ARTES
1817
SCIENTIA
LIBRARY
VERITAS
OF THE
UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN
PLURIBUS UNUSE
TUEHOR
SI-QUÆRIS-PENINSULAMIAMⱭNAM`
CIRCUMSPICE
THE GIFT OF
Professor
Louis I. Bredvold
THE
PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS
O F
Mr. WILLIAM DUDGEON.
CAREFULLY CORRECTED.
While thus laborious crowds
Ply the tough oar, PHILOSOPHY directs
The ruling helm; or, like the lib'ral breath
Of potent Heav'n, invifible, the fail
Swells out, and bears th' inferior world along.
THOMSON.
}
MDCCL X V.
THE
STAT E
OF THE
MORAL WORLD
CONSIDERED.
OR,
A Vindication of PROVIDENCE
in the Government of the
MORAL WORLD:
SHEWING
That there is no other evil in it, but that
arifing from the neceffary imperfection of
creatures. And that this life is a ftate of
difcipline, to train us up in Virtue, by
which we are fitted for a more perfect foci-
ety, capable of greater happineſs in a future
ftate of exiſtence.
This infancy of being cannot prove
The final ifjue of the works of God,
By boundless love and perfect wisdom form'd,
And ever rifing with the rifing mind!
Thomſon.
Firſt printed in the year, 1732.
A
ར॰ ༤ -
THE
CONTENT S.
I. The State of the Moral World confidered:
or, a vindication of providence in the
government of the moral world.
Page 5
II. A Letter to the Author of the State
of the Moral World confidered. Where-
in fome fatisfying account is attempted
to be given of the nature of virtue and
vice, the origin of moral evil, and the
end and duration of future puniſhments. 45
III. A Catechifm, founded upon experience
and reafon: collected by a father for the
ufe of his children.
159
IV. A view of the Neceffitarian or Beſt
Scheme.
197
V. Philofophical Letters, concerning the
being and attributes of God.
* a 2
229
(vii)
THE
PREFACE
THE
HE fubject of the following dialogue will
not, I hope, be unacceptable to the public,
the defign of it being to affert the univerſal good-
nefs of God in the government of the world, by
making all creatures to be proportionably more or
lefs happy as they practiſe virtue, which tendeth
to the good of the whole as well as the good of eve-
ry individual: and that virtue is the perfection
and happineſs of all men, and vice their mifery
by natural neceſſary confequence; which demon-
Strateth that it is abfolutely impoffible for the vi-
cious to commute the matter any way whatſoever,
fo as to expect to be as happy as the virtuous,
but by living the life of the virtuous.
If this fmall attempt to vindicate providence
in the government of the world, from the mistaken
opinions of fome concerning it, be favourably re-
ceived; it may, perhaps, encourage fome of
A 2
(viii)
greater leifure and abilities to enlarge further upon
it. In the mean time, if any think that I am in
the wrong, I do affure them that it is not thro'
defign; ſo that if they will be pleaſed to ſhow me
my error, I will receive their inftruction with
pleaſure and acknowlegement.
( 9 )
THE
STATE
OF THE
Moral world confidered.
A DIALOGUE.
SECTION I.
A
EEING, my friend, we are fo conveni-
ently met, when we have time, and are
not like to be interrupted in this retired place,
I would, if you pleaſe, enter upon a ſubject
that is attended with difficulties, which I would
fain have cleared, namely, "The origin of
"moral-evil in the government of a perfectly
"good Being."
B-
You could not have propoſed a ſubject more
worthy of our confideration, in ſuch a conve
10
OF
THE
STATE
nient time and place. But this antient quefti-
on hath been fo well handled before, that, I
think, little more can be faid to folve it; yet
I fay, it will be well fpent time to go over
what hath been already faid by others, fo we
may be fixed on a ſubject of fuch importance.
For me, indeed, I never doubt, that whatever
particular ills may be, yet there is no evil in
the whole of the government of a perfectly
good being *.
A-
That nothing is evil in the whole, and yet
fome ill in the particulars, which make up that
whole, fticks mightily with me. That there
neceffarily exifts a caufe of all things, the
things themſelves demonftrate, and that he is
a being of infinite goodneſs, wiſdom and pow-
er, hath, you know, been gone about to be
demonſtrated, by fome, with admirable ſucceſs,
after this manner. They have gone through
the principal phænomena of nature, and ſhown,
"That what hath been thought ill by fome,
*This would be a commendable government in one
whoſe wiſdom and power is not perfect, but there is no
parallel between perfection and imperfection.
THE MORAL WORLD.
11
"is only imperfection, which cannot properly
"be called evil, feeing all created things are
"neceffarily liable to it; nay further, that e-
very particular, which we have the means
"of knowing the circumſtances of, is demon-
ſtratively made the moſt uſeful and fervice-
"able, that the nature of the thing is capable
"of: and that we ought by parity of reaſon
"to conclude the fame of thoſe things, which
we have not had opportunity or means of
16
48
coming to fo thorough a knowlege of; it be-
"ing only the want of fuch a perfect know-
66
lege of things, that hindereth us from ſeeing
"that all things are perfectly good in their
"kind, as defigned and made by a being of
perfect goodneſs, with infinite wiſdom to
<<
66
contrive, and infinite power to execute his
good intentions." This they have done with
reſpect to the natural world, to the full con-
viction of all who attend it. I wish they had
attained the like fuccefs, with refpect to the
the moral world
B-
If I am not miſtaken, they have, by fhew-
ing, "That there is no other evil in the moral
I 2
OF
THE STATE
"world, but what neceffarily arifeth from the
"abufe of that noble faculty liberty, with
"which rational agents are endued."
A-
I am fo fully convinced by the works of na-
ture, and by the beauty and ftrength of the
arguments a priori, that there exiſts a being
of all perfections; who, as he is infinitely hap-
py
of himſelf, could have no other end in cre-
ating all variety of fubordinate beings, but to
communicate to each of them, all the happineſs
their ſeveral natures are capable of; making
the inanimate for the ufe of the animate, and
they for the mutual fervice of one another, all
confpiring to the good of the whole: I am fo
fully convinced of this, I fay, that I cannot a
gree with them in ſaying, “That by the abuſe
"of the faculty liberty, with which rational
creatures are endued, they have introduced
"moral evil, that is, fin and wickedness, into
"the world, contrary to God's intention, and by
"this fubverted the order and harmony eſta-
"bliſhed in the creation." Is not this a con-
tradiction to infinite wisdom and power, who
THE MORAL WORLD.
13
could not fail to contrive and execute the
means of a good intention?
But by the way, I think that this character
of the deity, namely, That all his other infinite
perfections are fubfervient to the purpoſes of
goodneſs, will not be difputed. Seeing if we
fuppofe it otherwife, that he is a being of in-
finite wisdom and power, not governed by per-
fect goodneſs, but acting by meer will and ca-
price, or perhaps malice, then he is the juft
object of the greateſt fear and hatred. Again,
if he is a good being, without infinite wiſdom,
or without infinite power, he is fo far imper-
fect; though he is the object of love, nay, he
is the object of pity too. Such characters of
the one true general Cauſe are as abſurd, as
that of fuppofing two, the ideas of which de-
ftroy one another.
The attributes of the deity are the different
modifications of his all-perfect mind. His
knowlege or wifdom is intuitive, as fome of
ours are; but moftly our knowlege is attained
by reaſoning, that is, by comparing the ideas
he excites in us, and drawing inferences from
them. Juftice and mercy cannot strictly be
B
14
THE STATE OF
called diſtinct attributes, but different acts of
wiſdom exerted in puniſhment or forgiveneſs,
as they tend moſt to the good of the fubjects
on which they are exerciſed.
B-
All that I readily grant; and it is to be re-
greted that the juſtice of God hath been fo
mifrepreſented, by fome in their fyftems, as to
be in the ſtricteft fenfe a principle of cruelty.
But to return.
If this liberty is a poffible thing of itſelf, and
given to creatures for good purpoſes, even for
the beauty and perfection of the whole creati-
on; and as you allow it neceffary to the beauty
and perfection of the whole, and confiftent
with the univerfal wiſdom and goodneſs of the
Creator, that there ſhould be different and va
rious degrees of creatures, whereof confequent-
ly ſome muſt be lefs perfect than others; and
this liberty implying a natural power of doing
evil as well as good, and the imperfect nature
of finite beings, making it poffible for them to
abuſe this their liberty to the actual commiffion
of evil; hence there neceffarily ariſeth a poffi-
1
THE MORAL WORLD. 15
bility of evil, notwithſtanding that the Creator
is infinitely good.
A-
This evil then is no other but what necef-
farily arifeth from the imperfection of crea-
tures, and is imperfection, which cannot pro-
perly be called evil or fin, being infeparable, in
fome degree, from all created beings, and moft
confiftent with the defigns of a perfect Cre-
ator.
B
But let us confider what this liberty is, and
how the abuſe of it is the occaſion of fin, for
which we fay rational and free agents are ac-
countable.
A-
With all my heart; for that will determine
whether men act, or not, contrary to God's
intention?
B-
Liberty is defined to be a power of begin-
ning motion, or a felf-motive faculty, or a
power of acting; which faculty or power is ex-
erted freely upon the laſt judgment of the un-
derſtanding. Now, though the will is necefla-
B 2
16
OF
THE STATE
5
rily determined by the laft judgment of the
underſtanding, this is only in a moral fenfe,
the motive power being ftill free to act, be-
cauſe the laſt judgment of the underſtanding
is no phyſical efficient, but only a moral mo-
tive.
Men, being thus naturally free, fhould de-
termine themſelves to act according to the e-
ternal law of reaſon, which God himſelf, being
perfectly free, determineth all his actions by;
and as it is a perfect rule to the moſt perfect
Being, it is certainly a perfect rule to his
imperfect creatures, who being made free, and
with faculties to difcover this law, almighty
God requireth that they should act according
to it.
But they, by virtue of this freedom,
without which they would be meer machines,
incapable of virtue and happineſs, act contrary
to this eternal law of reafon, and thus intro-
duce vice and wickedness, for which they will
be call to account.
A-
That men are not neceſſary agents in a natu-
ral ſenſe, is certain; a neceffary agent being no
agent at all, but a patient; and the eternal law
THE MORAL WORLD.
17
--
of reafon or nature, which God requireth ra-
tional creatures to act by, being the fame with
the practice of virtue, which tends to make
them happy; becauſe it is inconfiftent with
the goodneſs of God, who made them to be
happy, to require any thing of them but what
tendeth to their happineſs; ſo it is owned by all,
by experiencing it true in fact, that every one
acteth by the appearance of good, the deſire of
good or happineſs being an innate, inſeparable
principle from all creatures. But being im-
perfect creatures, that is, limited in their pow-
er and faculties, it is impoffible, but that in
ſome caſes they ſhould not diſcover what is their
real good or happineſs, and ſo fall into vice,
by miſtaking their true happineſs, and doing
that which brings fome degree of mifery upon
them; and this puniſhment, the natural con-
fequence of vice, will be for their after good,
by teaching them how to act in the like cafes.
Thus every new experience will teach them to
purſue their happineſs more ſteadily. In all
this there will be found no other evil, but that
of neceffary imperfection in creatures, ftill im-
proving by difcipline; which is moſt confiftent
18
OF
THE
STATE
with the perfect goodneſs of the Creator, with
every thing's being perfectly good in its kind,
and with every thing's coming to paſs accord-
ing to the divine fore-knowlege and decree,
which cuts off all accountableness and pofitive
puniſhment.
B-
You feem to make a moral neceffity come to
the fame effect, with a natural neceffity: but
though I own it certainly true, that the will is
neceffarily determined by the laſt judgment of
the underſtanding; or that motive, which after
more or less confideration, feems to be moſt for
our good, yet the felf-motive faculty exerteth
itſelf freely and you likewiſe intimate that e-
very action of moral agents comes to paſs by
a moral neceffity, according to the divine de-
crees, elſe there could be no foundation for pre-
ſcience.
:
A-
The difference between the exertion of the
felf-motive faculty, and the will's moving the
body to action, I do not underſtand; and that
any thing ſhould move body or matter, an in-
ert thing, but the will or mind, is impoffible:
THE MORAL WORLD. 19
and farther the mind cannot move the body to
action, without an inclination or difpofition to
move to one action rather than another, as fhe
is determined by the greateſt motive, or that
motive which ſeems to carry the moſt good with
it. Whether prefcience can be built on any
thing befides this moral neceffity, I leave you
to explain.
B-
The certainty of fore-knowlege does not
cauſe the certainty of things, but is itſelf foun-
ded on the reality of their exiſtence.
A
The fame may be faid of knowlege, with-
out being much to the purpoſe.
B-
More particularly, the foundation of prefci-
ence I take to be this. As one man, who knows
another's difpofition, can before hand tell what
he will do in certain circumſtances; and a wif-
er man ſtill with greater certainty can foretel
that fo the deity perfectly knows every one's
tempers, and inclinations of their minds, the
difpofitions and affections of their bodies, and
all other external circumstances they ſhall be in;
1
20
STATE OF
THE
and further can tell, what motives will be pre-
fented to them, and how they fhall be deter-
mined by them; all which put together, be-
comes infinitely exact, and is the foundation
of prefcience, without being the cauſe of ac-
tion.
A-
This ſeems to come juſt to what I have faid:
but though the parallel upon your ſuppoſition
holds between the wife man's and the deity's
manner of foretelling future events, yet the
one is not the cauſe of the action, which the
other is. The creature does not, you know,
give itſelf any faculties or inclinations, but all
is given to it by the Creator, who, as he is
perfectly good, could not give any ill ones;
and befides his creating all with certain incli-
nations or difpofitions, he orders all their ex-
ternal circumſtances whatſoever, as he fees beft,
and fo cannot but know what motives will be
prefented to them, and how they will be de-
termined by them, and thus what fhall come.
to pafs; which can be no other than what he
of his infinite goodneſs defigned, and confe-
quently not evil or wicked, though the acti-
ons of fome creatures may be faid to be evil or
THE MORAL WORLD.
21
imperfect in reſpect of the actions of others,
arrived to a greater degree of knowlege and
perfection.
B-
This feems to lead to abfolute fate, every
one acting what he could not but do, which
takes away all choice.
A-
There is no doubt but that every one does
what he fees to be beft in every cafe, and fo
could not do otherwife. To fuppofe one could
chuſe to act otherwiſe, than what he thought
beſt in every cafe, is an abfurd thing*.
people were neceffitated to act otherwife than
as they thought beft, this would be a fad fate
indeed! But to chufe to act upon the beſt rea-
If
I mean at the preſent time, for he may think, after
having got more knowlege, that it would have been bet-
ter for him to have acted otherwife. But ftill my mean-
ing may be miſtaken here, by ſome who lay a great ſtreſs
upon our natural power of acting, or being free from
any external natural force to do as we will, as if I de-
nied this. But I do affirm, that every one is conſcious
that he hath a natural liberty to act as he wills. But
then we are alfo confcious, that we cannot will other-
wife in any one cafe, but as we are determined by the
prevailing motive, or that motive which we at prefent
think will be moft for our good.
C
22
OF
THE
STATE
fon we can diſcover, is a freedom and perfec-
tion truly valuable To fay we are free from
this moral neceffity, to chufe among indifferent
things, or to chufe one or more things among
many others exactly alike, is trifling; becauſe
the things being perfectly indifferent, we are
as neceffarily indifferent which to take: in com-
mon affairs, we fay, there is no choice among
fuch things, I will take the next to my hand.
B
To fettle what you advance more fully, the
defires, powers, faculties, etc. of creatures,
fhould be enquired into, that it may appear,
whether fome do not abuſe them, and fo in-
troduce evil and vice of another fort than what
can be called imperfection. But let us reft a
little.
THE MORAL WORLD.
23
H
SECTION II.
B-
AVING reflected upon what we were
laft difcourfing, I find, that this felf-
motive or active power is no other than the
foul, mind, or will herfelf, determining the bo-
dy, which is only a paffive inftrument to acti-
on; and that this mind or will cannot be for-
ced in a natural ſenſe; yet if ſhe was not ex-
cited by fome inclination or affection, to acti-
on, which is in general the defire of good or
happineſs, ſhe would not act at all, being per-
fectly indifferent to all action: and the deſire
of happineſs being her infeparable principle, fhe
will always be neceffarily determined, in a
moral fenfe, which can only be applied to the
will, to act by the prepollent motive, or that
which feems to carry the greater good with it.
Thus all creatures, of a higher or lower de-
gree, neceffarily purſue their good as God
hath deſigned, who alſo giveth the means of
attaining that happinefs, which are their feve-
ral powers and faculties: but as thefe in all
C 2
24
THE STATE OF
creatures are more or lefs imperfect, and the
knowlege how to apply them being beſt learn-
ed by experience, it cannot be otherwife than
that all creatures ſhould ſometime be miſtaken
in the purſuit of their good; yet this miſtake
of happineſs, being fome degree of miſery,
makes them wifer, fo that they will purſue it
more ſteadily after. This is the moſt effectu-
al way of teaching, one not being fo well con-
vinced what is his happineſs, or what his mi-
fery, as when he finds it by experience. But we
are next to examine what thoſe powers and fa-
culties, affections and inclinations of the mind
of man are, ſo that we may know that none of
them are ill, as fome imagine, or at leaſt, we
may fee if every one keeps the balance among
them, and governs them by the chief principle
of reaſon, ſo as not to apply them to evil pur-
poſes. In the mean time, I think, that upon
this ſcheme there is no other difference between
virtue and vice than that between perfection.
and imperfection.
A-
And that is ſo great a difference as will not
fail to make all, who underſtand it, love and
THE MORAL WORLD.
25
purſue the one, and forfake the other as much
as is in their power. But to go on to what
you deſired, which I ſhall do in general, a par-
ticular ſyſtem on the paffions not being what
you expect from me: and this I am the more
willing to do, that as there is no evil in the
natural world, but what neceffarily ariſes from
matter and motion, and the imperfect nature
of all created things, which yet are the beſt
that can be made; fo I fay, it may be made
further to appear that there is no evil in the
moral world, but what neceffarily arifeth from
the nature of imperfect creatures, who always
purſue their good, but cannot but be liable to
error or miſtake. But as all this evil is only
that of imperfection, which is infeparable from
all created things whatſoever, it cannot pro-
perly be called evil, wicked, or contrary to
God's intention, but perfectly conſiſtent with
his good defigns which he could not fail to ex.
ecute.
The defires, affections, or paffions of the mind
are divided, in the general, into ſelfiſh and
public. The ſelfiſh or private paffions are
fuch, as love of life and its conveniencies, love
25
THE STATE OF
of honour, refentment of injuries, defire of
fenfual pleaſures, or appetite towards nouriſh-
ment and the means of generation.
The public paffions are fuch as the defire of
univerfal good or public happineſs, friendſhip,
complacency, compaffion, love of offspring and
relations. The private defires are called inte-
reſted, as they are planted in us chiefly for our
private good. And the public defires are cal-
led difintereſted, or benevolent, as they are
planted in us for the good of others; fo that
confidering the private and public defires as two
natural defires or difpofitions in us, we cannot
be happy, but in purſuing the fatisfaction or
ends of both thoſe defires confiftently with one
another.
And this is the foundation for benevolent
actions; the end, which the public deſires di-
rectly excite to, is the good of others, which
by experience we find to be our greateſt good;
which fheweth the inexpreffible love and good-
neſs of the wife author of our nature, in thus
ftrictly joining the interefts of mankind: fo
that the generous part, who do good to others
out of pure love and affection, come by this,
THE MORAL WORLD.
to enjoy the greateſt pleaſure and happineſs to
themſelves; and even the ſelfiſh part cannot be
happy, but by promoting the good of their
neighbours.
Every one is confcious that he hath fuch af-
fections and paffions, and that by their being
duly balanced and exerciſed on their proper
objects, he hath pleafure, and on the contrary,
pain; it follows that none of them are ill of
themſelves, but given for good purpoſes, and
that whatever is thought to be ill among them,
arifeth from their being not duly balanced, or
properly applied, which, you would fay, ſhould
be the buſineſs of the fuperior faculty, reafon,
which ſhall be confidered, after obferving
that a virtuous life is defined, in a large fenfe,
to be fuch a courfe of action as fheweth, that
both the ends of the private and public defires
are confiftently purfued, which promoteth, of
confequence, both the greateſt private and pub-
lic good; and on the contrary, fo far as this
is not advanced, through fome of the ends
which the defires excite to being purſued, and
others neglected, fuch a life is reckoned to be
fo far vicious. But more ſtrictly, thoſe acti-
28
OF
THE STATE
ons, which flow from the public defires, are
only reckoned virtuous; and thofe actions
which flow from the private deſires, while the
public ones are neglected, are accounted vici-
ous.
All the defires then being good, or given
for good purpoſes, evil arifeth only from the
abuſe of them, as may be inftanced in one
which fome have reckoned ill, namely, refent-
ment. This paffion is of great uſe to us in
hindering both preſent and future injuries,
from theſe who may ſo far miſtake their hap-
pinefs, as to purfue it in oppofition to ours.
By our refentment they will be taught that it
doth not lie there; and when this reſentment
goes ſo far with us, as to turn to direct hatred
and revenge, this arifeth from a miſtaken or
wrong opinion, that thofe who injured us, by
thinking their happineſs would be promoted in
fo doing, did it through direct malice and de-
fign. This fheweth us how much our happi-
neſs conſiſteth in having true opinions of men
and things, and the tendency of actions, that
we may purſue the fatisfacton of our defires
aright, by which is meant the governing of the
THE MORAL WORLD. 29
defires; and in doing this is the great uſe of
reaſon, which we attain thus. When we be-
gin to live in the world, we are governed by
others till we come to the ufe of our reaſon,
which we do by degrees: thus, by experiencing
what defires, when fatisfied, give us the great-
eſt pleaſure or happineſs, and by obferving by
what courſe or action we obtained fuch fatis-
faction, and fo comparing one cafe with ano-
ther which we know, we reafon upon what
will be the beſt for us to do in other cafes. In
a word, the uſe of reafon in governing and
balancing the defires is this. The defires are
the ſprings exciting to action;
our happineſs,
which is involved in that of the public, is the
end, and reaſon diſcovers or points out the beſt
means to that end. But the deſires, and the
faculty of reafon or power to apprehend, judge
and infer, being fo far weak and imperfect in
all creatures; hence arife wrong opinions,
and that imperfection of action or vice, in fome
degree in all creatures, as they are made more
or leſs perfect, confiftently with that diſplay
of the univerfal goodneſs of the Creator, in cre-
ating all orders of fubordinate beings, who by
D
3
30
THE STATE OF
experience and difcipline will be going on while
they exift, and it feems altogether inconfiftent
with the perfections of the Creator, to annihi-
late his works, to attain more and more
knowlege, to purſue that happineſs defigned
them.
B-
В
I perceive, by what hath been faid, that it
may be made out by inftances, that there is no
evil defire or affection in nature, and if it were
fo, it would not only prove the creature ill,
but the Creator himſelf who gave them; but
that all which is called vice in action, there
being none in intention, arifeth from the de-
fires being weak and imperfect, and the know-
lege or wiſdom got by comparing and drawing
inferences from the ideas which we have from
ſenſation and reflection on what paffes within
our minds, that is, our knowlege got by rea-
foning, which teacheth us how to purfue the
ends of our defires, being alfo weak and im-
perfect; from this neceffary imperfection of
creatures, I fee that all the irregularities of the
moral world may be accounted for; which ir-
regularities or evils, though arifing from the
THE MORAL WORLD.
31
neceffary imperfection of creatures, yet to un-
wary
obſervers ſeem to flow from evil intenti-
ons or difpofitions. But to go through with
this, would take in fuch a compaſs of time
and particulars, that no man is fufficient for it.
After all, I think by this view of things, one
of the principal arguments for a future ſtate is
entirely cut off, namely, that brought from
the perverted order of things here, vice often
flouriſhing, and virtue falling into diſtreſs,
which infers a future ftate, in which all things.
will be fet to rights, by puniſhing vice and re-
warding virtue.
A-
Was it true that the order of things is per-
verted here, this argument drawn from it in
proof of a future ftate, in which all things are.
to be fet to rights, proveth rather the contra-
ry. For if things are wrong in this ſtate, it is
a fhrewd preſumption, that they will be always
fo, elſe they muft fay that he is another fort of
governor who ruleth in the next ſtate, than he
who governeth in this: harmony, order and
deſign must be begun here, elfe we can never
expect that they will be improving in the other
D 2
32 THE
STATE OF
world. So that upon this ſcheme where every
thing is as good as can be, there being no other
diſorder, vice or mifery, but what neceffarily
arifeth from the finite and imperfect nature of
creatures in this their ſtate of infancy, who are
ftill improving by experience and difcipline,
and attaining greater and greater degrees of
perfection, virtue and happineſs, which of
courſe fits them for a more perfect ſociety;
upon this ſcheme, I fay, a future ftate can on-
ly be built. This added to the natural proofs
of the foul's immateriality and immortality,
and to that brought from the inconfiftency
with the infinite power, wiſdom and goodneſs
of the Creator, who made creatures to be hap-
py, to annihilate them, and fo deprive them
of it, will amount to the completeft demon-
ſtration poffible, except immediate poffeff on.
More of this after. What is brought by ma-
terialifts arguing from the powers of matter a-
gainſt the immateriality of the mind or foul, is
fo ridiculous, that when they come to examine
ever ſo ſtrictly into matter, they know nothing
of it, unleſs it be a mere paffive inert thing
without any powers at all. But to enquire a little
into the preſent ſtate and the diſorders of it.
THE MORAL WORLD. 33
T
SECTION III.
A-
O begin with examining what is meant
by vice flouriſhing, and virtue falling
into diftrefs: vice in action, (there being none.
in intention, all defires exciting either to pri-
vate or public good,) being the falling ſhort of
our greateſt good, either by the ſtrength of
fome private defires, or the weakness of our
reafon to direct us in purfuing the gratification.
of our public defires: this will never fail to
bring a proportionable degree of miſery upon
us. And virtue, being the confiftent gratifica-
tion of our private and public defires, cannot
fail to make us happy. So that in this ſenſe,
virtue flouriſheth, and vice brings pain and di-
ftrefs. If we could fuppofe creatures with de-
fires contrary to ours, fo as their happineſs
conſiſted in croſffing ours; them, as we have a
power of perceiving and approving virtue, and
difapproving vice, which is by fome named
moral fenfe, fo we have alſo a public fenfe, by
which we are pleaſed or diſpleaſed with pub-
a
34
THE STATE OF
licly uſeful or hurtful actions; them, I fay,
we would condemn as vicious aad wicked, tho'
with reſpect to themſelves, the gratification of
their defires would be good, and approved by
their neighbours of the like fenfes and defires.
And it would be as reaſonable in them to gra-
tify their defires, as in us to gratify ours. If
this were a poffible cafe, whoever of the two
ſets of beings were more perfect in their kind,
and became happy at the others coſt, thoſe laſt
would fay, that vice flourifhed, and virtue fell
into diſtreſs. But no fuch contradictory cafe
can happen in the government of a perfectly
wife and good being.
Vice's flouriſhing, and virtue's falling into di-
ſtreſs then, muſt be underſtood with refpect to
external circumftances. To know the truth
concerning this, I leave you to caſt your eye
abroad into the world and make your obferva-
tions, and perhaps you may find that though.
riches and power are of great ufe even in pro-
curing the means of gratifying of many of our
defires both public and private, yet thoſe are
not the moſt happy who poffefs moſt of them,
or they the moſt unhappy who have not fo large
THE MORAL WORLD.
35
a portion of them: but that probably all exter-
nal circumſtances are fo ordered by the deity,
with reſpect to every one, as is moſt conducive
to keep their defires in the beſt balance, and
to ſtrengthen the public ones, which are like
to be of the greateſt uſe to advance our happi-
nefs, both in this and a future ftate of exiſt-
ence.
B
There feems to be much truth in this. But
it being endleſs to go through particulars, I
will give you my opinion in fome principal caf-
es. We often obſerve the rich and powerful,
who are the moſt capable by thoſe means to do
the greateſt good, in which confifteth the great-
eſt pleaſure a rational creature can cnjoy, very
uneafy; becauſe they apply them for the gra-
tification of lower defires, as thofe called the
pleaſures of the internal ſenſes; ſuch as delight
in muſic, houſes, gardens, dreſs, equipage;
or in hunting, feaſting, and other pleaſures of
the external fenfes; which, though good in
their own place, and have a certain degree of
pleaſure attending them, yet cannot be com-
pared to the pleaſures of the moral and public
36 THE STATE OF
fenfes, either for intenſeneſs or duration, no-
thing yielding fo noble, rational, exquifite and
Jaſting pieaſures, as the reflection on our vir-
tue, and our being the inftruments of advanc-
ing the happineſs of all thoſe whom our influ-
ence can extend to. And on the contrary, we
fee men in low condition, who mind nothing
befides taking care of their families, and main-
taining them by their daily labour, and in being,
in one word, good neighbours; we ſee thoſe,
I fay, for the moſt part very happy; becauſe
they, not having the means, never think of
purſuing the pleaſures of the great, which are
very precarious and of fhort duration. But
the general conſtitution of the moral world with
refpect to fuch things, I take to be this.
The defires, powers and faculties of all crea-
tures being good, and more perfect in the high-
er orders of creatures, I think it will be own-
ed, that thoſe of creatures of the fame rank
and order are pretty equal; and as to the dif-
ferences that may appear in advanced age, they
are in great meaſure owing to external circum-
ftances, as the natural conftitution of their bo-
dily organs, education, etc. Thoſe again are
THE MORAL WORLD.
37
adapted to their feveral flations of life, certain
qualifications being requifite for magiſtrates,
teachers, etc. which are not requifite for huf-
bandmen, merchants, and mechanics; et e con-
tra.
Again, riches and power are given to thoſe,
who, the Deity knoweth, will make the beſt
uſe of them, or not abuſe them, ſo much as
thoſe would do who have not got fo much. On
the other hand, thofe, who have not got ſo great
riches and power, can act their part better
with what they have, than thoſe who have
more could have done in their circumſtances.
And it is worth obferving, that thoſe who em-
ploy what talents they have given them, tho'
fewer or weaker, to the beft advantage that
they can, are as virtuous or perfect in propor-
tion, as thoſe who have the moſt and greateſt
talents, and employ them the beft; which mak-
eth all the Virtuous content, eafy or happy,
being pleaſed with having done all in their
power.And now, having viewed and confi-
dered the ſtate of the moral world with reſpect
to the intentions and actions of creatures and
their external circumftances, I muſt acknowlege
E
38
THE STATE OF
to you, that there is no evil but imperfection
in it. Yet you have a great many authorities.
against you in this opinion. Many crying,
that there is not one who doth good, but all
are wicked!
A
Such declaimers always except themſelves
and a few of their elect party, who, they own
too, have their failings or infirmities; which
ſhows us, that what imperfections thofe find
in themſelves, they, through wrong opinion,
take to be wicked principles or intentions in all
others. But though fuch imperfect creatures
as men are be liable to many miſtakes or errors,
in purſuing their happineſs, which is involved
in that of the public; yet if it was well confi-
dered, there will not be fo much error this
way found in the world, as fome imagine;
many, through miſtake, pronouncing others,
for the neglect of fome indifferent actions,
which they believe that God will poſitively re-
ward them for the performance of, to be in
damnable errors.
Virtue then being the perfection and happi-
nefs of all rational creatures, which all covet
THE MORAL WORLD.
39
and purfue; and vice their mifery, which none
love or continue in, when they fhall find or be
informed how to be more happy; confequent-
ły, one man cannot be more ferviceable to an-
other, than to prefent to him fuch motives
and arguments as will convince him that ſuch
a course of action, (which are all thofe actions
that promote univerfal good,) will make him
happy, which ſhorteneth his way to it. Nor
can one do a greater injury to another, than to
lead him wrong, though both may be done
with the fame good intention.
B
The miſtakes of ſome often affect others,
and make them fo far pofitively unhappy, fuch
as perfecution, oppreffion, and the like; what
ſhall we ſay of thoſe cafes? can we ſuppoſe
thefe will be for the good of the fufferers?
A
The firſt of theſe may proceed from love to o-
thers, fome thinking that to be of fuch and ſuch
opinions can only recommend them to the Dei-
ty; and when they cannot perſuade them to
be of fuch opinions by arguments, they would
force them to it, which is impoffible. But
E 2
40
THE STATE OF
more frequently it proceedeth from the wick-
edneſs of their reafon, as doth always oppreffi-
on, both parties thinking to advance their hap-
pinefs by taking from their neighbours either
by fraud or violence, what they poffefs. But
if their neighbours, the perfecuted or oppref
fed, get power, they will refent it, as others
will alfo do, who are not fo nearly concerned;
nay, the fenfe of mankind turns againſt them,
which is alſo a puniſhment to thoſe who love
honour and efteem. By all this, perfecutors.
and oppreffors will be taught and puniſhed for
their errors; befides, when they ſhall come to
the knowlege of their error, which they will
certainly do fooner or later, in this or another
ſtate, it will be matter of uneafy reflection or
remorſe to them, for occafioning ſo much mi-
fery to others. And further, many of the fel-
fish defires being probably uſeful only in this
ftate, the ſtrengthening thoſe, and neglecting
to cultivate the public ones, will caft them far
behind others in perfection and happineſs in
the next ftate.
For thoſe and many other errors of fome,
affecting others, they may be defigned by God
THE MORAL WORLD. 4I
for their good, even for ftrengthening their vir-
tue, and fhewing them more effectually, the
evil attending vice, which is the way to hin-
der them from falling into the like errors, and
that they may teach their neighbours, the per-
fecutors, oppreffors, etc. the fame by argu-
ments, or if that will not do, to refift them,
and reſent the injuries done themſelves, which
the law of ſelf-preſervation, as well as the good
of our neighbours, oblige us to do, fo as make
thoſe experimentally know, that they can never
advance their happineſs by injuring their neigh-
bours. And even while they do not meet with
this, the very thoughts of being liable to it
makes them unhappy.
B-
This ſtate, then, cannot be called a ſtate of
trial, feeing the Deity certainly knows what all
his creatures will do, they doing no other thing
than what he defigned they fhould do.
A
I have called it a ſtate of difcipline to train
us up in virtue, which you fee it is. For as
we know that God, who is perfectly happy of
himſelf, could have no other exciting reafon to
42
OF
THE STATE
create us, but his own infinite goodneſs to
make us happy, it is impoffible that it could be
otherwiſe, but that when we were created inno-
cent and naked, or without knowlege of what
tended to our happineſs, and what not, we
fhould be fent here in our imperfect ſtate to
improve. And as it is inconfiftent with the
goodneſs of God, who made us to be happy,
with his wifdom, who could contrive the means
to it, and with his power to execute them, to
annihilate us, and fo deprive us of it; we may
certainly conclude, that he will take us to ano-
ther ſtate, when we are fit to act our part there,
where we will be ftill improving; thoſe, who are
fartheft advanced here in virtue and knowlege,
being capable of the greateſt happineſs in the
next ſtate, which is a ſtrong motive to excite
us all to the practice of virtue in this life.
