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TL
R E PORT º
INQUIRY INTO OPERATIONS OF THE 724
UNITED STATES AIR SERVICES 4.
REPORT
OF TEIE
SELECT COMMITTEE OF
INQUIRY INTO OPERATIONS OF THE
UNITED STATES AIR SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
sixty-EIGHTH CONGRESS
ON
MATTERS RELATING TO THE OF ERATIONS OF
THE UNITED STATES AIR SERVICES
UNDER AUTHORITY OF H. R. 192 AND H. R. 243
68TH CONGRESS, 18T SESSION
º
• * * *
º
WASHINGTON -
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
73728 1925

SELECT COMMITTEE OF INQUIRY INTO OPERATIONS OF THE UNITED
STATES AIR SERVICES
Hous E OF REPRESENTATIVES
SIXTY-EIGHTEI CONGRESS
FLORIAN LAMPERT, Wisconsin, Chairman
ALBERT H. VESTAL, Indiana. CLARENCE F. LEA, California.
RANDOLPH PERKINS, New Jersey. ANNING S. PRALL, New York.
CHARLES L. FAUST, Missouri. PATRICK B. O'SULLIVAN, Connecticut.
FRANK R. REID, Illinois. WILLIAM N. ROGERS, New Hampshire.
J. FREDERICK RICHARDsoN, Ohief Consulting Investigator
ALEXANDER. M. FISHER, Investigator and Statistician
C. FRANK CREIGHTON, Auditor and Clerk
14.S. #,”
ift
/-3, - / #24.
REPORT OF SELECT COMMITTEE OF INQUIRY INTO OPERA-
TIONS OF THE UNITED STATES AIR SERVICES
Hous E OF REPRESENTATIVES,
Monday, December 14, 1925.
The Select Committee of Inquiry into Operations of the United
States Air Services was appointed by the Speaker under H. R. 192,
assed on March 24, 1924. The scope of the inquiry was very broad,
eing defined in the resolution as follows:
* * * said inquiry shall include investigation of contracts, settlements, or
audits thereof, letters, expenditures, reports, receipts, or other documents in any
way connected with any or all transactions of the said United States Army Air
Service, the United States Naval Bureau of Aeronautics, the United States air
mail service, or any agency, branch, or subsidiary of either, and any corpora-
tions, firms, or individuals or agencies having any transactions with or being in
any manner associated with or controlled or regulated by the said Air Services.
The committee examined more than 150 witnesses under oath and
a duly appointed examiner cross-examined them, and other members
of the committee participated in the inquiries. The work of the
committee extended over a period of 11 months. Public hearings
began on October 4, 1924, and ended March 2, 1925, being held in
Washington, New York, Pasadena, and San Diego. Members of
the committee or direct representatives of the committee with power
to make examinations visited the following points: Bolling Field;
Anacostia naval station; Bureau of Standards; Langley Field, Army
Air Service; Langley Memorial Laboratories of National Advisory
Committee on Aeronautics; Hampton naval air station; the Wright
aircraft carrier, under construction; international races at Dayton,
Ohio; McCook Field, Army Air Service Engineering School; Wilbur
Wright Field, at Fairfield, Ohio, of Army Air Service; and the Curtiss
Aeroplane & Motor Co. at Garden City, Long Island.
The printed record of the investigation consists of six volumes
including an exhaustive index. In addition there are many exhibits
on file with the committee, which are open to the inspection of Mem-
bers of the House.
MANUFACTURERS AIRCRAFT ASSOCIATION AND SAVE-BIARMLESS
CLAUSE
In the debates in Congress which led to the appointment of this
committee much stress was laid upon the necessity of a complete
investigation of certain general charges which had been in circulation
throughout the country for some years concerning the relationship
between the Government and the industry, . concerning the
contracts between the Government and the industry. These charges
alleged corruption of Army and Navy contract officers, that manu-
facturers secured excessive profits, that there existed an aircraft
1
2 OPERATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES AIR SERVICES
trust or conspiracy among some of the Manufacturers Aircraft
Association, and that the so-called “save harmless” clause in the
contracts was unjust and inequitable and gave definite advantages
to certain contractors.
The committee made an investigation of these charges; studying
contracts in detail, examining many witnesses and calling upon the
War Department, the Navy Department, the Department of Justice,
and the Comptroller General to obtain the definite facts necessary.
Upon the basis of these facts, the committee finds as follows:
(1) That there was no evidence of corruption on the part of the
officers of the Army and Navy or the members of the aeronautical
industry submitted to the committee.
(2) That contracts given to aircraft builders have not resulted in
excessive profits, but, on the contrary, the aircraft industry, dependent
on Government contracts, has been liquidating and going out of
business to such an extent that the statement in the Lassiter Board
report that “it (the aircraft industry) is rapidly diminishing under
resent conditions and will soon practically disappear,” is justified.
(3) That the charges and the allegations that there existed an
aircraft trust, or conspiracy, were not proven. Both the association
and the cross-license agreement upon which it is based had been
investigated nine times in eight years, two of these investigations
having been made by the Department of Justice. Both have sus-
tained the legality of the Manufacturers’ Aircraft Association and the
cross-license agreement. That the findings of these legal investiga-
tions should now be accepted as conclusive.
(4) That the so-called “save-harmless” clause in all air contracts,
whereby the Government agrees to protect the contractor against
patent claims arising out of contracts for material with the Govern-
ment is directly in accord with the law, and is in fact merely an inter-
pretation of an act of Congress passed on July 1, 1918, to enable the
Government to obtain what it requires from the contractors and at the
same time protect those contractors against legal risk through viola-
tion of patents, by laying upon the Government itself the burden of
defending such violation or compensating for them if and when they
occur in the manufacture of the essential supplies for the Government;
that this principle has been the basis of Government contracting for
many years, and is recognized as basicly sound; that in some cases,
however, it works an incidental hardship upon inventors who are
financially unable to seek the redress provided for under the statutes
through the Court of Claims; that the constant circulation of rumors
and charges arising out of the above matters has been a destructive
influence in the aviation industry in the United States for the past
eight years; has deterred the influx of capital into this essential indus-
try and has tended to drive capital out of it; has laid upon the officers
of the Government and upon the owners of businesses in this trade
suspicions which this committee believe unfounded.
he subject of the Manufacturers’ Aircraft Association and
“save-harmless” clause is more fully discussed in Appendix A.
GOVERNMENTAL EXPENDITURES IN AIRCRAFT
The committee asked and received voluminous data and much
information from the Army Air Service and the Navy Bureau of
OPERATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES AIR, SERVICES 3
Aeronautics concerning expenditures for aircraft purposes. The
committee finds:
(1) That the total expenditure for aviation for the Army and
Navy Air Services for the five years, 1920 to 1924, inclusive, was
$424,234,107.90, divided as follows: º
Army-------------------------------------------------- $246, 310, 209. 51
Navy-------------------------------------------------- 186, 861, 061. 78
National Advisory Committee on Aeronautics--------------- 1,082, 126.85
The annual expenditure of the Army and Navy was approximately
$84,000,000 per annum.
Of this $246,000,000 charged against the Air Service of the War
Department, expenditures were made as follows:
Value of War surplus stock------------------------------------ $68,000, 000
Housing and maintenance of personnel------------------------- 76,000, 000
Operation, maintenance, research, experimentation, and develop-
ment of aircraft------------------------------------------- 78,000, 000
New aircraft, reconditioning of war-built aircraft and for engines, of
which $2,000,000 were spent for lighter than air craft.---------- 24,000, 000
Of the total amount spent in the Army Air Service, only 10 per cent
went into procurement of new planes and engines and remodeling
old ones.
(2) That of the Army expenditures, a total of $102,400,887.76
were made from direct appropriations; that the principal items from
these direct expenditures were as follows:
Operations, approximately----------------------------------- $59,000, 000
Research, invention, experimentation, remodeling, and construction
of airplanes for the Army itself and purchased from outside
SOUTC0S- - - - - - - - - ----------------------------------------- 43,000, 000
Purchase and remodeling of airplanes and engines for issue to units
in the Army---------------------------------------------- 22, 263, 140
That is, there has been spent about $12,000,000 annually in operat-
ing the Air Service and about $8,600,000 annually in procurement,
research, etc.
The average annual expenditure for purchase and remodeling of
airplanes and engines for issue to units in the Army has been
$4,450,000.
(3) That of the total additional cost of the Army Air Service, the
principal items during the five-year period had been an item of
approximately $14,000,000 per annum, representing the value of war
surplus used up year by year, an item of approximately $9,000,000
representing the pay of the Army and an estimated item of approxi-
mately $5,000,000 representing the expenditures of the Quarter-
master Corps in regard to Army aviation.
(4) That of the sum of $186,861,061.78 spent by the Navy in the
five-year period, about $57,000,000 were }. indirect expenditures
and $46,172,893 represented the value of war surplus material. Of
the balance of over $83,000,000 about $19,000,000 was spent for
new airplanes and over $10,000,000 for experimental, engineering
research, invention, and construction. The item of $19,000,000
includes approximately $2,500,000 for lighter-than-air equipment (the
Shenandoah, Los Angeles, etc.).
(5) That the expenditure of more than $30,000,000 in the five-year
period by Army and Navy combined, for so-called experimental
and research work, has built up or maintained in both bureaus a
4 OPERATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES AIR, SERVICES
governmental aviation industry larger than the entire civilian indus-
try, employing at the naval aircraft factory at Philadelphia at the
time of the investigation approximately 1,100 men, and at McCook
Field and Fairfield approximately 1,200 men, and entailing a naval
aircraft factory pay roll of approximately $2,200,000 a year, and at
McCook Field approximately $2,000,000 a year; that these expendi-
tures for experimental and research work have not produced results
commensurate with the expenditures and that both services, since the
committee began its hearings, have greatly curtailed these expendi-
tures and have shown a strong tendency to recognize the fact that it
is unwise for the Government to spend such a large proportion of the
resources in this branch.
A fuller discussion of this subject is embodied in Appendix B of
this report. &
(6) That in spite of the expenditure of nearly $40,000,000 for
purchase and overhaul of airplanes and motors the air services of
both Army and Navy have deteriorated in equipment and in morale;
that deterioration in equipment is due in large part to the increas-
ing age of the war surplus equipment issued to the services; that the
deterioration in morale is due in large part to four causes:
(a) The deterioration in equipment noted above. wº
(b) To the fact that war surplus equipment is far inferior in
aerodynamic quality to modern equipment.
(c) The discouragement of personnel arising out of inequality of
opportunity for promotion and increase of pay.
(d) The lack of an established, defined policy in the maintenance
of our air forces.
(7) That, in modern equipment, quality and performance are not
excelled, on the whole, in any other country in the world; but that
in quantity of such equipment, there is a crying necessity for new
equipment of the most modern types. Some essential types of service
planes have not been developed, especially bombers, attack, and
possibly pursuit planes.
(8) That the use of airplanes designed and built in the year 1918
and earlier constitutes a very large proportion of the machines used
in the Army and Navy. The progress of aviation has made these
machines antiquated and serviceable only for limited purposes.
Their use for purposes for which they are unsuited impairs the effi-
ciency of our aircraft service, lowers the morale of the flying per-
sonnel, and discourages the enlistment of new personnel and the
training activities of the reserve officers. The committee finds that
all obsolete and unsafe planes and equipment should, after proper
survey, be destroyed.
ADMINISTRATION OF GOVERNMENT AIRCRAFT ACTIVITIES
The committee gave much consideration to the administration of
Government aircraft activities.
In 1923 the War Department, convened a board, known as the
Lassiter Board, which thoroughly investigated the status of our
Air Service and considered requirements for its improvement.
This board found:
After an exhaustive study of the situation the committee reports that an
alarming condition in the Air Service exists, due to shortage of flying personnel and
OPERATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES AIR SERVICES 5
equipment, which, if allowed to continue, will very soon cause this important
combatant arm to reach a condition which will cause it to be negligible as being
any national defense.
The committee believes the Lassiter Board report constitutes à fair
basis for the present study of our administrative methods and that
its jºine as to the condition of our service are substantially true
to-dav.
#. Army and Navy are unable to agree in proposing legislation to
improve the alarming condition found by the Lassiter Board, and
therefore no substantial changes in legislation or administrative
practices have been instituted up to this time.
This subject is fully discussed in Appendix C.
IMPORTANCE OF AIRCRAFT
Aircraft will be the first resort of our country in case of a war emer-
gency. It is one of the most essential arms of our military defense.
Every new development of the modern airplane increases its relative
importance.
t has introduced an element of mobility in military operations that
compels a revision of all military plans of preaircraft days.
It has lessened the relative importance of the battleship, but has
not eliminated the necessity of it. The airplane becomes the neces-
sary auxiliary and defender of the battleship. The reluctance and
hesitation with which we have recognized its growing and future im-
portance are basic reasons for the retarded condition of our air power.
The question of the relative standing of the United States in air
ower among the nations of the world is largely a matter of opinion.
t is clear, however, that the standing of the United States is not higher
than third nor lower than fifth in the air power of the world.
The importance of aircraft is further discussed in Appendix D.
AIR SERVICE POLICIES
The committee finds:
(1) That there is no uniformity of Army and Navy policy as to
organization, equipment, control of personnel, procurement, design
or use of aircraft; that there is no continuity of policy with respect :
to design and purchase of aircraft and engines in either the Army or
the Navy; that the attempts to coordinate the activities of the
Army and Navy by the use of joint boards, the National Advisory
Committee on Aeronautics, and other agencies have been sporadic
and occasional and therefore have not achieved the results desired;
that there is a distinct conflict of opinion between the Army and
Navy as to air activities in coast defense; that there is a wide diverg-
ence of opinion between the Army and Navy as to the effectiveness
of aircraft operating against surface vessels; that there is an equally
wide divergence of opinion as to the value of antiaircraft artillery
operating against aircraft; that there is a certain amount of unneces-
sary duplication in the expenditure of both money and effort by the
Army and Navy seeking to accomplish similar results in technical
research, in construction, and in administration of aircraft; in pro-
curement, in º and in training and field activities.
(2) That the Navy system of promotion and pay deprives flying
personnel of opportunity for high command and does not recognize
that the aviation service is any more hazardous than the j
6 OPERATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES AIR, SERVICES
branches of the service; that this result is lowering the morale of the
aviators in the Navy and is a hardship which can be and should be
remedied.
(3) That discrimination arises in respect to the pay and pro-
motion of Army aviators, which has been one of the contributing
factors to a spirit of discontent, which appears from testimony to be
general throughout the Army Air Service. ---
(4) That the air defense of the country has created new and very
involved problems of administration. The difficulty of solving
these administration problems has been materially increased by
reason of the fact that neither in the General Staff of the Army nor
on the General Board of the Navy has there been sufficient repre-
sentation of officers experienced in aviation matters and who have
advocated the full and complete use and development of Army and
Navy aviation for the defense of the country.
(5) That a great many remedies have been advocated in this and
in other lands to cure the conditions arising out of the great problem
of administering the new art of air warfare, the principal of which are
as follows:
(a) A unified air force operating independent of the Army and Navy
and sending units to these services as needed.
(b) A separate air force operating individually, the Army and the
Navy at the same time retaining all the units required for Army and
Navy tactics.
(c) Aviation corps in both Army and Navy.
(d) A slight modification of the present system by the installation
of assistant secretaries of air in the War, Navy, and Commerce
Departments.
e) A department of national defense under one civilian secretary.
(f) The building up of a great air power through the curtailment
of many branches of Army and Navy.
THE AVIATION INDUSTRY
The committee found unanimity of opinion from all sources—
military, naval, commercial and industrial—that the aviation industry
is an essential part of national defense and must be maintained.
The committee finds as follows:
(1) That the aviation industry in the United States has dwindled
and is dwindling; and that the principal causes of the weakness of
the industry are as follows:
(a) Lack of continuity in Government orders.
(b) Losses on Government contracts, both experimental and pro-
duction.
(c) Direct competition by Government plants.
(d) Failure to recognize and protect design rights.
(e) A destructive system of competitive bidding.
(f) Discouragement of enterprise and individual efforts as the
result of more than 20 investigations of various sorts in a period of
8 Vears.
*: Lack of confidence and mutual understanding among con-
tractors themselves.
(h) Failure of the industry to develop commerical and export
trade.
OPERATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES AIR SERVICES 7
The power of the airplane industry to serve the country in case of
emergency has greatly decreased since the peak of its productivity
during the war period.
The subject is more fully discussed in Appendix E.
COMMERCIAL AVIATION
The committee finds:
(1) That in respect to the operation of airplanes for profit, the
United States is far behind in the use of planes for aviation.
(2) That other nations excel us largely because of subsidies granted
commercial aviation as a reserve for war.
(3) That commercial aviation lags because of the inherent diffi-
§§ of operating on a profit-making basis. That its development is
further handicapped by the lack of congressional legislation for its
regulation and encouragement, for the licensing of pilots, the in-
spection of airplanes, and the general regulation of interstate flying.
(4) There is a lack of airways, aircraft facilities, meteorological
Service, air terminals, and lines.
(5) That the United States has failed to ratify the International
Air Convention.
(6) The committee finds that there are about 10,000 surplus Lib-
erty motors. These motors placed on sale at moderate prices might
encourage commercial aviation.
(7) We find instances in which the departments calling for com-
petitive bids for new designs of airplanes have allowed insufficient
time in which bidders could properly prepare and submit plans and
designs. This matter is further ...? in Appendix F.
ACQUIRING TITLE TO PATENTS
There are many instances in which it is necessary or desirable that
the Government acquire the use or ownership of patents for aircraft
or other requirements. The Government is frequently charged with
the infringement of patent rights by owners. The Government may
acquire a patent or the right to use it by purchase or by appropria-
tion. In practice, the methods of acquiring patents, both by pur-
chase and appropriation, do not º satisfactory either from the
standpoint of the Government or the patentees. If the Government
infringes or appropriates a patent, the only recourse of its owner is to
prosecute a suit in the Court of Claims. The expense and delay of
such a proceeding frequently amounts to a substantial denial of the
rights of the patentee. This situation calls for remedial legislation.
DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE
Our military organizations are manifestly designed for one pur-
pose—the national defense. The Army and Navy are each vast
organizations, with a multiplicity of functions. They perform many
duplicated and similar functions. Each is designed for action in
case of war. They are less burdensome to maintain and more effi-
cient when their º their training, their preparation, and
the performances of their duties are coordinated, harmonized, and
centralized.
73728—25t—2
8 OPERATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES AIR SERVICES
A single department of national defense through its unity of com-
mand would harmonize our national defense system, reduce expendi-
tures for supplies, and prevent needless duplications, promote under-
standing, lessen friction between our different military arms, and pro-
vide a uniform and equalized system of pay, promotion, and retire-
ment. It should decrease the overhead of maintenance and decrease
the number of organizations and bureaus within the departments.
It should promote the interchange of effort in peace and war; it
º work for economy, efficiency, and strength in our national
€IGIOSé.
It would train and habituate our military organizations in peace
time, for that cooperation that is essential in war.
RECOMMENDATIONS
The committee recommends:
1. That the Federal Government cease competing with the civilian
aircraft industry in the construction of aircraft, engines, and acces-
SOI’léS.
2. That means be provided whereby the inventor who alleges
violation of his patents by the Government may apply for relief other
than by resort to the Court of Claims.
