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NAPOLEON'S
CAMPAIGN
IN
POLAND
1806-1807
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Napoleon's Campaign in
Poland
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Page 59, line 1, for “en " read “eu.”
142,
148,
244,
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59
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22, for "Beschofswerder" read "Bischofswerden
6, for "comrades" read "cossacks."
25, for "on the other" read "in the other."
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Map, Sheet II. (1).—Insert the name "Strzegoczin” against t
indicating dot about 2 miles north of Kowalavice a
2 miles south-west of Gonsiorowo.


Napoleon's Campaign
in Poland
1806-7
A MILITARY HISTORY OF NAPOLEON'S FIRST
WAR WITH RUSSIA
VERIFIED FROM UNPUBLISHED OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS
BY
FLORAINE PETRE
LATE OF THE INDIAN CIVIL SERVICE
WITH MAPS AND PLANS
LONDON
SAMPSON LOW, MARSTON AND COMPANY
LIMITED
St. Dunstan's House
FETTER LANE, FLEET STREET, E.C.
1901
لا
229
.P48
PRINTED BY
WILLIAM CLOWES AND SONS, LIMITED,
LONDON AND BECCLES.
Replace
Open B. Jess
1-23-42
PREFACE.
HIS volume
THIS
owes its inception to the difficulty
experienced by its author in finding, in English, any
satisfactory history of a campaign which he felt could not be
less interesting than its predecessors of Austerlitz and Jena.
There is, it is true, an outline of it in Alison's History of
Europe; but that is hardly sufficient for the student of
military history, and there is no good general map attached
to it. Sir Robert Wilson's account of it is not available in
every library, and it is not very accurate in many respects.
The English text-books on military history, as a rule,
scarcely allude to the campaign. The brief sketch of it in
Adams's Great Campaigns is, unfortunately, marred by
inaccuracies and misprints.
In French, the best history of the campaign is contained
in vols. xvii.-xix. of Comte Mathieu Dumas' admirable
Précis des Evènements Militaires, etc. It was, however,
written at a time (1826) when many sources of information,
now easily accessible, were closed to most writers.
Thiers' Histoire du Consulat et de l'Empire is not more
reliable in regard to 1806-7 than it is in the case of Waterloo.
The memoirs of Rapp, Savary, de Fezensac, Masséna,
vi
PREFACE.
Marbot, and Baron de Comeau do not profess to be histories
of the wars in which the writers were engaged, except
in so far as the operations came within their personal
cognizance.
Probably the best history of the campaign in Poland is
that of General von Hopfner, published in 1855, and based
upon Prussian and, to some extent, on Russian and French
official documents. The work is fully illustrated by numerous
excellent maps and plans. As far as can be ascertained, this
book has not been translated from the German. Nor has the
diary of Carl von Plotho, which is a good account of such
parts of the campaign as came under the writer's view.
In Russian, there is a history by Danilewski, which the
present writer has been prevented from quoting, except where
it is referred to by Hopfner, owing to his ignorance of the
language in which it is written.
A list of the published works, and the unpublished
documents, which the author has consulted is appended to
this preface. He takes this opportunity of acknowledging
the great courtesy and assistance which he received from the
officials of the Historical Section of the General Staff of the
French Army, in his search for information in their admirably
kept and arranged records. Thanks to these records, it has
been found possible to clear up, beyond all reasonable doubt,
many disputed and obscure points. Amongst these are the
question whether Napoleon intended to storm the village of
Eylau on the 7th February, 1807; the course of events in the
village of Schloditten during the night of the 8th February;
the exact extent of Ney's disobedience in pushing towards
Koenigsberg in January, 1807; and the history of the famous
captured despatch to Bernadotte, of the 31st January.
PREFACE.
vii
References to documents supporting these conclusions are
made in the footnotes, which, it is hoped, will be found
to give chapter and verse for almost every disputable or
doubtful statement in the text.
Is the campaign worth the attention of the military
student? It is hoped that a perusal of this history of it may
show that it is so. The campaign in Poland was the first
occasion on which Napoleon found himself pitted against
Russia as his principal opponent; for, before it commenced,
Prussia, as a military power, had been practically obliterated.
The small corps which she was able to put into the field, in
support of Russia, covered itself, and Lestocq its leader, with
glory, and was able, on one memorable occasion at least, to
play an all-important part. Still its numbers were too small
to render it more than a secondary factor in the great events
of the war.
The glamour of the campaigns of Austerlitz and Jena has
eclipsed that of their successor. Yet Napoleon's great scheme
for the destruction of Bennigsen in February, 1807, though
it failed, largely in consequence of the capture of a single
despatch, is hardly inferior, as a strategic combination, to the
marches upon Ulm and Jena. As a tactician, he perhaps
never exhibited to greater advantage his appreciation of the
features of a battlefield than at Friedland. Modern weapons
have, no doubt, rendered the interest of the tactics of 1807
merely academic; but it is not so with the strategy. So
long as campaigns are conducted on the surface of the earth,
the principles of strategy which have guided Alexander, Cæsar,
Turenne, Marlborough, Frederick, Wellington, Napoleon, and
every other great general of the past, will hold equally good.
If ever the perfection of aerial navigation should introduce a
viii
PREFACE.
third dimension into the operations of war, a new theory of
strategy, as well as of tactics, may become necessary; unless,
indeed, war should then become so destructive as to be
impossible.
In organising his armies, his supplies, his finances, and
his lines of communication, Napoleon never surpassed his
efforts in 1806 and 1807.
It is of the military aspect of the war in Poland that
this history mainly treats. The politics of the time are dealt
with only in so far as they directly affected the course
of military events. The campaign marks the zenith of
Napoleon's power in Europe. In the beginning of October,
1806, he still had to oppose him three great powers-Prussia,
Russia, and England. By July, 1807, one only was left-
England. Europe had her chance, in the three eventful
years 1805-7, of throwing off the yoke of the tyrant. The
campaign of 1807 is the record of her failure. Had its issue
been different, Leipzig and Waterloo might have been
anticipated by several years. Napoleon's military talents
had, in 1805 and 1806, shone forth in their greatest glory,
his army had scarcely begun to decline or to be composed
largely of allies. Was it likely that the next campaign
would show any falling off in either respect
?
Another fact which adds interest to the campaign is that
in it Napoleon first had a foretaste of the difficulties of
campaigning in winter in Northern Europe. Even in 1806
he considered the campaign he was entering on to be the
greatest enterprise he had ever undertaken. He had yet to
learn the value of the Russian troops. It is impossible to
doubt that he stored up in his memory all the trials of
1807 when he was preparing for his fatal enterprise of 1812.
PREFACE.
ix
His enormous preparations for the invasion of Russia, in
the latter year, show how he had learnt to appreciate the
difficulties of his task. It was only at Moscow that his
troubles of 1807 seem to have faded from his recollection.
A few words on the maps attached to this volume. They
have been prepared with great care from many sources. The
requisites of a good map for the study of a campaign, the
writer thinks, are (1) that it should show the name of every
place mentioned in the text, and (2) that it should not be
encumbered or confused by names not alluded to. With
these requirements, save in the omission of a very few
unimportant villages, it is believed the maps comply.
If his work succeeds in attracting some attention to an
episode in Napoleon's military career which seems hitherto
to have been unduly neglected, the writer's object will have
been attained.
27, GLEDHOW GARDENS,
LONDON, S.W.,
17th September, 1901.
F. L. P.
b
LIST OF WORKS AND DOCUMENTS CONSULTED
AND REFERRED TO IN THE FOOTNOTES.
I.-Published Works.
ABBREVIATED REFERENCE,
Adams
Alison
Annual Register
Biog. Gen.
Brialmont
Comeau
·
Cust
Davout
Dumas
Fezensac.
·
Hæpfner.
Houssaye
•
Jomini, Vie de Nap.
Jomini
Kausler
•
DESCRIPTION.
•
(Major). Great Campaigns in Europe, 1796-
London, 1877.
1870.
(Sir A.).
History of Modern Europe, 1789–
1815. Edinburgh and London, 1849.
Summary of Events for 1807.
Nouvelle Biographie Générale. (Firmin Didot.)
Paris, 1859.
(General). Life of Wellington. Translated by
Gleig.
(Baron de). Souvenirs des Guerres d'Allemagne
pendant la Révolution et l'Empire. Paris, 1900
(Lieut.-Gen. Sir E.). Annals of the Wars of the
XIXth Century, 1800-1809. London, 1862.
(Marshal). Opérations du 3º Corps en 1806-1807.
Paris, 1896.
(Comte Mathieu). Précis des Evènements Mili-
taires, etc., 1799-1814. Vols. xvii.-xix. Paris,
1826.;
(Duc de). Souvenirs Militaires de 1804 à 1814.
Paris, 1863.
(Gen. E. von). Der Krieg von 1806 und 1807.
Berlin, 1855.
(H.). 1815-Waterloo. Paris, 1899.
(Baron). Vie Politique et Militaire de Napoleon,
racontée par lui-même. Paris, 1827.
Art of War. English translation. Philadelphia
and London, 1875.
Atlas (avec texte) des Plus Memorables Batailles,
Sièges, etc. Merseburg, 1839.
xii
LIST OF WORKS CONSULTED.
ABBREVIATED REFERENCE.
DESCRIPTION.
Kirgener
Lanfrey
Larrey
Levasseur
Marbot
•
Masséna.
•
}
Mémorial du Depôt
de la Guerre
Napoleon I. (Works) :-
Corr.
(Gen. de brigade). Précis du Siège de Dantzíck.
Paris, 1807.
Histoire de Napoleon I. Paris, 1867–75.
(Baron). Mémoires de Chirurgie Militaire et
Campagnes, Paris, 1812.
Commentaries de Napoleon. Paris, 1851.
(Baron). Memoirs. English translation. London,
1892.
Mémoires du Maréchal Masséna (Prince
d'Essling). Par le Général Koch. Paris, 1848-50.
Mémorial du Depôt de la Guerre (Ministère de
la Guerre). Paris, 1851-52.
(followed by a serial number). Correspondence de
Napoleon I. Publiée par Ordre de l'Empereur
Napoleon III. Paris, 1858-69.
Corr. with Joseph. Confidential Correspondence of Napoleon with
his Brother Joseph. London, 1855.
Mémoires pour servir Mémoires pour servir à l'Histoire de France
sous le Regne de Napoleon I., écrits sous sa
dictée, à Ste. Helène, par Montholon et
Gourgaud. Paris, 1823-25.
Mém. de Ste. H. . Mémorial de Ste. Helène par Las Cases.
Nation in Arms
Perin.
Peuchet
Plotho
Rapp
Rustow
Savary
Segur
•
•
Tactical Problems set
by Baron von
Moltke, 1858-82.
Thiers
}
Paris, 1823.
The Nation in Arms.
By Gen. von der Goltz.
English translation. London, 1894.
Vie Militaire de Jean Lannes, Duc de Montebello.
(Jacques). Campagnes des Armées Français en
Prusse, en Saxe, en Pologne, etc. Paris, 1817.
(Carl von). Tagebuch während des Krieges.
zwischen, etc., 1806-7. Berlin, 1811.
(Gen.). Mémoires écrits par lui-même. Paris, 1823.
Stratégie; Histoire Militaire. French translation.
Paris, 1882.
(Duc de Rovigo). Mémoires sur l'Empereur
Napoleon. Paris, 1828.
(Comte Philippe de). An Aide-de-camp of
Napoleon. English translation. London, 1896.
English translation. London, 1894.
(A.). Histoire du Consulat et de l'Empire.
London, 1847.
LIST OF WORKS CONSULTED.
xiii
ABBREVIATED REFERENCE.
Témoin Oculaire.
•
Victoires, conquêtes.
Wilson
Wolseley.
DESCRIPTION.
La Bataille de Pr. Eylau gagnée par la Grande
Armée, etc. Relation d'un Témoin Oculaire.
Paris, 1807.
Victoires, conquêtes, etc., 1792-1815. Par une
Société de Militaires et de Gens de Lettres.
Paris, 1818.
(Sir Robert). Remarks on the Russian Army, etc.
London, 1810.
(Viscount). Decline and Fall of Napoleon.
London, 1895.
II.-Unpublished Documents.
Arch. Hist. Archives Historiques. Records in the historical section
of the Office of the General Staff of the French Army at Paris, con-
sisting of the following classes
(1) Statements of the periodical strength of army corps, divisions, etc.
(2) Reports of the operations of the various corps, divisions, etc.,
in 1806-7, prepared, under orders of Napoleon, by commanding
officers. The report on those of the 3rd corps has been published.
(See list of published works above.) Lannes prepared no report on
his command apparently.
(3) Daily correspondence during the war between corps commanders
and headquarters, and between divisional and corps commanders.
(4) Berthier's letters to corps and divisional commanders, separately
collected from (3). Most, but not all, of Berthier's despatches are
printed as appendices in Dumas' work.
III.-Maps and Plans.
The basis of the general maps on Sheet II. is the Map of Central Europe
(scale 1: 300,000), published in Vienna in 1881. The forests have
been marked in accordance with this map, which has been supplemented
by reference to the copies of portions of the larger Staff Map published
with Moltke's Tactical Rroblems, and to various district maps in the
British Museum.
The map on Sheet I. has been prepared from that of Thiers and the
Vienna map.
The battle plans are based on those of Alison, Thiers, Kausler, Hoepfner,
Davout, the Témoin Oculaire, etc. The positions of troops have, in all
cases, been marked in accordance with conclusions arrived at in the text.
The spelling of Polish names varies much, both in works and documents.
The spelling used in the Vienna map has been generally accepted, both
in the maps and in the text. Simplicity of identification has been aimed
at, rather than absolute correctness of spelling.
TABLE OF CONTENTS.
PART I.
THE SITUATION AND THE CONTENDING ARMIES.
CHAPTER I.
THE STATE OF EUROPE.
Napoleon crowned Emperor
Projected invasion of England
Campaign against Austria
Prussia's tortuous policy
·
Destruction of her armies at Jena
The Berlin decree
•
Napoleon's precautions against Austria and England
His desire for a Russian alliance
His policy in Turkey, Persia, and Poland
•
•
PAGE
3 15 3
4
5
6
7
8
9
12 22
•
12
CHAPTER II.
THE ARMIES AND THE LEADERS.
(A) The French Army.
Napoleon's expedients for increasing his army after Jena
Increase of cavalry required
Strength of army for advance on Warsaw
Napoleon's war contributions, and provision for supplies, commissariat,
hospitals, etc.
Organisation and quality of his army
17
21
22
•
23
26
•
xvi
TABLE OF CONTENTS.
(B) The Russian Army.
PAGE
The infantry, its character and qualifications
Cavalry and artillery
Cossacks and Bashkirs
The officers, staff, commissariat, hospitals, etc.
Strength and distribution of the army
28
32
33
34
37
38
The Prussian corps
Marshal Berthier
(c) The Generals.
Marshal Murat, Grand Duke of Berg
Marshal Bernadotte, Prince of Ponte Corvo
Marshal Dayout
Marshal Ney
Marshals Lannes, Soult, and Masséna
·
Marshals Mortier, Bessières, Augereau, and Lefebvre
Other French generals-Ages of leaders
Marshal Kamenskoi and Count Bennigsen
.
Barclay de Tolly, Bagration, Platow, and others.
Lestocq and Kalkreuth
General description
•
CHAPTER III.
THE THEATRE OF WAR.
Lakes, forests, and rivers
Communications
The populations, economic conditions, and climate
Diary of weather, 1806-7 .
Fortresses
39
40
41
41
42
·
43
44
45
45
•
46
47
·
48
19
51
52
53, n.
54
PART II.
THE FIRST CAMPAIGN-PULTUSK AND GOLYMIN.
CHAPTER I.
THE PLAN OF CAMPAIGN, AND THE PASSAGES OF THE VISTULA AND Bug.
Gradual development of Napoleon's plans.
Advance to Posen and Warsaw.
Negotiations with Prussia
Occupation of Warsaw
Napoleon's proclamation to his army.
Russian and Prussian retreat from the Vistula
•
59
62
64
66
67
68
TABLE OF CONTENTS.
xvii
French passages of the Vistula at Warsaw, Thorn, and between them.
Allies advance again
Napoleon's orders for advance beyond the Vistula
Davout's passage of the Bug
He reaches Warsaw in person
•
Russian positions
•
PAGE
68
70
71
73
75
76
222
CHAPTER II.
PASSAGE OF THE Ukra, and OPERATIONS OF THE 24TH And 25th
DECEMBER.
Napoleon passes the Ukra with Davout's corps
•
Augereau's passage at Kolozomb and Sochoczin
Positions of other French corps
Operations against the Prussians from Thorn, and action of Soldau
CHAPTER III.
THE BATTLES OF PULTUSK AND GOLYMIN, 26TH DECEMBER, 1806.
Description of the battle-field
Bennigsen's position
•
(A) Pultusk.
Arrival of Lannes on the field, and his dispositions
The French attack from 11 a.m. till 2 p.m.
Arrival of d'Aultanne's division on Lannes' left
The battle from 2 p.m. till its close
Bennigsen retreats in the night
Remarks on the battle
•
(B) Golymin.
Gallitzin is compelled to fight .
His first dispositions, and Augereau's attack on him
Murat drives in the Russian cavalry.
Arrival of Davout's two divisions, and his attack
Retreat of the Russians
Remarks on the battle
•
CHAPTER IV.
THE FIRST WINTER QUARTERS, AND EVENTS OUTSIDE POLAND.
Napoleon stops his advance
Russian movements
(A) Winter Quarters.
•
78
83
84
85
89
90
92
95
98
99
101
102
105
106
•
108
109
110
•
111
114
115
xviii
TABLE OF CONTENTS.
Napoleon's orders for winter quarters
Orders for fortification of bridge heads, and sieges of Danzig, Colberg,
and Graudenz.
PAGE
115
119
(B) Silesia.
Siege and fall of Glogau and Breslau, and defeat of the Prince of
Anhalt Pless
(c) Pomerania.
•
120
Mortier's operations in December and January .
(D) Turkey and Persia.
Sebastiani's mission to the Porte-He involves Turkey in war with
Russia
PART III.
THE CAMPAIGN OF EYLAU.
CHAPTER I.
THE MOVEMENTS UP TO THE BATTLE OF EYLAU.
Bennigsen becomes commander-in-chief
•
Lestocq's movements in January
Ney's unauthorised advance on Koenigsberg
Napoleon realises Bennigsen's scheme
His plan for the destruction of the Russians
Ney's narrow escape and retreat
Advance of Russians and Prussians against Ney and Bernadotte.
Bernadotte's escape, and battle at Mohrungen
His retreat, and end of Russian advance
·
122
123
127
128
128
132
133
•
•
136
•
136
138
142
143
145
147
•
149
•
151
•
154
157
157
Situations of the armies on the 31st January
Napoleon's scheme disclosed by capture of a despatch to Bernadotte
Bennigsen moves on Jonkowo .
Actions at Bergfried and Jonkowo
Retreat of allies, constantly fighting
Action of Hof
Ney and Lestocq
•
Bennigsen retreats on Eylau
TABLE OF CONTENTS.
xix
CHAPTER II.
THE BATTLE OF EYLAU.
(A) The Action of the 7th February.
PAGE
Description of the battle-field
158
Position of Bennigsen's rearguard
161
Arrival of Soult and Murat, followed by Augereau, and failure of first
attack
162
Russian rearguard driven on Eylau .
163
Assault on Eylau, eventually successful, though not intended
originally by Napoleon
164
•
Positions of the armies during the night of the 7th-8th February
167
Their strength
172
(B) The Battle of the 8th February.
Alterations in positions in the early morning
174
Commencement of the battle, at 8 a.m., in bad weather
176
Repulse of Legrand on the French left
176
Advance of Augereau and St. Hilaire
177
Destruction of Augereau's corps, and repulse of St. Hilaire .
178
Narrow escape of Napoleon from capture or death
179
Critical situation of the French centre
180
Murat's great cavalry charge
181
Arrival, in force, of Davout about noon
184
•
His corps gradually crushes in the Russian left
185
•
Captures Kutschitten and Anklappen
188
Critical position of Bennigsen.
188
March of Ney and Lestocq towards the field of battle
189
•
Lestocq arrives, and moves to support the Russian left
192
•
Re-capture of Kutschitten and Anklappen
192
Davout, driven back a considerable distance, with difficulty maintains
himself in front of Klein Sausgarten
194
•
Ney storms Schloditten .
195
Repulses a counter-attack, but eventually evacuates the village
The night after the battle-Bennigsen decides on retreat
195, n.
196
•
Feeble pursuit by French
199
Losses in the battle
200
(c) Strategy and Tactics of the Eylau Campaign.
The tactics at Eylau
201
The strategy of the campaign .
206
•
CHAPTER III.
EVENTS ON THE NAREW IN JANUARY AND FEBRUARY.
Savary placed in command of Lannes' corps-His instructions from
Napoleon
His movements-Battle of Ostrolenka
208
209
XX
TABLE OF CONTENTS.
PART IV.
WINTER QUARTERS, AND DANZIG.
CHAPTER I.
THE RETURN TO WINTER QUARTERS, AND THE RECRUITMENT
OF THE ARMIES.
(A) The Return to Winter Quarters.
Napoleon remains some days near Eylau, making small demonstrations
towards Koenigsberg
Issues orders for retirement towards the Vistula
Successful retreat
•
Napoleon's and Bennigsen's proclamations
Napoleon's arrangement of his new winter quarters
(B) Napoleon's Measures for Increasing his Force.
PAGE
215
·
218
219
220
221
Various schemes for reinforcements-Demand for conscripts of 1808, etc. 224
Strength of the French armies .
Napoleon's energy
228
299
•
(c) Events on the Main Front in February, March, and April.
Operations on Bernadotte's front
230
Events on the right-Ney at Guttstadt
232
The armies settle into winter quarters
233
CHAPTER II.
THE SIEGE OF DANZIG.
10th Corps, under Lefebvre, detailed for siege
•
237
Description of Danzig and its garrison
238
Completion of its investment
241
Operations on the Nehrung
241
First parallel opened
242
Second parallel commenced
243
Progress of works, and vigorous defence by garrison
243
Capture of Holm Island .
247
Kamenskoi's attempt to relieve Danzig from the sea-He is defeated. 249
Capitulation of Danzig
255
TABLE OF CONTENTS.
xxi
CHAPTER III.
OPERATIONS IN SILESIA AND POMERANIA, ON THE NAREW,
AND ON THE VISTULA.
(▲) Silesia.
Sieges of Brieg, Kosel, Neisse, Schweidnitz, and Glatz
Blockade of Stralsund
•
(B) Pomerania.
Operations in April, and armistice with Sweden
(c) On the Vistula and the Narew.
Desultory operations in Napoleon's front
Masséna's command on the Narew-Napoleon's instructions to him
PART V.
THE FINAL TRIUMPH-HEILSBERG, FRIEDLAND,
TILSIT.
PAGE
258
259
260
261
263
CHAPTER I.
THE RENEWAL OF THE CAMPAIGN, AND ITS PROGRESS TO THE 9TH JUNE.
(A) The Russian Advance.
Napoleon ready to advance on the 10th June
267
•
Strength of the armies
268
Bennigsen's plan for cutting off Ney
270
Lestocq's attack on Bernadotte at Spanden
272
Dochtorow's attempt against Soult
274
Operations against Ney-His masterly retreat-Collapse of the Russian
offensive.
275
(B) Napoleon's Resumption of the Offensive.
Concentration towards Osterode
278
Bennigsen decides on retreat
281
General advance of the French right and centre
281
Passage of the Passarge, and occupation of Guttstadt-Bennigsen falls
back on Heilsberg
282
•
xxii
TABLE OF CONTENTS.
CHAPTER II.
THE BATTLE OF HEILSBERG, AND OPERATIONS OF THE 11TH TO
13TH JUNE.
Description of the entrenched camp at Heilsberg
PAGE
285
Bennigsen's preparations for battle
287
•
Murat's and Soult's actions with the rear-guard at Lannau and
Bewernick
288
•
The battle on the plain, up to 7 p.m.
main front
288
Temporary success, and eventual repulse, of Soult from the Russian
292
Lannes' night attack repulsed .
295
Disgraceful scenes during the night
295
The losses and the tactics of the battle
296
Operations of the armies on the 11th to 13th June-Retreat of the
Russians.
300
CHAPTER III.
THE BATTLE OF FRIEDLAND.
(A) Lannes' Action-3 a.m. to noon.
Description of the battlefield
•
Bennigsen seizes Friedland, and proposes to destroy Lannes' corps
Lannes hurries forward to Posthenen
His waiting action against superior forces
Bennigsen passes the Alle, and marshals his army
(B) Napoleon's Arrival on the Scene.
He reaches Posthenen about noon
His orders for the battle.
304
305
·
306
306
-
309
Desultory fighting, noon till 5 p.m.
311
312
•
313
(c) The Renewed Battle.
Ney's advance on Friedland at 5 p.m.
315
•
He crushes the Russian left into Friedland
315
Advance of the French left
318
•
Disastrous retreat of the Russians
320
Positions on the night of the 14th-15th June
320
(D) Tactics at Friedland, and Strategy of the Campaign.
Bennigsen's mistake in fighting at Friedland
321
Tactics of both sides in the battle
322
Napoleon's strategy in the campaign
326
TABLE OF CONTENTS.
xxiii
CHAPTER IV.
KOENIGSBERG AND TILSIT.
Detachment of Murat, Soult, and Davout, against Lestocq and
Kamenskoi, towards Koenigsberg
Russians and Prussians driven into the fortress
Murat and Davout march for Friedland
•
Lestocq evacuates, and Soult occupies, Koenigsberg
Bennigsen's retreat, and Napoleon's advance to the Niemen
Masséna's operations on the Narew .
Armistice of Tilsit.
Napoleon's proclamation to his army
Positions of the armies
•
Negotiations and Treaty of Tilsit
MAPS AND PLANS (at end of volume).
Sheet I.-General Map of Theatre of War.
PAGE
330
331
331
332
•
332
333
334
335
336
337
Sheet II.-Enlarged General Maps of part of the above.
Sheet III.-Plans: (1) Illustrating the Passages of the Bug and the Ukra;
(2) Battle of Pultusk; (3) Battle of Golymin; (4) Battle of Eylau;
(5) Siege of Danzig; (6) Battle of Heilsberg; (7) Battle of Friedland.
PART I.
THE SITUATION AND THE CONTENDING ARMIES.
NAPOLEON'S
CAMPAIGN IN POLAND
1806-7.
CHAPTER I.
THE STATE OF EUROPE.
SHORTLY after the tragic death of the duc d'Enghien, on
the 21st March, 1804, Napoleon, then first consul for
life, took measures to induce the French senate to propose
his elevation to the Imperial dignity. With the senate he
found no difficulty. On the 18th May, that subservient
body declared him Emperor of the French. With regard to
his wish to make the title hereditary, he had recourse to a
plebiscite, the result of which was an overwhelming majority
in his favour. On the 2nd December, 1804, he was crowned,
or rather crowned himself, amidst a scene of unrivalled
pomp, surrounded by a brilliant court and by the marshals
whom he had recently appointed. The Pope himself had
been induced, or compelled, to attend the ceremony and
confer his benediction on the new sovereign.
If this revival of the sovereignty was received with
resignation, rather than with enthusiasm, by the bulk of the
populace, such was not the case with the army. It was by
his matchless military talents, and by the brilliant victories
B 2
4
NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN IN POLAND.
to which he had so often led the soldiers of the republic, that
Napoleon had become their idol and, with them at his back,
had risen from a humble lieutenant of artillery to be the
greatest personality in France and in Europe.
It was as much by the necessity for retaining the favour
of the army as by his own boundless ambition, and his
schemes for an universal empire, that the Emperor was
impelled to enter upon a continued career of conquest.
His designs he cloaked by pretended overtures to England,
with whom he had been again at war since May, 1803. He
neither believed nor hoped that peace would follow, but the
negotiations served to reveal to him the existence of an
alliance between England and Russia. Austria too, he knew,
was labouring to repair the losses she had suffered in recent
campaigns. Prussia, confident in the strength of an army
which was believed to be as invincible as those of the great
Frederick, was bent on playing her own game rather than
that of Europe generally. She offered a splendid opportunity
for the exercise of the diplomatic talents of Talleyrand and
his master who soon saw that, by judicious treatment, she
could be kept out of the field, until it was too late for her
to enter it with powerful allies.
Whether Napoleon really ever intended seriously to
attempt the invasion of England or not, his avowed inten-
tions enabled him to train, on his northern coasts, the finest
army he ever commanded. At that distance, his preparations
were far removed from the view of Austria, who little
thought that an army collected at a point so remote from her
frontier could be used against her with such rapidity and
deadly effect as it presently was.
At the same time, the Emperor was busy strengthening
himself on his continental frontier. Holland, soon to be
erected into a monarchy for bestowal on his brother Louis,
was brought under French control. The Italian republic
was induced to declare Napoleon king of Italy.
It was now time for him to precipitate matters. His
THE STATE OF EUROPE.
5
coronation at Milan with the iron crown of Lombardy, the
incorporation of the republics of Genoa and Lucca, as well
as other northern Italian states, his military celebration on
the field of Marengo, were so many insults calculated to
excite the anger and the fear of Austria. It was on Austria
that the Emperor had resolved to fall first. In August, 1805,
that power joined the coalition of England and Russia. To
them was added Sweden. Prussia alone, refusing to join
them, allowed herself to be led astray by the bait of Hanover
which she coveted, and which Napoleon insidiously dangled
before her greedy eyes. He had already occupied it in
pursuance of his war with England. On his south-western
frontier, his alliance with Spain and Portugal left him free
from anxiety.
In the end of July, 1805, Sir R. Calder's naval action.
convinced Napoleon that all hope of an invasion of England
was, for the present, at an end. He had no longer any
motive for delaying his meditated attack on Austria.
That power, which had long seen that war was inevitable
sooner or later, hoping to steal a march on her wakeful
adversary whilst he was occupied with his schemes for the
invasion of England, moved, early in September, into Bavaria,
a state allied to France. In doing so she, notwithstanding
her previous experience of him, underrated Napoleon and,
moreover, moved at least two months before she could expect
the arrival of the Russian army advancing to her assistance.
The Emperor's decision to hurl upon Austria the army of
England was taken at once. Every necessary order for the
march from Boulogne to the Danube had already been
prepared. It was executed with unparalleled rapidity and
exactness. On the 20th October, the unhappy Austrian
general Mack, surrounded in Ulm on all sides by the French,
capitulated with 30,000 men, all that remained under his
command of the 80,000 with whom he had invaded Bavaria
six weeks before. The very next day, Napoleon's power at
sea was for ever destroyed by Nelson at Trafalgar. A few
6
NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN IN POLAND.
days later, the Austrian forces in Italy, under the Archduke
Charles, were compelled to retreat before Masséna in the
hope of covering Vienna, now threatened by Napoleon's
advance. Negotiations for an armistice failed, owing to
Napoleon's excessive demands.
Prussia had, at last, come to a sense of the false position
she was occupying. She attempted no resistance to the
invasion of Hanover, now almost entirely clear of French
soldiers, by the allied troops of Russia, Sweden, and England.
The Prussian cabinet had taken offence at the violation of
Anspach territory, by the march through it of French troops
on their way to the Danube. So strong was the feeling
against France that Duroc, Napoleon's ambassador, left
Berlin whilst the King and the Czar, who had arrived there,
solemnly swore to rearrange Europe on the lines of the
treaty of Luneville. Haugwitz was despatched to inform
Napoleon of this intention and, in the event of its non-
acceptance by him, to declare war against him on the part
of Prussia. On the 15th December, Prussia had decided on
a course which, if she had followed it two months earlier,
placed as she was on the flank of the line of march from
Boulogne to the Danube, would have frustrated the Emperor's
whole plan. Whilst she was making up her mind to an
honest course, Napoleon had entered Vienna, had moved to
Brünn, and had finally, on the anniversary of his coronation,
inflicted on the Austrians and their Russian allies the
decisive defeat of Austerlitz. Haugwitz, arriving at the
French headquarters with the Prussian ultimatum in his
pocket, was put off till after the impending battle. Its
result caused him to take a very different course, to suppress
the ultimatum, the terms of which Napoleon could guess,
to offer Prussia's congratulations on the victory, and to con-
clude a disgraceful treaty by which his master bartered the
honour of Prussia for the cession of Hanover.
Austria defeated, not crushed, agreed to the terms of the
treaty of Presburg, to cede territory to Italy and to Bavaria,
THE STATE OF EUROPE.
7
to pay an indemnity, to recognise the recent changes in
Italy, and the elevation of Bavaria and Wurtemburg from
electorates to kingdoms.
Everything prospered for Napoleon. The allied invaders
withdrew from Hanover; Naples, attacked by the French,
shortly came under the rule of Joseph Buonaparte.
Having disposed, for the time being, of Austria, the
Emperor turned upon Prussia. He had always intended to
do so; her perfidious conduct had rendered him more deter-
mined than ever to destroy her. He could not trust her,
even had he wished to. Prussia had embroiled herself with
England by accepting from Napoleon the cession of Hanover.
Under pretext of defending his new ally against Great Britain,
he heaped insults on her, the last being the creation of the
Confederation of the Rhine as a standing threat against her,
and a great base for French operations, whether against
Prussia or against Austria.
After Austerlitz, the Russian troops had retired; but the
Czar had not been a party to the negotiations at Presburg,
and his hand was still free. Negotiations between Napoleon
and Russia and England, during the early months of 1806,
broke down. Prussia had been lashed to fury by the dis-
covery that Napoleon had attempted to bribe England with
Hanover, which he had so recently ceded to Prussia.
Wishing to strike her before succour could reach her
from distant Russia, the Emperor anticipated her ultimatum
by marching against her towards the Elbe.
The ultimatum was presented on the 1st October, 1806;
fourteen days later the Prussian army had been destroyed
at the fatal double battle of Jena and Auerstadt. The broken
remnants were pursued to the Baltic by Soult, Murat,
Bernadotte, Ney, and Lannes. Blücher was driven north-
wards to the Danish frontier, where he surrendered with
the last of his force. Magdeburg, with a large garrison,
capitulated to Ney on the 8th November; Hanover was
occupied by an army under Louis Buonaparte from Holland;
8
NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN IN POLAND.
Saxony, detached from the Prussian alliance, was eventually
attached (12th December) to that of Napoleon. The Saxon
Elector's alliance was cemented by his promotion to a king-
dom. No considerable organised hostile force remained to
confront the Emperor west of the Oder. A small fraction,
all that remained to the King of the Prussian army, alone
succeeded in retiring to the Vistula and East Prussia. The
Russians were still far off to the east of the Vistula when,
on the 26th October, 1806, Napoleon, preceded by Davout,
the victor of Auerstadt, entered Berlin in triumph.
In less than a year he had disastrously defeated Austria,
had forced the Russian army to retreat, and had absolutely
broken the power of Prussia. In all Europe there remained
but two substantial bulwarks against the tide of French
aggression-Russia and England.
Against the latter, at sea, the Emperor, since the battle
of Trafalgar, had been powerless. To ruin her, as he
thought possible, in her commerce, he, on the 21st November,
issued from Berlin his famous decree declaring the British
islands in a state of blockade and all English subjects, who
might be found in the countries under his control, prisoners
of war.
British merchandise in those countries was con-
fiscated, and all entry of English vessels into continental
ports was prohibited. Much as has been said against the
Berlin decree, it must always be remembered that it recited
some principles, such as the necessity for a blockade being
efficient in order to be valid, which have since been accepted
by most of the civilised powers. Napoleon did not pretend
to carry out these principles. His argument was that, as
Britain refused to admit them, she must be compelled to do
so by other methods.
Napoleon's position at Berlin was this. He was in
effective occupation of the whole of Northern Europe as far
as Berlin, his rear was safe owing to his alliance with Spain
and Portugal. In front of him, at a great distance still,
were the armies of Russia which had, in the first instance,
THE STATE OF EUROPE.
9
been designed only to support, as auxiliaries, the great army
of Prussia, now destroyed. Henceforth they were to bear
the whole brunt of Napoleon's onslaught.
His right flank, as he advanced against the Russians,
would be threatened by Austria, who, humiliated and sorely
wounded by the previous year's campaign, was yet far from
being a negligeable quantity. Her finances were crippled,
but, if she threw in her lot with England and Russia, she
might well hope for pecuniary assistance from the former.*
The Archduke Charles was reorganising the army, and had
already collected a considerable force in Bohemia and Silesia.
If Austria should, however, decide to renew the struggle,
she would still have to reckon with the army which Napoleon
maintained in Northern Italy after the conquest of Naples.†
That army, as it was drained of the best French troops for
employment in Germany, consisted, no doubt, largely of
inferior troops. Nevertheless, it was a power to be con-
sidered, and Austria would be bound to defend her southern
frontiers with at least 80,000 or 100,000 men.
Napoleon's left flank in Germany, and his rear in France,
were, now that the control of the sea had passed to England,
open to a descent by the English, the Swedes, and the
Russians, on the coasts of France, Holland, and Germany.
The Swedes held a footing on the German shore in Stralsund
and Swedish Pomerania. It was hardly likely at any time
* Austria's position was analogous to that which had been occupied by
Prussia in the preceding year. By throwing her weight into the scale against
the Emperor, if she could not entirely prevent his farther advance for the time
being, she could, at any rate, most seriously embarrass him. On the other hand,
she felt that a renewal of the war so soon, in violation of the treaty of Presburg,
would justly expose her to the charge of perfidy, whilst, if defeated again,
she could expect nothing short of annihilation at the hands of the incensed
Napoleon. To assist Prussia she could hardly feel bound, looking to the selfish
and treacherous policy pursued by the North German kingdom in 1805, when
Austria was herself in such dire distress. For that conduct the debâcle of Jena
seemed to Austria little more than a just retribution. The interests of Europe
called Austria again to the breach. She was not unselfish, or far-seeing, enough
to expose herself to the awful risk.
†This army was entirely separate from that guarding the Neapolitan kingdom.
10
NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN IN POLAND.
that a descent would be attempted in France; it became
more and more unlikely, as the Emperor succeeded in his
advance towards Russia. The utmost expeditionary force
which Napoleon considered England capable of landing was
about 25,000 men.* The attempt on Holland, in 1799, by
England and Russia, had not had an encouraging success. The
danger to the French left and rear was distinctly less than was
to be apprehended from a renewal of the war by Austria.
The fear of this last eventuality hung perpetually, during
the wars of 1806-7, like the sword of Damocles, over
the head of Napoleon.† His correspondence teems with
references to the subject, and much of the negotiations which
he carried on, during the latter part of the campaign, was
mainly with a view to avoid giving offence to Austria,
whose mediation had been offered. On the 26th October ‡
he inquires, through his ambassador at Vienna, as to the
truth of reports that the Archduke Charles was collecting
80,000 men at Prague. If so, a remonstrance is to be
addressed to the Austrian Court, which is to be told that
such measures are unnecessary for maintenance of the
neutrality promised by it. On the 4th November,§ he
writes to Eugene Beauharnais, explaining how he intends to
place at the disposal of the Viceroy 60,000 men, including
Marmont's corps in Dalmatia. That,
That, he thinks, should
suffice to detain 100,000 Austrian troops on the southern
frontier, should that power sufficiently recover from its
alarm at the fate of Prussia to assume a hostile attitude.
Eugene is to be ready to take the field on the 1st December.
To his brother Joseph the Emperor writes, on the same date,
in similar terms, || remarking that Austria appears to be
* Corr. 12,135.
† Austria defended her armaments partly on the ground of fear of a fresh
French invasion. "Austria took the opportunity to allege fears for her
neutrality; as if we had not enough to do with the winter and the Muscovite,
she pretended to think that we should pass the gorges of her mountains"
(Savary, iii. 2).
Corr. 11,088.
§ Corr. 11,172.
Corr. 11,173.
THE STATE OF EUROPE.
11
arming under pretext of assuring her safety as a neutral.
On the 7th November,* he again desires that the Emperor
of Austria be informed that his neutrality only is required,
not his active alliance, but that Napoleon cannot view with
equanimity the collection of 60,000 or 80,000 men on his
flank, or regard such action as evincing a genuine desire to
maintain neutrality. On the 14th March, 1807,† he writes
that he already has 80,000 men in Italy, and hopes shortly
to have 90,000. This should fully occupy 120,000 Austrians.
He would really prefer the alliance of Russia to that of
Austria, but with the latter he wants peace. On the 19th
and 20th of the same month he instructs Talleyrand to
inform Austria that her conduct has necessitated the increase
which he is making to his forces, and to say, unofficially,
that Austrian mediation can be considered only on condition
of her abstention from arming. He adds that he suspects
Russia of endeavouring to draw Austria into the coalition.
On the 9th April § he calls Talleyrand's attention to a
suspicious correspondence between the Russian General
Essen and the Austrian cordon on the Gallician frontier.
On the 16th || he agrees to accept the offer of mediation
tendered by the Austrian Emperor. On the 30th May The
writes to Brune, now commanding the army of observation
in Germany, pointing out that, should Austria move, that
marshal would be able to meet her with 60,000 men of his
own army, reinforced by 20,000 Poles and 20,000 men, under
Jerome Buonaparte, in Silesia.
These references suffice to show how constantly Napoleon
was harassed by the dread of an Austrian intervention, and
the means by which he sought to prevent or defeat it.
He saw, from Berlin, in front of him the Russian armies
-now preparing to meet him as his principal adversary. He
felt that, until he could gain over or crush the great Northern
power, he could never hope for success in his contest against
* Corr. 11,194.
§ Corr. 12,333.
+ Corr. 12,028.
|| Corr. 12,391.
Corr. 12,082, and 12,098.
¶ Corr. 12,704.
12
NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN IN POLAND.
Great Britain. He would probably have preferred to gain
Russia to his side without having to embark on an expedition
against her which he himself described as the greatest project
which he had ever undertaken.* He told Talleyrand, as has
just been mentioned, that he would prefer the alliance of
Russia to that of Austria. But the former power had been
too honourable in her adherence to her engagements to give
much hope of her detachment from them, until she had been
beaten in the field.
To embarrass her to the utmost, Napoleon sought, success-
fully, to embroil her with Turkey. He incited Persia also to
wage war on her rear. Russia, unfortunately for Europe and
herself, fell into the trap; at a time when every available
man should have been at liberty to fight against Napoleon,
she hampered herself by the detachment of a large army
against the Turks.
Throughout the war with the French, the necessity for
carrying on this subsidiary war with Turkey was a serious
drain on Russian resources, whilst the assistance which
Napoleon gave, through Marmont, in Dalmatia, to Turkey
in no way weakened his power in Germany or Italy.†
He promised many things to the Sultan; in the end, he
deserted the ally who had served him to such good
purpose.
Before closing this brief account of the general political
situation in Europe towards the close of 1806, a few words
must be said on the subject of Poland.
The three partitions, in the latter half of the preceding
century, of the Polish kingdom, had finally resulted in the
* Corr. 11,292. Letter to Lacuée, dated 22nd November, 1806.
† Napoleon (or rather Jomini, Vie de Napoleon, ii. 336) at one time
estimated Michelson's army on the Danube at 80,000, which was certainly in
excess of its real strength. Two divisions were presently withdrawn for
employment in Poland, and Berthier, writing on the 29th of January, 1807,
to Marmont, puts the Russian army of Moldavia at 30,000 (Arch. Hist., Berthier's
correspondence). The prevention of such a number from joining the Russian
army in front of him was of the greatest advantage to the Emperor.
THE STATE OF EUROPE.
13
acquisition by the three partitioning powers of the following
shares :-
Russia
Prussia
Austria
Square leagues.
Population.
23,247
5,764,398
6,707
2,596,389
8,296
3,600,000 *
The recollection of their former independence, and the
hope of its recovery, were strong in the hearts of the Polish
people, especially in those of the nobles. They felt that from
the three powers which had absorbed them they had no hope.
The advent of Napoleon, the effacement of Prussia in the
late campaign, and the defeat of Austria in 1805, afforded
them grounds of expectation.
No sooner had Napoleon's armies commenced their
eastward progress from Berlin than he was besieged with
deputations and petitions from the Poles, setting forth their
hopes and urging him to reconstitute the monarchy.†
His position in regard to this question was extremely
delicate. It was certain that, whatever differences might
exist between Russia, Prussia, and Austria on other subjects,
they would be unanimous in their opposition to any proposal
for the undoing of the partitions of Poland. Prussia's feel-
ings, in her present abased condition, he could afford to
disregard. Austria he could not treat in the same way, for
her neutrality was all important to him in his advance against
Russia. The latter power he was anxious, when he should
have defeated her, to bind to his own side in the struggle
against England. When, therefore, the Austrian Cabinet, in
reply to his remonstrances on the subject of its assembly of
troops in Gallicia, urged the danger of insurrectionary move-
ments in Prussian Poland extending to Gallicia, Napoleon
agreed not to allow his incitements of the Poles to be extended
* Wilson, p. 67, note.
† De Fezensac (p. 125) says that Lannes and Augereau, marching to the
left of Posen, found the Polish country-folk far less enthusiastic for revolt
against Prussia, and that the movement was mainly supported by the nobles.
14
NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN IN POLAND.
to the Austrian portion.* At the same time, he sounded
that Government on a proposal that it should cede to him
its share of Poland in exchange for Prussian territory in
Silesia, which had been wrested by Frederick the Great from
Maria Theresa.† The bait was tempting. To his own honour,
and the advantage of Europe, the Emperor of Austria avoided
the snare which was designed to embroil him with Prussia.
For the reasons which have above been stated, Napoleon
also resolved not to irritate Russia by inciting the Poles
subject to her to insurrection, and he, throughout the cam-
paign, restricted his operations in this sense to the Prussian
share of Poland.
To the deputations which approached him at Berlin
and at Warsaw, he replied vaguely, "France has never
recognised the different partitions of Poland; nevertheless, I
cannot proclaim your independence until you have decided
to defend your rights as a nation with arms in your hands
by every sort of sacrifice, even that of life. You have been
reproached with having, in your continued civil dissensions,
lost sight of the interests of your country. Instructed by
your misfortunes, reunite yourselves and prove to the world
that one spirit animates the whole Polish nation." ‡
According to de Fezensac, Napoleon was furious with
Murat for forwarding one petition from Warsaw, in which
it was prayed that the Polish kingdom might be reconstituted
under a French general. The Emperor discerned in it the
* To Baron de Comeau the Emperor said, "Poland! so much the worse for
them! They have allowed themselves to be partitioned. They are no longer
a nation, they have no public spirit. The nobles are too much, the people too
little. It is a dead body to which life must be restored before making anything
of it. I will make soldiers and officers of them; afterwards I will see. I shall
take Prussia's portion. I shall have Posen and Warsaw, but I will not touch
Cracow, Gallicia, or Wilna" (Comeau, 281).
† Corr. 11,339. Instructing Andreossy, his new Ambassador at Vienna, the
Emperor says he wishes to force nothing; but if Austria would be inclined to
exchange Gallicia for part of Silesia, he is ready to treat, either openly or
secretly. This was early in December, 1806.
‡ Corr. 11,279, dated 19th November, 1806.
THE STATE OF EUROPE.
15
handiwork of his ambitious brother-in-law and that he was,
doubtless, the French general suggested.*
The Emperor's replies, whilst making no definite promises,
were sufficiently encouraging to assure to him the moral and
material support of the Poles in the ensuing campaign, and to
deprive Prussia of all hope of recruiting her shattered army
by voluntary enlistment in Poland. It was, however, most
desirable for the Emperor to support the Poles, in their
resistance to Prussia, by occupying their territory, especially
Warsaw, their ancient capital, and by conferring on their
representatives at least a nominal share in the administration
of the country.
As soon, therefore, as he was in possession of Warsaw, he
constituted a provisional government of seven of the chief
nobles. The country was parcelled off into six departments,
the boundaries of which were already known.† The branches
of justice, the interior, finance, war, and police, were assigned
to separate members of the government, which voted by
majority and was empowered, on the report of the depart-
mental director, to pass necessary laws and orders.‡
In West Prussia, Napoleon had already organised his
own government, placing at the head of the civil departments
Daru, and at that of the military Clarke.§
* De Fezensac, p. 125.
+ Warsaw, Posen, Kalisch, Bromberg, Plock, Bialystok.
‡ Corr. 11,630, decree of 14th January, 1807.
§ West Prussia was divided into four departments, having their capitals at
Berlin, Custrin, Stettin, and Magdeburg. The existing local administrative
officers were generally retained, but the Emperor appointed his own men to the
general financial control, and for the collection of the contributions with which
the towns and states had been assessed (Savary, iii. 3).
Napoleon was not seriously troubled by disturbances in Germany. His
hold on the country was too firm, and the strength of the army of occupation
too great, to encourage insurrection.
The Hessian troops, from which he thought trouble might arise, were got out
of the way in Holland, France and Naples (Savary, iii. 2).
An attempted insurrection in Hesse Cassel, the Elector of which had been
deprived by Napoleon of his territories, was put down in a manner calculated to
discourage any further outbreaks.
16
NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN IN POLAND.
Silesia was yet unconquered, and its great fortresses
remained to be subdued.
Such, briefly, was the situation of Europe in November,
1806. Napoleon, holding all the territory of France, Italy,
Holland, and Northern Germany up to the Oder, was in
possession of immense resources in men, money, and material.
His rear was safe from the direction of Spain, and the
garrison left in France was ample to repel any descent
likely to be made by England on her coasts. Austria was a
danger to his right flank; but, lying, as she did, between the
French armies in Germany, and in Northern Italy, and
crippled by her recent disasters, she could only intervene at
great risk to herself. Sweden was only dangerous as the
ally of England, in the event of a descent by sea on the
Dutch or German coasts. Turkey was in active alliance
with the French.
I¹
CHAPTER II.
THE ARMIES AND THE LEADERS.
(a) THE FRENCH ARMY.
T has already been said that the army which Napoleon led
against Austria in the autumn of 1805 was the finest
he ever commanded. From that year commenced its decline,
slow at first, more rapid as the youth of the country was
exhausted by his overdrafts. It was in 1805 that he first
drew upon the resources of the future, by calling out, before
their time, the conscripts of 1806. They, however, formed
no part of the army which fought at Ulm and at Austerlitz.
As in 1805, so in 1806, Napoleon overdrew his account by
calling out, nearly a year before their time, the conscripts of
1807. At this period the conscription was expected to yield
annually about 80,000 recruits. There would thus be in the
French army, when the advance against the Russian armies
commenced, 80,000 recruits called out and trained a year
before their proper time of service, and shortly afterwards,
80,000 more also anticipated by nearly a year, and only
commencing their training.
*
Even the recruits of the conscription of 1806 were not,
apparently, provided with uniforms by the 22nd November;
Napoleon on that date had to urge the completion of their
equipment, as well as that of the conscripts of 1807.† He
* Napoleon called for the conscripts of 1807, in January of that year, instead
of September. Corr. 11,282, dated 21st November, to Senate.
† Corr. 11,291.
C
18
NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN IN POLAND.
proposed to call to the front the recruits of 1806, now fairly
trained, though he would be prepared to leave 20,000 in
reserve for the present. That would give him 60,000 for the
front.*
He recognised, as has been related already, that the
advance against Russia was the greatest enterprise he had
ever, so far, entered upon.† Operating at so great a distance,
he would necessarily require forces far in excess of those
which had sufficed for the destruction of Prussia. To provide
these additional men, he now employed various methods.
He had to think not only of the army at the actual scene of
operations, but also of that to be maintained in Italy as a
threat to Austria on her southern border, of forces to repel
any attempt from the sea on the Dutch or German coasts
and, finally, of the troops necessary to protect the ports of
France against a possible descent.
The last was the least important; for a descent on
the French coast by England was not probable and, if
undertaken, would not be likely to be made in great
force.
Napoleon calculated that early in December he had in
Germany, with the Grand Army, 1400 companies of infantry
averaging 123 men each.‡ He had 61 regiments; each
regiment, as a rule, consisted of 3 battalions, one of which
was left in France as a depôt. But a few regiments had 4
battalions, 3 on service and one in depôt. Of these he had
18 in Germany. He designed to increase the companies to
140 men each, which would give a total of nearly 200,000
for the infantry in Germany.
The cavalry regiments he proposed to raise to 5 squadrons
of 200 sabres each.§
Kellerman, who was in charge of the depôts on the
eastern frontier of France and in Western Germany, was
* Corr. 11,292, to Lacuée, dated 22nd November, 1806.
† Corr. 11,292, as above.
‡ Corr. 11,478, to Lacuée.
§ Corr. 11,238, dated 12th November, 1806.
THE ARMIES AND THE LEADERS.
19
ordered to send to the front 8,000 or 10,000 conscripts, whom
he would have collected by the 15th November.* Irrespective
of these, he was to form eight provisional battalions, of which
the nucleus was to be one company sent back from each
of eight 3rd battalions serving with the Grand Army. To
this nucleus were to be added conscripts who had only
undergone eight or ten days' training, who would be then sent
to continue their training with the provisional battalions at
Magdeburg or Cassel. As their training progressed, they
were to be formed into companies, then into battalions,
finally into provisional regiments for the march to the front.
As they marched their training continued. Men who were
left behind, sick or footsore, by one provisional battalion, at
any of the halting-stages, were gathered up by the next
to pass.† As these battalions passed through the principal
* Corr. 11,146, dated 2nd November, 1806.
+ Kellerman's report of his proceedings as commander of the Army of Reserve
is a document full of interest. He says that at first he was left with only
enough officers and non-commissioned officers to carry on the administration,
and the men were nothing but sick, wounded, and convalescents. He was
dependent on the conscripts of 1806, who began to reach him in October. He
considered that in one month he could turn out a fair soldier, understanding his
musket, how to use it, take it to pieces, to put it together, and exercised first
with blank cartridge, then at target practice. He complains bitterly of his
difficulties with clothing and transport contractors. For instance, the 28th
regiment marched from France with its baggage, but reached Kellerman several
months before it. As he despatched each detachment of 150 infantry or 50
cavalry, another was ready to follow it closely. During the whole campaign
he despatched 20 provisional regiments of infantry, and 11 of cavalry,
numbering 50,683 men, and 7112 horses. As the regiments were sent off, there
was such a dearth of officers that the marshal had to promote, subject to the
Emperor's confirmation, many non-commissioned officers.
Amongst his many troubles were sore backs among the horses, the result of
neglect. He proposes to cashier one sub-lieutenant who produced 32 horses
with sore backs out of a detachment of 47.
Besides these troops, Kellerman formed Mortier's corps at Mayence, and the
Legion of the North at Landau. The latter corps exercised him much, as it
was to be, under the Emperor's orders, composed of deserters from the enemy-
largely Poles. It had, owing to the neglect of contractors, to be sent off almost
without clothes and supplies. Yet, though, as was not unnatural, there were
many desertions from it, the Legion did good service before Danzig.
Kellerman also organised several corps of gendarmes, artillery, etc. Alto-
20
NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN IN POLAND.
places such as Wurtzburg, Erfurt, Wittenburg and Spandau,
they were required to be inspected by the local commandant,
who reported on them to headquarters. Thus Napoleon had
a continuous series of reports, enabling him to keep his eye
on the progress of his recruits who were sent forward under
officers from the depôts.
On arrival at the front, the provisional regiments were
again broken up for distribution, according to requirements,
to the various corps and regiments.*
For the defence of the French ports Cambacères was
directed to raise 9000 National Guards in the departments
of the Somme and the Lower Seine.† These were to join
the reserve in Paris, standing ready for movement to any
part of the coast that might be threatened. There were in
Paris three regular regiments for this purpose. Two of them
were replaced by these National Guards, and moved towards
the front in Poland. Napoleon later remarks ‡ that 40,000
men will be available in the 3rd battalions left in France.
3000 National Guards were mobilised at Bordeaux.§ From
Brittany he drew to the front two regiments. To compensate
for these, he sent there 6000 conscripts of 1806 and 4000 of
1807. He also raised 5000 men amongst the shipbuilders
and artificers of the ports, who were thrown out of employ
owing to the British supremacy at sea.||
gether, he says, there passed the Rhine at Mayence and Wesel, as reinforce-
ments for the grand army, 152,456 men, and 19,306 horses, of which 73,624 men,
and 9559 horses were from the Army of Reserve. These numbers of course do
not include the troops marching from Italy, Switzerland, and Holland, or the
German contingents (Kellerman's report, Arch. Hist.).
·
* "The bad method," says Von der Goltz, "of reinforcing armies by new
units, instead of by fresh drafts, bringing the old ones up to their normal
numbers, has long since been discarded in all great armies " (Nation in Arms,
p. 378). Napoleon, it will be observed, followed generally the principles here
advocated.
† Corr. 11,130. To Cambacères, 31st October, 1806.
‡ Corr. 11,262. To Cambacères, 16th November, 1806.
§ Corr. 11,066, dated 24th October, 1806.
|| Corr. 11,477, 15th December, 1806, to Dejean, and Corr. 11,479 of same date
to Admiral Decrés.
THE ARMIES AND THE LEADERS.
21
The regiment of "vélites" of the Guard, not having been
found to fulfil the objects for which it was intended, he
proposed to form into a regiment of fusiliers of the guard
1500 or 1600 strong,* which was to leave Paris for Berlin
on the 12th December.†
To his brother Louis he wrote that he should expect
him to provide at least 20,000 Dutch troops for the Grand
Army, the number, if possible, to be raised to 25,000 in the
spring. Three days earlier § he had ordered Louis to occupy
Hanover with three French regiments and 7000 or 8000
Dutch troops.
He was even willing to accept the offer of a Breton
gentleman to raise 500 or 600 volunteers, though he stipu-
lated that they should not be men who would be otherwise
taken by the conscription. He directed the raising of
regiments in Switzerland. For the armament of regiments
to be raised amongst the Poles, large numbers of muskets
were sent to Davout for delivery to Dombrowski, who was
charged with their organisation.** For a large cavalry force
in the great plains of Poland Napoleon at once recognised
the necessity. He was anxious to hurry up as many horse-
men as possible before he should meet the Russians. He
had already decided on adding a fifth squadron to his cavalry
regiments, bringing them nominally to a strength of 1000
each, though he did not expect them to appear in the field
with more than 700 sabres. He writes to Dejean that alto-
gether he has 60,000 or 70,000 cavalry in different parts of
Europe, and that he believes there are still 10,000 in the
* Corr. 11,292, dated 22nd November, 1806, to Lacuée.
† Corr. 11,330, dated 30th November, 1806, to Junot.
‡ Corr. 11,192, dated 7th November, 1806.
§ Corr. 11,171, dated 4th November, 1806.
|| Corr. 11,164, dated 4th November.
¶ Corr. 11,237, dated 12th November, and 11,302, dated 24th November.
** Corr. 11,257, dated 13th Nov., and 11,258, dated 14th Nov., to Davout.
The latter despatch remarks that 6 battalions might be expected from Posen
and 12 more in Warsaw, should it rise against the Prussians.
22
NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN IN POLAND.
depôts in France.*. On the 5th January, 1807, he calculates
there should be with the Grand Army 24 regiments of dragoons
and cuirassiers, 18 of chasseurs, 9 of hussars, making 51,000
men, at the nominal strength of 1000 per regiment. They
would not, however, amount to more than 36,000 actually
present. A few days earlier he had said he expected rein-
forcements of 16,000 cavalry during the year.† So urgent
was the need for cavalry that he ordered Kellerman to send
the men forward in batches of even 15 or 16, as they were
collected.
Cavalry was not required to any great extent in Italy.
The south was too mountainous for it, the north too much
intersected with canals and vineyards. Therefore, on the
4th November, 1806, he writes to Joseph that he has taken
8 French cavalry regiments from the army of Northern Italy,
trusting to Joseph's replacing them with 8 out of 12 regi-
ments which he had in Naples.
The army in Northern Italy was to be reinforced by
20,000 men from France in the beginning of December.‡
From Spain the Emperor directed Talleyrand to demand
10,000 infantry and 4000 cavalry, and the 6000 Spaniards
in Italy were ordered to march up to Germany.§
Such were the principal methods by which the Emperor
increased his armies in preparation for his first advance
against the Russians. In the spring he was compelled to
make still further demands on the military strength of
France. They will be described later in their proper
chronological order.
He was able by the end of November to count on 80,000
men towards Warsaw, whilst another 80,000 were following
in second line.
"Napoleon evinced, at all times, extraordinary care for
the measures to be taken to provide for the sustenance of
* Corr. 11,556, to Dejean.
† Corr. 11,544, to Dejean.
‡ Corr. 11,172, to Eugene Beauharnais, dated 4th November, 1806.
§ Corr. 11,476, dated 15th December, 1806, to Tallyrand.
THE ARMIES AND THE LEADERS.
23
his armies. Certainly he did not adhere to any fixed system,
but took the means of nourishing his hosts just wherever he
found them. He knew how, by promising high payment,
by his dexterous treatment of authorities and communities,
as well as by threats and brute force, to furnish himself with
supplies, even in exhausted districts. . . . But, before all
things, he was a master of organising his lines of rear com-
munication; and purchases, transport, requisitions, and
compulsory provisioning by the population, all contributed
to fill his soldiers' bellies."*
As soon as he found himself supreme in Prussia and the
allied states, the Emperor proceeded to impose enormous war
contributions on them all, especially on rich cities such as
Hamburg. The total sum exceeded 160 millions of francs
(£6,400,000).† A great proportion of this sum he could not
hope to realise in cash. What he did was to levy supplies
of various sorts from the cities and states. These were
nominally on payment; the value was met, not in cash, but
by a credit against the demand for war contribution.
Wherever there was a great local manufacture of articles
required for an army, it was utilised in this way: uniforms
were made up at Hamburg and Magdeburg, Leipsic and
Berlin, saddles at Berlin and elsewhere, boots at numerous
centres. If it is true that an army marches on its belly,
Napoleon equally recognised the care required for its feet.
* Von der Goltz, The Nation in Arms, p. 354.
†The contributions varied from 25 millions of francs in the case of
Saxony (which was subsequently modified by his alliance with that state) to
100,000 francs in the case of the smallest states (see Corr. 11,010, decree dated
15th October, 1806, the day after the battle of Jena). By the same decree, all
English merchandise in the northern cities, in whatsoever hands it might be,
was declared forfeit to the use of the French army.
The sums given here as contributions, do not include the ordinary financial
resources of the countries which were applied by the French to their own uses.
Altogether, there passed into Napoleon's hands, in money and goods collected
from Germany, more than 560 millions of francs (£22,400,000), whilst the net
cost of the war against Prussia and Russia was put at only 213 millions (see
summary of Daru's report, Dumas, xix. 489). Truly, in this instance, war was
made to support itself.
24
NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN IN POLAND.
Scarcely a day passes on which there is not some letter or
order from him dealing with the supply of boots, the con-
struction of bakeries, and the means of forwarding bread
to the armies. No detail was below his notice. "Every
detachment," he writes, "coming from Paris or Boulogne
should start, each man with a pair of shoes, besides two pairs
in his knapsack. At Mayence they will receive another pair
to replace that worn on the march. At Magdeburg they will
worn on the march from
receive a new pair to replace that
Mayence to Magdeburg, so that every man may reach his
corps with a pair of shoes on his feet and a pair in his knap-
sack." Notwithstanding all this care for their food, their
clothing and their boots, the French troops were often in dire
distress for all three.†
* Corr. 11,413. During the campaign there were supplied to the army,
from first to last, 587,008 pairs of shoes, 16,948 of boots, and 37,386 of gaiters,
all made up in Germany, besides 397,000 pairs of shoes sent from France
(summary of Daru's report, Dumas, xix. 490).'
+ Napoleon, writing to Soult, for instance, on the 27th February, 1807, remarks
that the Russians appear to be "like us," and not to have eaten for several days.
The difficulty, even under much more favourable circumstances, of keeping men
properly shod and clothed is illustrated by Von der Goltz: "In December, 1870,
some German soldiers might have been seen plodding along the miry roads, in
the depth of winter, barefoot, whilst many had only wooden shoes and linen
trousers." There were some weak German companies with so many as forty
shoeless men. Every sort of garment was utilised, with the exception of the
ominous French red breeches, the possible consequences of wearing which were
obvious (Nation in Arms, pp. 375-376). De Fezensac (132) says that, in the
winter of 1806-7, the French soldiers were living mainly on what they could
find in the country, as the arrival of supplies was delayed by the horrible
weather and the state of the roads.
The following quaint little note, written by Lasalle on the back of a
despatch from Milhaud to Murat as it passed through his quarters, speaks
volumes. It is in the daily correspondence, 25th December, 1806, in the Archives
Historiques. A force de cris et de menaces, j'ai obtenu un pain et une dame-
jeanne de vin que je suis trop heureux d'offrir á vôtre Altesse. Notre noble hôte
est un ladre qui nous laissera mourir de faim." Figure the shortness of supplies
when a general commanding a cavalry division has no hesitation in offering, as
an acceptable gift to the Emperor's brother-in-law, a loaf of bread and a bottle
of wine! What, too, must have been the feelings of the unfortunate despatch-
bearer, unexpectedly burdened with this precious and fragile load! Envy of
the good things he was carrying, and anxiety lest breakage of the bottle should
draw upon him the wrath of Murat, perhaps divided his sentiments equally.
THE ARMIES AND THE LEADERS.
25
For his sick and wounded the Emperor was equally
solicitous. The provision of hospital and ambulance arrange-
ments became more and more difficult as the armies advanced
into a country where the roads were atrocious and local
means of transport very scarce. The numbers, both of sick
and wounded, to be dealt with were very great; the supply
of hospital attendants and surgeons was deficient, especially
at the advanced hospitals. Nevertheless, by the end of
January, 1807, no less than 21 hospitals were open in War-
saw alone, with more than 10,000 occupants who had been
brought back, on foot in the case of those slightly wounded
or suffering from trifling ailments, on carts or sledges in the
more serious cases. The pressure was still greater after the
battle of Eylau. Hospitals were opened at Bromberg, Marien-
burg, Marienwerder, Elbing, and other places. To relieve the
hospitals in Poland, later on, many wounded and sick, who
could bear the journey, were transferred to Breslau and other
places in Silesia, where spacious barracks afforded excellent
accommodation. So great were the preparations made that
though, on the 30th June, 1807, there were 27,376 men in
hospital, it was calculated that there was still available
accommodation for nearly 30,000 men. From the 1st October,
1806, to the 31st October, 1808, over 421,000 * cases of sick-
ness or wounds occurred, with 32,000 deaths. The average
stay in hospital was 29 days. It may be taken, therefore, that
during this period the mean number in hospital was somewhere
about 16,500; at times it was very much higher.† These
figures do not include the enemy's sick and wounded prisoners,
or those of the allied troops, who ranged, during the period
November, 1806, to July, 1807, from th to 4th of the number
2
* The number sounds enormous, yet it is worth remembering that in 1870
(with, of course, a much larger army), the Germans had 400,000 sick, and 100,000
wounded (Nation in Arms, p. 331).
† For this brief account of the hospitals, see abstract of Daru's report at end
of vol. xix., Dumas. The number of wounded out of the total in hospitals was
47, and of fever cases 105 out of every 190. The largest number in hospital was,
in June 1807, 27,376.
26
NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN IN POLAND.
of French. For the service of the hospitals, the resources of
the conquered countries were fully utilised, as they were
in the case of supplies, clothing, boots, and saddlery. The
captured Prussian tents were cut up, partly for bandages,
partly for shirts, and partly for mattresses. Napoleon's army
carried no tents. If cantonments were out of the question,
they bivouacked in the open, whatever the weather. Great
numbers of cavalry and artillery horses, captured from the
Prussians, were pressed into the French service. The cavalry
from Italy and France were marched to Germany on foot,
and there remounted at the great cavalry depôt which Napo-
leon established at Potsdam. Altogether he raised 40,555
horses in the conquered territories.*
Into the finance of the war this work cannot enter, beyond
the remarks above, in the footnote (†) at p. 23.
The army was organised in corps, by no means of even
strength, rarely reaching the modern standard of 30,000
men. The only corps which generally approached this figure
were the 1st, 3rd, 4th, and 10th.
In addition to the corps of all arms, there were two cavalry
reserves-the first under Murat, nearly 10,000 strong at the
end of November, 1806.† The second, under Bessières, only
existed during the first phase of the campaign. It was broken
up before Eylau. The artillery was armed with a good gun,
as guns were at that date. Both it and the cavalry drew
their remounts largely from the captured Prussian troops and
from the horses found in the country.
The rank and file of the army was but little, if at all,
past its best. In the earlier part of the campaign, its youngest
* Daru's report, Dumas, end of vol. xix.
† Corr. 11,305, to Murat, dated 24th November, 1806. It comprised :-
Beaumont's and Klein's dragoons
Becker's dragoons
Nansouty's brigade
Milhaud's brigade
...
...
4800
...
1200
2400
800
Total, 9200
THE ARMIES AND THE LEADERS.
27
men were the conscripts of 1806 who had, owing to their
premature enrolment, already undergone a year's training.
Many of the troops had been with Napoleon in his earlier
campaigns and in Egypt, very many had been at Ulm and
Austerlitz, the majority had just emerged from the brilliant
campaign of Jena. They were now preparing for a renewed
war against fresh enemies; the hardest task that an army
can undertake.* Even these hardened and enthusiastic
warriors contemplated with dread the prospect of a fresh
winter campaign in an inhospitable and difficult country,
and Napoleon was often remonstrated with, as he rode
alongside of his men, for insisting on their advance into
Poland. To such complaints he would reply with the
rough jests which his veterans loved to hear from him, and
with promises to give them rest as soon as he possibly
could. In action, the infantry was still splendid, and did
not as yet require to be formed in deep columns of many
battalions, such as was Macdonald's at Wagram, three years
later.
The cavalry were excellent and well mounted, though,
in the latter respect, they fell short of many of the Russian
cavalry regiments.
The artillery was highly trained and invariably made
good practice.
Of the French soldier generally, Jomini makes Napoleon
say, “My soldiers are as brave as it is possible to be, but they
argue too much. If they had the impassible firmness and the
docility of the Russians the world would not be great enough
*"The most difficult task that can be imposed upon an army is to enter on
a second campaign, against fresh enemies, immediately after one in which its
moral energies have been partially consumed. Fortunate as Napoleon's
operations against the Prussians and the Saxons in the autumn of 1806 had
been, they all the same came to a standstill when, in the winter, he encountered
the Russians and the corps of General von Lestocq, which had not previously
been in action" (Nation in Arms, p. 335).
+ "Our soldiers were less satisfied; they showed a lively repugnance to
cross the Vistula. Misery, the winter, the bad weather, had inspired them with
an extreme aversion for this country" (Rapp, p. 118).
28
NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN IN POLAND.
for me. The French soldiers love their country too much to
act the part of the Macedonians." *
To the chief generals a separate section will be devoted;
but there are many regimental, brigade, and divisional
commanders whom it will be impossible to notice separately.
Several of them rose to the highest rank. Generally speaking,
the officers and non-commissioned officers were of excellent
quality and great experience in war.
The discipline of the army was certainly not such as
would be approved at the present time, either in the case of
the officers or in that of the men. De Fezensac mentions †
that Marchand changed the cantonments of his division three
times without vouchsafing any information to Ney, the
commander of the corps. Marauding, chiefly in search of
food, was common amongst the men. Even Thiers puts the
number of men "absent" after Eylau at 60,000.
(b) THE RUSSIAN ARMY.
Of the Russian army of 1806 ‡ we have an account by
Sir Robert Wilson, avowedly written with a favourable bias.
Still, being written by an eyewitness, at a time when
England was at war with Russia, it seems reasonable to
accept it as, on the whole, correct, at any rate as regards
facts.
The infantry consisted of men between the ages of 18 and
40, generally of small stature, but endowed with considerable
physical strength and inured to hardships of all sorts. They
could bear the stress of the worst weather, and, at the same
time, could subsist on the scantiest fare. The keynote to
* Vie de Napoleon, ii. 434. This work is in the form of a narrative
supposed to be addressed by the spirit of Napoleon in the next world to an
audience of all the great commanders who preceded him. The words quoted
here Napoleon is made to represent as used by himself to a connoisseur. They
would, therefore, appear to have been his own actual views.
+ Souvenirs Militaires, p. 139.
For this account of the Russian army, see chiefly Wilson, pp. 1–70.
THE ARMIES AND THE LEADERS.
29
their character was implicit obedience to superior authority
and absolute reliance on it. This submissive obedience was
not corrected by intelligence in the interpretation of orders.
Whatever commands he received, the Russian soldier would
do his best to carry out. It mattered not to him that, in
the meanwhile, circumstances had so changed as to render
the orders incapable of execution. Once he had received
them, and until they were cancelled by their author, it was
his sole aim to perform them. The lengths to which his
sense of duty, in this respect, would carry him are well
illustrated by the account given by Marbot of the battle
of Golymin. He describes how a stray body of Russians,
hoping to conceal, by their silence, their nationality from
the French who surrounded them in the darkness, restrained
their cries. Neither the excitement of action, nor the agony
of wounds, could draw from them the slightest sound. The
wounded and the dying fell and lay in perfect silence; to
their opponents it seemed as if they were firing at shadows."
*
The courage of men who could do such deeds was un-
questionable; their intelligence was of a very different order.
tyr Absolutely uneducated, they fought like animals rather than
like intelligent beings. The idea of seeking cover was foreign
to their nature and disdained by their courage. Death had
no terrors for them, no carnage appalled them.
The one
thing which they could ill brook was a continued retreat.
In such circumstances only, did their feelings express them-
selves in murmurs, so audible as, at times, to compel their
commanders to stand and fight when retreat was the wiser
course.
Their powers of marching were marvellous. For days at
a time they would march regularly every night and yet fight
all day with the very minimum of rest and food. Even the
terrible night of the 7th-8th February, spent without shelter
and without food, exposed to the full rigour of almost arctic
weather, with the scantiest clothing and almost without
* Marbot, i. 246-249.
-
30
NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN IN POLAND.
boots, failed to damp their ardour for the awful battle which
was to succeed it.
The Russian soldier could be trained to march and drill
with precision and rapidity, to fight steadily in square...
or column; but he was lost under circumstances where
separation from his companions, and perhaps from his officers,
required the exercise of that individual intelligence and that
natural aptitude for war which has always characterised the
French soldier. Their uniforms were bad in quality of
material, and they were armed with a musket so heavy and
cumbersome that the supplies of arms received from England,
not being sufficient for all, were reserved as a reward for
meritorious men. When it is remembered how clumsy a
weapon was the "Brown Bess" of those days, it is possible
to form some conception of the burden which must have been
imposed by the carriage and use of the Russian musket.
The troops fought in 1807, in a country whence the terror
of war and famine had driven every inhabitant who could by
any possibility quit it. In their flight the peasants carried
with them all that was portable. What they had to leave
behind they had done their best to bury beyond the reach of
the approaching armies. With a commissariat of the most
wretched description, unable often to supply any food, the
sufferings from hunger of the Russian soldiery are easier to
imagine than to describe. They could live only on what was
provided by their own diligence in unearthing and robbing
the hidden stores of the inhabitants. Long habituation to
the plainest and scantiest food could alone enable an army,
under such circumstances, to maintain life and strength.
Yet the Russians were always ready and able to fight with
undiminished fury and obstinacy.
The army was recruited on no fixed principle. A certain
number of men being required, the magistrates selected the
best of the young men up to that limit. Their pay was
infinitesimal-about half a guinea a year.
As might be expected, the arm in the use of which they
THE ARMIES AND THE LEADERS.
31
excelled was the bayonet. Their generally superior physique
gave them an advantage over the French in personal combat.
With the bayonet, Sir R. Wilson considers that the British
alone could dispute the supremacy of the Russian.
The Russian soldier's sense of moral obligations was that
of the barbarian. His religion was mixed with superstition,
but he was not a bigot. His sovereign he invested with an
almost godlike supremacy and, whilst his untold privations,
at times, overcame his sense of discipline in regard to his
officers, nothing could diminish his reverence for the Czar,
the father of his people. A curious story is told by Sir R.
Wilson, illustrative of this trait in the character of the
Russian soldier.
At a time when privation had driven many Russians,
as well as French, to form bands marauding in search of
food, a party of Russian officers, prisoners on parole, accom-
panied by some French officers, was marching towards
Warsaw. Falling in with a body of Russian marauders,
commanded by a sergeant, the French officers were, in spite
of the protest of their Russian companions, massacred. Then
came the turn of the Russians. As honourable men, they
refused to listen to the demand of the soldiers that they
should break their parole and return to the army at the head
of their captors. They were told that their country's right
to their allegiance overrode all obligations of honour towards
their enemy. They still refused, and were thereupon done to
death, with the exception of one officer who, left for dead,
eventually recovered and escaped to tell the story. Yet the
soldiers who could commit an atrocity such as this, would
share their last crust with a starving peasant whose all had
been unearthed and robbed.
The Light Infantry (Jägers), recruited mainly in Siberia,
were superior as marksmen to the line regiments. The
Imperial Guard was a picked body of about 17,000 men,
of magnificent physique, far superior in this respect to
Napoleon's guard, and even to the corresponding Prussian

