DA
A
496
17
1
VINDICATION
OF THE
Preſent M--y,
FROM
Ꭹ
The Clamours rais'd againſt
them upon occaſion of the
NEW PRELIMINARIES.
Whoever would frighten us with the Expence and
Tediouſneſs of ſuch à War, either are not ſen-
fible of our Danger, or if they are, they draw a
poifon'd Arrow out of a French Quiver.
Such a Peace (upon the fuppofition we could warrant
it) is to be rejected with Scorn and Indignation by
every true Englishman, as being both dishonourable
and deftructive to his Country.
Anguis in Herba.
1
LONDON,
Printed in the Year M. DCC, XI
Ford
(3)
1-7-43
46581
A VINDICATION of the
Preſent M——y, &c.
M-
A
MONG the many reftlefs Endeavours
of the Ruin'd Party to fink the Repu-
tation of the prefent M- -y, there
is none in which they discover their
Good-will to them more than in the Violence they
fhew in attacking the new Preliminaries; which,
tho they are fuch weak wretched things that they
mnſt fall of themſelves, without any oppofition
made to them, yet theſe angry Men run upon
them with all their might, and with the greateſt
Strength of Argument oppofe Articles which no
ferious Man can think worthy of an Anſwer.
A Man muſt have the meanest Opinion of the
My, not to be fure fuch trifling Prelimina-
ries can't be the Refult of the Negotiations,
which have been of late fo much talk'd of: for
an impartial Eye will difcern in them at firſt fight
moſt evident marks of their being fpurious; and
yet a certain Party take fuch pleaſure in infulting
the preſent M y, that they fet themſelves
againſt theſe Articles in great earneft, as if our
All depended on them, without the leaſt enquiry,
whether they are genuine or not.
y
This is fuch unfair Treatment of a M.
who have deferv'd fo much of the Nation in fo
thort a time, that 'tis but a piece of common
A 2
Juftice
(4)
Juſtice to them, to undeceive the World in this
point, and let them fee how groundleſs the Cla-
mours are, that with fo much induſtry and noife
are rais'd againſt them on this account: and I
doubt not, but the Reaſons that have convinc'd
me of the Spurioufnefs of thefe Preliminaries,
will have the fame effect on all impartial Men, and
fatisfy them, that nothing can be a greater Rc-
flection on the M-y, than to impute to them
fuch wretched Articles.
There is an obvious Prejudice that arifes againſt
thefe Articles from the very Stile of them. For
if they were drawn up by Mr. Mefnager on the
part of France, they were drawn, no doubt, in
French; and thoſe which go about, are a Tranſla-
tion only and if fo, one would naturally ex-
pect to find in them fome Gallicifms, fome Foot-
ſteps of the French Language, fome of thofe Signs
and Marks, by which Tranflations feldom fail to
diſcover them felves. And yet if we examine
thefe Articles never fo narrowly, we fhall find
every thing in them, befides the Senfe, intirely
English and I dare fay, that is the Language
they were originally penn'd in. This I take to
be a good prefumptive Proof, that theſe Articles
are not genuine.
But there is another thing obfervable in the
Stile of them, that confirms me ftill more in
this Sufpicion; and that is the loofe, general,
ambiguous manner that runs thro all of them,
which makes it impoffible to fix a determinate
Senfe upon any one of them, or fay preciſely,
what they mean. Beſides, there is in two or
three of them, an Expreffion, which as the
French Language won't bear, fo we have by long
Experience reafon to look upon it as a Jeft in
the mouth of a French Miniſter, and that is bona
fide, a thing they have been ſtrangers to, time
out
(5)
out of mind. This Argument perhaps may by
fome be thought to make againft me; and it will
be faid that the more ambiguous and prevarica-
ting the Articles are, the more likely are they
to be genuine: 'tis agreeable to the Character
of the French, and to what they have taught us
to expect from them. True, 'tis no ftrange thing
in a French Miniſter to fhuffle and prevaricate,
and make ufe of obfcure, doubtful, or uncertain
Terms. A Frenchman, I will allow, is capable of
offering fuch Articles; but it would be ftrange,
very ſtrange in any English Minifters to accept
them; which 'tis pretended they have done :
and 'tis for this reafon I make the Loofenefs and
Ambiguity of thefe Articles an Argument of
their being fpurious. For Propoſals that have a
Senſe ſo very indeterminate, are Propofals of no-
thing, and confequently in effect no Propofals
at all; and therefore 'tis impoffible, even the old
M
y could think fuch Articles fit to be the
Foundation of a Treaty of fo much importance.
If indeed theſe Articles were propos'd on the
part of England, as they are pretended to be on
the part of France, I fhould not be at a lofs to
find an Author for them, or fufpect their being
genuine but I muſt beg leave to fay, we have
a Miniftry too well skill'd in the Arts of Lan-
guage, and the Power of Words, to be fo fhame-
fully impos'd on by a much abler Man, than I
take the Manager of thefe Articles to be.
·
Thefe Prejudices which arofe in my mind a-
gainſt theſe Preliminaries upon the firft View of
them, made me throw them afide, as not de-
ferving any manner of regard; nor fhould I ever
have taken them into my hands again, if the
Enemies of the M- y did not make fo much
noiſe about them. They are the Subject that fills
all places; one can go no where, but one finds
fome
(6)
.
fome Paper or other writ againſt them; and
the Party triumph in their Succefs againſt this
Shadow of a Treaty. This made me refolve
to look upon thefe Articles once again, which
I never thought to do, and to confider them
a little more particularly; and I can't but fay,
that the more I look upon them, the more I
am confirm'd in my Opinion, that a Man muſt
be very partial, and have thrown off all Ef-
teem for the My, before he can be-
lieve them genuine. For firft, what Reader is
there can help obferving the prodigious diffe-
rence there is between thefe new Preliminaries and
the old ones? And how can any Man, that fees
the difference, think it poffible for any French
Miniſter to have impudence enough to offer fuch
trifling ftuff, or for any English one to agree to,
or be at all fatisfy'd with it? If any new Pre-
liminaries are agreed on, we may be fure the
Treaty about them was refum'd upon the foot of
the old ones; and every body knows, the French
King has over and over, and in the moſt folemn
manner declar'd, he was ready to confent to
all but the 37th; and the Conferences at Ger-
ruydenburgh were held for nothing elfe but to
find an Equivalent for that fingle Article: And
confequently, whatever new Preliminaries are a-
greed to, they can differ from the old ones, only
by fuch Alterations as the Change of that fingle
Article can make neceflary. In fhort, every
thing but what affects the manner of evacuating
Spain, fhould ftand as it did. And fince this is
what France has never difputed from the time the
firft Articles were form'd, 'tis inconceivable that
France fhould now ask us to give up Points fhe
has hitherto confented to, or that an English
My fhould give them up without asking.
'Tis
( 7 )
"Tis therefore a Principle with me I can't de-
part from, that no Preliminaries can be the true
ones, that don't intirely agree with the old ones,
except in what relates to the Evacuation of the
Spanish Monarchy; and for that reafon I can ne-
ver believe, thofe that go about the Town are
genuine.. For they are fo far from agreeing with
the old ones in all Points but one, that there is
no one point in which they are intirely alike; as
every body's Memory will tell him, without being
at the trouble to compare them.
Theſe new
Articles are fo far from being form'd upon the
old ones, that they unhinge them all at once; and
all the Steps that have been taken abroad to-
wards a Peace, are as effectually undone as if they
never had been made. In the old Articles the
Allies knew what they might depend on; Holland
and the Empire, not to mention the others, had
their Barriers fettled in full and clear Terms
that could admit of no Difpute or Equivocation:
but if we look for any thing like this in the new
Articles, we fhall look in vain. Inftead of fuch
and fuch ftrong Towns exprefs'd by name with
their Diſtricts and Dependencies, they have now
paum'd upon us a few indiftin&t words, that no
Man living can make any fenfe of. The Dutch
are told, they ſhall be put, inſtead of Lifle, Tour-
nay, and twenty or thirty other places named in
the old Preliminaries, into the poffeffion of the for-,
tify'd Places which shall be mention'd in the Ne-
therlands, to ferve hereafter for a Barrier. Have
the Dutch at a vaft Expence of Blood and Treafure
actually got poffeffion of a good Barrier, and
muft they now depend only upon fuch a Barrier,
as fhall be mention'd? Which words are fo like
nothing, that there is nothing like them; ex-
cept what follows in the next Article, That a
fecure and convenient Barrier fhould be form'd for
the
(8)
the Empire and the Houfe of Auftria. To tell
them they fhall have Brifac and Strasburgh, and
other places in Alface, and that the French Forts
upon the Rhine fhall be demolish'd, is very in-
telligible but to talk of a fecure and convenient
Barrier, is talking in the air, and faying no-
thing. I'm fure from fuch Articles no body can
tell what the French will confent to; but it is
plain they intend that Holland and the Empire
hall always lie at their mercy, and be in danger
of being over-run by a fudden Invafion, as foon
as they fhall have leifure or be in humour to ex-
tend their Conquefts.
What Flanders and the Circles upon the Upper
Rhine have fuffer'd for theſe laſt forty years from
France, is not to be exprefs'd. No one, who has
an image of the Barbarity of French Ambition,
can think of it without horrour. And if they
have no better Barrier than they have had hi-
therto, they will be ftill expos'd to the fame Ca-
lamities as before, after all they have fuffer'd in
this War to purchafe fome Security for the fue
ture. The Four Affociated Circles eſpecially will
be fo expos'd, upon whom all the Weight almoſt
of the German War has fallen; and their Mifery
is fuch, that they have fuffer'd almoſt as much
from Friends as Enemies. Nay, without the Bar-
rier for the Empire fettled in the old Prelimi-
naries, which is the leaft they can poffibly be
contented with, thefe poor Circles will be not
only in as bad, but a worfe ftate than before
ร
which yet can hardly be. For by thefe Articles
'tis evident the Elector of Bavaria is to be re-
ftor'd, with his Brother of Cologn, to all they
were before poffefs'd of: for they, no doubt,
are included, or rather particularly meant, by
thoſe general words in the third Article, That
the King's Intention is, that all the Parties engag'd
(9)
in the prefent War, without excepting any of them,
may find their reaſonable Satisfaction in the Treaty
which shall be made. Do but look now into a Map,
and fee the miferable Situation of thefe poor.