B-
Every one muſt think that ſhort argument
conclufive for the being of a future ftate, ex-
cept thoſe who are fo weak as hardly to be
argued with. I mean thoſe who think the Deity
to be an imperfect or arbitrary being, that is, one
who acteth by meer will and caprice, inconfift-
ently with any of his perfections. Or thoſe
THE MORAL WORLD.
43
who think annihilation a lefs evil than being,
which none do, but they who believe that God
is cruel, and will make their being a curſe to
them, by making their mifery exceed their hap-
pineſs. But what ſhould we think will be the
condition of children who are removed from
this ſtate ſo ſoon, that they are nothing im-
proved, nor even upon the other ſcheme, ca-
pable of a trial?
A
We are fo far from knowing every thing here,
(the wifeft may be faid to know but little of
what may be known,) that probable conjecture
is a fufficient anfwer to many queſtions. Such
children perhaps, for any thing we know to
the contrary, may be fent again, in founder
bodies, into the world to improve. But fup-
poſe they be not, as they had no opportunity
to improve in the focial virtues, fo they have.
not ſtrengthened the ſelfiſh defires in oppofi-
tion to them, and as their being ſo foon re-
moved, is thus no pofitive difadvantage to them-
felves, and may ferve fome good end towards.
their parents or others; fo the conſtitution of
the other ſtate, as that of this doth, may re-
44
THE STATE etc.
quire a fubordination of beings, which of it-
ſelf feems neceffary to afford matter of action,
and ſo of happineſs in every fociety.
But as what I have advanced, namely, that
very particular thing which we know in the
moral world, as well as in the natural world,
which is adapted to the moral world, is the
beſt that can be made, to make up the beſt
whole, according to the defign of the moft per-
fect Being: as we find this, I ſay, true in fact,
as far as our knowlege reacheth; fo we have
all the reafon that can be to conclude, that as
we improve in the knowlege of things, both
in this ſtate or in others, which God of his in-
finite wiſdom and goodnefs may have defigned
to place us in, we will ftill be more and more
charmed and ſatisfied with this excellent truth.
THE END.
A
LETTER
TO THE
AUTHOR
OF THE
STATE of the MORAL WORLD
CONSIDERED:
Wherein fome fatisfying account is attempted to
be given of the nature of VIRTUE and VICE,
the origin of MORAL EVIL, and the end and
duration of FUTURE PUNISHMENT.
Firſt publiſhed in the year, 1734.
F
( 47 )
47)
A
LETTER, etc.*
SIR,
H
AVING read and confidered your per-
formance, The ftate of the moral world.
confidered, and your principles quadrating in
the main with my own, I could not help wiſh-
ing the acquaintance of the author: but as I
could not have this conveniently, I am obliged
to this method of correfpondence t. I ever
thought this the only fcheme that could folve
difficulties, but being in fome meaſure new,
and conſequently unpopular, I foon ſuſpected
*This letter of our author is a vindication of his first
tract" The ſtate of the moral world confidered" in an-
fwer to a pamphlet publiſhed at Edinburgh, in 1732.
intitled, Some reflections on the ſtate of the moral world
confidered; faid to be wrote by the celebrated Mr. Bax-
ter, author of Matho, etc.
This letter was left to the bookfeller by an unknown
hand, to be conveyed to the author of The ſtate, etc.
F 2
48
VINDICATION OF THE
'
the confequences of your breaking the ice, in
publiſhing it to the world. Any one may fee
your principles to be confiftent, and the ef- .
fect of thought: but none having preceeded
you in this way, it was no wonder to me you
made not a more full delineation of them, con-
fidering with what difficulty any thing of that
kind is brought to perfection. This I find the
author of The reflections on your pamphlet has
taken advantage of, to fet them in the worft
light; and thinking it pity they ſhould be ſo
run down, I have prefumed to trouble you with
what ſmall help I could contribute towards a
further illuſtration of them. It is to be owned,
the Reflections contain ſome objections well
worth confideration; but as the writer of them
has mixed them with names and infinuations
which naturally provoke an author either to
anſwer in the like ftrain, or elfe entirely to o-
verlook them (which has made men of polite
tafte altogether diſapprove the way of carrying
on a debate by anfwer and reply, though other-
wife a very proper method to clear up difficul-
ties,) I thought, as I am no party, nor perfon-
ally engaged, I would be under fewer tempta-
STATE OF THE MORAL WORLD.
49
tions of that kind. If therefore theſe reaſons
have determined you againſt replying, and if you
think this worth publiſhing, you are welcome
to do fo; if otherwiſe, you may make of it
what uſe you pleaſe. I am indeed at any rate
an enemy to the anſwering of particular books;
but as the common objections advanced by o-
thers againſt this ſcheme are here laid together,
I have choſen it only for a text to fave myſelf
the trouble of gathering them from a variety
of authors.
For the more diftinct management of this
ſubject, I ſhall reduce the ſcheme I have laid
down to theſe following heads, "I. That there
is no evil intention in nature. II. That we
are morally-neceffary agents, or always deter-
mined to action by the prepollent motive; and
confequently as all our powers, inclinations
and circumſtances are adjuſted and ordered by
God, they could not fail to produce fuch and
fuch effects, and were decreed by him to do
fo; and therefore, III. That the only way to
reconcile the admiffion of moral evil with the
government of an infinitely wife and good Be-
ing, is by faying, that it is a neceffary imper-
50
VINDICATION OF THE
fection and that the whole of our duration,
:
both in this and another world, is a ſtate of
difcipline, in which we are only puniſhed for
our future good and reformation; or that the
end, the only end confiftent with the goodneſs
of God of annexing punishment to vice, is to
make us wifer and better.
In oppofition to which it has been afferted,
firſt, that this poſition of no evil intention in
nature does not folve appearances. Secondly,
that we are free agents, free not only from ex·
ternal impediments, but from a determination.
by motives; and confequently, in the third
place, that moral evil is introduced by the a-
bufe of our liberty, contrary to God's defign,
or is abfolute and real evil; and that therefore
we will be poſitively puniſhed for it. If there-
fore the foregoing pofitions can be defended,
and thefe objections anfwered, this fcheme of
difcipline, I prefume, ftands its ground.
I begin with the firft, that there is no evil
intention in nature, becauſe all the reft depend
in fome meaſure upon it. As this is a queftion
about a matter of fact,
one would think it
might be the more eafily determined, and yet
STATE OF THE MORAL WORLD. 5[
there is none about which men more general-
ly miſtake.
That there is no directly ill intention or ma-
licious difpofition in nature, is a principle I
always reflected on with pleaſure, as on the o-
ther hand I ever viewed with horror the com-
mon repreſentations given of the natural wick-
edneſs, averfion to good, hatefulneſs, etc. of our
fellow-creatures, by thofe who have the privi-
lege of afferting any thing in a looſe way, with-
out reafon or explanation. The occaſion of
fo general a miſtake, and fo much confufion
in this matter (next to the ill notions felf-love
makes us naturally apt to entertain of others)
has, as I take it, been the applying the word
ill, or wicked, to actions alone, without re-
gard to the difpofition, and thinking, that
fince the action was the fame, whatever defign
it was done with, it was equally ill; whereas,
if it be confidered that to do any thing from
ſelfiſh views, or to gratify a private paſſion,
and the fame thing from direct malicious views,
are as diſtinct principles of action as any can
be, and infer the moſt different confequences,
the miſtake would foon appear. It is only the
52
VINDICATION OF THE
laſt that can properly be called ill or wicked,
and the firſt, confidered feparately from the bad
effects it has on others, is fo far from being ſo,
that it is the firſt ſpring of action and founda-
tion of happineſs; but when ſuch a poſition is
laid down, as, that there is nothing evil or
wicked in our nature, it is eafy to muſter up a
great many ill actions men have done, and then
raiſe a popular cry, while men never give
themſelves the trouble to trace actions to their
true fource and principle.
The abfurdity of our being born with a hor-.
rid difpofition to do miſchief, merely for the
fake of fo doing, may be deduced immediately
✓ from the goodneſs of God itſelf; for if ſo, who
would be answerable for the confequences of
fuch inclinations but their author? or how
could his puniſhing them for having inclinati-
ons which he himſelf gave them be an example
to others? Beſides, it would be giving his
creatures inclinations to act directly contrary to
himſelf, and to thofe good and wife deſigns he
has ſhown in all his works; for a directly ill
difpofition cannot poffibly ferve a good end.
But it is ſpending time to confute what is com-
3
STATE OF THE MORAL WORLD.
53
monly given up now by all that pretend to rea-
ſon, and even by this author himſelf*, how-
ever inconfiftently with what he fays elfe-
where t.
And if we have not fuch incli-
nations originally, it follows we can as little
raiſe them in ourfelves, nor can a felfish or pri-
vate paffion ever produce or turn to a directly
malicious one, becauſe entirely diſtinct from it,
diſtinct in its very nature.
It is true indeed, we may ftrengthen our
ſelfiſh paſſions too much, and weaken our pub-
lic ones; we may get ill notions of men, fuch
as may make us contemn and hate them; or,
we may bring ourſelves to do ill," as he ſays,
"in jeft, or from mere wantonnefs and gaiety
"of heart." By the way, the very adding
thefe words confutes what he deſigns to
prove, that we do fo from direct malice. But
ftill all theſe are quite diftinct principles of ac-
tion from directly malicious affections; nor is
it at all neceſſary to have recourſe to any other
to folve appearances. It is a greater degree of
the fame paffion, that prompts one to join him-
4 Page. 41.
Particularly, p. 9. 10.
G
54
VINDICATION OF THE
JAL
felf to a wife in lawful wedlock, which makes
him commit adultery. The fame that makes
him induftrious to provide for his family in at
lawful way, which makes him ſteal his neigh-
bour's money, or rob him of it. To make
this plainer ſtill, we ſhall inftance in one of the
paffions that perhaps looks the likeft direct ma-
lice of any. Envy is a paffion that makes us.
grudge and repine at the happineſs of another.
The reaſon of this is, felf-love makes us more
fenfible of our own worth than others are, and
value ourſelves more than others do, and per-
haps more than we ought to do. Now, upon
fuch a perfuafion, it is not only natural, but
reaſonable, to grudge another a happineſs,
when, as we think, we deſerve it more. But
once deprive that other of what we think he
enjoys more than he deſerves, or give us a bet-
ter opinion of him, and envy ceaſes. Is it not
plain then from this, that either felf-love, or a
miſtake of others, is at the bottom of this paf-
fion? From all this then, it appears, that the
actions and wishes this author inftances in *
are very ill evidences of men's difpofitions, till
* P. 9, 10, II.
STATE OF THE MORAL WORLD.
55
he fhow what notions fuch had of their fellow-
creatures for to make good his point, he
fhould ſhow, that there are fuch monflers in
nature as hate goodneſs and a good character,
or, at leaſt, that have a direct difpofition to
do mifchief to others, without confidering them.
in a light that makes them the objects of real
hatred, which is very plain, Nero, Caligula,
and others did, as all tyrants do, and which,
it is no wonder many more do, confidering
what pains fuch authors as this and the Fable of
the Bees are at, to give us ill notions of our
fpecies, and to preach up their wickedness,
vileneſs, deformity, etc Nor do I ſee how
is reaſonable, upon fuch a fuppofition, to wiſh,
or to act otherwife. But fure I am, that in
all nature he will not find a difpofition to hate
a truly good character, or to love a wicked one
as fuch.
While I am only pointing out the ſpring of
'vice, I hope none will miſtake me ſo far as to
conſtruct this as an endeavour to excufe or ju-
Atify it. The puniſhment of vice, as I fhall
fhow afterward, is every whit as neceffary up-V
G 2
56
VINDICATION OF THE
}
on this ſcheme as the other, and I am fure it
anſwers better and wifer purpoſes. So that
this account of matters only fhews our fellow-
creatures to be fo much better than they are
commonly thought to be, and at the fame time
provides equally well for the peace and prefer-
vation of fociety, which one would think is a
very harmleſs notion, and ſhould give us a
better opinion both of God and one another.
I cannot therefore but wonder to fee this au-
thor afferting," That to fay the moſt immo-
ral actions have no evil intention, pulls up the
roots of morality, takes away the diſtinction
betwixt juſt and unjuft, right and wrong, good
and evil, and opens a door to all violence and
endleſs confuſions;" when any one cannot but
be fenfible upon the leaft reflection, that this is
what his own may with much better reafon be
charged with. For what good purpoſes, in
all the world, can fuch repreſentations of man-
kind ſerve, fuppofing them true, unlefs to ex-
tinguiſh every thing generous in our na-
tures, to create jealoufies, animofities, hatred
* P. 12.
STATE OF THE MORAL WORLD. 57
and ill-will? while the other tends as evident-
ly to cement our affections by giving us good
notions of one another. But, fays he, a little
before*: "It is the intention that gives the
action not only the denomination, but the na-
ture of fraudulent, cruel, barbarous; and
hence it is the law chiefly regards the animus."
We often give actions theſe names indeed; but
is it not as common to call want of compaffion
in a great meaſure cruelty? A mother that
murders her child, one of the ſtrongeſt inſtan.
ces of cruelty, is faid to be cruel to the laſt de-
gree, though every one knows it is only fear of
diſgrace, want, etc. or other fuch confiderati-
ons, overbalancing the parental affection, that
drives her to this; and I think none doubts,
that, notwithſtanding this, fhe has fome degree
of fuch an affection, and will rather choofe to
fuckle and fofter it, were theſe confidera-
tions removed. No mother, I dare fay, ever
murdered her child out of mere cruelty.
"And
hence," fays he, "it is that the law chiefly re-
gards the animus." But what is this animus, this
* P. II.
58
VINDICATION OF THE
intention? Either the ſelfiſh affections, or par-
tial benevolent ones, (fuch as love to our fami-
ly, or friend, or the like, which are virtuous of
themſelves *,) difcovering themſelves in fuch
In fpeaking of the benevolent affections, I would
have it obferved, that when I afirm them to be in every
man, I do not mean that every man, in every inſtance,.
is only fo far virtuous as he acts from a difintereſted ex-
tenfive view to the good of the whole community or
public, (a notion the author of the fable of the bees con-
fines virtue to, and then laughs at,) though every one
has this in ſome degree, and would prefer the good and
intereſt of his own nation to that of any other: but by
virtue I mean the benevolent or focial affections in ge-
neral, whether difcovered to a more confined ſyſtem, as
that of a family or party, or to a larger one, a city, a
kingdom, or the univerfe; in every one of which gra-
dations, the ftrength of the affection to the ſeveral mem-
bers of them is wifely made to decreaſe in proportion to
the connection we have with them, and the opportuni-
ties of being ſerviceable to them. Such inftances there-
for, as that author gives, as a proof of our being intire-
ly, and in all caſes, acted by ſelfiſh and intereſted views,
are nothing to the purpoſe. It is indeed ridiculous, ei-
ther to expect or fuppofe, that a chimney-ſweeper ſhould
chufe his employment from a difintereſted view to the
good of the whole community; but it is as ridiculous to
repreſent him as intirely void of virtue upon that account:
for fuch inftances as the choice of a trade,awife, and the like,
are actions that the happinefs of one's whole life depends
upon, whether that happineſs confifts in the gratification
of the public or felfifh affections, as it is evident it does
partly of both. The proper queſtion therefor is, whe-
ther even this chimney-fweeper, low as his condition is,
when confidered in the feveral relations of a father, â
citizen, an Englishman, would not ſhow difpofitions in
STATE OF THE MORAL WORLD
59
inftances, as are inconfiftent with the good of
fociety; and thefe may be the fource of the
fame ill effects in a fociety that direct malice.
would be. But be the fpring of the action what
it will, this is a cafe the law hath nothing to
do with, nor ever confiders; becaufe whatever
it is, the good of fociety requires the fame pu-
nifhment.
II. The next thing I propoſed to conſider,
was the account this author gives us of liber-
ty, in oppoſition to what you have advanced
about it. In this fection, he gave me hopes,
of finding ſomething more decifive than what
he had faid in the foregoing; but I muſt beg
fome degree reſpectively fuitable to each of theſe relati-
ons? But is he therefor entirely felfifh, or void of vir-
tue, becauſe he would prefer the intereft of his own
country to that of France, or of his own city to that of
another an hundred miles diſtant, or his own family to
his neighbour's, or his own life and private happineſs to
that of any other? Befides, upon this author's fuppofi-
tion, there would be no reaſon to confine virtue to a dif-
intereſted regard to the good of any particular fociety.
According to him, there can be no virtue, unleſs one act
in every inftance with a view to the good of the whole
world, or rather of the univerfe; for the fame reafon
that will make it virtuous to act with a view to the good
of any particular fociety, will make it fo to act with a
view to the good of the ſmalleſt family or party, or even.
of a ſingle perfon, a friend, or a neighbour.
60
VINDICATION OF THE
his leave to fay, I was much diſappointed. And
therefor I ſhall be the fhorter in what remarks
I have to make upon it: and the rather becauſe
I deſign to handle this ſubject at more length,
in a diſtinct diſcourſe, in which I ſhall parti-
cularly fhow, that a moral neceffity is not on-
ly reconcileable with virtue, but that it is the
only foundation it can be built upon, which, I
am forry, moſt of its defenders have been fo
defective in. I fhall therefore, at this time,
content myſelf with two or three remarks upon
what he has laid down.
1st. That liberty, according to his notion of
it, would be the greateſt imperfection, and de-
ftroy the very conclufion he would build upon
it, of man's accountableness. According to
him, the firſt ſpring of liberty, and molt fim-
ple and uncompounded inſtance of it, is a power
of paffing from idea to idea, without a motive.
or reaſon *. "In fhort, fays, he, this tran-
fition from idea to idea in the mind, is the firſt
fpring of liberty, or, at leaſt, is the firft
exerciſe of our liberty, where the inftance is fo
fimple and uncompounded, etc." And again t,
* P. 33.
+ P. 28.
STATE OF THE MORAL WORLD. 61
It is no leſs a contradiction, that a man cannot
change the object of his thought, difmifs one
idea, and confider another, without-
a
moral motive, fhewing him, that it was pre-
ferable to all others." "And the fame pow-
er," fays he, "we have with refpect to motion *,
namely, a power of beginning or changing it,
without a practical decifion of the underftand-
ing." So that, according to this account of the
matter, to be free, is to have a power to act with-
out any defign, reafon or motive; and whenever
we do otherwiſe, at leaſt, ſo far as we do fo,
according to him, our liberty muſt end. If
then we have fuch a power as this, and this
power be liberty, certainly one cannot miſs to
fee, that it must be the greateſt imperfection;
for if, as the more fteadily we are determined
by good and reaſonable motives, the more
perfect we are; ſo next, to a being determined
by ill ones, the more ready we are to determine
ourſelves by no motive or reaſon, the more im-
perfect we muſt be, and act the more abfurdly
and inconfiftently.
After fuch an account of
← P. 30, 31.
H
62
VINDICATION OF THE
liberty, it is pleaſant to hear the author fay-
ing *, "The queſtion is not here, whether e-
ver we are determined by moral motives or not?
No body denies, but we are fometimes, and if we
were oftner thus determined, it would be the
better. But the queſtion is, whether this de-
termination reigns throughout, etc." It ſeems
therefore, as far as it reigns, the mind has no
liberty, and yet the oftner thus determined, or
the leſs liberty the better, and the more perfect
we would be. Certainly this author fhould have
been more upon his guard againſt fuch glaring
contradictions, before he charged others fo con-
fidently with them.
And as fuch a liberty would be the greateſt
imperfection, fo, as I faid, it would deſtroy
what he intends to prove by it, man's accoun-
tableneſs; for, how can a man be reckoned vir-
tuous for changing the object of his percepti-
on, or paffing from idea to idea, or exerting
an act of his will, (fuppofing ſuch a thing poſ-
ſible) without deſign or motive, if by ſo doing
he happens to do an action materially ill?
P. 25.
STATE OF THE MORAL WORLD. 63
where, at this rate, is the difference betwixt
virtue and vice? Hitherto men have been ac-
counted more or lefs virtuous or vicious, ac-
cording to the ſtrength of inclination to do
what is fo, or as they have lefs liberty, in his
fenſe of the word, to do otherwife; but this is
the ſtrongeſt account of the matter ever was
advanced: for here men are made the objects of
rewards and puniſhments, for acting from no
reaſon, no motive. Is it not plain then from
this, that let one exert never ſo many of thoſe
free acts of his will, he is no moral or accoun-
table agent, till he is under a moral neceffity,
or comes to be determined by motives. What
then fignifies a liberty he is neither better nor
worfe for? As to what he fays,
"That the
the not
origin of moral evil is owing to
adhibiting the confideration of moral motives
in weighty cafes*:" and afterwards, "The
fault in this internal confulting is, that the mind
makes a tranflation of thought too quick, with-
out examining duly every particular, as we de-
liberate" I would ask him, whether, when
* P. 16.
† P. 34.
H 2
64
VINDICATION OF THE
this adhibition of motives is made, it be made
with or without a motive? If it be, his fcheme
is ruined; if not, if made without defign, or
at random, where is the virtue of fuch adhi-
bitions? Again, what makes the paffing from
idea to idea too quickly a fault? Is it not ei-
ther that the mind is tired and weary with
dwelling upon the prefent object, or haftened
forward to a change of idea, by the folicitation.
of fome paffion, which makes it overlook fome
weighty reaſons to the contrary? Or, as he ſays *
'Leans with partiality to a favourite fide,' which
are evident motives." But, fays he +, If the
herſelf (the foul) could fearch out for a motive,
or a prepollency of motive, to determine her to
act, it is clear fhe acts already, or wills, di-
rects, determines in this fearch, and all without
a determination." That the foul frequently
ſearches out for a motive when in a ftrait, or
when any matter of importance is under confi-
deration, is certain; but ftill it is with a view
to act wifely and rationally, or from a fear of
acting otherwiſe. And this, I hope, he will
· P. 37-
† P. 22.
STATE OF THE MORAL WORLD. 65
not deny is a motive. Or, if by this he means
that the foul, when in an indolent and unactive
poſture, caſts about for ſome reaſon of acting,
it is plain, that the doing fo is ſtill to divert
the prefent uneafinefs, or to find a motive or
reafon of fome action; in confequence of which
action it propoſes, at leaſt, fome degree of hap-
pineſs or pleaſure; which fhows the abfurdity
of what he fays, "That the mind, in fuch
a ſtate, cannot be fuppofed in concern about
the purſuit of its happineſs." As if there were
no degrees of happineſs, or no happineſs but
its fupreme and ultimate one. The leaft
degree of pleaſure is fufficient at fuch a
time to engage it. As to what he ſays †,
"That the power of acting by motives fup-
pofes this, (namely, the power of paffing from
idea to idea without a motive) as the foun-
dation of it, or that which makes it poffible :"
I can neither fee the leaft ground for fuch an
aſſertion, (for, how does the want of a power
of acting without motives, make it impoffible to
act by motives?) nor, were it true, do I fee
* P. 27.
† P. 37. and in other places.
66
VINDICATION OF THE
how it would anfwer his purpoſe; for, as I
have ſhown before, it is only ſo far as we act
from motives we are accountable ſo that a
:
bare power of acting without them, fuppofing
we had it, would neither make us more or leſs
fo.
2dly. The cauſe and foundation of this au-
thor's miſtake, and indeed of moſt of thofe of
his way of thinking, is owing to the not di-
ftinguiſhing ſufficiently betwixt a moral and
natural neceffity. The advocates for liberty
always confound theſe, and tack the confequen-
ces of each to the other, and then charge their
antagoniſts with maintaining them, with the
utmoſt injuftice. The bugbear that frights.
them, are fuch words as our author uſes thro'-
out this ſection, "Inevitable deſtiny, irreſiſtible
abfolute fate, neceffary determination, mecha-
nical paffive perception, ideal engines to work
the mind with, etc." words that have done
more to prejudice him and others againſt this
innocent doctrine, than ever the words moral
motives, as he alleges, have done others in
favours of it: whereas, if they would allow
themſelves to confider, that theſe two kinds of
1
STATE OF THE MORAL WORLD.
67
neceffities are perfectly different, different in
nature and kind; and that the matter may be
cleared by a very eaſy and plain diſtinction, the
cauſe of all theſe prejudices and outcries would
evaniſh, namely, that the actions of the mind,
perceiving, willing, inclining, defiring, etc.
let them be never ſo ſtrong or intenſe, have no
reſemblance or relation to a natnral neceffity,
fuch as of one ſtone's impelling another. Which
lets us fee how little to the purpoſe is what the
author fays in page 21, (and in many other places
where he always confounds thefe two neceffities)
"Neceffary agents (if that were proper) may
be acted, wrought, or moved, but cannot be
taught." How acted or moved? like a ftone
or foot-ball? or who, that pleaded for a na-
tural neceffity, ever faid fo? what relation has
this to an act of willing, or a determination by
moral motives? In short, I can hardly help
perfuading myſelf, that this long and intricate
debate about liberty, turns upon the defini-
tion of a ſingle word, which thoſe of his party
never attend to.
68
VINDICATION OF THE
eye
Laſtly, All the inftances he uſes for a proof
of this liberty, not only fail of proving his
point, but a great many of them prove the quite
contrary. He fays *, "When a man looks out
at a window upon the fields, he muft fee fome-
thing if his eyes are open; but it would be a
puniſhment to him to fix his eyes always on
one point, though it is arbitrary to him to direct
his view a longer or fhorter while to it." "And
afterwards +, To fay, that one could not turn his
from a point-till he had confulted how
and where to carry it next, would be ſpeaking
againſt common fenfe." If then it would be a
puniſhment, is not this puniſhment, be what
it will, the cauſe of changing his view? The
plain matter of fact in all cafes is this. The
mind is ever reſtleſs in purſuit of what is pleaf-
ing or agreeable, and when it has for the pre-
fent nothing to give it entertainment, it cafts.
about where it hopes moſt probably to find it.
No man, I dare fay, ever looked out a window
but to fee fomething. If his eyes meet an a-
greeable object, that fixes them; if not, or if
* P. 29.
† P. 30.
STATE OF THE MORAL WORLD.
69
it is tired with viewing fuch an one long, it is
plain theſe are the motives that fet him again a
roving, and turning his eyes another way.
The cafe is the fame with thought. The mind,
when in a remifs, indolent, or careleſs poſture,
(which the author miferably miſtakes for his
liberty; whereas, when the mind has no mat-
ter of moment to take up its thoughts, it is as
much determined to entertain what gives it the
leaſt degree of pleaſure, as the balance is turn-
ed with the leaſt grain,) finding nothing to rouſe
or engage it, difmiffes one thought, and takes
up another, in hopes always of finding one
more agreeable than the laft.
the foot of page 31. he fays, "If this moral
neceffity obtains, it muſt not only be with reſpect
to the action itſelf, but alſo to the time, place,
manner, and degree of it; for if there is not a
moral motive for every thing of this kind, ſome
circumſtance will be left arbitrary, and there-
for indifferent, to the ruining of the whole
ſcheme." And he inftances particularly in ftrik-
ing the arch of a circle, and afks, "Whether
I
In the note at
70
VINDICATION OF THE
the compaffes fhall be opened to half an inch
radius, or 3 4ths, 7 8ths, etc ?" But who does*
not fee, that after one is confined to fuch an
arch as his compaffes and extent of his paper
admits of, he takes up with that open and cen-
tre that comes readieſt to hand, if it be not al-
together inconvenient? and from this plain mo-
tive, that the finding more exact ones would not
anſwer the trouble of fearching for them. All
his other inſtances are anſwered the fame way.
As for that ſhame, fearfulneſs, remorfe, and
uneafineſs that attends the practice of vice,
which he further urges as a proof of this doc-
trine +, I anſwer, this is one mean wifely ap-
pointed by God for our reformation; but that
whatever it proceeds from, it fuppofes nothing
like his liberty for, whether it ariſe in a vici-
ous man, from his acting contrary to his moral
fenſe or conſcience, a fenfe that God has im-
planted in every man, by which we neceſſarily
approve good actions in ourſelves and others,
and difapprove ill ones; or from a conſciouſneſs
that he has incurred the refentment, diſappro-
† P. 37, 40.
STATE OF THE MORAL WORLD. 71
bation, and contempt of others, the neceffary
effect of felf-defence in them, which no man can
endure the want of, even in thought, he muſt
of confequence be ashamed, grieved, and have
remorfe; and this remorſe muſt follow, with-
out fuppofing the agent free in his fenfe of the
word.
He concludes with faying, "If theſe few
plain obfervations had been adverted to by Mr.
Leibnitz, Collins, and others of that way,
much needlefs debate and writing about liberty
and neceffity might have been ſaved." Whereas
I cannot help thinking if he had attended to
what they had faid on this head, he would have
fpared many of his obſervations, which are an-
fwered by them over and over again.
In short, all the power a man has or can
have, or is neceſſary to have in order to moral
agency, is of acting, (beginning, ending, or
changing motion or thinking,) upon his having
willed, and of willing upon a preceeding mo-
tive or reaſon. To affert a power of willing
without a motive, is both an inconfiftency,
and would be the greateſt imperfection; if to
act without a reafon be unreafonable, and if
I 2
72
VINDICATION OF THE
we had it, we would only be moral agents fo far
as we made no uſe of it, or acted only by good
or ill motives of action, or were neceffarily de-
termined, (morally fo I mean) and fo at any
rate, his account and defence of liberty is no.
thing to the purpoſe.
Our author proceeds to apply his notion of
liberty to anſwer fome pofitions of your's,
which he calls "difficulties in natural religi-
on"; the fallacy of which reafonings will the
more eafily appear, as they ſtand or fall with
this account of liberty. One or two of them
we ſhall inftance in juft now, the reſt we ſhall
have occafion to confider by and by.
One of the ufes he makes of it is to ſhow*
in what cafes we yield to the folicitation of the
ftronger motive, and how we come to do fo,
in oppofition to what you affert, that we do fo
always and neceffarily, which he calls the only
fpecious argument of the adverſaries of liberty,
and which he unjustly fays, they pretend is e-
nough to exculpate us whatever we do: for,
as I ſhall ſhow afterward, a liableneſs to pu-
* P. 39, 40.
STATE OF THE MORAL WORLD. 73
is
niſhment for our miſtakes and wrong choices,
upon this ſcheme abfolutely neceffary, both
for the good of fociety, and the reformation of
the offender; though the infliction of pofitive
puniſhment would be both uſeleſs and cruel.
After that, he goes on to fhow in what cafes
we yield to the folicitations of the ſtronger
motive, namely, when we have contracted ha-
bits, and how we are gradually brought to
this, which he fays *, "is a neceffity and ſlavery
of our own procuring." The way that we are
brought to this pafs he tells us is, "that at firſt
we do the action without confideration, mo.
tive or reaſon, or by precipitating the tranfiti-
on, "as he calls it;" "and if we do it once, we
may do it a ſecond and third time, till at length
a habit is fairly fprung up, and one comes to
do with deſign what at firſt he did with none.”
It is an unlucky thing men fhould fo often hit
chance-ways on the wrong fide, without any
deſign to either good or bad, and that tho'
we have good inclinations at firſt, as he owns †,
which one would think would be fufficient to
† P. 41.
* P. 39-
74
VINDICATION OF THE
caft the balance on the right fide; yet, that
they ſhould at laſt be curfed with a habit for
acting fo innocently. I think one may truſt
this reaſoning to any one without a confutati-
on; only I would ask him a queſtion or two
upon it. After how many of theſe free repe-
titions of the action do we act neceffarily?
Next, whether or not, when we begin to act
from a motive or reafon, or neceffarily, we are
not upon this ſcheme blamelefs? I always inno-
cently thought the ſtronger the inclination, or
greater the neceffity, the more blame-worthy,
or, which is the fame thing, the more neceffi-
ty for puniſhment; but this indeed is more
comfortable philoſophy, and one may now go
on with a good confcience in vice, as foon as a
habit is contracted, for he is blamelefs in all
what follows, becauſe it is morally neceſſary,
and the matter is as ill as it poffibly can be
with him, for having once or twice done this
action, without defign at firft. He fays in-
deed *,“That fuch an one is no more excufe.
able than a man would be who ſhould willingly
* P. 40.
STATE OF THE MORAL WORLD
75
difable himſelf from working, out of a view to
be maintained on charity." But this is a cafe
no way parallel; for here the man is fuppofed
purpoſely to difable himſelf with that view,
and to act from a motive contrary to what he
builds his reaſoning upon; but I dare fay he will
not allege that ever any man drank or whored
with a view to contract a habit, which too
would be acting from a motive. I have known
fuch curfe themfelves for the inclination, but
never met with fuch an inſtance.
Another uſe he makes of this his doctrine about
liberty is, to confute what he faid, page 43. you
had alleged, that the fore-knowlege of the deity is
the cauſe why the thing fore-known comes to
paſs; whereas, it is plain to any one who con-
ſults the paffage he refers to, that you make it
only the effect or confequence of our being ne-
ceffarily determined by thofe circumftances
God has placed us in. However, he rectifies
the ſtate of the queſtion afterwards*, and in his
reaſoning upon it, one cannot mifs to obferve
what ftraits he is put to, and how backward
· P. 44.
76
VINDICATION OF THE
and forward he talks. He makes indeed a great
fhow of modefty and caution in the matter,
and fays it were better not to pretend to inve-
ftigate the reaſon of God's fore-knowlege, and
yet to confefs the thing, becaufe it is an unde-
niable perfection; though at the fame time he
boldly charges you, and all that have taken
your way of explaining the divine attributes
with denying them. But he must not think
to get off ſo, for if his way of doing here be
not a denying them, I do not know what is fo.
He fays*, "When we act in caſes of indifference,
fuppofe,what becomes of the prepollency
that ſhould guide, and, if I may ſay ſo, illuminate
the divine prefcience? I anfwer, there is none
indeed in the world to do it, and therefore pre-
fcience on this fuppofition is an abfolute im-
poffibility. For let none think this is only a dif
ficulty we cannot explain; it is an unanſwer-
able demonſtration of the impoffibility of it, as
will be evident to any that but defines to him-
ſelf the terms indifference, or liberty of indif-
ference, as uſed by him, and prefcience; becauſe,
* P. 44.
STATE OF THE MORAL WORLD.