3. That procurement be separated from operation in all Govern-
ment air services. *
4. That one single governmental civil agency be given sole charge
of procurement of aircraft, engines, and equipment, to the end that
duplication in expense be avoided, uniformity of equipment promoted,
and a continuous and definite policy established looking to the
strengthening of the sources of supply, the maintenance of the indus-
try, the promotion of the aircraft production capacity of the Nation,
and the establishment of a sound policy of Government procurement.
5. Congress should at once pass a law permitting the procurement
of aircraft engines and aeronautical instruments and accessories
without requiring competitive bidding under restrictions that will
promote the best interests of the Government.
6. That Congress authorize the procurement agency to recognize
rights in designs of aircraft, engines, and accessories.
7. That the industry be assisted in the procurement of noncom-
mercial supplies, either through the Government as debits on pro-
curement contracts, or the grouping of purchases within the industry.
8. That the Air Service departments of the Government make
greater use of the facilities of the Bureau of Standards for research
and technical work and correspondingly reduce their own activities.
v. 9. That Congress provide by law for the regulation and encourage-
ment of commercial flying through a bureau of air navigation in the
Department of Commerce. Provision should be made for the chart-
ing of airways, for emergency fields, aircraft facilities, night flying,
and a specialized weather information service. That so far as practi-
cal such developments should be preceded by essential engineering
surveys.
10. That Army and Navy landing fields and facilities be made
available for civilian aviation, so far as practicable.
11. That Governors Island, at New York City, and Grant Park,
at Chicago, be made airports for postal and civilian use.
OPERATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES AIR, SERVICES 9
12. That a greater number of men be trained as aviators and that
#. adequate equipment and facilities be provided for our reserve
€I’S.
yº. That reserve pilots be given not less than four hours' training
per month throughout the year and be called for active duty at Air
Service stations for tactical training for a period of not less than two
weeks each year.
14. That additional compensation necessary to secure an adequate
number of competent mechanics to maintain airplanes in efficient
operation be provided; that such mechanics should be relieved of
routine military duties.
15. That Congress provide remedies for the inequalities and in-
justices suffered by the aviation officers of the Army and Navy.
16. That Congress determine immediately and settle by legisla-
tion the respective fields of operation of the Army and the Navy.
17. That the War and Navy Departments should survey, condemn,
and destroy all obsolete and unsafe airplanes.
18. That the War Department release for general commercial use
at least two-thirds of the war-built Liberty engines now held in
storage at moderate prices.
19. That not less than $10,000,000 should be spent annually for
the War Department and like sum for the Navy Department for
the procurement of new flying equipment, constructed by the civilian
industry. The Orders should be based on a continuing program.
20. That there be established a separate and all-inclusive budget
for each of the air services, the allocation of the appropriations to
be by law.
21. That a five-year program of construction, education, train-
ing, appropriation, and commercial encouragement should be formu-
lated and carried out.
22. That the Air Services of both the Army and the Navy should
at once be adequately represented on the General Staff of the Army
and the General Board of the Navy by members who will firmly
support the full and complete use of Army and Navy aviation for
the defense of the country.
23. That there be established a single department of national
defense, headed by a civilian secretary, specially charged with the
coordination of the defenses of the country.
FLORIAN LAMPERT, Chairman.
ALBERT H. VESTAL.
RANDOLPH PERKINs.
CHARLEs L. FAUST.
FRANK R. REID.
CLARENCE F. LEA.
ANNING S. PRALL.
PATRICK B. O'SULLIVAN.
WILLIAM N. RogFRs.
10 OPERATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES AIR SERVICES
APPENDIx A
MANUFACTURERS’ AIRCRAFT AssocIATION AND SAVE-HARMLESS CLAUSE
The committee naturally “began its inquiry by taking up definite charges made
in speeches delivered on the floor of the House against the methods of adminis-
tering the Air Service and against the aircraft industry.”
Briefly, and generally stated, these charges are:
1. Charges are openly made that the Air Service procedure is corrupt and that
Our defense in the air is in peril because of these conditions. Contracts given to
members of the Air Trust carry excessive profits “so that one-fifth of the money
appropriated by this Congress to the Air Service goes in profit, under the con-
tract, to the aircraft builders.”
The most searching investigation on the part of the committee discloses not the
slightest ground for the charge that the Air Service procedure is corrupt.
The concrete part of this allegation of corruption between the air services and
the industry is found in the statement that “one-fifth of the money appropriated
by this Congress to the Air Service goes in profit, under the contract, to the air-
craft builders.”
A mere perusal of the cost figures will show that the total amount paid by the
Army and Navy to this industry for planes and engines during the past four
years is far less than 20 per cent of the appropriations.
Instead of prospering on Air Service contracts, the industry is impoverished.
A large percentage has failed and gone into the hands of receivers. In one in-
stance the receiver got a Government contract and went into bankruptcy on it.
Of those which have escaped receivership, a number have gone into voluntary
liquidation. The remainder are, as expressed by Secretary of War Weeks,
“hanging on by their eyelids.” Secretary Weeks says (p. 717), “I do not think
that aircraft industry as an industry is making any money.” General Patrick,
On page 176, speaking of the industry, says, “I do not see how it could get much
lower.” Admiral Moffett says (p. 358), “I think the industry is in a very un-
satisfactory condition from the viewpoint of the industry as well as the viewpoint
of national defense. The lack of prosperity in the industry is due not only to lack
of Government orders but a lack of continuing policy.”
In fact, there is general agreement from all of the witnesses, whether from
the Government, the industry or outside, that the aircraft industry, instead of
fattening on Government contracts, is being steadily starved to death.
2. The next charge made against the Air Services, which is offered to account
for its present condition of inefficiency, is:
That aircraft companies were hastily organized to take advantage of the
war—that they formed themselves into an Air Trust, known as the Manufac-
turer's Aircraft Association (Inc.). This trust got up the “cross-license agree-
ment” and by means of it did and still continues to perpetrate a fraud upon the
Government.
The committee finds that there is no “aircraft trust”; that there is not now
and never has been a service conspiracy.
The Manufacturer's Aircraft Association (Inc.) was formed and the cross-
license agreement entered into under the following circumstances:
The principal patents in the airplane industry were controlled by the Wright-
Martin Aircraft Corporation and the Curtiss Aeroplane & Motor Corporation.
The former, controlling what is claimed to be a basic patent, was demanding high
royalties from all other aircraft manufacturers. The latter, controlling numerous
important patents, was likewise making demands for royalites upon the other
aircraft manufacturers. The patents controlled by these companies were of such
a character as to make it difficult for any aircraft manufacturer to construct any
modern approved form of airplane without infringing one or more alleged patents
of each of these companies. The result of these patent claims was not only to
render the cost of airplanes to the Government excessive, but also to make it
difficult for the Government to get its orders filled, because some of the airplane
manufacturers, in view of impending patent litigations, were unwilling to make
further expenditures upon their plants.
Confronted with this serious crisis, the War Department and the Navy Depart-
ment requested the advisory committee to investigate the situation and to sug-
gest a solution for the unsatisfactory conditions existing in the airplane industry.
Acting in accordance with these requests, the advisory committee proceeded to
make a careful study of the situation, and after several months of investiga-
tions and numerous conferences with all interests directly involved, recom-
OPERATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES AIR SERVICES 11
mended the formation of an association of aircraft manufacturers, with a form
of cross-license agreement.
Pursuant to the recommendation of that committee, the Association (Inc.),
was formed and the cross-license agreement now under consideration was en-
tered into.
Just what is the cross-license agreement?
Robert H. Young, special assistant to the Attorney General, having charge of
the preparation of the defense of aircraft patent claims brought against the
Government, described the cross-license agreement, as follows:
“The cross-license agreement brings together into a unitary control in the
neighborhood of 200 patents, including the basic Wright patent and the basic
Curtiss patent, whereby the Government is able to deal directly with all of those
and others grouped together, whereby the actions for infringement. On each
and all of these patents are avoided, and in the best of my judgment a reasonable
businesslike arrangement with the owners of those properties effected. It avoids
the necessity of defending suits and permits the Government to build ships,
flying machines, and be in a position to deal advantageously with the very large
group of important patents relating to that art” (p. 224).
See opinion of Attorney General Gregory rendered to the Secretary of War
October 6, 1917.
The subject of the legality and effect of the “cross-license agreement” and the
Manufacturers’ Aircraft Association has been gone into so thoroughly in opinions
of Attorney General Gregory, Attorney General Sargent, Lieutenant Colonel
McMullen, Col. Robert H. Young, and others that in order to do that subject
complete justice in a report the committee would be obliged to incorporate that
testimony in extenso.
After a most thorough going examination into this subject, we find that there
is no such thing in this country as an aircraft trust, nor are the manufacturers,
by means of the “cross-license agreement,” perpetrating a fraud upon the Gov-
ernment.
On June 20, 1924, W. A. Bethel, Judge Advocate General, prepared a mem-
orandum for the Assistant Secretary of War on the subject of “Violation of laws
by Manufacturers’ Aircraft Association and their cross-license agreement and
save-harmless clauses in Government contracts.” This opinion is printed at
length in the hearings and found on pages 179 to 209, and covers the subject
#. completely, and reviews in detail the criticisms made in speeches in the
OUISE.
In an opinion rendered by Attorney General Gregory at the request of Secre-
tary of War Newton D. Baker on October 6, 1917, the Attorney General said:
“Not to go into further detail, it suffices to say that upon the data submitted
to me, I am of the opinion that the Association (Inc.) as now constituted and the
cross-license agreement under which it is operated, are not in contravention of the
antitrust laws of the United States” (p. 1719).
A second opinion of Attorney General Gregory on this subject was included
in a letter dated October 31, 1918, transmitting to President Wilson the report
of the Hon. Charles E. Hughes, as follows:
“Whatever may be said of the charge that this arrangement tends to dis-
courage future inventions, one of its results was to enable the Government,
through contractors, to secure the use of all necessary patents at a fixed cost and
with little friction. It was not entered into until the Attorney General had given
an opinion that it did not conflict with the antitrust laws. I find no basis for
the suggestion that in bringing it about the members of the Aircraft Board were
actuated by an unlawful or dishonest motive.”
Attorney General Sargent on March 24, 1925, in reply to an inquiry of this
subject from the Secretary of the Navy, gave an opinion in which he said:
“The Secretary of War distinctly recognized the patents grouped in the
Manufacturers’ Aircraft Association and expressed the desire to proceed with the
use of such patents. Indeed, several agencies of the Government appear to
have collaborated and cooperated in creating the conditions established by the
cross-license agreement and the supplement thereto. It is obvious that the
Government was fully informed of the patents and that there was no purpose
deliberately to take the property of another without the intention that he should
be compensated, and there was assent by the patent holders that the patents be
used and a definitely established rate be paid for the use that ensued.
“You may, with entire propriety, enter into a contract with those “associates’
for the payment of royalties upon all airplanes to be manufactured or used by
the Government in the future, which airplanes make use of the inventions of any
of the patents here under consideration remaining in force.”
I2 OPERATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES AIR, SERVICES
See also Comptroller's Opinion, pages 3156-3163.
A searching investigation was made by the committee as to the existence of
an “air trust” and the effect of the cross-license agreement. The evidence is
too voluminous for quotation in this report. º
The cross-license agreement was a pooling of about two hundred patents,
some of which were basic, permitting each member to use all of the patents
pooled in payment of a royalty to the association of $200 per plane. It was a
practical business arrangement to do away with litigation over patents and permit
the members to build planes rather than try lawsuits against each other. An
builder could become a member upon payment of a membership fee of $1,000
and by putting in his patents get the right to use all other patents in the control
of the membership. A similar cross-license agreement has long been in use in
the automobile and other industries. The feature of a trust is to keep others
out. All could enter here upon payment of a membership fee costing about one-
seventeenth of the average cost of a plane.
3. The next distinct charge against the Air Service was that the “save-harm-
less” clause in the Government contract was in fact simply an authority granted
by the officials of the United States to certain private aircraft manufacturers to
steal deliberately the patents of any inventor whose patent appliances the Air
Trust might desire to use. g
This much discussed “save-harmless” clause is described by General Patrick
(p. 1421):
“Major General PATRICK. In 1910 the Congress passed an act which it was
thought would place upon the Government the burden of any claim that might
be raised by an inventor for the infringement of his patent, in the construction
of any article for the United States. A great many contracts were let with that
understanding. While the war was in progress, and if I recollect correctly, in
March, 1918, there was a decision of the Supreme Court which absolutely upset,
if I may put it so, that interpretation of this particular law, so that the contractor
had no protection and was himself subject to suits for infringement. The atten-
tion of the War Department and the Navy Department was drawn to this legal
tangle, particularly during the construction of certain wireless apparatus, and
the contractor who had agreed to furnish it at a certain price, after this decision
of the Supreme Court found himself confronted with the probability that he
would be sued for large sums of money for infringing certain patents belonging
to others. I am told there was a state of almost panic in the War Department
when that came to the attention of the authorities there. So vital was the matter
that the Secretary of War simply took upon himself to write to some of these
contractors to go ahead and that he would see that they were protected. Those
letters are on file. I have read them, and they can be produced, of course.
“The War Department and the Navy Department then combined and sought
relief from Congress. An amendment to, I think the Navy bill, was then passed
on the 1st of July, 1918, which in layman language places upon the United States
the burden of any claim on the part of an inventor for the infringement of his
patent used in the construction of any article for the United States. This save-
harmless clause which we have placed in our contracts merely puts in simple
language this law of Congress and says to the contractor, “Go ahead and build
this article, whatever it may be; if you infringe anyone's patent, the United States
will hold you harmless.’ This clause is clearly and distinctly in accord with this
particular law of Congress, which places that burden upon the United States.
We could have given the contractor the protection in several ways: We could have
recited the law in the contract, or could have referred to it, but, thinking that
many contractors like myself are not learned in the law, we put it in simpler
language. So that is the object and briefly the intent of this particular save-
harmless clause.”
Lieutenant Colonel McMullen, chief of the central patent section of the War
Department, testified (p. 208) in answer to the question:
“What is the legal effect at the present time of the present save-harmless
clause?” *
“Lieutenant Colonel McMull EN. The legal effect is that where a man has
legal property which is entitled to protection, like a patent, he saves the Gov-
ernment harmless. So that we are saved harmless as to suits or anything arising
in the future, and where we require the use of something which he does not own
we save him harmless. That is the legal effect of the save-harmless clause.”
Both the cross-license agreement and Save-harmless clause are discussed in
the evidence of Col. Robert H. Young, special assistant to the Attorney Gen-
eral (pp. 222 et seq.). At page 265 Colonel Young says:
OPERATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES AIR SERVICES 13
“Mr. YoUNG. The save-harmless clause is something which was brought into
the Government method of contracting in 1918; after the decision of the Supreme
Court in the cases of Marconi v. Simon and Cramp v. Curtiss, and there is no
relation to the cross-license agreement as such. It obtains and applies to any
Government contracts within the Air Service for engines or instruments of any
kind. It has no bearing upon the airplane patents.
“Mr. LEA. Do you know who introduced into the Army contract the save-
harmless clause?
“Mr. YoUNG. Secretary Baker, under these circumstances. A great many
contracts had been let in 1917 which were either silent on the question of patent
liability or contained a clause in which the contractor himself assumed a responsi-
bility. That situation was continued under the interpretation or general ac-
ceptance of the acts of June 25, 1910, which under any circumstances held the
Government responsible and the contractor immune involving patent infringe-
ment in the performance of contracts with the Government.
“When the Supreme Court in those decisions reversed that accepted view and
then suggested that equitable relief might be had by the owners of patents
against contractors, with the Government, a good many contractors, notably,
for instance, the De Forest Co., found themselves in violation of injunctions that
had been issued by the court in their private contracting and building. So
Mr. De Forest and others came down to the Government and said: “We can
not proceed because we are liable to suit; we are liable to injunctions, and the
more contracts we get the worse off we are.”
“Secretary Baker and also Secretary Daniels of the Navy recognized the neces-
sity of an emergency and issued orders reversing the liability and assumed the
liability on behalf of the Government, and the officers responsible in making
contracts then proceeded under that authority and instructions thereafter incor-
porated in the contracts that were made provisions whereby the contractor as-
sumed the responsibility for such patent rights as he might hold or be in privity
with, and the Government assumed that liability for such other patent rights not
possessed by the contractors.”
After the criticisms on the floor of the House leveled at the cross-license agree-
ment and save-harmless clauses in contracts, W. A. Bethel, Judge Advocate Gen-
eral, rendered an illuminative opinion found on page 209 of the record. That
opinion concludes as follows:
“9. The general policy of the War Department in regard to the so-called ‘save-
harmless’ clauses is defined in General Order No. 40, supra. The United States
requires the contractor to assume the ultimate liability incurred under all patents
which he controls. Where the contract and specifications involve the use of
patented devices, the patents not being controlled by the contractor, the United
States assumes responsibility for their infringement and in these ‘save-harmless’
clauses gives the contractor information to that effect.”
See also memorandum of the Judge Advocate General, dated April 11, 1918,
found on page 2479.
Lieutenant Colonel McMullen (p. 215) said:
“Those save-harmless clauses have been used for Government contracts for,
I should say, time immemorial. Before the war, or before 15 years ago, con-
tracting officers used to largely write their own contracts, and they negotiated a
contract as between the Government and a contractor just like private parties
would negotiate a contract. They would agree on the clauses. There were
certain statutory clauses that had to go in all contracts; but as to other clauses,
they were negotiated like any private contracts, and many of them contained
save-harmless clauses.
“We have had more patent suits growing out of Government use of inventions
during and since the war than we have had during the whole history of the
country. I might say that Mr. Young has just brought to my attention here a
case which I had forgotten. The first and only case that I know of in which the
save-harmless clause was adjudicated was the case known as the Winchester
Arms case. That was tried many years ago. I do not remember just when,
but in that case the Court of Claims said that the Winchester Arms Co. was, in
fact, saved harmless and that the Government had to pay, and they did recover
not only the judgment but the attorney’s fees, amounting to, as I remember,
about $14,000. I mean that the Government paid it all. The court held, and
it was upheld, too, that the contract was legal as to save-harmless clauses, and
that ºf-harmless' meant just what it said—that the contractor was saved
harmless.”
14 OPERATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES AIR SERVICES
The save-harmless clause as now used is the result of legislation by the Congress.
Prior to the act of June 25, 1910 (36 Stat. 851), no liability for patent infringe-
ment, to use that term strictly, existed on the part of the Government, for the
reason that such an infringement is a tort, and the Congress had never con-
sented to permit the Government to be sued on tort. That act provided: “When-
ever an invention described in and covered by a patent of the United States
shall hereafter be used or manufactured by or for the United States without
license of the owner thereof or lawful right to use the same, such owner
may recover reasonable compensation for such use by suit in the Court of Claims,”
with certain provisions which are not material to this discussion.
The United States Supreme Court in the case of Crozier v. Krupp (224 U. S.
203) clearly states the situation as it existed prior to the above act and the object
which the Congress desired to accomplish by the enactment of that act in the
following words:
“The text of this statute leaves no room to doubt that it was adopted in con-
templation of the contingency of the assertion by a patentee that rights secured
to him by a patent had been invaded for the benefit of the United States by one
Of : officers, that is that such officer under the conditions stated had infringed a
patent.
