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MNR, IRIAYNTIE,
DELIVERED IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES,
ON THE
Mrssron. To PANAMAt
MARCH, 1826.
Bashington Titº.
PRINTED BY GALES & SEATON.
1896.


\4-\ 2–
.*4-2
SPEECH
OF
DELIVERED IN The senate of the UNITED states,
ON THE
jmiššion to panama,
MARCH, 1826.
THE following resolution, submitted by the Committee of Fo-
weign Relations, being under consideration—
“REsolved, That it is not expedient, at this time, for the United States to send
any Ministers to the Congress of American nations, assembled at Panama.”—
MR. HAYNE, of South Carolina, addressed the Senate, in
substance, as follows: . -
If I could concur, Mr. President, with those gentlemen who
believe that the question of sending Ministers to represent the Uni-
ted States at the Congress of Panama, was one of very little conse-
quence, I should certainly not trouble the Senate with any remarks
upon the subject—for though I should consider this as a conclusive
argument against the mission, yet if, in fact, we were now called
upon to take a H. in an empty pageant, or an idle ceremony—if
(to borrow the language used elsewhere) our Ministers are merely
to present “an imposing spectacle to the eyes of the world”—I
should content myself with giving a silent, though decided, vote
against the measure. But the question presents itself to my mind,
in an aspect extremely different. It does appear to me, that what-
ever may be the result of this mission, it cannot possibly be indif-
ferent; it is a measure of the most decisive character, and one that
cannot fail to produce the most important results. It touches the
neutral relations of the United States in a contest of a peculiar na-
ture, towards which the attention of the whole civilized world is
anxiously turned, and in which their feelings and interests are most
deeply involved. It concerns the part we shall act towards the bel-
Tigerents in the great contest which has so long desolated the South
.
4
American hemisphere—a contest of which neither the nations of
Europe nor ourselves have been unconcerned spectators, though
they have so far escaped being drawn into the vortex. , Happily for
us, and most happily for the South Americans, this strict neutrality
on the part of other nations, has left to the youthful vigor of the new
Republics, a slow but certain triumph over their common enemy,
. nothing is now wanting to the establishment of their indepen-
dence on an immutable basis, but that there should be no interference
whatever in their concerns. Left to themselyes, their liberties are
secure. In seeking foreign assistance, they are committing a fatal
error, and as grievously mistake their own best interests, as we will
mistake our duties, should we comply with their wishes.
I regard this question, therefore, as one of the last importance,
not only to the new States, but to ourselves, because I consider it
as based on an entire change of the neutral position which we have
hitherto so happily occupied in the contest between Spain and her
colonies—a change that may not only involve us in the struggle, but
may be fatal in its consequences to those whom we are most anx-
ious to serve. -
In order to decide on the expediency of the proposed mission
to the Congress of Panama, and to ascertain how it may affect our
neutrality, it is necessary to determine, in the first place, the char-
acter of that Congress. And here I shall take it for granted, that
the character of the Congress will, in no degree, be affected by the
instructions which may be given to our Ministers, but can only be
ascertained from its declared and acknowledged objects. It is from
the documents, published to the world, and from these alone, that
the public can know the purposes for which this Congress is to be
assembled. These must stamp its character as peaceful or bellige-
rent, in the estimation of mankind. Now, on this branch of the sub-
ject, we are most fortunately furnished with information, authentic,
full, and perfectly satisfactory; information, not possessed by us
alone, but which has been published to all the world. The following
are the sources from whence we derive our knowledge as to the
character and objects of the Congress of Panama—sources equally
open to every nation in Europe:–
1st. A work on the necessity of a general federation of the
South American States, published at Lima in 1825, by Bernardo
JMonteagudo, Minister of State and Foreign Affairs of Peru, &c.
2d. Bolivar's circular and proclamation.
3d. The conventions between five of the Spanish American
Republics, under which the Congress is about to assemble.
4th. The communication in the Official Gazette of Colombia,
in February last, of some of the specific points which are to form
the subjects of the deliberations of the Congress. t
From these combined sources we will be enabled to derive
the most satisfactory and conclusive information, as to the true
character of the Congress; and when that shall be ascertained, the
5
task will be easy to show what effect must be produced on our re-
lations towards Spain by our taking any part in the deliberations of
that assembly.
From the work of JMonteagudo, (an abstract of which will be
found in the last number of the North American Review) it ap-
pears that the project of a confederacy of the South American
States was conceived as early as 1821; that, in 1823, Bolivar, as
President of Colombia, invited Mexico, Peru, Chili and Buenos
Ayres “to send delegates to Panama, with the express design of
“establishing A confederacy.” In December, 1824, conceiving
that the period had now arrived for carrying this great object into
effect, he issued a circular, proposing to the new States that dele-
gates should “immediately be sent to Panama by those Govern-
“ments, which had agreed to join IN THE conFEDERAcy;” and he
there characterizes the meeting as one “, which was to serve as a
“counsel to us in our distresses—(which can only mean, to advise
them how to carry on the war, so as to bring it to a successful is-
sue,) “and to be a RALLYING point in our common dangers;” (in
other words, to furnish the means of making a successful stand
against the common enemy, old Spain, by º: fleets and rais-
ing armies, and by furnishing respectively their contingent of men,
arms, and money.) The author of this work was a man of uncom-
mon talent and great influence, who not only filled the station of
Minister of State in Peru, but, in behalf of that State, negotiated
and signed the convention with Colombia, in relation to this very
business. His authority, therefore, is entitled to great weight, on
a question with which he was so intimately acquainted. He sums
up in two lines, the duties of the Congress, and informs us it is de-
signed to give “ INDEPENDENCE, PEACE, AND security, to the NEw
“states.” Independence to colonies engaged in a contest with the
mother country for its establishment—Peace, to nations actually in-
volved in war—Security, to those who are exposed to all the
casualties of invasion from abroad and convulsions within. And
how are these objects to be attained? The answer is obvious,
and is given by all the documents before us: . By ALLIANCEs, offen-
sive and defensive; by which each State stipulates to make a com-
mon cause, and to furnish their respective quotas of men, of money,
and of arms.
On this point, nothing shall be left to conjecture or inference.
I will produce the highest possible evidence—evidence which must
satisfy the most sceptical as to the true character of the Panama
Congress. The States represented there have entered into formal
TREATIEs—and it is under these solemn Conventions, that this Con-
gress is assembled. Under the call made upon the President by the
Senate on the 3d of January last, he has submitted to us conven-
tions between *e.
The Republic of Colombia and that of Chili,
The Republic of Colombia and Peru,
6
The Republic of Colombia and the Federation of the Centre of
America, and
The Republic of Colombia and the United Mexican States.
On looking into these conventions, (some of which were enter-
ed into as early as 1822, and one as late as September, 1825) we
discover that in the execution of the plan of the Liberator, of unit-
ing all the Spanish American States into “one GREAT conFEDERA-
“ cy,” he has succeeded in forming among them treaties of alliance, .
offensive and defensive, in peace, and in war, and the Congress of
Panama grows out of, and is the first fruit of that alliance. It is
in fact a Congress of Confederated belligerent States, convened
for the great purpose of bringing the war, by their combined efforts,
to a speedy and successful termination, and at the same time, of
establishing a plan of general co-operation, in all cases whatsoever.
These assertions I shall establish beyond the possibility of a doubt,
by a brief reference to those conventions.
In the convention between Colombia and Chili, we find the
following provisions:
By the first article, it is declared that, “the Republic of Co-
“lombia and the State of Chili, are united, bound, and confederated,
“in peace and war, to maintain their influence and forces, by sea
“ and land—as far as circumstances, permit—their independence
tº of the Spanish nation, and of any other foreign domination what-
* Soever.”
By the second article, these two States “contract a league of
“close alliance for the common defence—for the security of their
“independence and liberty, for their reciprocal and general good,
“ and for their internal tranquillity, obliging themselves to succor
“each other, and to repel in common, every attack or invasion,
“which may in any manner threaten their political existence.”
By the third article it is declared, “the Republic of Colombia
“binds itself to assist, with the disposable sea and land forces; of
“which the number, or its equivalent, shall be fixed at a meeting of
“ plenipotentiaries.” -*.
Then follow the thirteenth and fourteenth articles, under
which the Congress at Panama is about to assemble. Thirteenth,
“Both parties oblige themselves to interpose their good offices with
“the Governments of the other States of America, formerly Spanish,
“to enter into this compact of UNION, LEAGUE, and confedera-
“TIon;” and fourteenth, “As soon as this great and important ob-
“ject has been attained, a GENERAL Assembly of AMERICAN STATES
“shall be convened [at Panama as subsequently stated] composed
“ of their plenipotentiaries, with the charge of cementing, in the
“most solid and stable manner, the intimate relations which ought
“to exist between all and every one of them, and which may serve
“As A councIL IN THE GREAT conflict, as a RALLYING Point in the
“ common DANGERs, as a faithful interpreter of the public treaties
y
“when difficulties occur, and as an umpire and conciliator in their
* disputes and differences.”
