
The court remarks : " Whatever power these corporations may pos-
sess to contract for the payment of interest, in the absence of any
express legislation on the subject, we are of opinion that their in-
debtedness, in the absence of such agreeinent, does not bear inter-
est. If such instruments (coupons) could in any event draw interest
without an express agreement, it could only be after a proper de-
mand of payment. Uutil a demand is made, such a body is not in
default. They are not like individuals, bound to seek their creditors
to make payments of their indebtedness." 4 The general and sound
Cornish, 19 Me. 191 ; Campbell v. Polk 18 Wis. 367. If under authority to issue
Co., 3 Iowa, 467 ; Union Co. Comm’rs v. bonds with eight per cent interest, bonds
Mason, 9 Ind. 97; Bayerque v. San Fran- be issued drawing twelve per cent, they
cisco, 1 McAll. C. C. R. 175; Bull v. are valid and bear interest at the statu.
Sims, 23 N. Y. 570 ; Montague v. Horan,
tory rate. Quincy 2. Warfield, 25 Ill.
12 Wis. 599. In an action on a county 317. Usury. That usury can be pred-
order payable out of the three per cent
three per cent icated of a sale or issue by a corpora-
fund, as fast as the same shall accrue to tion of its securities, see Danville v.
the county," it must be alleged that the Sutherlin, 20 Gratt. (Va.) 555 (1871);
county has received money from the speci- Lynchburg v. Norvell, 20 Gratt. (Va.)
fic fund named applicable to the order in 601 (1871); Clark v. Des Moines, 19 Iowa,
suit, or that the order was fraudulently 199. May be made payable outside the
drawn upou a fund in which the county State. Meyer v. Muscatine, 1 Wall. 384 ;
had no assets. Union Co. Comm’rs v. Maddox v. Graham, 2 Met. (Ky.) 56.
Mason, 9 Ind. 97 (1857). See chapter on 8 South Park Commissioners v. Dun.
Mandamus, post.
levy, 91 Ill. 49; Pekin v. Reynolds, 31
1 Langdon v. Castleton, 30 Vt. 285 Ill. 529; People v. Salomon, 51 Ill. 52 ;
(action on book account).
Chicago v. People, 56 lll. 327 (1870);
2 Robbins v. County Court, 3 Mo. 57 Chicago v. Allcock, 86 Ill. 384 ; Cook v.
(1831); State V. Pacific, 61 Mo. 155 South Park Commissioners, 61 Ill. 115.
(1875). In Iowa, coupons on county and 4 Pekin v. Reynolds, 31 Ill. 529 (1863);
city bonds are held to draw interest. S. P. Chicago v. People, 56 Ill. 327 (1870);
Rogers v. Lee County, 1 Dillon C. C. R. People v. Tazewell County, 22 Ill. 147 ;
529. See Evansville, &c. R. Co. v. Evans- Johnson v. Stark County, 24 Ill. 75.
ville, 15 Ind. 395; Hollingsworth v. De. But if made payable at a place other than
troit, 3 McLean, 472; Pruyn v. Milwaukee, the treasury, the bonds are not void, but
570
§ 507
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
view, however, is that coupons when due are regarded as in the
nature of an independent claim, and draw simple interest, and only
simple interest, unless otherwise expressly provided, from the date
of maturity.
1
§ 507. Implied Power to borrow Money and issue Commercial
or Negotiable Paper considered. --- Much conflict of opinion has
existed in the American courts touching the implied power of pub-
lic and municipal corporations to issue commercial or negotiable in-
struments, that is, instruments free from equities in the hands of
innocent holders for value. In respect of public or quasi corpora-
tions, such as counties, &c., as distinguished from municipal cor-
porations proper, the general current of authority is against the
proposition that, as ordinarily organized, they possess any such im-
plied power. And the power is not incident to the authority to
make specified expenditures or to make local improvements, but it
may be implied, where there is nothing to rebut it, from other
powers, such as the express power to borrow money.2
But in view of the more complex and diversified powers usually
conferred upon chartered or municipal corporations proper, there
has been a stronger tendency on the part of the courts to hold that
only this provision in them. Sherlock v. tion in the official paper, to present the
Winnetka, 68 Ill. 530 (1873). Post, sec. same for payment, and that interest would
514, note. In Madison County v. Bartlett, cease after a certain day. It did not appear
1 Scam. (2 Ill.) 67, it was held that coun. that plaintiff knew of such publication,
ties were not liable to pay interest on their though duly made. It was held that the
orders or warrants, not being named in city was liable for interest on the warrants
the statute regulating interest, and the owned by plaintiff down to the time of their
common-law not allowing it to be recov- presentation. Read v. Buffalo, 74 N. Y.
ered. So in Pennsylvania. Allison v. 463. Nor can it set up in bar of an action
County, 50 Pa. St. 351. In that State to recover a debt due from it, that it was
a county is not suable on its warrants, but once willing and offered to pay it; nor
suit must be on original claim. Ib. In can it stop interest upon its obligations
Ohio coupons due semi-annually have been by publishing a notice in a newspaper that
held to bear interest after maturity. Wil. such interest will cease after a certain date,
son v. Neal, 23 Fed. Rep. 129. In Cali- when the warrants bear interest. 16.; see,
fornia when no provision is made for also, Hummel v. Brown, 24 Pa. St. 311.
interest, both municipal bonds and their 1 Supra, sec. 486.
coupons bear interest after maturity at 2 Police Jury v. Britton, 15 Wall. 566
the rate fixed by law, whether the coupons (1872). The ordinary powers possessed by
are detached or not. Nash v. El Dorado counties, as agencies of the State in the
County, 24 Fed. Rep. 252 ; post, chap. xx. administration of public affairs, do not
A city issued warrants or orders on its give the incidental authority to issue nego-
treasurer, payable when funds should be tiable bonds and coupons. See Lynde v.
collected therefor from certain tax sales, Winnebago County, 16 Wall. 6.
with interest. The funds being collected Distinction between public and munici-
the common council ordered the treasurer pal corporations, in the sense referred to
to notify holders of warrants, by publica- in the text, see ante, secs. 22, 54, 58, 66.
$ 507
571
CONTRACTS: NEGOTIABLE PAPER.
such corporations, as usually existing in this country, have an inci-
dental or implied power to issue commercial securities. The line
of argument is substantially this: Trading and comniercial corpo-
rations have this power as an incidental means of effecting their
objects, why not municipal corporations as well ? Municipal corpo-
rations are clothed with large powers, which naturally, if not neces-
sarily, oblige them to use credit or to create debts; therefore, if
they may create debts, they may borrow the money to pay them;
and if they may borrow money, they have the incidental power to
do like other borrowers, nainely, give a negotiable bill, note, or bond
therefor. The whole argument is, in our judgment, unsound. It is
true that in this country private business corporations are usually
considered to have the incidental power to borrow money or give
negotiable paper as an evidence of their indebtedness, but in Eng-
land it is held that express power is necessary to enable even rail-
way corporations to draw, indorse, or accept bills of exchange. But
admit that the American doctrine is otherwise, and that it is
rightly so, still there is no resemblance between private and public
or municipal corporations in this regard. The latter are simply
agencies of government. They are not organized for trading, com-
mercial, or business purposes. They have, in general, but one mode
of meeting their liabilities, and that is by taxation, and it is upon
this resource that creditors must be taken to rely. For hundreds
of years in England such corporations have existed, without it ever
being contended that they could, without express authority, issue
commercial paper. Private corporations are much more vigilant
and watchful of their interests than it is possible for public or mu-
nicipal corporations to be. The frauds which unscrupulous officers
will be enabled successfully to practise, if an implied and unguarded
power to issue negotiable securities is recognized, and which the
corporation or the citizen will be helpless to prevent, is a strong
argument against the judicial establishment of any such power,
And the argument is unanswerable, when it is remembered that in
ascertaining the extent of corporate powers there is no rule of safety
but the rule of strict construction ; 3 and that such an implied power
is not necessary, however convenient it may be at times, to enable
the corporation to exercise its ordinary and usual express powers,
i See observations of Byles, J., in Bate- and Bills, 165; ante, sec. 488; Desmond
man v. Mid-Wales Railway Co., Law Rep. v. Jefferson, 19 Fed. Rep. 483, holding
1 C. P. 510 (1866). Ante, sec. 488. that a power to purchase property — as a
2 Stratton v. Allen, 16 N. J. Eq. 229; fire-engine — implies power to issue nego.
McCullough v. Moss, 5 Denio (N. Y.), tiable bonds for the purpose.
567 ; Straus v. Eagle Ins. Co., 5 Ohio St. 8 Ante, secs. 89, 90, 91.
59; 2 Kent's Com. 229; 1 Parsons' Notes
572
$ 507 a
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
or to carry into effect the purposes for which the corporation is
created.
§ 507 a. Same subject. The Author's Conclusions. We regard
as alike unsound and dangerous the doctrine that a public or munic-
ipal corporation possesses the implied power to borrow money for its
ordinary purposes, and as incidental thereto the power to issue com-
mercial securities, that is, paper which cuts off defences when it is
in the hands of a holder for value acquired before it is due. The
cases on this subject are conflicting, but the tendency is towards
the view above presented. The opinion of Mr. Justice Bradley, in a
case before referred to, evinces a thorough comprehension of the
whole question, and, in our judgment, is sound in every proposition
it advances, and must become the law of this country. This view
is confirmed by the almost invariable legislative practice in the
States to confer, when it is deemed expedient, upon municipalities
and public corporations, in express terms, the power to borrow
money or to issue negotiable bonds or securities; and it is of in-
struments thus authorized that we now proceed to treat.
undisputed doctrine that the power of public and municipal corpo-
rations to subscribe to the stock of railway companies and to issue
bonds therefor must be expressly conferred. The Supreme Court of
It is an
1 The Mayor v. Ray, 19 Wall. 478 and the issue of bonds in payment therefor,
(1873). It is difficult to understand on see McClure v. Oxford, 94 U. S. 429 ;
what ground the dissenting judges in this Anderson County v. Beal, 113 U. S. 227;
case regarded the corporation warrants as Crow v. Oxford, 119 U. S. 215. Tennessee :
“ negotiable securities of a commercial Kelley v. Milan, 127 U. S. 139; s. c. below,
character.” The cases are almost uniform 21 Fed. Rep. 842; Taylor v. Ypsilanti,
to the effect that such instruments do not 105 U. S. 60 (where by the vote authoriz-
.partake of the nature of commercial paper, ing a subscription, consent was given upon
except that by usage and custom, and certain conditions). Nebraska : Read v.
sometimes by legislative enactment, they Plattsmouth, 107 U. S. 568 ; State v.
pass by delivery. Post, sec. 509.
Babcock, 19 Neb. 230; S. C. Id. 223. As
2 The cases on this point are collected to liability of counties in Nebraska for bonds
in sec. 161, note. See further on this issued by precincts and the remedy in such
subject, ante, sec. 117 et seq.
cases, see Davenport v. County of Dodge,
Particular Statutes Construed. Illinois: 105 U. S. 237 ; Blair v. Cuming County,
Harter v. Kernochan, 103 U. S. 562; 111 U. S. 363 ; Rosenbaum v. Bauer, 120
approved Pana 2. Bowler, 107 U. S. 529 ; U. S. 450 ; Nemaha County v. Frank,
Kankakee v. Ætna Life Ins. Co., 106 U. S. 120 U. S. 41. Infra, sec. 509. Califor-
668; Prairie v. Lloyd, 97 Ill. 179; Wind- nia: Liebman v. San Francisco, 24 Fed.
sor v. Hallett, 97 Ill. 204 ; Douglas v. Rep. 705. Missouri: Ogden v. Daviess
Niantic Sav. Bank, 97 Ill. 228. Kansas : County, 102 U. S. 634; Tipton v. Rogers
Lewis v. Barbour Co. Comm'rs, 105 U. S. Loc. Works, 103 U. S. 523. New York :
739; Bard v. Augusta, 30 Fed. Rep. Thompson v. Perrine, 103 U. S. 806 ;
906. For construction of the general approved Same v. Same, 106 U. S. 589 ;
statute of Kansas concerning the subscrip- Red Rock v. Henry, 106 U. S. 596. Louisi-
tion by municipalities for stock of railroads ana : Hall v. New Orleans, 19 Fed. Rep.
§ 508
573
CONTRACTS: RAILWAY AID BONDS.
the United States has repeatedly adjudged that the grant of power
to a municipal corporation to appropriate moneys in aid of the con-
struction of a railroad, where the power is accompanied with a
provision directing the levy and collection of taxes to meet such
appropriation, and prescribing no other mode of payment, gives no
power, but excludes it, to issue negotiable bonds in payment of such
appropriation.
§ 508. Taxation limited to Public Purposes; What are Such;
Aid to Railways; Bonds to be paid by Taxation, for What Purposes
authorized After the numerous judgments of courts of the highest
authority to that effect, it may be regarded as a settled doctrine of
American law that no tax can be authorized by the legislature for
any purpose which is essentially private, or, to state the propo-
sition in other words, for any but a public purpose. What is a
public purpose may not always be easy to determine; but when
determined, it constitutes the boundary of the power of taxation.
Whether taxation to aid in the building of railways owned by
private corporations is taxation for a public purpose is a question
which has been decided by the courts of last resort in almost every
State in the Union, and by the Supreme Court of the United States.3
Although the doctrine of the constitutionality of such taxation has
been vigorously combated, still it must be admitted that the great
preponderance of the judicial judgments has been on the side of the
870 (a special law relating to New Orleans). aid a company in improving the water-
Alabama: Winters V. Montgomery, 65 power of the river for the purpose of pro-
Ala. 403 (special law relating to Mont- pelling public grist-mills, held to be issued
gomery).
to aid in constructing a
work of internal
1 Claiborne County ». Brooks, 111 U. S. improvement," within the meaning of the
400, 406; Wells v. Pontotoc Co. Sup., 102 statute in question. Blair v. Cuming
U. S. 631, 632 ; Ogden v. Daviess County, County, 111 U. S. 363. Aliter as to steam
Ib., 634, 639; Concord v. Robinson, 121 grist-inills, Osborne v. County of Adams,
U. S. 165 (1886).
106 U. S. 181 ; S. C. 109 U.S. 1; see and
2 Loan Assoc. v. Topeka, 20 Wall. 655; compare Township of Burlington v. Beas-
Curtis v. Whipple, 24 Wis. 350 ; Whiting ley, 94 U, S. 310; post, sec. 736, and cases
v. S. & F. R. Co., 25 Wis. 167; Allen v. cited ; Cooley on Taxation, chap. iv.,
Inhab. of Jay, 60 Me. 124 ; Jenkins v. "where the purposes for which taxes may
Andover, 103 Mass. 94 ; Lowell v. Boston, be laid." are enumerated, and illustrated
111 Mass. 454 ; Pray v. Northern Liberties, by the adjudicated cases.
31 Pa. St. 69 ; Mayor of New York, 8 Ante, secs. 153, 157 ; Rogers v. Bur-
In re, 11 Johns. (N. Y.) 77 ; Camden v. lington, 3 Wall. 654 ; Marshall Co. Sup.
Allen, 2 Dutch. (N. J.) 398 ; Sharpless v. V. Schenck, 5 Wall. 772, 779; Olcott v.
Mayor of Phila., 21 Pa. St. 147; Hanson v. Fond du Lac Sup., 16 Wall. 678; Burling-
Vernon, 27 Iowa, 47 ; Cooley Const. Lim., ton & Mo. River R. Co. v. Otoe Co., 16
129, 175, 214; Parkersburg v. Brown, Wall. 667; Citizens' Sav. & Loan Assoc.
106 U. S. 487 (manufactories); City of v. Topeka, 20 Wall. 655 ; Pine Grove Tp.
Eufaula v. McNab, 67 Ala. 588. Infra, v. Talcott, 19 Wall. 666 (1873).
sec. 510. Bonds issued under a statute to
577
§ 509
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
competency of such legislation, in the absence of special constitu-
tional restraint. And therefore the legislature may authorize sub-
scriptions by municipalities to the stock of railway corporations, or
donations to them, and provide for the payment of such subscrip-
tions or donations 2 by the issue and sale of the negotiable bonds of
the municipality. But a statute which authorizes the issue of bonds
to be paid by taxation to aid certain individuals or classes, or in aid
of the manufacturing enterprise of individuals or private corpora-
tions, is void, this being, within the meaning of the rule, a private,
as distinguished from a public purpose, although in a remote or
collateral way the local public might be benefited thereby. The
execution of the powers of local government and administration or-
dinarily conferred upon municipal corporations, such as improving
highways and streets, constructing water-works, gas-works, markets,
preserving the public health, and the like, are of course public pur-
poses; and upon legislative authority being given, negotiable bonds
may be issued therefor. What will constitute sufficient authority
for the issue of such bonds will be considered further on.
§ 509. Different Classes of Bonds ; Implied and Express Power to
issue; Recitals; Mode of Pleading. Negotiable securities of the
kind here referred to have been issued by municipal corporations
proper (generally under an express power to aid railways, or for gas-
works, water-works, or specified local improvements, but sometimes
under an implied power); and by counties, usually under express
power (generally to aid railways, or for public buildings, bridges,
or improvements 4); and by organized townships which are parts of
1 In Pine Grove Township v. Talcott, or donations, or loans of credit to private
19 Wall. 666, 677, Mr. Justice Swayne corporations. Cleburne v. Gulf, Colorado,
says that such legislation has been sus- & S. F. Ry., 66 Tex. 457 ; ante, sec. 157.
tained in nineteen out of twenty-one 8 Authority to borrow money “to be
States. As respects legislative power, expended in developing the natural advan.
donations and subscriptions for stock stand tages of a city for manufacturing purposes,"
on the same ground. Town of Queens does not warrant the issue of bonds as a
bury v. Culver, 19 Wall. 83 (1873).
donation to an individual to aid in devel-
If it be allowable to judge of a legal oping the water power of the city. One
principle by its fruits, the dissenting and who holds such bonds with notice of the
minority judges on this question will find facts cannot recover upon them. Ottawa
much to confirm the conviction that their v. Carey, 108 U, S. 110; ante, sec. 161.
views were sound. But it is useless to 4 In several of the States power is
fight that battle over again ; it has been given to municipalities or counties to issue
fought and lost. All that is left is the bonds to aid works of “internal improve-
contemplation and contrast of what might ment." And under this generic term, the
have been and what is.
question has arisen, What are works of
2 Wood v. Oxford, 97 N. C. 227. The internal improvement ? The Supreme
Constitution of Texas prohibits municipal Court of Alabanza, in defining the phrase
corporations from making appropriations
“internal improvements," says :
- Where
$ 509
575
CONTRACTS: RAILWAY AID BONDS.
counties, under express authority, and usually as a means of aiding
the construction of railways; and by school districts, under express
power, to raise money to erect school-houses. In some of the West-
ern States, counties have been legislatively made the agents for
the inhabitants of non-incorporated townships, and in Missouri for
“strips of territory” to issue bonds in the name of the county, but
to be paid out of the property within the specified township or des-
ignated territorial limits or strip of country. Reference is made to
this subject here in order to observe that where the bonds or securi-
ties are issued under an express power, the legislative act, being the
only source of the authority, measures and limits the power it con-
fers, and the same principle applies to the instruments issued under
internal improvements under State au- Co. v. Colfax County, 4 Neb. 450 (1876);
thority are spoken of, it is universally S. C. 3 Cent. Law Jour. 287; infra, sec.
understood that works within the State, 510, and note.
by which the public are supposed to be In Montana it is held that the legisla-
benefited, are intended ; such as the in- ture may authorize the creation of county
provements of highways and channels of indebtedness for public roads. Wilcox v.
travel and commerce.' Wetumpka v. Deer Lodge Co., 2 Mont. T. 574.
Winter, 29 Ala. 660.
1 Construction of the Missouri township
The legislature of Nebraska passed an railway aid act of March 23, 1868, and
act “That any county or city in the State the rights and remedies of the bondholder.
of Nebraska is hereby authorized to issue Jordan v. Cass Co., 3 Dillon C. C. R. 185;
bonds to aid in the construction of any Same 2. Same, Id. 245; Washburn v.
railroad or other work of internal improve. Cass Co., Id. 251 ; Harshman v. Bates
ment, to an amount to be determined by County, Id. 150 ; 92 U. S. 569 (1875);
the county commissioners of such county, . c. 3 Cent. Law Jour: 367, referred to at
or the city council of such city, not ex- large, infra. Construction of Kansas legis-
ceeding ten per cent of the assessed valua- lation. Thayer v. Montgomery Co., 3 Dil-
tion of all taxable property in said county lon C. C. R. 389, and note.
or city, provided the county commissioners Precinct bonds, supra, sec. 507, note.
or city council shall first submit the ques- 2 Thus a power to issue bonds of $1000,
tion of issuing bonds to a vote of the legal each bearing interest at six per cent, will
voters of said county or city, in the manner not authorize the issue of bonds of a dif-
provided by chapter ix. of the Revised ferent amount and at a greater rate of in-
Statutes of the State of Nebraska for sub- terest, as eight per cent. Taxpayers of
mitting to the people of a county the Milan v. Tennessee Central R. R. Co., 11
question of borrowing money.” Session Lea, 329. A power to subscribe to the
Laws of 1869, page 92. Under this act, stock of a railroad a certain sum “payable
a county and a precinct issued bonds to in not exceeding four years by annual
build a bridge across the Platte River, assessments," and authorizing the issue of
and on an application by a taxpayer to bonds in anticipation of the collections,
restrain the collection of taxes levied held not to warrant the issue of bonds
to pay interest on such bonds, the Su. payable in ten years. Norton v. Dyers.
preme Court of Nebraska, construing the burg, 127 U. S. 160. In this case it was
above act in the light of the legislation of contended that the town should be held
the State, held that a bridge was a work liable as upon non-negotiahle bonds or
of “ internal improvement” within the notes, treating the issue of the negotiable
meaning of the statute, and that under the bonds as an excess of authority only, and
power to aid, the county might itself con- not invalidating the loan as agreed upon.
struct the bridge. Union Pacific Railroad But the court said : “ It is a sufficient
)
576
$ 509
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
statutory authority by any of these classes of corporations, or quasi
corporations. But in respect to all these corporations and quasi cor-
porations, except, possibly, municipal or chartered corporations
proper, there is, we suppose, no solid ground to contend that they
have any inherent or general power to issue commercial securities,
and the true doctrine is that they can only do so by virtue of ex-
press legislative authority, which must exist in fact and which ought
regularly to-be-recited in the bond. And in respect to municipal
or chartered corporations, our opinion, as shown in a preceding
section, is that they also have no such inherent power, and no power
whatever except so far as conferred expressly or by fair implication.
This is an important principle; and it results therefrom that there is
no presumption in favor of the power to issue such securities, espe-
cially on the part of quasi corporations; and it would seem to follow
that if the bonds of municipal or public corporations contain no
recital as to the authority for their issue or their purpose, there
is no presumption in favor of their validity, and it devolves on
the holder to aver and show by evidence aliunde that the bonds
were issued for some purpose authorized by statute. And hence,
also, as a matter of pleading, the authority or power to issue the
bonds in suit ought to appear on the face of the declaration, or
by some recital in the bonds made part thereof; that is, it should
thus appear that they were issued for some purpose authorized by
statute.1
answer to this proposition to say that this Mode of pleading defences. The plea of
suit is brought solely for a recovery upon the general issue in assumpsit in States
the bonds and coupons, and no question where that mode of pleading is yet allowed,
growing out of the liability of the town for puts in issue the question of the authority
the subscription to the stock can be in- of the officers to issue the bonds and the
quired into in this suit."
bona fides of the plaintiff, but presump-
1 Thayer v. Montgomery Co., 3 Dillon tively the plaintiff is a holder for value
C. C. R. 389, and note ; Kennard v. Cass before maturity, without notice; the con-
County, Ib. 147; Nashville v. Ray, 19 trary must be shown by the defendant.
Wall. 468.
Chambers County v. Clews, 21 Wall. 317
Mode of declaring on bonds and coupons. (1874); Pendleton County v. Amy, 13
Kennard v. Cass County, 3 Dillon C. C. Wall. 297. Special plea erroneously held
R. 147, and cases cited in note on p. 150;
bad considered as amounting to the gen-
Thayer v. Montgomery County, supra. A eral issue ; and as the erroneous ruling
declaration on bonds against a municipal was harmless, the judgment was not re-
corporation having no general authority versed. Ib. Answer denying that plain-
to issue commercial paper, to be sufficient tiff is the owner, holder, or bearer of the
on demurrer, must show, either by aver. coupons in suit good on general demurrer.
ment or in the copies of the bonds an- Pendleton County v. Amy, 13 Wall. 297.
nexed, that the defendant had power to Proof of execution of bond when denied
issue them. It is not sufficient to allege under oath. Under the legislation of Al-
generally that it had full power and au abama, non assumpsit does not involve the
thority to execute the bonds. Hopper v. factum of the bonds. Chambers County
Covington, 118 U. S. 148.
v. Clews, 21 Wall. 317 (1874). Corpora-
1
$ 510
577
CONTRACTS : INTERNAL IMPROVEMENT BONDS.
§ 510. Bridges as Works of Internal Improvement; Validity of
Bonds issued therefor. In many States negotiable securities have
been issued under statute provisions authorizing the making of inter-
nal improvements. In a case in the Supreme Court of the United
States ? the question arose as to whether a toll-bridge was a work of
tion may plead nil debet and non est I Dodge Co. Comm’rs v. Chandler, 96
factum. Grand Chute v. Winegar, 15 U.S. 205 (1877). Works of internal im-
Wall. 355 (1872). Defence of non est provement definei. Fremont Building
factum sustained. Coler v. Cleburne, 131 Assoc. v. Sherwin, 6 Neb. 48 (1877); Bur-
U. S. 162 (1889). Here the statute pro- lington Tp. v. Beasley, 94 U. S. 310 ;
vided for the issue of bonds by cities, and Guernsey v. Burlington Tp., 4 Dillon, 372
directed that such bonds should be signed (1877); Lewis v. Sherman Co. Conım’rs, 5
by the mayor, and by him forwarded to the Fed. Rep. 269; ante, sec. 509, note. In the
Comptroller of the State for registration, opinion of the court in The County Com-
and a city, by proper ordinance, authorized m’rs v. Chandler, supra, it is said : “In
the issue of bonds for water-works. The approaching the solution of these ques-
bonds were dated Janurary 1, 1884. The tions, the first inquiry that naturally pre-
term of the mayor then in office expired sents itself is, whether a toll-bridge, like
in April following, and be was succeeded that referred to, is a public bridge, and
by a new officer. In July, 1884, the com- hence a work of internal improvement.
mon council, by resolution, requested the And we can hardly refrain from express-
ex-mayor, whose name had been engraved ing surprise that there should be any
on the coupons, to sign the bonds. Ho doubt on the subject. What was the
did so, adding the word “Mayor" after bridge built for, if not fit for public use?
his signature, and forwarded the bonds to Certainly not for the mere purpose of
the Comptroller, who duly registered them. spanning the Platte River as an arcbi.
In an action upon coupons brought by a tectural ornament, however beuutiful it
bona fide holder for value, the Supreme may be as a work of art ; nor for the pri.
Court of the United States held that as the vate use of the common council and their
statute provided for the signing and for families ; nor even for the exclusive use of
warding of the bonds by the mayor, the the citizens of Fremont. All persons, of
mayor at the time of signing was the only whatever place, condition, or quality, are
officer having power to sign and forward entitled to use it as a public thoroughfare
them, and that the city could not designate for crossing the river.
for crossing the river. The fact that they
any other person to act in his stead.
are required to pay toll for its use does not
“Bona fide purchasers of municipal bonds affect the question in the slightest degree.
must,” said the court, “take the risk of Turnpikes are public highways, notwith-
the official character of those who execute standing the exaction of toll for passing
them.” The city is not estopped from on them. Railroads are public highways,
defending upon the facts, and these facts and are the only works of internal improve-
established its plea of non est factum. This ment specially named in the Act; yet no
case is controlled by the principle of An- one can travel on them without paying
thony v. County of Jasper, 101 U. S. 693, toll. Railroads, turnpikes, bridges, ferries,
and is to be distinguished from Weyauwega are all things of public concern, and the
v. Ayling, 99 U. S. 112, and is held to be right to erect them is a public right. If
analogous to Amy v. Watertown, No. 1, it be conceded to a private individual
130 U. S. 301.
or corporation, it is conceded as a public
Remedy at law. A corporation cannot franchise; and the right to take toll is
be relieved against its bond in equity if granted as a compensation for erecting the
the ground for relief shows a complete de- work, and relieving the public treasury
fence or an adequate remedy at law. Grand from the burden thereof. Those who have
Chute v. Winegar (case in equity), 15 such franchises are agents of the public.
Wall. 373.
They have, it is true, a private interest in
VOL. I. — 37
578
§ 511
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
internal improvement for which bonds might under the statute legally
be issued to aid in building. The court held that “all bridges in-
tended and used as thoroughfares are public highways, whether sub-
ject to toll or not, and that county bonds which have been issued
under a statute authorizing the issue of such bonds in aid of an
internal improvement are valid when given for the building of a
bridge which is a thoroughfare, though tolls are charged thereon
by the county. Whether the county has the right to demand tolls
over a bridge which is a thoroughfare will not affect the validity of
county bonds issued to aid in the construction of the bridge.”
§ 511. The Law of Railroad Aid Bonds; the Law on this Subject
as developed in the Federal Courts. Where the policy of burden-
ing the future has been sanctioned by the legislature, the courts
have to deal with the legal rights of the municipality on the one
hand and with those of the holders of its obligations on the other.
The determination of their legal rights involves inquiries as com-
the tolls; but the works are public and which have been built by private individ-
subject to public regulation, and the entire uals, and which have been surrendered
public has the right to use them. These or dedicated to the use of the public.'
principles are so elementary in the com- Chancellor Kent says, "The privilege of
mon law that we can hardly open our books making a road or establishing a ferry, and
without seeing them recognized or illus- taking tolls for the use of the same, is a fran-
trated. Of course there may be private chise, and the public have an interest in
bridges as there may be private ways, and the same ; and the owners of the franchise
they are put in the same category by the are answerable in damages if they should
text-writers; but all bridges intended and refuse to transport an individual without
used as thoroughfares are public highways, any reasonable excuse, upon being paid or
whether subject to toll or not. Regularly, tendered the usual rate of fare. In the
all public bridges are a county charge, and same connection he enumerates in this
the county is bound to erect and maintain class of franchises, ferries, bridges, turn-
them ; but others may be charged with pikes, and railroads. In our judgment the
this duty, and a toll is the commonest of bridge in question is a public bridge and a
means for obtaining compensation for its work of internal improvement within the
performance. In Angell on Highways it meaning of the statute.” In Dawson Co.
is said that public bridges may be divided v. McNamar, 10 Neb. 276 (1880); S. C.
into three classes : 'First, those which 4 N. W. R. 991, it was held that under
belong to the public, as State, county, or the statute of Nebraska a court-house is not
township bridges, over which all people an internal improvement, and that a recital
have a right to pass without or with pay in the bonds that they were issued under
ing toll : these are built by public author. authority of the aforesaid “internal im-
ity at the public expense, either of the provement acts" did not invalidate the
State itself or of a district or portion of bonds, inasmuch as there was implied
the State. Secondly, those which have authority found elsewhere in the Act,
been built by companies (like turnpike whose provisions had been substantially
and railroad companies), or at the expense observed. Steam grist-mill not an internal
of private individuals, over which all per improvement. Supra, sec. 508, note.
sons have a right to pass on the payment Water-power for public grist-mill is such
of a toll fixed by law. Thirdly, those a work. Supra, sec. 508, note.
$ 511
579
CONTRACTS: RAILWAY AID BONDS.
plicated as they are important. The law on this subject is sub-
stantially the growth of the last few years. The decisions in the
various State and Federal courts are very numerous, and on some
points conflicting. It is impossible, were it even desirable, to
1 Ante, chap. vi. sec. 153 et seq. Since any special and peculiar provision of the
the decision of the Supreme Court of State Constitution, but upon general prin-
Michigan, in The People v. Township ciples of law, and related to contracts, the
Board of Salem, 20 Mich. 452 ; s. C. 9 case was not one in which the decision of
Ann. Law Reg. (N. s.) 487, before men- the State court had any other than a
tioned (ante, sec. 157), the question arose persuasive force; and it reversed the
in the United States circuit court for judgment of the circuit court, and held
the Western district of Michigan, in an that the bonds could be enforced.
action on municipal railway aid bonds, Rights in respect of negotiable bonds,
whether the Federal court was concluded accruing under a construction given by
by the judgment of the Supreme Court the highest court of the State will not be
of the State, and if not, whether the affected in the Federal court by a subse-
holder of bonds issued in full compliance quent change of decisions in the State
with the statute could recover thereon. court. Anderson v. Santa Anna, 116 U. S.