“The enactment of the statute, we think, grew out of the operation of the prior
statute law concerning the right to sue the United States for the act of an officer
in infringing a patent as interpreted by repeated decisions of this court. United
States v. Palmer (128 U. S. 62); Schillinger v. United States (155 U. S. 16); United
States v. Berdon Fire Arms Mfg. Co. (156 U. S. 552); Russel v. United States
(182 U. S. 516); Harley v. United States (198 U. S. 229). The effect of the
statute was thus pointed out in the last cited case (198 U. S. P. 234).
“We held in Russell v. United States (182 U. S. 516, 530) that in order to give
the Court of Claims jurisdiction under the act of March 3, 1887 (24 Stat. 505, c.
359), defining claims of which the Court of Claims had jurisdiction, the demand
sued on must be founded on a convention between the parties—a ‘coming to-
gether of minds.’ And we excluded, as not meeting this condition, those con-
tracts or obligations that the law is said to imply from a tort. Schillinger v.
United States (155 U. S. 163); United States v. Berdan Firearms Manufacturing
Co. (156 U. S. 552).
“In other words, the situation prior to the passage of the act of 1910 was this:
Where it was asserted that an officer of the Government had infringed a patent
right belonging to another—in other words, had taken his property for the benefit
of the Government—the power to sue the United States for redress did not obtain
unless from the proof it was established that a contract to pay could be implied—
that is to say, that no right of action existed against the United States for a mere
act of wrongdoing by its officers. Evidently inspired by the injustice of this rule
as applied to rights of the character of those embraced by patents, because of
the frequent possibility of their infringement by the acts of officers under cir-
cumstances which would not justify the implication of a contract, the intention
of the statute to create a remedy for this condition is illustrated by the declaration
in the title that the statute was enacted to provide additional protection for
owners of patents. To secure this end, in comprehensive terms the statute pro-
vides that whenever an invention described in and covered by a patent of the
United States ‘shall hereafter be used by the United States without license of the
owner thereof or lawful right to use the same, such owner may recover reasonable
compensation for such use by suit in the Court of Claims.’ That is to say, it
adds to the right to sue the United States in the Court of Claims already conferred
when contract relations exist the right to sue even although no element of con-
tract is present. And to render the power thus conferred efficacious the statute
endows any owner of a patent with the right to establish contradictorily with
the United States the truth of his belief that his rights have been in whole or in
part appropriated by an officer of the United States, and if he does so establish
such appropriation that the United States shall be considered as having ratified
the act ºf the officer and be treated as responsible pecuniarily for the conse-
quences.”
We find nothing to justify the charge that the “save-harmless” clause is wrong
in principle or is authority granted to the officials of the United States to air-
craft manufacturers to steal patents of inventors.
As stated by General Patrick (p. 142), “merely puts in simple language the
law of Congress.”
We do not find that the unsatisfactory condition in the Air Service is due to
the cross-license or the “save-harmless” clause in Government contracts.
OPERATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES AIR SERVICES 15
APPENDIX B
GOVERNMENTAL EXPENDITURES IN AIRCRAFT
In the fiscal years 1920–1924 the cost of the Army and Navy Air Services
has been the vast sum of $424,234,107.90.
Of this $246,000,000 was charged against the Air Service of the War Depart-
ment, of which $68,000,000 represented estimated cost of issues from war surplus
stock; $76,000,000 for pay, housing, and maintenance of Air Service personnel;
$78,000,000 for operation, maintenance, research, experimentation and develop-
ment of aircraft; $24,000,000 for new aircraft and reconditioning war-built
aircraft and for engines, of which $2,000,000 were spent for lighter-than-air
craft. (Weeks, 3017.)
Of the total amount spent in the Army Air Service only 10 per cent went into
procurement of new planes and engines and remodeled old ones. (Walsh, p. 1568.)
The expenditures from direct appropriations made to the Army Air Service
during this five-year period was $102,400,887.76; of this approximately $59,-
000,000 was spent in operations during these five years and approximately
$43,000,000 in research, invention, experimentation, remodeling, and construc-
tion of airplanes by the Army itself and purchased from outside sources. That
is, there has been spent about $12,000,000 annually in Operating the Air Service
and about $8,600,000 annually in procurement, research, etc.
For the purchase or remodeling of airplanes and engines for issue to units
the Army in these five years has spent $22,263,140, or an average of about
$4,450,000 each year.
It is thus evident that the Army Air Service has been spending on an average
of $4,200,000 per year in experimentation, inspection, its own construction, its
own effort to invent and develop, and only $4,400,000 per year in new equipment,
notwithstanding, as the Lassiter Board report said, “after an exhaustive study
of the situation the committee reports that an alarming condition in the Air
Service exists, due to shortage of flying personnel and equipment, which if allowed
to continue will very soon cause this combatant arm to reach a condition which
will cause it to be negligible as being any national defense.”
The figures presented by the Navy indicate that in the five fiscal years
1920–1924 there has been spent a total of $186,861,061.78. It appears that of
this, $57,000,000 was for indirect expenditures and $46,172,893 the value of war
surplus material, leaving $83,688,158; of this latter amount about $19,000,000
was spent for new airplanes and only $10,000,000 was spent in experimental
engineering, research, invention, and construction.
Too much has been spent attempting to put the Army and Navy in the busi-
ness of manufacturing airplanes, experimentation, research, etc., and too little
has been spent in actual purchase of airplanes and engines.
Both Army and Navy instead of sticking to their job—preparing themselves
to fight—have been operating large factories with thousands of employees and
specialists on the pay roll. The pay roll at the Philadelphia aircraft factory is
$187,000 per month—(Lane 1347) that means $2,204,000 a year.
“The amount allotted for salaries and wages for experimental and research
work at McCook Field for the fiscal year 1925 was $1,700,000. There has been
, since allotted $230,898 to provide funds for increase due to classification.”
(Patrick, p. 545.)
A total for salaries alone for experiment and research of $1,930,898, or nearly
$2,000,000, for the year 1925—while the Army only spends $4,000,000 annually
in new airplanes and engines.
Twenty million dollars passed through the engineering division of the Army
Air Service in five years (Patrick, p. 545), almost equal to the entire amount
spent for planes and engines by the Army.
At McCook Field there are between 800 and 900 employees and 400 at Fairfield,
the vast majority of whom are mechanics.
The naval aircraft factory at Philadelphia employs from 1,100 to 1,300 (Land,
p. 1341), and there are also 484 employed at Pensacola.
In other words, the Army and Navy Air Services are running the two largest
aircraft factories in the United States and employ more civilians than the entire
aircraft industry. (Lawrence, p. 1002.) Both services are violating the principle
that “It is fundamental that the Government should not engage in any business
which private enterprise can do as well or better” (p. 1002).
The Air Services (Army and Navy) have no standard procurement policy.
They have not sufficiently recognized the principle of “proprietary rights.”
16 OPERATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES AIR, SERVICES
They have not spent their money with a view to continuity of production in the
industry. They have constantly competed with the industry. They have
spent a large part of their appropriation in attempting to do things that ought
to be left to private capital, and which can better be done by private capital, all
with the result that the aircraft industry is languishing.
The industrial decline in aircraft is due to lack of orders. (Young, p. 238.)
There are many manufacturers of aircraft who are literally hanging on by their
eyelids, hoping something will develop to enable them to get a new dollar for an
old one. (Secretary Weeks, p. 617.)
The lack of prosperity in the industry is due not only to lack of Government
orders but a lack of continuing policy. (Moffett, p. 358.)
Until there does come a commercial demand, aircraft manufacturers are depend-
ing solely upon the Government for their orders. Without a continuity of work
in their factories they can not conduct their building of aircraft economically.
(Patrick, p. 527.)
It (the aircraft industry) has been absolutely declining over a period of some
years. (Patrick, p. 176.)
“Because of the lack of a definite, intelligent, and sympathetic policy in our
governmental aircraft organization since the armistice, our American aero-
nautical industry, built up at such great expense of money and effort, is rapidly
disappearing. No sensible business man is justified in keeping money invested
in the aircraft industry under the conditions which have maintained in the
United States since November 11.” (Coffin, p. 1219.)
“Secretary DAVIS. There are a great many companies building aircraft, and
I do not believe any of them are making any money, and I think the most of
them are just hanging on in the hope that the situation may get brighter. If
there is no prospect in the future, a great many more of them will go out of
business.
“Mr. PERKINs. To what do you attribute that situation?
“Secretary DAVIS. Very largely to the fact that practically the only custom-
ers, the only people buying airplanes, are the Army and the Navy services.
There is very little commercial aviation, and the Army and Navy have not
spent enough money in the past on procurement of planes to keep the various
companies alive. I think that is one of the most serious features of the whole
aviation situation” (p. 653).
“The state of the aircraft industry in the United States to-day is particularly
to be deplored. Due to lack of any appreciable use of aircraft for commercial
purposes, our factories are mainly dependent for their support upon the appro-
priations provided annually by Congress for Federal aviation purposes.” (Drum,
p. 1237.)
“Mr. PERKINs. What percentage of the airplane business in the United States
has been done by private capital and what by the Government?
“Mr. KEYs. If you take design, engineering, production, and major repairs as
being proper industrial functions in the aircraft industry, I do not believe 10
per cent of it has been done by the industry in the last five years.
“No other country in the world that desires to be an air power does anything
like the percentage of its own business in its own shops that is done by the United
States Government.” (Keys, p. 1155.)
In our opinion the thing that is essentially wrong with the Air Services is not
merely one of policy of spending the amount of money allotted to aviation. It
goes back of that. Air power is a comparatively new thing in war. Before it
can take its proper place, it must demonstrate its possibilities to officers who
have been educated and grown up in a different system of warfare.
Experience is naturally and properly conservative in its tendencies, and chary
to admit the claims of new instruments of war. But the reluctance of the older
, training to recognize the usefulness of newer methods can go too far.
Senator Bingham in his testimony before the committee (p. 2749) has instanced
this. He said, speaking of his war-time experience:
“I discovered also that the General Staff here in Washington at that time, by
act of Congress, was considerably reduced, as you may remember, had made no
plans, no constructive plans, for an air service. I was astonished to find that they
did not know how many planes we were to use, or how many pilots we were to
train, or what fields we were to train them at, or what system we were to follow.
Coming on duty here about the 1st of May, 1917, it seemed to me the General
Staff had entirely neglected the possibilities of aviation.”
iº then proceeds to relate his embarrassment when invited to look into a
plane:
OPERATIONS OF TEIE UNITED STATES AIR SERVICES 17
“Although an aviation officer, I was obliged to wear spurs. After awhile they
reversed that order, and aviation officers were not required to wear spurs, but
after I came back from abroad I found that they had gone on the old order
again, and aviation officers wearing boots were once more required to wear spurs.”
Along this same line see the testimony of Coffin (pp. 1207, 1215, and 1237),
LaGuardia (p. 2377), Mitchell (p. 1892), and Senator Bingham (p. 2753):
“Now, in our General Staff, while they have been able to use centuries of
wisdom gained from the experience of soldiers on foot, they have no experience
to guide them in making rules for the aviators. And that was the source of a
great deal of trouble and loss of sympathy.”
And page 2754:
“I heard General Staff officers say during the war that aviation was not very
dangerous. They objected to aviators getting extra pay, which is in the nature
of insurance,” and “I believe that the General Staff would be more sympathetic
toward aviation if more of them understood it as they should do, its difficulties,
and knew as much about it as they know about the Cavalry and Infantry.”
That as late as April, 1923, the Lassiter Board reported “an alarming condition
in the Air Service exists” and that “the committee finds our Air Service to be in
a very unfortunate and critical situation” + “ * “but measures have not
been taken in our country to keep step with this aviation evolution” is con-
vincing evidence that the high command in the Army and Navy did not appre-
ciate the importance of air power in national defense. A careful reading of the
evidence taken before our committee convinces us that (outside of the Air Services
themselves) there is not now in the Army and Navy a proper appreciation of the
importance of air power as a combatant arm.
The current appropriation for the Air Services of the Army and Navy represent
10 per cent of the total appropriations of these departments. When the Budget
was presented to the Budget Bureau, a decrease in the total appropriations for
these departments was made by the Budget Bureau. The departments were
requested to make adjustments in keeping with the decrease, and while the Air
Services represented but 10 per cent of the appropriation, the result of the adjust-
ment was a decrease in the Air Service appropriation amounting to approxi-
mately 30 per cent of the total decrease of the entire amount.
The evidence on the subject of the attitude of the other service arms toward
aviation covered hundreds of pages of the record and is far too voluminous for
citation in this report.
The very complete cross index in volume 6 will assist those interested in this
subject to readily put their fingers on the testimony leading to the conclusion
that (outside of the Air Services themselves and the Lassiter Board) the Army
and Navy are and have been very conservative, if not backward, in recognizing
the great importance of air power and its possibilities as a combatant arm.
This is not amazing in view of the fact that the higher commands have been
trained to other kinds of warfare. Of the 88 members of the General Staff only
2 have had actual experience in flying. (Drum, p. 1881.)
We find as a fact that there still exists an alarming situation both in the Army
and Navy Air Services due to shortage of flying personnel and equipment, and
that it is due further to a failure on the part of these services to duly appreciate
that importance of air power indicated at the beginning of this report.
We also find as a fact that “The aircraft industry in the United States at the
present time is entirely inadequate to meet peace and war time needs.”
APPENDIx C
THE LASSITER BOARD REPORT *
The Lassiter Board report was made more than four years after the close of
the World War and nearly two years before the inquiry by your committee.
This Lassiter Board report further stated:
“The aircraft industry in the United States at present is entirely inadequate
to meet peace and war time requirements. It is rapidly diminishing under
present conditions and will soon practically disappear” (p. 663).
The Lassiter Board report was a unanimous report, and concurred in by the
Chief of Air Service. (Drum, p. 1798.)
The Lassiter Board said further:
“The committee finds our Air Service to be in a very unfortunate and critical
situation. Since the World War, aviation has come to play an increasingly
18 OPERATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES AIR, SERVICES
important part in military operations, but measures have not been taken in
our country to keep step with this evolution’’ (p. 621).
jºry of War Weeks, on page 621 of the hearings, said that statement is
still true.
The Lassiter Board report is a fundamental document. (Drum, p. 1832.)
On page 521 General Patrick stated that he knew that no legislation had been
proposed in Congress to put into effect the recommendation of that board.
General Drum to the same effect (p. 1799):
“On account of the equal voice of the Army on the one side and the Navy on
the other, they have never been able to get together, and it has been withheld,
with the result that we have no air policy whatever.”
On page 624 Secretary Weeks was asked:
“The Lassiter report recommended that legislation be prepared for introduc-
tion into Congress. Do you know whether any legislation was ever prepared
or not?
“Secretary WEEKs. That legislation has not been prepared, or at least it has
not been presented to Congress. There are some differences between the Army
and the Navy Departments about this subject which have not been ironed out.
When the report was available and had been examined, the Secretary of the
Navy was having some troubles, or did soon thereafter; or anyway, we never got
to any agreement about what should be done.”
The Lassiter Board report was dated April 24, 1923. It was a fundamental
document. It said our Air Services were in an alarming and critical condition.
It said that measures had not been taken in our country to keep step with the
evolution in aviation. It recommended legislation to be prepared for introduc-
tion into Congress. More than two years have elapsed since that report. Such
proposed legislation has never been presented to Congress. The Army and
Navy have never agreed on a definite air policy.
The condition now in our Air Services is in the main as described in the Lassiter
Board report.
No one who has read the record can doubt the importance and necessity of an
inquiry into our Air Services.
We can have no adequate national defense without an adequate air force.
APPENDIx D
IMPORTANCE OF AIRCRAFT
President Coolidge is quoted as having said recently:
“The development of aircraft indicates that our national defense must be
supplemented, if not dominated, by aviation.”
General Duvall, who was chief of the French Air Service during the war, said
of aviation:
“The primary objective of the air force will be the enemy armies, and espe-
cially those parts of them in the areas beyond the fighting line, in which it will
carry disorder and terror. It will fight in the air for air supremacy and the
liberty of action which follows. Its power will grow with the number and devel-
opment of its airplanes, which will be more heavily armed, will be speedier, and
will have greater radii of action. The battle will no longer be confined to the
zone occupied by the troops. In fact, the object of that attack may no
longer be the opposing army, as this may be neglected, and the desired results
may be obtained by a campaign of terror carried on against the enemy country
rather than against its armed forces. The decision will be reached in the air
and the victor will dictate peace on the ground.”
Admiral Kerr, an English naval officer, said:
“War is an affair of communications. No admiral or general would attempt
any move unless his communications were assured. *
“There is only one arm which can strike at once a real blow at each one and all
of the above links in the chain of the enemy’s communications. Each side will then
endeavor to be the first to attack by air, and unless we are ready to do this our
people will feel war as they never felt it in all their history. Poison gas, poison
acids, high explosives, and incendiary bombs will be rising from the air wherever
there is a factory or arsenal to be destroyed.”
Lord Birkenhead said:
“In the last few years an immense and incalculable permanent change has
taken place in conditions which is vital and fundamental, and upon which the
OPERATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES AIR SERVICES 19
security and very existence of this country depends. It has become clear, be-
yond a doubt, that it is no longer possible to estimate the security of this country
in military or naval terms, but that there has arrived a third term, namely, that
of an aerial security.”
General Groves, an English officer, said:
“War, if it should come again, will begin with an aerial phase which may in
itself be decisive. Those not in close touch with the enormous progress in avia-
tion since the armistice, are inclined to underestimate air power and are prone to
judge it by the principal air raids of the past. The total weight in bombs dropped
upon London in the course of the World War was about 12 tons. To-day several
thousands of tons could be dropped on the Capital in the course of 24 hours.”
Marshal Foch has said:
“The potentialities of aircraft attack on a larger scale are almost incalculable,
but it is clear that such attack, owing to its crushing moral effect on a nation,
may impress public opinions to the point of disarming the Government and thus
become decisive.”
Admiral Fullam said (p. 3090):
“Air power is of comparatively recent origin, but in the past four years it may
be said to have reached a dominating position.” g
Admiral Sims says (p. 2968) :
“Airplanes will play a predominant part in the next naval war.”
Bonar Law said:
“The whole center of gravity has changed in the matter of national defense .
from the sea to the air.”
APPENDIx E
THE AVIATION INDUSTRY
There is general recognition of the essential relation of the aircraft industry
to the national defense. Our security in the air, no less than on land and sea,
rests in the last analysis upon our industrial resources. This makes it imperative
that a sound and healthy industry be developed and maintained for the design
and production of aircraft. This condition can not exist without a change of
policy on the part of the Government with reference to the aircraft industry.
The importance of an aircraft industry as a military souce of supply is un-
deniable and was testified to by many witnesses, and denied by none.
In the report of the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics we find:
“After the very costly lessons of the war it would be folly to say that the
Government is not concerned with the state of the aircraft industry. It is
concerned that there should be in existence and in a healthy condition, at least
an adequate nucleus of an industry. An aircraft industry is absolutely essential
to national defense” (pp. 1653–1654).
Former Secretary Weeks said (p. 167):
“We must maintain the aircraft manufacturing industry.”
Secretary of War Davis said (p. 659):
“The condition * * * we want to encourage in our national defense
* * * is to have as many companies as can live that will be able and equip-
ped to build airplanes in large numbers in case of emergency.”
General Patrick, Chief of Air Service, said (p. 130):
“The Secretary of War laid down to me when I first came in office a policy
which I have tried to follow. He stated: ‘It is important that there should be
a nucleus of aircraft manufacturers, ready to expand in time of emergency and
capable of turning out the number of aircraft which we may need.’”
