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I) Cº.
3o4
, H & 7.3
G E R MAN ARTILLERY
A SELECTION FROM
HENRY S. KING & 00'S LIST OF MILITARY WORKS,
–0–
Russia's Advance Eastward. By Lieut. STUMM. Trans, by Lieut. C. E. H.
VINCENT, 1 vol. crown 8vo. With a Map.
The Volunteer, the Militiaman, and the Regular Soldier; a Con-
servative View of the Armies of England, Past, Present, and Future, as seen
in January 1874. By A PUBLIC School Boy. I vol. Crown 8vo. 5s.
The Operations of the First Army under Steinmetz. By Von Schell.
Trans, by Capt. E. O. Hollist. Demy 8vo. Ios. 6d.
The Operations of the First Army under Gen. Von Goeben. By Von
SchELL. Trans. by Col. C. H. Von WRIGHT. Four Maps. Demy 8vo. 9s.
The Operations of the First Army in Northern France against Faid-
HERBE. By Col. Count HERMANN Von WARTENSLEBEN. Trans. by Col.
C. H. Von WRIGHT. Demy 8vo. 9s.
The Operations of the Bavarian Army Corps. By Capt. Hugo HElvig.
Trans, by Capt. G. S. SCHWABE, 5 large Maps. Demy 8vo. 2 vols. 24s.
Austrian Cavalry Exercise, By Capt. Illia Wojnovits. Trans, by Capt.
W. S. CookE. Crown 8vo, cloth, 7s.
Victories and Defeats. An Officer's Manual. By Col. R. P. ANDERson.
Demy 8vo. 14s. w
The Frontal Attack of Infantry. By Capt. LAYMANN. Trans, by Col.
EDWARD NEW DIGATE. Crown 8vo, limp, 2s. 6d.
Elementary Military Geography, Reconnoitring, and Sketching. By
Lieut. C. E. H. VINCENT. Fop, 8vo, limp, 2s. 6.
Studies in the New Infantry Tactics, Parts I. & II. By Maj. W. Von
SCHEREFF. Trans. by Col. LUMLEY GRAHAM. 7s. 6d.
Tactical Deductions from the War of 1870–71, Second Edit. By Capt.
A. Von BoguslawsKI. Trans. by Col. LUMLEY GRAHAM. Demy 8vo. 7s.
The Operations of the South Army in January and February 1871,
By Count HERMANN Von WARTENSLEBEN. Trans, by Col. C. H. Von
WRIGHT. Demy 8vo. Maps. 6s.
The Army of the North-German Confederation. By a Prussian GENE-
RAL. Trans, by Col. EDw ARD NEWLIGATE. Demy 8vo. 5s.
The Operations of the German Armies in France, from Sedan to
the End of the War of 1870-71. By Maj. W. BLUME. Trans, by E. M.
Jon Es. Demy 8vo. 9s.
Hasty Intrenchments. By Col. A. BRIALMont. Trans, by Lieut. C. A. Empson,
R.A. Demy 8vo. Nine Plates. 6s,
Studies in Leading Troops. By Col. Von VERDY Du VERNois, Trans, by
Lieut. H. J. T. HILDYARD. Parts I. and II. Demy 8vo. 7s.
Cavalry Field Duty. By Maj.-Gen. Von MIRus. Trans, by Capt. FRANK S.
RUSSELL. Crown 8vo, limp. 7s. 6d.
HENRY S. Kl NG & CO., 65 Cornhill and 12 Paternoster Row,
CAMPAIGN OF 1870–1871
THE
G E R MAN ARTILLERY
IN THE BATTLES NEAR METZ
COMPIZ, ED FROM THE OFFICIAL REPORTS OF THE ART/L LER Pº
--~~
.4° ** RY
\ ,”-
E: HOFFBAUER
cAPTAIN IN THE PRUSSIAN ARTILLERY, AND INSTRUCTOR IN THE
ARTILLERY AND ENGINEER ACADEMY
TRANSLATED BY CAPTAIN HOLLIST, R.A.
DEl’ARTMENT OF ARTILLERY STUDIES
W M T H MA PS 4 AV D PI. A MS
HENRY S. KING & Co.
65 CoRNHILL & 12 PATERNOSTER ROW, LONDON
1874
(A l l rig his 2 & served)
CONTENTS.
--O-O-O-
PAGE.
EVENTS FROM AUGUST 4 TO THE BATTLE OF BORNY ſº & ... I
BATTLE OF BORNY, AUGUST 14 e e * . . g & I I
MOVEMENTS ON AUGUST 15 . t ty & tº te g * . 47
BATTLE OF MARS LA TOUR, AUGUST 16 g tº ſº t 59
Movements ON AUGUST 17. te e e § tº ſº . I 47
BATTLE OF GRAVELOTTE, AUGUST 18 . ſº . I 57
APPENDIX.
ORDER OF BATTLE, GERMAN ARMY . tº e º , 34O
LIST of CASUALTIES, BORNY . tº * t g tº • 352
AMMUNITION EXPENDED, BORNY tº ſº * o te 354
LIST OF CASUALTIES, MARS LA TOUR . º e º . 355
AMMUNITION ExPENDED, MARS LA TOUR. tº * † ſº • 359
LIST of CASUALTIES, AND EXPENDITURE OF AMMUNITION ON
AUGUST 17 . º ſº o tº ſº tº g tº g , 373
LIST OF CASUALTIES, GRAVELOTTE . tº t o , 360
AMMUNITION EXPENDED, GRAVELOTTE . § º 37o
ORDER OF BATTLE, FRENCH ARMY . e * & t º , 374
* : * gº
sº 569 99
SKETCH
of the approximate Positions ºf the I* and II* German
and ºf the franch Armies on the 14 August 1870
shortly before the Commencement of the battle.
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Scale :
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ZŽe shaded &/ocks indica/e, the APench, armies.
Z%e, ozººey's 4/ke, 6'er/rvazv.
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Že Araße 4/.e. &ra/ºr /ćrisions.
A. Adranced 6 ward.
Henry S. King & Co. 65 Cornhill,I,0ndon.






THE GERMAN ARTILLERY
IN THE
BATTLES NEAR METZ.
FIFST PART.
I.
EVENTS FROM THE 4TH OF AUGUST TO THE
BATTLE OF METZ ON THE I4TH.
THE affair of Weissenburg on the 4th of August was followed
by the victorious battles of Wörth and Spicheren on the 6th.
MacMahon's army was shattered at Wörth. Pressed by the
Third German Army, under the command of H.R.H. the Crown
Prince, its fragments hurried without halting to the Moselle;
they dared not reassemble even behind the line of the Saar.
After its defeat at Spicheren the army of Napoleon was com-
pelled to retreat rapidly on Châlons. A portion of the 6th
Corps, which should have arrived on that battle field by train,
was turned back. More deliberate reflection resulted in the
French Army of the Rhine retiring behind the Nied.
The Germans now determined to march with concentrated
forces on the Seille and Moselle, for it was expected that, behind
these rivers, the French would collect their armies for a decisive
battle. To effect this it was necessary to make a complete wheel
to the right, the First Army forming the pivot; consequently
the Third Army would have to make very long marches, while
those of the First Army would be short. So much the more
necessary was it that the advance of the First Army should be
B
(X
2 The German Artillery.
stayed," because the Second required time to reach the line of the
Sarre in its forward march ; and the Third Army had to fear no
danger and scarcely any effective resistance from the flying
enemy, weaker in numbers as well as in moral.
The intention of the French to fight a battle with their
forces concentrated behind the Nied was not realised. Accord-
ing to the journal of Lieut.-Col. Fay, the French head-quarters
received on the IOth of August information generally correct
as to the strength and plans of the three German armies. That
the plan was abandoned must be attributed to this information,
and not alone to the weak points presented by the position on the
Nied, counterbalanced though they were by Some advantages.
It was determined then to retire to the camp at Metz, which,
on the advance of the German armies towards Paris, would
serve as a base for flank operations. Consequently the French
army, on the I Ith of August, took up the following positions
in front of Forts Queuleu and St. Julien :—
The left wing of the 4th Corps rested on the Moselle, the
right on the ravine of Vallières—astride the road to St. Barbe:
the 3rd Corps in the centre stretched from that point to Grigy,
astride the Saarbrück road, and in front of the village of Borny:
the 2nd Corps in front of Queuleu, on the high ground above
the village of Peltre, from the Strasburg road to the front of
Magny sur Seille. Lapasset's brigade occupied the château and
the approaches to Mercy le Haut, where the engineers had
intrenched the ground to strengthen this important point.
The 6th Corps, arriving gradually from Châlons, encamped
partly on the right bank of the Moselle near Montigny, and
partly on the high ground near Woippy. The Guard was in
reserve to the left of Borny; the 3rd Division of the Cavalry
Reserve, which had reached Metz on the 9th of August, en-
camped at Montigny. The Ist Division of the Cavalry Reserve,
with three regiments of the Chasseurs d'Afrique as well as the
supply parks of the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Corps, were on the island
of Chambière.
The line of French outposts, which was actually maintained
* The prosecution of the forward movement on the part of the First Army
alone, after the battle of Spicheren, would have exposed it to the numerically superior
forces of the adversary, and also to the danger of being beaten when isolated.
Preliminary Operations. 3
up to the commencement of the battle of the 14th of August, ran
(looking from the French position) forward from Magny by Peltre,
Jury, Ars-Laquenexy, Château d'Aubigny, Montigny, Montoy,
Noisseville, Servigny and Poix, as far as the Moselle. All these
places were occupied by French troops. The rain, which had
fallen heavily on the previous night and on the morning of the
11th, had seriously inconvenienced the troops. Marshal Mac-
Mahon reached the Moselle on the I Ith of August, and on
the 14th the 5th Corps (de Failly) was at Lamarche, the re-
mainder of his army being at Neufchâteau.
Meanwhile the German armies had resumed offensive opera-
tions. The I2th of August brought them to the German
Nied and south of that river and a great part of the cavalry
further to the west. Smaller detachments of cavalry succeeded
in destroying the railroad at Nancy and Maxville. A similar
enterprise at Pont à Mousson failed on the first attempt, but
telegraphic communication between Metz and Nancy by Thion-
ville was interrupted on the I Ith. The Third Army reached
the obstacle of the Saar on the 12th, and a portion of the
cavalry and the left wing followed the track of MacMahon's left
wing beyond it.
The German First and Second Armies found the French
Nied, and the Third Army the Saar, unoccupied by the enemy.
Extensive camps, which were seen in front of the forts of
Metz on the right bank of the Moselle, left no doubt of the
presence of considerable bodies of troops there. The French
army did not appear as yet to have relinquished all idea of
offensive action, reinforcements having been continually brought
up by the Châlons railway. Obviously MacMahon could en-
deavour, at least with a part of his army, to effect a junction
with the Emperor Napoleon on the left bank of the Moselle.
Under these circumstances the Germans decided on a rapid
and decisive course of action. To force the camp of Metz, in
order to obtain a decisive result, was out of the question ; the
only course to be pursued was to outflank the enemy, preventing
at the same time any forward movement on his part. A passage
of the Moselle to the north of Metz, which appears to have been
greatly feared at that time by the French, could only serve a
secondary object, as the destruction of the railway to Thionville,
R 2
4. 7%e German Artillery.
or as a demonstration. The following considerations pointed to
a passage of the Moselle south of Metz, and especially at
Pont à Mousson:-
The general direction of the roads;
The direction of the railway from Metz to Châlons ;
The intention of penetrating between the armies of Metz and
of MacMahon ;
The desire of preserving communication with the Third
Army, whose general direction was prescribed by its pursuit of
Marshal MacMahon. -
The task of preventing any forward movement on the
part of the enemy in front of Metz fell naturally to the First
Army; that of outflanking him on the south, to the Second
Army. A strong pressure on MacMahon's left wing would
eventually be effected to check his movements in a northerly
direction, but it was also certain that the enemy would not wait
inactive for the completion of the turning movement, as soon as
he became aware of it.
The French army could avoid being surrounded either by a
retreat on Verdun, or by an offensive movement in a southerly
direction on either side of the Moselle. A retreat on Verdun
would give up a large extent of Country without a battle, but on
the other hand would bring about a junction with MacMahon,
with the troops at Châlons, and with those on the march to
that place. If commenced at the right moment such a move-
ment could scarcely be interrupted. In both cases a possibility
of success was opened to the inferior numbers of the French by
assuming the offensive at the moment when the German armies
stood astride the Moselle and Seille. The configuration of
the ground on the right bank of the Moselle was more
favourable to an offensive movement than that on the left bank,
but the French army would there be exposed to an attack by
superior forces. On the left bank neither the form of the
ground nor the direction of the roads favoured such a movement,
but it possessed these advantages—a safe retreat behind the
Meuse in the event of failure, and a nearer approach to the
direct railway communication between Metz and Châlons and to
MacMahon's army. In either case it was important to assume
Preliminary Operations. 5
the offensive at the right moment, for which purpose it would
be necessary to occupy the principal passages of the Moselle by
detachments of all arms. Offensive operations on the left bank
seemed under existing conditions to offer the best chance of
success, but an immediate evacuation of the right bank of the
river was necessary in order to reach the plateau of Gravelotte.
The Germans were however compelled to maintain an offensive
attitude on the right bank, the French army being yet on that
side of the river. Consequently it was incumbent on the German
army to select points of passage over the Moselle beyond the
reach of the nearest fort, and instantly seize Pont à Mousson the
most important of them ; to prosecute the flank march with the
Second Army without delay, and in such a way as to preserve its
communication with the First Army so that it should be ready in
conjunction with that army to meet any offensive movement on
the right bank of the Moselle; to reach the Moselle with an
extended front at several points of passage simultaneously ; and
to conceal the whole movement as much as possible, which it
would be able to do by means of its strong body of cavalry.
Let us now glance at the German operations previous to the
battle of the 14th of August. The First Army arrived on the
I3th on the French Nied, which was crossed by the advanced
parties of the advanced guard.
Head-quarters of the Army at Varige.
On the I3th and until the commencement of the battle, the
line of the Prussian outposts ran along the front of the villages
Orny, Laquenexy, Colligny, by the ‘Maison isolée' and Reton-
say to St. Barbe. The army was disposed as follows:–
IST ARMY CORPS.
Head-quarters at Courcelles-Chaussy.
IST INFANTRY DIVISION (Lieut.-General von Bentheim):
main body and corps artillery at Courcelles-Chaussy;—advanced
guard (Major-General Freiherr von Falkenstein): 2nd Infantry
brigade, 1st Rifle battalion, 1st Dragoons, Ist field division
(Major Munk) at Pont à Chaussy; main body of the outposts
6 The German Artillery.
(Colonel von Busse), with the 1st Light field battery, at the
Tuileries de Landremont."
2ND INFANTRY DIVISION (Major-General von Pritzelwitz):
main body, to which were attached the 5th and 6th Heavy
batteries of the 3rd field division (Major Müller), at Landon-
villers;–advanced guard (Major-General von Memerty): 44th
regiment of infantry, two squadrons of the IOth Dragoons, 5th
and 6th Light batteries of the 2nd field division, in front of
Les Étangs.
VIITH ARMY CORPS,
Head-quarters at Pange.
ADVANCED GUARD (Major-General Baron von der Goltz):
26th Infantry brigade, 7th Rifle battalion, 8th Hussars, 5th and
6th Light batteries of the 3rd field division at Laquenexy.
13TH INFANTRY DIVISION (Lieut.-General von Glümer), to
which were attached the 5th and 6th Heavy batteries of the 3rd
field division (Major Wilhelmi), at Pange.
I4TH INFANTRY DIVISION (Lieut.-General von Kamecke) at
Domangeville.
CORPS ARTILLERY at Bazancourt.
3RD CAVALRY DIVISION (Lieut.-General Count von der
Groeben), to which the 1st Horse Artillery battery of the 7th
Westphalian field artillery regiment was attached, at Bry,
patrolling beyond St. Barbe.
IST CAVALRY DIVISION (Lieut.-General von Hartmann), to
which was attached the 1st Horse Artillery battery of the 1st
East Prussian field artillery regiment, at Pontoy, with patrols
towards Frontigny and Orny. On the left of the 1st Cavalry
Division at Orny lay the foremost troops” of the advanced
guard of the 18th Infantry Division (Colonel von Brandenstein):
two battalions of the 36th regiment of infantry, two squadrons
of the 6th Dragoons, the 2nd Light battery of the 1st field
* Throughout this work the larger unit of troops is written with a capital initial,—
Division. A division of artillery consisted of four batteries,—two Heavy (6 pr.) and
two Light (4 pr.). —TRANS.
* These troops arrived on the evening of the 14th, and are consequently included
in the detail of the army.
Preliminary Operations. 7
division of the 9th field artillery regiment. The main body
of this Division was at Buchy. These positions were held by
the First Army until the battle on the 14th.
The Second Army occupied the following positions on the
14th —The IIIrd Army Corps, Chéminot—Vigny; the 6th
Cavalry Division pushed forward towards Metz, supported by
the IIIrd Army Corps;
The IXth Army Corps at Buchy;
, XIIth , y y Solgne ;
, Xth yy 5 y Pont à Mousson,
with its advanced guard pushed forward beyond the river;
The 5th Cavalry Division at Thiaucourt and towards the
road Metz—Verdun ;
The Guard Corps—head-quarters at Sivry, main body at
Arreye, advanced guard at Thionville, cavalry further forward ;
The IVth Army Corps at Manhoué, advanced guard at
Armancourt;
The IInd Army Corps at Faulquemont;
Head-quarters of the army at Pont à Moussºn.
The Third Army stood on the 14th with the IInd Bavarian
Army Corps at Mojenvic;
The 4th Cavalry Division being advanced in the direction of
Nancy;
The Vth Prussian Army Corps at Einville, supported by the
Wurtemberg Division;
The XIth Prussian Army Corps at Luneville;
{ 12th Infantry Division at Dieuze;
y) I Ith 92 y 9 , Hening;
, Ist Bavarian Army Corps at Bourdonnay.
The execution of the plans above detailed is seen in these
operations:—
1. The flank march by the Second Army was in progress and
in part completed. Three army corps (the IIIrd, IXth, and XIIth)
and the 6th Cavalry Division stood in the Ist line facing
Metz, ready to make head against offensive operations in a
southerly direction. The remainder of the Second Army had ap-
, VIth }}
* The leading troops of the advanced guard reached Bermecourt, Flixy, and
Thiaucourt.
8 The German Artillery.
proached the Moselle by rapid marches in rear of that position,
and the most important passage of the Moselle, Pont à Mousson,
was already occupied.
2. The First Army, in its position on and beyond the French
Nied, was in contact with the enemy; and being in communi-
cation with the Second Army, was so situated that it could co-
operate with it, should the enemy assume the offensive. .
3. The Third Army was pursuing vigorously with its left
wing. Its right was held back, was in communication with the
Second Army, and in position to support it, should Bazaine press
it back by an offensive thrust on the right bank of the Moselle.
With regard to the part played by the cavalry in masking
these movements the following words dictated, and possibly
written, by Napoleon may be cited.’ ‘The Prussians concealed
their movements so successfully behind the formidable veil of
cavalry which they threw before them in all directions, that
the position of their main body was never really known.'
The French Commander in Chief is moreover censured, ap-
parently with justice, for never having endeavoured to pene-
trate this veil. It is true detachments up to the strength of
single Squadrons were habitually sent out for reconnoitring
purposes; but they had little chance of obtaining their object
in face of the masses of cavalry employed by the Germans for
objects of security and reconnaissance. There is no mention
whatever of the French having employed whole cavalry divisions
either of the reserve or army corps for reconnoitring in force.
The destruction of the railways and telegraphs on the left bank
of the Moselle above Metz was a warning to the French head-
quarters to look seriously at their own position.
The council of war assembled on the I2th decided for re-
treat on Châlons, which received the sanction of the Emperor.
According to Fay's account, the want of sufficient supplies and
ammunition appears conclusively to have determined him to
give up the project of remaining with the army in the camp at
Metz. On the same day Napoleon yielded to the pressure
of public opinion and laid the command in the hands of
Marshal Bazaine.
" Campagne d. 1870: des Causes qui on amend la Capitulation de Sédan. Par tº:
offcier attaché à l'Eſat Major-Généra/. Bruxelles: S. Rozez.
Preliminary Operations. 9
The 13th ought to have given the French army a greater
insight into the existing state of German operations. Commu-
nication between Metz and Paris by Nancy was interrupted,
Pont à Mousson in German hands, the transport of troops from
the camps at Châlons discontinued ; slight collisions had taken
place between the outposts at Château d'Aubigny and in the
forests near Mercy le Haut. On the approach of the Germans
the inhabitants flocked out of the villages, hurrying with bag
and baggage towards Metz and causing great confusion there.
With regard to the garrison of Metz, it was decided that the
Division Laveaucoupet of the 2nd Corps should form the nucleus,
and to it were to be joined four battalions, the national guard,
Sendentary guards, and men unable to march, formed into
several detachments.
On taking over the command, Marshal Bazaine, in accord-
ance with the decision of the council of war, received orders to
cross the Moselle forthwith, in order to lead his troops towards
the plains of Champagne.
Since the loss of the pontoon train at Forbach the means of
throwing bridges over the Moselle were scanty, and had to be
supplemented by trestle bridges. The sudden rise of water in
that river and the Seille during the night between the 12th and
I3th had, however, partially destroyed some of the trestle bridges
which had been commenced and sunk the shore-ends of others.
Consequently the commanding engineer of the army considered
it impossible to commence the passage of the river before
the morning of the 14th.
Marshal Bazaine, according to his own account, represented
to the Emperor Napoleon the danger of the movement across
the river. He proved that, owing to the propinquity and
watchfulness of the enemy, it might be the cause of bringing
On a battle under conditions unfavourable to the French
army; that it was preferable either to await an attack in
the Selected position near Metz, or to assume the offensive
on the right bank of the Moselle at the moment the enemy
was executing his flank march. In the event of success,
he intended to march with the Army of the Rhine to
Frouard, and take up a position on the plateau of Haye, between
IO The German Artillery.
Nancy and Toul, which would command the eastern railway.
To this Napoleon replied, on the 13th, by forwarding a despatch
from the Empress, which confirmed a rumour already brought
to his notice that the march of German troops towards Nancy
was merely a demonstration in that quarter. It spoke also of
the intention of Prince Frederick Charles to unite with General
von Steinmetz and to pass the Moselle below Metz in the neigh-
bourhood of Thionville, in order to march round the Army of
the Rhine in that direction; and it inferred that the junction
with the Crown Prince would consequently be effected near
Verdun. On the ground of this report, which bore on its face
the stamp of improbability, the Emperor again urged on the
immediate passage of the army to the left bank, and Bazaine
considered it his duty to execute this renewed order with the
least possible delay.
I I
II.
BATTLE OF METz (COURCELLES.–BORNy) ON THE I4TH
OF AUGUST, I870.
1. The movements of the French Army of the Rhine on the
I4th ºff to the commencement of the battle.
IT is remarkable that the night of the 13th of August passed
away without any of the numerous trains being passed over
the river by means of the two available stone bridges and the
railway bridge.
The orders published on the evening of the 13th were still
in force. ‘The army will be ready to march at 5 A.M. to-morrow.
Every man is to carry provisions for three days, and the In-
tendant-General is to take as many rations as possible, &c.’ An
order was indeed issued from head-quarters limiting the officers'
baggage to the utmost, but probably was not obeyed very
strictly, for Colonel Fay makes this a subject of reproach against
Marshal Bazaine ; and, indeed, according to French accounts
the Army of the Rhine resembled that of Darius in the amount
of its baggage.
The passage of the river was not commenced until early on
the I4th ; no wonder, then, that at four in the afternoon three
army corps were still on the right bank. On this subject Bazaine
says in his official report: “The movement of the troops should
have been from both wings, and so the semicircle which they
formed in front of Queuleu and St. Julien would have been
gradually diminished till they came under the protection of the
guns of Fort Belle Croix. The instructions on this head were
not adhered to, and the consequent delays brought on the battle
of Borny at a much greater distance from the line of ramparts
than would otherwise have been the case.’
I 2 7%e German Artillery.
2. Remarks on the field of battle.
(1) The battle field lay between two concentric arcs of
circles having Metz as a centre. The smaller arc extended
from Fort Queuleu by Borny to Fort St. Julien ; the larger by
Jury, Ogy, and St. Barbe to Vremy. Radii passing through the
Southernmost point of St. Julien and the northernmost point of
Quculeu formed the boundaries of the field on the north and
South respectively.
(2) The main position, occupied by the French at the be-
ginning of the battle, extended from Grigy by Grange aux Bois
to Colombey, and thence west of the defile of La Planchette—
Lauvallier by the wood of Mey to the chapel of La Salette on
the high road from Metz to Bouzonville. The position was
supported by the fortress of Metz, whose proximity allowed its
guns to take part in the battle. The works on this side were ;
—the strong permanent work of St. Julien, with its outworks
almost complete ; Fort Queuleu, as yet unfinished, whose arma-
ment, according to French accounts, was not ready on the day of
the battle ; and the fort of Belle Croix, to a certain extent serving
as a curtain to the other forts. The newly constructed lines
near Les Bordes were also adapted for the reception of guns.
St. Julien and Queuleu were of the utmost importance, as they
Supported the flanks of the position.
(3) The ground generally is undulating, hilly, and cut up by
ravines ; more open towards the north and east, but close towards
the South. The plateau of St. Barbe sends out two considerable
Spurs ; one beyond the eastern boundary of the battle field and
running parallel with it to a point South-east of Colligny, the
other towards Fort St. Julien. The western slope of the first
spur, with which we are most concerned, is richly furrowed by
the hollows formed by numerous streams converging in the
general direction of the roads and lanes to Metz. Between these
hollows the slope stretches out in long, narrow, and gentle spurs
falling away by steep inclines into the valley Ars-Laquenexy—
Colombey—Lauvallier, as well as into those parts of the neigh-
bouring defiles which are nearest to the main valley, the oppo-
site side of which also bears a similar character. It is impos-
Zaſłſe of Borny. I 3
sible for troops in close formation to cross the main valley
anywhere, on account of the vineyards covering the sides of the
hollows, and of the dense plantations of trees and hedges
running along the banks of the streams; and the lateral
defiles, for similar reasons, can only be traversed in their upper
parts, and even then the roads must be followed. Cavalry and
artillery are limited to the roads everywhere. The thick
plantations which extend throughout the valley from Ars-
Laquenexy to the north of Colombey and the great number
of small woods prevent artillery acting with efficiency. More-
Over it follows from the peculiar formation of the western slope
that there are many positions astride the high roads and lanes
fronting the west, where Small detachments of troops can make
a prolonged resistance to Superior numbers.
The other spur, bold and strongly marked, slopes away
gently from the plateau of St. Barbe to Fort St. Julien, has an
extensive command towards the west and south, and is the key
of the position. It folds round the valley of La Planchette—
ILauvallier, and would therefore take in flank any attack made
from the east in that direction. Close to its crest extends the
wood of Mey, which was not only of considerable importance
from its position, but possessed a great power of defence, being
thickly grown and artificially strengthened. On the north and
South this ridge has the appearance of a wall, and limits the
view in those directions. The northern slope of the spur to the
east of Villers l'Orme is unbroken, and is passable for all arms,
though difficult in some places. The western side is broken up
into long ridges and hollows, and is easier of access. The
southern slope, gentle in the high ground, becomes steeper
towards the lower, declining abruptly into the valley of Vallières
—Noisseville. In consequence of this sharp descent, and of the
existing vineyards, troops in close formation, marching either up
or down the hill, are confined to the roads.
The configuration of the valley of Nouilly resembles that of
Lauvallier—Colombey. Of more importance is the ridge, which
rises in gentle gradations from Ars-Laquenexy, and, curving
slightly to the west, extends to the north of Fort Queuleu. The
slope towards the stream of the Chenau is gentle, that on the
South and west more steep ; but the movcments of troops are
I4. The German Artillery.
there less hampered than among the vineyards which cover the
ground in front. The higher ground towards the west and
south, between Basse Bevoye and Mercy le Haut, commanded
and outflanked the French right wing, and this could not be
effectually prevented by Fort Queuleu, which is situated on a
lower level, and was still unfinished on the day of the battle.
An attacking force would gain a decisive advantage by the oc-
cupation of this ground, inasmuch as its configuration admits
of the employment of all arms.
The main position of the French army was a range of hills
in the shape of a horse-shoe, lying eastwards from Les Bordes
between the valley Colombey—Lauvalliers—Vallières and the
stream of the Chenau; it had a good command of the ground to-
wards the east, but was itself commanded from the south and
north. The position slopes gently towards the exterior of the
circle, and then, by falling sharply towards the valley, increases
the difficulties of that obstacle. There, on its southern and
steeper side, is the wood of Borny, thick with brushwood and
divided into two portions. The eastern portion, the scene of a pro-
tracted struggle, is remarkable for its dense underwood, want of
paths, and its artificial defences. The other was of importance
on account of the adjoining fir wood north-west of Colombey,
which formed a more remote although valuable support to the
position. On the inner side also the ridge falls away with an
easy slope, forming a gully, which affords sheltered positions
without impeding the manoeuvres of troops. The villages men-
tioned in the following account have massive stone houses with
tiled roofs, lying close to each other and surrounded with
orchards and gardens. The enceintes are enclosed by walls and
hedges. The isolated homesteads also bear the same character.
The natural convergence of the many roads and paths towards
Metz from the east is favourable to the concentration of advancing
troops; but, on the other hand, it facilitates the judiciously
timed employment of reserves by the defender from his con-
centrated position. The roads were generally firm and good,
but away from them the ground was heavy for guns, for the per-
sistent rain of the previous days had softened the clayey soil; and
especially was this the case on the slopes near Nouilly, Noisse-
ville, Montoy, La Planchette, and on the west of Coincy, &c.
P O S IT ION *
of the I* and II*German and frºnth armies at Metz On the BVEming Offiè15% Aſist
and in the night betweenthè15" and 18 August 1870.
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Battle of Borny. I5
The terrain on the whole offered more facilities for defence
than for attack, and had been carefully strengthened by numerous
intrenchments, abattis, shelter trenches, and batteries. Under
these circumstances artillery and infantry could act on the
defensive with advantage, though but slight opportunity was
presented for the effective employment of cavalry on either
side.
Let us now close the consideration of the field of battle with
a review of the French position.
Advantages: (1) A very formidable obstacle covering the
greater part of the position ;
(2) Extensive command of the ground towards the east,
where it was not intercepted by the village gardens and over-
grown hollows;
(3) Excellent sheltered positions for infantry and artillery;
(4) Numerous points of support in woods, homesteads, &c.;
(5) The possibility of keeping reserves and other troops under
cover until wanted ;
(6) The power of advancing for offensive action from the
flanks of the position with a broad front ;
(7) Safe retreat on the fortress in the vicinity;
(8) Co-operation of the guns of the fortress, more particularly
in support of the flanks.
Disadvantages: (1) The position being severed by the defile
of Vallières;
(2) The possibility of concealed attacks being made against
the right wing ;
(3) The wings resting on no good positions, the right being
completely exposed.
We arrive therefore at the conclusion that the flanks were the
weak points of the French position, more particularly the right
flank. It was extremely difficult to form any correct idea of
the position or to observe the effect of our fire owing to the
smoke, which lay thick, and to the fact that the sun shone on
the backs of the enemy and full in the faces of our troops.
As it sank towards the horizon these difficulties were propor-
tionally increased.
I 6 The German Artillery.
3. The attack by the advanced guard of the VII//, Army Corps—
Arrival of part of the Ist Army Corps in the line of battle—
Dispositions of the French at the beginning of the battle—
Furt/ler reinforcements to the Ist Army Corps and to the
I3//, /Jivision.
Towards 2.30 in the afternoon unanimous reports from the
cavalry patrols and outposts reached the advanced guard of the
VIIth Army Corps that the chemy was retiring from his camps
before Metz. General von der Goltz, who had received unofficial
information of the passage of a part of the ScCond Army over the
Moselle at Pont à Mousson in the morning, looked on the encry's
retreat as a consequence of that movement. A successful at-
tempt to delay the enemy on the right bank would disconcert
his plans, and Operate most injuriously on the passage of the
Army of the Rhine to the other banks. Thereupon General
von der Goltz decided to move forward with his advanced guard,
feel the enemy, and, if possible, compel him again to bring his
whole army into line. The commanders of the troops on the
flanks and rear-—Ist Army Corps, head-quarters and both divi-
sions of the VIIth—were made acquainted with this decision
and their eventual support requested.
General von der Goltz at once attacked (3.30 P.M.), for there
was no time to lose. The answers of the officers commanding
the troops came in during the engagement, promising their
co-operation. General von Manteuffel was close to the field of
battle, having ridden to the outposts at I.30 P.M., and was there
informed that the camps beyond Servigny and Borny were
broken up, and that that near Metz had become smaller. He
distinctly observed a considerable movement in the French camp,
and strong columns were seen on the march. Having watched
them for some time, he concluded from the direction of their line
of march and from the general Strategic state of affairs, that
the French intended to throw themselves either on the VIIth
Army Corps or on the Second Army, which they knew to be
in the act of crossing the Moselle." The general commanding
| The First Army had received orders to attack the enemy if he advanced towards
the south against the flank of the Second Army.
Battle of Borny. 17
consequently sent off his adjutants to put the troops on the
alert, so that they might be ready for immediate disposal.
After 4 P.M. General von Manteuffel heard guns in a southerly
direction, and the gradual increase of the firing told him that
a warm engagement was going on in that quarter. Presently
an adjutant ſrom General von der Goltz brought the news, already
mentioned, and the Ist Army Corps was ordered to push forward
rapidly by the two roads on which it was echeloned.
All this was reported to the Commander in Chief of the army,
and the general in command immediately issued orders for the
troops to attack vigorously and drive back the enemy, but not to
allow themselves to be drawn under the fire of the guns of the
fortress.
To return to the attack of General von der Goltz : The
column was preceded by an advanced guard under Colonel von
Delitz (1st and 2nd battalions of the 15th regiment, 6th Light
field battery, and one squadron of the 8th Hussars) in the
direction of Colombey, west of Marsilly, and was covered by the
7th Rifle battalion marching by Ars-Laquenexy. The main
body, under Colonel von Barby (Fusilier battalion of the 15th
regiment, the 55th regiment, and 5th Light field battery),
was directed on Marsilly, with its right flank covered by three
squadrons of Hussars between Marsilly and Ogy.
It was not intended to advance beyond Colombey at present.
The Hussars on the right flank soon had a slight skirmish with
the enemy's dragoons. On the repulse of the latter, the 5th Light
field battery (Captain Schreiber) was advanced to the west of
Marsilly, but as soon as it opened fire, the enemy, who showed
himself near Château d'Aubigny, withdrew." Our infantry
deploying meanwhile, moved on in pursuit, so that the 6th
Light battery under Captain Gasch, which had taken up a posi-
tion near Schreiber's battery, had no longer an object for its
fire. Some riflemen had also met with advanced parties of the
enemy's infantry near Ars-Laquenexy and pushed them back.
Advancing further, the right wing of the infantry came under a
heavy artillery fire in the defile of Coincy, which was opened on
* It was evident that the enemy's advanced parties, who alone had been visible
up to this time, were yielding easily to the determined attack of the advanced guard
of the VIIth Army Corps.
C
I8 The German Artillery.
it by the enemy. As the infantry advanced, so did the batteries.
Leaving its second position south of Coincy, Schreiber's battery
took up another to the south-west of that village, where
Schreiber had a horse killed under him. Gasch, under orders
from General von der Goltz, moved his battery into its second
position north of Château d'Aubigny, and after firing for a short
time against Some infantry in a thinly planted wood from 1,400
to 1,600 paces distant, it and Schreiber's battery engaged some
guns which appeared at a range of I,8OO to 2,400 paces. The
enemy brought up more and more artillery into position, so
that the batteries were overwhelmed with shell and shrapnel,
and were at the same time exposed to the fire of musketry.
Gasch's battery, however, alone suffered, Second Lieutenant
Dieterici being severely wounded ; and as the French guns had
now got the range and were making their more powerful and
accurate fire felt, the battery was obliged to change its position,
and retiring, placed itself on Schreiber's left. The commander
of the 3rd field division (Major Wilhelmi) on the staff of Lieut.-
General von Glümer, Soon afterwards arrived on the battle field
and took command of the two batteries.
Beyond Colombey the attack made by von der Goltz was
brought to a stand-still by the Superior strength of the enemy,
but not before it had attained its object. The zeal of some
of the infantry had carried them close to the small pine wood
north-west of Colombey; but there the brigade found it hard
to keep its ground, for the French continued to deploy heavier
masses and lead them to the attack. Intrenchments and
shelter trenches, together with the form of the ground, afforded
a protection to their infantry, while abattis barred the way
to the Prussians, now exposed to a deadly fire of small arms
added to that of large and continually increasing numbers of
guns and mitrailleurs.
While further reinforcements from the VIIth Army Corps
marched to the immediate support of von der Goltz's brigade,
the Ist Army Corps became actively engaged on its right flank.
The 1st Light field battery of the Ist East Prussian field
artillery regiment (Captain Hoffbauer) was permitted by the
commander of the advanced parties of the 1st Division to move
forward to the piquets of the outposts, which were then on the
Battle of Borny. I9
march. When near the ‘Maison isolée" on the Saarbrück high
road, it received orders from the general in command to come
into action on the right flank of von der Goltz's brigade ; and a
squadron of the 1st Dragoons was told off as its escort. A smart
trot soon brought the battery (4.45 P.M.) to its first position near
Colombey, which it took up with the sanction of the commander
of its division (Major Munk), who joined it at that moment.
Lieut.-General von Glümer, coming up at the same time, wished
the battery to be placed on the Saarbrück high road, but this could
not be immediately done, because the defile of La Planchette had
not yet been reconnoitred. Major Munk then left the battery
to order the other batteries of the division to the front. Only
a few rounds had been fired at the enemy's infantry seen on the
western border of the heights, when the infantry of the right
wing of von der Goltz's brigade rushed forward close to the small
pine wood immediately on the north-west of Colombey, and
masked the battery, which ceased firing. In the distance the
1st Dragoons and the Ist field division were now seen approach-
ing by the Saarbrück road, and Prussian infantry was advancing
in the defile Coincy—La Planchette. At that moment the enemy
attacked the troops occupying the pine wood, and surrounded
them with superior numbers. Under these circumstances Hoff-
bauer's battery (5 P.M.) moved to its second position on the Saar-
brück road, and opened fire with shell at 900–1,000 paces with
the object of extricating the infantry. A gun, capsized in cross-
ing the Coincy defile, soon came up into line. The enemy's
columns suddenly disappeared, and their place was taken by
long lines of skirmishers, one behind the other ; mitrailleurs
and guns also opened fire. For a few minutes the battery was
exposed to a heavy fire from skirmishers in the vineyards of
La Planchette adjoining the defile of Montoy, but opening fire
with case at 400 paces, it cleared the ground. The losses of
the battery were considerable. The battery commander was
severely wounded when taking up the position ; two officers,
Ganda and Ottzenn, were afterwards slightly wounded ; all the
officers' horses except one were killed or wounded."
At this moment riflemen and infantry from the advanced
* The captain's second horse, which had remained with the second line of waggons,
was severely wounded later in the day under Lieut. Krause.
C 2
2O The German Artillery.
guard of the 1st Division advanced through the defile of
Montoy, and strong reinforcements of artillery reached that
part of the battle field (5.15 to 5.30 P.M.) The three remaining
batteries of the 1st field division led by their divisional com-
mander, Major Munk, advanced at a trot and came into action
under a heavy fire of infantry, artillery, and mitrailleurs ; the
Ist and 2nd Heavy batteries (Captains von Horn and von
Selle) south of the high road, on the left front of the 1st
Light battery," which afterwards moved up into line ; the
2nd Light battery, Captain Puppel, on the left flank of the
heavy batteries, and somewhat retired owing to the con-
figuration of the ground. Major Wilhelmi placed the 6th
Heavy battery of the 7th Westphalian field artillery regiment,
Captain von Gostkowski, in a good position, with its right flank
resting on Montoy, and supported by a squadron of the 1st
Dragoons. Mention will be made below of the 5th Heavy
battery, which was brought into action on another part of the
field at the same time.
From the very beginning of the action all these batteries
between the defiles of Montoy and Coincy sustained heavy losses,
almost entirely from the fire of infantry and mitrailleurs.
Major Munk and Captain Puppel were so severely wounded that
they had to give up their commands respectively to Captain von
Horn and First Lieutenant Hardt. Lieutenants Hoffman and
Korsch were also wounded. First Lieutenant Stein and Second
Lieutenant Herford of von Horn's battery, as well as the
commander and Lieutenants Rettberg and Hauszmann of von
Gostkowski's battery, had horses killed under them. The objects
* In accordance with the desire expressed in a high quarter, some remarks are
here made about the fire of this battery. It opened fire at 800 paces. Nothing
could be seen except the smoke of concealed skirmishers and the flash of guns.
It was extremely diſficult to observe the burst of the 4-pr. shell, in consequence of
the position of the sum and the brisk fire of the enemy, so that it was not until
several shots had been fired that it became evident that the elevation was too
low. It was thereſore altered for 900, and afterwards for 1,000 paces, and at
both ranges hits appeared to be made. The correction was made by altering the
tangent scale marked with paces, with which the batteries had been provided shortly
beſore the beginning of the campaign, so that it was unnecessary to use the deſlec-
tion-scale. Twice after opening fire the battery had seen the enemy—once when
the skirmishers were driven up the slope in their rear by case, and aſterwards when
towards evening the enemy's artillery executed a flank march on the opposite ridge.
Then the guns and waggons showed out in dark outlines against the bright sky,
Battle of Borny. 2 I
aimed at by the batteries were nearly the same. The enemy's
artillery as well as infantry was shelled with great success at
ranges of from 800 to 1,000 paces by the nearer batteries, and
from 1,400 to 1,600 paces by the more distant batteries. The
batteries on the left wing mostly directed their fire on the
pine wood north-west of Colombey, where the infantry of the
13th Division was hotly engaged. When the battle com-
menced, the Ist battalion of the 44th regiment had moved
forward to the front line of the outposts for the purpose of
relieving the two squadrons of the IOth Dragoons attached
to the advanced guard of the 2nd Division, which were greatly
fatigued. This was consequently the first battalion of the
Ist Army Corps that appeared on the field of battle.
The batteries of the advanced guard, escorted by two squad-
rons of the IOth Dragoons, had, however, preceded it. The
5th Light field battery (Schweickart) and the 6th Light
(Dolmann) had taken up a position west of the line Montoy
—Noisseville (5–5. I 5 P.M.), the former north and the latter
south of the Saarbrück high road. A heavy fire from guns and
mitrailleurs under cover was directed on both batteries, without
causing them much loss, and they succeeded in materially
harassing some columns of infantry on the march from 2,500 to
3,OOO paces distant.
Meanwhile the 1st battalion of the 44th regiment had come
up, and was directed to march through Noisseville and round
the north of that village to Nouilly. The attack was supported
by the fire of the batteries, and, in spite of heavy losses, the
battalion drove the enemy back into the position of Mey.
“At the beginning of the battle,’ says the French official
account, “there were on the right bank only Grenier's Division,
forming the rear guard of the 4th Corps (General Ladmirault),
the 3rd Corps, and the Guard, which were to have been the last
to march.' General Decaen had previously directed his corps to
retire in echelons. This order was about to be put in execution,
when the piquets of Montaudon's and Castagny's Divisions were
so hotly attacked as to betoken the “prelude of a serious engage-
ment.” As soon as Marshal Bazaine was informed of this, he
ordered the 3rd Corps to resist the attack.
The French army then occupied the following positions:—
22 The German Artillery.
3rd CORPS (Decaen).
The 1st Division (Montaudon) had its right wing resting on
the Strasburg road in front of Grigy, its left on the wood of
Borny, which it occupied in force.
The 2nd Division (Castagny) occupied the plateau, which lies
to the north of Ars-Laquenexy and La Grange aux Bois, and
extends as far as the valley near the Château d'Aubigny.
The 3rd Division (Metman) had its right wing behind
Colombey and its left on the Saarlouis road.
The 4th Division (Aymard) extended thence to the defile of
Vallières.
4th CORPS (Ladmirault).
The 2nd Division (Grenier) extended from Mey to the
little chapel of La Salette."
The Guard was in reserve in front of the road Borny—
Vantoux ; Brincourt's brigade occupied the hill of Fort Queuleu
with the divisional batteries, for the support of the right flank
of General Decaen's Division.”
The French account states:—‘The whole of these divisions
were formed in two lines, the first deployed and the second
in columns of divisions. From the energy displayed by the
enemy opposed to Castagny's and Metman's Divisions in main-
taining a very brisk firc, there can be no doubt that it was his in-
tention to pierce the Centre of the 3rd Corps and seize the
Saarlouis road, which he considered to be our line of retreat. The
* According to other French statements, the brigade (Bellecourt) on the leſt ſlank
of the 2nd Division (Gremier) of the 4th Corps was posted in ſront of the wood of Mey
on the heights commanding the valley of Nouilly.
* French sources give but ſew details of this battle. The following inſorma-
tion about the French artillery has been discovered :—
I. Batteries of mitrailleurs were posted opposite the wood of Colombey.
2. The 4th Corps (Ladmirault) had posted batteries at an early hour so as to
sweep the defile of Nouilly and the ground near Servigny.
It is further stated that ‘Ladmirault's mitrailleurs directed an uninterrupted fire
against the enemy's infantry, which was pressing on in thick masses in the valley of
Nouilly.”
To this the writer can add from personal observation that a mitrailleur battery to
the north-west of La Planchette kept up a heavy fire on the ground in its ſront, and
especially on the defile of Montoy. The peculiar shrill noise of those machines
and the ricochet of the bullets, resembling that of case, leſt no doubt of the fact.
Battle of Borny. 23
battle had hardly commenced at this point when another attack
was directed at the same time against Grenier's Division of the
4th Corps.’ Whilst the Ist Army Corps attacked vigorously
on the right wing of von der Goltz's brigade, troops of the VIIth
Army Corps also marched up to its immediate Support.
The remainder of Glümer's Division, the 25th infantry
brigade, came up by Colligny on the right of von der Goltz's
brigade, to support it. Orders were then given to the two
heavy batteries to move rapidly to the front. As we already
know, Major Wilhelmi placed the 6th Heavy battery (von Gost-
kowski) close to Montoy. The 5th Heavy battery (Captain
Schnackenberg) received orders about 5. I 5 P.M. to Support the
infantry on the heights of Colombey, and marched under a
heavy fire of infantry to a position near the farm to the north-east
of Colombey. The fire of common and shrapnel shell from the
enemy was soon added to that of small arms. The pine wood
north-west of Colombey was shelled at a range of 1,000 paces
for ten minutes, and then the battery had suffered so severely
that ‘the service of the guns could no longer be properly
executed.’” It consequently retired. In this position Captain
Schnackenberg and First Lieutenant Baehr were severely, and
Second Lieutenant Borggreve slightly, wounded.” The guns
could only be withdrawn by the aid of the infantry and
with the greatest difficulty ; and the battery, commanded by
Second Lieutenant Rühle von Lilienstern, was afterwards
ordered to come into action on the left of Schreiber's battery.
4. Affairs of the advanced guard of the 2nd Division of Infantry
near Mey, of the 4th Regimenſ, and of the advanced parties
of the Ist Division of Infantry near Zauva//ier and La
Planchette—The enemy's left wing is extended—The two Jicavy
batteries of the 2nd Division of Infantry and the battery of
the 3rd Division of Cavalry come into action—Arrival of
the 25th Brigade of Infantry on the left flank near Colombey.
Meanwhile the advanced guard of the 2nd Division, con-
sisting of the two other battalions of the 44th regiment, ap-
1 Account of the 5th Heavy field battery.
2 Lieuts. Baehr and Borggreve afterwards died of wounds received in this action.
24 The German Artillery.
peared on the field of battle. With their assistance, in spite
of a heavy fire of mitrailleurs and of musketry supported by
that of artillery, possession was gained and retained of the
heights of Mey and of the wood near it. The main body of the
2nd Division had also arrived so near that its van formed by
the 4th regiment could be employed, and it therefore marched
forward at once to the left of the Saarlouis road. When General
von Mcmerty became aware that the right flank of the 44th regi-
ment was threatened, he ordered the fusilier battalion to march
round Noisseville towards the north to support it.
The other two battalions placed themselves across the high
road fronting Lauvallier, under a very heavy fire of artillery,
mitrailleurs, and infantry. The battle progressed but slowly.
But presently the 44th regiment fell in with some troops of
the 1st Division, which proved to be the advanced parties of
the division, consisting of the 43rd regiment and half a battalion
of rifles. Colonel von Busse had led them through the defile
of Montoy and to the north of it; and they now came into the
line of battle near La Planchette and Lauvallier.
A deadly contest ensued for half an hour, which resulted in
the Prussian infantry obtaining a firm grasp of the defile of
Lauvallier. About this time (towards 6 P.M.) the enemy's
left wing was extended. The commander of the 3rd field
division, Major Müller, who had come up during the action,
led Schweickart's battery (5th Light) into a position north-east
of Noisseville. Hostile infantry columns were indeed visible
from that spot, but were too distant to be reached with effect.
The battery therefore directed its fire with apparently good
results against the enemy's mitrailleurs at 1,800 paces, which
disappeared after a few rounds.
Soon afterwards the 1st Horse Artillery battery (Schrader) of
the 7th field artillery regiment came up, and placed itself in the
right rear of Schweickart's battery. When the alarm was sounded
at 5 P.M., this battery, with the 3rd Cavalry Division, broke up
from its bivouac at Bry, and marched by St. Barbe to the assist-
ance of the Ist Army Corps, which was already engaged. It
cannonaded the enemy's guns of the left wing at 2,300 paces
apparently with Success, but Soon left the position in conse-
quence of an Order from the 3rd Cavalry Division, which wished
to move further to the north.
Battle of Borny. 25
Nearly simultaneous with the arrival of this battery on the
field was that of the two field batteries of the 3rd field division
of the 1st regiment (a little before 6 P.M.). They had marched
with the main body of the Division as far as Les Étangs at a
walk, and then received orders to follow the advanced guard
on the high road at a trot. Major Müller posted the 5th Heavy
battery, Captain Grasz, on Schweickart's right, while for the
present he kept back the 6th Heavy battery, Captain Hellwig.
Hostile infantry columns were shelled at 2,500 paces, apparently
with Success, as was shown by their seeking cover in the in-
equalities of the ground.
‘About 5.15 P.M. the van of the 25th brigade reached the
field of battle, followed by the main body at 6 P.M. It was
ordered to attack the pine wood north-west of Colombey, the
light batteries of the 3rd field division preparing the way by a
vigorous fire.” Two battalions in close order were left west
of Coincy. Then the contest progressed slowly; the brigade
forming the advanced guard maintained its position in Colombey
with difficulty, and even the 25th brigade (Major-General von
Osten-Sacken) gained ground by slow degrees. About 6 P.M.
the fight became general, and the I3th Division, bringing up
the two battalions, which had been left behind, was hardly able
to resist the offensive thrust of its adversary.’
5. The corps artillery of both army com?s comes into line—Arrival
of the advanced guard of the Ist Infantry Division—Storm-
ing of the heights beyond the defile of Lauvallier, La
Planchette—Attack of the heights of May through the defile
of Lautvallier—The artillery of the Ist Infantry Division
crosses the defile of La Planchette—The French left wing is
reinforced and cattended—Capture of the wood of Borny by the
27th Brigade of Infantry and of the pine wood near Colomboy
by the 25th Brigade of Infantry—Arrival of the troops of the
18th Infantry and of the Ist Cavalry Division on the left wing.
Shortly after 6 P.M. the corps artillery of the Ist Army Corps,
under Colonel Yungé, arrived on the battle field. The alarm
* It seems as if ground had been gained by a charge of infantry.
* From the account of the VIIth Army Corps.
26 The German Artillery.
having been sounded at 5 P.M., it had been informed by Lieut.-
General von Bentheim that three ‘column-roads’ were available
for its use, so as to enable it to reach the fight as soon as
possible. Colonel Yungé made use of two roads; that South of
the high road for the two light batteries of the 2nd field divi-
Sion, and the high road itself for the remainder of the Corps
artillery. He led the way along the high road with the
horse artillery division (Major Gerhards) at a trot ; close in
rear followed the two heavy batteries of the 2nd field division
under Lieut.-Colonel Gregorovius. In accordance with an order
of the commander of the artillery of the Ist Army Corps, Major-
General von Bergmann, Colonel Yungé placed the horse artillery
division north-west of Montoy, on the left flank of Dolmann's
battery, with the 2nd Horse Artillery battery, Captain Crusc,
on the right, and the 3rd, Captain Schmidtke, on the left. They
Opened fire about 6. I 5 P.M. at 1,800–2, IOO paces on the enemy's
infantry and artillery in the direction of Vallières and Bellecroix
apparently with good effect.
The 2nd field division was unable, from want of space, to
take up a position south of the road for the purpose of enfilading
the enemy according to its orders. There was only room for
one battery on the left flank of the 1st field division, and
the 3rd Heavy battery, Captain Westphal, was directed to Occupy
it, finding itself therefore on the left of von Selle, but somewhat
too low down. Presently, however, von Selle moving to the
front, Westphal was able to occupy the better position thus
vacated, and directed his fire on the pine wood north-west of
Colombey. Lieut.-Colonel Gregorovius led the 4th Heavy
battery, Captain Iwentz, through the defile of Montoy, and,
shortly after the arrival of the horse artillery batteries, placed
it on a height in advance of their line. Two guns had stuck at
the foot of the steep, clayey slope, but were brought up later
into position. Hostile infantry was driven from the Opposite
ridge north of the Saarlouis road by common shell at a range
of 1,400 paces, and both infantry and artillery were fired at
apparently with similar success at from 2,OOO to 2,300 paces.
The enemy's artillery responded warmly with common shell
and shrapnel, but without effect.
Meanwhile the corps artillery of the VIIth Army Corps came
Aattle of Borny. 27
on the field (6.30 P.M.). Colonel von Helden-Sarnowski had heard
the sound of guns in front, and having turned out the corps
artillery, marched with it from the distant bivouac at Bazoncourt
to join the 14th Division at Domangeville, where it received orders
to advance. With the horse artillery division (under Lieut.-Colonel
von Coester) at the head, and the 2nd field division (under Major
Matthiasz) close in rear, it reached the field of battle at a smart
trot by way of Villers-Laquenexy at 6.30 P.M. Colonel von
Helden–Sarnowski rode to the front to obtain information as to
the state of the battle and to receive further Orders. In accord-
ance with the orders of the general Commanding, he directed
the 2nd field division to take up a position in Support of the
advanced troops. Major Matthiasz placed the two light batteries
in front of Coincy, and the two heavy just to the north of
Château d'Aubigny. The 4th Heavy battery (Captain Lemmer)
fired a single shot at the enemy's artillery, but then ceased firing,
having discovered that the range was too great, and that no
nearer position was available. The horse artillery division in
the next place took up a position on the right flank of the 3rd
field division, but was unable to effect any greater results, inas-
much as the infantry which had gone on in front intercepted the
line of fire. It therefore drew off to the right, and its further
movements in that quarter will be given below.
The infantry of the main body of the advanced guard of the
Ist Division, under Colonel von Legat, came up at the same
time with the corps artillery of the Ist Army Corps, and im–
mediately followed the ‘advanced parties ' on the Saarbrück
high road. Lieut.-General von Bentheim, not considering
the connection with the 2nd Division secure, caused the
3rd regiment to move to the right on Lauvallier. The infantry
at that place and at La Planchette was now again formed for
the assault of the heights beyond the defile.
All the batteries in position between the north side of Montoy
and the defile of Coincy prepared the attack by a vigorous fire.
As soon as the desired effect had been produced and a cavalry
attack, made from the heights and driven home, had been re-
pulsed, a determined onset of infantry and rifles drove the enemy
from the further side of the valley, beyond the forking of the
Saarbrück and Saarlouis roads. Most of the infantry then turned
28 7%e German Artillery.
to the right in the defile of Lauvallier and advanced against
the heights of Nouilly and Mey—which had already once been
taken"—stormed them, and definitely held them. The gallant
Captain von Horn, who was afterwards killed in battle near
Noisseville, then rode forwards across the defile of La Planchette
to the line of skirmishers, ‘in order to get information about the
ground beyond it, and to be able to form an opinion whether
the possession of the border of the valley on that side was So
secured that artillery might be taken across in safety. As far
as could be observed in the twilight now commencing, the French
had retired from the edge of the hills about I,OOO–1,2OO paces,
into a previously intrenched position, and thence opened a
violent fire of infantry, mitrailleurs, and artillery. Their aim
was in the highest degree faulty, yet the tempest of bullets
occasioned continual casualties in the deep, hollow road.
‘Close to the road were some companies of the Ist battalion
of rifles, some battalions of the 15th and 55th regiments of
infantry, and, more to the right, the 43rd regiment. The
infantry began to complain of want of ammunition.’”
To give a longer respite to the infantry and a fresh impulse to
the battle, Captain von Horn decided on taking his batteries over
the defile in echelons. His own battery, 1st Heavy, led by
First Lieut. Stein, crossed first at 7 P.M., and was fol-
lowed by Hoffbauer's battery, under Lieutenant Krause,” in
consequence of its commander being too severely wounded
to mount a second horse. The 2nd Light field battery,
under First Lieutenant Hardt (for Puppel), and the 2nd
Heavy, under von Selle, came next. The latter alone
suffered much loss in passing the defile. Two guns had their
poles broken, and were consequently delayed in coming up into
line. The batteries were placed astride the Saarbrück road
* General von Memerty, as related above, had captured the heights at an
earlier period ; but on the arrival of very superior reinforcements to the enemy had
temporarily given them up, having no supports at hand to reckon on. When the
44th regiment again advanced at a later period, it found the 3rd regiment in its
former position.
* From Captain von Horn's account.
* Lieutenant Krause had his second horse killed under him on this occasion ;
Lieutenant Ganda remained with the battery until the end of the battle, in spite of
his painful wound—a shot through the upper part of his thigh—and then went into
hospital. Licutenant Oettzemn remained with the battery.
Battle of Borny. 29
300 paces in rear of the foremost skirmishers, and shelled the
enemy's infantry and artillery with evidently good effect at
ranges of between 900 and 1,300 paces. The 2nd Light battery
with the 3rd company of the 1st battalion of rifles repulsed
a cavalry attack. The batteries Suffered from musketry fire
only, the enemy's artillery always firing their shrapnel too high.
During this period the adversary's left wing had been percep-
tibly reinforced and extended. The French official account
states on this point: “General Ladmirault, who was present
at the passage of the Ist and 3rd Divisions (4th Army Corps)
over the Moselle, was informed of the attacks directed
against General Grenier, and immediately ordered those divi-
sions to return to the heights, and the reserve artillery to
follow them. Cissey's Division, which was then descending the
hills to the bridge of boats communicating with the island
of Chambière, laid aside its knapsacks, clambered up the slopes
of St. Julien at the double, and relieved Grenier's Division,
which moved off towards the right and somewhat to the
rear towards the defile of Vantoux. On this the 20th battalion
of rifles threw itself with great gallantry into the little wood of
Mey, which the enemy's skirmishers had begun to occupy,' and
took possession of it. Then the 3rd Division (Lorencez) moved
into line farther to the left.’ It must doubtless have been this
division which reinforced and lengthened the left flank of the
enemy's position SO considerably.
To return to the left wing of the Germans : Here the
14th Division, Lieut.-General von Kamecke, had come up. The
28th brigade, General von Woyna, forming the van, was directed
against the enemy's right flank near Colombey, while the
27th brigade, General von Zastrow, moved to the heights east of
Colombey in reserve. The 28th brigade advanced through
the defile south of Colombey against the wood of Borny,
while the Ist Light battery, Captain Schweder, attached to
the brigade, prepared the attack from a position South of the
mill of Colombey, directing its shell apparently with good effect
against the skirts of the wood, 900 paces distant. The brigade
meanwhile, in co-operation with the advanced guard of the
* As has been already mentioned in a former note, General Memerty evacuated
this ground, without any assault being made on the enemy.
3O The German A7/7//e7-y.
VIIth Army Corps, pressed on without halting ; and the enemy
retired, leaving the wood in its possession.
Major Freiherr von Eynatten could not carry out his in-
tention of bringing the three remaining batteries of the Ist
field division into action, owing to the rapid progress of the
infantry fight in the intersected and close country, and, more-
over, because darkness soon put an end to the battle.
The 25th brigade, von den Osten-Sacken, after a severe
struggle and repeated assaults, succeeded in getting possession of
the little wood north of Colombey at 7.1 5 P.M., which had
been obstinately defended by the enemy though exposed for
a long time to the fire of the batteries of the Ist and VIIth
Army Corps.
The sound of guns from the battle field had reached the
18th Division ; and its commander, General von Wrangel,
having ridden out to the outposts to reconnoitre, ordered the
Division to get under arms at 5. I 5 P.M., and march to
the front. Our interest is confined to the movements of the
van, which, led by Colonel von Brandenstein, marched off on
the high road to Metz with its cavalry in front, and the batteries
in rear of the leading battalion. The infantry occupied Château
Mercy le Haut; and the 2nd Light battery of the 9th field
artillery regiment (Captain Freiherr von Eynatten), receiving
orders from Colonel von Brandenstein, trotted to the front
about 7.30 P.M., and took up a position under the direction of
its divisional commander, Major von Gayl, on the high road at
the point where the lane branches off to Mercy le Haut. Shortly
afterwards the Ist Horse Artillery battery of the 1st field
artillery regiment, Captain Preinitzer, placed itself on the
left of Eynatten. It had started with the Ist Cavalry Division
from Pontoy in the direction of Mercy le Haut, and then ad-
vanced under escort of two squadrons of the 3rd Cuirassiers
with orders to come into action against the enemy's right flank.
The two batteries fired on dense columns of infantry at ranges of
from I, IOO to 1,2OO paces with such good effect that they with-
drew." The guns of Montaudon's Division near Grigy replied,
but were forced to leave the field.
* It is scarcely necessary to mention that infantry contributed their share to this
result.
Battle of Borny. 3 I
The battle now became general. From Fort Queuleu
the heavy guns of the place and the field guns of the
division of Voltigeurs of the Guard opened fire with
common shell and shrapnel, but with little success, while the
shrill rattle of mitrailleurs was also heard, though its effect
was not traced. In the meantime von Eynatten's battery
continued to fire from its old position, and Preinitzer's battery,
escorted by cavalry, pursued the retiring enemy, throwing
shell into his rear and flanks. The last object aimed at by the
battery was hostile artillery in and near Fort Queuleu, at a
range of 1,800 paces.
After eight o'clock, when night was coming on, the 2nd
Heavy field battery, Captain Kindler, of the 9th field artillery
regiment, arrived on the field. It had started from Buchy with
the main body of the I 8th Division, and was then led to
the front by General von Wrangel. Major von Gayl placed
it on the right of Preinitzer's battery, and it was able for a short
time to take part in the fight with the enemy's artillery, till
night put an end to the duel of the guns." The enemy under
cover of the darkness, threw out skirmishers, who approached
to within 600 paces of the most advanced batteries; but being
driven back by our infantry, who had followed the guns, they
joined the general retreat of the French. The divisional
commanders ordered the troops on that part of the field of
battle back to their original bivouacs about 9.30 P.M.
6. Movements of the Ist Army Corps consequent on the extension
of the French left wing—Repulse of that wing—The left
wing of the Ist Army Corps and the VIIth Army Corps / old
the captured positions— Close of the battle.
The result of the battle on the left flank of the Ist Army
Corps was decidedly victorious, but on the centre and right it
was doubtful. The enemy constantly extended his left wing
more and more, and under these circumstances, the corps was
threatened with danger, either in the event of the enemy suc-
ceeding in turning its right wing or driving back the centre by
* The battery took the range from Preinitzer's battery, and aimed at the flash of
the enemy's guns.
32 The German Artillery.
an attack with superior forces. The whole of the artillery was
in line, except two batteries of the corps artillery and one of
the 3rd field division ; but of the infantry only the 2nd and 3rd
brigades and the 1st battalion of rifles had been engaged up to
that time.
Under these circumstances the general in command issued
the following orders :—
I. Major-General von Memerty will maintain the position
of Noisseville and the valley near it under all circumstances.
2. The corps artillery will be drawn more to the centre of
the Noisseville position.
3. The 1st infantry brigade will march to the Brasserie de
Noisseville.
4. The 4th brigade, leaving two battalions in reserve, will
advance round the north of Noisseville against the enemy's left
flank.
Major-General von Bergmann issued corresponding orders:—
The Ist field division is to remain on the left flank and form
the pivot.
The corps artillery will place itself between Noisseville and
the Saarlouis high road, and direct its fire as much as possible
on the enemy's left wing.
The 3rd field division is to move against the left flank of
the enemy near Poix and Servigny, and press forward energeti-
cally. *
The four batteries, skilfully led by Captain von Horn, re-
mained in the captured position on the left flank with praise-
worthy self-devotion under a tremendous fire of common and
shrapnel shell, mitrailleurs, and small arms. Von Gostkowski's
battery had followed them to the further side of the bridge of
La Planchette, but was unable to come into action Owing to
the approach of darkness.
The corps artillery meanwhile obeyed its orders (7.30 P.M.).
The two light batteries of the 2nd field division, which had
been delayed by the difficulties of the ground, were at last also
brought into action, but did not contribute to the result, as it
was already dark." On the extreme right flank, about 200
* They ceased firing after the first round.
Battle of Borny. 33
paces west of Noisseville, stood the 2nd Horse Artillery battery
(Cruse). It was joined by the following batteries drawn up, as
far as the configuration of the ground permitted, in a large arc: —
The 3rd Horse Artillery battery (Schmidtke), the 6th Light
(Dolmann), the 4th Light (Schmidt), the 3rd Heavy (Westphal),
the 3rd Light (Roehl); their left flank resting on the Saarlouis
road." The Ist field division, in action to the west of the defile
of La Planchette, might be considered as in prolongation of this
line of artillery. The corps artillery had, during its move-
ments and in its position, to Sustain a heavy, but fortunately not
very effective, fire from the enemy's guns, among which those of
the forts could not be mistaken. Its target was the artillery
and infantry of the left wing, which were constantly increasing
in numbers, and the practice was excellent.
To return again to the 3rd field division : The Fusilier
battalion of the 4th regiment had, in prosecution of its orders,
moved on Servigny and occupied that village as well as Poix.
Major Müller considered therefore that he could now move
his batteries to the right with safety. They moved off in
succession between 7.30 and 8 P.M. Hellwig's and Schweickart's
batteries were posted between Poix and Servigny, Grasz's
to the left of the latter village, and Schrader's horse artillery
battery of the 3rd Cavalry Division on their right, but
somewhat further back. All these batteries were fired upon
vigorously, but without much effect, by a number of the
enemy's guns, mostly placed behind intrenchments between
the roads to Bouzonville and Vremy, and also by several
mitrailleurs as well as by the guns of the forts. The more
advanced of the batteries fired on the enemy's artillery, mitrail-
leurs, and infantry under cover at a range of from 1,800 to 2,OOO
paces; those less advanced at a range of from 2,700 to 3,500
paces.
The 4th brigade had now reached the field of battle,
and drew up on the left of the Saarlouis high road. General
von Pritzelwitz retaining the two fusilier battalions in reserve,
sent the remaining four battalions round Noisseville to Nouilly
and Mey (8 P.M.) To support this movement to the front,
* The 4th Heavy battery, Captain Iwentz, also moved to this position by order of
Lieut.-Col. Gregorovius, but did not come into action as it was too dark.
D
34 The German Artillery.
Major Gerhards advanced with his horse artillery batteries
from Noisseville to Nouilly, and posted them on both flanks of
the horse artillery division of the 7th field artillery regiment,
consisting of von Hahn's and Hasse's batteries. This division,
under Lieut.-Colonel von Coester, though eager to take part in
the battle, had been unable to do so on the ground occupied by
the VIIth Army Corps for reasons already given. With the sanc-
tion of Colonel von Helden–Sarnowski, it had in consequence
moved off to the right, and, in spite of considerable obstacles, taken
up a position to the north and north-west of Flanville. This posi-
tion was, however, abandoned, after a few shots at hostile artillery
on the road Metz—Bouzonville, in order to get nearer the enemy
and thus support the infantry attack more effectually. The
division then opened fire on the enemy's artillery at 1,800 paces
apparently with good results. A hostile battery, appearing on the
right flank at a distance of about I, IOO paces, was obliged to give
way before the shells of Hasse's guns. Lieutenant Selhausen,
adjutant of the division, had a horse killed under him, and Major
Gerhards' endeavour to take part with the horse artillery
division of the 1st regiment in the struggle was frustrated by
the darkness, which caused a cessation of the fire. Major Müller
and his batteries fared no better. He advanced from Servigny
on the approach of the 4th brigade, but darkness prevented any
further action on his part. The appearance of that brigade
caused the enemy, already shaken by artillery, to retire after a
short exchange of infantry fire (8. I 5 P.M.).
At the same time the 1st brigade forming the main body of
the 1st Division was on the march to Noisseville. It formed up
to the east of the high road, and was held in reserve. As dark-
ness came on, the companies of the infantry regiments fighting
in the first line of the centre and of the right wing of the Ist
Army Corps were withdrawn to the position at Noisseville.
Lieutenant-General von Bentheim, who was present with the
advanced guard of the Ist Division, Collecting the troops near
him, advanced again with a loud hurrah, and pursued the enemy
beyond Vantoux, while, to support the attack, the 44th regiment,
which was still intact, was moved to the front, and afterwards
remained in the first line. The battle in that quarter was
Battle of Borny. 35
finished at 8. I 5 P.M. Five perfectly fresh regiments were still
at the disposal of the general commanding."
His Excellency General von Steinmetz, on his arrival on the
battle field, ordered General von Manteuffel to take his corps
back to its original position after collecting the wounded.
About IO o'clock the troops began their march, the bands
playing Heil dir im Siegerkranz.
With the commencement of night the firing on the battle field
of the VIIth Army Corps also died away, the corps remaining
on the field in occupation of the captured position, the enemy
keeping his ground on the opposite ridges.
French writers are generally of opinion that their army had
committed an error in accepting battle, but was justified in
claiming the victory. They appeal to the fact that the army
passed a part of the night of the 14th-15th in its old bivouac,
that it was able to make its retreat at its own time and unmo-
lested ; that, on the other hand, the Prussian army had re-
tired at all points, and that the French army generally had been
pervaded by a consciousness of victory.
Some of these statements are false; the remainder prove
nothing. The Prussian army had obtained its object on the
evening of the battle. A pursuit was therefore unnecessary, and
moveover it presented no prospect of obtaining trophies, &c.,
while there would be the risk of incurring useless losses from
the works of the fortress. The positions represented on the
plan of the battle-field prove that the French army was in
fact pressed back at all points, and at all events considerably
so in the centre. Even if the French were able to keep their
original bivouacs in that quarter, nothing is proved by this ; for
they would probably have ordered their bivouacs, as is the
practice of other armies—in rear of the position where they are
about to fight. º
The statement also with regard to the withdrawal of the
German army on the evening of the battle is not exact. The
VIIth Army Corps remained under arms on the captured position
till the following morning, while the Ist Army Corps had com-
* We know that the whole of the 27th brigade and 7 batteries of the virth Army
Corps were unemployed.
D 2
36 The German Artillery.
menced its retreat not from compulsion, but by orders from its
Commanding officer after more than an hour's rest.
With respect to the ‘consciousness of victory,' if it really
existed in the hostile army, it is only necessary to call to mind
that it is no rare phenomenon for Frenchmen to yield to illu-
sions.
The assertion of the French that they had fought against a
superior force is equally false. The “Spectateur militaire’ gives
the strength of the French as follows:—
Men Batteries”
3rd Corps º g º e o º • 48,360 2O
4th , , e 35,063 I 5
In addition, Brincourt's brigade, with the *) 4,500 to 3
of the Voltigeur division. º º 4,800
Total in round numbers o & 88, Ooo 38
Including 8 batteries of mitrailleurs.
The whole of the troops were fresh, and had suffered neither
from battle nor hardships; and, as a further addition to their
strength, the fact is notorious that the French were supported
by the garrison guns of their outworks.
The Prussian force is estimated as follows:—
Men Batteries
Ist Army Corps (infantry, cavalry, artillery, *) 29,700 I4.
pioneers) . º e o o e
VIIth Army Corps (infantry, cavalry, artillery, *) 29,700 I4
pioneers) . º & o º e
Van of the 18th Infantry Division . & e 2,450 2
1st and 3rd Cavalry Divisions . º tº º 6,300 2
Total e e º g º º º 68, 150 32
From this must be deducted the losses on the march, and
especially those in the previous battle of Spicheren, in which
the 14th Division had been chiefly engaged. The numbers,
therefore, did not exceed from 62,OOO to 64,000 men, with
32 batteries. With respect to the latter, we know, that a
considerable part of them could not be employed on account of
the peculiar configuration of the ground.
* The batteries according to Fay.
Battle of Borny. 37
Zhe French Zosses amounted to :-

Officers Men
“. . Missing ..." | Missing
3rd Corps * º g º I45 I 2,702 428
4th Corps º tº 54 *- 706 I6 I
Total e º I99 I 3,408 589
Marshal Bazaine himself received a severe contusion.
Amongst the wounded are reckoned Generals Decaen (com-
mander of the 3rd Corps, who died afterwards of his wounds),
Castagny, De Clérembault, and Duplessis.

