PI CONGRESS •AQRİAZMUNCHED. RIVERS AND HARBORS İKİYARETUŠNI sujet ST. LAWRENCE BASIN 1.2 Mat TC 427 $3 U57 1941 Đ Đ V B 428849 * こ ​-" GENERAL LIBRARY ARTES QU ERSIT UKI 1817 ·SCIENTIA ļ • VERITAS OF MICHIG A TE # тс 427 33 457 GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE BASIN HEARINGS BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON RIVERS AND HARBORS HOUSE OF RÈPRESENTATIVES SEVENTY-SEVENTH CONGRESS FIRST SESSION ON THE SUBJECT OF THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE SEAWAY AND POWER PROJECT PART 1 JUNE 17 TO JULY 9, 1941 I REVISED GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE BASIN U. & Bones. House. Commettle on rivers and harbors HEARINGS BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON RIVERS AND HARBORS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 62660 SEVENTY-SEVENTH CONGRESS FIRST SESSION ON THE SUBJECT OF THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE SEAWAY AND POWER PROJECT PART 1 JUNE 17 TO JULY 9, 1941 REVISED …………. UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE WASHINGTON: 1942 COMMITTEE ON RIVERS AND HARBORS JOSEPH J. MANSFIELD, Texas, Chairman JOSEPH A. GAVAGAN, New York LEX GREEN, Florida MARTIN F. SMITH, Washington WILLIAM T. SCHULTE, Indiana HUGH PETERSON, Georgia C. JASPER BELL, Missouri GRAHAM A. BARDEN, North Carolina JOHN E. RANKIN, Mississippi FRANK W. BOYKIN, Alabama JERRY VOORHIS, California MICHAEL J. KIRWAN, Ohio ANTON F. MACIEJEWSKI, Illinois CLYDE T. ELLIS, Arkansas ALFRED F. BEITER, New York II ALBERT E, CARTER, California FRANCIS D. CULKIN, New York GEORGE A. DONDERO, Michigan WILLIAM A. PITTENGER, Minnesota ROBERT L. RODGERS, Pennsylvania HOMER D. ANGELL, Oregon GEORGE H. BENDER, Ohio JOSHUA L. JOHNS, Wisconsin FRANK C. OSMERS, JR., New Jersey LEONARD W. HALL, New York ANTHONY J. DIMOND, Alaska SAMUEL W. KING, Hawaii JOSEPH H. MCGANN, Clerk ... £24. Mi NITHE STATES DU AHEMICA Mees *^* X ***\ là 1 nh 2 List of witnesses: Barnes, Julius H. Battle, John D.. Bede, Hon. J. Adam. Bergen, Hugh G__ Howe, R. E Hughitt, Thomas. Ireland, R. L., Jr.. Berle, Adolf Augustus, Jr. Beukema, John C.. Bland, Hon. S. O……. Blunt, Royden A…. Bodman, H. L.. Bonbright, Dr. James C. Brissette, Armand J., Jr. Brown, Alexander C- Brown, Andrew H_ Burns, Carlisle__ Burton, Frederick W. Butler, Hon. J. C__ Cafferty, Hon. Frank J. Callaghan, Cornelius H Conover, Julian D. Corbett, John T. Costello, Hon. James P., Jr. Cruise, Gerald V II 1 1 I I I I 11│ Jeffries, Hon. Edward J. Johnson, Gilbert R___ Johnson, W. D... Jones, Hon. Jesse H. Jones, W.-A_ Kasten, Hugo. Keiser, F. S.. J │ Danahy, James W. Danielian, Dr. N. R. Davis, Frank S. Dixon, Hon. Frank M. Edgar, Ralph C.. Ellis, Hon. Clyde T. England, Capt. Richard W. Flannery, Hon. J. Harold_ Fletcher, R. V. Frye, P. A.. Fuller, Hubert B Gaillard, S. P., Jr. Garsaud, Marcel- Greek, Darold I Griffith, M. D__ Grimm, George S.. Halleck, Hon. Charles A…. Hamlin, Chauncey J. Handschin, Robert_ Hart, Merwin K. Hedden, Walter P Hedges, M. H_ Henderson, Hon. Leon_ Hiltner, J. K.. Holling, Hon. Thomas L. Hood, J. M CONTENTS I 11 I ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬11111 11 11 I 1 ▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬ ▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬│ ▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬│ ▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬ ▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬ ▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬1 ▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬│ ▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬│ ▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬ ▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬ ▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬ ▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬1 ▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬│ ▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬! ▬▬▬▬▬▬▬ ▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬ ▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬ ▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬ !!!!!!!!!!…………………▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬!!!!!!!!!!!!! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! │▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬!!!!!!!! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !………………………………………………………………!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!………………………▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬…………………………………………………!!! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !!!……………▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬!!!!!!!!! ▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬│ !!!!!!!!!!▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬│!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!……………………………………………………………………………………!!!!!!!! ……………▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬!!!! ! ! !!!!!▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬………………………………▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬…………… ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !!!!!!!!!……………▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬…………………………………▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬…………!!!!! !!!!!………▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬……………………………EEEEEEE!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬、、、、、、、、、、、、、……………………………!!! │▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬ !!!!!………▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬……………………………………▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬!!! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !……………………………………………………………………………………!!!! │!!!│▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬ 1 1 1 1 1▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬ !!!!!▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬!!!!! !!!!!!!……………………………………………!!!!!!!! ▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬ ▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬! …………………………………………… ▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬………… │▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬ ▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬ ▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬ ………… 1 ▬▬▬▬▬ ▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬││ ……… T 1 E 1 ▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬│LE ▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬│ ……………▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬ ▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬ ▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬ ▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬│I …………………………! ▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬│ ……………… ▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬ 11 !! …………… II T - ▬▬▬▬▬▬▬ E 11 I I 11 11 Jackman, Prof. William T.. I 1 I ! ▬▬▬▬ 1 F ……│ ▬▬▬▬▬▬▬ ▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬ 1 I I 1 1 1 ▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬ I I . 1 1 I I 1 │ FE 1 1 I 1 ▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬1 1 114 …………│▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬ELTE!!! I I ▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬ ↑ 11 ││ I 1 1 I 1 19, 48, 64, 67 939 1 ││ | I 1460 1488 1118 841, 878, 895 1654 1638 1 I 11 I│ 1 1 } 1 1 111 I 1171 1949, 1957 466, 477, 525 1029 1353 [ I 1 1 1253 1045, 1104 2093 1651 1667 1017, 1041 2229 1307 558 2105 1553 1125 1542 1688 769 1869 2019 282 1551 2028 931, 1834 1 I I Page 302 1522 1844 1324 1 I 1 1 1 1 [ 751 2028 1195 1115 1173 1333 1495 619 709, 736 1 1919 I 1650 877 1275 2033 632 1253 2029 2244 403 1629 2197 III AI CONTENTS Kennedy, Thomas. Ketner, H. E__ Kilburn, Hon. Clarence E. Knox, Hon. Frank Knudsen, William S.. LaGuardia, Hon. Fiorello H. Lehman, Hon. Herbert_ Lewis, John L. Luhrsen, J. G.- Lush, S. C.. T 11 1 ! J I I } I Madeira, Louis C. Maize, Richard_ Mansfield, Hon. J. J. McCaffrey, George H. McGrath, Tom J Minott, George H. Molloy, Mrs. Joseph J. Moses, Hon. John_ Nesbitt, J. A__ Newton, Hon. Cleveland A. Northrup, John H.. O'Brien, Hon. George D_ O'Brien, Thomas C- Olds, Hon. Leland. Owens, John R……… Panasci, Anthony_ Parker, F. W_ Parker, Walter. Parmelee, J. H_ Perkins, Coleman T. Phillips, Hon. Leon C……. Poletti, Hon. Charles. Pouder, G. H_ Raper, Charles L. Regan, Michael E Reilly, John J__ Renshaw, Fred M. 1 I 1 1│ I 11 ………1 [11 ▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬│ ▬▬▬▬▬ ………… H.. Williams, Samuel Wing, Frederick K. Wood, A. T__ Wood, Baldwin... Zeidler, Hon. Carl F.. Ziegler, Louis. } } 1 1│▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬1 I I 1 1 │ 11 1│ 11 ▬▬▬▬▬▬▬ 1 …! …… 1│▬▬▬▬▬│ 4 411 111111 41 11 1│▬▬▬▬▬│ 11 ▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬ ▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬1 ▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬ ▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬ 11│▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬ ………│▬▬▬▬▬▬│▬▬▬▬▬▬ ▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬ 1▬▬▬▬│ ▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬│ ▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬││ 11411▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬ ▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬ ▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬ 1 1111…………… FIFI…▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬ │ E ││▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬│ 1111▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬ ▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬ ▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬ 1 14 ▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬ 111 It ▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬ ▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬ 1111111│T I ▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬ 11 ▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬ ▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬ ││ ▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬ ……………………………………………………!!!!!!!!!…………………… ………………………………││! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !│▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬ ▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬│││!!│▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬ ▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬…………………………………!!!!………………………… ▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬…………!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!…………………… …………………………………! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !!! !!! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !!!………………… ………………………………………▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬ $11 ………………………………!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!……………………………………………… ……… ▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬ ▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬ │▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬1 ▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬│!!!!!!!!!!!!!▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬ ▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬!!!!!!!!!!!!!! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !!!!………… ▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬ !…………………………………………………………│1 ▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬ ▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬ …………………………▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬ ▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬ ▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬………………… ▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬ ▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬ ▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬ ▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬ ▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬│ 11 I ▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬│ ▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬ … 1 ▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬ …▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬││ ▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬│ ▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬│ J│ ▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬ …………▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬ !!!!!……………………!!!! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !!!………………………………………… ▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬ ▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬│ $1 …………▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬ ▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬ ……………▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬ E 1│ 11 ▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬ IT 1 t 111 1 1 1 I 1 I Galle 1 11 I │││ 1 111 I│ │ Robins, Brig. Gen. Thomas M. Rock, Admiral George H. Ross, John H.. Sabin, L. C... Salmon, Herbert S. Saunders, Capt. Thomas Howard.. Schulten, Walter F Stadell, Charles W.. Stansbury, H. A_ Stassen, Hon. Harold E. Stimson, Hon. Henry L. Sullivan, Edmund D... Sullivan, Jesse V__ Taber, L. J.. Tallamy, Bertram D.. Taylor, Tyre__ Thornton, E. H_ Ulinski, J. A.. Umhey, Frederick F. Vogtle, Alvin W. Walker, Francis S. Ward, Ralph P. Waters, Mrs. Agnes_ Wickard, Hon. Claude R_ Widell, C. E. │T II [{ 11 │││▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬│ 111 T 11 111111 I 1 1 ▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬ I T I I 1 1 1 │ I I 11 Li. 1 I It I 1 I 1 1 I I 1 I 1 C 11 I 1 │▬▬▬▬▬▬│ 14 │ 1 I t 1 I 1 95 813 1071 114, 116, 118 1516 2000 1817 1686 1811 1742 1290 369, 400 1663 766 891 1915 1718 1158 1 1 1 1 1 1 I 1 1 I I 1 I 1 1 I I 1 1 I 1 198 523 321 2024 707 1263 1392 2162 1194 1357 233 1711 1235 1176 2027 1136 165, 203, 967, 998 147 914 432, 452 2096 660 1561 2271 2100 915 3 T ││ I I I | | 1 1 | 1 I 11 I F I 1 I | 11 │ I 1 1 1 1 ! 1 1 I | 1 T 1 1 1 ││ 1 Į 1 I 1 1 1 1 1 1191 1557 1387 565, 599, 668 2134 1747 1128 1003 1987 1269 2085 2140 1962 1760 1891 1105 1857 1401 795 2026 1 T 11 1 I I T Page 1465 1412 1953 1 T │ GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE BASIN TUESDAY, JUNE 17, 1941 HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON RIVERS AND HARBORS, Washington, D. C. The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:30 a. m., in the com- mittee room, new House Office Building, Hon. Joseph J. Mansfield (chairman) presiding. The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. We have before us for consideration this morning H. R. 4927 to provide for the improvement of the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence Basin in the interest of national defense, and for other purposes. The bill will be inserted in the record. (The bill H. R. 4927 above referred to is as follows:) [H. R. 4927, 77th Cong., 1st sess.] A BILL To provide for the improvement of the Great Lakes-Saint Lawrence Basin in the interest of national defense, and for other purposes Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That for the purpose of promoting interstate and foreign commerce and the national defense, and providing an improved waterway through the Great Lakes, the Saint Lawrence River, and connecting waters reaching to the Atlantic Ocean, and for the generating of electric energy as a means of financing, aiding, and assisting such undertaking, the agreement made by and between the Governments of the United States and Canada, published in House Document Numbered 153, Seventy-seventh Congress, first session, providing for the construction of dams and power works in the International Rapids section of the Saint Lawrence River, and the completion of the Saint Lawrence Deep Waterway, is hereby approved; and the President is authorized and empowered to fulfill the undertakings made in said agreement on behalf of the United States, and to delegate any of the powers and duties vested in him by this Act to such officers, departments, agents, or agencies of the United States as he may designate or appoint. The works allocated for con- struction by the United States under said agreement shall be undertaken im- mediately under the direction of the Secretary of War and the supervision of the Chief of Engineers in accordance with the laws, regulations, and procedures applicable to rivers and harbors projects, subject, however, to the terms and conditions of said agreement; and shall be diligently prosecuted with a view to making essential facilities of said project available for national defense uses at the earliest possible moment. SEC. 2. The President is hereby authorized and directed to negotiate an ar- rangement with the Power Authority of the State of New York for the transfer to said Power Authority of the power facilities constructed pursuant to this authorization and the right to use the United States' share of the waters at the project for hydroelectric power purposes upon such terms and conditions as may be agreed upon, including provision for payment of $93,375,000, which represents the revised estimate of cost allocated to power in accordance with the method of allocation included in the joint recommendation of the Corps of Engineers, United States Army, and the Power Authority of the State of New York dated February 7, 1933, such payment to be made by the Power Authority over a 1 2 GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE BASIN period of fifty years with interest at the rate of 3 per centum compounded an- nually. In addition, the arrangement shall include provisions protecting the interests of the United States and assuring a widespread equitable disposition of the power to domestic and rural consumers within economic transmission distances, and provisions for the prior use of such water for the purposes of navigation and the delivery, without charge to the War Department, of so much power as said Department shall need for the operation of navigation fa- cilities. The arrangement negotiated pursuant to this section shall be reported to Congress upon the convening of its next session, and shall become effective when ratified by Congress and the State of New York. SEC. 3. When the Secretary of War deems it necessary for the purpose of expediting the construction of this project he may enter into contracts without advertising or competitive bidding: Provided, That the cost-plus-a-percentage-of- cost system of contracting shall not be used; but this proviso shall not be con- strued to prohibit the use of the cost-plus-a-fixed-fee form of contract when such use is deemed necessary by the Secretary of War, and this authority to contract may be exercised through such officer or officers as the Secretary of War may designate. The prior use of all waters of the Saint Lawrence River within the boundaries of the United States and all lands, dam sites, and ease- ments required for the purposes of this Act are hereby declared to be necessary for the regulation of interstate and foreign commerce. The CHAIRMAN. I suggest that the President's message be printed at this point. (The message above referred to reads as follows:) [H. Doc. No. 245, 77th Cong., 1st sess.] To the Congress of the United States: I recommend authorization of construction of the St. Lawrence seaway and power project, pursuant to the agreement of March 19, 1941, with Canada, as an integral part of the joint defense of the North American continent. Production and more production is the keynote of our all-out race for na- tional defense. Electric power and transportation are limiting factors in the production of planes, guns, tanks, and ships. The enemies of democracy are developing every hydroelectric resource and every waterway from Norway to the Dardanelles. Are we to allow this con- tinent to be outmatched because short-sighted interests oppose the development of one of our greatest resources? Your action on this project will either make available or withhold 2,200,000 horsepower of low-cost electric power for the joint defense of North America. Your action on this project will either open or keep bottled up one of the greatest transportation resources ever offered a people. Both countries need the power. Both face power shortages which threaten to grow more serious as the demands of the defense program multiply with almost incredible rapidity. Let us remember that it takes tens of thousands of kilowatt-hours of electricity to produce the materials that go into a single airplane. Our present aluminum program alone calls for more than 10,000,000,000 kilowatt-hours a year. It is constantly expanding with the need for more planes to outstrip the aggressors. Steam-power-plant construction offers no substitute for St. Lawrence power. No steam plants can provide the large blocks of low-cost electric energy required for certain essential defense industries. Furthermore, we are going to need all our capacity to produce steam-power-plant equipment to meet the tremendous demands which are growing in other parts of the country and to build power installations to drive our merchant and naval vessels. Our defense production is a gigantic assembly line. Transportation is its conveyor belt. If raw materials cannot flow freely to our great industrial plants, and the products cannot move continuously to the front, defense breaks down. Bottlenecks in transportation are as serious as shortages of power. Expanding production is going to burden the railroads to the limit. We are expanding their rolling stock as fast as we can, but even the present orders for new cars and locomotives are competing for manufacturing capacity which could otherwise produce tanks and other items of heavy armament. The seaway will help prevent transportation bottlenecks. It will provide a great highway to and from important defense-production areas. It will cut by more than a thousand miles the stretch of dangerous open water which must GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE BASIN 3 be traveled by supplies to Great Britain and strategic North Atlantic bases. It will increase our capacity to build ships. The Great Lakes today hold many shipways and drydocks, as well as resources of men and materials for shipbuilding. They are bottled up because we have delayed completing the seaway. If we start the seaway now, scores of additional merchant ships may be built in coastal yards freed by transferring a portion of the longer-term naval program to the Great Lakes. The St. Lawrence project must be expedited. No comparable power, shipbuild- ing, and transportation facilities can be made available in the time required to construct this project. In dealing with the present emergency, too many people have underestimated the degree to which our resources will be taxed. We cannot afford to make any more mistakes of that kind. I am advised that we can build the St. Lawrence project in 4 years. Under emergency pressure it may be completed in less time. I should like to agree with the people who say that the country's danger will be over sooner than that. But the course of world events gives no such assurance, and we have no right to take chances with the national safety. I know of no single project of this nature more important to this country's future in peace or war. Its authorization will demonstrate to the enemies of democracy that, however long the effort, we intend to outstrip them in the race of production. In the modern world that race determines the rise and fall of nations. I hope that authorization will not be delayed. THE WHITE HOUSE, June 5, 1941. FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT. The CHAIRMAN. Gentlemen of the committee, we have a good many witnesses to come before us in the next few days and I suggest that each witness from the stand may be permitted to complete his state- ment before he is interfered with by questions, and then we will give each member of the committee an opportunity to ask questions at the proper time. We have first with us Mr. Secretary Stimson, Secretary of War, and, Mr. Secretary, we will be glad to hear from you. STATEMENT OF HON. HENRY LEWIS STIMSON, SECRETARY OF WAR, ACCOMPANIED BY MAJ. GEN. THOMAS M. ROBINS, ASSISTANT TO THE CHIEF OF ENGINEERS Secretary STIMSON. Mr. Chairman- The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary. Secretary STIMSON. On the 18th of July 1932, I signed on behalf of this country as Secretary of State, the original treaty with Canada for the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence deep waterway. I understand that you have before you now H. R. 4927, to approve of an agreement providing for the construction of the St. Lawrence deep waterway, the agreement being published as House Document No. 153. I am informed that the project of the St. Lawrence waterway which is provided by that agreement is substantially the same as the water- way provided for by the treaty which I signed as Secretary of State, with a single difference, which I will speak of in a moment. The reasons which actuated the Government at that time in propos- ing that waterway was stated by President Hoover on the same day the treaty was signed in the following language, which I should like to read into the record. The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir. 4 GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE BASIN Secretary STIMSON (reading): The treaty represents to me the redemption of a promise which I made to the people of the Midwest. It provides for the construction of a 27-foot waterway from the sea to all Canadian and American points on the Great Lakes. Such a depth will admit practically 90 percent of ocean shipping of the world to our lake cities in the States of New York, Ohio, Michigan, Indiana, Illinois, Wisconsin, and Minnesota. Its influence in cheapening transportation of overseas goods will stretch widely into the interior from these points. Its completion will have a profoundly favorable effect upon the development of agriculture and industry throughout the Midwest. The large byproduct of power will benefit the Northwest. These benefits are mutual with the great Dominion to the north. Now, I understand that the only substantial difference between the two projects is that whereas in 1932 there was contemplated a two-stage development of the portion of the waterway which runs through the International Rapids, now under the present agreement, there is but . one stage contemplated. At the time when the first treaty was proposed, the United States Government favored the one-stage project just as at present before you. The two-stage arrangement was made at the insistence of the Gov- ernment of Canada which feared for the overflow that would be caused by such a large dam, if one was created. Canada, I understand, has now yielded her objections and the con- struction is for one stage as I stated. That results in certain benefits. The one-stage system produces somewhat more electric power than the two-stage and it produces it at less cost of construction. So that the project as a whole before you is substantially the same as that which was proposed before, with the exception of this improvement in favor of the present project. There may be some other minor changes, but I am not familiar with them at the present time and they can be taken up by other witnesses. In the next place, the waterway provided by the proposed plan is for a 27-foot waterway throughout the entire Lakes and throughout the St. Lawrence River, with locks 800 feet in length. The benefit of that change in regard to the facilities of shipping can be estimated when you consider that the present through waterway route provides for only 14 feet of depth and locks only 260 feet long. In other words, the present waterway is not feasible to ocean shipping. There is one further benefit in the situation before you now over what we had 9 years ago in consequence of construction possibilities under modern methods. It was then estimated that the waterway would take some 10 years to complete. The Engineers inform me that it can now be built in 4 years, and possibly in three working seasons, the main improvement arising from the improvement in engineering methods in such projects that have been attained since that date. So far as the benefits to this country at this time of emergency are concerned, as I see them in my Department, they are: First, the increase in our shipbuilding capacity by taking in the shipbuilding capacity on the Great Lakes; second, so far as transportation of munitions to Great Britain is concerned, there is a slight improvement, compara- tively, in the distance which such munitions could be transported in a protected route. S In other words, under the existing seaway they could be transported without interruption as far as Labrador, without peril, I mean, GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE BASIN 5 whereas now they have to start from either New York or other places on the coast farther away. Thirdly, the great advantage is the fact that this waterway will produce an estimated total horsepower of 2,200,000. Now, that is a very important matter at this time of strain. This horsepower produced by this proposed project is, I am in- formed by the engineers, the largest block of undeveloped power at one site in the United States, as well as the cheapest in its operation. Speaking generally, it takes advantage of this enormous reservoir constituted by the five Great Lakes, of water power, and produces in the St. Lawrence River a flow of water which is steady throughout all seasons and does not have to be supplemented with steam power, and is, therefore, the most cheap to operate. When I speak of the 2,200,000 horsepower, I am speaking of the total horsepower produced of which we shall receive one half. Looking at it in just a final word, this project is proposed to realize the possibility of a great seaway reaching from the Atlantic Ocean into the very center of our country and producing, as Mr. Hoover said, in the statement which I read great decreases of ultimate costs in transportation of basic products from all of the central States of the United States. Benefit in transportation, whatever the immediate disturbance that may be produced, ultimately inures to the benefit of the entire people of the country and to me it seems inconceivable that when we take into consideration the long view, that we should not have the benefit of this great possibility of cheapened transportation and increased power. I think that that is all I have to say about it, sir. The details of the engineering part can be testified to by General Robins who has been a member of the joint committee on this, and I understand studies of the commercial benefits and effects of the waterway have been under study by the Department of Commerce. Any international matters further than that can be, and I under- stand, will be, testified to by the Secretary of State when he has finished with his unfortunate indisposition. The CHAIRMAN. I understand the Secretary of State will appear later, if he desires, not being able to be out today. Now, Mr. Secretary, when this matter was up before, acted on in the United States Senate, I believe in 1934, at that time the produc- tion of power and transportation alone seemed to have been the only features under consideration. We now have shipbuilding and power for national-defense pur- poses more prominent than was ever heretofore considered. J Now, objection has been made by many that this proposal could not operate to any extent for national-defense purposes, for the reason it is claimed that peace will probably be declared and the world cooled off a little before this work can be completed. In your opinion, will defense measures be necessary several years from now, say 4 or 5 years in the future? Secretary STIMSON. Mr. Chairman, I can only speak on such a ques- tion with the reservations that any person speaking in 1941 must speak about such an enormous drama as is going on throughout the 6 GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE BASIN world today; but I can only say that in my opinion, it is necessary to prepare for a very long emergency. We all hope that it will be briefer, but it is not safe to act on hopes in such a case as confronts us today. The one thing that your question brings up, Mr. Chairman, is that the construction of this seaway must necessarily be taken with due re- gard for the priorities of certain other great matters of national con- struction which are of immediate importance, this year-next year- but, even so, there is a very good chance, a very strong chance, in my opinion, of the emergency lasting long enough to enable this country to reap the benefits of this construction of the seaway. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Carter, did you wish to ask any questions? Mr. CARTER. Mr. Secretary, you stated, you signed the treaty in regard to this matter, I believe, in 1932, when you were then Sec- retary of State? Secretary STIMSON. Yes, sir. Mr. CARTER. That treaty, I presume, was prepared under your direction? Secretary STIMSON. Well, under my supervision; my general super- vision. Mr. CARTER. Your supervision? Secretary STIMSON. Yes. I did not have charge of the details of it. Mr. CARTER. No. Secretary STIMSON. And it was 9 years ago. Mr. CARTER. I beg your pardon. Secretary STIMSON. And it was 9 years ago. Mr. CARTER. What became of that treaty? Secretary STIMSON. I understand that it was not approved by the Senate. Mr. CARTER. Another treaty was submitted to the Senate of the United States in regard to this matter, was it not, at a later time? Secretary STIMSON. I do not recollect it, sir. I ceased to be Sec- retary of State, as you may or may not recall, on the 4th of March 1933, and, thereafter, I had no connection with this or any other treaty. Mr. CARTER. At the time you were Secretary of State you thought that the treaty was the proper way to approach this problem, did you? Secretary STIMSON. It is the way that we did approach it then, sir. Mr. CARTER. Have you any doubt as to the legality of the manner of approach on this particular occasion? Secretary STIMSON. You mean this case before us? Mr. CARTER. Yes. Secretary STIMSON. Why Mr. CARTER. Yes; approaching it not through the treaty avenue, but through another avenue. Secretary STIMSON. I have not considered that at all, sir; have had nothing to do with it. Mr. CARTER. You have not given any consideration to the legal aspect; it has not been within your province and is not at this time? Secretary STIMSON. It is not within my province or consideration. GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE BASIN 7 Mr. CARTER. You would not venture an estimate of the cost of this project, Mr. Secretary, or would you want to do that, for the benefit and enlightenment of the committee? Secretary STIMSON. There has been an estimate of it made by the Corps of Engineers, I believe, and I should prefer to have you get the details from them. I can only speak from hearsay. Mr. CARTER. You have not gone over it personally then yourself? Secretary STIMSON. Not the estimates; no, sir. Mr. CARTER. You say that you list as one of the benefits an increase in shipbuilding. Secretary STIMSON. An increase in the facilities for shipbuilding. Mr. CARTER. Well, do you mean by that that we would have an in- creased coast line, or do you mean by that that there are actual facili- ties there that are available now for shipbuilding? Secretary STIMSON. I am informed that there are actual facilities for shipbuilding on various portions of the Great Lakes; but I under- stand- Mr. CARTER (interposing). You are not prepared as to the details as to that? Secretary STIMSON. I am not at all. I understand that you are go- ing to have the Secretary of the Navy before you and possibly others who may have studied that. I have not studied it. Mr. CARTER. That is all. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Gavagan. Mr. GAVAGAN. Mr. Secretary, this bill as submitted to us, H. R. 4927, is undoubtedly, is it not, predicated upon the treaty between the United States and Canada to which you testified? Secretary STIMSON. What do you mean by "predicated"? Mr. GAVAGAN. I mean this bill is based upon the treaty entered into between the United States and Canada? Secretary STIMSON. If you mean by that that it contemplates the same kind of a waterway, I answer yes. Mr. GAVAGAN. Well, as a matter of fact, does not the bill in specific terms approve the treaty? I call your attention to page 2, line 5. After citing the treaty it says "is hereby approved." Secretary STIMSON. Excuse me, sir. I think that is the agreement. I do not think this refers to, or attempts to ratify the treaty. Mr. GAVAGAN. Well, the agreement is not the agreement based upon the treaty? Secretary STIMSON. The agreement provides in substance for the same kind of a project as the treaty did, if that is what you mean by being based upon it, that is so. Mr. GAVAGAN. In other words- Secretary STIMSON (continuing). But it is an entirely new agree- ment. Mr. GAVAGAN. But, it provides for substantially the same project as the treaty? Secretary STIMSON. It does. The CHAIRMAN. Judge Culkin. Mr. CULKIN. Mr. Chairman, I have received some maps from the engineers which cover this development. The CHAIRMAN. We will have those passed around. TE 8 GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE BASIN Mr. CULKIN. I understand that my colleague, Mr. Pittenger has an illuminated map, or a colored map, which is to be considered later. Mr. PITTENGER. A colored map prepared by the St. Lawrence sur- vey in the Department of Commerce. The CHAIRMAN. Perhaps you will want to use that when we get the engineers on the stand. Mr. PITTENGER. Yes. The CHAIRMAN. Do you have any questions, Mr. Culkin? Mr. CULKIN. My colleague, Mr. Carter, asked you with reference to the propriety of ratifying this agreement with Canada by joint resolution. Is it not a fact that that is the way Texas came into the Union? Secreary STIMSON. I do not dispute it, sir, if it is your recollection that that is the case. Mr. CULKIN. Well, that is true, I think. You can see no present impropriety in legislation, constitutional impropriety in this, Mr. Secretary? Secretary STIMSON. I have not been aware of any. The CHAIRMAN. Judge Culkin, if you will permit me, in order to keep the record straight, I will say that Texas had a treaty with the United States for annexation to be admitted as a State. That treaty was defeated in the United States Senate in 1844. Then after the Presidential election in 1845, a resolution was passed by Congress creating Texas as a State, and it was not based upon the treaty. Mr. ČULKIN. As I understand your testimony, Mr. Secretary, your Department and you yourself, as Secretary of War, regard this project as essential to national defense. Am I correct in that? Secretary STIMSON. I think it is a valuable national defense meas- ure. Mr. CULKIN. And if the war continues for some time, whether or not we participate in it, it will become more and more important, in your judgment? Secretary STIMSON. I think so. It is particularly valuable in the production of power. Mr. CULKIN. Yes. Secretary STIMSON. That is what brought it to my attention, par- ticularly. I have become aware of the possible shortage of power in the large effort which this country is contemplating now in the manufacture of its national-defense munitions, and this will be an addition of more than a million horsepower to that power, in a very strategically well-situated, part of the country. It would be within reach of a great many of our industrial cities. Mr. CULKIN. Mr. Secretary, would you venture a prophecy, assum- ing that we do enter the war, as to the probable length of it? Secretary STIMSON. I would rather not. I would rather not even hazard a guess at that, sir. Mr. CULKIN. Could you say this, that this would be a prolonged war, reaching through many years? Secretary STIMSON. I think we are facing a possibility of a long war. Mr. CULKIN. Yes. Secretary STIMSON. A very strong possibility. GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE BASIN 9 Mr. CULKIN. And the use of this power and these added shipping facilities to continental America would be a matter of prime im- portance to the outcome of that struggle? Secretary STIMSON. It would be a matter of great importance. Mr. CULKIN. That is all. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Green. Mr. GREEN. Mr. Secretary, under the provisions of the bill, and its operations, is it expected that Canada and the United States will share equally in the cost of construction? Secretary STIMSON. Well, I would rather have you ask General Robins questions on that subject, because that is a matter that comes directly within his province. The costs in general are to be shared, but they vary in amount now remaining to be paid, because each of the countries has already per- formed some of the work that will be counted in as a part of the construction of this seaway when it takes place. For instance, I believe Canada has done some work on the Welland Canal, and I believe we have done some work on some of the other parts of the improvements that come within the United States, and I should not like to make a statement upon, exactly what remains to be divided when there is a gentleman here who knows the facts and can give you the whole thing. I know that generally the provision was that the two countries should share equally. Mr. GREEN. In costs and benefits? Secretary STIMSON. In costs and benefits. Mr. GREEN. That is all. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Dondero. Mr. DONDERO. Mr. Secretary, can you give the committee any in- formation as to about how much shipbuilding capacity the Great Lakes yards would add to our national-defense program, so far as ship- building is now concerned? Secretary STIMSON. As I have already said, sir, I think that the Secretary of the Navy is coming to testify before you on that subject. I am not prepared to do it. Mr. DONDERO. You offered it as an opinion that if the seaway were completed under modern methods and improved methods of warfare that it would be highly important to the United States that some of the shipbuilding facilities should be located in the interior of the country, such as the Great Lakes section. Secretary STIMSON. I think I may have said something upon which you have based that. I think it would. I think it would be important that we should have some of the shipbuilding facilities for which an opportunity is offered by this project. Mr. DONDERO. The fact is that the President of the United States has already suggested that our great munitions plants be located somewhere between the Allegheny Mountains and the Rocky Moun- tains in the Midwest, to remove them from the fear and danger of bombing on the coast line of the country. Is that not correct? Secretary STIMSON. Yes; I think you are correct on that. Mr. DONDERO. Just one more question. The agreement that has been signed between Canada and the United States is based entirely upon a 10 GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE BASIN provision in the treaty of 1909 between the two countries which pro- vided that any matters coming up between the border waterways might be disposed of by concurrent legislation. Secretary STIMSON. I accept your statement, sir. I am not in a posi- tion to comment on it, for I have not refreshed my mind on it for a long time. Mr. DONDERO. That is all, Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Smith. Mr. SMITH. Mr. Secretary, realizing how important the time element is in our entire national-defense program, I understand that it is your opinion that the power in the St. Lawrence project will probably be available within a period of from 3 to 4 years? Secretary STIMSON. No; I have not said that, sir. I would rather have you ask for the details from the engineers. I am speaking just out of caution. The waterway, I am told, might be completed, with good luck, in three working seasons; but that does not apply to the power construc- tion, which would take somewhat longer. How much longer, I would rather have you ask General Robins. Mr. SMITH. But are you of the opinion, Mr. Secretary, that the gen- eration of power and making it available to our Government, a large block of power, would be a very valuable factor in the prosecution of any war which we might have to enter? Secretary STIMSON. With that I heartily agree. Mr. SMITH. Is it not a fact that Germany, starting with the Hitler regime, has developed all of the available hydroelectric power within Germany and now, since the outbreak of the war, is doing the same thing in all of the conquered countries under her sovereignty at this time? Secretary STIMSON. Well, I cannot state the extent of which she has done it, but I understand she is making great steps in that direction. Mr. SMITH. I have read somewhere the statement by an expert that the war might be won or lost, according to the number of kilowatt- hours available, electricity available. Is that a very far-fetched state- ment? Secretary STIMSON. I have not read that, but I think the matter of electric power would certainly be a very large factor in the industrial development necessary to produce the mechanized warfare of the pres- ent day. Mr. SMITH. Was it not demonstrated in the case of France, that that had a lot to do with her sudden collapse and downfall, the fact that she had not had and did not have the electric energy to carry out the vast mass-production program that was necessary? Secretary STIMSON. Well, I could not state on that, sir, from my own knowledge at all. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Pittenger. Mr. PITTENGER. I have no questions. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Schulte. Mr. SCHULTE. Mr. Secretary, you said, if I heard you correctly and remember right, that it was very necessary that this project be built for the defense of this Nation. Secretary STIMSON. I said it was important, sir. Mr. PITTENGER. I assume that you mean for this present conflict; is that right? GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE BASIN 11 Secretary STIMSON. I haven't said that, sir. I was asked the ques- tion whether this emergency might last for a long time, and I said it might. I think that is as far as I have gone on that, sir. You are trying now to pin me down to a statement that it is necessary for the present part of the emergency, and I never said that. Mr. PITTENGER. No; I am not trying to do that, Mr. Secretary. What I am trying to do is to get some facts so as to enlighten this com- mittee. You said that you thought it would be a long war; is that right? Secretary STIMSON. I said it might be a long war. Mr. PITTENGER. What makes you think, Mr. Secretary, that it might be a long war? Secretary STIMSON. When I review the various factors that are en- gaged in it, the strength of the opposing parties, and the eventualities that may occur, I think it is quite a possible thing that it may be a long war. Mr. PITTENGER. That is all, Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Rodgers. Mr. RODGERS. Mr. Secretary, Mr. Carter approached this proposi- tion from the standpoint of the former treaty. It is not clear to me and maybe you can clear it up for me, just why we depart from the usual procedure, from the precedent established in 1932 and 1934 with reference to approaching this subject from the treaty standpoint and now to depart from that and approach it from the joint resolution standpoint. Secretary STIMSON. When the present agreement was made and the present method that you speak of adopted, I was a private citizen and knew nothing about it. I would rather not comment on it now. Mr. RODGERS. At any rate the departure has been made. Now, with reference to shipbuilding about which you spoke, what type of ships, what tonnage of ships would be built on the Great Lakes where facili- ties are not now either on the Great Lakes or otherwise provided? Secretary STIMSON. I can only point out to you that the locks are to be 800 feet long, permitting a ship up to nearly that length, and the depth of the water will be 27 feet. You will have to ask the shipping experts what tonnage that will produce. Mr. RODGERS. Now, in the event we have the canal or seaway and we have an emergency and we want to transport munitions and imple- ments of war from the Great Lakes area out into the ocean in order to get them across and get them across quickly, there is no way that we can tell in advance as to what season of the year that emergency might occur, is there? Secretary STIMSON. No, sir. Mr. RODGERS. Then suppose, as this seaway will be out of commis- sion for at least 5 months of the year on account of ice, what would we do then? Secretary STIMSON. You wouldn't have the benefit of it in winter, but you will have the benefit of it at the time when the peak of pro- duction in the form of agricultural products and in the shape of manufactured products is at its highest. Mr. RODGERS. What power could we obtain there in years which we could not obtain in months by the use of coal and steam power? Secretary STIMSON. Well, I would rather have you ask the engineers about that. 12 GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE BASIN Mr. RODGERS. What percentage of present-day United States ships could use this seaway if it were in commission now? Secretary STIMSON. Now, Mr. Chairman, I think I have really made it perfectly clear as to the limitation of my testimony here." I am being asked now questions which these gentlemen must know are ques- tions for men in different departments from that which I occupy and men of entirely different professional training. I should much prefer to have questions directed to me in line with my office and these other questions reserved for others. I have come here under great pressure and I am very anxious to get back to my natural work in the War Department. The CHAIRMAN. I think you are correct, Mr. Secretary. Suppose you reserve those questions, Mr. Rodgers, until technical witnesses are on the stand. Mr. GAVAGAN. We all know the Secretary is an eminent lawyer and not necessarily an engineer. This questioning is wasting our time as well as the Secretary's. The CHAIRMAN. Judge Bell. Mr. BELL. Mr. Secretary, I have one question that I would like to clear up in my mind, regarding something said a moment ago in regard to the length of time it would take to build this. I be- lieve you made the statement in your opinion or upon the infor- mation which you have from the engineers. Secretary STIMSON. Upon information which I have. 4 Mr. BELL. I believe you said it would probably take "three work- ing seasons-three to four working seasons" to complete the canal as contemplated in this plan. Secretary STIMSON. That is what I have been informed by General Robins, who sits beside me here. Mr. BELL. And perhaps you would prefer that I ask him the question, but what I want to get at is what that means in terms of months or years-when would the first "working season" start? Secretary STIMSON. I would much prefer you ask General Robins. Mr. BELL. Very well, that is all. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Angell. Mr. ANGELL. No questions, Mr. Chairman, The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Beiter. Mr. BEITER. Mr. Secretary, has not the War Department listed the advantages and disadvantages of inland waterways? Secretary STIMSON. I assume it has. Mr. BEITER. In respect to the St. Lawrence project, were the dis- advantages and advantages listed by the War Department? Secretary STIMSON. I haven't seen a comparison made myself, sir. Frankly, I have had very little time to prepare for this hearing. I was only notified last evening. Mr. BEITER. I appreciate that. Will somebody else in your Depart- ment be able to answer that question? Secretary STIMSON. All those matters are within the knowledge and the experience of the gentlemen who will come here from the Engineering Department. Mr. BEITER. Well, this affects the War Department, Mr. Secretary, and I am wondering whether somebody else in your Department would be able to answer that question. GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE BASIN 13 Secretary, STIMSON. If anybody can I think it would be the Corps of Engineers; and both the Chief of Engineers and General Robins are here today. Mr. BEITER. What I would like to have, Mr. Secretary, from you is whether there were disadvantages and advantages listed by the War Department-I want to know whether you have anything under your jurisdiction along those lines. Secretary STIMSON. I have never seen such a list. Mr. BEITER. So you wouldn't know? Secretary STIMSON. I couldn't know of it of my own knowledge. Mr. BEITER. Well, you stated a few moments ago, I believe, that you estimated the engineers estimated the project would be com- pleted in 4 years and possibly 3 years. Secretary STIMSON. "With luck," I said. Mr. BEITER. "With luck," that is right. According to the schedule of the Office of Production Management, then we would have passed our peak of defense effort, would we not? Secretary STIMSON. Our present estimate of that peak, perhaps. Mr. BEITER. Yes. The Office of Production Management, I believe, predicted that in 1943 we would reach our peak and from then on it would be declining, so the seaway will not be completed until we have reached and passed our peak. Secretary STIMSON. No, no; that is a different statement, sir. That is their present estimate of the peak. They don't know everything about the future, and when they made that estimate they did not, certainly, know how long this emergency was going to last. Mr. GAVAGAN. Evidently, Mr. Secretary, some of the members of this committee think you are omniscient. Secretary STIMSON. I am beginning to think so. Mr. BEITER. That is all. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Bender. Mr. BENDER. Mr. Secretary, has Canada included this project in its defense program? Secretary STIMSON. I cannot answer that offhand. I think a rep- resentative of the State Department can tell you better about that than I can. Mr. BENDER. Mr. Secretary, isn't it a fact that Mr. Mackenzie- King in correspondence with the President, indicated-doubted the wisdom of undertaking the project because of Canada's occupation with present defense measures and active participation in the war? Secretary STIMSON. I cannot say of my own knowledge whether he did or not, but as I say a representative from the State Department is here now and he is undoubtedly full of all those facts. Mr. BENDER. Mr. Secretary, why has Canada entered into coopera- tion with this project? Secretary STIMSON. You had better ask Mr. Mackenzie-King that. Mr. BENDER. Isn't it a fact it is because of the insistence of the President and because the British are not keen about displeasing the President at this time? Secretary STIMSON. I don't care to answer a question of that sort, sir. Mr. BENDER. Mr. Secretary, under modern conditions of aerial war- fare, would not the entire waterway be vulnerable to attack? 62660-42—pt. 1————2 14 GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE BASIN Secretary STIMSON. It would depend on where the enemies were. I don't think Lake Superior would be very vulnerable, or any of the big lakes, nor the channels to them. Of course, it is possible that bombs might be dropped anywhere if the enemy had access. Mr. BENDER. Mr. Secretary, couldn't the whole project be crippled by the dropping of one aerial bomb in a strategic place in this proj- ect-in fact, couldn't it be rendered useless? Secretary STIMSON. That is a question which is so hypothetical that I would rather not attempt to answer it. If you could conceive that an airplane could avoid all antiaircraft dangers and reach within the limits of perhaps a lock or two and then make a fortunate hit, it might do great damage, but I would rather have you ask professional soldiers about that. Mr. BENDER. Mr. Secretary, has there been any consideration by the War Department of the cost of defending a waterway such as the St. Lawrence? Secretary STIMSON. Well, I think there you will have to ask the General Staff. I am not even omnisicient about everything in my Department. Mr. BENDER. One more question: How would priorities on tools and steel effect the progress of this proposed construction? Secretary STIMSON. I think certain forms of tools should be given priority over this, but I think the main bulk of the construction of this waterway is of a different nature and will use different materials than are involved in our present bottlenecks. My estimate is that a very large part of the construction necessary for this project will not interfere with our defense program. A great deal of it will be excavation work and such as that which would not interfere with the bottlenecks which we have at present. But I said in the beginning, sir, that I do not think that priorities should be given to this over a number of very important munitions which we are now in the course of manufacturing. Mr. BENDER. That is all. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Rankin. Mr. RANKIN. Mr. Secretary, the gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Bender, asked you about the vulnerability of these locks. They wouldn't be anymore vulnerable than the locks in the Panama Canal, would they? Secretary STIMSON. Not nearly so vulnerable. Mr. RANKIN. I heard the statement this morning that the Kiel Canal had been bombed over 100 times during this war and it is still in operation. Secretary STIMSON. I am not sure of the number but I know it has been said to have been bombed a great many times. Mr. RANKIN. These locks would be back at least 100 or 200 miles from the ocean, would they not? Secretary STIMSON. They would be more than 200 miles; they would be 500 miles, I am told. Mr. RANKIN. So far as the power dams are concerned nobody ever yet heard of a power dam being destroyed in this war by any country, because they are built heavily and are well protected. One of the gentlemen on the other side, or maybe on my side of the table, talked GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE BASIN 15 about the necessity of developing this project for the future in the light of the present emergency. Of course your answer was that nobody knows how long this emer- gency is going to last, but even if this emergency should close it would not materially affect the necessity for developing the water power in this river, would it? Secretary STIMSON. It wouldn't affect the advisability of it, in my opinion. Mr. RANKIN. That is what I say. Now, your statement here that we get the use of half of this power, or about 1,000,000 kilowatts- Secretary STIMSON. No; 1,000,000 horsepower. Mr. RANKIN. You said 2,200,000 Secretary STIMSON. Horsepower. Mr. RANKIN. Well, a horsepower is just a little less than a kilowatt. My recollection is that the engineers stated there would be about 2,000,- 000 kilowatts, which would leave us something like 1,000,000. Secretary STIMSON. I don't know the estimates in terms of kilo- watts; the figures given me were in horsepower. Mr. RANKIN. That would amount to, as I figure it, a little more than 8,000,000,000 kilowatt-hours a year; and at 2 mills a kilowatt-hour that would amount to $17,000,000 a year-a little more than $17,000,- 000 a year-for the power alone. It was stated by the Army engineers that Muscle Shoals could be amortized on a 4-percent basis. That $17,000,000 is 4 percent more than $400,000,000, or almost twice as much as the estimated cost of this entire project. I am bringing that out to show the value of the power to be developed there. Now, so far as the area there is concerned, I want to ask, Mr. Secre- tary, if this isn't the most thickly settled area in the United States, and where the use of electricity is probably at its peak and the demand for electricity is greater there than for any other part of the country. I don't mean the peak for all time. What I am trying to bring out is they use more electricity in that area, or demand more electricity, and are still demanding more, than almost any other section of the country. Secretary STIMSON. You mean the part of the United States which is adjacent to the international waterway? Mr. RANKIN. Yes. Secretary STIMSON. Or the International Rapids? Well, that por- tion of the waterway is, of course, near to the State of New York, and it is a highly industrialized section of the country. While I am not familiar with the figures as to the possibility of transportation of cur- rent, I feel quite sure that that length of possible transportation is long enough to include a very highly industrialized part of our country. Mr. RANKIN. The report of the Army engineers, signed by Secre- retary Hurley in 1930, gave the distribution radius, the economic dis- tribution radius, from Muscle Shoals as 350 miles. Now, 350 miles from this power dam on the St. Lawrence River would cover the entire State of New York, the entire New England States, and a large portion of the State of Pennsylvania. 16 GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE BASIN Last year the State of New York alone was overcharged $183,000,000 for its electricity, according to the Tennessee Valley Authority rates, and $201,000,000 according to the Ontario rates just across the river; and New England was overcharged $97,000,000 according to the T. V. A. rates and considerably more than $100,000,000 according to the Ontario rates. So if this power is distributed throughout that area not only can this dam, this investment be amortized by the sale of power, but it will also reduce the cost of power to the people of that area infinitely more in the time of that amortization than the entire investment would cost, would it not? Secretary STIMSON. I haven't made any calculation in that connec- tion, Congressman, and I would rather not be pinned down as to de- tails; but I think I have made by general statement to the effect that it would produce a very valuable source of power. It would be steady power and it would be cheap power. It would be relatively inex- pensive as to operation and will produce power in a very highly in- dustrialized section of our country. That is all that I feel my omni- science at the present time entitles me to go. — The CHAIRMAN. I suggest we wait until Mr. Olds of the Federal Power Commission appears before us. Mr. RANKIN. One more question and I will not take up any more of the Secretary's time. Some gentleman on the other side seemed to think that we had about reached the limit of the use of electricity in this country. I want to call attention to the fact that they told us he same thing when we were building the Tennessee Valley Authority-creating the Tennessee Valley Authority. At that time we used in this country only 62,000,000,000 kilowatt- hours of electricity a year. That was in 1932. Last year we used 118,000,000,000, and at the rate we are increasing consumption now we will reach 200,000,000,000, so the contention that there will be no market for this power is certainly beside the point. Secretary STIMSON. I haven't made any such contention, sir. Mr. RANKIN. I know the Secretary hasn't made any such contention, but one of the Congressman's questions inferred that. Secretary STIMSON. On the contrary, I think we are face to face in our national-defense program with a greatly increased demand for power and a possible shortage. Mr. RANKIN. And if they increase the use of power per capita as much as every other section of the country or as much as they have in the T. V. A. area or the Bonneville area or the Boulder Dam area, we would today, in my opinion, be using more than 200,000,000,000 kilo- watt-hours and couldn't possibly supply the demand. That is all, Mr. Secretary. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Hall. Ag Mr. HALL. Mr. Secretary, I understood you to say you didn't feel the construction of this waterway should be given precedence or priority over necessary national-defense projects. Secretary STIMSON. Over some of the immediate necessities which we are now confronted with. Mr. HALL. Well, money and efforts are needed in all national- defense projects and when we look at the new tax bill we see a lot of money is going to be needed. Now, if all that is needed for our GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE BASIN 17 present national-defense projects, which we all know are needed in the present emergency, do you feel that irrespective of that, even though it may be desirable, that we should go ahead with this project? Secretary STIMSON. When I saw the estimate of the Engineers for the share of the United States cost of this project, which I think was $200,000,000, and when I contrasted that with some of the hundreds of millions that we are paying for various items of national defense, I thought this was quite a cheap project. Mr. HALL. But your feeling would be that if all of our efforts are needed and all our money is needed for those projects we know now are necessary, we shouldn't take up anything like this. Secretary STIMSON. I didn't say that. Mr. HALL. I am just wondering. I am trying to follow out your thought. Secretary STIMSON. No, no. My opinion is the reverse. While I am aware of the enormous expenditures that this country faces, I believe that the emergency which it faces is so immensely more vital that we have got to take every possible step that we can to prepare for meeting that emergency successfully, even though we know that it is going to be a tremendous strain and burden on the United States to do so. Mr. HALL. That is all. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Ellis. Mr. ELLIS. Mr. Secretary, out in the Middle West and the South- west there are various hydroelectric projects under construction, within your Department, under the Corps of Engineers, and they are doing a grand job of it. They are going at it at half-pace, perhaps, because Congress has not given them sufficient funds to carry on. Don't you think in line with your statements concerning the St. Lawrence seaway and the power in connection with it, we should also start the construction at a more rapid pace of those projects out in the South, Southwest, and Middle West?" Secretary STIMSON. I am not sufficiently familiar with the projects that you have in mind to make my opinion worthwhile. Mr. ELLIS. Well, wouldn't your general statement that power and more power is vital apply also to other sections of the country? Secretary STIMSON. Well, it would depend altogether on the proj- ect and the feasibility of the project and the comparative expense of the project. I would rather not state an opinion on it. I am not sufficiently familiar with it to make any statement of mine worth anything to you gentlemen. Mr. ELLIS. That is all. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Peterson. Mr. PETERSON. Mr. Secretary, do you favor or not favor the imme- diate building of this project as a part of our national emergency defense program? Secretary STIMSON. I do favor it. Mr. PETERSON. Well, why do you favor it? Secretary STIMSON. I am afraid my hour here has been ill-spent if I haven't made it clear to you, sir. Mr. PETERSON. Mr. Chairman, and I am inclined to think it has been rather ill-spent myself. 18 GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE BASIN Mr. PITTENGER. I think that is a remark that you should not have made. Mr. PETERSON. As I understand, the Secretary refuses to say it is necessary as a part of our national defense? Mr. PITTENGER. The Secretary has been very frank with us, I think. - Mr. PETERSON. Do you consider it a necessary part of our national defense emergency program? Secretary STIMSON. I have said it was, I thought, a very important project and that we should undertake it. I think that is sufficiently clear. Mr. PETERSON. Mr. Secretary, is there a shortage of power in that vicinity which will be served by this project, at present? Secretary STIMSON. I am informed there is. Mr. PETERSON. That is all. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, on behalf of myself and the com- mittee I want to thank you sincerely for your appearance here this morning. Mr. BENDER. May I ask another question. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Bender. Mr. BENDER. Have the estimates or has the estimated cost of this project included the cost of fortifying and defending the project? Secretary STIMSON. I think it only includes the construction. The $200,000,000 that I spoke of only includes construction costs. Mr. BENDER. The Secretary surely is familiar with the cost of fortifying and defending the Panama Canal. I understand the Gov- ernment has spent $110,000,000 up to 1939 on defense of the canal and $19,000,000 annually to maintain its defenses, including the pay of soldiers. Secretary STIMSON. I was given notice that I was expected to be here this morning, at 6 o'clock last night. Now, whatever I have been able to bring you has been from papers perused since that time. You have asked me a great many questions which I think you should give more notice of and ask them of the gentlemen who have immediate control of such things. Mr. BENDER. That is all, Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, thank you, sir. Mr. Bender, I will state that the Secretary does not have all these details. He talked with me early this morning, and it was too late to go into those details before appearing here as a witness. Mr. RANKIN. In answering a question the Secretary said that this project was 200 miles inland. Mr. PITTENGER. Five hundred miles inland. Mr. RANKIN. And therefore is protected from attack from the sea already. i The CHAIRMAN. Our next witness is Mr. Berle, Assistant Secretary of State. GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE BASIN 19 STATEMENT OF ADOLF AUGUSTUS BERLE, JR., ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Berle, we have a letter from Mr. Secretary Hull, which we will ask the clerk to read. (The letter read was as follows:) The Honorable JOSEPH J. MANSFIELD, House of Representatives. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, Washington, June 7, 1941. MY DEAR MR. MANSFIELD: I have received your letter of June 3, 1941, transmit- ting a copy of H. R. 4927, a bill to provide for the improvement of the Great Lakes- St. Lawrence Basin in the interest of national defense, and for other purposes, and asking for an expression of my views relative to the advisability of enacting this measure into law. In reply I am glad to inform you that I am in full accord with the proposed legislation, and I trust that the bill will receive prompt and favorable consideration. The officers of this Department who are familiar with the subject matter of the bill will be glad to appear before your committee with reference thereto, should you desire to call upon them. Sincerely yours, (Signed) CORDELL HULL. The CHAIRMAN. Now, Mr. Berle, we will be glad to hear from you. Mr. Berle is from the Secretary of State's office and is here repre- senting the Secretary of State. Mr. BERLE. Mr. Chairman and gentlemen of the committee, let me first express my regret that Secretary Hull is unable to be here. As you know, he has been confined to his quarters with a cold for the past few days, and that condition, unfortunately, still continues. He has requested me, accordingly, to represent the Department in this matter. If I may, I should like to begin by putting into the record the underlined documents, with most of which I think the committee is familiar, and therefore I shall not undertake to read them. The first is the text of the agreement signed at Ottawa on March 19, 1941, to- gether with the text of letters exchanged between the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of Canada. The CHAIRMAN. You may insert them in your statement. Mr. BERLE. I don't undertake to read them because I think every member of the committee is familiar with them. If not, of course, they can be developed. The CHAIRMAN. They can become familiar with the record and there is no use to take up time by reading them now. (The document referred to is as follows:) DEPARTMENT OF STATE, March 19, 1941. No. 112 The Department of State made public the following exchange of notes between the Prime Minister of Canada and Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Right Honorable W. L. Mackenzie King, and the United States Minister to Canada, Mr. Pierrepont Moffat. At the same time there was made public a pamphlet containing reports submitted to the President of the United States of America and the Prime Minister of Canada, by the Canadian Temporary Great Lakes-St. Lawrence Basin Committee and the United States St. Lawrence Ad- visory Committee. The document contains (1) joint report submitted by the committees; (2) engineering report transmitted by the committees; and (3) detailed estimate of cost. 20 GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE BASIN DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, Ottawa, March 5, 1941. SIR: I have the honor to refer to certain questions which have arisen in the course of the St. Lawrence waterway negotiations, and which we have discussed recently. 2. As you are aware, my colleagues and I have been giving prolonged con- sideration to the problems presented by the St. Lawrence waterway project. We have noted the progress made in the preparation of the engineering plans for the international section and in the drafting of the general agreement. There is, however, one consideration of a fundamental character to which we desire to call attention. 3. The growing intensity of the war operations and the apprehension that still more serious perils will have to be faced in the very near future, necessitate the most careful examination of any proposed expenditure from the point of view of public need and in the light of war requirements. 4. In existing circumstances, the Canadian Government desires to know whether the Government of the United States is of the opinion, in view of the position in Canada, and, of course, the position in the United States as well, that the project as outlined in the State Department's proposals of 1936 and 1938 and under consid- eration since that time should now be proceeded with. 5. We have, of course, been fully aware of the desire of the Government of the United States to have a treaty or agreement respecting the St. Lawrence waterway concluded at as early a date as possible, and negotiations which have been carried on more or less continuously for some time past have had in view the desire on our part to arrive, at the earliest possible date, at terms of agreement which would be mutually advantageous. We are also aware of the pronouncements which have been made from time to time by the President, respecting the added emphasis given by the war to the importance alike of power and navigation developments in the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence waterway project. We are also duly appre- ciative of the agreement recently reached between our respective governments, whereby the Province of Ontario has obtained the right to the immediate use of additional power at Niagara, and the diversion of the waters of the Ogoki and Long Lac Rivers into Lake Superior, in consideration of which, authority was given for the immediate investigation by United States engineers of the project in the international section of the St. Lawrence River in Ontario, in order to enable work of future development to proceed with the least possible delay, once an agreement between the two governments respecting the St. Lawrence development was concluded. 6. We would naturally be prepared to give every consideration to power or navigation developments which the United States may deem necessary to the prosecution of measures calculated to aid Great Britain, Canada, and other parts of the British Commonwealth of Nations in the present war, or to further the security of the United States itself against possible future events which, at the moment cannot be foreseen, but of which in times like the present full account must be taken. We realize that the Government of the United States will be as solicitous as our own Government to appraise the project at the present time in terms of its contribution to the efforts which are being put forward by our respec- tive countries to preserve and to restore freedom. It is from this point of view and in this spirit that we would ask that the St. Lawrence project be again reviewed by the Government of the United States before an agreement or treaty be finally entered into. Accept, sir, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration. W. L. MACKENZIE KING, Secretary of State for External Affairs. LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Ottawa, March 10, 1941. SIR: I lost no time in bringing to the attention of my Government your note of March 5 in regard to the St. Lawrence waterway negotiations. In view of the importance of the question you raised, the matter was laid before the President, and I have been instructed, by way of reply, to transmit the following personal message from him to you: "I have given careful consideration to your recent request that in view of the growing intensity of current war operations and the apprehension over perils GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE BASIN 21 whích may have to be faced in the near future, the Government of the United States reviews the St. Lawrence project and give you an indication of its views as to whether, in the existing circumstances, this project as outlined in the State Department's proposals of 1936 and 1938 should now be proceeded with. "May I say at the outset that I am aware of Canada's increasing war effort and I readily agree that it must have first call upon your country's resources and man- power. I also agree that in view of the existing situation the most careful examination of any proposed expenditure is necessary from the point of view of the public need and in the light of defense requirements. "With these considerations in mind, the Government of the United States has, as you requested, reviewed the St. Lawrence project. We have welcomed this occasion to review this project because of the fact that our own defense program renders it desirable that all public expenditures in the United States be weighed in the light of considerations similar to those set forth in your communication. The Government of the United States is engaged in a great defense program. It is determined to supply such aid in material to Great Britain, the members of the Commonwealth, and their Allies as may be necessary to enable them to bring the war to a successful termination. Simultaneously, our own defenses are being strengthened to the extent necessary to prevent any foe from menacing the security of this hemisphere. It is indispensable that all public projects contem- plated by the Government of the United States be considered from the standpoint of their relationship to these supreme objectives. "The Government of the United States regards the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence project as directly associated with the accomplishment of the foremost national objectives of this Government. It believes that the project should be proceeded with and that construction should commence at the earliest possible moment. It regards the construction of this project as a matter of vital necessity. "You refer to the engineering investigation now being conducted in the inter- national section of the St. Lawrence River. I need hardly say that I directed the release of $1,000,000 from the special defense funds for this purpose only because of my conviction that the completion of this project by 1945 might prove of vital importance to our defense effort. It is gratifying that there has been sufficient progress to make possible the initiation of construction this spring. "I am sure you will agree with me that, while our countries must put forth the maximum immediate defense effort, we must also prepare for the possibility of a protracted emergency which will call upon the industries on both sides of the border to meet constantly expanding demands. The combination of ad- vantages offered by the St. Lawrence project makes it imperative that we under- take it immediately. "In terms of the time factor, the St. Lawrence project as a part of our defense program is not exceptional, since we are today appropriating money for con- struction of vessels of war which will not be ready for service until the com- pletion of the St. Lawrence undertaking. "I am convinced of the urgent need for the large increment in low-cost electric power which the St. Lawrence project will provide. Already the demand for power is running ahead of expectations. In fact, one of the most serious handi- caps to the rapid expansion of airplane production is the difficulty of finding the large supplies of high-load factor power required for aluminum production. We are, of course, expanding our electric facilities for this purpose as fast as prac- ticable, but by the time the St. Lawrence power is available other sources of cheap power will have been largely allocated. "The St. Lawrence project offers by far the soundest and most economical provision for the power requirements of certain portions of our long range defense program, more particularly for certain high-load-factor defense indus- tries. Furthermore, the manufacturing facilities and skilled labor available for the construction of steam turbines and electric equipment will be needed to meet the requirements of the vast areas of our continent where water power is not so economically available. "I am also convinced that the opening of the St. Lawrence deep waterway to afford an outlet for naval and cargo ships constructed in Great Lakes shipyards, far from representing a diversion of funds and resources from the defense effort, would have the opposite effect. Our shipbuilding program, to meet the requirements of defense, will call for a great expansion of shipyards with their associated machine shops and adequate supplies of skilled labor. The extent to which intensified submarine and air attacks on convoys may necessitate an expansion of the program is still unknown. If the war is pro- tracted, however, it seems certain that the number of shipyards required will 22 GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE BASIN have to be several times those at present available. In terms of our present industrial arrangements, many of these can be made most readily and eco- nomically available in the Great Lakes area. "If the full burden of our expanding ship construction must fall on seaboard shipyards, the time required to complete the vessels themselves must, in many instances, be increased by the period necessary to construct new shipyards and facilities. With this in mind, it is apparent that the deep waterway could be com- pleted in time to provide an outlet to the sea for many of the new vessels included in the present program. "In the light of these facts, it is my belief that the funds and manpower re- quired for the earliest possible completion of the St. Lawrence project could not be better spent for our joint defense effort, including aid to Great Britain. It is my feeling that failure to take advantage of the possibilities of this project would be short-sighted, in no way contributing to an increase in our immediate defense effort, while limiting our defense program in the difficult years which lie ahead." Accept, sir, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration. PIERREPONT MOFFAT. Mr. BERLE. I should like also to insert into the record the release of the Department of State, dated March 21, 1941, which likewise includes the text of the agreement and is the comment and official summary pre- pared by the Department of State thereon. This is, in substance, a guide to the interpretation to the agreement in the event there is any question as to the meaning of its terms. The CHAIRMAN. You may hand it to the reporter. (The document referred to is as follows:) No. 117. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, March 21, 1941. [CONFIDENTIAL: To be held in STRICT CONFIDENCE and no portion, synopsis, or intimation to be published or given out until the READING of the President's message transmitting the agreement has begun in the Congress. Extreme care must therefore be exercised to avoid premature publication] The President of the United States of America and His Majesty the King of Great Britain, Ireland, and the British dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, in respect of Canada, have decided to conclude an Agreement in relation to the utilization of the water in the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence Basin and to that end have named as their respective plenipotentiaries: The President of the United States of America: His Majesty the King of Great Britain, Ireland, and the British dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, for Canada: Who, after having communicated to each other their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed upon the following Articles: PRELIMINARY ARTICLE For the purposes of the present Agreement, unless otherwise expressly pro- vided, the expression- (a) "Joint Board of Engineers" means the board appointed pursuant to an agreement between the Governments following the recommendation of the Inter- national Joint Commission, dated December 19, 1921; (b) "Great Lakes System" means Lakes Superior, Michigan, Huron (includ- ing Georgian Bay), Erie, and Ontario, and the connecting waters, including Lake St. Clair; (c) "St. Lawrence River" includes the river channels and the lakes forming parts of the river channels from the outlet of Lake Ontario to the sea; (d) "International Section" means that part of the St. Lawrence River through which the international boundary line runs ; (e) "Canadian Section" means that part of the St. Lawrence River which lies wholly within Canada and which extends from the easterly limit of the International Section to Montreal Harbor; (f) "International Rapids Section" means that part of the International Section which extends from Chimney Point to the village of St. Regis ; GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE BASIN 23 (g) "Governments" means the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Canada; (h) "countries" mean the United States of America and Canada; (i) "Special International Niagara Board" means the board appointed by the Governments in 1926 to ascertain and recommend ways and means to preserve the scenic beauty of the Niagara Falls; (j) "deep waterway" means adequate provision for navigation requiring a controlling channel depth of 27 feet with a depth of 30 feet over lock sills, from the head of the Great Lakes to Montreal Harbor via the Great Lakes System and St. Lawrence River, in general accordance with the specifications set forth in the Report of the Joint Board of Engineers, dated November 16, 1926. ARTICLE I 1. The Governments agree to establish and maintain a Great Lakes-St. Law- rence Basin Commission, hereinafter referred to as the Commission, consisting of not more than ten members of whom an equal number shall be appointed by each Government. The duties of the Commission shall be- (a) to prepare and to recommend plans and specifications for the construction of works in the International Rapids Section in accordance with and containing the features described in the Annex attached to and made part of this Agreement, with such modifications as may be agreed upon by the Governments; (b) upon approval of the plans and specifications by the Governments, to prepare a schedule allocating the construction of the works in the International Rapids Section on such a basis that each Government shall construct the works within its own territory or an equivalent proportion of the works so approved; (c) to approve all contracts entered into on behalf of either Government for the works in the International Rapids Section; (d) to supervise the construction of the works and to submit reports to the Governments from time to time, and at least once each calendar year, on the progress of the works; (e) upon satisfactory completion of the works, to certify to the Governments that they meet the plans and specifications drawn up by the Commission and approved by the Governments; (f) to perform the other duties assigned to it in this Agreement. 2. The Commission shall have the authority to employ such persons and to make such expenditures as may be necessary to carry out the duties set forth in this Agreement. It shall have the authority to avail itself of the services of such governmental agencies, officers and employees of either country as may be made available. The remuneration, general expenses, and all other expenses of its members shall be regulated and paid by their respective Governments; and the other expenses of the Commission, except as provided for under Article III, paragraph (b) of this Agreement, shall be borne by the Governments in equal moieties. 3. The Governments agree to permit the entry into their respective countries, within areas immediately adjacent to the Niagara River and the International Section to be delimited by exchange of notes, of personnel employed by the Commission or employed in the construction of the works, and to exempt such personnel from the operation of their immigration laws and regulations within the areas so delimited. In the event that the Commission, pursuant to the provisions of paragraph 1 (b) of this Article, allocates to either of the Govern- ments the construction of works, any part of which is within the territory of the other Government, the latter Government shall make provision for the according, within the area in which such a part is situated, of such exemption from customs, excise, and other imposts, federal, state, and provincial, as may be reasonably practicable for the effective and economical prosecution of the work. Regulations providing for such exemptions may be settled by the Govern- ments by exchange of notes. 4. The Governments shall, by exchange of notes, prescribe rules and regula- tions for the conduct of the Commission. They may by the same means extend or abridge its powers and duties; and reduce or after reduction increase the number of members (provided that there must always be an equal number appointed by each Government and that the total number of members shall at no time exceed 10); and upon completion of its duties, the Governments may terminate its existence. 24 GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE BASIN ARTICLE HI The Government of Canada agrees: (a) in accordance with the plans and specifications prepared by the Com- mission and approved by the Governments, to construct the works in the International Rapids section allocated to Canada by the Commission; and to operate and maintain or arrange for the operation and maintenance of the works situated in the territory of Canada ; (b) to complete, not later than December 31, 1948, the essential Canadian links in the deep waterway, including the necessary deepening of the new Welland Ship Canal and the construction of canals and other works to pro- vide the necessary depth in the Canadian section of the St. Lawrence River: provided that, if the continuance of war conditions or the requirements of defence justify a modification of the period within which such works shall be completed, the Governments may, by exchange of notes, arrange to defer or expedite their completion as circumstances may require. ARTICLE III The Government of the United States of America agrees: (a) in accordance with the plans and specifications prepared by the Commis- sion and approved by the Governments, to construct the works in the International Rapids section allocated to the United States of America by the Commission; and to operate and maintain or arrange for the operation and maintenance of the works situated in the territory of the United States of America; (b) to provide, as required by the progress of the works, funds for the construc- tion, including design and supervision, of all works in the International Rapids section except (1) machinery and equipment for the development of power, and (2) works required for rehabilitation on the Canadian side of the international boundary; (c) not later than the date of completion of the essential Canadian links in the deep waterway, to complete the works allocated to it in the International Rapids section and the works in the Great Lakes System above Lake Erie required to create essential links in the deep waterway. ARTICLE IV The Governments agree that: (a) they may, in their respective territories, in conformity with the general plans for the project in the International Rapids Section, install or arrange for the installation of such machinery and equipment as may be desired for the development of power and at such time or times as may be most suitable in terms of their respective power requirements; (b) in view of the need for coordination of the plans and specifications prepared by the Commission for general works in the International Rapids Section with plans for the development of power in the respective countries, the Commission may arrange for engineering services with any agency in either country, which may be authorized to develop power in the International Rapids Section; (c) except as modified by the provisions of Article VIII, paragraph (b) of this Agreement, each country shall be entitled to utilize one-half of the water available for power purposes in the International Rapids Section; (d) during the construction and upon the completion of the works provided for in the International Rapids section, the flow of water out of Lake Ontario into the St. Lawrence River shall be controlled and the flow of water through the International section shall be regulated so that the navigable depths of water for shipping in the Harbor of Montreal and throughout the navigable channel of the St. Lawrence River below Montreal, as such depths now exist or may here- after be increased by dredging or other harbor or channel improvements, shall not be injuriously affected by the construction or operation of such works, and the power developments in the Canadian section of the St. Lawrence River shall not be adversely affected; (e) upon the completion of the works provided for in the International Rapids section, the power works shall be operated, initially, with the water level at the powerhouses held at a maximum elevation 238.0, sea level datum as defined in the Report of the Joint Board of Engineers, for a test period of 10 years or such shorter period as may be approved by any board or authority designated or estab- lished under the provisions of paragraph (f) of this article; and, in the event GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE BASIN 25 that such board or authority considers that operation with the water level at the powerhouses held to a maximum elevation exceeding 238.0 would be practicable and could be made effective within the limitations prescribed by paragraphs (c) and (d) of this article, the Governments may, by exchange of notes, authorize operation, subject to the provisions of this article, and for such times and subject to such terms as may be prescribed in the notes, at a maximum elevation exceeding 238.0. (f) the Governments may, by exchange of notes, make provision for giving effect to paragraphs (c), (d), and (e) of this article; (g) during the construction of the works provided for in the International Rapids section, facilities for 14 foot navigation in that section shall be maintained. ARTICLE V The Governments agree that nothing done under the authority of this agree- ment shall confer upon either of them proprietary rights, or legislative, admin- istrative, or other jurisdiction in the territory of the other, and that the works constructed under the provisions of this agreement shall constitute a part of the territory of the country in which they are situated. ARTICLE VI The Governments agree that either of them may proceed at any time to construct, within its own territory and at its own cost, alternative canal and channel facilities for navigation in the International section or in waters connecting the Great Lakes, and to utilize the water necessary for the operation of such facilities. ARTICLE VII The High Contracting Parties agree that the rights of navigation accorded under the provisions of existing treaties between the United States of America and His Majesty shall be maintained notwithstanding the provisions for termination con- tained in any of such treaties, and declare that these treaties confer upon the citizens or subjects and upon the ships, vessels, and boats of each High Contracting Party, rights of navigation in the St. Lawrence River, and the Great Lake System, including the canals now existing or which may hereafter be constructed. ARTICLE VIII The Governments, recognizing their common interest in the preservation of the levels of the Great Lakes System, agree that: (a) each Government in its own territory shall measure the quantities of water which at any point are diverted from or added to the Great Lake System, and shall place such measurements on record with the other Government semi annually; (b) in the event of diversions being made into the Great Lakes System from other watersheds lying wholly within the borders of either country, the exclusive rights to the use of waters which are determined by the Governments to be equiva- lent in quantity to any waters so diverted shall, notwithstanding the provisions of Article IV paragraph (c) of this Agreement, be vested in the country diverting such waters, and the quantity of water so diverted shall be at all times available to that country for use for power below the point of entry, so long as it constitutes a part of boundary waters; (c) if any diversion of water from the Great Lakes System or the Inter- national Section, other or greater in amount than diversions permitted in either of the countries on January 1, 1940, is authorized, the Government of such country agrees to give immediate consideration to any representations respect- ing the matter which the other Government may make; if it is impossible otherwise to reach a satisfactory settlement, the Government of the country in which the diversion of water has been authorized agrees, on the request of the other Government, to submit the matter to an arbitral tribunal which shall be empowered to direct such compensatory or remedial measures as it may deem just and equitable; the arbitral tribunal shall consist of three members, one to be appointed by each of the Governments, and the third, who will be the chair- man, to be selected by the Governments; (d) the Commission shall report upon the desirability of works for compensa- tion and regulation in the Great Lakes System, and, upon the approval by the 26 2. ¿ GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE BASIN Governments of any such works, shall prepare plans and specifications for their construction and recommend to the Governments an equitable allocation of their cost; the Governments shall make arrangements by exchange of notes for the construction of such works as they may agree upon. ARTICLE IX The Governments, recognizing their primary obligation to preserve and en- hance the scenic beauty of the Niagara Falls and River, and consistent with that obligation, their common interest in providing for the most beneficial use of the waters of that River, as envisaged in the Final Report of the Special International Niagara Board, agree that: (a) the Commission shall prepare and submit to the Governments plans and specifications for works in the Niagara River designed to distribute and control the waters thereof, to prevent erosion, and to ensure at all seasons unbroken crest lines on both the American Falls and the Canadian Falls, and to preserve and enhance their scenic beauty, taking into account the recommendations of the Special International Niagara Board; the Governments may make arrange- ments by exchange of notes for the construction of such works in the Niagara River as they may agree upon, including provision for temporary diversions of the waters of the Niagara River for the purpose of facilitating construction of the works; the cost of such works in the Niagara River shall be borne by the Governments in equal moieties; (b) upon the completion of the works authorized in this Article, diversions of the waters of the Niagara River above the Falls from the natural course and stream thereof additional to the amounts specified in Article 5 of the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909 may be authorized and permitted by the Governments to the extent and in the manner hereinafter provided: (1) the United States may authorize and permit additional diversion within the State of New York of the waters of the River above the Falls for power purposes, in excess of the amount specified in Article 5 of the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909, not to exceed in the aggregate a daily diversion at the rate of five thousand cubic feet of water per second; (2) Canada may authorize and permit additional diversion within the Prov- ince of Ontario of the waters of the River above the Falls for power purposes, in excess of the amount specified in Article 5 of the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909, not to exceed in the aggregate a daily diversion at the rate of five thousand cubic feet of water per second; (c) upon completion of the works authorized in this Article, the Commission shall proceed immediately to test such works under a wide range of condi- tions, and to report and certify to the Governments the effect of such works, and to make recommendations respecting diversions of water from Lake Erie and the Niagara River, with particular reference to (1) the perpetual preser- vation of the scenic beauty of the Falls and Rapids, (2) the requirements of navigation in the Great Lakes System, and (3) the efficient utilization and equitable apportionment of such waters as may be available for power pur- poses; on the basis of the Commission's reports and recommendations, the Governments may by exchange of notes and concurrent legislation determine the methods by which these purposes may be attained. ARTICLE X The Governments agree that: (a) each Government undertakes to make provision for the disposition of claims and for the satisfaction of any valid claims arising out of damage or injury to persons or property occurring in the territory of the other in the course of and in connection with construction by such Government of any of the works authorized or provided for by this Agreement; * (b) each Government is hereby released from responsibility for any damage or injury to persons or property in the territory of the other, which may be caused by any action authorized or provided for by this Agreement, other than damage or injury covered by the provisions of paragraph (a) of this Article; (c) each Government will assume the responsibility for and the expense involved in the acquisition of any lands or interests in land in its own terri- tory which may be necessary to give effect to the provisions of this Agree- ment. GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE BASIN 27 Done at Ottawa, the nine hundred and forty-one. (SEAL) This Agreement shall be subject to approval by the Congress of the United States of America and the Parliament of Canada. Following such approval it shall be proclaimed by the President of the United States of America and ratified by His Majesty the King of Great Britain, Ireland and the British dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, in respect of Canada. It shall enter into force on the day of the exchange of the instrument of ratification and a copy of the proclamation, which shall take place at Washington. In witness whereof the respective plenipotentiaries have signed this Agree- ment in duplicate and have hereunto affixed their seals. day of March in the year of our Lord one thousand (SEAL) ARTICLE XI ―― d ANNEX CONTROLLED SINGLE-STAGE PROJECT (238-242) FOR WORK'S IN THE INTERNATIONAL RAPIDS SECTION (See art. I, par. 1 (a)) The main features of the controlled single-stage project (238-242), described in detail with cost estimates in the report of the Temporary Great Lakes-St. Lawrence Basin Committees, dated January 3, 1941, are as follows: (1) A control dam in the vicinity of Iroquois Point. (2) A dam in the Long Sault Rapids at the head of Barnhart Island and two powerhouses, one on either side of the international boundary, at the foot of Barnhart Island. ► (3) A side canal, with one lock, on the United States mainland to carry navigation around the control dam, and a side canal with one guard gate and two locks, on the United States mainland south of Barnhart Island to carry navigation from above the main long Sault Dam to the river south of Cornwall Island. All locks to provide 30-foot depth of water on the miter sills and to be of the general dimensions of those of the Welland Ship Canal. All navi- gation channels to be excavated to 27-foot depth. (4) Dikes, where necessary on the United States and Canadian sides of the international boundary, to retain the pool level above the Long Sault Dam. (5) Channel enlargement from the head of Galop Island to below Lotus Island, designed to give a maximum velocity in the navigation channel south of Galop Island not exceeding 4 feet per second at any time. (6) Channel enlargement between Lotus Island and the control dam and from above Point Three Points to below Ogden Island, designed to give a maxi- mum mean velocity in any cross section not exceeding 24 feet per second with the flow and at the stage to be permitted on the 1st of January of any year, under regulation of outflow and levels of Lake Ontario. (7) The necessary railroad and highway modifications on either side of the international boundary. (8) The necessary works to permit the continuance of 14-foot navigation on the Canadian side around the control dam and from the pool above the Long Sault Dam to connect with the existing Cornwall Canal. (9) The rehabilitation of the towns of Iroquois and Morrisburg, Ontario. All the works in the pool below the control dam shall be designed to provide for full Lake Ontario level, but initially the pool shall be operated at maximum elevation 238. Mr. BERLE. And the third is the engineering report submitted to the President of the United States of America and to the Prime 28 GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE BASIN Minister of Canada by the Canadian Temporary Great Lakes-St. Lawrence Basin Committee, on the one hand, representing Canada, and the United States St.-Lawrence Advisory Committee, on the other hand, representing the United States. This report was jointly sumitted to the Government of Canada and to the President of the United States. In that there are in- cluded (a) a joint report submitted by the two committees sitting together, (b) the engineering report transmitted by these commit- tees, and (c) the detailed estimate of the cost submitted by these committees. In amplification I should like to state that the engineers for the American Committee were headed by Gen. Thomas M. Robins, of the United States Army Corps of Engineers, and the estimates have likewise been approved by that body, and this is therefore offered as the report of the two international committees sitting together. The engineering report is also, if I am accurately informed, the sub- stance of the report of the Army engineers thereon. The report has been concurred in likewise by the engineers for the Canadian Gov- ernment and I should like to have this also appear in the record. It is dated ot Ottawa, Canada, on January 3, 1941. The report of the Committee is signed by the Canadian members, being headed by Mr. Guy Lindsay for Canada and by the United States Committee members, headed by Mr. Leland Olds, chairman of the Federal Power Commission. The engineers were, respectively, for the United States, Brig. Gen. Thomas M. Robbins and for the Dominion of Canada, Mr. Guy A. Lindsay. The CHAIRMAN. Just hand the two documents you have mentioned to the reporter. (The document dated March 21, 1941, is as follows:) No. 118 DEPARTMENT OF STATE, March 21, 1941. [Confidential: To be held in strict confidence and no portion, synopsis, or intimation to be published or given out until the reading of the President's message transmitting the agreement has begun in the Congress. Extreme care must, therefore, be exercised to avoid premature publication.] M. J. MCDERMOTT. An agreement was signed between the United States and Canada on March 19, 1941, providing for a cooperative development and utilization of the water in the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence River Basin for navigation and power. The signatories to the pact, concluded at Ottawa, were the Honorable Leland Olds, Chairman of the Federal Power Commission, the Honorable Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State, and the Honorable Jay Pierrepont Moffat, Ameri- can Minister to Canada on behalf of the United States; and the Right Honorable W. L. Mackenzie King, Prime Minister of Canada, president of the Privy Council and Secretary of State for External Affairs; the Honorable Clarence D. Howe, Minister of Munitions and Supply, and Mr. John Read, legal adviser to the Department of External Affairs on behalf of Canada. The agreement contemplates an early completion of the seaway between the Great Lakes and the Atlantic Ocean by the St. Lawrence River, as well as the development of the vast hydroelectric resources of the International Rapids section of that river. The agreement is subject to approval by the Congress of the United States and the Parliament of Canada. An exchange of notes preceding the agreement revealed that the construc- tion of this project is regarded as directly associated with both the power supply and shipbuilding phases of our national-defense program, including the GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE BASIN 29 plan for defense of the Western Hemisphere and the determination to supply all possible aid to Great Britain, the members of the British Commonwealth, and their allies. In a personal message to Prime Minister Mackenzie King, the President pointed out that "while our countries must put forth the maximum immediate defense effort, we must also prepare for a protracted emergency which will call upon the industries on both sides of the border to meet constantly expanding demands." He called attention to the fact that, in terms of the time factor, the St. Lawrence project could be completed as soon as vessels of war for which money is now being appropriated. The President concluded that "failure to take advantage of the possibilities of this project would be short-sighted, in no way contributing to an increase in our immediate defense effort, while limiting our defense program in the difficult years which lie ahead." The essential features of the agreement may be summarized as follows: PROVISION FOR GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE BASIN COMMISSION In article I the two Governments agree to establish and maintain a Great Lakes-St. Lawrence Basin Commission, consisting of not more than 10 members, with each Government designating an equal number. The duties of this Com- mission would be to prepare and recommend general plans and specifications for the construction of works in the International Rapids section, prepare a schedule allocating the construction of these works to the respective Governments, ap- prove all contracts, and supervise the construction work. The Commission would submit periodic reports to the two Governments on the progress of the work. UNDERTAKING BY CANADA In article II the Government of Canada agrees to construct the works in the International Rapids section allocated to Canada by the Commission, to oper- ate and maintain the works in Canadian territory, and to complete, not later than December 31, 1948, the essential Canadian links in the deep waterway. There is a proviso that the period within which the waterway links are to be completed may be changed by mutual agreement to meet the requirements of continuance of war conditions or of defense. UNDERTAKING BY THE UNITED STATES In article III the Government of the United States agrees to construct the works in the International Rapids section allocated to the United States by the Commission, to operate and maintain the works in United States territory, and, not later than the date of completion of the essential Canadian links, to com- plete the works allocated to it in the International Rapids section and the works in the Great Lakes system above Lake Erie required to create essential links in the deep waterway. To counterbalance expenditures already made by Canada in the Welland Canal link in the deep waterway, the Government of the United States also agrees to provide funds for all works in the International Rapids section except machinery and equipment for the development of power and works required for rehabilitation on the Canadian side of the boundary. INSTALLATION FOR POWER AND USE OF WATER In article IV the two Governments agree that each may arrange for the installation in its own territory of machinery and equipment for the develop- ment of power at such time or times as may best meet its power require- ments, and that, except for the water which Ontario plans to divert from the Albany watershed into the Great Lakes Basin, each country shall be entitled to utilize one-half of the natural flow of water available for power purposes in the International Rapids section of the St. Lawrence River. In this article the two Governments also agree that the flow of the water shall be controlled and regulated so as to protect the navigable depths in the Harbor of Montreal and in the navigable channel of the St. Lawrence River below Montreal. They also agree to maintain facilities for 14-foot navigation during the construction period. 