Admiral Moffett, pages 358 et seq.
This general recognition of the vital character of the aircraft industry to
national defense runs through the evidence of many witnesses and needs no
further citation in its support. It is admitted by everyone who pretends to any
knowledge of the subject.
Unfortunately for the industry, many serious errors of departmental policy
have been committed—errors which have brought the industry to the verge of
ruin described in the Lassiter Board report and which have deprived the Nation
of a valuable source of strength.
The aircraft industry, which at the close of the World War had an annual
production capacity of 21,000 planes, is so far demobilized that it could not now
20 OPERATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES AIR, SERVICES
produce more than 1,200 planes per annum, without sharp expansion in capital
and equipment and after months of effort. (Keys, p. 1129.)
For the condition of the aircraft industry the industry itself is partly to blame.
Driven to the starvation point for business the industry has in the past not always
recognized good business principles nor each other's rights. It has attacked each
other's motives and theories and has failed to constantly practice good faith
toward each other. (Lawrance, p. 999.)
It has set about to put its house in order and passed a set of resolutions for its
ood conduct, which if lived up to will help its own situation very substantially.
§. the testimony of Mr. Lawrance, p. 999 et seq.)
Another fact which has largely tended to disaster is competitive bidding.
The remedy of this is legislation. The recognition of design rights, or, rather,
the lack of such recognition, has also been partly responsible for the decline in
the industry. Lack of continuity of orders is another.
We fully agree with Brigadier General Drum (1758) when he says:
“The early development of commercial aviation in the United States is essen-
tial from the viewpoint of national defense in order to create a reserve of trained
personnel and equipment, as well as to create the demand for aircraft which will
stimulate the aircraft industry to a point where it will be available for emergency
expansion to meet war-time production of planes. The development of commer-
cial aviation in the United States is also essential from an economic standpoint,
as the utilization of this new method of rapid transportation will undoubtedly
have a far-reaching effect.”
And with former Secretary of War Weeks (p. 3019):
“The development of the aviation industry depends on production demands
from both military and civil aviation. The demands from military aviation will
not be sufficient to maintain a large healthy aircraft industry therefore the air-
Craft industry must largely be developed under the stimulus of commercial avia-
tion which is an important aid to the national defense. In my opinion, the Gov-
ernment should encourage the development of commercial aviation in every
practical way.” *
There is really no dissent from these eminent opinions. We have an absolute
unanimity of opinion as to the importance of commercial aviation, and the
necessity of the Government encouraging its development “in every practical
way.”
º reference to the cross index will readily supplement the statements given
a, O OVE.
GOVERNMENT AID TO COMMERCIAL AVIATION
The Post Office Department has done excellent work in the transportation of
mail by air and has availed itself of a splendid opportunity for the development
Of commercial transportation by aircraft.
It has demonstrated that airplanes are entitled to a permanent place in the
general scheme of postal transportation. In order to do this they must be used
for continuous flight of mail over relatively long routes. The Post Office Depart-
ment has carried on night flying—a thing never undertaken before on long routes
and regular schedule. It has done this with signal success.
Since July, 1924, the Post Office Department has operated a continuous
transcontinental air mail service, flying at night over lighted airways. Its
service has been eminently satisfactory and, has more than justified the cost to
the Government.
The flying equipment of the air mail consists of surplus Army airplanes of
the De Haviland type, remodeled by the air mail in its own shops. These
De Haviland are war-built planes and poorly suited for carrying mail.
Some time ago the Post Office Department created a competition among the
airplane manufacturers, with the view of developing a practical type of air mail
transport.
“We have told them (manufacturers) that we want a ship that will carry at
least a thousand pounds and that will fly at least 100 hours cruising speed and
land 50 miles an hour slower and will have a service ceiling of some 15,000 or
17,000 feet. * * * So that between now and the 15th of March we expect
to have offered to us at least six airplanes, which, unless these manufacturers
have not taken advantage of our invitation, will be distinctly an advance in
the commercial airplane itself.” (Henderson, p. 280.)
The air mail service is forward looking and progressive. It is assisting ma-
terially to bring into being commercial aviation. It needs and deserves every
support that can be legitimately given to it by the Government and the people.
OPERATIONS OF TEIE UNITED STATES AIR SERVICES 21
APPENDIx F
COMPETITIVE SELECTION OF TYPES
The selection and development of new and improved types of airplanes is an
important and necessary function in the progress of air navigation. This has
been recognized by our air services by calling for competitive bids from time to
time for new designs of airplanes. While approving of the general purposes of
the air services in this matter, we can not give our entire approval of the methods
of procedure. We find instances in which the time allowed bidders to prepare
and submit plans and designs has been entirely inadequate for the presentation
of the best designs of which the bidders were capable. The limited time allowed
has caused bidders unnecessary expense and an insufficient opportunity to work
out most desirable designs. The limited periods allowed for offering designs
favored bidders with developed types and worked to the disadvantage of those
desiring to present new developments. The limited opportunity afforded tended
to deny to the Government the privilege of fully availing itself of the inventive
genius of the country in the development of superior airplanes.
This committee desires to express itself positively as believing that all com-
petitions invited by any department of the Government for the purpose of
developing new and better types of airplanes and engines should afford a full and
fair opportunity for all bidders to have adequate time and full and impartial
consideration of their offered productions. All prospective bidders should be
given due notice. Unreasonable terms in contracts, particularly as to time of
completion and as to changes and extras, should be avoided. The contractor for
production should be given ample opportunity to complete his contract on an
economic basis. Such a time should be given by the terms of the contract and
not depend upon the grace of the department making the contract.
Any design competition that does not give a full and equal opportunity to all
and result in the award to the design of greatest excellence would be a reproach
to our Government.
APPENDIx G
MILITARY VALUE OF PRESENT AIRCRAFT
As to the military value of our present aircraft in the plan of national defense,
General Patrick said, on page 529:
“I agree very thoroughly with the report of the Lassiter Board, that we are
not properly equipped to protect ourselves, certainly not in what the War De-
partment designates as a major emergency; that is, if we are called upon to
defend ourselves against the greatest combination that could be brought against
us. We need to be strengthened both in personnel and material.”
That most of our airplanes are neither modern nor suited for the purposes for
which they would be used in a war emergency is best illustrated by the testi-
mony of General Patrick on page 543; this evidence is the same as General
Patrick gave before the House Committee on Appropriations:
“Mr. REID (interposing). I call your attention—you say that you have no
war-time planes on hand at the present time?
“Major General PATRICK. No; I said by the end of this fiscal year there would
be no more war-time planes that I shall endeavor to recondition or put in service.
“Mr. REID (reading):
“‘Actually on hand on the 30th of September of this year—and these figures,
I am satisfied, are correct—of service types I had, of observation planes, 820;
of bombardment planes, 102; of pursuit planes, 190; of attack planes, 9; making
a grand total of 1,121 planes of those tactical types.’
“Major General PATRICK. Yes, sir.
“Mr. REID. (continuing reading):
“‘Mr. ANTHONY. Were they serviceable?
“‘General PATRICK. Not all of them. We have divided them also into three
classes, A, B, and C, just as before. That means that the A, B, and C classes
are first, second, and third line planes. The first line will be the most up to date.
They are the planes we would order in cases of a war emergency. The second-
line planes would not be ordered for use in an emergency, but they compare
reasonably well with foreign types, and they are fit for war use. The third line,
the reserve planes, are unfit for hard usuage in war, and they are seriously handi-
22 OPERATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES AIR SERVICES
capped in their relative performance. They are useful merely for tactical train-
ing. Of the observation planes, I have none of the first class. Of the second-class
lanes that now compare reasonably well with what we know foreign countries
ave, I have 138. Of the third class, which are absolutely unfit for war use,
and which are of value merely for tactical training purposes, I have 682.
“‘Mr. ANTHoNY. Have you put any of your planes which were inherited
from the war in the first class?
“‘General PATRICK. I do not put any of them in the first class.
“‘Mr. ANTHoNY. Are the first-class planes all planes that have been manu-
factured since the war?
“‘General PATRICK. Yes; and not only manufactured, but designed since the
war. In addition to those, I have on hand of training planes of the reserve class
379. I have no first class. Of what I call the transition or advanced training
plane I have 92, making a total of those types of 471, of which none are in the
first class.
“‘Mr. ANTHONY. How many planes have you on hand that were built during
the war, or are being built from war stock?
“‘General PATRICK. According to the figures, of the total I have on hand 1,291
: war-built planes, of which 471 are of the training type and 820 of the tactical
ype.
“‘Mr. ANTHONY. All of what are called the D–H type are war-built planes?
“‘General PATRICK. Yes, sir. -
“‘Mr. ANTHoNY. What are you using them for now?
‘‘‘General PATRICK. I am using them for Qbservation purposes, for training,
and for photographic work. I might add that I am also using them for attack
planes because I have no better planes for that purpose.”
“Mr. REID. Now, those are all referring to the war-time planes?
“Major General PATRICK. Yes; those are.
“Mr. REID (continuing reading):
“‘Mr. ANTHONY. Are they perfectly serviceable for the first three purposes
you mentioned?
“‘General PATRICK. They are, with this amendment, that they are not the
planes I would use in a war emergency.’”
And again, on page 576, General Patrick said, in regard to the attack planes
that the United States has:
“Mr. REID. Have you got any attack planes?
“Major General PATRICK. No, sir.
“Mr. REID. You have no attack planes?
lºor General PATRICK. I have some DH planes that I am using as attack
J)laneS.
“Mr. REID. But those are old planes?
“Major General PATRICK. Yes, sir.
“Mr. REID. Those are planes that you inherited from the war?
“Major General PATRICK. Yes, sir.
“Mr. REID. You have no single attack planes of the first class?
“Major General PATRICK. No, sir.”
APPENDIx H
Army planes, September 30, 1924

First Second Third Total
line line line
Observation--------------------- 0 138 682 820
Bomber 91 11 0 102
Pursuit--------------------------- 25 165 0 190
Attack-------------------------------------------- 0 0 9
116 314 691 1, 121
Training----- sº º ºr ºf atºm º º º sº 1379 *92 ---------- 471
Total_ gº & 1, 592
1 Reserve. 2 Advanced.
OPERATIONS OF TEIE UNITED STATES AIR SERVICES 23
Above from Major Walsh (supplementing statement by General Patrick) and
Secretary Weeks. e
In commission------------------------------------------------------ 829
In storage---------------------------------------------------------- 763
Built since war------------------------------------ ------------------ 140
War built----------------------------------------------------------- 623
763
To be reconditioned, at $5,000 each------------------------------------ 390
NAVY DEPARTMENT,
BUREAU of AERONAUTICs,
Washington, December 8, 1925.
MY DEAR MR. LEA: In compliance with your verbal request of this date I
am forwarding herewith certain information covering the aeronautic organiza-
tion of the Navy for use by the select committee of inquiry.
The attached-chart gives the status of all naval aircraft on hand or on order
as of July 1, 1925, divided into groups, as I believe you wished. Of the aircraft
listed as service types, all were delivered within the past five years with the
excéption of the VE7SF and VE-7 planes, which were delivered continuously
during 1920 and 1921. Also of the planes listed as “Obsolescent, to be used
until expended” the following have been delivered within the past five years:
DT-2, DT-4, MO-1, and NO-1.
With reference to the number of naval aviators trained during the past four
years (July 1, 1921, to July 1, 1925), you are advised that a total of 267 officers
completed the naval aviator's course and 48 enlisted men completed the naval
aviation pilot's course.
I Trusting that the above information will be satisfactory for your purposes,
am,
Very sincerely yours,
W. A. MoEFETT,
Rear Admiral, United States Navy,
Chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics.
Hon. C. F. LEA,
Select Committee of Inquiry into Operations
of the United States Air Services
House of Representatives, Washington, D. C.
NoTE.—The chart referred to in the above letter showed planes as follows:
Service types:
In serviceable condition---------------------------------------- 196
Unserviceable------------------------------------------------- 62
On order----------------------------------------------------- 163
Obsolescent:
Serviceable--------------------------------------------------- 365
Unserviceable------------------------------------------------- 56
Experimental:
Serviceable--------------------------------------------------- 34
Unserviceable------------------------------------------------- 2
On order----------------------------------------------------- 20
Obsolete:
Serviceable--------------------------------------------------- 78
Unserviceable------------------------------------------------- 56
Of the serviceable machine; of the service types, there were: 34 VE7SF, 19 VE-7.
Of the obsolescent planes, there were: 45 DT-2, 3 DT-4, 32 MO-1, 3 NO-1.
>k >k >k >k >k >k >k
The members of the committee are unanimous in concurring in
this report. Mr. Reid reserves the privilege of filing further views
on his part.
SPECIAL CONCURRING REPORT BY MR. REID
The committee, as a whole, recommends a department of national
defense, and points out glaring defects in the present system, or lack
of system, to indicate the need of a complete reorganization of our
national defense. In this I fully concur.
The committee, however, does not present to Congress an outline
of how this proposed department should be organized, and I believe
that this committee, having gone into the question very thoroughly
and being in º of all the facts necessary upon which to
present an outline, should have done so. $º.
I believe that there should be included in this report for the guid-
ance of Congress, statements of authorities on how the air forces
should be organized.
As the report states, a great many remedies were suggested for the
present deplorable condition of our air power, which ; a unified
air force, a separate air force, aviation corps in both the Army and
the Navy, and yet no statement of how these proposed plans would
work is given in the report of the committee.
The committee states that all branches of national defense should
be unified and harmonized into a single, efficient department, and this
naturally includes coordination and unification of all air services.
The very purpose of the recommendations of the committee is to end
duplication and differing policies.
The proposed department of national defense would be in the
hands of a secretary charged with full responsibility for the Nation's
defense, acting, of course, under the President of the United States.
His duties would be to determine matters of fundamental policy,
details would be assigned by him, naturally, to assistants, one for
the Army, one for the Navy, and one for air.
Howard Coffin, a member of the President's Aircraft Board,
testifying before our select committee, volume 2, page 1217, said, in
answer to a question on this subject:
Mr. PERKINs. But that there should be created an entirely new Air Service,
under neither the viewpoint of the Army or Navy, but with a view of uniting our
forces into an Air Service of the United States?
Mr. CoFFIN. Yes; but with the most sympathetic interest of those services.
And he presented a diagram showing a secretary of defense, with
undersecretaries for War, Air, and Navy (p. 1245).
Maj. Reed Landis said, on page 1820:
Mr. LANDIs But if it is primarily an aerial war it seems to me that the com-
manding officer ought to be a man who is an air specialist.
Mr. REID. Who is going to determine that? The Army would never agree to
that proposition, and neither would the Navy, I take it.
Mr. LANDIs. That is another reason for me favoring a unified air service.
Mr. REID. Do you make a distinction between a unified service and what we
call general defense, with one person in charge of the defense of the country?
Mr. LANDIs. I think concentration of authority in time of war is an absolute
necessity, and I believe that a unified air service is probably one step toward
24
OPERATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES AIR SERVICES 25
unification of the national defense, under a secretary of national defense, or
whatever you would call him, having under him the three branches—Air, Army,
Navy.
Brigadier General Mitchell, on page 1689, said:
Brigadier General MITCHELL. I think there is no question but what a depart-
ment of national defense, with subsecretaries to run the air and the water and
the land, is necessary. The reason we advocate this so strongly at the present
time, Mr. Lea, is that we are losing valuable time every year by being retarded
with the present operation, and we believe that the developments in the near
future will force a department of national defense.
Mr. LEA. Now, if the trouble with our present organization is not funda-
mentally in the organization itself, but in the particular personnel that lacks
vision and initiative and progress to take proper advantage of this new military
development, might it not well be a question of whether or not the problem was
not to try to shove out that personnel and put our machine into the hands of
better operators, rather than to try to change the machine?
Brigadier General MITCHELL. No; I do not think so. I think the thing is
fundamentally wrong. It is based on a force that operates on the land and on
the water and in the air. In each case where it is used they regard the air force
as an auxiliary to what to them is the main force. We believe when we are
fighting an air battle over the sea, it is nothing that the sea forces have anything
to do with. When we are fighting a battle in the air over the land, the Army
has nothing to do with it on the land. But all must be combined under one
general command to give the best return.
Pending the establishment of a department of national defense, I
believe that the only alternative to give aviation its rightful place
in the national defense system would be the establishment of a uni-
fied air service, and how a unified air service would function is shown
by the record.
FIOW A UNIFIED AIR SERVICE WOTLD FUNCTION
From the testimony it would appear that with a unified air service
the defense system would be organized as follows: War, Navy, Air,
with an officer at the head of each department; or they could be all
combined under one secretary of defense, with undersecretaries for
War, Navy, and Air.
The present naval aeronautics (including Marine Corps aero-
nautics), the Army Air Service, and the Post Office air service would
be handed over for administration, supply, promotion, etc., to the
secretary for air. The Post Office planes would be operated by
civilian pilots, or by Army or Navy º after leaving the military
services. Air service for purposes of other departments of the Gov-
ernment would be furnished when required by the air secretary from
the military or civilian personnel under his administration.
At the start, a certain portion of the combined force would be
handed back to the Navy for air work with the fleet only and such
coast-defense work as now allotted to the Navy until such time as
it may be eventually turned over to the Army, or to the air force.
This personnel would be under the absolute command of the Navy
and would constitute its air service.
A certain portion would also be handed over to the Army for its
purposes ºft as observation, as needed by the Army. This would be
the Army's air service.
There would be the third military air component, the Air Force—of
bombardment, attack, and pursuit aviation, and airships for special
strategic missions, either in connection with ground troops, the fleet
or independent of them.
26 OPERATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES AIR SERVICES
A vast amount of testimony was given by Army and Navy officers,
as well as others, concerning the subjects of unified air service,
separate air force, independent air force; and as I consider this a
most important part of the entire hearing, I am presenting a fair
review of the evidence on these subjects, subjoining copious footnotes
so that the sources of the statements can be readily located in the
printed record.
There may seem to be needless repetition herein, but owing to the
fact that the review is subdivided º have decided to repeat where
it is necessary for continuity of thought. I have also included a list
of definitions of aeronautical terms that will be useful.
TERMINOLOGY
In this review “aeronautics” is used as a general term to cover
the entire science and art of the design, construction, and operation
of aircraft of any type. A
“Aviation” is that branch dealing with gasless, heavier-than-air
aircraft, of which the airplane and helicopter are examples.
“Aerostation” is that other branch which has to do with aircraft
whose support is principally maintained by a gas lighter than air,
of which the airship and the balloon are examples.
Under “military aeronautics” is included all those matters per-
taining to aerial warfare, whether of the Army, Navy, or of the
independent air force.
The “U. S. Air Service” is the present official title of the air
Organization in the Army.
The “Bureau of Aeronautics” is the present official title of the air
Organization in the Navy.
By “air service” (not capitalized) generally is meant performance
of work by aircraft and their accessories for other organizations.
By “Army air service” is meant that complement of air personnel
and material which operates permanently as an auxiliary to the
ground troops in carrying out their missions on the ground, such as
observation.
By “Navy air service” is meant that complement of air personnel
and material which operates permanently as an auxiliary to the fleet
in carrying out its missions on the sea, such as scouting.
By “air force” is meant that, complement of air personnel and
material operating as a striking force, independently or in conjunc-
tion with other services in special and strategic missions.