32
NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN IN POLAND.
force.* The Russian regular cavalry had the great advan-
tage over their enemies of being mounted on horses, "match-
less," says Sir R. Wilson, "for an union of size, strength,
activity, and hardiness; whilst formed with the bulk of the
British cart horse, they have so much blood as never to be
coarse, and withal are so supple as naturally to adapt them-
selves to the manége, and receive the highest degree of
dressing.
""
When the Guard cavalry proceeded from St. Petersburg
to the front, the 700 miles was accomplished, as far as
Riga, at the rate of 50 miles a day, the men riding in
waggons. For the remainder of the journey the horses were
ridden 35 miles a day. Yet they reached their destination
in the finest condition. The hardships which the Russian
cavalry underwent, in a snow-covered country, were beyond
bounds. Forage, save the old thatch stripped from the roofs,
was unprocurable, and shelter, of course, was unknown.
As a horseman, the Russian regular cavalryman had no
experience, except in the schools. He was not born to the
use of horses, and he had to learn both how to ride and how
to care for them. Yet the Russian cavalry distinguished
itself throughout the campaign and was often victorious
over the French with all its training. They had no great
cavalry leader, no one who knew when to use them to the
greatest advantage.†
If good horses were a great advantage to the cavalry,
they were still more so to the artillery, which had to drag its
* Jomini puts into Napoleon's mouth these words, "I saw at Tilsit a
regiment of Russian guards; and I have not forgotten the sensation which I
felt at its appearance. Many only saw in it a disagreeable stiffness. I have
never loved armies of automatons, I required soldiers of intelligence; however,
I was surprised at the precision and assurance of this infantry. I understood
that an army so well disciplined and of such extraordinary firmness, would be
the first in the world if, to these qualities, it united a little of the electric
enthusiasm of the French.” The words were, perhaps, not used by Napoleon
himself, but the criticism, as that of Jomini, is valuable.
†The cavalry, which had been very inferior under Suvarow, had been
vastly improved since his time (Jomini, Vie de Napoleon, ii. 336, note).
THE ARMIES AND THE LEADERS.
33
guns through the new element of mud, which Napoleon
alleged he had discovered in Poland.
The Russian guns, according to Sir R. Wilson, were
good-better, apparently, than the infantry musket. The
carriage was strong, without being heavy, the harness and
tackle of the best quality. The horses were small, but
powerful and well bred. The ordinary teams were four for
the light guns, and eight or ten for the 12-pounders. With
these teams, guns were forced through drifts of soft snow deep
enough to cover them, and, at Friedland, they were first got
across a ford so deep that the horses were almost swimming,
and then up a nearly perpendicular bank.
The drivers, gunners, and non-commissioned officers were
good, but the officers were often ignorant of their arm.
The number of guns was excessive; at Eylau, there were
460 on the battlefield, which gives nearly 6 per 1000 men.
This great number was at times a disadvantage, and
delayed the movements of the army. Before Eylau, Bennig-
sen had to send his heavy artillery by a circuitous route, to
avoid encumbering his columns. The possibility of its capture,
whilst detached, was a cause of serious anxiety to him.
The comparatively small number of guns lost in the
campaign (the numbers were greatly exaggerated by Napo-
leon) speaks volumes for the exertions of men and horses.
Some 70 or 80 guns had to be abandoned in deep mud,
during the retirement to Pultusk and Golymin, in December.
The French were not more successful at that time in carrying
along their guns; but, as they were advancing, they were able
to recover those they left behind, whilst the Russian guns
necessarily fell into the enemy's hands, when abandoned in
retreat.
In addition to their regular cavalry, the Russians
depended largely on their cossacks. This irregular cavalry,
mounted on "very little ill-conditioned but well-bred
horses, was, throughout, a terror to the French. Against
**
* Wilson, p. 27.
D
34
NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN IN POLAND.
the heavy cavalry they could not, in ordinary circumstances,
stand; but at Eylau, when the French cuirassiers, exhausted
and with blown horses, encountered, after passing through.
the Russian infantry, the fresh and fearless cossacks, they
went down before them, and suffered terribly.
At the outposts, when the armies were in cantonments,
these hardy warriors, inured, like their horses, from their
birth to hardships of all sorts, were a continual thorn in
the side of the French light cavalry, whose training and
previous experience had failed to fit them or their horses to
bear the starvation and cold, which the cossacks felt but
little.
Platow, the Ataman of the cossacks, had immense per-
sonal influence with them, and it was only necessary for
him to dismount and appeal to them in order to steady them
against overwhelming odds.
Accustomed from childhood to the use of the lance, the
cossack was more than a match for the horseman armed only
with a sword, or for any but a very expert lancer.
The last class of troops employed by Russia consisted of
1500 baskiers, clad in chain mail, and armed with bows and
These men appeared on the field at the close of the
campaign. They were, of course, useless, and merely ex-
cited the derision of Napoleon.
arrows.
The officers who led the infantry of the Czar were not
worthy, as a rule, of the magnificent raw material which
they should have been able to mould into shape. The
lower grades were especially ill qualified. Scarcely better
educated than their ignorant men, they could neither inspire
respect nor teach an art of which they knew nothing.
Poorly paid, and looked down upon by the officers of the
cavalry and the Guard, the position of an infantry officer had
no attractions for the upper classes. The Guard, on the
other hand, was commanded mainly by men of these classes,
and even the ordinary cavalry officers were of a better class
than those of the infantry. There was no scientific class of
THE ARMIES AND THE LEADERS.
35
native officers for the artillery. The pick of the officers of
the whole army were foreigners; but they were too few,
and too much confined to the more important commands, to
have much influence in leavening the native mass. Gam-
bling was very prevalent, and the Russian officers were
much inclined to indolence, generally preferring to drive
rather than ride or walk.
The staff was clogged with red tape, and overburdened
with reports, which had to be submitted by every officer,
down to the commandant of a cossack outpost. With all
this reporting, there was no real method such as prevailed in
Napoleon's army. Leaders of ability were lamentably
scarce; the commissariat was wretched; the treasury was
exhausted; without money, magazines and transport could
not be organised, even if there had been any one with the
ability required to do so. At first, as the army was advancing,
it was possible to live on the country; but its never very
great resources were soon exhausted by the passage and
return of two great armies, and then the existence, even of
the French army, became precarious; for the Russian, life
became possible at all only owing to the hardihood and
patience of its men.
The hospital and medical arrangements were, if possible,
worse than the commissariat and transport. The medical
officers, uneducated and wretchedly paid, were worse than
useless. Platow, when asked by the Czar if he would have
an increase to his medical staff, then consisting of a single
officer, replied, "God and your Majesty forbid; the fire of
the enemy is not half so fatal as one drug." t

* Napoleon was not a stickler for rigid adherence to set forms of report.
He required reports of the operations of the various corps in a campaign, yet he
accepted documents varying so widely as Davout's elaborate report and the
skeleton reports of Ney and Murat. Ney's report is a mere "journal de
marche," giving the positions of his troops on each day; Murat's is much
the same. Lannes' appears never to have been written--perhaps in consequence
of his death at Essling in 1809.
+ Wilson, p. 53.
36
NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN IN POLAND.
What was good in the medical arrangements at Koenigs-
berg was supplied by Prussia. At the battle of Friedland,
for the first time, was any attempt made to succour the
Russian wounded on the field. What more pathetic picture
can there be of the suffering of the Russian soldiery than
these words of one of them who forced himself into the
presence of the Czar ?["For nine months I and my comrades
have endured, without a murmur, all the ills of the most
severe campaign. We wished to serve our Emperor faith-
fully, and not augment his difficulties. I call God to witness
that, for seven days, these soldiers and myself had nothing
to eat but a piece of hide, steeped in water that we might
be enabled to chew it when softened; and yet, for eighteen
hours, we remained on the field of battle, until, at the same
instant, we were struck by grape. Now that we have passed
our frontiers, and are returned to our country, we know that
the Emperor cannot profit by our ill treatment. Look at
this arm; undressed for seventeen days, and a burrow for
worms! Look at our bodies, worn down, and wasting for
food. The Emperor may want us again. We are ready to
serve him, but he shall know our condition that we may have
his redress.'
""*
Russia had
In numbers the army was inadequate.
prepared only to support Prussia as an ally. By the collapse
of that power, she suddenly found herself compelled to face
the mighty armies of Napoleon, receiving from Prussia but
one weak corps, the remnant of the great host which had
been destroyed at Jena and Auerstadt.
The Russian army was, in 1806, organised in 18 divisions,
each consisting of
6 regiments of 3 battalions each
10 squadrons heavy cavalry
10 squadrons light cavalry
2 batteries of guns of position
3 light batteries
1 horse battery
* Wilson, pp. 53, 54.
THE ARMIES AND THE LEADERS.
37
The batteries were of 14 pieces each for field, and 12 for
horse artillery.* Thus the division had a nominal strength
of 18 battalions, 20 squadrons, and 82 guns.
At the end of 1806, the whole army was distributed
thus:-
I. Imperial Guard under the Grand Duke
Constantine, at St. Petersburg, 1st
Division.
II. The army in Poland under Marshal
Kamenskoi, viz. :—
(a) 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 6th Divisions under
Ostermann Tolstoi, Sacken, Gal-
litzin and Sedmaratzki, forming the
1st army, commanded by Bennigsen.
(b) 5th, 7th, 8th and 14th Divisions, under
Tutchkow, Dochtorow, Essen III.,
and Anrepp respectively, forming
the 2nd army, commanded by Bux-
howden,
III. The army of Moldavia, under Michelson:
Divisions 9, 10, 11, 12, 13; of which
9 and 10 were commanded by Wol-
konski and Müller respectively. These
two divisions returned from the Turkish
frontier, when the Prussian power
collapsed, and joined Bennigsen's left
on the Narew, in the middle of January,
1807.
IV. Intermediary Corps under Count Apraxim
in Russia, comprising 15th, 16th, 17th,
18th Divisions.
Battalions. Squadrons. Guns.
33
35
84
147
170
504
90 100
306
54
30
144
Totals
324
335
...
1038
* Heavy field batteries-8 12-pndrs.
4 -púd howitzers (licornes)
2 light howitzers (licornes)
14
Light field batteries
8 6-pndrs.
4 4-púd howitzers (licornes)
2 small
""
""
Horse batteries
14
. 12 6-pndrs.
1

38
NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN IN POLAND.
Besides these, were the corps in Finland and Georgia,
which constituted an entirely separate army.
*
The force at first opposed to Napoleon consisted of the
two armies comprised under No. II. Their strength may be
taken, according to Hopfner, as follows:-
(a) Bennigsen's-
49,000 infantry
11,000 regular cavalry
4,000 cossacks
2,700 artillery
900 pioneers
68,000 and 276 guns.
Perhaps, Hopfner thinks, considering various authorities,
60,000 combatants is a full estimate.†
(b) Buxhowden's-
29,000 infantry
7,000 cavalry
1,200 artillery
37,200 and 216 guns.‡
Dumas estimates the strength somewhat lower at-Ben-
nigsen 55,000, and Buxhowden 36,000.§ The divisions of the
latter general had been at Austerlitz, and had not replaced
the losses which they had suffered there. An army of reserve
was being organised in the interior of Russia.
* Kamenskoi's army thus, in November, 1806, consisted
approximately of 90,000 men.||
The Prussian army was but a small remnant of the
mighty force which had been destroyed at Jena, gradually
reinforced and its losses repaired by such recruits as could
be raised in what remained to Prussia of her territory, or as
* Jomini, Vie de Napoleon, ii. 334, note, from which figures down to this
point are taken.
† Hopfner, iii. 26, 27.
§ Dumas, xvii. 99 and 101.
‡ Ibid., iii. 29.
This is the estimate given by Wilson (p. 84, note).
THE ARMIES AND THE LEADERS.
39
could escape from the conquered provinces. Excluding the
garrisons of Graudenz and Danzig, the Prussian corps in
Poland seems to have amounted to not more than 6000 men
in December, 1806, and at no time up to the end of July to
have exceeded 25,000. It consisted largely of recruits and
young troops, with only a nucleus of better-trained soldiers.
(c) THE GENERALS.
Of the great master of war who "fills a space in the
world's history far greater than that occupied by all the men
of action, all the thinkers, poets, or writers of every age. . .
who is still regarded by myriads as the greatest of human
beings,"
"* it would be presumption to speak in the few lines
which space will allow to be devoted to some of the principal
leaders in this war. His achievements have filled the world,
during more than a century, with wonder and admiration.
This history of one of them cannot pretend to give an account
of Napoleon himself.
He was, in many ways, his own chief of the staff.
He went into details which no ordinary commander-in-chief
could find time for, especially one burdened with the cares
of supervising the Government and the foreign relations of
a great state. But there was a limit to the powers even of
Napoleon, and he required a subordinate to amplify and issue
the orders which he dictated in outline.
For his purpose, Marshal Berthier was an ideal chief of
the staff. He was no general, and he could never have filled
the place of a Von Moltke; but he knew Napoleon, his ways
and his wishes, and could elaborate, to the liking of his master,
the brief orders which were what he usually received. "In
short words he (Napoleon) thus enumerated his measures.
Berthier separated them from each other, drew up each order
separately, and addressed them to the several addressees.” †
* Wolseley, Decline and Fall of Napoleon, p. 193.
† Nation in Arms, p. 73.
40
NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN IN POLAND.
"Berthier's position was more that of a chief of the cabinet
with high functions, than that of a chief of the general staff.” *
These two quotations, from a modern writer, express tersely
the duties which Napoleon demanded, and which, for many
years, Berthier executed, generally to his satisfaction. There
were occasions when he failed, as will be seen later; and
when Napoleon once † ventured to leave him temporarily in
a position similar to that of the modern German chief of the
staff, before his own arrival at the front, the result was very
nearly being disaster. He was a superlative, confidential
secretary-nothing more.
Joachim Murat, at this period Grand Duke of Berg, is
perhaps the most picturesque figure among Napoleon's
generals. He was nominally in command of the right wing
of the army; but it is extremely improbable that his Imperial
brother-in-law would ever have trusted him to act alone,
once operations had fairly begun. He owed his position more
to his connexion by marriage with Napoleon, and to the
impossibility of getting him to serve loyally under any other
command but that of the Emperor, than to his military merits.
Brave to a fault, vain and ambitious, with but limited intel-
ligence, he was the beau ideal of the leader of a cavalry charge.
Yet he was not, in any sense, a great cavalry general. His
ideas of reconnaissance were vague, his information often
defective and misleading. Even on the battlefield he some-
times handled his cavalry very indifferently. With his gaudy
uniform and his theatrical displays at the head of his cavalry,
with his habit of playing for the admiration of the enemy as
well as of his own men, one cannot help regarding him as a
poseur. Yet there was in him something chivalrous, hardly
to be expected in a man of his humble origin. His last letter
to his wife, before his miserable death in 1815, shows that
he was not devoid of feeling. As King of Naples, he was far
from being a failure, and it may be doubted whether the
* Nation in Arms, p. 74. † At the commencement of the campaign of 1809.
‡ Biogr. Gen., art. “Murat.”
THE ARMIES AND THE LEADERS.
41
Neapolitans would not have flourished more under his
dynasty than under the Bourbons.
In command of the left wing was Marshal Bernadotte,
Prince of Ponte Corvo, afterwards King of Sweden, a man
of a very different stamp. Calm, selfish, calculating, and
astute, of much more polished manners than most of Napo-
leon's marshals,* he was endowed with considerable powers
of command. Him the Emperor could, as far as ability was
concerned, trust in a semi-independent command. He had,
or his master professed to think so, fallen short of his duty
at Austerlitz, and, again, when he failed to support Davout
at Auerstadt. There was no love lost between him and the
Emperor; Bernadotte had even been at times in opposition
to Napoleon, notably in the case of the Imperial title. Did
Napoleon employ him in the field because he feared him, and
thought it dangerous to leave him behind in France? The
question seems worth consideration.
Marshal Davout, commanding the 3rd Corps, had dis-
tinguished himself lately by his magnificent conduct of the
battle of Auerstadt. It was he who had really ruined the
* De Fezensac (p. 132) describes his only meeting with Bernadotte, and
extols the superiority of his manners and behaviour to that of the other
marshals. Bernadotte even carried his consideration so far as to offer to keep
De Fezansac for a night's rest, instead of sending him back to Ney at once.
The offer was declined on the score of duty.
"His own people said that he (Bernadotte) would have been a hero in his
own cause, but his disposition was . . . thoroughly exclusive. He only opened
his heart when everything depended on him alone; then it became full of
ardour, generosity, and devotion for his own people, who found in him all
the seductions and fascinations of a great soul. But to endure an equal or a
superior; to help on the glory of another, whoever he might be; such an effort
was always either impossible or intolerable to him" (De Ségur, p. 296).
† Napoleon says that, after Jena, he had ordered Bernadotte's trial by
court martial for his conduct on that day, but abandoned the idea on personal
grounds (Mémoires pour servir, vii. 215, note on Bernadotte's Mémoires).
The name of this marshal is frequently spelt Davoust, sometimes Davoût.
Both seem to be incorrect. The form Davout is used in Napoleon's correspond-
ence, in Berthier's, by the marshal's nephew, the present Duc d'Auerstädt;
finally, there is no misreading possible of his own very legible signature on
numerous despatches and orders in the Archives Historiques in Paris.
42
NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN IN POLAND.
Prussian army on the fatal 14th October, though it would
not have been like Napoleon had he publicly allowed the
full credit to his lieutenant. With the exception only of
Masséna, he was probably the ablest of the marshals, both as
a strategist and a tactician. He was a stern disciplinarian,
but, apparently, popular with his men and subordinates.*
He was ever solicitous for their sustenance and shelter.


=
In the army generally, Marshal Ney occupied a position
in some ways analogous to that which Murat held in the
cavalry. The "bravest of the brave," he was the equal of
Murat in personal courage, his superior in intelligence-and
comprehension of the requirements of war. His general
good nature made him a favourite with his subordinates;
his sudden outbursts of temper frightened them, and often
involved him in quarrels with his equals or superiors.† As
a soldier, he was at his best commanding the rearguard of a
retreating army. Before Friedland, in the north of Portugal,
in the retreat of 1812, Ney seemed to be a great soldier. None
knew better how long it was possible to hold in safety a
covering position, more precisely the moment when it was
necessary to evacuate it and seek the next favourable locality
in which, by a bold stand, to check the advancing enemy and
afford time to the main body of his own army. In the front,
or detached, he seemed to lose his head, would be carried
away by ambitious projects, and sometimes run great and

--
* He was 66
a man of probity, of order, and of duty above all" (De Ségur, p.
296). After Eylau we find him complaining, in an order to Morand commanding
the 1st Division, that many men had skulked out of the battle on the pretext of
assisting the wounded to the rear (Archives Historiques, daily correspondence,
10th February, 1807). The remedy he recommends for this state of affairs is
"la savate avec du gras." This was a summary form of punishment inflicted
by the men themselves on their defaulting comrades. The delinquent was tied
up, and each man of his company, passing by, administered a sound blow or two
on the bare flesh with a shoe. This system of barrack-room justice is, or
recently was, in force in the French army in the case of petty thefts, etc.
+"He knew not how to administer a calm reprimand. He either said
nothing or else exceeded all bounds. Despite this violence of character, his
heart was good, his spirit perfectly just, his judgment sound; very precious
qualities in a soldier " (De Fezensac, p. 133).
THE ARMIES AND THE LEADERS.
43
unnecessary risk, almost in defiance of orders. There is
something very pathetic and natural in the man which blots
out the faults and compels admiration. Nev. "his third horse
killed under him, alone near an abandoned battery, striking,
in his rage, the bronze muzzle of an English gun, Ney,
baring his breast to the bullets of the soldiers he had so
often led, in that last tragic scene near the garden of the
Luxemburg, appeals to us, not unsuccessfully to forget his
weaknesses and his faults.
Napoleon boasted that he had no friends. His feelings
towards Jean Lannes were perhaps nearer akin to friendship
than he would admit. This marshal was one of the few old
comrades to whom Napoleon, even as Emperor, allowed the
familiarity implied by the use of the second person singular
in speech. At his deathbed the stern Emperor relaxed, and
gave vent to his grief. He had watched Lannes' progress
as a commander, and had seen him steadily improving.†
Impetuous, and ever ready to throw himself into the
thickest of the fray, Lannes was yet not rash, and on more
than one occasion in the Polish campaign he fought a good
and patient battle against very superior numbers. He
feared neither the enemy nor the Emperor; to the latter he
would, at times, unbosom himself, even regarding Murat, in
terms which would not have been tolerated from another.
Soult a man more of the stamp of Bernadotte than of
Ney, was, beyond doubt, a capable commander. He was un-
popular with his subordinates. Of his capacity as a general,
Wellington said that he respected him, but that, "though his
plans seemed always to be admirable, he never knew when
to strike." §
Masséna, the "darling child of victory," of whom Welling-
ton said that he was the best of the marshals, and "I always




* Houssaye, Waterloo, p. 374.
+ "Je l'avais pris pigmée, je l'ai perdu géant," said Napoleon (Mem. de Ste.
H., vol. i., pt. 2, p. 10.
$ "Exécré par le corps entier des officiers" (Houssaye, Waterloo, p. 58).
§ Brialmont, Life of Wellington, Gleig's translation, iv. 155.
44
NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN IN POLAND.
found him where I least desired that he should be," * played
but a minor part in the campaign. Yet it might well have
been one of infinite importance, calling for the exercise of all
the patience and endurance which he displayed in the defence
of Genoa, combined with the vigour and fire of the victor of
Zurich.† He was, it can hardly be denied, the most brilliant
of the marshals, and the best fitted for the command of
an army.
Mortier calls for little remark. He was a general of
average capacity, good enough for the command of a corps,
hardly suited for independent command of an army.
The name of Bessières will always be associated with the
command of Napoleon's Guard. He was not in the first
rank amongst the marshals, and acting, as he generally did,
under the personal command of Napoleon, he had no special
opportunity for establishing a reputation for originality or
independence.
Augereau was a curious mixture. His style of dress and
his manner gave the impression of a braggart, which he was
not. He was wanting, said Napoleon, in steadfastness and
perseverance. Even a day of victory seemed to discourage
him. His intelligence was not great, his education very
little; yet he maintained order and discipline among his
men, and was beloved by them.‡
Lefebvre had served Napoleon a good turn on the 18th
Brumaire, when he marched his grenadiers into the chamber
of the Five Hundred, and cleared it at the most critical
moment. His master repaid him with the marshal's bâton,
and the Dukedom of Danzig. The latter was probably better
deserved by his chief engineer, Chasseloup. A hard-headed,
courageous old soldier, Lefebvre was not a general of any
capacity. To his artillery officers at Danzig, he said, "Je
* Ibid., iv. 155.
+ Unlike Augereau, " Masséna vaincu était toujours prêt à recommencer,"
said Napoleon (Mem. de Ste. H., vol. i., pt. 1, p. 313).
‡ Napoleon's character of him (Mém. de Ste. H., vol. i., pt. 1, p. 313).
THE ARMIES AND THE LEADERS.
45
n'entends rien de votre affaire: mais fichez moi un trou et j'y
passerai." The words illustrate his character.
Amongst the commanders of French divisions were many
men who attained, in later years, great distinction-Victor,
Oudinot, Grouchy, and Suchet, all later made marshals, the
last already greatly distinguished in the wars of the Republic
in Italy; Morand, Friant, and Gudin, the excellent leaders of
the three divisions of Davout's splendid 3rd Corps; † Van-
damme, Rapp, Savary, Dupont, St. Hilaire, Lasalle, Milhaud,
Carra St.-Cyr, Kellerman, Chasseloup, Latour Maubourg,
were all names well known in the history of Napoleon's
campaigns; but it is impossible, in the limits of this volume,
to dwell on them.
The French generals were remarkable for their compara-
tive youth. Napoleon himself was 37, Lannes and Soult
were born in the same year as the Emperor, Davout was 37,
Mortier 39, Murat 36, Bernadotte 43. The veterans were
Augereau at 50, Berthier 54, and Lefebvre 52.
Of Marshal Kamenskoi, who commenced the campaign
as commander-in-chief of the Russian armies, little need be
said. A veteran lieutenant of Suwarow, he was now too old
His early measures in Poland were a mixture of
impetuosity and hesitation. His violent character, which
eventually led to his assassination by a peasant, rendered
him unsuitable for supreme command.
for war.
Count Bennigsen, who succeeded him, was a Hanoverian.
Born in 1745, he retired from his native army, and entered
the Russian service in 1773. In that army he had a dis-
tinguished career in the cavalry.‡
* Biogr. Gen., art. "Marshal Lefebvre."
† “Davout in a transport of joy replied, 'Sire, we are your Tenth Legion;
the 3rd Corps will be to you, everywhere and always, what that legion was to
Cæsar'"
(De Ségur, An A.D.C. of Napoleon, p. 311). The boast had been
justified at Auerstädt, and was to be so again at Eylau.
‡ The personal appearance of the Russian commander is thus sketched by
De Ségur: "A pale, withered personage of high stature and cold appearance,
with a scar across his face" (An A.D.C. of Napoleon, p. 328).
46
NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN IN POLAND.
He can hardly be described as a great general. If his
plans of campaign were sometimes not wanting in originality
and design, they failed in execution, or from Bennigsen's
inability to modify them to suit changing circumstances.
At times his conduct exhibited "a mixture of rash im-
prudence and of irresolution quite irreconcilable.” * For
the partial successes which he obtained in this campaign
against the French, the valour and obstinacy of his troops,
rather than his tactics, account.
Barclay de Tolly greatly distinguished himself in this
campaign, in command of a division, especially at Eylau.
His great claim to distinction, however, rests on his plan of
campaign in 1812, when, as minister of war, he was respon-
sible for the design, executed in part by himself, of drawing
Napoleon to his destruction in the heart of Russia. Better
had it been for Russia had that system been followed in
1807.
Prince Bagration, who was usually in command of
Bennigsen's advanced or rear guard, as the case might be,
showed himself to be to the Russians what Ney was to the
French. The excellence of his rearguard actions will appear
in the course of this history. He quarrelled, later, with
Barclay, to whose scheme for the campaign of 1812 he was
vehemently opposed.
The Ataman Platow, leader of the cossacks, occupied a
peculiar semi-paternal position amongst his wild troops. His
personal influence with them was enormous, and his example
would rally them against fearful odds. He had only to
dismount and call upon his horsemen in order to stop the
spread of disorder.
Of Prince Gallitzin, who led the Russian cavalry with
ability, of Dochtorow, of the two Essens, of Anrepp, Müller,
and Markow, it is unnecessary to make detailed mention.
One man, on the side of the allies, acquired a great repu-
His conduct
tation-Lestocq, the Prussian commander.
* Jomini, Vie de Napoleon, ii. 421.
THE ARMIES AND THE LEADERS.
47
was distinguished throughout by energy, firmness, and
ability. It was more than once his fate to be exposed in a
position where he could be cut from the Russians. On each
occasion he extricated himself, from an almost hopeless
situation, with the greatest ability. His march on Eylau was
a masterpiece of patience and resolution, as well as of resist-
ance to the temptation of a general action.
Marshal Kalkreuth, who acquired great glory by his
defence of Danzig, had seen much of war, and was best
known, before 1807, for his siege of Mayence in 1793.