Now, Sir, in all the other'conventions, similar, and in some of
them even stronger language is held. They all provide for alliances,
offensive and defensive, for the purpose of bringing the present
war against Spain to a conclusion, by furnishing their quotas of
men, money, and ships; and they all stipulate that as soon as the
ALLIANCE, shall become general, this Panama Congress is to be con-
vened, as the first step to be taken under it. It is the “GREAT coun-
“cIL” of these belligerent States, and will of course be perpetual, or
at all events, will have a duration equal to that of the Confederacy
itself. (Mr. H. here referred minutely to all the conventions, and
argued from them in support of his position.) The last document
to which I shall refer, is the Official Gazette of Colombia, of Febru-
ary last, in which the objects of the Congress are thus stated:
“1. To form a solemn compact, or league, by which the States,
whose representatives are present, will be bound to unite in prose-
cuting the war against their common enemy, old Spain, or against
any other power, which shall assist Spain in her hostile designs, or
any otherwise assume the attitude of an enemy.
2. To draw up and publish a manifesto, setting forth to the
world the justice of their cause, and the relations they desire to
hold with other Christian powers.
3. To form a convention of navigation and commerce, applica-
ble both to the confederated States, and to their allies.
4. To consider the expediency of combining the forces of the
Republics, to free the Islands of Puerto Rico and Guba, from the
yoke of Spain, and, in such case, what contingent each ought to con-
tribute for this end.
5. To take measures for joining in a prosecution of the war at
sea, and on the coasts of Spain. \
6. To determine whether these measures shall also be extended
to the Canary and Phillipine islands.
7. To take into consideration the means of making effectual
the declaration of the President of the United States, respecting any
ulterior design of a foreign power to colonize any portion of this
continent, and also the means of resisting all interference from
abroad with the domestic concerns of the American Governments.
8. To settle, by common consent, the principles of those rights
of nations, which are in their nature controvertible.
9. To determine on what footing shall be placed the political
and commercial relations of those portions of our hemisphere,
which have obtained, or shall obtain, their independence, but whose
independence has not been recognized by any American or Euro-
pean power, as was for many years the case with Hayti.”
From these documents no man can deny that the Congress of
Panama is to be composed of deputies from belligerent States, and
that its objects are essentially belligerent. These objects are not

3.
concealed, but are publicly avowed, and known to the world. It is
to be an assembly of confederates, differing very little from the old
Congress under our Articles of Confederation, to which, indeed, i
bears a striking resemblance. . . .
The question now arises, whether a neutral State can join in
such a council without violating its neutrality? Can the United States
lawfully send deputies to a Congress of the confederated Spanish
American States?—a Congress which not only has objects confessed-
ly connected with the prosecution of the War, but when it is noto-
rious, that these belligerent objects create the very occasion of its
assembling? Can we do so without departing from our neutral re-
lations towards Spain? Is it possible, . President, that this can
be seriously questioned?. It will not bear an argument. There can
be no difference under the Law of Nations—for there is, none in
reason or justice—between aiding a belligerent in council or in ac-
tion—between consulting with him in respect to belligerent mea-
sures, or furnishing the men and money to accomplish them. To
afford to such a Congress as I have shown this at Panama to be, even
the lights of our wisdom and experience—to enter into consulta-
tions with them as to the means of bringing the contest to a speedy
and successful issue—to advise with them how to proceed, and when
to proceed—(and it appears from the documents that we are quite
ready with our advice in these respects,) unquestionably must be a to-
tal departure from our neutrality. It is no answer to this argument to
say, that our Ministers, when they take their seats, and become
members of the Congress, will not interfere in the discussion of bel-
ligerent questions, and will confine themselves exclusively to those
which are in their nature peaceful. If the character of the Congress
is belligerent—no neutral can lawfully be there. If, for any pur-
pose whatever, questions connected with the further prosecution of
the war, are to be there discussed and decided, our Ministers cannot
take their seats in the Assembly without involving us, by that very
act, in the contest. A strict and honorable neutrality, must keep us
out of any meeting not having peaceful objects eacclusively. The
Law of Nations in this respect, cannot differ from those rules of
municipal law, founded in the common sense of mankind—which in-
volve, in a common guilt, all who associate with those engaged in
any unlawful enterprise. It is not permitted to individuals, nor can
it be permitted to Nations, to excuse themselves for acting with
those engaged in belligerent enterprizes, by alleging that their own
purposes are peaceful. Sir, I hold that if you go into counsel at all
with such powers, you become answerable for all their acts. At
this moment a case occurs to me that took place many years ago, in
England, and which affords an apt illustration of this principle.
Lord Dacres, a young nobleman of wild and irregular habits, asso-
ciated himself with a party who were engaged in robbing a Park-
one of that party, without the knowledge of consent of Lord Dacres,
'9
killed the Game Keeper. His Lordship was taken up, and tried for
the murder; and though probably as innocent of that offence as
either of us, he was, according to the laws of England, found guilty.
No rank or influence could save him—he perished on the gallows—
a victim to the strict, though necessary, rule, which involves in a
common fate, all who associate and act with others engaged in any
unlawful pursuit. s
But an attempt is made to remove all our apprehensions on this
subject, (and it comes from a high quarter too,) by the assurance
that Spain is just about to acknowledge the independence of her
former Colonies, under our mediation. The Secretary of State, in
his report which accompanies the President's Message of the 9th
January, in answer to our call for information, transmits a mass of
documents to show that our Government has invoked the aid of Rus-
sia—that the Emperor has interfered at our request, and that there
is a flattering prospect of speedy and entire success. So says Mr.
Middleton—so says Mr. Clay. But, Mr. President, it fortunatel
happens that the Senate, on the 30th January, made another .#
for information on this point, and the answer of the President, of the
1st of February, dispels the illusion entirely. The three letters of
Mr. Everett there disclosed, demonstrate that there is no hope,
whatever, of a peace. The Minister of the Spanish Government,
(Mr. Zea,) declares that the determination of the King, on that sub-
ject, is unalterable—he will stand upon his naked right, and look
to Providence, should all other means fail. But this is not all.—
The Russian Minister concurs in the views of Mr. Zea, and the
British Minister will not interfere. In short, it is proved by these
documents that all hope of a peace is entirely at an end. The
hopes raised by the message of the 9th of January, are thus totally
crushed by that of the first of February. This no gentleman will
now question.*
It has been well remarked by the Committee, in their Report,
that no nation (unless restrained by their weakness) ever permitted
such an interference, as we are about to attempt, without redressing
the wrong by war. And surely, Sir, we are not to be called upon
to violate our neutral obligations towards Spain—because Spain is
weak. If a sense of justice, and a due regard to our own character
and our interests, should not restrain us from a measure of that kind,
perhaps we may be influenced by the consideration, that a violation
of neutrality on our part, may lead to similar violations on the part
*The important letter of the 15th–27th July, 1825, from Mr. Middleton to Mr.
Clay, and of 26th December, 1825, from Mr. Clay to Mr. Middleton, are not commu-
nicated to the House of Representatives. Mr. Everett’s three very important letters
are also not communicated—while some of his subsequent letters were commu-
nicated—which last the Senate did not receive until after their final decision on
the question before them. The documents before the Senate, proved beyond
a doubt, that there was no prospect of peace, and though this fact does not appear
from the documents transmitted to the House of Representatives, yet it is not contra-
dicted by them.
&N
*
10
of the powers of Europe, and that we may thus be the means of de-
stroying those whom we mean to serve and hope to save.
But there is another question arising out of this, and almost
of equal importance. What is to be the mode of the organization
and action of this Congress P What is to be the nature of the
powers to be given to our Ministers ? And what are the subjects
to be discussed ? Surely all of these are questions of the most vital
importance; and whether the character of the Congress be bellige-
rent or peaceful, they must be satisfactorily answered before any
man who has a due regard for the welfare of his country, should
consent to take a single step in a business of this delicate nature.
This was the view of the subject originally taken by the President
himself, as appears from the documents on our tables. In Mr.
Clay's letter to Mr. Obregon, dated 30th November, 1825, he says:
“When at your instance, during the last Spring, I had the honor,
“&c. of conferring with you verbally, in regard to the proposed
“Congress, &c I stated to you, by direction of the President, that it
“appeared to him to be necessary, before the assembling of such a
“Congress, to settle between the different powers to be represented,
“several preliminary points, such as the subjects to which the
“attention of the Congress should be directed, the substance and
“form of the powers to be given to the respective REPRESENTATIves,
“ and the mode of organizing the Congress, and that, if these points
“should be satisfactorily arranged, the President would be disposed
“to accept, in behalf of the United States, the invitation with which
“ you were provisionally charged.” The ground here assumed by
the Administration has my most unqualified approbation. I yield
my hearty assent to the position, that information on all these points
was necessary—yes, absolutely and indispensably necessary—be-
fore we could prudently take a single step in the business. But,
Sir, this ground has been altogether abandoned, and for reasons
with which we have not been favored. The President has deter-
mined at once to send Commissioners to the Congress at Panama—
without having obtained any information whatever on three of the
points before deemed necessary, and on the other having received
only partial, imperfect, and contradictory statements. As to “the
substance” and “the form” of the powers to be given to the “Re-
presentatives,” and the mode of the “organization of the Congress,”
we are without a particle of information—and in respect to “the
subjects to be discussed,” a few of them are specified, (and impor-
tant enough they certainly are,) while, as to to the rest, we are left
to search for them in the regions of conjecture. If the President
was right in the first instance, he must be wrong now. To my mind
it is clear that he then took the true Constitutional ground—and
having abandoned it without any reason, I cannot consent to go
with him. Gentlemen whose faith in Executive infallibility is greater
than mine, may be satisfied that the President must always be
right ; but for my own part, I require either facts or argument
11
before I can yield my assent to any measure whatsoever, and espe-
cially to such as are novel in their character and important in their
consequences. I stand here to advise the President, independently,
and according to my convictions of the policy or impoſicy of the
measures he may recommend, and I cannot conscientiously advise
this mission, until full and satisfactory information is obtained on
these points, which the Executive formerly deemed necessary, and
which I still so consider.