By “unified air service” is meant a “concentration of air activities
of the United States—Army, Navy, and civil—within the direction of
a single Government agency created for the purpose” coequal in
importance with the Departments of War, Navy, Commerce, etc.
PRESENT SYSTEM OF AIR, DEFENSE
As a general proposition, the Army is intrusted with the defense
of America on land. To the Navy is intrusted the defense of our
country by sea. The defense by air is now divided between the
Army and Navy.
A complete lay-out of strategy and tactics has been developed
through the ages for land warfare. The same is true for marine
OPERATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES AIR SERVICES 27.
clashes. Both, however, are always undergoing at least minor
changes.
Now, war in and through the air has introduced many new basic
and minor features. Rapid and important changes in tactics and
strategy are continually taking place and these have their lesser
effect on the problem of land and sea.
The Army has always specialized in its field—land operations.
The Navy has specialized in its—sea operations.
Operations in the air might be considered a subject for intense
specialization, but to date these are auxiliary to the two established
branches of the national defense.
ARMY
Under the present defense system the U. S. Air Service is a com-
batant branch of the Army, like Artillery, Infantry, Cavalry, Chem-
ical Warfare, etc. It consists of officers and men who have trans-
ferred from other branches or who have originally elected the Air
Service during the World War. Once in the Air Service, they stay
in it for life unless transferred at their own request. The executive
of this branch is the Chief of Air Service, who, like the Chief of
Artillery, etc., reports to the Secretary of War.
THE NAVY AND MARINE CORPS
Aeronautics in the Navy is more complicated. From an adminis-
trative and technical viewpoint naval aeronautics is administered
through the Bureau of Aeronautics. From an operating point of
view naval aeronautics functions in a similar manner to such special
services as submarines, which require special training but are man-
ned by line personnel so trained.
The Marine Corps of the Navy also has flying personnel and equip-
ment. The Marine Corps air service is operated from a technical
standpoint through the Bureau of Aeronautics, from an adminis-
trative view through Marine Corps headquarters, and for operations
it functions with the Marine Corps in the same way that the Navy
aeronautics is operated with the Navy.
Personnel is detailed to aeronautics in both Navy and Marine
º for temporary periods. The chiefs of these two services report
to the Secretary of the Navy.
The entire defense project, of course, takes in the National Guard
and the Reserve Corps of both the Army and Navy.
The Aeronautical łºd. composed of members of the Army and
Navy, is a coordinating body for military aeronautics.
TRAINING—PERIOD OF SERVICE
Under the present defense system, all West Point and all Annapolis
cadets are now given increased instruction in aeronautics, and all
will have an opportunity, it is planned, to actually fly—as passen-
gers. So the officers of these two arms will in future be expected
to have at least a very limited knowledge of the possibilities and
limitations of aircraft.
28 OPERATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES AIR SERVICES
Those cadets of the Navy who elect aeronautics must be competent
naval officers as well. In addition to flying, including all its par-
ticular requirements, they must at all times be capable of assuming
any duty of any other naval officer up to command of the fleet.
Those who elect the Air Service of the Army spend all their energies
in flying only and its requirements, and they are not required to
command Infantry, Artillery, or other branches of the service.
CIVIL AERONAUTICS AT PRESENT
There is at the present time no Federal regulation of air traffic,
intº of machines and registration, or licensing of pilots.
comparatively large number of State and municipal laws and
ordinances have already been passed, designed to regulate air traffic.
However, air travel is primarily interstate and the duty of regulation
is logically Federal.
The Government offers no encouragement or aid, direct or indirect,
to private enterprise in civil aeronautics and progress has been
naturally much retarded.
The railroads were assisted in their inception by enormous land
grants. American shipping receives an indirect subsidy and, in
addition, is furnished such aids to navigation as suitable weather
reports by radio and otherwise, lighthouses, buoys, lightships, maps,
ice patrol, etc.
The only civil departments of the Government operating their
own aircraft are the Post Office and Treasury (Coast Guard).
Other departments using aircraft to a constantly growing extent
are the Departments of Agriculture, Interior, and Commerce. These
employ personnel and equipment loaned for special occasions by the
Army or the Navy. As time passes, this civil use will rapidly increase
in volume and it will soon be no longer possible for the military forces
to furnish such assistance.
From the testimony itself and from observations indicated thereby,
immediate steps should be taken to place civil aeronautics upon a
firm foundation through regulation and assistance in the way of
flying beacons, weather reports, aerodromes, etc.
Our Government is one of the very few countries signatory to the
International Air Convention which hº failed to ratify it.
Flying officers in both the Army and Navy have expressed adverse
criticisms of the present status of military aeronautics and their
aspirations have been expressed in proposals for various forms of a
“unified air service,” “united air service,” and an “air force”
(the latter an air force independent of the air service allotted to the
Army and Navy); or for an “air corps” within the present military
establishments.
They feel that aeronautics is not given its proper valuation in the
general scheme of defense—
Naval flying is sufficiently important to demand specialization to
the same extent as service in the Infantry, or Artillery, Cavalry, etc.
It does not make for efficiency in naval aeronautics to detail
men to the air for a period and then return them to the line in order
that they may obtain normal advancement.
Flying officers in the Army are discriminated against in the matter
of promotions under the present system.
Reserve flyers of both services get insufficient training.
OPERATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES AIR SERVICES 29
Aeronautics has no school such as West Point or Annapolis.
Aeronautics is not properly represented in the General Board of
the Navy and the General Staff of the Army.
Supply of new and up-to-date aircraft is insufficient.
Accidents and fatalities are largely due to the use of obsolete and
poorly designed aircraft.
The older services are now of lessened importance to national
defense.
There is lack of “unity of command” in national defense, not only
with respect to aeronautics but to coast defense.
The General Board and General Staff are unwilling to admit
present actualities and potentialities of aircraft.
AIR POWER
Air power has been defined as the might of a country to wage
war through the air forces, either alone or supported by land or sea
Ower.”
p A rather great volume of testimony was taken in discussion of its
value relative to the land and sea forces and of its intrinsic value as
a single arm of defense.
That an air force, independent of the land and sea power, is the
only arm “which can strike at once a real blow at each one and all
of the links in the chain of the enemy's communications” is, of
course, obvious; and from this priority of striking time the air force
must be considered as the “first line of defense.”
VAILUE OF AIR POWER
The testimony—Army, naval, and civilian—before the committee
is unanimous in support of the ..". * 7 of aircraft, both
alone and in cooperation with the military forces, and the bulk of it
is clearly to the effect that “the potentialities of aircraft * * *
are almost incalculable” “ and that “our national defense must be
supplemented, if not dominated, by aeronautics.” "
Considering the probable increase in the power of aircraft in future,
this opinion must outweigh the certain testimony placing aeronautics
as a mere “adjunct” or an “auxiliary”" to land and sea operations.
The uncontroverted evidence * * presented in support of this indis-
pensability and potentiality is so definite and overwhelming that one
1 Maj. Raycroft Walsh, U. S. A., 1699.
2 Admiral Kerr, 520.
3 Admiral Hilary P. Jones, 2941; Capt. E. G. Land, U. S. Navy, 1336, 1335; Admiral Moffett, 386, 383, 362;
National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics report cited by Admiral Moffett, 1655; General Pershing,
1
728.
4 Marshal Foch, 520; Admiral Sims, 2963.
* President Coolidge (520); ex-Secretary of War Baker, 1267.
6 General Drum, 1761, 1873; Sir Douglas Haig, 1724; Dickman Board, 1724; General Pershing, 1727, 1729:
Secretary of the Navy Wilbur, 2262; Admiral Moffett, 1658; Lieut. R. A. Ofstie, U. S. Navy, 2177; Theo-
dore Roosevelt, 2345,2346. .
7 Admiral Fisher, 2939; Brig. Gen. Lord Thompson, 536; Marshal Foch, Field Marshal Haig, General
Ludendorf, cited by Crowell, 2356; Major General Trenchard, cited by Perkins, 2357; Admiral von Scheer,
cited by Admiral Fullam, 3103; Admiral Sir Percy Scott, cited by Admiral Fullam, 3100; Admiral Fullam
3090; Gen. Mason M. Patrick, General Duval, Admiral Kerr, Bonar Law, Lord Birkenhead, Genera
Groves, Marshal Foch, 520; Lieutenant Arnold, 713; Reid Landis, 1821; Admiral Sims, 2963, 3004, 3005,
2960, 2987, 2968, 2988; General Patrick, 529; Admiral Fiske, 3096, 740, 3100, 3070, 3082; Col. William Mitchell,
2034, 2035, 291, 2037, 1894, 336, 2759, 1925; Starr Truscott, 718, 719, 720, 721; Admiral Jellicoe, 1293; Lieut.
Commander Edwards, U. S. Navy, 1292, 1293, 1321; Admiral Beatty, 723; Lieut. Leigh Wade, 707; Secre-
tary of War Davis, 665; Ex-Secretary of War Weeks, 617, 635; Howard E. Coffin, 1199, 1198, 1237; Arthur
Brisbane, 901; B. F. Castle, 1041; Edw. Rickenbacker, 2169,2156; Leon Cammen, 3151; Leslie P. Keſgan,
2078; National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, report, 1652; concurred in by President Coolidge,
1641; Maj. T. D. Milling, 2262, 2263; Benedict Crowell, 2355; American Aviation Mission (for list of mem-
bers see note 1234).
30 OPERATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES AIR SERVICES
is convinced that its importance demands that, at least, air power
must have “a coordinate voice in the councils of the Nation with sea
power and land power.””
THE UNIFIED AIR SERVICE
The American aviation mission's definition is concise and appears
to fully represent the general aims of the proponents of the united air
service or united air force.
The concentration of air activities of the United States—military, naval, and
civilian—within the direction of a single Government agency created for the
purpose, coequal in importance with the Departments of War, Navy, and Com-
InêI'Ce.
This means a secretary of air, obviously.
There is also the proposal to put these Departments of War, Navy,
and Air under a secretary of national defense, with undersecretaries
of War, Navy, and Air.
Considerable divergence of opinion is found among those who
favored the secretary for air controlling military, naval, and civil
aeronautics (or the air corps as an intermediate step *) and those who
were definitely against either but favored maintaining aeronautics
in the Army and Navy under the present system,” or under the
present system but placed under one secretary for defense.”
The testimony preponderates in favor of the ultimate organization
of our air defense within the limits of the definition first foregoing.
In addition to the general objections to the unified air service
mentioned foregoing, specific objections were registered:
Who is to control the aircraft carriers, a line officer of the Navy or
a unified air service officer.”
Assignment to Navy of aviators unskilled for naval purposes.”
Planes too large for carriers.”
Possibility of aviators serving with Navy not under Navy control.”
No supply if dependent on another branch.”
Absence of unity of command.”
8 Col. William Mitchell, 2758.
9 General Patrick, 521, 1896; Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, 1702; Lieut. Col. H. E. Hartney, 2106;
Reed G. Landis, 1819, 1820; Jacques, M. Swaab, 2250; Maj. Carl Spatz, 2246; Col. Wm. Mitchell, 2111,
1677, 1671, 1669; Maj. Raycroft Walsh, 1699, 1709, 1710; Maj. T. D. Milling, 2259; Lieut. Frank O’D.
Hunter, 2240; Lieut. C. B. Austin, 2241; Benedict Crowell, 2355; L. D. Gardner, 329; Col. Paul Henderson,
288; L. L. Driggs, 2210; Benedict Crowell, 2355; Lieut. Leigh Wade, 707; Edw. Rickenbacker, 2159,
2169; , P. N. Bellinger, U. S. Navy, 2367; Lieut. B. R. Holcombe, U.S. Navy, 2186, 2188: Lieut. J. K.
Montgomery, U.S. Navy, 2107, 2097,2098; Lieut. T. D. Borner, U.S. Navy, 2192; Lieut. F. Q. Rogers,
M.C., 2197; Lieut. R. A. Ofstie, U.S. Navy, 2181; Lieut. G. R. Henderson, U. S. Navy, 2202; Lieut. A.J.
Williams, U. S. Navy, 2206; C. M. Keys, 1432, 1431, 1152, 1153; Hon. F. L. La Guardia,2382, 1665
1664; Col. Wm. Mitchell, 1915. American Aviation Mission (which included Benedict Crowell; Howard
E. Coffin; Capt. H. C. Mustin, U. S. Navy; Col. Halsey Dunwoodie; Lieut. Col. J. A. Blair, G. S.; C. M.
Keys; George Houston; S. S. Bradley), 1897. e
tº General Drum, 1787, 1875, 1726, 1760, 1879; Admiral Moffett, 379 361; Ex-Secretary of War Weeks,
626, 3059, 3049; Secretary of War Dwight Davis, 663; Ex-Secretary of War N. D. Baker, 1726, 1235;
Ex-Lieut. W. S. Holt, U. S. Army, 2106; Theodore Roosevelt, 2367; Admiral Hilary P. Jones, 2918; Sec-
retary of Navy Wilbur, 364; Commander Byrd, U. S. Navy, 2367; Admiral Fiske, 3070; Admiral Sims,
3014; Capt. A. W. Johnson, U. S. Navy, 1999; Lieut. Commander Atlee Edwards, 1317; Capt. E. G. Land,
U. S. Navy, 1329, 1331; Commander Richardson, 1492, 1493; Commander Whiting, 2142, 1464; Lieut. C.
A. Sprague, U. S. Navy, 2200; National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, 1637.
11 Capt. E. G. Land, U. S. Navy, 1334.
* Commander Whiting, 1466, 1464.
* Admiral Moffett, 362; Theodore Roosevelt, 2349; Admiral Sims, 2985.
* Captain Land, U.S. Navy, 1316; Edwards, 1315.
15 Admiral Sims, 2968. º
16 Admiral Moffett, 362.
17 Commander Whiting, 1464.
OPERATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES AIR SERVICES 31
Other witnesses, however, fully answered these objections * by
argument and by citation of maneuvers * and general orders of the
War Department.” +
As to the specific objections mentioned foregoing, it is believed that
they represent merely unwarranted anticipations of minor difficulties.
INDEPENDENT AND COORD INATED FUNCTIONS
From the testimony it would appear that with a unified air service,”
the defense system would be organized as follows: º
War, Navy, Air, with a cabinet officer at the head of each depart-
ment.”
The present naval aeronautics (including Marine Corps aeronautics),
the Army Air Service, and the Post Office air service would be handed
over for administration, supply, promotion, etc., to the secretary for
air. The Post Office planes would be operated, by civilian pilots, or
by Army or Navy pilots after leaving the military service. Air
service for purposes of other departments of the Government would
be furnished when required by the air secretary from the military or
civilian personnel under his administration.
At the start a certain portion of the combined force would be
handed back to the Navy for air work with the fleet only and such
coast defense work as now allotted to the Navy until such time as
it may be eventually turned over to the Army or to the air force.
This personnel would be under the absolute command of the Navy
and would constitute its air service.
A certain portion would also be handed over to the Army for its
É. such as observation, as needed by the Army. This would
e the Army’s air service.
There would be the third military air component, the Air Force—
of bombardment, attack, and pursuit aviation and airships for special
strategic missions, either in connection with ground troops, the fleet,
or independent of them.
That takes care of present personnel.
THE AIR COLLEGE
On the acknowledgment of the importance of air power herein
made, it follows that there is warranted proper preparation and
training for the air to the same relative extent.”
It is obvious, then, that men should be trained for the air as for the
Army and Navy and we have West Point for the Army and Annapolis
for the Navy, and there should be established an air academy on a
relative par with these two institutions.
From this air academy the students would go to the Army or to
the Navy for their air services, to the air force, into civil branches of
Government flying, or to private life.
There is an expression in opposition to the air academy to the
effect that eventually all air personnel would feed in therefrom and
18 Colonel Mitchell, 1671, 2765; Commander Whiting, 1467; Geºral Patrick, 531, 532; Major Milling,
2274; C. M. Keys, 1432; Maj. Raycroft Walsh, 1701–1708; Reid Landis, 1820; General Drum, 1830.
19 Major Walsh, 1701–1708.
20 Major Walsh, 1702–1704.
a Major Milling, 2256, 2259; Commander Whiting, 1466.
b There is also the proposition of then combining all three under one secretary of defense, with undersecre-
taries for War, Navy, and Air reporting to the former now commonly accepted.
21 Colonel Mitchell, 335, 1891; Major Milling, 2260; Howard Coffin, 1278, 1279, 1243, 1244; American Avia-
tion Mission, 1225.
73728—25f—3
32 OPERATIONS OF TEIE UNITED STATES AIR, SERVICES
that the “Navy and the Army personmel would disappear within a
few years.””
dº SUPPLY AND SUNDRY
The unified air service would have a central system of supply.
The Army, Navy, Post Office, and other air services and the Air
Force would draw on the central organization. The special needs
of each branch would be served through the technical cooperation
of the branches centered in an engineering branch of the unified
air service.
Air promotion would be always within the unified air service and
under its control and would not be dependent upon vacancies in the
line of the Navy and the various branches of the Army as at present.
PROMOTION, RETIREMENT, REPLACEMENT
In a preceding section of this review is illustrated the working of
the unified air service.
The initial organization is, of course, made up of existing Army,
Navy, and Post Office air personnel.
The problem of promotion and retirement or disposal of the
flying personnel after a flying age limit is passed was discussed by the
witnesses before the committee. $3
Mention has been made of the air college and the expectation that
the present air officers of the Army and Navy will eventually have
severed their connection with the military forces through one cause
or another and will be replaced by those coming directly from the
air college.
There were witnesses who expressed the fear that under a unified
air service there would be “a very large personnel to get rid of in
some way and it is going to be a very expensive thing to do,” through
retirement or paying them off by a fixed sum *, and naval witnesses
urge that the Navy should supply its own air personnel, in opposition
to the unified air service and train them for naval duties as well so
that they might continue their naval careers at sea. *
Other evidence, however, indicates no apprehension may be noted
on this score and suggests a normal promotion, based on the expecta-
tion of life, with even the possibility of a transfer to other branches.”
The life expectancy of the flying personnel is said to be less than
one-third of that of the personnel of the other military services of
the United States, and consideration should be given to the subjects
of promotion, pay, insurance and retirement, for the benefit of the
aviators in the military and naval services. It is well to note that
the statistics of the air services show that the life expectancy of
flyers is only fifteen years.
Special notice should be taken of the report of the Shanks Board of
1922, that the single list promotion affects the Army Air Service
officers unfairly.”
22 Commander Whiting, 1467. *
23 Commander Whiting, 1473, 1474; Secretary Wilbur, 363; Lieutenant Commander Edwards, 1327.
24 Admiral Moffett, 382. tº e
25 General Patrick, 531, 523; Am. Av. Mission, 1225, 1226.
26 General Patrick, 523. r
OPERATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES AIR, SERVICES 33
THE AIR CORPS
The “air corps” for both the Army and the Navy has been offered
as a temporary compromise between the present system and the
ultimate unified air service. The testimony on this point, however, is
rather meager, perhaps due to the fact that the committee felt the
general public was well enough acquainted with the corps.
It is pointed out in behalf of Ş. proposal, and it is applicable
as well to the unified air service, that the “present national defense
organization is inefficient in that no single agency has this responsi-
bility [development, and utilization of air power] as a primary and
exclusive function.” ”
As illustrating this substitute, there may be taken the Marine
Corps in the Navy Department, with which service everyone is
familiar. Under this plan the Navy and the Army would have each
an air corps similar in plan and organization to the marines.”