62660-42—pt. 1– -3 30 GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE BASIN MAINTENANCE OF EXISTING RIGHTS In articles V, VI, and VII the two Governments agree that nothing done under the agreement shall alter the rights of the Governments within their respective territories, that either Government may at any time construct at its own cost alternative canal and channel facilities for navigation within its own territory, and that existing rights of navigation in both the Great Lakes and the St. Lawrence River shall be maintained. DIVERSIONS TO AND FROM THE GREAT LAKES BASIN In article VIII the two Governments agree that either country diverting waters into the Great Lakes system, from other watersheds lying wholly within its borders, shall have the exclusive right to the use of equivalent amounts of water for power below the port of entry, so long as it constitutes a part of boundary waters. In this article the two Governments also agree that, if any diversion of water from the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence system, other or greater than diversions permitted in either country on January 1, 1940, is authorized, the Government of such country will give immediate consideration to any representations which the other country may make. In case no settlement is reached, on the request of the other Government, such country will submit the matter to an arbitral tribunal which shall be empowered to direct such compensating or remedial measures as it deems just and reasonable. PRESERVATION AND USE OF NIAGARA FALLS AND RIVER In article IX, the two Governments agree to provide for the preservation and enhancement of the scenic beauty of the Niagara Falls and River and for the most beneficial use of the waters of that river, as envisaged in the Final Report of the Special International Niagara Board. Such provision would include: (1) Plans, to be prepared by the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence Basin Commission, for works designed to distribute and control the waters of the Niagara River, to prevent erosion and insure at all seasons unbroken crest lines on both the American and Canadian Falls. The construction of such works would be arranged by exchange of notes. (2) Permission, on completion of such works, for each country to authorize an additional diversion at the rate of 5,000 cubic feet of water per second for power purposes within its borders. (3) Recommendation by the Commission, after exhaustive tests, for the best and most equitable use of the waters of the Niagara River, with particular refer- ence to preservation of the scenic beauty of the falls and rapids, the requirements of navigation and power. The agreement provides that, on the basis of the Commission's recommendations, the Governments may by exchange of notes and concurrent legislation determine the methods by which these purposes may be attained. CLAIMS, DAMAGES, AND LAND ACQUISITION In article X the Governments agree on provisions for the disposition of claims and for responsibility for damages. Each Government assumes responsibility for the acquisition of lands or interests in lands in its own territory. EMERGENCY SPEEDS NEGOTIATIONS Negotiations leading to the present agreement were initiated in 1936. The out- break of the war in 1939 and the events of 1940 which compelled adoption of a policy of hemispheric defense, made it obvious that an agreement was of major importance. Accordingly, the technical features of the project were reviewed by experts from both Canada and the United States. On October 17, 1940, President Roosevelt allocated $1,000,000 of one of the early special defense appropriations to the Federal Power Commission and the Corps of Engineers of the United States Army for preliminary investigations, particularly engineering surveys, of the International Rapids section of the St. Lawrence River. At the same time the President established a St. Lawrence Advisory Committee consisting of Messrs. Leland Olds, Chairman of the Federal Power Commission; Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State; Brig. Gen. Thomas M. Robins, Corps of Engineers, United States Army; and Gerald V. Cruise, executive secretary and acting chief engineer of the New York State Power Authority. The function of this Com- GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE BASIN 31 mittee has been to advise the President in the necessary preliminary planning and to cooperate with the appropriate agencies of the Canadian Government, particularly the Canadian Temporary Great Lakes-St. Lawrence Basin Com- mittee, a comparable body designated to assist the Canadian Government. These two committees completed a joint report on January 3, 1941, which has been submitted to President Roosevelt and Prime Minister King. In this joint report the results of engineering investigations are submitted. The principal conclu- sion contained in the report is that the so-called "238-242" single-stage control project is the plan best adapted for the development of the International Rapids section of the St. Lawrence River. Such a project, according to the joint report, "combines the essential features which have been continuously advocated by the representatives of both countries throughout the long period of study and negotia- tion devoted to the undertaking," and involves a construction program arranged "so that delivery of power can be begun and navigation provided within 4 years of the time when active work is initiated." Accompanying the joint report there were analyses of the main features of the single-stage project and a revised series of cost estimates which take into account rising construction costs and additional expense likely to be incurred in expediting the work in the interests of national defense. These engineering data were submitted jointly by Brig. Gen. Thomas M. Robins, of the Corps of Engineers of the United States Army, and the Honorable Guy A. Lindsay, engineer in charge of the general engineering branch of the Department of Transport of the Canadian Government. They were assisted by Olivier O. Lefebvre, vice chairman of the Quebec Streams Commission; T. H. Hogg, chairman and chief engineer of the Hydroelectric Power Commission of Ontario; M. C. Hendry, assistant engineer, Hydroelectric Power Commission of Ontario; Roger B. McWharter, chief engineer, Federal Power Commission; and Gerald V. Cruise, executive secretary and acting chief engineer, New York Power Authority. COST OF INTERNATIONAL RAPIDS SECTION PROJECT According to the cost estimates, the total cost of the project in the Inter- national Rapids section will be $266,170,000. This will provide for completion of the 2,200,000-horsepower power project as well as for the deep-waterway im- provement in this section of the river. In addition, there will be expenditures for the improvement of navigation channels, both below and above the Inter- national Rapids section, in order that a waterway to accommodate vessels re- quiring 27 feet draft may be provided throughout the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence system, from Lake Superior to Montreal. (The second document referred to, dated January 3, 1941, is as follows:) ST. LAWRENCE DEEP WATERWAY-INTERNATIONAL RAPIDS SECTION [Reports submitted to the President of the United States of America and the Prime Minister of Canada, by the Canadian Temporary Great Lakes-St. Lawrence Basin Committee and the United States St. Lawrence Advisory Committee] 1. JOINT REPORT SUBMITTED BY THE COMMITTEES 2. ENGINEERING REPORT TRANSMITTED BY THE COMMITTEES 3. DETAILED ESTIMATE OF COST 1. JOINT REPORT To: THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES THE PRIME MINISTER OF CANADA The Canadian Temporary Great Lakes-St. Lawrence Committee and the United States St. Lawrence Advisory Committee, meeting at Ottawa, January 2 and 3, 1941, respectfully submit the following joint report on the preliminary engineer- ing and other investigations for that part of the Great Lakes-St.Lawrence Basin project located in the International Rapids Section of the St. Lawrence River. The two Committees held their first joint meeting at Massena, N. Y., on October 31, 1940, to determine upon the project plan best designed to serve the interests of 32 GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE BASIN both countries and to agree upon the general lines which the engineering investi- gation should follow. The Committees met again at Massena on November 15, 1940, to consult with a group of outstanding hydraulic and electric experts on technical aspects of the proposed undertaking. Special consideration has been given to the joint report prepared in January 1940, by a board of engineers representing Canada and the United States, includ- ing for Canada: Guy A. Lindsay, Engineer in Charge, General Engineering Branch, Department of Transport; Olivier O. Lefebvre, Vice Chairman of the Quebec Streams Commission; T. H. Hogg, Chairman and Chief Engineer of the Hydro- Electric Power Commission of Ontario; and M. C. Hendry, Assistant Engineer, Hydro-Electric Power Commission of Ontario; for the United States: Brigadier General Thomas M. Robins, Corps of Engineers, U. S. Army; Roger B. McWhor- ter, Chief Engineer, Federal Power Commission; and Gerald V. Cruise, Executive Secretary and Acting Chief Engineer of the Power Authority of the State of New York. These engineers were requested by the two Governments to examine the vari- ous plans proposed for the development of the International Rapids Section of the St. Lawrnce River together with their estimates of cost, and to recommend the plan best adapted to the needs of both countries. They agreed unanimously that the "238-242" Controlled Single Stage Project was the best from an engineering and economic point of view, bearing in mind the requirements of navigation and power and the protection of down-river interests. The two Committees, at the meeting of October 31, 1940, agreed that the engi- neering investigations should be undertaken in accord with the project as de- scribed in the engineering report above referred to. Subsequent investigations, including the testing of foundation conditions, etc., which have been proceeding rapidly, have sustained the conclusion that the "238-242" Controlled Single Stage Project is the plan best adapted for the development of that part of the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence Basin project located in the International Rapids Section of the St. Lawrence River for the following reasons: (1) The plan combines the essential feaures which have been continuously advocated by the representatives of both countries throughout the long period of study and negotiation devoted to the undertaking. specifically, it provides for the development of all the power in one stage at power houses located at the foot of Barnhart Island, while at the same time providing for complete control of the River at a control dam located near the head of the present rapids. (2) The plan is especially designed to assure full protection to the down- stream power and navigation interests in the Province of Quebec, including the harbour of Montreal, while at the same time providing for the economical development of the International Rapids Section for navigation and power as a part of the general Great Lakes-St. Lawrence Basin project. (3) The recent investigations, including the checking of previous explora- tions, new core borings, etc., indicate that the foundation conditions for the proposed dams, navigation locks, and power houses are satisfac- tory, while consultations with outstanding hydroelectric engineers assure that the project works will be sound and the construction and equipment of the power houses in accord with the best modern practice. (4) The construction program can be arranged so that delivery of power can be begun and navigation provided within four years of the time when active work is initiated, time being an essential factor in the emergency. Throughout their investigations, the two Committees have been constantly impressed with the defense aspects of the project as a part of a long-range program for use of the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence basin by both peoples to strengthen the defenses of the North American Continent. The power which the project will provide is urgently needed for expansion of essential defense pro- duction on both sides of the border. A deep waterway will afford an unex- ampled opportunity for the expansion of shipbuilding, both cargo vessels and naval vessels, in naturally protected waters. At the request of the two Committees, the engineers who prepared the report of January 1940 have carefully reconsidered that report in the light of the engineering investigations and have revised the cost estimates to take account of the effect of recent increases in construction costs and the acceleration of the GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE BASIN 33 construction program in the interest of defense. Their final conclusions, em- bodies in a report dated January 3, 1941, confirm the conclusions of the previous report. The two Committees submit herewith the report of the board of engineers as embodying their own conclusions and recommend that, in the event that the Governments decide to proceed with the development of the International Rapids Section of the St. Lawrence River, the work be undertaken in general ac- cordance with the plan of the "238-242" Controlled Single Stage Project described therein. Respectfully submitted. ! OTTAWA, CANADA, January 3, 1941. 2. ENGINEERING REPORT LELAND OLDS, A. A. BERLE, Jr., THOMAS M. ROBINS, GERALD V. CRUISE, United States Committee. GUY A. LINDSAY, T. H. HOGG, OLIVIER O. LEFEBVRE, J. E. READ, Canadian Committee. ST. LAWRENCE DEEP WATERWAY-INTERNATIONAL RAPIDS SECTION OTTAWA, CANADA, January 3, 1941. In view of the reopening of negotiations between representatives of the United States and Canada in respect of the improvement both for navigation and power of the International Rapids Section of the St. Lawrence River, engineers representing both countries were asked to examine the various plans proposed with their estimates of cost. The engineers representing the United States were Brig. Gen. Thomas M. Robins, Corps of Engineers, U. S. Army; Mr. Roger B. McWhorter, Chief Engineer, Federal Power Commission; Mr. Gerald V. Cruise, Executive Secre- tary and Acting Chief Engineer, New York State Power Authority. The engineers representing Canada were Mr. Guy A. Lindsay, Engineer-in- Charge, General Engineering Branch, Department of Transport; Dr. Olivier O. Lefebvre, Vice-Chairman, Quebec Streams Commission; Dr. T. H. Hogg, Chair- man and Chief Engineer of the Hydro-Electric Power Commission of Ontario; Mr. M. C. Hendry, Assistant Engineer, Hydro Electric Power Commission of Ontario. After careful consideration of the projects proposed and the estimates of cost thereof, the engineers agreed that the "238-242" Controlled Single Stage Project, is, in their opinion, the best from an engineering and economic point of view, bearing in mind the requirements of navigation and power and the protection of down river interests. The main features of the "238-242" Controlled Single Stage Project are as follows: (1) A control dam in the vicinity of Iroquois Point. (2) A dam in the Long Sault Rapids at the head of Barnhart Island and two power houses, one on either side of the International Boundary, at the foot of Barnhart Island. (3) A side canal, with one lock on the United States mainland to carry navigation around the control dam and a side canal, with one guard gate and two locks, on the United States mainland south of Barnhart Island to carry navigation from above the main Long Sault Dam to the river south of Cornwall Island. All locks to provide 30-foot depth of water on the mitre sills and to be of the general dimensions of those on the Welland Ship Canal. All navigation channels to be excavated to 27-ft. depth. (4) Dykes, where necessary, on the United States and Canadian sides of the International Boundary, to retain the pool level above the Long Sault Dam. 34 GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE BASIN (5) Channel enlargement from the head of Galop Island to below Lotus Island designed to give a maximum velocity in the navigation channel south of Galop Island not exceeding four feet per second at any time. (6) Channel enlargement between Lotus Island and the control dam and from above Point Three Points to below Ogden Island designed to give a maximum mean velocity in any cross-section not exceeding two and one-quarter feet per second with the flow, and at the stage, to be permitted on the 1st of January of any year, under regulation of outflow and levels of Lake Ontario. (7) The necessary railroad and highway modifications on either side of the International Boundary. (8) The necessary works to permit the continuance of 14-ft. navigation on the Canadian Side around the control dam and from the pool above the Long Sault Dam to connect with the existing Cornwall Canal. (9) The rehabilitation of the towns of Iroquois and Morrisburg, Ontario. All the works in the pool below the control dam shall be designed to provide for full Lake Ontario level, but initially the pool shall be operated at maximum elevation 238-0. Attached hereto is the detailed estimate of cost of this project revised to take into account rising construction costs and additional expense likely to be incurred in expediting the work in the interest of National Defence. The total estimated cost is believed to be sufficient to complete the work. THOMAS M. ROBINS, Brigadier General, Corps of Engineers, U. S. Army. GUY A. LINDSAY, Engineer-in-Charge, General Engineering Branch, Department of Transport, Ottawa, Ont. 3. DETAILED ESTIMATE OF COST ST. LAWRENCE DEEP WATERWAY-INTERNATIONAL RAPIDS SECTION, DETAILED ESTIMATE OF COST OF CONTROLLED SINGLE STAGE PROJECT 238-242 [To accompany the Report of the Canadian and United States Engineers, dated Ottawa, Canada, January 3, 1941] The detailed estimates are set up under three main divisions: (A) Works Solely for Navigation. (B) Works Primarily for Power. (C) Works Common to Navigation and Power. (A) Works Solely for Navigation: Under this heading are included the locks, entrance piers, channel or canal excavation, and all other works required solely for the purposes of navigation. (B) Works Primarily for Power: The items included under this heading are subdivided into: (i) Structures, Head and Tailrace Excavation: Under this heading are included all earth and rock excavation, ice sluices, railway connec- tions, etc., required primarily for power, as well as the substructures and superstructures of the power houses. The substructures include headworks, gates, racks, unwatering gates, gate checks, all gate- operating equipment, intakes, water passages, draft tubes, tailrace piers and deck, all covers for openings, railings, gratings, ladders, drains, piping, conduit, pit liners, speed rings, throat rings, draft- tube liners, scroll cases (whether moulded in concrete or of cast or plate steel), and all parts embedded in the substructures inci- dental thereto or connected therewith. The substructures, as esti- mated, are of sufficient dimensions to accommodate all equipment and apparatus including transformers and provide the necessary space for assembly, operation, and maintenance. (ii) Machinery and Equipment.-Under this heading are included turbines, governors, generators, and all other auxiliary machinery required above the generator floor, as well as the low voltage switching, control, and operating apparatus. (C) Works Common to Navigation and Power: Under this heading are in- cluded all channel excavation required for river enlargement, all dams, and GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE BASIN 35 dykes required to retain the levels in the pools created for navigation and power purposes, all land and property damages resulting from the raised water levels, all works in connection with the rehabilitation of Morrisburg and Iro- quois, the preservation of 14-ft. navigation on the Canadian side, railway and highway modifications, and all other works not included under "A" and "B.” Summary of estimate (A) Works solely for Navigation: (i) Upper Pool-at Point Rockway_ (ii) Lower Pool-Opposite Barnhart Isd__ (B) Works primarily for Power: No. (C) Works common to Navigation and Power: 1. Channel excavation_ 2. Ice cribs above Prescott and above Galop Isd_ 3. Iroquois Point Dam____ 4. Dykes---- 1 2 (i) Structures, Head and Tailrace Exc'n. (ii) Machinery and Equipment_. 5. Supply channel and weir at Massena_ 6. Diversion cut through Sault Isd. 7. Main Long Sault Dam__ 8. Guard Gate, 14-ft. Lock and Weir at Maple Grove_. 9. 14-ft. Lock and Dykes at Iroquois_-_- 10. Railroad relocation_ 11. Clearing pool----- 12. Rehabilitation of Morrisburg- 13. Rehabilitation of Iroquois 14. Acquisition of lands, etc., U. S. side_ 15. Acquisition of lands, etc., Can. side_ 16. Highway relocation Grand total____ Guide Pier in South Galop- Cribwork.. Point Three Points Lock and Entrance Piers- Concrete. Cribwork. 4 Dykes- Item Excavation—earth….. earth.. Lock gates, valves, operating machinery, etc... Emergency gate. 3 Approach channels to Point Three Points Lock- Excavation-earth Earth fill. Rock fill. Stripping. Land Damage. Total.. (A) WORKS SOLELY FOR NAVIGATION—(27 FT. DEPTH) (i) UPPER POOL AT POINT ROCKWAY earth. dredging. 5 6 Engineering and Contingencies. 7 Unit c. y. c. y. c. y. c. y. c. y. c. y. c. y. c. y. G c. y. C. y. C. y. $7, 497, 000 31, 081, 100 141, 960 94, 730 220,000 40,000 46, 476, 000 50, 328, 000 3,030,000 106,000 320, 500 48, 136, 000 · 656,000 • 1, 002, 770 63, 740 156, 560 7, 310, 000 12, 374, 000 2, 363, 000 2, 569, 000 20, 055, 000 Quantity Rate 2, 624, 000 604, 000 3, 696, 000 518, 000 5, 024, 000 3, 379, 000 4, 657, 000 14, 011, 000 2,812, 000 6,000 5.00 10.00 5.00 0.40 0.65 0.40 0.65 0.90 0.90 1.00 0.65 25% $38, 578, 000 96, 804, 000 130,788, 000 266, 170, 000 Amount $30,000 1,419, 600 473, 650 88,000 26,000 947, 700 175,000 1, 212, 000 68,900 288, 450 902, 490 63,740 101, 760 200,000 Total $30,000 3, 129, 950 1,569, 350 1,067, 990 200,000 1, 499, 710 7, 497,000 36 GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE BASIN No. 1 2 3 4 5 (A) WORKS SOLELY FOR NAVIGATION-(27 FT. DEPTH)—Continued (ii) LOWER POOL-OPPOSITE BARNHART ISLAND (c) Channel Excavation- (a) Above Long Sault Isd. to Robinson Bay Lock- Excavation-dry earth. Paving... (b) Robinson Bay Lock to Grass River Lock- Excavation-dry earth.. Grass River Lock to Shore Line- Excavation-dredging.... (d) At lower end of Cornwall Isd.- Excavation-dredging.. overdepth. (e) At mouth of Grass River— Excavation-dredging... Drainage ditch- Dykes- P Excavation-earth. Item Stripping. Trimming Sodding.. (a) Above Robinson Bay Lock- Earth fill Earth fill. Rock fill Stripping Trimming. Sodding. (b) Robinson Bay Lock to Grass River- Earth fill.. Earth fill Paving-concrete.. (c) Rock fill guide dyke below Grass River Lock- Rock fill Guard Gate and Supply Weir above Robinson Bay Lock- Concrete.. Concrete.. Foundation contingency. Cribwork. Concrete.. Concrete. Cribwork. Excavation-earth. trench. Sheeting and bracing. Lock gates, operating machinery, etc.. Sluice gates, hoists, etc.---- Robinson Bay Lock-Entrance piers and weir- Excavation-earth__ Lock gates and operating machinery Lock valves and operating machinery. Emergency gate.. Fenders, capstans, lighting equipment, etc... Sluice gates, hoists, etc... 6 Regulating weir at Robinson Bay- Concrete. Concrete. Foundation contingency. Excavation-Rock footings- Rock trench. Earth Unwatering. Sluice gates, hoists, etc.... Unit c. y. c. y. c. y. c. y. c. y. c. y. c. y. c. y. c. y. c. y. c. y. c. y. s. y. s. y. c. y. c. y. c. y. S. y. S. y. c. y. c. y. c. y. c. y. c. y. C. y. C. y. M. F. B. M. c. y. с. у. c. y. c. y. c. y. c. y. c. y. c. y. C. y. Quantity Rate nti 2, 513, 880 10, 020 2,942, 200 374, 000 522, 000 100,000 227,000 10, 200 807, 860 |2, 262, 560 49, 500 312, 110 191, 370 17,000 669, 270 357, 250 146, 510 167, 010 22,000 13, 880 63,000 4, 520 38, 080 41, 720 39, 240 3, 310 59 305, 920 114,600 84, 390 878, 530 13, 200 22, 190 2,970 450 348, 360 0.65 11.00 0.65 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.65 0.42 0.90 1.00 0.65 0.25 0.45 0.42 0.60 0.65 0.25 0.45 11.00 2.00 12.00 10.00 5.00 0.65 3. 10 110.00 10.00 15.00 5.00 0.65 12.00 10.00 2.40 4. 10 .65 Amount $1, 634, 020 110, 220 1,912, 430 299, 200 417, 600 80,000 181,600 6, 630 339, 300 2,036, 310 49, 500 202, 880 47,840 7,650 281,090 214, 350 95, 230 41, 750 9,900 152, 680 126, 000 54, 240 380, 800 5,400 208, 600 25, 510 10, 260 6, 490 149,000 33,800 3,059, 200 1,719,000 421,950 571, 040 801, 000 100,000 175,000 206, 700 52,690 158, 400 221, 900 15,840 7, 130 1,850 226, 430 35, 650 30, 800 Total $1, 744, 240 1,912, 430 299, 200 497,600 181, 600 6,630 2,683, 480- 795,000* 126,000 874, 120 7, 106, 580 698,000 I GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE BASIN 37 No. 7 10 11 8 N. Y. C. Rly. Diversion and bridges___ 9 12 13 14 1 2 3 4 4 15 5 (A) WORKS SOLELY FOR NAVIGATION—(27 FT. DEPTH)-Continued (ii) LOWER POOL-OPPOSITE BARNHART ISLAND—Continued Quantity Rate Amount 6 Grass River Lock and Entrance Piers- Concrete__ Excavation-earth. Cribwork.. Lock gates and operating machinery. Lock valves and operating machinery. Fenders, capstans, lighting equipment, etc. Item Canal lighting and office. Clearing pool- Clearing. Roads- Diversion.. Improvements. New.. Property damages-Lower Pool- Flowage.. Severance.. Engineering and Contingencies. Total (27 ft. depth)……. Tailrace Excavation— (a) Tailrace- Excavation-dry earth... dry rock.. dredging.... Credit for rock excavation………. (b) Crab Island Shoal- Excavation-dredging. 66 Ice Sluices and Walls at Powerhouse- Concrete... Concrete... Foundation contingency. Excavation-earth…. rock footing.. Sluice gates, hoists, etc. Powerhouse Structures- Total... overdepth.. Concrete in substructures. Superstructures... Gates and racks. Unwatering. Excavation-earth. dry rock.. Credit for rock excavation…. Railway Connection to Powerhouse. Engineering and Contingencies.. Unit (B) WORKS PRIMARILY FOR POWER (i) STRUCTURES, HEAD AND TAILRACE EXCAVATION C. y. C. y. c. y. acre Mile Mile Mile c. y. c. y. c. y. c. y. c. y. c. y. c. y. c. y. c. y. c. y. 351, 060 1,296, 950 76, 050 c. y. c. y. 150 1.25 2.75 2.40 3,868, 300 327, 320 844, 560 1,284, 930 178,000 169, 130 115, 050 214, 020 23, 920 1,209, 360 10.00 $3,510, 600 .65 843, 020 5.00 380, 250 845, 600 100,000 206, 700 1,308,000 16,000 1, 135, 850 235, 510 100.00 30,000 3,000 30,000 25% 0.65 1.60 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.65 2.40 15,000 0.65 1.60 37,500 8, 250 72,000 25% 330, 330 266, 600 $2, 514, 400 523, 710 760, 100 12.00 | 2,029, 560 10.00 1, 150, 500 202, 960 139, 110 57, 410 133, 600 3, 798. 210 327, 320 1, 156, 440 160, 200 15.00 18, 140, 400 3,880,010 3, 584, 090 1, 943, 500 738, 300 376, 820 28, 663, 120 235, 510 Total $5, 886, 170 1,308, 000 16,000 15, 000 117,750 596, 930 6, 216, 270 31, 081, 000 $3,470, 890 1, 316, 640 3,713, 140 28, 427, 610 250,000 9,297, 720 46, 476, 000 38 GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE BASIN No. 1 1 (B) WORKS PRIMARILY FOR POWER-Continued (ii) MACHINERY AND EQUIPMENT Item Machinery and Equipment- Generators and turbines. Switching. Cranes and service units. 2 Engineering and contingencies... 3 Total Channel excavation— (a) Chimney Point- Excavation—wet rock.. dredging. (b) Removal of Spencer Isd. pier- Excavation. (c) Removal of Gut Dam- Excavation.. (C) WORKS COMMON TO NAVIGATION AND POWER (d) Removal of center wall Locks 27 and 25 and Canal Bank- Excavation-Masonry and cribwork.. Dredging.. (e) North Galop Channel to below Bay- craft Island- Excavation-dry earth. dry rock. dredging. wet rock. (f) South Galop Channel-from Butter- nut Isd. to south of Baycraft Isd.- Excavation-dry earth.. dry rock. dredging. Unwatering-incl. banks. (g) South of Baycraft Isd. to below Lotus Isd.- Excavation-dry earth. dry rock. dredging.. (h) South of Lalone Isd.- Excavation-dry earth.. dry rock (i) Sparrowhawk Point- Excavation-dredging dry earth. (j) Galop Canal Bank, Presqu'isle and Toussaints Isd.— Excavation-dredging. dry earth. (k) Point Three Points- Excavation-dredging. dry earth.. (1) Leishman's Point and Opposite Leish- man's Point-- Excavation-dredging. dry earth (m) North and South side of Ogden Island- Excavation-dredging- dry earth. dry rock. Unit Quantity Rate Unwatering..... c. y. c. y. c. y. c. y. c.y. c. y. c. y. c. y. c. y. c. y. c. y. c. y. c. y. c. y. c. y. c. y. c. y. c. y. c. y. C. y. c. y. c. y. c. y. c. y. c. y. c. y. c. y. C. y. c. y. 180, 500 255, 190 123, 950 44, 640 14, 630 181,000 2,839, 980 224, 540 2, 197, 000 232, 690 464, 610 2,620, 530 362, 520 416, 030 289, 670 2,648, 780 289, 200 263, 200 3, 004, 090 1, 490, 790 2, 557, 600 324, 770 3, 442, 590 1,052, 130 1,719, 620 1, 582, 580 25% 1,400, 780 3, 814, 700 65, 490 4. 25 0.90 1.50 1.50 1.60 0.90 0.65 1.60 0.90 4. 25 0.65 1.60 0.90 0.65 1.60 0.90 0.65 1.60 0.90 0.65 0.90 0.65 0.90 0.65 0.90 0.65 Amount Total 0.90 0.65 1.60 $31,069, 260 8, 695, 780 498, 480 $767, 130 229, 670 185, 930 66, 960 23, 410 162, 900 1,845, 980 359, 260 1, 977, 300 988, 930 302, 000 4, 192, 850 326, 270 1,422, 960 270, 420 463, 470 2, 383, 910 187, 980 421, 120 2,704, 040 969, 010 2,301, 840 211, 100 3,098, 330 683, 880 1,547, 660 1,028, 680 1, 260, 700 2,479, 560 104, 780 194, 930 $40,263,520 10,064,480 50,328,000 $996, 800 185, 930 66,960, 186, 310 5, 171, 470 6, 244, 080 3, 117, 800, 609, 100. 3,673, 050 2,512, 940 3,782, 210 2,576, 340 4,039, 970 GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE BASIN 39 No. 1 2 4 (C) WORKS COMMON TO NAVIGATION AND POWER-Continued Channel excavation—Concluded. (n) Morrisburg Canal Bank and Canada Island- Item Excavation-dredging. dry earth.. masonry.. Riprap.... Brought forward. (0) North side of Cornwall Island- Excavation-dry earth. dredging (p) South side of Cornwall Island- Excavation-dry earth.. dredging. (g) Engineering and Contingencies.. (r) Total_ Ice Cribs above Prescott and above Galop Isd.- (a) Cribs, booms and rock fill— Cribwork.. Booms. Rock fill (b) Engineering and Contingencies. (c) Total 3 Iroquois Point Dam- (a) Dam- Concrete.. Concrete. Concrete. Foundation contingency Excavation-Earth. Rock.. Earth. Rock fill.. Gates, bridges, etc. Placing caissons. (b) Engineering and Contingencies. (c) Total Dykes- (a) North and South end of Iroquois Pt. Dam- Earth fill. Rock fill Stripping. Earth fill Rock fill. Stripping. (b) U. S. Shore-Wilson Hill to Louisville Landing- (c) West and East of Massena Canal- Earth fill.. Rock fill Stripping. Earth fill. Rock fill Stripping. (d) Between Massena Canal and Navi- gation Canal- (e) East and West of Long Sault Dam- Earth fill. Rock fill Stripping. Unit c. y. c. y. c. y. c. y. c. y. c. y. c. y. c. y. с. у. с. у. с. у. C. y. с. у. c. y. с. у. с. у. c. y. c. y. c. y. c. y. c. y. c. y. c. y. c. y. с. у. c. y. c. y. c. y. c. y. c. y. Quantity Rate Amount 1,364, 930 201, 300 13, 770 5, 180 618, 270 3, 150, 370 FI 800,000 634, 560 14 91, 340 22, 450 6, 470 37, 890 7,060 69, 920 234, 550 83, 720 6, 790 16, 500 556, 640 50, 120 106, 400 1,843, 600 185, 990 231, 920 478, 660 29, 510 72, 170 339, 530 48,840 32, 360 0.90 0.65 1.60 2.70 0.65 0.80 0.65 0.80 25% 25% 16.00 12.00 10.00 19.00 27.00 0.90 2.00 0.90 1.00 0.65 0.90 1.00 0.65 0.90 1.00 0.65 0.90 1.00 0.65 0.90 1.00 0.65 $1, 228, 440 130, 850 22,030 13, 990 520,000 507, 650 401, 880 2, 520, 300 200,000 45,000 281,000 1,461, 440 269, 400 64, 700 173, 080 719, 910 190, 620 62, 930 469, 100 682, 200 780,000 75, 350 6, 790 10, 730 500, 980 50, 120 69, 160 1, 659, 240 185,990 150, 750 430, 800 29, 510 46, 910 305, 580 48, 840 21,030 Total $1,395, 310 34, 558, 270 1,027, 650 2, 922, 180 9, 627, 900 48, 136, 000 526, 000 130,000 656, 000 4,873, 380 2,436, 620 7, 310, 000 92, 620, 260 1,995, 980 507, 220 375, 450 40 GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE BASIN No. 4 | Dykes-Concluded. 10 5 7 8 (C) WORKS COMMON TO NAVIGATION AND POWER-Continued 9 Item (f) Canadian side- Earth fill Rock fill Stripping. (g) On Barnhart Island- Earth fill. Rock fill Stripping (h) Engineering and contingencies. (i) Total... Supply channel and weir at Massena- (a) Supply channel and weir- 6 Diversion cut through Long Sault Island- (a) Diversion cut-- Excavation-dry earth_ dry rock. dredging. Concrete paving.. (b) Engineering and Contingencies. - (c) Total.. Concrete.. Concrete. Foundation contingency. Excavation-rock footing. rock trench.. earth dredging Concrete paving. Gates, bridges, hoists, etc.. (b) Engineering and contingencies- (c) Total Main Long Sault Dam- (a) Dam- Concrete.. Concrete- Foundation contingency Excavation-earth. Concrete. Cribwork rock footings. rock trench Gates, towers, hoists, etc... Unwatering... (b) Engineering and Contingencies- (c) Total Guard Gate, 14 ft. Lock and Weir at Maple Grove- (a) Lock, entrance piers, and weir- Excavation-earth. earth trench. Sheeting and bracing. Lock gates, sluice gates, hoists, etc. (b) Engineering and Contingencies_ (c) Total. 14 ft. Lock and Dykes at Iroquois- (a) Lock- Concrete. Excavation-earth Earth fill Rock fill. Stripping. Lock gates, etc…………. (b) Engineering and contingencies__ (c) Total.. Unit с. у. c. y. c. y. c. y. c. y. c. y. c. y. c. y. c. y. c. y. c. y. c. y. c. y. c. y. c. y. c. y. c. y. c. y. c. y. C. V. c. y. с. у. c. y. c. y. c. v. c. y. cu. yd. cu. yd. cu. yd. cu. yd. cu. yd. Quantity Rate Amount Total 4, 212, 180 583, 550 392, 820 1,578, 480 126, 600 201, 590 28, 260 66, 410 5, 400 650 988, 540 46,000 6, 550 2, 172, 420 29, 110 317,500 28, 270 709, 070 81, 290 1,402, 490 116, 260 530 98, 340 40, 870 859, 600 5,790 19, 140 78, 100 162, 040 13, 650 31, 630 0.90 1.00 0.65 0.90 1.00 0.65 25% 12.00 10.00 2.40 4. 10 0.65 0.90 11.00 25% 0.65 1.60 0.90 11.00 25% 12.00 10.00 0.65 2.40 4. 10 25% 10.00 5.00 0.65 4. 00 25% 10.00 0.65 0.90 1.00 0.65 25% $3,790,960 583, 550 255, 330 1, 420, 630 126,600 131,030 339, 120 664, 100 33,910 12,960 2,660 642, 550 41, 400 72, 050 82, 100 1, 412, 070 46, 580 285, 750 310, 970 8, 508, 840 812, 900 850, 880 911, 620 279, 020 1,640 978, 300 3,700.000 983, 400 204, 350 558, 740 23. 160 15,950 314,000 191, 400 50, 770 145, 840 13, 650 20, 560 60,000 $4, 629, 840 1,678, 260 2, 474, 120 12, 374, 000 1,890, 850 472, 150 2, 363, 000 2,055, 370 513, 630 2,569, 000 16, 043, 200 4, 011, 800 20, 055, 000 2,099, 600 524, 400 2,624,000 482, 220 121, 780 604, 000 GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE BASIN 41 No 10 11 12 13 14 14 (C) WORKS COMMON TO NAVIGATION AND POWER-Continued Quantity Rate Item Railroad relocation- (a) Norwood and St. Lawrence Rly (b) Canadian National Rly. (c) Engineering and contingencies. (d) Total_ Clearing Pool- (a) U. S. side.. (b) Can. side. (c) Engineering and contingencies.. (d) Total. Rehabilitation of Morrisburg. Rehabilitation of Iroquois Acquisition of land, etc., U. S. side. Acquisition of lands, etc., Can. side: 16 Highway relocation- (a) U. S. shore_. (6) Can. shore. (c) Engineering and contingencies.. (d) Total.. 11 Unit 25% 25% 25% Amount $207, 500 2,750,000 359,000 55,000 549, 500 1, 700, 000 Total $2,957, 500 738, 500 3,696, 000 414, 000 104,000 518,000 5,024, 000 3, 379, 000 4, 657, 000 14, 011, 000 2, 249, 500 562, 500 2,812,000 Mr. BERLE. I take the liberty of observing that some of the figures, including the final figures, differ rather widely from certain of the figures which have been freely talked about in some places. If the committee will bear with me I think perhaps it may be inter- esting to spend a few moments on the long history of this project. The CHAIRMAN. We will be glad to have you do so, sir. Mr. BERLE. In 1895 an international commission was created to ex- amine the feasibility of a ship canal from the Great Lakes to the Atlan- tic Ocean. That committee considered or had to consider the deepen- ing of the existing St. Lawrence Canal, which as you know is a century old and is in operation. That commission reported unanimously in favor of it and, accordingly, in 1897 the United States created a Board of Engineers and that commission reported on June 30, 1900, in favor of a 21-foot waterway on American territory. This was in 1900 when ships were not as large as they are now. In 1905 an International Waterways Commission was created and that Commission reported periodically on various subjects, including various phases of this. On January 21, 1920, the American and Canadian Governments cre- ated an International Joint Commission under the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909. That_Commission considered the question of the im- provement of the St. Lawrence for navigation and for hydroelectric power. The CHAIRMAN. We will proceed for 15 minutes. Proceed, then, Mr. Berle. Mr. BERLE. Thank you, sir. We got as far as the commission of 1920, which reported in 1921; and in 1924 a St. Lawrence commission was appointed to consider the whole question. It is interesting to note that Mr. Herbert Hoover was chairman of that commission. In 1924, likewise, Canada appointed a national advisory commis- sion for like purposes. And in that same year we designated three 42 GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE BASIN representatives to serve on the joint engineering board with the Cana- dian Government. In 1926 the joint board of engineers reported back to the two Gov- ernments, and that report was unanimous; but there was then the begin- ning of the controversy as to whether you should have a two-stage or a single-stage form. On April 9, 1932, the joint board of engineers was reconvened and made another report on the subject, and specifically on the Interna- tional Rapids section, with which this agreement practically deals. And on July 18, as you know, the Treaty of 1932 was signed. Since that time, aside from some reports, one in 1933 and another on January 10, 1934, the matter continued a subject of discussion by both Governments, but without definite action, until, on May 28, 1938, a draft of a probable new treaty or agreement was submitted to the Canadian Minister in Washington. Negotiations then continued more or less actively, and on March 14, 1940, by notes, exchange of notes, the joint international committees reestablished this report as it has been put in the record. On January 3, the report which is in the record was made, and on March 19, 1941, an agreement was signed between Canada and the United States, providing for the utilization of this water. This agreement was sent by the President to the Congress of the United States on March 21, 1941, and that is the agreement in respect of which H. R. 4927 proposes approval. On that point I should like to add that the agreement, by its terms, will go into force when it is approved by the legislative bodies of the two countries. That is to say, by the Congress of the United States and by the Parliament of the Dominion of Canada, respectively. The question was very carefully considered as to whether or not it was legal to proceed by an agreement, and I should like to read into the record the opinion of the Attorney General obtained on that point. Without trying to read a lengthy legal argument, let me perhaps ask that it be inserted in the record. It consists of the letter of the Secretary of State to the Attorney General, dated March 13, 1941, and the question asked is: I should appreciate it if you would advise me whether you agree that the arrangement may be effectuated by an agreement signed under the authority of the Executives of the two countries and approved by legislative enactments by the Congress and the Canadian Parliament. That question submitted by Secretary Hull was accompanied by a memorandum of the Legal Adviser of the Department of State, Mr. Green Hackworth, setting forth his views. The Attorney General answered, and the answer, perhaps, may be read into the record: MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I have your letter of March 13 and concur in the conclusion reached by your Legal Adviser that it is legally unobjectionable so far as this country is concerned for the Executives of the United States and Canada to enter into an agreement regarding the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence deep waterway project conditioned for its effectiveness upon the subsequent enactment of necessary legislation by the Congress and by the Canadian Parliament. If an agreement is executed and approved in this manner, its provisions would be binding upon the United States as respects Canada. GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE BASIN 43 As you are aware, in Canada that kind of procedure, of course, has the same force as the ratification of a treaty. (The documents referred to are in full as follows:) GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE WATERWAY PROJECT Correspondence between the Secretary of State and the Attorney General on the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence waterway project follows. The Secretary of State to the Attorney General MARCH 13, 1941. MY DEAR MR. ATTORNEY GENERAL: I enclose for your consideration a memo- randum prepared by the Legal Adviser of this Department, together with a copy of a proposed agreement between the United States and Canada regarding the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence Deep Waterway Project. It is hoped that an agree- ment may be signed within the next few days. I should appreciate it if you would advise me whether you agree that the arrangement may be effectuated by an agreement signed under the authority of the Executives of the two countries and approved by legislative enactments by the Congress and the Canadian Parliament. Sincerely yours, CORDELL HULL. [Enclosure] Memorandum by the Legal Adviser of the Department of State For several years the United States and Canada have had under consideration the feasibility of a joint undertaking for the improvement of the Great Lakes- St. Lawrence Basin so as to make these waters available to seagoing vessels, the development of hydroelectric power, etc. The Legal Adviser of the Department of State, in a memorandum dated February 10, 1939, expressed the opinion that an arrangement between the United States and Canada concerning the project could be effected by a simple agreement between the two countries and approval of the agreement by legislation in the United States and in Canada. The nego- tiations have progressed to the point where an agreement is about ready to be signed, but before proceeding to signature it is thought desirable to ascertain whether the Attorney General concurs in the view that the purposes may be accomplished in this fashion. It is not necessary here to enter into a discussion of the treaty-making power or of the power of the President to enter into executive agreements with foreign countries. It is sufficient to say that a very large number of such agreements on various subjects have been entered into from time to time throughout the history of this country. Some of them have been specifically authorized by acts of Congress; others, though not specifically authorized, have been within the framework of acts of Congress; and still others have been concluded without enabling legislation on the subject. Following the failure of the Senate to approve a treaty for the annexation of Texas, the annexation was accomplished by a joint resolution approved on March 1, 1845 (5 Stat. 797), after passage by a simple majority vote of the two houses of Congress. Likewise, in the case of Hawaii, a treaty of annexation had been signed on June 16, 1897, and approved by the Hawaiian Legislature, but there was not sufficient support in the United States Senate to obtain approval by a two-thirds vote. Thereafter Congress passed a point resolution to accomplish the same purpose, which was approved July 7, 1898 (30 Stat. 750). Of interest in this connection is action by Congress with respect to the construction of bridges across the international boundary-United States and Canada, subject to similar authorization by Canada. For example, Public Resolution No. 117, 75th Congress, 3d session, created the Niagara Falls Bridge Commission and authorized it to construct and operate bridges across the Niagara River, subject to "the approval of the proper authorities in the Dominion of Canada.' (52 Stat. 767.) On November 11, 1927, President Coolidge issued a presidential license to the Detroit-Ontario Subway, Inc., authorizing the company to construct, op. 44 GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE BASIN crate, and maintain a tunnel from a point in or near Brush or Randolph Street in the City of Detroit to a point on the international boundary line under the Detroit River. It is understood that corresponding authorization was given on the part of Canada by an Order in Council. The improvement of the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence Basin for navigation and other purposes would seem clearly to fall within the commerce clause of the Constitution, giving the Congress the authority to regulate interstate and foreign commerce. Where the undertaking with respect to interstate and foreign commerce involves boundary waters over which this country does not have exclusive jurisdiction, there would seem to be no reason why the Con- gress should not within its Constitutional power enact legislation, contingent upon a like legislative enactment in the other country, signifying its approval of a joint undertaking signed by both Governments. The signing of an agree- ment by the two Governments would be but a convenient way of bringing about in advance of legislative enactments a joint understanding by the two Governments on a complicated question which could hardly be handled without such advance understanding. The agreement would contain provisions which might otherwise be incorporated in a treaty, but would not take the treaty form or follow the treaty process. It would not constitute a binding interna- tional agreement until Congress and the Canadian Parliament had indicated their approval. GREEN H. HACKWORTH. The Attorney General to the Secretary of State MARCH 14, 1941. MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I have your letter of March 13 and concur in the conclusion reached by your Legal Adviser that it is legally unobjectionable so far as this country is concerned for the executives of the United States and Canada to enter into an agreement regarding the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence Deep Waterway project conditioned for its effectiveness upon the subsequent enactment of necessary legislation by the Congress and by the Canadian Paliament. If an Agreement is executed and approved in this manner, its provisions would be binding upon the United States as respects Canada. Respectfully, ROBERT H. JACKSON. The problem as to whether this would be submitted in the form of an agreement or in the form of a treaty was a problem which engaged the most careful consideration of the Department of State. This agreement differs from many treaties in that the effect of it is quite as great in terms of domestic matters as in terms of foreign affairs. It differs, for instance, from the kind of treaty which one might make, as for instance, a treaty of alliance or a treaty regarding arms limitation, or things of that kind. It accordingly agreed that, in view of the fact that the issues were very largely domestic, the con- sidered opinion of the House of Representatives as well as of the Senate was advisable and desirable and that it was only fair that it should be submitted also to that tribunal. I should like to add that that form of submission of agreement is in no way unusual in our history. The Texas agreement has been already adverted to here. One could cite a very, very long list of other precedents which I do not care to do here by reference unless someone is interested in that point. But I might note, among others, that there was a legislative authorization of agreement relating to reciprocal reductions of duties more than 30 years ago, and that this procedure was declared constitutional by the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Altman v. United States (224 U. S. 583, especially page 600). That under like congressional approval an agree- ment was entered into by which the United States entered the Inter- GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE BASIN 45 national Labor Office in 1934; and that by like congressional authority agreements were entered into relating to the limitation of supplying arms to belligerent countries in this hemisphere. An agreement on that point was upheld by the Supreme Court of the United States in what is, I suppose, the classic case on Executive power, United States v. Curtiss Wright Co. (299 U. S., 304). Mr. BELL. Pardon me, Mr. Berle, 299 U. S.? Mr. BERLE. 299 U. S. 304, which exempts such Executive power. For those who have a real scholarly interest in the question and are interested in a thorough statement of it, which I profess myself both unable to make and I think probably none of us would care to take the time, I should like to refer to the authoritative work on the sub- ject which is a book entitled, "International Executive Agreements," by Dr. Wallace McClure, published by the Columbia University Press, 1941, which takes in all of the long history beginning even in the days of the Continental Congress, and coming down to substantially the day of the date of these presents. Mr. GAVAGAN. What is the name of it, Mr. Secretary? Mr. BERLE. It is called International Executive Agreements, by Dr. Wallace McClure. Mr. GAVAGAN. Yes. Mr. BERLE. I merely mentioned this to indicate that this is not a new and casual idea. It is a thing which has been repeatedly done, and the United States Department of State functions now under a considerable number of agreements of that kind. One of them, for instance, the Finnish debt settlement, is familiar to you all, and the reciprocal-trade agreements, of course, have been a part of the history of the past 8 years. In view of the fact, accordingly, that the primary considerations were domestic, it seemed fair to the United States to submit this as an agreement. It hardly seemed Mr. CARTER. Pardon me, Mr. Berle. We have news fresh from the front. The Interior Department bill will not come on this afternoon; it has been postponed until Thursday. The clerk of the committee just sent me word. The CHAIRMAN. Then we will proceed in our usual way. Mr. BERLE. I propose to close this phase of the subject by saying that it did seem that in an issue of this size and of this importance, it was hardly fair to place in the hands of the minority of one house the ulti- mate decision on a measure of very great importance to the entire country. For that reason the agreement form was selected, and it is in that form that it is here. Speaking to the aspect of foreign relations, I should like to make merely a few observations, and then submit myself to such questioning as you care to do within my limited capacity to answer. While this agreement was in course of negotiation, it became obvious that the defense effort of Canada and of the United States would have to be a coordinated defense effort. Specifically, a joint_Canadian- American defense commission has been constituted and the staff ex- changes took place, so that in terms of defense we had gone very far toward the road of parallel action. During that same period it likewise became clear that the industrial effort would have to be coordinated, and the final development on that 62660—42—pt. 1—————4 46 GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE BASIN · subject came even after this agreement was signed, though not very long after it, and appeared in the famous Mackenzie King-Roosevelt communique of a few weeks ago. In a word, it became apparent that the development of the resources along the border could not be con- sidered as merely for the advantage of one country or another, but that these resources would have to be used jointly by both countries for the common preparation of what might become a common defense. To us in the State Department that question was still further ac- centuated by the state of occurrences which likewise have occupied some of the time of the Congress of the United States quite recently. Specifically, the threatened shortage of power to which Secretary Stimson referred began to cast its shadow ahead. The Office of Pro- duction Management opened negotiations with the State Department and with the Federal Power Commission and requested us to find more power in that area. Their reason for wishing it could be better stated by the O. P. M. men themselves, who, I am told, will testify on that point. But a very large part of chemical and ferroalloy industries in the Niagara region needed more power, and at the same time the St. Lawrence section likewise needed more power if they were to meet the increased schedules. We were accordingly requested to see whether additional power could not be got in that area. Under the boundary waters treaty of 1909 a division of the water has been reached, and it was agreed that only limited diversion should be made by each side. And all of those were already being used. Accordingly, we first made it possible for Canada to divert additional water over and above her allowance under the treaty of 1909 to meet the first onslaught of the present need. Later we increased the diver- sion which she could take and likewise got authority to divert addi- tional water, ourselves. This by negotiation. We have already been forced to give notice to the Canadians, and likewise to the authorities here, that we will within the next few weeks ask for another diversion of 7,500 feet out of Niagara; and, so far as we are aware, when that diversion is complete we shall have made full use of all the power there available. Subject to a limited amount of improvement which I am told is now going on on the Canadian side, when those resources are taken up we have come to the end of the road. Nevertheless, we already do not have sufficient power to take care of the defense industries on the American side of the St. Lawrence, and we are at this moment borrowing power from the Canadians, who sorely need it themselves, as a part of the cooperative arrangement; but they have indicated very plainly that as their new defense plants go into action they will need that power for themselves. And we shall have to go into still further makeshifts if we are to maintain the present level, let alone increase it. Perhaps that gives some of the background of the threatened short- age to which Secretary Stimson refers. As the new plants which are building and the new capacity which has been created go into action on our side of the river, we shall have to use not only all the water we are permitted to take but all the additional water there is under a temporary modification of the boundary waters agreement with Can- ada, approved only recently by the United States Senate; and we shall still be short, both for their needs and for our own. GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE BASIN 47 Under these circumstances it is plain that we have no option save to seek the largest additional amount of power that we can where we can. I should like to say that it is out of my jurisdiction, but this is with- out the slightest prejudice to certain additional resources of power in other parts of the country, which I am informed the Power Com- sion has been actively working on in the past few days, and in respect of which Mr. Leland Olds will be quite prepared to testify. Put concisely, it is not a question of this power as against some other power. It appears to be a question of needing all the power we can get, whether it be in Canada or in Arkansas; whether it be in the St. Lawrence or in the West. C At the same time, the problem was taken up as to the seaway. I should like to point out that in that regard the agreement makes a provision which I think perhaps might be borne in mind in this respect. Of the immediate necessity for developing power, both Governments were convinced by the most pressing of evidences and the most immediate of urgent necessities. As to the seaway, it was agreed that only the development of events could furnish a final answer. By consequence, the agreement provides that the seaway should be completed by the year 1948, but that the governments would continue in consultation as to the development of affairs, with a view either to accelerating that construction or deferring that construction, as the opinion of their respective governments particularly informed about defense needs might require. Under these circumstances, we considered that the agreement had protected the obvious and present needs for power which was apparent and had taken care of the seaway which we ourselves, and which I myself eventually believe to be needed now, but had provided neces- sary loopholes in the event that some problem of priority or other- wise might call for its delay. I should like to state that up to this point nothing has appeared which would indicate that the delay would be desirable, and many considerations have been adduced which would indicate that the con- struction of it should be promptly made. I think that, so far as the strict State Department phases of this matter are concerned, that this covers the operative questions. I think perhaps the balance of the matter can be best developed in the ques- tions which I know are to be asked. I cannot refrain from commenting on one point which was raised in connection with Secretary Stimson's testimony, the problem of the defense of the Canal. The joint Canadian-American Defense Com- mission has charge, of course, of defending the entire border. It has had to make special arrangements for the defense of various parts of the Canadian waterways for, as you gentlemen are quite aware, the Canadian-St. Lawrence Waterway exists, except for a small sector of 47 miles, and that waterway being in use, has to be defended along with the rest of the continental United States and the railways which run through that territory and which are of equal importance. By consequence, I think it can be said that the problem of the defense of the Canadian-American waterway, as it now exists, which would include the defense of the St. Lawrence-International Rapids section, is already being dealt with. 48 GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE BASIN In connection with that, it is also necessary to deal with one of the largest aluminum plants in the United States, at Massena, N. Y., which is in that area now, and with the other defense industries which like- wise require equal defense. Unless it is assumed that we are to aban- don one of our primary industrial defense regions to an enemy, which runs right along this route, the defense of that area has to be assumed. We are likewise, as you know, obligated by declaration and policy to share in the defense of Canada as a vital necessity to the defense of the United States. In consequence the proposed waterway and power development lie within an area which this Government is already committed to defend and which in any event it would have to defend in simple consideration of its own safety. The construction of the St. Lawrence waterway imposes no new obligations other than those presently employed in the defense of Can- ada, the defense of the existing waterway, the defense of the essential railroads which run through this territory, and the defense of the supremely essential war plants which are already there. With that, plus the addition that my Department earnestly hopes that this agreement may be promptly and favorably acted upon, per- haps let me close and submit myself to questions. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Berle, it is now nearly half past 12. I suggest that we might adjourn now until 2 o'clock. Mr. BERLE. With pleasure. The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, we will adjourn until 2 o'clock. (Whereupon, at 12:25 p. m., a recess was taken until 2 p. m.) AFTERNOON SESSION (The committee reassembled, pursuant to the taking of a recess, at 2 p. m., Hon. Joseph J. Mansfield, chairman, presiding.) STATEMENT OF ADOLF A. BERLE, JR., ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE-Resumed The CHAIRMAN. Now, Mr. Berle, I believe you had finished your main statement. Can you explain to us briefly, or in full, if necessary, what are the differences in many of the terms of this agreement now embraced in this bill with Canada and the treaty which was voted on in 1934? Mr. BERLE. The first and the greatest difference is that it provides for a single-stage dam instead of for two dams. Strictly speaking, as General Robins can explain better than I, instead of having two distinct dams, you have one, with a small control dam further up the river to control the flow. The second is that we endeavored to deal with a problem which has had a good deal of discussion, namely, the so-called Chicago diversion. We provided that in the event that there should be diversion, under proper authority, that the problem of such a diversion should be referred to arbitration and appropriate compensation or remedy awarded. This is a general provision and in terms applies equally to any diversion by the United States or to any diversion by Canada, but in practice and in geography the only diversion that is really pos- GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE BASIN 49 sible or that has been discussed at all is a possible diversion from Lake Michigan out of Chicago. The CHAIRMAN. Now, the only diversions for navigation are the ones that occur at Chicago and the Erie Canal. Mr. BERLE. I do not think that there is any great amount of diver- sion for the Erie Canal. There may be a very small amount of water diverted there. Mr. CARTER. Mr. Chairman, I think that that water is returned to the Lakes. Mr. BERLE. It is returned to Lake Ontario. Mr. CARTER. It is returned later. The CHAIRMAN. It is returned to the watershed. Mr. BERLE. Yes. M The CHAIRMAN. It is not returned to Lake Erie, but is returned to Lake Ontario; but the water taken out at Chicago goes to the Gulf, of course. Mr. BERLE. The water taken out at Chicago is not. The third main difference is that this agreement likewise deals with and provides for the development and beautification of Niagara Falls, which likewise is an item that is on the minds of a great many of us. The CHAIRMAN. Now, you spoke this morning of additional diver- sions for power purposes at Niagara Falls, both by Canada and by the United States. Would that interfere in any way with the beauty of the falls? Mr. BERLE. If that were continued, sir, it would. Only the pres- ence, sir, of a great emergency really leads us to do that. Those agree- ments are there limited in time. They expire, if I recall correctly, or rather the one that has been made, expires on October 1, 1942, subject to review in the event the emergency still continues, which shows what we thought of it. We could end that situation, were this agreement to go through, because in that case you could build the necessary com- pensatory works storing the power and creating a greater head further down and thereby getting the power without the diversion of the water. As it stands now it would ultimately impair the Falls. We should never think of these diversions, I may say, as permanent for that reason, because in times of emergency you do what you can while you can, and frankly one of the reasons that made us willing to do that, aside from the necessity, was the hope, and I trust the well-founded hope, that this agreement would pass and we could then get to work on building the necessary works so that this kind of diversion would no longer be necessary. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Carter, do you have any questions? Mr. CARTER. Yes. The treaty has been referred to. The treaty was rejected by the Senate. Mr. BERLE. Yes, sir. Mr. CARTER. With whom was that treaty made? Mr. BERLE. That treaty was made between the Government of the United States and the Dominion of Canada. Mr. CARTER. Was it not with Great Britain at that time? Mr. BERLE. Well, the formal title, the formal title both then, and I guess now, is the King of Great Britain, in respect to Canada. That, however, is as you know, part of the symbolism. 50 GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE BASIN Mr. CARTER. But Canada at that time was not on diplomatic rela- tions with us? Mr. BERLE. I think it was; yes. Mr. CARTER. Action taken or adopted by the various branches of the British Association of Nations was approved in 1925 and since that time Canada has transacted business virtually as an independent nation. Mr. BERLE. I think, sir, our own legation was established there in 1926 and theirs here at the same time-it was 1927. I beg your pardon. Mr. CARTER. What is the answer to the question, with whom was the treaty made? Mr. BERLE. The treaty was made with the Dominion of Canada. Mr. CARTER. With whom was that agreement made? Mr. BERLE. The treaty likewise was made with the Dominion of Canada. Mr. CARTER. You mean the agreement. Mr. BERLE. The agreement. I do not know whether I accurately get the point of your question. As you know, the Statute of West- minister, which gives the substance of the sovereign power to the Dominion of Canada is a peculiar British creation. Canada does not consider that Great Britain, for instance, can declare war for her or make peace for her. She reserves that as her own sovereign right and it is done by act of the Canadian Parliament, but the party to all of the obligations, agreements, treaties, and so forth, is continued as the King of Great Britain, Ireland, and the British dominions be- yond the sea, Emperor of India, in respect of the Dominion of Canada, and he can only do that on the recommendation of the Canadian Premier, and can only do it effectively with the assent of the Canadian Parliament. Mr. CARTER. You say that you were searching, or at least I under- stood you to say in your testimony, that you were searching for other sources of power, electric energy to produce power, to carry us through the present situation. Mr. BERLE. Strictly speaking, sir, I understand that the Federal Power Commission has conducted that search. It is naturally in their jurisdiction. We have assisted in that search insofar as it had to do with sources wholly or partly in Canada, and have worked with the Federal Power Commission in obtaining that power. Mr. CARTER. Did you have something to do with the drafting of the agreement? Mr. BERLE. The agreement was actually drafted as the result of a long set of negotiations, some part of which I helped to conduct. The drafting on the side of the United States was largely done by the State Department experts with whom I was associated, guided by General Robins, of the Army engineers, and Mr. Leland Olds, of the Federal Power Commission, and in a number of those sessions, the New York Power Authority likewise sat in and was consulted. WE Mr. CARTER. You stated that you did not think it was fair to put in the hands of the minority in one House a decision in this matter, and gave that, as I understood it, as one of the reasons why you chose the agreement course rather than the treaty; is that correct? GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE BASIN 51 Mr. BERLE. Well, that is one of the reasons, of course, Mr. Congress- man; yes. Actually, of course, the main reason was that the real issues here are domestic. We should have exactly this debate if there were no Canadian boundary and the St. Lawrence River and the rapids were entirely in the United States territory. In that case, however, the State De- partment would not be involved, and we should be, presumably, deal- ing with a simple matter. Mr. CARTER. That was a principal reason. You do not think that debate in the Senate would bring out all of these things- Mr. BERLE. Not in the slightest. Mr. CARTER (continuing). On a treaty confirmation, and you wanted to give the House the benefit and privilege of debating these questions? Mr. BERLE. I think that since, among other things, we are asked to spend something in the vicinity of $200,000,000 net of the United States Government's money, that at least that phase of it is one—I may say a peculiar one. Mr. CARTER. Well, my dear sir, you know over and above that they would have to come to the Appropriations Committee of the House to get money, do you not? Mr. BERLE. I know it well, Mr. Congressman. Mr. CARTER. So it seems to me that they would have to come there anyhow, whether this was decided by treaty or agreement. I was wondering, just as a sort of a matter of curiosity, if there was not some other reason that had not been stated here as yet. Can you think of any other reason now, or has any other reason occurred to you as to why you chose this particular course rather than the treaty course? Mr. BERLE. Well, it has occurred to me to wonder why a group of people whose main interests were in transportation should suddenly get excited about the treaty-making power of the Senate, I will confess, and turning the question around in reverse, why perhaps some of the real reasons for this debate really appear. Joking aside, of course, it is perfectly obvious that a matter of this kind could only be properly authorized by the vote of the two Houses and just as I suppose the desire of the people who never previously have been very much interested in the treaty-making power of the Senate was to erect a situation in which a smaller vote could defeat it, speaking with entire frankness, I suppose that it is fair for the pro- ponents of the project to wonder whether possibly a majority of both Houses might not be a perfectly adequate way of authorizing the project, particularly since, historically, that is the method by which this kind of project usually is authorized. Mr. CARTER. Well, I agree with you, if you substitute some other word than "adequate" in there. Mr. BERLE. Well, you are privileged to say that, Mr. Congressman. I, myself, would never have the temerity to say that a majority vote of this House and of the Senate went without adequate consideration and discussion and did not adequately speak for the sentiment of the United States. Mr. CARTER. Well, you say that that was the adequate way of au- thorizing this. I still say that I would use other words, or another word than "adequate" in there. 52 GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE BASIN You are familiar with the history of the treaty, are you not? Mr. BERLE. Yes. Mr. CARTER. You know that the Senate declined to adopt the treaty? Mr. BERLE. Yes. Of course, I am familiar with something else, too, and that was that when the boundary waters treaty of 1909 was estab- lished, there was a provision in it which indicated that further work of this kind should be authorized by agreement, authorized or approved by the legislative bodies of both countries. In other words, at that time the Congress of the United States ratified a treaty which declared the policy by which this kind of work might be done thereafter, and you will find that provision in the boundary waters treaty of 1909. I do not know what led the previous administration to select the treaty form, because I was then in private life. Mr. CARTER. You think that the agreement form is a legal way of getting at this, do you not? Mr. BERLE. Entirely legal. Mr. CARTER. I am inclined to agree with you on that, Mr. Berle, but I had an idea in the back of my head that those in charge of this bill probably viewing what happened to the other treaty thought that probably they could get an agreement adopted by the Congress, when they could not get a treaty; but from what you say, that did not enter into the discussions at all as to which course to follow. Mr. BERLE. That did not enter into our minds particularly, at least, not into my mind. I speak for myself only in that regard. Mr. CARTER. Well, do you think that a mistake was made at the time the other procedure was started and this treaty plan was put forth? Mr. BERLE. For myself I cannot say, because I do not know what the considerations and terms of international relations, and so on, then, were. I know that at the time there was a very strong group of experts in the State Department-this was back in 1932 who advocated the agreement form at that time. Since I have never had to try to figure out the rights and wrongs of it, and profess myself further unable to pass judgment on other men's work, I do not undertake to answer the question. The idea was not a new one. It was very earnestly urged then. Mr CARTER. Yes. It has been done in all other cases as cited here, too. Did you make the decision in this case? Mr. BERLE. No; I did not. Mr. CARTER. Did you confer with those who did make the deci- sion? Mr. BERLE. Well, I conferred with a great many people about it, but as you know, the ultimate decisions of the Department of State are made up in consultation with the entire group and ultimately no one of us would have the temerity to make a decision of that kind, except by the advice and with the authority of the entire Department. Mr. CARTER. You think, however, that the fate of the treaty en- tered very largely, if any, in arriving at a decision in this particular case? Mr. BERLE. Oh, I cannot say, but I do not think it was a con- trolling consideration, sir. 1 GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE BASIN 53 Mr. CARTER. That is all. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Gavagan. Mr. GAVAGAN. No questions. The CHAIRMAN. Judge Culkin. Mr. CULKIN. Will you amplify, Mr. Berle, the section in the 1909 treaty that confers jurisdiction on the popular assemblies of both countries over such international questions? I suggest, if you have the text of that section, that it be put into the record. Mr. BERLE. Will you pardon me for a moment? Mr. CULKIN. My colleague from Michigan, Mr. Dondero, sug- gests that it is section 13. Mr. BERLE. I believe he is right. I do not happen to have the text of the boundary-waters treaty of 1909 with me. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. McGann, you have it, do you not? The CLERK. Yes, sir. The CHAIRMAN. We will have it in a moment. Mr. BERLE. If you will permit, I will put it in the record. Mr. CULKIN. Will you put it in the record, Mr. Berle? Mr. BERLE. If I may; yes. I should like to state, in slight amplification, I cited that as evi- dence of the policy. Mr. CULKIN. Well, now that 1909 treaty was ratified by the Senate? Mr. BERLE. Yes, sir. Mr. CULKI.N By the customary two-thirds vote? Mr. BERLE. That is right. Mr. CULKIN. And what was in the minds of the men who wrote that treaty in behalf of the United States, you cannot tell now; you do not know what the reasoning was on it? Mr. BERLE. Well, as a matter of fact, I have seen some decisions in respect to that section. Mr. CULKIN. And what the reasoning on it from the standpoint of the United States was? Mr. BERLE. The reasoning was that the additional works, improve- ments, or structural changes, which might be needed along that water- way, really came under the head of ordinary river, harbor, and simi- lar improvements, and that therefore they might be dealt with in the ordinary course of legislation rather than as a matter of interna- tional treaty, since the policy has been established. Mr. CULKIN. And that was the reason that section 13 was written into the treaty, I assume? Mr. BERLE. I believe so. Mr. CULKIN. And there was not anything sinister about it? Mr. BERLE: I cannot see what it would be. Mr. CULKIN. The treaty was adopted in the Senate and now confers. jurisdiction on this whole question by joint resolution; is that true? Mr. BERLE. By a majority action of the two legislatures. Mr. CULKIN. Of both Houses. Mr. BERLE. Yes. Mr. CULKIN. That was the action of the Congress of the United States? Mr. BERLE. That was the action of the Congress of the United States. 54 GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE BASIN Mr. CULKIN. So if there is anything impure or sinister about it, it comes within the category of congressional action? Mr. BERLE. Yes. Well, this is one of the historical ways by which we have traditionally arranged matters with Canada. Even President Taft, when he proposed his reciprocity agreement, which failed of passage, proposed it in the form of an agreement. Mr. CULKIN. What year was that? Mr. BERLE. 1911. Mr. CULKIN. That was subsequent to the 1909 treaty? Mr. BERLE. That was subsequent to the 1909 treaty. Mr. CULKIN. And I assume that it was based on the 1909 treaty. Mr. BERLE. No, sir; that was a separate and distinct subject. It merely conformed to the policy which, well, which antedated the 1909 treaty, but which was enshrined as to certain matters in the 1909 treaty. Mr. CULKIN. Now, the relations of the United States with Canada, from the standpoint of continental defense, has changed greatly since 1934, have they not? Mr. BERLE. Very much; yes. Mr. CULKIN. And it is now the pronounced policy of the United States, which I believe is shared in by both sides of the aisle in both Houses, that we are committed to the defense of Canada. Mr. BERLE. Yes. Mr. CULKIN. Am I stating that too broadly? Mr. BERLE. You are not. I believe that probably the Monroe Doctrine committed us to it, in substance, in any event. Mr. CULKIN. So the great hue and cry that went up against the ratification of the former St. Lawrence Treaty was based on the fact that it was a waterway in a foreign country. You recall that? Mr. BERLE. I do. Mr. CULKIN. And from your viewpoint now, is it not a fact that that attitude was entirely mistaken, and to the detriment of the United States? Mr. BERLE. Well, in retrospect-- Mr. CULKIN. I mean in retrospect. Mr. BERLE. I believe so. I know, of course, now that it is a wholly extraneous issue. Mr. CULKIN. Yes. Mr. BERLE. This is one defense area. Mr. CULKIN. And if that had any weight then, in your judgment, it was genuinely mistaken? Mr. BERLE. I think that it was a mistaken issue then, and whatever validity it had then has certainly ceased to exist, in the light of the North American defense plans of today. Mr. CULKIN. Now, can you amplify that question further from the standpoint of your department? Mr. BERLE. In respect of defense. Mr. CULKIN. Yes; in respect of defense, and correlate with that the construction or the proposed construction of the St. Lawrence seaway as an aid to that. Mr. BERLE. Why, I think so, sir. We are now committed to the defense of the entire North American Continent. In aid of that we have obtained the right to construct bases in Newfoundland; bases on the Canadian coast-I beg your GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE BASIN 55 pardon. My mentor here points out that Newfoundland, technically, is not Canada. I should not have included Newfoundland. New- foundland is a Crown colony. We have of course strengthened our own defenses all down the coast. In addition to that, we have worked out a plan for the common defense of that area, and through the operation of the Canadian- American Joint Defense Commission, and we have implemented those agreements in respect of the defense of that area, and one of the considerations is the continued flow of industrial supplies and munitions; the manufacture in the terms of material and industrial supplies, and their transport in the form of munitions, and the plants contemplate, of course, such transportation as is available. Mr. CULKIN. Do you agree with the suggestion, Mr. Berle, that was made by Julius Barnes, who is a very distinguished publicist, internationally known, and I think the Grain Coordinator at the time of the World War- Mr. BERLE. That is right. Mr. CULKIN. That if the St. Lawrence seaway had been built then, that we might not have been compelled to enter the World War; that is, if the flow of materials, munitions, supplies, and food had not been interrupted by the glut on our side, largely the rail glut, that we would not have had to go into the war. Mr. BERLE. I do not know that I have facts sufficient to form an opinion other than to say that that probably was one of the contribut- ing factors. I was myself a doughboy and later a second lieutenant in that war, and my mind was not on cosmic matters at the time. Mr. CULKIN. You should have had a much higher rank, Mr. Berle. Mr. BERLE. I regret to say that I thought so, but the War Depart- ment did not agree with me, and I am inclined to think that they were right and I was wrong. Mr. CULKIN. Now, Mr. Julius Barnes made this further statement, and, as I say, he is extremely eminent in my judgment. He says that if the flow of materials had not been impeded by reason of the lack of lake transportation, together with the St. Lawrence waterway, the war at least would have been shortened and many thousands of lives would have been saved. Mr. BERLE. Well, it goes without saying, I suppose, that the more efficient your transport the more effective the military operations at the front. Mr. CULKIN. In fact, it is the real handmaiden of war; the service of supplies is the real handmaiden of war. Mr. BERLE. The line of communications is essential; yes. I speak as though I knew more about it than I do, Mr. Congressman. I have to realize that I do not claim to be an expert in military tactics. Mr. CULKIN. I certainly am not. Will you read that section now? Mr. BERLE. It is article XIII: In all cases where special agreements between the High Contracting Parties hereto are referred to in the foregoing articles such agreements are understood and intended to include not only direct agreements between the High Contracting Parties but also any mutual agreement between the United States and the Do- minion of Canada expressed by concurrent or reciprocal legislation on the part of Congress and the Parliament of the Dominion. 56 GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE BASIN Mr. CULKIN. And that, you would say, is the genesis of this power to ratify by joint resolution? Mr. BERLE. No. I would say that that expressed the policy as laid down by the two Governments. We did not relate this agreement directly to article XIII, but we considered that this was an expression of policy employed in a formal treaty between the two countries on which we could appropriately rely in suggesting or choosing this method as against the treaty method. Mr. CULKIN. And that treaty was solemnly ratified by the United States Senate. Mr. BERLE. That treaty was signed by Philander Knox and by Ambassador James Bryce and was approved by the Senate on March 3, 1909. I beg your pardon. It was signed by Elihu Root. Mr. CULKIN. And that would, of course, remove any sinister in- fluence or sinister suggestion in connection with the propriety of the present procedure, would it not? Mr. BERLE. I think it is generally recognized that Elihu Root, who was then Secretary of State, was one of the greatest constitu- tional lawyers of his time and he also had been in the United States Senate, and I cannot imagine that he would have laid down a policy like that in article XIII, if he had thought there was anything sinister in it. Mr. CULKIN. I wanted to calm the fears of my distinguished friend from California (Mr. Carter). Mr. CARTER. I have not had any fears, and so expressed myself to Mr. Berle. I want to say that I made quite an examination of the legal right to go ahead here by agreement, and I am inclined to the view that, notwithstanding that article XIII- The CHAIRMAN (interposing). And you so told me, before the dis- cussion commenced. Mr. CARTER. Yes. So, if you have been wasting your time trying to quiet me, I regret it, sir. Mr. CULKIN. I sit close to you. I observed your demeanor and the tone of your questions. Of course, I am tone deaf as to that. Mr. CARTER. You observed some things that are not there. Mr. CULKIN. I sit very close to you. Mr. BERLE. On behalf of the State Department, I should like to express appreciation for the generosity of the gentleman from Cali- fornia. Mr. CULKIN. Sometimes the gentleman can deal terrific blows. I want to ask you a bit about this diversion question: The older members of the committee had a liberal education on that several years ago. At that time I was fighting side by side with the gentle- man representing New York. I differ with him now. Do you consider this section with reference to diversion liberalizes the old treaty? Mr. BERLE. Well, I consider that it really sets up an entirely different basis. Mr. CULKIN. That it sets up-had you finished? Mr. BERLE. I do not undertake to say what the powers of the Con- gress of the United States are in respect to authorizing additional GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE BASIN 57 diversions. I believe that the only gentlemen who can answer that are the gentlemen who are the members of the Supreme Court of the United States. I do not undertake to forecast their decisions. The present article protects any rights which the Congress may constitutionally have in that respect, and it provides that should anything of that kind happen, then, and in that case, the government of the country which may have accomplished that diversion will give immediate consideration to any representations concerning the matters which the other government may make, and if they cannot reach a satisfactory settlement, then the country which shall have diverted agrees, at the request of the other, to submit the matter to an arbitral tribunal, who may direct the appropriate remedy. Mr. CULKIN. That, of course, would involve, I assume, in its broad sense, compensation for the taking of the water. Mr. BERLE. I presume so. Mr. CULKIN. Yes. Mr. BERLE. I suppose so. Mr. CULKIN. And you regard that section as a workable section, Mr. Berle? Mr. BERLE. I do; yes. Mr. CULKIN. And it does not take away, in fact, assuming the opin- ion of the Supreme Court would be against diversion, it does not add to the jurisdiction of the Congress on the whole question. Mr. BERLE. Well, as to that, I do not undertake to be able to answer. Mr. CULKIN. Of course I agree with you; the question is moot as to what the Supreme Court has never passed on. It has never passed on it, has it? Mr. BERLE. No; not finally. There have been, as you know, certain cases in the Supreme Court of the United States, but, as I understand it, the question has never squarely come up for a decision. Mr. CULKIN. I think the judge who wrote the opinion was Judge Taft. He said that he did not pass upon that question, as I understand. The CHAIRMAN. That is my recollection. Judge Hughes was master in that case, you know. Mr. CULKIN. But this treaty does not close the door to added diver- sion, assuming that this agreement does not close the door to diversion. Mr. BERLE. No. Mr. CULKIN. Assuming the Congress should so determine. Mr. BERLE. No. It closes no door that is not already closed by the legal situation, which I do not propose to state. Mr. CULKIN. Well, on that question I want to ask you this question, Mr. Berle: Does this treaty in any way affect the sovereignty of Lake Michigan or this agreement? Mr. BERLE. No; not in the slightest. Mr. CULKIN. Because of my association with my friend from Cali- fornia (Mr. Carter), I have called this a treaty. I mean agreement, of course. Will you please explain that? Mr. BERLE. If the committee will bear with me. There has been, of course, some discussion in various quarters about the so-called sovereignty of Lake Michigan. The sovereignty of Lake Michigan has not been in dispute, so far as I am aware, since the Canadian- American boundary was determined, a great, great many years ago. 58 GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE BASIN The Department considered whether we ought to have in the treaty a statement definitely recognizing the sovereignty of Lake Michigan, and we came to the conclusion that to do so would be to cast the first doubt that had ever been cast on that sovereignty-just as a man who knows he is sane does not normally go to a doctor to get his head examined and get a certificate of sanity so that he can prove the fact. If it had been desired to obtain such a recognition, I imagine there would have been no doubt that it could have easily been done. The fact of the matter is that the sovereignty of Lake Michigan never has been in question, is not now, and is not even remotely affected by this agreement. It is true that the water in an international reservoir system is, of course, capable of being affected by what either side does, and we are under the ancient common-law obligation not to use our own property so that our neighbors shall suffer, and they are under an equivalent obligation, and that does not affect sovereignty in any way, shape, manner, or form. Mr. CULKIN. It is merely a pawn of international comity, so far as international relations are concerned. Mr. BERLE. Actually, the same thing prevents us from putting a factory building on our side and producing poisonous gases on our side of the line and letting them go over on the other. Mr. CULKIN. There has been some change or will be some change in the water coming into the Great Lakes watershed, will there not? Mr. BERLE. Yes. Mr. CULKIN. And can you tell about that, the character of it, and the amount of it? Mr. BERLE. Yes. I should prefer to be pretty general on that point, and refer you, if I may, to the Army engineers. The fact is that the Canadian Government proposes to divert into the Great Lakes a river which formerly has flowed northward, thereby getting about 5,000 additional feet of water, which they thereupon wish to use for power purposes, as it flows down through the rapids and through the long millrace which is Niagara, and the rapids, which is what it really amounts to. That is the proposal which they have made and also is covered in this treaty. Mr. CULKIN. That diversion is in operation now? Mr. BERLE. That is right. Mr. CULKIN. Has it been accomplished? Mr. BERLE. I cannot answer the question definitely. Part of it has; part of the flow is coming in, but not the full flow. Mr. CULKIN. And that will be, as I understand you, 5,000 cubic feet per second? Mr. BERLE. Yes. The CHAIRMAN. That water is now flowing into Hudson Bay? Mr. BERLE. Yes. Mr. CARTER. That water; we have the use of that water all of the way down the chain of lakes? Mr. BERLE. For navigation we have it; for power they have it. Mr. CARTER. Is there any intervening power? The CHAIRMAN. For navigation, both countries have it. Mr. BERLE. For navigation, both countries have it. Mr. CARTER. I will withdraw that question. GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE BASIN 59 I heard you make a very able radio address in which I thought you were most devastating to your opponents, and in that radio ad- dress you spoke in regard to shipbuilding on the Great Lakes. Mr. BERLE. Yes. Mr. CARTER. Can you tell us anything about the possibility of that and the need for it? Mr. BERLE. I did not undertake to develop that in my direct testi- mony, because the Secretary of the Navy, who has jurisdiction over it, will be testifying before this committee in a day or two, and with him, I imagine, will be Admiral Robinson and Admiral Rock, and some of the other men who are in charge of those things. The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Williams. Mr. BERLE. For that reason, it seems to me that perhaps it was better that this committee get the picture from the experts on it. In general, of course, it can be said that the deep waterway will permit the construction of ships in the Great Lakes yards; further, that it would permit the construction of the ships not designed to be ready for, let us say, 3 or 4 years, in the Great Lakes yards, instead of occupying existing oceanside facilities for that construction. The need, of course, of additional shipbuilding, in view of the losses due to the war, is well known. And, finally, the information in the possession of the Department appears to indicate that, should the Axis powers be victorious, they would commence a shipbuilding race against the United States with the shipbuilding facilities of the en- tire European coasts, which are several times larger than our own. In that event, as indeed at the present, we should be faced with a situation in which every shipbuilding facility we might have and all that we could easily construct would be taxed to the limit. G I prefer to let that be developed, if you will bear with me, by the Navy experts who have the matter thoroughly in hand. Mr. CARTER. Well, does the gentleman know, or can he state at the present, that the shipbuilding facilities in the United States on both coasts and in the Gulf are now being used to the limit? If the gen- tleman does not know Mr. BERLE. I am informed by the Maritime Commission that they are being used to the limit, or have been, or are being committed for. I say that because I am aware that there are a few yards in various places that they expect to fill which have not yet been filled. But that is information that is second-hand. There is not at the moment any surplus shipbuilding capacity available anywhere. think that is a fair statement. I Mr. CULKIN. I am going to venture one more question. I attempted to ask this question with somewhat sad results, of the late distinguished witness, Secretary of War: "How long is this emergency, in your opinion, going to continue?" I just want you to state from the general situation the possibility of victory by the Allies or the possibility of victory by Germany, and how soon it will come. An answer to that question would be an illuminating one with reference to the necessity of building this seaway. Mr. BERLE. Naturally no one of us can predict the inscrutable fu- ture. All I can say is that there is no information in the Department which would lead to the belief that the present conflict will come to a speedy end. We have no basis which would lead us to assume that there 60 GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE BASIN would be a rapid conclusion. We cannot, of course, say how long it would last. The historical analogy of the Napoleonic wars, of course, calls itself at once to the attention. I am informed that that belief is also shared by a good many military and naval quarters. Mr. CULKIN. By the way, what was the duration of the Napoleonic wars? Mr. BERLE. It depends on where you take off from, but they were practically continuous for 17 years. I hope this won't last that long. There were occasional breathing spells, as you know, but not many of them. Mr. CULKIN. Well, I would like for you to divide the discussion in two specific subjects. Assuming Hitler wins, how about the future? How far will that extend into this hemisphere? Of course, in my nightly prayers I pray he won't do that, but facing that terrible eventu- ality, how long would we have to be on our toes here in America? Mr. BERLE. Well, we would have to be on our toes as long as a mili- tary philosophy dominated the continent of Europe. That might be a very considerable period of time. Possibly forever, but we hope not, of course. You would then have to be prepared against all of the force that that victory would imply as a possible menace to the United States. Mr. CULKIN. And assuming the eventuality comes that we go into this war, how long do you estimate the struggle would continue? I understand it is more or less speculative, but I would like to get your opinion on that. Mr. BERLE. I would not rather estimate, if you will forgive me, because I don't think anyone of us have the materials for an estimate. The best I can say it probably might have to be an extended period. No living being can tell what it would be. But I should like to state that no responsible person in this Government would undertake to take any chances on its being of short duration. Whatever your possible guess might be, the only sane, safe, and prudent course that respon- sible men could take would be to prepare for a long period of stress. And if a kindly providence let us off we should be very happy. In that regard I should think that the Secretary of War made the only answer that could be made, which is that every dictate of pru- dence, precaution, and foresight would require preparation for a very long period, which would seem to be indicated by present circum- stances. Although, of course, we might be fortunate; but one cannot entrust the safety of the Nation to the hope of good fortune. Mr. CULKIN. Now, if this treaty had been ratified in 1934, would you consider that we would be much better prepared for national defense and even a war abroad than we are now? Mr. BERLE. Of that there is no possible shadow of doubt. We have virtually had our defense program saved for us by another project which was opposed in some respects, on grounds similar to the Ten- nessee Valley Authority, which has proved a mighty bulwark. If we had had this in 1934 and the construction had now been finished, as it would have been, we should have had the huge resources of power. We should have had a tremendous accretion to our ferro-alloy and aluminum industries, either in existence or readily, very readily pos- GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE BASIN 61 sible, and, of course, we should have had the navigation resources of the Great Lakes ready at hand. I think every student agrees that it was a mistake from the point of view of the national defense not to have done it in 1934. I say this not by way of criticism of the men who then opposed it, because who of us foresaw what occurred, but in the light of what has actually happened and hindsight. We know that we very much wish we had had it. Mr. CULKIN. That is all, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Berle. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Green. Mr. GREEN. Mr. Secretary, where is the location of the majority of the expenditure proposed in this agreement-in the United States or in Canada or jointly? I mean by that where is the site of the expendi- ture-this side of the line or on their side of the line? Mr. BERLE. There are two main items of cost, the dam and the sea- way. The dam, of course, crosses the International Rapids, and there- fore is partly on their side of the line and partly on our side of the line. The bulk of the constructions, added up, would be on our side of the river bed. Mr. GREEN. The seaway and the dam both? Mr. BERLE. Yes; if you take the two together. Mr. GREEN. And the expense is to be borne jointly and equally; is that right? Mr. BERLE. Not quite. In 1928, or it may have been in the forepart of 1929, if you will forgive my vagrant memory, the United States and Canada entered into a gentleman's agreement in respect of the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence system. This agreement was that we would match dollars-that is to say, that we would spend an amount equal to what they spent. Canada has spent a very considerably larger amount than we have up to this point. We are behind in our development-I mean in our expenditures. Accordingly the agreement is that we shall spend on this project up to the point where we are equal in dollars to the amount that they have spent, and the balance thereupon we divide. The CHAIRMAN. Was that agreement contained in a treaty? Mr. BERLE. No; that was an exchange of notes and therefore merely set forth the policy of the two Governments. I may add that that agreement, in my judgment—and I hesitate to say this lest iny Canadian friends find it out-is probably one of the best bargains that the United States ever drove, because while we divide equally in terms of power, in navigation, in view of our vastly greater population and greater use, we get a great deal more use out of it than they do. Mr. GREEN. Does this agreement give us any greater sovereignty over the waters of the Great Lakes, including such items as water levels and diversions? Mr. BERLE. It makes no change in any situation as to sovereignty at all. As to the diversion of water, I have nothing to add to the pre- vious answer; but it does not affect sovereignty in any way, shape, manner, or form. Mr. GREEN. Did the Canadian Government when it entered the war in Europe do so of its own accord-did it have that right, or does it automatically go to war with Great Britain? 62660-42-pt. 1———5 -5 62 GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE BASIN Mr. BERLE. It declares war separately, sir. I may add that this precise point came up the 1st of September or the first week in Sep- tember of 1939, when that point was canvassed. war. Great Britain then declared a state of war, as you know. The prob- lem came up as to whether Canada was thereupon automatically at The Canadian authorities ruled that they were not and that a state of war did not come into existence until the Canadian Parlia- ment had declared that state, which happened to be some 4 or 5 days later. So that precise point has been passed on. Mr. GREEN. Then the Crown and Parliament in London does not in that regard exercise the same power that our Federal Government does over the respective States, does it? Mr. BERLE. As a practical matter, I think it can be said that Parlia- ment in London now has no power over the Dominion of Canada. There is even a question as to the method, if any, by which the Con- stitution of Canada, which, was an act of Parliament, can be amended because Parliament in London no longer has authority to do that. Canada has a constitution and sometimes there is an academic debate, the question posed: "How Canada would go to work to amend her constitution." Mr. GREEN. Presuming the present war should come to an early end and some country other than one friendly to the United States took control of Canada, what would become of our investment there? Mr. BERLE. If some country unfriendly to the United States took control of Canada we wouldn't be thinking about investments; we would be thinking about a lot of things a great deal more fundamental than that. I cannot imagine that such a thing could have occurred and I don't even propose to envisage the possiblity of the United States being defeated in the field. Mr. GREEN. I have in mind that in seventeen-1776 and again in 1812 and at one other period, the feeling and condition existing between the United States and Canada as it does today was not in that condition then. In these far-flung vast expenditures on foreign soil, part of it at least, I don't see what insurance we can have that those very invest- ments might not be turned back and used against the United States by a power that may become an enemy power. Mr. BERLE. Well, the fact of the matter is that Canada, vast though its expanse is when you include the northern wildernesses, is in sub- stance a strip a couple of hundred miles wide, running directly across our northern frontier; in language, in habits, in customs, in friend- ship, in economic ties it occupies a unique position to the United States. Their people come here to take office in our Government, go back and take office in the Canadian Government; the late Canadian Minister got his start as an attorney in the United States Department of Justice. Our people cross the line with equal freedom. A century ago or a century and a half ago when this country was struggling for its independence, of course you had a different situa- tion. Today it is questionable whether Canada could exist were the United States suddenly to be withdrawn and to become hostile. Just as it is an open question whether we could maintain ourselves mili- tarily were she to be occupied by an enemy. GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE BASIN 63 That is why the Monroe Doctrine originally, and now the Cana- dian-American defense agreements, are almost prescribed by geog- raphy and by foreign affairs. Our two countries are locked together in destiny and geography and the statesmen of both countries know it. Mr. GREEN. And it is quite remarkable we don't have any fortified line between the two. That is a great compliment to the Canadian people and to ourselves and a recognition of our power by the English Crown; but I am having some trouble to reconcile myself as to an expenditure of this nature when we have other streams running from these Lakes likewise through our own territory-the Erie Canal, the Mississippi River, Lake Champlain up the Hudson River and canals. across Florida; western dams where we can produce our power; others that give us adequate access to the ocean-for instance, the Erie Canal development would answer the same purpose as this for- eign investment. However, that solidifies the feeling between the two States and I don't expect you to answer that question, but it does seem a little odd we would do this. Mr. BERLE. Mr. Congressman, none of these other possibilities really are comparable; and in any case it is a bit late to be raising that. As you probably are aware, the entire steel industry depends on the west- ern part of this waterway. The St. Mary's River, which is a part of this waterway and which actually carries now more traffic than the Panama Canal carries, is an international section. So that we have already built up a fair proportion of one of the hugest industries in the United States on just that basis, and so far as I know nobody has ever worried about the investment. After all, this isn't a new thing. This St. Lawrence waterway is already there. It is this one small section in the middle of it that hasn't been completed. We are using it and the greater part of it does represent investments from days past. We use the Welland Canal all the time and it is in Canadian territory. We build indus- tries and our cities on that basis. We have already crossed that bridge. This relates merely to the final completing link. Mr. GREEN. But that doesn't get us around the fact that the outgo to the ocean is absolutely controlled and owned by another country, and, after all, we could so easily be cut off from our access to the ocean; and, too, it is only a 6 or 8 months' access to the ocean on account of the snow and ice. Mr. BERLE. We would have to have a great change in the situation that has existed since 1817, the date of the Treaty of Washington. That treaty has guaranteed us perpetual rights to ingress and egress into the Gulf of St. Lawrence and through the river up to it, so that so far as the legal situation now exists the Canadian Government does not have the right to take that away. The only thing that could change that would be a military change, and I cannot conceive that a military change could take place while we were still in the field. Mr. GREEN. Ör a difference in the diplomatic policy of the two countries. Mr. BERLE. NO; I don't think that could even happen. Those rights are perpetual and they cannot be abrogated. Mr. GREEN. Unless the nation becomes unfriendly. Mr. BERLE. And that suggests a military change. Mr. GREEN. Yes. 64 GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE BASIN Mr. BERLE. But you have to assume the continent of North America is defeated before that could take place. The CHAIRMAN. In regard to the steel industry, the famous Liv- ingstone Channel, which we dug, is wholly on Canadian soil, is it not? Mr. BERLE. Yes. The CHAIRMAN. It is wholly on the Canadian side of the interna- tional boundary line? Mr. BERLE. Yes. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Dondero. Mr. DONDERO. Mr. Berle, I don't think this record would be com- plete unless we had in it somewhere a brief record of your official, and I want to say splendid, service to this Nation. I think the com- mittee would be interested in knowing that as a background and the foundation for the testimony that you are giving to the country through this committee today. Will you state your background for the record? Mr. BERLE. Well, I consider it a very courteous request, but at the same time I am far too young to begin to be autobiographical. As I think you know, I left the practice of law to enter the United States Army. I was a private in the Signal Corps, a second lieuten- ant of infantry and then detailed to the staff of the American Com- mission To Negotiate Peace With Germany after the war. That Commission was present at the negotiations and joined in the negotiations of the so-called Versailles Treaty. My diplomatic career ended there. I resigned in protest against the Versailles Treaty. I then practiced law and taught first at Harvard and then Colum- bia University. Still later when the first Franklin Roosevelt admin- istration took office I was special assistant, particularly in railroad transportation matters, to the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, and did various jobs in foreign affairs and in the Caribbean Sea and elsewhere. Later I undertook the job as treasurer of New York City when we were endeavoring to rehabilitate the finances of that city after Mayor LaGuardia was elected. That was interrupted by two terms of duty as a delegate to the inter-American conferences. Mr. DONDERO. You mean between the North American and South American republics? Mr. BERLE. Yes; and I left their office, which I had arranged to have abolished, to become Assistant Secretary of State. Mr. DONDERO. What year was that? Mr. BERLE. That was a little over 3 years ago, sir. That was in February of 1938. Mr. DONDERO. And since that time your time has been taken up very largely with this agreement between the United States and Canada? Mr. BERLE. A good deal of it, yes; although I don't claim to have the expert knowledge to do it. I am charged with Canadian affairs among others in the Department of State. Mr. DONDERO. And you were one who signed this agreement on the part of the United States? Mr. BERLE. I was, yes. GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE BASIN 65 Mr. DONDERO. And the Dominion of Canada? Mr. BERLE. Yes; I say that because my associates in the State Department do most of the work and I know that any one of them knows a great deal more about it than I do, but I have been con- tinuously engaged in Canadian affairs since my arrival here. Mr. DONDERO. Now, Mr. Berle, directing your attention to the water- · way in particular, isn't it a fact that the entire St. Lawrence seaway from the Atlantic Ocean practically to the canal and the locks at the Soo, Mich., is considered as one waterway? Mr. BERLE. Yes. Mr. DONDERO. And the connecting links in the Great Lakes are now completed? Mr. BERLE. Yes; practically. Mr. DONDERO. Were they completed with a view of the deepening of the St. Lawrence seaway some time in the future? Mr. BERLE. In the main they were; yes. Mr. DONDERO. There has been considerable work done on these con- necting links, and most of them are international boundaries between the United States and Canada; isn't that correct? Mr. BERLE. Yes. Mr. DONDERO. How did you proceed to do that work? Was it by treaty or was it by agreement? Mr. BERLE. Practically all by agreement embodied in an exchange of notes and legislation. I think that in certain cases we proceeded by direct legislation, which I presume at that time came before this committee or the equivalent of this committee. The CHAIRMAN. On several occasions. Mr. DONDERO. Most of that work was done substantially under the machinery provided in the treaty of 1909. Mr. BERLE. Or its predecessor provisions. Mr. DONDERO. And particularly section 13, which permits concurrent legislation on the part of the legislative branches of the two Govern- ments? - Mr. BERLE. Either under that section or within the policy of that section in the treaty. That is a rather more enlarged construction than the statute, and that section not only creates a method within the frame of the treaty but also indicates a policy, and that policy we have steadfastly or steadily followed. Mr. DONDERO. Now, the chairman of the committee has called your attention to the fact that the Livingstone Channel in the Detroit River is wholly in Canadian waters. Mr. BERLE. That is correct. Mr. DONDERO. And while the locks at the Soo, Mich., canal are practically all in American waters? Mr. BERLE. That is right. Mr. DONDERO. And the Welland Canal, which American commerce uses, is all in Canadian waters? Mr. BERLE. That is right. Mr. DONDERO. So that the entire waterway of 2,000 miles, more or less, is operated under "a gentleman's agreement" carried out under the treaties heretofore made? 66 GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE BASIN Mr. BERLE. That is right. Mr. DONDERO. And this proposal is simply an addition to the many other agreements similarly made in the past and carried out by the two nations. Mr. BERLE. It is simply the last link in that chain; yes, sir. Mr. DONDERO. Mr. Berle, do you know how many shipyards there are in the Great Lakes? Mr BERLE. I would prefer you ask that of the Navy Department. Mr. DONDERO. I don't want to press the matter if you haven't the information. Mr. BERLE. I don't know. I have the facts and figures here in the St. Lawrence survey and I could look them up but I don't carry figures in my head very well. Mr. BARDEN. If the gentleman will permit me I will answer the question-there are eight. Mr. GAVAGAN. Forty-five in the Great Lakes. Mr. DONDERO. I asked the question and perhaps we better defer the answer. Mr. CULKIN. I suggest we are all sitting here as judges of the facts and I don't think we ought to have any prosecuting attorneys. Mr. DONDERO. I have just one other question: The question was raised this morning about the cost of defending this waterway should it be built, and my colleague from Florida has referred to the treaty between this country and Canada which ended the War of 1812. That treaty was completed in 1817. Didn't that treaty provide that neither government could erect any works of defense along the entire international boundary line between the two nations? Mr. BERLE. No. My impression is that that treaty provided that neither should maintain a naval establishment. I think that the treaty to which you refer probably is the 1870 treaty of the so-called Rush-Bagot agreement. Mr. DONDERO. 