The German losses were:— ”
Officers Men
*...* | Missing || “..." | Missing
Ist Army Corps © e & 90 * 2,824 I68
VIIth , , , , & tº º 84 * I,864 92
1st Cavalry Division. e tº -> - I -
36th Infantry Regiment . º --> - 32 -*
Total e e I 74 - 4, 72 I 26o
* These numbers originate from the Royal Statistical Bureau, and the following
remarks are appended :—
I. Portºdeſi/imrichs and others doing duty as officers are not included under
the head of officers.
2. Men who fell into the hands of the enemy when dead or wounded are not
reckoned among the ‘missing.’
With respect to the Prussian infantry, the heaviest losses occurred in
The 2nd and 3rd brigades of the 1st Army Corps, the former suffering most ;
The 25th and 26th brigades of the VIIth Army Corps, the former of which
suffered most.
The 2nd infantry brigade incurred the heaviest casualties, the 43rd regiment
alone losing 22 officers and 723 men killed and wounded.
The 1st battalion of rifles lost 9 officers and 284 men, killed and wounded.
3. The special losses of the artillery are given in the Appendix.
On the French side Aymard's and Castagny’s Divisions in the French centre
suffered most.
The ammunition columns remained behind the Nied during the battle.
The supply of the troops with ammunition was carried out on the following day by
ammunition columns previously indicated.
38 7%e German Artillery.
OBSERVATIONS.
a. On the French Army.
As soon as the retreat on Châlons was determined on, the
French army had all the less reason for committing themselves
to a battle on the 14th on the right bank of the Moselle, inas-
much as a great part of it had reached the other bank even
before the commencement of the fight, and the news which
was brought to Metz of the progress of the turning movement
on the part of the Second Army permitted no postponement of
the French operations.
To avoid an engagement was no longer in the power of the
French Commander in Chief, but it was possible for him so to
manoeuvre as to gain time for the retreat by an affair of the
rear guard. He might in the first place have averted for a time the
fall of the defensible semicircular ridge of heights on the west of
the defile of Colombey and Lauvallier into the hands of the
enemy. If the French statements are true that the armament of
the fortress, and more particularly of the advanced works of St.
Julien, Les Bordes and Queuleu, were still insufficient,” no other
* That the armament of these advanced works was still very much behindhand at
the time of the battle is, in the first place, proved unanimously by all the French
military writers, and further by the later observations of the German troops in front
of Metz. For example, the Prussian batteries which on the 17th fired from a
position near Mercy le Haut on Fort Queuleu as a demonstration, saw a great number
of artificers and labourers employed on that work.
It is a fact that many Frenchmen believed that it was actually the intention to
storm the works, the state of which could not be known by the Germans. At a
later period also, it is clearly proved from the transactions of the council of war of
the French Army of the Rhine (compare Bazaine) that the French had no great con-
fidence in this fortress. ?
The following letter, published by Marshal Bazaine and addressed to him by the
Battle of Borny. 39
course remained but a direct defence of that ridge by an occu-
pation in force. It should have been held till the Guard had
effected its retreat,
To render this feasible it was also requisite to hold for some
time the ridge in front of Metz, as far to the left as the chapel of
La Salette, so as to prevent the advance of the enemy on that
most important point.
The second line to be defended ran from this chapel by the
wood of Mey, thence along the left edge of the defile Lauvallier
—Colombey, where it took an oblique turn to the right and
rear, along the eastern and southern borders of the two copses
which together form the wood of Borny, till it struck the
stream of La Chenau. Fort Queuleu could be held by a special
detachment, as indeed was the case. The 3rd Corps and
Grenier's Division of the 4th, which were still at hand in the
neighbourhood of the position at the commencement of the
battle, sufficed for the occupation of this ground. To facilitate
the operation of putting an end to the battle, the cavalry of
the Guard, the 3rd and 4th Corps, with a part of the artillery,
could take up positions in rear, under cover and ready prepared.
A second position for a rear guard existed, provided Queuleu
still held out, between Borny, the intrenchment near Les
Bordes, and Fort St. Julien, under cover of which, and with the
most strenuous co-operation of the garrison guns already
mounted, the retreat could be carried out. The impression
cannot be avoided that at the commencement of the battle the
French head-quarters were not clearly acquainted with the
position of affairs.
We find the French army in such a situation as to warrrant
the conclusion that it was surprised. The right wing of the 3rd
Corps was totally unsupported, and, as the course of the fight
has shown, it gave way at the first onset of the van of the 18th
Emperor Napoleon, proves that the Emperor himself shared this view of the forts
previous to the battle of the 14th :—
* Metz, 12 août.
‘Plus je pense à la position qu'occupe l'armée, plus je la trouve critique ; car si
une partie était forcée, et qu'om se retirāt en désordre, les forts n'empêcheraient pas
la plus épouvantable confusion. Voyez ce qu'il-y-a a faire, et si nous ne sommes pas
attagués demain, prenez une résolution. Croyez à mon amitié.
(Sigmé) NAPOLíoN.’
4O The German Artillery.
Infantry Division. Marshal Bazaine's official report informs us
that the instructions issued by him were not respected ; that ac-
cordingly the troops forming a semicircle in front of Forts St.
Julien and Queuleu were compelled to converge to the rear, in
correspondence with the retrograde movements of the two wings.
It appears that this error might easily have been rectified, for
the right wing was first attacked at 7 o'clock in the evening.
b. On the Prussian Army in general.
The narrative has explained the motives which determined
the advanced guard of the VIIth Army Corps to attack the
enemy near Colombey. The writer does not command sufficient
information from all sources to justify satisfactorily that resolu-
tion, and the task is left to more competent pens at a future op-
portunity. For us some remarks on the execution and formation
of the attack will suffice for the better comprehension of the
mode in which the German artillery was handled, this being the
subject of the following section.
The advanced guard had regarded Colombey as its first
object, and the attack itself, executed with resolution and on a
comparatively broad front, took the enemy completely by Sur-
prise. The selected line of advance offered the great advantage
that it led direct to a position naturally defensive, in front of
which lay Colombey, like a bridge head. This was of the
greatest importance, since, in consequence of the considerably
superior forces of the enemy, the advanced guard of the VIIth
Army Corps must have been prepared, after the first shock,
to be thrown on the defensive.
It was therefore unavailing to advance merely as far as
Colombey, for it was imperative to get a firm footing beyond it,
and so obtain a close grip of the main body of the enemy. The
repulse of his outposts would be useless; for then there would
be the danger that he would prosecute his retreat under cover
of a small rear guard.
The comparatively broad front with which the advanced
guard attacked, was necessary here for the purpose of leading
the enemy to believe that he was opposed to more considerable
numbers than were actually present. This induced him the
Battle of Borny. 4. I
more readily again to form front with the main body of his
army, and to make greater preliminary preparations for the
counter-attack, thereby incurring a loss of time. This broad
front was, moreover, for a time a Security against being out-
flanked or surrounded by the enemy, which was especially to be
feared, in consequence of his great numerical Superiority, though
unquestionably the danger of being broken through was aug-
mented by such a formation.
It was obvious that the seizure of Colombey from an enemy
so superior in strength could only Succeed by a rapid, Sudden,
and resolute attack. Its confidence, moreover, must strengthen
the French in the belief that they had to deal with more con-
siderable hostile forces. The daring attack undertaken by the
advanced guard of the VIIth Army Corps necessitated prompt
support, if it were not to be exposed to great risks.
Thus the prompt support, afforded by the Ist Army Corps, was
of great advantage, and the narrative has shown what favourable
circumstances concurred to enable speedy action to follow the
immediate promise of support. We gather from the official
report of Marshal Bazaine that to the rapid and resolute onset of
a part of the Ist Army Corps must be attributed the cause of the
4th Corps (Ladmirault) again forming front for the fight. The
anxiety of the VIIth Army Corps, and of all the other troops
engaged, to reach the field of battle with the utmost rapidity,
and to march in the direction of the firing, as soon as they
understood the state of affairs, was everywhere remarkable.
For example, both divisions of cavalry with their batteries
and the van of the 18th Division, as also a battalion of its main
body, were successful in taking part in the fight on the wings
at the right moment.
The battle bore the character of being unpremeditated. The
whole attack resolved itself naturally into a series of deploy-
ments from the centre to the right and left. Each Division as it
came up was obliged to get the touch of that preceding it, and
the front opposed to the enemy was for a long time necessarily
limited. It was therefore always exposed to the danger of being
outflanked and surrounded. The troops in front were gradually
freed from this danger by the arrival of the Divisions from the
I Call".
42 The German Artillery.
Even after the entire 13th Division, the half of the 2nd, and
the 3rd brigades, together with the greater part of the artillery,
were engaged, the state of affairs remained unfavourable for the
Prussians, as for a long time the I3th was opposed by three
Divisions of the 3rd French Corps, and the brigade and a half
by Aymard's Division of that corps and the whole of the French
4th Corps. The casualties incurred by these troops in from four
to four hours and a half prove the obstinacy of the fight at that
time. -
The situation of the Ist Army Corps was for a time peculiarly
critical. The enemy had constantly made use of his superiority in
numbers to prolong his left wing, and threatened to overlap our
flanks. To prevent this, the troops of this corps already en-
gaged saw themselves compelled to defend a front of more than
3,500 paces, extending from La Planchette to beyond Poix,
thereby affording the enemy better opportunity of penetrating
the line. We know how the tactics of the commander com-
bined with the gallantry of the troops warded off this danger.
The battle could be conclusively decided only on the flanks.
Therefore it was important to repel the overlapping movements
of the enemy and attack him at his weaker points.
The reinforcements from the Ist Army Corps enabled us to
storm the heights of Mey and Nouilly simultaneously, as well as
to prolong the right flank of the attack. The arrival of the 14th
Division and of the van of the 18th with a battery of the 1st
Cavalry Division rendered it possible, with the co-operation of
the troops engaged (who had just succeeded in the capture of
the pine wood north-west of Colombey), to storm the wood of
Borny and lengthen the left wing of the attack. These were
the decisive moments on both flanks. The enemy recognised
them as his weak points, and retired from them with but slight
resistance, as is proved by his loss.
The importance of this hardly won victory cannot be esti-
mated by its trophies, for the vicinity of the fortress secured the
enemy from pursuit. Its principal value lay in the strategic re-
sult. The French army had lost time for its retreat; Prince
Frederick Charles had gained it for his turning movement."
1 Marshal Bazaine says:—
‘En retardant notre mouvement les Allemands avaient obtenu le résultat qu'ils
cherchaient : ils gagnaient le jour que nous perdions. . . .' We learn from the same
Battle of Borny. 43
c. On the special employment of the German artillery.
The arrival in line of the Prussian artillery has the appearance
of being improvised, as was the case with the whole battle. The
attack so boldly undertaken demanded prompt assistance. The
artillery was the arm which, by virtue of its mobility, was best
adapted to the peculiar formation of this field of battle. We
see it therefore eagerly pressing on from all points, in order to
come into action in the shortest possible time. Its occasional
separation from the bodies of troops to which it was attached by
the order of battle was unavoidable, yet its efforts to rejoin them
afterwards were undoubted.
In the first stage—the opening of the battle—the greater
part of the artillery was employed. We see the whole of the
batteries of the Ist Army Corps in action a considerable time
before the Ist and 4th brigades came into line. In the VIIth
Army Corps, the corps artillery arrived shortly after the main
body of the I3th Division, notwithstanding the length of the
march. Everywhere, as far as circumstances permitted, the artil-
lery supported the infantry throughout the battle, and prepared
the way to a decisive result.
Two considerations operated against the principle of bringing
into action the largest possible mass of artillery—the improvised
nature of the battle and the form of ground of a part of the
field of battle. They both tended to bring about the employ-
ment of Smaller masses of guns and even of single batteries.
The remarks on the configuration of the ground and the
narrative of the battle will have sufficed to prove that the former
was decidedly unfavourable to the employment of artillery on
the battle field of the VIIth Army Corps. For instance, before
entering on a decisive movement, to which the 13th Division by
itself was unequal, it was necessary to repulse the enemy's attacks
near Colombey. However desirable it was at that moment
that artillery should take up a position on the left edge of the
defile, it was unfortunately no less impossible, in consequence of
sources that the 2nd, 6th, and Guard Corps reached their appointed positions near
Gravelotte on the 15th. The 3rd and 4th Corps were only able to complete their
passage in the course of the morning of the 15th. The 4th Corps was not concen-
trated on the left bank of the Moselle till noon. Mention will be made in the second
part of this treatise of the circumstances which gave rise to other momentous delays.
44 7%e German Artillery.
the immediate vicinity of shelter trenches and small woods,
strongly occupied by the enemy. This has been shown in the
attempt to place the 5th Heavy battery of the 7th regiment of
field artillery immediately to the north-east of Colombey. To
maintain possession of the left edge of the defile was the difficult
task of our gallant infantry, able in all cases to procure more
effectual cover from the form of the ground.
In the detaining combat at this point there was at first but
one position available for artillery on the right of the defile
where it could come into action. But we know that it was
forced by the course of the fight, the form of the ground, and
the want of light soon to take up positions in reserve, however
great might be the desire of its leaders to employ their arm to
a greater extent. This explains why a great number of the
batteries of the VIIth Army Corps took no share in the battle, and
why some of them came on the battle field of the Ist Army
Corps. There the configuration of the ground was less difficult,
and we see the artillery generally employed in greater masses
against distinct objects under the same commander.
Pre-eminently conspicuous is the conduct of the artillery
mass represented by five batteries (one belonging to the VIIth
Army Corps) between the defiles of Coincy and Montoy opposite
that of La Planchette, and later on beyond it. It had materially
contributed to support the right wing of von der Goltz's brigade,
and afterwards that of the 13th Division, and also to facilitate
the march of the 1st Division by diverting the enemy's fire from
it ; to prepare the way for the capture of the pine wood north-
west of Colombey, and for the assault of the slopes by a portion
of the infantry of the advanced guard of the 1st Division, and
of the 13th ; and finally to support those troops in the posses-
sion of the Conquered slopes by taking up a position beyond the
defile of La Planchette.
The artillery mass is also remarkable, which was formed of
the corps artillery of the 1st Army Corps and a battery of the
3rd field division, and joined in the last position by two horse
artillery batteries of the VIIth Army Corps, While from the
centre of the corps, it prepared the assault of infantry against
the heights west of Lauvallier, with the greater part of the
batteries ;--from its second position, further to the right, it
Aattle of Borzy. 4 5
materially assisted, by its concentrated fire, with the co-opera-
tion of the three batteries of the 3rd field division, to prevent
the attempt to overlap our flank, which meanwhile had become
more pronounced and menacing. To the shattering of the
enemy's left wing by the fire of this artillery mass, it must be
mainly attributed that only a light pressure was needed to in-
duce the infantry to retire.
There remains to be noted the withdrawal from its first
position of the whole corps artillery and of the 3rd field divi-
sion to the right flank during the battle, for the purpose of
taking up their last position. This flank movement was for the
most part made under the fire of the enemy's guns without any
great loss. This goes to prove that there is no difficulty in
taking guns already in action out of the line of battle and em-
ploying them in another part of the battle field, and that flank
marches, not as a rule undertaken by artillery under fire, can be
safely executed in case of necessity. These reflections only
add strength to the principle of employing a greater part of the
artillery at the outset, and lead to the conviction that it is less
necessary to Keep artillery in reserve than infantry and cavalry.
The batteries carne into action at very different ranges, vary-
ing from 800 paces—which were reduced by the offensive thrusts
of the enemy to 400 and 500 paces—up to considerably more
than 2,000 paces; and however Strange such a variety of range
may appear, it was nevertheless the necessary result of existing
circumstances.
At the shortest ranges we find the artillery near Colombey,
and astride the Saarbrück high road opposite the defile of La
Planchette, and later on beyond that defile, as at that point it was
necessary to support the advanced guard of the VIIth Army
Corps, which was hardly pressed, especially on its right flank.
This was a decisive moment, and Consequently the considera-
tion of the effect of the fire outweighed that of Seeking cover
for the guns. That the batteries were exposed, is proved by
the list of casualties, which speaks for itself; bearing in mind
that the really combatant part of a field battery numbers 4
officers, 62 men, 48 horses, and that of a horse artillery battery
4 officers, 74 men, 96 horses, and that these losses were in-
curred within the space of a few hours.
46 7%e German Artillery.
A near approach at that point was possible, as the artillery
was in close connection with its own infantry; and it was all the
more demanded because the light was so extremely unfavourable
for observing the effect of the shots, and also that, owing to the
intersected and very close nature of the ground, the troops en-
gaged were liable to be annoyed by fragments of shells from
their own guns.
Greater ranges are found at the commencement of the battle
on the right wing, where it was required merely to keep the
enemy at bay ; here the artillery could maintain no connection
with its own infantry, which from its more defective mobility
was still on the march in rear, and it found moreover a target
in the dense columns of the the 4th French Corps marching up.
But when it was desired to create a decisive effect on both wings,
the batteries showed their eagerness to prepare the attack of the
infantry by taking up positions closer to the enemy. The
approach of night prevented the further advance of the artillery
on the right wing.
There also remains to be noticed the effective fire of case on
the part of a battery in Self-defence at a short range against skir-
mishers under slight cover.
The narrative of the battle and our own observations point
to the conclusion, that on this day the Prussian artillery vied
with its sister arm the infantry in ſortitude and gallantry, and
in devotion to King and Fatherland. At any rate it materially
contributed on the 14th of August, 1870, to entwine a fresh
leaf of laurel in the rich crown of victory of the German armies.
47
SECOND F AFT.
I.
A GLANCE AT EVENTS FROM THE BATTLE OF BORNY ON THE
I4TH OF AUGUST, I870, TO THE BATTLE OF MARS LA TOUR
ON THE 16TH OF AUGUST, 1870.
1. French operations after the battle of the 14th of August.
AFTER the battle of the I4th of August Marshal Bazaine ordered
the interrupted retreat on Châlons to be resumed. Under existing
circumstances it was imperative that this should be executed by
the French with the greatest possible rapidity, and as a prelimi-
nary operation it was necessary to concentrate the Army of the
Rhine on the high ground forming the left bank of the Moselle
—the plateau between St. Privat and Gravelotte. This could
be reached by four roads, not counting the indifferent by-
roads : —
I. The high road from Metz to Gravelotte;
2. The by-road from Ban St. Martin by Lessy, Châtel St.
Germain and Leipsic, to Chantrenne ;
3. The metalled road by Lorry to Amanvillers;
4. The high road by Woippy to St. Privat.
Although these roads ascend the left side of the valley by
steep gradations, still it was to be presumed that as no part of
the troops would have to march more than eleven miles, the
whole would be in position on the I 5th.
Everything depended on attaining the Orne, the Yron, or the
Longeau, without delay. Arriving there before the enemy, the
Army of the Rhine would intercept the Germans, and the main
48 The German Artillery.
difficulties of the retreat would be overcome. In addition to
Several by-roads there were available three high roads: that by
Mars la Tour to Fresne, and those by Conflans and Briey to
Étain. There was all the more reason to expect that the river
would be reached on the 16th, if no collision with the enemy
occurred, as the march for that day was far inferior in difficulty
to that of the 15th, as regarded both the length and character of
the roads.
The flank march of the Second German Army had been
carried so far, that it was not to be expected that the retreat
could be prosecuted on the 16th without fighting, and of this
the French possessed reliable information. Thence arose the
necessity of covering the march by a strong flanking detachment
on the most southern road, which would become the rear guard
after the army had passed the rivers.
Let us now glance at the marches actually executed by the
French Army of the Rhine. According to Marshal Bazaine's
dispositions, the following movements were to be made on the
I 5th :—
The 4th Corps to Doncourt;
The 3rd Corps to the line Vernéville—St. Marcel, with
observation of the Bois Doseuillons; -
The 2nd Corps to prosecute its march to Mars la Tour as
soon as the van of the 6th became visible ;
The 6th Corps to march to its position at Rezonville and
Vionville;
A Division of Voltigeurs and two batteries to take up a posi-
tion at Point du Jour, for the purpose of Covering the retreat in
case of necessity ;
The remainder of the Guard to form up at Gravelotte, leav-
ing a regiment at Longeville, till the whole of the army had de-
filed ;
De Forton's Cavalry Division to march to Tronville and
protect the army on the left flank and towards the front along
the road to St. Mihiel ;
Du Barail's Cavalry Division to perform a similar duty on
the Verdun road by Jarny.
These dispositions, however, were not strictly carried out,
and the two most Southern roads to Verdun alone were made
Preliminary Operations. 49
use of Marshal Bazaine alleged as his motives for not using
the road to Briey :—
The difficult nature of the ground at Briey itself;
Intelligence of the presence of a hostile corps of cavalry of
2O,OOO men at that town, confirming the rumour that Prince
Frederick Charles and General von Steinmetz were making a
flank march below Metz ;
The idea that the Army of the Rhine would be better con-
centrated (plus compacte) on the two southern roads for the pur-
pose of forming front in any direction in which the enemy might
appear.
It is obvious that the latter idea is incorrect, if it is con-
sidered what would be the situation of the whole Army of the
Rhine when marching with its trains on two roads only, and
that moreover the road does not fork before it reaches Gravelotte.
It is also remarkable that the arrangements of the march
were made dependent on a mere rumour, the improbability of
which is obvious, as shown in the first part of this treatise.
There is no notice in the French works of any measures being
taken for discovering the grounds of the rumour.
2. Reconnoitring combats on the I 5th of August.
On the I 5th the Germans made reconnaissances on both
banks of the Moselle, and H.M. King William visited the field
of battle of the 14th. These reconnaissances led to several en-
gagements during the morning of the I 5th, and an account must
be given of the part taken in them by the German artillery.
(1) The 13th brigade of the 5th Cavalry Division, under
Major-General von Redern, at Beney (23 miles west of Thiau-
court) had received orders to advance towards the high road
from Metz to Verdun with the 2nd Horse Artillery battery
(Captain Schirmer) of the IOth Hanoverian field artillery
regiment. It started at 3.30 A.M., and on arriving at Sponville
came upon hostile cavalry. The battery, according to its own
report, fired six shells at a considerable range from a position to
the north of that place at the enemy, who was retiring rapidly.
Escorted by a squadron of Hussars, it then moved to a position
about 1,800 paces south of Mars la Tour, in order to fire into
E
5O The German Artillery.
the defiles south-west of the village, which were filled with
cavalry, but here the enemy also retired immediately.
General von Redern had fallen in with de Forton's Reserve
Cavalry Division. As related in the French accounts, the 2nd
Corps (Frossard) had received orders, in consequence of delays
experienced by the other army corps, to halt at Rezonville, where
also the 6th Corps (Canrobert) was to remain. Consequently at
this moment the 2nd Corps was encamped to the south of the
high road from Rezonville to Vionville, and Valabrègue's Cavalry
Division near the latter spot. A smart fire ensued between the
two batteries of de Forton's Division, posted in front of Mars la
Tour, and Schirmer's battery, which lasted for an hour; the latter
battery losing two men severely and one slightly wounded in
addition to eleven horses, of which six were killed ; the five
wounded horses had also to be shot." After the battle, de
Forton's brigade (according to V. D.) retired on Vionville; it
was unsuccessful in obtaining intelligence about the German
troops on the left bank of the Moselle, and General de Forton
reported erroneously that the cavalry had been supported in
the affair by German infantry. But the 5th Cavalry Division
had ascertained that there was opposite to it at Rezonville an
encampment of infantry, estimated at 20,000 men, in addition
to a strong force of hostile cavalry.
(2) The 6th Cavalry Division, under the Grand Duke of
Mecklenburg, reconnoitred on the right bank of the Moselle on
the morning of the 15th ; the right and left divisions of the 2nd
Horse Artillery battery (Captain Wittstock) of the 3rd Branden-
burg field artillery regiment, attached to it, taking part in the
subsequent combats. t
The right division, under First Lieutenant von Gizycki,
starting from Verny at 5.30 A.M., joined Colonel Count
Groeben's detachment, consisting of the 3rd Lancers and a
squadron of the 6th Cuirassiers, at Pournoy le Chétif. This
force reconnoitring between the Seille and Moselle, ascertained
that the right bank of the latter river was unoccupied by the
enemy, who had abandoned several intrenchments during the
* The account given by the battery states that after the firing “it limbered up,
and retired about 1,000 paces. After obtaining men, horses, and ammunition from
the first line of wagons it again advanced, but found the enemy's position evacuated.”
Preliminary Operations. 5 I
night. But the position of a French camp below Moulins les
Metz was discovered by signals made by the enemy, although
Tort St. Quentin was hidden by the thick mist, which rose from
the Moselle valley. The guns were directed to open fire on the
camp at a range of 2,300 paces from a position at Bradin farm,
IOO paces from the railway embankment. The account given
by the artillery engaged is, that after the first shells struck the
camp the whole of the troops in it were on the alert, and taking
to flight ran wildly into the adjoining woods for protection.
The guns in consequence frequently altered their range, which
varied from 2,200 to 2,800 paces, and continued to fire until the
whole camp was abandoned. They expended 48 shells in all.
‘Fort St. Quentin fired three rounds and then ceased firing,
probably because it could not see in consequence of the mist.
Thereupon the detachment returned to Verny, the cavalry
remaining some time longer in observation. No losses were
sustained by the division.’
This affair is mentioned in French accounts. V. D. states:—
‘Towards 8 A.M. a German battery, having advanced as far as
Frescaty farm, threw some shells into the large body of troops
on the road between Longeville and Moulins. Fort St. Quentin
soon compelled it to retire, but in consequence of this bold step
the Emperor decided, on removing to Lessy.’ According to
another French account the first German shell, which fell into
the camp, burst among three French officers, who were quietly
breakfasting, and killed two of them, Severely wounding the
third.’
The left division of the battery, under Second Lieutenant
Hederich, was attached to Major von Heszberg's detachment,
consisting of a squadron of the I 5th Lancers and two Squadrons
of the 6th Cuirassiers. The column broke up from Verny at
5.30 A.M., and the Lancers, forming the van and followed by the
two guns, advanced along the road by Pouilly to Metz. On
arriving at the point where the railway crosses the road, part of
the cavalry was left behind to observe the road to Metz. The
account given by the artillery further states: ‘The division
turned out of the road to the left and advanced at a trot in the
direction of Montigny. As the station there was occupied and
trains were leaving with troops and forage, Lieutenant Hederich
R. 2
52 The German Artillery.
received orders to open fire on them. In consequence of the con-
formation of the ground it was necessary to approach to within
800 paces, and after a few rounds a building forming part of the
station appeared to be on fire. On this the enemy advanced,
lining the hedges and buildings with skirmishers, and opened
a brisk fire on the battery.
‘The guns consequently retired 500 paces, in pursuance of
orders, and shelled with apparently good results the buildings
from which the enemy was firing on the advanced cavalry posts.
Having attained its object, the reconnoitring detachment with-
drew along the left bank of the Seille to Marly, and then rejoined
the main body of the division. Meanwhile Fort St. Quentin had
commenced a heavy and somewhat damaging fire. The battery
expended 24 shells in all, and lost a horse in its first position.’
Lieut.-Colonel Fay gives this affair but a brief notice and
states: “Fort St. Quentin threw a few shells against the enemy,
who had placed his field guns in front of Montigny, and in the
midst of the firing an explosion was heard, which announced the
destruction of the railway bridge at Longeville, ordered by the
Commander in Chief.' We cannot but agree with the complaint
made by that officer against the French for not having thought
of destroying that at Ars also some days previously instead of
leaving it for the use of the Germans.
3. Position of the French Army on the evening of the 15th of
August and Bagaine's dispositions previous to the battle.
Bazaine's army did not reach its projected destination on
the 15th, which is accounted for on the following grounds:–
The fatigue of the troops engaged in the battle of the pre-
ceding day; the length of the columns of march, which were
enormously increased by the number of the trains and of military
as well as of private carriages ; the circumstance that only the two
southern roads from Metz to Verdun were used ; the delay
of some hours occasioned by the 3rd and 4th Corps making
up their complement of ammunition at Metz, and the confusion
which occurred, especially during the march.
Marshal Bazaine's statement shews that in consequence of the battle on the 14th,
the 4th Corps (Ladmirault) could not move towards the bridges over the Moselle
before 1 A.M. on the 16th, and that it was not brought together till I P. M.
Preliminary Operations. 53
The French army, according to the accounts given by Fay
and V. D., Occupied the following positions on the evening of
the I 5th :—
Du Barail's Division at Jarny ; /
De Forton's Division at Vionville ;
The 2nd Corps (Frossard) in front of Rezonville and to the
left of the road Metz—Mars la Tour—Verdun ;
The 6th Corps (Canrobert) at Rezonville, level with the 2nd
Corps, but to the right of the road ;
The Guard at Gravelotte ;
The reserve artillery of the army between Gravelotte and
Rezonville;
The 4th Corps had remained between Devant les Ponts near
Metz and Woippy, the 3rd Division being encamped by itself at
Lessy;
The 3rd Corps, contrary to its orders, was in front of the
4th Corps, with its Ist Division at St. Marcel; the 2nd and 4th
Divisions reached that place during the night, the 3rd, under
Metman, remaining on the Moselle. The Cavalry Division, under
Clérembault, lay close to the gates of the city."
Marshal Bazaine arrived at Gravelotte, and the Emperor
Napoleon left the army at 6 A.M. on the 16th for Châlons by
way of Verdun, escorted as far as the latter town by Marguerite's
brigade, consisting of the Ist and 3rd regiments of the Chasseurs
d'Afrique. On the evening of the 15th the Marshal had issued
orders that the army should get under arms at 4.30 A.M. the
following morning, stating his opinion that the 2nd and 6th
Corps would come into collision on that day with part of the
enemy's force, the strength of which was conjectured to be
30,000 men. Further delays in the march of the Corps in rear
decided the Marshal on the 16th to postpone the movement till
noon, so that the 3rd and 4th might come into line with the re-
mainder of the army. Moreover, he wrote significantly as
follows to Marshal Leboeuf, who on the preceding day had
taken over the command of the 3rd Corps, Decaen being
wounded : “At your request I postpone the march of the army
till noon this day. Order the Divisions in rear to concentrate
1 Marshal Bazaine so far differs from this account that he places two Divisions only
of the 3rd Corps on the line St. Marcel-Vernéville,
54 7%e German Artillery.
without delay. There is no enemy on your right flank. From
Gorze alone is danger to be expected ; reconnoitre therefore on
your left flank, so that in the event of a battle taking place
to-day the 3rd Corps may march up into second line in rear of
the 2nd and 6th Corps.'
4. Position of the First and Second German Armies on the might of
the 15th of August, and their movements previous to the battle.
To return to the German armies: In the course of the I 5th
it appeared no longer probable that the enemy would assume
the offensive, and it was concluded that he had commenced
the retreat from Metz with the whole of his troops. There was
much to warrant this conclusion, viz.:-
The fact that the French had deployed only two army corps
in the battle of the 14th ; the circumstance that during the night
of the 14th a continued noise of marching columns and moving
carriages along the high road to Verdun had been heard by the
outposts of the Second Army advanced towards Metz, and that
the patrols in front had everywhere been fired on ; and, lastly,
the results of reconnaissances made during the morning of the
I 5th.
Drawing their conclusions from these events, it was but natural
that the Germans should consider the hostile masses seen between
Mars la Tour and Rezonville on the 15th as a flanking detach-
ment covering the French armies then supposed to be in full
retreat on the northern roads from Metz towards the west ; for
such gigantic delays as occurred in the projected retreat of the
Army of the Rhine on Verdun could not possibly have been
anticipated.
Everything depended on vigorously attacking the enemy at
once, so as to arrest the flank march of the bulk of his force, if
practicable ; and the Royal head-quarters gave orders to this
effect. It was also of importance so to order the marches
and positions of the troops as to render it impossible for a
sortie from Metz either to endanger the passages of the Moselle
or to menace the communications, and more especially the rail-
road from Courcelles Sur Nied to Faulquemont. As it was
impossible for the Germans to know the position of the bulk of
Preliminary Operations. 55
the French army, the march towards the road Metz—Verdun
would have at first the character of a reconnaissance in force,
and must therefore be made with a comparatively broad front,
extending so far to the west as to insure their falling in with
the Army of the Rhine, which was now supposed to have
already advanced further. The marches generally were arranged
with a view to attaining this object. The greater part of the First
and Second Armies started on the 15th of August, and the
positions reached on the evening of that day or during the night
were as follows:—
The Royal head-quarters, Herny.
The head-quarters of the First Army, Bazoncourt.
Ist Army Corps, Courcelles-Chaussy.
VIIth Army Corps, Pange and the Courcelles station.
VIIIth Army Corps, Orny (Gneisenau's brigade, to which the
6th Light battery was attached, being on detachment).
Ist Cavalry Division, Verny.
3rd Cavalry Division, Avancy.
The head-quarters of the Second Army, Pont à Mousson.
5th Cavalry Division, Xonville, Puxieux, and Suzemont near
Hannonville,
Xth Army Corps, 19th Infantry Division with two horse
artillery batteries of the corps artillery, Thiaucourt. A detach-
ment under Colonel von Lyncker—consisting of the 2nd and
Fusilier battalions of the 78th regiment, the 1st and 3rd squadrons
of the 9th Dragoons, and the Ist Light battery—was pushed
forward in the morning towards Metz as far as Novéant, as a
precautionary measure. The 20th Infantry Division and corps
artillery, exclusive of the horse artillery, Pont à Mousson.
IIIrd Army Corps, 5th Infantry Division, Novéant; having
crossed the standing bridge. The 6th Infantry Division and
corps artillery echeloned from Arnaville to Vandières, the former
having made use of a bridge thrown over the river at Champey,
and the latter that of Pont à Mousson."
Guard Corps, Thionville on the left bank of the Moselle.
The brigade of Dragoon Guards under Count Brandenburg II,
with the 1st Horse Artillery battery, Thiaucourt.
* These troops did not reach their quarters till after midnight.
56 7%e German Artillery.
6th Cavalry Division, between the Moselle and the Seille,
near Sillegny.
IXth Army Corps, Verny–Silly.
XIIth Army Corps, Nomény. g
IVth Army Corps, opposite to Marbache on the right bank
of the Moselle, with its reconnoitrers beyond the river.
IInd Army Corps, Hans sur Nied.
The Third Army had already reached Nancy with its ad-
vanced parties.
The following were the destinations for the 16th of August –
The Royal head-quarters to Pont à Mousson.
The head-quarters of the First Army, to Coin sur Seille
two and a quarter miles from Verny.
Ist Army Corps, to the Courcelles station."
VIIth Army Corps, to Pommerieux.
VIIIth Army Corps, exclusive of the 31st Infantry brigade,
under von Gneisenau,” to Lorry and Arry.
1st Cavalry Division, to remain at first in its present position,
and then to move to Fey between the Moselle and the Seille,
two and a quarter miles east of Corny.
3rd Cavalry Division, between Courcelles and Mécleuves.
According to the orders of the Second Army issued at 7 P.M.
on the 15th from Pont à Mousson, the IIIrd Army Corps and the
6th Cavalry Division were to reach the road Metz—Verdun at
Mars la Tour and Vionville on the 16th, marching by way of
Novéant sur Moselle and Gorze.
The following dispositions were also ordered — ”
“The Xth Army Corps and the 5th Cavalry Division will con-
tinue their march along the road towards Verdun as far as St.
Hilaire and Maizeray.
‘The XIIth Army Corps will march from Nomény to Pont à
Mousson, with its advanced guard to Regnéville en Haye.
* The Ist Army Corps was also to follow the First Army over the Moselle as soon
as it was relieved by the army corps of General von Kummer, which was concentrating
at Saarlouis.
* The 31st infantry brigade, reinforced by a squadron of the 9th Hussars, the 6th
Light field battery of the 8th regiment, and a company of the 8th Pioneer battalion,
was detached in the direction of Thionville.
* Official account of the Second Army on the battle of Vionville.
Preliminary Operations. 57
“The Guard Corps, to Vernecourt, with its advanced guard at
Rambucourt.
“The IVth Army Corps, to Les Saizerais and Marbache, with
its advanced guard at Jaillon on the road to Toul.
“The IXth Army Corps, to Sillegny, so as to follow the IIIrd
Army Corps over the Moselle and by Gorze on the 17th.
“The IInd Army Corps will march with its van as far as Buchy,
and will begin to cross the Moselle at Pont à Mousson on the 17th.
“The head-quarters of the army will remain at Pont à
Mousson.’
When the orders of the Royal head-quarters, dated at Herny,
6.30 P.M., August the I 5th, were received, stating that two army
corps of the First Army were to take up a position on the line
Arry—Pommerieux on the 16th, ‘the IXth Army Corps (Second
Army) was directed to continue its march on the 16th close up to
the Moselle, and to cross the river immediately in rear of the IIIrd
Army Corps by the bridges constructed by that corps, while
part of the IXth Army Corps was to follow the IIIrd towards
Mars la Tour on the 16th and I7th.'
The orders for the further advance, issued by Lieut.-General
von Alvensleben II. on the evening of the 15th, directed the
6th Infantry Division to march at 5 A.M. by Onville on Mars la
Tour, followed by the corps artillery; the 6th Cavalry Division
was to complete its passage of the Moselle by the bridges at
Novéant at 5.30 A.M., and march thence by Gorze on Vionville,
followed by the 5th Division.
The 5th Cavalry Division, under General von Rheinhaben,
reinforced by the two horse artillery batteries of the corps
artillery of the Xth Army Corps, received orders early on the
16th from General von Voigts-Rhetz to advance and recon-
noitre in force in the direction of Vionville.* Lehmann's
brigade—consisting of the Ist battalion of the 78th regiment,
2nd and 4th Squadrons of the 9th Dragoons, and Ist Heavy
battery of the IOth regiment of artillery—was ordered to march
to Chambley, where it would be joined by von Lyncker's
detachment, and the entire force was to operate under the com-
* According to an extract from the report of the Xth Army Corps on the battle of
Vionville.
58 The German Artillery.
mand of Colonel Lehmann in support of the 5th Cavalry Division.
According to the reports of the Xth Army Corps, ‘St. Hilaire
was named as the destination of General von Schwartzkoppen
with the remainder of the 19th Division and the brigade of
Dragoons of the Guard. The 20th Infantry Division, with the
corps artillery, was to march to the north of Thiaucourt.’
59
II.
BATTLE OF MARS LA TOUR AND VION VILLE ON THE I6TH
OF AUGUST, 1870.
Description of the battle field.
OMITTING the northern part of the Bois des Ognons, which
towards evening became the scene of a separate engagement,
the battle field is bounded on the east by the ravine of la Jurée,
so called from the wood of that name, and on the west by the
Yron. The boundary on the south is the defile running from
Gorze to Tronville, and thence as far as Mars la Tour.
Two positions occupied in succession by the French have to
be considered. Both were astride the road from Metz to Verdun
and formed salient angles, the faces fronting in two directions,
the left towards the south and the right towards the south-west.
Just before noon the right flank of the second position, having
been extended, also fronted towards the south. The left flank of
the first position comprised the northern portions of the Bois
des Ognons, de St. Arnould, and de Vionville, while the right
flank extended from the north-western angle of the latter wood
by Flavigny to beyond Vionville. The scCond position ran
originally from the northern part of the Bois des Ognons by the
hills to the north of the Bois de St. Arnould (marked 308 and
311), following those heights as far as the old Roman road;
during the battle the right wing was extended beyond Greyère.
The German position formed a re-entering angle with its
fronts facing north and north-east, the right flank being indicated
by the Bois de St. Arnould, de Vionville, and the height at the
north-western angle of the latter (marked 326), while the left
wing extended from that height by Flavigny and the Tank
wood on the north-west to Vionville and the copses of Tronville.
6O The German Artillery.
The ground generally is undulating, hilly, and much inter-
sected by ravines containing water; but it is for the most part
open, the southern, north-eastern, and South-eastern margins alone
being covered with wood. That part of the field of battle lying
to the north of the high road from Metz to Verdun is cut in two
by the copses of Tronville. As regards the elevation of the
ground, the battle field is divided by nature into two portions.
The plateau of Vionville forms the principal portion, extending
on the north to the defile at the old Roman road and on the east
to the ravine of Rezonville. A broad ridge nearly in the form of
a right angle lies in front of the northern and eastern edge of
this plateau, its most commanding point being at Villers aux
Bois. It is bounded on the east by the ravine of la Jurée,
beyond which is the northern part of the Bois des Ognons:
As a rule the ground slopes from east to west. A broad
ridge forms the most commanding part of the plateau of Vion-
ville on its eastern margin, running from the defile at the old
Roman road nearly to the Bois de St. Arnould, where, after
sending out a spur in its original direction, it turns at right
angles to the South-west for a distance of from 1,200 to 1,500
paces, and finally resumes its original line of direction towards
Gorze. During the whole of the battle it was an object of eager
contention. The southernmost of the three parts into which
nature has divided this ridge culminates at a point at the north-
western angle of the Bois de Vionville (marked 326), and this is
the most commanding ground on the whole field of battle.
The northernmost is highest near the old Roman road and to
the south of Rezonville at the hill marked 3 II: the centre and
more level portion is in the form of a long, low saddle uniting
the other two features, and was frequently traversed in vain by
both antagonists in their endeavours to make themselves masters
of the whole ridge.
The French position was materially strengthened by the
woods covering the gentle slope to the north and north-west of
the ridge, which would take in flank any aggressive movements
directed from the copses of Tronville or from Vionville against
its northern side. The plateau is bounded on the east by the
defile of Rezonville. The northern part of the latter between the
old Roman road and Rezonville can be traversed by all arms,
Battle of Mars la Zour. 6 I
though not entirely without difficulty. But to the south of that
village it is so steep and narrow that infantry in loose order alone
can pass through the Bois de St. Arnould. As the stream
running through it is but shallow, the defile formed the line of
march which would be naturally taken by a force advancing
from Gorze to attack or turn the French left wing. These
operations were greatly facilitated by the vicinity of the Bois de
Vionville and St. Arnould. The Bois des Ognons lying further
to the east was as dangerous for the Prussian right wing as
for the French left, so long at least as it remained unoccupied by
that wing. The character of those forests is generally the same ;
being full of well-grown timber or dense underwood, they can
only be traversed with the greatest difficulty except by the
roads; and their edges can be easily defended. The western
slope of this ridge is thickly intersected by numerous defiles, of
which the most important are those of Vionville and Flavigny:
they can be traversed by all arms, though not always without
difficulty. Long spurs stretch out between them with regular
and gentle slopes as far as the line Vionville—Anconville. The
capabilities of defence are increased by the inequalities of the
ground, and also by patches of wood lying near the high road
from Metz to Verdun and to the south of it, the principal being
the Tank wood between Flavigny and Vionville.
Beyond the above-mentioned line the ridges again rise to the
hill immediately to the west of Vionville and the cemetery south
of that village, while an extensive terrace is formed further to
the south. This hill (297) commands the ground on the east to a
distance of 2,OOO paces, and that on the South-east and north
to a still greater distance. The situation of the village is so low
that one can see over it from the hill. The hill of the cemetery is
nearly on the same level with the hill of Tronville to the west of
it, and divided from it by a defile passable, though with difficulty,
for all arms. The latter hill commands the ground towards
the north and west for a considerable distance. From the heights
of Vionville and Tronville long spurs with gentle slopes radiate
north and south of the high road in the direction of Mars la
Tour. One of them extends beyond that village and trends
away with a gradual fall towards the north on the right bank
of the Yron. The hollows and defiles thus formed afford an
62 The German Artillery.
abundance of covered positions and are practicable for all arms,
with the exception of the steep defile running from Mars la
Tour to Greyère, which compels troops in close formation to
keep to the roads. The copses of Tronville lying on the
northern and north-western slopes of the hill of Vionville Owe
their importance to their position close to the high road to
Verdun and to their value as a mask rather than to any peculiar
formation ; for, containing but few trees, though full of thick
underwood, and traversed by no good roads, they are only pass-
able with great difficulty and ill adapted for defence. Two large
openings in the wood, running from north-west to South-east,
cut them into three parts and allow a clear view to be obtained
from the heights south of Bruville to the hill of Vionville.
The southern edge of the plateau of Vionville falls rapidly to
the defile of Gorze and Tantelainville, the opposite edge of the
defile being equally steep ; the difficulty of access to the plateau
from the south and south-west is increased by the fact of the
defile being very stony and full of bushes. Even the roads, to
which artillery and troops in close formation are here obliged to
confine themselves, do not materially decrease the difficulty of
access, owing to their steepness. Moreover the woods, which
under various names partially cover the edges of the valley and
stretch towards the south to the heights of Buxières, as well as
the formation of the ground, concealed from the defenders of
the plateau the movements of troops in the direction of Buxières
and Mars la Tour.
The broad ridge in front of the northern and eastern flanks of
the plateau of Vionville dips to the south from Villers aux Bois
with a gradual and easy slope between the two defiles of Rezon-
ville and la Jurée, finally terminating abruptly towards Gorze in
the Côte Mousa. Of the low knolls which cover it the most
important was that marked 308 to the South-east of Rezonville,
which, commanding the ground towards the South within range
of artillery, afforded to the French left wing, refused, a Strong
point of appui, and at the same time great facilities of concealing
its formations. The character of the ravine of la Jurče is similar
to that of Rezonville. The ridge running from Villers aux Bois
to Greyère with a gentle and regular incline also commands the
heights to the South beyond the range of field guns. From it
Battle of Mars la Tour. 63
positions as well as movements on both sides of the road from
Mars la Tour towards Rezonville towards the east could be
turned and taken in flank. The inequalities of the ground which
intersect the ridge longitudinally presented excellent covered
positions near Greyère for troops with their front towards the
south. The ravine of the old Roman road separates the ridge
from the plateau of Vionville, and the lower part of it to the
west of the copses of Tronville is so deep (in some places 50 feet)
and precipitous that troops in close formation, wishing to tra-
verse it, are obliged to follow the roads.
The villages, with which we are concerned, have generally
massive houses, built of stone, situated close together, roofed
with tiles and surrounded with gardens planted with fruit trees.
They are moreover enclosed by walls and hedges. The isolated
farms bear the same character. The roads are generally sound
and good, except in those places that have been mentioned.
The excellent high road from Metz to Verdun, which traverses
the field of battle, affords covered positions for riflemen in its
ditches. Attention is called to the character of the road on the
hill of Vionville, which is embanked, affording material cover to
artillery pointing towards the north. The soft arable ground
throughout the greater part of the field of battle renders the
movements of troops off the roads somewhat difficult, and is
prejudicial to the effect of common shell. The ground generally
is more favourable for defence than attack. It is especially
advantageous to infantry and artillery, and also permits to a
great extent the attack of cavalry.
Let us in conclusion review the French positions indicated
above. The advantages of the first French position (occupied
by the 2nd Corps, including Lapasset's brigade) were as
follows:--
I. The extensive command for its guns possessed by the left
wing of the ground in front wherever it was free from woods.
2. Facilities for obtaining good cover for both artillery and
infantry.
3. The existence of points of appui for the defence, such as
Vionville (otherwise not favourably situated), the hamlet of
Flavigny, the Tank wood, and several others.
4. The facilities afforded by the transverse hollows of the
64 The German Artillery.
ground of keeping troops under cover in rear of hills and villages
until required for employment.
5. The capability of advancing from the positions to the
attack with a broad front.
6. The suitability of the ground for the action of cavalry.
The position on the other hand possessed the following dis-
advantages:—
I. Its intersection by the ravines of Vionville, Flavigny, and
Rezonville.
2. The right wing being commanded by high ground at a
short distance.
3. The possibility of both wings being outflanked, and also
the left wing being turned unperceived, as the enemy could
advance through the woods which run up close to it.
4. That the front of the army was inclined to the new line
of retreat on Verdun, which it was the object to gain ; that the
old line of retreat on Metz was on the left flank of the left
wing ; and that the defile of Rezonville lay in rear of the
position.
From these considerations it is obvious that the wings were
the weak points of the position.
The second French position possessed the following advan-
tages: —
I. The possession of good points of appui for defence in
Rezonville and the woods on the right flank, as well as the
possibility afforded by the latter of bringing a flanking fire to
bear on assailants advancing between the old Roman road and
the high road. -
2. The possibility of outflanking such an attack still further,
and that too from a more commanding position, by extending
the right flank to Greyère.
3. A good obstacle in front of the flank so extended.
4. The command of the ground in front of the right flank
and centre of the position for a considerable, and in front
of the left for a moderate, distance towards the south and
West.
5. Excellent covered positions for artillery and infantry
along the greater part of the front.
Aattle of Mars la 7 our. 65
6. The possibility of keeping all the troops under cover until
required.
7. Great opportunities for employing cavalry.
8. The possibility of advancing to the attack with a broad
deployed front from any part of the position, except from the
extended right flank, where the obstacle in front prevented such
a movement.
The disadvantages of the position were as follows:–
I. Its intersection by the ravines of la Jurée and Rezonville.
2. The possibility of its salient angle at Rezonville being
surrounded.
3. Its being commanded by the hill (marked 326) in front
of the left wing.
4. The possibility of troops advancing through the forest
unperceived to attack and to turn the left wing refused.
5. The difficulty of an offensive movement from the extended
right wing, on account of the obstacle immediately in front, and
of the commanding heights of Tronville beyond it—a disad-
vantage all the more important, as it was precisely on this flank
that the strategical situation demanded a successful offensive
movement.
6. With respect to the retreat, the conditions were similar to
those of the first position ; but the position of the new line of
retreat on Verdun was somewhat more favourable, being now on
the right flank of the extended right wing.
It may be remarked in conclusion that the principal defect
in this otherwise strong position lay in its left flank being re-
fused.
The advantages of the main position, occupied by the
Germans, must now be referred to, viz.:-
I. Points of appui for defence in the Bois de St. Arnould and
Vionville, the hamlets of Flavigny and Vionville, the Tank wood
and the copses of Tronville.
2. The retreat of the left wing being covered by Tronville
and its heights, and that of part of the infantry of the right wing
by the Bois de Vionville and St. Arnould.
3. The possibility of keeping the troops under cover until
required.
4. Distant command of the ground in front from the height
F
66 The German Artillery.
near the Bois de Vionville (326), except where cover is afforded
by hollows and woods; and command of ground in front from
the hill of Vionville up to the range of field artillery.
5. The favourable and covered positions afforded by this
command and by transverse hollows, for infantry and artillery.
6. The possibility of assuming the offensive on a broad
front from the greater part of the position.
7. Abundant opportunities for the employment of cavalry.
8. The re-entering angle formed by the right wing out-
flanking hostile offensive movements made from Rezonville
towards the south or south-west.
9. The position intercepting the shortest line of retreat on
Verdun, the object at which the enemy was aiming. -
The disadvantages of the position were the following :-
I. Its intersection by the ravines of la Jurée, Rezonville,
Flavigny, and Vionville.
2. The command of the extreme right wing afforded by the
hill marked 308.
3. The difficulty which would be experienced by the extended
left wing (excluding its most distant portion to the west of
Mars la Tour) in making any offensive movement across the
defile between Greyère and the copses of Tronville, behind
which the enemy could obtain cover in a commanding position.
4. The existence in rear of the centre and right wing of an
obstacle not easily traversed, viz. the edge of the plateau and
the defile. º
5. The extent of the position (three miles) being out of pro-
portion to the available number of troops, which consisted at the
commencement of the battle of but one strong corps, including
von Lyncker's detachment.
6. The danger of both wings being turned and outflanked,
the right through the Bois des Ognons and the left from the
commanding ridge at Bruville.
7. The direction of the line of retreat being oblique to the
right wing, a danger which was, however, counterbalanced to
a certain extent by the reinforcements expected at that point.
The German position possessed several weak points from a
strategical point of view, the principal being the flanks.
67
ACCOUNT OF THE BATTLE.
I. Szºprise of the 2nd French Corps and Cavalry Reserve in
bivouac at Vionville and Rezong/i//e by the 5th and 6th
Cavalry Divisions—The artillery of the 6th Infantry Division
comics into action—Mars/a/ Bagaine's dispositions—Repulse
of the German cavalry.
THE official account of the Second Army states that the
morning of the 16th was very warm and the march of the troops
through the narrow valleys and up the steep ascents to the plateau
fatiguing.
The movements of the IIIrd Army Corps will first be traced.
Some advanced patrols of Dragoons reported at about 8 A.M.
‘that the enemy's outposts were visible at Tronville and Vion-
ville, and that extensive encampments were seen in their rear
near those villages. The general in command, von Alvensleben,
who was riding with von Buddenbrock's 6th Division, ordered it
to march as far as the plateau, and there await the arrival of the
6th Cavalry Division in a covered position in rear of the heights
of Buxières. Reconnoitring the ground from those' heights, he
perceived several hostile camps at Vionville, clearly indicating
the presence of a considerable force. The general determined
to attack without delay, as this was necessary in order to detain
the enemy.
General von Rheinhaben reported that he was advancing
with the 5th Cavalry Division towards Vionville, and would place
himself at the disposal of the IIIrd Army Corps. He also under-
took to inform the Xth Army Corps of what had taken place.
The Division had broken up from its bivouacs at Xonville and
Suzemont at 8.30 A.M., von Redern's brigade of Hussars march-
According to Captain Helmuth's Lecture.
F 2
68 7%e German Artillery.
ing in front, with four horse artillery batteries under Major
Körber. The 2nd Horse Artillery battery of the IOth regiment
was attached to the advanced guard, while the others followed
with the main body. The first lines of wagons remained with
the batteries, the second being united under the command of
First Lieutenant Macard. The Division had also been joined by
a squadron of the 2nd Dragoons of the Guard, which had served
as escort to the two horse artillery batteries of the corps artillery
on their march from Thiaucourt to Xonville; as well as by Colonel
Freiherr von der Becke, commanding the artillery of the Xth
Army Corps, and by Lieutenant-Colonel von Caprivi, Chief of the
General Staff. When the advanced guard reached Tronville the
skirmishers of the IIIrd Army Corps were seen in the direction
of Vionville and Tronville, and also a detachment of French
cavalry on the march. The 2nd Horse Artillery battery, Cap-
tain Schirmer, immediately opened fire from a position near
Tronville (2. r. X.), and its very first shell struck the object. The
hostile cavalry retired and unmasked some guns, which had taken
up a position on the hill to the west of Vionville. These were
shelled at a range of 1,500 paces with good results. But mean-
while Major Körber had brought up the batteries of the main
body, which, in their eagerness to get possession of the all-im-
portant hill of Vionville without further delay, came into action
in echelon, left in front, to the left of Schirmer's battery. They
stood in the following order:-The Ist and 3rd Horse Artillery,
Ioth regiment, Captains Frisch and Saalmüller, and the 1st Horse
Artillery, 4th regiment, Captain Bode, (I. r. X, 3. r. X., I. r. IV.)
The fire of these batteries at a range of about 1,500 paces com-
pelled the enemy to retire ; and to increase the panic, which
seized the enemy, Major Körber immediately advanced boldly
from the left wing to the hill of Vionville, while the other
batteries, remaining a little longer in action, were ordered to
direct their fire on the village, sheltered in the hollow. From
the hill the enemy's troops of all arms were seen retiring on
Rezonville, and were effectually shelled at distances varying
from 1,500 to 2,OOO paces by Bode's battery (I. r. IV.), posted
between the two roads from Mars la Tour and Tronville to Vion-
ville, and by Saalmüller's and Frisch's (3. r. and I. r. x.), which
stood on Bode's right.
AEattle of Mars la 7 our. 69
The 6th Infantry Division, under von Buddenbrock, had
meanwhile received orders to continue its march in the direction
of Mars la Tour, and the general, von Alvensleben, directed
General von Bülow (almost simultaneously with the orders
issued to the two Divisions of cavalry), to bring forward his
divisional artillery, under Lieutenant-Colonel Beck, escorted by
two squadrons of the 2nd Dragoons, with the object of attacking
the enemy's camp. The corps artillery was also ordered to
the front as rapidly as possible. In spite of the great distance
it had to march the divisional artillery came up in time to assist
in the attack made by the cavalry. The 6th Light field battery
of the advanced guard, Captain Schlicht, as well as the 5th
Light field battery, Captain Müller I. (6. and 5. l. III.), trotting at
the head of the division of artillery, came into action close to
Schirmer's battery near Tronville, immediately after the three
horse artillery batteries moved from the position. After firing
a few rounds at 2,000 paces at a French battery, these batteries
continued their advance ; von Schirmer's" and von Schlicht's
batteries coming into action on the hill of the churchyard to the
south of Vionville (2. r. X. and 6. l. III.), where they fired on
the enemy's infantry at Flavigny at 1,600 paces and obliged it
to retire; and Müller's battery (5. l. III.) further to the left.
Further reference will have immediately to be made to this
battery.
Simultaneously with the above, the 6th Cavalry Division
under the Duke of Mecklenburg, was ordered by General von
Alvensleben to ascend the plateau from Gorze.” Von Rauch's
brigade, advancing directly from Gorze on Flavigny, was pre-
vented from reaching the edge of the plateau by infantry fire
from the Bois de Vionville, but Grüter's brigade, taking a more
circuitous route from Gorze through the Bois de Gaumont, was
more fortunate. The 2nd Horse Artillery battery of the
3rd regiment, Captain Wittstock (2. r. III.), attached to the
latter brigade, came into action for the first time after a trot of
two miles through the difficult defile of Tantelainville; but one
1 The battery does not consider this position to be strictly correct, but from the
statements of the batteries in the vicinity the writer considers himself justified in
maintaining his opinion until he receives more reliable information.
* From the résumé of Major von Scherff's Lecture.
7o The German Artillery.
of its guns was left behind and only rejoined the battery at a
later hour. This battery, opening fire about the same time as
the batteries of the 5th Cavalry Division, shelled a large mass
of hostile artillery to the east of Vionville, 2,000 paces distant,
with good results. The two heavy batteries under Lieutenant-
Colonel Beck were also brought into line to the south-west of
Flavigny; the first to arrive being the 6th, under Captain
Meinecke (6. S. III.), which was followed by the 5th, under
Captain Eunicke (5. S. III.) During their advance and while
coming into action, they were exposed to shrapnel from guns at
Vionville and Flavigny, to which they replied with apparently
good results at a range of 2,000 paces. Meinecke's battery had
previously taken a temporary position more to the front, but
this is not shown on the plan of the battle.
Let us now follow the French accounts of this prelude to the
battle. At 8 A.M. the reconnoitring parties returned to the
French camp at Vionville and Rezonville and reported that there
were no strong bodies of the enemy in the neighbourhood, but
that single troopers showed themselves and exchanged shots
with de-Forton's vedettes. The 2nd Corps, Frossard, was advised
early in the morning of the march of a Prussian advanced guard
through Gorze, “which appeared to be taking a line of march
parallel to our own.' The general, however, considered that he
had already taken sufficient precautions for the safety of his
flanks, while de Forton's Division guarded his front. Part of
the latter was watering its horses in the direction of the enemy,
when, according to the French accounts, Murat's brigade of
Dragoons, carelessly encamped at Vionville, was surprised by
the German shells." It is also stated that the Prussian batteries
‘threw their shells into the camp of de Forton's Division and as
far as the cavalry of the 2nd Corps in rear of it.’ Some shells
also fell into the infantry camp. Great confusion ensued, for it
happened that the baggage of de Forton's Division had just
arrived, blocking the narrow street of Vionville and the high road.
Panic-stricken, the civilian drivers turned their wagons and horses
| Marshal Bazaine's work, Z'Armée du Rhin, which has recently appeared,
contains a statement vindicating General de Forton and denying that he was
Surprised,
Battle of Mars la Tour. 7 I
to the right about. Murat's dragoons, with some of their horses
unsaddled, followed them. All fled to the rear in confusion.
General de Forton endeavoured to rally his dragoons on the
brigade of Cuirassiers; but as his artillery, which had taken up
its position to the west of Vionville, was obliged to give way,
they withdrew along the north side of the road in the direction
of Rezonville to the right flank of the 6th Corps. Valabrègue's
cavalry division of the 2nd Corps joined in this retreat.
The French infantry, unaffected by the panic of the cavalry,
Soon formed up and moved forward to drive the foe from the
edge of the plateau. The 2nd Corps, Frossard, fronted in two
directions:—the 2nd Division (Bataille) and the 2nd brigade
of the Ist Division (Vergé) towards the south-west with its right
flank resting on the road to Verdun ; the 1st brigade of the 1st
Division (Vergé) and Lapasset's brigade towards the south,
watching the forests of Vionville, St. Arnould, and les Ognons,
and particularly the ravines running from Gorze to Rezonville.
The batteries of the reserve artillery were ready for employment
according to circumstances. The 6th Corps, Marshal Canrobert,
gradually took up a position to the right rear of the 2nd Corps.
The space between the road to Verdun and the old Roman road
was occupied by the 3rd Division, Lafont de Villers; the 2nd
Division, Bisson, consisting of but one regiment; and the artillery
of Tixier's Division. The Ist Division, Levassor-Sorval, formed
up to the east of Rezonville, facing the South, to support
Lapasset's brigade. Soon afterwards the Imperial Guard,
Bourbaki, was placed by Marshal Bazaine in reserve near Grave-
lotte in the following positions:—The Voltigeur Division at Mal-
maison and the Grenadier Division at the ‘Post’ at Gravelotte,
to secure the retreat on Metz ; the Zouaves of the Guard only
and part of the artillery on and near the road to Verdun, to
watch the ravine of la Jurée. The 3rd Corps, now under the
command of Marshal Leboeuf," was ordered to wheel to the left
from the line Vernéville—St. Marcel, so as to take the enemy
in flank. The 4th Corps, Ladmirault, was at the Commencement
* According to Marshal Bazaine's account, this general—to avoid crowding on
the roads, which were few and narrow—had on his own responsibility and contrary
to orders selected the more circuitous route by St. Marie aux Chênes,
72 The German Artillery.
of the battle only in the act of climbing the heights from Woippy
in the valley of the Moselle, with the intention of marching on
Doncourt, Marshal Bazaine trusted that it would march
towards the sound of the guns and support the movements of the
3rd Corps.
To return to the Germans. The hostile infantry, supported
by artillery, was pressing forward along the whole front and
gaining ground especially on the German left. At that moment
the batteries of the 6th Infantry Division received orders to
retire on their Division, which was marching up from Buxières
to Tronville, and maintain a closer connection with it.
Despite the vigorous and well-directed fire of the horse
artillery batteries at Vionville, they were unable to prevent that
village being re-occupied by Swarms of skirmishers. According
to General Freiherr von der Becke, commanding the Ioth
artillery brigade, they were at that time escorted by two
Squadrons of Dragoons of the 5th Cavalry Division, their own
infantry not having yet come up.” “When the French re-cap-
tured Vionville and their skirmishers pressed on beyond the
village, the situation of the batteries——and more especially that
of the 1st and 3rd Horse Artillery batteries of the Ioth regiment
fronting Vionville—became critical.’ Colonel Becke, with the
Sanction of the General of the Staff, Lieut.-Colonel von Caprivi,
directed both batteries to retire and await the arrival of the
German infantry. But the movement was not executed without
a considerable loss of men and horses, and Lieutenant Blanck
of the 3rd Horse Artillery battery had a horse shot under him.
Dode's battery (I. r. IV.), posted on the hill between the two
high roads, was fortunately well under cover and could not be
reached from the outskirts of Vionville ; but on the other hand
its guns could not see that place, and consequently could not hit
it. Major Körber remained with the battery, which stoutly
maintained its important position. At that moment Müller's
battery (5. l. III), advancing from its first position, moved up
* Von Redern's brigade of Hussars had advanced as far as the ravine between
Tronville and Vionville, the main body of the 5th Cavalry Division being in rear in
the direction of Tronville. The brigade of Hussars was brought forward to the
attack at a later hour by Lieut.-Colonel von Caprivi.
Aattle of Mars la Tour. 73
close to the village of Vionville, and came into action under a
heavy fire, several horses being either killed or wounded.
Swarms of skirmishers again rushed out from Vionville and the
moment became critical. The battery had recourse to case and
succeeded in driving the enemy back into the village, but as the
close and biting musketry fire continued to make many
casualties, it retired some 3OO or 400 paces and took up a fresh
position.
Understanding that the retrograde movement was general,
the batteries on the hill of the cemetery, south of Vionville,
also retired, having sustained a considerable loss from the fire
of mitrailleurs and musketry. A gun of von Schlicht's lost so
many horses that it was temporarily left behind. The spare
horses, which were brought up, were also killed, but the gun was
at length brought off, though not without further loss, by the
detachment under Lieutenant Maas, which had remained with
it. In that position Captain von Schlicht had a horse killed
under him. The hostile attack was pressed with such vigour
that the whole line of artillery stretching from the heights south
of Flavigny to the hill of Vionville was on the point of giving
way. This was noticed by General von Bülow, who had mean-
while ridden some hundred paces to the rear to give orders
to the corps artillery then coming up. In pursuance of the
orders received from General von Alvensleben, he immediately
directed the batteries to halt and unlimber, with the excep-
tion of the 5th Heavy field battery, Eunicke, which came into
action on the left of the Ist Horse Artillery battery of the 4th
regiment (Bode, I. r. IV.) near Vionville, as ordered by the 6th
Infantry Division." This was reported to the general in com-
mand and approved by him.
The 6th Cavalry Division with its battery (Wittstock, 2. r. III.)
was driven back to the wood of Gaumont and the ravine of
Anconville.’” As soon as the enemy's skirmishers succeeded
in approaching to within from 1,2OO to I,4OO paces the guns
were gradually withdrawn for cover behind the hill, though not
* The 5th Heavy battery, Meinecke, and the 5th Light, Müller I., did not come up
until a later hour, when the corps artillery was able to come into action in the centre
of the position, as described below.
* Résumé of Major von Scherff in the Militair-Wochenblatt.
74 7%e German Artillery.
without considerable loss. They then limbered up and retired
with their brigade (Grüter's) into the defile, there to await
further orders.
2. Advance of the 5% and 6th Infantry Divisions and retreat
of the 2nd French Corps to Regonville.
‘The infantry divisions of the IIIrd Army Corps, intended to
cut off the retreat from Metz on the west,’’ arrived in time, and
Lieut.-General von Stülpnagel, on hearing that the enemy was at
Vionville, determined to attack forthwith.” The Ist Light
battery, Captain Stöphasius, of the Ist field division of the 3rd
regiment was attached to the advanced guard of the 5th Infantry
Division. The remaining three batteries followed the leading
battalions of the main body under their divisional commander,
Major Gallus. The enemy had just commenced to occupy
the Bois de Vionville and St. Arnould when the advanced
guard under General von Döring ascended the plateau from
Gorze ; and the 2nd and Fusilier battalions of the Body Guard
Grenadiers were directed on Rezonville by the Côte Mousa.
‘The Ist and 2nd battalions of the 48th regiment advanced
along the hollow road from Gorze to Flavigny, while the 3rd
Rifle battalion followed the Musketeer battalion of the 48th, and
attacked the enemy in the forest on the right of the road.’”
After a severe and bloody contest the infantry succeeded in
pushing forward victoriously towards the heights and forest of
Vionville, thereby clearing the way for the artillery, which gradu-
ally came to the front. The enemy brought up considerable
reinforcements, which pressed our gallant infantry severely. At
this critical moment Captain Stöphasius brought his battery
into position on a hill previously reconnoitred by him and
General von Döring. His left flank was protected by the
Fusilier battalion of the 48th regiment, but the battery was
overwhelmed by the enemy's bullets before it came into action.
First Lieutenant Puscher and Second Lieutenant Flöthe were
severely wounded and three guns temporarily disabled. But
* Résumé of Major von Scherff.
* Lecture by Captain Helmuth.
* A'ésumé of Major von Scherff’s Lecture.
Battle of Mars la 7 our. 75
recognizing the importance of the situation, Captain Stöphasius,
as well as the infantry, resolutely maintained his ground. The
three uninjured guns opened fire at a range of from 800 to
1,OOO paces with such effect that the dense swarms of hostile
skirmishers were crushed and obliged to retire.
The Ist Heavy and 2nd Light batteries (I. S. III. and 2. l. III.),
Captains Nöldecke and Vollbrecht, soon came into action on the
right of the Ist Light battery under their divisional commander,
Major Gallus, and their fire was equally effective. Their losses,
however, were heavy. Lieutenant Schröder of the 2nd Light
battery was severely wounded, and Lieutenant Brehmer was
also hit, but was able to remain with his battery. Captain
Knobbe soon followed with the 2nd Heavy battery (2. S. III.)
His orders obliged him at first to remain in rear in reserve,
to avoid blocking up the road ; but concluding from the heavy
firing that the situation of affairs was serious, he advanced
immediately and brought his battery, considerably weakened,
into action on the left flank of the division. Two horses
were killed under him. “A superior force of the enemy
meanwhile attacked the 48th Fusiliers in flank and drove back
the three companies of the left wing; the leading battalion
of the IOth brigade (Ist battalion, 52nd regiment) advanced
at a double to support it, and repulsed the French to a
short distance only, when it was itself brought to a standstill
by superior numbers. Major-General von Döring fell mortally
wounded, and the enemy was not definitely driven off until the
arrival of the Fusilier and 2nd battalions of the 52nd regiment,
followed by the 2nd and Fusilier battalions of the 12th regiment,
which had approached during the fight.” The artillery of course
contributed materially in bringing about this result.
It was now I 1 o'clock. Major-General von Schwerin posted
his troops at the crossing of the roads Buxières—Rezonville
and Gorze—Flavigny, the two battalions on his left flank (the
2nd battalion of the 52nd regiment and the Fusilier battalion
of the 12th) pursuing the enemy towards the north. On the
right flank the infantry, after an obstinate struggle, succeeded
in reaching the northern edge of the Bois de Vionville, and
| Résumé of Major von Scherff,
76 7%e German Artillery.
established itself there. The 48th regiment and the Rifle
battalion had been reinforced by the 2nd and Fusilier battalions
of the 78th regiment, which had moved up into the intervals
between the batteries, under Colonel Lyncker, he having placed
himself under the orders of Lieut.-Gen. von Stülpnagel while
on the march from Novéant to Chambley. The two battalions
of the Body Guard regiment on the right of the line had
advanced to the margin of the wood of St. Arnould, and held
their position against Lapasset's brigade, which was greatly
Superior in numbers. In the centre the Ist field division of the
3rd regiment, having moved up between the 9th and IOth
Infantry brigades, had gradually wheeled to the right with
them, and had made Some progress. Major Gallus, wishing to
follow the enemy's movement and to rest his right flank on the
infantry in the Bois de Vionville, ordered the division to
advance, bringing its left shoulder forward and extending its
right flank. Knobbe's battery (2. S. III.), which was at some
distance on the left of the line, at once moved along the rear of
the other batteries, this movement being concealed by the con-
formation of the ground, and then advanced under a heavy
musketry fire for a short distance along the western edge of
the Bois de Vionville. This battery formed the pivot of the
wheel, the other batteries alligning themselves on it. At this
moment the 1st Light battery of the IOth regiment (I. I. X.),
under Captain Knauer, attached to Lyncker's detachment,
came into action on the left flank of the division and took an
active part in the fight. When the enemy retreated further, the
wheel was continued, so that at length the line fronted nearly
due east.
The ground was extremely favourable to our fire, which was
at first directed against the enemy's infantry at a range of from
I,600 to I,8OO paces, and the effect was apparently excellent,
since the hostile skirmishers and their supports withdrew in two
directions. After this the batteries fired alternately at artillery,
mitrailleurs, and infantry, according to circumstances, the ranges
being generally between I,6OO and 3,OOO paces. Some batteries
On the old Roman road at more than 4,000 paces were also
fired at, but this distance was exceptional, though even then
the effect was evidently good.
/3a///e of Mars la 7 our. 77
The hostile infantry repeatedly endeavoured to advance over
the hill to the north of Rezonville (31 I), but were exposed to
such an accurate and destructive fire from the German guns,
which were served with the greatest coolness, that they were
always obliged to retire. The French batteries were frequently
shelled with such effect that they were unable to come into
action.
Owing to the necessity of maintaining a rapid fire the ammu-
nition was soon expended. The command of the ammunition
wagons and the general supervision in rear had indeed been
entrusted to an officer, but nevertheless it was only with con-
siderable difficulty that a few ammunition wagons were brought
up from Gorze. This was principally owing to the march
being through the ravines of Gorze, the delays caused by the
steepness of the road, and the circumstance that the ground in
rear of the batteries was exposed to the enemy's shells.
The losses sustained by the batteries during the above move-
ment and also when in action were very considerable. The
French fire, though occasionally brisk, was not at first very
effective ; the shrapnel went over our heads, bursting in the air,
generally at a height of IOO feet, and the greater part of the
common shell burst short. Most of our losses were caused
by musketry. Major Gallus was struck three times by the
enemy's bullets, and soon afterwards died of his wounds, but did
not give over the command of the division to Captain Stöphasius
until after the third wound, by which time it was evident that
the enemy could not silence the German guns. The following
officers fell —Captain Vollbrecht, who was succeeded in the
command of the 2nd Light battery by First Lieutenant Wop-
pisch ; First Lieutenant von Heydenreich, and Second Lieutenant
Borchert. Lieutenant and Adjutant Steinlein of the 3rd brigade
of artillery was also severely wounded, while carrying an order
from General von Bülow to Major Gallus. The loss of horses
was very great ; Captain Stöphasius lost two, while Captain
Knauer, Lieutenant and Adjutant Krulle, and Lieutenant Haas
each had a horse killed under him. There were only three riding-
horses left in the Ist Light battery, so that the officers, with the
exception of the captain, were obliged to be carried on the
limbers. During the pauses in the action, which lasted from
78 The German Artillery.
half an hour to one hour at a time, losses were made good and
the Supply of ammunition replenished.
While these events were taking place on the right wing Cf
the Prussians, the left wing and centre had made some progress,
which afforded material support to the 5th Division. ‘The 6th
Division (von Buddenbrock), led by General von Alvensleben, had
reached Tronville, where soon after IO A.M. the 11th brigade
deployed on the south side of the village and the 12th on the
north side, facing the east. The 35th Fusiliers of the I Ith
brigade, Major-General von Rothmaler, advanced against
Flavigny and Vionville, and the 64th regiment of the 12th
brigade along the high road against the latter village.” On the
approach of the infantry, the two horse artillery batteries under
Saalmüller and Frisch (3. and I. r. X.), which were then retiring,
wheeled about and advanced with the supports of the skirmishers
of the leading battalions in the direction of Vionville and
Flavigny, as desired by Colonel von Becke. Frisch's battery
(I. r. X.) rejoined Bode's battery (I. r. IV.), and fired with good
effect at columns of infantry advancing along the high road
towards Vionville. Saalmüller's battery (3. r. X.) was equally
successful from a position in the cemetery south of Vionville,
where it had been sent by von der Becke, and it also shelled
Vionville. The losses of the batteries, both while advancing
and in action, were considerable, and were mostly due to the
close musketry fire from Vionville. In Frisch's battery Lieu-
tenant Bluhm was severely wounded and had a horse killed
under him, while Lieutenant Rückheim was slightly wounded,
but able to remain with the battery. The effect of the artillery
fire at Vionville was excellent, and it completely stopped the
advance of the enemy's columns.
‘Vionville, attacked on the north, west, and South, was
carried about I 1 A.M., Colonel von Bismarck being wounded in
the assault. But the enemy obstinately retained possession of
the heights on the east of Vionville, as well as of Flavigny and
the little wood between it and the high road. The Fusilier and
1st battalion of the 20th regiment attacked on the Southern side
of Vionville; more to the left, meanwhile the 24th regiment,
| Mºſsumé of Major von Scherff’s Lecture.
Battle of Mars la 7 our. 79
covering the left flank, had advanced from the 2nd line of the
12th brigade into the copses of Tronville.'" -
To return to the artillery. Meinecke's battery (6. S. III.) had
kept up its fire from the position to the south-west of Flavigny,
unconnected with any other troops except a Squadron of Hussars,
probably of the 16th regiment, which happened to be near its
right flank. It succeeded in driving back some hostile columns
of infantry at a range of 1,800 paces, which were in the act of
descending the opposite hills. Heavy losses were occasioned
by the French musketry and mitrailleurs, as well as by the
artillery, which was much more numerous. Second Lieutenant
Rohde was severely wounded.
To support his left wing General von Buddenbrock again
ordered his batteries, which had been detached to the right,
to move up to Vionville, now in the hands of the Ger-
mans. Being relieved by the corps artillery (as described be-
low), Lieut.-Colonel Beck brought them into line on the
left of Major Körber's artillery. Meinecke's battery (6. s.
III.) placed itself between Bode's battery’ (I. r. IV.) and
Eunicke's (5. S. III.), Müller's battery (5. l. III.) being on the
left of the latter. The latter soon afterwards advanced a few
hundred paces, so that its left flank rested on the wood occupied
by the 24th regiment. Meanwhile the Ist Heavy battery of
the Ioth regiment, Captain Kleine (I. S. X.), had placed itself
under the orders of Major Körber. It had marched to Chambley
with Colonel Lyncker's detachment, to which it had been attached,
and was now permitted to advance at a trot, without waiting for
the infantry, in order to take part in the fight at Vionville. It
came up immediately after the capture of that village, and took
up a position between Bode's and Frisch's batteries.” This
* From the résumé of Major von Scherff's Lecture.
* Meinecke's battery retired at a walk from the position it had hitherto held,
rapidly refitted, and then made a long flank march to its fresh position. A gun was
overturned in passing a ditch, but was soon brought up by Portſ/ſefāhnrich Kühling,
and came into action on the left flank of Eunicke's battery, as there was not sufficient
space between that and Bode's battery for the whole of Meinecke's.
* General Freiherr von der Becke states that the horse artillery batteries under
Major Körber were separated the whole day from the 5th Cavalry Division, to which
they belonged, by their advance from Tronville to Vionville. An orderly officer of
the Division arrived in the afternoon to recall the batteries, but this was not per-
mitted by the officer commanding the artillery, who pointed out the necessity of their
holding the position they occupied.
8O The German Artillery.
artillery mass of seven batteries directed its fire on various Ob-
jects as circumstances dictated. In the first place, by cannon-
ading the hostile artillery masses and batteries at a range of
from 1,800 to 2,000 paces, it prepared the way for the successful
infantry attack against the wood between Flavigny and the
high road. After this the ranges were occasionally increased
to 3,600 paces, at which distance good results were obtained
against infantry, artillery, and mitrailleurs. The encruy's Columns
were unable to gain ground ; his guns and mitraillcurs being
temporarily silenced, were compelled to retire and his ammuni-
tion wagons blown up. Later in the day bodies of troops ad-
vancing to the attack from Rezonville in a south-westerly direc-
tion were also effectively enfiladed.
But the position of the batteries at Vionville had already
become critical ; the losses were great, caused not only by
mitrailleurs and musketry but also by the enemy's guns, which
were continually increasing in number. Second Lieutenant
Oemler of Bode's battery had his right arm broken by a piece
of shell, and First Lieutenant Freiherr von Türcke was killed by
another. The horses of Captain Müller and of Lieutenant and
Divisional Adjutant Cordemann, of the 3rd field artillery regi-
ment, were killed by the same shell and fell on their riders.
Major Körber and Captain Bode also had horses killed under
them." In several instances it was necessary to exchange gun
with wagon limbers, to replace parts of carriages that had been
shot away, and make good Other defects under fire. The supply
of ammunition ran short, and Some batteries were obliged to re-
main inactive for a considerable period.”
The fighting round Vionville was still going on when the horse
artillery division of the corps artillery of the IIIrd Army Corps
came into action. On its march a little before arriving at Onville
In the report by Meinecke's battery attention is called to the fact that its right
division sustained extraordinary losses at the cross roads near a poplar, which the
enemy served as a mark.
* Meinecke's battery expended the ammunition in its limbers, in the first line of
wagons, and in an ammunition wagon belonging to another battery. Its sceond line
of wagons did not at first come up, having been kept back by a battery of the corps
artillery to which it supplied ammunition. The battery therefore, reserving five
common shell per gun for emergencies, ceased firing until the arrival of its second
line of wagons, which came up after an hour.
Battle of Mars la Tour. 8 I
it had received orders from General von Bülow to advance at
a trot in the direction of Mars la Tour. The horse artillery
division, under Major Lenz, at the head of the column, moved
off immediately at a trot, and the 2nd field division, under
Captain Stumpf, was ordered to follow, mounting its men before
starting. The first row of wagons of the ammunition columns,
in rear, was directed to march to the Barraques de St. Marie,
where it was to remain ſor the present. It was evident that the
field division with its men mounted would not arrive on the field
of battle till half an hour after the horse artillery, as the distance
was more than four miles and the road bad. General von Bülow
directed Colonel von Dresky to move his guns to the hill south-
west of Flavigny (271) and come into action. Von Schlicht's
battery (6.1. III.) joined the horse artillery division. From the
moment of passing the defile which runs from Flavigny towards
the south-west the 1st Horse Artillery battery suffered severely
from hostile infantry behind a hedge I,500 paces distant. Soon
after the batteries had taken up their position Wittstock's battery
(2. r. III) came into action on their right flank, having advanced
from a position on the right rear, where it had for some time effec-
tively enfiladed at a range of 1,800 paces some French infantry
engaged with the 5th Infantry Division under von Stülpnagel.
The four batteries thus united under the command of
Colonel von Dresky were the 2nd Horse Artillery battery,
Captain Wittstock (2. r. III.), the 3rd Horse Artillery battery,
Captain Rödenbeck (3. r. III.), the 1st Horse Artillery battery,
Captain Scheringer (I. r. III.), and the 6th Light battery, Captain
von Schlicht (6.1. III): their fire was directed at the enemy's
infantry and artillery at a range of 1,800 paces, apparently with
the best possible effect. They were, however, exposed to mus-
ketry fire from the left front, which occasioned many casualties.
Captain Rödenbeck was so severely wounded that he died a few
days after, the command of his battery devolving on Lieutenant
Meyer. Lieutenants Gerber and Wolter were also severely
wounded, one of them being hit before the guns unlimbered.
The deficiency of artillery in the centre of the army corps
arising from the 3rd field division being engaged in another di-
rection, could fortunately be provided for with very little delay
by the 2nd field division of the corps artillery. This had reached
G
82 The German Artillery.
the vicinity of Tronville under the command of Captain Stumpf
after a forced march, and was ordered to the front by General
von Bülow. The 3rd Heavy battery, Captain Vosz (3. S. III.),
was the first to arrive and came into action on the left flank of
the batteries united under the command of Colonel von Dresky,
which had experienced great difficulty in maintaining their posi-
tion against the more numerous artillery of the enemy. The
3rd Light battery, First Lieutenant von Pressentin (3. l. III.),
was placed to the south-west of Vionville, the 4th Light, Captain
Müller II. (4.1. III.), and the 4th Heavy, Captain Fromme (4. S.
III.), on the south side of the cemetery of Vionville. This
occurred at II.45 A.M.
Thus reinforced, Colonel von Dresky was able to advance
the five batteries under his immediate command to a more
favourable position 500 paces nearer the enemy, which afforded
a better command of the ground in front in the direction
of Flavigny. There, as well as on the hill of the cemetery,
they were overwhelmed by a storm of bullets at a range of
from 1,2OO to 1,600 paces, and Sustained heavy losses. Major,
Körber and Lieutenant Gerricke, who were with Saalmüller's
battery at the cemetery, had horses killed under them. Cap-
tain von Schlicht received so severe a contusion that he was
insensible for half an hour, First Lieutenant Bodenstein com-
manding the 6th Light battery during the interval.
It was now of the utmost importance to take Flavigny and
the Tank wood. By order of General von Bülow and of Colonel
Freiherr von der Becke, the greater part of the batteries at
Vionville and to the south of the village directed their fire at
those points and at artillery placed on either side of the road
for their defence, at a range of from 1,2OO to 2,000 paces, with
such success that the wood was carried by the Prussian infantry,
and Flavigny itself was soon in flames. Two dense columns of
infantry, issuing suddenly from the farm buildings to the north-
east and South-east, were shelled by the whole of the batteries
at a range of 1,500 or I,6OO paces, and retreated on Rezonville,
leaving the ground literally covered with corpses; while strong
French columns, which advanced from the hill to re-occupy
the village, met the same fate." It is reported by the artillery
On the day aſter the battle an extraordinary number of French corpses and a
Battle of Mars la Tour. 83
that the occupation of Flavigny was then effected by the
infantry without much fighting, although the conflict up to that
time had been most bloody. This occurred shortly after noon,
and that part of Frossard's Corps which faced the south-west,
consisting of Bataille's Division and the 2nd brigade of Vergé's
Division, was in full retreat.
It is interesting to compare the French accounts of the events
above narrated. General Frossard, Commanding the 2nd Corps,
states: “Two simultaneous and clearly defined attacks were made
against the 2nd Corps: one on its left flank through the Bois de
Vionville and de St. Arnould ; the other on its right flank in
front of Vionville.' The first was met by Lapasset's brigade and
Vergé's 1st brigade; the second by Vergé's 2nd brigade and
Bataille's Division. Along the whole of the enemy's front
numerous heavy batteries, to which our artillery found great
difficulty in replying, covered us with shell. On the extreme left
flank two 4-pr batteries were sent forward from the reserve to
support General Lapasset's battery; but owing to their inferior
calibre and the losses they, Sustained were compelled to retire
immediately. They had however assisted the left wing in
stopping the advance of the German columns. The fire of
Vergé's artillery, combined with that of the infantry, broke the
force of the attack, but the Superiority of the Prussian guns was
everywhere conspicuous. Such was equally the case on our right
flank, where several batteries which had reinforced Bataille's
Division were unable to gain any advantage. In spite of our
inferiority in this duel of artillery, the Prussian infantry was
checked at every point.
“The enemy, having brought up more artillery on his left,
contented himself with redoubling his fire on the 6th Corps;
which was replied to by the French guns.
• The hostile cannonade continued to become more intense :
we were harassed by guns of very heavy calibre, posted on the
commanding heights of Tronville. As the divisional artillery
large herd of cattle, which had fled from the farms, lay on the ground in and about
Flavigny, torn and mangled by shells.
G 2
84 The German Artillery.
was overmatched, General Frossard ordered the 12-pr. batteries
of the reserve to advance under the command of Colonel
Baudouin. The contest was then principally confined to artillery.
Several officers of the French artillery fell, and General Frossard
had a horse killed under him.’
Marshal Bazaine having made the above dispositions, joined
the 2nd Corps on the field of battle, arriving about the time
that Vionville was taken, and found the corps very hotly en-
gaged in a combat of artillery. The Marshal states that the
6th Corps, under Canrobert, had checked the advance of the
enemy who now confined himself to keeping up a brisk fire from
his batteries." He goes on to say: “It was clear that the
enemy would direct his principal attack against our left wing,
taking advantage of the woods to Screen his advance, and that
he would endeavour to cut off our retreat to Metz.’ Marshal
Bazaine decided therefore to remain with the left wing of the
2nd Corps, and Ordered up batteries from the general reserve of
the army to support it, while to support the right wing until the
arrival of the 3rd Corps under Leboeuf, de Forton's Reserve
Cavalry Division took up a position behind it on the old Roman
road, with its rear against the wood of Villers aux Bois. To
judge from the French accounts, and especially that of General
Frossard, the right wing (Ist brigade) of Bataille's Division was
the first to give way under ‘the Converging fire’ of the Prussian
artillery. It was followed by the 2nd brigade of Vergé's
* Lieut.-Colonel de Montluisant, commander of the artillery of Tixier's Division
of the 6th Corps, states that, in consequence of the superiority of the Prussian artillery
fire, he placed the guns in echelon with intervals of 33 yards and changed their
positions every half-hour, either to the front or rear. His four batteries were on the
right wing, and the position of the battery on the right flank at the old Roman road
was so advanced that it could take in flank all troops marching forward beyond the
line Vionville—Flavigny. These batteries were frequently taken to the rear to make
good their damages.
The yielding nature of the ground was advantageous to the French. Montluisant
says: ‘Heureusement les terres étaient meubles; les obus s'enſonçaient et nous
couvraient d'une mitraille très-pressée et peu meurtrière. . . Si le combat avait eu
lieu sur un terrain ferme, nous aurions été Écrasés.’
Before long the two batteries of de Forton's Cavalry Division came into action
near these batteries, and later on the two 12-pr. batteries (9th and 10th) from
the general reserve, which had been attached to Bisson's Division. T hey were
posted at first to the east of Rezonville ; and aſterwards took up a position on the
western side of that village, from which they were compelled to withdraw about 3OO
mêtres by the Prussian fire.
Ba///e of Mars la 7 our. 4 85
Division and, after General Bataille had been wounded, by the
2nd brigade of its own division. The 1st brigade of Vergé's
Division held out for some time longer until it too was obliged
to retire in consequence of its right wing being turned, so that
Lapasset's brigade alone stood its ground on the Southern front
of the position. According to Frossard Vergé's 2nd brigade
suffered greatly from the fire of a strong Prussian battery.
3. Advance of French cavalry at Flavigny to support the 2nd
Corps—It is repulsed and pursued by the German cavalry
Advance of Prussian Artillery in the Centre—The troops
engaged on both sides.
At Frossard's request Marshal Bazaine ordered the cavalry
at hand to advance and cover the retreat of the 2nd Corps. The
3rd Lancers of Lapasset's brigade rode resolutely forward
followed by the Cuirassiers of the Guard on its right. Exposed
to the fire of the German guns on the hill of the cemetery,
the French cavalry came upon the companies of the IOth and
1 Ith brigades,' which had advanced as far as the east of Flavigny.
The charge was checked by the steady fire of the Prussian in-
fantry, which the 17th Brunswick Hussars and the I Ith West-
phalian Hussars advanced from behind Flavigny to support, the
former charging the remnant of the French Cuirassiers and the
latter that of the French infantry.” A battery of the Guard,
having come up during the fight, was captured by the German
cavalry, and Marshal Bazaine, who had joined it, was for some
minutes in the greatest danger. But the fire of Picard's Grenadier
Division of the Guard, which had been brought up to Support
the 2nd Corps and lined the ditches of the high road, and
Valabrègue's Cavalry Division of the 2nd Corps advancing to
extricate the Marshal, forced Our Hussars to retire, although
unable to recapture the lost battery. The German cavalry was
supported by the 6th Cavalry Division, which had been sent
forward by General von Alvensleben in pursuit of the enemy,
but now came on the advancing French Grenadiers. Exposed
* Résumé of Major von Scherſ’s Lecture.
* According to Captain Helmuth, the Squadron of Dragoons of the Guard also
took part in this affair.
86 The German Artillery.
to a heavy musketry and artillery fire from covered positions,
it rapidly sustained heavy losses and Major-General von Rauch
was wounded, but no opportunity of attacking the enemy Was
found. The left wing, composed of the 3rd and I 5th Lancers,
alone crossed swords with the remainder of Valabrègue's
cavalry, and, after driving it off the ground, retired slowly to
the rear of Flavigny."
The occupation of Flavigny by the Prussian infantry and the
advance of the cavalry afforded the desired opportunity for the
artillery of the centre to advance. Schirmer's battery (2. r. X.),
which by this time had made good its losses previously sus-
tained, trotted to the front and took up a position to the east
of Flavigny, by order of Colonel Freiherr von der Becke. It
was soon followed, between I2.30 P.M. and 1 P.M., by Colonel
von Dresky, who brought up his five batteries in echelons from
the right. Major Lenz, with the horse artillery division, led
the way to the hill occupied by Schwerin's brigade, and the
other batteries were alligned with it, leaving an interval of from
150 to 200 paces on their right. The order of the batteries
from left to right was as follows:—Vosz's (3. S. III.), von
Schlicht's (6.1. III.), Wittstock's (2. r. III.), Rödenbeck's (3. r.
III.), and Scheringer's (I. r. III.)
The batteries on the hill of the cemetery were also moved
forward. Colonel von der Becke ordered Saalmüller's battery
(3. r. X.) to advance at a trot to a position to the north of
Flavigny. It was followed by Müller's battery (4.1. III.) and
afterwards by Fromme's (4. S. III.), which were directed to advance
by General von Bülow. All the batteries of the centre fired on the
enemy's infantry at ranges of from 1,500 to 2,400 paces, and by
their accurate fire always repulsed the attacks, which were often
made in close masses. Although the positions of the batteries
were not always favourable, being comparatively low, yet they
had this advantage in the case of a hostile attack, that the
French columns were always obliged to pass conspicuous features
of the ground, the ranges of which could be accurately estimated
by trial shots. It was observed that three shells striking con-
secutively in most cases caused the hostile columns to retire and
Résumé of Major von Scherff's Lecture.
Battle of Mars la Tour. 87
drag their skirmishers with them. As soon as the infantry was
out of sight, his artillery and mitrailleurs on the ridge extending
from the Roman road to the South of Rezonville were fired
at, the ranges generally varying from 1,800 to 2,500 paces. That
the effect of the fire against artillery was also good, was con-
cluded from the frequency with which the hostile batteries
changed their positions and the total disappearance of some of
them.
From want of nearer objects, the artillery posted at the
wood near the Roman road was occasionally fired on with
apparently good results at a range of 3,000 paces, and by some
batteries at a range of 4,000 paces. For a short time French
cavalry also formed a favourable object. As Saalmüller's battery
(3. r. X.) appeared to be very much exposed to the enemy's
skirmishers, Colonel von der Becke ordered it to retire 200 paces
to another position close to the high road from Vionville to
Rezonville. Schirmer's battery (2. r. X.) also moved from its
position south of Flavigny to another on the north of the high
road, for the purpose of taking in flank a battery which had
harassed it considerably by direct fire. The losses sustained by
the artillery in the centre at this time from artillery, mitrailleurs,
and the fire of skirmishers at long ranges, often extending to
I,8OO paces, were very serious.
As soon as the infantry at Flavigny was disengaged by the
cavalry, the portion of von Schwerin's brigade which had al-
ready reached that place (2nd bat., 52nd reg., and Fus. bat.,
12th reg.) continued its offensive movement as far as the high
road far to the east of Vionville; but being there opposed by a
fresh and superior force of French infantry, was obliged to retire
with considerable loss. The 52nd found support in Flavigny
and the 12th reformed in rear of the artillery line." At 12.30
P.M. the 24th regiment was at last able to advance from the
copses of Tronville against the heights to the east of them,
which had for a long time been raked by the guns at Vionville.
It was impossible to attack earlier, because the 2nd battalion,
detached for the security of the left flank to the northern margin
of the copses, had not till then been able to penetrate the thick
* On the authority of Captain Helmuth : so also what follows.
88 The German Artillery.
underwood. Incurring many casualties from artillery, mitrail-
leurs, and musketry from covered positions, this gallant body
of infantry crossed the long narrow ridge and the ravine beyond,
where it held its ground in spite of a biting fire on its flank
from Tixier's Division in the wood beyond the Roman road.
The IIIrd Army Corps was now master of the important
position which intersects the shortest road from Metz to Verdun,
and this it was necessary for Marshal Bazaine to force if he
desired to carry out his original plan of retiring on Châlons. It
was the object of the Prussians to hold this position, which ex-
tends for three miles from the Bois de St. Arnould to the
copses of Tronville. Now therefore commences the second
period of the battle.
The opposing forces up to this time had been as follows:—
On the French side : de Forton's Reserve Cavalry Division, the
2nd and 6th Corps, and the greater number of the batteries of
the Army Artillery Reserve (26 batteries exclusive of the latter).
On the German side : the 5th and 6th Cavalry Divisions, the
3rd Corps, von Lyncker's detachment, and a battery of
Lehmann's detachment (2 I batteries, of which 7 were heavy).
‘The whole of the artillery and nearly the whole of the in-
fantry was engaged in the first line. The second was formed by
the cavalry consisting, of the 2nd and 12th Dragoons (belonging
to the divisions), to each of which was attached half of the 9th
Dragoons from the 37th brigade ; Mecklenburg's Division in
the wood of Gaumont ; Redern's brigade of Hussars at
Flavigny, and the other two brigades of the 5th Cavalry Division
at Tronville.” Towards noon Colonel Lehmann arrived at the
latter village from Thiaucourt with three battalions and a half-
the remainder of the 37th brigade ; his Ist Heavy battery had
already joined Major Körber's division.
4. Movements of the Xth Army Corps—Attack of the French
Guard and 6th Corps—Charge of 12th cavalry brigade and
advance of infantry from Vionville.
General von Voigts-Rhetz, commanding the Xth Army Corps,
was desirous of reaching St. Hilaire, and after detaching the 37th
| From the résumé of Major von Scherff's Lecture.
Aattle of Mars la Tour. 89
brigade had marched in the morning with the remainder of von
Schwartzkoppen's Division, consisting of the 38th brigade, two
batteries and the brigade of Dragoons of the Guard attached to
it, ſrom Thiaucourt towards the high road Metz—Verdun. But
in consequence of reports received from von Rheinhaben's
Cavalry Division, he took the direction of Xonville before the
battle commenced, to afford timely support to the advanced
detachments. Even when the guns were heard, the troops,
judging from recent events and reports that had been received,
were far from believing in the possibility of an immediate en-
counter with the whole French army, which was supposed to be
in full retreat towards the Meuse," and consequently some of the
battalions continued at first to march in their original direction.
But when the firing increased, indicating unmistakably the
commencement of a Serious engagement, Orders were immedi-
ately issued to the whole of the columns on the march to take
the direction of the field of battle. The nearest detachments
under von Lyncker and Lehmann had already marched in that
direction on hearing the guns.
We have already spoken of the arrival of von Lyncker's
detachment on the field of battle, and we also know that Colonel
Lehmann's detachment, exclusive of the battery already in action,
had arrived at Tronville, and had placed itself at the disposal of
the officer commanding the IIIrd Army Corps. This detachment
was at first to remain in reserve until it “received certain in-
formation of the arrival of Kraatz-Koschlau's Division. The 2nd
battalion of the 91st regiment alone took part in the advance on
Vionville, and assisted the 24th and 35th regiments in a smart
engagement with a considerably superior force of skirmishers to
the north and north-west of that place.”
‘The 20th Division, under General von Kraatz-Koschlau, and
the corps artillery of the Xth Army Corps, which had been on the
march from Pont à Mousson to Thiaucourt and Beney since
4.30 A.M., received orders near Thiaucourt at I I.30 A.M. to take
the shortest route to the field of battle. The half of von
Schwartzkoppen's Division, with the Dragoons of the Guard,
was still on the march to St. Hilaire ; but receiving reports
| From the résumé of Major von Scherff’s Lecture.
* According to Captain IIelmuth's Lecture.
90 7%e German Artillery.
that continued firing was heard in the east, Count Brandenburg,
after a short halt, marched towards it. Before, however, Von
Wedell's brigade had formed up General von Schwartzkoppen
received orders from General von Voigts-Rhetz soon after twelve
o'clock to march to the battle field.’" Before the Xth Army Corps
could support the IIIrd, now very hardly pressed, the greater
part of it had to make a march of from 18 to 26 miles on a hot
and Sultry day.
Let us now turn to the French accounts of the period of the
battle just commencing. Marshal Bazaine reports that after the
Cavalry action, in which he and his staff were surrounded,
there was some hesitation in the Prussian lines. ‘This,'
continues the Marshal, ‘ allowed me to bring forward Picard's
Division of the Grenadier Guards, which advanced under the
personal command of General Bourbaki to relieve Bataille's
and Vergé's Divisions,' while a brigade of Levassor-Sorval's
Division of the 6th Corps was directed by Marshal Canrobert
to move to the heights on the left opposite Vionville. Deligny's
Division of the Voltigeurs of the Guard received orders at
the same time to march to the Bois des Ognons, occupying
it with its battalion of Chasseurs, and to watch the outlets of the
wood by which the Prussians might possibly reach the plateau
of Gravelotte.
The French writers differ in their accounts of the action
which ensued. It is however certain that — the Prussians
having halted between I and 2 P.M. after fully attaining the
object of their attack—a general offensive movement was made
between 1.45 and 3.30 P.M. by the whole of the French troops
on the western front of the position.” Bazaine's official account
omits all mention of this. Fay Speaks of some advantages
which the 6th Corps, Canrobert, had gained on its right wing.
Canrobert states that an offensive movement was made along
the whole line from Marcel to Rezonville about 2 P.M. after
the cannonade on the right flank began to slacken, which led to
1 From Major von Scherſſ's statement.
* Having regard to the attainment of the object and the danger in which the
leſt flank would be placed by the prosecution of the attack, General von Bülow ex-
pressly and repeatedly forbad his batteries to advance, when he was obliged to leave
thc artillery position about 4 P.M., on being sent for by the general in command.
Załłle of Mars la 7 our. 9 I
the inference that the enemy was discontinuing the attack.
Frossard Speaks even of a recapture and obstinate defence
of Flavigny, and of a futile attempt made by the French to
retake Vionville. That Flavigny was certainly not recaptured
at this time, is proved by the fact that Müller's and Fromme's
batteries (4. 1. and 4. S. III.), together with the infantry, never left
the ground immediately to the north of that hamlet until the
end of the battle."
The advance of the enemy's left wing was soon checked.
Exposed in front to a heavy and accurate fire from the German
artillery and attacked in flank by the 3rd Rifle battalion, the
48th and 78th regiments, which rushed out of the northern edge
of the Bois de St. Arnould and de Vionville, it was unable to
get beyond the hill marked 3 I I.” In spite of repeated and
energetic attempts to attack, the French were always repulsed
with terrible loss. The enemy's centre was more successful in
its advance against Vionville, but, in spite of its numerical
superiority, was repulsed by the accurate fire of the German
guns and of the infantry defending Vionville. The 64th, the
35th, and the 20th regiments, with two companies of the 91st,
charged the enemy and forced him to retire with great loss.
This gave fresh confidence to von Stülpnagel's Division, von
Lyncker's detachment, and the troops at Vionville.
The position of the 24th regiment on the extreme left wing
had become desperate. It had till then resolutely held its ground
against a Superior force, its losses increasing every moment, and
its ammunition being nearly expended. In consequence of a
report that some hostile Columns advancing along the road
Metz—Doncourt—Conflans had countermarched and were in the
act of ascending to the plateau South of Bruville, the 2nd bat-
talion of the 20th regiment, the last battalion of the reserve,
had been sent to its support by General von Buddenbrock.
General von Lehmann was indeed marching from Tronville
through the forests to the north of that village to reinforce the
* In justice to the endeavour which Frossard has generally made to give correct
information in his account, it must be remarked that isolated bodies of Prussian
infantry had succeeded in penetrating into the farm buildings of Flavigny, and that
these possibly were driven back.
* According to he account of Captain IIelmuth,
92 The German Artillery.
left wing, but some time would necessarily elapse before his
arrival.
In the interval it was possible for the enemy to annihilate
the left wing by his artillery mass on the plateau of the old
Roman road combined with the turning movement of his
infantry. Prompt support was therefore necessary, and this
could be given by cavalry only. Consequently General von
Alvensleben, fully recognizing the demand he was making on
the courage and devotion of the cavalry, ordered the 12th
brigade, under General von Bredow, consisting of the 7th
Cuirassiers and 16th Lancers, to charge the enemy's guns.
The Chief of the General Staff Colonel von Voigts-Rhetz, under-
took to explain the necessity for this important order.
This celebrated cavalry charge took place at I.45 P.M. The
batteries of Vionville, under Major Körber and Lieutenant-
Colonel Beck, prepared it, concentrating their fire on the point
of attack, after which they protected the right flank of the
cavalry. “General von Bredow advanced with three squadrons of
the 7th Cuirassiers and three of the 16th Lancers up the gentle
slope north of Vionville, where he deployed to the right under a
tremendous fire. The brigade then charged and rode down all
the troops of Canrobert's Corps between the Roman road, the
high road, and Rezonville.’" The charge was finally checked by
a flank attack made by de Forton's Cavalry Division and by the
fire of the hostile infantry, which had rallied. But the object
was attained ; the required time was gained and the left wing of .
the infantry disengaged.”
Even the French accounts recognise the gallantry with which
the Prussian cavalry pushed home its charge. As soon as the
hostile attack on Vionville was checked, the confidence of our
infantry rose to such a pitch that it was determined to assume
* From the résumé of Major von Scherff’s Lecture.
* That the French were unable to carry out their offensive movements at later
periods, and that the Prussian artillery contributed in effecting this result, is shown in
the Guerre de 1870, by V. D , officier d’état-major, published in the Spectateur
militaire of 1871, vol. xxiii. page 236. The following statement is made :-‘A
Rezonville les 5° et 6" divisions de cavalerie prussienne ont pu masquer pendant une
heure l’épuisement de leur 3° corps par des charges réitérées. Mais ce n'est pas
leur action quia empéché nos mouvements offensifs. Ceux-ci n'ont pas eu lieu, parce
que nos chefs n'y ont pas songé, que l'artillerie ennemie nous maintenait, et que nos
propres pertes nous faisaient attendre avec impatience l'arrivée des renforts.”
Aattle of Mars la Zour. 93
the offensive. Fresh columns of attack were formed under
Colonel von Rothmaler, the original formations having become
dislocated during the contest. The 20th, 24th, 35th, and 64th
regiments advanced against the heights at Rezonville and
succeeded, though with a heavy loss, in driving some of the
batteries temporarily from their position and in capturing a
gun. But at length the infantry was exhausted and was
obliged slowly to retire before the superior forces opposed to it."
Meanwhile the 64th regiment was drawn up in reserve behind
Vionville, ready to resist an attack which was momentarily ex-
pected from the north.”
This retrograde movement had of course its effect on the
position of the batteries east of Vionville. The fact of the 35th
regiment having lost ground to some extent to the north of
Flavigny decided Captain Müller II. to withdraw his battery
(4.1. III.), which was suffering severely, about 200 paces, so as to
bring it in line with the skirmishers. Schirmer's and Saalmüller's
horse artillery batteries (2. and 3. r. X.) received a heavy fire
from skirmishers in front and on the left flank, which occasioned
considerable loss. There was no infantry at hand to support
them, and Colonel Freiherr von der Becke, who was near the
batteries, ordered them to retire behind Vionville. After making
good its losses Schirmer's battery returned into the line of
battle, as related further on. Saalmüller's battery (3. r. X.) made
a flank march at a gallop round the Southern side of Vionville,
and although exposed to a sharp fire, Sustained but trifling loss :
one of its guns was however disabled for a short time. The
battery then took up a position to the north-west of Vionville
between Beck's batteries. The adjutant of the Ioth artillery
brigade, First Lieutenant Looff, had a horse killed under him to
the east of Vionville when near Colonel Freiherr von der Becke,
who though covered with earth by bursting shells, escaped
unwounded.
* From Captain Helmuth's Lecture.
* From Major von Scherff’s Lecture.
94 The German Artillery.
5. Eartension of the French right wing by the 3rd Corps and
Gremier's Division of the 4th Corps—Artillery combat at
Viozzzyż//e.
Somewhat before 2.30 P.M. Lehmann's detachment reached
the edge of the copses of Tronville opposite the enemy and
came under a heavy fire. The range was so great that the bat-
talions immediately pushed forward swarms of skirmishers from
the margin of the wood against the strongly occupied heights
in order to make their fire felt. The two battalions of the 91st
regiment occupied the eastern skirts of the wood and the Ist
battalion of the 78th the northern. The 1st Horse Artillery
battery of the Guard, Captain von der Planitz, had also come
into action somewhat earlier on the extreme left flank. Marching
with the brigade of Dragoons of the Guard, it had preceded von
Wedell's brigade to Mars la Tour, and arrived there about I P.M.
After the field of battle had been reconnoitred, permission was
given to the battery (I. r. G.) to take up a position on the hill
south-south-east of Bruville, to enfilade the enemy's line at St.
Marcel, covered by von Barby's cavalry brigade, which had ad-
vanced to observe the enemy. The battery drew on itself the
fire of several hostile batteries, including a battery of mitrail-
leurs, without incurring much loss, and it repulsed some French
infantry, which advanced from the forest to the south of St.
Marcel against the copses of Tronville.
The enemy now threw out skirmishers from Marcel against
the cavalry and the battery. At first the cavalry repulsed them.
Presently however they began to gain ground. The battery
now moved close to the old Roman road, and threw a few shells
at a long range against the enemy's right flank, which was
barely visible. It then withdrew and rejoined the brigade of
Dragoons of the Guard at Mars la Tour.
The following account is given by Marshal Bazaine of this
period of the battle: “It was now 2 P.M. The enemy was
completely repulsed on our right flank. In the centre he was
checked by the 6th Corps and the Grenadiers of the Guard,
and on the left flank he had not as yet assumed the initiative,
as I had expected, for which nevertheless he had made pre-
parations. His artillery fire was almost silenced, but it was
Z3a///e of Mars la 7 our. 95
evident that he was making dispositions for a fresh effort. The
3rd Corps, under Marshal Leboeuf, had been impatiently ex-
pected and now made its appearance. Wheeling to the left on
St. Marcel as a pivot, it moved up into the line of battle.
Marshal Bazaine, now at ease about his right wing, ordered
Leboeuf to hold his position to the last with Nayral's Division,
to open communication with the 6th Corps by means of
Aymard's Division, and to move Montaudon's Division to
Gravelotte, where it was to guard the outlet of the road from
Ars sur Moselle. The Divisions of the 2nd Corps which had
reformed were ordered to march in the same direction by Marshal
Bazaine, who also placed mitrailleurs and 12-pr. batteries at the
openings from the ravine to overwhelm the enemy's masses as
soon as they became visible. “I knew,’ says Marshal Bazaine,
‘that reinforcements had passed Ars and Novéant, and therefore
paid especial attention to the probability of an attack being
directed against our left flank. My line had been nearly
parallel to the ravine of Rezonville at the beginning of the
battle, but towards 3 P.M. became almost perpendicular to it,
extending from the Bois des Ognons to St. Marcel and Bruville.
At this moment the 4th Corps began to arrive in line of battle.’
Grenier's Division was the first to arrive, led by General
Ladmirault in person. Cissey's Division followed in the right
rear, and further to the right Clérembault's and Legrand's
Cavalry Divisions of the 3rd and 4th Corps. The latter
was joined by the 2nd brigade of the Cavalry Division of the
Guard under de France. General Ladmirault outflanked the left
wing of the 64th regiment and of Lehmann's detachment,
which were attacked in front and on the right flank by the two
Divisions of the 3rd French Corps. A brave resistance was
made by the Prussian infantry, but at last the turning move-
ments on both flanks made by a Superior force compelled the
left wing, fighting on the north side of the road Mars la Tour—
Vionville, to give way. The 24th regiment retired with the
last round in its rifles, and at the same time the 20th and
Lehmann's three battalions were slowly pushed back. The only
part of the copses of Tronville still in German possession was
that nearest to the high road.
As the enemy continued to press his attack against the left
96 The German Artillery.
wing, Captain Stumpf, at the request of Colonel von Rothmaler,
ordered the 3rd Light battery of the 3rd regiment of artillery,
First Lieutenant von Pressentin, to support the infantry north
of Vionville. Even in its march through the village the battery
sustained heavy losses, and Second Lieutenant Nicolai had
a horse killed under him. It however boldly advanced to a
position (3.1. III.) on the hill immediately to the north of Vion-
ville, on the slopes of which a small force of our infantry still
remained to meet the attack of the formidable hostile force,
which continued to advance. Within a few hundred paces of
the enemy's skirmishers the guns were brought into action, and
opened fire on the storming columns at a range of 800 paces
with great effect. But in a few moments considerable losses
were sustained. First Lieutenant von Pressentin and Lieutenant
Ahrens had their horses killed under them, the latter receiving
a severe contusion, which, however, did not oblige him to leave
the battery. Another officer commanding a division of the
battery was also disabled.
It was impossible to withstand the overwhelming numbers of
the enemy, and the Small body of infantry as well as the battery
were obliged to retire. One of the guns was reduced to two
tired horses which were unable to drag it through the heavy
ground. The limber was abandoned with the object of saving
the gun. Harnessing the horses one in front of the other,
Lieutenant Nicolai with the assistance of two volunteers from
the gun detachment and two drivers succeeded in carrying off
the gun. It was afterwards provided with a wagon limber and
returned into line. The five other guns retired under a tre-
mendous fire from artillery and skirmishers, but came into action
at every 150 paces, and checked the pursuit. The battery,
much weakened, at length came into position between Kleine's
and Bode's batteries to the west of Vionville, where it again took
part in the action.
As the configuration of the ground made it impossible to
come into action nearer the enemy, the batteries under Lieut.-
Col. Beck and Major Körber had kept up a deliberate fire at a
range of from 2,000 to 3,000 paces on the hostile artillery, which
had increased in number and fired with great rapidity. Soon
after 2 P.M. the left flank was enfiladed by a French battery,
Bałż/e of Mars /a Tour. 97
which, however, was driven off by the 5th Light battery, com-
manded by Müller I. (5. l. III.). The Prussian artillery line re-
tained its position, but at length, when our infantry had been
compelled to evacuate the northern portion of the copses of
Tronville and the enemy's skirmishers had begun to pour their
fire on its left flank, Lieut.-Colonel Beck withdrew gradually from
the position, which had then become untenable. Saalmüller's
battery (3. r. X.) followed the movement. Meinecke's battery
(6. S. III.) kept its position till the last, and with the remaining
batteries under Major Körber maintained so effective a fire on
the enemy's artillery that some of his ammunition wagons were
blown up, and batteries both of guns and mitrailleurs, which
had advanced to about 2,OOO paces, quickly retired. To obtain
cover from the threatened attack in flank, Meinecke's battery
wheeled to the left and retired behind the low road embankment,
where it took up a position with its front towards the north.
Shortly before the arrival of von Pressentin's battery on the
west of Vionville, Lieut.-Colonel Beck withdrew his three bat-
teries to the hill south-west of that village for the purpose of re-
pairing damages and replenishing his Supply of ammunition, and
the division remained there ready to take part in the action when
required. Saalmüller's battery also made good its losses."
The situation of Major Körber's batteries, which remained
in action at Vionville, where Colonel Freiherr von der Becke
was also present, had meanwhile become very critical, the
enemy's superior force continuing to outflank the Prussian left
wing. Three French batteries came into action on the ridge to
the south of Bruville (257), and enfiladed our artillery through
the openings which separate the Copse close to the high road
from the central copse. But the batteries still maintained their
position, the two on the left wing wheeling back so that the
position assumed the form of an acute angle. A steady fire
was kept up on the new as well as on the old antagonist. First
Lieutenant von Pressentin was so severely wounded previous
to taking up this new position that he was obliged to give up
the command of the 3rd Light field battery to Second Lieutenant
Ahrens. The hostile batteries exposed to the fire of this battery
| Some of the other batteries at Vionville were also occasionally obliged to retire
during the action to make good their losses, but soon returned into the line of battle.
| I
98 The German Artillery.
(3.1. III) and of Bode's (I. r. IV.) at a range of from 2,500 to
3,OOO paces very soon retired."
Scarcely were the batteries at Vionville free from this peril
when they encountered a fresh and greater danger. The enemy
now endeavoured to advance in dense swarms of skirmishers from
the central copse against the batteries and the Southern Copse.
The position, described as forming an acute angle, became a
line, so that the four batteries, joined by a fifth under Schirmer
(2. r. X.), which had come up after obtaining fresh supplies, again
fronted towards the north. Somewhat covered by the embank-
ment of the high road, they shelled the hostile infantry at a
range of from 900 to 1,000 paces and drove it back into the
wood. The French batteries, according to Montluisant's state-
ment, were withdrawn to make good their losses as soon as Our
batteries ceased to fire on them.
6. Arrival of the Corps Artillery and of the 20th Infantry
Division on the field of battle—Attack of Wedell's Brigade
—Charge of Baröy's and Brodow's Brigades of Cavalry
—Artillery combat at Vionville—Orders by the German
Commander in Chief.
The position of the Germans had become very critical, es-
pecially on the left wing, which was being gradually outflanked
and forced back by the superior numbers of the enemy. The
right wing still held its ground, but there also the hostile
attacks were repeated more frequently and in greater force, as
want of ammunition obliged the Prussian artillery to fire slowly,
and some of the batteries to cease firing entirely. The arrival
of considerable reinforcements from the xth Army Corps on
the field of battle at this time was consequently very oppor-
tune. The 20th Infantry Division had reached Thiaucourt at
I I A.M., and soon after its arrival First Lieutenant von Podbielski
brought an order from the corps head-quarters to proceed at
once to the field of battle. In the order of march the 3rd Light
and 3rd Heavy batteries, under Major Krause, followed the
leading battalion of the 39th brigade of infantry, while in rear of
In consequence of the fire opened on them by some batteries of the corps
artillery of the Xth Army Corps and of the 20th Division at Mars la Tour.
Battle of Mars la Tour. 99
that brigade marched the corps artillery under Colonel Baron
von der Goltz. The 40th infantry brigade came next, with the
4th Heavy and 4th Light batteries marching in rear of its leading
battalion.
Colonel von der Goltz received permission to move forward
with his two light batteries at a trot, escorted by the 16th
Dragoons. But when the batteries arrived at the head of the
39th infantry brigade, they found that the cavalry was employed
in another direction. They however continued their march to
Tronville without escort, in consequence of the news from the
field of battle repeatedly urging the necessity of immediate
support. Tronville was reached immediately after the evacua-
tion of its two northern copses. At the request of Lieut.-Colonel
von Caprivi, Chief of the General Staff, Baron von der Goltz took
up a position to the west of the village, so as to bring a heavy
fire on the southernmost portions of the Copses. From this
point shells were thrown on the enemy as he advanced to the
attack at a range of 2,500 paces, while masses of cavalry and
artillery were fired on at 2,800 paces. Three or four hostile
batteries replied, but without success. The attack was repulsed.
In this position the 5th Light field battery (5. l. X.), Captain
Berendt, was on the right flank, and the 6th Light (6. l. X.),
Captain Richard, on the left. Colonel von der Goltz now ad-
vanced to the high road to get a shorter range, and the French
batteries, distant from 1,500 to 1,800 paces, retired ; ' not how-
ever before they had occasioned great loss, which in the case of
Berendt's battery was due to the hostile mitrailleurs. Lieutenant
Schellhaas was killed. Two guns were rendered temporarily
useless by want of gunners, and three guns lost so many horses
that they could not be moved.
The van of the 20th Division, von Kraatz-Koschlau, reached
Tronville at 3.30 P.M. The Ist and 2nd battalions of the
56th regiment, the Fusilier battalion of the 79th, the 3rd,
Light and 3rd Heavy batteries (Captains Burbach and Heyn)
led by Major Krause, as well as the 5th and 6th Heavy batteries
(Captains von Scheven and Reinsdorff) of the corps artillery,
under Lieut.-Colonel Cotta, had already been sent forward from
1 These French batteries were evidently those which had fired on Major Körber's
through the opening between the copses.
- H 2
IOO 7%e German Artillery.
Buxières through the Bois de Gaumont and by Sauley Farm to
support the 5th Inſantry Division, under Stülpnagel." The
remainder of the Division, consisting of eight battalions and two
batteries, was led by General von Voigts-Rhetz from Tronville
against the copses with the object of occupying them before the
enemy could do so, or, if necessary, of recapturing them.
The batteries which had remained with the Division, the
4th Heavy (Brunswick) and the 4th Light, Major Ribbentrop
and Captain Mittelstädt (4. S. and 4. l. X.), trotted to a position
south of the high road from Mars la Tour to Vionville. They
fired on the enemy's artillery at a range of from 2,200 to 2,500
paces, and for a short time also infantry columns retreating to
the heights. The effect was apparently good. Lieutenant
Bachmann of the 4th Light battery was wounded and had a
horse killed under him.
Meanwhile the infantry of the Division came up. In the
résumé of Major von Scherff's Lecture it is stated that ‘Major-
General von Woyna immediately advanced with the 1st and 2nd
battalions of the 79th regiment by Tronville against the copses,
the southern of which was still held by our troops. The enemy
retired of his own accord before these fresh reinforcements
towards the north, evacuating what little ground he had gained
in the copses. The two battalions of the 79th wheeled out-
wards to the right and left towards the eastern and western
edges of the wood, and into the interval General von Kraatz
brought up the I7th regiment at a double, which worked its
way northwards through the thick underwood. The reserve
of the 20th Division—two battalions of the 92nd regiment,
the Ioth Rifle battalion, and the Fusilier battalion of the 56th
regiment, which had at first been in the rear—took up a posi-
tion in the south-western angle of the copses.’
Covered by the infantry Ribbentrop's and Mittelstädt's
batteries advanced along the western edge of the wood against
the opposite ridges, and coming into action fired with good
results on the enemy's infantry at a range of 1,500 paces, and
afterwards at from 2,200 to 3,000 paces. But being exposed
to the fire of some infantry under cover in the skirts of the
| According to Major von Scherff
Battle of Mars la 7 our. I O I
\
wood, at a short range of 800 paces only, considerable losses were
sustained, and Lieutenant Pfafferott had a horse killed under
him.
It was 4.30 P.M. when the contest was thus renewed on this
flank by the decisive counter-attack of half of Schwartzkoppen's
Division, which had been brought up from the west to Mars la
Tour. Its march had been accelerated as much as possible in
consequence of demands for support, which grew more and more
urgent. “Nothing but the most determined energy and the
employment (as is well known) of the very last reserves pro-
mised to restore the balance in this ardent struggle. But the
favourable circumstance that von Wedell's brigade was actually
on the march against the enemy's right wing, posted at the
north-west angle of the copses of Thionville (as known from
personal observation), while the 20th Division was advancing to
attack in front, afforded reasonable grounds for the hope that a
decisive success would be achieved.
‘On arriving at Mars la Tour towards 4.45 P.M., Lieut.-
General von Schwartzkoppen deployed the five battalions of the
brigade (16th regiment, 1st and Fusilier battalions of the 57th
regiment) in one line, and ordered them to advance against
the conspicuous clump of wood to the north-east.’" To prepare
this attack Lieut.-Colonel Schaumann brought up his batteries
to the east of Mars la Tour, the 2nd Light, Captain von Baum-
bach (2. l. X.), being on the right, and the 2nd Heavy, Captain
Lancelle (2. S. x.), on the left. The French infantry was shelled
at 1,500 paces and retired, after which the guns were turned
on the artillery and mitrailleurs at 2,OOO paces, apparently with
equally good results. The enemy answered with common shell
and shrapnel without occasioning much loss, but the former,
passing over the German batteries, set fire to the wood in rear
of them. First Lieutenant Keutner had a horse killed under
him in this position. Colonel von der Goltz had previously
endeavoured with his two batteries to pursue the retiring hostile
artillery to the next ridge beyond the high road, but had been
prevented by a brisk fire from skirmishers. The attempt was
now renewed, and although heavy losses were occasioned by
| From the résumé of Major vom Scherff’s Lecture.
I O2 The German Artillery.
the enemy's guns and mitrailleurs, which were in greater force,
they reached the ridge (257) with Richard's battery (6.1. X.)
in front. Berendt's battery soon followed, having been obliged
to halt for a short time under cover of the embankment of the
high road to repair damages. At first the batteries came into
action in front of the 57th regiment and directed their fire on
columns of French infantry and artillery at a range of from
1,000 to 1,200 paces with good Success. l
Of the batteries under the command of Lieut.-Colonel
Schaumann, Lancelle's (2. S. X.) Succeeded in reaching the same
ridge and took up a position somewhat to the west of the corps
artillery and close to the road to Bruville. The battery then
at a range of more than 700 paces shelled the enemy's columns,
which had advanced as described in the following extract : “The
assailants were overwhelmed by a grazing fire of musketry and
mitrailleurs. The two pioneer companies of the Division having
joined the right wing of the two battalions of the 57th regiment,
the troops advanced in twenty-two company-columns, which
quickly dissolved into a single line of skirmishers, for the ground
to be traversed was perfectly open for a distance of from 1,000
to 1,500 paces. Alternately throwing themselves on the ground
and running forward short distances, the troops advanced, and
at the foot of the hostile position came unexpectedly to a
ravine fifty feet deep, the sides of which were abrupt and broken.
This was crossed and the stormers emerged from it at various
points, 30, 40, and 50 paces from the French lines. Chassepot
and needle-gun were pitted against each other at these fearfully
short distances.
“But Cissey's Division now moved up at a double to support
Grenier's. Twenty-six French battalions were opposed to five
Prussian. This unequal contest was maintained on the hill for
several minutes and then the Germans began to fall back slowly.
The fire during the retreat was so destructive that the brigade
was nearly annihilated. Out of 95 officers and 4,500 men, 65
officers and 2,600 men, including only 350 men taken prisoners,
were sacrificed in this attack, which had thus miscarried instead
of being decisive. The 4th French Corps however estimates its
loss on this day at 200 officers and 2,300 men. The remnant of
Wedell's brigade retreating in confusion on Mars la Tour and
Battle of Mars la Tour. IO3
Tronville was pursued by the French army, which began to cross
the ravine.' "
A gallant stand was made by the Prussian batteries on the
ridge (257) to cover the retreat of the infantry, although the
enemy's skirmishers approached to within 400 paces. The
losses increased considerably. All the commanders of batteries,
Captains Richard, Berendt, and Lancelle, had horses killed under
them. Baron von der Goltz's horse was struck down by five
bullets. Among others Captain Lenz, of the ‘Intendance,' on
the staff of that officer, who had requested to be employed under
fire, was severely wounded. The detachments and teams suffered
so severely that the guns could scarcely be served or moved,
the horses in the teams being in some cases reduced to two.”
These losses however were not in vain. The infantry, so
terribly cut up, was partially extricated and saved from complete
annihilation. It was however only with the greatest difficulty
that the batteries could be withdrawn. On the approach of
hostile skirmishers to within a few hundred paces, Lancelle's
battery (2. S. X.), fired a few rounds at the close columns, which
were following immediately in rear of them, and then retired
slowly in column of route along the high road, which descends
rapidly to Mars la Tour. It then came into action on the left
of Baumbach's battery (2. l. x.), which was drawn up to the
South-east of that village ready to give support. Colonel von
der Goltz also retired slowly in echelon, Richard's battery in
the first instance taking up a position in support on the high
road not far from that previously occupied. But Berendt's
battery did not follow until the rear of the retreating infantry
had come up to it. As the hostile infantry pressed eagerly in
pursuit the 57th regiment and some of the Prussian batteries
were now exposed to the greatest danger, from which they were
* From the résumé of Major von Scherff’s Lecture.
* A gun of Berendt's battery had to be sent to the rear, being disabled by an
accident. No. 2 while in the act of closing the breech fell wounded without com-
pleting the operation. Under the impression, however, that this was done, No. 1
fired. The flame burst from the breech, wounding severely the commander of the
gun, No. 1 and No. 3, and the shell was so crushed that it jammed at the beginning
of the rifling. Under the pressure of circumstances, the commander of the
division gave the order to load, and No. 5 in his haste entered another shell into the
bore, which completely stopped up the gum, rendering it temporarily useless.
IO4 7%e German Artillery.
saved by the devotion and valour of the cavalry. The follow-
ing account is given by Major von Scherff:—
“At the commencement of Wedell's attack General von
Voigts-Rhetz, meeting General von Schwartzkoppen immedi-
ately to the east of Mars la Tour, sent orders to General von
Rheinhaben and Count Brandenburg, whose brigades were
drawn up between Tronville and Mars la Tour, to advance and
support the infantry. The 1st Dragoons of the Guard rode
forward in threes between Mars la Tour and the copses of
Tronville, taking the hedges and ditches in their stride. Charg—
ing the 13th regiment of Grenier's Division, the dragoons rolled
it up in confusion round its eagles and extricated the 57th
regiment and Berendt's battery, though at a heavy sacrifice.
With equal gallantry the escort of the corps artillery, consisting
of two squadrons of the 4th Cuirassiers, disengaged Lancelle's
battery. Ribbentrop's and Mittelstädt's batteries (4. 1. and 4. s.
X.) were also obliged to take up positions to the south of the high
road. The six batteries of the IOth regiment, thus posted,
facilitated the retreat of the 38th infantry brigade, which reas—
sembled at Tronville. Their fire was directed on hostile infantry
at from 1,600 to 1,800 paces, and on artillery at from 1,800 to
2,2OO paces, with such success that the pursuit was abandoned.
Towards the end of the fight observation was rendered difficult
and in some cases impossible by the Smoke of the guns, which
clung to the ground.’
From this description of the battle, we cannot but agree with
Major von Scherff, “that the cavalry a second time gallantly
came to the rescue of the infantry in a dangerous crisis.' We
must remark moreover that the artillery had also to thank it to
a certain extent for its safety. But we ought also to claim for
the latter, that by its exemplary conduct it afforded fresh and
firm support to the German left wing, and thus saved both the
other arms of the service.
The Horse Artillery battery of the Guard, Captain von der
Planitz (I. r. G.), had advanced to a position north-west of Mars
la Tour to support the attack of von Wedell's brigade. A large
body of hostile cavalry showed itself at Greyère, and retired after a
few rounds from the battery, which then galloped to a position close
to the high road to Jarny, escorted by the 4th Squadron of the 2nd
Battle of Mars la Tour. --- IO5
Dragoons of the Guard. The infantry and cavalry of the enemy's
right wing were successfully shelled at a range of 1,800 paces.
Skirmishers were then thrown out towards the battery, while
simultaneously an attack was made by Chasseurs d'Afrique
against its left flank. The battery appeared to be lost, but with
the true Spirit of comrades in arms the squadron of Dragoons at
Once charged the superior hostile force and extricated the battery.
The Squadron was now severely pressed, but the 13th Dragoons
hastening to its assistance drove the Chasseurs back. The
German cavalry was however recalled after a short charge,
because in the background a strong force of French cavalry
was crossing the ravine which runs from east to west towards
Jarny. The battery withdrew to Mars la Tour.
‘General Ladmirault was anxious that the numerous cavalry
assembled on the right flank in the plains between Greyère and
Ville sur Yron should complete the advantage gained by the
infantry.'" At first the 2nd regiment of Chasseurs d'Afrique, de
France's cavalry brigade of the Guard, and Legrand's Division of
cavalry moved forward to the attack. On the Prussian side
there advanced to meet them von Barby's brigade of cavalry,
the Ist and 2nd Squadrons of the 2nd Dragoons of the Guard,
the 13th and 16th Dragoons and the Ioth Hussars. The col-
lision of these masses was almost simultaneous along the whole
line. “Twenty-two squadrons were opposed to twenty-four in
this hand to hand struggle of more than 5,000 troopers, the
greatest cavalry action of the war. The French line gave way
and retired on Clérembault's Division of cavalry, which was
advancing from Bruville with three regiments of Chasseurs and
two of Dragoons towards the vast cloud of dust seen in the di-
rection of the plain. In their retreat the Hussars, leaving their
generals Montaigu and Legrand on the field, threw the leading
brigade under Bruchard into confusion, and the Chasseurs were
borne back in the general retrograde movement over the gully,
which General Clérembault with his two regiments of Dragoons
did not venture to cross. Infantry and artillery brought up from
all quarters formed a barrier to the Prussian cavalry and saved
the French right wing from a total rout. The recall was there-
| From Major von Scherff’s Lecture.
IO6 7%e German Artillery.
fore sounded, and the regiments retired slowly to the west of
Mars la Tour, followed cautiously by a single regiment of French
Dragoons. There the cavalry was ordered to cover the left flank
of the defensive position, which General von Voigts-Rhetz had
meanwhile taken up. This position was indicated by the
heights of Tronville, and extended from the copses of that
name as far as the road from Mars la Tour to Buxières. The
first line of troops was formed of the 20th Division, the six
batteries of the Ioth regiment mentioned above, with a few
other batteries, among which was Schirmer's (2. r. X). In the
second line were portions of the 37th and 38th brigades, which
had been assembled. It was now past 7 P.M., and the enemy
showed no desire to renew the attack.'"
The following is the French official account of the conclusion
of this action :-‘General Ladmirault considered the position of
Vionville too strong for his two Divisions to make themselves
masters of it, and was therefore obliged to content himself with
preventing the enemy from advancing beyond the ground already
won.” Ladmirault's Corps assembled on the ridge to the east of
Greyère and bivouacked. The 3rd Division, under Lorencez, had
not come up soon enough to take part in the battle.
As soon as the 20th Division, commanded by von Kraatz-
Roschlau, was established in the copses of Tronville, the bat-
teries under Major Körber (with which, as we already know,
Colonel Freiherr von der Becke had been for some time present)
again moved forward across the high road to the west of
Vionville. The batteries stood in the following order from
right to left : Frisch's battery (I. r. X.), Schirmer's (2. r. x),
Kleine's (I. S. X.), Bode's (I. r. IV.), Ahrens's [previously Pres-
sentin's] (3. l. III.). A tremendous fire was immediately opened
on them by the numerous French batteries on the old Roman
road, to which they responded, the range being between 3,000
and 3,500 paces. It was impossible to support the fire, as the
hostile artillery, besides being more numerous, was under cover
and had got the range of the embankment of the high road.
After sustaining heavy losses the German batteries were obliged
to withdraw behind the embankment, where they resumed firing.
* From Major von Scherſſ's Lecture.
Battle of Mars la Tour. Io.7
A limber of Kleine's battery was so shattered that the gun had
to be carried off by means of a Swingletree, and another gun
was temporarily disabled by a shell jamming. Lieutenant von
Neumann and Captain Bode had horses killed under them.
Having repulsed the attack of von Wedell's brigade, the
enemy reinforced his artillery opposite our position at Vionville
to such an extent that it appeared as if he wished to bring
his whole strength to bear on that point. Fully aware of its im-
portance as regarded the result of the battle, our artillery con-
tinued the contest with great steadiness, undaunted by its own
heavy casualties and the enemy's great Superiority. Some of
the batteries were obliged occasionally to withdraw for the
purpose of making good their losses. Vosz's battery (3. S. III.)
had been engaged since 7 P.M., having been ordered up from its
position at Flavigny by Prince Frederick Charles.
Schirmer's battery (2. r. X.) in pursuance of orders took up a
position to the west of Tronville, and exchanged shots with the
French artillery to the south of Bruville at very long ranges."
Kleine's battery (I. S. X.) returned to Lehmann's detachment
about 6.30 P.M., when the enemy's fire had ceased, and about 9
P.M. Vosz's battery (3. S. III.), Bode's (I. r. IV.), and Frisch's (1.
r. X.) withdrew from the position.
At 7.30 P.M. an attempt was made by some columns of
French cavalry to advance from the woods south of St. Marcel,
but these batteries opening fire on them at a range of 3,000
paces they rapidly withdrew. Major Körber bivouacked at
Tronville.
It was past noon before Prince Frederick Charles at Pont à
Mousson was informed of the very serious nature of the en-
gagement, and he reached the field of battle at 3.45 P.M., after
a rapid ride of an hour and a quarter.” Satisfied of the safety
of the right wing after receiving an assurance from General von
Stülpnagel that he would hold the position to the last man,
the Prince arrived at Flavigny towards 5 P.M., at the moment
* According to the statement of Colonel Freiherr von der Becke, Schirmer's
battery was moved too soon from the position at Vionville to Tronville, and was then
ordered to take up this position without his knowledge by Major von Seebeck, First
Officer on the General Staff of the Xth Army Corps.
* From the résumé of Major von Scherff’s Lecture.
IO8 7%e German Artillery.
when the arrival of the xth Army Corps in the line of battle
gave hopes of achieving a decisive success. His orders pointed
to an energetic attack against the enemy's right wing and Centre
along the gully of St. Marcel ; but the 38th brigade was crushed
before the 20th Division could engage, and the attack was then
no longer possible.
7. Arrival of reinforcements to von Stilpnagel's Division from
the Xt/. Army Corp.–Repulse of partial attacks made
by Prussian infantry against Reconville—The artillery of
f/\e 16t/, /Jivision comes into action—Mars/a/ Bagaine's
7/acasures for the security of /ais left wing—Great artillery
coſ/20at on the Prussian centre and right wing.
The troops ordered up from the Xth Army Corps to support
von Stülpnagel's Division had meanwhile reached their destina-
tion, the batteries owing to their great mobility being the first to
arrive. They moved up into the intervals in the great artillery
line between Flavigny and the Bois de Vionville, their arrival
being all the more opportune since, as above related, some
of the batteries had exhausted their ammunition." They were
now able to obtain a fresh supply. Towards 3 P.M. Major
Krause took up a position between Wittstock's and Sche-
ringer's batteries, Burbach's battery (3. 1. X.) being on the right
and Heyn's (3. S. X.) on the left. Lieut.-Colonel Cotta placed
Reinsdorff's battery (6. S. X.) on the right of Knobbe's near
the Bois de Vionville, while von Scheven brought up his battery
(5. S. X) on the left near Haase's (previously commanded by
Stöphasius). This battery had made an attempt to advance to
the right near the edge of the wood, but had been prevented
by a well-directed fire from skirmishers under cover.
As soon as the reinforcements of infantry came up, the 48th
regiment was sent into the Bois de Vionville and the 56th to the
left flank of von Stülpnagel's Division. Soon after this an
attack was made against Rezonville, the key of the French posi-
| Knauer's battery (I. l. X.) had expended the whole of its ammunition before
3 P.M. Its endeavours, made by order of Colonel von Lyncker, to find an ammuni-
tion-column, were unsuccessful, so that it was no longer able to take part in the
battle. An ammunition-column belonging to the IIIrd Army Corps arrived at a
latcr hour, as related helow.
Z3a///e of Mars /a Tour. IO9
tion simultaneously, by the 78th, 79th, and 48th regiments,
which advanced independently from the Bois de Vionville, as
well as by the two battalions of the 56th from the artillery
position on the plateau. The gallantry and devotion of the
German troops were, however, baffled by the energetic resist-
ance and numerical superiority of the enemy. The 56th regi-
ment was the last to retire after fighting for two hours; while
the 1st and 2nd battalions of the 12th regiment sent for to its
assistance by General von Schwerin and Supported by the fire of
artillery, were compelled to return to their original position
towards 6 P.M.
Later in the day, about 5 P.M., an offensive movement was
made by the German infantry from the Bois de St. Arnould, not
so much with the object of obtaining any direct advantage as
of preventing the enemy from assuming the offensive. The
half of the 16th Division commanded by Lieut.-General von
Barnekow had reached its destination, Arry sur Moselle, at I
P.M. On hearing the guns and receiving tidings that the IIIrd
Corps was seriously engaged, it again started after a short halt
with the sanction of General von Goeben, and, crossing the
Moselle by the suspension bridge at Novéant, marched on
Gorze, arriving there at 4 P.M.” At the suggestion of General
von Goeben the Division was joined by the I Ith Regiment
of the xth Corps, under Colonel von Schöning. A direct attack
on Rezonville was considered most advisable, and consequently
the 32nd infantry brigade, Colonel von Rex, and the II th regi-
ment were ordered to march on the Bois de St. Arnould. The
commander of the divisional artillery (3rd field division of the
8th regiment), Lieut.-Colonel Hildebrandt, received orders to
march through Gorze and come into action to the north-west
of that village. He arrived at the very moment the Prussian
infantry commenced to advance against Rezonville.
The 5th Heavy and 5th Light field batteries (5. s. and
5. l. VIII.), Captains Jacobi and Hammer, which were the first to
come up, were placed on the road from Chambley to Rezon ville
From Captain Helmuth's account.
* The 31st Brigade of Infantry, General Count Gneisenau, with the 6th Light
battery of the 8th regiment, was still detached to Thionville. Compare the account
given above.
I IO The German Artillery.
between the battalions of the 56th regiment, and supported
them effectually by firing on hostile artillery to the north of
the road from Vionville to Rezonville at a range of from
2,500 to 3,000 paces, and afterwards on infantry at 1,600 paces.
The 6th Heavy battery, Captain Mende, in position near the
Bois de Vionville, was equally successful at a range of 2,400
paces against French artillery on the road near Rezonville, as
well as against mitrailleurs and columns of infantry. When the
56th afterwards retired, Lieut.-Colonel Hildebrandt withdrew
Hammer's and Jacobi's batteries, which had sustained consider-
able loss from the heavy fire in flank and front, to the main
artillery position, where they again took an active part in the
engagement. Von Scheven's battery (5. S. X.), had apparently
produced but little effect on the enemy's infantry between
Rezonville and the Bois des Ognons, owing to the cover afforded
by the ground. Previous to the appearance of the artillery of
the 16th Division on the battle field, the battery had taken up
a position further to the north and opened fire on hostile artillery
to the west of Rezonville, which it silenced. Having obtained a
fresh supply of ammunition, it also followed the 56th regiment
to support its attack, but was too late, the regiment having
commenced its retrograde movement. It therefore now again
came into action between the batteries of the 8th regiment in
the main artillery station.
Before commencing the account of the artillery contest,
reference must be made to the movements of von Rex's
brigade and the I Ith regiment, which we left on the march to
the Bois de St. Arnould. Notwithstanding its terrible losses, the
Prussian infantry succeeded in retaining possession of the northern
skirts of the wood until the arrival of these reinforcements which
occurred about 5 P.M. After detaching the 2nd battalion of the
72nd regiment to the Bois des Ognons to support the right
flank, the three regiments (72nd, 40th, and I Ith), without re-
ceiving any direct support from artillery, made three successive
and determined charges against the French infantry, artillery,
and mitrailleurs occupying the height (308).” “All three charges
* Indirect support had been aſſorded by the batteries, which swept the whole of
the ground between Rezonville and the Bois des Ognons from their position on the
hill near the Bois des Ognons.
Aattle of Mars la 7 ozer. 1 I I
were pushed well home to the village of Rezonville itself, but the
troops in each instance were driven back towards the margin of
the wood by the strong French reserves, which were in great force.'
Rendered more and more anxious about his left wing by
these as well as by the earlier attacks of the German infantry
against Rezonville, Marshal Bazaine had ordered Montaudon's
Division (which had been directed to march to the ravine of Ars
from Villers aux Bois) to move up to the western side of the
ravine of la Jurée with the Grenadiers and Chasseurs à pied of
the Guard towards the hill (308); while a battery of mitrailleurs
was placed on the other side to enfilade the ravine. The re-
mainder of the Voltigeurs of the Guard, under General Deligny,
had also been engaged at a later hour. It is therefore not sur-
prising that all the attacks of the German infantry against a
force so superior in number were finally unsuccessful. In addition
General Bourbaki now brought up 54 guns of the reserve artillery
into position at Rezonville.
Meanwhile the long line of artillery, extending in a flat con-
cave arc from the Bois de Vionville by Flavigny nearly as far
as the high road, continued their fire under the general direction
of General von Bülow. Some further changes now took place
in this line. Knobbe's battery (2. S. III.) on the right flank was
withdrawn from the line for Some time to make good its losses,
just when the welcome reinforcement consisting of the batteries
of the 16th Division made its appearance on the field of battle."
This was rendered necessary not only by the tremendous losses
the battery had sustained, but also by the fouling of the guns
in consequence of the continued firing during the hot and dry
weather. Captain Knobbe, who had been wounded, soon re-
joined his battery and brought it again into line to the north of
the Bois de Vionville, soon after which he was obliged to give up
the command owing to his wound. The battery now had no
officer fit for duty.
Large masses of French artillery appearing to the west of
Rezonville, Captain Stöphasius ordered the 1st Light battery,
commanded by Second Lieutenant Haase, (for Stöphasius I. l.
III.) to make a half-wheel to the left to oppose them. Nöldecke's
* For a short time this battery occupied the place in the main artillery position
afterwards filled by Jacobi's battery (5. S. VIII.)
I I 2 The German Artillery.
battery (I. S. III.), and Knobbe's (2. S. III.) also, after the return
of the latter into line,—were placed on its left flank, while
Woppisch's battery (originally Vollbrecht's) was entrusted with
the duty of opposing any advance made by infantry over the
hill (3 II).
Saalmüller's battery (3. r. X.), having made good its losses
in the defile to the south-west of Vionville, was moving to
the south of that village, in order to resume its place in the line
of battle, when Prince Frederick Charles ordered it to come
into action to the south of Flavigny." It was obliged to ad-
vance at a walk, having lost a great number of draught horses.
It has been already mentioned that Colonel von Dresky had
by the Prince's order detached Vosz's battery (3. S. III.) to support
the artillery at Vionville ; but previous to this, nineteen bat-
teries were concentrated between the Bois de Vionville and the
high road under one commander.” The German fire was
directed at various objects according to circumstances, but was
always concentrated on the French infantry directly it showed
itself. In the attacks made by the latter, sometimes supported
by cavalry, the columns were shelled at ranges varying from
over 4,OOO paces to 800, and were always prevented from ad-
vancing nearer.” The effect was also observed to be good at
the longer ranges. On the occasion of the infantry attacks
from the Bois de Vionville against Rezonville, the batteries
in position to the north of Flavigny were able to enfilade
* It had been unable to retain its connection with the other horse artillery
batteries of its division.
* These batteries stood in the following order ſrom right to left –Reinsdorff (6.
s. X.);—Woppisch, vice Vollbrecht (2. l. III.);—Haase, vice Stöphasius (I. I.
III.);—Nöldecke (I. S. III.);—Knobbe (2. S. III.);—-Mende (6. s. VIII.);—von
Scheven (5. S. X.);—Hammer (5. l. VIII.);-Jacobi (5. S. VIII.);–Franck, vice
Rödenbeck (3. r. III.);—Scheringer (J. r. III.);—Heyn (3. S. x.);—Burbach (3.
l. X.);—Wiltstock (2. r. III.);—von Schlicht (6. l. III.);—Vosz (3. S. III.);—
Saalmüller (3. r. X.);—Müller II. (4. l. III.);--Fromme (4. S. III.);—Total, 114
guns.
* General von Bülow states that from the time of the capture of the farm of
Flavigny up to that of posting the outposts in the evening, there was not a single
infantry soldier within reach of the artillery in the centre, or, in other words, from the
position of the right wing of the corps artillery on the hill (326) as far as that of the
4th Heavy battery near the high road ; the farm of Flavigny alone being occupied by
two companies. The artillery was consequently obliged to deſend itself against the
attack of the enemy's skirmishers, which was done with perfect success.
Battle of Mars la 7 our. II 3
the hostile columns and take them obliquely. Finally, when
in spite of this the Prussian infantry was obliged to retire, pursuit
was prevented by a concentrated fire from the whole artillery
position, which played on the flanks as well as the front of the
enemy. These infantry attacks became more frequent and
more formidable during the long pauses in the firing occasioned
by the pressing want of ammunition. When the Prussian regi-
ments charged out of the Bois de St. Arnould, although without
artillery support towards their front, their own batteries having
been detached to the left, the great artillery line was able to
supply the want, and amply support them. Thus, for example,
the dense hostile masses moving between Rezonville and the
Bois des Ognons were taken in flank, apparently with good
results, by Mende's and von Scheven's batteries (6. S. VIII. and 5.
s. X.), at a range of 25OO paces.
Equally successful was the fire directed on the hostile artillery
and mitrailleurs, a great mass of which, having taken up a
position near Rezonville at 5 P.M., was cannonaded at a range
of from 2,400 to 3,000 paces, and Some artillery to the north of
the high road near the forest at distances varying from 3,000
paces to far over 4,OOO paces. That the effect was good is in-
ferred from the frequent changes of position made by the French
batteries, and especially by the mitrailleurs. Several batteries,
debouching from Rezonville, were unable to come into action in
consequence of the concentrated cross-fire. The batteries of the
right wing by a flanking or oblique fire repeatedly prevented the
enemy placing his artillery opposite the left wing, and similar
service was rendered to the right wing by the German left.
The artillery contest became remarkably keen when the re-
serve artillery advanced with the French infantry at Rezonville
between 6.30 and 7 P.M. The German guns, firing with great
accuracy and steadiness at a range of from 2,400 to 3,000 paces,
soon reduced the French to Silence." In consequence of the
* The ordinary procedure was sufficient for trial shots, but the constant motion of
the objects aimed at necessitated the frequent use of the deflection scale. The ob-
servation of the shots was often rendered difficult by the enemy's position being under
cover and by the smoke of the guns, which lay thick on that part of the field of battle.
This was particularly favourable to the enemy's fire. Burbach's battery (3. l. x.)
proved the correctness of its aim by striking one of the houses in Rezonville, when
ſiring at some artillery, which was standing near that village and was barely visible.
I
II 4 The German Artillery.
want of ammunition, occasioned by the length and severity of
the battle, the arrival of the 3rd artillery ammunition-column
of the 3rd regiment, brought up by Captain Bartels to the bat-
teries on the right flank, was very opportune, as in accordance
with orders not only ammunition but also horses were obtained
by the batteries which required them.
The losses sustained by our artillery at this period of the
battle from the enemy's guns, mitrailleurs, and musketry were
very considerable. Some of the batteries were much harassed
at a range of from 3,800 to 4,000 paces by the enfilade fire of
French artillery, which was posted between the high road from .
Rezonville to Vionville and the Roman road. Towards evening
the heavy fire of artillery from Rezonville occasioned fewer
casualties, but French infantry was repeatedly observed running
from that place along the high road; and after firing some volleys
at more than 1,600 paces against the batteries at Flavigny with
very little effect, it again disappeared.
A great number of casualties had previously occurred among
the officers, and the following were wounded in the course of the
afternoon in this position :-In the batteries of the 3rd regi-
ment, Captain Knobbe slightly, who nevertheless was able, as
previously stated, to command his battery for some time longer ;
Second Lieutenants Weyer and Krüger severely, and Second
Lieutenants Ahlers and Haase slightly. Second Lieutenant and
Adjutant von Massalski, of the horse artillery division, was also
slightly wounded when close to his commanding officer, having
previously had a horse killed under him. In the batteries of the
Ioth regiment Captains Saalmüller and Burbach were struck,
but remained with their batteries, and Second Lieutenant
Grumbkow was severely wounded. In the batteries of the 8th
regiment Captain Hammer and Lieutenant von Metzen, who
afterwards died, were severely wounded. First Lieutenant
Gillmeister succeeded the former in the command of the 5th
Light battery. Several officers also had horses killed or wounded
in this position, among whom were Lieut.-Colonel Hildebrandt
and his adjutant, Lieutenant Schulz, of the 8th regiment; Second
Lieutenant Schede, of the IOth regiment; Major Lentz and
Captain Scheringer, of the 3rd regiment, the latter losing two
horses. Captain Wittstock's horse was severely wounded.
Battle of Mars la Tour. II 5
Even at an early hour the casualties in the detachments were
so numerous that drivers, and not unfrequently officers also, were
obliged to work the guns, some of which had temporarily to
cease firing for want of gunners. Most of the teams were re-
duced to two horses."
8. Arrival of reinforcements from the Hessian Division—Last
general attack on the German right wing and centre—Line
of the German outposts—Losses—Supply of ammunition.
At 12.30 P.M., after the first reports had been received at
Pont à Mousson from the IIIrd Army Corps, H.R.H. the Com-
mander in Chief saw General von Manstein and having explained
the state of affairs, directed him to cover the right flank of that
corps and support it vigorously. The 49th brigade of infantry
and the Ist Reiter regiment of the 25th Hessian Division, then
on the march from Cherizey, accordingly crossed the Moselle at
Novéant at 4 P.M. under Lieutenant-General Prince Louis of
Hesse, commanding the Division, and marched towards Gorze.
The 1st and 2nd Heavy batteries, as well as the 1st Light
battery of this Division, bivouacking at Bezon, were turned out
at the same time, and under the command of Captain Reh over-
took a portion of the column, when they continued the march
in rear of the Ist regiment of infantry. The remainder of the
Division followed at a later hour.
Lieutenant-Colonel Stumpf, commanding the Hessian artil-
lery, led the 2nd Heavy and Ist Light batteries (2. S. and I. l.
IX. H.), Captains Hoffmann and Frank, from Gorze to von
Stülpnagel's Division. They marched at a smart trot, which
they kept up nearly the whole distance, along the western skirts
of the Bois des Prêtres and of the Bois de Vionville through the
artillery of the IIIrd Army Corps and came into action in the
first instance to the north of the Bois de Vionville. From that
* A French shell passed through a limber of the 2nd Horse Artillery battery of
the 3rd regiment, and another burst under a limber of the same battery, but no explo-
sion was caused in either case. Instances of gallantry among the men were very
numerous in this battle. It was not an uncommon thing for them to undertake
dangerous duties voluntarily and for non-commissioned officers to repair their damaged
material regardless of a heavy fire of artillery and musketry.
I 2
II 6 The German Artillery.
spot they shelled columns of French infantry moving between
Rezonville and the Bois des Ognons.
The 49th infantry brigade meanwhile was ordered to advance
through the Bois des Chevaux and the Bois des Ognons, followed
by the 1st Heavy battery. General von Manstein and Lieutenant-
General Prince Louis of Hesse joined this detachment. It must
have been about 7 P.M. or 7.30 P.M. when ‘the firing was renewed
with great vigour along the edge of the forest of St. Arnould.
The 2nd battalion of the 72nd regiment, which had been de-
tached to cover the flank of von Rex's brigade during its advance
through the forest, had worked its way as far as the northern
skirts, somewhat beyond that part of the forest already in our
possession, and its appearance was the signal for a fresh general
attempt against the heights of Rezonville.
“The Commander in Chief concluded from the renewal of
the firing that the van of the IXth Army Corps, brought up by
his orders, was now engaged. Anxious to convert the desultory
fight into a decisive victory, he issued orders for a general attack,
which was now all the more expedient, as the increasing feeble-
ness of the enemy's assaults against the right wing indicated his
exhaustion. The French had by this time given way to some
extent, and darkness was coming on, it being 7.30 P.M.
“The 49th infantry brigade of the 25th Division, under the
command of Major-General von Wittich, came into the line of
battle on the extreme right flank at the Bois des Ognons. Only
four battalions strong, it pressed forward with fixed bayonets
through the dense brushwood of the forest, driving back the
Chasseurs of the Guard, but was nevertheless unable to achieve
any decisive success. The firing in the forest continued long after
dark, until at last, towards IO P.M., General von Manstein gave
orders to break off the battle. The Hessians bivouacked in the
Bois des Ognons under arms.''
Encouraged by the presence of its commanding officer,
General von Alvensleben II, the wearied infantry again advanced ;
the 64th, 24th, 91st, 35th, and 20th Regiments continuing to
march along the high road east of Vionville, while General von
Kraatz-Koschlau led two battalions of the 20th Division to the
* Major von Scherff’s Lecture.
Battle of Mars la Zour. I 17
front. The German infantry supported by the brigade of
Hussars under the command of Colonel von Schmidt (in the
absence of Major-General von Rauch, wounded), soon came into
collision with the enemy. The ground having first been recon-
noitred by infantry in consequence of the darkness, the cavalry
charged some hostile masses (93rd regiment) and rode close up to
the village, but was even then unable to achieve any success of
importance. This was followed gradually by a general retrograde
movement up the hill to the original position. Colonel von
Schmidt was wounded. The batteries under Müller II. and
Fromme (4.1. and 4. s. III.) tried to advance on the left of the
cavalry from their position north of Flavigny, but were received
by So sharp a fire from infantry lying under cover along the
high road that they were obliged to come into action and open
fire upon it. As soon as it was dark Colonel von Dresky moved
the batteries nearer to Flavigny, where they bivouacked, ready
however to turn out during the night.
In consequence of this attack Marshal Bazaine ordered
Montaudon's Division to reinforce the 3rd Corps and de Forton's
Cavalry Division, which had been withdrawn, to return into its
original position at Villers aux Bois.
The order to resume offensive operations against Rezonville
was executed by the batteries under Colonel von Dresky in the
position south of Flavigny, with the utmost vigour and rapidity,
which their extraordinary losses of men and horses permitted.
These were Frank's (3. r. III.), previously commanded by
Rödenbeck ; Scheringer's (I. r. III.); Heyn's (3. S. X.); Bur-
bach's (3. l. x.); Wittstock's (2. r. III.); and Schlicht's (6. l. III.)
They had only a few rounds left, and in the increasing darkness
it was no longer possible to distinguish troops at a hundred paces.
Nevertheless the batteries advanced with resolution. Some
infantry discovered on the hill (308) was reported to be Prussian.
Frank's battery (3. r. III.) on the right flank rashly wheeled to
the left with the intention of firing into some skirmishers at
Rezonville at a range of 1,000 paces, and Suddenly received a
Smart fire at 800 paces in flank from the Supposed Prussian
infantry, which proved to be French. Near this battery was
Scheringer's (I. r. III.), which was also severely handled,
Captain Scheringer being severely and Lieutenant Müller
I I8 The German Artillery.
slightly wounded, while the loss of men and horses was very
considerable. The batteries extricated themselves by shell, and
were withdrawn to a short distance by Major Lenz. They then
loaded with case and awaited the course of events.
Burbach's and Heyn's batteries (3.1. and 3. s. X.) were
equally unfortunate. They had only just opened fire on the
outskirts of the village of Rezonville, when they received a
volley from skirmishers concealed in the ditches of the high road
and in some small bushes close at hand. The loss was heavy,
Lieutenants Bulius and Stolterforth being wounded. Major
Krause was also obliged to remove his batteries to another
position some hundred paces in rear, where they resumed firing.
The position of Wittstock's and von Schlicht's batteries (2. r.
and 6. l. III.), was still more critical. On receiving information
from an officer, which proved to be erroneous, that the heights
to the south of the high road near Rezonville were in possession
of the Prussians, Captain von Schlicht rode forward in the
twilight to select a position. He observed some troops, and
when within 150 paces of them recognised them as Grenadiers
of the French Guard, who opened a heavy fire on him. Although
his horse fell with him, he succeeded by a miracle in reaching his
battery, which was following him at a distance of 200 paces.
First Lieutenant Bodenstein meanwhile had sufficient presence
of mind to halt and load with case, seven rounds of which, with
from twelve to fifteen shells, sufficed to clear the ground. The
battery then retired at a walk with the gunners dismounted.
Great trouble was experienced in limbering up, in consequence
of the exhaustion of the men and the steepness of the ground,
the captain of the battery himself lending a hand. At this
moment ‘Portepeefähnrich' Lessing was killed. After retiring
some hundred paces the battery again came into action, and
opened fire at a range of 600 paces, to support Wittstock's
battery (2. r. III.) which had advanced on its right. That bat-
tery was also exposed to a heavy fire from infantry lining the
high road ; but extricating itself by six rounds of case, it retired
into the line of the other batteries. Colonel von Dresky reso-
lutely held this position until he received orders to return to
the position near Flavigny and bivouac. Saalmüller's battery
(3. r. X.), which had followed Colonel von Dresky's batteries on
Battle of Mars la Tour. I 19
the left flank, was prevented from coming into action by the
approach of darkness. It bivouacked at Flavigny, as well as
Pressentin's battery (3. l. III.), now commanded by Ahrens."
About the same time that Colonel von Dresky moved to the
front, Lieutenant-Colonel Stumpf also advanced on his right
with the Hessian batteries, Hoffmann and Frank (2. S. and I. 1.
IX. H.). Hostile infantry was fired on at 800 paces apparently
with good results, but the batteries were exposed to a troublesome
musketry fire in front and in flank. The position however was
maintained until after dark, when an order arrived from Prince
Frederick Charles for the batteries to rejoin von Stülpnagel's
Division and bivouac.
The rapid and almost uninterrupted fire, which some of the
batteries maintained for nine or ten hours, had fatigued the very
reduced detachments in the highest degree, rendering some of the
men almost blind and deaf. Most of the guns were very foul,
and several instances of jamming had occurred in consequence.
When the advance of the artillery on the right flank took
place, Grüter's brigade of Mecklenburg's Cavalry Division also
rode forward, and, directed only by the flash from the rifles,
charged the French infantry in and near Rezonville. Major-
General von Grüter, second brigadier of the Division, was
wounded. It was however impossible to make any progress
in the dark against the concentrated hostile force, and the re-
call was sounded.
About 9 P.M. the fighting ceased in every part of the field of
battle. The résumé of Major von Scherff's lecture concludes
with these words:– The Prussian outposts were posted after
dark in an arc extending from the Bois des Ognons along the
northern skirts of the forests of St. Arnould and Vionville, across
the well contested plateau of Rezonville, passing by the east of
Flavigny and Vionville to the copses of Tronville, whence it
was prolonged by the cavalry of the line, as soon as the moon
rose, across the blood-stained field of Mars la Tour to the
* When Colonel von Dresky advanced against Vionville, the 3rd field division of
the 3rd regiment (Lieut-Colonel Beck) also moved forward to the edge of the plateau
from its position south-west of Vionville, but it was prevented by the darkness from
taking any further part in the battle. Lieut.-Colonel Stumpf states that his batteries
came into action somewhat before Colonel von Dresky's.
I 20 7%e German Artillery.
stream of the Yron. During the night the enemy evacuated the
position still in his possession, and abandoning the march to
the west, withdrew nearer to Metz.” 4.
The losses of this day, on which about 138,000 French
with 476 guns, were engaged against a German force not
exceeding 67,000 men, with 222 guns, were in round numbers
as follows:—
* Germaſts.
Officers Mcn
IIIrd Army Corps º o e º o e º 3O7 6,300
Xth , , 2 3 e e º & te o º 169 5, IOO
6th Cavalry Division . e º & © e º 17 25O
5th 2 3 5 y : . º tº º tº •. e 59 950
One-half of the 16th Division, including the 11th Regiment 87 2,2OO
Hessians . e ſº o g o e º º I I2O
Dragoons of the Guard. © o © º 6. º 2O 25O
Total . e º 66O I5, 17O
* French.
Officers Men
2nd Corps (Frossard) . 9 G º 2OI 5,085
6th , , (Canrobert). tº tº º 171 5,457
3rd , , (Leboeuf) e º º 98 748
4th , , (Ladmirault) º e o o º 2OO 2,258
The Guard . º e º c o º º e II3 2, OIO
Reserve Cavalry . g º sº e º © 7o 465
,, Artillery. * © e © º º 6 IO5
Total . º Q 859 16, 128