It is true, Mr. President, that, although we have not been fur-
nished with this necessary information, yet, in relation to the orga-
nization and action of the Congress, we are enabled to glean a few
facts from the correspondence before us, which shed some light
upon the subject, and exhibit the Congress in no very favorable
point of view
It is to be A Congress, a deliberative Assembly, composed of
DEPUTIES, with undefined powers; it is called in the conventions
“a great Council ;” and though the members in some places are
called “Plenipotentiaries,” yet, in others, they receive different
appellations; and Mr. Clay himself, in one place, considers them as
“REPRESENTATIVEs,” and elsewhere describes them as “Commis-
sioners ” They cannot be “Ambassadors:” for they are not to go
accredited to any sovereign State. They will not be ministers to
Colombia, within whose territory the Congress is to be convened ;
they must present their credentials to the Congress itself by whom
their validity must be decided on, and the members admitted to
their seats. It is only by the special provisions of the “Conven-
tions” that the deputies could claim the privileges and immunities
of Ambassadors, and as no such stipulations have been made in our
favor, it follows, that our deputies will be indebted even for protec-
tion to the Congress of which they are to be members. In what
form the deliberations are to be conducted, we know not, but we
are expressly told that their deliberations may be “confidential ;”
and I infer from a provision which authorizes a change in the place
of meeting “with the consent of a majority of the States,” that they
will vote by States, and that a majority will govern. Mr. Salazar
tells us expressly that “we may form an EvenTUAL ALLIANCE for
certain purposes to remain secret”—and adds, “that the conferences
held on this subject, being confidential, would increase mutual
friendship and promote the respective interests of the parties.”
The Powers which the ministers are to bear, are, both in res-
pect to form and substance, altogether undefined ; but we are told
by Mr. Obregon, that the ministers of Mexico will carry with them
“full powers"—and it is expected “that the ministers of other
States will do the same.” A few of the subjects to be discussed
are stated; but, with respect to the others, we are told by Mr. Sala:
zar, that those “specified, being given by way of example, it is left
to the wisdom of the Governments and the judgment of the Repre:
sentatives, to propose whatever may be for the common good.” And
12
again he says, that “the points will arise out of the deliberations.”
Judging, therefore, from the information afforded us, it appears that
our ministers are to go as “Representatives,” accredited, not to
sovereign States, but to “a Congress” of Deputies—that they are
to have seats in “a great Council”—that they are to bear “full
powers”—that the subjects” to be discussed are “to grow out of the
deliberations,” and are to be “suggested by the judgments of the
Representatives;” that the deliberations are to be, in some instances,
secret and “confidential”—and that “eventual alliances to remain
secret,” are in contemplation; but beyond this, we are left entirely
in the dark . The question then recurs, Shall we consent to go into
secret council, (supposing all the objects of that council, as far as we
are acquainted with them, to be peaceful,) while these important
points remain unsettled? If we are kept in ignorance, the fault is
not in the Senate. We have diligently sought for light, and it has
been denied us. Sir, it is too manifest to be doubted or questioned,
that the course we are now called upon to pursue, does involve a de-
parture from the settled, the fundamental policy of these United
States; and is an entire abandonment of the neutral position taken
by our Government in the contest between Spain and her colonies—
a position from which we have derived much honor, and which has
been fruitful of such happy consequences to the South American
States.
But we are told that we ought to have confidence in the Presi-
dent. We are assured that his instructions to our ministers will
save us from all danger. Sir, I care not what instructions the Pres-
dent shall think proper to give to our ministers. The character of
the Congress being belligerent, our neutrality is forfeited by the ve-
ry act of joining in their deliberations. Instructions being from
their nature, as well as from diplomatic usage, secret, can have no
influence in determining a question of neutrality—that must be de-
cided by acts, not by professions. However gentlemen may be ena-
moured of this new doctrine of implicit confidence in rulers, it is
not the ground I apprehend, on which the Senate ought to act in
fulfilling their constitutional duty of giving advice to the President.
If we are to act by faith, and not by knowledge, we have no business
to be here. Besides, Sir, I am free to confess, and will presently
shew, that some of the views of the Administration itself, in re-
spect to the mission, and the part we are expected to take in the de-
liberations of the Congress, are dangerous to the peace and safety
of this country. But, after all, is it sound constitutional doctrine
* The President, in his message to the House of Representatives, says: “I can
scarcely deem it otherwise than superfluous to observe, that the Assembly, will be in
its nature diplomatic, and not legislative;” and then goes on to explain the mode of
its organization and action. JWo such information was before the Senate. The docu-
ments before them proved that the President had insisted on obtaining information on
those very points as preliminary to his acceptance, and had failed to obtain it. Cer-
tainly the Senate had no such information—and the documents before them, went to
show that the Congress was legislative and not diplomatic,
13
that we are, by our previous sanction to the President's measures—
(by the vote of a bare majority, and not of two-thirds, as required by
the Constitution,) to put it in his power to commit irretrievably the
neutrality of the United States. Sanction this mission, and the
peace of this country is, in the most favorable view of the subject
in the hands of the President. Suppose his instructions, on the ve-
ry points which he tells you are to be discussed, should direct our
ministers to Join in all the belligerent counsels of the Congress, to
advise and arrange with them the plan of carrying on the war, and
wresting Cuba and Porto Rico from the hands of the common ene-
my—where will be your neutrality then P It is idle to talk of the
control that we may exercise, by rejecting treaties, which, by our
own previous consent, we may be morally bound to sanction, or
when measures shall have been taken and acts consummated be-
yond recall. But the apprehensions of some gentlemen are quieted
by the assurance that the ministers of the States which have invited
us have themselves expressly declared that we are not “expected
to violate our neutrality.” Words, Sir ; words, merely . . This as-
surance furnishes us with a memorable example of how little reli-
ance is to be placed on professions—the professions, too, of diplo-
matists . They very well understand how to say one thing while
they mean another. Every one of these Spanish American minis-
ters—Obregon, Salazar, and Canas—profess that we are not expect-
ed to depart from our neutrality, while each of them specifies ob-
jects in which we are expected to take part, and which do involve a
distinct and unequivocal departure from our neutrality. For the
sake of example, (for all the invitations speak the same language) I
will refer to the letter of Mr Canas to Mr. Clay, dated 14th Novem-
ber, 1825. After stating that the Government he represents (Cen-
tral America) “ was sensible of the importance to the independent
“nations of this continent, of a general congress of their representa-
“tives, at some central point, which might consider and adopt the
“best plan of defending the States of the New World from foreign
“aggression,” and stating that his Government also acknowledged
“ that, as Europe had formed a continental system, and held a Con-
“gress whenever questions affecting its interests were to be dis-
“cussed, AMERICA should form a system to itself, and assemble in
“Cortes whenever circumstances of necessity and great importance
“should demand it,” he goes on to state, that his Government had
“ formed a convention” on the subject, and appointed “its depu-
“ ties;” and he then says to us, “I am anxious, therefore, to know if
“this Republic, (the United States) which has ever shown itself the
“generous friend of the new American States, is disposed to send
“ its envoys to the General Congress, the object of which is, to pre-
“ serve and confirm the absolute independence of these Itepublics,
“ and to promote the general good, and which will not require that
“ the representatives of the United States should, in the least com-
“promit their present neutrality, harmony, and good intelligence
14
“with other nations.” Mr. Clay accepts the invitation thus given,
without any limitation whatever. Can any man read this ſetter,
and pretend that we can comply with the wishes of the writer and
save our neutrality P
Having, I trust, proved that, from the character of the Congress
of Panama, we cannot send deputies there without departing from
our neutrality, and that, if this point could be considered as doubt-
ful, still the ignorance in which we are left of the mode of the orga-
nization of the Congress, its manner of proceeding, and the form and
substanee of the powers of the representatives, . constitute a
decisive inducement to abstain from involving ourselves in such a
measure, I proceed next to consides THE subjects to BE D1scuss-
ED by that Congress, and in which it is avowed that we are expected
to take a part. *
And here, Mr. President, I will insist, that, if this mission
were liable to none of these objections, there is not a single object
specified in the invitations and answers, or in the message of the
President, which would justify the measure proposed. They are
all either dangerous, or inexpedient, or unnecessary, and this I will
attempt to prove, by a brief examination of each of them.