THE
CHAPTER III.
THE THEATRE OF WAR.
HE theatre of the war to which most of the rest of this
work will be devoted, lies between the rivers Bug and
Vistula on one side, and the Niemen on the other. The
south-eastern boundary of this area may be taken as a line
joining Grodno to the point on the Bug where that river
ceased to be the northern frontier of Gallicia. The north-
western side abuts on the Baltic Sea. Within these
boundaries lay a country for the most part flat, marshy, and
thickly wooded-a country resembling, except in the last
respect, the broads of Suffolk and Norfolk. There are no
heights of any importance, and it is only in the north-
western corner, from Graudenz on the Vistula to Marien-
burg, and for a few miles to the east, towards Hohenstein,
that it is possible to describe the country as anything but an
undulating plain. Here the underlying rock of the Polish
plain crops out, and gives rise to hills which, in places, reach
an elevation of 500 to 700 feet above the sea, amongst which
are imbedded the lakes about Osterode, Pr. Holland, and
Mohrungen. The bulk of the military operations of 1807
occurred in the flat country farther east. Across this tract,
in a direction but slightly north of east, there extends, from
near the Vistula about Graudenz to the Niemen south of
Kowno, a broad belt of lakes and marshes of all sizes and
shapes. Individual lakes attain in places a length of 8 or
10 miles; chains of lakes with narrow strips of land between
THE THEATRE OF WAR.
49
them extend to much greater distances. Some of the lakes
are long and narrow, others of fantastic trace, with long,
finger-like bays protruding into the country in all directions.
The belt of lakes, roughly speaking, averages 25 miles in
breadth, and includes hundreds of sheets of water and marsh,
varying in size from the lakes above described to mere ponds,
which could only be shown on a very large scale map.
The forests, which in ancient times clothed the whole of
this country, had, in 1807, and even now have, only partially
been cleared. It was often, for a distance of many miles,
impossible to find an area sufficiently clear of continuous
forest to allow of the deployment of considerable forces.
The great forest of Johannisburg extended, almost con-
tinuously, for 45 miles north of the upper Narew, with a
breadth varying from 6 to 15 miles.
The principal waterways of this tract were the following:
The Vistula, rising in the Carpathian Mountains, is, even at
Warsaw, a large stream with a breadth of several hundred
yards. From Warsaw to a point some 20 miles below Thorn
(a distance of nearly 130 miles as the crow flies) the river
flows generally north-west between low banks, in a broad
marshy bed, studded with innumerable islands. At this point
it turns sharply to a direction slightly east of north, the
right bank begins to acquire some height and, in the
neighbourhood of Graudenz, rises to the dignity of a range
of hills. Some 30 miles south of the Gulf of Danzig, the
stream divides, the right branch flowing north-east and
falling into the Frisches-Haff, the great lagoon which stretches
from 20 miles east of Danzig to Koenigsberg. The left
branch flowing north nearly to the sea, again subdivides,
part of it falling into the western end of the Frisches-Haff,
the rest running west to Danzig, where it turns north into
the Gulf of Danzig. The river and the Frisches-Haff thus
separate from the main land the long, low, narrow strip
of land known as the Frische-Nehrung, in which a breach,
at Pillau towards its north-eastern extremity, affords an
E
50
NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN IN POLAND.
outlet to the sea for the lagoon and the waters which flow
into it.
The principal affluent on the right bank of the Vistula is
the Bug, which, after forming the northern boundary of
Gallicia, joins the Vistula 18 or 20 miles below Warsaw.
At Sierock, the Bug receives on its right bank another con-
siderable stream, the Narew, which, flowing from the western
frontier of Russia, as it was in 1806, passes Lomza, Nowo-
grod, Ostrolenka, and Pultusk. Both rivers are military
obstacles of importance, subject to heavy floods in wet
weather, fordable only in seasons of drought.* A short
way below Ostrolenka, the river Omulew reaches the Narew;
which again, a few miles above Pultusk, receives the Orezyc.
Both are small streams with a course of 40 or 50 miles from
the north-west. Close to its junction with the Vistula, the
Bug is joined by the Ukra, a stream of somewhat greater
importance which rises near Soldau, about 60 miles north.
The only other stream of the slightest importance which
reaches the right bank of the Vistula, in the theatre of war,
is the Drewenz, flowing from the Osterode lakes to the
Vistula, above Thorn.
The Pregel, in so far as it concerns the campaign, flows
west, past Wehlau, into the Frisches-Haff at Koenigsberg.
Two other rivers which played a great part in 1807 require
mention. The Passarge, originating in the lakes south-east
of Osterode, flows nearly due north to the Frisches-Haff near
Braunsberg. In its upper course it is of importance only
where it spreads out into lakes or marshes. Even in its
lower reaches it is not a very important stream, and, except
when in flood, is fordable in many places.
The Alle, starting not far from the source of the Passarge,
flows generally parallel to it at a distance of 8 or 9 miles,
till a point just north of Guttstadt; there it turns to the
* The united stream below Sierock is sometimes spoken of as the Narew,
sometimes as the Bug. The latter seems more correct, the Bug being the larger
stream, and it is adopted in this work.
THE THEATRE OF WAR.
51
north-east, and, flowing in a tortuous course past Heilsberg,
Bartenstein, and Schippenbeil, it joins the Pregel at Wehlau,
30 miles east of Koenigsberg. It is a more considerable
stream than the Passarge, and, even as high up as Heilsberg,
it is only fordable after a drought.
The tributaries of the rivers which have been described
were in no case of importance, from a military point of view,
in themselves; they became so only from their connexion
with the marshes, which they fed or partially drained.
The general features of this country were plains of sand,
or of mud in wet weather, intermixed with heaths, bogs,
forests, lakes, and morasses.
Across this area there passed no metalled road; the best
of the communications were mere banks of earth, not even
revetted except where their passage across marshes rendered
it impossible to maintain them without artificial support.
By the droughts of summer or the frosts of winter, these
so-called roads were hardened to a consistency which allowed
of the passage of artillery with as much ease as is ever
possible where unmetalled roads have to be used. When
soaked with rain, or dissolved by thaws, they became almost
impassable. Napoleon jokingly said that in Poland he had
discovered a new element-mud. In wet weather the slush
attained a depth to be measured in feet, not in inches. In
December, 1806, the infantry sank to their knees, often
further, in the soft roads; the horses to their hocks; the guns
to their axles: sometimes even, guns absolutely disappeared
in the clayey mire. Double and quadruple teams could not
drag them along as fast as the 1 miles an hour which the
infantry with infinite labour could cover.*
* The following references to the works of writers who took part in the
campaign, will serve to show the terrible condition of the communications in
open weather.
De Fezensac's account of his journey to make explanations to Napoleon on
behalf of Ney. He started on the 15th January in wet weather; his conveyance
broke down, and he had to go for miles at a footpace with wretched horses.
52
NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN IN POLAND.
The best of the roads were such as have been described,
the worst were mere tracks leading from one village to
another. The four principal roads between the Vistula and
the Pregel were-
(1) From Danzig to Warsaw by the right bank of the
Vistula;
(2) From Danzig to Koenigsberg by Dirschau, Elbing,
and Braunsberg, not far south of the Frisches-Haff;
(3) From Warsaw to Koenigsberg by Sierock, Pultusk,
Makow, Prasznitz, Willemburg, Bartenstein, Preussisch
Eylau, and Kreuzberg;
(4) The road from Pultusk to Ostrolenka, Lomza, and
thence towards St. Petersburg.
The more unfavourable portion of the theatre was
the southern half, inhabited by Poles. It was devoid
of large towns, sparsely populated, backward in every
respect. Farther north, the names of the villages and towns
indicate the German origin of the population. Large indus-
trial villages were comparatively frequent and there was a
general air of prosperity which was lacking in the country
of the Poles. "Old Prussia offers, compared with Poland,
the greatest triumph of civilisation over barbarism and of
light over darkness. On one side numerous industrial
wealthy towns, rich farms, and admirable cultivation; on
Then came frost on the 17th. He had to cross the Bug in a boat on the 18th,
as the bridge had been broken by the floating ice (pp. 134-135).
Bernadotte, writing of the operations towards Soldau in December, says,
"The roads were frightful; the artillery could not follow, and one marched all
day to cover three or four leagues" (7 to 10 miles) (Report on 1st Corps,
Arch. Hist.).
"The field on which we were about to fight was converted into a lake of
mud, where soldiers and horses could scarcely march " (Lannes' report on Pultusk,
Arch. Hist.).
"The country over which the army passed (25th December) was clayey and
marshy, the roads were frightful. Horsemen, infantry, and artillery could only
get over them in the face of almost insurmountable difficulties. It took two
hours to march a short league" (23 miles) (Davout, p. 132).
"We fought and marched in mud; we should have died of cold and misery
without movement " (Comeau, p. 288).
THE THEATRE OF WAR.
53
the other, paltry hamlets, huts side by side with a palace:
yet there is no difference in the soil. Customs, government,
religion, these are what constitute nations.'
The climate of this tract is inhospitable. The icy blasts,
which reach it from the frozen north, produce in winter a
climate almost arctic in its severity. In summer the heat
is great, for Europe, though of short duration. Hot days are
succeeded by damp cool nights, a condition of climate resulting
in the prevalence of fevers. The dampness of the country,
especially in the autumn and spring, its want of a well-
defined watershed, and the consequent frequency of marshes
and of sluggish streams, choked with the decaying débris of
the forests, render it unhealthy and malarious. Of every
196 sick in the French hospitals in 1807, as many as 105
were cases of fever.†
In connexion with military operations it is not so much
the terrain that is of importance in Poland as the climatic
and seasonal conditions. In summer the country is open,
* Jomini (Vie de Napoleon, ii. 354).
+ Daru quoted by Dumas, at p. 487, vol. xix.
+ The winter of 1806-7 was exceptional. Comparatively mild autumn
weather, alternating with frosts, lasted far later than usual. The following
account of the weather, during the campaign, is abstracted from the writings of
persons who went through it, chiefly from the correspondence of Napoleon.
"The weather, which had been magnificent during the month of October, and
the first part of November, (then) became horrible. It rained and snowed
incessantly. Provisions became very scarce; no more wine, hardly any beer,
and what there was exceedingly bad, muddy water, no bread, and quarters for
which we had to fight with the pigs and the cows" (Marbot, i. 240).
On the 18th November, 1806, no frost, sunshine every day, the roads too
heavy to allow the Emperor to travel, except in country conveyances. Duroc's
carriage overturned in the mud (Corr. 11,497).
Early in December, bright, dry, cold weather (Larrey, iii. 22).
15th December.-No frost, sunshine every day (Corr. 11,494).
17th December.-Thaw rendering roads very heavy (Corr. 11,497).
26th December.-Complete thaw for last two days (Rapp, p. 127, and others).
31st December.-Frost set in again (Larrey, iii. 22).
8th January.-Alternate snow and thaw (Corr. 11,584).
1st to 10th February.-Frost and snow (all authorities).
10th February.-Thaw set in (Larrey, iii. 61).
17th February.-Cold has ceased, and snow melted (Corr. 11,822).
54
NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN IN POLAND.
and practicable in all directions for all arms. The diffi-
culty in operations arises from the often oppressive heat.
In winter, when every lake, pond, marsh, and river is
locked in the embrace of severe frost, these features, as
obstacles, are obliterated. The only hindrances to progress
are the forests, the snow, and the severity of the cold.
In spring and autumn, rain swells the lakes and the rivers,
and the roads are almost impracticable for the passage of
wheeled traffic, owing to the sea of mud which covers them.*
Much of what has been said regarding the character of
the country beyond the Vistula applies equally to that
between the Oder and the Vistula.
Within the theatre of operations, when the French reached
Warsaw, there were still four fortresses in the possession of
Prussia.
1. Danzig, on the left bank of the Vistula near its mouth.
The strength of this place will be fully dealt with when the
siege is described.
2. Koenigsberg, at the mouth of the Pregel, the capital
18th February.-Rain and thaw. April weather (Corr. 11,823).
21st February.-Alternate frosts and thaw (Corr. 11,845).
26th February.-Loamy ground so slippery from thaw as to render cavalry
and artillery useless (Wilson, p. 246).
28th February.-Frosts and thaw alternately (Corr. 11,907).
17th March-Cold weather again. Two feet of snow in last three or four
days (Corr. 12,064).
2nd April.-Weather fine, but still cold. Three or four degrees of frost
(Corr. 12,263).
6th April.-Freezing hard (Corr. 12,322).
17th April.-Raining|(Corr. 12,394).
21st April.-Frost. January weather (Corr. 12,437).
2nd May.-Fine. Leaves coming out (Corr. 12,505).
16th May.-Weather like April in France (Corr. 12,593).
10th June.-Rain at night (Larrey, iii. 78).
14th June. Hot days, cool damp nights (Larrey, p. 84).
*"It has never yet," says Von der Goltz, "occurred to any one to write a
strategy and tactics for the different seasons of the year; and yet their influence
is certainly quite as great as that of terrain, which has often been treated so
longwindedly" (Nation in Arms, p. 327). The remark applies with special
force to Poland.
THE THEATRE OF WAR.
55
of old Prussia, a poorly fortified city but an immense depôt
of stores of all sorts.
3. Pillau, a fortified pentagon commanding the narrow
outlet from the Frisches-Haff to the Baltic.
4. Graudenz, a fort situated to the north of the town of
the same name, important as commanding a principal passage
of the Lower Vistula. It held out against the French
throughout the campaign. It was too small to be of great
value, and too much isolated. The siege was not worth
pressing with any great vigour, seeing that it was easy to
mask the place with a comparatively small force.
PART II.
THE FIRST CAMPAIGN-PULTUSK AND
GOLYMIN.
CHAPTER I.
THE PLAN OF CAMPAIGN AND THE PASSAGES OF THE
"JE
VISTULA AND BUG.
E n'ai jamais en un plan d'opérations," was a saying of
*
Napoleon. He did not imply that he had no general
scheme, no fixed goal towards which to direct his operations.
What he did mean was, that he made no pretence to de-
ciding beforehand precisely when and where he would meet
the enemy, and how he would dispose of him when met.
Whilst fixing his eye steadily on the end at which he had
decided to aim and laying down the earliest movements, he
recognised that, once the enemy was encountered, the further
direction of operations must depend on changing circum-
stances, from day to day and from hour to hour.
When he first arrived in Berlin he could, until the
fragments of the Prussian army had been destroyed, come to
no more definite decision than that he must, sooner or later,
encounter and defeat the Russians. On that point he was
certain, and he did not hesitate to proclaim it publicly to his
victorious army.t
As news of the surrender of Blücher and Weimar, the
capitulation of Magdeburg, the destruction of the other re-
mains of the Prussian army west of the Oder, and of the slow
advance of the Russian armies towards the Vistula came in,
he began to see his way more and more clearly. From the
* Nation in Arms, p. 152. † Corr. 11,093, dated 26th October, 1806.
60
NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN IN POLAND.
first, he had recognised the desirability of taking up his
quarters, for the winter, east of the Vistula.* By doing so
he would place himself in a position to open the campaign
next spring against the Russians without having to delay his
advance by the preliminary operation of forcing the passage
of a great river, the Vistula. He would cover completely
the operations for the subjugation of the Silesian fortresses,
he would support and secure the moral and material assist-
ance of the Poles, he would be able to cover the sieges of
Danzig, Colberg, and Stralsund, from which places he had to
fear a descent by sea upon his left flank and rear. Finally,
he would wrest from Prussia almost all the territory from
which she might hope to recruit her shattered army, leaving
her nothing but the Baltic provinces of Old Prussia. His
goal, for the present, was the establishment of cantonments
on and beyond the Vistula, with his advanced corps pushed
out far enough into Poland to leave him breathing space and
to afford sufficient room to enable him, in the event of his
being seriously attacked, to concentrate east of the Vistula,
for the defence of its line, without risk of a disaster. Should
he be able to attain that end, or even should he find himself
compelled to winter between the Vistula and the Oder, or
behind the latter river, he would still require a base secured
by the possession of the fortresses of the Oder in its whole
Should he winter beyond, or on the left bank of the
Vistula, the Oder would form a secondary base on which to
fall back, if necessary. Should he find progress beyond the
course.
*"It was desirable for the success of ulterior operations not to allow the
enemy to cross the Vistula; otherwise we should have been obliged to take can-
tonments in a bad position between the Vistula and the Oder, or else to recross
the Oder and winter in Prussia. That would have uncovered the operations in
Silesia, and have allowed the Prussians to recruit all the Poles who came under
our standards" (Savary, iii. 20).
“If I let the Russians advance I lost the support and the resources of Poland;
they might decide Austria, which only hesitated because they were so far off;
they would carry with them the whole Prussian nation which would feel the
necessity of doing everything it could to retrieve its disasters" (Jomini, Vie de
Napoleon, ii. 334).
THE PLAN OF CAMPAIGN.
61
Oder impossible, it would become his front line, with the
Elbe in support.
In the end of October and the beginning of November he
was uncertain as to the fate of the ruins of the Prussian
army of Jena; Magdeburg still held out against Ney;
Blücher and Weimar might yet escape to establish, with
their reorganised troops, a new army beyond the Vistula.
He had little information as to the situation and movements
of the advancing Russians. He knew not whether he would
have to meet them on a battlefield not far east of the Oder or
whether they were still beyond the Russian frontier, farther
to the east of the Vistula than he was to the west.
On the 5th November he writes fully to Davout, whom
he had promptly sent eastwards from Berlin. He directs the
marshal to advance on Driesen and Meseritz, beyond the
Oder, and to scour the country in advance with 2500
dragoons under Beaumont. On no account was his infantry
to pass Driesen and Meseritz without further orders. As far
as the Emperor's information at present went, it was im-
probable the Russians could reach Warsaw for another
fortnight. On Davout's right, Jerome, with 24,000 men, was
attempting the capture of Glogau; if he succeeded he would
march on Custrin, which had pusillanimously capitulated
and was temporarily garrisoned by 2000 Baden troops. If
Weimar surrendered to Soult, Bernadotte, and Murat, they,
with Lannes from Stettin, would be available to support
Davout's advance. When Magdeburg should fall before Ney,
he also would be in hand.*
All was still uncertain as regards the extent of the
advance. Two days later the clouds began to lift. Blücher
and Weimar had surrendered on the 7th; Magdeburg was on
the point of capitulation, and actually fell next day. It
seemed that Bennigsen, with the first Russian army, had not
more than 50,000 men, and that it was very improbable they
could all reach the Vistula before the 20th at the earliest.
* Napoleon to Davout, dated Berlin, 5th November, 1806 (Corr. 11,176).
62
NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN IN POLAND.
*
Davout was, therefore, to reach Posen on the 9th, when
Augereau would have arrived in support at Driesen. At
Posen he was to construct enormous bakeries for the supply
of the army which would concentrate on it. Nevertheless,
Davout was to avoid engaging the Russians should they,
perchance, have arrived on the Vistula. If they had not
been brought to a halt by the result of the operations against
the Prussians, the Emperor proposed, for the present, to halt
at Posen, which he thought it beyond the limits of possibility
for Bennigsen to attack before the 18th. Should the Russians
be further delayed, the Emperor's plans might be changed.
At the same time, Chasseloup was directed to fortify Stettin
against a surprise, as a support to the left of the base on the
Oder,† and numerous orders for the collection of ammunition
and supplies of all sorts at Posen were issued. For the
protection of his left rear against the sea, precautions were
also taken. To Louis Buonaparte his brother had no inten-
tion of trusting the command in this direction. On the 5th
November, the Emperor wrote to Mortier, in Hanover, that
Louis' health would probably necessitate his return to
Holland.§ On the 11th, Mortier was appointed to the
command on Louis' departure. The ill health of the latter
was, perhaps, diplomatic only. The army under Mortier was
ordered to seize Hamburg, and confiscate all the great stores
of English merchandise there.||
It soon became abundantly clear that no trouble to the
west of the Vistula was likely to arise from a Russian
advance in the winter. Davout had encountered practically
no opposition as far as Posen, his cavalry was well out in
front of him, meeting with no serious resistance.
The occupation of Warsaw, at any rate, was of vital
* Corr. 11,196 and 11,199, both to Davout, dated Berlin, 7th November,
1806.
† Corr. 11,178, dated 5th November, 1806.
Corr. 11,187 to 11,190, dated 5th November, 1806.
§ Corr. 11,175, dated 5th November, 1806.
Corr. 11,267, dated 16th November, 1806.
:
THE PLAN OF CAMPAIGN.
63
importance as assuring the support of the Poles. This
political consideration was of paramount importance, and
turned the balance in favour of an advance on the Upper
Vistula. From a purely military point of view the Emperor
would possibly have preferred to operate on the angle of the
river about Thorn, spreading his cantonments eastward, with
his flanks resting on the Vistula above and below Thorn. To
the Lower Vistula, as a base, there was the objection that his
communications would be more open to a raid from Pomerania
than they would be farther south. It is true they were more
exposed to Austria if he advanced on the southern line; but
then, if Austria entered the arena, the whole advance must
have been abandoned until she had been annihilated.
The Emperor, on these considerations, decided to advance,
at least as far as the line of the Vistula from Warsaw to
Thorn. The conduct of the Russians, when he reached War-
saw, would show whether it was safe to push on beyond the
great river.
The advance was to be in echelons with Davout and
Murat on the right in front. As those marshals progressed
beyond the re-entrant angle of the Vistula below Thorn,
their communications would be exposed to enterprise from
the river. To protect them on this side, the corps of Lannes,
Augereau, Soult, Bessières, Ney, and Bernadotte would move
in succession on Thorn, the three first-named then turning to
their right up the left bank of the river towards Warsaw.
In this way, any attempt by the enemy, across the river be-
tween Thorn and Warsaw, against the communications of one
corps, would be taken in flank by the corps following. When
Davout and Murat arrived in Warsaw, the corps of Lannes,
Augereau, and Soult would be along the river below it, within
call, whilst Bessières, Ney, and Bernadotte would be at, or
approaching, Thorn. Thorn and Warsaw would be strongly
held, when taken, as the extremities of the advanced base.
To cover the right flank of Murat and Davout, the corps
of Jerome was available, until the proximity of the Austrian
64
NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN IN POLAND.
frontier, as it turned northwards to the Bug, should form a
protection, so long as Austria was quiet. Murat, who was to
command the right wing of the army, would be able, should
the Russians show signs of standing to fight at, or in front of,
Warsaw, to dispose of 80,000 men, a force far superior to any
Bennigsen was likely to have.*
On the 24th November, the Emperor left Berlin, on the
25th he was at Custrin. He was, at this time, carrying on
negotiations with the King of Prussia for an armistice, the
idea of which he had refused to entertain until he had
gathered in all the fruits of his victories at Jena and
Auerstadt. The terms which he now offered were such as
Prussia could not possibly accept, unless she were prepared
to cut herself loose from the Russian alliance and to throw
herself on the mercy of the French. They were-
(1) The Prussian army to be withdrawn behind the
Vistula ;
(2) The French to occupy the right bank of the Vistula,
* Corr. 11,302, to Murat, dated 24th November, 1806. In this letter the
Emperor shows Murat the strength of his wing thus :—
1st Cavalry Reserve (Murat)—
Beaumont's and Klein's dragoons
Becker's dragoons
Nansouty's cavalry
Milhaud's cavalry
4800
1200
2400
800
Total
9200
...
Infantry.
7th Corps (Davout)
22,000
5th Corps (Lannes)
16,000
Cavalry.
1200
1200
:
7th Corps (Augereau)
16,000
1200
Part of 9th Corps (Jerome)
12,000
2000
...
Totals
...
66,000
5200
Grand totals
...
66,000 infantry, and 14,400 cavalry = 80,400 men.
The Russians could not, Napoleon thought, have more than 30,000 or 40,000
men at Warsaw. The remaining French forces might be expected to be as
follows:-
Ney at Posen on 24th. Soult at Frankfort on 25th. Sahuc's cavalry at
Posen on the 27th. Lasalle's on the 20th. Grouchy's on the 29th. Bernadotte
was still behind.
THE PLAN OF CAMPAIGN.
65
from the Austrian frontier to the mouth of the Bug, as well
as Thorn, Graudenz, Danzig, Colberg, Lenczyca, the Silesian
fortresses of Glogau and Breslau, and all Silesia on the left
bank of the Oder;
(3) The rest of East Prussia, and Prussian Poland to be
unoccupied by either party;
(4) The King of Prussia to obtain the withdrawal of all
Russian troops from his territories during the suspension of
arms.
The last condition it was beyond the power of the King to
comply with; the others would have the effect of leaving
Napoleon master of the situation on the recommencement of
hostilities, and he would naturally protract peace negotiations
till the season was suitable for his advance. He would then
be able, holding all the passages of the Vistula, to place his
army in Poland long before the Russians could reach it, and
Prussia would, meanwhile, have had little territory from
which to recruit a fresh army.
On the 27th November,* Napoleon informed Talleyrand
that the King had, as he must have expected, refused to
ratify the armistice. The period of negotiation had been
utilised by Napoleon in vigorously pressing his advance.
On the 10th November, Davout was at Posen, where he
had arrived the day before; Lannes was at Schneidmühl on
his left, on the Stettin-Bromberg road; Augereau was
at Custrin; Jerome, leaving 6000 Wurtemburg troops to
besiege Glogau,† was moving towards Kalisch on Davout's
right.
On the 18th, Davout had reached Sempolno, nearly half
way from Posen to Warsaw, and Nansouty's cavalry was as
far forward as Konin on the Wartha. Cavalry pushed out in
all directions, especially towards Bromberg and Thorn, had
* Corr. 11,311, dated Meseritz, 27th November, 1806.
† Glogau surrendered on the 2nd December, and Vandamme, with the
Wurtemburg division, moved to the siege of Breslau, where he was joined by
Jerome from Kalisch, with the Bavarian division. Breslau did not surrender
till the 7th January.
F
66
NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN IN POLAND.
forced the small bodies of Prussians in front of them to fall
back towards the Vistula. Lannes was before Thorn, into
which Lestocq, with the Prussians, had retired, after partially
burning the pile bridge. Augereau was at Bromberg. Davout's
left was, therefore, well protected. Lannes had, however, been
unable to induce the surrender of either Graudenz or Thorn.
Jerome with part of his corps was at Kalisch. Ney and
Soult were in second line, Bernadotte still marching, east of
the Elbe, on Berlin.
On the 24th November, as Davout and Murat continued
their advance on Warsaw, Lannes, who had remained till
then in front of Thorn, commenced his movement up the
Vistula, protecting their left. The small fort of Lenczyca,
surrounded by marshes, about equi-distant from Thorn and
Warsaw, and about half as far from the river as it was from
either place, was evacuated by the Prussians and occupied
by Davout. It was at once set in order as a great advanced
magazine, immense quantities of stores and ammunition being
collected in it.
The first Russian cavalry were met and driven back by
Murat at Blonie. On the evening of the 28th November, he
entered Warsaw as the Russians passed the Vistula to the
suburb of Praga on the right bank, burning the bridge
after crossing. Even now, Napoleon could hardly believe that
Bennigsen would leave him, uncontested, the passage at
Warsaw. He wrote to Murat, on the 1st December,* "If
the enemy commits the folly of evacuating Praga, seize the
faubourg, and construct a strong bridge head." On the 30th,
Davout arrived with Morand's division and part of Gudin's,
the rest of the infantry being between Blonie and Warsaw,
the light cavalry spread along the left bank of the Vistula
down to a point opposite the mouth of the Bug.
Lannes was now on the Bszura at Lowicz and Sochaczew.
Augereau, from the mouth of that river to Wroclawik, above
Thorn, touching, with his right, Lannes' left at Sochaczew.
* Corr. 11,332, dated Posen, 1st December, 1806.
THE PLAN OF CAMPAIGN.
67
His light cavalry, on the left, waiting for the arrival of Ney,
manoeuvered towards Bromberg.
On the 2nd December, the anniversary of the Imperial
coronation and of Austerlitz, Napoleon issued to his troops
one of the stirring proclamations with which he was wont to
announce the opening of a new campaign.* On the present
occasion there was special need for a strong appeal to the
enthusiasm and devotion of his soldiers who, in the past
fifteen months, had served the Emperor so well. They had
begun to feel the desire for a period of rest before renewing
their exertions; they looked with repugnance on the idea of
at once entering on a fresh campaign in the wilds of Poland,
in the midst of mud and snow. They had already learnt
something of the terrors of Polish weather in their march
from Berlin, and there was much grumbling at the idea of
going beyond the Vistula.†
It is now time to examine the situation of the Russian
armies and the small Prussian corps, with the outposts of
which alone the French had so far come into collision.
On the 1st December began the Russian retreat from the
* Here is the proclamation: "Soldiers! A year has to-day passed since you
were, at this very hour, on the memorable field of Austerlitz. The Russians,
fleeing in terror, or surrounded, were yielding their arms to their conquerors.
Next day they sent overtures, deceitful overtures, of peace. Scarce had they,
thanks to a perhaps culpable generosity, escaped from the disasters of the third
coalition, when they entered upon a fourth. But their ally, on whose tactics
they founded their chief hopes, is now no more. His strong places; his capital;
his magazines; 280 of his standards; 700 of his guns; 5 of his great fortresses.
are all in our hands. The Oder, the Wartha, the deserts of Poland, the rigours
of the season, have all failed to arrest for an instant your advance; you have
braved all, surmounted all, everything has filed at your approach. Soldiers! we
shall not lay aside our arms until a general peace has affirmed and assured the
power of our allies, and restored to our commerce its liberty and its colonies.
We have conquered on the Elbe and the Oder, at Pondicherry, and in our
Indian colonies; at the Cape of Good Hope, and in the Spanish colonies..
Who can give the Russians the hope of balancing destiny? Who can authorise
them to thwart such great designs? Are not they still, as we are, the soldiers
of Austerlitz?" (Corr. 11,352).
+"Our soldiers were less satisfied; they showed a lively repugnance to
cross the Vistula. Misery, the winter, the bad weather, had inspired them with.
an extreme aversion for this country" (Rapp, 118).
68
NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN IN POLAND.
Vistula before the French threatening a passage, not only at
Warsaw, but also lower down at Wroclawik and Zakroczin.
The 6th division (Sedmaratzki) fell back, from Praga, over the
Narew to Sierock. The 4th division retired, between the 2nd
and 4th December, from Pultusk to Ostrolenka with Bennigsen's
headquarters. The 2nd division from Plonsk to Rozan, the
3rd from Prasznitz to a post midway between Makow and
Ostrolenka. The advanced guard of Barclay de Tolly retired
from Plock to Novemiasto, behind the Sonna. Only a few
hundred cossacks remained on the Vistula.* The Prussians
under Lestocq had been guarding the line of the Lower
Vistula from Thorn, far too long a line for their weak force.
Lestocq, nevertheless, protested against Bennigsen's orders
for his retreat.† He was compelled to obey, especially as the
retirement of Bennigsen would expose his left flank. On
the 5th December, his headquarters were at Gollub, on the
6th at Strasburg. The detachments lower down fell back on
Deutsch Eylau, Bischofswerder, and Löbau.‡
On the 2nd December, Praga was occupied by a French
regiment. On the 3rd, Milhaud's light cavalry passed the
Vistula and proceeded towards the Bug. Between the 3rd
and 8th, Davout's three divisions crossed the Vistula and
occupied the small triangle between it, the Bug, and the
Austrian frontier, which left the Bug a few miles above
Sierock and met the Vistula a short way above Warsaw.
Davout's headquarters were at Jablona, his outposts stretched
along the left bank of the Bug from its mouth to the Austrian
frontier.
As long as Austria was neutral, this frontier now safe-
guarded Davout's right; Jerome's corps could devote itself to
the Silesian sieges. Lannes' corps replaced Davout in Warsaw
and Praga. Its headquarters were in Warsaw on the 5th
December.
Immense energy was being displayed in repairing the
bridge and in constructing redoubts, so as to make of Praga a
† Ibid., iii. 67.
* Hoepfner, iii. 69.
‡ Ibid., iii. 70.
PASSAGE OF THE VISTULA.
69
powerful entrenched camp and bridge head.* This work was
of the utmost importance as supporting the right of the new
base on the Vistula, and as a cover to a retreat, should that
be necessary.
Whilst Murat and Davout were completing the passage
of the Vistula on the extreme right, Ney had arrived on the
left of the line, in front of Thorn, now held only by a
rearguard left by Lestocq.
On the evening of the 6th December, a few French
companies, commanded by Colonel Savary, passed the river
in boats which had been collected under shelter of the islands.
After a little sharp fighting, the Prussians, whose strength
was small, were driven out of the town. More French troops
passing over, a battalion and two squadrons followed the
Prussian rear guard as far as Gollub. Having forced them
to continue their retreat, the French returned to Thorn, and
the repair of the bridge was at once taken in hand, though
not, apparently, with so much energy as was desirable, for it
was not completed till the 15th December.†
As Warsaw was required for a support to the right of the
base on the Upper Vistula, so Thorn was required for the
left. The old fortifications were ordered to be restored, in
order to make of the place a bridge head covering the
passage.‡
To support Ney, Bessières, with the second cavalry
reserve, passed at Thorn.
Bennigsen had ordered the retreat from the Vistula with
a view to uniting with the 2nd Army under Buxhowden
* Dumas, xvii. 111, 112.
† De Fezensac (p. 128) gives this date, mentioning that even on the 13th
troops had still to cross in boats. The wooden bridge had been burnt, and its
restoration was no easy matter.
Chasseloup was instructed to take in hand the fortification of the bridge
head at Thorn; but first he was to attend to Praga, where an intrenched camp,
large enough for 40,000 men, was required. He was also to submit a plan for
fortifying one of the islands at the mouth of the Bug. Another tête de pont
was required on the Bug, at the mouth of the Ukra (Corr. 11,463, dated 13th
December, 1806).
70
NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN IN POLAND.
(who, in the beginning of December, had only just passed
the Russian frontier,* and could not arrive on the Vistula
before the 15th) before attempting to oppose seriously the
French advance. Buxhowden, learning the retreat of the
1st Army, halted his own nearly thirty miles east of Ostro-
lenka, the headquarters of Bennigsen. The two commanders
were vieing with one another for the chief command. Both
saw it was impossible for Marshal Kamenskoi, rapidly losing
his reason, to retain his position long, and, it is to be feared,
their jealousy may have influenced their actions. No sooner,†
however, had Bennigsen retreated than he perceived his
mistake in allowing the French, unchallenged, to pass the
Vistula. No doubt he could not have prevented their
*The Russian western frontier in 1806 was very different from what it now
is. Starting from the Baltic some 10 miles north of Memel, it ran south-east to
the Niemen (or Memel) river, 25 miles east of Tilsit. Thence it ran east along
the river for about 60 miles. From this point it ran nearly due south, following
the Niemen nearly to its source, and thence in the same direction, to the
Bug and the Austrian frontier. This, the nearest point on the frontier to
Warsaw, and to the Vistula, was 90 miles east of that city.
† Dumas (xiv., 425-429) gives a note, furnished to him by Bennigsen,
on the latter's motives for not defending the line of the Vistula. After pointing
out the inferiority of his numbers, he rightly remarks that he would have
committed an unpardonable fault in attempting to defend the long line of the
river above Thorn. If he attempted to defend Thorn and Warsaw, the French
could cross between them, thus cutting him in two. The argument loses its
force when we consider Bennigsen's subsequent orders to Lestocq to retake
Thorn after its occupation by Ney.
A statement in the Arch. Hist. gives the positions of the French army on
the 5th December.
Imperial Guard, Posen.
Bernadotte 1st Corps.
Davout... 3rd Corps.
...
Soult 4th Corps.
Lannes 5th Corps.
Ney
...
6th Corps.
Augereau 7th Corps.
Reserve Cavalry—
Reserve of Grenadiers (Oudinot), Berlin.
Marching on Posen, due there on 7th.
Warsaw and Blonie. Light Cavalry on left bank of
Vistula from Warsaw to the Bszura.
About Posen.
Sochaczew, Lowicz, and along the Vistula below
the mouth of the Bszura.
Opposite Thorn, and at Bromberg, etc.
In front of Blonie. Light Cavalry opposite Thorn,
under orders to rejoin the corps.
Lasalle marching on Warsaw.
Milhaud on right bank of Vistula towards the lower Bug.
PASSAGE OF THE VISTULA.
71
passage; but he might, at least, have, for the moment,
delayed their acquisition of the two important têtes de pont
of Praga and Thorn. He decided again to advance. The
recovery of Praga was hopeless; but he could hope to check
Napoleon at the Bug, which had not yet been passed, and
he might still possibly recover Thorn, where the French had
shown less strength. Whilst he, with the main body of his
army, again advanced to Pultusk, he sent a hurried order
to Lestocq to attempt the re-occupation of Thorn. It was
too late. When Lestocq arrived before the place, which
he had evacuated only two days before, he found Ney's force
too strong for him. He was forced to retreat again to Stras-
burg, his rearguard being roughly handled by Ney, and to
take up a position towards Lautenburg, on the left bank of
the Drewenz.
Bennigsen's fresh forward movement was not more
successful; for he was shortly informed of the further
progress of the French, now to be narrated. Murat's orders
were, when he had passed the Vistula at Warsaw, to
endeavour also to pass the Bug.* This operation was
undertaken by Davout, on the 10th December, with Gauthier's
brigade of Morand's division. The points selected for the
passage were Okunin, about two miles above Nowydwor, and
Nowydwor itself, the principal passage to be at the former.
At 5.30 a.m. on the 10th, in the dark, Gauthier sent
across the river at Okunin, by boat, ninety men, with orders
to take post silently one hundred paces from the river on
the farther side. They were not to fire, unless attacked.
Wattier concentrating on Kutno.
Nansouty, Wiskitki, etc.
D'Hautpoult, Obermulki.
Klein, Mosna, etc.
Grouchy, near Posen.
Beaumont near Willanow.
Sahuc marching on Sempolno.
Becker in front of Blonie.
Several of the cavalry positions are not marked on the maps.
* Corr. 11,332, dated 1st December, 1806, to Murat.
72
NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN IN POLAND.
Effecting the passage undiscovered, they were quickly sup-
ported by more troops, and, at 7 a.m., a sharp fusillade was
opened by the French at Gora, higher up the river, in order
to induce the belief of a passage being intended there. There
was no such intention, and the action was confined to fire
across the river.
As the force opposite Okunin gathered strength, a recon-
naissance was pushed forward towards Pomiechowo, a village
on the right bank of the Ukra, about four thousand paces
north of the point of passage.
Simultaneously, another force had crossed opposite
Nowydwor, landing in safety. The Russians in Modlin,
near this landing-place, were forced to fall back on Pomie-
chowo, their retreat to which was threatened by the French
troops from the Okunin crossing. They passed the Ukra,
under fire from this force, by the Pomiechowo bridge.
Davout at once hurried on the construction of a bridge
at Okunin, and of a tête de pont on the opposite bank. By
evening he was firmly posted, with Morand's division, on
the right bank, and had a defensible work, covering his
bridge, well flanked, owing to the re-entrant angle of the
river, by batteries on the left bank, above and below it.
On the 12th, Augereau's advanced guard, passing the
Vistula, without opposition, at Zakroczin, was able to pro-
tect the construction of a bridge head between Zakroczin
and Utrata.
Bennigsen, hoping that by seizing Modlin on the 11th,
when Augereau was still beyond the Vistula, he might force
the French back across the Bug, possibly even over the Vistula,
sent a regiment of jägers and one of hussars across the Ukra
at Pomiechowo, at 7 a.m. This force drove the French 85th
regiment from Pomiechowo, and occupied a position between
that village and Koszewo. Davout, reinforcing the 85th
with the 25th, again attacked. By 2 p.m., after a sharp
combat, the Russians were compelled to re-cross the Ukra.
Informed of Augereau's crossing, and aware that Soult
PASSAGE OF THE VISTULA.
73
was approaching the Vistula on Augereau's left, Bennigsen,
once more abandoning his forward movement, determined to
defend the line of the Ukra.
Osterman Tolstoi's division (the 2nd) was at Nasielsk on
the evening of the 11th. On the 13th, he was at Borkowo,
on the Ukra, leaving Davout, unmolested, to strengthen his
position opposite Okunin.
*
Soult marched from Posen on the 13th in echelons of
divisions to Wrocklavik, and was preparing to cross there,
with such boats as he could collect, when he received orders †
to march up the river, to cross as near as possible to the
mouth of the Bszura, and march on Plonsk to join Augereau.
Selecting as his point of passage the re-entrant angle near
Dobrzyckow, he crossed unopposed there ‡ with St. Hilaire's
and Legrand's divisions, whilst Leval's passed at Plock, some
distance lower.
Bernadotte's corps, arriving at Posen only on the 8th
December, was not at Thorn till the 20th.
On the 13th December, Napoleon dictated, at Posen,§ the
following orders :-
Bessières, with the 2nd cavalry reserve from Thorn, to
advance to the right on Biezun, Rypin, and Soldau. Ney's
light cavalry on Strasburg. Bessières would thus find him-
self midway between Thorn and Pultusk, in a position
definitely to ascertain the Russian movements.
Soult, passing the Vistula on the 16th at Wrocklavik, to
join Bessières at Lipno. When the junction was effected,
Soult's light cavalry would move to the right on Plonsk, to
facilitate the passage of Augereau at Zakroczin, of Wattier
at Wyszogorod, and of Davout at Nowydwor. Bessières'
objects were: (a) to sweep the plain, and join Soult; (b) to
push the enemy over the Ukra; (c) to reconnoitre towards
Pultusk and Willemburg; (d) to compel the Prussians to
retreat.
* Hoepfner, iii. 81.
Ibid., xvii. 116.
† Dumas, xvii. 115.
§ Corr. 11,458.
74
NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN IN POLAND.
Leval (Soult's corps), crossing at Thorn in support of
Bessières, was to be at Lipno on the 17th. St. Hilaire,
followed by Legrand (both of Soult's corps), to pass at
Wrocklavik on the 16th. Thus, on the 18th, Soult would
be, with his three divisions, across the Vistula, his right at
Dobrzyckow, his left at Rypin. Ney, Bernadotte, and Lannes
in second line. Ney to make for Strasburg, his place at
Thorn being taken by Bernadotte and the Guard who would
arrive there on the 18th. For the present no further move-
ments could be definitely indicated, but, if the enemy did
not mean to make a stand, infantry would be useless for his
pursuit.
Scarcely had Napoleon passed these orders, when he
received a despatch from Murat, dated midnight of the
10th December, describing the passage of the Bug, and
asserting that the enemy had evacuated the left bank of the
Narew. This changed his views, and induced him to believe
the enemy was in full retreat. He at once issued fresh
orders.* Murat was directed in pursuit with all his avail-
able cavalry (about 30,000 men), including that of Davout,
Augereau, and Lannes, to link himself to Bessières towards
Biezun, to endeavour to interrupt the road from Pultusk
to Koenigsberg, and to harass the enemy's rearguard to the
utmost. With this great cavalry force, Murat would have
such a superiority of that arm that he would be master of
the situation, and could accept or refuse battle, as might
seem best in the circumstances of the moment. Meanwhile,
the infantry would secure as much rest as possible. Davout
to occupy Sierock, and, possibly, send one division to Pultusk.
Augereau to halt at Zackroczin and Wyszogorod, drawing
supplies from Plonsk and Blonie. Soult towards Plonsk.
Lannes to concentrate at Warsaw. Napoleon had himself
intended going to Thorn, but the reported retreat had changed
his views, and he was bound for Warsaw.
To Ney he wrote that his infantry would be useless for
* Corr. 11,462, dated 13th December, 1806.
PASSAGE OF THE VISTULA.
75
the pursuit, and he could protect his left with his light
cavalry.*
It was time for the Emperor to be at the front. He left
Posen on the 16th. The roads were so bad that he had to
travel in a country conveyance, and Duroc, overturned in his
carriage, broke his collar-bone.† Late at night on the 18th,
the Emperor reached Warsaw, where, notwithstanding the
hour, there was the wildest enthusiasm amongst the Poles.
Next day, he was besieged with petitions and deputations
seeking the reconstitution of the Polish kingdom. He
replied to them as he had replied from Berlin. His one
desire, as well as that of his soldiers, at this time, was to be
allowed peaceably to occupy cantonments for the remainder
of the cold season; but it was, at the same time, necessary to
gain space and drive the Russians from his front. He had
discovered the inaccuracy of Murat's report as to the general
retreat of the enemy, and had once more modified his orders,
thus-
Ney to move on Gollub with advanced guard at Rypin,
light cavalry towards Strasburg and Culm.§ Leval to occupy
Thorn between the departure of Ney and the arrival of
Bernadotte; then to join his own corps and support Ney at
Gollub. Bernadotte to arrive at Thorn, and await orders
there, after relieving Leval on the evening of the 17th. T
Soult to march between the Vistula and Biezun, so as to
* Corr. 11,465, dated 13th December, 1806.
† Corr. 11,497. 43rd bulletin.
‡
"It is time to take up our winter quarters which can only be done after
we have driven off the Russians" (Corr. 11,501, to Davout, dated, Warsaw, 19th
December, 1806). To Clarke he wrote from Lowicz, on his way to Warsaw, that
the armies were facing each other, the French on the left, the Russians on the
right bank of the Narew, and that it was possible that in a week there would be
a battle which would make an end of the affair" (Corr. 11,500).
"Not wishing to let the enemy shut us in on the Vistula, and feeling, on
the contrary, the necessity to give ourselves a broader sphere in front of Warsaw
and Thorn, I at once took the offensive" (Jomini, Vie de Napoleon, ii. 339).
§ Berthier to Ney, 15th December, 1806.
Berthier to Leval, 15th December.
T¶ Berthier to Bernadotte, 15th December.
76
NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN IN POLAND.
reach Plonsk on Ney's right.* Bessières, with his cavalry,
to drive the enemy on Soldau, and to send parties along the
Ukra and towards Plonsk, to meet the cavalry of Augereau.
Murat to cover Ney's advance.† Further orders were sent
to Bernadotte, on the 17th, to leave one division at Thorn,
and, with the other two, to support Ney and Bessières,
who would be subordinate to him as the senior marshal.‡
Augereau was ordered to be at Plonsk on the 22nd with
Milhaud from the cavalry reserve.§ Davout to pass all his
corps, except one regiment, to the right bank of the Bug.l
Murat also to send over Lasalle, Klein, Nansouty, and
Beaumont.T Lannes to move from Warsaw to the left bank
of the Bug towards Jablona and Zegrz, and the Guard to take
his place at Warsaw,** which would be defended by Poles.††
All was now ready for the French advance.
As for the Russian positions, Marshal Kamenskoi had,
at last, joined his armies on the 21st December at Pultusk.
Old and worn out in body and mind as he was, he was yet
all for a forward movement towards the Ukra in support
of the troops there. Gallitzin, with an infantry regiment,
2 cavalry regiments and 18 guns, was sent from Pultusk to
Glubowo, 6 miles north-east of Novemiasto, to support the
3rd division; Sedmaratzki, with the 6th division, was
ordered to advance to Zbroski; Buxhowden's 5th and 7th
divisions to march from Ostrolenka on Novemiasto, whilst
his 8th and 14th divisions marched on Pultusk.‡‡
*Berthier to Soult, 15th December.
↑ Berthier to Bessières, 15th December.
The despatches in this and the
four preceding notes are printed in full in Dumas, xvii., "Pièces justificatives."
Berthier to Bessières, 17th December.
§ Berthier to Augereau, 21st December.
Berthier to Davout, 22nd December.
¶ Berthier to Murat, 22nd December.
** Berthier to Lefebvre, 22nd December, and Berthier to Lannes, 23rd
December.
++ Berthier to Gouvion, governor of Warsaw, 23rd December. This, and the
despatches quoted in the preceding five notes, are quoted in Dumas, xvii., "Pieces
justificatives."
‡‡ Hopfner, iii. 84.
PASSAGE OF THE VISTULA.
77
Barclay de Tolly was, with 6 battalions, 1 hussar and 1
cossack regiment, and 6 guns, on the Ukra about Kolozomb
and Sochoczin.
Dorochow, with 3 battalions, 1 cavalry, 1 cossack regi-
ment, and 6 guns, part of the 2nd and 4th divisions, at
Borkowo.
Osterman, with the rest of the 2nd division, stood from
Borkowo on the Ukra to the Narew.
Bagavout, with 3 battalions, one regiment of cossacks,
and one gun, was at Zegrz, supported in rear by another
battalion and a regiment of cossacks.
Litow, with two infantry regiments, supported Barclay
and Dorochow.
Sacken, at Srenszk, stretched a hand to the Prussians,
whose left was there and right at Lautenburg." *
* Hæpfner, iii. 82, 83.
CHAPTER II.
PASSAGE OF THE UKRA, AND OPERATIONS OF THE 24TH
AND 25TH DECEMBER.
THE
HE Ukra falls into the Bug a short way above the
French bridge at Okunin. At its mouth it branches
right and left, forming a triangular island which is divided
into two unequal portions by a channel. Davout had
already crossed the right branch of the river, and occupied
the island up to the channel. During the night of the 20th
December, he seized the rest of the island, expelling the
Russian detachment which occupied the part beyond the
channel. There thus remained only one branch of the Ukra
for him to pass.
On the morning of the 23rd, Napoleon proceeded to
reconnoitre the position for the crossing which he proposed.
Mounting by a ladder on to the roof of a cottage on the
island, he soon decided on his plan, and dictated, on the
spot, the necessary orders.*
From opposite Pomiechowo on the Ukra, to Czarnowo on
the Bug, there runs a bank above flood-level of the rivers.
Between this bank and the island occupied by Davout, the
ground, like the island itself, is low, swampy, partially
wooded, and liable to floods. From the left branch of the
Ukra, across the broadest part of the low ground to the bank,
is a distance of some 2500 yards. On and below the bank was
* For this account of the passage of the Ukra, compare Hopfner, iii.
88-94; Dumas, xvii. 135-147; Davout, 115–127.
PASSAGE OF THE UKRA.
79
*
posted Osterman Tolstoi's force of 9 battalions, 2 squadrons, 1
regiment of cossacks, 14 field guns, 6 light guns. Davout
had Morand's division in the island, Friant's near Pomie-
chowo, Gudin's at the Okunin bridge. Napoleon had decided
on a night attack, and his orders were consequently given in
great detail, and with the utmost care.† They were executed
with wonderful exactitude by Davout's corps, perhaps the
best in the army.
At 7 p.m. Morand's division was formed, with its ad-
vanced portion in three columns in the island, as far as
possible from the enemy. Each of these leading columns
had a strength of one battalion. A company of voltigeurs
was detached from each column as escort to the guns which
were, under cover of the voltigeurs' fire, able to take position
and open a fire of grape across the left branch of the river,
on the Russians in the low ground. The river was then
passed by the voltigeurs in boats brought up from the Bug,
and three bridges, one at either extremity, and one in the
centre of the branch, were constructed, the work being pro-
tected by the troops which had passed in boats. As the
bridges were completed, the rest of the leading columns
crossed and advanced into the low ground. Behind them
came a regiment (the 17th) of light infantry and 3 squadrons
of cavalry. Behind these the rest of Morand's division.
Petit, with a detachment of Gudin's division, crossed the
upper bridge and pushed up the left bank of the river. To
support his frontal attack on the Russian right, 6 guns
enfiladed it from Pomiechowo. To alarm the enemy with the
idea of a passage at Pomiechowo, a quantity of damp straw
had been lighted in the bed of the river in that direction,
creating a dense smoke. Cavalry had also been sent up the
right bank to raise apprehensions, as well as to link Davout's
corps to Augereau's. A detachment of 50 men, under Perrin,
crossed 100 paces above the island, and helped to protect
* Plotho, p. 16.
+ For the orders in full, see Dumas, xvii. 136–138.
1
80
NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN IN POLAND.
Petit's left. Finally, 2 guns and 30 picked marksmen,
moving up the right bank, slightly in advance of Perrin,
flanked with their fire any attempt to attack his or Petit's
front on the left bank.
No great difficulty was found in expelling the Russians
from the low ground, and Morand advanced against the left
of the main position in echelons by his right.
The 17th Regiment, in advance of Morand's main body,
hurried forward, with more valour than wisdom, to the
attack of Czarnowo. The fury of its onslaught, for the
moment, staggered the defenders, and the French infantry burst
triumphantly into the batteries in front of the village. Their
triumph was short-lived, for the defenders, quickly rallying,
drove their rash assailants back with the bayonet. Support
was not at hand, and the advance was for the moment stayed.
The main body, however, soon came up, and a fresh attack was
organised. One battalion of the 30th turned Czarnowo by a
ravine leading to the Bug, another advanced against the front
of the village, and the third against the (French) left of it,
through a pine wood. The rest of Morand's division, with
cavalry behind the centre, followed in support. Still, the
first attacks were met and repulsed by Osterman's infantry
with a stubborn calmness which was proof against the élan
of the enemy. Osterman, however, could not but perceive
that, with fresh troops constantly feeding Morand's fighting
line, it was impossible for him long to hold out with his
inferior force. Fearing the loss, with that of Czarnowo, of
his heavy artillery, he despatched it in the direction of
Nasielsk. The fight for Czarnowo continued long with the
greatest fury. In the end, the superior numbers of the
French enabled them to gain a firm footing in the village
and, forcing the enemy out, they were able to deploy on the
plateau beyond.
On the opposite wing, Petit's attack had, in the mean-
while, been equally successful. At first he had only 400
men, besides Perrin's detachment on his left. Aided by a
PASSAGE OF THE UKRA.
81
vigorous cannonade from the 6-gun battery at Pomiechowo,
he was able to carry the Russian redoubts, from which the
artillery was withdrawn towards Czarnowo, only just in time
to save it from capture. The absence of pursuit soon showed
the Russians how weak the French left was, and they
launched a strong force of cavalry against Petit. His men,
calmly holding their fire till the cavalry were close upon
them, repulsed this and several other attacks by infantry
upon the captured redoubts. Davout was able to reinforce
Petit with more troops of the 3rd division, and every attack
made upon him was open to the flanking artillery fire from
Pomiechowo.
Osterman's troops had now, at 4 a.m., been for 12
hours under arms, for 9 under fire. The general, seriously
alarmed by the loss of Czarnowo, determined on retreat.
To cover it, he still continued his attacks on Petit, and kept
up a vigorous fire in front. At this juncture, being reinforced
by 3 battalions and 4 squadrons, he was able to draw off his
troops, still in good order, towards Nasielsk.
It is probable that the loss on the French side exceeded
that of the Russians, who had 1392* killed and wounded.
Napoleon's decision to attempt the passage by night was
remarkable, and unusual with him. He was using for it the
best troops in his army, and the accuracy with which they
carried out his programme fully justified his confidence in
them. Any deviation from his orders, any hesitation on the
part of the officers in leading, or of the men in following,
might have led to disaster. On the other hand, the passage
by daylight would have been attended with immense risk
and difficulty. The bridges would have had to be constructed
under the fire of the Russian guns commanding all the low
Davout states his loss at 807, but this is probably below the mark, and
appears to exclude Petit and part of the cavalry. The loss in officers was
specially heavy, as was to be expected in a night attack where bold leading was
essential to success (Davout, p. 127). Plotho (p. 24) says Osterman Tolstoi
reported his loss as only 500. Hopfner (iii. 93) gives 1392, including three
generals wounded.
Ꮐ
82
NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN IN POLAND.
ground, the advance across which could not fail to be
attended with much greater loss than was incurred at
night.
Friant's division, which had bivouacked between Pomie-
chowo and Koszewo, marched at 4 a.m. on the 24th, and
following the same route as Morand's, was on the battlefield
by daybreak. It at once took over the pursuit from the
victorious troops, now exhausted by a long night of con-
tinuous fighting.
Passing through Psucin, Friant arrived near Nasielsk
soon after midday. Rapp, with Marulaz's cavalry, and
Lemarroy, with a regiment of dragoons, were already engaged
with the Russians, whom they had driven out of the village,
and who had now taken up a position on the rising ground
beyond, their cavalry resisting the French in the meadows on
the left and in front. Dorochow from Borkowo had by this
time joined Osterman.
Friant, himself attacking in front, sent his voltigeurs to
threaten the Russian retreat by their left. So successful
was the flank attack that three guns were taken and the
Russians driven back to the wood. Friant had not been able
yet to bring up his guns over the muddy roads. The Russians
still held to the woods, and it was not till night had fallen
that they were compelled, by constant attacks of superior
forces, to continue their retreat to Strzegoczin, abandoning
some of their guns in the mud. Davout's 1st and 2nd
divisions bivouacked, during the night of the 24th-25th
December, in and beyond Nasielsk. The 3rd, which had
marched up from the Okunin bridge, was behind.
On the 25th, all the divisions marched in the direction of
Novemiasto; but, finding a strong Russian column in position
at Kaleczin, where the Novemiasto-Golymin and Nasielsk-
Ciechanow roads cross, Davout changed his direction to that
of Strzegoczin, whence he dislodged the enemy without
difficulty. The corps bivouacked that night in and behind
Strzegoczin. Lannes' corps, following from Okunin, was on
PASSAGE OF THE UKRA.
83
Davout's right rear on the 24th, and at Zbroski on the night
of the 25th.
Whilst Davout's corps had been effecting the passage of
the Ukra at its mouth, the next corps on the left, Augereau's,
had moved from Plonsk* early on the 24th, reinforced by
Wattier's and Milhaud's cavalry. Its march was directed
against Barclay de Tolly, holding the upper passages of the
river at Kolozomb and Sochoczin. Both bridges had been
burnt, and there was an earthwork beyond that of Kolozomb
defended by artillery, and by three battalions and two
squadrons. At Sochoczin, three battalions, and three squadrons
held the left bank. The two forces were linked by three
battalions in a wood between them.
Against Sochoczin marched Heudelet's division, with
Milhaud's cavalry attached; against Kolozomb Desjardins'
division, and Wattier's cavalry.
Whilst the 16th Light Infantry lined the right bank on
either side of the Kolozomb bridge, Savary,† with the
grenadiers of the 14th, forced his way across by utilising
some planks which the Russians had not burnt, and which
served to span the gaps in the partially destroyed bridge.
The French were met at Kolozomb by the Russian infantry
and hussars, but, being quickly reinforced, compelled the
enemy to retreat towards Novemiasto, leaving in their hands
six guns in the earthworks. Lapisse, meanwhile, had been
sent some 3000 yards down the river to surprise, at Pruski,
the enemy, who had no guns there. The Russian position at
Kolozomb was a very strong one, with the river in front and
a wood behind, and they had twelve guns. Lapisse passed
successfully, but an attempt to pass 1000 yards above
Kolozomb failed.§ Heudelet had been less successful.
There was no ford in front of him. Attempting to restore
the bridge, under cover of his infantry and artillery replying
*It had arrived there from Zakroczin on the 23rd (Hæpfner, iii. 96).
+ Brother of the future Duc de Rovigo.
Marbot, i. 245.
§ Augereau (Archives Historiques).
84
NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN IN POLAND.
to the Russian fire, his first attack was beaten off with heavy
loss. In a fit of temper, for which he is severely blamed
by Marbot,* he again sent forward his men, who were
once more repulsed. Any serious attack at Sochoczin was
unnecessary, seeing that a crossing at Kolozomb, farther east,
must infallibly result in the retreat of the Russians at
Sochoczin. It was only necessary to hold them at the latter
place by a demonstration preventing them from assisting
their comrades at Kolozomb. Accordingly, as soon as
Desjardins was across at Kolozomb, two of Heudelet's
brigades were summoned thither by Augereau. The passage
at Sochoczin was soon after left open by the retreat of its
defenders. Milhaud, pursuing the retreating Russians,
captured the baggage of their 2nd division. The French loss
at these crossings is given by Augereau at 66 killed and
452 wounded, about equally distributed between the two
divisions.† Savary was killed at Kolozomb.
Augereau now reassembled his corps. His light cavalry
(Durosnel) moved up the Sonna towards Ciechanow, to
expedite the Russian retreat, and the main body pursued the
Russians towards Novemiasto till stopped, short of that place,
by darkness.† On the 25th, Augereau occupied Novemiasto
and his advanced guard got as far as Bondkowo, his 1st division
to Gatkowo, and his 2nd to Gostynin. On Augereau's left
was Soult's corps. It reached Gora, west of Plonsk, on the
24th, and marching in the direction of Sochoczin and
Ciechanow, was at the former on the night of the 25th, with
light cavalry at Oirzen.‡ The Guard was with the Emperor
that night at Lopaczin. Murat, with all of the 1st cavalry
reserve which had not been detached, was, on the night of
the 25th, at Sochoczin. He had, on the 24th, attacked
Sacken at Lopaczin. With his retreat already threatened
by the forward movement of the French against Barclay on
* Marbot, i. 246.
† Archives Historiques.
Augereau (Archives Historiques) says he only reached Novemiasto on the
25th, which is less than Hopfner (iii. 68) gives him credit for.
PASSAGE OF THE UKRA.
85
his right, and Osterman on his left, Sacken gave way before
Murat, who, in the pursuit, forced the Russian 1st Division to
make the best of its way towards Pultusk. Part of it, under
Pahlen, was driven towards Ciechanow.
To bring up the story to the night of this dismal Christmas
Day, it remains to describe what was happening towards
Thorn, between the Prussians on the one hand, and Bessières,
Ney, and Bernadotte on the other.
On the 18th December, Lestocq had retreated from
Strasburg to Lautenburg, leaving Bulow to defend the defile
at Gurzno.*
On the 19th, Grouchy, with Bessières' advanced guard, †
seized Biezun. The point was of great importance to
Lestocq; through it he communicated directly with the
Russian right at Sochoczin, from which it was distant less
than two marches. On the 21st, Lestocq sent a detachment
through Soldau and Kuczbork to attempt the recapture of
Biezun. It was at Kuczbork on the 22nd, and consisted of
two infantry regiments, a regiment of dragoons, two of hussars,
and a battery of horse artillery. On the 23rd, it appeared
before Biezun, where Grouchy had now been joined by Bessières,
with infantry and artillery. The attempt was a complete
failure. The Prussians, charged by Grouchy, were driven
back two miles beyond Kuczbork, with the loss of 500
* Prussian official account quoted by Wilson (p. 253).
+ Bessières' 2nd cavalry reserve was about 6000 strong (Berthier to
Bessières, 17th December, Dumas, xvii. 456).
Its constitution was-
Light Cavalry division
2nd Dragoon division
4th
""
2nd Cuirassier division
...
...
...
Tilly
Grouchy
Sahuc
d'Hautpoult
(Soult's report, Archives Historiques.)
It was constituted on the 16th December, 1806, and again broken up on the
12th January, 1807, when the constituent troops were thus distributed—
Tilly's and Sahuc's divisions were made over to Bernadotte;
Grouchy's to Ney;
D'Hautpoult's was sent to Thorn and the neighbourhood.
("Journaux de Marche," Archives Historiques.)
86
NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN IN POLAND.
prisoners and 5 guns, besides killed and wounded.* On
the 24th, the detachment continued its retreat to Soldau.
Ney, whilst this detachment was in front of Biezun, marching
from Strasburg, came upon Bulow's rearguard at Gurzno.
On the 24th he drove it before him to Kuczbork, where it
joined the Biezun detachment in its retreat to Soldau.
From Kuczbork, Ney sent Marchand's division to operate
against the Prussians at Mlawa and Soldau.† With his other
division he remained in support behind Marchand's left.
Lestocq's corps, in the hope of ascertaining the intentions.
of the enemy and of maintaining communications with the
Russian right, was scattered over a front of some 10 or 11
miles, from near Lautenburg, on the right, to Neidenburg and
Mlawa, on the left. The whole strength of the Prussian
corps was not above 6000 men.
At Soldau, there appear to have been no more than one
battalion and 8 or 10 guns. Marchand had, according to
* Hopfner, iii. 138–140, where a full account of the action is given.
+ This is not quite Dumas's version, but see the next note for evidence in
support of this account.
+ Dumas (xvii. 189), basing his statement, apparently, on Marchand's
report, says there were 6000 Prussians entrenched at Soldau. Hopfner denies
this, and gives full details of the distribution of the corps (iii. 145, etc.). His
account is the more probable on the face of it. Against 6000 men in a strong
position covered by a stream, a canal, and a lake on its left, Marchand could
hardly have succeeded so easily as he did in capturing the town. Had he done
so, Lestocq would scarcely have led back to the storm of the captured position
a force which had yielded so easily when it had the advantage of the defensive.
It is curiously difficult to fix with certainty the date of the action at Soldau.
Hopfner gives the 25th; Dumas also. De Fezensac (131) says it was on the
same day as Pultusk, the 26th. Jomini does not specify the date clearly.
Bernadotte (Archives Historiques) gives the 25th. The "Journaux de Marche,”
of Ney's corps (in the Archives Historiques), unlike those of Davout, Soult,
Augereau, and Bernadotte, are very brief, mere diaries, giving the positions
occupied by the corps on each day. There are two versions of the manuscript;
the one which is rather fuller as regards details of positions, makes no mention
whatever of days of battle. The other merely states, in a column of remarks,
that there was an action on a particular date at a place named. Against the
25th December it has the entry "combat de Mlawa," against the 26th,
"combat de Soldau."
The matter, however, seems to be set at rest by a letter from Marchand to
PASSAGE OF THE UKRA.
87
his own statement, only two regiments of infantry, supported
later by the rest of his division from Mlawa. Ney was at
Gurzno with his 2nd division.
Notwithstanding the strength of the position, the weak
Prussian force was unable to make a serious resistance.
Marchand was master of Soldau soon after 2 p.m. Having
ascertained the direction of Ney's advance, Lestocq had
concentrated his troops and returned to recapture Soldau.
The attack on it was made from the Neidenburg road, about
5 p.m. Despite the valour with which the Prussian troops
fought, they were unable to get beyond the outer edge of the
village, whence, after desperate hand-to-hand fighting, they
were driven back. Lestocq, whose left had meanwhile
been driven in from Mlawa, retreated during the night on
Neidenburg, whither he was slowly followed by Ney.*
The same night, Bernadotte was marching to support and
replace Ney at Mlawa and Soldau. Bessières, with head-
quarters at Bogarzin, occupied the country about Mlawa,
Raciaz, &c.t
Thus the Prussians, on the night of the 25th-26th
December, were completely severed from the Russian right,
and retreating, away from it, towards Koenigsberg. Ney,
Bernadotte, and Bessières were interposed between the allies;
Soult was also marching to turn the Russian right; the rest
of the French army, opposed to their front, was towards
Golymin and Pultusk.
The Russian position at the same time was as follows:
Kamenskoi had ordered a general retirement on Ostrolenka,
Ney (Daily Correspondence, 26th December, in Archives Historiques), in which
he says, "Yesterday (i.e. 25th) I occupied Mlawa and Soldau. At Mlawa I
had no serious difficulty, but it was different at Soldau, as I had only two
regiments with which to attack 6000 men." This seems to show that Ney was
not in person at Soldau. The "Journaux de Marche" show his headquarters as
Gurzno on the 24th, 25th, and 26th December.
* Ney did not move his headquarters beyond Soldau till the 29th, when
they were at Neidenburg ("Journaux de Marche," 6th Corps, Archives
Historiques).
† “Journaux de Marche," Archives Historiques.
88
NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN IN POLAND.
artillery being freely abandoned to avoid hampering the
movement. Bennigsen, with the divisions of Osterman
Tolstoi, Sedmaratzki, and part of those of Gallitzin and Sacken,
was at Pultusk; Gallitzin, with the rest of his own division,
was retiring on Golymin; the rest of Sacken's was moving on
the same place from Ciechanow, but, owing to its having been
driven by Murat northwards, was farther from Golymin than
Gallitzin was. Of Buxhowden's army, Dochtorow's division
was east of Gallitzin, on the road through Golymin to
Makow; Essen's and Anrepp's were at Popowo, on the Bug,
preparing to retire direct to Rozan and Ostrolenka up the
peninsula between the Bug and the Narew.
Bennigsen resolved, disobeying Kamenskoi's orders, to
stand and fight at Pultusk. The marshal was himself with
Bennigsen, but broken in body and mind, he left the army
early next morning for Grodno, where his eccentric conduct
showed that he was no longer fit for command.* At this
point the gallant but worn-out old lieutenant of Suwarrow
disappears, except for a brief moment, from the scene.
* "On his return to Grodno he went, without his shirt, into the streets, and
then, sending for a surgeon, pointed out all his wounds, groaned as he passed
his hand over them, and insisted on a certificate of his incapacity to serve
(Wilson, 83, note). Truly a pitiful ending to the career of a gallant old soldier.
CHAPTER III.
THE BATTLES OF PULTUSK AND GOLYMIN, 26TH DECEMBER,
THE
1806.
(a) PULTUSK.*
*
`HE town of Pultusk lies on the right bank of the river
Narew, the general course of which here is nearly due
north and south.† The greater part of the town is in the low
ground, and is intersected by a small branch of the stream.
It spreads, however, also on to the bank, which is somewhat
steep and rises to a small elevation to the west. The river is
passed by the road from Strzegoczin and Golymin below the
infall of the small branch. That road runs to the north-west
over the height already mentioned, then falls into a slight
depression, again rises and mounts the height to the south-
east of the village of Mosin, and, passing through the centre
of a large wood, continues its course close to the south side
of Mosin. The height on which stands the large wood is a
plateau of some extent which, narrowing into a fairly wide
ridge,‡ continues to the south-east nearly to the river bank,
where it is bounded, towards the town, by a considerable ravine
falling into the low ground about one thousand paces from
*This account of the battle of Pultusk is based on a comparison of those
given by (a) Dumas, vol. xvii., pp. 164-171; (b) Sir R. Wilson; (c) Hopfner,
vol. iii., pp. 109-119; (d) Davout, pp. 131-137; (e) Lannes' report, Arch. Hist.
†The river at the bridge appears to have a breadth of about 100 yards. At
the date of the battle it was running very high, owing to the thaw, and was
covered with blocks of floating ice.
The wood measured about 1800 paces at right angles to the Golymin road,
and about 1200 at its greatest width along the road.
90
NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN IN POLAND.
the Golymin road. The plateau and ridge form a natural
screen, hiding from the forest on their west and south, the
town and all the lower portions of the Golymin road. In
front of a person coming from Pultusk there appears, from
the ridge of this screen, a shallow depression, bounded on its
farther side by the forest, to which the ground again slightly
rises, and covered in places, especially opposite the Mosin
heights, by outlying thickets and woods.
The position chosen by Bennigsen for his main line of
battle practically coincided with the line of the Golymin
road, from Pultusk to the point where it enters the wood on
the Mosin heights.
On this line, the left resting on the town and the right on
the Mosin wood, he drew up his main body in three lines.
In first line he placed 21 battalions of the 2nd and 3rd
divisions. Behind these, at about 300 paces' interval, stood,
in second line, 18 battalions, and behind them again, in third
line, towards the left, were 5 battalions of the 5th and 6th
divisions. The artillery of the main body was disposed in
advantageous positions along the front of the first line.
On the right, Barclay de Tolly was thrown forward into
the south-western half of the great wood. With three jäger
regiments he held the edge of the wood, whilst two battalions
of another regiment stood in reserve in the wood on the
Golymin road, thus forming a continuation through it of the
first main line. The third battalion supported a battery
placed outside the wood, astride of the road, commanding the
approach from Golymin. In the space between the wood
and Mosin was a regiment of Polish cavalry. There were
more guns, masked by a hedge, facing the Nasielsk road.
The Russian general had a similar advanced position on
his left wing, designed to cover the Narew bridge. Here
Bagavout stood, beyond the deep ravine, with 10 battalions,
2 squadrons of dragoons, 600 cossacks, and one battery.
His cavalry was pushed forward along the Warsaw road.
The
These troops were all drawn from the 6th division.
THE BATTLES OF PULTUSK AND GOLYMIN. 91
advanced posts of Barclay and Bagavout * thus occupied the
two extremities of the screening ridge, which has already
been described. To link them to one another, there were
posted along this ridge 28 squadrons of regular cavalry.
Owing to the conformation of the ground, and the
position of the advanced wings with their connecting line of
cavalry, the main lines, on the Golymin road, were concealed
from the view of an enemy debouching from the forest by
the Warsaw and Nasielsk roads. But, at the same time, the
fire of the greater portion of the Russian artillery was
masked by the cavalry line.
In the valley, beyond the cavalry and extending into the
outlying woods in front of the forest, was a long line of
cossacks, supported, in front of Barclay's position, by 10
squadrons of hussars. Lastly, one battalion of Anrepp's
division (14th) stood to guard the bridge on the left bank of
the Narew. Anrepp himself was on the march, under
Kamenskoi's orders, from Popowo, near the Bug, to Rozan
and Ostrolenka.
Such was the position in which Bennigsen prepared to
receive the French attack, which might fall upon him either
from the direction of Warsaw and Nasielsk or from that of
Golymin.
He had taken special precautions to cover the bridge, not
only by his strong detachment under Bagavout, but also by
keeping his reserve behind his left flank, ready to support
that commander.
From the outskirts of Pultusk to Barclay's battery on the
Golymin road was a distance of about 4500 paces. The
Russians had two lines of retreat, one by the right bank of
the Narew, through Makow to Ostrolenka, the other over the
bridge by the road on the left bank via Rozan. The latter
was decidedly longer, as it passed round the outside of the
* Bagavout began the battle with 5000 men before he was reinforced
(Bennigsen's despatch, Wilson, p. 235). He was between the river bank and
the extremity of the ridge, extending on to the slope heading up to it.
92
NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN IN POLAND.
great bend of the river. Therefore, Bennigsen's right flank,
covering the shorter line by the chord, was specially sensitive
to attack.*
Lannes, with his two divisions, commanded by Suchet
and Gazan, marched from Zbroski at 7 a.m. on the 26th
December. The distance to Pultusk is but five miles; to
the point where he must meet Bennigsen's foremost troops
scarcely four. Yet even this march, short in actual length,
was a tedious and difficult one. The weather had recently
been an alternation of frost and thaw. During the last two
days a decided thaw had set in. It had penetrated deep into
the ground, aided in its action by constant showers of rain,
of sleet, and of snow, which melted as it reached the surface
of the earth. The ground had become more and more
sodden, and the unmetalled roads had degenerated into lines.
of mud which, ground and churned by the passage of men
and horses, acquired a depth that rendered all movement,
not only irksome, but difficult in the extreme. For the
artillery, it was still more difficult to forge a way through
these terrible roads, even with the aid of double, treble, and
quadruple teams. For the infantry, a rate of progression
exceeding 11 miles an hour was not generally practicable.†
The men were generally halfway up to their knees in sticky
mud, often much further. Davout officially records that
several men, including an officer whom he names, spent the
night after the battle on the field, simply because they were
unable to move backwards or forwards in the mud.‡ Rapp
makes a similar statement.§ Lannes himself wrote: "The
*Hopfner, iii., 111. Behind his left wing lay both the road to Makow by
the right bank, and that over the bridge. The former, however, shortly turned
to the north-west, so that it was liable to be severed, farther on, behind the
right wing.
"The country was clayey and cut up by marshes; the roads were frightful.
The cavalry, infantry, and artillery, were lost in the depths of mud. None
could get out of them save by untold labour" (Rapp, p. 127). "It took two
hours to cover a short league" (Davout, p. 132).
One league = 4 kilometres = 23 miles.
‡ Davout, p. 136.
§ Rapp, p. 127.
THE BATTLES OF PULTUSK AND GOLYMIN. 93
rain and the hail overwhelmed our soldiers;" and, again:
"The field, on which we were about to do battle, had been
converted into a sea of mud, through which soldiers and
horses could with difficulty march.” *
By incredible exertions, the whole corps had been got
forward on the 25th from Czarnowo, with its artillery com-
plete, till the first division reached Zbroski, and Gazan's,
in second line, was a mile behind. The corps had marched
15 miles. The troops bivouacked in misery during a night
of storms of snow, hail, and rain.
When Lannes had started his corps on its march towards
the enemy, of whose presence in force at Pultusk he was
aware, he himself rode forward, with an escort of two
squadrons, to reconnoitre the position. As he emerged from
the forest on the Nasielsk-Pultusk road, he saw before him,
on the plateau covering Pultusk, Bennigsen's cavalry, and
the front of his advanced wings, the whole covered by the
line of cossacks in the intervening depression. He had
already had to clear some of the cossacks out of the thickets
on his side. The town of Pultusk, and Bennigsen's main lines,
were hidden from him by the rising ground. It was not till
considerably later that he realised the magnitude of the force
with which he had to do battle. Could he have known the
odds in numbers against which he had to contend, perhaps
even Lannes' brave spirit would have quailed; for he knew
of no succour likely to reach him from his left,† and he did
know that there was nothing behind him.
* Lannes' report on the battle to Berthier, dated 27th December, in daily
correspondence (Arch. Hist.). The report is written by Victor, then Lannes'
chief of the staff.
† Lannes had no information of the approach of Davout's 3rd division.
Indeed, Davout had no orders to send it to Lannes' support. He merely
directed it to keep from that marshal's left flank a Russian column retreating,
apparently, on Pultusk from Strzegoczin (Davout, p. 132). Berthier's despatch
to Lannes (dated 26th December), which reached him about 10 a.m., says:
"Marshal Davout is about to advance on Strzegoczin and Golymin." The
orders of the same date to Davout merely direct him on the last-named places,
and in no way indicate that he was to assist Lannes.
94
NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN IN POLAND.
Presently, Claparède, coming up with the 17th Regiment
Light Infantry as advanced guard, drove in the cossack out-
posts, and enabled Lannes to see better what was in front of
him. His position was difficult and dangerous, but he had
the Emperor's clear orders for the capture of the Pultusk
bridge, and he was not the man to hesitate, whatever the
difficulties. It was now about 10 a.m., and he had just
received the Emperor's order.'
*
As his troops slowly came up, he marshalled them, under
cover of the woods, in two lines, covering, as far as he could,
the whole length of the Russian position. In first line he
ranged the whole of Suchet's division, less the 40th Regiment.
In second line was Gazan's division, plus the 40th from
Suchet's. On the right of his first line, he placed Claparède
with the 17th Light Infantry, and Treilhard's Light Cavalry,
in support, opposed to Bagavout's detachment. The centre,
under Wedell, consisted of the 64th Regiment and one battalion
of the 88th. On the left were the other battalion of the 88th,
the 34th, and Becker's dragoons, the whole led by Suchet in
person. The left wing was covered, more completely than
the centre and the right, by detached woods, and its strength
was thus concealed from Barclay de Tolly, to whom it was
opposed. The few guns which had, so far, arrived were
disposed in front of the centre and the left. Gazan, with the
second line, followed the first at about three hundred paces.
The battalions were mostly deployed and their front covered
by a swarm of skirmishers.
The second line comprised only two regiments of Gazan's
and the 40th. In reserve there were the two battalions of
the 21st regiment (Gazan's division).
The strength of Lannes' corps may be taken at about
* These are the orders referred to in the last note. They inform Lannes that
the enemy's centre is pierced, that one or two regiments may have remained at
Sierock, if so, they will certainly be captured. The marshal is to advance
on Pultusk, to pass the Narew there, and at once to construct a bridge head.
Clearly the Emperor had no thought of any serious resistance to his advance at
Pultusk (cf. despatch quoted in full, Dumas, vol. xvii., pp. 485-487).
THE BATTLES OF PULTUSK AND GOLYMIN. 95
20,000 men, whilst Bennigsen had between 40,000 and
45,000.*
The attack commenced about 11 a.m. on the right, with
the advance of Claparède's men against Bagavout. The
French moved forward with enthusiasm to the attack. They
felt that behind them lay the dripping woods and the sodden
ground on which they had spent the preceding night, and
through which they had been toiling since seven o'clock. In
front of them was Pultusk, where, if they reached it, they
might hope to spend a less wretched night. The enemy
defending it they had already beaten at Austerlitz; they
had not yet learnt what was his capacity for stolid, dogged
resistance. Lastly, they were fighting under the eyes of a
marshal whom they adored, and who was always ready to
lead them in person where the battle raged most hotly.
Bagavout's cavalry and cossacks, no match for the
French infantry, were driven in without difficulty. The
next opponents of the French were the 4th Jägers, whom
Bagavout sent forward. Cheering, and regardless of the
heavy artillery fire with which they were smitten by the
Russian guns,† the French infantry drove the jägers back-
wards and leftwards, until they reached seven squadrons,
* Hopfner gives Lannes 20,000 men in the morning, and 30,000 at the
end of the battle, though it is difficult to suppose he is right in estimating
Gudin's division of Davout's corps at 10,000. The estimate seems at least 3000
too high. The same authority (iii. 10) gives Bennigsen's strength, allowing
for sick, detachments, etc., as 40,600 men, viz. 66 battalions, 55 squadrons, 7 field
batteries, and 2 horse batteries (128 guns).
Sir R. Wilson (p. 273) gives 45,000.
Lannes' strength was 24 battalions and 27 squadrons. If, as Hopfner
reckons, he had 20,000 men, the battalions may be reckoned at 750, and the
squadrons at 80 men. Assuming Davout's battalions to have had an equal
average strength, d'Aultanne's force could not have exceeded 7000, and the
whole French force engaged would not amount to over 27,000.
Napoleon (Corr. 11,305), sending orders to Murat, mentions the strength of
Lannes' corps as 16,000 infantry and 1200 cavalry. Becker's dragoons he puts
at 1200, which would give Lannes 18,400 in the morning. To this must be
added, in the afternoon, one-third of Davout's infantry, which Napoleon states in
all to be 22,000. Lannes' total in the afternoon would thus be only 25,300.
+ Bagavout's battery (14 guns) was on his left, close to the river bank.
96
NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN IN POLAND.
under Koschin, on the left of the cavalry line joining
Bagavout to Barclay.
Seeing the attack on Bagavout, Bennigsen had despatched
to his aid four battalions, under Osterman, from the reserve
and first line.*
Simultaneously with Claparède, Wedell, with the French
centre, had moved forwards, and now changed direction to
his right, intending to fall on Bagavout's right flank, whilst
Claparède attacked him in front. In doing so he, necessarily,
exposed his own left flank to Koschin's cavalry and the
defeated jägers who had fallen back on it. Koschin, quick
to see his chance, charged at once through a blinding snow-
storm which concealed his approach until his men were
actually in the midst of Wedell's leading battalions, sabring
them right and left. But the storm, which had aided him.
so far, now, in turn, prevented Koschin's seeing the advance,
against his own right flank, of Wedell's half of the 88th.
That battalion was just in time to save those in front of it,
attacked by Koschin in flank and by two battalions of jägers
and Bagavout's cavalry in front. In the confused, hand-
to-hand struggle which ensued, each side claims to have
annihilated the enemy. In the end, the Russians had to
retire, and the fight came to a standstill, Bagavout falling
back on his old position, and Koschin towards the rear of the
left wing.
Treilhard's cavalry now advanced. A Russian hussar
regiment in front of it waited till it approached, and then,
wheeling leftwards, exposed the French cavalry, on the ridge,
to the fire of a battery in the main line, which had previously
been masked. From it the French suffered severely.
It is now time to return to the movements which had
been going on simultaneously on the French left. Lannes,
* Two from the extreme left of the 1st line, and two from the reserve in 3rd
line (Wilson, p. 272).
†This combat occurred in the angle, on the French side, between the
Nasielsk and Warsaw roads, about 250 yards from either.
THE BATTLES OF PULTUSK AND GOLYMIN. 97
having started his attack on the right, hurried off to look
after Suchet's column advancing to the storm of the Mosin
heights. The 34th Regiment led the way with a swarm of
skirmishers and chasseurs à cheval in front, accompanied by
the intrepid Lannes, as well as by Suchet.
Fired by the example and encouragement of their leaders,
the 34th, bursting on the front of the wood, carried all before
them. Barclay's men were driven in confusion back through
the first half of the wood on to the reserve,* on the Golymin
road. The Russian battery in the wood was momentarily
captured, but the reserve turned the scale; the battery was
recovered, and the 34th driven into the midst of the wood
through which they had just triumphantly fought their way.
They were saved from disaster by the arrival of the 2nd
battalion of the 88th, which, it will be remembered, was
attached to this wing. In the outer half of the wood, on the
French side of the road, a furious personal conflict raged with
varying success. Whilst the French first line had thus, on the
whole, gained ground against the detachments of Bagavout
and Barclay, the 2nd line had followed steadily, and it now
occupied the ridge which had, at the beginning of the battle,
been held by the Russian regular cavalry joining the wings.
The cavalry had retired behind the main lines, and Gazan's
men were thus exposed to the full stress of the artillery fire
from the, now unmasked, batteries in front of Bennigsen's
main position.†
The battle had raged for several hours. The French had
made but little progress. Their right had failed to dislodge
Bagavout completely from his original position, their centre
had not got beyond the ridge occupied in the morning by
the Russian cavalry. There replying, as best it might with
a very inferior force of artillery, to Bennigsen's guns in the
Two battalions, vide supra, p. 90.
† Of the total of over 120 guns, Barclay had 28, and Bagavout 12. There
were another 14 in Osterman's reserve. Thus, Gazan was exposed to the fire of
nearly 70 guns.
H
98
NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN IN POLAND.
main line, it was suffering severely from their fire. On the
left, Lannes and Suchet were, with difficulty, maintaining
themselves, in the nearer half of the great wood, against
Barclay's superior force. There seemed every prospect of
Lannes' whole corps being compelled to a disastrous retreat.
But now a change came over the scene. The short day,
which would close by 4 p.m., had scarce two hours to run, a
premature darkness was threatened, owing to the stormy,
cloudy weather.
At this juncture, Bennigsen was warned, by the cossacks
on his right, of the approach, by the Golymin road, of a strong
hostile column. Davout's 3rd division, commanded tem-
porarily by his chief of the staff d'Aultanne, had started at
6 a.m. from Kowalavice, about two miles short of Strzegoczin,
in pursuit of a Russian column which appeared to be falling
back on Pultusk, and which it was ordered to fend off from
the left flank of Lannes' corps.
Finding in front of him a considerable body of cavalry
escorting guns and stores, d'Aultanne followed it without
seriously engaging himself. The enemy, in his retreat, was
forced, by the state of the roads, to abandon 14 guns and a
large number of waggons. Satisfied with his progress, the
French commander was about to bivouac for the night, when
he heard, on his right, a heavy cannonade, showing him that
Lannes was hotly engaged. The large number of guns
indicated that the enemy must be superior in this arm at
least; for d'Aultanne could infer that Lannes had had the
same difficulty as himself in moving up artillery.
With a just appreciation of the situation, he resolved to
move at once to Lannes' assistance. By the route which he
had followed he had had to march about double the distance
Lannes had, and he had, moreover, been delayed by fighting,
and collecting the abandoned guns and waggons.* It must,
therefore, have been somewhere towards 2 p.m. when he
arrived in view of the Russian right on the Mosin heights.
* For this account of d'Aultanne's march, see Davout, pp. 132-134.
THE BATTLES OF PULTUSK AND GOLYMIN. 99
1
With a double team he had succeeded in dragging up one
gun; with that he satisfied himself that Mosin was only
occupied by cossacks.
He had no time to concert measures with Lannes, to whom
he sent notice of his advance, in echelon from his right, in the
direction of the Golymin to Pultusk road. He had 9
battalions.* His right echelon, in front, skirted the woods
opposite Barclay's right; the left echelon rested on the little
brook which flows past Mosin to the Narew.
He was first attacked by the Polish cavalry regiment
from between Barclay's position and Mosin; that was easily
beaten off.
Meanwhile, Bennigsen, alarmed for his right, had wheeled
back the whole right of his main lines so as to face the
Mosin wood. He thus greatly lessened the volume of
artillery fire which Lannes' centre had to bear.
When d'Aultanne's right echelon arrived opposite the
angle of the Mosin wood, he changed direction to the left,
forming for attack, in columns of half battalions at 50 paces'
interval, and at once advanced in the midst of a heavy
snowstorm. The new direction which he had assumed
brought him obliquely on the right of Barclay's position, his
right directed on the extreme left of Lannes' left wing, still
fighting in the wood.
As the attack advanced, Barclay fell back towards the
now refused right wing of the main line. From this, there
hurried to his assistance two infantry regiments and 20
squadrons. At the same time, Bennigsen directed the fire of
a powerful battery, from the Golymin road, against the French
in the outer half of the wood.
Thus strengthened, Barclay once more advanced into the
wood beyond the road. At last, the French 34th, which had
so long and so gallantly maintained itself in the wood, was
*His whole cavalry force consisted of 70 chasseurs, and 100 of Rapp's
dragoons. His artillery was not up except the one gun just mentioned (Davout,
pp. 132 and 134).
Un
100
NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN IN POLAND.
.....
forced back out of it. The result of its retreat was to
create a great gap between it and the right of d'Aultanne's
force, whose flank was thus exposed. Into the opening so
made poured the 20 squadrons of Russian cavalry. Both
Lannes and d'Aultanne, separated by this mass of cavalry,
were in imminent danger when the situation was saved by the
firm conduct of the 85th Regiment of D'Aultanne's division.
Disorder was already spreading in his ranks, as well as in
those of Lannes. It was increased by the darkness which
had now settled down. The Russian cavalry was received
with a steady fire from the 85th, formed in squares and
facing the right flank of the intruding enemy. That cavalry
was compelled to fall back, though it several times charged
d'Aultanne's lines. Order had, however, been restored by
the exertions of Piré and Gauthier, and the charges failed.
The last of them was made about 8 p.m., in the midst of
another violent snowstorm.
Shortly before this, d'Aultanne had received a message
from Lannes, begging him to stand firm, as the marshal was
about to renew his attack. After waiting for an hour, and
seeing no signs of the promised attack, d'Aultanne decided to
retire to the woods along whose edge his right had advanced.
The further doings of the French centre and right have
still to be related. When Bennigsen turned most of his guns
to the support of Barclay,* Gazan, in the centre, was able
to direct his artillery against the right flank of Bagavout's
detachment, and to support a fresh attack on him by Claparède
and Wedell. Bagavout was overpowered, and driven back
across the ravine in front of which he stood. His guns
were captured, but he was promptly reinforced by five fresh
battalions. To support him, Osterman established a strong
battery behind his right. Bagavout once more urged forward
his troops across the ravine. After a long and desperate fight,
the French, unable to maintain their forward position, were
borne back across the ravine in confusion. A bayonet charge,
* About 2 p.m.
THE BATTLES OF PULTUSK AND GOLYMIN.
101
by a regiment under Somow, had completed their overthrow.*
They were unable to retain the guns which they had taken,
and which now again fell into Bagavout's hands.
Exhausted by many hours' fighting, following on a severe
march, Lannes' corps was not fit to continue the battle, in
which they had for four hours fought against double their
numbers. Even with d'Aultanne's division they had scarcely
equalled three-fourths of the Russian strength.
Weary and sullen, they fell back in good order, unpursued,
to the positions which they had occupied before the action
commenced.
Beyond that they did not retreat. Bennigsen's story,
that his cossacks, next morning, found no French within
eight miles of the field, may be dismissed as a fable. Possibly
the story may have been carried by cossacks scouting in the
direction of d'Aultanne, who, thinking Lannes could now
take care of himself, since Bennigsen had retreated, marched
off, before dawn on the 27th, to rejoin his own corps, leaving
the ground unoccupied in the direction of the Golymin road.
During the night, Bennigsen decided on retreat. The
greater part of his army, passing to the left bank of the
Narew, marched by the circuitous road on that side to Rozan
on the 27th, and on to Ostrolenka on the 28th.† The night
of the 26th-27th had been one of calm, succeeding the
tempest of the day. Lannes was in no state to pursue on
the 27th. His losses had been very heavy in the savage
hand-to-hand fighting throughout the 26th. His and d'Aul-
tanne's losses are greatly understated by the French. On
the whole, it is probable that they were not less than 7000
* Lannes (Arch. Hist.) states that a fresh attempt (apparently the one here
described) was made against his right about 3 p.m., but was arrested by
Gazan.
† Writing on the 28th December to Murat, Napoleon says that part of the
troops from Pultusk had retired by the right bank. Murat is ordered to
ascertain whether they had gone direct to Rozan or by Makow. If the enemy
were standing at Makow, they were not to be attacked until an overwhelming
force was collected (Corr. 11,512).
102
NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN IN POLAND.
in killed, wounded, and prisoners. The Russians, too, had
lost heavily; 5000 is, perhaps, not too high a figure at which
to estimate their casualties.*
Both sides lay claim to the victory in this well-contested
battle. It is difficult to award the palm to either. What
ground Lannes gained he lost again, and he had been so
severely handled that he could not molest Bennigsen's retreat.
Bennigsen, on the other hand, though he had repulsed the
attack of a very inferior force, had not been able, or had not
dared, to pursue it. He was, rightly, nervous lest the advance
of Napoleon's centre on Makow should cut his line across the
bend of the river to Rozan and Ostrolenka. He could not
feel sure that Lannes' attack would not be renewed next
day by a stronger force. Then, if he lost the Pultusk bridge,
almost inevitable ruin would stare him in the face. So badly
did he think of his position, that he preferred reaching Rozan
by a 22 mile march on the left bank of the river to risking the
direct march of only 15 or 16 by the right.
Having decided, contrary to Kamenskoi's orders,† to
stand and fight at Pultusk, Bennigsen might well have used
his position to better advantage, and, at least, have inflicted
a decisive defeat on Lannes. Had he fallen vigorously on
* Wilson puts the French loss at 10,000 killed and wounded, the Russians at
3000 killed without mentioning wounded (Wilson, p. 273). Elsewhere (p. 81),
he puts the Russian loss at less than 5000 men, and the French at 8000 at
least.
Hopfner (iii. 118) says that, though the Russian official accounts state
the French loss at 10,000, other Russian authorities say 7000 killed and
wounded, and 700 prisoners. The French admit only 600 or 700 killed and 1500
wounded. This is the figure given by Dumas (vol. xvii., p. 174), and by
Lannes (Arch. Hist.). The marshal puts the Russian loss at 2000 killed, 3000
wounded, 1800 prisoners. Dumas says more than 2000 dead Russians were
found on the field, and 1500 wounded, incapable of being moved.
The French, as the attackers, might be expected to lose more heavily than
the defenders. They were exposed to a terrible artillery fire, telling heavily on
the close formations. On the other hand, in the personal conflict which consti-
tuted so large a part of the battle, losses would probably not differ greatly.
Plotho (p. 36) calculates the Russian loss at only 3000 or 4000 killed and
wounded.
† Wilson, p. 80.
THE BATTLES OF PULTUSK AND GOLYMIN.
103
the French corps at the beginning of the battle, and advanced
with his right, he would probably have rolled it up and
driven it into the river before d'Aultanne could come up.
He could still have kept a strong reserve behind his right
wing to ward off any attack from the Golymin direction.
But his disposition of his troops was not calculated to favour
any such bold action. Instead of meeting the French
advance with over 100 guns posted on the ridge, he masked
the greater part of his artillery by the curtain of cavalry
which he drew between the advanced wings under Barclay
and Bagavout. Consequently, the French, whilst encounter-
ing strenuous resistance from these two commanders on either
wing, had nothing, at first, opposed to their centre but cavalry
and cossacks. It was only when these retired that the
Russian batteries behind could open on the enemy's centre.
What their effect would have been had they, with a consider-
able force of infantry, been where the cavalry were, can be
judged from the way in which they arrested Gazan's advance,
until their fire was diverted by d'Aultanne's appearance. But
for the weakness of the Russian centre in front, Wedell's
move to the right, to support Claparède against Bagavout
would have been impossible.
Bennigsen could well have placed 10,000 infantry and
50 or 60 guns where his cavalry were, still keeping a strong
reserve of infantry. The cavalry, standing behind his right
wing, could have issued on the French left flank and rear as
soon as the first attack had failed, as it must inevitably have
done. Then, with 25,000 infantry against him in front, as
well as a powerful artillery, with 38 * squadrons and a strong
force of cossacks attacking his left and rear, and, finally, with
practically no reserve at his command, it is difficult to see
how Lannes could have escaped total destruction. The battle
would have been over in two or three hours, well before
d'Aultanne could arrive, and that officer would, naturally,
not have risked an attack without the support of Lannes.
28 from the ridge, and 10 from in front of Barclay (vide supra, p. 91).
104
NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN IN POLAND.
Bennigsen reported that he had been attacked by
60,000 French under Napoleon in person. If he was, in
good faith, under this delusion it will account for his want of
vigour. But surely his intelligence should have been better!
He reported to the Czar that "the succours, so much
desired by General Buxhowden, did not arrive in time,
although it was scarcely distant from me two miles,* in the
neighbourhood of Makow, and that it had halted halfway to
afford me all the advantages of my victory." †
Buxhowden is unjustly blamed here; for he had Kamen-
skoi's orders to retreat on Ostrolenka, and he was doing so
with Dochtorow's and Tutchkow's divisions by Makow, and
with Essen's and Anrepp's from Popowo. Kamenskoi was
with Bennigsen the night before the battle, and Buxhowden
had no fresh orders from him. It is true that Dochtorow did
recall part of his division to support Gallitzin at Golymin,
but the cases were not altogether parallel. He was merely
supporting a rearguard retreating by the same road as
himself.
Lannes seems to have made the best of an extremely
unpleasant position. He was put in it owing to the
Emperor's false intelligence as to the enemy's lines of retreat.
His orders to Lannes, already quoted,‡ indicate clearly his
belief that there was no considerable force at Pultusk. They
do not even provide for Lannes' action in the event of his find-
ing himself outnumbered. Napoleon, in fact, believed that the
enemy was marching on Makow, and all his efforts were
directed against the right of the Russian army and its rear,
now that it was separated by Ney, Bernadotte, Bessières, and
* German miles of 4 English. Distance, therefore, was about 9 miles,
English.
† Bennigsen's despatch, quoted by Wilson, p. 336. The translation is not
very clear, nor well punctuated, but the meaning can be gathered. The proper
translation would appear to be "the succour so much desired by me from
General Buxhowden, although distant from me scarcely 2 miles, in the
neighbourhood of Makow, did not arrive in time to afford me all the advantages
of my victory; it had halted halfway."
+ Vide supra, p. 94.
THE BATTLES OF PULTUSK AND GOLYMIN. 105
Soult from the Prussians. Lannes received his orders only
as he reached the field of battle. They were so positive that
he could hardly have justified failure to follow them to the
letter. Moreover, he had already commenced the action
before he was fully aware of the immense superiority of
Beningsen's numbers.
necessity for
If there was
was no strong
He was hampered in his attack by the
keeping a strong second line to fall back on.
one thing he was certain of it was that there
supporting force between him and Czarnowo. At 2 p.m. his
position was more than ever hazardous, and he must have
felt that a strong offensive return against his left flank could
not but involve him in disaster. That it would eventually
have come, but for the unexpected arrival of d'Aultanne,
can hardly be doubted. The promptitude of the latter
commander, in marching to the sound of the guns is highly
commendable.
(b) GOLYMIN.
Whilst Lannes was fighting, at Pultusk, his uphill battle
against very superior numbers, another action was in progress
in front of Golymin, 12 miles to the north-west.*
At that village, Gallitzin had collected parts of his own
division. The portion of Sacken's which had been driven
northwards by Murat was also on its road to Golymin. The
rest of these divisions had retreated on Pultusk and formed
part of the army under the personal command of Bennigsen
on the 26th December. When Gallitzin reached Golymin,
about 8 a.m., his troops were too exhausted by their difficult
march to continue it farther towards Makow. He had,
moreover, to wait for Sacken's men. The same morning,
*The chief authorities consulted for this battle are: (a) Hopfner, iii. 122,
etc.; (b) Dumas, vol. xvii., p. 180, etc.; (c) Davout, pp. 137-140; (d) Marbot,
i. 246, 247; (e) Rapp, p. 128, etc.; (f) Augereau's report in the Archives
Historiques.
106
NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN IN POLAND.
under orders from the Emperor,* Augereau marched off
Desjardins' division, at 7.30 a.m., from Kaleczin.† The other
division (Heudelet's) was ordered to start at 9 a.m. They
were to march via Sonsk, whilst Durosnel, with the light
cavalry, was to cut the road between Ciechanow and Golymin,
collecting on it baggage abandoned by the enemy. Murat,
with part of the reserve cavalry, followed, marching by
Garnowo. Gallitzin had, overnight, informed Dochtorow,
who was marching in advance of him on Makow, of his own
march to Golymin, and had warned him that the French
were advancing to the attack from all directions. This
message Dochtorow received simultaneously with Kamenskoi's
orders for his retreat on Makow. Nevertheless, leaving his
division to continue its retreat meanwhile, he himself, with
a musketeer regiment and one of dragoons, remained at
Golymin to receive Gallitzin.§
Scarcely had the latter collected and organised his
wearied troops at Golymin when the rear-guard, of 2 squadrons,
was attacked by Murat's advanced guard. Gallitzin sent
3 squadrons of cuirassiers to endeavour to arrest the
French advance, and so to give him some time to rest his
men, before again proceeding towards Makow. The rear-
guard, thus strengthened, succeeded in repulsing Lassalle,
who led Murat's advance, to the woods from which he had
issued.
Presently there appeared, at Ruskowo, the head of
Augereau's column.
* Orders from Berthier to Augereau, dated Lopaczin, 26th December.
(Printed in Dumas, xvii. 487, 488.) In the same order he was warned that,
should he hear heavy firing on his right, it would mean that Davout was
seriously engaged and must be assisted by Augereau moving towards Strzegoczin.
† He went round by Sonsk on the Sonna. By this route the distance
to Ruskowo is about 10 miles.
This is the direct route. From Kaleczin to Garnowo, about 6 miles. He
had to start from Sochoczin, and was somewhat delayed until the Emperor was
satisfied that the force in front of Davout at Strzegoczin was retreating on
Golymin. See three despatches from Berthier to Murat, dated Lopaczin, 26th
December, printed by Dumas, xvii., pp. 488–491.
§ Hopfner, iii. 123.
THE BATTLES OF PULTUSK AND GOLYMIN. 107
Seeing that, in the exhausted condition of his troops,
retreat without fighting was no longer possible, Gallitzin
proceeded to make the best arrangements he could to meet
the French.
The position of Golymin, though almost absolutely flat,
was one of great strength for a defensive action against an
enemy advancing from the west. The ground is slightly
elevated to the north and north-west of the village, but the
rise is very gentle. Except on the north, it is almost entirely
surrounded by woods interspersed with marshes, which, owing
to the weather prevailing on the 26th December, were in
their most impracticable condition. The outer edge of these
woods abutted, at a distance averaging 3500 paces from
Golymin, on the open marshy plain over which the French
line of approach passed. The side most open to attack was
the rising ground, towards Wadkowo and Wola-Golyminska;
but even here there was a large wood, between Wadkowo
and Golymin.
Into the woods and ground about Kaleczin * Gallitzin
sent Tcherbatow with a regiment of infantry, and 4 light
guns. With the rest of his troops, he posted himself in front
of Golymin. His first line comprised 6 battalions of
infantry, and what remained of two cavalry regiments, from
which he had already made detachments. In reserve he
held a regiment of cuirassiers, 2 squadrons of hussars, and the
troops of the 7th (Dochtorow's) division.
On arrival at Ruskowo,† Augereau sent Heudelet, when he
arrived some time after Desjardins, to the left to attack by
Wadkowo, which he occupied without difficulty. Desjardins
moved forward, from Ruskowo, towards Golymin. At this
* A hamlet 400 or 500 paces west of Golymin, not to be confounded with
the place of the same name from which Augereau started.
† Looking to the state of the roads, and the distance they had to march,
this could hardly have been before 2 or 2.30 p.m., the time which Marbot
(pp. 246, 247) gives. He was himself with Augereau's cavalry.
It was
already getting dark, owing to the shortness of the day and the gloom of
the sky.
108
NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN IN POLAND.
*
moment, Murat arrived with Milhaud's and Klein's cavalry
divisions and was joined by Marulaz with Davout's light
cavalry, moving by the Strzegoczin road. They advanced, in
two lines, against the Russian cavalry, which gave way before
them, retiring into the woods, where the French horsemen
were unable to follow.
Meanwhile, Augereau's two divisions, which had been
unable to bring up their artillery, moved forward, Desjardins
from Ruskowo, Heudelet from Wadkowo.† Heudelet had but
poor success. The resistance of the Russian cavalry and
infantry was so strenuous that, wanting the support of guns,
he could advance but a short way. Desjardins' division,
which, unlike Heudelet's, had been completely successful at
the passage of the Ukra, attacking with more impetuosity, at
first drove back Tcherbatow's infantry regiment. Reinforced
by a battalion sent him by Gallitzin from the reserve, Tcher-
batow placed himself, sword in hand, at the head of his men,
and again led them forward to the attack. Desjardins lost
the ground which he had gained, but rallied, and once more
advanced against the foe. His men, when within 50 paces
of the Russians, were brought to a standstill by grape fire.‡
After this, the fight in front of Augereau degenerated into
a combat of skirmishers, which lasted, with varying success,
well into the evening. On the whole, the French left
(Heudelet) slowly progressed towards turning the Russian
right. So far, Gallitzin's small force had held its own with
* Including Lasalles' advanced guard and Marulaz, there must have been
between 6000 and 7000 cavalry at Garnowo.
† Desjardins' division was the first on the field. On its left, on arrival at
Ruskowo, it found many hostile troops. Augereau therefore sent orders to
hurry up Heudelet, and left one of Desjardins' brigades in Ruskowo, to protect
the rear of the other moving on Golymin, till Heudelet's arrival on the left.
Heudelet, advancing between Wadkowo and Golymin, was attacked in flank
by cavalry, but had time to form squares and repulse it. He was so constantly
attacked by the cavalry that he had to keep his troops permanently in squares
(Augereau, Arch. Hist.).
Desjardins' 2nd brigade, in its advance, was overwhelmed by grape when
within 50 paces of the enemy. It was forced to retire 200 yards, and to form
squares in front of Kaleczin (Augereau, Arch. Hist.).
THE BATTLES OF PULTUSK AND GOLYMIN. 109
success. There was yet another strong French column with
which he had to deal on his left.
Davout had started, with his 1st and 2nd divisions
(Morand's and Friant's), from Klukowo and Strzegoczin at
daybreak.* Marulaz, with the cavalry, was in advance, and,
as already described, had joined Murat in driving the
Russian cavalry back from Garnowo on the woods towards
Golymin. On his way, he had captured 20 guns, 80 am-
munition waggons and 200 others, abandoned by the retreating
Russians in the mud. He and Murat were now awaiting the
arrival of the infantry for the attack of the wood. The
Russian infantry were preparing for its defence. Gallitzin,
warned of the approach of Morand, had sent 3 fresh batta-
lions into the woods and marshes on Tcherbatow's left, and
2 squadrons on to the Pultusk road. At 3 p.m. the Russian
right had been reinforced by 2 cavalry regiments of the 7th
and 8th divisions, arriving from Ciechanow. This force had
succeeded in getting past Durosnel, by whose cavalry it was
attacked on the road. Davout's 1st division (Morand) had
to march 7 miles from Strzegoczin to Garnowo, and the 2nd
(Friant) 8 from Klukowo.
On arrival, Morand formed his 1st brigade in battalion
columns for the attack of the wood. The 2nd brigade
(d'Honnières) was behind him. It was 3.30 before the
1st brigade was ready. Darkness had fallen, though the
scene was illuminated by the burning village of Garnowo,
which had been fired by the cossacks as they left it. This
light facilitated the direction of the fire of the Russian guns.†
As the brigade charged into the wood, with its voltigeurs in
front, the Russian infantry, to free their limbs for the
struggle, threw off their knapsacks. Their resistance was
* Davout, p. 131.
+ Marbot, i. 248. He also mentions that the uniform of Murat's white
cuirassiers made them a prominent object for the direction of the Russian fire.
Many of the villages, says Marbot, were on fire. Probably Ruskowo and
Wadkowo were so. Augereau (Arch. Hist.) mentions, as burning, the village
between Ruskowo and Golymin, i.e. Kaleczin.
110
NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN IN POLAND.
obstinate, but the vigour of the French attack overcame all
opposition. Fighting hand to hand with their favourite
weapon, the bayonet, the infantry of Gallitzin was slowly
driven back through and out of the wood, leaving it strewn
with their dead and wounded, and with 4000 knapsacks,
which, in the agony of the struggle, the soldiers had no oppor-
tunity to recover. As in Augereau's case, Davout could
attack only with infantry, for his guns had fallen behind.
Perceiving that the enemy was attempting to retreat to the
right by the Makow road, Davout despatched d'Honnières'
brigade, in that direction, to attempt to turn the wood and to
advance on Golymin by the Pultusk road. The 51st Regi-
ment moved into the wood in front of Osiek, on the near
side of the Pultusk road, whilst Rapp with his dragoons
charged, on the road, the Russian cavalry. Himself at the
head of his men, Rapp, ever in the forefront of the battle,
bore back the Russian horsemen in confusion towards
Golymin. But, in doing so, he fell into a trap. The marshes
on either side were filled with Russian infantry, standing up
to their waists in the bog, safe from any attack by cavalry.*
From their fire, Rapp's men suffered heavily. The general
himself was wounded, and his dragoons were compelled to
fall back into line with their own infantry. To avoid what
appeared to be probable useless loss, Morand did not attempt
to advance beyond the border of the woods towards Golymin.
There he took post, with Rapp's dragoons in reserve, for the
night. Friant's division had not come into action at all.
Gallitzin and Dochtorow had now began their retreat on
Makow. Their troops, instead of obtaining some rest at
Golymin, had had a full day of fighting. Perhaps, even that
was less exhausting than plodding along the miry roads: at
least, it was less disheartening.
Dochtorow was the first to move off, as the storm of
combat lulled. It was not till 9 p.m. that Gallitzin was
able to move the last of his troops from the battlefield.
* Rapp, p. 128
THE BATTLES OF PULTUSK AND GOLYMIN. 111
He first withdrew his guns, which marched slowest and
with most difficulty. Next followed his cavalry. Behind
them was the main body of the infantry. Last of all came
the outposts, covering the ear of the infantry. When the
battle gradually died away, the Russians in Golymin were
almost surrounded; the Makow road was the only one open
to them. It was midnight before the head of Dochtorow's
detachment joined Tutchkow, and the remainder of his own
division, at Makow, 10 miles from Golymin.
As regards the proportion between the numbers engaged
on either side, the case of Pultusk was reversed at Golymin.
Gallitzin's own force was 15 battalions and 20 squadrons,*
a regiment (3 battalions) of infantry from Dochtorow and a
regiment of cavalry. At 3 p.m. he was joined by two
cavalry regiments retiring from Ciechanow, as well as some
* Wilson, p. 82. That authority asserts that Gallitzin was reinforced by
part of Dochtorow's and Tutchkow's divisions towards evening. It does not
appear probable that any of Tutchkow's troops took part in the battle.
Dumas (xvii. 176, 177) says Gallitzin had parts of his own and Sacken's
divisions and the whole of Dochtorow's-in all, 28 battalion, 45 squadrons.
On this question the authority of Hopfner seems preferable, as to only part
of Dochtorow's being present. Napoleon (Corr. 11,305, dated 24th November,
1806), writing to Murat, recapitulates the strength of that portion of his wing
of the army which was afterwards present at Golymin. Setting off losses
(Davout and Augereau had both suffered considerably in the recent actions)
against recruitments in December, it is probable the strength was slightly
below what is given by the Emperor, viz. :-
Dragoons-Beaumont (with Rapp))
I. Cavalry Reserve-
Kleins (with Murat)
Milhaud's light cavalry
II. Corps cavalry—
Davout's
Augereau's
4,800
800
1,200
800
7,600
III. Infantry—
Davout (only)
Augereau
14.600
16,000
Total cavalry and infantry
...
38,200
112
NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN IN POLAND.
of Sacken's infantry.
It would seem probable, therefore,
that he at no time had available more than 16,000 or 18,000
men.
The French had Augereau's two divisions, two of
Davout's (one of which was only in reserve), and part of the
cavalry reserve; altogether about 37,000 or 38,000 men.
The Russian losses are put at 775,† but were probably
somewhat higher.
Davout states the loss of the 1st division at 222,‡ and
Dumas says the French total losses were about the same as
those of the Russians.§
The action was a much smaller affair, in every way, than
that at Pultusk; the duration and vigour of the combat were
less. Gallitzin was at a great disadvantage as regards
numbers. To make up for this, he had two batteries of
artillery (28 guns), while the French had failed to bring to
the front any of theirs. The Russian position was an ex-
tremely strong one naturally, especially when the enemy
were unable to bring artillery to bear on the woods and on
the Russian lines. Again, Gallitzin had an advantage in
being attacked piecemeal by the different columns as they
arrived in succession. Augereau's effort had practically
collapsed before Davout arrived on the scene at all. Murat,
too, was unable to do anything beyond driving the hostile
cavalry before him back into the woods occupied by infantry.
The action was a disjointed one on the French side.
Davout's words || that " an hour after nightfall the corps of
* Augereau had sent Durosnel's light cavalry towards Pomorze to cut off the
enemy's baggage. Coming on Sacken in force, retreating on Golymin, he
turned in that direction, pressing the retreat. Reaching the field about nightfall,
he endeavoured to effect a diversion by attacking the Russian right. (Augereau's
report, Arch. Hist.)
† Hopfner, iii. 126.
‡ Davout, 140.
§ Dumas, xvii. 126. It is difficult to believe that the losses on either side
were not somewhat higher than 800. Plotho makes the Russian loss 553 killed
and wounded, and 203 prisoners.
|| Darout, p. 139.
THE BATTLES OF PULTUSK AND GOLYMIN. 113
Marshal Augereau was engaged with the enemy, nearly a
league to the left of the 3rd Corps; the darkness, and the
uncertainty as to the point of this attack, rendered impossible
any concerted action." Davout, advancing in front of
Garnowo, was exhibited to the view of the defending force
by the light behind him of the burning village, whilst his
opponents were hidden from him by the darkness and the
woods.
When all is said, these advantages were but a poor com-
pensation to Gallitzin for his numerical inferiority; it cannot
be denied that his resistance, with exhausted troops, is de-
serving of the highest praise. So brave was his defence that
Murat wrote to the Emperor, "We thought the enemy had
50,000 men.
It appears doubtful if Augereau's corps occupied Golymin
before the early morning of the 27th, when no unwounded
Russians remained there.† The exact time of its entry is
not of great importance, as it is certain that it was, in the
end, unopposed.
Napoleon, if we may accept the testimony of Jomini
speaking in his name, was more disappointed with the inde-
cisive result of the action of Golymin than with that of the
battle of Pultusk. His failure to get beyond Golymin on
the 26th, still more Soult's failure to pass Ciechanow,§
destroyed the hope of cutting the Russian line of retreat with
his left, and driving them against the Narew.
* Hæpfner, iii. 126.
† Dumas (xvii. 185), who says it was the 27th. Marbot (i. 247), who was
with Augereau, says they got into Golymin on the night of the 26th, and found
it littered with dead and dying. Augereau's own account (Arch. Hist.) is not
clear on the subject.
‡ Vie de Napoleon, ii. 342.
§ His light cavalry reached Ciechanow on the 26th, just after the enemy
had left it. That night the 1st and 2nd divisions were in front of Ciechanow,
the 3rd at Paluki, some 5 miles further on (Soult's report, Arch. Hist.).
I
....
Um
....
CHAPTER IV.
THE FIRST WINTER QUARTERS, AND EVENTS OUTSIDE
Ο
POLAND.
(a) WINTER QUARTERS.
N the 27th December the French army occupied a line
extending from Neidenburg, on the left, down the
valley of the Orezyc, to Pultusk on the right. There was
already a bridge head at Okunin, on the lower Bug; others
were at once commenced, on the Bug at Sierock, and on the
Narew at Pultusk. The 5th and 7th Russian divisions reached
a point about eight miles north-west of Rozan. Bennigsen
was at Rozan, where he was joined by the divisions of Anrepp
and Essen from Popowo.
On the 28th, Napoleon stopped the advance of his troops.
Bennigsen, finding he was not pursued with any energy,
first took position in the angle between the Omulew and the
Narew, opposite Ostrolenka. Buxhowden's army was on his
right, between Ostrolenka and Myszienec.*
Marshal Kamenskoi reappeared for a few hours at Ostro-
lenka, but, as it was ascertained that the orders he gave did
not emanate from the Czar, it was decided to disregard them.
He again returned to Grodno, finally disappearing from the
scene.
* Jomini (Vie de Napoleon, ii. 343) says the retreat on Ostrolenka was
disapproved by Bennigsen, who, losing sight of the ensemble of the campaign,
fancied that, in checking Lannes at Pultusk, he had gained a great victory
<over Napoleon.
....
THE FIRST WINTER QUARTERS.
115
Of the two Russian generals, Buxhowden was the senior.
Bennigsen, however, was not inclined to serve under him,
and looked for the chief command, which he considered his
stand at Pultusk would ensure to him. Consequently, he,
with his own army and the 8th and 14th divisions of Bux-
howden's, which had been prevented from crossing by the
destruction of the Ostrolenka bridge, marched up the left
bank of the Narew to Nowogrod, reaching it without mishap
on the 1st January. Buxhowden was 9 miles to the
north-east of Nowogrod, at Plock. The two portions of the
army were connected by a temporary bridge, the frequent
destruction of which, by floating ice, furnished Bennigsen
with a convenient excuse for not joining Buxhowden, and
for thus maintaining a semi-independent command. He could
not, however, disobey his senior's summons to a council at
which the future plan of operations was discussed. What
it was, and how it was carried out, may be left for description
until the French settlement in winter quarters has been
detailed.
Napoleon, now out of touch with the Russians, flattered
himself that he would be allowed, without further molesta-
tion, to take up his quarters, for the rest of the cold season,
in the broad stretch of country between the Vistula and the
Omulew.* His army was discontented at the hardships it
had to undergo in terrible weather, and he himself required
time to complete the organisation of his magazines, hospitals,
and transport.†
From Pultusk, and from Warsaw, he issued numerous
orders, detailing the position of each corps in the cantonments
*“I think all is finished for this year. The army is about to take up its
winter quarters" (Corr. 11523, to Josephine). The Emperor returned to Warsaw
on the 2nd January (Corr. 11,549, 48th bulletin).
†There was great disorder, at this time, in the commissariat at Warsaw,
which the Emperor had to remedy. His orders, placing under each marshal the
control of supplies in his own district, did not, at first, work satisfactorily. The
marshals, considering themselves supreme, hampered and interfered with the
collection of supplies by the civil commissaries. Napoleon had to issue severe
orders to check this (Savary, iii. 27).
116
NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN IN POLAND.
*
which he proposed to occupy. They were finally summarised
in a note by Berthier, dated 7th January, on the general dis-
position of cantonments, of which the following is an abstract.
I.-Cavalry without Infantry.
Latour-Maubourg, with the 5th and 7th Hussars, in the
country between Plock and Wyszogrod; cantonments not to
extend far, and this brigade to refit and rest.
Milhaud, with the two regiments of his brigade which
had suffered most, to rest on the right bank of the Vistula
between Plock, Dobrzyn, and Borkowo.
Klein-Dobrzyn to Bobrownik, guarding the small stream
running from Gollub to the Vistula.
Nansouty, with his heavy cavalry division, on the Pilica
about Rawa, on the road from Warsaw to Breslau.
D'Hautpoult's cuirassiers, with their artillery, about
Thorn-the regiments in Gollub, Rypin, and Sierps.
Espagne's cuirassiers to move forward from Posen to
Petrikau, behind Nansouty.
Guard cavalry, excepting four squadrons at Warsaw, with
artillery, ambulances, etc., between Warsaw and Biela, along
the left bank of the Vistula and the Pilica.
All the small depôts of cavalry, with the artillery park
of the army, to collect at Lenczyca.
Each command to concentrate at its headquarters, and
await orders, should the enemy take the offensive.
II.—Infantry Corps with Cavalry attached.
Bernadotte with Sahuc's dragoons; headquarters at
Osterode, occupying the districts of Elbing and Marienwerder.†
* These orders will be found printed in full in Dumas, xviii., pp. 288–309.
It is not very clear in Dumas, whether the note was by Berthier, but the
original in Paris dispels any doubt (Arch. Hist.).
† The Polish corps, then numbering 7000 under Dombrowski, was made over
to Bernadotte for the blockade of Graudenz (Corr. 11,535 and 11,536, dated 2nd
January). That fortress was effectually blockaded on the 18th January, after a
small fight, in which the garrison was driven in. (Bernadotte's report on 1st
Corps, Arch. Hist.).
THE FIRST WINTER QUARTERS.
117
Ney, having his supplies, depôts, park, and workshops at
Thorn, to occupy Soldau, Mlawa, Chorzel and their neigh-
bourhood, with outposts at Willemburg. His corps would
link that of Bernadotte to Soult, with whom he would settle
the limits of cantonments.
Soult, using Plock in the same way as Ney used Thorn,
to occupy Prasznitz, Makow, Sochoczin, Noviemasto, and the
Plock district, having in front of him, beyond the Orezyc,
Lasalle's light cavalry and Milhaud's brigade, with the excep-
tion of the two regiments ordered to rest on the Vistula.
Augereau, using Wyszogrod as his base, to occupy the
surrounding district up to the right bank of the Ukra, not
carrying his left beyond the stream passing Bodzanow. Should
he find himself cramped here, he was at liberty to extend to
the rear, on the Bszura, west of the Vistula, as far as Lowicz.
Davout's limits were, in rear, the left bank of the Ukra,
from its mouth to the little river Ziclini. Thence to near
Golymin, and on to near Pultusk. He was also to occupy
the whole country between the Narew and the Bug, up to
Ostrolenka.
Lannes to hold Sierock and the neighbourhood. His
light cavalry in the villages on the right bank of the Bug
from Sierock to Brok. Gazan's division, of the same corps,
was to hold the triangle between the Bug, the Vistula, and
the Austrian frontier. Suchet's division in Praga and the
suburbs of Warsaw. There also was Gudin's division of
Davout's Corps and the infantry of the Guard.
Orders issued for the collection of supplies, and the
establishment of hospitals at the bases fixed for the various
commands, at Marienwerder for Bernadotte, at Thorn for
Ney, at Plock for Soult, at Wyszogrod and Lowicz for
Augereau, at Pultusk for Davout, and at Warsaw for Lannes.
It will be noted that, with the exception of Pultusk, all
these centres were on or behind the Vistula. The Emperor's
desires were clearly stated to be, "not to have any encum-
brance on the right bank of the Vistula, so that there might be
118
NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN IN POLAND.
no obstacle to the evacuation of that country should His
Majesty see fit to order it."*
At the places named, was ordered the collection of every
sort of supplies, and the preparation of workshops for the
repair of harness, clothes, and artillery. Baking was to be
carried on to a much greater extent than was required for
the daily consumption of the army, a large supply of biscuit
being thus accumulated.
In case the enemy should take the offensive, the points of
concentration for the corps were-Ney at Mlawa, Soult at
Golymin, Davout at Pultusk, Lannes at Sierock, Augereau at
Plonsk.
It will be observed that nothing is said of a point of
concentration for Bernadotte, which would seem to point to
Napoleon's not believing he could be attacked without
warning from the corps on his right. Any marshal attacked
in force was at once to concentrate, and warn the others.
With his troops thus quartered, Napoleon's right and
centre were covering an area of country which it was well
within their power to defend against any force they were
likely to encounter. The corps, from Ney on the left to
Lannes on the right, covered roughly the segment of a circle,
the centre of which was at Wyszogrod, and the arc extended
from Neidenburg and Willemburg, down the right bank of the
Omulew and across the country from near Ostrolenka, to
Brok, on the Austrian frontier. Bernadotte's Corps alone was
unduly extended towards Elbing and the Frisches-Haff. The
whole of the arc was covered by light cavalry, and any one
of the corps behind it could be promptly reinforced from
flank and rear. Napoleon seems to have thought it extremely
improbable that the enemy would assume the offensive, still
more improbable that, if he did so, he would attack Bernadotte.
* Ney, Bernadotte, and Soult, alone, owing to their distance from the river,
were allowed to have small intermediate hospitals and depôts of supplies. The
words quoted in the text are a good instance of the caution displayed by
Napoleon, and his prevision of all possible eventualities.
THE FIRST WINTER QUARTERS.
119
He would appear to have under-estimated the Russian
generals' enterprise of design.
He urged on the fortification of important points of
support to his line. At Sierock a double tête de pont, on
the Bug and the Narew, was to be constructed; another
on the Narew, at Pultusk; a third at Modlin. The passage
of the Vistula at Warsaw was to be covered by a strongly
fortified camp at Praga, supported by works on the left bank.
Finally, Thorn was to be fortified as a bridge head.* Even
should he be forced to abandon temporarily the right bank
of the Vistula, Napoleon looked to being able to hold the
left, as well as bridge heads on the right bank at all important
points from Warsaw to Thorn. Thus, when he recommenced
operations in the spring, he would not have to force the
passage of a great river.
The object of Bernadotte's extension towards the Baltic
was to cover the siege of Danzig, which place, as a standing
menace, whilst in the enemy's hands, to his communications,
the Emperor desired to capture before the time came for a
fresh advance.
For this siege, and for the blockade of Colberg and
Graudenz, the 10th Corps was now constituted, and placed
under the orders of Lefebvre.†
* Corr. 11,585.
+ The command was first given to Victor, but he was captured by a
Prussian party from Colberg. Though he was, shortly afterwards, exchanged
against Blucher, this misfortune cost him his chance of the Dukedom of Danzig,
and, for a time, his marshal's baton. A letter (Arch. Hist., daily correspondence),
from him to the Emperor, describes his capture, as he was changing horses, by
disguised Prussian soldiers, and peasants. He is very indignant at what he
considers this unfair capture, and begs the Emperor to remonstrate with the
King of Prussia. Napoleon hardly appears to have taken the same view, as he
made no difficulty about exchanging Victor for Blucher. The constitution of
the 10th Corps at this time was—
(1) Dombrowski's Polish division, about 7000.
(2) A brigade of French infantry, about 4000.
(3) Two regiments French chasseurs.
(4) Baden troops (for blockade of Colberg), about 6000.
(5) Legion of the North, about 4000.
(6) A French cavalry brigade.
About 25,000 in all. To these would be added the Hessian troops so soon as
120
NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN IN POLAND.
Napoleon himself took up his quarters at Warsaw on the
2nd January, 1807.
Great as were the attractions of the Polish capital and its
delightful society,* it is certain that Napoleon, had he been
left undisturbed there, would have taken good care that it
should not have become a Capua, either for himself or his
army. There was no rest for him. He was employed night
and day in making innumerable arrangements, and conducting
business of every sort, from the provision of supplies for his
army to the supervision of affairs at home and abroad.
Here he may be left for the short period of cessation of
serious hostilities, whilst the course of events elsewhere than
at the principal seat of war is briefly sketched.
(b) SILESIA.
Though Napoleon's chief efforts against Russia were made
on the Vistula, it must not be forgotten that he was, at the
same time, carrying on operations, military or diplomatic,
in furtherance of his projects over the whole of Europe, from
France to Turkey, from Swedish Pomerania to Southern Italy,
and even in Persia. It is with the operations on the Vistula
alone that this history can deal in detail, but a brief outline
of events elsewhere is essential.
Silesia, when the advance to the Vistula commenced, was
still unsubdued. Though not held by any important Prussian
force in the open field, its fortresses † were strongly garrisoned,
and would afford rallying-places for Prussian levies, to say
Zayonchek with his Poles could relieve them of the duty of blockading Graudenz
(Corr. 11,680).
* It was at this time that Napoleon first made the acquaintance of the
beautiful Countess Walewska. Of her devotion to him, which continued even
to the days of St. Helena, there can be no shadow of doubt. Of the reality of
his love for her there is, perhaps, not quite the same certainty. In any case, it
is clear that he did not allow it to interfere with his energetic attention to his
army and his schemes.
†They were Glogau, Breslau, Schweidnitz, Glatz, Neisse, Brieg, and
Kosel.
EVENTS OUTSIDE POLAND.
121
nothing of being a strong support for Austria, should she
make up her mind to intervene. Obviously, these places
could not be left on the right rear of the French army.
The first siege undertaken was that of Glogau, which
surrendered, after some bombardment, on the 2nd December,
to Vandamme and the Wurtemberg troops.
The two
Bavarian divisions had, at this time, moved with Jerome to
Kalisch, Until Napoleon was in! possession of Warsaw, he
required these divisions to protect his right flank as it moved
eastwards. At Warsaw, he was able to rest it on the
Austrian frontier in safety, so long as that power remained
neutral. Jerome was, therefore, at liberty, in the beginning
of December, to return to the assistance of Vandamme and
the Wurtemberg division, who had at once, on the surrender
of Glogau, proceeded to partially invest Breslau. On the
10th, Jerome reached Breslau. On the 15th, the bombard-
ment was continued, the governor having refused to sur-
render. Deroi's division and Mazanelli's cavalry brigade,
which had been left at Kalisch, were now summoned, as it
appeared that the Prince of Anhalt Pless had raised the
peasantry in support of detachments from the other garrisons.
Vandamme, left alone owing to the departure of Jerome in
response to the Emperor's summons, attempted an assault of
Breslau on the night of the 22nd-23rd, but it was delayed by
various accidents, and was beaten off. The Prince of Anhalt
was approaching. On the 24th, his badly organised levies
were routed by Minucci's division, and their 6 guns captured.
The batteries in front of Breslau had now been strength-
ened by some of the artillery taken at Glogau, the ditches
were frozen over, and the governor negotiated for a surrender.
The negotiations were broken off on his hearing that the Prince
of Anhalt was again advancing to his relief with rallied and
increased forces. The Prince, evading the troops sent to
meet him, arrived near Breslau, whence he was repulsed, and
in his retreat was badly cut up by the detachments which
he had escaped in his advance.
122
NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN IN POLAND.
The governor of Breslau, now losing all hope of succour
from without, and fearing that the thick ice on the ditches
would expose the place to an assault, surrendered on the
7th January. The corps of Jerome now had at its disposal
the captured artillery for the sieges of the remaining fort-
resses. Napoleon, considering the subjugation of Silesia
practically complete, appointed his brother Jerome governor
of the province, and left Vandamme to carry out the sieges.*
(c) POMERANIA.
Protection for his left flank was equally essential to the
Emperor. To Mortier, with the 8th Corps,† was confided the
task of occupying and defending the conquered country
between the mouths of the Elbe and the Oder, including the
territory to the east of Stettin as far as Colberg. He had to
watch Swedish Pomerania, and to threaten Stralsund and the
Island of Rugen, which might be used as bases for a descent
by the English and Swedes.
On the 12th December, he occupied a central position on
the right bank of the Peene, his right at Uckermunde, left at
Demmin, and headquarters at Anklam. The Swedish troops
on the opposite bank fell back on Stralsund. Between
the 16th December and the 4th January, Mortier was
reinforced by four infantry regiments. To put a check
on the frequent expeditions from Colberg, he occupied
Usedom, Schweinmunde, and Wollin, at the mouths of the
Peene and the Oder. On the 6th January, a detachment,
attacked by Prussians from Colberg, at Wollin, successfully
drove them off. Mortier, refusing to be drawn into petty
fights, occupied a line behind the Peene, from Uckermunde to
* About this time Napoleon estimates his army in Silesia at over 30,000
men (Corr. 11,575).
+ It comprised Granjean's and Dupas' divisions; 3 cavalry regiments, 2
companies foot artillery, and 2 of Dutch light artillery.
22nd and 58th of the line, and 12th and 15th light infantry.
EVENTS OUTSIDE POLAND.
123
Treptow. Nothing more occurred here before the end of
January.
(d) TURKEY AND PERSIA.
At the Ottoman Court, Napoleon was most ably repre-
sented by his Corsican compatriot, General Sebastiani. The
Ambassador's clever combinations of threats and promises
were aided by the injudicious invasion, towards the end of
November, of Moldavia and Wallachia by Michelson with
50,000 or 60,000 men.* The demands of England and her
threats of bombarding Constantinople were also of assistance
to him.
The action of Russia, in thus imposing upon herself the
task of observing Turkey with a considerable force, at a time
when she wanted every available man to oppose the French
in Poland, was most unwise. Sebastiani was able, by the end
of December, 1806, to persuade the Sultan to declare war
against his Northern neighbour. The Czar, compelled by the
pressure in Poland to withdraw two out of the five divisions
with Michelson in Moldavia and Wallachia, sought to pro-
cure a diversion by England towards Constantinople. On
the 29th January, the Sultan, egged on by Sebastiani, declared
war against England also.f
In February a British fleet passed the Dardanelles, and
appeared before Constantinople. All was at once confusion
* Michelson at first had 90 battalions, 100 squadrons, and 306 guns. Of
these, 36 battalions and 40 squadrons were withdrawn to Poland in December,
1806 (Jomini, Vie de Napoleon, ii., 344 (note) and 346). According to the
same author (ii. 336) Michelson at first had 80,000 men, This seems too high
an estimate.
Plotho (p. 69-70) calculates the Russian forces as 500 per
battalion, 80 per squadron, and 200 per battery of 14 guns.
These figures
would give Michelson's original army as 58,200, and the numbers remaining
later as about 35,000. Napoleon himself, in the end of January, estimated
them at 30,000 (see ante, p. 12, note †).
† Napoleon, in seeking the co-operation of Turkey, appears to have had an
eye to using her against Austria also. "Austria is muzzled; if she moves, not-
withstanding my army of Italy, I will bring the Turks to the gates of Vienna,
and my Poniatowski will not be for them a Sobieski " (Comeau, p. 285).
124
NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN IN POLAND.
there. Sebastiani, in imminent danger of his life, kept his
head, urged on the defence of the capital, and amused the
British Admiral, Duckworth, with negotiations, until the
latter found the defences so strong that there was no course
left but a retreat again through the Dardanelles-no easy
matter, under the heavy fire of the now completed batteries
on either shore.
On the Danube, nothing of importance occurred during
the campaign in Poland; but Napoleon, by assisting the
Turks with the loan of French officers, and by threats of the
advance of Marmont's corps* from Dalmatia, succeeded in
keeping paralysed a considerable force under Michelson,
which could have been employed to much greater advantage
in Poland.
With Persia, too, he carried on negotiations in the spring,
which sufficed to alarm Russia in the East, and detain there
troops which might otherwise have given assistance in the
main theatre of war. With the affairs of Turkey and Persia
it will not be necessary, now that their general bearing on
the war has been indicated, to deal further.
* The 2nd.
PART III.
THE CAMPAIGN OF EYLAU.
AT
CHAPTER I.
THE MOVEMENTS UP TO THE BATTLE OF EYLAU.
T the council of war, held by Buxhowden, at Nowogrod,
on the 2nd January, a plan of operations had been
decided on.
The 14th division, with the two divisions under Essen I.,
now approaching from Moldavia, were to be left between the
Bug and the Narew to watch and occupy the French right
wing. The remaining 7 divisions would assemble by the
5th January, between Biala and the right bank of the Narew,
for an advance, behind the Johannisberg forest, into East
Prussia against the French left wing.
But it did not at all suit Bennigsen's views to undertake
these operations under the chief command of his senior, and
rival, Buxhowden. Seizing, therefore, on the breaking, by
floating ice, of the bridge at Nowogrod as a cover for his
action, he marched, on the 6th, up the left bank of the
Narew, by Lomza, to Tykoczin, with the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 6th,
8th, and 14th divisions, arriving there on the 8th. Thence,
crossing the Narew, he marched for Goniondz, where he
received the Czar's orders conferring on him the Order of
St. George, in recognition of his action at Pultusk, and, what
he prized still more, the chief command of the army, from
which Buxhowden was recalled. On the 12th January, he
crossed the Bobra, now covered with thick ice by the frost,
which had commenced on the 31st December.* On the
* This date is taken from Larrey, iii. 22.
128
NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN IN POLAND.
14th, he was at Biala, where Buxhowden surrendered the
command to him and left the army.
At Goniondz was left Sedmaratzki's division (6th),* to
cover the movement of the main army, and to keep up its
communications with Essen I. and the two Moldavian
divisions.
Lestocq, meanwhile, had fallen back, after the action of
Soldau, towards Gilgenburg, on the night of the 26th
December. On the march he changed direction towards
Neidenburg, with the result that there was considerable
confusion, and it was not for several days that the Prussians
were collected at the latter place. On the 7th January,
Lestocq, after retreating from Neidenburg to Oertelsburg
and Sensburg, reached Rastenburg.† On the 10th, he
marched to Angerburg, north of the Lotzen lake. On the
11th he moved westward again to Drengfurth, failing in an
attempt to recapture Schippenbeil from Ney, who had taken
it the previous day. On the 16th, he was at Barthen.‡ On
that date, Bennigsen had reached Arys, between the lakes
of Spirding and Lotzen. He had marched from Biala, on
the 15th, in four columns, the movement of which was com-
pletely concealed from Soult's cavalry, on the Omulew, by
the intervening forest of Johannisburg.
Napoleon's marshals had faithfully carried out his wishes,
with the sole exception of Ney. The keynote to the
Emperor's dispositions was the avoidance of all forward
movements calculated to rouse the enemy to activity.
He desired to leave the Russian bear to hibernate quietly,
if he would do so, whilst he himself was busy making
every preparation to awake him in the spring. Hibernation
was, as has been seen, not the Russian scheme, but Ney did
* Instead of the 14th, which had originally been ordered to stay behind, and
was now carried forward.
For this account of Lestocq's movements, see Prussian official account in
Wilson, pp. 253-254.
‡ Not Bartenstein.
MOVEMENTS UP TO THE BATTLE OF EYLAU. 129
not know that. He had received a general indication of the
Emperor's plans on the 4th January, but his cantonments
were not, in that order, precisely specified.'
*
The orders of the 4th January were surely clear enough
in their spirit to indicate to Ney the undesirability of an
offensive advance; yet, early in January, he began to
move towards Koenigsberg. His motives, according to De
Fezensac,† were the search for a country better supplied
with provisions, and an advance against Koenigsberg itself.
On the 2nd January, his light cavalry was marching on
Guttstadt by Passenheim and Oertelsburg. On the 8th-
11th, his headquarters were at Wartenburg; from the
12th to the 20th, they were at Allenstein, and he had his
troops dispersed all over the country at Bischofsburg,
Bischofstein, Seeburg, Wartenburg, Guttstadt, Queetz,
Gottkendorf, Neidenburg, Bartenstein, Oertelsburg, Mens-
guth. He had even, as far forward as Schippenbeil, a
battalion of grenadiers supporting his light cavalry still
farther out. ‡
On the 9th, he proposed a strong reconnaissance to see
if the enemy were still in Koenigsberg, but abandoned the
idea in consequence of fresh news. On the 10th he took
and occupied Schippenbeil, which Lestocq failed to re-
capture on the 11th. On the 14th, he estimated that he
had in front of him Lestocq with 9000 men, and Ruchel,
garrisoning Koenigsberg, with 4000. At the same time, he
wrote that he had no positive news of Bernadotte and
Soult, though he had incidentally heard of Sahuc's and
d'Hautpoult's cavalry divisions passing Neidenburg. He
adds that he is occupying a well-supplied country, and
* On the 4th January, Berthier had written to Ney: "The Emperor, not
wishing to make any offensive movements with his armies during the winter,
desires you to take such cantonments as will protect Marshal Soult's left and
Marshal Bernadotte's right." The distinct specification of Soldau, etc., was on
the 7th.
† Souvenirs Militaires, p. 134.
$ "Journaux de Marche," 6th Corps, Arch. Hist.
K
130
NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN IN POLAND.
his men are living in abundance.* On the 15th, Berna-
dotte wrote warning Ney that he was exceeding his orders
in advancing.† On the 16th January, Ney writes to
Berthier that he is negotiating with Lestocq and Ruchel
for a delimitation of the hostile fronts, and an armistice
requiring four days' notice for termination.
It is hardly surprising that the Emperor, when he at last
heard of Ney's proceedings, was furious. He believed that
Ney had long ago received the definite orders prescribing his
cantonments. It was only on the 18th that the Emperor
received information, and his despatches, for days after, show
traces of his anger.§ He was still ignorant, on the 26th, of
* Ney to Berthier, 14th January, Arch. Hist.
† Copy enclosed in a despatch from Bernadotte to Berthier, on 15th January,
Arch. Hist.
‡ Arch. Hist., daily correspondence, 16th January.
§ On the 18th, Berthier writes to Ney: "I have submitted to the Emperor
your letter, and one from Marshal Bernadotte informing him of the movements
you have made without his orders. He desires me to convey to you his dis-
pleasure. . . . His intentions are not to go to Koenigsberg; had he so proposed he
would have issued orders. The Emperor, in his general projects, requires
neither advice nor plans of campaign; no one else knows his designs, and it is
our duty to obey. His Majesty is all the more surprised at the movements you
have made, inasmuch as he had already explained to you the circumstances
under which you were not to act without orders. . . . The Emperor knew the
Prussians were retreating; that was no reason for you to spread your corps over
20 leagues. He orders you to take up the prescribed cantonments: do so
gradually, for this is the first retrograde step the Emperor makes. The
adjutant-commandant Jomini will explain to you how much the Emperor is
annoyed at the movements you have made without orders."
Again he wrote, next day: "The Emperor has been extremely astonished to
see by a despatch received from Marshal Soult, as well as from your own, that,
not only have you disobeyed his Majesty's orders relative to your winter quarters,
but that you have even counselled Marshal Soult to do the same. I reiterate the
order to return to the positions indicated to you for winter quarters; the
Emperor is unchangeable in his plans, and, but for political considerations,
would have made mention in the orders of the day of the non-execution of his
orders by your corps."
On the 19th, Berthier, writing to Soult, says: "His Majesty hopes that
this is the last occasion on which Marshal Ney, by his flighty dispositions, will
expose himself to the danger of compromising the fate of the army by such
grave faults."
De Fezensac (p. 136) had been sent to carry a despatch from Ney, and he
returned with Jomini and the reply. From Jomini he heard that the Emperor
MOVEMENTS UP TO THE BATTLE OF EYLAU.
131
Bennigsen's march, with the bulk of his army, against the
French left, though he saw that something was going on in
that direction.* Despatches travelled slowly in the difficult
country, and the wintry weather which now prevailed. A
severe frost had set in about the 17th, after some broken
weather.† The Emperor's information was, therefore, several
days behind time. Nevertheless, he had, from the 23rd, had
suspicions, and he, at least, expected heavy reprisals for the
irritation of Ney's march on Koenigsberg. From the 25th,
commences a series of orders calculated to meet any even-
tualities on the left. Only two days earlier, Lefebvre had
been ordered to proceed with the new 10th Corps towards
Danzig. He was
now directed to hold fast at Thorn.‡
Espagne was to march on Thorn; § Augereau to pass the
Vistula with his troops from the left bank, and concentrate
at Plonsk; || Oudinot to leave Kalisch, and reach Lowicz by
the 31st.T
Bernadotte was told ** that, owing to Ney's aggression,
was specially enraged by the armistice which Ney was negotiating with the
Prussians, and had remarked that other generals had been tried by court
martial for less grave offences. Yet Ney's conduct was not quite so bad as the
Emperor pictured it. In the Archives Historiques there is a despatch from Ney
to Berthier, dated 18th January, in which the writer says: "I received yesterday
(17th) the duplicate copy of the dispositions ordered on the 7th for the definite
quarters of all the corps, and have given orders for my troops to return in succession
to the neighbourhood of Chorzel, Soldau, and Mlawa." How Berthier's despatch
took 10 days to reach Ney is not explained. Still, with Berthier's letter of the 4th
before him (supra, p. 129, note), Ney clearly did not act in the spirit of his
instructions. Even now, he protested against the country he was ordered to
occupy as being void of supplies, and a "veritable cemetery " (Arch. Hist.,
daily correspondence).
* On the 26th, Berthier wrote to Soult: "The ill-considered point made by
Marshal Ney appears to have determined the enemy to make a movement to his
right."
† See De Fezensac's account of his journey with Ney's despatch (Souvenirs
Militaires, p. 136).
Berthier to Lefebvre, dated 25th January (printed in Dumas, xviii. 338).
§ Berthier to Espagne, 25th January (Dumas, xviii. 341).
Berthier to Augereau, 25th January (Dumas, xviii. 339).
¶ Berthier to Oudinot, 25th January (Dumas, xviii. 341).
** Berthier to Bernadotte, 26th January (Dumas, xviii. 341).
132
NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN IN POLAND.
the enemy was moving to the right. He was to hold the
line of the Passarge, and was even to go so far as to propose
to the enemy to fix that river as a boundary, intimating to
him that the Emperor had no intention of moving on Koenigs-
berg, and had recalled Ney. Should he attempt to force
Elbing, the Emperor was prepared to break up his winter
quarters, in order to prevent a passage of the Vistula by the
enemy. Elbing was not to be seriously defended. If it was
attacked determinedly, Bernadotte was to fall back so as to
cover Thorn, raising the blockade of Graudenz if he felt it
necessary, and drawing the troops before it partly to Thorn,
and partly across the Vistula.
On the 26th,* again, Ney was told that Soult would now
Occupy Willemburg and Chorzel, with his point of concen-
tration moved forward from Golymin to Prasznitz, whilst
Ney's own rallying-point was changed from Mlawa to
Neidenburg. These orders, it was remarked, were issued
on the assumption that the enemy proposed wintering in
front of Ney; a remark which clearly shows that the
Emperor had not yet grasped the full meaning and extent
of the Russian movement.
On the 27th, he was convinced that Bennigsen aimed at
nothing less than cutting off the extended French left, and,
by a movement on the Lower Vistula, endeavouring to force
the whole army to repass the river.
Such, indeed, was Bennigsen's scheme-a well-conceived
one, which had a good chance of success if well executed
against a general of ordinary capacity. The objections to it
were first, the difficulties of execution in such country and
such weather; and, secondly, the natural boldness of Napo-
leon, who could ill afford, after the checks at Pultusk and
Golymin, to expose his prestige to another blow by yielding
to the initiative of the enemy, and contenting himself with
the line of the Vistula, even with its well-protected points
* Berthier to Ney and Soult, both dated 26th January (Dumas, xviii. 343,
344).
MOVEMENTS UP TO THE BATTLE OF EYLAU. 133
of issue at Warsaw, Modlin, and Thorn. His great disincli-
nation for a fresh campaign in this season is clearly shown
by his despatch, of the 26th January, to Bernadotte,* which,
at the same time, indicated that he was prepared, in the last
resort, to undertake it.
Now that he saw it was inevitable, he prepared to make
his blow a crushing one. His scheme was to pivot on his
left at Thorn, and, wheeling forward his right and centre, to
drive Bennigsen into the angle between the Lower Vistula
and the Frisches-Haff, or against the latter.f
The movements which he had been ordering during the
last few days were all calculated to facilitate such a plan.
Murat was to assemble d'Hautpoult's, Klein's, and Latour-
* Vide supra, p. 131, note (**).
† What Napoleon's intentions were is clearly indicated in Berthier's despatch
of the 28th January to Bernadotte. "The intention of the Emperor is to
pierce the enemy's centre, and to drive to his right and left such of the enemy's
troops as may not have retired in time; but, holding fast to his system, which is
to cover Thorn, that should be the object of your movements. You would then
rejoin the left of the army, regaining, even by the rear if necessary, your com-
munications with Marshal Ney . . . the more deeply the enemy is involved the
better"
(printed in Dumas, xviii. 366). We may well believe that the
Emperor's secret hopes went further than this. If Bennigsen, unaware of his
impending fate, should push on south-westwards in pursuit of Bernadotte, it
might well happen that he would become so deeply involved as to find himself
in front of Thorn with the Lower Vistula barring his way westwards, watched
as it was by part of Lefebvre's corps spread down the left bank. In his front
he would find Lefebvre entrenched in Thorn. Wheeling to their left, and
driving Bennigsen on to the river, would be the corps of Bernadotte, Ney, Soult,
Augereau, Murat, and the Guard. In that case destruction, or at the best a
precarious retreat on Danzig, would stare him in the face.
A letter from the Emperor to Lefebvre (Corr. 11,711, dated 28th January),
warns him that the enemy, finding his left turned by Napoleon's wheel, might
march on Thorn, or across the Vistula.
Lanfrey (Hist. de Napoleon, iv. 45-46) thinks Napoleon only hoped to cut
off 15,000 or 20,000 Russians. It is true that, in his proclamation of the 30th
January (Corr. 11,739), he talks of driving the enemy across the Niemen, and
that in writing to Clarke at Berlin (Corr., dated 27th January, 1807) he warns
him to be on the look-out for 15,000 or 20,000 of the enemy, who might be
driven across the Vistula. That, however, by no means implies that this was
the limit of the Emperor's hopes, or that he did not expect to cut off a great
many more east of the Vistula, before they could reach it. See also the
concluding words of note ‡, next page.
134
NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN IN POLAND.
Maubourg's brigades at Raciaz, whilst the Emperor himself
proceeded with his headquarters to Prasznitz and Willem-
burg.*
Soult, raising his cantonments, to concentrate on Willem-
burg.† Ney to cover Soult's left, and, with Augereau now
marching on Mlawa, to unite him to Bernadotte.‡
Lefebvre was ordered to assemble his corps at Thorn for
the protection of that all-important fortress.§ Davout to
keep his advanced posts in position, and, under cover of
them, to concentrate towards Pultusk. Bernadotte's first
object was to hold on at Osterode, and cover Thorn, till
Lefebvre had assembled there, raising, if necessary, the siege
of Graudenz.¶ Bessières, with the Guard, to pass the Narew
on the 28th, and march on Pultusk on the 29th, leaving
15 guns for Oudinot at Warsaw.
Lannes' corps, and Becker's dragoons, were left to cover
the right of the army towards Ostrolenka, and in the penin-
sula between the Narew and the Bug.tt As Lannes took
* Berthier to Murat (2 despatches), dated 27th January (Dumas, xviii. 348,
349).
† Berthier to Soult, 27th January (Dumas, xviii. 350).
‡ Berthier to Ney, 27th January (Dumas, xviii. 352). Whether Bernadotte
should be able to maintain himself at Osterode, or whether he should be
compelled to retreat on Thorn, Ney and Augereau were to maintain the line
between his right and Soult's left. If, however, there should appear to be
danger of Bernadotte's being anticipated at Thorn by the enemy, Ney was to
cover that place. "The Emperor does not wish to re-occupy his winter quarters
before he has destroyed the enemy."
§ Berthier to Lefebvre, 27th January (Dumas, xviii. 350). Lefebvre was to
collect (a) his French brigade; (b) 12 guns now on their way from Warsaw;
(c) Espagne's cavalry; (d) if the siege of Graudenz had been raised, the Hessian
division; he was to keep his Poles on the left bank, watching it as far down as
possible. His objects were defined to be (a) the defence of Thorn, and the
restoration of the bridge, damaged by floating ice; (b) the watching of the left
bank of the lower Vistula as far as possible; (c) the protection of Bromberg;
(d) the formation of a reserve to the left of the army, and, possibly, an advance
on Danzig.
|| Berthier to Davout, 27th January (Dumas, xviii. 353).
¶ Berthier to Bernadotte, 27th January (Dumas, xviii. 354).
** Berthier to Bessières, 27th January (Dumas, xviii. 355).
†† Berthier to Lannes, 28th January (Dumas, xviii. 359).
MOVEMENTS UP TO THE BATTLE OF EYLAU. 135
up his position, Davout would move forward by Ostrolenka
and Makow to Myszienec, where he would leave all his
corps, except Gudin's division, by the 31st. Becker's
dragoons would quietly replace the light cavalry, which,
in turn, would, equally unobserved, replace Soult's at
Myszienec. Gudin's division, for the present, not to go
beyond Pultusk.
By these movements, the Emperor expected to have his
army, by the 31st, in the following positions:-
Lefebvre at Thorn, and down the left bank of the Vistula.
Bernadotte on his right. Augereau and Ney uniting Berna-
dotte with Soult and Murat in the direction of Willemburg,
with cavalry pushed towards Oertelsberg. Davout at Mys-
zienec. Lannes' corps and Becker's dragoons towards
Ostrolenka. The Guard and Gudin in second line, in the
angle between Davout and Lannes.
Everything being thus in readiness for the French advance
pivoting on Thorn, it is necessary to return to the movements
of the Russians and Prussians during the latter half of
January, which had induced the Emperor, much against his
will, to resume active operations.
Lestocq, driven by Ney from Schippenbeil on the 10th
January, failed in an attempt to retake it, and took post.
about Friedland. It was in this direction that a proposed
armistice between the opposing forces had so aroused the anger
of Napoleon against Ney.
Bennigsen, meanwhile, in furtherance of a promise to the
King of Prussia that he would defend Koenigsberg,† had
reached Arys on the 16th, and Rhein on the 18th, without his
movement being discovered by Ney, or by Soult, across whose
front he had marched behind the Johannisburg forest and the
Spirding lake.
Ney, on the 19th, ignorant of the storm which was
gathering on his right flank, and not yet having received
* Berthier to Davout, 28th January (Dumas, xviii. 361).
† Wilson, p. 242.