1817? Mr. BERLE. That is right, the Rush-Bagot treaty. Mr. DONDERO. That provided for the building of one boat not ex- ceeding 100 tons and not carrying more than one gun? Mr. BERLE. That is right. Mr. DONDERO. And that treaty has been carried out by the two Governments ever since that time, or for 120 years or more. Mr. BERLE. Yes; subject to an exchange of notes, which is quite recent, because both of us wanted to build naval vessels in the Great Lakes. Quite recently we effected an exchange of notes interpreting the Rush-Bagot agreement in the sense that we could, both of us, build and take the boats out-that is to say, that we could construct but could not maintain gunboats or vessels of war in that area. is the substantial modification, if you call it a modification, which has taken place in the last few months. That Mr. DONDERO. Of course, that construction is somewhat limited by the fact that we cannot now take those ships out to the open sea for want of deep water in the St. Lawrence River? Mr. BERLE. That is right. Mr. DONDERO. This is not for the purpose of debate; but what is your opinion on this point: Even though a part of this waterway is wholly within Canadian territory, if for any unforeseen reason they should shut off the upper St. Lawrence, the way the geography of the two GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE BASIN 67 countries stand they would also be shutting themselves off from an outlet to the sea as well as the United States if that should ever occur. Mr. BERLE. At once; yes. Mr. DONDERO. What is the government of Newfoundland? You made some statement that it was not a part of the Dominion of Canada. Mr. BERLE. Newfoundland has had a long and somewhat tangled history. It used to be one of the Dominions of the Empire, a separate Dominion. Subsequently it got into certain financial difficulties, and thereupon it was placed under a special form of government by a commission governing from London or deriving the authority from London. Whether that is a permanent status, of course, remains to be seen. The question is somewhat discussed in Canada even today. As you know, Newfoundland has relatively little industry, and therefore has had some heavy flooding economically. That is the reason why it happens to have a status somewhat different from the rest of Canada. Mr. DONDERO. As bearing upon the question of keeping the St. Law- rence River open for navigation and commerce of the United States, isn't it a fact that we have recently established some bases on New- foundland? Mr. BERLE. That is the fact. Mr. DONDERO. That is all, Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Smith. Mr. SMITH. Mr. Berle, we have all followed your distinguished career for a good many years, and I would like to go back just a little further than my good friend from Michigan, Mr. Dondero, and have the record show whether it isn't a fact that you were graduated from Harvard cum laude at a very early age? Mr. BERLE. I had hoped I had lived that down. Mr. SMITH. Well, we will agree that you have splendidly, but I think I have read somewhere that it was at the age of 17. Mr. BERLE. Yes; I suppose so, technically. I finished my work for my B. A. then and took leave of absence for a year and accumulated an "M. A.” I was quite proud of it at the time, but in retrospect I am not so clear. Mr. SMITH. I think you still have reason to be proud of the fact. Mr. BERLE. Well, I don't know. Let me say in an aside that since there was a man who took at the age of 18 his doctor of philosophy— that is a graduate degree-at the same year I took mine. The com- parisons were all in favor of somebody else which spoiled the drama of the occasion. Mr. GAVAGAN. What happened to the doctor? Mr. BERLE. He is a very able professor at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Mr. SMITH. Mr. Secretary, reference has been made to the legal status of Canada as a signatory to this agreement, and I just want to ask if it isn't a fact that Canada, of course, is a member of the British Commonwealth of Nations, which forms a very unique con- federation of nations, of what might be termed "quasi-independent nations," and probably without a parallel in history? Mr. BERLE. I believe that to be true; yes. Mr. SMITH. Which might afford a prototype for some future form of world association of governments because these nations apparently retain almost entirely their sovereignty and still they are associated 68 GREAT LAKES ST. LAWRENCE BASIN 1 with Great Britain in the British Commonwealth of Nations-a very unique situation. Mr. BERLE. Yes; it is one of the most fascinating developments of modern history. Mr. SMITH. Isn't it obvious that sometimes our Government makes a mistake in deferring the actual construction of a project until the time arrives when it is needed? Mr. BERLE. Mr. Congressman, I have sometimes, perhaps unjustly, thought that some of these projects were worked out after the fashion of the man with the leaky roof. When the sun shone he didn't have to repair it, and when it rained he thought he couldn't. That may not be a fair comparison and, of course, in view of the immense amount of useful work that has been done it is wholly unfair, but here is a case where everyone realizes it ought to have been done a long time ago. Now they say: "But there may not be time," and yet we know that the United States has been at war roughly once in every 25 years of its history and there will be other crises after this and no one can tell how long this crisis will last." Mr. SMITH. I think we can cite a number of such cases, and I have in mind particularly the Bonneville project on the Columbia River, which happens to be in my district on the Washington side of the Columbia River, and members of this committee will recall that in 1935 we had that project before this committee and there was a lot of opposition to it. The claim was widely made all over the Nation that "we never could use that power-we had no possible market for that power in the Pacific Northwest." Now, we have an actual shortage of power out there, and it is proving one of the most valuable assets to our Government in con- nection with national defense that we have. We have built two large aluminum plants there on the Columbia River in my district on account of Bonneville power, without which we couldn't get along at the present time in producing aluminum for our airplane construction and yet 5 and 6 years ago a great many people thought it was ill-advised. Mr. BERLE. The parallel is very apt. Mr. SMITH. That is all. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Pittenger. Mr. PITTENGER. Mr. Berle, you referred awhile ago to the diver- sion of water at Chicago into the Mississippi and discussed the Su- preme Court decisions. Did I understand you to say that House Document 153 of the Seventy-seventh Congress opened up an avenue for those folks who wanted further diversion to have the diplomatic representatives of the United States take it up with the diplomatic representatives of Canada so that if H. R. 4927 is enacted that holds possibilities to them which are now foreclosed under the Supreme Court decisions? Mr. BERLE. Well, obviously no agreement could enlarge the consti- tutional powers of the Congress, and I don't think that we could under- take to say what those are in the absence of a definitive ruling by the Supreme Court. To the extent that the Congress has any powers, they are free to exercise them. I presume, therefore, that we could, if GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE BASIN 69 desired-or we are at liberty, if desired-to make appropriate repre- sentations to the Dominion Government in that regard. The strict letter of the treaty provides merely that should such a diversion take place, then the opposite party, in this case Canada, could make representations which we would be bound to give attention to, and if we were unable to agree, then to submit to arbitration for appropriate remedy. Mr. PITTENGER. Are you discussing House Document 153 in those remarks? Mr. BERLE. Do you mind correcting me? My memory is that House Document 153 is the agreement. Mr. PITTENGER. That is the agreement; yes. Mr. BERLE. That is what I thought. Yes; I was. Mr. PITTENGER. In other words, as matters stand now, unless the Supreme Court of the United States should grant a right for a further diversion under the 1919 treaty or the 1909 treaty, the people that might want that diversion are forever foreclosed? Mr. BERLE. Well, they are foreclosed, if I may say so, not by any problem of treaty but by the law of our land, and that, of course, no agreement between this Government and the Canadian Government could change. Mr. PITTENGER. But if House Document 153, which is this recent agreement—if that is approved their rights are enlarged under that document, which refers to procedure for the diversion. Is that correct? Mr. BERLE. No; I don't think that that is true. I think that the limitations on diversion don't arise out of the treaty of 1909. To the best of my recollection, that treaty does not apply to the Chicago situation. I should have to check my memory on it, but my best recol- lection is that the legalities of that case are decided not on the treaty of 1909 but on the legal rights of the parties in view of the situation, and that it was on that that the Supreme Court rendered such decisions as it has rendered. Mr. PITTENGER. But there is language in House Document 153, the agreement under which they could apply to the Commission. Mr. BERLE. To the extent that there is any legal right inherent in the Congress, that article gives you the chance to exercise whatever rights you have; yes. As I say, we are not clear that we have such rights under the law and we cannot find out until a test case were finally decided. Mr. PITTENGER. That is all. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Bell? Mr. BELL. Mr. Secretary, I have just one or two questions. You spoke of the ocean-side shipways and also of the shipbuilding facilities on the Great Lakes. I think you said in your opinion that the build- ing of this canal-the opening of the canal so that ships built upon the Great Lakes could be transferable to the open ocean-was the advantage in having these shipways in the Great Lakes. From the standpoint of existing shipways, are there shipways on the Great Lakes now that are large enough to use for the purpose of building battleships or large ocean-going vessels, or would shipways of that character have to be built before that type of vessel could be constructed on the Great Lakes? ( 70 GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE BASIN Mr. BERLE. I should like to preface my answer by saying that you are getting a purely lay opinion. I am not any expert on shipbuilding. We have to rely there on the advice of the departments who do know that business and all about it. Mr. BELL. I realize that. Mr. BERLE. So you are merely getting an impression, and it is subject to correction by the men who know infinitely more about it than I do. There are now building certain types of naval craft in the Great Lakes. Naturally it is small craft. There are facilities available to build ships of ocean-going size, and, in fact, there are a good many such ships actually plowing the waters of the Great Lakes now. Naturally they have no exit to the sea. You have asked the type of vessel. My impression is that there are no facilities which would take care of the large battleships and none, perhaps, of the heavy battle cruisers. For light battle cruisers and boats of comparable size, I believe there are facilities and that others are easily available. And there are shipbuilding concerns there that are capable of building such ships and that industry could considerably be expanded. In respect of the ocean-side ways: My understanding is that some part of those, and very likely as sit- uations may develop, a larger part of them are tied up sometimes for 2 or 3 or even 4 years in building these certain type of craft, which, of course, blocks the ways so that they cannot be used for the mer- chant ships which can be built at the rate of 2, 3, or sometimes even 4 a year. For that reason it would be possible, I suppose, to build the long-range shipping, commencing, let us say now, if you gentlemen approve the agreement, and thereby freeing those yards for the build- ing of merchant ships. Mr. BELL. May I interrupt you, Mr. Secretary? Do you mean that the contemplation is to build a larger type of ship which would take 3 or 4 years to construct upon the Great Lakes and release the shipyards on the open coast for larger vessels? Mr. BERLE. I prefer to rest my statement on the fact that that pos- sibility is contemplated. As to the actual plans, I think the Navy can answer you more definitively. The possibility is there, and, of course, is obvious. Mr. BELL. The thing that I had in mind, Mr. Secretary, was that in the event that it is contemplated building large ships on the Great Lakes, ships which would take 3 or 4 years to produce, it would also mean that larger and different shipbuilding facilities would first have to be constructed in the Great Lakes. Isn't that your understanding? The CHAIRMAN. The large ships on the Lakes are larger than the oceangoing ships and have a greater capacity. Mr. PITTENGER. They are built in the Lakes in Great Lake yards. Mr. BELL. You mean ships built on the Great Lakes now are larger than ships that cross the ocean? Mr. BERLE. As large; yes, sir. Mr. CULKIN. Might I make an observation? Mr. BELL. Yes. Mr. CULKIN. During the World War there were a number of ships built on the Great Lakes on these ways. A good many of them were built in Duluth, as I remember it, and they were cut in two and GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE BASIN 71 taken to Montreal and there placed together. I don't recall the exact number but there were a number of them. The CHAIRMAN. Two of them, I believe. Mr. CULKIN. And may I observe further that at the time the need for shipping was not as grievous as now. Mr. BELL. That is all I want; thank you. Mr. BERLE. I ought to say, if I may, in slight amplification of that, we have been put to strange shifts, like the World War shift, and I am informed that there are somewhat similar shifts being resorted to now. The building of large ocean-going ships in the Great Lakes, but only half building them and taking them out via the Mississippi, but they then have to be reassembled, and the engines put in, and the superstructure put on, and all the rest of it, farther down. Of course, that is very expensive and a time-consuming process. I think it is fair to say that there are considerable amounts of facilities for that kind of shipping. Now, I prefer to rest on the testimony of the Maritime Commis- sion as to the exact amount of it; but they build ocean-going ships in the Great Lakes at this minute, and those facilities are available. There are a couple of million tons in one way or another, and a considerable portion of that would be ocean-going tonnage if it had an outlet. Mr. BELL. That is all. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Angell. Mr. ANGELL. Mr. Berle, if this agreement is approved, what ex- penditure is contemplated on the part of the United States? Mr. BERLE. Under this particular agreement, I suppose it will work out, gross, slightly under $300,000,000, and no doubt $100,000,000- Mr. ANGELL. That is the part allocated to the United States? Mr. BERLE. Yes. Of that amount the total gross amount, which is approximately $280,000,000, $93,000,000 comes back because of the power development and pays that, and that pays itself out. The balance is the United States expenditure, and there remains a cer- tain amount which Canada has to pay. My offhand recollection is about $50,000,000 is the total amount when we are all through, that the Canadian Government will be asked to pay. Mr. ANGELL. The figure you have mentioned is not only for the waterway development, for the dams, but also for the power instal- lation, as well? Mr. BERLE. That is right. Mr. ANGELL. Now, what is the amount contemplated on the part of the Canadian Government? Mr. BERLE. I think their total amount will approximate $50,000,000. Mr. ANGELL. Is that giving them credit for the work already done? Mr. BERLE. That is after giving them credit for the work that is done. Of course, the Canadian adjustments are their business and not ours. The last estimate, which was furnished quite recently by the Army Corps of Engineers, shows a total United States ex- penditure of $285,056,515 remaining to be expended. Of that, we shall get back $93,500,000, approximately, from the power people. Mr. ANGELL. That is amortization and the power investment? 72 GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE BASIN Mr. BERLE. That is power investment. If that goes to New York, then New York would undertake to repay that. In addition to that, we get back from Canada-not that we get back from Canada, but to Canada, which Canada has to expend, approximately; well, she would have to spend $144,000,000 for the entire proposition. She does not have to spend it all, now. I think that their estimates call for approximately $50,000,000 of present expenditure. Mr. ANGELL. Will you give us a break-down of those credits to which Canada will be entitled? Mr. BERLE. Well, as I say, you run into a problem there. The total cost to Canada, if you put it that way, would come to $144,- 048,000. But then of that the power development, which is paid by the Ontario Hydro, who are going to have to spend that money, anyway, either here or somewhere, comes to about $90,000,000. So that her total expenditure comes to, as I say, in round numbers, somewhat over $50,000,000. That is her net. That takes in the Great Lakes section, including the new lock at Sault Ste. Marie, and takes in the work that might have to be done on the Welland Canal, and it takes in the St. Lawrence River all the way, and it takes in what- ever additional work has to be done on the St. Francis and the Soulange and the Lachine sections. The CHAIRMAN. Did you include the Welland Canal work? Mr. BERLE. Yes, sir; that includes the Welland Canal work. That is, that would be included because that was provided when they constructed the Welland Canal. Mr. ANGELL. You contemplate that the United States will assist Canada or make any advance on these projects? Mr. BERLE. They have not raised that, and anyhow, the Canadian policy has been not to borrow money. Mr. ANGELL. Does this proposition come under the operation of the lease-lend bill? - Mr. BERLE. My associate from the State Department says, un- hesitatingly, "No." I do not undertake to say, because it has never been considered, I have never, myself, considered it in connection with the lease-lend bill. So, without checking up, I could not say. We had never thought of that contingency, and that is why I never have looked it up. Mr. CULKIN. Might I ask a question, Mr. Chairman? The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead. Mr. BERLE. I might add, at the conclusion of this you will see we shall merely have completed the gentlemen's agreement with Canada with reference to this whole Great Lakes waterway which has been made now back 12 or 13 years ago. We would then be even with the game. We are obligated at some time in the history of the world to make a substantial investment to match the investment they have made and the advantage we have had through the years, for lo, these many years. Mr. ANGELL. May I ask one additional question: In your judg- ment, Mr. Berle, would it require an additional modification of the existing treaty with Canada to provide for policing and defending this project? Mr. BERLE. No. You see, we are committed to defending that land line, as it is. If there never were any St. Lawrence waterway, we GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE BASIN 73 should still have to protect or join with the Canadians in protecting the deep waterway and up the St. Lawrence the very important aluminum plants at Massena, the section above the rapids, the ferro- alloy industries in Niagara, the St. Marys River and canal, which carries our ore, and so on all the way up. Our staff plans provide for that. Mr. ANGELL. Mr. Berle, in connection with the testimony you have given previously, under the treaty we are not permitted to maintain the vessels there on the locks. Could we, if we proceed with this project, continue, or maintain vessels of that character without fur- ther modification of the treaty provision? Mr. BERLE. No; we could not. All the staff plans contemplate; not defending against each other, but defending against an extra- continental foe. I hope that contingency will never arise. Undoubtedly, were it necessary in general defense of our two countries to modify the treaty, it would be possible to do so, but as yet no military necessity has been called to the attention of the State Department which would indicate that that would be needed. Mr. ANGELL. There is the possibility, however, that Canada might be taken over by some enemy country? Mr. BERLE. Well, I think if that happened, it would have happened somewhere else, and I think that then we would be radically revising not only this kind of an arrangement, but pretty much the entire national life of the United States; and we would be thinking, not so much of defending the waterway, as we would be of taking care of a vast frontier and everything that goes with it. I do not con- template that possibility, really. Should it happen, why, naturally, all arrangements would have to be immediately revised. Mr. GAVAGAN. From the national viewpoint, in the event such a contingency did arise, we would have to protect Canada by military force, even if that meant taking Canada, would we not, under our national commitments under the Monroe Doctrine and our recent declared Congressional policy of the United States? Mr. BERLE. And by every dictate of common sense and everything else. Mr. GAVAGAN. For self-defense? Mr. BERLE. Obviously. Mr. ANGELL. The modern method of protecting a country is by taking it over, as we have learned in Europe. Mr. BERLE. I agree with that. I am inclined to think that if it should look as though that were likely, the first people to desire it would be the Canadians, themselves. Mr. GREEN. Mr. Berle, let me mention one suggestion that I would like to make there: We owe them an obligation there on that treaty. The British Crown, the people you speak of in 1812 or 1912, whatever it is, the British owe us several million dollars. Why would not the State Department work up an agreement which canceled that debt, and let Canada write that off and reduce the pro rata of this cost? Let them put up the cash, instead of that old obligation against us. That is what you do in common business. Mr. BERLE. Well, yes, that has its appealing side. Mr. GREEN. It is common business. Mr. BERLE. There is this difficulty, and that is that the British debt is a debt owed by Great Britain. The Canadians as an inde- 74 GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE BASIN pendent entity within the British Commonwealth have, so far as I know, scrupulously met every penny of any obligation they ever owed to us, or any of us, and at the date of these presents they do not owe us a sou marquee. In other words, they have not only had no defaulted debts, but they are up to date on the obligations that they owe us here. The CHAIRMAN. I suggest to Mr. Green that if he can collect all of our war debts, we would make him President. Mr. GREEN. But they are a part of the British Empire. Mr. BERLE. I think they do not claim that they are responsible to the British. They claim they are a part of the British Common- wealth, which, as has been brought out, is quite a different thing. Mr. GREEN. About the same as a man dodging his wife's debts, isn't it? The CHAIRMAN. Have you finished, Mr. Angell? Mr. BERLE. No; I would not wish to confuse Canada with the United Kingdom. They have been substantially independent for so long you just could not operate on that basis. Their relations to us are different from other relations to us, from our relations to the British. Mr. BEITER. Mr. Chairman, initially I desire to correct the figure I gave to the gentleman from Michigan, when I said there were 8 projects located on the Great Lakes. What I meant to say was there were 8 projects in which construction work is actually going on. There are 25 projects on the Great Lakes, where construction work could be inaugurated, and in addition to that there are 18 additional projects which could be gone into by the additional expenditure for repairs and improvements. I wanted to make that correction. Now, you will pardon me, Mr. Secretary, if I roam from one sub- ject to another, or appear to roam from one subject to another. I have a number of questions I have jotted down here, notes that I made while you were discussing various phases of this project with other members. In the first place, you referred to the treaty or agreement and said it should rightfully be submitted to both the House and the Senate. I think you are extremely generous in your consideration at this time. I have never heard of it before, excepting probably when you ap- peared before the Appropriations Committee for an appropriation for consideration of the House. Mr. BERLE. If you will pardon me if I interject, I really think that is not by any means true, if you will pardon me, quite fair to the Department. There have been many, many agreements, which have been submitted to the two Houses, or with respect to which the authority has been first considered by the two Houses. Mr. BETTER. Well, is it not a matter of fact that you are really sub- mitting it to both Houses because you do not have enough votes to get it by in the Senate? Mr. BERLE. I am not by any means prepared to admit that the Senate of the United States is not as solicitous for the welfare of the United States as we are, and I firmly believe that two-thirds of them will be convinced that this is the proper thing to do. Mr. BEITER. I think you stated that this is vital to the defense of the North American continent. Has Canada included this in its de- fense program? GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE BASIN 75 Mr. BERLE. You know, I share the Secretary of War's feeling about the word "vital." No piece of work is vital in the sense that the defense of North America depends on it, alone. This is an important and a vastly important piece of work in that connection. Mr. BEITER. I will not quibble, then, on the words "vital" or "im- portant." But has Canada included it in its defense program, then? Mr. BERLE. The power aspect of it, in absolute fact, was raised and vitally urged by Canada even before or at least simultaneously with our own urging. If you will pardon my reminiscing a moment my recollection is very clear about the evening when, shortly after the outbreak of the war- no; before the outbreak of the war, the chairman of the Ontario Hydro, who is charged with providing adequate power, came to Washington quietly and asked some of us to come in and see him, and he said, "Gentlemen, I have got to have not only more power, but an added supply for the demands that I know are coming, and the obvious place to get it is in the St. Lawrence.” Shortly after the outbreak of the war he again discussed it with us and pointed out that it had become an increasing necessity. Finally, we heard from him once more, before we had time to turn around on it, shortly after and very close to the time when the Germans had captured Norway; and he then pointed out something to us; he said that the British had been borrowing war supplies from Norway, which took 3,000,000 horsepower of electricity to manufacture; that now that was lost, and the British were attempting to secure that same supply from Canada; and that by consequence an immediate burden of a considerable part of that 3,000,000 horsepower had suddenly been dropped on them, above their estimates, and he begged us to get this thing forward, if we possibly could, in order that they might have power for defense. As to the seaway, it was agreed at that time by them and by us that we would remain in consultation and see how things went. At that time it was not known whether the British shipping losses would be very great. They have been becoming continuously greater ever since. Mr. BEITER. You referred to the chairman of the Hydroelectric Power Commission of Ontario, and I assume you refer to Dr. Hogg? Mr. BERLE. Mr. Hogg, a very able man. Mr. BEITER. Did he not say at one time-and I quote from his state- ments: It is quite evident that this development cannot be classed as a war measure, for even if undertaken tomorrow it would be 6 or 7 years before it could be of use. Yet the project is persistently misrepresented as a war measure which, far from helping, would actually handicap war work. Mr. BERLE. The quotation is accurate. It was made in January 1940, at a time when the war was static, and the common belief was that nothing would happen; that the Maginot Line would remain intact. He has discussed that with us in that sense. At that time, as I say, he was talking to us about increasing needs in the future. At that time he was urging the project. It was a few months later, after the fall of Norway, that in the light of that very statement he urged us to get this forward as a matter of defense. Meanwhile, of course, the time needed has been somewhat revised as new engineering estimates came in, and the vitalness and the pres- sure and the urgency of the need have overwhelmingly increased. 76 GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE BASIN or Mr. BEITER. Yet he admits it would require 6 or 7 years for construc- tion before it could be used, and you, I believe, testified previously, admitted, that the project could not be completed within 4 years, and I think the Secretary of War said something about 3 years this morn- ing when he testified. Then of what value would it be to the national defense? Mr. BERLE. I do not admit the figures as to the time, and I am not sure as to what Mr. Hogg would admit as to the time if he were here. Mr. BEITER. I quoted him a moment ago. Mr. BERLE. I understand; but I think you will find a good many different ideas have come in. For one thing, we were figuring then on the basis of a peacetime construction and including the seaway and all kinds of things. But even if you take all of those figures that are true as completely accurate, you obviously have sources of information which are not available to us as to how long the emergency will last. All I can say is, if you can make them available they will be of immense help to the Department of State in making up its plans. Mr. BEITER. Now, I do not claim to have any- Mr. BERLE. Don't you think that Mr. Hogg was talking, as pretty much everyone was talking, and we, none of us, have any omniscience as to the future, and nobody foresaw the situation which actually occurred only a few months later. That is the substantial difference, and if everyone was still in the wishful-thinking stage and wishing you would wake up and it would all blow away, of course you can talk like that. No responsible person, either in Canada, Great Brit- ain, the United States, or anywhere on the globe, would take that to be the case. The only men that prophesied a speedy end to the war that I know of were the German high command, and they talk about that, naming a new date every few months or so. But we cannot, and we have to be prepared, then, for a long pull here. Mr. BEITER. Then let us use your own figure of 4 years, or the Sec- retary of War's figure of 3 years; of what value would it be to na- tional defense? Mr. BERLE. Why, this Mr. BEITER. In view of what the Office of Production Management stated, that they would reach their peak in 1943? Mr. BERLE. Why, this: That is the peak they are now planning. But if the tide runs heavily against us, and we are in even greater difficulties, we might very easily find that at the end of another few months, to make the country really safe, you would have to take that estimate that you now have, and double the amount on that. Every estimate made, even by the O. P. M., has already been revised upward once, twice, and some of them three times. And I believe that sub- stantially the same process has gone on in every defense arm. No one thinks that we can yet see the full scope of it. Were the entire Continent of Europe to be mobilized against us there would not be a single resource in the United States that we could afford to overlook. And if you want to have that when you need it you are going to have to begin now, and not later. You cannot have any interference or handicaps in defense. It is a con- tinuous process, and you have to have your material and your re- sources ready all the time. If there is a power in between there the GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE BASIN 77 consequence to the country might be such that I think you and I would not care to share the responsibility of it. Mr. BEITER. Well, in that connection, then, for years we have been trying to get additional diversion there at Niagara Falls to operate the Adams plant, and it was only in the last week you finally entered into an agreement with Canada to have an additional diversion of water there. That plant was standing idle for years; the machinery was installed there and ready to operate, and all you had to do was to turn on the spigot, and yet you sat idly by. If power was as badly needed as you say, why didn't you turn on that power weeks ago or months ago? Mr. BERLE. The vitalness of the need was not apparent. While I wish you would ask that question of the chairman of the Federal Power Commission, who is better informed on it than I am, let me say as a New Yorker that the Adams station is really a drastic under- taking. It is one of the least effective ways of using water that there is, and we use it now primarily because we do not have anything else. Something else should have been done up there many, many years ago. As to the urgency of the need, the urgency of the need comes very simply, I am informed, from one thing, the ferroalloy and the chemical and other similar industries situated at Niagara Falls were going along much as usual until the defense orders came in, and they were asked to increase their capacity, which previously they had not been particularly anxious to do, and they naturally said, "We can do that only if we have power. Where are we going to get the power?" It was at that point that the pressure arose for additional water from Niagara. That was the urgency that occurred, and it was that urgency which we then sought to meet. Prior to that time, so far as I am aware, there had been no great urgency for the power; and the real design, as I am informed, was not so much to get additional power as to try to buy up for one company the right to use an indefinite amount of Niagara water, an entirely different proposition. However, I suggest that you will find that the Federal Power Authority has the fullest material on that particular incident, which has many ramifications, some pleasant and some not so pleasant. Mr. BEITER. I shall discuss that, then, with the power authority. Mr. BERLE. I think you will find them very ready. Mr. BEITER. You did make a statement a moment ago that if we continued to divert water at Niagara Falls, it would interfere with the beauty of the falls. Just how do you explain that? Mr. BERLE. Well, if you take more water out above the Falls, of course, that does two things: It diminishes the flow over the Falls and, if continued for any length of time, it increases the erosion. Mr. BEITER. Well, the water over the Horseshoe Falls at the curve is about 12 feet in thickness there. Would it make any difference if that were only 8 feet or 10 feet in thickness, rather than 12 feet? Mr. BERLE. Well, I do not claim to be an expert on the precise points of the beauty of the Falls, not of Niagara, certainly. Yes; I should suppose it would. I do not see how it could, otherwise; and I say that I am not speaking as an expert. Mr. BEITER. Would it not have been cheaper for the Government to construct weirs in the river and separate that eventually and have 62660—42—pt. 1- -6 78 GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE BASIN it go to the American falls and to the Canadian falls, and make that available for power? Mr. BERLE. I should respectfully like, if I may- Mr. BEITER. I think the engineers have estimated it would cost $1,500,000. Mr. BERLE. I would like to refer that to the Army engineers. Like the Secretary of War, my claims to omniscience are not very great. The CHAIRMAN. I think General Robins has had quite a lot of ex- perience down there. Mr. BEITER. In connection with your statement that you have made studies of manufacturing plants and the need for machinery, I won- der if you have ever taken into consideration a plant located near Massena. There a plant exists capable of producing 750,000 horse- power, and the only thing that is needed is, as you say, some im- proved machinery. Have you ever taken into consideration the in- stallation of machinery there in that Canadian plant? It is located on the Canadian side. - Mr. BERLE. I think you will find that that has been fully included and meticulously studied, both by the Canadian people and by our- selves; yes. Mr. BEITER. Do you expect to utilize the plant at some time in the near future? K Mr. BERLE. We expect to utilize everything that can be utilized in that area. I say "we" without authority, because that, as I say, is on the Canadian side. My impression is that they expect to uti- lize everything that is capable of utilization, as rapidly as they can get the materials for its use. Mr. BEITER. Is that included, then, in your estimate of cost? Mr. BERLE. The estimate of- Mr. BEITER. The cost of the entire power development? Mr. BERLE. No; it is not. That is a separate thing. Mr. BEITER. Well, in addition to that plant, if another wing were constructed at the Beauharnois plant, you would still have another 750.000 horsepower available, which would be 1,500,000 horsepower available. Mr. BERLE. I guess you will find difficulty in getting water for that. Mr. BEITER. I think that water is available there. Mr. BERLE. Judging from representations vigorously coming from the Aluminum Co, wanting to get back on the Canadian side, I should gather they were not quite clear on that subject. Mr. BEITER. I beg your pardon? Mr. BERLE. I say, judging from the continuous representations which are made, requesting us to borrow, beg, or buy or steal the power from the Canadian side for the Massena aluminum plant, I should gather they were not so clear on that subject. Mr. BEITER. I hold in my hand here the treaty series No. 548, and turning to page 3, article 5—I wonder if you have a copy available, for I would like to have you explain paragraph 2. Mr. BERLE. What is the treaty? I do not happen to have that in my hand, so I do not know the treaty you are referring to. Mr. BEITER. The document is series treaty No. 548, the treaty of 1909, article 5. Mr. BERLE. That is the boundary water treaty. GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE BASIN 79 Mr. BEITER. I can read it to you. Mr. BERLE. Go ahead. Mr. BEITER (reading) : So long as this treaty shall remain in force, no diversion of the waters of the Niagara River above the Falls from the natural course and stream thereof shall be permitted except for the purposes and to the extent hereinafter pro- vided. That is article 5. Mr. BERLE. That is right. Mr. BEITER. You referred in your earlier testimony, I believe, to other considerations being given by the Department for further diversion. Mr. BERLE. That is the paragraph of the boundary waters treaty of 1909, which limits the Canadian diversion and the American diver- sion above Niagara Falls; yes. As you referred to it as a particular treaty series, I did not call it to mind, because I know the document by name rather than by the number of the treaty series. Under that, if I recall correctly, the American diversion is limited to 20,000 feet, and the Canadian- Mr. BEITER. Thirty-six thousand. Mr. BERLE. TO 36,000 feet; that is right. And there is an increase in those two amounts that we obtained for the diversion which you have just recently mentioned. The CHAIRMAN. And those increases are intended as temporary? Mr. BERLE. Only temporary. The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Mr. BERLE. We would never mortgage that permanently, the beauty of Niagara Falls, if we could avoid it. And we do it then only under the consideration of necessity. We shall have to increase that diversion before the summer is out, according to all indications. Mr. BEITER. I believe this morning you spoke of 2,200,000 horse- power. Can you testify just how much water and how much power will be available during the summer and winter seasons? Mr. BERLE. I cannot, except to say that this is firm power. Mr. BEITER. It is firm power? Mr. BERLE. Yes. Mr. BEITER. The 2,200,000 horsepower? Mr. BERLE. Yes, sir. Mr. BEITER. Who is authority for the statement that if steam-power equipment can be obtained the actual amount of machinery would be less than that for hydroelectric equipment? Mr. BERLE. I do not know. I have long since wanted to meet a responsible person who wanted to get steam equipment to do this thing. I have heard so many statements made about it that I am beginning to hope that some time the imaginary responsible person who puts out these figures will appear, because I would like to see him. For one thing, if he can do what he says he can do, we have a great deal of use for him about now. Mr. BEITER. Don't you believe it would be far more advantageous in our defense work if you were to build steam plants which would be working in 18 months, and at places where needed, rather than build a power plant up in the St. Lawrence where no plants are located except the Aluminum Co.? 80 GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE BASIN Mr. BERLE. There are let me simply split that sentence. It sim- ply assumes there are no plants within the limit of this power. Of course, I cannot think the Congressman makes that statement. is thinking of one plant which happens to be actually along the sea- side. But of course it is a perfectly well-known fact that power is capable of practically immediate transmission to some of the largest industrial areas in the Northeast, and practically all of it in varying degrees, of course, of importance. Mr. BEITER. Economically transmitted to long distances? Mr. BERLE. Yes, sir. You see, even a long transmission, like 300 miles, as one of the gentlemen of the New York Power Authority, Mr. Davidson, just called to my attention, loses only 10 percent. But in a far less radius than that, when you take a great range of those up-State New York industrial cities, you do not have to take in any large radius like that to get tremendous use for it. Mr. BEITER. Are there any defense areas within that 300-mile range you speak of, with the exception of the Buffalo area? Mr. BERLE. Oh, yes; you cover not only the Buffalo area, but you take the area- Mr. BEITER. I am a little bit familiar with the northern part of New York State. There are mostly dairy farms up in that section. Mr. BERLE. You are also pretty well aware of some available in- dustrial areas. Mr. BEITER. You spoke of aluminum this morning. Have you taken into consideration the many miles of aluminum that would have to be used in transmitting power? Mr. BERLE. Yes; I think that all of those matters have been not only studied, but studied exhaustively. I did not do that, but if you ask whether they have been taken into consideration, the answer is yes. Mr. BEITER. Going to shipping, now, what machinery has been set in motion to revise our harbors and channels to take advantage of the proposed shipbuilding facilities? Mr. BERLE. I respectfully refer that to the Navy and the Maritime Commission, who have that in charge. Mr. BEITER. I beg pardon? Mr. BERLE. I say, I shall respectfully refer that to the Navy_and the Maritime Commission, who have that in charge. They tell me that they have gone quite a way in those problems, but I personally do not know enough about that to try to talk about it. Mr. BEITER. Has not the War Department listed the advantages and the disadvantages of such an inland waterway? Mr. BERLE. I cannot say, I am sure. I think that if the Secretary of War felt it desirable to defer to the experts in his own Depart- ment, that the Assistant Secretary of State may be permitted to make the same reference. Mr. BEITER. I understood you to infer a minute ago that you practically slept with this project; not in those words, of course, but in the last 3 or 4 years I assume this has been called to your attention, and I wondered if you had gone into it. Mr. BERLE. I was not aware of any sleeping on this project. As I understand it, the sleeping has been rather curtailed. Mr. BEITER. Í used that as a figure of speech, as to the work in your Department; that is just a figure of speech. GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE BASIN 81 Mr. BERLE. Of course. The War Department is here recommend- ing it, and the Secretary of War has been here and made his state- ment, and the Army engineers are here to explain it and to favor it. They have meticulously carried out their researches and their cal- culations. So I think that the State Department would not feel that we were competent to revise expert calculations and conclusions of that kind. Now, we are wise, if, instead of taking extraneous and purely outside figures of varying degrees of authority, we rest on the people that really know their business and are going to be re- sponsible for the ultimate outcome. And that is what they actually have come to. How they added and subtracted to get their con- clusions is a matter they can explain to you a good deal better than I can. Also, anyone can make up lists of advantages and disad- vantages and come to a conclusion, and each one of us might have a different list and feel confident and still come to the same conclusion. - Mr. BEITER. Well, then, in your opinion, your own opinion, do you believe that the advantages will outweigh the disadvantages? Mr. BERLE. In my opinion, I do; yes. Mr. BEITER. Why? Mr. BERLE. I speak there, of course, not on behalf of the State De- partment, but on behalf of myself, and incidentally as a citizen of New York. Mr. BEITER. Why? Mr. BERLE. In the first place, we need the power; in the second place, the Lakes need the transportation; and in the third place, we need the power up there that we have been getting, and we need it on a much broader basis. The comparison between what happens in northern New York and what happens in the Province of Ontario is not definitely to the credit of northern New York. Another reason for feeling that we need it, and I speak as a New Yorker, is the terrible injustice that has been done to the workmen who want jobs in the Buffalo district, and if I may say, it comes pretty close to being another economic spectacle of a large order. Mr. BEITER. Let me tell the gentleman very definitely that the num- ber of men that are looking for jobs in the Buffalo district are few and far between, and industries are going down as far as Tennessee and out as far as Oklahoma to get the men to fill positions that are now vacant and available there. Mr. BERLE. I think that is due to the national defense. But if you check the figures, you see that the Buffalo industry came up and up and up to a point where the power was exhausted, if you please, and it comes to a full stop. And you take other areas engaged in the same line of industry and watch the same curve, and see them going on up, and still going up. If I were a Buffalonian I would wonder what had been done to me. But, of course, I am speaking more as a layman and as a New Yorker. Mr. BEITER. If the gentleman had taken the time when he was down. there studying conditions in Buffalo and given consideration to other conditions, he would have found that the reason industry has not located in Buffalo, is because of the high tax rate and not because of the lack of power. That is only one of the considerations. 82 GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE BASIN Mr. BERLE. That, of course, has something to do with it, that is one thing; and another, which I do not undertake to comment on here, but I do recall that we had considerable requests for assistance up there in the halcyon days from 1933 on. Of course, now the defense industry is going on, and I imagine your employment problem is pretty well taken care of. But Buffalo has been stunted in growth by those con- ditions. It is regrettable. Maybe Buffalo likes to limit its growth. That may be another item. I had not thought of that. The CHAIRMAN. We have a program for tomorrow that cannot very well be changed. We have General Robins, who appeared to go on this afternoon, but it looks like it is going to impossible to get to him. I would like to know if General Schley and General Robins are present now. Yes; they are. Mr. BEITER. I do not want to interfere with your program, Mr. Chairman. I shall be very glad to yield and discontinue my questions. The CHAIRMAN. I don't know what we are going to do about it. I would like to know from the War Department, if General Schley and General Robins, if we cannot get to them this evening, when can we set time for them? I do not think we could change the program set for tomorrow. It is the Navy Department and the Governor of New York and others that are billed to be here, and we cannot very well change it. Mr. RANKIN. The Army engineers are in town, and they could come around any time. The CHAIRMAN. That is what I wanted to find out. General SCHLEY. Any time you say. The CHAIRMAN. General, I do not believe we can get to you tonight. General SCHLEY. Very well, sir. The CHAIRMAN. We will meet at 10 o'clock in the morning. Mr. BEITER. Mr. Secretary, because of the dams and the locks in the St. Lawrence River and the interconnecting waterways to the Great Lakes system and the power plants located on the seacoast, would they not be vulnerable to attack from the air and by sabotage? Mr. BERLE. I suppose just as vulnerable as the New York Central Railroad or the rest of our communications; yes. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Berle, the English found out they were vul- nerable, didn't they? Mr. BERLE. Yes. As a practical matter, they are a part of your communications. The CHAIRMAN. Most anything is vulnerable in time of war. Mr. BERLE. Yes; if you get that far in. I should say far less vul- nerable than the Empire State Building, for instance. Mr. BEITER. The War Department, in making a report on the Sault Ste. Marie, calls attention to the fact that it might be vulnerable, and this is inland another four or five hundred miles, this power plant located on the St. Lawrence. Mr. GAVAGAN. If they once get in, anything is vulnerable. Mr. BEITER. How many locks does the waterway contain? Mr. BERLE. I cannot answer that, Mr. Congressman. I just do not know. I have all the material here, but that is hardly applicable to a State Department argument, and the engineers will be able to furnish that. Mr. BEITER. Probably the other questions I have are more for the engineers; so I have no further questions now. GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE BASIN 83 Mr. BERLE. Thank you. I appreciate that, because it would be absurd for a State Department representative to try to duplicate the work of the engineers. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Bender. Mr. BENDER. Just to what extent would the proposed power plant on the St. Lawrence River contribute to our defense requirements for power? Mr. RANKIN. What is that question? Mr. BENDER. To what extent would the proposed power plant in the St. Lawrence River contribute to our defense requirements for electric power? Mr. BERLE. 2,200,000 horsepower, of which 1,100,000, of course, comes to the United States and 1,100,000 to Canada. Since in prac- tice they draw on us for supplies and we operate in terms of a joint defense, you can consider that as pretty nearly a single item. I under- stand that provision is already planned for substantially full use of all that power as soon as it comes in. Mr. BENDER. I emphasized the defense requirements. Mr. BERLE. Yes. Mr. BENDER. Now, as I understand, nothing could be contributed before 1948 at the completion of this project? Mr. BERLE. No; at the latest 1945, and with luck, 1944. Mr. BENDER. We would then, on the basis of the question asked by the gentleman from New York, Mr. Beiter, have passed our defense peak as indicated by the O. P. M.? Mr. BERLE. Well, I think that there is a considerable misconception of what is called the defense peak. Based on the schedule of produc- tion that they worked out and that they expected to go into existence, you would construct the figure of 1943 as things then stood. As the Secretary of War rather plainly intimated, that was the best esti- mate then, and here is no reason to suppose that we may not need to find a new peak. Even at that peak, we shall be in trouble until we get into the power. Mr. BENDER. I understand the gentleman's point. I was listening very attentively to what you said previously. But it seems to me the present emphasis is placed on speed, and on the desirability for quick delivery. And would not the construction of this canal and the under- taking of this job at this time handicap the present defense program, because it would tie up about 60,000 men and machinery and materials that might be used immediately for defense purposes? Mr. BERLE. I am informed that it would not. The bulk of the ma- terials that are needed are not materials in which there is any shortage, principally cement. The bulk of the labor is not the labor of which there is a shortage. A large part of it is unskilled. The skilled con- struction labor, much of it will be freed in the coming months and years, as the defense plans which have been under construction cease to be construction jobs and go into operation, freeing those men. Indeed, at the moment there is a question of what to do with a con- siderable number of construction men who have been constructing camps in northern New York, and I am informed there is that group, for instance, which could be made immediately available on this proj- ect. What happens is that as the construction jobs get through, they are available for this. And the kinds of materials used in this are, as Secretary Stimson observed, materials of which there is no shortage, such as cement. - 84 GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE BASIN Mr. BENDER. In my first question I asked about the capacity of the St. Lawrence, and you indicated the power capacity would be some- thing over 2,000,000 horsepower. Mr. BERLE. 