Emmons, Circuit Judge, in an elaborate 356 (1885). In suits upon negotiable
opinion, holds, as to bonds issued before bonds issued before any construction of
the decision of the Supreme Court of the the State laws by the State Supreme
State, that the Federal courts are not con- Court, the subsequent construction of
cluded thereby, and that the constitution- those laws by such court is not conclusive
al power of the legislature to authorize on the Federal courts. Anderson v. Santa
their issue, in the absence of special lim- Anna, supra. A constitutional provision
itations, must be regarded as settled, at requiring that two-thirds of the qualified
least as respects the Federal tribunals. voters shall assent requires only two-thirds
The opinion displays great research and of those actually voting at the election.
learning, and will be found reported un- Carroll County v. Smith, 111 U. S. 556 ;
der the name of Talcott ». Township of following St. Joseph Township v. Rogers,
Pine Grove, vol. i. Bench and Bar (N. S.), 16 Wall. 644 ; County of Cass v. John-
50 (1872). The Supreme Court of Mich- ston, 95 U. S. 360 (ante, sec. 44, note);
igan adheres to its opinion on this sub- disregarding Hawkins v. Carroll County,
ject in the later case of The People v. 50 Miss. 735, the bondholders' rights hav-
State Treasurer, 23 Mich. 499. The ing been acquired before such decision was
course of reasoning of Emmons, J., in this made. Post, secs. 515, 517, and cases, cited.
case is coincident with that of the Su- In Gilchrist v. Little Rock, 1 Dillon C.
preme Court of the United States in the C. R. 201, and in Ranlett v. Leavenworth,
case of Olcott v. Fond du Lac Sup., 16 Ib. 263, the circuit court of the United
Wall. 678 (1872). In the case just men- States for the eighth circuit, prior to any
tioned the circuit court of the United decisions of the Supreme Courts of the
States, sitting in Wisconsin, decided that States of Arkansas and Kansas as to the
since the Supreme Court of that State constitutional validity of municipal rail-
had held a certain act under which the way aid bonds, declined to pronounce
bonds in question were issued to be un- such bonds in the hands of bona fide holil-
constitutional, and had never holden oth- ers to be void for the want of authority
erwise, that this construction, though in the State legislature to authorize their
given after the bonds were issued, was issue. History, of the well-known Iowa
binding upon or should be followed by the municipal bond cases.' King v. Wilson,
Federal courts. But the Supreme Court 1 Dillon C. C. R. 555. The word "aid”
of the United States was of the opinion as used in the statute of Nebraska in-
that, inasmuch as the decision of the cludes the power to make "donations” to
State Supreme Court was not based upon railroads. State v. Babcock, 19 Neb. 230.
580
§ 512
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
compass within the limits of a single chapter all the learning,
and to refer to all the cases, upon the subject of municipal secur-
ities. It will not be attempted. By reason of the greater favor
with which the rights of the holders of such securities have been
regarded by the Supreme Court of the United States, the volume
of municipal bond litigation has of late years taken place in the
Federal courts. It is, therefore, necessary to consider the law
on this subject as determined by the Supreme Court of the
United States; and our object will be to show exactly the doc-
trines and principles which have received the sanction of that
tribunal, and to illustrate, as far as needful, their application in
particular instances, referring incidentally or for further illus-
tration to the decisions of the State courts on the subjects or
topics discussed. The Supreme Court of the United States has
upheld the rights of the holders of municipal securities with a
strong hand, and has set a face of flint against repudiation, even
when made on legal grounds deemed solid by the State courts, as
well as by municipalities which had been deceived and defrauded.
That such securities have any general value left is largely due
to the course of adjudication in respect thereto by the Supreme
Court, and the reliance which is felt by the public that it will
stand firmly by the doctrines it has so frequently asserted.
§ 512. Form of Bond; Condition. — Municipal bonds, in the
usual form, containing words of negotiability, with coupons
attached, are absolute, and not conditional, promises to pay, and
hence are negotiable with all the incidents of negotiability. Such
bonds are held to be negotiable notwithstanding they contain
such a recital as the following: “This bond is issued for the
purpose of subscribing to the capital stock of the Fort Scott and
Allen County Railroad, and for the construction of the same through
the said township, in pursuance of and in accordance with an act
of the legislature of the State of Kansas, entitled 'An Act, to
enable municipal townships to subscribe for stock in any railroad,
and to provide for the payment of the same, approved February
1 "The Federal courts, which have tion were a doubtful one, a construction
with great unanimity sustained the valid- should be given to the statute which up-
ity of municipal bonds, should hesitate holds the bonds, rather than one which
long before accepting the forced and nar- turns them to ashes in the hands of the
row interpretation contended for by the bona fide holder." Coxe, J., in Rich v.
defendant. These solemn obligations, is- Town of Mentz, 18 Fed. Rep. 52. To
sued to invite the investors of the world, same effect, Shelley 2. Charles County, 17
should not be invalidated except for grave Fed. Rep. 909, per McCrary, J..
and serious infirmities. Even if the ques-
512
581
CONTRACTS: RAILWAY AID BONDS.
25, 1870;' and for the payment of the said sum of money and
accruing interest thereon, in manner aforesaid, upon the performance
of the said condition, the faith of the aforesaid Humboldt Township,
as also its property, revenue, and resources, is pledged;" the court
holding that the construction of the road through the township
was not a condition upon which payment was to be made.
1 Humboldt Township v. Long, 92 in blank as to date. Jackson Co. Sup. v.
U. S. 644 (1875); 3 Cent. Law Jour. 494. Brush, 77 Ill. 59 (1875).
Infra, sec. 513, and note. In giving its Power to substitute other bonds. Lynde
judgment, in the cas o above cited, the v. Winnebago County, 16 Wall. 6; McKee
court says : “Relying upon this clause v. Vernon, 3 Dillon C. C. R. 210.
of the certificate, the township coutends Coupons; l'orm of Instrument. - Ma-
that the construction of the railroad ker suable thereon in assumpsit, where
through the township was a condition the bonds are made by the defendant cor-
upon which the payment was agreed to poration and refer to the coupon, though
be made. We thiuk, however, this is not the latter, signed by the agents of the cor-
the true construction of the contract. poration, is in the form of an order or
The construction of the road as well as check on a bank named therein. Town
the subscription for stock was mentioned of Queensbury v. Culver, 19 Wall. 83
in the recital as the reasons why the town- (1873). Cases as to the form of coupons,
ship entered into the contract, not as con- see Daniel on Neg. Instr., secs. 1492-
ditions upon which its performance was 1496. May be made payable beyond lim-
made to depend. It was for the purpose its of the State, unless specially restrained
of subscribing, and to aid in the construc- by statute. Lynde v. Winnebago County,
tion of the road, that the bond was given. 16 Wall. 6. Coupons when severed from
The words ' upon the performance of the the bonds are independent claims and may
said condition' cannot, then, refer to any- be sued on as such. Kuox Co. Comni'rs
thing inentioned in the recital, for there V. Aspinwall, 21 How. 539, 546. Supra,
is no condition there.
A much more sec. 486, note. Limitations of actions on.
reasonable construction is, that they refer Clark v. Iowa City, 20 Wall. 583; supra,
to a former part of the bond, where the sec. 486, note. When payable to bearer
annual interest is stipulated to be payable or order are negotiable instruments. Ib.;
at a banker's, 'on the presentation and Aurora City v. West, 7 Wall. 82 ; Gel-
surrender of the respective interest cou pecke v. Dubuque, 1 Wall. 175. Instance
pons. Such presentation and surrender where form of coupon was held not to give
is the only coudition mentioned in the it a negotiable character. Myers v. York,
instrument. But that stipulation pre- &c. R. R. Co. 43 Me. 282; but quære, and
sents no such contingency as destroys the see Woods v. Lawrence County, 1 Black,
negotiability of the instrument, It is 386.
what is always implied in every promis- How signed. — The coupons, where the
sory note or bill of exchange, that it is to honds are properly signed and sealed, may
be presented, and surrendered when paid. be signed by a printed fac-simile of the
As well might it be said that a note pay- maker's autograph, adopted for the pur-
able on demand is payable upon a contin pose, although there is no statute author-
gency, and therefore non-negotiable, as to izing it. Pennington v. Baehr, 48 Cal.
affirin that one payable on its presentation 565 ; s. C. 2 Cent. Law Jour. 92 ; see
.and surrender is, for that reason, destitute McKee v. Vernon Co., 3 Dillon C. C.
of negotiability. See also, Hotchkiss v. R. 210 ; Lynde v. County, 16 Wall. 6;
Nat. Banks, 21 Wall. 354 (1874). As to State v. Terrebonne Parish Police Jury
form of bonds, seal, place of payment and 30 La. An. 287 ; Neeley v. Yorkville, 10
delivery, see cases cited Daniel on Neg: S. C. 141. Mistakes corrected in equity.
Instr., secs. 1492–1499. Cannot be issued Where a town voted to issue railway aid
582
§ 513
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
$ 513. Such Bonds are Negotiable Securities. — The following
doctrines are too well settled to be any longer open to question. A
bona fide purchaser of negotiable paper for value, before maturity,
takes it freed from all infirmities in its origin, unless it is absolutely
void for want of power in the maker to issue it, or its circulation
is by law prohibited. Municipal bonds, payable to bearer, are
subject to the same rules as other negotiable paper. A purchaser
of a municipal bond from a bona fide holder, who obtained it for
value before maturity, takes it free from equities, though he him-
self may have had notice thereof.2 An overdue and unpaid coupon
for interest, attached to a municipal bond which has several years
to run, does not render the bond and the subsequently maturing
coupons dishonored paper, so as to subject them, in the hands of
an innocent purchaser for value, to defences good against the
original holder. A bona fide purchaser for value of negotiable
483.
bonds to run 20 years, with the right to Nat. Bank of Nashville, 103 U. S. 770 ;
pay them in 10 years, and the bonds were Burleigh v. Rochester, 5 Fed. Rep. 667.
printed and issued, by mistake, without A municipal bond in the usual form is not
the option clause, a proceeding in equity rendered non-negotiable by a provision
to correct them, brought by the town that it should be “payable at the pleasure
against holders who had purchased them of the obligor at any time before due."
with full knowledge of the facts, was sus- Ackley School District v. Hall, 113 U. S.
tained. Town of Essex v. Day, 52 Conn. 135 (1884). Supra, sec. 512. Bonds pay.
able on the completion of a railroad and to
1 Cromwell v. Sac Co., 96 U, S. 51 bearer only, held not negotiable as being
(1877); ante, sec. 512; Baes v. Hewitt, payable on a contingency which might
20 Wis. 460 ; Gorgier v. Mieville, 3 B. never happen, and for want of certainty
& C. 45 ; Brooks v. Mitchell, 9 M. & W. as to the payee.
Blackman v. Lehman,
15; Goodwin v. Robarts, L. R. 1 App. 63 Ala. 547. As to negotiability of coul-
Cas. 476 ; Goodnian v. Harvey, 4 A. & E. pons which are due, detached from mu-
870 ; Burnham v. Brown, 23 Me. 400; nicipal bonds not due, see Thompson v.
Oridge v. Sherborne, 11 M. & W. 374; Perrine, 106 U. S. 589. An ordinary mu- .
United States v. Union Pacific R. R. CO., nicipal bond, negotiable in form, is “a
91 U. S. 72; Miller v. Race, 1 Burr. 452; promissory note negotiable by the law
White v. V. & M. R. CO., 21 How. 575; merchant," within the meaning of the Act
Moran v. Miami County, 2 Black, 722 of March 3, 1875, which allows instru-
(1862); Mercer County v. Hacket, 1 ments of that class to be sued on in the
Wall. 83 ; Gelpcke v. Dubuque, 1 Wall. Federal courts, by an assignee, notwith-
175; San Antonio v. Lane, 32 Tex. 405; standing the assignor could not have sued
Lexington v. Butler, 14 Wall. 282 ; St. thereon in such courts if no assignment
Joseph v. Rogers, 16 Wall. 644 (1872); had been made. New Providence v.
Humboldt v. Long, 92 U. S. 642 ; Macon Halsey, 117 U. S. 336 (1885); Ackley
Co. v. Shores, 97 U. S. 272; Calhoun Co. School District v. Hall, 113 U. S. 135.
Sup. v. Galbraith, 99 U. S. 214; Comin'rs Colorable and collusive transfers to citizen
v. Block, 99 U. S. 686 ; Block v. Bourbon of another State of bonds and coupons will
Co. Comm’rs, 99 U, S. 686 ; Marshall not give the Federal court jurisdiction.
Co. Sup. v. Schenck, 5 Wall. 784; New Farmington v. Pillsbury, 114 U. S. 138.
Providence v. Halsey, 117 U. S. 336; 2 Cromwell 1. Sac Co., 96 U. S. 51
Ottawa 2:. First Nat. Bank of Portsmouth, (1877). Ante, sec. 486.
105 U. S. 342; Wilson County v. Third 8 Cromwell v. Sac Co., 96 U. S. 51
§ 515
583
CONTRACTS : MUNICIPAL BOND CASES.
securities before their maturity may recover against the maker the
full amount of them, though he may have paid for them less than
their par value.
§ 514. Lis Pendens not applicable.
Another doctrine estab-
lished in reference to such securities is that the principle of lis
pendens is not applicable thereto. There may be actions pend-
ing regarding the bonds, but this will not affect the purchaser with
constructive notice. It is a general rule that all persons dealing
with real property are bound to take notice of a suit pending with
regard to the title thereof, and will, at their peril, purchase the
the same from any of the parties to the suit. But this rule does
not apply to negotiable securities purchased before maturity.2
§ 515. Course of Decision in the Supreme Court of the United
States. — In municipal bond cases the Supreme Court of the
United States does not hold itself concluded by decisions of the
State courts made after the bonds have been negotiated, unless
possibly where the question is one exclusively depending upon the
construction of local and peculiar provisions of the State Consti-
tution or enactments.3 It has rejected, when necessary to protect
(1877) ; Goodman v. Simonds, 20 How. Sav. Bank, 97 U, S. 110; Orleans v. Platt,
343; Murray v. Lardner, 2 Wall. 110; Nat. 99 U. S. 676; Cass Co. v. Gillette, 100
Bank of N. A. v. Kirby, 108 Mass. 497. U. S. 585. The pendency of a suit relating
1 Cromwell v. Sac Co., 96 U. S. 51 to the validity of negotiable paper not yet
(1877); Lay v. Wissman, 36 Iowa, 305; due is not constructive notice to subse-
Nat. Bank of Mich. v. Green, 33 Iowa, 140 ; quent holders thereof before maturity; and
Park Bank v. Watson, 42 N. Y. 490 ; this rule cannot be changed by State laws
Fowler v. Strickland, 107 Mass. 552 ; or decisions, so as to affect the rights of
Stoddard v. Kimball, 6 Cush. (Mass.) 469; persons outside the State. Enfield v. Jor-
Allaire v. Hartshorne, 1 Zab. (21 N. J. L.) dan, 119 U. S. 680 (1886). Scotland
665 ; Williams v. Smith, 2 Hill (N. Y.), County v. Hill, 132 U. S. 107 (1889).
301 ; Chicopee Bank v. Chapin, 8 Met. Although it is held by the Supreme Court
(Mass.) 40. As to power of a city or muni- of Illinois that a municipal corporation
cipality to sell, or to agree to sell, or dis- cannot lawfully make its obligations paya-
pose of its bonds or obligations for less ble at any other place than the office of the
than their par value. Memphis v. Brown, treasurer (ante, sec. 506, note), yet if thus
20 Wall. 289 (1873); Shirk v. Pulaski made payable, it does not affect the valid-
County, 4 Dillon, 209 (1877); Mayor of ity of the bond, or charge the bona fide
Nashville v. Ray, 19 Wall. 468 (1873). holder with notice of judicial proceedings
2 Leitch v. Wells, 48 N. Y. 586 ; Stone between a previous holder and a municipal-
v. Elliott, 11 Ohio St. 252; Kieffer v. ity so as to work an estoppel. Enfield v.
Ehler, 18 Pa. St. 388; Durant v. Iowa Jordan, supra.
Co., 1 Woolw. 69; Winston v. Westfeldt, 8 Gelpcke v. Dubuque, 1 Wall. 175
22 Ala. 760 ; Olcott v. Supervisors, 16 (1865); Havemeyer 0. Iowa County, 3
Wall. 678; National Bank v. Texas, 20 Wall. 294; Thompson v. Lee County, Ib.
Wall. 72; Minns v. West, 38 Ga. 18; 327 ; Lee County v. Rogers, 7 Wall. 181.
Warren v. Marcy, 97 U. S. 96 ; Warren v. See particularly on this point, Olcntt v.
Post, 97 U. S. 110; Warren v. Portsmouth Fond du Lac Sup., 16 Wall. 678 (1872);
584
§ 515
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
the bona fide holders of such securities, narrow and rigid construc-
tions of statutes and charters authorizing the creation of such debts.
Butz v. Muscatine, 8 Wall. 575, explained; the company, La doctrine denied in this
Carroll Co. Sup. v. United States, 18 court, in the Supreme Court of Pennsyl.
Wall. 71; Chicago v. Sheldon, 9 Wall. vania, and even in the Court of Appeals of
50; Pine Grove Tp. v. Talcott, 19 Wall. New York. People v. Mead, 24 N. Y. 124 ;
666; Elinwood v. Marcy, 92 U. S. 289 The Town of Venice v. Breed, 65 Barb.
(1875); Anderson v. Santa Anna, 116 597. They assert, also, that where an
U. S. 356 ; Claiborne County r. Brooks, authority is given to an officer to execute
111 U. S. 400 ; Taylor v. Ypsilanti, 105 and issue bonds (on the assent of two-
U. S. 60, following Douglass v. County of thirds of the voters of a town, the assent
Pike, 101 U. S. 677, where Chief Justice to be obtained by the officer, and filed in
Waite said, “The rights of the parties are a public office, with an affidavit verifying
to be determined according to the law as the assent), the verification amounts to
it was judicially construed to be when the nothing, subserves no purpose, and that
bonds in question were put on the market a bona fide holder of the bonds is bound to
as commercial paper.
New Buffalo v. prove that the requisite number of voters
Cambria Iron Co., 105 U. S. 73; Ralls did actually assent. They assert this as
County v. Douglass, 105 U. S. 728; Foote a.general proposition. They do not as-
v. Johnson Co., 5 Dill. 208 (1878); Cass sert that the statute so declares, or that
Co. v. Johnson, 95 U. S. 360 ; Cutler v. such is even its implied requisition. There
Board, &c., 56 Miss. 115 ; Vicksburg v. is, therefore, before us no such case of the
Lombard, 51 Miss. 126 ; ante, sec. 511; construction of a State statute by State
post, sec. 517; Kenosha v. Lamson, 9 courts as requires us to yield our own con-
Wall. 477; Campbell v. Kenosha, 5 Wall. victions of the right, and blindly follow
194 (1866). Read last two cases in con- the lead of others, eminent as we freely
nection with Foster v. Kenosha, 12 Wis. concede they are.". Infra, scc. 517.
616, which, in effect, is overruled or dis- Where a railroad company procured
regarded. See on this point Steines v. negotiable bonds to be issued by a town
Franklin County, 48 Mo. 167 ; Columbia under a statute, which was afterwards de-
County v. King, 13 Fla. 451.
clared unconstitutional, and the railroad
In speaking of the force of the State court sold and transferred them to citizens of
decisions in the Federal courts in this class another State, who, in an action in the
of cases, Mr. Justice Strong, in Venice v. Federal court, fixed the liability of the
Murdock, 92 U. S. 494 (1875), holds this town for the whole issue, it was held
language : “It is argued, however, that that the town had a good cause of action
the New York decisions (Starin v. Genoa; against the railroad company for the
Gould v. Sterling, 23 N. Y. 439, 456) are amount of the bonds and interest, on the
judicial constructions of a statute of that ground that its act in procuring and nego-
State, and, therefore, that they furnish a tiating the bonds was without authority of
rule by which we must be guided. The law and wrongful. Town of Plain view v.
argument would have force if the decisions, Winona & St. Peter R. R. Co., 36 Minn.
in fact, presented a clear case of statutory 505. The soundness of this conclusion is,
construction. But they do not. They perhaps, not so obvious as to prevent re-
are not attempts at interpretation. They agitation of the question. In State v.
would apply as well to the execution of Holladay, 72 Mo. 499, it was held that
powers or authorities granted by private where a State court had declared certain
persons as they do to the issue of bonds bonds issued in aid of a railroad void and
under the statute of April 16, 1852. They the courts of the United States afterwards
assert general principles, to wit, that per- held them valid, the State court cannot
sons empowered to borrow money and give deem them such absolute nullities as not
bonds therefor, for the purpose of paying to be the subject of compromise.
it to an improvement company, are not 1 Gelpcke v. Dubuque, supra ; Meyer
authorized to deliver the bonds directly to v. Muscatine (charter authorizing horrow-
$ 515
585
CONTRACTS: MUNICIPAL BOND CASES.
Against such holders it has given no favor to defences based upon
mere irregularities in the issue of the bonds or upon non-compliance
with preliminary requirements, not going to the question of
power to issue them i
It has held that tlie circuit courts of
the United States were clothed with full authority, by mandanus
or otherwise, to enforce the collection of judgments rendered
therein on such bonds, and that this authority could not be in-
terfered with to the injury of the creditor, either by the legislature
or the judiciary of the States. It has upheld and protected the
rights of such creditors with a firm hand, disregarding, at times,
it would seem, or holding to be inapplicable, principles which it
applied in other cases, and asserting the jurisdiction and authority
of the Federal courts with such striking energy and vigor as appar-
ently, but perhaps not actually, to trench upon the lawful rights of
the States and the acknowledged powers of the State tribunals.
Upon the whole, however, there is little doubt that its course has
had the approval of the profession in general and of the public, and
the result ought to teach municipalities the lesson that if, having
the power conferred upon them, they issue negotiable securities,
they cannot escape payment if these find their way into the hands
of innocent purchasers. Unfortunately, as will presently appear,
the decisions upon this important subject in the Supreme Court of
the nation and those in some of the State courts are not in all
respects harmonious.3
ing of money), 1 Wall. 384; Rogers o. power to aid railways are considered in a
Burlington, 3 Wall. 654 ; Van Hostrup previous chapter. Distinction between
v. Madison City, 1 Wall. 291 ; Seybert i municipal " donation " to a railroad com- .
Pittsburg, Ib. 272. If the Supreme Court pany and a municipal "subscription" to
cannot be said to have adopted liberal con- its stock. Hamilton County v. State, 115
structions of statutes authorizing the issue Ind. 64 (1888); s. C. 22 Eng. & Am. Corp.
of bonds, it may be indisputably affirmed Cases, 108, and note; 15 West. Rep. 329.
that it has, in such cases, held the munici- Reference to decisions construing State
pality firmly to the practical construction statutes authorizing municipal aid to rail-
it had put upon the enabling acts. ways, as to requisites of petitions, notice,
1 Knox County v. Aspin wall, 21 How. regularity, and sufficiency of elections, see
539 ; Moran v. Comm’rs, 2 Black, 722; 22 Eng. & Am. Corp. Cases, 19, note, 47,
Bissell v. Jeffersonville, 24 How. 287; note, 54, note, 71, note. The United
Marsh v. Fulton County, 10 Wall. 676 States Circuit Court for the Northern Dis.
(1870); Louisiana v. Wood, 102 U. S. trict of Ohio, before Jackson, J., in the
294.
case of Fellows v. Walker, Auditor, 39
2 Von Hoffman v. Quincy, 4 Wall. 535; Fed. Rep. 651, refused to enjoin the issue
Galena v. Amy, 5 Wall. 705 ; Riggs v. of municipal bonds under an act author-
Johnson County, 6 Wall. 166 ; Butz v. izing the issue of such bonds by the city
Muscatine, 8 Wall. 575. See, also, post, of Toledo to secure natural gas for public
chap. xx. on Mandamus, and cases there and private use. The court considered
cited.
the object authorized by the act to be a
8 The general questions relating to the public, as distinguished from a private,
586
§ 517
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
$ 516 (416 a). Same subject. — Under the line of decision in
the several States heretofore adverted to, sustaining the constitution-
ality of municipal railway aid bonds,1 millions upon millions of these
securities have been issued by townships, counties, and cities in
the different States, and sooner or later their issue has been often
followed by attempts to escape payment. The misrepresentations
which have oftentimes induced the issue of the bonds, and the
disappointment arising from the over-estimated benefits of the rail-
roads to the localities which aided their construction, make the
attempts to avoid payment of the bonds not unnatural, and more
excusable than they would otherwise be. The judicial history of
these attempts is found in the law reports of the different States
and in those of the Federal tribunals; and a comparison of their
judgments shows such a diversity of opinion upon some important
questions connected with such securities as to render it most ex-
pedient to refer separately to the decisions of the two classes of
courts. It is particularly inaterial to notice. with some fulness
and care the opinions of the Supreme Court of the United States,
since, for the reasons above mentioned, the course of this tribunal
and of the State tribunals has been such as to draw to the Federal
courts in most of the States nearly all of the litigation arising
froin this source.
Wherein the State courts and the Federal courts
differ, and wherein they agree, will best appear by referring to
some of the principal adjudications.
§ 517 (416 6). Iowa Muncipal Bond Cases. —- In the well-known
Iowa municipal railway aid bond cases, the bonds were issued after
the State Supreme Court had affirmed the constitutional power of
the legislature to authorize their issue, and before the same court
had reversed its holding in this respect; and in these cases the Su-
preme Court of the United States held it was at liberty to take, and
object, and that no sufficient case of clear of the State and Federal courts upon the
and irreparable injury was shown to justi- subject of municipal railway aid bonds in
fy the enjoining of the issue of the bonds. Iowa. That obligations of contracts can-
Ante, chap. vi. sec. 153 et seq.
not be impaired by subsequent decisions,
1 Ante, sec. 153 et seq.
see, also, Chicago v. Sheldon, 9 Wall. 50;
2 Gelpcke v. Dubuque, 1 Wall. 175 City v. Lamson, Ib. 477 (1869); County of
(1865); Thomson v. Lee County, 3 Wall. Randolph v. Post, 93 U. S. 502 ; Am. L.
327 (1865) ; Havemeyer v. Iowa County, Ins. Co. v. Bruce, 105 U.S. 328 ; Pana v.
Ib. 294 ; Rogers v. Burlington, Ib. 654 Bowler, 107 U. S. 529 ; Oregon 2. Jen-
(1865); Mitchell 2. Burlington, 4 Wall. nings, 119 U. S. 74 ; Concord v. Robin-
270; ante, sec. 516; Lee County v. Kngers, son, 121 U. S. 165. The five cases last
7 Wall. 181 (1868); Butz v. Muscatine, 8 cited, distinguished in German Sav. Bank
Wall. 575. King v. Wilson, 1 Dillon C. C. v. Franklin Co., 128 U. S. 526 (1888);
555 (1871), gives a review of the decisions Parmlee v. Chicago, 60 Ill. 267 (1871).
§ 517
587
CONTRACTS: IOWA MUNICIPAL BOND CASES.
it did take, the view which obtained in the highest judicial tribunal
of the State at the time the bonds were issued; and hence it ad-
judged that the bonds were binding upon and enforceable against the
municipalities and counties, although the Supreme Court of the State
was at the same time holding that, under the Constitution and laws
of Iowa, the bonds were utterly void. Subsequently the Supreme
Court of the United States went further, and held that such bonds
in the hands of innocent holders are valid, although the State Su-
preme Court had held otherwise, the latter basing its judgment,
however, upon the general principles of the law, and not upon any
special and peculiar provision of the Constitution of the State.1 It
seems to be the doctrine of the United States Supreme Court upon
this subject, that it is not concluded by the decisions of the State
courts in any case where they are first made after the bonds are issued
and have been sold in the markets; and such is undoubtedly its
doctrine in all cases relating to this class of securities, where the
questions involved do not turn upon the construction of peculiar
provisions of the State Constitution and laws. It has not decided
that it would hold valid bonds issued after the Supreme Court of the
State had held them to be invalid, and it would not probably so hold,
since such a doctrine is not necessary to protect the innocent owners
of such securities, and would involve the consequence of the Federal
courts setting up a policy in a State contrary to its Constitution and
laws as expounded by its authorized and rightful tribunals.3
1 Olcott v. Fond du Lac Sup., 16 Wall. preme Court, says : "This interpretation
678 (1872); ante, sec. 511, note.
[of the Supreme Court of Illinois] accom-
% Ante, sec. 515, and note.
panied all bonds subsequently issued into
8 King v. Wilson, 1 Dillon C. C. R. the hands of whoever took then, whether
555 (1871); Commercial Bank v. Iola, 2 a bona fide holder or not. This court must
Dillon C. Č. R. 353 (1873). See, how- recognize this decision of the Supreme
ever, on this subject, Butz v. Muscatine, Court of Illinois as an authoritative con-
8 Wall. 575 (1869); Olcott v. Fond du struction of the statute, made before the
Lac Sup., 16 Wall. 578.
bonds [in suit) were issued, and to be fol.
Since the text was written the Supreme lowed by this court. Douglass v. County
Court of the United States has distinctly of Pike, 101 U. S. 677 ; Burgess v. Selig.
decided, in accordance with the prediction man, 107 U. S. 20; Green County v.
therein, that as to bonds issued after a Conness, 109 U. S. 104 ; Anderson v.
construction of the State statute by the Santa Anna, 116 U. S. 356. In Douglass
Supreme Court of the State, such construc- v. County of Pike, supra, Waite, C. J.
tion is authoritative and binding upon the (p. 687) says: “After a statute has been
Federal courts. This subject is fully ex- settled by judicial construction, the con-
amined and discussed in German Sav. Bank struction becomes, so far as contract rights
v. Franklin County (Ill.), 128 U. S. 526, acquired under it are concerned, as much
538 (1888). In this case bonds were is- a part of the statute as the text itself.”
sued after the Supreme Court of Illinois Ante, secs. 511, 515, and notes; post, sec.
had construed the act under which they 525, note; Scotland County v. Hill, 132
were issued. Referring to this, Mr. Justice U. S. 107 (1889).
Blatchford, giving the opinion of the Su.
588
§ 519
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
§ 518 (416 c). General Result stated. — As preliminary to a more
immediate view of some of the leading cases decided by the Supreme
Court of the United States upon municipal railway aid securities,
it may be observed that the general result of its decisions has been
very clearly summarized in one of its judgments relating to bonds
of this character. Bonds, payable to bearer," says the learned jus-
tice who delivered the opinion of the court, “ issued by a municipal
corporation to aid in the construction of a railroad, if issued in pur-
suance of a power conferred by the legislature, are valid commercial
instruments; but if issued by such a corporation which possessed no
power from the legislature to grant such aid, they are invalid, even
in the hands of innocent holders. Such a power is frequently con-
ferred to be exercised in a special manner, or subject to certain regu-
lations, conditions, or qualifications; but if it appears that the bonds
issued show by their recitals that the power was exercised in the
manner required by the legislature, and that the bonds were issued
in conformity with those regulations and pursuant to those conditions
and qualifications, proof that any or all of those recitals are incorrect
will not constitute a defence to the corporation in a suit on the
bonds or coupons, if it appears that it was the sole province of the
municipal officers who executed the bonds to decide whether or not
there had been an antecedent compliance with the regulation, condi-
tion, or qualification which it is alleged was not fulfilled.” 1
It is definitely settled by this court that mere irregularities in the
exercise of the power will not avail as a defence against an innocent
holder for value, and that the only defence open against such a
holder is the want of power to issue the bonds. Obviously, then, the
most important inquiries to be considered are those which relate
to the question, when the power exists or arises; who is to decide
whether it existed or had arisen when the bonds were issued; and
what will estop the corporation which issued them to set up in de-
fence a non-compliance with antecedent or preliminary conditions :
and it is these inquiries that we shall seek to illustrate by a reference
to the leading decisions of the courts in cases which have arisen for
judgment.
§ 519. Condition precedent to Exercise of Power; Popular Vote ;
Non-compliance with Condition Precedent; Recital; restraining Is-
i St. Joseph Township v. Rogers, 16 this subject, as well as the impossibility
Wall. 644 (1872), opinion by Clifford, J. of otherwise presenting it with the requis-
In general throughout this work the authorite fulness and accuracy, has induced him
has not referred at length in the text to to depart to some extent from his usual
particular cases, but the importance of
course.
§ 519 CONTRACTS : MUNICIPAL BONDS; CONDITIONS OF ISSUE. 589
sue of Bonds. -- Generally, the power of the municipality, county, or
other local civil subdivision of the State, to subscribe for the stock
of railway companies, and issue bonds in payment, is conferred upon
certain officers, not absolutely but on the condition of a previous ap-
proving popular vote, or the assent of a majority or of some greater
proportion of the resident taxpayers. If this sanction is given, then
the officers, by the usual legislation, are authorized to make the sub-
scription and to issue bonds in payment therefor. A very common
defence to such bonds consists in a denial that the condition prece-
dent, i. e., the approving vote, the assent of the taxpayers, or what-
ever else it may be, has, in fact, been complied with; and hence,
as contended, the power to issue the bonds did not exist, or never
arose. 1
Where the legislation is of this character, — namely, requiring
compliance with some such condition before issuing the bonds,
the Supreme Court of the United States does not hold, as we under-
stand its decisions, that the power can be rightfully exercised
unless the condition precedent has been performed. As between
the immediate parties, the municipality and the railroad company,
doubtless, the inquiry is open, and fully open, whether the condition
on which the rightful exercise of the power depends has been com-
plied with; and if it has not been, on due application the issue of
the bonds will be enjoined,or if they are in the hands of the ori.
ginal party or of holders with notice, an action to enforce the bonds
may, if no estoppel exists, be successfully defended. 3 Want of
power is a good defence against a railroad company, endeavoring to
enforce by mandamus the execution and delivery to it of such bonds
by the municipality. In a suit by the payee, or by a person not
1 Mere informalities in the returns of laid and the cars running on sections of
such an election not prejudicing substan- ten miles each, “provided, the eastern
tial rights, failing to comply with statu- terminus, general offices, and headquarters
tory requirements which are directory only, of said railroad should be in" the city,
and clerical errors, will not defeat an appro- the court refused a writ of mandamus to
priation in aid of a railroad. Irwin v. compel their issue, for the reason that it
Lowe, 89 Ind. 540. Further, as to statu- did not appear that these conditions hail
tory requirements in respect of municipal been fulfilled. State v. Minneapolis, 32
bond elections, see State v. Harris (Mo.), Min. 501.