136
NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN IN POLAND.
Napoleon's peremptory orders to withdraw, still had his
cavalry at Schippenbeil. There it was encountered by
Gallitzin, on the 19th, with 40 squadrons, the Russian
advanced guard, exploring the roads from Rhein towards
Koenigsberg on the right, and Bischofstein on the left.* On
this date Lestocq, standing fast, effected his union with the
Russian right. Bennigsen marched with three advanced
guards under Markow, Barclay, and Bagavout.
On the 20th his headquarters were at Roessel, midway
between Rastenburg and Bischofstein, his cavalry driving in
Ney's with loss, and even surprising the cantonments of parts
of the corps which had still not begun their march. Lestocq
closed in towards the Güber, and, on the 21st, he and the
Russians were abreast on the line from Schippenbeil to
Bischofstein. At the latter place Colbert, with Ney's light
cavalry, retreating from Schippenbeil and Bartenstein, was
attacked by the advanced guard, and driven back with heavy
loss on to Seeburg. Bennigsen's advanced guard penetrated,
on the 21st, as far as Heilsberg. On the 22nd and 23rd, the
Russian main body halted, whilst the advanced guard moved
on towards the Passarge. On the latter date, Ney had
succeeded in making good his retreat, though not without
loss, to Neidenburg, whence he extended his corps towards
Soult on his right, and Bernadotte on his left.
Lestocq, on the 22nd, marched from Schippenbeil towards
Bartenstein, pushing outposts towards Landsberg. On the
23rd, he marched on Landsberg, so as to keep clear of the
* Hopfner (iii. 172) gives, on the authority of the original reports, the
allied strength thus:-
7 Russian divisions under Bennigsen
Sedmaratzki's 6th division at Goniondz
Corps of Essen I. at Bransk
Lestocq's Prussians about Friedland
...
:
...
66,000
8,000
18,000
13,000
Total
...
105,000
Deducting (Ibid., p. 177, note) about 3000 men connecting Bennigsen with
Sedmaratzki, he puts the force advancing from Rhein against Ney at 76,000
Russians and Prussians.
MOVEMENTS UP TO THE BATTLE OF EYLAU. 137
Russian columns, and sent his advanced troops towards
Mehlsack and Wormditt. That morning Roquette, on the
Heiligenbeil-Braunsberg road, reported having been driven
back by Bernadotte's advanced guard, which, for the moment,
induced Lestocq to suppose the marshal was marching on
Koenigsberg. However, when he reached Mehlsack on the
24th, he found that Bernadotte had abandoned Braunsberg,
and fallen back on Preussisch Holland. On the 24th, the
Russian headquarters were at Heilsberg. Markow's advanced
guard surprised and, after a sharp fight in Liebstadt, captured
about 300 French cavalry and infantry.
Bernadotte had scarcely reached the Frisches-Haff with
his left wing when he received news from his chief of the
staff, Maison, at Osterode, of the Russian offensive movement,
and Ney's retreat.*
Maison, without waiting for orders from his chief, with
admirable promptitude warned Pacthod, who was at Moh-
rungen with one infantry regiment, and directed the concen-
tration of Rivaud's division at Osterode, of Drouet's at
Saalfeld, and the retirement of the dragoon brigade from
Hohenstein.† Bernadotte, on the left, ordered the assembly
of Dupont's division, Laplanche's dragoons, and the light
cavalry at Pr. Holland, and directed Rivaud to hold
Osterode, blocking the defiles leading to it, whilst Drouet
should advance, on the 25th, from Saalfeld to Mohrungen, in
* Maison received the news from Ney (operations of 1st Corps, Arch.
Hist.). Ney has been accused of not sending warning of the Russian advance
to Bernadotte. This passage clears him.
† Bernadotte's orders had prescribed the following cantonments for his
corps :-
Dupont's Division: Pr. Holland, Elbing, Frauenberg, Braunsberg.
Rivaud's Division: Osterode, Mohrungen, Deutsch Eylau.
Drouet's Division: Saalfeld, Christburg, Riesmuhl with detachments at
Marienburg and Marienwerder.
Light Cavalry: To occupy the whole length of the Passarge.
4th Division of Dragoons: One brigade at Hohenstein, communicating with
Ney;
the other in reserve between Pr. Holland 'and Elbing (Bernadotte's
report, Arch. Hist.).
138
NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN IN POLAND.
order to support Pacthod's regiment there, and to give security
to the march of Dupont from Pr. Holland to Osterode.
On the 25th, Bennigsen's headquarters reached Arensdorf,
his left column, passing the Alle at Guttstadt, reached the
Passarge at Deppen, the advanced guard going forward to
Alt-Reichau on the road to Mohrungen. The right column
marched through Arensdorf to Liebstadt.
Lestocq, who had turned towards Mehlsack when he
thought Bernadotte was moving on Koenigsberg, had to make
a very long march to reach, with his headquarters, Schlodien,
on the 25th. His outposts were towards Mulhausen, Pr.
Holland, and Mohrungen - 4 battalions still behind the
Passarge. In this position he was joined by Rouquette, now
released, by Bernadotte's retreat, from guarding the road to
Koenigsberg near the Frisches-Haff.
ACTION OF MOHRUNGEN, 25TH JANUARY.
It was at Mohrungen, on the 25th, that there occurred
the first serious action between the advancing Russians and
the retreating French. Markow, with the advanced guard of
the right wing, had learnt, from the prisoners taken at
Liebstadt, that Bernadotte was on the march for Mohrungen.
Pushing on, he arrived near Mohrungen about noon on the
25th.* There he found Bernadotte with 9 battalions and 11
squadrons made up partly from Pacthod's regiment, partly
from Dupont's division arriving from Pr. Holland, and partly
from Drouets from Saalfeld.† Seeing the Russian advance,
Bernadotte sent to hurry up Dupont to his assistance, and
* Bernadotte (Arch. Hist.) thinks that Ney had abandoned Allenstein with
too much precipitation, thus leaving Bernadotte exposed on his right flank.
After the series of rebukes and peremptory orders he had received, it seems
scarcely fair to blame Ney for following to the letter his orders from
headquarters.
† Bernadotte reached the field, just as Markow appeared, with one battalion
9th Infantry, the 27th and 94th Regiments, and Laplanche's dragoon brigade
(Bernadotte, Arch. Hist.). The same authority puts the enemy's strength at
20,000, which was considerably too high.
MOVEMENTS UP TO THE BATTLE OF EYLAU. 139
prepared, with what troops he had, to attack Markow. That
general took up a position on the heights in front of
Georgenthal, north of Mohrungen. In first line he placed
two regiments of infantry, in second line one regiment. Two
battalions of another regiment, with the third in reserve,
advanced towards the defile of Pfarrersfeldchen. In front of
them, towards Mohrungen, was a regiment of hussars. To
the right front of Georgenthal were 2 battalions of jägers,
and in the village itself 3 more battalions-altogether 17
battalions and one regiment of hussars, besides cossacks.*
Scarcely had these dispositions been made when, about
1 p.m., Bernadotte's cavalry attacked the hussars. The
latter, at first victorious, were forced by the French artillery
to retire, and take post to the left of Georgenthal. The
French cavalry, in turn, were brought to a standstill by the
Russian guns.
Bernadotte now sent urgent orders to Dupont to make
for the Russian right flank, marching from Hagenau by
Koenigsdorf and Wiese, whilst he himself attacked in front.
He carried Pfarrersfeldchen with a rush, and advanced against
the main Russian position.† Darkness was already falling
on the field, when the two jäger battalions began to fall back
before his attack. They were supported by their reserve,
but Dupont's flank attack, from Wiese on Georgenthal, now
began to make itself felt. Notwithstanding the brave resist-
ance of 6 battalions detached against Dupont, Markow felt
himself outmatched, and compelled to retreat. At this
moment Anrepp arrived on the field, announcing that he was
* Bernadotte says that when he arrived, the plain in front of Pfarrersfeld-
chen was "inundated" by cossacks (Arch. Hist.).
+ For the attack of Pfarrersfeldchen, Bernadotte employed the battalion of
the 9th, and one of the 27th. He pushed forward 4 guns on to a height
commanding the village. The 9th were at first beaten off from Pfarrersfeldchen,
whilst the 27th made steady progress against the wood on the right. The
attack was then reinforced by the 2nd battalion, 27th, and by the 8th light
infantry, with the 94th in reserve, and dragoons in support. The 1st battalion
of the 27th, at the wood, lost, but again recovered, its eagle.
140
NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN IN POLAND.
hurrying up the cavalry of the Russian right wing. He
was mortally wounded as he moved to the front.
Following up the retreating Russians, the French lost
heavily. Dupont had now succeeded in defeating the two
regiments opposed to him, and was nearing Georgenthal.
In this moment of victory, Bernadotte heard firing
behind him at Mohrungen, but was unable to judge of the
strength of the force which had, apparently, taken him in
rear. Abandoning, therefore, the pursuit, he marched his
men back on Mohrungen.*
The cause of the noise was an inroad of Russian cavalry
upon the baggage in Mohrungen. Gallitzin, with the cavalry
of the left wing, had reached Alt-Reichau, and sent forward
3 squadrons, under Dolgoruki, supported by 6 more under
Pahlen, to reconnoitre through the defile between the Narien
and Mahrung lakes.† This force, reaching the western side
of the lakes at nightfall, moved on Mohrungen, which they
found almost denuded of troops, but full of baggage, and
supply columns. The place was promptly attacked, its
defenders captured, and the baggage plundered. Beyond it,
the cavalry met Bernadotte, retracing his steps with his
troops, and was compelled to retreat, carrying with them
some 360 French prisoners, 200 released Russian and Prussian
prisoners, and a quantity of plunder. They lost, however,
* Bernadotte (Arch. Hist.) points out the danger of his position, liable,
as he was, if defeated, to be cut from Rivaud's/division at Osterode.
† According to Danilewski, the sound of the battle at Mohrungen did not,
owing to the stormy weather, reach Gallitzin, so that Dolgoruki's arrival was, in
a sense, accidental (see Hopfner, iii. 185).
‡ According to Wilson (p. 35, note) they found in Bernadotte's personal
baggage 12,500 ducats which he had levied for himself in Elbing, as well
as a quantity of plate bearing the arms of minor German states, from which
it had been taken. Bernadotte's servant, when asked to point out his
master's property, denied that these articles were part of it. They were, how-
ever, found in the marshal's own quarters, and in such quantity that he could
hardly have been ignorant of their presence. If this story is correct, the future
King of Sweden cuts but a sorry figure in the episode. His own account (Arch.
Hist.) of the movements of his corps omits all mention of the irruption of
Russian cavalry into Mohrungen.
MOVEMENTS UP TO THE BATTLE OF EYLAU. 141
part of their force, which had been surrounded when it rashly
advanced too far towards Pfarrersfeldchen.
The action in front of Mohrungen might have involved
Bernadotte in a serious disaster, had Markow promptly sent
for assistance, from Gallitzin on his left, and from Anrepp on
his right. The Prussians were, perhaps, too far off to be
able to render much assistance; yet they had, at Hagenau,
to some extent hindered Dupont's junction with Bernadotte.
Bernadotte should have taken measures to guard the defile
between the lakes on his right rear. Probably he felt that
he had not sufficient troops available to be able to spare
any for this purpose.† Had he been able to do so, his
right flank and rear, to a distance of some miles, would
have been admirably protected. Till Dupont's arrival, he
was in a considerable inferiority in numbers, and by that
time the mischief was done.
*
The loss in this action was heavy, probably about 2000
on either side.‡
Lestocq on this day (25th) reached Hagenau as day
closed, after an engagement with part of Dupont's division
on its retreat from Pr. Holland.§
Proposing to free Elbing from the enemy, the Prussians
started on the 26th for Pr. Holland, but were ordered by
* The military importance of the lakes in this direction is well brought out
in the critical remarks of Count von Waldersee (representing Marshal von
Moltke) on the 66th problem set by Von Moltke in 1882 (Moltke's Tactical
Problems, text, p. 164). In the problem the western army is supposed to be
endeavouring to join an army corps to the north, and has to guard its flank
against an army east of the lakes.
+ De Fezensac (p. 140) says Bernadotte had only 9000 against 16,000, but it
is not quite clear whether he refers to the earlier portion of the action, or to
the later period when Dupont had arrived. At the latter period the French
probably had a superiority of numbers.
This is the number admitted by Wilson as the Russian loss. Bernadotte
gives his own losses as 700 or 800, whilst putting that of the enemy at 1600
(report in Arch. Hist.).
§ Lestocq, unlike Gallitzin, had heard the cannon at Mohrungen
(Hopfner, iii. 186), from which it may be inferred that a strong east wind was
blowing.
142
NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN IN POLAND.
Bennigsen to advance on Liebstadt. When they had got
halfway there, a fresh order directed them on Hagenau again,
to be prepared to support an attack on Mohrungen next
morning. After some twenty miles of marching and counter-
marching, they were much where they had been in the morning.
Bernadotte, on the 26th, fell back on Liebemühl, avoiding
the direct road to Osterode, which was rendered dangerous
by its proximity to Gallitzin's force at Alt-Reichau."
*
Bennigsen occupied Mohrungen with part of his main
army on the 26th, the rest coming up on the morning of
the 27th. His right advanced guard moved on Liebemühl,
the left on Allenstein, the former place having been
evacuated by Bernadotte who had continued his march on
Löbau, where he was joined by d'Hautpoult's cuirassiers on
the 29th, from the neighbourhood of Gollub. He thus
commanded 17,000 infantry, and 5000 or 6000 cavalry,
on the 30th. On the 28th, Bennigsen found himself at
Mohrungen with his troops wearied by 10 days of marching.
He decided to rest and replenish his stores.
Lestocq he again sent off farther to the right. On the
29th, that general reached Rosenberg, with outposts towards
Freystadt, Beschofswerder, and Deutsch Eylau. Rouquette's
detachment had marched on Marienwerder. The Prussian
advance had resulted in the raising of the blockade of
Graudenz by the Hessians. Bennigsen's right advanced
guard extended to Saalfeld, his left to Guttstadt. On the
30th, he sent Bagration to Deutsch Eylau to strengthen his
link with the Prussians, whilst he proposed to march him-
self towards Allenstein. On the 31st, Lestocq was at Frey-
stadt, with outposts at Lessen, Schönau, and Schwarzenau,
* Bernadotte's report says that the enemy's movement on his left flank,
threatening to cut him from Thorn, compelled his retreat. His corps was
completely assembled only on the 28th, at Roecken on the road to Löbau. On
the 30th and 31st, he was drawn up there for battle. On the latter day at
noon, he marched for Strasburg, his rear guard being roughly handled by the
enemy at Brattian. He did not leave Strasburg to advance again till the 4th
February (Arch. Hist.).
MOVEMENTS UP TO THE BATTLE OF EYLAU. 143
and 100 cavalry between him and Graudenz, which was
being rapidly provisioned. Bagration, with the right ad-
vanced guard of the Russian army, was at Deutsch Eylau
with detachments on the Drewenz. The left advanced
guard, and the 2nd division, were in and behind Allenstein,
with a detachment, under Barclay, at Osterode. The 5th,
7th, and 8th divisions under Tutchkow were at Samrodt,
between Mohrungen and Pr. Holland; the 13th and 14th
divisions, commanded by Sacken, with headquarters at
Gotteswalde, were on the march south of Osterode; reserve,
4th division under Somow, at Guttstadt; Bennigsen him-
self was in Mohrungen; cavalry of the left wing was as
far forward as Hohenstein and Passenheim.
On the same date, the French positions were:-Lefebvre
on the extreme left, at and about Thorn, and down the left
bank of the Vistula; Bernadotte at Strasburg; Ney at
Gilgenburg; Augereau at Neidenburg and Janow; Guard
(Bessières) at Chorzel; Davout, with two divisions, at
Myszienec, and Gudin's at Prasznitz; cavalry reserve
cavalry__reserve
(Murat) and Soult about Oertelsburg and Willemburg;
Savary, with the corps of Lannes (who was ill at Warsaw),
at Brok on the Bug.
Bennigsen was under the impression that he had suc-
ceeded in his enterprise, almost without a blow, and that
Napoleon was about to recross the Vistula between Thorn
and Warsaw. On the 1st February, the scales fell from his
eyes, and he saw, not only the full disposition of the French
army, but also the whole of Napoleon's great scheme for
his destruction.
Whatever might have been the effect of Bennigsen's
move in inducing a general of ordinary capacity to abandon
the country beyond the Vistula, Napoleon was the last
person to follow such a course. Bennigsen had not yet
appreciated his boldness, and he was, therefore, surprised
when the Emperor himself conveyed to him, unintentionally,
a full statement of his scheme. Bennigsen's flank march
144
NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN IN POLAND.
against the French left is a good example of the futility of
a good design if not supported by equally good execution.
His first fault was his waste of time, and force, in marching
up the Narew, and not joining Buxhowden directly. His
second was the direction of his march from Rhein towards
the head of Ney's column, instead of towards its rear. Had
he turned boldly to the south-west, he must, almost infallibly,
have separated Ney from Soult, and destroyed the greater
part of the former's corps. He would also have antici-
pated Bernadotte at Mohrungen and Osterode, and separated
Dupont's and Drouet's divisions from Rivaud's, forcing
them, probably, to cross the Vistula.
With Ney's corps, and two-thirds of that of Bernadotte,
cut off, Napoleon's position beyond the Upper Vistula would
have been one of extreme peril. It is difficult to see how he
could have maintained himself on the right bank.
Bennigsen lost two days by halting on the 22nd and
23rd-the fatigue of his troops probably rendered this in-
evitable. His halt at Mohrungen was, nevertheless, fortunate
for him, for it was then too late to cut off Ney or Bernadotte,
and a further advance would have plunged him more deeply
into the trap which Napoleon had now prepared for him.
*
Napoleon, too, had underestimated his adversary's
capacity for designing a bold move. It was not till the
27th January that he was convinced that the movement
against his left was anything more than a reply to Ney's
aggression. As a matter of fact, Ney had no part in in-
fluencing the Russian scheme, for it was decided on before
the marshal began to move northwards.
The Emperor, convinced at last that he must, unwilling
though he was, enter on a fresh campaign, lost no time in
pressing it to what he hoped might be a final decision.
On the 30th January, Berthier sent orders to Bernadotte
to concentrate wherever he might be, but to be careful to
* That is if the design was Bennigsen's at all. There is some reason for
believing it was not his, but Buxhowden's.

MOVEMENTS UP TO THE BATTLE OF EYLAU. 145
cover Thorn, until he was certain Lefebvre was there. Once
there, the latter would be able to hold it, if necessary, for a
week, which was more than would be required of him.* The
place was of infinite importance, as the hinge on which the
whole French movement was to turn.f
Napoleon had left Warsaw on the night of the 29th
January. On the evening of the 30th, he was at Prasznitz,
on the 31st, at Willemburg. The marshals had been warned
that the advance would commence on the 1st February.
From Willemburg a despatch was sent to Bernadotte by
Berthier. It ordered the 1st Corps to join the left of the
army under the immediate command of the Emperor. The
march was to be concealed from the enemy by being made
at night; a light cavalry regiment was to be left behind to
keep up the bivouac fires all night, and then, in the morning,
to retire slowly on Thorn, turning back any French convoys
it might meet, and warning Lefebvre that he was now de-
pendant on his own resources. If possible, Bernadotte was
to reach Gilgenburg, though, if he found serious difficulty,
he might continue to cover Thorn. The despatch gave
details of the positions of the other corps, and contained
the significant words, "It is unnecessary for me to tell you
that the Emperor, desiring to cut off the enemy, would prefer
your joining his left; but he must trust, in this, to your zeal
and your knowledge of the actual circumstances in which
you are."‡
* Berthier to Bernadotte, dated Prasznitz, 30th January, Dumas, xviii. 374.
† In Corr. 11,711, dated 28th January, Napoleon warns Lefebvre that the
enemy, finding himself turned by the French advance from the right, may
march on Thorn.
Berthier to Bernadotte, dated Willemburg, 31st January, Dumas, xviii.
380. A second despatch was sent off at 7 p.m., in which Berthier states that
the Emperor does not understand Bernadotte's meaning when he says that the
enemy is manœuvring against the left by Mlawa. He only knows of one Mlawa,
but that is not on Bernadotte's left. The despatch continues: "I have sent
you orders an hour ago; you will be guided by what has passed on the 31st ; if
the enemy is, as you suppose, in retreat on Osterode, you will pursue him
prudently; nevertheless, His Majesty hopes he will not have been in time to
escape altogether." Then follows a long complaint of the delay in carrying




L
146
NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN IN POLAND.
*
Here was Napoleon's whole plan of campaign, stated
with the lucidity which characterised his despatches. This
all-important paper was given by Berthier to the first officer
who came to hand. A young officer, fresh from one of the
military schools, was on his way to join his regiment in
Bernadotte's corps. He might as well be utilised to carry
the despatch. Naturally, he knew nothing of the country
he had to cross, nothing of the enemy's positions, and he
probably was only able to get a very sorry mount.* This
despatches. The officer with Bernadotte's despatch had been 15 hours on the
road. This second despatch is not given by Dumas. The fate of these two
despatches is narrated in one from Bernadotte (Arch. Hist.), dated 3rd February.
In it he explains that what he meant about Mlawa was that, whilst 8000 or
10,000 of the enemy were manoeuvring on his left, another column was reported
to be moving towards Mlawa on his right, and the Emperor's left. He goes on
to explain that he only received the second despatch, dated 31st January, 7 p.m.,
on the 2nd February. The one of an hour earlier never reached him, and he is
ignorant of what the orders were. He had ascertained from the villagers that
it was captured by cossacks at Lautenburg from a young officer of the École
Militaire, who was carrying it. The captain who carried the second despatch
had heard the same story.
The next despatch from Berthier to Bernadotte is dated 3rd February, 4 a.m.,
and says it appears possible Bennigsen will fight at Liebstadt, in which case
the Emperor desires Bernadotte to join his left, via Osterode, for the battle. The
next is dated 5th February, 8.30 p.m. It says that Ney has cut off the
Prussians. The Emperor believes Bernadotte to be at Osterode, but has no
news of him. He hopes Bernadotte is approaching the enemy by Liebstadt, or
by Guttstadt, from Osterode. On the 6th, at 3 a.m., Berthier again writes that
Ney had taken 3000 prisoners from Lestocq. Bernadotte is urged to try and
come up with this disorganised corps, as Ney is wanted to join the Emperor's
left (Arch. Hist., daily correspondence). Evidently, Bernadotte's despatch of the
3rd February, announcing the capture of Berthier's of the 31st January, had
not reached headquarters yet, and the Emperor was still ignorant of the marshal's
position.
The first despatch of the 31st January was sent en clair. Jomini (Fie de
Napoleon, ii. 359) makes the Emperor say that it would have been wiser to use
a cypher, and that he afterwards adopted this practice.
It appears to have been the custom in the Grand Army to assume that
every officer carrying despatches was properly mounted, and knew the country,
whereas the contrary was more often the case. "An officer always had an
excellent horse, he knew the country, he was never taken prisoner, he never
met with an accident, he arrived quickly at his destination; and this was so
little doubted that a second officer was by no means always sent. All this I
knew," says De Fezensac (p. 116), speaking of his mission with orders to Ney on
the 8th February.



MOVEMENTS UP TO THE BATTLE OF EYLAU. 147
unfortunate young man fell in with a party of cossacks sent
forward by Bagration towards Strasburg. He was captured
before he could destroy the paper, and the inestimable
prize reached Bennigsen, after being read by Bagration
on the 1st of February. Only one copy having been sent,
Bernadotte received no orders, and, therefore, stayed where
he was.
For Bennigsen, obviously, an early retreat was the only
possible course.] He "had fallen headlong into the trap; his
attention was fixed on Bernadotte, whom he was pursuing.
He was rushing blindly on his destruction," when his eyes
were suddenly opened by the captured despatch, whilst there
was still time to avoid the noose.† Yet he was unwilling
to seek safety in rapid retreat; moreover, he had, if possible,
to gain some time for Lestocq and Bagration to join him.
The former knew nothing of the French movement. The
latter had read the despatch to Bernadotte before forwarding
it, and acted on the information. On the 1st February, the
advance of the French right wing commenced by the move-
ment of Murat with the light cavalry, and of Soult's corps
on Passenheim, from which Dolgoruki was driven back on
Allenstein. Soult's light cavalry was sent to Mensguth to
safeguard the right.
Ney reached Hohenstein the same day. Davout, from
Myszienec, sent Marulaz with his light cavalry, 2 infantry
regiments, and 2 guns, to reconnoitre towards Johannisburg.
Gudin's division was at Chorzel. Lefebvre was ordered to
pursue the Prussians, as they retired between Marienwerder
and Osterode, and to re-invest Graudenz.‡


* Jomini, Vie de Napoleon, ii. 355.
† "This intelligence, which ought not to have been unexpected, created
some surprise" (Wilson, p. 89).
Hopfner (iii. 198) observes that Napoleon seems to have overlooked the
fact that they could have retreated in safety on Danzig.
The garrison of Graudenz had been closely blockaded and driven into the
fortress on the 18th January (Bernadotte, Arch. Hist.).
They were very short of supplies, and on the point of surrender, when
relieved, and their magazines replenished by Lestocq (Wilson, 144).
148
NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN IN POLAND.
On this day, Bennigsen ordered his army to concentrate
on Jonkowo. The reserve, from Guttstadt, and Sacken,
from Seeburg, were called up. Barclay was to wait at
Allenstein for Dolgoruki, retiring from Passenheim. Bagra-
tion had, of his own accord,* started for Liebemühl and
Allenstein, leaving his comrades to attack Bernadotte's out-
posts, and induce him to believe in an advance against
himself. On the 2nd February, Murat and Soult occupied
Allenstein, which was evacuated by Barclay's advanced guard.
It retired to Gottkendorf, whilst Bennigsen assembled the
greater part of his army behind the heights of Jonkowo.
There he took post, his right resting on a marshy wooded
valley, his left on the Alle at Mondtken, his front covered
by a small brook-now, of course, frozen over.
Ney nearly reached Allenstein, Augereau was half a day's
march from it, Davout was moving on Oertelsburg, after
leaving a strong rear-guard † at Myszienec to keep up the
communication with Savary. The Guard reached Passenheim.
On the 3rd February, Ney and Augereau, arriving at Allen-
stein, drove the _Russian_outposts on their main body.
Napoleon, hearing of the Russian position at Jonkowo‡
ordered the Guard to Allenstein, and himself reached
Gottkendorf about mid-day.§
Under cover of Ney's horse artillery, he threatened
Bennigsen's front with Ney's and Augereau's corps and St.
Hilaire's division of Soult's. Soult himself, with his two
other divisions, went down the right bank of the Alle to


* In consequence of his perusal of the captured despatch to Bernadotte.
† The rear-guard consisted of the 111th Regiment, the 2nd battalion 85th,
and the 2nd Regiment of chasseurs à cheval (Davout, 159–160).
This place is called Jonkendorf on the modern map. The name has been
retained here in the form used in all accounts of the campaign.
§ Up to the 3rd February, Napoleon was very doubtful as to the enemy's
intentions. On that day he writes to Murat: "Everything leads to the belief
that the enemy will try to re-unite at Guttstadt; it is impossible to believe
he will allow his left flank to be turned;" but he goes on to express his anxiety
lest the enemy, instead of retiring, should march by Mohrungen, Liebstadt, or
Osterode on Allenstein (Corr. 11,772).
MOVEMENTS UP TO THE BATTLE OF EYLAU. 149
seek a crossing at Bergfried, which would bring him out
on the left rear of the Russian army. Davout, who had
been attacked as he was on the way from Oertelsburg to
Wartenburg, received orders to turn towards Spiegelberg
and join Soult's right. Guyot's light cavalry, of Soult's
corps, was directed on Guttstadt; Gudin's division, on the
march from Prasznitz, was ordered to Oertelsburg by
Mensguth.
ACTION OF BERGFRIED, 3RD FEBRUARY.
For the protection of the bridge over the Alle at
Bergfried, Bennigsen had posted the 14th division (Kamen-
skoi) and 3 Prussian batteries. Four battalions undertook
the defence of the defile, whilst the rest remained in reserve.
One battalion held the village of Bergfried, on the right
bank.* The Prussian guns, on the heights of the left bank,
commanded the approaches to the bridge and flanked the
village, but the left bank above and below Bergfried, and the
heights behind, do not appear to have been occupied by
Russian infantry, so that the defence was confined to the
defile itself.
It was 3 p.m.† when the head of Leval's division appeared
before Bergfried. Two batteries were brought into action
against the Prussian guns, a third enfiladed the defile from
the heights to the left of Bergfried. The 24th Light Infantry
was directed to the attack of the village and bridge, whilst
Vivier, with the 4th of the Line and a battalion of the 28th,
attempted to cross the Alle below Bergfried.‡
The frontal attack on Bergfried was repulsed by the
* Soult (Arch. Hist.) says the Bergfried position was defended by 8000 men,
who were later reinforced by a second division of equal strength. This seems
excessive.
+ Sunset about 4.40 on this date.
Dumas (xvii. 346) says Vivier was to ford ("passer à gué ") the river.
Wilson (p. 89) says: "The Alle was long frozen, but impassable on account of
the snow that rested on its bed." What Vivier had to ford was not water, but
soft, deep snow.
150
NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN IN POLAND.
artillery and infantry fire of the defenders. A second,
enveloping attack was more successful, but a heavy fire of
case prevented the French from promptly following up the
Russian infantry, as it crossed the bridge in retreat.
Pressing the attack with great vigour, Leval's infantry
broke over the bridge, forcing the guns to retire. Presently
rallying, the Russian infantry charged again with the
bayonet. Carrying the enemy before them, they retook the
hotly contested bridge, in a desperate hand-to-hand fight on
it and the causeway. One Russian company, in the heat of
the moment following across the bridge, was almost destroyed,
and forced to retire.
Vivier, during this period, had not made much progress,
though some French accounts pretend that he succeeded
in taking the heights on the left bank, thus leaving the
passage open to Leval, and inflicting heavy loss on the
enemy. The Russians, on the other hand, say a fresh attack
on the bridge was repulsed. Soult himself says that, though
he drove the enemy across the bridge, and Viviers' flank
attack compelled him to retire, yet the division of Leval
bivouacked that night on the heights above Bergfried on
the right bank, keeping only outposts on the left bank.
Legrand was at Spiegelberg and Braunswalde, one brigade
at each place. St. Hilaire, who in the morning had had a
successful brush with the enemy, was at Kaltflies.
Soult's account vouches for the finding of 800 dead
Russians on the field, and puts his own loss at 300. The
losses were probably more equal.*
Bergfried was certainly not the decided success that
Napoleon represented it to be. Even accepting the account
most favourable to the French, they had done no more than
get across the river, and could not risk occupying the farther
bank in force at night. The attack, commencing only an
hour and a half before sunset, was too late to enable Soult
to take part, on that day, in the fight at Jonkowo. As,
* Soult, Arch. Hist.