Circles, hemm'd in between two Frenchify'd
Electors and the French Territories. Look into
fome Maps of the Palatinate, all in flames, be-
cauſe they would not join with France, or agree
to a Neutrality. 'Tis faid that Barbarous Prince
never wept but twice; and once was upon a Re-
preſentation of this unparallel'd Inftance of his
own Cruelty. Whoever confiders the unhappy
Situation of theſe Circles, and fees what they have
already fuffer'd, muft want common Humanity,
to deny them a good Barrier; or common Senfe,
to think they can be fafe without one. But that
is not all; 'tis not they only will be the Suf-
ferers, by being expos'd to the Ambition of
France, tho that muft very fenfibly move a Man
who has any Good-Nature, efpecially confidering
the Efforts they have made to fuftain the Burden
of the War, and the ſteddy Courage with which
they have withſtood all the Sollicitations of France
to come into a Neutrality: but that, I fay, is
not all; the Mifchief will reach a great deal
further. If theſe miferable People are neglected
in this Treaty, they will have no heart left;
they will in deſpair fubmit to any Terms France
fhall impofe, without any Power of Refiſtance,
or any Proſpect of Relief. To ſubmit to a Neu-
trality, will be the best they can do; 'twill be
an Act of Grace in the King of France to admit
of their Submiſſion upon fuch Terms. If he will
give Suabia and Franconia to the Elector of Ba-.
varia, to indemnify him for the great Loffes he
has fuftain'd this War in his Service; I don't
fee, how they can at all help themſelves. But
if he ſhould not be fo hard with them, fhould he
B
only
( 10 )
only oblige them to fubmit to a Neutrality, what
do we think will be the Confequence of that?
Won't the French King by that means be able
without any oppofition to carry his Arms into
the Heart of the Empire? Will he not be able
to invade the Auftrian Territories, and drive the
Emperor from his Throne, before any body is in
condition to lift up a Hand againſt him? Let
us but remember, how near this Danger came
the ſecond Year of this War, upon the Elector
of Bavaria's going into the French Intereft. The
Houſe of Auſtria were in one Campaign brought
upon the brink of Ruin, and the Emperor was
almoſt forc'd to retire from Vienna, upon the
Treachery of one Elector; and that tho the Con-
federacy was then form'd, and France had work
enough for their Arms in other parts: and yet
had not the Duke of Marlborough made the March
to Germany, and won the Battel of Blenheim, the
Emperor could not poffibly have furviv'd, no not
a few months, the Storm that then threaten'd
him. The Elector of Bavaria had been long
fince in the Imperial Throne, and had govern'd
Germany for the King of France, as his Grandfon
now does Spain: This had been then without a
Turn that must not be again expected, and will
certainly be one time or other, whenever France
has a mind to it, the Confequence of leaving the
Empire without a good Barrier. When the Con-
federacy is broke, and France is difengag'd from
their other Enemies, 'tis but the work of a fin-
gle Campaign; and the buſineſs may be done, be-
fore any new Alliance can be form'd or brought
to act. This, from what has been, we may be
fire will be; and then the long-labour'd Univer-
fil Monarchy is gain'd, beyond the Power not
only of England, but of Europe, to difpute it.
What
(11)
•
What now can be more unjuft in it felf, more
cruel to a brave but miferable People, more pre-
Judicial to the Houſe of Auftria, more fatal to
the Empire, or more furely deftructive of the
Liberty of Europe, than to leave the Empire
without a tolerable Barrier? And yet if we are
to judg by theſe Articles, 'tis evident that is
the Deſign: For if a good Barrier be intended,
why is it not nam'd? Why don't they in expreſs
words fay fo? Why don't they make the Minds
of our German Allies as eafy as they can, and tell
them what they will do for them? Does any
body fay lefs kind things, when they are able to
fay more? Do we fuffer our Friends to conti-
nue under an Alarm, when we can remove their
Fears, by ſpeaking plain? No body acts at this
wild rate: If thefe Articles tell them they fhall
have a fecure and convenient Barrier; fecure and con-
venient, we may be fure, is all they have to tell
them. This is in lieu of other good Securities:
They are to have words inftead of things; the
words of a French Agent, which they know are
never to be depended on, except when they
threaten from the Immortal Man Ruin and De-
ftruction.
Will any body now believe an English My
is fo devoted to the Intereft of France, as to
agree to Articles fo repugnant to Honour, Juf-
tice, and Humanity, to all Truth and Good
Faith, to the Safety of the Empire, and the Li-
berty of Europe? for thefe Points they are by
the Grand Alliance oblig'd to take the greateſt
care of, and to make no Peace without fecuring
them. And accordingly in the Negotiations on
the other fide the water, a juft Concern was
fhewn for them, and a good Barrier provided.
And 'tis aftoniſhing to fee any thing call'd a Pre-
liminary Treaty ftart up now, in which fo effen-
B 2
tial
( 12 )
tial a Part of a good Peace is left out, and no-
thing but two or three looſe words fubftituted
in the room of it. Can this be the work of an
English My, of the New My, the beſt
and wifeft this Nation was ever blefs'd with?
Others may believe this if they will, I never fhall
without having the worst Opinion of them.
But perhaps the Diſtance of the Empire, the
Remoteness of the Danger, what we hear of the
low Condition France is in, and the Inability of
drawing Confequences, may make fome People
fufpect much lefs mifchief in this Article than
there really is. Let them therefore try their
Thoughts upon a Subject nearer home, and fee
if they can think there is any Juftice, or Honour,
or Safety in the preceding Article which relates
to the Dutch Barrier; which, inftead of what
has been agreed to by all Parties, and by Eng-
land in particular, is now, we are told, to con-
fift of fuch places as fhall be mention'd. What
can be more Plainly telling the Durch, that they
fhall not have what has been mention'd? No-
thing is fo certain as that what shall be mention'd,
will be different from what has been mention'd;
tho no body who is not in the Secret, can tell
how great that Difference may bc: But that it
will be to the difadvantage of the Dutch, our Good
and Great, and moft Faithful Allies, and for the
Service of the Common Enemy, an Enemy whom
nothing can fatisfy but the Ruin of us both;
this there can't be the leaſt doubt of from thefe
Preliminaries. The old Frontier of the Nether-
lands is fo very infufficient, that a Man must be
a ftranger to all that has paft in Europe for thefe
fifty years, to think it can be depended on; and
yet even that is more than the French King can
at prefent engage they fhall have, fiuce he has
given Namur and Charleroy, with Luxemburgh
and
( 13 )
and the whole Netherlands, in Sovereignty to the
Élector of Bavaria, and by that means put it as
much out of his power to give the Allies the
Towns in Flanders yet unconquer'd.
But if this Difficulty could be overcome, which
it can't be any other way than by the Refto-
ration of the Elector, which there was reaſon to
hope the Allies would never confent to, but up-
on fome valuable Confiderations in favour of the
poor Duke of Lorain, whofe Protection is of
the greateſt Confequence to the Intereſt of the
Common Cauſe! Suppofe, I fay, this Difficulty
were overcome, and France could give the fame
Barrier for the Netherlands they had before, 'tis
no manner of Security to them, that they fhall
not be over-run, whenever France fhall have a
mind to it: And that we may be fure they can
never want, if we confider, that the Acquifition
of Flanders is one great Point, which has been
always at the bottom of the French King's De-
figns, and which is a View nothing has ever
made him lofe fight of. 'Twould make a Hifto-
ry to repeat all that France has endeavour'd to
compaſs this Deſign, ever fince the Treaty of
Munster; and nothing can effectually defeat this
Defign, but giving the Dutch a good Barrier,
which the French have fubmitted to in the Old
Preliminaries. But if we may credit the new
ones, they have found the way to get off of that
Engagement; and what Additions they will
pleafe to make to the old Barrier, we are left
to guefs from very general words, from which
nothing can be concluded, but that they fhall
not have what they were to have had before.
This is very unjuft in it felf, being directly con-
trary to the fundamental Articles of the Grand
Alliance; by which it appears, that a good Bar-
rier for the Netherlands was one of the capital
Points,
(14)
Points, for the fake of which both they and we
went into the War. And what makes this Ar-
ticle not only unjuft but abfurd, is, that a good
Barrier does not at all depend upon the pleaſure
of the French; 'tis already purchas'd, and that
at a vaft Expence of Blood and Treaſure; and
they are actually in poffeffion of what they would
have, or at leaſt of the most eflential Parts; and
theſe muſt be given up to France, if thefe Arti-
tles are to take place: for were it intended they
should keep what they have got, no doubt it
would have been exprefs'd. What now can be
more extravagant, than to go into a moft ex-
penfive War to get a good Barrier, to fucceed in
this War, and acquire by the Sword the Barrier
you want, and then, for no body knows what
reafon, to give up what you have been fo long
fighting for? Shall the Dutch be turn'd out of the
Acquifitions, that are the Price of their Blood
and Treaſure? And fhall a Son of France keep
poſſeſſion of a vaſt Monarchy, that coft him no-
thing, and which he has no better Title to than
what the vileft Treachery and Perjury can give?
Can Articles be genuine that fpeak theſe things?
'Tis impoffible! If Faith and Juftice did not in
the strictest manner oblige us to infiſt on a good
Barrier for the Dutch; the brave and honourable
Part they have acted in this War, and the great
Regard they have had to the Intereft of England,
highly deferves it of us; 'tis the leaft that in
gratitude we can do for them. For a Man that
is at all acquainted with the nature of their Go-
VOLment, and how intirely they fubfift by Com-
merce, needs not be told, that in their Inclina-
tions iley can never be averfe to Peace, 'tis their
Intereft to keep but of War as much as poffible;
and when the neceflity of Affairs has brought
them into it, they are always ftudying to put an
end
( 15 )
end to it as foon as they can. This is evidently
their Intereft, and the Spirit of their Govern
ment: This has conftantly been their practice in
all former Wars; and their great Propensity to
Peace has made them, on feveral occafions, in
too much hafte for it, which France has made
Advantage of: and there is nothing we have had
more reaſon to fear, than that the Length and
Expence of this War would tire out their Pa-
tience, and hinder them from purfuing it with
Vigour, till the Ends of the Grand Alliance
could be obtain'd.