23 Eng. & Am. Corp. Cases, 43, 47, note, As to the duty of enjoining the issue of
and cases. In the case of State v. Harris, bonds on the pain of being estopped to set
supra, the statute of Missouri was con- up irregularities in the exercise of the
strued to require two-thirds of the qualified power, see post, secs. 547, 548.
voters of the county to attend, not merely 8 Chambers County v. Clews, 21 Wall.
two-thirds of the votes actually cast. But 317, 321 (1874) ; Madison v. Smith, 83
see ante, sec. 44, note, 157, note.
Ind. 502, approving the text.
2 So where a city voted to issue bonds 4 Lamoille Valley R. Co. v. Fairfield,
in aid of a railway when the track was 51 Vt. 257. :
590
$ 520
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
an innocent holder, there is no legal ground for maintaining that the
action of the local officers in issuing the bonds, or any recital that
they may make therein, will conclude the question whether the
condition precedent has been performed; and there is no decision of
the Supreme Court of the United States in conflict with this state-
ment of the law, but several which distinctly establish it.
§ 520. Estoppel by Recital to show Non-compliance with Condi-
tions Precedent; Knox County v. Aspinwall. When the bonds
have been issued and sold in the market, and before maturity have
come for value, and without notice, into the hands of innocent
holders, another element of great importance is, according to the
doctrine of the Supreme Court, introduced into the transaction, as
respects compliance with conditions precedent, — the element of estop-
pel. This is so important in its practical relations to the subject as
to require careful and minute consideration. Conceding that the
rightful exercise of the power to issue the bonds depends upon a
condition precedent, for example, a popular vote in favor of the
proposition, when, how, and by whom is it to be ascertained whether
the condition precedent has been performed? Is it to be ascertained,
once for all, before the bonds are issued ? Or is it open to inquiry
and contestation in every action upon a coupon or bond ? Is the
municipality estopped, in favor of a bona fide holder of the bonds,
from setting up this defence ? and in what cases will the estoppel
be available in favor of the holder? These are grave questions, and
cases involving them have been frequently before the Supreme
Court, — the first and leading case being The Commissioners of
Knox County v. Aspin wall.2
1 Chambers County v. Clews, supra.
is essential." Ib. Ante, sec. 163, and
That court has several times adverted to cases cited.
the duty of the corporation or taxpayer Where, by statute, the signature of a
to interfere by injunction to restrain the particular officer is essential to the validity
issue of bonds where the statute has not of bonds issued in payment of a subscrip-
been complied with. Injunction lies to re- tion to railway stock, bonds issued without
strain issue of bonds where there has been such signature are not the bonds of the
a material departure from the statute. municipality, and recitals in then showing
Union Pac. R. Co. v. Lincoln County, the provisions of the statute and compli-
3 Dillon C. C. R. 300 (1873); Same v. ance therewith will not estop the munici.
Merrick County, Ib. 359 ; State v. Mont- pality from denying their validity. Bissell
gomery, 74 Ala. 226; McClure v. Oxford v. Spring Valley Township, 110 0. S. 162.
Township, 94 U. S. 429 ; Portland & Mayor's signature held to be essential ;
Oxford Central Railroad Co. v. Hartford, ex-mayor's signature insufficient. Coler v.
58 Me. 23. "In cases arising before the Cleburne, 131 U. S. 162 (1889), noted
issue of the bonds, estoppel has no place, ante, sec. 509, note.
and the sound doctrine is, that compliance 2 Commissioners of Knox County v.
with all substantial or material conditions Aspinwall, 21 How. 539 (1858).
See
$ 521 CONTRACTS : BONDS ; KNOX COUNTY V. ASPINWALL.
591
§ 521 (417). The Case of the Commissioners of Knox County v.
Aspinwall, respecting the liability of municipal and public corpora-
tions on their negotiable railway aid bonds, deserves to be particu-
larly noticed, as it stands in the order of time at the head of the
important line of decisions of the Supreme Court on this subject.
The action was by a bona fide holder for value of certain coupons
attached to negotiable bonds issued by Knox County, Indiana, in pay-
ment of a subscription to railroad stock. The defence was that the
bonds were not binding upon the county because the county commis-
sioners possessed no power to execute them. By statute, the county
commissioners were authorized "to take stock in the railroad, pay.
able in county bonds, such as had been issued, provided a majority
of the qualified voters of said county, at a designated election, shall
vote for the same.” The ground upon which the want of power to
execute the bonds was placed by the county was the omission to
comply with the requirement of the statute in respect to the notices
for the election (which the statute provided should be held on a
fixed day), at which a vote was to be taken for and against a sub-
scription to the stock of the railroad company. It was admitted in
the case that the notices, such as the statute prescribed, were not
given; and the court seemed to concede "that this would be deci-
sive against the authority of the county to issue the bonds, were it
not for the question which underlaid it; and that is, Who is to
determine whether or not the election has been properly held, and
a majority of the votes cast in favor of the subscription? . . . Is it,"
the court inquires, “ to be determined by the court, in this collateral
way, in every suit upon the bond, or coupon attached, or by the
board of commissioners, as a duty imposed upon it before making
the subscription ?” The court was of the opinion, and so decided,
that the county commissioners were the proper judges whether or
not a majority of the votes in the county had been cast in favor of
the subscription to the stock, and whether or not the election bad
been properly held, and that these questions cannot be determined
collaterally in an action upon the boods or coupons, at least when
brought by a bona fide holder for value. The court, in assigning
the reasons for this holding, speaking through Mr. Justice Nelson,
say: “The right of the board [of county commissioners) to act in
execution of the authority [conferred by the statute] is placed upon
the fact that a majority of the votes had been cast in favor of the
subscription; and to have acted without first ascertaining it, would
have been a clear violation of duty; and the ascertainment of the
further reference to this case, infra, sec. 1 21 How. 539 (1858).
524, note.
592
§ 522
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
fact was necessarily left to the inquiry and judgment of the board
itself, as no other tribunal was provided for the purpose. The
board was one, from its organization and general duties, fit and
competent to be the depositary of the trust thus confided to it.
The persons composing it were elected by the county, and it was
already invested with the highest functions concerning its general
police and fiscal interests. We do not say," he adds, “that the
decision of the board would be conclusive in a direct proceeding to
inquire into the facts previously to the execution of the power, and
before the rights and interests of third parties had attached; but
after the authority has been executed, the stock subscribed, and the
bonds issued and in the hands of innocent holders, it would be too
late, even in a direct proceeding, to call it in question. Much less
can it be called in question to the prejudice of a bona fide holder of
the bonds in this collateral way.”
» 1
§ 522 (418). Comments on Knox v. Aspinwall. The author
ventures to remark that he believes the decision upon the special
facts of the case to be right, and for the reasons thus clearly stated
by this able and experienced judge. But as sustaining the decis-
ion, a further position by way of argument is taken, which, unless
it is to be understood in the limited sense herein suggested, he con-
siders to be untenable, of a most dangerous nature, and subversive
of an important principle in the law of agency applicable both to
private and public agents. That position is this : that a purchaser
of the bonds had a right to assume, from the mere fact that they
were issued, that the condition on which the county' was authorized
to issue them had been complied with, and that a recital in the
bonds that they were issued in pursuance of the statute amounts to
an estoppel in pais upon the corporation, of which the officers issu-
ing the bonds were the public agents. That this is the position as-
sumed by the court will appear by the following extract : “Another
answer," continues Mr. Justice Nelson, “ to this ground of defence
is, that the purchaser of the bonds had a right to assume that the
vote of the county, which was made a condition to the grant of
the power, had been obtained, from the fact of the subscription by
the board to the stock of the railroad company and the issuing
of the bonds. The bonds, on their face, import a compliance with
the law under which they were issued. This bond,' we quote, 'is
issued in part payment of a subscription of $200,000, by the said
Knox County, to the capital stock, &c., by order of the board of
i 'Commissioners of Knox County v. Aspinwall, 21 How. 539, 544; infra, sec. 524,
note.
1
$ 522 CONTRACTS : MUNICIPAL BONDS; KNOX V. ASPINWALL.
593
commissioners, in pursuance of the third section of the act, &c.,
passed by the general assembly of the State of Indiana, and ap-
proved Jan. 15, 1849. The purchaser was not bound to look further
for evidence of a compliance with the conditions to the grant of the
power.” 1 This principle has been reiterated and this case frequently
referred to and followed, and one of the two grounds on which it
rests, if not indeed both of them, still has the approval of the court,
as will be seen by its subsequent judgments.?
1 Ib. 545. If by this it is meant that Lathrop, 51 Mo. 483 (1873). But see
where the power to issue bonds is given text, sec. 524, and cases cited in the next
upon the condition of a previous majority note.
vote in favor of the proposition, the pub. ? The cases in which Knox County
lic or municipal officers can, where in point Comm’rs v. Aspinwall has been cited and
of fact no vote has been talcen or the propo- followed or applied, are : Bissell v. Jeffer-
sition has been voted down, bind the county sonville, 24 How. 287 (1860); Woods v.
by the issue of bonds with false recitals Lawrence County, 1 Black, 386 (1861);
therein, the author feels bound respectfully Moran v. Miami County, 2 Black, 722,
to insist that, in his judgment, the princi- 724 (1862); Mercer County v. Hacket, 1
ple is unsound, and certainly it is one Wall. 83 (1863); Gelpcke v. Dubuque, Ib.
which will entail needless and incalculable 175, 203; Van Hostrup v. Madison, Ib.
injury upon public and municipal corpora- 291; Meyer v. Muscatine, lb. 384, 393 ;
tions. These securities, it is true, are Cincinnati v.gMorgan, 3 Wall. 275; Rogers
intended to be sold in distant markets, and v. Burlington, Ib. 654; Marshall County
therefore it cannot reasonably be required Sup. v. Schenck, 5 Wall. 772 (1866);
that purchasers shall be affected with irreg. Lexington v. Butler, 14 Wall. 284 (1871);
ularities, but they ought to be hield to Grand Chute v. Winegar, 15 Wall. 371
ascertain whether the substantial precedent (1872); Lynde v. Winnebago County, 16
conditions of the power have been, in fact, Wall. 6; Kenicott v. Jefferson County
complied with, and it ought not to be in Sup., Ib. 452; St. Joseph Tp. v. Rogers,
the power of public officers, unless the (leci- Ib. 644; Pendleton County v. Any, 18
sion of this question is by statute expressly Wall. 297; Colonia v. Eaves, 92 U. S. 484
or at least plainly committed to them, to (1875); Venice v. Murdock, Ib. 494 ;
bind the corporation for which they act by Moultrie v. Rockingham T. C. Sav. Bank,
their mere statements of what is in point Ib. 631; Marcy v. Oswego Tp., Ib. 637;
of fact untrue.
Humboldt Tp. v. Long, Ib. 642 ; Ran-
On grounds similar to those here sug- dolph County v. Post, 93 U. S. 502 ;
gested it has been held by the Supreme Callaway County v. l'oster, Ib. 567 ;
Court of Missouri that bonds issued where Leavenworth County v. Barnes, 94 U. S.
an election is required, but none ever held 70; Douglas County Coinm’rs v. Bolles,
and no vote taken, are void, because of 16. 104; Johnson County Comm’rs v. Jan-
want of power to issue them, -- void in uary, 1b. 202; Same v. Thayer, 1b. 631;
the hands of all persons ; but they may Scotland County v. Thomas, Ib. 682 ;
be validated by the legislature. Steines East Lincoln v. Davenport, Ib. 801 ; Cass
v. Franklin County, 48 Mo. 167 (1871). County v. Johnston, 95 U. S. 360 ; San
Wagner, J., in this case review's the prior Antonio v. Mehaffy, 96 U. S. 312; Same
adjudications of the United States Supreme v. Barnes, Ib. 316 ; Warren County v.
Court and of the Supreme Court of the Marcy, 97 U. S. 96; Macon County v.
State of Missouri, and limits the language Shores, Ib. 272; Nauvoo v. Ritter, 10.
used by the judges to the facts before 389 ; Daviess County v. Huidekoper, 98
them, and distinguishes between the case U. S. 98; Schuyler County v. Thomas,
of irregularities in an election and no elec- 1b. 169 ; Hackett v. Ottawa, 99 U. S. 86;
tion whatever. See, also, Carpenter v. Weyauwega v. Ayling, Ib. 112 ; Calhoun
VOL. I. - 38
594
§ 523
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
$ 523. Author's Statement of Rule. — Notwithstanding the broad
language in some of the opinions, to the effect that where under any
County Sup. v. Galbraith, Ib. 214 ; Wil- to its answer setting up facts showing that
son v. Salamanca, Ib. 499; Orleans v. the bonds were never excecuted by it, the
Platt, Ib. 676 (citing among other cases plaintiff was held to be estopped to deny
Royal British Bank v. Turquand, 6 El. & the matters so determined when suing
Bl. 325); Lyons v. Munson, 99 U. S. 684; the same municipality upon other coupons
Anthony v. Jasper County, 101 U. S. 693; froin the same bonds subsequently matur-
Roberts 2. Bolles, Ib. 119; Pompton v. ing. Bissell v. Spring Valley Township,
Cooper Union, Ib. 196; Douglass v. Pike 124 U. S. 225 ; compare Cromwell v. Sac
County, 1b. 677; Darlington v. Jackson County, 96 U. S. 51. The former action
County, Ib. 688; Foote v. Pike County, of Bissell on other coupons of the same issue
Ib. 688; Menasha v. Hazard, 102 U. S. 81; of bonds is reported in 110 U. S. 162.
Ottawa v. Portsmouth Nat. Bank, 105 After the opinion of the Supreme Court in
U. S. 342; Northern Bank v. Porter Tp., the case of the same plaintiff (reported 124
110 U. S. 608 (1883); Cary v. Ottawa, 8 U. S. 25) had been printed, and during
Fed. R. 199; Third Nat. Bank of Syra- the term, the author, having been em-
cuse v. Seneca Falls, 15 Fed. R. 783 ployed as counsel for the plaintiff, filed a
(1883); Nicolay v. St. Clair County, 3 petition and argument for a rehearing of
Dillon, C. C. 163 (1874); Huidekoper v. the opinion holding the judgment in the
Buchanan County, Ib. 175; Mygatt v. former action to be an estoppel. He
Green Bay, 1 Biss. C. C. 292; Smith v. urged, upon an examination of the plead.
Clark County, 54 Mo. 58, 81; St. Louis ing in the first record, (a) that it was not
V. Shields, 62 Mo. 247; Wilkinson v. adjudged therein that the bonds were
Peru, 61 Ind. 1; Black v. Cohen and never signed by the proper officer, but that
Shorter v. Rome, 52 Ga. 621 (1874); Webb it was only adjudged that if the bonds
v. Herne Bay Comin'rs, L. R. 5 Q. B. 642; were registered and purchased by the
In re Imperial Land Co. of Marseilles, L. plaintiff, as alleged in his petition, this is
R. 11 Eq. 478; Bargate v. Shortridge, 5 in law no answer to the plea that the clerk
Cl. H. L. C. 297; and a certificate of the did not sign the bonds or authorize any
proper officer that the bonds have been one else to sign them for him; (6) that the
duly issued and the signatures are genuine, adjudication in the first suit is no bar to a
and that the same hare been duly regis- suit upon other coupons when the plaintiff
tered in his office according to law, cannot proposes to establish as a fact for the first
be contradicted by evidence that there was time that the clerk, being ill, did author-
actually no registration in his office. Rock ize the bonds to be signed in his name by
Creek Tp. v. Strong, 96 U. S. 271. his brother, who was also his deputy, and
Estoppel to set up irregularities in issue that they were signed accordingly. The
of bonds by reason of the subsequent pay- petition for a rehearing was overruled, and
ment of interest. Marshall County Sup.
no further opinion was filed. The impor-
v. Schenck, 5 Wall. 772; compare Marsh tance and difficulty of the question seem
v. Fulton Co., 10 Wall. 676; Eminence v. to justify this further statement concern-
Grasser's Exrs., 81 Ky. 52; Aroma v. ing the cause which does not appear in the
Auditor, 15 Fed. Rep. 843 ; Oswego First reports. The extent to which the doctrine
Nat. Bank v. Walcott, 7 Fed. Rep. 892; of estoppel is seemingly carried in this case,
Whiting v. Potter, 2 Fed. Rep. 517 ; Par the author suggests with deference, goes
kersburg v. Brown, 106 U. S. 487; see beyond the line of the principle of pre-
also Portsmouth Sav. Bank v. Springfield, vious adjudications in the same court, and
4 Fed. Rep. 276.
to an extent which deserves further con-
Estoppel by former final judgment on
sideration as to its soundness.
demurrer : Where, in an action upon cou- Estoppel by retaining proceeds of bonds.
pons from bonds issued in aid of a railway, Pendleton County v. Amy, 13 Wall. 297
a final judgment in favor of the munici- (1871). Post, sec. 547.
pality was entered upon plaintiff's demurrer
§ 524
595
CONTRACTS : POWER TO ISSUE NEGOTIABLE BONDS.
circumstances the power exists in the corporation to issue negoti-
able securities, the bona fide holder has the right to presume that they
were duly issued, yet when the facts of the cases in which such lan-
guage is used are considered, we are unable, after a careful review of
the decisions of the Supreme Court, to say that they lay down the
doctrine that merely by recital in the bonds the corporation will,
under all circumstances, in favor of an innocent holder, be estopped
from showing that in point of fact no election whatever was holden,
or that any other condition precedent to the exercise of the power
has not been complied with. If upon a true construction of the
legislative enactment conferring the authority, the corporation or
certain officers, or a given body or tribunal, are invested with
power to decide whether the condition precedent has been complied
with, then it may well be that their recital of their determination
of a matter in pais which they are authorized to decide will, in
favor of the bondholder for value, bind the corporation.
§ 524. Qualification of last Section by the Supreme Court.
This,” says Mr. Justice Strong, in Coloma v. Evans, referring to
the language of the author in the last preceding section," is a very
cautious statement of the doctrine" of the Supreme Court. And
he adds, It may be re-stated in a slightly different forin. Where
legislative authority has been given to a municipality, or to its
officers, to subscribe for the stock of a railroad company, and to
issue municipal bonds in payment,
but only on some precedent
condition, such as a popular vote favoring the subscription, and
where it may be gathered from the legislative enactment that the
officers of the municipality were invested with power to decide
1 The language in this section stands as and the vote should be void unless the
in a previous edition ; but it must now be road should be completed by a specified
regarded as authoritatively qualified by day, and the bonds specially recited that
the judgment of the Supreme Court of the it was so completed, though the fact was
United States, referred to in section 524. otherwise. Oregon v. Jennings was dis-
See Oregon v. Jennings, 119 U. S. 74, tinguished in German Savings Bank v.
where Mr. Justice Blatchford said, “The Franklin County, 128 V. S. 526, 543
supervisor and town clerk . were the (1888).
persons entrusted with the duty of decid- That bonds recite, as the authority for
ing, before issuing the bonds, whether the the issue, a wrong act of the legislature,
conditions determined at the election ex- does not necessarily invalidate them, if it
isted. If they have certified to that effect can be shown that they were in fact is-
in the bonds, the town is estopped from sued under an act conferring the power.
asserting, as against a bona fide holder, Anderson Co. Comm’rs v. Beal, 113 U. S.
that the conditions prescribed by the 227 ; Johnson Co. Comm’rs v. January, 94
popular vote were not complied with.” U. S. 202, distinguished; Crow v. Oxford,
In this case the terms of the vote were 119 U. S. 215 (1886).
that the bonds should not be issued
596
§ 524
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
whether the condition precedent has been complied with, their
recital that it has been, made in the bonds issued by them and
held by a bona fide purchaser, is conclusive of the fact and binding
upon the municipality, for the recital is itself a decision of the fact
by the appointed tribunal. In Bissell v. Jeffersonville, it ap-
peared that the common council of the city were authorized by
the legislature to subscribe for stock in a railroad company, and
to issue bonds for the subscription, on the petition of three-fourths
of the legal voters of the city. The council adopted a resolution to
subscribe, reciting in the preamble that more than three-fourths
of the legal voters had petitioned for it, and authorized the mayor
and city clerk to sign and deliver bonds for the sum subscribed.
The bonds recited that they were issued by authority of the common
council, and that three-fourths of the legal voters had petitioned
for the same, as required by the charter. In a suit subsequently
brought by an innocent holder for value, to recover the amount of
unpaid coupons for interesty it was held inadmissible for the
defendants to show that three-fourths of the legal voters of the
city had not signed the petition for the stock subscription. A
similar ruling was made in Van Hostrup v. Madison City, and in
Mercer County v. Hacket. The same principle has recently been
asserted in this court, after very grave consideration, and it must
be considered as settled. In St. Joseph Township v. Rogers, it is
stated thus: Power to issue bonds to aid in the construction
of a railroad is frequently conferred upon a municipality in a special
manner, or subject to certain regulations, conditions, or qualifications;
but if it appears by their recitals that the bonds were issued in .
conformity with such regulations and pursuant to such conditions
and qualifications, proof that any or all these recitals were incorrect.
will not constitute a defence for the corporation in a suit on the
bonds or coupons, if it appears that it was the sole province of the
municipal officers who executed the bonds to decide whether or not
there had been an antecedent compliance with the regulation, con-
dition, or qualification, which it is alleged was not fulfilled.' There
1 The proposition here stated has been v. Covington, 8 Fed. Rep. 777; Irwin v.
re-asserted and applied in subsequent Town of Ontario, 3 Fed. Rep. 49; Phelps
cases. Anderson County v. Beal, 113 U. S. v. Lewiston, 15 Blatchf. 131. On the
227 ; Dixon County v. Field, 111 U. S. other hand a recital of facts which the
83; Northern Bank of Toledo v. Porter officers had no authority to determine,
Tp., 110 U. S. 608; Buchanan v. Litch- or a recital of matters of law, will not
field, 102 U. S. 278 ; Lane v. Embden, 72 estop the municipal corporation. Dixon
Me. 354 ; Anderson Co. v. Houston & G. County v. Field, 111 U. S. 83 ; see this
N. R. R. Co., 52 Tex. 228 ; Carrier v. case, post, sec. 529 a, note.
Shawangunk, 10 Fed. Rep. 220; Hopper
$ 524
597
CONTRACTS : POWER TO ISSUE NEGOTIABLE BONDS.
is nothing in the case of Marsh v. Fulton County at all inconsistent
with the rule thus asserted. In that case there were no recitals in
the bonds, and there was no decision that the conditions precedent
to a subscription, or to the gift of authority to subscribe, had been
performed. The question was, therefore, open. What we have
said disposes of the present case without the necessity of particular
consideration of the matters urged in the argument of the defendant
below. It was inadmissible to show what was attempted to be
shown; and even if it had been admissible, the effort to assimilate
the case to Marsh v. Fulton County would fail. There the sub-
scription was for the stock of a different corporation from that for
which the people had voted.” 1
1 Town of Coloma v. Laves, 92 U. S. tain a statement or recital that such vote
484. In this case, legislative authority has been given, then the bona fide pur-
was given to the town to make the sub- chaser of the bonds need go back no fur-
scription and issue the bonds on the pre- ther. He has a right to rely on the
vious sanction of a popular vote, to be statement as a determination of the ques-
ascertained, as the court construed the tion. But a mere execution and issue of
enactnient, by the officers of the town, the bonds without sueh recital is not, in
who were empowered to execute the bonds. my judgment, conclusive. It may be
The bonds were executed in due form by prima facie suficient; but the contrary
the proper officers, and duly registered may be shown. This seems to me to be
with the auditor of State. They contained the true distinction to be taken on this
the recital that they are issued under subject, and I do not think that the con-
and by virtue of the act incorporating the trary has ever been decided by this court.
railroud company,” approved March 24, There have been various dicta to the
1869, "and in accordance with the vote of contrary, but the cases, when carefully
the electors of said township of Coloma, at examined, will be found to have had all
a regular election held July 28, 1869, the prerequisites necessary to sustain the
in accordance with said law."
bonds, according to my view of the case.
The scope and effect of the doctrine of This view was distinctly announced by
the court are shown by the brief separate this court in the case of Lynde v. The
opinion in the case, given by Mr. Justice County of Winnebago, 16 Wall. 6. In
Bradley, who says :
the case now under consideration, there
“I dissent from the opinion of the is a sufficient recital in the bond to show
court in this case, so far as it may be con- that the
przper election was held and the
strued to reaffirm the first point asserted proper vote given ; and the bond was exe-
in the case of Knox County v. Aspinwall, cuted by the officers whose duty it was
to wit, that the mere execution of a bond to ascertain these facts. On this ground,
by officers charged with the duty of ascer- and this alone, I concur in the judgment
taining whether a condition precedent has of the court."
been performed is conclusive proof of its In the same case Mr. Justice Strong, in
performance. If, when the law requires the main opinion, after resting the judg-
à vote of taxpayers before bonds can be ment on the principle stated in the text
issued, the supervisor of a township, or (sec. 524), makes this reference to the case
the judge of probate of a county, or other of Knox County v. Aspinwall :-
officer or magistrate, is the oflicer desig. “ Indeed, some of our decisions have
nated to ascertain whether such vote has gone farther. In the leading case of
been given, and is also the proper officer Knox County v. Aspinwall, 21 How. 544,
to execute and who does execute the the decision was rested upon two grounds.
bonds; and if the bonds themselves con- One of them was that the mere issue of
598
§ 525
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
§ 525. Estoppel by Recital; Failure to give Notice of Election,
or Notice for the Required Time. - As showing the application and
effect of the doctrine stated in the preceding sections as to compli-
ance with conditions precedent, — particularly in respect of the
very common one of a previous election, or the assent of a given
proportion of the taxpayers, - a brief reference may be made
to some of the leading decisions of the Supreme Court, in which
it is evident that the whole subject again underwent thorough
consideration. In Humboldt Township v. Long, bonds issued under
legislative authority, requiring a popular vote at an election of
which thirty days' notice was to be given, and which contained
a recital (made by the officers having the power, as construed, to
determine whether the conditions of fact had been complied with,
and to issue the bonds) to the effect that they were “issued in pur-
suance of and in accordance with the act of the legislature," stating
the bonds, containing a recital that they issued in part payment of a subscription of
were issued under and in pursuance of $200,000, by the said Knox County, to the
the legislative act, was a sufficient basis capital stock, &c., by order of the board
for an assumption by the purchaser that of commissioners, in pursuance of the third
the conditions on which the county (in section of the act, &c., approved January
that case) was authorized to issue them 15, 1849." The act required the previous
had been complied with, and it was said sanction of a majority of the qualified
the purchaser was not bound to look far. voters of the county, and the defence was
ther for evidence of such compliance, failure to comply with the statute in re-
though the recital did not affirm it. This spect to the notices for the election. And
position was supported by reference to the proposition which has been doubted
The Royal British Bank v. Turquand elsewhere, and from which Mr. Justice
6 Ellis & Blackburn, 327, a case in the Bradley dissents, is contained in the fol-
Exchequer Chamber which fully sustains lowing sentence, extracted from the opin-
it, and the decision in which was con- ion of Mr. Justice Nelson in that case,
curred in by all the judges. This posi- who, after quoting the foregoing recital
tion taken in Knox Couuty v. Aspinwall in the bond (which, it will be seen, does
has been more than once reaffirmed in not expressly state that there was an elec-
this court. It was in Moran v. Miami tion), says : "The purchaser was not
County, 2 Black, 732; in Mercer County bound to look further for evidence of a
v. Hacket, 1 Wall. 83; in Supervisors v. compliance with the conditions to the
Schenck, 5 Wall. 784, and in Meyer v. grant of the power. In Moran v. Miami
Muscatine, 1 Wall. 384. It has never County, 2 Black, 722, 732, the court say :
been overruled, and whatever doubts may “We think and adjudge that the recitals
have been suggested respecting its correct in the bonds are conclusive (of compliance
ness to the full extent to which it has with the precedent condition), constitut-
sometimes been announced, there should ing an estoppel in pais upon the defend-
be no doubt of the entire correctness of the ants in this suit." Other cases to the
other rule asserted in Knox County v. same effect in the Supreme Court will be
Aspinwall. That, we think, has been so adverted to as we proceed. In Marcy v.
firmly seated in reason and authority that Oswego Township, 92 U. S. 638 (1875),
it cannot be shaken."
the doctrine as contained in the text (sec.
In further explanation we may add 524), was reasserted almost in the same
that the recital in Knox County v. Aspin- language.
wall was in these words : “ This bond is
§ 525
599
CONTRACTS : POWER TO ISSUE NEGOTIABLE BONDS.
it, were held not to be invalid in the hands of a holder for value,
before due, without notice, because the election was held within less
than thirty days after the date of the order providing for it. The
principle adopted, and the reasoning of the court by which it is
sustained, lead, it would seem, logically to the conclusion (although
there is, perhaps, no case in the Supreme Court where the facts
required a direct decision of the point) that, where the power to
issue the bonds is given upon the condition of a previous vote
in favor of the proposition, the public or municipal officers can,
where no vote whatever has been taken, or the proposition has been
voted down, bind the county or municipality by the false recitals
in such unauthorized bonds, provided they are issued by the offi-
cers entrusted by the statute with the power. Under such a doctrine,
limitations upon the exercise of the power, intended to prevent
fraud, and to secure a compliance with the conditions upon which
the bonds are authorized, are of little practical value, and will
frequently prove illusory. So, in Coloma v. Eaves, supra, - a case
1 Humboldt Township v. Long, 92 U. S. quent bond issue, were questions which
642. The court thus state the ground the law submitted to the board of county
of its decision : "The board of county commissioners, and which it was necessary
commissioners, who caused the bonds to for them to answer before they could act.
be issued, were constituted the authority in the present case the board passed upon
to determine whether the conditions of them and issued the bonds, asserting by
fact, made by the statute precedent to the recitals that they were issued ‘in pur-
the exercise of the authority granted to suance of and in accordance with the act
execute and issue the bonds, had been of the legislature.' Thus the plaintiff
performed, and their recital in the bonds below took them, without knowledge of
issued by them is conclusive in a suit any irregularities in the process through
against the township brought by a bora which the legislative authority was exer.
ide holder.” (So held, also, in Marcy v. cised, and relying upon the assurance
Township of Oswego, 92 V. S. 638.) "In given by the board that the bonds had
so ruling we but decided what had often been issued in accordance with the law.
before been decided, and what ought to be In his hands, therefore, they are valid
regarded as a fixed rule. Applying it to instruments." See Town of Elmwood v.
the solution of the question now before Marcy, 92 U. S. 289 (1875); St. Joseph
us, it is plain that the bonds are not in- Township v. Rogers, 16 Wall. 644 (1872);
valid because all the notice of the popular Anderson Co. Comm’rs v. Beal, 113 U. S.
election was not given which the legisla- 227; Lincolo v. Cambria Iron Co., 103
tive act directed. The election was a U. S. 412; American L. Ins. Co. v. Bruce,
step in the process of execution of the 105 U. S. 328, distinguished in later case
power granted to issue bonds in payment of German Sav. Bank v. Franklin County,
of a municipal subscription to the stock 128 U. S. 526, 541 (1888). Ante, sec.
of a railroad company. It did not itself 517, note.
confer the power.
Whither that step 2 92 U. S. 484; followed in Pana v.
had been taken or not, and whether the Bowler, 107 U. S. 529 ; last case distin.
election had been regularly conducted, guished in German Sav. Bank v. Franklin
with sufficient notice, and whether the County, 128 U, S. 526. See Rouede v.
requisite majority of votes had been cast Jersey City, 18 Fed. Rep. 719.
in favor of a subscription, and conse-
600
$ 525
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
from Illinois, — where the local officers of the town were empowered
by the statute to issue bonds, provided a majority of the voters
of the town voted for the subscription, — which fact, the statute
provided, shall appear by the statement of the town-clerk, filed
with the county clerk, showing the vote given, the amount voted,
and the rate of interest; it was held, in favor of a bona fide owner
of the bonds issued containing a recital of an election, that such an
owner need not look beyond the recitals made in the bonds by the
local officers authorized to issue them for evidence of the existence of
the facts in pais thus recited, the decision and declaration of that de-
cision in the bonds being conclusive upon the town. The court said:
After all, this is not an open question, as between a bona fide
holder of the bonds and the township, whether all the prerequisites
to their issue have been complied with. Apart from and beyond
the reasonable presumption that the officers of the law, the town-
ship officers, discharged their duty, the matter has passed into
judgment. The persons appointed to decide whether the necessary
prerequisites to their issue had been completed have decided and
certified their decision. They have declared the contingency to
have happened on the occurrence of which the authority to issue
the bonds was complete. Their recitals are such a decision, and
beyond those a bona fide purchaser is not bound to look for evidence
of the existence of things in pais. He is bound to know the law
conferring upon the municipality power to give the bonds on the
happening of a contingency Abut whether that has happened or not is
a question of fact, the decision of which is by the law confided
to others, to those most competent to decide it, and which the pur-
chaser is, in general, in no condition to decide for himself.” The
Supreme Court, while asserting its adherence to the previous decis-
ions on this subject, has declared its unwillingness to enlarge or
extend them.1
| Recitals by officers invested with au- ity to issue the bonds. We are unwill-
thority to determine whether precedent ing to enlarge or extend the rule, now
conditions have been performed, that the established by numerous decisions." Mr.
bonds have been issued " in pursuance of," Justice Harlan, School District v. Stone,
" in conformity with," or "by virtue 106 U. S. 183; see also Moulton v. Evans-
of,” or “by authority of,” the statute, have ville, 25 Fed. Rep. 382. A recital that
been held, in favor of bona fide purchasers bonds are issued
the provi-
for value, to import full compliance with sions of a certain statute simply asserts
the statute, and to preclude inquiry as to that they are subject to or controlled by
whether the precedent conditions have been the statute, and puts a purchaser upon
performed before the bonds were issued. notice to acquaint himself with its provi.