MOVEMENTS UP TO THE BATTLE OF EYLAU. 151

however, he had reached a position threatening Bennigsen's
left rear, the position at Jonkowo was no longer tenable.
In front of Bennigsen, Napoleon confined his operations
to a delaying action, awaiting the expected turning move-
ment of Soult and Davout. Nothing beyond a desultory
exchange of artillery fire occurred in this part of the field.
The Emperor still hoped that Bennigsen would remain to
fight next day, in which case, with Davout and Soult
descending on his rear, he must almost certainly have been
destroyed.
At daybreak on the 4th, the Emperor moved forward,
Murat in front of the centre, Ney on the right of Jonkowo,
Augereau on the left, Soult, from Bergfried, towards Mondtken.
It soon appeared that Bennigsen, aware not only of Soult's
presence at Bergfried, but also of the capture of Guttstadt by
Guyot on the previous evening, had retreated during the
night, leaving only a strong rear-guard to waste Napoleon's
time by inducing him to deploy for battle. The course which
he followed, in retreating northwards, was Bennigsen's only
chance of assuring his communications with Koenigsberg,
which were seriously compromised by the loss of Bergfried,
and by Davout's advance on Guttstadt.
The Russians marched in three columns, under Sacken,
Gallitzin, and Tutchkow, on Wolfsdorf and Arensdorf.
The rear-guard followed, also in three columns, under the
general command of Bagration; Bagavout on the right,
Markow in the centre, Barclay de Tolly on the left. They
were followed and harassed all day by Ney, Murat, and
Soult.
A sharp cavalry fight occurred between Ney and Bagavout
at Waltersmühl. Bagavout, reinforced by Bagration, and
touching Markow's column, kept up a running fight till
nightfall put an end to it.
Murat pushed on to Deppen, whence he drove the enemy
after a cavalry combat.
Soult, closely following the Russian left column, and
152
NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN IN POLAND.
frequently attacking it, reached at nightfall, Heiligenthal,
Ankendorf, and Alt Garschen. Davout, with Friant's division
and his light cavalry (Marulaz'), reached Rosengarten in rear
of Soult; Morand's division at Wartenburg, Gudin's, towards
Oertelsberg.* Augereau bivouacked at Pupkaim, behind
Murat.
Bennigsen, still anxious for the junction of Lestocq, who,
with the longer distance he had to traverse, had only reached
Liebstadt † on the evening of the 4th, once more took up a
position, as if for battle on the morrow, at Wolfsdorf, on the
road from Liebstadt to Guttstadt. The news of the French
occupation of Guttstadt, and his consequent anxiety for his
communications, decided him once more to make a night
march, leaving Lestocq to his fate.
Early on the morning of the 5th he marched through
Arensdorf on Frauendorf, halting 14 miles short of it, at
Burgerswalde.
Napoleon, convinced that Bennigsen was making for
Landsberg, continued to manoeuvre by his right with the
corps of Soult and Davout, whilst Ney and Murat delayed
the Russian rear-guard. The two wings were connected by
the Guard and Augereau's corps, under the Emperor's imme-
diate command. Davout was ordered to march direct on
Guttstadt; Soult to pursue between Guttstadt and Liebstadt,
towards Arensdorf, but in touch with Davout's left; Murat
to reconnoitre towards Liebstadt and Wolfsdorf, attacking
the enemy with his main body should he find him in position.
Ney would push the enemy towards Wolfsdorf and Arensdorf.
Ney had scarcely started, when it was reported that there
was a strong hostile force on his left, south of Liebstadt,
seeking to cross the Passarge. The Emperor at once ordered
* Davout, p. 152.
† Lestocq reached Deutsch Eylau from Freystadt on the morning of the
3rd February. Later in the day he was at Osterode, where he received a despatch
from Bennigsen, urging his junction with the Russian right. On the 4th, he
was marching through the defile between the Marien and Mahrung lakes, with
outposts towards the passages at Deppen and Waltersdorf.
MOVEMENTS UP TO THE BATTLE OF EYLAU. 153
him, with his two divisions and Lasalle's light cavalry, to the
left bank of the Passarge, towards Liebstadt. At 11 a.m. he
was attacked by Lestocq's advanced troops, and driven
back into the Waltersdorf defile. A wood, in which was
the French advanced guard, was stormed and taken. Ney,
arriving with his whole force in three columns, attacked the
wood, and drove the Prussians from it with heavy loss.
Continuing the pursuit till dusk, he forced the enemy † to
retreat between the lakes to Mohrungen.
Ney had only defeated an advanced guard which was
trying to cross towards Bennigsen's supposed position.
Lestocq, with the main body, succeeded in reaching Wusen,
on the right bank of the Passarge. Ney arrived at Liebstadt,
thus cutting off the advanced guard which he had driven on
Mohrungen.‡
Whilst these events were occurring on the French left,
Bennigsen, detaching a force § to hold Heilsberg and protect
his left flank, continued his retreat on Landsberg, his rear-
guard constantly stopping to fight. He took position for the
night at Frauendorf, his rear-guard strongly posted at the
entrance of the woods 12 miles short of it.
Soult, reaching Freymarkt, through Wolfsdorf and Arens-
dorf, had an advanced guard of 2 battalions, and his light
* 5 or 6 battalions, 3 cavalry regiments, and a horse artillery battery.
† Dumas (xvii. 355) says 2000 prisoners and 16 guns were taken, besides
killed and wounded. Hopfner (iii. 211) shows that this is an exaggeration.
Only 8 guns were engaged on the Prussian side. On the 6th February, at
3 a.m., Berthier wrote to Bernadotte that Ney had taken 3000 prisoners from
Lestocq, on the road between Schlitt and Liebstadt, and had pursued him
towards Mohrungen. Bernadotte was urged to fall upon, and complete the ruin
of this beaten corps, thus allowing Ney to join the Emperor's left (Berthier's
correspondence, Arch. Hist.). Jomini (Vie de Napoleon, ii. 357) says Lestocq
lost 16 guns and many prisoners.
‡ Napoleon was by no means certain what troops had opposed Ney. This
was perhaps due to the fact that Lestocq had Russians with him as well as
Prussians. The Emperor (Corr. 11,781) writes to Talleyrand that his only fear
is that it is nothing but the Prussians whom Ney has intercepted.
§ 3000 men (Wilson, p. 93). Davout (p. 154) puts the force at 4 Russian
regiments, several thousand cavalry, and 20 guns.
154
NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN IN POLAND.
cavalry, a mile or two farther on. Murat, after aiding in
Ney's fight, also reached Freymarkt.
Davout sent Marulaz, with a handful of cavalry, to
Heilsberg, which he occupied without opposition, but was
presently driven out and back on Reichenberg. Morand's
division and Gudin's reached Guttstadt; Friant's, with
Davout himself, arrived at Benern and Freymarkt, where it
joined Soult. On its march, news reached it of Bennigsen's
detachment moving to Heilsberg.
Continuing his retreat during the night of the 5th-6th
February, Bennigsen reached Landsberg.
On the morning of the 6th, Napoleon detached Davout
with Morand's division against Heilsberg; Friant's follow-
ing on Launau. Just as Davout had succeeded in ejecting
the enemy from Heilsberg, Friant appeared from Launau and
took up the pursuit, with Marulaz, towards Eylau, inflicting
some injury on the enemy on the road. Gudin only reached
Heilsberg after it was captured.
On Davout's left, Durosnel's light cavalry brigade main-
tained his communication with the corps moving on
Landsberg. The latter marched in a single column, Murat
in advance, followed by Soult and Augereau, through
Frauendorf.
ACTION OF HOF, 6TH FEBRUARY.
Bennigsen, himself going on to Landsberg, had left his
rearguard between Glandau and Hof. Barclay de Tolly
there commanded 4 infantry regiments, 3 of cavalry, 2 of
cossacks, and a horse artillery battery.
In his front he stationed 1 battalion of jägers, with 2
squadrons of hussars, and 2 guns.
About 3 p.m. the head of the French column appeared,
led by Murat. The Russian advanced force, now reinforced
by 2 more squadrons, was quickly driven in.
Barclay, finding that he would have to sacrifice himself
for the benefit of the army, drew up his little force in front
MOVEMENTS UP TO THE BATTLE OF EYLAU. 155
of Hof, behind a marshy stream. Immediately behind the
bridge, he placed a hussar regiment, supported in rear by 2
regiments of infantry, and another of hussars. On the wooded
heights to his right, he posted a jäger regiment with some
hussars; on his left, another jäger regiment, also in a wood.
The French skirmishers, advancing about 3 p.m.* against
the Russian left, were driven back when their opponents had
been strengthened by one of the jäger regiments from the
centre.
Murat next, leading the dragoons he had with him and
followed by d'Hautpoult's cuirassiers, hurried across the
bridge. Their formation constricted by the narrow defile, the
dragoons were overwhelmed, before they could reform beyond
it, by the onslaught of the Russian hussars and cossacks, and
were carried back in confusion across the bridge. The
reserve Russian regiment, following over the bridge without
orders, was in turn overthrown beyond it, and pushed back
across it by the French. The flight of this regiment broke
the other also, and both were hotly pursued until their horse
artillery brought the French cavalry to a halt, and compelled
them to retire.† Again reinforced, Murat once more
advanced, but was checked by an infantry regiment in
squares. This afforded time for the rally of the Russian
hussars who yet again drove off the dragoons. At last, the
cuirassiers, led by d'Hautpoult, came to their rescue, and by
* Wilson, p. 95. The Russians placed 8 picked battalions with their right
on Hof, and their left on a wood, their front covered by a deep ravine and 8
guns. The Emperor ordered the cavalry to attack without waiting for Soult
(Marbot, i. 254).
† Soult says the first cavalry attacks were repulsed, but d'Hautpoult's
cuirassiers bore down everything before them, and broke a Russian square.
Ledru's brigade reached the Hof plateau at the same time as the cuirassiers
(Arch. Hist.). Marbot (i. 254) says the Emperor thought it better to attack
with the cavalry without waiting for Soult. The light cavalry was first
repulsed, then the dragoons; finally d'Hautpoult's cuirassiers crashed through all
opposition.
Speaking of Murat's handling of the cavalry at Hof, Jomini (Vie de
Napoleon, ii. 356) remarks that he insisted on passing his brigades, in succession,
through the defile of a marshy brook, thereby exposing them to defeat in detail.
156
NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN IN POLAND.
sheer weight bore down the Russian dragoons, driving them
in wild confusion on the infantry squares, killing, wounding,
and capturing many of the Russian horsemen. Two
standards and 4 guns also fell into the hands of the victors.*
Barclay hastened through Hof to take a fresh position on
the other side. On his right the jäger battalion on the
wooded height had been surrounded, and was compelled to
force its way with the bayonet to another wood in rear.
In Hof, Barclay found 5 fresh battalions, which Bennigsen
had sent with Dolgoruki to his assistance. Leaving him
there, Barclay went to his left wing, where the French,
strongly attacking the wood, were endeavouring to cut off
from Landsberg the battalion stationed in it.
At the same time Dolgoruki was attacked in the centre.
Reinforced by Gallitzin † with two cuirassier regiments, he
succeeded in holding his ground till nightfall, when the
whole rear-guard fell back over the little brook which crosses
the road between Hof and Landsberg. On either side of this,
the contending armies faced one another, during the night, in
close contact.
The Russian loss in this engagement was 5 guns, 2
standards, and more that 2000 men. That of the French
was rather higher.
*The Russian regiment thus defeated was the Petersburg dragoons. In its
flight it broke two of the supporting battalions, riding over them, and exposing
them to terrible loss at the hands of the pursuing French cavalry (Wilson, pp.
95, 96).
This Prince Gallitzin, whose death in this action is mentioned by Wilson,
was not the commander of the Russian cavalry, but a younger man of the same
name who had just joined the army.
‡ Soult (Arch. Hist.) gives the Russian loss at 8000, of whom 3000 killed,
and 1500 prisoners. It seems that this must be an exaggeration. His own
losses he gives at—
Legrand's division
Light cavalry
...
Totals
...
1750
210
1960
but this takes no account of the losses among the dragoons and cuirassiers. He
also gives the guns taken as 11. The Russian losses in the text are those given
by Hopfner (iii. 216).
MOVEMENTS UP TO THE BATTLE OF EYLAU. 157
On this day, Ney was still opposed to Lestocq, who
marched to Engelswalde, near the Mehlsack-Zinten road, with
his rear-guard at Körpen and Bornitt, towards the Passarge.
He was not molested on the 6th by Ney, who, from Liebstadt,
reached Wormditt, where he received an order from Napoleon
to march on Landsberg, and form the left of the army in the
battle which the obstinate resistance at Hof had led the
Emperor to believe would be fought next day at Landsberg.
Davout was, at first, ordered to march on Landsberg on the
7th for the expected battle, but was later diverted towards
Eylau.*
Napoleon still believed that Bernadotte was following, and
would account for, the Prussians. As a matter of fact,
Bernadotte, owing to the capture of the despatch of the 31st
January, had only received orders on the 3rd February, and
was still two marches behind, at Mohrungen.†
But Bennigsen had no intention of fighting at Landsberg.
During the night he marched for Pr. Eylau. The rear-guard,
under Bagration, did not leave Landsberg till 8 a.m., when,
after an hour's fighting, it was driven out by Murat and
Soult.
Bennigsen, marching, during the latter part of the night,
in a single column on the Landsberg-Eylau road, was com-
pelled to clear it by sending his heavy artillery round to
the left to rejoin him at Eylau.
Napoleon promptly followed with Murat, Soult, and
Augereau, countermanding the orders to Davout and Ney to
join his right and left flanks at Landsberg. Ney was ordered
to march from Landsberg on Kreuzburg.‡
* Davout, pp. 156, 157.
† Bernadotte, Arch. Hist. His marches in his fresh advance were: 4th
February, Strasburg to Löbau; 5th, at Löbau; 6th, Löbau to Osterode; 7th,
Osterode to Mohrungen; 7th, Mohrungen to Reichertswalde.
He was at Liebstadt on the 5th; on the 6th at Wormditt, behind the
Drewenz (the small stream near Wormditt), with a detachment at Pr.
Holland; on the 7th he bivouacked outside Landsberg, on the Kreuzberg road
(Ney, Arch. Hist., " journaux de marche ").
THE
CHAPTER II.
THE BATTLE OF EYLAU.
(A) ACTION OF THE 7TH FEBRUARY.
HE road from Landsberg to Koenigsberg passes, for the
first 9 miles, through alternate plain and forest, finally
emerging, in a clearing, about a mile and a half before it
reaches the large village of Preussisch Eylau. In front of
this forest there stretches, to the north, east, and south, an
undulating plain, the greatest elevation on which amounts
to no more than a hillock. In the foreground, on the left
of the road, is the lake of Tenknitten, extending half a mile
north-west to the village of the same name; to the right is
the Waschkeiten lake. The space of 1000 yards between
the two lakes is occupied by slightly elevated ground, with
a fairly marked height across the road.
Half a mile before the road reaches Eylau, it begins
to descend a slope to the valley, in which the village is
situated. Viewed from this point, the depression bears
a strong resemblance to some of the open valleys of
Norfolk and Suffolk.* The height of the near edge is
inconsiderable; that of the farther side, beyond Pr. Eylau,
still less. The substantial village lies chiefly in front,
stretching some little way right and left of the road.
Towards the right of it, the church and cemetery stand on
a well-marked mound. The houses, as well as the church,
* Jomini describes the valley as "an undulating plain bounded on three
sides by more accentuated country and hills, among which are several lakes
(Vie de Napoleon, ii. 360).
THE BATTLE OF EYLAU.
159
were, in 1807, solidly constructed, and afforded good cover to
a force defending them.
Through the valley, from Rothenen a mile south-east of
Eylau, past Althof two miles north-west of it, flows a little
stream, the Pasmar. Under the near slope of the valley is a
long marshy lake. There are several other ponds in the
valley, and on the eastern plateau.
On Eylau converge the roads from Landsberg, Kreuzberg,
Koenigsberg, Friedland, Bartenstein, and Heilsberg. Beyond
the village the ground soon begins to rise again, and attains
the crest of the opposite plateau at a distance of 1000 paces
from the outskirts of Eylau. This side of the valley resembles
the other in contour. Its crest is rather lower on the
Landsberg-Koenigsberg road, somewhat higher farther east
by the village of Serpallen, where the highest point in the
neighbourhood, the Kreegeberg, overlooks the whole scene.
On the arc of a circle, drawn with the Eylau church as its
centre and a radius of 2500 yards, will be found the village
of Schloditten, on the Koenigsberg road; the hamlet of
Anklappen on that to Domnau and Friedland; and Serpallen
in the valley, a little to the left of the road to Bartenstein.
Behind Schloditten is Schmoditten; * behind Anklappen
lie Kutschitten and Lampasch; to the north of Serpallen is
Klein Sausgarten: all places of importance in the great
battle.
The horizon beyond Schmoditten is bounded by forest;
there are extensive birch woods in the centre of the triangle,
the angles of which are represented by Anklappen, Kutschitten,
and Klein Sausgarten,-more woods beyond Serpallen, and
between Rothenen and the western edge of the valley; behind
the spectator is the forest through which has passed the road
from Landsberg. In summer, all this scene is a sheet of
ripening wheat and rye, interspersed with green meadows,
and picked out by the darker colours of the woods, and by
* As will be seen presently, Dumas appears to have confused these two very
similar names.
160
NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN IN POLAND.
the blue of the lakes and ponds—a scene to which the horrors
of war seem wholly foreign.* Very different was the view
on this 7th of February: cold and desolate, much more
appropriate as a setting to the bloody scenes which were to
be enacted there in the next few hours. The whole surface
of the country was wrapped in a white pall of deep snow,
against the, as yet, unstained purity of which the black woods,
the villages, and the troops † stood out in sharp relief. The
undulations and the elevations, never very strongly marked,
were even less discernible than when colour and shade were
there to lend assistance to the eye.‡ The lakes and streams
were obliterated by the thick covering of snow which lay on
their frozen surface. So firmly were they locked in the grasp
of frost, and so completely concealed by the snow, that troops
of all arms, horses, waggons, guns, passed over their frozen
surface, without the men being aware that water lay beneath
their feet. There was no repetition of the shelling of the
ice at Austerlitz, which played such ghastly havoc with the
Russians there. The gunners knew not there was ice; had
they known it, it is by no means certain that they could have
broken it through the three feet or more of snow protecting
it from all but a plunging fire which could not be brought,
in that flat country, to bear on it.§
"In our pursuit of the Russians (in June) we passed by Eylau. Three
months before, we had left the fields covered with snow and corpses; now,
they presented a lovely carpet of green, studded with flowers " (Marbot, i. 276).
† Larrey (p. 84) remarks that Baron Gros' picture of Napoleon at Eylau
very correctly shows how the dead and wounded on the field showed out in
sharp contrast to the background of snow.
This remark is based on a photograph taken of Eylau from the descent of
the Landsberg road in March, 1901, when the battlefield, as in February, 1807,
was covered with snow. The picture of Napoleon at Eylau by Baron Gros
conveys the same idea. It may be remarked that this large painting appears to
represent the moment just before the attack on Eylau on the 7th. Bagration's
troops are passing in retreat through the intervals of Barclay de Tolly's division,
drawn up to cover the retreat, with guns posted on the small elevation in front
of the church.
§ As will be seen shortly, the 18th Regiment of Soult's corps came under
artillery fire (chiefly grape, it is true), when on the ice, without its being broken.
THE BATTLE OF EYLAU.
161
Such was the scene which met the eyes of Bennigsen's
troops as they wearily left the forest, after their 9 miles
night march from Landsberg, on the forenoon of 7th February.
Passing across the western plain and the valley, Bennig-
sen carried the main body of his army to the eastern slope,
and there ranged it, ready for the great battle which he
had determined to fight. To cover his operations,* he left
a strong rear-guard on the Ziegelhof plateau, as that to the
west was styled. This force was commanded by Bagration,
who posted it thus.f
On the rising ground crossing the road, a short way after
it passes the hamlet of Grünhofchen, was the horse artillery,
commanding the mouth of the defile between the woods.
Immediately behind the guns were, on the right, standing
on the frozen surface of the Tenknitten lake, one grenadier
regiment; in the centre, and on the left, two musketeer
regiments. In second line was another grenadier regiment.
In front of the guns, covering the whole of this line, and
passing back, leftwards, to and along the north-western shore
of the Waschkeiten lake, a jäger regiment was extended in
line of skirmishers. Behind the Tenknitten lake, north of
the road, was another musketeer regiment, with some artillery
in front of it, on the slope down to the lake. Behind this
advanced force, not far from where the descent to the Eylau
valley commences, were ranged the troops of the 8th division,
their left resting on the Heilsberg road, their right on that
of Landsberg. In front of the left were 14 guns, on the
edge of the Waschkeiten lake. In the space between that
lake and the long lake at the foot of the slope, 25 squadrons
* This was one motive assuredly. Bennigsen also assigns, correctly no
doubt, as his motive the protection of the line of march of his heavy artillery.
Owing to his having to march from Landsberg on a single road, he was forced,
in order to avoid blocking his column, to send his heavy guns by a more
circuitous route to the north. (See Russian official account, printed by
Wilson, p. 238.)
† Bennigsen began his retreat from Landsberg at dusk on the 6th, and was
in position at Eylau by noon on the 7th (Wilson, p. 96).
M
162
NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN IN POLAND.
stood in three lines. On the right, beyond the Landsberg
road, were 10 more squadrons. Further to the right front,
behind the village of Tenknitten, were posted the Petersburg
dragoons, who had suffered such a disastrous defeat on the
previous day.
Barclay de Tolly was charged with the defence of Eylau
itself. Part of his artillery held the church height on his left,
covered by infantry in front and on the left. The rest of his
infantry and artillery were in Eylau, and at the saw-mill on
its right rear.
It was 2 p.m. when Murat's cavalry, followed by the head
of Soult's corps, began to arrive at the edge of the woods
about Grünhofchen After the experience of the previous
day at Hof, the cavalry did not hurry alone to the attack
of the position. Soult sent forward on the left the 18th
Infantry, on the right the 46th, against the ridge across the
road.* Schinner's and Vivier's brigades, as they came up,
moved to the right, through the wood to Grünberg farm, to
turn the Russian left. Augereau, arriving later, was ordered
to turn the enemy's right by Tenknitten. At first, however,
the 18th and 46th were unsupported in their attack on the
centre. The 18th, somewhat in advance of the 46th, crossed
the end of the frozen Tenknitten lake under a heavy artillery
fire. Changing direction to the right, against the Russian
position, and already shaken, they were charged with the
bayonet. To complete their discomfiture, the Petersburg
dragoons, burning to avenge their overthrow at Hof, crossed
the lake and fell impetuously on the left of the 18th, which
had not time to form squares.† It suffered severely, and
* This action is described in Soult's report, Arch. Hist.
† According to Hopfner (iii. 223) both battalions of the 18th were over-
thrown by this charge. Dumas (xviii. 7) says only one battalion was broken.
This is also Napoleon's version (Corr. 11,796). Soult's report (Arch. Hist.) is
not precise on the point. He admits the 18th lost one of its eagles, but says he
believes it was buried in the snow when the regiment broke; it might be found
at the bottom of the lake near the road, as it would have sunk when the ice
melted. This remark shows that the 18th were actually on the frozen lake
when attacked, and that artillery fire did not break the ice.
THE BATTLE OF EYLAU.
163
was thrown into complete disorder. Fortunately for this
regiment, Klein's dragoons came on the scene, and, charging
the Russians, relieved the pressure on it, though not till the
disaster had occurred.
Just after this catastrophe, the 46th reached the Russian
front. It was attacked several times, but succeeded in main-
taining order in its retirement.
Soult, placing his guns on the rising ground about
Scheweken and Grünhofchen, opened fire on the Russians.
Schinner and Vivier had, by this time, got forward in the
wood on the right, which had delayed their progress.
Augereau, too, was moving on Tenknitten. When, therefore,
the attack on the Russian centre on the road was renewed
by the rest of the divisions of Leval and Legrand, supported
by St. Hilaire's, the Russians, feeling the danger on both
flanks, were already retiring on Bagration's main body near
the edge of the valley.
Vivier and Schinner moved on both sides of the Wasch-
keiten lake. The former overpowered the cavalry between
the lake and the valley, thus outflanking Bagration and
compelling him to retire on Eylau. There his men passed
through the intervals of Barclay's troops, drawn out at and
in front of the village.
Napoleon was now master of the whole plateau-from the
forest to the edge of the valley. His loss had been so heavy
that, three weeks later, when the Russians again returned to
Eylau, they found a hillock, on the scene of Soult's first
attempt, literally cased with dead bodies.* The opposing
armies were ranged on opposite sides of the valley, into
which, like a great bastion in front of the Russian line,
protruded the position of Barclay de Tolly.
It was not within the scope of Napoleon's intentions to
storm Eylau that night. He would have preferred to halt
on the easily defensible position of the western plateau,
until the arrival of Davout on his right, and of Ney on his
* Wilson, p. 96.
164
NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN IN POLAND.
left, should enable him to attack Bennigsen with his whole
army. Bernadotte, he hoped, had relieved Ney of the pursuit
of Lestocq. Into the assault of Eylau on the evening of the
7th he was forced by circumstances beyond his control. Part
of the Reserve cavalry followed the retreating Russians into
and beyond the village, so did some of Soult's corps. The
action there became so severe that it soon reached a stage at
which it was impossible to break it off.*
* The statement in the text differs from most of the previous accounts, and
requires proof.
Wilson, Alison, Thiers, Jomini, and Hopfner, all assume that Napoleon
designed the attack on Eylau on the 7th. Dumas goes further, saying,
"Napoleon, gauging the necessity of its (Eylau's) occupation,
Soult to drive the enemy from it."
•
ordered
The first piece of evidence in favour of the view adopted in the text is the
statement of Marbot (i. 255), which, taken alone, would perhaps not outweigh
the authorities quoted. Marbot, who was attached to Augereau's staff,
positively states that he heard the Emperor remark to Augereau on the
western plateau, "They wanted me to carry Eylau this evening, but I do not
like night fighting; moreover, I do not wish to push my centre too far forward
before Davout has come up with the right, and Ney with the left. I shall wait,
therefore, till to-morrow, on this high ground, which can be defended by
artillery, and which offers an excellent position for our infantry. When Ney
and Davout are in line, we can march simultaneously on the enemy." In this
Augereau expressed his concurrence. Meanwhile, the Emperor's personal
baggage having come up, was, owing to a misunderstanding, carried forward
into Eylau. The Russians began plundering it, Soult's men endeavoured to
rescue it, and the enemy, believing a serious attack to be intended, brought up
reinforcements. The battle thus developed beyond the point at which it was
possible to break it off. Napoleon's remark is, on the face of it, eminently
reasonable, and such as might have been expected from him. Augereau's
report makes no allusion to it; but, it must be remembered, he was on the sick-
list when the report was written, and, in any case, he would not necessarily
record a remark made to him personally, not concerning his own corps.
The next item of evidence is the Relation d'un Témoin Oculaire. This
pamphlet is attributed by Sir R. Wilson (p. 88, note) to Napoleon himself. It
was published in Paris in 1807, and obviously must have been approved by the
Emperor, if not inspired by him. On p. 9 the following remarks occur:
"The
dispositions for turning the enemy's rear-guard were no longer necessary once
the rear-guard had rejoined the main army. The Emperor gave orders to
remain in order of battle on the plateau of Eylau. But Vivier's brigade, which
had been ordered to turn the left of the rear-guard, advanced to the Eylau
cemetery, and there found itself engaged."
The last item of evidence is Soult's account of the operations of his corps
THE BATTLE OF EYLAU.
165
As Bagration and Markow retreated through Eylau, they
were covered by Barclay's men and guns in the gardens and
houses of the village. Here Markow and Bagavout separated,
the latter going towards Serpallen, the former turning to the
left towards Schloditten.
Legrand's and part of Leval's division, both of Soult's
corps, arrived in front of Eylau by the Landsberg road, and
one regiment pushed through, but was promptly charged and
driven back.* The rest encountered a strenuous resistance
from Barclay's infantry, from 2 guns at the junction of the
Kreuzberg and Landsberg roads, and from the artillery in
front of the church.
Whilst they were vainly endeavouring to get forward into
the streets, Vivier's brigade was reforming in several columns
on the ice-covered lake below the western heights. The bank
on its eastern side sheltered them from the artillery at the
cemetery. As these fresh troops, supported by St. Hilaire's
division, advanced to the storm of the cemetery and church,
(Arch. Hist.). He says the Russians were followed into Eylau by part of the
Reserve cavalry and by the 24th infantry of his own corps, which pushed into
and beyond the village, but was driven back again. An impulse had been
imparted to the troops, in consequence of which they got engaged in Eylau to
such a degree that it was impossible to withdraw them without great risk.
Besides, in the misery in which the troops were, Eylau, with its shelter and
its supplies, was an irresistible attraction to them. Whatever the danger of
the attack, it was impossible to withdraw the infantry.
The whole tone of the report (dated Elbing, 15th November, 1807) is that
of an apology for a movement which Soult felt to be undesirable, and knew was
against the Emperor's wishes.
The cumulative evidence of these statements of eye-witnesses, notwithstanding
discrepancies in detail, appears to lead irresistibly to the conclusion that the
storming of the village was forced upon the Emperor and Soult against their
better judgment. Once taken, Eylau could not be abandoned. Besides, by
this time, the Emperor appears to have been led to believe that Bennigsen
was again retreating (Jomini, Vie de Napoleon, ii. 358).
* It is a little difficult to say for certain what happened in the left part of
Eylau. Soult (Arch. Hist.) says the 24th Regiment passed right through it,
but, being attacked on the farther side, was driven back into the outskirts.
This seems to lend some colour to the assertion of Wilson (p. 96), that the
village was at first evacuated under a misapprehension of orders, and then
re-occupied.
166
NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN IN POLand.
the combat in the streets became more and more embittered
and sanguinary. At 5 p.m. the church and cemetery were
carried by storm, Barclay being severely wounded in the
gallant defence which he made there. Vivier had previously
succeeded in getting into the cemetery, but had been forced
out by a counter-attack. He now established himself in the
church and cemetery, where his brigade spent the night sur-
rounded by the dead and dying victims of the fearful struggle.*
Bagration was preparing to evacuate the rest of the village,
when Somow, with the 4th division, was sent forward from
the main position beyond, to retake Eylau at any cost. Led
by Bagration on foot, the division advanced to the attack
in 3 columns. They had much to endure from the French
infantry fire, and from the guns which swept the streets with
grape. By 6 o'clock, nevertheless, they had succeeded in
recapturing the village. Then came a sudden change. At
6.30, Bennigsen withdrew the 4th division again to the eastern
heights, covering its retirement with the Archangel regiment
of infantry in line of skirmishers, and with two battalions
advanced, on its right, to the saw-mill. Barclay drew off to
the left of Bagavout at Serpallen; and Eylau, once more
evacuated, was quietly reoccupied by the French by 7 p.m.†
The firing on both sides died fitfully away as the Russians
reached their station on the uneven edge of the valley. No
attempt to follow them was made, but, presently, Napoleon
moved Legrand's division just beyond Eylau, into the
space between the Koenigsberg and the Friedland roads.
Schinner's brigade was in the houses near the church;
Ferey's held the left of the village.
From the church height towards Rothenen, St. Hilaire's
division bivouacked in the open. Beyond him, on the
extreme right, Milhaud's cavalry occupied the ground in
* Soult's report, Arch. Hist.
+ Dumas fixes the final occupation of Eylau so late as 10 p.m. (xviii. 8).
Wilson says that at the commencement of the French advance on Eylau the
village was evacuated by the Russians, owing to some misapprehension of orders
(Wilson, p. 96). (Vide supra, p. 165, note.)
THE BATTLE OF EYLAU.
167
front of Rothenen and Zehsen. Grouchy's and Klein's
dragoons were behind Eylau, left and right respectively of
the Landsberg road. On Ferey's left, were the cavalry
brigades of Colbert, Guyot, Bruyère, and d'Hautpoult.
Still farther to the left, was Durosnel's cavalry of Augereau's
corps.
In 2nd line Augereau's corps bivouacked in and in front
of Storchnest and Tenknitten. The Guard infantry was on
the heights occupied in the afternoon by Bagration's main
body; the cavalry of the Guard on the right of the Landsberg
road, in line with its infantry.*
Bennigsen's army was thus disposed for the night. His
first line extended along the heights from Schloditten to
to Serpallen, passing across the Friedland road at a distance
of only 1000 paces from Eylau.† The ground, it must be
remarked, was not an even glacis-like slope, such as was
that in front of St. Privat in 1870. It was a series of
hillocks and slight transverse depressions, like that of the
Suffolk valley, with which comparison has been made. The
descent on the French side was similar. On the extreme right,
commencing from Schloditten, Markow commanded 12
cavalry regiments, with 6 more somewhat in advance of his
line. Beyond his right were some cossacks, seeking com-
munication with Lestocq. From his left, the line was
continued by 11 infantry regiments, each with two battalions
deployed in front, ‡ and the 3rd, a little distance in rear, in
* This is the position assigned to the Guard by the " témoin oculaire,” whom
there is no reason to doubt in this case. Hopfner (iii. 228) places the Guard
cavalry behind Ferey, and next to Klein. He also says there were 18 line
regiments of infantry with the Guard on the western heights.
† Wilson (p. 98) describes the Russian position as about two miles long and
one deep, bounded by fir woods, except in rear of the right and in continuation
of the left. Pr. Eylau had no species of work to protect it, and was in a
hollow about 300 yards in front of the Russian right centre on the hill which
rose above the village so as to overtop the houses.
‡ Jomini (Art of War, p. 295) remarks that this was also the order used by
Napoleon at the Tagliamento. It is, he says, "suitable for the offensive-
defensive, because the first line pours a powerful fire upon the enemy, which
must throw him into more or less confusion, and the troops formed in columns
168
NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN IN POLAND.
column. In front of Serpallen was Bagavout, with 2 infantry
and 2 hussar regiments. There, too, was what remained of
Barclay's force.
In 2nd line were 10 regiments of infantry in column at
battalion intervals.
In these two lines were the 2nd, 3rd, 5th, 7th and 8th
divisions. The 4th had halted, in its retirement, across the
Koenigsberg and Friedland roads, in front of the main line.
The 3rd line consisted of 5 regiments of infantry of the
14th division, and formed the reserve in front of Anklappen,
under Kamenskoi.*
The rest of the cavalry was behind the centre and left
wing, partly deployed, partly in column.
The right was commanded by Tutchkow, the centre by
Sacken, the left by Tolstoi, the reserve by Dochtorow, the
cavalry by Gallitzin.† Sixty horse artillery guns were at
Anklappen. The rest of the artillery (400 guns and
howitzers) was ranged in front of the 1st line, but behind
the advanced position of the 4th division. There was a great
battery of 70 heavy guns opposite Eylau, another of 60 on
the right, and a third of 40 between the centre battery and
Kl. Sausgarten. These three great masses of guns were in
addition to the more widely distributed batteries along the
line.
In these positions, the two armies prepared to pass the
night following the terrible combat of the evening, and
may debouch through the intervals and fall with advantage upon him while in
disorder."
* Quite a different person, of course, from the commander-in-chief of the
beginning of the campaign.
† Bennigsen had 7 divisions, viz. the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 7th, 8th and 14th.
Sedmaratzki, with the 6th, was left at Goniondz, and the two divisions which
had come from Moldavia were between the Narew and the Bug. The 1st was
the Guard, not yet at the front.
‡ The idea of maintaining a separate artillery reserve has, in modern times,
been abandoned. Regarding this reserve at Eylau, Jomini remarks (Art of
War, p. 289) that it had a powerful influence in enabling Bennigsen to recover
himself when his line had been broken through between the centre and the
left.
THE BATTLE OF EYLAU.
169
preceding the far more awful struggle of the morrow. It
requires a strong effort of the imagination to picture the
horrors of that night. The valley and the heights on either
side, deeply buried in snow, were lit by the bivouac fires
of 120,000 men. The flames flickered in the icy north wind
which swept along the positions, carrying with it the smoke
from the damp wood, and the constantly falling snow. Not
even the pale light of all these hundreds of fires could
impart warmth to this arctic scene. The men crowded round
the fires for warmth, hardly for rest; for what rest was possible
in such circumstances? Between the opposing lines of fires
stood the outposts of the armies, and the sentries, who, on
their cheerless posts, must have thought with envy even of
their companions behind them. So close were the main
lines that-
"The fix'd sentinels almost receive,
The secret whispers of each other's watch:
Fire answers fire; and through their paly flames
Each battle sees the other's umber'd face."*
The French had some shelter in the houses and in the
blood-stained church of Eylau. Milhaud's men were protected
by Rothenen, Augereau's by Tenknitten and Storchnest. A
large proportion, however, had no means of guarding them-
selves from the bitter blast and the frequent snowstorms.
If the sufferings of the French were great, far greater were
those of their enemy. Schloditten and Serpallen could only
shelter a few on the extremities; Anklappen was a mere
hamlet, in which Bennigsen and his staff could scarce find
accommodation. During the night, the cold increased in
intensity; the thermometer, which stood at 14° Fahr. on
the evening of the 7th, had by morning fallen to 2º above
zero.† The sufferings of the wounded were terribly aggravated
by the cold. In Eylau, a hospital had been extemporised in
the largest building. In the morning, when the village was
* Shakespeare, K. Hen. V., act iv., chorus.
† Larrey, iii. p. 37. The temperatures given by him in terms of Reaumur's
scale have been reduced to those of Fahrenheit's for the text.
170
NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN IN POLAND.
no longer suitable, temporary hospitals were established in
barns on the Landsberg road; but the straw, and even the
thatch, had been taken from them for the cavalry horses,
so that they were exposed on all sides, and the sufferers
had to be laid on the remaining débris of straw, sprinkled as
they were with snow. So intense was the frost, that the
very instruments fell from the hands of the attendants as
they waited on the operating surgeons.
*
In the villages nothing
Augereau and his staff
Food was lacking to both sides.
was left but potatoes and water.
with difficulty obtained a loaf or two of bread. The provision
trains had not been able to follow closely the long French
column, marching from Landsberg on a single road. The
Russians suffered still more severely from hunger and cold.
For days previously "the soldiers had to prowl and dig for
the buried food of the peasantry; so that, between search of
provision and duty, they had scarce time to lie down, and
when they did, they had no other bed than the snow, no
shelter but the heavens, and no covering but their rags.”‡
If the French commissariat, on which Napoleon had
lavished so much care, was unable to provide his army
promptly with the necessaries of life, how much worse must
have been the case of the Russians, whose commissariat
arrangements were almost non-existent! How terrible must
have been the sufferings of their wounded, for whose relief
on the battlefield there was, at present, no provision!
The man to whose boundless and unscrupulous ambition
all these miseries were due, Napoleon, having completed
the arrangement of his army, retired to a house in Eylau,
whence the most staring evidences of the mortal combat
had been hastily removed. There, sitting on a chair, he
slept for some hours in the midst of all the carnage, the
dying, and the dead.§ All around, his men were pillaging
* Larrey, iii. 38.
† Marbot, i. 256.
+ Wilson, 94.
§ This is the generally accepted version (see Alison, vii. 347, and Thiers, vii.
415). The plan of the battle in the account of the "eye-witness" shows, as
THE BATTLE OF EYLAU.
171
the village, and ransacking it for food.* If his hopes were
buoyed by visions of another Austerlitz or Jena on the
morrow, he still had ever before him the possibility of
another Pultawa. He alludes more than once, in his corre-
spondence from Poland, to the fate of Charles XII. He had
met with unexpected resistance at Pultusk, at Golymin, at
Bergfried, and at Hof. Might not the coming battle result
in defeat?
Bennigsen, too, was doubtless full of apprehension.
Whatever he might have written of his previous battles, he
knew well that he had not yet won a real victory. Were he
decisively defeated, his army, driven upon Koenigsberg,
might be ruined and compelled to surrender in the cul de sac
between that fortress, the sea, and the Curisches-Haff.
On
the other hand, he knew that Austria was only waiting for a
distinct, not necessarily decisive, defeat of the French to throw
in her lot with the allies. Now, if ever he was to have it,
was his chance to win eternal renown by a victory over the
hitherto unconquerable Emperor. To Bennigsen defeat meant
the possible loss of an army; to Napoleon it meant, not only
Napoleon's sleeping-place, on the nights of the 7th, 8th, and 9th, the plateau
where his Guard were. If it is true that Napoleon himself was the author of
this work, there is an obvious reason for his not admitting that he slept in
Eylau on the 7th, and more than a mile to the rear on the 8th. The admission
would imply that the results of the battle of the 8th had been such as to render
Eylau unsafe. On the other hand, when the Guard were present, the Emperor
usually slept in their midst. On this occasion, he would have had to sleep in the
open to be with the Guard.
Once more, in favour of his sleeping in Eylau, is Jomini's (Vie de Napoleon,
ii. 358) assertion that Murat reported the enemy to be in retreat. It is not
certain at what hour the news, if given, was ascertained to be incorrect. If he
believed in the retreat, the head of his army was the best place for Napoleon.
De Fezensac (p. 145) was at Eylau on the night of the 7th-8th, and
mentions Berthier's being in the village. Presumably, Napoleon also was there,
especially as de Fezensac, who left the village at 8 a.m. on the 8th, mentions
the Emperor mounting his horse about that time, as if he himself had seen it.
The matter is finally disposed of by Soult's report of the operations of the 4th
Corps (Arch. Hist.). He says that the Emperor fixed his headquarters in
Eylau, where he and Murat had the honour of joining him.
* "The total pillage of a town, taken as Eylau had been, can scarcely be
avoided" (Jomini, Vie de Napoleon, ii. 358).
172
NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN IN POLAND.
the loss of his army, but, possibly, the destruction of the
military despotism which he had built up with such infinite
care and skill. So mighty were the issues which hung upon
the result of the approaching struggle.
The strength of the forces* arrayed against one another,
* To commence with general accounts, the following numbers are given
by the authors named:
French.
Russians and Prussians.
Alison (vii. pp. 345 note, and 344) 80,000 75,000 (including 10,000 Prussians).
Thiers (vii. pp. 414, 415)
Dumas (xviii. 9 and 12)
Wilson (pp. 98, 99)
63,000
90,000
68,000 80,000
90,000 60,000 (Russians only).
Plotho (pp. 69, 70)
Rustow (i. 316)
...
90,000 65,000 to 70,000 (Russians besides
Prussians).
...
69,000 64,000
Bennigsen, in his official account (Wilson, p. 238), says; "I marched out of
Landsberg the 25th January (i.e. 6th February, new style), my army only con-
sisting of 70,000 men, different detachments of it having been separated." He
plainly does not include, in the 70,000, either Lestocq's corps or the detachment
sent to Heilsberg. The latter consisted of 3000 men (Ibid., pp. 93, 94), but
may have been reduced to 2000 by the fighting at and near Heilsberg. Lestocq
reached the field with about 7000 men, including those he left in Althof to
oppose Ney (he had 5584 against Davout alone) (see Ibid., p. 106, and Hopfner,
iii. 235).
Thus there would appear to have reached the field between 2 p.m. on the
7th and the evening of the 8th, about 72,000 Russians and 7000 Prussians,
say 78,000 in all, after allowing for losses on the march from Landsberg. It is
far from clear on what grounds Wilson reduces the Russians to 60,000 in face of
the despatch which he publishes. Bennigsen puts Napoleon's force at 90,000.
In an article "More Light on St. Helena," by Sir Herbert Maxwell, in the
Cornhill Magazine, for January, 1901, the following passage occurs: "In answer
to a question put to him (i.e. to Napoleon, by Sir George Cockburn) relative to
the greatest number of men he ever commanded, he said he had 180,000 at the
battle of Eylau, and 1000 pieces of cannon. The allies had nearly the same
number” (p. 31). There must clearly have been some misunderstanding here.
It is beyond the possibility of doubt that Napoleon had not 100,000 men at
Eylau, much less 180,000. The most hostile chronicler does not rate his number
over 90,000, and all are agreed that his guns were inferior in number to the
460 of Bennigsen. The numbers given in the article are about what
Napoleon commanded at Wagram, which was also the battle in which he had
the largest army. Is it not possible that he misunderstood Sir G. Cockburn's
question, or that the latter may have confused the name Löbau, used in con-
nexion with Wagram, with Eylau?
The "témoin oculaire " (p. 11) says 80,000 Russians were drawn up in a space
sufficient only for 30,000.
From the statements of the strength' of corps in February in the Archives
THE BATTLE OF EYLAU.
173
at and near Eylau, has been the subject of most contradictory
statements. On full consideration of the various accounts
Historiques, it is not possible to arrive directly at a conclusion as to the French
strength. The statements are, for the most part, noted as being correct up to
a much later date than February 7th, generally the end of March or beginning
of April. By that date, the losses of Eylau had been repaired and the corps
raised to a greater strength by troops from France and Italy.
The only course left is to work, as Alison did, on the January statements.
The strength of the corps which took part in the battle are thus shown in
the statements for January, the latest available before the date of the battle
(statements, Arch. Hist.).
Imperial Guard (excluding Oudinot)
3rd Corps (Davout)
4th
""
(Soult)
5th (Ney)
7th
""
(Augereau)
Reserve cavalry (excluding the 4th dragoon
division, with Bernadotte, and the 5th
with Savary)
...
...
9,199 of all arms on 20th January
19,757
15th January
19,643
33
1st January
16,039
1st January
14,966
15th January
1st February
17,706
Total 97,310
For Davout's corps, we have his own statement of the strength at Eylau,
after deducting losses and the detachment at Myszienec, viz. 15,100.
Soult lost at Bergfried at least 700, at Hof he admits 1960. He must have
lost quite 3000 altogether in the advance to Eylau.
Ney can hardly have lost less than 1,500 at Waltersdorf and the other
actions.
Augereau's loss may not have been above 500, as he had little fighting in the
advance.
The Reserve cavalry fought every day of the march on Eylau, and its loss
can hardly be taken at under 2500. It suffered .severely at Hof. The guard
lost little, say 200.
Deducting these losses, and taking Davout's corps at the figure he gives, the
French strength is reduced to the following round figures:-
Guard
Davout
Soult
Ney..
Augereau
Murat
: :
:
...
9,000
15,100
16,750
14,500
14,500
15,200
Total 85,050
But some allowance must be made for stragglers and detachments. On the
whole, it is improbable that Napoleon had much over 82,000 or 83,000 men.
Of these, 29,600 (Ney and Davout) were not on the field at daybreak on
the 8th.
In calculating the French strength at that hour, the losses of the 7th must be
174
NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN IN POLAND.
and authorities, it will not probably be far wide of the mark
to take the forces on the field at daybreak on the 8th
February at 67,000 Russians and 49,000 French. Napoleon
was expecting the arrival of Davout, with 15,100, on his
right, and of Ney, with 14,500, on his left. To join Bennig-
sen's right, Lestocq, facing Ney at Hussehnen, with 9000
Prussians and Russians, was under orders to march, as
quickly as possible, viâ Althof, to Schloditten.
(b) THE BATTLE OF THE 8TH FEBRUARY.
Bennigsen was astir at 5 a.m. He directed Dochtorow to
withdraw the 4th division from the position, towards Eylau,
which it had occupied during the night; also the 7th
division from its place in the line. With these two
divisions, and the reserve at Anklappen (14th division) he
formed two deep columns, each with a front of one battalion,
and placed them on a height behind his centre, on either
side of the Friedland road. The Archangel regiment moved
back from the saw-mill to the right wing, whilst Markow
filled the gap left in the line of battle by the withdrawal to
the reserve of the 7th division.
Napoleon also, now convinced that Bennigsen had no
intention of continuing his retreat behind the Pregel, made
changes in the positions of his corps.
The Guard infantry,
deducted. They were probably quite 4000, therefore they had not more than
about 48,000 or 49,000 men.
From Bennigsen's force of 78,000, must be deducted 7000 Prussians, and (say)
4000 for losses on the 7th. This leaves him 67,000 at the same hour.
Hopfner (iii. 227) allows him only 58,000, but there seems no sufficient
reason to disbelieve Bennigsen's own statement that 70,000 marched from
Landsberg, besides the detachment at Heilsberg.
The total allied forces Hopfner (iii. 235) puts at 63,500, the French at
80,000 (iii. 229).
The fairest conclusion seems to be that Napoleon had a superiority of about
4000 or 5000 in numbers, which was counteracted by the superiority of 110 guns
on the other side.
The strength of the two armies was, therefore, approximately equal. Up to
11 or 12 on the 8th, Napoleon was decidedly the weaker; he was not the
stronger until quite the end of the battle, when Ney had arrived.
THE BATTLE OF EYLAU.
175
and artillery moved forward from its bivouac to a position
behind the church. Augereau's corps took post, in columns
of brigades, with its left about 1000 paces behind the church.
At 8 a.m. it again moved forward to the line of the church,
on which its left rested. Desjardins' division (9 battalions)
was in 1st, Heudelet's (8 battalions) in 2nd line. To
make room for Augereau, St. Hilaire, with 8 battalions,
moved to his right, and formed line in front of Milhaud's
cavalry (18 squadrons); Legrand and Schinner were in front
of and in Eylau; Vivier and Ferey extended the line from
the left of Eylau to the windmill heights in front of the
saw-mill.
Behind Augereau, were d'Hautpoult's 12 squadrons
of cuirassiers, to the right of the Guard infantry. Behind
him were 12 squadrons of the Guard cavalry, and, on their
right, 12 squadrons of Grouchy's dragoons. Klein took
Milhaud's place in rear of St. Hilaire, and Milhaud moved
to the right. The light cavalry took post on the left, from
the windmill height towards Althof. It comprised the
division of Lasalle and the brigades of Bruyère, Guyot,
Colbert, and Durosnel.
One regiment of Guard infantry, the 18th of the line,
and 2 guns remained, in reserve, at the bivouac between
Tenknitten and Waschkeiten. The artillery was ranged
along the whole front, from opposite Serpallen to the saw-
mill. The Emperor took his stand near the church. Day
broke gloomy and wild. No "sun of Austerlitz," drawing
off the morning mists and exhilarating the men, rose in front
of the French army. Low, heavy clouds, swept across the
grey sky by a gusty and freezing wind, from time to time
discharged their snowy contents with violence in the faces of
the shivering soldiers. At such times, so dark became the
atmosphere that the Russians could not even distinguish
Eylau.* The snow prevented the commanders from seeing
their troops, the howling north wind rendered it impossible
* Hæpfner, iii. 237.
176
NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN IN POLAND.
for the soldiers to hear the word of command. At times, it
was not possible to see ten yards off. The action at such
moments had the character of a night attack.*
The French, in and behind
In the midst of this turmoil of the elements, before
Napoleon had completed his last arrangements, Bennigsen,
about 8 a.m., commenced the battle with a tremendous
artillery fire directed on Eylau.
the village, were, to some extent, sheltered by the houses
and by the mounds which closed up to it. The Russians,
on the other hand, standing out, when the atmosphere was
clear, in sharp relief against the white snow on the bare
slope, without any cover whatever, were exposed from head
to foot to the fire of the French guns.‡
The Russian fire, at first somewhat wild,§ increased in
intensity, as did that of the French. The preponderance in
numbers of the Russian guns made up for the inferiority of
the marksmanship.
Despite the awful fire, the French left pushed forward,
whilst the centre and right gained the slight elevations in
front of the Bartenstein road. The light cavalry, on the left,
got as far forward as the fulling-mill on the stream, 500
yards below the saw-mill. Legrand, advancing to the storm
of Tutchkow's position, was met in front by two infantry
regiments of the Russian right wing, and charged in left
flank by 2 dragoon regiments. He was driven back
towards Eylau with considerable loss. Napoleon, thinking
the Russians meditated the recapture of the windmill height,
and an advance against Eylau from that direction, sought to
disengage his left by an advance from his right. With this
object in view, he directed St. Hilaire to move forward,
bearing off somewhat to his right, whilst Augereau acted in
like manner. By this movement St. Hilaire would come
* Davout, pp. 169–171.
+ Wilson, p. 101; Marbot, i. 257.
§ Wilson, p. 101.
† Wilson, p. 98.
|| Hæpfner, iii. 240.
The "témoin oculaire" defines the Emperor's intention as being that
THE BATTLE OF EYLAU.
177
into touch with Davout, who was now gradually coming up,
and the army, pivoting on Eylau and wheeling to the left,
would drive in the Russian left wing. It was soon after
10 a.m.* when this advance began. At that moment, a
terrible snowstorm burst upon the field. The snow, driven
full in the faces of Augereau's infantry, blinded them, and
caused them to lose all sense of direction. Instead of bear-
ing to their right, as ordered, Desjardins' division, followed
by Heudelet's, took a direction to the left, towards the
Friedland road. They thus passed partially in front of
the batteries at Eylau, which, in the darkness, fired on
their own troops.† The corps thus diverged rapidly from
St. Hilaire's, which had kept the prescribed line. Presently
it found itself, unexpectedly, close in front of the Russian
line, at the point where the right wing joined the centre.
Augereau had the leading brigade of each division deployed,
the second behind it in squares. One battalion, which had
gone more to the right, was alone in the midst of the
Russian position. The corps artillery was at the church.
Desjardins and Heudelet were met by an overwhelming
fire of grape from the great central battery, which was alone,
sufficient to disorder them and cause immense losses.‡
Augereau should join St. Hilaire's left, so that the two might form a line oblique
to that of the enemy, uniting Davout to Eylau.
* St. Hilaire, quoted by Soult in his report (Arch. Hist.), says it was 10 a.m.
when he received the order for his advance. St. Hilaire's division was practically
taken from Soult's command on this day, and kept under the Emperor's direct
orders. Soult, therefore, incorporates St. Hilaire's report in his own, which deals
with the action of the other two divisions (Legrand's and Leval's). A report
(Arch. Hist.) by Parmentier, who became chief of the staff of the 7th corps after
Eylau, gives 8 o'clock as the time when Augereau moved to the line of the church,
and 8.30 as the hour at which the advance commenced. St. Hilaire's account
seems the more probable.
† Marbot, i. 257.
"Desjardins' division was half destroyed by grape and by the sabre;
Heudelet's fared no better" (Jomini, Vie de Napoleon, ii. 360).
In the Archives Historiques there is a report from Compans, who succeeded
temporarily to Augereau's command, showing how frightful must have been the
losses of the division. In the first place, he gives a list of about 30 officers killed
and wounded; but this only includes regimental officers of and above the rank
N
178
NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN IN POLAND.
Seeing their advance, Bennigsen had moved forward part of
his two great reserve columns. This body, after firing a
volley in the faces of the shaken French, charged with the
bayonet. Simultaneously, a brigade of the 4th division and
the Russian cavalry came upon the unhappy French corps.
No troops could withstand such an onslaught in front and on
both flanks, especially when the Russian cavalry were in
their midst before they were perceived through the snow.
Almost every regiment was broken; the whole mass fled in
the wildest confusion, followed, bayoneted, sabred, by the
victorious Russians. As the snow cleared, Augereau—of
whom Napoleon said that he wearied even with a day of
victory,-wounded, ill,* disheartened, saw the remnants of his
corps pouring back into Eylau in broken detachments. One
regiment, the ill-fated 14th,† was still on the slope, formed in
a rough square on a small mound, surrounded on all sides by
infantry, cavalry, and cossacks, fired into by musketry and
artillery, stabbed by the long lances of the cossacks, sabred,
suffering every conceivable woe, yet gallantly fighting to the
of chef de battalion and the general's staff. It goes on: "Each division showed
in the evening only about 700 men present." They had gone into action 7000
strong each! Of course, many stragglers must have turned up later, but the
remark shows the utter demoralization of the corps.
Augereau's official report (Arch. Hist.) admits a loss of 929 killed and 4271
wounded-total 5200. This takes no account of prisoners, and even so it is, per-
haps, below the mark.
Jomini says Augereau's corps found that they were at a great disadvantage
against cavalry, as their muskets had been so damped by the snow as often to
fail to go off (Art of War, p. 305).
* On the morning of the 8th February Augereau sent a note to Napoleon,
saying he was too ill to command in the field any longer, and proposed, with
the Emperor's permission, to retire that day. Napoleon, in reply, requested him
to keep the command for one day longer. Meanwhile, the battle had begun,
and Augereau sent another note, to say that he would be with his corps even if
he had to go on to the field in a sledge-a mode of conveyance which he actually
did employ till he reached his corps. He retired from the field about p.m.
(Arch. Hist., daily correspondence).
† It had led Augereau's advance (Marbot, i. 257). It was the regiment
which had stormed the bridge at Kolozomb on the 24th December, having its
colonel, Savary, killed there.
The snowstorm cleared off after half an hour (Témoin Oculaire, p. 13).
THE BATTLE OF EYLAU.
179
death. The marshal had not a battalion in condition to
attempt its rescue. He sent, in succession, the officers of his
staff to urge the 14th to retreat if possible. Two of them
disappeared in the hosts of the enemy, and were heard of no
more. At last, Marbot succeeded in reaching the doomed
regiment. Retreat was impossible. The eagle was carried
off by Marbot, though he nearly lost his life in doing so.
Firm to the last, the isolated regiment fought, unsupported,
refusing to surrender.* Not one officer and scarcely a soldier
escaped.
Napoleon, from the church, watched the course of this
awful disaster to Augereau on his left, whilst he saw St.
Hilaire, on his right, not destroyed, it is true, but checked,
his left attacked by cavalry in the gap between it and
Augereau's corps, unable to make any progress.
The triumphant Russians, following on the heels of
Augereau's ruined corps, were breaking into Eylau. Even
they, with the snowstorm at their backs, had partly lost their
way. One"
One "colonne perdue," as Napoleon described it,†
which he estimates at 4000 to 6000 men, had wandered into
the western street of Eylau, and had approached close to the
position of the Emperor. Behind him, the Guard was moving
forward to his rescue. Beyond the Russian column, Bru-
yère's cavalry, by direction of Murat, was preparing to charge
it in rear. The Russians were actually amongst the French
hospitals in the barns in rear of Eylau. The terrified wounded
who could walk were endeavouring to escape. Even the
others, trying vainly to follow them, were only induced, by
Larrey and his assistants expressing loudly their intention of
remaining where they were, to desist from the vain attempt.‡
The Emperor was in the most imminent danger of death
or capture. A stray bullet, a little more hurry by the
Russian column, might have changed the whole history-of
Europe. Napoleon alone, in the midst of all this confusion,
† Commentaires de Napoleon.
* Marbot, i. 263, etc.
‡ Larrey, iii. 40.
180
NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN IN POLAND.
standing on the mound with only his staff and a single
squadron, his personal guard, maintained his calm and his
presence of mind.
Before the Guard infantry* could reach the spot, the
Russians would be upon him. The Guard refused to fire;
they considered it was their duty to charge with the bayonet
without firing; † they were blind to the consequences of delay.
Every instant gained was of vital importance to their
Emperor. He employed the only means he had to gain a
few moments. The squadron of his personal guard was
ordered to charge. Rushing upon almost certain death, with
loud shouts of "Vive l'Empereur," this little band of heroes
fell furiously on the head of the Russian column.
It was
the attack of the pigmy upon the giant, but it gained the
necessary time. Before this squadron was exterminated, the
Guard had reached with the bayonet the front, Bruyère with
the sabre the rear of the Russians. Their destruction was
inevitable, and was as complete as had been that of Augereau's
larger force. The latter's corps had been wiped out. Marbot
goes so far as to say that it had but 3000 men left out of
15,000.‡
The situation of the French centre-Davout not yet
having come up in force on the right, Ney being still far
behind on the left, Soult's division repulsed, Augereau's
destroyed-was most critical. Napoleon recognised that only
heroic measures could save him from destruction. Bennigsen
failed to see that now, before Davout could bring substantial
help, he still had time for the attack with superior forces of
the French left, rolling it up on the centre.
As soon as the Emperor saw the formation of the gap
between St. Hilaire and Augereau, due to the latter's false
* A battalion under Dorsenne was in front, and made the attack (Dumas,
xviii. 20; Témoin Oculaire, p. 13).
+ Témoin Oculaire, p. 13, and Dumas, xviii. 20.
‡ Marbot, i. 257. Hopfner (iii. 244), with more exactitude, states Auge-
reau's loss at 929 killed and 4271 wounded-total 5200. This is Augereau's own
figure (Arch. Hist.).
THE BATTLE OF EYLAU.
181
direction, he ordered Murat to place himself at the head of
the cavalry reserve,* and, followed by Bessières with the
Guard cavalry, to make a supreme effort against the Russian
centre with this great body of 70 or 80 squadrons.†
In such circumstances Murat showed to his greatest
advantage. Splendidly mounted, in gorgeous uniform,
surrounded by a staff only second to himself in brilliancy,
his countenance inflamed with the lust of battle, he was the
beau-ideal of the cavalry leader.
Grouchy's dragoons, moving out over the ground beyond
the Bartenstein road, crashed into the right flank of the Russian
cavalry which had repulsed St. Hilaire, scattering it in all
directions. Grouchy himself had his horse killed, but was
remounted by an aide-de-camp. Rallying after the charge,
he again led his 2nd brigade to support his 1st.‡ Milhaud,
at the same time, faced Bagavout's detachment, at and behind
Serpallen which it had to evacuate.
Having defeated the cavalry on the flank of St. Hilaire,
Grouchy's dragoons, led by Murat in person, wheeled to their
left against the cavalry of the Russian centre, which was now
brought forward to meet them.
On his right, Murat was joined by d'Hautpoult's cuirassier
*"A commander may sometimes feel obliged to push his cavalry forward
alone, but generally the best time for charging a line of infantry is when it
is already engaged with opposing infantry. The battles of Marengo, Eylau,
Borodino, and several others prove this" (Jomini, Art of War, p. 305).
+ Murat's report (Arch. Hist.) shows as engaged on this day, in this part of
the field,-
2nd division cuirassiers
1st, 2nd, 3rd dragoon divisions
These may be taken, roughly, at,—
2nd cuirassier division
1st dragoon
2nd
3rd
Guard cavalry
+ Grouchy's report, Arch. Hist.
3
,
>>
1900
2000
2200
3100
1500
...
10,700
182
NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN IN POLAND.
division, and this great line of cavalry, followed by others,
poured in successive waves up the slope.
The Russian cavalry, going down before the shock, were
driven back upon their infantry. Murat's portion of the line
was met by fresh cavalry, and again compelled to retire:
d'Hautpoult's heavier horses and men broke through every-
thing. As the Russian horsemen scattered to the right and
left of him, they were charged in flank by fresh lines of
cuirassiers, and cut to pieces. D'Hautpoult, reckless of grape,
of infantry fire, and the bayonet, fired by the praise he had
received from the Emperor for his action at Hof, burst
through the line of guns, sabring the gunners, or forcing them
to seek shelter under their pieces. On rode the cuirassiers
through the first line of infantry where one battalion, striving
to resist by force this line of steel-clad warriors, was ridden
over by them. Through the 2nd line they forced their
way. It was only when they had reached the reserves,
standing with their backs to the Anklappen woods, that the
charge had expended its force, after passing over 2500 yards.*
Bessières, following with the Guard cavalry, the chasseurs
in 1st line, and joined by Grouchy, who had been checked
by the Russian 2nd line when d'Hautpoult passed through
it, fell upon the Russians, as they began to reform behind the
cuirassiers, again carrying death into their ranks. Joined by
the 5th cuirassier regiment and the mounted grenadiers, this
second wave of cavalry again broke through the two Russian
lines before it lost its force. The men and horses, exhausted
and breathless from their long gallop and the tremendous exer-
tions of the fight, were surrounded by the Russian cavalry,
infantry, and cossacks reassembling after their defeat. Twice
broken, the Russian lines had, with indomitable courage, twice
re-formed behind the intruding cavalry.† The French had to
* Grouchy's report, Arch. Hist.
† Jomini remarks that the retirement was as difficult as the advance, for the
Russian troops re-formed, facing to their rear, behind the French cavalry (Vie
de Napoleon, ii. 361).
THE BATTLE OF EYLAU.
183
cut their way back as they had come. Exhausted cuirassiers
of d'Hautpoult's division, which had gone the farthest, went
down before the lances of the cossacks, who could not have
resisted them for a moment when fresh. Some broke back
direct in the line by which they had come, others, passing
behind the Russian lines, rejoined the French left; very
many met their death in the midst of the Russian army.
The brave d'Hautpoult himself received his death wound.*
This tremendous charge, costly though it had been, had
yet served its purpose in checking the ardour of the Russian
centre, thus enabling Napoleon to hold his own, whilst he
anxiously awaited Davout's turning movement on the right.†
He had, besides the cavalry, his artillery, Soult's corps,
seriously reduced in numbers, the remnant of Augereau's,
and the Guard. The last-named had not been seriously
engaged, and was unshaken. Augereau's troops assembled
to the right of Eylau, the cavalry reserve more towards
Kl. Sausgarten with Klein in 1st, Grouchy in 2nd, and
d'Hautpoult in 3rd line. The Guard infantry was midway
between Eylau and Serpallen; the Guard cavalry on the
* "A regiment of French cuirassiers had, during the storm, gained an interval
in the Russian line between their centre and left wing; but the cossacks and
some hussars, immediately as they were perceived, bore down upon them. The
cuirassiers, apparently like men stupefied by the magnitude of their own enter-
prise, and unprepared for success, rushed with a considerable détour through the
rear of the camp, and then turned towards the right of the Russian right wing,
but their bodies successively tracked the course, and only 18 escaped alive'
(Wilson, p. 103).
†The cavalry charge was, on a far larger scale, almost as desperate a remedy
as the charge of Bredow's brigade at Mars la Tour, on the 16th August, 1870.
The loss in Murat's charge cannot be precisely ascertained, but Grouchy gives
his alone at nearly 250 killed and wounded. There were engaged in this
charge on the French side one division of cuirassiers, three of dragoons, and the
Guard cavalry. The cuirassiers lost more heavily than the others. Probably
the total losses of the reserve cavalry were somewhere between 1000 and 1500.
Even after the charge, they suffered heavily from the Russian artillery, under
whose fire they stood all day.
"At 11 a.m. Soult's corps had suffered much; Augereau's, so to speak, no
longer existed. All was lost but for the firm face I maintained for three hours,
at the cemetery, with the Guard, the cavalry, and the artillery, which I myself
directed" (Jomini, Vie de Napoleon, p. 366).
184
NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN IN POLAND.
right of the infantry, behind the reserve cavalry. The left
wing remained as before. It was now about 11 a.m. Till
noon, Napoleon held on determinedly to Eylau and the line
of the Bartenstein road. After that hour, Bennigsen had his
hands full elsewhere, and the battle became little more than
an artillery duel in the direction of Eylau. The tide of
victory on which Bennigsen had so far floated was about to
ebb.
Davout, at 2 p.m. on the 7th, had received orders from
Berthier to take position, in column, on the road from
Bartenstein, so as to have the head of his column at a
distance of about 3 miles from Eylau. His divisions,
accordingly bivouacked in these positions: Friant's between
Perschen and Beisleiden, about 4 miles from Eylau;
Morand at Zohlen, a short way in rear; Gudin, near
Bartenstein, 10 miles from Eylau. Marulaz, with the light
cavalry of the corps, joined Friant and Davout, from the
neighbourhood of Eylau, after Soult had taken up his
position.† All these divisions were ordered to march for
the battlefield two hours before daybreak. Friant, with
Marulaz in advance, took the direction of Serpallen. Morand
followed. Gudin started at 3 a.m., on account of the greater
distance he had to march. It was not yet day when the
cavalry encountered and drove in the cossacks. Soon after
sunrise, Friant drew up his division in order of battle on the
heights short of Serpallen, which village Bagavout had
evacuated as he approached, and which was now occupied by
some companies of the (French) 48th regiment.‡ Marulaz
* Davout, p. 158.
† Davout (p. 160) states the strength of his divisions thus :-
1st division (Morand) about
2nd
3rd
""
...
...
(Friant), less 111th regiment left at Myszienec
(Gudin), less 2nd battalion of the 85th at Ortelsburg
1st and 12th chasseurs, the 2nd being left at Myszienec
6000
4000
4500
600
Total 15,100
‡ Bennigsen, in his official account (Wilson, p. 238, etc.), says Bagavout
THE BATTLE OF EYLAU.
185
was on the right, Morand in 2nd line, behind Friant. There
appears to have been some delay here, waiting for the
approach of Gudin, for Davout's attack did not become
serious till towards noon. *
Davout, whilst waiting, caused a reconnaissance to be
made, searching for the right of St. Hilaire's division, with
which he required to connect his own left. Between eleven
and twelve, a body of cavalry appeared on Friant's right;
against it was sent Marulaz, supported by the 33rd regiment,
and followed, in the direction of Klein Sausgarten, by the
rest of Friant's division.
Bagavout had been reinforced by the 14th division
(Kamenskoi) from the reserve. The cavalry were repulsed
by Marulaz and the 33rd, but were immediately supported
by infantry.
Friant, attacked by the Russian infantry and by the
rallied cavalry, was engaged in a long and severe combat.
Finally, the enemy retired in good order before him, covering
their retreat by a heavy artillery fire from the heights behind
Serpallen.
Morand, meanwhile, sending his 1st brigade to the left
to link him to St. Hilaire, who was again moving to the
attack of the heights in front of him, took the 2nd brigade
through, and by the left of Serpallen. He was met by a
heavy artillery fire from the heights, 400 yards in front of
him. To this, but an inadequate reply could be made by his
light artillery. The 17th regiment was on his right in
echelon of reserve. The 51st and 61st were kept by
Davout ready to support either Morand or Friant, as circum-
stances might require, until the arrival of Gudin's main body
repulsed an attack on Serpallen about daybreak. There is no mention of this
either in Hæpfner or Davout.
Wilson himself (p. 102) says the attack was repulsed "some time after " the
defeat of Augereau, and that, when the village was fired, the snow and smoke
drove in the faces of the Russians. If so, the wind must have gone completely
round at that time.
* Jomini (Art of War, p. 198) puts the hour as late as 1 p.m.
+ Both of Gudin's division.
186
NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN IN POLAND.
as reserve enabled him to send the 51st to support Friant,
the 61st to follow Morand, and strengthen the union of his
left with St. Hilaire.
guns in the
to take Klein
Lochet, with
He was not at
Friant, still suffering severely from the
direction of the Kreegeberg, received orders
Sausgarten with one battalion of the 33rd.
this battalion, broke his way into the village.
once supported, and, after half an hour, attacked by infantry
and cavalry, which, passing from the left wing of the Russian
line beyond Kl. Sausgarten, reached his right flank, he was
forced to withdraw. Outside the village, he and Marulaz
maintained a stationary and sanguinary fight amongst the
stockaded enclosures in which sheep were wont to be folded
at night, to protect them from wolves. The Russian cavalry
were thus driven off by the 33rd, the 48th, and the 51st. The
enemy's infantry reinforced, continued to gain ground as they
vigorously assaulted the 33rd, the 48th and Marulaz's cavalry.
Lochet was killed here. At last, with the assistance of its
artillery, Friant's division succeeded in again advancing into
Kl. Sausgarten, where he firmly established himself.
Whilst the fight thus progressed on Davout's right,
Morand and St. Hilaire, in front, and to the left of Ser-
pallen, had to sustain very heavy fighting. So great was
the loss in the 13th light infantry, that it had to be
replaced in the fighting line by a battalion of the 17th from
the reserve. The 61st, at this period, took post on Morand's
right. To the left of it the 17th and 30th continued the line
till it joined the right battalion (10th light infantry) of St.
Hilaire. At first, the advance of St. Hilaire prospered.
Firing as they moved, his men compelled the Russians to yield
before them, abandoning 30 guns, which fell into Morand's
hands. Suddenly, in the midst of their success, the 10th
light infantry, forming the link between the two divisions,
was charged by 20 squadrons under Korff. This cavalry,
which had been concealed, partly by the inequalities of the
ground, partly by a snowstorm, coming upon the left of the
THE BATTLE OF EYLAU.
187
French regiment, drove it in confusion away from its own
division, back to the right on the division of Morand. Dis-
order spreading into this division also, it was pushed back
on Serpallen. The arrival of Klein's dragoons, from behind
St. Hilaire, saved the situation, and drove off the Russian
cavalry which had done so much harm.
During this combat, Davout had found it necessary to´
again strengthen Friant, on his right, with the 12th regiment
from Gudin's division. On this side, also, the Russians had
executed several fierce assaults, accompanied by heavy loss to
both parties, but in the end unsuccessful.
Osterman had now retreated, from in front of Morand and
St. Hilaire, to a position behind the Kreegeberg--a movement
which, by exposing the right flank of Kamenskoi and
Bagavout in front of Klein Sausgarten, compelled them also
to retire and join Osterman's left.
Nothing could stop the advance of Friant. As he moved
towards Anklappen, Morand and St. Hilaire were able to
reoccupy the small hills beyond Serpallen, from which they
had been driven, as just described, by Korff's cavalry,
supported by infantry. From them Morand was not again
ousted. With three regiments on them, he served as a pivot
for the wheel of Davout's right, from Kl. Sausgarten towards
Kutschitten and Anklappen. St. Hilaire, who had assisted
in the recapture of these heights, was now, by the Emperor's
order, again drawn to Morand's left, which he connected with
the reserve cavalry (Klein in 1st, Grouchy in 2nd, d'Hautpoult
in 3rd line). Beyond the reserve cavalry, were the remains of
Augereau's corps, on the right of Eylau. The Guard infantry
behind these, stood halfway between Eylau and Serpallen;
on its right, behind the reserve cavalry, was the cavalry of
the Guard. The whole left wing was posted as in the morn-
ing. Bennigsen, who had, since Davout's attack began, been
constantly moving troops from his right and centre to the aid
of his left wing, now ordered the latter to retire behind
Anklappen, whilst the right and centre held fast with their
188
NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN IN POLAND.
diminished forces. Davout, placing a battery of 30 guns on
the Kreegeberg to support his movement, pushed forward his
infantry even into the farmstead of Anklappen. From the
latter the 48th regiment was again forced to retire by
superior numbers. Whilst this first attack on Anklappen
was proceeding, Davout had detached the 30th towards his
right. Milhaud's dragoons were now at his disposal. Them,
with part of the 51st, and 4 companies of the 108th, he sent
against the Russians of Bagavout and Kamenskoi in the birch
wood to the right of Anklappen, whence they drove the
enemy. The French right was still protected, against the
attacks of the cossacks, and cavalry, by Marulaz's squadrons.
The Russians, driven from these woods, retreated,
constantly pursued, on: Kutschitten. At the same time, the
attack on Anklappen was renewed by Gauthier, with both
battalions of the 25th, whilst the little wood, on the left of
the farm, was invaded by a battalion of the 85th. Both
attacks were successful, though they met with vigorous
resistance. The troops pursuing the defenders of the larger
wood towards Kutschitten, were equally happy in taking
that village. The hour was about 5 p.m., the Russian left
wing was in full retreat. With the loss of Kutschitten the
direct road to Russia had been intercepted. The troops began
to break up; the whole plain between Kutschitten and
Schmoditten was covered with men, mostly wounded, bend-
ing their steps towards Koenigsberg.
The French left wing and centre, terribly crippled by the
morning's events, still occupied their original positions. The
Russians, in this part of the field, could only spare enough
troops to retain their own line. Neither side had strength
left for a renewal here of the morning's struggle, the
artillery alone continued the slaughter. From a point about
1000 paces south of Eylau, Napoleon's right wing and the
Russian left, turned at right angles across the plateau on the
Russian side. The French front extended from this point to
Kutschitten, with a kind of bastion projecting northwards
THE BATTLE OF EYLAU.
189
from its centre, where Davout's most advanced troops held
Anklappen. The battle seemed to be lost for Bennigsen.
Another startling change was about to come over
the fortunes of the field. Before describing it we must
leave, for a time, the armies in the positions described, and
turn back to trace the movements of the two actors, Ney
and Lestocq, whose appearance on the scene caused the
change.
About 7 p.m., on the 7th February, part of Lestocq's
corps, followed and harassed by Ney,* had reached
Hussehnen, about 7 miles from Eylau to the north-west.
His rear-guard, with infinite difficulty in cutting a road
through the forest for its artillery, only came up at 6 a.m.
on the 8th.
At 3.30 a.m. Lestocq received from Bennigsen an order
directing him to march, with his corps, on Pr. Eylau, and to
take post on the right wing of the Russian position.
He ordered the baggage column to assemble, at 5 a.m., at
Bomben, and to march, north of the fighting column, to the
Frisching, en route for Koenigsberg. Colonel Maltzahn,
with the remnant of the advanced brigade which had
suffered so heavily at Wattersdorf, was also ordered in the
same direction, to cover the Koenigsberg road. One bat-
talion, and one squadron were sent, by Dollstadt and Muhl-
hausen, on to the Eylau-Koenigsberg road. Esebeck, with
his dragoons, the Russian Kaluga regiment of infantry, and
half of a horse artillery battery, was to support the detach-
ment at Wittenburg. All the heavy batteries were ordered
to march at once, by Althof, to strengthen the Russian
artillery on the battlefield.
The troops which had not yet arrived were to take a
short rest at Hussehnen, and then follow Lestocq. At 8 a.m.
that general started, with 35 squadrons, 10 battalions, and
* Ney reached Landsberg and bivouacked there on the evening of the 7th.
Thence he despatched de Fezensac (at that time Comte de Montesquiou) on a
mission to Napoleon at Eylau. The 6th corps appears to have left Landsberg
in the small hours of the 8th (de Fezensac, p. 145).
190
NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN IN POLAND.
1 batteries of horse artillery, to march on Eylau by the
direct route, via Wackern, Schlautienen, Domiau, Görken,
and Roditten. As the head of the column emerged from the
forest at Schlautienen, Ney was seen approaching their right
flank from Bornehnen. To stop his advance, Lestocq sent
one battalion, whilst he pushed another, with half a horse
artillery battery, on to the heights running east from
Schlautienen. At the same time, the direct road to Althof
was abandoned, in favour of a more circuitous one by
Pompicken and Graventien.
As Ney drove in the flanking force of two battalions, he
advanced his guns towards the Schlautienen heights and
Wackern. He had received orders at 7 a.m. to march on
Kreutzburg, and to drive the Prussians from the Koenigsberg
road towards Bernadotte, who was supposed to be marching
direct on that place.
As the tail of the Prussian column was leaving Wackern,
the head of another French force was seen approaching from
the south-west. A company of infantry was sent into the
wood in front of Wackern, to delay, as much as possible, this
fresh column. So vigorous was the attack of this company
that the troops behind it were enabled to get clear of the village.
As the French, following up with infantry and artillery,
drove in this weak rear-guard, they occupied Wackern. One
Prussian company had to force its way out with the bayonet.
As Ney's men passed right and left of Wackern, 5 Prussian
squadrons and a half battery were forced aside, on to the
Kreuzburg road, notwithstanding the fire of their guns.
The brave stand at Wackern had given time to the
Prussians left to rest after their night march to overtake
the rest of the corps at Pompicken. They had set out from
Bomben as soon as they heard the guns at Schlautienen.
At Pompicken another stand was made. Ney was, once
more, delayed while Lestocq pushed steadily on with his
main body, by Graventien, to Althof, constantly fending off
Ney's advance against his right flank and rear, whilst
THE BATTLE OF EYLAU.
191
*
avoiding a general action. It was only at 2 p.m. that Ney
received Napoleon's orders, directing him to take post on the
left of the army, and attack the Russian right. The orders
had been despatched at 8 a.m., but the officer carrying them
was delayed by various circumstances,† and only reached
Ney at the hour named.
supposed, naturally
guns which had been
Incredible as it may
The marshal would, it might be
march to the sound of the 700 or 800
thundering, about Eylau, since 8 a.m.
seem, no sound of that tremendous conflict reached his
ears. The wind was unfavourable, and it is agreed by all
authorities that the sound did not travel against it through
the snow-laden atmosphere. Even from the heights be-
tween Drangsitten and Graventien, though Lestocq could
clearly see the flash and the smoke of the guns, he could
hear no sound.§
It was 1 p.m. when the Prussians approached Althof.
A battalion was left to hold the village and bridge of Drang-
sitten, covering the march of the corps to the Russian
right wing at Schloditten. Scarcely had Lestocq formed his
troops at Althof, when an urgent message reached him from
Bennigsen, requiring him to march to the aid of the now
retreating Russian left wing. All the troops he now had
* Lestocq himself says he had the greatest difficulty in avoiding being
drawn into a general action (see his report, Wilson, p. 257).
† The officer was de Fezensac, who has left a full account of his journey
(p. 145). He knew Ney was marching on Kreuzburg, as ordered, so he attempted
first to join him direct, viâ Pompicken, in the position he expected the marshal
to have reached. Finding the difficulties too great, seeing that he did not know
the country, he returned to Landsberg, and thence followed Ney, whom he
reached at 2 p.m. He adds that Thiers asserts that Napoleon sent orders on the
night of the 7th to Ney and Davout to march on Eylau. In so far as concerns
Ney, he vouches for the incorrectness of this statement, and for the fact that Ney
received no such orders till 2 p.m. on the 8th. As regards Davout, it is admitted
that he had his orders on the 7th.
Jomini, Vie de Napoleon, ii. 364.
§ Hopfner, iii. 235.
The stream was, of course, frozen, but its bed was filled with deep, soft
snow (Lestocq's report, Wilson, p. 257, note).
192
NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN IN POLAND.
available for this purpose were 9 battalions, 29 squadrons,
and 2 horse artillery batteries-5584 combatants.* With
this small force, he set out, through Schmoditten, for
Kutschitten.
The scene of rapidly increasing disorder, augmented by
the ever-growing fire of Davout's batteries, and the tri-
umphant advance of his right against the Russian left, has
already been described. Arriving at Schloditten in three
columns, the Prussians began to meet Russian officers (who
openly spoke of a lost battle on the left), and disorganised
bodies of troops, leaving the battlefield. These Lestocq
stopped, and gathered up to return with him to Kutschitten.
His artillery, coming into action ahead of the corps beyond
Schloditten, beheld the heights, between Anklappen and
Kutschitten, swarming with the enemy's skirmishers, every
man standing out sharp and clear against the background of
snow. Heavier bodies occupied Kutschitten and its neigh-
bourhood; behind that village stood Marulaz' light cavalry.
The Prussian general judged that, could he but tear Kuts-
chitten from his grasp, the outflanking enemy would himself,
in turn, be outflanked.
For the assault, the Russian Wyburg regiment took post a
short way to the left of Schöning's regiment; farther to the left
were the Ruchel and Towarzycs regiments, with 200 cossacks
who had rallied to the Prussian corps. As reserve, behind
these columns, followed, deployed, the grenadier battalion
Fabecky. Behind again, the Prussian cavalry in column.
With loud cheers, the centre column moved direct on the
village, the other two passing to the right and left of it.
The right column was faced by French infantry, which it
drove back into the great birch wood. The centre column,
rushing through a storm of grape, chased the French defenders
*Dumas (xviii. 32) estimates that 9000 Prussians left Hussehuen, and 2000
But he
were left at Althof; thus Lestocq arrived on the field with 7000.
makes no mention of, or allowance for, the detachments towards Koenigsberg.
The figures accepted in the text are those of Hopfner, based, apparently, on
official documents.
THE BATTLE OF EYLAU.
193
of Kutschitten into and through the village. These, en-
deavouring to stand behind the village, found themselves
taken in rear by the Prussian left column, which, after driving
off Marulaz's cavalry, had wheeled to its right and come down
upon the back of the village. Of the 51st regiment and the
four companies of the 108th in Kutschitten, hardly a man
escaped. Quarter was not much asked, or given, in the deadly
struggle. Three of the guns which Davout had taken were
re-captured.
Kutschitten successfully stormed, Lestocq again drew out
his troops, on the heights beyond, for the attack of the birch
wood, wheeling them to the right of their original line of
advance.
His arrival, and the firm countenance of his men, had
already effected wonders in restoring the Russian line
behind Anklappen. On the right he posted the infantry
regiment Schöning, then the grenadier battalion Fabecky,
and the regiments Ruchel and Wyburg. His cavalry were
in 2nd line. The Towarzycs regiment protected his left, the
cossacks held in check the French cavalry towards Kl.
Sausgarten.
Their spirits raised by a glimpse of the setting sun,
supported by their artillery on the heights to the right and
left, the line marched on the birch wood. The frontal attack
drove in the skirmishers, and carried back Friant's columns
50 yards into the wood, whilst the regiment Ruchel went
against their right flank.
Stubborn was the French resistance; for half an hour
the issue hung in the balance. At last, charging and charging
again with the bayonet, the Prussians carried the wood, and
drove Friant into the open between it and Kl. Sausgarten.
Davout, so recently riding on the crest of the wave of victory,
now felt success slipping from his grasp. He had lost
Kutschitten and the birch wood; and, at the same time,
Bagavout and Kamenskoi, rallying beyond Anklappen,
supported by the artillery of the left wing, had once more
194
NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN IN POLAND.
<<
stormed the hamlet. The French, driven from the burning
farm, fell back in disorder towards Kl. Sausgarten. Davout
realised fully his danger. Collecting his guns on the heights
between Kl. Sausgarten and the birch wood, he rode amongst
the disheartened troops.
Here," he cried, "the brave will
find a glorious death; it is the cowards alone who will go to
visit the deserts of Siberia." Not in vain was his appeal
made. The fire of his artillery, beating upon the Prussians
as they showed themselves on the edge of the wood, exhausted
by 12 to 14 hours of continuous marching and fighting, at
last checked them, and they slowly retired into the wood.
For some time, the artillery combat continued in the darkness
which had overshadowed the gloomy scene. Gradually it
died away, neither side being fit for more fighting. It was
10 p.m. as the last shots were fired on this side of the field,
now once more illuminated by bivouac fires. Davout's corps
stretched from in front of Kutschitten on its right,* past
the Kreegeberg, in the direction of Eylau, touching St.
Hilaire's right.
It still remains to narrate the movements of Ney,
following to the battlefield Lestocq, whom he had failed to
drive away from it.
At the bridge of Drangsitten, Ney encountered the rear-
guard left by Lestocq. Falling back on Althof before him,
this rearguard once more stood there. Attacked in front and
on both flanks, it formed square and slowly retired on the
main body of its corps, which it reached, near the Kutschitten
birch wood, about 9 p.m.
It was 8 p.m. when Ney formed for the attack of Schlo-
ditten, with Belair's brigade and one brigade of Lasalle's
* This differs from the French accounts. Davout (pp. 168, 169) affirms that
all the Russian attacks on Anklappen were beaten back with loss, and that his
left held the hamlet for the night. Dumas (xviii. 34) tells the same story.
That of Hœpfner (iii. 251) and of Lestocq himself (quoted, at p. 259, by Wilson)
has been preferred as the more probable. It seems clear that Davout's left, had
it remained in Anklappen, would have been in a position far more exposed than
would ever have been suffered by so able a tactician as that marshal.
THE BATTLE OF EYLAU.
195
light cavalry, which had stood all day on Napoleon's left.
The village, filled with Russian wounded and vehemently
defended by their troops, was only carried after a severe
action. The rest of Ney's corps was drawn out between
Althof and Schloditten.
The latter village, being on the road to Koenigsberg,
Bennigsen could not afford to leave it in Ney's hands. To
retake it he sent the Taurisch grenadier regiment, whilst a
Prussian battery continued to fire on it from the heights
towards Kutschitten.
Belair's troops stood, covered by the walls and houses of
Schloditten, patiently reserving their fire till the Russians
were almost on them. Then they opened fire with such
deadly effect, at close range, that the attackers quailed before
the storm, and fell back.* But it was no part of Ney's
* Hæpfner (iii. 253) and Bennigsen (quoted by Wilson, p. 241) assert that
the attack was successful, Ney being driven out at the point of the bayonet.
Dumas (xviii. 36), and other French authorities, say the assault was repulsed.
Dumas falls into confusion between the similar names, Schloditten and Schmo-
ditten, for it is the latter which he represents as the objective of the Russians,
though Ney never occupied it.
Jomini (Vie de Napoleon, iii. 364) says Ney was attacked by Sacken's division,
which had suffered less than the others, and that, though he maintained himself
near Schmoditten (sic), the attack imposed upon him, and he took position
at some distance from the Koenigsberg road.
The historical summary in the Annual Register for 1807, denies the Russian
success against Schloditten.
De Fezensac alleges that Belair repulsed the assault on Schmoditten (sic),
and Ney and his staff spent the night there, in the house of a peasant who had
been killed. He adds the picturesque detail that they all supped off one wretched
goose, the only food procurable, which Ney generously shared with his staff
(p. 148).
The plan of the positions at the end of the battle in the account of the
"témoin oculaire" shows Ney as holding Schloditten and the ground behind it ;
Lasalle's light cavalry between Schloditten and Schmoditten.
Careful search in the Archives Historiques has resulted in the version of this
much-disputed episode given in the text.
From Althof, Ney wrote a pencil note to Berthier (Arch. Hist., daily corre-
spondence) saying he had pushed Lestocq on Schmoditten, and had occupied
Schloditten with the 1st brigade of Marchand's division (Leger Belair's), but he
did not intend to hold the village after 2 a.m. if the enemy remained in force in
his front. At this time Marchand's 2nd brigade was in front of Althof
196
NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN IN POLAND.
intention to hold Schloditten against the enemy, if he con-
tinued in force there. Presently he withdrew his brigade
from the village, which was entered, about 2 a.m., by the
Russians, without opposition.
Gradually, with dying gasps of artillery fire, the battle
had subsided along the whole line. The positions of the
French centre and left remained as they had been before
Lestocq's arrival, except that the line had been prolonged by
Ney, between Althof and Schloditten.
The right, too, retained its position as far as the crest of
the eastern heights. Thence, instead of extending straight
to Kutschitten, with the centre advanced to Anklappen, the
extreme right passed, in front of the Kreegeberg, to Klein
Sausgarten, and the rising ground in front of the village.
Close in front of it were Lestocq's Prussians and Russians.
The whole valley, its slopes and the plateaux on either
side, were a scene of the most appalling carnage and
Gardanne's 2nd brigade was behind it-his first had been left behind to watch
the Prussians who had marched from Pompicken on Koenigsberg. This latter
brigade rejoined Ney just as he closed his despatch. Lasalle's light cavalry and
a brigade of dragoons were behind Althof. This despatch, signed by Ney,
appears to have been written about 8.30 or 9 p.m., just after the capture of
Schloditten.
An unsigned paper, probably sent by Ney at a later hour, distinctly affirms
the repulse of the Russians at Schloditten at 10 p.m.
In the correspondence of the 9th February, there is a hasty note from Soult
to Berthier, dated 3 a.m., in which he says that, though the enemy had occupied
Schloditten, he appeared to be diminishing in strength on Soult's front. He
encloses, for Berthier's information, the despatch from which he derived the news
about Schloditten. It is a pencil note from Dutaillis, Ney's chief of the staff.
It confirms the repulse of the Russian attempt on Schloditten at 10 p.m., adding
that Ney had, later, evacuated the village, in accordance with his previously
expressed intention. The Russians had re-occupied it only at 2 a.m.
These scraps of paper, written by the actors in the midst of the slaughter,
for the information and guidance of brother generals, not with a view to
publication, bear on the face of them the stamp of truth. To doubt that they
are a genuine expression of what the writer believed is impossible. He might be
mistaken in some matters, but it is incredible that he should be so in regard to such
a patent fact as the success or failure of the attempt to recapture Schloditten.
The despatches are hidden away in masses of correspondence which, probably,
have not been searched for years.
THE BATTLE OF EYLAU.
197
suffering, the outcome of this fearful struggle of two
days.*
Scattered all over the surface lay dead and wounded men
and horses, staining with their life-blood the trampled snow.
In places where the battle had been fiercest, the bodies lay
closer: where the French 14th regiment had fought to the
last, on the slope in front of Eylau, their position was
marked by a square of corpses.
Outside the square lay
the bodies of men and horses, slain in their attempts to
break the desperate regiment. The same scene was re-
peated, in reverse, below the Eylau church, where the Russian
column had so nearly saved Europe from years of the
Emperor's tyranny, but had itself been exterminated. In
and behind Kutschitten, lay the remains of its 800 French
defenders, of Davout's corps. In rear of the French position,
the eminence near Tenknitten still wore its ghastly cuirass
of human bodies.
To add to these horrors, the ghouls of the battlefield, the
followers, and even the transport soldiers, roamed amongst
the dead and dying, stripping and robbing them of every-
thing, down to their very boots. The wolves from the
neighbouring forests only awaited the satisfaction of these
human wild beasts to enjoy their share of the ghastly feast.
It was, to quote the title of a picture in the Salon of 1901,
l'heure des fauves." Marbot, left for dead, coming to his
senses when his boot was being pulled off his foot by a
transport soldier, seems to consider the latter's conduct quite
natural, and even remarks, almost with surprise, that his
plunderer was ready to return his clothes, when he found
who he was, and that he was not yet dead.† The starving
Russians were still, like the French, in search of what food
might be found in the villages, on the dead, anywhere.
* The day after the battle, Ney, riding over the field, viewing all this
slaughter, remarked to his staff, Quel massacre! et sans resultat "
(de Fezensac, p. 149).
† Marbot, i. 267.
198
NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN IN POLand.
Osterman could collect only 2170 men out of his whole
division.* The rest were dead, wounded, or marauding.
The French troops were almost more broken in spirit
than their enemies, who, at any rate, had the consolation of
having scored a success at the end of the battle. There were
no enthusiastic cries of "Vive l'Empereur," as there had
been in the morning. All was despondency, gloom, and
misery.
At 11 p.m. a strange council of war was held on the
Russian left wing. Bennigsen had summoned his generals,
and there, in the midst of the carnage and the snow, the
situation was discussed by these men on horseback. The
commander-in-chief expounded to the surrounding circle his
views and intentions. He had, he said, no bread † to feed
his troops, no ammunition to replenish their empty pouches
and caissons. He had no course open but retirement on
Koenigsberg, where he would find stores and ammunition in
abundance.
The generals besought him to hold on. Knorring and
Tolstoi offered at once to renew the attack, and complete
the victory, which they believed was theirs. Lestocq,
summoned to the council whilst he was actually preparing
again to move against Davout, added his entreaties. Ben-
nigsen was firm; he knew he had lost at least 20,000 men,
and he did not know that the French loss was even greater.
He insisted on retreat, and then, exhausted by 36 hours on
horseback, he sought a short period of repose, in a house
resounding with the shrieks of the wounded and dying who
filled it.
About midnight the Russians, about 2 a.m. the Prussians,
began reluctantly to abandon the field which they had so
* Hæpfner, iii. 255.
"The Prussians had provisions; but the Russians had no other sustenance
than the frozen snow. Their wants had induced numbers, during the battle,
to search for food in the adjoining villages, and the plain was covered by foraging
parties passing and repassing" (Wilson, p. 109, note).
THE BATTLE OF EYLAU.
199
*
gloriously held.* Lestocq, with his corps, took the road
towards Domnau and Friedland. The rest of the army moved
towards Muhlhausen, on that to Koenigsberg. Schloditten,
evacuated by Ney, was held as a protection to the right
flank.
As day broke on the 9th, Napoleon, from his bivouac on
the scene of the first encounter of the 7th, scanning with
anxious eyes the field of the battle, to renew which his army
was so little prepared, saw that, this time, the reported retreat
of Bennigsen was indeed true. On the northern horizon
were to be seen groups of cossacks covering the retreat of
the army, which had already disappeared in the forest
beyond.†
Murat was at once launched after the enemy, but his
cavalry, broken and exhausted by their exertions of the pre-
vious day, were in no condition to carry on a pursuit after the
heart of their leader. It may be said that they followed,
rather than pursued. On the night of the 9th, Bennigsen
halted at Wittenburg, beyond the Frisching; on the 10th, he
continued his march to Koenigsberg, there taking post in
front of the Friedland gate, his left resting on the Pregel,
his right covered by the detachments made from the
Prussian corps at Hussehnen, and driven from it at
Pompicken. Lestocq's corps, marching off in far better
* It was about 3 a.m. when Soult first noticed the diminution of the enemy
in his front. See his hurried despatch forwarding that of Dutaillis, quoted
above, p. 196, note.
† Wilson (p. 109) says that Osterman, owing to some mistake in his order to
retreat, did not move from his ground till 9 a.m. on the 9th, and then passed
unmolested across the French front. This story is incompatible with the
French account, and is not mentioned by Hopfner. On the whole it seems
improbable.
The "témoin oculaire" (p. 21) says the French would have marched on
Koenigsberg on the 9th, but for a change of weather, which rendered the roads
impracticable once more.
There was a thaw after the battle, but it did not commence till the middle
of the day on the 10th. Larrey, who appears to have kept a regular diary, says
(iii. 61) that a fall of icy rain on the morning of the 10th was the prelude to the
thaw which set in during the day.
200
NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN IN POLAND.
order than the Russians, reached Domnau on the 9th, and
was forced beyond it by Marulaz's pursuit.* On the 10th,
it reached Allenburg.
The losses of both sides in this sanguinary battle will,
perhaps, never be known with exactness. The best esti-
mate that seems possible, on a consideration of the various
accounts, would put the loss of the Russians and Prussians
at about 25,000, that of the French from 3000 to 5000 higher,
in killed and wounded. Prisoners, on either side, were com-
paratively few.† The hand-to-hand fighting was too fierce
to allow of quarter being freely asked or given.
* Lestocq says he left his van at Domnau and established his headquarters
at Friedland on the 9th (Wilson, p. 261).
+ Napoleon's bulletins are, as usual, clearly false as to losses. They give
them at 1900 killed and 5700 wounded on the French side: at 7000 killed and
12,000 to 15,000 wounded on that of the enemy. The latter is a curious under-
estimate, for Napoleon.
Plotho (p. 74) gives the Russian loss as 25,000 killed and wounded,
Altogether in the campaign he thinks they lost 10,000 killed and 25,000 wounded,
and the total loss of both sides, between the 20th of January and the 9th of
February, he puts at the appalling total of 60,000 killed and wounded.
The French losses at Eylau are very difficult, the Russian almost impossible
to estimate. The largest loss that Napoleon ever admitted was 18,000 (Mémoires
pour servir, viii. 67).
Davout admits that his corps lost 5007.
Augereau gives his loss as 5200, exclusive of prisoners; it was probably
higher. Marbot (i. 279) goes so far as to say it was 12,000 out of 15,000.
There is no complete statement, in the Archives Historiques, of the loss of
the cavalry reserve. Grouchy, in his report (Arch. Hist.), says his division lost
about 250 killed and wounded. The cuirassiers lost much more heavily. It will
not probably be too high an estimate to take the loss of the cavalry, including
that on the left and the Guard cavalry, at 2500.
The Guard infantry was scarcely engaged, but can scarcely have lost less
than 1000. It, as well as the cavalry, had to stand all day under the fire of the
Russian artillery.
Soult admits 8250 killed and wounded (report in Arch. Hist.). He probably
lost 10,000.
Ney must have lost quite 1500. These figures, taking Augereau at 8000,
give a total of 28,000.
Bennigsen's despatch (Wilson, 238-42) gives the loss on his side at 12,000
killed and 7900 wounded. It is unlikely that the wounded were less than the
dead. Assuming they only equalled them, the total would be 24,000.
THE BATTLE OF EYLAU.
201
(c) STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF THE EYLAU CAMPAIGN.
When the French army issued, in the afternoon of the
7th, from the woods towards Landsberg on to the Ziegelhof
plateau, it seemed uncertain, says Soult,* whether the whole
Russian army, or merely a rear-guard, was in front of it.
The conduct of the action against the Russian rear-guard
was, at first, somewhat disjointed on the side of the French.
Soult's centre moved so much faster than his right wing that
the frontal attack, on the Russian extreme rear-guard, com-
menced and failed before the flanking movement was ready.
It would seem that the assault should have been delayed,
until it could have been supported by Augereau on the left,
and Schinner and Vivier on the right, as it eventually was.
It has been shown that the storming of Eylau, on the
evening of the 7th, was probably far from what Napoleon
desired. The remark which Marbot alleges he heard fall
from the Emperor's lips admirably sums up the case.
Napoleon knew that Davout could hardly be in a position
to afford help, on the right, before the following day was well
advanced. Ney's last orders had directed him on Kreuzburg,
and his orders to march to the battlefield were not even
despatched till 8 a.m. on the 8th. This failure to call
Ney direct from Landsberg, on the night of the 7th, is
an omission, on the part of the Emperor, which it is very
difficult to explain. Ney was bivouacking that night close
to Landsberg,† ready to start early next morning for
Kreuzburg, as he actually did. Had he received orders by
midnight of the 7th-8th, instead of at 2 p.m. on the 8th,
he would have been before Schloditten many hours sooner
than he was, and, marching on the shorter line, would have
anticipated Lestocq there.‡
Whatever the cause of this neglect may have been,
* Soult's report (Arch. Hist.).