. The first great subject to which our attention at this Congress
is to be called, arises out of the pledge* which Mr. Monroe is sup-
posed to have given, “not to permit any foreign power to interfere
“in the war between Spain and her colonies;” and it appears, from
the correspondence, to be the special object of the new States to get
us to enter into treaties to redeem that pledge, according to the
construction they have chosen to put upon it, and in which, I am
sorry to add, the Executive seems to have acquiesced. Mr Obregon
tells us that the United States are only expected to take part in
those matters which the “late administration pointed out as being
of general interest, for which reason,” says he, “one of the sub-
“jects which will occupy the attention of the Congress will be the
“ resistance or opposition to the interference of any neutral nation
“in the question and war of independence between the new Powers
“of the continent and Spain;” and “that, as the Powers of AMERI-
“CA ARE of Accord as to resistance, it behoves them to discuss the
“means of giving to that resistance all possible force, that the evil
“may be met, if it cannot be avoided; and the only means of accom-
“plishing this object is, by a previous concert as to the mode in
“which each of them shall lend its co-operation: for, otherwise, re-
“sistance would operate partially, and in a manner much less cer-
“tain and effective.
“The opposition to Colonization in Jlmerica, by the European
* In relation to the supposed PLEDGE made by the United States to prevent colo-
nization in America, and also to prevent the interference of any European nation in
the present contest, there are two important documents before the House of Repre-
sentatives which were not before the Senate, viz: 1. The letter from Mr Adams to
Mr. Anderson, dated 27th May, 1823, in which the policy of this Government is fully
explained on that subject. 2. The message of the President to the House of Repre-
sentatives, in which he goes into an explanation of his present views.
15
“Powers, will be another of the questions which may be discussed,
“and which is in like predicament with the foregoing.”
Mr Salazar holds language on this subject still more explicit.
Now I do positively deny that Mr. Monroe ever pledged this
nation to go to war or make treaties to prevent the interference of
any European nation in the present contest. I deny that he had a
right to make any such pledge ; and most of all, do Ideny that any
sanction has been given to such an idea by the Senate, the House of
Representatives—by the States, or by the People of the United
States. The language of Mr. Monroe is extremely vague and inde-
finite. That great and good man well knew that he had no power
to use any but a moral force on that question ; and beyond this
moral influence over the councils of the nations of Europe, he nei-
ther attempted nor desired to go. He well knew—every intelli-
gent man in the United States knows—that this nation is not now, and
never has been, prepared to go to war for the Independence of
South America. The new States have always carried with them
our warmest wishes for their success—but beyond the indulgence of
a sincere and friendly sympathy, we have never been willing to pro-
ceed. Mr. Monroe's declaration, I repeat, was intended to pro-
duce a moral effect abroad; he designed it for the atmosphere of Eu-
rope, and therefore it was couched in such terms that, while it did
not commit us to any overt acts, it left foreign nations under a vague
impression of what we might do, if the event alluded to should ever
happen. The substance of Mr Monroe’s statement was, “that he
“should consider any attempt on their part (the powers of Europe)
“to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere, as dan-
“gerous to our peace and safety,” and as “the manifestation of an
“unfriendly disposition towards the United States.” It is obvious
that we are left by this pledge altogether free to act in any emergen-
cy according to circumstances and a sense of our own interests.
We have incurred no obligations to others by the declaration; and
it is our policy to incur none. But it now appears that the new
States have conceived themselves entitled to our aid whenever
foreign interference shall be threatened, and (what is truly unfortu-
nate) it further appears that the new Administration have acknow-
ledged their claims, and admitted our obligations; they have acted,
and are now about to act, on the presumption that the Spanish
American States may rightfully claim, and that we are bound to
grant, our assistance against all nations who may “hereafter inter-
“fere in any way whatever in the question and war of Indepen-
“dence.” Nay, so far have our Government gone in this respect,
that they have actually claimed commercial privileges from these
States on the ground that we are to be considered as “one of the
American Nations,” and “within the pale of the great AMERICAN
SystEM ;” that we are “prepared to bear the brunt of the contest
“ which will arise should any foreign Power attempt to interfere.”
To shew how far our Government have proceeded in this course, I
16
must be permitted to read a few pages from the documents before
us. In the letter of our Minister to Mexico to the Secretary of
State, dated 28th Sept. 1825, after giving an account of the difficul-
ties which had arisen in making a treaty with Mexico, in consequence
of the desire of that Government to introduce an article putting it
in their power to grant special commercial privileges to the .
Spanish American States, he informs us that he insisted that we
should be entitled to similar privileges, because “we were bound
to them by similar fraternal ties.” To some objections urged against
our claims on the ground that we had not yet taken partin the war,
our Minister replied in the following words, viz. “To these ob-
“ servations I replied, that, against the power of Spain they had
“given sufficient proof that they required no assistance, and the
“ United States had pledged themselves not to permit any other
“Power to interfere either with their Independence or form of Go-
“vernment, and that, as in the event of such an attempt being made
“by the Powers of Europe, we would be compelled to take the most
“active and efficient part, and to bear the brunt of the contest, it
“was not just that we should be placed on a less favorable footing
“ than the other Republics of America, whose existence we were
“ready to support at such hazards.” The Minister then goes on
to state, that, after explaining what we had already done, he de-
clared “what further we were ready to do, in order to defend
“ their rights and liberties, but that this could only be expected
“from us, and could only be accomplished, by a strict union of all
“the American Republics on terms of perfect equality and reciproci-
“ ty, and repeated, that it was the obvious policy of Europe to di-
“vide us into small confederacies, with separate and distinct inter-
“ests, and as manifestly ours to form A SINGLE GREAT conFEDERACY,
“which might oppose one united front to the attacks of our ene-
“mies.”
With the instructions to Mr. Poinsett we have not been favor-
ed; but his character is too well known to admit of a doubt, that, in
holding this language he faithfully reflected the sentiments “ of the
“Cabinet at Washington.” Mr. Clay, in his letter of 9th Novem-
ber, 1825, takes the same grounds; and our Government, by not
disclaiming the principles avowed by Mr Poinsett, (and we have
no disclaimer,) have sanctioned his views and confirmed his pro-
ceedings. In Mr. Clay's letter, he objects, especially, to any dis-
tinction being made between the United States and the other States
—because “it would place the United States, in some degree, out
“ of the pale of that AMERICAN systEM, of which they form no un-
“essential part.” From the Conventions between the South Ameri-
can States, it appears, that the Congress of Panama was designed
for the Confederated States only, which, in those documents receiv-
ed the appellation of “The JAmerican Wations.” To this Mr. Clay
adverts, and says “the Mexican Government has invited that of
“the United States to be represented at the Congress of Panama,
17
“and the President has determined to accept the invitation. Such
“an invitation has been given to no European power, and it ought
“not to have been given to this if it is not to be considered as one
“of the flmerican JVations.” In the same despatch, Mr. Clay alludes
to a most interesting transaction, to wit: a claim interposed, on the
part of the Mexican Government, for our interference, when it was
expected that France was about to take a part in the contest. We
are not furnished, either with the application to our Government, or
the answer made to it; but Mr. Clay mentions the proceeding—in the
following terms: “No longer than about three months ago, when
“an invasion by France, of the Island of Cuba, was believed at Mexi-
“co, the United Mexican Government promptly called upon the
“Government of the United States, through you, to fulfil the memo-
“rable pledge of the President of the United States, in his message
“to Congress, of December, 1823. What we would have done,
“had the contingency happened, may be inferred, from a despatch
“to the American minister at Paris,” &c. Now, when we refer to
that despatch, in order to find out what we are to do, under “the
memorable pledge,” when the “contingency,” contemplated by that
pledge, “shall happen,” (that is to say, when any European nation
shall interfere in the question of Spanish American Independence)
we discover that this is to be “inferred” from our declaration to the
French Government, as to what we would have done in relation to
Cuba and Porto Rico, viz. “that we would not consent to the occu-
“pation of those Islands, by any other European power than Spain,
“ under any circumstances whatever.” Thus, then, it appears, what is
the line of conduct which this administration has determined to pur-
sue under the aforesaid memorable pledge. We find that our Minis-
ter in Mexico has been directed to assure that Government, in sub-
stance, that we will not permit any European nation to interfere
with their independence in any contingency whatever. Such was
the course we had determined to pursue, with regard to Cuba and
Porto Rico, and we have assured the Spanish American States, that
We will pursue a similar course (under the pledge not to permit any
European nation to interfere in the contest,) whenever “the contin-
gency shall happen”—that is to say, whenever such interference
shall be attempted. Now, be it remembered, that it is for the avow-
ed purpose of making this pledge, thus understood, effectual, and to
put it, if I may so speak, into legal form, that we have been invited
to attend this Congress. And to this we are now called upon to give
our assent. The official Gazette of Colombia specifies this to be a
leading object of the Congress, Canas, Obregon, and Salazar all
repeat it, and the latter declares that this object is altogether consis-
tent with “THE REPEATED DECLARATIONS AND PROTESTs of THE
CABINET AT WASHINGTon.” His words are so remarkable, that I
must be suffered to quote them :
“The manner in which all colonization of European Powers on
“ the American continent shall be resisted, and their interference
3
18
“in the present contest between Spain and her former colonies pre-
“ vented, are other points of great interest. Were it proper, an
“eventual alliance, in case these events should occur, which is within
“the range of possibilities, and the treaty, of which no use should be
“made until the casus foederis should happen, to remain secret; or,
“if this should seem premature, a convention so anticipated would
“be different means to secure the same end, of preventing foreign
“influence. This is a matter of immediate utility to the American
“States that are at war with Spain, and is in accordance with the
“repeated declarations and protests of the Cabinet at Washington.