There is, of course, some objection to the corps plan, but the
opposition is much less than that to the unified air service, as deter-
mined from the testimony.”
THE LASSITER BOARD PROGRAM
The Lassiter Board, convened by the Secretary of War, made a
rather exhaustive report on Army aeronautics, which was approved
in principle by Secretary of War Weeks in 1923.”
n general, the board recommended a 10-year program of Army
air development based on an appropriation of $25,000,000 a year
and involving an increase in personnel of the Air Service from 1,100
officers and 8,000 or 9,000 men, as now authorized, to 4,000 officers,
2,500 flying cadets, and 25,000 enlisted men, with 2,500 planes, 20
airships, and 38 balloons, to be attained by progressive development
over this given period.
It was pointed out as an argument against the unified air service
that the proposals of the Lassiter Board actually furnished the
independent air force on which so much stress is laid in the unified
air service program and should be acceptable to the latter's adherents
under the present military defense system.*
The tactical organization under the Lassiter report was based on
the following principles:
1. Observation air service an integral part of divisions, corps, and
armies, with a reserve under general headquarters.
2. An air force of attack and pursuit an integral part of each
field army, with a reserve under general headquarters.
3. An air force of bombardment, pursuit and airships directly
under general headquarters for special and strategic missions, either
in connection with ground troops or independent of them.”
*7 General Patrick 522, 532.
28 General Patrick, 532, 1896, 524, 523, 522, 1800, 521; Major Spatz, 2248; Lieutenant Borner, U. S. Navy,
2194; Lieut. A. J. Williams, U. S. Navy, 2206; Lieutenant Holcombe, U. S. Navy, 2182, 2186, 2189.
* General Drum, 1826, 1827, 1760; Theodore Roosevelt, 2360; Admiral Shoemaker, 2336; Commander
Whiting, 2142.
30 Secretary Weeks, 1769, 3053, Drum, 1842, 1728, 1774, 3033.
31 General Drum, 1826, 1832, 1881, 1740; Secretary Davis, 673.
3? Drum 1728, Weeks 3033.
34 OPERATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES AIR SERVICES
The Lassiter Board found the Army “Air Service to be in a very
unfortunate and critical situation.” ”
Since the World War, aeronautics has come to play an increasingly important
part in military, operations, but measures have not been taken in our country
to keep step with this evolution.*
The aircraft industry in the United States at present is entirely inadequate
to meet peace and war time requirements. It is rapidly diminishing under
present conditions and will soon practically disappear.”
Other testimony confirms this.”
The recommendations of the Lassiter Board, however, do not appeal
to the adherents of the unified air service idea,” although it is a step
in the direction of the unified air service “and a ...i. one but,
of course, it does not go all the way.” ”
. The Lassiter program was submitted to the Joint Army and Navy
Board for consideration in connection with a Navy program with a
view to submission to Congress. The two programs were approved
by the Secretary of the Navy, but the Secretary of War qualified his
approval, as he desired a greater percentage for the Army. This was
not satisfactory to the Secretary of the §. and the matter was
referred back to the Joint Army and Navy Board for adjustment,
and there it still rests.”
The Lassiter Board report, and that of the Navy board, of course,
leave the air power of the Army and the Navy within these two
services, and dº the same general objections made to the pres–
ent organization will largely apply to these programs.
“INERTIA ’’—“CONSERVATISM''
One is compelled to take cognizance of the rather voluminous
testimony charging the Army and Navy officials and boards with
“conservatism,” “influences,” “interests,” and the like, which “deny
to aeronautics the place it should have in the military scheme of the
country,” ” and it must appear from the testimony " that such is the
case, although it is vigorously denied.”
Taking into consideration the history of new inventions and new
military weapons, one must find that conservatism among the military
is an age-old custom and the remedy is for Congress to enact legisla-
tion which will permit this new arm of defense to obtain its place in
national defense.
FREE SPEECH
That officers are embarrassed in testifying before congressional
committees for fear of disciplinary measures, unfavorable considera-
tion, or loss of opportunity for advancement, or other unfavorable
action, was the subject º affirmative testimony " which was not
refuted by other evidence. One is inclined to believe that there does
* General Drum, 1777; also 1914, 1622. . -
34 Admiral Moffett, 358; Secretary Davis, 376; Colonel Mitchell, 1914.
35 General Mitchell, 1690, 1895; General Patrick, 521.
36 General Patrick, 521. - -
36a Secretary Weeks, 624; General Drum, 1728, 1799; Colonel Mitchell, 1895; General Patrick, 521.
37 Honorable Lea, 336. e
38 Major Walsh, if 10; Admiral Fullam, 2940; Senator Bingham, 2749, 2753; Edward Rickenbacker,
2158—2161; Honorable LaGuardia, 2377; Colonel Mitchell, 300, 2038, 1690,296,292, 1889, 1890,2775, 2757,2758,
1895, 1893, 1891; Honorable Lea, 336, 1710; Admiral Sims. 2973, 2975; Major Spatz, 2246.
39 Secretary Weeks, 3018; Admiral Moffett,361; General Drum, 1795.
40 Admiral Sims, 3007; Honorable LaGuardia, 1667; Colonel Mitchell, 1675.
OPERATIONS OF TEIE UNITED STATES AIR SERVICES 35
exist at least a feeling of embarrassment, particularly among junior
officers, in giving testimony, and this condition should not be per-
mitted to continue.
|UNITY OF COMMAND
“Unity of command” is one of the major points of the whole air
controversy and about which there is a decided difference of opinion
as to just what it is. It must be admitted that “unity of command
is a prime requisite.” “
The adherents of the unified air service want unity of command for
the air services in peace and of all other services in time of emergency,”
while the Army wants unity of command for the Army, including
its Air Service, and the Navy wants unity of command for its fleet,
stations, Marine Corps, and its Bureau of Aeronautics.”
The opponents.of the unified air service are horrified at the idea
of a “trinity of command” which the “proposed organization
creates,” “ and it is argued that “another uncoordinated * national
defense force in the field of battle” would be a catastrophe, yet the
ºfton between the Army and Navy is claimed to “be very
good.
Other testimony is offered to the effect that “there is no unity of
counsel among them; there is no unity of thought. Each is working
on a separate basis without any thought for the thing as a whole,” “
and the prophesy is made that “there will never be complete under-
standing” between the unified air service and the Navy “were the
unified air service proposal enacted into law.
The arguments of the unified air service for unified command,
according to the “paramount interest,” are supported by the antici-
pation of the Joint Army and Navy Board that there would be inter-
change in the employment of Army, Navy, and marine aircraft in
their use under one command, whether Army or Navy. (Policy of
Joint Board, pp. 1651–1652.)
One is forced to believe that unified national defense effort is ob-
tained only by the unified air service proposal, with the Army, Navy,
and air under one secretary of defense.
DUPLICATION OF AIR EFFORT
Duplication of effort and money is charged in experimentation,
supply, and administration, and it is, of course, obvious that the
Army, Navy, and Post Office now maintain separate purchasing,
engineering, and production organizations * while other depart-
ments of the Government maintain machinery and facilities for
doing much work now done by these services at scattered points.
There is, also, testimony tending to minimize this duplication as
a result of the efforts of the Aeronautical Board,” though it is ad-
41 Drum, 1880; Weeks, 1842, 1762; Dickman Board, 1723; Lieutenant Commander Edwards, 1326, 1325.
42 Milling, 2274; Captain Johnson, U. S. Navy, 1955; Sir Samuel Hoare, 1929; Edw. Rickenbacker, 2159.
43 Lieutenant Commander Edwards, 1326.
44 Secretary Weeks, 3059, 1842.
* Drum, 1880.
46 Secretary Wilbur, 364.
47 C. M. Keys, 1399.
48 Admiral Moffett, 382.
49 Patrick, 529; Paul Henderson, 287; Mitchell, 1688, 1988, 1890, 1695; Emmons, 43; Moffett,400; Weeks, 639.
50 National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, 1639, 1640; Theodore #oosevelt, 2349; Lieutenaht
Commander Du Bose, 1611–1612.
36 OPERATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES AIR, SERVICES
mitted “there is a certain amount of duplication in spite of everything
we can do.” ”
There is also the suggestion that under a unified air service there
would be a “general duplication all along the line.” "
Coast defense is heavily bombarded in the testimony. Duplica-
tion of stations is brought out, with Hawaii and Panama cited as
examples. In Panama there are two adjoining flying fields belonging
respectively to the Army and Navy on which millions have been
spent. This condition should not be permitted to continue.
COAST DEFENSE
Duplication of effort and conflict of authority in coast defense is
given rather great prominence in the hearings.
Testimony points to both the Army and Navy planes now scouting
over the coastal waters *, and the difficulty of coordinating the Army
and Navy as at present organized along the coast ". This criticism
applies, it º appear, not only to the two present military air
services but to the Army and Navy proper. ~.
Reference is made by a witness to the law of 1920 which assigns
certain functions to the Army and Navy air services and he objects
to º interpretation put upon it by the joint board in its policy of
1923.
One must indorse the suggestion of Secretary Davis” that the
question as to who shall have control of the coast defense “ought to
be decided. That is a very important point. That is one very
ºtructive thing this committee, or some other committee, might
O.
Considerable evidence was introduced to the effect that control
should be given to the Army.” A naval witness recognizes that
“neither efficiency nor economy is promoted through a divided
administration of a single area” but wants the Navy to control this
“twilight zone.” "
There is also the proposal that the unified Air Service should be
given coast defense as a “problem which, it appears, only a united
air force can satisfactorily solve,” ” or the air corps. Other testi-
mony minimizes the usefulness of seacoast forts.”
The Army’s functions inherently include all operations from shore
bases and the Navy's function is inherently operation from mobile
bases at sea.
FFFECT OF AIRCRAFT ON COAST DEFENSE
That “aircraft possess important strategical and tactical qualities
in operations of coast defense and in adequate quantities may be
49 Patrick, 529; Paul Henderson, 287; Mitchell, 1688, 1988, 1890, 1695; Emmons, 43; Moffett,400; Weeks, 639.
* Qommander Whiting, 1473, 1470; Lieutenant Commander Du Bose, 1611-1612; Secretary of War, 1842.
53 Patrick, 529, 530; Milling, 2265, 2263, 2267; Lieutenant Commander Du Bose, 1612; Lieutenant
Commander Mitscher, 1485; Major Walsh, 1708; Admiral Moffett, 1646.
88 General Drum, 1768. *
* Major Milling, 2268; Colonel Mitchell, 1681, 1898.
* Commander Whiting, 1472; joint board, 1651.
* Secretary. Davis, 663. e &
37 Major Milling, 2265, 2263, 2267, 2268; Colonel Mitchell, 1681, 1898; Secretary Weeks, 646, 3062; Major
Walsh, 1711, 1706, 1705, 1707.
* Qaptain Craven, U.S. Navy, 17, 18, 19; Commander Mitscher, 1487; Commander Edwards, 1299.
39 General Patrick, 1896, 524; Colonel Mitchell, 1912. &
60 Admiral Fullam, 3099; Colonel Mitchell, 1696, 2758; Hon. LaGuardia, 2376.
OPERATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES AIR SERVICES 37
the decisive factor in such operations”" is borne out by a wealth
of testimony.”
One is satisfied from the evidence of the aircraft's supremacy over
the ship at sea, but renewed experiments and demonstrations both
for practice and for further development should be had.
PROCUREMENT AND PRODUCTION
Production is deemed of such importance as a result of the last
war experience that the “Army Industrial College” has been estab-
lished.”
The unified air service, of course, contemplates centralized pro-
duction and the weight of testimony “appears to be on the side of
the unified air service in this particular, even though witnesses do not
agree with the other elements of the unified air service proposal.”
The evidence for centralized production is not overwhelming, how-
ever, for naval witnesses solidly insist on separate sources of supply *
and it is pointed out that the department with the greatest power
would get equipment first, that for material wanted would be sub-
stituted something else, etc.
A central production organization is essential, both for efficiency
and economy.
FLYING AS A DISTINCT ARM

It would seem apparent that the principal duty of flying personnel
is to fly and to keep in flying trim and proficient with the ever-
changing progress in acrobatics, formation flying, navigation, cross-
country work, direction radio, radio telegraphy and telephony,
observation, reconnaissance, mapping, bombing, night flying, aerial
gunnery, uses of gases and Smoke artillery adjustment, Infantry
iaison, attack aviation, photography and interpretation, etc., in
addition to routing exercises, maneuvers, etc.
The consensus of opinion * is that military aeronautics is of
sufficient importance to demand undivided attention. In the Army
Air Service, the airman's sole duty is flight and its attendant features.
In the Navy, after a temporary detail to aeronautics, the airman
returns to the line for sea duty, and in order to obtain promotion,
a great point is made by the Navy that the airman must be in
all respects a fully competent officer of the line—a “jack of all
trades.” 68
* General Drum, 1752, 1870.
* Major Milling, 2267, 2268; Commander Whiting, 2140; General Pershing, Secretary Roosevelt, and
Secretary Weeks, 1897; Admiral Sims, 2961, 2980, 2986, 2972, 2983, 2984; Colonel Mitchell, 335, 339, 1686,
1678, 1680, 1677, 1890.
63 Secretary Davis, 691.
* General Drum, 1801, 1723, 1721, 1794; American Aviation Mission, 1226; Army board on Curry bill,
1725; General Pershing, 1729; Maj. D. C. Emmons, 41; ex-Secretary of War Baker, 1236; English Air Min-
istry, 1301; French System, 1461; Italian system, 1463; C. M. Keys, 1153; Aviation magazine subscribers’
program, 329; Hon. LaGuardia, 1664, 1663.
65 General Drum, 1801.
66 Lieutenant Commander Edwards, 1326, 1327; Admiral Moffett, 1634, 388; Commander Whiting, 1469;
Capt. E. G. Land, U. S. Navy, 1339,1338, 1316; Captain Edwards, U. S. Navy, 1315.
ºf Colonel Mitchell, 2768; Admiral Moffett, 355; Lieutenant Montgomery, U. S. Navy, 2098; Com-
mander Whiting, 2144, 1474; Lieutenant Holcombe, U. S. Navy, 2186, 2187, 2193; Lieut. R. A. Ofstie,
U. S. Navy, 2182, 2186; Admiral Shoemaker, 2237–2238.
08 Lieut. J. K. Montgomery, U. S. Navy, 2098.
38 OPERATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES AIR SERVICES
This º opinion as to flying as a “specialty,” “ however, is
modified by some witnesses who would return to the line of the Navy
airmen whose flying days are over.”
No evidence was presented by Army witnesses along this line as
the F. in that branch speaks for itself.
Those who elect aeronautics should remain constantly in aeronautics
if efficiency and economy is to be attained and there is no objection
to arranging for the transfer of airmen, after such air service, to
other branches of the military forces for which they may be fitted,
or to civilian flying activities of the Government.
FLYING OFFICERS IN COMMAND
The hearings produced evidence that many naval officers are draw-
ing flying pay though not qualified pilots or observers and it was
pointed out that . which established the Bureau of Aeronautics
in the Navy provided that flying organizations, with the exception
of aircraft carriers, or other vessels, shall be in all cases commanded
by flying officers.”
Witnesses suggest that much of the unrest among naval flyers
would be allayed if the law were strictly followed.
NAVAL AIERONAUTICS AS A NAVAL PROBLEM
Naval witnesses consistently insist at considerable length that air
personnel with the fleet must be “educated naval officers”; that naval
aeronautics is an especially “intimate and integral part of Navy
operations”; that “future careers of the personnel are wrapped up in
the success of the Navy”; that naval aeronautics is of a “specialized
naval nature” and a “distinct problem”; flyers must think of “naval
success as a primary mission” and be “thoroughly indoctrinated
with naval ideas.” ”
They omit discussion of the definite proposal that under a unified
air service the graduates of the air college who are to serve with the
Navy go to the Navy for specialized training and future service.
The very argument of these witnesses is included in the exact program
of the unified air service.
The Army presents no special claims for such “intimacy.” It
makes no demand that its flyers shall serve alternately in the air,
in the Infantry, or Cavalry, or Artillery, etc., throughout their
lives. The committee omitted any great questioning of Army or
other witnesses along this line, though enough testimony is brought
out to show a contradiction.”
That flying is the same, whether over land or over water, was
testified to by both Army and Navy witnesses.” Other naval testi-
mony modifies this. While agreeing that training and fighting is
the same,” it is argued that upon completion of training naval
69 Admiral Shoemaker, 2238.
* Admiral Moffett, 355, 382; Admiral Shoemaker, 2237, 2238. g e
* Lieutenant Holcombe, U. S. Navy, 2219, 2183; Admiral Shoemaker, 2237,2238; Aviation's national
policy, 329; Lieutenant Montgomery, U. S. Navy, 2101; Colonel Mitchell, 1693–1694. &
* Captain Land, U.S. Navy, 1329; Lieutenant Commander Edwards, 1319, 1320,1326; Admiral Moffett,
381, 382, 361, 386; Captain Johnson, U. S. Navy, 1999; Admiral Sims, 2974, 2965, 2967; Secretary Wilbur,
363, 364; Theodore Roosevelt, 2346; Secretary Baker, 1235.
78 Secretary Davis, 683. * &
* General Patrick, 532; Edw. Rickenbacker, 2167–2168; Lieutenant Arnold, 714; Lieut. Leigh Wade,
707–708, 703—704, 706; Lieutenant Commander Edwards, 1322; Captain Land, U. S. Navy, 1329,
75 Admiral Moffett, 1587; Commander Whiting, 1464.
OPERATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES AIR, SERVICES 39
flying has “no common ground with the other forms of air training.””
The point is also made of the special naval training necessary for
take-off and alighting on aircraft carriers’ decks, etc.” It is within
the recollection of all that such maneuvers were first demonstrated
by airmen trained on land before our naval air service existed.
Evidence is also given on the special training required for adjust-
ment of naval gunfire,” radio,” smoke screens,” observation,” and
bombardment.”
It would seem from the evidence, or its lack, that artillery adjust-
ment, bombing, screening, radio, and other functions of air operations,
whether over water or i. are identical or practically the same.
Where special knowledge, such as recognition of types of vessels, and
other, is necessary, proficiency therein would naturally be acquired
through training with the Navy and with the Army, as proposed in
the unified air service plan, to which this evidence is offered in
objection.
It is not believed that Navy aeronautics differs in principle from
Army aeronautics. The general functions of military aircraft and
their employment are in the main the same, whether over water or
OVer i. Should coast defense be definitely charged to the Army,
or to the unified air service, aviators will doubtless be employed over
both elements and will use both types of airplanes or amphibians
interchangeably.
TYPES AND MODELs of PLANES
Naval testimony was introduced to show principal differences
between Navy and other aircraft, pointing out that seaplanes and
flying boats are º to be wrecked if forced to alight on land, and
land planes will be lost if forced to alight in the water, and that
land airplanes must be especially designed and strengthened for use
in the Nº. over water when launched from catapults and arrested
by special devices when alighting, while Army airplanes have ample
fields in which to operate.*
Other testimony mentions housing on board ship, the necessity
for minimum size, corrosion, seaworthiness, limited number of
types,” special instruments for navigation, knowledge of naviga-
tion, etc.
Other testimony was to the contrary.”