But all our Fears of this kind have prov'd
groundlefs, to the great Surprize of their Friends
as well as of the common Enemy: They have out-
done themſelves, and all that was expected from
them; they have fhewn fuch a Firmnefs, as they
never did before fince they were a State, and
probably never will again, if theſe are to be the
Fruits of it. They have acted with a Spirit a
bove all private Views, and rejected with Dif-
dain all Temptations to come into feparate
Meaſures. There is nothing France would not
have given them many years fince to break with
their Allies, they might have had any Barrier,
and Commerce fettled upon what Terms they
would: and no body ever thought them very
much concern❜d for the Reftitution of Spain and
the Indies.
All this is notoriously known, and a Man muſt
be an utter ſtranger to Affairs to make the leaft
queſtion of this: And yet what a noble Part
have they acted? Who could have expected fo
fteddy, fo generous, fo difintereſted a Conduct,
fuch a punctual and exact Adherence to their
Allies as they have fhewn? They have been deaf
to the moſt ſpecious Offers, have declin'd all ſe-
parate Meaſures, and every thing that could give
the
( 16 )
the leaft Umbrage to their Friends; they have ta-
ken no Steps but in concert with them, all has
been above-board with the most perfect Honour
and Integrity. They wifely judg'd there was no
lafting Safety but in good Alliances; and that no-
thing can effectually fecure them the Affiftance of
new ones, when they fhall be wanted, but a
faithful and juft Adherence to the old ones.
They judg'd that no Terms France could give,
can be fo truly for their Intereft, as to culti
vate a perfect good Underſtanding with England.
For the fake of this they have refus'd all Offers
of Peace, in which England could not find their
particular Advantage; refolv'd, it feems, to
ftand and fall together.
This is the noble Firmnefs they have fhewn,
this the great and tender Regard they have had
to the Intereſt of England. Behold now their Re-
ward! Thefe brave and faithful Allies are to be
facrific'd, to no body knows what Intereft; their
Adherence to us, and Rejection of all private
Offers, is made Matter of Reproach. They
who might have had any thing they would ask,
if they would have been falfe, are to have no-
thing, becauſe they are true:. we defert them,
becauſe they would not defert us; and the Re-
compence they are to have for preferring the
common Good to any private. Views, I may fay
the Good of England to any feparate Good of
their own, is to be given up to France. We in
effect tell them, they have loft their Oppor-
tunity, that they fhould have taken care of them-
felves in time, and that they must now be con-
tent with what France will give, and that we
may be fure will be little enough; for, befides
all other Reaſons, they don't fcruple to tell us,
that France is offended with their Treatment of
their Minifters, that is in truth, with their firm
Adherence
( 17 )
Adherence to their Allies: and the worſe they
ſtand with France, the better Quarter this in all
reafon fhould procure them with their Friends.
But if they have no Security except in thefe Preli-
minaries, they have little to hope for from them :
for what they promiſe in thefe Articles is very
little; and as little as People promife, the Per-
formance generally is ftill lefs. So that they.
have reafon to fear they fhall be upon much the
fame foot they have been hitherto; and that will
expoſe them to perpetual Wars, and perpetual
Wars muſt needs end in the Ruin of their State.
What now can be more diſhonourable for Eng-
land, than to uſe in this ungrateful manner fuch
good Allies, who have been fo faithful to us,
and who deferve the greatest regard that can pof-
fibly be fhewn to them? Have we no Senfe of
Gratitude and Honour? Let us at leaſt have fome
regard to our own Safety; for fafe we can't be
while we leave them in danger: our Fate, in
ſpite of all that can be faid, is inevitably in-
volv'd in theirs; they are our Fence and Bar-
rier, and whenever they are over-run, or made
a Province to France, Unhappy England, from
that Moment take leave of thy Religion, Li-
berty and Commerce; thy Ruin is as infallible
as if it were now at thy Doors: For if England
with Holland is not a Match for France, what is
it we can do without them? But this is not all,
our Intereft is particularly affected by what af-
fects their Barrier; for by the fame Treaty that
we engage to maintain their Barrier, they reci-
procally engage to maintain our Succeffion; a
Point every Englishman must be heartily concern'd
for, and which no body can think can be too
well fecur'd, who confiders the evil Spirit that
diſcovers it felf in the North part of Great-
Britain, and which lurks about fo much in o-
G
ther
(18
•
ther parts, as to give juft Apprehenfions to all
who have the Proteftant Succeffion at Heart,
and are thorowly concern'd for the great Points
that depend upon it. But if this Treaty be
deſtroy'd, a great Security will be remov'd, and
that will encourage the Pretender's Friends to
take heart, and think they fhall now have a
good Game of it, when they are to act againſt
a People divefted of all ufeful Alliances, and
divided amongst themfelves. Thus, whether we
confider the natural, Confequence of diftrefling
the Dutch, by forcing them to fubmit to a weak
Barrier, or the particular Treaty by which we
have ingag'd our felves to maintain them in the
Poffeffion of a good one, our Safety is too clofe-
ly interwoven with theirs, to be feparated from
it, and one Fate will in the Event be the Fate
of both.
But if breaking in upon the Dutch Barrier be
fo very contrary to Juftice, and Honour, and
our own Intereft; a Man muft allow, the Ar-
ticles that do it cannot be genuin, or he muſt
have ſtrange Notions of the new My, and
think worfe of them than their greateſt Ene-
mies have ever pretended to do yet.
But there is ftill fomething more fcandalous
in thefe Articles with relation to the Dutch,
and which confequently makes it ftill more in-
credible that they can be true Articles; and
that is, the Preliminary about the Demoliſhing
of Dunkirk, which I take to be the groffeft Fic-
tion that ever was invented, and muft open the
Eyes of all that are not obftinately blind; for
'tis fo bare-fac'd, as to admit of no Colour or
Difguife. Dunkirk fhall be demolish'd, upon con-
dition that a proper Equivalent, that may con-
tent the French King, be given him. A Man
that has heard any thing of the old Prelimina-
ries, muſt be ſtrangely furpriz'd to fee fuch a
Con
( 19 )
Condition annext to this Article, which till now
the French King has never pretended to ask, fince
that Article was firft agreed. What a Myſtery
is this, that Things which were before unexcep-
tionably agreed to, muft now either not be done,
or done upon condition of giving an Equivalent,
and that Equivalent fuch as fhall content him?
and who can tell what that will be? A Man
that engages to do a thing upon no other Terms
but fuch as fhall be to his Satisfaction, will ei-
ther not do it, or be well paid for it, and will
take that part of the Alternative he has moſt
mind to. But to make this Article more a
Jeft, and infult the Dutch in the openeft man-
ner poffible, we are told, that England can't
give the Equivalent, and therefore
there-
fore what? why, it fhou'd be; and therefore
Holland fhall. But inſtead of ſaying ſo in di-
ret Words, which is moſt certainly their Mea-
ning, they chooſe to exprefs themſelves thus,
that the Difcuffion of it fhall be referr'd to the
Conferences to be held for the Peace. Now
what is the natural Senfe of thefe Words? We
will in the Conferences difcufs this Point, what
Equivalent ſhall be given to France for Dunkirk.
Well, this Equivalent will be found, or 'twill
not: if not, then Dunkirk is not to be demo-
liſh'd; if it be found, it muſt be found with the
Dutch; for the Article declares England can't
give it. Is not this now a pretty Story? Muſt
not Holland like mightily to be told, that they
fhall be oblig'd to give up a good part of the
Barrier, Lille and Tournay fuppofe, Places upon
which their Security fo much depends, to pur-
chaſe a Security for the English Trade? Do we
deſerve fo well of them, as to expect they
fhould easily confent to this? or can we have
the Face to ask it of them, when the great
Regard
C 2
( 20 )
Regard they have had for us is fo ill reward-
ed? And if they could be Fools enough to con-
fent to a reaſonable Equivalent for Dunkirk, are
the French Fools enough to think that reaſonable
which we ſhall be apt to think is? I can't but ´.
fear theſe two very ill Confequences of this
Article: first, That the French will have Intereſt
enough to put off the Dutch with a lefs Bar-
rier than they ought to have, under a Pre-
tence of demolishing Dunkirk; and when that
Point is gain'd, that one Stone of it will never
be thrown down. If we confider either the Im-
portance of the Place, or the conftant Practice
of the French in the Execution of all their Trea-
ties for half an Age, we muft own theſe are
very probable Sufpicions, tho not certain ones.
So fhall we difoblige the Dutch to the laft de-
gree, in complement to France, and gain nothing
by it our felves. This is all we are like to get by
confounding the Dutch Barrier, which is the ma-
nifeſt Intention of theſe Articles; in which there
is fo much Folly as well as Injuſtice and Ingra-
titude, that I fhould think no My that could
be pick'd in all England, except profeft Jacobites,
could ever be capable of giving their Confent
to them. I muſt therefore defire to be excus'd,
if I cannot believe fuch things of thofe, who
have at preſent the Adminiſtration of Affairs.
Thus ill, according to thefe Articles, 'tis like
to fare with Holland and the Empire. And the
Jeft goes round; for if we look well into them,
we hall find as little Proviſion made for our-
felves for what is it we are promis'd in the
firſt Article, but that he will acknowledg the
Queen, and alfo the Succeffion according to the
prefent Settlement, without a Word of the Pro-
teſtant Line, or of our Acts of Parliament ?
A mighty Favour indeed, for which we are much
oblig'd
•
21
oblig'd to him! But won't he acknowledg the
Pretender alfo in the fame Quality? Won't he
fupport his Pretenfions when 'tis for his Ser-
vice? Will he fend him out of his Dominions,
and take away all occafion of Jealoufy on that
fide? This was promifed very fully in the old
Preliminaries, but in the new ones there is not
a Word it! And what can be the Meaning of
this? Did not the English Mrs defire it? or
did Mr. Mefnager refufe it? Can we fuppofe the
firft guilty of fo great a Neglect, or that 'tis
omitted for any other reafon, but becaufe 'tis not
intended to be comply'd with? And if that be
the Truth of the matter, what a fine cafe will
theſe Articles put us into? If the Pretender's
Return be the Point in view, no wonder
the Barrier Treaty is confounded, by which, as
I have already obferved, the Dutch are engaged
to aflift us in maintaining the Proteftant Suc-
ceffion
Next to the Succeffion, the other great Point
England is concern'd for, is their Trade: Let
us fee now what Care thefe Articles take of
that, why truly, The King's Intention is, that
Commerce may be re-establish'd and maintain'd for
the future, to the Advantage of Great-Britain, of
Holland, and of the other Nations who have been
accustomed to exerciſe Commerce. A very gra-
cious Intention, this! We are told Commerce
fhall be re-eſtabliſh'd aud maintain'd; theſe
Words fay nothing elfe, but that Commerce
fhall, at the end of the War, be put upon the
fame foot it was upon before the War began:
and what could we expect lefs, if the War had
been as much againſt us as it has been for us?
