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M. I. T. in World War II
Q. E. D.

Entrance from the Great Court,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
UNID
OF
M.I.T. in World War II

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John Burchard
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The Technology Press
John Wiley & Sons, Inc., New York
Chapman & Hall, Ltd., London
COPYRIGHT, 1948
BY
THE MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
All Rights Reserved
This book or any part thereof must not
be reproduced in any form without the
written permission of the publisher.
PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Foreword
As I LOOK BACK on the vivid, hectic years of World War II
from the vantage point of peace and reconstruction in 1948,
a kaleidoscopic succession of impressions runs through my
mind. Perhaps I can do no better, as a foreword to this story
of M.I.T. in World War II, than to record some of these. As
with every Son of M.I.T., these impressions are the composite
result of personal experiences within the framework of our
institution and of those wartime organizations in which our
alumni, staff, and students played so prominent a role.
In retrospect, one quality of our wartime activity stands out
clearly, and I sometimes wish we could recapture it to an equal
extent in our postwar program. It is the quality of unity and
simplicity because, however difficult and numerous were the
problems, there was always just one criterion for their solution:
“'Is this the most useful thing which M.I.T., or any one of us
personally, can do to help win the war?” One of my close
friends is a strong advocate of "single-mindedness” and in his
own life he follows this principle with great effectiveness. His
principle is this: Pick out the thing which you most wish to
accomplish, and then organize all of your powers and activities
to this end. This was the characteristic policy of M.I.T.
in wartime.
No one can read the story set forth in this history without
being impressed by the fact that the Massachusetts Institute
of Technology is a tremendous national asset. This was very
vividly illustrated during the war; it is continually demon-
strated in peace. One can point to numerous accomplish-
ments of M.I.T. without which it can certainly be said that
the war would have lasted longer, its destructiveness would
have been greater, and its outcome precarious. Some of these
FOREWORD
TIY91
YYIL
accomplishments could not have been made except for the facil-
ities and personnel here available.
The war record of M.I.T., and of other great centers of war
activity, illustrates strikingly the power of cooperative group
effort. “Power” is, by definition, the rate of doing work. Jobs
were accomplished at incredible speed because each group of
workers was dominated by a single-minded, unselfish drive
to accomplish its objective, and because each group was com-
posed of individuals of high ability.
One of the outstanding lessons of the war was the great
value of civilian experts at high levels in the military and
other governmental councils. This is tied in with the value
of an emergency civilian organization with independent funds
and authority. The Armed Services deserve great credit for
their accomplishments under the tremendous pressures of rapid
expansion and shortness of time. They also deserve great credit
for the manner in which they learned to cooperate with civilian
experts as “team-mates.” In many cases this cooperation did
not come easily and naturally, but only after the civilian agency
had struggled with difficulties to the point where it could
make a striking demonstration or until after there had been
a replacement of military personnel by others of broader vision.
In some quarters the decision to purchase newly developed
equipment in quantity, without going through the peacetime
routine of successive qualifying tests, had to be forced by
civilian pressure. It was civilian pressure which finally broke
down a table of organization which called for “fifty-eight radar
experts" and opened the way for the training of these experts
by the thousands. It took, a devastating report by a civilian
scientific board to convince those in higher authority that the
traditional methods of antisubmarine warfare were inadequate
and that far more effective methods could be devised. When
escort vessels alone were proving inadequate to prevent sinkings
by enemy submarines and to prevent the invasion even of our
own coastline by these submarines, it was the Secretary of
War and his civilian aides who put through the first organized
FOREWORD
vii
effort to counterattack the submarines by airplanes fitted with
radar and magnetic detectors and it was a civilian organization,
M.I.T., which supplied this radar and trained the crews in its
operation. The amphibious vehicle DUKW was the name
given to the immensely important amphibious truck which
played such a role in the Normandy invasion and in the
amphibious landings and the harbor operations in the Far
Pacific. With one notable exception, the military authorities
expressed no interest in this project until the development
had been carried through and the significance of the DUKW
demonstrated by OSRD. Much the same thing can be said of
the rocket missiles, including the Bazooka, and there are some
instances of important developments which never did break
through into use. These illustrations are given, not in criticism
of the professional military men who had their own tremen-
dously difficult job to perform, but simply to illustrate the
point that civilian experts, well organized, operating at high
level with adequate funds and authority are a tremendous
supplement to the Armed Forces in a war emergency.
In many of the civilian war activities M.I.T. was the "guinea
pig.” Our facilities of personnel and laboratories, and whole-
hearted backing by the Executive Committee of our Corpora-
tion, made it possible for us to move rapidly to meet any new
need. For this reason the first really large OSRD contract was
located at M.I.T., and for this reason also the terms of this
contract, which were set by prolonged studies and negotiations
between our Division of Industrial Cooperation and our Admin-
istration and legal counsel on one hand, and the contracting
office of OSRD on the other hand, set the pattern for the
subsequent major contracts of the OSRD and had a very pro-
nounced influence on all subsequent governmental contracts
with private institutions, extending even now into peacetime.
For the same reason it was M.I.T. which was largely responsible
for setting the policies followed by all institutions with refer-
ence to tenure and salary scale of the staffs recruited for the
various research and development projects. Though this
viii
FOREWORD
1
achieved little publicity, I believe that the working out of
these policies on a fair “no profit, no loss” basis and in a readily
workable manner constitute one of M.I.T.'s most important
contributions during the war.
As will be clearly seen by the reader of this history the
Institute's contributions in World War II were principally
channeled in three categories: (1) research and development
contracts; (2) special training courses; and (3) personal
services by its staff. By its policy of rendering many of these
personal services available to the government without charge,
and in other cases of supplementing government salaries to our
staff so that our personnel could accept usefu! jobs without
impossible financial handicap, the rendering of these personal
services also represents a financial contribution by the Institute
of over a half million dollars to the war effort.
Our research and development projects were of two general
types. In one of these types the work was carried on primarily
by regular members of the M.I.T. staff. These were the smaller
projects, but many of them were very important. The other
type consisted of the very large projects for which the staffs
were recruited from all types of institutions and organizations
all over the country. These were definitely cooperative efforts
in which M.I.T. took care of the business operations and the
housekeeping but in general turned over the running of the
program to the best men available, whether members of the
M.I.T. staff or not. Thus in our war effort we owe a debt to
representatives from many other institutions who joined with
us in this great program. Some of these groups were like high-
strung race horses whose best performance was achieved by
“giving them their head,” but this is just another way of saying
that the Institute's first and only objective in this period was
to help to win the war, and not to seek institutional or per-
sonal advantage.
We are particularly fortunate in having John Burchard as
the author of this history. He had a remarkably wide contact
with the war effort at home and in the active theaters. Even
FOREWORD
before the war broke out he was borrowed from M.I.T. to head
a preparedness project located at Princeton University under
the auspices of the National Academy of Sciences. Throughout
most of the war he was the head of one of the important divisions
of the National Defense Research Committee. He also served
as Assistant Chief and later Deputy Chief of the Office of Field
Service and was responsible for organizing a number of special
projects in the active theaters. Finally, he had some of the
aspects of a first-class trouble shooter since he was given the job
in the OSRD organization of pulling several difficult assign-
ments out of confusion and into effective operation.
John Burchard did all of these tasks with superlative skill.
With this same skill, it seems to me, he has tackled the very
complex problem of M.I.T.'s wartime history. To organize
this complex material into a coherent story had seemed to me
a well-nigh impossible task. I think John Burchard has solved
the problem by organizing the material first around the frame-
work within which M.I.T.'s activities operated and then by
breaking down the story of accomplishments under various
generic headings. Even with all this, however, he will be the
first to admit that the story is far from complete. From my
limited knowledge I know that many of the activities recorded
briefly in this volume could themselves have each been expanded
into a full volume or even into many volumes. As a matter of
fact this is being done elsewhere, as for example in the OSRD
publications which include more than a dozen volumes on
the subject of radar and are largely built around the program
of the M.I.T. Radiation Laboratory. The story ALSOS, by
Professor Samuel A. Goudsmit, is a fascinating account of the
war's most important scientific intelligence mission, in whose
organization John Burchard played a part, and whose head,
Professor Goudsmit, was, during most of the war, a member
of the M.I.T. Radiation Laboratory. And finally, the accom-
plishments of M.I.T. staff, alumni, and students are so
numerous that it is wholly impossible to mention more than
a few of the most outstanding individual cases and projects.
JU
FOREWORD
Carved across the front of the National Academy of Sciences
Building in Washington is a Greek inscription from Aristotle
whose translation is “The search for truth is in one way hard
and another easy, for it is evident that no one can master it
fully nor miss it wholly; but each adds a little to our knowledge
of Nature, and from all the facts assembled there arises a
certain grandeur." I feel that this quotation can well epitomize
the history of M.I.T. in World War II. No one who participated
in these activities, nor any writer or reader of this history, can
grasp it fully nor miss it wholly, but it is certainly true that
from all the facts assembled there "arises a certain grandeur"
which is the total contribution by the Massachusetts Institute
of Technology toward the winning of what we hope and pray
will have been the last great world war.
March, 1948
KARL T. COMPTON
Preface
THIS BOOK DESCRIBES the contributions of a single privately
endowed American institution, the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, to the victory over the Axis powers. It is a record
which will have been paralleled by others, and in that respect
is typical of the assistance rendered the Allies by academic insti-
tutions. Technological emphasis of the recent war made the
work of technological groups more prominent than in previous
conflicts. In such a position the activity of a large technological
institution was naturally extensive and significant.
Intended to be a history of the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology during the war period, the book makes no effort to
speak of the contributions of other institutions, which were fre-
quently quite as important. Although I have taken pains not to
overstate the part played by the Institute, I dare say there will be
some to whom the text will seem boastful. I hope it is not that,
but it is of course written from a single point of view. A fuller
picture can certainly be obtained by reading kindred works
about other institutions, of which there is no dearth.
The book does not seek to be a history of individuals.
Research and development are almost always the work of
teams these days. Teams have leaders, and the team leaders
of this war would be the first to disclaim personal credit for
the lion's share. Nonetheless, it is usually easier to tell a story
in terms of individuals. I have accordingly not hesitated to talk
more about single individuals than their total role, relative to
that of others, would justify. But the reader who is interested in
a single individual will often find the individual difficult to trace
save through the index. The activities of a man are not placed
in juxtaposition here, save as they concerned but a single job.
Some members of the Institute did war work which still
xi
xii
PREFACE
remains classified. Of such work this history can, of course, say
nothing. Mention of a staff member in one capacity does not
mean, therefore, that in others he did not do work of greater
importance, while lack of any mention may mean only that the
man's work is still classified.
The important decisions to be made at the outset were:
1. Not to write a history of alumni activity. M.I.T. alumni
who appear in these pages do so because of some direct relation
to the activities being described. Relatively few of all alumni
who worked with distinction in the war will be met here.
2. Not to include the names of all the many persons from
other institutions who joined hands with groups at M.I.T.
and, working under M.I.T. contracts, made distinguished con-
tributions. This decision was reached with the greatest reluct-
ance for it must be admitted at once that there were few
important projects at M.I.T. which were exclusively the product
of M.I.T. people. It had to be made because of the very large
number of such outsiders, especially in the Radiation Labora-
tory. Had they all been included, the book would have become
a form of Who's Who and not a history.
3. Not to include staff activities which were of a normal
civilian nature and in which all patriotic citizens indulged in
greater or less degree. This refers to contributions to the blood
bank, Red Cross activities, bond drives, Office of Civilian
Defense, Selective Service administration, and the like.
Prior to my work on the book, Mr. J. J. Sharkey in 1945–
1946, as the result of a questionnaire to the staff, collected
such information on their activities during the war as the
individuals would supply. Subsequently I have augmented
this information in two ways; first, by personal conferences
with those who I felt would offer the most useful expansion
of detail; second, with the aid of Miss Beverly Brooks, by looking
up individuals who we were certain had done something sig-
nificant but, through modesty or otherwise, had failed to report.
The material was reworked in terms of types of activity rather
than in terms of the individuals. The text referring to each
PREFACE
xiii
individual was reviewed by him for errors of fact. Thus the staff
will have to share with me, at least in part, the blame for errors
of this sort. I cannot, however, escape personal blame for errors
of emphasis or interpretation.
Clearly such a technique must result in some lacunae. I am
sufficiently familiar with the general activities of the Institute
and with the course of research and development during the war
to feel reasonably confident that no important activity has been
omitted. I cannot feel so certain that some individuals have not
been overlooked; and to any who have been slighted, I apologize.
The greatest omissions of this sort are likely to concern
those with active military records and those who have come to
the Institute postwar, having served elsewhere before. In both
cases the individuals were often not on the staff at the time of
the first survey. The lacunae may be less serious than would
perhaps appear because the history is primarily the history of
research rather than of battle (the soldiers and sailors will
have their full day elsewhere), and because we really should
not claim credit anyway for the war activities of the newcomers.
The problem of citations was equally troublesome. Again
a questionnaire was sent out; the citations listed are simply
the grist from that questionnaire. It is almost certain that
many important ones have been omitted. Since the history is
not concerned with glory, the completeness of citations is
perhaps not important. They have been used, not for glory,
but to document my assertions that certain things were impor-
tant by showing that others, too, thought so.
The greatest fault in the record is of a different sort. It is
relatively easy to prepare an account of those who left the
Institute for careers, glamorous or not, or of those who remained
at the Institute to direct projects not in the ordinary line of
things. But there was another group of the greatest importance,
the group which kept the ship afloat when many of the officers
and men had left for other duties. A list of these people starts
with James Rhyne Killian, Jr., Vice President, and Horace S.
Ford, Treasurer, whose energy, foresight, and skill guided
T
xiv
PREFACE
the Institute during the extensive absences required of Dr.
Compton. It goes down through many other executive officers
and embraces a large number of distinguished teachers who
carried heavy overloads in order that their colleagues might
range in other fields. It is out of the question to make any reason-
able detailed statement as to these activities, and the attempt
has not been made. Some, and all too few, of the individuals
appear casually in the book in other connections, but most of
them remain anonymous. It would be quite impossible to over-
emphasize the nature of their contribution, one which left the
Institute in a position to carry on into the peace with increased
rather than diminished momentum.
In addition to the detailed review of parts by all the partic-
ipants, I was especially helped by Dean Edward L. Moreland,
Dean George R. Harrison, Professor Julius Stratton, and Mr.
Nathaniel McL. Sage, each of whom reviewed the whole
manuscript with great care. By their combined comments I
have been spared many an egregious error.
Thanks are also due Edna Kempton, who transcribed the
manuscript from very foul copy; to an always helpful colleague
of many years, Margaret Hopkins, who made most of the
checks of detail; and to Beverly Brooks, who did most of the
final investigation and who saw the manuscript through the
press. Finally, more perhaps than she knows, I am grateful
to my wife, Marjorie, who listened to many more versions of
the text than ought to have been imposed on anyone and who
frequently has saved me from banality.
As a member of the staff of M.I.T., I am proud of the record
made by my institution in this period of crisis. I hope I have
portrayed it with sufficient modesty. If it can be taken in the
spirit in which it was prepared, it may stand as an assurance that
the private universities of this nation are equipped to do in the
future as they have steadfastly done in the past. If this point is
made, the book will have served its purpose.
Cambridge,
1 March 1948
JOHN BURCHARD
Contents
PART I ORIENTATION
1. M.I.T. in 1939
2. Perspective
PART II RESEARCH AND
DEVELOPMENT AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL
3. The Research-Directing Agencies
4. The Projects of NDRC
5. For the Army
6. For the Navy
7. For the Office of Field Service
125
134
PART III RESEARCH AND
DEVELOPMENT AT TECHNOLOGY
8. The Division of Industrial Cooperation
9. To Make the Guns Behave
10. For the Wounded and the Well
11. Phenomena of Sky and Sea
12. In the Service of Materials
13. Flash Photos and Other Tools
14. Prelude to Hiroshima
15. Electronic Espionage – the Radiation Laboratory
153
164
178
196
209
215
PART IV THE STAFF AWAY
ON DIVERSE MISSIONS
16. On the Production Front
17. On the Psychological Front
18. Consultants to Industry
243
252
259
XV
xvi
CONTENTS
PART V THE HOME FRONT
19.
Teaching in the War Years
275
PART VI EPILOGUE
20. M.I.T. Redeploys for Peace
By J. R. Killian, Jr.
313
Glossary of Code Names and Abbreviations
327
Personnel Index
333
Subject Index
343
Part I
ORIENTATION
M.I.T. IN 1939
WHEN THE GERMANS invaded Poland in the early autumn of
1939 the Massachusetts Institute of Technology was preparing
to enter its seventy-fifth year. The years since 1865 had wit-
nessed a steady growth with some larger jumps which are not
of concern to this story. In the seventy-four years completed,
the original registration of 69 students who greeted President
Rogers in the fall of 1865 had become 1,000 after 36 years, but
had not gone over 2,000 until the return of veterans from
World War I, when it reached 3,000, mounting briefly to 3,500
in 1921–22. This 3,000 figure had remained relatively stable
during the twenty years between crises, stable in number if
not in distribution.
In 1935 the Institute had adopted a stabilized enrollment
plan which was, by 1939, in its fourth year and hence fully
operative; freshmen registrations were 605 out of 1,621 appli-
cants. The total undergraduate enrollment was 2,379, and 721
graduate students brought the total to 3,100. This enrollment
was no mere congregation of local residents; more than 70
per cent of all the students came from outside Massachusetts,
60 per cent from outside New England, 33 per cent from out-
side the North Atlantic States; 7 per cent were not from the
United States at all, coming from 41 nations, including both
Germany and Poland, the original combatants of 1939. In that
year this graduate student registration was the largest in the
history of the Institute and represented 170 American colleges
and universities and 61 foreign institutions.
The 10 staff members, all professors, who had cared for the
education of President Rogers’ 69 had grown to an also rela-
QED
tively stable figure of 683, of whom 282 were of faculty rank.
The ratio of number of students to number of staff members
was beneficently low, and this was the result of intention. In
1929, a decade before, for example, the staff had numbered
515, or 20 per cent less, for a student body of almost exactly
the same size.
Spearheaded by the generosity of George Eastman, who
contributed $20,500,000 to the growth of Technology, the
original zero endowment of President Rogers had become, in
1939, $36,000,000, the seventh largest held by an educational
institution in the United States. The original rented class-
rooms in the Mercantile Library Building on Summer Street
in downtown Boston had become, in this same fateful year
of 1939, a congeries of buildings and equipment valued at
$16,000,000, as contrasted with a valuation of $7,000,000 in
1916. President Rogers' tiny first budget, magnified only to
$86,000 by 1881, had grown for 1938–39 to an expenditure of
$3,203,300, the largest in the Institute's history up to that time.
The annual operating budget was derived 58 per cent from
student fees, 35 per cent from investments, 7 per cent from
other sources; expenditures for strictly educational purposes,
on the other hand, accounted for 70 per cent of the annual
expenditure.
Since 1916 the Institute had occupied the new buildings
designed by Welles Bosworth for the Charles River site in
Cambridge. On that date of occupancy the buildings had
provided the students and staff of Technology with approxi-
mately 680,000 square feet of working space. Between 1916 and
1939 about 345,000 square feet had been added so that in the
first year of crisis there was a total of some 1,025,000 square
feet available.
The 3,100 students of 1939 were enrolled in 17 different
departments and were taking 32 basic curricula,1 all related
to science or engineering. Many of these curricula had been
pioneered by the Institute.2
By 1939 research work had been undertaken by various staff
M.I.T. IN 1939
members of the Institute which was to lay the groundwork
for many of the most important war research projects later
undertaken at Technology. This was true, for example, of the
laboratories dealing with such diverse subjects as instruments,
servomechanisms, electronics, radioactive materials, aeronau-
tics, rapid analysis, X-ray, high voltage. In facilities, and in
trained personnel to operate them, the institution had been
preparing unconsciously for a crisis which it could not have
foreseen; when the crisis came it was ready.
By 1939 the crisis could begin to be discerned clearly, even
though the nation was at that time involved only spiritually
and even though the spiritual involvement was not shared by all
its citizens. In July, 1939, Dr. Karl T. Compton, President of the
Institute, decided to canvass the alumni for information a year
earlier than would have been necessary for the Register of
Former Students. Therefore a questionnaire for the Register
as well as one for the Placement Bureau was sent out on
September 30, 1939, the opening paragraph of which read:
Since war began in Europe we have observed here at the Institute
an increase in the demand for trained men, especially on the part
of industry. I am convinced that this demand will continue to
grow as our country adjusts itself to the new conditions imposed
by the foreign conflict.
The questionnaires were then totted, and the results enabled
the Institute in 1940 to recommend men for key positions both
in government and in industry.
The time was not ripe for the Institute to turn its activities
to war, but the storm clouds were described accurately enough
by Dr. Compton, in his ninth annual report to the Corpora-
tion in October, 1939, when he said:
Our first duty, in this time of turmoil and danger, is to carry on
our normal educational program as effectively as possible and with
a minimum of confusion. Whatever course future events may take,
the world will need young men versed in science and skilled in the
arts of its application to promote human welfare.
QED
After defining the Institute's second duty as the expansion
and improvement of its efforts in research for public service,
Dr. Compton continued:
In the third place, we should be alert to the needs and opportu-
nities for service to our country in direct proportion to the degree
of national emergency which may exist. For example, certain
technical problems of national defense might properly now engage
the attention of our staff which, under less portentous circumstances,
should be given a lower priority or left to other auspices. If ever
the extreme situation of a struggle for existence of our country or
its ideals should befall us, then I am sure that we should do as we
did in 1917 – temporarily subordinate our normal educational and
research program, and place all our facilities at the disposal of the
nation with suitable arrangements for their wise use.
LE
1
l
KY
le when te are so clear.itution wh
A year later Germany controlled western Europe, and Eng-
land was beginning her period of travail at the hands of the
Luftwaffe. The situation was entirely clear to the Institute's
president in his 1940 report, rendered fourteen months before
the Japanese struck at Pearl Harbor. In this tenth annual
report he said:
We are fortunate to serve an institution whose objectives in
respect to national needs are so clear-cut and constructive. Estab-
lished at a time when technically trained men were needed to
develop uses for our great national resources and to pioneer in the
new industrial era, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology has
had no reason to change its basic objectives, whether in times of
prosperity or depression, of peace or of war. Engineers are ever more
needed to operate and improve the productive industries of the
country; scientists are ever faced with opportunities to make
discoveries which will create new industries and employment, or
improve health and comfort, or add to the satisfactions of intel-
lectual achievement; business men with technological training are
increasingly able to cope with their problems as compared to those
without it in this technological era. And in a time of military
crisis, technological efficiency in production as well as in design of
instruments of defense and offense is the basic element of national
defense.
In my report last year, as the European war was just begin-
M.I.T. IN 1939
ning, I submitted my opinion that the Massachusetts Institute
of Technology's greatest service, in threat of war as in time of peace,
was to continue as efficiently and uninterruptedly as possible, its
program of technological education and scientific research. That
opinion still holds; but the progress of events has called for some
new definitions of policy and modifications in procedure.
Where we possess facilities of personnel or equipment which can
contribute in especially significant ways to the national defense
program, we should direct them to this effort, always guided by our
best evaluation of the national importance of this effort in com-
parison with other ways in which these same personnel and facilities
might be used. We should make this possible by postponing less
urgent research projects, by internal rearrangement of teaching
schedules, and by carrying a more than normal per capita burden
of work. We should not permit our facilities, many of which are
unique, to be tied up in work of a type which can be well performed
by many other agencies, and we should, in so far as possible, hold
our staff together as a working unit. The teaching and research
staff is certainly more effective intact than it would be dispersed,
and as an integrated organization can exert a greater force for
national defense.3
Dr. Compton then went on to describe ways in which this
program was already being implemented, ways which are the
theme of this book and which will therefore be expanded
later. Even at this early time special training courses had been
inaugurated; the wind tunnels and certain other laboratories
were working full time on military problems. More than two
dozen of the staff were specifically mentioned as having left
for war duties; they were merely the scouts of a larger hegira
to come.
The future was then predicted with great accuracy by Dr.
Compton:
If the national emergency should become acute, the foregoing
arrangements may have to be modified. It is conceivable that many
of the Reserve Officers remaining on our staff may be called to
active service, and that the number of regular students may be
materially decreased. We may have to transform our activities very
largely in the direction of emergency technical training courses and
QED
war research. If so, we are prepared to carry on with as close adher-
ence as may be possible to the basic policies and ultimate objectives
which have guided us in the preceding arrangements.
Fourteen months before the attack on Pearl Harbor, there-
fore, M.I.T. had begun to mobilize. A year later, and two
months before the attack, the Institute's president could report
that more than two hundred officers and members of the Insti-
tute staff were engaged as experts for various operating or
advisory agencies of the government, that those in this category
whose salaries had continued to be paid by M.I.T. had con-
tributed more than 50,000 man-hours to this service, that
defense research contracts with the Army, the Navy, and the
National Defense Research Committee had already been made
which totaled more than the annual budget of the Institute in
1938–39. From this point on, the acceleration was rapid and
by the time of the next report, ten months after war had been
declared, every sinew of the Institute had been stretched tight
as a partner in the national effort.
What this meant in detail will appear in the pages which
follow. In general it meant that of the 680-odd staff listed in the
fall of 1939 more than a third were away, on leave of absence
or not, carrying on war activities of primary importance; that
because of war contracts for research and little decrease in
teaching responsibility the total staff on the Institute lists
reached at the August, 1945, peak a figure of 6,200 or nine
times normal; that at the 1944–45 peak the annual budget
for the Institute was $44,354,800 or nearly fourteen times the
1938–39 figure; that the budget for supported research alone,
also at the peak, was $39,970,900; that building space had been
increased by 475,000 square feet or nearly 50 per cent. As
was expected, war research made inroads on civilian graduate
registration, and the Selective Service, paying little heed, in
the long run, to the national need for technological education,
reduced the civilian student body from the normal 3,100 of
1939 to a low of 1,165 in March, 1944, thus returning this
registration to the totals of the decade 1890–1900. This
reduction was partly compensated for, especially in the heart
M.I.T. IN 1939
9
of the war, by various special service courses, the ASTP for
a short time and the Navy V-12 for longer, but even with these
additions the total registration in the last two years of the war
declined from 3,600 (November, 1943) to a low of 1,870
(March, 1945), or to about the pre-World-War-I level. This
decline was equally marked in the Graduate School, where a
normal 1939 enrollment of over 700 had been reduced to 349 in
the fall of 1945, with a very large proportion of those who re-
mained coming from foreign countries which were either not at
war or were only nominal combatants.
These are the cold statistics of the Institute's contributions to
the victory. They suggest little save that in a great event of this
sort the Institute, like any other significant national institution,
was significantly affected. The quality of the contribution needs
more extensive analysis in order that it may be assessed; and it
is this quality which is the subject of the succeeding chapters.
FOOTNOTES
1 Aeronautical Engineering, Meteorology, Architecture, City Planning,
Biology and Public Health, Biophysics and Biological Engineering, Build-
ing Engineering and Construction, Business and Engineering Adminis-
tration, Chemical Engineering, Chemical Engineering Practice, Chemistry,
Civil Engineering, Economics and Engineering, Electrical Engineering,
Electrical Engineering (Cooperative), Electrochemical Engineering, Food
Technology and Industrial Biology, General Engineering, General Science,
Geology, Marine Transportation, Mathematics, Mechanical Engineering,
Mechanical Engineering (Cooperative), Metallurgy, Ceramics, Mining
Engineering, Naval Architecture and Marine Engineering, Naval Engineer-
ing, Naval Construction, Physics, Sanitary Engineering. Even with this
plethora of selection, 30 students, most of them juniors, were unclassified.
2 Among them, as professional courses, are Architecture in 1865, Electri-
cal Engineering separated from Physics in 1882, Chemical Engineering in
1888, Naval Architecture in 1893, Electrochemistry in 1901, Public Health
(with Harvard) in 1910, Architectural Engineering in 1923, Aeronautical
Engineering in 1926, Industrial Biology in 1927, Meteorology in 1928,
and Food Technology in 1935.
3 This proved to be more desirable than events made possible. The
demand for individual services away from M.I.T. was simply too over-
whelming to make achievement possible more than in part.
PERSPECTIVE
nya
BY DOING its regular business well in peace, Technology had,
more than it knew, prepared itself to serve the nation well in
war. The biggest part of its preparation lay not in its labora-
tories, not in its staff, not in its administration, prominent as
were to be the roles all these would play. Rather it lay in the
product of the previous forty-odd years: in its trained alumni.
This is a general rule which could be applied to any educa-
tional institution, either in peace or in war. In World War II
the alumni of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology could
scarcely be an exception. This was a war which exploited tech-
nical resources to an extent never witnessed in any previous
conflict. It called upon these resources in every conceivable way.
Not only did laboratories in the warring countries race against
each other to develop new weapons, but the factories, too, raced
to stretch their production to unheard-of limits. Even after the
new weapons were devised and produced, they needed personnel
to operate them, personnel with a skill never present in the
members of Napoleon's Old Guard. The lowliest soldier had to
become something of a technician. To be sure, even in this tech-
nological conflict the “dog-face” outnumbered all other ratings
and played a vital part when the battle was joined; but the “dog-
face at Dunkerque was helped little by his courage when tech-
nique and production had failed him; the American, the
British, or the Russian infantryman would have found himself
as helpless as the Ethiopian and the Pole, had he not been
supported by applied technology.
Indeed, it would not be stretching the point at all to say that,
in the last analysis, the war was won by superior technology,
10
PERSPECTIVE
11
superior research, superior production, superior use of weapons,
though the last was a long time in developing. And this superi-
ority in any one of these fields rested with the free nations, with
those whose research was untrammeled by political concepts
such as the aversion to “Jewish physics” held by Hitler; with
those whose production was still largely unregimented and
whose producers were encouraged to use their ingenuity and to
assert their independence; whose young men had been educated
on an independent basis and were well able to meet technical
challenges. Under these circumstances it was inevitable that the
alumni and the staff of a first-line technological institution
should play an important role in the victory, possibly a more
important role than their mere numbers would suggest.
These alumni and staff members were to be found every-
where. Many were in the armed services though their skills
made them indispensable to the laboratory and the shop. There
were surely fewer combat soldiers and sailors proportionately
among M.I.T. men than might have been found, for example,
in the graduates of a liberal arts institution. 1 More than were
in uniform would have been found in the ranks of industrial
management or on loan to the Government for various pur-
poses. Most of all, perhaps, took their places as engineers, design-
ers, research men, working for the most part in the halls of
private industry.
For all of this they were ready. The war brought to most of
them merely the challenge of a harder effort, of a tougher appli-
cation of skills already possessed, perhaps of a greater spirit of
self-sacrifice. Where they were called to duties outside their
normal vocations, they demonstrated that their education had
made them versatile enough to take up such tasks. Architects
might become diagnosticians of bombing, “long-haired” physi-
cists become electronic engineers, an etcher might become a
secret agent. But for the most part M.I.T.'s alumni were specifi-
cally ready for the task they were specifically called upon to
perform. There can be no doubt that in preparing them thus
to be ready the Institute made its major contribution to the
12
QED
hich had zed skills rigoro
nation; this contribution was made years before the war threat-
ened, when the men were at an impressionable age. It was made
without the guidance of the Army or the Navy, and indeed in
a milieu where specific preparation to help in a war formed no
significant part of the educational concept. In this rigorous and
full-scale training in a variety of generalized skills, in the inde-
pendent educational policies which had governed the growth
of these men and men like them from other free institutions,
lay our power to survive.
If, as seems certain, M.I.T.'s alumni made her greatest contri-
bution to the victory, it may seem strange that this record must
pass over it with scant mention. The reason is that the record
is so extensive and so complex as to defy any brief analysis. This
volume can deal in detail only with M.I.T.'s staff activities.
It is, however, possible to give a brief hint as to the extent
of the alumni record. As of January, 1942, this alumni body
numbered approximately 33,500. The Technology alumni serv-
ice flag carries 9,634 stars.2 Thus about 30 per cent of the
alumni were in uniform. This percentage is lower than was
characteristic of many seaboard institutions, but is accounted
for by the many persons with Technology training who were
engaged in essential occupations and who, even when they held
officer reserve status, were not called to active duty. This was
especially true of the many senior officers of corporations
engaged in the full-scale production battle, the directors or
assistant directors of research in institutions whose full research
attention was for the moment turned to war, to engineers afield
constructing bases and other engineering works as civilians, and
most of all, no doubt, to those in the ranks of industrial produc-
tion and research. Unfortunately, for none of these categories of
activity are there any satisfactory statistics.
The alumni in uniform were, like the alumni of any other
university, to be found in all ranks, in the plain wool of the
GI or the gob and in the brass of general or admiral. And
M.I.T.'s participation at the higher levels of the military
machine was substantial. There was good reason for this. It had
C
PERSPECTIVE
long been the policy of the Army and Navy to send carefully
selected graduates of their Academies to the Institute for
advanced training. Thus a few men who had gone through the
entire Institute curriculum were to be found in the higher
echelons, but to these were added a much larger number of
alumni who owed their graduate training to M.I.T. Counting
all kinds, the roster of M.I.T. alumni shows 94 generals of the
United States Army, 1 of the United States Marine Corps, 1 of
the Canadian Army, and 2 of the Chinese Army; 50 admirals
and commodores of the United States Navy, 1 of the United
States Coast Guard, and 1 of the Chinese Navy; 3 505 other
officers of army, navy, and marines who attained the rank of
colonel in the army or the corresponding rank of captain in
the navy.4
This is all that may profitably be told in this story about the
all-important activities of Technology's alumni. At times in
this tale an alumnus will appear, but only because mention of
his position will give the reader a clearer idea of the influence
M.I.T. may have wielded in a given situation; such a selection
is of course far from complete and is never intended to be
invidious.
This report, then, is the story of the activities of the staff of
M.I.T. as it was constituted in 1940, plus a number of men who
have joined the staff subsequently.5 The staff numbered 641
when war loomed. One-third took official leave of absence to
carry on the wide variety of duties which will be presently
described. Fully another third were equally engaged without
having to be away from M.I.T. continuously and therefore were
not technically on leave of absence. In this group were many
of those who remained to direct the research projects at the
Institute which jumped to 400 during the war, resulted in an
expansion of all employees from 1,100 to 6,000, increased the
annual expenditures of Technology from 4 million dollars
to 44.
conceivable way. It cannot too often be repeated that the war
14
QED
was a cooperative venture, that no individual and no institution
could honestly claim to have done all there was to do even in a
small field. Once this has been said, we will recall that this is a
history of M.I.T. and state what is categorically true, that some-
times in major ways and sometimes in minor ways a member
of Technology's staff could be found at almost every turn,
directing the conduct of the war at the highest levels, occupying
key positions in the agencies dealing with civilian production,
mingling in diplomatic matters of the war and of the peace.
Especially, of course, they were ubiquitous in matters of
research and engineering.
Consider if you like an air attack upon Germany or Japan.
Members of Technology's staff had worked with the planes
which flew the missions, with the rubber on their wheels, with
the gasoline in their tanks; they had prepared methods for air-
sea rescue and designed water supply for the pilot downed at
sea; they had worked on the navigational equipment, the gun
sights, the radar bombing sights; they had participated in target
selection, in assessment of bomb damage, in the ground control
of the air war, in the incendiaries which wrapped Tokyo in
flames, in the oxygen which supported the pilots at high alti-
tudes, in tests of air sickness by which the pilots had been
selected, in emergency parachute rations, in night photography
which helped the planes on their missions, in long-range navi-
gational methods such as LORAN, and finally in the devices
which brought the planes back on to the home strip through
zero zero visibility. The same general statement could be made
about air combat, about air defense, about amphibious warfare,
about submarine and antisubmarine warfare, about the housing
and the feeding of the soldier in the field, and the repair of the
wounded.
This participation took many forms. A considerable number
of administrative officers, department heads, and senior pro-
fessors occupied positions of administrative importance in
Washington, especially on the research front. A larger number,
perhaps, directed research projects at the Institute under con-
PERSPECTIVE
I
tracts between M.I.T. and various government agencies. A third
group also went away to administrative tasks of a nonresearch
nature with the government or as consultants to industry over
a wide gamut; finally a group remained at the Institute to direct
the largest mass-production educational program in its history.
The general Institute policy in all this was established at the
outset. It was consistent with its policy in peace but its applica-
tion to the scale of war was breathtaking and risky. It was simple
and direct. If a staff member could serve his country well by
leaving the Institute, he had a leave of absence without preju-
dice; in these cases he did not suffer financially for his patriotism
and the Institute sought to make sure that this was indeed the
case. If on the other hand he had duties for the government
which took less than his full time, the time he gave the govern-
ment was contributed by the Institute. The same general policy
applied to research. The Institute was anxious to put its
facilities at the disposal of the nation and it did not wish to
make a financial profit from this action. It did not make such
a profit.
Those of the Institute staff who went away generally had an
exciting time. They traveled extensively. They penetrated into
every theatre, on to almost every battlefield. They rode on com-
bat aircraft of all sorts, in battleships, PC's, and submarines.
Among them, they probably used every kind of transportation
available in the Army or the Navy and had nearly every kind
of experience. They suffered almost no casualties of an obvious
kind, and only one, James Dotson, was killed during the war. 6
But all the casualties of war are not apparent on the surface.
Some of M.I.T.'s staff rose to positions of new prominence in
the war, displayed unexpected talents, and will reap the benefit
of that display in their postwar opportunities. Very, very few
failed to live up to expectations. But habits of work, habits of
thinking, habits of life were all disrupted, and adjustment is not
always easy. Some people who left the field of their specializa-
tion in midstream and stayed out of it for five years while others
continued in it may be casualties as surely as though they had
QED
felt shrapnel. Not every civilian who entered the melee escaped
without hurt even when he remained a civilian.
The same thing is true of an institution. M.I.T. no doubt
bears its scars. The long-range program described in the final
chapter will do what it can to see that none of the scars are
harmful, but many of the hurts will not as yet have appeared.
The Institute has benefited, too. It has an enhanced prestige
and, perhaps more important, an internal warmth in the knowl-
edge that it gave itself wholeheartedly to the task and that the
task was on the whole well done. One scar which may be but a
pinprick is at the moment annoying. This is the assertion some-
times made by the thoughtless that because M.I.T. was “big
business” during the war it perforce made a good deal of profit
thereby. The answer to this is simple and direct, and is
nowhere better stated than in the President's Annual Report
for 1945, which may therefore profitably be quoted:
Turning now from the Institutes war activities and some of its
achievements, let us try to evaluate the effect of its war program on
its financial and physical resources. Here it will be found that the
Institute made a substantial over-all, out-of-pocket contribution. In
other words, the war cost the Institute money. This contribution
was made freely and gladly and was entirely proper, since the war
was costly to the entire nation and to every patriotic element in it.
Furthermore, it was in line with the obligation of such an institu-
tion to render public service. No service could be higher than
meeting a challenge to the existence of the republic.
With early realization, in the summer of 1940, that our country
was faced with a great crisis, M.I.T. adopted a firm policy always
to give first precedence to any important opportunity for service
in the crisis; never to let this service be delayed by arguments over
conditions or contracts; never to let the self-interest of the institu-
tion prevail over the interests of the nation. Though strenuous
effort was continually made properly to protect the interests and
conserve the resources of the Institute, neither failure nor delay
interrupted its response to calls for help. The only embarrassment
was sometimes in deciding which of several calls were the most
important when limitations of man power or facilities made it
impossible to handle all.
The Institute also adopted the policy that it would accept no
the innever to lice be delappa
PERSPECTIVE
profit on the war work it undertook for the Government. It depos-
ited with its chief governmental contracting agency, the Office of
Scientific Research and Development, a vote of its Executive Com-
mittee to return to the Government any net profit, if it should find
on termination of the contracts that there had been a profit.
The OSRD adopted a policy of “no gain, no loss" on its contracts.
Its auditors periodically examined the books of the Institute and,
in accordance with the findings, the allowance of overhead for
the next period was adjusted to cancel any gain or loss to date.
Further to insure compliance with this principle, the Institute's
own auditors, and occasionally an independent outside auditor,
were employed at the Institute's own expense to establish further
checks.
Financial Losses
(a) In a very few cases, the Institute assumed the salary of some
member of the staff of another educational institution that had
refused to grant him leave of absence with continuing salary and
thus would have prevented his filling an important war post because
policy considerations would have precluded his acceptance of salary
from the Government. Fortunately very few institutions were
unwilling thus to make their men available in the emergency. The
Institute, together with certain foundations, stepped into the breach
by contribution of its own funds to handle these exceptional cases.
Though expediency forced me to approve such a procedure, this
is the only category of M.I.T. contributions to the war over which
I feel any resentment. The Institute's share of this expense was
$28,000.
(6) By far the major financial contribution of the Institute to
the national war effort has been to carry the salaries of members
of its staff whose services in full or in part were volunteered to war
service without remuneration. Such service included work on gov-
ernmental boards and committees, like the War Production Board,
the National Defense Research Committee, the National Advisory
Committee for Aeronautics (or their subdivisions). The men could
all have secured remunerative war jobs and thus relieved the Insti-
tute of their salary expense, but by their preference and Institute
policy they elected to serve in these nonpaid positions when doing
so appeared to offer opportunity for greater service. This category
of M.I.T. contribution to the war amounted to over $500,000.
(c) To construct laboratory buildings for war purposes the Insti-
tute has committed or spent a total of $549,500 for which it will not
nerative warby their prefeositions when
18
QED
receive reimbursement. For the Chemical Warfare Building the
figure includes that part of the Institute's full payment which was
not amortized by service and use charges. For the other buildings
it includes what the Institute elected to invest in them to secure
permanently useful structures instead of the temporary structures
the value of which was paid for by the Government.
In return for such commitments, the Institute has two large and
several small buildings of continuing usefulness, which will come
to it soon as second-hand buildings. The investment was a good one
and cost the Government nothing extra. It must be considered,
however, that except for the war emergency the Institute would not
have erected these buildings unless it could have raised outside
funds for the purpose; its existing capital funds are too urgently
needed for purposes more important than new laboratory buildings.
Hence these building items involved the gain of a physical asset
at the expense of a loss of productive funds which would not have
been incurred except for the war.
(d) In addition to the foregoing actual outlays, the Institute at
various times incurred financial risks by underwriting important
war projects so that they could proceed without delay or interrup-
tion until the funds expected for support of them could be assured.
Most important such instance was the underwriting by M.I.T. of
$500,000 and the securing of additional underwriting of the same
amount from John D. Rockefeller, Jr., to permit reëmployment of
Radiation Laboratory staff at a time when the decision had to be
made before funds to continue this work had been appropriated by
Congress. Fortunately, this and other underwritings never had to
be called.
(e) The final category of war costs cannot yet be estimated. It
relates to the expenses of terminating the war contracts, of reconvert-
ing our permanent facilities to peacetime use, and of reëstablishing
our normal educational program. For termination and reconver-
sion, financial reserves have been set up, but it is not certain that
they will prove fully adequate or that all expenses deemed necessary
by us will receive governmental approval. As to reëstablishment of
the normal educational program, the net costs are also uncertain.
When the accelerated program was established early in the war,
we estimated that the transition to our normal schedule would cost
us about $750,000. That was before the GI Bill of Rights made
provision for students in service to return to college. Normal tuition
from these students will greatly reduce this reconversion cost and
may entirely eliminate it.
PERSPECTIVE
Financial Gains
The only financial assistance which the Institute derived from
its war activities lay in the fact that its research and war training
contracts served to pay salaries of some of its staff engaged on these
projects, and to pay part of the general administrative and general
overhead cost of operating the institution. These contracts there-
fore helped to keep the Institute from suffering financial losses
which might have arisen from the sharp curtailment of regular
student enrollment, with attendantly reduced income from tuitions.
The prestige gained from our war research is producing a gain
by encouraging industry to make grants-in-aid and to establish
fellowships.
I believe that even the assistance which the war contracts provided
in maintaining operating commitments was not a financial asset for
the Institute, if considered from a cold-blooded financial point of
view. Unlike most other institutions, M.I.T. has a staff to whom
industrial opportunities are very commonly offered, and at salaries
higher than those paid by the Institute. From spot checks among
our staff, I know that nearly all of them with great ease could have
secured war employment bringing increased income.
If, therefore, M.I.T. had set out to make a financial profit from
the war, it would have accepted no war contracts at all. It would
have urged and assisted its staff to secure outside paying war jobs.
It would have kept only enough teaching and administrative staff
to handle the reduced group of tuition-paying civilian students. It
would have laid up as annual profits a substantial portion of its
income from endowments. Its President would have spent the war
years in raising gifts from alumni and friends and in soliciting
contributions from the busy, highly taxed corporations. Devotion
to war service instead of such a policy has been, in my judgment,
the largest financial sacrifice made by the Institute through its
efforts to help win the war.
So much for perspective. We may now proceed to a closer
analysis of the activities of the Institute's staff members. We
shall begin with those who went to the administration of
research at the national level, for an understanding of their
activities is essential to an understanding of the projects carried
on in the Institute's yard in Cambridge.
QED
FOOTNOTES
1 For example, more than 70 per cent of Princeton's alumni were in
uniform. M.I.T.'s corresponding percentage would be approximately 30.
2 Of which 227 are gold.
3 Among these high-ranking officers, the following reached the top ranks:
UNITED STATES
Army
Blood, Kenneth T., Major General, '09
Colton, Roger B., Major General, '20 (graduate student)
Covell, William E. R., Major General, '23 (U.S. Military Academy)
Donovan, Richard, Major General, '21 (U.S. Military Academy)
Doolittie, James H., Lieutenant General, '24 (graduate student)
Fredenhall, Lloyd R., Lieutenant General, '07
Gardner, Fulton Q. C., Major General, '13 (U.S. Military Academy)
Groves, Leslie R., Jr., Major General, '17 (U.S. Military Academy)
Hegenberger, Albert F., Major General, '17
Henry, Stephen G., Major General, '24
Hill, Edmund W., Major General, '19
Hoge, William M., Major General, '22 (U.S. Military Academy)
Jones, Albert M., Major General, '13
Kenney, George C., General, '11
Kraus, Walter F., Major General, '25
Lull, George F., Major General, '21
Merrill, Frank D., Major General, '32 (U.S. Military Academy)
Murray, Maxwell, Major General, '21 (U. S. Military Academy)
Noce, Daniel, Major General, '21 (U. S. Military Academy)
Sayler, Henry B., Major General, '23 (U.S. Military Academy)
Spalding, Sidney P., Major General, ’11 (U.S. Military Academy)
Styer, Wilhelm D., Lieutenant General, '22
Waitt, Alden H., Major General, ’14
Navy
Beatty, Frank E., Rear Admiral, '22 (U.S. Naval Academy)
Bowen, Harold G., Jr., Rear Admiral, '37 (U.S. Naval Academy)
Brand, Charles L., Rear Admiral, '15 (U.S. Naval Academy)
Chantry, Allan J., Jr., Rear Admiral, '10 (U. S. Naval Academy)
Cochrane, Edward L., Vice Admiral, '20 (U.S. Naval Academy)
Combs, Thomas S., Rear Admiral, '32
Crisp, Frederick G., Rear Admiral, '17 (U.S. Naval Academy)
de Florez, Luis, Rear Admiral, '11
PERSPECTIVE
21
Durgin, Calvin T., Rear Admiral, '25 (U.S. Naval Academy)
Fahrion, Frank G., Rear Admiral, '24 (U.S. Naval Academy)
Fisher, Charles W., Rear Admiral, '06
France, Albert F., Rear Admiral, '24 (U.S. Naval Academy)
Furer, Julius A., Rear Admiral, ’05 (U.S. Naval Academy)
Hayler, Robert W., Rear Admiral, '20 (U.S. Naval Academy)
Howard, Herbert S., Rear Admiral, '09 (U.S. Naval Academy)
Kitts, Willard A., 3d, Rear Admiral, '22 (U.S. Naval Academy)
Land, Emory S., Vice Admiral, '07 (U.S. Naval Academy)
Miles, Arthur C., Rear Admiral, '20 (U.S. Naval Academy)
*Mullinix, Henry M., Rear Admiral, '23 (U.S. Naval Academy)
Noble, Albert, Rear Admiral, '23 (U.S. Naval Academy)
Pace, Ernest M., Jr., Rear Admiral, '17 (U.S. Naval Academy)
Pennoyer, Frederick W., Jr., Rear Admiral, '20
Pride, Alfred M., Rear Admiral, '26
Richardson, Lawrence B., Rear Admiral, '21 (U.S. Naval Academy)
Richey, Thomas B., Rear Admiral, ’14 (U.S. Naval Academy)
* Royal, Forrest B., Rear Admiral, '24 (U.S. Naval Academy)
Royce, Donald, Rear Admiral, '20 (U.S. Naval Academy)
Ryden, Roy W., Rear Admiral, '07 (U.S. Naval Academy)
Schoeffel, Malcolm F., Rear Admiral, '25 (U.S. Naval Academy)
Sherman, Forrest P., Vice Admiral, ’17 (U.S. Naval Academy)
Smith, William H., Rear Admiral, '15
Stevens, Leslie C., Rear Admiral, '22 (U.S. Naval Academy)
Stump, Felix B., Rear Admiral, '24
Van Keuren, Alexander H., Rear Admiral, '07 (U.S. Naval Academy)
Vickery, Howard L., Vice Admiral, '21 (U.S. Naval Academy)
*Whitman, Ralph, Rear Admiral, '01
Willson, Russell, Vice Admiral, '05 (U.S. Naval Academy)
Coast Guard
Smith, Edward H., Rear Admiral, '13
CANADA
Army
Young, James V., Major General, '13
CHINA
Army
Chu, Shih M., Lieutenant General, '26
Wong, Tsoo, Lieutenant General, '16
* Deceased.
QED
Navy
Mar, Pellian T. C., Rear Admiral, '15
4 Of the 505, there were 428 colonels (421 of the United States Army,
2 of the United States Marine Corps, 4 of the Chinese Army, 1 of the
Canadian Army) and 187 naval captains, of whom 184 were in the United
States Navy, 2 in the United States Coast Guard, and 1 in the Chinese
Navy.
5 The latter are identified by the word "now" before their titles.
6 James Vaught Dotson, Research Associate in Aeronautical Engineer-
ing, was killed in an airplane crash near the Burlington, Vermont, Airport
on 26 November 1943 while engaged on a D.I.C. research project on the
de-icing of airplanes for the Army Air Forces.
Part II
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT AT THE
NATIONAL LEVEL
THE RESEARCH-DIRECTING AGENCIES
AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL, during the war, five agencies played
significant roles in determining what research and development
were needed for military purposes and in providing the neces-
sary funds. Four of them were well established long before the
crisis; the fifth, the Office of Scientific Research and Develop-
ment, was emergency born. Yet it is entirely possible that except
for the work of the Manhattan District the OSRD was responsi-
ble for more spectacular technological developments than the
other four together.
Two of the prewar four were, naturally enough, the Army
and the Navy. Each of these had in 1939 existing establishments
for research, some of considerable age, many of considerable
fame. Even before the war brought all work of this sort into
prominence, the layman might well have heard favorably of the
Aberdeen Proving Ground (Army Ordnance), the Naval
Research Laboratory (Bureau of Ships), the Naval Ordnance
Laboratory, the Taylor Model Basin (Navy), Wright Field
(Army Air Forces), Fort Monmouth (Army Signal Corps), and
perhaps of some others as well. These laboratories were in no
sense superseded. Indeed, they multiplied manyfold; their
budgets, which had been altogether too small, were expanded
enormously; they carried. on important work throughout the
war. The top management of these laboratories was, of course,
military.1
The third powerful and effective agency in existence before
the war was the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics,
an independent federal agency responsible to the President and
directed at the beginning of the war by its Chairman, Vannevar
25
26
QED
Bush, '16, Life Member of the Corporation of M.I.T., once its
Vice President and Dean of Engineering, now President of the
Carnegie Institution of Washington. The NACA had its own
important research establishment at Langley Field in Virginia
and had contracts with many university and private research
laboratories. Under the Act of Congress establishing this com-
mittee in 1915, it was charged with “the scientific study of the
problems of flight with a view to their practical solution." Con-
sequently, its scope included research in the broad field of the
aeronautical sciences together with the practical application of
research results. It was not primarily concerned with problems
of military aircraft. However, its long experience, its skilled
management, the talent at its disposal, made it possible for the
NACA to shift rapidly and vigorously into full-time military
research at the crisis, and to undertake operations at several
times its previous scale.
When Bush was summoned by President Roosevelt to head
the new emergency research agency, it was necessary for him to
resign as Chairman of NACA. He was succeeded in this post by
another M.I.T. man, also a member of NACA. Professor Jerome
C. Hunsaker, then Head of the Departments of Mechanical and
Aeronautical Engineering, was at the time of his appointment
to the chairmanship of NACA a captain in the United States
Naval Reserve, having been a graduate both of Annapolis and
the Institute. He had not been called to active duty because he
was performing civilian services for the Secretary of the Navy.
When he was proposed as the new Chairman of NACA he was
released from these other duties by Secretary Knox who, under-
standing the need for continuity of leadership, also stipulated
that Hunsaker would not be called to active duty so long as he
was needed by NACA. From this date (November, 1941) to
the end of the war, Hunsaker spent four days a week on govern-
ment business. The chairmanship of NACA involved the gen-
eral administrative responsibility for expanding its facilities and
staff. To the Langley Memorial Laboratory in Virginia were
added the Ames Laboratory in California and the Aircraft
THE RESEARCH1
IL
-DIRECTING AGENCIES
27
Engine Research Laboratory in Ohio. The civil service staff was
increased from some 650 in 1941 to 6,900 in 1945; the annual
operating budget grew from 5 millions to over 30 millions.2
The work of the NACA in specific fields was guided by the
advice of various subcommittees of experts. A partial count of
the roster of M.I.T. staff members on these committees reveals
at least ten different persons, dealing with such diverse prob-
lems as aircraft fuels and lubricants, power plants, jet propul-
sion, and meteorological and de-icing problems.3 All told, the
work of the NACA was of such high order that the Office of
Scientific Research and Development, which had no hesitation
about entering any field where there seemed to be a need, was
on its own recommendation specifically excluded from aero-
nautical problems by the Executive Order which created it.
The fourth agency existing before the war, one supported
only in part by governmental funds, was the National Academy
of Sciences. This body was formed by President Lincoln as a
war measure in 1863. It has been self-perpetuating in that its
membership is by election; scientific or engineering distinction
is a prerequisite to membership. Occupying a monumental
building on upper Constitution Avenue in Washington, the
Academy receives no operating funds from the government but
is reimbursed for its expenses in advising the government on
scientific matters referred to it. It is required to give advice to,
or to carry on research for, any agency of the government. When
a research contract is made the Academy customarily appoints
a committee from its membership, and these members serve
without charge. To operate the contracts which became large
in number during World War I, a subsidiary operating agency,
known as the National Research Council, was created. The
NAS-NRC combination stood as a possible expansion joint
enabling the armed services to get important work done when
it required a mobilization of senior talent and services not
readily available directly. Unlike NACA, the NAS did not own
its laboratories. The armed services were familiar with the
modus operandi of the Academy and knew how to use it. As
28
QED
war loomed they turned again to it, and it continued to accept
contracts in increasing numbers throughout the war. The man-
agement of this important group, too, had a strong M.I.T.
flavor. The President of the Academy throughout the war was
Frank B. Jewett, '03, Life Member of the M.I.T. Corporation,
in 1940 President of the Bell Telephone Laboratories. 4
Despite the research potentials of the Army, the Navy, the
NACA, and the NAS-NRC, many scientists (including promi-
nent members of the NAS) were concerned lest the scale of
war research was going to be so enormous, the pressure of time
so great, that mere expansion of the existing organisms would
not suffice. After a number of informal discussions, Bush called
a more formal meeting to which he invited Jewett, Isaiah
Bowman, and K. T. Compton. From this meeting came the
idea for an emergency war research organization. The idea was
presented to President Roosevelt by Bush, and the President
acted upon it. By successive Executive Orders he created what
finally emerged as the Office of Scientific Research and Develop-
ment. The intermediate stages of growth of OSRD do not need
to be discussed here.5
As finally constituted, then, the Office of Scientific Research
and Development (OSRD) reported directly to the President
on all important matters; it received funds from the Congress
by direct appropriation. It administered these funds by writing
contracts with private or governmental laboratories and by act
of its Director, Bush.
The recommendations as to what contracts should be written,
for what purpose, in what amount, and with whom were made
to the Director by one of two committees – the Committee on
Medical Research (CMR) for matters in that field, and the
National Defense Research Committee for all other matters.
M.I.T. men, naturally enough, did not play an important role
in the top echelons of CMR, but they were influential in
NDRC. The NDRC consisted of a chairman, James B. Conant,
President of Harvard University, and seven members. Three of
these members were ex officio a representative of the Army, a
THE RESEARCH-DIRECTING AGENCIES
representative of the Navy, and the Commissioner of Patents.
The other four were active administrators in general charge of
a wide variety of activities; of these four, three were related to
M.I.T. Dr. Compton was in general charge of matters relating
to fire control, scientific instruments, radar, and countermeas-
ures for radar; Richard C. Tolman, '03, Dean of the Graduate
School at the California Institute of Technology, was in charge
of the groups working on hypervelocity guns, bomb selection,
rockets, proximity fuses, guided missiles, and subsurface war-
fare; Jewett was in general charge of work on transportation and
communication, including development of amphibious vehi-
cles. The fourth administrative member, Roger Adams, from
the University of Illinois, was in charge of problems in
chemistry.
Nor does this complete the record. By June, 1942, it was
apparent that Dr. Conant's responsibilities to NDRC were more
than he would be able to discharge if he were also to continue
his duties for Harvard University and the nuclear fission project.
A full-time executive officer was needed, and to this post in
June, 1942, came Edward L. Moreland, then Dean of Engineer-
ing (now Executive Vice President) on leave from M.I.T. He
served full time with increasing responsibility and authority
until he left in July, 1945, for a Pacific mission described in
Chapter 7. In this position Dean Moreland was the principal
administrative officer for NDRC in coordinating the research
activities carried out under that sponsorship, costing a total of
$425,000,000 and amounting to $153,000,000 in the single most
active year, July, 1944, to June, 1945.6
This is significant enough but it does not tell the whole tale.
The NDRC members were policy administrators and acted
somewhat in the role of reviewing boards; the active adminis-
tration of groups of related projects in NDRC was entrusted to
nineteen division heads and two panel heads. These men were
responsible for maintaining contact with the armed forces and
the progress of the war in their own fields, for the suggestion of
new research which needed to be done, for the selection of pos-
30
QED
VV
LI
sible contractors to carry out the work, for decision as to how
much ought to be allocated for the work and what priority it
deserved, for supervising the general conduct of the work by
the contractors, and for maintaining liaison with the services.
The last included the frequently important job of selling the
product of a development to a sometimes reluctant customer.
They were thus really the administrators of the NDRC work.
The chief of the smallest division directed the spending of
several millions of dollars during the war; the chief of the
largest (Division 14, Radar) controlled about 150 millions. Of
these twenty-one administrators, the M.I.T. staff, alumni, and
corporation furnished no less than six;? they were concerned
with bomb selection, guided missiles, fire control, petroleum
warfare, radar, optics, and miscellaneous applications of physics.
Even this strong representation in the top-echelon administra-
tive posts of OSRD does not exhaust Technology's contribution
made to this organization by staff members away from home.
The divisions varied enormously in size, complexity, and scope
of activities. For a large division a section chief might have jobs
to manage as important as those of a division chief in a smaller
unit. The NDRC divisions were assisted by a panel of consult-
ants. The division chiefs were further supported by full-time
administrative assistants known as technical aides, and in many
divisions the work of the technical aide was highly influential.
The roster of M.I.T. staff members who filled posts as section
chiefs, members, consultants, or technical aides to the various
divisions of NDRC is impressive; it can, however, be developed
with greater clarity in the next chapter, which describes in some-
what more detail the work of those divisions of NDRC in which
M.I.T. men played an important administrative role.
The NDRC was not created to supersede the existing research
agencies, all of which as we have seen grew enormously during
the war. It was not its purpose to duplicate directly the work
of any service laboratory but rather to supplement that work;
at times the "supplementing" did mean doing most of the work
in advance of service approval which was occasionally slow in
THE RESEARCH-DIRECTING AGENCIES
31
forthcoming. The power of OSRD lay in its independent char-
ter which permitted it to seek service approval and cooperation
for all its projects, but, failing that approval, to proceed anyway.
It was thus able to muster much "freewheeling” talent and to
T
enterprise. As a result it contrived to have a guiding hand in
most of the spectacular technological achievements of the war,
and specifically in radar, radar countermeasures, rocketry, sub-
surface warfare, bombing techniques, fire control, proximity
fuses, amphibious vehicles, and of course the atomic bomb,
even though the full-scale administration of that project was
carried on by the War Department, using the Corps of Engi-
neers as its agency.
Like NAS, the OSRD did not build its own laboratories or
hire personnel to conduct research; rather it placed contracts
with those institutions which seemed at the moment best fitted
to carry on the various sorts of needed research. The theory of
these contracts was always that the contracting institution
should neither profit nor lose by its service to the nation. They
were in principle a cost plus overhead type of contract, and
throughout the existence of OSRD the overhead charges, as
well as the direct costs, were scrupulously reviewed in the
interest of protecting the public.
Despite the talents at its disposal, despite its energy and free-
dom of action, despite its boldness and imagination, OSRD
would not have been a successful agency had it not enjoyed good
relations with the final customer, the Army or the Navy. These
relations were much helped by two developments, one in each
of the services.
Hunsaker, in 1941, naturally expected to be called to active
duty from his reserve position in the Navy. This, however, was
not to be. In May of that year, in response to a telephone call
from Admiral Towers, he went to Washington. There he was
taken to Secretary Knox and Under-Secretary Forrestal and
asked to investigate the position of the Navy with regard to
research, and particularly in reference to its relations with
32
LED
civilian research organizations.8 Because this assignment re-
quired all of Hunsaker's time he asked for and was granted
leave of absence from the Institute. He began the service on 18
May 1941, and continued on the work full time until Novem-
ber, 1941. By July he had advised Secretary Knox to set up in
his own office a Coordinator of Research and Development to be
charged with the responsibility for coordinating all research for
the various Naval bureaus and offices and for bringing civilian
scientific men and organizations into close relations with the
Navy. These recommendations, supported by the chief of each
bureau concerned, were accepted by the Secretary, who, on 12
July 1941, issued a general order establishing the Office of the
Coordinator of Research and Development and appointing
Hunsaker Coordinator and Chairman of the previously existing
Naval Research and Development Board.
The activities of the Coordinator's Office were of the utmost
importance to the successful relations of the OSRD and the
Navy. As first coordinator, Hunsaker brought to that office a
number of the younger men who became and remained key
people in a key organization from that day until the end of the
war. 9 He himself remained as Coordinator for but a few months
when, as has been related, he was relieved by the Navy in order
to become Chairman of NACA.
Rear Admiral J. A. Furer, '05, relieved Hunsaker as Coordi-
nator of Research and Development; the Assistant Coordinator
was Captain Lybrand P. Smith, USN; Captain Smith, Legion
of Merit, subsequently retired and now Visiting Professor of
Naval Engineering at Technology, was also Navy Member of
the NDRC from 1 August 1941.10
The development in the War Department was equally signifi-
cant. It also revolved around a member of M.I.T.'s staff, this
time Edward L. Bowles, Consulting Professor of Electrical Com-
munications. Most of Bowles's story can best be deferred to
Chapter 5, where it will appear in a clearer context. For the
moment it is sufficient to say that he became Expert Consultant
to Mr. Stimson, the Secretary of War, originally on radar and
THE RESEARCH-DIRECTING AGENCIES
33
electronics but ultimately on a wide variety of subjects; that
in the course of the war his activities extended further and
further and that as a friend of civilian research he was of enor-
mous aid to OSRD and other civilian agencies when the
going got sticky at high levels, as some times, unfortunately,
it did.
Hunsaker in the Office of the Secretary of the Navy, Bowles
in the Office of the Secretary of War, Jewett and Hunsaker at
the top of the NAS, Hunsaker Chairman of NACA, Bush
Director of OSRD, Compton, Tolman, and Jewett members of
NDRC, Moreland as NDRC's Executive Officer, six persons
close to M.I.T. occupying one-third of the top jobs in the
NDRC divisions — this is an impressive enough roster for a
single institution.11 What they and their colleagues did in
some of these agencies deserves a somewhat more extended
discussion.
t
FOOTNOTES
1 The one or two exceptions to this statement will be mentioned in
another chapter.
2 As in the case of so many top men, Hunsaker's primary responsibility
did not release him from many others which cannot be dealt with in this
short book. He was on the Advisory Board to the Director of OSRD, the
Advisory Board to the Research and Development Branch of the Quarter-
master Corps, the Cargo Plane Advisory Committee of the Department of
Commerce, the Visiting Committee to the United States Naval Academy;
he was a member of Division 5 of the National Defense Research Com-
mittee, which dealt with guided missiles, and a member of the Executive
Committee of the Guided Missiles Committee of the Joint New Weapons
Committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; he was a member of the “Wilson"
Committee set up to study the organization of a Research Board for
National Security, and the Vice Chairman of the RBNS when it was
established. With the concurrence of the Navy, he was a member of the
Board of Directors of the Cramp Shipbuilding Company, a war company
which built cruisers and submarines in Philadelphia. Despite these respon-
sibilities, he continued to handle the general administrative work of the
two M.I.T. departments of which he was head.
3 Walter G. Whitman, Professor of Chemical Engineering and in
charge of the Department, Chairman Subcommittee on Aircraft Fuels and
Lubricants.
QED
William H. McAdams, Professor of Chemical Engineering, Chairman
Subcommittee on Heat Exchangers.
Joseph H. Keenan, Professor of Mechanical Engineering, Chairman
Subcommittee on Propulsion Systems, member Subcommittee on Recovery
of Power from Exhaust Gases.
Edward S. Taylor, Professor of Aircraft Engines, Vice Chairman Sub-
committee on Power Plants, member Subcommittee on Jet Propulsion.
C. Fayette Taylor, Professor of Automotive Engineering, member Sub-
committee on Lubrication, Friction, and Wear.
Henry G. Houghton, Jr., Professor of Meteorology in charge of the
Department, member Subcommittee on Meteorological Problems and
De-icing Problems.
Hoyt C. Hottel, Professor of Fuels Engineering, Director of Fuels
Research Laboratory, member Subcommittee on Jet and Turbine Power
Plants.
C. Richard Soderberg, Professor of Mechanical Engineering, now Head
of the Department, member of Special Committee on Jet Propulsion.
Glenn C. Williams, Assistant Professor of Chemical Engineering, mem-
ber Subcommittee on Combustion.
John T. Burwell, Jr., Assistant Professor of Mechanical Engineering,
on leave as Lieutenant Commander, USNR, member Subcommittee on
Lubrication, Friction, and Wear.
4 In general M.I.T. activities on behalf of NAS and NRC and the men
working on them are discussed as they appear in the course of the book.
A few have been omitted, not because of their lesser importance, but
because their work did not appear naturally in the development of the
story. They include:
Robert S. Williams, Professor of Physical Metallurgy, Emeritus, then
Head of the Department of Metallurgy, member of committee in 1940
to study the sources, production, and mechanical effects of beryllium
because the great increase in airplane production made an interesting
possibility of aluminum-beryllium alloys which might save aluminum
and possibly improve quality as well.
Leon Festinger, now Assistant Professor of Psychology, senior statisti-
cian for the Committee on Selection and Training of Aircraft Pilots.
Robert S. Harris, Professor of Biochemistry of Nutrition, special con-
sultant to Committee on Medical Nutrition, member Committee on
Nutrition of Industrial Workers, Food and Nutrition Board
Samuel C. Prescott, Professor of Industrial Biology, Emeritus, Dean of
Science, Emeritus, prepared for NRC a report on troop feeding programs
in the United States Army. This report of about 350 mimeographed pages
covered the history of the feeding of troops in our Army from 1775 to
THE RESEARCH-DIRECTING AGENCIES
1940 and is the only report providing a comprehensive and continuous
record of the development of the Army ration over the whole period.
Charles H. Blake, Associate Professor of Zoology, prepared a report, for
the Committee on Quartermaster Problems, on insects and animals of
interest to the Quartermaster Corps. With the collaboration of Henry D.
Russell, this report was completed in 1943; about 350 pages long, it deals
with the relations of animals to the kind of material damaged, methods
of diagnosis, and control. The operations of the QMG were so widespread
that it was necessary to consider almost all sorts of nonliving material that
might conceivably be attacked by insects, mites, or rodents. An appendix
to Blake's report contains the chief facts about more than 1,000 insects and
mites associated with damage to the materials under consideration.
5 The growth will be comprehensively revealed in the official history of
OSRD to be published by Little, Brown and Company.
6 Prior to this appointment Moreland had served on a part-time basis
as Regional Adviser to the United States Office of Education for Region
I in connection with the emergency training program at the engineer-
ing schools throughout the country to meet the critical shortages in
trained technical personnel. In this capacity he had the responsibility
for coordinating the special training programs, at the college level, in the
degree-granting engineering schools in the four northern New England
states, at first under the Engineering Defense Training Program and later
under the Engineering, Science, Management War Training Program
sponsored by the U. S. Office of Education. This was carried on in con-
junction with M.I.T. duties and occupied about half time.
7 John E. Burchard, Chief of Division 2, Structural Defense and Offense.
Harold B. Richmond, ’14, Term Member of the Corporation, Treasurer
of General Radio Company, Chief of Division 5, Guided Missiles. When
Richmond resigned, for reasons of health, he was succeeded by Hugh H.
Spencer, '23, Radio Corporation of America.
Harold L. Hazen, Professor of Electrical Engineering, in charge of the
Department, Chief of Division 7, Fire Control.
Earl P. Stevenson, '19, President of Arthur D. Little, Inc., Chief of
Division 11, Petroleum Warfare.
Alfred Lee Loomis, Life Member M.I.T. Corporation, Chief of Division
14, Radar.
George R. Harrison, Professor of Physics and Dean of Science, Chief of
Division 16, Optics, and in the last year of NDRC, Chief of Division 17,
Physics, as well.
8 The Secretary appeared particularly concerned about a report issued
by the National Academy of Sciences on antisubmarine warfare which
indicated a dangerous lack of coordination, neglect of outside civilian
QED
scientists, and some hostility within the Navy to discussing problems which
were in urgent need of solution. This report is described in more detail in
the next chapter in connection with the activities of Professor Slichter.
9 Including John T. Burwell, Jr., Assistant Professor of Mechanical
Engineering, who entered the Naval Reserve as a lieutenant (ig) and who.
left it as a commander with a citation for his service from the Secretary
of the Navy.
10 Captain Smith was also member of the Uranium Committee for the
Navy from 31 July 1941 and member of the War Metallurgy Committee
from 11 December 1941.
11 The work of Bush, Compton, and Tolman for the atomic energy
projects was not less leading; but all the details of this are not releasable.
THE PROJECTS OF NDRC
IN CHAPTER 3 we mentioned that the affairs of NDRC were
administered by nineteen divisions and two panels. It will
help to assess the scope of NDRC operations and of M.I.T.'s
participation in them if we first examine a table of the divisions
and the panels. 1
1. Gun Erosion and Hypervelocity
2. Structural Defense and Offense
3. Rockets
4. Proximity Fuses
5. Guided Missiles
6. Subsurface Warfare
7. Fire Control
8. Explosives
9. Chemistry
10. Absorbents and Aerosols
11. Petroleum Warfare and Chemical Engineering
12. Transportation, including Amphibious Vehicles
13. Radio
14. Radar
15. Radar Countermeasures
16. Optics
17. Miscellaneous Applications of Physics, including Mine
Detection
18. Metallurgy
19. Special Work for the OSS
Applied Mathematics Panel
Applied Psychology Panel
QED
Of these twenty-one groups, M.I.T.'s staff furnished major
cogs for Divisions 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 11, 12, 14, 16, 17, and 18.2
RADAR
Of these divisions the one most popularly associated with
Technology was of course the Radar Division. This association
is not ill founded though it is perhaps somewhat distorted. It
devoted to radar and was located at the Institute; it is also
true that this laboratory accounted for a very large amount of
the total work undertaken by Division 14 and that the work of
this division in turn covered a very large amount of all the
most important developments in new instruments and appli-
cations of this powerful tool. Nonetheless there are several
important points to bear in mind.
In the first place, radar was not discovered at the Institute.
Successful radio detection devices relying on the echo prin-
ciple had been developed independently in America, England,
France, Germany, and Japan, during the 1930's. They had
their source in earlier science, for example, the experiments
of Hertz, the German, in 1886, which showed that radio waves
were reflected from solid objects. Marconi had suggested in
1922 that short waves be used for radio detection. A consid-
erable amount of work had been done at the Naval Research
Laboratory on detection using ordinary radio waves; the Signal
Corps of the Army had, in turn, made appreciable advances
in the development of short-wave radar and had carried out
preliminary experiments with microwaves; but microwave
radar could not be put to practical use until the development
early in the war of the modern cavity magnetron. This first
magnetron was developed by the British under the stimulus
of their war with Germany. Finally the principle of pulse
ranging, which characterizes modern radar, was first used in
1925 by Dr. Gregory Breit and Dr. Merle A. Tuve of the
Carnegie Institution of Washington for measuring the distance
to the ionosphere, which is the radio reflecting layer near the
THE PROJECTS OF NDRC
1
top of the earth's atmosphere. Putting these things together,
military scientists could begin to see the future, and by 1935
Rear Admiral H. G. Bowen had asked for and obtained an
allotment of $100,000 for research purposes for the specific
development of radar. By 1939 the Navy had demonstrated
rudimentary radar successfully on the battleship New York
and had awarded a contract to a commercial company for the
manufacture of six sets of aircraft detection equipment. At
the same time the Signal Corps was making progress and had
attracted the attention of the AAF. The stage was therefore set
for a fast advance before the NDRC or M.I.T. came formally
into the picture.3
The Radiation Laboratory when it did come into being
proved to be one of the fastest-moving and hardest-hitting
organizations which ever worked on an important development.
Its history will be dealt with in more detail in Chapter 15. But
it is well to remember that after M.I.T. staff members had
given the Radiation Laboratory its original impetus they were
siphoned off in large numbers to other activities which will
appear in this narrative. 4 At the end and for most of the life
of the Radiation Laboratory its top direction was very largely
made up of visitors from other institutions whereas M.I.T.
furnished the business management at the contract level and
the overall policy at the top levels of NDRC.
But before all this could come about, before what is now
often called obvious could be so brilliantly accomplished, a
good deal of spade work had to be done; and many of the
spade wielders were from Technology's staff.
As so often in this history, the record of Division 14 begins
with President Compton. One of the earliest assignments he
made in his part of the NDRC was to Section D-1, Microwave
and Detection Devices. To head this activity he called upon his
and Technology's great and good friend, Alfred L. Loomis,
Life Member of the Corporation. Loomis was a banker and a
physicist; he had a private physics laboratory at Tuxedo Park,
New York. With Loomis, Compton went to the Naval Research
1
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40
QED
Laboratory at Anacostia, Maryland, and to the Signal Corps
Laboratories at Fort Monmouth, New Jersey. As a result of
these two visits Loomis and Compton were convinced that
their first concentration of effort should be upon radar. An
agreement was therefore entered into with the Navy and Signal
Corps whereby NDRC would concentrate on the shorter wave-
lengths of 40 centimeters or less. It was in this range in the
long run that many of the most important radar developments
occurred, though this was not obvious at the time and though
until near the end much of the actual fighting gear was longer
wave. That summer (1940) Loomis took several workers to
Tuxedo Park where they set up a continuous (nonpulsing)
installation at 40 centimeters. Several months later, because of
the emphasis on radar and the parallel importance of sub-
marine detection, it was decided to transfer the latter from
Compton to Jewett, leaving Compton free to concentrate for
the moment on radar. The old Section D-l then became the
Microwave Committee.5 Loomis was chairman of this com-
mittee and Bowles its secretary until he resigned to become
Expert Consultant to the Secretary of War. On that resignation
John G. Trump, Associate Professor of Electrical Engineer-
ing, became secretary and remained in that post until February,
1944, when he was released by OSRD to become Director of
the British Branch of the Radiation Laboratory. 6 When Divi-
sion 14 was established in NDRC to direct NDRC's contracts
on radar Loomis became its chief. John R. Loofbourow, Pro-
fessor of Biophysics and Executive Officer of the Department
of Biology, became Executive Secretary of this division, suc-
ceeding Trump on the Microwave Committee. The Microwave
Committee is credited by the JBSIP report7 with the explora-
tion of the possibilities of using microwaves in radio detection,
“a problem that appeared speculative in the extreme, since no
good source of power at these wavelengths was known.” This
source of power became known when a British Technical
Mission headed by Sir Henry Tizard came to Washington in
September, 1940, and demonstrated their cavity magnetron.
I
THE PROJECTS OF NDRC
The demonstration of the first cavity magnetron by the
British did not, however, make everything smooth sailing
either for the Microwave Committee or for the persons strug-
gling with the development of better radar. John C. Slater,
Professor of Physics in charge of the Department, may be
credited with an important contribution in this connection.
Partly as a result of work in which he participated as a member
of the staffs of the Radiation and Bell Telephone Labora-
tories and partly as a result of work at Columbia University
and elsewhere, the x-band magnetron emerged; 8 it made pos-
sible radar programs in the x-band such as air-borne blind
bombing equipment. The result of the research was an under-
standing of the process of “strapping” partly explored in
England; this understanding greatly improved magnetron
efficiency, and circuit design principles could be worked out
to produce a series of magnetrons of continuously increasing
power. Of these the most conspicuous was the 725A. Slater was
sent to the OSRD offices in London for three months in the
second quarter of 1943 to demonstrate this tool. As a result the
British were convinced that the new magnetron was superior
to the one they had invented earlier and they adopted it for
their own use.
Meanwhile Dr. Compton continued his active personal inter-
est in all radar matters. He was primarily responsible for
NDRC radar of course, as the NDRC member directly in con-
tact with the activities of Division 14 and Chairman of the
Reviewing Subcommittee for that division. He was, more-
over, Chairman of the Radar Committee of the Joint Com-
mittee on New Weapons of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from 1942
to 1945 and Chairman of the United States Radar Mission to
the United Kingdom in 1943.
The latter mission was to work out American coordination
with the British. To prepare for this Dr. Compton obtained
permission from the Chief of Staff and the Chief of the Naval
Operations to get performance reports from front-line officers. 9
These discussions took place under the auspices of the Joint
TAYY
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42
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Chiefs of Staff. I. I. Rabi of Columbia University, one of the
key men in administration of the Radiation Laboratory, was
made head analyst for this project. Long before the military
plans were known, this group attempted to set up the radar
requirements for the following operations: (1) a full-scale cross-
ing of the Atlantic, (2) a landing in Africa, (3) consolidation of
African beachheads, (4) moving across Africa, (5) crossing the
Mediterranean and landing in Italy, (6) moving through Italy.
All these proposals asked what were the ideal solutions and
what radar could do, first as it existed and second as it might
be imagined to exist. The result was that it was possible to
schedule the American program of research and development
early enough to meet the prospective needs of that series of
operations. Copies were sent to Sir Stafford Cripps, to Sir
George Thompson, and to Sir Robert Watson-Watt.10 After
the discussions in the United Kingdom in May, 1943, and a
comparison of notes, the basic recommendations for subse-
quent radar development were made and accepted.
FIRE CONTROL
These pages will constantly stress the fact that no piece of
research or development in World War II can honestly or
fairly be attributed to a single individual or a single institu-
tion. But if one is looking for work at M.I.T. which comes near
to falling in that category, he will find the OSRD studies of
fire control closer to the mark than the work on radar. For
this undertaking the peacetime Institute was uniquely geared.
Not only did it have a distinguished Department of Electrical
Engineering, headed by Harold L. Hazen, Professor of Elec-
trical Engineering; it had also the Center of Analysis, directed
by Samuel H. Caldwell, Professor of Electrical Engineering,
which had followed up the early work by Bush on the differen-
tial analyzer and was now ready to handle extremely compli-
cated problems; it had the only university Servomechanisms
Laboratory in the country, under the direction of Gordon S.
THE PROJECTS OF NDRG
43
Brown, Professor of Electrical Engineering; and the Confiden-
tial Instruments Laboratory, under the direction of C. Stark
Draper, Professor of Aeronautical Engineering. All these
laboratories were drawn into extensive research on this impor-
tant problem under war contracts;11 their work will be
discussed in Chapter 9. Here we are concerned only with the
OSRD management.
The problem of hitting an enemy target with a projectile
rose to a new order of magnitude in World War II. Even on
the ground, and save for the ponderous German operations in
Russia, there were few sieges, few steady bombardments of
fixed targets. Ground warfare was mobile, and the tank of 1945
was fast and elusive as compared with the few clumsy machines
which came out of the mist that morning in the Somme offen-
sive, 15 September 1916. At sea, gone were the days when the
skipper ranged by putting his finger to the wind, gone even the
days when he could fire a long and a short shot and then by
bracketing his observations spot and hit his ponderous opposing
vessel. The modern naval ship was fast and defensible. She
could maneuver; she could hide herself; war on the surface
of the sea might have to be fought in the dark so far as the
eyes were concerned; moreover, to sink an enemy vessel meant
hitting her hard and quickly; there was no longer time to make
calculations and then send them by messenger boy or even
telephone to the battery; the submarine when spotted could
submerge rapidly, and time was of the essence if the target was
to be sunk. All these normal developments would in themselves
have complicated the problem of gunnery, but since the services
had some good sights for conventional speeds the human mind
might not have needed a mechanical assistant had it not been
for the new instrument of warfare, the airplane.
The airplane changed everything for gunnery. It was small
and hard to see. It moved rapidly and could change its course
quickly. It would usually not be disposed of simply by hitting
it with a projectile, the explosion of which was delayed; a
burst near the target was required. All this meant that on sea
44
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or on land or in the air, for an antiaircraft battery manned by
soldiers or for a group of 40-millimeter guns manned by sailors
and even for the flexible turrets of aircraft, the human vision,
the human calculation was no longer fast enough or accurate
enough. If the problem of hitting the airplane before it hit
you could not be solved, the plane might indeed sweep the
dreadnaught from the seas. And there were many who feared
that that was just what would happen when the great British
ships, the battleship Prince of Wales and the battle cruiser
Repulse, were caught in the bad days after Pearl Harbor,
caught without aircover off Malaya and sent to the bottom by
1
What was needed were detection devices which would spot
the target far off and hold it spotted, in the day or in the night,
in the clear or in the fog, which would provide the range and
bearing of the target at all times (this was radar); instruments
were needed which would transmit this range and bearing con-
tinuously to a computer; computing machines were needed
which would take this information and other important param-
eters, such as the velocity of the projectile, its ballistic charac-
teristics, the wind, and putting them together in complicated
formulas come out with a statement as to how the gun should
point at the moment of firing; computers also were needed
which would determine how the fuse should be set so that an
explosive projectile would burst at the right point in space and
then cut the fuse to produce such a setting. There was not a
man alive who could make these calculations with or without
a pencil and paper in the fraction of a second during which
many of the data would change; certainly none who could
take account of the fact that the data were changing.
It may be well to indicate the approximate quantities of the
problem. The plane needed to be hit before it dropped its
bomb. If it was traveling at 20,000 feet, the bomb would take
about 35 seconds to reach the ground after release. This meant
that the plane would release the bomb while it was still 35
seconds away from the target. If the plane was traveling at 300
THE PROJECTS OF NDRC
45
miles per hour, it was more than 21/2 miles away when it
dropped the bomb. Since its speed was about 440 feet per sec-
ond and the range of the guns was limited, it followed that
there was only a short time in which to locate and fire at the
plane. In the second place, the average shell velocity was 1,500
to 2,000 feet per second. This meant that it might take the
shell something like 10 to 15 seconds to reach the elevation of
the plane. During this period the plane, if on course, would
travel a mile or more. Thus the lead angle was enormous.
Finally, it was necessary that the shell should burst within some
20 yards of the target. This meant not only that the gun had
to be aimed so as to get the shell itself so near the target but
also that the fuse had to be timed so that the detonation would
occur at the right time.
All this has presupposed that the target would remain on
its course. This would in fact be true for a plane on a con-
ventional high-level bombing run. A full solution even of
this simple problem of antiaircraft fire was not possible with
the gun-laying devices which our services had developed at the
beginning of the war, though the Navy in particular had a
very fine system of antiaircraft fire control based on optical
measurements which within the limitations of optical data
gave a remarkable performance. Such systems were more than
adequate for ship-to-ship fire, and the corresponding Army
system which was also ingenious was up to the problem of the
moving tank. But both systems were slow in terms of the war-
fare which was to develop. They required 20 to 30 seconds to
spot the target. If the spotting was done in time, the computa-
tion system was itself deadly.
What the men of Division 7 did was to reduce the spotting
time of 20 to 30 seconds to one-tenth of that, to 2 to 3 seconds.
When this speed was coupled with radar detection, which made
the weapon an all-weather one and provided information over
a longer period, and when to these features was added the prox-
imity fuse, a new order of antiaircraft fire was possible. All this
was required to defeat the buzz bomb, and a contest with the
TI an
46
QED
Kamikaze would have been hopeless without it; the outcome
was close enough as it was.
But gyroscopic sights, computing devices, servomechanisms
could do these things, and having done them point the gun as
well so that the battery could go on firing and firing successfully
without delay.
Thus Division 7 had a hot problem and that it handled it
well is attested by the score against the Japanese planes in the
Pacific, against the submarines, the Kamikazes, and the V-l's.
This was by no means exclusively a Division 7 accomplishment,
for several of the most important developments at M.I.T., for
example, were under direct Navy or Army sponsorship; espe-
cially the former. Nonetheless, the division had a useful hand
in a good many of the pies. Six of M.I.T.'s staff were instru-
mental in lending this hand.
The Chief of Division 7 was Harold L. Hazen, Professor of
Electrical Engineering in charge of the Department; his tech-
nical aide was Karl L. Wildes, Associate Professor of Electrical
Engineering. Among the important advisers were Professors
Brown, 12 Draper, 13 Getting, 14 and Caldwell.15
TAYO
SUBSURFACE WARFARE
No campaigns of the war were more subject to fluctuation
than those waged beneath the sea and on the surface in pursuit
of the submarine. It is a short memory which cannot recall
how the German U-boats crossed the Atlantic, seriously threat-
ened our coastal traffic in oil, and for many months sank our
merchant vessels at a rate which caused the outcome of the
war to be in doubt. Less publicity has been given to the role
played by our own submarines in harrying the Japanese mer-
chant marine to the point where this was an important factor
in the collapse of the Japanese economy. In the temporary
“final” defeat16 of the German submarine and in the attacks
on Japanese shipping, both the Air Forces and the Navy played
a part, but it was the Navy which carried the brunt of the
struggle and to which belongs most of the kudos. They were
THE PROJECTS OF NDRC
.
helped materially in this success by the work of Division 6,
both in the development of various underwater instruments
and in the applications of scientific methodology to tactics.
The top administration of Division 6 was provided by John
T. Tate, Professor of Physics at the University of Minnesota,
and few of his right-hand men owed their allegiance to M.I.T.
However, two members of the M.I.T. staff played prominent
roles in the submarine war.
The story begins with Louis Byrne Slichter, who has now
left the Institute but who in 1940 was Professor of Geophysics.
From November, 1940, to January, 1941, he was a member
of a temporary antisubmarine committee appointed by the
National Academy of Sciences at the request of the Navy to
investigate the effectiveness of the Navy's antisubmarine devices.
E. H. Colpitts was chairman of this committee, and the other
members were Vern O. Knudsen, Professor of Physics at the
University of California at Los Angeles, W. D. Coolidge,
'96, Director of Research, General Electric Company, and
Slichter. 17 This committee reported serious deficiencies in the
capabilities of existing antisubmarine devices and weapons and
emphasized the Navy's need for a much-expanded and enhanced
antisubmarine research facility and staff. The report to the
Secretary of the Navy stressed the critical need for a vastly
larger basic research program than had ever been provided by
the Navy's peacetime budget. As a result a section of NDRC
was formed (later Division 6) under Jewett, and under the
auspices of this section Slichter went to the United Kingdom
with Tate in 1941 to obtain information concerning the status
of British antisubmarine research and antisubmarine warfare.
On his return and until January, 1942, he was director of the
division's program for the development of air-borne magnetic
methods for the detection of submarines. By September, 1941,
this project had successfully demonstrated the detection of
submarines by the Vacquier type of detector installed in a
Navy PBY plane. This system later became well known as the
Magnetic Airborne Detector (MAD).
48
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S
**
At the same time and until October, 1942, Slichter was
Director of the Special Studies Group for Division 6. This
group, advisory to the Chief of the Division, had the function of
analyzing the probable effectiveness of antisubmarine devices
and of making special studies designed to direct the division's
antisubmarine research program more effectively. From Octo-
ber, 1942 on, he was a member of the division but his attention
became more and more diverted to the use of the rocket against
the submarine. Since rocketry was the function of Division 3,
he passed imperceptibly to that group, and his later war activity
is better discussed under that heading.
But it was reserved for Philip M. Morse, Professor of Physics,
to make M.I.T.'s most distinguished contribution to the Navy's
successful antisubmarine campaign. His work started in 1940
when he began experiments for the Navy's Bureau of Ships
to develop underwater sound gear from hydrophones up the
line. By January, 1942, about six weeks after Pearl Harbor,
this work had developed far enough so that complete assemblies
were being put on to planes. Later in 1943 this project was
transferred from the Bureau of Ships to OSRD, and the work
was carried on under Division 6. In October of 1941 Morse
became Chairman of the NRG Committee on Sound Control.18
In June, 1942, this work was consolidated with NDRC, and
Morse continued as chairman. By the end of the year, however,
Morse was heavily involved with the Navy submarine cam-
paign problem, and it was felt desirable to consolidate this
with the other work in acoustics under Division 17. Morse
therefore became a member of Section 17.3.
Meanwhile he did not discontinue his interest in the affairs
of Division 6 of which he was a member from June, 1941.19
Here he had direct responsibility for a small group which began,
at the request of the Navy, and under the stimulus of an anti-
submarine committee in the Office of the Chief of Naval
Operations, to study the technique of attack upon the German
submarine. From this small beginning grew the Operations
Research Group of the Navy, attached to the Office of the Chief
TI
THE PROJECTS OF NDRC
of Naval Operations. This group, directed by Morse, made one
of the most distinguished applications of a new form of think-
ing to the tactics and strategy of war which was presented in
World War II. It gained increasing favor in the Naval High
Command largely because of its demonstrated successes in the
antisubmarine campaign. To the end of the war it remained
a unit which was operated under OSRD contract, but it became
increasingly a Navy show and its history is given in better
detail in Chapter 6.
The principal laboratories of Division 6 were operated by
Columbia University and Harvard University. On behalf of
the division, M.I.T. did undertake some research which is
recounted in Chapter 11. But its principal contributions to the
antisubmarine campaign were made by Slichter and Morse.20
ROCKETS
OSRD made highly important contributions to the develop-
ment of the rocket as a new weapon of warfare. The rocket is
colorful and has been well described in the press. It served in
the antisubmarine campaign, in the battle of the beaches; it
was fired from naval vessels, from tanks, from aircraft. The
OSRD development itself had two prongs; the one, principally
for the Army, was carried on chiefly by George Washington
University; the other, and much larger one, was principally
for the Navy but, spreading out as it gained momentum, was
the responsibility of the California Institute of Technology.
Indeed the rocket has become as closely associated with our
sister institution on the West Coast as radar has been with
M.I.T. In all this development M.I.T. can claim no leading
role. It did, however, furnish one important representative,
who was again Professor Slichter.
In about February of 1942 Slichter's general interest in the
antisubmarine campaign generated by his work for the NAS
Committee and for Division 6 led him to join with C. C.
Lauritsen and Max Mason, of the California Institute of Tech-
nology, in initiating the use of rockets aboard ships of the
50
QED
United States Navy. The first tests at sea (under the joint
auspices of Divisions 3 and 6) of rocket-thrown antisubmarine
bombs were made at San Diego in March, 1942. This led in
time to the introduction of the Mousetrap, a multiple-rocket
firer, aboard the Navy's small antisubmarine craft, such as PC's
and SC's and YP's. The Mousetrap led in turn to the necessity
for amending attack and training procedures at the Navy
Sound Schools. For a year and a half the Mousetrap training
program, which was essentially instruction in the new thrown-
ahead attack, 21 occupied the major part of Slichter's time. How
he operated is a good example of the scientific method applied
to a pedagogical problem. First complete observations were
made of practice antisubmarine attacks with the firing of
dummy ammunition, and the measurement of attack errors.
Nearly 3,000 practice attacks were observed at sea at San Diego,
Key West, Guantanamo, and Bermuda; of these 1,600 were
analyzed quantitatively for the purpose of improving attack
doctrine. The experience thus gained was projected to similar
weapons such as the British Hedgehog which were being
installed on destroyer escorts and destroyers. Attack doctrine and
instruction manuals for the use of Mousetrap and Hedgehog
equipment were prepared in collaboration with the sound
schools.
At the same time Slichter made and worked upon the sug-
gestion of the retro-rocket. This development arose because a
plane would often detect a submarine just when the plane was
over it. Under these cirmumstances it was useless to launch a
bomb since the trajectory of the bomb dropped from that posi-
tion would carry it far ahead of the U-boat. It was equally idle
to turn around and make a bombing run because by that time
the submarine would have submerged. The retro-rocket was a
device whereby, through using backward rocket propulsion,
the forward speed of the plane could just be compensated for;
under these circumstances the rocket bomb would land directly
below the position of the plane at the moment of launching.
Retro-rockets were successfully developed, installed on a PBY
THE PROJECTS OF NDRC
51
seaplane, and tested on the Goldstone rocket test range in
lower California in the late summer of 1942. The retro-rocket
is regarded as a perfectly sound device, but developments in the
antisubmarine campaign made it unnecessary by the time it
was ready for combat.22
BOMBS
From rockets to bombs is no far cry. Radar, fire control, and
rocketry all made their contribution to the art of bombing,
but three divisions of NDRC were devoted to considerations
of the bomb itself. And it happened that in all three of them,
M.I.T. personnel played a significant role.
Division 2 dealt with the conventional high-explosive bomb.
The problem of selecting the right such bomb for attack on a
specified industrial target was, at the beginning of the war, by
no means so simple as would appear at first glance. Historically
the situation was that the Army Air Forces were overly opti-
obtained with the Norden sight under conditions of combat23
and as to the damage which a single bomb of small size would
do when it hit. There was some uncertainty, moreover, as to
how a bomb should be fused for the optimum attack. Should
it burst in the air or at the ground, or should it be delayed until
it had penetrated the target? The answer would not always be
the same. To improve the accuracy of the bomb sight, Division
7 was engaged; to control of the bomb in flight, the attention
of Division 5 was turned; to the improvement of bomb selec-
tion, Division 2 addressed itself.
This last division came into the particular problem through
the back door. Division 2 itself was an outgrowth of the Com-
mittee on Passive Protection against Bombing established by
the NAS on request of the Chief of Engineers, U.S. Army.
Tolman was chairman of this committee, Compton was a mem-
ber, and John E. Burchard, Director of Bemis Foundation and
of Libraries, M.I.T., was executive officer. It soon became clear
that there were offensive implications in the work which could
52
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1
not be appropriately conducted under the contract with the
Army Engineers. Accordingly, a division of NDRC was estab-
lished for the study of “Structural Defense and Offense," and
Burchard was made its chief. Almost immediately after his
appointment he went, in 1941, on one of the early liaison
missions to the United Kingdom. Here he observed the careful
way the British Ministry of Home Security was studying every
single bombing incident, recording the damage, usually identi-
fying the size of the enemy bomb, establishing correlations
between the German bomb and their own, going on to con-
clusions as to what would be needed for the RAF to accomplish
a given result. This was an important development. It was
clear that the division should veer sharply away from questions
of defense or at least give them lesser priority. On Burchard's
return, Division 2 set out to become an American center for
information on what was happening to Britain, for furnishing
these data in usable form to the operating commands, and for
training young engineers and architects for service as opera-
tions analysts with the various American Bomber Commands.
All these objectives it achieved; its trainees served with dis-
tinction in every theatre of operations; its data sheets went to
every bomber wing. The experience of the division was put
at the disposal of General Arnold's Bombardment Advisory
Committee planning the strategic bombing offensive against
Germany. Later Division 2 collaborated with Division 11
through a joint committee whose chairman was Hottel 24 in a
study to determine the best combination of incendiary and
high-explosive loadings for the strategic offensive against Japan;
it also collaborated with the Joint Target Group of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff in preparation of information for the same
campaign.25
TAT
INCENDIARY WARFARE
In December, 1940, the Luftwaffe burned down the old City
of London. Aided by wind they did this with little two-pound
cylinders of magnesium. This first extensive use of the incen-
USA
incen-
THE PROJECTS OF NDRC
53
diary bomb seemed a horrifying thing to the world then. It
takes no long memory to recall how we were told to fight it;
first the instructions were to spray and then not to spray. Many
measures were developed to extinguish the incipient fires, to
deal with the fires as they grew. The success of these measures
was due largely to the fine discipline of the British Civil
Defense even when the Germans incorporated explosive with
some of the IB's and thus killed a few of the fire watchers.
To Division 11 of NDRC came the responsibility of develop-
ing an incendiary bomb against which there would be no
defense save that of keeping the bombers away. They developed
a weapon which would throw masses of petroleum jelly, a jelly
which would stick to walls and ceilings and then burn; they
studied the combustibility of woods of various kinds and of
different humidity contents, especially the kinds and the con-
tents which were known to be characteristic of Japanese cities;
they aided in the design and building of a Japanese-type village
in the desert at Dugway and peppered this with all the different
kinds of incendiaries and with high explosive as well. From this
study came the M-69 bomb, the bomb which reduced Tokyo
and substantially every other important Japanese city to ashes.26
The men on this development worked hand-in-hand with the
Chemical Warfare Service as did those working on the equally
spectacular divisional work on flame throwers, the tool which
burned the Japanese out of their caves. All these activities had
a strong M.I.T. tinge. Earl P. Stevenson, '19, President of
Arthur D. Little, Inc., was Chief of Division 11; Edwin R.
Gilliland, Professor of Chemical Engineering, was Deputy
Chief; two other M.I.T. chemical engineers were chiefs of
sections.
Hoyt C. Hottel, Professor of Fuel Engineering, was a mem-
ber of Division 11 and Chief of Section 11.3. This section was
responsible for all incendiary and flame thrower development
work and was the division's chief contact with the Chemical
Warfare Service. In late 1943, Hottel went to Great Britain
for three months to argue the changing ideas in incendiaries. 27
54
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An idea of the total scope of Division 11 may better be
obtained by considering the responsibilities of Section 11.2
whose Chief was Thomas K. Sherwood, then Professor of Chemi-
cal Engineering and now Dean of Engineering. This section
was a grab-bag unit which cared for matters falling outside the
normal fields of activity of the other sections of the Chemical
Divisions, such as new hydraulic fluids for aircraft, gun recoil,
and shipboard use at high and very low temperatures; new
antifouling coatings for ships' bottoms; modification of vesicant
chemical agents to make effective aircraft vesicant sprays; purifi-
cation of Levinstein mustard gas; an inert gas system for
preventing explosions in aircraft fuel tanks; development of
laboratory test methods for analyzing ballistic faults in liquid-
filled shells; a simple method for producing hydrogen for
meteorological balloons; improved photo-flash bombs; a simple
chemical method for repressurizing portable flame throwers
in the field; the development of large screening-smoke genera-
tors (the Langmuir-Esso); miscellaneous protective coatings for
chemical shells, bombs, fuses, gasoline containers; the produc-
tion of concentrated hydrogen peroxide. Sherwood also gave
general supervision to the work of the National Research
Council committee on quartermaster problems with NDRC
funds allocated to that committee through his section.28
GUIDED MISSILES
When it became apparent that, despite the Norden sight, the
bombardiers could not drop bombs from high altitudes into
anything approaching the classic “pickle barrel," and when it
appeared that radar blind-bombing devices, useful as they were,
were producing accuracies comparable only with those of the
best of daylight bombing, the interest of the Air Forces naturally
turned to the guided missile.
A guided missile is a robot launched from an airplane in
flight (or more recently also a rocket or jet-propelled machine
subject to remote control). The conventional bomb is on its
own after the bombardier has pushed the release button. It
THE PROJECTS OF NDRC
YA
falls from the bomb bay in accordance with laws over which no
further control can be exercised. It will strike the earth at a
point governed largely by the initial speed and direction of
the plane, the height of the drop, and the ballistic character-
istics of the bomb. If any mistake has been made, all the
bombardier's piety and all his wit cannot lure it back.
The first efforts with guided missiles were directed toward
permitting some control after the bomb had left the plane
through radio manipulation of fins and rudders on the bomb.
Both sides worked on such a weapon, but the Germans launched
it first in the Mediterranean and the Bay of Biscay. As with so
many new weapons, the use was tentative; this made counter-
measures possible before much damage was done. Nonetheless
the first display of the weapon was frightening enough and
stimulated increased activities on both sides.
The first radio bombs required the bomber to continue
close to his bombing course until the bomb had struck, not a
pleasant occupation over an area where enemy flak was intensive
and accurate. Moreover, the ground forces might easily learn
how to jam the controls.
The later NDRC developments were under Division 5, of
which Harold B. Richmond, ’14, Treasurer of General Radio
Company was first Chief. When he resigned because of illness,
he was succeeded by Hugh H. Spencer, '23, then of New Eng-
land Power Association. The division sought to exploit all
means of guiding missiles to their target — radio, radar, tele-
vision, heat and light radiations, and even pigeons. It com-
pleted the development of the AZON bomb, one which could
be guided in azimuth only and depended for range accuracy
on the bombadier's choice of launching point. This bomb was
therefore especially useful against long thin targets such as
bridges where range accuracy was not as critical, and after suc-
cesses in Italy it took heavy toll of the Japanese communications
over the ravines of Burma. The division had in fact begun
with RAZON which by similar but more complex methods
could be maneuvered both in range and in azimuth. This, how-
QED
ever, took much longer to bring to operational use (see Chapter
11), and it then concentrated on AZON and FELIX, a heat-
homer which could correct bomb release errors in a most spec-
tacular way under the right conditions, and without any
further attention from the bombing plane. Of these only AZON
was extensively used in combat, and the details of the others
are still blanketed by security provisions. The work of this
group, of course, carries, to the imaginative, heavy portents for
the future. In addition to the chiefs, no less than five M.I.T.
staff members were active in this division.29
11
OPTICAL PROBLEMS
Division 16, NDRC, bore the general title Optics. This
broad title covered work on a wide variety of problems involv-
ing optical principles, engaged in by upwards of seventy-five
contractors and costing altogether some 10 millions of dollars.
Perhaps the easiest way to obtain a quick comprehension of
the nature of the problems and their solution is to select a few
from both ends of the wide gamut.
Camouflage springs naturally to mind when one thinks of
optics applied to war. In its conventional sense and as a natural
sequence to the efforts of World War I, camouflage had an
early popularity in World War II; but as time went on it
became abundantly clear that static camouflage, no matter how
well contrived, did little to fool enemy bombers. Tactical
camouflage, on the other hand, remained important until the
end of the war. A case in point was the problem of making a
night fighter really invisible. When Division 16 looked at this
problem the practice was to paint the aircraft a dull black,
which was certainly the most natural thing to do. Unfortunately,
these dull black planes looked white in a searchlight beam
because they reflected some 2 per cent of the light. Faced with
this problem, Section 16.3, under Arthur C. Hardy, Professor
of Optics and Photography, worked out a shiny black paint so
selected that it would have the lowest non-specular reflecting
power. A plane thus painted could not be seen at all in a
1
THE PROJECTS OF NDRC
searchlight beam save for occasional very fleeting flashes when
it turned. This was because, instead of the diffuse reflection of
light which could be seen when a plane was painted dull black,
the shiny black paint reflected a single bright beam of light
which was moving so rapidly over the landscape that no anti-
aircraft battery could get a sight on its source. After the problem
was solved the job was not over, for it was necessary to keep
unceasing vigilance over the painting itself; it was so natural
for the painter to think that the camouflage paint ought to be
duller, and to mix sand, grease, or other available unconven-
tional dulling media with it.
Another similar problem put to the Hardy group led to an
unusual method of concealing an approaching bomber from
a surfaced submarine. Here lights were put along the leading
edges and the brightness was adjusted to that of the background
sky. Thus illuminated, a bomber could get within two miles
of its prey without being seen, and this meant only a fraction of
a minute for the submarine to do something – not enough.
But night remains the best camoufleur, and night served
both sides. It was natural, then, that both sides should be
vitally interested in infrared developments which might help
them to peer through the night or the murk. Conspicuous
among such developments were the applications of short-wave
infrared in the Sniperscope and Snooperscope, electron tele-
scopes which permitted a rifleman to see his target in the dark.
The gear for these weapons was fairly complex, and electronic
equipment is heavy and relatively fragile. In the circumstances,
Division 16 felt the need of producing something simpler to
supplement the electron telescope. The experimental work suc-
ceeded in catching the infrared directly on a phosphor screen
which had been prestimulated. This device, known as the meta-
scope, produced a useful image, and though less sensitive than
the electron telescope and giving less resolution, gained greatly
in simplicity and lightness.
In the far infrared there were also possibilities. Devices were
developed for plumbing the atmosphere at ranges too short for
58
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VYT
radar or under conditions where radar or radio silence was
required. This development was somewhat delayed because the
proponents of radar thought it would not be required. But it
soon proved necessary on the short ranges and was useful, for
example, to the pilot of a glider which was being towed through
a mist; the device would not of course penetrate a true fog but
would provide guidance in a light haze. The development
required a conjoint attack on methods for improving the
sources, the detectors, and the filters for infrared light.
Optical instruments of various sorts naturally engaged a good
deal of the division's attention. For example, a strenuous effort
was made to produce satisfactory substitutes for optical glass.
Over a hundred chemical substances, old and new, were investi-
gated to see which had the proper characteristics. Of these three
or four were promising enough to justify the further work of
providing proper refractive indices and permanence of shape.
Finally, lenses could be molded directly and without polishing.
The shortage of optical workers made this a fruitful endeavor
since girls could cast the new plastic lenses. The lenses were in
fact rather good, never better, but always cheaper and lighter,
than those of optical glass. Moreover, the heavy glass would
often kick out of adjustment on mountings such as those for
tank periscopes. The limitation on the plastics was their soft-
ness, and much time was spent trying to harden them. The
hardness was improved, as measured by the scratch test, by a
factor of 10, though a factor of 200 would have been needed
to make it comparable with the hardness of glass.
Another optical device was the Icaroscope. If one wanted to
see an airplane diving from the sun the dilemma was serious.
Seen through a dark glass, the plane could not be differentiated
from the sky. The Icaroscope compressed the range of the field
in brightness from millions to perhaps a hundredfold. It caught
the image on a rotating phosphorescent screen which was
viewed shortly with the image seen displaced.
One of the most important problems handled by the people
of Division 16 was aerial photography. They set out to find the
THE PROJECTS OF NDRC
causes for the limitations of resolution of aerial photographs.
In the optical shops at Harvard University a 40-inch camera
was developed to take pictures from 30,000 feet, and when the
war ended another one was under way 100 inches in focal length
with an f 5.6 lens, designed to take pictures from 60,000 to
70,000 feet which would resolve the ties in a railroad track.
Such precision instruments were generally pooh-poohed for air
reconnaissance because of plane vibration; when this was sup-
pressed, they were opposed because the resolving power of film
would be inadequate; when this was made adequate, it was
supposed that shutter speeds would not be right. But by han-
dling four difficult variables at once, including studies of tur-
bulence factors, the division achieved success.
This account is perhaps enough to indicate the scope and
the importance of the work of Division 16. The chief of this
division was George R. Harrison, Professor of Physics and Dean
of Science.30
METALLURGY
War research in metallurgy was covered for NDRC by Divi-
sion 18. Before the organization of NDRC, the War Metallurgy
Committee of the National Research Council was off to a good
start. As a result, the activities of Division 18 and of this com-
mittee were quite inseparable. The original metallurgical sec-
tion of NDRC was established by Bush and Conant in the latter's
domain (Division B - Chemistry) in September, 1940. Within
Conant's group were several vice chairmen. One of them was
Warren K. Lewis, Professor of Chemical Engineering, who was
head of a group of sections and was assisted in directing them
by Dean Sherwood. One of these sections was devoted to metal-
lurgy, under the chairmanship of Colonel A. E. White of the
University of Michigan. Robert S. Williams, Professor of Physi-
cal Metallurgy, Emeritus, was a member of this section. 31
Even the paragraph just written shows that here the record
of M.I.T.'s administrative activities in OSRD begins to degen-
60
QED
LI
erate into an enumeration of names and titles. This is the
point at which to stop this account, which is intended not as a
Who's Who but as orientation for the remaining chapters, to
consign the remaining participants to a footnote, 32 and to
turn to those of the M.I.T. family who served the Army or
the Navy still more directly.
FOOTNOTES
1 The titles used here are not always the official NDRC designations for
the divisions. These designations were sometimes deliberately confusing for
reasons of security, and here we use words which will have more meaning.
2 Even for the other groups there was often important administrative
activity by M.I.T. staff members. For example:
Arthur C. Cope, now Professor of Organic Chemistry, in charge of the
Department of Chemistry, formerly Associate Professor of Chemistry at
Columbia University, was a technical aide in Division 9 and at other times
a member of the same division and Chief of Section 9.2. His first service
was with H. S. Gasser, Director of the Rockefeller Institute for Medical
Research, in the administration of a large laboratory located at the
University of Chicago and engaged in studying the toxicological properties
of chemicals of war interest. His section of Division 9 was concerned with
miscellaneous chemical problems, including the investigation of chemical
warfare agents, preparation, decontamination and protective measures,
the composition and properties of commercial DDT, a search for superior
insect repellents, and the preparation of antimalarial drugs and inter-
mediates.
Thomas K. Sherwood, Professor of Chemical Engineering and now Dean
of Engineering, was a consultant to Division 10.
Division 15, which dealt with radar countermeasures, was an offshoot of
early work of Division 14 and was separated in the belief that work on
countermeasures (centered at the Radio Research Laboratory at Harvard
University) should be divorced from work on the affirmative employment
of radar.
3 All this background and much more can be found by the interested
reader in “Radar - a Report on Science at War," released by the Joint
Board on Scientific Information Policy of OSRD, War Department and
Navy Department, Superintendent of Documents.
4 Prominent among these staff members who were in the early days on
or closely associated with the staff of Radiation Laboratory but who later
went to other activity were:
THE PROJECTS OF NDRC
61
Edward L. Bowles, Professor of Electrical Communications, later Expert
Consultant to the Secretary of War. See Chapter 5.
Nathaniel H. Frank, Professor of Physics, later Expert Consultant to
the Secretary of War. See Chapter 5.
John R. Loofbourow, Professor of Biophysics, who became later Tech-
nical Aide to Division 14, supervising for the government the activities of
the Radiation Laboratory and other NDRC radar contracts.
Philip M. Morse, Professor of Physics, later Director of ORG for the
U.S. Navy. See Chapter 6.
John C. Slater, Professor of Physics, later on leave to Bell Telephone
Laboratories, Inc.
Julius A. Stratton, Professor of Physics, later Expert Consultant to the
Secretary of War. See Chapter 5.
William Phelps Allis, Associate Professor of Physics, later Lieutenant
Colonel in the War Department Liaison Office. See Chapter 5.
Lan Jen Chu, Associate Professor of Electrical Engineering, later Expert
Consultant to the Secretary of War. See Chapter 5.
John G. Trump, Associate Professor of Electrical Engineering, Secre-
tary of the Microwave Committee, who became Director of the British
Branch Radiation Laboratory and returned late in the war to head RL's
highly important Field Service Division. See Chapter 7.
5 The entire membership of this committee and more of its activity
appear in Chapter 15.
6 From 1941 to 1942, Trump was also Technical Aide to Alfred Loomis.
7 Op. cit. See footnote 3 to this chapter.
8"X-band" refers to the wavelength of the electromagnetic waves gen-
erated by the “x-band” magnetron. It was a code word used during the
war, as were “k” and “s," to denote 10- and l-centimeter wavelengths.
“X-band” referred to a 3-centimeter wavelength.
9 Strange as it may seem, at this time this procedure was none too
common even within the services. Field users were frequently not permitted
to talk officially with the service laboratories. It was especially unusual to
permit the discussions to take place with civilians. Time changed this in
all areas as it did many other peacetime procedures.
10 Sir Stafford Cripps was at that time Minister of Aircraft Production,
Sir George Thompson was Scientific Adviser to the Air Ministry (overall),
and Sir Robert Watson-Watt was Scientific Adviser on Telecommunica-
tions to the Air Ministry.
11 The Instrumentation Laboratory had important Navy contracts but
none were under OSRD sponsorship; OSRD contracts for services of the
Servomechanisms Laboratory were important but required only about
one-fourth of the laboratory's total effort.
12 Gordon S. Brown, Professor of Electrical Engineering. His principal
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QED
achievements, inextricably associated with those of the Servomechanisms
Laboratory, are recounted in Chapter 9. To Division 7 he was a consultant,
and at the request of the division went to Great Britain to exchange
information with the British Ministry of Supply on servomechanisms.
13 C. Stark Draper, Professor of Aeronautical Engineering. Like Brown,
his principal activity was in directing an M.I.T. laboratory, the Confiden-
tial Instruments Laboratory. See Chapter 9. For Division 7 he was a mem-
ber of Section 7.6 from its organization until its dissolution after V-J Day.
14 Ivan A. Getting, now Professor of Electrical Engineering. Most of his
activities stemmed from his work for Radiation Laboratory. He was, how-
ever, a member of Division 7 from December, 1942, and Chief of Section
7.6, Navy Fire Control with Radar. Under the auspices of this section a
number of developments were established and brought to a fruitful con-
clusion. These included the CW microwave chronograph developed by
Westinghouse Electric Manufacturing Company and a Navy gunfire con-
trol system sponsored in cooperation with Division 14, NDRC, and
developed jointly by Radiation Laboratory, General Electric Company,
and the Librascope Corporation. Getting was a vital factor in the develop-
ment of the SCR-584 M-I antiaircraft combination. He received personally
the Naval Ordnance Development Award.
15 Samuel H. Caldwell, Professor of Electrical Engineering. In his five
years' activity he traveled over a quarter of a million miles. First he worked
on problems of general fire control, participating in the development of
the Army's M-9 Antiaircraft Director. He was also chairman of a joint
committee with Radiation Laboratory with the responsibility of fostering
the application of radar in fire control. As Chief of Section 7.2 he was
responsible for air-borne fire control, to which he devoted most of his war
career, including a tour of duty in the United Kingdom in 1942. This work
included the development of equipment for the control of guns, bombs,
torpedoes, rockets, guided projectiles, and combinations of these elements.
As was so often the case, this responsibility led him on to several advisory
boards set up by the Secretary of War and the Army Air Forces for the
purpose of recommending new equipment for Air Force use.
16 This bull is used deliberately. The reader will recall how at the end
of the war the U-boats turned up again and lurked on our continental
shelf breathing with the aid of the Schnörkel. These boats might have been
very troublesome had the war continued.
17 This was the committee whose report may have touched off Secretary
Knox's request to Hunsaker to study the Navy's relations with civilian
research agencies. See page 32.
18 Whose purpose was to study sound control in combat vehicles. Two
laboratories were set up at Harvard University to study the acoustical
THE PROJECTS OF NDRC
63
problems of sound-control materials and the psychological and physio-
logical problems of noise in combat vehicles. A complete study was made
of noise in military aircraft and remedies proposed, and the committee
went on to study improvements in communications. By the end of the
war this work had expanded until intercommunications systems were being
studied, including the especially trying problem of intercommunication
between units in a Task Force.
19 He was also the divisional representative on the Applied Mathematics
Panel.
20 J. Warren Horton, Associate Professor of Electrical Communications,
left the Institute to take an important administrative role in the New
London Sound Laboratories operated by Columbia University under a
Division 6 contract. This is discussed in Chapter 18.
21 Thrown-ahead attack is to be contrasted with the previous conven-
tional use of the depth charge which was either dropped off the stern or
thrown astern or abeam by Y-guns. These did not have enough range to
make it safe to throw the depth charge forward, and forward-thrown
missiles made it possible to keep the detecting devices in operation longer.
22 After these efforts, which extended into 1944, Slichter found himself
with less urgent problems because the menace of the U-boat had subsided.
He and his antisubmarine group were then transferred to the Underwater
Ballistics Program at C.I.T., which is described in Chapter 18.
23 “We can drop it in a pickle barrel." The radius of the smallest pickle
barrel in practice turned out on the average to be several hundred yards.
24 See the account of Division 11 which follows shortly.
25 This account by no means exhausts the activities of Division 2; for
purposes of clarity they have been kept simple in the text. It developed
most of the information on the effect of impact and explosion on massive
concrete targets, on the effect of hypervelocity projectiles on armor; it
studied plastic protection for merchant vessels; it developed a new pro-
jectile for training flexible gunners in aircraft which would permit plane-
to-plane firing in the air under combat conditions without danger to the
operator of the fighter plane. Its activities can best be summed up under
the general heading of Terminal Ballistics — what happens at the target
when a projectile strikes or a bomb explodes.
Like so many others, Burchard had additional duties for OSRD. He
was Chairman of an ad hoc Committee on Navigational Aids to Landing
Operations, established at the request of the Commander-in-Chief United
States Fleet after the bad navigation of landing craft in the Casablanca
landing. This committee developed a highly successful navigational
device for close inshore navigation based on radar which would put the
boat within 50 to 100 feet of a predetermined landing point and within
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one minute of a predetermined time, from a point as far as 10 miles off
shore and under conditions of zero zero visibility. This device was used
extensively in the late naval operations in the Pacific. He was Chairman
of a similar Committee on Demolition of Obstacles to Landing Operations,
established a few months before D-Day to help the amphibious forces
cope with the threat of obstacles at the shore which the Germans were
presumed to be installing in large numbers. He was Chairman of a joint
Army-Navy OSRD Committee on Scientific Information Policy consisting
of three men called upon to make recommendations to the Secretaries of
War and Navy and the Director of OSRD on how best to give the public,
towards the end of the war, a clear and safe picture of what had been
accomplished on the research front. He was Chairman of OSRD's Publi-
cations Committee whose duty it was to develop policies which would
bring back the free interchange of scientific information at the earliest
possible date consistent with security.
Other M.I.T. staff members who served officially with Division 2 were
Burnham Kelly, Assistant Professor of City Planning, who was Special
Assistant to the Chief, Division 2 (and also Assistant Executive Officer,
Committee on Fortification Design, NAS), and the following consultants:
John B. Wilbur, Professor of Structural Engineering, in charge of the
Department of Civil Engineering.
Roy W. Carlson, formerly Associate Professor of Civil Engineering,
who has now left M.I.T.
Walter Maxwell Fife, Associate Professor of Structural Engineering.
Ernest Napoleon Gelotte, Associate Professor of Construction.
Herbert Lynes Beckwith, Professor of Architectural Design, was Execu-
tive Officer for the Princeton University Station, which was the principal
contractor to Division 2. He was active in the procurement of personnel
for training as Operations Analysts for the Air Force.
26 Sixty-seven of these cities were no longer military targets at the time
of surrender. Hiroshima and Nagasaki were victims of the atomic bomb;
Kure of Navy high explosives. The rest suffered most of their travail from
the IB's.
27 Hottel was also a member of Dean Sherwood's Section 11.2, Chair-
man of the AN-23 Committee on Optimum Bomb Loads, and on two
joint CWS-NDRC committees dealing with the evaluation respectively of
incendiaries and flame throwers.
28 Dean Sherwood was also consultant to Division 10.
29 Joseph G. Boyce, until the end of the war Associate Professor of
Physics at M.I.T. and now Chairman of the Department of Physics at
New York University, Chief of Section 5.5 dealing with the mechanisms
used in the various guided missiles, radio controls, servomechanisms, train.