“The conferences held on this subject being confidential, would in-
“crease mutual friendship,” &c.
And now, Sir, I must put the question, directly and seriously,
to the Senate, whether they are prepared to send Ministers to the
Congress of Panama, for the purpose of making effectual this pledge
of the President of the United States, as construed by the present
administration, and understood by the Spanish American States ?
Whatever may b the opinion of others, I, for one, have no hesitation
in declaring that I am not prepared for any such proceeding; I am
not ready now to declare that I will involve my country in all the
horrors of war for the establishment of South American Indepen-
dence; and, even if I were prepared to say, that, rather than permit
the interference of any foreign nation in the contest, “we must
fight,” still I should think it wise and prudent not to commit our-
selves by treaties or compacts, but to reserve the right to act when
the contingency shall happen, as our feelings or interest may then
dictate. It is of the last importance that we should reserve this pri-
vilege to ourselves; that we should enterinto no stipulations what-
eyer with other nations on such a subject. But, should we send
Ministers to Panama for these objects, we will not be free to pursue-
this course. If our Ministers go there with our sanction, committed
as we know the President to be, we must either sanction the com-
pacts which may be entered into, or disappoint the just expectations
which we will have raised. In the one case, our interests will be
sacrificed, and, in the other, our friendly relations with the new
States will be interrupted. Let us, then, avoid this dilemma, by
not placing ourselves voluntarily in a situation which will leave us
only a choice of difficulties, and impose upon us the hard necessity
of offending our friends or injuring ourselves.
Connected with this object, is another, bearing a close resem-
blance to it: “the opposition to colonization in America” by any
European power. If, by this, it is to be understood that we are to
interfere to obstruct the settlement of the territories in America
owned by Russia or England, it must speedily involve us in an unjust
and unnecessary war. But, if the design is to enter into compacts
with the South American States, not to permitany colonization with-
in our respective limits, or, if we are to make common cause in resist-
ing all such attempts, then I must boldly declare that the scheme is,
19
in the one case, derogatory to our honor, and, in the other, dangerous
to our safety What! is it come to this, that the United States of
America are to come under obligations to others; to bind themselves
to nations of yesterday, to preserve their own territories from inva-
sion, and their homes and their altars from pollution? Nay, are we
at this period of our history, to enter into solemn vows, that we will
neither permit ourselves to be conquered nor to be sold? sir, the
idea of treaty stipulations against colonization is degrading and un-
meaning, unless it is intended that we shall guaranty to the new
States the possession of their territories; and, if that is the plan, it
is as unwise as it is dangerous.
The next subjects to be considered by the Congress of Panama
are the suppression of the AFRICAN SLAve TRADE and the INDEPEN-
DENCE of HAYTI; and I admit that these involve questions of deep
interest to us all The United States were the first to set its face
against the Slave Trade, and the first to suppress it among their own
citizens. . . We are entitled to the honor of having effectually accom-
plished this great object, not more by the force of our laws than by
the omnipotent power of public opinion—a power in this country pa-
ramount to the laws themselves. In all measures of this character
every portion of our fellow citizens have cordially co-operated; and,
even in those States where slavery still exists, the People have gone
heart and hand with their Government in every measure calculated
to cut up this nefarious trade by the roots. In the State which I have
the honor to represent, any man concerned directly or indirectly in
this traffic would be indignantly driven out of society. Having done
so much, we may well call upon other nations “to go and do like-
wise,” before they can be permitted to taunt us on this subject, as one
of these South American Ministers has done.
The question of slavery is one, in all its bearings, of extreme
delicacy, and concerning which I know of but a single wise and
safe rule, either for the States in which it exists, or for the Union.
It must be considered and treated entirely as a Dom ESTIc question.
With respect to foreign Nations, the language of the United States
ought to be, that it concerns the peace of our own political family,
and therefore we cannot permit it to be touched; and in respect to
the slave-holding States, the only safe and constitutional ground on
which they can stand, is, that they will not permit it to be brought
into question either by their sister States, or by the Federal Govern-
ment. It is a matter, Mr. President, for ourselves. To touch it at all,
is to violate our most sacred rights—to put in jeopardy our dearest
interests—the peace of our country—the safety of our families, our
altars, and our firesides. Sir! on the question of our slave institu-
tions, so often incidentally mentioned, I will take this opportunity,
once for all, to declare, in a few words, my own feelings and opin-
ions. It is a subject to which I always advert with extreme reluc-
tance, and never, except when it is forced upon me. On the present
occasion the subject has been forced upon our consideration, and
20
when called upon to give my sanction to the discussion by our minis-
ters, (in connexion with a foreign Congress,) of questions so inti-
mately connected with the welfare of those whom I represent, I can-
not consent to be silent. On the slave question, my opinion is this;
I consider our rights in that species of property as not even open to
discussion, either here or elsewhere; and in respect to our duties,
(imposed by our situation,) we are not to be taught them by fanatics,
religious or political. To call into question our rights, is grossly
to violate them—to attempt to instructus on this subject, is to insult
us—to dare to assail our institutions is wantonly to invade our
peace. Let me solemnly declare, once for all, that the Southern
States never will permit, and never can permit, any interference,
whatever, in their domestic concerns, and that the very day on
which the unhallowed attempt shall be made by the authorities of
the Federal Government, we will consider ourselves as driven from
the Union. Let the consequences be what they may, they never can
be worse than such as must inevitably result from suffering a rash
and ignorant interference with our domestic peace and tranquillity.
But while I make these declarations, I must be permitted to add,
that I apprehend no such violation of our constitutional rights. I
believe that this House is not disposed, and that the great body of
our intelligent and patriotic fellow-citizens in the other States have
no inclination, whatever, to interfere with us. There are parties,
indeed, composed, some of them of fanatics, and others of political
aspirants, who are attempting, vainly I hope, to turn the current of
popular opinion against us. These men have done us much harm
already, and seem still fatally bent upon mischief. But if we are
true to ourselves we will have nothing to fear. Now, Sir, if it is
the policy of the States not to suffer this great question to be touch-
ed by the Federal Government, surely it must be the policy of this
government, exercising a paternal care over every member of the
political family, not to suffer foreign nations to interfere with it.—
It is their imperative duty to shun discussion with them—and to
avoid all treaty stipulations, whatever, on any point connected di-
rectly, or remotely, with this great question. It is a subject of too
delicate a nature—too vitally interesting to us, to be discussed
abroad. On this subject we committed an error when we entered
into treaties with Great Britain and Colombia for the suppression of
the slave trade. That error has been happily corrected. The first
treaty has failed, and the second was nearly unanimously rejected
by this body. Our policy then is now firmly fixed—our course is
marked out. With nothing connected with slavery can we consent
to treat with other nations, and least of all ought we to touch the
question of the independence of Hayti in conjunction with Revo-
lutionary Governments, whose own history affords an example
scarcely less fatal to our repose. Those governments have pro-
claimed the principles of “liberty and equality,” and have mai ched
to victory under the banner of “universal emancipation.” You find
21
men of color at the head of their Armies, in their Legislative Halls,
and in their Executive Departments. They are looking to Hayti,
even now, with feelings of the strongest confraternity, and show by
the very documents before us, that they acknowledge her to be in-
dependent, at the very moment when it is manifest to all the world
beside, that she has resumed her colonial subjection to France.—
Sir, it is altogether hopeless that we could, if we would, prevent
the acknowledgment of Haytien independence by the Spanish Ame-
rican States; and I am constrained to add that I must doubt from
the instruments to be employed by our government, whether they
mean to attempt to do so. We are to send, it seems, an honest and
respectable man, but a distinguished advocate of the JMissouri re-
striction—an acknowledged abolitionist—to plead the cause of the
South, at the Congress of Panama. Our policy, with regard to
Hayti, is plain. We never can acknowledge her independence.—
Other States will do as they please—but let us take the high ground,
that these questions belong to a class, which the peace and safety
of a large portion of our Union forbids us even to discuss. Let
our government direct all our Ministers in South America and
Mexico, to protest against the Independence of Hayti + Butletus
not go into council on the slave trade and Hayti. These are subjects
not to be discussed any where. There is not a nation on the globe
with whom I would consult on that subject, and least of all, the
new Republics.