2,200,000 horsepower. Mr. BENDER. And our share of that would be one-half? Mr. BERLE. Yes. That is not a fair statement, altogether, because we are actually drawing additional power now, borrowing it or hiring it from Canada as we need it, of their 1,100,000 horsepower, and there is a very fair possibility we will immediately borrow a very consider- able part of that. In fact, until it comes in, many of our own machines will run on borrowed power from Canada, at least as long as Canada can give us the power. Mr. BENDER. You indicated previously that the power generated in the St. Lawrence plants would be limited to distribution to northern New York State; is that correct? Mr. BERLE. No. The observation was made that the useful transmis- sion radius was about 300 miles. Mr. BENDER. Is it not a fact that the locks in the Panama Canal are the basis of our concern for its impracticability? Mr. BERLE. Well, I suppose it is true that the locks of any canal are its vulnerable part; yes. Mr. BENDER. The Panama Canal is considered vulnerable on the same basis as the St. Lawrence would be considered vulnerable? Mr. BERLE. No; the defense of it is an entirely different proposition, because, of course, that relates to defense from attack by sea and, pos- sibly, by seaborne aircraft or by aircraft which may have obtained a base on the mainland. I do not claim to be an expert on those matters, but militarily it is an entirely different problem. I should be of the impression that that was a vastly less dangerous situation than the Panama Canal. Nevertheless, we still need the Panama Canal. Mr. BENDER. Well, when we are considering the present rate of development in the aviation industry, these locks and this project of necessity call for a great expenditure of money to protect these locks and this project, as we are now protecting the Panama Canal? Mr. BERLE. Well, no more so, I suppose, than the Capitol over there, or this office building. In a sense, that is a part of the plan for defense everywhere. As I stated, we have to do exactly the same thing for all our communications, including the railroad system up there. We should have to do it for the plants up there, in any event. We have to do it in those lengths of waterway already. So you have not added anything to the discussion when you add this 47 miles. On this 47 miles you have to defend, for instance, the Massena Aluminum plant, just to take the one that has been mentioned, and there is no difference in the defense. You have to do that, anyhow. Mr. BENDER. The President declared an unlimited emergency, and in practically all the proposals we have for this project, it has been advanced as a defense project, and this power element has been dis- cussed considerably. Now, is it not a fact that we now produce all the power we need, if we would conserve the power that we are now wasting for nondefense purposes? Mr. BERLE. The answer to that is no. I suppose that if we were able to perform miracles so that all the power that went, let us say, in the lighting of the city of Washington, can be laid down some- € GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE BASIN 85 where in various parts of the West, in that section then you might say there is enough. In that connection, may I suggest that you ask that line of ques- tions of Mr. Leland Olds, who has just made a tour of that country, with the defense estimates and the statement of needs, I think that his conclusions, which are authoritative, would effectively end the statement by anyone who really is interested in the accuracy of what he says, that we had all we needed. The big push on power is going to come in now right along, as these defense plants go into operation. That is when the big draft hits you, and that is coming in power now to a point where we are, without saying so, having to cut down necessary production in north- ern New York because there is not adequate power to make it possible to expand the plans. We will be needing all we can get, and more besides. That is what Mr. Stimson meant when he said there was a shortage of capacity. Mr. BENDER. I have only two more questions, Mr. Chairman. In your opening statement you suggested or indicated that all the defense machinery necessary, that is, on the Great Lakes, all the defense machinery that was needed was now being provided. Am I correct in repeating that? Am I correct in saying that you indicated you did not need any additional defense machinery? Mr. BERLE. By machinery- Mr. BENDER. Ör manpower? Mr. BERLE. By "machinery," Congressman, I meant govern- mental machinery that brings them into existence; that the confer- ences have been held, that the plans have been authorized, and the Defense Commission is aeting and the staff people are at work, and You so on. I did not mean to say that the job was finished; no. would have to get better testimony than mine on that. What I meant to say was that the contingencies have been considered and using the word "machinery" I meant that the governmental machinery was available to bring it into existence. Mr. BENDER. I am sure, Mr. Secretary, you are aware of the fact that most of our Coast Guard protection on the Great Lakes has now been diverted for use for transport purposes and other purposes, other than the Great Lakes? Mr. BERLE. I have heard that; yes. Mr. BENDER. In closing, I just want to say that I come from Cleve- land, a community more in general line with Buffalo, and I am in- terested in your statement regarding industry reallocating elsewhere, and so forth. Of course, you are aware of the fact that we in a city like ours and in a State like ours pay, along with other industries and industrial States, the lion's share of Federal taxation. For every dollar we give in Federal taxes, we get only 57 cents return in benefits. Plans like T. V. A. and other similar projects might be helpful to others in other parts of the country, but certainly they are not very helpful to us in our section of the country. That is responsible for our inability to grow in proportion to our previous growth, and the fact that many industries are relocating elsewhere; that plus the fact that the labor problems and other industrial problems that have been created as a result of new conditions and new regulations and rules have been placed on industry, make it desirable for industries to move elsewhere. 86 GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE BASIN Mr. BERLE. Mr. Congressman, I would like to say, with whatever earnestness I possess, and believe me it springs from a very deep concern and a very grave conviction, that while what you say is true, if we try to bear out a little here or have a special interest there, in an industry or a section, each for himself, what we propose quite rationally will be impossible to do, and therefore prevent this coun- try from developing at the time when it needs it. The reference I have is that we would be headed for the same result as another sister republic. I can only say that that kind of reasoning is never per- mitted to enter into the consideration of a subject like this. In less strenuous times I agree with you, that that is a problem which has to be considered. And my own city of New York is in no different position from yours. And as Treasurer of New York I have had to consider those questions. So you have all my sympathy. But we are not now in a position, I think, where we can afford to accept that kind of consideration, if the effect is that our great re- sources fail to be distributed. Mr. BENDER. You can appreciate that very well, that we are all part of a Christian nation and we are interested in having the other fel- low enjoy the benefits that we enjoy. But we believe that since we work in order to establish something, we should enjoy, in a measure, the fruits of our own labors. And you can appreciate more the reasoning for the opposition to this project on the part of a great many people from the great industrial centers like ours, when they feel that for this project that we will have to pay, not our propor- tionate share but more than our proportionate share, and will bring us in competition with the kind of thing that makes for a breakdown of our whole industrial system and our whole social and economic fabric in a community like ours. · Mr. RANKIN. Mr. Chairman, may I ask a question, if that question is to be debated. I want to say something along that line. Mr. CULKIN. Will all the members of the committee be permitted to do that, Mr. Chairman? Mr. BENDER. Mr. Chairman, I resent that. The Judge was given great latitude. Mr. CULKIN. This gentleman is a witness here now. Mr. BENDER. I understand, but I am questioning him. Mr. CULKIN. You are supposed to wait for that. He is testifying in this hearing. Mr. BENDER. I understand. Mr. CULKIN. You are not supposed to make up your mind until you have heard the testimony. · Mr. BENDER. I listened very attentively to all phases. Mr. RANKIN. I would like to know whether you are through. I would like to ask the witness some questions. Mr. BERLE. I would like for you to have the answer. Mr. RANKIN. I would like to know if we are going to have a joint debate on that. Mr. BERLE. May I answer the question? Of course, all of these considerations are not only fair ones, but they are considerations which naturally arise in the minds of all of us when we are representing communities, as they did in my mind when I appeared before these hearings representing the city of New York; but the remedy, it seems to me, does not lie in stinting produc- tion or in closing off avenues by which you can increase the wealth GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE BASIN 87 of the country. Whether it lies in the appropriate changes in our tax system and in our credit system so that the losses will not be assessed upon the most productive; and even within that frame, some of us who have benefited greatly, perhaps can also give. In any event I do not see that we can afford to say no, you must not use the re- sources you are given at the time when you need them, because we do not agree with the social structure. On that reasoning it may very well be that someone else may take these decisions of these matters out of our hands and perhaps we will not like that so well. This is not saying that your question is unfair. It is to say you cannot fluff off these matters; and this is one you cannot; and, believe me, I am not trying to be facetious, because I think I understand the problem. I think that the fact is that Cleveland, as a seaport, would probably gain more than the losses, by the small fragment of the two-hundred- million-odd dollars which it might have to pay. The CHAIRMAN. Are you through, Mr. Bender? Mr. BENDER. Yes. 다 ​The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Rankin. Mr. RANKIN. Mr. Chairman, for a man from the agricultural States that feed and clothe these other States, it is rather amusing to hear them talk about paying the lion's share when we know that they get the lion's share off of us. And when we come here and beneficiently attempt to get them out of the night by assisting in the development of a great natural resource, these lectures to which we have just lis- tened become rather uninteresting; very much like a delayed post mortem. Now, the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. Bender] awhile ago said, Mr. Secretary, we had all of the power we needed if we would conserve it. As a matter of fact, if we raised the rate to what we were paying before the Tennessee Valley Authority was created; the people could not use the power we have now, could they? It would curtail the use of it automatically. Mr. BERLE. Well, I can only say that whenever they have lowered the rates, consumption has promptly increased. Again, I speak not for the State Department. We have no great knowledge of that. But that has been experienced. Mr. RANKIN. I have a few questions here. The gentleman spoke about the dangers. I think he met himself coming back and came very near getting bombed in the process, be- cause as he went out he said that the war would be over before these locks could be built, and yet before he got through with his questions he had the enemy bombing those locks and destroying them after they had been completed. Now, as a matter of fact, he got off on the Panama Canal. Of course, the Panama Canal is infinitely more vulnerable. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Rankin, I am making a sea-level canal of that. Mr. RANKIN. That will help. The Panama Canal, Mr. Secretary, is infinitely more volnerable than this would be, is it not, because of the fact it is exposed to territory from which airplanes could fly? Mr. BERLE. Yes; I assume so. Mr. RANKIN. And, besides, it is 2,500 miles from Washington and probably a thousand miles from the continental United States. 88 GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE BASIN Mr. BERLE. That is right. Mr. RANKIN. It is 85 feet above sea level, and, of course, if a bomber could be flown there large enough that they could destroy one of those locks, they could put it out of commission; but in this case they would have to fly inland about 500 miles, would they not? Mr. BERLE. Just about that; yes. Mr. RANKIN. They would have to not only come through all of our defenses after crossing the ocean- The CHAIRMAN. Greenland is the nearest alien territory, and that is about 1,400 miles away. Mr. RANKIN. They would have to fly inland about 500 miles after they reached the American Continent. I pointed out awhile ago that the war has been going on in Europe for almost 2 years, and yet neither the Suez Canal nor the Kiel Canal have been put out of business, have they? Mr. BERLE. No; not for any length of time. Mr. RANKIN. In other words, they have both been bombed. Some- body told me this morning that the Kiel Canal had been bombed over 100 different times and the Suez Canal had been bombed a great many times, and neither of them have been put out of business, have they? Mr. BERLE. That is right. Mr. RANKIN. The gentleman from California, Mr. Carter, after arguing a good deal about this contract, finally admitted its legality, so that eliminates all questions of whether or not we ought to go to the Senate and run the risk of one-third of the Senate blocking it or taking the democratic way and letting both Houses of Congress pass on it by a majority. But he said something about the sinister motives—— Mr. CARTER. No; I beg your pardon. I never used the word "sinister." Mr. RANKIN. Well, it was used on that side of the table several times. Mr. CARTER. I never used the word "sinister.” Mr. BERLE. I did not understand him to use the word. Mr. CARTER. I have not used the word "sinister." I have not thought "sinister" in connection with this. Mr. RANKIN. I am going to ask if there is any sinister motive in sub- mitting this proposition to both Houses of Congress instead of merely submitting it to the Senate. Mr. BERLE. I did not understand the gentleman from California [Mr. Carter] to use the word "sinister," or any such implication. I must say I was a little puzzled at why there should be some- thing particularly outrageous in submitting this thing to the House as well as to the Senate; but I assumed that that merely came under the head of good-natured bantering, rather than serious argument. Mr. RANKIN. Of course, I will say that there has been quite a righteous improvement in the Senate since 1934, and it might be that this would go through without any trouble. Certainly there has been a great improvement over there, but it is a great improve- ment to submit it to the House of Representatives, that really repre- sents all the American people. Now then, let me ask you about the diversion of water in the Great Lakes. I believe you said that there was being diverted 5,000,000 cubic feet. GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE BASIN 89 Mr. BERLE. Five thousand cubic feet per second. Mr. RANKIN. Five thousand cubic feet per second. Mr. BERLE. Yes, sir. Mr. RANKIN. Now, that water also goes down the St. Lawrence, does it not? Mr. BERLE. That is right. Mr. RANKIN. Then you spoke about it not being used for power, or rather said that it would be used for power in Canada, but would be used to increase the power at this dam, would it not, on the St. Lawrence? Mr. BERLE. Yes, sir. Mr. RANKIN. So that we would get that much benefit from this diversion. Mr. BERLE. Canada gets the benefit of it. In the sense now that it goes into a joint pool, why, of course, we get that much additional resource there. Mr. RANKIN. And now the gentleman on the other side- The CHAIRMAN. Did you understand his question? That is the water that is being diverted into Lake Superior by Canada that you are speaking of. ago. Mr. RANKIN. Yes. The CHAIRMAN. Canada gets all of that power, does it not? Mr. BERLE. Yes; under the arrangement, Canada has the right to divert for power purposes so much power as she puts in; and we have the equivalent right, should we put any in. My statement that we do get benefit out of it is that we are pres- ently using between us all of the power that is developed, and we are glad to have that additional power there, because a lot of it we probably will be needing, if the Canadians do not use it. Mr. RANKIN. Now, they spoke to you about Newfoundland awhile Mr. BERLE. Yes, sir. Mr. RANKIN. And Newfoundland being an independent dominion. As a matter of fact, in 1925 when the premiers of the various British. Dominions met in London, they adopted an agreement that is the basis for the British Commonwealth of Nations; did they not? Mr. BERLE. In 1926 it was adopted. Mr. RANKIN. Was it 1926? Mr. BERLE. Yes. Mr. RANKIN. I remember it very distinctly. I inserted it in the Congressional Record at that time, because I thought it was a very historical document. Now, under that agreement none of those dominions are subject to compulsion of any kind by the British Empire. Mr. BERLE. That is right. Mr. RANKIN. In other words, they are just as independent as the United States. (Some members of the committee said "No.") Mr. RANKIN. Yes; they are. The only tie is a social tie; the King is the social head of the British Association of Nations, but he has no power over them. Mr. BERLE. That is substantially accurate; yes. Mr. RANKIN. They cannot even tax Canada. Mr. BERLE. No. 90 GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE BASIN Mr. RANKIN. And it is stated-if I remember correctly-it is stated in that document that the decision of the courts of the various domin- ions are not subject to review by the British. Mr. BERLE. There is a classic dispute which is still going on in Canada as to whether an appeal lies to the Privy Council from Can- ada. I believe that that has not yet been cleared up. Mr. RANKIN. Nobody has ever dared to try it out, have they? Mr. BERLE. There have been a certain number of appeals to the Privy Council relating to certain very limited jurisdictions. Mr. RANKIN. I want to ask you about Newfoundland. G Mr. BERLE (continuing). But what they have done in that regard has been to provide that at any time when Canada chooses to ter- minate the right of appeal, it is wholly in her competency to do so. Mr. RANKIN. It is within her competency to do so; yes. Mr. BERLE. So if they want to get, as the Supreme Court, to the Privy Council's judicial committee, which is equivalent to their local supreme court, they can; but if they want to, they can by simple action end it. Mr. RANKIN. In other words, the British Empire, as such, ceased to exist in 1926 so far as these dominions were concerned, and became an association of independent nations. Mr. BERLE. That is the fact; yes. Mr. RANKIN. Now, I want to ask about Newfoundland. That is what I am getting around to. Was Newfoundland one of those independent nations? Mr. BERLE. Yes; at that time. Mr. RANKIN. So Newfoundland stands on the same footing as the Dominion of Canada, does it not? Mr. BERLE. No; Newfoundland is not on exactly the same basis. Newfoundland about that time was in difficulty with its finances and requested a particular arrangement, and thereupon got it in the form of a commission, which is appointed from London. Mr. RANKIN. I see. Now, I want to talk with you about what Mr. Hogg, chairman of the Hydroelectric Power Commission of Ontario, said a few years ago about this not being necessary as a defense program. As matter of fact, at that time, the world had not realized the efficacy of the airplane as a war weapon, had it? Mr. BERLE. No; they did not even Mr. RANKIN (interposing). And the vast necessity; we had not realized the vast necessity for the great volume of aluminum that is necessary to build an airplane. Mr. BERLE. They did not even realize that they were at war Mr. Congressman. They were talking about a phony war, and all that kind of thing. In point of fact, if you take Mr. Hogg's remarks in whole, the whole context, you do not get the impression that you get at all from that quotation. What he was arguing for was whether it was needed for defense or not he was going to need it anyway for civilian use and that in spite of all of the arguments you can take defense altogether out of it, and what he was saying was, you can stress this defense need, but I want it for my civilian consumption, because I am already running up to the danger point, irrespective of defense. That is what he was trying to say, and when you take that isolated quotation out of the context, you get a false impression of the real argument he was making. GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE BASIN 91 Mr. RANKIN. Since that time, the tank and the airplane and the Panzer formations have supplanted such military equipment, I will say, as the Maginot Line and it looked as though they might take the place of or surpass other military defense weapons. So the picture has entirely changed since Mr. Hogg's statement, even if you consider that. Mr. BERLE. Not only that The CHAIRMAN. And you did not include parachutists? Mr. RANKIN. No. Mr. BERLE. Some gentlemen from the New York Power Authority have_pointed out to me something which I had not recalled, that Mr. Hogg only recently wrote a letter to the New York Times and in that letter he pointed out the present need for the project as a defense need and specifically said that the quotation which has here- tofore been widely used was inapplicable. So he has either changed his mind, in view of the great need, or he has come to a different conclusion. But he is on record as asking that that quotation be not used as a statement of his views on the St. Lawrence. That is a more recent opinion. Mr. RANKIN. Now, some of the members of the committee spoke about this being in Canada, and that it might fall into the hands of a foreign power. Well now, as a matter of fact, if any foreign power of any kind attempted to take Canada, it is our duty to go to its defense, because it is necessary to defend the United States, is it not? Mr. BERLE. Absolutely. Mr. RANKIN. So to me it is preposterous to think about or talk about any foreign country, any foreign power, taking Canada, be- cause it would mean war with the United States and war to the hilt. Mr. BERLE. And at once. Mr. RANKIN. Another thing. They talk about this being too late for defense. Now, if we should get into this war, is it improbable that it would last 10 or 15 years, under the circumstances, with the conditions as they exist in Europe, with a vast war machine, the vast air power, and with what is happening to naval vessels on the high seas, if we were to get into this war, is it at all improbable that it would last 15 or 20 years? Mr. BERLE. Well, you will certainly have to reckon on the possi- bility. The probabilities are difficult to calculate, but as Secretary Stimson said, as you heard him, he put it as the probability of several years. Mr. RANKIN. Then again, if this war should close, one reason why we have gotten into this condition now is we did not do this many years ago. So if we are going to prepare for the future, if this is necessary for future defense of the country, then is there any reason why we should not go forward with it at this time? Mr. BERLE. There certainly is not. Mr. RANKIN. I want to ask you a question or two in respect to transmission, for the benefit of my friend over here on my left, Mr. Barden. They brought up this question of transmission of power. I be- lieve that you said that it could be transmitted, how many miles, at a loss of 10 percent? 92 GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE BASIN Mr. BERLE. Between 300 and 350 miles. That is not an expert opinion, but it is something in that order, according to my informa- tion. Mr. RANKIN. I was at Boulder Dam sometime ago and I asked the engineer what the loss was on the power transmitted from Boulder Dam to Los Angeles, Calif., 268 miles, and he told me that it averaged 6 percent. Mr. BERLE. That is about in line. Mr. RANKIN. The best engineering information I get is that you can transmit power on an ordinary 110-volt line, we will say, or one larger than that, at a loss of not more than 3 percent per hundred miles. Mr. BERLE. That is my own understanding, Mr. Rankin. · Mr. RANKIN. Now, I probably ought not to go into this, but my friend here on the left, Mr. Beiter, from Buffalo, has been talking about this power situation at Niagara and right across the river. I want to call attention to the fact that in the year 1940 the people of the State of New York paid $201,000,000 more for their electricity than they would have paid if they had gotten it at Ontario rates. They are going to come back and say that there were some taxes in that. I will answer that. The record shows that-the last figures we have-is that the power companies only paid $37,000,000 taxes in New York, which deducted from that amount would leave $164,000,000 overcharge. Mr. BEITER. Will the gentleman yield? Mr. RANKIN. I will be glad to. Mr. BEITER. The gentleman knows, because I have often talked with him about the power phase of this, and I said I would be for that phase if it were divorced from the seaway phase. But the seaway will have a tendency to throw about 25,000 people out of work in my congres- sional district. I am for the power phase of it if you can divorce the seaway, and I told him that have told him that time and again. Mr. RANKIN. The gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Bender, raised the same question. Now, according to the reports, the people of Ohio were overcharged $67,000,000 last year according to the Ontario rates, and $57,000,000 according to the T. V. A. rates. If this dam had been built in 1934-and I am one Member of the House who was in favor of it at that time, because I thought that those people needed the benefit of it-if this dam had been built in 1934, the savings on electric bills in the State of New York alone would have more than paid every dollar that the entire development would have cost. I believe that is about all I care to say to the gentleman from New York at this time. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Ellis. Mr. ELLIS. Mr. Berle, assuming that you should start the construc- tion of the seaway now, anticipating its completion in 3 or 4 years, could we simultaneously start the construction of ships on the Great Lakes and anticipating our ability to get them out? Mr. BERLE. I presume you could. Mr. ELLIS. Now, you have given considerable study to the power situation not only of the St. Lawrence area but of the entire country, have you not? Mr. BERLE. My own direct connection with power, of course, has to do primarily with these Canadian problems. GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE BASIN 93 Mr. ELLIS. Let me ask you this- Mr. BERLE. I do, for the reason, as of general interest, I try to keep up a little with those problems, but I do not claim to be an expert on that, because my own concern lies with these Canadian problems which we have to work with all of the time. Mr. ELLIS. You are generally familiar with the fact, are you not, that 95 percent of the Nation's production of bauxite, from which aluminum is made, is in Arkansas? Mr. BERLE. That is right. Mr. ELLIS. And that there are about 2,000,000,000 kilowatt-hours of hydro production possible annually in Arkansas and about 4,000,000,- 000 kilowatt-hours undeveloped power in that region of the Southwest in the four valleys of the St. Francis, White, Arkansas, and Red Rivers. Now, what consideration have you given or has your Department given, or has the Government given, that you know of, toward the development of that power out in that region? Mr. BERLE. Well, my Department considers Arkansas as being a part of the Union and not a foreign country. Therefore we do not have direct jurisdiction. Mr. ELLIS. May I say we are glad you consider us a part of the Union? Mr. BERLE. We emphatically do. We have had too much and too happy relations with you to consider it otherwise. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Ellis, you were trying to get out of the Union in 1861. Mr. ELLIS. So, we never got back in-economically, I believe. Mr. GREEN. The same goes for Florida. Mr. RANKIN. Maybe you need a treaty. Mr. BERLE. Let us try it by agreement. I do know that there has been a study conducted, and one was conducted very recently, relating to precisely that area. Mr. Olds, representing the Government, with a staff in the Power Commission, was working directly on that, and that, so far as I am aware, as late as only a few days ago, so that the Government not only has been studying it and considering it, but I imagine probably has some pretty definite ideas on the subject. I do not undertake to report for them, because it is not my report. I would only be reporting second-hand, and you will have it from first-hand sources. Mr. ELLIS. We, of course, are loyal to our country and we are in favor of developing this power for aluminum plants up on the St. Lawrence. We think it is vital to defense. But we think also that we are certainly within the picture and that we ought to think some- thing about the development of aluminum where the aluminum is out in our region. Mr. BERLE. If you are asking my personal opinion, I agree with you entirely. Mr. ELLIS. May I ask you one more question? Mr. BERLE. Yes. Mr. ELLIS. We have been led to believe that the railroads and the Railroad Brotherhoods are opposed to this legislation. As long as you have been studying it, you no doubt know something about that. Would you care to tell us what you know, if anything? 62660—42—pt. 1– -7 94 GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE BASIN Mr. BERLE. Well, the railroads, or more accurately, a representa- tive of them, and the Railroad Brotherhoods, of course, will pre- sumably speak for themselves in due time. Let me speak therefore merely of the railroads themselves. I have had personal contact more recently with a good many heads of rail- roads, many of whom I am privileged to have as personal friends. Long ago, when the St. Lawrence was first presented-that was in the early twenties-a very large number of the railroad heads ex- pressed themselves as being in favor of it. More recently a consid- erable number of them have expressed themselves to me personally as having no opposition to it. They indicated, however, that the principal opposition comes, not unnaturally, from certain eastern roads; northeastern roads; one or two, particularly, who consider that they might be affected by the competition. I take it that really what is called the railroad opposition in the main reflects merely the feeling of those particular roads. Of course we are coming into a new transportation phase, too. It was not so long ago that in a somewhat similar or analogous case, opposition was made to building pipe lines which could transport oil and gasoline to this eastern territory. That was opposed, fearing lest it might create a new form of transportation. Now that the tankers have to be used for other things, we face a possibility of rationing up here, as a result of that particular pleading of special interests, however legitimate it might be. I submit that you cannot go on doing that, and I do not think most of the railroads of the United States want to go on doing that, frankly. They of course will speak for themselves. I cannot undertake to speak for them, but I think you would find that there were only a very small number of railroads who really had any deep interest in this and then for reasons which are quite legitimate to them but, of course, are not conceived in the common interest and by the nature of things cannot be. I do not object to their maintaining their position because of their particular interests, because that is human; but, of course, that is not the main problem, and while the organization of the railroads is such that the bulk of them stand mute, and the real interest, I think you will find, is relatively small. Mr. ELLIS. That is all, Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. Gentlemen, I want to announce that we expected to have the engineers of the War Department follow the Secretary of War. It was found impossible to carry it out in that manner. Tomorrow the Navy is billed to come on-Secretary Knox, Admiral Rock, and Admiral Williams, and I doubt if that part of the program can be changed at this time. Their time has been set and they can- not change it very well. However, we will meet at 10 o'clock in the morning and Secretary Knox is not supposed to be here until 10:30. We therefore will take up the testimony of the Governor of New York the first thing in the morning at 10 o'clock. Without objection, we will adjourn now until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning. (Thereupon, the committee proceeded to the consideration of other business, after which, at 5: 10 p. m., it adjourned until 10 a. m. the following morning, Wednesday, June 18, 1941.) GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE BASIN WEDNESDAY, JUNE 18, 1941 HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON RIVERS AND HARBORS, Washington, D. C. The committee met at 10 a. m., Hon. Joseph J. Mansfield (chairman) presiding. The CHAIRMAN. Gentlemen, of the committee, we have Mr. Secre- tary Knox with us this morning. The Secretary has an urgent and important engagement at 11 o'clock and I will ask that you limit your questions so he may be able to get away. Secretary Knox, will you please come around. STATEMENT OF HON. FRANK KNOX, SECRETARY OF THE NAVY Secretary KNOx. I approach this whole discussion from the back- ground of a man who lives in the Middle West and to whom this problem is not a new one, and one who, as a newspapr editor, has always supported it. My recent experience as Secretary of the Navy emphasizes in my mind what a great boon it would have been to national defense now if when this project was first proposed it had been agreed to and put into effect. If that had been done it would not have been only along the 12,000 miles of coastline that we now have scattered our shipyards for building combatant ships, but it would have been along additional thousands of miles of inland waters, completely safe from any dangers from without, where we could be building cruisers, destroyers, sub- marines right now. There is an advantage in construction in the interior, not only one of security, one of nearness to raw materials and in a region where there is an abundance of skilled labor, but it would have been of tre- mendous advantage to me as the Secretary of the Navy, in letting these contracts for these combatant ships which we are now building in such large numbers, had this resource been available as it might have been, had this project been adopted then. That is one general statement I charged myself with making. The second is even more general: It is driven home to me with the close application I must give to the subject of sea power, that we are going to live in a disturbed world for a long time, no matter what the outcome of the war may be, and in that world which is out of balance and struggling for a new and secure footing the control of the seas is going to be of immense importance. Along with the development of modern sea power has come a new power-that of the air. To have a region in a time of turmoil and disturbance and of possible threatened war, where we could proceed 95 96 GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE BASIN with reasonable security in maintaining that predominance in sea power, which such a state of the world might require, would be an immensely invaluable national asset. So in your consideration of this whole question I hope you gentlemen will bear in mind the tre- mendously increased importance of sea power in the world for the next 25 or 50 years at least. We are thoroughly committed with almost universal approval, in the construction of a fleet which shall be twice as great as any fleet that sailed the seas. We propose to establish and maintain complete mastery of the seas around the entire Western Hemisphere, a fleet capable of carrying on a successful defense if need be, in both oceans at once. Now, if we should ever be confronted with that crisis it would be of a tremendous strategic advantage if a large percentage of the ships required for that defense could be builded in a region reasonably secure from attack from without. I said at the outset that I am a resident of the Middle West, not only a resident there but I happen to be the publisher of one of the largest papers there, with a very, what I think, competent staff and consequently I am pretty close and intimately in touch with both the industrial and agricultural development and interests of that whole region. I cannot in my judgment-in my opinion overexaggerate, overemphasize the importance to that entire region of having access to salt water in vessels of sufficient size to carry their cargoes un- broken from the point of loading to the point of unloading. All of you no doubt have studied Europe and visited Europe and are aware of how that intensified industrial region of Middle Europe has developed its river communications. They are of first importance, for instance, to Germany. We have, because of our tremendous natural resources, without artificial aid, never developed our inland waterways as we shall some day as our development proceeds. The most natural development there is in the whole picture of commerce is this development of a deep waterway to the ocean from the Great Lakes. This year, coming down the Great Lakes as a channel of commu- nication, there will arrive in the lower Lake ports not less than 75,000,000 tons of ore. The advantage of having water communication for bulk cargoes of that character is beautifully illustrated by what happens at the lower end of the Lakes. There you have the greatest steel manufacturing region in the world and it is simply because you are bringing the ore by water-borne freight to the region where the coal, which is the other essential, is found. If the ore happened to be in Pennsylva- nia and the coal in Minnesota and northern Michigan, we would have reversed the process. But the fact is that cheap water-borne trans- portation connects these two vital necessities for the greatest indus- try we have. Now, to take that region and give it ease of commu- nication, confer on it the advantage of an open channel to the ocean and you would be giving it an advantage that hardly could be meas- ured in terms of dollars and cents. This applies equally to the farmer as it does to the industrialists. One of the reasons, one of the underlying reasons for farm lack of prosperity in recent years is the increased cost of transportation of farm products to the sea coast, especially those crops designed for GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE BASIN 97 export. You will be shocked, I am sure, if you are not already familiar with the subject, to find how great the increase in cost of that transportation has been in the last 20 years. To connect up the Great Lakes region with the sea, inevitably will have a profound influence on the cost of transportation of farm products, especially bulk products like wheat, to the coast and from there on anywhere in the seven seas. We are going to be living in a world thoroughly disjointed, pretty well destroyed by the activities of war for years after this war is over, and the great bread basket of the middle west will have to feed a great many more people than it has ever fed before, and the opportunity to ship our bulk crops from the Middle West anywhere in the seven seas or anywhere in the world, will be a tremendous commercial asset and national asset. Now, getting down to the immediate problem of building ships: There are two departments in the shipbuilding industry at the moment that are under tremendous pressure, pressed by a need for additional defense on the high seas. We have contracted for the construction of something like somewhere between 375 and 400 combatant ships of size. The contracts for all these were prepared in anticipation of the passage by Congress of legislation designed to give us that fleet. They were let within the next 24 hours after the President's signature was attached to the bill and are now under construction. Sometimes some of my fellow newspapermen, lacking the oppor- tunity that I have to know more of the details of ship construction, make the mistake of assuming that only those ships which have been laid down on ways are under construction. Nothing could be farther from the truth. Every ship that has been authorized by an appro- priation by Congress, substantially, is under construction right now. There is a vast accumulation of various sorts of material that must precede the laying down of the keel of a vessel itself, and this entire program is now under way for combatant ships on the Atlantic and Pacific and Gulf coasts, and in every single yard that I know any- thing about construction is way ahead of the time schedule. Now the other phase of shipbuilding, which is under pressure, is the construction of merchant vessels. For this type of vessel there are a number of very well organized, efficient yards in the Great Lakes. The Maritime Commission, which has direct charge of this type of construction, has found a way, an ingenious way to build a pretty good size ship in the Great Lakes. They build her save her upper works and take her down the Illinois and Mississippi water route to sea, finishing her at some point enroute, so that every single ounce of productive capacity to be found in that region is now about to be employed under contract for the construction of merchant vessels. - If I could be sure, say 2 years hence, that a deep waterway, which would accommodate a vessel 500 or 600 feet in length with a draft of 20 to 25 feet, would be available, the Navy could utilize the Great Lakes yards as well as the coast yards, which would provide a means of promoting ship construction and distributing this work. The work is now confined as you know, to a narrow strip along the coasts. If we could establish this means of communication to salt water we would insure a future means of construction which would be a very marked military advantage to us. 98 GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE BASIN I don't know how long this war will last. It is pure speculation. But this thing I think I can be fairly confident of: That the need for protection on the high seas will be here for a long time to come, and anything we do which will enable us to build more rapidly and par- ticularly build more securely, and which will enable us to spread the work around the country in a more equitable fashion, I believe takes on the character of good, sound statesmanship. I think, Mr. Chairman, that covers the general thoughts I had on the subject. I will be very glad to answer any questions, if I can, that may be asked. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, we want to thank you sincerely for your appearance and the information you have given us. Now, if I understand your position thoroughly, regardless of the result of the war, the present war in Europe, you think our program of preparedness will have to continue for a good many years to come in any event? Secretary KNox. I do, sir. The CHAIRMAN. Gentlemen, any questions of the Secretary? Mr. SMITH. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask one or two questions. Mr. Secretary, I think you have made a very logical and convincing statement and I am very much impressed with it. I have had pre- sented to me the problem of how widely wood could be utilized in the construction of merchant ships, realizing that we are very much in need now of all the bottoms that can possibly be constructed, and as I understand it, the present program of both the Bureau of Ships and of the Navy Department and the Maritime Commission is limited to steel construction almost entirely. A great many people think that that is an unwise policy, and I happen to be one of them, and that is why I want to direct one or two questions in regard to that matter. Secretary KNOX. You mean you think we ought to employ wood? Mr. SMITH. I think so. Secretary KNOX. I agree with you but I would limit the size. I think that it is in harmony with the best and accepted engineering thought of the moment that up to 165 feet, which is the size of one of our types of smaller vessels, wood is all right, but when you get beyond that it doesn't seem to be wise for many reasons. Mr. SMITH. But we have a great need for vessels of that size? Secretary KNOX. One-hundred-and sixty-five-footers? Mr. SMITH. Yes; which could just as well be constructed of wood, could they not? Secretary KNOx. Not as well; no. They are not so useful a type. Mr. SMITH. Isn't it a fact that they are less costly? Secretary Knox. Well, I am going to refer you on those technical questions to my good friend Admiral Williams, who is here to pinch hit for me. Mr. SMITH. They could be constructed more rapidly? Secretary KNOX. Well, I doubt that. Mr. SMITH. And if they are lost you don't sustain as great a financial loss, do you? Secretary KNOX. If you are correct in your initial assumption. Mr. SMITH. Isn't it more expensive to use a steel ship? Secretary Knox. I may be off my base in saying this-I am an amateur and a newspaperman trying to administer the Navy Depart- ment, but I do think the construction of wooden ships of any size GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE BASIN 99 would not be justified now when steel can be had in great quantities and at very low cost. Mr. SMITH. I thought according to the latest report of Gano Dunn, consultant for the Office of Production Management there was a shortage of steel. Secretary KNOX. Well, we haven't suffered on it yet. Of course, as long as we produce 90,000,000 tons of steel and devote the first- give the first priority of that steel to defense purposes we won't have any trouble. Mr. SMITH. I want to thank you, Mr. Secretary. Mr. GAVAGAN. Mr. Secretary, I think you have made a magnificent contribution to this committee, but as a military man I would like to ask you this question: In the event of a military decision in Europe the United States will need every shipbuilding facility it possibly can find, isn't that true? Secretary KNOX. Yes, sir. Mr. GAVAGAN. And this waterway will open up the Great Lakes region for shipbuilding industries and give us ways, not only for mer- chant ships but for battleships? Secretary KNOx. Not for battleships, but up to the light cruiser type-anything under 10,000 tons. Mr. GAVAGAN. In other words these 10,000-ton cruisers-battle- cruisers could be built? Secretary KNOX. Again not battle cruisers; anything up to 10,000 tons, which would be a light cruiser, 6-inch or 8-inch cruisers; but it would take a tremendous pressure off of your coast yards by taking that type off the ways there. The CHAIRMAN. The type of ships that would not be constructed up there would be the battleships and airplane carriers and large battle cruisers? Secretary KNOx. That is true, anything in excess of 10,000 tons. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Carter. Mr. CARTER. Mr. Secretary, this committee has had before it in the past a proposal for enlarging the Erie Canal from the Great Lakes through New York and giving an outlet that way? Secretary KNOX. Yes. Mr. CARTER. Now, one of the arguments urged for the enlarge- ment of the Erie Canal was that it was an all-American route? Secretary KNOX. Yes. Mr. CARTER. It was a route that we would have absolute control of over its entire length? Secretary KNOX. Right. Mr. CARTER. Have you given any consideration to a proposal for enlarging the Erie Canal as compared with the proposition that we are considering here at the present time? Secretary KNOX. I have, sir, and the great objection, in my judg- ment, and this is an editorial opinion rather than an expert opinion, is that you have got to have a canal big enough to accommodate ships so you wouldn't break bulk when you go to sea, and that means you have got to dig a canal probably 30 feet deep, which would be pretty nearly impossible. Mr. CARTER. We have considered canals of varying depths and I think 30 feet was as far as we went. .. ...... 100 GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE BASIN Secretary KNOx. You have got to accommodate ships that can go right to sea when they get through the canal and that means you have got to deepen the channels all the way through and build locks and it would be a tremendously costly job. In addition to that I don't know whether there would be adequate water supply for such a canal. Mr. CARTER. Mr. Secretary, some reference was made here yester- day or brought out in the hearings, of the fact that the United States under certain conditions might find itself somewhat embarrassed in navigating those stretches of the St. Lawrence waterway that is entirely in foreign territory, and that we might have shipbuilding plants in the Great Lakes and find it difficult under certain condi- tions to get them out or bring those in if we so desired. Secretary KNOX. Well, that of course must presuppose unfriendly relations between Canada and the United States, does it not? Mr. CARTER. Well, I think it was based on that, because reference was made to the Revolutionary War and the War of 1812 and other incidents of the past where unfriendly relations did exist with Great Britain. I am sure the author of the question had in mind the possibility of a reoccurrence of those conditions. Secretary KNOx. Of course, that is humanly possible, but I would like to make two observations: If the time ever arrives when two peoples so identical in their ideals and their habits of life and ways of life and government can't live side by side as we have with the Cana- dians for the last 100 years, then the hope of a peaceful world is pretty slim and we probably better face the facts. Mr. CARTER. Do you call the present world a "peaceful world," Mr. Secretary? Secretary KNOX. I would say it would be a much worse world if the people of Canada and the United States couldn't get along in peace and amity, and I am sure they can. Anything else I think is a very remote danger. Mr. CARTER. Your endorsement of this proposal is based upon the assumption that peaceful relations are going to continue continuously with Great Britain and with Canada. Secretary KNOX. I should say that was the basic assumption; yes, sir. Mr. CARTER. That is all, Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. Gentlemen, any other questions? Mr. HALL. I would like to ask a question, Mr. Secretary. Through- out your statement you have spoken of the "waterway project." We also have connected with this, of course, a power project. Secretary KNOX. Yes. Mr. HALL. Now, in your support of it are you supporting it both as a project for power development and water transportation or do you favor one and not the other? Secretary KNOX. I don't differentiate. I think it has a two-way benefit one is a seaway and the other is a producer of a huge amount of I am not so familiar with the power problem. That is probably why I stressed the other. I do know this, however, right out of my experience in the last year, that we are having a growing shortage of electric energy produced by water power. GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE BASIN 101 Mr. HALL. From the standpoint of national defense, Mr. Secretary, which do you think is the most important? Secretary KNOX. I presume because I am Secretary of the Navy, I would say the waterway would be the more important, but that may be a prejudiced opinion. Mr. OSMERS. Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Osmers. Mr. OSMERS. I would like to ask the Secretary a question. I don't remember the exact words that you used, Mr. Secretary, but it was something along these lines-that the Middle West in the future would have to feed more people than it ever has before. If that state- ment can be substantiated I think it would be a very important argument for the project, but my own view of it is exactly the con- trary that the Middle West will have to feed fewer people in the future than it ever has before. I wonder if you would explain that statement? Secretary KNOX. Well, of course, I will admit right off it was a speculation; it was a hope and nothing which I can support with any figures. But I was thinking also in rather temporary terms because I think I did say in my initial statement, original statement, that we were going to emerge from this war into a very chaotic world, in which the sources of supply would be terribly upset and there would be a need for a number of years, of exporting our exportable surplus of foodstuff. I have this idea, Congressman-I may be wrong: Farming like everything else is going to yield to research and study and it is going to be a question of where you can produce the cheapest, and I am convinced that under the right kind of intensive cultivation and the most skillful management, including lowness of transportation costs, we have a very great chance to find a market for a large exportable surplus of foodstuffs. Mr. OSMERS. The point that I have in mind is this, Mr. Secretary: When I asked that question that during the last generation or since the start of the World War in 1914, there has been a growth of eco- nomic nationalism and that trend increased before the present Euro- pean war started and there seems to be no factor in sight that will change that course. Secretary KNOx. You are getting into a philosophy of the thing now and I am going to expose myself to probable successful attack by saying that I think it was that excessive type of national nationalism that brought the war on- Mr. OSMERS. It had something to do with it, no question about that. Secretary KNOX. And unless the war is going to result in a totali- tarian victory, under which all our ideals are going into the waste basket and our ways of life are radically changed, but should we emerge from the war victorious, those who believe in free government, then I am bound to say that I think all those nations which participate in that victory and those nations which will have their liberties restored to them because of that victory, ought to be drawn together in a very close economic block so as to make the standards of living in free countries so much higher and better than it is in slave countries that those regions of the world that are still living in slavery will want to join with the regions that are living in freedom. 102 GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE BASIN Now, that is just sheer philosophy. Mr. OSMERS. I will say it is a well-expressed hope. Secretary KNOX. That is all it is, a hope. Mr. OSMERS. But it just hasn't worked that way so far because of this principle because of the question of international exchange about paying for these things. We have found to our surprise that if we don't buy as customers their goods they don't buy our goods. Now, there is one other point I wanted to bring up for your opinion, Mr. Secretary: This project if constructed, will take, I don't know exactly the number of man-hours and tons of material, but it will run into the millions of man-hours. The time for completion of the project is estimated anywhere from 3 to 5 years in the future. Right now we are rapidly approaching a condition that might be called "full employment. I wonder if in your opinion it would be advisable or would you class this project as so vital that we should divert from the more immediate defense needs these millions of man-hours and these tons and tons of equipment and material and machinery that will be used in the construction of this project. "" Secretary KNOx. I would like to correct an error which I find very common in dealing with this labor problem. We are introducing a great many more hundreds of thousands of men into defense manufac- ture than we had before in the types of skill and crafts which are required to produce defense items. We are going to have a con- stantly increased employment, but in order to carry out the program that we are now engaged in we are going to constantly have to reduce the amount of raw material which is expended for nonmilitary and nondefense uses. Now, what happens if we should shut down all the automobile plants in order to put all that skill and all that labor, as much as we could use, into the manufacture of defense articles? You immediately produce an unemployment factor of something like 100,000 men, which would take perhaps a couple of years to absorb into new types of work in which the factories would be engaged. Well, now, apply- ing that thinking to some industry which is of the luxury character, which isn't essential, which we can get along without, then you have a source of unemployment; you have a source of employment in defense industries and you have a source of unemployment growing out of those industries which are shut down because of our needs for the raw material that enter into the production of those nonessential articles. So I think one will balance the other and we have not yet reached anything like the point of saturation in labor. We still have unem- ployed people in large numbers-probably two or three million. Now, how many of those are really employable and able to turn in a day's work, I don't know, but there is a considerable pool still and I think that pool is likely to be added to as we get into the realm of a shortage of raw materials, which we are rapidly approaching. We are now in that realm in steel and aluminum. mag Mr. OSMERS. I want to agree with the major contentions that you have made, Mr. Secretary, but I would like to point out that there are certainly not enough men unemployed anywhere near the site of this project to complete it. Secretary KNOX. That is true. GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE BASIN 103 Mr. OSMERS. It would require an economic dislocation to move the thousands of men, wherever they might be found, to complete this project. Secretary KNOX. That is true. Mr. OSMERS. And it would be an upsetting of the economic factor. Secretary KNOX. Well, I don't know how important it would be because that argument could be applied to almost any big develop- ment in time of peace. Mr. OSMERS. Yes; of course, it gets down, you might say, to the priority of this particular project. Secretary KNOX. That is right. Mr. PITTENGER. Pardon me, for the benefit of my colleague from New Jersey, we can give him all the W. P. A. workers up in northern Minnesota that he needs and still have plenty of unemployed left in northern Minnesota, so he doesn't need to worry about that feature of it. Secretary KNOx. I don't think that is a major concern. Mr. OSMERS. I hope the unemployed W. P. A. workers in northern Minnesota are competent to build a waterway. Mr. PITTENGER. They are all good workmen. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Bell. Mr. BELL. Mr. Secretary, I understood you to say a few moments ago that substantially all the shipbuilding facilities on the Great Lakes are either now or soon will be engaged to capacity. Secretary KNOX. That is right. Mr. BELL. In the building of these ships of comparatively small type-ships of not more than ten or fifteen thousand tons. They will Secretary KNOX. They wouldn't be as large as that. have to be at the present time under 10,000 tons. Mr. BELL. You couldn't go to 10,000 tons at the present time? Secretary KNOx. I think that would be a little large; but what they are doing, gentlemen, is build a ship part way up, leave off all of her upper works, just build her hull on the Great Lakes and then take her down the river to some point below the bottleneck, which I think is Cairo, or around Cairo, where they will establish a yard and put on the upper works, or perhaps do it in New Orleans or some place along the Mississippi. Mr. BELL. I take it there will be a demand for all the ships of that type and size you can build? Secretary KNOX. Yes, indeed. Mr. BELL. That leads me to wonder, Mr. Secretary, why it wouldn't be feasible and perhaps more economical instead of deepening this waterway to build additional shipways, say down on the Gulf of Mexico or somewhere else, and I am wondering if those new shipways to accommodate the building of more vessels, couldn't be built more quickly than this waterway can be deepened, which I understand will require somewhere between 3, 6, or 7 years. Secretary KNOX. Well, as a citizen of Chicago, I will answer "Yes," and as Secretary of the Navy, "No." Mr. BELL. That is all. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Culkin. Mr. CULKIN. The distinguished gentleman from California, Mr. Secretary, queried you about Canada. Now, isn't it our present policy, present national policy to maintain all of the Americas, 104 GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE BASIN North and South, free from any foreign influence, particularly an influence enforced by arms? Secretary KNOX. That is correct. Mr. CULKIN. Isn't that true? Secretary KNOX. That is correct-that is the Monroe Doctrine. Mr. CULKIN. Can you anticipate or see in the future any danger of Canada becoming involved with some nation that is hostile to Amer- ica? Secretary KNOX. I cannot. Mr. CULKIN. We are alike in language and institutions and we have had a peace lasting for 125 years? Secretary KNOX. That is right. Mr. CULKIN. And it is our fixed national policy-I may say our popular national policy-to keep Canada free from any hostile in- fluence that may threaten our institutions or our well-being. Secretary KNOX. It is just as essential to our defense as it would be to defend New England. Mr. CULKIN. Any suggestion that Canada would be hostile to us at anytime in the future is rather fanciful, is it not? Secretary KNOX. Yes; fantastic. Mr. CULKIN. Now, just one more question. I know you want to get away. You spoke about the security of construction within the Great Lakes area. Now, will you amplify that just a little. Secretary KNOX. Security? Mr. CULKIN. Yes; security of construction in view of the present methods of warfare. Secretary KNOX. Well, it would put us at least 1,000 miles away approximately, from the seacoast. Mr. CULKIN. From which the only danger from the air could come unless the enemy had established himself somewhere on the land in Canada. Secretary KNOx. Well, we propose, obviously, to protect the coast of Canada against that sort of invasion as much as we would our own coast. Under modern warfare an enemy based in lower Canada, down along the border there, would be almost as dangerous to the United States as if he had a base right within our own borders, so we are under the absolute necessity for our own self protection, of as- suring that Canada shall not be invaded. Mr. CULKIN. And we already have safeguards in Newfoundland by bases there? Secretary KNOX. Yes; and we are enlarging them. Mr. CULKIN. And even assuming that Canada should become hostile to the United States we would have to enforce our control over Canada by force of arms in order to protect our own security. Secretary KNOX. I don't want to discuss that, Mr. Culkin. I think that extreme is fantastic. Mr. CULKIN. You have viewed this question at long range for many years and you have not been a recent convert to this seaway. You have espoused it during your editorial career in Chicago? Secretary KNOX. That is correct. Mr. CULKIN. Then what will be the effect of this seaway on the Middle West from an economic standpoint? Secretary KNOX. I think it would be very marked and very great. I think transportation, Mr. Congressman, is one of the problems we GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE BASIN 105 haven't solved which will have a great deal to do with our economic prosperity. Mr. CULKIN. That is something that Congress does not seem generally to recognize. I read a statement recently written by the legislative representative of the Grange, that the farmer was getting 36 percent of the consumer dollar and 39 percent went to the trans- portation agencies. - Secretary KNOX. I guess that is true, or pretty close to it, and that has gone up from about 16 percent, I think it was. Mr. CULKIN. When that is true in any civilization, then civilization isn't functioning properly, isn't that correct? Secretary KNOXx. That is correct. Our distribution problem is the most serious problem we have to make our economic system work. Mr. CULKIN. And that is the cure for the present economic disease the farmers in the Middle West and beyond are suffering from. Secretary KNOx. I wouldn't care to say it would cure it; it would contribute to its cure. Mr. CULKIN. I think that is all. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Bender. Mr. BENDER. This seaway will be ice jammed for about 5 months of the year and it will not have any great economic value during that period, will it? Isn't it questionable as to any aid it might give the Middle West in the matter of transportation during that period? Secretary KNOX. Let me answer that suggestion by recalling to you that the most valuable line of water communication the Germans have is the Danube River and it is frozen up 3 or 4 months every year. That is a draw-back, no one will argue that it isn't, but if you can have it when the stream is open it is a tremendous asset. Mr. BENDER. Mr. Secretary, much has been said about this as a defense project and the need for it as a defense project. Under present conditions with the emphasis being placed on speed, do you think it is desirable to divert say 60,000 skilled mechanics, as would be necessary, at this time from essential defense industries to this project? Secretary KNOX. I don't think you would do that, Congressman. I don't think you would need to do that. I think you have abundant labor in the country to build this without diverting a single man from your defense industries. This isn't a highly skilled type of labor, you know, and a great deal of it will be done by machinery. Mr. GAVAGAN. And not by precision machinery or precision instru- ments at all? Secretary KNOX. That is correct. Mr. ANGELL. But that does not apply to generating equipment. Secretary KNOx. That is true, but that is a minor part of the whole program. Mr. BENDER. One more question. American agriculture has had great competition from foreign agriculture and what is the relative advantage or disadvantage in bringing foreign produce and foreign agricultural products in here, thus making it easier for this foreign produce to come in here and compete with our middle western agri- cultural products? Secretary KNOX. You don't want to precipitate a debate on the protective tariff, do you? I can't answer your question. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Green. 106 GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE BASIN Mr. GREEN. Mr. Secretary, at Jacksonville, Fla., during the World War considerable boat construction went on. We have practically an unlimited source of timber-pine, hardwood, cypress, and it is not far distant to the iron industry of Alabama, but so far I don't believe any ship construction for the Government, appreciably, is going on at Jacksonville and I am wondering if it wouldn't be well to utilize surplus labor and materials there. We have completed practically, the southeast air station at Jack- sonville and the military posts, so there is a large surplus of skilled and unskilled labor there now available and much of it is local labor. J Secretary KNOX. Well, I can only explain to you, Congressman, why we haven't encouraged building of shipyards there. We were in a hurry and when you have to start from scratch and don't even have a shipbuilding company organized down there, they must organize them and raise the money and then build their plant. That takes too long. We just availed ourselves of existing organizations and yards because we had to have speed. We had nothing against Jacksonville. We would be just as pleased to have our ships built in Jacksonville as in Charleston, but the difference was that Charleston had a yard and Jacksonville didn't. Mr. GREEN. But it would come in, though, under the program for production, more easily and more rapidly than the result of this legislation would bring it to the Great Lakes. Secretary KNOx. Well, we have a good many yards already in existence on the Great Lakes now. There are 14 fairly good yards out there. Mr. GREEN. Now, one further statement which I don't request the Secretary necessarily to answer; it is more of an observation. I was deeply impressed by the Secretary's pronounced statements for economical transportation. That brings to my mind the report of the Army engineers some time ago, favoring a sea level canal across the State of Florida for commerce and for national defense. During those hearings it was developed that this channel would handle twice the commerce that the Panama Canal handles. That came from well-informed witnesses whose integrity and ability could not be impeached. Also it was brought out by defense men, I think one of the best in the country and others who are good, that this Florida ship canal is an essential link in the defense of the Panama Canal and the Caribbean Sea area, and we appreciate the Secretary's frank statement in regard to economic transportation, and I want to say that the Florida Canal fits directly into this picture, and in the event the Florida straits are mined, which they will be and the Panama Canal in peril, which it may be, it would serve a similar purpose of providing communication between the Gulf of Mexico to the Atlantic Ocean just the same as the proposed project before us will serve as a communication from the Great Lakes to the St. Lawrence and the Atlantic. In addition to that it will be an all American construction and American controlled. That is all, Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Beiter. Mr. BEITER. Mr. Secretary, has the Navy Department or any other department, to your knowledge, formulated plans for the defense of the power plants and the new seaway, or estimated the cost of such defense? GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE BASIN 107 Secretary Knox. I would say that would come later. I have known of no such survey. Mr. BEITER. Šo that it is not in the initial cost of the project? Secretary KNOX. No; I should say not. It may be, but I do not think it is. Mr. BEITER. Under modern conditions, Mr. Secretary, of aerial warfare, would not the entire waterway be subject to bombing, with the long-range bombing planes? We are nearer to the Nazis than, say, the Panama Canal, and we have spent many millions of dollars to protect the Panama Canal. And with the long-range bombers they can fly from their base and return to the base without refueling, and would not this be more vulnerable to attack? Secretary Knox. Well, let us get this pretty thoroughly in mind, that there is only one feature of a lock or a canal which is particularly imperiled by bombing from the air, and that is the gates of the locks. They can drop all the bombs into the Panama Canal they want to, and if they do not hit the locks or the gates to the locks, it does not make any difference. It is a pretty small target and not a very easy target to hit. So I would say the danger of aerial bombardment that would put the canal and the locks out of commission is very remote. Mr. BEITER. Yes; but on the other hand, we are spending many millions of dollars to protect the Panama Canal. Secretary KNOX. Well, many millions of dollars to protect some- body from seizing it, but not very many millions of dollars to keep somebody from dropping bombs from the air. You have two locks provided for each passage, and they are building another canal, which will give you two more, and in order to prevent the passage through the canal they would have to hit four gates, and they are a pretty small target from a mile up in the air. Mr. BEITER. Well, has not the War Department recognized the vulnerability of the St. Lawrence area by asking Congress for an appropriation to build a new lock in the St. Marys River and Canal? Secretary KNOX. It may be so, but I do not think that is due to military defense. The CHAIRMAN. I want to suggest to Mr. Beiter that if he will give me a budget of a billion dollars, I will make a sea-level canal out of the Panama Canal. Secretary KNOX. That is right. You know, the Suez Canal has been bombed, and is being bombed almost every day. But it is constantly being cleared, the bombs are just swept out and exploded, and the canal goes back into use again. Mr. CULKIN. May I say to the gentleman from New York that I introduced that resolution with reference to the sea lock, and I did it at the request of Mr. Ralph Budd, who is the transportation man in the Office for Production Management. The CHAIRMAN. And president of one of the big railroads. Mr. CULKIN. And president of one of the big railroads. Mr. BEITER. My attention is directed to the statement of the district engineer which is set forth in the War Department's report, and I quote from it: "It is imperative in the interests of national defense that an additional lock be provided as a precaution against possible interruption of the movement of iron ore and other commodi- ties in Great Lakes commerce essential to national defense that would result from destruction or injury to the existing locks by accident, 108 GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE BASIN sabotage or hostile military action." So he admits that the St. Marys lock would be vulnerable, and that is many, many miles inland as compared with the St. Lawrence waterway. Has the Navy Department not given that consideration? And are there locks? Secretary KNOX. There are three locks; or there used to be three. I think there are four, now. Mr. BEITER. If three or four locks were destroyed, or any one of them, it will bottleneck all of your shipping, if they were destroyed either by sabotage or long-range bombers? Secretary KNOX. Yes. Mr. BEITER. You would have all the boats you contemplate building in the Great Lakes bottlenecked, because there is no other exit? Secretary KNOX. That would not bottleneck, though, the ships built on the Great Lakes, because I don't know whether there is any yard on Lake Superior, and that would only tie up Lake Superior, and that is a rather remote danger to any one of those locks out there. That is a long way from any possible enemy action. I would grant you that there is some risk, obviously some risk, that something might happen to one of the locks or something to tie it up temporarily. Mr. BEITER. Does the Suez have locks like the St. Lawrence? Secretary KNOX. The Suez is a sea-level canal. Mr. BEITER. Sea-level? Secretary KNOX. Yes. Mr. BEITER. Now, in the answer you made before, you probably misunderstood me. I was referring, of course, to the locks in the St. Lawrence seaway. Secretary KNOX. Yes. So was I. Mr. BEITER. Rather than out at Soo. With the large boats you intend to have built in the Great Lakes, and if one of those locks were destroyed, either by sabotage or by bombing, all the boats, the large boats you contend would be built there in the Great Lakes would be bottlenecked, because they have no other exit? Secretary KNOx. That is true. If you bomb the gates, you could not get them out. But I also said, with the locks in mind, that the target is very small and the danger is very remote. Mr. BEITER. Well, admitting that the bombers' targets would be small, but if it was sabotaged? Secretary KNOx. Well, we feel pretty secure down at Panama, and we have got locks there. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, the closest and nearest alien terri- tory from which airplanes might come would be southern Greenland, would it not, to this point? Secretary KNOX. Somewheres off the coast. The CHAIRMAN. About 1,400 miles away? Secretary KNOx. Probably. I don't know how many miles it is. The CHAIRMAN. Yes; about 1,400. Mr. GAVAGAN. Well, Mr. Secretary, is it not good military strategy, after all, to recognize that any possible military objective contains within itself, inherently within itself, possibilities of vulnerability? Secretary KNOX. Oh, you cannot fight a safe war. Mr. GAVAGAN. That is for any object? Secretary KNOX. That goes for anything. Mr. GAVAGAN. Any military objective? GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE BASIN 109 Secretary KNOX. Yes. Mr. BEITER. But, on the other hand, you have to look ahead, Mr. Secretary, and protect the objective from all dangers, do you not? Secretary KNOX. Oh, yes; take measures against that. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Peterson. Mr. PETERSON. I would like to ask a question or two of the Sec- retary. I was very much impressed with your statement in reply to the question of my friend, Congressman Green, of Florida, that the con- tracts for shipbuilding had not been awarded for work to be done at Jacksonville on account of the fact that the facilities were not im- mediately available or that there was not even any organization there for the purpose of accepting the contracts. I would like to call the Secretary's attention to the fact that down in my great State of Georgia we have been clamoring for some time for contracts for shipbuilding, both at Savannah and at Brunswick, and I believe we are the only State touching upon any of the oceans or the Great Lakes that have not had an opportunity to build any ships in this defense program. However, we have organizations that have been in existence for some time down in Savannah, that have furnished to the Navy Department every possible credential that they have asked for, financial and otherwise, and have been begging and pleading for some of these contracts, and so far it appears that our pleas have been in vain. I just wonder about that, Mr. Sec- retary. Secretary KNOX. Well, I am relying on my memory now. But my recollection is those yards in Savannah are very small, are they not? What is the maximum size ship they can build? Mr. PETERSON. Yes; but we have- Secretary KNOx. What is the maximum size ships they have ever built there? Mr. PETERSON. Well, during the World War they built quite a number of ships. I cannot tell you; they are comparatively small, but we have not gotten any contracts for the small ships. Secretary KNOX. I think- Mr. PETERSON. I believe a few days ago, maybe 3 days, maybe three very small mine sweepers, or something was given. Secretary KNOX. Yes; 220-foot long, three mine sweepers to the Savannah Foundry Co. Mr. PETERSON. Yes; you did recently let that contract. But we have another concern down at Savannah that has likewise been begging for contracts. This contract you have let there is for three very small vessels, compared to some of the other ships you are letting contracts for. We have been pleading for contracts and we have given you every assurance that could be requested, and still we have failed to get any. Secretary KNOX. I think that is about a million-dollar contract, Mr. PETERSON. How is that? Secretary KNOX. I think that is about a million-dollar contract that little concern has. Mr. PETERSON. Yes; about a million-dollar contract. Secretary KNOx. About as big as they can handle. 62660—42—pt. 1—8 110 GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE BASIN Mr. PETERSON. Yes; but you have other facilities there, and they have assured you of an ample supply of labor, both skilled labor and common labor, and they have come to Washington and have gone and placed at your disposal all of the information that you have requested and given you everything to meet your requirements, and still it appears that these contracts for ships were given out to the Great Lakes, and these various towns in Georgia are not getting any. Mr. PITTENGER. Not on the Great Lakes. Let us keep the record clear. Mr. PETERSON. And not in Georgia. Secretary KNOx. I want to assure the Congressman that we have not placed the contracts on the basis of anything else than where we could get these ships built first and most efficiently. We have had a business policy which I think the bulk of you will agree with, that we ought to use the facilities in existence before we undertake to develop new facilities which take a long time. Mr. PETERSON. Yes; but, Mr. Secretary, you did let some contracts on that basis? Secretary KNOX. Unfortunately, in one or two instances, and my opinion was right in the first place, that we never should have done it. Mr. PETERSON. Just one question further I would like to ask: Mr. Secretary, do you consider this project which we now have before us as necessary or essential as a part of our present national-defense program? Secretary KNOX. I think it is desirable; it is not vital. Mr. PETERSON. It is not vital? Secretary Knox. It is not vital. We will build our ships on the coast, but we are going in the future to use those regions where we could also build ships with greater security. Mr. PETERSON. Under those circumstances, from a practical stand- point, this Government and its people are being called upon to spend billions and billions and billions of dollars for defense purposes, and we are going out into the highways and byways all over the country pleading with these people to buy our Government bonds to help finance this program and to extend the credit to the Government to the very fullest possible extent and to skimp and save in order that their funds might go into this emergency defense program. Yet we have the Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of War and other leaders who are charged with this program coming in here and asking the people to spend that money for a project which you admit is not necessary or essential to the program. Secretary KNOX. I did not admit that; I did not admit that. Mr. PETERSON. Don't you think- Secretary Knox. I did not say it was not necessary. You have got to use your judgment. Mr. PETERSON. We should display a little more of the same degree of economy we are asking our people to display in promoting this great defense program. Secretary KNOX. You Members of Congress who have the appro- priating authority have got to determine later as to the necessity of this thing. The stress I put was not on immediate results for the construction of combatant ships; it is not that. It is the long-range needs of the country in the kind of a world in which we are sure we are going to have to live in the next generation. GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE BASIN 111 Mr. PETERSON. Yes; but that is what I am getting at. Would you not be, from a long-range development so far as the Navy is concerned would you not be promoting national defense far more by going to your seaboard towns such as Savannah and Brunswick and places which have everything you need available, and helping those people to provide these shipbuilding facilities, rather than going way inland for a few thousand or so miles and spending money on a project which you admit is neither vital nor necessary for the emergency defense program? Secretary KNOx. I do not believe I can add anything to enlighten you on this subject. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Ellis. Mr. ELLIS. Mr. Secretary, I certainly could not agree with my friend from Georgia here about the inadvisability of going inland to do anything. You being a middle westerner and living west of the mountains, are aware of the fact, are aware of the existence of the States of Arkansas and Missouri and some of the other Midwestern States; you know that they are out there? Secretary KNOX. Yes, sir. Mr. ELLIS. Now, of course, if this project is essential to national defense, or if it will help the whole country economically, then we in our section are for it. Secretary KNOX. You are what? Mr. ELLIS. We are for it. Secretary KNOX. For it? Mr. ELLIS. But do you think it would be possible to do any of this shipbuilding up and down the Mississippi River? Secretary KNOX. Yes; I am going to do so. Mr. ELLIS. I hope you do, and more along the eastern border of Arkansas. Secretary KNOX. I cannot answer as to that. The CHAIRMAN. On the Arkansas River. Mr. GREEN. Mr. Secretary, I talked with a Maritime Commission member, and I think he was the head of it, and rehearsed to him the fact we had plenty of facilities_in_the Southeast and plenty of labor and wanted to build boats in Jacksonville, and we had built plenty during the World War, and he said, "You have had plenty, without "" any more. Now, I hope the Secretary of the Navy will take advantage of the fact that he can build some ships at Jacksonville and help us to do it. Secretary KNOx. Now, I will tell you the answer to you and others like you: If you believe in your own regions for shipbuilding pur- poses- Mr. GREEN. I do. Secretary KNOX. Go ahead and organize your companies and build facilities and there will be shipbuilding done next year and the year after and the year after that, and when we are ready for shipbuilding, we will be glad to give you some business. Mr. GREEN. O. K. Mr. GAVAGAN. When you are handing out business, Mr. Secretary, don't forget my district. After all, my district is practically sur- rounded by water. Each morning when I look out, I look upon the "Rhine of America." We have waterways and everything, and no shipbuilding. .. **** 112 GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE BASIN **G*co Secretary KNOx. Anything further? The CHAIRMAN. I hope our committee will not go back into the "pork barrel" days. Mr. PETERSON. I would like to ask the Secretary one further question, in this matter of not letting contracts for shipbuilding on account of the fact that the facilities are not immediately available, and the further information that the Secretary has at last finally agreed to build a million dollars worth of ships in Georgia. Secretary KNOX. A million dollars is a lot of money, even now. Mr. PETERSON. It certainly is, but what about this: Information has just been brought to my attention that there is a concern on the west coast- Secretary KNOX. Where? Mr. PETERSON. On the west coast, that has never built a ship and has no yard, and has received contracts in the amount of approxi- mately $700,000,000. Secretary KNOX. Who is that? Mr. PETERSON. For the building of ships. Secretary KNOX. Who is that? Mr. PETERSON. My information is that the concern is known as the Kiser Co. Secretary KNOX. The Kiser Co.? I don't know; I never heard of that. Mr. CARTER. They are not building for the Navy. They happen to have their shipyards in my district. They have one contract that I know of directly with the British. It is true that they created a yard and are building the ships; the ships are under construction. think they have another contract with the Maritime Commission. Mr. GREEN. Does the Government put up the money? I Mr. CARTER. For the contract? Mr. GREEN. For the shipyards? Mr. CARTER. I do not know that they did. Mr. PETERSON. I would like to know, did they have any shipyards before they got the contract? Mr. CARTER. Before they got the contract from the British, they had no shipyard; but they went ahead and developed a shipyard at Richmond, Calif., and then after that- Mr. PETERSON. Who defrayed the cost of that shipyard? Mr. CARTER. I am unable to answer the gentleman from Georgia as to that; but I am certain that that yard was not financed by any loans from the Government of the United States. I think that was Secretary KNOX. I think that you are correct. financed by the British. Mr. CARTER. Yes; that was financed entirely by the British. Then I believe the gentleman is correct in saying they have another con- tract, and I am sure it is not with the Navy Department, but with the Maritime Commission. Mr. PETERSON. Of course. Mr. ANGELL. Mr. Chairman, this same company also has a yard in my district. They have contracts with the Government, and they have a very efficient organization, perhaps the best in the United States. Secretary KNOX. You are talking about Todd? : GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE BASIN 113 • Mr. ANGELL. The same outfit built Boulder Dam and half a dozen other projects. Mr. PETERSON. I would like to inquire whether they had the facilities for building the ships before they got the contracts. Mr. ANGELL. Probably not, but they had the money and the 'go-getting" to do it, the same as they did 9 or 10 years ago. Mr. PETERSON. Wait a minute. Here we have $700,000,000 worth of contracts that they let along the west coast to people who have no facilities, and yet the Government is turning thumbs down for the companies down along the eastern coast and in the State of Georgia and along the South Atlantic, where they already have facilities and have the organization and have given every assurance. And the Secretary of the Navy is coming in here and boasting of the fact that they have let us have at least that million dollars' worth of contracts, but they give $700,000,000 worth to a concern that has no facilities but was able to pull down the contract and come in. Mr. GREEN. Mr. Peterson, one further observation and I shall have finished: Nine years ago, Mr. Secretary, with all of that vast territory of coast line from Norfolk to the Rio Grande-it is better now, but this is 9 years ago-2 percent of the naval expenditures in the United States went to that vast stretch, and 98 percent went from Norfolk to Maine. 66 Now, then, in these vast projects that are brought in here to expend the Federal funds, in Canada and other places, I believe before more of that is expended, that at least a "widow's mite" should be spent in the southeastern portion of this country. Secretary KNOX. You want me to answer that statement? Mr. GREEN. That was before you were Secretary. You are making a good Secretary, and we are pleased with your career. Secretary KNOX. I would say that there is a lot of merit in what you say. The first concern of you Members, and every Member of Congress, is not where the money is spent, but how efficiently it is spent and how quickly we can get results when the world is on fire. Mr. GREEN. It is on fire now. Mr. CARTER. I understood the gentleman from Georgia to refer to a $700,000,000 contract? Mr. PETERSON. That is my information. Mr. CARTER. Your information is grossly in error. There is no $700,000,000 contract to any firm on the Pacific coast, or any other coast, at the present time. Mr. PETERSON. How much are the contracts with this concern? What is the correct name of this concern? I wanted to get that straight. Mr. BOYKIN. It is Todd. They have a $700,000,000 organization under one name or another. They have those different companies, one named one thing and one named another. Mr. CARTER. We are talking about ships. Mr. BOYKIN. We are talking about this contract on the west coast, and I have a copy. Secretary KNOX. Mr. Chairman, may I be excused? If you want me back, I will be very glad to come. The CHAIRMAN. We will excuse you, Mr. Secretary. Secretary KNOX. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you all, gentlemen. 114 GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE BASIN The CHAIRMAN. We will not have the time to take anyone else and to get through with him before the time we have to adjourn. I suggest that we now adjourn until 2 o'clock. (Whereupon, at 11:30 a. m., a recess was taken until 2 p. m.) AFTER RECESS (The committee reconvened at the expiration of recess, at 2 p. m.) The CHAIRMAN. The first witness this afternoon is Governor Lehman, of New York, and I will request my right-hand bower here, Mr. Gavagan, to preside and introduce the Governor from his State. STATEMENT OF HON. HERBERT H. LEHMAN, GOVERNOR OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK Mr. GAVAGAN. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I feel quite honored on this occasion to preside over the present hearing this afternoon. As you all know, the State of New York has had many great and illustrious governors, and I know of none who has been greater or more illustrious than our present Governor. It is now my great pleasure to introduce to you Governor Lehman, of New York. Governor LEHMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I have a prepared statement which, with your permission, I would like to read. Mr. GAVAGAN. All right. Governor LEHMAN. Chairman Mansfield and gentlemen of the com- mittee, it is a pleasure to appear before you today, in my capacity as Governor of the State of New York, to give hearty support to the pub- lic improvement comprehended in the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence project bill (H. R. 4927). For a generation the State of New York has sought to overcome the difficulties and obstacles which have thus far prevented the public development and use of one of the greatest natural resources of the State, the unharnessed International Rapids of the St. Lawrence River. We take pride in the fact that, as a result of the consistent policy of the State, this rich resource has been conserved and its pri- vate exploitation prevented, so that today it is available for develop- ment to serve urgent public needs in both the United States and Canada in a time of grave emergency. In the course of these hearings, official studies and reports will undubtedly be prepared and presented to the committee on behalf of toe State of New York, which, to my mind, establish beyond dis- puth the need for development of the St. Lawrence River as a valuable aide in our defense program. I leave to those, who have conducted the important studies and who are prepared to discuss them in desail, the presentation of their findings. el wish, however, at this point to direct the attention of the com- mtittee to one supreme consideration in connection with the element of the timing of our national-defense effort. It is becoming increas- ingly evident that the Federal Government and the States must cooperate to anticipate production needs a few years hence and to act now for the intelligent planning and use of our incomparable natural resources, if we are to avert a serious handicap to the whole program. We have been frankly advised and have been put upon T GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE BASIN 115 notice by the highest authorities of our Government, charged with responsibility for the national defense, that we are today faced with existing or threatened shortages in such essential materials and facili- ties as power, aluminum, railroad equipment, steel, and shipping. To every one of these needs the St. Lawrence project will contribute, either directly or indirectly, in a very substantial way. The question, therefore, of sectional, local, or group advantages sinks into insignificance and is entitled to no consideration whatever at a time when we must utilize every means to contribute to the eco- nomic strength and security of our country and to protect our very way of life. Careful study of the impartial and exhaustive reports of the Depart- ment of Commerce and other public agencies which have considered this project convince me that there is no foundation for the claims that the improvement of the St. Lawrence River will have a harmful effect upon our ports or existing transportation facilities. But even if these false and exaggerated fears were in any degree justified, we could not afford to trifle with our country's security by obstruction, on such narrow grounds, of a project which promises to contribute so much to the safety and well-being of the entire Nation. The bill now before the committee contemplates a cooperative enter- prise, in which four sovereignties will undertake to contribute to the success of the project: The Government of the United States, the Dominion of Canada, the Province of Ontario, and the State of New York. Under the terms of the bill, as I interpret them, it is the intention of Congress that the Power Authority of the State of New York, as the accredited public agency of the State, shall be accorded the func- tion of utilizing the United States' share of the flow of the St. Lawrence River for hydroelectric purposes and to exercise ownership, operation, and control over the power project on the New York side of the Inter- national Rapids section upon payment of the costs of construction of the works useful for such production. In this respect, the bill is consistent with the public power policy of the State of New York and with the principles of the Federal-State accord, recognized and maintained by every official agency of the Federal and State Governments which has dealt with the St. Lawrence project from 1933 down to the present time. It may be helpful to the committee to consider briefly the historical background of the Federal-State accord, upon which the State of New York has relied in forwarding its public power program and in accord- ance with which it expects to undertake the responsibilities defined in the terms of the bill now under consideration. The conservation of our power resources under ownership and con- trol of the State has had the support of a long line of the chief execu- tives of New York. Theodore Roosevelt and Charles Evans Hughes warned against the squandering of these resources during their terms of office as governor in the early days of hydroelectric development. Gov. Alfred E. Smith recommended to the legislature that the latent power of the Niagara and the St. Lawrence Rivers be combined under à State authority which should also construct transmission lines and retain control over the distribution of energy at cost to municipalities and load centers throughout the State. It was not until 1931, how- ever, when Gov. Franklin D. Roosevelt secured the passage of the 116 GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE BASIN Power Authority Act that the public power policy of the State of New York was clearly defined and became firmly embedded in the statute law of our State. Passed by a unanimous vote of both branches of the legislature, this act created the first power authority to be set up by any State. The resources of the International Rapids section of the St. Lawrence River are declared by this act to be the inalienable property of the people. The trustees of the power authority were directed by this act to cooperate with our Federal Government to the end that the power project might be constructed jointly in connection with the plans of the United States and Canada for the improvement of the river for navigation. When such plans were furnished by the two Federal Governments in 1932, the State of New York entered into an accord similar to the ar- rangement contemplated by the bill now before this committee. The Dominion Government of Canada and the Provincial Government of Ontario had previously reached an agreement providing that the Province should utilize the Canadian share of the flow of the river through the hydroelectric power commission of that Province.. On February 7, 1933, the United States engineers and the power authority of the State of New York jointly recommended a similar accord, fixing the costs to be assumed by the State in consideration of which the power authority should utilize the United States' share of the flow of water in this section of the river and exercise ownership, operation, and control of the power works to be erected in the State of New York. This report received my approval on February 8, 1938, and upon the recommendation of President Roosevelt was embodied in a joint resolution, House Joint Resolution 157, passed by the United States House of Representatives on April 26, 1933. When the 1932 draft treaty failed to command a two-thirds majority of the Senate in 1934 the resolution did not come to a vote on its merits in the Senate, although it was approved by an overwhelming majority of the Com- mittee on Foreign Relations, including the now senior Senator of the State of New York. During the past 7 years, the State of New York has cooperated. wholeheartedly with President Roosevelt and Secretary of State Hull in their tireless efforts and farsighted plans for the negotiation of a new agreement with Canada which would permit the utilization of the resources of the St. Lawrence River. In messages to the legislature in 1934 I expressed the hope, that in spite of delays, the great public improvement envisaged by the bill before this committee would ultimately be realized. Repeating a recommendation first made in 1933 and since enacted into law, I said, on March 26, 1934, in a special message: This bill * * * is needed in connection with the public development of power on the St. Lawrence River. The development of this power has been temporarily held up, but it is bound to come, because the production of cheap power is of such outstanding and vital interest to the people of the State. For several years before the outbreak of war in Europe the power authority in its annual reports to the legislature again and again recommended the immediate development of the St. Lawrence on the express ground that its production was required to prevent short- ages and to serve future needs for national defense. Had these warn- ings by our power authority been heeded, in accordance with the GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE BASIN 117 recommendations of President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull, the St. Lawrence River would now be providing 2,200,000 horsepower of the cheapest electricity in the world to industries and domestic consumers in the most populous areas of the United States and Canada. More- over, the shipbuilding facilities of the Great Lakes would today be employed to their full capacity for the construction of needed mer- chant and naval craft with adequate channels provided for their passage through the St. Lawrence to the sea. The exceptional character of the St. Lawrence as a resource readily available for development both for navigation and power has, I am sure, been brought to the attention of this committee in numerous official reports. In many surveys of the United States engineers the soundness and engineering practicability of the joint development has been clearly established. In numerous reports since 1934, which will no doubt be produced at these hearings, the Federal Power Com- mission has repeatedly emphasized, in its recommendation to the President and the Congress, the value and importance of the power development under the laws of the State of New York. The Com- mission reported in 1934 that the Power Authority Act of 1931— was the fruition of 25 years of effort to provide for development of St. Lawrence power by the State in the public interest. Licenses had been sought by private corporations for the right to exploit the power resources in the international rapids section, but such applications were rejected by both State and Federal agencies. * * * Authoritative forecasts of the electrical industry itself, tending to support the conclusions derived from analysis of the trends in the production and consumption of electricity, present incontrovertible evidence that the market for St. Lawrence power will be ready before the project itself can be completed. Operating in accordance with the purpose laid down for it by the New York Legislature, its influence in the direction of lower domestic and rural rates will be a force tending to promote this expansion in the market for electricity. Your honorable committee has also heretofore taken cognizance of the peculiar advantages and public benefits which would derive from proceeding immediately with the St. Lawrence development. On November 22, 1937, the power authority of the State of New York submitted to me a report which analyzed the costs of steam power in comparison with the hydroelectric power available from the great public projects contemplated by the Federal Government or under construction on the St. Lawrence, the Colorado, and the Columbia Rivers. This report was transmitted by the President to the chair- man, Mansfield, for your consideration and by action of the committee was published as House Document No. 52, Seventy-fifth Congress, second session. From this report I quote: The St. Lawrence River power development on the United States side of the boundary will be owned and operated by the Power Authority as trustee for the people of New York State. It has been included (in this report), however, because it is an important part of the general Government power program which contem- plates State and municipal development where public agencies have been created for the purpose. In 1938 Secretary of State Hull succeeded in reopening negotiations with Canada looking toward the immediate development of the International Rapids section. It was the privilege of the State of New York to cooperate fully with Secretary Hull and to submit plans under which the State might participate on an equal footing with the Prov- ince of Ontario in the completion of the power development, to be 1 118 GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE BASIN under taken in connection with the navigation plans of the two Federal Governments. In my message to the legislature on January 14, 1941, I reviewed the successful outcome of these discussions, culminating in the fall of 1941 with the start of preliminary engineering work at the New York site of the proposed development on the St. Lawrence. On that occasion I said: I believe the development and utilization of St. Lawrence power is an urgent necessity. Because of this belief I conferred last summer with the trustees of the power authority and thereafter presented to the President proposals looking toward the immediate undertaking of the St. Lawrence development. I pointed out that, in my opinion, there was authority for initiating the project under the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909 and recommended that preliminary engineering work be started at once. On October 16, the President, by Executive order, appointed the St. Lawrence Advisory Committee, directing it to proceed with the preliminary work and allo- cated $1,000,000 for the task. In the selection of this committee, the interests of the State of New York were again recognized by the appointment of a representative of the trustees of the power authority * * * * * * * * * Thus, the four governments directly concerned with the project in the Inter- national Rapids section are today working in harmony to make the development serve public needs on both sides of the border I consider New York's continued active collaboration in the work of great importance. I hope that favorable congressional action will be forthcoming as soon as final agreement with Canada is reached so that the low cost of power of the St. Law- rence can contribute at as early a date as possible in furthering the social well- being and economic betterment of all the people of the State of New York. The agreement between the United States and Canada covered by the present bill was signed on March 19, 1941. On the same day, tue Dominion Government and the Government of the Province of Ontario entered into a collateral agreement renewing in all important respects the Dominion-Provincial Accord of July 11, 1932. The present bill likewise applies the same method of allocation of costs as between our Federal Government and the State of New York as con- tained in the joint recommendation of the power authority and the United States engineers dated February 7, 1932, and fixes the costs to be assumed by the State of New York at $93,375,000. I consider the maintenance of the Federal-State accord and the allocation of costs arrived at by the engineers and fixed in this bill, subject to the approval of Congress and the legislature, an arrange- ment which is advantageous and equitable alike to the Federal Gov- ernment and to the State of New York. By this division of costs, the Federal expenditure for navigation will be reduced to less than $200,- 000,000. Similarly, the establishment of these costs enables the State to plan in advance for the efficient conduct of the self-liquidating power project for which it is to assume the responsibilities of ownership and operation. I have already signified to the President that promptly after the authorization by the Congress of the development we shall be prepared to proceed with arrangements for the State's active par- ticipation in this joint enterprise, subject to approval at the next sessions of the Congress and the legislature. I do not need to emphasize before this committee the value of the accords embodied in the agreements and recommendations of the past 10 years, in which the Government of the United States, the Dominion of Canada, the State of New York, and the Province of Ontario have joined. The character of the St. Lawrence as one of the R GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE BASIN 119 great international rivers of the world necessarily requires the free cooperation of the four sovereignties involved to insure its successful development in the public interest. Since 1934, profound changes have occurred in the conditions affecting the improvement of this international stream. Today, the United States and Canada are linked by insoluble bonds in the com- mon defense of democracy on this continent. The power and trans- portation facilities which this project will afford will serve the common needs of the people of both countries. Moreover, the military, naval, and air bases now shared by the two countries at the mouth of the St. Lawrence River serve to protect our populous centers of industry on the east coast as well as the interior sections of both the United States and Canada. Once completed, this great project will promote the social and economic welfare of the democratic people of the North American continent for all time to come. In spite of the critical problems this Nation must face in a world at war, we know that democracy in the end will triumph and that the ruthless destruction wrought by dictator- ship will pass. Amidst all the uncertainties of the future we at least know this, that the enormous costs we have been obliged to assume to make this country impregnable against attack must one day be paid out of the productive wealth of the entire Nation. To the extent that we act now to provide for the efficient utilization of our natural resources, we shall succeed in lightening that burden and protect, as we must, the standards of living of the American people. I know that we may look to this committee which has perfected the legislation under which vast constructive improvements in all parts of our country have been achieved, for the action necessary to permit us to go forward with the use of our resources, to serve the needs of our people in the present emergency and in the years to come. In that great effort, I am happy to assure you of the wholehearted cooperation of the State of New York. Mr. GAVAGAN. Governor, on behalf of the committee I would like to express my appreciation and our appreciation for the comprehen- sive and statesmanlike statement. Now, Governor, there has been quite some opposition to the project based upon the argument that its ultimate development will ruin the commerce of the eastern seaboard. So, undoubtedly you, as the Governor of New York, have given that subject full consideration. Would you at this time care to explain your opinion thereon in more detail? Governor LEHMAN. Well, a very comprehensive study of the effect that this development would have on the commerce of the ports on the eastern coast has, of course, been prepared by the Department of Commerce. I am sure that the members of the committee have seen that report and will familiarize themselves with it. That report goes into very great detail. It gives many figures and meets the situation in a technical way. I do, however, want to make this general observation. I start with the premise that the development of this project, both for navigation and hydroelectric power, will be of great benefit, not only to the mid- Atlantic States, the State of New York and the other States, but to the country as a whole. It will open new markets to the Midwest; - 120 GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE BASIN it will open up new markets to New England, I believe, and to a considerable portion of the southern coast. It will provide cheap power for the most populous area in the United States. Now, the ports that believe they will be the most affected are the port of New York and the port of Buffalo, and I am going to address myself to those particular ports. The port of Buffalo, I think, is fearful that it is going to lose some of its transshipment grain trade. It may be possible that in a minor degree the port of Buffalo will lose some of that transshipment trade. But I think the advantages that will go to Buffalo will far overbalance that possible loss. Buffalo will, immediately on the completion of this project, become what is in effect a salt-water port, and if they object to being made a salt-water port I think it will be the first instance of any large city objecting to that very great benefit. Buffalo-and when I talk about Buffalo, I of course mean the entire frontier section-is a great manufacturing area. It has to bring in its raw materials. Those raw materials to the south have to be brought in by rail or over the barge canal, which is a very slow and cumbersome process. Under this plan, raw materials can be brought to the frontier section from any part of the world, readily and speedily. Buffalo takes those raw materials and converts them into manu- factured articles. It is a great manufacturer of bulk goods, machinery, flour, chemicals, abrasives and articles of that sort. For that it has a limited market, because it has no means of cheap transportation. With this seaway, I believe Buffalo could take the raw materials which will be brought into it in part through this method, convert them into manufactured articles, and distribute them in a far wider market than they possibly can now. Buffalo today cannot compete so far as steel and iron and similar goods are concerned, with the enter- prises now on the Pacific coast. I believe that under this they may be able to do it. Certainly they can compete and certainly they can broaden their markets by far lower costs in other parts of the country, many other parts of the country. Now, so far as the port of New York is concerned, this report of the Department of Commerce shows in a very exhaustive examination and discussion that in all probability the port of New York will lose 1,800,000 tons of foreign shipping in a normal year, although there are great fluctuations. The fluctuation of the foreign-borne trade of New York has been as much as from fifteen to thirty million tons in different years. Now, that is about 8 percent of the foreign-borne traffic of New York City. It is less than 6 percent of the total water- borne traffic of New York City. Now, I believe New York, too, will have advantages which will fully compensate for that loss of a relatively small part of their foreign- borne commerce. It, too, will have a far wider distribution. It will secure very materially lower costs of power and it will gain in the general prosperity that has been created throughout the country by this development. And I am convinced that the prosperity of the country as a whole-I am not thinking only of New York State-will be enhanced by this undertaking. New York City is the greatest financing and the greatest trading center of the world. The prosperity of New York City does not depend so much upon the prosperity of the GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE BASIN 121 small territory contiguous to New York City as it depends upon the prosperity of the entire country. And if the country's prosperity can be increased, then the prosperity of New York City will be greatly advanced. I believe, for the reasons I have given you and for many more reasons discussed in a much more comprehensive way in the report of the Department of Commerce, that this development, both navigation and power, will be a real advantage both to Buffalo and to New York, and I am certain will be of equal advantage to the ports like Boston and Philadelphia and Baltimore and possibly some of the ports even farther south. Mr. GAVAGAN. Thank you. Does any member of the committee wish to ask any questions? Mr. Chairman? The CHAIRMAN. Governor, you referred to the fact that the findings of the Department of Commerce show that a small percentage of tonnage, for instance, handled at the Port of New York, may be diverted from it. Is it not a fact that Buffalo would reap a part of that benefit, if such is the case? Governor LEHMAN. I think that is very possibly so. The CHAIRMAN. That is all. Mr. BEITER. Would you elaborate on that, Mr. Chairman? How do you mean? Mr. CARTER. Just a minute, Mr. Beiter; I want to ask some questions. Mr. BEITER. All right. Mr. CARTER. Governor, you spoke of $93,375,000 as the pro rata power cost to be borne by the State of New York, I believe. Do you mean that this is borne directly by the State of New York, or is this the New York Power Commission. Governor LEHMAN. I cannot answer that question in detail, of course, until I know what agreement will be entered into between the Federal Government and the State of New York covering the ownership and operation of the power. I can say this to you, that it will not be a direct obligation of the State of New York. Under our constitution, the credit of the State of New York could not be placed behind this project, save on a vote of the people and an amendment to the constitution. Mr. CARTER. The bill, Governor, I might say, on page 3 refers to the Power Authority of the State of New York. Is that Power Authority in existence at the present time? Governor LEHMAN. Yes, sir; it has been in existence since 1931, continuously. Mr. CARTER. Is it operating any power projects at the present time? Governor LEHMAN. No; it is not. It was set up specifically for the purpose of aiding in the development of the St. Lawrence project. Also, mention is made in the act of the development of the power on the Niagara. Mr. CARTER. Well, then, so far as you know, it has no money in its treasury at the present time? Governor LEHMAN. It has no money whatsoever. The way this would be financed- Mr. CARTER. And has it the power or authority to levy taxes; if you know, Governor? 