1
Aerial view of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Radiation Laboratory complex visible
just over the larger dome.

E
NON
BENE HER NOS TORNEN SER BODEN
Some of the temporary laboratories built at the Institute during the war period expressly for war research.
Photographed from a Navy blimp.
THE PROJECTS OF NDRC
ing devices, and some not yet declassified parts. Later Special Assistant to
the Chief of Division 5, Boyce was for some time also a member of
Division 19, a member of the Vacuum Tube Development Committee,
and the NDRC member of a special subcommittee of the NACA on
power-guided missiles.
Bertram E. Warren, Professor of Physics, was a member of Section 5.2.
William H. Radford, Associate Professor of Electrical Communications,
was Consultant to Sections 5.5 and 16.4.
Charles F. Squire, Assistant Professor of Physics, also participated in
Division 5 activities until he joined Morse's ORG in the Navy.
Alan C. Bemis, Research Associate in Meteorology, was a member and
Deputy Chief of Section 5.5, and also a member of Section 16.4 of Division
16, which was concerned with infrared problems.
30 Arthur C. Hardy, Professor of Optics and Photography, was Chief
of Section 16.3; Seibert Q. Duntley, Assistant Professor of Physics, was
Technical Aide in the same section. Richard C. Lord, Associate Professor
of Chemistry and normally in charge of the Spectroscopy Laboratory, was
Technical Aide in the division and during Harrison's extended absence
in Australia had important administrative responsibility. Harrison was
also a member and later Chief of Division 17.
31 It would be futile to attempt to trace in a book of this scope the
complex activities of the Metallurgical Group. M.I.T.'s principal contri-
butions in metallurgy were not in the administration of Division 18 but
in specific projects which are discussed in Chapters 12 and 18.
32 Division 12 – Transportation. This division developed several am-
phibious vehicles, notably the DUKW and the Weasel. The principal tech-
nical aide and a strong catalyst for these vehicle-vessels all over the globe
was Palmer Cosslett Putnam, '23, Medal for Merit. Commander Henry E.
Rossell, Professor of Naval Construction, Emeritus, was a member of the
division until he resigned on 19 May 1943 to become President of the
Cramp Shipbuilding Company (see Chapter 18).
Numerous ad hoc committees were established from time to time by
OSRD, for example:
In 1944 Bush appointed a special OSRD committee on long-burning
propellants for missiles. Glenn G. Williams, Hoyt C. Hottel, and Dean
Sherwood were members.
Hurd C. Willett, Professor of Meteorology, served on an OSRD com-
balloon campaign against the West Coast and possible countermeasures.
Willett wrote the section of the report which dealt with the analysis of
upper level winds over the North Pacific and meteorological feasibility
of the Japs' using this wind drift to launch a concentrated attack by
balloons on any selected West Coast target.
66
QED
Harold A. Freeman, Associate Professor of Statistics, was Consultant
to the Statistical Research Group of the Applied Mathematics Panel of
the NDRC working on applications of sequential analysis to Army and
Navy problems, preparing a Sampling Inspection Manual for the Navy,
and dealing with projects for the Climatic Research Laboratory of the
Army.
W. Rupert Maclaurin, Professor of Economics, was Secretary of the
Committee on Science and the Public Welfare, OSRD, concerned with
preparation of a report to the President on a program for postwar scientific
research.
FOR THE ARMY
BEYOND THE WORK which the Institute did under contract with
the War Department, the Navy Department, or the OSRD
(which was, after all, working in their interests), specific con-
tributions to the victory were made by members of Tech-
nology's staff working directly under the banner of one or the
other service. The most conspicuous of these efforts were made
by a professor of electrical communications for the Army and
by a professor of physics for the Navy.
Beginning in the summer of 1940, the Professor of Electrical
Communications, Edward L. Bowles, worked with Dr. Comp-
ton in the national radar effort, both at the Institute and as
first secretary of the Microwave Committee, until on 6 April
1942, Mr. Henry Stimson, the Secretary of War, appointed him
Expert Consultant. The original appointment called upon
Bowles to advise the Secretary on radar policy, but even at
the beginning he was told to limit himself in no way to strictly
technical problems.
For the Army, by all odds most of the important radar
developments related to air operations, either as a means of
improving the offensive and defensive performance of our own
aircraft or as a way of establishing better control of other
defensive measures against enemy aircraft. It was almost inevi-
table, then, that much of Bowles's career should have been
spent on Air Force problems and that he should have been
especially useful to General H. H. Arnold.
When Bowles was called to duty his first assignment was an
overall analysis of the submarine menace off the Atlantic
Seaboard. He made recommendations which led to the estab-
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YY
lishment of experimental and operational AAF units to combat
the threat. Although the Navy played the major role in the
antisubmarine campaign, the comprehensiveness of Bowles's
scheme for the Atlantic Ocean Area attracted attention. It
pointed to the potentiality of the land-based heavy bomber in
attacking the submarine at sea; in particular it pointed up the
strategic value of first-class and modern communications sys-
tems and navigational aids in big bombing operations. It was
Bowles's comprehensive study, "The Acute Problem of Ocean-
Borne Transport and Supply," which Stimson carried to the
President in his drive for a more definitive policy with respect
to our antisubmarine operations, at a time when the submarine
problem was crucial. The report led General Arnold to ask
Mr. Stimson that Bowles be permitted to assume overall re-
sponsibility for all AAF communications, radar, and electronics.
In the discharge of this responsibility Bowles was empowered to
act directly for General Arnold. As his activities and respon-
sibilities in the AAF broadened, Bowles became in September,
1944, Special Consultant to the Commanding General AAF.
When a British delegation called upon General Marshall
for assistance in connection with the buzz-bomb assaults, the
Chief of Staff handed the problem to Bowles. He formulated
a plan which led to the immediate dispatch to the United King-
dom of some special antiaircraft equipment which could func-
tion under conditions of complete invisibility when fighter
planes were helpless. The buzz-bombs were finally brought
under control only by throwing at them everything in the book,
from bombing their launching sites to shooting them down
with fighters and antiaircraft guns; but in this struggle the
Bowles material played a significant part.
Later Bowles provided basic planning for radar bombing
by the Eighth and Fifteenth Air Forces and special planning
for the Twentieth Air Force. The 315th Air Wing, which dis-
tinguished itself in the air war against Japan, was the direct
result of plans laid for General Arnold in Bowles's office.
During the course of the war this office had representatives
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69
on the staffs of General Eisenhower and General MacArthur
and on the staffs of the major Air Force commanders in the
European, Pacific, and China-Burma theatres. Bowles's influ-
ence spread gradually over the War Department, and he was
consulted on many matters of scientific research far outside the
fields of electronics or air force operations; he ranged into
problems of the ground forces, of scientific and technical
intelligence, of scientific advice to the Commanding General
of the Group Control Council after the collapse of Germany.
Altogether the presence of this technically trained civilian in
the high councils of the War Department was of inestimable
value and established a precedent which will doubtless be
followed in the future.
Around him, in his office in the Pentagon Building, Bowles
gathered a nucleus of top-flight scientific and technological
personnel whom he loaned on occasion to various theatres or
commands who needed trouble shooters; sometimes, indeed,
they were sent out to stir up the trouble so that it could be
shot at. These men were especially active in the United King-
dom, where there was an Advisory Specialist Group to General
Spaatz, and at the end of the war in the Pacific, where some of
the same people assisted General Kenney. A number of them
were colleagues of Bowles from the Institute. How they worked
can perhaps best be realized by a somewhat detailed considera-
tion of the career of one. For this illustration we shall select
Julius A. Stratton, Professor of Physics and recently appointed
Director of Technology's new Research Laboratory of Elec-
tronics.
During the summer of 1940 Stratton, on suggestions from
Dr. Compton and Dr. Bowles, had undertaken preliminary
work on antenna problems. With the formation of the Radia-
tion Laboratory in November, 1940, he became a staff member.
During the remainder of that year and for the first few months
of 1941 he continued work on the propagation of microwaves,
in association with the Theory Group of the Laboratory. In
May, 1941 he joined a new group in Radiation Laboratory,
LE
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NY
under Mr. Melville Eastham, then President of General Radio
Company, to develop the finally famous LORAN navigational
system. In August, 1942, he was detached from that duty to
serve with Bowles as Expert Consultant to the Secretary of War.
During the summer and fall of 1942, strenuous efforts were
being exerted by the AAF to establish a ferry route over the
North Atlantic for fighters and bombers traveling to Great
Britain. The best route ran altogether too near to the magnetic
pole. Great difficulty was experienced in maintaining satisfac-
tory radio communications, causing not only a failure to meet
schedules but also frequent losses. At the request of Brigadier
General A. W. Marriner, Stratton made an investigation of this
situation in company with Dr. H. H. Beverage, Vice President
of RCA Communications. The AAF communications system
was studied at first hand in Labrador, Greenland, and Iceland.
As a result, recommendations were made which led to the
introduction of a very low frequency radio communication
system. This system worked, and is now in general use for air
operations in the Far North.
Toward the end of 1942, at the request of Brigadier General
Gordon P. Saville, Stratton organized a committee to study the
status of ground radar as used in air defense. The committee
members represented the several large industrial groups con-
cerned with the development of ground radar and, of course,
the Radiation Laboratory. It issued two reports. The first
proposed a development plan for lightweight ground radar; the
second, offered in June, 1943, and known as the Lewshle Plan,
established the first systematic scheme for the development and
introduction of ground radar in the AAF. Though subsequently
modified to take account of later radar developments, it remains
the basis of the AAF ground-radar program.
During the summer of 1943, at the request of Major General
H. H. McClelland, the Air Communications Officer, Stratton
organized two more committees to study and prepare radar
programs for the AAF. The first of them was concerned with
the problem of airborne fire-control equipment; its primary
FOR THE ARMY
mission was to eliminate a large number of obsolete or abortive
developmental projects. It then went on to provide a simplified
program according to which main attention would be concen-
trated on the rapid development and production of fire-control
equipment for the Super Fortress, the B-29, and the Super-
Super Fortress, the B-32. To the second of these two commit-
tees was given the problem of simplifying and orienting the
program of the AAF on air-borne radar bombing equipment.
In December, 1943, and January, 1944, Stratton accompanied
Bowles on a quick visit to North Africa, Italy, and the United
Kingdom to study the current status of radar bombing and to
aid in the organization of radar planning for the forthcoming
invasion.
In the summer of 1944 General Spaatz requested Bowles to
help in the organization of a systematic attack on the problem
of all-weather flying. As a result, the Committee on Air Navi-
gation and Traffic Control was established with Stratton as
Chairman. This committee worked intensively on various
aspects of all-weather flying. Since the end of the war a high
priority has been placed on the continuation of this project.
For his work Stratton received the Medal for Merit. 1
During Bowles's absence in Europe in 1945, Stratton acted
as his deputy and participated in the important negotiations
in the Pentagon Building, and over the teletype to Manila, as
a result of which a powerful group was established to render
scientific assistance to General MacArthur. This last story is
told in more detail in Chapter 7.2
It was only natural that the activities of Bowles and his
colleagues should, in the beginning, have been viewed with
suspicion by many highly placed officers. But the Bowles group
did nothing to justify that suspicion. Bowles was not an empire
builder and never sought to have a large organization or to
direct rather than to persuade. Gradually the group won the
confidence of most of the High Command with which it had
to deal, and in so doing struck an important blow for the future
of the military machine which, if it is to cope with modern
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events, must have civilian scientific advice close to the top.
That the War Department recognized this need is implicit in
its final action. On 14 November 1945 Bowles was decorated
by General Arnold with the Distinguished Service Medal, an
award which comes to civilians only on action by the President.3
Bowles remained with the War Department into the transitional
period, leaving it formally in August, 1947. In this transitional
period Bowles did much to consolidate progress made during
the war in the integration of military, industrial, and profes-
sional resources. One of the significant advances he championed
involved the cooperation of outside agencies with Military
Plans, Intelligence, Research, Matériel, and agencies in military
planning.
In his new post as Consulting Professor of Electrical Commu-
nications, Bowles will have his headquarters at M.I.T. Among
the national security interests which he will continue to follow
is his work with General Eisenhower's Advanced Study Group.
He will also serve as Scientific Adviser to the United States Air
Forces.
Members of the M.I.T. family also had high-level War
Department appointments outside of Bowles's office. Again this
group was led by Dr. Compton. Some of the positions he held
have already been described; his work for the Office of Field
Service will appear in Chapter 7. In addition to all these, he
was a member of the Advisory Staff of the Chief of Ordnance
Military Training, a member of the Advisory Board of the
Army Specialized Training Division, a member of the Com-
mittee on Postwar Research appointed by the Secretaries of War
and Navy in 1944, a member of the Advisory Board of the
Research and Development Branch of the Office of the Quar-
termaster General, a member of the Advisory Board of the
Chemical Warfare Service, and a member of the Secretary of
War's Special Advisory Committee on the Atomic Bomb.4
The Army Air Forces, too, received help directly from others
of Technology's staff independently of Bowles's office. Among
them, members of the Meteorology Department took a lead-
.
YT
FOR THE ARMY
73
0
DAY
ing part. They instructed Army officers in the basic prin-
ciples of long-range weather forecasting, sought ways to improve
the weather service on the principal North Atlantic route,5 sur-
veyed meteorological factors pertaining to operations of radar
on the Continent. They gave technical assistance to the Staff
Weather Officer of the Ninth Air Force,6 set up upper-air
forecasting centers in Cairo, and helped improve the perform-
ance of the similar station in Casablanca.7 They flew with the
53rd Weather Reconnaissance Squadron over the Greenland
icecap to make flight tests of icing-rate meters 8 and made regular
forecasts from La Guardia Field for the NATS, the ATC, and
nontransport Army and Navy flights over the Atlantic. 9
Another form of help was given the bomber commands by
the analysis of weapons to be used in a given attack and a post-
raid analysis of the results attained. It has already been men-
tioned that the men who did this work were trained in the
Princeton University Station of Burchard's Division 2, NDRC.
One of the men who formed the first group ever trained was
Bissell Alderman, then Instructor in Architectural Design.
Alderman was one of the first two men to be dispatched, and
spent the war with the largest of our bomber commands, that
of the Eighth Air Force, which spearheaded with the RAF
the Strategic Bombing Campaign against German economy.
Alderman spent more than two years with the Eighth Bomber
Command in the United Kingdom and with two others was
responsible for the introduction and promotion of the scientific
selection of weapons for the destruction of enemy targets. Later
he made frequent trips to the Continent to study the damage
in order that the results might be applied to the new operations
of the Eighth Air Force when it redeployed in the Pacific. He
was at Hamilton Field in San Francisco waiting passage to
Okinawa when he was recalled to Washington on V-J Day.
After the bombing was over the War Department set up an
extensive group to evaluate the results for future use. This
group was known as the United States Strategic Bombing Survey
(USSBS). It worked in close harmony with the AAF Evaluation
y
74
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Board, ETO, which was under command of Major General
Fickel.10
William W. Whitmore, quondam Instructor in Physics,
served with this board in France. His experience is worth
relating in detail as an example of the way technical training
may be put to use far from its original purpose. Whitmore
writes:
December 1944-June 1945 – on leave of absence from M.I.T. to
serve as Special Consultant to AAF Evaluation Board ETO - sta-
tioned in the vicinity of Paris. Was one of a group of eight civilians
attached to the Board for the preparation of a report on the tactical
bombardment of the French railway system during the Battle of
Normandy. Work involved a statistical and economic survey of the
bombing effort employed against the railway system and the results
in terms of damage to fixed installations and decline in traffic
flow – more briefly what's the best way to wreck a railway system
by bombing. It was hoped that conclusions would be of use in
planning tactical bombardment of Japan and it was received with
some eagerness by the groups who were planning such bombard-
ment, which fortunately never had to be executed.
As background information it might be mentioned that the job
had particularly little to do with physics, the chief requirement in
my own case being "curiosity and a certain amount of common
sense.” The rest of the group were either economists or statisti-
cians with the exception of one Interstate Commerce Commission
inspector who was the only member of the group with any actual
railroading experience. But by the time we were finished I think we
knew more about certain aspects of the French railway system than
the French officials. Just another example of the queer things that
technically trained people find themselves doing during a war.
This experience of Whitmore's was repeated on a much
larger scale and on a broader canvas in the work of Morse's
ORG of the Navy, which will be described shortly.
Next to the Army Air Forces, it was probably the Quarter-
master Corps which profited most by the firsthand ministra-
tions of people from M.I.T. Even before the war Bernard E.
Proctor, Professor of Food Technology and Director of the
Samuel Cates Prescott Laboratories of Food Technology, had
FOR THE ARMY
S
I
been an unofficial consultant to the Quartermaster General on
food-supply problems. In 1942 he was appointed an expert
consultant on foods and traveled extensively in organizing
various military food research activities. 11 In 1943 he was
appointed Director of Subsistence and Packaging Research for
the Office of the QMG and in this position had charge of all
food supply and ration development for the Army. This
involved the supervision of the QMC Subsistence Research and
Development Laboratories in Chicago; liaison with projects in
over two hundred universities, governmental laboratories, and
food plants; cooperation with the Allied food research agencies;
setting up specifications for all Army food supplies and food
packages; and the conduct of laboratory and field tests to deter-
mine the nutritional adequacy of Army rations. With the job
done he has returned to M.I.T., but will continue as expert
consultant to the Army while Director of M.I.T.'s Prescott
Laboratories of Food Technology. 12
The work on food for the Quartermaster sometimes led the
staff far away. While Charles H. Blake, Associate Professor of
Zoology, was in Australia and New Guinea for the Office of
Field Service in 1944, he was asked to consider the damage done
by insects to some foods, and especially grain products. He
found that almost all the insect damage was due to insects
which had infested the foods before they were shipped north
to the tropics from Australia. A rather unexpected finding was
that grain grown in New South Wales and southward had some-
what different insects from that grown in Queensland and that
there was evidence that these more southern pests tended not
S
plicated by the fact that Australia was passing through the
greatest drought known since the arrival of the white man, and
it was necessary therefore to produce flour from any available
wheat. Some of this had been in storage for as much as four
years and was in an extremely infested condition. In Brisbane,
for example, Blake found wheat in which scarcely one whole
grain could be seen in a handful. After discovery of the sources
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7
of the short supply of wheat and the causes of the damage to
the little wheat there was, it was decided that nothing could
be done except to wait for another crop, more than a year from
that date. Meanwhile, the front lines of the Pacific War had
moved so far north that the direct pressure was off Australia
as a source of supply.
But M.I.T.'s staff did not work exclusively on food problems
for the Quartermaster General. It was also concerned with the
development of clothing for use in arctic or tropical climates, 13
equipment for mountain troops, such as pitons for rock climb-
ing, 14 the application of sequential analysis to sampling inspec-
tion, 15 and the study of all sorts of items made of metal such
as canteens, cooking utensils, axes, and hammers.16
One significant activity of this sort was carried on by Edward
R. Schwarz, Professor of Textile Technology in charge of the
Division. Under a grant from Commander Slater the Slater
Laboratory was established in 1939 to do research in fabric
testing which might be useful to the armed services. Harold
Hindman, Research Associate in Textile Technology, was head
of this laboratory when it was started and still continues in that
capacity. Schwarz began working with the laboratory when it
was established and directed his attention especially to the
work for testing aeronautical fabrics under impact conditions.
Schwarz also tested body armor, tentage, and the abrasion of
fabrics for the Quartermaster Corps. As an expert consultant
to the Office of the Quartermaster General, Military Planning
Division, he spent two days a week working with Brigadier
General Georges Doriot, under whose direction the Quarter-
master made amazing strides in the creation of new materials
for the comfort and security of American troops.
Relatively few of the M.I.T. family actually found it neces-
sary or desirable to don uniforms in order to serve either the
War or the Navy Departments, but there were a few notable
exceptions. William P. Allis, Associate Professor of Physics,
after a year and a half at the Radiation Laboratory, was com-
missioned in the AUS first as Major and later as Lieutenant
FOR THE ARMY
Colonel. For most of his time Colonel Allis served in the War
Department Liaison Office for the NDRC. This office was
largely responsible, on the Army's side, for producing the har-
monious relations and smooth working between the military
and the civilian scientists which were finally attained towards the
end of the war. Allis's work in this connection was recognized
by an award of the Legion of Merit.17 From December, 1943,
to March, 1944, Colonel Allis was on a very important mission
for the Military Intelligence Service. On this occasion he went
to Italy as one of a small group to learn from captured Italian
scientists what they might know about scientific war research
in Germany. The mission did not get much information, but
it set the pattern for the highly successful intelligence mission
to Germany described in Chapter 7. Finally, Allis served with
the New Developments Division trying to establish a peacetime
research agency, somewhat similar to the NDRC, to work on
military problems. This work ended with War Department
endorsement of the Magnusson Bill to establish a National
Research Foundation.
It fell to the late Clark S. Robinson, Associate Professor of
Chemical Engineering, to play an important role which was not
spectacular save to those "in the know." He did this as a colonel
in the Ordnance Department. Those with long memories will
recall the many disastrous fires and explosions, both accidental
and planned, involving ammunition and explosives in World
War I. It may not have occurred to them that there were very
few such accidents within the continental United States in
World War II, and none which could be attributed to sabotage.
This was not a result of chance but was due to organizations
set up for the specific purpose of preventing such incidents.
Among them, two of the most influential were the Safety and
Security Division of the Ordnance Department and the Army-
Navy Explosives Board. Colonel Robinson was intimately con-
nected with the former agency during the first two years of
its existence (1942–44) and a member of the latter after 1944.
In both he described his duty as “the placing of the work of
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the two bodies on a sound scientific basis.” For his work he
received the Legion of Merit.18
If there were few of the Technology family who wore the
uniform of the Army, there were fewer who saw service in
active theatres while in that uniform although, as the record
has already attested, many M.I.T. civilians did have this sort of
duty. Among them, one was in North Africa and Italy where
he observed the first combat trials of microwave fire-control
radar sets and later won the Legion of Merit;19 a second,
working from the Air Surgeon's Office, AAF, visited Australia,
New Guinea, the Admiralties, and the Solomons, working on
the psychiatric problems of the flyers;20 a third was Chief
Water Supply Officer for the Central Task Force in the North
African invasion, landing in the vicinity of Oran;21 a fourth
was on General Bradley's staff, working on the analysis of the
transport position of the German Army.22 A fifth as navigator
of a B-17 earned distinction throughout the strategic bombing
of Germany; 23 a sixth organized direction-finding equipment
in the march on Rome, Leghorn, Pisa, and Florence; 24 a
seventh fought in the grim days of 1942 on Bataan; 25 an eighth
made countless transport flights in the worst days of the offen-
sive in the Southwest Pacific;26 a ninth after winning decora-
tions for work at Cassino and Velletri was one of five officers
who participated in the capture of Hermann Goering. 27 These
are but examples and there were others.28 Since this is not a
history of combat, these may be sufficient to show the variety
of the record and we may reasonably proceed to some of the
things which the M.I.T. group did for the Army's friendly rival.
FOOTNOTES
1 The citation reads: "Dr. Julius A. Stratton, for exceptionally merito-
rious conduct in the performance of outstanding services to the United
States. Dr. Stratton, as Expert Consultant in the Office of the Secretary of
War, from August 5, 1942 to date, displayed great initiative, foresight, and
ability of the highest order in planning, establishing and assisting in the
execution of effective programs for the development, procurement and use
FOR THE ARMY
79
by the Army of radar and related devices. He served with distinction,
exhibiting unique tact and vision in enlisting the active cooperation of
industry and the development agencies, thereby very greatly improving
the orientation of our effort to provide effective radar aids for the solution
of operational problems. Through his unusual qualifications of judgment
and wide scientific experience, he contributed greatly to the success of
radar aids to bombing, airborne radar fire control and communications.
By his tireless efforts and skillful application of his professional knowledge,
Dr. Stratton made an exceptional contribution to the war effort.”
2 Several others of M.I.T.'s staff served importantly in Bowles's office.
For example:
Nathaniel H. Frank, Professor of Physics, after a year and a half of
service in the Radiation Laboratory, became Expert Consultant to the
Secretary of War in Bowles's office; here he assisted the War Department
in the formulation and monitoring of wartime technical programs. He
received a letter of commendation from General Arnold for his work.
Ivan A. Getting, Professor of Electrical Engineering, was Expert Con-
sultant to the Secretary of War in Bowles's office for more than two years;
his principal duty was to assist the Commanding General of the Army
Ground Forces at the staff level on ground force problems involving
radar; he also served throughout the war as a member of the Subcom-
mittee on Gunnery and Searchlight Control for the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Trump was a member of the Bowles-constituted Advisory Specialist
Group to the Commanding General, United States Strategic Air Forces.
Lan Jen Chu, Associate Professor of Electrical Engineering, graduate of
Chiao Thung University in Shanghai, postgraduate in electrical engineer-
ing at M.I.T. in 1934, began research in the field of the microwave under
Barrow and Stratton. On organization of the Radiation Laboratory he
became consultant on magnetrons, transmission lines, antennas, and propa-
gation problems. In 1942 he became consultant as well to Harvard's Radio
Research Laboratory. In 1945 as Expert Consultant to the Secretary of War
he was sent to China to head the Advisory Specialist Group for Lieutenant
General A. G. Wedemeyer, Commanding General of the U. S. Armed Forces
in China.
3 The citation reads: "Doctor Edward L. Bowles. For exceptionally meri-
torious service to the Government in a duty of great responsibility from
2 September 1943 to 2 September 1945. During this time, as Consultant to
the Commanding General, Army Air Forces, Doctor Bowles was respon-
sible for over-all supervision in connection with all matters of communica-
tion, radar, countermeasures, radar aids to fire control and bombing, radio
and radar aids to navigation, and related electronic fields. Early recognizing
that only by the exploitation of communications scientific resources would
the Army Air Forces gain its required mobility, safety, and dispatch, and
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that only by the combined efforts of science, industry and military could
radar be developed to its full potential in the finding of targets and their
destruction, Dr. Bowles conceived and organized an advisory group com-
posed of select electronics specialists to advise on these highly technical
problems. He also secured the aid of leaders in scientific and industrial
laboratories throughout the country and made their invaluable assistance
available in the solution of special problems confronting the Army Air
Forces. He was successful in placing scientific personnel on the staffs of
all major AAF commands to assist in the introduction and development of
radar to its full application in the uses of modern air warfare. By his clarity
of vision, by his ability to interpret scientific principle into its practical
application in military tactics, by his effective organizational talent, Dr.
Bowles has made a material contribution to the combination of science and
skill resulting in the world's greatest Air Force and the destruction of the
enemies of democracy."
Bowles has formally accepted an appointment as an "Honorary Com-
mander of The Most Excellent Order of the British Empire (CBE) as
recognition of (his) services to Britain and to British scientists during
the war.”
4 War Department advisory appointments held by Hunsaker, Gilliland,
and others have been mentioned in preceding footnotes.
5 Hurd C. Willett, Professor of Meteorology. He was a civilian con-
sultant to the AAF for over three years. In pursuit of the duties described
in the text he visited the principal ATC Bases in the North Atlantic and
stayed at each one for a time (Newfoundland, Labrador, Greenland,
Iceland, Bermuda, Azores). His later work on the Japanese balloon
menace is described on page 65.
6 James M. Austin, Associate Professor of Meteorology, also a civilian
consultant to the AAF Weather Service. He was on duty in England and
France, and at the end of the war at the big B-29 training base in
Colorado. The Army Air Force Certificate of Commendation "in Recogni-
tion of Exceptionally Meritorious and Outstanding Performance of Mili-
tary Duty" further documents Austin's activity, as does the more recently
awarded Medal of Freedom.
"Professor Austin served as technical assistant to the staff weather
officer, Ninth Air Force, from 22 April to 5 September 1944, during which
time he was one of the principal forecasters engaged in forecasting for
the Normandy invasion and for the battle of Northern France. His work
in the Ninth Air Force Weather Station prior to and subsequent to D-Day
was of such high caliber that it improved the efficiency of the station con-
siderably, while his untiring efforts and patience in instructing the younger
weather officers was instrumental in raising the technical standards of the
weather service. His technical ability and scientific standards are of the