“ But in all such cases, as a careful exam- sions and limitations. In this case the
ination will show, the recitals fairly im- municipality was held not to be estopped
ported a compliance, in all substantial froin showing that the bonds were void for
respects, with the statute giving author- conflicting with a constitutional provision
or
or under
§ 526
601
CONTRACTS : POWER TO ISSUE NEGOTIABLE BONDS..
§ 526. Condition Precedent; Onus Probandi; Estoppel by
Recital. - In another important case, it appeared that legis-
lative authority was given to certain officers of a town to borrow
money to aid the building of a railway, and to issue bonds there-
for, provided the written assent of two-thirds of the resident tax-
payers should be previously obtained by said town officers, and
filed in the county clerk's office, with an affidavit of such officers
verifying such assent. A list of assenting taxpayers was filed
in the clerk's office, and also the required affidavit; bonds were
issued, and were in the hands of a holder for value : on the trial
the question arose whether the plaintiff must prove the signatures
to the assent to be genuine, and it was held by the Supreme Court
of the United States, denying Starin v. Genoa, and Gould v.
Sterling, cited in the note, that no such onus rested on him;
that the town officers were created a tribunal to determine whether
two-thirds of the resident taxpayers had assented, and that on
their decision the purchaser might rely, without looking further;
and that the town was concluded, in favor of an innocent holder,
from denying that the condition precedent had been performed.
limiting municipal indebtedness, which Supreme Court of the State adversely con-
was also contained in the statute. Bates v. struing the statute, was distinguished in
Independent School District, 25 Fed. Rep. German Sav. Bank v. Franklin County,
192. As to effect of the constitutional 128 U. S. 526, 541 (1888).
provision in such case, see infra, sec. 529 a. 1 Venice v. Murdock, 92 U. S. 494
A recital that bonds were issued “in pur. (1875); Rock Creek Tp. v. Strong, 96
suance of law” was held not to estop the U. S. 271; Mobile Sav. Bank v. Oktib.
town from showing that it did not have a beha Co. Sup., 24 Fed. Rep. 110; McCall
population large enough to be within the v. Hancock, 10 Fed. Rep. 8; Montclair
terms of a certain act, it not appearing v. Ramsdell, 107 U. S. 147 (deciding
that the officers issuing the bonds were also that a holder of bonds is presumed
required by law to ascertain the population. to have acquired them for value and in
Kelly v. Town of Milan, 21 Fed. Rep. 842; good faith ; and that when in a suit
but compare with School District v. Stone, upon them it is necessary for him to show
supra. Where bonds are issued under that value was paid, his title will be
proper authority, with recitals showing sustained if he proves that any previous
that they conformed to the requirements of holder paid value). In The People v.
the statutes authorizing their issue, and that Mead, 36 N. Y. 224 (1867), the decision
the city was liable for them, the city is in Starin v. Genoa and Gould v. Sterling,
estopped as against an innocent holder for referred to in the text, was adhered to
value from showing that it had imposed by the Court of Appeals of New York,
conditions upon its liability, even when although the court admitted it was con-
the statute provided for conditions, and trary to the decisions of the Supreme
that the bonds should not be binding until Court of the United States as to the
the conditions were performed. An. L. evidence of the assent of the taxpayers.
Ins. Co. v. Bruce, 105 U. S. 328. But
But In Venice v. Murdock, supra, Mr. Justice
this case, on the ground that its recital Strong, speaking of Starin v. Genoa and
of compliance with the statute was specific, Gould v. Sterling, says :
Gould v. Sterling, says: “These decisions
and on the further ground that the bonds are in conflict with the rulings of this
were issued prior to the decision of the court in Bissell v. Jeffersonville, 24 How.
602
§ 527
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
§ 527. Estoppel by Recital to set up Defence of an Over-
issue contrary to the Enabling Act. Among the limitations,
or attempted limitations, upon the exercise of the power to issue
287 ; Knox County v. Aspinwall, 21 How. written assent was a genuine signature of
539 ; Mercer County v. Hacket, 1 Wall. the person who bore the name, the prof-
83, and other cases which we have cited. fered aid to the railroad company was a
They are in conflict also with decisions in delusion. No sane person would have
other State courts. Society for Savings v. bought a bond with such an obligation
New London, 29 Conn. 174 ; Evanville, resting upon him whenever he called for
1. & C. S. L. R. Co. v. Evansville, 15 payment of principal or interest. If such
Ind. 395 ; Knox County Commissioners v. was the duty of the holder, it was always
Nichols, 14 Ohio St. 260. We have care- his duty. It could not be performed once
fully considered the reasons given for the for all. The bonds retained in the hands
judgments in the New York cases, with of the company would have been no help
out being convinced by them. They ignore in the construction of the road. It was
the paramount purpose for which the bonds only because they could be sold that they
were authorized by the legislature, and they were valuable. Only thus could they be
treat the written assent of the taxables applied to the construction. Yet it is not
as the authority to the township officers, to be doubted the legislature had in view
when, in fact, the power was given by the and intended to give substantial aid to the
legislature, and it was only left to the railroad conipany, if a sufficient number of
town to determine by the action of two the taxpayers assented. They inust have
thirds of the resident taxables whether contemplated that the bonds would be
the supervisors and commissioners might offered for sale, and it is not to be believed
act under the power. In Gould v. Ster- they intended to impose such a clog upon
ling the legislative act required no affi- their salableness as would rest upon it if
davit to be filed with a statement of the every person proposing to purchase was re-
assenting taxpayers, and in Starin v. quired to inquire of each one whose name
Genoa the affidavit filed was regarded as appeared to the assent whether he had in
merely verifying that the persons whose fact signed it.” In later cases the Court of
names appeared on the assents comprised Appeals adheres to its position. Cagwin
two-thirds of all the resident taxpayers. v. Town of Hancock, 84 N. Y. 532;
But it is obvious that if no more than this Town of Lyons 2. Chamberlain, 89 N. Y.
was meant by the required affidavit, it was 578; Craig v. Town of Andes, 93 N. Y.
wholly useless, for the assessment rolls of 405; infra, sec. 550, note. In a suit
the township would have shown as much.” by taxpayers to declare void bonds is-
The case, Venice v. Murdock, is so im- sued in aid of a railroad, on the ground
portant in overturning, so far as the Fed- that conditions precedent had not been
eral courts are concerned, the judgment complied with, the burden of proof is
of the Court of Appeals of New York, upon the plaintiffs. Connor v. Green
and as respects the proposition it estab- Pond, W. & B. R. R. Co., 23 S. C. 427.
lishes, that we reproduce the additional Where the validity of a subscription de-
reasons given by the Supreme Court in pends upon its ratification “ by a majority
support of its judgment. “It is very of the taxpayers,” proof of that fact, in a
obvious,” says Strong, J., “ that if the act suit upon bonds which recite that they
of the legislature which authorized an were issued in payment of the subscrip-
issue of bonds in aid of the construction tions, may be made by the poll books and
of the railroad on the written assent of the proceedings of the council, showing
two-thirds of the resident taxpayers of the result by a certificate of the election
the town, intended that the holder of the officers. It is not necessary to prove that
bonds should be under obligation to prove each person voting was a lawful voter.
by parol evidence that each case of the two Hannibal v. Fauntleroy, 105 U. S. 408.
hundred and fifty-nine names signed to the
$ 527
603
CONTRACTS: LIMIT ON POWER TO ISSUE BONDS.
bonds, one not unfrequently provided is that the amount voted
or issued shall not exceed a specified proportion of the taxable
property of the municipality, or such a sum as will require a
greater levy of taxes than a specified rate on the taxable property
to pay the annual interest on the bonds. The effect of a disre-
gard of a statutory limitation of this character by the officers en-
trusted by the statute with the exercise of the power came, for the
first time, before the Supreme Court in 1875, in a case arising under
the legislation of Kansas.
1 Marcy v. Township of Oswego, 92 the chairman of the board, and attested
U. S. 637. The legislative provision is by the clerk under the seal of the
essential to an accurate understanding of county.
the opinion and judgment of the court. The In Marcy v. Township of Oswego, supra,
act of the legislature, under which the the bonds to which the coupons were
bonds purported to have been issued, was attached contained the following recital :
passed February 25, 1870. Laws of Kan. “ This bond is executed and issued by vir.
1870, p. 189. The first section enacted tue of, and in accordance with, an act of
that whenever fifty of the qualified voters, the legislature of the said State of Kansas,
being freeholders, of any municipal town. entitled 'An act to enable municipal
ship in any county, should petition the townships to subscribe for stock in any
board of county commissioners of such railroad, and to provide for the payment
county to submit to the qualified voters of of the same, approved February 25, 1870,'
the township a proposition to take stock and in pursuance of and in accordance
in the name of such township, in any rail. with the vote of three-fifths of the legal
road proposed to be constructed into or voters of said township of Oswego, at a
through the township, designating in the special election duly held on the 17th day
petition, among other things, the amount of May, A. D. 1870." Each bond also de-
of stock proposed to be taken, it should be clared that the board of county commis-
the duty of the board to cause an election sioners of the county of Labette, of which
to be held in the township to determine county the township of Oswego is a part,
whether such subscription should be made; had caused it to be issued in the name
provided that the amount of bonds voted and in behalf of said township, and to be
by any township should not be above such signed by the chairman of the said board
a sun as would require a levy of more of county commissioners, and attested by
than one per cent per annum on the tax- the county clerk of the said county, under
able property of such township to pay the its seal. Accordingly, each bond was thus
yearly interest. The second section di- signed, attested, and sealed. The bonds
rected the board of county commissioners were registered in the office of the State
to make an order for holding the election auditor, and certified by him in accord-
contemplated in the preceding section, and ance with the provisions of an act of the
to specify therein the amount of stock pro- legislature. His certificate on the back of
posed to be subscribed, and also to pre- each bond declared that it had been regu-
scribe the form of the ballots to be used. larly and legally issued ; that the signa-
The fifth section enacted that if three- tures thereto were genuine, and that it
fifths of the electors voting at such elec- had been duly registered in accordance
tion should vote for the subscription, the with the act of the legislature.
board of county commissioners should order The defence to the bonds was that there
the county clerk to make it in the name of had been an overissue, contrary to the
the township, and should cause such bonds statute. The bond, it will be observed,
as might be required by the terms of the contains no statement on this point; but
vote and subscription to be issued in the it was held by the Supreme Court that the
name of such township, to be signed by above quoted recital in the bonds estopped
604
$ 528
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
5
§ 528. Same subject.
In the case referred to in the last section
- Marcy v. Township of Oswego, — the bonds were duly executed,
and contained a recital of the act, and that they were issued " in
virtue of and in accordance” with it, and " in pursuance of and in
accordance with the vote of three-fifths of the legal voters of the
township, at an election held on” a specified day. The plain-
tiff was a bona fide holder for value, without notice. The defence
was that the bonds were voted and issued at one time, as one act,
and in payment of one subscription, in excess of the amount author-
the township from making this defence ble bonds containing no recitals, actually
against a bona fide holder.
issued in excess of the number of bonds
The case of Marcy v. Township of Os- authorized by the act, and as security
wego was cited and approved in Humboldt for the personal debt of a fiscal officer of
Township v. Long, 92 U. S. 642, the court the corporation to the original holder,
observing :
are not binding upon the corporation.
“There is no essential difference be- Merchants' Bank v. Bergen County, 115
tween this case and that. The assess- U. S. 384 (1885). Bonds were voted to
ment rolls of the township may have been the amount of $250,000 ; but the presid-
proper evidence for the consideration of ing judge and clerk of the county court
the board of county commissioners when issued without power to do so bonds in
they were inquiring what the value of the excess of that amount.
The bonds con-
taxable property of the township was, but tained no recital on their face as to the
the bonds are not invalid in the hands Act under which they were issued, but
of a bona fide holder by reason of their each bond had a certificate thereon, signed
having been voted and issued in excess of by the county judge only, that it was
the statutory limit, as shown by the rolls. issued as authorized by the statute (naming
Whatever may be the right of the town- it) and by an order of the county court in
ship, as against those who issued the pursuance thereof. It was held that the
bonds, it cannot be set up against a bona bonds in excess of the $250,000 were void
fide holder of the bonds tbat the amount in the hands of even bona fide holders
issued was too large, in the face of the for value, for want of power to issue them,
decision of the board, and their recital and that the county was not estopped; that
that the bonds were issued pursuant to the bonds to the amount of $250,000 which
and in accordance with the act of 1870." were valid were the bonds which were first
Compare Daviess County v. Dickinson, delivered. Daviess County v. Dickinson,
noted infra, and see Sherman County v. 117 U. S. 657 (1885). Where bonds were
Simons, 109 U. S. 735 ; Potter v. Chaffee issued by'a municipal corporation to fund
Co. Comm’rs, 33 Fed. R. 614. Recitals in a debt part of which only was in excess of
bond held, in favor of a bona fide holder, the constitutional limitation, it was held
to estop the debtor municipality to set to be an entire and indivisible transaction,
up that the bond was issued in excess and that the whole issue of bonds was void.
of the amount authorized by statute. On this point the court says: “It is im-
New Providence v. Halsey, 117 U. S. 336 possible to distinguish the valid from the
(1885), a New Jersey case, in which the invalid portion of the debt secured by
court follows the decision on this point in the bonds; the transaction involved in the
Cotton v. New Providence, 47 N. J. I. issue of the bonds was entire and indivis-
401, and Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. ible, and therefore the whole is invalid.”
Elizabeth, 42 N. J. L. 235. Bergen Co. Millerstown Bor. v. Frederick, 114 Pa. St.
Freeholders v. Mer. Ex. Nat. Bank of N. Y. 435, 441. Compare Daviess County v.
12 Fed. Rep. 743. See also supra, sec. Dickinson, supra. Infra, secs. 528, 529,
525, and note; post, sec. 529 a. Negotia- 529 a.
§ 528
605
CONTRACTS: LIMIT ON POWER TO ISSUE BONDS.
ized by the statute. The circuit justice of the United States for
the circuit distinguished the case from Knox County v. Aspinwall,
before referred to, on the ground that the statute imposing the
limitation, the order for the election, the proposition submitted,
the order for the issue of the bonds, and the latest assessment roll
were not, properly, matters in pais, but were all public, all open,
all accessible, and all of record, and if consulted by the pur-
chaser would have shown the bonds to have been voted and issued
in violation of the express limitation upon the power contained
in the statute. But the judgment of the circuit court was reversed,
three judges dissenting, and the defence held unavailing. The case
was considered to fall within the principle of the previous decisions.
Mr. Justice Strong, speaking for the court, after stating the facts
as we have given them, observed : “In view of these facts, and
of the decisions heretofore made by this court, the question cannot
be considered an open one. We have recently reviewed the subject
in the case of The Town of Coloma v. Eaves (supra), and reasserted
what had been decided before; namely, that where legislative
authority has been given to a municipality to subscribe for the
stock of a railroad company, and to issue municipal bonds in pay-
ment of the subscription, on the happening of some precedent
contingency of fact, and where it may be gathered from the legis-
lative enactment that the officers or persons designated to execute
the bonds were invested with power to decide whether the con-
tingency had happened, or whether the fact existed which was a
necessary condition precedent to any subscription or issue of the
bonds, their decision is final in a suit by the bona fide holder of
the bonds against the municipality, and a recital in the bonds
that the requirements of the legislative act have been complied
with is conclusive. And this is more emphatically true when the
fact is one peculiarly within the knowledge of the persons to wbom
the power to issue the bonds has been conditionally granted.” 1
1 In the dissenting opinion of Mr. Jus- Dess, but I do know that in some of the
tice Miller (with whom concurred Davis cases tried before ine last summer in Kan-
and Field, JJ.), the view of the court is sas it was shown that the first and only
strongly combated. A few extracts will issue of such bonds exceeded in amount
show the opinion of the dissentients, and the entire value of the taxable property
bring into clearer relief the views of the of the town, as shown by the tax list of
court :
the year preceding the issue. This court
“In the cases under consideration," holds that such a showing is no defence
says Miller, J., “this provision of the to the honds, notwithstanding the express
statute was wholly disregarded. I am prohibition of the legislature. It is there-
not sure that the relative amount of the fore clear that, so long as this doctrine is
bonds, and of the taxable property of the upheld, it is not in the power of the legis-
towns, is given in these cases with exact- lature to authorize these corporations to
606
$ 529
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
§ 529. Same subject.
The cases referred to in the last two
sections afford, perhaps, a more striking illustration than any pre-
issue bonds under any special circum- itation upon the exercise of the power has
stances, or with any limitation in the use been complied with ; and especially and
of the power, which may not be disre- particularly if they make a false recital of
garded with impunity. It may be the the fact on which the power depends, in
wisest policy to prevent the issue of such the paper they issue, this false recital has
bonds altogether. But it is not for this the effect of creating a power which had
court to dictate a policy for the States on no existence without it. This remarkable
that subject. The result of the decision result is always defended on the ground
is a most extraordinary one. It stands that the paper is negotiable, and the pur-
alone in the construction of power's spe- chaser is ignorant of the falsehood. But
cifically granted, whether the source of in the Floyd Acceptance Cases, this court
the power be a State constitution, an act held, and it was necessary to hold so
of the legislature, a resolution of a cor- there, that the inquiry into the authority
porate body, or a written authority given by which negotiable paper was issued
by an individual. . . . No such principle was just the same as if it were not nego-
has ever been applied by this court, or by tiable, and that if no such authority ex-
any other court, to a State, to the United isted, it could not be aided by giving the
States, to private corporations, or to indi- paper that form. In county bonds it
viduals. I challenge the production of a
seems to be otherwise. In that case the
case in which it has been so applied. In court held that the party taking such
the Floyd Acceptance Cases, 7 Wall. 666, paper was bound to know the law as it
in which the Secretary of War had ac- affected the authority of the officer who
cepted time drafts drawn on him by a issued it. In county bond cases, while
contractor, which, being negotiable, came this principle of law is not expressly con-
into the hands of bona fide purchasers be- tradicted, it is held that the paper, though
fore due, we held that they were void for issued without authority of law, and in
want of authority to accept them. And opposition to its express provisions, is still
this case has been cited by this court valid. There is no reason in the nature
more than once without question. No one of the condition on which the power de-
would think for a moment of holding that pends in these cases, why any purchaser
a power of attorney made by an individ- should not take notice of its existence be-
ual cannot be so limited as to make any fore he buys. The bonds in this case
one dealing with the agent bound by the were issued at one time, as one act, of one
limitation, or that the agent's construc- date, and in payment of one subscription.
tion of his power bound the principal. All this was a matter of record in the
Nor has it ever been contended that an town where it was done.
officer of a private corporation can, by “So, also, the valuation of all the
exceeding his authority, when that au- property of the town for the taxation of
thority is express, is open and notorious, the year before the bonds were issued,
bind the corporation which he professes is of record both in that town and in the
to represent. The simplicity of the de- office of the clerk of the county in which
vice by which this doctrine is upheld as the town is located. A purchaser had
to municipal bonds is worthy the admi- but to write to the township clerk or
ration of all who wish to profit by the the county clerk to know precisely the
frauds of municipal officers. It is that amount of the issue of bonds and the value
whenever a condition or limitation is im- of the taxable property within the town-
posed upon the power of those officers in ship. In the matter of a power de-
issuing bonds, they are the sole and final pending on these facts, in any other class
judges of the extent of those powers. If of cases, it would be held that before
they decide to issue them, the law pre- buying these bonds the purchaser must
sumes that the conditions on which their look to those matters on which their
powers depended existed, or that the lim- validity depended. They are all public,
$ 529 a
607
CONTRACTS : OVER-ISSUE OF BONDS.
viously decided by that court, that the purchaser may implicitly
rely upon the recitals in the bonds made by the proper officers, that
the authority to issue them has arisen, and that he is under no
obligation to consult the records of the municipality, and is not
charged with constructive notice of their contents; and this, too,
it will be observed, where the recital in the bonds was general and
not specific in its nature, and where the facts which would have
shown the issue of the bonds to have been illegal were matters
appearing upon the public records of the township.?
§ 529 a. No estoppel by Recital to set up Defence of an Overissue
contrary to a Constitutional Limitation. Peremptory constitutional
provisions that municipalities shall not issue bonds exceeding a
specified percentage on the value of the taxable property within
the municipality, to be ascertained by the official assessments or
valuations for the purposes of taxation, are regarded by the Supreme
Court of the United States, as well as by the State tribunals, as
fixing a limit beyond which the power to issue bonds cannot be
legislatively conferred; and the Supreme Court holds, that if bonds
all open, all accessible (see on the point, had no part whatever in their issue and
sec. 529 a, post, and note, and sec. 549, and
no power to prevent it. This latter is
note),—the statute, the ordinance for their the true view of the matter. As the
issue, the latest assessment roli. But in corporation could only exercise such
favor of a purchaser of municipal bonds, power as the law conferred, the issuing
all this is to be disregarded ; and a debt of the bonds was not the act of the cor-
contracted without authority and in vio- poration. It is a false assumption to say
lation of express statute is to be collected that the corporation put them on the
out of the property of the helpless man market. If one of two innocent persons
who owns any in that district. I say must suffer for the unauthorized act of
' helpless' advisedly, because these are the township or county officers, it is clear
pot his agents. They are the officers of that he who could, before parting with
the law, appointed or elected without his his money, have easily ascertained that
consent, acting contrary, perhaps, to his they were unauthorized, should lose,
wishes. Surely if the acts of any class of rather than the property-holder, who
officers should be valid only when done in might not know anything of the matter,
conformity to law, it is those who man- or if he did, had no power to prevent the
age the affairs of towns, counties, and vil. wrong." See, also Lewis v. Barbour Co.
lages, in creating debts which not they, Comm'rs, 3 Fed. Rep. 191, notes; infra,
but the property-owners, must pay. ... It sec. 531, note. Compare with later case
is easy to say, and looks plausible when of Daviess County v. Dickinson, 117 U. S.
said, that if municipal corporations put 657 (1885), supra, sec. 527, note.
bonds on the market, they must pay 1 The author allows this section to stand
them when they become due. But it is as in the last edition. The Supreme
another thing to say that when an officer Court has not yet overruled the proposi-
created by the law exceeds the authority tions therein stated, but it has reached a
which that law confers upon him, and in different result where the overissue is in
open violation of law issues these bonds, violation of a constitutional provision, as
the owner of property lying within the will appear by the next section (529 a),
corporation must pay them, though he and the cases there cited.
608
§ 529 a
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS,
be issued in excess of such limit, they are void in the hands of
bona fide holders, notwithstanding a recital therein that they are
issued under and in pursuance of the Constitution of the State, in-
asmuch as such recital will not estop the municipality from show-
ing that the bonds were issued in violation of the constitutional
limitation, and if this be shown the plaintiff cannot recover, though
he be a holder for value and without actual notice of any over-
issue; at least, this was so held in a case where the bond itself
showed on its face the total aggregate issue of bonds, and where
the issue was in such an amount as that if compared with the
assessment roll (itself a public record, which everybody is bound
to notice), the fact of overissue would appear upon inspection or by
arithmetical calculation. The cases on this subject in the note
arising under constitutional limitations, were distinguished on the
grounds specially stated from previous cases where the innocent
holder of the bond was allowed to recover, notwithstanding the
bond had been issued in excess of a statutory limitation of a similar
character.1 Constitutional provisions of this kind are of recent
origin, and were ordained the more effectually to prevent the creation
of extravagant municipal indebtedness. The Supreme Court doubt-
less felt, and we think justly felt, the force of the consideration that
if the doctrines of that court in respect of the estoppels created by
recitals in a bond were extended to the question of the amount or
extent of municipal indebtedness, at least in cases where such amount
could be ascertained by reference to a public record, if not indeed in
all cases, would be to defeat or render practically worthless the very
purpose of the constitutional provisiou, - a purpose deemed so im-
portant that it is embodied in the organic law.
We have sought above to state with care what has been actually
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States in the
several cases referred to in the note, without attempting to antici-
pate future applications of that principle, or limitations upon it,
in cases where the facts are different from those of the cases which
have been thus far adjudged.2
1 Supra, secs. 527–529.
manner or for any purpose, to an aniount,
2 Buchanan v. Litchfield, 102 U. s. including existing indebtedness, in the
278 (1880); Dixon County v. Field, 111 aggregate exceeding five per centum on the
U. S. 83 (1883). Buchanan v. Litch. value of the taxable property therein, to
field, supra, involved the construction of be ascertained by the last assessment for
a provision of the Constitution of Illinois State and county taxes, previous to the
of 1870 (art. 9, sec. 12), which ordains incurring of such indebtedness.” A stat-
that "no county, city, township, school ute of Illinois authorized cities to con-
district, or other municipal corporation, struct water-works, and for that purpose
shall be allowed to become indebted in any to borrow money and issue bonds. Bonds
§ 530
609
CONTRACTS: RECITALS IN MUNICIPAL BONDS.
§ 530. Estoppel by recital of Matter of Fact, e. g. Date of Sub-
scription. The effect of recitals in the bonds, and of statements in
works.'"
were issued pursuant to the statute, each property within the city for the year in
reciting that “it is issued under authority which the bonds were issued." It is by
of an Act of the General Assembly of the no means clear from the opinion that a
State of Illinois [describing it], and in positive recital that the amount of the
pursuance of an ordinance of said city of bond issue was within the constitutional
Litchfield, entitled ' An Ordinance to pro- limit would, if it was false, avail the
vide for the issuing of bonds and the holder. The language of the court as to
construction of the Litchfield water- the effect of such a recital, though strong,
The constitutional provision is hypothetical and obiter ; and the effect
above mentioned is not referred to in the of recitals under the constitutional pro-
statute authorizing the issue of the bonds, vision is more fully considered in Dixon
or in the ordinance, or in the bonds. At County v. Field, infra. Although the
the time of the issue of the bonds the in- court distinguishes Buchanan v. Litch-
debtedness of the city already exceeded field from previous cases where the over-
the constitutional limit. Suit was brought issue of bonds was contrary to a statute
for overdue coupons on these bonds by a limitation, yet after all it seems to indi.
bona fide holder for valae, without any cate, to some extent, a recession from the
notice that the bonds were issued in ex- high water-line of the cases froin which
cess of the constitutional restriction. The it is thus distinguished.
Supreme Court of the United States de- In the subsequent case from Onio of
cided that the city was not liable, and the Northern Bank of Toledo 'v. Porter
that the plaintiff could not invoke the Township, 110 V. S. 608 (1883), not
doctrine of estoppel; and reference was involving, however, any constitutional
made to the absence of an express state. limitation, the court, considering especial-
ment in the bonds themselves that the ly the scope and effect of a recital as an
aggregate indebtedness, of which they estoppel, decided that where the bond re-
were a part, was not in excess of the con- cites that it is issued in part payment of
stitutional limit., In answer to the objec- a subscription to the capital stock of a
tion that the city was estopped to make the railroad, in pursuance of the several acts
defence, the court says (Ib., p. 292); of the General Assembly and a vote of
“ Any different conclusion from that in- the qualified electors taken in pursuance
dicated would extend the doctrines of this thereof, while the corporation is thereby
court upon the subject of municipal bonds estopped by the recitals in the bonds from
further than would be consistent with saying that no township election was held,
reason and sound policy, and further than or that it was not called or conducted in
we are now willing to go. The present the particular mode required by law, it is
action cannot be maintained, unless we not estopped to show that it was without
should hold that the mere fact that the legislative authority to order the election
bonds were issued, without any recitals of and to issue the bonds. “ The question
the circumstances bringing them within of legislative authority," said the court,
the limit fixed by the Constitution, was "in a municipal corporation to issue bonds
by itself conclusive proof, in favor of a in aid of a railroad company, cannot be
bona fide holder, that the circumstances concluded by mere recitals; but, the power
existed which authorized thein to he is- existing, the municipality may be estopped
sued. We cannot so hold."
by the recitals to prove irregularity in the
The court also said (p. 289): “The exercise of that power; or, when the law
purchaser of the bonds was certainly prescribes conditions upon the exercise of
bound to take notice, not only of the con- the power granted, and commits to the
stitutional limitation upon municipal in. officers of such municipality the deter-
debtedness, but of such facts as the mination of the question whether those
authorized official assessments disclosed conditions have been performed, the cor-
concerning the valuation of the taxable poration will also be estopped by the
VOL. I. - 39
610
§ 530
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
the records of the county which issued the bonds, is considered in
The Town of Concord v. Portsmouth Savings Bank. A controlling
recitals which import such performance.” (being the act that authorized counties to
(110 U, S. 619).
issue bonds), and the Constitution of the
The principle of the decision in the State (art. 12), adopted October, A. D.
case of Buchanan v. Litchfield, supra, 1875.” On each bond was also endorsed
was adopted and followed in the subse- the certificate of the county clerk, that
quent case of Dixon County v. Field, 111 the question of issuing said bonds was
U. S. 83 (1883), arising under the Con- duly submitted to the people of the
stitution of the State of Nebraska, which county, November 24, 1875, as follows :
ordains (art. xii., sec. 2) that " no city, “Shall Dixon county issue to the C. C.
county, town, precinct, municipality, or & B. H. R. R. Company $87,000 ten per
other subdivision of the State, shall cent twenty-year bonds? Which was de-
ever make donations to any railroad or cided in the affirmative by 462 votes
other work of internal improvement, un- against 120.” There was also endorsed
less a proposition so to do shall have been on the bond the certificate of the secretary
first submitted to the qualified electors and auditor of the State of Nebraska that
thereof, at an election by authority of it was issued pursuant to law. In point
law; provided, that such donations of of fact, the assessed valuation of the
a county, with the donations of such sub- county of Dixon for the year 1875 was
division, in the aggregate shall not exceed $587,331, and no more ; that is to say,
ten per cent of the assessed valuation of the annount of bonds issued was more than
such county ; provided further, that any ten per cent of the assessed valuation of
city or county may, by a two-thirds vote, the county. On the principle that there
increase such indebtedness five per cent must be authority of law by statute for
in addition to such ten per cent, and no every issue of bonds of a municipal cor-
bonds or other evidences of indebtedness poration ; that the corporation is bound by
so issued shall be valid, unless the same the recitals in such bonds only in respect
shall have endorsed thereon a certificate of facts which the corporate officers had
signed by the secretary and auditor of by law authority to determine and certify,
State, showing that the same is issued but not in respect of facts which they
pursuant to law.” Suit was brought on had no authority to determine, — such as,
negotiable bonds issued by Dixon County whether the amount of the bonds in that
by a bona fide holder for value. The case exceeded the constitutional limitation,
defence was that the bonds were issued in - the Supreme Court decided that the
violation of the above-quoted provision of county was not liable, saying : “There
the Constitution. The plaintiff contended was no power at all conferred to issue
that the municipality was estopped from bonds in excess of an amount equal to ten
setting up this defence, by reason of the per cent upon the assessed valuation of
recitals in the bonds, and by the certificates the taxable property of the county. The
of the secretary and auditor of State en- amount of the bonds issued was known.
dorsed thereon. There were eighty-seven It is stated in the recital itself.
bonds issued at one time of $1,000 each. $87,000. The holder of each bond was
Each bond contained a recital that it apprised of that fact. The amount of the
was issued under and in pursuance of assessed value of the taxable property in
an order of the county commissioners of the county is not stated; but, ex vi termini,
the county of Dixon, and authorized at an it was ascertainable in one way only, and
election held in said county on the 27th that was by reference to the assessment
of December, 1875, and under and by itself, a public record equally accessible to
virtue of chapter 35 of the General Stat. all intending purchasers of bonds as well
utes of Nebraska and amendments thereto as to the county officers. Nothing in the
It was
1 Concord v. Portsmouth Savings Bank, 92 U. S. 625 (1875).
§ 530
611
CONTRACTS : RECITALS IN MUNICIPAL BONDS.
question in the case was whether the power to subscribe for stock
and issue bonds therefor, given by the act March 26, 1869, was
way of inquiry, ascertainment, or deter- issued ; and no man could, by an exami-
mination as to that fact is submitted to ination of the bond, get any information
the county officers. The fact, as it is as to the amount of the issue, or, by
recorded in the assessment itself, is ex- comparing any information given by the
trinsic, and proves itself by inspection, 'bond with the record notice of the as-
and concludes all determinations that con- sessed valuation, know that the county
tradict it.” Dixon County v. Field, 111 had exceeded its power in the issue of the
U. S. 83 (1883). In the case next cited, bonds. So that, taking the case of Dixon
Potter v. Chaffee County, the Circuit Court County v. Field as the latest annunciation
distinguished it from Dixon County v. of the Supreme Court in respect to the
Field.