Details of the losses sustained by the German artillery in
personnel and matériel are given in the appendix. French
writers dwell much on those of their own artillery. The only
details to be found on this point are given in the works of de
Montluisant and Frossard, but they will serve the purpose of
comparison with the Prussian losses. Up to 12 o'clock the four
batteries under Lieutenant-Colonel de Montluisant, commanding
* The most recent accounts given by Marshal Bazaine differ somewhat from this,
giving the total French loss at 16,954 men killed, wounded, and missing, and 831
officers, including six generals (Legrand, Brayer, and Marguenat killed ; Bataille,
Letellier-Valagé wounded ; and de Montaigu missing).
Battle of Mars la Tour. I 2 I
the artillery of Tixier's Division, had 40 men and 50 horses
killed and wounded, including Captain Abord. One of these
batteries had indeed only four guns when it reached Gravelotte.
A battery of de Forton's Cavalry Division lost one man killed,
twelve wounded, and one missing, while the other battery lost
one man killed and nine wounded. Frossard states that the total
loss in his six reserve batteries was : officers, three killed and
seven wounded ;' men, four killed, sixty wounded, and six
missing.
The supply of ammunition.
The first line of wagons of the IIIrd Army Corps consisted
of the 1st infantry, and of the 2nd and 3rd artillery ammunition-
columns. It started early on the 16th of August from its
bivouac at Vandières, and joined the field hospitals of the corps
artillery. Captain Burchard, commanding the division of columns,
reached the field of battle early with the object of obtaining orders,
and in obedience to those received from Colonel von Dresky,
commanding the corps artillery, parked his wagons at the
Baraques de St. Marie, and issued ammunition to the battery
wagons. But very soon the demand from all parts of the field
of battle became so urgent that Captain Burchard considered
it necessary to advance his wagons to it.
Captain Bartels trotted with the wagons of the 3rd artillery
ammunition-column to within 600 paces of the batteries of
the 1st field division of the 3rd regiment at the Bois de Vion-
ville, and was soon afterwards ordered by the commander of that
division to move up close to it, the Horse Artillery division of
the Ioth regiment at Vionville being supplied from the spare
gun carriages of the column. But this supply only lasted a
short time, and then the 2nd artillery ammunition-column, under
Captain Reinsdorff, was brought up to the batteries of the two
Corps. Captain Hundrich also brought the Ist infantry ammuni-
tion-column to the front at a trot, as the infantry was beginning
to run short of ammunition ; this was not done without some
loss from the enemy's fire.
* It appears from a nominal list given in another place that of these ten officers,
two wounded and one killed belonged to the 1st division, two killed to the 2nd
division, one killed and five wounded to the reserve.
I 2.2 The German Artillery.
Under the pressure of circumstances a regular issue was out
of the question, the losses of men and horses having been so
considerable that the batteries were no longer in a position to
send their wagons for the ammunition, but in most cases the
wagons of the columns were brought up to the limbers of the
guns in action, and the ammunition was issued direct. That
the columns did their duty well under fire is proved by the losses
incurred in many instances." The empty wagons were generally
sent to the rear with the wheelers only, the other horses and men
being taken to fill up the casualties in the batteries. Having
given over the whole of their ammunition, the artillery ammuni-
tion-columns of the first line of wagons started on the return
journey to Vandières on the same day, but, in consequence of the
deficiency of horses, did not arrive there till late at night on the
I6th, quite exhausted after their long marches on bad roads in a
hilly country.
The 2nd line of wagons was also ordered to the front as soon
as the battle commenced. Having bivouacked at Pagny, it
marched by Pont à Mousson and Onville to the Baraques de St.
Marie, a distance of 27 miles, arriving there between 8 P.M. and
II P.M. During the night of the 16th and on the following day
the batteries of the 3rd regiment replenished their supply of
ammunition from the three artillery ammunition-columns of the
2nd line. One hundred and seventy-one horses were also given
over by the columns to replace casualties in the batteries, their
places being filled up by requisitions in the neighbourhood. The
artillery ammunition-columns of both lines having united at
Vandières, were ordered to Herny to obtain supplies from the
reserve ammunition-park, which had arrived there, and, as a
temporary measure, a first line of wagons for the IIIrd Army
Corps was made up of an artillery ammunition-column of the
9th regiment and of one of the 2nd regiment.
The 1st line of wagons of the division of columns of the Xth
Army Corps, which was parked at Atton on the right bank of
the Moselle on the I5th of August, was to have followed close in
rear of the corps artillery and of the 20th Infantry Division on
the 16th. At the beginning of the battle the commander of the
' Wide Appendix.
Battle of Mars la Tour. I 23
artillery ordered it up, but its march was delayed in consequence
of its being directed to make way for the xth Army Corps and
its trains, which had overtaken it, and afterwards for the head-
quarters. The columns then advanced at a trot to make up for
the delay, but the road was still blocked by troops marching to
the front, and an accident in one of the teams necessitated a
further halt at Pont à Mousson. It was late at night when the
1st artillery ammunition-column reached Charey beyond Thiau-
court where, being wholly unacquainted with the field of battle,
it was parked till break of day." It then marched to Tronville,
arriving there early in the morning of the 17th, and was sub-
sequently joined by the 2nd column. Ammunition was issued at
that place, but the supply contained in the two columns was
wholly insufficient. Two full columns were consequently ordered
to the front from the 2nd line of wagons, and arrived at Tron-
ville early on the 18th, while the empty columns returned to Pont
à Mousson on the 17th for a fresh Supply. These columns also
furnished horses and men to the batteries.
The two lines of columns of the IIIrd and of the xth Army
Corps were unable to supply all the batteries, so that it was
necessary to have recourse to the columns of other corps, as for
instance those of the Guard and IXth Army Corps. Captain von
Lüttwitz states that of the three artillery ammunition-columns
belonging to the latter corps, one and a quarter only had its full
complement of ammunition on the 18th of August.”
* A non-commissioned officer, sent from the field of battle to meet the column,
did not return, having lost his way in the darkness.
* General Freiherr von der Becke remarks that several of the 2nd lines of wagons
belonging to batteries willingly supplied ammunition to the 3rd regiment, either by
order or of their own accord.
I 24 7%e German Artillery.
OBSERVATIONS.
I. The French.
THE object of the Army of the Rhine was to retreat from Metz
on Verdun. The fact that this could not be carried out on the
16th without fighting—nor indeed without a serious engagement
—was apparent to Marshal Bazaine, as is evident from the orders
issued by him on the 15th and on the morning of the 16th. The
head-quarters already began to entertain doubts as to the success
of this retreat, on becoming acquainted with the delays in the
march of the army and with the exaggerated reports made by de
Forton's Reserve Cavalry Division of the skirmish on the 15th.
If once it gave up its connection with Metz, and was unsuccessful
in effecting its proposed retreat, the Army of the Rhine ran the
risk of being driven back towards the north, and in consequence
of the limited extent of country in its rear, of being thrown
with insufficient supplies of ammunition and provisions against
neutral territory, and annihilated. The original plan of basing
the operations on Metz, which had many supporters, again
claimed consideration.
The dispositions of the Army of the Rhine for the retreat on
Verdun and the measures taken to secure the march were in-
adequate, and to this alone is to be attributed the fact that the
army was surprised and obliged at the beginning of the battle to
fight in a position not conducive to the object in view. General
Frossard states that the 2nd Corps received early intelligence
that a Prussian advanced guard was marching through Gorze on
a line parallel to that taken by the French, and it appears that
this was also known at head-quarters. The question arises,
ought the 2nd Corps, after receiving this intelligence, to have
remained inactive in its bivouac at Rezonville 2 The answer is
decidedly in the negative ; it was imperative at all events to
dispute with the German army the possession of the plateau of
Battle of Mars la Tour. I 25
Vionville. The obvious course to have pursued was to have
marched immediately to the southern edge of the plateau, which
was abrupt and difficult of access (vide the description of the
battle field), occupying the Bois des Prêtres, de Vionville, and
de St. Arnould, and to have halted in this strong defensive
position. Then immediately on requests for support reaching
head-quarters and the neighbouring corps, the 6th Corps and de
Forton's Cavalry Division could have quickly extended the right
flank by taking possession of the important heights of Tronville.
More considerable reinforcements would have been able to reach
the battle field after a short time; the Imperial Guard from
Gravelotte, the reserve artillery of the army from its bivouac be-
tween that place and Rezonville, and three Divisions (according
to Bazaine two only) of the 3rd Corps from their camps between
Vernéville and St. Marcel. Even if it had been necessary to
preserve the connection with Metz for some time longer, in
order to cover the advance of the troops and trains still in
rear, by posting a strong detachment of the Guard in the Bois
des Ognons and des Chevaux to watch the defiles of Ars sur
Moselle and Gorze, the whole of the remaining troops could
have been brought up to support the 2nd and 6th Corps.
Everything depended on the right wing boldly assuming the
offensive with the least possible delay, and the conformation of
the ground was singularly favourable to such a line of action.
The left wing, the pivot of this great wheel to the left, scarcely
needing any support in consequence of the strength of its position,
every man was available for reinforcing the right wing, the con-
formation of the ground being such that it could advance
towards Buxières with a broad front.
A glance at the relative positions of the opposing forces on
the night of the 15th of August, as shown on the map, proves
that this great wheel to the left would have succeeded. At the
commencement of the battle the French army could reckon on
an overpowering superiority of force. But its head-quarter staff
might have known this had it calculated the possible marches of
the Germans on the basis of the information it had received.
Nor ought the erroneous and unjustifiable report of General de
Forton, that he had encountered hostile infantry on the occa-
sion of the reconnaissance on the 15th, to have materially altered
I 26 The German Artillery.
this view of the case, as the troops he met with could have been
nothing more than reconnoitring parties of German infantry.
Even on the assumption that the Germans would attain a
numerical superiority towards the end of the day, which was
very improbable, the French would nevertheless have gained
the advantage of being more advanced than they on the con-
tested road passing through Verdun to Châlons.
It must be acknowledged that the 2nd Corps speedily re-
covered from the effects of its first surprise, and by vigorous
offensive operations strove to make up for the neglect hinted at
above. But these were unsuccessful, and in making them it came
into a position, the front of which was completely turned away
from the new line of retreat without being in any way favourable
to the old one. The disadvantages of the tactical conditions
have been already referred to in the description and criticisms on
the field of battle, and it would be unjust to make the 2nd
Corps (Frossard), which fought with great gallantry, solely re-
sponsible for its want of success. We know moreover what
difficulty was experienced in forcing its left flank and bringing
the turning movement to a successful issue.
That the extreme right wing was forced with such comparative
ease and rapidity, must be ascribed to the 6th Corps. It was
imperative that that corps as well as the 2nd Corps should
vigorously assume the Offensive at all costs, by at once occupying
the copses of Tronville and the commanding heights of Vion-
ville. In his observations on the 16th of August Lieut.-Colonel
Fay states that Tixier's Division of that corps was kept at a
distance from the scene of action to lend support to the 3rd
Corps under Marshal Leboeuf. It was however clearly of much
greater importance to retain connection with the 2nd Corps on
the left flank than to support the other Corps on the right flank.
It is also stated that the 3rd Corps could not come into line
till late, but no reason is given why the three Divisions, which
arrived between Vernéville and St. Marcel at IO P.M. on the 15th
of August, did not march at once towards the sound of the
guns, Marshal Leboeuf being fully assured that no attack on the
part of the enemy was to be expected on his right flank. How
different would have been the result of the battle, had these
Battle of Mars la 7 our. 127
troops been employed at its commencement to outflank the
German left wing !'
It was doubtless necessary for the Commander in Chief to
bring forward his cavalry, at the request of General Frossard,
to support the 2nd Corps in its retreat. Time was actually
gained by the movement, and well employed in moving up the
Grenadiers of the Guard into line on the left flank of the 6th
Corps. It is not clear from the French accounts whether the
whole of the reserve artillery of the army in the vicinity came
into action at this time, as required by the state of affairs.
It is remarkable that an entire Division, the Voltigeurs of the
Guard, remained for a long time in the Bois des Ognons for the
sole purpose of watching the ravine from Gorze and Ars Sur
Moselle. As there was no enemy in that quarter, this object
could have been attained by pushing weak detachments well to
the front. The remainder of the Division should have been led
through the Bois des Ognons to outflank the German right
wing in the Bois de St. Arnould. The detention of this entire
Division for a merely defensive purpose appears all the more
extraordinary, as the 2nd Corps, having rallied, was afterwards
available for employment at that point.
The result of the battle was greatly influenced by the Com-
mander in Chief taking up his position, not on the right wing
where a decisive result was to be attained by turning and out-
flanking the enemy, but on the left wing, which covered the com-
munication with Metz. His presence at this point indicated a
doubt as to the success of the retreat on Verdun, and also an
anxiety to retain his connection with Metz. His intention to do
this and at the same time to Open a new Communication with
Châlons by Verdun naturally stamped Bazaine's dispositions as
half-measures. The German attacks on his left flank under his
own eye, impressed him more forcibly than the events reported
to be taking place on his right flank. Previous to his arrival
on the battle field the idea of breaking out in the direction of
Châlons prevailed, as testified by the dispositions of the Com-
* Is it possible that Marshal Leboeuf executed the order conveyed to him shortly
afterwards, to move upon the right of the 6th Corps and attack the enemy in flank,
at so late an hour as 2 P.M., in order to concentrate his whole corps ‘and keep up
the connection with the 4th Corps on the right '7
I 28 The German Artillery.
mander in Chief. The 3rd and 4th Corps were therefore ordered
to outflank the German left wing, and the Imperial Guard was
placed astride the high road at Gravelotte. After his arrival
on the left of the position he witnessed the check received by
the 2nd Corps generally and especially the vigorous attack made
against its left flank. The result was the movement of the whole
of the Guard Corps to the left flank and the Bois des Ognons.
The 3rd Corps (Leboeuf) was barely in the act of marching
up into line on the right flank and preparing with Grenier's
Division of the 4th Corps to dislodge the German left flank from
its position in the copses of Tronville, when—in consequence of
reports that a strong hostile force (parts of the 16th and 25th
Divisions) from Ars had marched into the line of battle, and that
the right flank of the Germans had been reinforced by the Xth
Army Corps—it received the momentous order to defend its
position to the last with Nayral's Division, keeping up its Com-
munication with the 4th Corps (Ladmirault) by Aymard's
Division, and to send Montaudon's Division to the left flank of
the French position near the Bois des Ognons, where it re-
mained for the present, though not required. A further move-
ment of troops, to and fro, between Rezonville and the Bois des
Ognons and de St. Arnould was occasioned by the hostile rein-
forcements engaging the French left wing and by the last general
attack made by the Germans.
Had Marshal Bazaine taken up his position on the right flank,
his dispositions would have assumed a very different character;
for he would at once have been convinced that the chances of
forcing the enemy's left flank were greatly in his favour, and
this would have relieved him from all anxiety about his own left
flank; for a tactical victory on his right would compensate for
the strategically bad position of his left flank. The Marshal
would certainly have directed all his disposable troops at a very
early hour against the German left wing, then in a critical
situation. These troops, consisting of the right wing of the 6th
Corps and those Divisions of the 3rd Corps which had reached
the ground, would then not have been employed simply on the
defensive when they had the opportunity of deciding the day by
a vigorous attack—i.e. at the moment when the Germans were
obliged to evacuate the copses of Tronville and afterwards
Battle of Mars la 7 our. I 29
when von Wedell's brigade was annihilated. In that case Mon-
taudon's Division would not have made its long and circuitous
march from Villers aux Bois to the Bois des Ognons, returning
at last to the 3rd Corps, but would have becn actively employed
on the right flank. It is however easy to understand that the
4th Corps (Ladmirault's) found itself too weak—after the check
of the cavalry, which ought to have completed the victory of the
infantry—to force the position of Vionville (Tronville) in the
evening without assistance. We observe consequently that
through want of a clear appreciation of the state of affairs two
objects were aimed at which produced half-measures, and the
result was that the main object was missed in spite of a large
numerical superiority."
2. The Germans.
I. The Object of the Germans was to strike as severe a blow
as possible on the French Army of the Rhine, which had been
considerably delayed in its retreat on Verdun by the battle of
the 14th of August. It was not at first expected that they
would be in time to prevent the whole of that army from pro-
secuting its march, for it was believed that its main body had
made greater progress along the more northern of the roads
leading from Metz towards the west than was really the case.
Before the battle commenced, however, the IIIrd Army Corps was
fully aware that considerably superior forces were encamped in
the vicinity of Vionville and Rezonville, but, notwithstanding
this, it was decided to attack them with the object of cutting
them off from Verdun, as otherwise the greater part would reach
that place. This important result, as is generally the case in war,
was not to be achieved without running a great risk of heavy
losses, and possibly of the destruction of the IIIrd Army Corps;
but it was obvious that a resolute attack by that Corps, imme-
diately supported by the 5th and 6th Cavalry Divisions, would
force on a battle, which would last for several hours before this
I Major von Scherff calls attention to the frequent changes in the positions of the
French artillery as very characteristic, stating that ‘fresh batteries constantly came
into action at various points, and after firing a few rounds against the Prussians
disappeared and were succeeded by others in different positions.” Such a proceeding
was only rendered possible by the great numerical superiority of the French artillery.
K
I 3O The German Artillery.
could be effected by the enemy. The time thus lost for the
march of the Army of the Rhine would be gained for the advance
of the Second German Army. The participation of the Xth
Army Corps in the battle at the right moment could be reckoned
on with certainty, and probably also the timely arrival of rein-
forcements from the other corps in the neighbourhood. The
bold course was determined on, which alone promised success.
2. Let us now turn to the execution of the attack. The
object was to intercept the French army on the shortest road
from Metz to Verdun, covering at the same time the retreat on
Gorze and Pont à Mousson. It was foreseen that the IIIrd
Army Corps would soon be thrown on the defensive, and would
for a long time be mainly dependent on its own strength, sup-
ported by the 5th and 6th Cavalry Divisions. It was therefore
necessary to gain a position in which both these conditions
would be fulfilled. The best was that formed by the copses of
Tronville, the commanding hill near Vionville, Flavigny, the hill
marked (326), and the forests of Vionville and St. Arnould ;-
but it could only be seized by surprise.
The account of the battle shows that the attack was carried
out in the most brilliant manner in accordance with these views.
The IIIrd Army Corps deployed for the attack from the order
of march by the simplest manoeuvres. The 5th Division, march-
ing by the most direct road towards the enemy, covered the
line of retreat, while the 6th Division was ordered to cut the
road from Metz to Verdun, but was obliged to execute a flank
march from Buxières in the direction of Tronville before the
commencement of the attack. The corps artillery, ordered to
move rapidly to the front before the beginning of the battle,
connected and supported both operations. This movement was
masked by the configuration of the ground and by the 5th and
6th Cavalry Divisions. Owing to this and the bold advance of
the cavalry with its artillery the attack had the character of a
surprise, and time was gained for the infantry divisions and corps
artillery to reach the field of battle. They were in time to
occupy the hill of Vionville, and that to the south-west of Fla-
vigny, which had been won, and were fully aware of the neces-
sity of making every effort to gain the other decisive points
/3a///e of Mars /a Zour. I 3 I
above mentioned." We have seen that the pursuit of the 2nd
French Corps by Redern's brigade of Hussars and by the 6th
Cavalry Division was checked by fresh bodies of the enemy's
troops. The strength of the IIIrd Army Crops was quite in-
sufficient to prosecute the offensive movement with success,
but nevertheless it gained possession of the contested position a
little before 1.30 P.M.
This closed the first period of the battle. If the Army of the
Rhine still desired to make good its retreat on Verdun, it was
necessary first of all to carry this position. “From that time
the maintenance of the position by the Prussians would be
tantamount to a victory.”
3. This was no easy task. The description of the ground
and the account of the battle have shown that the IIIrd Army
Corps, in striving for the great object it had in view, was
obliged to occupy a position of very great extent (three miles)
as compared with its own strength, although too limited as re-
garded the large force deployed by the enemy. It therefore
incurred the danger of being forced, or outflanked and sur-
rounded. A victory over the right wing of the German army
would threaten its retreat and its communications with the bulk
of the armies, while a defeat of the left wing would lay open
to the French the road to Verdun.
The situation of that corps therefore soon became very critical.
Being at first reinforced by von Lyncker's detachment alone,
with the battery of Lehmann's detachment, it was able only by
employing the whole of its strength, even to the last battalion
of the reserve, to parry the great blow dealt by the united
mass formed of the 6th Corps, the Grenadiers of the Guard,
Lapasset's brigade, the reserve artillery of the army, and ap-
parently of the artillery of the 2nd Corps also. The left wing
was in the greatest danger, as the advance of the hostile masses
threatened more and more to outflank it. We know the diffi-
culty experienced by the 12th cavalry brigade in warding off
that danger; a task attended with the prospect of annihilation.
The object, however, was of the highest importance, and its
* It has not been considered necessary to call special attention to the fact that von
Lyncker's detachment afterwards took part in these affairs.
* Captain Helmuth.
K 2
I 32 The German Artillery.
attainment will ever be reckoned among the most brilliant
exploits of cavalry.
4. The support given by the Xth Army Corps was sub-
stantial, and, considering the circumstances, prompt. That this
was not wholly given till late in the afternoon is accounted for
by the long marches of from twenty-two to twenty-six miles
made in Sultry weather.
As soon as it became evident from the great increase of the
firing that the matter in hand was not a slight skirmish (which
there was reason to expect near Vionville), but a serious engage-
ment, orders were issued for all the columns on the march to
move as rapidly as possible towards the field of battle ; while
Divisions not immediately under the eye of the Commander
in Chief abandoned as a matter of course their special routes,
which had been dictated without reference to the battle, not then
contemplated ; and, obedient to the well-known maxim, hurried
by the shortest roads to the field of battle, directed by the
sound of the guns. For instance, at the very commencement of
the affair we find von Lyncker's detachment, which was in the
vicinity, on the march to Chambley, placing itself at the disposal
of the 5th Infantry Division, and receiving orders from it. In
the same way Lehmann's detachment took the initiative, and
starting from Chambley, to which place it had been sent to
support the 5th Cavalry Division while reconnoitring, marched
in the direction of the Sound of the guns, placing itself at the
disposal of the general commanding the IIIrd Army Corps, who
afterwards employed it at a critical moment to reinforce the hard
pressed left wing of the 6th Division, in and near the copses of
Tronville.
There were two circumstances which rendered the concentrated
employment of the Xth Army Corps impossible—the configuration
of the ground, and the dispositions for the march of the Second
Army and Xth Army Corps. These had for good reasons given
the Xth Corps a more westerly direction and a Comparatively
broad front, so that much time would have been required to
concentrate the various Scattered columns previous to their
employment in the attack. But the pressure of circumstances
demanded that the IIIrd Army Corps should be supported as
Soon as possible, and consequently the detachments were sent
Battle of Mars la 7 only. I 33
into action in succession as they came up. Reinforcements were
required at every point of the thinly occupied and yet too
cramped position, and it appeared as necessary to strengthen the
front as to extend the wings.
Simultaneously with the turning attack made by the
French right wing reinforced (two Divisions of the 3rd Corps
and one of the 4th), which necessitated the obstinate defence of
the northern copses of Tronville, great pressure was also brought
to bear against the German right wing ; this was consequently
reinforced by a portion of the corps artillery, which had come
up very opportunely, and by the 20th Division of Infantry.
Von Wedell's brigade of the 19th Infantry Division, having
meanwhile arrived at Mars la Tour, was now employed in the
natural course of events in that quarter. We have learnt the
reasons which justified the attack of the brigade and the un-
foreseen circumstances to which its disaster is to be attributed.
Here again the German cavalry (Ist Dragoons of the Guard
and 4th Cuirassiers) was at hand at the right moment, and by a
heroic charge against the pursuing French infantry supported
the retreat of the brigade and artillery. Similar devotion was
displayed at the same time by the escort of the 1st Horse
Artillery battery of the Guard to the north of Mars la Tour,
consisting of a squadron of the 2nd regiment of Dragoons of
the Guard, which in its turn had to be extricated from the
enemy's hands.
The gallant charge made by Barby's brigade, although nu-
merically inferior, thwarted Ladmirault's intention of securing
the victory of his infantry by means of the large force of
cavalry on his right flank on the plain between Greyère and
Ville Sur Yron.
5. No sooner were the “higher authorities convinced that a
battle was inevitable than,—in accordance with the recognised
maxim that to ensure victory numbers can never be too great,
nor the chances too favourable,_we find them directing all the
troops to the battle field, which could reach it in time. This
being general wherever the Sound of the guns was heard, a part
of the 16th Division (three batteries and the Ist brigade, under
von Rex), a part of the 25th Division (Ist brigade, under von
Wittick, and three batterics), and One regiment of the I Sth
I 34 7%e German Artillery.
Division reached the battle field late in the afternoon and during
the evening. As the day was drawing to a close, the troops
marched by the shortest road towards the German right wing.
The account shows how the intention of the Commander in
Chief, after the arrival of the Xth Army Corps, to make a
vigorous attack against the enemy's right wing and centre, failed
in any decisive result. We know, moreover, that even at the
end of the day, when a portion of the IXth Army Corps appeared
on the field of battle, efforts were made to render the victory
decisive, and that, after the bloody and severe struggle of ten
hours, the remaining troops were assembled for this purpose.
The attack, however, was brought to an end by darkness, after
some ground had been gained.
6. The offensive operations of the German troops, frequently
undertaken without orders from higher authorities, were too
partial to gain any lasting success, but were nevertheless not
without their effect on the result of the battle. They invigorated
the German defence ; they gradually deprived the enemy of all
desire to assume the offensive ; and they succeeded in the main
object of increasing Marshal Bazaine's anxiety about his left
wing and his communications with Metz, causing him thereby
to divert to that flank troops which ought properly to have
been employed for the really important object on his right flank.
The German left flank was thus indirectly relieved.
The importance of this severely contested victory cannot
be estimated by the number of trophies actually captured but
by the great strategic result attained. In spite of their great
numerical inferiority the Germans succeeded in arresting the
march of the French army towards Châlons for a whole day.
The shortest and most southern line from Metz to that place
was in their possession, while their flank was close to the second
main line. The enemy could only gain those roads for his
retreat by a fresh battle, but the Germans had gained a day to
bring up their reinforcements, and the chances were therefore in
their favour that a new struggle would add another victory to
their standards.
Bafile of Mars la 7 our. I 35
3. The German artillery.
The battles of the 14th and 16th of August resembled each
other in their improvised character, and consequently the move-
ments of the artillery on the first as well as on the second day
were of the same nature.
I. The object in the first place was to throw the enemy into
confusion by a surprise near Vionville and Rezonville, and thus
gain time for the infantry yet on the march. We have seen that
the horse artillery batteries of the 5th and 6th Cavalry Divisions
performed this duty in a most brilliant manner. The batteries
of the 6th Infantry Division, sent forward to support them, also
succeeded in taking part in the first action.
2. To the configuration of the ground and to the improvised
character of the battle is to be ascribed the fact that the artillery
on several occasions became separated from the Divisions to which
it belonged. From the very commencement of the daring attack
by which the horse artillery surprised the enemy, up to the end
of the battle, the positions taken up by the artillery were so ad-
vanced as to expose it constantly to imminent peril and neces-
sitate assistance from the other arms. The configuration of the
greater part of the field of battle was suitable for artillery; it
was only on the wooded ground, as the Bois des Ognons and
similar localities, that it found no opportunity of coming into
action until the outskirts on the further sides of the forests were
reached. The artillery was consequently sent to the front, as
its greater mobility enabled it to come into action before the
other troops. For the same reason it was detached also to
other points apart from the infantry or cavalry, to which it be-
longed.
The deficiency of ammunition, experienced in the afternoon
more particularly on the right of the position, Owing to the
length of this severe and doubtful struggle, had its influence in
checking the detaching of the batteries in this way. The slow-
ness of their fire and the actual silence of some of them en-
couraged the enemy to make more frequent and vigorous attacks
upon Rezonville against the decisive point, the hill (326), while
at the samc time the Bois de St. Arnould was less threatened
I 36 7%e German Artillery.
than before. The batteries at this point were consequently re-
inforced by batteries of the corps artillery of the Xth Army
Corps, of the 20th, 16th, and 25th Infantry Divisions, the num-
ber of guns being thus not only increased, but several of those
previously in the position being enabled to re-open fire, having
obtained a ſresh supply of ammunition. It is obvious therefore
that the bloody attacks made afterwards by the infantry from
the Bois de St. Arnould received no direct support from artillery."
3. A large force of artillery was employed to open the battle,
in accordance with its special province. Mention has already
been made of the artillery of the 5th and 6th Cavalry Divisions.
As soon as it was resolved to attack the encºmy, orders were
sent to the corps artillery of the IIIrd Army Corps, which was
marching in its rear, to advance at a trot. The horse artillery
division at the head of the column succeeded in coming into
action while the infantry was still fighting round Vionville. The
field division in its rear did not come up till half an hour after-
wards, which is only to be attributed to its inferior mobility and
the badness of the roads. Under the circumstances the corps
artillery, reinforced by a battery of the 6th Infantry Division
and by another of the 6th Cavalry Division, served to connect
the attacks of the two infantry divisions, and supported them ma–
terially. Even before the infantry of the left wing succeeded in
penetrating the copses of Tronville and reaching the enemy, the
whole of the artillery of the IIIrd Army Corps, of the 5th and of
the 6th Cavalry Divisions, as well as that of von Lyncker's and
Lehmann's detachments, was in action, making a total of 21
batteries, or 126 guns.
We observe that in the isolated attack of the xth Army
Corps on the left flank the same principle was adhered to,
although it was owing to the necessity of previously detaching
the greater number of the batteries to other threatened points
of the field of battle, that artillery was not cmployed there in
greater numbers. The light batteries of the corps artillery and
the four batteries of the 20th Infantry Division reached the hills
The account of the battle shows that the attacks of the Prussian inſantry were
indirectly supported by some batteries on the right ſlank of the main artillery position,
which opened fire on the ſlank of hostile columns moving between the Bois des Ognons,
de St. Arnould, and Rezonvillc.
/3a///e of Mars la 7 our. I 37
of Tronville (at that time of such great importance) before the
infantry bclonging to them, and quickly checked Grenier's Divi-
sion on the French right flank, which was in the act of outflank-
ing the German position. They then advanced with the 20th
Division, forcing the enemy to retire to the heights south of
I3ruvillc.
Of the troops that arrived at St. Hilaire the 1st Horse
Artillery battery of the Guard, with the brigade of Dragoons
of the Guard, marched to Mars la Tour, and took an active part
in the battle at the time of the charge of von Barby's brigade,
checking the advance of the French right wing. This was an
advantage of considerable importance, as the execution of the
French movement threatening to turn our left flank was delayed
for some time. Before von Wedell commenced his attack, these
batteries and the 2nd Light and Heavy batterics of the 19th
Division opened fire at Mars la Tour.
4. The German artillery played as important a part in the
progress of the battle and in bringing it to a decisive conclusion
as it had done at its commencement. The principle of massing
artillery was carried out to a great extent. At the beginning of
the battle small masses, each under one command, were Scattered
over a large extent of ground — On the right wing the four
batteries of the 5th Infantry Division, reinforced soon afterwards
by the battery of von Lyncker's detachment:-Four batteries
in the centre, the Horse Artillery division of the corps artillery
of the IIIrd Army Corps, the battery of the 6th Cavalry Division
and one of the 6th Infantry Division. These were joined soon
afterwards by three batteries of the corps artillery, thus extend-
ing the left flank as far as the cemetery of Vionville:—Four
batteries of the 5th Cavalry Division were placed at first on
the left flank at Tronville. This number was gradually increased
to eight, consisting of three of those batteries, three of the 6th
Division, one of Lehmann's detachment, and one of the corps
artillery of the IIIrd Army Corps; the position then extended
from the cemetery of Vionville to the copses of Tronville.
We have already noticed the manner in which the artillery
mass at Tronville surprised the enemy. General Frossard in his
work bears witness to the great effect produced by it, when his
Corps (the 2nd), supported Soon afterwards by the 6th Corps and
I 38 7%e German Artillery.
the reserve artillery of the army, was to be driven back, and Somc
extracts from his work are given above. The capture and main-
tenance of Vionville by the German infantry was indirectly
supported by the artillery mass of the left wing,' which fired on
the French columns advancing in support and drew upon itself
the fire of the enemy's artillery. The artillery mass of the right
wing gave the most effectual support to the infantry in taking
and holding the important height (326) and afterwards in driving
back the right wing of Vergé's Division by enfilade fire. The
concentrated and heavy fire from the artillery mass in the centre
and from batteries of the left wing played a decisive part in the
capture of the Tank wood and of the hamlet of Flavigny, and
especially in dislodging the whole of Bataille's Division, while
the enfilade fire of the artillery on the right and centre had a
most important effect in routing the left wing of Vergé's Divi-
sion. Frossard States that his corps retired in consequence of
the converging fire of the Prussian artillery.
After the retreat of the 2nd Corps these masses of artillery
distributed on a broad arc were brought together in the main
artillery position, extending from the Bois de Vionville by Fla-
vigny to the copses of Tronville. The desire of taking up as
good positions as possible and of presenting small objects to
the enemy's fire led to the artillery being employed by batteries
all along the front, the more so that, as it was a question of
defending the position, there was no fear of the batterics being
masked too early by infantry advancing in front of them. The
intervals left in this way were Occupied, as might be cxpected,
by the batteries of the Xth and VIIIth Army Corps (16th Division)
coming up as reinforcements. It is obvious that owing to these
and other circumstances mentioned in (2) and (3) the connection
between the regiments of artillery, and generally cven the de-
tachments, was broken, although this does not appear to have
had any injurious effect on the battle.
We are justified in regarding this position between the copses
of Tronville and the Bois de Vionville as that of a great artillery
mass. The artillery Commanders were, as stated in the narra-
tive, actuated by similar motives, and in this case unity of action
| And directly by two battelies.
Battle of Mars la 7 our. I 39
was facilitated, as they were, as far as practicable, the channel of
Communication between the higher commanding officers and the
artillery. The various portions of the great artillery mass did
not limit their attention to self-defence and the enemy immedi-
ately in their front, but the prevailing idea was that of afford-
ing reciprocal support and of concentrating a cross fire on the
most important objects;–an employment of artillery rendered
more easy by the long ranges of rifled guns. Thus the right
flank Supported the left in repelling the enemy's attacks along
the road to Verdun, and in replying to the formidable force of
artillery well posted on the French right flank ; and similarly
the left flank supported the right in opposing the enemy's
Offensive movements near Rezonville towards the south-west, as
well as the French batteries in position near that village and to
the South of it. In this way only was it possible to obtain an
effective oblique and enfilade fire.
As soon as the hostile columns advanced to the assault, the
artillery concentrated its fire exclusively on them, regardless of
the enemy's guns, and to this is to be mainly attributed the fact
that several vigorous attacks, made with great gallantry, were
repulsed by the accurate fire of the German artillery.
The left wing was refused, as the ground in front offered no
suitable position for artillery, and a very advanced position would
have allowed the right wing of the enemy, then seeking to turn
our flank, to enfilade the line of guns. The attempt to keep
some of the batteries with the infantry astride the high road from
Vionville to Rezonville beyond the road from Flavigny to St.
Marcel (2. r. and 3. r. X), and afterwards to place a battery (3.1.
III.) to the north of Vionville, failed, mainly owing to the effective
and flanking fire of Some hostile infantry under cover. It became
necessary to withdraw all these batteries to the main artillery
position of the left wing. The batteries (4. S. and 4. I. III.) were
able to keep the position to the north of Flavigny, as they were
defiladed by gently rising ground on their left flank, which had
not fallen into the enemy's hands owing to the fire kept up by
infantry at and in front of Vionville as well as by artillery to the
west of that village.
It may be interesting here briefly to recapitulate the various
changes in the main artillcry position which were necessitated
I4O 7%e German Artillery.
during the battle either by the movements of the enemy or by
the prosecution of the German plans. As a matter of course
those on the left flank were the most frequent, that being the
One most menaced.
a. Owing to the left wing being enfiladed by the French
artillery firing through the northernmost opening in the copses
of Tronville, the battery on the left flank (5. l. III.) was re-
peatedly obliged to change front to the left, in order to fire with
greater effect;
ô. The evacuation of the two most northern of the copses of
Tronville by the German infantry necessitated the withdrawal
of the extreme left flank, which rested on them, in rear of the
high road from Vionville;
c. To avoid the flanking fire through the southern opening
in the copses without losing the important hill of Vionville, and
at the same time to answer the French fire, as well as to engage
the guns to the north-west of Rezonville, four batteries took up
an angular position dos-à-dos, two on either side of the angle ;'
d. Owing to the necessity of firing on the French skir-
mishers as they advanced to the attack from the centre copse
soon after the disappearance of the enfilading batteries, the
angular position became a line, the batteries wheeling to the left
and right up to the high road;
e. The desire of resuming the original position, with the left
flank resting on the copses of Tronville, at the time that they
were again Occupied by the German infantry, was the occasion
of a general advance of the batteries across the high road,
while they at the same time wheeled to the right ;
f. The impossibility of keeping its position under the greatly
superior fire of the French artillery, which had now got the
range of the road-embankment, obliged the left wing to wheel
left about and retire behind it, where it remained till the end
of the battle.
The batteries on the right flank of the great position ad-
* It appears almost as iſ the guns in this position were protected by the situation of
Vionville as well as by the embankment of the high road from the superior ſorce of
French artillery on the old Roman road. Although the enemy knew the approximate
position ſrom the rising Smoke, it must have been very diſficult to get the range, as it
was impossible for him to observe when the shells burst short in the space between
Vionville and the German guns, and on this the accuracy of his aim depended.
Zºad//e of Mars la 7 oz/7. I4 I
vanced under a heavy fire, bringing their right shoulder forward,
to avoid the oblique and enfilade fire of the French artillery at
Rezonville, and at the same time to reply to it more effectually.
The last change of position was the advance of the six batteries
of the Centre in the evening, which were joined by two of the
Hessian batteries.
5. The ranges at which the guns fired varied greatly, being
generally between 800 paces and considerably more than 4,000
paces. Some of the attacks made by the enemy necessitated
the use of case shot at ranges of between 300 and 400 paces."
However remarkable these differences may appear, they were
here also the natural Consequence of the peculiar circumstances.
After the Commencement of the battle the batteries in the
main artillery position fired at the longest ranges. The Germans
had, as we know, to play a waiting game and to defend their
position, in which the artillery had selected the most suitable
points. When not engaged in offensive movements the French
army maintained a defensive attitude along the ridge of heights
to the west of Rezonville. The positions occupied by the con-
tending forces diverged from south to north, the shortest in-
terval between the southern flanks being about 1,500 paces, while
that between the northern flanks was from 2,OOO to 3,000 paces.
Thus if the wings of the German army wished to afford a re-
ciprocal defence, they could not avoid having to fire at ranges
beyond 4,000 paces. *-
It has been asserted by several bodies of troops that enfilade
and oblique fire of this kind was very effective, although at long
ranges. On our side its peculiarly good effect in One instance
against hostile artillery as well as against hostile Columns was
observed. On the other hand the effect also of the French
artillery posted to the north of the high road as far as the old
Roman road was felt by several batteries in the centre of our
position. This occurred when the left flank of the German
artillery position was prevented from keeping the hostile guns
sufficiently in check. Hence the rule that in a great line of
battle no part of the artillery may cease firing, merely on ac-
Count of the great range, but nust keep the enemy's artillery in
* The battery 2, s. X. also fired at a range of 700 paces when opposing an offen-
sive movement made by the French.
I 42 7%e German Artillery.
check by a deliberate fire, so as to prevent it from enfilading
and taking obliquely other parts of the position.
In most of the other cases the ranges in the earlier positions
were between 1,500 and 2,OOO paces, and when this was ex-
ceeded owing to errors in estimating the distance, the batteries
as a rule moved nearer to the enemy as soon as practicable.
The shortest ranges employed for offensive purposes were
between 800 and 1,200 paces. These occurred in the following
instances:–
a. With the artillery of the 5th Division, when the decisive
point, the hill (326) on the plateau of Vionville, was carried –
b. When the batteries of the Xth Army Corps advanced to
the hill (257), to prepare the attack of von Wedell's brigade.
The fire of the 1st Horse Artillery battery of the Guard was
very effective, as its position to the north-west of Mars la Tour
enabled it to take the enemy obliquely at a range of I,6OO paces,
and there was no danger of its being masked by the movements
of its own troops. The fire of the enemy's skirmishers at 800
paces from parts of the copses of Tronville, which had not yet
fallen into the hands of the Prussians, prevented the batteries of
the 20th Division at that time from getting closer to the enemy
than 1,500 paces:—
c. When the artillery supported the general offensive move-
ment made by the infantry and cavalry in the centre and on the
right wing, at the commencement of darkness. We know that,
owing to the darkness, mistakes, and other causes, some of the
batteries were obliged to use case shot in self-defence':—
d. When the battery (3. l. III.) to the north of Vionville
attempted, in obedience to orders, to check the overpowering
force of the enemy, which was driving back our own infantry.
Although the attack mentioned in (a) was, after a sharp and
heroic struggle, completely successful, and the artillery referred
to in (c) did not retire, even after its great losses, further than
appeared absolutely necessary, the attacks mentioned in (%) and
(d) were less fortunate. These batteries, however, supported
the other arms with the devotion to be expected from comrades
* The account shows that the two batteries to the north of Flavigny were prevented
from taking part in this attack by the fire of Some skirmishers under cover on the high
road.
Z3a///e of Mars la 7 our. I43
in arms, and quitted the field together, although the enemy had
approached to within 3OO or 400 paces. When the heroic charge
of cavalry at Mars la Tour disengaged our infantry, the remnant
was supported by the artillery of the Xth Army Corps, men-
tioned in (%), which maintained such a steady and deliberate fire
that the enemy was unable to continue his offensive operations in
that quarter.
As regards the defensive conduct of the Germans, the ar-
tillery at the commencement of the battle held the ground at
Vionville, which had been gained by surprise, until it was threat-
ened with annihilation, when it allowed the assailants to advance
to within range of case shot. But even in the main position the
firing was not limited to long ranges. The repeated and vigor-
ous attacks made by the enemy with great gallantry, and in
large masses, were by no means always checked at the longest
ranges only, but generally at moderate ranges of between 1,200
and I,8OO paces. At Some points they were not stopped by the
cautious and well delivered fire of the line of batteries until
within from 800 to 900 paces. The advance of French skir-
mishers, completely covered by the copses of Tronville, was
arrested by common shell at ranges of from 900 to I,000 paces.
All these instances of short ranges occurred at decisive moments,
when attention had to be paid to the effect of the fire without
regard to cover.
6. That this was the case is strikingly proved by the numbers
in the list of wounded, which speak for themselves, if it is borne
in mind that the combatant part of a field battery, exclusive
of the lines of wagons, amounts to four Officers, sixty-two men,
and forty-eight horses; and of a horse artillery battery, to four
officers, seventy-four men, and ninety-six horses."
Some of the batteries lost all their officers ; others all, or
nearly all, their horses; while a few lost nearly three-fourths of
their men. It is obvious, therefore, that many guns were obliged
to cease firing until men could be brought up from the lines of
* Including the lines of wagons, which were in rear and as much as possible under
cover, the strength of the batteries was as follows:–
Officers Men Horses
Horse artillery battery e * o g 4. I5O 2O7
Light field battery . ſº e g & 4. I45 I 24
IIeavy field battery . g g © º 4 I5 I 126
I44. 7%e German Artillery.
wagons. Thus towards evening the very weakened batteries of
the 5th Infantry Division were no longer able to move, in Con-
sequence of the difficulty of bringing up the lines of wagons,
which had been left at Gorze ; and, moreover, the division was
prevented from taking part in the last attack in the Cvening by
want of ammunition.
It is remarkable that the damage to material, as shown in
the appendix, even in the batteries which suffered most from the
enemy's artillery, was extremely slight. Hence the opinion is
justified that less attention should be paid to disabling guns
than to disabling men and horses.
7. The batteries when in close connection with their own in-
fantry, as in the case of the three batteries of the IOth regiment
on the hill (257), fired common shell against hostile skirmishers
within range of case shot, with good effect; while others, being
Separated from their own infantry, were obliged to defend them-
selves with case shot, and were successful in every instance. This
occurred to the 5th Light battery of the 3rd regiment at Vion-
ville, to the 6th Light and to the 2nd Horse Artillery battery
of the same regiment in the evening south-west of Rezonville.
Evidently in such critical moments presence of mind was of the
highest importance.
8. Flank movements and ‘diagonal ' marches under fire were
not of rare occurrence in this battle also. Examples are scen in
the withdrawal of artillery of the 6th Infantry Division from
the centre to the left wing, in the flank march of the 2nd and
3rd Horse Artillery batteries of the IOth regiment, and in the
diagonal march of the horse artillery division of the corps
artillery of the IIIrd Army Corps from its second position up the
hill on the right to the main artillery position. All these move-
ments were made without any excessive loss, and we can only
repeat what we have already called attention to in our remarks
on the battle of the 16th : ‘It is clear that it is not difficult as a
rule to withdraw guns actually under fire from the line of battle
and employ them in another part of the field, and that flank and
diagonal marches, though not willingly made by artillery under
fire, can always be executed in case of necessity. These con-
siderations only strengthen the principle of employing a greater
part of the artillery from the commencement and lead to the con-
Battle of Mars la 7 our. I45
viction that it is less necessary to keep back reserves of artillery
than of infantry and cavalry.'
9. Finally, the battle shows the difficulty of executing flank
attacks in a bad light, as in twilight, and more especially for
artillery. For if it so acts as to create a decisive effect, it will
probably fire into the troops on its own side ; and if this is
avoided, it may very easily fail in attaining the desired object.
Its action cannot be rendered to any extent definite and effective
without danger to the troops of the same army, except by main-
taining most carefully the connection between the different
detachments by experienced officers, who can point out to the
artillery ordered to the front the objects for its fire and the
ground occupied by the troops on both sides ; because the com-
mander of the artillery, suddenly ordered to the front, and being
urged to bring his guns into action with the greatest expedition,
cannot in such cases make himself sufficiently acquainted with
the ground.
IO. The account of the battle also teaches that, owing to the
great expenditure of ammunition, the first line of wagons of the
ammunition-columns should follow the troops as closely as
possible, if not prevented by extraordinary circumstances; and,
moreover, that the number of the artillery ammunition-columns
should as a rule be increased, and especially in that line. This
change has already been decided on." The severe losses sus-
tained by the batteries were made good from the ammunition-
columns, decidedly a proper arrangement under the circum-
stances. But it is a question whether this supply (especially as
regards horses) should not for the future be provided by a dif-
ferent organisation, as, for instance, from horse-depôts. By
depriving the columns of So many horses, there is always a
risk of rendering them temporarily incapable of marching, and
of thus making the supply of ammunition a matter of uncertainty.
' The disadvantages of the second line of wagons being too far in rear was felt in
Some instances.
I46 The German Artillery.
CONCLUSION.
SCARCELY any German battle surpasses that of Mars la Tour
and Vionville in general tactics, in the skill of the commanders,
or in the zeal and devotion of the troops of all arms. The
moment was the most critical one during the first period of the
Campaign of 1870, and the German Artillery may proudly boast
that it materially assisted in bringing that crisis to a successful
conclusion.
P O S IT I 0 N
of the Is and I German and find armies at Met. On the wani; ºft:15*Aºst
and in the might betweenth917" and 18% Aſſist 1870.
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Remarks.
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the offer; 6.erman.
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Henry S. King & Co. 5 Comhill.london.