The wartime transportation problem solved by some of the labo-
ratory workers at the Institute. Photograph taken in the fall of 1943.
FOR THE ARMY
highest order. Professor Austin served in France with the IX Tactical
Air Command Weather Station and with the XIX Tactical Air Command
Weather Station from 27 July to 5 September 1944, and his interest,
enthusiasm, and insistence on the maintenance of high scientific standards
did much to raise the efficiency of those stations to their present high
level. Professor Austin lived under difficult field conditions, yet continued
his working and teaching with his usual enthusiasm and ability. His work
with the Ninth Air Force weather service has been of incalculable value."
7 Thomas F. Malone, Assistant Professor of Meteorology. Special Con-
sultant to HQ, AAF Weather Wing and attached for some time to the
Nineteenth Weather Squadron in North Africa.
8 Robert M. Cunningham, Research Associate in Meteorology. Icing
was found over the icecap in midsummer.
9 Eugene S. Pulk, Research Associate in Meteorology, Forecaster, and
Meteorology Instructor at American Export Lines.
10 The USSBS had three divisions. Director of the Structural Damage
Division was Harry L. Bowman, '14, one time member of M.I.T.'s Civil
Engineering Department and now head of the Department of Civil
Engineering at Drexel Institute of Technology. Bowman's military aide
and executive officer was Lieutenant Colonel John W. Beretta, '23.
11 At the same time the Samuel Cates Prescott Laboratories of Food
Technology, directed in Professor Proctor's absence by John C. Sluder,
then Assistant Professor of Food Technology, went full time on to Army
Food Research. Some of the work is described in Chapter 10.
12 Also active in the Quartermaster's food program were:
William L. Campbell, now Professor of Food Technology in charge of
the Department; Consultant to the Research and Development Branch,
Military Planning Division, QMG on Ration Program, Food Manufacture,
Transportation, Depot Warehousing, Post Quartermaster Performance,
Mechanical Equipment, Food Research Laboratory Programs, and Coordi-
nation of Shoe and Leather Research.
Samuel C. Prescott, Dean of Science, Emeritus, after a year of volun.
teered service with the QMG was appointed Special Consultant to the
Secretary of War, for the purpose of aiding in inspection and establish-
ment of dehydration plants for the Army, dealing especially with improved
methods of dehydrating vegetables and fruits. For this task Professor
Prescott was especially suited since he had been instrumental in establish-
ing the process of dehydration of vegetables in World War I.
Closely related to the work of Dr. Prescott was that of Cecil Gordon
Dunn, Associate Professor of Industrial Biology, who on leave of absence
from 1941 to 1946 was a Lieutenant Colonel in the QMC acting as Chief
of the Dehydration Section, Nonperishable Branch, Subsistence Division,
Office of the Quartermaster General. Lieutenant General E. B. Gregory,
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the Quartermaster General, wrote Colonel Dunn praising his work on
dehydrators and saying that they "marked your work as exemplifying the
highest traditions of military service."
Robert S. Harris, Professor of Biochemistry of Nutrition, was Expert
Consultant to the Secretary of War beginning 17 July 1943. He established
and directed laboratories at the Pentagon Building in Washington which
carried on studies in the losses in nutrients in foods prepared in large
quantities (army garrisons) and in methods for decreasing these losses.
13 Truman S. Gray, Associate Professor of Engineering Electronics,
Consultant to Climatic Research and Laboratory, R and D Branch,
Military Planning Division, QMG. Most of Gray's work related to the
development of electronic and other electrical equipment used in the
extremely rigid tests made of clothing intended for severe climates.
14 Carl F. Floe, Associate Professor of Physical Metallurgy, Executive
Officer of the Department, and Dean Peabody, Jr., Professor of Structural
Design. Peabody's personal experience as an expert mountain climber
doubtless stood him in as good stead in this assignment as his skill in
testing materials.
15 Harold A. Freeman, Associate Professor of Statistics. Consultant to
HQ, QMC Inspection Service.
16 Robert S. Williams, Professor of Physical Metallurgy, Emeritus, Tech-
nical Advisor to the R and D Branch, Military Planning Division, QMG.
17 The citation reads: “Lieutenant Colonel William P. Allis rendered
outstanding services as Assistant War Department Liaison Officer for the
National Defense Research Committee during the period April 1944 to
April 1945. Through his personal enterprise and initiative, sound judg-
ment, intelligence and broad scientific background, he made an outstand-
ing contribution to the War Department and the Nation in effectively
correlating the needs of the using forces with the capabilities of the
developing scientists in the field of radar, thereby expediting the employ-
ment of radar equipments in the field. Colonel Allis' services reflect great
credit on both himself and the military service.”
18 The citation reads: "Colonel Clark S. Robinson, 0 201 038 (then
Lieutenant Colonel), Ordnance Department, Army of the United States.
For exceptionally meritorious conduct in the performance of outstanding
services from October 1943 to October 1944. While assigned as Chief of
the Standards Correlation Section, Safety and Security Division, Office
of the Chief of Ordnance, Colonel Robinson, applying distinguished
scientific and technological skill, and intricate mathematical formulae,
completed in the short period of a year the first comprehensive analysis
of data obtained from accidental explosions. Presenting the results of his
efforts in an excellently prepared book with accompanying charts, he made
available to the Armed Forces of this country the first rational study
FOR THE ARMY
83
suitable for practical use and to the expanding military explosives industry
a firm scientific foundation for safety control.”
19 Homer R. Oldfield, quondam Instructor in Aeronautical Engineer-
ing, now head of the Air Forces Section, Government Division, Electronics
Department, General Electric Company. Commissioned as a second lieu-
tenant in the Coast Artillery in July, 1941, he served with the Coast
Artillery Board, the 108th Antiaircraft Gun Battalion as the Antiaircraft
Artillery Board's observer, with the Air Communications Officer AAF, and
represented the AAF on the Joint and Combined Radar Committee of the
Combined Communications Board of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Placed
on inactive status as Major, 1945.
20 Dr. John Milne Murray, Psychiatrist, Medical Department, as a lieu-
tenant colonel was a Chief Psychiatrist, AAF. In the field he organized and
maintained convalescent hospitals for AAF personnel and organized train-
ing programs in these hospitals for general physicians to be qualified to
carry on minor psychiatric activities.
21 William E. Stanley, newly appointed Professor of Sanitary Engineer-
ing at M.I.T., entered the Armed Forces from his position as Professor of
Sanitary Engineering at Cornell University. He rose to the position of
Major in the Corps of Engineers. Following the duties described in the
text, he became Water Supply Officer for the 727th Railway Operating
Battalion in the Tunisian Campaign. His subsequent career in Africa was
at Headquarters. He wears two Bronze stars on the European-African-
Middle Eastern Theatre ribbon.
22 Robert V. Rosa, Instructor in Economics, entered the army as a
sergeant and emerged as a lieutenant. His activities are described in greater
detail in Chapter 17.
23 Conrad Schuerch, Jr., now Teaching Fellow in Chemistry. Schuerch
joined the Air Force in February, 1943, after nearly two years with
Stockbarger on the project for the synthesis of calcium fluoride in the
optically pure state. As a navigator in the Eighth Air Force and subse-
quently with the Third Bombardment Division he participated in many
missions over such cities as Regensburg, Munich, and Berlin. Between the
11th of March and the 7th of June, 1944, he won the Air Medal with no
less than three Oak Leaf Clusters, the Distinguished Flying Cross, and
the Purple Heart.
24 Stuart T. Martin, Assistant Professor of Electrical Engineering.
Martin, who did graduate work at M.I.T. in the late thirties, left an
assistant professorship at Clark University in 1941 to do research work for
Radio Corporation of America. He was placed on active duty with the
Signal Corps, where his principal duties until February, 1944, were as
liaison with Division 13, NDRC. Through most of 1944 he was on a
mission in Italy involving the shepherding of about 25 tons of direction-
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Researchons of thoup
finding and associated equipment, getting it to Italy, and moving up with
it during the tactical operations of the Fifth Army in the summer offensive
of that year. Subsequently, from February to June, 1945, he carried out a
similar mission for the Twelfth U.S. Army Group (First, Third, and Ninth
Armies) during the German operations of that decisive period.
25 Samuel A. Goldblith, Research Fellow in Food Technology. As a
second lieutenant in the Corps of Engineers, with one enlisted man he
stole into Abucay near Bataan on the night of 18 January 1942, and
secured a 155-mm gun. For this he received the Silver Star Medal two
months later.
26 Howard Grekel, recently Assistant in Chemical Engineering, and
during the war a captain in the AAF. Grekel made countless flights in
unarmed transports carrying troops and supplies to forward positions in
the Southwest Pacific, over hazardous land and water routes, through
frequent inclement weather with landings often made within a few miles
of enemy bases. For this, in September, 1945, he received the Air Medal.
27 Harold L. Bond, Instructor in English and History. Winner of the
Silver Star at Cassino, the Bronze Star at Velletri, and a subsequent Oak
Leaf Cluster, Bond has described his big adventure with Goering in an
article he wrote which appeared in The Saturday Evening Post for 5
January 1946.
28 For example:
Schrade F. Radtke, now Teaching Fellow in Chemistry, had the same
position until January, 1941, when he went with Fernstrom to act as
Technical Assistant in the North Carolina Shipbuilding Company at
Wilmington. He entered the Army in June, 1942, and as captain served in
the Transportation Corps. He was awarded the Army Commendation
Ribbon by Major General Edmond H. Leavey for his work as Chief,
Production Division, New York Procurement Office.
Francis W. Sears, Professor of Physics, spent most of the war teaching.
In the year 1942–43 he helped in training for field work in degaussing.
His most interesting assignment was postwar when, from June, 1945, to
January, 1946, he served as head of the Physics Department in the Shriven-
ham American University in England, established by the War Department.
Rogers B. Finch, Assistant Professor of Textile Technology, entered
the Army in 1941 two months after his graduation from the Institute.
Until March, 1943, he was with the Quartermaster Corps at Camp Lee;
from then until November, 1943, he was in the Meteorology Service of the
Air Force; from December, 1943, to December, 1945, as a captain, he was
in charge of heavy textile research and development at the Jeffersonville,
Indiana, Quartermaster Depot. He was awarded the Army Commendation
Ribbon by Major General T. B. Larkin, Quartermaster General.
William R. Weems, Assistant Professor of Aeronautical Engineering,
FOR THE ARMY
85
od the Army in
Weapons Developmchool (now ca
entered the Army in June, 1941, and until February, 1944, worked at
Wright Field on Special Weapons Development (guided missiles). Then
he was made Head of the AAF Engineering School (now called the AAF
Institute of Technology). He was discharged as lieutenant colonel in
January, 1946, when he came to his present post at M.I.T.
William M. Hearon, Assistant Professor of Chemistry, was first with the
Office of Civilian Defense, then spent two and one-half years with the
Manhattan District, Madison Square Area. As Head of the Technical
Section to procure materials and supplies for a plant at Oak Ridge, he
attained the rank of major. He came to M.I.T. in the fall of 1946.
FOR THE NAVY
HUNSAKER, AS HAS BEEN TOLD, made his direct contribution to
the Navy by establishing the Office of the Coordinator of
Research and Development, and then went on to other activi-
ties with the NACA. Another very important thing M.I.T. men
did directly for the United States Navy was to furnish the head
and much of the personnel for Philip Morse's Operational
Research Group (ORG). This group came into being as a
result of difficulties the Navy was finding in combating the
German submarine off our shores. It began in a small way
under the auspices of Division 6, NDRC, and, although always
supported financially by the OSRD, became more and more a
part of and a pet of the Navy.
The successful application of analytical principles to combat
problems in the antisubmarine campaign was so impressive
that the size of Morse's group and the extent to which they
were consulted by the Navy on all sorts of operational problems
increased steadily throughout the war. At the end, in addition
to the original antisubmarine group, there was a prosubmarine
group, a group on air operations, and several others. The
significance of this can scarcely be realized by one not familiar
with the traditions of the Navy and the instinct of the Naval
commander, used to brooking no outside intervention on his
quarter-deck.
Actually ORG did not intervene on the quarter-deck.
What it did do was to bring to the Navy an application of the
principles of operational research. This was a technique which
became important in war for the first time in World War II.
Who first proposed that scientific processes of analysis could be
86
FOR THE NAVY
87
applied to the half-light of combat may never be known. Cer-
tainly one of the very early proponents of the process was
Professor P. M. S. Blackett, distinguished British scientist,
adviser to the Admiralty. He proclaimed that even though the
variables of combat could seldom, if ever, be evaluated with
the minimum accuracy tolerable in a laboratory, nonetheless
a reasonable effort would produce a fair statement of these
parameters. The British contributions to operations analysis
were spectacular. Once started it was taken up in America, most
particularly by the Army Air Forces and the Navy. The work
done by the Army Air Forces was good enough and it is no
derogation of it to say that the work of ORG for the Navy far
outstripped it and became, probably, the outstanding applica-
tion of operational research made by the United States Forces
in World War II. There are those who would add that the
reason this was so was that in the Navy scientists were called to
direct what was essentially a scientific task while in the Air
Forces the same responsibility was for the most part delegated
to attorneys while the sprinkling of scientists they were able to
glean occupied for the most part subordinate positions.
Operations research cannot be defined in a single popular
word; indeed its practitioners would perhaps not agree entirely
as to its scope. For our purposes it is perhaps enough to say
that it seeks in the first instance to collect a sufficient body of
comparable observations and, so far as possible, to have these
quantitative. It collects this evidence on the behavior of instru-
ments of war or combinations of them and the results they have
achieved on the actual battle field. Then, if enough data have
been assembled, rigorous statistical or other mathematical
methods of analysis are applied. The result is hoped to be an
expression of the probability that given a certain set of actions
by our side, a certain result can be produced, a result unfortu-
nate for the other side. Such an analysis may show which is the
better of a given number of devices for the purpose in hand,
which is the best way to employ a device or a group of them,
what plans are best for today, what plans may be anticipated
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for tomorrow. In the course of collecting the data the opera-
tions analysts may produce information revelatory to the com-
mand. It is, for example, an unnatural bombardier, who,
swaying among the flak, does not report honestly that his
bombs found the target, an unusual fighter pilot who will not
construe fall-away action as a kill, a strange skipper of a PC who
would not interpret an oil slick as a sinking. All these are honest
reactions and permissible as errors. Cumulatively they may lead
the high command into a gross overestimate of the damage done
to enemy plants, fighters, submarines. Finally also, in the field
of prediction operations analysis may foretell the needs for
procurement and thus for research and development. All the
way it opens the door to the controlled military experiment
which may not be possible when the gauge is down in a pitched
battle but which can be practiced more than it has been in a
strategic offensive stretching over many months.
Civilians working on operations research cannot all sit in an
office with a book on probability and a slide rule. They have
to go where their laboratory is, and that laboratory is on the
ocean and in the air and always where the enemy is, as well.
There they must observe the actions, must participate in inter-
rogations of returning pilots and skippers. When, with the
data back in the home office, the analysis is made and the
conclusion reached, it must then be presented to those who
make the decisions at the high-command level. This is not
always an easy time for anyone. The conclusions are not always
those which would obviously be reached by an able man of
action. It sometimes takes a good deal of confidence on the part
of the sea-dog and a good deal of patience and persistence on
the part of the scientist before the pay-off is made.
This perhaps shows as well as anything that operations
analysis does not supersede the command function. What it
does for the man in command is to give him a powerful new
tool in a quantitative form and rigorous conclusions instead of
a hunch. Ordinarily it will express the result of a past series
of events in terms of a degree of probability that a future set
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89
L
of acts will have a stated result. This probability will seldom
if ever be a certainty, and often will be not so high when com-
pared with some other probability as to make a single course
of conduct mandatory. The relative probabilities of various
courses will have to be weighed in terms of the force available,
the risk necessary to produce a given result, the importance of
the job to be done as related to that risk, the forces which may
be available a little later, and even the political situation.1 It
is a sound rule of the services that responsibility goes only with
authority, and operations analysis by civilians in no way seeks
to abrogate this rule. It seeks merely to give the man making
the decision a stronger pair of eyes and ears, a better basis for
making his decision.2
The ORG at its peak numbered seventy-three men; of these
twenty-one were scientists and they were for the most part,
though not exclusively, the key men. The others were business
and professional people largely from Massachusetts. In addi-
tion to Morse, twelve were from M.I.T.
These men went to sea in warships, under the sea in sub-
marines. They flew in combat aircraft. For example, Arthur F.
Kip, Assistant Professor of Physics, worked originally on the
antisubmarine problem but in the last year of the war was in
charge of a group dealing with defense of the fleet against air
attacks, especially attacks by the Japanese Kamikazes; his travel
duty included work in Trinidad, two periods in Great Britain
and one in Guam, and aboard ships of the Pacific Fleet.
M. Stanley Livingston, Associate Professor of Physics, after
work on the cyclotron3 joined ORG and spent much of 1945 in
London and later in Germany studying German U-boat tactics.
He received the Naval Ordnance Development Award for
his analyses of Operations Research data. Charles F. Squire,
Assistant Professor of Physics, who first worked on the guided
missiles project of Division 5, NDRC, ended in ORG and,
after spending most of his time at the Quonset Naval Air Sta-
tion in Rhode Island, occupied his last six months prior to V-J
Day in the Pacific with Navy Fleet Air Wing Two.4
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Back in the home office, the main one in the Chief of Naval
Operations with others in the field, the ORG sweated out the
answers based on the reports from operations officers and their
own men at sea. Presumably their biggest success and certainly
the one which won them the confidence of the Navy was their
analysis of how to meet the challenge of the German U-boats
in the Caribbean and off our Atlantic seaboard. Even for this
now old story all the details cannot yet be given. Interesting
as the techniques or the weapons might be, this record will
have to leave it a half-told story, the full account of which
may sometime be given by the Navy. It may be interesting,
however, to see the variety of problems which were given to
ORG after it had obtained the confidence of the Naval High
Command.
1. In the winter of 1943-44 the U-boats were getting through
the Straits of Gibraltar by approaching at night, submerging
at dawn, and running through the straits submerged. After
making a similar trip through the Straits in a friendly sub-
marine, a member of ORG suggested a piece of special equip-
ment to lay a trap for the "pig-boats.” There is good reason to
believe that, after this trap was set, no U-boat succeeded in
getting through the Straits without attack.
2. In the same year German blockade runners were carry-
ing tin, rubber, and other strategic materials from Japan to
ports in the Bay of Biscay. American Naval forces in Brazil
were ordered to intercept these ships in the South Atlantic.
Using a new set of radar search plans laid out by a member of
ORG on duty with the Fourth Fleet, United States Navy
patrol planes intercepted and sank the Weserland, the Burgen-
land, and the Rio Grande in three days and played a large part
in stopping this traffic.
3. Also in the fall of 1943 the Germans introduced their
acoustic homing torpedo with which they hoped to cut the
Atlantic supply line. This looked ominous, but within a month
after its long-heralded first use ORG had analyzed its perform-
ance and found its weak spot. With their assistance the Navy
FOR THE NAVY
91
designed an effective countermeasure and soon put an end to
this hope of the U-boats.
4. One of the more difficult problems solved by ORG pro-
duced a method for making a close estimate of the fate of our
own submarines which went out on patrol and were never
heard from again. ORG was able to deduce one of the principal
reasons for these losses and to initiate changes in equipment
and tactics which are credited with saving at least three of our
submarines from destruction by the enemy. Considering the
effect of our submarine campaign upon the Japanese economy
as estimated by the United States Strategic Bombing Survey, a
War Department group which had no reason to be partial to
the Navy, this contribution to a little-publicized part of our
war is important. The group associated with such problems was
appropriately called prosubmarine.
5. At a time when we were losing many planes to the Japa-
nese, ORG was assigned the problem of finding the weak spot
in the Japanese defenses. Mathematical methods were devised
for determining the safest course along which our planes could
approach the target. These methods were then applied by
specially trained officers assigned to the Carrier Forces. This
work was credited by Vice Admiral Marc A. Mitscher with saving
many of his planes from loss.
6. Until a war is won against a redoubtable army, it is
always touch and go. Towards the end of World War II the
Germans brought out their Schnörkel, which allowed the sub-
marine to "breathe” underwater for much longer than ever
before, and the Japanese, the Kamikaze or suicide plane. Both
were especially troublesome. It is even unpleasant to speculate
what might have happened had the Germans brought forth the
Schnörkel two years earlier or had the Japanese adopted
Kamikaze methods from the outset instead of storing some
9,000 Kamikaze planes, including 5,000 which were specially
equipped for the final defense of the homeland against invasion.
Both the Schnörkel and the Kamikaze were subject to refine-
ment, and it cannot now be told whether ORG had solved the
1
QED
questions raised by these developments or not. We can only
end on the same note as Frank Stockton's The Lady or The
Tiger.
That Morse's group was an important factor in winning the
war is fairly obvious to everyone who knows anything about the
inside of the war. The methods applied were admittedly crude
and did not begin to represent what might be worked out in
time, as is obvious to those who know how ORG operated.
The Navy recognizes the potential of this intellectual weapon
and will continue ORG in peactime,5 an encouraging sign for
our postwar security. That the methods are conceivably
applicable to the perhaps more complicated problems of peace
would seem a natural corollary; and here again it is gratifying
to know that some of the scientists who worked in operations
analysis during the war are interested in seeing how such appli-
cations can be made. For his leadership Morse received a well-
earned Medal for Merit.6
Two of M.I.T.'s present or past staff, civilians in uniform,
made important contributions to the scientific achievements
of the Navy, both as captains in the USNR.
J. P. Den Hartog, now Professor of Mechanical Engineering,
was on the staff of Harvard University when he joined the
Navy as a lieutenant commander. He has long been recog-
nized as one of the nation's leading experts on problems of
vibration. When summoned to active duty he was naturally
assigned to the Bureau of Ships, where he spent three years
working on minimizing the effects of vibration on the new
ships being constructed and on the older ones which were
being called upon for more arduous duty, which meant more
hours at top speed, and hence more vibration than ever before.
He took part in the trials of practically every new type of ship
launched and in the sea trials of almost all the larger vessels,
individually. In the fourth year of his service he was a member
of the United States Naval Technical Mission in Europe
(NavTecMisEu) investigating German war industry and
research, especially as it applied to naval matters. For each
FOR THE NAVY
93
of these activities he received personal citations from the Secre-
tary of the Navy.
The gratification the Institute feels in the acquisition of Den
Hartog is tempered by the loss it has suffered in the decision
of Ralph D. Bennett, Professor of Electrical Measurements
(absent), to extend his duty with the Navy. Like Den Hartog,
Bennett was called to active duty as a lieutenant commander
and rose to the position of temporary Captain USNR. All
Captain Bennett's service was at the Naval Ordnance Labora-
tory in Washington, save for temporary duty in the ETO for
three months in 1944, and for his service he was awarded the
Medal for Merit and the Order of the British Empire.
Captain Bennett joined the staff of NOL in July, 1940. As
an example of the parsimony of Congress, it should be marked
well that at that time the staff comprised about a dozen profes-
sional personnel plus assistants and mechanics. Its principal
problem at the moment was to develop means for measuring
the magnetic fields of ships and to devise equipment for neu-
tralizing those fields.7
Captain Bennett's original task was to expand the staff of the
NOL. He did this, as did others, by bringing in “friends and
acquaintances among the physicists and electrical engineers of
the country and their nominees” until eventually the staff of
professional men had jumped from a dozen to a thousand with
about as many assistants of various sorts.
Degaussing problems were solved by early 1942, and the
effort of NOL was then turned to the offensive phases of mining,
the development of depth charges and of contact fuses for
bombs and projectiles. Later considerable effort was expended
in developing detectors for mines and other underwater
obstacles, and influence exploders for torpedoes.
The principal achievements of the Laboratory according
to Captain Bennett were (1) the laying of a successful degaus-
sing program for both the Navy and the Merchant Marine by
which magnetic mines could no longer be set off by the mag-
netic field created by the normal ship hull; (2) the design of
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approximately half a hundred different types of mines which
were used extensively towards the end of the war. The cam-
paign put on in the home waters of the Japanese Empire with
the aid of B-29's using mines developed by NOL successfully
immobilized what Japanese shipping the submarines had left
afloat and, according to the Japanese, sank nearly twice as
many Japanese ships as all other methods combined in the last
months of the war.
Captain Bennett's career was thus characteristic of that of
many organizers of scientific research. He spent about eighteen
months in building up personnel for a starved laboratory; two
years in charge of the design section; the final eighteen months
as Technical Director, in which position he continues. The
success of his laboratory was such as to merit the construction
of the new White Oak Research and Development Plant costing
initially 16 millions of dollars. In order to staff this plant
adequately, Captain Bennett predicts, as would any informed
civilian, that substantial reforms in government employment
procedures for scientists and engineers will undoubtedly be
required. During the last several months Captain Bennett has
spent a large part of his time in defining the requirements and
getting the machinery set up to bring about these reforms. He
has chosen to remain with the Navy in this important postwar
task, on leave of absence from M.I.T.
Although these are perhaps the largest Naval activities in
which Institute people played a leading role they by no means
exhaust their direct contributions to the Navy program. A
cursory glance, at least, needs to be paid to those who worked
directly for the Navy on the civilian side and those who worked,
more colorfully, on the sea of battle.
Charles H. Blake, Associate Professor of Zoology, seemed to
have a penchant for landing himself in colorful situations. In
May, 1942, the Navy suddenly discovered that its underwater
listening devices in Chesapeake Bay were being interfered with
by a very high level of underwater noise which was also inter-
fering with similar mine-firing devices of the Army. There
FOR THE NAVY
95
were even those who asserted that this was due to some clever
development by the Germans who were always rated as being
superlatively clever. This noise level was particularly high at
night; it could easily interfere with the detection of submarines
which might, who knows, enter the bay and shell the great
Naval installations at Norfolk, or at least stand close in and
sink everything coming out. At the request of the New London
Underwater Sound Laboratory of NDRC, which doubtless had
a good idea of what was up, Blake went to Norfolk, primarily
to determine the cause of these characteristic sounds which
consisted of loud clicks at the rate of about 7 per second. Blake
did not bother with apparatus but went to a local and cooper-
ative fisherman. The latter loaned live specimens of several
commercial fish, among them the ubiquitous croaker. The
croaker, placed in a bucket of sea water on the beach and tickled
gently under the belly, gave off the expected sounds. Unfortun-
ately, as Blake puts it, and as is so often the case with biological
problems, it was fairly easy to find the difficulty, but any effec-
tive control would, in itself, have been catastrophic to the food-
fish supply of that region, and at a time when marine fishing
was endangered by submarines. Some 40 millions of pounds of
croakers are taken from Chesapeake Bay each year, and the
population of croakers is to be reckoned in the hundreds of
millions. However, no scientist is ever thwarted by such diffi-
culties. Blake went on to show something of the variation in
abundance of croakers in various parts of the bay and to assure
the armed forces that the high sound level was a phenomenon
of summer since the fish migrate south in cold weather. All such
events have their corollary. Blake was commissioned to prepare
for the Navy a report which would set forth the possible sound
levels due to fish over a considerable portion of the ocean and
which would also discuss the available evidence on sound pro-
duction by whales and a few other marine animals which had
been mistaken for submarines. 8
It is hardly appropriate to dwell upon the adventures of the
few naval officers from M.I.T.'s staff who found their way into
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combat areas. They did many things, nonetheless. One directed
the combat activities of teams using special radar gear in
amphibious landings and was wounded during the invasion
of the Marshalls;9 one was a gunnery officer on small vessels
both in the Atlantic and the Pacific and everyone knows that
active small vessels can have hair-raising experiences; 10 one was
Executive Officer in one of our most advanced base hospitals,
that on Peleliu;11 a fourth was finally in charge of the design
of many types of landing craft;12 a fifth was an exceptionally
useful assistant to Dr. Compton in many of his most important
ventures.13 A sixth, an English professor, showed great talent for
administration in the occupation of Korea and North China;14
a seventh did important psychiatric work in Naval hospitals
at home and in the field; 15 an eighth was cited for his perform-
ance in the assault on Okinawa;16 and a ninth as a Marine
lieutenant did stalwart radar work on Tinian.17 These are but
characteristic samples. 18
Thus we come to the end of the record of the direct con-
tributions of M.I.T. staff men to the work of the Armed Forces.
Of these, the contributions most significant in the long view
of history, and entirely divorced from their absolute accom-
plishment in terms of victory, will certainly be the work of
Bowles for the Army and Morse for the Navy. The men who
went into the services may have made equally important con-
tributions but they did not help to demonstrate one important
principle which badly needed demonstrating in this country.
This is the principle that the civilian and the man in uniform
together win wars and that the civilian and the man in uniform
must also work together in the peace. Our traditional pattern
has been based upon a suspicion of the military bureaucracy.
In peacetime we lend them scant support and scant prestige.
When war comes we suddenly elevate them to positions of
supreme command. At that time they tend to reduce the
civilian to the subordinate role. Neither of these attitudes
is wise.
The British, with their characteristic long-range wisdom,
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97
have long recognized the importance of untrammeled thinking
in the military machine and have accordingly elevated the
civilian to a position of equal importance with the officer in
both the Admiralty and the War Office. Indeed the directors
of research for those groups (both of whom are civilians) have
powers which make most admirals and generals tremble. In
this the British may have gone too far although they have
coupled “responsibility with authority" and simply not paid
too much obeisance to a suit of clothes. On our side before this
War we had, however, gone much too far in the other direction.
How far those who command the destinies of the Army and
Navy now understand this remains to be seen. But at the least
this can be said. Bowles showed that a civilian could be influ-
ential at the highest levels in the Army and deal with technical
matters without upsetting the processes of command; Morse
showed the same thing for the Navy; it remained to demonstrate
to the Asiatic theatre command that this was possible in the
field. That demonstration became the function of the Office of
Field Service of the Office of Scientific Research and Develop-
ment. The OFS offered the final demonstration of how the
civilian could be useful to the Army near to the battle without
the loss to him of his self-respect or his independence of thought,
without loss to the command of its ultimate authority. This
activity, like the other two, was directed by an M.I.T. man,
in this case the President of M.I.T. himself, Dr. Compton.
Together Compton, Bowles, and Morse held up three signal
flags for the services to read. To the message of the last of these
three flags we may now turn.
1
FOOTNOTES
1 For example, the frequent diversion of the Eighth Bomber Command
from the strategic bombing of Germany to the relatively futile bombing
of the submarine pens at St. Nazaire and Brest. This was said to be at the
personal behest of the Prime Minister who needed no operations analyst
to advise him how the psychological wind blew.
2 For further reading on operations research see "The Nature and
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Development of Operations Research,” by Charles Kittel, Guggenheim
Foundation Fellow in Physics, M.I.T. (Science, Vol. 105, No. 2719, 7
February 1947), and articles by P. M. Morse (Technology Review, Novem-
ber, 1946, Vol. 49, No. 1), and Jacinto Steinhardt (U.S. Naval Institute
Proceedings, 1946, 72, 649).
3 For an account of Livingston's work with the cyclotron see Chapter 10.
4 The other M.I.T. men in ORG were:
Walter E. Albertson, then Assistant Professor of Physics.
Edward S. Lamar, Assistant Professor of Physics (absent).
Ralph E. Beatty, Jr., Research Associate in Physics.
J. A. Neuenborffer, graduate student.
D. C. Peaslee, Research Associate in Physics.
J. K. Tyson, graduate student.
John R. Pellam, Research Associate in Physics.
5 Under contract with M.I.T.
6 “Dr. Philip McCord Morse, for extraordinary fidelity and exception-
ally meritorious conduct in the performance of outstanding services to the
United States from April, 1942 to August, 1945. Dr. Morse as Director of
the Antisubmarine Warfare Operations Research Group in the Head-
quarters of the Commander in Chief, United States Fleet, made use of the
scientific method in the analysis of naval tactics and equipment, and
instructed and directed others in these methods in the furtherance of the
United States' war efforts. Dr. Morse greatly assisted operational authorities
in meeting the rapid changes of scientific warfare, and was instrumental
in making important changes in doctrine, tactics, and the use of equip-
ment, which contributed greatly to the final victory."
7 It was in this field that another M.I.T. Professor gained his brightest
spurs in the war. Francis Bitter, Associate Professor of Physics, had been in
charge of M.I.T.'s large magnet laboratory. He was called to Washington
in June, 1940, as a civilian to work on countermeasures to the German
magnetic mine. As a first step he went to England with two naval officers
to see at first hand what had been done about the situation there. He
played an important role in the degaussing program which defeated the
magnetic mine. On his return to this country the NOL was well stocked
with technical experts, thanks to the work of Captain Bennett (vide
supra), and it was felt desirable to commission Bitter and to retain him
as a middle man between the scientists and the naval direction in an
effort to reconcile operational needs with technical possibilities. With the
degaussing program under way Commander Bitter was switched to the
mining program and later to air intelligence in an effort to assemble
operational data in a form suitable for operational analysis. An off-shoot
of this air-intelligence program, the Joint Target Group, was due in large
measure to the work of Commander Bitter. This joint Army and Navy
nal needs wander Bitter an effort to a shoot
FOR THE NAVY
99
group, in which the British were also represented, studied problems dealing
with the strategic bombardment of Japan.
8 Other M.I.T. staff men who were engaged on less spectacular efforts
for the Navy, not included in the M.I.T. Research Program, were:
Leopold R. Michel, quondam Instructor in Mechanical Engineering,
now a member of the Research Department of Polaroid Corporation,
spent a few months in 1944 in a secret Navy project in the wind tunnels at
the U.S. Bureau of Standards.
Truman S. Gray, Associate Professor of Engineering Electronics, spent
four months in 1941 as a contract employee for NOL assisting Captain
Bennett in the purchase of both permanent and expendable electrical
equipment for the expanding experimental program.
Addison F. Holmes, Associate Professor of Applied Mechanics, cooper-
ated with the Office of the Inspector of Naval Material in the testing of
materials supplied to the Navy by New England contractors.
Dean Peabody, Jr., now Professor of Structural Design, worked with
Professor Holmes in the assignment described above.
Dean Sherwood, shortly before the end of the war, was asked to plan a
Navy research program related to rocket fuels, and work was started in
this field under his direction in June, 1945.
Edwin R. Gilliland, Professor of Chemical Engineering, was (under the
auspices of the Office of Field Service) chairman of a Jet Propulsion Panel
set up at the request of the Navy to study possible coordination of the
many existing programs in the field and to suggest a plan for future
development.
9 John M. Hartwell, Jr., then Instructor in Business and Engineering
Administration, entered the Navy as Ensign USNR in August, 1942. He
spent much time in the Fleet Radar Center in the Central Pacific and
then as a member of the staff of Admiral Kelly Turner who was Com-
mander-in-Chief of the Amphibious Forces, Pacific. He was wounded during
invasion of the Marshall Islands.
10 Paul C. Eaton, then Assistant Professor of English, now at the California
Institute of Technology. First in the HQ of the Commander of the Eastern
Sea Frontier as a lieutenant (jg) he ended his naval career as Lieutenant
Commander USNR. He was variously First Lieutenant and Gunnery Officer
for the USS Fury, on the staff of Commander of Service Squadron 10, US
Pacific Fleet, and Operations Officer for the same group on USS Prairie, and
for this received a letter of commendation.
11 Dr. John Winslow Chamberlain, Assistant Medical Director, joined
the Naval Reserve in 1935, was ordered to active duty December, 1940, and
released to return to the Institute November, 1945. He served variously
as Medical Officer, Surgeon, and Executive Officer in the American, Euro-
African, and Pacific Theatres. Beginning at the USNRAB in Squantum,
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Massachusetts, continuing as Junior Medical Officer on the USS Memphis,
he ended as Chief of Surgery and finally Executive Officer of the USN Base
Hospital 20 on Peleliu with the rank of Commander.
12 Frank B. Hays, then Instructor in Mechanical Engineering, entered
Naval service as a Lieutenant Commander USNR and reached the rank
of Commander. All his service was in the Bureau of Ships where, asso-
ciated regularly with landing craft, his final post was that of Officer in
charge of design for engines used in landing craft and small boats. Major
landing craft included vessels 100 feet to nearly 500 feet in length, some of
which were the familiar LCT, LCI (L), LCM, LST, and LSD. The cost of the
major landing craft built was in excess of 3 billion dollars.
13 Thomas F. Creamer, formerly Assistant to the President of M.I.T.
After indoctrination training as an Ensign USNR, he was assigned to the
Senior Naval Officer M.I.T. and from that office to Dr. Compton's office
with the special assignment of helping him in NDRC business, not all of
which was conducted in Washington. As Dr. Compton's assistant he was
a member of the Secretariat of the Radar Subcommittee of the Joint New
Weapons and Equipment Committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, especially
in connection with the arrangements for the visit of the British Radar
Mission to the United States. In January, 1944, he was transferred to the
Executive Office of the Secretary of the Navy in Washington and thence
assigned to the Office of Field Service of the Office of Scientific Research
and Development as special assistant to the Chief (first Dr. Compton, later
Alan T. Waterman) and the Deputy Chief (first Waterman, later
Burchard). From September, 1945, to the end of his duty he was also
special assistant to the Chairman of the Committee on Publications of
OSRD. Creamer left the Naval service with the rank of Lieutenant to work
with the National City Bank.
14 Robert S. Woodbury, Assistant Professor of English and History and
Commander USNR. Awarded the Legion of Merit by Admiral Kinkaid,
commanding the Seventh Fleet, for his outstanding service as Flag Secre-
tary on the Staff of the Commander Seventh Fleet from July to November,
1945.
15 Dana L. Farnsworth, M.D., now Medical Director at M.I.T. and,
before the war, Director of Health at Williams College. As a Commander
USNR Dr. Farnsworth directed important work in the Naval hospitals at
Philadelphia, Oakland, Bethesda, and Palm Beach and served on the
USS Solace in the South Pacific.
16 Donald E. Boynton, Assistant in Chemical Engineering, Lieutenant
Commander USNR, Silver Star Medal. He was commanding officer of a
close-in fire-support ship during the assault on Okinawa Shima. His boat
shot down three and damaged five others during an extended air attack
by a large force of enemy suicide planes. When a friendly ship was hit by
FOR THE NAVY
101
0
)
a Kamikaze and raging fires ensued "he demonstrated outstanding sea-
manship and valor, in the face of exploding ammunition, by coming along-
side the stricken vessel, extinguishing the fires and towing it to a place of
safety.”
17 Marvin B. Sledd, Assistant Professor of Electrical Engineering, First
Lieutenant USMCR. Acting as a heavy antiaircraft group radar officer in
the Marianas from 2 August 1944 to 11 January 1945, Sledd was cited as
follows: “He personally assisted with the repair of these fire control instru-
ments, often working as long as thirty-six hours without sleep or rest.
Battery locations, terrain features, and weather conditions were such as to
require his walking from one radar to another. He was subjected many
times to enemy sniper fire en route."
18 Others whose activities do not fit neatly into the narrative would
include, for example:
Walter H. Gale, Associate Professor of Aeronautical Engineering, was
in the Navy from September, 1942, to November, 1945, also in the Bureau
of Aeronautics and engaged in work similar to that of Bisplinghoff (see
below). He left the Navy in November, 1945, with the rank of Lieutenant
Commander.
Howard F. Taylor, Associate Professor of Mechanical Metallurgy, was
at the Naval Research Laboratory from 1937 to 1945 as head of the
Foundry Research Section, working to improve foundry operations on
repair ships at advanced bases. He came to M.I.T. in November, 1945.
Raymond L. Bisplinghoff, Assistant Professor of Aeronautical Engineer-
ing, was in the Navy for two years beginning in September, 1943, as a
Lieutenant (ig) USNR. Working with the Engineering Division of the
Bureau of Aeronautics he dealt with the testing and design of aircraft
structures. He came to M.I.T. in August, 1946.
John C. Quinn, Assistant Professor of Chemical Engineering, who
joined the Navy in 1942 and until 1946 served with the Bureau of Ord-
nance working on the aircraft rocket-launching program. In his last year
with the Navy, as a Lieutenant Commander USNR, he worked in the
Office of Naval Research. He came to M.I.T. in 1946.
Fritjof A. Raven, Assistant Professor of Modern Languages, served at
the Taylor Model Basin (USN) from 1941 to 1946 as an analyst and was
awarded the Meritorious Civilian Service Award by Admiral Howard
for his translations of foreign technical documents. He came to M.I.T. in
June of 1946.
FOR THE OFFICE OF FIELD SERVICE
ONE OF THE MOST perplexing problems of World War II
was how to bring the knowledge of the laboratory fully to the
use of the field commander. In previous wars which had been
relatively untechnical this problem had not been serious. It
was always possible to teach enough bright young men enough.
But with complex modern apparatus which had a rapid rate
of obsolescence as well, this was no longer possible. Moreover
the scale of the war had caused a great dilution of the techni-
cally skilled professional officers who might have been able to
keep abreast of development. Finally, the training programs
for young specialists in uniform could, in the time allotted,
provide only the most rudimentary appreciation of the true
potentials of the weapons they were sent out to be experts about.
The problem could be stated this way. Suppose with a given
model of a weapon a skilled technician in the laboratory can
produce a combat efficiency of 40 based on a potential of 100;
suppose the same weapon in the hands of the normal user also
in combat yields an efficiency of 20; how then shall we double
the efficiency? If we assume that the standard field operative
will always get 20 per cent out of any apparatus, one way is to
give him a weapon twice as good; to do this will require that
the laboratory man mind his business and stay at the bench
and out of the battle. The other way is to send the technician
away from the bench, into the field, in the expectation that he
can show the regular operator how to double his competence.
In this case there will be no new development. This is not a
far-fetched example; differences in performance of this order
due purely to personal factors were common.
102
FOR THE OFFICE OF FIELD SERVICE
103
Now each new weapon makes a lot of trouble long after it
has ceased to make trouble in the laboratory or the pilot plant.
Therefore as a war nears an end there can be little doubt that
it is better to send the technician to the field than it is to keep
him making improvements in the laboratory which will never
reach the field because the war will be over. The difficult
question is, when does one have certainty that the war is “about
over” and what does about” mean?
The supply of technically trained personnel in this country
not only was not limitless but also was not being replenished
because of Selective Service Policy with respect to young tech-
nical students. The simple solution, then, of putting all the
needed technicians in uniform and sending them forth to work
with a combat unit or a headquarters for the rest of the war,
perpetually attractive to some Army and Navy officers, was a
will-o'-the-wisp; if pursued, it would have led us into a morass.
There were other reasons, too, why this would not have been
a good plan. The problem of communication in a large Army
or Navy is always acute, especially communication between
those who need to talk to each other at anything but the highest
levels. There are always intervening "channels," channels which
do not care much personally about the information or do not
appreciate its importance. Knowledge about recent develop-
ments at home percolates but slowly to the fighting men, and
this is partly due to a deliberately opaque filter on information
to the field interposed by the procurement services. Conversely,
and this is really worse, critically important information about
the field performance of weapons and gear needed in the devel-
opment centers comes back altogether too slowly. Neither of
these processes is catalyzed by a military policy which frowns
upon letting a field commander know about a weapon which
the home front may be unable to supply him, or which the
cautious home developers have failed yet to pass for field use.
Both are hindered by the less defensible and traditional reluct-
ance of field commanders, quite independent and supreme in
their bailiwicks, to let information about their difficulties
104
LED
get back home, by their tendencies to cover up field difficulties
and to work out their own solutions with their limited technical
man power and without "intervention” from Washington.
What the director of a laboratory wanted, of course, was to
send some of his most skilled men to an area where some of
his gear was being employed in a preliminary way. He wanted
these men to help the troops so that the latter got the most out
of what had been sent and the gear did not get a bad name
through inept handling. He also wanted a critical observation
of how the gear had performed, he wanted this to be objective
and reliable, he wanted it from his own men, and he wanted
it fast. Finally he wanted the men back; he did not cherish
the thought that they might be left behind in some thrust,
forgotten, and perhaps end by running a laundry on an atoll.
There were a number of reasons beyond this one of release
why the men who ventured forth should retain their civilian
status. They would for their own protection and comfort be
clothed in military apparel, of course, and they would have
to be responsible during their tour of duty to the local com-
mand. But still it was better that they be civilians.
In the first place the information sought might be in the
head of any man in the command from GI to general. Usually
it was in the head of the GI. The explanation, though, was
more usually in the head of neither but rested with a captain,
a major, or a colonel. The observer then needed to be able to
talk to all ranks with equal freedom. In itself this would suggest
that an observer of low officer status might get along because
he would be tolerated by the upper echelons so long as he was
seeking information and not trying to furnish it, 1 whereas if
he boasted higher rank he would freeze the GI or the sergeant.
But this was only half the battle. Having got information he
was also expected to give advice, and this might have to be
given at high level as well as low; here the low rank would be
an insuperable obstacle to success in most commands. The
simplest solution was to have the man occupy the anomalous
position of civilian, to give him a simulated rank high enough
FOR THE OFFICE OF FIELD SERVICE 105
so that he might presume to talk to the highest, so that he might
live with the staff and as the staff.2
The problem of getting the scientists to the field would have
been simple enough had all the civilians been employed in the
laboratories of the Army or the Navy. Under these circum-
stances they would simply have been ordered to the theatre
and out again. Unfortunately many of the best men were not
in this employ and somebody else had the final say as to whether
they could or could not go.
At the beginning the problem did not appear important.
Scientists and engineers are just as human as anyone else. The
prospect of a visit to an active theatre to watch one's dreams
come true was enticing even to the unromantically inclined,
even if no termination date was set for the duty; at the begin-
ning it also appealed to the top executives of the laboratory
and permission was ordinarily granted.3
But as time went on this source of field technical man power
began to dry up. The laboratories were stretched taut as to
personnel; they could not afford the loss, at least the permanent
loss, of any more key men. It was, on the other hand, the per-
fectly natural instinct of the services to feel that a man who did
really on their team. After all, some of them had been in the
theatre for months and were never going to get out until the
show was over. Perhaps an even more serious complication was
that the institution which had loaned the man for the war, in
the hope of getting useful information, found that he had dis-
appeared behind an iron curtain; that, through no fault of his
own, he was consistently frustrated in his effort to get informa-
tion back where it ought to go unless he brought it back in
person. These two factors combined to produce an increasingly
cold reception by laboratories to the suggestions of the services
that more men should go afield. At the same time accounts of
the unpleasant experiences of some scientists abroad traveled
fast in the well-developed scientific underground, and individ-
uals as well as institutions became wary.
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ST
This situation never became too serious in the European
theatre. It was definitely serious in the Pacific. To understand
this it is necessary to look briefly at the difference in military
structure in these two areas. In Europe the Supreme Com-
mander, General Eisenhower, had always to deal with a Com-
bined Command; for most of the war his base was in a definitely
civilian area; he was accustomed and so was his staff to meeting
civilians in all degrees of authority on much the same terms
as they would meet them in Washington. Finally, in the Euro-
pean theatre, a man who could not reach his objective through
an American channel might find his way through a British
channel and so on. Organizations like the Radiation Laboratory
had large civilian establishments in the United Kingdom and
these organizations were established to help the Supreme Com-
mand, to be sure, but were outside its jurisdiction. Communi-
cation and transportation between the base and the United
States were relatively easy, and again there was more than one
way to skin a cat. Had the flow of civilians and information to
and from the theatre been as free and easy in the Pacific as it
was in Europe there might never have been an Office of Field
Service. But it was not. Nothing got out of Oahu without the
consent of Admiral Nimitz, nothing out of Brisbane, Hollandia,
or Manila without the consent of General MacArthur.4
There were some reasons for the tighter controls in the
Pacific and one which could be understood was the more diffi-
cult transportation and communications and housing problems
which existed. Every visiting fireman who came to Oahu or to
New Guinea displaced a soldier or a sailor or a bag of flour.
It had to be proved that he was as valuable as the bag of flour.
Moreover General MacArthur, at least, had reason to feel
that his forces were not being well supplied as the first priority
always went to Eisenhower; under the circumstances the feeling
was that there was little use in having a lot of civilian experts
around, experts on weapons which would not reach the theatre
anyway.
Nonetheless, civilians did invade the Pacific. This was usually
FOR THE OFFICE OF FIELD SERVICE
107
accomplished because, as individuals, or through their sponsors,
they had some specific objective in mind, ordinarily one of sales-
manship. It was often possible to find some friendly ear in the
War Department and less frequently in the Navy to arrange
for their dispatch to New Zealand, New Caledonia, New
Guinea, or Burma. When they got there they were often useful
and they usually brought back useful information, but their
behavior upset the commands more than ever; they acted
strangely; they knew no discipline; they wore strange uniforms;
they quoted the opinions of individual officers as the voice of
the command. There was a grave risk that the civilian visitor
would be almost as unwelcome in the Pacific as a Jap would be;
equally grave risk that a civilian would not go to the Pacific
for love or money.
Under these circumstances, Dr. Bush asked Dr. Compton to
establish a new agency of OSRD, parallel in position with
NDRC and CMR; its purpose was to receive and evaluate
service requests for help in the form of technical personnel,
to coordinate these requests, to stimulate appropriate additional
requests. It was then to find personnel suited to fill the requests,
to persuade the personnel to go, to collect and disseminate the
information which might come in as a result of these field
workers. This new organization was to be called the Office of
Field Service. It ought to have the confidence of other elements
of OSRD since it was directed by a scientific colleague and
since it was sponsored by the top direction of OSRD. It should
be better able to get the men, better able to see to it that their
stays with the armed forces were not too long, that their treat-
ment was uniform, that the information they turned up was
satisfactorily, expeditiously, and officially made available to all
who needed it. The Office of Field Service was then to cut
across the divisional and other compartmentations of OSRD.
Dr. Compton assumed the post of Chief of OFS in October,
1943, and appointed Alan T. Waterman of Yale University his
Deputy Chief.
As almost his first official act Dr. Compton made a trip to
Yn
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the Pacific to find out what the needs of the theatre were. This
he undertook with an appointment as Special Representative
of the Secretary of War arranged with the assistance of Major
General Stephen Garrett Henry, Chief of the New Develop-
ments Division of the War Department, who was throughout
his career a very good friend of both OSRD and OFS. Dr.
Compton called upon Admiral Nimitz and Lieutenant General
Robert Charlwood Richardson in Honolulu and General
MacArthur in Brisbane. Admiral Nimitz felt no great need for
OFS assistance in Naval operations, but both the high Army
commanders expressed the desire to have teams of advisory
specialists working as an Operational Research Section attached
to GHQ. In General Richardson's command the problems
would be purely those of the military establishment; in Gen-
eral MacArthur's domain there would also be problems of
coordinating with the radar research being undertaken by the
Australians; there was some prospect at least that an organiza-
tion similar to British Branch Radiation Laboratory might
materialize in Australia.
Dr. Compton returned with formal requests for the estab-
lishment of these two Army teams and a list of problems which
the staffs in the two commands looked upon as of first impor-
tance. He then set about finding the proper people to send
and proceeded to make all sorts of detailed arrangements as
to their status, their compensation, and how they would travel.
The first scientist to follow Dr. Compton into the Pacific on
behalf of OFS was Dean Harrison, who was appointed an
Assistant Chief of OFS in February, 1944. In early March of
that year he proceeded to Australia and New Guinea where
he was to act as liaison officer between the OFS and those Army
and Navy agencies in the Southwest Pacific Area which might
be interested in the use of new weapons and devices. His main
duties were to consist of investigating the scientific problems
presented in the area, reporting on these to the OFS, arranging
for the local reception of scientists proceeding to the area, and
VV
FOR THE OFFICE OF FIELD SERVICE
109
carrying out such other duties as might be assigned by General
MacArthur and his staff.
When Dean Harrison arrived at Brisbane, the Army officers
considered it desirable that he be given an official position on
General MacArthur's staff and he was therefore appointed
Chief of the Research Section at GHQ, SWPA. An office was
set up at GHQ, staffed in part by Army personnel, and during
Harrison's four months there he made various trips through
Australia and New Guinea to investigate the uses of and
needs for scientific equipment. He returned in July, 1944, and
was succeeded by Paul E. Klopsteg of Northwestern Techno-
logical Institute. For his work in the Pacific Harrison received
the Medal of Freedom.5
Two months after Harrison's departure, Burchard, also an
Assistant Chief of OFS, followed him to the Pacific, leading
a team which was planned to be permanently headed by L. C.
Marshall of the University of California. Burchard and Mar-
shall collaborated in the establishment of the Operations
Research Section attached to Headquarters of the Commanding
General, Pacific Ocean Areas, a section which grew from small
beginnings to one of considerable size, and which performed
substantial service to that command in preparation for the
many landing operations which lay in the long trek from
Saipan to Okinawa. Despite the lack of official Navy encourage-
ment, this group with the acquiescence of General Richardson
did quite as much for the Navy and especially the amphibious
forces on an unofficial basis, as it did for the Army on an official
one. Burchard returned to the mainland in August, 1944,
leaving Marshall in charge where he remained for the rest of
the war.
With the outposts set up the OFS turned to the job of sup-
plying them with personnel, matériel, and information, of
routing the returning information appropriately, of taking
care of some of the many requests for help on the mainland. 6
The problems of securing adequate personnel were never
.
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n
easy ones for OFS, and to this task both John W. M. Bunker,
Dean of the Graduate School, and B. Alden Thresher, Direc-
tor of Admissions, turned their attention. Thresher spent con-
siderable time in Washington on this mission.
The next problem of major importance which came before
the OFS was providing personnel for the purpose of collecting
scientific intelligence as the German forces retreated before our
armies. In particular it was important to know as soon as
possible what progress the enemy scientists had made in the
problems of nuclear fission and bacteriological warfare. An
earlier mission to Italy of which Colonel Allis had been a mem-
ber7 had shown what the pattern ought to be. The investi-
gating personnel needed to be top-flight scientists of broad
interest, able to comprehend wisely and quickly, able to speak
the language of the enemy, men whom their German colleagues
would respect for scientific attainment so that they might more
quickly respond to interrogation. Moreover these scientists
could not be kept in a mere interrogating position because
their judgment as to where the best clues were was likely to
be better than that of the soldiers; at the same time soldierly
guidance was needed in the matter of transport, communica-
tions, billeting, and safety, for the group would often be close
on the heels of, or in confused areas even ahead of the troops.
There was obviously a great deal of intelligence to be uncov-
ered in Europe and much of it was not of such urgency.
Accordingly it was decided to leave the general exploitation
of technical intelligence to the Technical Industrial Intelli-
gence Committee to which OFS and therefore OSRD would sit
only as adviser; on the other hand OSRD would lend the
fullest support to the more intensive activity. This was to be
carried on under the direction in Washington of a small com-
mittee of which the chairman would be an officer from G-2,
and a member each would be supplied by the OFS and the
Navy. The mission itself, which would operate independently
in the field, was to be called ALSOS, carrying over the name
from the Pach-Allis mission.8 The scientific chief selected was
FOR THE OFFICE OF FIELD SERVICE
111
Samuel A. Goudsmit, Professor of Physics at the University
of Michigan, at the time staff member of the Radiation
Laboratory, and no more successful selection could have
been made. Under his guidance the mission covered itself with
glory.
At first Waterman, Deputy Chief of OFS, was the OSRD
representative on the ALSOS Advisory Committee, but he
was later replaced by Burchard. Burnham Kelly (now Assistant
Professor in City Planning and Assistant Director of A. F.
Bemis Foundation) was sent to Paris as technical aide to the
mission, and in July of 1945 Burchard followed him to inspect
the mission and to make recommendations as to whether it
should continue longer. He consulted with headquarters of
the Group Control Council on the establishment of a scientific
adviser in headquarters, and with the British on a joint pro-
gram for the release of scientific information. At the end of
this visit the mission was disbanded, but plans were being
made for its Japanese counterpart when the war suddenly ended.
When Germany began to run, it became sensible to con-
sider how scientific deployment in the Pacific could be intensi-
fied and made most efficient. No one could visualize in that
spring of 1945 how close the Japanese were to collapse, whether
or not the atomic bomb was to be used against them. Ahead
seemed to loom the long and costly invasion of the Japanese
homeland. For this action the best hunch was that MacArthur
would ultimately be the supreme commander although for the
moment he shared the role with Nimitz, and the two of them
had commanded very effective pincers actions. However, affairs
of the Research Division in General MacArthur's command
had, for several reasons, not been so prosperous as those in
General Richardson's command. Certainly one compelling
reason was the long distance which stretched between each
step towards Japan and the reluctance of the General Staff to
bring scientists to advanced headquarters; thus communication
and transportation between GHQ and the Research Section
were often too slow. There were other difficulties too, but it is
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bootless to rehearse them here. Suffice it to say that it was time
to remedy the situation.
The experience of BBRL in England and of the two research
sections in the Pacific made it clear to OFS that it would be
most effective if there could be in General MacArthur's area
a group responsible directly to OSRD and responsible to the
command only in matters which dealt with transportation,
security, housing and discipline, and the like. This was a new
concept to the high officers in the Pacific and one that, at first
glance, would be hard for them to accept. However, the capture
of Manila opened up a new opportunity, and General Mac-
Arthur might be willing to do in the Philippines what he
would have been loath to do in Australia or New Guinea.
Under the circumstances another emissary was indicated and
Waterman was dispatched to negotiate with General Mac-
Arthur. At the same time some of Bowles's men were negotiat-
ing to the same end with General Kenney. The upshot of all this
activity was that everything came out favorably; it was agreed
that a Pacific Branch of the OSRD should be established in
Manila under the direction of an appointee of Dr. Bush.
This man had to be top-flight; he had to enjoy the confidence
of all the scientists who would be asked to go. There could be
no compromise with quality, and it was decided that Dr. Comp-
ton, himself, should leave the position of Chief of OFS and go
to Manila to become the Director of PBOSRD. Thus in the
declining days of the war, Waterman became Chief of OFS
and Burchard the Deputy Chief. At the same time it was under-
stood that the redeployment of Radiation Laboratory personnel
from the European Theatre to the Pacific would be complicated,
and again a man was needed to direct this who would have the
full confidence of Radiation Laboratory personnel. Trump was
therefore recalled from his position as Director of BBRL to
become head of the Field Service Branch of the Radiation
Laboratory.
There was one other knot to be tied. If the Director of
PBOSRD was to have some independence of the command, it
FOR THE OFFICE OF FIELD SERVICE
113
was necessary that the commanding general have a scientific
adviser who was completely responsible to him; it was very
desirable that this man be one who could work well with Dr.
Compton and who was familiar with the accomplishments and
potentials of NDRC. While the negotiations about PBOSRD
were going on, others had been proceeding in parallel, calcu-
lated to provide the commanding general with a scientific
adviser who was completely responsible to him. Even before
Dr. Compton had decided to accept the position of Director
of PBOSRD, Dean Moreland had made up his mind to accept
General MacArthur's invitation and to go to the Pacific as
adviser to the High Command.
The final arrangement could not have been more happily
contrived. Dean Moreland was to resign as Executive Officer,
NDRC, and with the title of Expert Consultant to the Secretary
of War, proceed to the Pacific Theatre as Chief of the Scientific
and Technical Advisory Section, GHQ, AFPAC, reporting
directly and with no intermediary to the Chief of Staff, General
Sutherland. Dr. Compton was also to proceed to the theatre
with the responsibility already described as Director of
PBOSRD. The presence of these men who had worked so long
and comfortably together both in the peace and the war guar-
anteed that a smooth-working arrangement could be effected in
the Pacific. These two leaders from M.I.T., in point of fact,
proceeded to the theatre on the same plane.
They arrived in Manila to set up their new organization only
a few days before V-J Day and consequently were never called
upon to bring their plans into effect, although a good organiza-
tional start had already been made. Their presence in the
theatre at that precise moment was nonetheless timely and they
were pressed into service for the first invasion of scientific
intelligence on the mainland of Japan. Moreland headed
this Scientific Intelligence Survey and Dr. Compton was attached
to it for the first two weeks, after which he returned to the
United States. The functions of the mission were to make a
preliminary survey to determine the Japanese organization for
SI
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war research and to identify for further investigation by other
agencies any new developments of military importance which
might have been made by the Japanese. Moreland, completing
his mission, left Tokyo on 9 November 1945 and returned to
duty at the Institute a week later. For his theatre services he
received the Medal of Freedom.9
The OFS had made some important contributions to the
technical conduct of the war, especially in the Pacific; more
important, it had by trial and error, under the wise direction
of its chief, developed at war's end a system by which civilians
could be of effective help to the fighting forces at the scene of
the fighting, without loss of authority in the hands of the fight-
ing commander or loss of independent thought in the mind of
the civilian. Thus Bowles, Morse, and Compton together wrote
messages on how to use civilians in wartime which should be
pondered well by those in command in the future. Nor did the
messages go unheard. All three of these men received high-level
decorations, each of which has been mentioned in its appro-
priate place. More important than this perhaps was the memo-
randum of 30 April 1946 from General Eisenhower, Chief of
Staff, to the Directors and Chiefs of the Department General
and Special Staff Divisions and Bureaus and the Commanding
Generals of the Major Commands. This memorandum, con-
taining as it does so much implicit comment on the perform-
ance rendered by the OSRD and other civilian agencies in the
War, seems worth reprinting here in full.
SUBJECT:
Scientific and Technological Resources as Military Assets
The recent conflict has demonstrated more convincingly than
ever before the strength our nation can best derive from the inte-
gration of all of our national resources in time of war. It is of the
utmost importance that the lessons of this experience be not for-
gotten in the peacetime planning and training of the Army. The
future security of the nation demands that all those civilian
resources which by conversion or redirection constitute our main
FOR THE OFFICE OF FIELD SERVICE
115
support in time of emergency be associated closely with the activities
of the Army in time of peace.
The lessons of the last war are clear. The military effort required
for victory threw upon the Army an unprecedented range of respon-
sibilities, many of which were effectively discharged only through
the invaluable assistance supplied by our cumulative resources in
the natural and social sciences and the talents and experience fur-
nished by management and labor. The armed forces could not have
won the war alone. Scientists and business men contributed tech-
niques and weapons which enabled us to outwit and overwhelm
the enemy. Their understanding of the Army's needs made possible
the highest degree of cooperation. This pattern of integration must
be translated into a peacetime counterpart which will not merely
familiarize the Army with the progress made in science and indus-
try, but draw into our planning for national security all the civilian
resources which can contribute to the defense of the country.
Success in this enterprise depends to a large degree on the
cooperation which the nation as a whole is willing to contribute.
However, the Army as one of the main agencies responsible for the
defense of the nation has the duty to take the initiative in promot-
ing closer relations between civilian and military interests. It must
establish definite policies and administrative leadership which will
make possible even greater contributions from science, technology,
and management than during the last war.
In order to ensure the full use of our national resources in case
of emergency, the following general policies will be put into effect:
(1) The Army must have civilian assistance in military planning
as well as for the production of weapons. Effective long-range mili-
tary planning can be done only in the light of predicted develop-
ments in science and technology. As further scientific achievements
accelerate the tempo and expand the area of our operations, this
interrelationship will become of even greater importance. In the
past we have often deprived ourselves of vital help by limiting our
S
ment. More often than not we can find much of the talent we need
for comprehensive planning in industry or universities. Proper
employment of this talent requires that the civilian agency shall
have the benefit of our estimates of future military problems and
shall work closely with Plans and the Research and Development
authorities. A most effective procedure is the letting of contracts for
aid in planning. The use of such a procedure will greatly enhance
the validity of our planning as well as ensure sounder strategic
equipment programs.
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(2) Scientists and industrialists must be given the greatest
possible freedom to carry out their research. The fullest utiliza-
tion by the Army of the civilian resources of the nation cannot
be procured merely by prescribing the military characteristics and
requirements of certain types of equipment. Scientists and indus-
trialists are more likely to make new and unsuspected contributions
to the development of the Army if detailed directions are held to
a minimum. The solicitation of assistance under these conditions
would not only make available to the Army talents and experience
otherwise beyond our reach, but also establish mutual confidence
between ourselves and civilians. It would familiarize them with our
fundamental problems and strengthen greatly the foundation upon
which our national security depends.
(3) The possibility of utilizing some of our industrial and tech-
nological resources as organic parts of our military structure in time
of emergency should be carefully examined. The degree of coopera-
tion with science and industry achieved during the recent" war
should by no means be considered the ultimate. There appears
little reason for duplicating within the Army an outside organiza-
tion which by its experience is better qualified than we are to carry
out some of our tasks. The advantages to our nation in economy
and to the Army in efficiency are compelling reasons for this
procedure.
(4) Within the Army we must separate responsibility for research
and development from the functions of procurement, purchase,
storage and distribution. Our experience during the war and the
experience of industry in time of peace indicate the need for such a
policy. The inevitable gap between the scientist or technologist and
the user can be bridged, as during the last war, by field experimenta-
tion with equipment still in the developmental stage. For example,
restricted-visibility operations with the aid of radar, such as blind
bombing and control of tactical air, were made possible largely by
bringing together technologists who know the potentialities of the
equipment and field commanders familiar with combat conditions
and needs. Future cooperations of this type require that research
and development groups have authority to procure experimental
items for similar tests.
(5) Officers of all arms and services must become fully aware of
the advantages which the Army can derive from the close integra-
tion of civilian talent with military plans and developments. This
end cannot be achieved merely by sending officers to universities for
professional training. It is true that the Army's need for officers well
trained in the natural and social sciences requires a thorough pro-
FOR THE OFFICE OF FIELD L
1
117
SERVICE
gram of advanced study for selected military personnel, but in
addition we must supply inducements which will encourage these
men in the continued practical application of scientific and tech-
nological thought to military problems. A premium must be placed
on professional attainments in the natural and social sciences as
well as other branches of military science. Officers in each arm and
service must familiarize themselves as much as possible with progress
and plans made in other branches. Only then can the Army obtain
the administrative and operative talent essential to its task and
mutual understanding by the arms and services of their respective
problems.
In general, the more we can achieve the objectives indicated
above with respect to the cultivation, support, and direct use of
outside resources, the more energy will we have left to devote to
strictly military problems for which there are no outside facilities
or which for special security reasons can only be handled by the
military. In fact, it is our responsibility deliberately to examine all
outside resources as to adequacy, diversity, and geographical dis-
tribution and to ensure their full utilization as factors of security.
It is our job to take the initiative to promote the development of
new resources, if our national security indicates the need. It is our
duty to support broad research programs in educational institu-
tions, in industry, and in whatever field might be of importance to
the Army. Close integration of military and civilian resources will
not only directly benefit the Army, but indirectly contribute to the
nation's security as civilians are prepared for their role in an emer-
gency by the experience gained in time of peace. The association
of military and civilians in educational institutions and industry
will level barriers, engender mutual understanding, and lead to the
cultivation of friendships invaluable for future cooperation. The
realization of our objectives places upon us, the military, the
challenge to make our professional officers the equals in knowledge
and training of civilians in similar fields and make our professional
environment as inviting as those outside.
In the interest of cultivating to the utmost the integration of
civilian and military resources and of securing the most effective
unified direction of our research and development activities, this
responsibility is being consolidated in a separate section on the
highest War Department level. The Director of this section will be
directly supported by one or more civilians, thus ensuring full
confidence of both the military and the civilian in this undertaking.
By the rotation of civilian specialists in this capacity we should
have the benefit of broad guidance and should be able to furnish
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science and industry with a firsthand understanding of our prob-
lems and objectives. By developing the general policies outlined
above under the leadership of the Director of Research and Develop-
ment the Army will demonstrate the value it places upon science
and technology and further the integration of civilian and military
resources.
1
Here we leave the personal history of Dr. Compton. He will
appear in these pages no more save in the background. His
duties to the armed forces are not at an end. He is still con-
cerned with the organization of postwar research for military
purposes in many different ways, as Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff's Evaluation Board, member of the President's
Evaluation Commission on the Atomic Bomb Test, and mem-
ber of the Naval Research Advisory Panel. It is appropriate in
taking leave of his many activities for his nation at war to
indicate the appreciation felt by the armed services. On 8
February 1946 the Commander-in-Chief, Harry S. Truman,
conferred on him the Medal for Merit, which was personally
presented to him by his old Manila friend Lieutenant General
O. W. Griswold. The citation read:
DR. KARL TAYLOR COMPTON, member of the National Defense Re-
search Committee from 27 June 1940 to 2 September 1945 and Chief,
Office of Field Service of the Office of Scientific Research and
Development, from 11 October 1943 to 31 July 1945, for excep-
tionally meritorious conduct in the performance of outstanding
services to his country. As Chief of the Office of Field Service, Dr.
Compton mobilized and made available to the needs of the Armed
Services civilian experts in various scientific branches who assisted
in the introduction into use within theaters of operation of new
weapons, devices, and techniques developed by the Office of Scien-
tific Research and Development and others. Through his vision in
the formulation of the program of research and development of
microwave radar and his steadfast support of that program, Dr.
Compton contributed greatly to the technical superiority of the
Allied Forces in this field. Under his direct leadership, the programs
of research and development of the United States and United
Kingdom were integrated for a maximum effectiveness in the radar
field. The importance of this work was such that Dr. Compton
FOR THE OFFICE OF FIELD SERVICE 119
may be said to have been personally responsible for hastening the
termination of hostilities.
It is time to leave this discussion of research and development
at the national level. M.I.T. participated heavily in its direction.
From its closely attached alumni or from its staff it supplied
the Director of OSRD, the Chairman of NACA, the Presi-
dent and Treasurer of NAS, the Executive Officer and four
of the seven members of NDRC, the Chief of OFS, the Scien-
tific Adviser to the Secretary of War, the Directors of ORG
and NOL for the Navy, the first Coordinator of Research and
Development in the Navy, the Director of the Pacific Branch
OSRD, and of the British Branch Radiation Laboratory, the
Scientific Adviser to General MacArthur. This was enough for
one institution to do and it did not do so without some strain.
These activities claimed the full or a large portion of the time
of the President, three Life Members of the Corporation, three
Deans, and two other administrative officers, the heads of eight
departments, and sixty-five to seventy others of professorial
rank. This was nearly 30 per cent of all men of that rank on
the Institute staff in 1940 in the scientific and engineering
departments. It might have been expected that the absence of
so many of its key people all or part of the time would have
arrested the progress of the Institute on the home front. But
this is quite contrary to the fact. The Institute managed to
conduct a greater volume of research than ever before, to make
salient contributions from its own laboratories to the weapons
of war, and to carry on an emergency teaching program as well.
We may now turn to the work in the M.I.T. laboratories during
the period 1940–45.
FOOTNOTES
1 A classic remark which went around Washington was uttered by a
high-ranking Naval officer. He wrote it to a famous civilian scientist who
had suggested that he, in his position, might tell the admirals a thing or
two. This Naval officer professed to be complimented but then went on
to say, “but I assure you, Doctor, that in the Navy the process of education
does not flow upstream.”
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2 The British solved the problem by commissioning the civilian for his
turn of duty in the field and decommissioning him on his return to the
United Kingdom. They were of course careful by his insignia to make it
clear to the command that he was not a real officer. Our civilians seldom
had a simulated rank of less than major, more often of colonel and occa-
sionally of brigadier or major general, but that they bore these ranks was
ordinarily apparent only from their papers and not from their appearance.
Each system had its advantages and disadvantages; neither was foolproof.
3 Again it was often possible to make the arrangement with an indi-
vidual as was the case of Edgerton's visit to Italy discussed in Chapter 13.
M.I.T. of course was glad to let him go.
4 General Eisenhower followed the more successful course. His command
profited enormously from the system adopted in Europe, and part of the
starvation of the Pacific Commands couid be laid to their tight fences.
5 The citation read: “Dr. George R. Harrison, American Civilian, as
organizer and Chief of the Southwest Pacific section of the Office of Field
Service from March to July 1944, contributed materially to the applica-
tion of the weapons of science against the enemy and forces of nature
confronting troops in Pacific areas. He served with marked ability in con-
nection with the moisture and fungus proofing of electronic equipment,
the modifying of lightweight radar equipment for island warfare, the
investigation of radio wave propagation characteristics under tropical
conditions, and the development of electronic navigational aids, all of
which activities were contributions of unusual importance to ultimate
victory in the Pacific.”
6 There were many of these and several were very important but to
save space and to maintain the thread of narrative they will be omitted
from the text; indeed only samples will be listed even in this footnote.
Among them were:
a. The taking over of ORG from Division 6, NDRC; in this context
Morse also became an Assistant Chief of OFS.
b. The provision of a special panel for the Coordinator of Research and
Development to study jet propulsion problems; of this Gilliland, Professor
of Chemical Engineering, was Chairman.
C. The supply of a scientific adviser to the Joint Army-Navy Experi-
mental Testing Board at Fort Pierce, Florida. This board carried out
experiments and tests leading to the demolition of obstacles to landing
operations. To this post A. G. H. Dietz, Associate Professor of Structural
Engineering, was assigned.
d. The provision of a group to study vehicles for General Waldron of
the Army Ground Forces, to work for the Joint Target Group; the staffing
of many special missions.
e. To the Pacific groups some M.I.T. men also went. Among them were
1
FOR THE OFFICE OF FIELD SERVICE
121
Blake (see Chapters 5 and 6), who went to carry on an investigation of
the damage done to wooden vessels and piers of the Army in Australia
and New Guinea, and Dietz, who went to the Operations Research Sec-
tion, Central Pacific, on a mission similar to that he had carried out at
Fort Pierce. (See Chapter 5.)
7 See page 77. This was the first ALSOS mission.
8 The mission has been well described by Goudsmit himself in "ALSOS,"
Henry Schuman, Inc., New York, 1947.
9 The Moreland citation reads as follows: "Doctor Edward L. Moreland,
American Civilian, as Chief, Scientific and Technical Advisory Section,
General Headquarters, United States Army Forces, Pacific, from August to
November, 1945 ably organized the facilities, personnel, and equipment
to handle many scientific and technical problems. With the surrender of
Japan, he speedily and efficiently formed a group of specialists to secure
data on Japanese technical research facilities and accomplishments before
it could be destroyed. Through his skill and ability, Doctor Moreland
contributed notably to the preservation of valuable records and informa-
tion and to the study of Japanese research and developments."
Part III
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
AT TECHNOLOGY
THE DIVISION OF INDUSTRIAL COOPERATION
THE GREATLY EXPANDED need for research under speed and
pressure could not leave the Institute untouched. Nor would
it have been fitting that it should. Technology had uncon-
sciously been preparing for the crisis long before it was
apparent to anyone that a crisis loomed. It had, in its Divi-
sion of Industrial Cooperation, a mechanism which, though
small, was elastic and capable of expansion to the required
limit.
The Division of Industrial Cooperation, generally referred
to as the D.I.C., was organized in 1920 for the primary purpose
of fulfilling obligations which the Institute had incurred under
an arrangement known as “The Technology Plan.” This plan
created contracts with certain industrial companies on a basis
resembling that of a retainer whereby the Institute agreed to
make available certain of its facilities, notably the library, the
alumni records, the services of undergraduate placement, indus-
trial research, and "pure” research. The first director of the
division was Professor William H. Walker, the second, Profes-
sor C. L. Norton; on his death in 1939, Nathaniel M. Sage
became director and has held the position ever since.
Gradually the annual retainer fee of the Technology Plan
was discarded in favor of one whereby industrial research
involving the use of Institute facilities and personnel was under-
taken on behalf of a specific industry or company under special
contract. The policy consideration which governed the decision
whether the D.I.C. would accept or decline the offer of a con-
tract was that the job to be done must further the primary
125
126
QED
objectives of the Institute which have been repeatedly stated
to be:
(1) The advancement of knowledge through education and
research, both pure and applied, in science, engineering,
architecture, and the related social sciences and
Service to government and to industry by consultation
and research.
bility and the second accepted as it either did not interfere
with or preferably made a positive contribution to the achieve-
ment of the first. Even in peacetime a criterion frequently
applied to a proposed industrial research was that it could not
be done as effectively elsewhere. During the crisis of war the
importance of the two objectives had to be reversed and there
was inevitably some distortion of the principle that the teach-
ing facilities of the Institute should be furthered by the
research; but the excessive demands for work to be done at
Technology more than ever required that each proposal be
scrutinized with more than usual care to be sure it could not
be undertaken elsewhere.
Prior to the fall of 1940 the D.I.C. program was rather small
business. The Institute conducted few research projects for
governmental agencies. The duties of the D.I.C. were even then
much the same as they were afterwards: to work out the con-
tractual relations between the Institute and the other party,
and to set up the business procedures for the operation of the
program. But in 1940 these duties involved not more than 25
to 30 contracts at any one time and the annual dollar volume
was of the order of 100 to 200 thousands of dollars. For such a
scale of business but a small staff was required, and indeed in
September, 1940, it consisted only of Sage, the Director, F. L.
Foster, the Assistant to the Director, one full-time bookkeeper
and secretary, and a few girls who were engaged primarily on
work in the field of alumni and student placement.
Suddenly the D.I.C. found itself confronted with a job of
a different order of magnitude. From 25 simultaneous contracts
THE DIVISION OF INDUSTRIAL COOPERATION 127
it was called upon to administer 150 and discuss and decline
many more for lack of staff and facilities; from a dollar volume
of some 200,000 dollars in 1939 it found itself handling a
volume in the peak year 1944–45 of 40 millions, an increase
of sixfold in the number of contracts, of two hundredfold in
the dollar value. The budget of the D.I.G. in that year was
thirteen times the total operating income of the Institute for
the year 1939.1
Such a program required, as has been hinted, careful scrutiny
of each proposal before it was accepted, lest the Institute be
swamped. The first large contract came to M.I.T. because its
prosecution required large airport and hangar facilities, a loca-
tion in the East2 and near the sea, some thousands of feet of
laboratory space, and because M.I.T. was one of the only two
educational institutions in America with an already active
research program and a nucleus of trained staff in that field.
When this and other programs grew to the point at which the
existing floor space was not adequate, when new laboratories
had to be built, the Institute adopted the policy of not
accepting any additional projects unless no other contractor
comparably favorable in terms of personnel, equipment, and
experience appeared available for the job. To this same end
the principal governmental contracting agencies cooperated
through their policy of spreading work among institutions as
widely as would be consistent with prompt, effective, and well-
coordinated action. Of influence in certain cases was the
expressed desire of the Army or Navy that several aspects of a
given job be concentrated in one locality.
Despite this care, as the research grew and it became neces-
sary to take on part of the Army and Navy educational
program as well, it was necessary to erect new laboratory build-
ings. By 1943 the Institute had added by new construction
more than 450,000 square feet of laboratory space and by rental
an additional 268,000. This total of more than 700,000 square
feet of new space is to be compared with the prewar total for
the Institute of 1,023,000 square feet.3
During World War II the Institute's staff and employees
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increased from 1,100 to 6,000, almost all the increase being
accounted for by D.I.C. operations. Nor did these increases in
the problems which faced D.I.C. Research contracts with indus-
try are ordinarily easy to write; the question of profit made by
the institution does not arise. But the question of profit is
serious to the government at any time; it is especially so when
the state is fighting for its life. It was important that a nonprofit
and non-state-supported institution such as M.I.T. should have
impeccable relations with its government. In its relationship
with OSRD, this was accomplished by predetermining a total
annual overhead charge that represented a no profit or loss
figure. With the Armed Forces the overhead originally selected
has resulted in a break-even figure in the sense of approximately
recovering known measurable overhead expenses. However, the
overhead income did not provide margins with which to meet
delayed disallowances and other costs, and the continuing
expense for past contract responsibility and activity. All this
required a great deal of study at the beginning and constant
reconsideration thereafter.
Private institutions were almost without exception the first
of the universities to enter into the war research program on
any large scale. 4 This was implicit in their type of management,
which made rapid change of policy and rapid decision on details
as easy as it is for a private corporation. Again the flexibility
of the larger private institutions was apparent. In the very
early negotiations it was not always certain whether a given
contract would be approved by the government or not; mean-
time the days were passing and the crisis was intensifying.
M.I.T. could and did gamble with her own financial security in
favor of the national security and on at least one occasion
committed a half million dollars of her own funds with no
assurance that she would ever get them back. Furthermore,
researches for the Armed Forces were frequently months old
before the procurement type contracts offered could be modified
to fit research activities. With such a background it was natural
THE DIVISION OF INDUSTRIAL COOPERATION 129
SEL
that the D.I.C. should exercise some leadership in these negotia-
tions and that the fair and workable contracts between academic
institutions and government which finally resulted were influ-
enced materially by its thinking. The group principally con-
cerned were J. R. Killian, Jr., Vice President of the Institute,
Horace S. Ford, its Treasurer, and for D.I.C., Sage, Director,
Foster, Assistant to the Director, Phillips Ketchum, General
Counsel for M.I.T. and the Division, Melvin R. Jenney, Patent
Counsel for the Division, and Ronald H. Robnett, Professor of
Accounting, Fiscal Officer of the Division.
The D.I.C. was fortunately well constituted to take care of
this heavy burden of increased responsibility. The procedures
were firmly grounded and needed little alteration. The small
staff was of a type which lent itself smoothly to the inevitable
expansion from the three or four people of 1940 to the seventy
employed during the summer of 1945 in its Headquarters Office,
its two accounting departments, its Fiscal Office, its Property
Control Section, and its Patent Office.5
Only those familiar with governmental regulations and the
labor they impose upon any contractor, familiar with the
troublesome patent and property clauses of war contracts, and
familiar with the further administrative difficulties imposed by
security regulations can appreciate how efficiently the D.I.C.
was managed so that multiplication of contracts by 6 and multi-
plication of dollar volume by 200 could be cared for with a
staff increase measured by a factor of only 15.
In total, war research contracts handled by the D.I.C.
amounted to almost exactly 125 millions of dollars. Of this
amount 88.8 per cent was on OSRD and NDRC contracts, 3.8
per cent on contracts with the Army, 3.2 per cent on contracts with
the Navy, 0.5 per cent on contracts with the NACA and other
government agencies, and 3.7 per cent with industries on war con-
tracts. More than 80 per cent of all the contract funds were ex-
pended directly in salaries, wages, materials, and services. The
actual allotment for overhead and all direct and indirect costs not
included as direct charges to contracts on government research
-
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was of the order of 6 to 7 per cent of the gross expenditures. It
was swallowed up in ways discussed in Chapter 2.
The personnel of the Institute increased fivefold as we have
stated. Of this staff of 6,000 at the peak period, 4,600 were work-
ing upon D.I.C. projects. Only about 200 of these were members
of M.I.T.'s prewar staff, but this group of 200 furnished the
top leadership for every single D.I.C. project except the Radia-
tion Laboratory. The 200 thus engaged at home is to be com-
pared in quantity with the eighty-odd who worked for the govern-
ment described in Section II.
There seems little likelihood that the D.I.C. will resume its
prewar village atmosphere in which the director knew every
worker by his first name. Though research contracts have been
materially cut down, because of the liquidation of OSRD
projects, and though every proposal is now scrutinized free from
the blinders of emergency, it is nonetheless clear that the
Institute has a continuing responsibility to the defense of the
nation. It cannot pass by on the other side. The value of D.I.C.
business for 1946–47 was, for example, about 10 millions of
dollars, only one-fourth of what it was at the peak of the war,
but fifty times what it was when the war began.
Of the 125 millions expended by M.I.T. on war research more
than three-fourths was represented by funds appropriated to
the Radiation Laboratory. This laboratory was in itself a very
large organization; it handled many of its affairs directly. But
the D.I.C. always served as M.I.T.'s representative in all busi-
ness and contractual matters relating to the Radiation Labora-
tory; it operated as the paying office and had full responsibility
for collecting all moneys expended under the Radiation
Laboratory as well as the four hundred-odd other and smaller
contracts.
The accomplishments of the Radiation Laboratory were
many and brilliant and they have been exceptionally well pub-
licized. The buildings were large, the operations large, the
funds large, the staff large and not unobtrusive. All this tended
to confuse the nature of Technology's total contribution to
THE DIVISION OF INDUSTRIAL COOPERATION 131
war research. Radiation Laboratory was Technology's biggest
and presumably its most important single war research activity.
But it was not the only big activity and it was not the only
important one. If Technology had never had a Radiation
Laboratory6 its D.I.C. contracts would still have represented
an expansion of ten to fifteen times the annual previous expen-
ditures for supported research; it would still have made major
contributions to the war effort from its existing laboratories
and with its own personnel.
In this record of laboratory work we shall attempt, so far as
possible, to include all the research activities and to orient them
one with the other. The tangled skein which has to be unraveled
to permit this will scarcely be comprehended by the reader
who has not examined the case records of M.I.T.'s individual
staff members. The complication can best be illustrated by the
cursory survey of the research career of one member of the
staff, a career typical of many. Walter C. Schumb, Professor of
Inorganic Chemistry, was connected all-told with some nine
projects. The first of these projects was the optical crystal
problem dealt with by Stock barger and described in a later
chapter. Then Schumb went on to spend time on studying
methods for generating fluorine gas; in particular, electrolytic
processes were studied which might overcome various objec-
tionable characteristics of existing practice. This study resulted
in a later similar project for Manhattan District. As a result of
these two projects, industrial development occurring during the
war in the production of fluorine and useful fluorine com-
pounds received some of its orientation. Under another
project in association with Robert J. Van de Graaff, Associate
Professor of Physics, sulphur hexafluoride was prepared first on
a laboratory scale and then on a much larger scale; this was
useful as a replacement for air in high-voltage X-ray generators
and made much higher voltage attainable. For this work he
received the Naval Ordnance Development Award. Another
project was undertaken for the Raytheon Manufacturing Com-
pany to ascertain the possibilities of applying the electronic
132
QED
beam of a microwave radar to influence or initiate useful
chemical changes. For M.I.T.'s large metallurgical project
related to nuclear fission Schumb directed the pilot plant pro-
duction of several hundred pounds of special ceramic materials.
For the Radiation Laboratory he directed an investigation on
the dissociation pressures of several metal hydrides used in the
construction of electronic tubes. For the last months of the
war and in association with Dean Sherwood, he carried on an
investigation of the fundamental properties of hydrogen per-
oxide for the Bureau of Ordnance of the Navy; this project
continues.
There the situation lies. The writer's problem of what to do
with Schumb was repeated for many others of the faculty
although the example chosen is, of course, not the feeblest one
that could be adduced. Nonetheless it is possible to reshuffle
work and people, and at times to provide clarifying context if
work is discussed in terms of its intended application. This is
the effort which will be made in the succeeding seven chapters.
TIT
.
Vii
FOOTNOTES
1 The growth was fortunately somewhat gradual as is evidenced by the
contract figures for the several years:
1940-41
1941-42
1942-43
1943–44
1944-45
1945–46
$ 1,183,900
7,890,800
14,951,800
25,393,300
39,970,900
24,200,900
2 Because the electronic manufacturers were already located there.
3 Of the 450,000 square feet of new buildings about 270,000 square feet
were of temporary construction built by government funds under contracts
which made it possible to tear them down after the war; of the remaining
180,000 square feet the division was as follows:
75,000 were built exclusively with M.I.T. funds in the expectation that
they would be reclaimed from war projects for normal educational
and research purposes after the war.
105,000 were financed jointly by M.I.T. and government funds. The
principle here was that the government should pay an amount which
THE DIVISION OF INDUSTRIAL COOPERATION 133
would erect a temporary building of essentially equivalent facilities
and M.I.T. pay from its own funds the amount necessary to make
this construction of a permanent type to be useful after the war.
4 And they remained the largest contractors. The roster of the largest
would include Harvard University, Columbia University, University of
Chicago, University of California, and California Institute of Technology,
in addition to M.I.T.
5 Accounting problems became so involved and numerous that in June,
1942, the Institute auditors were asked to assist in the details of the opera-
tion. Plans were later evolved to install machine accounting in all projects
except the Radiation Laboratory accounts and this went into operation
in October, 1943. Its success resulted in a similar installation for Radiation
Laboratory accounts in May, 1944.
Many of the senior additions to the D.I.C. staff came from the Institute
faculty. Ronald H. Robnett, Professor of Accounting, joined the D.I.C. as
Fiscal Officer in the spring of 1943 and took full charge of accounting and
fiscal matters. In March, 1944, Ross M. Cunningham, Associate Professor
of Marketing, also joined the staff as Assistant Fiscal Officer.
A Property Control Section was established in June, 1944, under the
direction of the late J. Donald Mitsch, Associate Professor of Structural
Engineering. Mitsch was assisted for a period by Ernest Gelotte, Associate
Professor of Construction. The Division Patent Office was under the direc-
tion of Melvin R. Jenney, who was assisted by R. R. Hildreth, D.I.C.
6 And it tried very hard not to. The contract was accepted by Tech-
nology only to save the situation in an emergency after two earlier efforts
to set up the work under different auspices and at different places had
failed.
7 Edmund L. Gamble, Associate Professor of Inorganic Chemistry,
worked with Schumb on the fluorine projects.
TO MAKE THE GUNS BEHAVE
* TY
IN HIS EXCITING NOVEL, The Ship, C. S. Forester describes a
Mediterranean engagement between a British light cruiser and
an “Eyetie” battleship. Heavily outgunned, the skipper of the
British vessel watches the Italian commander apply the then
standard method of ranging of the Italian gun layers, first
firing a shot too long, then one too short, and then bracketing
to make an estimate of the hitting position. The salvation of
the British ship depends upon the British commander's assess-
ment of what the Italian commander will do if the data he gets
from his shots are confusing, and what the British ship can do
to make the data confusing. The British captain anticipates
correctly and escapes. This is not only an exciting tale but it
is an accurate one. That was about the state of refinement of
aiming Italian guns in the early days of the war, days when our
own Air Force was talking about bringing prominent duck-hunt-
ers down to the training fields to teach the air force gunners how
to lead their targets.
“Laddering” as described by Forester was, of course, not the
only tool available even to Italian ships by 1940. This method
may have been satisfactory when all the targets were relatively
large and relatively slow. But the general public itself knew it
was out of date when, not long after Pearl Harbor, a few Jap-
anese medium bombers caught the British battleship Prince
of Wales and the battle cruiser Repulse without air cover off
Malaya and sent them to the bottom with a loss of but four
Nipponese aircraft. Whatever may have been the explanation
of the earlier disaster at Pearl Harbor, including the fact that
the ships were stationary and surprised, here the public could
134
TO MAKE THE GUNS BEHAVE
135
see no further room for argument. The ships were in motion,
the war was official. The planes had simply been too fast for
the gunnery of their ponderous naval opposition.
This first demonstration made the surface warship look so
vulnerable to the dive bomber and the torpedo plane that there
were many experts who asserted at once that air power had
eclipsed sea power, that the dreadnaught was obsolete. So far as
future wars are concerned this may or may not be the case, but
for World War II the prediction proved ill-founded. The main
reason this was so was because of improvements in antiaircraft
gunnery.
Before leaping to any conclusions as to what was and was
not accomplished, it will be well to review the state of the art
as war began. For this purpose it will be desirable to separate
the problems of naval gunnery into three parts:
(1) Control of guns against surface targets.
(2) Control of larger caliber guns (5-inch) against aircraft.
(3) Control of small caliber rapid-fire guns against aircraft.
It will also be simpler to consider the situation only as it existed
in the United States Navy which for many years had been
superior to any other navy in the world, so far as fire control
was concerned.
In the field of control against surface targets the Navy was
especially proud of its position. Before World War II it did
not, of course, have radar and had to place reliance on optical
range finders and other less accurate means. The optical devices
had, however, been developed to high excellence and as used
against the slow-moving surface targets were deadly. For exam-
ple, one Naval officer reports that shortly after his graduation
from Annapolis in 1932 he participated in gunnery exercises in
which rapidly maneuvering targets were kept under fire by
“blind firing” at ranges of fifteen miles and that the fire com-
pared favorably with that possible now with radar. Rangekeep-
ers, which predicted and automatically transmitted gunlaying
data to the guns, were in universal use.
136
QED
VYC
Of course the rangekeeper was no more accurate than the
initial range data set on it for the first salvo. After first salvo
corrections were introduced (where necessary) the rangekeepers
did a fine job of following the target and pointing the guns,
blindly when necessary. Nonetheless, Forester's ranging salvos
were sometimes used.
They were necessary, for example, when with airplane spotting
the target was being fired on blindly. In such a case optical range-
finders, however good, were, of course, useless. Radar could and
did eliminate this blindness. But once the range was established,
the target was “held” by the rangekeeper assisted by aircraft or
land-based spotters. For example, this type of fire was respon-
sible for the scores of German tanks knocked out by Naval guns,
miles inland, during the invasion of France after “D” day.
The ranging salvo was also used occasionally when the target
could be seen. Such salvos were often called "ladders.” They
were especially helpful for long-range shooting where optical
rangefinders are naturally less accurate and when spotting the
fall of shot from the firing ship is most difficult. Even if the
range is accurately known, the first salvo may not always hit at
long ranges because of other variables. It becomes necessary to
spot on by estimating the amount “short” or “over” achieved
by the first shots. At long ranges and without radar this is diffi-
cult from a firing ship, as a spotter can really tell little more
from the ship than that the shot is “over" or "short.” In a con-
ventional "ladder” three salvos would be fired, the first intended
to be 500 yards short, the second “on” (to hit), and the third
500 yards over. One of the three would be expected to hit or
“bracket” the target. Knowing the exact yardage difference be-
tween salvos, the spotter could correct the mean range more
accurately than if all three salvos had landed at the same spot.
In one case he had a yardstick for use at ranges so great that a
difference of 500 yards was not apparent to the eye. In the other
he had no yardstick.
Sometimes, as well, the “ladder” was used because it was
possible to get off several shots at a long-range target before the
TO MAKE THE GUNS BEHAVE
137
first had landed. These intervening shots had to be fired without
benefit of information from the first shot, and the "ladder"
therefore offered a possibility of being fairly certain to get a
hit with one of the first few shots. Time is important in naval
combat and so, then, were ladders.
At medium ranges, however, and with good optical range-
finding such as was available, ladders were seldom used and
were generally considered a waste of ammunition in the United
States Navy for some time before 1940.
The optical rangefinders had some natural limitations, of
course. They could not see beyond the optical distance, they
could not see through fog or smoke. Radar was all that was
needed to cover these points. The applications of radar to naval
gunfire against surface targets is not a part of the story of this
chapter.
So far as hitting a surface target is concerned, then, we should
not be deceived by Forester's accurate account. The Navy had
the problem well in hand.
The fast-moving airplane bearing down on a ship offered a
problem of much greater difficulty. But even here, despite the
fact that the planes to be feared at the beginning of the war
were relatively slow compared with what came after, the Navy
had shown considerable foresight. Remote-controlled 5-inch
guns had been supplied on ships as early as 1933. Coupled with
these were highly developed rangefinders which automatically
computed gun range and deflection, fuse setting, and the like
and automatically aimed the guns accordingly. These guns were
dependent, of course, upon optical rangefinders prior to Pearl
Harbor, and the all-important VT (proximity) fuse which
made sure that bursts were near enough the target was, of course,
a war development. Nonetheless, the larger caliber American
antiaircraft fire control with the 5"/25 and the 5"/38 guns
was the envy of the British Navy before the war. This is the
reason that many American naval officers think that comparable
American ships would not have suffered the fate of the Prince
of Wales and the Repulse.
This optimism may or may not have been justified. In addi-
138
QED
tion to whatever weaknesses were implicit in optical range-
finders and the 1940 fuses, there was one other weakness in our
naval antiaircraft fire. The assumption was generally made that
the heavier caliber fire would be so deadly that the bombers
could never get in to close range. The users of the 5-inch guns
were therefore weak on training and operational experience at
short ranges, and when the bombers did, as they did, get into
close quarters, the gunners were not well prepared to fight them.
At these shorter ranges, too, the small caliber (20 mm and
40 mm) guns capable of much more rapid fire would be more
effective. And for such guns the necessary controls were lacking.
They were very largely provided by C. Stark Draper, Professor
of Aeronautical Engineering, and his group at Technology, who
were ready with an aiming mechanism which became the
Mark 14 sight. Pushed through development and into combat,
it is probable that it saw its first fight as a pre-production model
mounted on the USS North Carolina at the Battle of Stewart
Island on 24 August 1942. Some models were undoubtedly also
on the USS South Dakota in her historic engagement off the
Solomons in October of the same year. This was less than a
year after development began. Though probably not respon-
sible for all the success of that ship in her encounter with the
Japanese air force, during which she is rumored to have sent
thirty-two Japanese planes down without serious hurt to her-
self, they certainly helped. Regardless of the facts of these early
battles, the dramatic results do not rest on such engagements,
1
by the end of 1943.
Guns which are going to shoot down planes while they attack
a ship have to be rapid in firing, rapid in handling, and
equipped with sights which will quickly and accurately compute
the larger and more rapidly changing lead angles which the
changing course of the plane requires.
Such a sight and the first important one was the Mark 14.
For small guns a sight like this could be installed directly on
the gun if this were desirable, and on such occasions the sight
TO MAKE THE GUNS BEHAVE
139
would remain the creation of this single laboratory, directed by
Draper. For larger guns, however, and even for batteries of
small guns, remote controls are required and at this point a
marriage was indicated, a marriage with the output of another
important Institute laboratory, the Servomechanisms Labora-
tory, directed by Gordon S. Brown, Professor of Electrical
Engineering. Finally, for ranges longer than those of vision,
for seeing when the murk or the night stopped the eye, for
expansion in the quantity and type of data, it was radar which
joined the two previously mentioned, and this in turn was
largely the product of M.I.T.'s Radiation Laboratory.
This story is a complicated one, not made easier by the fact
that other ranging mechanisms were in use and often successful
or that both servos and radar had many uses beyond that of
cooperating with gyroscopic sights. For that is what the Mark
14 was, a computing machine based upon the gyroscope, based
as Draper says “on a development of gyroscope theory from an
engineering rather than a mathematical standpoint, for the
solution of a problem which at first glance seems too compli-
cated to solve.”
In the last analysis a gun must be so pointed at the moment
when the projectile leaves the muzzle that after all the forces
which will then speak have had their say, the projectile will
hit the target. Some of these factors are under the gunner's con-
trol in degree, others are variant with the performance of the
target. Major factors are the initial velocity of the projectile, the
relative velocity of gun platform and target, the distance the
target is from the gun, and the distance away it is going to be
at the problematical moment of impact, the ballistics of the
projectile which includes the forces of gravity. There are many
lesser parameters or at least parameters of varying importance
such as the wind velocity and direction; for many targets an
additional problem is introduced in that the shell must explode
at the time of impact or just slightly before, and in this case
a fuse has to be appropriately cut while the projectile is in the
gun. There is simply not time over the desk and pushing the
140
QED
slide rule to measure or estimate all these parameters, to reduce
them at once to an answer for the position of the gun at the
moment of firing, to cut the fuse and to fire the gun. Mechanism
must replace the slower and less accurate brain of man.
Details of the way which the marvelous little box made by
Draper does many of these things is beyond the province of
this tale. In effect what it does is to calculate quickly and auto-
matically the angle by which the gun must lead in order to hit
its fast-moving target. The gunner sights on the target by use
of an illuminated reticle which appears to him as a ring of
light. As he holds his sight on the moving target, an angular
displacement, or lead angle, is generated between the line of
sight and the line of fire. This lead angle compensates for rela-
tive movement between the target and the gun during the time
of flight of the projectile. Range may be introduced into the
sight if desired, but in the first uses of the Mark 14 it was
customary to introduce an estimated “mean” range which was
considered most effective. It was effective enough.
There were no scientific “miracles" in World War II. Back
of every development which seemed to spring spectacularly
from the brain of some progenitor there had been years of
patient and unobtrusive prewar research and study. The war
brought more funds, more man power to specific applications;
it accelerated these applications. That was all. The Draper sight
was no exception to this. Draper had begun applications of his
interest in gyroscopes to the problem of fire control nearly two
years before the attack on Pearl Harbor. He hoped not only to
improve existing methods but also to make his sight much
lighter than the conventional gear. He succeeded in both, and
ultimately his sight weighed only 10 to 15 per cent as much as
competing equipment.
First tests of Draper equipment in cooperation with the
Navy were held at Dahlgren Proving Ground in the early sum-
mer of 1941. After these tests the Navy gave the Sperry Gyro-
scope Company, which had supported Draper's work,1 an order
for thirteen sights based on a first approximation which was
TO MAKE THE GUNS BEHAVE
141
1
called the “Shoebox" and was built in Draper's laboratory.
After the first test of these production models the order was
increased to one thousand.
Sperry had begun its backing of the work in 1940 on the basis
of an interest in a lead-computing sight, working only in one
plane, which would make Army Ordnance effective against
tanks. As a result of the disastrous experiences of the Royal
Navy the interest was transferred to two-dimensional computing
or computing in two planes, and from this came the antiaircraft
development. As the Navy's interest in the problem increased
after Pearl Harbor and the Royal Navy experiences off Malaya,
it underwrote Sperry in future developments.
M.I.T.'s Confidential Instruments Development Laboratory,
as Draper's show came to be known during the war, was never
a behemoth. The Mark 14 sight was developed by a team con-
sisting of twelve people, of whom three or four were engineers
and the rest mechanicians. The gear was developed and tested
in a room 12 feet by 20 feet. Out of this modest effort there
came perhaps 200 million dollars worth of business; the sight
with its advanced model, the Mark 15, is credited in naval
battle reports with having shot down more enemy planes by
antiaircrat fire than all other directors put together.
The Mark 14 led the way in defending our ships against
enemy aircraft, but this was only the beginning. The first
Draper-Sperry sight was developed for the rapid firing of 20-
millimeter guns, and it did such a good job in providing a
heavy screen of this accurate but light-caliber fire that the
enemy was forced to improve his bombing and torpedo planes
until they could launch their missiles outside the range of the
20-millimeters. This brought about in answer the Mark 51
director, utilizing the Mark 14 sight in control of 40-millimeter
twin and quadruple mounts and even larger guns. Thus the
American ships were able to reach out and blast enemy planes
even before they had gone into their attack run. By the end
of 1943 some 80,000 of these sights were in operation.
The later sights, designated as the Mark 15 type or directors
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QED
Mark 51, 52, and 63, incorporated many improvements over
the original Mark 14. In addition to extending the range in
order to serve larger caliber guns, they incorporated many new
corrections including radar for ranging and for blind firing.
The work may not be finished because targets will continue to
move faster and faster. Progress can still be made along the
lines of the old Mark 14, and some of its proud parents believe
that the same theory and similar equipment can be used to
catch up with the V-2.
While research and development were going on in the Confi-
dential Instruments Laboratory the group was also giving
courses to Naval officers, training them to be “desk operators"
with the equipment in Washington, and then to go to sea to
be gunnery officers there. Unlike the common pattern of war
laboratories, Draper's did not find it necessary to send its own
people to combat theatres. The Sperry Company did have some
service engineers out but the sights did not require much care.
The special teaching undertaken in the Confidential Instru-
ments Laboratory which was paralleled in the Servo-
mechanisms Laboratory paid off in that the teaching was being
done by the people who were doing the research and the courses
could then be constantly modified to take care of what had
been learned yesterday; there was thus a far smaller than usual
lag between the knowledge in the laboratory and the knowledge
in the possession of the customer.
The Mark 14 was a naval sight developed for a specific pur-
pose. Its success should not lead to the conclusion that it was
the only important accomplishment of this laboratory. The
theory of the Draper sight applies just as well to air-borne as to
ship operations. It applies to guided missiles, to rockets, to
planes, to tanks, to stationary platforms. All these are but
special applications of a general solution. It was not surprising
then that the Wright Field Armament Laboratory of the AAF
should also ask for help. Under their request the M.I.T. group
developed two further sights. The A-1 sight has been tested and
a production contract with the Sperry Gyroscope Company has
TO MAKE THE GUNS BEHAVE
143
been worked out. The first models of the S-9 sight have been
designed and built. Complete system tests began in 1947.
Nor should the work of the Confidential Instruments Labora-
tory in the field of fire control be permitted to overshadow its
other achievements. It has been prominent, for example, in
the development of aircraft flight test instruments, which are
quite as useful for peace as for wartime activities. Special test
instruments have been developed for the Bureau of Aeronautics
and the Army Air Forces chiefly in connection with vibration
measurements and instruments for use in systems for the remote
recording of data from high performance fighter airplanes.
The work of the Confidential Instruments Development
Laboratory has been recognized by the Navy through the Naval
Ordnance Development Award; several members of the labora-
tory have received certificates for exceptional services for their
individual contributions.
In addition to a personal Naval Ordnance Development
Award, Draper himself was awarded the Medal for Merit, the
highest of all Presidential awards for civilian effort, for his
work in naval fire control.2
Draper will continue as director of the laboratory which has
now been renamed “Instrumentation Laboratory.” The staff
consists of some sixty people with an additional fifty from
consulting engineering firms. With the knowledge and experi-
ence gained during research and development on war products
the staff has improved the courses given on instrumentation for
graduate civilian students and developed a number of restricted
graduate courses on fire control for properly qualified Army
and Navy officers. The demand for all these courses is already
so great that quotas have had to be established on the students
who may enroll.3
When guns needed power aids and could not be hand
directed, it was time to call in the services of another of M.I.T.'s
specialized groups, the men of the Servomechanisms Labora-
tory.
A servomechanism is a device which permits one to perform
K
144
QED
operations or motions at a remote point and at high-power
level from a local low-power control station. All the mechanism
behavior in the control end is actuated by a signal which is a
function of the difference between what the mechanism is
doing and what it should be doing. It has therefore an error-
sensing element, and this error goes through an amplifier
which expands the microwatts in the control into kilowatts at
the output. This may not seem very simple but neither is a
servomechanism. In its most common form it is a device which
will accurately control a massive element at a remote station
by delicate elements at a local station. Servos before the war
had been used largely in the control of industrial processes and
especially in the chemical industries; they called for but rela-
tively sluggish responses. But slow progress had been made in
meeting the military requirements for much more rapid
response.
For a number of years before the war, M.I.T. had been a
pioneer in the theory of servos and the only educational institu-
tion which boasted a laboratory and an educational program in
this field. In the years following the war, it is understood, a
number of other institutions will follow suit.
The Director of the Servomechanisms Laboratory was Gordon
S. Brown, Professor of Electrical Engineering. His early activities
in a military sense were related to Draper's sight. His first con-
tribution was for Sperry on a 75 mm scatter gun. Later on he
worked on controls for Army 40 mm and 37 mm guns, and for
tanks. His first connection of servos with the armed services was
made when he began to teach a servo program for Fire Control
Officers set up by Captain Carlson, USN, in 1938.
Even before Pearl Harbor Sperry was looking for some new
ideas on servos and asked for a fresh fundamental approach,
which Brown was asked to undertake. He was released from
previous OSRD commitments4 in order that this might be
carried forward and began work on a servo drive for a 75 mm
and a 37 mm gun. This problem solved, he turned to turret
drives and made a successful solution. The next operation was