122 GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE BASIN Governor LEHMAN. Well, it has no power to levy taxes, but it has power to levy tolls; it has the power, not only the power, but the direction, to levy tolls and charges sufficient to care for the fixed charges and other expenses. Mr. CARTER. That is, tolls and charges for electric energy delivered? Governor LEHMAN. That is right. Mr. CARTER. Well, where do they propose to get the $93,375,000 with which to finance this power project? Governor LEHMAN. Well, they could get it in one of two ways; either through a yearly appropriation by the legislature, which the legislature of course would have the right to make, but which would have to be made on an annual basis, obviously, or they would have power to sell their own bonds, either to the public or deliver them to the Federal Government in payment for the expenditures made by the Federal Government. Congressman, it is not very different from what we have been doing with a great many different projects. Mr. ČARTER. Those are revenue bonds, I suppose, Governor? Governor LEHMAN. That is quite true. Mr. CARTER. And it would be based just on the revenues to be obtained from the power which would be furnished here out of this project that was built by the Federal Government? Governor LEHMAN. That is quite true. Mr. CARTER. Then we would have this situation, would we not, Governor: We would have the Federal Government_building this power plant and turning over the energy to a New York Power Author- ity, and the New York Power Authority is selling that energy or issuing bonds against the revenue that energy produces and taking that from those funds. Well, now, as a businessman, if money could be made that way, would it not be good business for the Government to sell that power? Governor LEHMAN. Which government are you referring to? Mr. CARTER. The Federal Government. Governor LEHMAN. Well- Mr. CARTER. Rather than turn it over to the New York Power Authority? Governor LEHMAN. Well, of course we have always maintained, and I believe very soundly, that the power on the St. Lawrence River which touches the State of New York belongs to the State of New York. That title or claim to ownership has never been questioned. so far as I know. Mr. CARTER. You have never waived it? Governor LEHMAN. We certainly have never waived it. Mr. CARTER. And you do not propose to waive it now? Governor LEHMAN. We do not. Mr. GAVAGAN. New York is still a sovereign State. Mr. CARTER. Well, I just want to know what the explanation is. Governor LEHMAN. Surely. Mr. CARTER. Eventually, Governor, I shall have to vote on this question, one way or the other, and I would like to know, Mr. Gavagan, what I am voting for, if I may find out. Mr. GAVAGAN. You seem to have some doubt as to New York's sovereignty. GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE BASIN 123 Mr. CARTER. Oh, no; I am not doubting that. But they might waive or dispose of certain of their rights, if they desire to do so. Mr. GAVAGAN. Only for the general good. We never surrender, Governor, only for the general good. Governor LEHMAN. We have not only never waived it, but we have asserted that sovereignty many times. Mr. CARTER. Governor, you are waiving a right here in this; you are waiving your undoubted right to build this power plant, and you are willing to waive that and place that burden on the Federal Gov- ernment. I am wondering, just as a matter of information, how you are going to work it out; whether the profits, if any, from this project, from the power end of the project, would go into the treasury of New York Power Authority, or whether it is going into the Treasury of the United States. Governor LEHMAN. I quite understand- Mr. CARTER. And according to your answer, the profits, if any, are to go into the New York Power Authority. Governor LEHMAN. Oh, I quite understand now what has confused you, and if I might explain it, I would be glad to do it. Mr. CARTER. Yes. Governor LEHMAN. There will be no profits on this, on the sale of this power. That is clearly understood. Mr. CARTER. Well, you do not mean to imply there will be a loss, do you, Governor? Mr. CULKIN. I suggest that the Governor be permitted to finish his statement. Governor LEHMAN. I should certainly hope that there would be no loss. We would be required to operate this project so as to derive sufficient revenue to pay the debt service and the operating charges of the operation. But undoubtedly a provision will be made a part of the agreement entered into between the Federal Government and the State of New York, which cannot become effective except by the affirmative approval of the Congress of the United States, that this power has to be sold at the lowest possible price and without any profit whatsoever, to either the Power Authority or the State of New York. Mr. CARTER. Would the rates be fixed by your board there; I don't know whether you call it the railroad commission, or what? Governor LEHMAN. No; it would be fixed by the Power Authority. Mr. CARTER. The Power Authority? Governor LEHMAN. Yes. Mr. CARTER. Which would mean that it would be fixed by the New York Power Authority, that is selling the power? Governor LEHMAN. Well, it would be fixed by the Power Authority subject, of course, to the provisions contained in the agreement entered into between the Federal Government and the State of New York. If I may refer for a moment to the bill, this is section 2: SEC. 2. The President is hereby authorized and directed to negotiate an arrange- ment with the Power Authority of the State of New York for the transfer to said Power Authority of the power facilities constructed pursuant to this authorization and the right to use the United States' share of the waters at the project for hydroelectric power purposes upon such terms and conditions as may be agreed upon, including provision for payment of $93,375,000, which represents the revised estimate of cost allocated to power in accordance with the method of allocation included in the joint recommendation of the Corps of Engineers— 124 GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE BASIN And then it goes on, at the end of the section: The arrangement negotiated pursuant to this section shall be reported to Congress upon the convening of its next session, and shall become effective when ratified by Congress and the State of New York. Now, Congressman, it is not possible for me to tell you just what the effect of such agreement would be. It would be a matter of nego- tiation between the President and the Power Authority of New York. But whatever that agreement is, it will be subject to ratification by the Congress and by the Legislature of the State of New York. Mr. CARTER. That is all, Mr. Chairman. Mr. SMITH. I understood you to say that in 1934, at the time the treaty was reported favorably by the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Senate, the senior Senator from the State of New York joined in that favorable report; is that right? Governor LEHMAN. That is my understanding. Mr. SMITH. Has Senator Wagner changed his views since, or is he still in favor of it? Governor LEHMAN. I cannot speak for Senator Wagner; I don't know.. Mr. SMITH. I have been informed that he was not in favor of it. That is why I ask. Governor LEHMAN. Of course, I could not speak for the Senator. Mr. CULKIN. I understand, or the last report is, that Senator Wagner has some substantial reservations on the navigation; that is the report I get. Mr. SMITH. If I may, I would like to ask what is the attitude of the junior Senator? Mr. CULKIN. I could not speak for him. Mr. Beiter is here. ment. Mr. BEITER. In a public statement issued last week, the junior Senator opposed the St. Lawrence seaway, and the senior Senator in 1934 led the fight in opposition to the seaway and the power develop- I believe at that time he stated if the power and the seaway could be separated, if the power project could be separated from the seaway project, that he would favor the power project. I think that is the contention of both Senators today, and the majority of the Members of Congress, if the seaway could be separated from the power project, the members would be for the power project. But they are opposed to the seaway. The CHAIRMAN. You are not speaking for all the Members? Mr. BEITER. No. Mr. GAVAGAN. It is an academic discussion, because the Senators will be able to disperse their views, whatever their opinions may be. I do not think it is binding upon us. Are there any further questions? Mr. SMITH. I would like to ask one additional question, and that is this: Do you consider, Governor, that the railroads of New York have valid grounds for their opposition to this project? Governor LEHMAN. I do not. I do not think that it will hurt the railroads, if my vision of the development of this country, both because of this defense movement in which we are involved and because of the natural growth of the country, is correct. I believe that there will be a great increase in the need for transportation. I believe that today there is a great shortage of transportation facilities in this country, GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE BASIN 125 which will become worse. I believe that this shortage can only be met by a development providing new facilities. I think it is going to be very difficult for the railroad companies to obtain through their own resources the equipment that will be necessary to increase their transportation facilities, unless they come into direct competition with many of our defense industries now engaged in the production of war matériel. Mr. SMITH. Is it not possible the railroads might benefit from the opening up of these new markets? Governor LEHMAN. I quite agree with you on that. Mr. SMITH. Thank you. Mr. GAVAGAN. Judge Culkin? Mr. CULKIN. Governor, may I congratulate you, as a member of the minority here, on your able and patriotic and clear discussion of this St. Lawrence issue. The gentleman from California recently discussed with you this question, and he seemed to have a dual solicitude for the fate of the State of New York and the United States Government. I was asking, or I was going to ask you, Governor, if you have any knowledge of any project, any power or navigation project, now completed or under construction in the United States, where the State or locality had agreed to pay the entire cost of the power installation? Do you know of any such project? Governor LEHMAN. I do not. Mr. CULKIN. New York pays about 25 percent of the taxes, nationally? Governor LEHMAN. I think that is approximately correct. Mr. CULKIN. And it might perhaps be better for the State to ask for the Government to do this, in view of the rather heavy penalty or payment to the national revenues. Such a proposition was once ratified by the Congress, whereby the State of New York agreed to pay at that time some $89,000,000 toward the construction of the power structure, the expenses of the power structure. That amount now, I understand, is $93,000,000? Governor LEHMAN. A little over $93,000,000. Mr. CULKIN. And that includes the construction of the power structures; does it not? Governor LEHMAN. It includes all the structures that are used in the development of the power, the powerhouse. Mr. CULKIN. Yes. Governor LEHMAN. It does not include the transmission lines. Mr. CULKIN. But you understand that New York, in the old agreement, and now, is prepared, subject to proper requisition by the legislature, to pay $93,000,000 of the expense of the power structures? Governor LEHMAN. I do, in the manner that I described to the gentleman from California. Mr. CULKIN. Yes; now, New York State is still solvent, and sov- ereign, I assume, as suggested by our distinguished acting chairman. Governor LEHMAN. I think so. Mr. CULIKN. What are you selling bonds at up there now, what is the rate of interest? Governor LEHMAN. I think that our last sale was at a rate under 1½ percent per annum. Mr. CULKIN. And you got the money for that in the local market? 62660-42-pt. 1— -9 126 GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE BASIN Governor LEHMAN. Yes; all our sales are. Mr. CULKIN. So it seems that New York credit is a tangible and moving asset. When it goes out to raise money, it has no difficulty in getting sufficient money. It is in a high stage of solvency? Governor LEHMAN. I think it is. I think we have maintained our financial position very well over many years. Mr. CULKIN. And as to any obligation, it not only can but will perform all obligations incident to this matter? Governor LEHMAN. Well, I want to make this point clear, so that there will be no misunderstanding on the part of you gentlemen: The State of New York would not put its own credit back of this undertaking. It cannot do that, under its constitution. Mr. CULKIN. Yes. Governor LEHMAN. What we would do would be to put up, subject to the approval of the legislature, either annual appropriations suffi- cient to care for these needs or the issuance of revenue bonds created by the Power Authority under the authority of the legislature. In exactly the same way as we have done in any number of other under- takings. Mr. CULKIN. Well, now, the New York Harbor Authority; what is that? Governor LEHMAN. The port authority. Mr. CULKIN. The port authority. That is an instance of the pro- cedure that is suggested to follow. That outfit built the tunnels under the rivers there? Governor LEHMAN. That is right; and bridges. Mr. CULKIN. And it built bridges and made some harbor improve- ments of various sorts, and solved various transportation problems through this outfit, this agency? Governor LEHMAN. That is right. Mr. CULKIN. And that outfit has the power to issue bonds for that purpose? Governor LEHMAN. That is right. Mr. CULKIN. And does continually issue bonds for that purpose? Governor LEHMAN. That is right; yes; at a very low rate of interest. Mr. CULKIN. What is the rate of interest now? Governor LEHMAN. Well, I think somewhere, I think slightly over 2 percent, between 2 and 2½ percent; but I am not quite certain about the exact figure. Mr. CULKIN. As I understand now, the amount has now gone to $93,000,000? Governor LEHMAN. $93,375,000. Mr. CULKIN. And that is an increase of about $4,000,000 or so, over the former cost; and that increase is due to the engineers' estimates on the increased cost of building now, due to that increased cost of building the power plant? Governor LEHMAN. Yes; that is my understanding. Mr. CULKIN. I think that is all. Mr. GAVAGAN. Mr. Schulte. Mr. SCHULTE. Mr. Chairman, I wish to join with my good friend from New York in complimenting the Governor on his contribution here this afternoon in the fight that he is putting up for the great State of New York in trying to get them cheap power and electricity. I can appreciate that kind of fight and how in the Midwest my people GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE BASIN 127 1 would enjoy that, coming from out of the city of Chicago where, of course, we are dominated by the so-called Power Trust. Now, getting back to Buffalo: I am just wondering now if my good friend from Buffalo-Mr. Beiter-is not going to gain this advantage, whatever may be lost to the port of New York, would be to the ad- vantage of the port of Buffalo; is that right? Governor LEHMAN. No; I do not think so. I think that they both will gain; but I do not think that the one will necessarily gain at the loss of the other. Mr. SCHULTE. Well, I am just now thinking of the Middle West, around Chicago, Gary, and that great steel center there. So, the only gain that we could make by the development of this sea- way would be by taking a chance on the building of ships, seagoing vessels, in the Middle West; is that right? Governor LEHMAN. I do not think so. I think that there will be great advantage to the Middle West. I think it would immediately- you want my answer to that specific question? Mr. SCHULTE. Yes; I do. Governor LEHMAN. I think the Middle West would gain by the opening up of vast new markets. I think it would certainly gain in the form of trade very greatly, because today it cannot possibly ex- port some of its goods profitably through using a port on the Atlantic coast and bringing the goods there by train. That is an expensive proposition. Mr. SCHULTE. I appreciate that, Governor, and that is a thought that a great many of our folks have back in the Middle West. We are very much concerned about this, because we are under the im- pression that it is going to be immeasurably beneficial to us. There is no question about that. But the point that I am making here is really that the benefactors of this are going to be the folks through New York State and in the State of Ohio and in there, by virtue of the fact that they are going to have this utility such as power that they are going to get at cost and still have an opportunity to build ships at the ports. Governor LEHMAN. Well, my answer to that is that I believe that the development will be of very great and immediate advantage to a large area. I say an immediate advantage, because though I think it will be of advantage to the entire Nation, it will be of immediate advantage, I believe, to the Middle West. I think it will be an advantage to the Middle Atlantic States, the New England States, and New York and the entire area, that is, within a reasonable distance of this development. Mr. SCHULTE. I am mighty happy to hear you make that state- ment, coming from the great State you do. You feel that the Middle West in particular is going to be bene- fited, and I want you to express your thought there, in view of the fact that several of the small chambers of commerce bordering on the Lakes are very much for this, but peculiar as it may seem, the Indiana State Chamber of Commerce went on record opposing the building of this project. Mr. CULKIN. Will the gentleman yield? Mr. SCHULTE. Yes. Mr. CULKIN. How many members of the board of directors of the chamber of commerce were present when they voted? 128 GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE BASIN Mr. SCHULTE. I am not a member of that body, I will say to my good friend. I have kept my skirts clean that far. Mr. CULKIN. Do you suppose that there were more than three or four in all, representatives of the railroads? Mr. SCHULTE. I have reported, and I will say again to my good friend, I do not have to be absolved of that; that is all. The CHAIRMAN. Your skirts are clear. Mr. SCHULTE. They have opposed every development that has been of beneficial interest to the people back in my State. I am through, Mr. Chairman. Mr. GAVAGAN. Mr. Pittenger. Mr. PITTENGER. I compliment the Governor for his contribution. I have no further questions. Mr. GAVAGAN. Does the gentleman from Florida have any ques- tions? Mr. GREEN. No questions. Mr. GAVAGAN. Mr. Bell. Mr. BELL. Mr. Chairman, Governor, I would like to ask you to give me a little information further as to how you think the develop- ment of the St. Lawrence will affect commerce out in the Middle West. Have you in mind Chicago in that area out there when you speak of the Middle West, or are you including the area down to the Gulf of Mexico? Governor LEHMAN. Well, of course, that is also a question that has been the subject of a survey by the Department of Commerce and which has gone into it exhaustively, I am told. I can only make this observation. It seems to me that the entire Middle West territory starting with Lake Superior, Lake Michigan, Lake Huron, Lake Erie, will benefit by this project because it is not only going to open new markets to them, but it is also going to mean that they will secure their raw materials much more readily, and cheaply. It seems to me obvious that that part of the country is very much circumscribed now in their transportation facilities, and this will certainly open up a new transportation channel, both for incoming and outgoing freight. Mr. BELL. What would you say as to this situation, Governor, the section located, we will say, from Kansas City and Missouri on south where the distance would be as great to Chicago, we will say, which might be the nearest ocean-going port after the St. Lawrence water- way is developed, where the distance from Chicago would be as great as it will be to the Gulf of Mexico, which now has contact with the open ocean. Would you say that there would be any benefit to that section of the Midwest? Governor LEHMAN. I would hesitate to express myself further, on the technical details of rates. I do not feel qualified to do so. Mr. ANGELL. Mr. Chairman: Governor Lehman, am I correct in my understanding that your position is that the State of New York claims title to this power? Governor LEHMAN. That is correct. Mr. ANGELL. Are there any other large hydroelectric projects in the United States developed by the Federal Government where the States in which they lie claim the ownership of the power? GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE BASIN 129 Governor LEHMAN. I cannot answer that question. I do not know the history of it. Mr. ANGELL. Do you know of any projects where the State has asserted ownership? Governor LEHMAN. I do not know. I cannot say whether they have or have not. I really have no knowledge of that. Mr. ANGELL. Is it your understanding in connection with navigable waterways where they are developed by the Federal Government for transportation purposes and that the power developed as incidental to the improvement of navigation becomes the property of the State in which it is located? Governor LEHMAN. Well, the State of New York has always asserted that position, and that goes back away before my time. Mr. CULKIN. Will the gentleman yield? Mr. ANGELL. Yes. Mr. CULKIN. May I call the gentleman's attention to the provision on page 3 of the pending bill where it recites that an agreement shall be made upon the recommendation of the Corps of Engineers and the Power Authority of the State of New York with reference to the pay- ment which is, I think, generally agreed upon as being now about $93,000,000, and then it goes on, in line 9, page 3: In addition, the arrangement shall include provisions protecting the interests of the United States and assuring a widespread equitable distribution of the power to domestic and rural consumers within economic transmission distances, and pro- visions for the prior use of such water for the purposes of navigation and the delivery, without charge to the War Department, of so much power as said Depart- ment shall need for the operation of navigation facilities. The arrangement ñego- tiated pursuant to this section shall be reported to Congress upon the convening of its next session, and shall become effective when ratified by Congress and the State of New York. Now, the gentleman will note that the Congress reserves or requires in this bill provision for the protecting of the interests of the United States and assuring widespread equitable distribution of power. That is more or less parallel, I mean, to the general facts to the Bonne- ville arrangement. Mr. ANGELL. If I may say to my colleague from New York, that does not reach the question I have in mind, and that is the question of ownership; who owns the title to the power developed in the project, which is on the navigable waterway developed by the Federal Govern- ment for navigation purposes. That power is incidental to the development of the waterway for navigation, and my understanding is that it has always been claimed by the Federal Government. There is no claim in my State upon the Bonneville project that the State owns the power, so far as I know. The Federal Government did not consult the State as to what should be done with the power. The Federal Government claims, so far as I understand, complete control and ownership over the power develop- ment on navigable waterways, which is incidental to the improvement of navigation. Governor LEHMAN. Of course, we have never asserted any rights with regard to navigation. New York has always recognized, in view of the fact that the St. Lawrence River is the boundary between two countries, that the control of navigation on the St. Lawrence is a Federal function; but we always have claimed title to the power that would come from the flow of the river. 130 GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE BASIN Now, so far as I know the question of those rights has never been adjudicated by any high court. What position the Supreme Court would take in connection with our assertion of rights, I do not know. I would hope that they would sustain it. Certainly President Roose- velt, when he was governor, asserted that right on many occasions, as did all of his predecessors so far as I know. Mr. ANGELL. Governor, let me ask you. The CHAIRMAN. Will the gentleman from Oregon yield to me? Mr. ANGELL. Certainly. The CHAIRMAN. I will state that in the construction of the works at Bonneville, for instance, our committee had charge of that, the State of Oregon, neither the State of Oregon nor Washington paid any portion of the costs of that work. In this case, if New York gets the power she pays that portion of the cost. Mr. ANGELL. That is quite true, but that is clearly aside from the point, if I may say so. Mr. SMITH. The State reimburses merely the outlay. Mr. ANGELL. The question here is who owns the power, whether it is the State of New York or the Federal Government. That is an important inquiry for this committee and it is important for us to know in determining what we shall do on the bill. If we develop and sell to the State of New York, that is one thing. If the Federal Government owns it, it does not necessarily have to consult the State of New York as to what to do with it. It does not need to enter into any agreement with New York. The Federal Government is amply able, I hope, to finance its own projects without considering New York or any other State. Mr. CULKIN. Do you not think that the State of New York is interested to the extent of $93,000,000? I just read the gentleman the section that shows that the Federal Power Authority, I think that is the body, or the engineers, reserve the right to protect the interests of the United States, and assuring a widespread equitable division. Mr. ANGELL. But they have no right to reserve that if the State of New York owns the power. Mr. CULKIN. That is a complete reservation in this bill. Governor LEHMAN. Well, so far as making reservations or condi- tions are concerned, I have no doubt the United States Government has the right to do that if it enters into a contract with the State of New York. Whether the State of New York would be satisfied with those conditions, I do not know, of course, until I see them. Mr. ANGELL. Unquestionably the Federal Government can enter into such an arrangement with the State of New York whether the State owns the power or the Federal Government owns the power, but the point we are pursuing, and I am particularly interested in now, is who owns that power, whether the State of New York or whether the Federal Government owns it. Governor LEHMAN. May I answer that? Mr. ANGELL. Certainly. Governor LEHMAN. The State of New York has always asserted its right to the power on the St. Lawrence. The ownership of the power, so far as I know-I am not a lawyer— has never been determined by the higher courts of the United States, and I have, of course, no more knowledge than you have as to what GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE BASIN 131 such determination would be, but certainly it would seem perfectly practical for the Federal Government to enter into a contract with the State of New York on terms satisfactory to the Federal Govern- ment and to the State of New York. Mr. ANGELL. A question somewhat similar is being raised in legis- lation appearing before the Congress now wherein the question is raised as to whether the Federal Government has the ownership to oil rights under lands which are in beds of navigable streams and along the oceanway within the 3-mile limit. The Supreme Court, however, has passed on that directly in a number of cases, holding that it belongs to the State in which these waterways are situated and not the Federal Government; but that is not an incident of navigation. The CHAIRMAN. May I ask a question there? Mr. ANGELL. Yes, Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. The power that is developed in Niagara, under treaty with Canada wherein the United States gets 20,000 and Canada 36,000 cubic feet, to whom does that power belong; does that belong to the State of New York or the Federal Government? Governor LEHMAN. Well, that is a complicated situation, Mr. Chairman, because away back in 1894 the Legislature of the State of New York passed certain legislation which it is claimed alienated the right to that power from the State of New York and gave it to private owners. The additional flow which was given, I think something like 20 years ago, and which, if my memory serves me right, amounts to about 4,500 cubic feet for the State of New York, was made the basis of a rental charge. Permits were issued by the Federal Government under the treaty with Canada and on that the State of New York gets an annual income amounting to between four and five hundred- The CHAIRMAN (interposing). That is developed by private in- dustry. Governor LEHMAN. That is developed by private industry under a license from the Federal Power Commission. Undoubtedly there will be further diversions amounting, I think, to about 8,000 cubic feet per second distributed 5,000 to the United States and 3,000 to Canada, and on that, too, I should suspect that the State would be recognized as an interested party and entitled to reasonable compensation for the use of the power. I have already had correspondence with Senator Wagner on that subject and my letter has been included in the Congressional Record. That letter sets forth the attitude of the State of New York very fully on the subject. May I return for one minute, Congressman, to your question? Mr. ANGELL. Yes. Governor LEHMAN. As I say, this question of the ownership of the power resources on a navigable stream, of course, so far as I know has never been determined. I do not know what the Supreme Court would hold, but it is certain that the Congress has the power to determine just what disposition is to be made of the power that comes from the development of navigation works on navigable rivers. Mr. ANGELL. That would not necessarily follow, Governor, if the State owned the power. If the Federal Government owns it, that is quite true, but if the Federal Government does not own it, then it can do nothing with it until it makes an agreement with the State. 132 GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE BASIN Governor LEHMAN. That is quite true; yes. Mr. ANGELL. Of course it is a pertinent inquiry for this committee to make and for Congress to know who owns this power if we are to develop power, which is a considerable portion of the expense of this project. If it belongs to the State, of course, we ought to know that. We might make a somewhat different agreement than we would if the State did not own it and it belonged to the Federal Government. Governor LEHMAN. May I say that we have always felt and believed that this power did belong to the State of New York and we have acted accordingly. Mr. ANGELL. As Chief Executive of the State, have you asked the Attorney General to give you an opinion on this question? Governor LEHMAN. Yes. He believes that it does belong to the State of New York, but after all, the final court is the Supreme Court of the United States in matters of this sort. Mr. ANGELL. Has the Attorney General of the United States passed on it so far as you know? Governor LEHMAN. I do not know. Mr. GAVAGAN. Governor, is it not a fact that even during the term of Governor Hughes, Mr. Chief Justice Hughes, when he was Governor of the State of New York, he in turn followed a long line of traditions and precedents of our State and asserted the right of the State to the power in Niagara? Governor LEHMAN. That is quite right. I believe it goes back even further than that. I believe it goes back to Theodore Roosevelt. The CHAIRMAN. Maybe you will get something valuable yet. Mr. ANGELL. One other question: What the acting chairman has just raised, of course, that might be another question as to power generated by Niagara Falls, because that is not power which is gener- ated incident to the improvement of a navigable stream. That is a natural condition of the waterway and is merely taking the power out as it exists, but this is an improvement in the waterway which is a navigable stream, over which the Federal Government has supreme control and the development of power is merely incidental to it, and it may raise an entirely different question than that raised by the taking of the power from Niagara Falls. Mr. GAVAGAN. Well, in the T. V. A. cases, the Supreme Court simply said that the Federal Government had the constitutional power as an incidental power to the regulation of commerce on navi- gable rivers to dispense with any electric power produced, but it did not determine the ownership of the power. Mr. ANGELL. Did not recognize the ownership in the States. Mr. GAVAGAN. Nor assert that it was in the Federal Government except that it said as an incident the Government could dispose of incidental power developed by the Government on navigable streams and the Government does dispense with it or appropriate the power developed. Mr. ANGELL. That raises an additional question as to who is to operate this project the development of which you are now asking Congress, whether it is to be a T. V. A. authority, or an independent agency or whether it is to be done through the Department of the Interior. Now, in this case, as I understand it, it is contemplated that New York will control this power, and it will not be controlled through the GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE BASIN 133 Department of the Interior; and it will not be controlled through any other authority or agency of the Federal Government, but it will be controlled through New York. Mr. CULKIN. But subject to the provisions of the agreement which will have to be entered into between the Federal Government and the State of New York, with the approval of Congress. Mr. ANGELL. That agreement will have to be entered into anyway, regardless of the ownership, by reason of the fact that the Federal Government is going to build it, and if it is going to build it, then, of course, it must be consulted upon what terms it is going to dispose of the project if it is built. Mr. CULKIN. That is quite right. Mr. ANGELL. But there is a deeper question than that underlying this, and that is the ownership of the fee, control of which gives, of course, control of the hydro power generated, and who is going to operate it afterward. If the State owns it, then it can put in a toll on this power double what the Federal Government is putting on in the Columbia River or the T. V. A., if they want to. If the Federal Government owns it they may control the rates. Governor LEHMAN. Mr. Chairman, may I add one word--make one correction or addition to my answer to Chairman Mansfield, when he asked me about the position of the State of New York in connection with the water-power of the Niagara River? I reviewed the history of that water-power development away back in 1894 and stated that the situation was complicated, because the legislature of that time gave certain powers to private concerns. And, I told you that that has caused a complication. The position of the State on that is that we claim even the Legis- lature of the State of New York could not alienate property, natural resources, belonging, by constitutional mandate, to the people of the State of New York and we are, therefore, suing in the courts of New York for the reversing of that procedure, and claiming that the State, regardless of action by the legislature of 1894, still takes title and con- trol of those waters. Mr. GAVAGAN. Mr. Pittenger. Mr. PITTENGER. Governor, where the difficulty lies, I think-I think it is immaterial whether New York State and this Government and other governments have entered into an agreement, where you waive those rights, it seems to me, under the very terms of this bill. Mr. GAVAGAN. No; we do not do that. We waive them insofar as it is necessary for the purposes of this bill, and furthermore we pay for them. Mr. PITTENGER. Yes; that is right. Mr. ANGELL. If I may say, they waive it to this extent, to the extent of permitting the Federal Government to pay for it in the first instance, and then pay the Government back, not through the taxing power of the State of New York, but through an authority which has no power to pledge the credit of the State, and if the revenues from the project are not sufficient to pay off the bonds, the owners will just have to dump them in the ashcan. Governor LEHMAN. Well, the State is paying the construction costs. You are perfectly right in saying that it is a self-liquidating project. 134 GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE BASIN Mr. ANGELL. Not the State as a sovereignty, but a separate entity, so-called, separate corporation or authority. Governor LEHMAN. An agency of the State, created by the legisla- ture to act for the State. Mr. ANGELL. But with no power to pledge the State's credit. Governor LEHMAN. No; but the State has the right, or the power authority has the right to pledge the properties itself. Mr. ANGELL. Yes; the revenues; pledge the revenues. Governor LEHMAN. The revenues or the property. Mr. BEITER. Mr. Chairman. Mr. GAVAGAN. Mr. Beiter. Mr. BEITER. Governor, did not the Power Authority consider the seaway inimical- Governor LEHMAN. I did not understand you. Mr. BEITER. Did not the New York Power Authority-I am speak- ing of the seaway now all through my discussion here, and not the power phase of it did not the New York Power Authority deter- mine the seaway inimical to the best interests of New York? Governor LEHMAN. Not that I know of, Congressman. Mr. BEITER. It did not? Governor LEHMAN. What year are you referring to? Mr. BEITER. The last year; within the last few months. Governor LEHMAN. I am quite sure that it did not. Mr. BEITER. Have you heard of the action of the New York Mayor's Advisory Committee against it? Mr. CULKIN. I think, Mr. Beiter Mr. BEITER. Just a minute. Mr. CULKIN. I think that you made a mistake. I think that you meant the New York Port Authority and not the New York Power Authority. Mr. BEITER. The port authority. Did I say "power authority"? I stand corrected. It is the port authority. Governor LEHMAN. Well, yes; they passed a resolution which became ineffective, because they had no right to take a position con- trary to the State policy which is part of the law of the State of New York. + Mr. BEITER. Do you not consider that the authority is in a position to make such a determination? Governor LEHMAN. I think that the individual members of the authority not only are in a position but have my permission to do it at any time they want, of course, and also I believe that the authority has the right and is justified in laying before this committee all its data and offering the services of its experts to the committee in con- nection with the consideration of the question. Mr. BEITER. You have heard that the New York Mayor's Advisory Committee advised against the seaway, and do you believe that this group of outstanding men are in a position to make such a decision in this regard? Governor LEHMAN. Congressman, I have heard that they have taken the position. I have never seen a report. And, I doubt whether it was ever made public or adopted in any authoritative way; but aside from that, even if they did take a position antagonistic to this, I do not know to what extent they had the information or whether they went into the question extensively. GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE BASIN 135 Mr. BEITER. Governor, is it not true that all of the commercial, industrial, and labor interests in the State of New York, outside of a few probably in the immediate vicinity of the St. Lawrence River, are opposed to this project, and did not the State business interests, the port and terminal facilities on the Great Lakes and the Erie Canal, and the Hudson River, and in the city of New York, in that area, oppose this project as ruinous to their property and their interests? Governor LEHMAN. Well, I know that a number of trade organiza- tions and individuals in the State of New York are opposed to this project; but it is my very sincere belief that the overwhelming majority of the people of the State are wholeheartedly in favor of it. Mr. BEITER. Now, as a candidate for Governor of the State, both the Republicans and Democrats alike, going back as far as Al Smith, were not they opposed to the St. Lawrence seaway? Governor LEHMAN. I cannot answer that question categorically, but I certainly do not recall that Governor Smith ever took a position antagonistic to or in opposition to the seaway. Mr. BEITER. To the seaway. He never did oppose the power phase or the power end of it, but as to the seaway itself. Every candidate for Governor of the State of New York, when they were candidates for Governor, you understand, were opposed to the St. Lawrence seaway; however, it changed when they became candidates for Presi- dent. Then they were for the seaway, and I can refer you, of course, to both sides. I refer to a statement made in the New York Times under date of March 27 when Senator Vandenberg and Tom Dewey were then Presidential candidates and were seeking votes in Wisconsin in the primary election, they stated their views on it. In 1934 Senator Vandenberg said in the Senate he voted for the St. Lawrence Seaway Treaty and "I continue to favor the St. Lawrence seaway," and so forth, However, only a few days ago Senator Van- denberg, not a candidate for President, stated in one of the papers he was opposed to the St. Lawrence seaway. Mr. SCHULTE. How did Willkie stand? Mr. BEITER. Mr. Dewey said: "I favor the St. Lawrence seaway and always have." Now, you do not have to answer this next question, Governor, but you are a candidate for President? P Governor LEHMAN. I am Governor of the State and expect to be for another year and a half, and I am looking after the interests of the State. Mr. BEITER. What I am trying to find out, or to bring out, is that the candidates for Governor, have opposed the seaway, as candidates. for Governor, because the people of the State of New York do not want the seaway. The candidates cannot be for the seaway and be elected Governor; but when it comes to being a candidate for Presi- dent, then they are for the seaway. Governor LEHMAN. May I answer that question? Mr. BEITER. Yes. Governor LEHMAN. I know something about running for governor. I should be very much inclined to doubt your statement with regard to the position of Governor Smith when he ran on a number of occasions. He was heart and soul for the power project. Mr. BEITER. Yes; I agree with you. 136 GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE BASIN { Governor LEHMAN. And I believe for the seaway development. I would be very, very much surprised if he had ever taken a position in opposition to the seaway. I know that President Roosevelt, when he ran for governor twice, never was in opposition to it. Mr. BEITER. He was for the development of the power project but not the seaway. Governor LEHMAN. He was in favor of the whole plan; the whole undertaking; the developing of that entire section and the opening up of great areas of the country. Mr. BEITER. As a power-development project, Governor, but never for the seaway. Neither Republicans nor Democrats have been for this seaway, or they could not have been elected. Governor LEHMAN. Wait a minute. I was elected Governor, and I have never taken a position in opposition to the seaway, not for one second have I done that. I have always been in favor of the project. Mr. CULKIN. Governor, you so stated. Governor LEHMAN. I have not stated it publicly once or twice, but I have stated it any number of times. Mr. GAVAGAN. I remember in a campaign speech in 1936, Governor, where you committed yourself absolutely, in a public speech, in Madison Square Garden, as Your Excellency will recall, where you committed yourself for it, absolutely in favor of the St. Lawrence water development. I assumed at that time, being on the platform that evening, that you went the whole way. Mr. CULKIN. Governor, President Roosevelt had a referendum on it last year and he got the greatest number of votes in Buffalo last year that he ever got. Buffalo had a referendum on it, and he got the biggest majority that he ever got. Mr. BEITER. I have heard the gentleman from New York, Mr. Culkin, praise the Governor here, and he is deserving; he has been a good Governor, one of the best; but I was wondering whether the gentleman from New York applauded the Governor and referred to the splendid credit of the State of New York under the administration of the Governor during the last gubernatorial campaign. I did. Mr. BENDER. While you are on that subject, is it not a fact that both candidates for the Presidency in the campaign came out against war and now they say that it was just campaign oratory? Mr. BEITER. Mr. Chairman- Mr. ELLIS. Mr. Roosevelt did not say that. Mr. GAVAGAN. Have you anything further, Mr. Beiter? Mr. BEITER. Yes. Mr. PITTENGER. I want to protest against putting a lot of wrong statistics in the record. Mr. BEITER. I am not putting any "wrong statistics" in the record. Governor, what assurance do you have that the New York Power Authority will handle this power? Do you have any assurance that the New York Power Authority will handle it? Governor LEHMAN. No; but I cannot have any assurance—well, I have this, yes; that it is in the bill. SEC. 2. The President is hereby authorized and directed to negotiate an arrange- ment with the Power Authority of the State of New York for the transfer to said Power Authority of the power facilities constructed pursuant to this authorization and the right to use the United States' share of the waters at the project for GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE BASIN 137 hydroelectric power purposes upon such terms and conditions as may be agreed upon. So that, assuming that we can have a meeting of the minds with regard to the terms and conditions, it is clearly defined and set forth in this bill that the Power Authority of the State of New York would be the agency that would handle it. Mr. BEITER. We have to assume that there will be a meeting of the minds. Governor LEHMAN. Of course, I could not have any guaranty, naturally, on a thing of that sort ever, but I assume that there will be a meeting of the minds and then that will have to be approved by the Congress of the United States and the legislature. Mr. BEITER. Governor, in the event the bill is approved by Con- gress and we start work on this project and it is completed in 4 years' time, what assurance do we have that the Dominion of Canada will complete its part of the project within that time? If they do not com- plete it, in order to benefit, the Federal Government will have to com- plete the Dominion of Canada's part of the project and in so doing, as has been pointed out by the gentleman from New York, we pay 25 percent of the Federal taxes, and an additional amount would have to be paid by the State of New York. Governor LEHMAN. Well, of course, the point covered by your ques- tion is part of the agreement between the United States and the Dominion of Canada. Mr. BEITER. That is true. Governor LEHMAN. I think we have to assume that the Dominion of Canada is going to carry out its understanding and undertaking. Mr. BEITER. But, if they are not able to carry it out? At the pres- ent time they are pressed for finances. Their per capita debt is higher now than it ever has been and they are taxed to the limit. They are not particularly anxious for the project. There is no assurance given in the agreement that they will carry out or can carry it out even if they entered into the agreement; but in the event they are not able to carry it out, in order to derive benefit from the project, we will neces- sarily have to complete it, and in completing it, New York State will be forced to bear additional taxes. Governor LEHMAN. Well, I think that you have to give reliance on the good faith of the contracting parties to an agreement, especially when the other party is the Dominion of Canada. I do not think that you can get any greater guaranty than their good faith. The CHAIRMAN. May I be permitted to ask a question? Mr. BEITER. Yes, sir; surely. The CHAIRMAN. If Canada does not come into it, enter into an agreement, it will not affect the power that might be developed on this power dam in the International Rapids. It might affect navigation below that power dam, but not the power feature of it. The power would be there anyhow. Mr. BEITER. The power would be there, providing the works were completed. If the work is not completed it will not be. The CHAIRMAN. The power would be completed when the dam was completed, but that portion below the dam does not have any effect upon the power. Mr. BEITER. Governor, you refer to the benefits to the city of Buffalo and then ask to refer to the report of the Department of 138 GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE BASIN Commerce. I have made a thorough study of the report of the Department of Commerce and the only benefit I can see that Buffalo derives would be by the importation of lard and bananas. Now, lard and bananas may contain a lot of vitamins, but I don't believe Buffalo jobs will be created by them. Governor LEHMAN. Mr. Chairman Mr. GAVAGAN. Yes; Mr. Governor. Governor LEHMAN. Congressman Beiter has asked me a question about the report of the United States Department of Commerce, with regard to the effect of this seaway on the port of Buffalo. I could read that part of the report which applies to that question, but it is quite long, and if agreeable to you, I would suggest that I just put it in the record. Mr. PITTENGER. We all have those reports here, Governor. can read them and find out about lard and bananas. Each member has a copy of the report before him, Governor, of the Department of Commerce. Mr. GAVAGAN. Yes, each member has a copy of the report before him, Governor. Governor LEHMAN. I see. Instead of bananas and what was the other commoidty? Mr. BEITER. Bananas and lard. Governor LEHMAN. I see chemical abrasives, aluminum, metal alloys, and other products of which Buffalo would also have the advantage of cheap deep water transportation. Also flour. That is on page 9 of the report. Mr. BEITER. Governor, the gentleman from Minnesota (Mr. Pittenger) a moment ago said that I was not stating the facts, or words to that effect, when we were referring to the former candidates for Governor of the State, and some doubt was expressed as to the stand or the position of Al Smith. Mr. PITTENGER. I said- Mr. BEITER. Just a moment. I hold in my hand a report on the St. Lawrence water project, which is the report of the National Transportation Committee dated February 13, 1933, in which Al Smith said, and I quote: I am opposed at this time to the construction of the St. Lawrence waterway because it would be a waste of public funds. Mr. PITTENGER. What is the date of that? Mr. BEITER. February 13, 1933. It is the report of the National Transportation Committee. Mr. PITTENGER. That is 8 years ago. Governor LEHMAN. 8 years ago. Mr. BEITER. 8 years ago. I am talking about candidates for Gov- ernor and their position on the seaway. Mr. PITTENGER. I make an objection to all of these statements and statistics on the ground that they are absolutely immaterial. Mr. SCHULTE. They did not mention the seaway. Mr. PITTENGER. It is wasting the time of the committee. Mr. BEITER. I just want to point out that these men were opposed to it, and I am trying to point out that the people of the State of New York are opposed to it; the businessmen, little businessmen and big businessmen, all businessmen, and labor, are opposed to it. GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE BASIN 139 The CHAIRMAN. They can pass on that. If Congress passes it, then it goes back to New York and they can determine whether or not they want to approve of that. Mr. PITTENGER. What is that? The CHAIRMAN. The power project. Governor LEHMAN. May I, just to correct the record, say one fur- ther word there, although I think it is quite irrelevant. Mr. GAVAGAN. Yes, Governor. Governor LEHMAN. Congressman Beiter said when men were can- didates for the governorship of the State of New York they opposed- Mr. BEITER. The seaway. Governor LEHMAN. The seaway; but the quotation that the Con- gressman read was dated 1933, and my recollection is that Governor Smith ceased, or rather the last time he ran for Governor was in 1926, so that it seems to me- Mr. BEITER (interposing). He had not changed his stand or views, or position, from the time he was Governor to the time that the re- port was made, so far as I know.