All the Trade he could hinder us of, is the Trade
with his own Kingdom, or with Spain; the first
we had little of before the War began, and
We
( 22 )
we ſhall have lefs of the fecond, if we have no-
thing but his Word to depend upon. We are
fure he has been long ftudying to turn the Stream
of the Spanish Trade another way, and as long as
his Grandfon is in poffeffion of the Spanish Mo-
narchy, we can't hope it fhould be otherwife.
But the latter part of this Article deferves our
particular Attention, and fhews us plainly what
we are to expect: To Great Britain and Holland is
added other Nations who have been accuftom'd to
exerciſe Commerce. What Nations does any
body think are here meant? Can they be any
other than France and Spain? What then can be
the meaning of theſe words, but that the French
will exercife Commerce where, and with whom,
and upon what Terms they pleafe? And there
is our Spanish and Weft-India Trade loft in a few
words. Is this the Language of the old Preli-
minaries? No, far from it; there 'tis exprefly
caution'd that France fhall not trade to the Spa-
nifh Weft-Indies upon any pretence whatever, nor
have any Settlements in any part of thofe Do-
minions. This was a great and real Security to
our Trade, but in the new Articles 'tis all taken
away, and we must take what France will pleaſe
to give us, and hold it at their pleaſure. This
is all we can expect from thefe Articles in a point
upon which the Strength and Riches of the Na-
tion fo much depend.
But do not theſe things fhock us? Don't we
begin to fufpect the Genuineness of Articles that
are fo very fcandalous? If the Danger of Hol-
Land and the Empire won't affect us, have we
no concern for poor England? If we are infen-
fible of the Calamities which an ill Peace will
expofe our Allies to, are we void of all regard
to our own Safety? Don't thefe Evils touch us,
when they come to us, and our own Trade and Li-
berty,
( 23 )
berty, with every thing elfe that is dear to us,
is at stake? If we have any fenſe of theſe
things, we muſt fee they are the neceffary Con-
fequences of thefe Articles, and fo obvious that
a wife My can't but fee them all; and there-
fore no Man who has the leaſt Eſteem for the
prefent My, can fuppofe they have agreed
to them.
1
In short, whoever confiders thefe Articles im-
partially, muft own that nothing can be more
contrary to the former Preliminaries, the chief
Articles of the Grand Alliance, the Affurances
which the Friends of the new My have all
along given us, or to the only authentick Ac-
count we have of what has paft in the late Ne-
gotiations: The New Journy to Paris, is the Piece
I mean; for every thing we know of thefe Tranf
actions, but what we have in that admirable
Hiftory, is convey'd to the World thro the
hands of Abel, the moft profligate Writer even
of this Age, and therefore nothing we find in
his Papers can be depended on; for 'tis impoffi-
ble any My would chufe to convey things
to the People by fo infamous a Hand, which is
enough to bring a difcredit upon any thing that
paffes thro it. Now in the Journy to Paris,
which is a maſterly Performance, we are made
to hope for other fort of things than we find in
thefe Articles: there Monfieur Matthews is over-
heard to fay with Refolution TOUT OU
RIEN; All, Sir, or Nothing. But if we give
credit to thefe Articles, this Refolution foon
gave way, and a fhort Decifion is made: The
King has given us of his great Goodneſs all the
latter part of the Alternative, and we have
without difficulty accepted it: that is, the King
has taken the All, and left us juft nothing; which
is directly contrary to all the Affurances the
Friends
24)
..3
Friends of the New My have all along given
us. For to make us eafy in the Change, which
many of us did not like at firſt, becauſe 'twas
new, they told us in all their Pamphlets that the
new My would take care to procure better
Terms for all the Allies in general than the old
ones had done, and particularly that more re-
gard would be had to the trading Intereft of Eng-
land. But how fhall thofe Affurances be recon-
cil'd with thefe Articles? Either thefe Writers,
if they were fincere, did not know what they
faid, or the Mrs are ftrangely alter'd fince,
or thefe Articles must be falfe: but there is no
room to ſuppoſe the firft. 'Tis plain thoſe Wri-
ters were too well acquainted with the Mrs
to miſtake their Senfe; and I have never heard,
nor I believe any body elfe, that the My had
in fo fhort a time chang'd their Scheme, nor has
any ill Turn of Affairs abroad forc'd them to it:
and therefore I conclude, they intend as good a
Peace for us as ever, and confequently that thefe
Articles are fcandalous and falfe; which are no
lefs contrary to the fundamental Articles of the
Grand Alliance, than to the Affurances laft men-
tion'd. But this and their Inconſiſtency with the
old Preliminaries is fo well and plainly fhewn in
a little Pamphlet, call'd, Remarks on the Prelimi-
nary Articles, that I fhall not ſpend any time in
repeating what is faid there: I fhall rather ob-
ferve, as a farther Prejudice againit the Autho
rity of theſe Preliminaries, a ſtrange Omiffion
in them.
The great difficulty in the old Preliminaries,
was the finding an Expedient for the 37th Arti
cle; the Evacuation of the Spanish Monarchy be-
ing the great Point for which we went into the
War, and upon which the Safety of us and our
Allies moft depends; to fay nothing of the Right
of
1
( 25 )
of the Houfe of Auftria, which we are engag'd
to fupport them in. This being the Point upon
which the former Conferences broke off; not
whether Spain and the Indies fhould be evacuated
or not, for that France did not difpute, but how
the Performance of that Article might be moft
effectually fecur'd; one would have expected to
have found fome Solution of this great Difficulty
in the new Preliminaries: but instead of any
Expedient for fo important a Point, or any Se-
curity for the Performance of it, 'tis quite dropt;
and did we remember nothing of the former Ne-
gotiations, we fhould from thefe Articles con-
clude, this had not been mention'd in them; nor
in the leaſt have fufpected that the Evacuation of
the Spanish Monarchy was any part of the Dif
pute. For all that thefe Articles fay, is, that
France will confent to the taking of all juſt and
reaſonable Meaſures, that the two Crowns may
never be united on the Head of the fame Prince.
Fuft and reaſonable are fafe words; and from what
the French have faid to maintain the Nullity of
the Renunciation their King himſelf made of the
Spanish Crown, we may be fure, if the Dau-
phin, or the Duke of Anjou, ſhould die without
Children, that in that cafe no Meaſures to hinder
the Union of the Crowns would be thought juſt
and reaſonable: for if any thing of that kind
can be juſt and reaſonable, the Renunciation was
fo; and if the Renunciation was not juft, the
Wit of Man can invent nothing which we can be
fure France will think fo, or rather which we are
not fure France will not think fo. 'Tis not in
the power of Treaties, Laws or Oaths, to tie up
thoſe whom the Solemnities of that Renunciation
could not bind. And therefore to talk of taking
juſt and reaſonable Meaſures, is ſaying nothing at
all; tho if that Point could be fecur'd, what are
D
we
(26)
we the better for it? While a Son of France
is on the Spanish Throne, the Spaniards will be but
Penfioners to them: They will not only infenfi-
bly ingrofs the Woollen Trade, but the Indies
will flow in to them. The Duke of Anjou will
by Inclination be led to promote their Intereft;
and if he were otherwife inclin'd, he is in fo
helpleſs a Condition, that he muſt be forc'd to
it whether he will or no. France will always
have that hold upon him, that he will be able to
refuſe them nothing: befides, there is all the
reafon in the world to think, he is under the
ſtrictest Obligations and Engagements to France,
for the great expence they have been at to fup-
port him on his Throne. Can any body think
this is all pure Honour in France? or that a Day
of Payment won't come? No, let us depend
epon it, he has engag'd to France the most ad-
vantageous Branches of Trade, and perhaps fome
of their beſt Ports in Spain and the Indies. This
will be conceal'd or deny'd at prefent, becauſe
'tis convenient to do fo; but when a Peace is
made, and he is fettled in his Government, then
both the Spaniards and we ſhall fee, when all Re-
medies are too late, what a Dependance they
are under to France, and what a dear Bargain
they have of a French Prince. So that in the
Event 'twill be all one whether the two Crowns
be united on the fame Head or not, as long as
they are both in the fame Family. And the Con-
fequence with respect to our Trade will be much
the fame in either cafe: it will be the certain
Ruin of this Nation. But 'tis poffible France may
not be difpos'd to ftay fo long; they may not
have patience to wait the iffue of flow Meaſures,
when they have quicker in their hands. When
Spain is by a Peace fettled on a French Head, the
French after a few years refpite will be at leiſure
to
to reſume their Deſigns upon the Netherlands ;
and for want of a good Barrier, the Dutch will
be able to make but a poor Reſiſtance: and if
either the Fears of an ill War, or the Misfor-
tunes of it, force them into French Meaſures,
what have we to truſt to, but to follow their
Example? And what can a tame Submiffion to
France end in, but the utter Ruin of our Reli-
gion, Trade, and Government? Theſe muſt be
the unavoidable Confequences, without fome
ſtrange Interpofition of Providence, of our fuf-
fering Spain and the Indies to continue in French
hands. And is this the Peace we have been fight-
ing for? Are thefe the Fruits of a fuccefsful
War? this the Purchaſe of Fifty Millions, and
of above a Hundred Thouſand of our own Men?
Can any Engliſhman be eafy in this fatal Profpect?
Can we think an English M- y can be guilty
of intailing fo much Mifery on us and our Pofte-
rity? Shall we not rather think thefe Articles
an Impoſture only, contriv'd to blacken them,
than believe them true, or that the prefent
Mrs are capable of giving into them?
Beſides theſe Arguments againft the Genuine-
nefs of theſe Articles taken from the Articles them-
felves, I can't but take notice, in Vindication of
the My, of two other great Prejudices that
lie againſt them: The firft is, that they have
never appear'd in any Paper publifh'd by Au-
thority; and the other is, that there has never
been publish'd any tolerable Defence of them.