77
at this rate, all poffible connection betwixt the
forefight and the action is broke; for, that a
thing fhall certainly come to pafs, and a thing
may poffibly not come to paſs, are contradic-
tory ideas.
But to make your argument amount to a di-
rect demonſtration, I obferve, that upon any
fuppofition (unleſs a direct denial of it) pre-
ſcience can only be the confequence of a decree.
To allow this author all the advantage poffible,
I fhall fuppofe for once that we are free in his
ſenſe, and then ſhow how this muſt be true
even upon that fuppofition. Only, I hope he
will grant me, that what God foreſees certainly
to happen, or what will certainly happen, will
certainly happen, fuppofe it be in a confiftency
with freedom. One, then that does an ill ac-
tion, determines himſelf this is foreſeen as cer-
tain-by God. This fore-knowlege then muſt
have ſome reaſon or foundation; for if there
be no reaſon, it is impoffible and contradictory.
This reaſon then (according to our fuppofiti-
on) muſt be not in God, or any chain of cauf-
es and effects he has eſtabliſhed; but in the
man himself: but this could not be unleſs this
K
78
VINDICATION OF THE
preſent ſcheme, and this man in particular,
were to exiſt, and place and opportunity were
given him for doing this ill action freely. It
is impoffible this can be, unlefs fome perfons,
places, opportunities and circumſtances were
to proceed theſe, and others theſe, and others
theſe, and ſo on, till we come to the firſt cauſe
of all. This firſt muſt be fet a-going fome
how, and as God is the firft caufe, he muft do
it. Now I would fain know the difference be-
twixt determining or decreeing one's acting
what is morally evil,. by placing him in cir-
cumſtances in which he is neeeſſarily and uner-
ringly determined by motives, and fetting a
fcheme a-going in which he foreſees that one
free agent will certainly act fo and fo, and in
which this will afford occafion to another's
likewife acting freely, but certainly ſo and ſo,
and that to another, and fo on, though the
reaſons of their doing ſo be not his decree, but
their own free-will: for, as he is author of the
firft fpring, and certainly forefees what will
happen upon fetting it a-going, (no matter
what the ground or reafon of this forefight be,
if it be certain,) upon the fetting of this firſt
STATE OF THE MORAL WORLD.
79
a-going all is determined by it; for upon the
doing or not doing of this all will either cer-
tainly follow, or be certainly prevented. The
decreeing this firſt then is equivolent to the de-
creeing the whole, or every particular event.
Now, as this is foreſeen by God, as what will
certainly happen upon ſetting the ſcheme ago-
ing, therefor preſcience can be only the effect or
confequence of a decree. 2. E. D.
He concludes this head with a paffage of
Dr. Clarke, who agrees with him in this point,
but all of a fudden he drops it, as if it burned
him. I fhall therefor cite the whole for him.
His words are very obſervable.
"The man-
ner,
CC
fays the doctor *," how God can fore-
fee future things without a chain of neceſſary
cauſes, is impoffible for us to explain diftinctly,
though fome fort of general notion we may
conceive of it; for as a man, who has no influ-
ence over another perſon's actions, can yet per-
ceive before-hand, what that other will do, and
a wifer and more experienced will ftill with
greater probability foreſee what another, whofe
* Demonſtration of the being and attributes of God.
K 2
80
VINDICATION OF THE
=
difpofition he is perfectly acquainted with, will
in certain circumftances do, and an angel, with
ſtill leſs degrees of error, may have a further
profpect into men's future actions; fo it is very
reaſonable to apprehend, that God, without
influencing mens wills by his power, yet, by
his forefight, cannot but have as much cer-
tainer knowlege of future free events, than ei-
ther men or angels can poffibly have, as the
perfection of his nature is greater than that of
theirs." Now, is it not evident from all this,
that that truly good and learned man unlucki-
ly made a ſuppoſition, which if he had but du-
ly attended to it, he would have ſeen to confute
what he defigned to illuftrate by it: and this I
ſuppoſe the author was fenfible of. For if it
be but added to what he there fays, that the
way that God can with certainty, or a man of
experience, or an angel, can, with any proba-
bility, foreſee the future actions of another, is
only in confequence of his being determined by
his diſpoſition and circumſtances; and that
there is this remarkable difference with reſpect
to God, that he is the author of this difpofi-
tion, and orderer of theſe circumſtances, or,
}
STATE OF THE MORAL WORLD. 81
which is the fame, lays a train of cauſes and
effects, by which the man fhall contract fuch
a difpofition, and be in fuch circumſtances,
the cafe juft amounts to what you made it; for
the doctor makes no difference in the way God
and the man of experience forefees the man's
future actions, namely, in confequence of his
being determined by his diſpoſition and circum-
ſtances, but only on the certainty of it.
If then we are morally neceffary agents, or
always determined to action by the prepollent
motive, as I have fhown, then it evidently fol-
lows, that as all our powers, inclinations, and
circumſtances are adjuſted and ordered by God,
they could not fail to produce fuch and fuch.
effects, and were decreed by him to do fo;
which was the other part of this head. This,
I think, needs no proof; for if we are always
determined by the prepollent motive, and if
God at firſt gave us all our inclinations and dif-
pofitions, and a good being, as I have ſhown,
could never give us ill ones; and placed us in
fuch circumſtances, then it evidently follows,
that we could not but be determined to a par-
ticular way of action by thefe circumftances and
82
VINDICATION OF THE
difpofitions; and therefor, fince he fo adju-
fted them, he muſt have adjuſted them with
this very defign, that we fhould be fo deter-
mined. Accordingly the frequency and great-
neſs of vices, are they not ever exactly in pro-
portion to men's opportunities and temptations,)
the weakneſs of their reaſon, and ſtrength of
paffions?
But in oppofition to this, it is afferted by
our author, "That we corrupt theſe faculties
given us originally good by our Creator, and
contract inclinations he neither gave nor de-
figned; and all ftill by the fame wonderful
power of acting without a motive*. And
particularly he tells us, "Would it not be ri-
diculous to ſay, we got the inclinations to fnuff
and brandy from the Creator, which coſts us
fo many qualms before we can acquire them?”
Had he inſtanced in roaſt beef and pudding, the
abſurdity would have been a little more glaring,
though the inclination to ſnuff and brandy may
juſt as properly be faid to be given us by God,
all of them being equally artificial preparations.
* P. 41, 42.
STATE OF THE MORAL WORLD. 83
Not that God at firſt gave us directly fuch
inclinations, which is a way of 1peaking, he
only takes advantage of; but that a train of
caufes and effects were laid by him, in confe-
quence of which fuch inclinations would cer-
tainly be produced. The plain cafe here is this:
God gives us general appetites, to which are
ſuited a vaſt variety of objects; and it is not a
whit more abfurd to ſay, as I fhall fhow after-
ward, that God, for good and wife ends, de-
figned ſome ſhould contract habitual inclinati-
ons to theſe, than that he ſhould furnish the
materials for gratifying thefe inclinations. And
I am ſure I may appeal to the experience of all
that ever uſed fnuff or brandy, if ever any of
them began the practice in fo whimſical a way
as he alleges, and took what was fo diſagreeable
to them, from no reaſon or motive; and if
they were not, on the contrary, determined to
the firft, either for company's fake, or an in-
clination to comply with the prevailing cuftom,
or to divert themſelves, or keep time from be-
ing irkſome or tedious: and to the other, ei-
ther from fome pleaſure it gave the taſte, or
for the fake of company, or being thought good
84
VINDICATION OF THE
1
neighbours, or fuch like reafons or motives.
And do we not every day fee inftances of ast
whimſical cuſtoms as that of fnuffing begun,
for the fake of being thought the authors of
a faſhion, or other fuch ridiculous reaſons ?
What he adds further in anfwer to this, fhall
be confidered afterward.
Having thus paved our way, we ſhall now
be able to proceed, in the third place, with
more clearness and eaſe, to the confideration
of the ſcheme itſelf, namely, that fince every
thing was defigned by God, to be as it is, and
vice muſt be ſo too, fince it takes place: there-
for, the only way to reconcile the admiffion
of it, with the government of an infinitely wife
and good being, is, by faying, that it is a ne-
ceffary imperfection, and that this is a ſtate of
diſcipline, in which we are puniſhed for our
miſtakes and faults, only in order for our fu-
ture good and reformation; or that the end,
the only end confiftent with the goodneſs of
God, of annexing puniſhment to vice, is to
make us wifer and better.
If therefor it be made out, t, that vice is,
STATE OF THE MORAL WORLD.
85
as you exprefs it, a neceffary imperfection *:
2dly, That this is a ftate of diſcipline, in which
we get experience, by the puniſhment annexed
to our miſtakes and vices, or in which we are
puniſhed only for our future reformation and
* That I may not be miſtaken, by a neceflary imper-
fection, I do not mean that vice is an imperfection, which
our prefent imperfect natures only make neceiïary; but
which, as fome think, would have been better away, had
it been poffible they could have admitted it; and far lefs
do I mean an imperfection abfolutely ill, and introduc-
ed by the abufe of liberty, contrary to God's defign;
but an imperfection abfolutely neceflary, or which is ne-
ceflary for making up the beſt whole, and fo is both de-
creed by God, and worthy to be fo, as will appear from
our following reafoning. I obferve, that there is an am-
biguity in the word beſt whole, even among the moſt ju-
dicious writers in defence of liberty; for though they al-
lege, that moral evil is abfolute evil, yet they fay, it
being impoflible for God to create us without this liber-
ty, and confequently without a power of abuſing it, it
was better fo to create us, than not to create us at all;
and fo this is ſtill the beſt poſſible world. And indeed,
at this rate, fo it may, and yet be a very indifferent one.
I have therefor endeavoured, in oppofition to this, to
fhow, how the fuppofition of the abfence of moral evil
would be a greater evil than its taking place. This re-
duces the queſtion to a clear ſtate. As for the old fcheme,
which is for abfolute decrees, and yet will needs have
moral evil to be abfolute evil, and to be permitted by
God, to be introduced contrary to, or at leaſt befide his
defign and decree, 1 fuppofe the abfurdity of it is now
feen by every one. This is the only fcheme, as far as I
can fee, that takes off all difficulties; for if vice be not
abfolutely ill, but, on the contrary, ferves, upon the
whole, a good end, there can be no ill in decreeing it.
L
86
VINDICATION OF THE
amendment; and that even the punishments,
inflicted by fociety, are made ultimately to ſerve
this end; and laftly, That this ſtate will be car-
ried on in another world, and that puniſhment
can only ſerve the fame end there that it does
here if theſe affertions can be made good, we
ſhall do all that is requifite to prove what we
propofed.
As to the 1st, that vice is a neceffary imper-
fection. I have already fhown, that there is
no evil difpofition in nature, that the material
part of vice, the external action confidered a-
part from the diſpoſition it proceeds from, is
neither good nor ill; or that vice is equally
vice, whether it be ſhown in action or not.
One who has fuch a love for money, as that
he would murder his neighbour for it, had he
a ſtrong enough temptation, and convenient
opportunity, is the fame ill man, whether ever
he meet with fuch an opportunity or temptati
on, or if he meet with them, is equally vici-
ous before and after the fact. And fo, he that
looketh upon a woman to luft after her, hath com-
mitted adultery already with her in his heart.
If then the whole of vice confifts only in the
STATE OF THE MORAL WORLD. 87
difpofition, and if there be no evil difpofition
in nature, and vice is nothing but an irregular
degree of a ſelfiſh affection, that is not evil in
itſelf, or a miſtake of one another and our true
intereft; then it evidently follows, that the
queftion commonly thought ſo difficult, “Why
vice is admitted under the government of an
infinitely wife and good being?" amounts pre-
cifely to this, why God hath proportioned fo
variouſly the reafon, capacities, tempers, paf
fions, appetites, circumftances, etc. of men:
and the fame reaſon will account for the
great-
eſt vices, that accounts for the different con-
ftitutions of men, the different
powers of rea-
fon, the different ftrength of paffion; becauſe
theſe are the only fprings of vice, and what
accounts for the leaft difference of this kind,
will account for the greateſt.
The only difficulty therefore now remain-
ing, is to show what makes it requifite, that
in many caſes our reaſon fhould be ſo weak,
our affections ſo balanced, and our circumſtan-
ces fo ordered, as to bring fo much mifery both
upon the perſons themſelves and fociety, and
how this imperfection comes to be neceffary.
L 2
88
VINDICATION OF THE
Now this, I hope, will adinit of a very eaſy
folution.
It is allowed, I think, by all, and indeed
it is plain of itſelf, that fo complicated a ſcheme,
as that of this world, requires an inconceivable
variety of creatures, and among the feveral fpc-
cies of theſe creatures as great a variety of tem-
pers, capacities, and circumſtances, and as
great a variety of events ſuited to theſe, to an-
fwer the ends of providence. This is viſible
even among the brutes, and ftill much more
among men. And it is this fubordination of
creatures, this difference of inclinations and
purfuits, that makes fo beautiful a contraſt in
the great drama, that lays a foundation for ac-
tion, intercourſe, and a plot, which is abfo-
lutely neceffary for the happineſs and improve-
ment of mankind, and which there could be
no happineſs, except what ariſes meerly from
the gratification of ſenſual appetite.
If then fuch a ſcheme be neceffary, it is evi-
dent vice muft be fo at the fame time. If vice
were abfolutely evil, it is plain God could, if
he had fo pleaſed, eafily prevented it, without
having recourſe to fo whimſical a fuppofition,
STATE OF THE MORAL WORLD. 89
as the abuſe of our liberty for its being intro-
duced contrary to his defign; for fince he has
made higher orders of creatures, lefs liable to
vice, or who improve fafter in knowlege and
virtue; fince we find, that he has at firft fo
balanced fome particular men's paffions, or pla-
ced them in fuch circumftances, as that they
have very little inclination or temptation to fome
particular vices, it would have been equally ea-
fy to have made every man altogether without
paffions, and fo to have made them perfectly
ftupid; or, by fupplying all our wants, and
fatisfying all our defires, he could have cut off
all occafion of complaint or injuftice. But
*
* The end of men's uniting in fociety is, that they
may have their feveral wants fupplied with the greateſt
eafe and conveniency: and God has wifely made our
wants fo numerous, on purpofe that we might be driven
to this only method of improvement: and he only, who
is infinitely wife, can adjuft and proportion them, fo as
to produce the greatest good in the whole. Now, if we
be fuppofed creatures, whofe reafon is imperfect, and
who have patlions, wants, and defires, the means of gra-
tifying which are not always laid to our hands, and who,
at the fame time, are placed in fociety with others, as
we plainly are, then vice muft be the neceflary confe-
quence of this. As things then are at prefent confituted,
there is a neceffity of vice's taking place from nature,
and there is a neceffity of fitness, that things fhould be
ſo conſtituted, othewife there had been no foundation
for improvement in knowlege, goodness, or perfection.
#
VINDICATION OF THE
then, is it not evident, how intirely this would
have ſpoiled the beauty of the ſcheme? A
world of fuch perfect beings, who had all their
wants ſupplied, and, if it were poffible, who
had all equally fo perfect a knowlege, as never
in one inſtance to miſtake their true intereft,
and never to do the leaft fault or wrong to c
thers, however happy fuch a ſtate is common-
ly imagined, would be the greateſt abfurdity
and imperfection, greater than making all crea-
tures of one fpecies, than making them all an-
gels or men: for, what would ſuch a ſet of
To have created us without paffions, would have been,
as I faid, to have made us ftupid; and for any creature
to be made perfect at firſt in knowlege or goodneſs, or
indeed to be created with any degree of them, is a na-
tural impoffibility. So that the order of things lies thus.
It is impoffible we, or any fet of creatures, could be
made at firſt with all degrees, or indeed with any degree
of perfection; and therefor we muſt advance toward it.
by a gradual improvement, though fome may be made
capable of improving faſter than others. In order to
this, it is neceflary we fhould be placed in fociety. To
force us thus to unite, and keep united, it is neceffary
we ſhould have a variety of deſires, paffions, capacities,
wants, etc. fuited to the various offices that are requifite
there; which, as God is wife and good, muſt be adjuſt-
ed with infinite wiſdom and goodneſs. And laſtly, this
makes vice neceffary; for the fame reafon that makes
fuch a variety of capacities, paffions, wants, etc. nccef-
fary, makes vice fo too, or rather in propriety of ſpeech,
vice is nothing elſe.
STATE OF THE MORAL WORLD. 91
creatures do? how employ themſelves? what
room here for action, for hope, for improve-
ment, or for happineſs, unleſs of the dulleft
kind? If all men's affections and reafon were
perfectly regular in the common ſenſe of the
word, what need of any to teach or inftruct o-
thers? what need of conftituting focieties, and
fencing them by laws and fanctions? what
ground for debates to improve the underſtand-
ing? God might have immediately fupplied us
with all the neceffaries of life without toil or
labour; but then, what occafion for a beauti-
ful intercourfe of actions, for fuch a variety of
trades, manufactures, occupations among men
all working to one another's hands? In ſhort,
where is the foundation for growing either in
knowlege or goodneſs, unleſs ſuch a ſcheme
were laid for contracting acquaintance with
men and things, for converſe, correſpondence,
and improvement?
It is true, indeed, as in the natural fo in the
moral world, by reaſon of the complication of
the ſcheme, it is impoffible for us to fhow the
confiftency of every particular event of provi
dence, with the general defign of our Creator;
92
VINDICATION OF THE
nor would it, perhaps, be of very great uſe if
we could; and yet the general laws and rules
upon which God acts in both, and the ends he
propoſes, ftand demonftrably proved. But as
fome have taken advantage from fuch events in
the natural world, to make objections againſt
the goodneſs of God, fo others have gone the
fame way to work in the moral; while in truth
all the ſtrength of ſuch objections lies only in
our ignorance. It is to the not taking an ex-
tenfive and generous enough view of the de-
figns of creation, that fuch cavils are owing.
To give an inftance for the illuftration of
this, the defire of propagating our fpecies is,
perhaps, the occafion of more irregularities, in-
trigues, whoredoms, murders, rapes, lies, dif-
eafes, etc. than any one paffion; but at the
fame time is the fource of much more happi-
neſs, the foundation of families, of conjugal
and parental love, nay, of the continuation of
our fpecies and fociety itſelf. This paffion, e-
very one knows, does not arife before fuch an
age, and with a particular violence, and is
much ſtronger in fome than others, and very
often ſtrongeſt where reafon is weakeft. Now,
STATE OF THE MORAL WORLD. 93
it is evident, that the violence of it is the cauſe
of many irregularities and evils, and that its ill
effects are more or leſs, according to mens dif-
ferent conftitutions, circumftances, and the
difference of their reafon to manage this paffion.
Is it not plain then, that the forementioned e-
vils are the neceffary effects of neceffary caufes
eſtabliſhed by God, and confequently muſt be
defigned by him, as he is wife and good, to
anfwer wife and good ends? And how they
may do ſo, any one may fee, that has read a well
wrought tragedy. But on the other ſcheme,
things ought to have been quite the reverſe of
what we in fact find them *.
I hope that none will imagine from this account of
matters that I have given, that I coincide with the fable
of the bees's notion, "That private vices are neceffary
for the welfare and proſperity of a nation;" for there is
a wide difference betwixt this, and faying, that a vari-
ety of tempers, circumſtances, etc. is neceflary for foci-
ety, for improvement, and an intercourfe of offices,
which I have reduced the queſtion to; and that what mi-
ftakes and vices happen in confequence of theſe are de-
figned by God, to anfwer wife and good purpoſes in the
whole, which appears, as I fhall fhow afterwards, from
their being allowed by God to happen. This is certain-
ly true, and yet in proportion, as their tempers and cir-
cumſtances lead them, in fome particular inftances, to
do what is vicious, to injure others, or miſtake their own
truc intereft, they must be unhappy. The cafe is the
M
94
VINDICATION OF THE
From this then it appears how inconfiftent
the author of Reflections, etc. is with himſelf,
when he fays *, "That it is agreeable to the
variety and gradation of the works of God, that
there should be fuperior orders of beings, that
is, that there fhould be fome orders of crea-
tures liable to fewer miſtakes, weakneffes, wrong
choices, etc. than others; for if vice, or moral
evil, be abfolutely evil, or introduced contrary
to God's intention or defign, the lefs liable to
it the better." Why then are there any inferior
orders of beings created, that ſhould be more
liable to it than others? Unlefs he fay, it was
wife and good that ſome creatures fhould be ex-
pofed more to miſtakes, temptations, and wrong
fame with focieties, as with private perfons or families,
as I may poſſibly ſhow upon another occafion; all nati-
ons muſt ever profper or decay in power and wealth,
in proportion to their virtue, frugality, and induſtry,
and the growth of arts and ſciences. It may indeed an-
fwer wife and good ends in the whole, that ſome nations
as well as particular perfons, fhould be more vicious,
and miſtake their true intereft more than others, as is e-
vident from that ignorance and barbarity that God fees
fit fhould prevail in many nations; for if vice be abſo-
lute evil, it is altogether unaccountable, even upon the
fcheme of liberty, that God fhould never interpofe to
remedy fo general a depravation; but then, for the fame
reaſon, it muſt be wife and fit, at the fame time, that
they fhould fuffer for it, and be unhappy in proportion.
P. 38.
STATE OF THE MORAL WORLD. 95-
choices than others; and yet that it was good
and fit, that all fhould equally fhun thefe, and
that moral evil fhould never have exifted. For,
if this was the end of God's creating us, cer •
tainly the furer methods were uſed to overtake
this end the better, unleſs he fay, God made
us liable to miſtakes, defignedly made us fo;
and yet that he expected we ſhould never mi-
ſtake. In ſhort, it is impoffible at all, upon
his ſcheme, to account for fuch variety and
gradation. It is ſtill more unaccountable upon
his principles, that among men fome ſhould be
born with ſtronger inclinations to fome parti-
cular vices than others, if it were wife and fit,
and for the good of the whole, that they
ſhould equally ſhun them. For to ſay, that
God made fuch difference of conftitutions, and
laid fome under fo much ſtronger temptations
than others, and yet to expect, that all this
fhould occafion no difference in their behaviour
and actions, and that he defigned, that not
one morally ill action fhould ever be com-
mitted in confequence of fuch temptations *,
* And this length he muft go; for if it can be but
fhown, that a morally ill action can but poffibly, in
M 2
96
VINDICATION OF THE
1
is very ſtrange; for certainly, the fame reaſon
that makes it unfit that God ſhould defign
what is morally evil, makes it likewife unfit he
ſhould deſign any thing that has a greater ten-
dency than another to bring it about.
If then the prefent ſtate of things could not
be otherwife, if ſuch differences of reaſon, con-
ftitutions and paffions, which are not ill of
themſelves, be neceffary for the happineſs and
beauty of the preſent ſcheme, and vice be the
natural and neceſſary conſequences of theſe, or
rather the fame with them, it is evident vice is
juſt as neceſſary, or no more than a neceffary
imperfection.
And it is upon theſe principles only we can
account for that great ſeeming irregularity that
we fee obferved, with refpect to the health,
ſtrength, conſtitutions, fortunes, etc. of men
here; how much happier the vicious are many
any one cafe, anſwer a better purpoſe than the not al-
lowing it will do, which one would think could ſcarce
be denied, it is not only confiftent with goodneſs to al-
low it, but God, as he is good, muft decree and approve
of its happening. And it is owned almoſt by all, that
God over-rules the worst actions for good ends; how
confiftently with a denial of his decreeing them, any
one may judge from what I have ſaid.
STATE OF THE MORAL WORLD 97
times in theſe reſpects than the virtuous, and
how they have it in their power to kill, per-
fecute, and maltreat them. The true folution
of this is, that virtue and profperity have no
neceflary connection with one another in the
nature of things. It is indeed wife and fit,
that in the refult of things pain ſhould be the
certain confequence of vice, and happineſs of
virtue, becauſe otherwife there would be no
difcouragement from the one, or encouragement
to the other; but that therefore the virtuous
fhould always be happy in their health, for-
tunes, etc. is no conclufion at all; for better
ends, more advantageous to the cauſe of virtue,
may be ſerved by this. As we are finite crea-
tures, indeed we would always wish it were fo,
becauſe we would with thoſe who have moſt
inclination to do good, had moſt power to do
it; but if we faw, for inftance, that the giving
a well inclined man a great fortune would have
a bad effect on his mind or body, or upon fo-
ciety, (and how often does wealth or power
produce pride, luxury, or violence, in theſe,
who in a low ftation were humble, fober and
juft!) in this cafe, we could not but fee a plain.
98
VINDICATION OF THE
reaſon why he ſhould want it, and another lefs
virtuous rather have it, if no fuch ill effect
would follow his getting it. Mifery or wants
may prevent vice in the innocent, as well as
reform the guilty, and this makes the afflicting
them both good and juft. And hence the ab-
furdity of meerly poſitive reward.
Theſe two queftions then are perfectly di-
ftinct. Why is mifery made, in the event, the
certain and neceffary confequence of vice, and
why are vicious men frequently happy in their
health, circumftances, power, while the virtu-
ous are otherwiſe? And unleſs it can be ſhown,
that no poffible good end can be ferved by this,
which is impoffible to do, this argument in-
cludes nothing. Now how often, even in this
dark ſtate, do we ſee the contrary? is not af-
fliction the ſchool of many eminent virtues?
do not misfortunes teach us patience, humili-
ty, fubmiffion? what defolation and confufi-
on, and ſeemingly unjuſt changes of fortune
follow wars? but do they not, at the fame
time, afford the nobleft opportunities of form-
ing men's minds to fortitude, to honeſty, and
the ſtricteſt friendship? and is it not thence we
STATE OF THE MORAL WORLD. 99
are furniſhed with fuch examples of heroiſm,
as are the fubjects of entertainment and imita-
tion to future ages? This then fhows beyond
contradiction, what good ends the vices of men
may ſerve towards others that fuffer by them.
Hence then, we may be furniſhed with an an-
fwer to fuch queſtions as the author of Reflec-
tions, etc. puts*; "We expect no redreſs, ſays he,
for being innocently oppreffed, maffacred;
Is it, let me aſk, tyranny to puniſh the oppreſſor,
and not tyranny not to reſtrain the oppreffion?
to let the innocent groan on? What thoughts
of the deity does this fuggeft? He will not pu-
niſh himſelf the guilty too: but hath his
torturers of the innocent, perfectly agreeable to
his deſigns!" I answer in a word by another
queftion, whether it be not the fame thing for
theſe innocent perfons to be cut off by the
fword of a Nero or Alexander, as to be carried
off by a plague, ſwallowed by an earthquake,
or overflown by the fea? Here then is a caſe
where innocent men are tortured perfectly a-
greeable to the deſigns of God, it being his
* P. 16.
100
VINDICATION OF THE
own immediate work, unleſs he ſuppoſe the
natural world as much from under his manage-
ment as he makes the moral; and where no re-
drefs can be expected, unlefs he feek it from
one to whom the leaft imperfection cannot be
imputed without blafphemy. Is it not plain
then from this, that he may make oppreſſors
the inftruments of doing what was otherwiſe
fit and proper to be done, and for which he
had wiſe reaſons, though poffible we may not
know them? If thofe of his way will look a-
bout them a little, they will find the world fil-
led with inftances of injuftice in their ſenſe of
the word, which vicious men have no hand in
bringing about. It is every whit as unjuft, ac-
cording to their abſtract notions of juſtice, and
anſwers juſt the fame purpoſes, that a bad man
fhould be heir to an eftate to which he has a
legal or juft right, or which falls to him by wife
and good laws, while another that deferves it
wants it, as it would be for the firft to rob the
fecond of it, the effects of both being the fame.
This then is a caſe he cannot but reckon ill or
unjuft, which yet has not happened contrary
to God's defign, by men's abufing their liberty,
STATE OF THE MORAL WORLD.
ΙΟΙ
and which must be accounted for, and jufti-
fied fome how or other, without having re-
courſe to his refuge, of things being wrong,
or the ſtate of the world diftempered, unleſs he
fay, God never defigned men ſhould eſtabliſh
good laws, or that they ſhould be altered or
broke, every time this happens. Again, a fleet
is left in a ſtorm at ſea, and a juſt cauſe with
it.
Here the men, and the fociety to whom
they belong, fuffer juſt as much as if their com-
mander had been the occafion of this loſs thro,
unfkilfulneſs, treachery, or cowardice, Now,
upon this ſcheme, though the event be the
fame in both cafes, yet in the one it muſt be
abfolutely right, in the other abfolutely wrong;
whereas, on the other, there is no difficulty in
accounting for fuch inftances. Every thing
runs eafily, every thing is confiftent with itſelf,
and with the goodness of God. God defigns
all that happens, and all is good. Appearan-
ces, the moſt crofs to the caufe of virtue, ferve
in the whole a wife and good end, and yet not
the leaſt encouragement is given to vice. But
on the other, no answer can be made to end-
lefs objections; all is confufion, patching,
N
102
VINDICATION OF THE
mending; all the numberlefs inftances of vice
are abfolute evils; and God can propoſe, at
leaft foreſee no end of his works, becauſe it is
always in our power to defeat his defigns.
The foundation of fuch objections as the au-
thor makes here, is owing, I fuppoſe, to the
confufed abftract notions that are commonly
framed of the merit or defert of virtue; where-
as, if it were confidered, that all rewards of
this kind are comparatively merited, and, as I
fhall ſhow afterward, are always relative to ſo-
ciety, the miſtake would foon appear. For in-
ftance in a fociety, where one man is better
:
than all the reft, we fay, This man better de-
ferves an eſtate, which he gets, than any other:
But place him again in a fociety, where all theſe
are better than he, it cannot be faid he deferves
the fame eſtate, though he be ſtill the fame man.
In ſhort, all the reward due to virtue, if it can
properly be called one, is a reward of a kind
with itſelf, improvement in it; and all that
can be expected of an infinitely wife and good
being in the management of the moral world,
is not providently to annex a poſitive reward
to every virtuous action, but to obferve fuck
I
1
STATE OF THE MORAL WORLD.
103
meaſures as will, upon the whole, produce
the moſt virtue and goodneſs, and the moſt
happineſs in confequence of it: which moft
certainly he does, however we, his ſhort-fight-
ed creatures, may be difficulted to reconcile
this his defign with fome particular inftances,
and may wish things otherwife than we fee
them.
And therefore, from all this I think you juſt-
ly infer the weakneſs of the common argument
for a future ſtate, taken from the perverted or-
der of things here, and fay, "That it rather
proveth the contrary; for if things are wrong
in this ſtate, it is a fhrewd prefumption they
muſt be always fo." To which it is answered,
"The preſent diftempered ſtate of the moral
world is too manifeft to be denied or diffem.
bled," etc. I have already fhown the abfurdi-
ty of fuch a perfect world as he would have,
and ſo anſwered this. But as a more direct
anſwer he ſays, "The infinuation, that if
things were wrong here, they fhould always be
fo, is equal an to abfolute affirmation, without
any condition, they are fo undeniably wrong.
* P. 18.
***
N 2
104
VINDICATION OF THE
He means, I fuppofe, that they have gone ſo
much, and fo long wrong, as that we have no
reaſon to expect a rectification. Now, to put
an end, if poſſible, to this long pretended ar-
gument in favours of a future ſtate, I obſerve,
that when it is alleged by thofe of his princi-
ples that things are wrong here, or, which is
the fame thing, the means of private happi-
nefs unequally diftributed, they muft either
mean that they are ſo abfolutely, and without
any condition, and that it had been better that
good men had been often in ill men's place
with reſpect to theſe things; or elſe they mean
nothing at all. For if they fay, that indeed,
all things confidered, it was more wifely order-
ed by providence, that good men ſhould be li-
able to afflictions, and that in the end it would.
ſerve a good purpoſe, to wit, their advantage,
the cauſe is given up; for then things are beſt
as they are, and they could not have been o-
therwiſe, conſiſtently with wiſdom and good-
neſs; and conſequently it is wife and fit, as he
himſelf fays, that we ſhould be innocently op-
preffed, maffacred, etc. But this the author
STATE OF THE MORAL WORLD.
105
will not grant, for he every where afferts, that
vice and its confequences are introduced con-
trary to God's defign, and are abfolutely wrong
and cannot ferve a good end; and yet he has
ftill a reaſon in referve why things fhould be
allowed to go on for fome time. He tells us,
page 42. "If God interpofed extraordinarily
to impede the external action, there would be
no fettled courſe in nature; or is it reaſonable
to defire God to diſturb the law of creation,
rather than that we fhould do what is in our
power to do?" I would aſk again, what fup-
pofe he did? Is there any danger in putting at
ſtop too foon, or too effectually to what is ab-
folutely evil or wrong, eſpecially fince this in-
terpofition, according to him, muft be fooner
or later? But then, "There would be no fett-
led courfe in nature." It feems then the al-
lowing moral evil is neceſſary to a regular fet-
tled courſe: but, according to him, vice is an
unnatural interruption of the fettled regular
confequences of virtue to others, and introdu-
duced contrary to God's defign, and that is
the moſt regular, fettled, harmonious ftate of
things in which virtue alone was to take place.
106
VINDICATION OF THE
It cannot therefore on this fuppofition be urged
that the law of creation would be diſturbed.
Beſides, the diſturbing general laws, being no
reaſon of acting or not acting in itſelf, the on-
ly reafon for not difturbing this fettled order
would be, that fome greater moral evil would
follow upon doing fo, than not doing it; for
general laws are only to be kept or broke as
the keeping or breaking them anſwers fome
morally good or ill end. Now the only confe
quences of ſuch extraordinary interpofitions,
and of giving dreadful and early examples of
vice, would be the more effectual difcourage-
ment of vice; and according to him, the more
effectual, the better: and if he would conde-
fcend on any ill confequences this would have,
as indeed they are innumerable, he will find that
he anſwers himself: fo that it is abfurd to talk
as he does of "Limiting agents to a certain.
time for doing ill," if vice be abfolute ill; for
to ſay this, is to ſay it would be better general
laws were broke, than vice were permitted.
But he will infift that fuch interpofitions would
*
* P. 49.
STATE OF THE MORAL WORLD. 107
deſtroy a free choice, and fo would be incon-
fiftent with a ſtate of probation. But if this
were a deſtroying our liberty, yet better to do
ſo than leave us with fuch a power, when, by
virtue of it, we chufe and do what is abſolutely
ill. Why truft us with fo dangerous a power
when we would only bring mifery on ourfelves
by it? Better drive one to do what is materi-
ally good againſt his will, than let him do what
is abfolutely evil with it; otherwife what
ferves laws and their penalties for? At this rate
no fociety ſhould puniſh malefactors, becauſe in
fo doing they deftroy a free choice in others.
But he tells us t, Though God would im-
pede the external action, he cannot impede the
wicked deſign itſelf, which is already the wick-
edneſs and obliquity from the rule of action.”