THIRD PART.
I.
A SHORT GLANCE AT EVENTS FROM THE BATTLE OF VION -
VILLE OR MARS LA TOUR ON THE 16TH OF AUGUST, 1870,
TO THE BATTLE OF GRAVELOTTE ON THE I 8TH OF
AUGUST, 1870.
I. French plans after the battle of the 16th.
AFTER the battle of Mars la Tour and Vionville there were two
courses open to the French—cither to carry out the present
intention of marching on Verdun, or to resume the original plan
and base their operations temporarily on Metz. The first was
the most desirable, but the shortest road was in possession of
the Germans and the French could not make use of it without
continuing the battle. They had, however, the alternative of a
flank march by the more northern road through Conflans or by
another passing through Briey, still further to the north and
more circuitous. But even this line of march was full of peril,
and did not evade a serious battle. The earlier the march
or battle was commenced, and the larger the force brought into
the field, the greater was the chance of success ; for every delay
was a gain to the Germans, to whom fresh reinforcements were
every moment arriving. Hence the advisability of employing
all the available troops from the garrison to co-operate with the
army in the field by making demonstrations. A large German
force would thus be detained on the right bank of the Moselle
by French movements threatening the communications, and
notably the line of railway from Metz to Faulquemont, which
L 2
I48 7/e German Artillery.
became longer and consequently more susceptible to danger as
the advance round Metz was developed.
With regard to the operations actually executed by the
French on the 17th of August, Lieut.-Colonel Fay writes:—
“After the success we had gained on that day everyone was
expecting to receive the dispositions for prosecuting our (French)
march into the interior, when the order to retreat was received
during the night from head-quarters. The army was directed
to take up the strong position of Amanvillers, which extended
from Rozérieulles to that place. The 6th Corps alone was to
remain in front of Vernéville.’ Metman's Division of the 3rd
Corps was to occupy the position of Gravelotte and cover the
retrograde movement. These orders were carried out in the
course of the 17th.
Marshal Bazaine gives the following explanations of the
motives which decided him to abandon his intended march on
Verdun and again to draw nearer to Metz:—(1) The tactical
conditions were so unfavourable as to render the prosecution of
the march impossible. An attempt to regain possession of the
southern road or to make use of the neighbouring road by
Conflans would, he considered, have brought on a battle with
forces considerably Superior to those he had encountered on
the 16th. He was debarred from using the road through Briey
by the difficulties of the terrain in the vicinity of that town, as
well as by the consideration that the French would then have
had their rear exposed to the enemy." (2) The want of pro-
visions, which had not been evenly distributed, owing to the pres-
sure of events on the preceding days ; for the convoys, limited to
the single road from Metz to Gravelotte, were unable to reach
all the corps on the 16th. (3) The pressing want of ammu-
nition, especially for the artillery. This is explained by the
great expenditure during the battle by the 2nd and 6th Corps
and by the artillery reserve of the army, as also by the absence
of the park of the artillery ammunition reserve, which had
remained in rear at Toul. Moreover, it was impossible to issue
ammunition to the army during the night between the 16th and
17th of August, owing to the extent of the line of battle and to
' With reference to this road, compare Part II.
Mozements on the 173/. I49
the confusion into which the Divisions had been thrown by their
contest of twelve hours' duration. 4. By offering battle to the
Germans in the position of Rozérieulles and Amanvillers, which
was considered impregnable and was moreover to be carefully
intrenched, the Marshal expected that the Germans would be
so weakened as to permit him to advance without further oppo-
sition. His intention was consequently to march on the 19th
or 20th in the direction of Briey, having previously issued
supplies to his troops, and from that point to gain the Meuse.
It would lead us too far from our subject to discuss all that
has been urged by French writers against the validity of the
above motives, and we prefer to turn our attention to the mea-
sures taken by the Germans.
2. German Movements after the battle of the 16th of August, and
the events of the 17th.
The movements of the Germans were influenced by the
considerations which follow from those already mentioned in
the prefatory remarks:–(I) The necessity of bringing up as
rapidly as possible all disposable troops to the battle field of
the 16th. They would then be in a position again to accept
battle on the same ground under more favourable conditions, or
to prevent the march of the enemy and bring events to a deci-
sive issue by taking advantage of the opportunities afforded by
the flank march. (2) The necessity of leaving detachments in
rear to protect the communications and more particularly the line
of railway, Metz—Faulquemont. These troops, however, could at
the same time make demonstrations against Metz, and so prevent
the enemy from withdrawing any considerable force from the
garrison for operations on the left bank of the Moselle. These
objects would be simultaneously attained by making attacks on
the south-east of Metz, in the general direction of Fort Queuleu.
Let us now trace the movements actually executed by the
Germans, commencing with those on the left bank of the
Moselle. All the troops, which had fought on the 16th or had
reached the battle field on that day, bivouacked on the ground
they occupied. Orders were issued by the Royal head-quarters
and by the head-quarters of both armies on the evening of the
I 50 The German Artillery.
16th or very early on the 17th, that strong reinforcements were
to be pushed forward from every possible quarter, so as to reach
the battle field at daybreak." The orders of the Royal head-
quarters to the First and Second Armies clearly showed that it
was intended to force the enemy from Paris and Châlons towards
the north.
With reference to the execution of the necessary marches, it
is obvious that the IXth Army Corps (18th Division and corps
artillery), encamped at Arnaville and Onville, as well as the
available corps (VIIth and VIIIth)” of the First Army, which lay
between the Seille and Moselle almost equally advanced with it,
could reach the battle field much sooner than the more distant
corps of the Second Army. Having started at an early hour, the
van of the IXth Army Corps reached the battle field at 6 A.M.,
followed soon afterwards by the VIIth and VIIIth Army Corps,
which had crossed the Moselle by all the available bridges, some
of which had to be repaired by the pioneers for that purpose.
The VIIIth Army Corps marched from Arry to Rezonville, leaving
Gorze on the left, while the VIIth, from Corny, reached Grave-
lotte by Ars and the lateral valley of the Mosellc.
The battle of the 16th having proved that the whole of the
Prench army had moved to the left bank of the Moselle, the 1st
and 3rd Divisions of Cavalry were sufficient to veil and cover the
marches towards Metz on the right bank of the Mosclle. The
Ist was soon afterwards moved up to the VIIth Army Corps near
the Moselle, leaving, however, detachments to watch Mctz till
the arrival of the 3rd Cavalry Division at Augny on the 17th.
The only troops of the Second Army available for battle on
the 17th were the XIIth Army Corps, which was 15 miles distant
with its advanced guard at Regnéville ch Haye and main
body at Pont à Mousson, and the Guard Corps, which was 20
miles distant with its advanced guard at Ramboucourt and main
body at Bernécourt. Leaving its bivouacs at 2 A.M., the XIIth
Army Corps arrived on the field of battle soon after noon, and the
Guard Corps—thanks to its having concentrated its troops in
General von Goeben, without waiting ſor orders, had caused the v111th Army
Corps to get under arms and march towards the field of battle.
* Omitting of course the portions of these corps that had reached the field of
battle on the 16th.
Movements on the 17th. I5 I
front at Flixey and Richecourt on receiving news of the battle
of the 16th —marched up on the left of the XIIth Army Corps
a little after 3 P.M. The brigade of Lancers of the Guard had
been detached towards the Meuse by orders from head-quarters.
On the other hand it was impossible for the IInd Army Corps
at and in rear of Buchy, and the IVth Army Corps, which
was at le Saizerais and Marbache with its advanced guard
at Gaillon, to reach the battle field on that day, and conse-
quently the IVth Army Corps received orders from the Second
Army at noon on the 16th to march in the direction of Sanzey
and Boucy, with a view to operations against Toul, while the
IInd Army Corps was to move on Pont à Mousson.
H.R.H. the Commander in Chief of the Second Army
arrived on the field of battle at 4 A.M. on the 17th. The enemy
gave many indications of his presence, and threw forward a line
of skirmishers beyond Rezonville towards the front of the Ger-
mans. All dispositions had been made for the renewal of the
battle, and the troops had formed up, but it was soon discovered
that the French, covered by their skirmishers, had broken up
their camp, and were for the most part retiring on Gravelotte.
On the arrival of the King on the field of battle soon after
6 A.M. patrols were pushed forward, who ascertained that the
enemy had retired. As he neither attacked nor advanced towards
the south-west, the Germans had no interest in forcing on a
battle on the 17th, for every moment brought them fresh rein-
forcements, and rest was necessary for those troops which had
undergone the fatigue and heat of the previous day's fighting.
But caution was necessary, for the enemy was still in possession
of Rezonville and Gravelotte. Sufficient time to cook could in-
deed be given to the troops actually present, but it was neces-
sary to continue the concentration of the remainder, and further
orders were issued to them from the field of battle. Accord-
ing to the Second Army, the rear guard of the enemy had at
noon taken up a position to the west of Gravelotte, and some of
his corps were subsequently seen on the plateau of Leipsic and
Moscou. Clouds of dust and weak detachments on the march
were observed in the direction of Conflans, while troops appeared
* Prince August von Wurtemberg had received this mews from the 23rd Division,
under Prince George of Saxony.
I 52 The German Artillery.
also to be moving in the direction of Vernéville." Everything
indicated that no attack was to be expected on the 17th.
The only fighting that occurred on the left bank of the
Moselle on the 17th was a skirmish between the French and the
advanced guard of the VIIth Army Corps, of which the following
account is given by Major von Schell:—‘South of the mouth of
the defile leading to Gravelotte, von Woyna's brigade came upon
hostile advanced parties of the guards and infantry of the line,
and, by order of the Commander in Chief of the First Army,
drove them by a light musketry fire as far as the skirts of the
wood opposite Gravelotte, penetrating at the same time on the
east side of the defile to the northern edge of the Bois de Vaux.
The detachments of the enemy which barred the defile dis-
appeared towards 2 P.M. in the direction of Gravelotte. As the
orders issued by the Royal head-quarters did not permit a pur-
suit, outposts were placed along the borders of the wood and on
the plateau to the south of Gravelotte.
“At that time, 2 P.M., General von Steinmetz rode up to the
plateau with his staff for the purpose of reconnoitring the enemy's
position. Columns were seen marching along the high road in
an easterly direction towards Point du Jour; and the heights to
the east of Gravelotte, as well as the ridge running from Point
du Jour by the Moscou Farm to Leipsic, were evidently occupied
in force, apparently by the Ist and 2nd Corps, large camps also
being visible. Batteries and shelter trenches were also observed.
At 2.30 P.M. the enemy's infantry began to advance against
the Bois de Vaux from the direction of Point du Jour, and the
fire from the batteries of mitrailleurs placed there reached the
woods, as well as the height where General von Steinmetz was
standing, without doing any harm, although the bullets struck
the ground close to the Officers of his Staff. The enemy retired
soon afterwards.”
Having received information from the Royal head-quarters
that the general attack was postponed till the next day, General
According to the lecture given by Captain von Helmuth, the 11th Hussars,
having reconnoitred in the direction of Jarmy during the morning, reported that
strong columns were on the march towards the north-east.
2 7%e Operations of the First Army under General von Stein/leſz, by A. von Schell.
II. S. King & Co.
Movements on the 17th. I 53
von Steinmetz removed his head-quarters to Ars Sur Moselle
and at 4 P.M. ordered the VIIth Army Corps to halt.
We must now relate the events that occurred on the I7th of
August on the right bank of the Moselle. We know that the
Ist Army Corps had remained on that bank to watch Metz as
well as to cover the German communication, more especially
the railway and the important depôt the Courcelles station.
General Manteuffel had received direct orders from the Royal
head-quarters to retire on Rémilly in the very improbable event
of the French army attacking the Ist Army Corps during the
next few days with superior forces. In order to divert the
cnemy's attention from the left bank of the Moselle, General von
Steinmetz had at 9.30 A.M. directed the Ist Army Corps to
make a demonstration towards Metz " and accordingly General
Freiherr von Manteuffel issued the following order — By order
of the general commanding, the corps will make a demonstra-
tion towards Metz to prevent the garrison detaching troops to
Marshal Bazaine's army, which is at present engaged with
portions of the First and Second Armies on the left bank of the
Moselle.” The Ist Division will take up a position at La-
quenexy ; the 2nd will move up at 2 P.M., march to Pouilly, and
push its advanced guard to Thiébault.* The corps artillery will
be posted at the point where the high road to Strasburg crosses
the railroad. The Ist Division must be under arms at 3 A.M.
As a serious engagement is to be avoided, the demonstration
will be limited to a bombardment of the south-western side of
Metz and of the forts in the vicinity. Further dispositions will
be made known. After 3 P.M. I shall be to the east of Pouilly.
‘VON MANTEUFFEL.’
To carry out the above order Major-General von Berg-
mann, commanding the artillery, assembled the commanding
officers at Laquenexy, and having informed them of the general
state of affairs and the object of the ensuing operations, gave
them the following verbal orders:– The whole of the artillery
* The Operations of the First Army, &c., by Major von Schell.
* Vide plan of the battle field of the 14th.
* About 1,800 paces west of Pouilly.
I 54. 7%e German Artillery.
of the Ist Army Corps will take up a position 5,000 paces from
the fortress, so as to embrace the front opposite Queuleu, viz.
the Ist field division west of Ars-Laquenexy and south of the
road leading from that place to Grigy; the corps artillery
between Château Mercy le Haut and Bevoye farm ; the 3rd
field division west of the Strasburg road on the ridges running
in a south-westerly direction from Peltre to Marly. The Ist
field division will cannonade Fort Queuleu : the light batteries
of the other divisions will direct their fire on the same point, the
heavy batteries against the south side of Metz.
“To reduce the casualties to a minimum, the guns will be in-
trenched with considerable intervals between them, for which
purpose a pioneer company will be attached : the fire is to be
deliberate and steady, and no useless expenditure of ammunition
permitted.’
The ground having been reconnoitred by General von
Bergmann, the artillery took up the following positions:—The Ist
field division, under Captain von Horn, west of the pond of Ars-
Laquenexy in the direction of Mercy le Haut ; the corps
artillery under Colonel Jungé, with its right wing, the horse
artillery division, Major Gerhards, between that village and the
Strasburg road ; and further along the ridge on the left of the Ist
division, the 2nd division under Lieut.-Colonel Gregorovius;
—the 3rd division, commanded by Major Müller, on the ridges
which run along the right bank of the Ruisseau de St. Pierre to
Marly sur Scille. The wagons remained under cover in rear of
the ridges, and some of the batteries were in pits constructed by
the pioneers, while infantry were posted in support under cover
in rear of and on the flanks of the artillery position.
Fire was opened at 5 P.M. Fort Queuleu was cannonaded
by the 1st division at a range of from 3,000 to 4,000 paces, by
the corps artillery at 4,OOO paces, and by the 3rd division at
5,OOO. At the same time the corps artillery and the 3rd field
division fired on the suburbs of Metz from distances of 5,000
and 6,000 paces with long pauses between the rounds.
Fort Queuleu replied to the fire with mortarshell, common shell,
and shrapnel from a considerable number of pieces of ordnance.
The shells fell generally in rear of the Prussian batteries, causing
some damage to the wagons. It was, however, difficult to observe
the effect of our own fire; although some damage was observed
Movements on the 17//. I 55
in the ramparts of Fort Queuleu, and the suburbs of the town were
on fire in several places. The report despatched by General
Freiherr von Manteuffel from Thiébault to the Commander in
Chief of the First Army, after mentioning the fire in the suburbs,
goes on to state – Dust was seen at 5.30 P.M. rising from the
street, which leads from Metz on the left bank of the Moselle,
and appeared to be made by returning columns. As our object
was attained as far as possible, orders were given at 6.15 P.M. to
cease firing, and the corps returned to its bivouacs at Laque-
nexy and Courcelles station.’
A letter, written by Marshal Bazaine to the Emperor
Napoleon on the 17th of August, proves distinctly that the
object of the demonstration was fully attained. It states :—‘It
is reported that the King of Prussia is at Pange or Château
d'Aubigny with an army of IOO,OOO men, and also that a large
force was seen on the Verdun road and at Mont sous les Côtes. . . .
An air of probability is given to this report of the King's arrival
by the fact that at this very moment that I have the honour of
writing to your Majesty the Prussians are making a serious
attack on Fort Queuleu; it is reported that they have thrown up
batteries at Magny, Mercy le Haut, and in the Bois de Pouilly;
the firing is now very brisk. . . .”
The detail of expenditure of ammunition and the losses
of the German artillery on this day are given in the appendix.
The First and Second Armies occupied the following positions
near Metz from the evening of the 17th until the beginning of
the battle on the 18th :—"
FIRST ARMY.
Head-quarters, Ars sur Moselle.
Ist Army Corps, Courcelles station.
VIIth Army Corps, in the valley between Ars sur Moselle
and Gravelotte ; the 26th brigade at Ars under the immediate
orders of the Commander in Chief, protecting the right flank on
the side of Metz.
VIIIth Army Corps at Gorze.
1st Cavalry Division at Corny.
3rd y y yy Augny, between the Seille and
Moselle.
* Wide sketch of position of the armies on the 17th,
I 56 7%e German Aräſ/ery.
SECONID ARMY.
Head-quarters, Buxières.
Ixth Army Corps, west of the Bois de Vionville and south
of the road Gorze—Vionville.
Guard Corps, between Mars la Tour and Hannonville au
Passage."
XIIth Army Corps, on the right of the Guard Corps between
Mars la Tour and Puxieux.
Torming the second line in rear were
The IIIrd Army Corps on the right } on the battle field of the 16th.
The Xth , ,, on the left
The 5th Cavalry Division at Tronville.
6th 3 y 3 y south of Flavigny.
The outposts of the First Army (exclusive of the 1st Army
Corps), which had got the touch of the enemy, extended from
Magny-sur-Seille, by Vaux, through the Bois de Vaux (the
northern angle of which was held by the enemy), and then
skirted the northern edge of the Bois des Ognons, where they
joined those of the Second Army. The line of the latter ran
from this point, in rear of Rezonville, to the Copses of Tron-
ville and thence to the Yron. The XIIth Corps, which furnished
the outposts on the left wing, watched the road through Hanon-
ville to Verdun.
| Captain Helmuth states that at 3 P.M. on the 17th, when the Guard Corps had
settled itself in its bivouacs, aſter a very fatiguing march, it received a second order
to bivouac at Puxieux, in rear of the bivouacs of the Saxons. This order had crossed
a despatch reporting the position of the bivouac. Prince August von Wurtemberg
considered himself authorised by the circumstances to leave his troops in the bivouac
already formed. This formed the subject of a verbal order by the Commander in
Chief on the morning of the 18th, but the arrangements remained unaltered.
‘The XIIth Army Corps, which, according to the second order, would be on the
left flank, was entrusted with the duty of securing the road to Verdun on that flank
by cavalry ; but this had already been done by the Crown Prince of Saxony. During
the fight he had ordered his Division of cavalry to occupy the road to the east of Mars
la Tour early in the morning ; and iſ it met no enemy there, to push forward to the
road on the north leading to Etain. It reached that road at a point seven miles east
of Jarny, and held it till the 18th. The Division reported to the corps head-quarters
at noon on the 17th that it had reached the road without coming into contact with the
enemy. This report, however, was forwarded no farther ; but a copy of the corps
order, assigning this duty to the cavalry, was despatched to the Commander in Chief.
I 57
TI.
THE BATTLE OF GRAVELOTTE OR ST. PRIVAT ON THE I 8th
OF AUGUST, 1873.
Description of the field of battle.
Two nearly parallel ridges run from the valley of the Moselle
above Metz, and from the northern side of the Bois des Ognons
between the ravines of Châtel St. Germain, the Mance, and la
Jurée in a north-westerly direction to the Bois de la Cusse. At
this point they are joined by a low saddle, and again separated
further on by the defile extending from Habonville to Auboué.
The western ridge maintains its original direction to the Orne,
while the eastern trends away from it in an easy curve towards
St. Privat and Roncourt on the east. These two ridges with the
defiles between and beyond them, and the westernmost portion
of the plateau of Plappeville, defined by a straight line drawn
from Bronvaux to Montigny la Grange, formed the battle field
of the 18th. Fort St. Quentin and the right bank of the Moselle
opposite St. Ruffine must not however be passed over, inasmuch
as French artillery from the former, and portions of the Ist
German Corps from the latter, took part in the contest which
extended in this direction during the afternoon. The field of
battle may be regarded as a plateau, very undulating and much
intersected by defiles, hollows, and Copses, especially in the
southern part.
The French position is indicated by the eastern ridge running
from St. Ruffine or Jussy by Rozérieulles—Point du Jour—
St. Privat la Montagne to Roncourt, with the northernmost part
of the Bois de Vaux, the quarries at Point du Jour, the Bois de
Genivaux and Champenois as Outpost positions. At the close of
the battle the right wing of the French when retiring found posi-
tions of support and for its rear guard along the line Montigny
I 58 7%e German A7-#//e7°1/.
la Grange—Quarries of Amanvillers – Bronvaux, astride the
roads to Woippy and Plappeville.
The line on which the German armies first deployed previous
to the decisive advance of the left wing runs from the valley of
the Moselle along the northern edge of the Bois de Vaux, but
intersecting its northernmost part, and after crossing the defile
of la Mance, some 1,000 paces to the south of Gravelotte, follows
the western ridge as far as the Bois de la Cusse. Beyond this
the left of the German army was formed in two echelons, the
position of the foremost being indicated by a line drawn from
the north-west angle of this wood to St. Ail, and the second by
the northern portion of the western main ridge with the defile
in front (north-east of Batilly). After the capture of Marie aux
Chênes the second echelon came up into line with the first, and
extended to the north beyond that village and along the ridge
on which it is situated." The extremity of the left wing, extend-
ing still further, was constantly advancing.
The eastern ridge, forming the French position, rises from
the valley of Moselle at Ars by a steep slope covered with vines,
up which infantry alone can clamber singly. The upper
portion, with part of the crest, is covered by the Bois de
Vaux, which consists of lofty trees and thick underwood,
through which troops can pass only in loose formations, except
on the roads. The ground to the west is commanded by the
ridge, which extends by St. Privat la Montagne to Roncourt,
assuming more or less the character of a plateau. Omitting
slight differences in altitude, formed by the alternations of flat
knolls and their connecting saddles, the Southern portion of the
ridge, as far as to the north of Leipsic, is on the same level.
Thence to St. Privat the ground is gently undulating, the hollows
being from 50 to 72 feet deep. There the ridge culminates,
forming the most commanding point of the right wing, and
then bends back in a large arc past Roncourt to the quarries and
wood of Jaumont.
The configuration of the western slope varies. Towards the
south as far as Moscou the gradations are generally more marked,
so as to present a wall-like appearance towards the west. Convex
* The first position taken up by the artillery of IXth Army Corps was in front of
the lime here traced.
Pattle of Grave/ot/e. I 59
in form, the upper and less wooded slopes can be swept by
musketry fire from the summit of the ridge; but the lower slopes,
precipitous and thickly wooded, fall away to the defile of la Mance,
the western side of which bears the same character. Notwith-
standing the dryness of the soil, the defile, from 60 to 8o paces
in breadth, can only be crossed by infantry in open formations,
and that with difficulty. This is the case as far to the north
as Chantrenne.
The slopes of the centre portion of the ridge as far as the
commencement of the commanding height of St. Privat are more
gradual. The hollows and undulations become less marked, and,
where covered with wood, are advantageous for skirmishers, who
are still further favoured by numerous hedges and ditches. The
stream of la Mance near Vernéville resembles the latter in
character, and as its banks are thickly wooded, it cannot be
crossed without considerable difficulty.
The Bois de Genivaux, on both sides of this gully, consist-
ing of young trees and thick underwood, cannot easily be tra-
versed. This also applies to the copse south of la Folie.
Both were intrenched ; the eastern part of the Bois de Genivaux
by stone parapets and shelter trenches; the south-western edge
of the copse of la Folie by a deep ditch and parapet, from
which two or more lines of men could fire, one above the other.
The Bois de la Cusse, which covers the western slope more
to the north, but which was not occupied by the French, is cut
up into a number of Small pieces by broad clearings covered
with thick underwood, amongst which are scattered oaks not
more than a foot and a half thick in the stem. Consequently
the protection afforded by the wood was slight, and all the more
precarious as the French could fire into it from the commanding
heights opposite.
The northern extremity of the ridge at St. Privat and
Roncourt falls away gently to the north and west, having the
appearance of a large glacis. But it is to be observed that the
upper part of the slope on the west side is somewhat steeper,
and a dead angle is formed about 800 or 900 paces from St.
Privat, from which the western outskirts of the village cannot be
seen, nor can they be seen into from it. The ground is quite
open for a distance of 3,000 paces on either side of the road to
I6O The German Artillery.
St. Marie; a few shallow gullies, the furrows running at right
angles to the road, and the potatoes growing on some of the
fields, alone afforded indifferent cover to attacking troops. On
the other hand the effect of the enemy's fire was increased by
the hardness of the ground, which caused the bullets to ricochet.
The western slope is bounded by the deep hollow formed
by the meadow ground between Habonville and Auboué, so
steep that artillery could not cross it without difficulty, and
was obliged to unlimber in the lower portion. Less difficulty
in this respect was presented by the higher part of the open
defile, which extends northwards from St. Marie and sends out
shallow gullies towards the position occupied by the French
right flank; the lower and northern part is again more difficult
and intersects the bushy copses between Auboué and Montois.
These copses as well as those to the south of Montois, the two
defiles already mentioned with the low and gentle ridge between
them, the gullies running from the eastern of the defiles, the
folds of the ground on the northern slope, and lastly the valley
of the Orne, afforded numerous covered positions, and concealed
the movements of troops advancing to turn the French right
flank. Numerous hedges and ditches between Roncourt and
the woods to the west of it provided suitable cover for skir-
mishers.
The steep declivity and the ravines immediately in rear of
the French position were covered with nearly pathless wood, so
that troops in close formation were limited to the roads. The
French rear guard positions on the western margin of the Bois
de Féves and de Saulny were somewhat more elevated than the
right of the main position ; these woods were impassable for
troops in close formation except by the roads. Fort St. Quentin
had an extensive command of the ground in its front, especially
on the left flank of the French position, which was within effec-
tive range of its guns, but woods concealed the right wing both
from that fort and also from Fort Plappeville. Marshal
Bazaine posted himself at the latter fort, which was in telegraphic
communication with an observatory on the lofty tower of the
cathedral at Metz.
The general character of the western ridge is similar to that
of the eastern, and was favourable to the deployment of the
Battle of Gravelotte. I6 I
German armies. Although everywhere lower than the enemy's
position, the higher parts, when not too much wooded, afforded
good positions for artillery, often covered from the enemy's fire
and commanding the ground for distances varying between 1,600
and 3,OOO paces. But the woods covering the defile of la Mance
occasionally prevented the enemy's position being seen, more
particularly so from the side of the ravine facing the enemy.
Thus there was no position for artillery immediately to the north
of the northern edge of the Bois des Ognons, and the same held
good at Malmaison.
The woods and villages on the sides of the ridges, as well as
the defiles, gave the assailants every facility of kecping troops
under cover until required ; while on the other hand they were
exposed to the view of the enemy while moving from south to
north beyond the limits of the battle field and while marching up
into these positions. This was especially the case with regard
to the turning movement, as already mentioned. The advance to
the field of battle was moreover rendered more difficult by the
deep valleys running at right angles to the general direction of
the movements, particularly to the north of Mars la Tour and to
the south of the road between Rezonville and Gravelotte, so
that troops in close formation and artillery were obliged to keep
the roads entirely,
The high roads are excellent. That from Gravelotte to
St. Hubert passes through a deep cutting to the east of the
village, and then crosses the ravine of la Mance by an embank-
ment and bridge of masonry, beyond which it is cut out of the
slope of the hill, so that it has an embankment on the north
side and a ravine on the South. This high road, regarded by
the French as a main line of Communication with Mctz, runs
into the valley of the Moselle obliquely to the position occupied
by their left wing. The road, leading from the mills in the
ravine of la Mance (South-east of Gravelotte) to the plateau,
is not passable for artillery, and that from the Bois de la Cusse
to Amanvillers is through a cutting and partially lined with low
hedges.
The railway between Habonville and Amanvillers, not com-
pleted at the time of the battle, runs partly through a deep
cutting and partly along a high embankment, and is therefore a
M
I62 7%e German Ardillery.
serious obstacle to troops. There are only two points, as shown
on the plan of the battle, at which it can be conveniently crossed ;
by the easternmost of these the road passes from Amanvillers
to St. Marie aux Chênes, and its position is marked by a house
of yellow sandstone occupied by a railway guard. The cutting
to the east of this afforded excellent cover for the French infantry
and formed a species of sally-port. The villages and farms
which stud the field of battle, being as a rule massively built,
are well adapted for deſence, and it is necessary to make a few
remarks on those which played a conspicuous part in the French
position. The principal points of a//u? on the left flank were
the farms of Point du Jour, Moscou, and Leipsic, strongly built
of stone, and in consequence of their commanding positions
infantry could sweep the gentle slopes in front with a grazing
fire. La Folic and Montigny la Grange afforded similar ad-
vantages in the Centre.
St. Hubert, l'Envie, and Champenois, surrounded with
massive walls, formed the outposts of these portions of the
position. The wall of the garden on the east side of St. Hubert
is only as high as the knce ; the west front, which was that
attacked, is quite encloscq and contains the two stables, while
the house in the courtyard is shut in on the north side by a
lofty wall; while its power of defence is still further enhanced
by the deep Stone-quarries to the west, affording cºcellent cover,
and which infantry can only climb up singly and with great
difficulty. The village of Amanvillers lies on the castern slopes
of the French position, and its banks and ditches afforded good
Cover for the encinny's skirmishers. It was of importance as a
rallying point. St. Privat la Montagne, which commanded
everything on the right flank of the French position, is sur-
rounded by a high and nearly continuous wall. On the northern
and western sides, at distancCs of 200 and 4OO paces, are walled
enclosures as high as the knee, constructed without mortar, in
Several rows. Prom these terraces as well as from the loop-
holed walls of the houses, a concentrated fire could be brought
to bear on attacking troops. St. Maric aux Chênes and
Roncourt are also surrounded by gardens enclosed by walls and
hedges. All the villages and ſarms with the exception of St.
/3a///e of Gravelo//e. I63
Marie aux Chéncs were artificially strengthened, the approaches
barricaded and walls loopholcd.
The defensive power of the position was also increased by
carthworks, gunpits, and shelter trenchcs, in several lines, one
above the other, on the ridge as well as on the sides of the hills
occupied by the left wing and centre; also by the large quarries
to the South of Point du Jour, singularly well adapted for
skirmishers." The hollow way running along the slope west of
Moscou from the Bois de Genivaux to the high road was of
great importance, and being converted into a shelter trench,
formed a strong position for the French infantry.
The defensive works were strongest on the left wing, but
were formidable in the centre also. That the 6th Corps was
but slightly intrenched is to be attributed to the fact of its late
arrival in position and its having no engineer park. The asser-
tion made by the French that that corps was not intrenched at
all is surprising, and contradicted by Marshal Bazaine's Orders
and by the accounts given by German troops; but at any rate
the preparations for defence made by the 6th Corps were Con-
siderably inferior to those made by the 2nd and 3rd Corps.
The terrain was generally more favourable to the defenders
than to the assailants, and was particularly adapted to defence
by artillery and infantry, affording, however, little opportunity
for the effective action of the cavalry of either side. Very
fortunately for the assailants, their right flank, which was
obliged by the plan of battle to act at first on the defensive,
derived the greatest advantage from the form of the ground ;
although on the other hand this rendered it more difficult for
them to assume the offensive, when required to do SO at the close
of the battle. Movements of artillery off the roads were im-
peded by the clayey nature of the soil.
We conclude the description of the field of battle with a
criticism on the French position. It possessed the following
advantages:—
(1) An excellent obstacle in front of the left wing and
Contre,
It must be observed that the Carrières de Jaumont, described by the fancy of
Trench newsmongers as the grave of masses of Germans, are situated on the eastern
edge of the forest of the same name, eastward of Roncourt.
Al 2
I64 7%e German Artillery.
(2) Command of the ground towards the west, where unin-
tercepted by woods, villages, and other objects.
(3) Good covered position for artillery and infantry.
(4) Numerous points of a//ui and advanced posts, afforded
by copses, villages, and homesteads. -
(5) Lines of intrenchment, generally well adapted to the
objects in view, especially on the left flank and centre.
(6) The possibility of keeping all the troops, as well as the
reserve, under cover till wanted.
(7) The possibility of assuming the offensive with a broad
front from the right, that being the flank from which the French
intended eventually to break out.
(8) Co-operation of the guns of Fort St. Quentin in support
of the left wing.
(9) Facilitics for the retreat of the right wing to the fortress
in the vicinity, for which the forest in rear with its heights
afforded, as a rule, good positions for supports and rear guards.
The position, however, possessed the following disadvan-
tages:—
(I) The possibility of troops approaching it undiscovercq ;
(a) against the left wing, until within moderate shell range,
through the Bois de Vaux (which, however, owing to want of
roads, was passable for infantry only, and that with difficulty); and
also through the vineyards extending towards St. Ruffine, until
close to that place; (5) against the Centre through the Bois de
Genivaux, after its capture, until within short rifle range of the
copses of la Folie, and through the Bois de la Cusse at a range
of 900 paces to the hill west of Amanvillers—disadvantages
which were, however, counterbalanced by the enfilade fire of all
arms which the French could bring to bear on the skirts of the
woods nearest to them ; (c) against the right wing and flank
at Roncourt, through the vallcy of the Orne, the hollows and
folds of the ground, and the Copses, until within from 700 to 1,000
1)aCCS.
(2) The exposed position of the right flank at Roncourt and
absence of any extensive intrenchments on that part of the
French position.
(3) The fact that the lateral movements of the reserves in
rear of the position were impeded by the woods and valleys.
Aattle of Gravelotte. 165
(4) Difficulty of retreat for the left wing and centre, since the
defile of Châtel St. Germain lay in rcar, and the main line of
communication with Mctz ran obliquely to the left wing and
partially along the vallcy of the Moselle, where it was com-
manded by the German guns across the river. This strategic
disadvantage, which would only be felt aſter the position had
been forced in this direction, was compensated to a great cx-
tent by the tactical Strength of this part of the position, due to
the situation of Fort St. Quentin.
In conclusion, the relatively weak point of the strong posi-
tion occupied by the French was the extreme right flank at
Roncourt, against which, moreover, strategical considerations
required that the Germans should direct their main attack.
The weather was very fine and clear throughout the battle.
In the early morning it was cool, though it became very warm
later in the day. It was frequently difficult to see the enemy,
owing mainly to his excellent artificial and natural cover, as
well as to the smoke, which became thicker as the battle went
on, and was driven by a slight wind somewhat towards the
attacking force.
I66 The German Artillery.
ACCOUNT OF THE BATTLE.
I. Position of the French army.
THE greater part of the French army retained its position of
the 17th up to the commencement of the battle of the 18th ; but
the 6th Corps was withdrawn into line with the other troops, on
the representation by Marshal Canrobert that it was very much
exposed at Vernéville. He had ordered the position to be most
carefully intrenched.
The following is the order of battle of the French army,
according to the accounts given by all French writers. The
6th Corps, under Canrobert, was on the right flank of the army,
with its right wing at Roncourt, and centre on the heights of
St. Privat, consisting of the 3rd Division (Lafont de Villiers), and
the 2nd Division (Bisson)." The left wing, extending to the
pond north-west of Amanvillers, was formed by the 4th Division
(Levassor-Sorval), while the 1st Division (Tixier) was probably
posted at the beginning of the battle in reserve to the east of
St. Privat on both sides of the high road. During the course of
the battle we find that a brigade was brought up to support the
3rd Division, and posted on the extreme right flank, obliquely
to the main line of battle, with its front facing northwards, so
as to watch the outlets from the woods lying in that direction,
while the other brigade (Péchot) was employed on the left flank
with the 4th Division. Bruchard's cavalry brigade of the
3rd Corps was joined on the 17th by the 2nd regiment of
the Chasseurs d’Afrique, which was the only regiment leſt under
du Barrail's command after the departure of the Emperor's
escort, the Division thus formed being placed under the orders
of the 6th Corps.”
* This Division consisted of the 9th regiment of the Line only.
* The distribution of the 6th Corps is mainly taken from Frossard, who is
particular on this point.
Lieut.-Col. de Montluisant gives exact details of the number, description, and
Aaff/e of Graze/ože. 167
The 4th Corps, under Ladmirault, extended from the left of
the 6th Corps to Montigny la Grange. On the right wing of
the first line stood the Ist Division (de Cissey) as far as Aman-
villers; on the left wing, between that village and Montigny la
Grange, the 2nd Division (Grenier), the 3rd Division (de Lorencez)
forming the second line. The cavalry Division was in rear of
Amanvillers. Both places were occupied and outposts thrown
forward to Champenois.
The line was continued towards the left by the 2nd Corps,
under Leboeuf, who had succeeded Decaen, as far as the bend of
the high road south of Moscou. The Divisions were in the
following order from right to left —The Ist under Montaudon,
the 2nd under Nayral, who had replaced Castagny, the 3rd
under Metman, and the 4th under Aymard. The Division of
cavalry was under cover behind the ridge. La Folie, Leipsic,
Moscou, and St. Hubert were occupied as advanced posts."
The Ist brigade of Montaudon's Division, consisting of the 87th
and 95th regiments (4 battalions), defended the wood south-west
of la Folie ; while the Bois de Genivaux was held by the 90th
regiment, with one battalion of the 69th regiment belonging to
Nayral's Division, and by two battalions of Metman's Division,
five battalions in all.
Rrossard's 2nd Corps formed the left wing from the bend of
the high road as far as St. Ruffine. The Ist Division, under
Vergé, was on the right at the bend of the high road opposite the
ravine of Gravelotte, occupying also Point du Jour. On its left
the 2nd Division, commanded by Fauvart-Bastoul in place of
Bataille, stretched along the old Roman road fronting the Bois
de Vaux. The extreme left wing consisted of Lapasset's
brigade, posted on the slopes of the ridge inclining towards
Rozérieulles, with a strong detachment at Ruffine watching the
position of the artillery on the field of battle of the 6th Corps :-76 guns, comprising
12 12-prs. and 64 4-prs. (Vide Order of Battle in Appendix). Thus there were no
batteries of mitrailleurs, while according to Fay's account that under Flottes’ command
must have consisted of mitrailleurs. On the left of St. Privat, Lieut.-Colonel de
Montluisant had 16 guns under his orders :-Lippmann's battery of six 12-prs.,
Blondel's of six 4-pºs., and Abord's of four 4-prs. On the right of that village were
60 guns :—Lequeux's battery of six 12-prs, and the 4-pr batteries under Bedaride,
Jaubert, Charpeaux, Boyer, Grimard, Labrosse, IIeintz, Oster, and Flottes.
St. IIubert was garrisoned by the 60th regiment of Aymard's Division.
I 68 7%e German Artillery.
approaches to that village and Jussy to protect the communica-
tion with Metz. Between this brigade and the 2nd Division the
batteries of the latter and the 12th reserve battery were placed
so as to command the roads and ground in front of the position,
and the remaining four batteries of the reserve were posted at
first in rear of the two Divisions. Advanced piquets and de-
tachments of infantry held the stone-quarry west of the high road.
Valabrègue's Division of Cavalry was encamped in the valley of
Châtet, and de Forton's Reserve Cavalry Division took up its
position at the Mill of Longeau.
The reserves were posted on the Col de Lessy between the
forts, Plappeville and St. Quentin, and comprised the Guards and
the general artillery reserve of the army." Marshal Bazaine had
taken up his head-quarters at Plappeville, and they were Con-
nected by telegraph with the observatory on the tower of the
cathedral,
2. Dispositions and orders of the Royal Head-quarters—Plans
and movements of the First and Second Armies before the
Čač/e.
Soon after noon on the 17th of August it became evident
that the enemy had no longer any intention of offering battle on
that day, and that it was possible to concentrate the First and
Second German Armies on the plan subsequently carried out.
After the concentration the numerical superiority of the Germans
was such that they were warranted in attempting to intercept
the French line of retreat by the northern road. Consequently
General von Moltke, by command of His Majesty, issued the
following orders from the hill south of Flavigny at 1.45 P.M. –
‘The Second Army will march at 5 A.M. to-morrow, and
advance in echelons betwccn the Yron and Gorze streams
general direction between Ville sur Yron and Rezonville).
The VIIIth Army Corps on the right flank will conform to this
movement. The VIIth Army Corps will at first protect the march
‘During the battle,’ says Bazaine, ‘I was obliged to held the plateau of Plappe-
ville with the Guard and artillery reserve, in order to repulse the attacks which
might have been made by the enemy cither from Vaux and St. Ruſſine or from
Woippy against our rear, as it was certain that he would endeavour to cut us off from
Metz,’
Paſtle of Gravelot/e. I 69
of the Scoond Army against any hostile attempts from the
direction of Mctz. Furthcr communications from H.M. the
King will depend on the movements of the cremy. Rcports
are to be sent to II.M. on the hill south of Flavigny.
‘VON MOLTKE.’
Consequent on these dispositions of the Royal head-quarters
the First Army issued an order at Ars sur Moselle at 6.30 P.M.
on the 17th of August to the following effect :—The VIIth Corps,
on which the First and Second German Armies were to pivot on
the 18th, was directed to maintain its present positions under all
circumstances, and to get under arms at 5 A.M. The VIIIth
Corps, on the other hand, was considered as temporarily with-
drawn from the Commander in Chief of the First Army. “The
1st and 3rd Cavalry Divisions were to await further orders in
their present positions on the right bank of the Moselle.”
Towards evening the VIIIth Army Corps reported the loca-
lities of its bivouacs to the First Army, and also that its connec-
tion with the VIIth Army Corps was Secured by outposts and
patrols.
At 4 A.M. on the 18th the Royal head-quarters at Pont à
Mousson issued the following orders to the First Army, which,
however, did not extend to the troops left on the right bank of
the Moselle under the command of General Manteuffel :—
‘The VIIth Army Corps will in the first place preserve a de-
fensive attitude in observation. Connection with the VIIIth
Corps can only be sought in front.
“Should the hostile army throw itself into Metz, our armies
will wheel to the right.
‘Direct support is to be given to the First Army, if neces-
sary, by the second line of that army.'
The above order arrived at Ars Sur Moselle at 6.30 A.M.
H.M. the King left Pont à Mousson in sufficient time to
reach the hill south of Flavigny at 6 A.M. With regard to the
cxposed position of the VIIth Army Corps, which would in all
probability have to bear the burnt of the first blow struck by
the chemy, General von Steinmetz thought that co-operation
Major von Schell's Operations of the First Army.
I 7o 7%e German Artillery.
from the right bank of the Moselle was desirable, and conse-
quently sent orders at 7 A.M. to General von Manteuffel ‘to
push forward a brigade of infantry, with a few batteries, in the
direction of Vaux, keeping beyond the range of the fortress,
with the object of taking in flank any offensive movement that
might be made by the enemy in the valley of the Moselle against
Ars from the right bank. This brigade was not likely to be en-
dangered, as the 3rd Cavalry Division was still in the line
Augny—Marly. General von Hartmann was directed personally
to obtain information, during the course of the day, of any
fighting that might occur, and to march with the Ist Cavalry
Division by the road Corny—Gorze to the plateau of Rezonville,
and there to act according to circumstances.
“With the view of obtaining more exact intelligence about the
enemy, General von Steinmetz rode to the plateau on the South
of Gravelotte.’’
The VIIth Army Corps had already reported at 6 A.M. :—
‘That the enemy occupies generally his position of yesterday.
Strong batteries and masses of infantry are at Point du Jour and
St. Hubert. The French camp is still standing between Moscou
Farm and Leipsic; much movement is going on there ; drums,
trumpets, bands are heard.'
“A post of observation established by the VIIth Army Corps
had remarked, at seven o'clock, strong columns of the enemy
and wagons moving along the road from Metz to Thionville, as
well as columns standing with their heads pointing in the same
direction. This was reported to the Commander in Chief at
IO. I 5 A.M.'
General von Woyna had sent half a company of infantry to
Gravelotte to prevent the enemy from getting water there. In
rear of the outposts on the slope of the plateau, and screened
from the enemy by the corners of the wood jutting out towards
Gravelotte, the I4th Division, under Kamecke, had been under
arms since 5 A.M., Supported by the 25th brigade of infantry
in the valley in rear. The Chief of the Staff, General von
Sperling, who had been sent at ten o'clock to His Majesty to
receive further orders, returned at II. I 5 A.M. with an order
| Major von Schell's Operations of the First Army.
Battle of Gravelotte. 171
to General von Steinmetz ‘that the First Army was not to attack
before the Second had come up into line on its left.”
Let us now turn to the Second Army. At 5 A.M. on the 18th
H.R.H. the Commander in Chief gave the dispositions for the
day verbally to the generals commanding the Guard, Xth and
XIIth Corps, in bivouac to the south of Mars la Tour, and at
5. I 5 A.M to the generals commanding the IIIrd and IXth Corps
to the west of Vionville.’ According to the official report of the
Second Army they were to the following effect:-
‘The Second Army will continue its march to-day with the
object of forcing the enemy from the line of retreat Metz—
Verdun and of attacking him wherever it may find him. The
army will advance in echelons, with the XIIth Corps on the left,
which will move off at 5 A.M., taking the direction of Jarny ;
on its right the Guard Corps will march in the direction of Don-
COurt,
‘The IXth Corps on the right rear of the Guard Corps will
start at 6 A.M., and march between Rezonville and Vionville,
leaving St. Marcel on the left. The VIIIth Corps will be in
echelon on the right rear of the IXth.
“In the second line the Xth Corps and Rheinhaben's cavalry
Division will follow the XIIth Army Corps.
‘The IIIrd Army Corps and the cavalry Division under
Duke William of Mecklenburg will be between the IXth and
Guard Corps.
‘The advance is not to be made in columns of march, but
the Divisions will be massed by themselves.
‘The Commander in Chief will be found at the head of the
IIIrd Army Corps.’
After issuing this order, Prince Frederick Charles reported
himself at the Royal head-quarters, which had arrived at Fla-
vigny, and then rode with his staff to join the IIIrd Corps on the
march towards Vernéville ; he remained for some time at the
head of the 6th Infantry Division, under von Buddenbrock, to
the west of Vionville.
The XIIth Army Corps had meanwhile sent its 23rd Division
forwards across the high road from its bivouac South of Mars la
Tour, followed by the 24th Division. There the deep ravines,
hedges, and walls impeded the movements of the troops to such
I 72 - 7%e German Artillery.
an extent that the greater part of the corps was obliged to
march through the village itself. It was 8.45 A.M. before the
24th was clear of the place. ‘The head of the corps reached
Jarny at 8. I5 A.M. without coming on the enemy. The IXth
Corps, and on its right the VIIIth Corps, had been on the
march since 6 A.M. But the Guard Corps, whose van reached
Mars la Tour at 6 o'clock, came upon the Saxons marching
through and near that place, and was obliged to halt till
8.45. P.M.'"
The reports which reached the Second Army during the
early morning stated —‘That Gravelotte was evacuated by the
enemy, that there was a camp to the east of that place, that
there was a good deal of movement in the camps at Moscou
and Leipsic, and moreover that those at Bruville and St. Marcel
were abandoned.” “At 8.1 5 P.M., however, Lieut.-Colonel von
Verdy was sent by the Royal head-quarters to the Commander
in Chief at Vionville to inform him that the enemy was supposed
to be in position in front of Metz with his right flank somewhere
about Amanvillers, which indeed had already been observed from
Vionville. It therefore appeared desirable that the Second Army
should not advance further in its present direction, towards the
north. If the surmises of the Royal head-quarters were confirmed,
the IXth Army Corps would attack the right wing, supported
by the Guard Corps, while the First Army advanced against
the enemy's front.’
‘About this time, towards 9 A.M., the Guard Corps reached
Mars la Tour; the XIIth Army Corps was assembling at Jarny
and the IXth Corps was on the march. The latter, which
was the nearest to the enemy, was ordered by the Commander
in Chief to halt at Caulre Farm and cook. Cavalry Scouts only
were to be pushed forward towards St. Privat and Leipsic as
well as to keep up the communication with the Guard Corps.
This corps was ordered to halt at Doncourt, the XIIth at Jarny,
and the Xth at Bruville. The IIIrd Corps had not yet started.
The VIIIth Corps received direct orders from the Royal head-
quarters to advance no further, and it formed up between Rezon-
ville and Villers aux Bois, covercq by the forests in its front.
From the Lecture delivered by Captain Helmuth to the Military Society.
* From the official report of the Second Army.
Battle of Gravelotte. $ I 73
“But about 9.45 A.M. the Commander in Chief of the Second
Army was made acquainted with the fact that the road by
Etain was reached at all points without touching the enemy."
The XIIth Corps reported at 9 A.M. that it had arrived at Jarny
and found no enemy; adding however, that hostile troops
had been seen to the north-west of that place at Valleroy (a
mile north-west of Moineville), as well as to the north of Don-
court. A quarter of an hour later, however, all this was con-
tradicted.’
It was reported by the Guard Corps that Doncourt was
evacuated by the enemy on the previous day, and at 8. I 5 A.M.
the IXth Corps reported that it was assembling at Caulre
Farm ; while its patrols sent out towards the north and north-
east had seen nothing of the enemy. There was therefore no
longer any doubt that at least the main mass of the enemy would
be found in front of Metz.
In pursuance of the orders brought by Lieut.-Colonel von
Verdy from the Royal head-quarters the Commander in Chief
of the Second Army decided to wheel the IXth and Guard Corps
only to the right, and for the present to hold back the IIIrd, Xth,
and XIIth Corps.
The following orders were therefore issued :—‘(IO A.M.)
The IXth Corps will advance in the direction of Vernéville and
la Folie, and if the right wing of the enemy is found there,
it will engage it, commencing the attack by the deployment of
a large force of artillery.'
‘(Io. 15 A.M.) The Guard Corps will march by Doncourt
to Vernéville and support the IXth Corps, which is advanc-
ing against the enemy's right wing at la Folie. It is desirable
to reconnoitre on the left towards Amanvillers and St. Privat
la Montagne and to report without delay.’
This order reached the Guard Corps just as its 1st Division
was assembling at Doncourt and its 2nd arriving at Bruville.
The XIIth Corps, which was to remain temporarily at
Jarny, was informed of both these orders. The report dated
Io. I 5 A.M. now received from the Guard Corps of its arrival at
Doncourt and of its patrols having seen nothing of the enemy
* From Captain IIelmuth's Lecture.
I 74 The German Artillery.
in the direction of St. Marie only confirmed the Commander
in Chief of the army in the views he had adopted.
Soon afterwards Lieut.-Colonel von Verdy arrived at Verné-
ville with fresh orders which had been issued by the Royal head-
quarters at Io. I 5 A.M. to the following effect:—‘From reports
that have been received, there is every probability that the
enemy will hold his ground on the plateau between Point du
Jour and Montigny la Grange; four hostile battalions have
advanced into the Bois de Genivaux. His Majesty is of opinion
that it will be advisable for the XIIth and Guard Corps to march
on Batilly, in order to fall upon the enemy should he march on
Briey, and to attack him from Amanvillers should he retain his
position on the hill.’
* An attack will be made at the same time by the First
Army from the Bois de Vaux and Gravelotte, by the IXth
Corps against the Bois de Genivaux and Vernéville and by the
left wing of the Second Army from the north in the same direc-
tion.’
In pursuance of this order Prince Frederick Charles made
the following arrangements at I I, 30 A.M. :—The IXth Corps
was directed, in the event of the “enemy in its front extend-
ing his line towards the north, to avoid becoming seriously
cngaged until the Guard Corps commenced its attack from
Amanvillers.' The Guard Corps was ‘to hasten its march by
Vernéville, extending as far as Amanvillers and thence to make
a vigorous attack to turn the enemy's right wing.’ It was more-
over added that the Guard Corps might also take the road by
Habonville.
The order despatched to the Crown Prince of Saxony at
I 1.45 A.M. stated —“The XIIth Corps is ordered to march to St.
Marie aux Chênes, to reconnoitre with cavalry towards Briey and
Conflans, and if possible to push cavalry into the valley of the
Moselle, in order to interrupt the railway and telegraphic com-
munication with Thionville.' It was also added that the corps
which were marching in the first line would attack the enemy
on the heights of Leipsic within two hours. In the second line
the xth Corps was directed on St. Ail, the IIIrd on Vernéville,
and the IInd on Rezonville as the reserve for the right wing.
While the Commander in Chief was issuing the above orders,
Aa/#/e of Gravelotte. I 75
which were to form the basis of further operations, guns were
heard from Vernéville, indicating that General Manstein had
reached and attacked the enemy. t
It was to be feared, therefore, that the corps, instead of
attacking simultaneously, as intended, would do so in Succession,
as those on the outer flank required more time to traverse the
longer distance which separated them from the enemy. The
Royal head-quarters, which knew that the IXth Corps was engaged
by the rapid increase of the firing up to 1 P.M., was anxious to
localise the contest, and despatched orders to that effect to both
armies: but the military situation had meanwhile become so
serious that the nearest corps to the IXth (Guard and VIIIth)
found themselves compelled to fight, and the battle became
general.
Thus the original plan was modified. It was no longer
possible for the chiefs to restrain the course of events: they
could only take the necessary steps as occasion required to
restore the balance of the contest or to give renewed impulse to
a desired movement by pushing forward fresh troops. Prince
Frederick Charles hurried forward at I 2 o'clock with his staff
from Vionville, and passing the 2nd Division of the Guards, now
arrived at St. Marcel, rode to the battle field of the IXth Corps,
afterwards taking up his position on the hill at Habonville.
3. Aftack of the IXth Army Corps—The battle is commenced by
the artillery of the 18th Division and the corps artillery—
Capture of L’Envic—Movements of the Guard Corps and
25th Hessian Division—Advance of the corps—Artil/cry of
the IIIrd Army Corps—Champenois is occupied by the
Aſessians.
We must again turn to the IXth Corps, which had halted as
ordered at Caulre farm, the 18th Division, under General von
Wrangel, north of the road, and the 25th Division, commanded
by Prince Louis of Hesse, to the south of it. Their cavalry kept
up the connection with the Guard Corps and reconnoitred as far
as Batilly. General von Blumenthal was ordered to push
forward his outposts towards Vernéville with the advanced guard
of the 18th Division, and his patrols reported that there were
Some small detachments of the enemy in that neighbourhood,
176 - 7%e German Artillery.
but only a few stragglers were found in the place itself. His
Outposts touched those of the VIIIth Corps, which had reached
Villers.
The IXth Corps was cooking when it received the above-
mentioned order, and at IO.30 A.M. commenced its march in
two parallel columns towards Vernéville through the openings
in the forest. The right column consisted of the 18th Division,
Lieut.-General Freiherr von Wrangel, followed by the corps
artillery, under Colonel von Yagemann. The 1st Heavy battery
(Captain Werner II.) was attached to the advanced guard
of the column (36th regiment, 9th battalion of Rifles, 6th
Dragoons), under General von Blumenthal, the remainder of
the Ist field division of the 9th field artillery regiment, under
Major von Gayl, following with the main body.
The 25th Division, under Prince Louis of Hesse, formed
the left column. The horse artillery battery, commanded by
Captain Freiherr von Schäffer-Bernstein, was attached to the
25th Cavalry Brigade. Having at first reconnoitred at the head
of the Division, this brigade, during the further advance, marched
by the west of the Bois Doseuillons and Anoux la Grange to
Habonville, so as to cover the left flank. The advanced guard,
under Colonel von Lyncker (2nd battalion of Rifles, 4th regi-
ment, 1st Heavy and Ist Light batteries, commanded by
Captains Reh and Frank), immediately in rear of the cavalry
brigade, advanced to the east of the Bois Doseuillons, taking at
first the direction of Vernéville. The main body (General von
Wittich) came next, and the remainder of the Hessian artillery
(2nd Heavy, 2nd and 3rd Light batteries) followed immediately
in rear of the batteries of the advanced guard. The whole of
the artillery divisions of the IXth Army Corps marched in
columns of batteries.
‘General von Blumenthal was ordered to move forward at
once with the advanced guard and occupy la Folie and the
wood in front. It was II A.M. when he passed through Verné-
ville to Chantrenne with the 2nd battalion of the 35th regiment
and three companies of the 9th battalion of Rifles; the remainder
of the advanced guard (1st battalion of the 36th, a company of
Rifles, Ist Heavy battery, and the 6th Dragoons) was retained
at Vernéville by General Manstein, who had ridden forward to
Aa///e of Grave/offle. I 77
that village. From the hill near Vernéville a large French
camp was clearly visible on the flat heights opposite at Aman-
villers and Montigny la Grange. The troops appeared to be
busy cooking, and Some battalions were moving in front of the
camp apparently in the direction of Vernéville, now occupied by
our advanced guard. In other respects the hostile camp seemed
to be in a state of careless repose, and the general considered it
advisable to attack vigorously, so as to gain the advantage of
a surprise, although the French flank extended far beyond la
Folie ; Owing to the configuration of the ground it was impossible
to see the whole length of the enemy's front, which extended
beyond St. Privat.
Major-General Freiherr von Puttkammer, commanding the
artillery, was therefore ordered at I I.30 A.M. to advance im–
mediately at a trot with the artillery of the 18th Division and
Corps artillery, escorted by two Squadrons of the 6th Dragoons,
to the hill beyond the valley north-east of Vernéville within effec-
tive range of the hostile camp and to Open as heavy a fire as
possible on it." It was also intended to protect the artillery
more completely by placing infantry on its left flank.
Major von Gayl deemed it advisable, pending the arrival of
his other batteries, to place the battery of the advanced guard
(I. S. IX.), Werner II., on the west of the valley to increase
the confusion in the evidently Surprised Camp by firing on the
hostile columns of infantry marching On Our side of it. The
battery, after firing a few rounds with doubtful effect, received
orders simultaneously from Generals von Manstein and Puttkam-
mer to advance. Before, however, this could be done, the other
batteries of the divisional artillery came up at a trot, and cross-
ing a somewhat difficult ditch at a gallop, came into action I,000
paces further forward, and fired at hostile batteries to the west
and south of Montigny la Grange.
They crowned the flat ridge extending from Vernáville to
Amanvillers, which seemed to offer an opportunity of deploying
and taking up positions, sheltered from the enemy's fire. The
2nd Light battery, Captain Freiherr von Eynatten (2. l. IN),
| From the hill north of Verneville the Bois de la Cusse appeared to extend to
the high ground South-west of Amanvillers. It was known to be occupied by the
enemy, and our own inſantry soon afterwards attacked it.
N
178 The German Artillery.
was the first in action, the 1st Light and 2nd Heavy batteries,
Captains Koch and Kindler (I. 1. and 2. S. IX.), aligning them-
selves with it on the left, while the 1st Heavy battery, Captain
Werner II. (I. S. IX.), came into action on the right obliquely to
the front of the line. The left wing was afterwards prolonged
by the batteries of the corps artillery, which came up in succes-
sion at a sharp trot, a considerable interval, however being left
on the left of the divisional artillery. The order of the batteries
from right to left was —3rd Heavy, 3rd Light, 4th Light, 2nd
Horse Artillery, 4th Heavy,” commanded respectively by Cap-
tains Roerdansz, von Bastineller, Mente, König, and Werner I.
But they were not allowed to come into action without opposi-
tion. The first shell of the 1st Heavy battery (Werner II) was
fired at II.45 A.M., and was the signal for the French army to
take up its previously prepared position. To protect their camp
the French battalions above referred to had deployed and in-
stantly opened a rapid fire at I,000 paces on our artillery and
the Bois de la Cusse. The hostile batteries at Montigny la
Grange were speedily reinforced by a strong line of mitrailleurs
and guns, which extended, partially covered by intrenchments,
in a large arc from la Folie by Montigny la Grange to the
heights between Amanvillers and St. Privat. To the storm of
shell, shrapnel, and mitraille, which overwhelmed our batteries,
was soon added the fire of great numbers of skirmishers who
advanced covered by intrenchments as well as by the form of
the ground.
Exposed to a concentrated fire in front, on the left flank, and
to some extent in rear, the artillery sustained enormous losses
from the very first. Colonel von Yagemann was so severely
wounded during the advance of the corps artillery, that Lieut.-
Colonel Darapsky took over the command. Major von Gayl
fell early, and was succeeded by Captain Koch, who, as well
as Captain Kindler, was shortly afterwards wounded, the com-
mand of the Ist field division then falling into the hands of
! When the batteries of the corps artillery arrived at the place of assembly, nearly
all of them began watering their horses, and sent men to procure wood, water,
and other things; so that when the order arrived to advance, they were obliged to
borrow gunners ſrom the reserves, and there was more or less delay in “hooking in.”
This prevented the corps artillery ſrom coming into action simultaneously.
Aazz/e of Gravelotte. I 79
Captain Freiherr von Eynatten. The batteries which suffered
least were the two on the right flank, owing to their being
defiladed by the ridge on the left.
The artillery kept up the contest in spite of the enemy's
Superiority of numbers and position, and nobly held its ground,
encouraged by General von Puttkammer and the other com-
manders. The hostile infantry in front of the camp was soon
driven back, our guns then directing their fire on artillery and
mitrailleurs, as well as at a later period on infantry in the main
French position. The enemy's guns, however, were so well con-
cealed that most of the batteries could only aim at the flash,
the range being from 2,000 to 2,400 paces. König's battery of
lorse artillery alone confronted a battery which was distinctly
visible in front of the camp. Bringing forward its right shoulder,
and Supported by the 4th Heavy battery, which came up soon
afterwards, so tremendous a fire was directed on the French
battery at 1,2OO or 1,300 paces that it was obliged to retire.
The effect of the fire of the other batteries, notwithstanding
the unfavourable circumstances, was also good, as proved by its
silencing the enemy's guns and mitrailleurs, and forcing them
frequently to change their positions.
The two squadrons of the 6th Dragoons brought up by
General von Puttkammer to cover the corps artillery were also
soon exposed to the enemy's shells, which fell here in great
numbers ; and as they could find no opportunity of acting and
were losing many men, they withdrew to Vernéville, where they
were ordered by General von Wrangel to await further orders
with the other two squadrons in rear of the wood west of
Chantrenne.”
Werner's battery had only taken up its position a short time
on the left of König's when it was overwhelmed by the fire from
the enemy's guns and mitrailleurs on the left and in rear, and
obliged to change its position. To limber up and retire, to
wheel to the right and,-advancing resolutely 200 paces, reply
to this tremendous fire, was the work of a moment. But in less
than half an hour two officers, three-fourths of the men, and all
the horses except eight were either killed or wounded. The
hostile mitrailleurs, which had fired with such deadly effect from
* Captain Helmuth's Lecture.
N 2
I8o The German Artillery.
a covered position 900 paces distant, were now silenced. Two
Soldiers, who had for some time been lying on the field near at
hand, and had been taken till that moment for Prussians who
had pressed forward, gave signs of life: they were French
officers. A battalion, hitherto hidden by a hollow," suddenly
appeared close to the battery, like figures on a stage. None of
Our infantry was at hand, and case shot was out of the question.
The hostile infantry, keeping up a heavy fire, continued to press
forward, and completed the destruction of Werner's battery.
The captain of the battery, already wounded and his horse
killed, mounted a fresh horse and endeavoured to save what he
could.
One of the guns had three horses left; Lieutenant Graszhof,
assisted by the gunners, cut the traces of one of the leaders
which had fallen, and was about to do the same with the
wheelers, lying wounded on the ground, when they recovered.
Leaping on the remaining leader, he urged the horses to exert
their remaining strength in dragging the gun up the hill to the
Bois de la Cusse. Thus with the loss of the team the gun was
saved, for the infantry was there close at hand. Captain
Werner I, led another gun with a team of four horses to the
edge of the wood, where the horses also fell under the enemy's
fire.
König's battery, next on the left, engrossed in the bloody
struggle, had not observed the disaster of Werner's battery.
Suddenly overwhelmed by a storm of Chassepôt bullets from
the hostile battalion, it sustained enormous losses in a short
time, but disengaged itself for a moment by a brisk fire of
shell. Deprived of support owing to the absence of infantry, to
maintain the position was only to Court speedy and useless
annihilation ; and the battery decided on retiring, which was
executed with great difficulty and unexampled loss. A limber
was abandoned, the whole of its team of six horses being killed ;
while the gun to which it belonged was hooked on to another
by First Lieutenant Rudolph and Second Lieutenants Ladewig
and Zeeden, and brought off in Safety.
König's battery had just Commenced to retire when the first
* Reſerence is probably made to the railway cutting.
Aa/ſ/e of Gravelo//e. I 8 I
infantry support came up and covered the retreat of the remain-
ing batteries of the Corps artillery. This step seemed all the
more necessary owing to the great danger threatening the
artillery not only from Amanvillers, but also from Champenois.
That farm, which lay close to the front of the German artillery,
had been seized in a bold rush from Montigny la Grange by
Some French infantry supported by a destructive and con-
centrated fire, although the guns of the IXth Army Corps played
on the advancing troops with great effect. It was moreover
necessary for the batteries to withdraw and make good their
loss of men and also of ammunition, the expenditure of which
had been very great in this critical state of affairs, while in many
instances the lines of wagons had been unable to follow the
batteries.
Lieut.-Colonel Darapsky, who, although severely wounded,
had not as yet been prevented from directing the corps artillery,
received direct permission from General von Manstein, com-
manding the corps, to withdraw his batteries one by one only
to the Bois de la Cusse to obtain Supplies, and infantry was
ordered to the front to cover the movement. The 84th, 36th,
and 3rd Hessian regiments advanced, and thus the Safety of
both of Werner's guns near the Bois de la Cusse was assured.
‘Two of the abandoned guns without limbers fell into the hands
of the French infantry and were only recovered at the capitu-
lation of Metz, while the other two, objects of the enemy's
repeated attacks, remained till evening on the Small plateau
over which the tide of battle continued to ebb and flow for a
long period.'"
The remaining batteries were now withdrawn from the left
in succession, covered by the advancing infantry, but the Orders
were only executed with reluctance. Mente's and Bastineller's
batteries were first of all directed to the Bois de la Cusse. The
3rd Heavy battery, under Roerdansz, calmly continued in action
for some time longer, but at last hostile infantry made its
appearance close in front. Captain Roerdansz had just given
the order to load with case when he fell, struck by the enemy's
bullets. A few rounds at 400 paces checked the enemy, and the
| Captain Helmuth's Lecture,
I82 7%e German Artillery.
battery under the command of Lieutenant Schattauer followed
the remainder of the corps artillery. At Vernéville infantry
assisted in getting a gun, whose team was reduced to three
horses, across a difficult ditch. The 84th regiment retired slowly
through the neighbouring battery (2nd Heavy, commanded by
Kindler), followed closely by hostile skirmishers, who fired on
the flanks and rear of the battery. Under these circumstances
the commander, who was lying on the ground severely wounded,
ordered his battery, which had suffered great losses, to follow
the corps artillery. To remove all the guns it was necessary to
obtain horses from those lines of wagons which had succeeded
in following the batteries, and five ammunition wagons had to
be abandoned. Two of the guns sustained such heavy losses in
limbering up that they could not retire at the same time with
the others. Lieutenant Kelbling, however, who was ordered to
remain with them, succeeded in bringing them off after some
further loss.
The corps artillery having been withdrawn from the position,
General von Puttkammer could turn his attention to the capture
of the homestead of Champenois, which was occupied by hostile
infantry.
The greater part of the extraordinary loss of the corps
artillery of the IXth Corps and the artillery of the 18th
Division in this battle was incurred at this time, and was mainly
caused by the Chassepôt and mitrailleur. Major von Gayl,
Captain Roerdansz, First Lieutenant Goetze, Second Lieutenant
and Adjutant Korschefsky, and Second Lieutenant Ladewig
were killed. The following officers were severely wounded :—
Colonel von Yagemann ; Lieutenant-Colonel Darapsky (who,
however, retained the command of the corps artillery for several
hours, until it had made good its losses); Captain Werner II.,
(who was succeeded in the command of the 1st Heavy battery
by Lieutenant Puttkammer); Captain Kindler (who gave over
the command of the 2nd Heavy battery, after it had retired, to
Second Lieutenant Kelbling); Captain von Bastineller, who was
replaced in the 3rd Light battery by First Lieutenant Heseler;
First Licut.cnant Horrmann, who afterwards succumbed to his
wounds; First Licutenant and Adjutant Sciffert; Scoond Licu-
tenant and Adjutant Krahe ; Second Licutenants Schmidt II.,
Battle of Grave/offle. 183
Treutler, Fischer, Walther I., and Surgeon Scherk. The follow-
ing officers were slightly wounded :—Captain Werner I. ; Second
Lieutenant Schmidt I. ; Second Lieutenants Kelbling (grazed by
a splinter) and Jourdan; Staff Surgeon Steinhausen (all of
whom remained with their batteries); Second Lieutenants Giese,
Meyer, and Schackschneider. Several officers had horses killed or
wounded under them, among which were the following:—Captain
König, of the 2nd Horse Artillery battery, two horses; Second
Lieutenant Zeeden, three horses in three-quarters of an hour ;
Captain von Bastineller and Lieutenants Heseler and Holsten,
one each. A limber of the Ist Light battery exploded.
Soon after the commencement of the battle by the artillery
of the 18th Division and corps artillery of the IXth Army Corps,
the Hessian Horse Artillery battery, Captain Freiherr von
Schäffer-Bernstein, having crossed the Bois de la Cusse by
General von Schlotheim's orders, came into action near the
south edge of that wood and north of Vernéville. While the
second row of wagons remained throughout the battle at Anoux la
Grange, the first followed the battery, halting I 30 paces in its right
rear. Ninety-three shells were fired at 1,700 paces at the hostile
artillery, which was under cover. The loss of men and horses
was considerable at the wagons as well as at the guns, a wagon
horse and a limber horse being killed. It was impossible for the
battery to hold its ground opposed to the accurate and greatly
superior fire of the enemy; it decided therefore on retiring and
getting supplies from the Second line of wagons.
As soon as this was completed the battery returned to the field
of battle between I and 2 P.M. A gun left on the ground owing
to the loss of horses afterwards missed the battery and came
into action with the Hessian battery under Reh, to which it was
attached by Major von Herget." It was intended that the battery
with its five guns should take up a position to the north-east of
Vernéville near the Bois de la Cusse, but this was prevented by
the heavy fire of the infantry. It consequently moved up and
came into action on the right flank of the three batteries of the
18th Division, which bravely held their ground under General von
Puttkammer against a Superior hostile force. During this move-
* Vide p. 285.
184 7%e German Artillery.
ment Captain Freiherr von Schäffer-Bernstein received so severe
a wound (of which he afterwards died) that he was obliged to
give over the command of the battery to First Lieutenant von
Grolmann. The losses sustained by the battery in the new
position were considerable. After a short time a gun was
rendered unserviceable by the bursting of a shell in the bore, in
which a splinter remained fixed. First Lieutenant von Grol-
mann was killed, and Lieutenant Brandt took over the command
of the battery.
Having thus sketched this memorable artillery contest of
the IXth Army Corps south of the Bois de la Cusse to its close,
let us return to its commencement, and investigate the circum-
stances which were the cause of the artillery being left at first
wholly unsupported. Even before the attack against Werner's
battery General von Puttkammer, who had accompanied the left
flank of his artillery, had been anxious to give it more effective
protection by infantry than was afforded by the two squadrons of
Dragoons. The general was at first unsuccessful, but presently
met a battalion of Hessian Rifles I,500 paces in rear of the
artillery, which promised to advance in the desired direction.
Ignorant of the disaster which had befallen Werner's (I) battery
in the interval, the general then rode to the centre and right
wing to give directions and to provide for their proper support
by infantry.
That the infantry of the IXth Army Corps was eager to
advance to the support of its hard-pressed sister arm is proved
by the following:—Two companies of the Ist battalion of the
36th regiment, which had been left at Vernéville, were ordered
to the front to carry the homestead of l’Envie, situated immedi-
ately in front of the artillery. Having driven out the enemy,
the companies prepared the farm for defence, and held it in
spite of a heavy fire of common shell and repeated attacks
made by the French infantry in the course of the afternoon.
The other two companies of the battalion were led at the same
time into the Bois de la Cusse, to support the artillery indirectly;
but deviating from the intended direction in the wood, which
was full of thick underwood and bushes, they reached the
northern part, where it is traversed by the railroad. - There they
Soon became engaged in a sharp contest with skirmishers of
Aſſaf//e of Gravelotte. 185
Cissey's Division. Part only of the infantry succeeded in reach-
ing the south-eastern angle of the wood, but it also was im-
mediately attacked by French infantry."
When the van of the main body of the 18th Division reached
Vernéville at I2.30 P.M., Colonel von Winckler was ordered to
occupy the Bois de la Cusse with the Ist and 2nd Fusilier
battalions of the 84th regiment for the protection of the artillery.
Exposed to a heavy fire in front and on the left flank from the
enemy's guns as it crossed the gully between the wood and the
artillery position, the Fusilier battalion at once wheeled into the
wood against the enemy supposed to be there ; but taking the
direction of St. Privat instead of that to the east, it reached the
railroad after a heavy loss simultaneously with the 2nd battalion
of Hessian Rifles. The Ist battalion at first followed the
Pusiliers, but about I. I 5 P.M. found itself at the south angle of
the wood opposite Amanvillers, where it was immediately
involved with the companies of the 36th regiment in the hot
and bloody combat against Cissey's Division, and consequently
was no longer available for employment in the other direction.
Such was the state of affairs in rear of the artillery when the
disaster occurred on its left flank. The further advance of the
enemy's infantry was checked by the arrival of the Ist battalion
of the 84th regiment, the Ist and 2nd and part of the 3rd com-
panies of which, at the request of General von Puttkammer and
Lieut.-Colonel von Darapsky, debouched in succession from the
Bois de la Cusse in a south-easterly direction, and established
themselves in a small gully on the left of the artillery, where by
a bloody musketry contest they repulsed several attacks made
by the enemy.
The Fusilier battalion of the 85th regiment received orders
at I P.M. at Vernéville to advance and disengage the artillery.”
It took the direction through the gully, running along the South
edge of the Bois de la Cusse; and being informed ‘that the
artillery was again threatened with an immediate attack by
hostile infantry, crossed the intervening space, which was swept
by shell, at a double. It had nearly reached the wreck of
1 This and the subsequent account are ſrom Captain Helmuth's Lecture.
2 The battalion was commanded by Major von Goddenthow.
I 86 7%e German Artillery.
Werner's (1) battery at 1.45 P.M. ; but was brought to a halt by
the fire of the enemy's infantry, supported by mitrailleurs.
Within twenty minutes more than half the battalion was disabled,
while the remainder was obliged to retire to the edge of the wood,
where it assembled and reformed under Colonel von Falken-
hausen. The enemy, however, did not push his advantage, and
the left wing of the artillery was cxtricated.
We left the Guard Corps at Doncourt and Bruville. At
II.30 A.M. it received a report that a French advanced guard,
consisting of all arms, was on the march from Amanvillers. The
above-mentioned order was received immediately afterwards."
Prince August von Wurtemberg learned from the Saxon corps
that in prosecuting its march beyond Jarny it intended to keep
somewhat to the west or left. From reports made by cavalry
patroling in the neighbourhood of Batilly it was surmised that
hostile troops were at St. Privat, and consequently Prince August
thought he ought not to execute the order literally, but deter-
mined on his own responsibility to march the 2nd Division only
to Vernéville, and to advance with the Ist and corps artillery to
Amanvillers. Orders to this effect were just issued when further
reports came in that hostile troops were marching from St.
Privat to St. Marie. General von Pape was therefore ordered in
the advance to Amanvillers, to take the road by Habonville.
At the head of the advanced guard of the 1st Division of
the Guards, under Colonel von Erkert, were the Hussars of the
Guard, which had already trotted forward to St. Ail by order
of General von Pape. They were followed by the Fusiliers and
the 4th Light battery. The main body consisted of the battalion
of Rifles in front; then the remainder of the Ist field division,
under Lieut.-Colonel Bychelberg; the two brigades of infantry,
and lastly the corps artillery, under Colonel von Scherbening.
The artillery marched in columns of batteries, and the infantry
in masses with a front of three battalions.
‘The 2nd Division of the Guards turned off the road to
Bruville, crossing the front of the Xth Corps, which had also
' The purport of this order was that the Guard Corps was to advance rapidly by
Vernéville, and to attack and turn the enemy's right flank beyond Amanvillers; it
also suggested that the corps might make use of the road through HIabonville,
Battle of Gravelotte. 187
arrived to the south of that place, and took the direction of
Vernéville, General von Budritzky sending the 2nd Lancers to
the front as an advanced guard.’" The 3rd field Division of
the artillery of the Guard, attached to the Division, under Lieut.-
Colonel von Rheinhaben, followed the infantry in column of
route. The Division of cavalry of the Guard, having re-assembled
at Mars la Tour at 8 A.M., brought up the rear with the Ist and
3rd Horse Artillery batteries. The brigade of Lancers alone
was still at St. Mihiel on the Meuse.
The Commander in Chief met the Division at St. Marcel, on
his way from Vionville to join the IXth Corps, having already
sent orders to the corps commander to march on Amanvillers
with all his available troops. He was already aware, from the
reports forwarded by the corps, that the greater part of the
Guard Corps was moving in the desired direction ; and now
General von Stiehle gave verbal orders to General von Budritzky
to march on Habonville. But meanwhile General von Pape had
arrived towards I 2.30 P.M. to the west of Habonville with the
van of his infantry, and became aware that the battle in which
the IXth Corps was engaged was rapidly reaching its height. Its
cavalry brigade, exposed to the fire of the French artillery, which
covered the ground in every direction, was in the act of taking
up a position of readiness near a copse on the right.
General von Pape immediately reported his arrival to the
IXth Corps, and observing that the long line of French artillery
was gradually extending towards St. Privat, far outflanking the
left of the IXth Corps, became impressed with the necessity of
attacking it at once in front. With this object in view, the 1st
Light battery and then the remainder of the Ist field division,
under Lieut.-Colonel Bychelberg, was brought forward at I 2.30
P.M. into a position between Habonville and the Bois de la
Cusse to reply to the heavy shell fire which the enemy was
pouring on the advancing Ist Division of the Guards. The
batteries stood in the following order from right to left —2nd
Heavy, Ist Light, I St Heavy, 2nd Light (2. S., I. l., I. S., 2. l. G.),
commanded respectively by Captains von Prittwitz, von Dewitz,
von Sametzky and von Niederstetter. The batteries opened fire
| From Helmuth's Lecture.
I 88 7%e German Artillery.
at 12.45 P.M. on the enemy's artillery at ranges between 2,600
and 2,700 paces.
General von Pape remained with the batteries until his in-
fantry came up. Convinced of the impossibility of continuing
the march on Amanvillers under existing circumstances, he pro-
posed to diverge to St. Marie and thence attack the French
position, since this did not appear practicable in front. Having
directed his advanced guard to move into the valley leading to
St. Marie, he was informed by Colonel von Dannenberg that the
general commanding the corps fully approved of the steps he had
taken. Prince August von Wurtemberg, who also watched the
progress of the battle from the west of Habonville, decided at
once on marching with the whole of his troops to support the
Ixth Corps, and sent orders to the 2nd Division to advance in
that direction. Von Manstein, commanding the IXth Corps, had
meanwhile stated his opinion that ‘direct support' was ‘not de-
manded, but rather ‘indirect support' by an attack in the direc-
tion of St. Privat.
He moreover wished that a brigade should be held in rescrve.
This was afterwards reported to the general commanding the
army, who ordered that a brigade of the 2nd Division of the
Guard Corps, which arrived to the south-west of Habonville at
2.45 P.M., should be held in readiness to Support the IXth Corps.
Consequently the general commanding the Guard Corps selected
the 3rd brigade under General von Knappe with von Unruhe's
battery for this service, and at 4 P.M. it was formed up South of
the railway in rear of the artillery position of the 25th Division
ready to support General Manstein."
Meanwhile Prince Hohenlohe with Colonel von Scherbening
reconnoitred the strong position taken up by the enemy, and saw
the necessity of concentrating a strong force of artillery against
it. The corps artillery was therefore immediately brought to the
front to prolong the left flank of the Ist field division, but a
battalion of infantry was ordered to cross the railroad to cover
the left flank before the corps artillery passed over it. While
the 3rd and 4th Light batteries (3. and 4. I. G.), under Captains
von Frederici-Steinmann and von Mutius, took up a temporary
| From Helmuth's Lecture.
Aattle of Gravelotte. 189
position by order of Major von Krieger at the crossing of the
railroad with the road from Jouaville to Habonville to reply to
the enemy's artillery, the other batteries of the corps artillery
trotted to a position South-west of St. Ail, where they were soon
joined by both the light batteries. The artillery was exposed
to a heavy fire of Common shell and shrapnel as they advanced
to the position, especially when crossing the two steep and
difficult ravines, notwithstanding which the operation was exe-
cuted with great intrepidity and without accident. Considerable
losses both of men and horses were incurred when actually in
position from common shell, but the shrapnel were harmless.
Second Lieut. Bockroth was wounded.
‘The Ist Division had meanwhile been ordered to march in
the direction of St. Marie aux Chênes and assault that village,
while to co-operate in the attack, as well as to gain a more
favourable position, the Ist field division was to move further to the
north. Even before the corps artillery had completed its move-
ment Colonel von Bychelberg had taken the necessary steps to
enable his division to cross the deep and wire-fenced railway cut-
ting in columns of route, and then to advance round Habonville
towards the east. In passing the defile east of that hamlet the
batteries sustained considerable losses, especially of horses, two
guns of the 1st Light, and two of the 2nd Light batteries being
left behind in consequence; but notwithstanding this the ad-
vance was continued.
The intention of participating in the attack on St. Marie aux
Chênes had, however, to be abandoned, because the corps artillery
was already marching up into position on the only eligible
ground. Consequently the first field division remained on the
right of the corps artillery.
The 25th Hessian Division followed on the left of the 18th ;
while its cavalry brigade had advanced towards Habonville north
of the woods, thus keeping up the connection with the Guards.
The Hessian cavalry came under the enemy's fire which after
I 2 o'clock swept the Bois de la Cusse and the ground in its
vicinity, and as General von Schlotheim could discover no work
for his brigade, he took up a covered position in readiness behind
one of the copses at the moment that the van of the Ist Division
I 90 7%e German Artillery.
of the Guards arrived at the same spot, about I P.M.' The
Horse Artillery battery, Captain von Schäffer-Bernstein, had
been sent to Vernéville when the fighting in that direction was
heard, and was there engaged, as above related. On the
arrival of the advanced guard of the 25th Division, commanded
by Colonel Lyncker, about this time—nearly I P.M.–it was
ordered temporarily to take up a position under cover to the
north of the Bois de la Cusse. It therefore wheeled to the left
towards Anoux la Grange, and was closely followed by the main
body of the Division, Prince Louis of Hesse having received orders
from General von Manstein to keep the whole Division ready in a
covered position to advance with the Guards to the attack at a
later hour. It was now past 1 o'clock. While the advanced
guard and main body were in the act of taking up the position
under cover near the Bois de la Cusse, the necessity became
evident of engaging the enemy's artillery which had opened fire
from the heights of Privat, and was already causing many
casualties. Acting in concert with Colonel von Lyncker, Lieut.-
Colonel Stumpf, commanding the Hessian field artillery,
ordered Major von Herget to trot forward with the two batteries
of the advanced guard and one of the main body—Ist Light,
Ist and 2nd Heavy—and come into action between Habonville
and the Bois de la Cusse.” He intended in the next place to
bring up the two remaining batteries on the left flank and then
to advance in echelon against the strong position of the enemy.
In this position the Ist Light battery already had a gun
dismounted.”
At this moment General von Manstein rode up from
Vernéville, where he had become aware of the great line of
hostile artillery south of St. Privat, which till then, almost
unchecked, had cannonaded so effectively the flank and rear
of the artillery of the IXth Corps in position south of the
Bois de la Cusse. He ordered the five Hessian batteries
instantly to advance nearer to the enemy. They therefore
moved forward at a trot, led by Lieut.-Colonel Stumpf, to the
* Compare the account given above of the advance of the Guard.
* The first position, occupied by three of the IHessian batteries, was almost iden-
tical with that relinquished by the Ist field division of the artillery of the Guards.
* This gun had a wheel broken. A wheel driver and two horses were killed,
Aattle of Gravelotte. I9 I
north-west angle of the Bois de la Cusse, and came into action
in the following order from right to left — Ist Heavy, 1st
Light, 2nd Heavy, 2nd Light, and 3rd Light, commanded re-
spectively by Captains Reh, Frank, Hoffmann, Weygand, and
Ronstadt. They opened fire on the enemy's artillery at and to the
south of St. Privat, at ranges varying between 2,000 and 3,000
paces. The effect was excellent, although the smoke partially
obscured the object. This position of the Hessian batteries was
in echelon to that of the artillery of the Guard Corps, which was
deploying to the north of Habonville, but to the right and in
advance of it. As the latter came up into line with the Hessian
at a later period, further mention of the contest in this quarter
will be postponed till then.
The Hessian infantry had also advanced with the artillery.
Colonel von Lyncker, by General von Manstein's order, had
already sent the 2nd battalion of Rifles into the wood, ‘posting
after I o'clock two companies also on the railway embankment
touching the 84th and 36th regiments, which had then for some
time been warmly engaged." A portion of the battalion suc-
ceeded in crossing the embankment under a storm of bullets,
and ensconced itself in a gully. “The battalion itself was soon
joined by a company of the 4th regiment, which by order
of Colonel von Lyncker had advanced close to the artillery
behind a point of the wood projecting northwards, and found there
the main body of the Hessian Division, so that after I.30 P.M.
six battalions were united at that point. The 3rd regiment, and
afterwards the Ist battalion of Rifles (Hessian Guard), had on
the advance of the main body been detached into the wood,
in which there were now, in addition to the above, four Hessian
battalions in line with the two and a half Prussian.
The 3rd regiment had at first waited for orders in an open .
space near the western edge of the Bois de la Cusse, but being
requested by an adjutant of the corps from head-quarters to
support the hard-pressed corps artillery, “it sent forward at once
the 1st battalion, which was soon followed by the 2nd. . . . The
Ist battalion reached the eastern Copse some time after the dis-
comfiture of Werner's battery. Some of the men worked at
placing the shattered guns in the safe position on the edge of
* Captain Helmuth's Lecture.
I 92 The German Artillery.
the wood, while detached parties joined the groups fighting in
the northern parts. The remainder of the battalion was formed
up in close column behind the eastern copse, exposed to the
enemy's fire, and sustaining severe losses. The 2nd battalion
however, led by the colonel commanding the regiment, reached
the edge of the wood facing Amanvillers and soon became
involved in the bloody struggle between the Prussian and
Hessian infantry and Cissey's Division.
The Ist battalion of Rifles of the Hessian Guard now came
up, having sustained heavy losses in the openings in the wood,
and placed itself under the orders of the 3rd regiment, which
directed it to form up in rear of its skirmishers on the eastern
edge of the forest. ‘Such was the situation of the infantry in
the Bois de la Cusse towards 3 P.M., and it was clear that neither
it nor any of the detachments made with the same object could
afford any permanent relief to the artillery.'
Towards 4 o'clock the battalion of Rifles of the Hessian
Guard was informed by an adjutant of the corps staff that its
advance to the now well-known ridge in support of the artillery
was urgently called for. It therefore advanced with great valour
from the cdge of the wood in a South-easterly direction and
drove back the enemy's skirmishers; but its further progress
was checked by Swarms of tirailleurs rushing out of Aman-
villers, whose attacks, often repeated, were repulsed by the de-
liberate fire of this battalion, which was to a certain extent
covered by a gentle incline. The Body Guard company of the
3rd Hessian regiment advanced to support the battalion in its
perilous position, but was thrown back into the wood with great
losses. The Rifles, however, succeeded in securing the two
abandoned guns of Werner's battery. This battalion now formed
the only advanced post on the South-east of the wood, the
portions of the 1st battalion of the 84th regiment having been
driven back after holding their ground for a considerable period."
As the edges of the wood were occupied by a sufficient force
of Hessian troops, orders were given that the two weakened and
fatigued battalions of the 84th regiment should be assembled,
So as to form an available support; this was done in one of the
* Captain IIclimuth's Lecture.
Z3a///e of Gravelofſe. I 93
open spaces in the wood, and two companies of the 36th dis-
persed by the forest-fight joined the regiment. The General
commanding the corps ordered the 84th regiment to reserve
these troops for further employment. All had sustained heavy
losses.
The remainder of the 25th Division had remained in reserve
at the railroad to the north of the wood till 3.30 P.M. In one
of the open spaces exposed to the cross fire of the enemy ‘Prince
Louis himself, in pursuance of the orders he had received, was
waiting till the Guard Corps should advance to the attack on his
left. He knew that its Ist Division had marched towards St.
Marie aux Chênes, and when about 3.30 P.M. it appeared that
an advance was being made from that direction, he ordered
General von Wittich to cross the railroad, and wheeling to the
right, to move against the hill.’" The General still had the 1st
regiment and the 2nd battalion of the 2nd regiment at his dis-
posal, while the reserve was formed by the seven companies of
the 4th regiment under Colonel von Lyncker.
General von Wittich led the attack in person. The railroad,
swept by mitraille, was crossed at a double, in spite of the
delay occasioned by the wire-fencing and the steep slopes of the
embankment and cutting. The 2nd battalion of the 2nd regi-
ment, led by the colonel of the regiment, and a half-battalion of
the Ist regiment, were already safely over and formed up accord-
ing to orders behind the patches of copsewood on the north of
the railroad, when General von Wittich received orders from the
25th Division to halt. ‘Prince Louis of Hesse had come to the
conclusion that the advance of the Guards and Saxons observed
by him at St. Marie had not been continued beyond that village
and that consequently the intended attack ought to be post-
poned.” The infantry that had got beyond the railroad took
advantage of the favourable ground there to engage the French
skirmishers north-west of Amanvillers, and the 2nd battalion of
the Hessian Rifles succeeded, as we know, in gaining ground for a
few hundred paces, thus giving more effective support to the
Hessian batteries as well as to the Guard Corps.
Let us now again revert to the beginning of the battle and
! Ibid. * From General von Wittich's report,
()
I94 7%e German Artillery.
follow the events on the right flank of the IXth Army Corps.
There the detachment under General von Blumenthal sent against
Chantrenne at II A.M. was received by a hot fire from the home-
stead and the plantation near it, but resolutely charging the
enemy, carried the place at the first rush. Meanwhile part of
the infantry slowly penetrated the Bois de Genivaux without
coming on the enemy, but on reaching the valley found him
established in force in the eastern part of the wood with five
battalions of Nayral's and Metman's Divisions; it was there-
fore impossible to advance in that direction. An attempt made
from Chantrenne across the ridge on its right to seize the Copses
lying in the direction of la Folie, defended by four battalions
of Montaudon's Division, failed in spite of the greatest gallantry,
and an endeavour to gain a firm footing in the angle of the
wood to the South-east of Chantrenne was equally unsuccess-
ful. The northern edge of the wood was flanked by a battery
of mitrailleurs posted at la Folie, while other batteries swept
the ground between the woods. It is therefore not surprising
that under such circumstances Blumenthal's weak detachment
was obliged to relinquish all idea of offensive action and limit
itself to the defence of Chantrenne and the ridge lying to the
east of it.
At 2.30 P.M. the Ist battalion of the 85th regiment reinforced
the garrison of Chantrenne by order of General von Wrangel,
who had repeatedly made himself acquainted with the state of
affairs at that point. The battalion carried the angle of the
wood South-east of the homestead at 2.45 P.M. by a rush, but
an attempt to penetrate the copses at la Folie made from the
eastern skirts of the wood was foiled by the enemy's superior
force. At 3 o'clock further reinforcements, consisting of the 2nd
battalion of the 85th regiment, reached Chantrenne by order of
General von Wrangel, and the officer commanding the regiment
made frequent efforts to gain ground in the wood, but the
enemy occupied it too strongly. Thus, although the north-
western corner of the Bois de Genivaux was now in our posses-
sion, the enemy still occupied the greater part of it to the South.
At 4 P.M. the struggle in this quarter was flagging, but the
infantry on the ridge at Chantrenne was still exposed to the
enemy's bullets. General von Blumenthal, whose horse was
wounded, remaincol with the troops.
Pattle of Gravelotte. I95
A short time only had elapsed after the repulse of the corps
artillery of the IXth Corps, before the batteries of the corps
artillery of the IIIrd Army Corps came into action at Vernéville.
The movements of that corps must now be related. It received
orders at Vionville at I 1.30 A.M. to follow the IXth Army Corps
in the direction of Vernéville with both Divisions near each other.
The corps artillery was engaged at the moment in distributing
the horses allotted to it, and at the suggestion of General von
IBülow the Commander in Chief permitted it to follow in rear of
the 5th Division. The greatest efforts had been made since
the 16th of August to complete the batteries of the IIIrd Corps,
but the losses on that day had been So Serious that it was only
with great difficulty that the whole of the artillery had been
rendered fit for service. The ammunition wagons and even the
greater part of the guns could only be furnished with four
horses; the complement of gunners was incomplete; the want
of horses was so great that the horse artillery detachments had
to be mounted on the axletree-boxes, and there was not suffi-
cient harness for all the horses received to complete the teams.
During the advance General von Alvensleben had preceded
his corps and received reports of the state of affairs at Verné-
ville from General von Wrangel. He expressed himself ready
to afford support in every way, but von Wrangel considered that
artillery would suffice. Consequently General von Alvensleben
issued orders, which however had been anticipated by those sent
by the Commander in Chief to General von Bülow, that the four
field batteries of the corps artillery should move forward and
take up a position at Vernéville to reinforce the artillery of the
Ixth Corps. Prince Frederick Charles had indeed for the day re-
tained the disposal of this corps artillery in his own hands. The
order reached General von Bülow at St. Marcel at 2.45 P.M., and
he immediately led the corps artillery forward, reaching Verné-
ville at 3 o'clock. Its arrival was all the more opportune as the
ammunition of the artillery of the IXth Army Corps had been
nearly cxhausted by the hot and desperate contest.
At the command of General von Bülow, Colonel von Dresky
placed the 2nd field division, Captain Stumpf, in a sheltered
According to Helmuth.
O 2
196 7%e German Artillery.
position on the ridge between Vernéville and the Bois de Geni-
vaux ; but as the space there was limited, the horse artillery
division was directed to take up a position under cover south of
Vernéville and wait for further orders. Even while moving up the
field batteries were exposed to a brisk fire from the French guns
and mitrailleurs on the opposite heights, as well as from hostile
infantry occupying the woods between la Folie and Chantrenne ;
little loss, however, was sustained, as the mitraille generally struck
the ground far from the batteries, and the common shell which
fell in the batteries produced no effect.
Colonel von Dresky received peremptory orders to engage
the enemy's attention, but on no account to advance. Before
the horse artillery division under Major Lentz had taken up
its covered position, an officer of the general staff brought an
order from General von Alvensleben to come into action to
the south of the Bois de la Cusse in support of the 25th
Division. It consequently advanced at a trot in column of
divisions round the west and north sides of Vernéville to the
left flank of the 1st field division of the 9th artillery regiment,
which still occupied its original position. Several ditches had to
be crossed, and one of them, full of bushes, caused some delay.
The division was exposed to a storm of shell, mitraille, and
Chassepôt bullets; while two guns of the Ist Horse Artillery
battery under First Lieut. Franck were left behind, one having
its pole broken, and the other having lost a great number of
men and horses. But the division Continued resolutely to advance,
and coming into action, opened fire on the enemy's artillery at
Montigny la Grange. The leading battery, 3rd Horse Artillery,
under First Lieut. von Gizycki, was the first to arrive, and the
1st Horse Artillery battery came into position on its right. The
two guns in the rear Soon came up, but, Owing to want of space,
were placed on the extreme left flank of the division, the
remainder of Franck's battery being afterwards alligned with
them.” In a short time considerable losses were sustained, First
Lieut. Franck having a horse killed under him. Later on, when
* The batteries came into action in the following order from right to leſ. :—4th
and 3rd Light, 4th and 3rd Heavy, and were commanded respectively by Captain
Müller II., First Lieut. Becker, Captain Fromme, and Captain Vosz.
* Vide flap of plan of battle of the 18th, I. r. and 3. r. III.
Battle of Gravelofſe. I 97
the battle had been going on for some time, Major Lentz, com-
manding the division, was struck from his horse severely wounded."
At first many casualties were occasioned by some mitrailleurs
placed in a covered position to the south-west of Amanvillers,
but after a hot contest of Io or 15 minutes they were silenced
by the shell of the two batteries, the range being 1,600 paces.
With this single exception all the batteries between the
Bois de la Cusse and Genivaux, although under two distinct
Commands, fired generally at the same objects, and thus the
advantage of a combined artillery mass was gained. The
hostile artillery and mitrailleurs crowning the ridges from la
Folie to Amanvillers, and protected (as we have seen) by breast-
works with embrasures, were effectively cannonaded by the field
batteries of the corps artillery of the IIIrd Army Corps at
ranges of from 3,000 to 3,800 paces, and by its horse artillery
batteries, as well as by the three field batteries of the 18th
Division, which had retained their position, and by the Hessian
horse artillery at ranges varying from 2,OOO to 2,700 paces.
Soon after the division of artillery commanded by Captain
Stumpf had opened fire to the south-east of Vernéville, General
von Puttkammer desired it to move up and support his right
wing, and as the request was urgent and repeated, and finally
made in writing, Stumpf, in the momentary absence of Colonel
von Dresky, considered it his duty to accede to it. Vosz's and
Fromme's batteries (3. and 4. S. III.) were therefore ordered to
the front, and the former came into action on the right of the
Hessian Horse Artillery battery, but Fromme was unable to
find an eligible position, as the homestead of l’Envie lay exactly
in the line of fire. An order now given to the battery by General
von Puttkammer to advance until it could see the enemy brought
it within 400 and 500 paces of French skirmishers, who were
lying concealed. This was owing to the peculiar formation of
the ground, which prevented any extensive view. The battery
was now obliged to retire with the sanction of higher authorities,
and expected to find room to come into action between two
* The number of casualties that occurred here is all the more remarkable as
these batteries of horse artillery, like most of those that had taken part in the battle
of the 16th, had already sustained enormous losses. The horse artillery division
went into this action with three officers only.
198 7%e German Arčiſ/e/ºy.
batteries which were under fire in rear. To create a moral ini-
pression on the troops the movement was deliberately cºccuted
at a walk, the battery only breaking into a trot for a few
minutes when crossing the front of another battery in action.
A scCond order from Puttkammer to Fromme's battery to advance
and take up a position to the south of l'Envic was not executed,
because Colonel von Dresky directed the battery to return to its
original position at Vernéville in obedience to the orders of the
general Commanding.
The duel of artillery was speedily decided in favour of the
Germans. Battery after battery was silenced, and towards 4 o'clock
the whole of the hostile artillery had ceased firing. The aim of
our guns on this part of the field of battle was so accurate that
all the efforts made by the enemy to bring frcsh batterics into
action were frustrated by our concentrated fire.
The contest of guns had to be broken off from time to time
to fire on the hostile infantry. Everywhere French skirmishers
lay concealed in the hollows of the ground, behind hcdges or
intrenchments, near the western edges of the copses betwccn
Chantrenne and la Folie, and harassed our artillery. In addition
to this, the French infantry gallantly made repeated charges down
the slopes, but all such attempts were nipped in the bud by the
German shell-fire, and often so at long ranges. As soon as the
hostile artillery had been reduced to silence, it became the CSpecial
duty of the artillery north-east of Vernéville, under the command
of General von Puttkammer, to drive the enemy out of Cham-
penois and open fire on the infantry to the east of it. The Corps
artillery was soon able again to co-operate, having under Lieut.-
ColonclDarapsky, who was severely wounded, as far as possible
made good their losses from the lines of wagons in and near the
Bois de la Cusse. Mente's battery availcd itsclf of ten cart-horses
which it found in the farm of Anoux la Grange and of Several
Stragglers. About 4 o'clock König's and Mcnte's batterics
had completed their refitment, and on this being reported to
the general in command, he ordered them again to come into
action. König's battery took up a position between Jourdan's
battery (originally Koch's) and Gizycki's Horse Artillery battery;'
* At first there was room for four guns only, and the other two camc into action
near Eynatten's battery, until the holse a tillery duolston of the 31 d legiment made
room to the left.
Battle of Gravelo//e. I 99
Mente's battery," in which Second Lieut. Müller had a horse
killed under him, being placed on the right of Puttkammer's
battery, previously commanded by Werner II. The 3rd Light
battery, under First Lieut. Heseler (for Bastineller), came
later into action on the right flank of the Hessian batteries
near the Bois de la Cusse, having mistaken the purport of an
order given by Colonel Darapsky. The 3rd Heavy battery,
Second Lieut. Schattauer (for Roerdansz), was, however, exposed
in its advance to a heavy fire of musketry, having lost its way
in the twilight, and did not come into action, while the re-
mainder of the 4th Heavy battery (Werner II.) had suffered so
severely that it was only able partially to take part in the contest.
Captain Kindler having been severely wounded, the command
of the 2nd Heavy battery had now devolved on Lieutenant
Kelbling, who was unable to get all the guns together until after
dark ; this battery also took no further part in the battle.
At the request of General von Puttkammer the 1st battalion
of the 2nd regiment of Hessian infantry was ordered to the front
towards 4 P.M. to recapture the homestead of Champenois.”
The first attack was attended by great losses, but the farm was
soon set on fire by the batteries under the direction of that
officer at a range of 600 paces. The garrison fled without wait-
ing for the assault of the Hessian infantry, and was nearly an-
nihilated by the combined fire of the Prussian guns and Hessian
infantry, and Champenois was permanently occupied.
The Hessian Horse Artillery battery was now able to get
closer to the hostile infantry, and under the command of Second
Lieutenant Drandt resolutely advanced to a position between
Champenois and l'Envie about 4.30 P.M., rapidly driving back
some French infantry which had approached to within 900 paces.
The battery then fired on both artillery and infantry, but after a
short time two more guns became unserviceable, SO that the
battery was now reduced to two guns.”
We left the 5th Light battery, Captain von Unruhe, attached
* Mente's battery could bring only five guns into action, as a French shell had
torm out the woodwork of both brackets of one of his gums.
* Compare the account given above.
* The wedge of one of these guns was rendered immovable by “fouling,’ and in the
other gun the screw of the wedge was bent in such a way that it could not be withs
drawn,
»
2OO 7%e German Artillery.
to the 3rd brigade of the Guard Corps, in rear of the position,
near the railroad occupied by the Hessian field artillery. An
order to advance to the assistance of the batteries of the IXth
Army Corps very soon brought it to the left flank, near Franck's
battery of horse artillery, where it opened fire on hostile infantry
behind a garden wall at 1,800 paces. Wishing, however, to ob-
tain a more extended range, it soon left its position and moved
up the hill towards Amanvillers; but before it had advanced
more than a few hundred paces it was exposed to so tremen-
dous a storm of bullets, that to avoid a uscless and in mediate
disaster the plan was given up." Second Lieutenant Roth was
killed and Captain Freiherr von Hadeln, adjutant to the general
commanding the artillery of the Second Army, who had brought
orders to the battery, was mortally wounded. Second Lieutenant
Freiherr von Tauchnitz was grazed, but remained with the
battery. Even in its original position, to which it then returned,
the battery was exposed to a smart flanking fire from French
infantry. As it appeared, however, that there was a more favour-
able position further to the south, the battery made a long flank
march along the rear of the artillery position of the IXth Army
Corps, and again came into action at l'Envie on the right of the
Hessian Horse Artillery battery.
About this time the fire of the German artillery between the
Bois de Genivaux and de la Cusse was directed on infantry
only, which it prevented from assuming the offensive either
from the heights or from the copses to the south-east
of la Folie. The guns also played on the copses, but the
chemy by his superior force and position was able to hold his
ground in spite of attacks made by detachments of the 18th
Division. The ranges varied between 1,500 and 3,000 paces,
but occasionally the enemy was repulsed when within 900
paceS. -
In addition the concentrated artillery fire now compelled the
enemy to keep to his covered position, and rendered abortive
his attempts towards evening to place fresh batteries on the hill.”
* Heavy losses were incurred by this battery on this occasion within a few minutes.
* It was very difficult to observe the eſſect of our fire on the cnemy's artillery on
this part of the field of battle, owing to the cover aſſorded to it by the ground, the
want of light, and the great distances of some of the batteries.
Aſſaſſ/e of Gravelotte. 2O iſ
Although at the early critical stages of the battle the artillery
of the IXth Army Corps, the Hessian Horse Artillery battery,
and the horse artillery division of the 3rd regiment had found
it necessary to fire with great rapidity, they afterwards confined
themselves to keeping the enemy in check, the firing being
therefore more deliberate, while this became still more imperative
about 4.30 P.M., when the artillery of the IXth Army Corps was
beginning to run short of ammunition. This was occasioned by
the great expenditure at the commencement of the battle, the
non-arrival of the lines of wagons of some of the batteries,
and by the great loss in the gun teams, which had to be made
good by the wagon teams, thus preventing the wagons from
bringing up Supplies from the columns.
Some of the batteries, indeed, as the 1st Heavy and
Hessian Horse Artillery battery, were obliged entirely to cease
firing for some time, but were ordered by General von Puttkammer
to remain in the position. In spite of that officer's exertions it
was impossible to bring up the ammunition columns immediately.
Temporary assistance, however, was afforded by some ammu-
nition wagons of the IIIrd Corps, and the columns came up
afterwards. Further details will be found in a subsequent
chapter on the Supply of ammunition.
Let us now examine the French accounts of the period of the
battle described above. The 2nd and 3rd French Corps observed
movements on the part of the Germans at an early hour. This
was reported to Marshal Bazaine at IO o'clock, and the orders
to the 3rd and 4th Corps as to the defensive measures they
were to take were repeated.
The troops were to encamp in two lines, in as close order as
possible, while the 6th Corps was to explore the road to Marange,
north of Bronvaux, which leads towards the extreme right flank,
and the 4th Corps to reconnoitre in the direction of Nerroy le
Veneur." It was already recognised as possible that the Germans
might extend their front so far as to threaten a serious attack on
St. Privat. In this case the 6th Corps was to hold its ground
there so as to enable the right wing to change its front in case
* Both these villages lay in the rear of the French position, and the fact suggests a
fear on the part of the Marshal that it was threatened by the Germans.
2O2 7%e German Artillery.
of necessity, with a view to taking up a position in rear, which
it was then in the act of reconnoitring. On the other hand the
4th French Corps was evidently surprised, and according to
Montluisant's account the 6th Corps also, by the attack of the
Ixth Army Corps. That writer says:– On the 18th also the
6th Corps possessed no information as to the position of the
enemy, and the staff was so far from suspecting the approach
of the Prussians that it looked on the first information sent from
St. Marie aux Chênes, suggesting the probability of an early
attack from Batilly and St. Ail, as unworthy of credence.'
According to Frossard the fire of the Prussian batteries at
Vernéville was at first directed against Montaudon's Division of
the 3rd Corps, and afterwards against Grenier's Division of the 4th
Corps. Both these divisions formed up in order of battle, their
artillery replying to the German guns." At the first shot the Ist
Division, de Cissey, of the 4th Corps took up its position between
Amanvillers and the left flank of the 6th Corps. “Its batteries
at once opened fire at 1,300 yards on the Prussian Columns,
which were making a flank march against our (French) right
flank.” During this time the reserve of the 4th Corps, Lorencez's
Division, formed up near Amanvillers.’
Frossard also states:—‘The battle became very hot on all
sides at 2 P.M., without the enemy's gaining any important
advantages or making any progress, but the artillery of Mon-
taudon's, Grenier's and de Cissey's Divisions, fired on by numerous
batteries, suffered severely.” The energy of the Prussian attacks
against the 4th Corps is mentioned in another place, and Frossard
says:–‘The 2nd Division, under Grenier, which advanced against
the Prussians in two lines, having directed its right wing against
the Bois de la Cusse, held that position firmly, and even suc-
ceeded in making some progress to the front. In one of its
attacks detachments of the 5th Chasseurs and I3th regiment
* V. D. speaks thus of the German artillery :—“Ou elle s'avançait jusqu’à 600
mêtres de nos fantassins.’
* These Prussian columns must be those which tried to advance along the south
edge of the Bois de la Cusse.
* The batteries included the Hessian field batteries north of the Bois de la Cusse,
the corps artillery of the IXth and, later on, that of the IIIrd Army Corps, as well as
the Hessian Horse Artillery battery between the Bois de la Cusse and Genivaux.
Aattle of Gravelotte. 2O3
captured a Prussian battery of seven (?) guns near the angle of
the wood, but only retained possession of two of them.”
As it appeared important to command the ground over which
the Germans would advance from Vernéville, the commander
of the 4th Corps brought his 3rd Division, Lorencez's, to the
front; it advanced in two lines to support Grenier's Division
and complete the communication between the 3rd and 4th
Corps. The Ist Division, under de Cissey, continued the
struggle and gained ground at the same time that it supported
the left wing of the 6th Corps.”
The situation of the Ixth Army Corps at the close of this
period of the battle was briefly this:–With a total of 23 bat-
talions and 90 guns, which could only be brought into action
in succession, it had succeeded in pushing forward as a wedge
towards the enemy's main position, and there establishing itself,
although the enemy had from the first deployed in rear of his
main position stretching far to the right and left, the whole of
the 4th Corps, half of the 3rd Corps, and part (that is, the
artillery) of the 6th Corps: a total of 49 battalions and 140
guns. Chantrenne, with the contiguous part of the Bois de
Genivaux to the south, l'Envie, Champenois, the Bois de la
Cusse and the ground between those points, was in the posses-
sion of the IXth Army Corps, which was supported by the corps
artillery of the IIIrd Army Corps and the 5th Light battery of
the Guard Corps. The IXth Corps remained on the defensive,
awaiting the attack of the left wing of the Second German Army,
which had not yet come up into line.
* This refers to the disaster of Werner's battery.
* This statement that the “Ist Division gained ground” is based on the repeated
and vigorous attacks made against that part of the Bois de la Cusse which lies in
front of the railway.
2O4. The German Artillery.
4. Rendezvous of the First German Army (VIIth and VIIIth Corps)
previous to the battle—The artillery of the 15th Division takes
zºp a position north of Gravelotte—Orders issued to the First
Army—7%e VIIIth Corps advances to the attack and its
corps artillery comes into action north of Gravelotte—
Movements of the artillery of the VIIth Corps—The defen-
sive attitude of that corps—Advance of the whole of the
artillery of the First Army—Assault and capture of St.
Hubert—Repulse of attacks on Moscow and Point du jour
—French accounts of this period of the battle. .
The van of the VIIIth Army Corps reached Villers anx Bois at
8 A.M. The 15th Division, commanded by General von Weltzien,
was advancing on the west of that place, the corps artillery was
astride the high road at Rezonville, and the 16th Division, under
General von Barnekow, to the south of that village, while the 31st
brigade, under General Count Gneisenau, detached from the
16th Division with a battery, was marching up from Corny. The
King's Hussars (7th regiment) had ridden forward to keep open
the communication between the VIIth and IXth Corps, the safety
of the march being Secured by advanced parties pushed out
towards the woods east of Malmaison.
‘The front of the VIIIth Corps faced towards the north-
east, for General von Goeben wished to be equally prepared
to advance against the enemy if he found him in position on
the east or retiring towards the north. The 14th Division of
the VIIth Corps was led forward to the point where the road
from Ars sur Moselle to Gravelotte debouches on the hill
south of the latter village; while the 25th brigade was ordered
to the west, the 26th to the north, and the corps artillery to the
south of Ars."
‘The outposts of the VIIth Army Corps had remained on the
northern edge of the Bois de Vaux, and the reports from them
as well as from the VIIIth Corps stated that Gravelotte was not
occupied by the enemy, but that, on the other hand, the whole
of the western border of the Bois de Genivaux as well as the
* According to IIelmuth,
Z3a///e of Gravelofſe. 2O5
north angle of the Bois de Vaux were so. The real French
position was, however, perceptible on the ridge further east-
wards.” Meanwhile von Zglinitzki's brigade of the Ist Army
Corps with the 6th Light battery marched along the right bank
of the Moselle till opposite Ars.
“The VIIIth Army Corps was ordered to advance to the attack
astride the high road to Gravelotte against the position east of that
village as Soon as the IXth Army Corps, directed on Vernéville, had
commenced its attack.'" Soon after I 1.45 A.M., hearing musketry
at Chantrenne and guns at Vernéville, General von Goeben
ordered the I 5th Division to move to the front, occupying
Gravelotte with infantry, and to take up a sheltered position in
the gully north-west of the village, there to await further orders.
The Division commanded by von Weltzien therefore marched
along the south-western edge of the Bois de la Jurée and crossed
the old Roman road, the leading regiment, the 33rd, being ordered
to occupy Gravelotte. The 1st field division, under Major
Mertens, was the first to reach the gully, where it took up a
position with full intervals ready to act as required. But our
leading infantry had hardly approached the gully when the
French artillery opened a brisk fire on it. General von Weltzien
was therefore obliged to bring his guns to the front to divert the
enemy's fire from his own infantry, which was now forming in
order of battle from its rendezvous position. He at the same
time ordered the 33rd Fusiliers to occupy Gravelotte and the
2nd battalion of the 67th regiment to cover the left flank of the
artillery. Before, however, the infantry could reach those points
Major Mertens placed the Ist Light battery (I. l. VIII.), Captain
Geiszler, to the west of the high road Gravelotte—Malmaison,
which was followed soon after by the Ist Heavy battery
(I. S. VIII), Captain Busse; while the 2nd Light and 2nd Heavy
(2. l. and 2. S. VIII.), Captains Leo and von Uthmann, came
up into line between them. As the individual batteries selected
the positions which offered the greatest advantages, they had
wide intervals between them. The 7th Hussars covered their
left flank as a temporary measure.
It was very difficult to hit the enemy, because the broad and
From Major von Schell's Operations of the First Army.
2O6 7%e German Artillery.
deep valley which separated the opponents could not be seen
into, and consequently the range could not be estimated correctly,
so that the batteries fired at distances varying from I,8OO to
3,800 paces. ‘The 15th Division formed up in the gully in rear
of the batteries, and the 31st brigade moved towards a selected
covered position on the south of the high road. Thus the left
wing of the VIIIth Corps confronted the 3rd French Corps,
commanded by Leboeuf, and the right wing Frossard's 2nd
Corps, the right flank being immediately covered by the VIIth
Corps.’"
From the position which the Ist field division had taken up
as a temporary measure pending the arrival of its own infantry
very little of the ground in the vicinity could be seen, and it was
fully commanded by the French artillery. A more favourable
position nearer the enemy, however, was found to the east of
the high road Gravelotte—Malmaison, to which the batteries were
ordered by Major Mertens to advance in succession ;-the more
readily as cavalry patrols had reported that the western skirts of
the Bois de Genivaux were already occupied by Prussian in-
fantry.” Busse's battery (I. S. VIII.) was the first to move to the
commanding hill north-east of Malmaison; but before we recount
the changes of position made by the remainder of this division
it is necessary to refer to the general movements of the First
Army. w
At I. P.M. the Commander in Chief of the First Army
received an order from H.M. the King, dated at 12 o'clock from
the south of Flavigny:—”
‘The fighting now heard is merely a partial affair in front
of Vernéville, and does not call for a general attack. Strong
masses of troops must not be shown, but artillery will be pushed
forward to prepare the attack to be made later on.’
The steps already taken by the First Army corresponded
fully with this order, and the VIIth Army Corps was still in a
position to act in accordance with it or to attack vigorously.
But this was not the case with respect to the VIIIth Army
* According to Helmuth.
* This somewhat inaccurate report arose from the fact that infantry of the
18th Division had marched from Vernéville by Chantrenne to the IBois de Genivaux.
* According to Major von Schell.
Aattle of Gravelotte. 2O7
Corps, which, unless the IXth Corps was to be left to be
overwhelmed in its isolated position, would have to disen-
gage its right flank by an attack. This was clearly seen by
General von Goeben, who had received more exact information
about the affair at Vernéville than the Royal head-quarters.
Such an attack, though in accordance with the earlier instruc-
tions, was in opposition to the last order, which was based on
conclusions no longer corresponding to the actual state of affairs.
General von Goeben therefore, with the approval of General von
Steinmetz, ordered General von Weltzien at I P.M. to advance
to the attack with both his brigades, one on the right of the
high road, the other on the left; and the corps artillery, under
Colonel von Bröcker, received directions at the same time to
reinforce the artillery line in action.
Busse's battery (I. S. VIII.) had just left its position when the
corps artillery was already advancing at a trot. Marching north
of the high road from Rezonville to Gravelotte, this division,
under Major Zwirnemann, in Column of batteries on the left, and
the horse artillery, under Lieut.-Colonel Borkenhagen, in open
column of divisions on the right flank, advanced to the steep
ravine of la Jurée. Covered by the hills in front, the corps
artillery deployed and came into action on the flanks of three
of Merten's batteries, which were still in position, as well as in
the intervals between them. On the left of von Uthmann's
battery (2. S. VIII.) were von Wissel's, Sommer's, von Teichmann-
Logischen's and Gehtmann's batteries (3. S., 4. S., 3. l., 4. l. VIII.);
and on the right of Geiszler's (I. I. VIII.) the Horse Artillery
batteries commanded by von Fuchsius, Protze, and Schlieben
(I. r., 2. r., 3. r. VIII.) They aimed at the French artillery on the
heights of Moscou and Point du Jour at ranges of from 3,500 to
3,800 paces, and here as on other Occasions succeeded in drawing
the fire of the enemy's artillery on themselves without ex-
periencing any great loss.
Almost simultaneously with the batteries of the 15th Division
to the north of Gravelotte those of the I4th Division came into
action south of that village, by Steinmetz's orders, with the
object of diverting the hostile fire from the 15th Division during
its advance. Having previously obtained a general idea of the
intended attack on the 18th, Major Baron von Eynatten had
2O8 The German Artillery.
reconnoitred the ground south of Gravelotte with the captains
of batteries on the afternoon of the 17th and early on the
18th to select the best positions, and had also consulted with
Lieut.-General Schwartz, commanding the artillery of the First
Army, who had been present on the latter occasion. This
trouble was now well repaid. The 1st field division, under
Major von Eynatten, advanced at a trot in column of route from
the left to the entrance of the forest-defile, where it formed column
of divisions. Then the division made a flank march towards
the north, concealed in the gullies from the enemy, and gained
sufficient space to form front to the right. Three of the
batteries, the 1st and 2nd ILight, as well as the 2nd Heavy
(Captains Schweder, Goetz, and Wolff), took up a position a few
hundred paces to the west of the high road running from Ars to
Gravelotte, while the 1st Heavy battery, Captain Hübner, was
Compelled by a hollow in the ground to advance beyond the
road and come into action at an angle to the division. The
manoeuvre was executed with the precision of the drill-ground.
As soon as the division took up its position it was over-
whelmed by a storm of common shell, shrapnel, and mitraille,
though fortunately the effect was comparatively slight." The
two light batteries sustained the greatest losses. Captain
Schweder lost his right hand by a splinter, and soon afterwards
Lieutenant Drees and Surgeon Beermann were wounded. The
command of the 1st Light battery devolved on Lieutenant Gaul.
The enemy's batteries and mitrailleurs under cover at ranges
varying from 2,500 to 3,300 paces were the objects of the fire,
which, though slow at first, became more rapid when it was known
that the effect was good. This artillery contest had barely
lasted an hour when three batteries of the 13th Division (von
Glümer) also opened fire. Having broken up their bivouac at
Ars sur Moselle towards 12.30 P.M., they trotted along the high
road to Gravelotte under the orders of Major Wilhelmi and, coming
into action between and on both flanks of the batteries of the Ist
field division wherever a vacant space had been left, directed their
fire on the same objects. The 6th Light battery (Gasch) was on
* This must be attributed to the ſact that some of the guns were so placed as to
see over the tops of the trees in the deſile in ſront, so that it was hardly possible for
the enemy to observe when the shells fell short. --
Battle of Gravelotte. 2O9
the extreme right flank, the 6th Heavy, Captain von Gottkowsky,
between Hübner's and Wolff's batteries, and the 5th Heavy,
Second Lieutenant von Lilienstern, on the extreme left. The
loss in those batteries was slight, notwithstanding the enemy's
heavy fire.
Meanwhile the 15th Division (von Weltzien) had, in obedience
to its orders, continued to advance to the attack of the French
position without halting. The 33rd Fusiliers' advanced from
Gravelotte at I.30 P.M. against the part of the Bois de Vaux on
the south of the high road, while at the same time the 30th
brigade was led by von Strubberg close round the north of Grave-
lotte, to attack the western edge of the Bois de Genivaux from
that point. The 60th regiment, belonging to von Wedell's
brigade, remained for the present in reserve at Gravelotte, its 2nd
battalion being ordered to cover the artillery.
“Before 2 o'clock the Fusiliers forced their way with trifling
loss into the Bois de Vaux on the South of the high road, driving
back detachments of Frossard's Corps, which had advanced
to that point. Then crossing the meadow ground it reached
the wooded slope beyond at 2 P.M. and occupied its eastern edge.
Some small detachments of the regiment succeeded, by a
bold charge, though with considerable loss, in capturing the
quarries which are situated a few hundred paces in front of the
wood, but could make no further progress against the heavy fire
of the superior forces opposed to them.
“The 30th brigade advanced at the same time on the north of
the road to attack the Bois de Genivaux, the 67th regiment and
the 8th battalion of Rifles being sent against that part of the
wood immediately to the north of the road, and the 28th regi-
ment further to the left with its left wing refused. In spite of a
heavy fire from the enemy, portions of the 67th regiment, rushing
eagerly forward almost without answering a shot, gained the
western skirts of the wood, of which by 2. I 5 P.M. they had ob-
tained possession for a distance of I,000 paces north of the high
road. The detachments of the 3rd and 4th Divisions of Leboeuf's
Corps lining the shelter trenches and stone parapets, which
skirted the wood, were driven down the wooded and difficult
* The 29th brigade of infantry, commanded by General von Wedell.
P
2 IO The German Artillery.
slope as far as the meadow ground. In the defile, which was
between 60 and 80 paces broad, and happened to be dry, the
troops of Strubberg's brigade, scattered by the fight in the
forest, reformed, and forced the enemy up the thickly wooded
and somewhat steep acclivity beyond. The eastern border of
the Bois de Genivaux, which is about 300 paces broad at the
high road, was first gained by parties of the 67th regiment and
8th battalion of Rifles, while the troops fighting on the left were
unable to reach the eastern margin of the wood, which widens to
2,OOO paces in the northern part, till a later hour.
“After the eastern skirts of the Bois de Genivaux had fallen
into the hands of Strubberg's brigade, repeated attempts to
advance over the open ground, which sloped upwards like a
glacis, terminated in a musketry contest of unusual severity, in
which neither of the combatants made any progress. The
enemy was posted in a continuous line of shelter trenches run-
ning from Point du Jour by Moscou to Leipsic, from which, as
well as from the strongly garrisoned farm of St. Hubert, he kept
up a biting fire of musketry and mitraille.
‘On the left wing of von Strubberg's brigade the 2nd batta-
lion of the 28th regiment, having advanced to the forking of the
meadow ground in the Bois de Genivaux already mentioned,
and commanded by the general in person, “drove back parties
of the enemy, posted behind two walls which traversed the
meadow land, in the direction of la Folie, and then strove to
press forward towards Moscou Farm in an easterly direction.
But here a devastating fire from the enemy in front and flank
forbade any advance; while further to the left the 2nd battalion
of the 67th regiment, which with the 7th King's Hussars had
undertaken to cover the left flank of the artillery, had rushed into
the Bois de Genivaux, connected itself with the IXth Corps,
and now formed up on the left flank of its own brigade.””
The 60th regiment of von Wedell's brigade had meanwhile
become available by the arrival of the 32nd brigade, under von
Rex, at Gravelotte. It was led with no slight loss across the ravine
and formed up on the south of the high road in rear of the right
wing of the troops in the line of battle. Thus the whole of the
* Von Schell's Operations of the First Army.
Æałż/e of Graveložfe. 2 I I
I 5th Division (von Weltzien) was now engaged with the enemy,
while the 16th Division (von Barnekow) formed the reserve.
‘On the right of the 15th Division the VIIth Army Corps had
held the skirts of the Bois de Vaux facing the road between the
inn of St. Hubert and Rozérieulles against Frossard's Corps, and
had till now chiefly maintained a defensive attitude, according to
orders. The two battalions of the 53rd regiment already there
under Colonel von Gerstein-Hohenstein (28th brigade, von
Woyna) had been reinforced by the 7th battalion of Rifles and
2nd battalion of the 13th regiment, commanded by Colonel von
Frankenberg (25th brigade, von Osten-Sacken). The remainder
of the 25th brigade, as well as the 27th brigade (Colonel von
Conrady), had been brought up to the south-west of Gravelotte,
while the remainder of the 28th brigade was pushed forward into
the defile South-east of that village behind the Bois de Vaux.”
In the meantime changes had also been made in the posi-
tions of the artillery of the VIIIth Corps. Von Strubberg's
brigade had scarcely forced its way into the Bois de Genivaux
when the corps artillery and the three batteries of the 2nd field
division, on the west of the high road, advanced in echelons to
more commanding positions nearer the enemy. The 4th Light
battery, Captain Gehtmann, moved up at a trot to the left of
Busse's battery north-east of Malmaison, and soon afterwards
the 1st Horse Artillery battery of the Ist field artillery regiment,
under Captain Preinitzer, made its appearance on the right of
the latter.
This battery had arrived with the Ist Cavalry Division, com-
manded by General von Hartmann, towards I o'clock in rear of
the artillery of the VIIIth Army Corps, and had received orders
to come into action at Malmaison. Desirous of getting closer
to the enemy, it determined to leave its connmanding position at
that place and advance I,OOO paces to another near the edge
of the ravine. There the batteries sustained heavy losses, which
were occasioned more by the enemy's mitrailleurs than his guns,
although these were superior in numbers and more advantageously
posted. Captain Preinitzer and his horse were both slightly
wounded ; this was also the case with First Lieut. Schmidt,
! //ſoſ.
P 2
2 I 2 The German Artillery.
Second Lieut. von Leibitz was severely wounded, but continued
to command his division until he was relieved. The two first-
named officers remained with their batteries. A gun Was
rendered unserviceable by a shell striking the breech-piece and
breaking it, while the gunner who was working it lost both his
hands.
Soon afterwards the 3rd Light battery (von Teichmann-
Logischen) came into line on the left of Gehtmann's battery.
Geiszler's battery (I. I. VIII.) had meanwhile crossed the high
road to take up a position immediately to the north of Mogador
farm, which had been set on fire by the enemy's shells." Further
to the north von Wissel's battery (3. S. VIII.) advanced beyond
the road and Sommer's battery (4. S. VIII.) up to it. Later on
Leo's and von Uthmann's batteries (2. l. and 2. S. VIII.), dis-
satisfied with their position, moved forward and came into action
to the right and rear of Preinitzer's battery. With these Geiszler's
battery and—by Order of Colonel von Broecker—von Wissel's
and Sommer's batteries also soon afterwards alligned themselves.
Lieut.-Colonel Borckenhagen carried out Colonel von Broecker's
order that the horse artillery division should take up a position
to the south of Mogador by advancing from the right in column
of batteries.
The movements of the batteries of the VIIth and VIIIth Army
Corps as well as of the Ist Cavalry Division were so closely con-
nected, and directed as far as practicable by the superior officers
of artillery Generals Schwartz, von Kamecke, and von Zimmer-
mann with such unity of purpose, that the artillery combat of the
First Army can be embraced in one account. The objects of
their fire were the enemy's batteries, which, under cover both
natural and artificial, Crowned the ridge from the south of Point
du Jour to the north of MOSCOu, at ranges generally between
1,900 and 3,500 paces. Preinitzer's battery of horse artillery,
according to its own account, alone cannonaded successfully some
mitrailleurs at 1,2OO paces, which were placed beyond the eastern
In contradiction to French accounts the German artillery assert positively that
this homestead, distinguished by a large flag as a hospital, was set on fire by lºrench
shells. Neither of the combatants had any interest in perpetrating a wanton act of
cruelty. It must thcreſore be accepted as a ſact that the enemy's shells, intended for
the German artillery, caused this accident. The Germans found it impossible to
rescue the wounded from the flames.
Aſſaf//e of Grazeloſſe. 2 I J
3
margin of the Bois de Genivaux before it was captured. The effect
of the German artillery was apparently excellent, while the fire of
the French guns and mitrailleurs slackened after a comparatively
short time.
Desirous of placing the division of horse artillery commanded
by Lieut.-Colonel Borckenhagen in a better position, Colonel
von Broecker ordered it to make a flank march along the high road
and through Gravelotte to a position immediately to the east of
the village and South of the high road to Metz, where it would
be some hundred paces nearer the enemy.
At the Suggestion of the commandant of artillery of the
VIIth Corps, General von Zimmermann, the corps artillery,
under Colonel von Helden-Sarnowski, had broken up its bivouac
South of Ars Sur Moselle at the commencement of the contest and
marched for the field of battle. The heavy batteries of the 2nd
field division were the first to be brought forward by Major
Matthiasz ; the 3rd Heavy battery, Captain Bleckert, coming
into action, by Order of Colonel von Helden-Sarnowski, in the
interval between Lilienstern's and Goetz's batteries near the
south entrance of Gravelotte; and the 4th Heavy battery, Captain
Lemmer, on the right flank of the horse artillery division of the
VIIIth Army Corps. Soon afterwards the 2nd Horse Artillery
battery, Captain von Hahn, was placed by its divisional com-
mander to the south-east of the latter battery near the wood to
augment the effect of the fire; but owing to want of space the
remaining batteries of the Corps artillery (3. 1, 4, 1., 3. r. VII.),
Captains Gnigge, Trautmann, and Hasse, were placed at hand
under cover west of Gravelotte.
To obtain a shorter and more effective range the batteries
south of Gravelotte under the command of Majors Baron von
Eynatten and Wilhelmi advanced in echelons as far as the
thickly wooded defile in front allowed. Wolff's battery (2. S. VII.),
losing its proper position by this movement, moved to the
left flank, where there was more space. Thus there were now
I 32 guns in line to the north and South of Gravelotte, which
maintained a steady fire, directed as a rule by the commanding
officers themselves.
The fire was powerful although not very rapid ; its excellent
effect was proved by the explosion of Several of the enemy's
2 I4. 7%e German Artillery.
limbers and ammunition wagons, and the gradual disappearance
of his batteries. Frequent attempts were made by the French to
bring up fresh batteries or to supply men and ammunition to
guns which remained silenced under cover, but this was entirely
prevented by the accuracy of the German practice. Columns of
hostile infantry were also successfully cannonaded, both when
retiring and also when advancing. The losses sustained by the
artillery at this time were generally slight, except in the case of
Goetz's battery, which had been obliged to leave two guns bc-
hind while advancing to the last position. One of the guns had
a driver killed, two wounded, all its horses killed, its pole broken,
and its limber damaged ; while the other gun had a wheel dis-
abled. Lieutenant Prüssen, having repaired damages and made
good the losses from the Ist line of wagons, brought up the guns
again into line without delay. As soon as it became evident
that the enemy's fire had slackened, some of the German
batteries were able to turn their guns on St. Hubert and pre-
pare the attack against that homestead.
‘Towards 3 o'clock detachments of both brigades of the 15th
Division (von Weltzien) had been pushed forward against St.
Hubert with heavy loss. The troops, however, in a broad schmi-
circle on both sides of the high road, slowly gained ground
towards the homestead and drove the enemy from the neigh-
bouring quarries. Unable longer to Cndure the annihilating fire
and animated by a common impulse, the Germans soon after
3 P.M. began to storm the massive buildings. Having already
been effectively cannonaded," the homestead, though strongly
garrisoned and prepared for defence with its garden walls loop-
holed for musketry, was carried by the 8th battalion of Rifles
and detachments of the 67th regiment, the enemy being driven
back with great loss to Moscou Farm.
“In this struggle portions of the 33rd Fusiliers of von
Wedell's brigade, as well as the Fusilier battalion of the 60th regi-
ment, had played a glorious part, and remained there to strengthen
the Seriously thinned ranks of von Strubberg's brigade ; other
detachments of the 33rd at the same time endeavouring to press
forward on the south side of the high road on Point du Jour.
* According to Captain IIelmuth some of the shells aimed at St. Hubert struck
our own inſantry.
ſºad//e of Grave/o//e. 2 I 5
The convexity of the ground permitted no view to be obtained
of citler Our Own position or of that of the enemy ; and an
advance, made in face of the shattering fire of the enemy
intrenched on the high road at Point du Jour, miscarried Owing
to the difficulty of leading the troops. For similar reasons, von
Strubberg's left wing could make no further progress either from
the Bois de Genivaux or from St. Hubert towards Moscou Farm,
notwithstanding the accurate fire which the German artillery di-
rected on that point. At 3.30 P.M. the bloody fight had slackened
along the whole front of the VIIIth Army Corps, while the VIIth
remained on the defensive.”
The French accounts of this period are very brief. Frossard
acknowledges the Superior power (ascendant) of the German
artillery and mentions particularly the tremendous effect of its
fire on Aymard's Division of the 3rd Corps. He passes over
the capture of St. Hubert and of the southern part of the Bois
de Genivaux, stating merely that Aymard's Division was
Seriously engaged.
5. The combat of the corps artillery of the Guard south-west of
St. Ai/—Changes in its position after the capture of St.
Ai/—The advanced guard of the 1st Division of the Guard's
detains the chemy at St. Marie aux Chénics during the ad-
vance of the main body and XIIth Corps—Advance of the
XII//; Corps—Two batteries of the Guard Corps, the greatcr
part of the 1st and 2nd field divisions, as well as the corps
artillery of the XII//, Army Corps prepare the attack against
St. Maric—Capture of that village.
Let us now revert to the left flank of the Germans, and in the
first place to the Guard Corps. We have already followed the
movements of the corps artillery to its position South-west of
St. Ail and have seen that the Ist field division was obliged to
halt on its right flank. The corps artillery opened fire at ranges
of between 2,400 and 3,000 paces against French artillery South
and south-west of St. Privat with evident success, inasmuch as
some of the hostile batteries were withdrawn. Columns of
infantry which showed themselves on the high road between
| Major von Schell's Operations of the First Army.
2 I 6 7%e German Artillery.
St. Marie aux Chênes and St. Privat were cannonaded with
equally good results, and French infantry endeavouring to
advance from the latter village were in every instance compelled
to retire.
It was necessary for the present to hold back the left wing of
the artillery of the Guard, for Hussars of that corps had reported
the presence of large bodies of the enemy at St. Marie and
St. Privat, and moreover hostile infantry was advancing from the
former place against St. Ail. Our own infantry had not been
able to move rapidly enough to guard the artillery against the
threatening danger. Major-General Prince of Hohenlohe-
Ingelfingen now received permission from the Commander in
Chief to take command of the whole artillery line of the Guard,
the latter remarking that the protection of the left flank should
be at once provided for by occupying St. Ail with infantry. Prince
Hohenlohe however could not think of advancing until this had
been effected.
The Ist field division, commanded by Lieut.-Colonel
Bychelberg, then came into action in line with the Hessian
artillery, which, as we have already observed, was near the Bois
de la Cusse in echelon on the right of the artillery of the Guard
Corps. Meanwhile the infantry of the advanced guard of the 1st
Division of the Guard had approached. The first shells were
greeted by Colonel von Erkert's troops with a shout of joy and
defiance. General von Pape detached a battalion to occupy
Habonville and support the artillery, while the other three
battalions advanced under cover through the valley towards
St. Ail. The Hussars of the Guard guarded the left flank,
and kept up the communication with the XIIth Corps, by
taking up a position in observation north-east of Batilly, and
pushing out patrols towards St. Marie.
As soon as the infantry of the advanced guard in the valley
had got abreast of St. Ail, a strong detachment of hostile infantry
rushed forward from St. Marie, which, however, did not prevent
our seizing St. Ail, and after a smart interchange of musketry
the enemy was driven back into St. Marie, which appeared to
be occupied in force.
As soon as the infantry was in possession of St. Ail the
corps artillery also moved up into line with the Hessian batteries,
Battle of Graveloffe. 2 I 7
between which and the village the following batteries of the
Guard came into action —The 2nd Light, 1st Light, 2nd Heavy,
1st Heavy, 3rd Heavy, 4th Heavy, 3rd Light, 2nd Horse Ar-
tillery, and 4th Light (2.1, I. I., 2. S., I. S., 3. S., 4. S., 3. l., 2. r.,
and 4. 1. G.);—nine batteries in all, commanded respectively
by Captains von Niederstetter, von Dewitz, von Prittwitz, von
Sametzki, von Ehlern, Seeger, von Friederici-Steinmann, von
Grävenitz, and von Mutius. The front of this great line of
artillery faced St. Privat and the ridge running thence to
Amanvillers. We shall see that the batteries on the extreme
left flank also cannonaded St. Marie, and a connected account
will be given below of the artillery combat in this position, which
lasted for several hours.
‘General von Pape was already convinced that before any-
thing of importance could be effected it would be necessary to
seize St. Marie, which was in front of the enemy's main position.
Although he had at once decided to attack the place, the
general wished however to wait for the arrival of his main body.
He therefore ordered Colonel von Erkert to deploy opposite
St. Marie ; who was however not to advance to the assault, but
rather to form a screen behind which the main body of the
division might form up undisturbed by the enemy. Colonel
von Dannenberg, who had ridden up during the movement,
approved of the measures adopted in the name of the corps
commandant, and at the same time gave positive orders to post-
pone the attack on St. Marie until the XIIth Corps, which
was marching up on the left flank, could co-operate. Prince
August von Wurtemberg, who appeared directly afterwards, re-
peated the above orders.''
To carry out these arrangements Colonel von Erkert occupied
St. Ail with a battalion of Fusiliers, while to the west of it another
battalion of that regiment and the battalion of Rifles of the
Guard surrounded St. Marie on the South and south-west, the
left flank being extended to the little wood situated in the
valley.
With regard to the occupation of St. Marie aux Chênes by
the French, Frossard states : —“The Division of Lafont de Villiers
From Captain Helmuth's Lecture.
2 I 8 7%e German Artillery.
got under arms and deployed on hearing the sound of the guns,
which reached it from the left. It threw the 94th regiment into
the village of St. Marie aux Chênes, which lay a kilometre to
the front, supporting it by a battery.’ German accounts, more-
over, assert distinctly that men of the 4th regiment had been
made prisoners at that village, as had also been the case at St.
Ail." The French battery directly flanked the southern outskirts
of the village from its position on the high road a few
hundred paces east of St. Marie aux Chênes.
According to Fay, Marshal Canrobert occupied the village
to prevent his right flank being turned, the danger of which
was soon observed by the French. Frossard further states that
‘Tixier's Division advanced to reinforce the left wing of the 6th
Corps on the ridge which connects St. Privat with Amanvillers.
The numerous batteries of the Guard cannonaded our position
and were briskly answered by the guns of the 6th Corps.'
Skilfully availing themselves of the cover afforded by the
ground, the infantry and Rifles of the advanced guard of the
Ist Division of the Guard approached to within a few hundred
paces of St. Marie, driving in the hostile skirmishers, who had
become very troublesome and had occasioned considerable loss.
Meanwhile, with the approval of General von Pape, the Ist
battalion of the Fusiliers of the Guard was brought up from
Habonville by Colonel von Erkert, the artillery in that quarter
being sufficiently protected by the infantry of the IXth Corps.
The two brigades forming the main body of the 1st Division
of the Guard had just formed on the south side of the railroad,
when they received the order of General von Pape to follow the
advanced guard to St. Ail. The railway was crossed in order of
battle, the 2nd brigade under General von Medem in front,
followed by the 1st brigade, commanded by General von Kessel.
On the first shells bursting between the battalions, the band struck
up the national hymn and the troops advanced with a loud
hurrah, preserving strictly their proper formation. The brigades
were then ordered by their divisional commander to take up a
position of readiness under cover behind the wood lying south-
* Captain IIelmuth is of opinion that either outposts from this regiment were
pushed forward beyond the actual position of the French, or that some of the men
had joined the 94th of their own accord. *
Aattle of Gravelofſe. 2 19
west of St. Maric. Before thcy reached it a communication
was received from the Hussars of the Guard that the infantry of
the advanced guard was threatened on its left flank by the enemy.
The Fusilier battalion of the 4th regiment, which was at the head
of the column and first received the information, marched at
once in the direction indicated, placing itself on the left of the
Rifles of the Guard, and gained connection with the Saxon troops.
General von Pape had meanwhile turned his attention to
preparing the attack against St. Marie. He recognised the
necessity of creating a sufficient impression by artillery in the
first instance, and we have noted the circumstances under which
his own batteries had been withdrawn from his immediate dis-
posal. By his orders, however, the batteries of von Mutius and von
Grävenitz' of the corps artillery of the Guard, which were nearest
to St. Marie aux Chênes, turned their guns against that place.
The general, moreover, to increase the artillery fire, obtained the
co-operation of the Saxon batteries of the 24th Division, which
had also opened fire to the west of St. Marie.
It is now necessary to recount the proceedings of the XIIth
Corps, whose arrival at Jarny has already been mentioned
The following dispositions had been made by H.R.H. the Crown
Prince of Saxony for the march from Mars la Tour:—The
23rd Division, commanded by H.R.H. Lieut.-General Prince
George of Saxony, furnished an advanced guard under Major-
General von Crausshaar, consisting of:—
The IO8th Fusiliers,
The Ist Reiter regiment,
The 2nd Light battery,
The 2nd company of Pioneers,
The sanitary detachment.
The right of the advanced guard was in connection with the
Hussars of the Guard.
It was followed by the main body of the Division in two
parallel columns ; the right column, commanded by Colonel
Garten, consisted of:—
The 45th brigade of infantry,
The 2nd Heavy battery,
The Ist Light battery.
| Two divisionsof this battery cannonaded St. Marie.
22O The German Artillery.
The left column, under Colonel von Montbé, was formed by
The 46th brigade of infantry,
The 1st Heavy battery,
The 4th company of Pioneers.
A field hospital.
The brigades were in rendezvous formation, and the corps
artillery, commanded by Colonel Funcke, followed the 46th
brigade of infantry.
A mile in rear of the corps artillery marched the 24th
Division, under Major-General Nehrhoff von Holderberg. The
2nd Reiter regiment was at the head of the Division, and was
followed by the division of artillery under Major Richter, which
marched in close column of batteries on both sides of the road
towards Jarny, with the 47th brigade on the right flank and the
48th on the left. The Ist line of ammunition columns followed
the 24th Division, while the trains of the corps assembled at Mars
la Tour, where they parked.
The Crown Prince of Saxony marched with the 23rd Di-
vision.
The main body of the Cavalry Division, commanded by
General Count Lippe, received orders to take the road to Puxe
four and a half miles west of Conflans, detaching a regiment to
a distance of four and a half miles to reconnoitre towards the
west and north, and carefully watch the roads running in that
direction as well as the railroad."
The advanced guard reconnoitred from Jarny towards Briey,
Auboué, and St. Marie aux Chênes. An early report that
hostile troops were visible to the north of Doncourt and at
Valleroy, I,OOO paces N.W. of Moineville, was soon afterwards
found to be erroneous.
As the original intention of the Commander in Chief was that
all the corps should attain the Étain road in first line, and as,
moreover, the advance of the XIIth Corps by itself was imprac-
ticable, the operation of seizing the last of the three roads
leading from Metz towards the west still remained unexecuted.
Consequently the Crown Prince of Saxony contented himself
with assembling his corps at Jarny and sending a report at 9
A.M. to the Commander in Chief.
" From the official account of the XIIth Army Corps.
Aattle of Gravelotte. 22 I
At II A.M. the reconnoitring patrols of the 1st Reiter
regiment fell in with a party of French cavalry and infantry at
Batilly, which retired ; and with hostile patrols at Coinville. The
report of this was received by the Crown Prince towards I 1.45
A.M. almost simultaneously with a communication from the
Guard Corps that it was on the point of again advancing from
Doncourt.
No further orders having been received, the Crown Prince
acted on his own judgment and ordered the advanced guard to
march along both banks of the Orne on Moineville, and Valleroy
1,000 paces to the north-west. The 23rd Division received orders
that the 45th brigade was to proceed to Tichémont and occupy the
wood of Ponty, while the 46th brigade was retained at Jarny at
the immediate disposal of the general in command. The 24th
Division, which was to be followed by the corps artillery, was
directed to advance by Jouaville and Batilly against St. Marie.
It thus formed a special advanced guard, under the command of
Colonel Leonhardi, and, when on arriving at Jouaville guns were
heard on the right, was reinforced to the strength of seven bat-
talions (the 47th brigade and 12th Rifles), the 2nd Reiter regiment,
and four batteries of the divisional artillery under Major Richter.
These dispositions were reported by the XIIth Corps to the
Commander in Chief at I I.45 A.M., and towards I 2 o'clock the
Crown Prince received the order from that officer already
mentioned, which had been despatched at I I.45 A.M. This
directed the XIIth Corps to advance on St. Marie aux Chénes,
to protect the flanks by cavalry in the direction of Briey and
beyond Conflans, and to push cavalry forward wherever possible
into the valley of the Moselle to destroy the railway and tele-
graph to Thionville. It also stated that the VIIth, VIIIth, Ixth,
and Guard Corps would within two hours attack the enemy,
who was in position on the heights from Leipsic to the Bois
de Vaux, with his rear towards Metz.
The dispositions already made were, as a rule, in accordance
with this order, and were now Only So far modified that
the 46th brigade, held in reserve, was directed to follow the
45th, while the 48th brigade formed the reserve of the army
corps. An order was also sent at I 2 o'clock to the Cavalry
Division at Puxe, commanded by General Count Lippe, to close
222 7%e German Artillery.
up with the army corps and to march on the Bois de Ponty, detach-
ing a regiment in the direction of Valleroy. Count Lippe, on
hearing the sound of guns at Habonville, had however already
ordered the two regiments of heavy cavalry, under General von
Senft-Pilsach, with a battery of horse artillery, to advance, but
had left the 17th Lancers at Puxe. These arrangements were
also in accordance with the order afterwards received."
The Crown Prince of Saxony with his staff had meanwhile
ridden in advance of the troops to the ridge between Jouaville
and Batilly. ‘The thunder of the guns, constantly increasing in
intensity, and the rattle of musketry proclaimed the importance
of the struggle at the Bois de la Cusse, and at the same time the
line of French artillery was seen through the rising clouds of
smoke as it extended towards the right in the direction of St.
Privat.’”
Reports from the Ist and 2nd Saxon Reiter regiments as well
as communications from the Hussars of the Guard proved that
the enemy's right wing extended beyond St. Privat, and that
Roncourt was occupied. A camp for a Division had been seen
at each of those places. Captain von der Planitz of the Saxon
general staff, having reconnoitred St. Marie about 12 o'clock,
before its occupation, confirmed this information, and reported to
the corps commandant that he considered it would be all the
more difficult to force the formidable and strongly occupied
ridge between St. Privat and Roncourt in front, as the ground
afforded scarcely any cover to the assailants. At the same time
it was reported by the left wing through General von Craushaar
that it had not yet come upon the enemy and that Briey had
been found unoccupied by reconnoitring cavalry.
Having weighed all these circumstances, which were partially
confirmed by his own observation, the Crown Prince of Saxony
decided on ‘employing only a small force for the front attack,
and all the remaining troops in turning the enemy's right flank
by Coinville, Montois la Montagne, and Roncourt.” With this
object the following dispositions were made –The 23rd Division,
Prince George, was to march by Coinville to the wood east of
Auboué and to Roncourt. General Nehrhoff von Holderberg was
| Official report of the XIIth Corps. * From Captain Helmuth's Lecture.
* Oſficial account of the XIIth Corps.
Aattle of Graze/offe. 223
directed to send the 47th brigade, commanded by Major-General
von Leonhardi, and the 12th Rifles round to the west of Batilly
and to move towards the north so as to advance from the defile
running west of St. Marie directly against that place. The 48th
brigade was, however, left at Batilly at the immediate disposal
of the Corps commandant.
A report of the movements ordered was made to the Com-
mander in Chief at 2.30 P.M. and information given to the Guard
Corps." -
But meanwhile the state of affairs had altered as regarded
the 23rd Division. In consequence of the continued increase of
the firing, together with information brought by an orderly officer
from the Guard Corps that the enemy was at St. Privat and
that it was decided to attack him, Prince George had marched
with the main body of the 23rd Division on the sound of the
guns towards St. Marie aux Chênes.
All available troops had been at once set in motion and the
leading batteries and battalions had arrived close to the scene
of fighting at St. Marie at 2.45 P.M., when they were met by the
order of the Crown Prince already mentioned. Prince George
now named Auboué as the nearest point of assembly not under
the direct fire of the enemy. Owing to the necessity of march-
ing generally across somewhat unfavourable ground, a consider-
able space of time would elapse before the troops could assemble
at that place and consequently before the turning movements
could be executed.” *
The advanced guard also, under General von Craushaar, had
without waiting for orders marched towards the sound of the
guns, which brought it by Hatrize and Beaumont to St. Marie
aux Chênes. Part of it had actually reached the field of battle
* The report was : “The Saxon Corps is advancing on St. Marie with the 24th
Division, while the 23rd Division is marching by Coinville and the wood between
that place and Roncourt to turn the French right wing.’
* The road selected by the corps commandant ſor the turning movement was
between 14,000 and 15,000 paces in length, and three hours would therefore be
required for the march, so that it would be 6 P.M. before the movement could be
executed. The further circuit by Montois would cause a delay of another hour. But
under the pressure of circumstances no calculations of this kind were made. The
Guard Corps received the impression, partly by verbal communications, that the
troops would reach Roncourt at 5 P.M. and attack the enemy in that direction.
224 The German Artillery.
at St. Marie and was becoming engaged in the fight, when
General von Craushaar likewise received orders to march to
Auboué, in order to take part in the turning movement.
The leaders of the 24th Division and 1st Division of the
Guard Corps, Generals Nehrhoff von Holderberg and von Pape,
agreed on the plan of attack to be adopted. It will be
remembered that while the greater number of the batteries of
the Guard strove to keep the French artillery at St. Privat in
check, von Mutius's battery and two divisions of von Grävenitz's
Horse Artillery battery (4.1. and 2. r. G.) had come into action
east of St. Ail, and had opened fire at a range of from 1,2OO to
I,7OO paces to prepare the attack against St. Marie aux Chênes,
With the same object in view Saxon artillery was now ordered
to the front, and at the expressed desire of the 1st Division of
the Guard the 2nd Saxon field division was ordered by General
Nehrhoff von Holderberg to take up a position south-west of
St. Marie aux Chênes. Major Richter found space for three
batteries only, the remainder of the ground being occupied by
infantry forming for the attack. Consequently the 4th Light, the
3rd and 4th Heavy batteries, commanded respectively by Major
von der Pforte and Captains Keysselitz and Groh, came into
action and cannonaded the south side of the village with shell at
ranges of between 800 and 1,000 paces. To the north-west the Ist
and 2nd Light batteries, under Captains Lengnik and Westmann,
had at the same time, or somewhat earlier, opened fire with
common shell and shrapnel at a range of from 1,600 to 2,000
paces against the outskirts and prominent points of the village.
Lengnik had previously come into action west of the great defile,
but after firing two rounds had changed his position, as the range
was found to be too great.
The corps artillery, under Colonel Funcke, was brought up
on the west of the defile astride the road from Hatrize to St.
Marie aux Chênes. On the right flank was the 3rd field
division, under Major Hoch, with the 5th and 6th Heavy and
the 5th Light batteries, commanded respectively by Captains
Hammer, Verworrner, and von Zeschau (5. S., 6. S., 5. l. XII.);
on the left flank the 4th ficlº division, under Lieut.-Colonel
Oertel, consisting of the 6th Light, 7th and 8th Heavy, com-
Aattle of Grave/offe. 225
manded respectively by Captains Fellmer, Bucher I., and Portius,
and the 2nd Horse Artillery battery, under Captain Müller
(6.1., 7. S., 8. S., 2. r. XII.) In front of the interval between these
divisions was placed the 2nd Heavy battery, Captain Leonhardi
(2. S. XII.)
These batteries to the west of St. Marie fired on the western
edge of the village, at a distance of from 2,000 to 2,400 paces,
as well as on the troops in the triangle formed by St. Marie, St.
Privat, and Roncourt. The cross-fire of the Saxon and Guard
batteries South and west of St. Marie was apparently very
effective, Richter's batteries, which were the nearest to the
village, breaching the enclosing walls in Several places, destroy-
ing the hedges, and setting fire to many of the houses. Our
batteries here were exposed to the enemy's musketry as well as
artillery, which, however, did not cause any great loss." But
Captain Keysselitz was so severely wounded at the moment of
coming into action that he was obliged to give over the com-
mand of the 3rd Heavy battery to Second Lieut. Exner.
The Saxon batteries kept up their fire until they were
masked by the advance of the storming Columns, and the
batteries of the Guard at St. Ail were then informed by Colonel
von Erkert that the desired effect had been produced. For the
present however they all retained their positions, awaiting the
result of the assault and ready to act in Support if so required.
Accompanied by the Divisional Commander, General Nehr-
hoff von Holderberg, the 47th brigade, Colonel von Leonhardi,
had deployed close to the road from Hatrize to St. Marie aux
Chênes under cover in the meadow ground, facing the western
side of the latter village, with the Ist battalion of Rifles in the
first line and the IO4th and IO5th regiments by wings in rear.
The 3rd battalion of the Fusiliers, belonging to the advanced
guard of the 23rd Division, was also advancing along the high
road from Auboué against the north side of the village. Meanwhile
the infantry of the advanced guard of the Ist Division of the
Guard, reinforced by the Fusilier battalion of the 4th regiment,
had made some progress against the enemy, and more particularly
* Lengnik states that the slight loss sustained by his battery, in spite of the
heavy musketry fire from St. Marie aux Chênes, was owing to cover aſſorded by a
thin hedge, behind which it had taken up its position.
Q
226 7%e German Artillery.
the Rifles of the Guard, who were on very favourable ground.
Both grenadier battalions of the 4th regiment were placed by
General von Pape in rear of the left wing as a reserve to the
attack, the 1st brigade of the Guard and the 2nd regiment being
in rear of the wood south-west of St. Marie. The Ist battalion
was marching up from Habonville.
As soon as the artillery had prepared the way, the infantry
advanced to the assault from all sides simultaneously, as Con-
certed by Generals von Pape and Nehrhoff von Holderberg.
No cover whatever being afforded by the ground, it sustained
considerable loss from the hostile artillery, from the rapid fire
of the garrison, and from that of swarms of French tirailleurs,
who had advanced from St. Privat till within 700 paces of the
place. But Saxon and Prussian pressed resolutely forward.
The garrison, already shaken by the German artillery, fell back
rapidly on the hostile masses in the direction of St. Privat and
Roncourt, leaving some hundreds of prisoners behind it, the
enemy however making an obstinate resistance in many of the
houses. There was not, as might be expected, space enough for
all the storming columns to enter the village, so that some of
them passed it on the right and left. The troops in front forced
their way through to the eastern side, and to some extent beyond
it, in pursuit of the garrison, while other detachments came up
and alligned themselves on these. The attention of Generals
Nehrhoff von Holderberg and von Pape, as well as of the other
leaders, was directed to Securing possession of the village by
putting the buildings in a state of defence and occupying the
eastern outskirts of the village in a regular manner. Shortly
afterwards the advanced parties of infantry on the east side
became engaged in a stationary but brisk and bloody musketry
fight with the hostile masses at St. Privat and Roncourt. Here
Colonel von Erkert was killed. The 4th regiment of the Guard
was moved up by General von Pape to the western edge of the
village in reserve.
The French accounts of Fay, Frossard, and others state
briefly that after the 94th regiment had been shattered, and St.
Marie set on fire by the German shells, it was obliged by Strong
hostile columns to evacuate the village.
Aaſt/e of Graze/offe. 227
6. CZanges in the positions of the Saaron artillery consequent on
Že capture of St. Marie auw Chénes, and continuation of the
artillery contest—Advance of the 2nd Division of the Guard
against St. Ail–The great artillery mass formed by the
&alleries of the Guard Corps and Hessian Division—Attack
of the French right repulsed—Advance of the 23rd Division
at Attboué, reinforced by the 48th brigade—Movements of the
2nd field division of the XIIth Corps.
To silence the heavy fire with which a French battery under
cover in the copse to the north-east of St. Marie aux Chénes
had harassed the left flank of the 47th brigade during the
assault on that place, the 3rd Light battery (3. l. XII.), under
Captain Bucher II., which had been held in reserve, was ordered
by the 24th Division to take up a position to the left of St.
Marie aux Chênes. It cannonaded the French battery at 2,200
paces with such success that the latter retired, Westmann's battery
(2. l. XII.), which selected the same target, having time only
to fire six common shell and shrapnel at it. These batteries
were protected on the left flank by the 2nd Reiter regiment.
After the storming of St. Marie aux Chênes the Saxon corps
artillery advanced from the right in echelon of divisions, the
leading division, commanded by Major Hoch, taking up a
position near the village and to the left of it, fronting the road
which leads from St. Marie to Auboué. While the 6th Heavy
battery (6. S. XII.), Captain Verworrner, came into action close
to the road, the 5th Heavy and 5th Light batteries, Captains
Hammer and von Zeschau, were pushed forward beyond the
road, where they sustained considerable losses from the enemy's
artillery, and especially from Swarms of skirmishers which had
ensconced themselves in the folds of the ground towards Ron-
court. Major Hoch was slightly wounded and Captain Hammer
severely. Two guns of the 5th Light battery very soon lost all
their horses and nearly all their gunners. To avoid useless
losses both batteries were withdrawn behind the high road in
line with the 6th Heavy battery.
* The corps artillery of this corps comprised two divisions, each of which con-
sisted oſ one light and two heavy batteries.--Trafts
Q 2
228 7%e German Artillery.
Bucher's battery (3.1. XII) soon came into action in the in-
terval between this battery and the two others; and later on
Groh's battery (4. S. XII) came up into line on the right. Major
Richter then brought up his batteries close to the road, where,
together with Pforte's battery (4.1. XII.), ordered to this spot
from the south-east of St. Marie, they formed an echelon Some-
what in advance of the right wing of Hoch's division.
Von der Pforte's battery had previously taken up a position,
by order of Major Richter and with the permission of the
Divisional Commander, on the South-east of the village, imme-
diately after its capture, to the left and somewhat in advance of
the artillery of the 2nd Division of the Guard, which was just
then deploying, and had cannonaded a hostile battery at St.
Privat at from 2,500 to 3,000 paccs.
Richter's and Hoch's divisions in rear of the high road run-
ning from St. Marie aux Chênes to Auboué were exposed to a
fire, happily less effective than heavy, from the French artillery
in its commanding position at Roncourt and St. Privat, which
also fired on our infantry as it debouched from St. Marie aux
Chênes in pursuit of the retiring garrison. The fire of the Saxon
batteries was directed against artillery at ranges of from 3,000
to 3,500 paces with good results, also against infantry retiring
towards the east and north-east, as well as against Swarms of
skirmishers which hovered between St. Privat and Roncourt and
afterwards established themselves behind hedges; the precision
of the Saxon fire was proved by the frequent changes of position
of the hostile artillery and the hasty retreat of the infantry to
Roncourt.
While this was taking place Oertel's division of the corps
artillery had advanced to a covered position close to the high
road, it being impossible at first to bring the batteries into action
on the ridge because the Copses to the east of Auboué were still
held by the enemy. This had been proved to be the case by
the 2nd Reiter regiment; offensive movements made by the
enemy from Roncourt in the direction of these woods having
been invariably repulsed by Our guns, the corps commandant
concluded that they were unoccupied, and had ordered that
regiment to ride along the castern side of them, which, however,
was revented by a biting firc of infantry occupying the wood.
/3a///e of Grave/o//e. 229
Lengnik's and Westmann's Light batteries (1.1., 2. l. xII),
as well as the 2nd Heavy battery (Leonhardi) of the 1st field
division, which had taken part in the combat at St. Marie aux
Chênes, had meanwhile received orders to move into the valley
of the Orne, and there, covered by the high ground of Grimon-
ceau, await the advance of the 23rd Division, which was being
formed up to turn the enemy's right flank."
Let us now turn to the 2nd Division of the Guard, Com-
manded by General Budritzki. It had reached the line Anoux
la Grange—Jouaville at 2 P.M., and in obedience to orders had
formed up and halted north of the wood at Jouaville. It has
already been mentioned that the 3rd brigade was detached to
the IXth Army Corps. From personal observation and a recon-
naissance made by General von Dannenberg, the Corps Com-
mandant was convinced that it was necessary to wait for the
attack of the Saxon corps before taking any further measures.
He therefore ordered the infantry to postpone its attack while
the artillery opened fire to occupy the enemy's attention.
With the object of drawing the available troops together,
Budritzki was instructed to march to St. Ail with the remainder
of his Division, including the 4th brigade, three batteries of the
3rd field division, and the 2nd Lancers. He was there to await
further orders. The Division advanced by the valley, and the
van of the infantry reached St. Ail at 5 P.M. The Lancers took
up a position South-east of St. Marie.
The 3rd field division was immediately brought into action
by Lieut.-Colonel von Rheinhaben by order of General von Bu-
dritzki. Scarcely was St. Marie taken, when the division, after
a long trot, reached a position between that place and the defile
of St. Ail, and took part in the contest, which had already been
carried on for a long time by the artillery of the Guard and the
Hessian batteries. We have already seen in the previous pages
that the Hessian batteries under Lieut.-Colonel Stumpf, as well
as the corps artillery (Colonel von Scherbening) and the 1st
field division (Lieut.-Colonel Bychelberg), under Prince Holmen-
lohe, formed a long line between St. Ail and the Bois de la
* This is on the authority of the Saxon Colonel Schubert.
23O - The German Artillery.
Cusse, unbroken except by the defile of Habonville. After the
capture of St. Marie aux Chênes those batteries of the artillery
of the Guard which had formed an angle with the front of the
main position wheelcd up into line to the right. We have
observed also that at a later hour the 3rd Light battery of the
9th regiment came into action on the right of the Hessian
batteries."
Although these three groups of batteries, which had arrived
in succession, were separated by the form of the ground and
were under different commanders, yet, as they all fired at the
same objects, they formed to some extent a single artillery mass
during the greater part of the battle.
It will be remembered that at the moment when the Hessian
batteries moved to their second position, St. Marie aux Chênes
was still in the enemy's possession, and that hostile troops had
also shown themselves at St. Ail. After both these places were
occupied by the Germans, French troops of all arms appeared
in the space between them and the main position. Three strong
lines of skirmishers, one in rear of the other, were pushed for-
ward immediately in front of the greater part of the artillery
position, almost wholly concealed by the furrows of the ground.
It was therefore impossible for the artillery to get to closer
quarters with the enemy before our infantry advanced to the
attack and dislodged the skirmishers. General Prince Hohen-
lohe had some difficulty in restraining the impetuosity of his
troops, although these circumstances were pointed out to them.
It was all the more imperative for the Prince to keep back his
artillery as the orders of the general commanding the Guard
Corps required that the enemy should only be kept in play in
front until his right flank was turned.
To guard the long line of artillery more effectually against
the lines of skirmishers which might endeavour to creep up to
it under the cover afforded by the undulating ground, the Prince
* The eighteen batteries now formed three groups in a ſlat arc, its concave side
facing the enemy, and were in the ſollowing order from right to leſt : —3. l. IX, First
Lieut. Heseler/or Bastineller (wounded); I. S., 1. l., 2. S., 2, 1., 3. l. H., Captains Reh,
Frank, Hoffmann, Weygand, Ronstadt; 2. l., 1. l., 2. S., I. S., 3. S., 4. S., 3. l.,
2. r., 4, 1., 6. J., 5. S., 6. S. G., Captains von Niederstetter, von Dewitz, von Prittwitz,
von Sametzki, von Ehlern, Seeger, von Friederici-Steinmann, von Grävenitz, von
Mutius, Ising, von Roon, and von Oppell.
Aſſaſſ//e of Grave/o//e. 23 I
asked for assistance from the 2nd Division of the Guard. The
Ist battalion of the regiment Augusta, commanded by von
Rosenberg, being detailed for this duty, formed company columns
in the intervals between the batteries and lay down. Once the
commander of the battalion wished to advance against the lines
of skirmishers, but was prevented by the Prince in consideration
of the general state of affairs.
At the beginning of the battle the French artillery was the
principal object at which the Hessian and Guard batteries aimed,
the ranges varying between 1,800 and 3,200 paces. The imme-
diate result of their concentrated fire was the withdrawal of the
enemy's advanced batteries to his main position, where his
artillery was SO strongly posted as to necessitate a lengthened
cannonade, So that it was 4 P.M. before the French fire perceptibly
slackened, and at 5 P.M. it died away almost entirely. After this
only a few fresh batteries came into action. The success against
the hostile infantry and cavalry was equally great. Columns of
both arms, which showed themselves on the high road between
St. Marie aux Chênes and St. Privat as well as to the north of
it, were cut to pieces by German shells.
When, after the capture of St. Marie, hostile masses advanced
from the main position in a westerly and north-westerly direction
against the Saxon Army Corps, the good effect of the flanking
fire was perceptible, notwithstanding the long range. The
enemy was finally compelled by the Saxon artillery to desist
from all further aggressive movements in that quarter, and from
attempts which he repeatedly made to advance against the
front of the German artillery from his main position, especially
from St. Privat. As a rule the ranges varied from 1,800 and
3,2OO paces ; but they were often much shorter, as, for example,
when the enemy's skirmishers, advancing against Our front to
within 800 paces, were completely stopped by the German shells.
In the course of the afternoon the commander of the 2nd
battalion of Hessian Rifles informed Major Herget that a hostile
column was endeavouring to debouch by a hollow road from
Amanvillers. To prevent this a gun of Reh's battery, under the
command of Lieutenant Goes, was pushed forward close to the
deep railway cutting. The officer, the non-commissioned officer
of the gun, and the whole of the detachment with the exception
. 232 7%e German, A/7//ery.
of one man were wounded, but the firing was maintained with
the greatest gallantry, and all attempts of the hostile Columns to
debouch were frustrated.
In addition to all these important results it must be observed
that the right wing, i.e. the Hessian batteries, succeeded in
drawing on itself the fire of the enemy's guns and mitrailleurs in
its front, and thereby diverting it from the German batteries
on the other side of the Bois de la Cusse, which had been
so effectively enfiladed. On the other hand the left wing,
i.e. the artillery of the Guard, kept the hostile artillery opposed
to it in check from the very first, and diverted its fire from the
right flank of the infantry advancing from the South against St.
Marie aux Chênes.
The firing was generally deliberate, as the military situation
here required that the enemy should be merely kept in play :
but at first the Hessian batteries fired rapidly, when it was
desired to extricate the batteries south of the Bois de la Cusse,
and the whole of the artillery did so whenever it was necessary
to repulse the hostile attacks. A rapid fire was also directed
against the Swarms of skirmishers which closely threatened the
artillery.
During this artillery contest the commander of the artillery
of the Second Army, Lieut.-General von Colomier, rode up to
the artillery of the Guard and signified his approval of the steps
that had been taken. Finding himself in the vicinity of Verné-
ville while reconnoitring the enemy's position, he had missed
the Commander in Chief of the Second Army, and was now
riding through the positions of the artillery to give any directions
that might be necessary.
Up to this time the battle had been fought with obstinacy,
the artillery of the Guard and Hessian Division in spite of their
losses displaying great coolness and determination. The
enemy's common shells were more effective than his shrapnel,
which generally burst too high; but the principal loss was caused
by the Chassepôts of his skirmishers, who lay under cover in the
furrows, as well as in the ditches of the high road between St.
Marie and St. Privat.
During the afternoon the fire of artillery, musketry, and
mitrailleurs from the other side of the Bois de la Cusse, to which
Pattle of Gravelotte. 233
the Hessian batterics were exposed both in flank and rear, occa-
sioned the heaviest casualties. Captain Ronstadt was killed;
Captain Weygandt, Lieutenant and Adjutant Beck, Lieutenants
Goes, Kehrer, and Deisz, Portepeefähnrichs Wagner I. and
Wagner II. were wounded. Lieutenant Kehrer succeeded
Captain Ronstadt in the command of the 3rd Light battery, and
retained it to the end of the battle, in spite of a severe wound.
Lieutenant Leydhecker took the place of Captain Weygandt in
the command of the 2nd Light battery. Considerable damage
also was done to the material of the batteries, and a gun of the
3rd Light battery being dismounted by a shell bursting under it,
was disabled for the remainder of the battle.
Let us now return to the infantry of the Guard Corps and XIIth
(Saxon) Corps at St. Marie aux Chênes." The former reports that
during this period of the battle it observed only one large column
of hostile infantry, which was advancing from St. Privat against
the east side of St. Marie, but was brought to a halt at a con-
siderable range and obliged to retire by the fire of the infantry,
combined with that of the artillery of the Guard in action south
of St. Marie. Such, however, was not the case with the Saxons.
As soon as St. Marie was taken, strong bodies of hostile troops
began to move against that village from Roncourt and St.
Privat. Colonel von Leonhardi saw that their object was
the recapture of St. Marie, and to prevent this by a counter
movement he urged his troops, which had already advanced,
to continue their attack, and also sent forward against Roncourt
the 3rd battalions of the IO4th and IoSth regiments, till then
held back in reserve.
The French troops which had assumed the offensive were
according to Fay's account, the Division commanded by Lafont
de Villiers and the 1st brigade of Tixier's Division, supported by
du Barail's Division of cavalry.
The fighting around the village was very Soon Surpassed in
violence and daring by that to the north-east. The brigadier,
Colonel von Leonhardi, was wounded and replaced by Colonel
Elterlein. The Saxons, advancing with the greatest gallantry,
| Here the account of Captain Helmuth is generally followed.
234. 7%e German Artillery.
were checked by the vastly superior force of the chemy, whose
repeated attacks, however, cspecially directed against our left
wing, were finally baffled by the steadiness of the infantry and
the effective fire of the artillery, which at the same time kept
the French batteries completely in check.
General Nehrhoff von Holderberg had watched the contest
from St. Marie, and at first did not interfere, as it appeared that
its object was only to drive the enemy from the innmediate
vicinity of the village. But perceiving that, contrary to the
intention of the corps commandant, it was gradually growing
more serious, and moreover that the enemy's superiority rendered
it useless, he ordered Colonel Eltorlein to break off the fight
and assemble his brigade at St. Marie. At the same time
he received an order from the general commanding the corps
to the same effect.
As the whole of the infantry of the 47th brigade had been
hotly engaged and widely scattered, it was some time before it
could be reassembled. This was not completed until 5 P.M.,
when the brigade formed up to the north-west of St. Maric,
which had only just then becn occupied by Prussian troops.
Aſter its capture General von Pape had brought up the 2nd
regiment of the Guard close to the west of the village, and at
3.45 P.M. the Ist brigade also, which had taken up its position
600 paces to the South-west, so that the whole of the 1st Divi-
sion was united at that point. A lengthened pause in the battle
in front of the Guard Corps and Saxons now intervened, broken
only by a measured fire of artillery.
From his position on the west of St. Marie the Crown Prince
completely overlooked the contest of his troops and the ground
as far as Roncourt; and he soon became aware that the encry
was present there in much greater force than had been previously
suspected, so that the importance and difficulty of the
turning movement were proportionately cnhanced. The Crown
Prince therefore at once (3.30 P.M.) ordered the 48th brigade,
which had been held in reserve at Batilly, to advance to Auboué
to reinforce the turning column. Prince George was informed
of this and directed to make the turning movement more towards
the north, as it was obvious that an advance in thc direction
Aſſaf//e of Grave/offe. 235
previously indicated would lead directly against the enemy's post
at Roncourt.
General von Pilsach had reached the Bois de Ponty about
3 P.M. with the two Reiter regiments of the Saxon cavalry and
the Ist Horsc Artillery battery. It was useless to think of em-
ploying this force against the cnemy's front, but an opportunity
might occur during the turning movement. The general was
therefore Ordered to join the turning columns, and morcover to
scnd two Squadrons into the valley of the Moselle to break up
the railroad and telegraph betwccn Metz and Thionville. We
have already seen that the Commander in Chief of the army had
given similar instructions to the XIIth Corps at I I.30 A.M. and
when it was known that we were opposed to the bulk of the
enemy's force, it became all the more important to destroy
his last communication with the country in his rear. In an order
by Prince Frederick Charles despatched at 3.45 P.M. from
Habonville he again urged the importance of this step.
Meanwhile the 23rd Division had continued its march on
Auboué during the contest at St. Marie aux Chênes, and the
Ist and 2nd battalions of Rifles belonging to the advanced guard,
which were the first to arrive, were at once directed by H.R.H.
Prince George against the hostile skirmishers occupying the
copses east of Auboué.
Convinced of the necessity of employing a strong force of
artillery against the masses opposed to him, the Crown Prince
at 4.30 P.M. ordered the corps artillery to move further for-
ward, which could now be done without risk, as the progress
of the Saxon skirmishers in the copses was clearly visible.
Leonhardi's battery (2. S. XII.) was ordered by Prince George of
Saxony to take up a position on the extreme left flank, Oertel's
division of artillery afterwards coming up on its right, and the
whole of the batteries maintaining their position against a brisk
hostile fire. Before long Hoch's division also came up into line
on the right, followed by Richter's division, whose batteries were
now all present."
* The twelve batteries were in the following order from right to leſt —Von der
Pſorte, Groh, Bucher II., Exner /or Keysselitz, Verworrner, Hammer, von Zeschau,
Müller, Fellmer, 13ucher I., Portius, and Leonhardi (4. l., 4. S., 3. l., 3. S., 6. s.,
5. S., 5. l., 2. r., 6. l., 7. S., 8. S., 2. S. XII.)
236 7%e German Artil/e79.
During the movement Captain Müller observed some hostile
cavalry in front of Roncourt. Galloping to the front with the
2nd Horse Artillery battery, he crossed the defile, and opening
fire with shell compelled the French horse to retire. Our
artillery between St. Marie and the wood to the north of it was
principally occupied in subduing the fire of the enemy's guns
between St. Privat and Roncourt, and in preventing him from
advancing to impede our turning movement. Consequently the
enemy's artillery was generally the object of our fire ; but the
instant that any hostile columns or swarms of skirmishers ad-
vanced from Roncourt and St. Privat, as was frequently the
case, the Saxon artillery concentrated their fire on them. The
ranges were generally between 2,500 and 3,800 paces, being
reduced to 1,500 paces during the offensive movements of the
enemy. Common shells were mostly employed, but shrapnel
were also used by some of the batteries.” The practice made by
these twelve batteries was excellent and obliged the hostile
artillery to withdraw, while every attempt made by the French
infantry to advance from its position was successfully repelled.
‘Meanwhile Prince George had received orders from the
corps commandant at 5.30 P.M. to take a wider Sweep towards
the north with his turning column ; while at the same time
the 48th brigade arrived, which had also been placed at
his disposal, and the 46th was marching up. The Prince
therefore ordered Colonel Schulz with the 48th brigade—re-
inforced by the 1st Reiter regiment and three batteries, and
followed by the two regiments and the battery of his cavalry di-
vision—to prosecute his march till in a line with Joeuf and Montois,
and march thence by the latter village against Roncourt. General
von Craushaar was at the same time to Occupy in force the wood
to the east, and to advance to the attack of Roncourt as soon
as the 48th brigade had commenced its attack from the north,
* Nothing certain is stated as to the eſſect of the shrapnel. The 4th Light
battery observed that its shrapnel fire at 2,800 paces was affare/uſ/y effective against
strong swarms of skirmishers north of St. Privat. The 5th Heavy and 5th Light
batteries fired three and seven rounds respectively at ranges of about 2, Ooo and
1,800 paces against hostile artillery and inſantry. They considered that the bursts
were well timed.
Z3a///e of Gravelotte. 237
but not before. As the 46th brigade was still on the march, orders
could not at present be given for its employment.'"
It was about 4.45 P.M. when these arrangements were made.
The IO8th regiment of Rifles was already forcing its way slowly
through the bushy copse, intersected by a deep ravine, and driving
the French tirailleurs before it under a smart interchange of
musketry, a fire of artillery being at the same time kept up on
the wood.
General von Craushaar had ordered the IOOth Body Guard
Grenadiers to follow the Rifles, near which it soon became en-
gaged. The IOIst regiment came after in reserve. At 5. I 5 P.M.
the first line reached the edge of the wood on the side of
Roncourt and occupied it. Some of the troops rushed out of
the wood in pursuit of the flying skirmishers, but the general,
in obedience to his orders, halted the two regiments on the edge
of the wood and in front of it, where the most advanced of the
troops maintained a brisk musketry combat with some hostile
skirmishers.” As soon as the French were observed at Montois,
a battalion of the IOIst was ordered to move in that direction
and watch the village until the arrival of the 48th regiment,
which led to a stationary musketry fight with the enemy at
800 paces from the outskirts of the place. While these move-
ments were taking place, the 48th brigade, accompanied by
Prince George, was marching along the valley of the Orne.
7. Situation of the First German Army at 3 P.M.–General zon
Sºcin/actº decides to assume the offensive–Advance of the
corps artillery of the VIIIth Corps—Changes in position of
the artillery of the First Army—Corps artil/cry of the VII//,
Corps at St. Hubert–Success of the French left wing—
Contest of the 8th Division at St. Hubert and in the Bois
de Genivaux—French accounts of these cºchts.
Let us now briefly examine the situation of the First German
Army after 3 P.M.
The artillery—or at least that part of it which had become
* According to Helmuth.
* The 47th brigade also arrived at this point at a later hour from St. Marie to
form the reserve.
238 7%e German Artillery.
engaged—had from its position north and south of Gravelotte
almost silenced the French batteries, and now, owing to the
paucity of objects, maintained a measured fire. The I5th Di-
vision, under General von Weltzien, held its ground with dif-
ficulty and loss beyond the defile of Gravelotte in the northern
part of the Bois de Vaux, in the western portions of the quarries
on the east, in St. Hubert, and in the southern part of the Bois de
Genivaux as far as the forking of the ravine. To the north the
battle swayed to and fro. The extreme left flank was in con-
nection with the IXth Corps at Chantrenne. The troops of the
Division were greatly exhausted and no longer retained their
tactical formations.
The 32nd brigade, under von Rex, and the artillery of the
16th Division (von Barnekow) were under cover to the west of
Gravelotte in reserve ; while the 31st brigade, General Count
Neidhardt von Gneisenau, had rejoined the Division at 2 P.M.,
having completed its expedition in the direction of Thionville.
The 7th King's Hussars guarded the left flank of the artillery,
the 9th Hussars being postcq to the west of Gravelotte. The
latter village was put in a state of defence and garrisoned to
meet the possibility of a repulse.
The VIIth Army Corps had by the King's orders been held
back from all offensive action up to this time. At Gravelotte
were assembled the 27th brigade, Colonel von Conrady, and the
77th regiment of the 28th brigade, General von Woyna, whose
Fusilier battalion supported the corps artillery. The Fusiliers of
the 53rd regiment were in rear of the right of the artillery, while
the other two battalions occupied the eastern skirts of the Bois de
Vaux. Here were also the 7th battalion of Rifles,' and since 1.30
P.M. two battalions of the 13th regiment, belonging to the 13th
Division, commanded by General von Glümer, while a battalion
of the I3th was detached to defend the mill in the defile and
the places of assembly established there. General von Osten-
Sacken was in the rear of the right flank of the artillery with the
73rd regiment of the 25th brigade, and General von der Goltz
with the 26th brigade at Ars in the valley of the Moscle
Riflemen as well as infantry had also collected by degrees in the gravel-pits
near the forest-track east of the wood. Some partial attacks only had been made,
with great loss against the retiring troops, which had been repulsed by von Welt-
zien's Division.
Zaſłſe of Grave/o//e. 239
The I 5th Hussars were posted to the west of Gravelotte,
while the Ist Cavalry Division, under General von Hartmann, had
been formed up since I P.M. behind the left flank of the
artillery.
‘General von Steinmetz had attentively watched the progress.
of the conflict, and had ridden with his staff so far to the east of
Gravelotte as to expose himself to the enemy's fire. Officers of
his staff were killed and wounded. Among others Captain Köhler
of the Ist East Prussian field artillery regiment, adjutant to the
general Commanding the artillery of the First Army, was wounded.”
‘Towards 3 o'clock the expected advance of the Second
Army could not yet be discerned, but the infantry of the VIIIth
Army Corps had gained ground towards St. Hubert along both
sides of the high road. The determined resistance of the enemy
appeared therefore to be overcome, and the right moment
seemed to have arrived to bring up cavalry and artillery to
support the infantry fighting beyond the defile on the east of
Gravelotte. The enemy showed only a small force of infantry
on the heights from Point du Jour to beyond Moscou Farm,
which led to the conclusion that part of the force posted there
had been withdrawn to support the right wing of the French
army.
‘General von Steinmetz now sent a verbal order by General
von Sperling to von Hartmann's Cavalry Division, which had
come up in rear of the left wing of the artillery, “to advance
across the defile in front of Gravelotte, so as to be ready at
hand.” The whole of the corps artillery of the VIIth Army
Corps was to cross the defile in succession, and the moment
appeared favourable for an attack against the enemy's left wing.
The VIIth Army Corps was therefore to advance in force against
the strong position of Point du Jour, while it was intended to
direct the reserve, consisting of the 26th brigade, under von der
Goltz, on Vaux.’”
Before, however, this order could be executed the situation
of the VIIIth Army Corps had changed. General von Goeben
had anxiously watched the I 5th Division, and observed the
difficulty with which it maintained its ground. To support it he
According to Helmuth.
* Major von Schell's O/crations of the First Army.
24O The German Artillery.
sent orders at 3 P.M. to the 31st brigade, General Count Gneisenau,
to advance across the ravine to the plateau in the direction of
Moscou. The 69th regiment was therefore directed to march
on the north side of the high road, while the 29th moved along
the defile itself, its van reaching the middle of it at 4 P.M.
At the same time the 3rd field division was ordered by
General von Goeben to move to the front. Led by Lieut.-Colonel
Hildebrandt, it quitted its position under cover 2,200 yards west
of Gravelotte and trotted along the high road through that village
to the right of the batteries of the 8th artillery regiment already
in position to the north of it, about the time that the horse
artillery division of the same Corps completed its change of
position in the same direction.
The artillery of the First Army now formed a mass of 26
batteries—I 56 guns in all." The commanding officers were careful
to concentrate the fire on the most important points, wherever
this was necessary or had not already been done. The German
guns had previously established their great superiority over
the enemy's artillery, although the latter was excellently placed
behind artificial cover, and now an organised cannonade of an
hour's duration at a range of from 2,2OO to 3,000 paces sufficed
to silence it completely. Repeated attempts made by the French
to bring fresh batteries into action were invariably baffled by the
accuracy of our concentrated fire ; many of the guns could not
even unlimber, and others which succeeded in doing so, were
obliged to retire after firing a few rounds. Explosions of am-
munition wagons and limbers were frequently observed ; while
the German shells also told with great effect on infantry as it
retired along the high road. After silencing the enemy's guns
our artillery concentrated its fire on the farms of Moscou and
Point du Jour, as well as on the crowded shelter trenches. The
losses now sustained by the artillery were trifling.
* The batteries were in the following order from right to leſt :-Gasch (6.1.),
IIübner (I. S.), von Gostkowski (6. S.), Gaulſor Schweder (I. I.), Götz (2. l.), Wolff
(2. S.), Bleckert (3. S.), Rühle von Lilienstern (5. S.), von Hahn (2. r.), Hasse (3. r.)
did not fire in the position, Lemmer (4. S.), of the 7th regiment; Proſze (3. r.), von
Fuchsius (I. r.), Schlieben (2, r.), von IIclien-Sarnowski (6.1.), Mende (6. s.), Jacobi
(5. S.), Gillmeister (5.1), Sommer (4. S.), Geiszler (I. I.), von Wissel (3. S.), von Uth-
mann (2, s.), Leo (2. l.), of the 8th regiment ; Preinitzer (I. r.), of the 1st regiment;
Busse (I. S.), Gehlmann (4.1.), von Teichmann-Logischen (3.1.), of the 8th regiment.
Z3a///e of Grave/offe. 24. I
During the artillery contest General von Hindersinn, inspector
of artillery, arrived at Gravelotte with his adjutants, Major
Fassong and Captain von Rheinhaben. After passing some
time with the batteries of the VIIth and VIIIth Army Corps near
that village, he rode to the batteries at Malmaison, where he
remained till the end of the battle.
Let us now see how the order given by the First Army was
carried out: The batteries of the VIIth Army Corps from the
South, the horse artillery division of the VIIIth from the west,
and twenty Squadrons of von Hartmann's Division advanced to-
wards the mouth of the defile, which the 29th regiment had just
entered ; the 9th and I 5th Hussars also moved up from behind
Gravelotte. From every quarter troops were hurrying towards
the defile, or rather towards the plateau beyond, on which it was
expected to reap the fruits of victory.
To provide an escort for his batteries ordered to the front
from his own troops, General von Zastrow had directed the 27th
brigade, von Conrady, to take up a position of readiness on the
slope on this side of the ravine. Two battalions of the 39th
regiment were, in pursuance of this order, in the act of passing
through the defile when the batteries of their corps reached it.
Those batteries of the corps artillery that had not yet been
engaged had long been impatient to take part in the contest, so
that the order to cross the defile and come into action beyond it
was received with joy. The 4th Light battery, Captain Traut-
mann, immediately moved off on receiving orders direct from
General von Zastrow, and was joined by the 3rd Light battery,
Captain Gnigge, the 3rd Horse Artillery, Captain Hasse, and
the 4th Heavy, Captain Lemmer. They were accompanied by
Colonel Helden-Sarnowski, commanding the corps artillery, and
General Zimmermann, commandant of the artillery of the VIIth
Corps.
But now the van of the Ist Cavalry Division had come up, and
its twenty squadrons with Preinitzer's battery completely filled
the defile for a considerable period. The other batteries of the
corps artillery of the VIIth Corps, Borckenhagen's horse artillery
division of the VIIIth Corps, and von Eynatten's division on the
left, found themselves cut off from the defile, while Wilhelmi's
division, which had also approached from the extreme right flank
R
242 7%e German Aréil/e/y.
of the artillery of the First Army, was again obliged to form
front to the right. But the space at Gravelotte was too limited
for all the batteries on our side of the defile again to come into
action; the horse artillery division of the VIIIth Corps, the 2nd
Horse Artillery battery and the 3rd Heavy of the corps artillery
of the VIIth Corps, as well as the 2nd Heavy battery of von
Eynatten's division, alone succeeded in doing so, and as they
appeared sufficient, the other three batteries of the latter division
were withdrawn to the west of Gravelotte in reserve.
Von Hartmann's Cavalry Division had reached the defile
before the 9th and 15th Hussars, who were also pressing towards
it, just when the ammunition wagons of the 3rd Light battery,
having got ahead of the other batteries, were striving to cnter it.
General von Sperling communicated to General von Hartmann
his views as to the supposed state of affairs with the enemy,
which however was in reality far otherwise. For although the
most advanced of the French troops had becn routed and driven
back, large masses, wholly intact, were drawn up behind ex-
cellent cover, where it was absolutcly impossible for cavalry to
get at them.
Captain Trautmann was soon severely wounded, but directed
his battery, as he lay on the ground at St. Hubert, to the posi-
tion it was to take up. Meanwhile artillery and cavalry were
crowded together with infantry in the defile. Till then the enemy
had kept comparatively quiet, but now there suddenly poured
from every part of his position a storm of shells, mitraille, and
musketry, which Swept the bare plateau and the defile reaching
even to Gravelotte. The German batteries nevertheless con-
tinued resolutely to advance. The leaders of one of Trautmann's
guns (4th Light) falling, it was left in the defile. The remaining
guns passed it, led by First Lieut. Humann, and came into
action, by General Zimmermann's orders, to the south-east of St.
Hubert just in front of the Ist battalion of the 60th regiment,
which was on the Outer flank of the infantry then on the plateau.
Captain Hasse had followed close in rear with the 3rd Horse
Artillery battery in column of route. Wheeling to the right
and forming line to the front, he came into action on Traut-
mann's left. Captain Gnigge saw that there was no eligible
position for the 3rd Light battery on the plateau, which was
Zaſł/e of Grave/o/ſe. 243
swept by a close and biting fire of musketry, but found a com-
paratively good position on the high road to the south-east of St.
Hubert, where Some cover was afforded by a garden wall as high
as the knce. After coming smartly into action to the left flank,
the battery incurred considerable losses and Captain Gnigge's
horse was wounded. Some minutes were spent in making good
the losses before the battery could open fire. The 4th Heavy
battery, whose commander, Captain Lemmer, was mortally
wounded, was unable to gain a firm footing on the plateau.
The movements of the cavalry Division in rear, which was
rapidly losing men and horses from the cremy's musketry and
mitrailleurs, must now be traced. In a few minutes the narrow
defile, already obstructed by the disabled gun, was blocked up
with bodies of men and horses, while to augment the confusion
a limber now dashcd through the defile. In spite of all this the
determination of the 4th Lancers at the head of the cavalry
carried them to the outlet of the defile, and the regiment formed
up at a gallop on the south of the high road and in the right
rear of the 4th Light battery. But no object for attack pre-
sented itself ; men and horses fell in heaps under the murderous
fire; and the cavalry, unable to hold its ground, retired in
echelons. General von Hartmann finding the actual circum-
stances entirely different from those under which the order to
attack had been given, was compelled to retreat. In spite,
however, of the heavy fire to which the rear of the division was
exposed in the crowded defile, the officers succeeded generally
in preserving order. Some of the troopers, however, could not
be prevented from galloping wildly along the high road through
Gravelotte, where they spread dismay, and caused disorder among
the throng of ammunition wagons and trains, including the carts
of the market-tenders, which had now reached that place. Order,
however, was soon restored and the Division drew up to
the north-west of Gravelotte, where it was quickly reformed.
Preinitzer's battery of horse artillery (I. r. I.) was ordered by
General von Hartmann again to come into action ; it therefore
took up its former position among the batteries of the 8th
regiment, and afterwards advanced on two different occasions.
While these cvents were taking place the enemy's mitrailleurs
and Swarms of skirmishers at Point du Jour, in the quarries, as
R 2
244 The German Artillery.
well as at Moscou and in the hollow road between that farm
and St. Hubert, poured an incessant fire on the front and flanks
of the batteries to the east of the defile, rendering their position
desperate. Colonel von Helden-Sarnowski, and soon afterwards
Major Matthiasz had horses killed under them, the former being
also struck by a bullet. Lieutenant Ruhnke of Humann's battery
(originally Trautmann's) was killed and Portepeefähnrich Brauns
was hit by a ricochet. The battery had only just opened fire
with evidently good effect against Moscou, distant 900 or 1,000
paces, when the teams of four limbers bolted towards the defile,
most of the horses being wounded ; the officers tried in vain to
stop them ; a single limber was with difficulty brought back to
the guns, where the only men fit for duty were a non-commis-
sioned officer, a driver, and two gunners besides the officers. Two
of the guns were brought off in succession by means of the two
limbers, Lieutenants Humann and Basch assisting to limber up.
The three remaining guns, which were still exposed to several
hostile attacks, were not withdrawn across the defile till after
dark by means of wagon limbers.
Hasse's horse artillery battery from the very first sustained
enormous losses ; First Lieutenant von Hochwächter and Second
Lieutenant Humann II. were severely wounded. Captain Hasse
himself received a slight wound, which however obliged him to
give over the Command to Second Lieutenant Hoeckner for a
short time only ; all the Officers of the battery had horses killed
under them. But in spite of the losses both of men and horses,
which increased from moment to moment, the battery not only
bravely held its ground, but also maintained its fire with great
effect. Shells were thrown at from 700 to goo paces against
hostile skirmishers in the hollow road, and at 1,100 paces against
Moscou, as well as at shelter trenches and mitrailleurs east and
west of that farm. -
Perceiving the desperate situation of the battery, Lieut.-
General von Schwartz sent his adjutant, Captain von Blecken-
Schmeling, through the storm of bullets with an order for it to
withdraw across the defile. But so many horses had already
been disabled that the battery could not be moved, and Captain
Hasse affirmed that death was preferable to leaving the position
unnecessarily. The firing was therefore continued, till at length
Zºaſt/e of Grave/offe. 245
but one gun could be served, and that by four men only ; for all
the gunners of the other detachments were either killed or
wounded. The ammunition of its own gun limbers as well as that
of a limber of the 4th Light battery was exhausted, and there
was no more at hand, the lines of wagons not having been able
to pass the defile. At this moment Major Coester, the divisional
commander, reached the battery and repeated the order to retire.
The major was with the 2nd Horse Artillery battery (von Hahn),
which, as we have seen, had come under fire at Gravelotte before
Hasse's battery, and had not observed the advance of the latter
until it was beyond the defile. He then shared the fate of
Hahn's battery in being prevented from crossing. Having,
however, received orders from General von Schwartz to take
steps for bringing off Hasse's disabled battery, he now arrived
with three wagon teams, which the adjutant, Lieutenant
Selhausen, had procured.
Having refitted under fire as far as was absolutely necessary,
the battery then retired through the defile, its limbers riddled by
bullets, the drivers on foot, the guns drawn by two or four horses,
and closely packed with the severely wounded. The movement
was made at a walk and further losses were sustained. Major
Coester had a horse killed under him ; the last gun was suddenly
reduced to One horse, and, heavily laden with wounded men, was
obliged to halt for assistance. The battery was received at
Gravelotte with a loud hurrah, and General von Schwartz em-
braced the commander with emotion in the presence of the
troops. The retreat of this heroic battery was a triumphal march
in the real sense of the word.
We have seen that the 3rd Light battery (Gnigge) also
cxperienced heavy losses from the very first. In a few minutes
a great number of men and horses were wounded or lying dead
on the ground. After it came into action the battery was
fortunately covered from the tremendous fire from Moscou by the
low garden wall; but suffered severely on its right flank, which
was still exposed. Captain Gnigge, however, efficiently assisted
by Lieutenant Wintgens, maintained a steady fire against
MOScou, as well as against the shelter trenches and gun-pits
near it and in its front, at ranges of from 800 to 1,000 paces.
Moscou itself was set on fire by this battery and Hasse's. They
246 7%e German Artillery.
also prevented the enemy placing fresh batteries in position,
the effect of their fire being observed and reported by a wounded
officer of Lancers in the upper story of the inn of St. Hubert.
The only troops available in the first instance for the
support of the right flank were some weak detachments of the
29th and 69th regiments, and all the cfforts of Colonclvon
Helden-Sarnowski, Major Matthiasz, and Captain Gmügge were
directed to obtaining further reinforcements. Whenever any
infantry reached that dangerous point, it was invariably cut to
pieces by the tremendous fire to which it became exposed.
As might be expected, the failure of the Ist Cavalry Division,
joined to the heavy fire, which now again burst forth after a
long pause, operated disadvantageously on the I5th Division.
Let the reader picture to himself the situation of the greater
part of its troops after the long and bloody struggle against
the enemy's superior force. Both brigades of the Division were
terribly cut up and the troops were falling back into the ravine.
But here the few commanders, who still remained unhurt, and
among them General von Wedell, were ready to halt and reform
the men. The infantry had at first lost ground north of the
quarries and then the quarries themselves, which had been SO
gallantly held.
On the other hand the failure of the cavalry had not affected
the garrison of St. Hubert, which place was in addition filled with
Stragglers and wounded ; and Gnigge's battery was also able to
maintain its position. The special reserves of St. Hubert were
partially brought forward. The enemy did not at present venture
to make a direct attack against St. Hubert, but Swarms of
skirmishers attempted to surround it ſrom Moscou ; they were,
however, brought to a halt by the infantry at St. Hubert, by von
Strubberg's brigade, occupying the outskirts of the wood, and by
the effective fire from the German artillery at Gravelotte.
The troops under the personal orders of General von
Strubberg in the ravine of the Bois de Genivaux had not received
direct intelligence of these events on the plateau, but suddenly
the firing was again heard breaking out in full force. In the
belief that the enciny was about to make an attempt to recap-
ture St. Hubert, the 28th regiment dashcq out of the wood in
Aattle of Grave/ot/e. 247
order to take part in the conflict; but, after heavy losses, a portion
only succeeded in reaching the homestead.
The two battalions of the 39th regiment, which General von
Zastrow sent forward through the valley south of the defile of
Gravelotte, advanced resolutely about 4.30 P.M. up the steep
slope towards Point du Jour with some detachments of the
33rd regiment, which it met on the way. Too weak to storm
the enemy's strong position, they stood firm at 600 paces from
the enemy, and prevented him from advancing from the quarries,
which would have been disastrous to the batteries at St. Hubert."
The 29th regiment had been prevented from immediately
deploying by the advancing batteries and by the Ist Cavalry
Division ; but as soon as the latter retired, the regiment, which
was met by fugitives from the Lancers, again moved forward, as
from the heavy firing it was believed that a serious combat was
taking place. On reaching the quarries and St. Hubert, a rush
was made under a hot fire towards Moscou, but failed to carry
the farm, in spite of the greatest valour. After sustaining heavy
losses it was thrown on the defensive, while a portion of the
regiment fell back into the Bois de Genivaux ; and supports,
detached from time to time to the batteries at St. Hubert, were
invariably cut to pieces by the enemy's concentrated fire.
The 1st battalion of the 69th regiment, which reached
Malmaison at a later hour, made a resolute attack against
Moscou, but was repulsed after a heavy loss by the enemy's
superior force. The two other battalions attacked the enemy
in the Bois de Genivaux in succession and partially reached St.
Hubert. Their arrival was all the more welcome as the detach-
ments of the 28th regiment fighting at the forking of the meadow
ground had expended all their ammunition. Towards 5 P.M.
the 69th, the 28th, and the 67th cleared the southern part of
the Bois de Genivaux of the enemy, but the 69th, which advanced
resolutely over the open ground against Moscou, was soon obliged
to retire.
In spite of its devotion and daring the 31st brigade had been
unable to force its way beyond the points contested by the 15th
| Major von Schell's Operations of the First Army.
248 7%e German Artillery.
Division, but the fighting there had the effect of raising the de-
pressed spirits of the troops, and the Division had been reinforced
at nearly every point. In St. Hubert alone eleven companies
had come to the assistance of von Weltzien's troops.
After 4.30 P.M. it appeared to the superior officers, who were
watching the progress of events from Gravelotte, that affairs on
the left flank at the Bois de Genivaux were taking an unfavour-
able turn. At 5 P.M. General von Steinmetz had directed
General von Goeben to support the attack, and the latter had
consequently ordered his last brigade, the 32nd, under von Rex,
to advance. The 72nd regiment received orders to march
along the road and take up a position in the ravine, in im-
mediate support of the troops engaged. The Ist battalion
of the 40th regiment was placed at Malmaison to cover the
artillery, while the 2nd and 3rd battalions were directed to
advance on the north side of the high road to the forking of the
ravine in the Bois de Genivaux. On arriving there they found all
going on well with von Strubberg's brigade. An attempt now
made by the 3rd battalion against Moscou was nipped in the
bud by the enemy's heavy fire; the 2nd battalion fell back again
to the high road and moved on to the plateau, whence it after-
wards advanced in the direction of St. Hubert and took part
with the 29th and portions of the IInd Corps in the fighting,
which occurred during the evening.
H.M. the King had arrived at Gravelotte at 5 o'clock with
his head-quarters at the moment the cavalry was retiring from
the defile and the contest beyond it had broken out with re-
doubled violence. The head-quarters were now within reach of
the enemy's bullets, and several shells also fell close to the large
group of horsemen, although this was purely accidental on the
part of the enemy's batteries. General von Steinmetz hastencil
to report the state of affairs to His Majesty. The Quarter-
master-General, Colonel Count Wartensleben, had already been
sent to ask for the support of the IIIrd Corps, which originally
had been told off as the reserve of the First Army, but at noon,
as we have already seen, was with the approval of the Royal
head-quarters directed on Vernéville. Consequently the IInd
Corps, General von Fransecky, which was formed up at Rezon-
ville, now received orders to march to Gravelotte,
Battle of Gravelotte. 249
The great artillery mass of the First Army had meanwhile
Continued the contest wherever it was not masked by the advance
of its own troops." Its fire was directed, as already mentioned, on
Moscou, Point du Jour, shelter trenches, and various other points.
To its co-operation must it be mainly attributed that the objects
aimed at by Hasse's and Gnigge's batteries were so successfully
cannonaded. The result was that Moscou was set on fire, the
Initrailleurs near that farm driven away, and the enemy pre-
vented from bringing up fresh batteries of guns and mitrailleurs.
Point du Jour was also set on fire. Columns of hostile infantry
which showed themselves on the crest of the hill, or even on the
slopes, were invariably cut to pieces by the accurate shell-fire;
and especially those bodies of troops which were moving between
Moscou, the Bois de Genivaux, and St. Hubert, as well as those
which showed themselves at Point du Jour. The fire of this
artillery mass moreover was so effective that the French were
prevented from assuming the offensive in sufficient force to drive
back across the ravine the German troops which still maintained
their ground beyond it.
The batteries of horse artillery under Lieut.-Colonel Borcken-
hagen (8th regiment) in their new position east of Gravelotte
were exposed to a heavy fire from French infantry in the Bois
de Vaux (probably stragglers), and were consequently obliged to
fall back to the eastern outskirts of the village. Major Wilhelmi's
horse was wounded.
The French accounts of this period of the battle, although
brief, agree generally with the German. “As the German
artillery,’ writes Frossard, ‘had attained a marked superiority
(quelque ascendant) over ours, the enemy hastened to take ad-
vantage of it. Strong columns of infantry preceded by skir-
mishers debouched from the woods and ravines of Gravelotte
and marched on Point du Jour to seize that important position.
General Vergé reinforced the right flank of his threatened first
line by two battalions of the 32nd regiment; while General
Frossard ordered the 23rd regiment of Bastoul's (2nd) Division
| Major Wilhelmi kept No. 6 gun of the 5th Heavy battery of the 7th regiment,
i.e. the left gun of his division, under his personal orders, and employed it very
successfully to obtain the range of different objects by trial shots, the result being
communicated to the neighbouring batteries.
25O 7%e German Artillery.
to support the left flank. The fire of our infantry and mi-
trailleurs checked the enemy's columns and drove them back into
the ravine, notwithstanding the heavy cannonade with which
this attack was supported." Captain Dupré's mitraillcur battery
(2nd Division), having been pushed forward somewhat too far
on the road, lost a great number of men and horses in a few
minutes.' The battery was extricated and the guns finally with-
drawn, covered by the 1st battalion of the 23rd regiment and
the I2th battalion of Rifles.”
‘On the right of Vergé the 4th Division (3rd Corps), under
Aymard, was exposed to a terrible fire of artillery, and had also
been engaged in opposing the attack directed against Point du
Jour, but the force of the assailants was spent against the firm
and vigorous resistance which they encountered.' If Frossard
means by this that the Germans, in spite of three attacks pre-
pared by a heavy shell-fire, failed to carry the Bois de Genivaux,
he must refer to that portion of it south of the forking of the
ravine.
8. The 26th brigade, with the co-operation of the 5th Light
Öattery of the 7th regiment, seizes Vaua and jussy--The
4th brigade and the 6//, /g/ºt battery come into action at
St. Æuffine—French accounts of this period of the battle.
In obedience to its orders the 26th brigade, commanded by
General von der Goltz, advanced between 2 and 4 P.M. in two
columns from Ars Sur Moselle against Vaux, one of which
marched along the valley and the other through the vineyards on its
slopes. Previous to the receipt of the order the 5th Heavy battery,
Captain Schreiber, had taken up a position on the high vine-
covered hills at Ars, which commanded the valley of the Moselle.
It now moved off with the brigade; but unable to advance
through the vineyards, it was obliged to march by the road in
the valley.
' The German infantry held its ground on the eastern edge of the valley. This
is confirmed by V. D., who says, “ſnais oil elle se main/in/, /talgré les perſes que ſui
ſaisait &/ºrouver la convergence de Juo/re /ir.’
* This must have occurred at the commencement of the attack made by the
I 5th Division.
Aattle of Grave/o/fe. 25 I
The chemy had placed batteries at Vaux, Jussy, and St.
Ruffinc, as well as on the heights of Rozéricullcs, and had also
barricaded the chtrances to the villages. Our infantry forced its
way under a heavy fire through and beyond Vaux, into the
vincyards in front of Jussy, of which village it gained possession
after a sharp fight in the streets. Strong bodies of troops were
now visible at Rozériculles and St. Ruffine. General von der Goltz,
judging that a serious engagement would have no useful result,
ordered his troops to hold their ground without attempting to
advance.
As Soon as the French skirmishers were even partially driven
away, Captain Schreiber, by von der Goltz's orders, led his
battery (5. l. VII.) up the steep slope beyond Vaux, and taking
up a position in the vineyards between that place and Jussy,
threw shells with good effect into the villages of St. Ruffine and
Moulins, as well as at hostile columns which showed themselves
in their vicinity, at ranges varying between I,4OO and 2,500 paces.
To the fire of the French infantry and field guns was added
that of the heavy guns of Fort St. Quentin, but to the latter
the battery paid no attention, as their shells struck the ground
far in rear and more important objects for its fire presented them-
selves. Among the casualties, which were due almost entirely
to the Chassepôt, was Second Lieut. Müller, slightly wounded ;
who however remained with the battery.
About 5 P.M., after the capture of Jussy, the 6th Light
battery, Captain Dolmann (6.1. I.), opened fire from the right
bank of the Moselle. In obedience to an army order that
a brigade was to operate against the flank of a hostile column
advancing in the valley of the Moselle, the Ist Army Corps had
directed the 4th brigade, General von Zglinitzki, consisting of
the 5th and 45th regiments, reinforced by the 3rd Squadron of
the Ioth Dragoons, the 6th Light battery, and half a company of
pioneers, to manoeuvre in the direction of Vaux. Reaching
Augny at 4.30 P.M., the brigade ascertained the state of affairs at
Jussy by reconnaisance, and Dolmann's battery advanced to Orly,
cscorted by two companies, which were directed on Frescaty.
Its shells appeared to strike the village of St. Ruffine, at which
they were aimed, although the range was 5,OOO paces, and the
firing was continued till dark.
252 7%e German Artillery.
An officer, sent from the brigade to communicate with the
troops of the VIIth Corps engaged on the left bank, returnca at
7 P.M. with the news that they were seriously engaged, and
expected the brigade to make a diversion in their favour. As
hostile columns were now seen retiring from the field of battle
towards the valley of the Moselle in the direction of Metz, the
Fusilier battalion of the 5th regiment was pushed forward towards
Vaux as far as the railway embankment, with its 9th company
towards St. Ruffine. The latter alone succeeded in engaging the
enemy, whose columns were apparently thrown into confusion
by the heavy fire with which they were plied.
The fire of the guns of Fort St. Quentin directed on the
marching columns occasioned no loss.
The contest of infantry at Jussy and St. Ruffine lasted till
II P.M., when the line of outposts extended along the cdges of
the Bois de Vaux on the side of Rozérieulles and then across
the high road to Jussy.
The French accounts of this period of the battle state that
von der Goltz's brigade was opposed by Lapasset's, the village of
St. Ruffine being held by the 97th regiment. Marshal Bazaine
first learnt during the afternoon that his whole line was attacked,
and then rode from Plappeville to Fort St. Quentin. Fay
remarks—and nearly all the French writers concur in the opinion
—that ‘it was apparent to everyone that our antagonist could
attempt nothing of importance in this direction.' But Marshal
Bazaine—to judge from his own work—thought it possible that
the enemy would try to turn the French left flank by means of
the army corps on the right bank of the Moselle, especially as
the forts, unfinished and scarcely armed, were in no condition to
afford any material support. (“Les forts de Metz, inachevés et à
pcine armés, étaicnt hors d'état de rendre quelque service sérieux.')
Therefore to avert the danger of being cut off from Metz, which
he greatly dreaded in consequence of the troops not having yet
received their supplies of provisions, Marshal Bazaine was
induced to place batterics from the reserve So as to command the
valley of the Moselle, and these now replied to the fire of the
German artillery.
Aattle of Gravelotte. 253
9. The First Army is ordered to assume the offensive—Attacks by
the 2nd and 3rd French Corps—The 4t/, / ight battery at
St. Huberſ—Advance of the 32nd brigade—Co-operation of
the artillery of the IInd Corps with that of the First Army—
Arrival of the IInd Corps at Gravelotte—Attack of the 3rd
Division against Point du jour and Moscow—Advance
against the French left flank—Close of the contest on the
German right flank—The 4th Division on the morning of
the 19th–The 5th Heavy battery under the guns of Fort
St. Quentin.
At six o'clock the contest at Gravelotte had gradually died
away along the whole line, but towards 6.45 P.M. unusually heavy
firing was heard in the direction of St. Privat. The Royal head-
quarters presumed that this was a fresh and possibly decisive
attack by the Second Army, and, to afford direct support,
Ordered the First Army to advance at once to the attack with
all available troops, it being also known that the whole of the
IInd Corps was already on the march and therefore might be
reckoned on for support.
General von Steinmetz immediately issued the necessary.
orders to Generals von Zastrow and Goeben, but the number of
available troops was small. The position of the VIIth Army
Corps was such that its movements necessarily conformed in
every way to those of the IInd Army Corps, and will be de-
scribed below. After the advance of the 40th regiment General
von Goeben had no troops at hand except the 72nd regiment,
which was in reserve in the ravine; but before the order for its
advance reached it, the heavy firing from Moscou and St.
Hubert announced a sudden change in the situation.
Some uneasiness was caused to the 2nd and 3rd French Corps
by the abrupt renewal of heavy firing on the right flank and
along the whole line. General Frossard therefore ordered all
the troops in reserve to move up into the first line, a similar
movement having already taken place on the left flank of the
3rd Corps, where the Voltigeurs of the Guard had been sent to
the front; and at the same time the whole of the artillery reopened
fire.
254 . 7%e German Artillery.
No information is given by French writers as to whether
this movement was made with the intention of assuming the
offensive or merely to guard against the expected attack of the
Germans. This much however is certain, that, in addition to the
advance of small bodies of troops from every part of the line,
strong masses of troops also rushed forwards with shouts from
the hill between Leipsic and Moscou in the direction of St.
Hubert and the copses to the north-west.
‘Shortly before the outbreak of the hostile fire General von
Goeben had become aware that though St. Hubert was sufficiently
garrisoned by companies of the 15th and 16th Divisions, there
were in and about that place hundreds of stragglers from different
battalions, who, without coherence, object, or leaders, and wearied
by the long contest, were likely to give way to any sudden
pressure. When, therefore, the stillness was broken by the re-
newed firing, and swarms of tirailleurs advanced from Point du
Jour and Moscou, the foremost men fell back, carrying with them
those in rear; while the panic increased in proportion to the
distance from the supposed danger. The garrison of St. Hubert,
although now engaged in the contest, was not affected by this
retrograde movement.’
The position of Gnigge's battery (3. l. VII.) was at this time
more than ever perilous, great losses being caused by the hostile
fire from Point du Jour, which took it in flank and rear. But a
sense of the importance of the position induced the com-
mander to maintain it, and he was moreover encouraged to
do so by General von Goeben, who had arrived in the vicinity
of the battery with General von Kamecke, commanding the
artillery of the VIIIth Army Corps.
Even when the mass of stragglers rushed towards the battery
Captain Gnigge preserved an unshaken calmness, and en-
deavoured to “restore order out of chaos.' Vain attempt The
mighty stream could not be checked, but poured through
the battery, where it was overwhelmed by the enemy's fire,
and men and horses were crushed together. Everything was
obscured by clouds of dust. Captain Gnigge, utterly powerless,
saw part of his battery swept away in the general confusion ;
* From Helmuth's Lecture.
Aſſaſſ//e of Grave/ot/e. 255
and when the turmoil was over, three guns without limbers
and another unhorsed limber were all that remained of the
battery in its original position. Collecting however a few gunners
and infantry men, about 30 in number, he opened fire with
case at a distance of from 3OO to 500 paces on the pursuing
skirmishers, and repulsed them." The German infantry then
again advanced in good order against the enemy's position, so
that the battery was unable to fire more than a few rounds in the
direction of Point du Jour for fear of hitting some of the
troops. Second Lieut. Wintgens had meanwhile removed his
division of the battery to a position 200 paces to the rear, near
the high road, to support the infantry; there he had time to fire
a few rounds of shell and case in the direction of Point du Jour
before the guns were masked by the advancing infantry.
The battery did not quit the position where it had behaved
so nobly until darkness made it impossible to lay the guns, and
the IInd Corps advanced to the assault. Everything that could
be removed was carried on the guns; the wounded were con-
veyed to the rear, and the road as much as possible cleared of
the corpses of men and horses. The battery bivouacked with
the corps artillery at Gravelotte.
‘The mob of stragglers had meanwhile crossed the ravine,
spreading confusion on the right and left as far as the detachments
which still maintained their ground ; so that, notwithstanding
the steadiness of the troops in front, the state of affairs appeared
to those far in rear to be critical.” The 72nd regiment of
the 32nd brigade (von Rex) now advanced from the ravine as
far as St. Hubert, passing the mob of stragglers with unshaken
steadiness and order, and was followed by the 2nd battalion of
the 40th regiment. The 2nd battalion of the 72nd attacked
Moscou, incurring heavy casualties, but failed to gain possession
of the place.
At this moment the IInd Corps reached Gravelotte with
The battery had previously (before 6 P.M.) fired four case-shot, being for the
moment without other projectiles, against an ammunition wagon escorted by cavalry,
which came forward from behind some cover. The troopers immediately ſled,
abandoming the wagon. Aſter 6 P.M. Acting Sergeant-Major IIaase brought up the
long-desired supply of ammunition from Gravelotte.
* According to Iſelmuth.
256 The German Artillery.
bugles sounding and drums beating amidst the shouts of
thousands. With the permission of the Royal head-quarters
General Fransecky had started from Pont à Mousson at 2 A.M.
instead of at 4 A.M. At 1 P.M. on the previous day the corps had
received orders to march from Mézières to Rezonville, where it
formed up in the presence of the King, and then advanced by order
of the Royal head-quarters to Gravelotte. The corps artillery,
Colonel Petzel, escorted by the I Ith Dragoons, was immediately
sent forward at a trot with orders to come into action on the
west of the ravine.
The 3rd Division, General von Hartmann, followed at 5.45
P.M., and in rear of it the 4th Division, commanded by General
Hann von Weihern ; the advanced guard of the 3rd Division
arrived to the south of Gravelotte at 6.30 P.M. Having asked
for orders from General von Steinmetz, the IInd Corps was
directed ‘to advance against the hills of Point du Jour and
Moscou, and to make itself master of the plateau and home-
steads.” The struggle there was cvidently a hot one, for the
Chassepôt and mitrailleur bullets actually reached as far as
Gravelotte. Information was received from General von Zastrow
that it was possible to march along the high road and on
either side of it, but not through the Bois de Vaux. In order to
bring up the fresh troops with rapidity it was necessary to
advance as far as possible in line ; General von Fransecky placed
himself at the entrance of the defile to direct the operation.
Before we follow the IInd Corps into action we must
return to the contest of the great artillery mass of the First
Army at Gravelotte. The guns had ceased firing for some
time,” when large masses again showed themselves on the
opposite heights. Favoured by the form of the ground and
approaching twilight the French batteries were not discovered
until they opened fire. Although a heavy fire of shell, shrapnel,
and mitraille was directed on the German artillery from the
hostile position, the loss was trifling. It, in return, shelled with
the best effect masses of infantry which showed themselves
at Point du Jour, Moscou, and other points; while advancing
| Some of the batteries ſed their horses and Scrved out rations to the men,
Aattle of Gravelotte. 257
columns were compelled to retreat at ranges of from 1,800 to
2,OOO paces. Batteries on the left flank directed their fire ap-
parently with good results against bodies of hostile troops
(possibly reserves) not far from the Bois de Vaux at ranges
varying from 3,500 to 4,OOO paces. In a short time the position
of the hostile artillery was discernible only by the flash of the
guns, at which our batteries aimed. The enemy soon ceased
firing entirely.
The corps artillery of the IInd Corps reached Gravelotte in
open column of batteries, but there was no room for it to come
into action. Single guns were, however, eagerly pushed forward
into the intervals between the Westphalian artillery, and after
some trouble space was found on the extreme right flank of
the great line of artillery by a division of the 2nd Horse
Artillery battery, Captain Rodenwaldt, the 3rd Heavy battery,
Captain Zöllner, and the 3rd Horse Artillery battery, Captain
Roehl. The two latter fired only one round each against the
hostile masses at Point du Jour, and were then ordered to cease
firing, as there was danger of hitting our troops as they advanced
beyond the defile. The remaining batteries of the corps artillery
were obliged to remain to the South-east of Gravelotte. Several
casualties were occasioned by musketry and mitrailleurs.
Meanwhile orders to advance were brought by Colonel Count
von Wartensleben to the advanced guard of the IInd Corps
under Colonel von Decken at 6.45 P.M. The 2nd battalion of
Rifles, followed by the 54th regiment, marched along the wooded
slope of the ravine. The Ist Light battery, Captain von
Eckensteen, belonging to the advanced guard, was, in obedience
to orders, on the point of following the infantry into the defile,
which was swept by the enemy's musketry and mitrailleurs; but
was prevented by the divisional commander, Major Freiherr von
Eynatten, because the infantry on reaching the opposite side of
the defile became at once engaged in a hot musketry fight. The
battery was obliged to move into the great artillery line of the
First Army to the east of Gravelotte, and fired a few rounds at
2,OOO paces against hostile artillery at St. Hubert, when orders
were given to cease firing, to avoid injuring our own advancing
troops,
S
258 The German Artillery.
Owing to the limited space the other batteries of the Ist
field division experienced great difficulty in aligning them-
selves with Eckensteen's, as ordered ; this, however, they at last
accomplished one after the other, but only just as darkness was
coming on. Consequently the 2nd Heavy battery, Captain
Hildebrandt, and the 2nd Light battery, Captain Linker, were
unable to fire more than one round each in this position. The
latter had already cannonaded Point du Jour at a range of 2,500
paces from a position near the 5th Heavy battery of the 7th
regiment. The Ist Heavy battery, Captain Goetsch, which
finally arrived on the left flank of the division, did not come
into action." All the batteries incurred casualties from the
enemy's musketry fire.
The 3rd field division, Lieut.-Colonel Bauer, in columns of
batteries, had followed the leading brigade of the 4th Division
on the right flank, and was obliged to remain near at hand
in rear of the Ist field division. The 5th Light battery alone
was able to come into action on the right flank of the 1st field
division, where it fired two rounds of common shell. This
division also suffered from the enemy's musketry.
The Pomeranian artillery also was prevented from carrying
out its intention of coming into action beyond the defile, for
Colonel Petzel found that the defile was almost completely
blocked up. When at length it became more free, darkness had
intervened, and it was impracticable to take the artillery over.
The 1st and 3rd field divisions after moving off were obliged
to halt, and several casualties were occasioned by the Chassepôt.
Having traced the movements of the Pomeranian artillery to
| The reports of the Ist field division state that the batteries, and especially the
ammunition wagons heavily laden with forage, experienced great diſficulty in crossing
the ravine of la Jurée at the side of the high road. In that of the 1st Heavy battery
it is related that ‘the battery selected a bye-road leading along the edge of the wood,
by which ſour guns only succeeded in reaching the plateau without accident. On
the other hand, two guns were delayed by the halting of an ammunition wagon of the
1st Light battery (of the advanced guard), one of the guns being precipitated down a
steep bank with the wheelers. No damage, however, was dome, and Lieutenant
Klopsch, commanding the division of the battery, succeeded in bringing up both
guns half an hour later.'
The assistance of the detachments was also necessary in getting the ammunition
wagons up the slope.
Aſſaf//e of Gravelotte. 259
the end of the battle, we must return to the other arms. Let it be
remembered that the IInd Army Corps after completing the long
journey by rail had continuously made forced marches. It had
on this day started before midnight and been eighteen hours on
the march, but the consciousness that it was destined to
decide the day, animated the corps to such an extent that
fatigue was forgotten, while the announcement by General
Fransecky that it was in the immediate presence of the King
was received with loud hurrahs. Resolutely, with colours flying
and drums beating, the troops pressed forward towards the ravine.
Thus, long before the news of the decisive success of the
Second Army against the French right wing could be received,
the head-quarters were convinced that the State of affairs on the
right, where the First Army was posted, was secure against all
changes of fortune. By order of General von Fransecky the
2nd battalion of Rifles advanced on the South of the high road
to cover the right flank and alligned itself with the 39th regi-
ment. Skilfully led, the battalion succeeded, notwithstanding
the hostile fire, in approaching in the twilight to within a few hun-
dred paces of Point du Jour, and maintained its position there.
The 54th, which was following, advanced right and left
of St. Hubert against Moscou and Point du Jour, sustaining
heavy casualties, and established itself at the bend of the
road near the latter place. At a few hundred paces from
Moscou it suffered severely, not only from the enemy but also
from our own infantry in rear, which, losing Some men as it
advanced, aimed at the spot where the enemy was supposed
to be. To avoid this the leading troops at last ceased firing, but
maintained the ground already won.
The advanced guard of the Division was soon followed by the
main body, seven battalions strong, from the 42nd, 2nd, and 14th
regiments, which pressed forward eagerly along the high road
and to the south of it. Generals von Hartmann and von
Koblinsky endeavoured to keep the troops in hand as much
as possible, and General von Barnekow Crossed the ravine
for the same purpose ; but this was rendered almost impossible
by the darkness, the want of space in front of the defile, and the
general state of affairs. Beyond St. IIubert the leaders were
S 2
26O 7%e German A rtillery.
unable to make the troops act together, and each commander
acted on his own responsibility.
Of the main body of the 3rd Division the 2nd and 14th
regiments attacked resolutely in the direction of Point du Jour,
General Hartmann retaining half a battalion of the 2nd in hand
at St. Hubert. In the advance it was impossible to avoid their
becoming mixed up with the 54th regiment and portions of the
VIIth as well as of the VIIIth Army Corps, but pressing on and
passing them, they partially reached the first line. It was
8.30 P.M. when the last regiment (the 42nd) of the Division
reached the other side of the ravine, and seeing no oppor-
tunity of engaging, formed up with its left flank resting on the
high road. *
The 4th Division, General Hann von Weihern, which had
followed the 3rd, began to arrive to the east of Gravelotte
exactly at Sunset, Consequently after 8 P.M., with the 7th brigade,
du Trossel, in front. The 8th brigade, having been met by His
Majesty on the march, received him with loyal acclamations and
was directed on Gravelotte. Eager to reach the front at all
costs, the battalions made their way through the hedges and
fences enclosing the wood. As soon as the brigade came up on
the left of the 7th, being thus nearest to the defile, it received
orders to march towards the plateau. The leading regiment,
the 21st, made its way with great difficulty through the crowded
defile and halted near St. Hubert to await further orders. A
few of its leading companies, however, pressed forward into the
front line of the troops engaged against Moscou and Point du
Jour, and with a heavy loss took part in the contest.
The 21st regiment was followed by the 61st, which on
reaching the defile was ordered by General von Moltke to halt
on this side of it. That officer, having watched the progress of
events for Some time from a position close to the defile, had
come to the conclusion that the troops of the IInd Corps beyond
the ravine were in sufficient force to secure the victory, while
it would be impossible in the darkness to manoeuvre with
success the vast body of troops now pressing onwards. But the
impatience of the men and their officers was not to be repressed,
and the 2 Ist also was directed by General von Kettler to march
towards the heights occupied by the cnemy.
Battle of Graveloffe. 26 I
Let us now briefly notice the movements of the VIIth Corps.
At 7 o'clock General von Zastrow had issued orders to von
Kamecke's and von Glümer's Divisions to advance to the attack.
But in order not to be left entirely without a reserve, three bat-
talions of the 27th brigade of von Kamecke's Division (74th
regiment) were left to the east of Gravelotte. General von
Glümer, knowing that his only brigade on the spot (the 25th)
was much scattered, assembled the 2nd and 3rd battalions of
the 73rd regiment, and led them along the forest road towards
Rozérieulles and the plateau.
“It was now past 8 P.M. and already dark; from the left was
heard the din of war, as well as the shouts and bugle calls of the
IInd Corps, while General von Glümer advanced against Point
du Jour, though there was but little prospect of success against
the hostile masses, which soon became visible.’" On the right of
General von Glümer the 53rd, the 13th, and the 7th Rifles, under
Colonels von Frankenberg and von Gerstheim-Hohenstein, were
advancing at the same time. By a decisive attack the extreme
right flank succeeded in making its way to within 80 paces of
the main road, where it held its ground until nearly IO P.M.,
when the fighting ceased. The troops then withdrew in good
order to the eastern edge of the wood, where the 7th Rifles and
the 73rd had placed their outposts.
General von Osten-Sacken had directed the Ist battalion of
the 73rd regiment to march towards the north end of the Bois
de Vaux, whence it reached the plateau South of the high road
and was soon lost among the advancing troops of the IInd Army
Corps. General von Woyna was also marching on the same
point with part of the 77th regiment of von Kamecke's Division,
which, as well as the 39th, advanced mixed up with the 14th
regiment against Point du Jour.
At 9.15 P.M. the ‘Halt' and ‘Assembly’ were sounded
for the troops beyond the ravine, and at 9.30 P.M. the enemy's
fire gradually died away, although every now and then a volley
of musketry or an occasional round from a mitrailleur was
fired haphazard into the darkness.
* From Captain Helmuth's Lecture.
262 7%e German Artillery.
The arrangements for assembling the troops were conducted
with the utmost energy under the immediate Supervision of the
generals in command; a task of considerable difficulty, Owing to
the darkness, the position of the ravine in rear, and the fact that
the troops of three army corps were mixed together At St.
Hubert half of the 2nd battalion of the 2nd regiment and the
the 21st and 42nd regiments were formed up, with the 61st just
arrived in second line. These battalions were directed by
Generals von Hartmann and Hann von Weihern to take up
a position to the west of St. Hubert (which was still occupied),
extending across the high road from the edge of the wood on
the north to that on the south of it, with orders to remain
under arms, but not to fire unless they saw the enemy close
and distinctly. All other troops were ordered to assemble in
the ravine.
It was 2 A.M. before the plateau was clear of the disordered
and retiring masses of troops. At St. Hubert the half-battalion
of the 2nd regiment had throughout preserved its formation
unshaken. Meanwhile the last brigade of the IInd Corps (the
7th, under General du Trossel) was ordered to the front to
furnish the outposts; and when this had been done, twelve bat-
talions in addition (the 4th Division, the 42nd regiment, and half
of the 2nd) were formed up in line with St. Hubert ready to
resume the contest if necessary on the following morning. The
Fusilier battalion of the 9th regiment was pushed forward by
order of General Hann von Weihern to the bend in the high
road, and the Ist company of the 2nd regiment established itself
a hundred paces from Point du Jour.
On the left flank von Strubberg's men, reinforced by some
companies of the 2nd battalion of the 69th, had finally made
themselves masters of the Copses extending from the south of the
neighbouring defile to the enemy's shelter trench. This line
therefore indicated the boundary of the ground won from the
enemy. An examination of the map shows that the infantry had
forced its way like a wedge into the line Moscou–Point du Jour.
Even after IO P.M., by which hour the enemy's fire had
generally ceased, it broke out again at three distinct periods
during the night, disturbing the troops and occasioning casualtics.
This was possibly intended to cover the enemy's retreat, which
Aattle of Gravelotte. 262
J
lmad already commenced at this part of the line. Not a man was
left on the following morning except a detachment of 200 men
at Point du Jour; being summoned by the colonel of the 9th
regiment to lay down their arms, only a few men obeyed, but
the party retired firing, when two fusilier companies were
ordered to the front. The 2nd battalion of the 9th regiment
now occupied Moscou and Point du Jour, which were merely
smoking heaps of ruins.
Hann von Weihern's Division was posted astride the high
road ready to oppose any offensive movement by the enemy
from Metz, and was supported by Lieut.-Colonel Bauer with two
batteries (5th Heavy and 5th Light, commanded by Captain
Meisner and Rhades), which had been ordered to cross the ravine
early in the morning and take up a position at Point du Jour.
The pioneers commenced digging gun-pits for the batteries, whose
appearance on the plateau was the signal for Fort St. Quentin
to open fire from its heavy guns, the shell falling close in front
of the batteries and in the intervals between them. The batteries
were therefore withdrawn 200 paces and placed under cover
until the completion of the pits.
Io. The attack of the Guard Corps on St. Privat, supported by the
Hessian field artillery—The French position is picreed at a
point S. W. of St. Privat.
Let us now return to the Guard Corps. It has already been
shown that the Ist Division was assembled in and about
St. Marie aux Chênes ; that the 2nd Division was on the
march from the wood east of Jouaville to St. Ail, its van having
already reached the latter village, and was forming up ; and
that the whole of the artillery (exclusive of the batteries
attached to the cavalry), together with the Hessian batteries,
formed a line extending from St. Marie aux Chênes by St.
Ail to the Bois de la Cusse, having already reduced the French
guns to Silence.
Prince August von Wurtemberg had watched the enemy's
position incessantly, and the right moment for decisive operations
seemed to have arrived. Movements were observed on the part
of the enemy which might be interpreted as indicating an inten-
264 7%e German Artillery.
tion to attack one of the neighbouring corps or as the com-
mencement of a change of position to avoid a decisive engage-
ment at that point. The sun was sinking and the thick Smoke
made it seem later than it really was ; the time available for a
battle was evidently short.
The Prince, observing also the increasing activity of the Saxon
artillery north of St. Marie and the uneasiness of the enemy at
Roncourt, considered that the Saxon troops engaged in the
turning movement could not be far from Roncourt. Moreover
the difficulty experienced by the Ixth Army Corps in maintain-
ing its position in the Bois de la Cusse urgently demanded an
attack by the Guard Corps to disengage its left flank. Con-
sequently Prince August decided to attack St. Privat, with the
conviction that the co-operation of the Saxon Corps would not
long be delayed. This was reported to Prince Frederick Charles,
who had ridden up to the hill of Habonville, and could not
withhold his consent.
General von Dannenberg conveyed the orders for the
attack to both Divisions. The 4th brigade was to advance
against St. Privat from St. Ail on the south of the high road,
the 1st from St. Marie on the north of it, followed by the 2nd
regiment of the 2nd brigade in support. The advanced guard
of the 1st Division was to remain for the present at St. Marie,
which village was to serve as the point d'appui for the attack, as
well as a rallying point in the event of a repulse.
Prince August von Wurtemberg rode along the front of the
4th brigade, just then deploying, to St. Marie to confer with
General von Pape about the proposed attack. That officer
immediately issued orders to the 1st brigade to advance: as it
had however to march up from its position in reserve south-west
of St. Marie, it could not commence the attack until twenty
minutes later than the 4th brigade, which having deployed,
advanced soon after 5.30 P.M.
The description of the field of battle has conveyed some
idea of the great natural strength of St. Privat, which its garrison
had turned to the best possible advantage. At nearly every
point the assailants were exposed to the fire of four or five ranks
of men, one in rear of the other, supported by shell and shrap-
nel from Several batteries recently brought forward. Neither
Battle of Gravelotte. 265
St. Privat nor its garrison had as yet suffered from the German
artillery.
The 4th brigade of the Guard, General von Berger, had de-
ployed at St. Ail with the precision of the parade. The advance
to the attack was simultaneous, the regiment Franz being on
the left flank and the reignment Augusta on the right. A
battalion of the latter regiment, ordered to escort the artillery,
could no longer be kept back from advancing with the other
troops, one half joining the right wing of its own regiment, and
the other half passing the right of the artillery with part of the
1st battalion of the regiment Alexander, which till now had
been posted at Habonville, where the remainder of this battalion
was retained for the present as a support.
The bands played the national anthem, but their music was
soon drowned by the din of battle, which broke forth on the
collision of the combatants. Our infantry incurred heavy
casualties from the very commencement of the advance, but
pressed onward with gallant impetuosity. It was past 5.30 P.M.
and the battle at its height when the 1st brigade of the Guard
moved from its position in reserve on the south-east of St.
Marie. It marched round the south of St. Marie to the north
of the high road to avoid the troops of the 4th brigade in that
direction, and already during this flank march was exposed to
a heavy fire. On arriving there, the brigade, although losing
severely, wheeled to the right so as to bring its flank 600
paces from the road, when it advanced direct against St. Privat.
Up to this time the regiments had been formed in contiguous
columns of half-battalions, but now by continually reinforcing
the foremost troops the line of battle was so ordered that two
battalions of the 3rd regiment were on the right flank ; on the
left of which were two and a half battalions of the Ist regiment
and still further to the left the remaining battalion and a half
(1st battalion of the 3rd regiment and a half-battalion of the
Ist). In spite of the murderous fire, which mowed down whole
ranks of men even at this great distance, the troops pressed
forward with admirable bearing.
When the infantry of the Guard advanced to the assault,
Prince Hohenlohe ordered the artillery to prepare for the attack
by concentrating its fire on St. Privat and the enemy's batteries,
266 7%e German Artillery.
which had reopened fire. But as soon as the infantry had driven
in the French tirailleurs, which till then had prevented our
batteries advancing, the Prince ordered them to move up in
order to support the attack more effectively. Lieut.-Colonel
Bychelberg with the 1st field division advanced from the centre,
and Colonel von Scherbening with the corps artillery in echelons
from the left flank; while still further to the left Lieut.-Colonel
Rheinhaben at the same time led the 3rd field division to the
front. This division with the two batteries on the left of the
corps artillery, under von Mutius and von Grävenitz, which
trotted forward at first, opened fire at 1,700 paces on columns
of infantry and at 2,000 paces on St. Privat from intermediate
positions, which however they were soon obliged to leave, being
masked by their own infantry. Here considerable loss was in-
curred, principally from hostile infantry, Captain von Mutius
and Second Lieut. von Vangerow receiving severe wounds, of
which the latter eventually died. Captain von Oppell and
Second Lieut. von Vangerow had horses killed under them.
A storm of Chassepôt bullets, common and shrapnel shells, was
poured on the artillery of the Guard, but in spite of great losses
it moved steadily onwards. A fresh position was taken up as
close to the enemy as the form of the slope permitted." Owing
to the circumstance that the corps artillery inclined somewhat
to the right, to give the advancing infantry more room and also
to avoid being masked, the relative position of the Ist Heavy
battery of the Guard, von Sametzki, with regard to the other
batteries was changed. With the assent of Lieut.-Colonel
Bychelberg it wheeled to the right by divisions and made a
flank march along the rear of the other batteries, afterwards
coming into action on this right of this division. During the
movement it incurred but few casualties, notwithstanding the
cnemy's heavy fire.
The advance of the artillery as well as of the infantry of the
Guard was supported by the Hessian batteries, which confronted
the heights of Amanvillers and were drawn up in echelon on
the right rear. It will be seen that Some of them afterwards
came up into line on the right of the artillery of the Guard
| The slope is irregular. Had the artillery advanced further at that time, it
would have ſound itselſ in a hollow and been unable to see anything.
Aattle of Gravelotte. 267
The infantry meanwhile continued eagerly to press forwards,
without waiting until the artillery could take up its second posi-
tion nearer the enemy. The batteries could only come into action
between the advancing Columns by degrees. The new line was
not completed, and only a few of the batteries had just reopened
fire when the attack of the infantry was brought to a standstill.
At a distance of 800 paces from St. Privat the left wing of the
4th brigade was exposed to a biting fire of artillery and infantry,
which compelled it to halt. It now received orders from the
corps commandant to abandon the attack and maintain its hold
of the ground it had won. A stationary musketry contest
ensued. Very great loss was occasioned by hostile infantry
behind the hedge, enclosing the road which runs to the south-
west corner of St. Privat. It was, however, dislodged by a
combined attack made in front and rear by parties from both
regiments.
A detachment from the right wing of this brigade had
already succeeded in seizing that part of the hill of St. Privat
which juts out towards the south-west. This was from 1,000
to 1,300 paces from the village, and was in fact part of the
French main position. The detachment was presently attacked
by strong columns from Amanvillers, probably of Cissey's
Division. . The few companies at hand held their ground reso-
lutely, but with great difficulty, against the enemy's superior
force." The important point was in danger of being lost. Gene-
rals von Berger and von Budritzky, who were actively engaged
in the struggle, looked anxiously for the advancing artillery.
But the cry from the hill for support had already reached the
2nd Heavy battery of the Guard, commanded by Captain von
Prittwitz. Without waiting for orders it advanced up the slope,
and coming into action near the hard-pressed infantry, main-
tained the important point against all attacks. But heavy losses
were caused by the hostile musketry fire, and Lieutenant von
Winterfeld was severely wounded. In its advance three guns
were temporarily left behind, one of them having lost all its
drivers. In this position the battery fired on the hostile columns
* Consisting of Falkenstein's and Arnim's companies of the regiment Augusta,
and two sections of the regiment Alexander.
268 7%e German Artillery.
and skirmishers at a range of 800 paces with such effect that
they were compelled to halt.
The battery, however, was not alone. With equal daring
Captain von Friederici-Steinmann was advancing with the 3rd
Light battery of the Guard to come into action somewhat
further to the north. Forming the last echelon of the corps
artillery, it was only just on the point of taking up a position in
the great line of artillery confronting St. Privat, when General
von Berger made his request for support to the divisional com-
mander, Major von Krieger. By order of that officer the battery,
passing along the rear of the other batteries of the division,
advanced to the hill. It also was czposed to a deadly fire, but
came into action, notwithstanding the heavy casualties incurred.
The captain of the battery fell severely wounded, and died soon
afterwards. The command devolved on Lieutenant Schmalz.
The enemy was shelled at ranges of from I, OOO to I, IOO paces.
By the fire of the batteries, in conjunction with the obstinate
resistance of the weak body of infantry, the foremost troops of
the enemy were repulsed and possession of the important point
maintained.
The 4th Heavy battery of the Guard, Captain Seeger, next
came into action between these two batteries, and all three
directed a deliberate and most effective fire at 1,500 paces against
the hostile masses which continued to advance from Amanvillers.
Almost in a line with the 4th brigade and within 400 or 500
paces of the enemy, the attack of the 1st brigade was also
checked. After losing nearly all its officers and half its men, it
nevertheless held its ground under a heavy fire with four and a
half battalions in a thin line fronting St. Privat, while by order
of General von Kessel a half-battalion and a company of pioneers,
forming an angle with the remainder of the brigade, faced Ron-
court. The 6th battalion (1st of the 3rd regiment) had diverged
further to the north and joined the Saxon troops.
General von Pape had remained with the 1st brigade in the
foremost line, encouraging the troops by his presence. Its
critical position, and the gap now formed between it and the 4th
brigade, did not escape his notice. He therefore at 6 P.M. ordered
up the 2nd regiment of the Guard to connect the brigades.
Accompanied by Brigadier-General von Medem, it pressed reso-
Aattle of Gravelotte. 269
lutely forwards under the renewed fire of the enemy. Its bat-
talions with great gallantry reached the foremost line, and after
losing many officers and men filled up the gap between the bri-
gades, General von Medem being among the wounded. General
von Pape had his horse killed under him, and several of his
staff were either killed or wounded.
A regiment of Chasseurs of du Barail's Division charged the
left flank, but was repulsed with great loss by a well-directed volley
from the 2nd battalion of the Ist regiment. The 2nd Lancers
of the Guard saw the hostile cavalry and dashed forward from
its position west of St. Marie, but was unable to get to close
quarters.
The position of the left wing was still critical. In con-
sequence of a report to this effect made by General von Kessel,
General von Pape ordered the 4th regiment of the Guard to
march to its support. Towards 6.30 P.M. it advanced from the west
of St. Marie and was ordered by Prince August von Wurtemberg
to keep as much as possible under cover in the hollow ground as
far as the meadow close to the south edge of the wood, which it
was then to follow to the left flank of the Ist brigade. By skil-
fully taking advantage of the ground as it advanced, the regiment
succeeded in prolonging the left of the line without any very
serious loss and in getting within 800 paces of the north-west
corner of St. Privat. It was 7 P.M. and the co-operation of the
Saxons had for some time made itself felt.
According to the statements of Lieut.-Colonel de Mont-
luisant the great losses of the Guard Corps must be attributed
to the biting fire of the 9th battalion of Rifles no less than to the
French shell and shrapnel, which were very effective against its
columns of infanty even at a range of 3,000 yards. We conclude
from the French reports that the seventeen battalions of the
Guard, exclusive of the four battalions left behind to garrison
St. Marie, were opposed by nearly 40,000 men, consisting of by
far the greater part of the 6th Corps, as yet nearly intact, and
Cissey's Division of the 4th Corps, most of whose battalions
wheeled to the right to attack the Guard Corps.
In spite of this numerical disproportion and the great ad-
vantage of position enjoyed by the French, the troops of the
27O The German Artillery.
Guard Corps, unaided, had now succeeded in enveloping St. Privat
on the South-west, west, and north-west at a distance of 800 pacCS.
Part of the 4th brigade had moreover already forced its way like a
wedge into the enemy's main position, had broken the connection
between the 4th and 6th French Corps, and now held its ground
materially supported by three batteries of the Guard. To con-
tinue the contest, however, was impossible; it was now necessary
to await the effect of the artillery on St. Privat and the develop-
ment of the attack of the Saxon Army Corps. Orders to halt
were therefore issued to the foremost troops of the infantry of
the Guard, and had to be repeated owing to the eagerness of the
troops to push forward.
I I. Continuation of the artillery contest between the Bois de la
Cusse and de Genèvaua–Attack of Amanvillers—The 18th
Division at Chantrenne, supported by artillery of the IIIrd
Army Corps.
Meanwhile the IXth Army Corps had continued the contest.
On the more open high ground in the centre, artillery was mainly
employed, while on the two flanks resting on the Bois de
Genivaux and de la Cusse infantry maintained the struggle.
We have seen that the hostile artillery here had already been
silenced. Thick Swarms of skirmishers now showed themselves
between Montigny la Grange and Amanvillers in the vicinity of
the French camp ; on them the nine batteries” under General
von Puttkammer concentrated their fire at ranges of from 1,800
to 2,500 paces. To obtain a more direct fire Captain Freiherr
von Eynatten, with the permission of General von Puttkammer,
wheeled his three batteries of the Ist field division an eighth of
a circle to the left, which was executed by the 2nd Light battery
advancing 3OO paces and at the same time bringing its right
shoulder forward, the other batteries being aligned with it. This
advantage was of course gained with loss of cover, the effect
It was probably Péchot’s brigade which had been driven back.
* (I. r.) First Lieut. Franck, (3. r. III.) Tirst Lieut. von Gizycki, of the 3rd field
artillery regiment; (2. r.) Captain König, (I. I.) Second Lieut. Jourdan for Koch,
(2. l.) Captain Freiherr von Eynatten, (I. S.) Second Lieut. Puttkammer ſor
Werner II., (4.1.) Captain Mente, of the 9th regiment, (r. H.) Lieut. Brandt Jor
Captain Schäſſer-Bernstein, and (5. l. G.) Captain von Unruhe.
Pattle of Gravelotte. 27 I
of which was soon felt, the Chassepôt adding fresh casualties to
the heavy losses previously incurred. But, encouraged by the
words of General von Puttkammer and the example of their
officers, the men continued to work their guns with great gallantry.
The Ist Light battery (Second Lieut. Jourdan for Captain
Koch) experienced exceptional difficulty in moving into the
new position. The detachments had been so thinned that the
guns could only be unlimbered with the greatest difficulty. One
of them sustained such heavy losses that it had to be left in its
old position, and afterwards joined the 2nd line of wagons. No
riding-horse was left in the battery, so that the captain himself
was obliged to walk. Second Lieut. Jourdan and some men
were severely wounded by the explosion of a cartridge while
loading. But the French infantry was soon forced to retire by
the accurate and concentrated fire of the batteries under the
orders of Generals von Puttkammer and von Bülow at ranges
varying from 1,600 to 3,500 paces.
There was now a considerable pause in the battle, which
however was frequently broken by successive attacks of bodies
of infantry, while the attempts made by the enemy to bring
forward fresh batteries of guns and mitrailleurs were always
frustrated by the concentrated fire of the German artillery. But
some losses were experienced by the latter from the hostile
artillery, as well as from small parties of infantry, which, covered
by hollow roads and incºlualities of ground, it was impossible
wholly to drive away. A limber of Jourdan's battery was com-
pletely destroyed by a French shell.
Let us now turn to the offensive movements made by the
Ixth Army Corps. The attack was simultaneous with that of the
Guard Corps and in support of it. When General von Manstein
observed that the 4th brigade was advancing, he sent orders
about 5.30 P.M. to General von Knappe to lead the 3rd brigade
of the Guard to the attack of Amanvillers; at the same time
General von Wittich was to advance along both sides of the rail-
way, the 4th regiment forming his reserve under Colonel von
Lyncker.
The Commander in Chief had indeed held out the prospect
of aiding General von Manstein with a brigade of the IIIrd Corps
in case of an attack, but it failed to appear. General von Alven-
272 The German Artillery.
sleben, on being informed of this, had decided to advance with the
whole of the IIIrd Corps to the point where his presence was re-
quired. Both Divisions had already started from Vernéville when
the enemy was reported to be advancing against the right flank of
the IXth Corps. At the same time, 4.30 P.M., the din of war was
again heard at its height in the direction of St. Hubert; it seemed
indeed that the battle was extending towards the west, which
the reported movement of the enemy made highly probable.
This was of such moment that General von Alvensleben con-
sidered he had no choice but to meet the movement, and there-
fore led his infantry to the west of the Bois de Genivaux, leaving
General von Manstein to his own resources.
Meanwhile General Knappe von Knappstädt had at 5.30
P.M. put his brigade in motion. In the first line the battalion
of Rifles was to march through the Bois de la Cusse against the
hill north-west of Amanvillers, with the remaining two battalions
of the Emperor Alexander's regiment on its right, while the
Elizabeth Grenadiers with the 2nd and 3rd Pioneer companies
were for the present held in reserve."
The description of the battle field shows that even in this
direction the French position was naturally strong, although the
approach to it was concealed to within I,000 paces by the Bois
de la Cusse.
The 3rd brigade of the Guard, six battalions strong, advanced
against Lorencez's entire Division of thirteen battalions.” In
consequence of this formidable attack it was, according to Fay,
necessary to reinforce the Division. The left wing was south-
east of Amanvillers and the right extended towards the railway,
where it touched Cissey's left flank.
But to appreciate fully the difficulty of the task imposed on
this brigade of the Guard, it must be understood that the German
artillery had been able to sweep the left flank of this part of the
French position only, the right flank having remained entirely
unmolested. On the advance of the infantry to the attack, the
batteries of the IIIrd and IXth Corps fired with increased rapidity
against the hostile troops on the hill between Amanvillers and
It has been mentioned above that the 5th Light battery of the Guard, Captain
von Unruhe, attached to this brigade, came into action about 5 P.M.
2 This is the probable number of battalions.
Battle of Gravelotte. 273
Montigny la Grange, and continued to do so until masked by
the advance of its own infantry on the left. After this the
enemy was held in check on the heights further to the south,
and by this means prevented from advancing against the right
flank of the assailants.
According to the order of attack the battalion of Rifles
of the Guard now led the way from the east side of the
Bois de la Cusse, which was occupied in force by the 3rd Hessian
regiment, and advanced against the hill north-west of Aman-
villers. The battalion was immediately exposed to a heavy
fire, but continued resolutely to advance, notwithstanding the
heavy losses incurred, to within a few hundred paces from the
hollow road leading from St. Ail to Amanvillers, which was lined
by French infantry in great force. Having lost all its officers and
half its men, with both flanks and rear exposed to the enemy's
fire, the battalion formed a thin and irregular line, maintaining
its position without attempting to advance.
The two battalions of the regiment Alexander advanced up
the gully on the south edge of the wood against Amanvillers.
On General Knappe von Knappstädt being severely wounded
Colonel von Zeuner took the command of the brigade. Both
battalions pressed forward under a heavy fire with equal deter-
mination ; the Fusilier battalion getting the touch of the Rifles
on its left, while the 2nd battalion, inclining to the right, worked
its way towards Amanvillers, passing the left flank of the bat-
teries, and on the flat hill south-west of that village, relieved the
Hessian Rifles, exhausted by a contest of three hours, in which
they had spent their last cartridge. The farm of Champenois was
also occupied by a party of the regiment Alexander, its previous
garrison having evacuated it. But the heroism of these battalions
of the Guard was not rewarded by the capture of the enemy's
position. After incurring terrible losses, especially of officers,
they were obliged to halt a few hundred paces from the enemy's
position, where they kept up a hot fire of musketry. During
this time energetic and frequent attacks of hostile infantry were
repulsed by the deliberate fire of the infantry and artillery of
the Guard on the hill south-west of St. Privat; and cavalry,
which repeatedly showed itself between Amanvillers and
Montigny la Grange, was obliged to retire.
T
274 The German Artillery.
With difficulty did these three battalions hold the ground
they had won, against the superior numbers of the enemy,
especially as a gap had formed between the 2nd and Fusilier
battalions of the regiment Alexander. To fill this the Elizabeth
Grenadiers received orders to move up at 6.15 P.M. While the
2nd battalion of that regiment remained for the present in
reserve, the other two battalions advanced resolutely under a
murderous fire, but were unable to push beyond the line of
the foremost deployed line. But as the situation of the 3rd
brigade was critical, the last battalion of the regiment Elizabeth
was ordered up at 7.30 P.M. It must be mentioned that the
skirmishers of the 2nd company of pioneers of the Guard were
also engaged.
The result of the contest was that Knappe's brigade had
gained a position, the centre and most advanced portion of
which was the flat hill south-west of Amanvillers ; its left flank
being a few hundred paces from the hollow road occupied by the
enemy and about the same distance from the guard's house on
the railway, which the Hessians had meanwhile occupied ; and
its right flank extending as far as the artillery immediately to the
south of the Bois de la Cusse, a detachment having occupied
Champenois.
Soon after the 4th brigade of the Guard on the left had
advanced to storm the hill and about the same time with the
charge of the Rifles on the right, Prince Louis of Hesse, in
obedience to orders, gave the signal for attack." General von
Wittich accordingly made the following dispositions:—The first
battalions of the Ist and 2nd Hessian regiments, after joining the
detachments of Rifles already on the north of the railway, were
to advance on that side of it, and the 2nd battalion of the 1st
regiment immediately south of it. Portions of the 2nd Rifles,
which had been ordered by Colonel von Lyncker to hold the
railway embankment, could not resist the prevailing enthusiasm
and voluntarily joined the advancing troops.
By this time the 4th brigade of the Guard had effected a
breach in the enemy's main position South of St. Privat, but was
exposed in front and on its right flank to a heavy fire from Cissey's
| Captain Helmuth's Lecture.
Aattle of Grazelotte. 275
and Lorencez's Divisions. Against these the Hessians now
directed their attack, unchecked by the bloody loss occasioned
by the enemy's Overwhelming fire. The Hessians connected
themselves with the 4th brigade of the Guard on the left, and
with the 3rd brigade on the right, and succeeded in forcing their
way until in line with the guard's house on the railroad and
the gully which runs north-east to St. Privat, thereby support-
ing the great line of artillery which, as we have seen, was
gradually forming between St. Privat and the Bois de la Cusse,
The gallant Hessians could however advance no further. Gene-
ral von Wittich indeed led a detachment of infantry on the right
flank against the hollow road to disengage the battalion of Rifles,
but found that it was impossible to drive back the Superior forces
of the enemy strongly posted under cover.
Detachments of the 3rd Hessian regiment also advanced
from the eastern edge of the Bois de la Cusse to disengage the
hard-pressed 3rd brigade of the Guard on the left flank, and was
joined by the 84th and 36th regiments, with all the strength
that the bloody struggle had left them. Heavy losses were
again incurred, but the troops were unable to dislodge the
enemy.
On the right flank of the IXth Corps at Chantrenne the state
of affairs had remained unchanged. The infantry, in spite of
repeated attacks, executed with the greatest energy and heavy
casualties, had been unable to obtain possession of the strongly
occupied copses at la Folie.' Artillery now advanced to its
support. By General von Bülow's order Colonel von Dresky
directed the 2nd field division of the 3rd regiment of artillery,
Captain Stumpf, to wheel half-right, so as to bring a more effec-
tive fire to bear on the copses. The enemy's guns at a distance
of from 1,700 to 1,800 paces were indeed frequently silenced, but
reopened fire as often as our own infantry advanced to renew the
attack.
General von Alvensleben now ordered, 6 P.M., a heavy fire to
be concentrated on the copses by the divisional batteries, which
had been held in reserve ; and the four heavy batteries of the
* From Captain Helmuth's Lecture.
T 2
276 The German Artillery.
Divisions advanced by order of General von Bülow. Captain
Stöphasius at once moved to the front with the 1st and 2nd
Heavy batteries, Captain Nöldecke and Second Lieut. Châles de
Beaulieu, from the reserve position at Anoux la Grange. The
reduction of the teams, by the bloody battle of the 16th, to four
horses each, and the thick clay forbad a rapid movement; it was
6.45 P.M. before these batteries could come into action South-
west of L'Envie. After this, when darkness was coming on,
Lieut.-Colonel Beck came up on the left with the 5th and 6th
Heavy batteries, Captains Eunicke and Meinecke, those officers
having in obedience to orders reconnoitred during the afternoon
a position near the Ist field division of the 9th regiment with a
view to support it after the withdrawal of the corps artillery of
the IXth Corps; but on the arrival of the horse artillery batteries
of the corps artillery, by directions from another quarter, the
lieut.-colonel had received counter-orders. During the recon-
naissance, which was conducted under a heavy fire, Lieutenant
and Adjutant Cordemann was wounded. As soon as these two
batteries made their appearance at L'Envie, Captain von Unruhe,
with the 5th Light battery of the Guard, placed himself on their
left flank.
Having obtained a fresh Supply of ammunition from the
Prussian batteries in the vicinity, the two guns of the Hessian
horse artillery battery still serviceable came into action against
the hostile infantry South of Amanvillers. But their breech-
pieces became so jammed by fouling that they also were dis-
abled and were removed by Lieutenant Brandt to the bivouac
north of Vernéville.
The mass of artillery at Chantrenne and L'Envie, which had
gradually increased to nine batteries, was ordered by General
von Bülow to enfilade the South edge of the copses of la Folie
at a range of from 1,700 to 2,OOO paces." The 2nd Heavy
battery, commanded by Châles de Beaulieu, advanced some-
what beyond the line, bringing forward its right shoulder to get
clear of the infantry. That the effect was excellent was proved
1 In order from leſt to right the batteries stood as follows:–(5. l. G.) Captain von
Unruhe, (5. s.) Captain Tunicke, (6. s.) Captain Meinecke, (I. s.) Captain Nöldecke,
(2.s.) Second Lieut. Châles de Beaulieu, (3 s.) Captain Vosz, (4. s.) Captain Fromme,
(3, 1.) First Lieut. Beck, and (4. l. III.) Captain Müller II.
Pattle of Gravelotte. 277
by the cessation of the hostile musketry fire and by the number
of corpses afterwards found shattered by shell. Some mitrail-
leurs also, which had taken up a position in the twilight at the
south-west corner of the wood, ceased firing after a few rounds.
In this stage of the battle the batteries sustained considerable
loss from the enemy's musketry fire, to which the right flank in
particular was exposed."
Although General von Wrangel had ordered the 3rd company
of Rifles to Chantrenne to support the assault of the two battalions
of the 85th regiment, these five weakened Prussian battalions,
pitted against ten French battalions in a strong position, were
unable to wrest from them a decisive victory. The two bat-
talions of the 85th and a detachment of the 36th had however
occupied the angle of the wood south of Chantrenne, and the
farm itself was garrisoned by the weakened 3rd battalion of the
latter regiment, which had moreover expended all its ammunition.
Portions of the 2nd battalion of the 36th and of the Rifles then
advanced from the east, but were repulsed with great carnage.
Perceiving this, the 2nd battalion of the 84th, forming with two
battalions of the I Ith the reserve at Verneville, sent forward
two companies in support at 6. I 5 P.M., which however in spite
of their resolute attack, attended by heavy losses, were unable
to give a favourable turn to the fight.
General von Blumenthal now determined to make a last
attempt with the 1st battalion of the 85th. Advancing reso-
lutely, it reached the road running parallel with the wood at a
distance of a few hundred paces; where, exhausted and
weakened by its great losses, it was reduced to maintaining a
brisk musketry fire. An attack made by the enemy against the
left flank was effectually repulsed.
As darkness was gradually falling on the blood-stained battle
field, General von Blumenthal concentrated the troops in the cap-
tured position, the 36th Rifles repulsing several hostile attacks
by musketry and finally making an advance of a hundred paces
to the right. In the last moments of the contest General
Leboeuf had considered it necessary to reinforce his menaced
right flank by fresh troops, as described below.
* Some of the batteries state that this fire came from Champenois, which, at any
rate, was not occupied by our infantry at that moment,
278 7%e German Artillery.
I2. Advance of the corps artillery of the Saton Army Corps to
prepare the assault of Roncourt—Fwacuation of Æoncourt
by the French—Attack of St. Privat.
We left the Saxon Army Corps disposed in the following
manner. Prince George of Saxony was marching with the
48th infantry, and the light cavalry brigades, with the batteries
attached to them, along the valley of the Orne to turn the
enemy's right flank. The 45th brigade had occupied the border
of the wood east of Auboué facing Roncourt and, with the co-
Operation of the twelve batteries posted on its right rear on the
hill north of St. Marie, was engaged in keeping the enemy in
play until the turning movement was completed. One battalion
of this brigade watched Montois la Montagne. The 47th bri-
gade, having reformed at St. Marie, was in the act of taking up a
position in reserve near the above wood. No precise orders
had as yet been issued to the 46th brigade, which however was
marching in the same direction."
Meanwhile the 45th brigade now advanced on the west of
Roncourt, slowly driving in the swarms of hostile skirmishers
across the ground between that village and the wood. On the
right of this brigade at 6 P.M. the troops covering the left flank
of the Ist brigade of the Guard—the 1st battalion of the 3rd
regiment of the Guard and half a battalion of the Ist regiment
—advanced to the attack, not without considerable loss, and
opened a brisk fire.
From previous reconnaissances Roncourt was considered to
be strongly held, although the ground beyond it could not
be seen into, Owing to the ridge which extends from St. Privat
to that place ; the enemy was however supposed to be in
force at that point also. To prepare the assault Colonel
Funcke was ordered by the Crown Prince of Saxony to advance
to close quarters with the corps artillery in echelon of batteries
* The 23rd Division, moreover, was prevented from seeing the attack of the
Guard Corps against St. Privat by the thick smoke which hung between the Saxon
batteries and the enemy's right flank,
Battle of Gravelotte. 279
from the left. Two positions were taken up in succession, the
second being in line with the 54th brigade, and its left flank rest-
ing on the wood. The 2nd Heavy battery, Leonhardi, was brought
up to Montois to join the outflanking column, but the 2nd field
division was, in consequence of a mistaken order, withdrawn to
the 47th brigade further westwards." This division was then
ordered by the corps commandant to come into action in the
last position on the left of the corps artillery, to increase the
weight of its fire, but Major Richter only found room enough
there for two batteries, the 4th Heavy and the 4th Light,
Captain Groh and Major von der Pforte.” The losses sustained
by the Saxon batteries were occasioned principally by
musketry. Lieut.-Colonel Schörmer, commanding the column
division, who had directed the operation of supplying ammuni-
tion, was here severely wounded.
The left wing of the Saxon artillery overwhelmed Roncourt
with shell at ranges of from 2,600 to 2,900 paces from its first
position, and of from 2,200 to 2,300 paces from its second. The
right wing also fired with equally good effect against St. Privat
and the batteries placed north-east of that village, until at
length only a few of the latter still held their ground. Müller's
battery of horse artillery opened fire with shrapnel on
advancing columns of infantry at 2,000 paces, apparently with
good effect. -
While General von Craushaar with the 45th brigade and
the artillery thus carried out the wishes of the corps command-
ant by preparing the attack against Roncourt and keeping the
enemy in play, the 48th and troops attached to it had deployed
at Montois at 6 P.M., and the Crown Prince of Saxony, who was
watching them, saw that the movement had made such progress
that the assault of Roncourt was near at hand. He therefore
rode from St. Marie and joined General von Craushaar. This was
at 6.30 P.M.–about the time that the left flank of the 1st brigade
of the Guard was being prolonged by the 4th regiment. The
* From Captain Helmuth's Lecture. According to the report of the Saxon
artillery, the 2nd field division remained a quarter of an hour at most with this
brigade.
* Pforte's battery also, to judge from its own account, did not open fire, being
masked by the batteries in its vicinity.
28O The German Artille, y.
struggle at St. Privat, carried on with unwonted vehemence, had
for some time been perceptible. Of the 48th brigade Colonel
Schulz ordered the IO7th regiment on the right to advance from
the west and two battalions of the IOOth from the north against
Montois, which was reported to be occupied ; they were followed
by the 2nd battalion of Rifles. The IO7th found, however, that
the place was already abandoned. Schulz's brigade therefore
wheeled immediately to the right against Roncourt, on its being
discovercq that the wood south of Montois had also been eva-
cuated. Detaching three companies to cover the flank towards
Malancourt, whence shots had been fired, the IOOth regiment
(5 companies) moved against the north-east of Roncourt. It
was about 6.30 P.M. when this combined assault, which had been
concerted by the Crown Prince and Prince George of Saxony, was
commenced by the 45th brigade from the woods against the
west side of Roncourt and by the 48th from Montois against the
north side.
Both princes expected to find Roncourt as well as the ground
immediately in rear of it strongly occupied. But in fact Marshal
Canrobert had already withdrawn nearly the whole of his troops
which originally occupied this part of the position in force, in
order to concentrate them opposite the Guard, at that moment
checked in its attack, and to meet the turning movement of the
Saxons, which had then been discovered. Consequently the
XIIth Corps made more rapid progress than the Crown Prince had
ventured to hope.
In the first line of the 48th brigade were the five available
companies of the IOOth regiment on the left flank and the Ioyth
on the right; followed by the 2nd Rifles in support. In the first
line of the 45th brigade the 1st battalion of the IO Ist Grenadiers
was on the left ; on the right of which came the IO8th regiment,
a battalion and a half of the IOOth Body Guard Grenadiers, and
on the right flank half a battalion of the 1st and a battalion of
the 3rd regiment of the Guard, as well as the 1st company of
pioneers. The remainder of the IOOth Body Guard Grenadiers
formed the 2nd line, and the 2nd and 3rd battalions of the IOI st
Grenadiers the 3rd line. Prince George was with the Io&th
regiment, and General von Craushaar on the right flank of his
brigade.
Battle of Grave/o//e. 28 I
Although the cavalry found no object of attack, the artillery
attached to the turning column came into action immediately
after the capture of Montois, in order to prepare the way against
the French right flank, and—which was of most importance—to
indicate to the 23rd Division, according to agreement, that the
outflanking column had reached Montois and was ready to
advance. Its first shots were in fact the signal for the com-
mcncement of the combined assault to which reference has been
made above.
From a position south-west of Montois the 1st Light
battery, Captain Lengnik (I. I. XII.), opened fire on Roncourt
at a range of 2,500 paces with Common shell and shrapnel, and
on the advance of the infantry moved forward to a range of
I,7OO paces, coming into action and again firing at the village.
The effect of this fire, to which was added that of the 2nd Light
battery (2. l. XII.), Captain Westmann, which also came into
action at this spot, was apparently good.
The hostile skirmishers, which till then had held their ground,
retired before our infantry to Roncourt, the village itself falling
almost at the same time into the hands of detachments of the
two Saxon brigades as well as of the Guard. It was garrisoned
by the IO3th regiment and held against all counter movements
of the enemy. The 1st battalion of the IOIst regiment, the 3rd
battalion of the IO7th, as well as two battalions of the IOOth
regiment, became engaged in a brisk musketry fight with the
hostile troops occupying the wood of Jaumont and could not
advance.
The 2nd Heavy battery, Leonhardi, which had soon followed
the light batteries of the Ist field division, came into action
further to the east, but did not fire, as Roncourt was already
cvacuated. The Ist Horse Artillery battery (I. r. XII.), Captain
Zenker, having with the brigade of cavalry under General von
Senfft-Pilsach brought up the rear of the turning column,
could not consequently come into action on the east of Montois
until a quarter of an hour after the field batteries. A few
rounds then sufficed to drive away two bodies of infantry, which
were seen at the edge of the wood south of that place.
Meanwhile Lieutenant von Esebeck, orderly officer to General
von Pape, had been sent to the Saxons for information. He first
282 7%e German Artillery.
met General von Craushaar and then the commander of the
IO7th regiment, Colonel von Schweinitz, and impressed on both
those officers the desperate situation of the Guard as well as the
importance of attacking St. Privat without delay. Eager to
support their comrades the Prussians in this emergency, they
with some of the Saxon infantry diverged even before the
capture of Roncourt from the direction in which they were
moving, without waiting for further orders. -
Under the pressure of circumstances it was impossible to
avoid a temporary confusion among the tactical units of the
infantry. General von Craushaar directed the 2nd and 3rd
battalions of the IOIst regiment from the 3rd line against St.
Privat, detachments of the Ist and 3rd regiments of the Guard
and the IOOth Body Guard regiment also making a similar
change of direction. The latter had not yet completed the
wheel, when Colonel von Schweinitz with the 1st and 2nd
battalions of the IO7th regiment came up and passed through
it. The report sent by the colonel to the brigadier of his
having decided to advance against St. Privat was not received,
as the officer carrying it was struck down.
Of the Saxons the two battalions of the IO/th regiment
came first into collision with the French troops lining the walls,
which ran parallel to the north side of St. Privat, and encountered
an obstinate resistance. Exposed to a rapid musketry fire in
front and taken in flank by the hostile batteries east of St.
Privat, these battalions incurred heavy casualties, and Colonel
von Schweinitz was killed. But the troops pressed resolutely
forwards. The enemy did not wait to receive the attack behind
the walls but retired, the Ioyth immediately establishing itself
among them.
General von Craushaar also led forward the above-named
troops of his own brigade and of the Guard on either side of the
IO7th, which then again advanced. Loud hurrahs from the
right announced that they had got into connection with the 4th
regiment of the Guard, with which they now moved to the
assault. These troops lost heavily, but their progress was not
checked. The left flank Suffered less, thanks to the use made
* Other portions of both these battalions continued to march in the original
direction.
Aattle of Gravelotte. 283
of the cover afforded by hcaps of stones and inequalitics of the
ground. The enemy was soon driven from the walls, and in fact
a square enclosure, immediately connected with the north-west
corner of St. Privat, was already in the hands of the assailants."
During this attack a brisk rattle of musketry was heard in
rear at Roncourt. Half a battalion of the 3rd regiment of the
Guard, which had advanced with the other troops against St.
Privat, inferring that the state of affairs at Roncourt was very
critical, considered it necessary to return to that place. The
enemy had indeed made an attempt to advance from the wood
against that village, but had been repulsed by the Ist battalion
of the IOIst regiment.
The exertions of the Crown Prince and Prince George of
Saxony had been directed meanwhile to preventing the troops
engaged in this improvised attack from being thrown into dis-
order. Prince George pushed forward the Io8th regiment to—
wards St. Privat in support to within 600 paces of the foremost
fire-line ; while a battalion from the 46th brigade, which had
reached Roncourt towards 7.30 P.M., was ordered to support the
106th regiment in the ravine east of that village.
13. The artillery of the Guard Corps prepares the final assault on
St. Privat—That of the XIIth (Saron) Corps opens fire on
the village—Roncourt is occupied and St. Privat stormed---
French accounts of the 6th Corps—The artillery of the Guard,
Xth, XIIth Corps, and of the Hessian Division form a line
from the Foré de Jaumont to the Bois de la Cusse—The
final assault on Amanvillers—The Germans do not pursue—
Saron cavalry in the valley of the Moselle—Losses of the
combatants.
It was past 7. I 5 P.M.; the advance was checked along the
whole line of the Saxon and Guard Corps; time was required
to recover breath and reform previous to a final assault on the
village of St. Privat. But the pause was filled up by a brisk
fire-fight, principally of artillery, to which we must now again
turn our attention. We left the artillery of the Guard in the
act of taking up a position, from which to prepare the final
| Portions of the Iorst Grenadiers and of the 4th regiment of the Guard.
284 7%e German Artillery.
assault. A few only of the batteries were able at first to open
fire for this purpose, while three batteries of the Guard were
engaged on the hill south-west of St. Privat in keeping up a hot
fire on Amanvillers.
In compliance with the suggestion of General von Budritzky,
Colonel von Scherbening ordered the 2nd field division, Major
von Krieger, to bring forward its right shoulder, so as to obtain a
more effective fire against the hill on which St. Privat is situated.
The formation of the slope" did not allow of the whole of the
artillery approaching nearer to the village than from 1,500 to
2,OOO paces. Being masked by advancing infantry, von Roehl's
and von Oppell's batteries (4. 1., 6. S. G.) came into action north
of the high road.
As soon as the fire had been kept up for some time from this
new position, General von der Goltz gave permission to Major
von Buddenbrock to advance with the Ist and 3rd Horse
Artillery batteries of the Guard, Captains von der Planitz and
von Anker, from the rendezvous position of the Cavalry Division
of the Guard west of St. Ail, and come into action in the gap
which had been formed between von Rheinhaben's division and
the corps artillery by the movement above-mentioned. The
major now assumed command of the three horse artillery
batteries of the Guard which had thus been accidentally brought
together at this point. -
Shortly after this the first batteries of the Xth Corps came
into action. General von Voigts-Rhetz with his staff had ridden
forward to St. Ail about 6 P.M. in advance of his corps, which
was on the march from Batilly to that place. Considering it
advisable to bring a more powerful fire of artillery to bear on
St. Privat, he ordered Colonel von der Becke to move the
corps artillery (Colonel von der Goltz) to the front. The 20th
Division was directed to form up in rear of St. Ail. Colonel
von der Becke led the six batteries of the corps artillery through
the difficult defile between Batilly and St. Ail, and in obedience
to direct orders from General von Voigts-Rhetz the 1st and 3rd
Horse Artillery batteries (Captain Frisch and Lieutenant Mar-
card), under Captain Saalmüller, came at once into action
between von Buddenbrock's and von Rheinhaben's divisions.
' Wide page 266,
Aaft/e of Gravelotte. 285
The artillery of the Guard was further reinforced on the
right flank also. After the successful advance of the Hessian
infantry, Hoffmann's and Leydhecker's batteries (2. S. and 2. l. H.),
under the command of Major Herget, were ordered to come up
into line by Lieut.-Colonel Stumpf, who was present with this part
of his artillery, which he had intended should be the first to ad-
vance, being still intact and having a sufficient supply of ammu-
nition. The other three Hessian batteries, with the horse
artillery gun and the 3rd Heavy battery of the 9th regiment,
were continuing their fire with good effect against hostile
artillery, mitrailleurs, and advancing columns.
Exposed to a terrible fire of musketry, the whole of the
artillery, notwithstanding the great range, Sustained very con-
siderable loss while coming into action and subsequently. Captain
von Ehlern, of the artillery of the Guard, was severely wounded.
First Lieut. and Adjutant Sluytermann van Langeweyde had a
horse killed under him ; First Lieut. Crantz, Lieutenants von
Oppen, von Hoyer, von Voigts-Rhetz, and others had their
horses wounded. In the horse artillery batteries of the Ioth
regiment Captain Frisch was severely, Lieut. and Adjutant
Rehkopf slightly wounded. In spite of his severe wound, of
which he afterwards died, Captain Frisch retained the command
of his battery till the end of the action. In the Hessian artillery
Captain Hoffmann as well as Lieut. and Adjutant Bekker
had horses killed under them. Nevertheless the heavy fire of
the enemy was unable to shake the steadiness of this long artillery
line.
The batteries under the Supreme Command of General Prince
von Hohenlohe concentrated their fire at first wholly on St. Privat
and on the batteries or other troops in its immediate vicinity
the ranges varying from I,500 to 2,OOO paces. Although By-
chelberg's division on the right flank sustained heavy losses, its
fire was not diverted from the main object until masked by the
advancing infantry, when it turned its guns on the troops on the
hill in the vicinity of the pond. Both the Hessian batteries
fired in the same direction.
But the German artillery was able presently to cannonade
* This gun, belonging to the IIessian IIorse Artillery battery, having been leſt
behind, was attached to Reh's battery. Pide page 183.
286 7%e German Artillery.
St. Privat also from the north and north-west. To prepare the
way for the attack of the infantry the Crown Prince of Saxony
had at 6.30 P.M. sent orders to the corps artillery to open fire
on St. Privat, as apparently the infantry experienced great diffi-
culty in its capture.
Colonel Funcke immediately advanced with the corps artil-
lery and 2nd field division in column of batteries from the
centre, and wheeling to the right came into action on the line
Roncourt—St. Marie, without however extending to the latter
village. This movement was rendered difficult by the inequali-
ties of the ground as well as by batteries of the 23rd Division
coming into action, which had advanced from the direction of
Montois and Malancourt. Many batteries consequently lost
the relative positions they previously occupied, and were
obliged by flank and diagonal marches to get into line wherever
they could find room." The inevitable result of this was that the
divisions were to a great extent broken up.
When the infantry came up to the position of Lengnik's
and Westmann's batteries (I. and 2. l. XII.) south-east of
Montois, Lieut-Colonel von Watzdorf advanced them to within
1,700 paces of St. Privat, both batteries opening fire with
common shell, Lengnik's also with shrapnel. Here also they
were shortly afterwards masked by the advancing infantry,
on which they again moved forward, coming into action on the
left of Colonel Funcke's batteries or in the intervals between
them. The 1st Heavy battery (I. S. XII.) reached meanwhile
the north of St. Marie aux Chênes with the 46th brigade, and
was the last that joined the great Saxon artillery line
previous to the assault.
The whole of the Saxon artillery (exclusive of two
batteries) formed at 7. I 5 A.M. a united mass on a curved line
enveloping St. Privat on the north and west, at a distance of
from 1,200 to 1,800 paces; and concentrated a heavy fire of
common shell on the village, as well as on the batteries near
it and columns retiring from it.” Some batteries, as the 4th
and 6th Heavy and Ist Light, fired shrapnel also, but it was
* This is illustrated by the lines of march drawn on the plan.
* Owing to the form of the slope in front, the Saxon artillery was unable to get
a position nearer the village.
Battle of Gravelotte. 287
difficult to distinguish their effect from that of the common
shell. Just before the assault the fire of thirty-two batteries
(192 guns including those dismounted,) was concentrated on St.
Privat and batteries near it." The effect was decisive. Jérusa-
lem and St. Privat were on fire in several places, the flames
rising high in the air. The great massive buildings were
breached and thrown down by the German shell while all the
batteries in the vicinity of St. Privat were obliged to retire.
It was past 7. I 5 P.M. when Prince August von Wurtemberg,
who had watched from St. Marie the advance of the left wing and
the attack of the Saxons, gave orders for the assault. The
Crown Prince of Saxony had also decided to take the same step,
but before the order was sent to the front the whole of the line
of battle encircling St. Privat on the north, west, and South-west
rose as one man and moved towards the goal so long withheld
from it. Generals von Budritzky, von Pape, and von Craushaar
had given the signal for the advance to the nearest troops, but
generally the movement had the appearance of being a volun-
tary and preconcerted act on the part of the troops. Although
many of the troops were exhausted by the bloody struggle in
which they had been already engaged, they pressed resolutely
forwards from all sides, animated by an eager desire to take part
in the final assault. The hostile detachments, which had held
their ground under cover in front of the village, were driven
back. The annihilating fire of French infantry and artillery at
short ranges could not check the impetuous and victorious
charge of the Germans. The Saxons and the Prussian Guard
pressed on simultaneously from north, west, and South. A hand
to hand struggle arose in the streets of the village, where it was
fought out with clubbed muskets and bayonets, while some of
* These batteries were in the following order from left to right, including Seeger's
and von Prittwitz's batteries of the Guard, which had previously cannonaded St.
Privat from this position :-I. l. Lengmik, 4. S. Groh, 8. S. Portius, 7. S. Bucher I.,
2. l. Westmann, 5. s. von Goetz for Hammer, 5. l. von Zeschau, 6. l. Fellmer,
2. r. Müller, 6. s. Verworrmer, I. S. Rothmaler, 4. 1. von der Pſorte, 3. l. Bucher II.,
3. s. Exner for Keysselitz, of the XIIth Corps; 4. 1. von Roehl for von Mutius, 6. s. von
Oppell, 5. s. von Roon, 6. l. Ising, of the Guard Corps ; 3. r. Marcard for Saalmüller,
I. r. Frisch, of the IOth regiment ; I. r. von der Planitz, 3. r. von Anker, 2. r. von
Grävenitz, 3. s. von Ehlern, 4. S. Seeger, 2. S. von Prittwitz, I. 1. von Voigts-Rhetz for
von Dewitz, of the Guard ; 2. S. Hoffmann, 2. l. Leydhecker for Weygandt, of the
Hessian artillery.
288 The German Artillery.
the Grenadiers did not disdain to make use of heavy stones,
which lay at hand.
The flying enemy was hotly pursued at all points, Prussian and
Saxon emulating each other in planting the German flag on the
enemy's stronghold. More than 2,000 unwounded prisoners fell
into our hands; it was past 8 o'clock, and the enemy was hurry-
ing in disordered masses to the valley of the Moselle.
General von Craushaar was killed at the commencement of
the assault. General von Pape followed the first storming
columns into St. Privat, where he preserved order among the
German troops now pressing in from all sides, taking care that the
side of the village opposite the enemy was occupied in sufficient
strength.
The Fusilier regiment of the Guard had, by General von Pape's
orders, followed its Division in reserve, not without incurring
considerable loss. On arriving at St. Privat it was anxious to
attack the great line of French artillery which had come into
action to the east, but this was prevented by General von Pape,
as it was possible that the enemy might make a fresh attack,
and the regiment was therefore ordered to take up a position in
support at St. Privat.
At the commencement of the assault the German artillery con-
tinued its fire over the heads of the infantry. Most of the bat-
teries of the 20th Division came into action on the right of the
Saxon artillery, having been ordered to manoeuvre on the left of
the Division, which was preparing at #St. Ail for the attack on
St. Privat." The range within which objects could be discerned
by the Prussian and Saxon artillery was becoming so limited,
owing to the thickness of smoke to the west and north-west of
St. Privat and to the increasing darkness, that the entry of the
leading assaulting columns into the village was not observed.
Some horse artillery batteries of the Prussian Guard, which
crowned the ridge immediately to the South of St. Privat, were
mistaken for hostile batteries, more especially as numbers of
French shells coming from that direction fell among the batteries
west of the village. These were in reality aimed at the horse
artillery batteries of the Guard, from the great hostile artillery
' These batteries, in their eagerness to come into action, masked the extreme right
flank of the Saxon artillery.
Aattle of Gravelotte. 289
position near the quarries of Amanvillers, but they fell beyond
the object, and burst in front of and among the Prussian as
well as Saxon batteries north-west of St. Privat. The inevit-
able consequence of this was that casualties were occasioned
among German troops by shells from their own guns. For a mo-
ment combatants of both nations sought shelter behind the same
cover. General von Pape instantly sent orders to the rear to
stop the firing ; but this was difficult, owing to the length of the
artillery line, and the more so that further requests to continue
the firing were afterwards received from the front, having been
delayed in the transit. Major von Buddenbrock sent to the
rear as far as St. Ail, whence also shots appeared to be fired.
At the commencement of the assault General von Berger had
left the Ist battalion of Queen Augusta's regiment of the 4th
brigade in rear to support the artillery line, which was gradually
forming South of St. Privat. The battalion Alexander, which had
pushed forward from Habonville, was also left there. The troops
of the 4th brigade of the Guard were just assembling to the
south of St. Privat, when the arrival of the 20th Division was
announced by the appearance of a battalion of Brunswickers.
General Frossard gives the following account of the final
assault on St. Privat:—“Crushed by the concentric fire of the
artillery of the Guard Corps, the XIIth and part of the Xth Corps,
the 6th Corps, without reserves or ammunition, was compelled
to evacuate the village of St. Privat, now no longer tenable."
Marshal Canrobert, who presented a brilliant example of
gallantry and devotion, was powerless to check the retreat. On
the urgent and repreated requests for support made by the 4th
and 6th French Corps, the Guards had indeed been set in motion,
but did not arrive in sufficient time to prevent the loss of
that decisive point.
Let us now cast a glance at the enemy's head-quarters and
the disposal of his reserves, basing our remarks on French
sources, We left Marshal Bazaine in Fort St. Quentin, from the
bastions of which he could survey the plateau occupied by the
French left and centre. It was however as impossibie for him
| Montluisant states that the assault was delivered after the half-hour's ſire of the
German guns had swept away half the defenders of St. Prival.
U
29O The German Artillery.
from that place as from the head-quarters at Plappeville to dis-
tinguish the position of the French right flank or the German
movements against St. Privat and Roncourt. Nor could the
guns in that direction or at Amanvillers be heard by the marshal
Owing to the direction of the wind ; towards 6.30 P.M. a few puffs
of Smoke only rising above the tops of the trees in the Bois de
Châtel, and Occasional shots at long intervals on the plateau of
Rozérieulles appeared to indicate that the fight was over. The
marshal knew that the French Corps had held their lines; the
Guard was not engaged and Brincourt's brigade of Voltigeurs,
which had been brought up towards noon above Châtel St.
Germain and placed at Marshal Leboeuf's disposal, was ordered
by him to support Aymard's Division. General Deligny occu-
pied the approaches to the Col de Lessy with the other brigade
of Voltigeurs. At 3 o'clock the Grenadier Division under
General Bourbaki had marched off, with instructions to place
itself at the disposal of Marshal Canrobert, but at the same time
not to engage rashly and to keep a look-out on its right flank.
The horse artillery regiment of the Guard and two 12-pr.
batteries of the General Reserve, sent to the 6th Corps, had
reached the entrance of the Bois de Saulny.
As the reports received during the day gave no cause for
anxiety, Marshal Bazaine thought that the battle was won, as is
proved by a despatch sent to the Emperor Napoleon at 7.50 P.M.
on the 18th,” and returned to his head-quarters at Plappeville.
The whole of the staff congratulated themselves on the success
of the day. Suddenly information was brought by adjutants
from Marshal Canrobert and General Ladmirault that the French
right flank was attacked, turned, overwhelmed by superior
forces, and driven back, and that moreover it was retiring in all
haste on the intrenched camp.
We must now relate the events on the extreme left flank of
the Saxons, Prince George had observed that the left flank of
the troops advancing against Roncourt was exposed to a heavy
* This despatch states: ‘J’arrive du plateau. L'attaque a €té très-vive; en ce
moment, sept heures, le ſcu cesse. Nos troupes Sont constamment restées sur leurs
positions. . . .” Bazaine still believed that he should reach Verdun, for he thus replies
to a question from the Emperor with respect to provisioning that fortress : “Je crois
qu'il est nécessaire de n'y laisser que ce dont j'aurai besoin, si je parviens à gagner
la place.'
Aaſt/e of Grave/o//e. w 29 I
fire, and had already Ordered an attack against the forest, the
edge of which eastwards of that village as well as the road
embankment in its front were occupied in force by the IOOth
French regiment. There were at first only five companies of
the IO6th regiment available under Colonel von Abendroth, and
they were Soon engaged in a bloody struggle at the road em-
bankment. Presently the 3rd battalion of the Iožth regiment
advanced from Roncourt, and the Saxons charging with the
bayonet drove the French back into the forest.
About this time General Senfft von Pilsach with his two
regiments of cavalry and Zenker's battery of horse artillery
attempted to trot past the east of Roncourt from its position
between Montois and Malancourt, but was obliged to retire by
a flanking fire from the forest of Jaumont. The battery then
came into action east of Roncourt, to prepare, in conjunction
with Leonhardi's battery (I. r. 2. S. XII.), the attack which the
infantry was making against the forest. The range was between
1,300 and 1,500 paces, the battery of horse artillery firing shrap-
nel in addition to common shell.
On the first attack of the Saxons against the forest being
repulsed and the enemy assuming the offensive, both batteries
retired to a position 500 paces in rear of Roncourt in conse-
quence of the heavy musketry fire, but returned to their original
position on the infantry again advancing against the forest.
With considerable loss the infantry now forced its way into the
forest, the enemy retiring into the interior and some of the
Saxon infantry penetrating as far as Bronvaux.
The left flank of the Saxons had yet to dislodge hostile
skirmishers from the quarries of Jaumont, where they attempted
to make a fresh stand. It was late before the fighting in the
wood entirely ceased. At the last moment the companies of
the 106th regiment, which had been detached towards Malan-
court, advanced to attack the quarries, and Colonel Schulz also
led forward the 13th battalion of Rifles and the 3rd battalion of
the Iográ regiment from Roncourt with the same object.
As soon as the safety of the left flank was secured by the
occupation of the forest of Jaumont, Prince George Ordered
Zenker's and Leonhardi's batteries to advance and come into
action in front of Roncourt, thus prolonging the left flank of the
U 2
292 7%e German Artillery.
great artillery line. St. Privat was already taken, but the
batteries were still able in the twilight to throw their shells with
good effect among the flying French troops at ranges of from
I,6OO to 2,000 paces.
We must now turn to the 20th Infantry Division. At 7
o'clock General von Kraatz-Koschlau at St. Ail received orders
from the corps commandant to march against St. Privat, as the
firing as well as the advance of the Guard and Saxons gave
reason to infer that support might be required. It was about
7.45 P.M. when the Division crossed to the north of the high
road, at the very moment therefore that St. Privat was carried
by assault. Of this the 20th Division was still ignorant, which
is explained by the deafening noise of guns and musketry on
the hill; by the storm of shells and bullets which still swept the
ground between St. Marie and St. Privat; and by the continua-
tion of the fire by the greater part of the German artillery,
which was before long still further reinforced by batteries of
this Division. These fresh troops consequently went forward
with the full expectation of Striking the final and decisive blow
in the mighty struggle.
The 40th brigade, General von Diringshofen, consisting of
the 17th and 92nd regiments, marched in the first line with
skirmishers to the front, drums beating and colours flying,
against the heights of St. Privat until it was observed that the
place was taken.
Two battalions of the 17th advanced through St. Privat and
round its northern side, where they were employed to support
some batteries of the XIIth Corps and of the 20th Division. A
battalion of the 92nd remained in the village, the 2nd battalion
marching through it to the outskirts beyond, while the leading
companies pushed on still further and directed their fire against
hostile batteries near the wood. Portions of the Brunswick
Fusiliers, which had advanced to the South of St. Privat and
beyond, pushed forward to the forest of Jaumont, where they
came into connection with the IOth battalion of Rifles and 51st
Fusilicrs and afterwards furnished the Outposts.
During this time the German artillery had not been idle.
Unable further to co-operate with the infantry (still Cngaged
around St. Privat), as the guns were masked by the advancing
Aattle of Gravelotte. 293
troops, a great number of batterics passed on to support those of
the Guard, which had becn in action for some time on the spur
I,OOO paces South-west of St. Privat. On the ſall of that strong-
hold the whole of the German artillery in that part of the ficla
of battle moved forward, the batteries vying with each other in
cagerness to reach the heights of St. Privat, and coming into
action wherever it was possible to do so, while those which had
been long under fire were forced out of the line by the
new arrivals.
Lieut.-Colonel Bychelberg trotted to the front with the three
remaining batteries of his division and took up a position at a
considerable interval to the right of Prittwitz's battery, under a
heavy fire of artillery and musketry. Captain von Sametzki with
the Ist Heavy battery had previously been able to support the
assault on St. Privat at a short range from an intermediate
position. In the next place Captain Reinsdorff, by Colonel von
der Goltz's orders, brought up Richard's and Berendt's light
batteries of the corps artillery of the Xth Army Corps on the
left of Seeger's battery of the Guard," while on their left again
Schede's and von Scheven's batteries came up afterwards into
line.
Major von Buddenbrock brought the horse artillery batteries
of the Guard (von der Planitz, von Grävenitz, and von Anker)
at a smart trot to the hill south of St. Privat, soon after the
village was captured, where they maintained their position
under a very heavy fire from the French guns at the quarries
at Amanvillers. Of Rheinhaben's division Ising's and von
Roon's batteries of the Guard as well as a division of von
Oppell's battery, under Lieutenant Poncet, were alone able to
find room on the hill ; the remainder of this battery as well as
von Roehl's battery (originally von Mutius's) finding them-
Selves excluded from this position. Advancing from an inter-
mediate position south-west of St. Privat the horse artillery
battery of the IOth regiment, commanded by Captain Saalmüller,
who had again taken over the command from Lieutenant
Marcard, came up into line by order of Colonel von der Becke;
| Colonel von der Goltz calls attention to the fact that these two batteries came
into action previous to the capture of St. Privat, and that there were then but few of
the batteries of the Guard immediately on their right,
2.94. 7%e German Artillery.
while Frisch's Horse Artillery battery, finding no room here,
joined the batteries of the 20th Division.
The batteries of the corps artillery of the Guard found thcm-
selves excluded from the line by the field batteries of the Corps
artillery of the xth Army Corps. Colonel von Scherbcning
therefore took the necessary steps to reassemble his batterics
and make good his losses; Seeger's and von Grävenitz's bat-
teries alone remaining in their selected positions, while Schmalz's
battery (previously Friederici-Steinmann's) withdrew from its
post of honour, having expended the whole of its ammunition.
From the 5th Cavalry Division, held by General von Voigts-
Rhetz in readiness for pursuit if required, Major Körber received
permission to bring both his batteries into action. After advancing
from St. Marie aux Chênes and making a flank march along the
rear of the hills crowned by artillery, Bode's battery of the 4th
regiment and Schirmer's battery of the Ioth, came into action
between Prittwitz's battery and the three other batteries of Bychel-
berg's division of the artillery of the Guard. But the great
artillery line now forming was destined to be still more crowded
and its length increased. The day was already at an end and
twilight commencing when, desirous of taking part in the closing
act, Lieut.-Colonel Stumpf brought up the Hessian artillery,
and Lieut.-Colonel Schaumann the Ist field division of the IOth
regiment of artillery.
While Schaumann's division, breaking into column to the left,
moved to St. Privat and thence made a flank march covered by
the form of the ground to the extreme right flank of the whole
line, Seeking for intervals large enough to admit even Single
batteries, Colonel Stumpf and Major Herget sought for space
On the right flank for the Hessian batteries. It became at last
impossible to distinguish the troops and necessary to enquire
what they were. It was therefore here also unavoidable that
these batteries of the xth Corps and of the Hessian Division
thrust themselves between those of the Guard and partially
masked them.
The Hanoverian batteries, which at last came into action,
were only able to fire a few rounds, as shown by the return of
ammunition. The 1st Heavy and 3rd Light Hessian batteries
as well as the 3rd Heavy battery of the 9th regiment with the
Battle of Gravelotte. 295
Hessian horse artillery gun were unable to come into position
herc. The fire of the other Hessian batteries also was limited
by want of men, and because four breech-pieces in the Ist
Heavy battery and one in the 2nd were split.
A long interval elapsed between the commencement and
completion of this great line of artillery, but during that period
the duel of guns never ceased for a moment. Another mass of
cleven batteries had meanwhile been formed north-east of St.
Privat. As soon as it was observed that the attacking columns
had established themselves firmly in St. Privat, the Saxon and
Prussian artillery north of the high road vied with each other in
their haste to reach the hills north-east of that place at a trot.
Colonel Funcke with Groh's battery of the Saxon artillery was
the first to reach the highest ground between St. Privat and
Roncourt. He was soon followed by four batteries of the
Saxon Corps artillery, Hammer's heavy battery (now commanded
by von Götz) of Hoch's division, Bucher's and Portius's heavy
batteries of Oertel's division, as well as Müller's horse artillery;
also by the 2nd field division of the Ioth regiment, under Major
Krause, consisting of Heyn's, Ribbentrop's, Burbach's, and
Mittelstädt's batteries, Leonhardi's and Zenker's batteries had
to come into action on the left rear, owing to the form of the
ground."
As soon as Colonel Bychelberg reached the hill his batteries
concentrated their fire at ranges between 1,2OO and I,500 yards
on the swarms of skirmishers and masses of infantry which
showed themselves at Amanvillers, while Major von Budden-
brock shelled the French retiring columns at ranges of more
than 1,000 paces with equal success.
* The following was the order of the batteries from the forest of Jaumont by St.
Privat to the railway, as shown on the flap of the plan of the field of battle :—
2. s. Leonhardi, I. r. Zenker, 4. S. Groh, 8. S. Portius, 7. S. XII. Bucher I. ; 4. s. X.
Ribbentrop; 5. s. von Götz for Hammer, 2. r. XII. Müller; 3. l. Burbach, 4, 1. Mittel-
städt, 3. s. X. Heyn; 6. S. G. von Oppell (under Poncet); 3. r. X. Saalmüller; 5. S.
von Roon, 6. l. Ising, I. r. von der Planitz, 3. r. G. von Anker; 2 l. X. Baumbach;
2. r. G. Grävenitz; 6. s. Schede, 5. S. von Scheven, 6. l. Richard, 5. l. X. Berendt; (also
at an earlier hour 3. 1. von Friederici-Steinmann), 4. S. Seeger, 2. S. G. Prittwitz;
-I. r. IV. Bode; 2. r. x, Schirmer; I. S. von Sametzki, I. 1. von Voigts-Rhetz for von
Dewitz, 2, 1. G. Karbe for von Niederstetter; 2. S. Hoffmann, 2. l. II, Leydhecker for
Weygand. Then came probably in the ſollowing order —3. l. I. l. I. S. H. (Kehrer
for Ronstadt, Frank, Reh) ; 3. l. IX, Heseler for Bastineller ; I. l. 2. S. I. S. X.
(Knauer, Lancelle, Kleine).
296 7%e German Artillery.
The most advanced Saxon and Prussian batteries, north-
east of St. Privat, under the command of Colonel Funcke and
Major Krause, harassed the flying French troops at from 1,500
to 2,000 paces; while Ribbentrop's battery states that it fired
at only 800 paces into a hostile column, which had with-
drawn into the wood. The Saxon batteries under Bucher I. and
Portius also fired shrapnel at ranges of from 1,600 to 2,000
paces against dense swarms of tirailleurs and bodies of
infantry in close order. Apparently the effect was good, but
here also it was difficult to distinguish it from that of common
shell.
The batteries while coming into line were at times masked
by our own infantry. On the arrival of the two light batteries
of the corps artillery of the Xth Army Corps, which occurred
very early, Colonel von der Goltz ordered Richard's battery to
open fire on the formidable mass of French artillery at the
quarries of Amanvillers, while Berendt's battery laid its guns on
the village itself. Shortly afterwards the whole of the twenty-one
batteries and the two guns to the north of Berendt's battery
concentrated their fire with good effect on the enemy's artillery,
ten batteries and the two guns being between Berendt's battery
and St. Privat, and eleven between that place and the forest
of Jaumont.
On the other hand the right wing of this great artillery line
cannonaded the masses of infantry and swarms of skirmishers at
Amanvillers with such success that they speedily disappeared.
But when fresh hostile batteries appeared soon afterwards
to the north-east of Amanvillers and opened a brisk fire, the
right wing, in default of other objects, was directed to reply,
the range being from 1,800 to 2,200 paces. Colonel von der
Goltz therefore ordered Berendt and Richard (5. 1. and 6. l. X.)
to advance to a shorter range; but they had only fired a few
rounds at 1,900 paces when a brisk musketry fire was directed
against their right flank. Berendt's battery and a division of
Richard's wheeled at once to the right, and after driving away
the hostile infantry by a few well-aimed shells again resumed
their practice at the French artillery. Amanvillers, repeatedly
struck, was in flames.
This battle of artillery had been as a rule directed by the
Battle of Gravelotte. 297
superior officers, among whom were Prince Hohenlohe, Colonel
von der Becke, and Colonel Funcke.
It must have been about this time that the 3rd brigade of
the Guard, Colonel von Zeuner (for General Knappe von
Knappstädt), made a final and successful offensive movement.
We left it engaged in a stationary musketry action ; its last
available battalion, the 2nd of the Elizabeth Grenadiers, having
been ordered to the front. This battalion advanced with a
heavy loss direct on Amanvillers on the left flank of the
Fusilier battalion of the same regiment. The “Advance' was
now sounded for the whole brigade. Owing to the darkness
and want of ammunition-charges with the bayonet were frequent.
The brigade gradually gained ground towards Amanvillers, but,
fortunately for the enemy, the darkness concealed his hasty re-
treat, and, as the troops were exhausted, General von Manstein
at 8 P.M. ordered the brigade to content itself with holding the
position it had won. The enemy now renewed his fire with in-
creased fury against the right flank of the artillery from Amall-
villers and the skirts of the wood. Masses of French infantry
preceded by swarms of skirmishers made a fresh attack at
7.30 P.M., but were checked at a distance of from 1,200 to 1,500
paces by the calm and concentrated fire of the German guns
combined with a rapid fire of infantry. According to Prince
Hohenlohe's report three such assaults were attempted, and
were severally repulsed, the French columns seeking shelter in
the defiles of Amanvillers.
The centre and left wing of the German artillery had mean-
while continued their fire with success against the artillery
mass at the quarries of Amanvillers, and had also forced a large
column of cavalry, which showed itself to the east of St. Privat,
to retire.
The losses of the German artillery in the last position were
not inconsiderable, the right flank being exposed to musketry fire
from Amanvillers, and the left to that from the forest of Jaumont.
Most of the French common shell passed over it, while the shrap-
nel, which were almost exclusively used towards the close of the
day, generally burst too high. But notwithstanding this, the
batteries immediately to the south of St. Privat incurred heavy
casualties. Brilliantly illuminated by the flames of the village,
298 7%e German Artillery.
they were the only objects which the enemy could distinguish in
the increasing darkness, and he consequently concentrated his
artillery on them.
In this position Captain Ising, of the artillery of the Guard
lost his left arm, the command of the 6th Light battery devolving
on First Lieut. von Saldern-Ahlimb. Captain von Roon was
slightly wounded, and one of his limbers exploded, the entire
gun detachment being wounded, although First Lieut. Villaume,
who was close to it, escaped unhurt. A shell passed between
Captain von Grävenitz's legs, the rush of air rolling him over
and over, and so severely bruised was he, that he had to be lifted
on his horse. Another shell passed between Lieutenant Dudy's
legs while in the act of dismounting, destroying the saddle but
without seriously injuring the horse. That officer escaped with
a bruise only. Lieutenant von Oppen had a horse killed under
him. In the artillery of the Xth Army Corps Colonel von der
Goltz was grazed by a splinter, but remained with his guns.
The heavy firing was continued even after dark, the guns
being laid on the flash of the enemy's guns. It was not until
8. I 5 P.M. that complete darkness terminated the contest.
The material as well as the personal of the artillery had
suffered considerably during this hot and protracted combat.
Mention has already been made of the Hessian batteries in this
respect. In the artillery of the Guard several damages to the
guns were made good under fire by exchanging wheels, elevat-
ing screws and other articles with those of the spare carriages.
Comparatively few guns were here disabled, but a gun of the
2nd Heavy battery had to be withdrawn from the last position,
as its breech-piece was injured and the spare one did not
fit.
The Ist field division, Lieut.-Colonel Bychelberg, remained
till daybreak in the position, protected by portions of the regi-
ments Augusta and Alexander, and afterwards by the Ist
battalion of the 57th regiment, for whose support the colonel had
asked General von Voigts-Rhetz. Three Hessian batteries also
remained for the present near the division, but were finally
ordered to withdraw to the Bois de la Cusse and bivouac with
the 25th brigade of cavalry, which during the last part of the
Battle of Gravelotte. 299
contest had been in reserve in the right rear, covering that flank
of the great line of artillery."
Firing was resumed at frequent intervals until after IO P.M.,
when all became still. Amanvillers was evacuated by the
enemy, but was not occupied by the Germans until early on the
19th. Montigny remained in the enemy's possession throughout
the night. Isolated encounters with detachments of the retreat-
ing enemy occurred while placing the outposts. A detachment
of the 2nd battalion of the Elizabeth Grenadiers being summoned
by a body of French troops to lay down its arms, replied by a
volley.
We must now examine the French accounts of this period of
the battle. Marshal Canrobert succeeded in covering the flight
of the 6th Corps by posting a rear guard at the entrance of the
wood near the quarries of Amanvillers. The available troops con-
sisted of the 94th and IOOth regiments and du Barail's Division
of Cavalry. The most important services were rendered by the
artillery of the 6th Corps, under Lieut.-Colonel de Montluisant,
in a formidable position opposite St. Privat, where it was after-
wards joined by the batteries of the Guard and of the 4th Corps
in succession.”
The effect of the retreat of the 6th Corps was soon felt by
* The Hessian guns were brought horizontal, to be ready to meet a night attack.
* According to Montluisant's account, which repeats the report of General of
Division Tixier, ‘he placed sixty guns (six batteries of Tixier’s Division and four of
the 9th regiment) 2,300 yards to the east of St. Privat in support soon after the
capture of St. Marie aux Chênes near the quarries of Amanvillers, on the high road
to Woippy. (‘. . . Je vis de loin la prise de St. Marie aux Chênes, les masses
€crasantes de l'adversaire, et je pris immédiatement mes précautions de retraite. . . .
Je disposai de suite les trois batteries Lippman, Blondel, Abord, etc. . . .”.) The
somewhat thickly planted slope afforded a position with three terraces one above the
other. That this position was carried so early was principally owing to the failure of
ammunition in the 6th Corps, which, being unprovided with an ammunition park,
had only a little over IOO rounds per gun at the beginning of the battle. As the
ammunition soon ran short, the firing in the first position necessarily became slow, the
guns only firing one round every quarter of an hour until they ceased fire entirely, so
as to retain a reserve of ten or fifteen rounds for eventualities. ‘The firing from
these guns,’ says Montluisant, ‘commenced at 6 P.M., when the Prussians surrounded
St. Privat and crowned the heights right and left with more than sixty guns, which
deluged us with shell.’ The cannonade lasted into the might. The army corps
meanwhile retired, leaving the roads to the guns. At last, when the enemy was
checked and the battle terminated, Montluisant withdrew after firing his last round.
3OO 7%e German Artillery.
the 4th Corps, for as soon as the enemy had made himself master
of the heights of St. Privat, he directed a hot fire against the right
flank of the latter, which was exposed by the retreat of the former
and menaced through the gap which had becn made between
the villagés of St. Privat and Amanvillers. At the same time a
fresh attack was made against Ladmirault's front. His Ist
Division at once changed front to the right; but the fire of the
enemy's artillery," taking the French in flank and rear, was so
destructive that, in spite of the almost superhuman endcavours
of General Ladmirault to prevent it, a portion of his Corps
also was obliged to retire,” the exhausted troops, who had no
cartridges left, following the movement of the 6th Corps. The
remainder of the 4th Corps made a firm stand for a time in
rear of Amanvillers against the German frontal attack,” but
then also followed the retrograde movement to the plateau of
Plappeville, with the exception of the 1st and 6th regiments of
the line (Ist brigade of Cissey's Division), which still occupied
the skirts of the wood in rcar of Amanvillers, and an infantry
battalion whose name has been forgotten and which remaincol
in the farm of Montigny la Grange throughout the night without
the enemy attempting to dislodge it.
When also the right wing of the 4th Corps retired, the Im-
perial Guard had reached the defile of the Bois de Saulny, and
there the disordered masses of that corps were rallicd, while its
artillery, which had preceded it, came earlier into action. “At
length,’ says V. D., “Picard's Division of Grenadiers reached the
field of battle aſter dark, and deploying to the right and left of
the artillery, supported it.”
In consequence of the right flank of the 3rd Corps becoming
cxposed by the retreat of the 4th Corps Marshal Leboeuf ordered
up two reserve-batterics and the 41st regiment of the line, till
* This ſire was evidently ſrom the right flank of the German artillery position, which
had been formed at the close of the battle between St. Privat and the Bois de la
Cusse.
* Maisle tir de l'artilleric cmnemie devicnt tellement écrasant, qu'une partie dece
corps d’armée est obligåe aussi de Céder (Frossard). Montluisant also describes the
cſſect as terrible.
* This was the attack of the IXth Army Corps, reinſorced by the 3rd brigade of
the Guard. .*
* From Frossard and the anonymous account of an ‘officier supérieur.”
Aa///e of Gravelotte. 3O I
then held in reserve, to Support it. ‘These troops used their
utmost czertions to check all advance in that direction by the
enemy.'
The French are unanimous in admitting that the retreat of
the 4th and 6th Corps, the former to the plateau of Plappe-
ville and the latter by Woippy into the valley of the Moselle,_-
was attended by the greatest confusion," and that the advance
of a few German troops as far as Woippy would have resulted
in the annihilation of the 6th French Corps and the capture
of a great part of its material. As a fact Prince Frederick
Charles had despatched orders to the Crown Prince of Saxony,
urging him to follow up the advantages that might be gained,
and to push infantry as well as cavalry into the valley of the
Moselle on that day. But at that time affairs at St. Privat had
not yet taken a decisive turn, and when they did so, pursuit
was prevented by the darkness, which concealed and favoured
the flight of the enemy; by large bodies of fresh troops covering
the retreat, and strongly posted as rear guards at the Bois de
Jaumont; and by the complete exhaustion of all the German
troops in the immediate presence of the enemy, who had been
on their legs since 5 A.M. (I 5 hours), and some of whom had
been engaged in a furious struggle during nine hours.
The 46th brigade was indeed still intact, having however
made forced marches, and was now actually on the march under
fire to the north-east of St. Privat ; but in Consequence of the con-
test on the left flank, which was maintained with great vivacity
in the Bois de Jaumont till after dark, the Crown Prince hesi-
tated to risk his last available fresh troops. The Ist squadron of
the Reiter regiment of the Guard, and the 2nd Squadron of the
3rd Reiter regiment had been sent at 4 P.M. into the valley of the
Moselle to break up the railway at Richemont and Daspich,
which was effected in spite of great difficulties experienced on
the march, from abattis and barricades.
This line was still more completely broken up near Mézières
on the 19th of August by the 46th brigade, reinforced by a
squadron and a company of pioneers. The road through Mar-
Ilm'y avait plus nibataillons, mi régiments, ni divisions, mais des amas d’hommes,
de chevaux et de voitures, qui représentaient dams la Vallée de la Moselle le 6° Corps,
sur les hauleurs de Plappeville le 4".
3O2 The German Artillery.
hange taken by the brigade was barricaded for a distance of
more than a mile and a quarter.
The line indicating the position of the most advanced French
troops after the cessation of the battle followed the margins of
the Bois de Saulny and de Châtel to Montigny la Grange,
passing round the copses south-west of la Folie and thence
by Leipsic, Moscou, Point du Jour, and Rozérieulles to St.
Ruffine.
Those French corps, which still held their positions on the
field of battle, bivouacked on the ground they occupied with
the exception of Montaudon's Division of the 3rd Corps, which,
being most exposed to danger, remained under arms. It was
not until 4.30 A.M. on the 19th that these troops began by
Bazaine's orders to move off the battle field in order to encamp
with the other troops of the Army of the Rhine behind Forts St.
Quentin and Plappeville. -
The outposts of the Second Army for the night after the
battle were furnished by the Ixth and xth Corps. The XIIth
(Saxon) Corps encamped at Roncourt, and most of the Guard
between St. Privat and St. Marie; the IIIrd Corps in and near
Vernéville. The line of outposts of both German armies is
shown on the plan of the battle.
It was not until the morning of the Igth that the whole im-
portance of the brilliant victory of the previous day was realized
at St. Privat. The enemy had everywhere disappeared.
The losses were as follows:–
German.
Officers Men
Guard Corps . § e & * e 288 7,700
IInd Army Corps . & e º e 44 I, 3OO
IIIrd 2 3 º ſº ſº & * 6 8O
VIIth } % tº g o ſº t 29 75o
VIIIth , , g e e * e I68 3,200
IXth } ) © & e tº ſe I81 4, ICO
xth 5 2 g e te i. g 8 IOO
xIIth j 7 e g e ſº * 87 2,200
Total . e tº 8II e I9,43O