It would seem the best airplane for similar purposes over land or
sea does not differ in characteristics except in those minor modifica-
tions adapting its alighting gear, etc., to use on shipboard or airdrome
as the case may be. The same aerodynamic principles apply and
skillful operation of the airplane, no matter how modified, is meas-
78 Admiral Moffett, 1587, 361, 386; Commander Whiting, 1464; Lieutenant Commander Edwards, 1319,
§ §ptain Land, U. S. Navy, 1329; Secretary Baker, 1235; Roosevelt, 2346; Lieutenant Holcombe,
77 Theodore Roosevelt, 2346.
78 Admiral Moffett, 1584, 383; Lieutenant Commander Edwards, 1326; Captain Land, U. S. Navy,
1329; Lieutenant Holcombe, U. S. Navy, 2188.
79 Admiral Moffett, 385.
40 Admiral Moffett, 384.
81 Lieutenant Commander Edwards, 1324, 1325, 1318; Admiral Moffett, 384; Theodore Roosevelt, 2346.
84 Admiral Moffett, 384.
88 Admiral Moffett, 385, 361; Brassey's Naval Annual, 1585; Commander Mitscher, 1488, 1486.
* Admiral Moffett, 361, 385, 386; Theodore Roosevelt, 2349; Commander Richardson, 1489, 1490; Com-
mander Whiting, 1476; Secretary Wilbur, 371.
88 Major Milling, 2258, 2259; Admiral Moffett, 400; Major Walsh, 1707.
40 OPERATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES AIR SERVICES
ured by ability as a pilot rather than other special qualifications of
either K. or Army personnel.
It is to be noted that in the recent races the Army and Navy had
identical planes which won both land and water contests, changing
from land to water gear without difficulty, Navy pilots flying land
planes and vice versa.
In actual service planes it is noted that the Army and Navy have
different models for practically the same missions and it is not ap-
parent to the committee that these differences, attended by increased
cost in experimentation, design, and production, are sufficiently im-
portant to support the theory of extraordinary requirements for naval
aircraft. It is noted that the British, French, and Italian Govern-
ments have unified production.
One is familiar with the fact that wheeled airplanes take off in
about the same distance whether on land or aircraft. carrier. Pro-
Vision of arresting or launching gear and proficiency in its operation
does not seem to require knowledge peculiar to naval officers.
It is recalled that the adjustable and reversible propeller has been
designed and tried on land airplanes for the same purpose of arrest-
ing flight as well as for improving get-away with load and other ad-
Vantages.
It is conceivable that in future it may be necessary in operations
from land, either military or civil, to take-off and alight in confined
Spaces or mountainous country. The universal propeller, portable
launching gear, and arresting systems may doubtless be as important
On land as at sea. -
It is considered, too, the Army makes use of water aircraft, and
such must, it would appear, have similar qualities and character-
istics as especially demanded for water aircraft of the Navy.
The development of the amphibian plane may indicate a possible
reduction in types of planes.
A centralization of the aircraft procurement and production
organizations of the Government could result in greatly increased
efficiency and economy without detriment to the technical interests
of any operating department.
AIRD ROMES
Much of the advantage in all air transport, whether of passengers
or goods, must be lost when airdromes are located at considerable
distances in point of time of ground travel from the cities which they
Se]"We.
Where Government airways are in operation, the nearest available
location should be selected. In the case of New York City, the Gov-
ernment owns Governors Island, which should be the New York
terminal for the post-office air service and in the case of Chicago
Grant Park should be the post-office terminal for Chicago.
Similar use should be made of other Government property, simi-
larly located, as other Federal airways may be put into operation
and Government airdromes and fields should be available to private
aviation enterprises.
OPERATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES AIR SERVICES 41
TECHNICAL DEVELOPMENT
Study and experimentation should be conducted toward the reduc-
tion in size of such airway terminals, actually and through the de-
velopment of launching and arresting devices, adjustable and re-
versible Pºlº, design of aircraft, and the like.
There will be great objection to the noise now made by open
exhausts, and efficient mufflers should be developed.
Illumination of fields, signaling systems, night flying beacons,
directional radio, or other forms of guidance should be improved.
The service of the Weather Bureau to aerial navigation should be
enlarged to meet requirements of military and civil flight as the lack
of proper meteorological data for aeronautics has caused and will con-
tinue to cause many fatal crashes. The loss of personnel and equip-
ment amounts to many times the cost of this service.

I N D. E X
A
IPage
Accidents and fatalities due to obsolete and poorly designed planes—Reid- 29
Acquiring title to patents------------------------------------------- 7
Activities, administration of Government aircraft.---------------------- 4
Activities of committee-------------------------------------------- 1.
Adaptability of land and sea planes—Reid---------------------------- 39
Administration, duplication------------------------------------ –––– 5
Administration of Government aircraft activities-------------------* = ~ * 4
Advanced training planes----------------------------------------- -- 22
Aerodynamic principles same for land and sea planes—Reid------------ 39
Aerodynamically inferior, war surplus equipment---------------------- 4
Aeronautical Board a coordinating body—Reid----------------------- 27
Aeronautical terms, definitions of Reid------------------------------ 26
Aeronautics as a naval problem, naval–Reid------------------------- 38
Aeronautics, at present, civil–Reid---------------------------------- 28
Aeronautics, definition-Reid--------------------------------------- 26
Aeronautics has no school-Reid------------------------------------ 29
Aeronautics not given proper valuation—Reid------------------------ 28
Aºuties not properly represented on General Board or General Staff— 29
€10-----------------------------------------------------------
Aerostation, definition-Reid--------------------------------------- 26
Aid to commercial aviation, Government----------------------------- 20
Aids to commercial aviation---------------------------------------- 8
Air, Assistant Secretary of, in War, Navy, and Commerce-------------- 6
Air College-Reid-------------------------------------------------- 31
Air Corps-Reid------------------------------- * - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 28, 33
Air-------------------------------------------------------------- 33
Aircraft
Activities, administration of Government------------------------ 4
Compels revision of military plans------------------------------- 5
Essential arm of military defense-------------------------------- 5
First resort in case of war-------------------------------------- 5
Government expenditures in------------------------------------ 2, 15
Industry + 4 + diminishing, * * * will soon practically dis-
*PPear----------------------------------------------------- 17
Industry entirely inadequate----------------------------------- 17
Importance of ----------------------------------------------- 5, 18
Military value of present--------------------------------------- 21
Supremacy over ships—Reid----------------------------------- 37
Versus surface vessels----------------------------------------- 5
Air defense, present system of—Reid-------------------------------- 26
Airdromes-Reid------------------------------------------------- 40
Air effort, duplication of-Reid------------------------------------- 35
Air force-Reid--------------------------------------------------- 28
Definition—Reid--------------------------------- ------------- 26
First line of defense–Reid------------------------------------- 29
For Army-Reid---------------------------------------------- 25
For Navy-Reid---------------------------------------------- 25
Separate----------------------------------------------------- 6
Unified------------------------------------------------------ 6
Air forces lack defined policy--------------------------------------- 4
Air mail forward-looking and progressive---------------------------- 20
Airplane necessary auxiliary and defender of battleship---------------- 5
Airplanes, new, Navy, $19,000,000---------------------------------- 3
Airports, Governors Island and Grant Park-------------------------- 8
44 INDEX
Page w
Air power-Reid-------------------------------------------------- 29
Defined------------------------------------------------------ 29
Not appreciated.---------------------------------------------- 17
Retarded condition-------------------------------------------- 5
Through curtailment of Army and Navy------------------------- 6
United States not higher than third nor lower than fifth------------ 5
Value of Reid----------------------------------------------- 29
Air Service:
Army, men stay in flying service–Reid-------------------------- 28
Coffin advocates new—Reid------------------------------------ 24
Definition-Reid---------------------------------------------- 26
Navy, more complicated—Reid--------------------------------- 27
Policies------------------------------------------------------ 5
Representation on General Staff and General Board--------------- 9
Air services:
Charges against----------------------------------------------- 10
Deteriorated as to equipment and morale------------------------ 4
Air terminals, lack of—--------------------------------------------- 7
Air trust:
Alleged------------------------------------------------------ 2
Discussion--------------------------------------------------- 10
Not proven--------------------------------------------------- 2
Air transport advantages lost—Reid--------------------------------- 40
Airway terminals, reduction in size–Reid---------------------------- 41
Airways, lack of—------------------------------------------------- 7
Alarming situation in Army and Navy Air Services------------------- 17
Alleged charges--------------------------------------------------- 1
Allocation of appropriations to be by law---------------------------- 9
Alternative to department of national defense—Reid------------------ 25
Amphibian-Reid------------------------------------------------- 40
Annapolis cadets to fly as passengers–Reid-------------------------- 27
Antiaircraft efficiency--------------------------------------------- 5
Antiquated planes------------------------------------------------ 4
Appendix A:
Referred to-------------------------------------------------- 2
Manufacturers’ Aircraft Association and save-harmless clause------ 10
Appendix B:
Referred to-------------------------------------------------- 4
Governmental expenditures in aircraft.--------------------------- 15
Appendix C:
Referred to-------------------------------------------------- 5
The Lassiter Board report------------------------------------- 17
Appendix D:
Referred to-------------------------------------------------- 5
Importance of aircraft.----------------------------------------- 18
Appendix E:
Referred to--------------------------------------------`------ 7
The aviation industry----------------------------------------- 19
Appendix F:
Referred to-------------------------------------------------- 7
Competitive selection of types---------------------------------- 21
Appendix G: Military value of present aircraft ----------------------- 21
Appropriation:
Allocations to be by law--------------------------------------- 9
Cut out of proportion for Air Service---------------------------- 17
Program, five-year-------------------------------------------- 9
Appropriations:
Twenty per cent of profit alleged in------------------------------ 10
Less than 20 per cent for industry------------------------------- 10
Arm, flying as a distinct—Reid-------------------------------------- 37
Army-Reid------------------------------------------------------ 27
Army Air Service:
A combatant branch of Army–Reid----------------------------- 27
Alarming condition in------------------------------------------ 17
Definition-Reid---------------------------------------------- 26
Like Artillery, Infantry, coast defense in Army—Reid-------------- 27

Procurement of equipment only 10 per cent----------------------- 3
INDEX
45
Army and Navy:
Determine fields of operation for-----------------------
Had identical planes in recent races—Reid---------------
Have never been able to get together on Lassiter report
Landing fields available to civilian aviation--------------
Less burdensome under certain conditions----------------
Operating factories-----------------------------------
Army aviation:
Discrimination in promotion and pay--------------------
Expenditures, 1920–1924-------------------------------
Army expenditures---------------------------------------
Army functions, from shore bases–Reid---------------------
Army industrial college–Reid------------------------------
Army planes---------------------------------------------
Arresting gear-Reid--------------------------------------
Assistant secretaries of air in departments-------------------
Attack planes--------------------------------------------
Authorities on importance of aircraft.------------------------
Aviation, commercial-------------------------------------
Aviation Corps in Army and Navy-------------------------
Aviation:
Definition-Reid-------------------------------------
Expenditures, Army and Navy, 1920–1924--------------
Industry--------------------------------------------
Industry essential part of national defense---------------
Not recognized as more hazardous----------------------
Aviators, train additional----------------------------------
Award to design of greatest excellence----------------------
Battleship, aircraft lessened importance of.------------------
Bidding:
Competitive, not to be required------------------------
Destructive system of competitive----------------------
Bids:
Due notice of…--------------------------------------
Insufficient time for----------------------------------
Time inadequate-------------------------------------
Birkenhead, Lord, quoted.---------------------------------
Bomber planes-------------------------------------------
Board:
Aeronautical–Reid-----------------------------------
Shanks, of 1922–Reid--------------------------------
Budget cut out of proportion for Air Service-----------------
Budget, separate, all inclusive, for each of air services
Bureau of Aeronautics—Reid------------------------------ *
Definition-Reid-------------------------------------
Bureau of Standards, greater use of ------------------------
Capital deterred-----------------------------------------
Causes of deterioration of air services-----------------------
Causes of weakness of industry----------------------------
Central system of supply—Reid----------------------------
Charges against aircraft industry and air services- - - ---------
Charges alleged------------------------------------------
Charges of corruption, not the slightest ground for-----------
Chicago, Grant Park an airport----------------------------
Civil aeronautics at present—Reid - – -----------------------
Civil departments operating air craft—Reid -----------------
Civilian industry, Government aviation larger---------------
Civilian industry to build new planes-----------------------
Civilian secretary of national defense-----------------------
Coast defense:
Bombarded-Reid-----------------------------------
Conflict of opinion-----------------------------------
Effect of aircraft on–Reid----------------------------
Page
46 INDEX
Coffin advocates new air service—Reid - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
College, air-Reid-------------------------------------------------
Command:
Flying officers in-Reid----------------------------------------
Unity of T-Reid-----------------------------------------------
Commercial and export trade not developed - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Commercial aviation-----------------------------------------------
Lags, reasons why---------------------------------------------
Regulation and encouragement of -------------------------------
Commercial encouragement, five-year program - - - - - ------------------
Committee:
Activities----------------------------------------------------
Findings-----------------------------------------------------
Members----------------------------------------------- Face
Recommendations---------------------------------------------
Competing, Federal Government cease-------------------------------
Competition by Government---------------------------------------
Competitive bidding:
Disastrous---------------------------------------------------
Destructive system of.-----------------------------------------
Not to be required--------------------------------------------
Competitive selection of types--------------------------------------
Concurring report by Mr. Reid, special------------------------------
Conditions, unsatisfactory, in Air Service not due to cross-license or save-
harmless clause-------------------------------------------------
Conservatism-Reid-----------------------------------------------
Consolidation of air services under Secretary for air—Reid------------
Conspiracy, not proven--------------------------------------------
Construction, duplication------------------------------------------
Construction program, five-year------------------------------------
Continuing program-----------------------------------------------
Continuity of orders, lack of.---------------------------------------
Continuity of policy lacking in Army and Navy-----------------------
Continuity of production, money not spent for------------------------
Contracts, unreasonable terms--------------------------------------
Contractors, lack of mutual confidence------------------------------
Controversial review of testimony with foot-note references—Reid - - - - - -
Coolidge, President, quoted.----------------------------------------
Cooperation, provides for, with department of national defense----------
Coordinated functions, independent and—Reid------------------------
Coordination of air service under unified air service–Reid -- - - - - - - - - - - -
Coordination of defense--------------------------------------------
Coordination sporadic----------------------------------------------
Corps, air-Reid--------------------------------------------------
Corps, aviation---------------------------------------------------
Corrosion-Reid--------------------------------------------------
Corruption:
Discussion---------------------------------------------------
No evidence among officers Or industry---------------------------
Court of Claims:
Expense and delay--------------------------------------------
Inventions unable to seek redress in -----------------------------
Procedure a substantial denial of rights-------------------... — — — - - - -
Relief for patentees other than in -------------------------------
Creighton, C. Frank, auditor and clerk------------------------- Face-
Criticism, adverse, by flying officers—Reid ---------------------------
Cross-license:
Argument and workings discussed-------------------------------
Alleged a fraud-----------------------------------------------
Agreement explained-------------------------------------------
Investigated nine times----------------------------------------
Not cause of unsatisfactory conditions---------------------------
Curtailment of Army and Navy to build air power-------------- - * ~ + - -
* }
Page
.
;
:
;
2
i
2.
:
INDEX 47
D
Defects, points out glaring defects—Reid - - - - - ----------------------- 24
Defense:
Coast-Reid------------------------------------------------- 36
Department of ---------------------------------------------- 7
Of air, intrusted to Army and Navy—Reid - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 26
Of sea, intrusted to Navy—Reid-------------------------------- 26
On land, intrusted to Army—Reid - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 26
Deficient in quantity of equipment---------------------------------- 4.
Definitions of aeronautical terms—Reid------------------------------ 26
Definition of unified air service–Reid - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 30
Department of Justice sustained legality of cross license---------------- 2
Department of national defense------------------------------------- 6, 7, 9
Alternative to-Reid------------------------------------------ 25
Recommended by committee as a whole–Reid -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 24
Departments operating or using aircraft—Reid----------------------- 28
Design rights not recognized----------------------------------------
Design, rights to, recognized ---------------------------------------
Destroy obsolete and unsafe planes----------------------------------
Destroy unsafe airplanes-------------------------------------------
Deterioration of air services ---------------------------------------
Determine fields of operation for Army and Navy---------------------
Development, technical—Reid--------------------------------------
Developments to be preceded by engineering surveys------------------
Diagram showing secretary of national defense referred to—Reid -- - - - -
Discontent in Army aviation---------------------------------------
Discrimination against flying officers—Reid - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Discouragement of personnel---------------------------------------
Discrimination in pay and promotion in Army aviation---------- - - - - -
Distinct arm, flying as a+Reid -------------------------------------
Duplication in coast defense–Reid----------------------------------
Duplication of air effort—Reid--------------------------------------
Duplications, prevent, with department of national defense------------
Duvall, General, quoted.-------------------------------------------
2
:
:
1
8
Economy, efficiency, and strength with department of national defense--
Educated naval officers—Reid --------------------------------------
Education program, five-year---------------------------------------
Effect of aircraft on coast defense—Reid-------------------- — — — — — — — — —
Enlistment discouraged by inferior equipment - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Engineering surveys-----------------------------------------------
Engines, Liberty, sell at moderate price------------------------------ 7,
Equipment and facilities for reserve flyers----------------------------
Equipment:
Peterioration-------------------------------------------------
New, etc., Army Air Service, $4,450,000 annually - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Expenditures in aircraft, Government-------------------------------- 2,
Expenditures, reduce, with department of national defense-------------
Experimental and research work, Army and Navy, $30,000,000_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Experimental types, Navy--------------------------------- :- — — — — — — —
.
:
1
2
Facilities, lack of—------------------------------------------ ------- 7
Faust, Charles L--------------------------------------------- Face I
Federal regulation of air traffic—Reid------------------------------- 27
Field activities, duplication----------------------------------------- 5
Fields of operation for Army and Navy, determine -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 9
Findings of committee--------------------------------------------- 1–8
Findings of Lassiter Board----------------------------------------- 4, 17
First line of defense, air force–Reid--------------------------------- 29
Fisher, Alexander M., investigator and statistician- - - ------------ Face 1.