rule of decision, it must be held that the
The Constitution of Colorado contains county is estopped from pleading in this
a provision that no county shall contract case that the bond was issued in exchange
any debt by loan, in any form, except for for a void warrant."
public buildings, public roads, and bridges, Since the foregoing was written and as
s and such indebtedness contracted in any this volume passes through the press, the
one year shall not exceed the rates upon Supreme Court of the United States has
the taxable property iu such county, fol- decided the cases of Lake County v. Rollins
lowing, to wit:.” (here specifying the (130 U. S. 662) and Lake County v. Gra-
rates). The legislature of Colorado passed ham (16. 674, 1888). In the case first cited
an act authorizing counties to fund their the Supreme Court, reversing the same case
floating indebtedness. (Laws Colorado, be
below (34 Fed. Rep. 845), held that the
1881, p. 85.) In pursuance of that act, constitutional provision in Colorado was
the county of Chaffee issued bonds, which an absolute limitation upon the power of
contained a full recital showing compli- the county to contract any and all in-
ance with all the provisions of the fuuding debtedness, including county warrants is-
act. In the case of Potter v. Chaffee sued for ordinary county expenses. In
County, U. S. Circuit Court, Colorado, the second case the same principle was
1888 (33 Fed. Rep. 614), suit was brought applied to funding bonds of a county
against the county of Chaffee on such negotiable in form and in the hands of
fnnding bonds. The county defended on bona fide holders, issued under the author-
the ground that the bonds were issued in ity of a funding act in excess of the con-
exchange for county warrants, which war- stitutional limitation, although the bond
rants were void because issued in the recited that all of the provisions and re-
first instance in violation of the consti- quirements of the statute had been fully
tutional limitation, above quoted, as to complied with by the proper officers in the
county indebtedness. The plaintiff was a issue of the bonds, and that such issue had
bona fide holder of the funding bonds in been authorized by a vote of the majority
suit. The Circuit Court, reviewing the of the duly qualified electors of the county.
cases of Buchanan v. Litchfield, Dixon The bonds in suit showed that they were
County v. Field, Bank of Toledo v. Porter part of an issue amounting to $500,000,
Township, held that they did not control and contained no reference to the Consti-
the case before it, and gave judgment for tution, and no statement that the constitu-
the plaintiff. After referring to Dixon tional requirements had been obseryed. In
County 1. Field, the Circuit Court, this respect, if it be material, the bonds
Brewer, J., said : “But in the case now were different from those in suit in the
before this court, there is nothing upon
case of Potter v. Chaffee County, supra,
the face of the bond which shows how and this circumstance seems to be the only
many bonds were to be issued or how large one to distinguish that case from Lake
the series was. The statute, in terms, County v. Graham. In the latter case the
gave to the county commissioners the court considered the principles of Dixon
power to determine the amount to be County v. Field applicable to the case, and
612
§ 530
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
annulled by the new Constitution of the State (whiclı took effect
July 2, 1870) before the subscription was made, or a valid contract
distinguished it from cases where there had cision in the last-mentioned case, holding
been an overissue of bonds contrary to the bonds to be void, suit was commenced
the provisions of a statute, as in Sherman against the city of Litchfield by Ballou, a
County v. Simons, 109 U. S. 735, and Ore- large holder of the bonds, in which he al-
gon v. Jennings, 119 U. S. 74. Lamar, J., leged that the money received by the city
speaking for the court, said : “ The ques. for the sale to him of these bonds was
tion here is distinguishable from that in used in the construction of a system of
the cases relied on by counsel for defendant water-works for the city, of which the city
in error (the overissue cases contrary to is now the owner. That though the bonds
a statute]. In this case the standard of were void, as held in the case of Buchanan
validity is created by the Constitution. In Litchfield, yet that in equity the city is
that standard two factors are to be con- liable to him for the money it received from
sidered : one the amount of assessed value, whim; and since hy the use of that money
and the other the ratio between the as- the water-works were constructed, he asked
sessed value and the debt proposed. These for a decree against the city for the amount, ,
being the exactions of the Constitution it and if not paid, that the water-works of
self, it is not within the power of the the city be sold to satisfy the decree. It
legislature to dispense with them, either appeared from the answer and proofs on
directly or indirectly, by the creation of the part of the city, that the lands on
a ministerial commission whose finding which the water-works were constructed
shall be taken in lieu of the facts." were bought and paid for before the bonds
The author may be permitted to observe were issued or voted, and much of the
that when the provisions of the statutes expense, also, of the construction of the
under which the overissue cases were de- water-works was paid by taxation, and by
cided are considered, they being silent as resources of the city other than the water-
to the creation of any ministerial commis- works bonds. A decree was passed as
sion or special tribunal to decide upon the prayed, in the court below, which decree
amount of indebtedness, it seems to be not was reversed by the Supreme Court of the
easy to find logical and solid grounds for United States, with directions to dismiss
the distinction. But the distinction is the bill. The Supreme Court held that the
made. It is doubtless a sound exposition prohibitions of the Constitution extended as
of the Constitution; and as to the constitu- well to implied contracts to repay the money
tional provision, it is firmly established by as to the express contracts found in the
the judgments of the State tribunals, as bonds. Mr. Justice Tiller's language on
well as hy those of the Supreme Court of this point is very decisive. “The language
the United States. What effect it will of the Constitution,” he says, “is that no
hereafter have upon the soundness of the city, &c., “shall be allowed to become in-
decisions sustaining bonds issued under debted in any manner or for any purpose
similar circumstances, but in excess of a to an amount, including existing indebt-
like statutory limitation, remains to be edness, in the aggregate exceeding five
per centum of the value of its taxable
A holder of bonds issued in violation of property.' It shall not become indebted.
such a constitutional provision is practi- Shall not incur any pecuniary liability. It
cally remediless. The public policy which shall not do this in any manner. Neither
underlies the constitutional limitation of by bonds, nor notes, nor by express or im-
Illinois, above mentioned, was upheld by plied promises. Nor shall it be done for
the Supreme Court, in a case where the any purpose. No matter how urgent, how
equities of the creditor strongly appealed useful, how unanimous the wish. The
for recognition and protection. We refer prohibition is as effectual against the im-
to the case of Litchfield_v. Ballou, 114 plied as the express promise, and is as
U. S. 190. This was a sequel of Buchanan binding in a court of chancery as a court
v. Litchfield, 102 U. S. 278. After the de- of law.” The decree below was attempted
seen.
$ 530
613
CONTRACTS: RECITALS IN MUNICIPAL BONDS.
to subscribe was completed. The court held that, in: point of fact
a legal and binding subscription was made, or agreed to be made,
in December, 1869, and hence the defence of want of legal power
failed; and it then proceeded to view the case as affected by
estoppel, the plaintiff being a bona fide holder for value without
notice of any defence. The opinion was expressed that a recital
in the bonds that the subscription was made in December, 1869,
being the recital of a matter of fact, and a fact, too, peculiarly,
if not exclusively, within the knowledge of the board of supervisors,
estopped the county under the circumstances to set up that the
subscription was not made until after July 2, 1870, when their
authority to subscribe had expired. As the same judgment could
to be sustained, on the theory that the city negotiable, issued by a municipal corpora-
was in possession of the money received for tion to fund a debt incurred contrary to the
the bonds, or, what is the same thing, its provisions of the Constitution, is void even
equivalent in property identified as having in the hands of a holder for value. Millers-
been procured with this money. The court town v. Frederick, 114 Pa. St. 435 (1886);
held that this theory was not sustained by distinguishing Kerr v. Corry, 105 Pa. St.
the proofs, or sustainable, inasmuch as the 282 (1884), where the power to issue the
money received by the city from the bond bonds existed, but the bonds themselves
holders had long since passed out of its were misapplied, and a bona fide holder
possession, and could not be restored. Also held entitled to recover. Purchasers of
held that it was not a case for the applica- bonds are bound to take notice of the offi-
tion of the principle that the plaintiff's cial statement required by the statute to
money could be traced into property and a be filed with the clerk of the proper coun-
constructive trust fastened upon it, since ty relating to the amount of municipal
other funds raised by taxation had also indebtedness and taxable values. If no
gone into the property, which had been such statement is filed its absence should
purchased before the bonds were issued, put the proposed purchaser on inquiry,
or were public streets into which no and this although the duty of making and
property of the complainant had entered. filing such statement is imposed upon the
This decision seems to leave the holders officers of the municipality as a personal
of the bonds remediless notwithstanding duty, and this although it will not operate
their strong equities, which equities there against the municipality as an adjudica-
would appear to be no difficulty in ordi- tion or an estoppel. Ib. Construction of
narily enforcing in equity as a lien, or on constitutional provision limiting municipal
the principle of a constructive trust, if it indebtedness, see Wheeler v. Philadelphia,
were it not for the effect given to the con- 77 Pa. St. 338, 351 (1875). As to the
stitutional prohibition.
construction of limitations on municipal
Under Art. IX, sec. 8, Pennsylvania indebtedness, see ante, secs. 130–137 ; In-
Constitution of 1874, a municipality may dex, tit. Limitation on Indebtedness; East
incur a debt or increase its existing debt St. Louis v. People, 124 Ill. 655 ; Mr.
to an amount exceeding two per cent upon Merryman's Article .on Limitations on
the assessed valuation of the taxable prop- Municipal Indebtedness, 29 Central Law
erty therein, if the whole indebtedness will Journal, 346 (November, 1889).
not thereby exceed seven per centum of 1 Concord v. Portsmouth Savings Bank,
such valuation. This limit cannot be ex- 92 U.S. 625 (1875); infra, sec. 539. The
ceeded, unless the municipality procures point is so material that we subjoin the
the assent of the electors in the manner opinion delivered by Strong, J., on this
provided in the Constitution, and laws re- point. He says: “There is, however,
lating thereto. A bond, though in terms
A bond, though in terms another consideration that is worthy of
0
و
614
§ 530
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
be reached on the ground that a valid contract to subscribe had
been made before the Constitution took effect, it may be a question
whether the last point was a point really adjudged by the court.
notice. The findings of the court are expired before the subscription was made,
that the plaintiff below is a purchaser of in the face of the recitals and of the coun-
the bonds for a valuable consideration, ty records ? Whether it had expired was
having purchased them before their ma- a matter of fact, not of law, and it was
turity and without notice of any defence, peculiarly, if not exclusively, within the
They were executed by the president of knowledge of the board of supervisors.
the board of supervisors and the county After having assured a purchaser that
clerk. They recite that they are issued their subscription was made in December,
by the county of Moultrie, 'in pursuance 1869, when they had power to make it,
of the subscription of the sum of eighty it would be tolerating a fraud to permit
thousand dollars to the capital stock of the county to set up, when called upon
the Decatur, Sullivan, and Mattoon Rail- for payment, that it was not made until
road Company, made by the board of after July 2, 1870, when their authority
supervisors of said county of Moultrie, expired.” If the records of the county
in December, A. D. 1869, in conformity had contradicted the recitals in the bond,
to the provisions of an act of the General and had affirmatively shown that no sub-
Assembly of the State of Illinois, approved scription was made until after the Con-
March 26, A. D. 1869.' Now, if it be stitution took effect, would the purchaser
supposed that the purchaser of bonds of the bonds be bound to notice that fact ?
with such recitals was bound to look See supra, sec. 529 a, and note ; post, secs.
further and inquire what was the author. 539, 540, 549.
ity for the issue, where was he to look ? Purchaser not affected by statements in
Had he looked to the act of the General county records contrary to recitals in the
Assembly of March 26, 1869, he would bonds issned by the county. Nicolay v.
have found plenary authority for a stock St. Clair County, 3 Dillon C. C. R. 163
subscription and for the issue of bonds, (1874). But compare sec. 529 a, and note.
in payment thereof. If he was bound to in Aller v. Cameron, Ib. 198, the defend-
know that the constitutional provision ant town was held estopped to set up
terminated that authority after July 2, against a holder of its bonds for value
1870, he knew that any subscription made that it was not legally incorporated.
before that time continued binding not- Effect of recital by authorized officers.
withstanding the Constitution, and that See also Chambers County v. Clews, 21
bonds issued in payment of it were, there. Wall. 317, 321; Grand Chute v. Winegar,
fore, lawful. If, then, he had inquired 15 Wall. 355 ; Lynde v. County of Win-
whether a subscription had been made nebago, 16 Wall. 6 ; C. B. & Q. R. R. Co. v.
before July 2, 1870, at the only place Otoe County, 16 Wall. 667; Mercer County
where inquiry should have been made, v. Hacket, 1 Wall. 83 ; Woods v. Lawrence
namely, at the records of the board, he County, 1 Black, 386 ; Gelpcke v. Du-
would have found an order to subscribe, buque, 1 Wall. 175; Meyer v. Muscatine,
equivalent to a subscription made, in 1b. 384; Kennicott v. Supervisors, 16.
December, 1869, corresponding with the Wall. 464. The Supreme Court of Illinois
assertions of the recitals, and declared by refused to follow the ruling in the last
them to have been a subscription. He cited case. Scates v. King, 110 Ill. 456.
could have made inquiry nowhere else A recital in a bond issued in payment of
with any prospect of learning the truth. a subscription to railway stock, that it is
Every step he could have taken assured authorized by a certain statute, will not
him that the recitals were true. How, estop the municipal corporation from as-
then, can the county be permitted to set serting that the issue was not authorized by
up against a bona fide holder of the bonds
a proper vote as required by law. Carroll
that the authority to make a subscription, County v. Smith, 111 U, S. 556.
with all its legitimate consequences, had
§ 531
615
CONTRACTS : BONDS; ESTOPPEL BY RECITALS.
§ 531 (419). Rationale of Estoppel. A correct view of this
subject would seem to be this: Officers are the agents of the cor-
porate body; and the ordinary rules and principles of the law of
agency are applicable to their acts. Their unauthorized acts are not
binding upon the corporate body of which they are the public
agents Ordinarily, their unauthorized representation that they
have power to do an act is not binding upon the corporation; that
is, the question is as to their power, in fact and in law, not what
they have represented it to be. The only exception to this rule,
in addition to the one herein before treated of, to wit, where it is
the sole province of the officers, who issued the bonds to decide
whether conditions precedent have been complied with f is where
both parties have not equal means of knowledge as to the extent
and scope of their powers, and where the particular character of
their commission and authority is, from its nature and circun-
stances, peculiarly known to the officer or agent; in which case the
principal will or may be bound by the false representations of the
agent respecting his authority, and its extent and scope; but where
the authority to act is solely conferred by statute, which, in effect
is the letter of attorney of the officer, all persons must, at their
peril, see that the act of the agent on which he relies is within
the power under which the agent acts; and this doctrine is recog-
nized by the Supreme Court of the United States in some of its
judgments. Accordingly, bonds issued in violation of an express
statute or constitutional provision are void, though in the hands
of innocent holders for value.2 On the principle that there can
be no de facto officer unless there is a de jure office, bonds executed
1 The Floyd Acceptances, 7 Wall. 666 v. Richmond, 18 Gratt. (Va.) 339 (1868);
(1868); Marsh v. Fulton County, 10 Wall. S. c. 7 Am. Law Reg. (N. s.) 589. Upon
676 (1870). See, also, Clark v. Des this principle it was held that the legisla.
Moines, 19 Iowa; 199, 210 (1865); Tread- ture may make the negotiability of muni-
well v. Commissioners, 11 Ohio St. 183, cipal bonds dependent upon their delivery
(1860), reviewing and criticising Knox by a State officer, and that a purchaser
County v. Aspinwall, 21 How. 539. See, of bonds purporting to have been issued
also, Gould v. Sterling (action on bonds), under a statute containing such a condi-
23 N. Y. 464 ; s. C. 1 Am. Law Reg. (N. s.) tion, is not a bona fide purchaser without
290, and note of Prof. Dwight; Starin v. notice, in case the bonds are fraudulently
Genoa, 23 .N. Y. 452 ; People v. Mead, issued without being delivered by the
36 N. Y. 224; Dodge v. County of Platte, designated officer. McCrary, J., Lewis v.
82 N. Y, 218. United States v. City Bank Barbour Co. Comm’rs, 3 Fed. Rep. 191.
of Columbus, 21 How. 356 (1858), is a Aspinwall v. Daviess Co. Com., 22
very striking illustration of the general How. 364; Marsh v. Fulton County, supra;
principle that a corporate officer cannot Moore v. New York, 73 N. Y. 238, approv.
bind the corporation by his unauthorized ing text. As to bonds issued in excess of
acts or representations concerning the constitutional and statutory limitations,
authority of himself or others. De Voss see supra, secs. 527-530.
2
616
§ 532
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
by persons purporting to be de facto officers of a county when there
was no lawful statute in existence creating the office, are absolutely
void for want of power to issue them.1
§ 532 (420). Estoppel by Recitals in the Bond ; Illustration.
So in a subsequent case, similar in character, the conimon council of
a city were, by virtue of various statutes, authorized to subscribe
for stock in a railroad company, and to issue bonds in payment
therefor on the petition of three-fourths of the legal voters of the city.
Before the issue of the bonds, the council decided that three-fourths
of the citizens had petitioned, and the bonds themselves thus recited.
The Supreme Court of the United States held that the council was
the tribunal to decide whether the requisite number had petitioned;
that it was contemplated that this question, which was one of fact,
should be ascertained and conclusively settled prior to the issue of
the bonds; and that when the city was sued upon the bonds by
innocent holders for value, parol testimony was inadmissible to show
that the petitioners did not constitute three-fourths of the legal voters
of the city.
1 Ante, sec. 276 ; Norton v. Shelby no validity even in the hands of bona fide
County, 118 U. S. 425 (1885). In this holders. The validity of the bonds was
case it appeared that the administration of attempted to be sustained on the ground
local matters in each county in Tennessee that the acts of the County Commissioners
had for nearly a century been vested in a under a statute subsequently held to be
County Court, or as often called, Quarterly unconstitutional, were to be regarded as
Court, composed of justices of the peace the acts of officers de facto, and hence
elected in its different districts. Power binding in favor of the bona fide holders of
was given to the County Court to make a the bonds. But the Supreme Court de-
subscription and issue bonds to a railroad cided otherwise; and, in a very learned and
company. Before the power was executed elaborate opinion, reviewing the authori-
the legislature passed an act abolishing the ties, by Mr. Justice Field, it is held :
County Court, and vesting its powers, iu- First, that it was the duty of the Federal
cluding the power to subscribe for stock Court on a question of this kind to follow
and issue bonds, in a Board of County the decision of the highest court of the
Commissioners. The County Commis. State. Second, that there could, in law,
sioners issued the bonds. The act abolish. be no such thing as an officer either de jure
ing the Quarterly Court and creating the or de facto if there be no office to fill ; and
Board of County Commissioners was held, that the act attempting to create the office
after the issue of the bonds, to be uncon- of commissioners never became a law and
stitutional by the Supreme Court of the the office never came into existence. The
State of Tennessee, on the ground that the view of the court on this point is tersely
County Court was one of the institutions summed up in this sentence (Ib., 442):
of the State recognized in the Constitution, “An unconstitutional act is not a law; it
and that the act creating the Board of confers no rights; it imposes no duties ;
County Commissioners and conferring on it affords no protection; it creates no office;
them the powers of the County or Quarterly it is, in legal contemplation, as inoperative
Court' was unconstitutional and void ; and as though it had never been passed."
hence it was held by the Supreme Court
2 Bissell v.
Jeffersonville, 24 How.
of the United States that the bonds had (U.S.) 287 (1860), approving Kuox County
$ 533
617
CONTRACTS: ESTOPPEL BY RECITALS IN BOND.
t
$ 533 (421). Estoppel by Recitals in Bond; Illustration. — In
another case, the action was upon coupons payable to bearer
v. Aspinwall, 21 How. 539; S. P. Evans- also, according to the rule before stated,
ville, I. & C. S. L. R. R. Co. v. Evans- the fact was one not of a nature to be
ville, 15 Iud. 395 (1860); Moran v. ascertained by purchasers in the market
Miami County, 2 Black, 722, 724 (1862); to whom the bonds were designed to be
Marshall County Sup. V. Schenck, 5 sold.
Wall. 772 (1866); Rogers v. Burlington, Recitals in bonds. Where a bond re-
3 Wall. 654 ; Cincinnati v. Morgan, Ib. cites that it is issued “under authority
275; Mercer County v. Hacket, 1 Wall. 83; of” an act, reciting its title, such recital
Meyer v. Muscatine, Ib. 385, 393, per estops the municipality from making, as
Swayne, J.; Gelpcke v. Dubuque, 1 Wall. against a bona fide holder for value,
175, 203 ; Pendleton Co. v. Amy, 13 Wall. the defence that the road was not com-
297 (1871); St. Joseph Township v. pleted in time. Oregon v. Jeunings, 119
Rogers, 16 Wall. 644 (1872). In the case U. S. 74 (1886). To the effect that such
last cited it was insisted that the bonds a recital estops a town, as against a bona
were invalid for want of the required vote. fide holder for value, from showing the
One of the answers of the court to this conditions imposed on its liability by the
objection was that “the act of the legisla- vote of the people had not been complied
ture made it the duty of the supervisor with, although the statute declared that
who executed the bonds to determine the the bonds should not be valid and binding
question whether an election was held, until compliance with such conditions, see-
and whether a majority of the votes cast Am. L. Ins. Co. v. Bruce, 105 U, S. 328.
were in favor of the subscription, and in- In Pana v. Bowler, 107 U. S. 529, 539,
asmuch as he passed upon that question recitals in bonds in favor of a bona fide
and subscribed for the stock, and subse. holder were held effectual to estop the
quently executed and delivered the bonds, municipality, as against an alleged defect
it was clearly too late to question their in the mode of conducting an election held
validity, where it appears, as in this case, prior to the adoption of the Constitution
that they are in the hands of an innocent of Illinois of 1870, the bonds being issued
holder.' The decision in the case referred after its adoption, although that instru.
to in the text is clearly right, for the rea- ment forbade the issuing of the bonds, unless
son that the council were the body to their issue should have been authorized
decide the preliminary fact, and because, under then existing laws by a vote of the
1 Mercer County v. Hacket, 1 Wall. ized the supervisors of the town of Grand
83 (1863). This case, and the case of Chute to make a plank-road subscription
Woods v. Lawrence County, 1 Black, 386, to the amount of ten thousand dollars.
are cited by Mr. Justice Hunt in the case The bonds in question were signed by the
of Grand Chute v. Winegar, 15 Wall. 372 chairman of the board of supervisors of
(1872). The learned justice says: The that town, and recited that the subscrip-
same principles were announced in Gel- tion had been made by the supervisors of
pcke v. The City of Dubuque, 1 Wall. the town, and that these bonds were issued
175, and in Meyer v. The City of Musca. in pursuance thereof, for the purpose of
tine, Ib. 384. In the latter case the court carrying out the provisions of that act.
said that if the legal authority (that is, The plaintiff was the bona fide holder for
the legislative enabling Act] was suffi. value of the bonds in suit, and his title
ciently comprehensive, a bona fide holder accrued before their maturity. The cases
for value has a right to presume that all cited are an answer to the numerous offers
precedent requirements have been com- to show want of compliance with the forms
plied with. By the act of February 10, of law, or to show fraud in their own
1854, the legislature of Wisconsin author. agents."
618
§ 533
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
belonging to negotiable bonds issued by a county in payment of
stock subscribed for in a railroad company. By an act of assembly,
con-
people prior to the adoption of the Con- could be exercised only upon the petition
stitution.
of a majority of taxpayers, “not including
Recitals in a bond that it is issued in those taxed for dogs or highway tax only,
payment of a subscription authorized by a a petition stating that the petitioners were
statute referred to, held not to estop the a majority of the taxpayers of the town"
municipality to show that the issue was was held to be fatally defective. Town of
not authorized by a vote of two-thirds of Mentz v. Cook, 108 N. Y. 504 (1888).
the voters of the corporation, as required Ante, sec. 515, note.
by the Constitution of the State. Carroll A city was authorized to take stock in
County v. Smith, 111 U. S. 556. Recitals a railroad company “on the petition of
in bonds that they were issued “ in pursu- two-thirds of the citizens, who are free-
ance to the vote of the electors of Anderson holders," &c. Bonds of the city were
County, September 13, 1869," held, in favor duly issued, signed by the proper officers
of a bona fide holder thereof, to be equiv- and attested by the seal of the city, and
alent to a statement that the vote was one on their facc recited that they were issued
lawful and regular in form ; and that evi. by virtue of an ordinance of the city mak.
dence to show that the thirty days' notice ing the subscription. The minutes of the
of the election required by the statute was city council simply stated that “the free-
not given was not available to the municipal- holders of the city, with great unanimity,
ity as a defence. The case was considered had petitioned,” &c. It was held that
to fall within Town of Coloma v. Eaves, 92 the city council were the proper judges
U. S. 484, 491; Anderson County Com. whether or not the required number had
missioners v. Beal, 113 U. S. 227 (1884). petitioned, and that the city, as against
Where the Constitution required the ques- bona fide holders for value, was
tion of local taxation to be submitted to cluded” by the ordinance as to any
the electors, a statute which empowered the irregularities that may have existed in
resident taxpayers to authorize a town to carrying into execution the power granted
issue bonds in aid of a railroad, was de- to subscribe the stock and issue the bonds."
clared unconstitutional and void. Har- Van Hostrup v. Madison City, 1 Wall.
rington v. Plainview, 27 Minn. 224, fol- (U. S.) 291 (1863); S. P. Meyer v. Mus-
lowed in Plainview v. Winona & St. Peter catine (where charter required "a majority
R. R. Co., 36 Minn. 505.
of two-thirds of the votes given ") Ib. 384,
As to proceedings preliminary to issuing 393 ; Aurora v. West, 22 Ind. 88 (1864);
of bonds. Ante, secs. 163, 515, note; Knox contra, People v. Mead, 36 N. Y. 224.
Oo. Comm’rs v. Nichols, 14 Ohio St. 260 ; Post, sec. 550, note.
Atchison v. Butcher, 3 Kan. 104 (1865); Where the act authorizing a munici-
Mercer County v. Hacket, 1 Wall. 83; pality to issue bonds was not to take effect
Rogers v. Burlington, 3 Wall. 654; Moran until “ approved by two-thirds of the
· v. Miami Co., 2 Black, 722 ; Flagg v. Pal. electors present at a city meeting held for
myra, 33 Mo. 440; Commonwealth v. that purpose, and a copy of its doings
Allegheny Co. Comm’rs, 37 Pa. St. 237; lodged in the office of the secretary of State,"
compare Marsh v. Fulton County, 10 Wall. bona fide purchasers of such bonds are not
676 (1870); Treadwell v. Hancock Co. bound to look beyond the certificate thus
Comm’rs, 11 Obio St. 183 (1860); post, lodged, and are not affected by the action
sec. 550 ; Pendleton County v. Ainy, 13 of the city, refusing at prior meetings to
Wall. 297 ; City of Lexington v. Butler, approve the act. Society for Savings v.
14 Wall. 284 ; St. Joseph Township v. New London, 29 Conn. 174 (1860).
Rogers, 16 Wall. 644 (1872); Grand Chute Fraud in the election authorizing the
V. Winegar, 5 Wall. 372 (1872); New subscription must be set up before rights
Haven, M. & W. R. R. Co. v. Chatham, 42 have accrued. Butler v. Dunham, 27 Ill.
Conn. 465.
474 ; People v. San F. Sup., 27 Cal. 655.
Where authority to issue town bonds Further as to the construction of powers
!
§ 533
619
CONTRACTS: ESTOPPEL BY RECITALS IN BOND.
the county commissioners were authorized to subscribe the stock and
issue the bonds only upon the following “restrictions, limitations, and
conditions, and in no other manner or way whatever :" 1.“ After,
and not before, the amount of such subscription shall have been des-
ignated, advised, and recommended by a grand jury of the county."
2. Said " bonds shall, in no case, be sold by the railroad company at
less than par.” 3. That the acceptance of this act shall be deemed the
acceptance of another act fixing the gauges of railroads in the county
of Erie. The plaintiff was a bona fide holder for value, of a number
of the bonds issued by the county. To defeat a recovery, the county
on the trial offered to show, not that no recommendation by a
grand jury was ever made, but that no such recommendation was
made as the act required. The following was the recommendation :
The grand jury“ would recommend (omitting the words designate
and advise') the commissioners of Mercer County to subscribe an
amount not exceeding $150,000," — but not otherwise designating
the amount. The bonds referred on their face to the act of assembly
and its date, which authorized their issue and recited that they were
issued in pursuance thereof. This was regarded by the court not as
an offer to show " that no law exists to authorize their issue, but as
one to show that the recitals in the bonds are not true, and to show
that they were not made in pursuance of the acts of assembly' au-
thorizing them;" and, following Knox County v. Aspinwall, 1 it was
adjudged that the matters thus offered to be shown constituted no
defence against a bona fide holder, on the principle that “where bonds
on their face import a compliance with the law under which they
were issued, the purchaser is not bound to look further." And fol-
lowing Woods v. Lawrence County, it was also ruled that it was no
defence against such a holder that the bonds were sold by the rail-
road company for less than par, they being negotiable and the plain-
to aid in the building of railways, see ante, the law, the county cannot afterwards deny
chap. vi. sec. 153 et seq. Ante, secs. 515, its obligation to pay the amount sub-
519, and notes.
scribed. In a suit brought to recover the
1 Knox Co. Comm’rs v. Aspinwall, 21 arrears of interest on such bonds, it is not
How. 539.
necessary for the holder to show that the
2 Woods v. Lawrence County, 1 Black, grand jury fixed the manner and terms of
386. In Woods v. Lawrence County, paying for the stock ; nor is it a defence
above cited, it was also held where the for the county to show that the grand jury
statute requires the grand jury to fix the omitted to do so. It is enough that the
amount of a subscription to railroad stock, manner and terms of payment were agreed
and to approve of it, and upon their re- upon between the company and the com-
port being filed empowers commissioners missioners. This case, among others, was
to carry the same into effect by making its cited and approved in Grand Chute v.
subscription in the name of the county, Winegar, 15 Wall, 372 (1872); S. c. 5
that if these things be done agreeably to Chicago Legal News, 337.
620
§ 535
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
tiff innocent. And it was also decided that the acceptance by the
railroad company of the bonds authorized by the act operated per se
as an acceptance of the gauge law.
§ 534 (422). Estoppel by Recitals in the Bond ; Illustration.
In another case, authority to a city "to take stock in any char-
tered company for making a road, or roads, to the said city," was held,
in favor of a bona fide purchaser of its bonds, to authorize it to sub-
scribe to a railroad which, by the terms of its charter, and in fact
did not terminate at said city, but whose nearest terminus was forty-
six miles distant, it appearing that there was, at the time of said
subscription, another railroad leading from that terminus to the
city. Authority was given by the legislature to the city of Mil-
waukee to issue bonds in aid of a railroad company specially named,
“ and any other railroad company duly incorporated and organized
for the purpose of constructing railroads leading from the city of
Milwaukee," &c., and it was held, such having been the construction
put upon it by the city authorities at the time, that the power to
issue bonds was not confined to companies then in existence, but ex-
tended to companies afterwards created.2
1
§ 535 (422 a). Estoppel by Recital in Bond; Ilustration. In
another case, the city was held liable upon bonds issued to a railway
company under the following circumstances, viz.: The legislature au-
thorized the city to subscribe on the condition of a majority vote;
the city embodied three conditions in the proposition submitted to
the voters, one of which was that $1,000,000 should be subscribed
by other parties; the vote carried; other parties did not subscribe
the $1,000,000; the city refused to subscribe and issue bonds, but
1 Van Hostrupv. Madison City, 1 Wall. construed to give the requisite authority
291 (1863); see Aurora v. West, 9 Ind. to issue the bonds of the county to raise
74 ; s. C. 22 Ind. 88, 96, 503. The deci- money to build a court-house. The case
sion in Van Hostrup v. Madison City was also holds that it was competent for the
undoubtedly influenced by the natural proper county official (the county judge)
desire to protect the holders of the bonds. to visit New York for purposes connected
Doubts can but be entertained that the with the disposition of the bonds, and
Columbus and Shelby Road, distant and while there, and out of his jurisdiction, to
between different points, was a road lead- issue and seal new bonds with a new seal
ing to Madison. Note remarks of Nelson, J. procured at the time, in exchange for bonds
See also Kirkbride v. Lafayette Co., 108 already issued, but not yet put on the mar-
U. S. 208.
ket, and it was so held although the
2 James v. Milwaukee, 16 Wall. 159 statute of the State provided that in the
(1872).
case of the absence of that officer the county
In Lynde v. Winnebago County, 16 clerk should take his place.
Wall. 6 (1872), a special submission, under 8 Lexington v. Butler, 14 Wall. 282
the laws of Iowa, to a popular vote, was (1871).
$ 537
621
CONTRACTS: ESTOPPEL BY RECITALS IN BOND.
was compelled to do so by a mandamus of an inferior court, whose
judgment was afterwards reversed by the Court of Appeals of the
State, which held that the city had no authority to take the stock or
issue the bonds until the $1,000,000 had been subscribed by other
parties. Meanwhile, however, bonds were issued by the city, bear-
ing its seal and signed by its mayor and clerk, reciting that they
were duly issued under a specified act of the General Assembly.