Tracker operating a gunsight mounted on a director stand.
TO MAKE THE GUNS BEHAVE
to revamp some British hydraulic drives that had operated
successfully on a searchlight and had been put on a 40 mm
gun but were inadequate to handle the greater load. This
resulted in a long development using the principles developed
in the servos for the 37 mm gun, thousands of which were built
and used by the Army.
Thus a small group) started work on a fundamental program
for developing hydraulic servos in the 1 to 2 horsepower class.
This was the beginning of fifty-odd D.I.G. war projects on
A
also the beginning of a long, happy, and profitable relationship
with the Sperry Company, happy for the participants and
profitable to the nation and to the science of servomechanisms.
It was at this time that Sperry agreed to be sponsor to a develop-
ment for the U.S. Army 37 mm gun, intending to be ready with
a servo using domestic components, made of American materials
and by American production methods.
By March, 1941, this development had progressed far enough
so that Sperry was willing to show the system to Army repre-
sentatives. This demonstration was to take place on 9 March,
a Monday. On both the eighth and the ninth, in the words of
Brown, “it snowed like hell.” The M.I.T. crew had taken the
37 mm into a room so small that the gun could not traverse
Al Hall, Jay Forrester, John Silvey, Gordon Brown, and Ed
Dawson of Sperry, sweated despite the weather since they had
never put the elevator drive together before. Sunday morning
Brown went home in the snow and stood by for the birth of
his daughter at 10 A.M. With this settled, he returned to the
laboratory and his second child, the gun, was delivered at
4 P.M. Servos had many births like that in the war. The labora-
tory demonstration was a success, and the Army realized that
M.I.T. had an amazing development, that these servos could be
applied to the big stuff. The Army ultimately built 30,000
units of this sort and the Navy had Brown re-engineer it for
40 mm guns on rolling and pitching ships, a tough assignment.
ent
146
LED
By April, 1941, the activity had outgrown the 200-odd square
feet available in Room 10-066. The work was then moved to
the east end of Building 32 and the staff enlarged. At the
request of Army Ordnance and Sperry, the laboratory activities
continued for another six months wholly under Sperry spon-
sorship save for the one NDRC project involving a few hundred
watts described in footnote 4. By late May and early June this
work had gone far enough so that Brown and Draper were
ready for a crude field demonstration.
Draper's box was mounted on a plumber's pipe stand; the
director was a dummy, a 22-caliber rifle. At this point Sperry
authorized Draper and Brown to make a laboratory demonstra-
tion to Commander Murphy and Lieutenant Commander
Horatio Rivero.6 The Navy delegation arrived on 28 May.
First Draper and Brown explained the principles involved and
then started the machinery turning. That was the day the Navy
realized what Draper had done. It was six months before Pearl
Harbor.
Things were now ready for the field demonstration of the
37 mm gun and Draper's director. A gun mount was loaned
by the War Department which also dug up 25 rounds of ammu-
nition. The gun was taken to Fort Heath in Winthrop,
Massachusetts, for firing test. Draper's computing mechanism
continued to rest on the plumber's pipe stand which was
equipped with synchros to transmit the motions of the com-
puter in azimuth and elevation to the 37 mm gun. The servos
were rudimentary; they had pots beneath them to collect the
leaking oil which was then poured back into the mechanism.
The sight and the gun were only 20 feet apart, but the problem
would have been the same had they been further.
As Brown reminds us, only small groups in the Navy were
servo-minded in June, 1941.7 At the fall of France the Army
Ground Forces owned only a few remotely controlled anti-
aircraft guns in their whole establishment. The Air Forces
owned only a few remotely controlled turrets. But this demon-
stration witnessed by representatives of M.I.T., the Army, and
TO MAKE THE GUNS BEHAVE
147
Sperry was a milestone. It showed what later became the basic
fire-control system for the United States Navy for the control
of 20 and 40 mm machine guns and later for some 5-inch
antiaircraft mounts, as the only way to meet the attack of
many Japanese planes.
After the success of this work the Servomechanisms Labora-
tory was formally recognized as the agency of M.I.T. to conduct
research in this field for the armed services. During the
remainder of the war, contracts were written with Army
Ordnance, Navy Ordnance, NDRC, and commercial firms.
The work covered the remote control of gun mounts, the
control of armored turrets for fixed emplacements or for tanks,
the control of radar antennas, the control of fuse-setting mech-
anisms for shells, the control of instruments in computers, the
control of missiles guided only by their own air-borne intelli-
gence. An incident in the radar story is a good one to tell here.
It began when K. T. Bainbridge in the Radiation Laboratory
asked for hurry-up development of a servo-control for a “super-
duper” radar, the CXBL, which was intended to be an experi-
mental set. It did not long remain experimental. The historic
old Lexington had been sunk, and the new Lexington was
putting out. This first hand-built model was put at her top and
she sailed with no one to guide her, so to speak. By the time
she had shaken down, the short cuts taken in early design had
proved no short cuts to reliable long-range endurance. The
laboratory was called upon and sent Jay W. Forrester to Pearl
Harbor. He was flown to Honolulu and, on the Lexington,
found that the failure was in the dielectric of some control
elements. While there he decided to give the whole system an
overhaul. While working below decks he was asked by a radar
officer if he would like to take a trip. There was not any com-
pulsion. He indicated his willingness and went on working.
Nothing more was said but when he went top-side the
Lexington was at sea en route to the Gilberts. Forrester was
on the famous ship throughout the Gilberts and Marshalls
campaigns, was aboard when she was torpedoed. He spent one
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whole night at the top of her mast replacing a small electrical
element whose brushes had slipped off, using no light which
could be visible to enemy submarines. 8
This set later became standardized as the SM and was the
most vital radar on a carrier as it directed fighters against
enemy planes. The experimental set stayed on the Lexington
until production was extensive. It was kept so long because
having more range than could be justified in the production
set it could outperform the latter. From this point on, assign-
ments came thick and fast to the Servomechanisms Laboratory;
the Army especially sent them along as fast as they could be
absorbed. They applied io all sorts of problems.
Because of the complexity of the servo problem and the
scarcity of trained personnel in industry the laboratory not
only handled the research and development of the equipment
but also built pilot models, participated in service tests, pre-
pared manufacturing specifications, manufacturers' drawings,
manufacturers' test equipment, service manuals; it trained
personnel for both manufacturers and the services. It can be
estimated that production contracts for work developed wholly
by the Servomechanisms Laboratory was 35 to 40 million
dollars and for that in which the Laboratory played an impor-
tant part as much or more.
In retrospect and despite the concrete accomplishments,
Brown is inclined to feel that the Laboratory did its greatest
job as an advance guard. It showed that difficult servo problems
could be solved and established performance possibilities. The
staff was always small as compared with many war laboratories
and only during the last year of the war numbered over one
hundred. As a group it learned advanced principles and had
the opportunity to apply them. The laboratory practice was to
prepare reports on this sort of activity. Five or six of them
were published in planograph form and became a sort of bible
of servos. 9
During the war there was a dearth of adequately trained
personnel in the servo field. There had been a large and rapid
TO MAKE THE GUNS BEHAVE
149
10
growth in the use of automatic control equipment, the knowl-
edge of the fundamental problems was held by few, and at the
same time many restrictions were imposed on the transmission
of that knowledge within the profession.
The result was that many corporations, even prime contrac-
tors, found themselves without personnel qualified to make
decisions on developmental or production snags. The Labora-
tory was often called in to meet such difficulties and frequently
had the authority to make design changes in advance of formal
service approval.
As in the case of the Confidential Instruments Laboratory,
the distinguished service of Brown's group was recognized by
the Naval Ordnance Development Award, as was Brown's
service personally, 10 and the effort of the Laboratory on behalf
of Army Ordnance was specifically cited by General Barnes
when he conferred the Army Ordnance Distinguished Service
Award to M.I.T. in July, 1944. Again, like the Instrumentation
Laboratory, the Servomechanisms Laboratory will carry on con-
tinuing projects for the services in peace, in a field where
peaceful applications can be even as spectacular as those of war.
The demand for the servomechanisms courses as well is so great
that student quotas have had to be applied.11
And it was not only in the spectacular new applications of
aiming that Technology contributed to making the guns better.
On 1 July 1942, at the request of the Navy, a laboratory was
established at M.I.T. to assist the Bureau of Ordnance in stress
analysis problems of a complex nature. More accurate methods
of stress analysis and design were urgently needed for naval
guns which were being called upon to do more than ever
before. This laboratory, known as the M.I.T. Gun Design
Group, was led by Charles W. MacGregor, Professor of Applied
Mechanics, assisted by Louis F. Coffin, Jr., Professor of
Mechanical Engineering, John C. Fisher, Instructor in Mechani-
cal Engineering, Charles S. Hofmann, Research Associate in
Mechanical Engineering. The group was the only one outside
the Navy Department engaged directly by the Bureau of
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new
Ordnance on a stress problem for naval guns. The new and
original methods of analysis developed are now in active use
by the Navy. They cover almost every phase of the problem
of stress analysis of gun barrels and various component parts
and apply both to the smallest and the largest calibers. They
were applied to various urgent problems during the war,
involving some twenty separate projects, and have provided the
basis for a revision of gun design procedures. Among these
projects was also the development of new gear drives for gun
turrets.
The Gun Design Group has been continuously engaged on
these problems for the past five and a half years and the work
is still under way.
FOOTNOTES
1 The Sperry Company was the prime naval contractor. The Crossley
Radio Corporation, Refrigerator Division, and the Waterbury Clock
Company were subcontractors. The M.I.T. Laboratory provided the prin.
cipal technical contributions and were helped by a subcontract with the
Doelcam Company of Newton, Massachusetts, which produced fine
machine pieces used in preproduction models of the eventually perfected
sight.
2 The wording of this citation is as follows: "Dr. Charles Stark Draper,
for exceptionally meritorious conduct in the performance of outstanding
services to the United States. By his devotion to duty, scientific leadership,
and his inspiring and infectious enthusiasm, Dr. Draper was primarily
responsible for the development of numerous major improvements in
anti-aircraft fire control equipment. These improvements have been an
important and determining factor in the increasing efficiency of the United
States Navy against enemy air power."
3 Active on the staff of the D.I.C. during the war were the following of
M.I.T.:
C. Stark Draper, Professor of Aeronautical Engineering.
Frederick H. Norton, Professor of Ceramics. With others cited elsewhere
in the text, Norton received the personal Naval Ordnance Develop-
ment Award for his contributions to the Mark 15 sight.
Henry B. Phillips, Professor of Mathematics in charge of the Depart-
ment.
Philip Franklin, Professor of Mathematics.
John A. Hrones, Associate Professor of Mechanical Engineering.
TO MAKE THE GUNS BEHAVE
151
J. F. Hutzenlaub, Instructor in Aeronautical Engineering.
Edward P. Bentley, quondam Research Assistant in Aeronautical Engi.
neering.
Robert K. Mueller, Assistant Professor of Aeronautical Engineering.
Robert C. Seamans, Jr., Assistant Professor of Aeronautical Engineering,
Naval Ordnance Development Award for work on the Mark 63.
Yee J. Liu, Assistant Professor of Aeronautical Engineering.
J. J. Jarosh, D.I.C.
R. W. Gras, D.I.C.
J. W. Tone, D.I.C.
R. S. Henderson, D.I.C.
C. A. Haskell, D.I.C.
4 This was in December, 1940. At this time the Laboratory had already
made a tentative commitment to NDRC for a long-range research program
on the development of servos for the remote control of military equip-
ment, especially guns. NDRC, however, was unable to carry out its desires
to provide some of the important laboratory apparatus. In the circum-
stances NDRC released the Laboratory and permitted it to undertake the
Sperry job.
5 G. S. Brown, Albert C. Hall, Associate Professor of Electrical Engineer-
ing, who personally received the Naval Ordnance Development Award
for his work on guided missiles, Donald P. Campbell, Assistant Professor
of Electrical Engineering, Jay W. Forrester, D.I.C., and John O. Silvey,
D.I.C.
6 Later on the staff of Admiral Nimitz. Rivero had done a thesis inves-
tigation on a principle very similar to that of the Draper sight.
? It might be noted in justice to those small groups that the first United
States remote-controlled guns were the 5"/25 battery of the USS Portland in
1933. As of 1936, the Farragut Class of DD's had their 5"/38 double-purpose
guns with Thyratron remote control. DD's 356-363 had electric hydraulic
remote control as did the 6-inch three-gun turrets of the Brookland Class.
These were Ford Instrument Company controls. By 1941 Receiver Regu-
lators were ready for installation in connection with the 16-inch turrets of
the Battleship North Carolina. In the early 1930's the Bureau of Ordnance
had letter copyright taken out covering the use of the word "Synchro" in
combination, applying to electrical signal transmission for servo use, as
for example Synchro Generators and Synchro Motors.
8 This story is told not to magnify the thrills which occasionally came
to a scientist and were common enough for naval officers but as an example
of scientific resourcefulness and of the pressure to get a few essential units
into action.
9 A few other agencies, that is, the Bell Telephone Laboratories and
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Division 14, NDRC, paralleled independently these efforts in the analytical
field.
10 The Naval Ordnance Development Award was given to the following
M.I.T. Laboratories:
Center of Analysis
Gun Design Group
High Voltage Laboratory
Instrumentation Laboratory
Radiation Laboratory
Servomechanisms Laboratory
Torpedo Fuel Laboratory
Turbo Laboratory
11 Among the M.I.T. staff members who worked with the SM Laboratory
during the war were:
Gordon S. Brown, Professor of Electrical Engineering.
Albert C. Hall, Associate Professor of Electrical Engineering.
John A. Hrones, Associate Professor of Mechanical Engineering.
Charles Kingsley, Jr., Associate Professor of Electrical Engineering
(recipient with others of personal Naval Ordnance Development
Award).
Lynwood S. Bryant, Associate Professor of English.
Donald P. Campbell, Assistant Professor of Electrical Engineering.
Jay W. Forrester, D.I.C.
John O. Silvey, D.I.C.
10
FOR THE WOUNDED AND THE WELL
CYCLOTRONS AND BLOOD
ONE OF THE SPECTACULAR but little-known pieces of detection
in the war was carried out by the Radioactivity Laboratory at
Technology under the direction of Robley D. Evans, Professor
of Physics. Evans's work with radioactive tracers has now been
well known for some years. It will be recalled that, using the
cyclotron, he and his associates have bombarded various mate-
rials with deuterons, thus making them artificially radioactive.
When they are then introduced into a system, it has been
possible through their radioactivity to measure their travel
through the system. One of the much-described applications
of this method was the measurement of the distribution of
iodine in thyroid cases.
It was only natural that such a powerful tool should have
found its way to many applications during the war and that
Evans and his associates should have had more calls upon their
skills and their apparatus than they could possibly meet. Many
of these applications are still cloaked in secrecy.
One application, still closely held, led to the marking and
detection of plastic mines which began to be used by both sides
as magnetic detection methods made it less and less easy to
hide the metallic type. Another, at Camp Dietrich, dealt with
biological warfare, studying leakages which were often greater
than in chemical engineering processes, and the range of flight
of insects, and otherwise tagging biological agents; a third went
into the study of all possible methods for detecting fragments
of glass substitutes in the body (synthetic windshields of aircraft
shattered sometimes in combat and threw fragments which were
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hard to find at surgery). A fourth was also related to aviation
medicine and consisted of producing radioactive argon, which
in turn made it possible to study the rate of saturation and
desaturation of a pilot's blood and hence the "bends”-like
condition incident to exceptionally rapid ascent. A fifth was
concerned with Manhattan District problems, especially relating
to the purification of uranium ores; a sixth incorporated radio-
active agents with chemical agents to measure the distribution
of the chemicals after a chemical bomb had burst. A seventh
was an instrumental project for the detection of dangerous
concentrations of radon; an eighth provided radioactive cobalt
for the TR boxes in radar sets.
The enormous increase in the production of radium-luminous
dials, especially for aircraft, tanks, and submarines, exposed a
large number of industrial workers to the potential hazard of
radium poisoning. During and after World War I, hundreds of
radium-dial painters were sickened or killed by chronic radium
poisoning. During the 1930's, Evans developed new physical
instruments and techniques for studying chronic radium poison-
ing, and carried out many experimental studies of radium poi-
soning in animals and humans in collaboration with Robert S.
Harris, Professor of Biochemistry of Nutrition, and John W. M.
Bunker, Dean of the Graduate School of M.I.T., Dr. J. C. Aub
of the Massachusetts General Hospital, and Dr. Harrison Mart-
land of New Jersey.
As World War II approached, and the number of persons in-
dustrially employed on radium work increased, Evans and his
colleagues developed newer physical techniques for use in rou-
tine physical examinations of radium workers, designed to detect
small amounts of radium in the body and give warning of the
approach of the dreaded disease, long before any clinical symp-
toms could be expected to appear. Workers who were thus endan-
gered were then transferred out of radium employment, and if
necessary given special medical treatment of a type developed by
Aub and Evans and designed greatly to alter their calcium and
radium metabolism. The combination of these physical and
ed to an ease, lono and give
FOR THE WOUNDED AND THE WELL
155
1
medical techniques was widely used throughout the war and
reduced the radium poisoning injuries in the protected plants
to zero.
Moreover, the scientific data accumulated in the earlier studies
of radium poisoning by Evans, Aub, and Martland became the
basis of the so-called tolerance dose or maximum permissible
dose of radium permitted industrial workers in the United
States. These quantitative data are the best documented informa-
tion on the resistance of human beings to alpha radiation, and
they formed the scientific basis for the safety procedures and
permissible levels in the handling of plutonium and allied haz-
ards in the atomic bomb project.
As Evans says, his group really constituted a radioactive
center. Every man was involved in almost every project; radio-
active tracers provided the common theme. It was possible to
do most of M.I.T.'s part of the work in its existing laboratories.
From a human interest point of view, perhaps the greatest
of these projects was that which dealt with the application of
these physical methods to blood plasma and whole-blood
preservation problems, which had hitherto been unsolved. This
was the joint work of many medical clinics combined with the
M.I.T. group and was in every sense a team job.
During the early part of the war, vigorous research was con-
ducted by a number of contractors under the Committee on
Medical Research of the OSRD. The combined results eventu-
ally showed that the most important factor in preventing or in
treating battlefield shock is to maintain oxygenation of all the
tissues, especially those which have been injured. Plasma was
useful in battlefield treatment because it acted as a suspending
medium to maintain the circulation to all the tissues, but it
was limited to the circulation of those red cells which the
soldier might still have available. Red cells, were of course,
what counted since it is they which carry oxygen from the
lungs to all the tissues and organs of the body.
Under the CMR contract Evans and his associates had been
working since 1941 on the fate of red cells in experimental
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animals subjected to shock. They did this by working out a
method to produce radioactive iron in donor cells.
Ordinary iron consists of a mixture of four staple isotopes.
By deuteron bombardment of manganese a nuclear transmuta-
tion can be produced creating another iron isotope with a
different atomic weight from any of the standard ones. 1 This
isotope is radioactive, emits gamma rays, and has a half life of
five years. Similarly the bombardment of cobalt will yield still
another iron isotope2 which emits beta and gamma rays and
has a half life of forty-seven days. Each of these isotopes can be
prepared without contamination from other radioactive mate-
rial. In the work in question radioactive iron was synthesized
into ferric ammonium citrate and this was injected intraven-
ously into the subject. Some of the radioactive iron thus
introduced was in turn synthesized by the subject into hemo-
globin in his own circulating red cells in a period of two to
four weeks and without any reaction of the subject to the
small amount of radiation received. 3
This small amount of radiation was nonetheless detectable
by special Geiger-Mueller counters and circuits and it was also
possible to distinguish between the two iron isotopes even in
the same blood sample. The radioactive materials as made at
M.I.T. could be sent to investigators far away; these investi-
gators could prepare blood samples and mail them back to the
laboratories for radioactive analysis. A number of cooperative
investigations were thus carried on by laboratories which were
thousands of miles apart. The largest share of the clinical work
was done in the Boston area, under joint contracts between the
CMR and the collaborating teams of physicists and physicians at
M.I.T., Peter Bent Brigham Hospital, and the Massachusetts
General Hospital.
Thus it was found that in normal people all the red cells in
the body are in active circulation, but that in shock cases, a
fraction of the red cells are trapped away and are not accessible
to circulation. This made plasma not quite so attractive, and
it was even less so because the usual battlefield casualty involves
FOR THE WOUNDED AND THE WELL
157
hemorrhage as well as trauma. Both the shock factor and the
hemorrhage made it important for the wounded soldier to
receive additional red cells, and not merely a plasma trans-
fusion.
After 1943, then, the laboratory devoted the major part of its
work to the development of satisfactory methods for preserving
whole blood in such a way that it could be drawn from civilians
in the United States, shipped to bases in the theatres of opera-
tion, and trans-shipped to the front line hospitals. By using
the radioactive indicators previously described, donor red cells
were tagged, stored under various chemical and physical
environments, and ultimately transfused. The survival of the
transfused cells was directly measurable in the recipient because
the radioactive tags made it possible to distinguish between the
recipient's own blood cells and those which he had received by
transfusion.
Again throughout the country and in Canada the M.I.T.
laboratories supplied the radioactive materials, measured the
returned blood samples. The preservative finally selected was an
acid-citrate-dextrose (ACD) solution. It was prepared in sterile
vacuum bottles, each accompanied by an expendable transfusion
set including the necessary needles, rubber tubing, and filters. At
a Red Cross bleeding station the donor's blood was drawn directly
into this vacuum bottle, which already contained the preservative
solution. Ten such bottles were then packed in an expendable
plywood and fiber-glass refrigerator box developed by the Navy
and chilled by means of chipped ice. The blood never left this
refrigerator until it reached the patient. The refrigerator itself
could be dropped by parachute on land or sea. Blood preserved in
this way more than met, after 21 days in storage, the American
transfusion requirement that at least 70 per cent of the trans-
fused red cells remain in the recipient's circulation for 24
hours after transfusion, the determination to be carried out by
radioactive iron. All the blood in the Pacific theatre of opera-
tions was preserved and shipped in ACD solution, and every
invasion force carried this whole blood with it.
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L
The successful solution of this important problem has by no
means terminated the interest of the Laboratory in such work.
By mid 1945 its efforts were directed towards developing satis-
factory solutions for resuspending red cells after the plasma
had been removed by centrifuging. Ordinarily whole blood has
approximately 40 per cent red cells and 60 per cent plasma.
It has been the hope of the Laboratory that it will be able to
provide well-preserved solutions for transfusions, containing a
very high percentage of blood cells. Such solutions would be of
particular importance in certain types of battlefield and civilian
casualties and in treating the anemias of convalescence.4
Another activity to benefit the wounded was undertaken by
the Department of Biology under the direction of Francis O.
Schmitt, Professor of Biology in charge of the Department.
This department, which worked through the war as a team,
was called upon to study materials of value in the treatment of
burns. A bentonite preparation was made in collaboration with
Ernst A. Hauser, Associate Professor of Chemical Engineering,
which greatly reduced the loss of plasma from second-degree
burns. These preparations were particularly useful in burns
of the face. Subsequently, however, the Army called for the
material to be stable at 22 degrees below zero Fahrenheit and
this material, which was aqueous in nature, could not meet such
a specification. Tests were then made of various aluminum
soaps stable at these low temperatures and recommendations
were submitted.5
SUTURES AND DRUGS
Certainly the most interesting of the cooperative ventures in
the Department of Biology involved application of the joint
knowledge of this staff in connection with the fibrous protein
collagen (tendon skin, bone, connective tissue). As in the case
of most M.I.T. projects the directors insist that this was wholly
a team job.
When the war broke out fundamental studies of collagen
FOR THE WOUNDED TYY
Z
159
LL
n
AND THE WELL
were already under way in the Biology Department. The war
made it seem probable that shortages in surgical sutures would
develop and that we might not be able to rely on the supply of
"catgut" materials, the principal constituent of which is col-
lagen. Accordingly, a number of the staff decided to see whether
some progress might be made in forming a satisfactory suture
from slaughter-house waste products such as beef tendon. Such
a suture if practicable not only would add to the existing
supplies but also might possibly be an improvement, as it might
be composed of purified (non-irritating) protein, and made in
continuous lengths possessing more uniform properties than
was the case with existing surgical gut.
Preliminary experiments suggested the feasibility of this pro-
gram, and, starting 1 December 1942, the development of
collagenous products such as fibers, sheets, and tubes for surgical
repair was undertaken by the Biology Department under
contract with CMR. This program was successful in producing
on a laboratory scale, and also to a considerable degree in
conversion to larger scale production methods, collagenous
products showing promise for surgical applications. An impor-
tant medical problem in the war was the repair of nerves
severed by battle wounds. In joining the severed ends of the
nerve, it is necessary to enclose the ends in a tube so that the
nerve fibers may grow out properly into the portion beyond the
rupture. For this purpose collagen tubes were prepared which
are elastic, so that a tube of proper diameter would enclose the
nerve ends, snugly but without undue tension. Sterile prepara-
tions were sent to various medical research centers where they
were employed surgically. The processes have now been turned
over to interested commercial concerns, and the formal connec-
tion of the group was terminated in October, 1945.6
Even drugs came in for M.I.T.'s attention. Leicester F.
Hamilton, Professor of Analytical Chemistry and Executive
Officer of the Department, directed a project on the synthesis of
certain antimalarial drugs; Bernard S. Gould, Associate Pro-
fessor of Biochemistry, was concerned with the use of serum
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phosphatase in the treatment of scurvy and the possible
detection of scurvy at the subclinical level. Dean Sherwood
directed a research project on the vacuum drying of penicillin
from its frozen aqueous solution,7 and Irwin W. Sizer, Associate
Professor of Physiology, and Marshall W. Jennison, then
Associate Professor of Bacteriology, were consultants to peni-
cillin producers. 8
FOODS AND VITAMINS
The Food Technology Laboratories at the Institute were
directed by John C. Sluder, Assistant Professor of Food Tech-
nology, during Proctor's absence with the QMG in Washing-
ton.9 This laboratory worked almost full time on contract
with the Quartermaster Corps carrying out research on foods.
It produced a dehydrated mashed potato powder without loss
of color, flavor, or vitamin content.
In addition, Robert S. Harris, Professor of Biochemistry
of Nutrition, directed two successful projects in the develop-
ment of rations. The first produced an emergency parachute
ration for the AAF. Twenty-day iron rations were developed in
the form of palatable, stable, high-calorie, nutritious biscuits.
The second resulted in an abandon-ship ration for the Bureau
of Medicine and Surgery of the Navy. This was a liquid ration
containing one liter of water and 1,500 calories. It was partially
balanced nutritionally to prevent starvation symptoms and was
used successfully in naval aircraft life rafts.
Finally Nicholas A. Milas, Associate Professor of Organic
Chemistry, worked with a group which synthesized several bio-
logically active vitamin A products which were tested by Harris.
These products did not then go into industrial production al-
though they did serve as possible insurance in the touchy times
when it appeared that important supplies of this basic vitamin
would be successfully blockaded by Germany and Japan. They
are now being developed for industrial production.
Close-up view of the M.I.T. cyclotron chamber show-
ing the emergent cyclotron beam of 14 million elec-
tron volt deuterons (high-speed deuteron ions). This
beam is ordinarily used to produce atomic transmuta-
tion in targets of various materials placed just inside
the target container from which the beam is emerging
in this photograph.
Close-up view of the M.I.T. cyclotron chamber. The
bottles contain carbon tetrachloride, which is being
bombarded with neutrons from the cyclotron for the
transmutation of chlorine into radioactive sulphur
to be used in the investigations of the action of
mustard gas by other research groups in the United
States, Canada, and England.

2

FOR THE WOUNDED AND THE WELL
161
WATER
It fell to the lot of one of Technology's few women scientists
to make one of the most colorful contributions in the general
field of health. This was a venture of the Solar Energy Con-
version Research Project carried on by Maria Telkes, Research
Associate in Metallurgy.
For long centuries one of the great problems of the sea has
been the lack of water for persons shipwrecked and cast upon
the ocean in frail craft with insufficient water. Often, as the sea
tales relate, they have been driven in desperation to drink sea
water, with dreadful results. Was it then possible to convert
salt water into a liquid which could be drunk without danger
to the individual and with an apparatus which could be accom-
modated on a life raft? The raft itself, especially the inflatable
type carried by aircraft, could afford to supply hardly enough
water for two days per man. Must all downed aviators die of
thirst or, like the Rickenbacker party, have the luck to catch
rain water, to find fish whose flesh they can eat, or gulls whose
blood they can drink? The principles of solar energy distilla-
tion were investigated by Telkes in an OSRD project. After
considerable investigation into newly developed plastic mate-
rials, an inflatable floating type of solar still was constructed.
This distiller, containing no rigid or breakable parts and weigh-
ing just a pound, could be folded into a quart-size package. To
put it into use it was inflated with air, filled with salt water,
and placed overboard. On a clear tropical day it would yield
about a quart of potable water. The M.I.T. design was not
identical with the standard equipment issued by the AAF for
life rafts; but the work done in the M.I.T. development had an
important influence on the form of distiller finally adopted.
FOOTNOTES
1 Atomic weight 55; the naturally occurring isotopes weigh 54, 56, 57,
58, respectively.
2 Atomic weight 59.
3 Which was of about the same order as that received by all individuals
from cosmic rays.
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4 Associated with Evans in this were:
J. G. Gibson, 2nd (M.D., Harvard Medical School).
M. Stanley Livingston, Associate Professor of Physics.
Sanborn C. Brown, Associate Professor of Physics.
Martin Deutsch, Assistant Professor of Physics.
John W. Irvine, Jr., Associate Professor of Chemistry.
Eric T. Clarke, Research Associate in Physics.
Wilfred M. Good, then Research Associate in Physics.
Wendell C. Peacock, Research Associate in Physics.
Others of M.I.T.'s staff worked on kindred problems. For example,
George Scatchard, Professor of Physical Chemistry, spent about half his
time after July, 1941, working with Dr. Edwin J. Cohn at Harvard Medical
School on the fractionation of the plasma proteins for military use, at first
informally and later under OSRD contracts. His special tasks were the
determination of the osmotic pressure and other physico-chemical proper-
ties of the plasma protein, particularly of albumin, and of other material
proposed for intravenous injection for the treatment of shock, and the
standardization of solutions of the plasma proteins, particularly of
albumin.
Hans Mueller, Professor of Physics, developed a photoelectric device
for the study of human albumin which was helpful in getting the com-
mercial production of albumin going so that enough was on hand for
the invasion of Normandy.
5 In addition to Schmitt and Hauser, active participants in this project
were Irwin W. Sizer, Associate Professor of Physiology, and Cecil E. Hall,
Associate Professor in Biology.
The same group studied material embedded in the skin of victims of
blast pigmentation. Analysis of pigment obtained from soldiers at the
Valley Forge General Hospital, under the electron microscope, confirmed
the idea that the pigment was carbonaceous in nature. Recommendations
were then made concerning further steps in the treatment of victims of
blast pigmentation.
6 Those particularly active in this project were:
Francis O. Schmitt, Professor of Biology in charge of the Department.
Richard S. Bear, Associate Professor of Biophysical Chemistry.
Bernard S. Gould, Associate Professor of Biochemistry.
Marshall W. Jennison, then Associate Professor of Bacteriology.
Irwin W. Sizer, Associate Professor of Physiology.
David F. Waugh, Associate Professor of Physical Biology.
E. Lloyd Duggan, formerly Research Associate in Biology.
Torsti P. Salo, Research Associate in Biology.
Henry Sherman, Research Associate in Food Technology.
FOR THE WOUNDED AND THE WELL
163
Miss Janette Robinson, Research Assistant in Biology.
Eugene R. L. Gaughran, then Assistant in Biology.
A natural sequel to the project was one for the NAS and the QMC
in the fundamentals of the tanning of the collagen of leather. This was
carried on by Schmitt, Bear, Salo, and Sherman, with the addition of
0. E. A. Bolduan, Research Associate in Biology.
7 Associated with Dean Sherwood was Robert M. Bridgforth, Jr., then
Research Assistant in Chemistry.
8 Sizer for the Hayden Chemical Corporation of Princeton, New Jersey.
His work involved a study of the absorption spectra physical method for
assay of penicillin and certain enzyme problems associated with its pro-
duction. Tennison was consultant to the United Drug Company.
9 See Chapter 5.
II
PHENOMENA OF SKY AND SEA
YATI
1
hn
OIIIII
JI
ANSWER TO THE ACOUSTIC MINE
TECHNOLOGY'S STUDENTS OF ACOUSTICS, led by Morse, were
quickly brought into the war research program. The most
urgent of these acoustic problems arose in connection with
subsurface warfare. The total of underwater research was car-
ried on in a large number of establishments, and the projects
in several, such as Columbia and Harvard Universities, were
more extensive than those at M.I.T. Nonetheless the M.I.T.
group took an active and prominent part in the early research
and continued on some underwater problems until the end. This
work was first directed by Morse but, as he and some of his
colleagues became progressively more busy with the problems
of ORG,1 an important part of the M.I.T. work concerned
with acoustic apparatus fell to Richard D. Fay, Associate Pro-
fessor of Electrical Communications. 2
The first problem came up in January, 1941, under contract
with the Navy's Bureau of Ships. The chief objective of this
project was to find a way to sweep acoustic mines. Such a mine,
in which the Germans took great glee, is detonated, not by
contact with a ship or by the magnetic field of the ship, but by
sounds of the ship’s movement through the water. The sweep-
ing vessel will of course make sounds and movements of its
own and it cannot, therefore, get close enough to the mine to
pick it up with a conventional sweeping device. It therefore
seeks to carry out its mission by causing the mine to detonate
with no harm to any vessel, including the sweeper itself.
At the beginning of the project very little was known about
acoustic mines in general and still less about the noise output
164
PHENOMENA OF SKY AND SEA
165
pecue obven 104
of various vessels. The first requirement, then, was to measure
and analyze the sound received by a hydrophone located at the
bottom of a channel as ships of various types ran through this
channel. At that time there was not even any known technique
for calibrating the hydrophones; the group had to start essen-
tially from scratch. Nonetheless, effective measuring systems,
both portable and permanent, were made available by early
summer.
The development of sweeping gear kept pace with the
measurements. A successful sweep must, evidently, make more
noise than the ship if it is to set off the mine at a safe distance.
Since little was known about the peculiarities of the mine save
that the ship would set it off, the most obvious solution was to
have the sweep sound like a ship but much louder. The first
successful noisemaker developed by the project was, as a matter
of fact, rather spectacular. It was a simple device, so simple
that the first model was designed and built in rather less than
two hours. Tests the following day showed that this noisemaker
had an acoustic output one thousand times greater than that of
the towing vessel.
This is the kind of success story which sets a trap for the
unwary. It is likely to make them believe that scientific
miracles can be passed in short order once the scientists buckle
down to work. Aside from the circumstance that this noise-
maker did embrace certain well-known principles, later events
showed that there was a large amount of luck in this develop-
ment. It turned out subsequently, for example, that the relative
dimensions necessary to realize this behavior were rather criti-
cal, a thing which was not known when the first model was
conceived. Yet no subsequent variation produced a higher
acoustic output in the same range of speed. Modifications of this
noisemaker were later used to decoy acoustic torpedoes.
In the process of working on these problems certain supple-
mentary projects were undertaken by the group, notably the de-
sign of streamlined housings for hydrophones and a study of the
transmission characteristics of sound in relatively shallow water.
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QED
By July, 1943, when the group had grown from an original
team of four or five to one of sixty, the work on this project
was finished. A new project was then set up, this time under
Division 6 of NDRC. The objectives were to develop counter-
measures involving underwater sound and, as requested, to
have personnel and portable equipment available to assist other
groups in underwater sound measurements. The group was
also to work on certain relatively long-range problems con-
nected with submarine warfare. Practically all the work under-
taken was brought to a successful conclusion by July, 1945, at
which time all experimental work save for one uncompleted
job was stopped. The one unfinished job was important enough
so that it was continued until 31 October 1945 when the Bureau
of Ships set up a new project at the Institute to carry it still
further.
The acoustics group has been reconstituted with the peace
and, known as the Acoustics Laboratory, will undertake civilian
problems with attention to military problems when these seem
urgent. The laboratory will be headed by Richard H. Bolt,
Associate Professor of Physics.
TIT
YY
WATCHMEN, WHAT OF THE WEATHER?
Much of the work of Technology's meteorology staff was
carried on at Army establishments and has been described in
Chapter 5. However, there were a number of projects under the
general direction of Henry G. Houghton, Jr., Professor of
Meteorology in charge of the Department. They ranged from
work to improve daily weather forecasting through increased
use of aerological data plotted on special upper air maps, to
measuring the icing conditions encountered by aircraft.3
More unusual, perhaps, was the work carried on by the Sta-
tistics Laboratory in the Mathematics Department under the
direction of George P. Wadsworth, Associate Professor of
Mathematics. This laboratory as a whole had contracts both for
PHENOMENA OF SKY AND SEA
167
the Ordnance Department and the Air Force; for the former it
worked on problems of inspecting fire-control equipment; for
the latter it spent more time and developed more color in an
effort to arrive at better weather prediction based on probability
theory.
This project before it had ended engaged in nearly all phases
of mathematics applied to meteorology, including the analysis
of climatological data, the application of statistical techniques
to long-range forecasting, and the development of satisfactory
techniques for the verification of weather forecasts. Proposed
meteorological theories were tested by fundamental investiga-
tion of their premises, and a broad and intensive inquiry was
made into the behavior of the basic weather elements. This
inquiry laid special emphasis on their relations with one
another, their geographical pattern, and their temporal develop-
ment.4 Short-range forecasts were made by statistical techniques
and found to be on a par with those produced by standard
methods.
The group soon became convinced that there were no uni-
versal laws of weather in terms of the variables being used by
the forecasters. They then set out to test the possibility of
determining the future course of the present weather by refer-
ence to analogous past situations (called analogues). Mathe-
matical representations of the pressure pattern over vast areas
of the earth were obtained in such a way that by examination
of past weather sequences one could find analogues to the
present situation very rapidly. Statistical techniques were then
developed to choose the sequence which had the highest prob-
ability of being similar to current weather. These sequences
would indicate the general development to be expected for
periods over large sections of the earth's surface. Such analogues,
once the project was well under way, were sent daily to the
European, Mediterranean, and Asiatic theatres.5
IMPROVEMENT OF AIRCRAFT
Formal higher education in aeronautics in the United States
is believed to have begun at Technology. The contributions of
168
QED
M.I.T. to war aircraft are much less obvious to the layman
than the spectacular achievements with the gyro-sight, the
servomechanism, or radar. They were nevertheless important.
Although many of the staff were called away to other duties
along lines already described, what was left of the staff in
Aeronautical Engineering managed to tuck in a good deal of
useful work. Not all this was done after the crisis became
evident to everyone. For almost two years before the outbreak
of war, the Wright' Brothers Wind Tunnel had been engaged
continuously in the testing of models of confidential military
aircraft in cooperation with the principal aircraft manufac-
turers of the country. After the war began and throughout its
duration the tunnel was operated on a two-shift basis and
without interruption for a total of 4,500 working hours a year.
In this elliptical-shaped tube with the flattened-out-torus
plan, models of aircraft were mounted on a measuring system
which permitted rapid measurements. The models of many
famous planes paraded through the tube. The 300-odd reports
which were rendered covered among others the A-30 (Balti-
more), PBM Flying-Boat, Mars, XP-55, C-46 (Commando),
SC-1 (Sea-Hawk), SB2C (Helldiver), F4U (Corsair), F7F,
B-32, XP-75. This work was done for a roster of manufacturers,
including many a blue-chip name: Glenn L. Martin, Chance-
Vought, Curtiss-Wright, Grumman, Brewster, Bell, General
Motors, Boeing, Lockheed, Ranger, and Kaiser. Moreover, the
men of the tunnel tested models of designs for new dive
bombers, future fighters, new torpedo bombers, flying wings,
jet-propelled fighters and bombers as yet unreleased or even
unbuilt. The research work covered such diverse subjects as
airfoil sections, elevator and rudder controls, hinge moments,
cowl, cooling fan and related internal airflow problems, special
cowl problems on inline engines, and studies of the aero-
dynamics of steerable bombs and radar projectors. At the same
time personnel were trained for the design and operation of
other tunnels such as those at Boeing and United Aircraft
Corporations. Various of the staff members participated in the
PHENOMENA OF SKY AND SEA
169
design of specialized wind tunnels for the study of heat transfer
in aircraft oil coolers and radiators.
Throughout the war this wind tunnel work was under the
joint direction of John R. Markham, Professor of Aeronautical
Engineering, Shatswell Ober, Associate Professor of Aeronau-
tical Engineering, and Joseph Bicknell, Associate Professor of
Aeronautical Engineering. 6
A more curious piece of research was carried on in the
so-called Flutter Laboratory. This began in 1940 when a small
wind tunnel was completed and made available for this research.
The end object of a study of flutter is to determine the speed
at which the wings of a particular airplane will begin to flutter
and therefore become dangerous.
The M.I.T. project was aimed at the collection of basic data
on unsteady flow effects. Under Army sponsorship model wings
were constructed upon which the interplay between aero-
dynamic, elastic, and inertial effects could be studied in an
overall way through a comparison of the flutter speeds observed
in the tunnel with those predicted by theory.
This Army study involved over 3,000 flutter runs with models
having different aspect ratios, densities, centers of gravity,
elastic axes, aileron balances, and aileron restraints, in
all the different possible combinations. The primary fact
wanted was the critical speed, but to make the record as com-
plete as possible, a special camera was built with a 12-inch roll
film arranged to work with Edgerton stroboflash equipment.
For the Navy the Flutter Laboratory undertook a study of
the feasibility of simulating the elastic properties of complex
structures by simplified models and to demonstrate the work-
ability of the proposed simulation scheme. This work included
the building and testing of three dynamic scale models of Navy
aircraft wings. The last of these models, one of a Grumman
“Hellcat," was designed for experimentation at the full diving
speed of the actual aircraft to bring out the influence of com-
pressibility on flutter.
The staff of this laboratory, numbering some twenty persons,
1
170
QED
was directed by Manfred Rauscher, Associate Professor of Aero-
nautical Engineering. Eric Reissner, Associate Professor of
Mathematics, helped by his analysis of stress in wing covers, a
study of the distribution of lift on wings undergoing oscilla-
tions and the applications of these results to the analysis of
airplane flutter. This produced what may well have been the
first rational method for calculating the aerodynamic effect of
finite wing span on the values of flutter speed in aircraft.7
As the facilities of the Flutter Laboratory have increased and
the original interest in flutter has expanded into an interest in
the general dynamics of aircraft structures, arrangements have
been made to give regular instruction in this field. Such train-
ing is already being requested by the Army and the Navy for
their students at the Institute, whose facilities for this purpose
are believed to be unique.
In addition to these two activities, Joseph S. Newell, Profes-
sor of Aeronautical Structural Engineering and Executive
Officer, Department of Aeronautical Engineering, completed
three research projects connected with the structure of airplanes
for the NACA, two for the Army and one for the Navy.
The war work of the aeronautics group at the Institute may
well be summarized by a letter from Dr. G. W. Lewis, Director
of Aeronautical Research, Advisory Committee for Aeronautics,
addressed to Dr. Compton. Dr. Lewis wrote in part:
The twenty-two researches in the fields of aerodynamics, aircraft
power plants, and aircraft structures that have been carried on at
M.I.T. during the war produced results that in many cases proved
invaluable in the solution of urgent problems arising during the
course of the war.
The Institute's contribution to the science of aeronautics in this
manner has been of such magnitude as to make it extremely diffi-
cult at this time to acknowledge each individual contribution.
I trust that the splendid cooperation that has existed between
M.I.T. and the NACA during the war may be carried forward in
the years to come, particularly in the Committee's program of
contract research.
This work will be continued and intensified in peacetime.
PHENOMENA OF SKY AND SEA
171
For example, for use in connection with an extensive research
project which the Institute has undertaken for the Navy, plans
and specifications are now being prepared for a supersonic
laboratory to be erected at the Institute which will include a
supersonic wind tunnel. This tunnel is to be capable of develop-
ing air velocities up to 1,800 miles per hour in a test section
3 square feet in cross-section area and up to 3,000 miles per
hour in a smaller test section. This will enable the Institute to
carry aerodynamics research far beyond the capacity of its
present equipment.
ROBOT BOMBS
The new gimmick is almost always more interesting than
the old gadget. Guided missiles are more exciting than
airplanes.
In Chapter 48 we have sketched something of the early com-
bat history of the guided missile and it will not be repeated
here. When intensive research sought to produce better weapons
of this sort the research was distributed among many labora-
tories throughout the country, but M.I.T. can take pride in
having done pioneering work on two of the more important of
these weapons. AZON, except for BAT (which, however, was
not developed at M.I.T.), the only one which saw serious use in
combat, went through its fundamental stages at M.I.T.; and
much the same could be said for FELIX, which was starting for
the Pacific when the Japanese gave up.
The M.I.T. work on AZON is associated with the name
of Bertram E. Warren, Professor of Physics.9 The research
aimed to create a bomb equipped with small wing surfaces,
elevators, rudders, and ailerons which would respond to radio
signals sent from the plane which had launched the bomb.10
Of course the man running the radio had to be able to follow
this were originally considered: one was a television camera in
the bomb's nose which would transmit a picture back to the
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QED
could be seen by the bombardier all the way down to the strike.
The project at M.I.T. carried out most of the preliminary basic
research for the development of the dirigible bomb, including
the aerodynamic measurements for the design of wing surfaces
and control surfaces and the development of a coupled-gyro
system for maintaining roll stability. As AZON finally emerged
it was equally a product of the Gulf Research and Development
Corporation at Pittsburgh, for the project was switched there
when it became evident that it would need development and
1
S
depleted reserves of M.I.T.'s staff.
The success of AZON was surprising. It was a limited-purpose
bomb, for control was possible only in azimuth, and where it
struck in range was still a function of when the bombardier
dropped it. It was therefore most effective against long thin
targets such as railway lines, bridges, and air strips. The cost
and weight of the controls made it uneconomical to go into such
complications for a small payload; hence the target had to be
one which warranted several hundred pounds or even tons of
explosives in one place. After a certain amount of hard going,
AZON was accepted and made spectacular records in Burma,
where with 459 bombs it destroyed 27 bridges in the period
between 27 December 1944 and 3 March 1945. These figures
include in many cases more than one strike per bridge. This
record is to be compared with the 44 sorties required, in the
same theatre, to strike one bridge with conventional bombs.
These sorties would, for a B-24, result in dropping six or seven
times 44 bombs of the conventional sort for the one strike.
Figures obtained by the Applied Mathematics Panel based upon
both test and combat results of AZON and ordinary bombs
show that, for a typical line target, AZON should score 25 hits
per hundred bombs dropped, against 1.7 hits for the same
number of standard bombs.
AZON, however, had some demerits. For one thing the bomb-
ing plane had to keep on its run or close to it until the bomb
had struck, and this was dangerous business in Europe where
S
11
PHENOMENA OF SKY AND SEA
173
the flak came high, thick, and accurate. Its limit to azimuth
control was also serious. This limitation led to the successor
bomb (not developed at M.I.T., but developed under the
supervision of M.I.T. alumni) called RAZON, which solved the
much more complicated problem of control in range as well
as azimuth. As a matter of fact, it was the bomb later to be called
RAZON which was first envisioned by this M.I.T. group; but
when it developed that the problems to be ironed out before
this bomb could be in the hands of the services would take so
long that it was likely that the war would be over before it
would be useful, it was decided that the wisest course would be
to concentrate upon the development of AZON, which could
be brought into use much sooner. The RAZON bomb was
finally developed, and it was the product of the Gulf Research
and Development group, but it never did come into service
during the war. It remained for another M.I.T. group to work
on an entirely different approach, which relieved the bom-
bardier of further responsibility after he had launched his
bomb. This weapon was known as FELIX.
FELIX relied for its accuracy on the differential heat radia-
tion from a target and the surrounding terrain or water. It
could not be used indiscriminately because one had to be sure
that the differential existed. If it did, the bombardier had only
to release FELIX so that its natural trajectory would land it
reasonably near the target and, after getting straightened away
in its fall, it would see (or feel) the target and automatically
guide itself toward it.
The Institute's work on this project can be attributed largely
to Alan C. Bemis, Research Associate in Meteorology.11
Bemis began his interest in the military possibilities of the
infrared in quite a different context. Emphasis at first was
placed on development of devices to detect enemy aircraft from
interceptor planes at ranges too short for radar. It was
recognized that such a device would not operate through a
dense fog and it was soon learned that a background of clouds
also made the problem difficult. Meanwhile it was nevertheless
174
QED
demonstrated that sensitive far-infrared detecting devices suit-
able for use in aircraft could be built. It was natural enough
then, in 1942, to shift the emphasis to detection of surface
vessels on the ocean by the heat energy radiated from them.
This led to the design of automatic control equipment for the
self-steering or homing of various kinds of missiles. 12 A
major fraction of Bemis's time from then on was devoted to
work on a bomb designed to steer itself automatically into its
target. This bomb was under joint development between the
Heat Research Laboratory at M.I.T. and the Gulf Research
and Development Company of Pittsburgh. By June, 1945, the
development was complete and FELIX was in large-scale pro-
duction. Nearly one thousand units had been manufactured
by the end of the war. The Twentieth Air Force on Guam had
requested several hundred, but none had actually been shipped
overseas.
WOOD TO BURN
Not all the work at the Institute on bombs and bombing
was directed to the aircraft, the navigation, the finding of the
target and the bomb; some was spent on the targets. Probably
the most interesting of these was carried out for Hottel's section
of Division 11, NDRC, by Gordon B. Wilkes, Professor of Heat
Engineering. This division, as has previously been noted, was
studying various types of incendiary weapons for the rain of
fire which was to fall upon Japan. They found it desirable to
have an idea of the extent to which these various compositions
would set fire to wood, especially the woods which were preva-
lent in the target land. The whole study of the fire problem in
Japan was very carefully undertaken, and, so far as Wilkes's
part was concerned, involved the study of wood species and
moisture contents to be expected in the Japanese wooden cities.
Wilkes, therefore, tested and reported on the flammability of
these woods at diverse relative humidities as they were exposed
to various intensities of radiation; he also tested the radiation
intensity of the various proposed gels, thermite, and magnesium
PHENOMENA OF SKY AND SEA
175
incendiaries, and evaluated them with respect to their ability
to ignite wood.
CONCRETE TO SMASH
Not far removed from this project, though more on the
defensive side and of possibly longer range significance, was
a series of studies undertaken by John B. Wilbur, Professor of
Structural Engineering, in charge of the Department of Civil
and Sanitary Engineering.13 Here the Corps of Engineers had
already put together a good deal of information of an empirical
sort on the resistance of heavy structures to the impulsive loads
initiated by the strike of a projectile or the detonation of an
explosive. At the same time advanced mathematical analyses
of the vibrational behavior of massive slabs had been worked
out, but were not in a form suitable for the designer to use. To
bridge these two and to provide engineers with a rational
method for analyzing future structures and their behavior
against conjectural weapons, OSRD commissioned Wilbur and
his group to make some studies. The project involved prelimi-
nary work relating to basic methods for the analysis of struc-
tures acted upon by impulsive loads, the development of
approximate practical methods for analyzing structures sub-
jected to such loads, the presentation of impulsive loading data
in a form suitable for use in design, a study of the fiber stresses
permissible under these extreme military conditions, and the
application of the proposed methods of design to numerous
specific problems by the Corps of Engineers. The group also
developed laboratory procedure to determine periods and char-
acteristic shapes of the normal modes of vibration for various
structures. 14
TY
IN SUMMARY
For the strategic bombing offensive, then, Technology's
laboratories had supplied basic information for the design of
better bombers, radar, and other navigational gear to get the
planes over the target and back to the base, radar and other
176
QED
sights to improve the accuracy of the bombardment. They
further contributed to the development of new bombs which
would in part at least guide themselves to the target, and could
always be counted on to provide corrections in original errors
of aiming, and so that the bomb could do a better job when it
got there, methods of analyzing the target to be struck. As in
all research of this sort, M.I.T. cannot claim an “exclusive"
on any of these, but it was consistently in the front line of
contributors. To complete the strategic bombing offensive
there remained but the climactic weapon, the atomic bomb.
M.I.T.'s participation in this project is, however, reserved for
Chapter 14.
FOOTNOTES
1 See Chapter 6.
2 Associated with the acoustic project during the war in addition to
Morse and Fay were:
Earl B. Millard, Professor of Physical Chemistry.
Herman Feshbach, Associate Professor of Physics.
John D. Trimmer, then Assistant Professor of Aeronautical Engineering.
3. Others in the group were Edward M. Brooks, Instructor in
Meteorology, and Robert Morton Cunningham, Research Associate in
Meteorology.
4 In this work the ideas of Norbert Wiener on generalized harmonic
analysis were used extensively.
5 In addition to Wadsworth, others concerned with this work were:
Allan T. Gifford, Associate Professor of Hydraulic Engineering.
George B. Thomas, Jr., Assistant Professor of Mathematics.
Albert H. Bowker, Research Associate in Mathematics.
Chester H. Gordon, Jr., Instructor in Mathematics.
Joseph G. Bryan, D.I.C.
6 Project and shift leaders whose contributions were important include:
Michael Witunski, Research Associate in Aeronautical Engineering.
Lawrence Bernbaum, Research Assistant in Aeronautical Engineering.
Henry Hoadley, then Research Assistant in Aeronautical Engineering.
Frederic W. Watriss, Research Assistant in Aeronautical Engineering.
Holden W. Withington, then Research Assistant in Aeronautical Engi-
neering
James H. Grimes, Jr., Wind Tunnel Test Engineer.
Paul H. Lee, Wind Tunnel Test Engineer, now Research Assistant in
Biology.