Tho perhaps the My might not think it pro-
per to publiſh them, before they were communi-
cated to the Allies; yet fince they are come a-
broad, and are in every body's hand, 'tis pro-
bable, when they were no longer a Secret, the
M- -rs would, if they had been genuine, have
given us an authentick Copy of them: which fince
D 2
they
(28
28)
they have not done, this must be allow'd to be à
great Prefumption that they are fpurious.
But I infift more on the other Prejudice that
lies againſt them, I mean the poor weak De-
fences that have been made of them: For fome
of the Friends of the My have been as blind
as their Enemies, and have been as zealous in
defending the Preliminaries, as the others have
been in attacking them, without e'er inquiring
whether they are genuine or not. But what
are thefe Defences, but pitiful Declamations up-
on the Miſeries of War? upon which there is
not a School-boy that can't declame better from
any Common-place-Book, than all that theſe
Writers have advanc'd. They never ſtate the
Queftion, or enter into the Merits of the Cauſe,
there is not the Shadow of an Argument in all
they fay; they lay down no Rules to judg by,'
don't confider the Defign of the War, or what
we propofed by entring into it, or the Obligati
ons we are under to our Allies, or what is effen-
tial to a good Peace, or the Importance 'tis of
to the lafting Welfare of the Nation. But thefe
are things that must be inquired into and ftated,
before they can fay a Word to the purpoſe. In
fhort, all they fay amounts to this, That War
is a fad thing, and brings a World of Evils
with it; But Peace, O dear Peace! how ſweet
art thou! They are fo filly as to think Peace
admits of no Epithets, as fomebody fays inge-
nioufly of Slavery; that there is no fuch thing
as a bad Peace: you would think by their Wri-
tings, that that Expreffion implys a Contradic-
tion. Let Peace be Peace, and without more
ado 'tis with them a good Peace. They quite
miftake the ftate of the Queftion, which is not
whether we ſhall prefer Peace or War, but whe-
ther we fhall continue the War we are in a lit
Y
tle
(29)
tle longer, to fecure a good Peace; or by run-
ning haftily into an infecure one, expofe our
felves to the Danger of a new War four or five
Years hence. This is the Queſtion to be con-
fider'd: War is not fet againft Peace; but the
prefent War, which is in a condition of being
carry'd on with the greateſt Profpect of Suc-
cefs, against a future War, when the Enemy will
have recover'd the Misfortunes of this, and we
fhall neither be able to encounter him ourfelves,
nor find any fure Support in our Allies; which is
not to be expected, if this War ends no better than
'tis like to do by thefe Articles. Sometimes in-
deed they endeavour to make us believe that the
Peace is neceſſary; but how do they prove this?
Perhaps 'tis neceffary; but for whom? For
Peter or John? But that is not the Queftion:
Is it neceffary for the Nation? Can they prove
that? Can they fhew upon a Comparifon, that
we fuffer more by the War than the Enemy, or
are lefs able to carry it on? 'Tis not Declama-
tions on the Mifery of the People will prove
the Point, it must be done by comparing our
Condition with that of the Enemies which is.
à Compariſon not for their turn, they know,
and therefore they don't meddle with it. All
therefore they fay proves nothing, but that War
is an evil thing; and if there is any Force in
their Arguments, we ought upon no Confidera-
tion to enter into it. For if any thing be a
reafon for entring into a War, there may be
the fame reafon for continuing in it, till we
have obtain❜d what we want, or the Enemy by
their fuperior Strength force us to a Peace;
which God be thank'd is not our Cafe. If we
make a fcandalous Peace (for a Peace may be fcan-
dalous) we have nobody elfe to blame, we force
our felves into it. And till the Defenders of
į
2
thefe
30
thefe Articles can fhew the contrary, all they fay
is to no purpoſe. But befides the Weakneſs of
their Arguments, the whole manner of their
Writings is fach, as fhews they are Writers of
a very low Form; which is a great Sign thefe
Articles are not genuin: For if they were, we
may be affur'd the ableft Pens would have ap-
pear'd in Defence of them; we fhould have had
fomething from the ingenious Writer of the
Tale of the Tub, or the excellent Author of the
Ladle, Subjects pretty much of a fize with theſe
noble Articles. Theſe Writers would have given
us fome Wit from themſelves, tho there be no
Reafon in their Caufe; and Colours at leaſt
would have been found, that with many might
have paffed for Arguments. The Perfons con-
cern'd would never have left a Matter of fo much
Importance, to be defended by fuch dull Wri-
ters as Abel, or Sir Th. Spunge, and fome others
I could name, who are not able to do Juftice to
a good one, much lefs to diſguiſe artfully a bad
one, fo very bad a one as this, which wants all
the Help that Invention and Art can give.
Moſt of thofe who have hitherto appear'd in
the Defence of it, plainly fhew they know no-
thing of the matter, nor are able to judg whe-
ther they fhould defend the thing or not; but
out of Zeal, or to make their Court, write at
all Adventures, without confulting their Princi-
pals, or receiving their Inftructions.
•
One of them indeed, I mean the Author of
an infolent and furious Libel against the Duke
of Marlborough, called his Vindication, could pre-
tend to be of a higher Form, and affumes the
Air of a Firſt Minifter; there are many Marks
of this in his Invective, but particularly to-
wards the end he fays, We can't explain to our
People.
This
( 31 )
This is an Expreffion that does not very well
become an Author in a lower Sphere, and he
muſt think very greatly of himſelf before fuch
an Expreffion could drop from him. I fhall not
pretend to gueſs at the Author, tho his ridicu-
lous and unfair Quotation out of Sir William
Temple might lead one to think of a certain Wri-
ter, whofe Religion is faid to be equal to his
Skill in Politicks. But to let that paſs at the end
of this Pamphlet, the Author fets forth with all
his Eloquence the Mifery of the People, and in-
fers from thence the Neceffity of a Peace, and
more than infinuates, that perhaps they might
make a ſeparate one; which puts me in mind of
a Saying I have heard of fomebody's, That we
might have a better Peace than ever was offer'd
yet, if her Majefty did not too fcrupulouſly ad-
here to her Alliances: which is a great Commen-
dation of her Majefty, but I think not much for
the Honour of any body elſe. But whatever
Peace the Minifters think fit to make, this Au-
thor thinks the People may be fully fatisfy'd,
'twas the beft they could obtain. I have I con-
fefs a very great refpect for the prefent My,
but can't go the Lengths this Writer would
have me; I can't implicitely confide in what they
do: We have been too long us'd to Liberty, and
have paid too dear for it, to part with it ſo eaſily :
We have been taught to reafon upon the pub-
lick Tranſactions, and the Conduct of our M-rs;
and this, I believe, this Writer will own was
very right during the late My; and for
that reafon I can't but think it fo ftill: And he
muſt take away our Underſtandings, or elfe we
fhall be apt to make ufe of them, and fpeak too
what we think, whether we like it or not. And
indeed it feems to be no great Compliment to
the My, to defire a blind Submiffion to them;
for
( 32 )
+
for the righter their Conduct is, the more 'tis
for their Honour to have it look'd into; and it
looks as if things would not bear the Light,
when thoſe who are their Friends defire we
would fhut our Eyes.
·
But there is one Point indeed relating to a
Peace, upon which the Writers of this Side ad-
vance fomething, that has the colour of an Ar-
gument; and that is, that the Face of Affairs is
chang'd by the Death of the Emperor, and there-
fore we ought not to wonder that the My
depart from the old Preliminaries, as to the en-
tire Reftitution of the Spanish Monarchy; fince
they would have it thought to be equally dan-
gerous to Europe, to have Spain and the Empire
in one hand, as the Union of Spain and France
would be. But as fpecious as this may feem to
fuch as know nothing of the Affairs of Europe;
to all who are the leaft acquainted with them,
this Talk muft needs appear to be a mere Ban-
ter. And the Death of. the Emperor is only
made ufe of for a Cover to the Partition they de-
fign'd before he died: for if we look back to
what the Examiner and his Friends told us a year
ago, we fhall fee their Schemes of Peace ne-
ver fuppos'd the Evacuation of Spain; but, on
the contrary, they pretended 'twas unreafonable
to inlift upon it, and that addreffing, the Queen,
as both Houfes of Parliament did, not to make
any Peace without the Reftitution of Spain, was
done with no other View than to perpetuate the
War; and therefore Spain and the Indies fall in
a future Peace be given up to France. 'Tis not
because the Emperor is dead, 'tis becauſe they re-
folv'd to do it, whether the Emperor had dy'd
or not; 'twas refolvid, when his Death was no
moie thought, on, than the Death of any Man
that is now alive. All their Pretences therefore
for
( 33 )
for leaving France in poffeffion of Spain and the
Indies, are infincere and falfe. But in this very
Pretence of theirs, all honeſt Men will fee a Vin-
dication of the old M-y, to whom Juſtice muſt
not be deny'd any more than to the new, if, as
they fay, the Emperor's Death has alter'd the
Cafe, and made it not neceſſary for us to infift
any longer on the intire Reftitution of the Spa-
nish Monarchy. This is a Confeffion that, before
this Cafe happen'd, 'twas right and neceffary it
fhould be infifted on, and confequently the old
My did but their Duty to contribute what
they could towards it. Indeed nothing could be
more juſt or neceffary, if we have any regard to
our Treaties, to the End for which we went in-
to the War, to the Intereft of our Allies, and
to our own Safety; and this has been the united
Senfe of Queen and People, of the whole Nation,
of all our Allies: and we must have a very un-
accountable deference to the Examiner and his
Friends, to think that all of a fudden to be ve
ry wrong, which all the World have for fo ma-
ny years thought to be right, and fo neceffary that
no Peace could be fafe without it. Thefe Wri-
ters had a wretched Caufe to maintain while the
Emperor liv'd, and that makes them lay hold of
his Death, as if that would juftify their new
Schemes. But upon a very little Examination,
this Cover will appear to be a very thin oneş
for what can be more trifling than to tell us at
this time of day, that the Houſe of Auftria
would be too. formidable, and the Liberty of Eu-
rope be in danger, if the whole Monarchy of Spain
were to be given to the new Emperor?