Battle of Gravelotte. 3O3
Aºrench.
Officers Men
2nd Corps e § tº e Aº e 27 594
3rd , , g tº tº e g tº I IO 2,050
4th , , * e g & º tº 246 4,561
6th , , º e º ſº © & 2 I 2 4,473
Total . tº tº 595 11,678
The effective strength of the French on the 17th of August
was, according to V. D. :—
Corps Men
2nd Corps, including Lapasset's, but excluding Laveaucoupet's Division . I6, ooo
3rd , , . º º o g tº * tº g ſº G • 44, 7OO
4th , , , © o gº & ſº g Q g tº . 31,800
6th , , . o o e e e e º & gº • 32,400
Guard Corps . tº º te g tº {º e s e . 18,8oo
Reserve Cavalry, exclusive of Marguerite's brigade, and allowing for
the losses on the 16th o º © * o * tº • 4,400
Artillery and Engineer Reserve . © o ſº & º e . 2,500
Total . º ſº . I 50,6OO
The effective strength of the Germans, including Cavalry
Divisions, after the enormous losses of the previous battles and
the forced marches made by some of the troops, was in round
numbers from
2 IO,OOO to 225,000 men.
But it must be remarked that on both sides a large force was
held in reserve, that on the German side being much the largest ;
also that the Germans could only be brought up by degrees and
after considerable losses, while the French were from the very
first deployed with a wide front and had no marches to make ;
and lastly that the latter possessed great advantages from their
excellent position, the greater part of which was intrenched, as
well as from the co-operation of Fort St. Quentin. They how-
ever lay great stress on the fact that the 6th Corps was very defi-
cient of artillery ammunition.
3O4. The German Artillery.
SUPPLY OF AMMUNITION AND REFITMENT OF
THE BATTERIES, BOTH AS REGARDS MEN
AND MATERIAL."
I. Supply of ammunition to the limbers from the ammunition
zvagoſºs.
The lines of wagons as a rule followed their batteries at the
regulated distances, but there were many instances when this
was not the case. Thus with some of the batteries of the Guard
(horse artillery and 3rd field division) the wagons of the 1st
line were close up to the guns, and ammunition was served
direct from them, so as to keep the complement in the gun
limbers intact for an emergency. In the case of the batteries
of the 7th regiment, which crossed the ravine of Gravelotte,
the 1st line did not follow them. The wagons of the 3rd
Ilight battery tried indeed to cross, but were kept back by su-
perior orders; consequently these batteries very soon ran short
of ammunition. In many instances the lines of wagons were
unable to follow the batteries of the IXth Army Corps, Hessian
as well as Prussian. Thus the Ist line of wagons of the Hessian
field batteries, which was at first IOO paces from the latter, very
soon increased the distance to 3OO or 500 paces and halted south
of the railway covered by the Bois de la Cusse. That owing to
the lines of wagons frequently remaining in rear in this way, as
well as to the severity of the contest, the batteries south of that
wood experienced a want of ammunition, has been mentioned
in the preceding pages. *
* In addition to its 15 batteries every regiment of field artillery had 9 ammuni-
tion-columns, 5 of artillery and 4 of infantry. A column was formed into two
divisions of three sections (Zug) each. A section consisted of four wagons. The
column comprised 4 spare gun-carriages, a field forge, a store wagon, and a baggage
wagon, the remainder being ammunition-wagons, 8 ſor 6-pr. and 9 for 4-pr ammuni-
tion.—Zºravis.
Aattle of Graze/offe. 3O s
2. Refitment of the batteries from the ammunition-columns.
a. The Ist echelon of the column-division (1st artillery, 1st
and 2nd infantry ammunition-columns) of the Guard Corps,
under Major von Heineccius, was at Hagéville, 2+ miles south-
west of Chambley, on the 17th ; the 2nd echelon (2nd, 3rd,
4th, 5th artillery, 3rd and 4th infantry ammunition-columns) at
Thionville on the Moselle.
Early on the 18th the Ist echelon was ordered in the first
place to Mars la Tour. The 2nd echelon also received
orders to make a forced march to the same point, and arrived
there in the course of the day.
From Mars la Tour the 1st echelon followed the corps to
Doncourt, and afterwards halted near Habonville, where it was to
issue ammunition. By great exertions the 2nd and 3rd ar-
tillery ammunition-columns of the 2nd echelon, Captains
von der Planitz and von Keudell, also succeeded in reaching
that place during the battle. Consequently Major von Hei-
neccius, who always remained close to the batteries in action, was
able to conduct the supply of ammunition so regularly that at
the close of the battle only one battery had exhausted its am-
munition. On the 19th, and during the subsequent night and
day, the ammunition was made up to the full complement from the
columns which were also obliged to furnish material and 200
horses, these being replaced by requisition during the march to
and from the field of battle.
All the artillery ammunition-Columns returned to Saarbrück
for fresh supplies, with the exception of the Ist, which completed
its supply from the 4th. One only of the infantry ammunition-
columns was emptied to the extent of one-third of its contents.
b. The supply of ammunition which the IInd Army Corps
received from its column-division cannot be precisely stated,
but on the 25th and 26th of August a large amount of its
artillery ammunition was issued to the IIIrd and IXth Army
Corps. The 4th and 5th artillery ammunition-columns were re-
plenished at Herny, whence they returned to Auboué on the 31st
of August and 2nd of September.
c. It has been stated in the 2nd part of this work that the
X
J
2O6 The German Artillery.
whole of the artillery ammunition-columns of the IIIrd Army
Corps were emptied during the battle of Mars la Tour, and on
the 18th were on the march to Herny to be replenished. By
order of the Commander in Chief of the army an artillery
ammunition-column of the IInd Army Corps and one of the
Ixth were made over to Captain Burchard ; but the former
did not reach the bivouac at the Baraques de St. Marie till
the 19th of August.
The 1st division of the artillery ammunition-column of the
IXth Army Corps gave up its ammunition to the IOth regiment
of artillery before the beginning of the battle. . Captain
Burchard with the 2nd division, in pursuance of orders, left the
Baraques at 5 P.M. on the 18th, and made a forced march to
Vernéville, but could not reach that place till after dark.
Ammunition was issued to the batteries of the 3rd regiment on the
19th, and then the whole column started at once for Herny to obtain
a fresh supply. Captain Burchard bivouacked on the 19th at
Vernéville with the Ist infantry ammunition-column and the
artillery ammunition-Column of the IInd Corps which had arrived
there.
d. The orders for the 18th issued to the 1st echelon of the
ammunition-columns of the VIIth Army Corps were to halt for
the present at Ancy between Ars sur Moselle and Corny, where
several batteries of the Corps replenished their supplies during
the following night. At the suggestion of the commandant of
artillery this echelon was advanced to the plateau of Grave-
lotte on the 19th and bivouacked about 3,000 paces to the west
of that village. There the remainder of the batteries and other
troops of the army Corps received their supply of ammunition.
e. The Ist echelon of the ammunition-column of the VIIIth
Army Corps, under Captain Eggers, bivouacked during the
battle and after it in the defile of Rezonville to the south of the
road from Mars la Tour to Metz. The supply to the batteries
was partially carried out during the night and completed on the
19th and 20th. The Columns had also on the 19th to make
good the losses in men and horses.
During the battle the commander of the column-division
received an order, probably in consequence of a misunderstand-
ing, to send an infantry ammunition-column in the direction of
Battle of Gravelotte. 3O7
Gravelotte. Captain Hermann was therefore directed at 5 P.M.
to march with the 3rd infantry ammunition-column along the
high road to the farm north-west of that village. As several
casualties were caused by the enemy's shells, the column was
halted in a hollow road, and two wagons only were sent
forward as rapidly as possible to the farm under the Sergeant
Major, who was to leave the ammunition there. To avoid the
chance of explosion as much as possible this was to be repeated if
necessary; but it turned out that the infantry in that quarter
were in no want of ammunition.
By the advice of General Count von Gneisenau, Captain
Hermann kept the Ist division of the column in the covered
position during the battle, the 2nd division returning to its bivouac.
f. The column-division of the IXth Army Corps, commanded
by Captain von Lüttwitz, originally consisted of two infantry
and of three artillery ammunition-columns, but the latter were
reduced by the great expenditure in the battle of Mars la Tour
to one-fourth of the 1st and the entire 2nd artillery ammunition-
Columns only.
At the commencement of the battle of the I&th hostile shells
fell into the bivouac at Rezonville ; at noon information was re-
ceived from Colonel von Jagemann that the corps artillery was
advancing on Vernéville. Without waiting for orders Captain von
Lüttwitz at 3.30 P.M. determined to place his division at Villers
aux Bois. He was induced to take this step by the desire of
being nearer to his own army Corps in the event of its re-
quiring ammunition, and to avoid the risk of being cut off from
the IIIrd Army Corps by the advance of the IInd. On the
march Lieutenant Forsbach brought an order from General
Puttkammer that the whole of the Column-division was to move
at once to the field of battle, stating moreover that the batteries
were in want of ammunition, which they were unable to obtain
from their own lines of wagons on account of the absence of
some and of the great losses incurred by the others. The very
interesting report of the commander of the division goes on to
state : ‘I immediately mounted the men on the wagons and the
division moved off in Sections at a trot by Villers aux Bois towards
Vernéville, where I reported myself to General von Wrangel, com-
manding the 18th Division. I halted the infantry columns at
X 2 o
3O8 7%e German Artillery.
Vernéville, "passed through that village at a trot with the
artillery ammunition-column and a quarter, and advancing
towards the 2nd Horse Artillery battery (König's), brought up
the wagons at a gallop to about ten paces in rear of the bat-
teries in action. The column was immediately beset on all
sides, every battery requiring ammunition ; but unfortunately
Sergeant Gräger, who had taken two wagons to a heavy
battery, had the key with him, and it was necessary to break
open all the locks. The issue of ammunition was conducted as
follows:-- On the arrival of the column a mounted man from
each battery reported himself, and a wagon was told off to him ;
a place of assembly was appointed for empty wagons about 500
paces in rear of the front line. As soon as the first supply was
issued I withdrew the remaining wagons to the place of assembly
behind the hill, all the batteries being informed of its position.
Orderlies were sent when necessary from the batteries, which
brought up the wagons to them at a gallop ; when empty they
returned. Presently a team came back without its wagon, and
the drivers on being questioned stated that they had been
ordered to unhook and return with their horses to the place of
assembly, and that they were to go back for the empty wagon
after half an hour ; had they remained at the battery they
would certainly have been killed to no purpose. This plan was so
good that it was adopted by all the other batteries. Lieutenant
Klinger the divisional adjutant, Lieutenant Roehrig commanding
the column, Lieutenant Schlenther and I, rode up and down in
rear of the guns, looking after the wagons which were dispersed
in all directions, while I also directed Lieutenant Roehrig to take
every care by means of his non-Commissioned officers and
trumpeters that no wagon was absent when the assembly was
sounded. The column reached the position at 4 P.M. and it was
9 P.M. before it formed up in the place of assembly in complete
order. During these five hours it was exposed to an incessant
fire of musketry, for even the place of assembly, though not seen
into by the enemy, was by no means defiladed from his fire. The
whole of the column was present with the exception of a limber
which had been given to a battery to replace an exploded one.
In addition to this a pole was broken, two non-commissioned
officers, one man, and Some horses wounded, and one man
missiº: ..:..
o
©
©
• Tº e ° e
© O © tº e
Aattle of Gravelotte. J
3O9
g. The Xth Army Corps was followed on the 18th of August
by the 1st cohelon of its ammunition-columns as far as Don-
court, where it was to await further orders; but as during the
afternoon the battle appeared to be getting more distant, it
marched to Jouaville and drew up near the high road without
unhooking. In the evening the Ist column issued four wagon
loads of 4-pr ammunition on requisition to batteries of the Guard
artillery.
On the morning of the 19th of August the echelon moved to
a bivouac in rear of the corps artillery at St. Ail, where a supply
of men, horses, and ammunition was for the first time made to
the batteries of the IOth regiment.
/.. Early on the 18th the Hessian Division ordered all its
columns and trains to march on Vionville, where they were to
be parked. The column-division consisted of two artillery and
two infantry ammunition-columns, under Major von Giersberg.
During the course of the day the Ist echelon of the ammunition-
columns (Ist artillery and Ist infantry) was ordered to the field
of battle by the commanding officers of the Division and of the
artillery; but although they trotted most of the way, it was
evening before they reached the telegraph at Vernéville, where
the issue of ammunition at once commenced. On the 20th of
August the two artillery ammunition-columns marched to
Falkenberg to replenish, but were obliged to go on to Forbach
before they could obtain a supply.
7. The Ist echelon of the ammunition-columns of the Saxon
Corps followed the 24th Division in its advance on the 18th
and took up a position during the battle to the west of the
defile of Habonville—Auboué, not far from the crossing of the
roads from Auboué to Batilly, and from Hatrize to St. Marie
aux Chênes. It afterwards marched to the latter village. The
3rd echelon was parked with the trains at Mars la Tour. The
supply of ammunition to the batteries took place during the
night of the 18th and on the following day. It has already been
mentioned that Lieut.-Colonel Schörmer, commanding the
column-division, was wounded, having come under fire in his
eagerness to supply the batteries.
3 IO The German Artillery.
OBSERVATIONS.
I. The J77-cy/c/h.
TIIE intention of the French was to allow the Germans to
waste their strength against the formidable position St. Privat
—Amanvillers—Rozérieulles, and having completed their Sup-
plies, to assume the offensive from the right flank in the direc-
tion of St. Marie. By these means they hoped to overthrow the
weakened enemy and then reach Briey.
To carry out this plan it was necessary to hold the position
everywhere, especially on the right flank. This was possible by
intrenching the ground and distributing the troops judiciously ;
for the selected position was so strong by nature as to Com-
pensate fully for the numerical superiority of the Germans. It
is clear from the description of the battle ficla that an offensive
movement from the right flank of the position was greatly
favoured by the ground. -
Under these circumstances Marshal Bazaine had impressed
on all his corps the duty of carefully strengthening their positions;
but it is very remarkable that this was carried out fully by the
2nd and 3rd Corps only, to a less extent by the 4th Corps, and
scarcely at all by the 6th Corps. The reasons of this omission
on the part of the 4th Corps cannot be gathered from French
sources; but the 6th Corps seems to have had no engineer park,
and arrived late in its position, which it then occupied only on the
urgent representation of Marshal Canrobert. It thus happened
that the left flank, already strong by nature and supported by
Fort St. Quentin, was thoroughly intrenched, whereas the right
flank, the decisive point and weakest by nature, was left in its
normal condition. ^
The distribution of the I’rench forces is cqually surprising.
If it was intended finally to assume the offensive on the right
flank, the army reserves should have been placed in rear of it,
Aattle of Gravelotte. 3 II
to compensate for its relative weakness, whereas they were
actually placed between Forts Plappeville and St. Quentin, four
and a half miles from St. Privat. Marshal Bazaine admits that
he thus disposed his reserves, fearing to be cut off from Metz,
and he considered that an aggressive movement against his rear
from Woippy on the one flank, or from St. Ruffinc and Vaux on
the other, could be most effectively repulsed from the plateau
of Plappeville. The fortress of Metz was, we admit, necessary
to the Marshal after the battle of Mars la Tour as a source of
supplies. If the Germans succeeded in forcing back the French
left flank, no favourable conditions for retreat were presented by
the valley of Châtel St. Germain and the roads in the Moselle
valley running to Metz ; but then to force that part of the position
was a task of peculiar difficulty, and moreover all pursuit was
forbidden by Fort St. Quentin. Consequently the majority of
the Marshal's staff did not participate in his anxiety; but singu-
larly enough this was also the case with regard to the possibility
of an aggressive movement against the French rear from Woippy
after effecting the passage of the Moselle below Metz. If such
a manoeuvre were attempted within reach of the fortress, it would
doubtless have been possible in case of necessity to detach a
sufficient force from the right flank along the road to Saulny.
The placing the reserves of the French army in rear of the left
wing appears therefore indefensible. Nor was the position of the
French outposts before the battle thoroughly judicious, for had
the Bois de la Cusse been occupied, the German artillery could
not have surprised the 4th French Corps in its camp.
It is remarkable that the French did not attempt in the
first stage of the battle, when their deployed front considerably
overlapped the left of the Germans, to make a general attack,
and falling on the IXth Army Corps, annihilate or drive it back.
The offensive movements of the French in this quarter were
partial and made by the advanced troops without orders. It
almost seems as if the corps leaders took too strict a view of the
extent to which they were bound by the Marshal's dispositions
for a defensive attitude and feared the responsibility of depart-
| The French state that the armament of Fort St. Quentin was incomplete ; but
that, at any rate, heavy guns were mounted in it, has been mentioned in the account
of the battle.
3 I 2 7%e German Artillery.
ing from them, although the conditions on which they were
based had changed. The occupation of St. Marie at the last
moment on the approach of the Germans was extraordinary
and certainly not in accordance with the Marshal's plan of battle.
It had, however, the effect of postponing the decision of the contest.
Of great moment was the fact that Marshal Bazaine took up
his position at Fort Plappeville, and even spent some time in
Fort St. Quentin ; for all impressions made on the left wing
in his immediate presence appeared to him more important
than those reported on the right. Consequently a brigade of
Voltigeurs of the Guard was sent as early as I 2 o'clock to St.
Châtel to support the 3rd Corps ; batteries of the general reserve
of the army were employed to secure the left flank against the
attack of the Germans on Jussy and St. Ruffine; and the reserves
were moved to the right flank so late that they only served to
cover the retreat, whereas their early arrival might have warded
off the decisive issue of the battle.
2. The Germans.
It was necessary that the Royal head-quarters should make its
dispositions for the 18th of August to meet two alternatives;–
either the enemy would endeavour to retire by the northern roads,
or, recognising the difficulty of such an operation, would offer
battle immediately in front of Metz with his rear towards Ger-
many.
In both cases a march towards the north at once became
necessary, with the armies concentrated as much as possible. In
the first case the Germans would come into collision with the
flank of the enemy, obliging him to halt and fight. In the
second case the last link which connected Metz with the interior
of France would be cut and the troops enabled to deploy and
outflank the enemy's right.
If however the French army took up a position on the
heights with its rear towards Metz, it would be necessary during
the flank march to cover the right flank against any aggressive
enterprise on the part of the enemy, and also to provide for
blocking the roads by which the communications with Germany
might be threatened from the fortress.
It was moreover desirable that the troops marching towards
Battle of Gravelotte. 3 I 3
the north should come into collision with the enemy's columns
on the road Gravelotte—Conflans as much as possible at the
same moment. As the German army had encamped with its
front immediately to the south of the road from Metz to Grave-
lotte and Mars la Tour, the marches to be made by the right
flank were shorter than those to be made by the left.
We shall now see that both eventualities were met in the
simplest way by the dispositions of the Royal head-quarters
and of the Commanders in Chief of the Armies.
The Second Army was to advance on the 18th, massed as
much as possible, in echelon from the left, with three army
corps in first line and two in second line between the Yron and
Gorze. The XIIth Corps on the left flank, having to make the
longest march, had to move off at 5 A.M.; the IXth Corps on
the right, an hour later.
It fell of course to the lot of the VIIth Army Corps—the
nearest to Metz—to protect the right flank of the armies during
the manoeuvre, while it was prepared also to meet any advance
of the enemy in the valley of the Moselle towards Ars. On the
other hand the Ist Army Corps and the 3rd Cavalry Division
provided for the safety of the communications on the right bank
of the Moselle.
The VIIIth Army Corps connected to a certain extent the
fixed pivot of the movement represented by the VIIth Corps with
the Second German Army ; it was to conform to the echelon
movement. In accordance with the time-honoured maxim that,
previous to fighting a decisive battle, all troops should be ordered
to the battle field that can by any possibility reach it, the IInd
Army Corps was ordered from Pont à Mousson to Buxières as
a last reserve. Owing to the difficulties experienced in march-
ing up into position already alluded to, which were augmented
by the configuration of the ground at Mars la Tour and the
great distance of the camps of the Saxon and Guard Corps, the
battle could not be expected to commence till comparatively
late in the day. Not until the troops were actually on the march
was the true position of affairs discovered. When the leading
army corps of the Second Army reached the centre road of
the three which lead from Metz to the west, at Doncourt and
Caulre farm, the only communications still open to the enemy
were the roads to Briey, and to Thionville by the Moselle valley.
3 I 4. 7%e German Artillery.
At the Royal head-quarters and at those of the Second
Army it was now a matter of certainty that large hostile masses
intended to hold the plateau running north from Point du Jour.
But although therefore it was highly probable that the Germans
would have to fight facing the east, it was still expedient to bear
in mind the possibility of the enemy's marching to Briey.
Both these cases were evidently met by the dispositions of
the Germans. The Commander in Chief of the Second Army,
who was near the right flank, received information which enabled
him at IO A.M. to order the Guard Corps to march against
the plateau occupied by the enemy, the XIIth Corps being left
for the present at Jarny; while at IO.30 A.M. the Royal head-
quarters considered it advisable that the Guard and XIIth Corps
on the left of the first line of the Second Army should continue
their march as far as Batilly and stop the enemy, if they found
him on the march at St. Maric aux Chênes, or attack him if in
position. As regarded the extent of the enemy's right flank
nothing was as yet known by the Germans; the orders of the
Second Army indicating that it was at la Folie, while the Royal
head-quarters were of opinion that it extended to Montigny la
Grange.
It is clear that the orders for the attack were based on the
following ideas —“Our numerical superiority will be taken ad-
vantage of to turn the enemy's flank from the north ; the First
and Second Armies will advance simultaneously against the
French front and right flank, but not before the whole of the
troops have marched up into position ; during the interval the
attention of the enemy in front will be engaged principally by
artillery.'
The line of battle of the whole army was to be formed by
the army corps wheeling to the right in succession. We have
seen that the XIIth Corps had anticipated the orders of the
Second Army as well as those of the Royal head-quarters ;
and that erroneous information about the enemy, which how-
ever was immediately corrected, had caused it to take a more
westerly direction, which however only slightly delayed the
whole operation.
It is clear from our remarks that the Royal head-quarters as
well as the armies made every preparation with the greatest care
\
Aattle of Gravelotte. 3 I 5
and forethought for a pitchcq battle, in which, nevertheless,
much had after all to be improvised. Under the conviction that
the camp at Montigny la Grange represchted the chemy's right
flank, and animated with the desire of taking the enemy by
surprise, a chance of which was afforded by the enemy's care-
lessness, the IXth Army Corps resolved from the first to make
a vigorous attack with its artillery at a short range. As Secrl
from Vernéville, an opportunity of protecting the artillery seemed
to be offered by taking possession of the Bois de la Cusse, which
was reported to be unoccupied by the enemy, and towards which
infantry was at once directed.
The narrative has shown that this was to a great extent
erroneous. Had the Ixth Corps been fully aware of the state
of affairs, it would have contented itself with occupying and
holding the Bois de la Cusse, so important as a point of Sup-
port and as affording a comparatively covered approach for the
assailants; and at any rate it would not have at Once advanced
far beyond the defile of la Mance. Being only able to come
up into position gradually, its situation was now very critical,
the front of the French line overlapping it and threatening to
outflank it both on the right and left. The left wing of the
advanced artillery line, partially annihilated, was obliged to
retire. The corps, however, obstinately held the ground it had
won against all hostile attempts, and especially the Bois de la
Cusse, the importance of which was so rightly appreciated.
It was natural for the Royal head-quarters to conclude from
the dispositions they had made and the orders they had issued,
that the fighting heard at Vernéville was only a partial affair,
not requiring the general attack of the First Army; and that
consequently they should order it to employ its artillery only in
preparation for a future attack.
This order was not fully carried out by the First Army, as
the conclusions which led to its issue were no longer admissible
at the time of its receipt. For the VIIIth Army Corps had
then full information as to the severity of the contest waged at
Vernéville by the IXth Army Corps, whose right wing needed
immediate support to prevent its being turned and annihilated
by superior hostile forces. Consequently, with the Sanction of
the Commander in Chief of the First Army, and (in this emer-
316 7%e German Artillery.
gency) certainly not in opposition to the intention of the Royal
head-quarters, the 15th Division of the VIIIth Army Corps
assumed the offensive astride the high road running through
Gravelotte. Its success justified the great loss incurred in the
bloody struggle with a superior force, for not only did it save
the right wing of the IXth Army Corps from being outflanked,
but it also succeeded in capturing the southern portion of the
Bois de Genivaux, St. Hubert, and the western portion of the
quarries. Thus a lodgment of the character of a bridge head was
formed in front of the defile of Gravelotte, and the assumption
of the offensive at the decisive moment by the whole of the
First Army was facilitated. That the opponent regarded this
position as a constant and effective menace is proved by the fact
that he did not dare to draw off any of the troops confronting
it to other parts of the field of battle, and that Marshal Bazaine
considered it necessary to reinforce the 3rd Corps at that point
by the brigade of Voltigeurs of the Guard from the reserve.
The IXth Army Corps was at first left to a great extent to
its own resources in protecting its left wing from being out-
flanked. For this purpose the greater part of the 25th Divi-
sion, with portions of the 18th, took up a position under cover
at the north-western angle of the Bois de la Cusse, while the
Hessian field batteries came into action to the north of it.
The Guard was at first unable to co-operate except by means of
the artillery of its Ist Division, and the corps artillery from a
position further to the rear. But eventually it was prepared to
support the IXth Corps with all its available troops ; we know,
however, that the 3rd brigade alone was asked for by that corps
to act as its reserve.
We have seen that the critical position of the 15th Division
made it necessary for the VIIIth Army Corps to send forward
the 3 Ist brigade against Moscou, and for the batteries of the
16th Division to come into action in the great artillery line
formed by the First Army.
The narrative of the battle also mentions the circumstances
from which the Commander in Chief of the First Army concluded
that the obstinate resistance made by the enemy had been over-
come even before the advance of the 31st brigade to the assault.
We know moreover that in consequence of this assumption the
Aattle of Gravelotte. 3 I 7
1st Cavalry Division and some batteries (corps artillery of the
VIIth Corps and others) were ordered to cross the ravine of
Gravelotte to complete the success; but that under the actual
circumstances the attack of the cavalry although resolutely
attempted was completely foiled, and only a part of the artillery
was able to come into action beyond the defile.
The attack of the 26th brigade and the battery attached,
which was ordered at the same time by the Corps commandant,
with the co-operation of Some infantry and a battery of the
1st Army Corps, had in addition to the capture of Jussy the
very important result of increasing Bazaine's anxiety about
his left flank and diverting his attention from St. Privat.
This was the cause of his keeping the reserves so long on the
plateau of Plappeville when their presence was so urgently re-
quired on the right flank ; and also of his employing part of the
reserve artillery of the army to oppose this attack, which was
merely of secondary importance.
We know that the XIIth Army Corps after reconnoitring
the hostile position decided against a direct assault on Privat
as presenting too many difficulties, but resolved to turn the right
flank, while detaining and amusing the enemy in front princi-
pally by artillery. This accorded with the spirit of the dispo-
sitions made by the Royal head-quarters, and was at the
same time the plan best Suited to the form of the ground.
Then followed the capture of St. Marie aux Chênes, which
had been hastily occupied by the enemy. The assault, having
been prepared by the greater part of the Saxon batteries
and by those on the extreme left of the corps artillery of the
Guard, was made from the South, west, and north-east by por-
tions of those corps; while the greater part of the corps artillery
and the field division of the Guard kept the enemy on the heights
of St. Privat in check. It is not surprising that some of the
Saxon troops, on hearing the rapid fire, diverged towards St.
Marie from their properline of march until ordered back; although
this also tended to delay the execution of the turning movement.
As soon as the Guard had formed up and its artillery had
partially silenced the enemy's batteries, it advanced resolutely
to the assault of St. Privat. The narrative gives as motives for
this —The necessity of obtaining a decisive result before the
3 18' 7%e German Artillery.
end of the day, as it was now late and the smoke made it appear
even later; and the belief that the turning movement of the XIIth
Corps was more advanced than was really the case. The circum-
stances have been mentioned which led to the attack being made
in echelons from the right ; and to its being checked for a time
in spite of the brilliant gallantry of the troops. This is not
to be wondered at, considering the strength of the enemy's
position, not as yet sufficiently shaken by our artillery, and that
the assailants were attacked on both flanks by overwhelming
hostile masses. But nevertheless two important results towards
a decisive success had already been achieved ; a portion of the 4th
brigade of the Guard, supported by artillery, had succeeded in
seizing and maintaining possession of the Spur South-west of
St. Privat, forming part of the main French position ; and more-
over the whole of the hostile troops were here so engaged in
their front as materially to facilitate the decisive movement
against the enemy's flank.
We have seen that the Saxons had not made such pro-
gress in the turning movement as was supposed by the Guard
Corps, and that the attack of this corps was checked before the
Saxons could come into collision with the enemy.
As required by its own dispositions and the general military
situation, the IXth Army Corps collected all its disposable forces
to renew the frontal attack with energy; the IIIrd Army Corps
did not join in the attack as had been intended, because the
enemy had just made a fresh and decisive advance against the
First Army, which it was considered necessary to paralyse by
holding back that corps. Although in the resolute advance
of the 3rd brigade of the Guard, the Hessian Division, and
part of the 18th Division from the Bois de la Cusse against
Amanvillers the main French position was not reached, neverthe-
less ground was won, and, what was of most importance, by it
the attention of the hostile troops opposite was diverted from the
right flank of the Guard Corps, while the right of the great
artillery line north-east of the Bois de la Cusse was also enabled
to advance nearer the enemy. The batteries on the spur south-
west of St. Privat as well as those not so far advanced co-operated
most effectively in producing this result. But notwithstanding
that the corps artillery, the heavy divisional batteries of the IIIrd
Aattle of Gravelotte. 3 I 9
Corps, and a battery of the Guard maintained a heavy fire on
the southern skirts of the copses of la Folie, the determined
attacks made against them by detachments of the 18th Division
from the Bois de Genivaux failed to place them in our possession.
The din of battle, which reached the Royal head-quarters at
Malmaison from St. Privat and Amanvillers, indicated unmis-
takeably that the Second German Army had commenced its
attack in front and flank of the enemy's right wing. It was
therefore time for the whole line of the First Army to make a
resolute attack against his left wing, so as to prevent him with-
drawing troops from that flank to support his right. Conse-
quently this army also received orders to attack with all its
strength, the IInd Army Corps also being moved forward.
We know that owing to its great strength, the great losses
here sustained by the Germans, and the approaching darkness,
the Germans in spite of their gallantry were unsuccessful in
forcing this part of the enemy's main position ; although they
succeeded in thrusting themselves like a wedge between Point
du Jour and Moscou. Nor could a final and decisive movement be
successful until the XIIth Corps, having completed its flank march,
advanced to turn the French right, and after the last assault
had been prepared by the artillery of the Guard, Xth and Saxon
Corps—St. Privat and Roncourt having also been cannonaded
by the Hessian division.
The narrative has shown that the execution of the turning
movement on the part of the Saxons was delayed and modified
by accidental circumstances, which caused several officers of the
Saxon Corps, excited by a noble spirit of enthusiasm, to march
without orders to the support of their hard-pressed comrades of
the Guard. The assault on St. Privat was finally delivered from
three directions by Guards and Saxons who, stimulated by
emulation, rushed forward shoulder to shoulder.
The 6th French Corps was everywhere decisively driven
back; and the right wing of the 4th Corps, in spite of the most
strenuous exertions, was unable to Sustain the concentrated fire
of the German artillery crowning the heights South of St. Privat.
The 3rd brigade of the Guard also continued to gain ground
in a second decisive advance against Amanvillers until further
success was prevented by the approaching darkness.
32O The German Artillery.
This victory, in common with the others near Metz, was
attended by no great capture of trophies or of prisoners. The
enemy was protected from immediate pursuit on the battle field
not only by his employing fresh troops to cover the retreat and
by the exhaustion of the Germans, but above all by the ap-
proaching darkness; while any further pursuit was prevented
by the vicinity of the fortress. Nevertheless a decisive result
in a military sense was attained by the victory ; the battle was
the close of the strategic operations round Metz ; the result was
that the communications of the hostile army with Paris were
severed.
3. The German artillery.
As the battle of the 18th of August was conducted more
systematically than those of the I4th and 16th, so also did the
movements of the artillery partake of the same character ; there
were however here also several instances of improvised action.
I. The battle commenced with a surprise of the enemy's
camp by artillery, as was also the case on the 16th. Owing to
the faulty arrangements of the French for the security of their
position, the ridge between Vernéville and Amanvillers enabled
the artillery to approach under cover, deploy, and open a flank-
ing fire on the French right wing, for which the camp at Mon-
tigny la Grange was mistaken. The measures for supporting
the artillery as narrated seem to have been sufficient.
It might appear that the chances in favour of the decisive
success of this surprise by artillery were greater than on the
16th; but in fact the conditions were much less favourable. On the
18th the artillery confronted a strong hostile position, occupied
in force and far more Commanding. Although it is true that
the surprise at Vionville placed the artillery in a critical position,
here on the other hand Success was out of the question, for it was
impossible to remain long under the tremendous fire from troops
of all arms at close quarters and mostly under cover until the
arrival of the last batteries of the corps artillery of the Ixth Army
Corps. After heavy losses the Squadrons, which formed the
only escort of the guns, were compelled to retreat, although the
artillery still strove against the inevitable. Not until a battery
had been worsted in a gallant and isolated conflict with hostile
Battle of Gravelotte. 32 I
skirmishers, and the others were threatened with useless annihi-
lation, was there any thought of withdrawing the left wing of
the artillery, which had held its ground with astonishing bravery
in spite of its heavy casualties. Even then the batteries obeyed
the orders to retire, issued with the sanction of the corps com-
mandant, with reluctance and very gradually The first de-
tachment of infantry which came up only succeeded by heroic
devotion in covering the withdrawal of part of the artillery and
was at last compelled to give way to the enemy's superior force.
The three batteries of the 18th Division on the right alone
were able to maintain their position longer, being somewhat
more sheltered in a break in the southern slope of the ridge.
That at a later hour the horse artillery batteries of the corps
artillery of the IIIrd Army Corps and one of the batteries of the
corps artillery of the IXth Army Corps, which had been taken
to the rear, were able again to come into action on the left
flank of this artillery line, must be attributed not alone to the
gallantry of the troops, but also to the circumstance that the
destructive fire from the heights towards the north, which had
played on their flanks and rear, had in the interval slackened
considerably; for the enemy in that quarter was now held in
check by German troops prolonging the left flank. That also
towards evening the left of the artillery was unable again to
recover its former position, is proved by the resolute but futile
attempt made by the 5th Light battery of the Guard to come
into action on that flank.
2. Let us now consider in what way the artillery of the Ixth
Corps would have been disposed if the actual state of affairs
with respect to the enemy had been known to the authorities
from the commencement of the action. The views of the Royal
head-quarters and the general military situation demanded that
the entire First Army as well as the IXth Corps should at first
detain the enemy, for the object was to prevent him from advan-
cing from his position and to engage his artillery, so as to divert
its fire from the other troops and prepare the attack which was
to follow. The best position for the execution of this essentially
defensive project was on the heights to the right of the defile of
la Mance and their continuation towards the north. This
ground was in fact occupied by the artillery of the First Army.
y
322 The German Artillery.
The desire of retaining possession of the Bois de la Cusse,
which was held by German infantry, necessarily led to the
batteries of the IXth Corps becoming scattered ; so that while
the Hessian artillery took up a position to the north of the Bois
de la Cusse at Habonville, the corps artillery and the batteries
of the 18th Division were enabled to crown the heights on either
side of Vernéville, a good position from which to prepare attacks
of infantry against L'Envie and Champenois. We have seen
that consequently the field batteries of the corps artillery of
the IIIrd Corps afterwards came into action here; and that it
did not advance further, as it would have been very much ex-
posed to the hostile infantry occupying the copses south-west of
la Folie.
3. In this battle also it was impossible to avoid the separation
of the artillery from the bodies of troops to which it belonged.
This was generally brought about by the circumstances of the
battle and by the form of the ground, although seldom executed
but by the express orders or with the sanction of the superior
officers. Thus it was impossible to place artillery at the northern
edge of the Bois de Vaux because the only road leading to it
from the ravine of la Mance was impassable for guns. Con-
sequently the whole of the artillery of the VIIth Corps was em-
ployed on its left flank, the 5th Light battery alone being able,
after over coming considerable difficulties, to support the 26th
brigade at Jussy and St. Ruffine.
The corps artillery of the Guard and afterwards the heavy
divisional batteries of the IIIrd Corps were detached and sent to
the front to reinforce the hard-pressed artillery of the Ixth
Corps and to support the attack of the 18th Division. Similarly
the horse artillery batteries of the Guard and 5th Cavalry
Division as well as the artillery of the Xth Corps were detached
to assist the artillery of the Guard and Hessian Division in pre-
paring the assault on St. Privat and afterwards in the last
position in the pursuing of the retiring enemy by shelling the
4th French Corps and the formidable artillery position east of
St. Privat.
Although the Ist ficla division of the Guard Corps was
separated from the 1st Infantry Division by the corps artillery
rushing in between them, yet this did not materially affect the
Battle of Graveloffe. 323
amount of support given to that Division in its attack of St. Marie,
After attaining the principal object of keeping the enemy and
notably his artillery in check on the hills south of St. Privat,
and thus diverting its fire from the right flank of the attack
against St. Marie aux Chênes, it appears to be a matter of indiffer-
ence whether the battery and a half, which remained available
for the direct support, belonged to the corps artillery or Ist field
division. The voluntary support given by batteries of both the
Saxon Divisions to the Ist Guard Division fully compensated
for the absence of its own artillery. This also necessitated a tem-
porary separation of the batteries from the troops to which they
belonged, but it is evident that they endeavoured to rejoin them
shortly afterwards.
The 5th Light battery of the Guard, which had been assigned
to the 3rd brigade of the Guard, was detached owing to the neces-
sity of supporting the artillery of the IXth Army Corps south of
the Bois de la Cusse. When the first attack against Amanvillers
was made by that brigade, simultaneously with that by the 25th
Hessian Division, the only means of Supporting its right flank
was by the fire of the left wing of the artillery south of the Bois
de la Cusse. There was no direct Support whatever. That the
artillery to the south of the wood did not follow the assault of
its own accord, appeared to be well explained by the necessity
of holding the hostile troops on and behind the opposite hills in
check, to prevent their being employed against the flank of the
assailants. Direct support would certainly have been afforded
by the available light divisional batteries of the IIIrd Army
Corps at short ranges, had not that Corps been prevented by
the situation of the Ist Army Corps from taking part in this
attack. When the 3rd brigade of the Guard again advanced it
was supported effectively by the batteries on the right of the
great artillery line on the heights South of St. Privat.
4. In this battle the principle of employing artillery in masses
was carried out from the very commencement, and on every
part of the battle field, to the greatest possible extent. This is
to be ascribed not only to tactical considerations but also to the
formation of the ground.
a. The only position for artillery on the entire battle field of
the First Army, especially at the beginning of the battle, was
--- Y 2
324 The German Artillery.
the ridge on which Gravelotte is situated, extending from about
1,000 paces to the south of the village to 800 paces north-east
of Malmaison. Consequently we find that the whole of the
artillery of the First Army, 28 batteries or 168 guns, was here
united, as far as the space permitted, under one command.
The enemy admits that the concentrated fire of this mass was
overwhelming; for it efficiently prepared the assault on St.
Hubert, set Moscou and Point du Jour on fire, and silenced his
artillery.
One thing was naturally impossible for the artillery, namely,
to drive the enemy from under cover. This, when at all, had
to be done by infantry. The attack here, already difficult on
account of the ravine in front, was rendered more so as the
artillery could only co-operate to a limited degree. For though
at first the artillery mass at Gravelotte could fire over the heads
of the infantry without any risk of hitting it, it was afterwards
obliged to cease firing. This was the critical moment when
the enemy's masses might have attempted to drive back the
shaken infantry.
The form of the ravine was such that as a rule artillery beyond
it could not open fire on the hostile position until the guns
had advanced nearly to the crest, and this would necessitate the
occupation of the ground there by infantry. In any case such
an advance of artillery would be attended with danger, and would
be only justifiable if the decisive attack was to be made at this
point. This was indeed the idea when the corps artillery of
the VIIth Army Corps was ordered to cross the defile, but at
that time the infantry had not made sufficient progress, and con-
sequently three batteries only could be brought into action.
That two of these were able to retain their position for some
time is to be attributed not only to their praiseworthy valour,
but also to the direct and indirect support afforded by St.
Hubert, by the gully running thence to Moscou, and by the fire
of the great artillery mass in rear at Gravelotte, although this
gully only gave them command of Moscou and the ground in its
immediate vicinity.
The enemy was prevented from pursuing our retreating
infantry in any force by the precision of the fire of the artillery
Battle of Gravelotte. 3.25
mass at Gravclotte," and although fresh hostile batteries were
repeatedly brought up, they were either prevented from coming
into action or obliged to retire after a few rounds.
ð. The surprise of the enemy's camp at Montigny la Grange,
mentioned above, was executed by ten batteries brought into
action in Succession on the south-east of the Bois de la Cusse,
and united under one command, consisting of the corps artillery
of the IXth Army Corps, the batteries of the 18th Division,
and the Hessian Horse Artillery battery. When they found that
no permanent success was thus attainable the batteries were
ordered to prepare the two attacks made by the infantry of
that corps through the Bois de la Cusse against Amanvillers, as
well as from Chantrenne through the Bois de Genivaux against
the copses at la Folie. This was to be cffected in the first
place by cannonading the troops on the opposite heights, and
CSpecially the artillery posted there. The number of German
batterics engaged in this particular duty varied during the battle,
amounting at most to thirteen, after the 5th Light battery of
the Guard came into action. They included six of the Ixth
Corps (one of these being the Hessian horse artillery battery),
six of the IIIrd, and one of the Guard Corps. Although they
formed two groups under different commanding officers, their
fire was, as a rule, concentrated on the same object, and after a
severe contest the hostile artillery here also was driven away.
The artillery claim that Champenois was evacuated owing
principally to the concentrated and heavy fire of the batteries
to the south of the Bois de la Cusse, and certainly the precision
of the guns between that wood and the Bois de Genivaux was
such that all the attempts made by the enemy to place fresh
batteries on the opposite heights, as well as the offensive move-
ments made by isolated bodies of infantry, were foiled.
Several alterations occurred in this position, the recapitulation
of which will be interesting.
I. In consequence of the hostile fire, which took the left of
the position in flank and rear, the 4th Heavy battery of the
* It must of course be understood, and it has already been shown in the narrative,
that parties of infantry, which held their ground on the easterm edge of the ravine,
as, for instance, the garrison of St. Hubert, endeavoured to co-operate as much as
possible. * g
326 The German Artillery.
9th regiment moved to the front, but after the disaster which it
sustained the temporary withdrawal of the whole of the corps
artillery and a battery of the 18th Division was imperatively
called for.
2. Anxious to support the remaining three batteries of the
18th Division, which, although hard pressed, were unwilling to
give up the ground already won, the horse artillery division of
the corps artillery of the IIIrd Corps, which was passing by, came
into action on their left, and the Hessian Horse Artillery
battery, which was retiring, on the right.
3. The 2nd Horse Artillery battery and 4th Light battery
of the corps artillery of the Ixth Army Corps, having rapidly
refitted, again came into action in the artillery line.
4. Owing to the capture of Champenois the Hessian Horse
Artillery battery was able to advance into line with that place
and L'Envic.
5. Being ordered to advance and support the artillery south
of the Bois de la Cussc, the 5th Light battery of the Guard
came into action for a short time on the left flank. Desirous,
however, of obtaining a better field of view, it advanced in the
direction of Amanvillers; but the impossibility of finding an
cligible position compelled it to return to its first position.
Thence it made a long flank march along the rear of the posi-
tion, and came into action on the right of the Hessian Horse
Artillery battery, where the range was more open.
6. Towards evening the four batteries on the right flank
wheeled to the left, so as to bring a more effective fire to bear
on fresh hostile artillery and infantry (supposed to be Lorencez's
Division) at Montigny la Grange.
7. All its guns having become unserviceable the Hessian
Horse Artillery battery was obliged to withdraw during the
cvcning.
8. As soon as the hostile artillery on the heights had been
silenccci, the southern group of batteries (field division of corps
artillery, IIIrd Army Corps) was able to wheel to the right so as
to cnfilade the southern skirts of the wood of la Folie. This
line was morcover now prolonged on the left by five batteries
(four heavy divisional batteries of the IIIrd Corps and the 5th
Light battery of the Guard) to the north of the defile of Chan-
Battle of Gravelotte. 327
trenne, so that the fire of these nine batteries under one com-
mander was concentrated with great success on the same object.
c. To the north of the Bois de la Cusse also artillery was
employed in masses, for instance, at first:—
I. The five Hessian field batteries, afterwards joined by the
3rd Light field battery of the 9th regiment, immediately to the
north of the wood."
2. To the north-west nine batteries of the Ist field division
and of the Corps artillery of the Guard Corps, which after the
occupation of St. Ail by the Germans were aligned on the Hes-
sian batteries.
The general commanding the IXth Corps, who had distinctly
seen the critical position of the batteries south of the Bois de la
Cusse, was obviously right in ordering the Hessian artillery to
advance from its first to its second position,” for it was necessary
to create a more rapid and decisive effect, which could only be
effected at a shorter range. After a hot conflict the well-directed
fire of these batteries was successful in so diverting the attention
of the troops confronting them that the left wing of the Ixth
Corps, and more especially the advanced line of artillery to the
south of the Bois de la Cusse, were to some extent relieved from
the fire which till then had played with such deadly effect on
their flanks and rear.” The mass of artillery of the Guard
alluded to in (2) had at first to play a secondary part, that of
detaining the enemy and preventing his artillery on the heights
near St. Privat from enfilading the Hessian batteries (1). With
their co-operation it carried on a decisive contest from its posi-
tion south-east of St. Ail against the French artillery on the
heights to the south of St. Privat, and though interrupted by
frequent attacks of the enemy, always repulsed them by its
accurate and overwhelming fire. We know that here also the
German artillery gained the advantage, though not without con-
siderable loss,
* The narrative has shown that this position had already been occupied by the
1st field division of the artillery of the Guard.
* It has been mentioned above that the commander of the Hessian artillery had
already intended to make this movement.
* It was not possible wholly to silence the flanking fire of the hostile inſantry,
because the ground immediately to the south-west of Amanvillers, where it found
cover, could not be seen into by our artillery.
328 7%e German Artillery.
3. Further to the north-west again, thirteen Saxon batterics
(seven of the corps artillery and three from each of the Divisions
of the XIIth Corps) were concentrated and most efficiently pre-
pared the assault of St. Marie aux Chênes, while the extreme
left flank of the corps artillery of the Guard Corps (4.1. and
part of 2. r. G.) fronted St. Marie for the same purpose.
After the capture of that place the bulk of the Saxon
artillery was employed in supporting the turning movement of
this corps, which wheeled to the right on St. Marie as a pivot;
the position of the artillery being immediately to the north of
the village, i.e. at the pivot. Intermediate positions were indeed
at first taken up with the left flank refused, until the Saxon
infantry drove the enemy out of the copses between Auboué and
Roncourt. This was scarcely accomplished when we find twelve
batteries (72 guns) massed under one command to the north of
St. Marie, where it brought the conflict with the hostile artillery
between St. Privat and Roncourt to a successful termination,
and with the co-operation of part of the artillery of the Guard
repulsed repeated offensive movements made by the enemy's
right flank. At this time also occurred the resolute and suc-
cessful advance made by the 2nd Horse Artillery battery against
hostile cavalry.
While the 1st Heavy battery accompanied the 46th brigade
in its march into position, the main body of the Ist field division
and the 1st Horse Artillery battery followed the extreme left
flank of the XIIth Corps, opening the way for its advance against
Roncourt and the forest between that place and Malancourt.
4. Soon after the capture of St. Marie aux Chênes the 3rd
field division of the artillery of the Guard came into action
between that village and St. Ail to reinforce the fire of the
batteries of this corps already engaged.
When the infantry of the Guard moved to the assault of St.
Privat, the artillery of that corps had almost silenced the hostile
batteries on the west and south of that place, but had not had
time to cannonade the village itself sufficiently. It was not
therefore until the infantry had advanced far enough to protect
it against the line of hostile skirmishers lying under cover, that
it was able to move forward in echelons and prepare the
Battle of Gravelotte. 329
assault more cffectively at a shorter range. But the infantry was
now advancing SO impetuously that part only of the batteries
of the Guard reached this new position, where they were soon
again overtaken and masked by the infantry. We know that
the assault, commenced with such brilliant gallantry, was for
a time interrupted owing to the enemy's numerical superiority
and advantage of ground, in order to give time for the artillery
of the Guard to preparc the way by cannonading St. Privat, as
well as to await the co-operation of the XIIth Corps. We have
seen that the 2nd Heavy and 3rd Light batteries of the Guard
(afterwards joined by the 4th Heavy) hastened to the front to
establish the success which the Guard Corps had just attained
by the capture of the spur south-west of St. Privat. In that cri-
tical situation they held their ground shoulder to shoulder with
the weak parties of infantry, and most effectually repulsed by
the accuracy of their fire all endeavours on the part of the enemy
to regain possession of the spur.
The Hessian artillery had at first to cover the right of the
attack from its position in retired echelon, until the IXth Corps
had also gained ground towards the front, when some of its
batteries moved up into line with the artillery of the Guard.
With the above exceptions the artillery of the Guard—which
was before long reinforced by the two horse artillery batteries of
the Cavalry Division, the corps artillery of the Xth Army Corps,
and two Hessian field batteries, two batteries of the Guard being
pushed forward through the advancing infantry immediately to
the north of the high road—now continued its fire with re-
doubled vigour against St. Privat and the hostile batteries in its
vicinity, which again made their appearance."
The Saxon artillery also was now able to lay aside its de-
fensive attitude and, inclining to the left and bringing forward
its left shoulder, conform to the turning movement of its
infantry. It prepared the attack against Roncourt, and finally
against St. Privat, from two different positions near the south
edge of the wood between the former village and Auboué. The
capture of Roncourt was the signal for the whole of the Saxon
* Then the three other batteries of the Ist division of the artillery of the Guard,
which had remained on the right flank of the great artillery line, being masked by
advancing infantry, directed their fire at the hill where the pond is situated.
33O The German Artillery.
artillery to move forward to a position enveloping St. Privat on
the north and north-west. Having been detained too long by
the forest-fight, the two batteries on the extreme left flank (east
of Roncourt) arrived too late to contribute to the very effective
fire which was concentrated for some time on St. Privat from
this new position. In the last moments of the contest that
decisive point was encircled on the north, west, and south-west
by a mass of thirty-one batteries (186 guns) from the Guard,
Saxon, and Xth Army Corps and from the 25th (Hessian)
Division, to which four batteries of the 20th Division were added
at the commencement of the assault. Overwhelmed by the
German shell (including a few shrapnel), the enemy's proud
stronghold yielded to the last assault. French accounts, and
especially Montluisant's, testify to the decisive part played by
the German artillery at this important phase of the contest.
The gallant infantry had hardly captured St. Privat and taken
up a position on the heights, when batteries came up from the
artillery mass to secure possession of what had been won and
to be in readiness for future events." Thus by degrees the
last great artillery mass was formed extending from the Forêt
de Jaumont by St. Privat to the Bois de la Cusse, in which
finally thirty-eight batteries (228 guns) were crowded together.
While the left and larger wing (19-2O batteries), after successfully
shelling the retiring hostile columns, concentrated its fire on the
artillery position at the forest, the right wing poured its fire, ac-
cording to the enemy's own admission, into the right flank (and
rear even 2) of the 4th French Corps with such effect that it was
compelled first to change front and then to retreat. The accurate
fire of this wing always repulsed the Offensive movements which
were repeatedly directed against it by Small as well as by large
bodies of infantry from Amanvillers.”
5. In this battle also the ranges varied between 800 and 4,000
paces, with the single exception of the 6th Light field battery
of the 1st Army Corps, which fired from the right bank of the
Moselle at the enemy's flank at a distance of 5,000 paces.
* Reinforcements reached the batteries of the Guard on the spur south-west of
St. Privat during the contest round that village.
* This refers, no doubt, to Ladmirault's endeavours (French accounts say that
they were superhuman) to lead his troops back to their original position and cover
the retreat of his corps.
Battle of Gravelotte. 33 I
On a few occasions case shot had to be resorted to, in repelling
hostile attacks. However extraordinary these differences of range
may appear, they are accounted by for existing circumstances.
We find the longest ranges in the beginning of the battle,
with some few exceptions which have been already men-
tioned. This was necessary not only because it was required at
first to “detain' the enemy, which as a rule allowed of long
ranges, but also because there were no eligible defensive posi-
tions at shorter ranges. The following are instances of these
long ranges:—(I.) The artillery of the First Army at Grave-
lotte was forced to concentrate its fire on points of the hostile
position which lay opposite one or other of its flanks at ranges
of from 2,500 to 4,000 paces.; '-(2.) The field batteries of the
corps artillery of the IIIrd Army Corps south of Vernéville at
3,800 paces;–(3) The artillery of the Guard Corps in its first
position at 4,000 paces;–(4.) The Saxon artillery up to more
than 4,000 paces, from its position north and north-west of St.
Marie.
We have already seen that in the last three instances the
artillery was prevented from advancing to shorter ranges by the
enemy either permanently or temporarily occupying the copses
of la Folie, the village of St. Ail, and the wood between
Auboué and Roncourt.
At these long ranges, nevertheless, not only was the purpose
of “detaining’ the enemy fully accomplished, but also, after the
range had been obtained by trial shots, the systematic firing
succeeded in silencing the enemy's guns, either wholly or par-
tially, as in the case of the artillery of the First Army. In
another quarter the decisive contest on the part of the Saxon,
Guard, and Hessian artillery was conducted at ranges of from
2,OOO to 2,800 paces.
The artillery on the heights of St. Privat afterwards fired at
the hostile batteries near the forest to the east of that village
at ranges varying from I,8OO to 2,500 paces. Still shorter ranges
were employed against hostile artillery, although the fire was
directed at other objects also, by the artillery of the IXth Army
* The 1st Horse Artillery battery of the 1st regiment alone relinquished the
advantage of its commanding and covered position for that of a shorter range.
332 7%e German Artillery.
Corps south of the Bois de la Cusse and the batteries of the
VIIth Army Corps on the east of the ravine of Gravelotte.
The shortest ranges for offensive purposes varied from 800
to 1,2OO paces, and were resorted to in the following instances:—
(1) By the batteries of the VIIth Army Corps at St. Hubert. (2.)
By the left wing of the corps artillery of the IXth Army Corps.
(3.) By the batteries of the XIIth (Saxon) Army Corps, which
cannonaded St. Marie from the south. (4.) By the batteries of
the Guard, which came into action alongside the hard-pressed
infantry on the spur south-west of St. Privat. (5.) By Some of
the Saxon batteries in the last position against St. Privat. We
know that the artillery of the Guard was obliged by the form of
the south-western slope of the heights of St. Privat to remain
somewhat further off in order not to lose sight of the object.
(6.) By those batteries which crowned the heights north and
south of St. Privat so rapidly that they were in time to fire into
the retreating columns.
But all these occurred at decisive moments, or at moments
considered so by the commanding officers, when attention had
to be paid to the effect of the fire rather than to obtaining cover
for the guns. Although this principle was carried out by the
batteries mentioned in the first two instances to such an extent
as to cause their partial destruction, they were unsuccessful in
attaining a decisive result, that being rendered impossible by the
general state of affairs; nevertheless the advantage gained was no
slight one, as the best possible effect was produced on the morale
of the other troops.
In the other instances the effect of the artillery fire was de-
cisive; this has been shown in the narrative by several quota-
tions from the French reports.
We find similar short ranges used for defensive purposes and
in some instances case shot resorted to. The narrative shows that
this occurred when several of the batteries that were cannonading
the hostile position at long ranges had to defend themselves against
small bodies of hostile infantry, principally skirmishers, which tried
to creep up under cover of the ground Of this character was the
successful cannonade of Champenois by batteries of the IXth
and IIIrd Corps from the South of the Bois de la Cusse; the
repulse of the Offensive movement made by the extreme right
Aattle of Gravelotte. 333
flank of the French by the accurate fire of the Saxons, assisted
by that of some of the batteries of the Guard (here the shortest
ranges were somewhat exceeded), also the repulse by Hessian
guns of the parties of infantry which tried to push forward near
the Bois de la Cusse along the railroad ; and, lastly, the repulse
of repeated attacks on the part of the 4th French Corps from
Amanvillers by the deliberate and accurate fire of the batteries
on the right of the great artillery line south of St. Privat, con-
sisting of the Ist field division, 3rd Light and 4th Heavy
batteries of the Guard artillery, some batteries of the Xth Corps,
of the 5th Cavalry Division, and of the Hessian artillery.
6. In this battle also we find case shot successfully employed
in self-defence. At ranges of 400 paces the 3rd Heavy
battery of the 9th regiment repulsed an attack of skirmishers
from Champenois, and the 3rd Light battery an attack from
Moscou, while the extreme left flank of the corps artillery of the
Ixth Army Corps had not even time to try the efficacy of case
shot, which, however, would hardly have extricated it from its
critical position.
7. Shrapnel shells were fired by some of the Saxon batteries,
but it was very difficult, as already mentioned, to distinguish
their effect as they were fired at the same time as the common
shell at the same objects.
8. In this battle also flank marches were not unfrequently
made by artillery within effective range of the enemy, more or
less protection being afforded by the ground, of which the follow-
ing are instances :—The artillery of the VIIth Army Corps
taking up its position at Gravelotte. The march of the artillery
of the IXth Corps into position south of the Bois de la Cusse
relatively to the position of the encrimy in front. The movement
of the corps artillery of the Guard Corps from its first position
near the railroad through the defile to its second position. The
flank marches of scveral detachments of Saxon artillery from
their first positions towards the north through the defile running
from Habonville to Auboué. The movements made by Hano-
verian and Guard batteries after the capture of St. Privat to
crown the hills which, commencing to rise at that point, covered
the operation to some extent.
It was, however, impossible to avoid exposing the flanks in
334 7%e German Artillery.
some instances, as for example:—When the Ist field division of
the Guard moved from its position close to the Bois de la Cusse
on the south of the railway to another north of it; also when
the 1st Heavy battery of the Guard (having lost its relative
position in its division by the advance in echelon of the artillery
of the Guard from its position between St. Ail and the Bois de
la Cusse) was forced to move to the right flank of the line;
and again when the 4th Light and 6th Heavy batteries of the
Guard, being masked by the advance of the infantry of the Guard
to the assault, were obliged to move to the north of the road
from St. Marie to St. Privat. Then also the Saxon batteries
which had lost their relative position as they advanced in echelon
into the crowded position at Roncourt were obliged to come into
action wherever they could find room. In all these cases con-
siderable losses were sustained by the enemy's fire, but not to
such an extent as to prevent the attainment of the object. Nor
is it stated in the reports of those batteries of the VIIth Corps
which had to deploy at St. Hubert that the manoeuvre itself
was the cause of the heavy loss incurred. That the horse
artillery division of the 8th regiment of artillery sustained no
casualties in its flank march from the position at Mogador to
that on the south of the high road near the eastern outskirts of
Gravelotte, is explained by the circumstance that the enemy,
being kept in check by the batteries which had remained in
the position, had his attention diverted from the movement.
We can therefore only repeat our statement with regard to
the battles of the 14th and 16th of August : “that as a rule it is
not difficult to withdraw artillery in action from the fighting line
and employ them in another part of the field of battle ; and that
flank and diagonal marches, which artillery do not make willingly
under the enemy's fire, can always be executed in case of neces-
sity.' These reflections add weight to the principle of employing
a greater part of the artillery at the outset, and lead to the con-
viction that reserves of artillery are less necessary than of
infantry and cavalry.
9. As already mentioned in the narrative of the battle, the
German artillery occasionally fired into their own troops, but
* According to Captain Helmuth's Lecture at the Military Society, there is no
doubt that this was the case. It must, moreover, be remarked that accidents of this
nature occurred also on the 14th and 16th of August,
Aattle of Gravelotte. 335
in all the instances which have come to the writer's knowledge
this arose from mistaking them for the enemy under some such
circumstances as the following :—
a. When the artillery was firing over its own troops at long
and unknown ranges.
b. In close and intersected ground, when it became difficult
to distinguish objects owing to the insufficient light caused by
Smoke, dust, and approaching darkness, or when the Sun was
shining in the faces of the troops.
c. During the hasty pursuits made by detachments of the
assaulting Columns after villages or positions had been taken,
especially when it was growing dark.
d. When the batteries, brought forward from the reserves or
columns of march, happened to come within range of the hostile
guns which were firing at batteries already in action in front.
This was more frequently the case when the latter, being placed
on high ground, prevented the hostile batteries being seen, as for
example, on the heights of St. Privat, which defiladed the hostile
artillery position near the wood east of St. Privat from the
batteries coming up from the rear.
e. During the assaults on the enemy's flank in which artillery
co-operated, and which became Somewhat disconnected owing
to the approaching darkness. The more extensive the Scale on
which the attack was conducted, so much the greater was the
danger of single detachments pressing forward being enfiladed
by those that had remained in their positions.
Such accidents may in future be avoided by the following
precautions:—
a. Should the formation of the ground necessitate troops
firing over the heads of those in front, as in the case of an
assault, the officers who have the arrangement of the assault
must make it their business to give exact information to the
artillery when it is to take place, so that it may cease firing." But
the assaulting Columns must also understand that they are not
to advance under such circumstances without orders. This is
all the more imperative if the formation of the ground requires
the employment of long ranges or if want of light makes it diffi-
* It is scarcely necessary to mention that artillery is by no means absolved from
the duty of attentively observing the movements of its own infantry.
336 7%e German Artillery.
cult to see. At a given signal the artillery will cease firing and
the assault will be delivered.
Information of this description was given by the commander
of the advanced guard of the 1st Division of the Guard Corps
to the two batteries of that corps while cannonading St. Marie
aux Chênes. This does not appear to have been the case at all
in the attack on St. Privat; nor was it indeed possible, because
the last assault was commenced before the superior officers
could issue their orders for it.
b. It is as much for the interest of the infantry as of artillery
that as a rule successful assaulting columns should not pursue
beyond the object they attack, but that this duty should be left
to troops coming up in rear or to reserves ; besides which the
artillery following the movement has more time for co-operation
and will be less likely to mistake its own troops in the front for
those of the enemy.
c. Artillery which is to be brought forward during the battle
into the fighting line must be directed when possible by officers
who have been able to follow the course of the battle, and are
thoroughly acquainted with the relative positions of their own
and the enemy's troops. This is of peculiar importance if
events in front call for immediate action, as the commandant of
artillery, who has generally no reconnoitring patrols at his dis-
posal, has no time to obtain sufficient information under such
unfavourable conditions.
It is as a rule not sufficient merely to point out the general
direction in which artillery is to come into action.
d. When it is intended to prosecute assaults against the
enemy's flank after dark, it will in most cases be advisable for
the artillery to cease firing entirely. Its fire does more harm
than good, as the actual effect must be very slight when objects
can no longer be distinguished. The gain in morale which the
troops acquire from the knowledge that they are supported by
artillery is on such occasions more than counterbalanced by the
danger of being hit by it.
IO. The losses of the artillery in this battle are according to
the lists very varied. The heaviest were sustained by the
batteries of the IXth Army Corps in the position south of the Bois
de la Cusse, and by the batteries of the VIIth Army Corps en-
gaged to the east of the defile of Gravelotte, in some instances
Battle of Gravelotte. 337
amounting to the loss of all the officers, three-fourths of the men,
and more than the complement of horses."
The losses were, as might be expected, least when the
artillery was engaged in merely ‘detaining ' the enemy which
could be done at long ranges from under cover, and in some
batteries the casualties were in such cases extremely few. On
the other hand batteries which ſought at short ranges at decisive
moments lost more than one-third of their men and three-fourths
of their horses.
The loss in material was remarkably trifling, and we con-
sequently consider ourselves justified in repeating the maxim that
artillery opposed to artillery should aim less at dismounting
guns than at disabling men and horses.
CONCLUSION.
FROM the preceding narrative it is evident that on the 18th of
August also the German Artillery vied with its sister arm, the
infantry, in heroism, and played a most important part in gain-
ing this decisive victory; its distinguished behaviour has received
full recognition in the reports of the German Armies.
* The lines of wagons are not included in the purely combatant portion of the
batteries. This is as follows:–
Officers Men Horses
Field battery . * & 4. 62 48
Horse Artillery battery . 4. 74 96
The full strength of mobilised batteries is :--
Officers Men Horses
Horse Artillery battery . 4. I 50 2O7
Light field battery . tº 4. I45 127
Heavy 5 y | e 4. I 5.1 I 26
APPENDIX.
#
i
ORDER OF BATTLE
OF THE GERMAN ARMIES FROM THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE WAR TILL AFTER THE BATTLE
BEFORE METZ ON THE 18th OF AUGUST, 1870.
Commander in Chief. . . H. M. THE KING OF PRUSSIA.
dº Aides-de-Camp : General of Infantry voN BoyEN, Zieut.-General voN TREskow, Major-General BARON VON STEINAECKER,
Zieut.-Colonel Count von LEHNDORFF, Zieut.-Colonel PRINCE ANTON RADziwill, Zieut.-Colonel Count von WALDERSEE, Major von ALTEN.
Chief of the General Staff of the Army—General of Infantry Freiherr von Moltke.
Quartermaster-General—Zieut.-General von Podbielski.
Chiefs of Sections—Zieut.-Colonel von Brousart von Schellendorf, Zieut.-Colonel von Verdy du Vernois, Lieut.-Colonel von Brandenstein.
Inspector-General of Artillery—General of Infantry von Hindersin.
Inspector-General of Engineers—Zieut.-General von Kleist.
FIRST ARMY.
Commander in Chief—General of Infantry von Steinmetz.
Chief of General Staff—Major-General von Sperling.
Quartermaster in Chief—Colonel Count von Waldersee.
Commander of Artillery—Zieut.-General Schwartz.
Commander of Engineers and Pioneers—Colonel Biehler.
- !
Army Corps Divisions Brigades Regiments Remarks
Ist Army Corps— *st Infantry Brigade — | 1st Crown Prince Grenadiers — Col. von Artillery |
General of Ca- Maj.-Gen. von Gayl * Lieut.co. von Menaeideliºpºi Mº
valry Baron von 1st Infantry Di º —Lieut.-Col. von Meerscheidt- attached to 1st Infantry Divi-
Manteuffel s & 21- sion
* & "on i. 2nd Infantry Brigade — 3rd Grenadiers—Col. von Legat 3rd. Field Division (Maj.
Chief of General heim Maj.-Gen. Freiherr von 43rd Regiment—Col. von Busse Müller), to 2nd Infantry
Staff — Lieut.- Falkenstein Division
1st Horse Artillery Battery, to
Ist Cavalry Division