But what then? Let him that ſhould, fuffer for
it. But becauſe he is wicked, fhould another,
that is not fo, fuffer for his wickednefs, if it be
abfolutely unfit he fhould do fo? Is not this
then a demonftration, that the permitting it
anfwers fome good end with refpect to others,
* P. 44.
66
+ The fame page, 44.
108
VINDICATION OF THE
fince, after all, the evil of the action is alrea-
dy committed, to wit, the defign, that part of
it (the material part) is ſtill allowed to follow,
for which the perfon is neither more or leſs
guilty, and by which others alſo fuffer? For
why permit it, when this permiffion anſwers
no good end? If it does, fuch as brightening
the virtue of the fufferer, or the like, then
here is a good reafon not only for permitting
but decreeing moral evil; and fo we have a
good reaſon for God's decreeing all the ill ever
happened.
You have good reaſon, therefore, I think to
fay, that upon this ſcheme only, in which eve-
ry thing is as right as can be, a future ftate can
be built. The immortality of the foul is what
I both fincerely wifh and believe, and I dare
fay, it is the wiſh of every one not exceedingly
loft to goodness; and that even the moſt athe.
iſtical perfon, in the midſt of all his attempts
to prove it falfe, wiſhes a confutation; and
therefor, I think the author ought to have
been more fparing in the reflections he makes
upon you, and in effect upon all that are of
your principles, as deciding fo overbearingly
STATE OF THE MORAL WORLD. 109
in this fum and chief of all enquiries, and build-
ing it upon an idle and inconſiſtent fancy of
your own, in oppofition to a proof agreeable
to the fenfe of all mankind. I am ſtill of opi-
nion, that upon this fcheme only it can be
built, and more confiftency, than upon one
that arraigns the goodnefs of God, by main-
taining things to be abfolutely wrong, and fo
in effect deſtroys the foundation of all hope.
For, though indeed that fenfelefs argument,
that things will fometimes be fet right, becauſe
they are here evidently wrong, be cut off*;
* It is true indeed, things will be fo far rectified, as
that the virtuous and knowing will be placed in ftations
fuitable to their capacities and virtue, as their future im-
provement and happineſs will admit, and as the laws of
that fociety require, which is the natural and only pro-
per reward of virtue. For it is abfurd to fuppofe, that
virtue fhould always want its natural reward. It may
indeed do fo for a time, when it is beſt it ſhould be fo,
when this tends the more to brighten it and render it
happier at the laft. But if virtue were always to be mi-
ferable, there would be no accounting for things; this
would be always ufing the means, when yet the end
were never to follow. But that virtue will ever be the
road to happineſs, and lead to it fooner or later, and in
fuch a time and way as will answer the beſt and wifeſt
cnds, as we ſee it fometimes happens here, is as evident
as the goodneſs of God. This is fuch a rectification of
the conftitution of the world as will always be going
on, if it can be called a rectification; for I have no de-
ILO
VINDICATION OF THE
yet the argument, drawn from virtue's wanting
its natural reward, is great and unanswerable.
The natural rewards of virtue are here but of-
ten felt in part, fometimes fcarce at all, in the
caſe of a ſudden death in the purſuit of it,
which no account can be given of, without fup-
poling another world; for here would be a
means evidently defigned for bringing about
fuch an end, and which is ever deſigned
by God for bringing it about, (whatever
good ends it may over and above ſerve with
refpect to fociety) and yet the end not follow.
Again, as this is but a part of the whole fcheme,
and evidently broken and incomplete, and as it
is plain, we are fent here for improving in
knowlege and goodnefs, when we are fo far
advanced in this, and confequently when the
reafon for our continuance in being, to wit,
our capacity of doing always more and more
good, is always growing ſtronger and ſtronger,
to be daſhed into nothing all at once, is abfo-
lutely inconfiftent with all the notions we have
of wildom and goodneſs; and conclufions,
fire to quarrel about the word, providing it be not made
to include the ſuppoſition of things being once abſo-
lutely wrong.
STATE OF THE MORAL WORLD.
111
drawn from the goodneſs of God, are as cer-
tain as any drawn from his natural perfecti-
ons, nay more certain, as we have clearer no-
tions of it. Again, there is no ultimate end
here; every thing anfwers fome end, that an-
other, and that another, and fo on, which
plainly leads us beyond this world; and as he
himſelf very well expreffes it," the relation of
things ſtretch out into eternity," and that with-
out having recourfe to an unnatural interrup-
tion of the ſcheme, in order to have virtue re-
warded, and vice puniſhed. The actings of
infinite wisdom and goodnefs are always uni-
form and confiftent. And this lays a beautiful
foundation not only for another ſtate, but for
the eternity of it; which the other ſcheme does
not. For if the virtuous meet with as much
happineſs there as they wanted here, as the re-
ward of their virtue; and the vicious as much
pain, it infers no more, and a future ftate upon
it may end fo at this rate a millennium may do
all the buſineſs. But this argument I ſhall en-
deavour, upon another opportunity, to pro-
pofe in its full force, where particularly I ſhal
fhow, that moral reafons are what alone muſt
0 2
II 2
VINDICATION OF THE
determine this point, they being ever the rule
of God's acting, and that too much regard has
been had to the natural ones, both by the
friends and enemies of this doctrine.
2dly. What we propofed further under this
head, as neceſſary to reconcile the admiffion of
vice with the goodneſs of God, and happineſs
of the creation, was, that this is a ſtate of dif-
cipline, in which we get experience by the pu-
niſhments annexed to our miſtakes and vices, or
in which we are puniſhed only for our future
reformation and amendment.
That at our birth, we enter into the great
ſchool and nurſery of the creation, in which,
as our reafon opens, we improve by a gradual
acquaintance with men and things, in know-
lege, virtue, and a capacity for happineſs;
and as we miſtake, are wifely and kindly pu-
niſhed, in order to our future good, and at
more regular purſuit of our happineſs and
that this ſtate of difcipline will be carried on
without end, by our tranflation to another and
happier fociety, is, I think, the moſt delight.
ful truth in all philoſophy.
That childhood is a ſtate of difcipline, and
a ſtate of diſcipline only; and that it would be
STATE OF THE MORAL WORLD.
113
cruel to puniſh children with any other view,
than in order to their future good, and the
correcting of their faults, and the determining
them to a more careful purſuit of the rules of
virtue and happineſs, is ſeen and acknowleged
by all.
But, as if when we advance in years,
we became new creatures, and get new powers
and faculties, it is alleged we then come to be
in a ſtate of probation too, though how, or at
what precife time this ſtate begins, is not ſaid;
and that what faults we commit then, we de-
ferve to be poſitively puniſhed for hereafter, or
puniſhed without any fuch view; though it is
plain, the miſtakes we fall into then are ow-
ing to the fame caufes thefe of childhood are,
weakneſs of reafon, or ftrength of paffion, and
are equally predetermined by God. To this
purpoſe are the many objections made by the
author of Reflections, againſt our being here
in a ſtate of diſcipline only.
He tells us*, "From this ſcheme it would
follow, that man would never fall into the
fame vice again: for ignorance is made
* P. 5.
114
VINDICATION OF THE
the reaſon why they fall into vice; and it is af-
firmed, every new experience will teach them
how to act in fuch cafes afterward." And af-
terwards * "This is an age wherein the the-
ory of morality, at leaft, is perfectly under-
ſtood; therefore, according to this doctrine,
it ſhould be moſt virtuous." But how does
this follow? Becauſe one is fenfible for the pre-
ſent of the evil of vice, by feeling its confe-
quences, and made to repent his choice, muſt
he therefore be ever after fo? If indeed all cir-
cumſtances were the fame, if he had as freſh a
ſenſe and rememberance of his folly, and no
ftronger temptation to vice the ſecond time that
he had the firſt, it would be impoſſible to fall
again into vice. But though the theory of mo-
rality ſhould be never fo well underſtood, yet
fure he will not fay, every man ſkilled in
this theory knows and confeffes, upon every fo
licitation of private paffion, that it is beft for
him, at the time, in all reſpects, not to grati-
fy that paffion. Theſe are quite different things.
Will he, or any man fay, a man that drinks
* P. 6.
STATE OF THE MORAL WORLD.
115
drunk, to uſe his own inftance, which one.
ſkilled in the theory of morality may do, thinks
drinking, in all refpects, worfe at the time than
not drinking? As we are imperfect creatures,
we muſt be more affected with prefent things.
than future; and whatever applies itſelf moft
ftrongly for the preſent to the paſſion, that
permoſt carries it; our former ſenſe of things
alſo wears off, and our circumſtances vary, and
thence it is we fall again into vice. This is
the neceſſary effect of our imperfect finite na-
tures and conſtitutions; and hence a repetition
of experiences becomes neceffary.
up-
But ftill it will be urged, if this be a ſtate
of diſcipline only, how fhall we account for
men's contracting habits of vice? This feems
to be an intire defeating the end of annexing
puniſhment to vice, when inſtead of being re-
formed, and made wifer by it, we contract ha-
bits that we go out of the world hardened in,
as this author reafons *." Doth not drunken-
nefs carry its own puniſhment along with it;
yet of what do we contract ſtronger or more
* P. 5 and 10.
116
VINDICATION OF THE
incorrigible habits?" This, it muſt be owned,
is the moſt plaufible objection urged againſt
this fcheme; and therefor I anſwer, 1st, that
we can contract no directly ill difpofitions, as
I have already ſhown; and therefor, the moſt
any man can do, is only to ſtrengthen his fel-
fifh ones, (which are not ill of themſelves, but
only accidentally fo) to the bearing down, in a
great meaſure, his virtuous ones; but no man,
no not the moſt vicious that ever lived, is al-
together void of virtue. 2dly, That every man,
both the moſt ignorant, and the moſt vicious,
improve much more, both in knowlege and
goodnefs, than is commonly imagined. I may
venture to fay, there is not fo
great a difference
betwixt the moſt acute philofopher, and a
countryman of common fenfe, as betwixt the
fame perfon when a child, and when a man.
Nor can it be otherwife; for God has fo clofly
twiſted our concerns and intereſts in this world,
as that every man, that is not an idiot, muft
grow in acquaintance both with men and things,
eſpecially the common maxims of morality, and
*. P. 6.
STATE OF THE MORAL WORLD. 117
benevolence, either to a larger, or more confined
ſyſtem, according to his circumſtances. 3dly,
There is this remarkable difference betwixt ha-
bits of virtue and vice, that the firſt are attended
with a growing pleaſure, the other, the more
indulged, afford continually lefs and lefs. The
organ becomes more and more blunt, and at
length a complete cure is brought about by its
deſtruction: (whereas, habits of knowlege and
goodneſs have no dependence upon the body :)
though in the mean time vicious habits, and
a continuance in them for fome time, muft hap-
pen, in confequence of that variety of confti-
tutions and circumftances, that, as I fhewed
before, the good of the whole requires.
But after all, if there be any difficulty in ac-
counting for the growth of vicious habits, the
other ſcheme is as much obliged to anſwer for
it as this for whatever puniſhment any act of
vice may deferve after it is committed, yet fure.
none will be fo cruel or unreaſonable as to fay,
that a vicious man can do any thing to deſerve
ſo dreadful a curſe, as that his recovery ſhould
always grow more and more difficult, and in-
clination to vice ſtronger and ſtronger; for this
P
118
VINDICATION OF THE
is a matter that juſtice, even in their own mif-
applied fenfe of the word, has nothing to do
with. The fyftematic writers indeed fay,
"It is judicial blindnefs, and hard nefs of heart,
or a withdrawing of the fpirit." But I fcarce
think our author will go fo far.
Another objection he ftarts is, how fuch a
ftate of difcipline can be carried on in the other
world?" Shall we," fays he*, "be in ha-
zard of acting fraudulently, oppreffively, etc.
there, in caſe we have not got knowlege and
experiences enough of theſe things here? or
fhall we be vicious to eternity,that we may
ftill be improving in virtue and know-
lege, from our vices, or from the puniſhment
they bring along with them?" And after-
wards, Men that have finned luftily, as Ca-
ligula, Nero, etc. bid fair to be the brighteſt
fpirits." And again ‡, "Thefe", to wit,
dreadful monſters of men, "fhould be the
beft men, having had moft experience." But
who does not fee, that all this is founded on
a miferable miſtake of this ſcheme, as if it fol-
(6
* P. 7.
† P. 8.
‡ P. s.
STATE OF THE MORAL WORLD. 119
:
lowed from it, that the being deterred from
vice, by feeling the confequence of it, was po-
fitive improvement in virtue and knowlege,
and therefor the more experiences of this kind
the better whereas it is plain, that the confe-
quences of vice being only to fright us from
making any more experiments of it, and to fet
us upon a right courſe, the perfon who falls
again and again into vice, is never the better
for having formerly felt its effects, no more
than a child is better for falling again into the
fame fault, after having been before chaftifed
for it, whom yet none will deny to be puniſhed
again only for his amendment. The end of
puniſhing being only to deter from vice; the
fooner this end is overtaken, the better for the
perfon: though indeed the prefent conftituti-
on of things will not allow that men ſhould be
made fo perfect, as never to need correction.
And it can never follow, as he infinuates, that
becauſe the deſign of punishment is to make us
wifer and better, by teaching us to reform and
amend; therefor we are made fo, though we
are not reformed by it, but fall again and again
into the fame fault. From this then it appears,
P 2
I 20
VINDICATION OF THE
how abfurd it is to talk of dealing fraudulent-
ly, oppreffively, etc. in heaven in order to im-
provement; for ftill the more improved, the
more happy we are, and the leſs liable to act
fo, and fo the lefs occafion for punishment,
though we can never be abfolutely perfect, or
altogether free from error and miſtakes.
Again *, he endeavours to fhow, that on
your principles there can be no ground for the
complaint you make, "That the greateſt con-
fufions, and bloodieft maffacres, have arifen
from certain opinions." "For," fays he,
"if there is no real evil in the world, nothing
but what is confiftent with the good and im-
provement of mankind, and what God defign-
ed, it will follow, that it is perfectly needleſs
to feek to alter the opinions of other men
and that no former opinions can have an ill
conſequence, or new ones a better, every thing
taking that iſſue that God defigned it fhould."
That every thing happens for the beſt, and
takes that iffue God defigned, I have already
fhown; but does it follow from this, that it
* P. 13.
STATE OF THE MORAL WORLD
121
is needleſs to ſeek to alter the opinions of men?
For God may defign that too; and if he does
fo, he muſt alſo defign the means of it.
This is what has been urged over and over
again, by every one that has but in the leaft
dipped into the predeftinarian controverſy; and
therefor, when he fays*, "that the doing ſo
is fighting againſt the Creator, and oppofing
his deſigns, and making him defign all the con-
trariety among men that ever was or will be;"
he may as well fay, that the taking medicines
to mend a difeafed conftitution, or to cure a
diſtemper that one has fallen into through no
miſmanagement of his own, (and this, at leaſt,
I hope, the author will own to be defigned by
God, as being the effect of natural laws, eſta-
bliſhed by him,) is fighting againſt him, and
making him defign contrarieties. The cafe is
the fame in the moral world as in the natural,
they both alike need this kind of mending. It
is true indeed, from our partial and limited view
of things, we do not know what is beſt in the
whole in many cafes, till the event difcover it,
* In the following 13th page.
122
VINDICATION OF THE
at leaſt not with certainty; and therefor, we
will always defire, and do what appears beſt
to us; and if we be virtuous, what we think
will do the greateſt good, though God may fee
fit, for wife ends, to difappoint our wishes and
endeavours, which abundantly folves all the
contradiction he loads you with. One may in-
nocently point out any paft evil, which God
faw fit ſhould happen, in order to prevent the
like in time coming, and yet God may not fee
fit to grant this wiſh; unleſs he ſay, that to pre-
vent this contrariety, God fhould grant every
particular wiſh of every good man that is made
with an honeft intention, which is both im-
poffible and abfurd; becauſe, by reaſon of his
imperfect knowlege, he muſt frequently defire
things not good in the whole.
He objects next*, that this ſcheme takes a-
way the force of all laws, both human and di-
vine. "How comes human laws," fays
he," to inflict puniſhments for men's im-
proving themſelves in virtue and knowlege,
etc?" Certainly the author could not be ig-
* P. 14, 15.
STATE OF THE MORAL WORLD. 123
norant, that the reformation of offenders can,
upon this ſcheme, only be brought about by
puniſhment, and that this is the end you always
affert puniſhment ferves. Not as I obferved be-
fore, that feeling the effects of vice is pofitive
improvement in virtue or knowlege, which he
always infinuates; but only defigned to deter
us from vice. All therefor he ſays here is be-
fides the purpoſe. "But," fays he, "when
a rogue is hanged, all his future advancement
in perfection is uncharitably cut off, at leaft
here." Very true, but not hereafter. And
by this, both he and the fociety are moſt evi-
dently benefited; the fociety, in that a bad mem-
ber is cut off; and he himfelf, in that when
his ſelfiſh paffions are now come to fuch an
height, as in a great meaſure to extinguiſh his
virtuous ones, and to make both himfelf and
others for ever uneafy while he is joined in ſo-
ciety with them; he is by death fet free, both
from the organs and objects by which fuch paf-
fions are gratified: fo that this man's refor
mation is brought about by puniſhment. And
herein appears the great goodneſs and wifdom
of the end God makes all punishment to ferve,
124
VINDICATION OF THE
in that whatever other views fociety may have
in puniſhing, he ever puniſhes with a view to
reform, and makes even the punishment inflic
ted by fociety on malefactors ferve this end.
His next objection is *, "That there is an-
other thing affumed as certain in this fcheme,
which yet ſeems contrary to obſervation and
experience in this life, namely, that mifery or
puniſhment is the natural confequence of all
vices in it;" (though in the foregoing he had
faid, it inferred remifs impunity;)" which,"
he tells us,
"is not true, and fo far as it is
not, it takes away the very foundation of this
ftate of difcipline." And he fays,
"It is fo
far from being true, that ſome men, fecure by
their ill got power, rather triumph in their vil-
lany as they enjoy health, eafe, affluence,
etc." That all vice is always followed by one
kind of puniſhment, the bearing down the vir-
tuous affections, and for the moſt part with
more, to wit, pofitive pain and mifery, is very
certain; but that the fame vice is always
followed with the fame degree of confe-
'
# P. 16.
STATE OF THE MORAL WORLD.
125
quent mifery or puniſhment in different per-
fons, and at the fame diftance of time, this
ſcheme never faid. And it is fufficient for all
the ends of God's government, that this pu-
niſhment ſhall be at fuch a time, and in fuch
meaſure, as he ſhall fee beft to anfwer the ends
of puniſhment, the good of fociety, and refor-
mation of the offender. And to proportion
thefe aright, is only the province of him that
is infinitely wife. When God has fome great
revolution to bring about in the world, ſup-
poſe the humbling one grand villain, as he calls
him, or deſtroying a wicked nation, by allow-
ing another grand villain to reign fo long in
unbridled power and tyranny, and, if he pleaf-
es, in dealing death and deftruction around
him, will any man fay, this laſt is never to feel
the effects of his vice, becauſe he does not feel
them fooner than the end he was fent into the
world for be accomplished; and that therefor
the whole of his duration (not this life only,'
which he without ground infinuates this fcheme.
reftricts it to.) is not a ſtate of difcipline? In
this world, the time of punishing the malefac-
tors is not always the fame after the fact.
е
126
VINDICATION OF THE
Again, of two men that equally love drinking,
the one has a conftitution that feels not half
the confequent diforder after drinking the
fame quantity as that of the other does. This
then, I hope, fhows, that fuch inequalities are
as little to be accounted for upon his ſcheme as
this: for, why is the fame vice punished fo diffe-
rently here? or, why are not both perfons alike
referved for pofitive puniſhment hereafter? As
for the virtuous bearing the pains due to the
vicious, if this be not for their good and im-
provement, let him tell what it is for, fince
their virtue would have been the fame, and the
fame poſitive reward' (fuppofing fuch upon his
ſcheme) due to them, whether they had fuf-
fered or not. I proceed now,
In the last place, to fhow, that as this
world is a ſtate of difcipline only, ſo this ſtate
will be carried on in another world, and that
puniſhment can only ferve the fame end there
that it does here. The great drift of all our
author's reafoning is to prove, that this is a
ftate of probation, in oppoſition to its being a
ftate of diſcipline only; and in this, it muſt be
owned, he has the generality on his fide. From.
STATE OF THE MORAL WORLD.
127
which he infers *, "That reafon furely con-
cludes, that the puniſhments in an after-ſtate
muſt be poſitive." And again †, He calls ju
ftice a neceffary perfection. I fhall therefor
take this opportunity of delivering a few
thoughts, with as much diftinctneſs as I can,
on a ſubject of this importance; which I the
more readily do, becauſe though it has of late
been hinted at, in general, by fome, yet it has
never, as far as I know, been purfued its full
length.
There are no words more frequently used by
men in converfation and writing, than juſtice
and injuftice, right and wrong, merit, defert,
fatisfaction, guilt, and the like, nor, as they
themſelves think, with more propriety and
clear ideas; and yet I may venture to affirm,
there are very little understood, or ſpoke with
a more confuſed meaning. The reaſon of this
I take to be, they fee certain puniſhments an-
nexed here, by wife lawgivers, to certain
crimes, and in many cafes can diſcover the rea-
fon and neceffity of thefe, for the good and
* P, 50.
+ P. 48.
Q2
128
VINDICATION OF THE
preſervation of fociety. But then, not attend-
ing to, or not keeping in mind, the true rea-
fon of this, and finding, at the fame time, their
averfion always rife at the remembering fuch
enormities, they thence come to think the fame
puniſhment ſhould always follow the fame.
crimes, without rega: d to time, place, or the
circumſtances of a fociety; and their own hu-
mour or paffion, however variable it may be,
yet it is always made for the prefent the only
juſt and certain ſtandard of puniſhing, and e-
ven of God's puniſhing. Thus, how often,
upon pardoning fuch offences as the law makes
criminal, do fome cry out of injuftice, though
the good of ſociety as plainly requires this in
fome cafes, as, for ordinary, it does the con-
trary? And the fame way are men apt to judge
of the actings of the fupreme governor of the
world. They obferve fome go out of this
world unpunished, and that very often for fuch
crimes as indeed exceed the meaſure of common
ones; and thence haftily conclude the fame pu-
niſhment they fhould have met with here, or
far greater, will certainly find them there, with-
out ever confidering what end it can ferve, or
STATE OF THE MORAL WORLD.
129
whether or not theſe perfons be placed in fo
ciety, where rewards and puniſhments can on-
ly be of ufe, and the most part, in the heat
of their zeal, extend theſe to eternity. And
this I take to be one reaſon, that wild enthu-
ſiaſts, and men of hot imaginations and wrath-
ful tempers, are more ready to damn one another
than perfons of cooler heads and kinder tem-
pers. They are ever reprefenting the faults of
others, eſpecially injuries done themſelves, in
fuch a light, as no puniſhments are fufficient, as
they think, to expiate. Now, the abfurdity
of all this would foon appear, if ſuch would
but allow themfelves to confider, that the
words juft, unjuſt, deſert, etc. are neceffarily
relative to ſociety, and that it is nonſenſe to uſe
them but with refpect to men placed in a fociety.
One living by himſelf, who ſhould drink drunk,
or otherwiſe abufe his body, or the faculties of
his mind, would do an injury to himfelf, but
could not be faid to do an unjuft thing; be-
cauſe in this cafe, theſe actions have neither a
good nor ill influence upon others; and it
might be wife and good to puniſh fuch an one,
for his own fake and future happineſs; but it
30
VINDICATION OF THE
would be no act of juftice. But once place
this man in fociety, he is juſtly puniſhable for
the fame actions from quite other reaſons, to
wit, the good and prefervation of fociety, and
the diſcouraging others, which is ever the end
and rule of puniſhment in a fociety; and dif-
ferently for the fame crime in different fo-
cieties, according as their different intereſts re-
quire.
First, Hence then appcars the abfurdity of
thinking juſtice is an attribute of God distinct
from wiſdom and goodneſs. Juftice being ever
relative to fociety, as I have ſhown, it it plain
it can argue no difpofition diſtinct from good.
nefs, and far lefs any that is inconſiſtent with
it, or contrary to it, as is commonly imagined,
but it is only that particular inſtance of good.
nefs in conjunction with wiſdom, that is ex-
erted towards perfons connected with one an-
other in a fociety; and to do every one juſtice,
or to give every one his due or merit, is only
to diſpenſe the rewards and puniſhments of the
fociety in fuch a manner, as is proportionable to
the inclination and capacity of its ſeveral mem-
bers to advance or act contrary to its intereſts;
STATE OF THE MORAL WORLD.
131
or, in a word, to encourage virtue, and dif-
courage vice.
So that juftice is the fame to fociety, or the
body politic, that a wife and prudent paternal
love is to a child, to wit, the uſe of the pro-
pereft ways to bring about its happineſs by re-
wards and puniſhments. And if juſtice argue
no diſtinct difpofition from goodneſs in God,
far leſs can it fignify any thing like reſentment
in him, (the worſt kind of which is called ju-
ftice in God by a great many,) becauſe we can
do him no perfonal injury by our vices; and yet
the only poffible way of defending the common
notion of God's juſtice is, by repreſenting him
as a being liable to paffion, wrath, and re-
fentment, and wanting perfonal fatisfaction
for fin. Upon this fuppofition therefor, and
this only, they go right to work, who fay,
that the merits of another has fcreened fome
from wrath and vengeance; while he has left
by an act of his fovereign will the moſt part of
the world to perish, when he could juft as ea-
fily have faved all as one. For however con-
fuſed, inconſiſtent, or abfurd notions fuch may
maintain of guilt, merit, juftice and mercy,
132
VINDICATION OF THE
yet as it never comes into their head that theſe
have any relation to fociety, but that God, as
a wrathful, furious, revengeful being, who
reſents vice as a perfonal injury, and whofe re-
fentment must vent itſelf fome way or other,
though upon the innocent in place of the guil-
ty, is prevailed upon by the importunity and
fufferings of another, to pafs an act of pardon
for a few, which otherwiſe he was not inclin-
able to; ftill it muſt be owned, they are ſo far
confiftent with themſelves
2dly, Hence likewiſe appears the abſurdity
of the doctrine of pofitive puniſhments in a fu-
ture ſtate. And that I may not be miſtaken,
nor fight about words; -by pofitive puniſh-
ments I mean fuch as are inflicted merely for
what is paſt, without any view to what is to
come, which is the common notion of them,
and this author's in particular, as is plain, from
his expecting redreſs in another world for fuf-
fering in this, and from his contending for
puniſhment; when yet he afferts +, what is in-
deed commonly afferted, "That there is no fin
* P. 15.
† P. 7.
STATE OF THE MORAL WORLD.
133
there for if there can be no vice there, pu-
niſhment can never be inflicted to prevent it;
and therefore it must be merely pofitive, or in-
flicted only for what is paft." Now if, as I
have ſhown, the only wife and good end pu-
niſhment can ſerve, is the preventing vice for
the future, and the only end for which it is
inflicted by fociety; and if, as I have likewiſe
fhown, there be no diſpoſition in God prompt.
ing him to inflict it, with any other view, it
is plain, that the inflicting it merely for what
is paft, as it would be altogether uſeleſs, and
confequently cruel, fo it muſt be abfurd. And
here let it be obſerved, that if what is commonly
called guilt, or a liableneſs to puniſhment
merely for paſt acts of vice, be the confequence
of any act of it, it muſt be fo of every act of
every man, and all muft fuffer there, fince all
are more or lefs guilty. I have already ſhown,
that there is no evil diſpoſition in nature; that
vice is only owing to the weakneſs of our rea-
fon, or the ſtrength of our ſelfiſh affections, or
partial benevolent ones; and that none of theſe
are ill, confidered in themſelves, but are only fo
accidentally with reſpect to others, as they fuffer
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134
VINDICATION OF THE
by them; for theſe difpofitions, confidered as
exifting without fuch ill effects, fuggeft nothing
horrible to us; and yet if one have the difpofi-
tion, he is equal vicious, whether he ſhow it by
external action or not. If then no ſelfiſh affec-
tion be abfolutely ill in itſelf, there can be no
evil in having the greateſt degree of ſuch an af-
fection more than the leaſt; and therefor no
degree of them, even the higheft, is pofitively
puniſhable more than the leaft: for if any be
fo, all muſt be fo, fince they differ not in na-
ture, but only in degree. I fay, pofitively pu-
nifhable; for to puniſh in order to prevent thefe
ill effects for the future, and reform the offen-
der, and make him more capable of the advan-
tages of fociety, is both wife and juſt, and is
the very way this ſtate of diſcipline I am plead-
ing for is carried on. No reafon therefor can
be given, for puniſhing one man and freeing
another. If it be faid, repentance makes this
difference; then here again the good of focie-
ty, and not the guilt, is made the rule of pu-
niſhing; for, what makes it unfit to puniſh a
penitent is, that whereas before he was an ill
member of fociety, he is now, by his change
STATE OF THE MORAL WORLD.
135
of mind, a good and uſeful one: but if pu-
niſhment be inflicted merely for what is paſt,
one is equally liable to it, whether he repent
or not.
But here, perhaps, our author will be ready
to cry out, if none is to be puniſhed only for
what is paſt, then it feems we are to expect no
redreſs for being innocently oppreſſed, maſſa-
cred; and oppreffors are not accountable *. I
afk, what redrefs a generous mind would ex-
pect, but the prevention of the like for the fu-
ture, and the reformation of the offender,
(which I have already ſhown, all puniſhment,
even that inflicted by a fociety in its own
defence, is wifely over-ruled by God to tend
ultimately to,) and his being brought to a ſenſe
of the ill he has done? not a ſenſe of his hav-
ing acted contrary to God's defign, or of hav-
ing done what is abfolutely ill in the whole; but
of his own finiſter and ſelfiſh deſigns in what
he did, though it was wifely defigned and o
ver-ruled by God, which is foundation enough
for repentance and remorfe. Or does he mean
* P. 15.
R. 2
136
VINDICATION OF THE
by redreſs, revenge, and that oppreffors ſhould
be treated the ſame way they have treated o-
thers? This is a redrefs unbecoming any good
man, and far more God; and yet this is the
only fenfe his words will bear, fince no other
kind of redreſs can be hereafter expected from
them As for that other inftance adduced by
our author, to prove and illuftrate the juftice.
and reaſonablenefs of pofitive puniſhments *
to wit, "The juſtice of a great man's fending
off an inferior with marks of anger, for abuſ-
fing his favour, and kind defigns of raiſing
him ;" an inftance commonly uſed by thoſe of
his way I anfwer, that indeed there is no
doubt but ſuch a thing would be juſt and
right; but ftill for this reafon, that it would
be the propereſt way of difcouraging ſuch prac
tices in others, and particularly in the man
himſelf. But if fuch a benefactor had the
power of creating this man, and foreſaw, and,
for wife ends, decreed, that he ſhould act fo
upon fuch treatment, and yet, notwithſtand-
ing this, fhould punish him for any other rea-
fons than theſe I mentioned, I need not fay
what name fuch a conduct would deſerve.
* P. 46.
STATE OF THE MORAL WORLD.
137
What I have faid likewife fhows, how far
we can be properly faid to be accountable to
God. God has implanted in every man a prin-
ciple of felf-prefervation; and that one man
fhould puniſh another for an injury, is as na-
tural as is the principle from which fuch a pu-
niſhment proceeds. But this right that every
man has in a ſtate of nature, being made over
by him, for wife ends, to the magiſtrate; the
magiſtrate, in puniſhing, acts in the name,
and by the appointment of the fociety, in the
defence of the fociety, that thus refents its in-
juries; and it is the fociety that properly pu-
niſhes. Accountablenefs then to them is a li-
ableneſs to a puniſhment that they inflict in
their own defence, and for their future good
and fecurity againſt what hurts them. This
then we fee is a quite different thing from at
merely pofitive punishment inflicted after by
God, when it cannot at all ferve this purpoſe,
the future good of fociety; and therefor it
muſt be abfurd to fay, we are accountable to
God in this fenfe, if he punithes only for paſt
acts of vice. So that there would be no paral-
lel here betwixt God's puniſhments and thofe
138
VINDICATION OF THE
of fociety. As this fhows how we cannot be
accountable to God in the fame fenſe we are
to fociety, or magiftrates acting in their name;
becauſe we can do him no perfonal injury, as
we do them, and becauſe the prevention of
vice for the future is not here fuppofed to be
the end of puniſhment; and therefor it muſt
be abfurd and improper to juftify pofitive pu-
niſhments, by faying, we are accountable to
God as we are to earthly lawgivers, fince pu-
niſhment would, in this caſe, be inflicted with
fuch different views.
From what I have faid of pofitive puniſh--
ment, appears the abſurdity of the doctrines of
hell-torments, as commonly taught; for if
there be no foundation for poſitive puniſhment,
that is, puniſhment only for what is paſt, it is
plain there can be no foundation for an eter-
nity of ſuch puniſhment; and yet it muſt be
owned, if any reafon at all can be given for
fuch puniſhment, the fame reaſon will hold
for any degree, or any duration of it. And
therefor I cannot but think it ftrange, to find.
the author of Reflections, etc. faying, in the
note at the foot of P. 12. "That an older
STATE OF THE MORAL WORLD.
139
ſcheme was for exorbitant pains :" fince it is
矍
​impoffible to ſay, what pains are exorbitant
upon his ſcheme, which neither fixes, nor can
poffibly fix, any ſtandard of future puniſhment,
otherwiſe than by faying, "it will be juſt and
right;" which, I have already ſhown, are words
that, on his fyftem, have no meaning. Whether
eternal puniſhments can be eſtabliſhed on any
other foundation, fhall be confidered by and
by.
Before I leave this fubject I would have it
obferved, that that fenfe in which I have ſhown
poſitive puniſhments to be abſurd, is the only
fenſe in which I would maintain them to be
fo; for if by pofitive puniſhments be meant.
fuch as are inflicted by a fociety for its own de-
fence and prefervation, this is a notion I have
nothing to quarrel at, unleſs perhaps the im-
propriety of a word, it being as natural and
neceſſary for a fociety, or a fingle perfon, to
defend themſelves, and reſent an injury, as for
lofs of health to follow intemperance; and I
am fo far from meaning this, that I fhall im-
mediately ſhow, that fuch puniſhments, as they
are good and wife in every ſociety, ſo they will
140
VINDICATION OF THE
1
certainly take place in a future one, though the
author of Reflections would fain confound thefe
two widely different notions of pofitive puniſh-
ment, and load this ſcheme with denying it in
this laſt fenfe, as is evident from his way of
arguing, in page 14.