I proceed next to consider the great object (which seems to lie
so near to the hearts of some of our statesmen,) of building up what
they are pleased to call “AN AMERICAN systEM”—terms which, when
applied to our domestic policy, mean restriction and monopoly, and
when applied to our foreign policy, mean “entangling alliances”—
both of them the fruit of that prurient spirit which will not suffer
the nation to advance gradually in the development of its great
resources, and the fulfilment of its high destinies, but would accele-
rate its march by the most unnatural and destructive stimulants.-
“As Europe, (says Mr. Canas,) has formed a continental system,
“America should form a system for herself.” “The mere assemb-
“ling (says Mr. Salazar) of the Congress, by shewing the ease with
“ which America can combine, will increase our political import-
“ance.” In plain terms, Mr. President, we are called upon to
form a Holy ALLIANCE on this side of the water, as a counterpoise
to the Holy Alliance on the other side of it. Are the people of this
country prepared for that?, What is there in the history or char-
acter of the Holy Alliance that makes it a fit subject for our imita-
tion? This combination of nations at peace, to maintain certain
* The President, in his Message to the Senate, mentions neither the slav E TRADE
nor Hayti, but they are mentioned in the documents, which accompany that message,
as questions which were to form subjects of deliberation at the Congress of Panama.
This was all the light the Senate possessed on the subject. In the message to the
House, the matter is presented in a light somewhat different.
22
principles and institutions, contains the most atrocious violation of
the natural and social rights of man that the world has ever seen.
It is wrong—most fatally wrong—and it makes no difference, in
reason or justice, what the principles to be maintained are. It is
of the essence of National Independence, that every country should
be left free to adopt, and to change its principles and its policy ac-
cording to its own views of its own interests; and from the very
bottom of my soul, I abhor the idea of combinations among sove-
reign States, for any purpose whatever. Great Britain, the only
nation in Europe that possesses the shadow of freedom, has refused
to join the Holy Alliance. I hope we shall follow her example in
having nothing to do with this “great American confederacy”—
Mr. Canning declared that such an alliance was unconstitutional—
and surely, if it was so in Great Britain, it must be so here. *
I come now, Mr. President, to the last subject specified by the
South American Ministers, in which we are expected to take a part,
and which is strongly relied upon here as constituting in itself a
decisive inducement for our sending Ministers to the Congress of
Panama—I mean the fate of CUBA. Now, Sir, I have on this point
the authority of the President himself, that neither he nor his Cabi-
net considered this question as furnishing any reason in favor of
this mission. If the President or his Cabinet had supposed it ma-
terial, he would have stated it to us as one of the reasons which
rendered the mission desirable. But neither in his message, nor in
the documents which accompanied it, did he say one word about
Cuba; and all our information on the subject has been extracted
by the call for information made by the Senate on 3d January last.
And yet no man can deny that this is one of the most interesting
and important topics connected with the subject. But, Sir, the
fact is, that the Executive is unfortunately so committed, in rela-
tion to Cuba, as to leave themselves bound hand and foot, deprived
of the power of taking a single step that could be productive of any
beneficial results; and therefore, no doubt it was, that the President
did not deem it important to mention the subject to us at all. On
examining the documents now before us, it will appear, that while
our government has taken the bold ground in relation to Russia,
France, and Great Britain, that “ they will not permit any nation
except Spain, to take Cuba, under any circumstances whatever,”
they have, in relation to the South American States, declared ex-
pressly that we cannot interfere. Though the interests of the
United States would be much more deeply affected by the posses-
sion of Cuba, by any of the new States than by France, or even by
Russia, yet, while in relation to the latter, we throw ourselves fear-
lessly into the breach, and have declared—“we will not permit
them to act”—with respect to the former, “we can see no ground
“on which we can forcibly interfere.” Mr. Clay, in his letter to Mr.
Middleton, 26th December, 1825, says—“On this subject it is pro-
“per we should be perfectly understood by Russia. For ourselves,
23 s
“we desire no change in the possession of Cuba, as has been here-
“tofore stated. We cannot allow a transfer of the island to any
“ European power. But if Spain should refuse to conclude a peace
“ and obstinately resolve on continuing the war, although we do
“ not desire that either Colombia or JMeacico should acquire the
“island of Cuba, the President cannot see any justifiable ground
“ on which we can forcibly interfere. Upon the hypothesis of an
“unnecessary protraction of the war, imputable to Spain, it is evi-
“dent that Cuba will be her only point d'appui, in this hemisphere.
“How can we INTERPose on that supposition, against the party
“clearly having right on his side, in order to restrain or DEFEAT A
“ Lawful operation of war P If the war against the islands
“should be conducted by those republics in a desolating manner;
“if, contrary to all expectation, they should put arms into the
“hands of one race of the inhabitants to destroy the lives of another;
“if, in short, they should countenance and encourage excesses and
“examples, the contagion of which, from our neighborhood, would
“be dangerous to our quiet and safety; the government of the Uni-
“ted States might feel itself called upon to interpose its power.—
“But it is not apprehended that any of those contingencies will
“arise, and, consequently, it is most probable that the United States,
“should the war continue, will remain hereafter, as they have been
“heretofore, neutral observers of the progress of its events.
“You will be pleased to communicate the contents of this des-
“patch to the Russian government. And as, from the very nature
“of the object which has induced the President to recommend to
“ the governments of Colombia, and Mexico a suspension of their
“expeditions against the Spanish islands, no definite time could be
“suggested for the duration of that suspension; if it should be ac-
“ ceded to, it must be allowed, on all hands, that it ought not to be
“unnecessarily protracted.”
In accordance with these views, Mr. Clay writes to Mr. Sala-
zar, 20th December, 1825—“The President believes that a suspen-
“sion for a limited time of the sailing of the expedition which is un-
“derstood to be fitting out at Carthagena, or of any other expedition
“which may be contemplated against either of those Islands, (Cuba
* In relation to Cuba and Porto Rico, the President’s Message to the Senate, and
the documents which accompanied it, did not mention them at all. In answer to the
call for information, made by the Senate on 3d January, the President communicated
a number of documents, some of which touched this subject. Among them, a letter
from Mr. Clay to Mr. Middleton, dated 26th December, 1825, and which has not been
communicated to the House of Representatives. That letter, among other important
matters,contains the very remarkable passage above quoted, shewing that our Govern-
ment had taken the ground that we could not interfere to prevent the invasion of these
Islands by the Spanish American States, while on the other hand we had determined
“not to permit any European Nation, except Spain, to take them under any circum-
stances whatever.”
This passage, connected with the two others above quoted, from Mr. Clay's letter
to Mr. Salazar, dated 20th December, 1825, was the foundation of the argument in
the Senate, on this point.
24
“ and Porto Rico) by Colombia or Mexico, would have a salutary in-
“fluence on the great work of peace.” . And again—“he expresses
“the hope that the Republic of Colombia will see the expediency in
“the actual posture of affairs of forbearing to attack those islands,
“ until a sufficient time has elapsed, to ascertain the result of the pa-
“cific efforts which the great powers are believed to be now making
“ on Spain.” Well, that time has elapsed—the result is ascertain.
ed., The mediation has failed—and the Executive stands fatally
pledged—not to “interpose” to defeat “a lawful operation of war.”
on the part of those “who have right on their side,” unless indeed
the “manner” of conducting that operation, should induce us to
change our position; and this, says the Secretary, “is not appre-
“ hended.”
Thus, then, it manifestly appears that our faith is plighted, and
that we have acknowledged the high obligations of duty not to in-
terfere, unless, indeed, the slaves should be excited to murder their
masters; and then, says Mr. Clay, perhaps we might; and as to the
invasion, all we have felt ourselves authorized to ask is, a small
delay in the sailing of the expedition, only until the effect of our
interposition with Russia shall be ascertained—of the total failure
of which we are now officially informed. I repeat, therefore, our
Executive has forever closed the lips of their Ministers on this sub-
ject, and there is no pretence for supposing that we can now inter-
fere to prevent the invasion of Cuba and Porto Rico.
Nothing remains for us now, if, indeed, any thing can be done,
but for Congress to interpose their authority in preventing the Ex-
ecutive from carrying their views into effect, and that interposition
will not take place by confirming this mission. The true Constitu-
tional ground is, that the President has no right to pledge this na-
tion, either as to our not permitting any foreign nation to take Cu-
ba, or as to there being no ground to interfere to prevent its cap-
ture by the new Republics. I would change our position, at least
so far as to declare, that the South American States should not be
permitted to take it, or to revolutionize it. . But, as the question
now presents itself as connected with this mission, WQ. Cain a CCO In-
plish no good, and may involve ourselves in difficulties, by consel-
iing with those who are merely to settle the mode of co-operation
in the invasion of Cuba and Porto Rico—a measure already decid-
ed on, and against which our government have bound themselves
not to interfere It is in vain to say that the Executive has only
disclaimed forcible interference. No other could be effectual. For
a nation to disclaim the ultima ratio, is to surrender the point in
dispute. There is no such disclaimer as to Europe. There, “we
will not permit;” here, “we cannot forcibly interfere.” But we
have gone further. We have stated expressly to the new States,
that we only ask delay, and nothing but delay; and that to “a day
“ certain,” and now past. e e e
As to the other objects of this Congress, specified in the invi-
25
tations, there is one answer to them all—they belong to ordinary
diplomacy, and will be better and more speedily accomplished by
our ministers to these new States, than by going into a Congress of
their deputies, whose attention must be chiefly engrossed by belli-
gerent operations and local objects.