A view of the Wright Brothers Wind Tunnel from above. This was used for extensive tests on models of
new aircraft such as the Mars, the B-32 and the XP-75. Photograph by John Garfield.
PHENOMENA OF SKY AND SEA
177
Arthur P. McCabe, then Wind Tunnel Test Engineer.
Don H. Ross, Wind Tunnel Test Engineer.
Robert D. Taylor, Wind Tunnel Test Engineer.
7 Others of the M.I.T. group who did important work in the Flutter
Laboratory are:
Rodney H. Smith, Assistant Professor of Aeronautical Engineering.
Thomas Gouzoule, D.I.C.
8 See page 54.
9 Associated with Warren were Hans Mueller, Professor of Physics,
C. F. Squire, Assistant Professor of Physics, and A. J. McLennan, D.I.C.
10 Related to all guided missile work was the project of Shatswell Ober,
Associate Professor of Aeronautical Engineering, on the general aero-
dynamics of rudder-equipped bombs.
11 Bemis's group at M.I.T. was known as the Heat Research Laboratory.
Roy W. Prince, Jr., was made assistant director of the laboratory in 1944,
and its staff included several other M.I.T. graduates. Closely associated
with the project were Henry G. Houghton, Jr., Professor of Meteorology
in charge of the Department, Louis Harris, Associate Professor of Physical
Chemistry, and William H. Radford, Associate Professor of Electrical
Communications.
12 Initially these infrared applications were studied under the aegis of
Dean Harrison's Division 16, NDRC. Later, when the work became pri-
marily guided missile development, the project was shifted to Division 5,
Hugh Spencer, Chief.
13 With the collaboration of:
Walter M. Fife, Associate Professor of Structural Engineering.
Charles H. Norris, Associate Professor of Structural Engineering.
Charles F. Peck, Jr., Instructor in Civil Engineering.
Milton M. Platt, then Assistant in Civil Engineering.
14 Closely akin to this work, although susceptible to a wide variety of
other applications, was a series of projects directed by the late A. V.
de Forest, Professor of Mechanical Engineering, on the measurement of
rapidly changing rates of strain. With various pieces of ingenious appa-
ratus, invented by him, de Forest made measurements of the phenomena
associated with high and rapid rates of loading in wires, plates, and gun
barrels. This work, coupled with parallel investigations at the California
Institute of Technology and Westinghouse Electric Manufacturing Com-
pany, has laid the basis for a whole series of advances in the consideration
of the effects of impact loading.
12
IN THE SERVICE OF MATERIALS
IN ANY STUDY OF TOPOGRAPHY it is usually easier to comprehend
the mountain peak than it is the rolling hills but both are
important. We come now to a chapter which cannot be as easy
to read as some of those which have preceded or which follow.
It must deal with a miscellaneous group of contributions, some
of individual importance, some parts of a bigger pattern. The
full context cannot always be provided and the reader may
therefore feel some confusion. Nonetheless, if he persists to the
end he will have a map of what Institute laboratories did in the
service of war materials, and however the details may vary in
interest the map as a whole will prove illuminating. The story
will range across such diverse things as oxygen, steel, tin, rubber,
mica, dielectrics, crystals, fuels and power, and the wares of
Chemical Warfare.
OXYGEN
Among the elementary substances described in chemistry
courses, oxygen occupies a conspicuous place. The most abun-
dant of all the elements, it exists in the free state to the extent
of nearly a quarter the total weight of the atmosphere; yet its
separation from the air is a highly technical affair. In no
previous war has it been so extensively or urgently needed both
as a liquid and as a gas. The Air Forces needed gas to supply
respiratory masks at high altitudes. The Navy required it to
replenish the oxygen consumed by respiration in submerged
submarines. Early in the war, stored liquid oxygen was desired
to oxygenate the exhaust gases of Diesel engines to be recycled
as a means of underwater propulsion. Naval supply vessels
178
IN THE SERVICE OF MATERIALS
179
were, of course, required to maintain large quantities of the
familiar bottled oxygen to supply combat vessels and shore
units, principally for the welding and cutting of steel. The
extensive use of oxygen for medical purposes is well known.
The ubiquitous commercial oxygen cylinder weighing 125
pounds contains normally but 18 pounds of oxygen. On the
one hand, to transport the enormous number of steel bottles
needed by the services from the home plants in the United
States to the widely scattered bases and back again meant
using up valuable shipping space, tremendous tonnage, and
personnel in a situation already strained fantastically. The com-
mercial plant oxygen generator based on liquid air distillation
(-300°F) is, on the other hand, heavy, bulky, and does not
lend itself to installation in the field, especially if the field is
itself mobile. Under these circumstances it appeared certain
that light portable oxygen generators would be of enormous
use; and this proved to be the case.
Low-temperature research is not a new venture at M.I.T.
In 1920 the U.S. Bureau of Mines solicited the interest of
Frederick G. Keyes, Professor of Physical Chemistry, and allo-
cated funds to the M.I.T. Research Laboratory of Physical
Chemistry to obtain information desired by the Bureau and to
center for cryogenic research in the United States. In 1940 when
pure oxygen supplies for the armed forces became urgent, the
group, experienced in low-temperature research in its various
aspects, was comprised of Francis Bitter, Associate Professor
of Physics, assisted by Albert R. Kaufmann, Associate Professor
of Metallurgy, in magnetic research, and F. G. Keyes, Professor
of Physical Chemistry, and S. C. Collins, Associate Professor of
Mechanical Engineering, plus Clark C. Stephenson, Associate
Professor of Chemistry, Research Associates R. B. Jacobs and
Chauncey Starr, National Research Fellows J. F. G. Hicks and
R. W. Blue, and numerous graduate students. Bitter was early
diverted from cryogenic research to perfect a device which would
protect vessels from magnetic mines. 1
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Fortunately several of the group had been pursuing research
relating closely to some of the main aspects of the oxygen unit
problems presented for solution by the armed services. Thus,
besides earlier experience in building and operating liquid air
plants, two hydrogen liquefier units had recently been designed
and built for attaining temperatures 470°F below the freezing
point of water and used for the measurement of the heat capaci-
ties of salts. Also the Research Corporation had allocated funds
in support of Collins's development of expansion engines, to be
used for the direct production of liquid helium required in
Bitter's magnetic research and for research planned by others.
The first project discussed in September, 1940, was large-scale
production of liquid oxygen aboard submarines at a rate of
1,000 to 5,000 pounds per hour. The equipment could occupy
a space in the submarine equivalent to a cube roughly 16 feet
on a side and it could not weigh over 150 tons. The means
compressors and expanders. However, no facilities existed any-
where in the United States, although large turbo-compressors
had been used in Europe. According to the estimates, even if
the turbo-compressors had been available, the space allotted was
much too small to permit the production of even as little as
1,000 pounds per hour. The project was therefore not pushed.
During the fall of 1940 and through the following winter,
however, the group turned to the problem of a liquid air recti-
fier for the production of oxygen aboard ships and airplanes,
and a number of designs were tested. The restricting conditions
were still so cramping that a solution proved difficult and work
was in progress a year later. However, in a report by Collins and
ber, 1942, a successful application to the unit designed to supply
respiratory oxygen to the crew of a bomber was described, and
operating tests on a model were reported.
In September, 1942, the Air Corps requested that the model
airplane unit be forwarded for test to Wright Field at Dayton,
Ohio. Collins and McMahon left the group to perfect, at the
IN THE SERVICE OF MATERIALS
181
CU
Frigidaire Division of General Motors, a final model of their
unique portable low-pressure generator in preparation for pro-
duction. The units as finally produced weighed 470 pounds
complete with 70-pound oxygen compressor, occupied a very
small space, were automatic in operation, and could be operated
in transit. Their capacity, 150 cubic feet per hour (99.5 per cent
purity of oxygen), was sufficient for the ten-man crew of the
bomber. They should have important uses in postwar aviation.
Request for a lightweight compact unit for replenishing the
respiratory oxygen on submarines was made in the late summer
of 1942 and led to the design of a light, compact, high-pressure
unit to operate with or without precooling. The unit was to be
supplied with air feed from either of the two compressors
(3,000 pounds per square inch) normally used aboard sub-
marines, to charge the air flasks of the torpedoes. The model
constructed was designed for automatic operation, and delivery
of liquid oxygen was through flexible vacuum-jacketed metal
hose. The yield of oxygen was 20 pounds per hour without pre-
cooling, and 35 pounds per hour with precooling. Two of the
units manufactured by Servel, Inc., were supplied to our British
allies.
In February, 1943, the U.S. Bureau of Ships requested the
development of a dual-purpose oxygen-producing unit to pro-
duce liquid oxygen with and without precooling, and also to
produce high-pressure oxygen gas directly, without the use of
a compressor. Since the unit was to be used on supply ships it
was necessary to provide a rotating column. The purity of the
oxygen was to be 99.5 per cent and adapted for air feed in
amount 67 cubic feet per minute at 3,000 pounds per square
inch, or 300 pounds per hour. The quantity of oxygen obtain-
able was to be not less than 35 to 40 pounds per hour.
The most difficult element of the unit was the design and
development of an air-driven liquid oxygen pump capable of
raising the pressure on the liquid to 2,400 pounds per square
inch for injection and subsequent evaporation in the heat inter-
changer. The perfection of the designs, for the rotating column
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head, the liquid air distribution device, the antiflooding still
bottom and float cage details were due to Dudley Williams,
assisted in course by suggestions from C. E. Teeter, Jr., T. E.
White, R. P. Cavileer, and others, all of D.I.C.
The model unit produced was half the size the Bureau
of Ships later desired, and the group cooperating with the
Independent Engineering Company of O'Fallon, Illinois, com-
pleted the design for a unit to deliver 70 pounds per hour of
2,200 pounds per square inch gaseous oxygen or an equal
amount of liquefied oxygen. One of the units was under test
in June, 1945, and the second nearing completion. Both units
have since been under test at the Philadelphia Laboratory of
the Bureau of Ships.2
STEEL
Steel is one of the oldest of military materials and the later
improvements made in it are slower and less spectacular. Much
of Technology's contribution to the war metallurgy of this
basic material was naturally made through activities of its staff
on the War Metallurgy Committee.3 There were nonetheless
some specific projects in the Technology laboratories.
Under the direction of Peter E. Kyle, then Associate Professor
of Mechanical Engineering, a group in the Materials Process-
ing Laboratory of the Department of Mechanical Engineering
studied the possibility of improving low-alloy armor steels, for
tank and aircraft applications, by flame treatment. The results
indicated that the properties of this type of armor, which had
the advantage of not using so much critical material, could be
greatly increased by flame hardening; under some conditions it
would compare favorably with the widely used carburized
armor.
At the conclusion of this project the group, under subcon-
tract with Battelle Memorial Institute, investigated captured
enemy matériel, especially large-caliber guns on which tests were
made to determine metallurgical and mechanical properties,
chemical compositions, and probable methods of manufacture. 4
IN THE SERVICE OF MATERIALS
183
In 1941 John Chipman, Professor of Metallurgy and now in
charge of the Department of Metallurgy, carried on a project
for the development of a non-magnetic steel which could be
used for light-gauge armor in the vicinity of magnetic com-
passes. Ordinary armor plate could not be used because of its
effect upon the compass, yet the pilot was a critical man and
needed protection both on the bridge of a ship and in aircraft.
Several appropriate steels were successfully developed in collab-
oration with A. R. Kaufmann, Associate Professor of Metallurgy,
and Morris Cohen, Professor of Physical Metallurgy.5
Cohen also directed study sponsored by the Sheffield Founda-
tion on the dimensional stability of metal.6 He sought to find
the basic reasons why accurately finished gauges, dies, and pre-
cision parts undergo dimensional changes in storage or in
service; he developed rapid test methods for determining
dimensional stability, made a study of the subzero temperatures
currently used to promote this stability, and compiled reliable
stability data as a function of steel composition, heat treatment,
and method of storage. This research was of particular value to
the Ordnance Department, to mass production industries, and
to manufacturers of precision equipment generally, all of which
were concerned with interchangeability, close tolerances, and
permanency of dimensions.
TIN
Antoine M. Gaudin, Richards Professor of Mineral Dressing,
led an expedition to Bolivia in 1942 to find out how best to
increase the production in this important source for tin and
tungsten. The outcome of his exploration was a research project
under arrangements with Patino Mines and Enterprises, Boliv-
ian Tin and Tungsten Corporation, and Mauricio Hochschild
SAMI. The object of the work was to develop methods of
concentration which would increase the recovery of tin from
ores which were currently being treated by crude methods; also
to find treatments which would make possible recovery of tin
from ores not treatable by the older practices. These investiga-
184
LED
tions, carried on in the Richards Mineral Dressing Laboratory,
resulted in developing industrially attractive flotation processes
for a number of the Bolivian ores and carried certain of the
processes to the point of recommending pilot plant construc-
tion, since they promised increased production of tin and
increased life for the Bolivian mines.?
14
JET ENGINE MATERIALS
For three and one-half years, Nicholas J. Grant, Assistant
Professor of Process Metallurgy, directed a program investi-
gating the development, testing, and treatment of metallic
materials for gas turbines, jet propulsion units, and turbo-
superchargers. Materials developed were of both forged and
cast types. The latter required application of the new art of
precision casting whereby tolerances of 0.001 inch are main-
tained in small articles weighing up to one-half pound. This
work was done for the Bureau of Ships of the Navy. In con-
nection with its precision casting program the laboratory under-
took to supply the CWS and the Army Medical Corps with
highly intricate, newly designed metallic articles which can be
manufactured only by such a technique, such articles as special
medical instruments.
RUBBER
The Institute's principal contribution to the critical rubber
program was of course the services of Dr. Compton on the
Baruch Committee. Three members of the Institute's faculty,
T. K. Sherwood, E. A. Hauser, and C. Myers, also worked for
this committee. When the government established the Office of
Rubber Director, Colonel Bradley Dewey, an alumnus of the
Institute and a Life Member of its Corporation, was appointed
Deputy to Rubber Administrator William Martin Jeffers, whom
he later succeeded. Edwin B. Gilliland, Professor of Chemi-
cal Engineering, was appointed his deputy.8 The far-sighted
deductions drawn by the Baruch Committee and the gigantic
task successfully completed by the Rubber Administrator and
IN THE SERVICE OF MATERIALS
185
his staff will never be forgotten. However, the laboratories in
Cambridge also played a part.
Even before the attack on Pearl Harbor the D.I.C. had a
project, sponsored by the Midwest Rubber Reclaiming Com-
pany, to work out a method for reclaiming the synthetic rubber
known as Neoprene. This was desirable because the methods
ordinarily used for reclaiming vulcanized natural rubber did
not yield usable reclaims of the man-made product.
Ernst A. Hauser, Associate Professor of Chemical Engineer
ing, was in charge of this project, and in collaboration with
Desiree S. le Beau, then Research Associate in Chemical Engi-
neering, was able to solve this problem so that during the war
it was possible to reclaim not only Neoprene, but also the
later-developed Butadiene copolymers, either alone or in com-
bination with natural rubber, without using different equip-
ment from that which was customary in the rubber-reclaiming
industry.
Another rubber project was directed by Nicholas A. Milas,
Associate Professor of Organic Chemistry, on behalf of the
Union Bay State Chemical Company. Here the problem was
to develop new synthetic rubbers and also new synthetic
organic peroxides. Two new rubbers were created, Mersopol
and Isopol. The latter is now manufactured industrially. A new
synthetic rubber chloride entirely satisfactory for war purposes
was created for the binding of metal to metal and metal to syn-
thetic rubber, and it is now being produced industrially. Sev-
eral organic peroxides were synthesized and were found to be
effective in the rubber and plastics industries and in increasing
the "cetane number” of diesel fuels. Some of them are being
produced industrially, and one was used in substantial quan-
tities by the General Electric Company for the production of
a high-priority plastic used in military aircraft.9
MICA, DIELECTRICS, AND CRYSTALS
For a number of years prior to the war the Electrical Engi-
neering Department had maintained an Instruments and Mate-
186
QED
rials Research Laboratory under the direction of Jayson C.
Balsbaugh, Associate Professor of Electrical Power Production
and Distribution. This laboratory, in peacetime, had been
supported largely by industrial companies and had a great deal
of specialized equipment for research in the measurements
field. It was quickly and readily converted into a government
laboratory for war work. It had an interesting project in the
development of a substitute for mica.
Mica has been used for many years as a major insulator in
electrical apparatus and is critically important in radar and
communications. Naturally, then, there was considerable con-
cern shortly after the attack at Pearl Harbor when it was
feared that the Japanese would be able to prevent shipments
from India, which would have brought about a critical shortage.
As a result there was a good deal of pressure to develop new
electrical insulators.
Prior to the war, some work had been done at M.I.T. on a
new electrical insulating film called Alsifilm, invented by
Hauser. Visitors to M.I.T.'s Open Houses have seen this film
displayed. It is based upon the film-forming properties of
bentonite clay and has structural characteristics similar to
mica, might, indeed, be called "synthetic mica.” In view of the
promise of the film and the threatened shortage of the natural
material, Balsbaugh and his group set out to improve its elec-
trical properties, and to develop at the same time methods of
producing the film more rapidly. They also gave attention to
methods of fabricating it into electrical condensers. After some
preliminary development work, film production was taken over
by Rohm and Haas Company of Philadelphia, while the
Aircraft Marine Products, Inc., sponsored further develop
mental work at Technology on methods of fabricating it into
electrical devices. The film, as made available commercially
by Rohm and Haas, found important wartime application in
pulse networks for radar systems, for by-pass and blocking pur-
poses, for radio circuits, and for ignition condensers in air-
craft engines, where it is further advantageous in that its use
IN THE SERVICE OF MATERIALS
187
in place of mica permits substantial reduction in the size and
weight of units.
In the long run, as things turned out, the Japanese did not
succeed in cutting the supply line, although they pared it thin
at times; the mica shortage did not materialize. Nonetheless,
this insulating film, probably one of the few new electrical
insulating materials developed during the war, has some unique
characteristics. Among them is the fact that it is stable at high
temperatures as contrasted with the more common organic
insulating materials. It is therefore expected that it will find
useful peacetime applications now that it has served its war
purpose. 10
The term “dielectrics” designates all nonmetallic substances
when investigated in electric or electromagnetic fields. Under
the direction of Arthur R. von Hippel, Professor of Electrical
Engineering, M.I.T.'s Laboratory for Insulation Research
served during the war as a center of dielectric research and
development for NDRC. Working closely with Radiation
Laboratory, the Insulation Laboratory helped in the solution
of radar problems by improving existing dielectrics and devel-
oping new materials and applications. As a national evaluation
center it developed new measuring techniques and instruments
over a frequency range of 60 to 1010 cycles, examined dielec-
tric materials produced throughout the country, and furnished
manufacturers with information necessary to improve their
products. It also supplied procurement agencies and designers
with the needed critical information on the properties, advan-
tages, and limitations of the various available dielectric mate-
rials. 11 The Insulation Laboratory, in addition, was engaged
in research and development on infrared photocells.
Crystals played an important part in many optical and other
wartime applications, and like other materials offered some
risk of being in short supply; moreover, from the natural
sources there is always the chance of erratic supply either in
quantity or quality. For the optical group of NDRC under
Dean Harrison, Donald C. Stockbarger, Associate Professor of
SY
188
QED
Physics, developed apparatus and a method for growing cal-
cium and barium fluoride crystals of optical quality from the
melt. Since these inorganic crystals do not come naturally
from the melt, the developments required much original study
and invention.
In point of fact Stockbarger developed the first optically
usable laboratory-grown fluorite crystals ever obtained and
succeeded in producing crystals far larger than those ever found
in nature. His work made available for the first time optically
usable crystals of fluorite of sufficient size to be used in aerial
camera objectives and other lenses larger than the objectives
of microscopes (up to 6 inch diameter instead of 1 inch).12
S
FUELS AND POWER
A variety of miscellaneous projects, falling under the gen-
eral category of power and fuel, was carried on by Institute
investigators. Glenn C. Williams, Assistant Professor of Chemi-
cal Engineering, worked to obtain fundamental knowledge
about high-output combustion and to develop suitable burners
for application to turbo-jet and ram-jet power plants. Although
still in the experimental stage, this project resulted in promis-
ing new-type chambers for these operations. Williams also
carried on studies of the performance of high-energy-content
gas-producing systems for operating Naval torpedoes. For his
work on torpedo fuels he received the personal Naval Ordnance
Development Award, as did Ernest P. Neumann, Assistant
Professor of Mechanical Engineering, who became Assistant
Director of the Turbo Laboratory after earlier work on super-
sonic aerodynamics for NACA.
Ascher H. Shapiro, Associate Professor of Mechanical Engi-
neering, supervised a project on combustion chambers, fuel
systems, and high-temperature gas turbine units all with refer-
ence to their application to torpedoes; he later was connected
with the investigation of gas turbine power plants for aircraft.
For his work on torpedo plants he received the personal Naval
Ordnance Development Award. 13
IN THE SERVICE OF MATERIALS
189
Joseph H. Keenan, Professor of Mechanical Engineering,
worked in the experimental determination of coefficients of
heat transmission between a tube wall and an air stream flowing
at velocities up to the speed of sound. With Joseph Kaye,
Assistant Professor of Mechanical Engineering, he made ana-
lytical studies of aircraft power plants; with Frank M. Lewis,
Professor of Marine Engineering, he developed a new type of
marine propulsion unit for the Bureau of Ships; he found
further time to study ejectors both experimentally and analyti-
cally and made analytical studies of aircraft propulsion systems
for United Aircraft Corporation.
Throughout the war, moreover, the Sloan Laboratory under
the direction of the brothers Taylor carried on numerous
D.I.C. projects relating to internal combustion motors. These
totaled some fifteen, of which some were under the direction
of C. Fayette Taylor, Professor of Automotive Engineering, and
others under the direction of Edward S. Taylor, Professor of
Aircraft Engines.
THE WARES OF CHEMICAL WARFARE
Technology's largest contribution, in Cambridge, to the
Chemical Warfare Service was its participation in the work of
the Chemical Warfare Service Development Laboratory. For
this purpose the Institute constructed with its own funds the
large addition to its permanent plant known as Building 12,
and now occupied by the Department of Chemical Engineering.
This was a large laboratory for chemical engineering research
and instruction, and throughout the war was rented exclusively
to the Chemical Warfare Service and operated under CWS
management.
But the Institute's contribution did not end with providing
space. As one of the conditions of the arrangement, Harold C.
Weber, Professor of Chemical Engineering, was loaned full
time to the Chemical Warfare Service and served as the chief
technical man in the new laboratory, with the title of Technical
Adviser, CWS Development Laboratory. In addition, during
190
QED
two emergency periods he served as Division Chief of two
divisions of the Laboratory and was at all times Liaison Officer
between the Laboratory and the Institute.
Moreover, Scott Walker, then Assistant Professor of Chemical
Engineering, and Roy P. Whitney, then Assistant Professor of
Chemical Engineering, were loaned full time to the laboratory
and served as Division Chiefs during the last two years of its
operation.14 The laboratory employed approximately 350
highly trained workers. Many of them were M.I.T. graduates.
About one-third were Army personnel, the rest civilian.
The work ranged from problems of gas warfare to preserva-
tives. Gas warfare work had both its offensive and defensive
sides. For defense against enemy gas and smoke the laboratory
developed, for example, a lightweight assault mask, offering
superior protection, in which the canister was carried directly
on the face piece. Troops landing on the Normandy beaches
on D-Day carried these assault masks. Several types of wearing
apparel were developed offering superior protection against
vesicant gas attacks but were not used in active combat because
the enemy did not employ the vesicants. Based on theoretical
work done at the laboratory, a new type of paper was developed
for use in smoke filters and, after this, a new, compact type of fil-
ter far superior to any previously in use by the Allies was devel-
oped and used in many of the gas masks issued in the latter part
of the war. Owing in large measure to work done in the labora-
tory, the United States was able to produce gas mask canisters
of lighter weight and longer life than those used by any other
country. Finally, a sensitive, compact, simple field apparatus
for detecting and identifying the various gases which might be
encountered during a gas attack, was developed. This was
really a complete chemical laboratory for the detection and
estimation of war gases, contained in a small satchel approxi-
mately the size of a standard building brick and weighing about
two pounds. The entire equipment could be readily operated
by one entirely unfamiliar with chemical work, and the unit
even had a self-contained light source for use at night.
IN THE SERVICE A
191
OF MATERIALS
On the offensive side the laboratory developed a simple,
commercially practicable mustard purification process. It puri-
fied several hundred pounds of mustard in Building 12 and
finally built a semiworks plant just outside Boston and purified
almost a hundred tons. Again a new method was found for
making phosgene which did not involve the use of refrigera-
tion or expensive equipment. Over a ton of phosgene was
actually produced by this process in a pilot plant erected in
Building 12.
Flame throwers and other devices of petroleum warfare also
engaged the attention of the laboratory. Because of a feared
shortage in raw materials to make the type of jellied fuels used
in flame throwers and incendiary bombs, a second type of jel-
lied fuel was developed by the laboratory to be used as a
substitute should the emergency develop. Again a large amount
of work was done on portable flame throwers and two improved
models were created, one of which was accepted for commercial
production. The laboratory operated what was probably the
only full-sized flame thrower range in this country in one of
the abandoned mill buildings just outside Boston.
Smoke also engaged the attention of this CWS group. An
intensive research was carried on in connection with smoke
and smoke measurements, and by the end of the war every plant
making smoke filters for gas masks was equipped with an auto-
matic smoke penetration meter of a design furnished by the
laboratory. Every gas mask manufactured in these plants was
tested on such a meter, and some of the meters were furnished
to a few of the Allies for use in their smoke work. The labora-
tory furnished a complete design for a plant making noxious
smoke grenades, and a plant involving most of the features of
the laboratory design was built and operated.
At the very outset of the war necessity for mildew-proofing
was recognized by the CWS; one of the first laboratories set up
to study this problem was in Building 12 at M.I.T. This section
did pioneer work on mildew-proofing, using all the fungi
encountered in various theatres and particularly those from
192
QED
Pacific areas. By the end of the war all important chemical
warfare items were proofed against mildew.
Field laboratories were necessary in connection with chemical
work carried out under field conditions in the various theatres
of operation. The laboratory was responsible for the design of
all equipment used in these laboratories for supplying gas,
electricity, compressed air, water, and sewerage. In addition,
it was responsible for the specifications and choice of all
benches, laboratory furniture, and mechanical or electrical
equipment or supplies. In almost every case this meant that
new designs had to be worked out and tested. These laboratories,
complete with all equipment, a small library, and the necessary
apparatus to reproduce pictures and drawings photographically,
were of such size that they could readily be carried on two or
three small trucks. A second type of laboratory of a simpler
nature could be carried on a single 21/2-ton truck. Both these
laboratories, in addition to performing the functions stated,
were capable of carrying out all the specialized work necessary
in connection with chemical warfare. Several of the units were
in field operations during a considerable part of the war.
There were, moreover, miscellaneous CWS projects in other
Glenn Williams conducted a project on the evaluation of
droplets to determine the effectiveness of spraying vesicant
gases from aircraft. William H. McAdams, Professor of Chemi-
the development of a portable device for pressurizing portable
flame throwers, 15 and another project on the purification of
mustard gas. Archibald W. Adkins, Associate Professor of
Applied Mechanics, starting in the summer of 1945, did part-
time work on mechanized flame throwers and in January, 1946,
went to Edgewood Arsenal, Maryland, where he supervised a
project for the evaluation of three newly developed mechanized
flame throwers, one of which had been developed at the
Institute. Finally, as might have been expected, Technology's
Grand Old Man of Chemical Engineering, Warren K. Lewis,

Electric breakdown of calcium fluoride guided in preferential direc-
tions by electron waves. Laboratory for Insulation Research.
IN THE SERVICE OF MATERIALS
193
topped off his many contributions to industry and to govern-
ment by directing a series of projects relating to chemical war-
fare, such as the use of sulphur in screening smokes, the design
and development of canisters and filters, the testing of filters,
methods for vaporizing liquid drops, and so on long into the
night.16
IN SUMMARY
chapter may now breathe deeply and turn to more colorful
fare. If he has read with perception, he will have detected
between the lines more than could be told; he will have drawn
some conclusions as to how these jigsaw pieces fitted into the
great puzzle; he may have had some ideas as to the possibilities
for peacetime in some of these prosaic-sounding techniques.
If he understands none of these things, he will in any event,
it is to be hoped, have obtained a better view of the wide scope
of activities at the Institute than he could have, had we con-
fined ourselves to the parts of our stage where drama was
played. If he has done all this he is entitled to more entertain-
ment, as provided, for example, by the story of the way
ments of the German Army for Patton on his swift advance.
This story will be told in the next chapter.
FOOTNOTES
1 The Institute staff members of the oxygen group from 1940 to 1945,
cooperating with Keyes, named as supervisor under an NDRC contract,
James A. Beattie, Professor of Physical Chemistry.
Samuel C. Collins, Associate Professor of Mechanical Engineering.
Clark C. Stephenson, Associate Professor of Chemistry.
Howard O. McMahon, Research Associate in Physics.
Robert P. Cavileer, D.I.C.
Dudley W. Williams, D.I.C.
2 Edwin R. Gilliland, Professor of Chemical Engineering, also partici-
pated in the development of oxygen-producing units under a separate
194
QED
contract. The unit was based on the use of a chemical compound which
absorbs oxygen from the air.
3 See Chapter 4.
4 Others in this group were the late Frederick R. Evans, Assistant
Professor of Mechanical Metallurgy, Edward L. Bartholomew, Jr., Assist-
ant Professor of Mechanical Metallurgy, and Malcolm S. Burton, Assistant
Professor of Mechanical Metallurgy.
5 Others from the Staff in the group were:
Nicholas T. Grant, Assistant Professor of Process Metallurgy.
John R. Clark, then Research Associate in Metallurgy.
Donald L. Guernsey, Research Associate in Metallurgy.
Robert T. Howard, Research Assistant in Metallurgy.
6 With Cohen were Benjamin L. Averbach, now Assistant Professor of
Metallurgy, and Stewart G. Fletcher, then Research Assistant in Metal-
lurgy.
Cohen also continued his research on the heat treatment of high-speed
steel, a program of direct concern to the mass production industries. This
work was carried out by P. K. Koh under a grant-in-aid from the
Vanadium-Alloys Steel Company, and consisted of an investigation of
the phase transformations and internal stress changes produced in high-
speed steel by subzero temperatures.
Cohen acted as Metallurgical Consultant for the Boston Ordnance
District, and was a member of the War Products Advisory Board of the
American Society for Metals. With Victor 0. Homerberg, Professor of
Physical Metallurgy, he offered National Defense Training Courses in
“Applications of Metallography," and gave special lectures on heat treat-
ment to inspectors in the Boston area.
In connection with the NDRC, he acted as Official Investigator on a
project to develop nonmagnetic armor plate for use in the vicinity of
compasses on ships and aircraft. After this assignment, he became Super-
visor of the Manhattan Project at the Institute, and later he was appointed
Associate Director.
Frederick H. Norton, Professor of Ceramics, was responsible for a
project in the creep testing of special alloys for use in airplane super-
chargers and jet engines. His brother, John T. Norton, Professor of
Physics of Metals, led work to determine the residual stresses in welded
armor plate and the influence of these stresses on the behavior of the
joints under impact loading.
7 Associated with Gaudin were Reinhardt Schuhmann, Jr., Associate
Professor of Process Metallurgy, and during 1942 H. Rush Spedden, now
Assistant Professor of Metallurgy. From 1944 on, Gaudin directed the
Mineral Dressing Project at M.I.T. for the Manhattan District. Schuhmann
was also connected with this work. See Chapter 14.
8 See Chapter 16.
IN THE SERVICE OF MATERIALS
195
9 Also active in the rubber research program at M.I.T. were Dean Sher-
wood and Avery A. Morton, Professor of Organic Chemistry.
10 This laboratory also undertook many special measurement problems
for the Radiation Laboratory. These problems concerned analysis and
measurement of circuit constants and performance characteristics of pulse
networks, resistors, condensers, and transformers.
The laboratory also conducted a broad program of research under the
sponsorship of Aircraft-Marine Products, Inc., Harrisburg, Pennsylvania,
on the development of solderless terminals and terminal apparatus. These
terminals and associated equipment were used to a very great extent
during the war in aircraft and other equipment utilizing electrical appa-
ratus. This type of terminal permitted the saving of many man-hours
during manufacture. These terminals were developed to the point where
they had an electrical stability and performance equal to or better than
that of the conventional soldered type of terminal.
11 Associated with von Hippel in some of this work was Robert G.
Breckenridge, Assistant Professor of Electrical Insulation, who directed
a group working on high dielectric constant ceramics.
12 Associated with Stockbarger for a part of the period were:
Arthur A. Blanchard, Professor of Inorganic Chemistry, Emeritus.
Walter C. Schumb, Professor of Inorganic Chemistry.
Isadore Amdur, Associate Professor of Physical Chemistry.
Ralph C. Young, Associate Professor of Inorganic Chemistry.
13 Working with Shapiro, testing high-output combustion and turbines,
was William A. Reed, Research Associate in Chemical Engineering, who
also received the Naval Ordnance Development Award.
14 Consultants to the CWS Laboratory from the Staff were:
Ernest H. Huntress, Professor of Organic Chemistry.
Earl B. Millard, Professor of Physical Chemistry.
Jayson C. Balsbaugh, Associate Professor of Electrical Power Production
and Distribution.
T. R. P. Gibb, Jr., Assistant Professor of Chemistry.
Irving M. Dubin, then Research Associate in Chemical Engineering.
15 With McAdams on this project from M.I.T.'s staff were:
Bernard Chertow, Assistant Professor of Chemical Engineering.
A. S. Collins, Research Associate in Chemical Engineering.
C. C. Neas, Research Associate in Chemical Engineering.
R. C. St. John, Research Associate in Chemical Engineering.
M. W. Raymond, D.I.C.
R. L. Wentworth, D.I.C.
16 Dean Sherwood, as his time permitted from duties in Washington,
participated in many of these chemical engineering projects.
FLASH PHOTOS AND OTHER TOOLS
AT TECHNOLOGY's prewar Open Houses there were certain
laboratories which were always bound to attract the visitors
attention: one was the differential analyzer; another the X-ray
machines; a third the metal derby hat on Vassar Street which
covered the Van de Graaff Generator; à fourth the power
flashes of light that came from Harold Edgerton's laboratory.
Each of these laboratories was called upon in the war to under-
take an important mission.
The work of Harold E. Edgerton, Associate Professor of
Electrical Measurements, in the field of high-speed photography
has been widely known for years. With Herbert E. Grier and
Kenneth J. Germeshausen, Research Associates in Electrical
Engineering, he had teamed up to produce an extremely
intense flash for an extremely short time. But it was a far cry
from his maximum prewar achievement to the final days of
the campaign on the Loire when the Nazi Panzers, pinned by
day by our fighter planes, moved only at night; when we needed
more than radar reconnaissance of these dark infested highways
and byways; when the same Edgerton methods, multiplied
manifold, bathed the terrain in enough light to take photo-
graphs of the Nazi movements; when these photographs were
quickly transferred into intelligence and the Panzers could
thus be smitten by night as by day. All this was a far cry from
Edgerton's pictures of golf swings and humming birds. Between
them lay a long road which was not the shorter for being
traveled fast.
There were, naturally enough, many less picturesque ways in
which the services contrived to use the talents of Edgerton and
196
FLASH PHOTOS AND OTHER TOOLS
197
his team (including, in addition to Germeshausen and Grier,
Charles W. Wyckoff and Frederick E. Barstow) in the field of
flash photography. They applied the photographic methods to
theodolites, flight recorders, director recorders, beacons, identi-
fication equipment, high-speed motion picture equipment,
ballistic measurements, and indeed almost any dynamic project
which might be conjectured. But the job which cast Edgerton
in the role of assistant to the contemporary JEB Stuarts will
probably live longest in his memory.
By the end of World War I, day reconnaissance by air had
been well developed. Air reconnaissance, even in those early
days, was different from cavalry reconnaissance. The horse
could stop while his rider took notes; the plane could not.
The pilot, even of the hovering aircraft of the 'teens, never got
a complete view of what he was to report. The inevitable
answer was photography and photointerpretation. The success
of aerial photography in that time was sufficient to call forth
concealment and to suggest that more troop movements than
ever would have to take place when the planes could not
observe. This was, of course, at night or in a heavy fog. For the
latter only radar as yet has an answer and that is partial.
Colonel George Goddard, AAF, a pilot in World War I, and
at the beginning of World War II stationed at Wright Field,
was among the first to realize that air reconnaissance must be
vastly improved before another war. He worked out a flash
bomb which could be dropped and detonated; by means of a
photocell in the plane he provided for opening the camera
shutter. Before this, pilots had opened the shutter before drop-
ping the bomb. The British adopted the Goddard system
wholeheartedly.
But Colonel Goddard was not satisfied with this partial solu-
tion. He realized that there were several disadvantages to the
flash bomb, and in 1939 insisted that the Edgerton flash method
should be worked on for night air photography. This required
quite a jump for Edgerton from the scale of photographing
perhaps a dozen people to that of taking in a square mile,
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requiring light which was thousands of times more powerful
than any he had ever used before. By extrapolation of informa-
tion already in the laboratory it was possible to guess that the
thing could be done if the efficiency at the higher levels was
comparable with the existing efficiency and if lamps could be
made that would not blow up. The first lamp was put in a
B-18, and on 6 May 1941 was flown out of Boston. The bulb
was hung with reflectors in the bomb-bay and the camera was
in a second plane. Edgerton thinks this is still the ideal way
if the two planes can be kept together at night, which he found
practically impossible unless one were a drone to the other.
These first planes took pictures of M.I.T. from 2,000 feet, of a
well-known baseball park in the Bronx, of General “Hap"
Arnold's house in Washington. Reports were written and sent
to Washington. Then nothing happened for two years.
Sometimes delays like this could be blamed on military indif-
ference. But the answer was not so simple as that this time.
The AAF in 1941 and 1942 stood in awe of the fighters of the
Luftwaffe and especially of the Nazi flak. The feeling was
strong that our planes, to operate over Germany at all, would
have to be at very high levels, perhaps as much as 35,000 to
40,000 feet. (The Jerries did keep them high until the end but
not so high as that.) Thus the Air Force said that photography
at 2,000 feet was simply impracticable, and they asked for
something which could be done at much higher altitudes. Such
an effort would take more light, a lot more light. It would need
a plane a great deal bigger than the B-18. Such a plane was in
the offing. It was the B-24, the Liberator.
The Liberator was then on the drafting board. Colonel
Goddard and Edgerton got sketches and designed a unit which
would load the B-24 pretty heavily but which might be possible.
This unit would have to have a 4,000-volt supply and would
produce a flash from a 7,000-microfarad capacitor. The lamp
would need to stand several thousand such flashes and also
be sturdy enough to bear up under the vibration of the plane.
Since one lamp could not accept so much energy, two were

Photograph made by the High Voltage X-Ray Generator of the
High Voltage Laboratory at the Institute, showing Japanese ord-
nance captured on Attu in the Aleutians in 1943. Top to bottom:
mortar shell, hand grenade, arming device, small anti-personnel
aerial bomb, anti-tank shell, hand grenade.

SA
ON
M.I.T. Diferential Analyzer Number Two. Shown are electronic
panels for the servomechanisms which transmit the mathematical
data within the machine.
FLASH PHOTOS AND OTHER TOOLS
199
required. When finished, the lamps themselves weighed some-
thing between one-half and one pound apiece. But back of
them were 6,000 pounds of gear, mostly condensers, power
supplies, and the like. There was some anxiety as to whether
these bigger units would blow out, and indeed some did. This
story makes the lamp development sound easy, as most success
stories do; but in between there was a good deal of study, for
example, of the gases to be used in the bulbs.
The B-24 set up for the project could land in Boston's Logan
Airport but could not get off with the additional load of 6,000
pounds. So they flew her into Logan, and installed all the gear
to see that it would fit. Then she was unloaded again. She was
to fly over to Bedford Airport, a military field near by, and the
gear was to be trucked over; there the permanent installation
would be made. The B-24 took off and disappeared.
Some hours later the pilot telephoned in from Westover
Field. He had gone to Bedford but he was worried about his
nose wheel and didn't want to land on the grass at Bedford.
So they trucked the apparatus to Westover and installed it
there. Although preliminary laboratory trials had looked all
right, the installation was a failure. The lamps would not
hold up.
This failure led to a vigorous period in which Edgerton
spent much time at Wright Field. Each night the tubes would
be tested. He would see what was going on and would take the
1 A.M. train to General Electric's Nela Park plant outside of
Cleveland. He would get to the quartz blowing department
as soon as it opened. In the afternoon the AAF would send a
plane to bring him back to Dayton in time for another night
session. This cycle went on for nights on end. Finally every-
thing was working and the job was finished from a technical
point of view; some more selling was needed though; there had
to be demonstrations. That was the night the B-24 burned up
while she was being gassed for her final flight to test continued
operation. There were no more B-24's to be had at once. They
were not filling the skies like gnats in those days. It would take
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some time to replace the apparatus, too, but replacing the
plane was more serious.
This gave everyone time to take stock. The lens system which
had been used in these trials was a 1.5 and, by using the fastest
film available, fair pictures could be made of Ohio farmlands
from an elevation of 20,000 feet. Photographing Ohio farm-
lands is not, however, what night reconnaissance needs to do.
The real problem is never one of the static object which
can be photographed better by day, and thus from higher up
if the flak makes it necessary. The real use of night air pho-
tography is against movement, its significance tactical rather
than strategic. The Air Force still maintained that planes
could not fly over Festung Europa at less than 20,000 feet
without being shot down. While Edgerton's group were waiting
for a second B-24, they took out the old B-18 flash unit and
rebuilt it to fit a B-25 airplane. This would fly only at about
5,000 feet. For the time being, therefore, Edgerton's attention
was diverted to the problem of photographing submarines at
night where the low level would not constitute a hazard.
This was in 1943 when the submarines were coming up at
night. The crew of a patrol bomber coasting along at 300 feet
would catch a blip on a radar screen and when they caught it
they would drop their eggs. What they wanted to know was,
of course, what the source of the blip was and whether they had
come anywhere near that source with their bombs. Edgerton
thought he could help them by taking pictures of the bomb as
it went for the target.
The Army Air Force was still in the campaign and it was
easy to develop this method and to make successful flight tests.
Then the AAF was written out of the antisubmarine campaign
and the Navy took over. The Navy did not seem even interested
in looking at Edgerton's apparatus. Finally Edgerton got down
to Quonset through the intervention of Professor Morse. He
explained to the Naval CO what his gear would do; that he
had four or five machines ready for the Army and no planes
to fly them in; that they were just sitting around M.I.T. He
FLASH PHOTOS AND OTHER TOOLS
201
1
suggested that the CO make an unofficial call to Wright Field
and try to borrow one. The CO did it, and two days later the
equipment was taken from M.I.T. to Quonset, put in a PBM,
and demonstrated. It worked. Then Edgerton made his trip to
Italy and England. When he came back nine months later the
Navy was still fiddling with the gear. Meanwhile the subma-
rines were beginning to use Schnörkels but still the Navy was
not using the light. One of the reasons given was that it weighed
150 pounds and this meant you would have to sacrifice either
gasoline and hence patrol range or else a bomb or two. This
type of combat decision was always hard for a scientist to under-
stand. It was the same sort of decision which held AZON back.
Someone had to decide which had priority, more information
or more explosive; the decision was often in favor of throwing
more ammunition. Edgerton gave up and went back to his first
love, the Army.
Meanwhile, and before he went to Europe, the AAF had
loaned another B-24. At the same time a small installation
was built for an A-20. The A-20 was, in its day, a fast plane,
and it would take a lot of pictures at 1,000 to 1,500 feet and
perhaps be able to get away. This A-20 job was put together in
a hurry and sent to maneuvers in Texas. The pictures were
excellent, but they were never of the right thing!
There are two ways to get the right thing; if you don't get
it, your reconnaissance is, of course, no good. One way is to
tell the planes to cover all road intersections. The other is to
tell them to scout around and, if they see anything, to photo-
graph it. At night over Europe you can see very little so the
second method was out. The first, save for one week in four
when there may be good moonlight without overcast, is hard
to carry out because the plane cannot locate itself well even
when the observer is in the nose of an A-20, whence the visi-
bility is first class. This was the situation in late 1943. All the
equipment had been developed but there was no tactical doc-
trine; there were no requests and therefore not many orders.
In the spring of 1944, though, the tide turned. We were stale-
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mated around Cassino. We were sending out bombers to destroy
the German communications. The Krauts always had plenty
of ammunition but day reconnaissance did not show how they
were getting it in. The command wanted to see what they were
up to at night. Wright Field packed up the experimental
equipment and sent it along to Italy. They sent Edgerton too.
This equipment was taken to San Severo in Italy with three
special airplanes for use of the 90th Photo Wing. When it
arrived it was found that the planes were not suited to the
local conditions, so modifications were made in the field. Such
on-the-spot modifications happened to almost everything.
Two A-20 airplanes were outfitted to be used as night photo
airplanes, and they made some eighty missions over enemy
territory during the drive from Cassino past the Po River.
After three months in Italy, the Ninth Air Force, the tactical
force based then in England, requested night photographic
equipment. In response, some of the equipment and Edgerton
were transferred to the United Kingdom. Here it was modified
again for use in the A-20's of the 155th Night Photo Squadron.
As the 155th was the only night photography squadron in the
United Kingdom they were called upon for any assignment
there was during the invasion of June 6 and subsequently in
the campaign to the Rhine. At the end of the long road there
was a real pay-off in the place where it counted most.
But even then the pay-offs were not made without sweat.
The following story is a good example of the way civilian
scientists were sometimes able to accomplish things by virtue
of their rather anomalous position. Since the use of night
aerial photography depended upon GEE stations located at
intervals of not more that two hundred miles, the British had
in their methodical way decided upon the positions of these
stations well in advance of the invasion, and had prepared maps
to be used in conjunction with the pulse signals of the navigat-
ing device to guide the planes on their photographic missions
over Europe. When Patton's army swept ahead, however, many
supporting operations were thrown off schedule. Among them

Early morning 6 June 1944. An important road and rail junction
in Normandy. This picture gave the good news that there was no
traffic of any kind in this area in the hours just before the invasion.
The source of the flash for this picture was in the plane itself.
FLASH PHOTOS AND OTHER TOOLS
203
were the schedules of the presses which were to print the neces-
sary maps. The delivery of the maps had to be synchronized with
the advance of the armies and the establishment of the GEE
stations in order for the night photographic missions to be
of use at all. When it became apparent that Patton's army had
outstripped its help from night aerial photographs because of
the lack of these special maps, Edgerton and David Davidson,
Radiation Laboratory staff member at that time with the
BBRL, flew to England to see if the presses couldn't take the
necessary maps ahead of schedule. Edgerton tackled the brass
and Davidson started at the bottom to see if anything could be
done there. While Edgerton was being told by the men at the top
that nothing could be done in less than three weeks to free the
presses for these maps, Davidson located a flight officer in the
W.A.A.F. who found a copy of the original map. Davidson had
a dozen photostats made, telephoned Edgerton, who dropped
his unsuccessful mission with the men at the top, and they
both flew back to the front with the photostats which were
used on a photographic mission that night. The photostats were
used constantly for the next few weeks until they became
obsolete with the further advance of the armies and the arrival
of the official maps.
After six months of actual operations in the field, Edgerton
was returned to the States by General Vandenberg to develop
improved equipment based on this experience. New apparatus
was prepared for an A-26, and the end of the war found him
in California expecting to go to the Pacific theatre. Later his
distinguished contributions were rewarded with the Medal of
Freedom.1
Edgerton's saga has been recounted at length because it
happens to be an unusually clear epitome of experiences which
were common to many of M.I.T.'s staff, and other engineers and
scientists who are men of peace. The invariable pattern was that
the man knew from his past work and experience what might
be done, that he was called upon to step up his scale of values
enormously, that he finally made some sort of successful dem-
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QED
onstration, and that he then went through a period of disap-
pointment and frustration while the military wheels seemed
to him to turn exceedingly slow. If he were tenacious, patient,
and reasonable he would find more often than not that in the
long run the idea would prevail; frequently he had the chance
personally to see the benefit to his fellow countrymen of the
work he had wrought right in the place where the benefit was
yielded. Write a different cast of characters, a different military
problem, and the same general plot might be woven around a
substantial number of individuals whose deeds have been
recorded here less journalistically. The important thing to
remember is that these men were ready – that they did not
wave magic wands — and that the reason that they were ready
was that as free men in a free institution they had been per-
mitted to proceed on projects which caught their imagination
without any insistence on the part of their superiors that they
be able to forecast a pay-off.
X-RAYS
The well-known X-ray installations of the Institute also were
put to work on a different kind of photography. During the
war the High Voltage Laboratory under the direction of
Robert J. Van de Graaff, Associate Professor of Physics, and
with the collaboration of W. W. Buechner, Assistant Professor
of Physics, was directed to the design and the building for the
Navy of superhigh-voltage X-ray outfits for the examination
of castings and especially of munitions, both our own and those
captured from the enemy. Operating at several million volts
with literally a pinpoint focal spot, these instruments were
reliable and easily regulated over a wide range of operating
conditions. They represented a peak of achievement in secur-
ing penetrating X-ray pictures of sharp definition both in angle
and in depth and won praise from the Naval officers who were
responsible for their use.2
Applications of X-ray were also made in large numbers, of
course, by the Radiographic Laboratory in the Department of
FLASH PHOTOS AND OTHER TOOLS 205
Metallurgy under the direction of John T. Norton, Professor
of the Physics of Metals; this was its peacetime function as well.
NDRG welding projects at the University of California engaged
Professor Norton's attention as a consultant for they involved
application of the X-ray stress-measuring methods developed at
Technology to problems of shipwelding. The Radiographic
Laboratory was consultant to Radiation Laboratory on X-ray
methods and materials; under various D.I.C. projects it carried
out radiographic inspection for the CWS Laboratory and
routine inspections for the Army and Navy contractors in the
New England district, particularly on weldments and aircraft
castings. Another piece of work which is a continuing program
was concerned with the residual stresses in various types of
specimens and the study of the influence of these stresses
upon the mechanical behavior of the specimens. The X-ray
method of stress measurement has been developed into a prac-
tical measuring tool, and new methods for studying three-
dimensional stress patterns in the interior of specimens have
been worked out. Thus much has been learned, among other
things, about the modification of residual stress patterns by
small amounts of quite localized plastic flow.
As a result of his experience in conducting M.I.T.'s Radio-
graphic Laboratory, Norton was made a consultant on X-ray
inspection to the Naval Ordnance Laboratory, with the mission
of organizing, designing, and equipping a radiographic labora-
tory to meet the inspection needs of the Bureau of Ordnance.
This project will continue as a postwar development and, when
completed, Norton says, it promises to be one of the most
completely equipped and finest radiographic laboratories in
the world.3
SUPERCALCULATIONS
The Rockefeller differential analyzer, latest of a long line
of M.I.T.'s electrical calculators, and progeny of the first differ-
ential analyzer developed by Vannevar Bush, was placed in
active service during the war under the supervision of Samuel
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H. Caldwell, Professor of Electrical Engineering (Director),
and Richard Taylor, Assistant Professor of Electrical Engineer-
ing (Associate Director) of the Center of Analysis in the Depart-
ment of Electrical Engineering. Though given its first public
demonstration on 29 October 1945 it had in fact been held
under security through much of the war and had worked on
several war projects. Though these statistics are perhaps mean-
ingless it may as well be recorded that the instrument is several
times larger and more complicated than its ancestors. It contains
about 2,000 electronic tubes, several thousand relays, about
150 motors, and nearly 200 miles of wire. It occupies a labora-
tory specially strengthened to support its 100 tons and has a
special ventilating system to dissipate the heat it generates
when it starts to calculate.
For ordinary operations the automaton requires only one
operator. The mathematical symbols which state the problem
whose solution is desired are translated into a language which
the machine understands. This language, a code punched on
paper tape, is transmitted to the machine which then auto-
matically selects the various units required for the process of
computation. A few minutes or, at most, hours, will suffice to
solve a problem which would require the services of specially
trained computers for a period of weeks, and the problem will
be solved without error by the machine.
Oliver Wendell Holmes wrote many years ago in the first
chapter of The Autocrat of the Breakfast Table: “Given certain
factors, and a sound brain should always evolve the same fixed
product with the certainty of Babbage's calculating machine.
What a satire, by the way, is that machine upon a mere math-
ematician! A Frankenstein-monster, a thing without brains
and without heart, too stupid to make a blunder; which turns
out results like a cornsheller, and never grows any wiser or
better, though it grind a thousand bushels of them!
“I have an immense respect for a man of talents plus 'the
mathematics. But the calculating power alone should seem to
be the least human of qualities, and to have the smallest amount
FLASH PHOTOS AND OTHER TOOLS
207
V
of reason in it; since a machine can be made to do work of
three or four calculators, and better than any one of them.”
The machine Holmes was talking about was not much, but
his words would be repeated with more emphasis about the
present apparatus. Machines such as this have freed the math-
ematician so that he can use the imagination it takes to set
up problems aright, which the machine can never do, and
leave the rest to electronics.4 He can indeed attack problems
which previously were useless to attack since, after the equa-
tions were set up, they could not be solved within any
reasonable time.
The differential analyzer has, from time to time, proved valu-
able for working out answers to such diversified problems as
the analysis of information on earthquakes, sound waves, geo-
physical explorations, the rate of change in chemical processes,
atomic wave functions, analysis of complex vibration problems,
the design and performance of aircraft, analysis of radar wave
problems, and the study of cosmic ray phenomena. Beginning
in 1942, it was assigned various war problems of which the most
formidable was the urgent task of computing new range tables
for the guns of the Navy. Built to accommodate as many as
three complex problems at once, the machine's powers could be
directed at the same time to the solution of other problems
such as those of fire control and radar antenna design without
interrupting its main program. For his work Caldwell received
the Naval Ordnance Development Award. Its war service over,
this new instrument will turn to its original objective, the solu-
tion of peacetime problems which may arise in any branch of
science or engineering.
FOOTNOTES
1 "Mr. Harold E. Edgerton, Civilian Technical Advisor, rendered meri-
torious achievement in connection with military operation in the develop-
ment and installation of equipment for night photo reconnaissance during
the period 1 June 1944 to 20 November 1944. His untiring effort, resource-
fulness and competence made aerial night reconnaissance of enemy held
territory a reality under adverse weather conditions. Without his invalu-
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able knowledge, unswerving zeal and ingenuity under adverse conditions,
this type of military operation would not have been possible at such an
early date. The results of his endeavor have provided the U.S. Army Air
Forces and Ground Forces with vital intelligence information that previous
equipment of this nature was not capable of obtaining."
2 For this work the High Voltage Laboratory received the Naval Ordnance
Development Award. Working with Van de Graaff on this project and re-
cipients with him of individual Naval Ordnance Development Awards were
the following:
Walter C. Schumb, Professor of Inorganic Chemistry.
Herman Feshbach, Associate Professor of Physics.
William W. Buechner, Assistant Professor of Physics.
E. A. Burrill, Jr., D.I.C.
L. R. McIntosh, D.I.C.
E. W. Nickerson, D.I.C.
A. Sperduto, D.I.C.
W. A. Tripp, D.I.C.
Also associated with Van de Graaff and recipients of the group Naval
Ordnance Development Award were:
Ralph C. Young, Associate Professor of Inorganic Chemistry.
Sheppard Y. Tyree, Jr., then Instructor in Chemistry,
Robert W. Cloud, Research Associate in Electrical Engineering.
Henry Walter, Research Associate in Physics.
3 Associated with Norton were:
Daniel Rosenthal, Assistant Professor of the Physics of Metals.
John R. Clark, then Research Associate in Metallurgy.
Samuel B. Maloof, then Research Associate in Metallurgy.
4 Well, not quite all the rest.
14
PRELUDE TO HIROSHIMA
JUST AS M.I.T. had become the center for radar and had drawn
scientists from many other institutions, so it fell, among the
universities, to Columbia University, the University of Chicago,
and the University of California to call, in their turn, for help
from all the sister institutions. M.I.T. gladly released to this
work those of its staff who were called upon and whose previ-
ously incurred wartime duties permitted them to go.1
It did more than that. From the midsummer of 1942 on it
operated what came to be called the "M.I.T Metallurgical
Project.” This, little publicized as it was, was the largest single
Institute war research project save for the Radiation Laboratory
and the Underwater Sound Laboratory
In that summer a representative of the “Metallurgical
Project” at the University of Chicago visited the Institute
in search of metallurgical help. The newly worked-out fission
of Uranium 235 and the possibility of applying this great
store of energy to war purposes were then being actively inves-
tigated by OSRD. It was the beginning of what was soon to be
the "Manhattan District Project” of the U.S. Corps of Engi-
neers. Several tons of uranium were needed in the immediate
future and efforts to procure the material were bogging down.
A fairly good supply of the metal in powdered form was avail-
able from a near-by plant, but the intended use required solid
pieces. Could the Institute metallurgists do anything about this?
They could. John Wulff, Professor of Mechanical Metallurgy,
had taken an active part in recent researches in powder metal-
lurgy. Now he undertook the manufacture of briquetted cubes
and bars of the uranium metal. Several tons of these pieces
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210
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were pressed and shipped to Chicago. John Chipman, Professor
of Metallurgy, in collaboration with R. J. Anicetti of Metal
Hydrides, Inc., had been working for several months on a
similar problem for that company. They had devised a method
for converting this same powder into solid castings. With the
aid of an active group of research men who were loaned to the
Institute by the University of Chicago, the method was per-
fected and the equipment enlarged to handle several hundred
pounds of metal a day. The castings produced were used for
the now celebrated “pile,” which was built under the North
Stands at Stagg Field in Chicago and produced atomic power
for the first time on 2 December 1944.
A number of other Institute people had joined in this
endeavor, including Albert R. Kaufmann, Associate Professor
of Metallurgy, and O. Cammann, D.I.C. When the casting
work had been finished, attention was turned to methods for
forging and rolling this new element which was now, for the
first time, available to metallurgists in quantities sufficient for
such experiments. Research was also undertaken on alloys of
the element, and much information was obtained which was
useful in designing and operating the great plants at Hanford,
Washington, and Oak Ridge, Tennessee.
Not much later Chipman moved to Chicago to become head
of the metallurgy section of the project there; during his absence
the Institute's metallurgical project was directed by Morris
Cohen, Professor of Physical Metallurgy. This work continued
throughout the atomic energy and atomic bomb developments,
and many technical contributions were made to the research
and production programs at Chicago, Oak Ridge, Hanford, and
Los Alamos.
The expansion of the work of the project during this period
included the establishment of an analytical laboratory under
the direction of George G. Marvin, Associate Professor of
Analytical Chemistry, in which a host of new and strange alloys
and other materials were analyzed and new methods of analysis
evolved.
PRELUDE TO HIROSHIMA
211
A precision casting laboratory was developed by Shadburn
Marshall, of Remington Arms Company, and his co-workers for
the purpose of applying the new techniques of this ancient art
to the manufacture of special shapes of uranium. The special
equipment developed by this group played an important part
in producing the atomic bomb.
In the spring of 1944 it became apparent that the research
activities of the Manhattan Project in the field of ceramics
would have to be extensively enlarged and a central laboratory
established to serve all branches of the project. This work was
placed at M.I.T. under Frederick H. Norton, Professor of
Ceramics. Active ceramic developments have continued since
that time. The ceramic problems were unique in that they
demanded the use of special compounds hitherto unused in
ceramics. A number of such materials were synthesized in
the laboratory by Walter C. Schumb, Professor of Inorganic
Chemistry, and Isadore Amdur, Associate Professor of Physical
Chemistry. Methods for making small nonporous articles resem-
bling fine porcelain but containing only a given material were
developed by Helen R. Barlett of A. C. Spark Plug Company
and Theodore T. Magel, D.I.C., formerly of the University of
Chicago. The products of this laboratory were used in metal-
lurgical research and in making the atomic bomb.2 By the
spring of 1945 the project's personnel list had reached its
maximum of 91.
Almost all the facilities of the Spectroscopy Laboratory were
used during the war under contract with the Manhattan Dis-
trict. This laboratory was one of the standardization units set
up to test the purity of materials which had been produced and
analyzed in other laboratories.
With the unique spectroscopic equipment of the laboratory,
thousands of analyses were made not only for samples involved
in the work of the metallurgical section but also in analysis of
materials other than uranium which were important in the
Manhattan District.
The laboratory was also asked to develop new and still more
1
212
QED
U
sensitive methods of analysis. It served as a training center for
analysts who were sent to other laboratories under the Man-
hattan District to set up and teach the same methods of analysis.
Other prominent members of the Institute's staff worked on
the atomic project in other places. On the whole their history is
interwoven with the history of the institutions for which they
worked and can be understood only if read in that context.
Some examples, however, may show the nature of things they
were called upon to do.
George Scatchard, Professor of Physical Chemistry, spent
about half his time from February, 1943, with Harold Urey at
Columbia University. Later when that part of the S.A.M.
Laboratories doing research on the fractionation of uranium
isotopes by gaseous diffusion was transferred to Carbide and
Carbon Chemicals Corporation, he was Chairman of the Re-
search Committee of that laboratory. Roy M. Carlson, for-
merly Associate Professor of Civil Engineering, left the
Institute early in 1943 and spent the rest of the war in New
Mexico; he states that his duties were varied and that he did
all manner of special problems under the general title of “engi-
neer.” W. P. Overbeck, then Research Associate in Electrical
Engineering, was borrowed from the Institute by the Metallur-
gical Laboratory at the University of Chicago in February,
1942. He was in charge of the initial installation of record
equipment for the second "pile” which was set up at the
Argonne Laboratory. In June of 1943 he moved to the Clin-
ton Laboratories at Oak Ridge and was in charge of the instru-
ment group there; in 1944 he moved with most of his crew
to Hanford, where he helped to start up the plant; in April of
1945 he was made Superintendent of the Instrument Depart-
ment. Robert J. Schrader, then Instructor in Chemistry, upon
leaving M.I.T. in 1943 was promptly loaned by the Eastman
Kodak Company to the Clinton works in Oak Ridge, where
he was responsible for reviewing the work of the builders of
the chemical buildings. This was a large project which was
finished only in 1945, at which time he was transferred from
>
>
PRELUDE TO HIROSHIMA
213
the Chemical Production Division to the Engineering Division
as Head of the Department of Chemical Engineering. Jerome B.
Wiesner, Associate Professor of Electrical Engineering, left the
Radiation Laboratory in October, 1945, to be Group Leader
of an Electronics Development Group in the Manhattan District
project at the University of California.
The attitude of all these people as well as that of those who
worked at home or who failed to report their work on the
threshold of the atomic age is probably well summarized by
Overbeck, who writes:
We have done a remarkable job at Hanford and one of the most
difficult parts of that job has been in the instrument field. This job
of course has been done by the organization rather than by an
individual and credit for our success must go to the entire group
who absorbed training so readily and who applied themselves so
vigorously. My part in the job, and one for which the Institute can
take credit, was in assisting with early development and in translat-
ing the results through training to the men who did the final job.
At the beginning this required understanding and appreciation of
basic science and towards the end it required a cooperative spirit
towards industry. These are the things which the Institute teaches
and even has engraved on its walls. I am sure that there are many
other M.I.T. men who performed the same service during the war
years.
The Institute was happy to leave the role of atomic develop-
ment in war to other institutions while it busied itself with
previously undertaken commitments. In time of peace, how-
ever, no first rate institution can ignore the technological impli-
cations of the new source. Accordingly, extensive plans have
been made for nuclear research at M.I.T.
In furtherance of these plans the Institute has called to its
staff several distinguished contributors to the work of the
Manhattan District who had other associations prior to the war.3
214
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FOOTNOTES
1 Including:
Antoine M. Gaudin, Richards Professor of Mineral Dressing.
V. 0. Homerberg, Professor of Physical Metallurgy.
John T. Norton, Professor of Physics of Metals.
George Scatchard, Professor of Physical Chemistry.
Bertram E. Warren, Professor of Physics.
Lynwood S. Bryant, Associate Professor of English.
Roy W. Carlson, then Associate Professor of Civil Engineering.
Harold W. Fairbairn, Associate Professor of Petrology.
John D. Trimmer, then Assistant Professor of Aeronautical Engineering.
Robert J. Schrader, then Instructor in Chemical Engineering.
Mayo D. Hersey, Research Associate in Mechanical Engineering.
W. P. Overbeck, then Research Associate in Electrical Engineering.
Robert M. Bridgforth, Jr., then Research Assistant in Chemistry.
2 Others of M.I.T.'s staff who participated in this project were:
Gerhard Dietrichson, Associate Professor of Physical Chemistry.
J. Edward Vivian, Associate Professor of Chemical Engineering Practice.
Andrew L. Johnson, then Assistant Professor of Ceramics.
G. M. Kavanagh, Research Associate in Chemistry.
Joseph J. Connelly, Research Assistant in Metallurgy.
R. T. Howard, Research Assistant in Metallurgy.
R. N. Palmer, then Research Assistant in Metallurgy.
L. M. Redman, then Research Assistant in Chemistry.
3... Such as:
Jerrold R. Zacharias, Professor of Physics and Director of the Laboratory
for Nuclear Science and Engineering. Zacharias came to the Radiation
Laboratory in November, 1940, as head of the Division on Radar Trans-
mitter Components. He remained until June, 1945, when he went to Los
Alamos and worked on the Manhattan District Project until November,
1945, when he returned to the Institute in his present position.
Victor F. Weisskopf, Professor of Physics, was second in command of
the Theoretical Physics Division in the Los Alamos Atom Bomb Laboratory
from its opening. He remained there from March, 1943, until March,
1946, when he came to M.I.T. in his present position.
Charles D. Coryell, Professor of Chemistry, came to M.I.T. in January,
1946, from the Clinton Laboratory at Oak Ridge, where he had been
throughout the war save from May, 1942, to September, 1943, when he
worked on the atom bomb pile for the Metallurgy Laboratory at the
University of Chicago.
15
ELECTRONIC ESPIONAGE — THE RADIATION
LABORATORY
IT IS HARDLY LIKELY that any reader of this report is unfamiliar
at least with the rudimentary principles of radar or with the
fact that the word which is now part of the English language
is a contraction of the descriptive phrase "radio detection and
ranging” which might more appropriately have been "radio
direction-finding and ranging.” Radar can of course see farther
than the eye and through things the eye cannot pierce; its
beam, having penetrated the murk or the distance, is reflected
back, and from its indicated reflection comes knowledge. But
it is important to remember that radar is far more than a mere
reporter which informs that something is out there in space
which the eye cannot see; it also will report the bearing, the
range, and the elevation of objects in its field of view; it was
the accurate reporting of these coordinates that made the most
exciting applications of radar possible.
Now this is important because it also points up precisely what
the contribution of the civilian scientists to radar was. The
service laboratories had worked with radar for many years,
though with insufficient personnel and funds. They had begun a
study of the principles of pulsing the radar beam instead of
sending it out continuously, and pulsing was to be one of the
two major factors in the creation of modern radar. But this
effort was still small. Few persons in the United States were
engaged full time on pulse radar research when the Germans
invaded Poland; perhaps as few as twenty, almost surely no
more than fifty.
But even with some radar developed, radar which formed
215
216
QED
the basis for about half the ultimate service procurement of
this equipment, service research and development not only had
been slow but also had missed the most important factor which
made modern radar possible, the use of microwaves.1 All the
early sets based upon the service research operated at frequen-
cies of 200 megacycles per second or below (wavelengths of 150
centimeters or longer). The characteristic of the radar developed
by the NDRC contractors was that it was short wave (10 centi-
meters, 3 centimeters, or even 1 centimeter). There were good
reasons why the services had not reached this point sooner, and
among them was the fact that there was, up to 1940, no apparent
source of sufficient power at these shorter wavelengths. But
regardless of reasons the fact is that it fell to the lot of the
civilian scientists working for NDRC to carry forward the work
in microwave radar to a series of brilliant successes, such that
many of the most effective performances of radar after the early
days were based on microwave equipment.2
The short wave has very important advantages over the
longer wavelengths used in the early developments. In radar
the possible accuracy of range determination is increased with
shorter pulses; these are not possible on the longer wavelengths;
the shorter lengths will then permit greater accuracy in range,
and especially in the measurement of bearing and elevation.
The reason for the latter is that it is easier to send forth a
narrow beam of radiation at very short wavelengths. Narrow
beams in turn give this greater accuracy; they can be brought
low to the water or the land so that enemy planes cannot fly
beneath them; they can be used with cathode ray tubes to give
almost pictorial presentations of what the radar is scanning,
and they are much harder to jam. All this adds up to the fact
that the microwave development was the most important one
in war radar; this development was by agreement exclusively
one for NDRC to sponsor and direct.
Microwaves had been known long before the war, indeed
from the earliest days of radio. As early as 1930 the French
subsidiary of the I. T. and T. Company had a telephone link
0
ELECTRONIC ESPIONAGE
217
operating across the English Channel at a wavelength of 20
centimeters. However, little practical importance could be
attributed to microwaves until the British made their spec-
tacular development. Microwaves cannot be generated, trans-
mitted, or received by ordinary means, and of the four possible
sources of centimeter waves prior to 1940, only two seemed to
have any real possibility of operating at 10 centimeters or less.
One of these was the klystron, which had been developed at
Stanford University and information about which had been
published in 1939. The other was the splitanode magnetron, a
magnetically operated two-element vacuum tube developed at
General Electric, much improved by the Germans and still
more by a Japanese, Kinjori Okabe, who published his first
important papers in 1927. It was the still further exploitation
of these latter ideas by the British which resulted in the cavity
magnetron and the first manufacturable tube giving 10 kilo-
watts of peak power on pulses at 10 centimeters. This was a
really revolutionary development in its effect, although it was
evolutionary in the way it came about.
Meanwhile, and regardless of the practicability of sending
out microwaves with any real power behind them, other workers
had studied the transmission and reception of these waves.
Independent work by G. C. Southworth at Bell Telephone
Laboratories and Wilmer L. Barrow, Associate Professor of
Electrical Communications at M.I.T., had resulted in reports
in 1936 that microwaves could be conducted in tubes or sent
forth and picked up by flaring the ends of these tubes into
horns. The tubes were called waveguides. At the same time
important work was begun at Stanford University by W. I.
Hansen and R. H. Varian on the properties of resonant cavi-
ties. The result of all this was that research on microwaves was
continued at these three institutions along the lines already
marked, and that at the time of crisis the three were ready to
apply their knowledge and the facilities they had established.
At this time the work at M.I.T. was largely on the properties
of waveguides and horns, at Stanford on the klystron and
218
Тахотна
11
resonant cavities, and at the Bell Laboratories on crystal mixers
and other receiver components. 3
By 1939 the communications group in M.I.T.'s Depart-
ment of Electrical Engineering headed by Bowles had begun
experiments with a radio blind-landing system using the ultra-
high frequency techniques which had been worked out by
Barrow and his colleagues. In that year the klystron was used
as a source of 40-centimeter waves (which then seemed quite
short) for a straight-line glide-path scheme. Later the Sperry
Gyroscope Company sponsored a project at M.I.T. for the
development of an aircraft detecting device using the klystron
on a 10-centimeter wavelength. This was crudely on the way
by 1940 as were the achievements of Alfred L. Loomis and his
colleagues at the private Tuxedo Park Laboratory. 4
As has been stated in Chapter 4, Dr. Compton reached an
early agreement with the Services that the NDRC would con-
centrate on radar at 40 centimeters and shorter. At the time this
must have seemed to the Services a safe relegation of the civilian
scientist to the fundamental and long-range work where he was
no problem to them; the scientists thought otherwise. Events
moved fast, and this decision resulted in the important contribu-
tion which NDRC made to radar development and history.
We have also told how Alfred Loomis formed his section
which later became the Microwave Committee. The first mem-
bers of this committee were Ralph Bown, Director of Radio
and Television Research at the Bell Telephone Laboratories,
Bowles, of M.I.T., secretary of the committee, and Hugh R.
Willis, Research Director of the Sperry Gyroscope Company.5
Armed with the mandate to carry on developments in micro-
waves and to get them through in time to be useful in the war,
the committee surveyed the field. What it found was not encour-
aging for the production with adequate power of the very short
lengths desired, namely 10 centimeters or less. Only two tubes
seemed even to have promise; one was the klystron already
being commercially developed by Sperry; the other a multi-
element vacuum tube developed at the University of California
ELECTRONIC ESPIONAGE
219
I
and named the resnatron. To the University of California, then,
went the first NDRC microwave contract on 1 November 1940.
The University was to try to develop a resnatron with more
power and higher frequency.
It was at this discouraging time, in the fall of 1940, that the
British Technical Mission led by Sir Henry Tizard came to
the United States and revealed their development of the cavity
magnetron.
The British achievement of the cavity magnetron was per-
haps the most important single contribution to technical
development of the first years of the war. Designed and brought
into production at Birmingham University, it was capable of
giving several kilowatts peak power at 3,000 megacycles. A new
embodiment of the conventional magnetron tube, it may well
prove to be, historically, one of the most important vacuum tube
developments.
The revelation of the cavity magnetron and the success which
the British had obviously obtained by their concentration of
work in the field in one spot led the Microwave Committee at
once to the conclusion that a large central laboratory should be
established in this country, under civilian direction, staffed by
research physicists. The first proposal was to set this laboratory
up at Bolling Field, Washington, D. C. Here the Army would
erect a large, heated hangar and the associated laboratories.
Immediately delays were encountered in getting under way
at Bolling Field. It was made clear that NDRC did not have
the power to administer its own laboratories but should oper-
ate them under contract with existing institutions. There was
some doubt as to whether a development on Army property
would be well received in the Navy. This left five possible
contractors, if one looked at their previous work in the field.
The two West Coast universities were too far away for good
liaison; The Bureau of Terrestrial Magnetism of the Carnegie
Institution of Washington was committed to another NDRC
project; the Bell Telephone Laboratories, represented by
Jewett, thought that the work might be done at a university,
220
QED
When Dr. Compton arrived in Washington on 17 October 1940
he was confronted by a phalanx consisting of Jewett, Loomis,
Bush, and Bowles, all of whom told him that M.I.T. offered
the best prospect.
Eight days later NDRC approved a program for the estab-
lishment of a laboratory at M.I.T. under contract with the
Institute. The then munificent sum of $455,000 was allocated
for the first year's operations; the project envisioned the employ-
ment of about fifty persons all told, including the mechanics
and secretaries. The space necessary was easily available in
M.I.T.'s existing buildings.
By the end the laboratory had a scientific and technical
staff of 1,200, supplemented by 2,700 technicians, assistants,
mechanics, stenographers, business staff. Its operating expenses
during its maximum year (the fiscal year of 1 July 1944 to 30
June 1945) were over eighty times the original budget for one
year. It occupied 15 acres of floor space in Cambridge; it oper-
ated large sublaboratories at the East Boston and Bedford
London, Orlando, Panama, and elsewhere. It maintained a very
active branch laboratory in England and smaller stations in
France and Australia. At the close of the war it was organizing a
section of over a hundred men and several hundred tons of
equipment for Manila to serve the forward Pacific areas. Its
staff had operated in every war theatre from North Africa to
China, from the Aleutians to Australia. It was visited by some
100 officials daily from Army, Navy, or manufacturing con-
cerns, and 180 Army and Navy officers were in residence at the
laboratory for liaison purposes. With the exception of the
atomic bomb activity, it became the largest of the civilian
research and development agencies.
Division 14, NDRC, which administered the radar contracts,
participated in the development of half of all the radar and
associated equipment procured by the Services. The total cost
of the equipment engendered by Division 14 sponsorship was
of the order of 12/3 billion dollars. The total allocation by
CA
ELECTRONIC ESPIONAGE
221
.
Division 14 during the war for radar and LORAN research was
141 millions. Thus the dollar value of equipment generated by
Division 14 and delivered prior to 31 July 1945 was something
more than twelve times the cost of the research.
Although Division 14 did have many other contracts, a very
large part of its effort was carried on either directly at M.I.T.'s
Radiation Laboratory or under subcontracts with producers
led by M.I.T. The extent to which this is so can be estimated
by remembering that of the 5,000-odd persons engaged in radar
development under Division 14 contracts, some 4,000 were
Radiation Laboratory employees. The laboratory participated
in the development of some 150 different radar systems; systems
applied to every problem of radar, navigation, early warning,
gun direction, blind bombing. One other section of the Radia-
tion Laboratory was almost solely responsible for the develop-
ment of LORAN,6 for which long-range navigational method
more than 70 million dollars worth of equipment was procured
by the Services by the middle of 1945.
The duties of this laboratory were many. Of course it had
to do fundamental research on the behavior of microwaves
although time always pressed and much of the most successful
work was ad hoc, cut and try. It developed new tubes, new
circuits, new components. It designed whole systems to meet
new uses; often it thought up the uses before it developed the
systems; it manufactured small numbers of units where these
were urgently required because NDRC could always produce
small quantities faster than the Services could; it had an asso-
ciated model shop, the Research Construction Company in
Cambridge;7 and its own British Branch.8 It was closely con-
nected to the Radar School which was, however, a strictly
academic function of M.I.T. and not a part of the Radiation
Laboratory. Its men acted often as salesmen, as expediters, as
naggers and prodders, and sometimes it must have seemed to
them that they spent more time on these jobs than in designing
and demonstrating new equipment.
Radiation Laboratory was big business as this record has
222
QED
shown; it was successful business as the record will show; it was
business in which every friend of M.I.T. can take pride that
M.I.T. was sponsor and host; but it was not by any stretch of
the imagination exclusively M.I.T. business. Indeed it was not
even close to that. In the upper councils of OSRD, NDRC, and
Division 14, M.I.T. men were playing an influential role as we
have seen; so were they in the Office of the Secretary of War;
but in the actual laboratories at M.I.T. the accomplishment
was an interuniversity one. It represented the conjoint efforts
of scientists, mostly physicists, from practically every university
in the land; and in the top management, M.I.T. men, who at
the start were very influential but who were gradually drawn
off to other service and who played a relatively lesser role at
the end.9 So a fair picture of the Radiation Laboratory is one
which shows that the Institute earns distinction in having been
the logical place to start such an activity, in its having managed
the whole affair so well, but also shows that it must at once
yield a heaping measure of praise to the 1,000-odd scientists
from the widespread campuses of the nation.
This can readily enough be understood if one examines the
roster of top organization of the Radiation Laboratory. The
Director was Lee A. DuBridge, Dean of Science and Head of
the Physics Department at Rochester, and now President of
California Institute of Technology; the Associate Director was
F. Wheeler Loomis, Head of the Physics Department at the
University of Illinois. The affairs of the laboratory were directed
by these two in association with a Steering Committee compris-
ing in the beginning I. I. Rabi of Columbia University, L. N.
Ridenour of the University of Pennsylvania, K. T. Bainbridge
of Harvard University, L. C. Marshall of the University of
California, L. W. Alvarez of the University of California, R. F.
Bacher of Cornell University, L. A. Turner of Princeton Uni-
versity, J. R. Zacharias of Hunter College, and John G. Trump
of M.I.T. Of these eleven principals, only the University of
California could claim two; M.I.T. had one post, along with
ELECTRONIC ESPIONAGE
223
Columbia, Cornell, Harvard, Hunter, Illinois, Pennsylvania,
Princeton, and Rochester.
Moreover, Ernest Lawrence of the University of California
had a strong hand in the early establishment of the Radiation
Laboratory and in the procurement of personnel. His influence
in persuading people to come to the laboratory cannot be over-
estimated. The persons he “sold” came at least without the
misapprehension which was deliberately placed in the public
mind at the time. The name Radiation Laboratory was selected
as a cloak to the true activities in the expectation that it would
suggest to the passer-by that the group was engaged on research
in nuclear physics. 10 This was at that time considered by many
scientists a harmless activity!
The Radiation Laboratory was entrusted with three missions
at the outset; two were to be based upon the cavity magnetron.
The first of these, the most urgent from the British point of
view, was to build a 10-centimeter air-borne set for use by night
fighters; the second was to develop a very accurate precision
gun-laying radar; the third was to design a long-range navi-
gational device, later to be called LORAN.
Each of these developments has a long history which is better
told elsewhere. Each had a successful denouement. In the
process of achieving these successes the Radiation Laboratory
had to make improvements of greater or less degree in most of
the components, in, for example, the pulser or pulse modulator,
the antennas, the receivers, the indicators, 11 and of course the
power source, the magnetron.
The Radiation Laboratory takes great pride in the improve-
ment of the magnetron for which, however, an enormous share
of the credit must be yielded to the Bell Telephone Labora-
tories; by the spring of 1941 much better magnetrons had been
developed, operating both on 10 centimeters and on 3. The new
magnetrons of course required restudy of all the other com-
ponents; they also introduced some new components. Coaxial
lines which would have had to be prohibitively small were
TIL
224
LED
abandoned for waveguide lines, and the properties of these
had to be studied carefully. New components had to be devised
such as tuners, rotary joints, T's and angles, and flexible wave-
guides. In each of these is a story of research and development,
the scientific saga of some individual which cannot be sung
here.
In 12 to 18 months the original assignments of the Laboratory
were demonstrably on their way to success. It was time to turn
to other applications. At this point the Laboratory program
burst pyrotechnically into thousands of sparks, each spark an
application, all the applications hard to follow even in a longer
text than this one can be. But not to supply any catalogue would
be to do the project less than justice even in so brief a report.
At the end of the chapter, then, some of the landmarks will be
described briefly. For the moment it is sufficient to say that the
laboratory did vital early work in the creation of radar for
blind bombing and blind landing, and pioneered in develop-
ment of lightweight mountain height-finding, microwave early
warning, and antiaircraft equipment.
To the Armed Forces, Radiation Laboratory meant high-
performance radar equipment and fantastic uses of the war-baby
before the war was over; to the great producers of electronic
equipment it meant a powerful technological assistance and
stimulus which was felt and acknowledged by every one of
them, just as Radiation Laboratory would be the first to
acknowledge the brilliant production records established; to
M.I.T. it meant some difficult administrative problems and a
sense of a giant, an almost dangerous giant, lurking in the
back yard.12
The Institute solved part of its administrative problem by
never attempting to exert control over laboratory technical
policy, although it did control matters of buildings and
grounds, plant protection and security and allied problems,
in cooperation with the Steering Committee. The splendid
personal relations between DuBridge and Dr. Compton made
this easier, and the Institute's easy relations with an organism
IT
O