The only thing now remaining to be confi-
dered is, whether we will be placed in fociety
in another world; and if we be, how far re-
wards and puniſhments will be required there?
That the other world will be a ſociety, is, I
think, hardly denied or doubted by any rea-
fonable man, and therefore needs the lefs proof.
And indeed it is plain of itſelf; for as we are
creatures plainly defigned for improvements in
knowlege and goodneſs, and as theſe can only
be brought about by culture, teaching, and
difcipline, to which converſe and intercourfe
with others is abfolutely neceffary; for we can
never know unleſs taught, nor improve in vir-
tue and goodneſs, nor confequently in perfec-
tion and happineſs, without opportunities be
afforded us of contracting acquaintances and
friendſhips, and without a foundation be laid
for an intercourfe of offices; and as it is necef-
STATE OF THE MORAL WORLD.
141
fary we ſhould be placed in fociety here for
that end, fo it is plain we muſt be ſo hereaf
ter. Befides, if it were otherwife, we would
be placed fo long in a ftate, which has no con-
nection with that other, and confequently all
our improvements here would be loft and ufe-
lefs, which is inconfiftent with all the notions
we have of infinite wiſdom, that never does any
thing in vain. It is plain then we will ſtill be
fociable creatures there, and have opportuni-
ties of expreffing our love by mutual good of
fices; which therefor muſt be wanted in that
world as well as in this.
And if there be a fociety, then it evidently
follows, there must be both miſtakes and im.
perfections there as well as here, and confe-
quently puniſhments proportionable to theſe,
and fuitable to the nature of that ftate; and
for the fame reafon: for a fociety without laws.
and fanctions is an abfurdity; and unless there
be wants, defects, miftakes, imperfections, and
a fubordination of creatures, (as it is evident
there will, from men's being removed by death
at all ages, and with fuch different capacities
and degrees of improvement) there can be no
S
142
VINDICATION OF THE
foundation for laws and fanctions. Whatever
reaſons there might otherwiſe be for our herd-
ing or affembling together, yet we could never
be faid to be joined in fociety. As particular
capacities, inclinations, appetites, and parti-
cular ties and interefts, and a fubordination of
creatures are, as I have fhown, abfolutely ne-
ceffary here, for affording a foundation for fo-
ciety, for action, intercourfe, improvement,
and a plot, without which no rational creature
could be happy, the fame muſt take place here-
after, otherwiſe all ground of future improve-
ment is cut off, and there could be no reaſon
for placing us in focicty there. I do not mean
we will have the fame fenfes and objects of gra-
tification we have here; for theſe are loft at
death; but that there muſt be fenfes of fome
kind, both private and public, (for all happi-
neſs conſiſts in the gratification either of our
public or private fenfes, and to loſe all fenſe,
would be to loſe both happineſs and conſciouf-
nefs,) and particular interefts built upon thefe,
and particular fub-divifions of that fociety,
connected by particular ties and interefts,
which must neceffarily occafion vices, that is,
STATE OF THE MORAL WORLD.
143
miſtakes of one another, and our true intereſt.
And is not this the ground upon which our in-
imitable poet Milton has built fo beautiful a
ſcene of action in heaven? Not that I would
lay any ſtreſs upon a poetical fiction, any fur-
ther than it ſhows the fenſe we naturally have
how neceffary imperfections and miſtakes of
one another, and our own happineſs, and par-
ticular inclinations, tempers and parties, are
for giving occafion to ſhow and improve in the
moſt heroic virtues, friendship, patience, and
a contempt of danger.
From all this then it appears, that a future.
ſtate will only be a continuation of this, or a
ſtate of diſcipline only carried on; in which,
as our reafon and experience grows, the lefs
liable we ſhall be to miſtakes and punishment,
and the more engaged to virtue by the love of
it; a ſtate in which our happineſs will always
keep pace with our improvements, and in which
they, whoſe improvement in knowlege and vir-
tue has been in a great meaſure hindered by vi-
cious purfuits and habits, muft ftill be brought
to by diſcipline; and what they fell behind
here, fo much the more trouble muſt they go
S 2
144
VINDICATION OF THE
through hereafter, and fo much the more
imperfect muft they be, and lefs fit to be
ſharers of the nobler privileges of that more
perfect fociety. Aud as it will be wifely or-
dered, the diſcouragements to vice will be fuch
as ever to make the offender in the end fenfi-
ble of his folly, and forry for it, to which, as
I faid, all puniſhment ultimately tends. And
what greater puniſhment, or hell, or redreſs
would one require, or what ufe would any o-
ther ſerve? We would think it hard if any
more were required of us.
But when I fpeak of vice and puniſhment in
another world, I would not be thought to
mean, that this will be any diminution of the
happineſs of that ftate; but, on the contrary,
the only foundation for its everlaſting increaſe,
which, on any other fuppofition, there is no
room for. Nor would I be thought to mean,
there will be fuch blunders and miftakes as we
commit here, or thatfuch flaviſh puniſhments will
be neceffary in confequence of them: for, as
by vice, I mean that neceffary imperfection of
our natures that makes us miſtake our true in-
tereft, fo the more we improve, the lefs liable.
STATE OF THE MORAL WORLD.
145.
to it will we be; but as we can never be abſo-
lutely perfect, we can never be altogether fo.
It is an abfurdity and contradiction, and every
one, upon reflection, muſt fee it, to ſay, that
upon changing our ftate we can be made per-
fect all at once in knowlege and virtue; for e-
very finite being must be trained up in theſe
by degrees, and by a conftant progreſs; and
there is no difference betwixt vice and imper-
fection in knowlege and virtue, at leaft I mean
no more by it. So long as we need improve-
ment, fo long we are imperfect, or, which
is the fame thing, vicious. But though this
be fo yet it would be abfurd to infer from it,
that we ſhall be in danger of acting fraudu-
lently, oppreffively, etc. in heaven, for we
might as well argue from childhood to man-
hood, as from earth to heaven; and that the
one is not a ſtate of difcipline at all, becauſe it
is ſo perfect in refpect of the other; which
yet, I think, none denies it is to good men.
There is no doubt, but there is an almoſt in-
finite difference betwixt a Newton or a Clarke,
and one but beginning the rudiments of ma-
thematics or morality; but it does not there-
146
VINDICATION OF THE
for follow, that there are no degrees of know-
lege or virtue beyond what they poffeffed, or
that they will not feel the confequences (however
inconfiderable they may be in reſpect of theſe
of the other) of miſtakes or imperfections.
I fhall conclude this fubject, with confider-
ing fome other arguments ufually urged in fa-
vours of eternal torments; for, though perhaps
the abfurdity of poſitive puniſhments may be
granted, yet it is thought, there are other rea-
fons that lay a foundation for eternal mifery.
As, ft, It is alleged by fome, that we contract
habits of vice here, which we go out of this
world hardened in, and that thefe remain e-
qually violent in another world; and that
therefor, fince we there want the objects of
their gratification, we muft of courſe be for e-
ver miſerable. But to this the anſwer is very
eafy; for who does not fee, that fince all vici-
ous habits depend entirely upon the body, they
will be dropt with it at death. And in this
appears evidently the neceffity of death, and
the great wiſdom and goodneſs of our Creator
in fo ordering things, that whatever habits of
vice we contract here, yet we can carry none
STATE OF THE MORAL WORLD.
147
|
of theſe with us to the other world; whereas
our improvements in knowlege and habits of
virtue, have, as I obſerved before, no depen-
dence at all upon the body: even thoſe vicious
habits that are commonly thought to have the
leaſt dependence upon the body, pride, anger,
envy, refentment, revenge, etc. are either
owing to the ſtrength of ſome ſelfiſh paffion,
or to a miſtake of ourſelves or others, as I
fhewed before, and fo muft either ceafe at
death, or go off, as we improve in knowlege,
goodneſs, and acquaintance with others. It is
therefor abfurd to fay, as this author does *,
"That all the pleaſure our nature would be
capable of, after a life thus fpent (to wit in
vice) would be to be continued in an eternity
of wallowing." That the dead retain their
old habits, does well enough indeed in a poeti-
cal or fabulous performance, but it is very indif-
ferent philofophy; for how can one have a defire
either to debauchery or intemperance, when the
very organ of fenſe itſelf is deftroyed? or how
can he be any longer proud, or exceed in a good
* P. 48.
148
VINDICATION OF THE
opinion of himſelf, when he comes to know
the real worth of others as well as himſelf?
2dly, It is afferted, that, if the end of all
puniſhment be the good of fociety, and the
prevention of vice for the future; and, if the
eternal puniſhment of fome can moſt effectually
anfwer this end, by deterring others, as it
would appear it may, then it is good and juft,
according to the account we have before given
of juftice.This is what is commonly, and
with the beſt fhew of argument urged in fa-
vours of this doctrine, and therefore I fhall be
the more careful to anſwer it.
And for that end, I obferve, that every pu-
nishment ſhould be proportionable to the vice,
and that a fociety exceeds in puniſhment, when
the pain an offender is made to fuffer is fo
great, as to over balance any advantage the
ſociety can propoſe to reap from the more ef
fectual deterring of others by the inflicting it.
My meaning is, that no puniſhment ſhould be
greater than is fufficient to deter any one, that
duly confiders his intereft, from the vice for
which it is inflicted, and which there is reafon
to think will be fo; and every punishment is.
STATE OF THE MORAL WORLD.
149
:
fo far unjuſt, as it exceeds this meaſure. If
this were not fo, then death ought to be the
puniſhment of every crime here, fince the great-
er the puniſhment be, the more effectually muſt
vice be diſcouraged and by the fame rule, if
any one fuffer eternally in a future ſtate, all
ſhould do fo, and the punishment ſhould be as
intenſe as poffible, as well as long. Now it is.
evident, if any punishment can be exceffive,
eternal puniſhment must be fo: for it is im-
poffible, the moſt viciouſly inclined perfon, e-
ven in this world, that has his fenfes, or the
leaſt degree of reaſon, can need fuch exam-
ples of extreme everlaſting mifery to deter him.
from vice; and far lefs is it to be thought,
that in a ſtate ſo much more perfect than this,
where we will be fo much more improved in
knowlege and virtue, and always improving
more and more, eternal punishments will be
needful for this end, when fome inftances of
ſhort temporary ones inflicted now and then,
ſerve in moſt caſes to deter men from vice here,
and anſwer all the purpoſes of fociety. It is
the greateſt abſurdity to think, that when we
fhall arrive at truer notions of our own intereſt,
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150
VINDICATION OF THE
and be made more thoroughly fenfible how
much it lies on the fide of virtue, that we will
need more terrible examples of miſery to deter
us from vice.
Add to this, that it is abfolutely impoffible
in the nature of things, but fuch fufferings
muſt produce repentance in the fufferer, that
is, make him forry for what he has done, and
reſolve to amend it if he had opportunity; and
it muſt effectually ſpoil his being an example
to others, if after this he were ſtill to lie un-
der the puniſhment: for, how can it be an ex-
ample to others, to puniſh one that has no lon-
ger an inclination to do ill, and that repents
his former choice? If it be alleged, that this
repentance is not a right one, proceeding from
a change of temper, from a love to God and
goodnefs, but only forced and extorted by the
fenſe of preſent pain: I anſwer, it is true in-
deed, fufferings of themſelves can never pro-
duce a change of temper. But this is nothing
to the purpoſe in this cafe: for the queftion
here is not about the nature of repentance,
but the good of fociety; and all repentance
equally ferves this end, from whatever fpring
it proceeds; this is all the repentance either
STATE OF THE MORAL WORLD. 151
does, or can poffibly take place at firſt upon
forfaking any vice; and therefor it would be
unreaſonable to expect more; for all repentance
is at firſt no more than a ſenſe of pain follow-
ing the vice, overbalancing any pleaſure the
committing it is attended with, and forcing
the perfon to what he has otherwife no incli-
nation to; and this is fufficient to answer all the
ends of fociety, the prevention of vice for the
future, and the fetting the offender upon a
right courſe, which, as every man has natu-
turally good inclinations, he will afterwards
purſue from choice. Befides, as there is no
directly ill difpofition, there is no man's temper
that needs an entire fpecific change, nor, if it
did, could ſufferings produce it, but only the
love of vice needs to be weakened; and there-
for, ſince ſuch ſufferings, if they were to be
eternal, could not ferve any good purpoſe with
reſpect to the offender himſelf, nor be deſign-
ed to do fo, and yet would produce ſuch a re-
pentance, as would hinder his being an exam-
ple to others, it is plain the inflicting them
would be uſelefs and cruel; and therefor the
fuppofition of them is abfurd,
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152
VINDICATION OF THE
**
In ſhort, all the end a wife and good being
could propoſe in placing us in fociety, is our
happineſs and improvement in knowlege and
goodneſs, which there is no foundation for,
unleſs we be fo placed; and that the advanta-
tages of being fo placed might over-balance any
pain we might ſuffer for vice, more than we
would have fuffered, had we not been fo pla-
ced. My meaning is, that when one fuffers
any puniſhment, or any degree of it, for the
fake of the fociety of which he is a member,
and to be an example to others, more than he
would have done, had he not been placed in
fociety; yet ftill it was better for him to be fo
placed upon this condition, than not to be fo
at all. For, even upon the fcheme of liberty,
if God but forefaw that the end of one's being
placed in fociety, (his improvement and happi-
neſs,) would not only be defeated, but that he
would purſue fuch a courſe, as would make his
being fo placed upon the whole his greateſt mi-
fery and misfortune; it would be fo inconſiſtent
with all the notions we have of goodneſs to
place him, fince it would have been better, ab-
folutely better, not to have done fo. For of
what would it be an example, but of the
STATE OF THE MORAL WORLD.
153
greateſt partiality and cruelty, to fee one de-
voted to fuffer more than is neceffary, either to
reclaim him, or for the prefervation of fociety?
But when, on the other hand; I fee that theſe
fufferings are no more than the good of fociety
makes abfolutely neceffary, and at the fame
time, that they will in the end bring about the
perfon's reformation, and that it is a fufficient
diſcouragement from vice, that men be always
made fenfible, by its confequences, of the im-
poffibility of being happy in the practice of it,
which they will always be more and more, as
they improve in knowlege and experience;
when I fee that not one will be loft to the end
of their creation, but that all will be for ever
going on in a gradual progreſs towards perfec-
tion and happinefs; and when I confider at
the fame time, that the good of the entire fy-
ftem required fuch a particular character, and
that the perſon ſhould be placed in ſuch a courſe
of action; this reconciles me both to the
ſcheme and puniſhment.
Laftly, The only remaining argument I know
urged for everlaſting puniſhment, is that taken
from the New-Teftament, where it is plainly
154
VINDICATION OF THE
}
afferted. To which I anfwer, that the moſt
orthodox divines allow, that the feveral ex-
preffions there made uſe of to denote the miſery
attending vice in another world, fuch as bad
men's being driven from the prefence of God,
the worm that never dies, lakes of brimſtone,
a bottomleſs pit, everlafting, flaming, and un-
quenchable fire, utter darkneſs, fmoke,
chains, etc. are merely metaphorical, and muſt
indeed be fo, unless the moſt inconfiftent
things can be reconciled: and therefor I think
I may fafely conclude, that all the ſtreſs that
can or ought to be laid on theſe is, that mifery
muſt be for ever the neceſſary confequence of
vice, or that as long as there is vice, or as long
as we are finite creatures, which will be for e.
ver, there muſt be puniſhment, and that that
way of reprefenting the matter is calculated
only for popular conceptions. And certainly
this is as juſt and natural an explication of the
word everlasting, as is that which they give of
the words fire, darkneſs, worms, chains, etc.
or of the emblems under which heaven is re-
preſented, feafting, marrying, etc. which are
all ſhort and temporary actions. But if, from
STATE OF THE MORAL WORLD
155
what I have faid upon this fubject, any fhall
ftill think fit to judge me no Chriftian, as the
moſt part are taught to do all thoſe that are not
of thofe opinions they reckon Chriſtianity, all
I can do, is to affure fuch, that I am a fincere
friend to Chriftianity, as taught in the goſpel,
and particularly in the doctrines of its foun-
der, which are as different from thoſe taught
in fchools and fyſtems, as charity is from bi-
gotry, and more a friend than thofe who have
fathered fuch doctrines upon it, as are incon-
fiftent both with itſelf, and with common
fenſe.
I have given my thoughts with the more
freedom upon this fubject, becauſe I find I am
not fingular in my opinion about it: for I am
now glad to fee fo abfurd and horrible a doc-
trine beginning to be given up by all men of
fenſe; a doctrine that has fo long been made
the engine of enflaving men's minds, and of
fetting them upon deftroying one another, and
which alone has added weight to the moſt hor-
rible fpiritual impofitions and anathema's. For
the moſt impious and fanatic fuperftitions, the
moſt bloody maffacres, all the rogueries of
prieſts, and all the perfecutions and enmities
156
VINDICATION OF THE
among religious fects that have been, or fill
are among the ſeveral divifions of Chriftians,
have been founded upon this, that all who dif-
fered from them in principles, or practices,
neither good nor ill of themſelves, were God's
enemies, reprobated, and doomed to that hor-
rible place. Remove but this fear, you re-
move at once all contentions about articles of
belief, and all that cruelty, rancour, and ill-
will that weak, enthufiaftic or defigning men
have inſpired men with againſt one another.
And how feldom has it been made uſe of to de-
ter men from what is really vice, in refpect of
thoſe other ufes that have been made of it? I
cannot therefore help wifhing, with the good
and ingenious Dr. Burnet, to fee that doctrine
as much abhorred and ridiculed as ever tran-
fubftantiation has been.
And let none think, that the expofing it is
doing any harm to the caufe of virtue, or a
taking off any neceffary reſtraint from vice: for
fince, as I have already ſhown, pain and miſe.
ry muft for ever be the certain and neceffary
* Mafter of the Charter-Houfe, and author of The
Theory of the Earth, De ftatu mortuorum, and other in-
genious pieces.
•
STATE OF THE MORAL WORLD.
157
confequence of vice, under the government of
an infinitely wife and good Being, this anfwers
all the purpoſes of eternal torments, and ſhows
how needlefs, as well as cruel, they would be.
For it is juſt equivalent for the deterring men
from vice, (which is the only end eternal tor-
ments can in reafon be ſuppoſed to ſerve,) to
be made fenfible, that mifery and repentance.
muſt eternally be the confequence of vice, and
to fee others eternally fuffer for it. So that no
encouragement to vice is given by this to any
who allow themſelves to reafon, and ftudy to
be rightly informed of the confequences of their
actions. And as for thoſe that do not fo, but
are refolved at any rate to go on in a courſe of
vice, neither this, nor any other account of
matters, will be regarded by them. But fure
I am, if ever ſuch be brought to reaſon, and
be reformed in this world, they will foon-
er be fo by a reaſonable hell, than by an un-
reaſonable one. As for honeft well-meaning
perfons, who need no fuch flavish motives, it
would be a great relief to them to be freed
from fuch fears, (for the beſt have fuch fears)
U
158
VINDICATION, etc.
by which they are all their lifetime fubject to
bondage.
If theſe hints can be any way uſeful to re-
concile men to the government of the world,
and their own ſtation in it, or to increaſe their
love to God and one another, I have my end.
I am,
Sir,
Yours, etc.
A
CATECHISM
FOUNDED UPON
EXPERIENCE and REASON:
Collected by a
FATHER,
For the uſe of
His CHILDREN.
The THIRD EDITION, corrected.
To which is prefixed,
An INTRODUCTORY LETTER to a Friend,
concerning Natural Religion.
WHEREIN,
The Morality of the ANTIENTS and MODERNS
is briefly compared.
Firſt printed in the Year, 1739.
U 2
[161]
A N
INTRODUCTORY LETTER
To a FRIEND,
Concerning NATURAL RELIGION.
A
S religion, my friend! is of the greateſt
importance to all mankind, and as there
are a great variety of religions in the world, e-
very one of them pretending to be the true reli
gion; nothing feemed to me fo well worth my
ferious ſtudy as to enquire into the grounds of
them; in order to fee which, if any, of them
was well founded. And as this enquiry has
coft me very much pains, I have, in this Ca-
techifm, laid down, in the fhorteſt and cleareſt
manner I could, the refult of my reſearches,
for a guide to my Children, in cafe my tender
conftitution do not allow me the pleaſure of
talking over theſe things to them, when they
may become of age for fuch inftruction.
Something more full, in this way, I intend-
ed; if want of health, and of time from the
162 An INTRODUCTORY LETTER.
)
immediate affairs of life, had not hindered me,
But I am truly glad that I have ſuch a FRIEND
as you, who hath always prevented me with
good offices; in whom I can perfectly confide for
that virtuous and free education, which, per-
haps, I may not have the opportunity myſelf
to fee my young ones trained up in.
I have, in this Catechifm, purpofely avoid-
ed faying any thing directly againſt any parti-
cular religion, for theſe reaſons: becauſe that
would have given offence to thoſe, into whoſe
hands it might fall, of another way of think-
ing; and might have, probably, brought my-
felf to unneceffary trouble. You know, my
Friend, that the bare fufpicion of my not be
lieving the opinions in faſhion in our country,
hath already occafioned me fufficient trouble.
And indeed, it is the very nature and genius.
of every particular religion, by laying the main
ſtreſs of falvation on mere belief of their pecu-
liarities, to wean their profeffors affections from
all who are not of the fame houfhold of faith
with themſelves; to cauſe them to reject here-
tics; and to mark them, with infamy or other
puniſhments, who caufe divifions and offen-
An INTRODUCTORY LETTER.
163
ces, contrary to the doctrine which they have
learned. While on the contrary, natural re-
ligion wholly confifts in right, or loving, af-
fections to God and mankind, and a fuitable
behaviour towards them, without regard ei-
ther to people's belief or unbelief of any doc-
trines or opinions; which being neceffarily in
proportion to their perceptions of the degrees
of evidence for the truth of the opinions, are
neither virtues nor crimes. And therefor, a
due regard for the honour of God, and the
good of mankind, would make every thinking
and impartial man wish that natural religion
alone was embraced by all men. Then would
the great ſtrife about the truth of particular
revelations, which moſt nations, in all ages,
pretend to, and the greateſt contentions about
the meaning of them, ceafe; and that perfect
peace and unity, which are the genuine effects of
truth, and which we hope will at laſt prevail,
cover the whole earth. But this is rather to
be wiſhed for, than expected foon. For truth,
which hath the weakneffes, and what is worfe,
the prejudices of mankind, inftilled into them
by a formidable body of intereſted men, to
164
An INTRODUCTORY LETTER.
fupport the peculiarities of the particular efla-
bliſhed, or political religions in moſt countries,
to overcome, muft work its way, the only
way left it in many nations, privately, and by
flow degrees.
Thus the cafe ftands; not for men's want
of knowlege of the religion of nature, but be-
cauſe it is fo intermixed with idle reveries and
myfterious notions, ftrongly inculcated upon
the people by their authorized guides, that
few have time, opportunity, ability, or rather
refolution enough to fearch into thefe dark opi-
nions, eſtabliſhed more by power than reaſon
and truth.
No fociety can fubfift, you know, my Friend,
without the practice of natural religion or mo-
rality; and therefore, every particular religion
muſt have the precepts of it intermixed with
its own peculiarities. Hence the abfolute ne-
ceffity of natural religion muſt be allowed. But
the clergy, whoſe wealth and power in every
country depends on having fome additional
opinions believed, will always have fomething,
right or wrong, to ſay in favour of them. Hence,
"natural religion hath been faid not to be
An INTRODUCTORY LETTER.
165
A
"underſtood before their fyftems appeared;
"and though it hath been known, yet it is
"infufficient to bring men to happineſs with-
out fome additional difcoveries not in the
power of mankind by the mere light of their
"reaſon to attain." Now, though I deem it
not prudent to argue directly againſt any par-
ticular popular religion; yet I thought it need-
ful to maintain the certainty and fufficien-
cy of what is common, in fome degree, to
them all, morality, I mean, or the religion of
Nature; which makes all particular religions
more or less perfect, as they partake of it. And,
Though it might be demonftrated, from
the nature and reafon of the thing, that reli-
gion, which is of the higheſt concernment to
all, fhould admit of the cleareſt and ſtrongeſt
evidence level to the capacities of all; and alfo
from the perfections of God, its Author, the
common governour of mankind; for where
there is no law, there can be no government,
no obedience, or tranfgreffion; yet I chooſe
rather to appeal, with the maintainers of par-
ticular ſchemes, to experience. And it is moſt
evident from the writings which remain to us,
Χ
*166 An INTRODUCTORY .
LetterLETTER.
of Socrates's difciples, that morality or natu-
ral religion was as well underſtood above two
thousand years ago, at leaſt, as it is at this day;
and the rules or precepts of it as clearly deli-
vered by Xenephon, Plato, Cebes, Cicero,
Epictetus, etc.; (a good fummary of which
you will find in Gataker's introductory dif
courſe to the life of M. Antoninus,) as they can
be by any at this time, notwithſtanding all the
helps we have. And what is more, it is con-
feſſed even by the favourers * of more modern
ſyſtems and eſtabliſhments, "That the anti-
ents, not the philofophers only, but the great
"and bufy part of them, excelled us in all
"the virtues which adorn human life and
"render focieties flouriſhing and happy.” And
there were good reafons for this, which the
author referred to hath not given. For the
antients taught, That in religion or morality,
as well as in other fciences and works of geni-
us, wherein they excelled us, men fhould fol-
low Nature. For fo generally known and
See Mr England's Enquiry into the Morals of the
Antients, which I fend you with this Letter and Cate-
chifm.
An INTRODUCTORY LETTER.
167
deeply founded is natural religion, that in hu-
man nature itſelf are implanted the immediate
motives to all virtuous and religious actions, as
well as the obligations to them. For example,
thus: a love or reverence for an over-ruling,
inviſible Power, with a defire of his protection
and approbation, and a fear of his diſpleaſure,
are common and ſtrong affections in * mankind
in all ages and in all places; however different
their outward manner of expreffing them, which
is no effential thing, hath been. So alfo have
the love of our fpecies or kind, with a defire
of their love or eſteem, and an averfion at their
mifery, and having their ill-will, been fo uni-
verſal affections as to make up what we call by
the name of humanity, that is, the character-
iſtic of human nature. And no lefs common
is the defire of life, and averfion to the loſs of
it. Befides, and above, all thefe natural af-
fections or defires exciting us to, and refting
in their proper objects or ends, viz. in God,
·
* So very ſtrong have theſe religious paffions been in
mankind, that the ambitious and defigning part of men
have, by applying to them, got the direction of the
fouls, bodies, and properties of their fellows, and ſub-
jected them to the greateſt flavery.
X 2
168
An INTRODUCTORY LETTER.
1
}
our neighbour,. and ourſelves, and in the ex-
ercife of which there is great pleaſure; we
have a determination, in our own nature, to
perceive, and approve or difaprove of right or
wrong, i. e. kind or unkind, affections both
in ourſelves and others, and their applications.
to their objects. This is that felf-approving
or condemning principle which mankind, tho'
they may a little ftifle, can never diveft them-
felves of. So that it hath obtained the name
of common fenfe, moral-fenfe, or confcience.
And as our greateſt pleaſure or pain ariſes, by
the appointment of the author of our nature,
from this perception and judgment of our own
right or wrong affections and their applications,
this lays the ſtrongeſt obligations upon us to
attend to, and obey, the dictates of, this go-
verning principle of all our actions, our con-
fcience.
I cannot avoid obferving, with regret, how
contrary fome modern teachers go to that ex-
cellent rule of the antients, To follow Nature;
for they teach, "That human nature is alto-
gether corrupted, and therefor not to be
" followed, but croffed." Thus men have
An INTRODUCTORY LETTER.
169
been taught to look upon one.another, 'as na-
turally villainous, and that they can be rege-
nerated only by a found faith in certain opini-
ons which lay a foundation for wealth and
power to their teachers. Hence that truſt and
charity natural in mankind for one another
hath been almoſt rooted out for the fake of an
intereſted part. And how have the cheated
laity been wickedly egged on to deſtroy one a-
nother, in fupport of the ambitious and mif-
chievous defigns of the clergy, to bind their
chains fafter upon them?
But the antients not only taught to follow
Nature, but alſo gave all encouragements to
the following her kind and beneficent move-
ments. For men were not then as now re-
warded or puniſhed on account of mere belief,
or opinion. Thofe men who imitated God,
by fhewing the ſtrongeſt inclinations to pro-
mote the good of mankind, were ranked a-
mong the immortals; and all public honours,
or marks of eſteem were paid them both before
and after their deaths; and e contra: which
was a following Nature too, in rewarding and
puniſhing. Good offices, done to the public,
170
An INTRODUCTORY LETTER.
met, what they merited, public returns of
gratitude. And this could not fail to pro-
duce more heroic acts of virtue, (though it is
abfurd to expect a perfect practice from imper-
fect creatures, let their rules be ever ſo plain
and obligatory *,) among the antient Greeks and
Romans, than are to be feen in latter ages.
The heroism, which meets great rewards in
modern times, confifts in a ftout belief of, or
rather a great zeal for, the faſhionable or eſta-
bliſhed religious opinions; however myfteri-
ous and incomprehenfible they may be, or e-
ven abfurd and contradictory, and always va-
rying.
And indeed fo uncertain and indetermina-
ble are theſe fublime opinions which are in
later times fuper-added, (with ſome poſitive
rites and ceremonies which ferve as marks of
the parties who eſpouſe them,) to the eternal,
invariable religion of nature, that not one of
theſe gentlemen, who for intereft's fake de-
fend them, can agree with another, which of
them are effential to be believed, or which not:
nay, every one of them are given up, by turns,
*Morals of the Antients, p. 4.
An INTRODUCTORY LETTER.
171
by fome of their advocates, as not effential to
their ſyſtem; while they are, by turns, as ſtre-
nuouſly maintained by others. How fuch
diſcoveries, then, can promote human happi-
neſs I know not; but on the contrary, we ſee
that they furniſh continual fund of debate and
contention; and thus defroy that mutual love,
forbearance, and peace, which is the chief
end of religion to promote among mankind.
The moſt uncivilized nations now on earth, as
the Hotentots, and native Americans, with
their natural impreffions of virtue, and of a
Supreme Being, who will reward and puniſh
them according to their works, without any
formal teaching, far out-do us Europeans in
this refpect. For, as it could never enter into
their heads, unleſs it fhould be put into them
by intereſted teachers, that God will ever re-
ward or punish them for mere belief or opini
on, they live at perfect peace with every bo-
dy, their country-men, or ftrangers, fo as ne-
ver to quarrel *. But we Europeans have not
* See the Strength and Weakneſs of Human Reaſon.
Edition II. p. 148. etc. Which I cite as an unfufpect-
ed authority; being one of thoſe who place religion in
belief and ſpeculative knowlege more than in practice.
172
An INTRODUCTORY LETTER.
thought it enough to quarrel and fight among
ourſelves about ufelefs ceremonies and opini-
ons, but have even, to get the direction of
their religion, confciences and properties, car-
ried this ſpirit to foreign countries. Nay, have
outright deftroyed millions of the innocent in-
habitants of nations, formerly unknown to us,
on pretence of their not believing as we do.
And our clergy, who would thus have the di-
rection of every body's faith, fwear and fub-
ſcribe to the belief of opinions, for the ſake of
preferment, and do frequently afterwards,
when compelled by the force of truth, contra-
dict them, or explain them quite away; as is
evident, upon comparing the articles which
they fubfcribe with the books they write: and
what is moſt aftonishingly infincere, fubfcribe
again rather than lofe preferment: which is
of moſt fatal example to fet at naught all com-
mon honeſty. And again, in order to exalt
their own factious political fchemes of belief,
they weaken the force of the religion of nature
itſelf, which is the foundation of all other re-
ligions; by afferting, That its rules or pre-
cepts are not certain and obligatory; and thus
An INTRODUCTORY LETTER.
173
throw men looſe from all obligations of religi
on who believe not in theirs. And while they
act this deſtructive part, they judge of other
people's honeſty by their own *. Such, gene-
rally, are the men who beſtow ſo high enco-
miums upon themfelves †, and laugh at the
morals of freethinkers ‡, who lay all the ſtreſs.
of their eternal welfare on morals only; and
account them, with equal charity and polite.
nefs, as raving madmen and known liars; for
no other reaſon than I can find, but becauſe
freethinkers do commonly expofe the licenti-
ous writings of the clergy, who place the great
ftrefs of people's falvation in a ſtrong belief of
thoſe opinions, upon which are eſtabliſhed
their claims to wealth, power and reverence.
I fay, fuch generally are the men; for I ex-
cept fome worthy, learned, and truly religious
clergymen, who openly declare for morals, a-
gainſt idle fpeculative opinions and uſeleſs ce-
remonies, and for liberty againſt impoſition.
But fuch honeft men, feldom, meet with pre-
Morals of the Antients, p. 4. and other places, com-
pared with p. 360.
↑ P. 358.
P. 360.
Y
174
An INTRODUCTORY LETTER.
ferment in the church; nay, the civil magi-
ftrate hath enough to do to protect them from
the fury and perfecution of their brethren.
Thus while our clergy exclaim against the de-
teſtable principles of popery, they inconfiftent-
ly retain the wickedeft parts of it, viz. its per-
fecuting fpirit, and claims to dominion over
the confciences of men.
Upon the whole, you fee, my Friend, that
natural religion is univerfal, and fufficient to
bring mankind, if they were not led afide by
falfe opinions, to happineſs; which is the end
that God defigned it for, and which they all
neceffarily defire; and fo greatly and juſtly to
be preferred to all particular religions, which
occafion infinite difputes and ſtrife among men.
But with refpect to Chriftianity, I muft fay,
that though I doubt nothing that there was
an extraordinary perfon fent unto the Jews a-
bout feventeen hundred years ago, to reſtore
to them, both by precept and example, the re-
ligion of Nature, which they had neglected for
facrifices, rites and ceremonies; yet it does
not at all appear that that divine perfon ever
intended, or commanded any of thoſe things
An INTRODUCTORY LETTER.
175
to be written concerning him which we have;
far lefs that any man's falvation fhould in the
leaft depend upon believing on fuch traditions,
fuppofe they could admit of certainty. And
as the Chriſtian religion is commonly placed
now more in believing his hiſtory, than in
practiſing his morals; by which Chriftians are.
rendered exceedingly corrupt, and the more fo
by certain unintelligible creeds and directories
pretended to be built upon theſe traditions, I
would defire that natural religion purely fhould
be firſt taught my children, which cannot fail
to recommend itſelf to their underſtandings,
preferable to all others, on account of its plain.
neſs, certainty, and uſefulneſs.
I fhall talk more fully to you on thefe matters
which are the ſubject of this letter, at meeting.