Col. von der
Burg Attached to Division : 1st Rifle Battalion—Maj. von Ploetz;
* Ist Dragoons—Lieut.-Col. von Massow
i
É
Order of Battle—continued.
Brigades Regiments
Remarks
4th Grenadiers—Col. von Tietzen u. Hennig
3rd Infantry Brigade —
44th Regiment—Col. von Boecking
5th Grenadiers—Col. von Einem
4th Infantry Brigade —
45th Regiment—Col. von Mützschefahl
Attached to Division : IOth Dragoons—Col. Freiherr von der Goltz
Attached to Army Corps: Ist Regiment of Field Artillery, 1st Pioneer Battalion,
Artillery—cont.
Remainder belonged to Corps
Artillery, under Col. von
Yungé ; – Horse Artillery
Division (Maj. Gerhards);
2nd Field Division (Lieut.-
Col. Gregorovius); Column-
Division (Maj. Karnhofen)
25th Infantry Brigade — 13th Regiment—Col. von Frankenberg-Lud-
Maj.-Gen. Baron von wigsdorfſ
Osten-Sacken 73rd Fusilier Regiment—Col. von Loebell
26th Infantry Brigade— I5th Regiment—Col. von Delitz
Maj.-Gen. von der 55th 2 3 Col. von Barby
Goltz
Attached to Division : 7th Rifle Battalion—Lieut.-Col. Reinike;
8th Hussars—Lieut.-Col. Arent
27th Infantry Brigade — 39th Fusiliers—Col. von Eskens
Maj.-Gen. von François || 74th Regiment—Col. von Pannwitz
28th Infantry Brigade— 53rd Regiment—Col. von Gerstein-Hohen-
Maj.-Gen. von Woyna II. stein
77th Regiment—Col. von Conrady
Attached to Division : I 5th Hussars—Col. von Cosel
Attached to Army Corps: 7th Regiment of Field Artillery, 7th Pioneer Battalion,
Army Corps
Divisions
Commander of
Artillery—Maj.-
General von
Bergmann
2nd Infantry Di-
vision — Maj.-
Gen. von Prit-
zelwitz
Maj.-Gen. von Memerty
Maj.-Gen. von Zgli-
nitzki
Ist Train Battalion
v11th Army Corps
— General of
Infanry VOI).
Zastrow
Chief of General
Staff—Col. von
Unger
Commander of
Artillery—Maj.-
Gen. von Zim-
Iſle IIIla. Ilſl
13th Infantry Di-
vision— Lieut.-
Gen. von Glü-
IQ62I
14th Infantry Di-
vision— Lieut.-
Gen. von Ka-
mecke
7th Train Battalion
Artillery
1st Field Division (Maj.
Freiherr von Eynatten), at-
tached to 14th Infantry Di-
vision
3rd Field Division (Maj.
Wilhelmi), to 13th Infantry
Division
1st Horse Artillery Battery, to
Cavalry Division
Remainder belonged to Corps
Artillery (Col. von Helden-
Sarnowski);-Horse Artillery
Division (Maj. Coester); 2nd
Field Division (Lieut.-Col.
von Wellmann); Column-
Division (Maj. von Fragstein-
Niemsdorff)
#.
i
Order of Baffle—continued.
Brigades Regiments
Remarks
33rd Fusiliers—Lieut.-Col. von Henning
60th Regiment—Lieut. Col. von Dannenberg
28th Regiment—Col. von Rosenzweig
67th 3 y Col. von Zglinicki
Attached to Division : 8th Rifle Battalion—Maj. von Oppeln-
Bronikowski; 7th King's Hussars—Col. Freiherr von Loë
29th Regiment—Lieut.-Col. von Blumróder
69th y 5 Col. Beyer von Karger
4oth Fusiliers—Col. Freiherr von Eberstein
72nd Regiment—Col. Mettler
Attached to Division : 9th Hussars—Col. von Wittlich or
von Hinzmann-Hallmann
Attached to Army Corps: 8th Field Artillery Regiment, 8th Pioneer Battalion,
Army Corps
V IIIth Army
Corps—General
of Infantry von
Goeben
Chief of General
| Staff—Col. von
Witzendorf
i
}
Commander of
Artillery—Maj.-
Gen. von Ka-
Imecke
Divisions
I5th Infantry Di-
vision — Lieut.-
Gen. von Welt-
zien
29th Infantry Brigade —
Maj.-Gen. von Wedell
3Oth Infantry Brigade —
Maj.-Gen. von Strub-
berg
I6th Infantry Di-
vision — Lieut.-
Gen. Baron von
Barnekow
31st Infantry Brigade —
Maj.-Gen. Count Neid-
hardt von Gneisenau
32nd Infantry Brigade—
Col. von Rex
8th Train Battalion
Artillery
1st Field Division (Maj. Mer-
tens), attached to I5th In-
fantry Division
3rd Field Division (Lieut.-
Col. Hildebrandt), attached
to 16th Infantry Division
Remainder belonged to Corps
Artillery, under Col. von
Broecker ;-Horse Artillery
Division (Lieut.-Col. von
Borkenhagen); 2nd Field
Division (Maj. Zwirnemann);
Column - Division (Capt.
Eggers)
i
.
Order of Battle—continued.
Divisions Brigades Regiments
Remarks
1st Cavalry Brigade — 2nd Cuirassiers—Col. von Pfuhl
Maj.-Gen. von Lüderitz 4th Lancers—Lieut.-Col. von Radecke
1st Cavalry Di- 9th , , Lieut.-Col. von Kleist
vision— Lieut.- || 2nd Cavalry Brigade — 3rd Cuirassiers—Col. von Winterfeld
Gen. von Hart | Maj.-Gen. Baumgarten | 8th Lancers—Col. von Below
I2th , , Lieut.-Col. von Rosenberg
1st Horse Artillery Battery of Ist Field Artillery Regiment
6th Cavalry Brigade — | 8th Cuirassiers—Col. von Rödern
3rd Cavalry Di- || Maj.-Gen. von Mirus 7th Lancers—Lieut.-Col. von Pestel
Gen. Count von Maj.-Gen. Count Dohna | 14th , , Col. von Lüderitz
Army Corps
Cavalry Divisions
attached to
First Army
Iſl2.Ilſl
vision — Maj.-
der Groeben
7th Cavalry Brigade — 5th Lancers—Col. Freiherr von Reitzenstein
1st Horse Artillery Battery of 7th Field Artillery Regiment
Summary of First Army.
Ist Army Corps & . 25 Battalions, 8 Squadrons, I4 Batteries (
VIIth 5 y 2 y 㺠, 25 5 y 8 3 y I4 5 x (
VIIIth , , 3 y * . 25 5 y 8 3 y I5 , , (
1st Cavalry Division . e - j j 24. } % I » (
3rd } } 9 y e ... -- 3 y I6 } % I 3 ) (
84 guns).
84 , ,
6 ,
6 5 y
*=ºsºme sº-sº tº-mº smºsºmsºmºms
Total . g . 75 2 3 64 3 * 45 y 9 (270 , , ).
)
)
90 , , ).
)
}
#
i
Commander in Chief .
SECOND ARMY.
e º GENERAL OF CAVALRY PRINCE FREDERICK CHARLEs OF PRUSSIA, K.H.
Chief of the Staff—Major-General von Stiehle.
Quartermaster-General—Colonel von Hertzberg.
Commander of Artillery—Zieut.-General von Colomier.
Commander of Engineers and Pioneers—Colonel Leuthaus.
Army Corps Divisions Brigades Reginnents Remarks
Guard Corps — ISt Guard Infantry Brigade 1st Foot Guards—Col. von *. Artillery
General of Ca- —Maj.-Gen. von Kessel 3rd ,, 2 3 Col. von Linsingen Ist. Field Division (Col. von
wº. º: "in ºil. 2nd Guard Infantry Bri- || 2nd Foot Guards—Col. Count von Kanitz i. ...) pºsted to
FC. H 8, - º - Gen gade—Maj.-Gen. Baron 4th , , y 5 Col. von Neumann ry
von Pape von Medem Fusilier Guards—Lieut.-Col. von Erkert 3rd Field Division (Lieut.-
Chief of General Col. von Rheinhaben), to 2nd
Staff — Maj.- Attached to Division : Guard Rifle Battalion—Maj. von Arnim Infantry Division
Gen. von Dan- Remainder bel d C
nenberg emainder belonged to Corps
Commander of
Art illery —
Maj.-Gen. Kraft
Prince von Ho-
henlohe Ingel-
fingen
2nd Guard In-
fantry Division
— Lieut.-Gen.
von Budritzki
3rd Guard Infantry Bri-
gade — Colonel Knappe
von Knappstädt
4th Guard Infantry Bri-
gade — Maj.-Gen. von
Berger
1st Grenadier Guards—Col. von Zeuner
3rd y 2 j > Col. von Zaluskowski
2nd Grenadier Guards—Lieut.-Col. von Boehn
4th » 5 2 Col. Count von Wal-
dersee
Attached to Division : Guard Sharpshooters Battalion—Col.
von Fabeck
Artillery (Col. von Scherbe-
ning)
Horse Artillery Division (Maj.
Baron von Buddenbrock)
2nd Field Division (Maj. von
Krieger)
Column - Division (Maj.
Heineccius)
von
i
§