2
4
6
8
9
10
The Steering Committee of the Radiation Laboratory in February,
1944. Pictured at one of their weekly meetings are, left to right:
(1) I. I. Rabi of Columbia University (Associate Director of the
Laboratory and a Nobel Prize winner), (2) E. C. Pollard of Yale,
(3) T. W. Bonner of the Rice Institute, (4) J. W. Hinkley then of the
Central Hudson Gas and Electric Co., (6) R. G. Herb of the Uni-
versity of Wisconsin, (8) L. C. Marshall of the University of Cali-
fornia, (9) L. N. Ridenour of the University of Pennsylvania, (10)
L. A. DuBridge of the University of Rochester (Laboratory Direc-
tor), (12) J. G. Trump of M.I.T., (14) D. H. Ewing of Smith
College, (15) J. L. Lawson of the University of Michigan, (16) F.W.
Loomis of the University of Illinois (Associate Director), (13)
Britton Chance of the University of Pennsylvania. Standing are
(5) Jerrold Zacharias then of Hunter College, (7) L. J. Haworth of
the University of Illinois, and (11) D. G. White of the Farmer's
Cooperative Bank of Berkeley, California, for H. Gaither. Seated,
right rear, are (17) Channing Turner, former president of the U.S.
Wind Engine and Pump Co. of Batavia, Illinois, and (18) 1. A.
Getting of M.I.T. Absent: J. R. Killian, Jr., J. Street, L. Turner,
and M. White.
ELECTRONIC ESPIONAGE
225
which did not have the reputation of always being easy to get
along with bear witness to this spirit of mutual respect and
cooperation.
Left to themselves and in their anxiety to get on with the
war, the Radiation Laboratory Steering Committee might
easily have wrecked the Institute's back yard, its roofs, and very
likely its rhododendrons as well, in the constant pressure for
more space. Indeed the stories of space expansion and of the
Radar School may point up as well as anything what sort of
difficulties confronted M.I.T.'s administration as its Gargantua
grew up.
By July, 1941, the Laboratory staff had grown to number 225.
The space had not grown proportionately. The original space
in M.I.T.'s Building 4, on the roof of Building 6, and in shops
provided by Mechanical Engineering in Building 3, amounted
to about 20,000 square feet. It was in that month that the
Laboratory finally obtained 6,300 square feet of hangar space
at the East Boston Airport although experimental flights had
been proceeding for some time. The problem was obviously
critical since the staff was clearly too small, and yet it had only
about half as much space per person as would be considered
a reasonable minimum in a good industrial laboratory. The
result was that on 1 August Technology broke ground for a
permanent fireproof building behind the main group, now
known as Building 24. This building was originally planned
for three stories but before completion it was made to provide
six stories and a penthouse. This added 52,600 square feet of
working space, but before it was ready the staff had grown
proportionately again. The Institute then purchased with
NDRC funds the Hood Milk Company Building located on
Massachusetts Avenue about two blocks from M.I.T. This
purchase added 110,000 square feet more. But this served only
to whet the appetite of Radiation Laboratory, and a temporary
building near Building 24 was authorized. This was Building
22, and provided another 110,000 square feet. But by March,
1943, this was still not enough. Because M.I.T. was renting
226
LED
space in a number of unsatisfactory places in town another
temporary building, Building 20, was constructed. This added
120,000 square feet. When it was ready for occupancy in early
1944 the staff of the laboratory numbered 2,662. The net space
available, exclusive of airport hangars, was about 350,000 square
feet. During the next year and a half 1,000 more employees
were added, two wings were added to Building 20, and a four-
story garage was rented across the Charles River for crating and
shipping. In May, 1945, the net area in square feet excluding
hangars was about 410,000 but still the area per person had not
improved much over that of 1941; it was now 112.
This was the situation on Technology's own grounds. But
there were many other laboratories to administer away from
Cambridge; shacks on Deer Island in Boston Harbor; a station
at the Interceptor Command School at Orlando, Florida; the
Spraycliff Observatory on Beavertail Point at Jamestown, Rhode
Island; houses and a laboratory on Fisher's Island in Long
Island Sound; a building on North Ridge on Great Neck, near
Ipswich, Massachusetts; the Heathfield station replacing Battery
Winthrop at Fort Heath, Massachusetts. Other still more tem-
porary stations were established from time to time at Province-
town, Gloucester, at Mt. Cadillac near Bar Harbor, Maine. Air-
port space was constructed at Bedford Airport with the consent
of the War Department, and hangars were occupied in many
other air stations. When the shooting was over the problem of
demobilizing these facilities in an orderly way remained to
plague the Institute administration, but it was satisfactorily
solved.
As research work went along promisingly Dr. Compton and
Bowles realized that, if it came to war, the services would need
many officers trained in the fundamental principles of ultra-
high frequency microwave radar. Since Wilmer L. Barrow, Asso-
ciate Professor of Electrical Communications, had carried on
important theoretical and experimental studies in this field
and had collaborated in the blind-landing project previously
ELECTRONIC ESPIONAGE
227
described, he was obviously well fitted to be a leader in such
an endeavor.
By 1941 Dean Moreland had felt increasing concern over the
prospect of putting a great deal of highly specialized equipment
into the hands of the Services with no one who knew how to
operate or maintain it. After thinking about it for some time, in
training program ought to be initiated either at M.I.T. or else-
where and probably at M.I.T. Bowles agreed at once and set
about securing War Department interest. The Army represen-
tatives concurred with a general plan for radar instruction at
M.I.T. which should be largely fundamental and which should
be illustrated by laboratory work on one complete Army radar
system. It was agreed that the level of instruction should pro-
vide a strong fundamental background which would equip the
graduates to act as instructors of other officers or enlisted men.
This led to the establishment of the Radar School at M.I.T.
under the direction of W. L. Barrow. Barrow was succeeded in
September, 1943, by Carlton E. Tucker, Professor of Electrical
Engineering.13 The school was originally located on the Insti-
tute campus in Cambridge but soon moved to larger quarters
in the Harbor Building, on Atlantic Avenue in Boston, which
overlooked Boston Harbor and had the immense advantage of
easy sight of interesting radar targets. The main unit was located
in the five upper floors of the Harbor Building with branches at
19 Deerfield Street and on the M.I.T. campus. It gave instruc-
tion in radar, radio, LORAN, sonar, and measures designed to
combat enemy radar activities. The great objective of the course
was to provide instruction on those basic principles of ultrahigh
frequency and microwave radar which must be understood for
effective operation and maintenance of service equipment.
As a result of promotional activity by the late Captain Charles
S. Joyce, USN (Ret.), Navy officers were enrolled in the school
after completing three or four months of preparatory work at
one of three pre-radar schools located at Bowdoin College,
TY
-
228
QED
Princeton University, or Harvard University. Army officers
took their pre-radar course at Harvard. At the M.I.T. school the
Navy officers completed their preparation for duty with the
Fleet as radio specialists (changed in 1944 to electronic spe-
cialist), whereas the Army officers were prepared for assignment
to radar maintenance, and in most cases received further main-
tenance training on specific radar sets at one of several Army
service schools; Signal Corps officers, for example, went to Fort
Monmouth or to Camp Murphy, Florida; Air Force officers to
Boca Raton, Florida; Antiaircraft Artillery officers went to
Camp Davis, North Carolina; Seacoast Artillery officers to Fort
Monroe; Air Force (Weatherwing) officers were assigned to the
Weather Equipment Maintenance Section at Spring Lake,
New Jersey.
Though M.I.T.'s was the leading school of radar, other
colleges and universities conducted courses as well. To help
them the M.I.T. staff designed a standard microwave kit to be
used for laboratory instruction; for them it acted as the central
agency for obtaining priorities in order that these kits might
IL
27
Through this school by war's end had passed 8,657 students
of whom 2,761 were from the Army, 5,552 from the Navy, and
344 from the OSRD. Graduates of the school were to be found
in every action, and in every radar center; they were the
apostles, sent forth from the place where the development was
being done; they are not the least of M.I.T.'s achievements in
its wartime radar program; and without them it is certain that
the mere apparatus would have been by no means so effective. 14
It is time, though, to turn back to some specific pieces of that
apparatus to make a fitting close to this rather pedestrian
account of what was anything but a pedestrian activity.15
One of the first important radar developments which saw real
service was later called the SCR-582. A few preproduction sets
were built by the Research Construction Company from Radia-
tion Laboratory designs before the North African invasion.
They were called Harbor Entrance Control sets and operated
ELECTRONIC ESPIONAGE
229
on a 10-centimeter wavelength. They were the only sets at the
time capable of detecting low-flying planes, and they gave yeo-
man's service during the North African campaign in harbors
like Algiers before they were sent on to Crete and Italy.
The H X air-borne radar set, originally designed in the
Radiation Laboratory, was to be built in huge quantities by
Western Electric and Philco as standard navigating and “bomb-
ing through overcast” equipment for all heavy bombers. But it
took time to get assembly lines running and the urgency was
great. At the special request of the Army Air Forces the Radia-
tion Laboratory, together with its model shop operated by the
Research Construction Company, built 12 H2X sets with spares
and installed them in Flying Fortresses. Lieutenant General
Ira C. Eaker sent twelve of his experienced Pathfinder crews
to Boston. They flew the new equipment around New England
until all adjustments had been perfected and the crews were
thoroughly familiar with it. Then they flew the planes to
England and led all the "instrument” bombing raids of the
Eighth Air Force over Germany from 1 November 1943 to
15 March 1944, when the commercially manufactured equip-
ment became available. In this period of the year only four or
five days in a month are clear enough over Germany for visual
bombing. Hence it was this laboratory-built equipment which
kept the Eighth Air Force bombers operational during those
critical four and a half months.16
Among the earlier devices developed in Radiation Labora-
tory was the now justly famous SCR-584 set for directing anti-
aircraft fire. It substitutes radar for visual tracking, and func-
tions automatically and reliably through fair or foul weather.
The production contract for this equipment, which went to
General Electric with Westinghouse and Chrysler as subcon-
tractors, was the first example in the radar field in which
sufficient faith was shown in a laboratory model to countenance
plunging into a huge production contract without the usual
time-consuming peacetime schedule of preproduction models,
tests, and standardization preceding the production contract.
230
QED
11
On the basis of the performance of the model built by the
Radiation Laboratory this production contract was placed,
exceeding in dollar value the entire cost for the Boulder Dam
project. It was one of the war's best investments. It turned back
the Luftwaffe at Anzio and the buzz-bombs in England. It parti-
cipated in the Normandy landings and in consolidation of the
beachhead; it moved forward to Bastogne, to the Rhine, to the
meeting with the Russians at the Oder; and everywhere it left a
trail of broken German aircraft.
In 1942 the German submarine campaign had created a
desperate situation for the Allies. Despite the gallant convoy
program, enemy submarines and their kills were increasing at
an alarming rate. The submarines had learned to avoid and to
counter a British type of radar detection which we were also
using. A more powerful and accurate radar device and one
much more difficult to escape had just been developed by
Radiation Laboratory and was going into production by
Western Electric. But without waiting for this, the Army Air
Forces, backed by the Secretary of War, got together a small
squadron of old B-18's and had the new ASV equipment
installed in them at the East Boston Airport. It also installed
certain magnetic equipment which had been developed for
short-range detection at Columbia University. Armed thus with
equipment to locate submarines at considerable distances on
the surface and at lesser distances submerged, supplied with
bombs and depth charges, the little Air Force squadron pursued
the submarines by day and by night all along the coast from
Halifax to South America, wherever they were reported. The
results were immediate and effective and the submarines largely
stopped their operations near our coast. This may have been the
turning point in the antisubmarine campaign. Then the Navy
took over these techniques and with even more advanced ones
carried the attack to mid-ocean and to the European Coast.
The most powerful radar set on which information has been
released is the huge MEW (Microwave Early Warning). It was
designed and built in the Radiation Laboratory and tested in
ELECTRONIC ESPIONAGE
231
the air-defense network in Florida. Simultaneously five other
introductory sets were built in RL and RCC while commercial
production was getting under way. These five sets played a
notable role in later phases of the war. The first was mounted
near the southwestern tip of England. It immediately proved its
ability to detect the approach of enemy aircraft towards any
portion of southern England. Only a few days after it was
installed it discovered a formation of American heavy bombers
which had lost their way and, low in gas, were headed westward
out over the Atlantic about 250 miles away. It guided the planes
back to England and by this one act saved not only many lives
but also planes and equipment far exceeding in value the total
cost of the entire MEW program. Then the set was used to
direct our fighter escorts as, in successive waves, they took over
the protection of our great bomber formations flying to and
from Germany. It produced a magnificent radar-witness account
of the aircraft operations on D-Day. Finally, after Normandy
was ours, one of these MEW sets was assigned to each American
army to guide the close-supporting tactical aircraft towards
their targets. As the Japanese war ended these sets were being
mounted on near-by Pacific islands to perform a similar function
in the attack on Japan..
Still another radar application developed in the Radiation
Laboratory is the Ground Control of Approach (GCA) system
for landing aircraft even when the field and its approaches are
completely obscured by fog or darkness. This device owed a
great deal to the genius of Luis Alvarez, physicist from the
University of California and head of Division 7 of Radiation
Laboratory. It differs from all other blind-landing systems in
that it requires no equipment whatsoever in the plane except
the ordinary radio communication set; it requires only willing-
ness of the pilot to follow instructions received through his ear-
phones and requires no training in the use of special equipment.
The gear is mounted in a truck and can be run onto an airfield
and set up for operation in a few minutes. Its operators see on
a screen a line which indicates the proper approach and landing
232
QED
path for the incoming plane. They also see on the screen the
location of any obstacles which must be avoided. They see at
every instant the location of the incoming plane as a spot
moving, if all is well, right along the ideal landing line. They
can tell at a glance if the plane is to the left or the right or above
or below this ideal line, and by how many feet. They can talk to
the pilot over the radio communication system and tell him
just what to do to keep on the line.
It is as if the pilot had, sitting beside him, an invisible co-pilot
who sees the exact path down which the pilot should fly and
who says to him, “Get over 50 feet to the right. Let her down
just a trifle. Now about 20 feet more to the righi. Everything
OK. You're 100 yards from contact. Now!” A blindfolded pilot
can land time after time and never vary more than a plane's
length or so from the theoretical touchdown spot and never
off line at all.
Two factors have slowed the rapid adoption of this device.
One is the powerful backing for earlier blind-landing systems
and good ones, another is the greater faith of pilots in an instru-
ment which they can see than in a voice which they can only
hear. Nevertheless, this equipment has already saved planes and
pilots who had never heard of it until they were caught above an
airfield with zero ceiling, had to come down; and were “talked
in” to safety. It enabled countless military missions to be flown
which would otherwise not have justified the risk. It has an
important future even if other systems should become standard.
Small private planes, for example, may not afford the luxury
of blind-landing instruments and some military aircraft, for
example, fighter planes, cannot afford the extra weight and
space. For such types as well as for emergencies and for mobile
use, GCA will be a valuable supplement to whatever more
elaborate system may be installed at the principal airports.
The reader may recall that one of the three original assign-
ments to Radiation Laboratory was to develop a long-range
navigational device which would let a plane or ship, without
radar signaling devices of its own, know its position accurately.
ELECTRONIC ESPIONAGE
233
In 1941 the Laboratory submitted this new scheme for long-
range navigation based on radar principles and now called
LORAN.
LORAN, as developed in America, was based principally on
suggestions made by Alfred Loomis, and the system was originally
called LRN, the initials of Loomis Radio Navigation. On his
objection it was changed to Long Range Navigation. The vowels
were added in 1942 when a cape in Labrador became the site of
an LRN station. The cape was named LORAN, and the name
was subsequently extended to cover the system. But though
Loomis provided the inspiration and suggestions on which the
system was based, the success of the development is associated
with the name of Melville Eastham.
When Loomis proposed long range navigation by pulse-time
measurements it was known that the British had some kind of
radio navigation system; security, however, prevented its disclos-
ure at the time. This turned out later to be the GEE method, a
system differing from LORAN principally in wavelength. Al-
though later it was learned that others had thought of the prin-
ciples on which LORAN was to be based, the development and
the initial exploration of the system came from NDRC impetus.
LORAN was administered separately by a subcommittee of the
Microwave Committee in order not to endanger the microwave
program of the Radiation Laboratory by intruding long-wave
radar techniques. In April, 1941, entire responsibility for the
project was placed in the hands of Melville Eastham. Eastham,
a member of the Microwave Committee, was already assisting
M.I.T. virtually as a staff member in its administration of the
Radiation Laboratory, and now gave practically his entire time
to LORAN. The success of the project from this time on was
assured. Compton and Eastham, with Admiral Furer's assistance,
convinced the Navy of the vital potentialities of this navigational
asset. Later, the Army Air Forces were interested. It was one of
Eastham's right-hand men, Donald G. Fink, '33, who supervised
the establishment of the S.S. LORAN system for the night bomb-
ing of Germany. LORAN it was, along with radar bombing aids,
234
QED
which formed the two principal navigational means to the long
range bombing of Japan. Ultimately, after it had been firmly
established, the LORAN project was absorbed by the Radiation
Laboratory organization. Without Eastham's vision, understand-
ing, and selfless effort the value of Loomis's idea would most
probably have been lost to the war effort.
The development of LORAN required transmitting and re-
ceiving stations, and they were constructed by Radiation Lab-
oratory personnel in Delaware, on Long Island, and Cape Cod,
in Nova Scotia, Newfoundland, and Labrador. All the stations
save that on Long Island are still in operation by the Navy.
The Navy undertook to sponsor the installation of the initial
equipment to aid in navigating the northern convoy route
across the Atlantic. Here the necessity of zigzagging to avoid
submarines, the compass variations, the necessity for radio
silence, and the inability to see sun or stars through the pre-
vailing fog and clouds introduced such errors of navigation that
ships often failed to meet their escorting aircraft by as much
as two hundred miles. LORAN equipment, built and largely
installed under the Radiation Laboratory contract, proved most
successful. Now the Atlantic and Pacific are covered by the
LORAN network, produced by a few mainland and island
stations. Any ship or airplane carrying lightweight receiving
equipment can locate its position quickly and reliably, inde-
pendent of chronometric and astronomical observations. Many
transoceanic air transports, military aircraft, and ships now use
this navigation method, which is one of the permanently useful
products of war research.
This is perhaps sufficient documentation, if any indeed were
needed, to attest the fact that the Radiation Laboratory was
a success. Ask any key person of the Radiation Laboratory why
it was a success and he will be quick to reply. He will say it is
because persons trained well in the fundamentals of physics
were allowed in the emergency to overturn an accumulation of
engineering practice; he will say it was because the group was
energetic enough and imaginative enough and therefore lucky
ELECTRONIC ESPIONAGE
235
enough to be able to depart from its standard practice of slow
growth on fundamentals to the quick application of funda-
mental knowledge often based on guesswork, usually trial and
error as required by war tempo. Most of all though, he will say
it was because the organization of even this large group was
loose and informal, the spirit and morale were high, enterprise
was always encouraged. It did not matter if a man, through
his enthusiasm, "got into trouble.” Men drifted across the
organizational lines, they helped each other in tight spots, they
poached on each other's preserves. The group was picked, it was
strong, it was uninhibited. It was in fact so uninhibited that
it was militantly against much or any control from OSRD, the
Army or the Navy – some might even say too militantly. From
the point of view of the top, everything else was subordinated
to making the Laboratory a comfortable place, spiritually, in
which a physicist was to work. The pay-off demonstrated the
validity of the principle.
These principles were no novelty to the administrative
officers of M.I.T. who practice them in their daily operations
in the work of the Institute, and with rather less fuss and
feathers than was brought about by the war, which brought
together a scratch team of people who knew each other's repu-
tations but not always each other's personalities. The principle
of independence of action in matters of research is not one
which needs to be brandished from the housetops as something
new or extraordinary between the staff members of the Institute
and its administration.
The principle is important to remember, though, for it
accounts as well for most of the other dramatic successes of
OSRD. It has not always been followed in research controlled
by the Army or the Navy which tends to have difficult direc-
tives imposed from the top; nor, more strangely, is it char-
acteristic of all government-directed research. In the future
conduct of national research these experiences may well be
recalled. They apply just as fully to problems of peace as they
do to problems of war.
236
QED
Radiation Laboratory was much less of an M.I.T. activity
than an ardent alumnus might in a moment of carelessness
proclaim. It was more of an M.I.T. activity than many a Radia-
tion Laboratory man would ever admit. In between lies the
truth, and this has been well summed up by Dr. Compton in
his President's report for 1945:17
The organization of the Radiation Laboratory makes it clear
that, while M.I.T. can take just pride in its accomplishments, this
pride can also be shared with many other organizations. The Insti-
tute took the contract, the responsibility for management and
performance, and some very considerable financial risks; it furnished
a small portion of the personnel and selected and employed the
rest; it established a working pattern of the organization. Once
established, the technical work of the laboratory was ably guided
by its Director, Dr. Lee A. DuBridge, supported by a steering com-
mittee of the heads of various departments into which the laboratory
was divided. The program was subject to periodic review and occa-
sional redirection by a committee of the National Defense Research
Committee of OSRD, headed by Dr. Alfred L. Loomis. The com-
mittee, acting much like a Board of Directors, included scientists
or engineers from M.I.T., the University of California, Columbia
University, the University of Rochester, the Bell Telephone Labora-
tories, the General Electric Company, the Westinghouse Electric
Corporation, the Radio Corporation of America, the Sperry Gyro-
scope Company, the General Radio Company, and the War Pro-
duction Board. Through these men, constructive criticism and
cooperation with industrial firms were always available. Then the
programs in their more general aspects, and especially the budgets,
were checked and approved by the NDRC, and final authorization
was given by Dr. Vannevar Bush as Director of OSRD. At every
level in this organization, close contact was maintained with the
Army and the Navy through their appointed liaison officers or
through actual membership of their officers on committees. I mention
these organizational details to emphasize the widely cooperative
character of the Radiation Laboratory enterprise and hence the
widely shared credit for its success.18
C
AA
FOOTNOTES
1 The Navy did not receive its first production set of the CXAM until
May, 1940; no production contracts were let for Army equipment until
August, 1940. Neither Army nor Navy had seriously studied air-borne
ELECTRONIC ESPIONAGE
237
radar systems at that date. The British, under more pressure, were farther
along.
2 There were sets based on the longer waves which gave distinguished
service. The Navy's CXAM was an aircraft warning set for big naval
vessels; the Army's SCR-270 and SCR-271 were land installations for
long-range detection and early warning against aircraft. The 270 was
mobile, the 271 permanent. Another important Army set was the SCR-268,
mobile for searchlight and antiaircraft fire control. Any defects in the sets
were implicit in the wavelengths on which they operated, and at the time
they were designed there was no choice on this score. They remained on
active duty to the end of the war and are entitled to a fair share of the
medals for gallant service.
3 It goes without saying that there were efforts before the war to use
microwaves for detection. The Signal Corps, Naval Research Laboratory,
RCA, General Electric, the Germans, all worked over the problem, in
general using continuous wave methods. Their only source of power was
the split-anode magnetron and its power was so low as to make the possible
ranges too short to be of much value. Nevertheless the French had a micro-
wave detector on the Normandie.
4 Loomis also in 1940 contributed funds to support a program of micro-
wave propagation research at M.I.T.
5 The committee finally included, in addition, R. R. Beal, Director of
Research of the Radio Corporation of America; George F. Metcalf of
General Electric Company; Melville Eastham, then President of General
Radio Company; J. A. Hutcheson of the Westinghouse Electric and Manu-
facturing Company; Ernest O. Lawrence, Professor of Physics and Director
of the Radiation Laboratory for Nuclear Physics at the University of
California; J. G. Trump (succeeded E. L. Bowles), later served as Director
of BBRL, Malvern, England; J. R. Loofbourow (succeeded Trump when
the latter went to England with the British Branch of RL); C. G. Suits
(succeeded G. F. Metcalf), then Assistant Director of Research Labora-
tories, General Electric Company; W. R. G. Baker, Vice President of
General Electric Company; M. J. Kelly, Director of Research, Bell Tele-
phone Laboratories; L. F. Jones, Director of Government Development
Division, Radio Corporation of America; F. E. Terman, Dean of Engineer-
ing, Stanford University, then Director, Radio Research Laboratory,
Division 15, NDRC; L. A. DuBridge, Director, Radiation Laboratory,
M.I.T.; A. T. Waterman, Professor of Physics, Sloane Physical Laboratory,
Yale University, also with the Office of Field Service, NDRC; Warren
Weaver, Director of the Natural Sciences, Rockefeller Foundation, also
with Section 7.5, NDRC, and the Applied Mathematics Panel; R. C. Ellis,
Director of Radio and Radar, WPB, now Vice President of Raytheon
Manufacturing Company; I. I. Rabi, Professor of Physics, Columbia
University, Associate Director of Radiation Laboratory. The group was
he latter wentvern, England; J. R. E. L. Bowles),
238
QED
thus a composite of the best administrative and scientific talent in the
laboratories of leading universities and industrial establishments.
6 Only one element in the system was not an RL product.
7 Radiation Laboratory altogether supplied about $12,500,000 of equip.
ment directly to the Services; RCC matched this figure.
8 The British Branch was far more significant than this account can
suggest. The skillful leadership of Trump earned for him the British
decoration King's Medal in the Cause of Freedom.
9 For example, Bowles, Slater, Stratton, Morse, Frank, Loofbourow,
Trump, and A. C. Hall.
10 Lawrence's laboratory at Berkeley was of course so named.
11 Involving, for example, a full study of cathode ray tubes. The Plan
Position Indicator (PPI) form of presentation, producing as it does a
map, is the most comprehensible presentation and the most exciting to
a layman.
12 It meant, for example, a relinquishment of any large role in the top
project, which was that of nuclear fission, although radar clearly had a
more important effect in World War II than the atomic bomb, which
appeared only after the war was won.
13 The staff from M.I.T., in addition to Barrow and Tucker, consisted of:
William H. Radford, Associate Professor of Electrical Communications,
who supervised the teaching staff comprised of civilians and Army
and Navy officers.
Prescott D. Crout, Associate Professor of Mathematics.
Godfrey T. Coate, Assistant Professor of Electrical Engineering.
H. Guyford Stever, Assistant Professor of Aeronautical Engineering.
Henry J. Zimmermann, Assistant Professor of Electrical Engineering.
14 Those readers interested in reading further on Technology's Radar
School are referred to the article by W. H. Radford in The Technology
Review, Vol. XLVIII, number 4, February, 1946.
15 What follows is taken very largely verbatim from pages 10–15,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology President's Report, issue 1944-45,
Cambridge, October, 1945.
16 Sometimes these matters are better understood when they are per-
sonalized. Consider, for example, the citation to Frank P. Zaffarano,
Research Assistant in Electrical Engineering, accompanying his Medal of
Freedom.
Zaffarano had come to the Radiation Laboratory in May, 1942, and in
September, 1943, went to BBRL where he remained until June, 1945. It
was during his tour of duty in the United Kingdom that he earned the
citation which reads:
"Frank P. Zaffarano, Technical Observer, U.S. Army Air Forces, for
exceptionally meritorious service in discharging his duties as technical
advisor to the Eighth Air Force on micro-wave beacon operation from
ELECTRONIC ESPIONAGE
239
October 1943 to April 1945. Mr. Zaffarano has been in a large measure
responsible for the success of the Micro-H bombing program in the Eighth
Air Force. He accompanied the first pre-production beacon units to the
United Kingdom and upon arrival selected sites and set up the units. He
then devoted much of his time to training beacon mechanics and instruct-
ing navigators and radar personnel in the proper technique of tuning
airborne radars for beacon signals. When the first trials of the M-H bomb-
ing system began in April 1944, he modified the beacons for delayed
operation and designed a modification to a standard Gee indicator to
permit its use as a precision monitor for the delay. He planned and super-
vised the construction of the mobile M-H stations and accompanied these
stations to the continent. Then he assisted in siting and setting up the
stations, and supervised their maintenance for a period of five months.
During this time he traveled almost continuously among the various sites
and worked long hours under trying field conditions. Upon the arrival of
production models of the M-H beacons in the theater, he set to work and
designed suitable modifications for M-H operation, and once again super-
vised installation work. Throughout the entire period of his assignment
with the Eighth Air Force, Mr. Zaffarano has worked night and day
without rest or respite. His work, his superior technical knowledge, his
advice and his unbounded enthusiasm have all contributed immeasurably
to the success of radar bombing in the European air offensive."
17 Op. cit. in footnote 15, page 238.
18 The list of Radiation Laboratory staff members and M.I.T. men who
worked there is too full to be included here, and the interested reader is
referred to the book Radiation Laboratory Staff Members 1940–1945, pub-
lished at the Radiation Laboratory in June, 1946.