† Ney, Arch. Hist.
‡ Napoleon afterwards said that, unless Lestocq had been pressed, he might
have fallen on the French left and rear (Mémoires pour servir, etc., viii. 66).
This scarcely seems to cover the case.
202
NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN IN POLAND.
it was clear that, if Napoleon occupied Eylau on the night
of the 7th-8th, and if Bennigsen held firm on the eastern
heights, the French centre would be in a very exposed
situation.
Nor could the Emperor hope to face Bennigsen with
equal forces. He was nearly 30,000 men short of his full
strength, so long as Davout and Ney were absent. Ben-
nigsen was only 7,000 below the strength he developed on
the arrival of Lestocq.
With his superior numbers, on the morning of the 8th,
Bennigsen, had he been a commander of the capacity of his
adversary or even of that of Davout, might have rolled
Napoleon's left upon his centre, and the whole in confusion
on Davout, long before Ney could put in an appearance.
The Emperor had not infantry to properly fill the posi-
tion of his left wing, which consisted almost entirely of
Lasalle's light cavalry and that of the corps of Soult and
Augereau with part of the cavalry reserve.*
For four hours Napoleon's centre at Eylau was in the
most imminent danger. It was only at noon, when Davout's
flank attack became serious, that the intensity of the pressure,
on the centre and left, was relieved. When Davout moved
forward on Kutschitten and Anklappen, a vigorous attack
from Eylau would probably have decided the battle in
Napoleon's favour, but the French troops there were too
shattered and exhausted, by the events of the morning, to
attempt it.
The danger to the left wing did not escape the observa-
tion of contemporary critics. Marbot wonders at Bennigsen's
failure to overwhelm Eylau before Ney and Davout arrived.
Even Soult† says that, so late as the arrival of the Prussians,
Bennigsen should have attacked the French left. Napoleon's
* Soult's report (Arch. Hist.) says there was nothing but cavalry to the left
of Eylau. The village was a somewhat straggling one, and it was a little
difficult to say precisely where it ended.
† Marbot, i. 256. Soult's report, Arch. Hist.
THE BATTLE OF EYLAU.
203
own anxiety for it is shown by his stupendous efforts, with
St. Hilaire's division, with Augereau's corps, and with the
cavalry reserve, to distract attention from it.
At St. Helena he exhibits his sensitiveness to the impu-
tation that he had attacked at Eylau piecemeal. He tries to
prove that, if he had two corps detached, they were opposed
by equal Russian detachments. He distorts the facts.* The
Prussians, it is true, opposed Ney, but they were much
inferior to him in strength. Davout, Napoleon says, was
opposed by a force equal to his own, which he drove on
to the field in front of him, and which (and not troops
from Bennigsen's right) opposed him at Serpallen and
Kutschitten. This is a misstatement. Davout found only
3000 men at Heilsberg, and they had all joined Bennigsen
on the night of the 7th. His first fighting on the 8th
was with Bennigsen's left wing, posted overnight. The only
possible defence for an advance of the centre into the
valley, the only ground on which Napoleon could accept
it with equanimity, appears to lie in the false information
which Jomini † alleges he received from Murat, that Bennig-
sen was retreating once more, as he had already done from
Jonkowo, from Wolfsdorf, and from Landsberg. The report
was not prima facie improbable; if true, it would have been
well for Napoleon to be in Eylau. The fact that he left
Augereau and the Guard on the western plateau during the
night, seems to indicate that the Emperor believed it, for a
time at any rate.
Another criticism, to which Napoleon, at St. Helena,
showed his sensitiveness, concerned the formation of
Augereau's corps in its disastrous advance at 10 a.m. He
asserts that the corps was deployed under his own eyes,
* Mémoires pour servir, etc., vol. viii. p. 67. Shortly after the battle, Napo-
leon wrote that the Russian army in column appeared to intend outflanking the
French left when Davout appeared on the field (Corr. 11,796).
† "Murat announced to me that the enemy was retreating, which supposi-
tion was rendered plausible by the loss of Eylau" (Jomini, Vie de Napoleon,
ii. 358).
204
NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN IN POLAND.
and that it could not have debouched in column in face
of the heavy fire.*
by columns.
The wings, he says, were supported
On this point Augereau's report + may be accepted. He
states that the 1st brigade of each division was deployed, the
2nd formed in squares in support of it. They were first
overwhelmed by a terrible artillery fire, then charged by
infantry, and finally by cavalry.
In the constantly recurring darkness of the snowstorms,
the only way to maintain concert of action was by very close
contact of units, a rule which Davout observed in his attack.‡
Had this plan been adopted by Augereau and St. Hilaire,
the disastrous deviation to his left of the former would, perhaps,
not have occurred.
The great cavalry charge was a desperate remedy for a
desperate situation. As the space between Augereau and
St. Hilaire opened out, it became necessary to fill it somehow.
Both outflanked, Augereau and St. Hilaire were being driven
in opposite directions. All that Napoleon had left was his
cavalry and the Guard. The latter was his last reserve, and
he was always reluctant to use these picked troops till the
last moment; therefore, the cavalry had to be sacrificed.
Besides, they, with their superior mobility, played a part in
clearing St. Hilaire's and Augereau's flanks, which could
hardly have been done in time by infantry. The moral effect
of this cavalry incursion into his very centre was, probably great
on Bennigsen, and damped his ardour for the general advance,
which Napoleon had such reason to dread. The foolish pride
of the Guard battalion, which insisted on charging with the
bayonet, nearly cost the Emperor his life or his liberty.
By noon, the French centre and left were comparatively
* Mémoires pour servir, etc., viii. 68.
† Arch. Hist.
$ "The order had been given to close up, and not even to leave the regula-
tion interval between one battalion and another at times when the snow,
falling thickly, prevented the discernment of objects at a distance of ten paces
(Davout, pp. 169, 170).
"
THE BATTLE OF EYLAU.
205
safe, owing to the vigorous action of Davout, whose splendid
corps once more covered itself with glory, and was within a
hair's-breadth of completing the ruin of the Russians. Lestocq
was only just in time to stop the growing disorder. Still,
even with the ground he regained, the Russian position,, with
its left wing en potence, and with Ney holding Schloditten on
the other flank, on the road to Koenigsberg, was one of great
peril.
Could either side have renewed this sanguinary struggle
on the 9th, is a question impossible to answer. Still, Napoleon
had two corps, Ney's and the Guard, comparatively ininjured,
whilst Bennigsen had none. The Russian ammunition had
nearly run out.* On the French side, Davout, at any rate,
had got up his ammunition columns and replenished his
supply. Probably the reserve ammunition had also arrived
by the Landsberg road.
He
Bennigsen's retreat was, doubtless, his wisest course.
had inflicted enormous loss on the French and had rendered
it impossible for them to pursue with any vigour; better
still, the blow to Napoleon's prestige in Europe had been
very heavy.
The Russian general appears to have made no attempt
to fortify his selected field of battle. There were no barricades
or abattis in Eylau, none in Serpallen, nothing to check the
progress of troops in the woods. In the prevailing frost,
the ground was, of course, unworkable; but is it not
possible that something might have been done with the snow?
Might it not have been utilised, at least, to afford some
concealment to the Russians on the bare face of the heights?
As it was, they were silhouetted clearly against the snow,
and, when the sky was clear, offered a splendid target to the
French artillery. Anything in the form of trenches in the
snow would have seriously incommoded Murat's cavalry.
The fact appears to be that it was not the way of the Russians
to use the spade, even on a defensive field of battle, at this
* Wilson, p. 107.
† Davout, p. 171.
206
NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN IN POLAND.
period, and they were probably not supplied with tools.
Had the will to entrench been present, they might, no doubt,
have worked the soft snow without proper tools.
Strategically, the plans of Bennigsen and Napoleon had
alike miscarried. The Russian commander aimed at cutting
off Bernadotte; he stumbled upon Ney in a position where
he, as well as Bernadotte, might have been destroyed, had
the opportunity been properly utilised.* As it was, Ney's
foolish advance towards Koenigsberg probably saved Berna-
dotte by the delay which it caused to the Russian march;
his escape was indeed a narrow one.
As he and Ney fell back, Bennigsen became infected
with the delusion that the most important part of his
scheme had succeeded, that the Emperor was in full retreat
across the Upper Vistula, his retirement being covered
by the two marshals.
Napoleon's scheme was ruined, it is hardly too much to say,
entirely by the capture of the despatch of the 31st January.
It gave Bennigsen warning of what was coming quite twenty-
four, if not forty-eight, hours before he could have gathered it
otherwise. The importance of even twenty-four hours gained
or lost at such a moment, was incalculable. It certainly saved
Lestocq, who was the nearest to Thorn and the Vistula.
Even if Bernadotte had got a second copy of the despatch,
there would have been a great alteration in the subsequent
course of events. Wanting instructions, he was left hope-
lessly behind. At Eylau, Napoleon was deprived of the
services of his corps which, if it had pursued Lestocq closely,
* "Unfortunately, General Bennigsen was not acquainted with the full
security in which General Ney confided, or, by directing the march on Wartem-
burg, instead of Bischofstein, the whole of the marshal's corps would, probably,
have been obliged to capitulate" (Wilson, p. 84).
Instead of falling on the rear of his (Ney's) corps, disseminated in columns
of regiments over 25 leagues, it (the Russian army) made a long detour to gain
its head, and drive it back on its line of retreat; this fault allowed it to.
concentrate in an excellent position at Gilgenburg" (Jomini, Vie de Napoleon,
ii. 353).
THE BATTLE OF EYLAU.
207
would probably, with the aid of Ney, have disposed completely
of him.
Even with his adversary's scheme laid bare before his
eyes, Bennigsen risked much in marching on Jonkowo,
instead of on Liebstadt.* Till he was well past the latitude
of Guttstadt, he was in the most imminent peril of being cut
from Koenigsberg, and driven on the Frisches-Haff. In
favour of his delay, it must be said that he was apparently
influenced by a loyal desire to give Lestocq time to rejoin
him on his right. Even at Eylau, Davout's attack very nearly
drove the Russians off the Koenigsberg road. Napoleon's
expressed hopes of piercing the hostile centre, driving one
half on the Niemen, and the other on the Vistula and Frisches-
Haff, failed completely; yet it was one of his boldest and
best-conceived schemes.† It has not attracted such general
attention as the march on Ulm or on Jena, because it
failed, whilst they succeeded. In conception it equalled
them; in execution it failed, chiefly, if not wholly, through
the contretemps in connexion with Bernadotte. One result
of the campaign was to cause the Emperor to transfer his
advanced base to the middle and lower Vistula, and his main
line of communications from the Posen-Warsaw road to that
of Thorn.‡
* Bennigsen "saw the impossibility of continuing at Jonkowo, and regretted
his movement from Mohrungen, since he now had to retire in presence of an
enemy, and General Lestocq's corps was exposed to imminent hazard” (Wilson,
p. 91).
† "In these campaigns I saw more, I understood more, I learnt more of war
than I had in my preceding campaigns, and even than I did in those which
I saw afterwards. Napoleon owed there nothing to chance. Everything was
arranged and foreseen. He did not seek to conquer only, or to invade; he
sought to surpass a great warrior who had operated before him in those countries."
"I have studied Napoleon on other theatres, but it is in this campaign that
he seemed to me greatest, the man born a general, calculating calmly what
was possible, difficult, or impossible. The last he left to the enemy; from the
others he derived his own advantage and glory" (Comeau, pp. 228, 290).
‡ Writing to Daru on the 12th February, he says that the line of communi-
cation will now pass through Thorn, not Warsaw (Corr. 11,804).
-2
7
122
0
CHAPTER III.
EVENTS ON THE NAREW IN JANUARY AND FEBRUARY.
O
No mention has, so far, been made of the movements on
N° the extreme French right, where Savary was left in
*
command of the 5th corps, to guard the approaches to Warsaw
by the Narew and Bug, and to cover the right rear of the
movement northwards. The corps at his disposal consisted of
Suchet's and Gazan's divisions, with Becker's dragoon division;
in all, about 18,000 men. Opposed to him, between the
Narew and the Bug, were the two divisions from the army of
Moldavia, under Essen I. There was also Sedmaratzki's 6th
division at Goniondz, which might have to be reckoned with.
Savary's instructions were, if he found Essen only in
small force about Nur, to attack him. If, on the contrary,
the Russian general had been reinforced, Savary would only
hold Brok and Ostrolenka with cavalry. In any case his
object was to cover the right bank of the Narew, from the
mouth of the Omulew to Sierock, and to guard the latter
place strongly, as well as the course of the Bug between
it and the Austrian frontier. He was to bridge the Bug
near Sierock, and to press on the completion of the tête de
pont at Pultusk. If forced to retire on Pultusk with the
bulk of his force, he would require a regiment to guard the
Bug from Sierock to the Austrian frontier. The cavalry
in Ostrolenka would require a small infantry force to
support it.
* Berthier to Savary, dated Prasznitz, 31st January, 1807; printed, Dumas,
xviii. 377.
EVENTS ON THE NAREW.
209
Essen, meanwhile, had, on the 27th January, advanced
from Bransk to Wyoki Mazowiecki, whence he reinforced
Sedmaratzki with 3 infantry regiments from the 9th division.
On the 3rd February, the French were driven out of
Ostrow. About this time, Savary received orders to abandon
Brok and retire upon Ostrolenka, so as to strengthen his
communication with the Emperor's army. Davout, it will
be remembered, had left a detachment at Myszienec. Oudinot
also was on the march from Lowicz to Prasznitz, to assist in
filling the gap with his grenadier division.
When Savary took command of his corps, he found
himself in the unpleasant position of being junior to his
divisional generals. It is not very clear why Suchet, a tried
lieutenant, should have been superseded by him. He found the
troops suffering severe privations, marauding in large numbers
in search of food. Therefore, in order to facilitate supplies,
he marched to Ostrolenka by Pultusk, which, as he himself
admits, exposed Becker, between the rivers, to great risk.*
After Eylau, Essen was ordered by Bennigsen to drive
back Savary, who, at the same time, had made up his mind
to assume the offensive. The French advanced cavalry
captured a copy of Bennigsen's despatch. Savary also
received information that Essen had sent 4000 or 5000 men
across the now frozen Narew, at Tykoczyn, to turn his
left.
He decided to hold Ostrolenka on the defensive, whilst
he assumed the offensive on the right bank of the river.
This was on the 15th February. In the low hills outside
Ostrolenka he left 3 brigades, flanking them with batteries
on the opposite bank. On the morning of the 16th, he moved
out against the Russian force coming down the right bank.
* Savary remarks that, luckily for him, the Emperor's attention was too
much taken up with the events in his own front to allow him to give much
consideration to details on the Narew. But for this, he says, more forcibly than
elegantly, "j'aurais eu la tête lavée de main de maître pour m'y être mépris "
(Savary, iii. 46).
Р
210
NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN IN POLAND.
Gazan, meeting the enemy on the march, drove them back
on a narrow road between two woods, before they had a
chance of deploying. They were pursued for some 5 miles.
In the meanwhile, a brisk artillery fire, at Ostrolenka,
warned Savary that his troops on the left bank were engaged.
The Russians moving forward in three columns had been
firmly met by Reille, commanding the three brigades in
Ostrolenka, amongst which were part of Oudinot's grenadiers.
Though he was driven into the town, the flanking artillery
fire from across the river had already checked the Russians.
Savary now passed the river with the rest of Oudinot's
grenadiers and Suchet's division, the latter called in from
the Omulew. Issuing from the town, Savary drew up his
troops in two lines. On the left, leaning on the river, the
grenadiers, and the cavalry; in the centre, Suchet; on the
right, Campana's brigade (Gazan's division). In this for-
mation he moved against the Russian position on the sand
hills. Thence he dislodged them with a loss of about 1000
men and 7 guns.
*
The Russian advance on the right bank had not been in
as great force as Essen had intended. Sedmaratzki's division
had been summoned to join Bennigsen, and there remained
only the 3 regiments, under Wolkonski, which Essen had
sent to reinforce him. After their repulse by Gazan, they
also were ordered to join Bennigsen. After the failure of his
attempt on Ostrolenka, Essen fell back again, on the 17th, to
Wyoki Mazowiecki. Savary, under orders from the Emperor,
holding Ostrolenka with a detachment and repairing the
bridge there, confined himself generally to the occupation of
winter quarters along the right banks of the Omulew and
Narew down to Sierock. Oudinot, who had temporarily
turned aside to assist Savary, resumed his march to
Willemburg.
Savary's action at Ostrolenka, though not anything very
remarkable as a victory, had been useful in disclosing the
* Hœpfner (iii. 285) says only 2 guns.
EVENTS ON THE NAREW.
211
fact that the Russians were in no great strength on this side,
and that Napoleon had little to fear from any attempt to
strike his communications with Warsaw. When he had
Masséna in command of the 5th corps, on the marshal's
arrival from Italy, there was little need for anxiety, especially
looking to the great entrenched camps which had been
created at Sierock, Warsaw, and Modlin.
PART IV.
WINTER QUARTERS, AND DANZIG.
CHAPTER I.
THE RETURN TO WINTER QUARTERS, AND THE RECRUITMENT
OF THE ARMIES.
(a) THE RETURN TO WINTER QUARTERS.
WHETH
HETHER the terrible struggle at Eylaujwere a victory
for the French or not, the very fact of its incom-
pleteness was sufficient to inflict a severe blow on the
reputation for invincibility of Napoleon, which had already
been somewhat shaken by the indecisive results of Pultusk
and Golymin, and the promptitude with which Bennigsen
had resumed the offensive.*
It was absolutely necessary for the Emperor to convey to
Europe, especially to Austria, the impression that he had
conquered. The Poles, too, might be inclined to think that
their hero was not invincible if he retreated too soon after
the battle.
Anxious, therefore, though he was to give his troops their
well-earned rest in cantonments, the Emperor was con-
strained by political considerations to remain some days on
or near the battlefield, thereby showing that, if his army was
* Many French writers even do not attempt to represent Eylau as a victory.
"The battle was long, very bloody, and, despite the pæans of victory and
the bulletins, it is one of those which I have always held lost" (Comeau,
p. 284).
Savary (iii. 64) says that it could be considered a victory only if the retention
of the battlefield, and the retreat of the enemy, can be considered alone to con-
stitute victory.
Ney's exclamation, "Quel massacre! et sans resultat!" (de Fezensac, p. 149)
shows what that marshal thought of it.
216
NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN IN POLAND.
too much shattered for him to dare a fresh advance on
Koenigsberg, the Russians were equally not in condition to
retrace their footsteps westwards.
Even had the French corps been fit for a renewal of the
campaign, its difficulties would have been vastly increased by
the break-up of the frost on the 10th February.
One more reason for delay was the necessity for clearing
the country, by sending to the hospitals in rear, the many
thousands of wounded French and Russians who were lying
in every village near the scenes of the series of actions
culminating at Eylau. Little or no attempt to bury the
dead was made: they were left to the beasts and birds of
prey. As Platow grimly remarked, when an armistice was
proposed for this purpose after an action in March, the
weather was so cold that there was no fear of pestilence from
this source.* Besides, so long as the ground was unthawed,
burial was almost a physical impossibility.
Napoleon at once issued orders for the removal of the
wounded, no easy matter where carriages were scarce and
could only be dragged through the snow and mud by double
and treble teams.† Their sufferings, jolted, and shivering in
the bitter cold, on open carts or sledges, must have been
aggravated to a frightful degree. It was no short distance
* Wilson, p. 125. Platow's words, according to this authority, were that
"the weather, being cold, there was no danger of any inconvenience from their
want of interment, and that he should give himself no thought about their
obsequies, but he warned off, in future, all such frivolous messengers, unless they
wished to increase the number of the unburied." Perhaps Sir R. Wilson would
have better consulted the reputation of his hero by omitting this anecdote, which
smacks strongly of the barbarian.
+ Marbot, one of the wounded himself, describing his journey, says: "So
long as we were in that horrible Poland it required 12, sometimes 16 horses, to
draw the carriage at a walk through the bogs and quagmires” (Marbot, i. 271).
"The wounded, obliged to be moved in sledges in the open air to a distance
of 50 leagues" (Napoleon to his brother Joseph, dated 1st March, 1807: see
Confidential Correspondence with Joseph, No. 278, p. 231).
"We had to add to our spring carriages, sledges and bad carts, the move-
ment of which became more or less difficult with the thaws and frosts which
alternated" (Larrey, iii. 48).
THE RETURN TO WINTER QUARTERS.
217
that they had to traverse, for the Emperor had resolved, at
any rate, to abandon his forward position, where the difficulty
of supplying his army was already felt.* He was uncertain
even, whether he would be able to maintain himself beyond
the Vistula at all. Therefore, he ordered the establishment
of his hospitals at Posen, Thorn, Bromberg, and Gnesen, on
or behind the great river.† So anxious was he that he sent
Bertrand to open negotiations with the Prussian king, offer-
ing terms far more favourable than any suggested since
Jena, and than those he subsequently granted, when he was
in a position to dictate conditions. To the credit of the
king and his advisers, the offer was rejected.
On the 11th February, Bernadotte at last reached Eylau,
and was sent on to the road to Kreuzberg.§ Murat was
ordered to watch beyond the Frisching, supported by Ney on
the Eylau-Koenigsberg road. Davout took up cantonments
at Domnau, with cavalry towards Friedland. Soult was in
the villages on the battlefield, the Guard at Eylau, and the
remnant of Augereau's corps on the Bartenstein road.
Bennigsen called in the Prussians from Allenburg, but
left some 2600 cavalry there and at Friedland. The latter
place Davout seized on the 13th. The events of the next
two or three days are of no interest or importance; there
* Corr. 11,805, dated 12th February, 1807.
† Corr. 11,804, to Daru, dated 12th February, 1807.
‡ Corr. 11,810, dated 12th February, giving instructions to Bertrand. That
officer was to offer the restitution of the Prussian territories practically intact.
He was to point out that, even if the position of Prussia were restored through
Russia, the king would be, so to speak, a vassal of the Czar, which would suit
neither Prussia nor France. Napoleon would prefer to make the restoration
himself, but he absolutely declined the idea of a conference at which England
should be represented. Such a course would involve endless delay, and might
spread over the next two years. Prussia was necessary to Europe, as well as to
France, as a barrier against Russia. The throne of Berlin must be filled shortly,
whether by a member of the house of Brandenburg, or by some one else. The
person to whom it fell must, however, clearly understand that it was the gift of
Napoleon alone.
§ Bernadotte's headquarters on the 11th, 12th, 13th were at Görken; on the
14th, 15th, 16th about Kreuzburg.
“Journaux militaires," 1st corps, Arch. Hist.
218
NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN IN POLAND.
were a few small combats of cavalry, but neither side was in
a condition to undertake any serious operation. Napoleon
was, in fact, preparing everything for retreat to the position
behind the Passarge, which he hoped to be able to gain un-
perceived, and to hold during the rest of the cold season.
On the 16th, the wounded having for the most part been
removed, the Emperor considered he had stayed long enough
near the scene of the great battle to show, at least, that he
had not been defeated. The orders for retreat were issued,
therefore, on that date to the following effect:-*
On the 16th reserve parks, baggage, sick, and everything
that would delay the march, to gain a start of 8 or 10 miles
in the line to be followed by the respective corps.
The
march to commence on the 17th, all outposts remaining as
they were, so as to deprive the enemy of any knowledge of
the movement going on behind them.
Ney, commanding the rear-guard, with his own corps,
with the cavalry divisions of Lasalle and Klein and the
brigade of Guyot, would reach Eylau on the 17th, Landsberg
the 18th, and Freymarkt on the 19th. Campans,
with the remains of Augereau's corps, was to start on
the 16th for Heilsberg, with two battalions sent on as far
as possible towards Guttstadt, to which place he would
follow with the rest on the 17th.
Davout to reach Bartenstein on the 17th, Heilsberg on
the 18th, Guttstadt on the 19th. The battalion of the 85th,
which he had left at Oertelsberg, would rejoin him at
Heilsberg.
Bernadotte was to reach Schlautienen on the 17th,
Seefeld on the 18th, Wormditt on the 19th. The country
on his left, towards Zinten and Mehlsack, to be watched by
light cavalry; from Seefeld more light cavalry to be sent to
Orschen.† Ney was to be kept fully informed of what was
* Dumas, xviii. 54-60, and the detailed orders printed at pp. 432-439 of the
same volume.
† On Bernadotte's pointing out the difficulty of moving his artillery by this
THE RETURN TO WINTER QUARTERS.
219
happening in Bernadotte's direction. Soult to reach Lands-
berg the 17th, Frauendorf 18th, and Liebstadt 19th.
Bessière's marches, with the Guard, were to Landsberg on
the 17th, to Freymarkt on the 18th, and to Liebstadt on the
19th.
By these movements the army would, on the 19th, be on
the line Wormditt-Liebstadt-Guttstadt, with Ney some-
what in advance at Freymarkt. It will be observed that
Augereau's and Soult's corps, which had been so shattered at
Eylau, were kept well away from any pursuit the Russians
might attempt, if they discovered the movement before it was
complete. The brunt of the pursuit would fall on the un-
shaken corps of Ney and Bernadotte. Napoleon clearly
thought it unlikely that Bennigsen would interfere with his
right. He hoped, and the event justified him, that the
retreat would, owing to the maintenance of the outposts to
the last moment, remain undiscovered till it was complete.
It was only on the 19th that Bennigsen realised that his
enemy was gone. Platow, on that date, entering Eylau,
found there 1500 Russians and a few hundred French, whose
wounds were so bad as to render their removal impossible.
On the 20th, the main body began to advance. The
Prussians occupied Domnau and Bartenstein. Here they
were joined by Sedmaratski, who had now arrived and
marched on their left to Seeburg. That evening, Lestocq
received orders to send part of his force to act as the right of
the allied army, holding the French left in check.
On the 21st, the Russian advanced guard reached Lands-
berg, where more of the most severely wounded were found.
There was some fighting between the cossacks and the
retiring French outposts in the village. The main body was
at Eylau with its second line behind Kreuzburg; the reserve
still behind the Frisching.
route, he was allowed to move by the Mehlsack road, provided, always, he took
good care to cover that to Landsberg (Berthier to Bernadotte, 16th February;
printed, Dumas, xviii. 437).
220
NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN IN POLAND.
The Prussians were now partly on the right, partly on the
left of the advance, while Bennigsen moved in a single
column. Plotz, on the extreme right with part of the
Prussians, crossed the Lower Passarge at Braunsberg.
Encounters with the last rear guards of the French frequently
occurred.
Napoleon, before he retreated, had announced* to his
army, by proclamation, his intention of taking up his quarters
nearer the Vistula. He boasted loudly the success of his
operations against Bennigsen. The latter, at Landsberg, on
the 25th February, in turn, appealed to his army with an
equally exaggerated account of his alleged successes.†
*
"Pr. Eylau, February 16th. Soldiers,-We had begun to enjoy a little
repose in our winter quarters when the enemy attacked the first corps, and
showed themselves on the Lower Vistula. We broke up, and marched against
him. We have pursued him, sword in hand, 80 miles. He has fled to his
strongholds, and retired beyond the Pregel. In the battles of Bergfried, Deppen,
Hof, and Eylau, we have taken from him 65 pieces of cannon, and 16 standards,
besides his loss of more than 40,000 men in killed, wounded, and taken
prisoners. The heroes who, on our side, remain in the bed of honour, have died
a glorious death. It is the death of a true soldier. Their relatives will always
have a just claim to our care and benevolence. Having thus defeated all the
enterprises of the enemy, we shall return to the Vistula, and resume our winter
quarters. Those who may dare to disturb these quarters shall have reason to
repent; for, whether beyond the Vistula or on the other side of the Danube,
whether in the middle of the winter, or in the beginning of autumn, we still
shall be found French soldiers and soldiers of the Grand Army" (Proclamation,
quoted, Wilson, p. 200).
"Soldiers,-As I was informed by my outposts that the enemy flattered
himself he would cut us from our frontiers, I caused the army to take a different
position, so as to mar their plans. The French, deceived by this movement, fell
into the snare which I had spread for them. The roads by which they followed
us are strewn with their corpses. They were drawn on to the field of Eylau,
where your incomparable valour surpassed my hopes; and you have shown them
all that Russian heroism can do.
"In that battle more than 30,000 French met their death. They have been
forced to retire from every point, leaving us their wounded, their standards, and
their baggage.
“I vainly endeavoured to draw them under the walls of Koenigsberg—there
to complete their destruction. Only eleven regiments dared to advance. They
have been destroyed, or taken prisoners.
"Warriors! you have now rested after your exertions; let us pursue these
disturbers-let us crown our great deeds, and, after having, by fresh victories,
THE RETURN TO WINTER QUARTERS.
221
Bennigsen hoped that Napoleon was still in retreat across
the Vistula, but was not strong enough to dare to push him
hard; the Emperor had no intention of repassing the river if
he could help it, but he was far from certain that Bennigsen
might not compel him to do so.
He at once proceeded to issue orders for the assumption
of winter quarters as he desired to hold them. His main
line of communications was now changed. The route by
Warsaw ceased to be his principal line, being replaced by
that of Thorn. The chief depôt on that line would be Posen,
whence canals afforded excellent communications, in open
weather, with Magdeburg in rear, and Bromberg in front.*
The Warsaw line was by no means given up. It was
necessary on all grounds, military as well as political, to
retain the Polish capital. Savary's success at Ostrolenka
had cleared the country, and allowed of the establishment of
direct communication between Warsaw and the main army
on the Lower Vistula, instead of forcing convoys to hug the
bank of the river.† To strengthen the force at Ostrolenka,
Jerome was ordered ‡ to send to it a Bavarian division of
about 10,000 men, as well as about 5000 or 6000 Polish
levies. Napoleon had also added to it a tower of strength
in the person of Masséna, whom he had summoned from
Italy to take the command of his right. Masséna's relations
with King Joseph at Naples had not been too cordial, and
he welcomed the summons to more active duties in the field.
given peace to the world, we will re-enter our beloved country. Our monarch
awaits us to recompense your incomparable valour. In the arms of our wives and
children, we shall console ourselves for all the misfortunes which have afflicted
our dear country" (Bennigsen's Proclamation, quoted, Dumas, xviii. 66, 67).
* Corr. 11,804, dated 12th February, to Daru.
† On the 19th February, the Emperor sent orders for the construction of a
good road from Warsaw to Osterode, behind the Ukra, passing through Zakroc-
zin, Plonsk, Raciaz, Soldau, and Gilgenburg (Corr. 11,831). Osterode was
to be the principal depôt beyond the Vistula, and the construction there of great
bread and biscuit bakeries was directed (Corr. 11,830, dated February 19th).
‡ Corr. 11,811, dated 13th February, and orders of 24th February to Mas-
séna (Dumas, xviii. 467).
222
NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN IN POLAND.
He was, however, disappointed to find himself relegated to
a secondary part of the theatre of war. He remarked to
the Emperor, "Then, sire, it is a simple corps of observation
that I am to command, on the rear of the Grand Army?"
The complaint was scarcely fair, for it was by no means
impossible that the command might become of supreme
importance, should the Russians once more attempt an
advance on Warsaw. Moreover, as Napoleon explained to
Masséna, he could hardly supersede men who had borne the
brunt of the campaign in favour of the last comer, even if he
were Marshal Masséna. Masséna's objects were (a) to cover
Warsaw; (b) to hold in check the enemy's left; (c) to
protect the country against incursions of cossacks, and to
maintain the communications of the army.†
On the opposite flank, the capture of Danzig was
urgently necessary, and orders were issued to Lefebvre, so
early as the 18th February, to proceed to its investment.
The siege would be carried on, even if a retreat to the left
bank of the Vistula were forced; in that case it could not be
so effectually covered. Lefebvre would have the Poles,
already assembled on the left bank, Menard's division of
French troops, which ought to have arrived, and the Saxons,
about to march from Posen.
* Masséna, v. 316.
•
+ See full instructions to Masséna, dated Osterode, 25th February; printed,
Dumas, xviii. 467, etc.
He was, if possible, to maintain the line of the Omulew, with an advanced
guard in Ostrolenka, and the main body in Pultusk, Makow, and Prasznitz. If
forced to do so, he could fall back successively on the lines of the Orezyc and
the Ukra. In the last resort, he would have to defend the great entrenched
camp at Praga and Warsaw. In the event of the Emperor's deciding to resume
the offensive, he would send Masséna special orders. If the Russian main body
acted offensively against the Emperor, Masséna would take the offensive, with
a view to detaining Essen on the Narew, or to follow him if he slipped away.
Were Masséna's corps attacked in great force, he would require to let go Pultusk,
but should hold the bridge at Sierock as long as possible. By so doing, he would
be in a position to follow the force which had driven him back, should it turn
northwards against the Emperor.
‡ Corr. 11,826, dated Landsberg, 18th February, to Lefebvre.
THE RETURN TO WINTER QUARTERS.
223
To cover this great siege, and the blockades of Graudenz
and Colberg, the following orders for cantonments were
issued, on the 20th February.*
Osterode was fixed as the rallying-point for all the corps.
of the centre and left, in the event of the enemy again
advancing. Augereau's corps ceased to exist, the small
portion of it which had escaped at Eylau being distributed to
others.
To Bernadotte was assigned the Lower Passarge, from its
mouth to Spanden. He was to occupy Braunsberg and
Saalfeld, with his troops cantoned in columns between the
two; headquarters at Pr. Holland. Infantry and cavalry
posts along the Passarge, watching all the passages so as to
prevent a crossing by the enemy's light cavalry.
Soult would take up the line on Bernadotte's right,
holding Wormditt, Liebstadt, Mohrungen, and Liebemuhl,
having only advanced guards across the Passarge, and guard-
ing its course from Spanden to Deppen. His troops,
generally, would be in column from Wormditt to Liebemuhl.
Ney was to occupy Guttstadt and Allenstein, keeping
cavalry and infantry posts between the Alle at Guttstadt and
the Passarge at Elditten, watching the passages of the former
river from Guttstadt to Allenstein. His park, ambulances,
etc., somewhere between Allenstein and Osterode.
Davout was to occupy cantonments from Hohenstein to
Gilgenburg, watching the country towards Passenheim and
Willemburg with detachments.
These four corps were thus spread out like a fan, radiating
from the centre at Osterode to the arc through Braunsberg,
Wormditt, Guttstadt, Allenstein, and Gilgenburg. The
Guard, and Oudinot's grenadiers, were ordered to Osterode,
Löbau, Rosenthal, Neumark, etc., forming a general reserve.
The headquarters of the cavalry reserve were also at
Osterode. Sahuc's dragoons were made over to Bernadotte,
another dragoon division to Ney, Millhaud's to Davout.
* Orders printed in full, Dumas, xviii. 448, etc.
224
NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN IN POLAND.
Klein was to occupy cantonments at Elbing, and on the road
to Pr. Holland. There also Durosnel was to refit his light
cavalry. That under Lasalle was to go to Neidenburg and
the neighbourhood. The three cuirassier divisions, which had
suffered heavily before and at Eylau, were sent to the rear,
about Riesenburg, Freystadt, Bischofswerder, Strasburg, etc.
The movements, commencing on the 21st, were to be
completed by the 23rd, except in the case of Bernadotte.
Each corps was to have a small hospital on the right bank
of the Vistula, besides a larger one on the left.
At Osterode, food was to be stored sufficient for the army
for 10 days; two points between Osterode and Thorn were
also to be selected, and kept stored with 5 days' supplies
at each.
At Thorn, 20 days' more supplies were to be collected and
kept up, thus making 40 days' altogether in reserve.*
(6) NAPOLEON'S MEASURES FOR INCREASING HIS FORCE.
This seems to be the most convenient moment at which
to interrupt the narrative of events for the purpose of sketch-
ing briefly the measures which, during the next four months
after Eylau, the Emperor took for the purpose of reinforcing
his army to a strength which should place beyond all doubt
the result of the campaign in the spring or summer. He
felt, too, that his prestige had suffered so severely that he
must so strengthen himself in Germany as to render it
almost impossible for Austria to dare the risk of interference,
and, at the same time, to guard against an English descent,
in support of the Swedes, on his left rear.
Such a descent he had always thought possible, though
he estimated 25,000 men as the utmost number the expe-
dition was likely to muster.+ In the earlier stages of the
* Berthier to Daru, 20th February, 1807, Dumas, xviii. 453.
† Corr. 12,135, dated 23rd March, 1807, to his brother Louis. Also Corr.
12075, dated 18th February, in which he tells Clarke that it is even possible
Berlin might be temporarily occupied by a raid from the sea.
The estimate of numbers was certainly a liberally high one.
THE RECRUITMENT OF THE ARMIES.
225
war the possibility of its landing on the coasts of France was
greater than it was now that the Emperor had transferred
the seat of war to, and beyond the Vistula.
Under these circumstances, the Emperor felt that he
could venture on a further denudation of the French and
Dutch ports, and of the reserve at Paris, the void being
filled by conscripts of 1807 and 1808; for he contemplated
another draft on the military reserves of the future.*
Each of the 5 battalions in Paris, and the 6 at Brest, was
reduced to 600 men, all above that number being drawn for
the nucleus of fresh provisional regiments. The depôts of the
65th and 72nd, in Holland, were required to provide 160 men
each for the same purpose.† Zayonchek's Polish corps,
which was destined to fill the gap between Masséna and the
main army, was ordered to be recruited up to 25,000 men.
Napoleon's design was to create an army of observation.
in Germany, to be placed under the orders of Brune.
Raising it to 60,000 or 70,000 men, and having available on
its wings the corps of Mortier in Pomerania, and of Jerome in
Silesia, he would have at his disposal at least 100,000 men
in rear of his army on the Vistula. This great force could be
moved forward on the Vistula, back upon the Elbe, north to
the coast, or south against Austria, as circumstances might
require.
The conscripts of 1808 were demanded by a message
to the Senate, dated 20th March, 1807, about one and a half
years before they were due. Their distribution was laid
down precisely, the principle of sending them where they
* Corr. 12080, dated 19th March, to Lacuée, in which Napoleon says he
proposes demanding the conscription of 1808. Reckoning it at 80,000, he would
send 36,000 to 5 legions of reserve, and 24,000 to complete the 3rd battalions at
home. Thus the boys of under 20 would be kept back from the scene of active
operations, for which he thought them unfit. Writing to Kellerman on the 4th
June, he says that the conscripts of 1808 are too young for work at the front.
(Corr. 12,722.)
† Corr. 11,901, dated 28th February, to Dejean.
+ Corr. 12,100.
226
NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN IN POLAND.
were not likely to see active service being carefully ob-
served.*
From Italy were drawn, for the army of observation, the
French divisions of Boudet and Molitor,† and other troops.
Spain was called on to supply 15,000 men for the army
of
observation. The Prince of Peace had been organising
Spanish troops, nominally to be able to assist Napoleon if
required, really to be prepared for action in the event of his
defeat. The Spaniard's hand was forced by the Emperor's
demand, and he meekly sent the troops.
In the latter half of April, the ports were once more
drawn on for four divisions, to be replaced by the reserve
legions and by conscripts. These four divisions would
march parallel to the coast, following the English move-
ments, and ready at any moment to meet a descent from the
sea on their left. To embarrass England, Admiral Decrés
was ordered to make preparations in Brest, as if for a
descent on Ireland. The Emperor believed an English expe-
dition to be starting at the end of April.§ Very complete
+
*The distribution was thus-
20,000 for the 5 legions.
60,000 for the Active Army 15,000 to Italy.
25,000 for the rear of the Grand Army.
(10,000 to the legions.
20,000 for the Reserve 5,000 to Italy.
(Corr. 12,228, dated 30th March.)
5,000 to the Grand Army.
† Corr. 12,232, dated 30th March.
‡ Corr. 12,435, dated 21st April, 1807, to Lacuée. The Emperor again says
he does not believe England able to embark more than 25,000 men. If the
expedition, which he believed to be starting shortly, should appear to be making
for the Baltic, the four divisions would march off thus, following its movement,
and being replaced as they started by the legionaries and conscripts :-
1st division from Boulogne
2nd
""
39
3rd
4th
•
""
""
St. Lo
Pontivy
Camp Napoléon
7,680 men
6540
""
7000
...
...
...
4,480
""
25,700
§ Corr. 12,486, dated 29th April, to Decrés.
THE RECRUITMENT OF THE ARMIES.
227
instructions were sent to Brune for his action in every pos-
sible case.
More cavalry was drawn from the army of Italy in
May;† and, as the season for the resumption of hostilities
approached, urgent orders were sent to Clarke to hurry
forward the provisional regiments; to Jerome, to forward all
recovered invalids, especially cavalry, from Silesia; § to
the Fusiliers of the Guard (2 regiments), to hasten their
march through Germany, using carts as far as Brom-
berg.
Immense efforts were made to increase the supply of
horses. Napoleon expected to have 80,000, of which 56,000
would be with the Grand Army.T
To the increase of his artillery he gave special attention,
even going so far as to cast guns of a different calibre to
utilise the ammunition captured from the Prussians.**
* Corr. 12,494, to Brune, dated 29th April.
His corps of observation, irrespective of Mortier's and Jerome's corps, would
for the present consist of 20,000 French troops (Boudet's and Molitor's divisions
from Italy), 14,000 Dutch and 14,000 Spaniards: the new draft from Spain could
not arrive before June. (Corr. 12,465.)
The left of this corps should be between the Elbe and the Weser, the centre
between Lubeck and Demmin, the right between Demmin and the Oder, Molitor
and Boudet at Magdeburg, the Spaniards in Hanover. If the English landed
in Holland, Brune would move on that country. If they made for Hamburg,
Brune would also go there. If Danzig was their objective, he would move to
his right. Should they go still further east, he would lean on Stettin, leaving
but a small force to resist a possible diversion towards Hanover.
Corr. 12495, dated 29th April, instructed Mortier to besiege Colberg and
cover the coast from the Oder to the Vistula. If a landing were attempted at
the mouth of the Oder, the marshal would lean to his left and support Brune;
if at Colberg, all his forces (about 18,000) must unite to cover the siege, Brune
supporting him.
If Danzig or Koenigsberg were the landing-place, Mortier would march on
the former, Brune moving up behind him.
† Corr. 12,543, dated 6th May, to Eugene, and Corr. 12,567, dated 10th May.
‡ Corr. 12,542, dated 6th May.
§ Corr. 12,541, dated 6th May.
|| Corr. 12,038, dated 15th March, to Dejean.
¶ Corr. 12,038, dated 15th March.
** Jomini, Art of War, p. 318.
228
NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN IN POLAND.
By these and similar measures the Emperor would
have, in the middle or end of May, in addition to the
garrison at home and the army on the Vistula, the strength
of which will be dealt with later, roughly speaking, the
following forces directly or indirectly covering him against
possible aggression of the English and Swedes in the north, of
Austria in the south of Germany, and of England in the
south of Italy—
(a) Brune's army of reserve with the corps of Mortier and
Jerome
100,000+
(b) The army of Northern Italy, with Marmont's corps in
Dalmatia, both threatening Austria's southern frontier
72,000 +
(e) Army of Naples
...
...
52,000 $
Altogether Napoleon cannot have had less than 600,000
men in different parts of France and Europe-a gigantic
army at that period.
The issue of all the numerous orders necessary for these
preparations was alone a heavy piece of work; but it was
* A new provisional regiment was formed from the 3rd battalions of the
59th and 69th (Corr. 12,485, dated 29th April.)
There were 16 provisional regiments from which to recruit the army on the
Vistula (Corr. 12,472, dated 25th April).
Also 7 new provisional garrison regiments (Corr. 12,433, dated 21st April).
On the 21st April, Napoleon notes, in a letter to Lacuée, that, out of 160,000
fresh troops expected by him, 113,000 had already arrived (Corr. 12,434, dated
21st April).
This does not appear to include the French troops marching up parallel to
the coast from Boulogne, etc., but they would about compensate for the move-
ment of Mortier across the Vistula at the re-opening of the campaign.
On the 30th May, the Emperor, writing to Brune (Corr. 12,704), says that
marshal will have, by July, 60,000 infantry, 6000 cavalry, and 7000 or 8000 men
in the provisional battalions at Hameln, etc. This army, left in his rear, was not
meant merely to check England. Should Austria move, it would have to go to
Silesia and Gallicia, in which case it would be reinforced by 20,000 Poles, and
20,000 men in Silesia, and would have 100 guns. Its composition is summarised
as: (a) Dutch troops; (b) Spaniards from Etruria; (c) Spaniards arriving in
June from Spain; (d) Molitor's and Boudet's divisions; (e) Loison from before
Colberg.
Corr. 12,543, dated 6th May, to Eugene.
§ Letter to Joseph, dated 1st March, 1807, No. 278, at p. 231, vol. i., Corr.
with Joseph.
THE RECRUITMENT OF THE ARMIES.
229
only a portion of what the Emperor got through, in his
seclusion from the distractions of the gay world, at Osterode
or Finkenstein.* He had to deal with troubles at home,
panic and a fall in the funds,† with matters of diplomacy all
over Europe and in Persia, with a thousand great questions:
yet he found time to watch every detail concerning his
army, its communications, and its supplies. Nothing seemed
to escape him. It was he who called attention to the
omission from a return of two regiments which had been
overlooked at Luxembourg; it was he who, by comparing
hospital with regimental returns, discovered how many of
his men were marauding all over the country. All this
time he was being urged, by Murat and the other generals at
Osterode, to retire to the left bank of the Vistula.§ Napo-
leon's correspondence during March and April, teems with
complaints of insufficient information from his generals,
with orders for the establishment of bakeries, for forwarding
supplies of all sorts, for the establishment of hospitals and
the removal of the wounded, with demands for more shoes,
and with instructions for reconnaissances and surveys.
There is hardly any point on which he insists more strongly
than the provision of ample supplies of shoes. The principal
central depôt for shoes and uniforms, as well as other stores,
would now be Posen; thence, they could go by canal to Brom-
berg, and so to the army beyond the Vistula.||
As the hospitals at the front became crowded with the
sick and wounded, the less serious cases were transferred to
Breslau and Glogau, where fine barracks gave good accommo-
dation. In this way the congestion of the main hospitals was
relieved. To facilitate communications, bridges at Thorn,
Marienburg, and Marienwerder were built or completed.
* "If the Emperor, instead of sitting in a hole, like Osterode, had gone to
a large place, he would have taken three months to do all he actually did in one"
(Savary, iii. 65).
† Savary, p. 65.
Corr. 12,485.
|| Corr. 11,804, dated 12th July, to Daru.
¶ Corr. 12,102, dated 20th March, to Jerome.
§ Savary, 65.
230
NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN IN POLAND.
(c) EVENTS ON THE MAIN FRONT IN FEBRUARY,
MARCH, AND APRIL.
In seeking to take up the winter quarters prescribed by
Napoleon, on the 20th February, the corps of Davout, Ney,
Soult, the Guard, and the cavalry reserve, had nothing but a
rearward movement to make. With Bernadotte the case was
different, for he had to spread his corps down the Passarge
to Braunsberg.
On the 25th February, the Emperor received information
that the Prussians were marching on Elbing with about 4000
men, and also on Guttstadt. His first care was to guard
with Soult's corps, the bridge on the Passarge at Alken.*
He seriously apprehended a general advance of the enemy,
and he expressed his intention, in that event, of fighting a
great battle on the Osterode plateau, where he calculated he
could collect 95,000 men in thirty-six hours,† whilst he
reckoned the enemy's whole strength at 55,000. ‡
On the 25th, the Prussians had passed, in part, the
Passarge at Braunsberg, and had pushed cavalry and infantry
into and beyond Stangendorf and Zagern. Lestocq was
moving on the Passarge through Wormditt, which the French
had evacuated, towards Alken and Spanden.
His right was ordered to move cautiously, on the 26th,
towards Muhlhausen. On that day, however, Bernadotte
* Corr. 11,877, dated 25th February, to Soult.
† Corr. 11,882, dated 26th February, and 11,889 of the same date, both to
Soult.
+ Hopfner (iii. 293) gives the allied strength as-
Russians
Prussians
...
...
...
39,545
11,300
50,845
which the expected arrival of Sedmaratzki would raise to about 61,000 regular
troops, and 6,300 cossacks.
THE RECRUITMENT OF THE ARMIES. 231
sent Dupont's division, with three light cavalry regiments
under Lahoussaye, and a dragoon brigade from Muhlhausen,
to force the Prussians back across the Passarge at Brauns-
berg. Before these troops they retired.* Dupont, sending
the 9th infantry and the 5th chasseurs to his right on
Petelkau, himself moved direct on Braunsberg with 3 infantry
and 2 cavalry regiments. He found the Prussians drawn up
behind Stangendorf, with their left resting on Zagern. That
village being carried by the French right column, the
Prussians took up another position, behind a ravine, between
it and Braunsberg.
Dupont, meantime, had carried the position behind
Stangendorf. Once more the Prussians formed on the heights
in front of Braunsberg. Hence, again overpowered, they
were driven across the river beyond the town.
On the 27th, Dupont retired to the left bank, burning the
Braunsberg bridge, and established himself at Braunsberg,
Frauenburg, and Tolkemit. The Prussians lost at least 800
men in these actions.
On the 1st March the Prussians and Russians took up
the following positions:-
Russians:
Advanced guard (Platow) at and about Arensdorf, supported by the
mass of the cavalry under Gallitzin, at Benern.
1st line-5th division (Tutchkow), Mehlsack.
8th division (Essen III.), Frauendorf.
3rd division (Sacken), Raunau.
2nd division (Osterman Tolstoi), Reichenburg, beyond the
Alle.
2nd line-7th division (Dochtorow), Plauten.
14th division (Kamenskoi), Stabunken.
4th division (Somow), Heilsberg.
Headquarters: Heilsberg.
* They retired to Heiligenbeil and Mehlsack, with outposts at Wormditt.
"The loamy ground was so slippery from the thaw that cavalry and artillery
were useless" (Wilson, p. 246).
232
NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN IN POLAND.
Prussians:-
1st advanced brigade, Grunau and towards Braunsberg.
2nd advanced brigade, Schalmen, Anken, &c.
3rd advanced brigade, Langwalde and along the Passarge.
Supports in Plaswich, Lindenau, Damerau, &c.
Main body in the neighbourhood of Hohenfurst and along the
Mehlsack-Braunsberg road.
Reserve about Lilienthal, &c.
Headquarters: Peterswalde.
Ney, during these days, on the 26th February, sending
one brigade forward again from Guttstadt into the Schmolainen
forest, had badly cut up an advanced Russian regiment.
Reinforced, the Russians turned the tables on him, forcing
him to evacuate Guttstadt in the following night. The town
was of importance to the French, as a support for the
advanced portion of their line, and Napoleon was annoyed
at Ney's retirement from it as there were only, the
Emperor believed, 4000 or 5000 of the enemy in front of
him.*
For its recapture measures were now taken. Ney had
fallen back to a position with Deppen on his left, and the
Emperor was inclined to think the enemy contemplated an
advance against the right of the Grand Army. In that case,
he would reply by a movement from Braunsberg, which
would soon alarm Bennigsen for his communications with
Koenigsberg, and put a check on the movement of the
opposite wing. Bernadotte was therefore to support Dupont
by a division at Muhlhausen.† To fill the gap between
Davout and Masséna, Zayonchek's Poles were ordered to the
neighbourhood of Neidenburg.‡
* Corr. 11,895, dated 27th February, to Soult.
† Corr. 11,905, dated 28th February, to Bernadotte.
Corr. 11,909, dated 1st March. This force should amount to 10,000 or
12,000 (Corr. 11,925, dated 4th March). It was afterwards ordered to be raised
to 25,000. Its mission was to guarantee the flank from Neidenburg to Allenstein,
to keep touch also with Masséna, and to protect the road on the right bank of
the Vistula from Warsaw to Mlawa, Soldau, and Osterode (Corr. 11,957 and
11,958, dated 6th March).
THE RECRUITMENT OF THE ARMIES.
233
Davout was now at Mohrungen, not within reach of Ney;
but Soult could support Ney at Deppen, being, in turn,
supported by Davout, behind whom, again, would be the
Guard and Oudinot.
*
.
On the 3rd March, whilst Bernadotte and Soult made
demonstrations on the Passarge, Ney moved, with about
18,000 men, on Queetz, which he occupied without much
difficulty. On the 4th he continued his movement through
Guttstadt on Schmolainen.
There, finding Sacken had concentrated at Launau, he
stopped, and, on the 5th, retired again to Guttstadt, whilst
Bernadotte and Soult, Ney's object having been effected,
recrossed the Passarge.
The Emperor was still apprehensive of a movement
against his right, but was most anxious to hold on to his
cantonments, and ordered them to be fortified as far as
possible. "Il faut remuer de la terre et couper du bois," he
wrote to Soult, on the 5th March.† He now broke up and
distributed to other corps the shattered remnant of the corps
of Augereau, who had himself been allowed to return to
France to get cured of his wounds.‡
Napoleon had now discovered that there were many
stragglers from the army, including, he heard, even officers.
For the arrest of these, and their return to the army, he
issued stringent orders to Rapp, now governor of Thorn, and
to Clarke.§
Another point on which orders were issued was the
strict blockade of the garrison of Graudenz by the Hesse
* Corr. 11,915, dated 2nd March, to Soult.
† Corr, 11,939 and Corr. 11,962, dated 6th March, to Lefebvre.
The corps was distributed thus:—
16th Light Infantry, 63rd, and 24th of line, to Bernadotte.
7th Light Infantry to Davout.
14th (almost destroyed) and 105th to Soult.
44th to Lefebvre (Corr. 11,951, dated 6th March, to Daru).
§ Corr. 11,951 and 11,955, both dated 6th March.
234
NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN IN POLAND.
Darmstadt troops.* They were placed under Victor, who
was exchanged against Blücher early in March.†
Bennigsen appears really to have intended a further
advance against Ney, and Napoleon considered it desirable
to alarm him in the direction of Willemburg, where he
thought it possible that there might be part of Essen's
troops, whom it was Massena's duty to retain on the
Narew.‡ He accordingly sent Murat with about 6000
cavalry, part of Oudinot's grenadiers, and some of
Zayonchek's Poles against it. The movement was sup-
ported by Davout from Allenstein and Hohenstein. Murat,
finding only cavalry at Willemburg, occupied it on the
10th.§ He was ordered || to advance as far as Wartemburg,
and then, after waiting a day to pick up stragglers, to fall
back again to Osterode. T
After this period, comparative peace reigned in front of
the enemy's army. There were trifling outpost skirmishes
here and there which are not worth detailing, but the
Russian army had settled into winter quarters. On the
20th March its positions were:
**
Bagration, with advanced guard, altogether about 11,000 men, besides
artillery and cossacks, at Launau.
Markow, with the cavalry of the right wing, about Reimerswalde and
Heilsberg.
Right bank of Alle :-
Gallitzin's cavalry of the left wing about Kerwienen, Kiewitten, etc.
2nd division (Osterman), Lauterhagen, Roggenhausen, Krekollen.
14th division (Kamenskoi), Gallingen, Kraftshagen, etc.
* Corr. 11,904, dated 28th February.
†The exchange is mentioned as having been effected in Corr. 11,976, dated
8th March.
+ Corr. 11,978, dated 9th March.
|| Corr. 12,008, dated 12th March.
§ Corr. 12,000.
¶ Gazan's division from Masséna's corps was sent to Willemburg. The
objects of this were explained by the Emperor to Masséna as: (1) that the
division might be available on the third day at Osterode, should the enemy move
in that direction; (2) to maintain communications between Masséna and the
Emperor, and to hold Willemberg, which was the key of Omulew (Corr. 12016,
dated 13th March).
** Hæpfner, iii. 325, etc.
THE RECRUITMENT OF THE ARMIES.
235
Reserve :-
4th division (Somow): Tolks, Albrechtsdorf, Borken, etc., on the left
bank of the Alle.
7th division (Dochtorow) about Tormitten, on the right bank.
Tolstoi about Wargitten and towards Seeburg.
Platow with cossacks at Oertelsburg and Passenheim.
Headquarters: Bartenstein. Point of assembly: Schippenbeil.
Bennigsen had, by the middle of March, received re-
inforcements of about 10,000 men, partly fresh regiments,
partly stragglers and recovered invalids.
The Prussians were about Heiligenthal, Zinten, and
Plauten, with advanced guards towards the lower Passarge.
Napoleon held to his old line, vigorously pressing the
siege of Danzig and the strengthening, by fortification, of his
main front.
Lefebvre was ordered to occupy the Nogat island, be-
tween the branches of the Vistula, and to drive the enemy
as far up the Nehrung as possible, blocking his return by
fortifications.*
Masséna was required to send Gazan towards Willem-
burg, which was the key of the Omulew, and where he
would strengthen the link with the centre.†
Even on the 22nd March, the Emperor did not feel sure
that he could maintain himself on the right bank of the
Vistula. He was still intent on the idea of a great battle,
about Saalfeld or Osterode, should the enemy advance,
and he ordered positions for the purpose to be carefully
surveyed.§
* Corr. 11,962, dated 6th March.
+ Corr. 12,016, dated 13th March, to Masséna (see note, p. 234).
On that date he wrote to Daru that the country in which he was could
not long feed his army. When the bridges and bridge heads at Marienburg,
Marienwerder, and Sierock were quite complete, it would be necessary to con-
sider whether he would not be constrained to lead his army to the left bank, in
which case his chief positions would be Dirschau, Mewe, Schwetz, Bromberg,
Thorn, and Wroclawik. Then the Marienwerder bridge would be of special
importance (Corr. 12,120, dated 22nd March).
§ Corr. 12,321, dated 6th April. A most interesting document, showing how
fully the Emperor appreciated the advantages, to the defensive, of the lakes and
marshes, as a protection against turning movements.
236
NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN IN POLAND.
In these positions the main armies may be left whilst
we describe, as fully as space will allow, the great siege
which it was Napoleon's object to cover, Bennigsen's to
raise. The operations in Silesia and Pomerania will also be
very briefly indicated to their conclusion.
SPAC
CHAPTER II.
THE SIEGE OF DANZIG.
PACE will allow of but a brief account of this great
siege, which would require a volume to itself if it were
to be fully described.*
Scarcely was the battlefield of Eylau cleared when, on
the 18th February,† Napoleon commenced his arrangements
for the siege, which had been interrupted by Bennigsen's
advance, necessitating the recall of Lefebvre to guard Thorn.
Troops were already on the move in that direction.
The 10th corps, under Lefebvre, had to deal with the
sieges of Danzig, Colberg, and Graudenz. It consisted of two
Polish divisions under Dombrowski, the Baden contingent,
a Saxon corps, two Italian divisions, and various French
troops altogether about 27,000 men and 3000 horses.
About 10,000 men were French, the rest auxiliaries. The
numbers available for the principal siege (Danzig) varied
according to the requirements of the others, with which it is
not proposed to deal. Graudenz was blockaded; but it was
after all but a small fortress, and no great vigour seems to
have been exhibited in the siege. It sufficed to effectually
mask the place.
On the 18th February, Menard and Dombrowski, near
* This account is based on that of Dumas (xviii. pp. 123-198) of Kirgener
Director of Attacks (Précis du siège de Dantzich, Paris, 1807), and of Hopfner
(iii., pp. 335-529).
† Corr. 11,826, to Lefebvre, directing him to invest Danzig, and remarking
that Menard's French division should now be at hand, that the Saxons were at
Posen, and the Poles long ago ready.
238
NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN IN POLAND.
Mewe, drove back part of the Danzig garrison which had
moved out in that direction.
A more serious affair occurred on the 23rd, when the
same two generals attacked the Prussians in Dirschau. A
body of 1500 was cut off in the town, where they made a
brave resistance. Overwhelmed by numbers, they were
almost entirely destroyed by the Poles, who, exasperated by
race hatred and by the long resistance offered, gave but little
quarter.
With this effort, the endeavours of the garrison of
Danzig to keep the enemy at a distance ceased, and they
settled down in and about the city for the siege. Lefebvre,
not considering himself strong enough to commence the
siege, did not move beyond Dirschau till the 9th March.
At that period, the civil population of Danzig numbered
about 45,000. The city had somewhat declined in import-
ance of late years, yet was still a very important port and
market. Its fortifications had, in 1806, been much neglected,
and were in very bad repair. It was only when the Prussian
power collapsed, in the autumn of that year, that a siege
began to seem probable. Then every effort was made to
repair and strengthen the fortress. Much assistance in this
respect was derived from the great stores of wood in the
place. Palisades and earthwork formed a great feature in
the new defences.
The fortress itself was situated in the low ground on the
south bank of the left branch of the Vistula, which here
flows from east to west before it finally turns north, just
below Danzig, to the sea. Through the town flows the little
river Mottlau, by damming which it was practicable to
inundate the country for some distance from the fortifica-
tions of the east and south sides. In these directions the
place could be rendered, in those days, practically impreg-
nable. On the north side, it was protected from close
approach by the river, from which it was only separated by
300 yards of marshy land intersected by channels. The
THE SIEGE OF DANZIG.
239
enceinte consisted of bastioned fronts. On the west side,
the land rose above the enceinte to a height which
commanded the town. On this height was constructed,
with earth and palisades, another front, protecting the
western enceinte, which, without it, would have been easily
subdued. This outer line of works extended from the
inundated south side to the Vistula.
The dominating parts, separated from one another by a
valley, were those on the southern height of the Bischofsberg
and the northern the Hagelsberg.* In front of the line,
where it joined the Vistula, projected the large redoubt of
Kalk, lying in the low ground with a smaller work beyond
it. Even the Bischofsberg and the Hagelsberg fronts were
not on the highest parts of the rising ground, and were, to
some extent, commanded by the ground in front of them.
This was obviated by the great height of the works
themselves.†
* "As compared with the Hagelsberg, the front of the Bischofsberg was
broader and the trace better. The Hagelsberg ditches, on the other hand, were
deeper. The two works and their continuations formed a continuous connected
line; once the last palisade at any point was passed, the besieger would
command the whole line. The weakest point was between the Hagelsberg and
the river, but an attack on that was flanked by the Kalk redoubt. There the
ground was level and open. In front both of the Hagelsberg and the Bischofs-
berg it was broken, hilly, and difficult for works of approach.
In conclusion, if the Bischofsberg and the Hagelsberg fronts had both abutted
on a plain, the former would have been the stronger. The nature of the ground
in front reversed their value. The besieged, perceiving this, continued to
occupy the orchards and suburbs before the Bischofsberg, until the besieger was
irretrievably committed, by the progress of his works, to the attack of the
Hagelsberg " (Kirgener, concluding observations, pp. 38-47).
†The commanding engineers of the attack and defence were respectively
Chasseloup de Laubat, and Bousmard, both famous in the annals of fortification,
and each the inventor of a new system. The two systems were alike in their
use of ravelins advanced beyond the glacis ; but neither of the fronts attacked
at Danzig was traced in this manner. These two famous engineers directed the
operations of attack and defence, and, as is natural, the contest between two
such representative men is full of interest.
Lefebvre knew nothing whatever of military engineering, and was ordered
to act entirely on Chasseloup's opinion in technical matters. Chasseloup, who
had other work on hand, was ably represented in the details of the siege by
Kirgener, who was constantly on the spot.
•
240
NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN IN POLAND.
Beyond the river, on the north, was the western extremity
of the low island known as the Frische-Nehrung, stretching
away east as far as Pillau, near Koenigsberg. The extreme
western corner of the Frische-Nehrung, at the point where
the Vistula changes its course from west to north, was separated
from the rest by the navigable canal of Laake, connecting
Danzig with the lower reach of the river. The triangular
island of Holm, so formed, was of great importance in the
siege. So long as the canal remained open, Danzig was
directly connected with the sea. The mouth of the Vistula
was guarded on its right bank by the fort of Weichselmunde.
Opposite to this fort was a large entrenched camp, at Neu-
fahrwasser, having the greater part of its front protected by
the Sasper lake, and the channel joining it to the Vistula.
It was further guarded by a double line of works.
Between Weichselmunde and Danzig, on the Nehrung,
there was a large wood. The island of Holm and the Laake
canal were defended by several redoubts and other works,
which spread down the banks of the Vistula, connecting
Danzig with Weichselmunde.
The artillery of the fortress consisted of 303 guns, 20
howitzers, and 26 mortars. In addition, there were 28 guns,
1 howitzer, and 3 mortars at Weichselmunde, and 51 guns,
2 howitzers, and 3 mortars at Neufahrwasser.
The two forts of the Bischofsberg and the Hagelsberg, on
which the French approaches were afterwards directed, had
40 pieces each.
The garrison numbered nearly 16,000 men, including
about 1600 cavalry. About 11,000 were in the fortress, the
rest at Weichselmunde, Neufahrwasser, on the Holm island,
and on the Nehrung.* The besiegers are given by Hopfner
as 24,105,† at the beginning of the siege. Dumas denies
that Lefebvre had more than 16,000 men at his disposal.‡
The truth lies, perhaps, somewhere between the two.
* Hopfner, iii. 371–380.
† Ibid., iii. 382-384.
+ Dumas, xviii. 144. See following note.
THE SIEGE OF DANZIG.
241
The troops of the garrison were far from being of the
first-class, as is admitted by both sides.* Lefebvre gradually
completed the investment of the place, occupying the whole
of the Nogat island, which was useful to Napoleon as a
remount depot,† and disposing his troops in the villages
west and south-west of the fortress. Many of his troops,
too, were not of the best quality, and Napoleon inculcates on
him the necessity, with such troops, for strengthening his
front with field works.‡
On the 16th March, the Schidlitz suburb, in the valley
separating the Bischofsberg and Hagelsberg ridges, was
stormed and fortified. On the 18th, Danzig was completely
invested, except on the north side. On that date Field-
Marshal Kalkreuth, commanding the garrison, joined it by
the Nehrung, bringing some Russian reinforcements.
Napoleon had already urged the necessity of cutting this
last open line, which was of the greatest importance; of
occupying the western part of the Nehrung, and of separating
Danzig from Weichselmunde and the sea.§ In execution of
this order, General Schramm, with about 2000 men and 6 guns,
was sent to Furstenwerder on that branch of the Vistula
which falls into the western end of the Frisches-Haff. Cross-
ing silently in the early morning of the 20th March, the French
troops reached the northern bank unperceived. Thence they
advanced in two columns, driving the Prussian posts partly
towards Pillau, partly towards Danzig. The latter only rallied
towards Danzig, at Wondelen and Bohnsack. Thence, though
reinforced, they were driven along the Nehrung to Weichsel-
munde. The other French columns, meanwhile, protected
* Napoleon, on the 4th March, wrote to Lefebvre that there were only 8000
young troops in Danzig, against 18,000 with him (Corr. 11,921).
Again, on the 29th, he says Lefebvre has plenty of troops. There are no
good troops in Danzig, and, even if there were, Lefebvre's are their equals (Corr.
12,213).
+ Corr. 12,062, dated 17th March.
‡ Corr. 11,962, dated 6th March.
§ Corr. 12,012, dated 12th March.
R
242
NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN IN POLAND.
Schramm's rear, towards Pillau. About 7 p.m. Kalkreuth
attempted, by a sortie on the Nehrung, to prevent Schramm's
establishment, but was beaten off. Measures were at once
taken to secure Schramm's position by field works in all
directions towards Pillau, towards Danzig, and towards
Weichselmunde. A bridge over the Vistula was constructed
above Danzig.
:
A general sortie attempted by the garrison, with the
object of destroying such works as the besiegers had already
constructed, was repulsed. Lefebvre had now collected
sufficient troops to warrant him in opening the regular
siege.*
The question was debated as to the point of attack, and
was really decided by Chasseloup, the well-known engineer,
to whose counsels Lefebvre was directed to defer in all
technical matters. The decision was that the real attack
should be on the Hagelsberg front. To divert attention, a
false attack was to be made on the Bischofsberg front, and
another on the entrenched camp of Neufahrwasser.†
It was also very necessary to subdue the works on the
left bank of the Lower Vistula, connecting Danzig and
Weichselmunde. The ground about them, marshy, and cut
up by canals, was extremely unfavourable to the construction
of solid works of approach. Schramm was now securely
fortified in the Nehrung, his left supported by a village
towards the Lower Vistula, his right resting on the sea. His
orders were, as far as possible, to intercept communication
between Danzig and Weichselmunde.
On the night of the 1st to 2nd April, the first parallel
was opened, to a length of 400 yards, on the crest of the
Ziganckenberg, at a distance of 1600 yards from the enemy's
works of the Hagelsberg. The operation was completely
* Napoleon was, so early as the 31st March, urging expedition in the siege
on Lefebvre (Corr. 12,245).
On the previous day, he had appointed, to command the artillery of the siege,
Lariboisière, a trusted officer (Corr. 12,234, dated 30th March).
† For reasons as to the best point of attack, see note ante, p. 239.
THE SIEGE OF DANZIG.
243
covered from the defenders' observation by a vigorous attack
on the village of Aller, to the left. An attempt, next day,
by the besieged to establish themselves in rear of the parallel,
at Ziganckendorf, failed.
During the 2nd April, the parallel was completed, not-
withstanding a heavy fire from the artillery of the Hagelsberg
and Bischofsberg. During the following night the French
advanced by zigzags from the parallel, and, at the same time,
stormed the Kalk redoubt, on the bank of the river in front of
the main works. Kalkreuth, however, in the early morning,
recaptured this important fort, which for the present the
French were unable to take again. On the 3rd April, the
first parallel was extended farther to the left, and was
supported by various works and batteries, whilst the advance
from it was pushed forward. On the 9th, the first parallel of
the false attack on the Bischofsberg was opened. The
besiegers, meanwhile, had been working at a counter approach
against the left flank of the true attack, and it was necessary
to put a stop to them. At 10 p.m., on the 10th, 500 French
attempted an assault on the besiegers' work, only 80 yards
from the enceinte. Overwhelmed by its fire, they were
driven off. Renewing the assault at 1 a.m., they succeeded
in taking and destroying the work.
During the night of the 11th to 12th, the second
parallel was commenced by flying sap. Next day, the
batteries and redoubts commanding the river on the left
were partially armed. A commencement of the bombard-
ment of the city was made with two howitzers.
But the garrison was commanded by a man of great
energy and activity. The works of counter approach were
again taken in hand, the French were driven from them, and
a new redoubt in front of the Hagelsberg was thrown up.
Attacked by the Saxons, this new work was taken and
retaken three times, finally remaining in the possession of
the besiegers. The French works were still too distant to
allow of their maintaining themselves in the counter
244
NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN IN POLAND.
approach.* They were not left undisturbed. On the 13th,
so determined an assault was made upon the captured work
that, not only were the Saxons ejected from it, but the head
of the French trenches was gained, and, for a moment, they
were in great peril. The situation was saved by Lefebvre,
who, himself heading the 44th regiment,† fell, sword in hand,
on the Prussians.
Once more the tide of victory turned before this vigorous
onslaught, supported by the now rallied Saxons. The
Prussians were again forced from the redoubt, now strewn
with the dead and wounded of this bitter conflict.
On the 14th April, the French second parallel was com-
pleted, and two redoubts to support it were begun. During
the ensuing night, the works were pushed leftwards, and
batteries were constructed to fire upon the Hagelsberg, and
the extremity of the Schidlitz suburb.
Another important point was gained on the north bank of
the Vistula by Gardanne, who established himself and con-
structed two works at the north entrance to the canal of
Laake, thus interrupting communication by it. On the 16th,
a powerful sortie from Weichselmunde was directed on these
works. Heavy fighting, lasting seven hours, ended in its
repulse, when the works were resumed and completed. They
had to be protected from the enemy's fire from Weichsel-
munde in one direction, and the island of Holm on the other.
At this time, three separate attacks were in progress: (1)
the true attack on the Hagelsberg; (2) the false attack on
* Kirgener, p. 3.
†This regiment had been at Eylau, part of Augereau's unfortunate corps. It
was next to the 14th in the fatal attack, and appears to have lost its eagle. There
is, in the Archives Historiques, a long correspondence between the two regiments
as to which it was that had lost its eagle. The decision was in favour of the 14th,
whose eagle was saved by Marbot, according to his own account. In glancing
over this correspondence, the author did not observe any mention of Marbot's
exploit.
These two redoubts were about 600 yards apart, on the right bank of the
canal, and were, on the 17th, connected by a double parapet (Dumas, xviii.
p. 154).
THE SIEGE OF DANZIG.
245
the Bischofsberg; (3) another attack on the defender's works
on the Lower Vistula.
Using the flying sap, a movement forward from the
second parallel was made on the 17th, and a place of arms
was constructed on a plateau only 80 yards from the Hagels-
berg front. The batteries and redoubts were completed, and
their armament advanced. On the 17th, a work on the left
bank of the river, designed to cross fire with Gardanne's
works on the right bank, was thrown up, and an English
corvette, attempting to ascend the river, was forced to desist.
Whilst zigzags on the left of the second parallel were con-
structed, a great battery was commenced on the Stolzenberg,
with a view to bringing a reverse and enfilading fire to bear
on the Hagelsberg.
The 19th, 20th, and 21st April were days of rain and
snow, which filled the French works, and stopped all progress.
The whole of the 20th was spent in clearing the snow from
the trenches. On the 21st, a second place of arms in front of
the right of the parallel was constructed.*
The night of the 22nd-23rd was bright, and the French
suffered heavily from the Prussian fire, as they pushed
forward in the moonlight, by flying sap, from the right-hand
place of arms. By the 24th, the French had 69 guns,
howitzers, and mortars firing on the Hagelsberg and the city
beyond it. The defenders replied with equal vivacity, but
were overmatched. A summons to surrender was refused
by Marshal Kalkreuth.
On the 23rd, the sapheads were overthrown by a small
sortie. Another battery, against the Bischofsberg was con-
structed on the southern slope of the Stolzenberg. Artillery
and ammunition were now arriving from Warsaw.†
The day of the 26th was one of heavy artillery fire on
* Kirgener, p. 8.
† Napoleon, writing to his brother Joseph, on the 24th April, mentions that
he has 80 pieces of artillery before Danzig, of which 60 were siege guns. He
also indirectly estimates the garrison at 18,000, and the besieging corps at
25,000 (Corr. 12,469).
246
NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN IN POLAND.
both sides. About 7 p.m., that of the Prussians suddenly
ceased, a fact which aroused suspicions that they were about
to attempt a sortie, to meet which preparations were made.
These suspicions were justified by the event, for, about
10 p.m., the French advanced posts, rushing in, announced
the issue of the enemy.
Six hundred Prussian troops, followed by 200 workmen,
whose duty it was to destroy the works when captured, fell
upon the head of the French trenches. Menard, prepared
for the coming storm, met it with the bayonet in front, whilst
detachments, which he had placed on his right and left,
charged the Prussians in flank. The Prussian loss was
heavy, and the sortie completely failed.
A truce of two hours, for the burial of those killed in this
sortie, afforded the French an opportunity of surveying the
ground in front of them, and selecting sites for new batteries.
On the Lower Vistula, the attack was pushed from the
mouth of the Laake canal; the extremity of the Holm island
was seized by Sabatier from the left bank of the Vistula, and
defended by a channel cut across it from the canal to the
river. Communication was thus established, in this direction,
between the right and left banks by boat bridges across the
river and the canal.
On the 25th, the third parallel in front of the Hagelsberg
had been commenced, 40 yards from the covered way on the
crest of the rising ground. On the 26th and 27th, it was
continued, in the face of sorties on both days. At 10 p.m.,
on the 28th, the garrison made a fresh sortie in force.* Their
attack on the left of the third parallel was beaten off, the
assailants being pursued to the covered way. A battalion of
Prussian grenadiers on the other side was, at first, more
successful in penetrating to the head of the trenches, where,
however, they met the French reserves. Thrice was the
attack renewed before the Prussians were compelled, with
heavy loss, to seek again the shelter of their fortress.
* 2000 men, according to Kirgener (p. 13).
THE SIEGE OF DANZIG.
247
On the 29th, the third parallel was extended right and left.
On the 30th, the bombardment was continued, and Danzig was
fired in several places, though the besieged replied with vigour.
During the night, notwithstanding the illumination by
the defenders of the enemy's works by means of fire balls, the
communications between the second and third parallels were
completed, and the French commenced to approach, by
double sap, from two points in the third parallel towards
the capital of the ravelin.
On the earthworks of the place the French artillery
was producing but little effect, and the destruction of the
palisades became necessary before an assault could be
ventured on.
The approaches progressed on the 2nd May, and next
night they were united near the parallel. One more sortie
against the works was beaten off.
Early on the morning of the 4th, the Prussian artillery
brought the saps to a standstill, until it was silenced by the
batteries of the second parallel.
On the 5th and 6th, the saps were continued, though
constantly interrupted by the fire of the fortress. They
reached to a distance of only 12 yards from the salient of
the ravelin.
The Holm island was still held by the garrison, with the
exception of the extremity captured on the 26th April.
Until the French could get possession of it, they were unable
to establish satisfactory batteries taking in reverse the works
of the Hagelsberg. Chasseloup insisted on the necessity for
seizing it; Lefebvre decided to do so on the night of the
6th-7th. Its garrison consisted of 1500 men, 15 guns, a
mortar, and a howitzer.*
The main attack was to be made by Drouet from the left
* Hæpfner, iii. 466.
Dumas gives only 1000 men besides artillery. He says there were as many
howitzers and mortars as guns, but, as only 17 pieces were captured, this seems
to be a mistake (Dumas, xviii. 167). The numbers in the text are given by
Hopfner (iii. 446).
248
NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN IN POLAND.
bank of the Vistula, whilst Gardanne seconded him from the
direction of the canal.
At 10 p.m., 12 boats, containing 300 men in all, pushed
off from the left bank, followed shortly by a second detach-
ment. Landing unperceived, the French stormed two
redoubts, driving their defenders to the south end of the
island. At the same time, the Kalk redoubt was attacked
and taken. The enemy's retreat was cut off by Gardanne,
who had crossed the canal. The second detachment, from
the left bank, was equally successful in capturing a large
redoubt. All the works on the island were seized in
succession, the garrison being almost entirely destroyed or
captured. Surrounded as they were, escape was scarcely
possible.
The island was a most valuable prize; it was promptly
fortified, and its guns turned against Danzig, the defences of
which they took in reverse. A bridge of rafts joining it to
the left bank, just below the angle of the river, was hurried
on.* The flying bridge connecting Danzig with the island
was gallantly cut adrift, by a miner named Jacquemart,
under a heavy fire.
The works and palisades of the Hagelsberg were at last
suffering severely from the heavy fire of the besiegers, and, on
the 7th, the crowning of the covered way, opposite the salient
of the ravelin, was successfully effected in the face of a storm
of grape, which cost the French 100 men. The situation of
the mines constructed by the besieged was discovered, and
they were occupied.
The defenders of the covered way were forced, by the
fire of two batteries, to evacuate the whole of that part of it,
except a blockhouse in the re-entrant angle of the right face
of the ravelin.
*Kirgener (p. 18) summarises the advantages of the capture of the island
and the Kalk redoubt as: (a) the improved reverse fire which was possible from
the island; (b) the saving of the necessity for numerous traverses in the trenches
to protect the workers from the enfilading fire from the Kalk redoubt.
THE SIEGE OF DANZIG.
249
On the 8th, the left sap was advanced to the capital of
the bastion.
Lefebvre was now for attempting an assault, for which
the place was not yet ripe.* Reconnaissances soon satisfied
him that this was so. Yet his works of approach had reached
a stage when the early surrender of the fortress, unless relief
reached it from outside, was a matter of certainty.
The state of affairs was known to Bennigsen, and he had
resolved on a supreme effort to save the fortress by an
expedition from the sea.
Napoleon, too, had inferred that this must come, and
had made his arrangements accordingly.† For some days
past the presence of Prussian vessels in the Frisches-Haff
had been observed. Napoleon had constituted, for the purpose
of combating any such attempt at relief, a new reserve corps,
of which the command was given to Lannes. It consisted of
the picked grenadier division of Oudinot, and of the division
of Verdier: altogether, between 15,000 and 16,000 men.
This corps had been detained for the assistance of Lefebvre,