$ 536. Same subject. -- The Supreme Court of the United States
held in the case last cited that a bona fide holder for value of these
bonds, who had no actual notice of the facts relied on for a defence,
could recover thereon. Mr. Justice Clifford, delivering the opinion
of the court, makes use of this language in stating the ground of the
judgment : “Admitted, as it is, that the corporation defendants pos-
sessed the power to subscribe for the stock and issue the bonds, it is
clear that the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon the merits, as the
repeated decisions of this court have established the rule that when
a corporation has power under any circumstances to issue negotiable
securities, the bona fide holder has a right to presume that they were
issued under the circumstances which give the requisite authority,
and that they are no more liable to be impeached in the hands of
such a holder than any other commercial paper." By the expression
that it is admitted that the city "possessed the power to subscribe
for the stock and to issue the bonds," reference is undoubtedly made
to the act of the legislature which gave this power on condition of a
majority vote, and possibly to the fact that it was admitted in the
plea that the vote was cast in favor of the subscription, for other-
wise it seems to have been denied that the power existed ; and that
it did not exist as between the city and the railroad corporation was
decided by the Court of Appeals of the State. The substance of the
decision of the United States Supreme Court in this case would seem
to be that a bona fide purchaser of the bonds had a right to presume
that the condition annexed by the city as to the $1,000,000 of other
subscriptions had been complied with; and thus viewed, the judg-
ment of the court rests upon grounds whose soundness cannot admit
of question. It is not an authority upon its essential facts in favor
of the proposition that if the bonds had been issued without any
vote, or attempt at a vote, they would have been binding, in the
absence of estoppel other than by recitals, or in the absence of other
ground of liability
$ 537 (422b). Other Grounds of Estoppel. — In another case, the
authority to subscribe for the stock of the company was given on con-
1 Pendleton v. Amy, 13 Wall. 297 (1871).
622
§ 538
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
dition that the county should so vote by a majority of real estate holders
residing therein. A subscription was made in 1853, and a certificate
of stock was issued to the county, which was received by it, and was
still owned by it in 1869, when suit was brought. It did not appear
that the bonds contained any recitals that conditions precedent had
been complied with, or that the county had subsequently levied
taxes to pay interest on the bonds. The county set up as a defence
that there was no power to issue the bonds, because no vote of the
people had ever been taken. The plaintiff being a bona fide holder,
it was held that he was entitled to recover, and that the county was
estopped to set up that no vote was had. The ground of the estoppel
is thus stated by Mr. Justice Strong: “The county received in ex-
change for the bonds a certificate of the stock of the railroad com-
pany, which it held about seventeen years before the present suit
was brought, and which it still holds. Having exchanged the bonds
for the stock, we think the county cannot retain the proceeds of the
exchange, and assert against a purchaser of the bonds for value that
though the legislature empowered it to make them, and put them
upon the market, upon certain conditions, they were issued in dis-
regard of the conditions.” It will be observed that if the court had
been of opinion that the bonds were enforceable in the hands of a
holder for value though no election had in fact ever been held, the
case would naturally have been put upon that ground.
§ 538. What constitutes Completed Subscription or Contract to
subscribe. - Interesting questions have arisen as to what constitutes
a subscription on the part of a municipality or other public corpora-
tion, or a valid contract to subscribe, to the stock of a railroad
company, and when rights are vested thereunder which cannot be
legislatively impaired without the consent of the parties in interest.
Where a precedent popular vote is required, and upon such vote
authority is given to subscribe for the stock, the vote without more
does not constitute a contract between the municipality thus author-
ized to subscribe and the railroad company.
1 Aspinwall v. County of Jo Daviess, pany. Bates County v. Winters, 112 U. S.
22 How. 364 ; Town of Concord v. Ports- 325 (1884). For what is necessary to com-
mouth Savings Bank, 92 U. S. 625; Harsh- plete a valid subscription, see Nugent v.
man v. Bates County, 3 Dillon C. C. R. Putnam Co. Sup., 19 Wall. 241; Moultrie
150, 162, note ; s. C. affirmed in Supreme County v. Rockingham T. C. Sav. Bank,
Court, 92 U. S. 569 (1875); ante, sec. 70, 92 U. S. 631; infra, secs. 539, 540.
and cases cited. German Bank v. Frank. The rights of a municipality as a stock-
lin County, 128 U. S. 526 (1888). Sub- holder in a railroad company, and whose
scription by a county for stock held to be stock has been paid for by the bonds of
complete, although no actual subscription the municipality, are no greater than the
was made on the stock books of the com- rights of other stockholders ; and unless
§ 539
623
CONTRACTS : BONDS; WANT OF POWER.
§ 539. Same subject. Power may be annulled by Constitutional
Provision or Legislative Action before Rights become vested ; Bonds
in Such Case are void in Everybody's Hands. As illustrating the
necessity of a continued existence of the power to issue the bonds, and
as showing what did not amount to a completed contract before the
power was repealed by a constitutional provision, the case of the
Town of Concord v. Portsmouth Savings Bank may usefully be re-
ferred to. Chronologically stated, the facts were these: The bonds
were issued under the act of March 7, 1867, and so recited. The
act enacted that certain incorporated towns and cities, and towns
acting under the township organization law (among which it was
conceded the town of Concord was one), should be and were sever-
ally authorized to appropriate such sum of money as they might
deem proper to the Chicago, Danville, and Vincennes Railroad
Company, to aid in the construction of the road of said company,
to be paid to the company as soon as the track of said road should
have been located and constructed through said city, town, or town-
ship respectively. To this was attached the following proviso :
“ Provided, however, that the proposition to appropriate moneys to
said company shall be first submitted to a vote of the legal voters
of said respective townships, towns, or cities, at a regular annual or
special meeting, by giving at least ten days' notice thereof; and a
vote shall be taken thereon by ballot at the usual place of election,
and if the majority of votes cast shall be in favor of the appropria-
specially authorized by the legislature, the ship upon an adjudication by the Supreme
railroad company has no power, when re- Court of the State that the law authorizing
ceiving the subscription and bonds, to the issue was unconstitutional, it was held,
agree to put the municipality in a better in a suit brought by the railroad thirteen
position than other stockholders, as, for years afterwards, and after the decision of
example, by agreeing to pay a fixed rate the State court had been reversed by the
of interest on such stock, equivalent in Supreme Court of the United States, that
amount to the interest on the municipal the return of the bonds by the State officer
bonds issued in payment therefor. Pitts and their retention by the township were
burgh & S. Railroad Co. v. Allegheny a conversion which entitled the railroad
County, 79 Pa. St. 210 (1875); s. C. 3 company to bring suit at once, but that
Cent. Law Jour. 204. Instance in which the bill brought after such a lapse of time
there was legislative authority for such a should be dismissed. Young v. Clarendon
contract, see case of the Pittsburgh and Tp., 26 Fed. Rep. 805.
Connelsville Railroad Co., 63 Pa. St. 126. 1 Concord v. Portsmouth Savings Bank,
When contract to subscribe stock is com- 92 U. S. 625 (1875); see infra, sec. 540,
pileted. Shelby County Court v. Cumber- note. Effect of the constitutional provi-
land & 0. Railroad Co., 8 Bush (Ky.), 209, sion of Illinois of July 2, 1870, quoted in
300 ; Chicago, K. & W. R. R. Co. v. Osage the text, see German Bank v. Franklin
County, 38 Kan. 597. Where a township County, 128 U. S. 526 (1888), and cases
delivered its bonds in escrow to a State there cited, in Ilinois and in the Supreme
officer, to be held until the completion of Court of the United States, construing and
the road in aid of which they were issued, applying the same. Post, secs. 542, 550;
and the officer returned them to the town. ante, sec. 530.
624
§ 539
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
tion, then the same shall be made, otherwise not.” The second sec-
tion empowered and required the authorities of said municipalities
to levy and collect a tax, and make such provisions as might be
necessary for the prompt payment of the appropriation under the
provisions of the law. The town voted on the 20th day of November,
1869, that it would make a donation, provided the company would
run its railroad through the town. On the 20th of June, 1870, the
company gave notice of its acceptance of the donation. On the 2d
of July, 1870, the new Constitution of the State went into opera-
tion, by which it was ordained that “no city, town, township, or
other municipality shall ever become subscribers to the capital stock
of any railroad or private corporation, or make donation to, or loan
its credit in aid of, such corporation; provided, however, that the
adoption of this article shall not be construed as affecting the right
of any such municipality to make such subscriptions, where the
same have been authorized under existing laws by a vote of the
people of such municipalities prior to such adoption.” On the 9th
day of October, 1871, the bonds in suit were executed and deliv-
ered as a donation to the railroad company; and the question was
whether there was any existing authority to make the donation and
issue the bonds. The Supreme Court, after pointing out that the
authority given to the town of Concord by the act of March 7,
1867, was not to subscribe for stock, but to make an appropria-
tion or donation, which distinction is also taken in the provision of
the Constitution above quoted, held that no donation could be made,
under the act of 1867, until after the completion of the location
and construction of the road through the town; that the vote of
November 20, 1869, in favor of an appropriation, was not an appro-
priation or donation; that the power to make such donation was
annulled by the Constitution on July 2, 1870, and that there was
at that date no contract in esse between the town and the railroad
company which stood in the way of the operation of the consti-
tutional prohibition. As to the effect of the vote of the town, of
November 20, 1869, and the acceptance of the railroad company of
June 20, 1870 (both of which, it will be observed, were before the
Constitution went into operation), the court observed : “But the
town was not empowered to make the donation until the road was
located and constructed through the town. It had no authority to
make a contract to give; and the acceptance was an undertaking to
do nothing which the company was not bound to do before the
authority of the town to make a donation, or to engage to make a
donation, came into existence. What is called the acceptance of
the railroad company cannot be construed as an engagement to
$ 540
625
CONTRACTS : BONDS ; SÚBSCRIPTION TO STOCK.
locate and build the railroad through the town. It amounted to no
more than saying, 'If we build our road through your town, we will
receive your gift. There was, therefore, no consideration for the
town's promise to give, even if the popular vote can be considered
a promise. There was no contract to be impaired. A contract
should be clearly proved before it invokes the protection of the
Federal Constitution. We conclude, then, that at the time the do-
nation was made, there was no authority in the municipality to
make a donation to the railroad company, and consequently no
authority to issue the bonds. It follows that the bonds and cou-
pons are void.” 1
§ 540. Same subject. Mode of Subscription ; when Subscription
Complete. — Power by legislative act to the board of supervisors of a
county to subscribe an amount not exceeding a given sum to the stock
of a specified railroad company, and to issue bonds in payment
therefor, without requiring the sanction of a popular vote, but with
a proviso that the bonds shall not be issued until the road is open for
traffic, gives complete authority to the county to subscribe for
the stock, or to make a binding agreement to subscribe therefor
preparatory to a final subscription. The proviso that the paynient
of the subscription should be postponed until the railroad should be
opened does not limit the power to subscribe, or to enter into an
agreement to make the subscription before the road is completed.
And it was held that a resolution of the board of supervisors, made
when the power to subscribe existed or had arisen, that the county
subscribe a given sun to aid in the construction of the road of the
company, without any subscription on the books of the company,
amounted to a subscription, or, at all events, to a legal undertaking
to subscribe, which, when assented to or accepted by the company,
became a binding contract, which the county could not revoke, and
which could not be impaired by any subsequent prohibition of the
Constitution or the legislature without the assent of the railroad
company. .2
1 In Iowa it is beld that if money be Ind. 1 ; infra, sec. 540, note. A muni-
expended before the repeal of a statute, cipal corporation which issued its bonds to
upon the faith of the tax provided for by a railroad company formed by consolidating
it, the repeal does not invalidate the tax two other companies was held estopped to
and it may be collected. Burgesv. deny the validity of the consolidation.
Mabin, 70 Iowa, 633; approved Barthel v. Young v. Township of Clarendon, 26 Fed.
Meader, 72 Iowa, 125.
Rep. 805. See infra, sec. 541. In a case
2 Town of Concord v. Portsmouth Sav- where a subscription was made to a rail-
ings Bank, 92 U. S. 625 (1875); Livings- road company by a city, payment to be
ton County v. Portsmouth Bank, 128 U. S. made when ten miles of the railroad was
102, 126 (1888); Scott v. Hansheer, 94 completed, and the charter of the company
VOL. I. -40
626
§ 540
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
But before any subscription is made, or before any contract to
subscribe is completed, the authority to subscribe may be repealed
or taken away by legislative or constitutional provision. And if
the authority to subscribe depends upon a precedent vote of the
people, the vote, without a subscription or an agreement to sub-
scribe, does not create a contract, or preclude the repeal of the
authority to make the subscription :2 it is executory until the sub-
required it to complete its line in fifteen the operation of a constitutional limitation
years, it was held that an extension of the upon the power of the legislature and of a
time within which the line could be com- constitutional inhibition upon a municipal-
pleted did not release the subscription. ity, is the case of Norton v. Brownsville,
Jacks v. City of Helena, 41 Ark. 213. 129 U. S. 479 (1888). Here an act of Feb-
1 For the effect upon incomplete sub- rnary 8, 1870, authorized Brownsville to
scriptions of the adoption of constitutional issue bonds in aid of a railroad company
provisions forbidding or limiting the power on a majority vote. May 5, 1870, the
to aid railroads, see infra, sec. 542, note; amended Constitution took effect, which
and, also, Concord v. Robinson, 121 ordained that “the credit of no city shall
U. S. 165, distinguished, German Bank be given or loaned to or in aid of any per-
v. Franklin County, 128 U. S. 526, 543 son or corporation, except upon an election
(1888); Katzenberger v. Aberdeen, 121 to be first held by the qualified voters, and
U. S. 172 ; Oregon v. Jennings, 119 U. S. the assent of three-fourths of the votes at
74, distinguished, German Bank v. Frank- said election.
said election." May 11, 1870, five days
lin County, 128 U. S. 526, 543 (1888); Nor- after the amended Constitution took effect,
ton v. Shelby County, 118 U. S. 425. The proceedings were initiated to issue bonds,
effect of the prohibition in the Constitu- and an election was held under the act of
tion of Missouri of 1865, of municipal sub- February 8, 1870, at which every vote was
scriptions in aid of railways without the cast for the issue of bonds. The bonds
previous assent of two-thirds of the quali- recited that they were issued by authority
fied voters, has been considered in many of the act of February 8, 1870. It was
cases determined in the State courts of held that the power to issue bonds under
Missouri and in the Federal courts. The the act of 1870 not having been acted
State courts first held that the effect of the upon until after the Constitution of 1870
constitutional provision was to limit the went into effect, such power could not be
future exercise of legislative power, but exercised without further legislation in
did not take away any authority granted conformity therewith ; the effect of the
and in existence at the time the Constitu- constitutional prohibition being to annul
tion of 1865 went into operation. Sub- all unexecuted powers conferred upon the
scriptions were made and railway bonds corporation. Whether this would have
issued when this construction prevailed; been the effect if the terms of the act of
and the Federal courts held that such 1870 and of the constitutional amendment
bonds were valid. The Supreme Court of had not been inconsistent, quære. See Jar-
Missouri afterwards put a different con- rolt v. Moberly, 103 U. S. 580; Kelley v.
struction on the Constitution ; but the Milan, 127 U. S. 139, 154 ; post, sec. 851a;
Supreme Court of the United States de Norton v. Taxing District of Brownsville,
clined to reconsider its former decisions, to 36 Fed. Rep. 99 (U. S. Cir. Ct., W. D.
the prejudice of bona fide holders of bonds Tenn. 1888).
issued prior to the change of decision in 2 Aspinwall v. County of Jo Daviess,
the State court. The cases on this subject 22 How. 364 (1859); U. P. R. R. Co. v.
are reviewed by Mr. Justice Harlan, in Davis Co., 6 Kan. 256 (1870); State v.
Scotland County v. Hill, 132 U. S. 107 Saline Co., 45 Mo. 242 ; Jeffries v. Law-
(1889).
rence, 42 Iowa, 498 (1876); Bound v.
Illustrative of the distinction between Wis. C. R. Co., 45 Wis. 543; ante, sec. 70;
$ 540
627
CONTRACTS: BONDS ; SUBSCRIPTION WHEN COMPLETE.
.
scription is actually made. But an actual manual subscription on
post, sec. 866, note, and cases there cited; pledge to subscribe the fifty shares in this
Harshman v. Bates County, 3 Dillon C. C. particular road, but as actually taking, and
R. 162, note; affirmed 92 U. S. 579 ;'Ger- in substance and legal effect subscribing
man Bank v. Franklin County, 128 U. S. for that number of shares. So in Nugent
526 (1888). The law on this subject is v. The Supervisors of Putnam County, 19
thus stated and the cases referred to and Wall. 241, it was said that to constitute a
distinguished, by Mr. Justice Strong, in subscription by a county to stock in a
The Town of Concord v. Portsmouth Sav. railroad company, it is not necessary that
ings Bank, supra :
there be an act of manual subscribing on
“This case (although between the same
the books of the company. These cases
parties] differs very materially from the lead directly to the conclusion that the
case of The Town of Concord v. The Ports- action of the board of supervisors in
mouth Savings Bank, No. 43, of this term. December, 1869, was in substance and in
[Supra, sec. 539.] In that, we held that legal effect a subscription. And if this
the bonds were void because the legislative conclusion could not be reached, it would
authority to issue them as a donation to make but little difference to the present
the railroad company had been annulled case, for it could not be doubted that the
by the Constitution of the State before action of the board was at least an under-
the donation was inade. But a sub- taking to subscribe, and this was assented
scription on the boolcs of the company was to or accepted by the railroad company.
unnecessary, for that which amounted to a The resolutions were entered of record by
subscription had been made in December, the clerk and president of the railroad
1869. The authorized body of a municipal company, and the company made an ap-
corporation may bind it by an ordinance, propriation of the bonds to be received
which, in favor of private persons inter in payment of the subscription, by a con-
ested therein, may, if so intended, operate tract made on the 15th of April, 1870. In
as a contract, or they may bind it by a either aspect of the case, therefore, there
resolution, or by vote clothe its officers was an authorized contract existing be-
with power to act for it. The former was tween the county and the railroad com-
the clear intention in this case. The board pany when the new Constitution came into
clothed no officer with power to act for it. Operation. No matter whether the contract
The resolution to subscribe was its own was a subscription or an agreement to sub-
act, its immediate subscription. Western scribe, it was not annulled or impaired by
Saving Fund Society v. The City of Phil- the prohibitions of the Constitution. The
adelphia, 31 Pa. St. 175; Sacramento v. delivery of the bonds was no more than
Kirk, 7 Cal. 419; Logansport v. Blake- performance of the contract. For these
more, 17 Ind. 318. In Clarke County reasons, it is in vain to appeal to the de-
Court Jus. v. Paris, W. & Ky. R. Turnp. cisions made in Aspinwall v. The County
Co., 11 Ben. Monroe (Ky.), 143, it was of Jo Daviess, 22 How. 364, and The Town
ruled that an order of the county court, of Concord v. The Savings Bank, decided
by which it was said the court subscribed, this term. In neither of those cases was
on behalf of Clarke County, for fifty shares there any contract made before the author-
of stock in the turnpike company, if con- ity to make one was annulled. We do not
curred in by a competent majority of the assert that the constitutional provision did
magistrates, was itself a subscription, and not abrogate the authority of the board of
bound the county. There was no subscrip- supervisors to make a subscription for rail-
tion on the books of the company; but the road stock. On the contrary, we think it
Court of Appeals said, “We cannot, there- did. But we hold that contracts made
fore, regard this order as a mere offer or under the power while it was in existence
1 To. ; Cumberland & O. R. R. Co. v. (1874); Shelby Co. Court v. Cumberland
Barren Co. Court, 10 Bush (Ky.), 604 & 0. R. R. Co., 8 Bush (Ky.), 209.
628
§ 541
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
the books of the company is not necessary to entitle the county to
the stock, or to bind it as a subscriber thereto.1
§ 541. Same subject. Completed Subscription; Effect of Consol-
idation of Railway Companies on validity of Subscription.
The
authority to make a subscription and to issue bonds in payment
therefor may, if it has never been executed, be revoked by any event
which has the legal effect to extinguish the power. Thus, where
the power to subscribe depends upon a precedent popular vote and
the vote is had in favor of Company A, which under a general law
of the State consolidated with Company B, and formed thereby a
new company, C, which consolidation was effected before any sub-
scription or contract for subscription was made, and the only sub-
scription made was to the consolidated company, without any new
election, it was held that the subscription was unauthorized, and
that the bonds which recited these facts were void, even in the
hands of a bona fide holder for value. The ground of the decision
was that the authority to make the subscription ceased with the
extinction of the company in whose favor the vote was had, such
extinction being the legal consequence of the consolidation. This
were valid contracts, and that the obliga. This is sought to be justified on the
tions assumed by thein continued after the ground that the former company became
power to enter into such contracts was consolidated with another, thereby form.
withdrawn. The operation of the Consti- ing a third, to whose stock the subscrip-
tution was only prospective. Indeed, it tion was made. This consolidation was
is expressly ordained in its schedule that effected under a law of Missouri authoriz-
‘all rights, actions, prosecutions, claims, ing consolidations, and declaring that the
and contracts of the State, individuals, company formed from two companies
or bodies corporate, shall continue to be should be entitled to all the powers,
as valid as if this Constitution had not rights, privileges, and immunities which
been adopted.' It is hardly necessary to belong to either; and it is contended that
say that, under the act of the general this provision of the law justified the
assembly, the authority to make a sub- county court in making the subscription
scription was coupled with an authority without further authority from the peo-
and a duty to issue county bonds for the ple of the township. But did not the
sum subscribed. No action of the board authority cease by the extinction of the
was needed after the subscription was company voted for ? No subscription
made."
had been made. No vested right had
1 Cass County v. Gillett, 100 U. S. accrued to the company. The case of
585.
The State v. Linn County Court, 44 Mo.
2 Harshman v. Bates County, 92 U. S. 504, only decides that if the county court
569 (1875). The grounds of the judg. refuses to issue bonds after making a
ment of the court on this point are thus subscription, a mandamus will lie to com-
succinctly stated by Bradley, J.:
pel it to issue them. There the authori-
" Another objection to the validity of ty had been executed and a right had
the subscription for which the bonds were become vested. But so long as it re-
given in this case is, that the township mains unexecuted, the occurrence of any
voted a subscription to one company and event which creates a revocation in law
the county court subscribed to another. will extinguish the power. The extinc-
§ 5+1
629
CONTRACTS : BONDS TO CONSOLIDATED RAILWAY.
case differs from Nugent v. The Supervisors of Putnam County in
the material circumstance that in that case the subscription to one
of the constituent companies was before the consolidation, while in
this one it was afterwards. In this case there was nothing but a
bare vote before the consolidation, which, without more, creates no
contract between the municipality and the railroad company; while
in the Putnam County case there was a subscription in addition to
the vote, before the consolidation; and the right, having become
vested in the railroad company, may be transferred to another on an
authorized consolidation being effected. Where the consolidation is
provided for or contemplated by the legislation of the State in force
when the subscription is made, a subsequent consolidation, in pur-
suance of the enactment, does not have the effect to invalidate the
subscription. This principle was distinctly settled in the Putnam
tion of the company in whose favor the made to the Hannibal & St. Joseph Rail-
subscription was authorized worked such road Co. without a popular vote ; and
a revocation. The law authorizing the such subscription is void. The consolida-
consolidation of railroad companies does tion operated an extinction of the original
not change the law of attorney and con- company, and the power to subscribe
stituent. It may transfer the vested riglits thereto perished with the company. In
of one railroad company to another, such case there could be no innocent
upon a consolidation being effected ; but purchasers of the bonds. Ib. See refer-
it does not continue in existence powers ence to this case in Livingston County v.
to subscribe for stock given by one per- Portsmouth Bank, 128 U. S. p. 128 (1888).
son to another, which, by the general See also Menasha v. Hazard, 102 U. S.
law, are extinguished by such a change. 81. In Iowa it is held that the alienation
It does not profess to do so, and we think of a railroad before its completion works a
it does not do so by implication. As suf- forfeiture of a tax voted in its aid, the
ficient notice of these objections is con- decision being based upon the provisions
tained in the recitals of the bonds them. of a statute requiring that the taxpayers
selves to put the holder on inquiry, we shall receive stock in the corporation to
think that there was no error in the judg- the amount of taxes paid by them. Held
ment of the circuit court; and it is, there. also, that the collection of taxes in such
fore, affirmed."
cases may be enjoined at the suit of a tax-
Same case in circuit court, 3 Dillon payer. Manning v. Matthews, 66 Iowa,
C. C. R. 150 ; . P. McClure v. Oxford, 675; Blunt v. Carpenter, 68 Iowa, 265.
94 U. S. 429; Bates County v. Winters, 97 1 Nugent v. The Supervisors of Put-
U, S. 83 (1877); S. C. again, 112 U. Ş. nam County, 19 Wall. 241. See Ray Co.
325 (1884), and see Livingston County v. 1. Vansycle, 96 U. S. 675, where a sub-
Portsmouth Bank, 128 U. S. 102 (1888), scription by the county authorities to
where the same statutes are considered, another company was sustained and the
and the court refused to apply the doctrine doctrine of estoppel applied. See also,
of Harshman v. Bates County, 92 U. S. Cass Co. v. Gillett, 100 U. S. 585 ; Har-
569, and Bates County v. Winters, 97 U. S. ter v. Kernochan, 103 U. S. 562. One
83. See supra, sec. 540, note ; State v. subscription does not exhaust the power.
Garroute, 67 Mo. 445, where the court People v. Waynesville, 88 Ill. 469. Ir-
say the consolidation does not operate to regularities no defence. Roberts v. Bolles,
transfer to the latter the franchises and 101 U. S. 119 ; Empire Tp. v. Darlington,
unexecuted rights of former companies 101 U. S. 87.
so as to authorize a subscription to be

630
$ 542
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
County case just cited ;1 and such existing legislative authority to
change the organization controlled the decision, and constituted, in
the judgment of the court, the ground of distinction between that
case and the oft cited case of Marsh v. Fulton County. Indeed,
the Supreme Court has since gone farther, and has frequently de-
cided, where at the date of the vote in favor of the constituent
company there exists a statute authorizing its consolidation with
another company, that such consolidation does not necessarily ex-
tinguish the power to subscribe given by the vote, and that bonds
issued to the consolidated company under such vote are, or might
be valid.3
$ 542. There must be a valid Legislative Act as the Basis
of the Power; Construction of Special Powers. A purchaser
of municipal bonds is bound, as has already been incidentally
shown, to take notice of any provisions of the Constitution or legisla-
tion of the State relating to the power of the municipality to issue
them; and if the act conferring the power is m conflict with the
Constitution, the bonds are void, even in the hands of a bona fide
holder for value. And the purchaser must also mnotice the pro-
1 19 Wall. 241. The principle was 105 U.S.TS (1881). The cases on this
followed and applied in Thomas . Seot- subject are carefully stated and considered
land County, 3 Dillon C. C. R. 8. c. by Blalchyurd, in livingston County v.
94 U. S. 682, and in Washburn. Cass Portsmouth Bank, 128 S. 102 (1888),
County, 3 Dillon C. C. R. 251, and the distinguishing and limiting, if not, indeed,
bonds held valid notwithstanding the overruling Harbinger Bates County.
consolidation. A change in the name of Antes se 540.
the company will not invalidate the sub Harshman . Bates County, 92 U. S.
scription. Reading v. Wedder, 66 Ill. 80 569 (1875), distinguished, Bates County v.
2 Marsh v. Fulton County, 10 Wall. Winters, 112 U. S. 325; Lamoille Val. R.
676. In People v. Granville, 104 Ill283, R Co. v. Fairfield, 51 Vt. 257; Allen v.
an act providing that the liability of Louisiana, 103 U. S. 80 ; Jarrolt v.
municipal corporations which had voted Moberly, 103 U. S. 580; Wells v. Pontotoc
aid to railroads should cease on a certain Co. Sup., 102 U. S. 625; Ogden v. Daviess
date, after which no bonds should be Co., 102 U. S. 634; supra, sec. 529 a ; post,
issued in virtue of any previous vote, was see, 553 As the decision in the first case
held to be a statute of limitation, not is supposed to invalidate all the bonds is-
impairing the obligation of contracts; and sued under the Township Aid Act of Mis-
a mandamus to compel the issue of bonds sour of March 23, 1868, said to amount
after that date was refused.
to nearly $3,000,000, the point on which
3 County of Scotland v. Thomas, 94 the act was decided to be unconstitutional
U. S. 682 (1876), distinguishing Harshman will be stated. The Constitution of 1865,
v. Bates County, 92 U. S. 569 ; S.P. Art. II. c. 14, prohibited such subscrip-
Scotland County v. Hill, 132 U. S. 107 tions "unless two-thirds of the qualified
(1889); East Lincoln v. Davenport, 94 U.S. voters of the municipality issuing the
801 (1876); Wilson v. Salamanca, 99 bonds "shall assent thereto." The Town-
U. S. 499 (1878); Menasha v. Hazard, 102 ship Aid Act authorized the issue of
U. S. 81 (1880); Harter v. Kernochan, 103 bonds "if two-thirds of the qualified vo-
U.S. 562 (1880); New Buffalo v. Iron Co. ters of the township voting at such election
§ 542
631
CONTRACTS : BONDS; SPECIAL POWERS,
visions and extent of the legislative enactments on the subject.?
Thus where authority was given to certain counties lying north of
are in favor of the subscription.” The See, also, Cass County v. Gillett, 100 U. S.
Supreme Court held that there is a broad 585, affirming Henry County v. Nicolay,
difference between the Constitution and 95 U. S. 619; Jarrott v. Moberly, 5 Dill.
the act, – the former requiring the assent 253 ; Howard County v. Paddock, 110
of two-thirds of the qualified voters of the U. S. 384.
municipality, while the latter requires The provisions of the Constitution
the assent of only two-thirds of the quals which require the assent of two-thirds of
ified voters who vote at the election. The the qualified voters of a county to a sub-
same case, in the court below, decided on scription on its behalt for stock in a cor-
another ground, -- the constitutional ques- poration, do not apply to cases where
tion being made for the first time in the such subscription is made for stock in a
Supreme Court, — is reported in 3 Dillon railroad company pursuant to the power
C. C. R. '150. Post v. Supervisors, 105 conferred by its charter granted prior to
U. S. 667; South Ottawa v. Perkins, 94 the adoption of that Constitution, notwith-
U. S. 260. In these two cases an act au- standing the contemplated road is a branch
thorizing the issue of municipal bonds road, the construction of which, although
which had been passed in conformity with authorized by such charter, is undertaken
the requirements of the Constitution of as an independent enterprise under the act
Illinois was declared void by the Supreme of March 21, 1868, entitled “An act to
Court of the United States, following the aid in the building of branch railroads in
uniform decisions of the State court, and the State of Missouri.” Cass County v.
the bonds issued in pursuance of it were Gillett, 100 U. S. 585 ; Scotland County
held to be invalid even in the hands of v. Hill, 132 U. S. 107 (1889); ante, sec.
those who took them for value, and in 540.
the belief that they had been lawfully is. i German Savings Bank v. Franklin
sued.
County, 128 U. S. 526, 538 (1888).
Efect of constitutional provision adopted "When the Savings Bank purchased the
in 1870 on existing powers to aid railways bonds, it was, notwithstanding the re-
in Mississippi. Infra, sec. 544, note ; Cal- citals on the face of them, chargeable with
houn Co. Sup. v. Galbraith, 99 U. S. 214; notice of the act of April 16, 1869 (which
Woodward v. Calhoun Co. Sup. (U. S. contained provisions which invalidated
Dist. Court for Mississippi, Hill, J.), the bonds, but which Act was not recited
2 Cent. Law Jour. 396. In Ohio, Cass v. or referred to in the bonds], and of the
Dillon, 2 Ohio St. 607 ; State v. Union construction which had then been given
Tp., 8 Ohio, 394. In Missouri, State v. to it by the Supreme Court of Illinois
Sullivan Co. Court, 51 Mo. 531 ; Kansas prior to the issue of these bonds, in Town
City, St. J. & C. B. R. R. Co. v. Nodaway of Eagle v. Kohn, 84 Ill. 292." Ib. per
Co. Court Jus., 47 Mo. 349; State v. Same, Blatchford, J., pp. 537, 538. Post, sec.
48 Mo. 339; State v. Macon Co. Court, 41 545, note. “Every person dealing with
Mo. 453 ; Smith v. Clark County, 54 such a corporation must, at his peril, take
Mo. 58 ; State v. Greene County, 54 Mo. notice of the existence and terms of the law
540 ; Thomas v. Scotland County, 3 Dil- by which it is claimed the power to issue
Ion C. C. R. 7; Nicolay v. St. Clair such bonds is conferred. The power to
County, Ib. 163; Huidekoper v. Dallas issue such bonds is derived exclusively
County, Ib. 171 ; Jordan v. Cass County, from the legislative authority of the State,
Ib. 185; Foster v. Callaway County, Th. and the laws which confer them enter into
200; Henry County v. Nicolay, 95 U. S. and form a part of the bonds themselves.