SCR-582 overlooking Algiers Harbor, 23 September 1943. Antenna and reflector being raised through hatch.
Part IV
THE STAFF AWAY ON DIVERSE MISSIONS
16
ON THE PRODUCTION FRONT
1
ONCE RESPONSIBILITIES in the direction of the prosecution of
research had been discharged, it was normal to find the next
largest Technology staff activity addressed to problems of
production, especially engineering problems in that field.
Production as a federal activity was epitomized by the War
Production Board though this was preceded by both the War
Resources Board and the Office of Production Management and
though a very important side partner, which had both research
and production problems, was the Rubber Administration.
Activities of the War Production Board were closely related
to those of the Lend Lease Administration and the Foreign
Economic Administration. It is not the province of this history
to explain the ramifications and interconnections of the various
Rooseveltian groups for war management. Here we shall assume
that the reader has a general familiarity with what went on in
Washington in this sphere.
In production, as in so many other fields, it was the chief of
M.I.T. who blazed the way for his colleagues. Back in the pre-
war period when the crisis was mounting sharply, the reader
may recall that President Roosevelt appointed a War Resources
Board. This was in 1939. The board was under the chairman-
ship of Mr. Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., a Term Member of M.I.T.'s
Corporation. Dr. Compton was a member. The War Resources
Board was ill-fated almost from the start. It had been appointed
without consulting the then Secretary of War, Mr. Woodring;
it had no representative for labor. Nevertheless it was requested
by the President to make recommendations about an industrial
mobilization plan which had been prepared by the Joint Army-
Navy Munitions Board. The WRB made as careful studies as it
243
244
QED
could of the conditions in Europe, consulting such experts as
Colonel Lindbergh, Colonel Faymonville, military attaché to
Moscow, and the military attaché to Berlin, Colonel Smith. It
finally brought a program to the President covering special
services which would need to be organized. This differed from
a plan the President had proposed in one particular. Where
Mr. Roosevelt, who already had upwards of one hundred
agencies reporting directly to him, proposed that each new war
agency should also report directly to him, the WRB proposed
the grouping of similar sets of agencies under single chieftains.
By this grouping four powerful individuals would in turn
report directiy to the President.
Mr. Roosevelt declined this proposal and asked for further
consideration of his plan. It was at this critical moment that
Senator Champ Clark moved the appointment of a special
Congressional committee to investigate the actions of the War
Resources Board and “to see how far the President has gone
in his plans to get the nation into war.” To this proposal the
President responded that the committee had finished its work
and had been discharged. Thereafter nothing happened for
seven months, at the end of which time the Office for Emergency
Management was established.
The War Resources Board was in effect a flop to Anglophiles,
who said it had not done enough, and to isolationists, who said
it had done much too much. Actually its recommendations were
never carried out in detail by the President, and the largest
value it had to Dr. Compton was doubtless experience which
served him in good stead in the many delicate negotiations
which he was later charged with undertaking.
The next production agency, in point of time, with which
M.I.T. men were seriously concerned was the Office of Produc-
tion Management (OPM). This was merged into the War
Production Board (WPB) in December, 1941, and several of
M.I.T.'s staff served both agencies. It may be easiest to get a
view of the nature of these activities by surveying several
individual cases, not necessarily in their order of importance.
Walter G. Whitman, Professor of Chemical Engineering, in
ON THE PRODUCTION FRONT
245
charge of the Department, served with the War Production
Board as Director of the Basic Chemicals Division, which con-
tained three sections, one dealing with alcohol and solvents,
one with aromatics and intermediates, and one with inorganic
chemicals. This division was responsible for securing adequate
supplies of all basic chemicals for the war program, including
both the military and the essential civilian economy. The four
main problems were:
1. To predict future requirements which shifted constantly
as the war went along.
2. To allocate critical chemicals so that they would be used
most effectively in the war program.
3. To stock-pile where necessary against future requirements.
4. To see that new facilities were constructed as, and only
to the extent that, they were required.
Such work of course required close cooperation with industry
and the Services, with financing agencies such as the Defense
Plant Corporation and Defense Supplies Corporation, with
Lend Lease, with the Department of Agriculture, with the
Petroleum Administration for War, and with various Con-
gressional committees. While explosives, synthetic rubber, and
aviation gasoline made spectacular demands for increased
amounts of basic chemicals, most of the production was widely
distributed. New construction was completed totaling several
hundred million dollars, and during the critical phase of the
war production program about 70 million dollars worth of
basic chemicals was allocated every month.1
Similar problems beset other Divisions of the WPB. For
example, George B. Waterhouse, Professor of Process Metal-
lurgy, now Emeritus, spent nearly five years with OPM, WPB,
OLL, and FEA on problems concerning iron and steel and
engineering. First he helped Mr. A. J. Whiteside to organize
the Iron and Steel Division with special emphasis on alloy
materials for steels; later he was charged with the administra-
tion of a special order covering the production, composition,
and use of tungsten, which was in very short supply. In 1942 he
246
QED
was sent to the United Kingdom on the first technical exchange
mission in the field of iron and steel since the war had begun.
For Lend Lease he had to listen to the demands of various
foreign purchasing commissions seeking iron and steel, notably
those of the USSR, France, Great Britain, and the Dominions,
India, China, and Turkey, and make recommendations and
decisions about allocations. In December, 1942, he served as
Chairman of the Industrial Equipment Division of the Bureau
of Areas of FEA, which had to make decisions on all requests
from the USSR for machine tools and industrial equipment.
In January, 1945, he became as well Consultant to the Enemy
Branch of FEA which was to submit recommendations concern-
ing treatment of Germany and Japan as regards industrial
reparations. This position required setting up technical mis-
sions to study conditions inside Germany and missions in
conjunction with the War Department to study war damage,
especially in the mines and iron and steel plants of Germany.
Waterhouse was demobilized in May, 1945.
Similarly Roland D. Parks, Associate Professor of Mineral
Industry, served the WPB and its related agencies, and subse-
quently the CPA. Professor Parks's work in the war dealt with
metals and minerals and was largely in the fields of mining
and mineral economics. He served with various titles of increas-
ing responsibility for WPB and CPA, ending as Deputy
Director of Metals and Minerals Division, CPA. Like Professor
Whitman's, his work involved public purchase, stockpiling, and
determination of surplus raw materials, if any. As Chairman
of the Inter-Agency Quota Committee (WPB-OPA) he was
associated directly with the Premium Price Plan, which is a
differential price plan used by some 3,500 domestic mines. His
work for the CPA continued, as previously, to deal entirely with
metal and mineral problems but emphasized civilian output
rather than expansion of war output. He returned to full-time
duty at M.I.T. as of 1 March 1946.
Douglass V. Brown, Alfred P. Sloan Professor of Industrial
Management, is known primarily as an expert in labor rela-
tions. Much of his important work in the war was indeed in
UT
ON THE PRODUCTION FRONT
247
that field and will be dealt with later in this chapter. In fact,
at the outset of the war preparation period he conducted a
survey for the Bureau of Labor Statistics of the current and
potential labor supply in the machine tool and aero-engine
industries. Beginning in July, 1940, however, and for a period
of a year and a half, his attention was directed to production
rather than to labor problems. From July, 1940, until January,
1941, he was Head of the Economics and Statistics Section of
the Raw Materials Division of the Advisory Commission to the
Council on National Defense, a division charged with the
responsibility of mobilizing raw material supplies for defense
purposes. From January to August, 1941, he was Chief of the
Review Division of the Materials Branch of OPM and assistant
to W. L. Batt, Vice Chairman of OPM. In both these jobs he
dealt with problems of materials supply and with special
assignments such as coordinating the American effort with the
Canadian effort along the same lines. From September to
November, 1941, he was in Russia as a staff adviser to the
Harriman-Beaverbrook Mission, which was the forerunner of
Lend Lease to Russia. After this interesting assignment Brown
returned to more strictly labor problems. 2
Closely related to production, if at times perilously far from
it, was the work of the Rubber Administration. It is hard now
for the short memory to recall that the war came near to being
lost on rubber and that Mr. Baruch's Rubber Committee was
nearly as important in its day (lest a war be lost) as his Atomic
Control Committee was later (lest a peace be lost). The situation
was critical and it was touch and go for a time. All our other
power was in danger of being wasted because we had no latex.
To meet this crisis President Roosevelt summoned his elder
statesman. To head the committee to study the problem he
named Mr. Bernard Baruch. The other members summoned
in 1942 were J. B. Conant, President of Harvard University,
and Dr. Compton. According to popular fancy they sat on
benches in Washington's parks and finally rendered a report.
The result was the Rubber Administration. To the chairman-
ship of this administration Mr. William Martin Jeffers, Presi.
248
QED
TAT
dent of the Union Pacific Railroad, was named; his deputy was
Colonel Bradley Dewey, '09, Life Member of M.I.T.'s Corpora-
tion. Later Dewey succeeded Mr. Jeffers as Rubber Director.
But this is not an alumni record and Colonel Dewey's achieve-
ments must go unrecorded here. Here we list only the achieve-
ments of the M.I.T. staff, led, as so often, by their president.
Edwin R. Gilliland, Professor of Chemical Engineering, was
a key figure in the synthetic rubber program. From the summer
of 1940 to July, 1943, he directed an NDRC project on oxygen
production, and subsequent to his work on rubber he occupied
important positions in NDRG. For the Rubber Administration,
Gilliland was Assistant Deputy Rubber Director in Charge of
Research and Development from October, 1942, to October,
1943, and Assistant Rubber Director from October, 1943, to
October, 1944.3
Behind problems of production were problems of labor.
Here again a specialized department of the Institute was ready
to supply its staff for the solution of war problems comparable
to those with which they had dealt in times of peace. These
activities centered around two agencies of which the more
important from the M.I.T. point of view was the War Labor
Board, and the less important, the War Manpower Commission.
To the former many of Technology's staff were summoned.
For example, after his service with the Harriman mission to
Moscow, Douglass Brown became a special arbitrator for the
National War Labor Board. In 1942 and 1943 he carried out
a study with several other members of M.I.T.'s Industrial Rela-
tions Section and a staff member of the University of California
on the labor relations and conditions in the longshore and
maritime industries. This study was made for the Army Service
Forces. Associated with Brown were Irving Knickerbocker,
Assistant Professor of Psychology, Douglas M. McGregor, Asso-
ciate Professor of Psychology, Charles A. Myers, Associate Pro-
fessor of Industrial Relations, Paul Pigors, Associate Professor
of Industrial Relations, and John Landgraf, then Instructor in
the Department of Economics and Social Science.
Subsequently, Brown served successively as Public Panel
ON THE PRODUCTION FRONT
249
Member for the New England Regional War Labor Board, as
Public Member of that board, and as arbitrator in many dis-
putes, particularly those involving textiles. Knickerbocker
became consultant on labor relations to Dewey and Almy Com-
pany and Raytheon Manufacturing Company and later a Public
Panel Member of the New England Regional War Labor Board
and an arbitrator in various labor disputes. McGregor became
an ad hoc consultant to various industrial firms, a member of
the Regional Appeals Committee of the War Manpower Com-
mission, and, from 1944, Director of Industrial Relations for
the Dewey and Almy Company. Myers went on to be a con-
sultant on labor relations and personnel problems to the Nashua
Manufacturing Company. He also was a member of the New
England Regional War Labor Board and from December, 1943,
to July, 1944, made a field study of the personnel problems of
the postwar transition period for the Committee for Economic
Development.
Pigors was a Public Panel Member for the New England War
Labor Board during most of its history, in addition to serving
as arbitrator in many disputes and as consultant to a number
of companies and unions.
William T. Martin, Professor of Mathematics and Executive
Officer of the Department, was a member of the Public Panel
of the Second Regional War Labor Board, and Ralph E.
Freeman, Professor of Economics in charge of the Department
of Economics and Social Sciences, performed a similar function
for the New England War Labor Board.
In April, 1942, Richard M. Bissell, Jr., then an assistant
professor at Yale University, joined M.I.T.'s staff as Associate
Professor of Economics. He promptly took leave of absence to
go to the War Shipping Administration, where in the Division
of Ship Control he was successively Economist to the Com-
bined Shipping Adjustment Board, Assistant to the Deputy
Administrator, Director of Economic Policy, Director of Ship
Requirements, and Executive Officer of the Combined Shipping
Adjustment Board. For nearly a year, beginning in December,
1945, he served in the Office of War Mobilization and Recon-
250
QED
version, first as Economic Adviser to the Director and subse-
quently as Deputy Director.
Thus in their various ways chemists, mathematicians, metal-
lurgists, geologists, economists, and psychologists from M.I.T.'s
staff worked on problems of war production, supply of material,
creation of new sources, and labor relations in fields not too
remote from their training and background. A little more off
the M.I.T. beam was the work of a handful of individuals on
the psychological front. To them we may now turn.
t
FOOTNOTES
1 Whitman's work started in June, 1941, as part-time consultant with
particular responsibility for increasing toluene production tenfold to meet
the needs for TNT. After the attack on Pearl Harbor he assumed the
described poston full-time leave of absence from the Institute. Other
posts he held were: (1) Chairman of the Subcommittee on Aircraft Fuels
and Lubricants of the NACA; (2) chairman of a special committee of
OSRD to study and report on long-burning propellants for missiles; (3)
member of a panel appointed by the Bureau of Aeronautics of the Navy
to recommend techniques for increasing the range of combat aircraft;
(4) member of the U.S.-Canadian Ordnance Committee on the Production
of Explosives.
2 This by no means exhausts the roster of those who worked with WPB
and its related agencies, though it is probably enough to set the general
stage. Among the others were:
Antoine M. Gaudin, Richards Professor of Mineral Dressing. During
1942–1943 consultant to Materials Division, WPB; in 1942 Head Pro-
duction Specialist for the Board of Economic Warfare. In that con-
nection he visited Bolivia for four months in 1942 to find out how best
to increase that country's production of tin and tungsten (see also
Chapter 12).
Carle R. Hayward, Professor of Process Metallurgy, Emeritus, was
consultant to the Copper Division of WPB and subsequently served as
general metallurgical consultant to the United States Bureau of Mines.
Jerome C. Hunsaker, Professor in Charge of the Department of Aero-
nautical Engineering, then in charge of the Department of Mechanical
Engineering as well, was a member of the Cargo Planes Advisory Com-
mittee to the Department of Commerce.
John M. Lessells, Associate Professor of Mechanical Engineering, was
a member of WPB Committee 165 on Production and Properties of
Magnesium Press and Hammer Forgings.
Charles A. Myers, Associate Professor of Industrial Relations, was on
ON THE PRODUCTION FRONT
251
black icelor! Ots Marketing
the staff of the Industry Consultant Branch, Labor Division, WPB; the
job was to assist the Industry Division in conversion of consumer goods
industries to war production.
Paul A. Samuelson, Professor of Economics, served as part-time con-
sultant to WPB in connection with their Economics and General Plan-
ning Program.
Robert R. Shrock, Associate Professor of Geology, left M.I.T. in 1943
to become a member of the Quartz Section of the Miscellaneous Minerals
Division of WPB and has now returned.
C. A. Stokes, then Assistant Professor in Chemical Engineering, was for
a time consultant in carbon black to WPB.
Gerald B. Tallman, Associate Professor of Marketing, was consultant
to the Office of Civilian Requirements of the WPB.
Edward S. Taylor, Professor of Aircraft Engines, was consultant to
WPB on aircraft and tank engines.
Robert S. Harris, Professor of Biochemistry of Nutrition, was consultant
in nutrition to the FEA, where he acted as an adviser on food relief
and rehabilitation problems, especially in the Far East.
3 Other staff members concerned with the Rubber Program were:
Dean Sherwood, consultant to the Baruch Committee.
Charles A. Myers, Associate Professor of Industrial Relations, staff mem-
ber of the Baruch Rubber Survey Committee.
Ernst A. Hauser, Associate Professor of Chemical Engineering, staff
member of the Baruch Rubber Survey Committee.
William L. Campbell, now Professor of Food Technology in charge of
the Department, in the Office of the Rubber Director, dealing with
problems of producing the raw materials.
ON THE PSYCHOLOGICAL FRONT
1
IT IS A FAR CRY from the arts of production to those of diplo-
macy. However, even in this unexpected field, Technology's
staff were called upon for service. Bellwether of this group was
Robert G. Caldwell, Dean of Humanities, one-time United
States Minister to Portugal and later to Bolivia. In 1940 Dean
Caldwell was called back to State Department activities by
Mr. Nelson Rockefeller and during 1940–41 was Chairman of
the Cultural Division in the Office of Inter-American Affairs
which, at that time, was under the National Defense Council.
In 1941-43 he was a member of the General Advisory Com-
mittee on Cultural Relations for the Department of State. In
both these tasks his extensive State Department and Latin
American experience stood him in good stead.
The program mentioned above was initiated more than a
year before Pearl Harbor to supplement the ordinary political
activities of the Department of State. It was not an effort to buy
good will, but to avoid obvious dangers and to create the
greatest possible unity in a period of crisis.
There were, at least at the beginning, two sides of the pro-
gram: one economic and commercial, intended to prevent
dangerous economic dislocations and, later, to promote the
production of strategic materials; and the second cultural, in a
very large sense, intended to combat German propaganda in
certain key countries and to promote knowledge and under-
standing.
The means used in this second program included the greatly
enlarged exchange of students and leaders; the study of Latin
America; the translation of important books and the use of the
252
ON THE PSYCHOLOGICAL FRONT
253
S
radio, the cinema, and the newspaper to give a more general
understanding of the two regions.
The Office of Inter-American Affairs was established for the
emergency. With the war over, many ideas which originated
there were taken over on a permanent basis by the State
Department and are now supported on a greatly increased basis
by such legislation as the Fulbright Bill, now become law,
which provides up to $20,000,000 in foreign currencies from
the proceeds of the sale of surplus war material for each of
certain foreign countries for international educational pur-
poses.
In the formative year, Dean Caldwell spent two days each
week in Washington, where policies were formulated, and
another two in New York, where many of them were actually
carried out.
Norman J. Padelford, Professor of International Relations,
served in the Department of State as a consultant, beginning
in 1941, and still continues in that capacity. During the war
period he was particularly associated with the development of
plans for the United Nations Organization, and also with policy
respecting the postwar organization of European inland trans-
portation. He was a member in 1943 of a small group of experts
designated by Secretary Hull to draw up the first American
draft of a United Nations Charter. In 1944 he was a member
of the United Nations Delegation to the Dumbarton Oaks
Conference on International Organization and Security which
agreed on the basic outlines of the new world organization. In
April, 1945, he served as Secretary to the Committee of Jurists
which met in Washington to revise the Statute of the World
Court. After that, he was Executive Officer at the San Francisco
United Nations Conference which drafted the United Nations
Charter. At this meeting he was especially connected with the
work of establishing the new International Court of Justice
as well as assisting in the general administration of the confer-
ence. In September, 1945, he accompanied Secretary of State
James E. Byrnes to the London meeting of the Council of
254
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KY
11
1
Foreign Ministers in the role of special personal adviser. At
this conference he was adviser to the Secretary on matters con-
nected with the internationalization of the Danube and other
European waterways in the treaties of peace. While in London
he was made a United States delegate to the Conference on
European Inland Transport which established the European
Inland Transport Organization. Since the London Council
meeting he has continued as adviser and consultant to the
government on questions relating to the administration and
disposition of various European waterways. 1
Clair E. Turner, ’17, Professor of Public Health, Emeritus,
and now Visiting Professor of Health Education at the Univer-
sity of California, turned his experience in public health matters
to good account in the field of international relations. From
1 March 1944 to 1 August 1945 he was Chief Health Education
Officer in the Division of Health and Sanitation of the Office
of Inter-American Affairs. Cooperative programs were develop-
ing between the United States and eighteen Latin American
countries; one of these involved health education. For those
countries to the south who had already initiated health educa-
tion, the United States group helped to extend the program;
for those who had not previously entered the field, first pro-
grams were initiated. To expedite this activity Turner visited
most of these countries, worked in the field with U.S. Public
Health groups and with the local national health authorities.
Successive to that mission he organized a year of study at the
University of California, sponsored by the Office of Inter-
American Affairs, set up for the further study of fifteen Latin
American graduate students under a fellowship arrangement.
Even more remote from Technology's accepted sphere was
the activity of the Office of War Information. Here William N.
Locke, now Professor of Modern Languages in charge of the
Department, carried out an assignment with the Psychological
Warfare Division of SHAEF (Supreme Headquarters Allied
Expeditionary Forces). First in charge of field printing of com-
bat propaganda for the First United States Army, then for the
Eighth Corps at the siege of Brest, later chief of propaganda
X
ON THE PSYCHOLOGICAL FRONT
255
production and staff liaison officer with the Ninth Army Psy-
chological Warfare Team, Locke, at the end of the fighting in
the Ruhr, was transferred to duty as press officer with Twelfth
Army Group Psychological Warfare Division. He directed pro-
duction of the first postoccupation newspaper in the Ruhr.
When the Ruhr was handed over to the British, Locke returned
to America to take up his work at the Institute.2
Boonyium Meesook, then Research Associate in Chemistry,
went at the request of the Siamese Minister to San Francisco
to take charge of Siamese language short-wave broadcasts con-
ducted under the supervision of the OWI. These broadcasts
were made three times daily, lasted altogether about three hours
a day, and were regarded by the resistance groups in Siam as
their authoritative source of information. This work together
with that of other Free Thais working on intelligence missions
for the OSS brought about coordination between the activities
of the Allies and of the resistance groups in Siam. The Japanese,
as it turned out, surrendered before any of the plans for inva-
sion of Thailand were carried through. At the end of the war
Meesook resigned his position, which was then Chief of the
Thai Language Section, OWI.
Dorwin P. Cartwright, Associate Professor of Psychology, was
employed full time from February, 1942, to the end of the war
by the Division of Program Surveys in the Bureau of Agricul-
tural Economics of the Department of Agriculture. There he
directed research to develop information about a number of
subjects; a periodic public opinion survey for the OWI; infor-
mation about marketing problems for the War Finance Division
of the U.S. Treasury; information about the distribution of
savings and attitudes towards their use for the Federal Reserve
Board; information as to public opinion and attitudes towards
various war programs of the War Food Administration. In
April and May, 1945, he joined the United States Strategic
Bombing Survey as a planning consultant for the Morale
Division.
Justin R. Hartzog, then Assistant Professor of City Planning,
followed activities closely related to his profession, all dealing
ge Secris positled the
256
QED
with the housing of war workers. For some time he acted as
Regional Coordinator of Defense Housing for New England;
after this, as Special Consultant to the Defense Housing Coordi-
nator in Washington, he assisted in making comprehensive
city and regional planning investigations, analyses, and recom-
mendations in connection with the development of war housing
projects of large proportions in localities of such complicated
character as Detroit (Willow Run), Buffalo, Fort Worth, Los
Angeles, New Orleans, Hampton Roads, Freeport, Texas, and
Las Vegas, Nevada.
The Institute even had its hand in the mysterious activities
of the "cloak and dagger boys' of the Office of Strategic Services.
Some of this work was in connection with research for OSRD
which supplied certain tools to OSS. Others who were directly
connected feel that they cannot yet say much about their activi-
ties.3 Of the rest the most interesting career was probably
enjoyed by Robert V. Rosa, Instructor in Economics, 1941-43.
Rosa left the Institute in April, 1943, and served in the Army
first as a sergeant and ultimately as a commissioned officer,
assigned to OSS. For this group he went to England in January,
1944, to join a small group of economists who were working on
target policy for the United States Strategic Air Force. Com-
missioned in September, he was transferred to General Bradley's
Staff Headquarters, Twelfth Army Group. Until the following
May he served in the G-2 Branch, analyzing the supply and
transport position and vulnerability of the German Army in
those areas. His time during this period was divided between
the Twelfth Army and the Advanced Headquarters of the
Ninth Air Force. In May of 1945 he returned to London to
work with the Enemy Objectives Unit, composed of personnel
from OSS and FEA and attached to the Embassy. He went to
London because the United States Ambassador felt that, in
dealing with reparations, it might be useful to have a survey
made by the same people who had been studying Germany from
a military point of view. This work culminated in a report, of
which Rosa was editor, entitled The German Economy of the
Next Decade and the Reparations Potential of the Western
ON THE PSYCHOLOGICAL FRONT
257
Zones. These, then, were among the more colorful activities
of members of M.I.T. staff who strayed somewhat from the
beaten or the traditional Technology path. A full survey of the
activities of the Technology staff off-campus requires only some
consideration of the vast amount of consulting which members
of this staff did for industry, and to that final consideration we
may now turn.
FOOTNOTES
1 Also serving the State Department was F. Alexander Magoun, Asso-
ciate Professor of Human Relations, who was Consultant to the Division
of Cultural Relations from 1942 to 1944.
2 Professor Locke's citations read as follows:
“1. On the occasion of the termination of his service with Psychological
Warfare Branch, P & PW Detachment, 12th Army Group, from 19 May
1944 to 26 June 1945, it is desired to commend Mr. William Locke,
0-247749, Civilian, OWI, for exceptionally meritorious service in the field
of combat propaganda. His duties were performed in a superior manner
and his service was characterized by loyal devotion to duty, initiative,
determination, and persistence.
"2. Mr. Locke served as Chief Printer during the organization and
training period in the Spring of 1944 in addition to other duties which
he was performing for Psychological Warfare Division, Supreme Head-
quarters Allied Expeditionary Force. His counsel, advice and assistance
in the construction, alteration and repair of field printing units and in
the training of personnel for field printing were invaluable. Mr. Locke
served with outstanding efficiency with Mobile Printing Units in the field,
and made extensive reconnaissance of printing plants, for supplies and
equipment. His work was meticulous and painstaking in every respect.
“3. Mr. Locke rendered a very substantial contribution to the suc-
cessful accomplishment of the Psychological Warfare mission of 12th Army
Group."
EUROPEAN-AFRICAN-MIDDLE EASTERN CAMPAIGN RIBBON
"Under the provisions of War Department Cable WARX 29101, 30
January 1945, the European-African-Middle Eastern campaign ribbon is
awarded, for outstanding and conspicuous service with the armed forces
under difficult and hazardous combat conditions during the period indi-
cated, to: William Locke, 14 June 1944 to 21 May 1945."
3 Among them were:
The late Kurt Lewin, Professor of Psychology, Director of Research
Center for Group Dynamics.
258
QED
Ronald Lippitt, Associate Professor of Psychology. Lippitt collaborated
in the development of a training program for OSS personnel who were
being sent to the Far East on intelligence or psychological warfare missions.
Karl Deutsch, Associate Professor of History. His activities are synop-
sized in the Certificate of Merit conferred upon him:
“During several crucial war years, while assigned to the Latin America
Division, Research and Analysis Branch, Mr. Deutsch distinguished himself
by the display of extreme competence, energies and zeal in undertaking
and bringing to highly successful completion several basic research projects
of vital and continuing significance to the Allied cause. In particular, Mr.
Deutsch organized and carried to impressive accomplishment the valuable
study of the pro-Axis press in Argentina, later used as part of the Argentine
dossier prepared for the American delegation at the Mexico City Confer-
ence in February 1945. The research standards established and maintained
by Mr. Deutsch contributed greatly to the uniformly high professional
morale within the Division.”
18
CONSULTANTS TO INDUSTRY
IN THIS CHAPTER we essay the most difficult task in this report,
that of relating the contribution of Technology's staff as con-
sultants to industry or to research projects away from the
Institute.1 The task is difficult because the assignments were
so diverse, because the contribution of a consultant is almost
inevitably part of a bigger picture which cannot be drawn in
these confines, because almost certainly many of the staff have
not reported this type of activity and the picture is therefore, at
best, a partial one.
The method of the chapter is, first, to draw some generali-
zations concerning the nature and scope of these consulting
activities, and then to amplify this picture somewhat by selected
anecdotal treatment of the work of some individuals.
Before the war the scientific staffs of the Institute were more
concerned for the most part with fundamental research than
they were with industrial connections. This was not true of the
engineering departments, which had several reasons for a dif-
ferent attitude. One of these reasons was the knowledge that
the product of their teaching would be so much a part of indus-
trial personnel; another was that most engineering research
tends to require at some stage larger physical facilities than any
educational institution can possess and so the engineering
teacher or research man may at some time arrange to finish his
job in the halls of industry; a third was the knowledge that the
teaching profited largely by close industrial contacts so that
teaching might not become “old hat." All these factors con-
joined to create a situation where before the war a substantial
number of M.I.T. staff members, especially in the engineering
departments, had built up important connections for the
259
260
QED
employment of their spare time in such fields as aircraft and
motor production, mining and metallurgical industries, ship
building, production of electrical power and equipment, and
the chemical industries.
Under normal circumstances, then, it might have been
expected that the staffs of the engineering departments would
have expanded their activities for the industrial producers and
that this would have been done largely on the industrial front;
while also, normally, the period of a war would have been too
UTM
mentals might have been expected to remain in their labora-
tories seeking knowledge which might be useful in the next
war but not in this.
But this was not a normal situation. It happened that funda-
mental research of the previous twenty-five years had progressed
to the point where a number of applications were implicit; to
the laymen these have smacked of the miraculous but to the
men who made the discoveries they were not so startling. To
be sure, they had not come so far that the development was
obvious or to be achieved by an artisan or by pushing a button;
the crisis required a vastly accelerated development if it was
to occur in time, and this required scientists. Scientists needed
to be diverted into the border fields between the seeded ones of
known scientific facts and the crop-bearing ones of known
engineering application; harvesting the crop in the border
land could not be entrusted completely to the engineer, if that
term may be used without inveighing any unfortunate distinc-
tion between scientists and engineers. Now to do this meant
that the scientists would have to forsake in considerable degree
their fundamental work, that we would have to live for a time
on our scientific fat. This is and always will be, no doubt, one
of the prices of war. It is not the least price. It should not be
forgotten, simply because some pragmatic by-products usually
ensue to titillate the fancy of the thoughtless.
The spectacular and important technological developments
of the war were, for both sides, and on the whole, in the domain
of physics and its applications. The losers had their jets and
CONSULTANTS TO INDUSTRY
261
their V-l's and 2's, their Schnörkels; the winners had several
extremely important advantages over these which will be men-
tioned shortly. Such an obvious spectacular application of
chemistry as gas was not used. Though there was much talk of
bacteriological warfare neither side suffered from this possibly
horrible weapon.
At least on the face of it, the big and winning applications
of new technology were radar, underwater sound, modern fire
control, rockets, operations analysis, the proximity fuse, the
new incendiary, the guided missile, and the atomic bomb. The
bomb has tended to overshadow everything else. It was not
needed to win the war. All these applications were applications
of physics or chemistry and most of them of physics.
Practical-minded physicists, mathematicians, and chemists
could be used in any of these jobs; the record shows that they
were. The engineers in the fields most closely related to these
developments could not escape being swept up in the mael-
strom. At M.I.T. this meant especially the chemical engineers
and the electrical engineers.
Of the rest, the economists, psychologists, and students of
business and engineering administration naturally found them-
selves on the production front, mostly with the government; the
naval architects were naturally called to shipyards which were
growing faster than trained management for them was avail-
able; the civil engineers naturally went to the field to build
bases; this left still available for consulting and in the very place
where they could be of most use, the aeronautical and mechani-
cal engineers, and the others who have been mentioned on pages
167–169 et seq. Thus the total picture of M.I.T., despite the
obvious dislocations which have appeared in this book, was
not abnormal, not too different from the picture for the nation.
It is revealing as well to look at the sample another way. No
less than fifteen different men consulted on various problems
which would affect the performance of aircraft, and this was
by far the largest group; seven worked whole or part time for
arsenals and other ordnance establishments to better guns or
munitions; five worked on problems of marine propulsion;
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.
LL
five on various problems of metals, supply, refining, or new
properties through new alloys. Three men went to the field to
seek new sources of materials which threatened to be made
scarce through blockade; two worked in the laboratory to synthe-
size materials similarly threatened. Two worked on chemical
warfare problems and two on new applications of light polar-
izers. Two built bases and a third was concerned with the
design of an Arabian refinery. One worked on new refractories,
one on gauges for measurement at high speed, and one on the
public health problems of a great port of embarkation.
No less than ten left the Institute to join the laboratories
of other universities under OSRD contracts.2 Of these, six were
concerned with subsurface warfare and problems of detection,
underwater ballistics, or offensive weapons. Four of them were
at Columbia University and two at Harvard University. One of
the six went on to the California Institute of Technology to
take an important part in the rocket work at that institution.
Of the other four, two worked on a problem of aviation medi-
cine at Wesleyan University and two on radar. These two were
joined by one from the underwater group and the three split
their time equally between the Bell Telephone Laboratories,
the Raytheon Corporation, and the Wave Propagation Group at
Columbia University.
This is perhaps enough of generalization from incomplete
data. In turning to specific examples it is well to emphasize
that the persons singled out for mention were chosen because
they illustrated something and not because their work was
necessarily any more important than that performed by others
not so mentioned.
Consider then first Robert R. Shrock, Associate Professor
of Geology. His was the role of modern explorer. After a period
of service for the WPB, during which he allocated quartz to
the manufacturers of oscillators for radar and radio, he joined
the geological staff of the Reynolds Metals Company where he
remained until 1 September 1945, when he returned to the
Institute. This staff, organized by Warren J. Mead, Professor of
Geology and Head of the Department, acting as Consultant to
CONSULTANTS TO INDUSTRY
263
the Reynolds Metals Company, and headed by Walter L. White-
head, Associate Professor of Geology, was commissioned to ex-
plore promising areas for new sources of aluminum ore; its work
can be broken into three phases. In the first, which took nearly a
year from mid-1943 to mid-1944, the explorations were wide-
spread over the Republic of Haiti, the Dominican Republic,
Puerto Rico, Cuba, and Mexico. They resulted in the discovery of
a relatively large deposit of ore in Haiti, and the government of
that republic subsequently granted the company a sixty-year con-
cession for the mining of the ore. In the second phase explora-
tions for bauxite were carried on first in Jamaica and later again
in Haiti. A number of ore bodies of probable commercial grade
were discovered in Jamaica and the second trip to Haiti un-
earthed appreciable reserves beyond the first discovery; in the
third phase the group made investigations of reported bauxite
deposits in southwest Washington and northwest Oregon.
Another of Technology's explorers had an equally interesting
time but was not so fortunate. Harold W. Fairbairn, Associate
Professor of Petrology, like Shrock, took his geologist's tools
to the field. His mission was undertaken at the time when the
tanker line was being heavily attacked along our eastern sea-
board and oil supplies were running short in the northern
United States. He was assigned to investigate the petroleum
possibilities on Anticosti Island, a low hundred-mile island
lying in the Gulf of St. Lawrence. The favorable east coast
location would have made this island ideal for petroleum
development in war had there been a good supply, and this
desideratum may have influenced the thinking of some who
were convinced it had a good oil potential. Fairbairn's explora-
tions showed that this was not the case.
James Holt, Professor of Mechanical Engineering, left his
usual concern with heat problems at the Institute to deal with
problems in the cold. He was attached to the joined firms of
Shreve, Lamb, and Harmon, architects of New York, and Fay,
Spofford, and Thorndike, engineers of Boston, as division
engineer to prepare plans and specifications for the construc-
tion of Army posts and airfields in Newfoundland, Canada,
264
QED
Labrador, and Greenland. Holt took charge of all such mechani-
cal engineering work connected with these projects as heating,
power plants, fuel oil and gasoline storage and dispensing,
cold storage plants, laundries, bakeries, and incinerators.
The roster of those concerned with far places cannot be
closed so quickly. Victor O. Homerberg, Professor of Physical
Metallurgy, worked with the Rock Island Arsenal to determine
the materials most suitable to use for pins and bushings in the
bogie suspensions of light and medium tanks destined for
combat in Tunisia. These materials, which had to operate
without lubrication, withstood the action of fine sand in the
African desert and, so far as is known, also operated without
failure on the coral of the Pacific, over the shingle of Normandy,
through the mud of Touraine and the Rhine. In making the
tests the tanks were driven over sand deserts, slag piles near
steel mills, and refuse dumps in the back yards of steel casting
companies.
The polarizing plastic, commercially labeled Polaroid, is
well known to those who wear goggles to cut down road glare
or to see the fish at the bottom of a pond. Many students of
graphics also know well the stereoscopic drawing of John T.
Rule, Professor of Drawing and Descriptive Geometry in charge
of the Section of Graphics. Before the war Rule had been
working with the staff of Polaroid Corporation on applications
whereby superimposed photographs could be viewed through
polarizing glasses, the glass for each eye being polarized in a
different sense with the result that a startling stereopicture was
possible without cumbersome apparatus. This device, known as
the Vectograph, set forth relief with amazing brilliance and was
useful for photointerpretation. At the beginning of the war
Rule joined the staff of the Polaroid Corporation to take
charge of the development of the Mark I Machine Gun Trainer
for the Navy, which was created at Polaroid. This training
device consisted of a machine gun which shot stereoscopic tracer
bullets at stereoscopic motion pictures of airplane attack flights,
and registered hits. The machines went into naval bases
CONSULTANTS TO INDUSTRY
265
throughout the country, to Hawaii, England, Guam, and other
outlying stations.
Parker Hamilton, Instructor in Mathematics, was also asso-
ciated with the Vectograph development. He spent nine months
of his time under the supervision of the Air Service Command
in the field as a technical representative; of these nine months,
eight were in New Guinea and the Solomons. Here Hamilton
had to locate those groups in various branches of the service
who could make good use of such equipment as mosaics, as
single pictures, or as projection slides; having located them, he
had to show them what could be done; having convinced them
of the usefulness of the device, he had to train the local service
laboratories so that they could make the pictures themselves.
At the beginning of the war Christian E. Grosser was Assistant
Professor of Mechanical Engineering. One of his jobs was at
Wesleyan University collaborating with Dr. Richard Wendt,
designing and supervising the erection and operation of a
special elevator used in the study of air sickness and sea
sickness.3
Arthur C. Ruge, then Assistant Professor of Engineering
Seismology, is best known to most friends of the Institute for
his model shaking table. Long before the war, however, he had
collaborated with the late A. V. de Forest, Professor of Mechani-
cal Engineering, in the invention and development of various
wire strain gauges for the measurement of dynamic conditions.
These gauges proved so important in the study of many types
of military and naval equipment, especially aircraft, that he
took leave in order to spend all his time consulting on applica-
tions of the gauges.
Henry E. Rossell, Professor of Naval Construction, Emeritus,
was called away on a very different mission. He went to Phila-
delphia to become President and General Manager of a newly
organized but important shipbuilding group, the Cramp Ship-
building Company. This unit was devoted almost exclusively
to the production of naval vessels and especially of cruisers and
submarines. Vice President of the Company in charge of Engi-
266
QED
neering was Garland Fulton, '17, and the Vice President in
charge of Production was Karl D. Fernstrom, who in 1940 was
Professor of Business Management at Technology.
A still different activity of importance, though not usually so
in war, was that of Joseph H. Keenan, Professor of Mechanical
Engineering. Keenan, like many of his colleagues, had a variety
of industrial consulting assignments; he directed research proj-
ects at the Institute. Nonetheless he found time to collaborate
with Joseph Kaye, Assistant Professor of Mechanical Engineer-
ing, in a book, Thermodynamic Properties of Air, which pro-
vided for the ready computation of processes for air and gases.
The tables of this book were extensively used in design and
engineering work related to gas turbines, jet propulsion ma-
chinery, and internal combustion engines. They were so im-
portant for war activities that an abbreviated form was made
available in 1943 prior to the publication of the whole by
John Wiley and Sons in June, 1945. A second book, which
also influenced war research, was Microwave Transmission,
prepared by John C. Slater, Professor of Physics, in charge of
the Department. This book, published by McGraw-Hill Book
Company in 1942, set forth the fundamental principles of
microwaves primarily for the benefit of those on the staffs of
Radiation Laboratory and other institutions concerned with
wartime radar development.
A team of five4 worked with John M. Lessells, Associate
Professor of Mechanical Engineering, in an important consult-
ing capacity for the British. Beginning in October, 1939, the
production of aircraft forgings for England was begun in the
United States. They were chiefly crankshaft and airscrew hub
forgings for Rolls-Royce, Limited, involving the introduction
in this country of a new steel developed in Britain. The Lessells
group drew up the material specifications and inspection pro-
cedures in collaboration with representatives of the steel mill
and drop forging companies, and when the British Air Com-
mission was established in Washington these procedures were
adopted by them.
When the supply of ball and roller bearing for aircraft
CONSULTANTS TO INDUSTRY
267
engines became a serious problem, sources of supply were found
in this country and inspection procedures again developed.
Under these arrangements large quantities of such bearings
were supplied to Britain. As consultant to Rolls-Royce, Limited,
Lessells then guided the Packard Motor Company in the selec-
tion of suitable American materials for the production of the
Rolls-Royce Merlin engine.
Regarding the production of aircraft forgings in this country,
it was soon realized that much heavier hammer equipment
would be required to maintain production schedules. Consult-
ing advice was given by the Lessells group in the design and
maintenance problems connected with the larger type of
hammer which was developed. Later on, as a natural denoue-
ment, Lessells became a consultant to the British Ministry of
Supply and U.S. Ordnance Departments on tank engines and
parts. Based on the investigations by his group carried out at the
Ford Motor Company and at the Institute, the groundwork
was laid for the adoption of forged crankshafts rather than the
previous cast type on the Ford eight-cylinder tank engine.
Murray P. Horwood, Professor of Sanitary Science, had a very
different assignment. For four critical years he was consultant
to the Boston Health Department when Boston was an impor-
tant and swollen port of embarkation and debarkation. Here
he gave an extended course of training to the large staff of
sanitary and food inspectors, made a sanitary survey of all eat-
ing and drinking establishments, and inaugurated a system for
the regular laboratory examination of samples from eating and
drinking utensils to determine sterility; he investigated the
public water supply, problems of sewer pollution and refuse
disposal, the delousing facilities in the port and the sanitation
at food processing plants, and developed programs for com-
bating rodents and vermin.5
Of those who went to OSRD laboratories away from M.I.T.
the careers of Professors Slichter and Horton may be taken as
examples. Much of Slichter's work has been discussed previ-
ously.6 Beginning in 1944 his previous distinguished work in
the field of antisubmarine measures led Division 3 to request
13
268
QED
1
that his group transfer to the Underwater Ballistics Program at
the California Institute of Technology. This program was con-
cerned chiefly with the water entry of aircraft torpedoes, a
problem which then had very high priority in the Bureau of
Ordnance. The program included study of the water entry,
ricochet, and underwater behavior of bombs, rockets, torpedoes,
and other underwater projectiles. Full-scale testing of aircraft
torpedoes had been provided for by a special launching range
on Morris Dam Lake, designed and operated by a group under
Dr. F. C. Lindvall. The primary immediate function of the
Morris Dam group had been testing of performance character-
istics of underwater bombs and projectiles. Preliminary mode!
studies of underwater ballistics had also been made. Under
Slichter the group became especially active in the development
of model study techniques and in the study of the complex
similitude relationships which exist in any dynamic problem
where two such different media as air and water are involved.
The group with which Professor Slichter was associated made
a very spectacular improvement in aerial torpedoes. By simply
attaching a ring to the tail, at the ends of the fins, that standard
aerial torpedo was transformed from an uncertain weapon
which was dangerous to use to a very effective one. The standard
torpedo had to be launched from a very limited height and at
a very limited speed. If launched at a higher altitude or at
greater speeds the impact on the water would wreck the torpedo.
The ring made it possible to launch the same torpedo from
heights four times as great and at speeds up to twice as many
miles per hour with a very great improvement in the percentage
of hot runs. The beauty of the development was that the ring-
tail could be readily added to torpedoes in stock. This was a
beautiful example of a small change to an existing piece of
equipment which made all the difference in the world.
J. Warren Horton, Associate Professor of Electrical Com-
munications, was also drawn into the underwater campaign
but over a different route. As Lieutenant Commander in the
U.S. Naval Reserve he was deferred from active duty by the
Secretary of the Navy in order that he might serve as a civilian
0
CONSULTANTS TO INDUSTRY
269
S
scientist at the Underwater Sound Laboratory. This laboratory
at New London was operated by Columbia University under
NDRC and OSRD contracts. Horton was assigned the technical
direction of development groups who were devising new under-
water sound instruments and techniques for use against the
German submarines. In 1943 the scope of the laboratory was
broadened to cover subsurface warfare generally. From that
time on, Horton's responsibilities as Assistant Director of the
Underwater Sound Laboratory were in connection with under-
water sound devices to be used by our own submarines when
they were on the prowl. Horton had two turns of foreign duty,
one in 1943 when he served for a time as technical liaison for
the laboratory in the United Kingdom, dealing mostly, of
course, with the Admiralty; and in 1944 he was attached to the
staff of the Commander of Submarines, Pacific Fleet, at Pearl
Harbor, to study the operational requirements of underwater
sound equipment for submarines on the attack. He has now
returned to M.I.T. and is writing a textbook, The Fundamentals
of Sonar, at the request of the Navy.?
We have dipped our seine and brought up a variegated catch;
we have seen professors tramping the mountains of Haiti in
search of bauxite, scouting the isles of the St. Lawrence for oil,
designing cold-storage plants for the edge of Greenland's icecap,
contriving bogies to stand against the drifting sands of Tunisia,
sweating in the Solomons to bring new stereo techniques to
the forces there; designing machines to simulate air sickness, and
gauges to measure strain in propellers rotating at high speed;
directing the operations of a new and important shipbuilding
company. We have observed them writing books, which is a
conventional enough professorial activity to be sure. We have
seen them as consultants to British Air Missions and the British
Ministry of Supply, protecting our embarking troops from the
insanitary hazards of a great port and taking leading roles in the
study of undersea warfare, both offensive and defensive.
It is enough to speed us on our way to the end of this story;
the least dramatic, but not by any means the least significant
role, was played by those who saw their colleagues fly in droves
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QED
to adventure and who, with diminished manpower occasioned
by this flight, and faced with the largest shotgun educational
program ever undertaken at Technology, remained at the
Institute to carry on the important campaign of the home front.
FOOTNOTES
1 Other than work for the Manhattan District which has been dealt
with in Chapter 14.
2 Exclusive of those who went to Manhattan District. See Chapter 14.
3 He was joined in this project by Leopold R. Michel, then Instructor
in Mechanical Engineering, now on the research staff of Polaroid Cor-
poration.
4 Peter E. Kyle, then Associate Professor of Mechanical Engineering,
William M. Murray, Associate Professor of Mechanical Engineering, Edward
L. Bartholomew, Jr., Assistant Professor of Mechanical Metallurgy, the late
Frederick R. Evans, Assistant Professor of Mechanical Metallurgy, and
G. S. Cherniak, a graduate student.
5 While M.I.T. was being used as a training center for large units in the
A.S.T.P. and V-12 programs of the Army and Navy, Horwood was respon-
sible for the sanitary supervision of the Walker Memorial and Graduate
House Dining Services. Here the level of sanitary achievement attained
was so high as to preclude the possibility of epidemic diseases arising to
the detriment of the war training program.
Horwood also served as consultant in bacteriology and sanitation to the
Atlantic Gelatin Company of Woburn, Massachusetts, a subsidiary of
General Foods Corporation, and aided in the sanitary production of a
valuable food substance as well as a product employed extensively in
photography. He served also as a member of a special committee inter-
ested in studying the possibility of using gelatin as a blood serum sub-
stitute in the treatment of shock resulting from wounds.
6 See pages 49–51.
7 There were, of course, many more. Among them, including some cited
elsewhere in the text, were:
Beers, Roland F., quondam Research Associate in Geology; consulting
geophysicist for the U.S. Geological Survey.
Boyan, Edwin A., Assistant Professor of Business Management; member
staff Wallace Clark and Company, advisers to French purchasing
commission; prepared Handbook of War Production for McGraw-Hill
Book Company; attached to Office of Chief Signal Officer as adviser
on operating procedure.
Breger, Irving A., now Research Assistant in Geology; inspector of
powder and explosives, War Department; Chemist, Koppers United
Company and Publicker Commercial Alcohol Company.
CONSULTANTS TO INDUSTRY
271
Campbell, William L., now Professor of Food Technology in charge of
Department; Consultant to Michigan Tool Company, Quincy Pump
Company, Los Angeles Ship and Drydock Company, and York Safe
and Lock Company.
Chertow, Bernard, now Assistant Professor of Chemical Engineering; Cli-
matic Research Laboratories of U.S. Army Quartermaster Corps on
clothing for fighting in cold, damp climates.
Cohen, Morris, Professor of Physical Metallurgy; Consultant for
Millers Falls Company and the Titanium Alloy Manufacturing
Company.
Davis, Tenney L., Professor of Organic Chemistry, Emeritus, Director
of Research and Development, National Fireworks, Inc.
Floe, Carl F., Associate Professor of Physical Metallurgy; Consultant to
Gorham Manufacturing Company, Nitralloy Corporation, and Pratt
and Whitney Aircraft Corporation.
Freeman, Harold A., Associate Professor of Statistics; Consultant to
Kendall Company.
Gibb, Thomas R. P., Jr., Assistant Professor of Chemistry; consulting
Director of the Analytical Laboratory for Metal Hydrides, Inc.
Hall, William M., then Assistant Professor of Electrical Communica-
tions; Engineering Staff of Raytheon Manufacturing Company,
Waltham, Massachusetts, particularly the SG radar.
Hersey, Mayo D., Research Associate in Mechanical Engineering; Con-
sultant to Westinghouse Research Laboratories and Jackson and
Moreland.
Homerberg, Victor O., Professor of Physical Metallurgy; Consultant
to Wright Aeronautical Corporation, Pratt and Whitney Aircraft,
Allison Division of General Motors Corporation, Studebaker Cor-
poration, Dodge-Chrysler plant at the Chicago Airport.
Howes, Victor E., Instructor in Graphics, Harvard Underwater Sound
Laboratory, and later the Systems Research Laboratory also at Har-
vard; received Naval Ordnance Development Award.
Hrones, John A., Associate Professor of Mechanical Engineering; Con-
sultant to Chrysler Corporation.
Keenan, Joseph H., Professor of Mechanical Engineering; Consultant
to General Machinery Corporation, United Aircraft Corporation, and
United Shoe Machinery Corporation.
Keyes, Raymond E., quondam Instructor in Naval Architecture; Engineer
for Kaiser Company, Inc., Richmond Shipyard No. 3, later marine
engineer for George G. Sharp, naval architect of New York.
Levinson, Norman, Associate Professor of Mathematics; research mathe-
matician in the Applied Mathematics Group at Harvard University
and later technical representative of the same.
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QED
Lewis, Frank M., Professor of Marine Engineering; Consultant to
General Motors Corporation, General Machinery Corporation, regard-
ing vibration problems.
MacGregor, Charles W., Professor of Applied Mechanics; Consultant to
Watertown Arsenal, to A. D. Little, Inc., and the Clifford Manufac-
turing Company.
Marvin, George G., Associate Professor of Analytical Chemistry; Con-
sultant for T. J. Edwards Company, Inc.
McBride, Guy T., Jr., Research Associate in Chemical Engineering;
Assistant Engineer, Engineering Department, Standard Oil Company
of California, concerned with the engineering designs for the Saudi
Arabia Refinery.
Pekeris, Chaim L., Research Associate in Geology, absent; Chairman of
Columbia University Wave Propagation Group, Analysis Section.
Robertson, Walter W., Assistant Professor of Ship Construction; Con-
sultant Naval Architect to Cramp Shipbuilding Company and Bethle-
hem Shipbuilding Company.
Shapiro, Ascher H., Associate Professor of Mechanical Engineering;
Consultant to United Aircraft Corporation.
Shrock, Robert R., Associate Professor of Geology; Geological Staff of
Reynolds Metals Company.
Sloane, Alvin, Associate Professor of Applied Mechanics; Consultant to
Pratt and Whitney Aircraft.
Soderberg, C. Richard, Professor of Mechanical Engineering; Con-
sultant to Columbia University Division of War Research (Naval
Ordnance Development Award); Consultant to United Aircraft
Corporation and to Elliott Company.
Taylor, C. Fayette, Professor of Automotive Engineering; Consultant
to Lawrence Aeronautical Corporation and to Matériel Division,
USAAF, Wright Field.
Taylor, Edward S., Professor of Aircraft Engines; Consultant to Wright
Aeronautical Corporation, to Scott and Williams, and to Baldwin
Locomotive Works.
Wiener, Norbert, Professor of Mathematics; operational research at the
Columbia University Laboratory; helped devise a new method for
computing air flow about the head of ogival projectiles for the Navy.
Part V
THE HOME FRONT
19
TEACHING IN THE WAR YEARS
WORLD WAR II laid an especially heavy hand on youth; more
than in any previous conflict the young men of America found
themselves called upon to serve, and to serve for the most part
in uniform. The almost universal aspect of conscription natu-
rally had far-reaching effects upon application for admission,
registration, speed-up of education, curriculum, and the com-
position of the student body. Each of these effects is worth
examining. Back of them all, however, were the vagaries of
Selective Service policy, and some consideration of these is an
appropriate way to start this analysis. 1
That the student body in a university would, by virtue of its
age, be especially vulnerable to conscription is self-evident.
The extent of the vulnerability may perhaps not be appre-
ciated. It was dramatically revealed by a table presented by
Registrar Joseph C. MacKinnon in his annual report for
1940-41, published in October, 1941. The analysis showed
that 44 per cent of the entire student body was twenty-one
years of age or over and hence required to register under the
Selective Service Act of October 16, 1940; 96 per cent of all
graduate students, 67 per cent of the seniors, and 28 per cent of
the juniors were in this category. At that time, of course, the
vulnerability was potential rather than real. The draft had
made no perceptible inroads either on applications for admis-
sion or on the number in the student body, however much its
implications may have caused concern and uncertainty to the
individual student. This was because, as of October, 1941, local
draft board policy was generally to grant deferment to men
undergoing technical training, and, moreover, the provisions
of the act itself provided an automatic status of I-D for a student,
275
276
QED
.
with deferment to the end of the academic year. Beyond that
it was indicated that a further II-A deferment would be allotted
to students in some of the fields of instruction offered at Tech-
nology. This made it necessary for the Institute to undertake
the job of assisting its students in their requests for deferment.
The policy adopted was that such assistance would be rendered
if the student were preparing for work in an essential occupa-
tion, if he were in high standing at the Institute, and if he
showed promise of making a significant contribution to the
national welfare in a civilian capacity. An office was established
to provide this assistance and was in the first instance under the
direction of Henry B. Kane.2
The intimations for the future were not reassuring, and
several administrative officers pointed fingers at what was likely
to happen; but for the moment this finger pointing was
prophecy and no more. Then the Japanese assault on Pearl
Harbor set the national machinery in high gear. Less than two
weeks after the attack, the announcement was made at an
Institute Convocations that the program for the graduating
class of 1942 would be speeded up "with some curtailment of
non-professional subjects, to permit graduation on April 27"
instead of in June. Slightly more than three weeks later the
Faculty voted for the war period:
1. To have the first-term program for seniors begin in June
immediately following their completion of junior work with a
consequent graduation the following February.
2. To request undergraduates other than seniors to obtain
employment which would contribute to the war effort if they did
not go to summer school and to require them to submit a report
of what their summer work had been when they met their regis-
tration officers in the fall.
3. To make a special effort to accommodate freshmen beyond the
stabilized number of 600 so long as there were increased numbers
of applicants with superior qualifications and so long as good
performance was possible with available staff and laboratory space.
4. To continue the existing practice of permitting qualified
students to anticipate subjects or take advanced standing examina-
tions in subjects in which they had not been enrolled, thus expedit-
ing their completion of graduation requirements.
TEACHING IN THE WAR YEARS
277
The public announcement of this new policy recognized that
it might be temporary but for the moment at any rate the Insti-
tute felt that “this program is preferable for such an institution
as M.I.T. to the more extreme speed-ups which are being
adopted for sound reasons in other types of institutions, par-
ticularly liberal arts colleges.”
Through the remainder of 1941–42 students continued to be
helped in their applications for deferment. By May, 1942, how-
ever, Selective Service Requirements had been so amended that
a student might not be considered for deferment until he had
practically completed the second academic year of his college
work. Under these circumstances Dr. Compton announced at a
Convocation of May, 1942, that the Institute had agreed to par-
ticipate in the new Enlisted Reserve Corps plan of the Army,
that John J. Rowlands, Director of News Service, would succeed
Kane as special adviser on deferments, and that the late John D.
Mitsch, Associate Professor of Civil Engineering, would act as
adviser to students on the various reserve plans of the armed
services.
By another year, the situation had become so complex, so
uncertain, and so generally difficult that Harold E. Lobdell,
then Dean of Students, allotted a substantial section of his
annual report for 1942–43 to the problems raised by various
developments.
At the opening of the fall term of September 28, 1942, a
physically qualified undergraduate had two ways in which he
might remain at his studies:
1. He might obtain occupational deferment if he had practically
completed two years of college work.
2. He might join the Enlisted Reserve Corps plan of the Army
which at that time proposed to provide for insuring a future
source of college graduates as officer candidates for the Navy
and Marine Corps as well as for the Army.
The freshman and the sophomore had, of course, only the
second of these alternatives. Moreover, he had to exercise the
choice before 31 December 1942 regardless of his age or when
he might become eligible for conscription. This might not
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occur until he was well along in his second or even his third
year. Furthermore, he was warned that enlistment in the
Reserve might not keep him in school at all regardless of the
field he was studying and regardless of his proficiency in the
field. For example, on 8 September 1942, a statement was issued
from the Office of the Secretary of War which said:
The exigencies of the war have now become such that it is now
expected that, by the end of the college term or semester beginning
in September, those student members of the Reserves who have
reached Selective Service age will all, or for the most part, be called
to active duty, and those reaching that age during subsequent
terms will similarly be called....
If true, this would of course destroy the utility of the Enlisted
Reserve and a student might better simply remain at his studies
until conscripted under Selective Service. Ten days later, there-
fore, on 18 September, the Secretary issued a second statement
in which he deplored the fact that his previous statement
had been misinterpreted “in some quarters to mean the end
of all higher education for the duration of the war," and he
continued:
The Army is greatly in need of men of specialized training, par-
ticularly physics, chemistry, engineering and medicine. We are
equally interested in having adequate numbers of men of such
training available to war production industries and the civilian
research agencies of the government. Plans are now being worked
out for the method of training for those inducted into the Army,
but in any event it is hoped that the colleges will maintain their
training of students in engineering and medicine and other sciences.
In some cases, it will be necessary to expand this training....
This second statement clearly suggested that some method
would be worked out whereby engineering students, at least
those in high standing, might continue their studies and thereby
constitute a true reserve not only for the uniformed services
but also for replacements in industry. But through this fall of
1942 it became embarrassingly clear that any estimate of the
TEACHING IN THE WAR YEARS
279
future based on current information was foreordained to be
contradicted by counterinformation soon to be forthcoming.
On 5 December 1942 President Roosevelt, by Executive
Order, transferred the Selective Service system to the War
Manpower Commission and barred voluntary enlistment in
the Army or Navy, regular or reserve, to all men between
18 and 38; another part of the order enjoined upon the WMC
the responsibility for “insuring the efficient utilization of the
nation's educational facilities and personnel for the effective
prosecution of the war.”
A week later the Secretaries of War and Navy, with the
approval of the Chairman of WMC, issued a joint statement
which laid forth their plans for future use of the colleges. This
statement prescribed the establishment of the Army Specialized
Training Program (ASTP) and set forth a schedule of dates
upon which members of the Enlisted Reserve Corps and of the
Navy's reserve programs would be called to active duty. This
schedule retained most Naval reservists at M.I.T. on inactive
status until June, 1943, and did the same for juniors and seniors
in the ERC; but it required that sophomores and freshmen in
the ERC be called to active duty in February, 1943. This
affected the education of 533 students at M.I.T., not all of
whom had been impelled by age considerations to join the
ERC.
Here the Navy took the longer view as was so often the case
in matters of education during the war. But that was not all.
Navy reservists at M.I.T. would for the most part continue
their regular studies at M.I.T. without interruption. Army
reservists, with the single exception of those assigned to training
in meteorology, would leave M.I.T. for thirteen weeks of basic
military training required of men who had been inducted into
the Army through Selective Service. After the reservists had com-
pleted this training they might apply to be ordered to some
college or university as members of an ASTP unit. But it was not
guaranteed that they would return to the institution whence
they had been drawn, nor was it clear that they would return at
TI
280
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i
all inasmuch as personnel for ASTP units would be selected by
"screening procedures administered by the Army which would
also specify the content of instruction for each unit.4
Two days later Selective Service regulations were again
amended to permit a request for occupational deferment to be
entered at the end of a man's freshman year. Under this new
ruling many sophomores who had not enrolled in any reserve
might now be deferred to continue study while 289 of their
classmates who had enlisted in the ERC would be called to
active duty in February. Six weeks later, and only four days
before the zero day, the Army postponed calling up ERC sopho-
mores who were “pursuing approved technical engineering sub-
jects” from February, 1943, to June of the same year.
Meanwhile, early in January, 1943, it had become apparent
to the Faculty that conditions implicit in the Army and Navy
plans could be met only by revising the Institute calendar to
provide for year-around operation. The Navy expected to
specify terms of the same length as those at M.I.T., that is,
fifteen weeks for instruction and one of examination. The Army
insisted that for its ASTP units the term be twelve weeks. Since
no Navy units were likely to be established before summer, and
in the hope that the terms at least for civilian and Navy students
could be synchronized, the Faculty voted in January to adopt
for the year 1943–44 a new program of three consecutive terms
of sixteen weeks each, becoming effective for civilian students
in June, 1943, when the first of the three terms under the new
plan would open; and to admit the next freshman class in that
June.
ERC sophomores had by belated ruling been given a period
of grace to June, 1943, but not so the freshmen. On 25 February
the various service commands began ordering M.I.T. freshmen
in the ERC to active duty; the ink was scarcely dry on these
orders before Selective Service amended its regulations again
to provide occupational deferment for students in most M.I.T.
courses provided that “if he continues his progress he will
graduate from such course of study on, or before July 1, 1945."
Under the accelerated calendar even freshmen of the Class of
TEACHING IN THE WAR YEARS
281
1946 would be due to graduate at the end of the spring term of
1945, so again those who had enlisted in the ERC received a
bad break.
Classes for the first ASTP unit at M.I.T. began April 5.5 Two
days later 237 juniors and 5 seniors who were members of
Advanced ROTC and of ERC were ordered to Fort Devens to
be placed on active duty on 11 April. They were returned to
the Institute the next day to resume their regular academic
programs which they continued until the end of the term.
The summer term for civilians began on 28 June, and on
1 July the Institute's first Navy V-12 unit was established in
the Graduate House with a complement of 910, all under-
graduates. This complement included 249 Naval Reservists who
had been civilian students at Technology in 1942-43, 238
entering freshmen selected by the Navy as a result of its coun-
trywide V-12 examinations, and 423 Naval Reservists from
other colleges and universities where no V-12 unit was to be
established. 6
Despite these violent shiftings and the ensuing uncertainties,
the total number of civilian undergraduate registration was
very little affected up to the end of the fall term in January,
1943. There were, of course, changes in composition, and espe-
cially in age, which will be discussed subsequently. Beginning
in January, 1943, however, the civilian undergraduate regis-
tration began to decline sharply and during the academic year
1943–44 fell to one-third the prewar average. During this
period (though not later) the numbers of trainees, cadets, and
officers of the military and naval services kept the total under-
graduate registration well above normal, although the fluctua-
tions were sometimes rapid and violent.
Meanwhile, the machinery of Selective Service continued to
clash its gears. When the academic year 1943–44 opened, Selec-
tive Service age had for 8 months been lowered to 18, but the
regulations still provided that competent students in most
M.I.T. courses could be certified provided that if they contin-
ued their progress they would graduate within 24 months of
the date of certification. Under the Institute speed-up calendar
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all undergraduates were immediately eligible for certification
except the freshmen who had just been admitted in June, 1943,
and they, often under 18 at that moment, would become eligible
6 months later.
However, on 11 December 1943, President Roosevelt trans-
ferred Selective Service authority back from the Chairman of
WMC to Major General Lewis B. Hershey as Director of
Selective Service. It took General Hershey four weeks to pre-
pare an announcement released on 9 January 1944 that all
occupational deferments in effect 1 February for registrants in
the 18 to 22 age group? would be allowed to expire and would
not be renewed. Student deferments would be limited there-
after by reduction in the number of specialized fields of study
which were deferable and by the fixing of a national quota of
10,000 students who might be occupationally deferred in addi-
tion to those who would be graduated on or before 1 July 1944.
Hitherto, affidavits requesting deferments had been forwarded
directly to the Local Board concerned. Now they had to be
sent, accompanied by a certified transcript of the student's
record, to the National Roster of Scientific and Specialized
Personnel of the WMC. If approved by the Roster, the indi-
vidual's papers were then returned to M.I.T., which was to
transmit them to the Local Board; the board still had veto
power.
Late in January, 1944, the Institute also furnished to the
Roster data on the civilian undergraduates of the ages 18 to 22
so that the Roster might determine how to allot the country-
wide quota of 10,000 engineering, physics, chemistry, geology,
and geophysics students. At the same time a census was made
of the Selective Service status of all undergraduates for later
use by the Faculty Committee which would have to nominate
men for Technology's institutional quota after it had been
established.
On 3 February this quota was set at 128. The first set of nomi-
nations was forwarded to the Roster within ten days, and the
students concerned were notified that their names had been
TEACHING IN THE WAR YEARS
283
submitted. In due course all nominations were approved by the
Roster and returned for transmission to the Local Boards.
Meanwhile some students who had been nominated had
become discouraged and had applied directly to their Local
Boards for voluntary induction; the institutional quotas were
modified and the new M.I.T. quota was set at 137 with all the
paper work to do over. During March it became clear that
... the quota system was an unhappy compromise between the
immediate pressing military demands for more and more “younger"
physically fit recruits and the equally prudent, but less immediately
pressing, demands for training replacements for war industry and
research, and for the technical branches of the uniformed services.
The quite natural resistance to any "exceptions” on the part of
Selective Service as administered by Army authority, and the belief
in many quarters that the war could be successfully ended before
deferred students would have graduated and become actively
helpful, were telling arguments against any continuing student-
deferment plan. Moreover, the necessary smallness of the institu-
tional quotas produced inevitable administrative and emotional
complications on campuses. For these and probably other reasons,
the abortive quota system was abolished on April 8.8
Henceforth no educational institution could request occu-
pational deferment for any physically qualified student except
for those registered in certain professional courses who would
graduate before 1 July 1944. After that date the only students
eligible for deferment were those holding classifications 1-A (L)
or 4-F. The door had been shut on civilian technical training
for the duration of the war, and had the war lasted longer,
the consequences might have been bitter to the nation in the
years to come. As it was, the period in which this was in effect
was short; its importance rests in a warning to generations to
come.
The general confusion and difficulty the fluctuating rules
imposed upon the administration which had to work under
them will be apparent to anyone who has contemplated the
foregoing résumé; their effect upon the individual exposed
284
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to them is harder to calculate. Before turning to a discussion
of the changed teaching program which resulted, it will be
worth while to examine their effect on applications for admis-
sion and upon registration both in the undergraduate and
graduate student bodies.
ADMISSIONS
For several years after the adoption of the stabilization plan
in 1935, which limited admissions to the freshman class to a
round number of 575 to 600, applications for admission to this
class had steadily, if slowly, increased. For example, in 1940
applications reached a new high of 1705, an increase of 5 per
cent over the previous year. In the subsequent years the figures
were:
1941
1942
1844
2080 (First year in which stabilized quota for fresh-
men was increased by faculty action as a war
measure. Admissions climbed from 647 to 731.)
2059
1705 (Civilian)
2024
1943
1944
1945
1
It will thus be noted that only in one year, 1944, was there
a serious decline in the number of applications and that
immediately after hitting this nadir, which was exactly the
same as the figure for 1940, applications continued their up-
ward climb.
There was, however, a significant shrinkage in 1943 between
the number who were notified that they would be admitted and
the number who actually registered when the time came. In the
previous year 850-odd candidates were notified that they would
be admitted and 730-odd registered. This was a characteristic
shrinkage. In 1943, on the other hand, out of about 920 who
were scheduled to be admitted only 580 appeared to register.
This exceptionally heavy shrinkage was due to the operations
of Selective Service and the fact that a considerable number of
accepted civilian applicants were subsequently selected by the
TEACHING IN THE WAR YEARS
285
Navy for assignment to V-12 Navy college training units at
M.I.T. or elsewhere.
In the next year, when the low point in applications was
reached, there were two freshman classes entering at different
times, for the first time since World War I.
More important than the numerical changes, which were not
great, was the age of the entering group. In the class which
entered in 1942, 38 per cent had reached 18 by 1 July; for the
1943 class, the corresponding figure was 14 per cent; for 1944,
11 per cent. These figures measure the absolute difference in
age composition among the three groups; this difference was
accentuated by the earlier date of entrance provided by the
speed-up. Thus of the 1942 class, the last to enter in September,
55 per cent had reached 18 by their date of entrance; in 1943-44,
on the other hand, only about one-tenth of the class was as old
as 18 on entrance.
After the slight decline, demobilized veterans began to
return, and by the middle af 1945 the flood was on. Intimations
of this flood were to be found even in the report for the low
year of 1943–44. In his report of October, 1944, the Director
of Admissions, B. Alden Thresher, could write:
eas mavithout int with a policy
The number of inquiries from men in the armed forces, as well
as from relatives on their behalf, regarding post-war admission, has
grown rapidly and continues to increase. To meet this situation an
explanatory statement has been prepared, together with a special
post-war preliminary application. Both are on air-weight paper
suitable for overseas mailing, and the application is designed to be
filled out in the field without reference to records. This makes it
possible to provide the applicant with a rough evaluation of his
status, as a guide for future action. The policy of the Admissions
Office has been (1) to provide assistance and information wherever
possible, but (2) to defer any final action on post-war applications
until such time as they can be expressed in terms of definite
numbers and for specified dates of entrance.
By 1944-45, then, the war crisis had passed for the Admissions
Office. It had not been much of a crisis. It was to be succeeded
286
QED
by a real one, that of the postwar. Immediately following the
end of the war in August, correspondence and interviews soared
to unprecedented proportions. These astronomical figures are,
however, not a part of M.I.T.'s war history even though the
problems they propose are directly a result of the war and the
arrested education of millions of young Americans.
If freshman admissions suffered no very dramatic changes
civilian registration as a whole. The saving factor in the admis-
sions situation was that freshmen might still have a few months
of grace which they could employ in college in furtherance of
their educational ambitions. The same alternative was not, of
course, open to upperclassmen, some of whose difficulties have
already been hinted at. How these difficulties were manifest in
registration figures has been summarized from the successive
annual reports of the Registrar.9
These reports show nothing spectacular until well along in
the war. Total registration had expanded steadily in the years
of the war, from a total of some 2,500 in 1934 to a total of 3,100
in 1939. Graduate registration had increased a little more
rapidly than undergraduate (from 500 to 700 for the former;
2,000 to 2,400 for the latter).
Until 1942, moreover, the total figures did not change much.
Undergraduate registration fluctuated around 2,400, while the
graduate student body continued to grow until it hit a peak of
759 in 1940–41. In the following year the number declined to
679, and this decline would have been still more marked had
the figure not included some hundred special graduate students
in meteorology.
In the year 1942–43, however, the break began. Registration
that year started at 2,452 undergraduates and 596 graduates
(only 455 if the special meteorology students are not counted).
Of this total of 3,048, all but the 141 meteorology students were
civilians. That was in the fall of 1942–43. For the remainder of
that academic year the total registration actually showed an
increase in numbers but its composition changed materially.
TIT
TEACHING IN THE WAR YEARS
287
A
Finally, in the year 1944, the total numbers, held up heretofore
by special Army and Navy programs, began to drop with the
discontinuation of those programs. The changes were so strik-
ing over this period that it is best to display them by a table
which incidentally will give some clue as well to the change in
composition of the student body:
REGISTRATION AT M.I.T. IN VARIOUS TERMS
Civilian Military Total
Winter 1942 2,907
141 3,048
Spring 1943 2,210 559 2,769
Summer 1943 1,579 2,016 3,585
Winter 1943 1,470 2,159 3,629
Spring 1944 1,165 1,175 2,340
Summer 1944 1,271
2,243
Winter 1944 1,198 861 2,059
Spring 1945
1,173
699 1,872
Summer 1945 1,538 430 1,968
972
With the fall term of 1945, returning GI's began to swell the
registration so that the upward trend had begun which by 1947
had brought the Institute registration to the greatest in its
history (5,662). Moreover, the composition was now so largely
civilian as to make a distinction between civilian and military
students meaningless.
Thus, on a purely statistical basis the number of students at
the Institute was seriously depleted over a period of only some
five terms towards the end of the war; but on a composition
basis the depletion was much greater. Since not all the service
training programs were calculated to produce fully trained
scientists and engineers, the actual cost to the nation as meas-
ured by a deficit in trained personnel was much greater than
would appear from a cursory examination of these figures.
Nor was the change in composition to be measured only by
the proportions of civilian and military students. At the same
time the average age of the students was declining. Previous
comments have shown how that decline applied to freshmen.
For the Institute as a whole it was magnified by the change in
1
288
QED
the proportions of the various classes in which the younger
classes grew and the older classes shrunk. Thus:
603
534
MEN IN EACH CLASS
First Term 1942 (November) Summer Term 1943
Freshmen
727
937
Sophomores
886
Juniors
600
Seniors
522
881
Graduates
455
357
Graduate School registration suffered more severely still.
After reaching a peak of 764 in 1940–41, it began a precipitous
deciine to 679, to 596, to 357, and finally to 349 in the final
year of the war. But even this cut, to less than one-half the
registration of 1940-41, fails to tell the whole story so far as
American nationals is concerned. In the prewar years foreign
students had averaged about 80 in the graduate school and
were usually distributed among some twenty-five nations. By
the end of the war, on the other hand, the preponderance of the
registration in the Graduate School was measured by students
from a handful of countries, notably Latin and South America,
China, India, and other Far Eastern countries.
The effect of all these changes in registration on the service
the Institute was able to render in the field of advanced educa-
tion was well summarized by the Registrar in his annual report
for 1944–45. Here he exposed the deficiency in the number of
students who had completed work satisfactory for a degree,
which is perhaps the best measure of the extent to which men
are trained and ready for national service. MacKinnon said:
The total three-year deficiency in output as compared with the
preceding ten-year average is 238 S.B. degrees, or about 52 per cent
of one year's output; 146 S.M. degrees, or 72 per cent of one year's
output; and 59 Doctor's degrees, or 107 per cent. The decline in the
number of degrees awarded in the middle of the previous decade
and the decline in registration in the early part of that decade seem
to indicate that if corrections for trends were made, the decrease
in degrees awarded during the prewar depression would be practi-
cally the same as during this three-year war period under an
accelerated program.
TEACHING IN THE WAR YEARS
289
The situation at the Institute, however, was not typical of
American institutions. The Institute was the only engineering
school which had well-established courses in all the fields of science
and engineering desired by the Navy; consequently our Navy V-12
program was a regular four-year professional training and thereby
increased the number of Bachelor's degrees. Our real deficiency in
trained United States citizens for advanced degrees was much larger
than indicated by the figures, as a great proportion of graduate
students were from foreign countries.
The foreign student situation previously alluded to had in
it the germs of real difficulty. A collegiate institution cannot
admit a man either as an undergraduate or graduate unless it
intends to let him finish his work so long as his performance is
satisfactory. There was therefore a great risk lest “the foreign
groups now seeking entrance, if admitted in accordance with
the liberal policies which have hitherto prevailed with us, may
not pre-empt places which should be reserved for others, par-
ticularly for those who at present are fighting the war."10
The magnitude of the problem was well revealed by the
1944–45 report of Paul M. Chalmers, Associate Professor of
English and Assistant Director of Admissions. This called atten-
tion to the fact that whereas the average attendance of foreign
students in the years 1920–39 had been 156 and the registration
of March, 1945, was 302, applications in April of 1945 were
667 and in September, 1945, were 907. The distribution of
these applications was also significant.
Registration Registration Applications
Average March, April, September,
1920–39 1945 1945 1945
India
271
China
36
Other Far East
12
Near East
147
Latin America
Central and
Southern Europe
Western Europe
Northern Europe
British Empire
Total 156
31
95
153
224
82
Goooo
X
290
QED
Accordingly, in January, 1945, the President, acting upon a
recommendation of the Administrative Council, requested the
Committee on Stabilization of Enrollment to "review the
broad problem of foreign student quotas for the purpose of
formulating a basic policy for the Institute, including the dis-
tribution of foreign students, both graduate and undergraduate,
within the Institute, criteria to govern their selection for
admission, and any other matters which may seem pertinent
to the Committee."
The Committee found "that the search for a solution raises
many difficult questions of principle ...” and reported “at
some length in order that the whole matter may be thoroughly
reviewed, and all the relevant considerations brought before
the Faculty.” Its recommendations were:
1. That beginning immediately, admission of foreign students
be subject to close control, to the end that the total number enrolled
shall not exceed 300.
2. That a division of this total shall be 170 for the Graduate
School and 130 undergraduates, subject to reconsideration by the
Faculty on recommendation of the Committee.
3. That the Admissions Office and the Dean of the Graduate
School shall share responsibility for maintaining a reasonable
balance among countries of origin, to the end that no one geo-
graphical area shall pre-empt an excessive share.
4. That the qualifications of foreign students be scrutinized with
particular care, to insure that so far as possible only those of high
promise shall be accepted.
In offering these recommendations, which were unanimously
endorsed by the Faculty Council on 26 March before receiving
unanimous approval of the Faculty itself on 18 April, the
Committee recognized that “insofar as they are quantitative,
they cannot be defended on the strict ground that they follow
logically and inevitably from any available data. They repre-
sent rather a considered judgment, based on a general estimate
of conditions in the next few years, and taking into account
past experience so far as this seems relevant. They are in part
arbitrary in the sense that we cannot prove that a higher or
TEACHING IN THE WAR YEARS
291
lower figure would be wrong. They represent, nevertheless, in
our unanimous collective judgment, the best working com-
promise now attainable.”
These, then, were the ways in which the drain on manpower
conditioned admissions, registration, and the student body at
the Institute during the war years and to some extent into the
peace as well. This is all that needs to be said about the size and
composition of that body. It remains to explore the ways in
which the things the students were taught differed from those
which their predecessors had been taught before the war.
For the regular student who managed to remain at the
Institute the changes were remarkably slight. He lived, of
course, in an atmosphere of war and of personal uncertainty.
He saw his fellows departing on very short notice and in accord-
ance with no readily discernible policy. He might have to
move from a dormitory in the middle of the night to accommo-
date an expected Army unit which then did not arrive. He
suffered, of course, as any student must, from taking the work
too fast with no time to let his mind lie fallow. But so far as
composition of courses, size of sections, and caliber of instruc-
tion were concerned, he was given a regular Institute diet.
Except for advanced electives which might require the presence
of a specific faculty member, the Institute offered a full curricu-
lum with, of course, fewer sections in each subject. Even the
electives were not too seriously reduced because so many of the
teaching staff were away from the Institute only a part of their
time. The staff which taught the subjects was by and large the
same staff, at least in the undergraduate courses, and this was
because the greater drain came on the research and not on the
teaching staff. The Institute had relatively little occasion to
bring in groups of untried outside instructors while its own men
were out in other fields. There were occasional exceptions to
this, of course. For example, in the summer of 1943, it was
suddenly found necessary to increase the number of sections in
mathematics from about 60 to more than 90 to take care of
increased demands, including 900 Navy V-12 students. In such
cases outside help had to be sought. But on the whole a man
AT
292
QED
who remained at the Institute in the war years got a regular
Institute education.
Of course, as time went on there were fewer students who
were able to take the regular course and more of the whole
Institute program was directed to other kinds of teaching. In
any list these appear complicated and confusing, but considered
as broad efforts they are not so complicated. There were, in
fact, six phases to the teaching work at the Institute during the
war years, over and above the standard curriculum for the reg-
ular civilian students. Before considering them each in detail, it
may be well to take an overall look for orientation.
The first of these programs was initiated by the Institute
itself. This was a program in meteorology begun in 1940 and
growing into a fairly extensive program under Army and Navy
contract. It never passed through the stage of being a part of the
Engineering Defense Training Program because it was regarded
by the government as “science” and not engineering
The second set of programs began as a part of the national
program of Engineering Defense Training. The courses offered
by various institutions for this and its successor programs varied
widely in their quality; many, including several at the Institute,
were out-of-hours programs conducted by the staff of the insti-
tution and not always on the institution's own grounds. So far
as M.I.T.'s part in this program was concerned, it was essentially
all at serious collegiate level; from it grew several curricula of
great importance, operating under Army or Navy contract or
under contract with both services.
As the pressure of these EDT programs for rapid training in
the beginning of the crisis was relieved, they were replaced by
Army and Navy programs intended to take care of educating
had its own program for this work, and the two programs had
little in common. Those institutions which had only one or the
other of the programs presumably had less difficulty than one
like M.I.T. which had to take care of both. The first of these
programs, the Army Specialized Training Program (ASTP),
began at the Institute in the spring of 1943. The Navy V-12 pro-
TEACHING IN THE WAR YEARS
293
gram began with the arrival of one of the largest Navy V-12
units at M.I.T. in July, 1943, to the tune of 900 students. While
the ASTP and V-12 programs were expanding, the civilian
students were being depleted by the draft. The two movements
canceled each other for some time, however, and registration
remained at an approximate level of 3,000 or higher until the
spring of 1944, when the service programs began to retrench.
The ASTP began to close down in March of 1944, and the
Navy program, which was always intended to produce a fully
educated man, followed suit more than a year later in July,
1945. By the time this latter reduction began to be seriously felt,
the Institute was already feeling the surge of the demobilized
veteran and was facing no problem of scarcity but rather one
of surfeit.
In addition to the programs which have been laid down in
the broad outline just given, there were, of course, numerous
special lectures, summer courses, colloquia conferences, special
training groups in war research laboratories, all of which were
colored by the fact that the nation was at war.11 In a book of
this sort any attempt to recapitulate them would but lead to
confusion, and a good enough idea can be obtained of the
nature of M.I.T.'s war pedagogical activities if we look with a
somewhat closer eye at the programs in meteorology, in EDT,
and for the ASTP and the V-12 groups.
METEOROLOGY
The course in advanced meteorology for war purposes had
small enough beginnings. In his annual report for 1939–40,
Dr. Compton called attention to this, beginning in the follow-
ing words:
Weather forecasting is an essential feature of modern warfare.
For a number of years we have been giving postgraduate training
in meteorology to young men sent to us by the Army, Navy and
Weather Bureau. This summer a special intensive course was given
to recruits for the meteorological service of the Army Air Corps,
and during the current year (i.e., 1940-41) we will have another
group of approximately sixty special postgraduate students in this
294
LED
subject, mostly from the Army Air Corps and the Weather Bureau.
With these additions we have had a threefold increase in the
number of graduate students studying meteorology.
The first summer course was a free course, and for some time
the Institute continued to offer this curriculum on a voluntary
basis and without an official sponsor specifically contracting for
the work. The students for the special ten-weeks' summer course
of 1940 and the one-year course in meteorology given by the
Army Air Force in 1940-41 were selected with the aid of the
Admissions Office. The expected 60 students for the academic
year 1940–41 became 98; the Department of Meteorology
was created as a new departmental entity under the direc-
tion of Sverre Petterssen, who came to his M.I.T. post from
Vervarslinga Pa Vestlandet (Weather Service of Western
Norway), of which he had been chief.12
In his first report, Petterssen remarked that the regular
meteorology courses had begun in July, 1941, instead of the
more usual September and would end on 7 February 1942, thus
accelerating the training of meteorologists for defense; that
enrollment had jumped from 98 to 117; and a special six-weeks'
course had also been given on the application of meteorology to
field artillery problems.
This was success in a dramatic way, but it brought its prob-
lems. The immediate importance of the subject caused the
staff to make an extensive review of the curriculum. Based on
the findings, the course was considerably revised and new sub-
jects introduced to meet the new needs. Thus the new subjects,
long-range weather forecasting, descriptive meteorology, aero-
nautical meteorology, and climatology were introduced; many
old subjects were adjusted, including synoptic meteorology,
dynamic meteorology, and meteorological instruments. The
expansion of the training program had made it necessary to
provide texts for various subjects, and staff members therefore
published books on synoptic meteorology and dynamic meteor-
ology and issued mimeographed texts in a number of other
subjects.
TEACHING IN THE WAR YEARS
295
This rapid expansion called forth the following additional
comment from Dr. Compton in his presidential report for
1940-41:
1
Last summer a special intensive course in meteorology was given
to recruits for the Army Air Corps, and during the past academic
year another group of approximately sixty postgraduate students
came for training for the Army Air Corps and the United States
Weather Bureau. This course is now being repeated for a consid-
erably enlarged group.
This work in meteorology provides a striking example of the
mounting demand for men in highly specialized fields. For about
ten years our meteorological course was a pioneer in this country
in application and new development of scientific methods to
meteorological art. There were enthusiasm in the staff, an impor-
tant research program, but very few students and large per capita
cost. The justification of the expense was frequently questioned.
But now the investment justifies itself. In 1939–40 our full-time
postgraduate enrollment in meteorology totalled thirty, in 1940–41,
ninety-eight and in 1941-42, one hundred seventeen. During the
interval essentially similar courses have been established at Cali-
fornia Institute of Technology, New York University and University
of Chicago, and the new methods have been adopted by the United
States Weather Bureau.
With February, 1942, a new period began. The curricu-
lum had been revised, textbooks provided, and the armed
services were more interested than ever. Beginning in that
month, the Institute offered an advanced course in meteorology,
Meteorology “A,” under contract with the Army Air Forces.
This course offered a new and larger training program for the
production of weather officers. It involved an extension of the
training program to eight and one-half months following a
conference in Washington between representatives of the five
universities cooperating in the program, the armed services,
and the Weather Bureau. The course was divided into three
terms of approximately three months each, the time assigned to
most courses increased, new courses were added in oceanography
and physics of the atmosphere. The training in weather map
analysis and forecasting was revised and extended. Particular
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emphasis was placed on the analysis of Northern Hemisphere
charts and on forecasting on the basis of local data alone.
The first Air Force cadre was graduated from the new cur-
riculum on 1 December 1942; it was followed by two further
groups, each taking the nine-month course and when the last
group graduated on 5 June 1944, 699 Air Force officers had been
commissioned as a result of their training in one of these three
sessions.
At the same time similar courses were offered to the available
civilians; the demand for civilian meteorologists had been
greatly increased by the war and many of the needs were as
important to the war effort as the work of weather officers in
the armed services. Because of the great preponderance of gov-
ernment, service or Weather Bureau students, civilian students
in general followed the same schedule and took the same sub-
jects as the government students although certain advanced
subjects were also offered.
Finally the Navy also joined in this program under contract,
with essentially the same curriculum, and when the last of its
groups was graduated in February, 1945, the total of Navy
personnel given this advanced training was 148, including
63 Waves.
In addition to the advanced course in Meteorology “A,” the
Department gave one course under contract with the War
Department in premeteorology. This involved the instruction
of 242 trainees of the Army Air Forces to prepare them to
become aviation cadets and so to undertake Class A Meteor-
ology. On September 18, 1943, 198 of the group who had entered
in March were graduated and the work terminated.
Evidently the Air Force group was by far the largest which
received meteorological education at the Institute during the
war. This group, made up of students in both Classes A and B,
formed the 3515th AAF Base Unit under command of Major
J. F. Ratliff, Sr., Air Corps. The detachment established its
own medical facilities at the Institute and all cadets received
individual commutation allowances for quarters and subsistence
which were furnished them in the undergraduate dormitories
TEACHING TY
297
IN THE WAR YEARS
.
and by the Walker Memorial dining service. They were paid
a high compliment by an administrative officer of M.I.T. who
said: “The Air Force meteorology program was well officered
and well run. Except for marching to classes and singing as
they marched, you would not have known that they were on the
campus.”
With the end of the AAF program in June, 1944, and the
Navy program in February, 1945, affairs began to resume a
more normal status in the Meteorology Department although
it was unlikely it would ever be so small again as it had been
before the war. Two classes of Navy V-12 students were still
receiving training in meteorology. One would finish in Feb-
ruary, 1946, the other in October, 1946. The indications at
the end of the war were that some of the men who took one of
the war training courses in meteorology would return for
advanced training and degrees, a task which it would be possible
to undertake without hesitation since the quality and scope of
instruction during the war had not been allowed to deteriorate.
1
EDT (LATER CALLED ESMWT)
As in the case of meteorology, the Institute administration
was forehanded in its approach to engineering defense training.
Before Congress had begun to finance a formal program of this
sort under the United States Office of Education, Dr. Compton
could report in his annual summary of 1939–40:
While governmental agencies this summer have sponsored a vast
program of technical, vocational, and apprentice training at sub-
collegiate levels, and while they were working to set up an intensive
program at the engineering school level, we took time by the fore-
lock and carried through a ten weeks' intensive course to train
junior aeronautical engineers. Fifty-one graduates in civil, mechani-
cal and other engineering fields from engineering schools in north-
eastern United States were accepted for this course, without tuition,
and even before finishing the work practically all of them had been
engaged for employment by aircraft manufacturing concerns. The
success of this demonstration has led to repeated requests by these
companies that the course be repeated and that similar courses be
offered in other fields, such as airplane engines. Obviously we
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no
cannot continue to give such courses without some provision to
defray our out-of-pocket costs of instruction, and arrangements for
financing these important special courses are impending. Congress,
for example, recently appropriated $9,000,000 for financing short
intensive courses in engineering schools.
The 9 million dollars referred to was provided by the First
Supplemental Functions Appropriation, October, 1941. It was
designed to meet the shortage of engineers with specialized
training in fields essential to the national defense. The respon-
sibility of administration rested with the United States Commis-
sioner of Education. He was expected to buy the training for
“cost,” and “cost” was intended to mean the amount an
institution spent in providing the course over and above the
expenditure involved in maintaining the rest of its program.
It could include salaries, travel, instructional material, supplies,
reference books, maintenance and repair of equipment, and a
maximum of 20 per cent of the allotment to an institution for
the purchase or rental of equipment or the leasing of space for
carrying out its approved plan.
For some institutions the plan was a life-saver; and some
perhaps lowered their standards to take advantage of the only
fiscal rescue which was apparent in a world where regular
students were disappearing; for others the cost of the program
never constituted a large part of the budget, there was no occa-
sion to reduce standards in any way, and the institution did
what it could in the face of other and more urgent obligations.
M.I.T. was in the last category. Nonetheless, since the national
program was large, M.I.T.'s part was not trivial.
For administration of the act the United States was divided
into twenty-two districts. Each district had an adviser, and for
Northern New England this post was occupied by Dean More-
land until shortly before he went to Washington in June of
1942. In order to supervise the work at M.I.T., to represent it in
formulating programs which would be of maximum service to
government and industry, the President appointed a Committee
on Special Training Programs for National Defense with
Raymond D. Douglass, Professor of Mathematics, as Chairman
TEACHING IN THE WAR YEARS
299
and A. L. Townsend, Associate Professor of Mechanical En-
gineering, as Secretary. 13
This committee was responsible throughout the program for
proposing suitable courses, for selecting teaching and supervi-
sory personnel, for recruiting and selecting trainees, for expend-
ing funds, and for keeping records and accounts. An office
known as the Engineering Defense Bureau was opened at the
Institute and the publicity for the six engineering schools in
the Boston area was handled from this office.
So far as the Institute was concerned, 27 courses were offered
in this first year of training between 3 February and the end of
the summer of 1941. Thirteen of them were full-time courses, 2
part-time courses, 12 evening courses; 929 men were trained,
of whom 314 were Army or Navy officers and 213 civil servants.
The requirements for admission were generally speaking high,
requiring an engineering degree for many of the courses,
although two programs were designed for arts and science
college graduates and one for high school graduates.
Three courses in Aeronautical Engineering, two in Aircraft
Engines, and one in Naval Architecture were for Naval officers
detailed to M.I.T. for special instruction; one course in Naval
Architecture and one in Marine Engineering were requested by
the Civil Service Commission. Ultrahigh Frequency was given
on request of the Army and the Navy, and Ordnance Inspection
was given in cooperation with the Ordnance Department at the
Watertown Arsenal; a night course in Naval Architecture was
offered at Quincy for the convenience of properly qualified
men at the Bethlehem Steel Company. Other courses were given
in Engineering Fundamentals, Materials of Engineering, Intro-
duction to Engineering Drawing, Textiles, Chemistry of
Powder and Explosives, Applications of Metallography, Ap-
plied Mathematics, Exterior Ballistics, Instrumentation and
Vibration Measurement, and Vibrations and Their Application.
With very few exceptions, all this instruction was carried
by members of the regular M.I.T. staff in addition to their
regular working load. Of the 94 instructors participating, 81
were on the M.I.T. staff at the beginning of the program.
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On 1 July 1941, Congress replaced the EDT with the En-
gineering Science and Management Defense Training Program
(ESMDT). This program provided an appropriation of
$17,500,000 for short courses of college grade in engineering
subjects, chemistry, physics, and production supervision. In
July, 1942, this program in turn was replaced by the Engineer-
ing, Science and Management War Training Program
(ESMWT) with an annual appropriation of $30,000,000.
The previous EDT program at the Institute moved forward
under these new appropriations with no essential change in
purpose. During the year 1941-42, 46 courses were given and
1,727 students received certificates indicating that they had
satisfactorily concluded courses of study of 4 to 16 weeks, either
full- or part-time. The longest and most serious courses at the
Institute under this program continued to be in various aspects
of Naval Architecture, Aircraft Engines, and Aeronautical
Engineering for Naval Officers, and Ultrahigh Frequency Tech-
niques for officers of both services. The latter program included
a teachers' training course to which 40 engineering schools
were invited to send a member of their staffs. In addition to
these major courses, full-time courses were given for Civil
Service employees in Naval Architecture, and for civilians de-
tailed to M.I.T. by the Bureau of Ordnance of the Navy for
programs in degaussing; 22 part-time courses were offered to
civilians who were in war work, of which 18 were given on
In 1942–43 the program was curtailed somewhat at the In-
stitute because of excessive pressure on the staff, classrooms,
and laboratories. Nonetheless, 58 courses 14 were offered – each
only after request by the Army, the Navy, the Civil Service, or
industry. Sixty members of the instructing staff participated,
together with 46 instructors from outside the Institute. The
enrollment increased to 4,144, or more than double that of the
previous year. This increase was due almost entirely to the
expansion of programs designed to give special training to
Army and Navy personnel, and this despite the fact that the
courses in Aeronautics and Aircraft Engines for Naval officers
TEACHING IN THE WAR YEARS
301
previously carried under ESMWT were not under separate con-
tract. Army and Navy personnel in the various courses had
increased from 680 to 2,827.
By 1943–44 the program was reaching the end of its course;
21 courses were offered to an enrollment of 679. The subject
matter had changed notably and included such courses as Work
Simplification, Mass Production Methods, Fire Protection
Engineering, Statistical Methods for Experimentalists, and Sta-
tistical Methods for Inspection. In the four years in which the
Committee had steered this venture, it could report that 156
courses had been given to 7,635 registrants, of whom about
4,000 were from the services and 3,600 were civilians.
Moreover, these courses had had some important offshoots.
The courses in Ultrahigh Frequency, for example, had gone
on to bę courses in Radar and had led to the large Radar School
which has been described earlier in Chapter 15. The courses
in Naval Architecture, by cooperation with the Navy Yard and
the Civil Service, had trained many men for the Construction
Corps of the Navy, men whose procurement and placement
were cared for by the Navy. The courses in Aeronautical En-
gineering and Aircraft Engines had proved so attractive to the
Navy that a special contract had been entered into between
the Navy and M.I.T., whereby four groups of officers, totaling
330, had received twelve weeks of instruction in those fields
beginning in February, 1943.
THE SERVICE PROGRAMS
Each of the two services set out in its own way to give some
of its youth an advanced education after they were in uniform
and to provide this through the medium of the colleges and
universities of the nation. The Navy program was called V-12,
the Army's known as ASTP.
Relatively few institutions were called upon to serve both
programs. M.I.T. was one of those which was; it had a chance
to observe both; and the experience as already publicly re-
counted in various annual reports is worth summarizing for
any lessons which may be gleaned.
1.
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The V-12
The Navy program was in every respect serious and stead-
fast. It was prepared in Washington by Naval officers and
civilians who respected the knowledge and experience of
trained educators; the group paid deference to the academic
viewpoint and contrived, in times of great stress, to provide a
decent average engineering program of education, one for
which a college or university degree could be awarded without
cynicism. It made every effort to take account of the problems
on the campus. It studied term lengths and classroom hours.
The underlying philosophy which had so much to do with how
things went was expressed by Vice Admiral Randall P. Jacobs,
Chief of Naval Personnel, who said that its purpose was “to give
prospective Naval officers the benefits of college education in
those areas most needed by the Navy. We desire, in so far as
possible, to preserve the normal pattern of college life. . . . We
are contracting not merely for class-room, dormitory, and mess-
hall space and for a stipulated amount of instruction, but for the
highest teaching skill, the best judgment, and the soundest ad-
ministration of which colleges are capable.”
The integration of the Navy V-12 program with M.I.T.'s
teaching schedules and practices was therefore more complete
than for any other service program, and through the effective
and wholehearted cooperation of the commanding officer, the
late Captain Charles S. Joyce, USN (Ret.), then Senior Naval
Officer at M.I.T., and his staff, with M.I.T.'s Faculty and Ad-
ministrative officers, the entire V-12 program went forward in
a well-organized manner. V-12 students will in general have
little difficulty in picking up advanced education at exactly the
point where they may have left off.
The Army ASTP policy, if it could be discerned at all, was
that of establishing a storage reservoir at the colleges which
could be drawn on at any time regardless of program and re-
gardless of training. The men selected were not uniformly of
high grade; the programs of instruction stipulated by the Army
were often impossible and occasionally ridiculous. The prime
TEACHING IN THE WAR YEARS
303
S
example perhaps was a requirement for men to take in the same
term qualitative chemistry, quantitative chemistry, physical
chemistry, and industrial chemistry. Men seemed to be moved
to and from the campuses capriciously; the term of twelve weeks
was out of phase with the Institute trimester system though
perhaps keyed to the quarter plan of other institutions. Even
in the latter case there seemed to be little effort to cause the
ASTP terms to coincide with the starting and stopping dates
of the established university terms.
Perhaps the difference in the two programs as they were
conducted at M.I.T. is epitomized by the provisions for study.
The Army students lived in dormitories which were operated
as barracks; the first requirement was so many hours of drill
and physical training, usually at the beginning of the day, so
that the student was tired by the time he came to class; regular
taps hours were enforced and lights were then out in study
halls so that it is not a canard to say that ASTP students re-
paired to the toilets after taps to prepare their class work for
the next day. The Navy, on the other hand, provided proper
study rooms which could be occupied within reason until the
boy's work was done.
It is fitting to close this estimate of the merits of the ASTP
and V-12 programs with a fairly long quotation from the
Annual Report, 1943–44, of the then Dean of Students, Harold
E, Lobdell:
1
ASTP
On March 1, 1943, the Institute received notification from the
War Department to prepare to receive an Army Specialized Train-
ing Program unit of 500 soldiers, who would begin classes on March
15. But, ... , the ASTP experienced considerable delay in selecting
properly qualified personnel during its early stages. Thus instruc-
tion actually began for 330 trainees on April 5 in “Advanced
Engineering” (Civil, Mechanical, Electrical, and Chemical), but
of this number nearly a third had to be academically disqualified
before the end of the term. The curricula of the ASTP were laid
down rigidly by the Army authorities in cycles of 12 weeks, but
because of the starting confusion permission was granted for the
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first cycle at the Institute to be extended to 13 weeks, i.e., from
April 5 to July 3.
For the second cycle (July 12–October 2), the Army's "screening"
procedures operated more effectively, and replacements brought the
size of our unit to 401, or 80 per cent of the strength originally
contemplated. For the third cycle (October 11-December 31), 560
trainees were registered for Advanced Engineering and 141 for
"Basic" studies at the freshman level - a total of 701. Marine
transportation was added to the four Advanced Engineering fields
noted above for 25 trainees in the third cycle only. For the fourth,
and last, cycle (January 10–March 31), reductions took place: to
439 for Advanced Engineering and 91 for Basic – a total of 530.
Press comment in December indicated that the continuance of
the ASTP was debatable, but on the thirteenth the War Depart-
ment denied that it was "in process of liquidation. The number of
soldiers in the program will depend in the future, as in the past,
on the actual needs of the Arms and Services.” During January,
however, the House Committee on Military Affairs had under
serious consideration a recommendation against continuing the
ASTP, except for "engineers and men for military government
operations abroad.” Congressional interest was directed, it was
reported, in order "to save an estimated 200,000 pre-war fathers
from military induction.”
In view of the current state of public opinion, the 200-odd par-
ticipating educational institutions were prepared for some shrink-
ages, but not for the War Department's decision of February 18
which meant a virtual abandonment of the program. “The increased
tempo of offensive operations, together with the mounting casualties
demanding immediate replacements in the field,” the War Depart-
ment statement read, “have created a situation which has necessi-
tated drastic economies in the employment of personnel throughout
the United States and a decision to reduce the soldiers in colleges
in the program will be primarily those trainees taking advanced
courses in medicine and dentistry, or engineering, and include
5,000 pre-induction students.” In commenting, the Secretary of War
stated: “This decision has been made for reasons of imperative
military necessity. I desire at this time to express my conviction of
the great value that this training has been to the Army and to
express my appreciation of the devoted and intelligent cooperation
of the colleges and their faculties, who have done so much to make
the program a success.”

A.S.T.P. and V-12 students at M.I.T. during the War.
TEACHING IN THE WAR YEARS
305
The severity of the curtailment, as well as its sudden application,
and the fact that nearly a month was to elapse before the War
Department made known in mid-March which particular local units
would be discontinued, were especially disturbing to the colleges.
On many campuses the prospective loss of an ASTP unit meant
being threatened with very real financial and other operating
readjustments. Although the Institute had one of the two larger
groups of Advanced Engineering trainees in the First Service Com-
mand, we immediately undertook to formulate plans for shifting
assignments of instructing personnel, which would become obliga-
tory if the War Department eventually determined to drop us from
the list - an outcome which seemed not unlikely in view of our
parallel training commitments to the Army Air Corps and to the
Navy.
On March 14 we received formal notification that our unit would
be discontinued on March 31, at the end of the then current cycle.
By April 1 we were fortunate in being able to reassign all members
of the Faculty and instructing staff previously engaged in teaching
ASTP to other duties (with the sole exception of one physical
training instructor who had been employed solely for the ASTP)
and to make other arrangements which relieved the Government
of considerable expense otherwise accruing under the “90 days
notice" clause in the termination article of its contract.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
At one time or another, 920 individual AST trainees were in
attendance as shown below, 391 (42%) being here less than the
equivalent of one M.I.T. semester, 248 (27%) longer than one
semester but less than two, and 281 (31%) the equivalent of at
least one normal academic year, viz.:
Basic
Total
109
Advanced
Engineering
For four cycles 109
For three cycles 172
For two cycles 174
For one cycle
219
Less than one cycle
793
172
248
40
119
. 13
127
259
132
920
At this writing one is still too close to the event with its academic
and administrative operating tensions - of which there were many
– to appraise impartially the merits of the ASTP at Technology. In
all our other service units, such as the V-12 and those of the Army
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Air Forces, a trainee or cadet had commissioned status as an ulti-
mate goal. But the objectives of the ASTP were seldom stated except
in broad, and often vague, generalities. On our campus, therefore,
the ASTP suffered in the minds of staff and students by contrast
since it was not an “officer" program, but even more so because
graduation from the ASTP held out no specified promise of non-
commissioned advancement, nor of any assignment to duties which
would enable the Army and the soldier to capitalize upon his
achievement in the ASTP.
Despite these circumstances, morale seemed surprisingly good on
the whole and no doubt many of the 181 men who completed
Advanced Engineering curricula, as well as some of the 607 others
who attended at least one full cycle of the ASTP at the Institute,
will seek further engineering education here or elsewhere in the
post-war period.
• . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
In mid-April, 1943, 267 members of the Advanced ROTC were
placed on active duty at Fort Devens but permitted to return to the
Institute and continue with their regular academic programs during
the balance of the spring term. Some were thus able to complete
graduation requirements by June, but the majority were third-year
students of the Class of 1944. These latter presumably could all
graduate by February, 1944, if allowed to continue under the Insti-
tute's year-round plan of operation which became effective June 28.
But, instead, all 267 were ordered to report during June at replace-
ment training centers of their respective service branches for basic
military training, in order that they might afterward be rushed to
Officer Candidate Schools to fulfill anticipated demands for more
commissioned personnel in the lower grades.
Hardly had they begun basic military training, however, than a
press release of the War Department, issued July 21, stated that
"reduced quotas for the Officer Candidate Schools in connection
with a slowing up of the officer training program have made possible
a modification of the original plan of training ROTC students
called to active duty. It is now possible to permit this group to be
returned to school for academic training designed to increase their
value as future officers.” Therefore, upon completion of basic mili-
tary training, “they will be returned to college under the super-
vision of the Army Specialized Training Division, pending the
availability of vacancies in the Officer Candidate Schools. ... Ulti-
mately, all advanced ROTC students will be assigned to Officer
Candidate Schools to complete their officer training."
TEACHING IN THE WAR YEARS
307
The last sentence of the press release was contradicted the follow-
ing day by a War Department memorandum (No. W145-16-43)
which indicated that ROTC students “at replacement training
centers who are not recommended for attendance at Officer Candi-
date School because of their unsatisfactory training or leadership
record or other reason will lose their ROTC status and will com-
plete their training ... as other non-ROTC trainees at replacement
centers.” Later this ruling was successfully protested on the ground
that the agreement entered into by a student joining the Advanced
ROTC was equally binding on the Government, and obligated the
Army to give him the opportunity of attending Officer Candidate
School. It was also pointed out, in connection with the protest, that
deficiencies found in "leadership records” seemed quantitatively
excessive.
Since the duration of basic military training varied for the dif-
ferent branches, it was clear that returning ROTC men would not
report upon any common date. Furthermore, since their stay would
depend upon the "availability of vacancies” in their respective
Officer Candidate Schools, the voluminous and complex directive
issued by the AST Division to prescribe detailed curricula mani-
festly served no useful purpose in so far as our situation was con-
cerned. Under a compromise reached with the First Service Com-
mand, the Institute Faculty obtained discretionary control over the
academic arrangements of the returning ROTC, and every endeavor
was made to adapt our schedules so that a man might, in so far as
practicable, carry on with the Course in which his registration had
been interrupted the preceding June.
The first contingent, a group of 80, resumed instruction on
October 11, and the last to depart, a group of 18, were ordered away
170 days later, on March 31. The average number under instruction
throughout this period was 137.4.
By the end of October, the attendance reached 200, and it con-
tinued at 200 or more throughout November and December, attain-
ing a maximum of 223 on December 17, 18 and 19. During the first
three weeks of January a few less than 150 were present, but addi-
tional late arrivals brought the total to 206 on the thirty-first. On
February 1, however, departures reduced the strength below 150,
by the tenth it fell below 100, and by the end of the month below
50. From March 1 on, 20 or less remained.
Of the 230 individual ROTC men who reported, 204 were among
the group who had left the Institute the previous June, while 26
had been members of the Advanced ROTC at three other schools.
Of the 204 former M.I.T. Advanced ROTC who returned, 14 were
308
QED
allowed to stay long enough to be able to satisfy degree require-
ments before being ordered to Officer Candidate School.
· · · ·
· · · · · · · · ·
V-12
On July 1, 1943, the Navy V-12 program became operative in 131
American colleges and universities with 77,000 student trainees
selected from secondary schools and colleges, and from the fleet
and shore establishments of the Navy. Its "mission” was that of
meeting the Navy's calculated mounting demands for officers for
active duty in the different branches, viz., deck, aviation, engineer,
engineer specialist, supply corps, chaplain corps, aerology specialist,
physics major, medical corps, dental corps, and reserves for the
Marine Corps and Coast Guard.
Students under instruction in the V-12 program have the status
and pay of apprentice seamen in the Navy, and are furnished tui-
tion, uniforms, housing, food and medical services. ...
The Institute was designated as one of the schools to participate
in parts of this program for which we were especially qualified by
reason of faculty and facilities, and our V-12 unit, which is housed
and messed in the Graduate House, was established July 1, 1943,
with an initial complement of 910 undergraduates as follows:
(a) Former V-1 and V-7 naval reservists who had been
civilian students at the Institute during 1942–43, and who
continued for 1943–44 in the regular M.I.T. curricula of
their respective professional Courses .................... 249
(6) Former V-1 and V-7 naval reservists who had been
civilian students during 1942–43 at other colleges and uni-
versities at which V-12 units were not established. Among
these were 62 men designated as pre-medical or pre-dental
students. The remaining 351 transfers, men interested in
engineering or scientific studies, were placed for 1943–44 in
the Institute's regular curricula after a careful evaluation
of each individual's academic credits ................... 423
(c) Entering V-12 freshmen, selected by the Navy as a
result of its country-wide V-12 examination held April 2,
1943. These students followed a “Basic” curriculum pre-
scribed by the Navy in its V-12 Bulletin, No. 101 ........
910
At the close of the spring term of March, 1944, one academic
year had been completed and the “fully-prescribed” (second year)
curricula became effective for trainees of group (c) above. During
238
TEACHING IN THE WAR YEARS
309
the spring term these men were "screened" for upper-level special-
ties in engineering in accordance with the Navy Regulations. The
Bureau of Naval Personnel had requested the Institute to give the
fully-prescribed curricula (set forth in Bulletin 101) for Mechanical
Engineering, Electrical Engineering (Power and Communications),
Aerology, Naval Architecture and Marine Engineering, Aeronauti-
cal Engines and Aeronautical Structures, and, on March 6, 1944,
198 trainees were assigned to take work in these fields.
The V-12 freshmen who entered in July, 1943, contained many
men of high promise and accomplishment, and since the content
of the Navy's "fully-prescribed” curricula in the upper-level special-
ties paralled the make-up of the Institute's undergraduate Courses
in these fields, the Faculty voted on January 19, 1944:
"That the schedules listed in Navy V-12 Bulletin 101, with such
minor changes as may be approved by the Committee and the Com-
manding Officer, be accepted by the Faculty as adequate for S.B.
degree in Courses I, II, VI, VIII, XIII, and XVI with respect to the
following students only; those now in attendance in the first year
of these schedules at the Institute and those who may transfer into
this group from other V-12 programs in March, 1944, for the second
year and following schedules. No decision, favorable or unfavorable,
is implied with respect to other schedules or other groups until the
need for a decision arises. Approval of these schedules for degrees is
withdrawn when the Navy V-12 is terminated.”
As Dean Lobdell's report has indicated, the assigned quota
strength of V-12 students at M.I.T. for the first four terms of
operation (July, 1943, through October, 1944) was 900 trainees
and the complements “on board” were respectively 910, 857,
853, and 887. After the summer term of 1944, the Navy discon-
tinued enlistments from civil life for the V-12 program,
intending that thereafter new trainees would be confined to
men assigned from personnel of the fleet, and in October, 1944,
the Bureau of Naval Personnel, “because of the decreasing need
for young reserve officers,” reached a decision "to make no
input of trainees into the Navy V-12 program on 1 March, 1945.
This decision does not affect in any way those men now under
training in the V-12.” After operation for three calendar years,
instruction of Navy V-12 trainees was concluded in June, 1946,
the unit's complement in its nine terms of operation being as
follows:
310
QED
799
Term
1943-44 1944-45 1945-46
July-October
910
887
431
November-March 857 812 236
April-June
853
699
34
Averages per term 873
233
Between July, 1943, and November, 1944 (after which no
new trainees were sent), a total of 1,751 individuals were as-
signed by the Navy to the V-12 Unit at M.I.T. Of these, 38 were
subsequently found medically unqualified, 38 were discharged
from the Naval service by reason of their accumulation of
sufficient "points,” and 732 were transferred from the V-12
program to recruit training or back to general duty. Most of
the last-mentioned group of 732 were “separated” for failure
to meet the academic standards set by the Navy, since the
disciplinary troubles of the Unit were comparatively minor.
The remaining 943 trainees, of whom 482 completed the
Institute's degree requirements as members of the V-12 Unit,
were disposed as follows for further duty or training:
Commissioned in the Naval Reserve directly upon comple-
tion of V-12 training (226 at M.I.T., and 23 elsewhere) 249
Sent to Midshipman's Schools (at Columbia, Cornell,
Fort Schuyler, Notre Dame, or Northwestern), or to Pre-
Midshipman's Schools (at Asbury Park, or Princeton)... 353
Transferred to Naval ROTC Units (at California, Har-
vard, Illinois, Michigan, R.P.I., or Tufts) .............. 177
Transferred to other V-12 Units (at Bates, Brown, Colum-
bia, Dartmouth, Harvard, Louisville, or Williams).....
Transferred for "other indoctrination" (at U.S. Naval Hos-
pital, Chelsea, Mass., Camp Endicott, Davisville, R. I.,
or Camp McDonough, Plattsburgh, N. Y.) or for "avia-
tion duty” (at “Tarmac,” Brooklyn, N. Y.)............
Transferred to service academies (at Annapolis, Md., West
Point, N. Y., or New London, Conn.) ................. 11
From July, 1943, until the end of the November-March term
of 1945–46, the Unit was housed and messed in the Graduate
House, the 34 trainees remaining for instruction during the
final term (April-June of 1946) being accommodated as to
their living at Harvard.
TEACHING IN THE WAR YEARS
311
The late Captain Charles S. Joyce, USN (Retired), as
Senior Naval Officer at M.I.T., served as commanding officer
of the V-12 Unit from 1 July 1943 to 1 February 1945, upon
which latter date he was relieved by Captain Roswell H. Blair,
USN (Retired). Captain Blair was, in turn, relieved on 4
December 1945 by Captain William H. Buracker, USN.
These, then, were the complexities which confronted the
Institute Administration in perhaps its most difficult task, that
of keeping the educational spark alive during the demanding
years of war. In retrospect it could look with satisfaction on the
fact that it had not lowered its standards for the civilian students
who were left to pursue their courses, that it had taken a
pioneering position in important training in meteorology, in
naval architecture, in aeronautical engineering, and in ultra-
high frequency techniques, that it had done its share in the
useful EDT and ESMDT and ESMWT programs, that it had
operated an efficient and a happy Navy V-12 unit. If it was less
satisfied with the difficulties which the vagaries of Selective
Service had imposed on all the educational institutions of the
land, and could remember with still less enthusiasm its own ex-
perience with the ill-conceived ASTP program, it could none-
theless forgive these mistakes which were born of great urgency
and great strain. From them it could hope that the military
would plan more wisely for another emergency if that should
ever come.
. M.I.T., like its great sister institutions, had survived the
strain and had continued somehow to do its job. It had been
strained, academically, close to the danger line; but its muscles
were still eager; they were ready for the equally strenuous days
which lay ahead.
AYS
FOOTNOTES
1 Practically all the information in the ensuing section on Selective
Service, and frequently the exact words without courtesy of quotation
marks, have been taken from the successive annual reports of M.I.T.'s then
Dean of Students, Harold E. Lobdell.
2 Kane was and is Director of the Alumni Fund.
3 19 December 1941.
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QED
4 As this chapter will later show, the screening procedure, the prescribed
training, and the plans for keeping an ASTP man in school were not
well conceived.
5 The gyrations of the ASTP program at M.I.T. are discussed in more
detail later in this chapter. See pages 303–308.
6 Further details of the V-12 program at M.I.T. are provided later in
this chapter. See pages 301, 302–308, 309.
7 Except those in Agriculture or those excepted by the National or the
State Directors of Selective Service.
8 Dean Harold E. Lobdell. Report of the Dean of Students. President's
Report, October, 1944, page 43.
9 All the figures here used refer only to bona fide M.I.T. registrants
and do not include those in EDT courses or in the Radar School, which
if included would increase the numbers enormously.
10 Report of Committee on Stabilization of Enrollment, 1945.
11 For example, in the fall of 1939, at the request of the United States
Navy, the Department of Naval Architecture and Marine Engineering
offered special courses calculated to make up for the acute national shortage
in marine engineers; similar special work for the service was undertaken
in the Departments of Aeronautical Engineering and Electrical Engineer-
ing. Even as early as this the Institute was also cooperating with the Civil
Aeronautics Authority by giving ground-school instruction for those
participating in the Civilian Pilot Training Program. These are but the
first examples and might be multiplied manyfold. Early radar training,
for example, is discussed in Chapter 15.
12 It had previously been an adjunct of Aeronautical Engineering.
Petterssen remained for only a short time. He left M.I.T. in 1942 to
join the Royal Norwegian Air Force in England, and, serving on the
Norwegian Army Headquarters Staff, was loaned to the British Air Min-
istry. On his departure the department was directed by Henry G.
Houghton, Jr., first as Executive Officer and now as Head of the Depart-
ment.
13 Other members: Robert M. Kimball, Administrative Assistant to the
President; Joseph C. MacKinnon, Registrar; and Franklin L. Foster,
Assistant to the Director, D.I.C.
14 For the whole country, 216 institutions participated in the program
and offered 12,888 courses, with an aggregate enrollment of 567,838.
20
M.I.T. REDEPLOYS FOR PEACE
By James R. Killian, Jr.
“I come now to something more volatile, more fugacious
yet – more secret and subtle and mysterious ...; I come to
the wanderings, alightings, fertilisings of man's thought.”
My allusion and my cue come from Sir Arthur Quiller-
Couch's memorable lecture, The Commerce of Thought, which
traces the intricate ways in which man's ideas have been trans-
mitted and transmuted by the comings and goings of men and
how the Wandering Scholar used the trade routes and the war
roads to find a home in the ancient universities.
The American scholar, to a degree without precedent, became
a wandering scholar during World War II. Not only were he
and his fellows distributed and redistributed geographically
over the face of the earth; they were redistributed in function
to a degree without precedent both in civilian and in military
capacities.
Never isolated, even in peace, behind an ivory curtain, the
M.I.T. staff in war became involved and redistributed to a
greater extent than that of almost any other American institu-
tion, as this volume bears detailed testimony. As a result, the
M.I.T. staff was more completely diverted from education, al-
though the institution was actually enlarged as a war research
organization. The concentration of war research on its campus,
the presence here of a great assemblage of gifted scientists from
hundreds of institutions, and the remarkably varied activities
of its own staff, in Cambridge and elsewhere, all contributed in
one overshadowing way to the establishment of a fresh and
vigorous postwar program. I refer to the wholesale cross-
fertilization that resulted; no one at M.I.T. during this postwar
313
314
QED
.
period can fail to be impressed by the ferment of ideas, the
prevailing temper to re-evaluate and to strike out in new
directions, and the broadened concept of the institution's
responsibilities. The expanded “commerce of thought" result-
ing from these conditions is probably the most profound after-
effect which the war had on M.I.T.
Another effect of these special conditions was M.I.T.'s rapid
war demobilization and its equally rapid mobilization for
peace. The organizaton which had functioned to oversee
$100,000,000 of war research was geared to liquidate the war
program expeditiously and at the same time to rebuild the
long-term educational program. Those who served on the
Institute's governing bodies during this period will long re-
member the excitement and urgency of reconversion. They
will remember how a housing program for married veterans –
the first in an American college – was planned and started
before federal funds became available. They will remember
how we improvised to handle the tidal wave of applicants and
how we counted square feet for classroom space to handle 3,000
more students than were registered at war's end. They will
remember the search for new talent in the war research
laboratories, which, with the generous support of the Corpo-
ration, quickly brought to the Institute a remarkable group of
"cream-of-the-crop” graduate students and a number of major
and outstanding faculty appointments. In rapid succession new
programs were adopted, as in Food Technology, in Economics,
in the Humanities, in Electronics, and in Nuclear Science; de-
partments rebuilt and given new directions, as in the School
of Architecture and Planning; new facilities blueprinted and
financing started, as exemplified by the Gas Turbine Labora-
tory, the great Charles Hayden Memorial Library, and the
Senior House.
And while the staff was thus throwing its released energy
into rebuilding the educational and research program, steady
progress was being made in demobilizing the war research or-
ganizations and readapting buildings and equipment in a
manner that could best serve the interest of the country and
7
O
S
M.I.T. REDEPLOYS FOR PEACE
315
leave the Institute in as strong a position as possible for its
expanded peacetime program. Both the temporary and the
permanent buildings erected for war work have been acquired
by the Institute. This added space not only has enabled us
to take care of the great increase in the student body but also
at the same time has both permitted and required a wholesale
reallocation of space and renovation of equipment throughout
the entire Institute plant. This general redistribution of space
- the greatest since the Institute moved from Boston to Cam-
bridge – together with the acquirement of new buildings, has
required an expenditure of $1,750,000. While this has been a
very severe drain on the Institute's limited unrestricted funds,
the Corporation felt the expenditure warranted by the resulting
gain in educational efficiency.
The great rush of redeployment after the end of the war
soon came face to face with an overwhelming situation -- stu-
dents, students in numbers greater than the Institute had ever
handled before. Prior to the end of the war, two decisions had
been reached: (1) that M.I.T. would take back all its students
who had obtained leave for war service, and (2) that we had
an obligation to accept a substantial temporary overload of
students in order to share to the limit of our ability and our
educational standards in the national policy of providing
educational opportunities for veterans. The result of these two
decisions quickly became apparent, and to an unexpected
degree. Our own students returned in larger numbers and
more quickly than we had expected. Nearly 95 per cent decided
to return to the Institute, and in the fall of 1946, when we had
expected 700, a total of 1,100 actually registered. In the mean-
time, applications were pouring in from veterans at a rate that
ran about 4,000 a month for nine months and that has tapered
off at an astonishingly slow rate. As a result the Institute found
itself with 5,660 students in the fall term of 1947, a total 80
per cent greater than the largest prewar enrollment. The
resultant load on staff and facilities has not been proportional
to the increase in the number of students. It has been far
greater since nearly every subject of study has had to be given
316
QED
every term, three terms a year. As a consequence the load on
the staff has been excessive judged by any ideal long-range
program. This becomes all the more apparent when we con-
sider that the Institute's staff has, in addition to this large
teaching commitment, the responsibility for directing a great
research program, which in dollar expenditure totaled almost
$10,000,000 in 1946–47, nearly twenty times larger than any
comparable program undertaken before the war.
It is interesting to note that the number of people at the
Institute during this period 1946–47 totaled over 8,000, as
many as were here during the peak of the war. Whereas during
the war we had 2,000 students and 6,000 staff and nonstaff
personnel, we now have over 3,000 personnel and 5,260 stu-
dents. Before the war we employed approximately 1,500
people, less than half our present total.
Our budget for 1946–47 of nearly $14,000,000 is over four
times our largest prewar budget. I cite these statistics because
the enlargement of our program and the overload they reflect
have of course had a bearing on the Institute's reconversion.
Under prevailing conditions there could be no return to pre-
war organization or leisure. Under these conditions the Insti-
tute has come hard upon vitally important adjustments to
insure its effectiveness as an educational institution. Let me
next outline some of these problems of adjustment, some of
the ways we seek solutions, and some of the new points of view
which are developing.
Foremost among all our responsibilities is maintaining a
strong educational program. In the wake of war's disruption,
it has been necessary to retest programs, regain standards, and
look ahead. Is our curriculum the best that we can devise to
meet the conditions of the postwar world? What are the opti-
mum conditions for creative scholarship and research on the
part of both students and staff? These basic questions are being
examined by all the groups responsible for the management
and conduct of the Institute, and significantly enough the
current overload is not precluding this basic rethinking of our
program.
M.I.T. REDEPLOYS FOR PEACE
317
TO
The Faculty, for example, has appointed a Committee on
Educational Survey to make a long-range study and re-
evaluation of our curriculum and those policies which contrib-
ute to educational effectiveness. This committee, under the
chairmanship of Professor Warren K. Lewis,1 has taken its
assignment in great seriousness and has initiated a deeply prob-
ing study of those factors which contribute toward making an
educational institution vigorous in scholarship and spirit. Not
only is it reconsidering our undergraduate curriculum in the
light of our prewar objectives but it is reaching out to deter-
mine what the objectives of the future should be in the training
of scientists and engineers. Under the impetus provided by
Dean Robert G. Caldwell's repointing of our humanities pro-
gram, it is giving special attention to the problem of how best
to relate the humanities to a professional curriculum and what
kinds of training will best equip an engineer to handle the
great social and public responsibility and power which must
inevitably rest in his hands. And finally it is courageous enough
to tackle some of the imponderables, mentioned above, which
affect the "wanderings, alightings, fertilisings of man's thought.”
What are those factors which we must emphasize at M.I.T. to
provide the best possible environment for scholarly, creative
work by students and staff?
Concurrently with the study by the Committee on Educa-
tional Survey, other approaches to the problem are being fol-
lowed. The Committee on the Graduate School, under the
leadership of Dean J. W. M. Bunker, has underwritten the
high standards of graduate study here while at the same time
providing greater flexibility to the individual student in pur-
suing his professional objectives. New ways of organizing and
coordinating research with teaching are being tested and
policies formulated for handling sponsored research to the
advantage of the academic program. During the war we ob-
served the effectiveness of research teams, and we are now
experimenting to determine how best to reap the advantages of
group research in an academic organization. We are certain that
research teams should never displace the brilliant individualist
TY
318
QED
1
who avoids entangling alliances, but we want to find out how
the two approaches supplement and assist each other.
One of the devices which we are using to handle group re-
search – and to stimulate individual work – is what we call
"centers of research.” These are interdepartmental organizations
which coordinate the cooperative activities of various depart-
ments in important fields of overlapping interests. While we call
them "centers of research” because research is their predominant
role, they are nevertheless playing a very important part in our
educational program, especially by providing superior oppor-
tunities for senior and graduate student thesis work.
These centers of research appear to be a highly satisfactory
answer to a problem which has long confronted educational
institutions, namely, the handling of those interests which reach
outside the traditional departmental boundary lines and re-
quire the cooperation of the specialists from several disciplines.
Certain institutions have tried to meet this problem by setting
up separate institutes. Others have set up new departments. It
is our feeling that both these solutions seem to be lacking in
two desiderata: namely, the mobilizing of the interested person-
nel of the various departments into a cooperative whole while
still recognizing each department's special interest in the
various aspects of the program and, most importantly, the full
coordination of the research with the educational program.
We have established these centers of research in about half
a dozen fields, but the first and the most highly developed of
our programs is our Research Laboratory of Electronics, which
is operated jointly by the Department of Physics and the De-
partment of Electrical Engineering. Some sixty-five graduate
students are now doing their theses in this laboratory. It has a
highly productive program of research that is managed by pro-
fessors from the two collaborating departments and it maintains
a concentration of equipment which is available to the staffs
of the two departments.
Other centers of research now actively in operation include
the Laboratory for Nuclear Science and Engineering, which
represents an even wider distribution of interest than the
M.I.T. REDEPLOYS FOR PEACE
319
.
Electronics Laboratory since it involves the Departments of
Physics, Chemistry, Electrical Engineering, Metallurgy, Me
chanical Engineering, Chemical Engineering, Biology, and
others to a lesser degree. This laboratory, incidentally, repre-
sents a major and carefully planned move on the part of the In-
stitute to give adequate emphasis in its overall program to the
tremendous opportunities in nuclear physics and in the new art
of nuclear engineering. Other "federalized” laboratories include
the Spectroscopy Laboratory, the Acoustics Laboratory, and the
Laboratory for Insulation Research.
As the postwar program develops, other educational trends
are clearly observable. There has been a fresh and constructive
concern with teaching methods, and several departments have
instituted carefully designed programs for checking and im-
proving the instructional techniques of young staff members.
Reflecting the current interest of students in educational
methods, one of the student honorary societies has undertaken
careful evaluation of individual instructors in selected depart-
ments, all with the wholehearted interest of the departments.
In another direction, there is a trend, continuing from before
the war, toward deepening engineering education through the
adoption of more of the analytical tools of pure science, through
more graduate training in engineering, and through the use of
research to attract men of imaginative minds and to educate
engineers who have the temerity and capacity to dream and
speculate beyond the boundaries of the immediately practical.
Similarly the science departments have deepened their pro-
grams, and the push, which began in earnest in 1930, to build a
great School of Science occupying a position of equal partner-
ship with the School of Engineering has attained its objective.
Along with the deepening and broadening which come from
a comprehensive understanding of physical laws, there is the
broadening effect of humanistic study, which is receiving
increased attention, as I have already noted in connection with
the Committee on Educational Survey. Concurrently with the
study by this committee, other approaches to the problem are
being followed. The humanistic effects of extracurricular activ-
320
QED
ities and the close integration of our humanities with
supporting activities in the Technology community are being
explored. In this direction, Dr. Everett Moore Baker, who was
appointed Dean of Students on 1 January 1947, and Dean
Thomas P. Pitré, who became Dean of Freshmen at the same
time, are exerting a powerful and liberalizing influence on the
student body, with a response from the students of instant and
hearty appreciation. The Registration Officers in all the several
professional courses have stepped up their own effective con-
tacts with students, and other personnel have thrown themselves
into the overall movement to bring students and staff into a
community of scholars having the broadest possible outlook.
Contributing importantly and by design to this community
building has been the new Director of the Medical Department,
Dr. Dana L. Farnsworth, the Institute's first full-time Medical
Director. Out of a background of both psychiatry and internal
medicine, he has made the Medical Department an important
and liberalizing factor in safeguarding the health and promot-
ing the morale of students and staff. And to serve the general
welfare of the students in close relation to the Office of the Dean
of Students and the Medical Department, a full-time Director
of Athletics has been engaged and charged with the responsi-
bility of making athletics serve education in the broadest sense.
Students at the Institute exhibit a similar interest in improv-
ing the environment and broadening the base of education at
the Institute. With 60 per cent of the student body veterans
returned from service, we of course have an older and more
mature group, but we also have a new interest in the values
to be found in the field of the liberal arts. The present-day stu-
dent usually has a well-thought-out program for his education
and a willingness to work without stint to get ahead rapidly. He
is willing, without any diminishment of his interest in pro-
fessional subjects, to organize a liberal arts club; to organize
a symphony orchestra; to sponsor (and to attend) lectures by
prominent figures from nonprofessional fields; and to run care-
fully planned forums on such subjects as labor relations and
universal military training.