on the distinct understanding that it was to be used only
against a relieving force, not for the ordinary work of the siege.t
*This was Napoleon's opinion on the 5th May, when he sent Bertrand
to Danzig to inspect the works and bring a personal report (Corr. 12,534).
Lefebvre, on the 9th, gave notice to his commanders of his intention to assault
(Kirgener, p. 20). It was suspended next day.
† So early as the 23rd April he warns Lefebvre to be on his guard against a
descent from the Frisches-Haff, which the enemy commands (Corr. 12,458).
On the 11th May he again writes, indicating the probability of an attempt
to relieve the fortress from the sea, but says he sees no movement in his own front,
such as might be expected (Corr. 12,572).
‡ Corr. 12,536, dated 5th May, to Berthier, orders the formation of
the corps from Oudinot's and Verdier's divisions. The Emperor hopes, by
the end of May, to raise its strength to 20,000 by the addition of an Italian
division.
In Corr. 12,572, dated 11th May, Napoleon tells Lefebvre that Oudinot is
available at Marienburg, but is not under Lefebvre's orders.
In a letter from Berthier of the same date, Lefebvre is censured for having
ordered up Oudinot; and it is remarked that the Emperor does not believe that
more than a diversion with a small force will be attempted by the Nehrung.
The great effort he expected from the sea. (Printed, Dumas, xix. 288.)
250
NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN IN POLAND.
Mortier was also ordered to Danzig.* Lefebvre had desired
Oudinot to send a brigade into the Nogat island from
Marienberg, where the corps was assembled. He had also
warned Schramm, on the Nehrung, to be on his guard.
On the 10th and 11th May, 57 transports, crowded with
Russian troops, appeared off Weichselmunde. They were
the relief force, under Kamenskoi, detached from the main
army, and sent by sea from Pillau.
On the whole, it seems improbable that Kamenskoi
commanded more than 7000 or 8000 men,† including the
garrisons of Weichselmunde and Neufahrwasser. He dis-
embarked on the 11th, at Neufahrwasser. He was, till he
landed, unaware of the loss of the island of Holm, which
seriously compromised his plans.
Lannes' leading division (Oudinot) only arrived at Danzig
on the 12th, as Kamenskoi landed. The besiegers were in
imminent peril had Kamenskoi attacked promptly, before the
arrival of the whole. Lefebvre's address to his men shows
that he felt his danger. "Comrades," he said, "as long as
we live, we will abandon nothing to the enemy; let every
man defend his post to the death.”
But Kamenskoi was disturbed at finding the island gone,
and he hesitated, wasting precious hours and days.
The delay gave time for the French reinforcements to
arrive, and for arrangements to be completed. With the
reserve corps at hand, it was still not so easy for Lefebvre to
decide on the best mode of employing it. To Kamenskoi,
holding Weichselmunde and Neufahrwasser, with free com-
munication between them across the river, two courses
* Berthier to Mortier, Dumas, xix. 288, dated 12th May. On the same
date Oudinot is ordered to Danzig, but to leave a battalion at Furstenwerder to
construct a bridge (Berthier to Lannes, Dumas, xix. 287).
On the 14th, Napoleon writes to Lefebvre that Lannes is only to be used
against a relieving force from the sea (Corr. 12,881).
+ Dumas (xviii. 174) puts the number as high as 11,000 to 15,000, but seems
uncertain.
Kirgener (p. 25) only estimates his force at 7000 or 8000.
Hæpfner (iii. 483) gives 6600.
THE SIEGE OF DANZIG.
251
were open. Being safe behind the works, he could elect to
act against Schramm in the Nehrung, or against the left
flank of the French works on the left bank. In the latter
case, he could hope for the co-operation of the garrison from
the Hagelsberg and Bischofsberg. This was the more
promising scheme, as it was the more dangerous to Lefebvre.
Attacked in front and flank, there was considerable risk of
the besiegers on the left bank being rolled up from their left.
If Schramm were attacked, he might be destroyed before he
could be succoured; but he was well protected by works, and
it was unlikely. It is true that the French had a bridge
across the river near its bend; still, a disaster might occur to
Lefebvre before Lannes, if he were on the Holm island, could
cross. It was decided to keep him on the left bank, whence,
if the storm burst on the Nehrung, he might be able to pass
in time.
Kamenskoi wasted four days, concerting measures by
signal from Weichselmunde, keeping his troops in Neufahr-
wasser. On the 13th, the besieged force increased the
vigour of their fire on the works of approach; a sortie, in the
evening, penetrated into the head of the sap before it was
repulsed.
Work was continued on the 14th by the French against the
bastion on their left, but the difficulties were great. A mine
was also started against the blockhouse in the re-entrant
angle of the covered way. At last, at 4 a.m.
on the
15th May, Kamenskoi issued from Weichselmunde against
Schramm and Gardanne, whose troops were drawn up about
the redoubts facing Weichselmunde.
The Russian movement was made in four columns:
1st: 6 battalions, 1 squadron, 200 cossacks, and 4 guns, on
the left, along the seashore against the wood.
:
2nd 5 battalions against the work at the head of the
wood, in the centre.
3rd: 6 battalions, 120 cossacks, 4 guns along the Vistula,
on the right.
252
NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN IN POLAND.
4th: 4 battalions, 100 cossacks, 6 guns, in reserve in front
of the fort.
At the same time, a demonstration with a few hundred
men was made, on the opposite bank, by the Neufahrwasser
garrison.
In Danzig, 1000 men were ready to cross to the Holm
island when it should be attacked from Weichselmunde.
The English ships were to endeavour to assist in the
river.
On the other side, Schramm had, on his right, the 2nd
light infantry; in the centre, a Saxon infantry brigade; on the
left, towards the canal, his Polish infantry; in reserve, the
Paris infantry regiment.
The first assault was on Schramm's left and centre, about
5 a.m. Seeing them yielding ground, Lefebvre sent over a
battalion to his aid. Four times did the Russians attack; on
the last occasion they were nearly successful. As they
retired, the battle was restored by the use of the reserve.
At this moment, Lannes and Oudinot arrived with the first
column of the reserve corps; the engagement became very
hot and sanguinary. Oudinot's horse was killed, and, falling
against Lannes, the latter also was unhorsed. The two
generals continued the fight on foot.
The Russians were now overmatched, and were presently
driven back upon Weichselmunde, with a loss of over 1500
killed and wounded. The French lost about equally.*
Kalkreuth had not supported Kamenskoi by a sortie against
the works, but had contented himself with a heavy bombard-
ment. He asserted that he was prepared for an attack on
the island, when Kamenskoi's advance collapsed, and rendered
it useless.†
To support the sortie from Weichselmunde, Bulow, with
4 battalions, 2 companies of artillery, and 100 cavalry, sailed
* Hopfner, iii. 486. He says that the loss (1530) was equal to about one-
fourth of Kamenskoi's force.
+ Hopfner, iii. 487.
THE SIEGE OF DANZIG.
253
on the Frisches-Haff from Pillau. He was late, and Kamen-
skoi was already defeated when he landed and came upon
Schramm's outposts at Kalberg. They fell back on Fursten-
werder, whilst the Prussians marched along the south side of
the Nehrung to the western extremity of the Haff. Against
them, from Furstenwerder, there came the battalion of
Oudinot's grenadiers in the Nogat island, with Beaumont's
dragoons.* Meeting Bulow, they defeated him, and drove
him, with heavy loss, 25 miles along the Nehrung.
The attempt to relieve Danzig had failed disastrously,
owing largely, as it would appear, to Kamenskoi's delay, as
well as to the insufficiency of his force. It was not renewed.
The Russians remained in their entrenchments at the mouth
of the river.
The besiegers' works against the Hagelsberg had suffered
no interruption. On the evening of the 16th, the mine under
the blockhouse was fired, but without completely destroying
it, though it was much damaged. A fresh mine was com-
menced from the crater formed, and was continued on the
17th. A small sortie, in the evening, resulted in the spiking
of a French howitzer opposite the salient of the bastion, but
it was unspiked after the sortie had been repulsed.
On the 18th, 19th, and 20th, a covered descent into the
ditch was worked, and endeavours were made, without much
success, to destroy the enormous palisades in the ditch.†
On the 19th, an English corvette, trying to ascend the
* In Berthier's letter to Lannes, of the 12th May (Dumas, xix. 287), he is
ordered to leave at Furstenwerder the battalion of grenadiers which had been
sent there to construct a bridge and guard the crossing. All the correspondence,
about this date, from Berthier, insists that any movement from Pillau along the
Nehrung can be nothing but a diversion, and that the real relieving force will
come by sea. (See despatches from Berthier to Lefebvre on the 11th, and to
Lannes on the 12th, Dumas, xix. 284-288.)
† The Hagelsberg ditch was found to be 27 feet deep, and the slope of the
breach in the left face of the bastion was very steep. Endeavours to make it
less so were made from the covered descent. (Kirgener, p. 28.)
The covered descent was made with gabions on either side, roofed in with
fascines and earth.
254
NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN IN POLAND.
river, grounded, and was captured.* The guns of the fortress
were still firing with considerable effect on the works of
approach.
Kalkreuth's last sortie was made on the night of the
20th. After succeeding in destroying the work of the pre-
ceding day, it was finally driven back with the aid of
reinforcements.
On the 21st, Mortier joined Lefebvre with all his corps,
except what he had left in front of Colberg. In the night
of the 21st, Vallet, a private of the 12th infantry of the line,
ventured on a gallant enterprise. On the crest of the breach,
in front of the covered descent of the ditch, the Prussians had
arranged three great beams, retained by ropes, ready to be
rolled down on the assailants issuing from the descent.
Vallet alone climbed the breach to cut the cords. He
succeeded, though wounded, in his desperate business. The
beams rolled into the ditch, and, under the constant fire from
the French guns, it was impossible to replace them.
The Hagelsberg was now, or very shortly would be, in a
condition to warrant an assault, which was ordered by
Lefebvre † at Napoleon's instance. Before delivering it, he
sent a final summons to Kalkreuth. That officer had made a
resistance distinguished by that activity which is essential to
every able defence of a fortress; prolongation could only
result in the garrison of the Hagelsberg being subjected to
the horrors of a storm. The advantages were certainly not
commensurate with the terrible loss of life which must ensue
to both sides. It is true that the Hagelsberg was only an
outer defence, but from it the city and the enceinte would lie
at the mercy of the captors. A few hours, or at most a day
or two, of bombardment must compel a surrender on terms far
* The plan at the end of Kirgener's work shows the scene of this event at a
point about halfway between the angle of the river and the northern extremity
of the Holm island.
† Napoleon, at last, thought the time for assault had arrived, and that more
men were being lost in the daily bombardments and sorties than would fall in a
storm (Berthier to Lefebvre, 18th May, Dumas, xix. 298).
THE SIEGE OF DANZIG.
255
less favourable than the French might be expected to grant
in view of the avoidance of the losses of an assault. A few
more days of resistance could now make no appreciable
difference to Bennigsen. Kamenskoi's attempt to relieve the
place, supported by an insufficient army, and ruined by
hesitation, had failed, and there was no hope of its renewal.
Bennigsen's feeble demonstrations in front of Napoleon had
shown the futility of expectations from that quarter.
Kalkreuth, therefore, was perfectly justified in his acceptance
of Lefebvre's proposals to treat for a capitulation.
He declined to treat for the surrender of Neufahrwasser
and Weichselmunde, pointing out that, separated as he was
from them, he could not control their garrisons.
If he was in a position which compelled him to desire a
capitulation on honourable terms, Napoleon was still more
inclined to grant them.* The summer was now commencing,
and the Emperor was anxious to reopen the campaign, which
he dared not do with Danzig still holding out in his rear.
He wanted, too, the troops besieging it.
After three days of negotiation, the terms of surrender
were fixed. The garrison was to march out with all the
honours of war, with drums beating, matches lighted, and
standards flying, taking two light guns with them. They
were to be conducted to the Prussian outposts before Pillau.
On the other hand, they engaged not to fight against the
French and their allies for a year.
The actual surrender was arranged for the 26th May, on
the formal condition that the place was not relieved from
outside before then. At noon on that day, the western works
were handed over to the French. Next day the garrison
* Corr. 12629, dated 22nd May, to Lefebvre. The Emperor grudges the
loss of the garrison, whom he estimates at 10,000 or 12,000, as prisoners of war;
but has clearly weighed with care the considerations in favour of obtaining an
immediate surrender. He lays down the terms to be granted, which are
practically those accepted by the governor of Danzig. The Emperor still
thought it might take another 15 days to compel an unconditional sur-
render.
256
NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN IN POLAND.
marched off along the Nehrung for Pillau, whilst Lefebvre
made his formal entry into Danzig.*
Kamenskoi had set sail from Weichselmunde, and, shortly
after, the garrison of the fort surrendered.
Thus ended this memorable siege, the conduct of which
was shortly afterwards acknowledged by the conferment on
Lefebvre of the Dukedom of Danzig.† The defence had
redounded to the credit of Kalkreuth and his garrison, who,
contesting almost every inch of the besiegers' progress, had
held out over seven weeks against open trenches.
The one blot on the defence would appear to be the
failure to support, by sorties, Kamenskoi's relieving force.
The siege is a typical example of the regular approach of
a bastioned front with dry ditches; for water, of course, was
not available for those of the outer line of works.
The besiegers, too, had, many difficulties to contend
against; they were, at first, in inferior force, both in men and
guns; the perimeter to be guarded was great; there was no
proper plan of the defences; the ground on the front of attack
was difficult to reconnoitre in advance of the siege works.
The island of Holm was all-important to them, as en-
abling fire to bear on the reverse of the front of attack. The
desirability of its early capture is admitted by Kirgener, the
French engineer, but he points out the difficulties of an
attack on it, so long as the garrison held the Kalk redoubt,
so often taken and retaken, on Lefebvre's left. It was for-
tunate for the French that they held that island when
Kamenskoi fell upon Schramm in the Nehrung. Without it,
and the bridge uniting it to the left bank of the Vistula, his
relief by Lannes and Oudinot would scarcely have been
* The number that marched out is given by Hopfner (iii. 523) as 335
officers, 12,448 men, 1275 horses. This takes no account of the garrisons of
Weichselmunde and Neufahrwasser.
† Corr. 12666, dated 28th May, being Napoleon's message to the Senate
regarding the creation of a new order of nobility.
See Kirgener's conclusions, quoted in Dumas, xviii. 191, etc. They are at
pp. 38-47 of Kirgener's précis.
THE SIEGE OF DANZIG.
257
possible. The capture of Neufahrwasser and Weichselmunde,
thus separating Danzig from the sea, was also very desirable.
Kirgener, however, points out that all the artillery available
was required at the Hagelsberg, and they could only be taken
with the aid of siege guns. He also discusses fully the
respective merits of an attack on the Hagelsberg and on the
Bischofsberg.* The reasons in favour of the former are
technical, and apparently forcible.
From famine or shortness of supplies or ammunition the
garrison had never suffered. Enormous quantities of stores
of every description remained in the place, and were of the
utmost service to the French.
* Vide supra, p. 239, note.
S
CHAPTER III.
OPERATIONS IN SILESIA AND POMERANIA, ON THE NAREW,
AND ON THE VISTULA.
THE
March to May, 1807.
(a) SILESIA.
HE operations in Silesia were left at the surrender of
Breslau on the 7th January.
Brieg, invested by Vandamme with the Wurtemburg
division and a few Bavarian battalions towards the end of
January, surrendered, with large quantities of artillery and
ammunition, on the 8th February.
The Prince of Anhalt-Plessis was still in the field. He
was attacked and driven into Glatz by the Bavarian cavalry
under Lefebvre-Desnouettes, who remained in observation
of the fortress, whilst Vandamme laid siege to Kosel,
Neisse and Schweidnitz. The last-named surrendered on the
11th April. A vigorous attempt to succour Neisse from
Glatz was beaten off, but the fortress held out bravely till
the 16th June. Glatz was then attacked, and surrendered on
the 28th June.
The army of Silesia had, as already noted, been weakened
by a Bavarian division sent to Masséna, in place of which
Jerome was directed to recruit 8000 Poles.*
It is unnecessary to go farther into the details of the
* Corr. 12,305, dated 5th April.
OPERATIONS IN POMERANIA.
259
operations in Silesia.* As the fortresses fell, the artillery
captured in them was utilised for the sieges, not only of
the other Silesian fortresses, but also for those of Danzig,
Graudenz, and Colberg. The Emperor further drew from
Silesia immense resources in kind and in money.†
(b) POMERANIA.
In Pomerania, Mortier was last mentioned as holding, up
to the end of January, the line of the Peene.
A good deal of trouble was experienced from the enterprise
of the Prussian garrison of Colberg, which sent raiding
expeditions far and wide.
In the middle of February an Italian division, under
Teulié, was sent to blockade the place, which it succeeded in
doing after some sharp actions during its advance.
On the 28th January, Mortier, deciding to blockade
Stralsund, passed the Peene at Anklam and Demmin, and
between them. Granjean on the right, driving the Swedish
outposts before him, reached Greifswalde, which he carried
with slight loss. Dupas, on the left, advanced parallel to
Granjean, without encountering any resistance. The two
columns next day, after a slight combat, arrived in front
of Stralsund. On the 30th, the blockade of the land side
was completed, but the communications by sea with the
island of Rugen remained open, and Mortier was much
annoyed by fire from gunboats.
For two months he continued before Stralsund, completing
the lines of investment, and occasionally engaging in small
* Very full details of the sieges will be found in Hopfner (vol. iv.), who,
as a Prussian, was specially interested in them, and who gives throughout much
fuller accounts of Prussian than of Russian movements.
† By June, Jerome's corps had been very much reduced by drafts to Masséna,
etc. The return for the 15th June (Arch. Hist.) gives his strength as-
Bavarians
Wurtemburgers
...
2629
...
5640
8269
260
NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN IN POLAND.
combats with the garrison, which was by no means inactive.
During this period 3 French infantry, and 1 cavalry regiment
were taken from him to the Vistula, and replaced by Dutch
troops.
On the 29th March, he was ordered to leave only Granjean's
division * before Stralsund, and to proceed, with the rest of
his corps, to Colberg. No sooner was he gone than Essen,
the Swedish general in command of Stralsund, issued from
the place, with greatly superior numbers, against the weak
division of Granjean. The latter, attacked in front and
threatened on his left, was compelled to fall back by Greifs-
walde on Anklam across the Peene. Attacked there on the
3rd April, he was again driven on Uckermunde. Once
more threatened on both flanks with interruption of his
line to Stettin, he retired to that place, reaching it on the
7th April. He now received orders from Mortier to move
on Passewalk. The marshal himself started on the 11th to
his assistance at Stettin, which he reached on the 13th with
one French and one Italian infantry regiment, and a regiment
and a half of cavalry. Granjean was reinforced the same
day by a French infantry regiment from Berlin.
Mortier, including Granjean's division, now had 12,000
or 13,000 men, about equal to the strength of the Swedes.
Leaving at Passewalk a provisional regiment which had
just arrived, Mortier advanced against the enemy, and, in a
series of actions, drove him upon Anklam. The weather was
very bad, constant hail and rain, but the Swedes were steadily
forced back across the Peene on the 17th April.
Mortier had been authorised to propose to Essen an
armistice, and to raise the blockade of Stralsund. The Swedes
were discontented at the want of support from England, and
the French successes decided Essen, with the consent of his
sovereign, to treat.
Between the 18th and the 29th April, the negotiations
ended in an armistice terminable only after a month's notice,
* Two French and two Dutch infantry regiments, and one of Dutch cavalry.
OPERATIONS ON THE VISTULA AND NAREW. 261
and confining the Swedes to the line of the Peene. They
also made over to the French the islands of Usedom and
Wollin, engaging to render no assistance to the beleaguered
garrisons in Colberg and Danzig.
This armistice was a great relief to Napoleon, enabling
him, as it did, to utilise the greater part of Mortier's corps on
the Lower Vistula. No further mention of operations in
Swedish Pomerania will be necessary. Mortier may hence-
forward be considered as forming part of the main army on
the Vistula.
(c) ON THE VISTULA AND THE NAREW.
When Napoleon, satisfied that the enemy in front of him
was at last settling down for the rest which both armies so
badly needed, had himself withdrawn his corps to their
cantonments, he adhered generally to his original scheme of
the 20th February.
He carried on, during this period of rest, some desultory
negotiations, not so much, probably, with any hope or desire
of success, as with the wish not to irritate Austria by a
refusal of her mediation, which had been offered and accepted.*
He was busy, as ever, directing the siege of Danzig, and
ordering the fortification of his line of cantonments † so
that the position became almost impregnable.
Supplies, which had been very scarce in February and
March,‡ now arrived regularly, as the means of transport
* Corr. 12,391, dated 16th April.
† Corr. 12,144, dated 24th March, gives detailed orders regarding the
entrenched camp at Praga. Corr. 12,321, dated 6th April, again alludes to the
strengthening of the front about Osterode. Davout fortified the château at
Allenstein (Davout, pp. 187 and 190). Bridge-heads were constructed at
Braunsberg and Spanden. Ney fortified Guttstadt. The ground being generally
frozen, wood and manure were used for works (Davout, p. 187). Numerous other
works on the Alle were constructed (ibid., p. 190).
"The Russians appear to be like us, and not to have eaten for several
days" (Corr. 11,895, dated 27th February). More complaints of shortness of
food (Corr. 11,897, dated 27th February). Ney is told, on the 7th March, that
262
NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN IN POLAND.
were organised and improved. The Imperial headquarters
were removed on the 1st April to Finkenstein.*
It was only on the 11th May † that Napoleon saw
indications of an early attempt to relieve Danzig from the
sea. The measures which he took to reinforce Lefebvre have
already been described in the history of the siege.
Though, on the 11th May, there were no signs visible to
Napoleon of a movement in his own front, he was naturally
not surprised when they appeared a few days later. It was
to be expected that a demonstration at least, if not a serious
attack, would be made by Bennigsen to withdraw the
Emperor's attention from Danzig, and to prevent him, if
possible, from reinforcing Lefebvre. On the same day, 11th
May, there were assembled at Heilsberg the Russian 1st, 2nd,
3rd, and 14th divisions, and the cavalry of the left wing;
whilst the 7th and 8th divisions, with the right wing cavalry,
concentrated at Burgerswalde. On the 13th, a forward
movement was made from Heilsberg to Launau, and from
Burgerswalde towards Wormditt and Arensdorf; but, as it
was reported that Napoleon also was on the point of advancing
in great force, the movement was abandoned; on the 14th,
the troops returned to their former cantonments.
On the 13th, Platow had successfully attacked a Polish
post and had driven in Gazan's outposts in front of Willem-
burg. A somewhat more decided movement, to be described
presently, had been made against Masséna; but, on the whole,
the diversion to cover the operations for the relief of Danzig
by Kamenskoi was most feeble. Napoleon had expected
something much more serious, and was prepared for it.
Had it been more positive in its nature, Ney was to
he must be patient in his deficiency of supplies, which are at Osterode, detained
by want of transport (Corr. 11,967). Even on the 27th March it is noted that
Ney is hard up for food (Corr. 12,194).
* Corr. 12,263, dated Finkenstein, 2nd April.
† Corr. 12,572, dated 11th May. Even then Napoleon saw no signs of an
advance in front of himself.
‡
Massena, v. 328.
OPERATIONS ON THE VISTULA AND NAREW. 263
concentrate in a strongly entrenched position about Guttstadt
and Wolfsdorf. Davout in similar positions at Hohenstein,
Allenstein, and Osterode; Soult at Elditten; Bernadotte on
the Lower Passarge. Murat, with a great part of his cavalry
reserve supported by infantry, would advance through
Willemburg and Wurtemburg, followed by Zayonchek from
Neidenburg, and with Gazan moving, on his right, from
Willemburg on Oertelsberg,* thus threatening that left wing
which, since the operations before Eylau, had always been a
source of anxiety to Bennigsen.
After these futile threats on the part of Bennigsen, both
armies settled down again into a tacit cessation of hostilities
until the time came, early in June, for the opening of the
final campaign.
During the months from the battle of Ostrolenka till June,
the course of events on the Narew had not been very active.
On the 8th March, the Bavarian division which Napoleon had
ordered from Silesia reached Warsaw, between 7000 and 8000
men, under the Crown Prince of Bavaria and General Wrede.
Masséna fixed his headquarters at Prasznitz. The Bavarian
division he posted with one brigade on the Narew, from
Sierock to Pultusk; the other, and the cavalry, partly at Praga,
partly at Prasznitz. Suchet's division held the Narew from
Pultusk to the Omulew at Zawady. Along the Omulew
from Zawady to Willemburg was Gazan's division, with
Becker's dragoons between Janow and Chorzel. The link
between Gazan's left and Davout's right, at Allenstein, was
supplied by Zayonchek's Poles. A third brigade of Bavarians,
arriving early in April, remained at Warsaw. On the Russian
side, a line of cossack posts watched the French on the
Omulew, and had behind it Wolkonski's troops in support.
More Russians, between the Narew and the Bug, watched the
course of the former river from Ostrolenka to Sierock. On
the 14th April, † the Emperor directed Masséna to clear the
space in front of the Pultusk and Sierock bridges. This was
* Hopfner, iii. 529.
† Corr. 12,378, dated 14th April.
264
NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN IN POLAND.
done by 200 Polish cavalry driving back the cossacks on
Wyszkowo, whilst Lemarrois, from Warsaw, followed in the
same direction on the 10th May. Popowo was reached
that day, and the Russians concentrated on Wyszkowo. On
the 12th they moved out, under General Loewis, against the
Bavarians, pushing them back on Nowavics, and, on the
following day, to the bridge-head at Sierock.*
Masséna, to check this movement, sent troops across the
river at Pultusk, towards Poplawy and Psary.† Before the
superior forces now arrayed against them, the Russians fell
back after a sharp fight.
After this, Masséna cleared the peninsula between the
Bug and the Narew for some distance, and was not seriously
molested during the rest of the month of May.‡
* Massena's memoirs (Koch) say that, on the 12th May, another attack was
made at the mouth of the Omulew, which, though successful at first, was
eventually repulsed by Girard. On this day Gazan, as already mentioned,
was also attacked at Willemburg. Masséna himself was in front of Chorzel
with a Bavarian force, to prevent the turning either of Suchet on his right or
of Gazan on his left (Masséna, v. 328).
†The date of this action is given in the memoirs of Masséna as the 16th
May (Massena, v. 329).
Napoleon's fresh instructions to Masséna are well worthy of study (Corr.
12,596, dated 17th May, 1807). His duties are laid down as: (a) to cover
Warsaw; (b) to form the right of the army; (c) to hold an offensive position,
alarming the enemy for his left, and preventing him from weakening it to
support his centre and right.
The enemy could advance on Warsaw either by the Bug or by the Narew.
To cover the city, therefore, Sierock would be the best point. The next best
position would be astride of the Narew, between Pultusk and Rozan, at the
extremity of the great bend which was only 8 or 9 miles from the Bug.
The third best would be Pultusk, but it would be inferior owing to its distance
from the Bug. Last of all would come Ostrolenka: it, however, would be as
far from there to Brok as to Sierock.
But there was also to be taken into consideration Masséna's third object, and
for that Ostrolenka would be by far the best position. Therefore, Suchet should
occupy the right bank in force, with outposts in forts at Ostrolenka. Seven
Bavarian battalions should hold Ostrykow, at the angle of the Narew, three
should be at Krasnosielsk, two at Pultusk, two at Sierock, a light infantry
battalion in Ostrolenka. "Should it be asked why Ostrolenka is to be occupied,
the answer is simple; it is, in the first place, that the enemy may not occupy it:
next, it is in order to occupy both banks of the Narew, without the navigation
of which it is impossible to live; lastly, the occupation of both banks acts as a
menace to the enemy."
PART V.
THE FINAL TRIUMPH-HEILSBERG-
FRIEDLAND—TILSIT.
CHAPTER I.
THE RENEWAL OF THE CAMPAIGN AND ITS PROGRESS TO THE
ΝΑ
9TH JUNE.
(a) THE RUSSIAN ADVANCE.
APOLEON had begun to contemplate a renewal of the
campaign so early as the 29th April, when he wrote to
Soult to send his sick to the rear, preparatory to a general
advance.* But he did not wish to push on towards Russia so
long as Danzig remained untaken on his rear, and he was dis-
appointed as to the progress of the siege. By the 8th May,
he was able to judge, approximately, when Danzig would fall.
He wrote that he hoped to have it by the 20th, and to com-
mence his general movement in the first half of June. He
had fixed on the 10th, thinking that, now Danzig had fallen,
it was extremely improbable the enemy would take the
initiative. So little did he apprehend this, that he paid a two-
days' visit to Danzig so late as the 31st May. Everything
was, however, in readiness, whether for an advance or for
meeting an attack by the enemy.
Rapp, now appointed Governor of Danzig, had been
* Corr. 12,496.
+ On the afternoon of the 5th June, Napoleon wrote to Soult, "Everything
leads to the belief that the enemy is on the move, though it is ridiculous on his
part to engage in a general action now that Danzig is taken. . . . I shall be
very glad if the enemy spares us the trouble of going to him. My design was
to set myself in motion on the 10th " (Corr. 12,731).
‡ In Corr. 12,710, dated 2nd June, the Emperor writes that he had been two
days at Danzig, and was returning that evening to Finkenstein.
268
NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN IN POLAND.
instructed to put the place in a state to stand a fresh siege
from the sea or from the Nehrung.* Pile bridges were
under construction at Dirschau and Marienburg, which
had acquired an entirely new importance as lines of com-
munication, since the capture of Danzig.†
Danzig.† The fullest
instructions had been issued for the collection and forwarding
of supplies.‡
All the troops required for the front had arrived, or
were on the march, and the corps recently engaged in the
siege of Danzig were now available, except in so far as they
were required for a garrison for the fortress. Lefebvre's
corps was distributed to the garrison and to the corps of
Lannes and Mortier.§
Facing one another on the line of the Passarge and the
* Corr. 12,728, dated 5th June. This seems to be merely a written reminder ;
for the Emperor, during his visit to Danzig, had, no doubt, discussed this question
fully.
† Corr. 12,662 and 12,663, dated 28th May.
These instructions to Daru (Corr. 12,689, dated 29th May) are a good
example of Napoleon's methods. He states that he wishes to provision his army
for eight months. He will require, therefore, for current expenditure and
collection of a reserve, a daily supply of 80,000 rations at Warsaw for the right,
of 100,000 at Thorn, Wroclavik, and Bromberg for the centre, and of 80,000 for
the left at Danzig, Marienburg, Elbing, Marienwerder, etc. The first thing to
be done is to settle and mark on a map the areas from which each point is to be
supplied. To Warsaw would be assigned a breadth extending from Warsaw to
Wroclavik, and a depth including the districts (arrondissements) of Warsaw
and Kalisch; for the centre, the districts of Posen and Bromberg to a breadth
represented by the line Wroclavik-Graudenz; the left would draw from the
country between Marienwerder and the sea, with a depth including the whole
of Pomerania. Next, the best places for magazines must be selected in each
circle.
Of supplies there are five sources: (1) what is actually in existence on the
1st June; (2) what can be supplied by each Polish district; (3) what can be
demanded from Pomerania; (4) what can be brought up from magazines in
rear; (5) what must be brought to supply the existing Polish markets or to
start new ones. Before setting up a market, a careful calculation of cost of
carriage from Breslau, Custrin, or Magdeburg must be made, and compared with
the cost of supplies, if any, procurable in the neighbourhood, the cheapest being
chosen. Then follow detailed remarks as to the best way of starting markets
and searching out the resources of a country.
§ Jomini, Vie de Napoleon, ii. 403.
RENEWAL AND PROGRESS OF THE CAMPAIGN. 269
Alle, on the Omulew and the Narew, were 220,000 French
and auxiliary troops, and 115,000 Russians and Prussians.*
* The numbers of the Russians and Prussians are given in detail by
Hæpfner (iii. 555, etc.), and his statement may probably be accepted as fairly
correct. It shows these numbers.
On the Lower Passarge 15,000 Prussians, exclusive of a detachment on the
Nehrung. In support of them was Kamenskoi's division, returned from Danzig,
at Lilienthal. The total of this right wing is estimated at 20,000 and 78 guns,
including 7500 cavalry. There were, far in rear, the garrison of Koenigsberg
and 6000 reserve troops at Gumbinnen.
The Russian main army was as follows:-
Bagration (Launau), advanced guard
Uwarow (cavalry of right wing)
Dochtorow, 7th division
Sacken, 3rd division
Essen III., 8th division
...
Osterman Tolstoi, 2nd and 14th divisions
Galitzin, cavalry of left wing
Gortchakow, 6th division and cossacks
Guard, Grand Duke Constantine
...
Platow's flying column, chiefly cossacks
On the Narew, under Tolstoi
:
12,537
3,836
4,653
6,432
...
5,670
9,615
2,982
10,873
17,000
6,347
15,800
:
Another 30,000 men, under Labanow, were on their way, but were still far
behind the Russian frontier.
Altogether, allowing for sick, stragglers, etc., there were about 87,000 regular
troops (11,000 of them cavalry), and 8,000 cossacks facing Napoleon.
Including the force on the Narew, there were thus about 111,000, not
reckoning the Koenigsberg and Graudenz garrisons, the 6000 at Gumbinnen,
the detachment on the Nehrung, and the reinforcements under Labanow.
Dumas (xviii. 221) puts the allies at 118,000, including the detachment on the
Narew. Danilewski (see note, Hæpfner, iii. 562) gives, as the combined force
in the middle of May, 125,000. The discrepancies are not very marked, and
it seems safe to take the army at the numbers given in the text. Jomini
(Vie de Napoleon, ii. 400) says that the Russians, during the three months
after Eylau, had been reinforced by an infantry division and the Guard. Still
they were not above 120,000 or 130,000, including Lestocq and the corps on
the Narew.
The French numbers, according to the table at the end of Dumas, vol. xviii.,
were, on the Vistula :-
123,073
30,390
Infantry
Cavalry
Artillery
...
...
...
...
4,909
158,372
This does not include officers. Adding for these, and for Dombrowski's
division of the 8th corps, the numbers of which are not stated, it is probable
270
NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN IN POLAND.
For the operations north of Masséna's charge there were
190,000 under the Emperor in person, against 100,000
under Bennigsen.
On the 2nd June, Bennigsen, having determined to
attack the advanced corps of Ney, had concentrated his
army about Heilsberg, excepting the advanced guard, Platow's
flying column, and the right wing under Lestocq.
His plan for the destruction of Ney was extremely com-
plicated. Whilst Lestocq held the French on the Lower
Passarge, 6 columns were to converge on Ney.
1st column-Dochtorow, with 24 battalions and 4 batteries,
the 7th and 8th divisions-was to advance from Olbers-
dorf* (Albrechtsdorf), south of Wormditt, driving the French
across the Passarge and barring their return with small
detachments. He was then to ascend the right bank of the
stream, and take up a position between Elditten and
Schwendt (Schwenkitten),† opposite the bridge of Pithenen.
He would thus prevent the junction of Soult and Ney.
2nd column-Sacken, with the 2nd, 3rd, and 14th
divisions, and the cavalry of both wings, in all 42 battalions,
140 squadrons, and 9 batteries -was to march by Arensdorf,
and attack Ney, supporting the advanced guard and the
1st column.
that the army beyond the Lower Vistula was quite 170,000 strong, with about
300 guns. Masséna had about 30,000 on the Narew, and Zayonchek, connecting
the two, had perhaps 20,000 Poles. The latter were afterwards used to replace
the French at Osterode, Guttstadt, etc., as the Emperor advanced. The exact
French numbers at this period are of comparatively little importance, for there
can be no doubt that their total beyond the Lower Vistula, excluding the
garrison of Danzig and Zayonchek's Poles, exceeded those of Bennigsen by
at least 65,000 or 70,000.
Rustow (i. 319) gives Napoleon only 158,000, against 101,000 Russians and
Prussians on the Vistula, but he, apparently, does not include the troops from
Danzig.
* So the name is written in all the old accounts and maps. In the modern
map of 1881, as well as in the copy of the staff map in Moltke's Tactical
Problems (Map No. 27), from which the 1881 map is reduced, it is written
"Albrechtsdorf."
+ "Schwenkitten" on modern maps.
‡ Of 12 to 14 guns each = (say) 120 guns.
RENEWAL AND PROGRESS OF THE CAMPAIGN.
271
3rd column-Bagration's advanced guard, 42 battalions,
10 squadrons, and 6 regiments of cossacks-leaving its sup-
port about Peterswalde, to march by Grünau and Altkirch, so
as to cut off the troops which Ney had in Peterswalde. As
soon as Altkirch should be taken, the supports to advance
and uphold the main body, attacking the enemy between
Knopen and Glottau.
4th column-Gortchakow, with the 6th division, 12 bat-
talions, 20 squadrons, and 3 regiments of cossacks-passing
the Alle above Guttstadt, to fall upon Ney's right, detaching
a brigade towards Seeburg in support of Platow.
5th column-Platow, 3 battalions, 10 squadrons, 9
regiments of cossacks, and 12 guns, besides the brigade
(Knorring's) above mentioned-masking his movement from
Masséna's (Gazan's) outposts about Willemburg, to pass the
Alle at Bergfried, and assist in the envelopment of Ney.
6th column-the Grand Duke Constantine, with the
1st division (Guard), 28 battalions, 28 squadrons, 3 batteries-
to follow, as reserve, in two columns from Benern, Arensdorf,
and Sommerfeld to Petersdorf.
Lestocq, meanwhile, would advance against Bernadotte on
the Passarge from Braunsberg to Spanden, holding him there,
preventing him from crossing to the right bank, and, at the
same time, covering the roads to Zinten and Koenigsberg.
He
The scheme had in its favour the fact that Ney, his front
being surrounded by forests, could not see what was going
on at any considerable distance. Nevertheless, he obtained
sufficient information from his outposts to convince him that
some serious movement was in progress before him.
accordingly took measures for the concentration of his corps,
with the intention of taking up a position behind Ankendorf,
and there holding out till he could receive support from the
rest of the army. He also requested Soult to support his
left from Elditten, and Davout to strengthen his position at
Bergfried on the right.
Bennigsen, originally intending to attack on the 4th of
272
NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN IN POLAND.
June, had sent orders to Lestocq to alarm the enemy on the
Lower Passarge on that day. He now postponed the move-
ment till the 5th, informing Lestocq, but does not seem to
have formally cancelled his previous order for the 4th. On
that day,* therefore, the Prussian outposts and their supports
advanced, whilst the main body moved somewhat to its left,
so as to be more in touch with the Russians, and available
for their assistance in the hour of battle.
Rembow's division was assembled in the night of the
3rd-4th, behind Mehlsack, in all about 3000 infantry, 1500
cavalry, and 2 batteries. At 1 a.m. it started for Spanden in
four columns.
The attack on the bridge-head had already commenced
when a message from Dochtorow at Wormditt, inquiring the
cause of the cannonade, showed clearly that the attack was
premature. Rembow, accordingly, broke off the action and
retired, leaving strong outposts watching Spanden.
On the same day Dupont had been bombarded at Zagern.
These unfortunate premature attacks had no other effect
than to put Bernadotte on the alert, and give him time to
prepare against a serious advance.
On the 5th June, about 10 a.m., the attack on the
The works there
Spanden bridge-head was renewed.*
crossed the neck of a peninsula re-entrant towards the
French. A central redoubt, about 1000 paces from the
bridge, was connected by parapets with the river on either
side. Behind this, immediately in front of the bridge, was
another work, open at the gorge, covering the bridge
completely.
* Victor (Précis of operations, 1st corps, Arch. Hist.) dates these operations
the 3rd, which seems to be an error.
* In a despatch, dated 5th June, to Lannes, Berthier gives the hours at
which the various attacks commenced that day on the French corps :-
1st corps
3rd corps
4th corps
...
Bernadotte
Davout
Soult
...
10 a.m.
...
9 a.m.
8 a.m.
6th corps
Ney
6 a.m.
(Arch. Hist.)
RENEWAL AND PROGRESS OF THE CAMPAIGN.
273
The direction of the river facilitated the flanking of
the work by troops on the left bank; but as it was, in
this neighbourhood, and at this season, fordable in places,
its value as a defence was much impaired. In the works
beyond the bridge was the 27th light infantry, with 4 guns,
and one howitzer. On the left bank, partly above and
partly below the bend, was the rest of Villatte's division and
artillery.
*
After two hours' heavy bombardment of the outer work,
the Prussians moved to the assault. Waiting till the enemy
were at point-blank range, the 27th received them with such
a murderous fire that they were driven off with heavy loss,†
and pursued by the 17th dragoons issuing from the bridge,
towards Wusen.
In this fight Bernadotte, wounded in the head by a
musket ball, had to make over command of the corps to
Dupont, who, next day, handed it over to Victor.‡
Whilst this combat was in progress, Dupont was held
fast, at Petelkau and Zagern, by another considerable body of
Prussians.§
These, of course, were only false attacks; the real one fell
upon the advanced corps of Ney, and on that of Soult on his
left.
During the night of the 4th-5th Dochtorow had moved on
* The precise dispositions are thus given by Victor (Arch. Hist.) :-
Girard's brigade (94th and 95th regiments) on the left, in a wood between
Spanden and Schlodien.
63rd regiment, on heights behind the bridge.
17th dragoons, with the 63rd infantry.
2 guns, on a height behind the works.
19th dragoons, in front of Deutschendorf.
18th and 20th dragoons, in front of Schlodien, on the left of Girard's brigade.
† 500 killed and wounded (Hopfner, iii. 575). 700 or 800 according to
Dumas (xviii. 234).
‡ Dumas, xviii. 234. Hopfner, iii. 575. Victor, Arch. Hist. Victor's
appointment was ordered in Corr. 12,743, dated 7th June, in which the
Emperor mentions that he is assembling all his reserves at Mohrungen, and hopes
to make an end of the enemy, who seems to be striking a mad blow.
§ Victor (Arch. Hist.).
T
274
NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN IN POLAND.
}
Wormditt. At 6 a.m. he issued from the forest at Albrechts-
dorf towards Lomitten, driving in the French outposts.
The bridge here was covered by a work, as at Spanden,
except that the advanced work consisted of redoubts at
either extremity of a breast work, another work thrown
forward on the high ground on the right bank, and another
on the corresponding ground of the left bank. On the
left front of the bridge, the wood had been fortified by
abattis.
One battalion of the 57th was, with 4 guns, in the bridge-
head and works; the other held the wood on the left. A
battalion of the 24th light infantry was in the wood on the
Liebstadt road, on the left bank. The other watched the
river from Sporthenen to Alken. The remainder of Carra
St. Cyr's division was on the plateau in front of Liebstadt,
and from it reinforcements of 3 battalions, and 2 guns, were
sent, as soon as the artillery duel began.
The battle was opened, at 8 a.m.,* by the Russians
advancing against the abattis and the works in 3 columns,
whilst part of the cavalry forded the river near Sporthenen,
and a detachment of infantry with artillery threatened a
passage lower down, towards Alken.
In the wood, and before the works, a long and sanguinary
fight ensued. The abattis, carried at the first onslaught, was
recaptured from the Russians by French reinforcements.
Against the enemy who had passed at Sporthenen, the 24th
light infantry charged with the bayonet, driving them again
to the right bank, and burning the bridge which they had
partially constructed.
Meanwhile the abattis had once more fallen before the
Russian attack, and the victors were about to force the
passage at Lomitten when the reinforcements sent by St. Cyr
came up. The 2nd battalion of the 57th once more cleared
the wood, and for four hours maintained itself behind the
abattis. At the same time, a battalion of the 46th, and one of
* See p. 272, note.
RENEWAL AND PROGRESS OF THE CAMPAIGN.
275
5
the 24th drove off the enemy from in front of the bridge at
Lomitten.
Again and again the Russians attempted the storm of the
bridge-head. This fierce combat had raged for eight hours
when a final effort was made in a single column. Success
was almost within its grasp, when a splendid charge, by two
French battalions, snatched victory from it.
Dochtorow, during this action, marched off with the
greater part of his troops, towards Kalkstein and Elditten,
with the intention of seconding the attack on Ney's left.
The motive of his movement was correctly appreciated by
Soult, who was informed of it by St. Hilaire, standing with
his division behind the bridge at Pithenen. Measures were
at once taken for defending the passage at this place, which
had been protected by earthworks. St. Cyr, at Lomitten,
was told to confine himself to the defence of the bridge-head,
and even to retire to the left bank, if hard pressed. He
evacuated the wood on his left, and was finally forced to
leave the earthworks on the right bank, which had become
untenable owing to the destruction wrought on them by the
enemy's artillery, and by the fires which it had caused in the
village of Lomitten. The bridge, protected by the works on
the left bank, still remained closed to the Russians. About
p.m. the action died out, and the Russians fell back on
Albrechtsdorf.
8
According to French accounts, St. Cyr lost about 1200
men, the enemy 2800.*
Dochtorow does not appear to have made any attempt on
Pithenen, finding it too strongly held.
The actions at Spanden and Lomitten were but a cover
to the more serious attempt, which was simultaneously
made, to cut off Ney's corps in its exposed position about
Hæpfner, iii. 579. The same authority alleges that Soult admitted that
he had been so severely engaged as to be unable to assist Ney. I have been
unable to find the letter to Napoleon referred to by Hopfner (iii. 579, note),
but, in a letter to Ney (Arch. Hist.), dated June 6th, 3 a.m., the marshal makes
the statement referred to.
276
NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN IN POLAND.
Guttstadt. If the attack had many points in its favour, it
had the disadvantage of being opposed by a general who was
a consummate master of the art of conducting a rear-guard
action, and of delaying, to the last safe moment, the enemy's
march.
Ney's positions were-
At Guttstadt: headquarters and Marchand's division,
which was also partly in Altkirch and Neuendorf, and had one
cavalry and one infantry regiment in front of Schmolainen;
Bisson's division occupied Queetz, Lingnau, Glottau,
and Knopen.
Leaving his supports to watch the Schmolainen wood in
front, Bagration, with the rest of the advanced guard, moved,
about 6 a.m.,* on Altkirch, which he took without much
difficulty, driving its defenders on Guttstadt, where Mar-
chand's division now concentrated.
At Altkirch, Bagration halted, waiting for Sacken and
Gortchakow, who had started too late to keep in line with
him, and without whose help he did not feel strong enough
to continue his enveloping movement against Guttstadt.
Sacken was only between Dietrichsdorf and Petersdorf when
Altkirch was stormed.
Ney, seeing the danger to which his advanced cavalry
and infantry at Schmolainen were exposed, seized the
opportunity to withdraw them to Guttstadt. To cover the
retirement, and his concentration, Ney made a strong counter-
attack on Bagration, causing him a loss of about 500 killed
and wounded.
As Sacken arrived, the marshal, finding himself greatly
outnumbered, fell back in first-rate order on Ankendorf,
fighting every step of the way, and holding every fold of
the ground with strong swarms of skirmishers; Gortchakow,
meanwhile, occupied Guttstadt, which Ney had abandoned.
* See note, p. 272. Also Corr. 12,729, dated 5th June, 2 p.m., in which the
Emperor rightly assumes that the attack on Bernadotte was a feint, and that
the real assault would be on Ney.
RENEWAL AND PROGRESS OF THE CAMPAIGN. 277
At Ankendorf, and Heiligenthal Ney halted, whilst the
Russians took post, towards 3 p.m., about Queetz, with
Gortchakow in reserve.
Platow, who had crossed the Alle at Bergfried, and
arrived nearly in Ney's rear, joined the left of the position
at Queetz.
Ney, leaning his right, at Ankendorf, on a wood which
he held, was covered by the Queetz lake on his right. His
centre and left extended, along a marshy brook, to the
Passarge. In front of his left, where the road from Walters-
mühl to Deppen crosses the brook, was a small wood. His
retreat lay over two bridges, one behind either wing. He
had still about 16,000 men; he had lost heavily, some 400
killed and wounded, and 1600 prisoners, besides 2 guns, and
a great part of his baggage. The Russian loss had been
about 2000 killed and wounded, amongst the latter being
Osterman Tolstoi, and Somow.
On the morning of the 6th, the Russian advanced guard
found Ney still in position.
The attack was thus ordered: on the right, a column,
under Gallitzin, moved on the small wood in front of Ney's
left, seeking to drive it on the bridge at Deppen, and cut
off the retreat there. Sacken was sent against the centre,
Gortchakow against the right, whilst Bagration and the
Grand Duke Constantine served as reserve. Fighting com-
menced at 5 a.m.
Gortchakow assaulted the wood on the French right
front, but was brought to a standstill by Ney's moving
forward there also.
Steady progress was made by the Russian centre and
right columns. Gortchakow, after his failure at the wood,
wandered round the further side of the Queetz lake, hoping
to turn Ney's right, and avoid the wooded marshy land in
front of it. He thus put himself, for several hours, out of
action, and left Ney's right in safety. The marshal, who,
falling back of necessity before the enemy's immense
278
NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN IN POLAND.
superiority, had already passed Heiligenthal, at once saw the
fault of Gortchakow, and utilised it by returning to Heili-
genthal with his right, thus covering the retreat of his centre
and left into the valley and across the Passarge. His whole
corps got safely across with small loss.
Bennigsen was furious at the ill-success of his plan, and
seems to have expressed himself so freely that Sacken left
the army temporarily.*
The Prussians and Kamenskoi did nothing during this
day beyond assembling about Mehlsack. On the evening
of the 6th, Bennigsen's advanced guard was on the right
bank of the Passarge, headquarters at Heiligenthal, the
reserve behind it. Gortchakow at Guttstadt and Knopen,
with a detachment observing Davout; Dochtorow, leaving
cossacks to watch the Passarge from Elditten, had joined the
Russian right wing.
(b) NAPOLEON'S RESUMPTION OF THE OFFENSIVE.
Bennigsen's offensive had expended its force and come to
a standstill.
Napoleon had not been idle. He had, as soon as he
heard of the attack on Ney, on the 5th, directed Murat to
assemble his reserve cavalry at Marienburg, Christburg,
Elbing, Bischofswerder, Strasburg, and Soldau.†
The guard cavalry to assemble at Finkenstein.‡
Lannes to march at once on Christburg, where he should
arrive by 9 a.m. on the 6th.§
Mortier to march towards Christburg, halting 5 or 6 miles
short of it for orders.||
On the 6th, Soult was ordered, if he had been forced to
* Hæpfner, iii, 583.
+ Berthier to Murat, printed, Dumas, xix. 317.
Berthier to Bessières, ibid., xix. 318.
§ Berthier to Lannes, ibid., xix. 318 and 321. In the first despatch the
Emperor was uncertain if the enemy meant seriously; in the second, he was
certain.
|| Berthier to Mortier, ibid., xix. 323.
'
RENEWAL AND PROGRESS OF THE CAMPAIGN. 279
retreat, to cover Mohrungen as long as possible, utilising the
defiles between the lakes.*
Ney's retreat to Deppen was approved. If he was again
attacked, he would defend the defile south of the Narien
lake.† Davout would support his right.‡
Similarly, Bernadotte, if forced back, would gain time
by a slow retreat on Pr. Holland.§
Writing to Davout, at 8 p.m. on the 6th,|| Napoleon asks
whether the enemy will dare to march on Allenstein with
the French on their flank at Deppen and Leibstadt. If the
enemy advances on Osterode, Davout will choose a position
for its defence on the Russian flank. Above all, he must
"maintain Alt Ramten, for it is the head of Osterode."
this despatch, the Emperor mentions that his lines of opera-
tions are through Marienwerder, Marienburg, and Danzig.
Gazan¶ and Zayonchek** had already been ordered to
concentrate.
All commanders were required to fill up ammunition
and supply waggons, and see that their men had plenty of
cartridges. The Emperor himself, sending his heavy baggage
to Danzig, went to Saalfeld and Seegerswalde, at which latter
place he gave up his carriage and mounted his horse.††
* Berthier to Soult, Dumas, xix. 325.
† Berthier to Ney, ibid., xix. 326. Also Corr. 12,736.
Corr. 12,730, dated 5th June.
§ Berthier to Bernadotte, ibid., xix. 327.
Corr. 12,741.
¶ Berthier to Gazan, ibid., xix. 321.
** Berthier to Zayonchek, ibid., xix. 321.
tt Corr. 12,735, dated Finkenstein, 6th June. The movements of the
Emperor's headquarters were as follows, up to the 19th June:-
6th, Finkenstein.
7th, Mohrungen.
8th, Klein Krickau.
9th. Guttstadt.
10th, in front of Heilsberg.
11th,
""
12th, Pr. Eylau.
>>
13th, Pr. Eylau.
14th, Friedland.
15th, near Wehlau.
16th, Wehlau.
17th, Toplicken.
18th, Schwarzlauken.
19th, Tilsit.
(Itinerary of route of Imperial headquarters kept by Berthier, Arch. Hist.).
280
NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN IN POLAND.
Davout had been fully alive to the situation. When
Platow, on the 5th, had forced the bridge at Bergfried, he had
threatened the connexion between Ney and Davout. The
latter, anticipating the order received on the 6th from the
Emperor, assembled the 1st and 3rd divisions at Allenstein,
and sent the 2nd on to the Passarge above Ramten.*
On the morning of the 7th, he marched his 1st and 3rd
divisions to the left, taking up a position on a small tributary
of the right bank of the Passarge, thus effectually threatening
the left flank and rear of the Russians in front of Deppen. On
the previous evening, he had sent a despatch to Ney, saying
that, if the enemy continued his movement, he would have
Davout with 40,000 men on his rear. This was a consider-
able exaggeration of numbers for the benefit of Bennigsen.
Davout took care to send the despatch by a route on which
the luckless bearer was certain to be captured, as he actually
was.†
Bennigsen had gone to Guttstadt in the night of the
6th-7th, leaving the Grand Duke in command. His lieu-
tenants, thinking the offensive movement was to continue,
were preparing to march on the Passarge and on Allenstein,
when the commander-in-chief, returning on the evening of
the 7th, ordered a retreat.‡
Napoleon, informed of the hesitation of the enemy to
advance against Ney, himself went to Deppen, sending orders
to Victor and Soult to force the passage of the Passarge in
their front.
The Guard and Mortier were ordered to march on Deppen,
as well as the cavalry of Lasalle, Grouchy, and Nansouty.
Espagne's and Saint Sulpice's cavalry to Mohrungen.
* Davout, p. 192, and Friant's report, dated Lochen, 7th June, 1807, at
p. 352 of the same volume.
† Ibid., p. 193. He gives his real strength as 28,891, p. 194.
The Emperor at first found it difficult to believe Bennigsen really meant
a serious offensive. He says it seems impossible that he should do so, after
letting Danzig fall without an attack on the main army (Corr. 12,731, dated
the 5th June).
RENEWAL AND PROGRESS OF THE CAMPAIGN.
281
Latour-Maubourg's cavalry was placed at the disposal of
Soult, Milhaud's at that of Davout. Zayonchek's division
was ordered to occupy the now deserted Osterode.
On the morning of the 8th, there was no longer any doubt
that the Russians were retreating.* Napoleon took up the
offensive.
Soult had his light cavalry at Waltersdorf, where he had
sent it after the affair at Lomitten on the 5th.
On the morning of the 8th, his whole corps passed the
Passarge at Elditten, and Pithenen, marching on Wolfsdorf,
the left covered by Latour-Maubourg's cavalry. To Guyot,
commanding his light cavalry, Soult sent orders to confine
himself to observing the enemy. That general, however,
incautiously involving himself in an action at Kleinenfeld,
without making a proper reconnaissance, was surrounded by
cossacks, and his brigade very severely handled, he himself
being killed.†
Legrand and St. Hilaire (both of Soult's corps), seiz-
ing Wolfsdorf, held fast there, with St. Cyr in second
line.
This movement against his right flank finally determined
Bennigsen to retreat.
The news reached him about midday, when he had already
seen great masses of French assembling on the farther side
of the Passarge. They confined themselves, however, to
reconnaissances, and there was no fighting worth mention.
Gortchakow was now ordered direct to the entrenched
camp at Heilsberg, by the right bank of the Alle, sending a
detachment of two infantry regiments, and one of cavalry,
with some cossacks and 6 guns, under Barasdin, to hold the
defile of Launau on the left bank. The rest of the army fell
* Corr. 12,744, dated 8th June, to Soult. The Emperor says he has forced
the enemy to disclose a body of 13,000 infantry and 7000 or 8000 cavalry, and
he learns from prisoners that the rest are at Guttstadt.
reverse.
† Soult, reporting on this affair, under date 8th June, treats it as a serious
He attributes it entirely to Guyot's carelessness. The losses he puts
at 25 killed and 250 prisoners. (Soult to Berthier, 8th June, Arch. Hist.)
282
NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN IN POLAND.
back on Guttstadt, except Bagration with the rear-guard, who
only moved in the evening to Queetz.
At noon, orders were sent to Lestocq to watch the Lower
Passarge, as well as Soult's movement. At 3 p.m., another
order was sent, announcing that Bennigsen meant to fight a
battle at Guttstadt next day, and desiring Lestocq to advance
against Soult. The bearer of this despatch, passing through
Mehlsack, came upon Kamenskoi there. There was a good
deal of confusion on this side, with orders and counter-orders,
the final result being that Kamenskoi and Lestocq were left
behind, intending to attack Soult's left and rear in the battle
which they expected next day at Guttstadt.
On the morning of the 9th, Bennigsen drew up his army
for battle at Guttstadt. Finding the position not sufficiently
satisfactory, he changed his mind, and retreated by the right
bank of the Alle to Heilsberg, which he reached in the
evening. Expecting the French to follow on the right bank,
he, at first, only passed over one division to the left bank at
Heilsberg, as a support to Barasdin's detachment at Launau.
Bagration's rear-guard was left to cover the retreat.
At 3 a.m. on the 9th, Napoleon commenced the passage
of the Passarge at Deppen, moving towards Guttstadt. Murat
led the way, supported by Ney. Behind him came Lannes
and the Guard. Mortier was still a day's march in rear,
at Mohrungen. Davout passed the river at and above
Hasenburg, for he had fallen back on its left bank on the 8th,
one division going so far as Osterode, whilst the others were
at the southern extremity of the Schilling lake. He had, on
the 8th, received his orders to cross the Passarge next day.
Soult, also, was ordered to Guttstadt. Just as he was starting,
Kamenskoi appeared, from the direction of Dietrichsdorf, on
his left rear.
St. Hilaire's division, the nearest, was moved against the
enemy, whilst the light cavalry, and Latour-Maubourg, went
against Dietrichsdorf.
Kamenskoi's men had already passed the wood of
RENEWAL AND PROGRESS OF THE CAMPAIGN. 283
Dietrichsdorf, and were approaching Wolfsdorf. A powerful
battery, which he had established in front of the latter village,
was quickly silenced by the French guns. St. Hilaire, at
this moment, impetuously attacked the Russians with the
bayonet, and drove them back, with heavy losses, in confusion.
The cavalry continued the pursuit to Wormditt. Soult did
not allow himself to be diverted from his march on Guttstadt.
Kamenskoi, unmolested beyond Wormditt, after a few hours'
rest there behind the Drewenz stream, continued his march to
Heilsberg by Migenen, Raunau, and Reimerswalde,* arriving
there next morning, after a very long march. Meanwhile,
Murat was following Bagration, who halted at Glottau to
fight an action covering the passage of the rest of the army at
Guttstadt. Bravely supporting him, Platow's cossacks were
at first driven back towards the Alle, and began to lose order.
Platow, seeing the danger, himself dismounted, and, by his
personal example, restored order. Bagration's cavalry, too,
made a gallant resistance; it was only when Ney's infantry
arrived in support that Murat finally succeeded in driving
Bagration into Guttstadt. The Russian general successfully
passed the river, covered and followed by Platow's cossacks,
who destroyed the bridges behind them.†
On the night of the 9th, the French occupied these
positions :-
* According to Hopfner (iii. 599), the French victory was hardly so com-
plete here as is alleged by Dumas (xviii. 261). Kamenskoi, he says, retreated
in good order to Wormditt, which he reached at 1 p.m. It was only at 2 p.m.
that he received a despatch from Bennigsen announcing his abandonment of the
intention to stand at Guttstadt.
†There were two bridges in the town, and three had been constructed above
it (Wilson, p. 141).
Platow, who had been on the left on the 5th-7th, passed to the right on the
8th (ibid. p. 140).
In the rear-guard action of the 9th, the forces engaged on the Russian side
were:
Bagration
Platow
Į Infantry
Cavalry
Cossacks
...
5000
1500
...
2000
During the night, Bagration fell back about halfway to Heilsberg, covered by
the cossacks (ibid., pp. 141–143).
284
NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN IN POLAND.
Soult at Altkirch;
Ney, Murat, and the Guard at Guttstadt;
Davout held the left bank of the Alle above Guttstadt,
and the villages of Knopen and Ankendorf;
Mortier was approaching Guttstadt.
Napoleon's design now was, cutting the Russian army
from Koenigsberg and its resources, to drive it from the sea
and across the Pregel.
While, therefore, he proposed, next day, to attack Bennig-
sen in front with 50,000 men forming Murat's cavalry, Soult's,
Lannes', and Ney's corps, and Savary's grenadiers, he would
keep in hand, at Guttstadt and Altkirch, the corps of Mortier
and Davout, destined to be interposed between Bennigsen's
right and Koenigsberg. The Guard in reserve. Victor, on
the Lower Passarge, would retain there the Prussians, and
presently force them back on Koenigsberg, where they would
be hopelessly severed from their allies.
CHAPTER II.
THE BATTLE OF HEILSBERG, AND OPERATIONS OF THE
11TH-13TH JUNE.
THE
HE small town of Heilsberg, situated on the left bank of
the Alle, was connected by several bridges with a
poor suburb on the opposite side. From the hollow in which
the town lies, the ground rises to the north, east, and south,
to a curved line of heights of—for this generally flat country
-fairly commanding elevation. The ridge crosses the
river, which divides it about a mile below the town.*
On the right bank, the heights curve back rather sharply,
till they meet the marshy brook flowing from south to north,
through the suburb, to the Alle. On this side, their elevation
is greater than that of their northward continuation beyond
the river, and they form quite a respectable height. In the
brook, with its marshy bed, to the south they find a strong
support from the point of view of an army defending them.
In this direction they can only be turned with difficulty, by a
considerable detour. North of the Alle, the line of hills is less
strongly marked; it sweeps away from the river, almost at
right angles, for a distance of nearly a mile and a half, before
turning back towards the village of Konegen. Two and a
*This account of the battle of Heilsberg is based on those of Dumas,
Hopfner, Soult (Arch. Hist.), and Savary. Kausler's atlas and text has also
been consulted. The text must be accepted with caution, for it commits a
glaring error in representing Lannes' corps as consisting of the divisions of
Gazan and Suchet. Those divisions formed Lannes' old corps, the 5th, which
was at this time on the Narew, under Masséna.
286
NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN IN POLAND.
quarter miles north of Heilsberg, to the left of the Koenigs-
berg road, there is a considerable sheet of water on the shore
of which is situated the village of Grossendorf.
The heights are bare on their outer slope.
It was this line of rising ground which Bennigsen had,
during the spring, carefully fortified as a support to his army.
The portion on the right bank was by nature stronger than that
on the left. It was also that to which the Russian engineers
had devoted most care and attention. Its crest and outer slope
were covered with a series of redoubts and other works which,
combined with the protection afforded by the marshy stream
on its left flank, rendered it almost impregnable to anything
but a regular siege.
On the left bank of the river, where it passes through the
heights, there was, at the foot of their slope, a work designed
for the protection of the bridges above it. Some 500 paces
from the river, on a projecting spur, was redoubt No. 1;
900 paces farther in the same line was redoubt No. 2.
No. 3 was 1500 paces farther, on the right rear of No. 2.
A small earthwork was constructed across the Koenigsberg
road, 700 paces south of the Grossendorf lake. These, with
two or three interspersed flèches or minor works, were all the
fortifications on this side of the river. In front of the
position on the right bank, the country was thickly wooded
along, and to some distance from, the river.
On the north side, an undulating plain stretched in all
directions. It was intersected by the semicircular course of
the Spuibach, forming the outlet of the Grossendorf lake to
the Alle. On the left bank of this brook, rather more than
2 miles north-west of Heilsberg, was the wood of Lawden.
Half a mile south-west of the wood was the village of the
same name. Continuing the line between the wood and the
village, the next point reached is the village of Langwiese,
more than half a mile from Lawden; proceeding, always in
the same south-westerly direction, another full half-mile, the
village of Bewernick is reached; a short distance beyond that
THE BATTLE OF HEILSBERG.
287
the Alle, about three miles below the line of Bennigsen's
fortifications. Along the south side of Bewernick passes the
road from Guttstadt, by the left bank, on which, at a short
distance from the river, it continues to Heilsberg.
On the fortified heights on both banks, Bennigsen, on the
10th June, ranged his army for battle. On the left bank,
with its left flank resting on the work near the river, stood
the 8th division. Next to it, on the right, the 6th took up
post. Beyond this the 4th and 5th divisions, and 27
squadrons of Prussian cavalry, continued the line behind the
redoubts. From the Mehlsack road the position bent back
towards redoubt No. 3, at which point the infantry line ended.
It was a continuous double line, in which each regiment had
its 1st and 2nd battalions deployed in first line, and the 3rd
in column as second line.
Behind the left wing and centre stood, as reserve, 12
battalions, drawn up in three columns. A few more
battalions were in front of the left, in and about redoubt
No. 1. Kamenskoi's infantry garrisoned redoubts Nos. 2
and 3, the former of which had 16 Russian guns, partly in,
and partly near it. No. 3 was held by a 6-pr. battery (14
guns). Behind No. 2, in support of its garrison, was the 2nd
battalion Towarzycs regiment (cavalry).
The Russian cavalry extended the infantry line from
redoubt No. 3 towards Konegen, ending with the main body
of the cossacks. The rest of the Prussian cavalry was
stationed thus: 5 squadrons behind the right of the infantry
line; 10 squadrons (Zieten's dragoons) and a horse artillery
battery behind the left flank of the Russian cavalry; farther
to the rear, 2 squadrons of hussars and the first battalion
Towarzycs regiment, in reserve, behind the centre of Kamen-
skoi's infantry. Beyond the lake, 5 regiments of cossacks
held Grossendorf.
At the commencement, there were, on the right bank, the
1st, 2nd, 3rd, 7th, and 14th divisions. As the day advanced,
all these passed to the left bank except a few regiments.
288
NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN IN POLAND.
The 2nd division held the left of the southern position,
resting on the marshes; the 1st, on its right, extended to the
Alle. The others, at first, were at the three redoubts nearest
the river. The Guard hussar regiment was out in front on
the Guttstadt road, 2 more cavalry regiments on that leading
to Seeburg,* where Knorring, with a flying column, main-
tained communication with the force on the Narew. To
connect the two portions of his position across the river,
Bennigsen had a permanent bridge behind his work on the
left bank, 3 pontoon bridges a little above it, and 5 per-
manent bridges in the town.
Between 9 and 10 a.m., the Russian commander-in-chief·
received information from Barasdin's outposts at Launau,
about 6 miles towards Guttstadt on the left bank, that the
French were advancing in force in that direction. He at
once despatched 2 jäger and 1 musketeer regiments, with
a militia battalion, a dragoon regiment, and 2 light guns
towards Launau. At the same time, he sent orders to
Bagration, who was retiring on the opposite side of the river
from Reichenburg, to cross by the pontoon bridges, and to
move again up the left bank and fend off the enemy.
At Bewernick, Bagration met Barasdin, and the force sent
to his support, retiring before Murat. Rallying them, he
posted himself behind the depression in which Bewernick and
Langwiese lie. He had three columns of infantry, and one
of cavalry, on the near side of the valley, with cossacks and
skirmishers in front, along and behind the Bewernick brook;
more cavalry and a battery towards Langwiese. Two batteries
occupied the heights behind Bewernick, where the infantry
columns were.
Murat, followed by Soult, Savary's grenadiers, and
Lannes' corps in the order named, had left Guttstadt early
in the morning. As already mentioned, he had driven in
*This cavalry was withdrawn to the cavalry reserve, when, towards
evening, it became certain that an attack was to be apprehended on the right
bank (¤œpfner, iii. 605).
THE BATTLE OF HEILSBERG.
289
Barasdin's outposts, about 8 a.m., at Launau; about 2 p.m.,
he again drove back on Bewernick the reinforcements which
Bennigsen had sent. His further progress was arrested by
the batteries which Bagration had posted behind Bewernick.
He was compelled to wait for Soult's infantry and artillery
to open a road. The latter placed 36 guns, part on a height
across the Liebstadt road, part on heights on the left, about
500 yards from Bewernick. The fire of these overpowered
and silenced that of the Russian batteries, and cleared the
way for an advance on Bewernick, from which the hostile
skirmishers had retired.
Shortly after leaving Launau, Legrand's division had
borne off to the left, on the direct line to Langwiese; Savary's
grenadiers, on the left rear of Legrand, skirted the woods
north-west of Bewernick. In front of that village, Soult had
St. Cyr's division in 1st, St. Hilaire's in 2nd, line; Murat's
cavalry on the left. The objective of Legrand, Savary, and
Murat, was Lawden and the wood beyond it. Soult's own
cavalry supported St. Cyr and St. Hilaire.
Under the protection of Soult's 36 guns, St. Cyr occupied
Bewernick about 3 p.m., and, deploying beyond it, became
involved in a long, severe, and slowly advancing conflict with
Bagration's infantry, in which he had to seek support from
St. Hilaire to enable him to advance. Whilst this combat
was proceeding on the Russian side of Bewernick, Murat was
moving on Langwiese; Legrand, followed by Savary, on
Lawden, which he had nearly reached.
Bagration's cavalry attacked Murat before he reached
Langwiese; it was defeated and pursued through the village,
losing 2 guns on the left of it.
Before he had completely reorganised his cavalry beyond
Langwiese, after their passage through it, Murat was
attacked by a large force of cavalry. Bennigsen, seeing the
French progress towards Langwiese and Lawden, had ordered
Uwarow, with 25 squadrons and 3 jäger regiments, to support
Bagration.
U
290
NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN IN POLAND.
Crossing the Spuibach in two columns, Uwarow, with the
3 jäger regiments, and a few cavalry, went to the right towards
Lawden. He found the village already occupied, and came
under artillery fire from a French battery on the Gaberberg.
Making a circuit out of range, he occupied the wood with the
jägers.
The other column, commanded by Koschin, who had so
distinguished himself at Pultusk, and Fock, crossed the
Spuibach at the main road, just as Bagration's men were
retreating before St. Cyr. Turning to its right, the column
fell upon Murat's cavalry, as it was deploying, and, at
the first onset, carried it away in confusion back towards
Langwiese. Napoleon, seeing the advance of the Russian
cavalry, had sent Savary † to support Murat with his two
fusilier regiments and 12 guns. In order to reach the plain
where Murat was manoeuvring, Savary had to pass a long
defile between marshes, and through the village of Lang-
wiese. This defile, he perceived, was also the only line of
retreat of the cavalry, should they be defeated. Had he met
them in it, the results must have been disastrous; he hurried
forward as fast as possible. He had scarcely deployed, two
battalions in front and the rest in columns on his flanks,
when he was almost carried away by Murat's cavalry, fleeing
*The "journaux de marche " of the cavalry reserve (Arch. Hist.) show, as
engaged at Heilsburg-
2nd and 3rd divisions heavy cavalry,
1st division dragoons;
in all, between 6000 and 7000 sabres.
+ Some French writers have endeavoured to ignore the presence of Napoleon
on the battlefield. It is, however, proved (a) by Savary's statement, as in the
text, in his account of his action (iii. 79-81); (b) by a statement on p. 162,
vol. xvii., of the work, Victoires, Conquêtes, etc., des Français, published at
Paris in 1818, and certainly not prejudiced against Napoleon; (c) by a picture
of the battle in the museum at Versailles.
Hopfner (iii. 609) says he arrived at the front at 10 a.m. It is curious that
Hopfner makes no mention of Savary's part in this cavalry action. It is also
difficult to believe that he has not (iii. 607) understated the strength of
Uwarow's attacking cavalry at 1000. He had most of 25 squadrons, besides the
rallied cavalry of Bagration.
THE BATTLE OF HEILSBERG.
291
before the victorious Russians. He opened a steady artillery
and infantry fire, refusing to obey Murat's orders to advance
with the bayonet. According to his account,* the Russian
cavalry were supported by infantry and artillery, which he
with difficulty beat off, thanks to the excellent service of his
own artillery, under Grenier. Murat, rallying behind him,
and reinforced by more cavalry, turned the tables. Koschin
was killed, Fock wounded, and the Russian cavalry swept ·
back behind the Spuibach.
The final repulse of this cavalry exposed the right flank
of Bagration, still on the French side of the Spuibach, and
compelled him, pressed in front by St. Cyr, to retreat in
some confusion across it. He might have suffered a serious
disaster but for the prompt action of the Grand Duke
Constantine on the right bank of the Alle. That commander
pushed forward a powerful battery to the river below the
infall of the brook, the right bank of which he was thus able
to sweep, causing heavy loss to St. Cyr and St. Hilaire. St.
Cyr, alone, was unable, after several attacks, to cross the
brook against Bagration, now drawn up on its farther side.
He accordingly gave place to St. Hilaire's division, which,
after a desperate combat, succeeded in getting to its left bank.
Whilst this struggle was going on between Bagration and
St. Cyr, Legrand, supported by Savary, moved, under cover of
his artillery at and behind Lawden, to the attack of the
Lawden wood. In it the French met Uwarow's 3 jäger
regiments, who fought fiercely with the bayonet. It was
only after a protracted, well-sustained combat that Legrand
succeeded in ejecting the enemy, and strongly occupying the
wood, which was an invaluable support to the left of the
French line.
Bagration and Uwarow had now played to the bitter end.
their part in warding off, as long as possible, the French
troops from the main position. So long as they were on the
plain in front of it, they, necessarily, masked the fire of the
* He probably alludes to the infantry and artillery on Bagration's right.
292
NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN IN POLAND.
powerful artillery ranged on the heights before Heilsberg.
The curtain, which so far had protected the French from this
fire, was now drawn aside. Bagration's infantry, worn out
by a long march followed by a severe action, retired by the
line of the main road. His jägers stopped to occupy the
earthwork on the left bank of the river, the rest passing
the Alle, took up their stand in the centre of the southern
area. Bagration himself joined Kamenskoi in the northern
redoubts. His cavalry, united with that of Uwarow, proceeded
to the right wing of the army.
It was at this time that Bennigsen brought over the 7th
division, followed by the 3rd and 14th, from the right bank
to the left, their place being, to some extent, filled by
Bagration's infantry. The 1st and 2nd divisions formed a
new reserve on the left bank. Bagration's retreat began
between 5 and 6 p.m.; by the latter hour, the plain in front
of the Russian entrenchments was cleared of their advanced
troops.
The French on the Spuibach plain, at Lawden, and in
front of the wood, were now exposed to the full fury of a
cannonade from all the guns on the northern heights, as well
as from those in many of the works on the south bank, and
the battery on the river's edge opposite the mouth of the
brook. Their own artillery was not sufficient to reply with
great effect to the 150 pieces brought to bear on them.
Inaction under such a fire would have been intolerable. St.
Hilaire's division on the right, followed by St. Cyr's and by
the cavalry, pushed on over the plain, towards redoubt No. 1,
passing through an ever-increasing storm of artillery fire.
Simultaneously with their advance, Legrand, on the left,
and Savary, issued from the Lawden wood, sending forward
the 26th light infantry to the storm of redoubt No. 2. Passing
through the depression in front of the work, they suffered
from a most efficacious grape fire, and from the musketry
of the two battalions at the redoubt. Nothing could stop
the impetuous charge of the 26th. The redoubt was carried
THE BATTLE OF HEILSBERG.
293
about 7 p.m.,* the infantry driven back, and the 1st battalion
of the Towarzycs regiment (cavalry), which had attempted
to attack the French left, was forced to give way by the
musketry fire which it encountered.
Grohlmann, who commanded here, finding his troops
forced out of the work, the palisades of the gorge of which
had been broken to facilitate the withdrawal of the guns, at
once sent to Warneck in rear, imploring him to fall upon
the intruding French, before they could be supported, or
establish themselves firmly in the captured redoubt.
Most readily did Warneck bring forward the Perm and
Kaluga regiments. Moving in perfect order, joined by the
Sonsk regiment, on their left, they saw the French, in and
about the redoubt, not yet firmly settled in it, endeavour-
ing to prepare for its defence. As the Russian regiments
marched forward, they received a heavy fire of grape from
the guns of the work, now turned against them. Warneck,
struck by a musket-ball, fell, as he bravely led forward his
men. His place was instantly filled by Grohlmann, who was
personally well known to the men. With a loud cheer he
placed himself at their head. Bravely though the French
fought, they could not stand against the bayonets of the
Russian infantry. Broken and in disorder, they fled to the
rear, pursued by their triumphant conquerors. As Warneck
charged, the 1st battalion of the Zieten dragoons, supported
by the 1st battalion of the Towarzycs regiment, and the now
rallied 2nd battalion, galloped forward on his right. Bring-
ing forward their right shoulders, this body of cavalry fell on
the cuirassier division of Espagne halted between the Lawden
wood and the infantry. Then ensued a deadly hand-to-hand
struggle, ending in the defeat, with great loss, of the cuiras-
siers. The Prussian horsemen pursued them into the midst
of their batteries, hewing down the gunners. It was not
until they were met by a heavy infantry fire that the
Prussians were forced to retire to their original position.
* Wilson, p. 146.
294
NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN IN POLAND.
St. Hilaire, seeing the defeat of the 26th at redoubt No. 2,
had sent to support it the 55th regiment from his left.
Charged by more Prussian cavalry, whose approach was
concealed by the thick smoke, disordered by the beaten
26th and the Russian infantry, their colonel killed, this
regiment, too, was overthrown, and lost 'its eagle. Not till a
fresh French chasseur regiment came to its aid, was it dis-
engaged from the Prussian cavalry, now forced to a rapid
retreat through the Russian infantry lines. On this wing
there was an indescribable scene of confusion. Legrand's
and Savary's infantry-formed in hollow squares, containing
the Russian prisoners, arranged checkerwise and intermixed
with the reserve cavalry—were attacked in all directions by
Russian and Prussian cavalry again pushing forward. Slowly
they gave way, their squares moving without being broken,
again across the Spuibach. But for the timely arrival at this
juncture, on their left, of Verdier's division of Lannes' corps,
and the support offered by St. Hilaire on their right, they
could hardly have avoided total defeat.
As Legrand and Savary were forced back, they necessarily
exposed the left flank of St. Hilaire and St. Cyr. Those
generals had arrived close in front of redoubt No. 1, but, met
in front by the Russian defenders, and their left flank
exposed as above described, they had found themselves
unable to go farther. They, too, fell back, suffering appalling
losses.
The assault on redoubt No. 2 had occurred soon after
7 p.m.;* by 9 p.m. the whole French line was again driven
behind the Spuibach, though they still held the Lawden
wood beyond it. The Russians had retired, after their victory,
to their entrenched positions; the battle seemed over for
the night. Not so thought Lannes, who had now reached
* Napoleon's 78th bulletin (Corr. 12,747) says it was 9 p.m. when St.
Hilaire was in front of the Russian position. Jomini (Vie de Napoleon, ii. 408),
apparently following the bulletin, gives the same hour. Wilson (p. 146) says
Legrand moved foward "about 7 p.m."
THE BATTLE OF HEILSBERG.
295
the field. He resolved on one more attempt. Collecting
Verdier's division, he sent it forward once more against
redoubt No. 2, from the Lawden wood, about 10 p.m. Warned
by a deserter * of the impending assault, the Russians were
prepared to meet it. As Verdier, supported by the 75th of
Legrand's division, moved out across the plain, he was
received with such a storm of artillery fire that his division
withered before it. The attack collapsed, the troops once
more fell back on the wood.
The 18th regiment of Legrand's division had been pushed
forward in the afternoon towards Grossendorf, to threaten
Bennigsen's communications with Koenigsberg. There it
had been set upon by the cossacks. Formed in battalion
squares, it had for hours resisted every attack with success.
When the fighting was over on his own front, Legrand
sent out two more battalions to its aid. With their help,
it was able to rejoin the main French line.
After the failure of Verdier's attempt, a few Russian light
infantry were sent in the darkness against the Lawden
wood; they found the French too strongly posted there to
give any hope of their being driven out.
It was 11 p.m. before the last sounds of fighting died
away, and were succeeded by silence, broken only by the
shrieks and groans of the many thousand wounded, strewing
the plain between the contending armies.
The honourable warfare of the day gave place to a scene.
which was equally disgraceful to either army. Swarms of
followers, the scum of the armies, skulked out from either
side into the plain, not intent upon mutual destruction,
but united in a common warfare against the defenceless dead
and wounded. The clouds, which had been threatening
during the day, discharged a heavy fall of rain, as though
Heaven itself wept over this dreadful sight. When morning
broke, the soldiers of the two armies, inured as they were
to the horrors of war, were yet struck with dismay at
*Wilson, p. 146.
296
NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN IN POLAND.
the sight which met their eyes on the plain between them.
Thousands upon thousands of naked bodies lay upon it;
many dead; many still shivering with fever after the night
of rain.* The dead and wounded alike had been stripped
of clothes, and everything they had, by the foul human
beasts of prey who, during the hours of darkness, had
glutted themselves with the plunder of the sufferers and
the dead. So great was the horror inspired by this dis-