I am forry that our diſtance gives us not more
opportunity of converfing together; but that,
nor any thing elſe,can ever diminish towards you
the fincere friendſhip and brotherly affection of
October 10th,
1738.
The AUTHOR,
Y 2
A
CATECHISM
FOUNDED UPON
EXPERIENCE and REASON:
Collected by a
FATHER,
For the uſe of
His CHILDREN.
>
[ 179 ]
A
CATECHISM.
A¹
QUESTION.
MONG the great variety of religions,
prevailing in the world, which occafi-
ons infinite difputes among the different fects,
what is the True Religion?
ANSWER.
That, which is common to all religions,
is the true religion only, viz. the morality
of them.
QUESTION.
What do you underſtand by morality?
ANSWER.
Morality is a conformity to thoſe unalter-
able obligations, which reſult from the na-
ture of our own exiftence, and the neceffary
relations of life; whether to God as our Crea-
tor and Governor, or to mankind as our fel-
low-creature or neighbour.
180
A CATECHISM.
QUESTION.
How comes it that morality is common to all
religions?
ANSWER.
Morality being founded in our nature;
and the neceffary relations of things, is uni-
verfal as nature and its Author; and does
always neceffarily obtain, however diſguiſed
under various appearances, occafioned by the
prejudices of mens différent educations.
QUESTION.
What is it that lays the obligation upon us
to act according to Nature, or the rules of
morality, which arife from it?
ANSWER.
The Author of Nature, God himſelf, hath
made our acting according to Nature, or
the rules of morality, the only way to true
happineſs, which we all neceffarily defire;
ſo that no man, or fociety of men, can be
happy, but in proportion as they obey the
rules of morality, or the dictates of unpreju-
diced nature.
QUESTION.
How doth it appear that there is a God?
A CATECHISM.
181
ANSWER.
The ideas of order, adminiftration, and
a God, naturally fpring up in the mind of
man, as his underſtanding opens; and all God's
works proclaim his being; their paffiveneſs and
dependence infer his felf-exiſtence and indepen-
dence; their beauty, order and happineſs prove
his goodneſs, wiſdom and power.
QUESTION.
What is God?
ANSWER.
God is an abfolutely perfect Being who
made and governs the univerfe.
QUESTION.
Are there more Gods than one?
ANSWER.
ONE God is neceffary, and one is fuffici-
ent; which fufficiency of one deſtroys the
neceffity of more.
QUESTION.
What are the duties which arife from
the nature of our own exiſtence, and the rela-
tion we ſtand in to God?
ANSWER.
To God, our Creator and Preferver, our
Z
182
A CATECHISM.
higheſt love and gratitude is due, with en-
tire fubmiffion to his will in the courfe of his
providence and abfolute truft therein; as we
know that a perfectly good Being, who can
have no oppoſite intereft to the happinefs of
his creatures, orders all things for the good of
the whole; however, fome things may have a-
nother appearance to us, who ſee but a very
fmall part of the perfect univerſal ſyſtem ;
partial views muft occafion imperfect appear-
ances of that which is altogether perfect.
QUESTION.
How is God to be worshiped?
ANSWER.
for
God is to be worſhiped in ſpirit and in
truth, with internal fincerity, not external
fhew; for God fees and knows the heart, and
pure religion towards him is altogether an in-
ternal perfonal thing, as deſcribed in the laſt
queſtion.
QUESTION.
What are the duties which arife from the
nature of our own exiſtence, and the relations
we ftand in to our neighbours?
A CATECHISM.
183
ANSWER.
We are to love our neighbours as ourſelves.
Or, in other words, we fhould do to others,
in all cafe, as we would have them to do
to us, upon a change of circumſtances; which
is the meaſure of both natural juſtice and
charity, the great means of human happi-
nefs or public good, in all the various relations
of life, whether fuperiors, inferiors, or equals.
QUESTION.
Does the love of God and our neighbours
comprehend and make up all morality?
ANSWER.
It does; and in it confifts our own great-
eft good or happinefs; for, befides the plea-
fure we have in the exerciſe of benevolence,
gratitude, and the like kind affections, with
the felf-approbation arifing upon our having
acted according to them, the love of God and
our neighbours encreafeth their mutual love
and affiſtance to us; fo fhort, plain, and a-
greeable, is natural religion, which makes our
duty and intereft the fame.
Z 2
184
A CATECHISM.
QUESTION.
What is our duty to any who ſeem not to
love God and their neighbours?
ANSWER.
It is natural for mankind to love God and
one another, if they have not conceived ill o-
pinions of them; in ſuch a cafe, we ought,
therefor, to labour to undeceive them, by giv-
ing them a true or fair character of God; and
ſhewing ourſelves worthy of their love, by
rendering them good for evil, in fuch a man-
ner, as will not encourage them to continue in
their prejudices.
QUESTION.
Why is morality alfo called natural religion?
ANSWER.
Becauſe it reſults from the nature of our
exiſtence, as before faid, or is founded in our
natural conſtitution; for by it we are neceffa-
rily diſpoſed or inclined to love God and man-
kind; and our reafon is implanted in us, to
direct us to the means of promoting the glory
of God, and the good of his creatures, which
are the fame; while our confcience naturally
approves of this ultimate end of all our affec-
A CATECHISM.
185
tions and actions, the general good, which in-
volves the happineſs of individuals; the per-
fection or happineſs of a ſingle nature, ariſing
in proportion, as it contributes to that of the
univerſe.
QUESTION.
What is required of us in fubordination to
the ultimate end of general good?
ANSWER.
A regard to every one's felf, in the tempe-
rate gratification of all his private appetites and
defires, in confiftence with one another.
QUESTION.
What makes this moderate and confiftent
gratification of our appetites and defires ne-
ceſſary?
ANSWER.
Such fobriety and confiftency in the grati-
fying of our appetites and defires, is neceffa-
ry; becauſe the intemperate and inconſiſtent
gratification of any one of them tends to the
deftruction of the reft, and ruins the health of
body and mind; and fo renders us unfit for
advancing our chief end, the general good, in
*
186
A CATECHISM.
.
which our own greateſt good or happineſs is
included.
QUESTION.
How is this to be prevented?
ANSWER.
By keeping our chief good as much as pof-
fible at all times in our view, by attending
clofe to the dictates of confcience, and by a
vigorous uſe of our reafon and judgment, in
the conduct of all our defires to their proper
ends, in fubordination to our chief end; by
which method, we will acquire the habit of
acting with prudence, temperance, juſtice and
fortitude in all cafes. And thus, all our de-
fires being under the direction of conſcience
and reafon, no difappointments from objects
without our power will give us any uneafinefs;
for honefty and contentment, if we will them,
are always within our own power.
QUESTION.
What is fin?
ANSWER.
Sin is a want of conformity to thoſe unal-
terable obligations, which refult from the na-
A CATECHISM.
187
ture of our own exiftence, and the neceffary
relations of life.
QUESTION.
Whence arifeth fin?
ANSWER.
Sin arifeth from the neceffary imperfection
of our finite nature; a perfect creature being
an impoffibility and contradiction.
QUESTION.
What doth every fin deſerve?
ANSWER.
Every fin is naturally, (i. e. by God's ap-
pointment) attended with proportionable mi-
fery or unhappineſs.
QUESTION.
How is this to be remedied?
ANSWER.
By amendment and improvement only; for
to excite or determine us to amend and im-
prove, the pains affixed to vice are defigned,
fuch as the tomenting workings of hatred, an-
ger, and the like unfocial paffions, with the
ſelf-condemnation ariſing upon our having act-
ed according to them, and alſo the puniſh-
188
A CATECHISM.
ments of ſociety which are founded upon felf-
defence.
QUESTION.
Is fin always attended with proportionable
mifery, and duty always attended with pro-
portionable happineſs ?
ANSWER.
Mifery is naturally confequent upon, and
connected with immorality, and happineſs
with morality; and every man feels it fo, for
the moſt part, even in this life, although fome
may ſtifle and diſguiſe their feelings. But if
in any cafe, or at any time, theſe confequen-
ces ſeem to be delayed, or the connection bro-
ken, as by death; this fhews, that this ſtate
hath a connection with, and lengthens out in-
to another ſtate, where the fame moral diſci-
pline, by rewards and punishments, for our
reformation, or improvement in virtue or mo-
rality, will take place, to complete the great
and good ſcheme, the final happineſs of all
creatures for their perfect Creator and Pre-
ſerver, who brought them into being, for that
end of making them happy, wants neither
good intention, infinite wifdom, nor power to
A CATECHISM.
189
carry on and accomplish it; and therefor will
complete what he hath begun. It is moft in-
confiftent with all our notions of a perfect be-
ing, to think, that God, who does nothing in
vain, and who hath given us a defire of, and
capacity for happinefs, will annihilate us, when
theſe are ſo far increafed, as to fit us for a
happy life and ſtate. Nay, it would be a con-
tradiction to perfect benevolence, or goodneſs
itſelf, to give us a defire and foretaſte of hap-
pineſs, only to diſappoint us, and that af-
ter we are ſo far trained up in knowlege, vir-
tue, and a capacity for it: this ſtate, therefor,
is but a nurſery to the next more free and glo-
rious field of improvement, in which our hap-
peneſs will keep pace with our improvement
in virtue for ever.
QUESTION.
How are we to behave to thofe, who happen
to differ from us in religion?
ANSWER.
As mens capacities and ways of education
are very different, this muft of neceffity often
happen; therefor, do to them as you would
be done by, and give them no uneafinefs upon
A a
*
190
A CATECHISM.
1
that account; but offer your advice or inftruc-
tion to them, if they pleafe to hear you; and
attend with patience, and without prejudice,
to what they have to fay for their religion;
which, if it should appear to you, after a fair
and thorough examination, to be a better, or
more reaſonable religion, (that is, if it tends
more to the good of mankind, which is the
teſt of all religions) than your own, embrace
it; for to change opinion upon rational con-
viction, is a perfection in a finite being. On
the other hand, to take religion upon any o-
ther authority, than that of reafon and con-
fcience, which is the voice of God within
man, is Popery in any place, and a baſe flaviſh
obedience to man, and rebellion againſt God
the Lord of our confcience. But the worſt
part of Popery is, to give our neighbour any
trouble upon the fcore of different belief; as
many who take the name of Proteftants do,
moſt inconfiftently with the natural unaliena-
ble right of private judgment in religious mat-
ters, practiſe even among themſelves, to the
deftruction of charity, mutual forbearance and
peace.
ནཱནཾ
!
A CATECHISM.
QUESTION.
191
How fhall we behave to others, if they cn-
deavour to force their religion upon us?
ANSWER.
Force may make hypocrites, but cannot al-
ter opinions. Yet for peace's fake, comply
with them in every indifferent thing, which
are for the most part the things contended for
by bigots. But fuffer patiently, when you
cannot defend yourself, rather than do any
thing inconfiftent with God's glory or the good
of his creatures, efpecially in countenancing
the falfe impious doctrine and cruel practice
of perfecution. And encourage yourſelf with
this confideration, that ftrength of mind and
habits of virtue, which fit men both for this
and a future ſtate, are beft acquired, moſt il-
luftrated, and fureft fortified by fevere exer-
cife and trial.
And do not repine at provi-
dence, which makes every thing confpire to
the good of the whole, by ways far above our
conception. But ſtrive to act your part well
in this ftate to the laft, and remove, at the
call of him who placed you here, with good
humour and contentment, whether you be in
A a 2
192
A CATECHISM.
a high or low ſtation, in profperity or adver-
fity, it is all one with refpect to the next; for
if you act the part affigned you here well, you
will be fure to have the approbation of the
Ruler of the univerfe, with the approbation
of your own, and that of every other good
mind; and the more fo, in proportion to the
difficulties you have furmounted. The tri-
umph of virtue in adverſe circumſtances, which
are the proper fcene for the diſplay of true
magnanimity and refignation to the will of
God, is much more glorious than that in prof-
perity; wherein it is well if men do not lofe
their ſenſe of dependence upon the Deity, and
that focial affection to, and ſympathy with, the
poor and diſtreſſed, whence only can ariſe in-
ward tranquillity and conſcious worth, which
are infinitely more valuable and lafting than all
outward poffeffions.
QUESTION.
How hath it come to pafs, that mankind,
whoſe natural difpofitions or inclinations de-
termine them to love God and one another;
have, contrary to thefe natural propenfities
and impulſes of humanity, perfecuted one ano-
A CATECHISM.
193
ther upon account of religion itſelf; the de-
fign of which is to promote peace on earth,
and good-will towards men.
ANSWER.
Perfecution (the leaft uneafineſs given to
our neighbour upon account of different be-
lief is fuch, and an acting from the Popiſh
principle of not keeping faith with heretics)
hath arifen from a grofs miſtake of moft Chri-
ftians, placing their religion in the belief of a
fet of traditional opinions, about which, tho'
they themſelves are endlefly divided, yet they
will pronounce all, who do not believe as they
do, to be God's enemies, and objects of hat-
red. Whereas true religion confifts not in
mere faith or belief of any ſet of opinions
whatever, but in love, or charity, flowing
from a benevolent difpofition or kind tem-
per, which God, who is love or goodneſs it-
felf, hath impreffed as his own image upon
our minds; fo that he only who loves, knows.
God, imitates and obeys him in loving man-
kind, and promoting their good to the ut-
moſt of his power, is a godly or religious
man, whether he believes traditions or not.
194
A CATECHISM.
Confequently all which tend not to the che-
riſhing and improving this benevolent or God-
like temper, which is beft judged of by our
actions, are falfe principles, from whence
fpring all fuch inhumane, irreligious, ungodly
practices, as perfecution, with all its horrid
terrible effects; against which we can never
be enough guarded, as it defaces God's image
in our minds, and tends to eradicate it altogether.
CONCLUSION.
Let us, therefor, carefully endeavour to
obey the will of God, imprinted upon our
minds, and written in our hearts, and not to
ſpend our time in ſeeking it any where elſe;
for this is the only certain way by which God
communicates his pleaſure to all mankind, if
they attend to it. To cultivate and improve
this good difpofition or kind temper of mind,
by the conftant fincere practice of virtue or
morality is what can only make us happy in
all times and places; nothing fubftituted in its
room can do it, or can atone for the want of
it, and nothing but it can be acceptable to,
or approveable by God. Whoever, therefor,
A CATECHISM.
195
3
1
hath neglected to improve this good and God-
like temper, or deviated from the pleaſant paths
of virtue, either through weakneſs of reafon
and ftrength of felfifh paffions, or by being
perverted by falfe teaching and bad example,
muft return to the paths of virtue, and have
his will renewed, or his temper mended, by at-
tending cloſe to the dictates of his confcience
and reafon, or the will of God within him; for
by no other method can true peace of mind, and
everlaſting happineſs be attained. Virtue, to
which happineſs is neceffarily connected; and
vice, to which mifery is neceffarily connected,
i. e. merit and demerit, are altogether perfonal
things, and ſo can neither be transferred or im-
puted, or yet any how exchanged. If you
fhall ever be obliged, for the fake of peace, to
comply with the external rites and cuftoms of
worſhip prevailing in your country; remember
then, that ſuch outward performances cannot
fupply the place of true piety or religious wor-
ſhip, which is internal, or of the mind; a per-
petual fenfe of our dependence on God, and a
conftant defire or endeavour to fulfil his will,
in promoting the happineſs of mankind, by the
196
A CATECHISM.
1
practice of juſtice and charity.
And being
inſtructed in true religion, or morality, ſtript
of all the mythology and pomp, which law-
givers have thought it neceffary to clothe it
with, in order to ſtrike the fancy, and fo engage
the attention of the people, that they might
inform their underſtandings, in found morals
and obedience to good laws; we ought not,
therefor, to run down all the mythology and
eſtabliſhed rites of a country, while they are
made any how fubfervient to the end of go-
vernment, or good of ſociety; and not ſubſti-
tuted in the place of morality or religion itſelf,
to ſerve the purpoſes of ignorance and ſlavery.
But thoſe are the beſt conftituted governments,
and liable to the leaſt abuſe, in which morality
and immorality only are rewarded and punished,
and every one is equally protected in worship-
ping God according to his own confcience, with-
out either encouragements or difcouragements,
which tend to deftroy fincerity and honeſty;
unleſs any maintain principles that are inconfiſt-
ent with the good of fociety, as Papiſts and
perfecutors do; for no plea of private conſci-
ence can be ſuſtained againſt public fafety.
1
A
VIE W
S
OF THE
NECESSITARIAN or BEST
CHEM
M E:
FREED FROM
The OBJECTIONS of M. CROUSAZ, in his
Examination of Mr. POPE's Effay on Man.
SRANGE! that there should be in Nature the idea of an order
and perfection, which NATURE herself wants! That be-
ings which ariſe from Nature ſhould be ſo perfect, as to
discover imperfection in her Conftitution; and be wife e-
nough to correct that Wisdom by which they were made!
Characteriſtics, Vol. II.
Firſt printed in the Year 1739.
B b
[ 199 ]
CONTENT S.
INTRODUCTION, The doctrine of Pre-
ordination, or, neceffity, very antient. P. 201
SECT. I. The notion of the Neceffitarian, or
Best Scheme, ftated.
P. 203
SECT. II. The Best Scheme defended from
the objections drawn from the nature of the
thing.
P. 206
SECT. III. The question stated, Whether the
Scheme of liberty, or neceffity, is moſt worthy
of God? and determined, by a comparison of
their confequences, for that of neceſſity. P. 210
SECT. IV. The grand objection about the ne-
ceffity of evil anfwered.
P. 219
CONCLUSION. The belief of the Necefft-
tarian, or Best Scheme, productive of good
effects.
P. 226
[
2011
A
VIEW of the NECESSITARIAN,
or, BEST SCHEME,
FREED FROM
The OBJECTIONS of M. CROUSA Z.
A
INTRODUCTION.
THE doctrine of Pre-ordination, or Ne-
ceffity, was maintained by many of the
antient heathen philofophers, particularly by
the Stoics, who thought it confiftent with a
liberty from compulſon; and what a good in-
fluence it had on them, both in high and low
life, the emperor Antoniffus and Epictetus are
bright examples. The fame doctrine hath
been efpoufed by many Chriftians, and by
them thought to be exprefsly contained in
the Scriptures. A gentleman of M. Croufaz's
reading cannot but fee this. I fee no reaſon,
}
2
202
A VIEW OF
therefor, why M. Croufaz calls this the Leib-
nitzian ſyſtem; though that eminent philofo-
pher, M. Leibnitz, maintained it with great
acuteness.
M. Croufaz hath reafoned little from the
nature of the thing againſt the doctrine of
Pre-ordination, or Neceffity; but hath laid to-
gether a good many popular objections againſt
what he imagines to be its confequences. But
if feveral of theſe objections are not the fair
confequences of this doctrine; or, if M. Crou-
faz knew that they were not owned to be fo
by them on the other fide of the queſtion, it
it
ſeems not very confiftent with his candour to
preſs them in the manner he does. And, parti-
cularly, if the ingenious author, and celebrated
poet's words, upon whom he remarks, will, in
ſome places, bear a good ſenſe, as M. Croufaz is
fenfible*, it appears ſtrange, that he, "who loves
to fee God ſpoken of with reverence," ſhould, in
the fame page, put an ill one upon them, and that
in the moſt indecent expreffions. But not to
infift upon things of this kind, I proceed to
* P. 105.
THE BEST SCHEME.
203
lay down and conſider the doctrine of Neceffi-
ty, or Pre-ordination itſelf, and its confequen-
ces. M. Croufaz himſelf gives a good account
of this fyftem from its defenders †, which is
well worth tranfcribing.
SECTION I.
"GOD, that is to fay, the Eternal Being,
"is fuch, that it implies a contradiction.
"for him not to be; infinite in power,
"infinite in knowlege, he comprehends in
((
himſelf the ideas of every thing he hath
power to give being to. An infinity of
"worlds preſents itſelf to his mind; but a-
mong the ideas of theſe innumerable worlds,
"there appeared one, which, upon the whole,
preſented a work more perfect than all o-
"thers; and God infinitely wife, and infi-
"nitely perfect, was detertermined not by
cc
conſtraint, or againſt his will, but with
a full and perfect approbation, to pre-
"fer to all the reft the fyftem which at
"prefent exifts, and of which we ourfelves
† P. 16, and 17.
204
A VIEW OF
1
"make a part: the all-perfect nature of God
"did not fuffer him to chufe any other."
*
M. Croufaz fays, "There is fomething,
fpecious and fublime in this fyftem, and very
proper to deceive." And, on the contrary,
the notions of this ſyſtem appear to me ſo na-
tural and conſiſtent, that they cannot be over-
thrown. Nay, M. Croufaz does not venture
to attack it directly; but endeavours to fhew
that it is attended with ſtrange confequences.
"Let us, adds he, examine what is built on
"theſe principles. In order that the univerſe
<<
might be infallibly fuch as God its Creator
"had conceived it, every thing which it com-
"prehends muft fubfift by neceffity; and e-
66
very thing that is doing in it neceſſarily
" and infallibly comes to paſs.”
Theſe are fair confequences from the above
principles; therefor, if the principles are true,
the confequences muſt be admitted.
M. Croufaz goes on with a diſcourſe about
machines, corporeal and fpiritual. That our
bodies are machines is not denied; but I never
heard that ever Mr. Leibnitz, or Mr. Pope,
* P. 17.
THE BEST SCHEME.
205
called fpirits, or intelligences, machines. Mr.
Leibnitz did indeed maintain fome peculiar no-
tions about the operations of the foul and bo-
dy, which he explained by a pre-eſtabliſhed
harmony; but I do not fee what ground M.
Croufaz hath to charge Mr. Pope, or any o-
ther defender of the Neceffitarian Scheme, with
thefe opinions.
That the material world, and every part of
it, goes on according to the determination and
difection of its Almighty and all-wife Creator
and Preferver, nothing happening in it contra-
ry to his defign, is not difputed by M. Croufaz,
nor any wife man. And as the fame perfect
Being made and preferves the intellectual
world; it appears as evidently abfurd to con-
tend that any thing in it comes to paſs contra-
ry to his defign. But M. Croufaz can conceive
no determination applicable to ſpirits, but by
mechanical impulſe; which yet in fome caſes,
as diſeaſes of the body, affect the foul. I will,
therefor, endeavour to fhew him the determi-
nation which neceſſarily, and at all times, af-
fects intelligent beings. And in few words,
it is a natural defire of good or happineſs. This
Cc
206
A VIEW OF
defire of happineſs, which is effential to every
intelligent being, neceffarily determines them,
not by compulfion, but voluntarily, to prefer
and do every thing, which is within their li-
mited power to do, that appears to them, at
the time and circumſtances they are in, to be,
upon the whole, for their happineſs. And
thus, as God who makes them with this defire
of happineſs, and with certain capacities of
reafon, degrees of knowlege and natural pow-
ers, and, likewife, places them in certain cir-
cumſtances; every thing they do neceffarily
comes to paſs, according to the perfect deſign
of the Creator and Governour of both the cor-
poreal and intellectual worlds.
This is the ſcheme of Neceffity, which is ac-
cording to nature, common fenfe, feeling, or
experience; and fo, eafy to be defended.
6
SECTION. II.
ANY thing that looks like a direct argu-
ment a gainst the neceffarily Beſt Syſtem by M.
Croufaz, is what follows. "Is it permitted
THT BEST SCHEME.
207
}
"to a man to believe that he is well enough
"affured of the depths of divine knowlege,
"and has an idea of it just enough to conclude
"from thence, that it was not poſſible for this
"infinite Intelligence to form different plans
"of the univerſe, every one of which ſhould
"be as perfect and as worthy of the choice of
"its divine Author as the reft?" *
But what is this to the purpofe? Is M. Crou-
faz well enough affured of the depths of divine
knowlege to affert, on the contrary, that
there is no beſt plan of the univerſe more wor-
thy of its divine Author than any other?
Allowing that among imperfect plans, fome
may equally be good, and that the divine pow-
er extends to the production of any of them;
yet it feems to me no daring piece of temerity,
to affert that the perfection of God will not fuf-
fer him to produce a worſe ſyſtem when a bet-
ter is poffible.
M. Croufaz goes on t." It is by choice of
"God's goodnefs intirely free that he was de-
"termined to create, rather than not to cre-
It is enough to fay, that he was not
"ate.
+ P. 33.
* P. 32.
Cc 2
208
A VIEW OF
"forced to it; we must add, that he was
(C
willing it ſhould be fo by a choice perfectly
"free." It is confeffed here, that it was good,
ate.
to create; nay, better to create, than not cre-
Could God in this cafe chufe not to cre-
ate? No, certainly. The perfection of his
nature would not allow him to prefer what
was worſe, not to create, to that which was
better, to create. His effential goodneſs ne-
ceffarily determined him to will creation. But
God was not forced, or compelled to produce.
happy intelligences, as M. Croufaz in his pious
reflections, which follow after what I laſt
quoted, would, by altering the ſtate of the
cafe, unfairly charge upon his antagonist's
principles.
M. Croufaz, in order to fhew that all the
works of God "were not the neceffary confe-
quences of a preference which the divine wif
dom could not help making", brings an in-
ſtance from mountains, which, though he
he owns them fit and neceffary to be in the
earth, yet he affirms their order is not neceffa-
ry, but may be altered without any inconveni-
* P. 45.
THE BEST SCHEME.
209
ence. Upon making fuch a change of the fi-
tuation of mountains as he fuppofes, he ſays,
"The diurnal revolution of the earth would
"be made with the fame regularity, and the
"mountains preſent the fame poſitions to the
"fun." But might not other inconveniences
enfue? would the vapours be collected in the
fame meaſure and quantity? and the ſame
fprings and rivulets, formed upon ſuch a
change of fituation of the mountains, to
water the fame plains below? There may
be other reafons from the internal ſtructure of
the earth, which we are intirely ignorant about,
that may cauſe a ridge of mountains to be ne-
ceffarily as they are. I wonder to find the op-
poſers of the Neceffity Scheme run to fuch in-
ſtances of an indifference of things, which are
built entirely upon their own ignorance of the
whole of the cafe. As well might a man, ig-
norant of the ſtructure and uſe of all the parts
of a human body, argue, that though he ſees
a heart, ftomach, liver, etc. neceffary to the
body, yet he cannot fee that any inconvenience.
would ariſe upon their fituations being chang-
ed from what they are.
110
A VIEW OF
Theſe are the principal arguments I find
urged by M. Croufaz, againſt the Leibnitzian
fyftem, as he calls it, drawn from the nature
of the thing; I go on next to confider thoſe
ariſing from its confequences.
SECTION III.
"BUT though I fhould be complaifant
enough to agree, fays M. Croufaz, *
"that it was neceffary for God to prefer a
"world entirely perfect to one which, upon
"the whole, was lefs fo; yet the fyftem of
"machines and fatalifm is not eſtabliſhed by
"this conceffion; for I infift upon it, and this
"affirmation feems to me evidently true, that
an univerfe, in which there fhould be free
"and truly active intelligences, would be a
"work much more worthy of God, than a
"world where good and evil, virtue and vice,
are the infallible and inevitable confequences
"of the conſtruction of every being, and of
"the firſt impulfe which the Creator impreffed
on them."
* P. 34.
THE BEST SCHEME.
21[
M. Croufaz hath affirmed this; therefor it
must be true. Whenever he is at a lofs for a
reafon against the principles he would expoſe,
M. Croufaz returns always to his pious and de-
vout reflections, and fets them in a'nodious and
falfe light, What follows in fome pages to
fupport the truth of the above affirmation,
may take with vulgar readers, who, being no
good judges of found reaſoning, are dazzled
with a flaming fhew of devotion and zeal for
religion. M. Croufaz has heard a ſtory of a
Scotch minifter *: I reckon he hath heard of
the Scotch covenant too; by which the Scots
made a bargain with God, that he only fhould
be their God, and they only his people, exclu-
five of almoft all the world befides.
though Mr. Leibnitz, Mr. Pope, and feveral
others, have profeffedly efpoufed the Scheme
of Neceffity in defence of providence, to vin-
dicate the ways of God to man; yet M. Crou-
faz reckons all on that fide of the queſtion, Li-
bertines, enemies to God and religion; and
thofe on his fide of the queftion, the defend-
ers of religion . M. Croufaz fays ‡, Nothing
For,
** P. 27.
† P. 37.
P. 38.
212
A VIEW OF
can withſtand the clear proofs of their doctrines
of religion but an obftinate refolution. How
modeft and charitable is this! But in anſwer
to the above affirmation; if fcripture, which
all fects claim authority from, was allowed to
be brought into philofophical difputes, which
are only to be determined by the nature and rea-
fon of the thing, I might cite texts too on my
fide, as well as M. Croufaz does on his fide of
the queftion: I keep therefor to the laws of
philofophizing.
I have fhewn + from the ideas which natu-
rally ariſe from common fenfe or feeling, that
man, though free from compulfion or reſtraint,
yet is neceffarily determined, by the conftituti-
on his nature, to deſire happineſs; and that
this natural defire of good or happineſs necef-
farily determines him, at the time and circum-
ftances he is in, to be, upon the whole, for
it. If M. Croufaz will call fuch a creature as
this a machine, we fhall not diſpute about a
word. Machines being taken in this fenfe,
I deny every word of M. Croufaz's affirmation
above cited.
* P. 36.
† P. 205, 206.
THE BEST SCHEME.
213
44
An abfolutely perfect creature is an impof-
fibility and contradiction in itſelf. M. Crou-
faz allows this himſelf t. The beft poffible
creatures, therefor, muft, of neceffity, have
fome degrees of folly or vice in their conftitu-
tion, whether upon M. Croufaz's fcheme, or
its contrary. The queſtion then will not be,
Whether a world of intelligent beings, where
fome degrees of vice or folly are the infallible
confequences of their conftructions; or a world
of abfolutely perfect creatures would be a work
more worthy of God? For this laft part of the
fuppofition is impoffible, and contradictory, e-
ven in the beſt fyftem of beings. But the
queſtion would be, Whether a world in which
there ſhould be intelligent free creatures, free
not only from compulfion, but from a deter-
mination to deſire and purſue their happineſs;
or a world in which there fhould be intelligent
creatures under a neceffary determination, from
the conſtruction of their own being, or nature
of their own exiſtence, to defire and purſue
what appears to them to be, upon the whole,
their good or happineſs, would be a work more
Dd
† P. 32.
214
A VIEW OF
worthy of God? This, I fay, is the proper
ftate of the queſtion between the maintainers
of the Neceffitarian Scheme and its contrary.
And my anſwer to this is, firft, As there is
a neceffity for God to prefer a more perfect
work to a leſs perfect one, a world of intelli-
gent neceffary beings, as it is here explained,
being what we actually find in this world;
therefor, this is a work more worthy of God
than a world of intelligent free beings, free
from all manner of determination or neceffity,
otherwiſe God could not have preferred this to
the other.
But M. Croufaz will diſpute the fact; and it can
only be determined by experience. M. Croufaz
muſt anſwer for himſelf; I for myſelf, whether
we are free to will, or chufe evil, as evil, buton-
ly under the apprehenſion of good? This was
never queſtioned by the antient philofophers.
Nay, it was an eſtabliſhed maxim among them,
"That no man could will, or chufe evil, as
"evil, but under the appearance of good".
But M. Croufaz replies in a quotation, from
the Bibliotheque Germanique, "That when
"the foul is on many occafions in a ſtate
THE BEST SCHEME.
215
"of doubt and fufpenfe, then he is un-
"der no determination at all." To this
I answer, that the foul is even in all theſe
cafes under the fame determination to purſue.
happineſs; but her ignorance of what may be
the beſt means to it determines her to fufpend
her judgment and deliberate upon the beſt
means. M. Croufaz will aſk again, If two
means to the fame end be in all refpects equal-
ly good, fhall we live in that irrefolution for
ever, which would be extremely prejudicial to
us; becauſe, there can be nothing in this cafe
to determine our choice but mere will? I an-
ſwer, That fuch cafes feldom, or never hap-
pen. But allow they did, one of the two equal
means, it muſt, of neceffity, ufe; but there
being no preference, or betterneſs, in the na-
ture of the thing, the will cannot be concern-
ed about them; it muſt, of neceffity, be quite
indifferent; fo we take any of them by chance
and random; or, more properly, mere mechani-
cal cauſes determine the cafe: for inſtance; pity
determines me to give a fhilling to an object;
I put my hand into my pocket where there are
† P. 39. etc.
Dd 2
216
A VIEW OF
feveral fhillings all equally good; I take out the
firſt my hand falls upon by chance, and no other;
for this plain reafon, this fhilling being equal-
ly good with the reft, it is not worth my while
to put by this and take another. In fhórt, if
men are always neceffarily determined to will
or chufe, what appears beft to them, and only
free from this determination in indifferent caf-
es; fuch freedom is not worth contending for.
Let us now examine which of the two works,
cr fyſtems of liberty or neceffity, would be
more worthy of God by a compariſon of their
good or ill confequences.
Men being free to do as they will, but un-
der a neceffity of willing their own happineſs,
many of the abfurd confequences which are
ignorantly drawn from this notion of neceffity
are the true confequences of the notion of li-
berty; fuch as," that it overthrows the fimple
" and natural ideas of morality, of juſt and un-
juft, laudable and punishable." +
6،
For the happineſs of intelligent beings con-
fifting in their living up, or as near, to the
rules of morality as poffible; this neceffity,
+
† P. 101.
THE BEST SCHEME.
217
therefor, which determines them to purſue
happineſs, does, at the fame time, determine.
them to practife morality, the true way to hap-
pineſs. And the puniſhments, or pains, of all
forts, attending vice or immorality, are necef-
fary means to determine them to virtue or mo-
rality. But on the ſcheme of liberty, where
men are not neceffarily determined by pleaſure.
or pain, virtue or vice, naturally attended with
pleaſure or pain, would be mere indifferent.
things to them, and rewards or puniſhments,
praiſe or difpraiſe, could never affect thoſe who
have no determination to defire happineſs.
Upon the Scheme of Neceffity men are de-
termined to embrace reafons and opinions which
appear to be for their good. But if men have
no neceffary defire of happiness, they would
not be affected with reafons and opinions of a-
ny kind; ſo that to reafon, or write, upon
the fcheme of liberty would be an uſeleſs thing,
but neceffary means to bring about an end up-
on the other ſcheme *.
Virtue is in its own nature amiable and
pleafant, vice painful and deteftable: this de-
* P. 110. of Examination, etc.
218
A VIEW OF
termines men, who neceffarily defire their own
happineſs, to approve of the one and diſapprove
of the other, both in themſelves and other
people; hence, that felf-reproach, or remorfe
and ſhame, upon viewing our own character
when vicious, are neceffary means to deter-
mine us to improve in virtue. But thefe things.
can be of no ufe in a ſcheme where men are
not neceſſarily determined to purſue happineſs,
and to embrace the means of it.