Five-year program------------------------------------------------ 9
Flying as a distinct arm-Reid------------------------------------- • 37
73728–25f 4
48 INDEX
Page
Flying duties—Reid----------------------------------------------- 37
Flying officers in command–Reid----------------------------------- 38
Flying personnel, General Board lacks------------------------------- 6
Flying same over land or water—Reid------------------------------- 38
Foch, Marshal, quoted.--------------------------------------------- 19
Free speech-Reid------------------------------------------------ 34
Friction, lessen, with department of national defense - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 8
Function, how a unified air service would–Reid---------------------- 25
Functions duplicated.---------------------------------------------- 7
Functions, multiplicity of, in Army and Navy------------------------ 7
Fundamental document, Lassiter report a---------------------------- 18
Fullam, Admiral, quoted.------------------------------------------- 19
G
General Board, Air Service representation on------------------------- 9
General Board and General Staff—Reid------------------------------ 29
General Board lacks flying personnel-------------------------------- 6
General Staff:
Eighty-eight members, but two with flying experience_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 17
Air Service representation on----------------------------------- 9
Piscussed---------------------------------------------------- 16
Lacks flying personnel----------------------------------------- 6
Neglected possibilities of aviation------------------------------- 16
Government: *
Aid not offered-Reid----------------------------------------- 27
Aid to commercial aviation------------------------------------- 20
Aids should be furnished—Reid--------------------------------- 28
Aids were given railroads, highways—Reid - - - - - - - - - - ------------- 28
Aircraft activities, administration of ---------------------------- - 4
Airdromes and fields available to private enterprises—Reid--------- 40
Aviation industry larger than civilian industry-------------------- 4
Is concerned as to aircraft industry------------------------------ 19
Should encourage commercial aviation in every practical way------- 20
Should not engage in any business which private enterprise can do as
Well or better----------------------------------------------- 15
'Governmental expenditures in aircraft------------------------------- 2, 15
Governors Island an air port--------------------------------------- 8
Governors Island an air port—Reid--------------------------------- 41
Grant Park an air port-------------------------------------------- 8
Grant Park an air port–Reid -------------------------------------- 40
Groves, General, quoted.------------------------------------------- 19
Guidance should be improved—Reid -------------------------------- 41
H
High command opportunities, deprived of---------------------------- 5
Housing on board ship—Reid.-------------------------------------- 39
How a unified air service would function—Reid -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 25
H. R. 192, Mar. 24, 1924------------------------------------------ 1
- I
Importance of aircraft--------------------------------------------- 5, 18
Importance of aviation industry------------------------------------ 19
Independent and coordinated functions—Reid --- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 31
Industry: *
Aviation----------------------------------------------------- 6, 19
Charges against----------------------------------------------- 10
Causes of weakness-------------------------------------------- 6 :
Greatly decreased since war------------------------------------ 7
Had capacity of 21,000 planes end of war------------------------ 19
Has capacity of perhaps 1,200 planes now------------------------ 20
Inadequate to meet peace and war time needs-------------------- 17
Languishing-------------------------------------------------- 10
Liquidating-------------------------------------------------- 2
Must be maintained------------------------------------------- 6
INDEX
Industry—Continued.
Mutual confidence lacking------------------
Starved to death--------------------------
sºme ºr amº sº mº as sº sº sº sº, º ºsm ºme ºm, ºms sºme mºs. = * *
To be assisted in procurement of noncommercial supplies_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
To build new planes-----------------------
Unsatisfactory conditions------------------
Inertia-Reid--------------------------------
Inquiry; scope of.-----------------------------
Inspection of airplanes-------------------------
* º ºsº gº ºn º ºs ºm º º ºs º ºs º ºsm ºmº ºm º ºx º'
* * * * * * * * * * ame º ºsmº assº amº as amº am sº sº.
* * * *-* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
Interchange of effort with department of national defense--------------
International Air Convention not ratified—Reid—-
Investigations, destructive of enterprise----------
Inventors, relief other than in Court of Claims----
Jack of all trades–Reid-----------------------
kerr, Admiral, quoted.-------------------------
Lack of facilities and services-------------------
Lampert, Florian, chairman--------------------
*º tº ºr tº º º 'º - sº º smº -> * - ºms º º º ºsmº º
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
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* * * * * = * * *-ºs = * * * * * * * * * *
* * * * * * * * * = ** * * * - Face
Landis recommends unification of national defense—Reid--------------
Lassiter Board:
Convened in 1923-------------------------
Findings substantially true to-day-----------
Investigated status of Air Service-----------
Program-Reid---------------------------
Quoted.----------------------------------
Lassiter Board report--------------------------
Army and Navy unable to agree------------
Launching gear—Reid-------------------------
Law, Bonar, quoted.---------------------------
Laws already passed, State and municipal—Reid--
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *ss º
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* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
Lea, Clarence F---------------------------------------------- Face
Legality of cross license sustained---------------
Legislate fields of operation for Army and Navy-----------------------
Legislation:
Needed for commercial aviation-------------
No changes as result of Lassiter Board_--_ _ _ _
* * * *-* * * * *-* * * * * * * * * * * * *
* * * *-* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
Not proposed to Congress from Lassiter report--------------------
Liberty engines:
Sell at moderate price---------------------
To be sold at moderate price---------------
Licensing of pilots-----------------------------
Life expectancy of flying personnel—Reid--------
Lighter than air, Navy, $2,500,000--------------
Lines, lack of—--------------------------------
“Los Angeles”--------------------------------
Losses on contracts----------------------------
Lowering of morale in Navy aviation------------
Manufacturers’ Aircraft Association-------------
Manufacturers Aircraft Association:
Alleged a trust----------------------------
Lawful-----------------------------------
Open to all for $1,000 and royalty-----------
Marine Corps—Reid--------------------------
McCook Field and Fairfield, 1,200 men----------
McCook Field, pay roll, $2,000,000--------------
Mechanics to maintain airplanes----------------
Mechanics to be relieved of routine military duties
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
•= ** * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
* - * * * * * * * * * * * * *m amº ºm º ºsmº º
* * * * * * * & sº mº mimº sº º my ºr * * * * *
wº- ºgº ºn mº sº, º mºm º ºs m.º. ººm sm ºmº ºms &m tº * * * *
* * * * * * * *-* * * * * * * * * * * * *
* * *-* = * * * *-* - smº - ºr *-* * * * * * * *
* =º º sº sº º mº & º º mº º 'º º 'º dº E *-* tº sº-
* * * * * * * * * sº me me tº am, sº me º ºs ess sº
* = a- * * * = * * * * * * * * * * * * =
* * * * * * * * * = ** = * * * * * * *mº sº.
* = * * * * * * *e ams sºme ºs m sº * * * * = as
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
* * * * * * * * * * * * * = * * * * * *
* * * = ** *-ºs tº º ºm º º sºme ºms, sº º sº ºm º ºr º
sº gº -ºº º- º ºs º º sº º º 'º -º ºr * *-* -- * * *
37
18
50 INDEX
.
:
.
.
*
Page
Members of committee--------------------------------------- Face 1
Members of committee signing report-------------------------------- 9
Meteorological data—Reid----------------------------------------- 41
Meteorological service, lack of.------------------------------------- 7
Military aeronautics, definition–Reid - - - - - - - - - - - - ------------------- 26
Military organizations designed for national defense------------------- 7
Military value of present aircraft------------------------------------ 21
Mitchell recommends department of national defense; air, water, and
land subsecretaries–Reid---------------------------------------- 24
Models of planes, types and—Reid---------------------------------- 39
Moffett, W. A., letter to Hon. C. F. Lea re planes and training---------- 23
Morale in Navy aviation, lowering of-------------------------------- 5
Morale lowered because of equipment-------------------------------- 4
Motor, Liberty, sell at moderate price------------------------------- 7, 9
Mufflers should be developed—Reid-------------------------------- 41
N
National Advisory Committee expenditures, 1920–1924- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
National defense, department of ----------------------------------- 6, 7, 9
National defense department, alternative—Reid - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 25
National Guard—Reid--------------------------------------------- 27
Naval aeronautics as a naval program—Reid - – ----------------------- 38
Naval aircraft factory:
One thousand one hundred men--------------------------------- 4
Pay roll, $2,200,000------------------------------------------- 4
Naval cadets must be competent naval officers as well—Reid -- - - - - - - - - 28
Naval flying should demand specialization—Reid - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 28
Naval problem, naval aeronautics as a-Reid----- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 38
Navigation, knowledge of Reid ------------------------------------ 39
Navigation instruments—Reid-------------------------------------- 39
Navigational and other aids to commercial aviation- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 8
Navy and Army:
Determine fields of operations of ------------------------------- 9
Less burdensome under certain conditions------------------------ 7
Navy and Marine Corps—Reid------------------------------------- 27
Navy and War Departments to spend not less than $10,000,000 each
annually------------------------------------------------------- 9
Navy air service: ar
Alarming condition in----------------------------------------- 17
Definition–Reid---------------------------------------------- 26
Navy aviation expenditures, 1920–1924- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 3
Navy expenditures-------------------------------- F- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 15
Navy expenditures, indirect, $57,000,000----------------------------- 3
Navy functions from mobile bases at sea—Reid -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 36
Navy, has absolute command of its air force–Reid-------------------- 25
Navy planes----------------------------------------------------- 23
Navy, promotion and pay------------------------------------------ 5
Need to be strengthened both in personnel and material---------------- 21
New aircraft, insufficient supply–Reid------------------------------ 29
New York City, Governors Island, an air port------------------------ 8
Noncompetitive bidding------------------------------------------- 8
Not properly equipped to protect ourselves--------------------------- 21
Nucleus of industry necessary-------------------------------------- 19
O
Objection less to air corps plan—Reid - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ------------- 33
Objections merely unwarranted anticipation of difficulties—Reid-------- 31
Objections to Lassiter program—Reid------------------------------- 34
Objections to unified air service–Reid------------------------------- 30
servation planes------------------------------------------------ 22
Obsolescent types, Navy------------------------------------------- 23
Obsolete and unsafe planes, destroy--------------------------------- 4
Obsolete types, Navy---------------------------------------------- 23
Officers in command, flying—Reid - - - - - ----------------------------- 38
Older services of lessened importance—Reid------------------- ------- 29
INDEX
On order planes, Navy---------------------------------------------
Operating, Army Air Service, $12,000,000 annually--------------------
Operating factories, Army and Navy--------------------------------
Operation, separate from procurement-------------------------------
Operations in air subject for intense specialization—Reid---------------.
Operations Navy Air Service like submarines—Reid-------------------
Opinions of Attorney General as to cross license-----------------------
Opportunity for high command, deprived of- - - - - - - - - - - - - - ------------
Opportunity, inequality of—-----------------------------------------
‘Organization for unified air service–Reid ----------------------------
Organizations, number of, decreased with department of national defense-
'Organizations, tactical, under Lassiter program—Reid-----------------
O'Sullivan, Patrick B------------------------------------------ Face
Overhead decrease with department of national defense----------------
P
Patent acquirement not satisfactory to Government or patentee---------
Patents, acquiring title to--------------- ---------------------------
Patent legislation suggested.-----------------------------------------
Pay and promotion in Army aviation, discrimination------------------
Pay and promotion, Navy------------------------------------------
Pay of Army Air Service, $9,000,000 annually-------------------------
Pay roll, McCook Field--------------------------------------------
Pay roll, naval aircraft factory, $2,200,000---------------------------
Performance and quality unexcelled------------------- *-------------
Period of Service, training—Reid------------------------------------
Perkins, Randolph--------------------------------------------- Face
Personnel detailed in Navy and Marine Corps temporarily—Reid - - - - - - -
Personnel, discouragement of ---------------------------------------
Personnel stay in Army Air Service for life—Reid---------------------
Pilots, training for reserve------------------------------------------
Planes:
Antiquated---------------------------------------------------
Built since war-----------------------------------------------
First line, Second-line, and third line-----------------------------
In commission------------------------------------------------
In storage----------------------------------------------------
Larger proportion are war-built---------------------------------
, Observation, bomber, pursuit, attack, and training- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
On hand, Army, September 30, 1924-----------------------------
Serviceable for limited purposes---------------------------------
Should be destroyed.-------------------------------------------
To be reconditioned at $5,000 each--- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Types and models of Reid------------------------------------
War-built----------------------------------------------------
Policies, Air Service-----------------------------------------------
Policy, lack of defined policy---------------------------------------
Post Office Department, excellent work------------------------------
Prall, Anning S---------------------------------------------- Face
Present aircraft, military value of -----------------------------------
Present system of air defense—Reid---------------------------------
Procurement and production—Reid---------------------------------
* Centralized—Reid---------------------------------------------
Procurement, duplication------------------------------------------
Procurement of equipment, only 10 per cent in Army Air Service- - - - - - -
Procurement of noncommercial supplies------------------------------
Procurement policy, no standard------------------------------------
Procurement, research, etc., Army Air Service, $8,600,000 annually------
Procurement separate from operation--------------------------------
Procurement, single agency for--------------------------------------
Procurement, sound policy of—--------------------------------------
Production, procurement and—Reid---------------------------------
IProfits:
Excessive, not found-------------------------------------------
From appropriations-------------------------------------------
2
.
3
1
52 INDEX
Program: Page.
Five year---------------------------------------------------- 9.
Lassiter Board-Reid------------------------------------------ 33
Promotion and pay: &
In Army aviation, discrimination------------------------------- 6.
Navy-------------------------------------------------------- 5.
Promotion and retirement uniform and equalized with department of
national defense------------------------------------------------- 8
Promotion, pay, etc., provide against inequalities and injustices as to--- 9
Promotion, retirement, replacement—Reid--------------------------- 32
Promotion with unified air service–Reid----------------------------- 32
Propeller, adjustable and reversible–Reid---------------------------- 40.
Proprietary rights not recognized------------------------------------ 15.
Purpose of recommendations to end duplication—Reid----------------- 24
Pursuit planes---------------------------------------------------- 22.
Q
Quality and performance unexcelled--------------------------------- 4
Quantity of equipment, deficient------------------------------------ 4
Quartermaster, Army Air Service, $5,000,000 annually----------------- 3
Question of coast defense must be settled—Reid----------------------- 36,
R.
Recommendations 1 to 23------------------------------------------- 8–9
References to testimony in review of hearings—Reid------------------- 29,
Regulation and encoufagement of commercial aviation----------------- 8
Regulation of interstate flying--------------------------------------- 7
Reid, Frank R----------------------------------------------- Face . 1
Reid, special concurring report by Mr-------------------------------- 24
Relative standing of United States in air power----------------------- 5.
Release date December 14, 1925--------------------------------- Title-page.
Reluctance and hesitation affect air power---------------------------- 5
Remedies advocated----------------------------------------------- 6.
Remedies to be provided for injustices and inequalities----------------- 9
Reorganization, indicate need of complete–Reid---------------------- 24
Replacement, promotion, retirement—Reid--------------------------- 32
Report by Mr. Reid, special concurring------------------------------ 24
Report should show how air force should be organized—Reid----------- 24
Report, the Lassiter Board----------------------------------------- 17
Report, unanimous------------------------------------------------ .23
Representation on General Staff and General Board-------------------- 9
Research and technical work through Bureau of Standards-------------- 8
Research duplication----------------------------------------------- 5
Reserve Corps—Reid----------------------------------------------- 27
Reserve flyers:
Adequate equipment and facilities------------------------------- 9
Get insufficient training–Reid---------------------------------- 28
Reserve pilots training--------------------------------------------- 9.
Reserve training planes-------------------------------------------- 22
Reserves privilege of filing further views, Mr. Reid-------------------- 23
Retirement, replacement, promotion—Reid-------------------------- 32
Review of testimony on unified air service, etc.—Reid - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 26,
Review of testimony with footnote references—Reid------------------- 29,
Richardson, J. Frederick, chief consulting investigator------------ Face p
Rogers, William N------------------------------------------- Face 1
Rumors and charges, destructive influence--------------------------- 2.
- S
Save-harmless clause---------------------------------------------- 1, 10.
A result of legislation------------------------------------------ 14
Alleged authority to steal patents.------------------------------- 12
Basicly sound------------------------------------------------ 2
In accord with law-------------------------------------------- 2, 12
Not cause of conditions---------------------------------------- 14
Puts law in simple language------------------------------------ 14
Works incidental hardship------------------------------------- 2 :
INDEX 53
• * Page
Save-harmless clauses used for many years--------------------------- 13
Scope of inquiry-------------------------------------------------- 1.
Seaworthiness-Reid---------------------------------------------- 39
Secretary of national defense--------------------------------------- 9
Duties of Reid---------------------------------------------- 24
With three branches—air, Army, Navy—Reid -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 25
Selection of types, competitive-------------------------------------- 21
Separate air force------------------------------------------------- 6
Service, lack of—-------------------------------------------------- 7
Service types, Navy----------------------------------------------- 23
Serviceable only for limited purposes-------------------------------- 4
Serviceable planes, Navy------------------------------------------- 23
Shanks Board of 1922–Reid--------------------------------------- 32
“Shenandoah”--------------------------------------------------- 3
Sims, Admiral, quoted.--------------------------------------------- 19
Single agency for procurement-------------------------------------- 8
Single department of national defense-------------------------------- 9
Effects of --------------------------------------------------- 8
Special concurrning report by Mr. Reid------------------------------ 24
Specialized naval nature–Reid ------------------------------------- 38
Speech, free-Reid------------------------------------------------ 34
State and municipal laws already passed—Reid------- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 28
Strategic missions, coordinated or independent—Reid------ - - - - - - - - - - - - 25
Subsidies granted in other countries--------------------------------- 7
Sundry, supply and—Reid----------------------------------------- 32
Supply and sundry—Reid------------------------- -a, - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 32
Surface vessels versus aircraft--------------------------------------- 5
Survey, condemn and destroy obsolete and unsafe airplanes_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 9
Surveys, engineering----------------------------------------------- 8
Suspicions unfounded---------------------------------------------- 2
System of air defense, present—Reid - - - ----------------------------- 26
T
Tactical organizations under Lassiter report—Reid - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 33
Technical development—Reid-------------------------------------- 41
Terminology-Reid ----------------------------------------------- 26
Terms, definitions of aeronautical—Reid -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 26
Thoroughly indoctrinated with naval ideas—Reid--------------------- 38
Time too limited for bids----------------------------------------- 21
Title to patents, acquiring----------------------------------------- 7
Trade not developed---------------------------------------------- 6
Train additional aviators------------------------------------------- 9
Training:
Duplication-------------------------------------------------- 5
For reserve pilots--------------------------------------------- 9
Of reserves discouraged by inferior equipment - - ------------------ " 4
Period of service–Reid---------------------------------------- 27
Training planes--------------------------------------------------- 22
Training program, five-year---------------------------------------- 9
Types and models of planes—Reid---------------------------------- 39
Types:
Competitive selection of--------------------------------------- 21
Essential not developed---------------------------------------- 4
U
Unanimous report------------------------------------------------- 23
Understanding, promote, with department of national defense-- - - - - - - - - 8
Unified air force ºleºnt of Army and Navy, sending units to them-- 6
Unified Air Service–Reed ----------------------------------------- 28, 29
Definition-Reid---------------------------------------------- 26
Objections to-Reid------------------------------------------- 30
Would function, how—Reid------------------------------------ 25
Unified production, British, French, and Italian–Reid.I.I.I.I.I.I. 40
Uniformity, of policy, none in Army and Navy----------------------- 5
United Air Service–Reid------------------------------------------ 28
54 INDEX
* * * Page
United States behind in commercial aviation- - - - --------------------- 7
United States not higher than third nor lower than fifth- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 5
'Unity of command—Reid------------------------------------------ 35
i. of-Reid------------------------------------------------ 29.
Unserviceable planes, Navy---------------------------------------- 23.
United States Air Service, definition—Reid--------------------------- 26.
V
Value of air power-Reid------------------------------------------ 29
Value of present aircraft, military----------------------------------- 21
Vestal, Albert H---------------------------------------------- Face I
Vocations, aeronautical–Reid-------------------------------------- 37
W
Weather Bureau service-Reid-------------------------------------- 41
West Point cadets to fly—as passengers—Reid------------------------ 27
War surplus, Army Air Service, $14,000,000 annually------------------ 3
War surplus equipment aerodynamically inferior---------------------- 4
War surplus material, Navy, $46,172,893---------------- - - - - - - - - - - - - 3
War Department convened Lassiter Board in 1923-------------------- 4
War-built planes, larger proportion are------------------------------- 4
War and Navy Departments to spend not less than $10,000,000 each
annually------------------------------------------------------- 9.
Lili
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3 9015
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TY OF M
ÖC 30, 1937
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