I could be glad the Fears of theſe Gentlemen
were not quite fo groundlefs as they are, for then
we might hope our Allies would be a Match for
France, without our engaging in their Quarrels
་ ་
E·
and
}
(34)
and that is the greateft Happineſs for this Na-
tion that any true Englishman can hope for: for
if the Allies were a tolerable Ballance againſt
France without us, then it would always be in
our power to turn the Scales, and we fhould be
Arbitrators of Europe in earneft. And if the
Houſe of Auftria could really be as formidable,
as the Patrons of an ill Peace would have it
thought, even then the Danger to us would by
no means be equal to what we may fuffer from.
the exorbitant Power of France. The Great-
nefs of the Houfe of Auftria might be trouble-
fom to their Neighbours on the Continent, but
what have we to apprehend from them? Can
they, be they as great as they will, affect us in
our very Vitals, and ruin our Commerce, as France
may do? Can we fuppofe the Houſe of Auftria
could have a fuperior Fleet drop out of the Clouds?
Or can they difturb our Trade without a Fleet?
What then is it we pretend to be afraid of?
But, alas! the very Suppofition of their Great-
nefs is all a jeft. Let us but look back into the
laft War: Had not the Emperor all the Spanish
Monarchy of his Side, and yet what did it figni-
fy, what a Figure did they make in Spain and upon
the Rhine? What did the Houſe of Auftria with
all their Allies, and England it felf, perform?
Was not France abundantly too hard for all?
How much worfe then muft the Iffue of that
War have been, had England not engag'd in it?
Is now the Riches or Power of the Emperor in-
creas'd fince that War, or could Spain give him
more Affiftance now than it did then? Has not
the House of Auftria been exhaufted by continual
Wars for thefe thirty years paft? Are not the
Hereditary Countries drain'd almoft to the laſt
Drop? And is it not the fame with Spain? Was
it not in a miferable languid Condition before
•
this
( 35 )
this War began? And is it poffible to defcribe
how much it has fuffer'd fince? What then is it
we pretend to fear? Is there any thing but a
fhadow of Power left? Has not the Weakneſs
of the Houſe of Auftria been fufficiently difco-
ver'd by the weak Efforts they have made this
War, by the Infults they have born from a little
Prince, for fo the King of Sweden is in compa-
rifon of what an Emperor fhould be; and by
their Inability to compel the Princes of the Em-
pire to do their Parts in the Profecution of the
War? Can we turn our Thoughts to any one
fide, on which we would take a View of the
Strength of the Houfe of Auftria, and not pre-
fently diſcover it to be all Weakneſs? But if this
be the prefent State of it, can any body tell
when 'tis like to be otherwife? Have they the
fame means to recover themſelves, as France and
other trading Nations have? Have they any Prof
pect of having Influence enough on the Members
of the Empire, to make them unite with Vi-
gour againſt France? Are they not furrounded
with Neighbours, from whom they have always
reafon to apprehend Danger? And won't that
even in time of Peace oblige them to fo great
an Expence, as will not fuffer them to recover
their prefent Weaknefs, but by very flow de-
grees? And after all, is there more than one
Branch left, and is not that a very great weak-
ening of the Auftrian Intereft? What then can
be more ridiculous than to fear the new Empe-
ror ſhould grow too great? We may be very fure,
if his Neighbours won't disturb him, he won't
diſturb them; 'tis his Intereft to be quiet, and
Europe may promife it felf a lafting Peace, if it
be not broke till he be the Breaker of it: For no-
thing can be weaker than his Power in the Em-
pire is at prefent; and the addition of the Spa-
E 2
nish
·
with Monarchy will be a Burden to him rather
than any Advantage for many years, tho a Bur-
den he would be glad to bear, rather than it
fhould fall into the hands of France, to whom
Spain and the Indies would be infinitely more ufe-
ful than they can ever be to him. If therefore
he were poffeft of the whole Monarchy, he
would be himself the leaft Gainer by it; it
would be taking a great Strength ftom France,
but he would add very little by it to himfelf:
and therefore in truth his Allies, England par-
ticularly, is more immediately concern'd for the
Reftitution of Spain and the Indies than the Em-
peror can be, tho even our Intereft is, in fome
meafure his. For the ftronger and richer, we are,
the more able we ſhall be to fupport him againft
France, which Support he can't Itand without,
and it will be well if he can with it, which there
will belittle hopes of, if this War end in an ill
Peace.
But at prefent the beft Profpect we have, is,
that if we unite together, we may be able to
ftand our Ground. And is not this a fad State of
things, that all the Powers of Europe fhall be
over-run by one, if England don't take part
with them? Is it not our Intereft to make the
utmoſt Effort, to put things on a better foot,
that we may not be neceffitated to go into a
War, which is fo extremely inconvenient for a
People, whofe Riches depend fo much on their
Trade, and who can't but at a vaft Expence
make War upon the Continent, whenever France
pleafes to invade any of its Neighbours? But
this is an Evil there is no poffibility of avoid-
ing, if France continues in the poffeffion of Spain,
or the Power of the Houfe of Auftria is fo low.
Inftead therefore of imaginary Fears from the too
great Power
Power of the Emperor, the true Concern
We
37
We ought to have, is, that all we can do can't
Inake him powerful enough to preferve the Peace
of Europe, and ballance France without our Help.
'Tis plain now, that as the Death of the Em-
peror is not the true reafon for not infifting on
the Evacuation of Spain, fo neither is it a good
one; and the Ufe we ought to make of the turn
his Death has given to Affairs, is just the Reverſe
of that which thefe miferable Politicians would
make of it. It ought to give us freſh Hopes of
carrying our Point, and make us infift on the
Reftitution of Spain more than ever; fince by
the Imperial Crown's being fettled on K. Charles
his Head, we have a fairer Profpect of fucceed-
ing, than we could have while his Brother liv'd:
for now the Intereft of the Emperor and King of
Spain is but one Intereft, the fame Perfon being
both. And as the new Emperor is more con-
cern'd to maintain himself in the Spanish Mo-
narchy, and knows better the Condition of it,
and how to take the propereft Meafures for it,
fo he has it a great deal more in his power than
he had before; and therefore we may reafona-
bly expect he will make much greater Efforts,
than either he or his Brother did before, to fe-
cure a Point of fo much Concern to him. And is
this a time to give up the Difpute? Shall we
now defert his Caufe after having ftood by him
fo long? Have we fpent fo much Treafure and
Blood to keep his Caufe alive, while he was able
to do but very little for himfelf? And fhall we
now leave him, when by his Succeffion to the
Imperial Crown, he has fo much a better Prof
pect of recovering Spain, if we continue our Af-
fiftance, and confequently of making us fome
Amends for our Adherence to him? Sure thefe
are ftrange Politicks, to quit our Point when 'tis
moft likely to fucceed, and fit down with the
...
Lois
38
Lofs of all we have been contending for, when
the Reward of our Expence and Pains is in
view.
'Tis very ftrange to make that Turn of Af-
fairs a Reafon for giving up the Caufe, which
is the greateſt Reafon that can be for purfuing
it. But this is the wife Part thefe Writers
take, who think the Death of the Emperor a
very good Reafon, or rather Excufe, for doing
what they were refolv'd to do before, whether
it were to be juftify'd or not: And as if they
had clearly decided this important Queftion,
and the entire Reftitution of the Spanish Mọ-
narchy were to be no more thought of, they
proceed to give us a Scheme for a Partition of it
between the two Competitors, which they value
themſelves fo much upon, as to tell us, 'twould
puzzle a very wife Man to know which Part to
chufe. But do they think us fuch Fools, as to
believe 'tis in the Power of England to chufe
which Part of the Alternative they will? Is it
not plain to a Demonftration, that there is no
Choice left? If the new Emperor fhould chufe
Spain and the Indies, which way fhall he come
at them? Has he a great Fleet to tranfport him
from Italy to Spain, when he has a mind to it?
and if he had, while Italy is in French Hands,
which it would be by this Partition, how could
he get to it? How long will Men impofe fuch
grofs Nonfenfe on the Nation? Let them not
talk of Alternatives, or of making choice of this
or that let them fpeak plain, and tell us, that
Spain and the Indies fhall remain to the Duke of
Anjou, and that the Emperor must take what
is left, or nothing. This is and muſt be their
Meaning; and why don't they ſpeak it out? Is
it not becauſe their Scheme won't bear to be
fet in its true light, and that they think Peo-
*
ple
(39)
•
ple won't be pleas'd to fee Terms forc'd up-
on the Emperor, and the most valuable Parts
of the Spanish Monarchy fuffer'd to remain in
French Hands? What is this but the Peace the
French offer'd at the end of the Ramillies Campain,
which was rejected by all the Allies with Scorn?
And fhall we now be taught to think That a
good Peace, after fo many and great Succeffes
againſt the common Enemy, which fo long ago
nobody thought tolerable? Let them fhew that
was a good Peace then, or allow this is a very
bad one now. 'Tis furprizing to fee, that we
who are without difpute moft concern'd in the
Reftitution of Spain and the Indies, fhould be
moft willing, nay the only People that are wil-
ling, to make a Peace without them. What
can the Meaning of this be, that we fhould be
fo very fond of ending fo fucceſsful a War on
fuch Terms, in contradiction to the declared
Senfe of our own Nation, and of all the Pow-
ers in Alliance with us? That the Dutch fhould
be truer to our Intereft than we are our felves,
and ſhould be fo averfe to making thofe Con-
ceffions to France, by which we fhould be the
greateſt Sufferers? The Senfe of our own Na-
tion unanimouſly expreft in Parliament, in all
the Parliaments that have been fince the War
began till now, and the Concurrence of the
whole Alliance in the fame Sentiments, if they
have any weight with us, ought to make us ve-
ry much fufpect the Wifdom or Honefty of
thoſe Men, who would infufe into us contrary
Notions, and make us think that right, which
all the World have hitherto thought exceeding
wrong. It ſeems to me much more reaſonable
to condemn the prefent Opinions, which are
the Sentiments of one part only of the Nation,
and in which they stand alone, than to cenfure
thofe
(40)
thofe which have been fo univerfally receiv'd,
and have all our Allies of their fide; and for
that' Reaſon I ſhould think all that has been
advanc'd of late to betray us into an infecure
Peace, ought to be rejected, tho what they have
to fay in favour of it were a great deal more
plaufible than it is. Nothing can make it rea-
fonable to take now a Peace, which it was not
reaſonable to take five Years ago, unleſs the
Run of the War had been against us; and in-
deed, were we to judg of the Fortune of the
War from thefe new Preliminaries, one would
think there had been a ſtrange Turn in it, fince
the former Articles were made: nothing elſe
can give a tolerable account for the prodigious
Difference there is between them; and yet in
Fact the War has gone as much in favour of us,
as from thefe Articles one would fufpect it had
gone againſt us. We have fucceeded in every thing
we have undertaken in Flanders, and been Lofers
no where, except in that part where fome Peo-
ple thought the War ought chiefly to be puſh'd,
and in the Expedition to Canada, the Event of
which was not known when thefe Articles firſt
came abroad; but we had then Reaſon to think
it would fucceed, and were told it could not
fail. Now from the Continuance of the fame
Succefs, we had Reafon to hope for the Conti-
nuance of the fame Preliminaries that had been
at first agreed to: This can't but be the Senfe
of Men that think; this we are fure is the Senſe
of our Allies. And Monfieur Buys can tell us,
the Great Penfionary, that Father of his Coun-
try, that perfect Maſter of the Arts, not the
Tricks of Government, when he was asked this
Summer on the part of France, on what Terms.