The Scheme of Neceffity is a ſcheme laid to
improve intelligent beings in virtue, in order
to happineſs, which they neceffarily defire, and
when they are convinced by reaſons that their
private happineſs is included in the good
of the whole, they will be neceffarily deter-
mined to promote it. But what good end can
be attained on the fcheme of liberty, where
intelligent beings may freely, or willingly, and
knowingly, reject happineſs and all the means
to it? God can propofe no end but what fuch
creatures may defeat; he can foreſee nothing
which is entirely in the will of theſe free crea-
tures to do, or not; and they being free to
chufe pleaſure or pain, as fuch, nothing but
THE BEST SCHEME. 219
I
compulfion, or force, can make them do, or
hinder them from doing, what they will, if it
was to fave, or ruin, the whole creation
conclude, therefor, upon this compariſon of
the confequences of the fchemes of liberty
and neceffity, that a world of intelligent be-
ings under a neceffary determination, from the
conſtitution of their natures, to purſue happi-
neſs, is a work much more worthy of God,
than a world of intelligent beings free from
ſuch a determination.
SECTION IV.
BUT the grand objection to the Neceſſi-
tarian Scheme remains to be anſwered. Which
is, "That God having laid the whole of this
"fcheme, or ſcheme of the world, and pre-
"ordained whatfoever comes to paſs in it;
"he is, therefor, the author of all the ill as
"well as good in it." To this we anſwer,
that as God is perfectly good to defign the beſt
ſcheme of the univerfe, perfectly wife to con-
trive it, and infinitely powerful to execute it;
1
220
A VIEW OF
there can be nothing evil with reſpect to the
whole creation. And feeing that in this im-
menfe whole there are an infinity of things
mutually relative, of which a finite mind can
have but an imperfect view; this muſt, of ne-
ceffity, occafion imperfect appearances of things,
in themſelves really perfect, if fully feen; theſe
appearances, therefor, can be no objections a-
gainſt this fcheme. If the opponents of this
ſcheme of a perfect whole, will contend that
theſe appearances of imperfection, or evil, are
real evils, or imperfections, it falls to their
part to prove it; fince the appearances of evil
not only agree with our hypothefis, but are
neceffary confequences of it.
Right and wrong, good and evil, are rela-
tive terms. What may be ill for me, may be
good for the whole neighbourhood. In war
feveral individuals are wounded, feveral killed;
this war enfures liberty to one nation, and re-
claims their ambitious enemies. Where is the
virtue of thoſe who do not willingly fuffer for
the good of their country? It is better for
them to die gloriously than to furvive their
virtue. Contradictions cannot poffibly hap-
THE BEST SCHEME.
221
pen; contrarieties are neceffary; for out of
thefe, harmony and good arife. Storms and
calms are contraries, yet both are neceffary.
What fignifies the lofs of fome fhips, etc. in a
ftorm, which clears a ſtagnant air from infecti-
ons which might ſweep off the whole race of
mankind; yet a continual ſtorm would retard
all buſineſs, and ruin every thing.
M. Croufaz, and thoſe in his way, will not
deny but that in the natural world thing comes
to paſs according to the deſign and direction
of its architect; however they do not allow
this in the moral world. But,
If plagues or earthquakes break not Heav'n's
defign,
Why then a Borgia or a Catiline?
This is not a confounding of moral and phyfi-
cal ills, as M. Croufaz anfwers*. If phyfical
evils which occafion pain to intelligent beings
are not real evils, but neceffary means to bring
about great pleaſure, or real good; why may
not the pains attending, or occafioned by, mo-
* P. 90
E e
222
A VIEW OF
ral evils, be alfo neceffary means to produce
greater pleaſure or real good? And thus the
exiſtence of the one can be no objection to the
perfections of the author of the whole fcheme
of things, more than the exiſtence of the other
fort of evils; none of them, neither phyfical
nor moral ills, being really, and upon the
whole, evils, but neceffary means to univerfal
good.
M. Croufaz owns*, that God draws uſeful
effects from vice, though he fays, vice is not
neceffary. Upon this I afk him, are theſe
uſeful effects, or this good which God draws
from vice, neceffary, or not? If they are not
neceffary, could not God have prevented the
premiſes from which they are drawn to exiſt?
could not God have kept fuch vicious charac-
ters as Borgia or Cataline out of the ſcheme of
creation? or has he willingly fuffered them to
exift, to make the world worfe than it would
have been without them? But if M. Croufaz
will not grant theſe abfurdities; but will fay,
"That the goodneſs, wifdom and power of
"God is more to be admired in not fuffering
* P. 149.
THE BEST SCHEME.
223
"vice to produce all the ill in fociety that
might naturally ariſe from it, but even draw
"ufeful effects from it:*" then it is evident,
even upon this fcheme, that certain degrees of
vice are neceſſary for the difplay of God's
goodneſs, wiſdom and power, and neceffary
premiſes from which God draws ufeful effects;
and therefor, worthy not only to be permitted,
but to be ordained by him.
Gods fends a plague or famine, among a
people who are juſt about to invade their
neighbours, or are already engaged in a war
against them to fubject them to their own
yoke. Thefe are chaftiſements, M. Croufaz
will fay†, "to reform both theſe who feel them
themſelves, and thoſe who are witneffes of
them in others." In like manner, God raiſes
up a vicious prince to chaftife a vicious people;
or even fuppofing them not actually vicious,
to call forth their virtues into exerciſe, by his
oppreffions: this reforms the people, or im-
proves and ſtrengthens their virtues. A wick-
ed prince then is as neceffary as a plague, or fa-
mine, and worthy of God for his author. And
* P. 129.
+ P. 88.
E e 2
224
A VIEW OF
if the people are determined to chaftife the vi
cious prince in their turn, to reform both him.
who feels it, and thoſe who are witneffes of it;
this would not be ordaining contradictions, no
more than when, in the cafe of the plague, the
people take medicines appointed for the cure
of it. Hence, contrary to what M. Croufaz
afferts *, all nature continually concurs in pro-
curing good for men, either to reform them
from vice, or to determine them to virtue and
improve them in it.
Ceafe then, nor order imperfection name:
Our proper blifs depends on what we blame.
Know thy own point: this kind, this due degree
Of blindness, weakness, heav'n bestows on thee.
Submit—in this, or any other ſphere,
Secure to be as bleft as thou canst bear,
Safe in the hand of one difpofing pow'r,
Or in the natal, or the mortal hour.
All nature is but art, unknown to thee;
All chance, direction which thou canst not fee:
All difcord, harmony not understood:
All partial evil, univerfal good:
* P. 88.
THE BEST SCHEME.
225
And fpight of pride, in erring reaſon's ſpight,
One truth is clear; Whatever is, is right.
Mankind are made naked, or ignorant of
the means of good and evil, though with a
neceſſary determination to purſue the one and
avoid the other: but being finite creatures they
are incapable to receive any great degrees of
knowlege, virtue and happineſs all at once;
in thefe, therefor, they must be trained up by
a continual progrefs. This world is a fcheme.
laid for ſuch an improvement. We experience
the pleaſures of virtue, or kind affection; this
determines us to improve in it: and we expe-
rience the pains of vice, or unkind affection;
and this determines us to avoid it. Repeated
experiences improve us in the knowlege of the
means of attaining happineſs, and our natural
defire of it determines us to apply them. But
as finite creatures can never become the fubjects
of infinite, or perfect, properties, fome degrees
of ignorance, vice, and imperfection, and un-
happineſs, muſt, of neceffity, be found in the
moſt improved and happy creatures, in the
226
A VIEW OF
beſt world that can be made by the moſt per-
fect Being.
If M. Croufaz can prove that God can com-
municate good or happinefs to finite creatures.
without any mixture of pain or evils; then,
and not till then, I will allow that this is not
the Beſt Scheme, where a mixture of both ap-
pears to me to be neceffary from the nature
and fitnefs of the things themſelves, and alfo
from the perfections of their Creator, who
would have made them otherwife, if that had
not been impoffible and contradictory in itſelf.
CONCLUSION.
UPON this Scheme God ordains all things;
and therefor," whatever is, is right." Ap-
pearances, the moft croſs to the caufe of virtue,
ſerve, upon the whole, a wife and good end.
This belief of theifm determines us willingly
to fubmit to the order of nature, fate, or the
unalterably wife and good decrees of God. By
this faith we are determined never to prefume,
Alphonfo-like, to think that if we had been in
THE BEST SCHEME.
227
the council of God at creation, we could have
directed him to have made a better work; nor
vainly to wiſh that any thing may come to
pafs otherwife than according to his perfectly
wife and good determination. And this faith
of theifm determines us to love God and all his
works; and to concur, as much as we can, in
bringing about the great and good defign of
final univerfal happineſs. But as this is not, and
cannot be, completed in this infant ſtate, we
are determined to expect another life, in which
our happineſs will keep pace with our improve-
ment in virtue for ever.
This infancy of being cannot prove
The final ifjue of the works of God,
By boundless love and perfect wisdom form'd,
And ever rifing with the rifing mind! *
M. Croufaz hath written fome other pieces
on the like fubject with this Examination,
which I have not yet feen; I may poffibly con-
fider them at more leifure. In the mean time,
as the principal topics on both fides of the
* Thomfon's Summer.
£28 A VIEW OF, etc.
queſtion about liberty and neceffity are here
briefly debated; this, perhaps, may be ſuffici-
ent for to determine on the merits of the cauſe -
by people of difcernment, who judge not by
the number, or bulk, of the writers on any
fide of a queſtion.
PHILOSOPHICAL LETTERS
CONCERNING
The BEING and ATTRIBUTES
O F
GO
O D.
Firſt printed in the Year 1737.
Ff
[ 231 ]
PHILOSOPHICAL LETTERS.
I
LET TE R. I.*
Reverend SIR,
HAVE read your very ingenious Vindi-
cations of Dr. Clarke's Demonſtration of
the Being and Attributes of God; and it ſeems
needleſs to make an apology for offering objec-
tions to an Author's principles which he is
willing to have cleared of all difficulties.
After I have, Sir, with my utmoſt attenti-
on, confidered that great good man's argu-
ments, and your's, brought to prove the necef-
"The
* The following Letters were wrote to the Rev. Mr.
JACKSON, a noted Clergyman in England, of a very
metaphyfical genius, and an admirer and difciple of the
great Dr. CLARKE. They were occafioned by two me-
taphyfical Pieces of Mr. JACKSON; one entitled,
"Exiſtence and Unity of God, proved from his Nature
"and Attributes." The other, being the Defence of it.
Mr. JACKSON, though he had all the metaphyfical
acuteness, yet he wanted the philofophical genius, of
Mr. DUDGEON.
Ff 2
232
PHILOSOPHICAL LETTERS.
fary exiſtence of God, his eternity, immenſity,
and unity, they appear to me conclufive.
Granting then the exiſtence of one eternal,
immenfe being, I do not underſtand what can be
meant by, "his power being exerted ad extra?"
frequently fuppofed and reaſoned trom both in
the Existence and Unity*, and Defence of it t.
A power, either exerted from eternity or time,
ad extra, with refpect to the immenfe Being,
is impoffible to conceive: it is fuppofing him
immenfe and not immenfe at the fame time,
which is an exprefs contradiction. And to
fuppofe, that things may exift, in confequence
of this exertion of power, ad extra, while no-
thing can be ſuppoſed to exift externally to the
immenſe ſubſtance, is again a contradiction in
terms. All reafonings, therefor, and opinions
built upon that impoffible and contradictory
fuppofition of God's exerting his power, ad ex-
tra, are chimerical and groundlefs, if his im-
menſity is demonſtrated.
You feem, Sir, to be fenfible of the abfurdi-
ty of fuppofing the exiſtence of other fubftan-
ces, befides the immenfe fubftance, (though it
* P. 33, 34, etc.
† P. 142, 143, etc.
LETTER I.
233
is always fuppofed and reaſoned from in your
books*.) Wherefor you fay, "That the di-
vine omniprefence comprehends, pervades, and
fills all things;+" which expreffion can imply
no more than, that one only immenfe fubftance
or Being exiſts, or that God is omnipreſent.
More, Sir, might be faid in fupport of the
above reaſoning, and in confequence of it; but
this would be too much to fwell a private epi-
ftle, and perhaps thefe fubjects are more proper
for the converfation of contemplative men,
than for a public controverfy. I would be
glad, however, to know how far theſe few ſhort
obfervations upon your reaſoning in your two
Vindications are just or not? And as it is na-
tural for knowing men to be communicative,
I expect it from you. I am with truth and
great eſteem,
Dec. 25. 1735.
Reverend Sir,
Your most humble Servant.
* Defence, P. 179, and other places.
+ Exiſtence and Unity, P. 151.
234
PHILOSOPHICAL LETTERS.
I
LETTER II.
Reverend SIR,
AM favoured with your's of the 19th of
January; and if any thing fatisfactory can
be faid on the argument before us, I expect it
from you, who have written with the greateſt
clearness and ftrength of the Exiſtence and U-
nity of God. But after all your very ingeni-
ous reafonings on this fubject, yet, "The ex-
ertion of God's power in the production or
government of things of extraneous effence and
fubftance, or fuch as are not his fubftance, (i. e.
things which have a diftinct cxiftence)" feems
to me to be impoffible; there being neither
place for his exertion of power, nor their ex-
iftence. Exertion of power hath a neceffary
relation to particular place, time, motion,
change; all which ideas are contradictory to
our ideas of an immenfe fubftance. Creation,
production, or government of things ad extra,
or ad intra, are, therefor, contradictory to the
nature of an eternal, unchangeable, immenſe
fubftance or Being.
LETTER II.
235
But fuppofing the exiſtence of other fub-
ftances, in confequence of God's exertion of
power, to be poffible, yet the immenſe ſub-
ſtance cannot comprehend another fubftance.
of a different kind, unlefs it hath vacuity in
it, equal to the real dimenfions of the compre-
pehended fubftance, which is a fuppofing it
immenſe and not immenſe at the ſame time;
an exprefs contradiction!
But if it be ſaid, that the divine ſubſtance
penetrates or pervades the fubftances compre-
hended by it, and that yet the penetration is not
mutual; this is attempting to defend one im-
poffibility by afferting another: or elſe we muſt
fuppofe that the one hath no real dimenſions,
as is alleged *, and confequently is no real
diftinct fubftance and exiftence: wherefor if
the divine immenſity is demonftrated, as I think
it is by you, no other ſubſtance exiſts.
If you allow this reaſoning juft, one of your
diſcernment will eaſily ſee the confequences, and
they appear not unworthy of your confiderati-
on. Iam, Reverend Sir,
Feb. 10. 1736.
Your obliged humble Servant.
* Exiſtence and Unity, P. 91.
1
236 PHILOSOPHICAL LETTERS.
I
LETTER. III.
Reverend SIR,
RECEIVED the favour of your's, of
February 23. In it you begin, "That
fomething exiſts, whether fubftance or pro-
perty, which is not the immenſe ſubſtance of
God, or any property of it, is felf-evident."
This I take to be the point yet to be proved.
I can eaſily conceive that the idea of an im-
menfe or infinite fubftance includes the idea of
infinite power to fupport infinite modes, inher
ing in it; but that after the exiſtence of one
immenfe fubftance or Being is demonſtrated,
there ſhould yet be fuppofed other ſubſtances,
finite or infinite, of different kind, to exiſt,
appears to me an abfolute impoffibility. "The
divine power exerted in producing them, "you
fay," exiſts, and is exerted in his fubftance,
and the fubftances produced exift alfo in his
ſubſtance, but cannot coincide or mutually pe-、
netrate or comprehend each other; by the fup.
poſition of their being different in kind.” This,
LETTER
III.
237
in both letters you obliged me with, you infift
upon, and alſo, in the Defence of the Exiſtence
and Unity. But this fuppofition of the being
of different fubftances itfelf, is what I contend
to be impoffible: agreeable to which you fay,
in the fame page of your book, though not
to what you faid above, "That one being can
no more have the fame prefence than the fame
exiſtence, or than it can be the fame being
with another." Now the divine ſubſtance be-
ing omnipreſent, either it hath the fame pre-
fence with your different fubftances, which
you own to be, as indeed it is, impoffible; or
elfe they have no prefence at all; and confe-
quently no diftinct exiſtence or fubſtance.
How you can conceive an immenfe fubftance
to comprehend another or different ſubſtance, I
know not; but as I can frame no idea of this,
it is an impoffible fuppofition to me and on
the contrary it is evident, that any compre-
hending ſubſtance muſt have vacuity in it, e-
qual to the real dimenfions of the comprehend-
ed ſubſtance or fubftances; which to ſuppoſe
of the immenfe fubftance is a plain contradic-
# P. 179.
G g
PHILOSOPHICAL LETTERS.
tion and a finite fubftance of no dimenfions,
:
is an abfurdity.
The confequence of my reafoning, you
think, may infer the impoffibility of any exift-
ence but of God, which you call an evident
abfurdity: if by exiſtence you mean ſubſtance,
I own it, and that he is all in all, and the ab-
furdity appears to lie in the contrary ſuppoſi-
tion. But if by exiſtence, you mean things
immediately dependent upon, fupported and
comprehended by, the immenfe all-powerful
ſubſtance, or Being, it does not, nor do I in-
tend it fhould, infer any fuch conclufion.
As to your diſtinction of exiſtents or ſub-
ftances into folid and unfolid, I have no fort of
idea of either of them. Solid and unfolid are
ideas only exiſting in the mind, and being
mere ideas, cannot be called properties of any
fubftance. One thing or idea is ſaid to be fo-
lid or unfolid, in refpect of others; but abſo-
lute folidity is what you call an abſtract idea,
and unfolidity is the bare negation of it; and
fo are neither of them properties of any being.
From my own exiſtence, I infer the exiſt-
ence of a being, upon which I depend, who
LETTER
239
III.
affects me with ideas, attended either with
pleaſure or pain, independently of my will.
Intelligence and will, I infer, by what I expe-
rience in myſelf, to be the properties of that
Being, which either muſt be the felf-exiftent
Being, or muſt depend upon fome other, till
by neceffary deductions of reaſon, we come to
the ſelf-exiſtent Being, who, as he exiſts by a
neceffity of nature, muft exift always and eve-
ry where. Intelligence and will, as they are
properties of the One, eternal, infinite Being,
have no relation to particular place, time, etc,
But for volitions, reflections, etc. they have a
neceffary relation to particular time at leaſt:
production of fubftances, in conſequence of
exertion of power, muft be, and they muſt
exiſt, in fome particular place, in all place,
or no place; which fuppofitions are all equal-
ly impoffible: the firſt two being contradicto-
ry to the divine immenfity, and the laft con-
tradictory in itſelf.
This production muft alfo have a neceffary
relation to particular time; for to fuppofe an
eternal thing produced, is a contradiction in
terms: and whether you can fuppofe produc
Gg 2
240
PHILOSOPHICAL LETTERS.
tion, without including in that idea, at the
fame time, a certain degree of motion and
change, you know beft. I cannot conceive of
it otherwiſe.
Upon the whole, as the existence of diffe-
rent fubftances is impoffible, fo neither do I
ſee the fuppofition of them needful; the one
infinite, eternal, intelligent fubftance, being
all-fufficient, by which all things confift, and
in which all things have their being; whoſe
exiſtence, (if that was poffible to be fuppofed)
being taken away, all things would fall to no-
thing. I am, fincerely,
Reverend Sir,
Your very much obliged humble Servant.
March 16. 1736.
P. S. If it be aſked, what is meant by
the term I? does it not denote a diftinct
fubftance? The anſwer is, that the term I de-
notes a very ſimple thing, which cannot be
properly, or in truth, called a diſtinct ſubſtance;
LETTER
III.
241
for when I confider what I am, I find that I
have fuch a neceffary relation to, and depen-
dence on many things in nature, nature itſelf,
univerfal mind, or God, that if his power which
fupports all things was fufpended, I would
ceaſe to exift; the fufpenfion of God's power
being a contradiction to neceffity of exiftence.
Hence the eternity of all independent things is
evident.
To conclude this long Letter and Poſtſcript;
neither fenfe nor reafon informs me of any other
exiftents, than that of the One, only, immenfe
ſubſtance, or univerfal mind, finite intelligen-
ces, dependent upon, and ſupported by him,
and ideas. The chimerical diſtinction of ſub-
ſtances into ſpiritual and material, hath con-
founded all the reafonings on metaphyfical fub-
jects, and filled natural philoſophy with para-
doxes and contradictions, ſuch as the exiſtence
and motion of fubftances in fubftances, the
infinite divifibility of finite extenfion, etc.
242
PHILOSOPHICAL LETTERS.
1
LETTER IV.
Reverend SIR,
THE
HE favour of your's, of the laft of March,
I have.
One's own exiſtence is the firft
part of knowlege. His doubting of the exiſt-
ence of all other things, makes him perceive
his own exiſtence or thinking, which cannot
be abſtracted one from the other. I confefs
my own exiſtence, moft certain, but that
a diftinct fubftance, exift, I never faid. On
the contrary I faid, that I immediately depend
upon, and am fupported and comprehended
by the all-powerful, omniprefent ſubſtance of
God; which is confiftent with the exiſtence of
one only ſubſtance, and every thing's being
modifications of his effence, the ncceffary con-
fequences of the proofs for the immenfity of
God. Eternity, immenſity, power, intelli-
gence, are properties of God; and you own,
"Qualities or properties inhering in one ano-
ther, or properties of properties; and, that
fpace and and time are properties of God only,
LETTER
243
IV.
nay, are his individual immenfity and durati-
on:*" as to what follows of contingent exiſt-
ences, finite, or infinite, I know not what
you mean by them. I fee no room for their
fuppofition in a ſcheme where intelligence and
defign take place. "The finite continuance,
or time of every thing, is their exiſtence in
particular portions of God's duration," you
fay in the fame page. Now, may not their
finite exiſtence itſelf, be as well particular por-
tions of God's immenfity or fubftance, and
their finite intelligence particular portions of
God's intelligence; or, to uſe another expref-
fion of yours," particular conceptions of his
being, or different modes of apprehenfion.+”
By volitions, reflections, etc. I mean, there-
for, modes of intelligence, or partial concep-
tions of it.
As to ſpace, its being in common ſpeech,
and even by philofophers, called a vacuity, it
is not to the purpofe; and I would have
thought, that the ingenious Mr. Jackſon would
not have followed either the vulgar or learned
* Exiſtence and Unity, P. 80, 81.
+ Defence, P. 65.
244
PHILOSOPHICAL LETTERS,
opinion in this, after he hath demonftrated,
that the divine fubftance fills all ſpace, which
cannot then be a vacuity, for finite ſubſtances
to be comprehended, or to move in.
Whatever, therefor, is conceived to exiſt in
this immenfe fubftance, muſt be properties of
it, or partial conceptions of its being, The
relative ideas of motion and refiftance, folidi-
ty and unfolidity, are excited in me; but
that a merely inert fubftance, fuch as matter
is imagined to be, ſhould be the cauſe of theſe
ideas, is a plain contradiction to its inactivity;
nor can I, from theſe ideas, infer any other
exiſtence, but that of the univerfal caufe or
mind, who ſtands in no need of ſecond cauſes,
inftruments, and occafions.
You have made feveral fuppofitions about
abfolute motion, etc. in your books, which
depend upon the doctrine of abſtraction, which
make ſome think, that they have ideas, when
indeed they have none, but are making impof-
fible fuppofitions; which I might ſhew, had
I now leifure from the neceffary avocations of
a huſbandman.
Two or more beings of the fame prefence,
LETTER IV.
245
-
is a contradictory fuppofition: it is fuppofing
them different beings, while they are the fame
being. That fomething exifts, is evident a
pofteriori; that one eternal, immenfe fubftance.
exiſts, is demonftrable a priori; therefor, as
two or more beings can no more have the fame
preſence than the fame exiſtence, no other fub-
ftance exifts, but the One, eternal, immenfe,
intelligent Subſtance, or Being; and all things
are modes, or partial conceptions of his exiſt-
ence or effence. This I take to be ſtrict de-
monſtration, or elfe I know not what it is.
Space being God's individual immenfity or
preſence, we are therefor partial conceptions
of his prefence and fubftance, or else you muſt
ſuppoſe, that we have a diſtinct preſence or
exiſtence in a part of fpace, a mere vacuity,
where God is not prefent; and what are the
confequences of this fuppofition, I need not
fay-
One only, eternal, immenfe, all-powerful,
intelligent Being or fubftance exifting, and all
hings being modifications of his effence; all
volitions, reflections, etc. I own with you, are
herefor not properties diftinct from the pro-
Hh
246
PHILOSOPHICAL LETTERS.
perties of the infinite, eternal intelligence and
will, etc. of God, but partial conceptions of
them. An eternal exertion of power in pro-
ducing ſubſtances, is, I think, a very impro-
per expreffion, and not lefs indeed, than a
contradiction in terms; a fuppofing that things
were produced, which exifted eternally, and
ſo were never produced. And to fuppofe the
exiſtence of eternal power, poffibly to be exert-
ed only in a finite determinate time, involves,
as you fay, feveral abfurdities: therefor God's
power, which ſupports all things, exiſted e-
ternally, and will exift eternally, as his infi-
nite fubftance, which includes that property,
is felf exiftent: the exertion and ſuſpenſion of
God's power, in a particular time, are therefor
contradictions to neceffary exiftence; and an
eternal creation or production is no creation.
at all.
The exiſtence and motion of ſubſtances in
fubftances, (which must be, if other fubftan-
ces exift and move in the divine fubftance) is
as evident an abfurdity as tranfubftantiation.
itfelf; and truly I do not fee, but that Chriſt
may as well be prefent in a wafer, as God
LETTER
24/
IV.
may be in any other fubftance.
The infinite
divifibility of finite extenfion, which I tran-
fiently mentioned in my laft, is not only a
difficulty, as you call it, but an exprefs con-
tradiction; a fuppofing a part of extenfion
finite and infinite at the fame time: but this
tenet, and many more, are founded upon the
doctrine of abſtraction, or the art of fancying
impoffible fuppofitions. I am fincerely, and
reſpectfully,
Reverend Sir,
Your most humble Servant.
April 10. 1736.
P. S. Neceffity is the foundation of exiſt-
ence, both of the divine fubftance, and all
the attributes. To talk then of arbitrary exer-
tions of God's power, and all its confequences,
as the Dr. does †, in contradiction to a natural
* Dr CLARKE'S Anfwer to a viith Letter.
+ Prop ix. and x. of his Demonftration of the Being
and Attributes of God.
Hh 2
248
PHILOSOPHICAL LETTERS.
neceffity, while a neceffity of fitnefs he owns,
is unintelligible to me; for this neceffity of
fitneſs is founded in nature, and therefor is a
natural neceffity, and according to him, ante-
cedent to the will of God, and is the reaſon
or cauſe of his willing fo and fo.
LETTER V.
249
$
I
LETTER V.
Reverend SIR,
AM favoured with your's of April 24;
and give me leave to take notice of the laſt
part of your Letter first; which is the com-
mendable zeal you fhew in oppofing tenets,
which you think inconfiftent with fenfe, phi-
lofophy, and religion: but then I would not
have you too forward, as fome learned men
have been, in tacking abfurd confequences to
true principles, which, upon due confiderati-
on, will be found not to follow: befides you
know that if any principles are demonftratively
true, their fair confequences muſt be admitted,
be what they will. I affure you, Sir, that
I never did, or ſhall, knowingly maintain, or
defend any principles, which are inconſiſtent
with that philofophy and virtue, which is
founded in nature, fenfe, reaſon, and experi-
ence, and not in mere fancy or imagination;
unleſs it be, for this good reaſon, viz. to have
250
PHILOSOPHICAL LETTERS.
them folidly confuted; and fo I reſume the
point in debate. It is precifely this.
I allege, and fincerely believe, till I fee
better reafons to the contrary, that the argu-
ments for the exiſtence, immenfity, and unity
of the divine fubftance, if they are conclufive,
prove that no other fubftance exiſts: and I
think it more confiftent with fenſe, reaſon, and
virtue, or true philofophy, to give up the ex-
iſtence of all other fubftances, than the divine
fubſtance, which is all-fufficient. And it ap-
pears to me, with the evidence of a maxim,
"That if God exiſts always, and every where,
"he is every thing, whether fubftance or
properties;" and according to the first in-
tent, and reaſon of my writing to you, the
trouble of proving the contrary falls to your
part. However, as I have not only made, but.
endeavoured to prove my objection, I ſhall a-
gain try to clear it from the great and evident
abfurdities which you think do attend this no
tion, which appear to be the confequence of
your own arguments. In order to this, I ob-
ſerve,
First, That the foundation of all your rea-
LETTER V.
251
foning to the contrary of what I ſtill think de-
monſtration, is built only upon a bare fuppo-
fition, or a thing taken for granted, which
ought firſt to be proved, viz. " The exiftence
of material or immaterial ſubſtance, the mode
of whoſe exiſtence, or prefence, is effentially
diftinct from God's." This fubftance is by
Mr. Locke and all the logicians, confeffed to
be an unknown fubject; and therefor, as I have
no idea of it, either from fenfe or reaſon, it
evidently appears to me, to have no other
mode and place of exiſtence or prefence, than
all other caſtles of the air, or works of mere
imagination have, which a lively fancy can cre-
ate and vary ten thouſand ways, and annihilate
at pleaſure. But I cannot fee why all fuch
fancies are oppoſed to a real exifting, or felf-
exiftent fubftance, or being, or mind, the
caufe of all things or ideas, which are the ef-
fects, not fecond caufes, from whence I infer
their cauſe, viz. God, and not an unknown ſub-
ject. All our knowlege, but of God, is about
ideas they exiſt only in the mind, and their
effence and modes confift only in being perceiv
ed; and from their being excited in us, inde-
t
252
PHILOSOPHICAL LETTERS.
pendently of our will, we immediately infer
their caufe, who excites them in us, and at the
fame time makes us capable of perceiving them
and comparing them, etc.
This being fo in fact, I prefume that my
demonſtration of the exiſtence of one, only,
immenſe, etc. fubftance, remains unfhaken.
Not to multiply words,
Secondly, and laftly, I obferve, that befides
the above chimerical notion of material fub-
ftance, you have a true idea of matter; which
matter, you ſay, may be ſeen and felt; and I
add, tafted, ſmelled, and heard, likewife.
Thefe ideas, I am certain, as I faid above, are
excited in me by the immediate cauſe of all
things, who at the fame time makes me capa-
ble of perceiving them, and not by an unknown
fubject.
It is extremely ridiculous to talk any thing
about an unknown fubject, that it exiſts, that
it is active, which exciting of ideas implies, or
even paffive, if a paffive fubftance was ſenſe;
a ſubſtance or thing fupporting, and paffive-
nefs, or being fupported, are oppofites.
thing, or idea, may be relatively, or impro-
A
LETTER
253
V.
perly, faid to ſupport other things; as the
earth is faid to produce or ſupport vegetables,
etc. But who, except thoſe who take the
name of philofophers for wandering after fe-
cond cauſes, knows not, that God is the im-
mediate fupport or caule of earth, water, air,
fire; vegetables, and all the vàrious combina-
tions of fenfible ideas; and further, "That
we are his offspring, and that he works in us
both to will and to do of his good pleaſure,
and than none can refift his will." God exiſts
neceffarily his difpofition or defire is neceſſa-
rily good his will neceffarily follows, or is
fubfervient to, or determined by his difpofiti-
on his knowlege and power are both neceffa
rily fubfervient to his will, as that is to his na-
tural difpofition; and thus the chain of necef-
fity, (not an external, but an internal neceffity)
lies in order of nature, and runs through all
God's neceſſary and voluntary * manifeſtations
of himſelf; and there is no real or abfolute e-
vil, fin, or error, in all nature; although fome
ideas are relatively pleaſant or painful, as are
:
* Will is not opofed to neceflity, but to outward
co-action, or force.
Ii
254
PHILOSOPHICAL LETTERS.
the ideas of virtue and vice. I hope you will
be pleaſed to confider and difcufs the main ob-
jection, before you proceed to its confequen.
ces. I am,
Reverend Sir,
May 5. 1736.
Your fincere Friend and Servant,
P. S. Since I wrote to you laft, a Defence
of Human Liberty, 2d Edit. came to my hand.
And in my opinion, the true notion of Necef-
fity is ftated*; and Plotinus his arguments a-
gainft it, which he calls an" Excefs of Neceffity,"
are the true or fair confequences of it, and up-
on that ſcheme only, can fatisfactory anſwers
be given to your objections + of your additi
onal Vindication of Human Liberty.
am forry, that neither my time nor my circum-
ftances will allow me to difcufs theſe matters
fully; and I have done more already this way
than is confiftent with my outward quiet. I
P. 153.
+ P. 53, 54.
But I
LETTER
255
V.
:
am forry alfo to fee the bonds of charity or vir-
tue moft broke through by them who pretend
to be moſt on the fide of religion or virtue, in
their reaſonings, and in their practice or actions.
And yet I believe all theſe things, which I
cannot help being forry for, are ordained of
God for the greateſt good. Our language is
adapted to vulgar conceptions, and not philo-
fophical truth and therefor, I hope you will
not take the advantage of my ſpeaking of acti-
ons, which are but paffions, and relatively ill;
but really good upon the whole. Far from
ſeeing the relations of things to one another,
and to the whole of nature fully, how can we
pronounce any wrong in her conftitution, or
think that any of her works need mending! On
the contrary, our view encreafing, charmed
with her perfections, who can help crying out
with a noble author, "O! glorious Nature! fu-
premely fair, and fovereignly good!" etc. You
will excuſe me. Adieu.
li 2
256 PAILOSOPHICAL LETTERS.
I
LETTER VI.
Reverend SIR,
WROTE to you May 5th, and have received
no anfwer as yet; but whether you did not
get my letter, or got it, and your answer to it is.
miſcarried; or that you do not incline to write
again, be the reaſon of my diſappointment, I
cannot gueſs. If I was fure that the laſt,
and none of the two first, was the cafe, I
ſhould not have troubled you more. Any of the
letters being loft, I would be glad to repeat it,
or have it repeated, that we may, if poffible,
come to fome end in theſe matters in debate.
In my laſt, in anſwer to your's, of April 24th,
I fhewed that our fenfes informed us only of
the exiſtence of ideas; and from thefe ideas,
which are excited in us independently of our
will, we immediately inferred their cauſe, viz.
God, and not an unknown fubject, as ſubſtance
is, by all the logicians, faid to be. And that
it is ridiculous to talk any thing of an un-
LETTER
257
VI.
known fubject, and that nothing can proper-
ly, or in truth, be called a fubftance, but God.