Air view of the Institute and its temporary housing facilities for veterans and their families. Located between
Vassar Street and Memorial Drive, Westgate is in the center of the above photograph, and Westgate West is to
the right.

Two views of a model of the new senior dormitory which is in
process of construction on Memorial Drive west of Massachusetts
Avenue. Designed by the Finnish architect Alvar Aalto, Research
Professor of Architecture in the Institute's School of Architecture
and Planning, the dormitory contains a lounge, dining room, music
room, living room, and hobby room. The building will house
353 students and in order to have as many rooms as possible face
the Charles River basin, the unique plan has been arranged as a
combination zig-zag and serpentine form.
M.I.T. REDEPLOYS FOR PEACE
321
Concomitant with this broadening of the staff's and students'
interest has been a broadening of the Institute's planning for
its future development. Instead of expecting that the major
portion of the Institute will be east of Massachusetts Avenue,
we now realize that the growth of the Institute's educational
facilities is certain to be so great that these facilities alone
will require all the land on the eastern half of the campus.
The western tract of fifty acres is now conceived of as an
area where we may develop really adequate student hous-
ing and recreational facilities and where a new type of campus
development might be carried out which would have the
dignity and beauty and community living facilities that would
contribute to the development of well-rounded men. In this
area will be located the new Senior House, the Institute's first
dormitory unit designed on the house plan. Here, too, we hope
to have other housing units, adequate playing fields, and a
gymnasium so long needed and still unrealized.
The planning of facilities to promote a broadened education
is epitomized in the concept for the Institute's projected Charles
Hayden Memorial Library, which is one of the major postwar
developments. In planning this new library building we have
conceived of it as serving a dual but consistent purpose. As the
nucleus of our departmental library system and itself a great
repository, it will provide the most serviceable collection pos-
sible of advanced research and teaching material in the scien-
tific, engineering, and architectural disciplines to which the
Institute is primarily devoted. In addition, however, it must
serve the humanities program and the nonprofessional devel-
opment of our students by offering them the maximum invita-
tion to the many important fields of thought and inspiration
outside our required curriculum. This concept recognizes that
the humanistic responsibility of the Institute's library is in some
ways even more far reaching than that of the libraries of the
great liberal arts institutions.
The Charles Hayden Memorial Library, then, will be a great
deal more than a conventional library. It will house, for
example, our departments in the social sciences and the hu-
322
QED
n
manities so that they will be contiguous to their libraries, which
are in effect their laboratories. In addition to this formal
implementation of the Institute's humanistic program, the new
library will seek to facilitate the student's examination of
various cultural heritages which cannot find a place in the for-
mal curriculum. The already large collection of recorded music
possessed by the Institute will be housed in carefully designed
quarters in the new building as part of an audio-visual center
which will make available all sorts of recorded sound as well
as visual tools such as motion picture film. This center will be
as modern as we know how to make it, will provide a variety of
sizes of listening and viewing facilities, and, on the formal side,
will increase the facilities for instruction in modern languages
and public speaking. The library will also house some of the
Institute's special museum collections, will serve as a graphic
arts center, will have adequate exhibition space for arts and
crafts, and will have a special map room for our growing
collection of maps.
Here the educational utility has been carefully thought
through in its relation to environmental factors, and a function
which can sometimes become stereotyped in an educational
institution has been given a fresh outlook and a tremendous
new opportunity to serve as an aid to learning and to provide
those amenities which stimulate scholarship of the highest
order.
The Charles Hayden Memorial Library is but one unit in
the Institute's present program, planned to implement the
developments and new objectives described in this chapter.
This program, involving a total ultimate expenditure of
$29,000,000, includes, in addition to the library and west
campus already mentioned, the development of such new edu-
cational facilities as a Metals Processing Laboratory, a Hydro-
dynamics Laboratory and Naval Towing Tank, a Supersonic
Wind Tunnel, and a Gas Turbine Laboratory (now under
construction), and permanent buildings for the Research
Laboratory of Electronics, the Laboratory for Nuclear Science
and Engineering, and a Laboratory for Biology and Food
1
M.I.T. REDEPLOYS FOR PEACE
323
Technology. In addition there are essential facilities for en-
riching student life, including the new Gymnasium and the
new Senior House, already mentioned, and, in behalf of the
staff, a Faculty Club. The launching of this development
program and the solicitation of funds to carry it through has
been one of the major undertakings of the redeployment period.
Of the total of $29,000,000 the equivalent of about $9,000,000
has been secured, but the remaining $20,000,000 must be
raised. Actually the needs of the Institute are greatly in excess
of this total, and the next five years must witness a sustained
effort to enlarge capital resources.
This record would be incomplete without an estimate of the
effects of the war on the Institute staff and of the personnel
changes made during the redeployment period. This book is
conclusive evidence that before the war the Institute possessed
a staff of magnificent capacity and scope. What now?
By any available test, the Institute has gained strength.
Fortunately, there were few losses; almost 100 per cent of the
senior professors who were on leave are back. This was a major
factor in the Institute's successful reconversion. While getting
back its war service personnel, the Institute had an exceptional
opportunity, as a result of its expanding program, to make
a large number of major new appointments and to set high
standards of selection in making these appointments. The war
contacts of our staff and administrative officers and the con-
centration in Cambridge of a great number of outstanding men
during the war were major factors in assisting the Institute to
spot men who met these high standards. In every major
appointment we sought to answer affirmatively the question: is
the candidate the best available man in the country or even in
the world to fill the post? Essentially the same question has also
been asked in making promotions to the full professorship.
As a sampling, let me list some of the new appointments,
omitting many outstanding younger members of the staff and
limiting the list to those who now rank as full professors or who
occupy positions of administrative responsibility.
Edward L. Moreland, who withdrew from the deanship of
324
QED
Engineering to become Executive Vice President, part time, has
been succeeded as Dean of Engineering by Professor Thomas
K. Sherwood of the Department of Chemical Engineering. To
the deanship of the School of Architecture and Planning has
come William W. Wurster, who had been in private practice
in California. To the Office of Dean of Students has come
Everett Moore Baker, a minister from Cleveland. A new post
has been created, carrying the title of Director of Libraries,
and this has been filled by John E. Burchard, Director of the
Bemis Foundation at the Institute. To replace William N.
Seaver, who retired for age, Vernon D. Tate of the National
Archives has become Librarian. I have already mentioned the
appointment of Dr. Dana L. Farnsworth as Medical Director.
Among new appointments to department headships are
Arthur C. Cope, who came from Columbia University to head
the Department of Chemistry; William T. Martin, who came
from Syracuse University and is now Head of the Department
of Mathematics; Vice Admiral Edward L. Cochrane, who comes
from the Navy Department, where he has been Chief of the
Bureau of Ships and more recently Chief of the Material
Division, to head our Department of Naval Architecture and
Marine Engineering; and William L. Campbell, who came from
industry to head the Department of Food Technology. From
our own staff came C. Richard Soderberg to head the Depart-
ment of Mechanical Engineering, John B. Wilbur to head the
Department of Civil and Sanitary Engineering, and John
Chipman to head the Department of Metallurgy.
Julius A. Stratton of our own Department of Physics was
appointed Director of the Research Laboratory of Electronics,
and Jerrold R. Zacharias, also of the Department of Physics
and earlier from Hunter College and the Radiation Laboratory,
accepted the directorship of the Laboratory for Nuclear
Science and Engineering. Edward S. Taylor of the Department
of Aeronautical Engineering was appointed Director of the new
Gas Turbine Laboratory. Eugene W. Boehne came from the
General Electric Company to succeed Professor William H.
Timbie, retired, in charge of the cooperative course in Electrical
M.I.T. REDEPLOYS FOR PEACE
325
Engineering. Ivan A. Getting from Yale University and the
Radiation Laboratory is now Professor of Electrical Engineer-
ing; Bruno B. Rossi from Cornell University, Victor F. Weiss-
kopf from the University of Rochester, and Albert G. Hill from
M.I.T. and the Radiation Laboratory are Professors of Physics;
Charles D. Coryell, from the University of California and
the Clinton Laboratories at Oak Ridge, is Professor of Chem-
istry; Hsue-Shen Tsien, from the California Institute of
Technology, is Professor of Aerodynamics; Norman J.
Padelford, from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, is
Professor of International Relations. Douglass V. Brown is the
first appointee to the new Alfred P. Sloan Professorship of
Industrial Management; and Jacob P. Den Hartog, from
Harvard University, is Professor of Mechanical Engineering.
On the fiscal side, Joseph J. Snyder is now filling the long-
vacant post of Assistant Treasurer and is giving special attention
to increasing the Institute's capital resources. Robert M.
Kimball, who during the war organized and directed the Insti-
tute's first Personnel Office, joined the President's Office as
Assistant to the President and has helped to carry the increased
responsibilities of the office.
These men, together with the colleagues they have joined,
are the real measure of the Institute's success in rebuilding
itself as an educational institution. They, together with the
extraordinary student body now at the Institute, are evidence
enough that the impetus and the new spirit which President
Compton brought to the Institute in 1930 still guide its rede-
ployment for future widened service. Under his leadership there
has been one clear objective: to maintain here in Cambridge
such a combination of facilities, programs, and men that out-
standing young scholars from all over the world will seek it out
as did the Wandering Scholars the ancient universities.
FOOTNOTE
1 Other members of the committee are Professors John R. Loofbourow,
Ronald H. Robnett, C. Richard Soderberg, and Julius A. Stratton.
ADDENDUM
As the forms of this book were being locked up by the printer,
the British Information Services announced from Washington
citations made by the British Ambassador, Lord Inverchapel,
on behalf of the King. Among those listed were the following
M.I.T. men whose names appear in this book:
Honorary Knight Commander of the Civil Division of the Most
Excellent Order of the British Empire
Vannevar Bush
Honorary Commanders of the Civil Division of the Most
Excellent Order of the British Empire
Edward L. Bowles
Karl T. Compton
Jerome C. Hunsaker
Honorary Officers of the Civil Division of the Most Excellent
Order of the British Empire
Richard Tolman
Carroll L. Wilson
Recipients of the King's Medal for Service in the Cause of
Freedom
Joseph C. Boyce
Samuel H. Caldwell
Hoyt C. Hottel
326
GLOSSARY OF CODE NAMES AND ABBREVIATIONS
A-20. Fighter-bomber, "Havoc," Douglas.
A-26. Fighter-bomber, “Invader,” Douglas.
AA. Antiaircraft.
AAF. Army Air Forces.
ACD. Acid-citrate-dextrose solution, a blood preservative.
AFPAC. Army Forces Pacific; the name taken by General MacArthur's
consolidated command.
ALSOS. Greek word for grove; a code name for the special scientific
intelligence mission to Europe run jointly by Army, Navy and OSRD.
AMP. Applied Mathematics Panel; a subdivision of NDRC.
APP. Applied Psychology Panel; a subdivision of NDRC.
ASF. Army Service Forces.
ASTP. Army Specialized Training Program.
ASV. Aircraft-to-Surface-Vessel radar.
ATC. Army Transport Command.
AZON. A guided missile controllable in azimuth only.
B-14. Twin-engine medium Army bomber.
B-18. Twin-engine medium Army bomber.
B-24. Four-engine heavy bomber, "Liberator,” Consolidated-Vultee.
B-25. Twin-engine medium bomber, “Mitchell," North American.
B-29. Four-engine heavy bomber, “Superfortress," Boeing.
BAT. Code name for an early guided missile.
BBRL. British Branch Radiation Laboratory.
BUAER. Bureau of Aeronautics, USN.
BUMED. Bureau of Medicine and Surgery, USN.
BUORD. Bureau of Ordnance, USN.
BUPERS. Bureau of Naval Personnel, USN.
CBE. Commander of the Most Excellent Order of the British Empire.
CBI. China-Burma-India Theater.
C.I.T. California Institute of Technology; not in favor as often confused
with Carnegie Institute of Technology.
CMR. Committee on Medical Research.
CO. Commanding Officer.
COURSE I. Civil Engineering (M.I.T.).
COURSE II. Mechanical Engineering (M.I.T.).
COURSE VI. Electrical Engineering (M.I.T.).
COURSE VIII. Physics (M.I.T.).
327
328
GLOSSARY OF CODE NAMES
COURSE XIII. Naval Architecture and Marine Engineering (M.I.T.).
COURSE XVI. Aeronautical Engineering (M.I.T.).
CPA. Central Pacific Area. Civilian Production Administration.
CW. Continuous-wave.
CWS. Chemical Warfare Service.
CXAM. Experimental sky-search radar set, antiaircraft against high-flying
planes.
CXBL. Experimental radar set, later to become the SM set; Ship-Control-
DD. Naval code name for a full-size destroyer.
D-Day. First day of the Normandy landing; a special application of a
term in general military usage for the first day of an engagement.
DDT. Þ, p-dichloro-diphenyl-trichloro-ethane; an insecticide.
D.I.C. Division of Industrial Cooperation (M.I.T.).
DIVISION. As used here, an administrative unit of NDRC.
DUKW. Code name for amphibious 21/2-ton truck.
EDT. Engineering Defense Training.
ERC. Enlisted Reserve Corps (U.S. Army).
ESMWT. Engineering Science and Management War Training.
ETO. European Theater of Operations.
FEA. Foreign Economic Administration.
FELIX. A heat homing bomb.
FLAK. Antiaircraft fire; from the initials of the long German term
Flieger Abwehr Kanonen.
G-2. Army General Staff section responsible for intelligence.
GCA. Ground Control of Approach.
GHQ. General Headquarters.
GI. Government Issue; originally meaning a private in the infantry,
applied now to all branches and all ranks in the United States Services
of World War II.
H-2-X. Radar set for airborne bombing and navigation through overcast;
based on the British H-2-S, known as "Home Sweet Home."
HE. High Explosive.
IB. Incendiary bomb.
JBSIP. Joint Board on Scientific Information Policy (Army-Navy-OSRD).
GLOSSARY OF CODE NAMES
329
LCI (L). Landing Craft, Infantry (Large).
LCM. Landing Craft, Mechanized.
LCT. Landing Craft, Tank.
LORAN. Long-Range Navigation radar system.
LSD. Landing Ship, Dock.
LST. Landing Ship, Tank; often called "large slow target."
MAD. Magnetic Airborne Detector.
MEW. Microwave Early Warning radar.
M.I.T. Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
NACA. National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics.
NALOC. Committee on Navigational Aids to Landing Operations.
NAS. National Academy of Sciences.
NATS. Naval Air Transport Service.
NavTecMısEu. U. S. Naval Technical Mission in Europe.
NDRC. National Defense Research Committee.
NOL. Naval Ordnance Laboratory.
NRC. National Research Council.
OFS. Office of Field Service.
OLL. Office of Lend Lease.
OPA. Office of Price Administration.
OPM. Office of Production Management.
ORG. Operations Research Group (Navy).
OSRD. Office of Scientific Research and Development.
OSS. Office of Strategic Services.
OWI. Office of War Information.
PANZER. Armor or armor plate (German); thus armored, or tank.
PBM. Navy patrol bomber, “Mariner," Glenn L. Martin.
PBOSRD. Pacific Branch Office of Scientific Research and Development.
PBY. Navy patrol bomber, Consolidated-Vultee.
PC. Patrol Craft.
POA. Pacific Ocean Areas.
PPI. Plan Position Indicator, a type of radar presentation.
Q.E.D. Quod erat demonstrandum; that which was to be demonstrated
or proved.
QMC. Quartermaster Corps, U.S. Army.
QMG. Quartermaster General.
RAF. Royal Air Forces (British).
330
GLOSSARY OF CODE NAMES
R AND D. Research and Development; usually applied to a section,
division, branch or departmental subdivision in the Armed Services.
RAZON. Guided missile controllable in both range and azimuth.
RBNS. Research Board for National Security.
RCC. Research Construction Company (M.I.T.).
RL. Radiation Laboratory.
ROTC. Reserve Officers Training Corps.
R.P.I. Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute.
SC. Submarine Chaser.
SCR-268. Signal Corps Radar; mobile medium-range searchlight and
antiaircraft fire-control radar.
SCR-270. Signal Corps Radar; mobile long-range early-warning antiair-
craft radar.
SCR-271. Signal Corps Radar; fixed long-range early-warning antiaircraft
radar.
SCR-582. Signal Corps Radar; mobile antiaircraft radar, called Coastal
Surveillance Systems or Harbor Entrance Control sets.
SCR-584. Signal Corps Radar; mobile ground-based antiaircraft fire-
control radar.
SHAEF. Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces (Europe).
SM. Navy radar; Ship-Control-of-Interception type.
SWPA. South West Pacific Area; the first name of General MacArthur's
Command.
TNT. Trinitrotoluene; the most common military high explosive.
TR. Transit-receive.
U-BOAT. A German submarine; World War I term from the original
German Unterseeboot.
UN. United Nations.
UNO. United Nations Organization.
USMCR. United States Marine Corps Reserve.
USN. United States Navy.
USNR. United States Naval Reserve; as distinguished from USN, the
regular Navy.
USNRAB. United States Naval Reserve Air Base.
USSBS. United States Strategic Bombing Survey.
V-1. Vengeance weapon 1; Nazi buzz-bomb or robot plane.
V-2. Vengeance weapon 2; Nazi guided rocket weapon.
V-E. Victory in Europe.
V-J. Victory over Japan.
GLOSSARY OF CODE NAMES
331
VT. Variable time; designation for a particular design of proximity
fuse; it could be set to detonate at a variable distance from the target.
WAAF. Women's Auxiliary Air Force; British women members of the
RAF.
WEASEL. Code name for a tracked amphibious vehicle.
WLB. War Labor Board.
WMC. War Manpower Commission.
WPB. War Production Board.
WRB. War Resources Board.
Y-GUNS. A Y-shaped catapult for propelling depth charges.
YP. District patrol vessel; Navy patrolling of this sort was largely done
by converted civilian craft, and YP are often considered to be the
initials of Yacht Patrol.
PERSONNEL INDEX
101
N Haro Wellese, JT
Adams, Roger, 29
Bentley, Edward P., 151
Adkins, Archibald W., 192
Beretta, John W., Lt. Col., 81
Albertson, Walter E., 98
Bernbaum, Lawrence, 176
Alderman, Bissell, 73
Beverage, H. H., 70
Allis, William Phelps, Lt. Col., 61, Bicknell, Joseph, 169
76, 77, 82, 110
Bisplinghoff, Raymond L., Lt. (jg),
Alvarez, Luis W., 222, 231
Amdur, Isadore, 195, 211
Bissell, Richard M., Jr., 249
Anicetti, R. J., 210
Bitter, Francis, 98, 179, 180
Arnold, H. H., Gen., 52, 67, 68, 72, Blackett, P. M. S., 87
198
Blair, Roswell H., Capt., USN, 311
Aub, Joseph C., M.D., 154, 155 Blake, Charles H., 35, 75, 94, 95, 121
Austin, James M., 80, 81
Blanchard, Arthur A., 195
Averbach, Benjamin L., 194
Blood, Kenneth T., Maj. Gen., 20
Blue, R. W., 179
Bacher, R. F., 222
Boehne, Eugene W., 324
Bainbridge, K. T., 147, 222
Bolduan, 0. E. A., 163
Baker, Everett Moore, 320, 324 Bolt, Richard H., 166
Baker, W. R. G., 237
Bond, Harold L., 84
Balsbaugh, Jayson C., 186, 195 Bosworth, Welles, 4
Barlett, Helen R., 211
Bowen, Harold G., Jr., Rear Adm.,
Barnes, G. M., Maj. Gen., 149
20, 39
Barrow, Wilmer L., 79, 217, 218, Bowker, Albert H., 176
Bowles, Edward L., 32, 33, 40, 61,
Barstow, Frederick E., 197
67–72, 79, 80, 96, 97, 112, 114,
Bartholomew, Edward L., Jr., 194, 218, 220, 226, 227, 237, 238
270
Bowman, Harry L., 81
Baruch, Bernard M., 247
Bowman, Isaiah, 28
Batt, William L., 247
Bown, Ralph, 218
Beal, R. R., 237 .
Boyan, Edwin A., 270
Bear, Richard S., 162, 163
Boyce, Joseph C., 64, 65
Beattie, James A., 193
Boynton, Donald E., Lt. Cmdr., 100
Beatty, Frank E., Rear Adm., 20 Bradley, Omar, Gen., 78, 256
Beatty, Ralph E., Jr., 98
Brand, Charles L., Rear Adm., 20
Beckwith, Herbert L., 64
Breckenridge, Robert G., 195
Beers, Roland F., 270
Breger, Irving A., 270
Bemis, Alan C., 65, 173, 174, 177 Breit, Gregory, 38
Bennett, Ralph D., Capt., USNR, Bridgforth, Robert M., Jr., 163, 214
93, 94, 98, 99
Brooks, Edward M., 176
Barrow6, 227, 238k E., 197
333
334
PERSONNEL INDEX
Brown, Douglass V., 246–249, 325
Brown, Gordon S., 42, 43, 46, 61, 62,
139, 144-146, 148–152
Brown, Sanborn C., 162
Bryan, Joseph G., 176
Bryant, Lynwood S., 152, 214
Buechner, William W., 204, 208
Bunker, John W. M., 110, 154, 317
Buracker, William H., Capt., USN,
311
Burchard, John E., 35, 51, 52, 63,
73, 100, 109–112, 324
Burrill, E. A., Jr., 208
Burton, Malcolm S., 194
Burwell, John T., Jr., Cmdr., 34, 36
Bush, Vannevar, 26, 28, 33, 36, 59,
65, 107, 112, 205, 220, 236
Byrnes, James F., 253
Clarke, Eric T., 162
Cloud, Robert W., 208
Coate, Godfrey T., 238
Cochrane, Edward L., Vice Adm.,
20, 324
Coffin, Louis F., Jr., 149
Cohen, Morris, 183, 194, 210, 271
Cohn, Edwin J., 162
Collins, A. S., 195
Collins, Samuel C., 179, 180, 193
Colpitts, E. H., 47
Colton, Roger B., Maj. Gen., 20
Combs, Thomas S., Rear Adm., 20
Compton, Karl T., 5-8, 28, 29, 33,
36, 39–41, 51, 67, 69, 72, 96, 97,
100, 107, 108, 112, 113, 114,
118, 170, 184, 218, 220, 224,
226, 233, 236, 243, 244, 277,
293, 295, 297, 325
Conant, James B., 28, 29, 59, 247
Connelly, Joseph J., 214
Coolidge, W. D., 47
Cope, Arthur C., 60, 324
Coryell, Charles D., 214, 325
Covell, William E. R., Maj. Gen., 20
Creamer, Thomas F., Lt., USNR,
100
Cripps, Sir Stafford, 42, 61
Crisp, Frederick G., Rear Adm., 20
Crout, Prescott D., 238
Cunningham, Robert M., 81, 176
Cunningham, Ross M., 133
Caldwell, Robert G., 252, 253, 317
Caldwell, Samuel H., 42–46, 62, 206,
207
Cammann, Oswald, 210
Campbell, Donald P., 151, 152
Campbell, William L., 81, 251, 271,
324
Carlson, Milton O., Capt., USN,
144
Carlson, Roy W., 64, 212, 214
Cartwright, Dorwin P., 255
Cavileer, R. P., 182, 193
Chalmers, Paul M., 289
Chamberlain, John W., Cmdr., 99,
100
Chantry, Allan J., Jr., Rear Adm.,
20
Cherniak, G. S., 270
Chertow, Bernard, 195, 271
Chipman, John, 183, 210, 324
Chu, Lan Jen., 61, 79
Chu, Shih M., Lt. Gen., 21
Clark, Champ, U. S. Senator, 244
Clark, John R., 194, 208
Davidson, David, 203
Davis, Tenney L., 271
Dawson, Edward, 145
de Florez, Luis, Rear Adm., 20
de Forest, Alfred V., 177, 265
den Hartog Jacob P., Capt.,
USNR, 92, 93, 325
Deutsch, Karl, 258
Deutsch, Martin, 162
Dewey, Bradley, Col., 184, 248
PERSONNEL INDEX
335
Dietrichson, Gerhard, 214
Dietz, Albert G. H., 120, 121
Donovan, Richard, Maj. Gen., 20
Doolittle, James H., Lt. Gen., 20
Doriot, Georges, Brig. Gen., 76
Dotson, James, 15, 22
Douglass, Raymond D., 298
Draper, G. Stark, 43–46, 62, 138–144,
146, 150
Dubin, Irving M., 195
DuBridge, Lee A., 222, 224, 236, 237
Duggan, E. Lloyd, 162
Dunn, Cecil Gordon, Lt. Col., 81, 82
Duntley, Seibert Q., 65
Durgin, Calvin T., Rear Adm., 21
Fletcher, Stewart G., 194
Floe, Carl F., 82, 271
Ford, Horace S., 129
Forester, C. S., 134, 136, 137
Forrestal, James, 31
Forrester, Jay W., 145, 147, 151, 152
Foster, Franklin L., 126, 129, 312
France, Albert F., Rear Adm., 21
Frank, Nathaniel H., 61, 79, 238
Franklin, Philip, 150
Fredenhall, Lloyd R., Lt. Gen., 20
Freeman, Harold A., 66, 82, 271
Freeman, Ralph E., 249
Fulton, Garland, 266
Furer, Julius A., Rear Adm., 21, 32,
233
Eaker, Ira C., Lt. Gen., 229
Eastham, Melville, 70, 233, 234, 237
Eastman, George, 4
Eaton, Paul C., Lt. Cmdr., 99
Edgerton, Harold E., 120, 193, 196–
204, 207
Eisenhower, Dwight D., Gen., 69,
72, 106, 114, 120
Ellis, R. C., 237
Evans, Frederick R., 194, 270
Evans, Robley D., 153–155, 162
Fahrion, Frank G., Rear Adm., 21
Fairbairn, Harold W., 214, 263
Farnsworth, Dana L., Cmdr., 100,
320, 324
Fay, Richard D., 164, 176
Faymonville, Philip R., Col., 244
Fernstrom, Karl D., 84, 266
Feshbach, Herman, 176, 208
Festinger, Leon, 34
Fickel, Jacob E., Maj. Gen., 74
Fife, W. Maxwell, 64, 177
Finch, Rogers B., Capt., 84
Fink, Donald G., 233
Fisher, Charles W., Rear Adm., 21
Fisher, John C., 149
Gale, Walter H., Lt. Cmdr., 101
Gamble, Edmund L., 133
Gardner, Fulton, Maj. Gen., 20
Gasser, H. S., 60
Gaudin, Antoine M., 183, 194, 214,
250
Gaughran, Eugene R. L., 163
Gelotte, Ernest N., 64, 133
Germeshausen, Kenneth J., 196, 197
Getting, Ivan A., 46, 62, 79, 325
Gibb, Thomas R. P., Jr., 195, 271
Gibson, J. G., II, 162
Gifford, Allan T., 176
Gilliland, Edwin R., 53, 80, 99, 120,
184, 193, 248
Goddard, George, Col., 197, 198
Goering, Hermann, 78, 84
Goldblith, Samuel A., Lt., 84
Good, Wilfred M., 162
Gordon, Chester H., Jr., 176
Goudsmit, Samuel A., 111, 121
Gould, Bernard S., 159, 162
Gouzoule, Thomas, 177
Grant, Nicholas J., 184, 194
Gras, Ranulf W., 151
Gray, Truman S., 82, 99
336
PERSONNEL INDEX
Gregory, E. B., Lt. Gen., 81
Grekel, Howard, Capt., 84
Grier, Herbert E., 196, 197, 214
Grimes, James H., Jr., 176
Griswold, O. W., Lt. Gen., 118
Grosser, Christian E., 265
Groves, Leslie R., Jr., Maj. Gen., 20
Guernsey, Donald L., 194
Hindman, Harold, 76
Hitler, Adolf, 11
Hoadley, Henry, 176
Hofmann, Charles S., 149
Hoge, William M., Maj. Gen., 20
Holmes, Addison F., 99
Holmes, Oliver Wendell, 206, 207
Holt, James, 263, 264
Homerberg, Victor O., 194, 214, 264,
271
Horton, J. Warren, 63, 267–269
Horwood, Murray P., 267, 270
Hottel, Hoyt C,. 34, 52, 53, 64, 65,
174
Houghton, Henry G., Jr., 34, 166,
177, 312
Howard, Herbert S., Rear Adm., 21,
Hall, Albert C., 145, 151, 152, 238
Hall, Cecil E., 162
Hall, William M., 271
Hamilton, Leicester F., 159
Hamilton, Parker, 265
Hansen, W. I., 217
Hardy, Arthur C., 56, 57, 65
Harris, Louis, 177
Harris, Robert S., 34, 82, 154, 160,
101
251
Harrison, George R., 35, 59, 65, 108,
109, 120, 177, 187
Hartwell, John M., Jr., Ens., 99
Hartzog, Justin R., 255, 256
Haskell, Clarence A., 151
Hauser, Ernst A., 158, 162, 184–186,
251
Hayler, Robert W., Rear Adm., 21
Hays, Frank B., Cmdr., 100
Hayward, Carle R., 250
Hazen, Harold L., 35, 42, 46
Hearon, William M., Maj., 85
Hegenberger, Albert F., Maj. Gen.,
20
Henderson, Robert S., 151
Henry, Stephen G., Maj. Gen., 20,
108
Hersey, Mayo D., 214, 271
Hershey, Lewis B., Maj. Gen., 282
Hertz, Heinrich R., 38
Hicks, J. F. G., 179
Hildreth, Richard R., 133
Hill, Albert G., 325
Hill, Edmund W., Maj. Gen., 20
Howard, Robert T., 194, 214
Howes, Victor E., 271
Hrones, John A., 150, 152, 271
Hull, Cordell, 253
Hunsaker, Jerome C., 26, 31-33, 62,
80, 86, 250
Huntress, Ernest H., 195
Hutcheson, J. A., 237
Hutzenlaub, John F., 151
Irvine, John W., Jr., 162
Jacobs, Randall P., Vice Adm., 302
Jacobs, Robert B., 179
Jarosh, John J., 151
Jeffers, William M., 184, 247, 248
Jenney, Melvin R., 129, 133
Jennison, Marshall W., 160, 162,
163
Jewett, Frank B., 28, 29, 33, 40, 47,
219, 220
Johnson, Andrew L., 214
Jones, Albert M., Maj. Gen., 20
Jones, L. F., 237
Joyce, Charles S., Capt., USN, 227,
302, 311
PERSONNEL INDEX
337
Kane, Henry B., 276, 277, 311 Lippitt, Ronald, 258
Kaufmann, Albert R., 179, 183, 210 Liu, Yee J., 151
Kavanagh, George M., 214
Livingston, M. Stanley, 89, 98, 162
Kaye, Joseph, 189, 266
Lobdell, Harold E., 277, 303, 309,
Keenan, Joseph H., 34, 189, 266, 271 311, 312
Kelly, Burnham, 64, 111
Locke, William N., 254, 255, 257
Kelly, M. J., 237
Loofbourow, John R., 40, 61, 237,
Kenney, George C., Gen., 20, 69, 112 238, 325
Ketchum, Phillips, 129
Loomis, Alfred L., 35, 39, 40, 61,
Keyes, Frederick G., 179, 193
218, 220, 233, 234, 236, 237
Keyes, Raymond E., 271
Loomis, F. Wheeler, 222
Killian, James R., Jr., 129, 313 Lord, Richard C., 65
Kimball, Robert M., 312, 325
Lull, George F., Maj. Gen., 20
Kinkaid, Thomas C., Adm., 100
Kingsley, Charles, Jr., 152
MacArthur, Douglas, Gen., 69, 71,
Kip, Arthur F., 89
106, 108–113, 119
Kitts, Willard A., III, Rear Adm., 21 MacGregor, Charles W., 149, 272
Klopsteg, Paul E., 109
MacKinnon, Joseph C., 275, 286,
Knickerbocker, Irving, 248, 249
288, 312
Knox, Frank C., 26, 31, 32, 62
Maclaurin, W. Rupert, 66
Knudsen, Vern O., 47
Magel, Theodore T., 211
Koh, P. K., 194
Magoun, F. Alexander, 257
Kraus, Walter F., Maj. Gen., 20 Malone, Thomas F., 81
Kyle, Peter E., 182, 270
Maloof, Samuel B., 208
Mar, Pellian T. C., Rear Adm., 22
Lamar, Edward S., 98
Marconi, Guglielmo, 38
Land, Emory S., Vice Adm., 21 Markham, John R., 169
Landgraf, John, 248
Marriner, A. W., Brig. Gen., 70
Larkin, T. B., Maj. Gen., 84
Marshall, George C., Gen., 68
Lauritsen, Charles C., 49
Marshall, Lauriston C., 109, 222
Lawrence, Ernest O., 223, 237, 238 Marshall, Shadburn, 211
Leavey, Edmond H., Maj. Gen., 84 Martin, Stuart T., 83
le Beau, Desiree S., 185
Martin, William T., 249, 324
Lee, Paul H., 176
Martland, Harrison, 154, 155
Lessells, John M., 250, 266, 267 Marvin, George G., 210, 272
Levinson, Norman, 271
Mason, Max, 49
Lewin, Kurt, 257
McAdams, William H., 34, 192, 195
Lewis, Frank M., 189, 272
McBride, Guy T., Jr., 272
Lewis, G. W., 170
McCabe, Arthur P., 177
Lewis, Warren K., 59, 192, 317 McClelland, H. H., Maj. Gen., 70
Lincoln, Abraham, 27
McGregor, Douglas M., 248, 249
Lindbergh, Charles A., Col., 244 McIntosh, L. R., 208
Lindvall, Frederick C., 268
McKay, Walter, 151
338
PERSONNEL INDEX
Oldfield, Homer R., Maj., 83
Overbeck, Wilcox P., 212–214
Mitsch, Johharc A., Vice 29, 33,
McLennan, A. J., 177
McMahon, Howard O., 180, 193
Mead, Warren J., 262
Meesook, Boonyium, 255
Merrill, Frank D., Maj. Gen., 20
Metcalf, George F., 237
Michel, Leopold R., 99, 270
Milas, Nicholas A., 160, 185
Miles, Arthur C., Rear Adm., 21
Millard, Earl B., 176, 195
Mitsch, John D., 133, 277
Mitscher, Marc A., Vice Adm., 91
Moreland, Edward L., 29, 33, 35,
113, 114, 121, 227, 298, 323, 324
Morse, Philip M., 48, 49, 61, 65,
74, 86, 89, 92, 96–98, 114, 164,
176, 200, 238
Morton, Avery A., 195
Mueller, Hans, 162, 177
Mueller, Robert K., 151
Mullinix, Henry M., Rear Adm., 21
Murphy, Maron E., Cmdr., 146
Murray, John Milne, Lt. Col., 83
Murray, Maxwell, Maj. Gen., 20
Murray, William M., 270
Myers, Charles A., 184, 248–251
Pace, Ernest M., Jr., Rear Adm., 21
Padelford, Norman J., 253, 254, 325
Palmer, R. N., 214
Parks, Roland D., 246
Patton, George, Gen., 193, 202, 203
Peabody, Dean, Jr., 82, 99
Peacock, Wendell C., 162
Peaslee, David C., 98
Peck, Charles F., Jr., 177
Pekeris, Chaim L., 272
Pellam, John R.., 98
Pennoyer, Frederick W., Jr., Rear
Adm., 21
Petterssen, Sverre, 294, 312
Phillips, Henry B., 150
Pigors, Paul, 248, 249
Pitré, Thomas P., 320
Platt, Milton M., 177
Prescott, Samuel C., 34, 81
Pride, Alfred M., Rear Adm., 21
Prince, Roy W., Jr., 177
Proctor, Bernard E., 74, 75, 81, 160
Pulk, Eugene S., 81
Putnam, Palmer Cosslett, 65
y 19
Quiller-Couch, Sir Arthur, 313
Quinn, John C., Lt. Cmdr., 101
Neas, C. C., 195
Neuenborffer, J. A., 98
Neumann, Ernest P., 188
Newell, Joseph S., 170
Nickerson, E. W., 208
Nimitz, Chester, Adm., 106, 108,
111, 151
Noble, Albert, Rear Adm., 21
Noce, Daniel, Maj. Gen., 20
Norris, Charles H., 177
Norton, C. L., 125
Norton, Frederick H., 150, 194, 211
Norton, John T., 194, 205, 208, 214
Rabi, Isidor I., 42, 222, 237
Radford, William H., 65, 177, 238
Radtke, Schrade F., 84
Ratliff, J. F., Sr., Maj., 296
Rauscher, Manfred, 170
Raven, Fritjof A., 101
Raymond, Milton W., 195
Redman, L. M., 214
Reed, William A., 195
Reissner, Eric, 170
Richardson, Lawrence B., Rear
Adm., 21
Ober, Shatswell, 169, 177
Okabe, Kinjori, 217
PERSONNEL INDEX
339
Richardson, Robert C., Lt. Gen.,
108, 109, 111
Richey, Thomas B., Rear Adm., 21
Richmond, Harold B., 35, 55
Rickenbacker, Edward V., 161
Ridenour, Louis N., 222
Rivero, Horatio, Lt. Cmdr., 146, 151
Robertson, Walter W., 272
Robinson, Clark S., Col., 77, 82
Robinson, Janette, 163
Robnett, Ronald H., 129, 133, 325
Rockefeller, John D., Jr., 18
Rockefeller, Nelson, 252
Rogers, William Barton, 3, 4
Roosevelt, Franklin Delano, 26, 28,
243, 244, 247, 279, 282
Rosa, Robert V., Lt., 83, 256
Rosenthal, Daniel, 208
Ross, Don H., 177
Rossell, Henry E., Cmdr., 65, 265
Rossi, Bruno B., 325
Rowlands, John J., 277
Royal, Forrest B., Rear Adm., 21
Royce, Donald, Rear Adm., 21
Ruge, Arthur C., 265
Rule, John T., 264
Russell, Henry D., 35
Ryden, Roy W., Rear Adm., 21
Schumb, Walter C., 131-133, 195,
208, 211
Schwarz, Edward R., 76
Seamans, Robert C., Jr., 151
Sears, Francis W., 84
Seaver, William N., 324
Shapiro, Ascher H., 188, 195, 272
Sherman, Forrest P., Vice Adm., 21
Sherman, Henry, 162, 163
Sherwood, Thomas K., 54, 59, 60,
64, 65, 99, 132, 160, 163, 184,
192, 195, 251, 324
Shrock, Robert R., 251, 262, 263, 272
Silvey, John O., 145, 151, 152
Sizer, Irwin W., 160, 162, 163
Slater, John C., 41, 61, 238, 266
Sledd, Marvin B., Lt., USMC, 101
Slichter, Louis B., 36, 47–50, 63, 267,
268
Sloane, Alvin, 272
Sluder, John C., 81, 160
Smith, Edward H., Rear Adm., CG,
21
Smith, Lybrand P., Capt., USN, 32,
36
Smith, Col., 244
Smith, Rodney H., 177
Smith, William H., Rear Adm., 21
Snyder, Joseph J., 325
Soderburg, C. Richard, 34, 272, 324,
325
Southworth, George C., 217
Spaatz, Carl, Gen., 69, 71
Spalding, Sidney P., Maj. Gen., 20
Spedden, H. Rush, 194
Spencer, Hugh H., 35, 55, 177
Sperduto, Anthony, 208
Squire, Charles F., 65, 89, 177
Stanley, William E., Maj., 83
Starr, Chauncey, 179
Stephenson, Clark C., 179, 193
Stettinius, Edward R., Jr., 243
Stevens, Leslie C., Rear Adm., 21
Sage, Nathaniel M., 125, 126, 129
St. John, R. C., 195
Salo, Torsti P., 162, 163
Samuelson, Paul A., 251
Saville, Gordon P., Brig. Gen.,
70
Sayler, Henry B., Maj. Gen., 20
Scatchard, George, 162, 212, 214
Schmitt, Francis O., 158, 162, 163
Schoeffel, Malcolm F., Rear Adm.,
21
Schrader, Robert J., 212, 214
Schuerch, Conrad, Jr., 83
Schuhmann, Reinhardt, Jr., 194, 214
340
PERSONNEL INDEX
Turner, L. A., 222
Turner, R. Kelly, Rear Adm., 99
Tuve, Merle A., 38
Tyree, Sheppard Y., Jr., 208
Tyson, J. K., 98
Stevenson, Earl P., 35, 53
Stever, H. Guyford, 238
Stimson, Henry L., 32, 67, 68
Stockbarger, Donald C., 131, 187,
188, 195
Stockton, Frank, 92
Stokes, C. A., 251
Stratton, Julius A., 61, 69–71, 78,
79, 238, 324, 325
Stump, Felix B., Rear Adm., 21
Styer, Wilhelm D., Lt. Gen., 20
Suits, C. G., 237
Sutherland, Richard K., Lt. Gen.,
113
Urey, Harold, 212
1
Van de Graaff, Robert J., 131, 204,
208
Vandenberg, Hoyt S., Maj. Gen., 203
Van Keuren, Alexander H., Rear
Adm., 21
Varian, R. H., 217
Vickery, Howard L., Vice Adm., 21
Vivian, J. Edward, 214
von Hippel, Arthur R., 187, 195
Tallman, Gerald B., 251
Tate, John T., 47
Tate, Vernon D., 324
Taylor, C. Fayette, 34, 189, 272
Taylor, Edward S., 34, 189, 251, 272,
324
Taylor, Howard F., 101
Taylor, Richard, 206
Taylor, Robert D., 177
Teeter, C. E., Jr., 182
Telkes, Maria, 161
Terman, F. E., 237
Thomas, George B., Jr., 176
Thompson, Sir George, 42, 61
Thresher, B. Alden, 110, 285
Timbie, William H., 324
Tizard, Sir Henry, 40, 219
Tolman, Richard C., 29, 33, 36, 51
Tone, J. W., 151
Towers, John H., Adm., 31
Townsend, Arthur L., 299
Trimmer, John D., 176, 214
Tripp, W. A., 208
Truman, Harry S., 118
Trump, John G., 40, 61, 79, 112,
222, 237, 238
Tsien, Hsue Shen, 325
Turner, Clair E., 254
Wadsworth, George P., 166, 176
Waitt, Alden H., Maj. Gen., 20
Waldron, A. K., Maj. Gen., 120
Walker, Scott, 190
Walker, William H., 125
Walter, Henry, 208
Warren, Bertram E., 65, 171, 177,
214
Waterhouse, George B., 245, 246
Waterman, Alan T., 100, 107, 111,
112, 237
Watriss, Frederic, 176
Watson-Watt, Sir Robert, 42, 61
Waugh, David F., 162
Weaver, Warren, 237
Weber, Harold C., 189
Wedemeyer, A. C., Lt. Gen., 77
Weems, William R., Lt. Col., 84, 85
Weisskopf, Victor F., 214, 325
Wendt, Richard, 265
Wentworth, R. L., 195
White, A. E., Col., 59
White, T. E., 182
Whitehead, Walter L., 263
Whiteside, A. J., 245
PERSONNEL INDEX
341
Whitman, Ralph, Rear Adm., 21
Whitman, Walter G., 33, 244, 246,
250
Withington, Holdence, Adm., 21
Willson, Russell, Vice Adm., 21
Withington, Holden W., 176
Witunski, Michael, 176
Woodbury, Robert S., Cmdr., 100
Woodring, Harry H., 243
Wong, Tsoo, Lt. Gen., 21
Wulff, John, 209
Wurster, William W., 324
Wyckoff, Charles W., 197
Whitmore, William W., 74
Whitney, Roy P., 190
Wiener, Norbert, 176, 272
Wiesner, Jerome B., 213
Wilbur, John B., 64, 175, 324
Wildes, Karl L., 46
Wilkes, Gordon B., 174
Willett, Hurd C., 65, 80
Williams, Dudley, 182, 193
Williams, Glenn C., 34, 65, 188,
192
Williams, Robert S., 34, 59, 82
Willis, Hugh R., 218
Young, James V., Maj. Gen., 21
Young, Ralph C., 195, 208
Zacharias, Jerrold R., 214, 222, 324
Zaffarano, Frank P., 238, 239
Zimmermann, Henry J., 238
SUBJECT INDEX
319
Aberdeen Proving Ground, 25
Corps; rations; Research Sec-
ACD solution, 157
tion SWPA; Scientific and
Acoustics Laboratory (M.I.T.), 166, Technical Advisory Section,
AFPAC; SHAEF; Signal Corps;
A. C. Spark Plug Company, 211
Wright Field
Agriculture, U.S. Department of, Army Air Forces, U.S., 25, 39, 51,
255
70, 72–74, 83–87, 142, 143, 146,
Air Commission, British, 266
160, 161, 167, 178, 180, 197,
Aircraft Engine Research Labora 198, 200, 201, 208, 228-230,
tory, 27
233, 238, 272, 293, 294–297,
Aircraft-Marine Products, Inc., 186, 305, 306
195
Evaluation Board, 73, 74
Air Navigation and Traffic Control, Institute of Technology, 85
Weather Service, 80, 81
Air Service Command, U.S. Army, Army Service Forces, U.S., 248
265
Army Specialized Training Pro-
Air Wing, 315th, 68
gram, 9, 270, 279, 280, 292,
albumin, human, 162
293, 301-307, 311, 312
alpha radiation, 155
Atlantic Gelatin Company, 270
Alsifilm, 186
Atomic Control Committee, 247
ALSOS Advisory Committee, 111 AZON, 55, 56, 171-173, 201
ALSOS Mission, 110, 111, 121
Ames Laboratory, 26
Baldwin Locomotive Works, 272
amphibious vehicles, 29, 31, 37 ballistics, terminal, 63
anti-malarials, 60, 159
balloon campaign, Japanese, 65, 80
Anzio, 230
Baltimore plane, 168
Applied Mathematics Panel, 37, 63, Bastogne, 230
66, 172, 237
BAT, 171
Applied Psychology Panel, 37
Bataan, 78
argon, radioactive, 154
Bates College, 310
Argonne Laboratory, 212
Battelle Memorial Institute, 182
Army, U.S., see also Chemical War. Bell Telephone Laboratories, 28,
fare Service; Engineer Corps; 41, 61, 151, 217–219, 223, 236,
ERC; ESMWT; Ground Forces; 237, 262
Medical Corps; mountain bends, aviation, 154
troops; New Developments Di- beryllium, 34
vision; Operations Research Bethlehem Shipbuilding Company,
Section, POA; Ordnance De- 272
partment; Quartermaster Bethlehem Steel Company, 299
343
344
SUBJECT INDEX
biological warfare, 153
Birmingham University (British),
219
blast, pigmentation from, 162
blood, whole, preservation of, 155,
157, 158
blood cells, red, 156
blood plasma, 155, 157
Boeing Aircraft Corporation, 168
Bolivian Tin and Tungsten Cor-
poration, 183
Bolling Field, 219
bomb, atomic, 31, 72, 155, 209–214,
238, 261
M-69,- 53
Bombardment Advisory Committee,
California, at Los Angeles, Univer-
sity of, 47
California, University of, 109, 133,
205, 209, 213, 218, 219, 222,
223, 231, 236, 237, 248, 254,
310, 325
California Institute of Technology,
29, 49, 63, 99, 133, 177, 222,
262, 268, 295, 325
camouflage, 56, 57
Carbide and Carbon Chemicals
Corporation, 212
Carnegie Institution of Washington,
26, 38, 219
52
casting, precision, 184
Center of Analysis (M.I.T.), 42,
152, 206
centers of research (M.I.T.), 318
chemicals, basic, 245
Chemical Warfare Service, U.S.,
53, 63, 72, 178, 184, 189, 191,
192
bomb damage, 14, 52, 73, 74
bombing, radar, 68, 71
bombing, strategic, 73; see also
Strategic Bombing Survey, U.S.
bomb selection, 29, 30, 51, 52, 73
bombs, 51
buzz, 45, 68, 230
Boston Health Department, 267
Boston Ordnance District, 194
Bowdoin College, 227
Brown University, 310
Bureau of Aeronautics, USN, 101,
143, 250
of Labor Statistics, U.S., 247
of Medicine and Surgery, USN,
Chemical Warfare Service Labora-
tory (M.I.T.), 189–192, 195,
205
Chicago, University of, 60, 133,
209–214, 295
Chrysler Corporation, 229, 271
Civil Service Commission, U.S.,
299
160
of Mines, U.S., 179, 250
of Naval Personnel, USN, 309
of Ordnance, USN, 101, 132, 147–
151, 205, 268, 300
of Ships, USN, 25, 48, 92, 164,
civilian scientists in field), 102–
107, 120
Clark, Wallace and Company, 270
Clark University, 83
Clifford Manufacturing Company,
272
Climatic Research Laboratory, 66
Clinton Laboratories, 212, 214, 325
clothing, Army, for severe climates,
76, 82
cobalt, radioactive, 154
collagen, 158, 159, 163
181–184, 189, 268, 164, Climatic Resea
of Standards, U.S., 99
Burgenland, SS, 90
Burma, bridge strikes in, 172
burns, bentonite treatment of, 158
SUBJECT INDEX
345
250
Columbia University, 41, 42, 49, 60, DDT, 60
63, 133, 164, 209, 212, 222, 223, Defense Housing Coordinator, 256
230, 236, 237, 262, 269, 272, 310, deferment, student, quota system of,
324
282, 283
Commerce, Department of, U.S., degaussing of ships, 93, 98, 179
Dewey and Almy Company, 249
Committee A-N 23,- 64
dielectrics, 187
Committee on Demolition of Obsta- differential analyzer, 196, 205, 207
cles to Landing Operations, 64 director:
Committee on Fortification Design M-9 antiaircraft, 62
(NRC), 64
Mark 51,- 141, 142
Committee on Medical Research Mark 52, – 142
(OSRD), 28, 107, 155, 156, 159 Mark 63,- 142
Committee on Navigational Aids to Division of Industrial Cooperation
Landing Operations, 63
(M.I.T.), 125–132, 145, 151,
Committee on Passive Protection 152, 185
against Bombing (NRC), 51 Division 1 (NDRC), 37
Committee on Publications Division 2 (NDRC), 35, 37, 38, 51,
(OSRD), 100
52, 63, 64, 73
Committee on Scientific Informa- Division 3 (NDRC), 37, 38, 50, 267
tion Policy, 64
Division 4 (NDRC), 37
Confidential Instruments Labora. Division 5 (NDRC), 35, 37, 38, 51,
tory (M.I.T.), 43, 62, 141-143, 55, 65, 89, 177
149
Division 6 (NDRC), 37, 38, 47–50,
control of guns, remote, 137, 139, 86, 120, 166
144-147, 151
Division 7 (NDRC), 35, 37, 38, 45,
Coordinator of Research and Devel 46, 51, 62, 237
opment, USN, 32, 86, 119 Division 8 (NDRC), 37
Cornell University, 83, 222, 310, 325 Division 9 (NDRC), 37, 60
Corsair plane, 168
Division 10 (NDRC), 37, 60, 64
cosmic rays, 161
Division 11 (NDRC), 35, 37, 38,
Council on National Defense, 247
52–54, 63, 174
Cramp Shipbuilding Company, 33, Division 12 (NDRC), 37, 38, 65
65, 265, 272
Division 13 (NDRC), 37
croakers, sound levels of, 95
Division 14 (NDRC), 30, 35, 37–
Crosley, Corporation, 150
41, 60, 62, 152, 220-222
crystals, laboratory grown, 131, Division 15 (NDRC), 37, 60, 237
187–188
Division 16 (NDRC), 35, 37, 38,
Curtiss "Commando,” 168
56–59, 65
cyclotron, 153
Division 17 (NDRC), 35, 37, 38,
48, 65
Dahlgren Proving Ground, 140 Division 18 (NDRC), 37, 38, 59,
Dartmouth College, 310
65
346
SUBJECT INDEX
Division 19 (NDRC), 37
Doelcam Company, 150
Drexel Institute of Technology, 81
DUKW, 65
Dumbarton Oaks Conference
(UN), 253
Dunkerque, 10
fluorine production, 131, 133
Flutter Laboratory (M.I.T.), 169,
170, 177
food, infestation of, 75
Ford Instrument Company, Inc., 151
Ford Motor Company, 267
Foreign Economic Administration,
243—246, 251, 256
Foreign Ministers, Council of, 253
Fort Heath, 146
Fort Monmouth, 25, 40
fuels, torpedo, 188
Fulbright Bill, 253
Fury, USS, 99
Eastman Kodak Company, 212
Edgewood Arsenal, 192
Education, U.S. Office of, 35, 297
Educational Survey, Committee on
(M.I.T.), 317, 319
Edwards Company, J. T., 272
Eighth Air Force, 73, 229, 238, 239
Elliott Company, 272
Engineering Defense Bureau, 299
Engineering Defense Training pro-
gram (EDT), 35, 292, 293,
297–301, 311, 312
Engineering Science Management
War Training program
(ESMWT), 35, 297–301, 311
Engineers, Corps of, U.S. Army, 31,
51, 52, 83, 84, 175
Enlisted Reserve Corps plan (U.S.
Army), 277–281
European Inland Transport, Con
ference on, 254
Experimental Testing Board, Joint
Army-Navy, 120
explosives, safety of, 77, 82
Gas Turbine Laboratory (M.I.T.),
314, 322, 324
gas warfare, 190–192
GEE (British), 202, 203, 233
General Electric Company, 47, 62,
83, 185, 199, 217, 229, 236, 237,
324
General Foods Corporation, 270
General Machinery Corporation,
271, 272
General Motors Corporation, 181,
271, 272
General Radio Company, 35, 55,
70, 236, 237
Geological Survey, U.S., 270
George Washington University, 49
Gibraltar, U-boats in the Straits of
90
Faculty Club (M.I.T.), 323
Fay, Spofford and Thorndike, 263
Federal Reserve Board, 255
FELIX, 56, 171, 173, 174
fire control, 29–31, 37, 42-46, 51,
101, 134-147, 150, 167, 261
flame throwers, 191, 192
Fletcher School of Law and Di-
plomacy, 325
flight test instruments, aircraft, 143
glass, optical, substitutes for, 58
Gorham Manufacturing Company,
271
Ground Control of Approach
(GCA), 14, 231, 232
Ground Forces, U.S. Army, 146,
208
Group Control Council (Berlin),
69, 111
Grumman "Hellcat,” 169
SUBJECT INDEX
347
guided missiles, 29, 30, 37, 51, 54,
55, 85, 89, 142, 171-174, 177,
261
Gulf Research and Development
Corporation, 172-174
gun, erosion, 37
stress analysis, 149, 150
Gun Design Group, 149–152
gyroscope, sight, 46, 139
insect damage, 35
institutions, private and war re-
search, 128
Instrumentation Laboratory
(M.I.T.), 61, 143, 149, 152
instruments, optical, 58
intelligence, military, 77
scientific, 69, 76, 92, 110, 111, 113,
121
see also ALSOS
International Court of Justice, 253
International Telephone and Tele-
graph Company, 216
Insulation Laboratory (M.I.T.),
187, 319
invasion, African, 78
iron, isotopes of, 156
radioactive, 156
isopol, 185
Hanford, 210, 212, 213
Harriman-Beaverbrook Mission,
247, 248
Harvard University, 28, 29, 49, 59,
60, 62, 133, 164, 222, 223, 228,
247, 262, 271, 310, 325
Medical School, 162
see also Radio Research Labora-
tory
Hayden Memorial Library
(M.I.T.), 314, 321, 322
Heat Research Laboratory
(M.I.T.), 174, 177
Heyden Chemical Corporation, 163
High Voltage Laboratory (M.I.T.),
152, 204, 208
Hiroshima, 64, 209
Hood Milk Company, 225
Hunter College, 222, 223, 324
Hydrodynamics Laboratory
(M.I.T.), 322
hydrogen peroxide, 132
Jackson and Moreland, 271
Japan, incendiary attacks on, 174
"Jewish physics,” 11
Joint Board on Scientific Informa-
tion Policy, 40, 60
Joint New Weapons Committee, 33,
41, 100
Joint Target Group, 52, 98, 120
Kaiser Company, Inc., 271
Kamikaze, 46, 89, 91, 101
Kendall Company, 271
klystron, 217, 218
Koppers United Company, 270
Icaroscope, 58
icing, on aircraft, 166
Illinois, University of, 29, 222, 223,
310
incendiaries, 14, 174, 191
incendiary warfare, 52, 53
Independent Engineering Com-
pany, 182
infrared, applications of, 57, 58
detecting devices, 174
Laboratory for Nuclear Science and
Engineering (M.I.T.), 318,
319, 322, 324
landing, blind, 14, 231, 232
Langley Field, 26
Langley Memorial Laboratory, 26
Lawrence Aeronautical Corpora-
tion, 272
348
SUBJECT INDEX
lenses, plastic, 58
teaching program, war problems
Lewshle Plan, 70
of, 275–312
Lexington, USS, 147, 148
see also Acoustics Laboratory;
Librascope Inc., 62
Center of Analysis; centers of
Little, Arthur D., Inc., 35, 53, 272 research; Chemical Warfare
LORAN, 14, 70, 221, 223, 227, 232– Service Laboratory; Confiden-
234
tial Instruments Laboratory;
Los Alamos, 210, 212, 214
differential analyzer; Division
Los Angeles Ship and Drydock of Industrial Cooperation; Edu-
Company, 271
cational Survey Committee;
Flutter Laboratory; Gas Tur-
Machine Gun Trainer, Mark 1,-264 bine Laboratory; Heat Re-
Magnetic Airborne Detector, 47
search Laboratory; High Volt-
magnetron, cavity, 40, 41, 217, 219 age Laboratory; Hydrody.
splitanode, 217
namics Laboratory; Instrumen-
x-band, 41, 61
tation Laboratory; Insulation
Magnusson Bill, 77
Laboratory; Laboratory for Nu-
Manhattan District, 25, 36, 85, 131, clear Science and Engineering;
154, 194, 209, 211-214, 270
Metals Processing Laboratory;
Mars plane, 168
Prescott Laboratories of Food
Massachusetts General Hospital, Technology; Radar School; Ra-
154, 156 ,
diation Laboratory; Radioac-
Massachusetts Institute of Tech tivity Laboratory; Radiographic
nology (M.I.T.):
Laboratory; Research Labora-
alumni, 10-13
tory of Electronics; Senior
budget, 8-13
House; Servomechanisms Lab-
buildings, 4, 8, 17, 18, 127, 132
oratory; Slater Laboratory;
curricula, 4, 9
Solar Energy Conversion Re-
enrollment, 3, 9, 275, 284, 315
search Project; Spectroscopy
foreign students in, 289, 290
Laboratory; Supersonic Wind
graduate school, 9, 288
Tunnel; Torpedo Fuel Labor-
metallurgical project, 132, 209– atory; Turbo Laboratory.
214
Materials Processing Laboratory,
meteorology, war courses in, 293– 182
297
matériel, investigation of enemy,
Placement Bureau, 5
182
policy on government service, 15, Mauricio Hochschild SAMI, 183
16
Medical Corps, U.S. Army, 184
policy on supported research, medicine, aviation, 154
125-128
Memphis, USS, 100
Staff as consultants, 259–262 Merlin engine, 267
teaching program, acceleration of, Mersopol, 185
276, 277
metal, dimensional stability of, 183
SUBJECT INDEX
349
Metal Hydrides, Inc., 210, 271
metallurgy, powder, 209
Metals Processing Laboratory
(M.I.T.), 322
Metascope, 57
mica, substitute for, 186
Michigan, University of, 59, 111, 310
Michigan Tool Company, 271
microscope, electron, 162
Microwave Committee, 40, 41, 61,
67, 218, 219, 233
Midwest Rubber Reclaiming Com-
pany, 185
mildew proofing, 191
Millers Falls Company, 271
mine, acoustic, 164, 165
design of, 93, 94
plastic, detection of, 153
Ministry of Air (British), 61, 312
Ministry of Aircraft Production
(British), 61
Ministry of Home Security (Brit-
ish), 52
Ministry of Supply (British), 62,
267, 269
Minnesota, University of, 47
Morris Dam Lake, 268
mountain troops, 76, 82
Mousetrap, 50
National Defense Research Com-
mittee, 8, 17, 28-33, 35, 37, 39–
41, 47, 48, 51–56, 59-62, 64–66,
77, 82, 83, 86, 87, 95, 107, 118,
119, 120, 129, 146, 147, 151,
152, 166, 174, 187, 193, 194,
205, 216, 218, 219–222, 225,
233, 236, 248, 268
see also Applied Mathematics
Panel; Applied Psychology
Panel; Divisions 1-19 NDRC
inclusive; Committee on Demo-
lition of Obstacles to Landing
Operations; Committee on
Navigational Aids to Landing
Operations; Office of Scientific
Research and Development
National Fireworks, Inc., 271
National Research Council, 27, 28,
34, 48, 54, 59
see also Committee on Fortifica-
tion Design; Committee on
Passive Protection against
Bombing; National Academy
of Sciences
National Research Foundation, 77
Naval Ordnance Laboratory, 25, 93,
94, 98, 99, 119, 205
Naval Research and Development
Board, 32
Naval Research Laboratory, 25, 38,
39, 101, 237
Navy, U.S.:
Navy Technical Mission in
Europe, 92
see also Bureau of Aeronautics;
Bureau of Medicine and Sur-
gery; Bureau of Naval Per-
sonnel; Bureau of Ordnance;
Bureau of Ships; Coordinator
of Research and Development;
Dahlgren Proving Grounds;
Naval Ordnance Laboratory;
Nagasaki, 64
Nashua Manufacturing Company,
249
National Academy of Sciences, 27,
28, 31, 33–35, 47–49, 51, 64,
119, 163
see also National Research Coun-
cil
National Advisory Committee for
Aeronautics, 17, 25-27, 32, 33,
65, 86, 119, 129, 170, 188, 192,
250
National City Bank, 100
350
SUBJECT INDEX
Naval Research and Develop-
ment Board; Naval Research
Laboratory; Office of Naval
Research; Operations Research
Group; Taylor Model Basin;
Uranium Committee; and vari-
ous vessels by name
neoprene, 185
New Developments Division (War
Department), 77, 108
New England Power Association, 55
New York, USS, 39
New York University, 64, 295
Night Photo Squadron, 155th, AAF
202, 203
Nitralloy Corporation, 271
Normandie, SS, 237
North Carolina Shipbuilding Com-
pany, 84
North Carolina, USS, 138, 151
Northwestern Technological Insti-
tute, 109
Northwestern University, 310
Notre Dame University, 310
nuclear fission, 132, 238
Office of Naval Research, 101
Office of Production Management,
243-247
Office of the Rubber Director, 184,
243, 247, 248, 251
Office of Scientific Research and De-
velopment, 17, 25, 27, 28, 30–33,
35, 40, 41, 42, 43, 48, 49, 59,
60, 61-65, 67, 86, 97, 100, 107,
108, 110, 114, 118, 119, 129,
130, 144, 155, 161, 175, 209,
222, 228, 235, 236, 250, 256,
262, 267, 268
see also Committee on Medical
Research; National Defense
Research Committee; Office of
Field Service; Publications
Committee
Office of Scientific Research and
Development, Pacific Branch,
112, 113, 119
Office of Strategic Services, 37, 255,
256, 258
Office of War Information, 254, 255
Office of War Mobilization and Re-
conversion, 249, 250
operations analysis (or research),
86–92, 97, 98, 108, 261
Operations Research Group
(USN), 48, 49, 61, 65, 74, 86-
92, 98, 119, 120, 164
Operations Research Sections
(POA), 109, 121
Ordnance Department (U.S. Army),
25, 72, 77, 82, 141, 146–150,
167, 183, 267, 299
oxygen, generators, 14, 178–182
Oak Ridge, 85, 210, 212, 214, 325
Office of Civilian Defense, 85
Office of Education, see Education
Office of Field Service, 72, 75, 97,
99, 100, 102–121, 237
see also ALSOS; Office of Scien-
tific Research and Develop-
ment; operations analysis; Op-
erations Research Group
(USN); Operations Research
Section (POA); Research Sec-
tion (SWPA); Scientific and
Technical Advisory Section
(AFPAC)
Office of Inter-American Affairs,
252–254
Office of Lend Lease, 243-246
Packard Motor Company, 267
Patino Mines and Enterprises, 183
penicillin, 160, 163
Pennsylvania, University, 222, 223
Peter Bent Brigham Hospital, 156
SUBJECT INDEX
351
petroleum warfare, 30, 37, 191
Philco Corporation, 229
photography, aerial, 58, 59
high-speed, 196–204
night, 14, 197–204
pile, Stagg Field, 210
Plan Position Indicator (PPI), 238
plasma proteins, 162
plutonium, 155
Polaroid Corporation, 99, 264
Portland, USS, 151
Prairie, USS, 99
Pratt and Whitney Aircraft, 271,
272
Prescott Laboratories of Food Tech-
nology (M.I.T.), 74, 75, 81
Prince of Wales, HMS, 44, 134, 137
Princeton University, 20, 29, 64, 73,
222, 223, 228, 310
proximity fuse, 31, 37, 137, 261
psychological warfare, 254–257
Publications Committee, OSRD, 64
Publicker Commercial Alcohol
Company, 270
pulse ranging, 38
radar, search, 90
Radar School (M.I.T.), 221, 226–
228, 238, 301, 312
Radiation Laboratory, 18, 39–42,
60–62, 69, 70, 76, 106, 111, 130–
133, 139, 147, 152, 187, 194, 195,
203, 213, 214, 215, 220-239, 266,
324, 325
British Branch (BBRL), 40, 61,
108, 112, 119, 220, 221, 237, 238
Field Service Branch, 61, 112
see also LORAN
Radioactivity Laboratory (M.I.T.),
153–158
Radio Corporation of America, 35,
70, 83, 236, 237
Radiographic Laboratory (M.I.T.),
204, 205
Radio Research Laboratory (Har-
vard), 60, 237
radium poisoning, 154, 155
range finders, optical, 135-138
rations, Army, 14, 34, 75, 81, 82
Navy, 160
Raytheon Manufacturing Company,
131, 237, 249, 262, 271
RAZON, 55, 173
Remington Arms Company, 211
Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute,
310
Repulse, HMS, 44, 134, 137
rescue, air-sea, 14
Research Board for National Se-
curity, 33
Research Construction Company
(M.I.T.), 221, 228, 229, 231,
238
Research Corporation, 180
Research Laboratory of Electronics
(M.I.T.), 69, 318, 322, 324
Research Section (SWPA), 109
Reserve Officers Training Corps,
281, 306, 307
Quartermaster Corps, U.S. Army,
33, 35, 72, 74, 75, 76, 81, 82,
84, 160, 163, 271
Quincy Pump Company, 271
radar, 14, 29–32, 37–45, 49, 51, 54,
55, 67, 108, 118, 136, 148, 168,
215-239, 261, 262
bombing, 71
CXAM, 236, 237
CXBL, 147
H-2-X, 229
MEW, 230, 231
microwave, 216–220
SCR-582, - 228
SCR-584, – 62, 229, 230
SCR-268, 270 and 271,– 237
352
SUBJECT INDEX
resnatron, 219
resources, scientific as military
assets, 114-118
Reynolds Metals Company, 262,
263, 272
Rio Grande, SS, 90
Rochester, University of, 222, 223,
236, 325
Rockefeller Foundation, 237
Rockefeller Institute for Medical
Research, 60
rockets, 29, 31, 37, 48–51, 54, 99,
142, 261
Rock Isiand Arsenal, 264
Rohm and Haas Company, 186
Rolls-Royce, Ltd., 266, 267
Roster, National, of Scientific and
Specialized Personnel, 282
Royal Air Force (British), 52
Royal Norwegian Air Force, 312
rubber, synthetic, 184, 185
Rubber Survey Committee, 184, 251
shock, battlefield, 155, 157
Shreve, Lamb and Harmon, 263
Shrivenham University, 84
sight, 14
A-1, - 142
gyroscopic, 146, 168
Mark 14, - 138–142
Mark 15, — 141, 150
Norden, 51
S-9,- 143
Signal Corps, U.S. Army, 25, 38,
39, 40, 83, 228, 237, 270
Slater Laboratory (M.I.T.), 76
Sloan Laboratory (M.I.T.), 189
smoke, military, 191
Sniperscope, 57
Snooperscope, 57
Solace, USS, 100
Solar Energy Conversion Research
Project (M.I.T.), 161
South Dakota, USS, 138
Spectroscopy Laboratory (M.I.T.),
65, 211, 319
Sperry Gyroscope Company, Inc.,
140-147, 150, 151, 218, 236
Stabilization of Enrollment, Com-
mittee on (M.I.T.), 290, 312
Standard Oil Company of Califor-
nia, 272
Stanford University, 217, 237
State, U.S. Department of, 252, 253,
257
Statistics Laboratory (M.I.T.), 166
steel, flame treatment of, 182
non-magnetic, 183
still, solar, 161
Strategic Bombing Survey, U.S.,
73, 81, 91, 255
Studebaker Corporation, 271
student life during war, 291
subsurface warfare, 29, 31, 37, 46–
49, 67, 86, 91, 93, 164–166,
200-201, 230, 231, 262, 269
m
Schnörkel, 62, 91, 201, 261
scientific resources as military as-
sets, 114-118
Scientific and Technical Advisory
Section (AFPAC), 113
Scott and Williams, 272
scurvy, treatment of, 160
Selective Service, 8, 103, 275-288,
311
Senior House (M.I.T.), 314, 321,
323
serum phosphatase, 160
Servel, Inc., 181
servomechanisms, 5, 46, 144–151, 168
Servomechanisms Laboratory
(M.I.T.), 42, 61, 62, 139, 142–
149, 152
Sharp, George C., firm of naval
architects, 271
Sheffield Foundation, 183
SUBJECT INDEX
353
Supersonic Wind Tunnel (M.I.T.), uranium, 209–212
171, 322
Committee, 36
Supreme Headquarters Allied Ex- purification of, 154
peditionary Forces, 254
Vacuum Tube Development Com-
suture, synthetic, 159
mittee, 65
Syracuse University, 324
Valley Forge General Hospital, 162
Vanadium Alloys Steel Company,
Taylor Model Basin, 25, 101
194
Technical Industrial Intelligence
Van de Graaff generator, 196
Committee, 110
Vitamin A, synthetic, 160
Technology Plan, 125
V-1 bomb, 46, 261
Technology Review, 238
V-2 bomb, 142, 261
telescope, electron, 57
V-12 training program, USN, 9,
textile technology, 76
270, 281, 284, 291-293, 297,
thrown-ahead attack, 63
301-303, 305, 308–312
tin, Bolivian, 183, 184
Titanium Alloy Manufacturing War Department; see also Army
Company, 271
Liaison Office, 61, 76, 82
torpedo, acoustic, 90, 165
War Food Administration, 255
aerial, 268
War Labor Board, 248, 249
Torpedo Fuel Laboratory (M.I.T.), War Manpower Commission, 248,
249, 279, 282
tracers, radioactive, 153-157
War Metallurgy Committee, 36, 59,
Treasury Department, U.S., 255
182
Tufts College, 310
War Production Board, 17, 236,
Turbo Laboratory (M.I.T.), 152, 237, 243–246, 250, 251, 262
188
War Resources Board, 243, 244
Tuxedo Park Laboratory, 39, 40, War Shipping Administration, 249
218
Waterbury Clock Company, 150
Twentieth Air Force, 174
Watertown Arsenal (Army), 272,
152
299
underwater sound, 164–166, 261, waveguides, 217
262, 269
Wave Propagation Group (Colum-
Union-Bay State Chemical Com bia), 262, 272
pany, 185
Weasel, 65
Union Pacific Railroad, 248
weather, forecasting, 73, 166, 167
United Aircraft Corporation, 168, Weather Bureau, U.S., 293, 295
189, 271, 272
Weserland, SS, 90
United Drug Company, 163
Wesleyan University, 262, 265
United Nations, San Francisco Con- Western Electric Company, 229,
ference, 253
United Shoe Machinery Corpora- Westinghouse Electric Corporation,
tion, 271
62, 177, 229, 236, 237, 271
230
354
SUBJECT INDEX
Wright Field (AAF), 25, 142, 180,
197, 199–202, 272
Williams College, 100, 310
wind tunnel, supersonic, 171
Women's Auxiliary Air Force (Brit-
ish), 203
Wright Aeronautical Corporation,
271, 272
Wright Brothers Memorial Wind
Tunnel (M.I.T.), 168
X-ray, generators, 131
high-voltage, 204
Yale University, 107, 237, 249, 325
York Safe and Lock Company, 271

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