It only remains for me to notice the additional subjects speci-
fied by the President. He considers this mission necessary to pre-
vent the new States from granting special favors to Spain and to
each other. The treaties now submitted to us show, that these
States have determined not to grant any privileges to Spain; and
with respect to each other, we have already formed treaties with
some of them in terms of the most perfect reciprocity, and, with
the only State with which we have had the least difficulty (Mexico)
our latest accounts leave no doubt of their being speedily removed.
The President next tells us that it is important to establish the
principles and restrictions of reason on the extent of blockade—but
surely, Sir, these and similar objects are to be attained by treaties
negotiated in the ordinary way. They require no such extraordi-
nary and questionable proceeding as a mission to this Congress.
We are next informed by the President that it will be one of
our objects to inculcate on the new States the principles of reli-
gious liberty;" and some hints are thrown out of an indirect influ-
* On the subject of RELIGION, the President was understood in the Senate, to re-
commend an attempt to alter the Constitution of the new States on that point; but in
his message to the House of Representatives, he limits the object to the obtaining for
our citizens the right of worshipping according to their own consciences—a right which
is secured to them in all the treaties already made with those States, and which it is
presumed can, in the ordinary course of negotiations, be obtained from all of them.
The following are the passages in the messages of the President to the two Houses, on
this subject:
To the Senate, the President said:
“There is yet another subject upon which, without entering into any treaty, the
moral influence of the United States may, perhaps, be exerted with beneficial conse-
quences at such a meeting—the advancement of religious liberty. Some of the South-
ern nations are, even yet, so far under the dominion of prejudice, that they have incor-
porated, with their political constitutions, an exclusive church, without toleration of
any other than the dominant sect. The abandonment of this last badge of religious
bigotry and oppression, may be pressed more effectually by the united exertions of
those who concur in the principles of freedom of conscience, upon those who are yet
to be convinced of their justice and wisdom, than by the solitary efforts of a minister to
any one of the separate Governments.”
To the House of Representatives, he says:
“And lastly, the Congress of Panama is believed to present a fair occasion for urg-
ing upon all the new nations of the South, the just and liberal principles of religious li-
berty. Not by any interference, whatever, in their internal concerns, but by claiming
for our citizens, whose occupations or interests may call them to occasional resi-
dence in their territories, the inestimable privilege of worshipping their Creator ae-
cording to the dictates of their own consciences. This privilege, sanctioned by the
customary law of nations, and secured by treaty stipulations in numerous national com-
#. secured even to our own citizens in the treaties with Colombia, and with the
ederation of Central America, is yet to be obtained in the other South American
States and Mexico. Existing . are still struggling against it, which may,
perhaps, be more successfully combatted at this general meeting, than at the separate
Seats of Government of each Republic.” g
4. g
26
ence that may be exerted over their councils. If, Mr. President, it
is against the spirit ºf our Constitution to interfere in any way with
the religion of our own people, I should conclude it must be alto-
gether foreign to our policy to interfere with the religion of other
nations. We both believe ourselves to be right, and I know of no
power but that of the Almighty which can decide between us. Besides
Sir, is it not obvious that any attempt to acquire influence over the
councils, or to regulate the religious policy of the new States, must
have a tendency to interrupt the friendly relations now existing
between us, in the cultivation of which the President assures us, he
found the last and decisive inducement for accepting the invitation.
Nothing, to my mind, can be clearer, than that this mission must
either terminate in an idle ceremony, or our ministers will deeply
wound the sensibilities of the new States; unless indeed, they shall
be authorized to enter into stipulations inconsistent with our neu-
trality and fatal to our interests. Look at the questions to be sub-
mitted to their consideration. On every one of them our deputies
must refuse to act, or, by acting, commit the country.
I have given to this subject, Mr. President, the most dispas-
sionate consideration, and I am free to confess, that, whether I con-
sider the measure itself, the form of the invitation, or the course
which has been pursued in relation to it, my mind is filled with the
most unqualified astonishment. That the President should have
committed himself—committed us, and committed the nation; and
that the question should have been brought before us, under the cir-
cumstances to which I shall now briefly advert, will form, it appears
to me, a curious page in the history of this country, which will, here-
after, be referred to with peculiar interest.
The first, and only intimation, it appears from the statement of
the Secretary of State, made to our government on the subject of
this mission, was verbally made some time “during the last spring.”
It is true that the Minister of Colombia speaks of “some verbal
conferences,” and the Minister of Mexico mentions “conversations;”
but Mr. Clay assures us there was but one conference. A verbal
answer was given by the President, in which he intimates a disposi-
tion to accept the invitation, provided the subjects to be discussed—
the powers of the JMinisters, and “the mode of the organization and
action of the Congress,” shall be previously adjusted.
On the 2d and 3d of November following, the answers were
received to this demand, and, although they did not contain any
compliance with the President's reasonable wishes, he held the
subject under advisement until the 30th of November, (sia, days
only before the meeting of Congress,) when he notified the Ministers
of Mexico and Colombia that he had determined Ar once to accept
of the invitation. The minister of Guatemala gave no invitation
before the 14th of November, and the answer to him bears
date the 30th of the same month, and accepts without any
qualification. Thus far several material circumstances suggest
27
themselves to our consideration: the first is, that the invitation
should have been given originally by but two of the Republics to be
represented at the Congress, and that to this day we have not
heard a word from three of these powers. The next is, that all the
other powers to be represented, had formed solemn conventions
among themselves, under which the Congress is to be convened, and
that no such stipulation has been made with us. But the most im-
portant circumstance of all is, the determination of the President
to commit himself to the acceptance of this invitation, six days only
before the meeting of Congress. I will not believe, Sir, that the
President could have desired to influence the decision of the Senate
by such a proceeding. Yet we do know, that the idea of the em-
barrassment to which he will be subjected, should the Senate refuse
to ratify his proceedings, constitutes the leading reason with many
entlemen here, and the only efficient one with several, for confirm-
ing the nominations. Six days after giving his answer to the South
American ministers, Congress met, and the President in his open-
ing message stated, “that the invitation had been accepted, and
ministers will be commissioned.” The claim thus set up to
send these ministers by his own authority, is the only plausible rea-
son that can be given for its premature acceptance; and I am com-
pelled to conclude, that at this time the President did not intend
to ask the consent of the Senate except to the appropriation. From
the 6th to the 26th of December, though the measure had been re-
solved on, we heard no more upon the subject, and yet we have
since been told that the Congress was actually in session on the
3d of November last,” and our delays have been complained of, how
justly we shall presently see. During this interval, the right of the
President to commission ministers of his own free will, and without
consulting the Senate, was boldly and publicly asserted, and the in-
genious writers in the public journals (under whose high displeasure
we have fallen) contended “that the Senate would take new
ground, if they undertook to question it.”
Though there is not a line or a principle in any part of the
Constitution which authorizes the President, either expressly or by
implication, to appoint foreign Ministers, without the advice and
consent of the Senate, and though the distinction between the accre-
dited agents of the government bearing commissions, and the mere
private and personal agents of the President, is too obvious to es-
cape the most superficial observation, yet the argument urged, was
that as Mr. Monroe had appointed private agents to visit South Ame-
*In Mr. Obregon’s letter to Mr. Clay, of 3d. November, 1825, he states “that
“ the Congress is to be assembled at Panama, at which City the Representatives from
« Colombia, Peru, Guatemala, and Mexico, will have already arrived at the date of
“ this.”—3d November. The President, however, did not make his nominations till
26th December, near two months after. The Conventions show that the Congress is,
from its nature, as well as its duties, permanent. It is to serve as the great counsel
during the war, and an interpreter of treaties, &c.
23
rica, Mr. Adams had a right to commission Ministers to attend a
Congress. At length, however, on the 26th of December, the Pre-
sident sent us his message, asking for our advice and consent; he
accompanied it by a clear and unequivocal assertion of his right to
act without our consent. His words are—“Although this measure
“was deemed to be within the constitutional competency of the Ex-
“ecutive, I have not thought proper to take any step in it before as-
“certaining that my opinion of its expediency will concur with that
“of both branches of the Legislature: first, by the decision of the Se-
“nate upon the nominations to be laid before them; and, secondly,
“by the sanction of both Houses to the appropriations.”
Now, as it was the intention of the President to obtain the
opinion of both Houses on “the expediency of the mission,” his
requiring this of the Senate by a vote on the nominations, and of the
House of Representatives by a subsequent vote on the appropria-
tion, was a measure singularly unfortunate for obtaining an unbiass-
ed opinion on those subjects. The form in which the question was
submitted, hardly presented an alternative to either House. The
vote on the nominations does not necessarily involve the expedien-
cy of the mission. Suppose we should reject these gentlemen—
may not the Executive construe it into an objection personal to the
individuals, and send us other names to-morrow? And should we
confirm the nominations, do we not know that many members of the
other House will then consider themselves bound by a constitution-
al duty to make the appropriation? I feel that the course which
has been pursued precludes the possibility of now obtaining an un-
biassed expression of the opinion of either House, while, if the Pre-
sident, without accepting the invitation, had submitted the question
of expediency to the two Houses of Congress, by calling for an ap-
propriation, such an opinion would have been secured. In his mes-
sage to the Senate of the 26th December, the President gave us
nothing but the bare invitations and acceptance, with a few remarks
of his own, and left us altogether in the dark on every other impor-
tant particular.