graceful scene, that, by mutual, though unspoken consent,
French and Russian met peacefully on the ghastly plain to
bury the dead and remove the wounded.
The loss in this great battle was enormous on both sides.
Soult's corps alone admittedly lost 6601,† the total loss of the
French was probably at least 10,000. Yet there were engaged
on their side only the corps of Soult, Murat, and one division
of Lannes'.
The Russians had lost 2000 or 3000 killed, and 5000 or
6000 wounded; in all, not less than 7000 or 8000, besides
prisoners. The 1st and 2nd divisions, and the greater part
of the Russian cavalry, had not been engaged at all.
With such losses, it is easy to judge how fierce was the
struggle.
Was this awful loss of life justified by the possible
results on either side? It seems doubtful.
From Napoleon's point of view, it is certain that his
object, in so far as it consisted in compelling the Russian
general to evacuate the position he had prepared with such
care, could have been attained with trifling loss on the
succeeding day. As Davout and the other corps of the French
* At the time of Heilsberg and Friedland the days were oppressively hot,
the nights damp and cold (Larrey, iii. 85). The weather on the night of the
10th June was bad (ibid., iii. 78).
† Soult's report, Arch. Hist. Hopfner (iii. 615) gives the number as
8286, and Lannes' losses as 2284. The total loss he puts at 1398 killed, 10,359
wounded, and 864 prisoners. Total, 12,621.
‡ Hæpfner, iii. 615. Plotho (p. 162) says the Russian loss was 9000.
After the battle he gives their strength as still 76,000.
THE BATTLE OF HEILSBERG.
297
left appeared beyond Bennigsen's right, there can be no
doubt that he would have felt himself bound, as he actually
did on the 11th, to seek temporary safety, once more, on the
right bank of the Alle. Attacked in front, he was, no doubt,
bound to defend himself as he did. But his victory—for such,
in a tactical sense it undoubtedly was,—to use Sir Robert
Wilson's words, "had not an influence beyond the moment,
for the redundant power of the French was still unimpaired,
and they could traverse by the right of the position, move on
Koenigsberg, or, by throwing bridges over the Alle, surround
and blockade the Russian army, who had not two days' bread
in their camp, or in those magazines of whose capture
Buonaparte vaunts; whilst contagion from the putrid loads
that polluted the atmosphere, would have augmented the
evils of famine.” *
Of the tactics of the French in this terrible combat, there
is not much that is favourable to be said. Napoleon attacked
a very strong position with very inferior forces, for it was not
till too late in the day to save the situation, that Lannes'
corps, Ney, and the Guard could reach the battlefield. The
two latter took no part in the fighting, and merely served as
a support on which the beaten corps in front could fall
back.
With Soult's endeavours, in face of an overwhelming
enemy, no fault could be found. But for Napoleon's pre-
sence on the field, it is not impossible that that cautious
marshal would have refrained from pressing his attack much
beyond Bewernick, until the turning movement on the
Russian right should take effect.
Murat, on this day, appeared to no advantage. Savary
relates how the cavalry commander urged him, against his
better judgment, to advance with the bayonet, when a steady
fire was the only hope for him, as well as for the cavalry.†
* Wilson, p. 149.
† Savary, iii. 82, 83. He describes how, in the evening, when every one
was out of temper at the ill success of the day, he told the Emperor plainly that
298
NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN IN POLAND.
Napoleon was disgusted with the behaviour of his
cavalry; "they did nothing I ordered," he said.*
Lannes' final attack, at 10 p.m., was mere waste of life;
it could not reasonably be expected to succeed with a single
division.†
On the other side, Bagration's conduct of his rear-guard
action against Soult was as admirable as his fight on the
previous evening before Guttstadt. His steadfast resistance
wore out the enemy, before they even arrived within striking
distance of Bennigsen's line of battle. Similarly, Uwarow,
and the Prussian cavalry behaved magnificently towards
Lawden against Murat, Savary, and Legrand.
The promptitude with which the Grand Duke Con-
stantine supported Bagration, by his battery on the right
bank of the Alle, must not be forgotten.
On the morning of the 11th June, the armies again faced
one another in order of battle; but, beyond some cannonading
of St. Cyr's division, on the French right, by the Russian
batteries beyond the river, no fighting occurred. Napoleon,
had resolved on dislodging Bennigsen by manoeuvring, as he
might have done equally well, without making a serious
frontal attack on his position, on the previous day.‡
About noon Bennigsen received information that Davout's
his brother-in-law was "un extravagant qui nous ferait perdre un jour quelque
bonne bataille; et qu'enfin il vaudrait mieux pour nous qu'il fût moins brave,
et eût un peu plus de sens commun. The Emperor silenced him, saying he
was in a temper, but, nevertheless, remembered the words and the still more
unmeasured terms of Lannes.
* See Wilson, p. 149, note, who says this remark was made to a "person in
high authority," whose name he cannot disclose.
† According to Hopfner (iii. 615, note) the French themselves admit
Lannes' loss as 2284 killed, wounded, and prisoners. Most of this must have
occurred in the night attack.
"In renewing the fight next day, I should have risked the destruction of
the corps destined for it; there was all the less reason for my exposing myself to
this in that, by manoeuvring on Koenigsberg, I was sure to displace the enemy
without striking a blow. For a moment I hesitated whether I would march
with the corps of Ney and Davout, by my right, to Bischofstein; the motives I
have already indicated determined me to take the opposite direction" (Jomini,
Vie de Napoleon, ii. 408).
OPERATIONS OF JUNE 11-13.
299
corps had been sighted on the Landsberg road.* When the
marshal presently appeared at Grossendorf, Bennigsen, now
seriously alarmed for the safety of his right flank and rear,
with supplies running low, and with the prospect of his
position becoming untenable, if only from famine, and the
terrible odour of the corpses festering in the sun, determined
on retreat during the ensuing night, by the right bank of the
river.
At 9 p.m., Kamenskoi was ordered to pass the Alle with
9000 men, to march on Bartenstein, and thence to join
Lestocq behind the Frisching. He arrived at Bartenstein
(13 miles) early on the morning of the 12th. Starting again
at 7 a.m., he made another 13-mile march to Lampasch.
Prussian cavalry, reconnoitring on his left flank, found a
strong column of the enemy already in Pr. Eylau. Kamen-
skoi's troops were weary, but, after two hours' rest, they
once more set out, more to their right, to avoid the enemy,
and to seek Lestocq.
Bennigsen, with the rest of the army, crossing the Alle at
midnight, unperceived by the French, marched in 4 columns
for Bartenstein.
Bagration, once more, with Platow's cossacks, took the
post in which he had already shown such marked capacity,
the command of the rear-guard. It was not till the morning
of the 12th was well advanced that the last troops had
passed the river, burning the bridges behind them,† as well
* Bennigsen at first failed to appreciate the true significance of Davout's
appearance in this position. He "conceived that the enemy were moving on
Koenigsberg, and that General Lestocq, who had been ordered, in the morning,
to Zinten from Heiligenbeil, on which he had fallen back, might not be strong
enough to resist the advance of the enemy and cover Koenigsberg; he therefore
detached General Kamenskoi, with 9000 men, to join him, and ordered General
Lestocq to fall back upon Koenigsberg with all expedition and maintain that
city, as he (Bennigsen) was moving upon Wehlau with the army to support the
line of the Pregel" (Wilson, pp. 149, 150). The last words are worthy of
special note, as showing that, at this time, Bennigsen had no idea of returning
to the left bank of the Alle at Friedland.
† Hæpfner (iii. 622) says 11 a.m.; Wilson (p. 151), 7 a.m. The latter
authority thinks that the rear of the Russians might well have been involved in
300
NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN IN POLAND.
as the camp on the right bank. Soult presently occupied
Heilsberg, where he found numbers of Russian wounded and
magazines—the latter full according to French accounts,*
empty according to Wilson.† The retreating Russians were
followed and watched, not pursued, by only one division of
dragoons, and two of light cavalry.‡
Napoleon, meanwhile, had, on the 11th, again ordered
Davout from Grossendorf on Preussisch Eylau, which he
reached on the 12th, his advanced guard meeting, as has been
related, the hussars on Kamenskoi's left. As he left Grossen-
dorf, his rear-guard had a few slight skirmishes with Platow's
cossacks. The 3rd division, in advance, took post on the
12th at Rothenen; the 2nd, delayed by having to make way
for the 3rd, as well as for Oudinot's grenadiers, only arrived
at Eylau at 8 p.m.; the 1st took up its quarters at Wasch-
keiten. Marulaz made reconnaissances on the Eichorn-
Bartenstein road, whilst waiting to act as escort to the reserve
park.
Ney, from Launau, marched, early on the 12th to
Eichorn, halfway between Heilsberg and Eylau.§
a terrible disaster, had the French been more alert, for at sunrise (soon after
3.30 a.m.) there were still three Russian divisions on the left bank. But it must
be remembered that Soult's corps alone was at this time facing Heilsberg, and it
was no part of Napoleon's programme to draw the Russians on it.
"At day-
break on the 11th my army, defiling in two columns, marched for Landsberg
and Pr. Eylau. A single corps was left in front of Heilsberg to cover my move-
ment. I did not conceal from myself the possible danger of this course; for in
undertaking it I left my own communications in the power of the enemy, who,
basing himself on the camp of Heilsberg, could operate on our rear and shut us
in between his own army, the Lower Pregel, and the sea" (Jomini, Vie de
Napoleon, ii. 409).
* 78th bulletin (Corr. 12,747).
+ Wilson, p. 149, note.
Wilson, p. 151.
Latour-Maubourg's dragoon division and the light
cavalry divisions of Durosnel and Wattier (Hopfner, iii. 622; also Dumas,
xviii. 283).
§ This, it will be observed, does not quite agree with Jomini's account (Vie
de Napoleon, ii. 409) just quoted. Hopfner (iii. 619, note) justly remarks on
the extreme difficulty of fixing with certainty the French movements before and
after Heilsberg, as well as during the battle itself. In this case, however, there
OPERATIONS OF JUNE 11-13.
301
Napoleon's headquarters were at Eylau on the 12th, and,
Bennigsen being now gone from Heilsberg, Soult and Murat
were ordered to follow the other corps towards Eylau.*
Mortier reached Heilsberg from Altkirch, the Guard also was
at Heilsberg. Napoleon, with the mass of his army, was
now nearer to Koenigsberg than Bennigsen, whom he could,
moving on the chord of the arc which the Russians were
following, by the right bank of the Alle, intercept at
Friedland.
To bring the position up to date, it is necessary to turn
back to the movements of Lestocq and Victor on the Lower
Passarge.†
The latter general, on the 10th, made a general recon-
naissance from Spanden, towards Wusen and Baarden.
Wusen was abandoned by the Prussians. Heavy artillery
fire at Baarden indicated that they were in force towards
Mehlsack.
On the 11th June, Lestocq intercepted a despatch, from
Berthier to Victor, directing the latter to attack the Prussians,
to seize Mehlsack, and to be prepared to march either on
Drewenz and Landsberg, or direct on Koenigsberg. Seeing
the danger to his left flank, Lestocq, at 3 a.m. on the 12th,
marched his 1st division from Heiligenbeil to Zinten, where
it took position.
During the same night, Victor debouched by the Spanden.
is no room for doubt, as Napoleon's order (Corr. 12,745) is dated Heilsberg,
12th June. It directs Ney to march on Eylau, and to be rejoined by two
regiments which he had left at Guttstadt. At the same time Zayonchek's Poles
were to occupy Guttstadt, now evacuated by the advancing army.
*To Murat, the Emperor wrote that Soult, passing by Landsberg, was sweep-
ing the Prussians before him. Murat was to reconnoitre the country on his right,
by parties, on Bartenstein and Friedland. He was not to disperse his troops,
and was to call in the regiment on his left so as to give him more troops for
his right.
† Dumas, xviii. 284; Hopfner, iii. 623; Victor, Arch. Hist.
Berthier to Victor, dated 10th June, Guttstadt, 10 a.m. The despatch is
given in full by Hopfner (iii. 627). Berthier does not seem to have repeated
his error of January by sending only one copy, for another reached Victor
safely.
302
NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN IN POLAND.
bridge, towards Mehlsack, driving in the Prussian outposts,
which retired towards Zinten. Dupont's division, with two
regiments of cavalry, marching from Frauenburg and Brauns-
berg, up the Passarge, followed the rest over the Spanden
bridge.
One Prussian brigade had been left behind to watch
Braunsberg. Victor was compelled to leave the 24th regiment,
with 2 guns, at Spanden, to oppose it.*
During the night of the 12th-13th, Lestocq received
Bennigsen's despatch, informing him of his own retreat, and
of the detachment of Kamenskoi towards Muhlhausen and
the Frisching. Lestocq also heard of the arrival of the
French at Eylau.
Early on the morning of the 13th he set out on his march
to join Kamenskoi behind the Frisching. At 3 p.m. on that
day he came upon the head of the Russian column at Gollau,
a little way short of Koenigsberg; here, for the moment, he
may be left.
Rapp, Governor of Danzig, had received orders to clear
the Frische-Nehrung, with a column of 2500 men and 4 guns,.
up to the Pillau channel. Behind this column followed the
sailors of the Guard from Elbing.
Bennigsen, finding his right more and more outflanked,
halted at Bartenstein but a few hours, to rest his troops,
before continuing his march to Schippenbeil at midnight of
the 12th-13th. He marched in three columns. Kollo-
gribow, with the Russian Guard, marched by the right bank..
The second column, of three divisions, and the cavalry of the
left wing, took the road along the left bank. The third, of
two divisions, acted as support to the rear-guard, composed
of one division and the cavalry of the right wing. The
cossacks guarded the flanks.
The head of the column reached Schippenbeil at 4 a.m. on
the 13th. As the troops passed through the town, they took
position, as if for battle, behind it, between the Alle and its
* Operations of 1st corps, by Victor, Arch. Hist.
OPERATIONS OF JUNE 11-13.
303
tributary, the Guber. But there was no rest for Bennigsen's
troops, wearied though they were with more than a week of
constant marching and fighting, for he now learnt that the
French were already about Domnau. Trembling for his
communications with Lestocq and Koenigsberg, he again
resumed his march at midday.
On the 13th, early in the morning, Napoleon directed
Murat on Koenigsberg, with St. Sulpice's, and Milhaud's
dragoons, and Lasalle's light cavalry. This force, with
Davout's corps in support, marched by the direct road;
Soult, also in support, to the left, by Kreuzberg. The object
of this detachment was to place a strong force between
Bennigsen and Koenigsberg in any case.
At the same
time, Lannes was directed on Friedland through Domnau.
Mortier, Ney, and the Guard, following Lannes, took post
between Eylau and Domnau. Victor arrived at Eylau.*
The three cavalry divisions, which had followed Bennig-
sen to Bartenstein,† crossed the river there, and moved on
Domnau.
* At 11 a.m. on the 13th, the Emperor, at Eylau, summarises the position
of his army in a letter to Murat (Corr. 12,749). Lannes was advancing on
Lampasch, Davout on Wittenburg, Soult had started at 10 a.m. for Kreuzburg,
Victor was at Landsberg, Ney and Mortier just arriving at Eylau. If Murat
found himself able to enter Koenigsberg, he was to use Soult for the purpose, as
Napoleon wished to have his extreme left in Koenigsberg. If the enemy should
arrive to-day at Domnau, Murat would still push Soult on Koenigsberg, placing
Davout so as to head the Russians between Domnau and Koenigsberg. In case
Bennigsen should march thus by Domnau, it would be necessary for Soult to
make sure of the town of Brandenburg, so that there might be no anxiety for
the Emperor's communications, which would be by his left. Half an hour later
(Corr. 12,750) he writes to the same effect to Soult, and expressly states that
there are indications of the enemy's intention to concentrate on Domnau.
Brandenburg, in these circumstances, would be important, as it would protect
the left if the right were exposed.
By 3 p.m. (Corr. 12,751) the Emperor had heard that Bennigsen was
retreating on Schippenbeil, and he tells Lannes to move on Domnau with
cavalry towards Friedland.
† Vide supra, p. 300, note ‡.
CHAPTER III.
THE BATTLE OF FRIEDLAND.
(a) LANNES' ACTION-3 A.M. TO NOON.
URING the last four miles of the route from Domnau
DU
to Friedland, the general slope of the country is down-
wards towards the Alle, on the left bank of which stands the
little town of Friedland.* Two miles before it is reached, a
slight elevation, in rear of Posthenen, affords a clear and
uninterrupted view over the whole battlefield, and down to
Friedland, lying directly to the spectator's front. On the
right front, some 500 paces from the village of Posthenen, is
the great wood of Sortlack, extending down to the village of
the same name, at the head of a re-entrant angle of the Alle,
which here flows between high and steep banks. A mile and
a quarter to the left (north) of Posthenen is the village of
Heinrichsdorf. Two-thirds of the distance, in a direction
but slightly north of east, from Heinrichsdorf to the Alle, is
the small wood of Damerau. Behind the line joining
Posthenen and Heinrichsdorf are large woods.
The whole space, between the left bank of the river and
the points which have just been denoted, is a gently undu-
lating, open plain, with no gradients sufficient to impede the
free movement of troops of all arms.
* The chief materials for this account of the battle of Friedland are the
narratives of Dumas, Hopfner, Savary, Victor (Arch. Hist.), Jomini, Wilson,
Marbot, Kausler (atlas and text), etc.
THE BATTLE OF FRIEDLAND.
305
On the 14th June, the whole of this plain was one sheet
of crops, rye and wheat.
Open as the plain generally was, there was one feature in
it the supreme importance of which was at once recognised
by Napoleon. Rising west of Posthenen, a small stream,
known as the Millstream, flowing through the village, thence
takes a course direct for Friedland. It divides the plain into
two portions, the greater extending northwards to the
Damerau wood, the lesser southwards to that of Sortlack.
In its passage from in front of Posthenen till it reaches the
outskirts of Friedland, the brook flows between steep banks,
and, though narrow, is a serious military obstacle, entirely
obstructing the free passage of troops. At Friedland, it
expands into a semicircular pond, covering the greater part
of the north side of the town. On the south side is the Alle,
flowing at this point from west to east, and then turning
north after passing the town. Friedland is thus built at the
end of a peninsula, of which the north and south sides,
respectively, are closed by the Millstream and by the Alle.
On the opposite bank of the Alle there is a plain similar
to that on the left bank, backed by a great wood on the Allen-
burg road. The large village of Allenau stands back from the
river, opposite Sortlack; a smaller village, Kloschenen, is on
the brink of the high right bank, 2000 paces below Friedland.
It was 6 p.m. on the 13th June when the head of
Bennigsen's army, under Gallitzin, began to reach the
neighbourhood of Friedland. Lannes' cavalry had already
ejected from the town the few Russian troops guarding the
magazines there. A French patrol was surrounded and
captured on the right bank of the river. Passing into Fried-
land, Gallitzin captured 60 cavalry in it;
on the west, he found the French 9th Hussars, which he
forced back on Lannes' corps at Domnau, taking post with
his cavalry at Posthenen.
beyond the town,
Kologribow detached small bodies to Wohnsdorf, Allen-
burg, and Wehlau, to watch the lower passages of the Alle,
X
306
NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN IN POLAND.
There then
and to gain communication with Lestocq.
remained at Friedland, 28 squadrons, and 17 guns.
Towards 8 p.m., Bennigsen himself reached Friedland.
Informed of the proximity of Lannes' corps, he ordered the
first troops which arrived to cross the river in support of the
cavalry, and directed the construction of three pontoon bridges,
one above and two below the permanent bridge. It was not
till 11 p.m. that the head of the Guard infantry column
arrived at Friedland. One battalion was sent over at once to
the support of the cavalry, and three more regiments as day
dawned (about 3.30), and the French began to appear. It
was 5 a.m., before the first battalions of the main Russian
body came up.
As soon as Lannes had heard, from his retiring cavalry, of
the Russian passage at Friedland, he despatched Ruffin's
brigade, and part of Oudinot's grenadier division, towards that
point. Scarcely had they started, when a despatch from
Napoleon warned Lannes that Bennigsen appeared to intend
crossing at Friedland, and marching direct on Koenigsberg.
The Emperor had promptly ordered Grouchy, from Eylau,
with his own dragoon division and Nansouty's cuirassiers, to
join Lannes as quickly as possible. Lannes followed shortly,
with the rest of Oudinot's and Verdier's divisions.
*
It was still night when Oudinot, between 2 and 3 a.m.,
debouched on the Friedland plain, to find Ruffin in front of
him, advancing against the Russian cavalry. He pushed
forward two battalions into the Sortlack wood, and held his
main body in front of Posthenen, on the near bank of a small
brook, which issues from the wood towards the Millstream.
In front, he placed 2 batteries, and behind them were 5 or 6
battalions, and 1 gun, somewhat to the left, with their backs to
* Corr. 12,573. To Lannes, dated Eylau, 13th June, 9 p.m. The Emperor
is, he says, uncertain whether it is the whole Russian army or only a detachment
that is at Friedland. He promises to send on Ney at 1 a.m., and to have Victor
at Domnau by 10 a.m., in case he is required. He presumes Lannes will seize
Friedland, if the enemy is not in force there.
THE BATTLE OF FRIEDLAND.
307
the Bothkeim wood. From the Russian side also, skirmishers
were sent into the Sortlack wood, where they met the French.
Musketry and artillery fire broke out all along the line. The
Russian skirmishers were from the Guard infantry, which
had been sent over to the left of the cavalry. They were
exhausted by a long march without rest, and they were
ignorant of the ground.
At 3 a.m., Grouchy arrived with French and Saxon
dragoons. At this hour Lannes had on the ground 9000
infantry, and 3000 cavalry.'
*
The next to arrive were Oudinot's dragoons, who took post
behind his right, on the south bank of the Millstream.
This cavalry moved out, between 5 and 6 a.m., across the
little brook in front of the guns, against the Russian cavalry.
They were not as yet strong enough to beat Kologribow's
* Hæpfner, iii. 653.
The numbers engaged at Friedland are, as in the case of every other
action in this campaign, most variously stated thus:-
Thiers gives 75,000 Russians and 80,000 French.
Alison takes the French at 80,000 and the Russians at 55,000, including the
detachments to Allenburg, etc.
Dumas puts the Russians at 61,000.
Hopfner gives Bennigsen 46,000 on the left bank of the Alle, besides the
14th division and other troops on the right bank, and the detachments to
Allenburg, etc.
Plotho (pp. 162-165), guessing the French force at 70,000 or 80,000, says
that, after Heilsberg, Bennigsen still had 76,000. Of these he detached 9000
under Kamenskoi, and 6000 to Allenburg, which would give him 61,000 on
both banks of the Alle at Friedland, or, say, 55,000 actually engaged on the
left bank. Considerable deductions must, however, be made for stragglers in
the long march from Heilsberg.
The text of Kausler's Atlas des Plus Memorables Batailles, etc., gives
75,000 Russians and 85,000 French.
Marbot allows Napoleon 80,000.
There is a close agreement as to the French numbers, and it will not be far
wide of the mark to call them 80,000. As for Bennigsen, considering all the
authorities, it seems doubtful if his numbers were higher than these-
On the left bank of the Alle
...
46,000
On right bank
...
6,000
Detachments to Allenburg, etc.
6,000
58,000
308
NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN IN POLAND.
horsemen. As they were being driven back, they received
timely succour by the arrival, at 6 o'clock, of Fresia's Dutch
cavalry (of Mortier's corps), who made a fresh addition to
the strength of the French right, and forced Kologribow to
retire. Whilst these cavalry combats were in progress,
Grouchy had observed that the Russians, who were now
rapidly crossing the river, were advancing in force on Hein-
richsdorf by the road to Koenigsberg. From that village
they would be in a position to gain the French rear through
the Georgenau wood.
Sending Nansouty forward from the Domnau road,
Grouchy followed towards Heinrichsdorf, direct from Pos-
thenen. Nansouty, passing through the Georgenau wood,
drove out of it, through Heinrichsdorf, the advanced troops of
the Russians, until he was stopped by infantry and artillery.
Ordering Nansouty to form front towards the enemy at the
village, Grouchy himself charged their guns as they entered
it; whilst Nansouty, aided by Albert's dragoons, now sent up
by Lannes, attacked in front. Disordered by a successful
onslaught, the French were, in turn, charged by Russian
cavalry, who, however, only succeeded in facilitating the
withdrawal of most of their own guns before they were
beaten off. Grouchy then drew up his men on either side of
Heinrichsdorf at its eastern entrance.
All this time a desultory combat, without any decisive
result on either side, had been in progress along Lannes'
whole front. That marshal found himself in a position in
some ways similar to that which he had held at Pultusk. As
at Pultusk, he was facing a very superior force, for the
Russians were now hurrying across the Friedland bridges,
Bennigsen hoping and believing that only Lannes was at
hand. But there was this great difference between the two
cases, that, at Pultusk, Lannes felt he had nothing to fall
back on, whilst, at Friedland, he knew that the Emperor was
hurrying up an overwhelming force to his aid.
It was now 9 a.m., and there were on the field 9000
THE BATTLE OF FRIEDLAND.
309
French infantry and 8000 cavalry. Lannes had made the
most of his small force. He covered the whole of his
front with an unusually dense line of skirmishers; the
troops behind them were able to give the impression of
larger numbers, owing to the detached groups of trees, the
inequalities of the ground, and the high crops. Lannes also,
by moving them about and deploying them in different
positions, conveyed the impression of the arrival of more
troops. Their business was to fight a delaying action, to
keep Bennigsen occupied, and to induce him to bring across
the river his whole army, very inferior in numbers to the
corps which Napoleon, in a few hours, would be able to
collect against it. By 9 o'clock, Bennigsen had passed
across the river 46,000 men, a force amply sufficient to over-
whelm Lannes, with whom alone he still believed he would
have to deal.*
Six divisions of infantry, and most of the cavalry, had
crossed.
As his troops arrived, the Russian commander drew them
up on the plain between Sortlack and the Damerau wood.
On the northern half of this space, between Damerau and the
Millstream, the 8th, 7th, 6th, and 3rd divisions, under
Gortchakow, stood, whilst the smaller southern portion, from
the Millstream to Sortlack, was occupied by the 1st and 2nd
divisions, the advanced guard, and part of the cavalry under
Kologribow. The greater part of the cavalry was in the
northern portion, under Uwarow and Gallitzin.
The infantry were drawn up in two lines; in the first
the regiments stood with their first and third battalions
deployed, the 2nd battalion in column behind. The second
line consisted of entire regiments in columns of battalions,
behind the 3rd battalions of the front line.
The greater part of the cossacks were about the Damerau
* At 9 a.m. all the divisions had passed except one. The 6000 men
detached towards Allenburg were sent back from the left bank (Wilson,
p. 155).
310
NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN IN POLAND.
wood. In the Sortlack wood were about 3000 picked jägers,
who had been driven back into it, and were fighting there.
In support of them, at Sortlack, stood two battalions, five
squadrons, and four guns.
To obliterate, as far as possible, the separation of his left
from his centre and right, Bennigsen threw four small
bridges across the Millstream. On the right bank of the
Alle remained the 14th division and 20 squadrons, on the
Schippenbeil road, as well as Platow's flying column, and a
large part of the artillery. The detachments which Kolo-
gribow had made to Wohnsdorf and Allenburg, were
reinforced by a guard infantry regiment, 3 cavalry regiments,
some cossacks, and a part of the guard artillery.* Some of
the guns covered the pontoon bridges, a battery at Kloschenen
supported the right wing across the river, another fired on the
French issuing, from Sortlack wood, against the left flank.
The fight in that wood had oscillated backwards and
forwards: at one moment the Russian jägers had driven the
French out of it; a few moments later the latter had returned,
and again made their way deep into the covert, only once
more to be driven back to its edge. So the fight swayed
backwards and forwards.
About 9 o'clock, the whole Russian army moved forward,
bringing its left into line with the front then held by the
jägers in Sortlack wood, whilst the right wing stood 500
or 600 paces short of Henrichsdorf.
The cossacks, pushing into and through that village,
arrived on the rear of the French line towards Schwonau,
as the Russian cavalry of the right wing attacked it in front.
Beaumont and Colbert, with 2500 cavalry of the 1st and 6th
corps, quickly drove off the cossacks, and then, joining in
the severe cavalry fight which was in progress, they turned
the balance in favour of the French.
* Hœpfner, iii. 656. Wilson (p. 155) says Bennigsen detached 6000 men
to guard the lower passages of the Alle at Allenburg. This number may
perhaps fairly represent the detachments made and thus reinforced.
THE BATTLE OF FRIEDLAND.
311
Mortier's corps * was now beginning to appear on the
scene, Dupas' division of it reaching Heinrichsdorf just in
time to arrest the progress of the Russian infantry. Dupas
then took his stand on the right of the village, which
was still occupied by 3 battalions of grenadiers. The
remainder of the grenadiers returned to their own division,
on the right, whilst 3 Polish regiments, of Dombrowski's
division, placed themselves behind the battery in front of
Posthenen. The French now had 23,000 infantry and 10,500
cavalry present when, at 10 a.m., Verdier's division, the rear
of Lannes' corps, at last put in an appearance, raising the
French to 40,000 against 46,000 Russians. Bennigsen at last
began to see that he was likely to have more on his hands
than he could manage. He could only hope that Napoleon
would not be able to overwhelm him before night should
afford him an opportunity of retrieving the error which he
had committed in crossing the river. Meanwhile, officer
after officer had been despatched to inform Napoleon of the
position of affairs.
(b) NAPOLEON'S ARRIVAL ON THE SCENE.
He reached the field about noon,† and, from the height
in rear of Posthenen, scanned the battlefield.
A very
different sight was before him on this bright summer morning
from that which he had witnessed under the wintry sky of
Eylau, and he was in very different spirits. To his staff
he had remarked at Domnau, "The enemy appears to wish
to give battle to-day; so much the better, it is the anni-
versary of Marengo." His wonderful power of grasping the
points of a battlefield at once showed him the faultiness of
Bennigsen's position, split in two by the Millstream, with
*The return for the 15th June (Arch. Hist.) shows this corps as com-
prising only one weak French division of 3976 men, besides cavalry and artillery.
The other two divisions, the numbers of which are not stated, were Poles.
† Hopfner, iii. 659. Marbot (i. 282) says 11 a.m. Jomini (Vie de
Napoleon, ii. 413) gives 1 p.m. as the hour.
312
NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN IN POLAND.
his left wing across the opening of the triangular peninsular
ending at Friedland, bounded on one side by the Millstream,
on the other by the Alle. He saw that this wing was cut
off from the support of the rest of the army by the stream,
and that the four bridges, by which Bennigsen had attempted
to remedy this fatal defect, were almost useless. He saw
that, as the left wing was forced back, it would be driven
closer and closer together, until it was enclosed in Friedland,
where its defeat, with the capture of the town, must infallibly
bring disaster upon the centre and right, if they attempted
to maintain their position, with the river, unfordable as he
believed it to be, close behind them. He felt that Bennigsen
had lost his only chance of escape by neglecting to fall upon
Lannes with far greater vigour, and to destroy him before the
rest of the army could arrive.
By this time, Napoleon had sufficient strength to hold
back the wearied Russians until the arrival of Ney, Victor,
and the Guard. Till then, he was not anxious to press the
fight, in which a lull now occurred. By 2 p.m. the orders
for the battle were dictated and issued. They were as
follows:
"Marshal Ney will take the right from Posthenen towards
Sortlack, and will rest on the present position of General
Oudinot. Marshal Lannes will form the centre, commencing
from the left of Marshal Ney, up to Posthenen; the grena-
diers of General Oudinot, at present forming the right of
Marshal Lannes, will lean insensibly to the left, drawing
upon themselves the attention and the forces of the enemy.
"Marshal Lannes will close in his divisions as much as
possible, by this closure enabling himself to form two lines.
The left will be formed by Marshal Mortier, holding
Heinrichsdorf and the Koenigsberg road, and thence extend-
ing opposite the Russian right wing. Marshal Mortier
will never advance, as the movement will be by our right,
pivoting on the left.
* Corr. 12,756, dated "Bivouac behind Posthenen, 14th June."
THE BATTLE OF FRIEDLAND.
313
"The cavalry of General Espagne, and General Grouchy's
dragoons, united to the cavalry of the left wing, will manœuvre
so as to cause as much harm as possible to the enemy when
he, pressed by the vigorous attack of our right, shall feel the
necessity of retreat.
“General Victor and the Imperial Guard, horse and foot,
will form the reserve, and will be placed at Grünhof and at
and behind Posthenen.
"Lahoussaye's division of dragoons will be under the
orders of General Victor; that of General Latour-Maubourg
will obey Marshal Ney. Nansouty's division of heavy cavalry
will be at the disposal of Marshal Lannes, and will fight
alongside the cavalry of the reserve.
The Emperor will be with the reserve in the centre.
“The advance must be always from the right, and the
initiative of the movement must be left to Marshal Ney,
who will await the Emperor's orders to begin.
"As soon as the right advances against the enemy, all
the artillery of the line will redouble its fire in the direction
most useful for the protection of the attack on the right."
But the Emperor was still in some doubt as to what
force was in front of him. On the previous evening, his
cavalry had not been able to give him any precise information
as to the enemy's movements.* Murat, according to Savary,†
had informed him, on the morning of the 13th, that the bulk
of the Russian army was marching direct on Koenigsberg.
The cavalry had, apparently, over-estimated Kamenskoi's 9000
men. The fact of his detaching two entire corps and three
cavalry divisions to deal with the enemy at Koenigsberg shows
that Napoleon believed the Russians to be in much greater
strength in that direction than they really were. When he
reached the front, at Posthenen, Oudinot had told him there
were 80,000 men in front of him. Savary, sent out to see
* Savary, iii. 84: "Our cavalry could give no precise account of the
enemy's march."
† Loc. cit.
314
NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN IN POLAND.
if the enemy were, as Napoleon could hardly believe possible,
determined to fight a great battle with the river close behind
them, reported that they were still crossing the bridges in
great numbers.* The Emperor's doubts are clearly exhibited
by a despatch dated, "Before Friedland, 3 p.m., June 14th," †
which is worth quoting in full.
"The cannonade has been in progress since 3 a.m.; the
enemy appears to be here in order of battle with his army;
at first he wished to debouch towards Koenigsberg; now he
appears to be seriously meditating the battle which is about
to commence. His Majesty hopes that you are already in
Koenigsberg (a division of dragoons and Marshal Soult are
sufficient to enter that town), and that, with two cuirassier
divisions and Marshal Davout, you will have marched for
Friedland; for it is possible the battle may last over to-morrow.
Endeavour, therefore, to arrive by 1 a.m. We have not, as
yet, any news of you to-day. Should the Emperor be led to
suppose that the enemy is in very great force, it is possible he
may rest satisfied to-day with bombarding him, and wait for
you. Communicate part of this letter to Marshals Soult and
Davout."
From noon till 5 p.m. the action was maintained in a
desultory fashion, chiefly by the artillery of both sides. The
Russians who had been marching all night, and most of
the previous day, were exhausted. At 4 p.m., Victor's corps
and the French Guard arrived.
As Bennigsen saw column upon column arriving on the
edge of the woods behind Posthenen, moving into line, and
forming a "deep girdle of glittering steel," ‡ on the horizon,
he bitterly repented his passage of the river, and had already
given orders to attempt a retreat. They had scarcely been
issued when they had to be cancelled.
* Savary, iii. 87.
† Dumas, xix. 327.
Wilson, p. 157.
THE BATTLE OF FRIEDLAND.
315
(c) THE RENEWED BATTLE.
At 5 o'clock, the comparative silence was broken by
three salvoes of 20 guns, the signal for the advance. The
echo of the last had not died away before, from the whole
line of French artillery, there burst forth a furious fire. At
the same moment, Ney's corps, already collected in the
clearings of the nearer portion of the Sortlack wood,† dashed
forward with loud cheers, driving the jägers slowly back.
By 6 o'clock the wood was cleared, and Ney's columns began
to debouch on the farther side. The supporting Russian
troops, at Sortlack, were powerless to stop their movement,
but a battery on the farther bank of the Alle caused them
some annoyance.
In mass of divisions, Marchand leading on the right,
Bisson on the left, Latour-Maubourg behind, Ney pushed on.
Marchand, overwhelming the retiring Russians at Sortlack,
drove them in wild confusion into the Alle below the village.
To accomplish this he had to diverge to his right, into the
eastward bend of the river, thus leaving an open space
between himself and Bisson. Into this space dashed Kolo-
gribow at the head of his cavalry; but he was promptly met
by Latour-Maubourg, moving up to fill the gap. Charged by
this force in front, fired into by Marchand and Bisson on his
flanks, Kologribow's attempt to split Ney's infantry failed.
Marchand, as the Russians retired again, moving westwards
along the river, effected, once more, his union with Bisson,
and the two ranged themselves across the neck of the Fried-
land peninsula, from the re-entrant angle of the Alle to the
Millstream. The Russians in the peninsula, now bent back
at an obtuse angle from the line north of the brook, were
*5.30 according to Wilson, p. 159.
† Ney formed his columns in the wood. Only the artillery were on the
roads through it; but, fortunately, there were three broad clearings, each
sufficiently wide to allow of a column of infantry and one of cavalry, as well as
the artillery, standing in them (Savary, iii. 87-88).
316
NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN IN POLAND.
gradually being compressed by the narrowing space into
compact masses on which the French artillery wrought
fearful havoc.
As Ney advanced, Napoleon had moved up Victor's
corps, on the right of the Eylau road, in two lines, with
Lahoussaye's dragoons in 3rd line. Durosnel's cavalry
followed. Ney's corps, with a cloud of skirmishers in front,
again moved forward towards Friedland, Latour-Maubourg
following some way behind. Marchand, on the ground
sloping towards Friedland and the Alle, was suffering heavily
by case from the Russian batteries beyond it, to silence which
Ney moved his corps artillery to the bank. Bisson, pro-
tected by the slope towards the Millstream, was less exposed.
Both divisions, however, lost heavily from this artillery
fire, as well as from the infantry and artillery fire, against
their front. They were already wavering when Bennigsen's
reserve cavalry, standing beyond the brook, crossed it and
fell upon their left flank. It wanted but this blow to com-
plete the repulse of Ney. His troops were retreating in
considerable disorder when help reached them. Dupont,
with his division of Victor's corps, had pushed forward his
guns, which had barely time to fire a round of case before
the Russian cavalry was upon them. Dupont, with great
promptitude, for which he earned the special approval of
Napoleon,* changing direction to the right, hurried up his
infantry at the double into the gap, on Ney's left, cut by the
cavalry. This division was specially enthusiastic in its
attack, for, up to the surrender of Ulm, it had belonged to
Ney's command.† The men felt, therefore, that on them
depended the safety of old friends and comrades in the
glorious fields of 1805. Latour-Maubourg and Durosnel also
galloped forward against the Russian cavalry, which was now
carried back on the infantry across the neck of the peninsula,
spreading disorder in its ranks. The confusion was still
further increased by the fire of 38 guns, which Senarmont,
* Savary, iii. 89.
+ Jomini, Vie de Napoleon, ii. 419.
THE BATTLE OF FRIEDLAND.
317
holding 6 more in reserve,* and escorted by Lahoussaye's
cavalry and a battalion of infantry, moved steadily forward,
opening fire first at 600 paces, then at 300, at 150, and,
finally, at 60. The Russian cavalry made a desperate effort
against this battery, but the French gunners, calmly await-
ing their approach, mowed them down with a volley of
grape.†
The Russian left, in the peninsula, was now, in hopeless
confusion, making the best of its way into Friedland, pur-
sued hotly by Ney's rallied troops, as well as by Dupont and
the fire of Senarmont's guns.‡
Dupont, having restored the fight here and completed the
Russian disaster, wheeled to his left, across the Millstream, a
movement which brought him upon the left flank and rear of
the Russian centre, still maintaining its forward position.
Ney, pressing on into Friedland, and engaging in a fierce
fight in the streets, was in possession of the town by 8 p.m.
The Russian cavalry and infantry in front of him streamed
towards the now burning bridges. At 7.30, the Russian
artillery, beyond the river, had set fire to the houses nearest
the bridges, and the flames had spread to the bridges them-
selves. The river was too deep to ford with safety; great
numbers of the Russians, failing to reach the bridges whilst
they were still passable, were drowned in the attempt to
cross by swimming. Their heavy accoutrements dragged
down the infantry.
* Victor, Arch. Hist. At 60 yards Senarmont used nothing but grape,
which told with awful effect on the crowded Russians.
† Ibid. He says that when Senarmont had dispersed this cavalry, he
was supported by a battalion of Frère's brigade and the 4th division of dragoons.
Dupont lost 649 killed and wounded altogether.
"Senarmont's and Ney's artillery sowed terror and death amongst the
battalions and squadrons of the enemy, which, with their backs to the town, to
the river, or to the brook, knew not by which way to escape from destruction "
(Jomini, Vie de Napoleon, ii. 419).
§ Hæpfner, iii. 667. Jomini says, "Bagration, having
bridges to stop our pursuit" (Vie de Napoleon, ii. 419).
the bridges were ordered to be fired" (Wilson, p. 160).
Savary, iii. 91.
withdrawn, fired the
"During this contest
318
NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN IN POLAND.
The battle, as designed by Napoleon, was as good as won
when Friedland was captured.
Lannes and Mortier had intelligently carried out their
orders by fighting a waiting action,* merely detaining
Gortchakow north of the Millstream, though harassing him
with a terrible artillery fire, to which he could but feebly
respond.† It was only when he saw the thick smoke rising
from the houses and the bridges of Friedland, that he realised
that his retreat in that direction was cut off. He had already
fallen back to the position of the early morning before the
overwhelming fire of the artillery of the 1st and 6th corps.
Dupont was. north of the pond, at Friedland, on his left flank.
Leaving his cavalry to hold in check, as far as possible,
the corps of Lannes and Mortier, he sent his two nearest
divisions of infantry to the recapture of Friedland. These
brave men, charging with the bayonet Dupont's and Ney's
troops, carried them back into the town, and re-occupied the
part of it nearest the lower pontoon bridge, only to find
the bridge burning and impossible to cross.
Some sought to cross to the right bank there, the majority
wended their way, still fighting, down the river to Kloschenen,
where, fortunately for Bennigsen, late in the evening, there
had been discovered a deep ford, the existence of which had
previously been unknown. Bad, and deep, as it was, it
proved the salvation of the Russian army; for it not only gave
a chance of crossing to its infantry and cavalry, but also
enabled Bennigsen, with infinite difficulty, to get back many
* Lannes and Mortier had even allowed Gortchakow to gain some success,
to draw him farther into the trap (Jomini, Vie de Napoleon, ii. 420).
The fire was tremendous. Victor alone had 48 guns in one great battery.
Bennigsen, trying to make the best of his bad position, formed squares flanking
one another; in doing so, he lost a great part of his front of infantry fire
(Savary, iii. 90).
The French, until the battle recommenced in the evening, had been con-
cealed from the view and the fire of the Russians by the trees, the high crops
and grass, and the inequalities of the ground, of which they took every
advantage. The Russians, on the contrary, were fully exposed, standing in
lines and columns on the open plain (Wilson, p. 150).
THE BATTLE OF FRIEDLAND.
319
of his guns. These he managed to get up the steep right
bank, and range there as a cover to the retreat, though it
was for long impossible for them to fire on the confused
throng of friends and foes. Much of the ammunition was
rendered useless by water in the deep ford.*
Instant retreat was now the only course open to Gort-
chakow, with his remaining two divisions of infantry, his
artillery, and his cavalry. The last he still left, to cover him
against Mortier and Lannes. First he withdrew his guns,
then his infantry. The latter slowly retired in great masses,
through which the French artillery tore wide lanes, marking
every halting-place with heaps and lines of dead and
wounded.
It was now the moment for Napoleon to slip the leash in
which he had, so far, held his centre and left. Rejoicing to
be at last allowed to take an active part, the infantry of
Lannes and Mortier poured over the plain towards the Alle, to
complete the destruction which the artillery had begun.
They found their enemy in no mood for surrender; the
brave Russian infantry preferred death by the bayonets of
their opponents, or to take their chance of drowning in the
river, to yielding themselves prisoners; few were taken.
Part of the cavalry crossed with the broken infantry near
Kloschenen; the majority retreated down the left bank, to
Allenburg. Had Napoleon's cavalry, beyond Heinrichsdorf,
shown the energy which might have been expected from them,
this retreat by the left should have been impossible. There
were 40 French squadrons in this direction, opposed to but
22 Russian. Even Savary, no friend of Murat, deplores his
absence.* He would have seen the opportunity and have
rolled up the Russian right, so that scarcely a man could
have escaped. As it was, the French squadrons remained
dismounted during the greater part of the renewed battle,
content with what they had accomplished in the morning,
doing nothing. The reason given, forsooth, was that they
*Wilson, p. 161.
† Savary, iii. 92.
320
NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN IN POLAND.
had no orders.* Murat at least would not have waited for
orders with such a chance before him.
The defeated Russians who succeeded in crossing the river,
united with the reserve in the Gnatten wood. Thence, in
two columns, they marched for Wehlau, their rear covered by
Platow's flying column, which, during the day, had made a
futile attempt to cross the river behind Ney's right, but had
been easily beaten off.†
At Allenburg, the retreat was joined by the cavalry, which
had followed the left bank. At noon, on the 15th, Bennigsen
had got together, at Wehlau, his broken army. Pursuit, there
was none worth mentioning. A French general is said to
have remarked that Friedland was "a battle gained and a
victory lost.‡
During the night, the French corps occupied the following
positions when the battle at last, about 11 p.m., ceased..
Lannes on the Koenigsberg road, between Friedland and
Heinrichsdorf. Mortier beyond Friedland, on both banks of
the river. Victor at Posthenen. Ney in and behind Fried-
land. The Guard, surrounding their victorious Emperor,
slept on the plain where had stood the Russian centre.
The permanent bridge at Friedland was quickly rendered.
serviceable; for the flames had failed to destroy the strong
buttresses built to protect it against floating ice in the winter.
Over it, early on the 15th, part of the cavalry set out to.
follow the Russians, whilst the rest went down the left bank.
Before it could reach Bennigsen, he had passed his troops
*This was not even correct, for Napoleon's orders had directed Grouchy,-
Espagne, and the cavalry of the left wing, to "manœuvre so as to cause as much
harm as possible to the enemy when he, pressed by the vigorous attack of our ·
right, shall feel the necessity of retreat." Their inaction was certainly no com--
pliance with this order.
The cavalry reserve engaged at Friedland, according to Murat (Arch. Hist.),
consisted of the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd heavy divisions, the 1st, 2nd, and 4th dragoon.
divisions. The last-named was with Victor.
† Wilson, p. 159, note.
‡ Wilson, p. 162.
THE BATTLE OF FRIEDLAND.
321
across the Pregel at Wehlau, and was, for the time being,
safe.
The battlefield of Friedland * presented, on the morning of
the 15th, a ghastly spectacle. The French had lost consider-
ably, though less than they had at Heilsberg. On the
Russian side the destruction had been fearful. Friedland
was filled with dead and wounded; but the most terrible
spectacle was on the plain, north of the Millstream. There,
long lines of corpses marked where the troops had been
mown down by artillery fire, as they patiently stood for hours,
unable to advance, unwilling to retire. Farther to their rear,
the positions where their squares had halted in their retreat,
to resist the pursuing French, were outlined by dead; between
these places a broad trail of blood and bodies marked their
line of movement.†
Before Friedland, about the Eylau road, the dead, lying
thick and close, marked where Senarmont's and Ney's
batteries had ploughed great furrows through the masses of
fleeing Russians, crowded together in the narrow peninsula,
or where Bennigsen's cavalry had temporarily arrested Ney's
victorious advance.
(d) TACTICS AT FRIEDLAND, AND STRATEGY OF THE
CAMPAIGN.
Bennigsen's object in crossing the Alle at Friedland is
the first point requiring notice in dealing with this battle.
It has been said that he proposed to attempt a direct march
on Koenigsberg, instead of, as he certainly intended when he
wrote to Lestocq on the 11th June,‡ after Heilsberg, crossing
the Pregel first. Napoleon himself was evidently under
* The respective losses of the armies in this battle are, as usual, very
variously stated, and it is only possible, by a comparison of the different
authorities, to arrive at an approximation to the truth.
The French losses were probably about 7000 or 8000. Plotho (p. 168) puts
that of the Russians at 18,000 to 20,000. The French claim that it was 25,000.
† See Savary's description of the field (iii. 92).
‡ Wilson, p. 150.
Y
t
322
NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN IN POLAND.
this impression, when he wrote from Posthenen, at 3 p.m. on
the 14th, to Murat.* This view seems to be erroneous. What
Bennigsen really appears to have meant was to crush Lannes,
whom alone he believed to be within reach of Friedland,
and then to continue his march on Wehlau. A general action
on a favourable field was what Napoleon desired above all
things. At Friedland, Bennigsen gave him precisely what
he wanted. Though it was absolutely necessary for Ben-
nigsen to stop any French passage of the Alle in force at
Friedland, he would have been wiser to content himself with
holding that point strongly, whilst his army defiled past it,
en route for Wehlau. To stop and attack Lannes, even had
he alone been there, was to waste valuable time. Moreover,
* Vide supra, p. 314.
+ Bennigsen himself wrote: "I freely admit that I should have done better
not to undertake the affair of Friedland; I had the power, and I should have
been safer to maintain my resolution, not to undertake a serious battle, since it
was not necessary for the safety of the march of my army; but false reports,
with which every general is often beset, had raised in me the erroneous view,
which was confirmed by all my intelligence, that Napoleon had, with the
greater part of his army, taken the road towards Koenigsberg" (Hopfner,
iii. 656).
Wilson fairly describes the action as "a battle undertaken from an error of
information, persevered in from an apprehension of retreat, but whose catastrophe
was alleviated by the extraordinary valour of the officers and troops" (pp. 161,
162).
"The weakness of the French column suggested to Bennigsen the idea of
fighting a fortunate battle en passant” (Rustow, i. 322).
Adams (Great Campaigns, p. 154) puts very clearly the object of Napoleon.
Hopfner blames him (Napoleon) for not continuing the battle of Heilsberg on
the 11th June instead of manoeuvring; but his abstention is a proof of his sense
of the precarious nature of his position, and he was, moreover, anxious to
-economise force.
"Without Bennigsen's blunder, the Russians would have arrived safely on
the Pregel, whilst Napoleon's line, already extended, would have been still
further stretched. The point had been reached when the occupation of
territory was of no further value, but in this poor district rather the contrary,
and a general action was the sole object worth striving for. This object was
attained at Friedland by good fortune, which, according to Bennigsen, was
owing to his misinformation as to Napoleon's movements on Koenigsberg."
It may be said Napoleon had his chance of a general action at Heilsberg.
True! but Heilsberg was a very unfavourable field for him. Friedland was all
that he could desire.
THE BATTLE OF FRIEDLAND.
323
Bennigsen's men, exhausted by a march of 34 miles* in
48 hours, in oppressively hot weather,† were hardly fit to
undertake a day of fighting:
If Bennigsen was badly informed as to the French move-
ments, Napoleon was equally in doubt as to the distribution
of the two Russian forces, towards Koenigsberg, and on the
Alle.
Bennigsen's position at Friedland, with a considerable
river close behind his back, with his only line of retreat, so
far as he knew, behind his left wing, and with his front split
in two by a serious obstacle to the free movement of troops,
was as bad as it could be. It is true he had another line of
escape by the Allenburg road, on the left bank of the Alle;
but that, again, led from a wing parallel to his line, and was
close against the river. His one chance was to overpower
Lannes, whilst that officer was still in very inferior force in
the early morning, and thus clear for himself space for a less
unfavourable field of battle.
Napoleon had, perhaps, rarely been more happy in
appreciating, at the first glance, the features of a battlefield.
His orders for the renewal of the attack show, by their
reiteration of the caution to his left not to press forward,
* Left Heilsberg midnight, 12th-
Reached Bartenstein noon, 12th
Reached Schippenbeil ...
Schippenbeil to Friedland
Miles.
13
8
13
31
† The day of Friedland was oppressively hot (Marbot, i. 279).
‡
Wilson (p. 153) says of it: "His (Bennigsen's) own feeble army was lodged
in a position that was untenable, from which progress could not be made against
an equal force, nor retreat be effected without great hazard, and where no mili-
tary object would be attained for the interests or reputation of the Russian
army, whose courage had been sufficiently established, without tilting for fame
as adventurers who have nothing to lose and everything to win."
"There was in his (Bennigsen's) conduct a mixture of rash imprudence and
of irresolution quite irreconcilable" (Jomini, Vie de Napoleon, ii. 421).
Benningsen, ill at the time, seemed to have forgotten that he had come to
the left bank to fight" (Rustow, i. 323).
324
NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN IN POLAND.
how completely he had estimated the vital importance to
Bennigsen of Friedland, and the tongue of land on which it
stood. Yet he failed at first, as is shown by his letter to
Murat, to value correctly the strength of the force to which
he was opposed. It was not till the action recommenced
that he saw that Bennigsen had delivered himself into his
hands. Could he have been certain of the Russians remain-
ing another 24 hours on the hither side of the river, he
might, even as it was, have preferred waiting till the arrival
of Murat and Davout gave him a still greater preponderance
of numbers,* and until his own troops, many of whom
(Victor's corps especially) had had much fatiguing marching,
were rested. But he had too often experienced the Russian
general's capacity for slipping away during the night from
the most dangerous positions to risk a repetition of these
tactics. When, therefore, Ney's advance had shown him his
great superiority of force, he had no longer any hesitation in
pressing home his assault.
Dupont's action in support of Ney, without any orders
from Victor,† reflected credit on that unfortunate general,
whose great reputation was afterwards destroyed at Baylen.
The inaction of the French cavalry at Heinrichsdorf, in
the evening, is almost inexplicable. All that can be said
is that Napoleon seems to have been so busy with the
operations of his infantry, as to neglect to insist on com-
pliance with his orders. Murat would have acted even with-
out orders. Grouchy, possibly, did not consider he was in a
position to warrant his doing so; though, as already pointed
out, he had orders.
The failure to pursue during the night is, on the face of it,
* "Perhaps I should have done better to wait for Davout and Murat. I
should not have hesitated had I thought Bennigsen would dare to continue his
march towards Koenigsberg viâ Abschwang. Reinforced by 40,000 men,
including my cavalry, I should have driven him on the marshy forests of Zehlau
and Frischind, from which he could never have emerged" (Jomini, Vie de
Napoleon, ii 413).
+ Savary, iii. 89.
THE BATTLE OF FRIEDLAND.
325
still more difficult of explanation. No general ever was more
alive than Napoleon to the advantages of pursuing a defeated
enemy, "l'epée dans les reins," to use the forcible French
expression. If his infantry were tired, his cavalry had no
reason for being so. They had neither marched an excessive
distance, nor had any very heavy fighting.
Is it possible that the Emperor's slackness, in this respect,
was due to political considerations? He felt that Bennigsen
was badly beaten, and could not again face him short of the
Niemen. The Russian army was worn out by marching and
fighting. A pursuit, such as that of the Prussians after Jena,
must have caused the enemy much loss, and given rise to
very bitter feelings towards the French in the breasts of the
leaders, as well as of the Russian soldiery. At this period
Napoleon did not yet contemplate the invasion which he
attempted in 1812, with such disastrous results. He still
had doubts as to Austria, and it would have ill suited him to
be involved in a fresh campaign beyond the Niemen. A
murderous pursuit might have so incensed the Czar as to
induce him to continue the struggle which, he must have
known, would eventually be stopped by winter, and to adopt
the Fabian tactics, afterwards so successfully employed in
1812.
Napoleon did not wish to make a permanent enemy of
Russia. He had already written to Talleyrand* that he
would prefer the Russian to the Austrian alliance, if he had
to choose between the two. He wanted Russia, as a sea
power with a large seaboard and a great trade with England,
to join him in his campaign against the commerce of his
detested enemy. In these conditions, is it not probable that
the Emperor thought that the destruction of a few thousand
Russians, in a night pursuit, was not worth the risk of a
continuation of the war?
The strategy of the first few days of the campaign
requires but little comment. Napoleon had left Ney in a
* Corr. 12,028, dated 14th March, 1807.
326
NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN IN POLAND.
somewhat exposed position, according to some authorities,*
as a bait to the Russians. That marshal was the best man
to be placed thus; for he could always be relied on to make
the most of a rear-guard action, to hold the enemy and
delay him to the utmost, without compromising himself. He
showed his mastery of such tactics on the 5th and 6th of
June. Davout's position enabled him to support Ney's right,
and to threaten the left flank and rear of the Russians as they
advanced to the Passarge.
Napoleon did not expect Bennigsen to assume the offen-
sive. The Russian general had, he considered, lost his
opportunity, if he ever had one, in failing to make a general
advance in support of Kamenskoi's attempt to relieve Danzig.
If he was going to attempt the offensive at all, then was his
chance. He was, but for the absence of Kamenskoi's 7000
or 8000 men, as strong on the 15th May as he was on the 5th
June. Napoleon, on the other hand, was weaker by the
corps of Lannes, Mortier, and all of Lefebvre's except what
was required for the garrison of Danzig after its fall-quite
40,000 men in all. In June, Napoleon had an enormous pre-
ponderance of numbers over his adversary, and if he began
to concentrate rearwards towards Osterode, "il ne reculait
que pour mieux sauter." If Bennigsen's forward move had
not stopped at the Passarge, it must inevitably have done so
before the lakes at Osterode.
When the tide turned, Napoleon's movement was a
simple one to the front with the bulk of his army, whilst he
endeavoured, by holding Lestocq and Kamenskoi on the
Lower Passarge with the 1st corps, to separate them from
the rest of Bennigsen's army. Lestocq had been dealt with
in a precisely similar manner in the two earlier phases of the
campaign, before Pultusk and before Eylau.†
* Jomini, Vie de Napoleon, ii. 406.
† Adams (Great Campaigns, pp. 153, 154) says, "It is difficult to see,
moreover, the object the allies had in assigning a detached sphere of action to
the Prussian contingents. The German authorities agree that, in spite of
constant defeat, the individual German soldier retained the confident feeling of
THE BATTLE OF FRIEDLAND.
327
When the French reached the bend of the Alle at
Guttstadt, there were, according to Jomini, two courses open
to the Emperor, between which he hesitated for a moment.
Napoleon himself has nowhere indicated that he had any
such doubts. He might, says Jomini, have pushed forward,
establishing his line with its left at Guttstadt, and his right
towards Bischofstein. "It would have been absolutely the
same movement as that of Jena and Naumburg against the
Prussians, with better chances of success; for the Russian
army, beaten on its left and driven back on the Lower
Passarge and the Frisches-Haff, would have been thrown into
the sea. Koenigsberg, no doubt, offered it a refuge; but that
place itself, with the Baltic behind it on the west, and the
Curisches-Haff on the north, would have offered no issue to
this beaten army; for I should have forestalled it at Wehlau,
as soon as it began to retreat.
“The second course to take was to advance direct against
the entrenched camp of Heilsberg, whilst 50,000 men
manoeuvred by my left on Eylau, to menace the line of
operations of the allies, to force them to abandon their
redoubts without fighting, to press them vigorously in their
retreat, and to strike them heavily at the passages of the
Pregel and the Niemen. This last course was less advan-
tageous; it was even contrary to the rules of strategy, which
do not allow of compromising a considerable corps by
passing it between the enemy and the sea. I preferred it,
because my left was already in that direction, and, in order
to manœuvre by my right, I should have to describe a long
circle round the Russian army, to uncover the roads which
served for communication with Thorn and Warsaw, and to
throw myself into the wooded country on the right bank of
physical superiority; but the cause may probably be found in a superannuated
system, by which the Prussian leaders were first of all punctiliously unwilling to
serve other than independently, fearful lest such a course would imply
inferiority; and next, showed a reluctance to adopt anything new after a long
period of peace."
328
NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN IN POLAND.
the Alle. However, I must admit I should have acted in a
better military spirit in adopting the first course.
"One of the motives which contributed most to determine
me in favour of the second was that I had already remarked,
at the time of the battle of Eylau, that Bennigsen showed a
pusillanimous anxiety for Koenigsberg; but, as it was not
a military point, I thought that he had special motives,
whether of policy towards Prussia, or of consideration for the
great magazines. In depriving the enemy of his magazines,
I should procure them for my own troops, which, in a distant
country, is essential; I should overturn the enemy's system
of operations. On the other hand, it was possible that the
march of Soult on Koenigsberg might decide the Russians to
retreat to their right, to cover that city, and I was always
master of the power to throw forces on their left flank,
threatening to cut them from Tilsit. For these sub-
sidiary reasons I disregarded strategical principles, and
decided to advance on Heilsberg by the left bank of the
Alle."
The arguments in favour of the course actually adopted
are, no doubt, valid; but it may be doubted if Napoleon ever
hesitated in his choice, or if the first course really was the
best strategically. His lines of communication were not at
this period with Warsaw primarily, or even with Thorn.
They were by Marienwerder, Marienburg, and Danzig. The
proposed movement to the right would have laid them all
open, that to the left covered completely the Marienwerder,
Marienburg, and Danzig lines.
Moreover, Bennigsen, if he were not bold enough to
attack the lines of communication, would probably have
taken fright and retreated down the Alle long before the
extended movement round his left could have been completed.
He would then have had the advantage of the shorter line to
the Pregel, and would have been joined on it by the
Prussians. As has already been said, Bennigsen could
* Jomini, Vie de Napoleon, pp. 406-408.
THE BATTLE OF FRIEDLAND.
329
probably have been manoeuvred out of Heilsberg, without the
bloody battle of the 10th June.
When Napoleon divided his army at Eylau, marching
partly on Koenigsberg, partly on Friedland, it seems almost
impossible to doubt that, as before at Pultusk, he was under
an entirely erroneous impression as to the distribution of the
two portions of the enemy. His cavalry could give no
precise account of the enemy's march,* and probably
exaggerated the strength of Kamenskoi's 9000 men marching
past Eylau on the 12th. It is difficult to believe that the
Emperor would have deliberately detached 60,000 men to
deal with less than half their number. His despatch to
Murat from Posthenen, seems to show that he recognised his
mistake. With Murat, and half the cavalry he had at
Koenigsberg, on the field at Friedland, it is likely that that.
battle would have resulted in a still greater disaster for the
Russians. Soult's corps, with a cavalry division, and,
perhaps, the addition of one division of Davout's infantry,
could easily have dealt with Lestocq and Kamenskoi, had the
Emperor known how small their force was. Had he detached
30,000 or 35,000, under Soult or Davout, against Koenigs-
berg, he would have been quite safe in that direction, and
would have disposed of an additional 25,000 or 30,000 men
at Friedland, not to mention the advantage of having Murat
to lead the cavalry of the left wing.
* Savary, iii. 84.
A
CHAPTER IV.
KOENIGSBERG AND TILSIT.
GLANCE back must now be given to the movements
of the detached forces in the direction of Koenigsberg.
Lestocq and Kamenskoi were last mentioned when, about
3 p.m. on the 13th, they met at Gollau. Between them
they mustered about 25,000 men, all that were available to
oppose 9000 of Murat's cavalry, 22,000 of Soult's corps,* and
29,000 of Davout's; in all 60,000. Of the allied forces,
Lestocq took command. They had been in touch with
Murat's cavalry, and fighting with them, on the evening of
the 13th, on the direct road from Eylau to Koenigsberg.
On the 14th, Soult's advanced guard, moving on the
Kreuzburg-Koenigsberg road, first encountered the enemy at
Bergau. Lestocq was at Gollau, opposing the progress of
Murat, when Soult's arrival on his right flank forced him to
retreat on the city. A battalion of his infantry was cut off
and captured by Milhaud's dragoons with Soult.
* Soult, at the opening of the campaign, had 30,000 men; but he had lost
6600 at Heilsberg alone, and, including the losses on the Passarge, he cannot
have lost less than 8000 since the 5th June.
The cavalry employed began the campaign at the following strength
Lasalle
St. Sulpice
Milhand
...
...
...
5703
1967
...
1859
...
...
:
Davout, at the same time, had 29,560.
9529
KOENIGSBERG AND TILSIT.
331
Another attempt to make a stand against the now united
corps of Soult and Murat, 1000 paces from the works of
Koenigsberg, was found to be hopeless. Outflanked and
severely pressed, the allies shut themselves into Koenigsberg.
The French force was now supplemented by the arrival of
Davout. Gudin's division joined Murat's right, and extended
towards the Pregel, above the city. A battery, which Davout
established in this direction to test the possibility of an
assault, was silenced by the superior fire of the defenders.
Davout then ordered Friant, supported by Morand, to make
preparations for the passage of the river, but only passed
over one regiment.
About mid-day, a brigade of about 1200 men, which
Lestocq had left behind to watch the direction of Branden-
burg, appeared behind Soult's left, attempting to rejoin the
Prussians.
It made a brave struggle for liberty, but, surrounded in a
village, it was forced to lay down its arms.
All this time, Lestocq and Kamenskoi, ignorant of
Bennigsen's movements, were buoyed by the hope that a
bold defence of the city could not fail to be supported by
him in the course of a few hours.
Setting fire to the Brandenburg suburb, on the left bank
of the river, Lestocq withdrew most of his troops within the
fortifications. Those which remained were attacked in the
suburb by Legrand's division, which inflicted heavy loss on
them, and took a number of prisoners. The works of the
place were strong enough to render an assault out of the
question. Soult refused to listen to the rash counsels of
Murat in favour of it.
In the evening, Murat receiving Napoleon's order, dated
3 p.m. on the same afternoon before Friedland, at once started
with Davout's corps in the direction of Friedland. Soult,
now left alone before Koenigsberg, was in strength inferior
to that of the enemy. He therefore contented himself with
taking up a position of observation in front of the fortress.
332
NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN IN POLAND.
Lestocq endeavoured to send, through Soult's lines, a small
body of cavalry with a despatch for Bennigsen, of whom he
had still heard no news. The party was surrounded and the
despatch captured, as was the cavalry belonging to the brigade
which had been cut off in the afternoon.
On the 15th, Soult began preparations for an attack on
the fortress, which he bombarded.
At 10 p.m., it was ascertained, from deserters, that
Kamenskoi's corps had left as soon as the news of the battle
of Friedland had arrived, and that the Prussians were pre-
paring to follow. On the morning of the 16th, Soult entered
the fortress, where he captured the single battalion which
Lestocq had left to cover his evacuation. A large number of
wounded Russians and Prussians were found in the town,
and very large magazines and stores of every sort, as well as
of artillery.*
To return to Bennigsen and Napoleon: the former, passing
the Pregel, at Wehlau, on the 15th, by a single bridge, burnt
it behind him, and, at Petersdorf, on the farther bank opposite
the mouth of the Alle, gave his troops a few hours of much-
needed rest.
On the 16th, he marched 18 miles to a position between.
Mehlauken and Popliken. On the 17th he made another
march of 18 miles, across the little river Schillup, where
he was rejoined by Lestocq and Kamenskoi.
On the 18th, the allied army, passing through Tilsit,
crossed the Niemen on boat bridges, which were immediately
afterwards burnt by Bagration, who, as before, commanded
the rear-guard in this last retreat.
Napoleon, meanwhile, had moved thus:-
After the victory of Friedland, the march of Murat and
Davout, towards that point, ceased to be necessary. They
were diverted, therefore, from Abschwangen, across the Pregel,
at Tapiau. Murat, sending his light cavalry to Wehlau,
* Soult's report (Arch. Hist.) says he took, in Koenigsberg, 3600 sick and
wounded Russians, and 4000 Prussians.
KOENIGSBERG AND TILSIT.
333
reached Tapiau with St. Sulpice's dragoons and Davout's
corps, on the morning of the 16th.
It was not till 24 hours later that Davout succeeded in
getting across the river. With his light cavalry he set out
in pursuit of the enemy in the directions of Koenigsberg and
Labiau, whilst Napoleon also manœuvred to his left, in the
hope of driving the Prussians on the Curisches-Haff. It
was too late. Marulaz alone reached the Prussian rear-guard,
with which he engaged in small combats.
Murat, after passing the Pregel on the 16th, rejoined the
main army, with St. Sulpice's dragoons, at Wehlau.
The army which had fought at Friedland marched, on the
15th, to Wehlau, except the corps of Ney, which remained at
Friedland.
On the 16th and 17th, Victor, followed by Lannes,
Mortier, and the Guard, in the order named, passed the
Pregel. He was at Petersdorf on the evening of the 16th.
On the 17th the cavalry, supported by part of Victor's corps,
had a slight engagement with Bagration at Mehlauken. He
was again seen on the 18th near Niemen.
On the morning of the 19th, Murat entered Tilsit; Victor
was halted on the left bank of the river below Tilsit, Davout
above it.
Ney, meanwhile, moved, on the 17th and 18th, to Gum-
binnen, covering the right flank of the army. Soult remained
on the left, at Koenigsberg, sending St. Hilaire to invest
Pillau on the east, whilst Rapp's detachment, on
Nehrung, invested it on that side and from the sea. It
shortly capitulated.
There remain to be narrated the operations of Masséna
on the Narew. On the 11th June, the Russians, having
advanced between the Narew and the Bug, attacked, with
6000 or 8000 men, Drenzewo and the French entrenched
camp at Borki, a little below Ostrolenka on the right bank
of the Narew. Claparède, defending it, was at the same time
334
NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN IN POLAND.
bombarded by batteries on the left bank.* He was finally
forced out,† and the Russians entrenched themselves in it.
Suchet had reached Rozan with the rest of his division.
On the 12th, at 10 a.m., Masséna in person directed an attack
on the Russian lines. Overwhelmed by superior numbers,
they were forced, under the protection of their batteries,
partly across the Omulew, and partly across the Narew, at
Ostrolenka.
No further movement of importance took place till the
22nd, when Masséna, already informed of the result of the
battle of Friedland, marched on Ostrolenka which he reached
on the evening of the 23rd, to find the Russians gone in the
direction of Tykoczin.
He followed them by Nowogrod, Lomza, and Sniadow
towards Bialystok, as ordered by the Emperor.
On the 19th June, Bennigsen, now on the right bank of
the Niemen, received orders from the allied sovereigns to
demand an armistice. About mid-day the demand ‡ was
transmitted to Murat in Tilsit, and was passed on to
Napoleon, who shortly afterwards reached the town, and who
at once accepted the proposal to negotiate.
On the 21st, the armistice was signed on the following
conditions:
(a) Armistice to be for the purpose of negotiating a
peace.
* According to memoirs of Masséna (v. 331), there were 8000 Russians, and
Tutchkow had covered his real attack by threatening a passage at Rozan. An
attack by cavalry was also made on Gazan at Zawady on the Omulew.
+ Back to Nozewo (Massena, v. 331).
The terms of Bennigsen's letter to Bagration for communication to Murat
were as follows: "After the torrents of blood which have lately flowed in
battles as sanguinary as frequent, I should desire to assuage the evils of this
destructive war, by proposing an armistice before we enter upon a conflict, a
fresh war, perhaps more terrible than the first. I request you, Prince, to convey
to the chiefs of the French army this my intention, of which the consequences
may produce all the more salutary results, seeing that there is already question
of a general congress, and which may prevent an useless effusion of blood.
Kindly inform me of the result of your action" (Wilson, p. 170, note).
KOENIGSBERG AND TILSIT.
335
(b) Either party proposing to terminate it to give one
month's notice of his intention.
(c) A separate armistice to be concluded between the
French and Prussian armies.
(d) The line of delimitation between the armies was
fixed.
(e) Plenipotentiaries, for the negotiation of peace, to be
at once appointed, and commissions for the exchange of
prisoners.
Napoleon had spoken the prologue to the great drama in
his proclamation of the 2nd December, 1806; on the 22nd
June, he delivered the epilogue. "Soldiers, on the 5th June,
we were attacked in our cantonments by the Russian army,
which misconstrued the causes of our inactivity. It per-
ceived, too late, that our repose was that of the lion; now it
does penance for its mistake. In the days of Guttstadt, of
Heilsberg, in the ever-memorable day of Friedland, in 10 days
campaigning we have taken 120 guns, and seven standards;
we have killed, wounded, or captured 60,000 Russians; torn
from the enemy's army all its magazines, its hospitals, its
ambulances, the fortress of Koenigsberg, the 300 vessels
which were in the port, laden with every kind of supplies, and
160,000 muskets,* which England was sending to arm our
enemies.
"From the shores of the Vistula, we have reached those
of the Niemen, with the rapidity of the eagle. At Austerlitz
you celebrated the anniversary of the coronation; you have
this year worthily celebrated that of the battle of Marengo,
which put an end to the war of the second coalition. French-
men, you have been worthy of yourselves, and of me; you
will return to France covered with laurels, after having
acquired a peace which guarantees its own durability. It is
* Wilson (p. 166, note) denies the capture of these muskets, which, he says,
were landed at Riga. He also affirms that there was very little left in Koenigs-
berg of supplies or artillery, most of them having been removed by Lestocq.
It is hardly probable that that officer had time to make considerable removals.
336
NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN IN POLAND.
time for our country to live in repose, sheltered from the
malign influence of England.
'My rewards will prove to you my gratitude and the
greatness of the love I bear you."
The positions taken by the armies, pending the com-
pletion of the peace negotiations, of the result of which there
could be no doubt, were the following:-
French:
Headquarters of Guard at Koenigsberg, with detachments
at Tilsit guarding the Emperor's person. Soult at Labiau.
Davout, Lahoussaye, and Lasalle at Tilsit.
Ney, and Latour-Maubourg at Marienpol, east of
Gumbinnen.
Mortier and the Polish divisions at Augustowo, Olitta,
and Nsobra, on Ney's right.
Victor at Wehlau. Lannes at Koenigsberg, Tapiau, and
Brandenburg.
Espagne, Saint Sulpice, Nansouty, Grouchy, and Mil-
haud, the cavalry reserve, in cantonments on the Pregel and
Alle.
Murat, fixing his headquarters at Koenigsberg, himself
remained with the Emperor at Tilsit.
Masséna's corps was at Nowogrod.
Russians and Prussians:-
Imperial headquarters at Pickupponen, opposite Tilsit.
Gortchakow, with two divisions, the cavalry of the right
wing, that of the advanced guard, and all the cossacks and
bashkirs, at Willkischken, Limspohnen, and Bennigskeiten.
.
Essen, with four divisions and the cavalry of the left
wing, at and about Georgenburg.
Lestocq and Kamenskoi's two divisions, in cantonments,
between the Gilge and Russ rivers.
Labanow, with two divisions, about Kanen.
Tolstoi, with three divisions, near Bialystock, with out-
posts on the upper Narew, facing Masséna.
Kologribow, with the Guard, except one battalion, one
KOENIGSBERG AND TILSIT.
337
cavalry regiment, and one squadron of another, the Czar's
personal guard, retired to cantonments in Lithuania.*
With the armies thus posted, Napoleon proceeded to
enact the transformation scene which was to mark his new
position as the arbiter of the destinies of Europe.
Prussia he had crushed, and was determined to humiliate
to the lowest depths. Russia he had defeated, not conquered.
He required her aid in the struggle with the one enemy
whom he had been unable to cripple. He proposed a per-
sonal meeting, to settle the bases of peace, between himself
and the Czar Alexander. There was no mention of the King
of Prussia. Alexander, flattered by the recognition of the
pre-eminence of his own power, accepted the proposal.
An enormous raft was constructed by the French
engineers, and moored in midstream. It bore a magni-
ficently decorated pavilion, worthy of the memorable scene
which was to take place within it.
On the 25th June, towards 1 p.m., Napoleon, accom-
panied by Berthier, Bessières, Duroc, and Caulaincourt, left
the southern bank at the same moment as Alexander, with
the Grand Duke Constantine, Bennigsen, Labanow, Uvarow,
and Count Lieven, set out from the northern. Reaching the
raft simultaneously, the two Emperors embraced, and then,
alone, entered on a discussion lasting two hours, the purport
of which can be guessed only from its results. It has been
said that Alexander's first words were, "I hate the English
as much as you do yourself." To which Napoleon replied,
"If that is the case, peace is already made." It is unneces-
sary to put any great faith in this story. The Czar may
have thought he had not received so much support, in men
and money, as he had a right to expect from Great Britain;
but her conduct had certainly not been such as to warrant so
complete a revulsion of feeling towards her.
The King of Prussia was contemptuously left out of this
Some of the places named above are not marked on the map, being
beyond its limits.
Z
338
NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN IN POLAND.
meeting, at which, presumably, his spoliation was decided on.
He was only admitted to the second interview, on the suc-
ceeding day, after which the Czar and the King occupied
quarters in Tilsit, which had been neutralised for their
accommodation. It was only on this day that the armistice
with the Prussians was signed and ratified.
The beautiful and noble Queen of Prussia accompanied
her husband. She it was who had been the spirit of the
war. Napoleon had not the magnanimity to forgive her
conduct, now that her power had been broken. His whole
treatment of her and the King was such as to show that he
regarded them, and Prussia, as unworthy of his considera-
tion. With the unpleasant history of these days we need not
deal fully.
i
Napoleon, determined to treat entirely separately with
Russia and Prussia, insisted on distinct treaties. That
between Russia and France was executed on the 7th July,
and ratified two days later.
The Prussian treaty was executed only on the day on
which that with Russia was ratified, and it was not ratified
till the 12th July.
Of the complicated provisions of the treaties a short
resumé is all that seems necessary.
Napoleon, bent on passing every possible insult upon the
unfortunate Prussians, attributed such poor terms as he
granted them to the intercession of Alexander.
Of the conquered territories, he restored to Prussia that part
of the Duchy of Magdeburg which was situated on the right
bank of the Elbe, thereby excluding the fortress itself, which
he knew the Queen specially cherished. Also he surren-
dered Pomerania, Silesia, and other territories constituting
approximately the kingdom as it was before the 1st January,
1772. From that portion of the ancient kingdom of Poland
which had been acquired by Prussia in and after 1772 he
constituted the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, which he presented
to the King of Saxony, together with a military right of way
KOENIGSBERG AND TILSIT.
339
across the intervening Prussian territory. He excepted a
considerable area in the direction of Bialystock, which was
made over to Russia. Danzig he made a free city, under the
protection of Prussia and Saxony. The recognition of the
Napoleonic Kings of Naples and Holland, of the Confedera-
tion of the Rhine, of the new kingdom of Westphalia, now
carved out of Prussian territory west of the Elbe and
bestowed on Jerome Bonaparte, was stipulated for.
Turkey, which had so materially helped him, was
abandoned by Napoleon, anxious in every way to conciliate
Russia. He merely offered his mediation between the two
powers, whilst agreeing to accept that of the Czar between
England and himself. Prussia, as well as Russia, was bound
to aid his campaign against the commerce of Great Britain.
Such were the more important provisions of the treaties,
the full details of which can be studied in the documents
themselves.* Their result was aggrandisement of the power
of Napoleon to an enormous, of Russia to a small extent, at
the expense of Prussia.
Prussia was hedged round with states subservient to
French interests-the Rhenish Confederation, Saxony, West-
phalia, the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, Holland, and Danzig.
England's last allies on the Continent, with the exception of
Sweden, which was soon to follow, were torn from her.
With the gradual withdrawal of the French armies it is
not proposed to deal. Napoleon's grasp on continental
Europe was now assured, and it was not till his own action
in the Peninsula of Spain sowed the germs of the "Spanish
ulcer," and until Austria, in 1809, made another struggle for
liberty, that his almost universal power was challenged.
* Printed in full by Wilson (pp. 263–271).
THE END.
PRINTED BY WILLIAM CLOWES AND SONS, LIMITED, LONDON AND BECCLES.
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