he was willing the Negotiations fhould be re-
newed, gravely anfwered, He faw no Reafon
the
)
(41)
the Allies had to depart from the Preliminaries,
there having been no Change in their Affairs
to make them of another Mind. This is the
fteddy Conduct of the Chief Mr of the
States, who is univerfally applauded for the
wife Part he has acted in this whole Affair:
And 'tis no great Complement to an English
M-y, to fuppofe them lefs able to judge
right, or lefs zealous for the common Intereſt
of us and our Allies. For my part, I have
that juſt Eſteem for the Prefent My, that
had I no other Argument for it, I ſhould from
their known Character be pretty well fatisfy'd,
that whatever Articles are given out, we can
be in no danger of an ill Peace. Such a Peace
as theſe Preliminaries promife, even the Old
My, as bad as they are reprefented, would
not have put upon us; much lefs can we rea-
fonably entertain any Sufpicions, that the New
My have any fuch Intentions, who both by
their Words and Actions have encourag'd the
Nation to expect the greateſt things from them :
and any Terms, but what fully anſwer the Ends
for which we began the War, will now doubly
diſappoint us, as. contradicting not only our
Hopes from fo much Succefs, but the great
Expectations raifed of them. Can we think
this My would take an infecure Peace,
who have done fo much towards a firm and laf-
ting one? Can we give way to fuch a Thought
of Men, who we are obliged by many Authen-
tick Acts to believe have reſtored Credit? Men,
who have corrected all the Corruptions and A-
buſes of the Government with the fame Succefs?
Men, who have not confin'd their Cares to our
Home-Affairs, but have made every Part of the
Alliance feel the Influence of their wife Admi
nistration? Can we fufpect any Defigns of an
F
ill
(42)
ill Peace, when fuch Care is taken to cultivate
a perfect good Underſtanding with our Friends ?`
when the Hague, Bruffels, Vienna, Turin, Barcelona,
have all had their Part in the bleffed Effects of the
late Change, and no one of them can complain
they have been neglected? How can we doubt
of a good War, or a better Peace, when all
Places have been vigoroufly provided with freſh
Generals and Minifters, who being Men of un-
blemih'd Reputation, and of great Ability, and
equally fit for the Affairs of War and Peace,'
can't but have given new Life to our Allies,
and confirm'd the Union, on which a good Peace
entirely depends?
I should not forget to add, that the Court of
Hanover in particular has not been forgot; all
imaginable Affurances have been given them, but
that of calling over the Succeffor, that their In-
tereft would be taken due care of, and that by a
Mr of fuch undoubted Credit, as gives no
little weight to his Commiffion. And tho fome
People may wonder that we don't hear 'how that
Court have exprefs'd their Satisfaction, no bo-
dy from their Silence has Authority to fay the
contrary. But what gives us ftill greater. Affu-
rance of the Intentions of the My to puſh
the War with Vigour till they can obtain a
good Peace, is, that neither England, nor Europe
it felf, can find Work enough for theſe indefati-
gable Men. The new My extend their Cares
to the new World, and have endeavour'd to
wound the Enemy in too fenfible a part, for any
Man to think they can be fecret Friends to them.
And if the Deſign did not fucceed, 'tis not the
fault of the Mrs, who did all they could to-
wards it, by the Preparations made for it, the
great Quantities of Stores of all forts, the Num-
ber of good Troops, and above all, by the Choice
they
(43
they made of a fit Perfon to command it, whoſe
Zeal and Affection to the Q- no body, that
has heard his Name, can doubt of.
In fhort, what the new My have done, or
endeavour'd to do, is enough to convince all im-
partial Men, that they are very different from
the old ones; and therefore if we had any reafon
to fear an ill Peace then, we can have none now.
And tho they had done none of the great things
I have hinted at, we can never fufpect them as
concerting a Peace upon fuch wretched Articles,
without making two ftrange Suppofitions, nei-
ther of which have in them the leaft degree of
Probability: we muſt fuppofe them very un-
grateful to the Q, and very regardless of
themſelves. Can we think Men, who have fuch
great Obligations to her Majefty, whom he has
fo unexpectedly rais'd to the firſt Places in her
Government, whom she has exprefs'd fo great a
-Value for, and honour'd in fo fingular a manner;
can we think theſe Men can be guilty of fo much
Ingratitude, as to take any Meaſures inconfiftent
with the Safety of her Perfon, or the Reputation
of her Government? Much lefs would they fully
a Reign of fo much Glory with the Difgrace of
an ill Peace. But fuppofe the worst that can be,
that theſe M-rs could be ungrateful to the
Q-, have we the leaft reafon to think them re-
gardleſs of themſelves? But that they muſt be
to a great degree, before they can come into fuch
Deſigns as their Enemies fo freely impute to
them. For what can be more hazardous for any
My under the Inſpection of perpetual Par-
liaments, than to go into fuch Meaſures as muſt
needs draw upon them the Refentments of the
Nation, eſpecially in an Affair of fo much con-
fequence; in the iffue of which, as 'tis good or
bad, the Profperity or Ruin of us is involv'd,
F 2
and
(44)
and that without retrieve? For if this War
end ill, 'tis next to an Impoffibility that another
can begin well, or be long kept off. I know
thoſe who are difaffected to the My turn
this Argument the other. way, and make that a
reafon for their clapping up a Peace at any rate,
which to me proves juft the contrary. They
fay, 'tis neceſſary for them to have a Peace, and
therefore they will have one. And perhaps it
may be pretty neceſſary for them; that I fhall not
difpute but I can't allow the Confequence.
Thoſe Miniſters are very fhallow Politicians, who
confider.nothing but what will ferve the prefent
Turn; 'tis the part of Wiſdom to look forward:
and Men who have a true Concern for their own
Safety, will carefully weigh future Dangers, efpe-
cially when not very remote, againſt prefent In-
conveniences: And Men lefs wife than the pre-
fent My would be very loth to make a Peace,
which the Nation would not laftingly have rea-
fon to acquiefce in. They that can fufpect this
of the prefent Mrs, muſt be very little ac-
quainted with their Characters: for 'tis remarka-
ble, that among the infinite good Qualities they
are commended for, by those who by their Wri-
tings may be prefum'd to be acquainted with
them; the Chief Mr is particularly, and to
a degree beyond what was ever faid of any mor-
tal Man before, celebrated for his great Pene-
tration and Infight into things at a great diſtance,
and of a very uncertain nature. There is no-
thing that happen'd from the first Years of this
Reign to the late Impeachment inclufive, but
what the Secret Hiftory of Arlus affures us he
forefaw; and in the Hiftory of the Guifcard-
Plot, nothing less than unlimited Forefight clofes
a long Train of admirable Vertues. Now if we
may credit thefe Characters, nay if half of them
be
(45)
be true, they can neither intend to hurt the Na-
tion by an ill Peace, nor hurt it without intend-
ing it; for Men of fo much Forefight can't but
be aware even of the remote Confequences of
fuch a Peace both to the Nation and themſelves.
And fince the Miſchief the Publick would receive
by ſuch Meaſures muft in the event reach them
too, had they no other Quality but Self-love, I
fhould think we may be fecure, the Miſchief is
not defign'd. Great Men may be regardleſs of
themſelves to ſerve their Country, but wife ones
won't easily hazard their own Safety, by going
into deſperate Meaſures, which can end in no-
thing but the Ruin of it. What a very ill Opi-
nion now muſt Men have of the prefent My,
if they can't be convinc'd by all theſe Arguments
that theſe Preliminaries are not genuine?
If any body will ſtill maintain they are fo, after
all I have faid to evince the contrary, there is but
one Suppoſition upon which one can account for
them; and that is, that they are publiſh'd to try
the Pulfe of the Nation upon fo nice a Subject,
which 'tis not amifs for the My to feel, be-
fore they determine. But firft 'tis not very pro-
bable, that to betray the Nation into an ill
Peace, they would publiſh ſuch a pack of Arti-
cles, as muſt frighten all thinking People at firſt
fight: and if all that the Town fays of the caufe
of Count Gs his Difgrace be true, 'twas ne-
ver the Deſign of the My y that any fuch
Articles fhould be publish'd; or if that be not
true, the Publication of them muſt have been
made to ftir up in the Nation freſh Refentments
againſt France, by letting People fee, that they
are not yet come to any fincere Intentions of
confenting to a good Peace, notwithſtanding the
Advances they have in appearance made towards
us, or rather we towards them. But I can't fuf-
pect
( 46 )
pect the prefent M y have this Intention,
fince that would lay them open to the fame Re-
proach which they know has been fo unjustly
thrown on their Predeceffors, that they have a
Defign to perpetuate the War: whereas I dare
fay, every body is at preſent ſatisfy'd, they are
very fincerly inclin'd to a Peace; which they are
in the greatest hafte for, if one may judg by
their Friends, who are, fo impatient for a Peace,
that they can't bear the leaft check fhould be
put to it, by any body's infifting on a good one.
And from thence we may be fure, the M-y
are not capable of doing any thing, that may
create in People an averfion to what they are
themſelves fo well inclin'd to: and that I think
puts it paft difpute, that theſe Articles do not
come from them, and confequently are not ge-
nuine.