"Two
In your's, of April 24th, you fay,
beings of the fame prefence are a contradiction,
but two beings, the mode of whofe exiſtence
or prefence is effentially diftinct, are no con-
tradiction." Spiritual and material fubftan-
ces, you own, do agree in this mode of exiſt-
ence, viz. That both are extended, and fo oc-
cupy a part of ſpace at leaſt, and have dimen-
fions. You alſo own, “that if matter," to
which you attribute folidity, and extenſion,
"was proved to be immenfe, it would be to
my purpoſe to demonſtrate the exiſtence of one
only ſubſtance:" for the fame reafon, allowing
ſpiritual fubftance to be immenſe, it is as much
to my purpoſe; for where can matter, which
hath the fame mode of exiſtence with ſpirit, viz.
Extenfion, exift, unleſs you allow a penetration
of dimenſions, which is impoffible and contra-
dictory?
In fhort, two or more limited beings of the
fame or different kinds, may exiſt in different
parts of space, but two beings immenſe or un-
limited, of the fame or different kind, cannot
258
PHILOSOPHICAL LETTERS.
exiſt in the ſame place or ſpace, without a pe-
netration of dimenſions, which is impoffible
and abfurd; and a being of no dimenfions, or
unextended, not occupying ſpace, exiſts no
where, or is a chimera; therefor, if the divine
ſubſtance fills all ſpace, no other ſubſtance can
polfibly exift of any kind whatever. If God
is omniprefent, no other ſubſtance exiſts, but
what muſt have the fame prefence with him,
and fo muſt be the fame being.
If you be refolved, Sir, to drop this corre-
fpondence, pray let me know it frankly; that
I may apply elſewhere for a folution of ſome
philofophical fcruples connected with theſe
principles. I have little time indeed for ſuch
inquiries, but a ſtrong defire exciting me on
to them; and if you drop me, I do not know
where to find fo able a hand to direct and af
fift me.
I am,
Reverend Sir,
June 26. 1736.
Your obedient humble Servant.
LETTER VII.
259
I
LETTER VII.
Reverend SIR,
AM favoured with your's of April 11th, in
anſwer to both my laft, and am particular-
ly well pleafed with the gentle and ſtrong rea-
foning of it. If I had known when you was
in Yorkſhire, I might perhaps have fpared a
few days to have had the advantage of the in-
ſtructive converſation of fo great a philofopher
and divine, which my low circumſtances and
bufy life will not allow me to come by at a
greater diſtance. I will ever reckon myſelf high-
ly obliged to you, for your kind endeavours to
give me the true knowlege of God and our-
felves, by your letters; though this end would
probably be ſooner and eaſier obtained by con-
verſation, if that could be had conveniently.
Thinking that you had dropped me, I appli-
ed to a worthy friend of Dr. Clarke, for fur-
ther fatisfaction on thefe heads, viz. the right
reverend, the lord bishop of Wincheſter *
Dr. Benj. Hoadly.
260
PHILOSOPHICAL LETTERS.
and I thought it more than needleſs to offer
an apology for addreffing fo eminent a divine.
for inftruction, whofe great abilities and be-
neficent difpofition is acknowleged, even by
his enemies. I expect not his anfwer fo foon.
As it it an honour few controverfial writers
have yet allowed themfelves, to yield to the
force of reafon and truth, and it is none to yield
where theſe do not appear; I ſhall ſhew you
how far I acquiefce in your reaſonings, and
how far I do not. This, by my following
fincere thoughts of the matters in debate, laid
down in the fimpleft manner I can, you will
judge of.
That one, eternal, infinite, intelligent ſub-
ſtance or Being exiſts, I own to be demonſtrat-
ed; but though you ſay, “ That we perceive
not by our fenfes the fubftance of God ;” yet I
feel that in every inftance, I am fupported by
this univerfal fubftance or Being, (and confe-
quently all the qualities or properties, which
I am improperly faid to fupport) and who af-
fects me with ideas of pleafure and pain, in-
dependently of my will: and this voluntary,
and at the ſame time neceffary, activity of God
LETTER VII.
261
and paffiveneſs in me, I think conftitutes the
diſtinction between the felf-exiſtence of God,
and my dependent exiſtence. That ideas exiſt
in the ſelf-exiſtent mind, and in the minds of
dependent beings, without my mind, I allow; but
that there are material unthinking fubftances,
or objects exifting without all minds, I rather
think that we deceive ourſelves, by inferring
the exiſtence of any fuch objects from ideas,
which can only exift in the mind, and which
one mind can only excite in others, than that
our fenfes are deceived, and ſo caft what is our
own miſtake upon providence*.
I do not at all deny God's agency, though
I think he acts neceffarily, and fo in the per-
fecteſt manner, as thus I formerly fhewed;
viz. God exiſts neceffarily; his difpofition is
neceffarily good; his will is neceffarily deter
mined by his difpofition; his wiſdom and pow-
er are both neceffarily determined by his will,
as that is by his natural difpofition; and ſo an
Solidity, refiftance, motion, reft, I confider only
as ideas or perceptions attended with pleaſure or pain,
according to the prefent difpofition of finite percipients,
not as properties of any fubftance, which I fee no rea
fon for.
K k
262
PHILOSOPHICAL LETTERS.
internal neceffity lies in order of Nature, and
runs through all God's neceffary, voluntary,
and perfect works.
As to the neceffity that reigns through the
actions of dependent beings, it is complicated
and imperfect. We are neceffarily determined
by the very frame or conftitution of our na-
ture to purſue what appears to us, to be our
good or happineſs: our will is neceffarily deter-
mined by our natural difpofition, or defire of
happinefs; and our knowlege and power are
both neceffarily determined by our will, as that
is by our natural diſpoſition. (And, therefor,
it is to no purpoſe to talk of a power to act or
not to act in any cafe contrary to this diſpoſi-
on; but our knowlege being attained by flow
experience, and our power gradually increaſ
ed, hence by the neceffary conftitution of our
dependent natures, which cannot admit of per-
fection, we are unavoidably liable to miſtakes
or wrong purſuits of our real or greateſt hap-
pineſs in ſeveral inftances.) This is called a
moral neceffity, in contradiftinction to a na-
tural, or, rather an unnatural, neceffity, out
LETTER
263
VII.
ward co-action, or force upon us by external
circumftances.
Thus our natural difpofition or defire of
good or happineſs is a general fixed principle,
which inevitably determines us in all our acti-
ons; and whoever attends to what paffes in his
own mind, will find ſeveral paffions or affecti-
ons in it, exciting to this end: fome of which,
as more ſtrictly regarding the agent himſelf,
are called private paffions; and others regard-
ing the fyftem, with which he is connected,
are called public or benevolent paffions. The
exerciſe of the focial paffions is our higheſt en-
joyment, and the confiftent gratification of all
the paffions, private and public, is our great-
eſt intereſt or happinefs, which is always ob-
tained in proportion to our degrees of know-
lege, power, and external circumſtances. And
by the conſtitution of our natures, we are
determined to approve of virtue, or a bene-
volent difpofition and courſe of actions in our-
felves and others, and fo difapprove of vice, or
an entirely ſelfiſh difpofition and courſe. This
is called the moral fenfe, which perceives and
approves or difapproves of virtue and vice,
Kk 2
264
PHILOSOPHICAL LETTERS.
And thus virtue hath, and, in my opinion, on-
ly can have, a foundation on the Neceffitarian
ſcheme; while the ſcheme of liberty, or of de-
pendent beings their being left to act contrary
to the intention and will of God, is contradic-
tory in itſelf, contrary to fact, and attended
with innumerable abfurdities.
To fuppofe a dependent being acting con-
trary to the intention and will of the Being up-
on whom it depends, is an exprefs contradic-
tion; a fuppofing it independent while it is de-
pendent: and granting that a Being of perfect
goodnefs, wiſdom, and power, is the author
and governor of the univerfe; every thing in
it muſt be for the best, good, perfect, and ac-
cording to his intention, will, and immediate
direction. The contrary of this cannot be
fuppofed true, without throwing up the per-
fections of the Deity, his particular direction
and government; then indeed endless confufi-
on might enfue.
As to the evils which come to paſs, while
a perfect Being prefides; they muſt only be
relatively, improperly, or apparently fo, but
really good in the whole fcheme of things,
LETTER VII.
265
で
​though we do not fully fee the relations of
things to the whole. And I cannot fee why the
maintainers of abfolute decrees, neceffity, or
fate, fhould be blamed for making God the
author of evil, e. g. in ordaining a tyrant to
enflave a people, more than when he deſtroys
a fleet at fea, going to relieve them, by a ſtorm,
which is certainly his own immediate work; un-
lefs it be faid, that he hath left the natural, as well
as the moral world, to itfelf: and granting this
abfurdity, how can any be fure, that ever he
will regard them more? It is evidently inconfift-
ent with the character of a perfect Being to
make any of his works ill, or to permit any of
them to run wrong, fo as to need mending.
But why do I infiſt upon theſe things to a per-
fon of your diſcernment? If you have any
thing further to add upon theſe fubjects, I
wait it with pleaſure; if not, and if you think
that theſe papers may be of any uſe to others,
you are welcome, for my part, to publiſh them.
I am,
Reverend Sir,
Your real Friend and humble Servant.
August 30. 1736.
266
PHILOSOPHICAL LETTErs.
I
LETTER VIII.
Reverend SIR,
AM favoured with your's of September 25th,
and with one from the bishop of Wincheſter,
who declines to enter upon theſe fubjects;
but I am glad we are agreed about the firſt
ſubject of debate, viz. the immenſity and pow-
er of God, and the exiſtence of one only im-
menfe fubftance; for you allow, "That we,
matter, and all things, are continually fup-.
ported by the infinite, omniprefent fubftance
and power of God." We then are beings de-
pendent upon God, the only immenfe, all-pow
erful Subſtance, in whom we live or exift; and
matter may be a collection of fenfible objects
or ideas exiſting in the divine mind, (for I can
have no notion of ſubſtances exifting in a mind,
and out of the univerfal mind nothing can ex-
iſt,) ad extra to the minds of all finite perci-
pients. But whether there be objects exiſting
without, or ad extra, to all finite minds or
not; yet as you allow, that God can excite
LETTER.
VIII. 269
the ideas of them in our minds, though they
did not exiſt, theſe ideas ferve all our purpof-
es of pleaſure and pain, as well, the impreffi-
ons themſelves being real, as if they did in-
fer external objects or inftruments, which in-
deed we muſt own, a perfect being ſtands in
no need of in his workings, though limited
beings do. God can, (and I fee no reaſon for
his doing otherwiſe) effect every thing by a
mere act of his will, without inftruments;
which yet if he did uſe, it cannot be ſaid that
there is any activity or power in the inftru-
ments, but only in the agent: fo that I do not
fee that any powers can be attributed to mat-
ter, fuppofing God uſed it as an inftrument.
I allow you, that we limited beings, as we
cannot do otherwife, excite ideas in other
minds, by the intervention and mediation of
other ideas or fenfible objects, which are real
things or ideas, not fubftances, including ac-
tivity or power.
Having faid enough upon this fubject, I
proceed to confider what ſeems to me more
important; and which the firft fubjects of de-
bate led us into: viz. to confider the nature
208
PHILOSOPHICAL LETTERS.
of neceffity or fate, and the foundation and
diſtinction of virtue or vice upon this ſcheme.
And though you think, that the ſcheme of
neceffity ends in atheifm, for my part, I can-
not fee that it does, but on the contrary, when
rightly explained, it ends in theifm. This I
fhall endeavour to do in as clear and ſhort a
way as I can, by firſt ſhewing, how the acti-
ons of God are at the fame time neceffary,
voluntary, and good; and next, how the ac-
ons of men are neceffary, voluntary, virtuous
or vicious, and approveable or diſapproveable,
good in kind: And laſtly, though imperfect,
confpiring to the greateſt good in the whole;
and by this obviate your objections.
Firſt, To be acted upon by another, I allow
you, is an imperfection; and the Being, who acts
in confequence of this, cannot properly be
faid to be active, but paffive in his actions;
and this cannot be the neceffity by which God
acts. But God acts by a neceſſity of his own
nature, i. e. from his natural diſpoſition,
which is the ſpring of all his actions, and which
is the thing, that denominates a Being, good,
evil, or ſelfiſh. If it is a benevolent difpofiti-
LETTER
269
VIII.
on, or a deſire to communicate happineſs to
fenfible beings, then it is called good: if it is
a difpofition to make fenfible beings unhappy,
then it is called evil: and if it is a diſpoſition
to purfue his own happinefs, without regard
either to the happineſs or miſery of other be-
ings, but as theſe conduce to his own happi-
nefs, then it is called felfifh.
And theſe denominations they take antece-
dently, to any action of the being, in order to
theſe ends: fo that what you fay of goodness.
confifting in agency, is a miſtaking the matter
altogether; for the fame action may be good,
evil, or ſelfiſh, according to the difpofition it
flows from; and if we know that a being hath
a kind or benevolent difpofition, we call him
a good being, though he be incapable to ſhow
it, or to act according to his kind intentions.
The natural difpofition of God to commu-
nicate happineſs, is the cauſe, the neceſſary
cauſe, of his willing it, and of his knowlege
and power being applied for this end. And
thus it appears, that willing, and acting for the
happineſs of fenfible beings, are the natural
neceffary effects of his natural difpofition,
Li
270
PHILOSOPHICAL LETTERS.
which is neceſſarily benevolent or good. And
fo far as we are convinced of a being's acting
neceſſarily from a benevolent or good-natural
difpofition, fo much our love of that being,
our truft in, and fubmiffion to him, encreaf-
eth: fo far is the notion of neceffity, or of
God's willing and acting neceffarily in confe-
quence of his natural diſpoſition, from deſtroy-
ing religion, that it is the beſt foundation and
encouragement of it. And granting that God
defigned the happineſs of mankind, and that
he hath perfect wiſdom and power to contrive
and execute the means of it, all mankind muſt
be ultimately happy, as happy as their diffe-
rent conftitutions and capacities will allow.
Nor do I ſee a poffibility of defeating this end,
by introducing what tends to real or abfolute
evil, or final mifery; neither do I ſee any thing
in nature that tends this way, but the contra-
ry. And further, I think, that all who go a-
bout to maintain the exiftence of any thing
that tends to abfolute evil, whether by God's
ordination or permiffion, with his will or a-
gainst it, arraign the goodneſs, wiſdom, or
power, of the Author and Preferver of nature,
LETTER
271
VIII.
though they would ſeem to caft the blame elfe-
where. But thefe opinions flow not, I think,
from any evil difpofition, but from men's ne-
glecting to follow the dictates of reafon and
nature, and following the prejudices of edu-
cation, and an unwarrantable authority in mat-
ters of faith.
I come in the next place to confider the
actions of men.
Secondly, The natural conſtitutions of de-
pendent beings, whatever they be, are derived
from God, the Author of all things; and the
natural conftitution of mankind, we experience,
neceffarily determines us to purſue pleaſure,
and avoid pain. And this natural diſpoſition,
or defire of happineſs, is the caufe, the necef-
fary cauſe, of our willing it, and of our know-
lege and power being applied to obtain this
end. Our happineſs, we find, is neceſſarily
connected with that of other beings, and of
the whole ſyſtem. So that we cannot purſue
our own happinefs, without promoting in
fome degree, the happineſs of the ſyſtem of
which we are parts or members.
The exercife of the focial or public paffions,
LI 2
272
PHILOSOPHICAL LETTERS.
I called virtue, and not the neceſſary percepti-
on, and approbation of it, which I called a
moral fenfe or confcience, as you miſtake me
to do. Now our natural defire of happineſs
being the general fixt principle of all our acti-
ons, and having feveral paffions, private and
public, exciting to this end; the paffions and
ideas fpringing up in our minds, and thoſe ex-
cited in us from without, depend not upon
our will, but on the will of the fupreme Spi-
rit, the Author of our nature, and circum-
ftances: for we are under a neceffity of think-
ing at all times, at leaſt while awake, and by
the conftitution of our nature, being neceffarily
determined to purſue pleaſure and avoid pain,
this natural defire of happineſs neceffarily de-
termines our will, and all our limited or im-
perfect faculties, or powers of thinking or act-
ing, by reflecting, comparing, confidering, or
reaſoning, to find out the means, and all our
natural powers or abilities, to apply them for
the obtaining of this end, and avoiding pain.
or mifery and thus it appears that our reflec-
tions, etc. though voluntary, are at the fame time
neceffary, and that all our powers of willing,
:
LETTER VIII.
273
1
reaſoning, and acting, as well as theſe of per-
ceiving, are the natural and neceffary inftru-
ments of our natural difpofition, or defire of
happineſs; and further, That virtue, though
it be the neceſſary effect of a benevolent, kind,
or good difpofition; and vice the neceffary ef
fect of a ſelfiſh diſpoſition, yet we neceſſarily
approve or diſapprove of them, as well at per-
ceive them in ourſelves and others.
Lastly, As no creatures can be made abfo-
lutely perfect, they muſt, of neceffity, in pro-
portion to their degrees of perfection and cir-
cumſtances, or, through want of perfect know-
lege, power, and advantageous circumſtances,
miſtake, or fall fhort of their greateſt happi-
neſs, which is connected with that of others.
Hence, from the neceffary imperfection of our
dependent natures, arifeth all moral evil, which
can infer no other puniſhment from the deity,
but what is the natural effects of fuch miſtakes;
and this, in the natural conſtitution and courſe
of things, tends to the improvement of the
agent, by teaching and exciting him to act
more confiftently after; fo that theſe miſtakes
are ſo far from tending to real or abſolute evil,
274
PHILOSOPHICAL LETTERS.
that they tend to abfolute good, with reſpect
to the agent, and confequently to the fyftem
of which he is a part or member. And as a
fyſtem or conſtitution, in its very notion, im-
plies variety, and the nature of the thing re-
quires it; fo we fee in this world an in-
conceivable variety of creatures, and among
the ſeveral ſpecies of theſe, as great a variety
of diſpoſitions, or tempers, capacities, circum-
ftances; and as great a variety of objects and
events, fuited to theſe, to anſwer the good
ends of providence; and it is this gradation,
and fubordination, of creatures, this variety
and difference of inclinations and purſuits, that
makes ſo beautiful a contraft in the great DRA-
MA; that lays a foundation for action, inter-
courſe, and a plot, which is abfolutely necef-
fary for the happineſs and improvement of
mankind; and without which there could be
no happineſs but of the dulleft fort, arifing
merely from the gratification of fenfual appe-
tite. From this confideration and view of
things, it appears, that vice or moral evil,
which is the neceffary effect of the variouſly
proportioned difpofitions, tempers, paffions,
1
LETTER
275
VIII.
reaſon, circumſtances, etc. of men, is not on-
ly a neceffary imperfection, that creatures can-
not be made without (as fhewn above) but is
alſo neceſſary and abfolutely fit and requifite
to the beauty and happineſs of the whole fyf-
tem, ordained and directed of God. A full
delineation of theſe principles, and an illuftra-
tion of them by inftances, would fill a volume,
which I have neither time nor abilities for ; but
would be glad to fee this fubject fully treated
by a proper hand. I am with fincerity, and
gratitude, for your affiſtance in theſe fpecula-
tions and enquiries,
08. 8. 1736.
Reverend Sir,
Your moſt humble Servant.
P. S. To give one inftance to illuftrate the
above reaſoning: perfecution, and all its hor-
rid terrible effects, is perhaps the greateſt ob-
jection to this ſcheme of theifm. To it I re-
ply, that to permit it, comes to the fame with
276
PHILOSOPHICAL LETTERS.
ordaining it; but if the ordaining ſerves a good
end, even to the perfecuted, and at the fame
time proceeds from no directly evil intention
or diſpoſition in the perfecutors, where is the
evil of ordaining it? yea rather, the ordaining
of it would be neceffary and fit to cauſe an o.
verbalance of good in the whole fcheme. The
common belief, "that opinions recommend
to the favour of God," neceffarily leads people
of good tempers to bring others to believe ſo
and fo, firſt by gentle, then by any means; at
laft, when none prevail, to hate them, and
treat them as God's enemies. This is the na-
tural ſource of perfecution, good in itſelf, but
arifing from wrong notions of religion. As to
the end perfecution ferves, I need not tell you,
that tribulation or affliction is the ſchool of many
eminent virtues. Mr. Chandler informs us," that,
"as the primitive Chriftians had any intervals
"from perfecution, they became more profli-
gate in their morals, and more quarrelfome
"in their tempers *. The neceffity then of
perfecution was evidently fit, and uſeful to
on.
"
* Introduction to the Hiftory of the Inquifiti-
P. 18.
LETTER VIII.
277
mend the tempers and morals of the perfecuted,
beſides to be of good example to others.
To fhut up all in a word; moral as well as
natural evil muſt tend to final happineſs, or
abfolute good in the whole fyftem of things,
though we cannot account for every appear-
ance, and fo is not fin or real evil; or elfe we
muſt give up the perfections of the Deity, and
take up with the moſt uncomfortable of all o-
pinions, that of forlorn nature, and a father-
lefs world; except that more horrid one, of
things being either willingly or weakly fo con-
ftituted and directed, as to introduce fin or
evil, deſtructive of rational and final happineſs,
equally impoffible and abfurd.
M m
278 PHILOSOPHICAL LETTERS.
LETTER. IX.
Reverend SIR,
T
HE favour of your's of October 20th, I
received, and am hopeful we ſhall agree
in all our fentiments that are of any moment.
You agree with me that matter is not an active
ſubſtance, and yet you immediately add, “ that
it hath a power by its prefence to the mind to ex-
cite ideas in it". If matter hath a power to excite
ideas in the mind, it is certainly an active fub-
ſtance, contrary to what you before ſaid: and
indeed if matter be a fubftance, it muſt include
activity and power. If people always kept the
fame idea or definition of ſubſtance, which is
ufually given of it, viz. "A thing fubfifting
by itſelf, independently of any other, the ſub-
ject of accidents or qualities," much debate a-
bout fubftances might be fpared; for in this
fenſe, there can be but one only ſubſtance, (as
I have all along urged, and you have demon-
ftrated in your Vindications) eternal, infinite,
etc. In this proper fenfe of the word ſubſtance,
LETTER
279
IX.
I think, you will not allow matter to be a ſub-
ſtance, with the real properties of extenfion,
power, etc.; but only a fenfible object, which
I cannot, as you do, diſtinguiſh from an idea
or perception *: for ideas are the proper objects
of ſenſe, and God is the proper author, or im-
mediate cauſe of both our fenfes and their ob-
jects. And ideas are fometimes, at leaſt, ex-
cited in our minds, as in fleep, without the
preſence of external objects, and give us real
pleaſure or pain.
I always agree with you, that there is will,
reaſon, agency, as well as difpofition to uſe
them in the Deity. But then this difpofition,
which we agree is benevolent or good, ("For
"the general mind can have no particular in-
"tereft, but the general good, or good of the
"whole, and its own private good, muſt, of
neceffity, be one and the fame+") is ante-
cedent to them all, and they only the inftru-
ments of attaining the ends which this difpofi-
<<
* There is indeed a difference between the real im-
mediate perception of an object, and reflection on that
perception after.
+ Characteriſtics, Vol I.
Mm 2
280
PHILOSOPHICAL LETTERS.
on or defire excites to. A being cannot be
conceived to will, reaſon, or act for any end
without first defiring it: fo that I cannot un-
derſtand," how God's natural diſpoſition to
communicate happineſs has a neceſſary foun-
dation in his intelligence or reafon." This is
making one attribute, viz. goodneſs, to be
founded in another, viz. intelligence. One at-
tribute in order of application does naturally
and neceffarily precede another; as firft, Dif
pofition towards an end; fecondly, Willing it;
thirdly, Reasoning about the means to it; and
laftly, Executing them. And theſe attributes,
infinite goodneſs, wifdom, and power, all
founded in the divine fubftance, make up God's
perfect character, or what you may call divine.
rectitude; in confequence of which, all his
works muſt of neceffity be good, right, or ac-
cording to his intention, abfolutely happy;
and this we call a reaſonable end; becauſe our
moral fenſe approves of it, upon immediate
perception. But whether or not there can be
any fucceffive defiring, willing, reaſoning and
acting in the divine mind, is what I prefume
not to determine, otherwiſe than as he animates
LETTER IX.
281
and influences all things, according to the o-
pinion of the antient Stoics, but without be-
ing acted upon: for I can conceive of the di-
vine operations in no other way. To reafon
or confider of the beſt means, he needs never
do, as he intuitively knows all things. With
him there can be no fecondary cauſe, or mo-
tive of action; but his perfect defire is the
immediate caufe of his willing or acting accord-
ing to his perfect knowlege. He wills, and it
is done. But it is not always thus with de-
pendent beings. We neceffarily defire our
own happineſs: we will it; our imperfect in-
telligence makes us reafon about the means of
it: and our defire of happineſs neceffarily de-
termines us to chufe what appears to our limit-
ed conceptions to be the beft means, and to act
accordingly.
A man, I own to you, may make himſelf
miferable, or to fuffer pain, for a little time,
in view of a greater future good, if he will;
and fo he may make himſelf always or finally
miferable, if he will; but then it is impoffible
for him to defire, and confequently to will fi
nal mifery, as you fuppofe; and it is evident.
282
PHILOSOPHICAL LETTERS.
ly inconfiftent with the divine goodneſs, to
make us miferable (ultimately, fo I mean, for pre-
fent pain we may be ordained to fuffer in order
to future good) againſt our will. If our fu
ture exiſtence is confiftent with our happineſs,
(which confifts in the gratification of our mo-
ral and public fenfes, as well as of our private
fenſes; for all happineſs or pleaſure is fenfitive,
or perceived by a fenfe) as I doubt not it is;
and who would defire it, if it is not? we have
no more reafon to doubt of it, whatever changes
we may undergo, than of the divine goodneſs,
and his perfect wiſdom and power, to accom-
pliſh his good-deſigns; for upon theſe, the
continuance of our being entirely depends, as
or preſent exiſtence doth.
Dr. Clarke*, and all who contend for "its
being God's will and intention, that rational
beings fhould freely act, to make themſelves
happy or miſerable," as you expreſs it in your
former letter, allow," the neceffity of the
"various and different degrees of creatures for
.
diſplaying the infinite wiſdom of the Crea-
"tor, whereof, confequently fome muſt be
"lefs perfect than others, and fo liable to a-
Being and Attributes of God, P. 104. Edit. 7th.
LETTER
283
IX.
"buſe their liberty" (which, by the way, is
no more than a freedom from external impe-
diments, or natural power to act or not to act,
which is neceffarily determined by the will, as
that is by the agent) to the actual commif-
fion of evil." Now, Sir, allowing this varie-
ty of creatures for the diſplay of infinite wiſdom
in the Creator; yet if it was not as much for
the diſplay of perfect goodneſs, which can in-
tend no final mifery, or abfolute evil in its go-
vernment, that wiſdom ſhould give way to the
fuperior quality or attribute of goodneſs: for
what can we think of that wiſdom which is not
employed for a good end? Befides, to make
creatures ſo imperfect, as to be liable to abuſe
their liberty, or rather under a neceffity from
their imperfect conſtitution to miſtake evil for
good, and yet to expect and require that thefe
imperfect beings ſhould never fo miſtake, or a-
buſe their liberty, is a plain abſurdity; and to
puniſh them merely for fo doing, is evident in-
juſtice and wickednefs: for moral obligations.
can extend no further than natural poffibilities.
It is to no pupofe to reply, that they have a
natural power to act in another manner, a
power to do good as well as evil; for if they
284
PHILOSOPHICAL LETTERS.
want defire ſtrong enough to furmount all ob-
ftacles to good, and a capacity of reaſon to diſ-
cover the beſt means to it, their natural pow-
er, which is but an inftrument, cannot be ap-
plied to it; and if moral evil is fin, or real e-
vil, why ordain any thing that hath a greater
tendency than another, as leſs perfect creatures,
to bring it about? The truth is," Things
cannot be otherwife, or in another manner, or
in any other reſpect different from what they
are," whatever we may imagine," as they
proceed from perfect power, directed by per-
fect wiſdom and goodneſs:" for if we ſuppoſe
an alteration of the effects, we muſt ſuppoſe, at
the fame time, an alteration in the cauſe,
which is impoffible: neceffary goodneſs, with
perfect wiſdom and power fubfervient to it, is
an unalterable ſteady principle of action; a fyf
tem or conſtitution without variety, gradation,
and fubordination, mutual corrofpondency,
and relation of parts, is a natural impoffibility
and abfurdity. Variety, gradation, and fub-
ordination of creatures, with as great a va-
riety of difpofitions, tempers, capacities, cir-
cumſtances, and as great a variety of objects,
and events correfponding to thefe, fo as to
LETTER IX.
285
}
conſtitute the world properly one adminiftrati-
on or government, cannot be conceived other-
wife, without deſtroying the nature of the
thing, and the beauty and happineſs of the
whole. Suppoſe the contrary, for we may
ſuppoſe what in fact cannot take place, viz. an
equality of difpofitions, capacities, circum-
ſtances of any one fpecies of creatures; for ex-
ample, men; and let them be fuppofed of any
degree of perfection you pleaſe, ſo as never to
commit one fault or wrong to others, and you
will immediately fee the abfurdity of fuch a
fuppofition. It deftroys the very being of a
conftitution or government, and all foundati-
on for action, hope, improvement, and hap-
pineſs, except of the dulleft kind. What
could ſuch a ſet of beings do? or how employ
themſelves? where could be the founda-
tion for good offices? or for the exerciſe of
the nobleſt paffions, of generoſity, compaffi-
on, fortitude, etc. if their correfponding ob-
jects were not ordained? If there was no
vice, moral evil, or miſtakes, interfering of
interefts, competitions, etc. there could be
as little virtue, or moral good. There could
N n
286
PAILOSOPHICAL LETTERS,
be no fociety here, no need of laws and their
fanctions, no ground of debates to improve
the underſtanding. In a word, there could
be no foundation for growing in either know-
lege or goodneſs, if fuch a fcheme was not laid
for contracting acquaintance with men and
things, for converſe, correfpondence, mutual
good offices, etc.: and this can only be where
there is variety of tempers, capacities, inclina-
tions and purſuits, and as great variety of cor-
refponding objects and events. And fuch is
the preſent beſt conſtitution, where all the va-
riety of things are fo contempered and adjuſted
by infinite wisdom and power as to produce
the greateſt happineſs or abfolute good of the
whole, which cannot poffibly be altered for
the worſe, while perfect goodneſs prefides.
After all; if we feriously and attentively
look into ourſelves, where our knowlege is
moft certain, we find that the univerfal Geni-
us or Mind animates and influences us all,
works in us both to will and to do of his good plea-
fure towards genera! univerfal good or happi-
nefs, and this without fo much as our confi-
dering of, or knowing the real ends of our ac-
LETTER IX.
287
tions. Our appetites, paſſions, defires, (that
are very many, fuited to all kinds of objects
preſented to us, and which depend upon our
conftitution, of which God is the Author)
prompt, excite, or indeed cauſe us to act for
the preſervation of the individual, and good of
fociety, when none of theſe ends are in our
view. Children eat, drink, fleep, etc. with-
out any fuch view as felf-prefervation, but are
altogether influenced by their nature, or rather
the Author of it, to theſe ends. Men are the
fame way influenced, and experience only tells
them of the final cauſes of theſe appetites, paf-
fions, or movements; and then they knowing-
ly concur with theſe excitements. It is the
fame with the benevolent paffions or move.
ments; and men even promote public good,
when they intend only private advantage. And
when there are competitions among the paffi-
ons, private with private, public with public,
or private and public, the ſtrongeſt always car-
ries it, and neceffarily determines us to act,
with more or lefs confideration, and fometimes
with no confideration at all, according to the
ſtrength of it.
Nn 2
288
PHILOSOPHICAL LETTERS.
Brutes, lefs perfect creatures than man, are
influenced in the fame manner, by their paffi-
ons or inftincts. And indeed fo infenfible is
the gradation among beings, that fome men
differ little from brutes; and if moral obliga-
tion was in proportion to natural power or a-
gency, in which fome place the idea of liberty
and accountablenefs, idiots and brutes have of
ten the greateſt ſhare of it; and therefor would
be under the greateſt moral obligation; which
is evidently abfurd. It is plain then, that it
is the ftrength and balance of the paffions, af-
fections, or inclinations, and the ſtrength of
reafon and judgment, which depend upon their
conftitutions, and their external circumſtances,
that cauſe men to act in this or in that man-
ner, as the Author of our nature and circum-
ftances ordains and directs. And thus we are
intended by providence, and made inftruments
of good to one another, and to the whole,
without our directly knowing or intending it
in every cafe; and as we improve in know-
lege, fo as to fee plainly that the general good,
and our own private good is the fame, our na-
tural difpofition or defire of good or happi-
LETTER IX.
289
-
nefs will neceffarily determine our will and
natural powers, to concur with the general in-
tention or deſign, and we fhall be more and
more perfect, and happy, in proportion as out
natural defires of private and public good (for
we have inſtincts to them both, and both be-
ing connected together, the means to both are
the fame) and our capacities to advance them
encreaſe by diſcipline, experience, uſe, or prác-
tice, which ſtrengthens all defires, habits, and
practical principles.
It may be objected here, that practice
ftrengthens vitious habits, as well as virtuous
habits. To this it may be anfwered, That
there is a very great difference between them;
virtuous habits are attended with a growing
pleaſure, and ſpoil no organ, as not depend-
ing on the body; but vitious, or entirely felf-
iſh habits, which few contract, (they being al-
ways mixt,) the more we indulge them, give
always lefs and lefs pleaſure. The organ be-
comes more and more unfit, till at length it is
entirely deſtroyed by death, which feems only
a change of ſtate, where we may retain our ha
bits of goodneſs, virtue, reaſon and knowlege,
290
PHILOSOPHICAL LETTERS.
while the more ſelfiſh appetites, or defires and
habits of vice, though neceffary, and of uſe in
this infant ſtate, may be dropt here with the
body. But ftill that new and more perfect
ſtate muſt be ſuppoſed a ſociety, where a gra-
dation, and fubordination of more improved
creatures will obtain; which only can lay a
foundation for improvement in goodness,
knowlege, virtue, and happinefs, to eternity.
Having now explained myſelf on the ſubjects
before us, fo as you underſtand me; I hope
we ſhall agree in our fentiments about them,
though differently expreffed, as men will rea-
dily do, who have no other view, but to follow
nature and truth in their reſearches; at leaſt,
if we happen to differ in our conceptions of
things, we fhall do it with becoming grace and
charity. I am, with truth and perfect eſteem,
Reverend Sir,
Your most humble Servant.
Nov. 2. 1736.
16
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