619; Callaway County v. Foster, 93 U. S. The holder of a municipal bond is charge-
567 ; Louisiana v. Taylor, 105 U. S. 454 ; able with notice of the statutory provis-
Ralls County v. Douglass
, 16. 728; Scot- ions under which they are issued.”* Wal-
land County v. Thomas, 94 U. S. 682; lace, J. National Bank 1. St. Joseph, 31
Macon County v. Shores, 97 U. S. 272. Fed. Rep. 216. In this case a statutory
632
§ 542
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
66 the
the Missouri River, a subscription made and bonds issued under
such authority by a county south of the river are void in the hands
of everybody.
provision authorizing the city to call in lature, by extending the route of the pro-
bonds and pay the same at any time, and posed road beyond the point designated in
providing that upon tender of the principal the original charter, to authorize a county
the interest should cease, was held to be south of the Missouri River to incur
effective as against a holder for value before indebtedness in aid of the road, with-
maturity. Citing Ogden v. County of out a two-thirds vote as required by the
Daviess, 102 U. S. 634; Anthony v. Jasper Constitution. 3. That since there was an
County, 101 U. S. 693; Northern Bank of entire want of power to issue the bonds,
Toledo v. Porter Tp., 110 U. S. 608. Infra, they were void even in the hands of inno-
sec. 543.
cent purchasers. 4. That the fact that
i Sherrard v. Lafayette County, 3 Dil. the county court had paid interest on
lon C. C. R. 236 (1875). The case was these bonds did not estop it from after-
briefly this : By an act of the legislature wards setting up their invalidity. But
of Missouri, a company was incorporated see Burr v. Chariton County, 12 Fed. Rep.
with power to construct a railroad from 848.
the town of Louisiana, which is situated Construction of special power. The act
on the Mississippi River, north of the which authorized the issuing of the bonds
Misssouri River, to a point on the Mis- to pay the county subscriptions to a rail-
souri River, and the county court of any way company directed that the bonds so
county in which any part of the route of issued should be made payable to
said road should lie was authorized to sub president and directors of the railroad
scribe stock to the company, without a company, and their successors and as-
vote of the people. Afterwards the new signs." The bonds issued were made pay-
Constitution of. Missouri went into effect, able to “ the railroad company or bearer.”
prohibiting the General Assembly (1) from It was held that the power granted was
creating corporations by special act, ex- sufficiently pursued, and that the bonds so
cept for municipal purposes ; (2) from issued were valid. Woodward v. Calhoun
authorizing any county, &c., to become a Co. Sup. (U. S. Dist. Court for Mississippi,
stockholder in, or loaning its credit to, Hill, J.), 2 Cent. Law Jour. 396 (1874).
any company, association, or corporation, Special act held to control general act.
unless two-thirds of the qualified voters Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. Co. v. Otoe County,
should assent thereto. Subsequently to 16 Wall. 667 (1872).
this the legislature passed an act purport- Power to donate bonds in lieu of lands
ing to amend the charter of the said rail- and right of wity. By various provisions
road company, which provided that the of a city charter, the mayor and city coun-
county court of any county in which any cil were authorized to make donations of
part of the line of said railroad might be land for the right of way and other privi.
located might subscribe to the stock of leges to a railroad company, and to ex-
said company and issue bonds, &c. Under pend money for the purpose of acquiring
this act, the county court of Lafayette land to be given, and were authorized to
County, a county lying wholly south of borrow money to an unlimited extent,
the Missouri River, issued without a vote when instructed so to do by a popular
of the people, the bonds from which the vote, and further, to issue bonds to fund
coupons here sued on were detached, and any indebtedness of the city, existing or
several instalments of interest had been to be created. Under this authority, a
paid on them. Held, 1. That the amend- railroad company, hy reason of complying
atory act from which authority to issue with certain conditions, became entitled to
these bonds is claimed is a special act, in demand from the city the right of way and
effect creating a new corporation, and is depot grounds. The company agreed with
hence inbibited by the State Constitution. the city to accept the bonds voted to pro-
2. That it was not competent for the legis- cure the right of way and grounds in lieu
$ 513
633
CONTRACTS : BONDS ; REGISTRATION STATUTES.
§ 543. Registration of Bonds; Effect of Fraudulent Antedating.
- The history of the issue of municipal bonds in this country shows
that conditions imposed by law requiring a popular vote, or condi-
tions in the propositions submitted to the voters, intended to prevent
fraud and to secure the actual building and completion of the roads,
have been often evaded, and bonds issued without compliance
therewith. Such bonds, when negotiated for value, the courts, as
we have seen, have held to be binding. To prevent such improper
or improvident issue of bonds in the future, the legislatures of some
of the States have passed acts requiring all bonds to be registered
with one of the executive departments of the State before they are
issued or negotiated. Thus in 18721 the legislature of Missouri, a
State in which many fraudulent bonds had been issued, passed an
act which provided that " before any bond, hereafter issued by any
county, .. shall obtain validity or be negotiated," it must be first
registered by the State auditor, who shall certify thereon that all
conditions precedent required by law, and by the contract under
which the bonds were ordered to be issued, have been complied
with. In the case of Anthony v. Jasper County, it appeared that
of the right of way and grounds, and it would have no 'validity,' and hence could
was held that the city had the power thus not support an action in the hands of any
to agree, and that the bonds were valid.
person. But they are antedated ; and the
Converse v. Fort Scott, 92 U. S. 503 question is, whether they have validity in
(1875); s. c. 3 Cent. Law Jour. 449. the hands of the innocent purchaser. Upon
A proposition once voted down may be the best consideration we have been able
subsequently re-submitted and adopted, to give, our conclusion is that the bonds
unless the act evinces a contrary inten- cannot be enforced. The case comes with-
tion. Soc. for Sav. 1. New London, 29 in the doctrine, which is well settled, that
Conn. 174 ; Smith v. Clark County, 54 where a statute declares absolutely and
Mo. 58.; Woodward v. Calhoun County, 2 without exception that a contract or bond
Cent. Law Jour. 396. In Kentucky it is or note is void, it is void into whosesoever
held that municipal corporations are not hands it may come. This statute declares
restricted to one subscription. Tyler's that no unregistered bond shall be valid or
Ex. v. Elizabethtown & P. R. R. Co., 9 be negotiated. Bonds must first be regis.
Bush (Ky.), 510 (1872). Second subscrip- tered. Without registration they obtain
tion held valid. 16.
no validity,' Such is the statute. A dec-
Issue of bonds before law authorizing laration that bonds shall have no valid-
it took effect. Rochester v. Alfred Bank, ity is equivalent to 'declaring them to be
13 Wis. 432; Berliner v. Waterloo, 14 void. Is the county estopped to set up
Wis. 378.
this defence? We think not.
The case
1 Act of March 30, 1872 (Laws of Mis- is to be distinguished, we think, from
souri, 1872, p. 56).
those decided by the Supreme Court of the
2 Anthony v. Jasper County, 4 Dillon United States, in which it is held that the
C. C. R. 136 (1876); s. C. 3 Cent. Law frauds of the officers cannot be visited
Jour. 321 ; affirmed 101 U. S. 693. In upon the innocent bondholder, and falls
delivering its judgment, the Circuit Court within the principle of Bayley v. Taber, 5
said : “ If the bonds bore date after the Mass. 286. In that case it was held,
act of March 30, 1872, and had not been where a statute enacted that promissory
registered, it is plain, we think, that they notes of a certain description, 'made or
634
§ 543
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
bonds were signed, sealed, and issued in the manner above appear-
ing, after this statute went into effect, and were antedated to a date
prior to the passage of that enactment. In point of fact the con-
ditions on which the bonds had been voted had not been fully com-
plied with; and hence they could not have been, and were not,
certified by the auditor as registered bonds. The bonds found their
way into the hands of an innocent holder for value, who did not
know that the bonds bore a false date. The Circuit Court held
that the bonds could not be enforced, and that the county was not
estopped to set up the defence, – a decision which necessarily im-
plied a distinction between such a case and those in which the
Supreme Court of the United States had held that the county or
municipality could not visit the frauds of their officers upon the
innocent holders of the bonds. The case was taken to the Supreme
Court of the United States, and the distinction taken below was ad-
judged to be sound.1
A municipal corporation issued bonds valid on their face, but in
.
issued' after a specified day, should be Jasper County, 110 U. S. 53, where it was
utterly void, and no action should be also held that innocent holders for value
sustained thereon,' that it was competent are charged with the duty of knowing the
to the makers of such notes, when sued laws concerning the registration and certi-
upon notes bearing date before the day fication of bonds, and of inquiring whether
fixed by the statute, to prove that they they have been complied with. Northern
were, in fact, made and issued after such Bank v. Porter Township, 110 U. S. 608 ;
day. The principle of that case is the Lewis v. Commissioners, 105 U. S. 739 ;
same as in the case at the bar, and if that Menasha v. Hazard, 102 U. S. 81. Con.
is a sound principle when applied to the struction of Kansas Bond Registration Act.
individual maker of prohibited paper, it January v. Johnson County, 3 Dillon C. C.
should apply with at least equal force in R. 392; Bissell v. Spring Valley Township,
favor of public bodies, where one or two 124 U. S. 225 ; Crow v. Oxford, 119 U. S.
officers, without the consent of the others, 215; Lewis v. Comm’rs, 105 U. S. 739.
may, as in this case, combine to evade the Nebraska Registration Act. Dixon County
law, the other officers being innocent of v. Field, 111 U. S. 83. Illinois Registra-
wrongful participation. The principle in- tion Act. German Sav. Bank v. Franklin
volved is one of great consequence. For Co., 128 U. S. 526, 540 (1888).
illustration : Loose and general powers 1 Anthony v. Jasper County, 101 U. S.
have been heretofore given in this State to 693 (1879); Douglass v. Lincoln County
municipalities and counties to issue such (Mo.), 5 Fed. Rep. 775. Where a constitu-
bonds. This power has been taken away tion or law fails to give conclusive effect to
hy the new Constitution. Can the pro- registration or to the certificate thereof, the
tective provisions of that instrument be certificate will not conclude a municipal
evaded and rendered useless by the mere corporation from denying the facts certi-
fraudulent act of the officers of the county fied to. Dixon County v. Field, 111 U. S.
in antedating the bonds ? If so, the power 83 ; s. C. supra, sec. 529 a ; s. P. German
to defraud is endowed with a fearful vital- Sav. Bank v. Franklin County, 128 U. S.
ity, which survives the prohibitions of the 526, 540 (1888), distinguishing Lewis v.
Constitution, and threatens to become im- Barbour Co. Comm’rs, 105 U. S. 739.
mortal."
See also Crow v. Oxford Tp., 119 U. S.
This decision was adhered to in Hoff v. 215.
§ 544
635
CONTRACTS : BONDS ; CURATIVE ACTS.
fact void, because they were antedated to evade the registration act, and
were not registered; the corporation had power to borrow money,
and the proceeds of the bonds passed into the city treasury and
were used for lawful purposes; it was held that the corporation was
liable in an action for money had and received to the purchaser of
the bonds or his assignee, not for the amount of the bonds, but for
the amount of money actually paid for the bonds to the corporation,
with simple interest thereon.1
§ 544. Retrospective Statutes validating Irregular Subscriptions
and Bonds. — In the absence of special constitutional restrictions,
the competency of the legislature to enact retrospective statutes,
to validate an irregular or defective execution of a power by a
municipal or public corporation, is undoubted. And the power
1 Wood v. Louisiana, 5 Dillon C. C. R. v. Baldwin, 111 U. S. 1; Thompson v.
122 (1878), affirmed by the Supreme Court Perrine, 103 U. S. 806 ; approved Same v.
102 V. S. 294 ; Gause y. Clarksville, 1 Same, 106 U. S. 589; Dows v. Town of
Fed. Rep. 353 ; ante, sec. 461 ; compare Elmwood, 34 Fed. Rep. 114; Gardner v.
Litchfield v. Ballou, 114 U, S. 190. See Haney, 36 Ind. 17. The legislature may
supra, sec. 529 a, and note. The general legalize a subscription to the stock of a
subject of implied liability of municipal railroad, made by a municipal corporation
corporations has been treated in another without authority, unless prohibited by
connection.
the Constitution, and if the subscription
2 Keithsburg v. Frick, 34 Ill. 405; would have been legal had it been done
County of Jasper v. Ballou, 103 U, S. under legislative authority. Grenada
745 ; Copes v. Charleston, 10 Rich. County v. Brogren, 112 U. S. 261, distin-
(S. C.) Law, 491; McMillen v. Boyles, 6 guished Hays v. Holly Springs, 114 U. S.
Iowa, 304 ; Ib. 394 ; Gelpcke v. Dubuque, 120, referred to infra. See also Otoe
1 Wall. 220 (note statute there con- County v. Baldwin, 111 U. S. 1; Cooley
strued); People v. Mitchell, 35 N. Y. on Taxation, 223, 232.
551 ; Thomson v. Lee County, 3 Wall. In Mississippi it is held that where the
327 ; Bass v. Columbus, 30 Ga. 845 (1860); State Constitution prohibits the legisla-
Bissell 'v. Jeffersonville, 24 How. 287 ture from authorizing the issue of muni.
(1860); Cainpbell v. Kenosha, 5 Wall. cipal obligations in aid of corporations, or
194 ; Kenosha v. Lamson, 9 Wall. 477 lending of credit therefor, except on con-
(1869); Steines v. Franklin County, 48 dition that two-thirds of the qualified
Mo. 167 (1871); Knapp v. Grant, 27 Wis. voters assent thereto at an election, the
147 (1870); Black v. Cohen, 52 Ga. 621 legislature cannot, by a mere retrospec.
(1874); Duanesburgh v. Jenkins, 57 N. Y. tivo act, validate municipal bonds which
177 (1874), overruling s. C. 46 Barb. 294, were issued without legislative authority
and distinguishing People v. Batchellor, before the Constitution became operative.
53 N. Y. 128 ; Kimball v. Rosendale, 42 Sykes v. Columbus, 55 Miss. 115; Gren-
Wis. 407 (1877); s. 0. 24 Am. Rep. 421 ; ada Co. v. Brogden, 112 U. S. 261 ; Hays
Ritchie v. Franklin Co., 22 Wall. 67 (1874); v. Holly Springs, 114 U. S. 120, referred
Bradley v. Franklin Co., 65 Mo. 638 to in this section, infra. See also, Cairo,
(1877); Lewis v. Shreveport, 3 Wools C. & St. L. R. R. Co. v. Sparta, 77 Ill. 505
C. 205 ; Cooley on Const. Lim. 371, and (1875).
cases there cited ; ante, secs. 70, 75, 79, In St. Joseph Township v. Rogers, 16
419 ; post, sec. 554, note ; Bolles 2. Town Wall. 666, where it appeared that the
of Brimfield, 120 U. S. 759 ; Otoe County election at which the subscription was
636
§ 544
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
to cure defective subscriptions to the stock of railway companies
and to validate bonds issued therefor has been frequently exercised
approved was held before the passage of the same bonds afterwards came before
the law authorizing the subscription, the the Supreme Court of the United States
court said : Argument to show that de- in Elmwood Township v. Marcy, 92 U. S.
fective subscriptions of the kind inay, in 289 (1875), and a majority of the court,
all cases, be ratified where the legislature not vindicating, nor, it would seem,
could have originally conferred the power approving, the decision of the Supreme
is certainly unnecessary, as the question is Court of Illinois, nevertheless, as there had
authoritatively settled by the decisions of been in their view, no conflicting deci-
the Supreme Court of the State (Illinois), sions of that tribunål on the point, and
and of this court in repeated instances." as it involved the construction of a
And again : “Mistakes and irregularities peculiar provision of the Constitution of
are of frequent occurrence in municipal Illinois," they felt bound to follow it, al-
elections, and the State legislatures have though it was made after the bonds
often had occasion to pass laws to obviate in question had been issued. Clifford,
such difficulties. Such laws, when they Swayne, and Strong, JJ., dissented, on
do not impair any contract or injuriously grounds which would seem to be strongly
affect the rights of third persons, are never supported by the previous decisions of the
regarded as objectionable, and certainly court. Marshall Co. Sup. v. Schenck, 5
are within the competency of legislative Wall. 772 ; Pine Grove Tp. v. Talcott, 19
authority.”
Wall. 666, 677 ; Chicago, B. & Q. R. R.
The Constitution of Nlinois of 1848, Art. Co. v. Otoe County, 16 Wall. 667 ; Olcott
ix., sec. 5, declared “that the corporate v. Fond du Lac Co. Sup., Ib. 678 ; Quincy
authorities of counties, townships, school v. Cooke, 107 U. S. 549.
districts, cities, towns, and villages may In Foote v. Johnson County, 5 Dillon
be vested with power to assess and col- C. C. R. 281 (1878), it was ruled that the
lect taxes for corporate purposes, such Supreme Court of the United States, hav.
taxes to be uniform in respect to persons ing held the "township railroad aid act
and property within the jurisdiction of of Missouri constitutional (Cass County
the body imposing the sanie.” The Su- v. Johnston, 95 U. S. 360), it was the duty
preme Court of the State (Marshall v. of the Circuit Court to follow that judg-
Silliman, 61 Ill. 218; Wiley v. Silliman, nent, notwithstanding the later decision
62 Ill. 170 ; see ante, secs. 79, 419) decided of the Supreme Court of Missouri in The
that this section having been intended as State v. Brassfield, 67 Mo. 331 (1878); and
a limitation upon the law-making power, that where negotiable commercial securities
the legislature could not grant the right of are issued and negotiated before there is
corporate taxation to any but the corporate any decision by the courts of the State
authorities, nor coerce a municipal corpora against the validity of the act authorizing
tion to incur a debt by the issue of its their issue, the Supreme Court of the
bonds for corporate purposes.
And the United States does not consider itself
court held that an act validating an elec- bound to follow a subsequent decision of
tion, irregularly called and notified, to the local courts invalidating such secu-
vote upon the question of township sub- rities, but will decide for itself whether,
scription, and declaring the same legal and under the Constitution and laws of the
binding, was void. In the opinion of the State, such securities are valid or void.
court, the act was an effort to confer the S. P. Douglass v. County of Pike, 101 U.
power of municipal taxation upon per- S. 677 (1879).
sons who were not, by themselves, the The rights of the innocent holders of
corporate authorities in the sense of the municipal bonds issued in aid of railroads
Constitution, and to compel the town to is- are to be determined by the luw as it
sue its bonds for railroad stock, by declar- was judicially construed to be when the
ing a void proceeding to be a valid sub- bonds were put on the market as com.
scription. The liability of the township on mercial paper." County of Ralls v. Doug.
$ 544
637
CONTRACTS : BONDS; CURATIVE ACTS.
and judicially sustained. Subsequent legislative sanction within
constitutional limits is equivalent to original authority. But the
intention of the legislature to validate the subscription or the bonds
must clearly appear from the terms of the curative act. An
oblique validation, or one expressed in doubtful, covert, or obscure
language, will not be sufficient, especially where the subscription was
made or the bonds issued in disregard of conditions which the Con-
stitution required the legislature of the State to in pose upon the
municipality before the power to make the subscription or to issue
the bonds should arise or exist.2
lass, 105 U. S. 728 ; Green County v. the city at a special election held for the
Conness, 109 U. S. 104 ; Sawyer v. Con- purpose.” But as the provisions of the
cordia Parish, 12 Fed. Rep. 754 ; Mar- Constitution are inhibitory upon the legis-
shal v. Elgin, 8 Fed. Rep. 783. This sub- lature, and not enabling to the city; as
ject is fully and instructively discussed in under the Constitution legislative authority
the recent cases of Germau Sav. Bank v. to enable the municipality to issue such
Franklin County, 128 U. S. 526 (1888), bonds must provide for the assent of two-
and Scotland County v. Hill, 132 U. S. thirds of the voters at an election ; as no
107 (1889). See ante, sec. 542, note. such election had been provided for by
1 Wilson v. Hardesty, 1 Md. Ch. 66; legislative act; as the curative act of 1872
County of Jasper v. Ballou, 103 U. S. 745 ; made no reference to the unauthorized
Shaw v. Norfolk R. R. Co., 5 Gray (Mass.), election of 1871, and did not ratify and
180 ; Satterlee v. Matthewson, 2 Pet. 380; approve it; and as the language of the
Wilkinson v. Leland, 2 Pet. 627 ; Wat- curative act was too vague to warrant the.
son v. Mercer, 8 Pet. 88 ; Charles River conclusion with certainty, that the legis-
Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 11 Pet. 420; lature “intended to confirm and ratify
Stanley v. Colt, 5 Wall. 119; Croxall v. the subscription in question,”-it was held
Shererd, 5 Wall. 268 ; Keithsburg v. Frick, to be insufficient for that purpose, and the
34 Ill. 405.
plaintiff, although a bona fide holder of
2 Hayes v. Holly Springs, 114 U. S. the bonds containing the recitals of full
120 (1884). In this case it appeared that compliance with the Constitution and laws
the Constitution of Mississippi of 1869 pro- of the State, was defeated. The case was
hibited the legislature from authorizing any distinguished from the case of Grenada
municipal subscription to any corporation County v. Brogden, 112 U. S. 261, also
"unless two-thirds of the qualified voters from Mississippi, since in that case the
at a special or regular election shall assent legislature had in the curative act “des-
thereto.” In 1871, without any statute ignated and iilentified the voting at an
authorizing it, an election was held in the election, described as resulting in an ap-
City of Holly Springs, Mississippi, which proval by the constitutional two-thirds of
resulted in favor of a subscription by the the qualified voters, followed by an author.
city of $75,000 to a specified railroad com- ity to Grenada County, declared to be
pany. In 1872, the legislature passed an based upon such approval, to subscribe for
act providing that “all subscriptions to the stock." Per Blatchford, J., in Hayes
the capital stock of the said railroad com- v. Holly Springs, 114 U. S. at p. 126.
pauy made by any county, city, or town in As to the recitals in the bonds (see
this State not in violation of the Constitu- supra), the court said, “Even a bona fide
tion, are hereby legalized, ratified and holder of a municipal bond must show
confirmed.” After this act bonds of the legislative authority in the issuing body
city were issued, which recited that they to create the bond. Recitals on the face
“issued under and in pursuance of of the bond or acts in pais, operating by
the Constitution and laws of Mississippi, way of estoppel, may cure irregularities in
and authorized by a vote of the people of the execution of statutory power, but they
were
638
§ 546
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
§ 545. Want of Power always a Defence; Question of Power
is the One of Chief Interest and Importance. Touching the rights
of the holder of authorized negotiable municipal securities, it may
again be observed that such instruments are commercial paper,
and governed by the rules of the law merchant concerning such
paper, and that as respects a holder for value, before due, without
notice of facts constituting a defence thereto, the only defence which
is available is, that there was no power in the defendant corporation
to issue the bonds or instruments in question. By want of power as
here used is meant the want of any existing valid legislative act
authorizing the municipality to make the bonds or instruments;
not irregularities in the exercise of the power, but want of legis-
lative power itself. This principle is thus expressed in one of
the judgments of the Supreme Court : “ Bonds payable to bearer,
issued by a municipal corporation, ... if issued in pursuance of a
power conferred by the legislature, are valid commercial instruments;
but if issued by such a corporation which possessed no power from
the legislature, they are invalid, even in the hands of innocent hold-
ers."1 Irregularities in the exercise of the power, as against a holder
for value, without notice of such irregularities, constitute no defence.2
Since, therefore, want of power is the only defence open to the cor-
porate maker of such instruments, when they have been negotiated
for value to innocent holders, the question of power is the one around
which the principal interest centres, and to which, in its various
phases, we have given our main attention.
$ 546. Bonds void against bona fide Holders ; Recitals in Bonds
cannot cure want of Power to Issue. Where there is an entire
absence of power, as distinguished from a defective execution of the
power, then the recitals of those invested with the ministerial duty
of issuing the bonds will afford no protection even to bona fide
holders for value. If such bonds are issued without legislative
cannot create it. If, as in the present violation of a constitutional provision. See
case, legislative authority is wanting, the post, chapter on Mandamus.
bond has no validity."
2 Jacksonville, N. & S. R. R. Co. v.
1 Per Clifford, J., in St. Joseph Town- Virden, 104 III. 339 ; Bank of Statesville
ship v. Rogers, 16 Wall. 644, 659 (1872). v. Statesville, 84 N. C. 169.
As nearly all the cases in the Supreme 8 German Bank v. Franklin County,
Court have turned on the question of 128 U. S. 526 (1888), is a strong applica-
power, it is not deemed material again to tion of the doctrine of the text, where
cite them in this connection, as the propo- bonds, notwithstanding certain recitals
sitions in the text are no longer the sub- (ante sec. 542, note), were held void in
ject of judicial controversy. Ante, sec. the hands of bona fide holders. See, also,
529 a, as to invalidity of bonds issued in Force v. Batavia, 61 Ill. 100 ; Williams v.
$ 548
639
CONTRACTS : BONDS ; LACHES; ESTOPPEL.
authority they are void, and the levy of taxes and payment of in-
terest will not render them valid.1 So where there is want of power
the mere silence of the taxpayer in permitting the issue of bonds will
not create an estoppel even in favor of an innocent holder for value.2
It is the duty of purchasers to examine into the power of the muni-
cipality to issue the bonds, and if no power exists there can be no
recital which will protect even bona fide holders for value.3
§ 547. Laches; Acquiescence; Failure to enjoin the Issue ;
Payment of Interest, and retaining the Consideration, as Grounds of
Estoppel. - The cases we have heretofore considered were mainly
those in which the municipality has been held estopped by the
recitals in the bonds to show that conditions precedent had not
been complied with. We will now advert to other grounds of estoppel,
arising from the acquiescence or acts of the municipal authorities.
It is undoubtedly a sound proposition that a municipal corporation,
as well as a private corporation, may, in the absence of constitu-
tional or legislative restriction, confirm acts, not ultra vires, which
it may deem beneficial to it.
$ 548. Same subject. — As experience shows that the officers of
public and municipal corporations do not guard the interest con-
Roberts, 88 Ill. 13 ; Lippincott v. Pana, these bonds, and its statute attempting
92 Ill. 24; Eddy v. People, 127 Ill. to confer such authority is void, the mere
428 (1889); Sykes v. Columbus, 55 Miss. payment of interest, which was equally
115; Williamson v. Keokuk, 44 Iowa, 88 unauthorized, cannot create of itself a
(1876); Aspinwall v. Daviess County, 22 power to levy taxes, resting on no other
How. 364 ; Marsh v. Fulton Co., 10 Wall. foundation than the fact that they have
676 ; Citizens' Loan Assoc. v. Topeka, 20 once been illegally levied for that pur-
Wall. 655 ; St. Joseph v. Rogers, 16 Wall. pose."
644 (1872). See, also, Avery v. Spring- So where a county court was empowered
port, 14 Blatchf. 272. See supra, sec. 529 to issue bonds to the amount of $250,000,
a, and note ; Duke v. Brown, 96 N. C. bonds issued in excess of that sum were
127 ; Millerstown v. Frederick, 114 Pa. declared void in the hands of a pur-
St. 435 ; Ottawa 'v. Carey, 108 U. S. 110; chaser before maturity, for value and
Purdy v. Lansing, 128 U. S. 557 (1888); without notice of the overissue. Daviess
Agawam National Bank v. South Hadley, County v. Dickinson, 117 U. S. 657. See
128 Mass. 503.
supra, sec. 529 «.
1 Citizens' Savings & Loan Association 2 McPherson v. Foster, 43 Towa, 48
v. Topeka, 20 Wall. 655 ; Schuyler Co. (1874).
Sup. v. Farwell, 25 Ill. 181; Marshall Co. 3 One who purchased bonds from a
Sup. v. Cook, 38 Ill. 48 ; Lippincott railroad company, which had been issued
v. Pana, 92 Ill. 24. In Loan Association by a town in its aid, was held, after the
v. Topeka, the court says: “We do not bonds had been declared void, not to be
attach any importance to the fact that the subrogated to the rights of the company,
town authorities paid one instalment of if it had any, to enforce collection of the
interest on these bonds. Such a payment appropriation voted by the town. Aetna
works no estoppel. If the legislature was Life Ins. Co. v. Middleport, 124 U. S.
without power to authorize the issue of 534.
640
§ 548
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
fided to them with the same vigilance and fidelity that characterize
the officers of private corporations, the principle of ratification by
laches or delay should be more cautiously applied to the former than
to the latter. But the principle applies to both classes of corpora-
tions, as well as to natural persons. The general doctrine is un-
doubted, -- that there is ordinarily no estoppel in respect to acts
which are in violation of the Constitution or of an act of the legisla-
ture, or which are obviously and in the strict and proper sense of
the term, ultra vires. The history of the doctrine of ultra vires
in Great Britain and in this country makes it difficult to affirm
that the rule is without exceptions; and it is the part of prudence and
wisdom to keep close to the adjudications without undertaking to
formulate in advance rules of universal application. Precision is
absolutely essential to legal conceptions. A legal term which
stands for an indefinite idea or for several different ideas will neces-
sarily introduce confusion when used without qualification; and
perhaps no term in the law has been more unfortunate in this
respect than the expression ultra vires. We mean by it, as here
used, the want of legislative power, under any circumstances or con-
ditions, to do the particular act in question. As to irregularities in
the exercise of an express power to issue bonds, and particularly in
respect to steps connected with preliminary conditions, the failure
of the municipality or of the taxpayer to enjoin the issue, followed by
long acquiescence, especially when this is accompanied by affirma-
tive acts which recognize the validity of the bonds, such as receiving
and holding the stock or consideration for the bonds, or paying
interest on them for a series of years, has been held to estop the muni-
cipality from defending, on the ground of non-compliance with con-
ditions precedent, - especially when the bonds, as is usually the case,
have been negotiated for value. But the corporation is in no case
estopped from setting up a total want of power to issue the
bonds. The leading cases in the Supreme Court relating to the
subject matter of this section are referred to in the note. It is
1 As to the effect of failure to enjoin the St. 587. No estoppel when bonds are
issue of the bonds and of acquiescence in issued in excess of a constitutional limita-
the irregular exercise of the power, see tion on the amount which may be issued.
Rogers v. Burlington, 3 Wall. 654, 667. See supra, sec. 529 a.
Compare dissent on this point, Ib. p. 672; In Supervisors v. Schenck, 5 Wall. 781,
Bissell v. Jeffersonville, 24 How. 300; - from Illinois, which is an important
Cooley on Taxation, 548, 549; ante, sec. case on this subject, it appeared that in
522, note ; Butler v. Dunham, 27 II. 477; Illinois counties were authorized, upon a
Steines v. Franklin County, 48 Mo. 176, popular vote, to subscribe for stock and
185 ; State v. Van Horne, 7 Ohio St. 331 ; pay therefor in bonds; an election was
Barrett v. County Court, 44 Mo. 201 ; ordered by the county court in a certain
Shoemaker v. Goshen Tp. Trs., 14 Ohio county, when it should have been ordered
§ 548
641
CONTRACTS : BONDS ; LACHES ; ESTOPPEL.
obvious that a constitutional provision requiring a public sanction
to a subscription by a municipality to railroad stock prevents the
subsequent acts of the municipal officers from operating as a ratifica-
tion without the assent of the voters. 1
(by reason of a change in the law) by the this point; and certainly the case seems
board of supervisors; it was duly held ; the to be an extreme application of the doc-
propositiou was carried ; the supervisors trine of estoppel. The bonds (so far as
made the subscription, issued the bonds, appeared) were without recitals ; no pay-
received the stock, and ordered the levyment of interest had been made ; a popu-
of taxes, and paid the coupons for nine or lar vote was made necessary, and the plea
ten years ; and it was held by the Su- alleged that no such vote had ever been
preme Court of the United States, in con- had, and that the question of subscription
formity with the doctrine of the State had never been subniitted to or voted
Supreme Court, as first announced but upon by the people ; and the mere receipt
subsequently overruled, that the acquies and holding of the stock were held suffi..
cence, conduct, and acts of the county au- cient to estop the county to make the
thorities were a ratification of the bonds, defence. We have not been able to recon.
at least when in the hands of an innocent cile the case, on this point, with Marsh v.
holder, and estopped the county to make Fulton County, referred to in a subse-
the defence that the election had been quent portion of this note.
ordered by the county court instead of The case of Marsh o. Fulton County,
the board of supervisors. In view of the 10 Wall. 676 (1870), decides this princi-
facts as stated, the judgment of the court ple, viz., that where, under the legisla-
would appear to be sound and open to no tion of the State, the county authorities
criticism, as the ground of the objection had no power to subscribe for stock and
to the bonds was an irregular exercise of issue bonds therefor, and where (as held)
an admitted power in the county, and not they made the subscription and issued the
a want of power. The recital in the bonds bonds without the sanction of a popular
is not given, but it would appear from the vote, the bonds containing no recital, such
opinion that the plaintiff's case also fell bonds are void, and are not ratified by
within the doctrine of Knox Co. Comm'rs acts of the county authorities, such as ap-
V. Aspinwall.
pointing agents to participate in the cor-
In Pendleton County v. Amy, 13 Wall. porate meetings of the railway company,
297 (1871), decided on demurrer, it did by the payment of part of the bonds
not appear that there was any estoppel by and the interest on the others for a series
reason of recitals in the bond, or from of years; and the reason given by the
subsequent payment of interest; but the court was that no ratification could be
pleadings showed that the county had made unless it was authorized by the peo-
received in exchange for the bonds a cer- ple, the defect being one of power. Field,
tificate of the stock of the railroad com- J., observed : “They (the supervisors]
pany, which it had held for seventeen could not, therefore, ratify a subscription
years before the suit was brought, and without a vote of the county, because
still held. The county was authorized to they could not make a subscription in the
purchase the stock, but only on condition first instance without such authoriza-
of a popular vote. It was decided by the tion." Compare Pendleton County v.