Some indeed, who are Friends to the My,
and yet maintain that theſe Articles are genuine,
do confefs, that thefe Articles make but a very
flender appearance in themſelves; but then for
our comfort they affure us, there are other ve-
ry good ones in reſerve. But how can that
be? Why muft we not know the good ones, if
there be any fuch, as well as the bad? Why!
becauſe, it ſeems, we can't know them, but our
Allies muſt know them too. And why, I pray,
muſt they be conceal'd from our Allies? becauſe
they won't be pleas'd with them. And why not?
There is but one poffible reafon for fuch a Ma-
nagement; and that is, that we intend to fa-
crifice their Intereft to our own, againſt common
Juſtice, and in direct Violation of the fundamen-
tal Articles of the Grand Alliance, by the fe-
venth Article of which they all folemnly engage
not to treat of Peace with the Enemy, unleſs
jointly and with the common Advices of the
other
( 47 )
other Parties; and that no Peace fhall be made,
unleſs a reaſonable Satisfaction be procur'd for
all, according to the Tenor of the other Arti-
cles. So that the Enemies of the new My
pretend, theſe good Articles they give us hopes
of, are to be good for our felves only and not
for our Allies; and confequently, they are to be
the Price of the greateſt Injuftice and Iniquity,
purchas'd by the Blood and Treaſure of our
Friends, who have for thefe ten years ftood firm
to us; for the laſt time, I doubt, if this be our
Juftice, this the Reward of their Fidelity. And
upon theſe terms honeſt Men will think no Arti-
cles can be good. But be that as it will, what
purpoſe will it ferve to conceal thefe Articles
from our Allies? Will they think there are no
private Articles, becauſe they are not told what
they are? No, juft the contrary; from the
Scandaloufnefs of the Articles they do fee, they
will certainly conclude there are others they are
not let into. And 'tis a known Obfervation,
Quod tegitur, majus creditur effe Nefas.
But the fame ill-difpos'd Perfons further fay,
that ſuppoſe we could for the prefent conceal
from the Allies the Bargain we have made, and
what it is that has induc'd the My to confent
to fuch Preliminaries; can they always be con-
ceal'd? And if any ill Effects are apprehended
from their knowing them now, won't the fame
ill Effects follow, whenever they are known? Are
we afraid left after the example we have fet, they
Thould fall into private Tamperings with France,
and try to make Terms for themfelves, when
they fee we take fo little care of them? And
that the Confequence of fuch feparate Meaſures
may be, that we may at laſt be left in the lurch
our felves, while France can make a cheaper Bar-
gain fomewhere elfe? Do we fear this might
be
( 48 )
1
•
be the cafe, if the Allies knew all? And can we
think, we have not already done enough to jufti-
fy their taking fuch a courfe? Will not the Jea-
loufy we have given them, have the fame ill
effects in this refpect, as the moft certain know-
ledg of all that has been doing could produce?
But ſuppoſe we can ward off this Blow, and the
Treaty we are upon fhould not be defeated by
any of our Allies being before-hand with us,
and treating for themſelves; thefe Men fay
further, What can a Peace end in, let the Terms
be what they will, that is founded in manifeſt
Injustice, and built on the Difunion and Difcon-
tent of our Allies? What Terms can ballance
the Inconvenience that muſt attend the difobli-
ging thofe, on whofe Affiftance we muſt rely for
the performance of them? Thus it is a certain
and undoubted Truth, that no Peace, be it e'er
fo good, can be a lafting one, if for the perfor-
mance of the Articles the Allies are not mutual
Guarantees for each other; nothing elfe can hin-
der France from breaking any Treaty that may be
made. But this is a Security, they fay, we can't
expect, if this Alliance end in Difcord and Con-
fufion, as it muſt do, if we are falfe to our
Allies, and fell them to France, to purchaſe fome
feeming Advantages to our felves. They call 'em
Seeming Advantages, for that all the feparate Pro-
mifes of France must be: they can give us nothing
to compenfate the real Securities we have hither-
to infifted on, but fome Advantages of Com-
merce in the Indies, or fome Ports in Spain: but
every thing of this kind muſt be very precarious.
France can give us nothing, which it won't be in
their power to take away at pleaſure; and that
before we can have time to arm our felves, or
make Alliances: befides that it will be in vain
to think of finding new Allies, if the prefent
Alliance
(49)
Alliance end, as by theſe Articles 'tis like to do.
If we confider how difficult and expenſive it is,
to fubfiſt the ſmall Gariſon we have now at Gibral-
tar, we ſhall be foon convinc'd, 'tis a jeft to
think we can maintain our ſelves in any Spanish
Port, if one or two, fhould, to allure us, for the
prefent be put into our hands. The diftance we
are at from them, will make it impoffible to keep
them any longer than France and Spain fhall have
a mind to it; and that we may be fure they won't
have long: and all the Articles of this fort can
only ſerve to draw us into the Danger and Ex-
pence of a Standing Army, without any fervice
in this point at all from them.
All this is urg'd by the Enemies of the preſent
My; and if thefe Articles that relate to
matters nearer home are fo precarious, much
more muſt thoſe be ſo, that refpect any Settle-
ment in the West-Indies. 'Tis impoffible any Ad-
vantages can be yielded to us in thofe parts,
which may not by the united Force of France
and Spain be taken from us, before we can fo
much as kno they are attempting it. And what
reafon have we to think they won't do, what is
fo much for their Intereft, the first convenient
opportunity they have? And fhall we, for fuch
Advantages, for Terms we can't maintain an
hour after the Alliance is broke, difoblige our
Friends, and make it impracticable for them to
unite with us again, whenever our Safety fhall
make it neceſſary? But fuppofe France would
keep their word with us, tho the very Suppo-
fition is ridiculous, what muſt be the Confe-
quence of leaving our Allies in a weak and de-
fenceleſs State? Won't France in a little time
be taking the advantage we put into their hands,
of invading one or other of them? And what
part in that cafe fhall England take? Shall we
bc
(50)
*
be in condition to go into a new War? Can we
expect a perfect Unity and Confidence in all the
Members of a new Alliance? or fhall we fit ftill,
and fuffer Europe to be over-run? And if we do,
what is it we may expect for our pains? Won't
it be a mighty Satisfaction to have France make
us the Promife Polyphemus made Ulyffes, when he
was devouring his Companions, that as an A&t of
his great Goodnefs he will referve is for the laft
Morfel? A great Comfort this indeed! and yet
this is all we can expect from a Peace, that is
bad for our Allies. This will be the fure effect
of the fecret good Articles, which, 'tis faid, we are
to have. No Peace can be good, tho Spain it felf
were given up, that will not be lafting; no Peace
can be lafting, that is made on precarious Terms;
no Terms can be other than precarious, that
leave the French fufficient Power to violate them
when they will. France will always have Power to
do this, if the Allies don't bring them down to the
firft Preliminaries, and mutually engage to main-
tain the Treaty that ſhall be made. Much lefs can
fuch an Engagement be alone fufficient: and if
it were, 'tis not to be hoped for, 't not poffible
to be had; if inſtead of the old Preliminaries, a
fcandalous Treaty be founded in Iniquity, and
the Intereſt of our Allies be facrific'd by us to
fome fpecious Articles for our felves, which yet
at the bottom are good for nothing, and can ne-
ver be maintain'd.
From all which I can't but conclude, that all
talk of better Articles is mere Banter; and that
confequently thofe we have feen can't be genuine,
fince by the Confeffion of thoſe who are the
Friends of the My, they make but a fad ap-
pearance by themfelves. Upon the whole, I am
fully perfuaded that no My will ever fubmit
to fuch Articles, till 'tis abfolutely neceffary;
and
(51)
and that moſt certainly at prefent it is not, unless
we have made a Neceffity our felves, by pre-
tending to think there is one; which I own I
am not without fome fear of, left the Jealoufies
rais'd in the Allies by the clandeftine Steps that
have been made towards a Peace, fhould have
caus'd fuch a Difunion, as will make it impoffi-
ble to carry on the War with the fame Vigour
we have hitherto. And if that be the Cafe, we
are in a bleffed State indeed, that we can neither
continue the War as we fhou'd, nor put a good
End to it; and it will be but fmall Comfort
to inquire when 'tis too late, Who are the Men
have brought us into it? Which leads me to
another great Inducement to believe, a Treaty
will never be made upon thefe Articles
For tho I were miſtaken in my good Opinion of
the M-y, and tho all the Arguments I have urg'd
to fhew thefe Articles cannot be genuine ſhou'd
be inconclufive, yet we have a fure Refuge in the
P-
-t, which may put us out of our Pain;
for it can't be thought the Q will conclude
an Affair of fo much Importance with
their Advice; and I believe 'twas never known.
that a P-- - acted againſt the true Inte-
reſt of the Nation in any great Affair, provided
they were well inform'd of the true Nature of it.
For which Reafon I can't but wifh, that both
Houſes had, in this refpect, the fame Advantage
the Upper have, whofe Happineſs it is to have
of their Body a noble Peer, who had the Ho-
nour to be Her Majefty's Plenipotentiary du-
ring the Negotiations at the Hague and Ger-
truydenburg; a Perfon of that Application and
Capacity, that he is perfectly Maſter of all the
Parts of this Grand Affair, and of fuch known
Honour and Integrity, that the Houſe are fure
they may depend on the Truth of what he fays.
The
(52)
The clear and diftin& Insight fuch a Member
will be able to give the Houſe, into all the
Steps that have been taken on the other Side,
and into the feveral Interefts of our Allies, and
the Reaſons why they ought to be fupported
in them, gives me the greateſt Aſſurance, that ſo
great and wife a Body, having the Advantage of
fuch good Information, will give into no Treaty,
which fhall be diſhonourable, unfafe, and unjaft s
but will adviſe the infifting on fuch Terms, as
will be to the entire Satisfaction of our Allies,
from whence alone we can expect any lafting
Security to our felves. Let others therefore
amufe themſelves with affected or real Fears,
if they pleaſe; I can be in no Apprehenfions
of an ill Peace, while I confider the Wiſdom of
the Prefent My, or the Virtue of a British
Parliament.
Multa virum virtus animo, multufque resurfa
Gentis Honos.
good Peace can never come too foon, nor a
bad one too late; and I can't but hope that ho-
neft Men of all Denominations are of the fame
Mind, and that nobody will interpret the
My's pacific Intentions to an ill Senfe, or
fafpect that the Repreſentative of the Nation
is capable of confenting to any thing which is
not truly for its Intereft, and for the Glory of
the Prince they have the Honour to adviſe,
FINI S.