Order of Battle—continued.
Army Corps Divisions Brigades Regiments Remarks
Guard Corps — 1st Guard Cavalry Brigade Gardes du Corps—Col. von Krosigk Artillery—cont.
(continued) —Maj.-Gen. Count von Guard Cuirassiers—Col. Baron von Branden- The Batteries of Horse Artillery
Brandenburg - Stein were attached to the Cavalry
2nd Guard Cavalry Bri- || 1st Guard Lancers—Lieut.-Col. von Rochow Division as required
Guard Cavalry gade—Lieut.-Gen. Prince || 3rd , , Dragº; F. W. von Ho-
Albrecht of Prussia
Guard Hussars—Lieut.-Col. von Hymmen
Ist Guard Dragoons—Col. von Auerswald
Col. Count Finck von
Finckenstein
2nd Guard Lancers—Col. Prince Henry of
Hesse
Attached to Guard Corps: Guard Field Artillery Regiment, Guard Pioneer Battalion,
*-*-
Division —
Lieut.-Gen.
Count von der
Goltz
3rd Guard Cavalry Bri-
gade—Maj.-Gen. Count | 2nd , , 2 3
von Brandenburg (2)
Guard Train Battalion
IInd Army Corps
—General of In-
fantry von Fran-
secky
3rd Infantry Di-
vision — Maj.-
Gen. von Hart-
II].3.Illl
5th Infantry Brigade —
6th Infantry Brigade —
2nd Grenadiers—Col. von Ziemietzky
Maj.-Gen. von Koblinski || 42nd Regiment—Col. von der Knesebeck
14th Regiment—Col. von Vosz
Col. von der Decken 54th 2 3 Col. von Busse
Attached to Division : 2nd Rifle Battalion—Maj. von Netzer; and
3rd Dragoons—Col. Baron von Willisen
Artillery
1st Field Division (Maj. Baron
von Eynatten), attached to 3rd
Infantry Division
3rd Field Division (Lieut.-Col.
Bauer), to 4th Infantry Division
#.
i
Order of Battle—continued.
Army Corps
Divisions
Brigades Regiments
Remarks
-- T.
- **
.*
Chief of General
Staff—Col. von
Wichmann
Commander of
A r till ery —
4th Infantry Di-
vision—Lieut.-
Gen. Hann von
Weihern
7th Infantry Brigade—
9th Grenadiers—Col. von Ferenkeil Gruppen-
Maj.-Gen. du Trossel
berg
49th Regiment—Col. von Laurin
8th Infantry Brigade — 21st Regiment—Lieut.-Col. von Lobenthal
Maj.-Gen. von Kettler 61st 2 3 Col. von Wedell
Attached to Division : I Ith Dragoons—Lieut.-Col. von Guretzki-
Artillery—cont.
1st Horse Artillery Battery, to
2nd Cavalry Division
Remainder belonged to Corps
Artillery (Col. Petzel); Horse
Artillery Division (Lieut.-Col.
3.
Chief of General
Staff—Col. von
Voigts-Rhetz
|
|
|
|
nagel
Attached to Division : 3rd Rifle Battalion—Maj. von Jena;
I2th Dragoons—Maj. Pfeffer von Salomon
Attached to Army Corps : 3rd Field Artillery Regiment, 3rd Pioneer
Battalion, 3rd Train Battalion
Maj.-Gen. von ; Carnitz Maschke); 2nd Field Division
RCleist (Maj. Hübner); Column-Di-
Attached to Army Corps : 2nd Field Artillery Regiment, 2nd Pioneer vision (Maj. Grabe)
Battalion, 2nd Train Battalion
9th Infantry Brigade — | 8th Body Guard Grenadiers—Lieut.-Col. Artillery
Maj.-Gen. von Döring von L’Estocq s 3-ric; or, (M A ;
º Corps 5th Infantry Di- 48th Regiment—Lieut.-Col. von Garelts 1st Field Division (Maj. Gallus),
— Lieut. - Gen. vision—Lieut.- attached to 5th Infantry Di-
von Alvensle- G. von S. Ioth Infantry Brigade — | 12th Grenadiers—Col. von Reuter vision
ben e p Maj.-Gen. von Schwerin 52nd Regiment—Col. von Wulffen
3rd Field Division (Col. Beck),
to 6th Infantry Division
2nd Horse Artillery Battery, to
6th Cavalry Division
|
|
Commander of
Artillery —
Maj.-Gen. von
Bülow
6th Infantry Di-
vision—Lieut.-
Gen. von Bud-
denbrock
20th Regiment—Col. von Flatow
35th 5 x Col. du Plessis
24th Regiment—Col. Count Dohna
64th 3 x Col. Freiherr Treusch von
Buttlar Brandenfels
I Ith Infantry Brigade —
Maj.-Gen. von Rothmaler
I2th Infantry Brigade —
Col. von Bismarck
Attached to Division : 2nd Dragoons—Col. von Drigalski
Remainder belonged to Corps
Artillery (Col. von Dresky);
Horse Artillery Division (Maj.
Lentz); 2nd Field Division
(Maj. von Lyncker); Column-
Division (Capt. Burchard)
i
§
Order of Baſſ/e—continued.
Brigades Regiments
Remarks
26th Regiment—Col. von Schmeling
Maj.-Gen. von Borries
66th 5 3 Lieut.-Col. Count Finck von
Finckenstein
27th Regiment—Col. von Pressentin
93rd 5 j Col. von Krosigk
Attached to Division : 4th Rifle Battalion—Maj. Baron von Lettow-
Vorbeck; 7th Dragoons—Lieut.-Col. Baron von Schleinitz
31st Regiment—Col. von Bonin
7Ist 3 y Lieut.-Col. von Klöden
16th Infantry Brigade — 86th Fusiliers—Col. von Horn
Col. von Scheffer 96th Regiment—Lieut.-Col. von Redern
Artillery
1st Field Division (Lieut.-Col.
von Freyhold), attached to 7th
Infantry Division
2nd Field Division (Maj. won
Gilsa), to 8th Infantry Division
1st Horse Artillery Battery, to
5th Cavalry Division
Remainder belonged to Corps
Artillery (Colonel Crusius);
Horse Artillery Division
(Lieut.-Col. Forst); 3rd Field
Division (Maj. Steltzer) ;
Artillery – Attached to Division : 12th Hussars—Lieut.-Col. von Suckow Column - Division (Capt.
Maj.-Gen. VOI. g º * e Meisner)
Scherdening Attached to Army Corps : 4th Field Artillery Regiment, 4th Pioneer
Battalion, 4th Train Battalion
Ixth Army Corps 35th Infantry Brigade — | 36th Fusiliers—Col. von Brandenstein Artillery
Maj.-Gen. von Blumen- Col. von Winckler
Army Corps
Divisions
Ivth Army Corps
— General of In-
fantry von Al-
vensleben
Chief of General
Staff—Col. von
Thile
Commander of
7th Infantry Di-
vision — Lieut.-
Gen. von Grosz
or von Schwarz-
hof
I3th Infantry Brigade—
I4th Infantry Brigade —
Maj.-Gen. von Zychlin-
ski
8th Infantry Di-
vision — Lieut.-
Gen. von Schö-
1er
I 5th Infantry Brigade—
Maj.-Gen. von Keszler
—Gen. of In-
fantry von Man-
stein
18th Infantry Di-
vision — Lieut.-
Gen. Freiherr) 36th Infantry Brigade —
von Wrangel
thal
84th 9 3
11th Grenadiers—Col. von Schöning
Maj.-Gen. von Below 85th Regiment—Col. von Falkenhausen
Attached to Division : 9th Rifle Battalion—Maj. von Minckwitz ;
6th Dragoons—Col. Baron von Houwald
Ist Field Division of 9th Regi-
ment (Maj. von Gayl), attached
to 18th Infantry Division