Supreme Court that purchasing and hold. Amy, supra.
ing the stock under these circumstances i Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U. S.
estopped the county to assert against an 425 ; following Aspinwall v. Daviess
innocent holder of the bonds that they County, 22 How. 364; Marsh v. Fulton
were issued in disregard of the condition County, 10 Wall. 676, 684; Wadsworth
of a popular election, required by the act v. Eau Claire County Sup., 102 U. S.
of the legislature conferring the power. 534.
Three of the judges dissented, probably on
VOL. I.
- 41
642
§ 549
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
§ 549. General Summary of Doctrine of the Supreme Court as to
Estoppel by Recitals. — In passing from this portion of our subject,
we may observe that if we have not mistaken the meaning and
effect of the leading judgments of the Supreme Court which we have
passed in review, they establish the following principles : The pur-
chaser is bound to see that there exists legislative power not in
conflict with the State Constitution for the issue of the bonds or
commercial securities of the municipal, public, or quasi corporation,
and is bound to notice the contents and recitals in the instru-
ments but if such bonds are duly executed by the proper officers,
and if these officers are, by the true construction of the legisla-
tive enactment in that regard, invested with the power to decide
whether conditions precedent have been performed, and the bonds
contain a recital that such conditions bave been complied with,
_or_a recital which implies such compliance, whether the prelim-
inary conditions consist of facts in pais or facts of record,
the issue of the bonds, under such circumstances with such a re-
cital, is conclusive against the municipality as to the fact or facts
recited or implied in the recital, and estops it, in an action by an
innocent holder for value, before due, to show the contrary. This is
the doctrine of the Supreme Court of the United States, and the
point in which it differs from the general line of decisions in the State
courts is in regard to the evidence of compliance with conditions pre-
cedent. In all the cases in the Supreme Court of the United States,
that tribunal has held that the municipal or local officers were con-
stituted the judges to decide whether antecedent or preliminary
steps or conditions had been complied with, and that their decision,
stated or implied in the recital, was conclusive against the corporate
maker when the bonds have found their way into the hands of in-
nocent holders. The view which holds the local officers a tribunal
authorized to make so important a decision rests not alone upon
an express declaration of the legislature to that effect, but may be
gathered," by construction, from the supposed intent and pur-
pose of the legislature. Many of the State courts, but not all of
them, have taken a somewhat different view. They agree that mere
irregularities, not relating to the essence of the power, will not
affect a bona fide holder; but inasmuch as there exists no general
power to issue such securities, and as the fact of compliance
or non-compliance with conditions precedent is usually a matter
of which there is a record, the purchaser of such securities is bound
to ascertain whether the power to issue them existed or had arisen,
especially where this depends upon matters of which a record is
required to be made. The subject is full of difficulties. If the
§ 550
643
CONTRACTS : BONDS; STATE COURT DECISIONS.
latter view is sustained, it has the effect to impair the ready sala-
bility and market value of the securities. If the former, it has the
effect of enabling the local officers in power for the time being to
perpetrate, without any effectual preventive in many cases, the most
outrageous frauds. On principle, it would seem that the legislative
intent to invest local officers, by means of a false recital, with a
power_so tremendous ought not to be held to exist, unless it is
declared or plainly implied, and that more caution in the purchase
of these securities than is required by the doctrine of the Supreme
Court would promote the interests both of the maker and the
purchaser.
1
$ 550 (423). State Court Decisions relating to Municipal Bonds
and the power to issue them; Conditions precedent. Some of the
leading differences relating to the law of municipal railway aid
bonds between the Federal and State courts have already been
mentioned. Having surveyed with minuteness the course of deci-
sion in the Federal courts, a brief reference will now be made to
the adjudications of State tribunals. The authority to subscribe
to the stock of a railroad corporation may be made conditional on
certain previous steps being taken, as, for example, a prior author-
ization of the act by a majority of the qualified voters of the muni-
cipality or district to be affected, or a recommendation in its favor
and a designation of the amount by a grand jury, and the statute
may be so framed as to evince the legislative intention to be that
no power to subscribe or issue bonds shall exist unless this be
done. Thus, where the act authorizing a town to borrow money to
1 This section stands as in the last merely directory, but mandatory. Where
edition. Nothing has been decided that the enabling act requires the amount to
clearly requires any change in it. The be specified, a vote not specifying defi-
decisions referred to in sec. 529 a, supra, nitely the amount is, as to the immediate
tend, perhaps it can only be said that parties, void. State v. Saline County, 45
they tend, to show that there are or may Mo. 242 (1870), following Mercer County
be certain facts of such a nature, of which v. Pittsburgh & Erie R. R. Co., 27 Pa. St.
a public record is required, that a pur- 389, and Starin v. Genoa, 23 N. Y. 439
chaser may be bound to take notice of (see infra), and distinguishing Knox
them. See supra, secs. 527-530.
County v. Aspinwall, How. 539,
2 Mercer County v. Pittsburgh & Erie and Flagg ». Palmyra, 33 Mo. 440. It
Railroad Co., 27 Pa. St. 389 (1856); Mer- should be remarked, however, that the
cer County v. Hacket, 1 Wall. 83 ; Au- case above referred to (State v. Saline
rora v. West, 22 Ind. 88 (1864); ante, County, 45 Mo. 242, 1870) was manda-
sec. 153 et seq. ; City and County of mus to compel the relator to deliver
St. Louis V. Alexander, 23 Mo. 483 the bonds, and to assess taxes to pay
(1856). In this last case the provision interest on bonds which had been issued,
requiring a submission of the question to and the writ was denied because the
the voters " before the subscription herelvy amount of bonds to be issued was not
authorized shall be made," was held not specified ; but subsequently, in The State
21
644
§ 550
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
pay for the stock subscribed expressly provided that the officers
thereof should “have no power” to do so until the written assent of
two-thirds of the resident taxpayers had been obtained, this was
held by the Court of Appeals of New York to be a condition
precedent, without which the power did not exist.
v. Saline County, 48 Mo. 390 (1871), it it was held that a vote of the electors
was held that such bonds, when in the registered and voting at a regular election
hands of an innocent holder for value, under the charter was intended, and that
could be collected. What, in the opinion the city authorities had no power to order
of the Supreme Court of Missouri, such a a new registration. Smith v. Wilming-
holder nnust show in the way of compli- ton, 98 N. C. 343. Post, chap. xx.
ance with precedent conditions, in order 1 Starin v. Genoa, 23 N. Y. 439 (1861);
to recover, see the case of Carpenter v. In- Gould v. Sterling, Ib. 439, 456 ; distin-
habitants of Lathrop, 51 Mo. 483 (1873). guished on this point from Bank of Rome
This case seems in spirit, if not in effect, v. Village of Rome, 19 N. Y. 20. Under
to depart froin the earlier cases in that the act it was held that the onus was on
court upon this subject. See Railroad the plaintiff to show affirmatively the
Co. v. Platte County, 42 Mo. 171, where written assent of the requisite number of
permissive words respecting an election to taxpayers; and the manner in which
authorize subscriptions were held to be this must be shown is considered at
imperative. In St. J. & D. C. R. R. Co. length. But see Bissell v. Jeffersonville,
v. Buchanan Co., 39 Mo. 485, the words 24 How. 287 ; Knox County v. Aspinwall,
that the county court, after an afirmative 21 How. 539 ; Mercer County v. Hacket,
vote by the people, “shall have power to 1 Wall. 83, heretofore referred to. In The
subscribe," were held to leave it discre. People v. Mead, 36 N. Y. 224 (1867), the
tionary with the court whether to sub- decision in Starin v. Genoa, and Gould v.
scribe or not. In the case of The People, Sterling, above cited, was adhered to by
ex rel. v. Tazewell County, 22 Ill. 147, it the Court of Appeals, though it was ad-
was held, under the general law of the mitted that a contrary ruling as to the
State, that it was discretionary whether evidence of the assent of the taxpayers
the county should subscribe all or but a had been made by the Supreme Court of
portion of the amount voted by the citi. the United States, in favor of similar
zens, and that county authorities might bonds in the hands of bona fide holders,
impose any proper conditions they might and the case was distinguished from Mur-
choose. So where the legislature, without dock v. Aiken, and Ross v. Curtiss, 31
conditions, provides for subinitting the N. Y. 606. Starin v. Genoa, and Gould
question of subscription to the voters of v. Sterling have been expressly disap-
a township, the electors have the power proved, as we have seen, by the Supreme
to vote to subscribe on any conditions Court of the United States, as respects the
they may see proper to annex. People bona fide holders of bonds. Venice v. Mur-
v. Dutcher, 56 Ill. 144 (1871) ; see also dock, 92 U. S. 494 (1875). See supra,
People v. Logan County, 45 Ill. 162; sec. 526, note. Illustrating text, see Ben-
Veeder v. Lima, 19 Wis. 280 (1865); Chi- son v. Albany, 24 Barb. 248.
cago, B. & Q. R. R. Co. v. Aurora, 99 III. Where the statute gives the power to
205 ; Memphis, K. &C. Ry. Co. v. Thomp- issue bonds when a majority of the tax-
son, 24 Kan. 170. But such conditions payers whose names appear upon the last
must not violate any express provision of preceding tax list, or assessment roll, as
law or any general rule of public policy. owning a majority of the taxable property
Coe v. Caledonia & M. Ry. Co., 27 Minn. in the corporate limits, make application to
197; Hoyt v. Braden, 27 Minn. 490. the county judge, by petition, &c., such
Where the statute, as a condition pre- a petition is essential to the jurisdiction
cedent to the issue of bonds, required a of the county j'idge, and the authority
vote of the majority of the qualificd voters, conferred by the act will, on certiorari, be
§ 551
645
CONTRACTS; BONDS; STATE COURT DECISIONS.
§ 551 (424). State Court Decisions ; Conditions Precedent.
So, under an act providing "that no subscription or purchase of
stock shall be made, or bonds issued, by any county or city, creating
a debt for the payment of such subscription, unless a majority of the
qualified voters of the county or city shall vote for the same," it was
held that bonds issued without an election, or where the election
was called by the wrong authority (as by the county court instead
of the county board of supervisors), are void, for want of power to
issue them, in whose hands soever they may be, and are not vali-
dated by the levy of taxes and the payment of interest thereon.
required to be exercised in strict conform. (1870). Subscriptions to turnpike roads
ity with the act in its letter and spirit. by the county judge, under acts of the
The petition, it was held, must be that of legislature, were held unauthorized and
the taxpayers, and it is erroneous to void, it being admitted that an amount of
count as petitioners those whose names stock sufficient, with the aid of county
are affixed, in their absence, under previ. subscriptions, to complete each mile of
ous verbal authority. In such proceed- road, had not been taken by private sub-
ings, where there are no provisions to the scription, as required by the statutes.
contrary, competent common-law evidence Clay v. Nicholas Co., 4 Bush (Ky.), 154.
of the facts to be established should be Where there is a danger of a misapplication
produced before the county judge, and of funds subscribed, a court of equity, and
this officer cannot act upon his personal it seems a court of law, should refuse to
knowledge. The People v. Smith, 45 N. enforce a subscription until the corpora-
Y. 772 (1871). Ante, sec. 515, note. tion properly secures the appropriation of
By its charter a city was authorized the bonds, or their proceeds, in accordance
to take stock in railroads, "provided, that with the terms of subscription. Cumber-
no stock shall be subscribed or taken by land & O. R. R. Co. v. Washington County,
the common council, unless upon the pe- 10 Bush (Ky.), 564 (1874).
tition of two-thirds of the residents of Where a municipal corporation has
said city who are freeholders of said power to make a donation in aid of a rail-
city." It was held, in an action by the road, to levy and collect taxes to pay it,
railroad company against the city on or to borrow money to pay it and to issue
the contract of subscription, that it was the bonds to meet the loans, the railroad coin-
duty of the common council to determine pany has a claim for money only, and
whether the requisite number of the free cannot compel a municipal corporation to
holders of the city had petitioned for the issue bonds for it; on the other hand, it
subscription, no other tribunal having cannot be compelled to take bonds in
been provided for that purpose ; and, hav. payment of the donation. Chicago, D. &
ing passed upon that question, their deter. V. R. R. Co. v. St. Anne, 101 Ill. 151.
mination is conclusive, unless it may be Ante, sec. 515, note.
set aside in some direct proceeding for 1 Marshall County v. Cook, 38 Ill. 44
Evansville, Ind. & C. (1865), commenting on and distinguishing
Straight Line R. R. Company v. Evans- Mercer County v. Hacket, 1 Wall. 83, and
ville, 15 Ind. 395 (1860), following and Gelpcke v. Dubuque,
Gelpcke v. Dubuque, lb. 175. See, also,
applying Knox County v. Aspinwall, 21 Shoemaker v. Goshen, 14 Ohio St. 569;
How. 539. See also Bissell v. Jefferson. Berliner v. Waterloo, 14 Wis. 378 ; Veeder
ville, 24 How. 287 (1860); Mercer County v. Lima, 19 Wis. 280 (1865); Dunnovan v.
v. Hacket, 1 Wall. 83 ; compare, however, Green, 57 Ill. 63; St. Joseph Township v.
Veeder v. Lima, 19 Wis. 280 (1865); Du- Rogers, 16 Wall. 644 (1872); S. P. as to
anesburgh v. Jenkins, 40 Barb. 574; ratification, Marsh v. Fulton County, 10
Society, &c., v. New London, 29 Conn. Wall. 676 (1870); Hancock v. Chicot Co.,
174; State v. Saline County, 45 Mo. 242 32 Ark. 575 (1877). The corporation is
that purpose.
646
§ 552
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
But this view was denied to be sound by the Supreme Court of the
United States, which decided that an innocent holder for value of
such bonds was entitled to recover upon them. The only defect in
the execution of the power was that the election was ordered by the
wrong authority; and the Supreme Court held that the conduct of the
county in retaining the stock, and in levying taxes and paying inter-
est for å series of years, estopped it to set up as a defence that the
bonds were invalid, and it refused to follow the judgment of the
Supreme Court of the State, which had held the same issue of bonds
to be void.1
§ 552 (425). Same subject. — In a case in Ohio, where the legisla-
ture authorized “the county commissioners of any county through or
in which a railroad might be located, to subscribe to the capital
stock of the said company," and, for the purpose of paying therefor,
estopped — where the power to issue ex- Sup., 31 Gratt. (Va.) 685, approving
isted — from setting up irregularities in text. The Supreme Court of Illinois holds
the issue of the bouds, after repeated pay. that since the Constitution of 1870 the
ments of interest thereon. Keithsburg v. onus is on the holder of the bonds to show
Frick, 34 Ill. 405; Jasper County v. Bal. that they were lawfully issued ; and that
lou, 103 U. S. 745 ; Schaeffer v. Bonham, they are void if the conditions on which
95 Ill. 368; Han. & St. J. R. Co. v. Marion the issue was authorized are not complied
County, 36 Mo. 294 ; Mercer County v. with. Town of Prairie v. Lloyd, 97 Ill.
Hubbard, 45 Ill. 139 ; Beloit v. Morgan, 179 ; Town of Eagle v. Kohn, 84 Ill. 292;
7 Wall. 619 (1868); Schenck v. Marshall Richeson v. People, 115 Ill. 450 ; Eddy v.
Co. Sup., 5 Wall. 772 ; compare Marsh People, 127 Ill. 428 (1889). Ante, secs.
v. Fulton County, 10 Wall. 676. The 530, and note, 539, 540. Where the legal
municipal authorities, on mandamus or voters of a city voted in favor of a railway
other proceedings to compel them to subscription, to be paid in city bonds, upon
make subscription to the railroad com- the condition, among others, that the
pany, may show that the election was in. railroad should be completed within the
fluenced by it and its employees, by bribery county on or before a certain date, and
and corruption. People v. San Fr. Sup., before the expiration of that time, but
27 Cal. 655 (1865); Butler v. Dunham, 27 after the Illinois Constitution of 1870 went
Ill. 474 ; post, chap. xx.
What is a ma- into effect, the city council, by an order,
jority of votes. People v. Chapman, 66 Ill. and without further action by the voters,
137 (1873); Decker v. Hughes, 68 Ill. 33 cxtended the time for the completion of the
(1873). Subscription cannot be made road within the county, the Supreme Court
without an affirmative vote. People v. of the State was of the opinion that bonds
Cass Co., 77 Ill. 438 (1875). The pre- issued in payment of the subscription were
sumption is that the vote cast at an elec. in violation of the condition, and were void,
tion held according. to law, is the vote of for the reason that the extension was not
the whole number of legal voters, and this authorized by the legal voters, and the
presumption cannot be rebutted by proof city, under the new Constitution, had no
of the number of votes cast at an election power to make a new contract in regard to
held in the preceding year. St. Joseph v. such subscription. It was accordingly
Rogers, 16 Wall. 664 ; Melvin v. Lisenby, held that a tax levied to provide money to
72 Ill. 63 (1874).
pay interest on the bonds could not be
1 Marshall County Sup. v. Schenck, 5 collected. Eddy v. People, 127 Ill. 428
Wall. 772 (1866); Redd v. Henry Co. (1889).
$ 553
647
CONTRACTS : BONDS ; GENERAL RESULT STATED.
$
"to borrow the necessary amount of money, for which they shall
issue their negotiable bonds,” &c., it was decided to be a defence to
an action on the bonds (though by a bona fide holder) that the rail-
road was “never made or located through or in the county;” that
it was "located and completed so as not to touch the county.” The
defence was held good, upon the ground that the authority to issue
the bonds never existed.1 Other cases have been decided upon
similar grounds. It is the general doctrine of the State courts that
not only is express authority requisite, but that the substantial re-
quirements of the law must be observed : 3 while in the Federal courts
the failure to comply with the requirements, or rather the decision
of the local officers, especially when embodied in the recitals of the
bond that such requirements have been complied with, is, as we
have seen, no defence against the bona fide holders of such bonds.
§ 553 (426). General Result stated. - It may be remarked, in
conclusion, that this general survey of the adjudications shows some
1 Treadwell v. Hancock Co. Comm’rs, must be perfected before the construction
11 Ohio St. 183 (1860), reviewing and of the road intended to be aided. State
criticising Aspinwall v. Knox County
V. Highland, 25 Minn. 355.
Comm’rs, 21 How. (U. S.) 539, approved 2 Under the New York Act of 1871,
in Bissell v. Jeffersonville, 24 How. (U. S.) chap. 298, which requires all the counties
287 (1860). Compare Purdy v. Lansing, through which the road would pass to be
128 U. S. 557 (1888), cited infra. In designated and the road located, before the
Veeder v. Lima, 19 Wis. 280 (1865), bond of any town can be issued in aid
Treadwell v. Commissioners and Gould v. thereof, this requirement is held to go to
Sterling, before cited, are approved, and the question of power, and bonds issued
Aspinwall v. Commissioners and Moran v. without previous action of the board of
Miami County are criticised. Compare directors of the company, adopting the
State v. Van Horne, 7 Ohio St. 327; re- entire route, and designating all the coun.
affirmed, State v. Union Township Trus- ties through which the road would pass,
tees, 8 Ohio St. 394, 401. The two cases are void. Purdy v. Lansing, 128 U. S.
last cited (7 Ohio St. 327, 8 Ohio St. 394) 557 (1888); approving People v. Moryan,
do not intend, probably, to assert the prin- 55 N. Y. 587; Mellen v. Lansing, 20
ciple that the non-action of the taxpayers Blatchf. 278.
or inhabitants will supply a want of power, Bonds issued where a valid condition
in the just sense of that expression, in precedent imposed under legislative au-
the trustees to subscribe for the stock, thority was disregarded, and there was no
or estop the quasi corporation from specific recital covering the point, held to
making the defence of ultra vires, if it be void for want of power. German Bank
existed.
v. Franklin Co., 128 U. S. 526 (1888).
Under a charter authorizing counties See nice distinctions there drawn in the
through which " a given railroad “ may cases on this subject.
pass
to subscribe to its stock, it was 8 Lamoille, &c. Co. v. Fairfield, 51 Vt.
held that a county between the termini of 257 ; People v. Waynesville, 88 Ill. 469 ;
the road might subscribe without waiting Sykes v. Columbus, 55 Miss. 115 ; Dela-
until the route was located, or built with- ware Co. v. McClintock, 51 Ind. 325
in the county. Woods v. Lawrence Coun (1875); Harding v. Rockford, R. I. & St.
ty, 1 Black (U. S.), 386 (1861). In Min. L. R. R. Co., 65 Ill. 90 (1872).
nesota the agreement to issue the bonds
..
618
§ 553
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
difference of judicial opinion (chiefly in cases involving the rights of
innocent holders of negotiable municipal securities) respecting the
evidence of compliance with conditions precedent, and as to what
will estop the municipality from showing non-compliance in fact
with such conditions. Yet, aside from these differences, the courts
all agree that such a corporation may successfully defend against
the bonds in whosesoever hands they may be, if its officers or agents,
who assume to issue them, had, in the sense already explained, no
legislative power to do so. The officers of such corporations possess
no general power to bind them, and have no authority except such
as the legislature confers. If the statute authorizes such a corpora-
tion to issue its bonds only when the measure is sanctioned by a
majority of the voters, bonds issued without such a sanction (either
in fact, or according to the decision of authorized officers, or some
authorized body or tribunal), or when voted to one corporation and
without authority of law issued to another, are void, into whoseso-
ever hands they may come. This is the sound and true rule of law
on this subject, and the one which has had the uniform approval of
the State courts in this country, and it has also received the high
sanction of the Supreme Court of the United States. The distinc-
1 Ante, chap. vi. sec. 163. The provis. by law and as security for a personal debt
ions of a railroad charter made it lawful of an officer, was held to have no claim
for certain counties to subscribe stock on upon the county whose bonds they pur.
a majority vote, and, on such vote being ported to be.
had, made it the duty of the county com. 2 Ante, chap. vi. sec. 163 ; supra, secs.
missioners to subscribe for stock and issue 529 a, 542.
bonds therefor. Accordingly a vote was 8 Marsh v. Fulton County, 10 Wall.
had, resulting in favor of a subscription ; 676 (1870). Speaking of this subject, Mr.
a.fter the vote, but before the subscription Justice Field, in the case just cited, deliv.
was actually made and the bonds issued, ering the opinion of the court, says :
counties were prohibited by law from sub- “But it is earnestly contended that the
scribing for stock, unless paid for in cash. plaintiff was an innocent purchaser of the
It was held that the power to subscribe and bonds, without notice of their invalidity.
the vote did not constitute a contract within If such were the fact, we do not perceive
the meaning of the clause of the Constitu- how it could affect the liability of the
tion making contracts inviolable; that county of Fulton. This is not a case
until the subscription was actually made where the party executing the instru.
the contract was unexecuted ; and that ments possessed a general capacity to
bonds thus issued were void, even in the contract, and where the instruments
hands of innocent holders for value. As might, for such reason, be taken without
pinwall v. Daviess Co. Comm’rs, 22 How. special inquiry into their validity. It is
(U. S.) 364 (1859); Eddy v. People, 127 a case where the power to contract never
111. 428 (1889); ante, sec. 70; Marsh existed ; where the instruments might,
v. Fulton County, 10 Wall. 676 ; Hayes with equal authority, have been issued
V. Holly Springs, 114 U. S. 120 ; Mer- by any other citizen of the county. It is
chants' Bank v. Bergen County, 115 a case, too, where the holder was bound
U. S. 384, when a bona fide holder, for to look to the action of the officers of the
value, of bonds, containing no recitals, county and ascertain whether the law
issued in excess of the number authorized had been so far followed by them as to
$ 554
649
CONTRACTS : BONDS; DEFENCES.
tion, however, must be remembered, between want of power to issue
the bonds and irregularities in the exercise of the power, which
latter are unavailing against the bona fide holder without notice of
the irregularity
§ 554. Defences; Waiver of Irregularities in Issue of Bonds, &c.
Defences grounded on corporate neglect, or technical in their
nature, are not favored when the bonds are in innocent hands.1 The
issue of the bonds raises a presumption that conditions precedent,
imposed by ordinance, have been complied with or waived. This is
The au-
justify the issue of the bonds.
S. C. 5 Chicago Legal News, 265; Burr v.
thority to contract must exist before any Carbondale, 76 Ill. 455 (1875).
protection as innocent purchaser can be 1 Maddox v. Graham, 2 Met. (Ky.)
claimed by the holder. This is the law 56 ; Commonwealth v. Pittsburgh, 43 Pa.
even as respects commercial paper, al. St. 391 ; San Antonio v. Lane, 32 Tex.
leged to have been issued under a dele- 405.
gated authority, and is stated in the case 2 Commonwealth v. Pittsburgh, supra ;
of Floyd Acceptances, 7 Wall. 666. In Gilchrist v. Little Rock, 1 Dillon C. C.
speaking of notes and bills issued or ac- 261 ; Danielly v. Cabaniss, 52 Ga. 211
cepted by an agent, acting under a gen- (1874); Black v. Cohen, Ib. 621.
eral or special power, the court says : 'In The Supreme Court of the United
each case the person dealing with the States has held, in an action on negoti-
agent, knowing that he acts only by virtue able bonds issued by a public corporation,
of a delegated power, must, at his peril, that where the defendant has shown fraud
see that the paper on which he relies in the origin or inception of the instru.
comes within the power under which the ments, this will throw upon the holder
agent acts. And this applies to every the burden of showing that he gave value
person who takes the paper afterwards ; for them before maturity. Smith o. Sac
for it is to be kept in mind that the pro- County, 11 Wall. 139 (1870), Clifford, J.,
tection which commercial usage throws dissenting ; Montclair v. Ramsdell, 107
around negotiable paper cannot be used U. S. 147 ; Pana v. Bowler, 107 U. S.
to establish the authority liy which it was 529, 542.
originally issued.'" And in this case the When special authority to borrow money
bonds of the county of Fulton, though or to subscribe to the stock of a railroad
negotiable in form, and not disclosing or company will impliedly repeal existing
reciting their purpose or origin, were held charter limitations upon the amount of
void, in the hands of bona fide holders, for indebtedness that may be contracted by a
want of authority in the county to issue municipality, or upon the rate of taxation.
them, having been voted to one corpo. See Amey v. Allegheny City, 24 How.
ration and delivered (according to the 364 (1860); Butz v. Muscatine, 8 Wall.
view of the court) to another and distinct 575 (1869); ante, sec. 162, and cases there
corporation. See also, Lewis v. Barbour cited.
Co. Comm’rs, 3 Fed. Rep. 191 ; noted Mode of enforcing payment of municipal
supra, secs. 529 a, 531, note; supra, sec. bonds. See chapter on Mandamus, post.
524. See Society, &c. v. New London, 29 The authority to levy and collect special
Conn. 174; compare People v. Mead, 36 taxes to pay bonds authorized to be issued
N. Y. 224; Adams v. Memphis & L. R. R. cannot be withdrawn or repealed by the
Co., 2 Coldw. (Tenn.) 645; Lynde v. Win. legislature to the prejudice of the holder
nebago County, 16 Wall. 6 (1872); Steines of such bonds. Von Hoffman v. Quincy,
v. Franklin County, 48 Mo. 167 (1871); 4 Wall. 535 (1866); ante, chap. iv.; post,
Livingston County v. Weider, 64 Ill. 427; chap. xx. Where bonds of a county are
650
§ 555
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
certainly so where the bonds recite in substance that they are issued
under and pursuant to the enabling act.
§ 555. Where Lost or Stolen. Having stated the law of muni-
cipal bonds, it may be useful to give a synopsis of the principles
applicable to negotiable securities, including such bonds, when lost
or stolen.
A negotiable bond stolen and its number altered by the thief has
been held to be good in the hands of a bona fide holder, who pur-
chased it for value.1 Negotiable bonds or coupons, although stolen,
are collectible by a bona fide holder who took them for value in the
usual course of business, before maturity and without notice. If,
however, the instrument is incomplete, as if any essential part is
left in blank, and is afterwards filled up by the thief, or holder
under the thief, no recovery can be had; as, where in an incomplete
instrument the place of payment was left in blank, and, before it
was filled up by the authorized officer, the bonds were stolen.3 A
legally authorized to be issued by a vote Perrine, 103 U. S. 806. See supra, sec.
of the people, and, by the law authorizing 544.
the vote, it is provided that the bonds 1 Elizabeth v. Force, 29 N. J. Eq. 587;
shall be executed by certain officers, and Birdsall v. Russell, 29 N. Y. 220 ; Com.
countersigned by the treasurer of the monwealth v. Savings Bank, 98 Mass. 12;
county, it was held, that the omission of Diamond v. Lawrence Co., 37 Pa. St. 353;
the treasurer to countersign the bonds is a Crosby v. New London, W. & P. R. R.
mere defect in the execution of them, Co., 26 Conn. 121 ; Myers v. York & C.
which a court of equity would, in the ab- R. R. Co., 43 Me. 362 ; Clarke v. Janes-
sence of a remedy at law, ordinarily sup. ville, 1 Biss. 98; Morgan v. United States,
ply, and that an injunction restraining the 113 U. S. 476 (reversing s. c. 18 Court
collection of taxes for the payment of such of Claims Rep. 386), where alteration of
bonds should not be allowed. Breese, C. numbers of stolen bonds is one of the facts
J., and McAllister, J., dissenting. Melvin stated, and where the court, while not
v. Lisenby, 72 Ill. 63.
directly passing upon the legal effect of
Township Railroad Aid Act of Missouri such alteration, sustained the title of bona
held unconstitutional. Webb v. Lafayette fide purchasers for value and without notice
Co., 67 Mo. 353; Ranney v. Bader, 67 Mo. of the alteration ; Brown, Riley & Co. v.
476 ; State v. Brassfield, 67 Mo. 331. But United States, 20 Court of Claims Rep.
the Federal courts, as to bonds previously 416, construing opinion of Supreme Court
issued, refused to follow the State court on this point in case of Morgan v. Uniteil
decisions. Foote v. Johnson County, 5 States, supra; Jones on Railroad Securi-
Dillon C. C. R. 281 (1878); Douglass v. ties, sec. 216; Wylie v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co.,
Pike County, 101 U. S. 677 (1879). The U. S. Circuit Court, S. D. N. Y. MSS.
law of New York intended to legalize the Compare Suffell v. Bank of England, 9
acts of commissioners to aid railways Q. B. D. 555.
was declared unconstitutional. Horton v. 2 Evertson v. Nat. Bank of Newport,
Thompson, 71 N. Y. 513. The Supreme 66 N. Y. 14; State v. Wells, 15 Cal. 336;
Court of the United States declined to fol. Spooner v. Holmes, 102 Mass. 503.
low the ruling in Horton v. Thompson, 8 Ledwich v. McKim, 53 N. Y. 307;
supra, and it held the same act to be Jackson v. Vicksburg, S. & T. R. R. Co.,
constitutional and the bonds in question 2 Woods, 141.
to be validated by it. Thompson v.
§ 555
651
CONTRACTS: LOST OR STOLEN BONDS.
bona fide holder of such an instrument cannot, by inserting the name
of a place in the blank, recover its value. Where the corporate
seal of the obligor and the indorsement of the trustees were both
wanting when the bonds were stolen, and these were subsequently
forged, and in that condition caine into the plaintiff's hands, the
company was not liable.2
As a bond takes effect from its delivery,
it is presumed that a blank as to the date in an instrument other-
wise complete and duly delivered would not affect a recovery. The
insertion by the thief of the name of the payee in the blank left
for that purpose when the bond was issued and delivered, is not
such an alteration as will avoid the bond. The fact of the bond,
otherwise negotiable, not being payable to a particular person, does
not render it non-negotiable. If overdue bonds or coupons are stolen
and then come into a bona fide holder's hands, he cannot collect their
amount.6 Coupons have been held to be entitled to three days' grace,
so that a purchaser, after the time specified for payment, but before
the expiration of the days of grace, is deemed a purchaser before
maturity. Giving immediate notice of the theft by publication
will not of itself deprive the bona fide holder of his right to recover.
After actual service of such notice, bankers and brokers should retain
a memorandum in order to identify stolen bonds if presented.
9
1 Ib.
wealth, 18 Gratt. (Va.) 750 (holds that
2 Maas v. Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co.,. there is no grace).
11 Hun (N. Y.), 8.
8 Seybel v. Nat. Cur. Bank, 54 N. Y.
8 Pierce v. Richardson, 37 N. H. 306; 288 ; Murray v. Lardner, 2 Wall. 110.
Bills v. Stanton, 69 Ill. 51.
9 Vermilye v. Adams Exp. Co., 21 Wall.
4 Boyd v. Kennedy, 9 Vroom (38 N. 138. Mere omission to look for such no.
J. L.), 146; Dutchess Co. Ins. Co. v. tice several months after publication is no
Hachfield, 1 Hun (N. Y.), 675.
proof of mala fides. Raphael v. Bank of
5.Smith v. Clark County, 54 Mo. 58. England, 17 C. B. 161. See Preston v.
6 Arents v. Commonwealth, 18 Gratt. Hull, 23 Gratt. (Va.) 600 ; s. C. 21 Am.
(Va.) 750 ; Vermilye v. Adams Exp. Co., Rep. 699; also see elaborate note by Mr.
21 Wall. 138.
Stewart to Elizabeth v. Force, in 29 N. J.
7 Evertson v. National Bank of New Eq. 587, reversing s. C. 28 N. J. Law,
port, 66 N. Y. 14; Arents v. Common. 463.
END OF VOL. I.
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