This message having been referred to the Committee of Fo-
reign Relations, that committee on the 3d of January, presented a
ſººn calling on the President for further information on the
subject.
On the 13th January, an answer was given to this call, covering
the conventions between the Spanish American States, and an ex-
tensive and highly interesting correspondence, between Mr. Cla
and Messrs. Salazar and Obregon, and our ministers at St. Peters-
burg, Paris, and Mexico. These documents, which cover 40 printed
pages, shed so much light on the subject, that until we received
them, the Senate may be truly said to have been groping in worse
than Egyptian darkness. The belligerent character of the Congress
was here so fully developed and clearly established, that, unless
from the hope of peace, presented by the correspondence with Mr.
29
Middleton, I presume no question would have been then made that
the acceptance of the invitation would give to Spain just cause of
war. On this point, however, we were lulled into security by the
fact disclosed in that correspondence, that our Government had in-
voked the mediation of Russia to bring about the recognition by
Spain of the independence of her colonies, and the confident
opinion expressed by Mr. Clay, that this mediation would be suc-
cessful. It was obvious that if peace was about to take place, there
would no longer be any force in the objection that the contemplated
mission would violate our neutrality. Sir, did any member of the
Senate believe, that at the very moment these cheering prospects of
peace were held out to us, there existed in the Bureau of the Secre-
tary of State, in Washington, conclusive evidence that these pros-
pects were illusory—that at the very moment Mr. Clay was des-
jº. to us the assurance that the mediation of Russia, would in all
uman probability be effectual with Spain, he had, in his own hands,
the despatches of Mr. Everett, our minister at Madrid, which de-
monstrated that there was no hope of such a result? Such, Sir, was
the fact, and it was disclosed to us under the call of the gentleman
from New York, (Mr. WAN BUREN) who, considering it as somewhat
strange that while we are speculating on the probability of a peace,
we should not have communicated directly with the Spanish Go-
vernment on the subject, resolved to ask for specific information.—
The call was made on the 30th of January, and on 1st of February,
the correspondence of Mr. Everett being laid before us, all hopes of
peace vanished, and the charm was instantly dissolved.
There was not a gentleman, I assert confidently, on this floor,
who did not at once perceive and acknowledge, that all hope of the
success of our mediation was entirely gone, Count Nesselrode
had expressly stated to Mr. Middleton, that every thing would de-
pend on the determination of the Spanish government—so that it
was obvious that all our hopes rested on their temper on this
subject. , Well, Sir, Mr. Everett tells us that he made the Span-
ish Minister acquainted with our wishes and our mediation, and
that, so far from his receiving an answer to justify hope, the reply
shut it out forever. The Minister declares emphatically, that the
King never will, under any circumstances, acknowledge the Inde-
pendence of his revolted colonies; that he would stand upon his right;
that if reduced to as low a state as Louis the 18th, during the
height of Napoleon's power, like him he would waituntil Providence
in good season should restore him to his own. He repeats, again
and again, and in every form, the fixed determination of the King
never to surrender his rights to the colonies, under any circumstan-
ces whatever. Nor is this all: Mr. Everett informs us further, that
the Russian Minister acquiesced in the justice of these views, and
that England, satisfied with the commercial advantages of her posi-
tion, had ceased to interest herself in the question. Thus was all
hope shut out at the very time we were flattered by the second set of
30
documents, with the delusive expectation that peace was near at
hand. Sir, let it be recollected, that it was at the moment when we
had called for and not yet received these most important documents,
that we were chided for delay, and that a movement was made in
the other House, by the confidential friends of the Executive—that
the administration presses opened their batteries on this body col-
lectively and individually; that State Legislatures were roused in-
to action; and no means of coercion left untried to bring the Senate
to an instant decision of the question. I thank my God, Sir, that
these afforts have signally failed, and that the Senate stood un-
moved; and, though slander and misrepresentation have been busy
with our names, it is now demonstrated that the delay which has
occurred in the proceedings of this body, has arisen chiefly from the
necessity imposed upon us of making repeated calls for important
information, which was not communicated to us in the first in-
stance, and without which we should have been left in pro-
found ignorance of the true character of the proposed mission.—
The next important step in our proceedings on this subject, was the
resolution passed by the Senate on the 15th February, that the
question “ought to be discussed with open doors,” unless the pub-
lication of the documents would be “prejudicial to pending nego-
“tiations;” and on this point information was respectfully request-
ed of the Executive, the officer charged with all our negotiations.—
To this resolution, the President replied in the following message:
“WAshLNGToN, 16th FEB. 1826.
To the Senate of the United States:
In answer to the two resolutions of the Senate, of the 15th in-
stant, marked (Executive,) and which I have received, I state, re-
spectfully, that all the communications from me to the Senate, re-
lating to the Congress at Panama, have been made, like all other
communications, upon Executive business, in confidence, and most
of them in compliance with a resolution of the Senate, requesting
them confidentially. Believing that the established usage of free
confidential communications between the Executive and the Senate,
ought, for the public interest, to be preserved unimpaired, I deem it
my indispensable duty to leave to the Senate itself the decision of
a question involving a departure, hitherto, so far as I am informed,
without example, from that usage, and upon the motives for which,
not being informed of them, I do not feel myself competent to de-
cide.
JOHN QUINCY ADAMS.”
The plain and obvious import of this message, divested of the
diplomatic garb in which it is invested, is, that we were bound by the
confidence which had been imposed upon us by the Executive, (who
kindly reminds us of what our usages are, what they ought to be—
and that they ought not to be changed,) and while he leaves us free
to act as we thing proper, refuses to furnish us with the information
31
on which alone we could act, and for which we had respectfully call-
ed. The message closes with an allusion to our motives on which
the President is restrained from commenting, because they were
unknown. Sir, I was one of those who believed that we could not,
with a due regard to our own rights and the public interests, proceed
to act upon the subject at all, until the information was furnished,
which the Executive alone possessed: for which we had respectfully
called, and which was necessary to enable us to dccide on our own
“rules of proceeding;” a privilege expressly reserved to us by the
Constitution. In this I have been overruled, and I must submif.-
I am, Sir, further of opinion, that we ought never to proceed until
an answer is given by the President to the call made in the other
House by his friends, (and it is to be presumed with the knowledge
and consent of the Executive,) because, should the President give
to that House publicly, all the information we now possess, there
would no longer be any reason for our proceeding with closed doors;
and if he should give more, we ought to possess that additional in-
formation before we come to a decision, and if less, we may consi-
der what it would then become our duty to do. In these views we
have also been overruled, and are constrained to submit.
But, I beg pardon, Sir; I am wandering from the question,
and have trespassed too long on the patience of the Senate. The
whole question may be resolved into this: are we prepared now
to depart from the fundamental policy of this country, never to in-
terfere in the concerns of other nations? Are we ready to embark
our fate with that of the Spanish American Republics? To become
parties to an “American Confederacy,” against the “European
Confederacy?” Sir, it will not, it cannot be denied, that the pro-
posed measure is entirely out of the course of ordinary diplomatic
relations; it has no precedent but in that “great Alliance,” pro-
fanely called “Holy,” and equally offensive to God and to Man.
We are about to violate the maxim of the Father of his Coun-
try, which enjoins upon us, as the most sacred of duties, “to cul-
tivate peace and honest friendship with all nations, entangling
alliances with none”—to equally violate the wise and prudent po-
licy of the late President, of the benefits of which we have a glow-
ing picture from the pen of the Secretary of State, in the documents
now on your table. “The United States, says he, have not, indeed,
“taken up arms in support of the independence of the new States;
“but the neutrality which they have maintained has enabled them
“more efficaciously to serve the cause of independence than they
“could have done by taking part in the war. Had they become a
“belligerent, they would, probably, have drawn into the war, on
“the other side, parties whose force would have neutralized, if it
“had not overbalanced, their exertions. By maintaining neutral
“ground, they have entitled themselves to speak out, with effect,
“ and they have constantly so spoken, to the powers of Europe-
“They disconcerted the designs of the European alliance upon the
32
“new States, by the uncalculating declarations which they made,
“in the face of the world. They were the first to hasten to ac-
“knowledge the independence of the United Mexican States, and,
“by their example, drew after them Great Britain.”
Shall we abandon this high and honorable ground to engage in
a crusade, the end of which no human being can foresee? Letit be
remembered, that when, a short time prior to the meeting of Con-
gress, it was rumored that this invitation had been given, and the
determination of the President was as yet unknown, not one press
in all ſlmerica, not one enlightened man of any party, as far as
I know, raised a voice in its favor. All, all, declared that the invi-
tation would, of course, be respectfully declined. What, Sir, has
occurred since, to produce any change in public opinion: Nothing—
absolutely nothing. Sir, my opinions on this subject have under-
gone no change, and, if this extraordinary mission must be sanction-
ed, I will wash my hands of it. #