#.
§
i
Order of Baffle—continued.
Brigades Regiments
Remarks
I Ith Regiment—Lieut.-Col. Coulmann
2nd 2 3 Col. Kraus
Ist Rifles—Maj. Lautenberger
3rd Regiment—Lieut.-Col. Stamm
4th • 2 3 Col. Zwenger
2nd Rifles—Maj. Winter
1st Hessian Reiter Regiment—Col. Baron
von Riedesel zu Eisenbach
2nd Hessian Reiter Regiment—Col. Baron
von Bouchenröder
Attached to Army Corps : half of the 9th Field Artillery Regiment,
Division of the 1st Hessian Field Artillery, a Pioneer Battalion,
Artillery—cont.
2nd Field Division (Lieut.-Col.
von Darapsky), and 2nd Horse
Artillery Battery formed the
Corps Artillery, under Col.
von Jagemann
Column-Division
Lüttwitz)
Hessian Field Artillery (Lieut.-
Col. Stumpf)
Field Division (Maj. von Her-
get), attached to Division
(Capt.
VOIl
Horse Artillery Battery, to Ca-
valry Brigade
Column-Division (Maj. Nickel)
Attached to Division : 9th Dragoons—Lieut.-Col. Count
von Hardenberg
Army Corps
Divisions
Chief of General
Staff — Maj.
Bronsart von
Schellendorf
Commander of
A r tillery —
Maj. - G e n.
Baron von Putt-
kammer
25th Hessian Di-
vision — Lieut.-
Gen. Prince
Louis of Hesse
49th Infantry Brigade —
Maj.-Gen. von Wittich
50th Infantry Brigade—
Col. von Lyncker
25th Cavalry Brigade —
Maj.-Gen. von Schlot-
heim
9th Train Battalion, and Hessian Train Division
xth Army Corps
—Gen. of In-
fantry VOI).
Voigts-Rhetz
19th Infantry Di-
vision—Lieut.-
Gen. von Sch-
wartzkoppen
37th Infantry Brigade— 78th Regiment—Col. Baron von Lyncker
Col. Lehmann 9 Ist 2 3 Col. von Kamecke
38th Infantry Brigade—
Maj.-Gen. von Wedell
16th Regiment—Col. von Brixen
57th 52 Col. von Cranach
Artillery
Ist Field Division (Lieut.-Col.
Schaumann), attached to 19th
Infantry Division
2nd Field Division (Maj.
Krause), to 20th Infantry Di-
vision
i
º
Order of Battle—continued.
Brigades Regiments
Remarks
56th Regiment—Col. von Block
79th 5 y Col. von Valentini
70th Regiment—Col. von Ehrenberg
40th Infantry Brigade—
92nd 3 2 I'lieut.-Col. Haberlandt
Commander of Attached to Division: Ioth Rifle Battalion—Maj. Dunin von Przychowski;
Artillery—Col. I6th Dragoons—Lieut.-Col. von Waldow
Becke Attached to Army Corps : Ioth Field Artillery Regiment, Ioth Pioneer
Battalion, IOth Train Battalion
45th Infantry Brigade— Iooth Body Guard Grenadiers—Col. Garten
- Maj.-Gen. von Craus- IOIst Grenadiers—Col. von Seidlitz Gersten-
23rd Infantry Di- haar berg -
XIIth Army Corps | vision— Lieut.- IO8th Skirmishers—Col. Freiherr von Hansen
IO2nd Regiment (Crown Prince)—Col. Ru-
dorff
IO3rd Regiment—Lieut.-Col. Dietrich
Artillery—Cont.
2nd Horse Artillery Battery, to
6th Cavalry Division
Remainder belonged to Corps
Artillery (Col. Baron von der
Goltz);-Horse Artillery Divi-
sion (Maj. Körber);-3rd Field
Division (Lieut.-Col. Cotta);-
Column-Division (Maj. Strac-
kerjan)
2nd Reiter Regiment—Maj. Genthe
Artillery
1st Field Division (Lieut.-Col.
von Watzdorff) attached to
23rd Infantry Division
2nd Field Division (Maj. Rich-
ter), to 24th Inſantry Division
Army Corps
Divisions
Chief of General
Staff—Maj. von
Caprivi
20th Infantry Di-
vision — Maj.-
Gen. von Kraatz-
39th Infantry Brigade —
Maj.-Gen. von Woyna
Maj.-Gen. von Dirings-
Koschlau hofen
Freiherr von der
(Royal Saxon)
—Gen.
Prince Albert of
Saxony, K. H.
Chief of General
Staff — Lieut.-
Col. von Zez-
schwitz
Commander of
A r till ery —
Maj. - G e n.
Köhler
Crown |
Gen. Prince
George of Sax-
ony, K. H.
24th Infantry Di-
vision — Maj.-
Gen. Nehrhoff
von Holderberg
46th Infantry Brigade —
Col. von Montbé
1st Reiter Regiment (Crown Prince's)—Lieut.-Col. von Sahr
Ioath Regiment (Prince Frederick Augustus'
—Col. von Elterlein
Iošth Regiment—Col. von Tettau
12th Riſles—Maj. Count von Holtzendorff
Ioéth Regiment (Prince George's)—Col. von
Abendroth
Io'7th Regiment—Lieut.-Col. von Schweinitz
13th Rifles—Maj. von Götz
47th Infantry Brigade—
Maj.-Gen. von Leon-
hardi
48th Infantry Brigade—
Col. von Schutz
1st Horse Artillery Battery, to
12th Cavalry Division
Corps Artillery (Col. Funke) ;-
3rd Field Division (Maj. Hoch),
4th Field Division (Lieut.
Col. Oertel), each of 2 heavy
and I light batteries ;
2nd Horse Artillery Battery;
Column - Division (Lieut.-Col.
Schörmer)
§
i

Order of Battle—continued.
Army Corps Divisions Brigades Regiments Remarks
12th Cavalry Di- || 23rd Cavalry Brigade — Guard Reiter Regiment—Col. von Carlowitz
vision — Maj.- |Maj.-Gen. Prince von Nidda 17th Lancers—Col. von Miltitz
XIIth Č. Corps ; Count zur 24th Cavalry Brigade — | 3rd Reiter Regiment—Col. von Standfest
g 1ppe Maj.-Gen. Senfft von | 18th Lancers—Lieut.-Col. Trosky
Pilsach
Attached to Army Corps : 12th Field Artillery Regiment, 12th Pioneer
Battalion, 12th Train Battalion
IIth Cavalry Brigade — 4th Cuirassiers—Col. von Arnim
Maj.-Gen. von Barby 13th Lancers—Col. von Shack
5th Cavalry Di- 19th Dragoons—Col. von Trotha
vision—Lieut.- I2th Cavalry Brigade — 7th Cuirassiers—Lieut.-Col. von Larisch
Gen. Baron von | Maj.-Gen. von Bredow | 16th Lancers—Maj.-Gen. von der Dollen
Rheinhaben 13th Dragoons—Col. von Brauchitsch
I3th Cavalry Brigade — Ioth Hussars—Col. von Weise
•e s º Maj.-Gen. von Redern IIth 2 3 Col. Frh. von Eller-Eberstein
Cavalry Divisions 17th 5 5 Lieut.-Col. von Rauch
attached to the º * & &
Second Army 1st Horse Artillery Battery, 4th Field Artillery Regiment
6th Cavalry Di-
vision—Lieut.-
Gen. Duke Wil-
liam of Meck-
lenburg-Schwe-
rin
2nd 2 3 2 3 5 3 Ioth 52 32 5 y
I4th Cavalry Brigade — | 6th Cuirassiers—Lieut.-Col. Count Lynar
Col. Freiherr von Die- || 3rd Lancers—Col. Count von der Gröben
penbroick-Grüter I5th , , Col. Count von Alvensleben
I5th Cavalry Brigade— 3rd Hussars—Col. von Zieten
Maj.-Gen. von Rauch I6th , , Col. von Schmidt
2nd Horse Artillery Battery, 3rd Field Artillery Regiment
i
§
29 Battalions, 32 Squadrons, I5 Batteries ( 90 guns).
Guard Corps > *
IInd Army Corps. *
IIIrd , 5 *
IVth 2 > 9 3
IXth , , 2 3
xth 2 3 y 2 *
XIIth , , 32 ° &
5th Cavalry Division
6th , , 55 *
Total &
25
25
25
23
25
29
. I 81
2 >
2 3
8
8
8
I 2
8
24
36
2O
&ºmºmºmºmº
156
Summary of Second Army.
I4.
I4
14
I5
I4
I6
2
I
IO5
(84
(84
(84
( 90
(84
( 96
( 12
( 6
(630
2 3
)
)
)
)
).
)
)
)
§
i
Alist of Casualties on the 14th of August, 1870.
Non-Com-
Officers Wounded º Horses
and Men
Corps
rt, -U
* | 3 || 3 || 3
Severely Slightly à ă É ă
> | * | >
Artillery of the Is: Army Corps.
1st Field division, Maj. Munk e - Maj. Munk . º . Second Lieut. and Adj. Hoffmann. | – || – || – || –
1st Heavy field battery, Capt. von Horn Second Lieut. Korsch . - -- I II | 9 || 3
2nd ,, ,, Capt. von Selle - - - * I I7 | 6 || 8
1st Light ,, Capt. Hoffbauer Capt. Hoffbauer . . Second Lieuts. Ottzenn, Ganda 2 24 || 13 | I5
2nd , , ,, Capt. Puppel . Capt. Puppel - - I | 2 || 6 || 5
2nd Field division, Lieut.-Col. Gregorovius --- - - *- — | – || – || I
3rd Heavy field battery, Capt. Westphal * - - -º-º- — | 4 || 1 || 5
4th , , ,, Capt. Iwentz . - - -* * — 2 | I —
3rd Light ,, Capt. Roehl - - - - – — — I
4th 5 y 5 3 Capt. Schmidt - - - -*. * | *- : *m, sm-
3rd Field division, Maj. Müller º e * - - * *-* I - I -r- I -
5th Heavy field battery, Capt. Grasz . - *- -*. -º-º: — || 4 || 1 || 2
6th , , ,, Capt. Hellwig. º - wº- -*. -º- - I — 2
5th Light ,, Capt. Schweickart . - - - * I I I —
6th , , ,, Capt. Dolmann - - - --> – || 2 | – || 2
Horse Artillery division, Maj. Gerhards - - - -- * : *- I -m. I =
1st Horse Artillery battery, Capt. Preinitzer . * - - * — | 3 || – || –
2nd ,, 5 y Capt. Cruse ſº *- º- - º-e — | 2 || 5 I
3rd , , 3 y Capt. Schmidtke cº- -> -> --> — | 3 || 8 || 3

i
§

Alist of Casualties—continued.
:
& Non-Com-
Officers Wounded Fººd Horses
and Men
Corps
~5 -u
Tº || 3 || 3 || 3
Severely Slightly # | 5 || = | r 5
O O
Artillery of the VIIth Army Corps.
1st Field division, Maj. Freiherr von Eynatten . cº- - *- - *- : -m- *-
1st Light field battery, Capt. Schweder - -* *- -* — | — I —
2nd Field division, Maj. Matthiasz . --- -*. <=- -*. — | I | – | —
3rd , , ,, Maj. Wilhemi g º - - cº- - * I - r *-* I am-
5th Heavy field battery, Capt. Schnackenberg ºpiº) Second Lieut. Borggreve 3 I5 || 9 || I4
6th , , 2 3 Capt. von Gostkowski - --> *- -*. 3 IO 7 II
5th Light 2 3 Capt. Schreiber *- - sº- -* I || 2 | — —
6th , , y 2 Capt. Gasch . º Second Lieut. Dieterici. *- - — | 6 || 2 || 5
Horse Artillery division, Lieut.-Col. von Coester -*- -ºs sº- -* – — I | –
1st Horse Artillery battery, Capt. Schrader . - - *- -* I | – || – | —
2nd , $ 2 Capt. von Hahn. - - *- -*. — | 2 | – || 5
3rd Y 2 »; Capt. Hasse -- -*. *- --- - | I — I
Artillery of the IXth Army Corps.
1st Field division, Maj. von Gayl . º -ºs- -* * - - I wºme 1 -ºme I sm-
2nd Heavy field battery, Capt. Kindler. º - *- -* sº- -* - -sºm -e sº-
2nd Light 2 3 Capt. Freiherr von Eynatten . *- -º *- -* -- — 3
First Lieut. Baehr and Second Lieut. Borggreve afterwards died of their wounds.
The following damages occurred :—
1st Horse Artillery battery of 1st Artillery Brigade: framework of limber and one wheel broken.
2nd
y 5 3 y y y one wheel broken.
5th Heavy battery of 7th Artillery Brigade: gun carriage and limber wheel broken.
354 Appendia.
Bxpenditure of Ammunition by the Prussian A7 fil/ery on
f/he 14th of August, 1870.
Battery
Number of Rour.ds
Artillery of 1st Army Corps and Ist Cavalry Division.
1st Heavy field battery, Capt. von Horn
2nd , , } ) Capt. von Selle
Ist Light y 9 Capt. Hoſſbauer
2nd , , } ) Capt. Puppel.
3rd Heavy } | Capt. Westphal
4th , , } } Capt. I wentz.
3rd Light } } Capt. Roehl .
4th , , } } Capt. Schmidt
5th Heavy } } Capt. Grasz .
6th , , } } Capt. Hellwig
5th Light 5 y Capt. Schweickart
6th , Capt. Dolmann
} %
1st Horse Artillery battery, Capt. Preinitzer .
2nd } ) y J Capt. Cruse
3rd 5 y ) ) Capt. Schmidtke
1st Light field battery, Capt. Schweder g g
4th Heavy 3 y Capt. Lemmer º
5th , , } } Capt. Schnackenberg
6th , , } } Capt. von Gostkowski
5th Ilight y J Capt. Schreiber
6th , , ) Capt. Gasch
Ist Horse Artillery battery, Capt. Schrader
2nd y J 5 y Capt. von Hahn
3rd 5 § } } Capt. Hasse
Artillery of Ixth Army Corps.
2nd Heavy field battery, Capt. Kindler
2nd Light } }
Artillery of VIIth Army Corps and 3rd Cavalry Division.
Capt. Freiherr von Eynatten .
Total
Shell Case
I63 -*
I 2 *
º: 6
28O **
35 * *
75 **
I
I sº-º-º:
IOO *-
46 -
57 -
3I 5 -
227 *-
I68 *
I 75 *-
28 *-
I82 -
I 34 tº-º-º-º-
I 34 *s-
66 *-
58 *
68 ** *
26 *w-
2,849 6
i
3.
Zist of Casualties on the 16th of August.
Killed Wounded
Corps a ! 3 Officers 3
@ wn Q: º
Officers : É * # 3.
Severely Slightly x-li
1st Horse Artillery battery, Guard Corps, *" | *------
Capt. Edler von der Planitz o } *- tº- — 3 *- tº- * - 3 || 4
Artillery of the IIIrd Army Corps.
Staff of Lieut.-Gen. von Bülow, di - 4. * - a
the º e • - comman uns l --- *- — | – | Lieut, and Adj. Steinlein -* * - - -
Ist Field division, Maj. Gallus - º - - — | 3 || Maj. Gallus (died later). - - — I
> ISt Heavy field battery, Capt. Nöldecke - -º- 9 |4O Second Lieut. Brehmer t - -- 3 I | –
* | 2nd , 2 X Capt. Knobbe . First Lieut. Heidenreich 8|40 | Second Lieut. Krüger . . Capt. Knobbe 37 || –
|N) e * * , e. e. º First Lieut. Puscher, l -
Ist Light 2 ) Capt. Stöphasius - - *- 3|4°li Second Lieut. F.) Second Lieut. Haase 3O —
2nd , , 3 ) Capt. Vollbrecht gº ‘....'...") 4 || 42 | Second Lieut. Schröder | Asst. Surgeon Lissa 39 || 8
3rd Field division, Lieut.-Col. Beck — *- — | I -- --- - - *- : *-
5th Heavy field battery, Capt. Eunicke e- e- I II - - - -º- I 3 || 3
6th , , } y. Capt. Meinecke *- *- 2 || 9 || Second Lieut. Rohde - *-*. I5 4
5th Light , , Capt. Müller I. & *- - 2 | I I *- *- - -*. I2 I4
6th , , , 7 j Capt. von Schlicht”. - - 3 |29 - - - Capt. von Schlicht I 7 | I 5
Corps Artillery, Col. von Dresky *- - - - - *- - - - - - -
2nd Field division, Capt. Stumpf - *- - - -ms • *- - - - - I -
3rd Heavy field battery, Capt. Vosz - - 4 |I2 - - * - I6 || 3
4th , , ,, . Capt. Fromme & *- *- I |I4 - - - - I 2 13
3rd Light , First Lt. von Pressentin - - 5 ||25 | First Lt. von Pressentin Second Lieut. Ahrens . 15 15
4th , , * 5 Capt. Müller II. - *- 3 || 8 *- - - - II | I 3
| This officer remained with his battery.
* Portépéefähnrich Lessing was among the killed.

§
i
Mist of Casualties—continued.
Killed Wounded
Corps a # Officers 3
f Officers © # 3 | #
* | # * >| | 3
Severely Slightly $ 1-3
Artillery of the IIIrd Army Corps—cont.
we tº º gº * •ºmº: ** * --- Second Lieut. and
Horse Artillery division, Maj. Lenz 2 wº- Adj. v. sº I | —
ſ Capt. Scheringer,
1st Horse Artillery battery, Capt. Scheringer *mºs *- 3 42 Second Lieuts. --- *= 18 17
Gerber and Wolter
2nd $ 3 33 Capt. Wittstock * * 5 23 - - * - I4 18
Capt. Rödenbeck ; Second Lieut. Müller
3rd 5 * y 2 Capt. Rödenbeck --- *-ºs- 4 5O (died later), Sec. { or Wiehr, Second y | 26 || 28
g Lieut. Weyer { Lieut. Ahlers
3rd Artillery Ammtn. Column, Capt. Bartels . *-tº- ss=sº I 9 --- - * * 6 || 5
Ist Infantry , , , 3 y Capt. Hundrich . *Eº-º-e * * * === - * * -sº * | *-*E*
Artillery of the viſith Army Corps.
3rd Field division, Lieut.-Col. Hildebrandt --- sºmºmº — 2 - * - **** *E= | *
ſº - | Second Lieut. von
5th Heavy field battery, Capt. Jacobi *- * *3|i Metzen (died later) } - amº I2
6th , , 33 2 9 Capt. Mende . --- * 3 2 * sº-mºm. - * 4. 5
5th Light , , ,, Capt. Hammer - **- —- 26 || Capt. Hammer - * 3O 22
Artillery of the ixth Army Corps.
Hessian Field Artillery, Col. Stumpf .
2nd Heavy field battery, Capt. Hoffmann
Ist Light , , y 2 Capt. Frank .
I
I

i
§

List of Casualties—continued.
Killed Wounded
Corps 3 Officers tº
Officers 5 # 5 #
* | 3 º >| | C
Severely Slightly ;I,
Artillery of the Xth Army Corps. •====== lººm-
Staff, Col. Freiherr von der Becke * * — I - gº-ºº- •==== *-
1st Field division, Maj. Schaumann -- * - - * - * – ||
1st Heavy field battery, Capt. Kleine •ºmºsºmsº - — 5 - - -- **. I3 IO
2nd , , , , 3 5 Capt. Lancelle. a-s-s-s * I 4. * - --- * 8 || I
Ist Light , , ,, Capt. Knauer . º * * 5 5 * * - - I
2nd , , , , 5 y Capt. von Baumbach - *- — — - * ** - 3 g
2nd Field division, Maj. Krause . --- *- •=- ? - * * -- *- --- 5 -
3rd Heavy field battery, Capt. Heyn . ºmmº -º-º: 2 | IO | Second Lieut. Bulius First Lieut. Stolterforth ' | Io 5
4th .. * , ,, Maj. Ribbentrop * --- I | 6 *-* --- * *-*. 6 —
3rd Light , 7 y Capt. Burbach --- *sº, 2 | 1 | | Sec. Lt. von Grumbkow | Capt. Burbach . tº 14 2
4th , , 5 5 3 y Capt. Mittelstädt * = 4-º-º: I 7 - -- } Second Lieut. Bach-l
sº mann” e J 4 2
Corps Artillery, Col. Baron von der Goltz -- * — | 1 || Capt. Lenz . gº - * 2 2
3rd Field division, Lieut.-Col. Cotta tº *E* º-º-º-º- — — . Lieut.-Col. Cotta . --- --- * - -º-º-º:
5th Heavy field battery, Capt. von Scheven . - * I I4. - --- Second Lieut. Varnove. I4 |_
6th , , y 5 ,, Capt. Reinsdorff *E. * * I | 8 --- --- -- ~. ; 7
5th Light , ,, Capt. Berendt Second Lieut. Schelhaas || 3 || 20 - * ºs--º-º: * 24 ||—
6th , , 2 3 ,, Capt. Richard *mº * 6 30 -º-º-º: - *-*. * II 2
IIorse Artillery division, Maj. Körber -- * — I - * * *m-. I I
g ** * * * ſ Second Lieut. Rück-
1st Horse Artillery battery, Capt. Frisch - - 4 18 Second Lieut. Bluhm | heim, Staff º 38 17
Maritz"
2nd , 3 y Capt. Schirmer. * ººm 6|| 47 -- --- tºmºsºs all lù Z. *-*. I5 3
3rd , 3 y Capt. Saalmüller * * 3 || 24 tº- *-ºs-ºs, Capt. Saalmüller . I9 |25
Artillery of the IVth Army Corps.
1st Horse Artillery battery, Capt. Bode Lieut. Frh. von Türcke 3 21 Second Lieut. Oemler *º-º-º: * 18 15
* These officers remained with their batteries.
358 Appendia.
The following damages were reported by the batteries —
The 1st Heavy battery, IIIrd Corps : a gun wheel,
,, 2nd , , y 5 3 * the centre box of a limber.
,, 2nd Light , y y several poles and the lid of a limber-box.
, 4th , , } } 2 3 two gun wheels and an elevating screw (replaced
under fire).
,, 2nd Horse Artillery battery IIIld Colps: a limber box, by a shell passing through it.
,, 5th Light battery, VIIth Corps : a pole and a limber.
, , Ist , , ,, Xth , , a limber and gun wheel.
, , 2nd , , } % y 3 2 5 a gun wheel and gun carriage.
,, 4th , , j } 9 W 3 y a pole, 6 spokes, back rail of limber box.
, , 5th Heavy , , } } }} gun axletree-box seat.
,, 5th Light 1 9 y j : 5 a gun wheel.
,, 1st Horse Artillery battery, IIIrd Corps : a gun wheel.
In addition to the above, nearly all the batteries sustained minor damages in material.
Appendix.
359
Expenditure of Ammunition on the 16th of August, 1870.

Number of Rounds
Battery
Shell Case
Artillery of Guard Corps.
1st Horse Artillery battery, Capt. Edler von der Planitz 82 *-
Artillery of IIIrd Corps.
1st Heavy field battery, Capt. Nöldecke |\ , 6 KO
2nd , , 3 y Capt. Knobbe |ſ ‘’ 5 -
1st Light 9 3 Capt. Stöphasius e 2, o&
2nd , , ) ) Capt. Vollbrecht e , O33 -
3rd Heavy 2 3 Capt. Vosz g 925 -
4th , , } ) Capt. Fromme . e º 735 --
3rd Light y y First Lieut. von Pressentin. 552 --
4th , , y 7 Capt. Müller II. 4I 7 -
5th IIeavy } } Capt. Eunecke . 562 --
6th , , } } Capt. Meinecke. 432 *-
5th Light y 3 Capt. Müller I. 465 5
6th , , } } Capt. von Schlicht 576 8
1st Horse Artillery battery, Capt. Scheringer I, I48 * -
2nd } } } } Capt. Wittstock. 838 6
3rd } } } % Capt. Rödenbeck I, 164 sº-
Artillery of VIIIth Corps.
5th Heavy field battery, Capt. Jacobi . * 2 I I -
6th , , } } Capt. Mende . * 289 -
5th Light } } Capt. Hammer 4OO *s-
Artillery of IXth (Hessian) Corps.
2nd Heavy field battery, Capt. Hoffmann 38 *-
Ist Light } } Capt. Frank 65 -
Artillery of Xth Corps.
1st Heavy field battery, Capt. Kleine 59 -
2nd , , y 9 Capt. Lancelle . 332 --
Ist Light } ) Capt. Knauer . * 677 *-
2nd , , } } Capt. von Baumbach . 444 -
3rd Heavy y 9 Capt. Heym 255 º-
4th , , } } Major Ribbentrop I57 -
3rd Light y 9 Capt. Burbach . 475 -
4th , , } } Capt. Mittelstädt 225 wº-
5th Heavy } } Capt. von Scheven 259 -
6th , , ! } Capt. Reinsdorff 175 *-
5th Light } } Capt. Berendt . e 248 -
6th , , $ 2 Capt. Richard . I4 I -
Ist Horse Artillery battery, Capt. Frisch I, O48 *-
2nd , 9 3 Capt. Schirmer 785 -
3rd } } } } Capt. Saalmüller 603 -
Artillery of Ivth Corps.
1st Horse Artillery battery, Capt. Bode 585 -
19,638 I9
JCist of Casualties on the 18th of August.
§
Staff of Lieut.-Gen. von Schwarz, commanding \
the artillery of the First Army £º
| Staff of Lieut.-Gen. von Colomier, command-\
ing the artillery of the Second Army . J
Staff of Maj.-Gen. Kraft Prince of Hohenlohe-
Ingelfingen, commanding the artillery .
1st Field division, Lieut.-Col. Bychelberg
2nd , , x 3 Capt. von Prittwitz
Ist Light 5 y Capt. von Dewitz
2nd Capt. von Neiderstetter
3rd Field division, Lieut.-Cºl. von Rhinº
5th Heavy field battery, Capt. von Roon
Artillery of the Guard Corps.
6th , , 2 y Capt. von Oppell
5th Light 3 y
6th y 2 5 y
Capt. von Unruhe .
Capt. Ising
1st Heavy field battery, Capt. von Sametzki . "
Killed
5
Officers >.
*- - 2
Capt. von Dewitz. I
º - 3
Sec. Lieut. Roth . I
*== * 3
i
17
I 2
6
Wounded
Officers - || 3
3 || 3
> O
Severely Slightly ;I,
- * Capt. and Adj. Koehler ||—||—
Capt. and Adj. U - - -º ºmº •
Freiherr von Hadeln’ſ *
N.
*S.
*E*-º * *m. — — — $
Sec. Lieut. and Adj. U |_ I §:
* ** { Reinecke * . §
•=º * *- *= 8 I2 ..ºf
Sec. Lieut. von Y. * *E* 13 18
Winterfeld . J.
* - - ºmºs I7 5
Capt. Neiderstetter? Lieut. Dudy' I9 || 23
--- * * * — | I
* - Capt. von Roon *. I5 5
ſ Sec. Lieut. von } mº-º-º: *-*. IO 9
\ Vangerow” s
Sec. Lieut. Freiherr 17 | 12
g-g assºs von Tauchnitz'
Capt. Ising . * wº-ºº: 12 7
* These officers, though wounded, continued to do duty with their batteries.
* These officers afterwards died of their wounds.
i
3.
List of Casualties—continued.
Killed Wounded
r: | 3 Officers §
©
Officers § # # #
;I, Severely Slightly ;I,
tºº - — Io | Capt. von Ehlern. sºmeºs 5 —
&mºre *E**** apt. von Friederici &
2 | 28 Steinmann 2 } Sec. Lieut. Bockroth 18 15
gººms ºmºs — 20 | Capt. von Mutius. *º-ºº: 6 —
*-*- * — 7 &mme *=ºe *º-ºººº. 7 || 5
º sºmº I 16 || Capt. von Grävenitz' * I9 3O
* * =e — 9 * * mº e-º-º: 3| 6
*==ge * I | 12 |Lieut. Leibitz. Capt. Preinitzer 28 20
tº-sº *º-º-º: — | 2 tºmsº *sº *s — 5
Artillery of the Guard Corps—cont.
Corps Artillery, Col. von Scherbening
2nd Field division, Maj. von Krieger .
3rd Heavy field battery, Capt. von Ehlern
4th , , 2 3 Capt. Seeger . &
3rd Light y 7 Capt. von Friede-l
rici Steinmann. e ‘º tº * g
4th Light field battery, Capt. von Mutius
Horse Artillery division, Maj. Baron von
Buddenbrock . tº & sº tº
1st Horse Artillery battery, Capt. Edler
von Planitz • * g *
2nd Horse Artillery battery, Capt. Grävenitz
3rd y 3 y 3 Capt. Anker .
Artillery of the 1st Army Corps.
6th Light field battery, Capt. Dolmann
1st Horse Artillery battery, Capt. Preinitzer
Artillery of the IInd Army Corps.
Staff of Maj.-Gen. von Kleist, commandingl
the artillery * gº & * > . ſ
1st Field division, Maj. Freiherr von Eynatten.
1st Heavy field battery, Capt. Goetsch #
* This officer, though wounded, continued to do duty with his battery.
* This officer afterwards died of his wounds.

º
i
List of Casualties—continued.
Corps
p.
Artillery of the IInd Army Corps—cont.
2nd Heavy field battery, Capt. Hildebrandt.
Ist Light 5 x Capt. von Eckensteen
2nd , , 5 y Capt. Linker.
Corps Artillery, Col. Petzel * º
2nd Field division, Maj. Hübner . &
3rd Heavy field battery, Capt. Zollner .
4th , , 5 y Capt. Steinkeller
3rd Field division, Lieut.-Col. Bauer .
5th Heavy field battery, Capt. Meisner
6th , , 9 3 Capt. Ostermeyer
5th Light 5 3 Capt. Rhades.
6th , , 2 3 Capt. Preuszendorf.
Horse Artillery division, Lieut.-Col. Maschke.
2nd Horse Artillery battery, Capt. Roden-
woldt . ſº º gº g *
3rd Horse Artillery battery, Capt. Roehl
Artillery of the IIIrd Army Corps.
Staff of Maj.-Gen. von Bülow, commanding
the artillery & * > g s &
1st Field division, Capt. Stöphasius jº
1st Heavy field battery, Capt. Nöldecke
2nd , , 2 3 Lieut. Châles de
Beaulieu . tº. tº * * & }
Killed Wounded
c § Officers 5 #
Officers J. 3 “sº I o
* | HE e * | *E
Severely Slightly
- * - I *mº * I I
* ºm- — 2 ** * I I
* *= — I *º * — I
*º-º: - --- * * - 2 *
* -- - R •-º- - ==== i <-
*º- - - - - - *- — 3
*=º - *- : *- = -- - — 2
- tº- - mºs * - * 2
*º- * — I smº * as-- I -
*-* - sm. I * - — 2
i
§
Mist of Casualties—continued.
Killed Wounded
Corps a # Officers a #
Officers 35 | ? 5 $º
> É > #
Severely Slightly
3rd Field division, Lieut.-Col. Beck ſº gº sºme sm * | *-* - *-*. Cordennann
5th Heavy field battery, Capt. Eunicke. º --- - sm- it * - --- - 4º
6th , , y 2 Capt. Meinecke & * ems-sms *
Corps Artillery, Col. von Dresky . tº tº sºmºmº * *- : *----> --- - * *-*.
2nd Field division, Capt. Stumpf . gº tº -*. * ---
Artillery of the IIIrd Army Corps—cont.
Lieut. and Adj. }
I
3rd Heavy field battery, Capt. Vosz . º *º-sº * — I --- - ** *-
4th , , 92 Capt. Fromme & * * — 4 * * - *-
3rd Light 33 Lieut. Beckh . ge * - — I - * -- -
4th , 2 3 Capt. Muller II. . * * *- : * * *º - &= -º
Horse Artillery division, Maj. Lentz g * sº-ºº. * * — — Maj. Lentz . * e --- sº-º-º:
1st Horse Artillery battery, Lieut. Franck . * * I 32 * * * *
3rd 2 y 2 y Lieut. Gizycki . * * — I9 * *- -*. * =
Artillery of the v11th Army Corps.
Staff of Maj.-Gen. von Zimmermann, com- *º-
manding the artillery . * g & * * * * * *E* sº-º-e e-ºº:
1st Field division, Maj. Freiherr von Eynatten. * * * ºs-ºs- *º- - * º-
1st Heavy field battery, Capt. Hubner. & *E==º &=º — | 2 - *s e-º-º-º: *
2nd , , 5 5 Capt. Wolff . º * gºmº. *** * * * *-º - -->
1st Light 2 3 Capt. Schweder . sº-º-º- * —| 7 | Capt. Schweder . . . Sec. Lieut. Drees.
2nd , 2 3 Lieut. Götz . † tºº *E* 2| I3 *E* *-º-º-º: Dr. Beermann
*
I
º
:
I
:
º
i

Alist of Casualties—continued.
Artillery of the v11th Army Corps—cont.
3rd Field division, Maj. Wilhelmi . &
5th Heavy field battery, Sec. Lieut. Rühle tº
von Lilienstern * e ge º
6th Heavy field battery, Capt. Gostkowski
5th Light 3 3 Capt. Schreiber
6th , , Capt. Gasch .
Corps Artillery, Col. von Helden-Sarnowski
2nd Field division, Maj. Matthiasz . e
3rd Heavy field battery, Capt. Bleckert
4th , , 3 3 Capt. Lemmer
3rd Light } } Capt. Gnigge
y 2
3
k. 2 2 3
Horse Artillery division, Lieut.-Col. Coester
2nd Horse Artillery battery, Capt. von Hahn
3rd 3 y 2 3 Capt. Hasse
Capt. Trautmann .
Killed Wounded
- 3 Officers tºo
Officers 3 É 5 #.
~ || -- 2. O
M-4 Severely Slightly ;I.
--- * == | "T * * - --- — I
* *-* — I - --- * *-ºs I I
* - •= | T -º-º-º-º-º: --- –. ... - — 2
--- - I 4. - - Sec. Lieut. Müller I.' . 6|| 6
sºmº * --- I * -- - *m. I I
- * I * - ſ Col. von Helden-Y.
4- U Sarnowski " . J. – —
*-*. - --- I -- - - ºsmºm. * : -
emº tº-mº I 2 sºmºsº. * --- ---
*m-. &mº – Io Capt. Lemmer” - -- º 3
- - 2 26 --- --- Lieut. Waldschmidt I2 I4
Sec. Lieut. Ruhnke 3| 30 | Capt. Trautmann . - -- I2 7
- --- *m-m. A "* – ------ --- -º-º: I 2
Lieut. von Hoch- l
- --- 5|67 wachter, Sec. Lieut. - Capt. Hasse 3O IO
Humann II.
ſ
* These officers, though wounded, continued to do duty with their batteries.
* This officer afterwards died of his wounds.
i
º
List of Casualties—continued.
Artillery of the VIIIth Army Corps.
Staff of Maj.-Gen. von Kamecke, commanding
the artillery * g tº * * }
1st Field division, Maj. Mertens * e
1st Heavy field battery, Capt. Busse . º
2nd , , 3 5 Capt. von Uthmann
Ist Light 3 y Capt. Geiszler
2nd , , 3 * Capt. Leo
3rd Field division, Lieut.-Col. Hildebrandt
5th Heavy field battery, Capt. Jacobi .
6th , , . y 2 Capt. Mende .
5th Light y J Lieut. Gillmeister
6th , , 5 y Capt. von Helden-
Sarnowski *
Corps Artillery, Col. von Broecker .
2nd Field division, Maj. Zwirnemann .
3rd Heavy field battery, Capt. von Wissel
4th , , 3 y Capt. Sommer
3rd Light 3 y Capt. von Teich-
mann-Logischen tº g *
4th Light field battery, Capt. Gehtmann
Killed Wounded
a # Officers a §
Officers § 5 : 3
;I, Severely Slightly ;I,
* * --msm- * - - --- — 4
- — — | 5 || – – — | 6 || 3
- - -as I - - Sec. Lieut. Kamp' 2 2
--- -º-º-º-º: I 3 - - - I —
- sº-º. amº-rm - sº- Lieut. Gillmeister," 3 —
Sec. Lt. Burg II."
- * * * *m. --- 4- - 2 || 8
- --- — I -* *s-sº *mº — 3
mº-º-º: - * *- - *-*. *- — 2
-- - I -- *sº- * I 2
* These officers, though wounded, continued to do duty with their batteries.
3.
i

Alist of Casualties—continued.
Killed Wounded
a # Officers 3
Officers 3 £ 3 £
>| | 3 3
H; Severely Slightly >, | #
ºmºsºm. *s-> — 5 -*. * * - 5 || 3
--> *-* — I5 - - -- * II | I4
--- *-*. I I4 *E* --- - sºmº, 4 —
* * I — - *ms- - * — I
- & Lieut. and Adj. -- - *m, ºm-º.
* Maj. von Gayl * - ºms Seiffert .
- smºs 3 ||38|| Capt. Werner II. . . | Sec. Lieut. Schmidt' 23 I4.
sºme * 8 6o | Capt. Kindler . . Sec. Lieut. Kelbling I." | 17 | Io
Capt. Koch, Lieut. º •y
* ** 5 54 } Horrmann? } Sec. Lieut. Jourdan 34 || 8.
* These officers, though wounded, continued to do duty with their batteries.
Artillery of the vLIIth Army Corps—cont.
Horse Artillery division, Lieut.-Col. Borcken-
hagen. ſº 4- * * tº Hº
Ist Horse Artillery battery, Capt. von
Fuchsius . * * & e g
2nd Horse Artillery battery, Capt. Schlieben
3rd 2 3 5 5 Capt. Protze .
2nd Infantry Ammunition Column, Capt.
Hermann s }
Artillery of the Ixſh Army Corps.
Staff of Maj.-Gen. Freiherr von Puttkammer,
commanding the artillery . g tº }
a. Arussian Artillery.
Ist Field division, Maj. von Gayl
1st Heavy field battery, Capt. Werner II.
2nd , y 2 Capt. Kindler.
Ist Light 3 y Capt. Koch
* This officer afterwards died of his wounds.
i
§

Alist of Casualties—continued.
Killed Wounded
Corps a # Officers v.
Officers 3. # 5 #
* | E 2. .3
Severely Slightly ki-;
Artillery of the IXth Army Corps—cont.
2nd Light field battery, Capt. Freiherr von
Eynatten. e e * gº º } * - 3 || 36 - - * * 18 9
Corps Artillery, Col. von Jagemann --- - — I iº. º: } Staff Surg. Steinhausen' | 1 ||—
2nd Field division, Lieut.-Col. Darapsky. V. “º, Adi } — I Lieut.-Col. Darapsky - - - - - -
3rd Heavy field battery, Capt. Roerdansz Capt. Roerdansz . . || 4 |44 || Lts. Treutler and Fischer - - 32 || 8
4th , , 3 2 Capt. Werner I. First Lieut. Goetze II |45 | Sec. Lieut. Walther I. Capt. Werner I. " 34 || 4
3rd Light 2 3 Capt. von Bastineller * - 3 |4I | Capt. von Bastineller Lieut. Giese . . 2 I | 6
t. Ment * - --- - Lieuts. Meyer and
4th , , ...” Cap en • º * - 3 || 4 I Schackschneider 26 || 8
2nd Horse Artillery battery, Capt. König Sec. Lieut. Ladewig 7 |81 || Dr. Scherk . * - 29 20
b. Hessian Artillery.
Staff of Lieut.-Col. Stumpf, commanding -*. - — 2 - - - --- — I
Field Division, Maj. von Herget - - *- - - - - Lieut. and Adj. Beck’. — | 1
1st Heavy field battery, Capt. Reh -* - 2 || 6 | Sec. Lieut. Goes . - - 22 || 4
2nd , 22 Capt. Hoffmann - - 2 || 4 - — -- -* 7 | I
1st Light 5 2. Capt. Frank -** - 3 9 - -w * - -*-* 9 || 6
2nd , 5 y Capt. Weygand -* - 3 || 8 || Capt. Weygand Sec. Lieut. Deisz. IO 5
3rd , , Capt. Ronstad Capt. Ronstadt 4 || 9 C - - Sec. Lieut. Kehrer' I6 || 9
Horse Artillery battery, Capt. Freiherr von - apt. Freiherr von \
Schäffer-Bernstein y - ºp º Lieut. Grolmann . 6 22 Schäffer-Bernstein’ſ º- - - 24 I5
1 These officers, though wounded, continued to do duty with their batteries.
2 This officer afterwards died of his wounds.
3.
i
A.ist of Casualties—continued.
Wounded
#
;
Officers
Severely
Slightly
Killed
Officers
Artillery of the xth Army Corps.
Staff of Maj.-Gen. Freiherr von der *}
commanding the artillery . & g
1st Field division, Lieut.-Col. Schaumann
Ist Heavy field battery, Capt. Kleine .
2nd , , 3 y Capt. Lancelle
1st Light y 9 Capt. Knauer.
2nd , , 9 3 Capt. von Baumbach
2nd Field division, Maj. Krause . * g
3rd Heavy field battery, Capt. Heyn
4th , , 2 3 Maj. Ribbentrop
3rd Light 3 y Capt. Burbach
4th , , y 5 Capt. Mittelstädt
Corps Artillery, Col. Baron von der Goltz
3rd Field division, Capt. Reinsdorff. ſº *
5th Heavy field battery, Capt. von Scheven .
6th , , J First Lieut. Schede.
5th Light 3 2 Capt. Berendt
6th , , 2 3 Capt. Richard
Horse Artillery division, Maj. Körber
1st Horse Artillery battery, Capt. Frisch
2nd 3 y 2 3 Capt. Schirmer .
3rd 3 J. 3 y Capt. Saalmüller
ISt 2 y y J
Capt. Bode
4th regiment, }
sºme
*
sº-º.
*º
*-ºs-
*mºm
ººm
*
**
*=
º
*E*
smºs
ammºmºsºs
mºmº-º-º:
*º-º
emsº
Capt. Frisch’”
**º-
*
*º-
*
sº-
*
*
cº-º
sºmºsºme
*
*E=
*E*
amº
*=º
*
First Lieut. Frels'
*
tº-
* sºmºmº
Sec. Lieut. Rehkopf .
;
-**I
*f
* These officers, though wounded, continued to do duty with their batteries.
* This officer afterwards died of his wounds.
i
§
.
Zast of Casualties—continued.
Corps
Artillery of the xIIth Army Corps.
Staff of Maj.-Gen. Köhler, commanding the
artillery . wº s * a * •
1st Field division, Lieut.-Col. von Watzdorf .
1st Heavy field battery, Capt. Rothmaler
2nd , , 2 3 Capt. Leonhardi
1st Light 3 2 Capt. Lengnik .
2nd , , 2 y Capt. Westmann
2nd Field division, Maj. Richter . sº
3rd Heavy field battery, Capt. Keysselitz
4th , , 2 3 Capt. Groh
3rd Light 2 x Capt. Bucher II.
4th , 2 3 Maj. von der Pforte.
Corps Artillery, Col. Funcke . * g
3rd Field division, Maj. Hoch *
5th Heavy field battery, Capt. Hammer
6th , , 2 3 Capt. Verworrner
5th Light > 3 Capt. von Zeschau .
4th Field division, Lieut.-Col. Oertel ſº
7th Heavy field battery, Capt. Bucher I.
8th , , 5 J Capt. Portius.
6th Light 2 3 Capt. Fellmer
1st Horse Artillery battery, Capt. Zenker
2nd } } 3 ſº Capt. Müller
Column-division, Lieut.-Col. Schörmer
Killed Wounded
3 Officers tº
ſ: ºf ©
Officers 3 || 5 5 #.
Severely Slightly
smº - * - mammº, *=º. -** -- 2 || I
*-*. *-*. *º-sº - -- * * 2 || ||
* * — — . . . – wº * sº — 2
“E-º * —|—| Lieut. and Adj. Friedrich -- * | *-
*- *E* *-ºs mºmºsºm *E* *-*. Capt. Keysselitz — 2
– *º *-*- sºmºsºme * - ºmsºm” 5 5
* *-* mºms *. * *=- I —
*E=º ** * amas-s * * Maj. Hoch sºme ºf "-
mº * — — Capt. Hammer, * *m mºsºms
* **º- I *ms memº- * 3 —
- - I II ** * *º- 9 || 8
- * * *º-º-º: -amºs *ººms I 2
*º-º-º: - * --- * I I
tº &= I *= * * I 2
mº *m. — I --- sº-º-º-º: * I 9
sºmº-º-º: - 2 * * -- I 2
Lieut.-Col. Schörmer .
AApendia.
Axpenditure of A/tunition on the 18//, of August, 1870.
Battery
Number of Rounds
Shell
Common | Shrapnel
Artillery of the Guard.
Ist Heavy field battery, Capt. von Sametzki
2nd , , 3 y Capt. von Prittwitz
Ist Light $ 2 Capt. von Dewitz .
2nd , , 3 y - Capt. von Neiderstetter .
3rd Heavy 2 y Capt. von Ehlern .
4th , , y 5 Capt. Seeger º e
3rd Light A 3 Capt. von Friederici-Steinmann
4th , , Capt. von Mutius .
5th Heavy y 9 Capt. von Room
6th , , } } Capt. von Oppell .
5th Light 3 y Capt. von Unruhe.
6th Capt. von Ising . e
3 y 3 y º
1st Horse Artillery battery, Capt. Edler von der Planitz
2nd Capt. von Grävenitz.
3rd Capt, von Anker
3 ) 5 y
y y y 3
Artillery of the Ist Army Corps,
6th Light field battery, Capt. Dolmann
1st Horse Artillery battery, Capt. Preinitzer
Artillery of the IInd Army Corps.
2nd Heavy field battery, Capt. von Hildebrandt.
Ist Light > y Capt. von Pºckensteen .
2nd , , 3 y Capt. I,inker
3rd Heavy 5 y Capt. Zöllner
5th Light J. J. Capt. Rhades
3rd Horse Artillery battery, Capt. Roehl
Artillery of the IIIrd Army Corps.
Ist Heavy field battery, Capt., Nöldeckc
2nd , , } , Lieut. Châles de Beaulieu
3rd , , } } Capt. Vosz
4th , , } } Capt. Fromme
3rd , , j } Licut. Beckh
4th , , } ) Capt. Müller II.
5th , , y y Capt. Eunicke
6th Capt. Meinecke
603
7O4
662
632
494
607
727
762
590
#
375
632
342
8oo
32O
90
693
I
:
-*.
47
68
283
46 I
382
416
2 I
Case

5 y } }
Ist IIorse Artillery battery, Lieut. Franck .
3rd Licut. Gizycki.
} } 5 §
Total
253
852
I 2, O24
A//endix.
37 I
Zx/end//l/re of A/l/tu/tition—continued.
3attery
Brought forward
Artillery of the VII//, Army Corps.
1st Heavy field battery, Capt. Hübner
2nd , } } Capt. Wolff .
1st Light } } Capt. Schweder
2nd , , } } Lieut. Gotz .
3rd Heavy 7 y Capt. Bleckert
4th , , 2 3 Capt. Lemmer
3rd Light 5 y Capt. Gniigge
4th , , 3 y Capt. Trautmann . º º
5th Heavy } } Lieut. Rühle von Lilienstern .
6th , , 2 y Capt. von Gostkowski
5th Light } ) Capt. Schreiber
6th Capt. Gasch .
2nd Horse Artillery battery, Capt. von Hahn
3rd } } } } Capt Hasse
Artillery of the VIIIth Army Corps.
1st Heavy field battery, Capt. Busse .
2nd , , 3 y Capt. von Uthmann
1st Light 3 y Capt. Geiszler
2nd , , > * Capt. Leo . e
3rd Heavy } } Capt. von Wissel .
4th , , } } Capt. Sommer - º
3rd Light 3 y Capt. von Teichmann - Logi-
Schen
4th Light field battery, Capt. Gehtmann
5th Heavy 3 y Capt. Jacobi
6th , , y 3 Capt. Mende
5th Light 3 ) Lieut. Gillmeister . - e
6th , , y 3 Capt. von Helden-Sarnowski.
y
1st Horse Artillery battery, Capt. von Fuchsius .
2nd } } 5 2 Capt. Schlieben
3rd 3 x 3 y Capt. Protze
Artillery of the IXth Army Corps.
a. PRUSSIAN ARTILLERY.
1st Heavy field battery, Capt. Werner II. . l
2nd , , } } Capt. Kindler J
1st Light 3 y Capt., lxoch . e \
2nd , , } } Capt. Freiherr von Eynatten ſ
3rd Heavy } } Capt. Roerdamsz e
4th , , 3 y Capt. Werner I. . - e
3rd Light 5 y Capt. von Bastineller
4th y, Capt.
3 y Mente . º & ſº
1st Horse Artillery battery, Capt. König , t
Total
Number of Rounds
Shell
Case
Common | Shrapnel
I 2, O24
229
47O
I68
3O6
I43
52
225
IO
445
I 73
I83
43O
I 44
243
386
47O
6O6
572
468
544
552
416
26 I
178
423
345
26o
2 I 2
226
I, 32O
I,93O
26 I
I45
34 I
533
702
26,396
37.2 A//endia.
Bxpenditure of Ammunition—continued.
Battery
Brought forward
b. HESSIAN ARTILLERY.
1st Heavy field battery, Capt. Reh
2nd , , y 3 Capt. Hoſfmann
1st Light j ) Capt. Frank.
2nd , , 2 3 Capt. Weygand
3rd , , y 5 Capt. Ronstadt wº
Horse Artillery battery, Capt. Freiherr von Schäffer-
Bernstein . & - - º º º
Artillery of the Xth Army Corps.
1st Heavy field battery, Capt. Klein .
2nd , 3 y Capt. Lancelle
1st Light } } Capt. Knauer
2nd , , 3 y Capt. von Baumbach
3rd Heavy 3 y Capt Heyn
4th , , y 3 Maj. Ribbentrop
3rd Light 7 y Capt. Burbach
4th , , y 5 Capt. Mittelstädt .
5th Heavy } } Capt. von Scheven
6th , , } } Lieut. Schede
5th Light 5 y Capt. Berendt
6th , , } } Capt. Richard
1st Horse Artillery battery, Capt. Frisch
2nd } } y 5 Capt. Schirmer
3rd Capt. Sallmüller
Ist H. A. battery, 4th Regiment, Capt. Bode
Artillery of the XIIth Army Corps.
1st Heavy field battery, Capt. Rothmaler
2nd , , y y Capt. Leonhardi
1st Light y J Capt. Lengmik
2nd , , y 7 Capt. Westmann
3rd Heavy } } Capt. Keisselitz
4th , , j } Capt. Groh .
3rd Light } } Capt. Bucher II.
4th , , y 5 Maj. von der Pforte
5th Heavy 7 ? Capt. Hammer
6th , , y 5 Capt. Verworrner ,
5th Light 7 j Capt. von Zeschau
7th Heavy } } Capt. Bucher I.
8th , , } } Capt. Portius
6th Light } } Capt. Fellmer
1st Horse Artillery battery, Capt. Zenker .
2nd } } } } Capt. Müller
l
ſ
Number of Rounds
Shell
Common | Shrapnel
Case
26,396
651
564
92O
96o
776
576
I::
I
2O
Grand Total . b
34,481
I 79
Appendix.
373
Ilist of Casualties and Æxpenditure of Ammunition of the Artillery of ſhe
1st Army Corps on the 17th of August, 1870.

Men Horses Number
Battery O
Killed Wounded | Killed Wounded Shell
1st Heavy field battery - 3 -*. I 53
2nd , , - - -- - 66
Ist Light y 9 - - 2 - I 39
2nd , , p 7 - - - - I 32
3rd Heavy J } I --- 2 3 63
4th , , - - -* - I 37
3rd Light y 5 - - - - I4 I
4th , , - - - *s- IO3
5th Heavy } } -- - - - 56
6th 3 y 9 3 - - - 85
5th Light 9 y - - -*. º- 39
6th 3 y 3 3 e - - - - 54
2nd Horse Artillery battery - - - - I 22
3rd - 3 y y ) te - I - II 3
The following damages were reported by the batteries on the 18th :—
2nd Heavy field battery, Guard Corps :
3rd Horse Artillery battery
5 y
y 9
3 y
y 9
j }
3 *
Ist Army Corps :
2nd Light field battery, VIIth Army Corps :
Ist Light
2nd , ,
3rd } }
5th Heavy
ISt y 9
4th , ,
6th Heavy
3rd Horse Artillery battery, VIIth
} %
3 y
5 y
5
3.
Army Corps:
6th Heavy field battery, VIIIth Army Corps :
Ist Light
4th , ,
1st Horse Artillery battery, Ixth Army Corps :
y 5 IXth
} } } }
3 )
} )
1st Light field battery, Hessian Artillery :
2nd
5 y 3 y
Horse Artillery battery
3rd
3 )
5 y
3 *
Xth Army Corps :
a breech piece and a gun carriage.
an elevating screw, a wheel, and a
limber box.
a wheel and a limber box.
a limber.
a limber (exploded), and a breech
piece.
a wheel.
a breech-piece.
a pole and gun-wheel.
two wheels.
a wheel.
an axletree-box seat.
a wheel.
two limbels.
a limber, gun carriage, and two
wheels.
a pole.
a wheel.
a limber and a wheel.
two wheels.
a limber wheel.
6th Light field battery, XIIth Army Corps :
The muzzle of a gun in the 2nd Heavy field battery of the Ixth Army Corps was
indented by a French shell, but remained serviceable during the whole campaign,
During the advance of the battery both store wagons were so injured that they were
left behind as unserviceable.
A store wagon of the 4th Heavy field battery of the xth Army Corps was also so
damaged that its place was supplied by a captured French wagon.
a gun wheel.
3 7. Appendia.
ORDER OF BATTLE
OF THAT PORTION OF THIE ARMY OF THE RHINE WHICH
TOOK PART IN THE BATTLES NEAR METZ.
Commander-in-Chief . H. E. MARSHAI. BAZAINE.
Chief of the Staff—General of Division Jarras.
Commander of Artillery—General of Division Soleille,
Commander of Engineers—-General of Division Coffinières.
2ND CORPS. GENERAL OF DIVISION FROSSARD.
Chief of the Staff—General de Saget.
FIRST DIVISION. General of Division Vergé.
Chief of the Staff—Colone! Andrieu.
1st Brigade—General Letellier-Valazé : 3rd Rifles, 32nd and 55th Regiments.
2nd Brigade—General Jolivet : 76th and 77th Regiments.
Artillery—5th and 12th Batteries, 6th Battery (mitrailleurs), 5th Artillery Regiment.
Engineers—9th Company, 3rd Regiment.
SECOND DIVISION. General of Division Bataille.
Chief of the Staſſ—Mieut.-Colonel Loysel.
1st Brigade—General Pouget : 12th Chasseurs, 8th and 23rd Regiments.
2nd Brigade—General Fauvart-Bastoul : 66th and 67th Regiments.
Artillery—7th and 8th Batteries, and 9th Battery (mitrailleurs), 5th Artillery Regiment.
Engineers—12th Company, 3rd Regiment.
THIRD DIVISION. General of Division de Laveaucoupet.
Chief of the Staff—Alieut.-Colonel Billot.
1st Brigade—General Doens: Ioth Chasseurs, 2nd and 63rd Regiments.
2nd Brigade—General Micheler : 24th and 40th Regiments.
Artillery—7th and 8th Batteries, I Ith Battery (mitrailleurs), 5th Artillery Regiment.
Engineers—13th Company, 3rd Regiment.
CAVALRY DIVISION. General of Division Marmier,
Chief of the Staff—A.ieut.-Coloſtcl de Cools.
1st Brigade – General de Valabrègue: 4th and 5th Chasseurs.
2nd Brigade—General Bachelier : 7th and 12th Dragoons,
Appendia. 375
ARTILLERY RESERVE.
loth and 11th Batteries, 5th Regiment,
6th and Ioth Batteries, 15th Regiment,
7th and 8th Batteries, 17th Regiment.
2nd Company, Bridging Train,
Detachment of 3rd Company, Artificers,
ENGINEER RESERVE,
2nd Company, 3rd Engineer Regiment.
Detachment of Sappers, 1st Engineer Regiment.
3RD CORPS, GENERAL OF DIVISION DECAEN,
Chief of the Staff—Arigadier-General Manèque,
FIRST DIVISION. General of Division Montaudon,
Chief of the Staff—Colonel Folloppe,
1st Brigade—General Baron Aymard : 18th Chasseurs, 51st and 62nd Regiments,
2nd Brigade—General Clinchant: 81st and 95th Regiments.
Artillery—6th and 8th Batteries, and 5th Battery (mitrailleurs), 4th Artillery Regiment.
Engineers—6th Company, 1st Regiment.
SECOND DIVISION. General of Division Castagny,
Chief of the Staff—Colonel du Martray.
1st Brigade—General Nayral : 15th Chasseurs, 19th and 41st Regiments.
2nd Brigade—General Duplessis : 69th and 90th Regiments.
Artillery—9th and 11th Batteries, 12th Battery (mitrailleurs), 4th Artillery Regiment.
Engineers— Ioth Company, 1st Regiment.
THIRD DIVISION. General of Division Metman,
Chief of the Staff—Lieut.-Colonel d’Orléans.
1st Brigade—General de Potier: 7th Chasseurs, 7th and 29th Regiments.
2nd Brigade—General Arnaudeau : 59th and 71st Regiments,
Artillery—6th and 7th Batteries, 5th Battery (mitrailleurs), I Ith Artillery Regiment.
Engineers—IIth Company, 1st Regiment. -
FourTH DIVISION, General of Division Aymard,
Chieſ of the Staff—Alicut.-Colonel de la Soujeole,
1st Brigade—General de Brauer : 11th Chasseurs, 44th and 60th Regiments.
2nd Brigade—General Sanglé-Ferrière: 80th and 85th Regiments.
Artillery—9th and Ioth Batteries, 8th Battery (mitrailleurs), 11th Artillery Regiment.
&ngineers—12th Company, 1st Regiment,
376 Appendia.
CAVALRY DIVISION. General of Division Clérembault.
Chief of the Staff—Lieut.-Colonel Jouffroy d'Albans.
1st Brigade—General de Bruchard : 2nd, 3rd, and Ioth Chasseurs.
2nd Brigade—General de Maubranches: 2nd and 4th Dragoons.
3rd Brigade—General de Juniac ; 5th and 8th Dragoons.
ARTILLERY RESERVE.
7th and Ioth Batteries, 4th Regiment.
I Ith and 12th Batteries, I Ith Regiment.
Ist, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Batteries, 17th Regiment,
4th Company, Bridging Train.
Detachment of 7th Company, Artificers.
ENGINEER RESERVE.
I} company and a detachment of Sappers, 1st Regiment.
4TH CORPS. GENERAL OF DIVISION DE LADMIRAULT.
Chief of the Staff—Brigadier-General d'Osmont.
FIRST DIVISION. General of Division de Cissey.
Chief of the Staſſ—Colo?te/ de Place.
1st Brigade—General Brayer : 20th Chasseurs, 1st and 6th Regiments.
2nd Brigade—General de Golberg : 57th and 73rd Regiments.
Artillery-–5th and 9th Batteries, 12th Battery (mitrailleurs), 15th Artillery Regiment.
Engineers—9th Company, 2nd Regiment.
SEconD DIVISION. General of Division Grenier.
Chief of the Staſſ—Mieut.-Colonel de Rambaud.
1st Brigade—General Bellecourt : 5th Chasseurs, 13th and 43rd Regiments.
2nd Brigade—General Pradier : 64th and 98th Regiments.
Artillery—6th and 7th Batteries, 5th Battery (mitrailleurs), 1st Artillery Regiment.
Engineers—IOth Company, 2nd Regiment.
THIRD DIVISION, General of Division de Lorencez.
Chief of the Staſſ — Lieut.-Colonel Villette.
t Brigade—General Pajol; 2nd Chasseurs, 15th and 33rd Regiments.
2nd Brigade—General Berger : 54th and 65th Regiments.
Artillery–9th and Ioth Batteries, 8th Battery (mitrailleurs), 1st Artillery Regiment.
Engineers— I 3th Company, 2nd Regiment.
Aſpendix. 377
CAVALRY DIVISION. General of Division Legrand.
Chief of the Staff—Colonel Campenon.
1st Brigade—General de Montaigu : 2nd and 7th Hussars.
2nd Brigade—General de Gondrecourt : 3rd and 11th Dragoons.
ARTILLERY RESERVE,
IIth and 12th Batteries, 1st Regiment.
6th and 9th Batteries, 8th Regiment.
5th and 6th Batteries, 17th Regiment.
8th Company, Bridging Train.
Detachment of 5th Company, Artificers,
ENGINEER RESERVE.
I company and a detachment of Sappers, 2nd Regiment.
A MIXED BRIGADE OF THE 5TH CORPS.1
General Lapasset.
I4th Chasseurs, 84th and 97th Regiments.
3rd Lancers.
7th Battery, 2nd Regiment.
6TH CORPS, MARSHAL CANROBERT,
Chief of the Staff—Brigadier-General Henri.
FIRST DIVISION. General of Division Tixier.
Chief of the Staff—- Micut.-Colonel Fourchault.
1st Brigade—General Péchot : 9th Chasseurs, 4th and IOth Regiments.
2nd Brigade—General Leroy de Dais : 12th and IOOth Regiments.
Artillery—5th and 7th Batteries, 8th Battery (mitrailleurs), 8th Artillery Regiment.
Engineers—3rd Company, 3rd Regiment.
SEconD DIVISION. General of Division Bisson.
Chief of the Staff—Colonel de Fresnel.
1st Brigade—General Noël : 9th and 14th Regiments.
2nd Brigade—General Maurice : 20th and 31st Regiments.
Artillery—11th and 12th Batteries, Ioth Battery (mitrailleurs), 8th Artillery Regiment.
Engineers—4th Company, 3rd Regiment.
v Attached to the 2nd Corps during the battles near Metz, according to Frossard.
378 Appendia.
THIRD DIVISION. General of Division Laſont de Villiers,
Chief of the Staff—Lieut.-Colonel Piquemal.
Ist Brigade—General de Sonney : 75th and 91st Regiments.
2nd Brigade—General Colin : 93rd and 94th Regiments.
Artillery—5th and 6th Batteries, 7th Battery (mitrailleurs), 14th Artillery Regiment.
Engineers—7th Company, 3rd Regiment.
FOURTH DIVISION. General of Division Levassor-Sorval.
Chief of the Staff—Colonel Mellin.
Ist Brigade—General de Marguenat 1 25th and 26th Regiments,
2nd Brigade—General de Chanaleilles: 28th and 70th Regiments.
Artillery—7th and 8th Batteries, 9th Battery (mitrailleurs), Ioth Artillery Regiment,
Engineers—IIth Company, 3rd Regiment.
CAVALRY DIVISION. General of Division de Salignac-Fénelon,
Chief of the Staff--Lieut.-Colonel Armand.
Ist Brigade—General Tilliard : 1st Hussars and 6th Chasseurs,
2nd Brigade—General Savaresse : 1st and 7th Lancers.
3rd Brigade—General de Béville : 6th and 7th Cuirassiers.
ARTILLERY RESERVE.
5th, 6th, IOth, and 12th Batteries, Ioth Regiment.
8th and 9th Batteries, 14th Regiment.
1st and 2nd Batteries, 9th Regiment.
Detachment of 6th Company, Artificers.
ENGINEER RESERVE.
I company and a detachment of Sappers, 3rd Regiment.
IMPERIAL GUARD, GENERAL of DIVISION BOURBAkt.
Chief of the Staff—Brigadier-General d'Auvergne.
FIRST DIVISION (Voltigeurs). General of Division Deligny.
Chief of the Staff—Colonel Ferret.
1st Brigade—General Brincourt: Chasseurs à Pied, 1st and 2nd Voltigeurs.
2nd Brigade—General Garnier : 3rd and 4th Voltigeurs.
SECOND DIVISION (Grenadiers). General of Division Picard. .”
Chief of the Staff—Colonel Balland.
Ist Brigade—General Jeanningros : Zouaves, 1st Grenadiers.
2nd Brigade— General Poitevin de Lacroix; 2nd and 3rd Grenadiers,
Appendix. 379
CAVALRY DIVISION. General of Division Desvaux,
Chief of the Staff—Colonel Galinier.
Ist Brigade—General Halna du Frétay : Guides and Chasseurs,
2nd Brigade—General de France: Lancers and Dragoons.
3rd Brigade—General de Preuil : Cuirassiers and Carbineers,
ARTILLERY OF THE GUARD.
Regiment of Field Artillery, 6 batteries (2 mitrailleurs),
Regiment of Horse Artillery, 6 batteries.
Squadron of Train,
ENGINEERS.
2 companies, 3rd Regiment.
RESERVE CAVALRY.
IST CAVALRY DIVISION. General of Division du Barail.
Chief of the Staff—Squadron Commander de Lantivy.
Ist Brigade—General Margueritte : 1st and 3rd Chasseurs d’Afrique.
2nd Brigade—General de Lajaille : 2nd and 4th Chasseurs d’Afrique,
Artillery—5th and 6th Batteries, 19th Regiment.
2ND CAVALRY DIVISION. General of Division de Bonnemains.
Chief of the Staſſ—Lieut.-Colonel de Tugny.
Ist Brigade—General Girard : Ist and 4th Cuirassiers.
2nd Brigade—General de Brauer : 2nd and 3rd Cuirassiers.
Artillery—7th and 8th Batteries, 19th Regiment.
3RD CAVALRY DIVISION. General of Division de Forton.
Chief of the Staſſ—Colonel Durand de Villers.
1st Brigade—General Prince Murat : Ist and 9th Dragoons.
2nd Brigade—General de Gramont : 7th and Ioth Cuirassiers,
Artillery—7th and 8th Batteries, 20th Regiment.
*
GENERAL RESERVE OF ARTILLERY, B, gadier-General Canu,
13th Regiment, 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th, Ioth, I Ith, and 12th Batteries.
18th Regiment, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, and 8th Batteries.
38O Appendix.
GENERAL RESERVE OF ENGINEERS.
2nd company of Sappers, 1st Regiment (telegraph).
2 companies and a detachment of Sappers, 3rd Regiment.
A’ E/MAAC K.S.
(1) According to Fay's account, the following troops of the 6th Corps—aſter-
wards included in the newly formed 12th Corps—remained behind in the camp at
Châlons, in consequence of the destruction of the railway : —
The 2nd Division of Infantry, with the exception of the 9th Regiment of the Line;
The Reserve Artillery;
The Engineer Reserve ;
The Cavalry Division.
(2) The deficiency of the 6th Corps in artillery was supplemented by allotting
several batteries to it at later periods, as pointed out by Montluisant. The
12th Battery of the 8th Regiment (Blondel) succeeded during the night, between the
14th and 15th August, in reaching Metz by way of Mézières and Thionville, and it
was temporarily attached ſo the Ist Inſantry Division of the 6th Corps.
On the 13th August the 9th and Ioth Batteries (12-prs.) of the 13th Regiment
(General Reserve) were attached to the 2nd Infantry Division, and so remained till
the battle of the 16th, after which they joined the 1st Infantry Division, which had
thus 6 batteries on the 18th.
For the 18th, moreover, the 7th and 8th Batteries of the 18th Regiment (4-prs.
from the General Reserve) were attached to the 6th Corps.
After the battle of the 18th more artillery was allotted to the 6th Corps, and at
Noisseville its artillery, under General Baron de Berckheim, consisted of
(a) The original batteries of the Ist and 3rd Infantry Division, as given in the
foregoing order of battle.
(b) The 7th and 8th Batteries of the 19th Regiment, and the 12th of the 8th Regi-
ment of the 4th Inſantry Division.
(c) Of the Reserve Artillery—
9th and IOth Batteries, 13th Regiment (12-prs.);
II th Battery (mitrailleurs), 15th Regiment (Lauret);
9th Battery (mitrailleurs), 4th Regiment.
Lauret's battery belonged previously to Laveaucoupet's Infantry Division, which
joined the garrison of Metz on the 14th August.
(d) The 5th and 6th Batteries of the 19th Regiment of the Cavalry Division.
Total, I 5 batteries, I I 4-prS., 2 12-prs., 2 mitrailleurs.
A discrepancy is to be found between Fay's and Montluisant's accounts with regard
to the batteries of mitrailleurs. According to the former 4 out of the 15 batteries
were mitrailleurs.
(3) In the 1st Division of Reserve Cavalry (Du Barrail) the 4th Regiment of Chas-
seurs d’Aſrique was absent from the first.
After the departure of the Emperor Napoleon's escort on the 16th August, Bru-
chard's cavalry brigade of the 3rd Corps was added to the 2nd Regiment of Chasseurs
d'Afrique and the two batteries, which were then the only troops left to General
Appendix. 381
du Barrail, and the division thus reorganised was placed under the command of the
6th Corps. &
(4) The large artillery ammunition park, which left Versailles on the Ioth August,
was unable to reach the army, and only reached Toul.
(5) Marshal Bazaine gives the strength of the artillery of the Army of the Rhine
3.S
456 guns,
84 mitrailleurs.
Total 540
He estimates the strength of the army on the 13th August, when he took over the
command, at I 70, Ooo men —
Infantry tº e $ * * . I 22, OOO
Cavalry g * e g & . I 3, OOO
Artillery º * e IO, OOO
Engineers and Administration g . 25, OOO
9 *|W. OF MICH IGAN,
ŠEP 6 1913
LONDON : PRINTEU) BY
SPOTTISWOODE AND Co., NEw-STREET SQUARH,
AN ID PARLIAMENT STREET
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Remarks.
# //zerºes and/or zºne ſºon the arrara/ of the reinfºrcements of
the 4* and ſº tº Army (bºys & Zºe zzzzra/ of the //essan
Baaze (/ºom abour ºn a 72” )
† Awarzer and/or /º/, /d/, //e armºra/ of the //es.wºazz batteries
zo the end of the baſſ/e/Zºº /*uarian attack after / / /*
- - - - - Ze/? /º/ ºverz Żazº Zowardº AA"
|-|--|- 7%.e. z/24 (bºys aſazz & Pº
c cº-o-o-o: Zarávº &ra/ºr azac% adowſ: 4, Z/*
+++++/*awaz, Južorſ, aſ ºe end of Ae Mazz/e.
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names underlined.
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FEBRUARY, 1874.
A CLASSIFIED CATALOGUE OF
HENRY S. KING & CO’S PUBLICATIONS
CONTENTS.
PAGE PAGE
II ISTORY AND T3 IOGRAPHY º * ... I INDIA AND THE EAST . wº sº . 2C)
VOYAGES AND TRAVEL e - . . 5 Books For THE YouNG, &c. . . . 22
SciENCE . - e e • * ... 7 POETRY . - e - - e . 27
Essays, LECTURES, AND COLLECTED FICTION - - - - - . . 3O
PAPERS - - s - - . I 3 THEOLOGICAL . e - - º • 34
MILITARY Works * • • . . 16 Corn HILL LIBRARY OF Fiction . . 39
Aſ/STOR V AAV/O B/OGAZA PAH V.
—0–
w
AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY AND OTHER MEMORIALS OF
MRS. GILBERT, FORMERLY ANN TAYLOR. By Josiah
Gilbert. In 2 vols.
IEngravings.
Tost 8vo. With Steel Portraits and several Wood
[Preparing.
PERSIA; ANCIENT AND MODERN. By John Piggot, F.S.A.
Post 8vo.
SARA COLERIDGE, MEMOIR AND LETTERS OF.
Crown 8vo.
by her Daughters. 2 vols.
Third Edition, Revised and Corrected.
‘‘We havc read these two volumes with
genuine gratification.”—Homer.
“We could have wished to give speci-
mens of her very just, subtle, and concise
criticisms on authors of every sort and time
—poets, moralists, historians, and philoso-
Sara Coleridge, as she is revealed,
or rather reveals herself, in the corre-
spondence, makes a brilliant addition to
a brilliant family reputation.”—Saturday
phers.
A'ez) fezeſ.
Edited
With 2 Portraits. Price 24s.
With Index.
“These charming volumes are attractive
in two ways: first, as a memorial of a most
anniable woman of high intellectual mark;
and secondly, as rekindling recollections,
and adding a little to our information re-
garding the life of Sara Coleridge's father,
the poet and philosopher.”—- thenaeumt.
“An acceptable record, and presents an
adequate image of a mind of Singular
beauty and no inconsiderable power.”-
E-raminer.
SAMUEL LOVER, THE LIFE AND UNPUBLISHED WORKS
O F.
By Bayle Bernard. In 2 vols. Post 8vo. With a Steel Portrait.
[Prºſaring.
65, Co////i//; & 12, Zºadc//losſer A'ozcº, London.
Works Published by Henry S. King & Co.,
POLITICAL WOMEN. By Sutherland Menzies.
HISTORY AND IRIOGRAPHY-continued.
A MEMOIR OF THE REV. D.R. ROVVLAND WILLIAMS, With
selections from his Note-books and Correspondence.
IRowland Williams.
Large post 8vo.
Price 24s.
“Has all the information of history, with
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With a Photographic Portrait.
Edited by Mrs.
In 2 vols.
[/7, the Aress.
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THE LATE REV. F. W. ROBERTSON, M.A., LIFE AND
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I. In 2 vols., uniform with the Sermons. Price 7s. 6d.
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III. A Popular Edition, in I vol.
I25.
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^,
LIVES OF ENGLISH POPULAR LEADERS.
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the Royal Palace at Copenhagen, 1663–1685.
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Translated by F. E.
With
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Works Published by Henry S. King & Co., 3
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HISTORY AND BIOGRAPHY-continued.
THE DAY.
The sketches are absolutely impartial.”
Athenaeum,
HISTORY OF THE REVOLUTION OF 1688.
Regius Professor, Queen's Coll., Belfast.
Simpson.
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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES OF STATESMEN OF
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THE RUSSIANS IN CENTRAL ASIA. A Critical Examination,
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Theodore Wirgman, LL.B., late 6th Inniskilling Dragoons; for-
merly of the Austrian Service; Translator into English verse of Schiller's
“Wallenstein's Camp.” In I vol., large post 8vo, with Map. [AVearly ready.
-
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Works Published by Henry S. King & Co.,
HISTORY AND BIOGRAPHY-continued.
BOKHARA : IT'S HISTORY AND CONQUEST. By Professor
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in Central Asia,” &c. Demy 8vo.
“We conclude with a cordial recommen-
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THE RELIGIOUS HISTORY OF IRELAND : PRIMITIVE, PAPAL,
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THE
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“For those who shun blue books, and
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I vol.
GOVERNMENT OF THE NATIONAL DEFENCE. From
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By Mons. Jules Favre.
Member.
“A very eloquent book.”—Examiner.
“Of all the contributions to the history
of the late war—we have found none more
fascinating and, perhaps, none more
valuable than the “apology,” by M.
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“A graceful and touching, as well as
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Translated ſrom the Arabic Originals.
Clerk, Author of “The Antipodes and Round the World.”
|Price 18s.
“Almost every page abounds with com-
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29
I’OETRY-continued.
CALDIERON'S TIFAMAS.
Translated ſrom the Spanish. By Denis
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SONGS FOR SAILORS. By Dr. W. C.
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i
|
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GOETHE'S FAUST. A New Translation
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SONGS OF TWO WORLDS.
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MIRANDA. A Midsummer, Madness. By
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